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**THE
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IN THE
CUBAN CRISIS**

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1962

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
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FOREWORD

This study has been written by many hands. Its authors are historians of the Headquarters, Air Defense Command and ADC's air divisions. Specifically, the contributors are as follows: Chapter I was prepared by Mr. Richard F. McMullen; Chapter II by Mr. Denys Volan; Chapter III by Mr. Grover C. Jarrett; Chapter IV by Mr. John W. Dennison; Chapter V by Miss Ruth Wampler; Chapter VI by Mr. James M. Russell; Chapter VII by Mr. Jean Martin; and Chapter VIII by Technical Sergeant Benjamin T. Siler.

No attempt has been made by the authors to assess the Cuban experience. The chapters were written too soon after the event to make this possible, even if an historian's assessment were desirable. Also, no organizational format or stylistic standards were imposed on the authors. Consequently, there are inconsistencies among the presentations. Collectively, the authors wish to acknowledge the cooperation of the dedicated officers and airmen of the Air Defense Command, who displayed unusual understanding and patience with them as they got underfoot in a hectic effort to preserve the memory of a significant experience in air defense operations.



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
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CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND -- "SOUTHERN TIP"

The reaction in the United States was generally favorable when Fidel Castro came down out of the Cuban mountains in late 1958 and ousted the dictator Batista in January 1959. Events of the next two years, however, offered adequate proof that Castro's Cuba was no friend of the United States. There was increasing evidence that Cuba, despite its location, had been drawn behind the Iron Curtain. On 3 January 1961 the Eisenhower administration, as one of its last official acts, broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The emergence of a Communist state off the Florida coast, plus intelligence concerning the lengthening of airport runways and the building of missile pads, made it

prudent to look to the defenses of south Florida. There was no likelihood of a major offensive strike from Cuba, but Castro was believed capable of nuisance raids against Miami, where many of his opponents had taken refuge, and other cities of south Florida. CONAD (the U. S. element of NORAD) decided to take out insurance for south Florida in the form of a "Contingency Plan for Augmenting the Air Defenses of Southern Florida," dated 5 January 1961. This plan recommended use of radars at Key West and the Miami-Homestead AFB area in Florida and the Shaw AFB and Myrtle Beach areas in South Carolina for early warning and the control of interceptors deployed at Key West and Homestead. The Key West interceptors were to be Navy aircraft. Those at Homestead were to be F-102A aircraft from ADC's Tyndall AFB. As the initial plan was written in January 1961, ADC was to participate only to the extent of providing a contingent of alert interceptors for Homestead and the communications facilities needed to weld the various elements into an operating air defense system. The CONAD document was not immediately effective, except for planning purposes, since JCS approval was required prior to implementation.

1. NOFORN EX CANADA, CONAD Operation Plan 1-61, "Contingency Plan for Augmenting the Air Defenses of Southern Florida," 5 Jan 1961 [Doc 96 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

Oddly enough, the only permanently based Air Force interceptor strength in the area, the 76th FIS at McCoy, was in the process of moving to the northeast at the time the requirement for strengthening the defenses of Florida developed. In order to position the diminishing interceptor force as nearly astride probable enemy approach routes as possible, USAF, in the summer of 1960, had approved the transfer of the 76th FIS from McCoy to Westover AFB in Massachusetts. The 76th had disposed of most of F-89J aircraft by the end of 1960 and aircrews and support personnel had begun to move north. F-102A interceptors for the re-equipped squadron began to arrive at Westover in February 1961 and by mid-April the 76th was fully equipped. Unfortunately, the 76th, when needed in Florida, was in Massachusetts.²

On 7 April 1961, the JCS, through CONAD, ordered a two-week test of the contingency plan for south Florida (nicknamed SOUTHERN TIP), beginning 12 April. Tyndall deployed six F-102A aircraft to Homestead, where two

2. Memo for Rec, "76 FIS Capability to Support F/TF-102 Aircraft," n.d., ca. 31 Jan 1961 [Doc 352 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg 26MDC 2-3, 26 AD to ADC, 10 Feb 1961 [Doc 354 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Minutes, Program Control Committee, ADC, 25 Apr 1961 [Doc 356 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

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interceptors were maintained in five-minute-alert status at all times. All elements of SOUTHERN TIP were on hand on 12 April except the radar picket ship, USS Protector, which encountered rough seas and arrived on station 36 hours late. The Navy, in fact, did more than was asked of it by voluntarily providing a second picket ship, the USS Searcher, and three WV-2 airborne early warning and control aircraft (Navy version of ADC's RC-121D AEW&C craft) shortly after the exercise got underway. This makeshift air defense system was in being when the abortive invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro forces occurred on 17 April.³

The two-week suitability test of the south Florida defenses did not end on 26 April as originally scheduled. The following day the JCS directed that SOUTHERN TIP continue indefinitely. Also on 27 April 1961, CONAD forwarded to the JCS a four-phase plan which would result in establishment of a permanent air defense system in the area. The four phases were as follows:

Phase I	SOUTHERN TIP
Phase II	Extended Contingency Operations
Phase III	Minimum Permanent Installations
Phase IV	Permanent Full Capability

3. Msg ADOOP-P 741, ADC to USAF, 8 Apr 1961 [Doc 358 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg 32OCO-260, 32 AD to ADC, 19 Apr 1961 [Doc 11 in 32 AD Study, "The Air Defense Build-Up in Southern Florida, January-December 1961], hereafter cited as "32 AD Study."

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The JCS agreed to implementation of Phase II on 29 May 1961, but added that action on Phases III and IV would have to await further political and military developments.⁴

The lengthening of SOUTHERN TIP into a commitment of indefinite duration brought changes in the basic plan which increased ADC's stake in the operation. The temporary interceptor detachment from Tyndall was to be replaced by a more-or-less permanent contingent of the 482nd FIS from Seymour-Johnson AFB in North Carolina. The temporary TAC radar at Richmond Naval Air Station (Florida) was to be replaced with ADC equipment. The three Navy WV-2 AEW&C aircraft were to be replaced with an AEW&C detachment provided by ADC.⁵

After these decisions had been made by the JCS and CONAD, the story of SOUTHERN TIP, so far as ADC was concerned, was an account of ADC's attempts to furnish the men and

4. Hist of NORAD, Jan-Jun 1961, pp. 84-88; Ltr, CONAD to JCS, "Air Defense in the Southern Florida Area," 27 Apr 1961 [Doc 13 in 32 AD Study]; Msg COOP-X 162, CONAD to JCS, 13 May 1961 [Doc 100 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

5. Msg AFOOP 75504, USAF to ADC, 6 Jun 1961 [Doc 35 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOAC-EG 1196, ADC to USAF, 8 Jun 1961 [Doc 36 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-E 1257, ADC to USAF, 15 Jun 1961 [Doc 37 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP-E 1344, ADC to USAF, 26 Jun 1961 [Doc 105 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP-EI 1359, ADC to 26 AD, 28 Jun 1961 [Doc 106 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

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equipment required. Provision of a portion of the interceptor force (the Navy also had interceptors based at Key West) was possibly the simplest of the required actions to accomplish. While the 73rd Air Division at Tyndall felt it could ill-afford the absence of six F-102A aircraft from test activities and obtained ADC permission, in mid-May, to reduce the number based at Homestead to three, the number of ADC interceptors increased to four in July when the detachment from the 482nd FIS arrived in Florida. Because it was necessary to begin repairs to the Homestead runways in July, the F-102A interceptors from the 482nd were based at Miami International Airport until Homestead was again available.

Approximately 50 officers and men were required to support the four F-102A's maintained at Miami. This group was on temporary duty status until Detachment 1 of the 482nd

6. Msg 73ODC X188E, 73 AD to MOADS, 18 May 1961 [Doc 360 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADIRP-E 1077, ADC to USAF, 23 May 1961 [Doc 361 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADODC 1109, ADC to 73 AD, 26 May 1961 [Doc 362 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP-WI 1179, ADC to 73 AD, 6 Jun 1961 [Doc 363 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg AFOOP-BU 76498, USAF to ADC, 8 Jun 1961 [Doc 364 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP-CA 1213, ADC to FAA, 9 Jun 1961 [Doc 365 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP-WI 1334, ADC to 26 AD, 24 Jun 1961 [Doc 369 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

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FIS was established on a permanent basis at Homestead in November 1961. The four aircraft (two of them on five-minute-alert status at all times) moved from Miami to Homestead in January 1962.⁷

With respect to the AEW&C detachment, however, the difficulties were much greater. While the Navy had materially increased the effectiveness of the initial SOUTHERN TIP system by gratuitously providing WV-2 aircraft for AEW&C use, it was the desire of the 32nd CONAD Region and CONAD that ADC furnish the long-haul AEW&C capability. The Navy cooperatively offered to loan ADC six operational WV-2 aircraft if this gesture would help maintain radar surveillance over the Florida Straits.⁸

The immediate question, then, was the manner in which this requirement was to be met. ADC, on 15 June 1961, saw four possible methods. One plan (Plan A) involved staging RC-121D aircraft from Otis AFB (Massachusetts) and using Key West as a turn-around base. The Navy WV-2 aircraft

7. Msg ADMDC 1969, ADC to SAC, 15 Sep 1961 [HRF]; Msg ADOOP-EI 2078, ADC to SAC, 27 Sep 1961 [HRF]; Msg ADLSP 2354, ADC to 26 AD, 25 Oct 1961 [HRF]; FCS: 1AF-V14, ADC 2 Feb 1962 [HRF].

8. NOFORN, Msg 320OP 310, 32 CONAD Rgn to CONAD, 8 May 1961 [Doc 99 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg AFOOP 75504, USAF to ADC, 6 Jun 1961 [Doc 35 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

would not be utilized under this plan, which would mean the abandonment of one and one-third AEW&C stations off the East Coast. Plan B called for manning of the WV-2 aircraft with ADC crews and basing the operation at Key West. This would involve the loss of one and one-half surveillance stations on either the East or West Coasts until additional aircrews could be trained. Plan C would simply assign the six WV-2 aircraft to the 551st AEW&C Wing at Otis for use as the tactical situation demanded. Plan D required no AEW&C aircraft at all, but involved meeting the low-level surveillance requirement through installation of gap-filler radars at Naples, West Palm Beach and Marathon Island. ADC favored the latter plan as furnishing the required capability without reducing⁹ AEW&C coverage in areas ADC felt were more critical.

Actually, none of the four plans drawn up by ADC were placed in effect. Instead, pending JCS decision on the three gap-fillers, ADC was asked to man one AEW&C station in the Florida Straits on an "on call" basis. No AEW&C aircraft were to be stationed in Florida, but within 12 hours of notification by CONAD, the AEW&C Wing at Otis was to supply sufficient aircraft, based at MacDill, to cover the Florida Straits¹⁰ station.

9. NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-E 1257, ADC to USAF, 15 Jun 1961 [Doc 37 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

10. Msg ADOOP-E 1344, ADC to USAF, 26 Jun 1961 [Doc

The JCS, however, thought a defense effort of somewhat greater scope was required in south Florida. Not only did the JCS approve the establishment of three gap fillers to support the radar station at Richmond, but also the permanent deployment of an AEW&C unit to Florida. The JCS¹¹ decision was made known to ADC on 29 August 1961.

This crystallization of SOUTHERN TIP policy required, as a first step, determination of adequate locations for the AEW&C unit and the three gap filler radars. The earlier plans for utilization of MacDill as the base for AEW&C were scrapped for two reasons. At first, MacDill had to be removed from consideration because it was one of the bases chosen for inactivation by the Department of Defense. When this action was cancelled, MacDill became unavailable because it was chosen as the headquarters for the new U. S. Strike Command, an organization composed of the Strategic

[Cont'd] 105 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP-EI 1359, ADC to 26 AD, 28 Jun 1961 [Doc 106 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg 26LPRO 323-C, 26 AD to 551 AEW&C Wg, 30 Jun 1961 [Doc 107 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg 26 LPR 335-S, 26 CONAD Rgn to ADC, 7 Jul 1961 [Doc 108 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP 1493, ADC to USAF, 18 Jul 1961 [Doc 109 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; 551 AEW&C Wg Ops Plan 8-61, 28 Aug 1961 [Doc 20 in 32 AD Study].

11. Msg AFOOP-DE-WC 97862, USAF to ADC, 29 Aug 1961 [HRF]; ADC Elec Sys Div, Weekly Act Rept, 8-14 Sep 1961 [HRF].

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Army Corps and the Tactical Air Command. McCoy was therefore chosen as an alternate location, despite the objections of SAC, host command at McCoy. A group of five RC-121D aircraft (two from the 551st AEW&C Wing at Otis and three from the 552nd AEW&C Wing at McClellan) began operations from McCoy in November 1961 as Detachment 1, 551st Wing. The six WV-2 AEW&C aircraft offered by the Navy had grown to eight by the autumn of 1961 and were undergoing conversion to ADC configuration by the end of the year. These aircraft (to be known as RC-121J) were to replace the RC-121D aircraft at McCoy in the spring of 1962. These former Navy aircraft were to be operated by a new organization, the 966th AEW&C Squadron, under the administrative control of the 551st AEW&C Wing at Otis.

Action to determine sites for the three SOUTHERN TIP gap fillers was taken 14 September 1961. By 12 October, sites for these untended radar had been established at Naples, Long Key and Jupiter, all in south Florida. Construction contracts were awarded in mid-December, and near the end of January 1962

12. Msg AFOOP-BU 71755, USAF to ADC, 19 Oct 1961 [HRF]; Msg AFOOP-DE-WC 73111, USAF to ADC, 25 Oct 1961 [HRF]; Msg DPLC 3073, SAC to USAF, 24 Oct 1961 [HRF]; Msg AFCVC 76906, USAF to SAC, 3 Nov 1961 [HRF]; Msg ADMLP 2541, ADC to 26 AD, 14 Nov 1961 [HRF]; Unit Programmed Action Directive 61-24, ADC, 7 Dec 1961 [HRF]; RCS: 1AF-V14, ADC, 29 Nov 1961 [HRF].

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it appeared that construction at all three sites would be finished in early March. If these beneficial occupancy dates were realized, it was anticipated that the radar equipment could be installed by the end of May 1962.¹³

During the early stages of SOUTHERN TIP, height-finding capability for the radar station at Richmond was provided by a mobile MPS-14 height finder provided by TAC. Phase II SOUTHERN TIP operations required the replacement of the TAC equipment with two FPS-6 height finders to be operated by ADC crews. The original planning for Phase II anticipated operational readiness of the FPS-6 sets by the end of 1961. By late June 1961, however, an operational date of 1 September 1961 had been established.¹⁴

Hindsight later proved the 1 September date to be impossibly optimistic, although the full extent of the slippage which was to be experienced did not become apparent for several months. In late July it was expected that the necessary construction would be completed by 18 August and

13. Msg ADOAC-ER 1952, ADC to 32 AD, 14 Sep 1961 [HRF]; Msg ADIRP-R 2240, ADC to USAF, 12 Oct 1961 [HRF]; ADC Daily Staff Digest No. 116, 26 Oct 1961 [HRF]; ADC, Program Mgmt Div, Weekly Act Rept, 3-9 Nov 1961 [HRF]; ADC, Elec Sys Div, Weekly Act Rept, 19-25 Jan 1962 [HRF].

14. Msg ROZICG 724, GEEIA to USAF, 28 Jun 1961 [HRF]; Msg AFMME-EE 81146, USAF to GEEIA, 23 Jun 1961 [HRF]; Msg ROZICG 727, GEEIA to Eastern GEEIA Rgn, 30 Jun 1961 [HRF].

that an operational date of 20 September could be met. When the latter date approached it was revealed that the radar tower extensions had been received in incomplete form. The construction contractor, to complicate matters, had left the site. A new operational date of 15 December was suggested. An estimate of the situation in November predicted a January 1962 operational date. By that time it had been discovered that 235 parts were missing from the radar towers provided for Richmond and that replacement parts were exceedingly difficult to obtain. In December the Ground Electronic Equipment Installation Agency (GEEIA) estimated that an operational date of 28 February 1962 might be attained. Meanwhile, the mobile TAC MPS-14 height finder continued in place, although an ADC crew had assumed responsibility for its operation and maintenance because TAC could no longer spare the manpower.

Although the JCS had approved only Phase II (extended contingency operations) of the four-phase CONAD plan for the air defense of South Florida, the SOUTHERN TIP system was gaining a look of permanency by the end of 1961, insofar as ADC involvement was concerned. A detachment of F-102A interceptors was

15. ADC, ADOAC-E, Weekly Act Rept, 21-27 Jul, 22-28 Sep, 3-9 Nov and 22-28 Dec 1961 [HRF]; Msg ROZI-35059, Eastern GEEIA Rgn to 35 AD, 20 Nov 1961 [Doc 29 in 32 AD Study]; 32 AD Study, pp. 65-66.

permanently established at Homestead. A squadron of AEW&C aircraft was to be permanently in place at McCoy in early 1962. Height-finder radars on solid foundations of steel and concrete were going into Richmond. Three gap-filler radars were being readied to augment the low-level detection capability of the main radar site at Richmond. The time was near when south Florida would be afforded a degree of protection similar to that offered the eastern, northern and western approaches to the United States.

The four F-102A interceptors at Homestead were a token force that ADC (and CONAD) was anxious to supplement. One plan, broached in February 1962, called for the transfer of a squadron of F-104 aircraft from the Air National Guard to ADC for use in Florida. USAF showed interest in this proposal, although not all USAF staff offices agreed with ADC as to the manner in which the ANG F-104 aircraft should be used. There was one school of thought which held that the F-104s should be retained by the ANG and that the Homestead alert should be maintained by rotation of ANG aircraft and crews. ADC strongly disapproved of this suggestion, countering with the recommendation that all ANG F-104 be transferred to ADC. When that happened, ADC proposed to move the 71st FIS from Selfridge to Homestead and re-equip

it with F-104 aircraft. The remainder of the ANG F-104's were to be used to replace the F-102A interceptors of the 331st FIS at Webb.¹⁶

USAF finally adopted the ADC position in early summer and forwarded the ADC proposal to the Department of Defense. Despite repeated inquiries on the part of ADC, the DOD delayed its decision month after month until mid-October, when a negative decision was rendered. Probably because the situation in Cuba would not permit delay, DOD decided to shift a squadron of Navy interceptors from San Diego to Key West, rather than authorize the re-equipment of the 71st FIS following a transfer from Selfridge to Homestead. The Navy unit was ready to move almost immediately. Re-equipment of the 71st FIS with F-104's obtained from the ANG would have required at least several weeks. On the other hand, DOD approval of the USAF/ADC/CONAD proposal in July would have resulted in combat-ready F-104 aircraft being available in South Florida when the Cuban crisis developed in October.¹⁷

16. Msg ADCCS 617, ADC to USAF, 2 Mar 1962 [HRF]; Msg AFOOP 72866, USAF to SAC, 23 Mar 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADCCR 1072, ADC to USAF, 19 Apr 1962 [HRF].

17. SECRET-NOFORN, Msg ADMDC 1946, ADC to AFLC, 20 Jul 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADODC 2111, ADC to USAF, 9 Aug 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOOP-WI 2240, ADC to 32 AD, 23 Aug 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOOP-WI 2445, ADC to USAF, 12 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg 82788, USAF to SAC, 14 Sep 1962 [HRF]; SECRET-NOFORN, Msg ADOOP-WI 2800, ADC to 26, 32, 28 and 30 Air Divs, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF].

At any rate, when the Cuban crisis broke, ADC had four F-102A interceptors in the Southern Tip area. While ADC began making arrangements to furnish an FPS-6 height finder for the FAA radar at Miami in 1961, consideration of the use of a second SOUTHERN TIP radar at Key West did not begin until early 1962. The Navy already had FPS-37 and FPS-6 radars in operation at Key West and it was possible to link both the Miami and Key West radars with Montgomery Air Defense Sector (MOADS) at Gunter AFB, Alabama, and thereby improve radar surveillance in the direction of Cuba. Some thought was given to replacement of the Navy's FPS-37 with an ADC FPS-20 radar, but an evaluation of the FPS-37 in May 1962 revealed that it could offer performance that was almost equal to that of the FPS-20. It was therefore decided to retain the FPS-37. Meanwhile, a third radar station was added to the SOUTHERN TIP network with the addition of AFSC-owned FPS-66 (an improved FPS-20) at Patrick AFB, the support base for Cape Canaveral. To differentiate the SOUTHERN TIP radar network from the regular ADC network, these three stations were given special code names -- Z-209 (Key West),
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Z-210 (Richmond NAS) and Z-211 (Patrick).

18. Msg ADOAC-EE 868, ADC to USAF, 30 Mar 1962 [HRF];
Msg ADOAC-E 1434, ADC to USAF, 24 May 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-EG 1469, ADC to USAF, 29 May 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-AP 1472,

The radar installation at Key West was the one which presented the most problems. Because the Navy FPS-37 search radar and FPS-6 height finder were not supported by the equipment required for heavy and sustained air defense operations, both the Navy and ADC agreed that it would be necessary to build a Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) building at a new location at Key West and provide another FPS-37 (to be supplied by the Navy) and another FPS-6 (supplied by ADC). This building was still in the design stages in early September 1962. Meanwhile, operations with the existing FPS-37 were jeopardized in late September when mechanical failure became "highly probable." It was also discovered, upon closer examination, that the antenna of the FPS-37 was corroded. In this situation, ADC recommended that TAC provide a mobile search radar either until the old FPS-37 could be repaired or the new FPS-37 (to be erected in conjunction with the GCI building) was available. The TAC mobile radar was in place
19
at Key West by 10 October.

[Cont'd] ADC to USAF, 31 May 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 1801, ADC to USAF, 6 Jul 1962 [HRF]; ADC, ADOAC, Weekly Act Rept, 1 Jun, 15 Jun, 29 Jun 1962 [HRF].

19. Msg 32ODC 7974, 32 AD to CONAD, 30 Jul 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2091, ADC to USAF, 7 Aug 1962 [HRF]; Msg 32OAC-E 9018, 32 AD to MOADS, 4 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2388, ADC to 32 AD, 7 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2417, ADC to USAF, 11 Sep 1962 [HRF]; SECRET-NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOAC-ER 2558,

Construction of the three special SOUTHERN TIP gap filler radars (Naples, Long Key and Jupiter, Florida) began in late December 1961 and early January 1962. All three gap fillers were designed to provide surveillance information for the prime radar at Miami. Although it was planned that the gap fillers would be operational by 2 July 1962, various delays made it impossible to meet this date. All three, however, were considered 95 per cent operational by 1 October. While the gap fillers were being equipped and tested, CONAD decided that the gap filler at Long Key would also have to provide information to the prime radar site at Key West, although the necessary communications and read-out equipment were not in place when the Cuban crisis erupted. While the gap fillers were under construction the Navy provided a radar picket ship off South Florida to perform part of the function of the gap fillers. It was ADC's understanding,

[Cont'd] ADC to USAF, 25 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2625 ADC to 32 AD, 1 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2623, ADC to USAF, 11 Sep 1962 [HRF]; SECRET-NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOAC-CE 2781, ADC to USAF, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2622, ADC to 32 AD, 1 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2662, ADC to Eastern GEEIA, 4 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2708, ADC to USAF, 10 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2774, ADC to USAF, 17 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-CO 2775, ADC to 32 AD, 17 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-CO 2782, ADC to 6936 Comm Sec Dep Gp, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-CE 2793, ADC to USAF, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2811, ADC to SE Div, Navy Bureau of Docks, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF].

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in 1961, that the picket ship would be withdrawn when the gap fillers were operational. In mid-October 1962, however, CONAD reached the conclusion that it would be wise to retain the picket ship in Florida waters indefinitely. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed.

There was no marked increase in ADC's airborne early warning capability in the SOUTHERN TIP area during the first nine months of 1962. There were five RC-121D aircraft based at McCoy at the end of 1961. Six were available in October. In 1961 it was planned that the WV-2 aircraft furnished by the Navy (the number was variously given as six, seven and eight, but was eventually established at seven) would be modified to the configuration required by ADC and would replace the RC-121D aircraft based at McCoy. Early in 1962, however, it was decided that the Navy planes would be modified to Airborne Long Range Input (ALRI) configuration and that the RC-121D aircraft currently based at

20. ADC, ADOAC, Weekly Act Rept, 19 Jan, 23 Feb, 2 Mar, 4 May, 29 Jun and 6 Jul 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-CE 905, ADC to 32 AD, 4 Apr 1962 [HRF]; SECRET-NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOAC-CE 1739, ADC to 32 AD, 27 Jun 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2389, ADC to 32 AD, 7 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-CE 2464, ADC to USAF, 13 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOOP-EI 2605, ADC to CONAD, 28 Sep 1962 [HRF]; SECRET-NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOAC-CE 2746, ADC to USAF, 15 Oct 1962 [HRF].

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McCoy would remain there. Thus, the AEW&C capability established at McCoy in 1961 was essentially unchanged when²¹ the October crisis came.

