

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

APRIL 5, 2006

Subject: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

FOIPA No. 0977600-000

Dear Requester:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552		Section 552a
⊠(b)(1)	□(b)(7)(A)	□(d)(5)
⊠(b)(2)	□(b)(7)(B)	□(j)(2)
□(b)(3)	⊠(b)(7)(C)	□(k)(1)
4	⊠(b)(7)(D)	□(k)(2)
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	□(b)(7)(F)	□(k)(4)
□(b)(4)	□(b)(8)	□(k)(5)
□(b)(5)	□(b)(9)	□(k)(6)
⊠(b)(6)		□(k)(7)

1074 page(s) were reviewed and 357 page(s) are being released.

- Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:
 - ☑ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
 - referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

☑ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice,1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

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The Black Vault



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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 198

Office Memorandum - United States Government NO TO Mr. A. H. Belmont DATE: October 18, 1950 FROM : BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE byc. SUBJECT: b1 b6 b7C (5) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Espionage Section for their information. Enclosure SWR: hb hb CLASSIFIED BY WEINLS BIA CE CO267 Decinating DARDED . 15
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 1/13/2028
977600 100 -93216-366 34 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNGLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE 5 2.061 68

Mr. Tolson . ARCONDESSOR OF THE STORY OF Mr. Ladd -U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LUSTICE Mr. Clegg -COMMUNICATIONS SECTION Mr. Glavin Mr. Nichols Mr. Rosen Mr. Tracy TELETYPE WASH FROM NEW YORK 1041 DIRECTOR DEFERRED **b**6 b7C BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ESP - SABOTAGE. BUFILE ONE HUNDRED - NINE THREE TWO ONE SIX. LETTER WILL BE SUBMITTED OCT. TWENTY NEXT. SCHEIDT HOLD 100-93216-36 9CT 23 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • United STATES GOVERNMENT

D. M. Ladd

A. H. Belmont

ABNORMAL LOSS OF HOGS IN NEBRASKA AND ILLINOIS

PURPOSE

To advise no evidence of sabotage was developed in the captioned matter and this case is being closed.

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BACKGROUND

You will recall this investigation was based on information received from Congressman Karl Stefan of Nebraska to the effect that large numbers of hogs in the Middle West were dying following inoculation against cholera,

The Omaha, Chicago, and Springfield Offices conducted investigations and no evidences of sabotage were developed.

As a result of extensive studies and research by the Department of Agriculture and similar circumstances which occurred during the past two summers, the conclusion has been reached that the excessive number of deaths of hogs has been caused by what is known as a "variant" which is, in laboratory terms, an matypical virus. "

All individuals interviewed stated it was not logical or justifiable in the absence of any specific allegation or indication of such to assume there is any actual sabotage by anyone. It was the belief of the individuals interviewed that the "Variant virus" together with local conditions and the physical conditions of the hogs being vaccinated are the contributing factors causing the abnormal death rate.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the publicity given to this matter and the request from Congressman Stefan, it is suggested copies of reports reflecting the results of the FBI investigation be directed to the Criminal Division for any further action it may desire taken. If you approve, there is attached a memorandum to the Criminal Division together with copies of the investigative reports.

Attachments KFL: jgh

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 UC

h6 b7C

October 19, 1950

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORT MADE AT	DATE WHEN PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE	REPORT MADE BY
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	10-10-50 9-27-50	FVE:bv
TITLE		CHARACTER OF GASE
-		-
UNKNOWN SUBJECT;	- INFORMANT	MISCELLANEOUS MATTER
Par	Teriological Wars	te
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***	This investigation	was initiated upon receipt
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	who had on Septemb	er 12, 1950, written to the
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Chicage File #62-4536

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

REFERENCE: Letter from Director to Chicago dated September 20, 1950.

Assistant Attorney General James M. McInerney October 19, 1950 Criminal Division Director, FBI ABNORMAL LOSS OF HOGS IN MEBRASKA AND ILLINOIS RECORDED - 4 INDEXED - 4 On September 12, 1950, Congressman Carl Stefan of Norfolk, Nebraska, expressed concern over the recent abnormal death rate of hogs following vaccination for hog Investigation has been conducted by this Bureau and no evidence of sabotage has been developed to date. For your information in regard to the captioned matter, there is attached one copy each of the following reports reflecting the results of investigation conducted: Report of Special Agent dated September 28, 1950, at Omaha, Nebraska. Report of Special Agent dated September 26. 1950, at Springfield, Illinois. Report of Special Agent dated October 10, 1950, at Chicago, Illinois. No further investigation is being conducted by this Bureau pending receipt of additional instructions from you. A prompt reply in this regard would be appreciated. Attachments BE MELLEE

Tolson Clegg Olavin Nichol

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DECLASSIFIED BY 60207 MC NLS ON 1 13 04

RELEVED - DIRECTOR

SAC, Baltimore October 13, 3950 Director, FBI BACTERIOLIGICAL WARRANG - SABOTAGE **b**6 This is to advise that Special Agent will be attending courses of instruction at Chap fetrick, Maryland, during the week beginning b7C October 23, 1950. TDB:MEG ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11303 BY 60267 UC M Tolson Clegg

Office Memor ndum UNITED STATES GOVER Mr. Glavia ... DATE: August 22001950 Director, FBI SAC, Salt Lake City UBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE Rebulet 8/16/50. b7C of this office is being This is to advise that SA designated Liaison Agent with representatives of the Army's Biological Warfare Test Center at Camp Dugway, Utah. JCN:FR 65-1122 DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC MIS BIACE b7C


Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO : DIRECTOR, FBI PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL DATE: 10/30/26 Teachy FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE ReBulet 10/18/50. Linasmuch as SA attended courses of instruction in connection with the above-captioned matter during the week of October 23, 1950, it is assumed that he will have been furnished with all up to date developments in this field. No regular liaison contact with Camp Detrick will be made by Baltimore, and it is suggested that Agent furnish the Baltimore Office with a copy of any report reflecting new information he obtained during the period of his instruction. Baltimore will recontact liaison representatives on Bacteriological Warfare at Camp Detrick no later than 11/15/50 EGG: DEP 66-891 DECLASSIFIED BY 68267 uc/NUS/B;ACB DECLASSIFIED BY 68267 uc/NUS/B;ACB	*				4	
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D FORM		
Office	e Memorandum • united states	GOVERNMENT
то :	Ladd DATE:	October 26, 1950
FROM :	A. H. Belmont	Tolson
SUBJECT: C	BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE	Cless
,		Rosen
	Purpose:	Mohr
e Te	To inform you that biological warfare tests conducted in the San Francisco, California, area by A Navy representatives were regarded as successful.	
	Background:	b7C
	You will recall that information has been p furnished to the Bureau by its liaison arrangements a Maryland, and the Naval Biological Laboratory, Caklan that BW tests were being made in the San Francisco ar	t Camp Detrick, d, California.
b6		
b7C	Recent Developments:	
7		.55
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS JINCLASSIFIED DATE: D	RECORDED - 127	/00-932/6 OCT 81 1950
7.		24,
	EHM: bar	CHIVE ENW

b6 b7C b7D

Action:

The above is for your information.



Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Iustice

422 Federal Office Building Civic Center San Francisco 2, California October 19, 1950

STREET, STATE OF THE ST
Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clogg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Locob
Mr. Tracy
Mr. 1 :50
Mr. Dolmort
Mr. Hohr
Tele. Loom
Mr. Negge
Miss Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

REGISTERED

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE (Bufile 100-93216)

Dear Sir:

b2 b6 b7C b7D Director, FBI

Remylet 9/25/50 and Bulet 9/26/50.

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The Bureau's appreciation of ______offer to provide indoctrination of Bureau Agents in regard to matters of BW was expressed in accordance with Bulet of 9/26/50.

Very truly yours.