21. RCS: 1AF-V14, ADC, 31 Jan and 3 Oct 1962 [HRF];
ADC, ADOAC, Weekly Act Rept, 25 May 1962 [HRF].

CHAPTER TWO

THE OCTOBER CRISIS

On 17 October 1962, certain key persons in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, ADC Headquarters, were asked to attend an impromptu conference with their counterparts in Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD). When they arrived they were informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had just directed General John K. Gerhart, CINCONAD, to increase the fighter-interceptor¹ force in the southeast. For the Air Defense Command, involvement in the Cuban Crisis had begun, for, as the USAF component of CONAD, ADC commanded the resources needed by CINCONAD to fulfill the orders of the Joint Chiefs.

1. Ltr, ADC to 25 AD, "Briefing on Participation of ADC in Present Contingency Operations," 16 Nov 1962 [HRF].

The forces under CINCONAD's operational control in Florida on 17 October were not inconsiderable, considering that the extent of the threat from Cuba was not yet fully known. At Homestead AFB, near Miami, four F-102's belonging to Detachment 1 of the 482nd Fighter-Interceptor Squadron were on alert. At Key West Naval Air Station there were stationed eight F4D aircraft of the Navy's VFAW-3 Squadron based at North Island, California. The eight-plane detachment at Key West was under the operational control of CINCONAD. Also at Key West under CONAD operational control were 12 to 14 F4B fighters of the VF-41 squadron provided on 9 October 1962 by CINCLANT.² At McCoy AFB near Orlando were based six RC-121D Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft of the 966th AEW&C Squadron of ADC. It was the mission of this unit to man one off-shore station on a full-time basis for surveillance of the Florida Straits. Patrolling the surface of the Straits was a radar picket ship³ of the U. S. Navy.

2. These aircraft were provided to CINCONAD by DOD in lieu of a CONAD-ADC request for F-104's. The planes of VF-41 were to replace those of VFAW-3 in due time.

3. Pre-Cuban Crisis status of forces in Florida under CINCONAD was obtained from Memo, "Proposed Remarks by General Gerhart to Commanders Conference 29 November 1962," [HRF].

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As a result of the JCS order to augment his forces in Florida, General Gerhart ordered Lieutenant General Robert M. Lee, Commander of the Air Defense Command, to "insure the availability" of 18 combat-ready F-102A aircraft, air-crews, maintenance personnel, equipment, supplies and conventional armament from the 482nd Fighter-Interceptor Squadron at Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina. These aircraft were to be "available" at Homestead AFB from 1300Z 20 October 1962 until release by CINCONAD. The 18 F-102's thus ordered by CINCONAD included the four planes already at Homestead. In addition to the F-102's CINCONAD directed General Lee to make available at Patrick AFB 12 F-106's from the 48th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron at Langley AFB, Virginia, also not later than 1300Z, 20 October 1962. The balance of the 48th FIS was to be prepared to deploy on 12-hour advance notice.⁴

In addition to the 30 interceptors from the 482nd and 48th FIS's, ADC was to support the Florida operations with its Tyndall-assigned F-101's, F-102's and F-106's as directed by CINCONAD. The Tyndall forces were not inconsiderable. They included 17 F-101's, five F-102's, 18 F-106's and four⁵ TF-102's -- a total of 44 aircraft armed and ready to fight.

4. These orders from CINCONAD were included in CONAD Operation Plan 1-62, 18 October 1962 [HRF].

5. Memo to 4756th Air Def Wg commander from 4756 Air Def Gp commander, "Activities History, 18-27 Oct 1962," 30 Oct 1962 [HRF].

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ADC was also to augment the Navy's VFAW-3 detachment at Key West with additional aircrews, equipment and armament as required for maximum readiness.⁶ Thus, on 18 October ADC was committed to make available a total of 74 interceptors from its regular resources to the Florida operation and to support them indefinitely.

In addition to the one full-time offshore station manned by the five RC-121D's stationed at McCoy, ADC was directed by CONAD Operation Plan 1-62 to provide sufficient AEW&C aircraft to man two more stations during daylight hours.⁷ To ADC, this called for a total of 12 RC-121D's to be staged from McCoy AFB. Consequently, ADC ordered the 26th Air Division to assure a total of seven planes at McCoy and the 28th Air Division to provide the balance. Deployment was to be immediate, with all aircraft in place by 1300Z, 20 October.⁸

The two fighter-interceptor squadrons earmarked for Florida lost no time in deploying. Both contingents took off on 18 October from Langley and Seymour-Johnson, "turned-

6. CONAD Operation Plan 1-62 [HRF].

7. Ibid.

8. Msg ADODC 62-262A, ADC to AFLC, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF].

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around" at Tyndall, and arrived at Patrick and Homestead on
the following day. No nuclear weapons were carried,
CINCONAD having stipulated that conventional armament would
be deployed with the aircraft.

On the eve of the crisis, the air defense radar net
in Florida comprised seven heavy radar and six gap fillers.
Of these, however, only three were located where their sur-
veillance capabilities extended to the skies between Cuba
and the mainland. These were Z-209 at Key West NAS, Z-210
at Richmond NAS and Z-211 at Patrick AFB. Z-209 employed
an FPS-37 search radar which was not well-regarded by the
32nd Air Division, and an FPS-6 height finder. Z-210 was
a "joint use" station, using an FAA-owned ARSR-1 search
radar. No height-finder was operational at Z-210 though two
FPS-6's were being installed at the time the crisis erupted.
Z-211 used an FPS-66 (modified FPS-20) search radar and an

9. Historical Monograph, "Contingency Operations of
the 73rd Air Division (Weapons), 15 Oct-31 Dec 1962," p. 16
[HRF].

10. The heavy radars were TM-198 at Tyndall, M-114
at Jacksonville, TM-200 at Cross City, M-129 at MacDill, Z-211
at Patrick, Z-210 at Richmond NAS, and Z-209 at Key West. The
gap fillers were TM-198A and B near Tyndall, TM-200A near
Cross City, M-114A near Jacksonville, and M-129A and B near
MacDill.

11. A TAC-owned mobile search radar (MPS-11) was in
place on 10 Cot at Key West as a back-up for the Navy FPS-37
which was being repaired.

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FPS-6 height finder. Z-209 was operated by the 671st AC&W Squadron and also served as a NORAD Control Center (NCC) when manual procedures were used in the sector. Z-210 was operated by the 644th AC&W Squadron. Z-211 was operated by Detachment 1 of the 679th AC&W Squadron. The detachment became the 645th Radar Squadron on 1 November 1962.

The augmented interceptor force, the additional RC-121D's and the radar picket ship in southern Florida were bound to tax existing communications facilities to the utmost. Consequently, on 18 October, even before the first contingent of interceptors arrived at their new bases, ADC asked for two duplex on-line teletype circuits between MOADS and Homestead and MOADS and Patrick.¹² Also, ADC asked for immediate implementation of a high-frequency single-sideband radio net between Key West, Homestead, Tyndall and Patrick, as well as a separate single-sideband circuit between Key West and MOADS. Circuits to support AEW&C and picket operations from Key West were also demanded.¹³ In the event the cable between Key West and the mainland was severed no end of confusion was bound to ensue. Consequently,

12. Msg ADOAC-CO 2782, ADC to 6936 Comm Sec Dep Gp, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF].

13. Msg ADOAC-CE 2781, ADC to CSAF, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg 320AC, 32 AD to ADC, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF].

to safeguard against this, ADC asked USAF for a tropospheric scatter communication system to provide emergency back-up¹⁴ between Key West and Homestead.

Even as early as the CONAD-ADC conference on 17 October, it was obvious that additional interceptors to those stipulated in CONAD 1-62 might be needed in southern Florida. As insurance against unpreparedness, ADC, on 19 October, warned the 32nd Air Division to alert its 331st FIS at Webb AFB, Texas to the fact that it might be called upon to deploy¹⁴ 12 F-102's on three hours notice.

The alert warning was given none too soon. On 20 October, a phone call from the JCS to CONAD directed the latter to "re-examine its air defense plans for the Southeast United States."¹⁵ This resulted in two major actions. On the following day CINCONAD recommended to the JCS that certain¹⁶ Air National Guard units in the southeast be federalized, and on 21 October, on instructions from CINCONAD, ADC directed two additional units to deploy fighter-interceptor forces to

14. Msg ADOOP-W 2801, ADC to 32 AD, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF].

15. Msg COOP-P TS 1022, CINCONAD to JCS, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF].

16. Ibid.

the southeast. The First Fighter Wing at Selfridge AFB, Michigan, was to deploy 12 F-106's to Patrick, with resources "sufficient to support 18 sorties per day for an indefinite period."¹⁷ The 331st, already alerted two days earlier, was to deploy 18 F-102's, with resources capable of supporting 20 sorties per day for an indefinite period.¹⁸ The 4756th Air Defense Wing at Tyndall, already aware of trouble brewing to the southeast, was to place six F-102's, eight F-106's and eight F-101's on five-minute alert within one hour's notice.¹⁹

Also on 21 October, the 32nd CONAD Region, in whose territory the crisis was taking shape, moved to establish advance control posts in Florida. CONAD Task Force 32, with headquarters at Key West, was created under the command of Colonel Theo R. Diltz, Deputy for Operations of MOADS. Detachment 1 of Task Force 32 was set up at Homestead under the command of Colonel Paul H. Kenney.²⁰ The creation of the

17. Msg ADCCR 62-272, ADC to AFLC, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF];
Msg ADCCR 62-274, ADC to 30 AD, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF].

18. Msg ADCCR 62-272, ADC to AFLC, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF];
The 71 FIS from Selfridge AFB, arrived at Patrick on 21 Oct 1962. The 331 was in place at Homestead in the pre-dawn of 22 Oct.

19. Ibid.

20. Hist Mono of 32 AD and 32 CONAD Rgn in Cuban Crisis, Oct-Dec 1962, p. 17 [HRF].

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advance post at Key West was not a spur-of-the-moment decision. As early as March 1962, it had been decided that, in the event CONAD support of military operations conducted by CINCLANT was required, such support activities would be directed from Key West by a senior CONAD officer.

Thus, when President John F. Kennedy addressed an anxious American people on Monday, 22 October, and broke the news of the Russian missile build-up, he was supported in his resolve to quarantine Cuba against a further Russian build-up by an impressive show of air defense forces contributed by the USAF Air Defense Command and controlled by CINCONAD.

One hundred and four interceptors owned by ADC were based in Florida, operationally ready with conventional armament. These included 42 F-106's, 41 F-102's, 17 F-101's and 4 TF-102's. In addition, 12 RC-121's were based at McCoy and engaged in patrolling the waters between the mainland and Cuba. Only four days previously the total of ADC's interceptor commitment in Florida was four F-102's at Homestead and 44 assorted interceptors at Tyndall. The result of

21. Col T. R. Diltz, "Narrative Report of Task Force 32 Operations, 19 Oct to 1 Dec 1962," [Doc 13 in Historical Monograph on the Cuban Crisis, 32 Air Div] [HRF].

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the ADC build up was a net gain of 56 operationally ready interceptors and seven RC-121's.

And yet, the extraordinary reinforcements in Florida were no cause of complacency to air defense officials. The gravest defect of air defense -- the ability to see and to fight at low altitudes -- remained largely unrectified. This caused ADC to dispatch a worried message to the 28th Air Division on the day of the President's speech asking for immediate action to evaluate the capability of AEW&C aircraft to detect and track small, low-level targets such as T-34's and U-3A/B's and to control interceptors against them. ²² Of course, the low altitude deficiency was not news to ADC, NORAD or ARADCOM. Three gap-filler radars had been sited and FPS-18 radars were being installed when the crisis broke, in an effort to partially alleviate the deficiency. The radars were "on-the-air" when the President addressed the nation. Like U. S. military units throughout

22. Msg ADOOP 2818, ADC to 28 AD, 22 Oct 1962 [HRF]; For a full account of this project, dubbed "Mickey Mouse," see Historical Monograph of the 28th Air Division, "Operations During the Cuban Crisis, October - December 1962," p. 23 and documents appended thereto.

the world, ADC assumed the posture of DEFCON 3 on orders
from the JCS at 2300Z on 22 October. ²³ "Minicom" was also
implemented the same day. Sabotage plans were reviewed;
command posts were put on 24-hour operation; personnel were
ordered back to duty and the slack was taken up throughout
the command.

At 1200 hours local on the day of the President's
speech, another, and in many ways the most extraordinary
action of the Cuban crisis so far as ADC was concerned,
occured. At that time the order was given to implement
Annex O of ADC Operation Plan 20-62, resulting in the flush-
ing of 161 interceptors from 28 squadrons to 16 dispersal
bases throughout the country. What made the dispersal so
unusual was not the transfer of aircraft to new locations,
or even in the fact that the new bases were not, in some in-
stances, prepared to meet the influx of interceptors, but
that the flushed "birds" were carrying full loads of atomic
armament (GAR-11's and MB-1's) -- the first such ordered
flight in the history of the command. ²⁴

23. Msg AFOOP-CP-EA, ADC 62-292, USAF to ADC, 22 Oct
1962 [HRF].

24. NCRC-C1, CONAD 62-554, CINCONAD to Cmdr Alaskan
CONAD Rgn, 22 Oct 1962 [HRF]; The dispersed aircraft included
66 F-101B's, 64 F-106A's, and 31 F-102A's.

The dispersal of ADC interceptors and the adventures that befell them is best told by their own air division historians in the chapters that follow. From the ADC headquarters standpoint, the effort was deemed an extraordinary success.

As to Florida, the 331st FIS remained at Homestead only about a week before it was replaced by the 325th FIS from Truax. The change was made because CONAD had decided that more capacity to deal with low-level targets was needed in South Florida. The F-102A armed with 2.75-inch rocket, was chosen as the preferred weapon for this job. The 325th FIS was therefore picked for movement to Florida since it was the only F-102A squadron which had not yet been modified to carry the GAR-11 nuclear missile as primary armament. The 482nd FIS remained at Homestead, but took action to fit its interceptors with 2.75-inch rockets. The 325th FIS was notified of commitment on 26 October and the move to Homestead was made on 27 October.

To further enhance low-level combat capability in the area, ADC also furnished several two-seat trainer versions

25. Msg COOP-X 497, CONAD to ADC, 26 Oct 1962 [Doc 32 in "Chronology"]; "Chronology," 30 and 32 Air Divs, 27 Oct 1962; Operations Log, ADC Command Post Operations Log, 26 Oct 1962.

of the F-102A (TF-102A) for that purpose. These aircraft could not be armed with nuclear weapons, but could be fitted with 2.75-inch rockets. Three of these aircraft began standing "strip alert" at MacDill AFB on 30 October. Two each began performing a similar function at McCoy AFB and Patrick on 4 November. The next day, 11 TF-102A aircraft were being put to this use, four each at McCoy and Patrick and three at MacDill. ADC continued to offer this low-level protection to these three key Florida bases for the remainder of the crisis period.

26

Although the use of Air National Guard squadrons was not contemplated in the original draft of CONAD Operation Plan 1-62, 18 October, immediate federalization of five ANG squadrons was recommended when the plan was revised, at JCS direction, on 20 October. These included the 159th FIS at Jacksonville, Florida; the 122nd FIS at New Orleans; the 111st FIS at Houston; the 157th FIS at McEntire ANG Base, South Carolina and the 151st FIS at McGhee-Tyson Field, Tennessee. The latter two squadrons had F-104 aircraft and it was proposed that each squadron maintain four F-104's on alert at Key West.

27

26. Msg COOP-X 497, CONAD to ADC, 26 Oct 1962 [Doc 32 in "Chronology"]; Msg ADODC X-88, ADC to 32 AD, 27 Oct 1962 [Doc 42 in "Chronology"]; Msg ADOOP-W 3040, ADC to 73 AD, 3 Nov 1962 [HRF].

27. SECRET-NOFORN, Msg COOP-P TS 1002, CONAD to JCS, 21 Oct 1962 [Doc 9 in "Chronology"].

That portion of the revised plan which dealt with the ANG was not placed into effect at once, as were the other portions. Rather, the pertinent operations plan (312-14-16) of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) was revised to call for use of ANG interceptors. Implementation of the CINCLANT plan was held in abeyance. Also, a phased procedure for federalization of the ANG was adopted. Phase I squadrons included not only those at Jacksonville, New Orleans and Houston mentioned in the revised CONAD plan, but also the 198th FIS in Puerto Rico. The F-104 squadrons in South Carolina and Tennessee were briefly earmarked for TAC use in Phase II, but by the end of October were back under ADC jurisdiction. As a precautionary measure, ADC issued conditional orders federalizing every one of the 26 ANG air defense squadrons on 29 October. These orders were not to be given effect, however, until the implementation directive was received or until subordinate commanders (of air divisions or sectors) determined that a confirmed state of national emergency or war existed. None of the ANG squadrons assigned to ADC were called to federal service during the Cuban crisis.

28. Msg ADODC 2900, ADC to 26, 28, 30 and 32 Air Divs, 26 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADODC 2957, ADC to 26, 28, 30 and 32 Air Divs, 30 Oct 1962 [HRF]; ADC SO C-113 thru C-124, 29 Oct 1962 [HRF].

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During the first month of the Cuban crisis four squadrons were maintained in southern Florida, although it did not prove possible to provide the full complement of 60 aircraft at all times during the entire period. And the trend as regards aircraft on hand was steadily downward as the effect of extensive flying on machines and the men who maintained them began to tell. During the first week an average of 49 aircraft were on hand. In the first week of November the average dropped to 45, then to 39 the following week. During the last 12 days of the crisis period that ended 23 November, the average number of ADC interceptors available was 35.²⁹ The day-to-day situation is given in the following table.

DEPLOYMENT OF ADC INTERCEPTORS IN FLORIDA

22 October - 23 November 1962

<u>Date and Time (EST)</u>	<u>Patrick AFB (F-106A)</u>	<u>Homestead AFB (F-102A)</u>	<u>Total</u>
22 Oct 0328	24	36	60
23 Oct 0600	16	30	46
24 Oct 1200	23	36	59
25 Oct 1200	23	29	52
26 Oct 1800	17	24	41
27 Oct 0600	21	30	51
28 Oct 1800	21	15	36
30 Oct 1200	20	27	47
31 Oct 1200	22	23	45
1 Nov 1200	19	26	45
2 Nov 1200	19	26	45
3 Nov 1200	20	24	44

29. ADC Status Reports, 22 Oct-23 Nov 1962 [HRF].

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<u>Date and Time (EST)</u>	<u>Patrick AFB (F-106A)</u>	<u>Homestead AFB (F-102A)</u>	<u>Total</u>
4 Nov 1200	17	26	43
5 Nov 1200	17	26	43
6 Nov 1200	16	26	42
7 Nov 1200	20	15	35
8 Nov 1200	18	20	38
9 Nov 1200	19	21	40
10 Nov 1200	16	19	35
12 Nov 1200	18	15	33
13 Nov 1200	18	18	36
14 Nov 1200	18	15	33
15 Nov 1200	15	15	30
16 Nov 1200	17	24	41
17 Nov 1200	17	20	37
18 Nov 1200	17	13	30
19 Nov 1200	18	17	35
20 Nov 1200	17	17	34
21 Nov 1200	20	23	43
22 Nov 1200	22	16	38
23 Nov 1200	22	5	27

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CHAPTER THREE

THE 25TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

By

Grover C. Jarrett

PREPARATIONS

By the time the President began his televised address at 2300Z on the 22nd, most of the assigned 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division personnel had made arrangements to be near radio or television receivers. They listened with interest as the President told the nation that the United States was not going to stand by and let the missile site construction continue, that a "quarantine" was to be imposed against certain materials that were being shipped into Cuba by Russia, and that serial surveillance by United States Air Force aircraft was going to continue as a matter of routine.

Although all of this action -- the actual build-up of Soviet forces in Cuba and the Presidential decision about what was to be done to counter the build-up -- was taking place approximately 3,000 miles from the 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division (SAGE) area of responsibility, it had an immediate effect on the Region/Division units. Also, the Presidential message explained the reason for certain actions the Region/Division was ordered to take earlier in the day.

The Region/Division introduction to the Cuban Crisis actually came at 1735Z (0930 PST) when Commander-in-Chief CONAD ordered all primary armament placed in a state of increased readiness throughout the command. Upon receipt of that directive, the Region/Division immediately brought its operational units into a DEFCON 5 Delta situation.¹ The battle staffs at Region and Sector headquarters were fully manned within 15 minutes after being notified of CINCONAD's order. The Region/Division headquarters then made ready for the steps that were to follow.

It was a little unusual to see a weapons status "Delta" on the Division board and, at the same time, the

1. Extract from 25 Air Div Chief Controller Log, 22 Oct 1962.

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Region/Division remaining in a DEFCON 5 status -- a normal condition of readiness.

Also unusual was the telephone call from Commander-in-Chief CONAD at 1918Z² which directed the dispersal of Division units to designated dispersal bases with primary weapons in place.³ The Director of Operations for the Region/Division felt that CONAD had made a mistake in directing dispersement with primary weapons because, up to this time, such flights were allowed only under higher conditions of readiness. Therefore, when the conference call between Commander-in-Chief CONAD and his Region commanders was completed, the Region/Division called back to the Combat Center at Colorado Springs and asked for a clarification of the directive.⁴ Again, the Division was told to disperse with primary armament, which it did.

This dispersal arrangement meant that 12 F-106 interceptors, six from Spokane International Airport and six from

2. Extract from 25 Air Div Chief Controller Log, 22 Oct 1962.

3. Dispersal directed under provisions of ADCR Ops Plan 20-62, Annex D.

4. It must be remembered that at the time of this action the Division did not know what preparations were being made as a result of talks at Government level. It wasn't until after the Presidential speech that the real reason for directing dispersal of primary weapons under DEFCON 5 was understood.

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McChord Air Force Base, would be deployed to Paine Field armed with MB-1 rockets, and, at 1923Z, the 325th Fighter Wing at McChord and the 84th Fighter Group at Spokane were directed to carry out the dispersal plan. The first aircraft from McChord Air Force Base arrived at Paine Field at 2105Z.⁵ Spokane's first aircraft reached Paine at approximately 2110Z. By 2121Z, all operationally ready aircraft were on 15-minute alert status and the aircraft assigned identification duty were on five-minute alert status.⁶

Then, at 2300Z, about the time the Presidential address began, the 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division was placed in a DEFCON 3 status and at 2340Z Commander-in-Chief CONAD advised the Region/Division by telephone that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States had declared DEFCON 3 on a world-wide basis.⁷ These changes in alert posture were immediately relayed to subordinate units of the Region/Division.

5. Extract from 25 Air Div Chief Controller Log, 22 Oct 1962, and from 318 FIS Pilot's Form 179 (Lt Lundy).

6. Extract from 25 Air Div Chief Controller Log, 22 Oct 1962.

7. Ibid.

While the interceptors were en route to their dispersal base, preparations were being made at McChord to deploy spare parts, tools and technicians for the maintenance of the interceptors. A convoy of tractors and trailers, buses and trucks left the base at approximately 2130Z and, although they passed through the heart of the Boeing Airplane Company complex where traffic could have been a major problem, the convoy arrived at Paine Field at about 0100Z on October 23 with no undue delay or public alarm. It had military or civil police escort during the entire trip.

A hurried conference was called at Spokane at 0600Z on October 24 to work out details for supplying and reinforcing the 84th Fighter Group personnel force already dispersed to Paine Field. By 0900Z, eight commercial vehicles were en route with the necessary tools, parts and equipment. This group reached Paine at approximately 1700Z.

Surveillance and detection units also were alerted and brought up to a DEFCON 3 state of readiness. When the Region/Division was placed on DEFCON 3, Spokane Air Defense

8. Interview with 325 Trans Sq Mtr Pool Dispatcher and members of the convoy.

9. Info supplied by Office of Info, 84 Ftr Gp.

Sector was in a Mode II configuration due to maintenance being accomplished in the Great Falls Air Defense Sector area. This condition had existed since 1615Z, October 16. To bring the Region/Division back to its full potential, the Spokane Sector was directed to return to a Mode I configuration and by 2326Z, the return had been completed.

Also, at this time, the radar facility at Mt. Hebo Air Force Station, Oregon was inoperative due to damages suffered in a severe windstorm on October 11-12, 1962. High altitude coverage was being provided by the overlap of adjacent radar stations but, at the beginning of the Crisis, low altitude coverage was seriously degraded. Coverage of the low altitude function was being provided by USAF airborne early warning aircraft and U. S. Navy picket vessels of the seaward element.

At radar squadrons where operations were in a normal state, personnel were placed on a three-shift schedule to provide for full force around-the-clock manning, and all preventive maintenance and equipment testing was cancelled.

With its surveillance and detection units and fighter interceptor squadrons operating under the increased readiness

10. 25 Air Div Chief Controller Log, 22 Oct 1962.

11. USAF Accident/Incident Rpt, 18 Oct 1962; and interview with 25 CONAD Rgn/25 Air Div C&E Battle Staff Officer, 26 Oct 1962.

posture, the 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division SAGE system was ready for whatever emergency might follow as a result of the Presidential order that placed the "quarantine" against certain materials being shipped into Cuba.

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR OPERATIONS

Because they were dispersed from their home stations, the 318th and 498th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons were the first 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division units to feel the effects of the increased readiness posture brought on by the international situation evolving out of the Russian acts in Cuba.

One of the Region/Division's first operational planning considerations was to insure that its dispersed units had had sufficient weapons available to carry out an extended air battle if necessary. To give the interceptor squadrons that capability, it was decided that each of the dispersed F-106's should have the capability of launching three sorties with primary armament. This decision required that additional weapons, people and equipment should be placed at Paine Field as soon as possible. Also, the Region/Division knew from experience that dispersed aircraft on 15-minute

alert should be rotated to their home bases each 72 hours¹² for maintenance. Therefore, in a message to the two air defense sectors having operational control over the dispersed squadrons, the 25th CONAD Region said that weapons deployment would be accomplished by tactical ferry flights from McChord Air Force Base and Spokane International Airport, and wherever possible in conjunction with the¹³ rotation of aircraft from dispersal to home station. This was in accord with ADC instructions.

At this point weather conditions entered the picture. Weather in the Pacific Northwest had been bad for several days prior to the implementation of the increased readiness posture and remained bad during most of the first week of operations. Because tactical ferry flights in conjunction with the rotation of aircraft would have been dependent upon the whims of weather, regular ferry flights were established and took off whenever weather conditions permitted. By October 25, the necessary stockpile of primary weapons was completed. Each dispersed interceptor had sufficient weapons for three sorties.

12. Msg 25COOP-O 626-G to CONAD Sctr Seattle, CONAD Sctr Spokane, 24 Oct 1962.

13. Ibid.

Also, the Region message pointed out that during the tactical ferry period, the MB-1 would be configured with the igniter safety pins installed and the ejection rack cartridges removed, that all tactical ferry flights of primary weapons would be conducted during daylight hours only. ¹⁴ Further compliance with established safety measures required that these flights be conducted over water wherever possible, and, where not possible, over sparsely settled areas.

Although the Region message pointed out that the bomb rack ejection cartridges would be removed during tactical ferry flights, the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was of the opinion that this was wrong. The Squadron Commander felt that the cartridges should have been installed, that the pilot should not have been prevented from exercising the prerogative of jettisoning the weapon if necessary for ¹⁵ over all safety.

The Squadron Commander also felt that the stockpiling of the primary weapons should have been accomplished with cargo aircraft, and this opinion was expressed verbally to Seattle Air Defense Sector. The Squadron Commander based

14. Msg 25COOP-O 626-G to CONAD Sctr Seattle, CONAD Sctr Spokane, 24 Oct 1962.

15. Interview, 318 FIS Cmdr and 25 Air Div Dir of Info, 3 Feb 1963.

his opinion on several factors: the cargo aircraft could carry more weapons, had an additional safety factor with two engines, and could have adjusted its fuel load to allow for immediate landing instead of remaining in flight until the fuel load was burned off.¹⁶

The Division had good reason for establishing the tactical ferry schedule, however. It was not physically equipped to carry armed weapons aboard cargo aircraft. Stockpiling with cargo airlift would have meant that the Division would have had to disassemble the weapon, crate the separate items and can the warhead, and then wait for strategic airlift. Since past experience had shown that there would be a three to five day wait for strategic airlift,¹⁷ the tactical ferry schedule was established.

Once the three sortie stockpile was in place, the weapons were to be returned to their home stations only when maintenance or mandatory inspection was required. However, upon inquiry, Headquarters, Air Defense Command granted authority for the Division to set up a maintenance and inspection system at Paine Field. This system was established early in the crisis period and none of the

16. Ibid.

17. Interview, Ch of Armament, 5 Feb 1963.

weapons were returned to their home stations until the Cuban situation was settled.

With the inspection system established and operating, it was found that even small components could create problems which could hamper operations, as did the shortage of ARD 446 bomb ejection cartridges. The basic technical order states that these cartridges could be used ten times on solid pin or one year from the date of initial insertion for springloaded pins. However, Headquarters Air Defense Command had imposed a more stringent provision which allowed the cartridges to be used only once. With the added requirement for primary weapons usage during the Cuban Crisis, Air Defense Command's provision created a shortage of cartridges and 25th Air Division had to ask for authority to increase the usage time. On October 23, 1962, the Division told the 325th Fighter Wing, the 84th Fighter Group and the 408th Fighter Group that the provisions of Paragraph 5-10 of Air Defense Command Manual TM136-1 which pertained to the use of ARD 446 cartridges was waived, and that provisions of the technical order were implemented. ¹⁸ This gave the Region/Division more latitude in the use of its primary weapons and a greater capability.

18. Msg 25MME-DE 109358 to 325 Ftr Wg, 84 Ftr Gp and 408 Ftr Gp, 23 Oct 1962.

The dispersal also brought with it another minor problem for the 84th Fighter Group. With its forces split, part at Paine Field and part at Spokane International Airport, the Group found itself with a shortage of MF-9 trailers, which are used by nuclear equipped units to transfer and load primary weapons. On October 24, the Division told the Group that they had authority "to assume control of Air National Guard MF-9 trailers that are being used for training purposes." The Group also was given authority to effect "local repair of crossmembers on out-of-commission MF-9 trailers until such time as new crossmembers are received, at which time they will be replaced." Portland International Airport also offered to assist the 84th Fighter Group with a loan of some of its trailers.

After these early problems were worked out and a sufficient supply of primary weapons was available for the F-106's dispersed to Paine Field, there still was a need for more primary weapons for the F-102's at Portland International Airport, Portland, Oregon. Because the 337th Fighter Group's 460th Fighter Interceptor Squadron had not been modified to handle the GAR-11, its primary weapons remained the GAR-1D and GAR-2A and these were in short supply. On October 30,

19. Msg 25MME-DE 109367 to 84 Ftr Gp, 24 Oct 1962.

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1962, the Region/Division asked Middletown Air Materiel Area for additional GAR-1D's and GAR-2A's²⁰ to be stored at Kingsley Field, Klamath Falls, Oregon for the 460th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, but no assistance was received. Middletown Air Materiel Area said additional weapons were not available for assignment and that Portland International Airport would have to be supplied through a redistribution of weapons already possessed by the Region/Division. This was of no help since the internal distribution of F-102 weapons already was as fair as it could be. The 337th Fighter Group went through the Cuban Crisis with a limited number of primary weapons, but it had a sufficient number²¹ of secondary weapons - 2.75 FFAR rockets.

Although some of these problems now appear to have been minor in nature, it was necessary that they be solved before the Region/Division could consider itself to have its full capability.

Dispersal Conditions at Paine Field. With the arrival of 12 additional interceptor aircraft at Paine Field and the tactical ferry aircraft used to bring in primary weapons,

20. Msg 25MME-DE 669-G to MAAMA, 408 Ftr Gp and 337 Ftr Gp, 23 Oct 1962.

21. Interview with NCOIC Armament and Munitions Sect, 25 Air Div.

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space was at a premium. Hangar space for the dispersed aircraft was not available. And, security forces had to be augmented from other bases to provide guards for the areas brought into use as parking ramps.

But, there were other than physical aspects to the dispersal at Paine Field. In a report to the 25th Air Division on November 14, 1962, the Spokane Air Defense Sector pointed out that the "quality and number of personnel deployed and doing two shifts at Geiger has watered down our over all maintenance capability." ²² The necessity for having black boxes, test equipment and ground power support equipment at the dispersal base also reduced the over all maintenance capability at Spokane International Airport, the 498th Fighter Interceptor Squadron's home station.

²³
The 84th Fighter Group Commander, in a report to Spokane Air Defense Sector, said that because of the reduced maintenance capability the 498th Fighter Interceptor Squadron's sortie success rate was reduced. In that type of dispersal there is much ferrying of unit equipped aircraft which never could have attained a successful mission.

22. Msg SPOOP-62S-240 to 25 Air Div, 14 Nov 1962.

23. Msg 84GCCR 178 [as quoted in SPOOP-62S-240].

For the 498th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, there was an increase of 9.2 per cent in unscheduled maintenance and a decrease of 17.9 per cent in "OK" flights, and no aircraft were recovered within one hour. Further, the operational ready rate dropped nine per cent following the deployment of the squadron.

The Spokane Air Defense Sector also said that an analysis of the ratio of missed intercepts to attempted intercepts for similar period before and after October 22 showed that 195 attempts were made during the 20 days before the 60 missed intercepts, for all reasons. After October 22, 130 intercepts were attempted and 55 missed. This showed the squadron with a 75 per cent success rate before the Cuban Crisis and a 58 per cent success rate after having²⁴ been deployed for a period of 20 days.

Significant was the fact that prior to October 22, 60 per cent of the missed intercepts were due to Airborne Electronic Failure or Fire Control System malfunction. This jumped to 73 per cent during the days following the imple-²⁵mentation of the increased readiness posture.

24. Msg SPOOP-62S-240 to 25 Air Div, 15 Nov 1962.

25. Ibid.

Ground aborts also increased considerably following the increased readiness status and the deployment of the squadron. Prior to October 22 there had been no ground aborts; however, in the following 20 days 15 were logged. ²⁶

The Sector Commander added that continued operation from such a deployed configuration "will most surely continue to decrease the total combat capability of the 84th Fighter Group." ²⁷

While the 498th Fighter Interceptor Squadron had its problems at Paine Field, the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron fared somewhat better. There was no appreciable change in its success rate or in the number of ground aborts experienced. In fact, the squadron's success rate for October 1962 was only two per cent lower than for September. In December, the rate had climbed to eight per cent above the September figure, but, in neither case, did the squadron feel the fluctuations were caused by the deployment to Paine Field. Also, it should be remembered that the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was returned to its home base in less than two weeks after it was

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

deployed. Most likely, then, the December increase was due
28
to increased training and maintenance efforts.

57th Fighter Group, 409th Squadron Alert Commitments Changed. The 57th Fighter Group, under normal conditions, would have had 24 F-102 aircraft available for alert commitments, but when the Cuban Crisis struck, four of the 24 Delta Daggers assigned were away from their home station for inspection and repair as necessary. Then, on October 27, 1962, Headquarters, Air Defense Command directed the 25th Air Division to provide two TF-102's from the 57th Fighter Group and two from the 337th Fighter Group to meet
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requirements in the southeast area. Air Defense Command Tactical Evaluation Team members flew in on October 29 and
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picked up the two 57th Fighter Group aircraft. (Only one TF-102 was picked up from the 337th Fighter Group). Since this left the 57th Fighter Group with only 18 aircraft, its alert status was changed from 24 to 18 aircraft on October
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31, 1962.

28. Interview with 318 FIS Ops Officer.

29. Msg ADODC-X-88, to 25, 26 & 32 Air Divs & CINCNORAD,
27 Oct 1962.

30. Interview with 25 Air Div Ftr Intcp Officer.

31. Msg 25ODC 677-G to 57 Ftr Gp, 64 FIS, 31 Oct 1962;

Two days later, on November 1962, the Royal Canadian Air Force Air Defence Command requested that the 25th NORAD Region reduce the "Charlie" alert status of the 409 Squadron at RCAF Station Comox from six to five aircraft to allow the unit to meet minimum essential training

sorties. ³² The Region, in turn, asked CINCNORAD for approval, which was granted. The 409 Squadron alert commitment was reduced at 2200Z on November 2. ³³

318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Returned to McChord AFB. Shortly after the increased readiness posture got under way, the 25th Air Division asked CINCNORAD for authority to return the six 325th Fighter Wing F-106 aircraft to their home station. The Region felt that since McChord Air Force Base was no longer carried as a Category I base and that the number of aircraft dispersed to Paine Field was causing overcrowded conditions, the 318th might just as well be returned to its home base as soon as possible. ³⁴

[Cont'd] 25 NORAD Rgn Battle Staff Journal entry by Ops Officer; Msg NCRC-C-124, 31 Oct 1962.

32. Msg 25NOPS 719-G to CINCNORAD, 2 Nov 1962.

33. Msg 25NOPS 723-G to 409 Sq, Comox B.C., 2 Nov 1962.

34. Rgn Dep for Ops in presentation to officers following close of Cuban Crisis.

CINCNORAD agreed and the Region told Seattle Sector that the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron would be returned to McChord.³⁵

The stockpile of primary and secondary weapons for the 318th was left at Paine Field, however, to maintain the three sorties per aircraft capability if any future dispersal should be required during the increased alert.³⁶ These weapons were returned to McChord on November 24; the Spokane weapons³⁷ were returned to their home station on November 23.

Deterioration of Combat Capability. With the interceptor units committed to a rigid increased alert program, training requirements had to be overlooked in many cases. Since interceptor pilot training starts to suffer within a short period of time during prolonged periods of readiness, the Division was greatly concerned about the suspected deterioration of its combat capability. On October 30, this concern was expressed to Headquarters, Air Defense Command when the Division reported that under the conditions of the alert status normal training activities were not possible.³⁸

35. Msg 25CRC 688-G to Cmdr NORAD Sctr Seattle, 31 Oct 1962.

36. Ibid.

37. Msg 84NOSO-62S-0243; Msg FWMME-MM 0228.

38. Msg 25ODC 676-G to USAF ADC, 30 Oct 1962; and

On November 1, the Division became more specific about its concern over loss of combat crew proficiency. The Division told ADC that minimum essential training sorties during "Charlie" alert could not be provided and that within a period of a few weeks the combat proficiency would deteriorate unless additional crew training could be provided. Most affected by this condition were the F-106 units, with the F-101 and F-102 units affected to a lesser degree.³⁹

The training situation was eased somewhat on November 3, when CINCNORAD changed the alert status back to DEFCON 3 "Bravo."⁴⁰ This status change permitted the use of more aircraft for training and relaxed the squadron pilot alert commitment. From this point until the end of the increased readiness no crash actions were required, and it was seen that the Division would be able to maintain at least a minimum training program for its aircrews.⁴¹

[Cont'd] Rgn Dep for Ops during presentation to officers following close of Cuban Crisis.

39. Msg 25ODC 697-G to ADC, 1 Nov 1962.

40. Extract from 25 NORAD Rgn Chief Controllers Log, 3 Nov 1962.

41. Rgn Dep for Ops during presentation to officers following close of Cuban Crisis.

When training records were compiled at the end of the crisis period, they showed that Region/Division interceptor units had flown a total of 1,634 training sorties between October 22 and November 26. At first glance, that would appear to have been adequate. However, when the over all total was broken out by individual unit, the situation was found to be very unhealthy. For instance, the 498th Fighter Interceptor Squadron flew an average of only four training sorties a day, and that was not considered enough to maintain pilot proficiency. The 460th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, at the other end of the scale, flew an average of 15 sorties a day -- perhaps due to the number of aircraft possessed⁴² during the period.

Support for Siskiyou County Airport Dispersal Activities.

Tactical aircraft from 28th Air Division also were operating from the 25th Air Division area. On October 25, 28th Air Division asked Headquarters Air Defense Command for equipment to satisfy navigational aid requirements at Siskiyou County Airport, where a part of that Division's fighter interceptors were dispersed. Since Siskiyou was in the 25th Air Division area, the Division told Portland Air Defense

42. Rgn Dep for Ops during presentation to officers following close of Cuban Crisis.

Sector that such action would be completed only after all other higher priority requirements were satisfied. Also, the Sector was told that immediate consideration was to be given to the possibility of developing suitable scramble and recovery procedures to serve Siskiyu.⁴³

83rd, 84th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons at Kingsley Field. In addition to the 28th Air Division interceptors dispersed to Siskiyu County Airport, 12 F-101's from the 83rd and 84th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons were dispersed from their home stations and arrived at 2100Z on October 22, 1962. They were parked on the approach end of Runway 36, in an area temporarily reserved by the Kingsley Field Airport Manager for military use. Sleeping quarters, scramble procedures and vehicles were set up at the BOQ, where 28th Air Division aircrews were billeted. Shortly after arrival at Kingsley, the dispersed unit was reduced from five minute to 15-minute alert. When the Region was reduced to "Charlie" status at 2130Z on October 23, the 28th Air Division aircraft were placed on one hour alert and four of the 12 aircraft returned to their home stations.

43. Msg 2500P-0 J 0072 to POADS, 31 Oct 1962.

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Air National Guard Participation in Cuban Crisis. The Washington and Oregon Air National Guard fighter squadrons at Spokane International Airport and Portland International Airport also participated in the increased readiness on the same basis as did the regular United States Air Force interceptor squadrons. It was an Air National Guard F-89J pilot from Portland International Airport who increased the pulse rate of the system during the evening hours on November 1. While flying off the mouth of the Columbia River he spotted an aircraft which was seen to drop flares and circle over the area.⁴⁴ The F-89J pilot moved in to investigate but the unidentified aircraft apparently began evasive action. This was reported to Portland Air Defense Sector and the aircraft was declared an "unknown" at 0454Z. After Federal Aviation Agency and Portland International Airport were unable to identify the track, Portland Sector contacted the Naval Air Station at Whidbey Island (Seattle). The Navy advised that a Navy rescue squadron had SA-16 type aircraft practicing night illumination in the general vicinity of the position of the unidentified track. This seemed to solve the mystery of the flare-dropping aircraft and the

44. Extract from the 25 NORAD Rgn Battle Staff Journal.

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Region/Division settled back to what had become a normal state of being during the increased readiness period.

F-102 Lost on Flight from Paine Field. Following the excitement created by the Navy SA-16, a note of sadness crept into the Region/Division affairs on November 10 when an F-102 on a tactical flight from Paine Field was reported overdue. Search was immediately begun and several unconfirmed reports of flares, parachute and life raft sightings were received. Each was checked out by both air and ground parties but no sightings were confirmed. All organized search for the missing aircraft was discontinued on November 18 because of bad weather conditions and the lack of further leads. The pilot was being carried as missing.

Termination of Dispersal. Also, on November 18, the 25th NORAD Region told the Spokane and Seattle Sectors to terminate the dispersal of aircraft at Paine Field as soon as practical. All primary armament was to be returned to its home station by tactical ferry flights under configuration and restrictions imposed at the beginning of the

45. Msg RCC Vancouver to 25 Air Div, 10 Nov 1962; Msg CCGD Thirteen to CGAS Port Angeles, CGC Klamath and CG-95328, 10 Nov 1962; Msg 570DS 11-4604, 11 Nov 1962; Msg 57CBPO-PRA 11-4604, 12 Nov 1962; Msg 57CBPO-PRA 11-4683, 18 Nov 1962.

46. Msg 25NCRC 896-G to Seattle, Spokane & Portland NORAD Sctrs, 18 Nov 1962.

dispersal period. At the home station, a weapons status of DEFCON 3 "Bravo" was to be maintained and Paine Field was to maintain a Phase II dispersal capability.

SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION

At the time the 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division went into the increased alert posture on October 22, 1962, the radar facilities at Mt. Hebo Air Force Station, Oregon still were unusable. The 689th Radar Squadron's AN/FPS-24, AN/MPS-11, and AN/FPS-6 had been damaged during a severe windstorm on October 11-12. Only an AN/FPS-6B was left operational. However, during the early days of the Cuban Crisis the 689th Radar Squadron was not standing idly by.

When the seriousness of the international situation became known, the Squadron Commander⁴⁷ and the Communications and Electronics Officer⁴⁸ accelerated their efforts to bring the station back into the surveillance network. They had no intention of being caught up in a serious situation with an inoperative radar station.

First, they exchanged height finder locations, moving the FPS-6B into the FPS-6 tower, where it was already scheduled

47. Maj Raymond R. Robinson, AO 878469.

48. Maj Ray V. Cooley.

to go at some future date. To get the FPS-6B equipment into its new location meant that all of the damaged FPS-6 gear had to be removed and a great amount of electronic wiring re-routed. By doing this work themselves, members of the Squadron had the height finder back in operation on October 25, three days after the beginning of the increased readiness. Had they waited for approval through normal channels, it was doubtful that the equipment would have been ready at any time during the crisis.⁴⁹

This departure from approved methods did not mean that the Squadron acted without guidance. Headquarters, Air Defense Command provided an expedited approval for the move, stating that the Squadron's actions were unorthodox but that the exigencies involved probably were sufficient to warrant deviation from standard procedures.⁵⁰

A search radar was sorely needed, too, if the station was going to be in the air defense business at all during the alert period. So, getting a replacement for the MPS-11 moved almost as fast as the relocation of the FPS-6B. A few days after the storm, the Squadron began looking for a new bubble and found one at Rome Air Materiel Area headquarters.

49. Interview with 689 Sq Cmdr, 18 Dec 1962.

50. Msg ADOAC-AM 39113 to GEEIA, 23 Oct 1962.

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A new antenna -- the old one had been ripped from its tower and slammed onto the ground at the base of the FPS-26 tower -- was located at Winslow Air Force Station, Arizona and flown to Mt. Hebo, but not until some complications were cleared up. Restrictions imposed on flying and the need for cargo aircraft for support of the southeast area made it almost impossible to get airlift for the antenna. Finally, an aircraft was allowed to take off and the needed piece of equipment arrived at Mt. Hebo at about 0600Z on October 24. One hour and 40 minutes after arrival, the antenna was on top of the 30-foot tower and the bubble was being inflated.

"It was so foggy that night that you could hardly see the ground from the top of the tower," the Squadron Commander said. "The only way we could adequately signal the crane operator was with a flashlight."

Also, he added that the entire operation would have been impossible without the teamwork of every man at Mt. Hebo Air Force Station. "Manual labor was something everyone shared, regardless of his rank or position," the Commander said.

The search capability of Mt. Hebo Air Force Station was finally restored at 1840Z on October 28, eliminating a hole that had existed in the 25th NORAD Region/25th Air Division surveillance and detection network since the beginning

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of the alert. High altitude overlap coverage had been provided by adjacent radar stations during the time Mt. Hebo was inoperative, but low altitude coverage was somewhat degraded. Some low altitude coverage was provided by USAF airborne early warning aircraft, but this was on a random-manned basis and there were long periods of time when the airborne early warning stations off the Portland Air Defense Sector were not manned at all. Also, some information affecting the area was received from U. S. Navy picket ships on patrol off the coast as part of the seaward
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element.

In November, in response to the urgent need for an operational FPS-24 at Mt. Hebo Air Force Station, Headquarters, United States Air Force told Electronic System Division that repairs would not be delayed pending a final assessment of cost and liability, and that every effort should be made to return the electronic components to operation as quickly as possible and to expedite plans to rebuild the
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radome. However, in view of the Mt. Hebo area weather situation during the winter months, Electronic System Division did not plan to start new radome installation work

51. Interview with 25 NR C&E Battle Staff Officer,
26 Oct 1962.

52. Hq ADC Daily Staff Digest No. 181, 21 Nov 1962.

before April or May 1963. Antenna repair was estimated at \$52,000 for a 75-day work period and 15-day test period, and Electronic System Division planned to award the repair contract as soon as money was available for the job.⁵³

At the end of December 1962, the FPS-24 still was not ready for use and probably would not be ready for several months. Until it was returned to operation, the outdated MPS-11 was going to be the only search equipment available should another increased readiness be ordered.

Interference at Klamath Air Force Station. While the facilities at Mt. Hebo were still down and the Region/Division was concerned over the lack of low altitude coverage in that area, Klamath Air Force Station reported that electronic interference was being experienced on both search and height finder radars.⁵⁴

Although the interference was light and represented an annoyance more than a degradation of Klamath's search and height finder capabilities, the situation did cause the Battle Staff some concern.

The first report came at 0235Z on October 25, when the Battle Staff was advised of the problem. An amplifying

53. Hq ADC Daily Staff Digest No. 181, 21 Nov 1962.

54. Extract from 25 NR Battle Staff Journal, 25 Oct 1962.

report was made at 0308Z, when the 777th Radar Squadron reported that the interference was coming from a bearing of 210 degrees. A few minutes later, Headquarters, Portland Air Defense Sector added to the suspense by reporting a radar pickup on a surface vessel bearing 220 degrees at a distance of approximately 56 nautical miles from Klamath
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Air Force Station.

At this point, the Region advised Headquarters, Western Sea Frontier of the problem and asked that the surface vessel be investigated. Headquarters, 28th NORAD Region/28th Air Division also was notified of the interference
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report, since the target was moving in that direction.

Both the track and the interference faded at 0700Z,
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at which time the 25th NORAD Region/25th Air Division still did not have positive identification of the interference source. But, like the Air National Guard-Navy SA-16 incident off the mouth of the Columbia River, the incident gave the Division pulse rate reason to fluctuate a little.

55. Extract from the 25 NR Battle Staff Journal,
25 Oct 1962.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

Maintenance of Radar Equipment. With the problem at Mt. Hebo at least partially solved and the electronic interference no longer present, the primary problem faced by the Region/Division was the maintenance of its radar equipment, which, for the most part, presented no real problem. In fact, the only serious problem foreseen as a result of such a prolonged period of increased readiness was that of keeping single channel equipment in continuous operation. 58

When the crisis began, the Division wanted its equipment ready for any emergency, so on October 23 field units were told to conduct only those tests necessary to assure that all equipment was operating effectively. 59 Even so, requests to remove equipment from active air defense use continued to come from the field.