Harry M. Kimball Special Agent in Charge

October 31, 1950 SEC, Baltimore Brological Warfung CHEMICAL WARPARE - SABOT b6 Arrangements have been made for SA of the FHI Laboratory to visit Edgewood Areenal on November 8, 9, and 10 in order to obtain technical information of interest to the Bureau in connection with the above-entitled matter. White will arrive in Baltimore about 8 A. Y. on November 8, 1950. Please arrange transportation from Baltimore to Edgewood Arsenal. BJWMMEG 100-93216-37 Ladd Clegg Clavir Nichols Rosen ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Tracy COMM - - dl Harbo HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/3/04 BY 60267 UC NISBACO Belmont Tele. Hoor Nease

Office Memorandum · united states government

FROM :	SAC, New Haven S-18-5
SUBJECT:	OBACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE 66
	- Informant b7C
	b7D
× 1/4	On September 15, 1950, while being
	interviewed in connection with another matter, volunteered the information that
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3 0 b6	
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A DE S	
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE (13/04 BY 4224 749)	
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No.	4.7
it to 10/26/5	cc: Washington Field
J.t. 10/36/5	RECORDED - 9 1/00-93216 - 376 D
	98-1061 Zik f
i i	6 1 m 10-2450
- F	b6
- 3	b7C

Director, FBI

September 28, 1950

The Washington Field Office is requested to check the records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Displaced Persons Commission for background information relating to and furnish the same to the Bureau and the New Haven Office.

It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to bring the above information to the attention of the armed services interested in bacteriological warfare. It is to be noted that has stated that he would be willing to discuss further and assist in whatever way he could with information relating to

SAC, NEW HAVEN

October 26, 1950

DIRECTOR, FBI

MY

Ladd_ Clegg

Glavin_ Nichols

OCT 2 G 1950

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABCTAGE W

RECORDED - 61	Reurlet dated September 28, 1950, captioned "Bacteriological Warfare - Sabotage; Informant."	
El - 14	The Bureau desires that prior to disseminating the information contained in your referenced letter to G-2 and ONI, the following discrepancies should be clarified by your office:	b6 b7C
En	Your attention is directed to page 2, paragraph 1, of your referenced letter wherein the informant related	b7D
	On page 3 of your letter, it is stated that the informant In view of the	
	above statements, it would appear that	
	This matter should be clarified.	is:
	Into mayour broate ob clairing.	83
	Also on page 3 of your referenced letter, the informant	
	reportedly stated	
*		
	This statement is in conflict with the statement appearing	
	on page 2	
b6	It is desired that further clarification be obtained concerning the conflicting statements referred to above in	. OII
20	order that the information contained in your referenced letter can be	
b7C	promptly brought to the attention of G-2 and ONI by the Bureau. This	
b7D	matter should be given immediate attention by your office.	
	For your information, a review of the Bureau's files has	
	been made for information concerning	
	with negative results.	16
1 4	100-93216 11 8 0241 UL Witate.	

cr 26 3 eu PH 35.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE!!!3|04 BY 6267 UC | NES BIA

U5

51 NOV 7 1950

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

5th

b6

WFO 100-20142

b6b7Cb7D

-1 -	Displaced Persons Commission records further reflected that
	The New York Office is requested to review
	The Boston Office is requested to review Immigration ralization Service file at the District Office of Immigration and ration Service and the file of
	It should be noted that the files of the Displaced Persons Commiss

SAC. New Haven

October 30, 1950

referred to in

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b6 b7C b7D

Director, FBI

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE Re Washington Field Office letter dated 10-19-50 captioned "Bacteriological Warfare - Sabotage, Informant, and re Bureau letter dated 10-26-50. Bureau files fail to reflect any information that can be identified with In referenced Bureau letter you were advised Bureau files fail to reflect any information that could be identified with Bureau files do reflect. however, the following references to who is not .

known by the Bureau to be identical to

referenced Washington Field Office letter:

The Marodni Glasnik (The Mational Herald), a pro-Communist newspaper published in Pittsburgh, in its October 3, 1944 issue contained an article entitled "\$72 to the Fand of Marodni Glasnik." The name of George Bilic, Sacramento, California appeared in this article as a donor who had donated \$10 to the aid of this newspaper. (100-10123-114, p. 680)

The Warodni Glasnik in its March 29, 1945 issue contained an article entitled "Celebration in Sacramento Exceeded All Expectations. The article reflected that a celebration had been held in Sacramento, California in honor of the 37th anniversary of the Harodni Glasnik. Contributions were made, according to the article, by a list of persons to strengthen the newspaper. The name of George Bilic appeared in the list of names of contributors. (100-10123-144, p. 1210)

62			(61-734	1-47-23)	· N	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
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OCT 30	1950		SUNCLASSI		10 10	7

Tolso

Tele. Room

ECRET WASHINGTON 25, D. C NOV 6 "1953 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Poisoned Bullets SUBJECT: 1. This Agency has received the following information concerning the Soviet use during World War II of poisoned bullets. This information originates with 2. According to this source, Soviet agents in World War II used poisoned pistol bullets in their attempts on the lives of the German government functionaries in the occupied territories. This bullet is used to secure a mortal effect even when the hit has not been deadly. 3. It has been proven that such bullets were used against the high functionaries of the civilian German government with three sorts of effects. 100-93216-379 **b**6

SECRET

4. The above data are furnished you for your confidential information only and are to be given no further dissemination.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ROBERT A. SCHOW Assistant Director

DZ

Mr. D. M. Ladd

A. H. Belmont

BURGAU WAR PLANS

P	UkP	OS	E
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To recommend that the Laboratory study the problem of biological warfare material being
and thereafter make recommenda-
tions regarding preventive measures which could also be applied
BACKGROUND b7E
You will recall that considerable study has been given in the past, by the Army's 3W research groups, to the introduction
of BW materials
ACTION b7E
It is recommended that the Bureau Laboratory study the problem of biological warfare material being
and thereafter make recom-
mendations regarding preventive measures which could also be
applied
LW:EFF

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12/13/50

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OBSERVATIONS:

impressed the FBI representatives

as being [

it is believed that the direct statements to not to use the name of the FBI in any capacity could not be stressed too strongly. Liaison will follow with Army in the event any developments occur in this matter.

100-93216-38/

-2- 56021

Mederal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

422 Federal Office Building Civic Center San Francisco 2, California November 15, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

A Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY 60207 ne his By CO

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE (Bufile 100-93216)

Dear Sir:

Remylets dated October 19, 1950, and September 25, 1950.

has advised that	
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8/00-93216-383 8001-43550 Line

b6 b7C

MECEINED

Director, FBI

Re: Biological Warfare
Espionage - Sabotage

b2 b7D

Since there does not, at this time, appear to be any necessity for such a conference between and a Bureau official, no such conference is being suggested.

b2 b6 b7C b7D

Very truly yours,

HARRY M. KIMBALL

SAC

1 Z FILED COPY RECORDED

100-93216-3.84 November 1, 1950 Tos Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Department of the Army The Pentagen Washington 25, D. C. Attention: Chief, Security and Training Group From: John Edgar Hoover - Director Federal Bureau of Investigation BICLOGICAL TARFARE Subject: ESFICNACE - SABCTAGE HISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING was interviewed by Special Agents of the New Haven Office on September 19, 1950. b6 b7C b7D DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC MISB Alexa Clegg. Glavin ElM: gmu: jpa Nichols Rosen Balmont Mohr Tele. Ho 32 DEC 7 1950

b6 b7C b7D

can	be	The files of this Bureau contain no identified with	information which
		above data furnished by	whose none appears
	A 1986	The above has been jurnished for you	our confidential

cc - Director of Maval Intelligence
Department of the Mavy
The Pentagon
Bashington 25, D. C.

b6 b7C

b7D

CUNITERIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: October 28, 1950

FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(Bureau File 100-93216)

REBULET to New Haven dated 10/26/50.

The following corrected pages of New Haven letter to the Bureau dated September 28, 1950, are being submitted in accordance with instructions set forth in the reference Bureau letter, i.é., Pages 2 and 3.