Then, on October 30, after a week of dual channel operation, the Division saw that a program of maintenance monitoring was essential to insure maximum availability of equipment and that some periods of single channel operation would be necessary to allow for repairs to degrading equipment. To insure recovery at the earliest possible time

58. Rgn Dep for Ops during presentation to Div officers following close of Cuban Crisis.

59. Msg 25MME-MC 109351 to SEADS, SPADS & POADS, 23 Oct 1962.

after going into a single channel situation, the air defense sectors were instructed to keep close control of units in that configuration.

By November 6, maintenance policies moved from 25th Air Division level to Command level, with Headquarters, Air Defense Command setting up procedures to be used by all divisions during the remainder of the increased readiness period. Headquarters, Air Defense Command said that numerous interpretations of operations regulations pertaining to equipment status had arisen and that to prevent further system degradation certain guidance had to be followed, particularly that of operational improvement versus operational degradation while improvements were being accomplished. In other words, was the period of degradation worth the improvements made during the time the equipment was inoperative? In general, where recovery time was one hour or less, it was felt that repairs should not be deferred. Upon receipt of the Air Defense Command policy, the Division amended its earlier policy to conform with the Command procedures.

60. Msg 25OAC-E 109478 to SEADS, SPADS & POADS, 23 Oct 1962.

61. ADCR 55-12.

62. Msg ADOOP-EI 3047 to All Air Divs, 6 Nov 1962.

63. Msg 25OAC-E 109610 to SEADS, SPADS & POADS, 7 Nov 1962.

After the international situation became less serious, further amendments to maintenance policies were made to allow for periodic tests and preventive maintenance routines which required removal of a function from operation or stand-by status when dual channel recovery was 30 minutes or less, or, in the case of single channel functions, the adjacent facilities were operational in that function and recovery time was 30 minutes or less.

When the period of increased readiness was cancelled, all maintenance procedures were returned to normal. And, with the return to normal, the Division noted with interest that it had weathered the increased readiness with fewer unscheduled outages than usually experienced during normal conditions.

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

Units of USARADCOM's 7th Region, headquartered at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, also were alerted and placed in a DEFCON 5 "Delta" status at 1735Z on October 22,

64. Msg 250AC-E 119910 to SEADS, SPADS & POADS, 26 Nov 1962.

65. Rgn Dep for Ops in presentation to officers following close of Cuban Crisis.

and were brought up to DEFCON 3 at 2300Z and brought down to DEFCON 3 "Charlie" along with other units of the 25th CONAD Region.

At the time the alert was called, the 7th Region missile site at Vashon Island ⁶⁶ had been turned over to contractor and support personnel for a 60-day period for installation of an improved radar system kit. With the international situation requiring a high state of military preparedness, installation of the kit was expedited and the site returned to active use on November 9, 20 days ahead of schedule. Return of the site gave the 7th Region ⁶⁷ full air defense capability.

In addition to the active U. S. Army units affected by the increased readiness, four National Guard units were rotating on 15-minute alert status. All National Guard units assigned an on-site mission stood ready for federalization. They accelerated their training programs and imposed certain availability restrictions on their personnel so that any call-up could be completed in minimum time. Although none of these units was actually federalized

66. Battery B, 4th Msl Bn, 4th Arty.

67. Asst Chief of Staff, G-3, 7th Rgn.

during the alert period, 7th Region was prepared to implement any orders for the call-up of National Guard on-site mission units.⁶⁸

Operational readiness of the NIKE-equipped units was maintained at a very high state considering the prolonged period of time involved and the high operational rate required. This was confirmed by statistics published during the first two weeks of the increased readiness period which showed the 25th NORAD Region-controlled 7th Region had the highest over all readiness rate in the country.

While the Region was maintaining its high readiness rate, it also was experiencing periods of non-operation; but, these were of short duration and had little effect on the unit's combat capability. Over a longer period of time, however, the maintenance of such a high state of alert would have had its effect on operations, primarily because⁶⁹ of the lack of live exercises.

MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS

Operations at the beginning of the Cuban Crisis appeared a little unusual to 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division,

68. Ibid.

69. Asst Ch of Staff, G-3, 7th Rgn.

particularly when the weapons were brought up to a DEFCON 5 "Delta" status while the rest of the Region/Division remained in its normal air defense condition. There had been routine intelligence on the increasing seriousness of the Cuban buildup, but there had been nothing to indicate that the increase in the weapons alert status was a result of that, or any other, world situation. So, when the Region/Division was instructed to move its interceptors to dispersal bases with primary armament aboard, it requested clarification of the directive. After being told that the dispersal would be carried out as originally instructed, and with the unusual status remaining on the board, the Region/
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Division acted in a positive manner.

Manning in the Combat Center/Direction Centers. With the interceptors alerted and dispersed, the Region/Division began arranging for 24-hour a day combat center manning without the use of Canadian personnel. This was necessary at the beginning of the increased readiness period because all actions were taken unilaterally by CONAD, the Canadian government not having begun their participation. Therefore, the Royal Canadian Air Force members of the Region were not

70. Rgn Dep for Ops during presentation to officers following close of Cuban Crisis; also pp. 4 and 5 of this document.

eligible for duty in the Combat Center and Direction Centers. With the Candaians eliminated, it became necessary for some CONAD Region/Air Division people to live in the centers on almost a round-the-clock basis.⁷¹ The Region/Division operated under these conditions until Commander-in-Chief NORAD declared DEFCON 3 "Charlie" at 1731Z on October 24.

Interceptor Force Survival. Only two of the Region/Division's five Air Force fighter interceptor squadrons and two Air National Guard fighter interceptor squadrons were dispersed during this time and they were operating from an established Air Force installation. At the same time, a second dispersal base⁷² was being prepared for further dispersal use. The field was closed to traffic at 2115Z on November 5, 1962 after Headquarters, Air Defense Command gave the go-ahead on needed repairs,⁷³ and re-opened at 1710Z on November 29, 1962.⁷⁴

71. Rgn Dep for Ops during presentation to officers following close of Cuban Crisis.

72. Walla Walla, Wash.

73. Msg ADIFS 2925, 27 Oct 1962.

74. Interview with Mr. William A. Stancer, 25 Air Div Civil Eng Office.

During the 24-day closure, a 150 foot wide overlay was spread over the existing 7,188 foot runway, which was found to be in good shape structurally but limited to aircraft with a wheel-load of 25,000 pounds.

The short time required for the repair of the runway was directly attributable to the Cuban Crisis and the possible need for the base if further dispersals were required.

Survival of Essential Facilities. Planning for survival of essential facilities also was directed as part of the Region/Division preparation for whatever might come as a result of the "quarantine" placed around Cuba. All 25th Air Division units were advised that command posts and other essential facilities were to be sandbagged where practical to increase protection from fallout, all disaster control teams were to be updated, civilian employees and on-base dependents were re-briefed on emergency procedures, and close liaison was established with local civil defense and public agencies.

75

Sub Contact Quebec 23. While these survival plans were being ordered, further realism was added to the situation when the 25th NORAD Region Battle Staff was advised

75. Interview with 25 Air Div Disaster Cont Officer, 26 Oct 1962.

at 0230Z on October 25 that a good contact had been made with an unknown submarine off the Portland Air Defense Sector. The contact, tabbed "Quebec 23," was taken under surveillance by the U.S.S. Watts, a U. S. Navy destroyer patrolling in the general vicinity of the reported sighting. Twelve hours later the contact was still good and hold down tactics were being carried out. General surveillance was continued until after four destroyers reported they had had negative results with the contact. The search was terminated at 0728Z on October 26.

76

The end of "Quebec 23" was not the end of submarine sightings reported to 25th NORAD Region/25th Air Division, however. Headquarters, Portland Air Defense Sector forwarded a message to the combat center at 2052Z on October 26 stating that a civilian living on the coast had reported a possible submarine surfaced off the coast in the vicinity of 41 29N 124 11W. Headquarters, Western Sea Frontier was advised of the report and asked to investigate. Final evaluation by the Navy was that the "sub" was either a probable fishing boat or rock formation off the coast.

77

76. Extract from 25 NORAD Rgn Ch Controller Log, 26 Oct 1962.

77. Ibid.

Exercises and Evaluations Cancelled. While these reports lessened the routine of the long increased alert, they did not provide the live training the Region/Division thought was necessary. From previous experience, the Region/Division knew that without sufficient live exercises combat center proficiency would begin to deteriorate. But, four days after the alert was implemented, all 25th NORAD Region and Sector exercises and evaluations, synthetic or live,⁷⁸ and support thereto were cancelled until further notice. Also, support of adjacent division and sector exercises⁷⁹ and evaluations were cancelled. This, in effect, eliminated any possibility for live exercises during the period.

SAC Runs Against RBS Sites Continued. Although Region/Division exercises and evaluations were no longer allowed, Commander-in-Chief NORAD said there was no objection to the continuation of Strategic Air Command runs against⁸⁰ radar bomb scoring sites. Therefore, during the October 22- November 27 alert, USARADCOM units in the 25th NORAD Region

78. Msg 25NOOP-X 109438 to SENS, SPNS, PONS,
26 Oct 1962.

79. Ibid.

80. Msg 25CRC J 0025 to SEADS, SPADS & POADS,
25 Oct 1962.

continued to provide overflying bombers with results of their "bomb" drop.

Peacetime Flight Restrictions Lifted. On October 27, Headquarters, Air Defense Command told all air divisions that peacetime flying limitations had been lifted and that other restrictions previously imposed which were restricting operations could be lifted by local division commanders. On the surface this appeared to be a simple, straightforward directive that could easily be placed into effect throughout the 25th NORAD Region/25th Air Division. On closer observation, however, it was soon apparent that numerous restrictions had been imposed from time to time and that the difficulty of researching these items and determining which was to be removed was going to be a major project. ⁸¹

For example, there were restrictions on carrying F-106 drop tanks, the use of high altitude flight suits above 50,000 feet, tail number scheduling in accordance with AFM 66-1, PRIME requirements, data collection for both AFM 66-1 and PRIME, and many others still to be researched well after the close of the period. ⁸²

81. Rgn Dep for Ops during presentation to officers following close of Cuban Crisis.

82. Ibid.

The Division realized that to react quickly in the future all such restrictions would have to be catalogued, even though determining which items were not required during higher states of alert was going to be a big job.⁸³ This was just one of the lessons learned during the Cuban Crisis.

Reflections on the Cuban Crisis Participation. After the 25th NORAD Region/25th Air Division Battle Staff went on reduced manning at 1600Z on November 21, there was an opportunity to look back over the entire period of increased readiness and pick out the areas that were in need of further investigation.⁸⁴ At the end of December 1962, the Region/Division was asking:

Were we satisfied with the existing NORAD regulation outlining readiness conditions and states of alert?⁸⁵

What restrictions imposed during readiness conditions could and should be lifted during increased readiness? For instance, should the requirements of AFM 66-1 be partially disregarded?

Was there a need for more supervisors to direct management of resources during operations on a 24-hour a day basis?

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. NORAD Reg 55-3.

~~SECRET~~

What training requirements should be maintained during period of extended higher alert status?

How long should communications and electronics facilities be maintained at a peaked condition without regard to preventive maintenance policies?

Should cross training regulations be reviewed with the idea of training selected personnel in highly technical areas so commanders at sectors can be advised on technical implications that arise periodically?

This was by no means a complete list of the questions Region/Division was asking itself at the end of the crisis. There was to be no let-up in the Region/Division efforts to overcome even the most minute deficiency uncovered during the period. The end of the crisis was, in actuality, a point from which to begin to strengthen combat capability and to prepare for the real thing.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE 26TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

By

John W. Dennison

ALERT

The alert began at 1918Z when COCO color was implemented. All Battle Staff members of the 26th NORAD Region were in place within the hour. Minicom was implemented at 2025Z. At 2300Z Defense Condition (DEFCON) 3 was declared.* In these early hours of frenzied activity, CINCONAD directed the 26th Air Division, after it had attained DELTA alert status**, to revert to CHARLIE alert status.

* The various defense condition postures may be found in Chart IV "DEFCON Instructions."

** Explanation of alert posture may be found in Chart III "Status of Alert Conditions."

Approximately five hours after the alert was implemented, the 26th NORAD Region had achieved full DELTA alert status. Within NORAD all units were placed on CHARLIE alert status at 2255Z on 23 October.¹ CHARLIE alert status remained in effect until 3 November when DEFCON 3 BRAVO was implemented. The deployed aircraft did not change their alert status with the new status but remained on the same alert posture.² Not until 28 November was the 26th returned to DEFCON 5, the normal alert status.³

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Upon receipt of increased alert status, Battle Staff members took their positions and war plans were reviewed. Up to date intelligence summaries were furnished by the Intelligence Staff through intelligence briefings. Major General Henry Viccelio notified commanders that maximum

1. Log, Record of Events, 26AD/26NORAD Rgn COC, 22 Oct 1962 to 27 Nov 1962, hereafter referred to as COC Log; Msg CCRC-C-1, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD Rgn, et al., 22 Oct 1962; Msg NCRC-3-31, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD, et al., 23 Oct 1962.

2. Msg 26NOOP-PL 11352, 26 NORAD to Boston NORAD, et al., CINCNORAD/CONAD declared DEFCON 3 BRAVO 03/1632Z, 3 Nov 1962.

3. Interview with Maj Gen Viccelio, Cmdr 26 NORAD/CONAD/AD (SAGE), 5 Dec 1962.

security measures would be initiated, increased effort would be made to maintain the highest incommission rate for all types of equipment, all flight leaders and commanders would be thoroughly familiar with current war plans and rules of engagement, and each commander would make the maximum use of personnel, equipment, and supplies.⁴

As the direction of the flourishing crisis was unknown and could progress toward actual aircraft engagement and major armed conflict, rules of what to do when confronting a hostile aircraft became of primary importance. A CONAD Supplement to NORAD Regulation 55-6 set forth⁵ the first instructions. These instructions were modified by CONAD Operation Plan 2-62 which gave a general synopsis of the crisis, duties of participating commands, and the rules for engagement.⁶ Generally, the rules for engagement specified that CONAD Region commanders had the authority to permit aircraft engagement. All destruction actions

4. Msg 26CCR 62-10946, 26 AD to BAADS, et al., Personal Vicellio to Sect Cmdrs and Cmdr 551 FIS, 23 Oct 1962.

5. CONAD Supp #1 to NORAD Reg 55-6, 9 Dec 1959, Rules for Engagement of Cuban/Sino-Soviet Tactical Aircraft, 22 Oct 1962.

6. NOFORN, Msg COOP-P X-488, CINCONAD to 26 CONAD, et al., CONAD Ops Plan 2-62, 26 Oct 1962.

would be with non-nuclear armament. Nike-Ajax or non-nuclear Nike-Hercules missiles could be considered for employment only when the safety of the surrounding areas from falling components was assured. In the event that an aircraft was deemed hostile, engagement would be conducted as follows:⁷

1. Attempts by every practical means would be made to direct pilot to land the aircraft at a non-critical airport under U. S. control for purpose of capture.

2. If the aircraft was responsive to attempted forced landing actions, attempts will be made to divert the aircraft to a non-critical airport for capture. Capture would be attempted using USSR visual interception signals as indicated in the en route low-altitude flight information publications for Alaska, Canada, and North Atlantic. The intercepting aircraft would escort the hostile aircraft to a non-critical airport for purpose of capture.

3. If the suspected aircraft failed to follow the intercepting aircraft, shots or rocket or flare could be fired in such a manner that the aircraft was not endangered but that the pilot could not fail to see it.

7. Ibid.

4. If the suspected aircraft continued not to respond, the interceptor pilot would so advise CONAD region commander. Then the CONAD region commander could authenticate the order for destruction using non-nuclear weapons or issue such other instructions as were appropriate. Engagement was to be conducted within the Air Defense Identification Zones.

5. Pursuit, attack, and destruction of any Cuban naval craft or airplane, attacking or attempting to attack U. S. military shipping, aircraft or naval unit was authorized. Attack on the basis of such craft or airplanes would be authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs only in the event that it was absolutely necessary in order to protect American lives.

Besides the responsibility for authorizing aerial engagements, Major General Viccellio, as 26th CONAD Region and 26th NORAD Region Commander, had other responsibilities reserved specifically to him. These actions are listed on the charts titled: "NORAD Actions Reserved to Commander of 26th NORAD Region" and "CONAD Actions Reserved to Commander of 26th CONAD Region." ⁸ If one of the reserved actions of

8. Ltr, Maj Gen H. Viccellio to 26NOOPS and 26NOCC, NORAD Actions Reserved to Cmdr 26 NORAD Rgn, 30 Oct 1962; Ltr, Maj Gen Viccellio to 26COPS and 26COCC, CONAD Actions Reserved to Cmdr 26 CONAD Rgn, 30 Oct 1962.

the CONAD or NORAD Commander took place during the absence of General Viccellio, all decisions related to these actions would be accomplished under the following chain of command:⁹ Major General J. T. Snodgrass, USA, Deputy Commander; Colonel G. R. Bickell, USAF, Vice Commander; Colonel W. P. Mace, USAF Deputy for Operations.

Position manning for the Continuous Battle Staff consisted of:¹⁰

1. The Commander, Deputy for Operations, or Director Combat Operations.
2. Fighter Officer, Interceptors or Fighter Officer, Missiles.
3. Air Defense Artillery - Navy.
4. Combat Reporting Center.
5. Communications and Electronics.

In addition, one of the following officers, Major General Viccellio, Colonel Mace, Colonel Bickell, or Colonel W. E. Thurman, would always be on duty in the headquarters.¹¹

9. Ltr, Maj Gen Viccellio to 26NOOPS and 26NOCC, NORAD Actions Reserved to Cmdr 26 NORAD Rgn, 30 Oct 1962; Ltr, Maj Gen Viccellio to 26 COPS and 26COCC, CONAC Actions Reserved to Cmdr 26 CONAD Rgn, 30 Oct 1962.

10. IOM, 26COPS to All Officers Concerned, 26 CONAD Rgn, 26 AD, Continuous Battle Staff Manning, 26 CONAD Rgn, 23 Oct 1962; Msg 26NOPS 10-25-47, 26 NORAD Rgn to CINCNORAD, et al., 25 Oct 1962.

11. Ibid.

A command problem developed concerning control of U. S. Forces of the Bangor Sector. In September 1962, Bangor NORAD Sector was transferred from the 26th NORAD Region to the Northern NORAD Region. The Northern NORAD Region was located at St. Hubert, near Montreal, Quebec, and was under the Command of Air Vice Marshal J. B. Harvey, Royal Canadian Air Force. When the Cuban alert was initiated operations were limited to U. S. military Participation. Numerous countries offered assistance early in the crisis, but Canada delayed a policy announcement until 29 October causing some consternation among Canadian military personnel on duty with U. S. military personnel. Therefore, CONAD, rather than NORAD of which Canada was a member, had the responsibility to conduct the air defense of the United States. Thus for CONAD or Continental Air Defense policies, Bangor Sector had to be reassigned. To correct the situation, CONAD directed that Bangor Sector would be placed under the

12. Msg 26NOIN N62-7026, 26NORAD to Bangor NORAD Sector, et al., NORAD Intelligence Item, 25 Oct 1962.

13. Msg NNFO-164, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD, et al., Canadian Personnel, 29 Oct 1962.

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NORAD ACTIONS RESERVED TO COMMANDER 26TH NORAD REGION

Declaration of Air Defense Warning Red in the event of a no-warning attack.

Declaration of airborne objects as Hostile prior to the initiation of hostilities.

Declaration of airborne objects as Hostile subsequent to the initiation of hostilities.

Declaration of full or partial SCATER.

Placing "Pop-Up" procedures in effect.

Authorizing engagement by Air Defense Artillery of ECM emitters.

Releasing AEW&C aircraft to adjacent Regions for purposes of re-establishing operational control.

CONAD ACTIONS RESERVED TO COMMANDER 26TH CONAD REGION

Authority to divert or engage Cuban/Sino-Soviet tactical aircraft penetrating the ADIZ or CONUS airspace.

Declaration of target as CINCLANT - designated aircraft enroute to Cuba after visual identification by interceptor pilot.

Authority to engage CINCLANT - designated aircraft enroute to Cuba.

Specific authority in each instance for use of NIKE AJAX or non-nuclear NIKE HERCULES in engaging CINCLANT - designated aircraft enroute to Cuba.

Declaration of target as Sino-Soviet Bloc aircraft after visual identification by interceptor pilot.

Authority to commence harrassment, denial, seisure or destruction of Sino-Soviet Bloc aircraft.

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Specific authority in each instance for use of NIKE AJAX or non-nuclear NIKE HERCULES for the destruction of Sino-Soviet Bloc aircraft.

Ordering the use of nuclear weapons in air defense against objects determined to be Hostile in accordance with NORADR 55-6.

Unmodified Rules of Engagement as contained in NORADR 55-6 are applicable in all instances in which it has been determined that aircraft approaching from the South are participating in a coordinated Soviet attack. In such instances nuclear weapons may be authorized.

operational control of the 26th CONAD Region in matters
14
pertaining to CONAD and the Cuban Crisis.

DISPERSAL AND DEPLOYMENT

Upon the receipt of the dispersal message, two units of the 26th Air Division (SAGE) prepared to deploy to bases in Florida.¹⁵ The 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) from Langley AFB, Virginia, deployed its F-106's to Patrick AFB, Florida, and the 482nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron from Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, deployed its F-102's to Homestead AFB, Florida. During the crisis, the 482nd kept four F-102's operationally ready at Homestead. The 48th FIS had 12 F-106's ready at Patrick AFB.* Two F-101's from the 444th FIS at Charleston AFB, South Carolina, were rotated to Langley AFB to fill alert commitments left by the departure of the 48th FIS.

14. Msg NCRC-C-69, CINCONAD to Cmdr CONAD Sect Bangor, 27 Oct 1962; Msg 26COOP-PR, C62-7050, 26 CONAD to CONAD Sect Bangor, et al., 30 Oct 1962; Msg COOP-E X-517, CINCONAD to 26 CONAD Rgn, 6 Nov 1962.

15. Msg CCRC-C-1, CINCNOAD to 26 NORAD Rgn et al., 22 Oct 1962.

* For status of the deployed and dispersed unit see Chart II "26th Air Division Aircraft Deployed Status."

Aircraft from six 26th Air Division fighter interceptor squadrons were sent to dispersal bases.* The 76th FIS at Westover AFB, Massachusetts, sent F-102's to Burlington Municipal Airport, Burlington, Vermont, where six aircraft were placed on alert. The 539th FIS at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, dispatched four F-106's to Olmstead AFB, Pennsylvania. F-101's from the 49th FIS at Griffiss AFB, New York, and the 75th FIS at Dow AFB, Maine, were dispersed to Niagara Falls Municipal Airport, Niagara Falls, New York. And to Atlantic City Airport, Atlantic City, New Jersey, the 98th FIS at Dover AFB, Delaware, sent F-101's¹⁶ and the 95th FIS at Andrews AFB, Maryland, sent F-106's.

* Evaluation of the 1965 war games indicated a need for fighter dispersal bases situated away from high potential target areas of Soviet missile attack. The war games disclosed that under the present posture, no base within the 26th Air Division was immune to heavy fallout danger following such an attack. As a result of these studies, dispersal bases were selected within the 26th Air Division where units could send fighter forces and associated support equipment for survival and restrike. These additional bases also complicated Russian targeting and increased tactical deployment to more realistically meet a predicted bomber threat.

16. COC Log; Msg CCRC-C-1, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD Rgn, et al., 22 Oct 1962.

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The aircraft remained on alert status at the dispersal bases until 17 November when CONAD sent instructions for them to redeploy their home bases.¹⁷ By 19 November the dispersed aircraft had been returned.¹⁸

The aircraft in Florida were not released at the same time as those aircraft at the dispersal bases. As the crisis continued to dissipate, further reductions were made in the military might posed near Cuba. President Kennedy lifted the quarantine on 20 November.¹⁹ Eight days later, the F-102's of the 482nd FIS were returned from Homestead AFB, Florida, to Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina. Then on 6 December, the F-106's of the 48th FIS redeployed from Patrick AFB, Florida, to Langley AFB, Virginia.²⁰ On 8 December, with the departure of the last F-106, Major General T. J. Gent, Commander of the 32nd CONAD Region, announced²¹ that the Cuban crisis had come to an end.

17. Msg NCRC-C-184, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD Rgn, et al., 17 Nov 1962.

18. COC Log.

19. Syracuse Post Standard, 21 Nov 1962.

20. Interview with Maj Gen Viccellio, Cmdr 26NORAD/AD 5 Dec 1962; COC Log; Msg 26OOP-W 62-12096, 26 AD to WAADS, Force Withdrawal South East U.S., 3 Nov 1962; Msg 26OOP-WF 62-12113, 26 AD to WAADS and 48 FIS, Withdrawal of Forces S.E. USA, 5 Dec 1962.