SFD: FGM
98-1061
Enclosure

cc Washington Field (100-20142) (Encl.)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11304 BY 60267 UC NES BACOS

1/00/130/16-32/

Director, FBI

November 14, 1950

SAC, Buffalo

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ESPIONAGE - R

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erning the unauthorized irst reported this information the came to the Buffa	mation toand	it was at suggestion
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Encl (4 copies of 1 memo)

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ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Letter to Director RE: PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ESPIONAGE - R

b6 b7C Buffalo, New York November 13, 1950

were engaged in suspicious activities. An investigation conducted by the New York State relice at the request of this office revealed that in order to hold drinking parties there. They did this, according to the report, in preference to drinking in public or having parties in Silver Creek where they might be the subject of "small town criticism". It the time this investigation was conducted, CHMITT were the operators of the Silver Creek Precision Company and In addition, at that	In regard to the Buffal	o Office files con-
in order to hold drinking parties there. They did this, according to the report, in preference to drinking in public or having parties in Silver Creek where they might be the subject of "small town criticism". It the time this investigation was conducted, CHMITT were the operators of the Silver Creek Precision Company and In addition, at that time, the Buffalo Police Department had a record of		
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SCHMITT were the operators of the Silver Creek Precision Company and In addition, at that time. the Buffalo Police Department had a record of	cerding to the report, in preference to drinking in public Silver Creek where they might be the subject of "small	lic or having parties
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		ion furnished by
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whose reliability is not known, the	nt has disclosed in to persons not authorized to receiv
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No further information was available.

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Office Memorandum · UNITE

SOVERNMENT

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	то :	MR. HARBO	At a second			DATE: Novem	ber 9, 1	950 .
45	FROM :	D. J. PARSON	s Va	* - * "	b6			Tolson
196	SUBJECT:	VISIT OF SA	T. D. BEACH		b7C			Clegg
	C	TO CAMP DETR BACTERIOLOGI			GE			Rosen
					· L			Harbo Mohr
		Recently SA nd, the Army	s bacteriolo	gical wa	rfare in	stallation	. The	Tele. Room
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The veterinarians consider hoof and mouth disease, primarily a disease of cattle, and rinderpest, also a disease found in cattle and other domestic animals as well, to be extremely dangerous should they be introduced in this country. There has been no hoof and mouth disease for some years here in this country and the nearest foci are in Mexico. The last outbreak in the United States was stamped out by the slaughtering and burying of diseased animals.

of the veterinarians because of the possibility of the successful use of animal disease agents being introduced, and on the part of some

of the plant pathologist where cereal plants are concerned.

There has been no outbreak of rinderpest on this continent. However, it is a highly infectious disease for many animals used as food. The introduction of either one of these could very well result in serious epidemics among domestic animals with serious consequences.

The plant pathologists are fearful of an introduction of strains of wheat rust to which our predominant species of wheat are not resistant. There are two strains which are considered particularly dangerous. One of them has never been encountered in this country and at present there are no known species of wheat which are not susceptible. As for the second one, most of the wheat grown in the wheat belt is resistant, but there are other species of wheat grown which offer no resistance to this rust. The latter species was discovered present last year in certain restricted areas in the middle west. However, it is believed that the introduction of this species was accidental and was carried into the middle west by the wind from the south and east.

With respect to human disease organisms, quite a large number

50DEC &

7A 100-23216-386 NOV 22 1950 b6

Memo	to Mr. Harbo b7C		e.		
Re:	to Mr. Harbo b7C Visit of SA	to	Camp	Detrick,	Maryland

have been considered as offering potentialities with respect to bacteriological warfare and acts of sabotage, but due to difficulties in culturing, instability, their delicate nature, or complicated life cycle, they have been considered of less importance.

b7E

- 2 -

Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

The Director

D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

MANUAL INSERT

OBIOLOGICAL WARFARE SABOTAGE

PURPOSE

To recommend the attached Manual insert concerning biological warfare be incorporated in Section 86 of the Manual concerning sabotage.

In view of the current publicity concerning biological warfare a series of hypothetical instances involving biological warfare sabotage was directed to the Department. On October 3, 1950, the Department furnished an opinion regarding this series of incidents. Inasmuch as the Department advises under certain circumstances a violation of sabotage statutes may exist, it is believed the Department's answer should be incorporated in full in the Manual of Instructions.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the attached Manual insert be presented to the Executive Conference for approval.

EFL:CMC

Nichol

DATE: November 2, 1950

SECTION 86. SABOTAGE

1. Identity of the company and its contractual relations, whether direct or indirect, with Army or Navy.

2. A detailed statement of the damage involved.

3. Statement concerning the existence of a labor dispute including: a. Identity of union

b. Extent and duration of dispute

c. Mames of representatives of the union, together with any known subversive tendencies

4. Evidence of any subversive influence involved.

This information should be immediately reported to the Bureau by teletype, followed by a closing report.

(8) Fiological Warfare

The Criminal Division of the Department was presented with several hypothetical instances involving blological warfare sabotage activity to determine whether existing sabotage statutes cover civilian personnel not engaged in national defense employment. On October 3, 1950, the Criminal Division advised as follows:

The statutes applicable to your hypothetical cases are contained in 18 U.S.C. 2151, 2153, 2154, 2155 and 2156. Section 2151 contains definitions which you will note differentiate between times of war and of peace in defining 'war material', 'war premises' and 'war utilities' and in peacetime 'national defense material', 'national defense premises' and 'mational defense utilities'. According to the statute, willful injury to those articles defined by the statute with certain intent as spelled out in the statute is necessary. In this connection you will note that if the end result is only to slow down production but not to injure the articles defined, no violation of the sabetage statute would result.

"With the foregoing statement in mind, the hypothetical cases which you have posed have been reviewed.

"1. The poisoning of food in a factory manufacturing war materials under contract to the United States Government.

"Since the food is not being manufactured as a war material but is being used in a factory manufacturing war material, the poisoning of that food does not some within the purview of any of the provisions of the sabetage statute.

where the food is to be sold to the general public. on the war material when they are intended for adapted to, or suitable for the time of the United States or any associate nation, in connection with the conduct of war adapted to be peace when the food or foodstuffs are intended for the use of the United States or any associate nation, in connection with the conduct of war adapted of peace when the food or foodstuffs are intended for the use of the United States they are last on the food which you describe as being poisoned comes within the statute will depend on the circums stances and each case would have to be judged on the facts.

EFL:CMC

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED TO STEEL A SUMMER OF THE STATE OF

*3. Releasing biological agents in a theater or similar public area attended by a mixed group of persons employed on Mational Defense work, employed by the United States Government, and those not employed on Mational Defense work or for the United States Government.

"Since the release of biological agents in the theater will not set on material, premises or willties but rather on persons in the theater, such release will not come within the purview of the sabotage statutes.

*4. The use of biological agents against crops and live stock where the food will be used by a mixed group consisting of civilians not engaged in National Defense employment, civilians in National Defense work and military personnel.

"The use of biological agents against crops and livestock will come within the statute when the food will be used by military personnel. During time of war it would thus be intended for, adapted to er suitable for the use of the United States and as such would be 'war material'. During time of peace where the food would be used by military personnel it would then be intended for the use of the United States in connection with the national defense and thus some within the statute.

ws. Poisoning the water supply of a large metropolitan area at the source (the source act being on United States Government property), where the water is used by a mixed group consisting of civilians employed in National Defense facilities, by civilians not employed in National Defense facilities and by military personnel. Poisoning the water supply of a locality where the water is used only by civilians not employed in National Defense facilities.

Then the water supply of a large metropolitan area is poisoned at the source and military personnel use that water supply, then it comes within the definition of a 'war utility' in time of war and a 'national defense utility' in time of peace and thus would come within the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2153 and 2155. When the water supply is used only by civilians not employed in national defense facilities, the act of poisoning does not come within the purview of the sabstage statute.

"It should be noted, of course, that even when the act does not come within the purview of the sabotage statute, yet it will violate some local law such as murder, manufacturer, assault and battery, malicious mischief, etc."

section 20, Internal Security Act of 1950, Public Law 831 of dist Congress requires the registration of any person who has knowledge of or has received instructions or assignment is explorage, counterespionage, saleotage, service or tacting in the government of a foreign country or a foreign political party. In view of this statute, therefore, and investigation of any reported act of biological chemical, or radiological variare saleotage should be instituted impediately in order to identify the perpetrator and to determine if there has been a violation of this statutes in addition to a violation of the saleotage statutes.