21. Msg 26OOP-WF 2226, 26 AD to WAADS, 48 FIS, 482 FIS, 551 AEW&C Wg, Msg for Gen Gerhart from Gen Gent, 12 Dec 1962.

~~SECRET~~

During the crisis, Major General Gent stated that fighter interceptor aircraft flew 8901 hours and that air-borne early warning and control aircraft flew 3754 hours²² without a major accident.

These aircraft missions were performed from strange airfields upon short notice under conditions that were not always the most desirable.²³ Early in the crisis, all flight restrictions concerning the carrying of external fuel tanks²⁴ on fighter interceptor aircraft were waived. In addition, division commanders were authorized to waive operational and safety limitations imposed on F-101, F-102, and F-106 aircraft by handbooks, safety of flight supplements, and other restrictive directives issued by ADC and other headquarters, during actual conditions of DEFCON 3, 2, 1, or Air Defense Emergency.²⁵ To increase force survivability, local commanders were instructed to keep aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons for an indefinite period and were

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Msg 2600P-WF 0591-C, 26 AD to BAADS, et al., External Fuel Tanks, 30 Oct 1962.

25. Msg 2600P-WF 0588-C, 26 AD to BAADS, et al., Waiver of Peacetime Flying Limitations, 30 Oct 1962; Msg ADOOP-WI X-72, ADC to 26 AD, et al., Waiver of Peacetime Flying Limitations, 26 Oct 1962.

permitted to waive the high explosive criteria for a period
26
of 72 hours during operational emergencies.

Region commanders were also authorized to approve rotational flights of tactical aircraft between home and dispersal bases for the purpose of exchanging aircraft, crews, and weapons, and conducting essential training. Certain limitations were imposed, however. CONAD recommended that aircraft on rotational flights carry nuclear weapons only if the weapons needed to be returned to the home base for maintenance or mandatory inspections. Then the MB-1 would be ferried with the igniter safety pin installed and the ejection rack cartridges removed. The GAR-11 would be ferried as prescribed by Air Force Regulation 122-23, paragraph 15, dated 2 April 1962. Before one aircraft could be down-loaded and rotated, another operationally ready aircraft was to be in place at the base. All operationally ready aircraft at the dispersal bases were to be fully loaded with primary armament at all times except during the exchange of weapons. Primary armament would be down-loaded prior to all rotational flights. Loading safety and technical directives were always
27
in effect. The 26th Air Division amplified CONAD instructions

26. Msg ADMDC 2902, ADC to 26 AD, Limitations to Force Survivability, 26 Oct 1962.

27. Msg 26COOP-0 N62-7028, 26 CONAD to CONAD Sctr

by authorizing sector commanders to rotate conventionally armed aircraft and aircrews every 72 hours. When it became necessary to transport primary weapons for maintenance or mandatory weapons inspection, the commander was to notify the 26th Region Duty Deputy for Operations and receive permission for each flight. Flights with primary weapons were kept to an absolute minimum and conducted during the daylight hours. Flights followed minimum safe distance routing²⁸ consistent with normal landing weights for the aircraft.

Due to the congestion at bases where ADC fighter aircraft and SAC bomber aircraft were collocated, fighter flushing* instructions were reviewed early in the crisis. Under the instructions, dispersed aircraft would not flush. Home based aircraft on 5 and 15 minute alert status would flush, and all other would "come up" and flush as soon as possible unless DEFCON 1 or Air Defense Emergency had been reduced. Category 1 Air National Guard aircraft would also flush.²⁹ As for the possibility of flushing all aircraft,

[Cont'd] Boston, et al., 25 Oct 1962; Msg CCRC-C-28, CINCONAD to 26 CONAD, et al., 24 Oct 1962.

28. Ibid.

29. COC Log.

* Flushing means to scramble aircraft for survival by any means, off runways and taxiways, upon receipt of a missile attack warning.

the 26th Air Division did not foresee any problem areas, but did direct its subordinate units to coordinate their flush policy with collocated units. ³⁰ At the beginning of the crisis, all planned exercises, tactical evaluations, and simulated tests were either postponed or cancelled. ³¹ But as the crisis began to subside, exercises and tactical evaluations were rescheduled. ³² Thus, APACHE NOOSE*, AUTUMN MOON and DESK TOP V Part III were scheduled tentatively for ³³ February 1963.

TEXAS TOWERS

During the Cuban Crisis, the Texas Towers were in operation but weather continued to be an obstacle.

30. Msg 26OOP-0585-C, 26 AD to BAADS, Fighter Flushing at ADC/SAC Collocated Bases, 25 Oct 1962.

31. Msg NOEV-E-134, CINCNORAD to 26 AD, et al., NORAD Training Exercises, 25 Oct 1962; Msg NCRC-C-51, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD, et al., 27 Oct 1962.

32. Msg 26NOOP-OE 11-21-71, 26 NORAD to NORAD Sctr Boston, et al., Exercise Postponements, 21 Nov 1962; Msg 26NOOP-OE 11-21-69, 26 NORAD Rgn Exercise Schedule for Dec, Jan, and Feb, 21 Nov 1962; Msg 26NOOP-OE 12-28-48, 26 NORAD Rgn to CG 1st Rgn ARADCOM, et al., 26 NORAD Rgn Exercise Schedule for Jan, Feb and Mar, 28 Dec 1962.

33. Msg 26NOOP-OE 12-28-48, 26 NORAD Rgn to CG 1st Rgn ARADCOM, et al., 26 NORAD Rgn Exercise Schedule fo Jan, Feb and Mar, 28 Dec 1962.

* APACHE MAGIC, to be held in Dec, was cancelled.

Deteriorating weather on 30 October caused concern when minimums were reached. In this regard total evacuation of Phase III of the Texas Towers was to be accomplished when the advancing storm and associated "wind wave" obtained a 31-knot speed at 35° 00" north latitude or within a 350-mile radius of either Texas Tower. At the towers, the safety of the personnel took precedence over all other considerations, including the air defense mission during conditions of normal readiness. ADC had directed, however, that for alert periods in DEFCON 3* or higher, the Texas Towers were to remain manned unless a tropical storm or a hurricane was approaching.³⁴ On 3 November, weather forecasts indicated 50-knot winds at the Texas Towers. However, the towers continued operational except for 12 minutes on 4 November when Texas Tower 3 was down due to loss in the air conditioning. Bad weather continued with helicopters being sent for tower evacuation on 5 November. Weather conditions necessitated the towers to be placed on evacuation alert status again on 9 November and 14 November. Then on 16 November, General Viccellio and General Greenfield ordered

* ADC changed this to DEFCON 2 with Change 1, 17 Nov 1962.

34. ADC Ops Plan 18-62, Texas Tower Evacuation Plan, 10 Nov 1962; Ch 1 to ADC Ops Plan 19-62, Texas Tower Evacuation Plan 10 Nov 1962, 17 Nov 1962.

the manning at both towers reduced to seven men because of high waves.* Thus, on 16 November, Texas Tower 3 and 2 became non-operational at 2105Z and 2115Z, respectively. As the storm lessened on 18 November, inspectors arrived to perform underwater structural inspections. Fifty-three men were returned to Texas Tower 3; but, when the inspectors found severe scouring and erosion around the tower's legs, the tower was re-evacuated on 20 November.³⁵ Manning continued with seven men at both towers throughout the remainder of the Cuban Crisis while USAF evaluated future utilization of the towers.³⁶

MISSILES

One basic operational advantage of the missile as a weapon system was that it is perpetually on alert. In its posture within the 26th Air Division, the BOMARC was operationally ready to strike a target 400 miles distant in 17 minutes. Thus, the Cuban Crisis changed very little the alert conditions of the missile. More system readiness

* The usual complement of a tower was approx 80 men.

35. COC Log.

36. Msg AFOOP-DE-WC 60608, Ch of Staff USAF to ADC, 7 Dec 1962.

checks were performed (the number was increased from approximately three a day to 12), but this was accomplished without sacrificing alert posture. The ready force was retained above the 80 per cent minimum (200 plus missiles) through accelerated and round the clock maintenance and extended man hours.³⁷ Security forces around missile installations were also increased requiring additional personnel and man hours.³⁸

The crisis did reclarify conditions that had existed routinely before and clarified procedural reporting as to missile alert status. In addition, it emphasized the old axiom, "Train the way you fight, and fight the way you train."³⁹

PROBLEMS AND LESSONS

The Cuban Crisis necessitated unplanned aircraft and personnel movements. Associated with these movements were

37. Interview with Maj Schmidt, 26 AD Msl Br, Ops and Training, 8 Jan 1963.

38. Interview with 2nd Lt McNulty, Base Prov Marshal, Niagara Falls Aprt, 14 Nov 1962; Interview with L/C Gannon, Ch Sec/Law Enforce Div, 26 AD, 16 Nov 1962; Interview with S/Sgt Turner, Prov Sgt, 35th Msl Sq, 14 Nov 1962.

39. Interview with Maj Schmidt, 26 AD Msl Br, Ops and Training, 8 Jan 1963.

possibly the most serious problems of the crisis. The lack of readily available airlift caused delays in the arrival of support equipment and personnel at dispersal bases. Had it been necessary for deploying aircraft to be employed immediately upon their arrival, the lag caused by the air-⁴⁰ lift might have had a disastrous effect.

Another problem was the shortage of security personnel. Security personnel were not available at the dispersal bases and only a working minimum were present at the regular bases. Augmentation people had to be supplied from other sources; then, in some cases, airlifted to priority positions. Seventy-seven air police were deployed during the first three hours of the alert to 26th Air Division dispersal bases with the last complement arriving at Niagara Falls shortly before mid-⁴¹night on 22 October. This method of gaining supplementary people had disadvantages in that many had inadequate security experience and needed training. No Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve people were used although the Air National Guard offered assistance. The extended period and nature of the alert further complicated the security problem and pointed

40. Ltr, 26 AD to ADC, Object Lessons, 27 Dec 1962.

41. Interview with L/C Gannon, Ch Sec/Law Enforce Div, 26 AD, 16 Nov 1962.

up a need for more pre-planning to increase the number of security personnel and equipment and the organizing of a security force fly away kit during a period of emergency. ⁴²

In an area of high Soviet targeting, force survivability continued to concern the 26th Air Division. Dispersal concepts, tested during the crisis, pointed out the need for a greater degree of flexibility. If the interceptor force was to meet an air breathing threat following a missile attack, the 26th Air Division needed the capability to operate from a greater number of airfields than currently designated by ADC. ⁴³ Thus, the 26th Air Division recommended that the number of dispersal bases selected be increased to ⁴⁴ improve force flexibility and survivability.

The Bangor CONAD command and control problem, discussed under Command and Control, was resolved with a change in assignment. Effective 1 December 1962, the Bangor CONAD Sector was transferred from Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command to the 26th CONAD Region. Effective the same date the 26th CONAD Region was assigned an area of responsibility consisting of that U. S. territory and

42. Ibid.

43. Ltr, 26 AD to ADC, Object Lessons, 27 Dec 1962.

44. Ibid.

adjacent U. S. territorial waters and international waters contained within the 26th NORAD Region and the Bangor CONAD Sector.⁴⁵

Other problems, such as supply support, long hours, and loss of flying time while on alert, were present; but, overall, the absence of problems, in what could have been a most serious situation, was one of the most noticeable items of the crisis. The absence of major problems was attributed to previous training that made alert and dispersal assignments almost routine.⁴⁶

CONCLUSION

The Cuban Crisis demonstrated that units of the 26th CONAD Region/26th Air Division (SAGE) could react quickly and effectively upon short notice to an emergency. Training and experience had sharpened the units so that dispersal and deployment assignments were accomplished with a minimum of problems. Thus, the crisis confirmed the training and testing

45. GO 29, CONAD, 30 Nov 1962.

46. Interview with L/C Miller, Exec Off, DCS/OPS, 26 AD, 19 Dec 1962; Interview with Capt Bell, Det C.O. 75 FIS, 14 Nov 1962; Interview with Maj Patrick, 2600P-WF, 19 Dec 1962.

procedures conducted within the Command validating earlier assumptions. The importance of planning was reiterated, especially if the basic plans were valid and flexible. In this regard, units dispersed and maintained an alert to unfamiliar fields with only a few modifications to basic procedures caused by conditions peculiar to the base. Next, the crisis introduced an excellent motivating element for all personnel not found generally in a test, exercise, or training. Finally, the Cuban Crisis fulfilled an important facet for the 26th Air Division; it testified to the Command's high state of readiness and capability to perform the air defense mission.

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47. Interview with Col Mace, 26NOPS/26OOP, 9 Jan 1963.

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR STATUS AT HOME BASE

		<u>17 Oct</u>	<u>1 Nov</u>	<u>8 Nov</u>	<u>21 Nov</u>	<u>26 Nov</u>	<u>26 Dec</u>
<u>F-101</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Auth/Poss</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>
2FIS	Suffolk	18/16	16/15	15/12	16/12	16/12	16/14
49FIS	Griffiss	24/22	15/12	16/7	24/18	24/20	21/19
60FIS	Otis	18/17	17/16	16/10	16/13	17/14	17/14
75FIS	Dow	19/17	13/9	13/9	16/15	16/16	16/16
98FIS	Dover	19/16	9/4	14/11	17/14	17/14	17/16
444FIS	Charleston	19/15	13/13	14/12	15/11	15/13	16/15
<u>F-102</u>							
76FIS	Westover	21/19	12/10	12/9	17/15	17/14	20/18
482FIS	Seymour- Johnson	27/24	13/10	19/13	19/14	21/14	24/19
<u>F-106</u>							
27FIS	Loring	23/21	16/4	16/4	21/15	21/12	21/15
48FIS	Langley	21/20	7/3	7/1	7/2	8/5	20/13
95FIS	Andrews	20/17	11/5	11/6	17/11	17/14	16/12
539FIS	McGuire	21/15	13/12	21/12	16/11	16/12	14/10
<u>F-100</u>							
118ANG	Bradley Fld	22/19	19/14	19/15	19/12	19/12	19
<u>F-89</u>							
134ANG	Burlington	25/27	27/23	27/23	27/22	27/23	27
132ANG	Dow	24/28	28/24	28/24	28/23	28/20	28

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		<u>17 Oct</u>	<u>1 Nov</u>	<u>8 Nov</u>	<u>21 Nov</u>	<u>26 Nov</u>	<u>26 Dec</u>
<u>F-102</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Auth/Poss</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>	<u>Poss/OR</u>
146ANG	Pittsburg	17/16	16/10	14/8	14/11	14/13	28
<u>F-104</u>							
157ANG	McEntire	24/24	24/16	24/16	24/16	23/7	23

Deployed aircraft status is depicted on 26th Air Division Aircraft Deployed Status Chart and are not included in the figures represented on this chart.

SOURCE: Fighter Interceptor Status Chart, 26COC.

26TH AIR DIVISION AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED STATUS

23 October thru 6 December
1962

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Deployed To</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>23</u> <u>Poss</u> <u>& OR</u>	<u>Oct</u> <u>Combat</u> <u>Loaded</u>	<u>8</u> <u>Poss</u> <u>& OR</u>	<u>Nov</u> <u>Combat</u> <u>Loaded</u>	<u>19</u> <u>Poss</u> <u>& OR</u>	<u>Nov</u> <u>Combat</u> <u>Loaded</u>
76FIS	Westover	Burlington	F-102	6	6	6	6	6	6
98FIS	Dover	Atlantic City	F-101	5	5	4	3	4	4
95FIS	Andrews	Atlantic City	F-106	5		4	4	4	4
49FIS	Griffiss	Niagara Falls	F-101	8	8	8	8	8	8
75FIS	Dow	Niagara Falls	F-101	4	4	4	4	4	4
539FIS	McGuire	Olmstead Langley	F-106 F-106	4 4	4 4	4 4	4 4	4 4	4 4
27FIS	Loring	Olmstead	F-106	6	6	6	6	6	6
48FIS	Langley	Patrick	F-106	12		12		12	
482FIS	Seymour- Johnson	Homestead	F-102	14		5		5	
444FIS	Charleston	Langley Andrews	F-101 F-101	<u>2</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
Total:				70	33	55	37	55	38

SOURCE: 26th Air Division Aircraft Deployed Status Chart, 26COC.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Deployed To</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>21 Nov</u> <u>Poss & OR</u>	<u>Nov</u> <u>Combat Loaded</u>	<u>28 Nov</u> <u>Poss & OR</u>	<u>Nov</u> <u>Combat Loaded</u>	<u>6 Dec</u> <u>Poss & OR</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>Combat Loaded</u>
76FIS	Westover	Burlington	F-102						
98FIS	Dover	Atlantic City	F-101						
95FIS	Andrews	Atlantic City	F-106						
49FIS	Griffiss	Niagara Falls	F-101						
75FIS	Dow	Niagara Falls	F-101						
539FIS	McGuire	Olmstead	F-106						
		Langley	F-106						
27FIS	Loring	Olmstead	F-106						
48FIS	Langley	Patrick	F-106	12		12		Redeployed	
482FIS	Seymour-Johnson	Homestead	F-102	5		Redeployed			
444FIS	Charleston	Langley	F-101	<u>2</u>		<u>Redeployed</u>			
				19		12			

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STATUS OF ALERT CONDITIONS

<u>Weapon Type</u>	<u>ALPHA</u>			<u>BRAVO</u>			<u>CHARLIE</u>			<u>DELTA</u>		
	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>30 Min</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>30 Min</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>30 Min</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>15 Min</u>	<u>30 Min</u>
Manned Interceptor	2	1/3 A/C Poss Per Sq		2	8 A/C Per 24 A/C Sq	6 A/C Per 18 A/C Sq	4 A/C Per 12 A/C Sq	2	12 A/C Per 24 A/C Sq	10 A/C Per 18 A/C Sq	6 A/C Per 12 A/C Sq	All Combat Ready A/C
Surface-to-Air combat ready fire units in a defense with more than 2 fire units (NIKE-HERCULES)		25%	50%		50%	25%		50%	50%	100%		
Surface-to-Air combat ready fire units in a defense with more than 2 fire units (NIKE-HERCULES)		50%	50%					50%	50%	100%		
Surface-to-Air combat ready fire units (NIKE-AJAX)		25%	50%			25%		50%	50%	100%		
Unmanned Interceptors (BOMARC)												

All combat ready missiles at a two minute state of alert.

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DEFCON INSTRUCTIONS

Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON). A general indication of the type action that may be taken or directed to bring the air defense system to a desired readiness posture to meet any contingency. Defense Readiness Conditions consist of 5 numbered DEFCON's and "Air Defense Emergency."

DEFCON 5. A normal readiness posture which can be sustained indefinitely and which represents an optimum balance between the requirements of readiness and the routine training and equipping of forces for their primary mission.

DEFCON 4. A readiness posture requiring increased intelligence watch and a continuing analysis of the political/military situation in the area of tension; review contingency plans for the area concerned, and based on the above analysis, make modifications or formulate new plans, as required; take actions to increase security and anti-sabotage measures, etc., if considered necessary; keep appropriate commanders informed of the developing situation. During this condition no measures will be taken which could be considered provocative or which might disclose operational plans. Every effort should be made to insure that measures taken do not cause public speculation.

DEFCON 3. A readiness posture that requires certain portions of the assigned forces to assume increased readiness posture above that of normal readiness. Generally, in this condition, all forces and resources will come from within the command. Plans of the next higher condition are reviewed and readied. During this condition no measures will be taken which could be considered provocative or which might disclose operational plans. In assuming this condition, and unless otherwise directed, commanders should time-phase actions in a manner to avoid public speculation, if possible.

DEFCON 2. A readiness posture requiring a further increase in military force readiness which is less than maximum readiness; certain military deployments and selected civil actions may be necessary in cononance with the commander's mission; resources may be made available from outside the command; preliminary measures are taken to permit the most rapid transition to maximum readiness, if necessary.

DEFCON 1. A maximum readiness posture requiring the highest state of preparedness to execute war plans.

Air Defense Emergency. The highest state of preparedness by the military forces and civilian agencies whereby all air defense measures are readied for implementation. This is the declaration which is the authorization to implement approved military and civilian plans and agreements for defense of the North American Continent. Subsequent to the declaration of the Air Defense Emergency, imminence of attack will be specified by Air Defense Warning Red, Air Defense Warning Yellow or Air Defense Warning White.

Air Defense Warning Red. A declaration meaning that attack by hostile aircraft/missiles is imminent or is taking place.

Air Defense Warning Yellow. Is probable.

Air Defense Warning White. Is not considered immediately probable or imminent but does not cancel Air Defense Emergency.

966TH AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON

Cumulative Station Manning Data
18 October to 4 December 1962

	<u>STATION "DOG"</u>	<u>STATION "ECHO"</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Station Required	1152+00	1010+45	2162+45
Station Provided	1151+40	1010+30	2162+10
Per Cent Provided	99.97%	99.97%	99.97%
Bent Time	12+00	5+35	17+35
Per Cent Bent Time	1.04%	0.552%	0.812%
Station Break	+20	+15	+35
Per Cent Station Break	0.03%	0.03%	0.03%
APS 45 in	1054+10	920+10	1974+20
Per Cent APS 45 in	91.5%	91.04%	91.29%
Track Total	1961	2257	4218

	<u>STATION "DOG"</u>	<u>STATION "ECHO"</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>AEW&C Intercepts</u>	50	14	64
<u>M.A.</u>	48	12	60
<u>M.I.</u>	2	2	4

Station DOG performed low altitude radar between Florida and Cuba in the vicinity of the Florida Keys.

Station ECHO performed low altitude radar coverage between Florida and Cuba in the vicinity of the Great Bahama Bank.

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CURRENT EMERGENCY - CUBAN SITUATION

Revised Net Addition Obligations
(in dollars)

22 Oct - 31 Dec 62

	<u>Estimated</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Civilian Pay	6,932	2,842
TDY	150,933	101,955
Transportation	6,916	4,725
Communications	13,058	2,968
Utilities	4,208	1,388
Equipment Rental	910	892
Real Property Maintenance	9,700	5,500
Contractual Services	6,949	2,168
POL & Fuels (Heating-Utilities)	12,957	4,665
Supplies	143,051	47,006
Equipment	6,480	6,096
Medical Services	3,950	1,951
Subsistence	131,905	8,620
Total	<u>497,949</u>	<u>190,776</u>

The difference between the estimated and actual totals are not as great as the figure would indicate on first observation. The estimated figure was a prediction up to 31 December, whereas the crisis ended early in December. Then at Hancock Field, Strategic Air Command reimbursed \$65,000 worth of supplies to the 26th Air Division. In the area of TDY, expenses began to decline after the initial surge of movement had been reached. The only figure that was not representative was Subsistence. In this area, additional checks were being conducted to determine why there was such a great variance. For a more accurate comparison, subtract Subsistence totals from the Estimated and Actual columns (revised Estimated Total \$366,045 and revised Actual Total \$182,156), then reduce the Estimated Total by one-half (\$183,022) to comply with the shorter duration of the crisis; with a result that the totals (\$183,022 Estimated to \$182,156 Actual) are almost equal. [26ABF and Interview with Lt Col Richard Hamilton, Dir of Budget, 26 AD, 11 Jan 1963].

CHAPTER FIVE

THE 28TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

By

Ruth Wampler

In spite of the uneasy international situation, the normal readiness posture designated by Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) 5 Alpha was still in effect. As required by this readiness posture, two fighter interceptor aircraft with non-nuclear armament were on 5-minute alert to carry out identification missions and one-third of the possessed aircraft in each squadron less the 5-minute aircraft, were on 15-minute alert status with nuclear weapons. (This latter requirement had gone into effect in February 1962 as a part of the survival plan in the event of a nuclear missile attack).

1. NORADR 55-3, Defense Readiness Conditions, States of Alert, Alert Requirements, and Air Def Warnings, 9 Mar 1962.

Training and maintenance activities were proceeding normally. The 28th Air Division command post (CP) was functioning as the System Maintenance Control Center on a 24-hour basis in accordance with current directives.² Major General Conrad F. Necrason, division commander, and his Chief of Information, Lt Colonel Louis J. Churchville, were in Colorado Springs, attending a meeting of the Citizens' Committee at Headquarters Air Defense Command.

That this peaceful status was soon to end was foreshadowed by a message from the Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD) warning that a change in the defense readiness condition was expected in the near future.

DEFCON 5 Delta Declared. When the notice of increased readiness was received at 1033 PDT on 22 October, it was not a change in the DEFCON as might have been expected. Only the alert requirements were changed from Alpha to Delta. Under NORADR 55-3, Delta alert status required that all combat ready weapons be placed on 5-minute alert,³ but a higher than the next lower alert status of Charlie was directed by CINCONAD. Under this "hard" Charlie-"soft" Delta

2. 28 OI 11-11, Command Post Operation of System Maintenance Control (SMC) for Logistics, 27 Jul 1962.

3. NORADR 55-3.

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status, all combat ready aircraft were to be placed on 15-minute alert with nuclear armament except for those maintaining a 5-minute status for identification.⁴

With the change in alert status and the notification that the President was to address the nation on a matter of utmost urgency, Lieutenant General Robert H. Terrill, ADC Vice Commander, directed General Necrason and his Chief of Information to return to the division headquarters.

Dispersal Ordered. At 1200 PDT, CINCONAD ordered dispersal in accordance with ADC Operations Plan 20-62. Since the aircraft to be dispersed were on 15-minute alert armed with nuclear armament, the order to disperse under DEFCON 5 caused immediate concern in the division. Air Force Weapon Safety Rules prohibited flying with MB-1 nuclear missiles until declaration of DEFCON 1 and with GAR-11⁵ nuclear armament prior to DEFCON 3. CONAD/NORAD directives also specified that safety rules in the Air Force regulations were mandatory until declaration of an Air Defense Emergency.

4. Ibid.

5. AFR 122-23, Weapon System Safety Rules T/F-102A/GAR-11, 2 Apr 1962; AFR 122-35, Weapon System Safety Rules F-101/MB-1, 27 Jul 1961; AFR 122-36, Weapon System Safety Rules F-106/MB-1, 27 Jul 1961.

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In the light of these conflicting instructions, the division was reluctant to disperse aircraft with nuclear weapons without further clarification. Since General Necrason had not yet reached his headquarters, the Vice Commander, Colonel John W. Weltman, sought clarification from the 28th CONAD Region. Following discussion between the two commands, dispersal action was taken.

In all, 22 nuclear-armed aircraft were dispersed. The 78th Fighter Wing at Hamilton AFB dispersed 12 F-101B's to Kingsley Field, Oregon. Four of the 15th FIS F-101B's went to Williams AFB, Arizona, from their home base at Davis-Monthan AFB. Six F-106's from the 456th FIS at Castle AFB dispersed to the Fresno Municipal Airport. Seven F-102A's from the 82nd FIS at Travis AFB dispersed to the Siskiyou County Municipal Airport. The F-101B's each carried two MB-1 nuclear missiles and the F-106's each carried one. The F-102A's were armed with GAR-11 nuclear missiles. Take off and recovery times were:

15th FIS: First take off -- 1308 PDT
Last take off -- 1311 PDT
Last recovery -- 1331 PDT

6. 28 Air Div Command Post Summary, 22 Oct -
9 Nov 1962, Atch 2, DOC 5, this chapter.

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82nd FIS: First take off -- 1649 PDT
Last take off -- 1653 PDT
Last recovery -- 1849 PDT

78th Ftr Wg: First take off -- 1259 PDT
Last take off -- 1310 PDT
Last recovery -- 1355 PDT

456th FIS: First take off -- 1312 PDT
Last take off -- (time not available)
Last recovery -- 1342 PDT

The reason for the concern felt during this initial dispersal is indicated in the following comment by the division's missile/nuclear safety officer:⁷

Tactical fighters of 28th Air Division were "flushed" in a fully armed condition during a DEFCON 5 Delta situation. Later interpretation and clarification proved this to be a deployment. However, on this initial flush, aircraft were fully armed with no safety pins installed. The pilot, by an inadvertent act, would have been able to achieve the full nuclear detonation of the weapon.

At the time dispersal was ordered, only two or three key people in the 28th Air Division headquarters knew the true situation. Other personnel were in pretty much the same position as that prevailing in the interceptor branch:⁸

...when word came that NORAD was dispersing our interceptors, the first that we in the interceptor shop

7. Ltr, 28CAS-M, Summary of Missile/Nuclear Safety Problems Stemming from Tactical Dispersal Operations during Cuban Crisis, w/atch 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, 4 Jan 1963, DOC 6, this chapter.

8. Transcribed Informal Discussion of Contingency Operations, 20 Nov 1962, DOC 7, this chapter.

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knew about it was when we could hear the F-101's booming off the runway. We weren't quite sure if they had a BMEWS warning or just what was going on. We never did know until we heard the President's speech.

The 28th Air Division command post (CP) had not been manned when dispersal was ordered. Although there seemed to have been some uncertainty with regard to manning the CP because of the DEFCON 5, the call did go out and the command post was manned by 1322 PDT.⁹ Thereafter the command post became the focal point for coordinating component staff actions and for gathering and reporting status of forces and certain logistical information to the 28th CONAD Region and to ADC/USAF. The chief of the command post was also the 28th CONAD Region liaison officer in accordance¹⁰ with pertinent directives.

DEFCON 3 Charlie Declared. At 1600 PDT, the President informed the nation of the crisis and the CONAD forces assumed a DEFCON 3 Charlie status. After the grim speech made by President Kennedy, everyone knew that there was real danger of nuclear war. All actions were accelerated to provide the capability to survive and to strike back if attack came.

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9. Command Post Log, 28 Air Div Dep for Materiel.
 10. 28 OI 11-3, Emergency Manning and Alert Procedures,

So many actions took place simultaneously or in such rapid succession, that it is not feasible in this monograph to discuss all of them in detail or in their exact time sequence. All command posts were manned on a continuous basis. Leaves were cancelled for an indefinite period, and personnel not on leave or TDY were quietly called back to duty. Some rated officers who had been in non-flying status were made available to serve as crew members to meet mission support flight requirements. Personnel resources were shifted from overhead type work to fill essential mission requirements. Certain types of individual training were discontinued. Base security measures were increased.

[Cont'd] 30 Jul 1962, DOC 8, this chapter; 28 OI 11-18, Command Post Organization, Responsibilities, and Procedures, 9 Jul 1962, DOC 9, this chapter.

11. Msg, 28 AD to All Units, Military and Civilian Leave Policy, 1 Nov 1962, DOC 10, this chapter.

12. 28 AD Command Post Log, 22 Oct-9 Nov 1962, DOC 11, this chapter.

13. Msg, ADC to All, Return of FSC-3 and 4 Officers to FSC-1, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 12, this chapter; Msg, ADC to All, Return of Flying Status Code 3 & 4 Officers to FSC 1, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 13, this chapter.

14. Msg, 28 AD to All Units, Use of Overhead Personnel, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 14, this chapter.

15. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, TDY Training, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 15, this chapter.

16. Msg, CINCONAD to Rgns, Base Security, 23 Oct 1962,

Mobility plans and other contingency plans were reviewed to¹⁷
insure their adequacy if implementation should be required.
Radars down for depot level maintenance, or for other¹⁸
reasons were returned to the air as quickly as possible.
Aircraft maintenance was expedited.¹⁹ Exercises and tacti-
cal evaluations were cancelled.²⁰ "Minimize" procedures²¹
were implemented world-wide.

While all of the actions mentioned above, and many others, had an impact on the division, the major problems of division personnel were concerned with supporting dispersal operations.

[Cont'd] DOC 16, this chapter; Msg, 28 AD to Sectors, JCS Instructions for Base Security, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 17, this chap.

17. See DOC 11, this chapter.

18. See DOC 7, this chapter.

19. Charts showing the operational ready status of aircraft are included as DOC 18, this chapter. These charts show that for short periods of time, some squadrons reported 100% operational ready aircraft status. The goal, however, was to maintain an acceptable status at all times with a normal flow of work to maintenance sections.

20. Msg, 28NR to Sectors, Regional Exercises, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 19, this chapter; Msg, 28NR to Sectors, NORAD Training Exercises, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 20, this chapter.

21. Msg, CSAF, Minimize, 23 Oct 1962, DOC 21, this chapter.

THE DISPERSAL SITUATION

Status of the Program. Plans for dispersing aircraft from bases considered to be high on the enemy's target list had been in preparation for months, ²² but only an interim Phase I capability had been reached at the time dispersal was ordered. In Phase I, a dispersal base was required to be able to service and re-launch recovered alert aircraft within two hours after a BMEWS warning. No rearming was required. In Phase II, reloading with one load of conventional armament per aircraft was added to these requirements. Not until Phase III, was rearming with nuclear armament stated as a requirement. Obviously, before this capability could be reached, dispersal bases would need facilities for storage and maintenance of nuclear weapons, for aircraft maintenance and operations, for housing personnel, and for other purposes necessary to fighter operations. Since final selection and approval of dispersal bases was not yet firm at the time of the Cuban crisis, any kind of construction was still in the future.

Of the four bases used, only Kingsley was an active ADC base capable of supporting operations with nuclear armament.

22. Annex V, App 1 through XVII, 28 AD Wartime Basic Plan 2-61.

None of the remaining three bases had any storage facilities for nuclear weapons or any capability of maintaining such weapons. Williams AFB was not manned to support 24-hour operations as it was dependent upon civilian contract personnel who worked a 40-hour week. At the Fresno Municipal Airport, the 144th Fighter Group (ANG) provided sufficient support and facilities for an interim Phase I capability.²³ The base that lacked everything was Siskiyou County Airport. There was virtually nothing there for Air Force use except a runway and a converted dental van.²⁴

Air Lift Problems. One of the problems that immediately affected the dispersal operations was the lack of support aircraft for airlift. Airlift planning had been based upon the availability of C-123 aircraft of the 4650th Combat Support Squadron and the C-119's of TAC's reserve units. Airlift requirements had been carefully calculated and distribution of airlift support worked out in the 28th

23. Msg, SFADS to 28 AD, Interim Phase I Capability at Fresno, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 22, this chapter; Ltr, 28 AD to ADC, Joint ADC/CONAD Fighter Dispersal Test, 20 Nov 1962, DOC 23, this chapter.

24. Ltr, 28ODC to Sectors, Status Rpt, 2 Oct 1962, w/1 Atch, DOC 24, this chapter. The pictorial section, submitted under separate cover, graphically illustrates the lack of facilities at Siskiyou.

Air Division Wartime Basic Plan. The plan assumed that these aircraft would be made available automatically under certain conditions requiring dispersal. This was shown as "Condition Autolift" in the basic war plan.

That is not the way things worked when the test came. First, ADC notified the division that it needed all the air-²⁵craft and crews of the 4650th Combat Support Squadron. Having lost the C-123's before they could be used, the division turned hopefully to the C-119's of TAC's 349th Troop Carrier Wing at Hamilton AFB. The discouraging fact was then learned that TAC had not consummated any agreement²⁶ for their use to support ADC's dispersal operations.

This left the division dependent upon its own meager resources. At that time, the available in-commission support aircraft included one TC-121 belonging to the 552nd AEW&C Wing, a C-47 from the 78th Fighter Wing, and a T-29 from²⁷ the Phoenix sector. Maintenance personnel began immediately to return out-of-commission aircraft to an operational status and instructions were given to operations personnel to provide crews. All internal support aircraft were brought under central control in accordance with published directives.

25. Msg, ADC to 26, 28 and 29 AD, Operational Requirements, 22 Oct 1962, DOC 25, this chapter.

26. See DOC 7, this chapter.

27. See Atch 2, DOC 5, this chapter.

At this point, the 82nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron was successful in getting Travis AFB to provide a C-124 to move personnel and equipment to Siskiyou. With this unexpected help, 22,000 pounds of cargo and 10 passengers were airlifted to Siskiyou the first day. Without this help, surface transportation would have been the only means of accomplishing this move. Since an impenetrable fog enveloped the area that night, there would have been many hours of delay. It was not until the morning of 23 October, for example, that the first two truck loads of fuel arrived at Siskiyou from Hamilton AFB. Tank cars filled with JP-4 fuel did not arrive until 0135 PDT on 25 October.²⁸

The TC-121 aircraft airlifted MC-11 compressors, aerospace ground equipment, and other materiel to Kingsley Field in support of the 83rd and 84th Fighter Interceptor Squadron deployment. Other support aircraft carried passengers, critically needed parts, and other items needed parts, and other items needed to keep the defense system functioning. In all, in spite of the limited airlift available, 75,900 pounds of cargo and 57 passengers had been airlifted by 24 October.²⁹

28. Ibid.; Also see DOC 7, this chapter.

29. Ibid.

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After the first critical period was over, most of the requests for airlift were met. By early November, the 78th Fighter Wing had set up a regular schedule for rotating personnel and delivering mail and other items as needed. The flight operated from Hamilton to Kingsley and Siskiyou with stops at Travis as necessary.

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Security Problems. Another problem that was common to all the dispersal bases -- and indeed to the home bases as well -- was lack of sufficient numbers of air police. With nuclear-armed aircraft dispersed to locations such as Siskiyou, Williams, and Fresno, where security fencing and lighting and other safeguards were lacking, the need for trained air police was acute. ADC immediately asked for information on the air police manning available at the home and the dispersal bases, but could offer no help in meeting the problem. In the final analysis, each unit had to find a solution from its own resources. Maintenance personnel and other non-air police personnel were used as security guards. Such trained air policemen as were available

30. Msg, 78 Ftr Wg to 28 AD, Request to Operate a Scheduled Flight, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 26, this chapter; Msg, 28 AD to SFADS, 78 Ftr Wg, 82 FIS, Approval for Scheduled Flight, 2 Nov 1962, DOC 27, this chapter.

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supervised the less experienced men, and no untoward incident occurred.

Security requirements for lighting, walkie-talkies, manpower, and armament for security personnel at dispersal bases was prepared for future consideration by the division's Chief of Security and Law Enforcement. There was little chance that the manning requirements could be met. The shortage of air police seemed to be a "live with" situation for the foreseeable future.

Sabotage Alert. One security measure that did work out well was the sabotage alert procedure established in early November. The procedure provided for immediate dissemination of information involving possible sabotage.

31. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Security at Dispersal Bases, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 28, this chapter; Msg, 28 AD to 456, 15, and 82 FIS's, Security at Dispersal Bases, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 29 this chapter; Msg 28 AD to ADC, Security at Dispersal Bases, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 30, this chapter; Deployment of Air Police to Meet World-Wide USAF Requirements, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 31, this chapter; Msg, 456 FIS to 28 AD, Security Status of Unit, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 32, this chapter; Msg, 408 Ftr Gp to 25 AD, Security at Dispersal Bases, 28 Oct 1962, DOC 33, this chapter; Msg, 28 AD to Sectors, USAF Levees for Air Police, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 34, this chapter; Msg, ADC to 28 AD, Use of Personnel Other than Air Police on Nuclear Security Posts, 3 Nov 1962, DOC 35, this chapter; Msg, 456 FIS to 28 AD, Security Operations at Dispersal Base, 7 Nov 1962, DOC 36, this chapter; Msg, 82 FIS to 28 AD, Request for Walkie-Talkies, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 37, this chapter.

32. Ltr, 28CIG-S to 28ODC, Security Requirements for Dispersal Bases, 20 Nov 1962, w/1 Atch, DOC 38, this chapter.

A sentry, or anyone else, observing an act threatening the combat capability of an ADC unit or a unit tenant on an ADC base was to notify the central security control immediately if sabotage seemed to be a possibility. This report, known as a "Seven High" report, was then passed to the command post by the central agency and disseminated by way of the tactical network through the commands to ADC. If a preliminary investigation failed to rule out sabotage, a "Red Skin" report was required immediately. Follow-up reports giving additional details of the situation were required until the incident was terminated. ³³ (When the system was accidentally triggered by an airman who took a short cut to work through a restricted area, it was found to work most efficiently.)

Special Problems at Siskiyou. Siskiyou had all the problems common to the dispersal bases with a number that were peculiar to itself. As already noted, Siskiyou County Airport did not even have an interim Phase I capability when the crisis arose. The airport lacked accommodations for personnel, shelter for equipment, fuel storage, and just about everything else needed by an operational base.

33. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Sabotage Notification Procedures, 9 Nov 1962, DOC 39, this chapter.

Immediate arrangements were made with the 25th Air Division for circuitry, but navigational aids were not available. On 25, and again on 27 October, the division requested help from ADC in securing mobile, air transportable navigational aid equipment to meet an urgent requirement at Siskiyou.³⁴ When ADC tried to obtain these facilities from USAF, they were told that uncertainty over the use of Siskiyou and lack of navigational aids Air Force-wide made any immediate support impossible.³⁵

At this time the division had positioned 35 people, air-ground communications equipment, aerospace ground equipment, two portable light banks, crash and fire vehicles, and a bus, a station wagon, and a weapons carrier at Siskiyou. Arrangements had also been made for messing and housing personnel in the town of Yreka some 12 miles from the airport. Two house trailers had been requested to provide an

34. Msg, 28 AD to ADC, NAVAIDS at Siskiyou County Airport, 25 Oct 1962; Msg, 28 AD to ADC, Fighter Dispersal - Siskiyou County Airport, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 40, this chapter.

35. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, NAVAIDS in Support of ADC OPLAN 20-62, 1 Nov 1962, DOC 41, this chapter.

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alert facility at the airport. Rental of these trailers³⁶ was approved by ADC. The division stated that it could and would support a dispersal capability at Siskiyou.

With operations at Siskiyou limited to VFR conditions by lack of navigational aids, CINCONAD approved the return of the aircraft and crews to Travis Air Force Base on 24³⁷ October. Ground personnel and the support equipment remained in place to provide for further use of the base by dispersed aircraft if desired.

Bad weather at Siskiyou prevented the return of the F-102's until 26 October. About noon on that day, the weather cleared sufficiently to permit take off and all seven air-³⁸craft were safely back at Travis by 1444 PDT.

Williams AFB. The main problem at Williams was manning. Tower operators and security personnel had to go on 12-hour shifts in order to keep the base operational for the dispersal aircraft. As the 15th Fighter Interceptor Squadron had no resources from which to assist the base, the

36. See DOC 28, this chapter; Msg, ADC to CSAF, Alert Crew Housing, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 42, this chapter; Msg, ADC to 28 AD, Alert Crew Housing, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 43, this chapter.

37. Msg, CINCONAD to 28CR, Return of Dispersed Acft from Siskiyou, 24 Oct 1962, DOC 44, this chapter.

38. See DOC 11, this chapter.

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division requested help from ADC. That command, in turn, requested assistance from the Air Training Command to provide additional tower operators and air police. There is no evidence that ATC was able to relieve the situation.

With civilian personnel inexperienced in supporting combat aircraft providing the support at Williams AFB, there was also a safety hazard as graphically described below by the Chief of the Airmunitions Division:

One item that scared us all was watching the refueling at Williams. This base has contract refueling. I don't know where they got the refueling unit operator, but I feel the biggest thing he ever refueled before was a Fordson farm tractor because he spilled 15 or 20 gallons -- it looked like a lot more -- of JP-4 on the ramp right under his truck. He then proceeded to start to get into his truck, start up, and barrel off. Naturally, about four hands went up and grabbed him by the collar and pulled him down out of the truck. One thing about refueling hot-loaded aircraft, it has to be done right and it shouldn't be done by contract refueling people.

When asked if there wasn't a requirement for an Air Force man to be on the end of the hose in a refueling operation, he went on to say:

The blue suit man was there at the aircraft, but the

39. Msg, 28 AD to ADC, Shortage of Control Tower Operators and Air Policemen at Williams AFB, 20 Oct 1962, DOC 45, this chapter; Msg, ADC to ATC, Shortage of Control Tower Operators and Air Policement at Williams AFB, 1 Nov 1962, DOC 46, this chapter.

40. See DOC 7, this chapter.

trouble was that the operator of the unit was over at the unit, and this is where you can cause trouble. Of course, he was defueling the aircraft instead of refueling and this is why he ran the unit over... Everyone realized what had happened right quick. The fire engines were on hand and immediately came up and started taking care of the spilled fuel.

Rotation. On 24 October, CINCONAD authorized rotation of aircraft between dispersal and home bases for the purpose of exchanging aircraft, crews, and weapons and for accomplishing essential training. Maximum training for air crews and ground environment personnel was to be accomplished during rotation except when aircraft were ferrying primary weapons. ⁴¹

The only time aircraft on rotational flights were to carry nuclear weapons was when these weapons had to be returned to home base for maintenance or for mandatory inspections. Aircraft at dispersal bases were fully loaded with primary armament except after a replacement aircraft arrived. Then the aircraft to be replaced was downloaded and the replacement aircraft uploaded.

The message authorizing rotational flights also prescribed the tactical ferry configuration. An immediate problem arose because the configuration directed by CINCONAD required removal of the ejection rack cartridge. This

41. See Atch 2, DOC 6, this chapter.

instruction was just the opposite of the instructions contained in the Air Force Weapon Safety Rules found in AFR 122-35 and 122-36. Both the Air Force regulations and ADCR 55-25 provided for jettisoning of a nuclear weapon under conditions prescribed in the directives if an inflight emergency made the chance for landing safely with the weapon the greater risk. Under the CINCONAD directed configuration the weapon could not be jettisoned. Since commanders would surely be reluctant to recommend an emergency landing with the weapon on board the aircraft because of its high susceptibility to fire, even a simple emergency⁴² could result in the loss of an aircraft.

The division brought the situation to the attention of ADC. Until clarifying instructions were received, the division also instructed its units not to ferry nuclear⁴³ weapons between the home base and dispersal base.

ADC's reply was that CINCONAD had JCS approval before sending the message and, therefore, the instructions would remain in effect unless changed by CINCONAD. During the⁴⁴ crisis, ADC considered that CONAD directives took precedence.

42. See DOC 6, this chapter.

43. See DOC 6, Atch 4, this chapter.

44. See DOC 6, Atch 5, this chapter.

The division had no choice but to order compliance with the CINCONAD configuration. Tactical ferry operations were conducted in this manner until all dispersed aircraft were again at their home bases.⁴⁵

Since the problem involved nuclear safety, both the division and the region made recommendations to their higher headquarters concerning the matter after the Cuban crisis eased. The Division recommended strict compliance with Air Force regulations pertaining to ferrying nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ The Region recommended that the weapons configuration be prescribed by CINCONAD in accordance with conditions existing at the time.⁴⁷ That is where the matter stood at the end of the year.

A SAC Dispersal Problem. SAC created a dispersal problem by unexpectedly deploying four of its B-47's to Oxnard AFB on 24 October. The use of Oxnard as a dispersal base was apparently a part of the 15th Air Force dispersal plan, but no one in the 28th Air Division or in the 414th Fighter Group at Oxnard had any previous knowledge of this

45. See DOC 6, Atch 6, this chapter.

46. Ibid.

47. See DOC 6, Atch 7, this chapter.

plan. When the bombers suddenly arrived, the fighter group made the best of the unexpected situation. A quantity-distance waiver necessitated by the presence of the bombers was requested and approved and the group provided such support for the SAC visitors as could be given without interfering⁴⁸ with the primary mission of the base.

Although the situation was handled satisfactorily at Oxnard, the need for prior coordination when other commands planned to use ADC bases was brought to the attention of⁴⁹ ADC. The matter was also taken up through the NORAD channels and NORAD requested a list of the bases SAC planned to use.

Maintaining Dispersal Capability. Since there was no way of knowing in advance just how long the Cuban crisis might last, there was need to evaluate the capabilities and requirements for maintaining the dispersal posture. At the outset of the crisis, ADC had requested information as to the maximum dispersal capability that could be achieved

48. Msg, 28 AD to ADC, Other Command Use of ADC Bases for Dispersal, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 47, this chapter.

49. Ibid.

by repositioning home base assets at the interim
50 bases. This information was provided by the division. 51
On 30 October, ADC asked for information as to the minimum
essential outside resource requirements necessary to support
a dispersal posture for 30, 90, and 180 days. The require-
52 ments were to be based upon normal training activities.

At the time this request was made, DEFCON 3 Charlie
was still in effect. On 3 November, alert requirements were
53 reduced to a Bravo Status. This permitted reduction of
the number of aircraft dispersed by each squadron to four
if more had previously been dispersed. It also reduced the
number of aircraft required on 15-minute alert at the home
54 base. Aircrews were on one-hour alert status at the dis-
persal bases in accordance with a previous message from
CINCONAD, but aircraft and weapons remained on 15-minute
55 status.

50. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Ftr Dispersal, 23 Oct 1962, DOC 48, this chapter.

51. Msg, 28 AD to ADC, Dispersal Base Capability, 24 Oct 1962, DOC 49, this chapter.

52. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Ftr Dispersal, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 50, this chapter.

53. See DOC 11, this chapter.

54. NORADR 55-3.

55. Msg, 28NR to Sectors & 28 AD, Status of Aircrews at Dispersal Bases, 24 Oct 1962.

In the light of the change in alert status, and also because USAF had indicated that the Department of Defense would soon approve programming action for implementing and funding of the Phase III ADC fighter dispersal program, ADC sent another message concerning support for dispersal. Prime consideration was to be given to use of temporary contractual and rental facilities and services at the interim bases. Other instructions also emphasized that only minimum manning, facilities, and equipment would be considered since the permanent dispersal bases would replace the interim bases earlier than had previously been expected. 56

The dispersal requirements submitted by the 28th Air Division in response to the first request, 57 were scaled down wherever possible in accordance with the second message, but there were still requirements for additional personnel, such as air police, and for facilities at Siskiyou to give that base a capability comparable to that of other dispersal bases. 58

56. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Short Range Ftr Dispersal Support Requirements, 7 Nov 1962, DOC 51, this chapter.

57. Msg, 28 AD to ADC, Dispersal Requirements, 2 Nov 1962, DOC 52, this chapter.

58. Msg, 28 AD to ADC, Short Range Ftr Dispersal Support Requirements, 13 Nov 1962, DOC 53, this chapter.

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On 30 October, the JCS authorized reduction in dispersal forces where this would contribute to maintaining the combat ready posture.⁵⁹ At that time, the 28th CONAD Region had recommended no reduction so long as DEFCON 3 Charlie⁶⁰ was in effect.