Ladd
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Tolsor

Mederal Bureau of Investigation Dir. Clase United States Department of Justice Mr. Richols 301 Continental Bank Building Lie. Dozen Salt Lake City 1, Utah November 15, 1950 Director, FBI BIOLOGICAL WARFARE Miss Gandy ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE (Bufile 100-93216) DECLASSIFIED BY 60347 4 C/ALS BY Dear Sir: Rebulet 10/3/50. On 10/31/50, contact was made at the Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, Division Chief, by SA Security and Intelligence Division, broached the subject of liaison mentioned in bulet and advised that he had been designated by the to handle this liaison. He exhibited a letter dated 10/2/50, Chemical Officer, to b6 the Commanding Officer of the Dugway Proving Ground requesting that he b7C co-operate with the FBI in every way possible. This letter also enclosed a letter dated 9/28/50, from [Security and Training Division, on behalf of Assistant Chief of Staff G-2. addressed to the Commanding Officer of the Sixth Army, advising that the FBI was interested in establishing direct liaison at the Dugway Proving Ground and stating that the FBI's interest is predicated on a desire to be in a position to be of maximum assistance to the Commanding Officer of the Dugway Proving Ground in the event of an emergency. It was stated that this could be best accomplished through a personal as well as an official working relationship between the personnel of both agencies and would insure the FBI's knowledge of the physical characteristics of the installation, their ready access thereto when called upon, and a knowledge of problems which may be encountered. It stated that the Chief Chemical Officer had been consulted on this mattering and had given his concurrence. advised that the Dugway activated 7/1/50, under the command of administrative officer, and that Lieutenant Colonel SPEERS G. PONDER is the **b**6 and in charge of research. He advised that the Proving b7C Ground was set up as a testing and proving ground for radiological, bacteriological, and chemical warfare equipment, and is an installation funder the command of the Chief of the Chemical Corps, Sixth Army Area. M. 25 814 .551 RHT: RMB 65-1122 b6 b7C

Salt Lake City letter to Bureau (11/15/50) Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE was interviewed in the presence of L and the scope of the liaison as set forth in bulet was discussed. indicated his desire to co-operate with the Bureau and referred SA b6 b7C On November 1, 1950, Dugway Proving Ground, was interviewed and furnished the following information which he advised is considered top secret by the War Department: He advised that the United States is wide-open and vulnerable to a bacteriological warfare attack, based on the fact that persons can travel in this country without restraint and the ease with which bacteriological warfare substances can be disseminated. He advised that the three fields in which bacteriological warfare research is being conducted are man, animals, and agricultural products, He advised that research in the field has come to an advanced stage and that the Army has the knowledge to do a very effective job in the covert field, that military use would be effective, but that the knowledge of the engineering aspects of military use of bacteriological warfare has not progressed to a point of practical use. He advised that the dissemination of bacteriological warfare agents through missiles is not developed to a stage for practical use. He advised that the great difficulty in combating bacteriological warfare engaged in by covert agents for sabotage purposes is that on the cutbreak of a disease it would be difficult to determine if it were a natural outbreak or a planned infestation. He stated also that the medical profession of this country is not educated to the possibilities of bacteriological warfare and that disease strains resistant to conventional treatment have been created and that hence the medical profession would not be likely to readily distinguish induced from natural occurrences of disease. He suggested that the Bureau in order to combat sabotage may desire to institute some form of liaison with the medical profession, under which liaison cases of disease difficult to diagnose, unusual in location, or heavy in occurrence would be reported for investigation. advised that in the field of bacteriologib6 cal warfare research no new germs have been developed but that research has been aimed at developing strains of germs impervious to established methods b7C of treatment. He advised that germs have been developed, the parent strain of which is killed by penicillin or other "miracle drugs," and that these germs thrive on such drugs. This is done he stated by culturing surviving organisms in progressively stronger concentrations of the drug. In the field of germs effecting man, he advised that through selective culture smallpox strains have been developed against which immunization by Vaccination is not effective.

Salt Lake City letter to Bureau (11/15/50)
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

He stated that research has not progressed to a point where epidemics could be created in populations and that bacteriological warfare agents used against man, for all practical purposes, would require individual infection. He stated that the possibility of causing epidemics in cattle_is very good because of the lack of sanitary control of cattle. He advised that epidemic infestation of food crops is possible and could easily be carried out by traveling through belt areas where important crops are raised, such as the wheat belts in the Midwest, and releasing airbonne spores of plant disease.

He stated that research has been made on undulant fever caused by brucella melitensis and that at least four strains have been developed, each with five to ten variations. Research has also been made on anthrax caused by bacillus anthracis. Both of the above diseases infect man and cattle. He stated that research has also been made on the bubonic plague (virulent pestis) and on psittacossis caused by the bacteria salmonella psittacossis, which infect man, and that the Ghemical Warfare Corps is in a position to effectively use these four diseases by covert means and will have perfected methods of distributing them by bombs within a year.

stated that research has been made on a hoof and mouth disease (rinder-pest), caused by a virus, and that a large stockyard area such as Chicago could be infected with the contents of a small vial by a saboteur. He advised that an induced epidemic of this disease of cattle in the United States would break the economy of the country.

He advised that other diseases on which research is being conducted are smallpox, typhus, and poliomyelitis.

He stated that research has been made on botulinas poison, a chemical compound produced by bacteria, and that it can be produced in quantity and is ready for war use. In use it can be distributed in food or more effectively in water supplies, in which it would be a deadly poison to man.

He stated that research is being made on mussel poison, a protein chemical compound created naturally by bacteria in shell fish. He stated that this compound, not yet named, has been isolated and that they are on the verge of synthesizing it. In use it would be disseminated by air as it effects the respiratory system of man.

He stated that research is being made in the field of carbonates, specifically to synthesize curare with a view of its possible use in making poison bullets.

Salt Lake City letter to Bureau (11/15/50) Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE Regarding the possible methods of distributing bacteriological **b**6 warfare agents aimed at man by a saboteur, that the most likely method would be through contamination of water supplies, b7C in which case small amounts would be effective against a large number of people. Very truly yours, Special Agent in Charge

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9 -	Federal Bureau	of Investigation, b6	e e
	United States Do Washington, D. (epartment of Justice,	ν,
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1	to me recently,	during my visit to Washington	•
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×	sistance to you	in your formidable tasks.	5-
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	TANDARD FORM NO. 04
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-	Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
	Office 1v1emorandum • United States Government
	33
	DATE: November 16, 1950
7	DATE: November 10, 1990
	Tolson
1	FROM : OD. J. Parsons Vo
7.5	Ladd
11 m	CAPOTA WAS PARE CAPOTA OF
	SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE D6 Gavin D7C
1/	Visit of SA to Edgewood Arsenal, b7C yland
V	Rosen
de la	O. V
3	On November 8, 9, and 10, 1950, SA visited Edgewood
	Arsenal, Maryland, in order to obtain information concerning recent
1	demal companies to absorb markens The markets of this reight was to
7.1	ascertain the possibilities of the use of the agents in sabotage
C+ B	
	and to learn the latest developments in the protection of personnel
8	subjected to attack through sabotage or warfare using these agents.
	The state of the s
	TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AVAILABLE
	TYPES OF ACHEMICAL AGENTS AVAILABLE
	Ald the al
	Although the Chemical Warfare Corps has developed and tested a larg
	without of chemical exerts at Edward Angenal in the past for record the ag
	number of chemical agents at bugewood Arsenal In the past lew years, the agents.
	which are considered to have the greatest potentialities as war gases and also
9	for use in sabotage are the so-called nerve gases, which are designated as
	*C-agents.
b7E	These materials
בוע	upset the normal enzyme action in the blood and thereby directly affect the
	nervous system. This action takes place almost immediately after contact and
	extremely small amounts of the G-agents will incapacitate and produce death.
15	
~	The effect of these agents is prolonged and cumulative.
a.	
3	TOXICITY OF G-AGENTS
	X X X
0	
~	G-agents are toxic if inhaled, taken orally through the mouth as in
-	water or food, and they are also absorbed through the skin. By inhalation
w v	it is calculated thatof air if breathed
W 3	for one minute would kill an individual. Because of the cumulative effect
UAS	
4.0	would be fatal. Approximately
: 50	the same amount,
20,41	would hospitalize an individual for three days.
who	would cause the pupils of the eyes to remain contracted to pin point
766	
30	size for more than 24 hours.
1.4.	The G-agents are colorless liquids
ZL!	with practically no odor. b7E
2	With problems in odds
	2
55	
0,00	This
213°	makes these agents particularly insidious, as all other poisonous gases
80	
0	previously used in chemical warfare had characteristic and penetrating odors.
34.7	if present on the skin
SE CO	will produce death in less than an hour.
5%5	
CCO.	
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XAVAILABILITY OF G-AGENTS TO RUSSIA