On 17 November, with the reduced alert status and the decreasing possibility of war, NORAD authorized the return of all dispersed aircraft to their home bases as soon as practical. Weapons status Bravo was to be maintained at the home base and a Phase II capability was to be maintained at the dispersal bases.⁶¹ Phase II required capability to rearm with one load of conventional weapons.

The 28th Air Division immediately instructed the sectors to return their dispersed aircraft, using surface transportation and organic support aircraft to the maximum extent to return personnel and materiel. The dispersed aircraft had all landed safely by 1144 PDT on 18 November.

With regard to the rearming capability required for Phase II at the dispersal sites, lack of storage facilities

59. Msg, CINCONAD to CONAD Rgns, Reduction in Dispersal Forces, 30 Oct 1962.

60. Msg, 28CR to CINCONAD, Reduction in Dispersal Forces, 20 Oct 1962.

61. Msg, CINCINORAD to NORAD Rgns, Return of Dispersed Aircraft, 17 Nov 1962.

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was the major limiting factor. The division directed that armament was not to be pre-positioned at these bases unless they had suitable storage facilities. Training flights were to be conducted to the dispersal bases often enough to insure a two-hour turn-around capability. Flight safety was to be paramount on all deployments. The units were to notify the division of any limiting factors beyond their control⁶² which would prevent achievement of a Phase II capability.

Replies from the field indicated that none of the dispersal bases, with the exception of Kingsley, could support a Phase II operation. There were either no storage facilities for conventional armament or security was inadequate. The 82nd FIS also indicated that it would need additional personnel to support a modified Phase II capability⁶³ at Siskiyou after 5 November. (A return to normal

62. 28 AD msg to SFADS and PHADS, Ftr Dispersal, 18 Nov 1962, DOC 54, this chapter.

63. Msg, PHADS to 28 AD, Phase II Capability at Williams AFB, 21 Nov 1962, DOC 55, this chapter; Msg, SFADS to 28 AD, Ftr Dispersal, 20 Nov 1962, DOC 56, this chapter; Ltr, 28MDC to 28ODC, Dispersal Site Limitations, 21 Nov 1962, DOC 57, this chapter; Msg 82 FIS to 28 AD, Modified Phase II Manning of 82 FIS Dispersal Base, Siskiyou County Airport, 28 Oct 1962, DOC 58, this chapter.

readiness on 27 November ended the requirement for Phase
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II.)

AEW&C OPERATIONS

Station Manning. NORAD Regulation 55-3C stated that the 552nd AEW&C Wing would man all five primary stations upon declaration of DEFCON 3. This requirement had to be waived during the Cuban crisis because of high priority demands made upon the wing for aircraft and for aircrew, radar crew, and maintenance personnel.

Random manning of AEW&C stations was continued except when manning of specific stations was required. During the period when the Mt. Hebo radar in the 25th Air Division was down because of storm damage, AEW&C Stations 1 and 3 were manned to cover the critical northern approach routes. At the request of the Los Angeles Air Defense Sector, Station 9 was manned during a period of serious anomalous propagation
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along the approaches to the Los Angeles-San Diego complex.

64. Msg, CINCNORAD to ADC, Phase II Capability, 30 Nov 1962, DOC 59, this chapter.

65. See DOC 11, this chapter.

TDY to the 966th AEW&C Squadron. The 552nd AEW&C Wing was also required to send aircraft and personnel to McCoy AFB, Florida, to support AEW&C operations in that area. A report on 3 November showed that 26 officers and 74 airmen from the 552nd AEW&C Wing were on TDY with the 966th AEW&C Squadron in Florida. Crews and aircraft were rotated between McCoy AFB and the home base at McClellan AFB to permit maintenance and periodic inspections to be performed on aircraft and to provide for replacement of personnel.

Mickey Mouse. The 28th Air Division was also given two special projects in connection with the Cuban crisis. The first, code-named "Mickey Mouse," was to determine the maximum capabilities of an airborne control station to detect, track and conduct intercepts on small, low-altitude targets. The project was also expected to result in establishing the best tactics to be used by interceptor aircrews in detecting and obtaining maximum AI lock-on and positioning to effect a "kill."

66. Msg, 966 AEW&C Sq to 26 and 28 AD, Displacement of Personnel, 3 Nov 1962; Msg, 552 AEW&C Wg to ADC, Displacement of Personnel, 6 Nov 1962; Msg, 552 AEW&C Wg to 966 AEW&C Sq, Directed Rotation of Aircraft and Crews, 8 Nov 1962.

Mickey Mouse was a joint effort by the 552nd, the 78th Fighter Wing, and the San Francisco Air Defense Sector under 28th Air Division supervision. Major Joseph H. Livernash, Jr., and Captain B. D. Powell, both from the 28th Air Division's Tactical Evaluation Office, were project officer and assistant project officer, respectively.

The 41st Air Rescue Squadron provided air rescue service and the communications relay. Tests took place on 23, 24 and 25 October.⁶⁷

The targets were U-3A/B, PA-24 (Piper Comanche), and unaugmented T-33 aircraft. The 78th Fighter Wing provided two five-minute alert F-101B's and aircrews to perform the interceptions. No special maintenance was performed to "peak" any of the equipment. The AEW&C crews were not hand-picked and received no additional training. Procedures were generally those used for daily operations, but all the intercept directors were combat-ready, skilled or expert. The weather was good and the sea calm during the three days.

The tests proved that the AN/APS-95 search radar could provide adequate radar information on small low-altitude targets. The associated equipment also performed adequately

67. Tactical Evaluation "Mickey Mouse," 23-25 Oct 1962, DOC 60, this chapter.

with the exception of the AN/APS-45 height-finder and the AN/ARC-27 UHF radio transceivers. The transceiver was inadequate at very low altitudes and at distances of 100 nautical miles. Standard fighter tactics using look-down procedures proved to be adequate.⁶⁸

The procedures and tactics found most effective during the Mickey Mouse tests were included in the report on the project. Because of the success of Mickey Mouse, the 552nd AEW&C Wing project officer, Captain Leland D. Holcomb, was sent to Florida to brief the ADC aircrews that were on TDY at McCoy, Tyndall, Patrick, McDill and Homestead AFB's and at the Key West Naval Air Station. In addition, he briefed personnel of the 966th AEW&C Squadron and of the direction center in the Montgomery Air Defense Sector.⁶⁹

Fly Speck I. The second project, known as "Fly Speck" was to determine the capability of AEW aircraft to detect and track targets of the U-2 category. Tests were conducted on 30 November, and 1, 2, and 4 December as a joint effort of the 4080th Strategic Wing (SAC) and the

68. Ibid.

69. Msg, ADC to 552 AEW&C Wg, Mickey Mouse Presentation by Capt Holcomb, 552 AEW&C Wg, 3 Nov 1962; Msg, ADC to MOADS, Mickey Mouse Presentation by Capt Holcomb, 6 Nov 1962.

552nd AEW&C Wing under the supervision of the 28th Air Division with Major Livernash again in charge of the project.

Specific objectives of Fly Speck were to determine and establish: (1) the maximum and minimum usable surveillance/detection range on very high, non-SIF/IFF targets, (2) the optimum altitudes for ADC station stabilization to track very high altitude targets in high scope clutter areas, and (3) the tracking degradation due to target/AOC aspect relationships. These objectives were tested over coastal plains, over mountainous terrain, and over water in line-of-sight of land. The final objective was to determine the techniques and modes of operation to allow maximum blip/scan ratios in the various environments.

The RC-121D's used in this evaluation were not specially "peaked" for the mission. The AEW&C radar crews were not hand-picked, but on the last mission, all radar operators were highly-experienced. The targets were U-2A aircraft provided by SAC.

Among the conclusions drawn from the four missions were that the AN/APS-95 search radar could provide excellent positive tracking information on U-2 targets over water, but

70. Tactical Evaluation, Proj Rpt Fly Speck, 30 Nov-4 Dec 1962, DOC 61, this chapter.

tracking was marginal or nil over extensive mountainous terrain. The AN/APS-45 height finder again proved to be inadequate. Single-side-band radio transceivers were needed in all AOC aircraft required to perform air defense from low altitude station platforms. These, and other recommendations and conclusions, were set forth in the tactical evaluation report on the Fly Speck operation.⁷¹

Fly Speck II. An environmental test, consisting of two missions, was conducted on 12 and 13 December. The objectives of this test differed somewhat from those of the first Fly Speck test. The specific objectives were to establish: (1) the maximum and usable detection/surveillance range and reliability on very high altitude, low decibel targets, (2) the optimum low altitudes for AOC station stabilization for elimination of detrimental terrain and sea clutter, (3) the optimum lateral spacing from target track, and (4) the radar and aircrew techniques for very high altitude detection and tracking. A secondary objective was to determine intercept control capability at very low platform altitudes.⁷²

71. Ibid.

72. Tactical Evaluation, Environmental Test, Fly Speck II, 12-13 Dec 1962, DOC 62, this chapter.

Major Livernash and a hand-picked crew from the 552nd AEW&C Wing carried out the second test. Equipment was selected to insure optimum performance. Single-side-band transceivers were installed for primary air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, with UHF for backup. The missions were flown over the coastal waters of Southern Florida under varying weather and sea conditions.

This second project proved that RC-121D aircraft equipped with AN/APS-95 radar could positively track and flight-follow low decibel targets at very high altitudes over water when the recommended platform altitudes and crew procedures were followed. The final report made specific recommendations on platform altitudes and aircrew techniques and on procedures to be followed by each member of the radar crew. The report also stated that the AN/APS-45 height finder should be replaced and that single-side-band radio communications were a necessity.⁷³

EFFECTS OF THE ALERT

When the Soviets indicated that they were not willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba, the alert status was changed from Charlie to Bravo on 3 November. No one knew at that

73. Ibid.

time how long DEFCON 3 Bravo would need to be maintained nor exactly what the effect of a prolonged alert would be.

Prime. An evaluation of the effect of the Charlie and Bravo alert status on both the fighter units and the ground environment was indicated by the Preparedness of Resources Influencing Mission Effectiveness (PRIME) reports during October and November. Comparative ratings and dispatch of pressure points were held in abeyance during the crisis, but otherwise, the PRIME system remained in effect.

PRIME statistics for October showed that the average hours flown by primary duty aircrews was off 10 per cent. The division average number of operations sorties flown was 16 per cent below stated requirements. The withdrawal of SAC and Navy target aircraft caused a loss of high altitude and ECM (electronic) sorties. However, in spite of restrictions resulting from the Charlie alert status, the flying hour program was very near its goal for October. In November, many of the losses were made up, although shortage of ECM targets and some other limitations remained. The change to Bravo alert status resulted in an increase in the primary duty aircrew average flying time, and the number of combat ready aircrews also increased in November.

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74. 28 AD Command Data Book for Oct 1962, DOC 63, this chapter; and for Nov 1962, DOC 64, this chapter.

Since the possibility of having to maintain a Bravo Charlie status for six months to a year existed in early November, there was need to assess the ability of the air defense system to maintain combat capability under such alert conditions.⁷⁵

The general feeling was that intercept director requirements could be met under a prolonged Bravo status. Fighter units could also attain most of the PRIME requirements except for certain required sorties such as those against ECM (electronic) targets. In contrast, there was a general feeling that aircrew and intercept director proficiency could not be maintained for any length of time under a Charlie status. Such long duty hours would be required of both aircrews and maintenance personnel that fatigue would soon begin to effect their work. Interest and morale would both suffer,⁷⁶ and the end result would be loss of combat effectiveness.

The effects of the October-November alert on the ground environment system were not very evident because of

75. Msg, 28 AD to Sectors, Interceptor Aircrew & Intercept Director Proficiency, 2 Nov 1962, DOC 65, this chapter.

76. Msg, SFADS to 28 NR, Interceptor Aircrew & Intercept Dir Proficiency, 12 Nov 1962, DOC 66, this chapter; Msg, 414 Ftr Gp to 28 AD, Interceptor Aircrew & Intercept Dir Proficiency, 7 Nov 1962, DOC 67, this chapter.

the relatively short time that the alert was actually maintained. The limitations imposed would undoubtedly have resulted in degradation of the air defense system if the alert had been indefinitely prolonged.

The San Francisco Air Defense Sector listed a number of limitations imposed under DEFCON 3 that were potential degradation factors. Among them were:

A. Ground training

- (1) Mode II, III, and IV training had stopped.
- (2) AEW (Reactor) training had decreased.
- (3) SAC ECM radar site training had ceased.
- (4) AEW director training at Madera had ended.
- (5) Region and sector live exercises and region SSTM's had been cancelled through November.
- (6) Cross training of intercept directors and aircrews had ceased.
- (7) Sector SSTM training was degraded by requirement for personnel to serve within the battle staff, the combat reporting center, and the direction center crew positions.

B. Flying training

- (1) ECM targets were not available.
- (2) Combat readiness training was curtailed or stopped.

C. Technical equipment

- (1) C&E radar site inspections were ended.
- (2) Radar evaluations were deferred.

The sector also felt that restrictions such as cancellation of staff visits and operational conferences, and of

77. See DOC 66, this chapter.

school quotas for upgrading personnel would have a degrading effect on future capability if continued. Use of personnel from non-security sources to meet increased security requirements was also expected to have a disruptive effect.

A restriction imposed during the alert concerning maintenance of emergency generator units at the radar sites could have created a serious problem had the emergency lasted much longer. At the beginning of the increased readiness, ADC had directed that no major overhaul or any IRAN of any generator was to be undertaken. Everything was to be kept in operation. If this situation had continued for any length of time, the generators would have required overhauling or rebuilding or else they would have dropped apart like the "wonderful one hoss shay." The sites would also have had a serious manpower problem if they had been called upon to operate the generators on a 24-hour basis. The UMD's did not provide manning for such an operation.

A number of the ground radars were shut down for various reasons during the alert period although no major breakdown occurred. Like the generators, the radars required

78. Transcribed Rpt of Round Table Disc of Cont Operations 29 Nov 1962, DOC 68, this chapter; Ltr, 28IFS to 28CIO-H, Summary of Cont Operations, 29 Nov 1962, DOC 69, this chapter.

79. Ltr, 28MME-EA, Radar Breakdown, 3 Jan 1963, DOC 70, this chapter.

overhauling a little at a time or eventually a complete overhaul would have been required to keep them in operation. The maintenance required could not be performed under the single shift concept. SFADS adopted a split shift maintenance operation with the manning authorized. The SFADS commander warned, however, that any reduction in authorized manning would prevent a split shift operation.

Return to DEFCON 5 Alpha. Fortunately, the air defense system capability was not to be tested under a prolonged alert condition. On 27 November, all the air divisions under CINCONAD's operational control returned to a normal readiness status except the 32nd. On 3 December, that division also assumed normal readiness bringing the crisis to an end so far as CONAD component forces were concerned.

The phase-out had been going on gradually before the declaration of DEFCON 5 Alpha. Command posts had closed down, leave policies were liberalized, TDY and dispersed personnel and equipment returned to their home bases, and normal training was beginning to be resumed. The 28th Air Division command post had closed on 9 November.

The division, along with the rest of the ADC command was congratulated by the ADC commander for a job well done. The fact that nuclear weapons had been safely up-loaded,

down-loaded, and ferried under circumstances not previously tested within the air defense system was a cause for heartfelt gratitude. The manner in which dispersal requirements, not anticipated until Phase III, had been met under interim Phase I conditions was also commendable.

The division had been given an invaluable opportunity to assess its operational planning and its ability to carry out war plans. The crisis also brought to light conflicts in directives and the unexpected impact of plans made by other commands and services such as those involving dispersal.

Comments on Contingency Operations. Looking back over the situation existing at various times during the Cuban crisis, there were a number of times when plans and directives were found to be inadequate to meet the situation. The operational planning all seemed to have been based upon a more or less orderly sequence of actions by an aggressor which would be followed by appropriate action on the part of the air defense system. The plans had definitely not been conceived on the basis of a DEFCON 5 Delta situation and of a prolonged increased readiness. As one of the participants stated it:

All the plans assume that we will go to an increased

80. See DOC 66, this chapter.

state of readiness and then something is going to happen. The thing will either shut down, or the balloon will go up. There is nothing in the materiel, personnel, or maintenance planning for keeping everything going during an extended period of readiness....One thing is sure. You can't maintain a DEFCON 2 for a 60-day period. It just isn't practical.

The existing plans were useful, but, in some areas at least, they worked out mainly because experienced personnel were available to improvise and adjust procedures to meet the new and unexpected situations which arose.

Problems with regard to airlift and dispersal have been discussed earlier. Dispersal problems were not a matter of inadequate planning but of being catapulted into an advanced situation without available facilities.

The inability to follow procedures planned for the AEW&C wing resulted from unforeseen, high priority demands made upon wing personnel and equipment.⁸¹

Requirements were found to exist for engineered circuits not included in plans for an emergency operation and many circuits were called up by the division or by ADC. Overloading of tactical circuits resulted in ordering of a preempt feature at the 28th RCC and the four sectors to permit a circuit to be seized for a higher priority call.⁸² Even with

81. Ltr, 2800P to 28C10-H, Info on Cont Operations, 30 Nov 1962, DOC 71, this chapter.

82. Ltr, 280AC-A to 2800P, Info on Cont Operations, 28 Nov 1962, DOC 72, this chapter.

this feature, the needs of the region and sector commanders were not satisfactorily met because of the time it took to clear the circuits. The region commander requested a two-way, four-wire telephone circuit between the region and the sector commanders to meet the need.

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Personnel planning in support of the dispersal program was sound so far as manning by regular Air Force people was concerned. The trouble was that the people were not yet available. Air police for dispersal bases were not authorized until Phase III of the program, but additional personnel were needed the minute nuclear armed aircraft landed at dispersal bases.

Plans for extensive use of inactive Air Force Reserve personnel in Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadrons located near dispersal bases were found to be totally unreliable. Short of actual conflict, there was no way to insure that reservists would be available on short notice. Even if they were available, they would not be able to offer effective support unless they had received adequate advance training.

84

83. Ltr, 28NROP-E to 28 AD, Commanders' (Red Phone) Tele Svc, 31 Dec 1962.

84. 1st Ind, 28PDC-E to Memo, 28COI, 26 Nov 1962, Info on Contingency Ops, 14 Dec 1962, DOC 73, this chapter.

Problems with regard to paying dispersed and deployed personnel arose during the early stages of the Cuban operations. ADC at first denied per diem payment to such personnel on the basis of Air Force joint travel regulations published in mid-1962. Later, this decision was reversed and per diem payment was authorized. Arrangements were also made for getting pay checks to the deployed personnel to prevent financial hardships for them and their families. ⁸⁵

If the Air National Guard had been mobilized, the procedures in the ADC and Division WPB's for supporting and funding these units would not have been adequate. The plans were being revised to overcome the noted deficiencies. ⁸⁶

The SFADS commander's comments to the division brought up questions of unit security and defense which were answered by the division's Chief of the Security and Law Enforcement

85. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Recent Chg to JTR, 2 Jul 1962, DOC 74, this chapter; Ltr, 28 AD to All Units, Chg 116 to JTR and ALMAJCOM 1167/62, 19 Jul 1962, DOC 75, this chapter; ADC to ALADC, TDY under Present Emergency, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 76, this chapter; Msg, 28 AD to 78 Ftr Wg and 414 Ftr Gp, Mailing Chks to TDY Personnel, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 78, this chapter; Msg, ADC to ALADC, Per Diem Entitlement, 9 Nov 1962, DOC 77, this chapter.

86. Ltr, 28AAF to 28AAC, Info on Contingency Ops, 28 Nov 1962, DOC 79, this chapter; Msg, ADC to ALADC, Acct and Fin Support for Mobilized Units, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 80, this chapter.

Division. As in the case of security at the dispersal bases, the problem involved providing the best security measures possible with the limited resources available.

The SFADS letter also noted that difficulties had been experienced during the crisis with the new SAGE-BUIC switching communication system. Attention was also called to the vulnerability of the land lines. The cause of the trouble with the switching communications system had been cleared up and facilities soon to be completed were expected to increase the survivability of the communications systems. ⁸⁷

Operation of the 28th Air Division command post for such an extended period as that of the Cuban alert provided experience upon which improvements could be made. ⁸⁸ In the early stages of the crisis, for example, the fact that the command post at each echelon was supposed to be the focal point for all operations seemed to be overlooked. Subordinate units made direct contact with staff agencies at division headquarters by message or telephone and the staff took action

87. Ltr, SFADS to 28 AD, Comments Concerning Cuban Alert, 31 Dec 1962, DOC 81, this chapter; Ltr, 28ODC to 28CIG, Comments Concerning Cuban Alert, 7 Jan 1963, and 1st Ind, 28CIG, 14 Jan 1963, DOC 82, this chapter; 1st Ind, 28OAC to Ltr, 28ODC, 7 Jan 1963, Comments Concerning Cuban Alert, 17 Jan 1963, DOC 83, this chapter.

88. Memo, Lt Col Johnson French, Jr., to 28OTN, Info on Contingency Ops, 28 Nov 1962, DOC 84, this chapter.

in the same way. No records of these messages or telephone calls were available in the command post to acquaint replacement personnel with the situation existing during previous hours.

Later, copies of such messages were made available to the command post. A procedure was also established for maintaining a comprehensive log and a daily summary report of actions.⁸⁹ From these sources, the information necessary for continuous effective action was always available in the command post.

Periodic briefings were suggested to keep eligible personnel completely familiar with all plans, procedures, and requirements necessary for assuming the position of commander/assistant commander of the division command post. An additional suggestion was that a current outline of all directives and required actions be maintained in the command post for immediate use.

Personnel manning some positions in the command post during the crisis were unfamiliar with actions to be taken or to be monitored by the position. To overcome this problem, manning of such positions was recommended whenever operations orders for exercises required command post manning.

89. Cys of 28 AD Cmd Post Log and Daily Summaries are included with this mono as DOCS 5 and 11, this chapter.

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Other areas worthy of further study were those involving possible duplication of effort by the RCC and the command post, or where unrealistic demands for logistic information or changes in logistic reporting procedures by ADC placed an unnecessary burden on division and unit personnel.

Follow-Up Action on Dispersal. Experience during the Cuban crisis proved the need for a Phase III capability for dispersal bases as soon as possible. The confusion caused by uncoordinated use of the same bases for dispersal by more than one command also showed the need for a master dispersal plan.

On 22 November, ADC provided the division with a list of dispersal bases resulting from actions taken by ADC, NORAD, USAF, and the Department of Defense. The 83rd FIS was dropped from the dispersal program because of plans for inactivating the squadron. The remaining six squadrons were all included in the dispersal plans. Three new dispersal locations were listed. They were Nellis and Edwards AFB's and the San Nicolas Island Naval Air Station. ADC was requesting authority from the host commands to survey these three locations, and

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the division was to prepare programming documents for facilities required at these additional bases.

The list of bases as of 22 November 1962, and squadrons earmarked for them were:

15 FIS (F-101) from Davis-Monthan AFB to Williams AFB.
82 FIS (F-102) from Travis AFB to Siskiyou County Apt.
84 FIS (F-101) from Hamilton AFB to Siskiyou County Apt.
329 FIS (F-106) from George AFB to Nellis AFB.
437 FIS (F-101) from Oxnard AFB to San Nicolas Is NAS.
456 FIS (F-106) from Castle AFB to Edwards AFB.

On 23 November, information was received concerning the survey of civilian airports by the ADC teams. Facilities that could be provided through M&O projects could be ready two years before those requiring military construction program (MCP) action. This was to be kept in mind by division personnel preparing MCP's as well as those on the ADC team.

On 28 and 29 November, a fighter dispersal conference was held at Edwards AFB to determine the ability of that base to support the dispersal of the 329th FIS during Phase III. SAC, MATS, and TAC were also planning to use Edwards AFB as a dispersal base. The entire TWA fleet assigned to

90. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Cite #ADOOP, ADIRP, and ADMLP 3213, Ftr Dispersal Program, 22 Nov 1962.

91. Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Ftr Dispersal Program, 23 Nov 1962, DOC 85, this chapter.

MATS had been given first priority by the host command. All facilities needed by the 329th FIS were available at Edwards with the exception of the alert readiness building. Priorities would have to be worked out with the other commands⁹² for use of dispersal facilities.

28th Air Division representatives attended a dispersal⁹³ conference at ADC headquarters on 5-7 December. The use of Nellis AFB for the 329th FIS dispersal and the concentration of F-101's and F-102's at Siskiyou were discussed. ADC explained that the use of Siskiyou for both the 82nd and the 84th squadrons had been necessary because of the high cost of preparing a previously selected dispersal base for the 84th. The possibility that Siskiyou would be used as a recovery base for SAC aircraft was a further complication.

The division objected to the use of Nellis AFB as a dispersal base for the 329th because of its distance from the area to be defended and because it was a storage base for DASA. Nellis was subsequently dropped from the list of bases approved by ADC. Fresno, dropped earlier because of its vulnerability if an ICBM attack occurred against Castle AFB, was reinstated.