"Tabun" was developed in Germany	
and large quantities of this material were prepared in Germany during World	
War II. Sarin" was also developed in	
Germany during World War II, but was not in production in large quantities.	
Quantities of both of these agents and information concerning their manufacture	
	b2
taken over and moved one of the plants which manufactured these agents into	
Russia. Some of the scientists who developed these compounds are also supposed	D/E
to be in Russian territory. It is, therefore, known that Russia has these	
agents in probably large quantities because of their relative ease of	
manufacture and low cost production.	
APPLICATION OF AGENTS TO SABOTAGE	
/ Internation of addition to be a second	30
Because of the fact that these agents are effective, either by	9.0
inhalation or taken orally, they would be particularly adaptable for	
sabotage purposes.	
to constitute a lethal concentration in	
assumption of only exposure which would mean all individuals in the	
room would be killed by exposure to this concentration. It is	
to be noted that approximately of this amount probably would totally	b7E
incapacitate an individual if breathed for and it is doubtful if	DIE
a person would be physically capable of getting out of the room. It is	
estimated that in water would be toxic. This	
amount would produce poisonous symptoms. It is estimated that approximately	
would be necessary to poison the water supply of a large city.	
it is not believed likely the agent would be	
used in this way.	
v av v a	
The agents could be placed in food and they would be lethal in	
about the same degree as in water. It is believed that the agents would be	
particularly effective if used for assassination purposes or for destroying	
a select group of people who might be concentrated in one room.	1
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RECOGNITION OF G-AGENTS

The most useful method for recognizing these agents is by the symptoms which they produce. This method is necessary due to the fact that the agents have no odor. The usual symptoms from exposure to the G-agents is a contraction of the pupils of the eyes, thereby causing blurring of vision. It is possible that a person would not notice this effect on himself and, for this reason, individuals who are working in buildings with possible contamination are cautioned to watch each other's eyes for this reaction. Because of this contraction, the eyes will ache, followed by a headache. There is usually noticed a tightness in the chest with difficult breathing and the nose runs similar to asthma attacks. These symptoms are followed by nausea and, if a lethal amount was obtained, a person will have convulsions before death. The initial symptoms are based on the assumption that an individual does not receive a lethal amount within the first few minutes of exposure.

The Chemical Corps is developing a chemical detection kit by which these agents could be identified in air or water. A request will be sent through liaison to obtain secret bulletins which have been published by the Chemical Corps concerning chemical identification of these agents.

TREATMENT AND PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS AGAINST G-AGENTS

It is, of course, essential that any treatment after exposure to the G-agents must be given whithin a minute or minutes. It follows, of course, that as soon as the symptoms are detected, gas masks must be put on. If no mask is available, then a wet cloth should be placed on the face and the individual should breathe through the cloth until is is possible to get out of the building or the affected area.

Any liquid which might get on a person's skin

should be removed at once with a damp cloth, preferably dampened with water and baking soda. If the agents are suspected of being in water, it can be decontaminated by adding baking soda and boiling. The regular Army gas mask will give protection against the G-agents except in exceptionally high concentrations.


GAS MASKS

At the preent time gas masks which we have obtained are designated as type M-4. These masks will protect against ordinary concentrations of chemical warfare materials including G-agents and ordinary concentrations of bacterial warfare agents. According to the officials at Edgewood, the M-4 mask is now considered obsolete and if any further masks are obtained by the Bureau, it is suggested they should be of the type known as M-9. The M-9 mask is the one now recommended by the Army and has the canister which attaches on the side of the mask. This does away with the necessity of having an air tube such as used on the M-4. The M-9 is much more compact

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and would be much easier to operate, under conditions such as firing a gun, than the M-4. It is pointed out that insofar as the mask itself is concerned, the M-4 will give equal protection. The M-9 has the added advantage that it is designed to be used with hoods to prevent any leakage of the gas around the periphery of the mask. It is not believed that the hoods would be necessary for ordinary attacks using G-agents. The Army is contemplating using them only for decontamination purposes and for use if there is reason to believe there will be very high concentration of the G gases.

In connection with the use of hoods, other protective clothing such as rubber boots and butyl rubber gloves will be used in decontamination. At the present time, the Chemical Corps is developing a semi-permeable fabric clothing which would be much more desirable than the rubber.

It is probable that more information will be available on this in approximately six months. This phase of the work will be followed if the Bureau is desirous of obtaining such protective materials.

For the handling of G-agents in water, it was the opinion at Edgewood that any type of gloves impermeable to water and a gas mask would be sufficient protection.

PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS

The engineers at Edgewood have worked out a system of protection for buildings against bacteriological warfare and chemical warfare. These protective systems are complicated and very expensive, including panel systems, filters, and air locks. For confidential information which should not be disseminated outside the Bureau,

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This alarm system is designed

for the protection against Gagents.

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
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CONTAMINATES IN FUEL	AND LUBRICATING OILS	
CONTAMINATES IN FUEL This information is select and ureau as the Chemical Warfare Service aterials be kept servet as far as pos	should not be disseminated out desires that the presence of sible. Various chemicals have	side the these been
	should not be disseminated out desires that the presence of sible. Various chemicals have	side the these been

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7	OTHER	POSSIBLE/CHEMIC	CAL AGENTS	19 EE	STATE (8)	
which are u warfare. M	uture reference, t nder examination a ost of these have e which is of inte	t Edgewood Arse previously come	enal for poss to the atte	ible use intion of t	n chemica he labora	tory.
affect the decisions of a truth ser	mind in such a man r acting in an int	mer that a persequence that a persequence that a persequence manner.	son will be i	ssolved in ncapable o t have the	f making	
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	mely toxic substan			37.	, the	
			wil	l produce	death.	
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RECOMMENDATIONS:



- 1. If the Bureau desires to secure any more gas masks, it is suggested that attempts be made to secure the M-9 type masks particularly for the use of special agents. It is believed that the M-9 mask would be superior to the M-4 because it is more compact, is designed for use with hoods, and because the M-9 would permit better manipulation of firearms. The M-4 masks do give equal protection to the M-9 and, therefore, if they are easier to secure than the M-9, it is suggested that they might be issued to clerical personnel.
- 2. Based on the information obtained at Edgewood, it is not believed necessary at the present time to secure protective hoods and clothing for possible handling of sabotage cases involving chemical poisons. It is recommended that any decision for such action be deferred for six months, at which time the development work on the semi-permeable clothing should be completed.
- 3. It is recommended that the "Protection of Buildings against Chemical Warfare" program at Edgewood be closely followed. These developments should also be completed within six months.

We will follow

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A Novel of Scientific Treason

Who Is My Neighbor?

By Nigel Balchin.

Little Brown. 308 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by John Franklin Bardin Author of "The Burning Glass" and frequent contributor to "The New Leader"

A GROUP of biochemists have been working for more than a decade on a method of mass immunization against epidemic which involves the development of super-virulents. On the eve of the publication of a paper which would make this scientific advance common knowledge, the alert government steps in and forbids publication on the grounds that the supers virulents are not without a military application which the enemy could use against the nation. Pressure is exerted to require the scientists to devote their technique to the ends of bacterial warfare. An agent of the enemy country almost succeeds in possessing himself of the secret by persuading one of the scientists that it is his responsibility to humanity to publish the paper surreptitiously.

Certainly the ethical conflict in the minds of democratic scientists, who believe that it is their role to increase knowledge regardless of the use to which it may be put by laymen or governments, when confronted with the evidence that their theories are being used against humanity, is a sound subject for a novel. Nigel Balhin has exhausted his theme in Who My Neighbor? and has written competently, melodramatically and

slickly. The scenes in the laboratory are as convincing as those in Arrowsmith; the dialogue and characterization has the terse authority of a craftsman who is not content to report but insists on rendering every facet of his form. No, there is no contradiction in what I have written. Mr. Balchin has rendered everything he intended to render, but he has written a slick melodrama.

The clue to what the novelist has left out in this case is the clue to what, no matter how unwitting, must be called the political bias of this book. Although the authorities of the democratic government win out in the end and the leading scientist, also the protagonist, wavers but does not commit the traitorous act-indeed, retrieving a fellow worker before he can betray his country—the reader finds himself at all times rooting for treason. The emotional identification lies with the kind of thickheaded irresponsibility that in our day too often is called "being aware of one's responsibility to mankind and to freedom."

If you are a novelist and know your trade, and you want to make your reader sympathize with qualities and ideas he would not otherwise accept as his own, you dramatize the side of the problem you are for and report the side you are against. You describe the protagonist in terms that make him the kind of person your reader innately wants to be, and you describe the authorities, whose law the hero will nearly transgress, as the sort of person the reader fears. In the end, you sell out the reader's sympathy by allowing your hero to "sell out" to ideals that have only been stated—and the reader closes his book emotionally agreeing with treachery.

This is the way the Communist point-of-view is being set forth in novels today. Mr. Balchin, who may be an honest dupe, can point to the fact that repeatedly in his novel he has his characters say and do those words and actions that are expected of free-thinking citizens in a democracy. And the critic can only point out that the novel is constructed to make the reader wish that the characters had not acted as they did. Incidentally and fortunately, the novel does not succeed in its purpose: it takes more than technique to make a reader believe-it takes the integrity of imagination and that is what Mr. Balchin lacks.

This is a clipping from Page 22 of the NEW LEADER

Date 11-27-50 Clipped at the Seat of Government. Five

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DATE 113 04 BY LOSU 7 LL NIS GARD

DEC 19 1950

ffice Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT A. H. Belmona DATE: December 5, 1950 FROM b7C SUBJECT: Glavin b7D LIN, J. MATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION CONCERNING PURPOSE Tele. Ro To advise results of a telephone call received from on December 4, 1950. BACKGROUND You will recall on November 10. 1950, captioned individual b6 was interviewed by Supervisors b6 time b7C b7C b7D сору memoranaum is attachea. DETAILS At 4:45 P.M. on December 4, 1950,] telephonically contacted Supervisor at which time he advised that b6 b7C b7D EFL: CMC

stated he was furnishing the information

b7C b7D

b6

stated he was furnishing the information to the Bureau for any action it desired to take and he was not contemplating following the matter any further.

ACTION

None - for your information.

Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERN CONFIDENTIA DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 12/7/50 SAC, BALTIMORE SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE On 12/5/50 SA of the Baltimore Office contacte and b7C was furnished the following information: b7D **b**6 b7C ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED INCOME IN CONTAINED EXCELL IS UNCLASSAFED EXCELL WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. EGG: DEP 66-891 RECORDED - 117 /0 DE' -8-1950 Enclosure 59DEC 151950 b6 b7C



L/Dir.
12/7/50
from SAC, Baltimore
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

share the opin much as it exposes the ex by the United States. It and also indicates the lo	estilence" is a source of considerable contro- at Camp Detrick, Maryland, and
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CORRECTION


L/Dir. 12/7/50 from SAC, Baltimore RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

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are being made, and the film will Laboratory in order that the princonfidential handling.	be forwarded to SAof the its made from it can be given appropria
A copy of a memorandum prepa Warfare Sabotage Agents" is being	ared by entitled "Biological g forwarded by messenger to SA

ENCLOSURE TO THE BUREAU
with letter from SAC Baltimore dated 12/7/50
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
Baltimore file 66-891

Two photos of wheat plants.

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STANDARD FORMINO, 64 Mr. Tolson Mr. Ladd Mr. Clarg
Office Niemorandum • United States Government
DATE: 12/1/50
SAC, BALTIMORE
SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE b6 Rouge
Camp Detrick, Maryland, Bureau liaison with the
Biological Warfare Unit of the Army Chemical Corps, advised SA of the Baltimore Office on 12/5/50 that
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L/Director from SAC, Baltimore 12/7/50 RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

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A careful investigation of available library sources has failed to show any information on

Below is a list of the sources consulted.

Engineering Index: 1949 - 1940.

Industrial Arts Index: September 1950 - 1940.

U.S. Documents Monthly Catalogue: June 1950 - 1941.

International Index of Periodicals: September 1950 - April 1940.

Handbook of Civilian Protection by L. L. Snyder and others; McGraw Hill Book Co.,
Inc., New York. 1942.

What the Citizen Should Know about Civilian Lefense by W. D. Binger and H. H. Raitey; W. W. Jorton & Co., Inc., New York. 1942.

Civil Defence by C. W. Glover; Chemical rublishing Co., Brooklyn, New York. 1941.

Radioactivity Protection Devices by F. R. Ingram; American Water Works Association Journal, Vol. 42, June 1950, pages 537-543.

Atomic Wastes and Water Quality by W. A. Rodger; American Water Works Association

Journal, Vol. 42, June 1950, pages 533-536.

"... Taking Into account the various factors enumerated, permissible levels

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b6 b7C b7D have been tentatively determined for a number of specific radioactive isotopes. A table of such data has recently been published in the Journal (February 1950). To give some idea of the great degree of variation possible, it may be noted that the permissible concentration, in microcuries per liter, is 0.0000001 for radium and 6,000 for radiocarbon (C 14), a variation of 10¹⁰

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"Effects of Atomic Bombing. . . . The radicactivity released would be mixed at the instant of the blast with a tremendous quantity of water. . . . The water delivered after the first day to those consumers who survived the blast would have an activity level only ten times as high as the lifetime drinking tolerance. It is possible, of course, that 'slugs' of activity well above the levels estimated might come through the plant and into the mains unmixed. Such slugs could be detected by ionization chambers set at a relatively high level . . . Although it is possible that for 24 hours it would be well not to drink the water, it should be all right for all other purposes . . . In fact, under emergency conditions, the consumption of water with perhaps 1,000 times the normal activity would be permissible . . . "

Research on the Disposal of Radioactive Tastes by O. R. Placak and R. J. Morton;

American Tater Works Association Journal, Vol. 42, February 1950,
pages 135-142.

". . Permissible Concentrations . . . The tolerance value for beta and name emitters applies to mixed fission products. For each individual isotope, a different value might apply. Some theoretical values are shown in Table 3. The exact limits of tolerance cannot be given with absolute certainty until more biological and physiological data are obtainable. A reassuring statement should be made, however. If the tolerance values in use are in error, they are probably on the conservative side. It is thought that, for many of these materials, more than 100 times the amounts listed might be ingested, provided it were a single occurrence with no subsequent exposure . . .

Table 3 (in part). Permissible Concentration of Radioisotopes Permissible Concentration Isotope L'aximum Oral in Tissue. MC./g. Absorption (fraction) 2.8 x 10⁻⁶ Ra 0.35 1.5 x 10⁻² C 14 0.30 1.5 x 10-3 Sr 89 0.05 - 0.60Sr 90, Y 90 7.2 x 10-2 0.05 - 0.60

Isotope	Maximum in Crit	Half-Life,	
	Organ	Fraction	Effective (days)
P.a	Bone	0.99	16,000
C 14	Total body	1.0	0.174
Sr 89	Bone	0.70	41.9
Sr 90, Y 90	Bone	0.70	196

Table 3 (continued)	Permissible Concentration - Water	- M 0./00.
Ra	1.1 x 10 ⁻¹⁰	I S
C 14	6.3	
Sr 89	7.4 x 10 ⁻⁴	***
Sr 90, Y 90	7.8 x 10 ⁻⁵	:

". . . Table is adopted from table prepared by K. Z. Morgan, Health Physics Division, ORNL; to be published by the National Research Council in the Handbook of Nuclear Instruments and Techniques "

Radioactivity; a new factor in Water Works Practice by A. E. Gorman; American Water Works Association Journal, Vol. 41, December 1949, pages 1053 - 1060.

Safety Criteria in Radioactive Water Monitoring by H. A. C. McKay and G. N. Walton; Nucleonics, Vol. 5, August 1949, pages 12-21.

Contamination of Water Supplies by Kadioactive Substances by J. C. Morris and J. R. Carritt; New England Water Works Association Journal, Vol. 62, March 1948, pages 1 - 9. Also, Civil Engineering (London), Vol. 43, June 1948, pages 293-295.

EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO COMMANDER F. R. PHILBROOK (MC. USN. Deputy Director, Preventive Medicine Division Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Department of the Navy) MADE IN A SPEECH AT ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ON OCTOBER 31, 1950

"..... The second method involves the clandestine introductions of these agents to sabotage air, food, or water supplies. The saboteur who sets out to contaminate a water supply would not waste his material by disseminating it at the source of a protected supply, because filtration and the other usual sanitation procedures would defeat his purpose. He would even more profitably attack the distribution system near the point of use, selectively.

...... Two or more agents might be used simultaneously, thus semplicating the problems for clinical and laboratory diagnosis and therapy.

..... As to when or where the enemy might use these conteminants, the answer of course is whenever and wherever it suits his purpose to do so. The possibility of sabotage directed against key individuals or selected population groups in advance of a declaration of war, must be borne in mind. Their use prior to an open declaration of war could be timed to an anticipated development period in such a manner that key individuals might be casualties at the time of need for important action on their part. Attacks against military targets might involve civilian casualties in this as in other forms of warfare......

In this discussion, Commender Philbrook had in mind primarily B.W., for rather (NOTE FOR FILE: obvious reasons. We believe there is very little doubt but that anyone would place the problem of R.W. at a much higher order of probability.)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED WEINES BIACO 10-6-93216-396

DATE 1304 BY LOSGY WEINES BIACO 10-6-93216-396

EGG _{BA}		
DED 2	160-9-20	75
ערי	·	
EX-1	Dear	

b6

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 1, 1950, ferwarding copies of reports and correspondence concerning

This material has been placed in the hands of the FBI Laboratory staff for their information.

I wish to express my appreciation for the thoughts which prompted you to forward this data.

Sincerely yours.

John Edgar Hoever Director

TDB: MEG of the dor wings

U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE F. B. 1.

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REC'D-TOLSON'S OFFICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED DATE 1/13/04 BY 60267 MC NES B; NCB

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

FROM :	Mr. R. T. Harbo D. J. Parsons	824	N p			Tolson_
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SUBJECT:	TELEPHONE CALL	FROM	711		b7C	Olavin_
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December 8, 1990 SAC, Chicago Director, FBI b6 b7C b7D It is expected that will contact your office by telephone in order to acquaint your office concerning the as well as to urge your office to delegate a representative to witness or to have your office advise **b**6 the Bureau of this information. b7C It is not desired that an agent from your effice the designated to
and no one from the Bureau will be present? However b7D attend to furnish the Bureau any regults z data, or you should invite comments following JUSTICE PEC 9 1134 AM "51 REC'O-TOLSON'S OFFICE TDB: MEG Tolson Ladd the MIGHT Clegg Olavin Nichols Belmon! ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

RLS: BD 100-91131 M

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 13 04 BY 60267 MC MLS B; A/CE

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NY 100-91131 Letter to the Director b6 b7C b7D b6 b7C The D.P.C. file further reflected investigation conducted by b7D Hq. Counter Intelligence Corps, Reg XI, 7970th CIC Group, European Command, APO 800, U.S. Army, on as follows: 1. Agency Checks Results a. Police and Court Records No record b. I.R.O. or Assembly Center Records No record c. Denazification Records Not checked d. Post Provost Marshall Negative e. Central Registry f. Berlin Document Center g. CIC files h. Others Negative


NY 100-91131 Letter to the Director

Neighborhood Check

Name	2.3*	Birth date	Address	Results	
				Negative	
					b6
				Negative	b7C
WALERIAN LANG	ia ia	1/21/95	Northern DPC Wurzburg, has known 2 years (no relation)	Negative	

No other information was available in the D.P.C. file. RUC.

Office Men lum





GOVERNMENT

1.00		+1
10	TO : DIRECTOR, FBI CONFIDENTIAL DATE: 12/6/50	
04	FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE	, :
. 1	SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE b6 ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE b7C DECLASSIFIED BY LOZG TUE NUS BIA	148
	ATTENTION: SA FBI Laboratory	
	Enclosed herewith is a copy of a memorandum entitled Biological Warfare Sabotage Agents prepared by	
	supplies to the second future The supplies on the future The supplies of the supplies	6 7C 7D
İ	onat gould be used in bins	
	Agent will report the results of his contact with on 12/5/50 by separate let.	3
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DATE 1/13/04/BY 40247 UC JACS/BJA/CB
#977000

fice Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Director, FBI

DATE:

12/7/50

SAC, Mobile

SUBJECT:

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE SABOTAGE Bufile 100-93216

ReBulet 10/17/50 to this office under the above caption which refers to Mobile letter to the Bureau dated 9/28/50 under the caption "PROCLI, ESPIONAGE - C." There is being enclosed herewith for the Bureau five copies of the report of SA dated 12/7/50 at Mobile in this matter, setting forth the results of a preliminary investigation at

b6 b7C

b7D

The Bureau is requested to advise if authority is granted for an interview with

It should be noted. however.

It appears that no further logical investigation remains to be conducted in this matter at Tallahassee, Florida, accordingly, no further investigation is being conducted by this office at this time until such time as further instructions are received from the Bureau.

JBH-lo

Encl. (5)

65-10

cc MIAMI

WINCHED - 89

RECORDED - 89

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED DATE 1/13/04 BY LOZUT LIC INLS B, A CB

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mobile	DATE WHEN MADE 12/7/50	9/26,10/31,11/6-8 24/50	REPORT MADE BY	b7C
BIOLOGICAL WARFAR	E (PROCLI)		ESPIONAGE; SABOTAGE	
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:	<u>c c</u>	NFENTIA	<u>L</u>	
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2 Km			with no apparent	
subv	ersive tendenci	les. Records of		
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and	criminal record	no disloyal mais negative.	notives found. Cred	lit
	criminal record	es negative.	notives found. Cred	
DETAILS: AT T	ALLAHASSEE, FLO	P - DRIDA.	is pres	sently a
DETAILS: AT T	ALLAHASSEE, FLO	P - DRIDA.		sently a
DETAILS: AT T	ALLAHASSEE, FLO	P - DRIDA.	is pres	sently a pember 26,
DETAILS: AT T	ALLAHASSEE, FLO	- P - ORIDA.	is presting Agent on Septe	sently a pember 26,
DETAILS: AT T	ALLAHASSEE, FLO	P - ORIDA.	is presting Agent on Septe	sently a pember 26,
DETAILS: AT T student at Florid 1950 that APPROVED AND FORWARDED: COPIES OF THIS	ALLAHASSEE, FLO	P - ORIDA.	is presting Agent on Septe	sently a pember 26,
DETAILS: AT T student at Florid 1950 that APPROVED AND FORWARDED: COPIES OF THIS	CALLAHASSEE, FLO	P - DRIDA. Sity, advised report 100 - 93	is presenting Agent on September 16 HOREC	sently a pember 26,
STATIS: AT TO Student at Florid 1950 that APPROVED AND FORWARDED: COPIES OF THIS	Special age in charge (100-93216)	P - DRIDA. Sity, advised report 100 - 93	is present on September of Write In these spaces	sently a pember 26,

PROPERTY OF FBI.—This communication report and its contents are loaned to you by the FBI and are not to be distributed outside of agency to which loaned.

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	It should be noted that the Bureau has formerly advised this
Ľ	office that the U. S. Army is
. L	
	3. C.
	The Bureau was advised of the foregoing information by letter
(dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office
	The Bureau was advised of the foregoing information by letter dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office instructed to discreetly obtain the name of who reported
	dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office reinstructed to discreetly obtain the name of who reported discussed
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Ē	dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office instructed to discreetly obtain the name of who reported discussed Authority was granted to conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of this individual at the above University. Authority was also granted to contact reliable
Ē	dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office instructed to discreetly obtain the name of who reported discussed Authority was granted to conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of this individual at the above University. Authority was also granted to contact reliable sources of information. established contacts and confidential informants
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	dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office instructed to discreetly obtain the name of who reported discussed Authority was granted to conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of this individual at the above University. Authority was also granted to contact reliable sources of information. established contacts and confidential informants what all interviews should be conducted in such a manner as to avoid any
	dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office instructed to discreetly obtain the name of who reported discussed Authority was granted to conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of this individual at the above University. Authority was also granted to contact reliable sources of information. established contacts and confidential informants that all interviews should be conducted in such a manner as to avoid any possible repercussion or embarrassment to the Bureau. On October 31, 1950 the original informant,
	dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office instructed to discreetly obtain the name of who reported discussed Authority was granted to conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of this individual at the above University. Authority was also granted to contact reliable sources of information. established contacts and confidential informants that all interviews should be conducted in such a manner as to avoid any possible repercussion or embarrassment to the Eureau. On October 31, 1950 the original informant,
	dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office instructed to discreetly obtain the name of who reported discussed Authority was granted to conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of this individual at the above University. Authority was also granted to contact reliable sources of information. established contacts and confidential informants that all interviews should be conducted in such a manner as to avoid any possible repercussion or embarrassment to the Bureau. On October 31, 1950 the original informant,
	dated September 28, 1950 and by letter dated October 17, 1950 this office instructed to discreetly obtain the name of who reported discussed Authority was granted to conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of this individual at the above University. Authority was also granted to contact reliable sources of information. established contacts and confidential informants that all interviews should be conducted in such a manner as to avoid any possible repercussion or embarrassment to the Bureau. On October 31, 1950 the original informant,

- 2 -

MO 65-10

. . . .

b6 b7C An examination was made of the records of the Credit Pureau of Tallahassee, the Leon County Sheriff's Office, and the Tallahassee Police Department in efforts to determine if possessed possible records at my of those sources, however, this phase of the investigation resulted negatively.

- PENDING -

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6	authority			Bureau i	s being	requested	to grant	ži.
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7D	N .		 Š.	(#)	Ø.	3		

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LEADS

MIAMI DIVISION-

b6

AT SARASOTA, FLORIDA:

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b7C

1. Will conduct a discreet, preliminary investigation of

MOPILE DIVISION

AT TALIAHASSEE, FLORIDA:

1. Will, in the event the Fureau authorizes such an interview, contact and obtain complete information from him regarding

by coverage of the above leads.

REFERENCE: Mobile letter to Bureau 9/28/50.

Bureau letter to Mobile 10/17/50.

For your information, copies of your referenced report

have been furnished to the armed Forces intelligence agencies

references in the Bursau's files.

Tele. Room

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Recorder Section
Please file
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64			Mr. Tolor Mr. Lade	11.
Office	7 : 3 .m	• UNI	DVERNA DVERNA	MENT-
то 🧃 :	DIRECTOR, FBI		DATE: Dec. 21; 12	950
PROM (SAC, SAN FRANCISCO		Er. Meh	w
SUBJECT:	OBIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE (Bufile 100-93216)	(ONF)	SENTIA Mass Ga	il
er for	Remylet November 15, 19	950.	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	*
DE	As noted in relet,			
value	ble to contact this inform concerning the captioned will be cons from this trip, and the	matter. ontacted in the nea	r future when he	b2 b7D
	mation thereby obtained.	5 241044 W2 11 50 44	vious of any	#)
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IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

Dederal Bureau of Investigation United States Department - Fusince

301 Continental Bank Building Salt Lake City 1, Utah December 18, 1950



Mr. Theory

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247 MC/NCS BIAGE

Director, FBI

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE (Bureau File 100-93216)

Dear Sir:

b6 b7C b7D Set forth in this letter is information from top secret documents of the Army Chemical Corps and it is believed the fact they have been furnished and their source should be kept strictly confidential.

Q d

RTH:MEN 65-1122 AMSD REGISTERED-RRR

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TO: RE:	DIRECT BW	OR		31						*	
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DIRECTOR b6 b7C b7D The documents were not in possession of this office long enough to forward them to the Bureau for photostating purposes, nor was it considered advisable to do so in view of the confidential nature of them. In the event the Bureau is unable to secure such documents as they are published in the future and if they are received at this division they will be photographed as has been done in this instance, unless advised to the contrary. b6 b7C

	RD GORM NO. 64
2	Office Memorandum - united states government
	TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo DATE: December 20, 1950
A	FROM : D. J. Parsons
O.	SUBJECT: DEVICE DEVELOPED b6 b7C b7D Mr. Nease b7D
1	Reference is made to the memorandum from F. C. Holloman to Mr. Wichols dated December 5, 1950.
6	On December 19, 1950, SA discussed with of the Chemical Warfare Service the device developed by This device is an ozone generator
7C 3	
J. J.	
1	
1.	July 1
CA	
(34)	BJW:MEG ###
	RECORDED - 22 VOO - 93216 - 407 INEDXED - 22 3
N.	MTACHE
2	EN 100
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	DATE IL SIDE
	52 JAN 4 1951

Office Memorandum . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MR. NICHOLS TO DATE: December 5, 1950 F. C. HOLLOMAN FROM : Glavin SUBJECT: Nichols taday that he had certain information regarding b6 b7C b7D FCH:mb

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE #13/07 BY COLUT LICENS BJACO

DEC128 1950

DEC128 1950

That Ser Water r Serious Thinking ater Is Necessary

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/13/104 BY 40267 UC NISBIA CB

Returned to Nature Must Be Recaptured

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE: 1/3/04 BY 60367 LICENTE

would more than justify the cost. The basic problem was to find a medium of purification and a method of perfect application of that medium of purification of that medium of purification that would turn sewage disposal effluent water into absolutely pure drinking water and a water free from odor, and taste. Furthermore, an application of the purification medium which would make it possible to treat either thousands of gallons a day or hundreds of millions of gallons per day at a reasonable cost. That method has been found. It has taken a long period of constant work done many years ago by Louis Pasteur, the great krench scientist, and carried to completion. Everyone knows our shell-fish industry has almost been ruined by sewage pollution. Here in the metropolitan area everyone knows about the ruination of our beaches by sewage pollution. Our plan will eliminate that pollution, for there will be no more dumping of sewage disposal effluent into our rivers, bays and ocean.

This protection of the health of our people and children, when they go swimming in the summer time and the saving of the property values—now down to a vanishing point at many beaches—is worth the investment alone. But the main point above all is that we are giving back to nature some of the water resources it loans to us.

There is one last point, and one not to be lightly considered. The very vastness of the project would mean the employment of thousands

There is one last point, and one not to be lightly considered. The very vastness of the project would mean the employment of thousands of workers and a colossal purchasing program that would add to our prosperity while at the same time groving an absolute necessity for the welfare of our people.

Harry Deegan Fleck and Donald F. Fleck,

TO	: DIRECTOR, FBI	DATE: DEC. 22, 1950
FROM	Bacteriological Wartare	
SUBJEC		
	DeBulat December C. Dec	b6 b7C
	ReBulet December 8 last.	b7D
- 1	For the information of the Bureau, did not contact the Chicago Office in contact the Chicago Off	nnection with the ttaching a copy
	of a letter signed by	
See City	It will he noted that indicates that the FBI among other agencies would be present during In compliance with the Bureau's instructions of fice attended.	her Governmental
	IAR:MNW-56-1	
3	HNOLOSURE ATTACKED	A.S.
Net	EX - 35	
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