92. Ltr, 2800P to 280DC, Trip Rpt, 30 Nov 1962, DOC 86, this chapter.

93. Ltr, 2800P to 280DC, Trip Rpt, 11 Dec 1962, DOC 87, this chapter.

ADC had no objection to a switch among squadrons and bases by the division so long as no additional cost was involved. The division proposed the following Phase III dispersal locations:
94

- 82FIS - San Nicolas Island NAS
- 84FIS - Siskiyou County Airport
- 456FIS - Fresno Municipal Airport
- 329FIS - Edwards AFB
- 437FIS - San Clemente Island NAS
- 15FIS - Williams AFB

Addition of San Clemente Island to the bases already approved by ADC would overcome the problem of having two squadrons disperse to Siskiyou, but logistical support and airlift requirements would be costly for island sites.

The time required to move squadrons to these dispersal bases was furnished to ADC. All movement of support equipment and personnel could be by surface within means available to the division except for the movement to San Clemente and San Nicolas islands. Military airlift, furnished by ADC, or contract commercial airlift would be required for the island sites.
95

94. Ibid.

95. Msg, 28 AD to ADC, Movement to Dispersal Bases, 18 Dec 1962, DOC 88, this chapter.

The estimated funding requirements for Phase III facilities at these sites, as submitted by the division, totalled almost \$8,000,000.⁹⁶

When the ADC Operation Plan 20-63 was published on 15 January 1963, all the proposed dispersal bases remained in the program, but the squadrons earmarked for these bases differed from those proposed by the division with the exception of the 15th and the 84th. The ADC list of squadrons and bases for Phase III was:

- 15FIS - Williams
- 82FIS - Fresno
- 84FIS - Siskiyou
- 329FIS - San Clemente Island
- 437FIS - San Nicolas Island
- 456FIS - Edwards

The interim dispersal bases were to be the same as those for Phase III except that no interim dispersal was planned for the 437th FIS. Navy approval had not yet been obtained for the use of the two island sites for dispersal.

Planning for dispersal of the AEW&C aircraft had been underway for some time.⁹⁷ Fresno Municipal Airport was

96. Ltr, 28IRP to 28OPP, 28 AD Ftr Dispersal, FY-64 MCP, 14 Dec 1962, DOC 89, this chapter.

97. Ltr, 28OPP to 28ODC, AEW&C Dispersal Conference, 23 Oct 1962, DOC 90, this chapter; Msg, 28AD to 552 AEW&C Wg, Dispersal Conference, 6 Nov 1962, DOC 91, this chapter; Ltr, 28OPP to 28ODC, Trip Report-Report of AEW&C Dispersal Visit, 16 Nov 1962, DOC 92, this chapter.

selected as the dispersal base for Phase I and II. For Phase III, only one squadron would be permanently dispersed to Fresno. The other two squadrons would be dispersed at Comox, Canada, and Edwards AFB. The 552nd AEW&C Wing Operations Plan 1-63 was being written at the close of 1962⁹⁸ on this basis.

Congressional approval and funding would be required before necessary construction could start at the Phase III dispersal bases. The division and ADC were taking all possible action to expedite the Phase III program once Congress had acted. In the meantime, progress was being made toward a Phase II capability at interim bases with April 1963 as a target date.

SUMMARY

The Cuban crisis provided the most realistic operation possible, short of actual war. The 28th Air Division (SAGE), together with all other parts of the military establishment, had the opportunity to evaluate its planning and procedures in this realistic atmosphere and to find out where improvements were needed.

98. Ltr, 28ODC to 28CJA, CSG, AAC, CIG, COI, and IDC, Development of a Plan for the AEW&C Fleet, 11 Dec 1962, DOC 93, this chapter.

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If this evaluation was followed by vigorous action, the Cuban crisis would have been just the catalyst needed for improving the national defense.

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CHAPTER SIX

THE 30TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

By

James M. Russell

The 30th CONAD/NORAD Region did not become directly involved in the Cuban Crisis until October 20, 1962, when the Commander was notified to expect the immediate deployment of part of its interceptor forces. The following day twelve F-106 aircraft of the 1st Fighter Wing were deployed from Selfridge AFB, Michigan to Patrick AFB, Florida. On October 22nd, the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) ordered the implementation of the fighter dispersal plans and increased the state of air defense readiness from DEFCON 5 Alpha (normal) to DEFCON 3 Delta (This was almost immediately reduced to DEFCON 3 Charlie). On October 27th

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the 327th Fighter Group at Truax was ordered to deploy all available F-102's to Homestead AFB, Florida.

On November 20, 1962, the 30th Region was given permission to withdraw its interceptors from the dispersal bases. These aircraft were returned to their home bases within a few days. On 27 November NORAD reduced the state of air defense readiness to DEFCON 5 and the 30th returned to normal operations. The detachment of the 1st Fighter Wing was returned to Selfridge by December 8, 1962, and the 327th Fighter Group came back to Truax on December 20, 1962.

CONAD/NORAD and the RCAF

DEFCON 3 was ordered on October 22, 1962 by CONAD. This alert applied only to the United States air defense components of NORAD, Air Force Air Defense Command, Army Air Defense Command and Navy. The CONAD device was employed in this instance to give the Canadian government time to consider the situation and determine whether it chose to support the advanced alert. It was not until October 24 that the Canadians came to a decision and the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) also declared DEFCON 3.

The declaration of a CONAD alert did not pose any problems as far as the southern deployment of forces was

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concerned as all of the forces involved were those of the United States. However, it did have its peculiar aspects as it related to the air defense radar sites and interceptor forces manned and controlled by the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). Most of the early warning system was on Canadian territory and much of it manned by the RCAF. The Canadians also possessed fighter interceptor squadrons and one BOMARC site. Officially these NORAD components remained on DEFCON 5 (normal) status until 1700Z on October 24.¹

The 30th NORAD Region was authorized some 39 RCAF officers and 62 RCAF enlisted men.² Many of RCAF personnel assigned held responsible positions. The Vice Commander of the 30th NORAD Region, the Director of the Combat Center and the Director of Exercises and Systems Evaluation were all RCAF officers. There were RCAF personnel employed in the Combat Center and in three of the Direction Centers as weapons directors, weapons controllers, C&E staff officers and AC&W technicians.

1. Unofficially the RCAF air defense forces were placed on an advanced state of readiness on October 22.

2. 30 NORAD Rgn had an RCAF authorization of 10 officers and nine enlisted men; Detroit 10/20; Duluth 10/20 and Sault Ste Marie 9/13. Joint Hqs Table of Distribution, 1 Jul 1962.

When CONAD went to an advanced state of air defense readiness on October 22, these RCAF personnel were excused from operational duties. A strange situation. While the Combat Center went on DEFCON 3 on October 22nd, its RCAF Director, W/C. J. Woolfenden, technically remained on DEFCON 5 until forty-eight hours later.

DEPLOYMENT

During the Cuban Crisis twelve F-106's from Selfridge and twenty-two F-102's from Truax were deployed to bases in Florida. These deployments represented an unusual circumstance in air defense. While there had been occasional deployments of fighters to temporarily fill gaps in the system, the transfer of half or whole squadrons on a moment's notice was a unique maneuver. The Century Series fighter - interceptor units of 1962 were elaborate organizations tailored to operate and maintain a large and complex machine on a permanent base and in a fixed ground environment.

Unlike the fighters of the World War II era, the interceptor of the 1960's was not capable of operating from just any landing strip equipped with a radio and a few 55 gallon drums of gasoline. The F-101's, F-102's and F-106's with which the Air Defense Command squadrons were equipped were

normally supported by large maintenance organizations, an elaborate supply system, and considerable physical facilities including alert and maintenance hangars, test stands, test labs and special weapons storage areas.

The massive support requirements of the modern interceptors were demonstrated by the size of the support organizations. The 327th Fighter Group at Truax, which supported one F-102 unit (the 325th Ftr Intcp Sq) was authorized over 1,500 men. The 1st Fighter Wing at Selfridge, which had two F-106 squadrons assigned (the 71st and 94th Ftr Intcp Sqs), was authorized almost 3,500 men. While this Group and Wing had other support responsibilities (i.e., Selfridge also supported a large SAC tenant), most of their effort was directly expended on their own U. E. aircraft. The 327th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Truax, for example, was authorized over 500 men and expended about 80 per cent of its time in support of U. E. aircraft.

The Air Defense Command fighter interceptor squadrons were, in other words, specifically equipped and manned to fight an air battle in a sophisticated ground environment (SAGE) from an established base. While it was expected that these units might be temporarily "dispersed" or even deployed from one ADC base to another on a short-term basis, there had been little thought or planning given to the

possibility of moving a unit or part of a unit fifteen hundred miles on a few hours notice. Unlike the Tactical Air Command, ADC had not practiced such abrupt moves. The deployments carried out during the Cuban Crisis were not only unusual and unprecedented -- they were completely unrehearsed.

As relations with Cuba worsened, CONAD took steps to strengthen the air defense forces in the southeastern United States.³ During 1961 six RC-121 AEW&C aircraft were moved to McCoy AFB to augment surveillance in the area and a detachment of four F-102 aircraft from the 482nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Seymour Johnson AFB was ultimately stationed at Homestead AFB. Three additional gap filler radars were also programmed for Florida to improve low level surveillance --⁴ a serious deficiency in the area. At the time of the Cuban Crisis these forces were augmented by two F-102 aircraft on alert at Tyndall AFB plus twelve Navy F-4H's and eight⁵ F-8U's at Key West.

3. CONAD Opl 1-61 "Contingency Plan for Augmenting the Air Defenses of Southern Florida," 5 Jan 1961, (nicknamed "Southern Tip").

4. Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961, Chapter 12.

5. 30 AD 300OP Briefing, "Participation of ADC in the Contingency Operations in the Cuban Crisis," 21 Dec 1962, DOC 1, this chapter.

On October 17, 1962, CONAD, after consultation with ADC, decided to increase the number of AEW&C aircraft and interceptors in the Southeast. Twelve F-106's from the 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadron were deployed from Langley to Patrick AFB and six more RC-121's were brought in from Otis. On October 21, CONAD ordered the deployment of 12 more F-106's from Selfridge to Florida -- thereby increasing the number of F-106's at Patrick to 24. At the same time 18 aircraft from the 331st Fighter Interceptor Squadron were transferred to Homestead, bringing the number of F-102's there to 36.⁶

On October 25, 1962 NORAD (which went on DEFCON 3 on October 24) decided that there was a serious deficiency in the defense against low level attack. All of the interceptors then in Florida were equipped to carry either guided air rockets (GAR) or the MB-1 rocket with a nuclear warhead. Nuclear warheads could not be used against a low level target and the GAR's with high explosive warheads were not considered to be very effective under such conditions. It was decided that an F-102 with the 2.75 rockets would be best equipped to deal with the situation.

6. Ibid. There were, additionally, thirty-nine Century Series aircraft at Tyndall and seven more at McDill.

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30TH NORAD REGION
Deployment of Aircraft to Florida
October 1962

<u>Unit</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date Deployed</u>	<u>No/Type/A/C</u>	<u>Date Returned</u>
1 Ftr Wg	Patrick	21 Oct 62	12/F-106	5-8 Dec 62
327 Ftr Gp	Homestead	27 Oct 62	22/F-102	20-21 Dec 62

30TH NORAD REGION
Personnel Dispersed and Deployed
Oct - Nov 1962

	<u>29 Oct Off/Amn</u>	<u>7 Nov Off/Amn</u>	<u>20 Nov Off/Amn</u>
Volk	18/114	23/140	26/148
Hulman	6/52	0/13	0/0
Clinton	12/37	11/36	11/37
Des Moines	0/3		
Alpena	27/120	29/128	26/132
Patrick	24/86	24/85	18/112
Homestead	34/235	36/236	36/269
Total	121/647	123/638	117/703*

* Five airmen from 327th Fighter Group (432X0) at Tyndall AFB. As of 20 November there were also nine officers on special assignment at other bases:

- 1 - Tyndall
- 1 - Gunter
- 2 - McDill
- 2 - Richards-Gebaur
- 3 - Key West

SOURCE: 30-PDC Statistical Resumes, 29 October - 21 November 1962 [DOC 2, this chapter].

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The 325th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Truax was the only ADC F-102 unit whose aircraft had not been modified to carry the GAR-11. It had, therefore, some of the last 102's with a 2.75 rocket capability.* The 325th was deployed to Homestead on 27 October 1962 and the 331st Fighter Interceptor Squadron was returned to Webb AFB. The TF-102 with two seats was considered to be more satisfactory for low level work as the pilot could concentrate on flying and the co-pilot could handle the radar. All available TF-102's were, therefore, dispatched to Homestead.⁷

After the aircraft of the 1st Fighter Wing and the 327th Fighter Group were deployed to Florida, they were placed under the operational control of the Montgomery Sector of the 32nd CONAD/NORAD Region. The 30th Region, therefore, had only a support responsibility for these forces. The number and type of sorties which they flew

* All ADC F-102 aircraft originally were equipped to carry 24 2.75 Folding Fin Aircraft Rockets (FFAR) and six GAR's. During 1961 and 1962 most of the ADC F-102's were modified to carry the larger GAR-11 which had a nuclear warhead. As a result of the modification, these aircraft lost the FFAR capability. The 325th aircraft were not modified as the unit was originally programmed to inactivate in 1962.

7. Ibid.

and their alert commitments were controlled by the 32nd. The 30th did, however, monitor the activities of these units carefully to determine their support requirements. This headquarters also took considerable and understandable pride in their accomplishments.

1st Fighter Wing -- Deployment to Patrick (Project "Tree House"). The 1st Fighter Wing was notified at 2230 hours CST on 20 October 1962 that they were to deploy twelve F-106 aircraft, loaded with secondary armament to Patrick AFB, Florida. Maintenance personnel were recalled and preparations begun. After uploading of these aircraft had started, the unit was ordered to install drop tanks. This operation proved difficult. Many tanks, long unused, proved to have faulty seals. Some tanks would not fit the mounts properly. The tanks were difficult to install without using the prescribed engine stands and there were not enough stands available. Crews worked all night and by the morning of 21st, 12 aircraft, three spare aircraft and an initial shipment of spare parts, ground handling equipment and Auxiliary Ground Equipment (AGE) were ready.

8. 1st Ftr Wg, Historical Resume-Cuban Crisis, DOC 3, this chapter.

At 1515 hours CST on October 21st final notification was received and the aircraft began leaving in pairs at fifteen minute intervals. Support personnel and equipment were airlifted at 1700 CST. The first F-106 landed at Patrick at 1900 EST and the last at 2030 EST. ⁹ Eight aircraft landed in commission and four were on alert by 2230 EST on October 21st.

The 1st Fighter Wing detachment at Patrick originally consisted of 12 F-106's, 18 aircrews and 63 ground support personnel. The number of aircraft did not change but the number of personnel located at Patrick increased steadily. By the end of November there were eighteen officers and ¹⁰ 112 enlisted men at the base.

The initial aircrew commitment to Patrick was supplied by the 94th Fighter Interceptor Squadron. At the time the movement was ordered, however, the 94th had only fifteen combat-ready aircrews available and three pilots were "borrowed" from the 71st Fighter Interceptor Squadron. The 94th maintained the Florida detachment of the 1st Fighter

9. These aircraft were recovered by personnel of the 48 Ftr Intcp Sq detachment at Patrick as 1st Ftr Wg ground personnel had not yet arrived. Ibid.

10. 30 AD, 30-PDC, Historical Resume, DOC 2, this chapter.

Wing until 15 November 1962 when they were relieved by the 71st Fighter Interceptor Squadron. Pilots were rotated between Patrick to Selfridge on a regular basis beginning on October 23, 1962.¹¹

While the housing and mess facilities available at Patrick were satisfactory, working conditions were far from ideal. The ground crews worked a seven day week and twelve hour shifts with little or no time off. Despite this, morale remained high during the entire deployment and the maintenance personnel performed legendary feats as a matter of routine. When plans were being made to establish a personnel rotation system after the first week of deployment, it was discovered that no one at Patrick wanted to go home.¹²

The personnel on temporary duty (TDY) at deployment and on dispersal bases did not receive advance travel payments or per diem allowances. Although an attempt was made to provide such persons with maximum partial payments on their salaries, and with emergency allotments where required,¹³ some hardship did result.¹⁴

11. 1 Ftr Wg, Hist Resume-Cuban Crisis, DOC 3, this chapter. The 71 Ftr Intcp Sq aircrews began to arrive at Patrick on 5 Nov 1962.

12. 30 AD, Staff mtg notes, 29Oct 1962, DOC 4, this chapter.

13. 30 AD (30AAC), Hist Resume, DOC 5, this chapter.

14. 1 Ftr Wg, 71 FIS, Hist Resume, DOC 3, this chapter.

The amount and type of materiel required to support this deployment was originally an unknown factor. At first notification, the materiel and maintenance people did not know what the expected sortie rate would be, how much supply or maintenance support would be available at Patrick, or the anticipated length of the deployment. The 1st Fighter Wing initially stocked 629 line items at Patrick. This list was inadequate and was ultimately expanded to 1150 items. When it was discovered that an MA-1 fire control system mock up was needed at Patrick, one was dismantled, shipped to Florida and reassembled in less than 24 hours. The final requirements at Patrick were indicated by the fact that it required twenty-three C-123 aircraft sorties to transport a total of 214,042 pounds of material back to Selfridge when the unit returned in early December 1962.¹⁵

All of the F-106 parts required at Patrick Air Force Base (for aircraft of both the 1st Fighter Wing and the 48th FIS) were furnished by the supply system at Selfridge. Items not available at Patrick were ordered, by telephone, from Selfridge. These requests were filled by air shipment. If the part was not available at Selfridge, it was ordered from the depot and shipped by the depot directly to Florida. Selfridge, thus, became the depot for 53 F-106 aircraft (71st, 94th and 48th FIS). During the period

15. Ibid.

October 22 to November 27, 1962, Selfridge, as a result of the deployment, shipped 1299 items, satisfied 102 Not Operationally Ready for Supply (NORS) requirements and requisitioned 531¹⁶ items from the depot for shipment to Patrick.

The sortie rate maintained by the 1st Fighter Wing detachment at Patrick was little short of phenomenal. As was previously noted, the detachment arrived in Florida on October 21, 1962 and assumed an alert commitment with four aircraft the same day. From then until mid-November the 94th FIS flew as many as 20 sorties and 50 flying hours a day. Between October 21 and November 27 the detachment piled up a record of 430 sorties (of which 406 were combat air patrols)¹⁷ for a total of 1028 flying hours. This rate was far above that ever accomplished by the unit under normal conditions and was, in fact, probably something of a record for F-106 aircraft.¹⁸

16. 1st Ftr Wg, 1st AB Sq, Historical Resume, DOC 3, this chapter.

17. Ibid., See table, Sortie Rate, this chapter.

18. Detroit Air Def Sector, Historical Summary, DOC 6, this chapter.

SORTIE RATE

Detachment 1, 1st Fighter Wing (94 FIS)
Patrick Air Force Base, Florida

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Time</u>	
		<u>hour</u>	<u>minutes</u>
Oct 21	12	27	55
22	10	22	35
23	21	47	55
24	20	46	05
25	9	22	25
26	9	22	50
27	11	21	56
28	9	20	15
29	6	10	45
30	6	13	35
31	4	9	10
Total:	117	265	20
Nov 1	16	39	05
2	17	43	15
3	16	37	25
4	12	30	20
5	18	43	00
6	23	48	45
7	17	43	30
8	8	20	30
9	6	15	50
10	19	40	15
11	18	37	15
12	13	31	20
13	16	27	20
14	23	56	55
15	8	19	05
Total:	230	543	50
Overall Totals:	347	809	10

SOURCE: 1st Fighter Wing, 94th FIS, Historical Resume,
DOC 3, this chapter.

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The exceedingly high sortie rate maintained by the 1st Fighter Wing detachment in Florida was made possible by a high Operationally-Ready (O/R) rate. Although the aircraft were maintained with minimum equipment, spares and technicians, the average O/R rate from October 21 to November 27 was 82 per cent.¹⁹ This rate was better than that attained at Selfridge during the same period.

The accelerated flying also increased the frequency of other maintenance requirements. The Patrick aircraft required eleven periodic inspections in a thirty day period.²⁰ This represented about three times the normal rate.

Detachment 1, 1st Fighter Wing, at Patrick was employed primarily in combat air patrols (CAP) over the Straits of Florida or in manning certain Strategic Orbit Points (STOPS) in the same area. The STOPS were occupied round-the-clock but at random to conceal the pattern of defense from the Cubans.²¹

19. 1st Ftr Wg, 1WDME, Historical Resume, DOC 6, this chapter.

20. Ibid.; Aircraft requiring periodic inspections were rotated back to Serlfridge.

21. 30 AD, 300OP, Briefing, "Participation of ADC in the Cuban Crisis," 21 Dec 1962, DOC 1, this chapter.

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Deployment of the 327th Fighter Group to Homestead Air Force Base. The 327th Fighter Group was notified on October 26, 1962, at 1830 hours (CST), that all available F-102 aircraft of the 325th FIS, with maintenance personnel would be deployed to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. All personnel were recalled by 1900 hours and preparations were begun. The situation was complicated by the short notice and by the fact that seven aircraft were at the Des Moines, Iowa, dispersal base.²²

The group was advised that air transport - six C-54's and fourteen C-123's assigned to the 4650th Combat Support Squadron - would begin arriving at approximately 0500 (CST) on October 27. Aircraft spares were collected, crated, inventoried and moved to a loading area on the ramp. Ground support equipment (AGE) was also transported to the loading area. The material in the loading area was separated into aircraft loads of 12,000 pounds each. Passengers lists were prepared with forty in each shipment. Arrangements were made to pay each officer \$100 and each airman \$50 prior to their departure.

22. 327 Ftr Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 7, this chapter;
30 OOP Historical Resume, DOC 8, this chapter.

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The seven F-102's at Des Moines were returned to Truax Field during the night of October 26th. These, along with fifteen other U. E. aircraft, were fitted with drop tanks.

A production line for the paying and processing of passengers was set up in a hangar at 0500 (CST). When the first transport arrived at 0514 (CST) several loads of passengers and cargo were ready. The first transport left Truax at 0958 (CST) with priority maintenance personnel.²³

The F-102 aircraft began leaving in flights of six at 0915 (CST) on October 27. Each flight was separated by nine hours. The final flight did not depart, therefore, until 0300 (CST) on October 28. The last, or twenty-second aircraft, which had aborted from an earlier flight left at 1100 (CST) on the same day.

Twenty-four transports arrived on October 27 and 18 departed the same day. All personnel were shipped by 2110 (CST) on the 27th. Two transports were diverted to Des Moines to pick up the material left there. Six more cargo aircraft left for Homestead on October 28th. There was, however, still material to be shipped and the Group

23. This delay was caused by the necessity of changing aircrews on the transport.

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asked for five additional transports. The shipments were not completed, therefore, until October 31st.

The F-102's encountered considerable trouble on their flight to Homestead. Four aircraft diverted to Lockbourne and four to Greensboro, North Carolina because of fuel feed problems with the external tanks. Four other F-102's stopped at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base for re-
24
fueling and maintenance.

Despite the delays encountered by the F-102's, the 327th Fighter Group did succeed in transporting 22 U.E. aircraft, 24 aircrews, 240 maintenance personnel and 330,000 pounds of freight to Florida within 27 hours of notification. This was considered to have been pretty
25
good time for a first try.

The detachment of the 482nd FIS at Homestead provided supply support for the 327th. Truax did not, therefore,
26
have supply responsibility for its deployed unit. The number of personnel at Homestead was augmented, but not

24. 30 AD, 30NOCC, Historical Resume, DOC 9, this chapter.

25. 30 AD, Staff Mtg Notes, DOC 4, this chapter.

26. 327 Ftr Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 7, this chapter.

substantially. On October 29 there were 34 officers and 235 men deployed. As of November 20 there were only two additional officers and 34 additional men.²⁷

The detachment of the 327th Fighter Group became part of a fighter task force at Homestead. This force was commanded by Colonel John S. Stewart, the 327th Group Commander. Like the detachment of the 1st Fighter Wing at Patrick, the 327th was under the operational control of the 32nd Region. The F-102's based at Homestead were employed on combat air patrols (CAP). They also helped man the 24-hour "slingshot strip alerts" at Patrick, McCoy McDill and Homestead. This rather unique alert status required two aircraft at each base in the "slingshot position" - that is, on the runway with pilots in the cockpit and engines running.²⁸

With the 325th FIS gone, the flight line at Truax was deserted. Its maintenance capability was reduced to 30 per cent.²⁹ The alert commitment on the base was taken

27. 30 AD, 30 PDC, Statistical Resume, DOC 2, this chapter; See table, Personnel Dispersed and Deployed, p. 170.

28. 30 AD, 30 OOP Briefing, DOC 1, this chapter.

29. 327 Ftr Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 7, this chapter.

up by the 176th IFS, Wisconsin Air National Guard. The Chicago Sector was, nevertheless, reduced to one regular fighter squadron - the 319th at Bunker Hill. Moreover, one third of the 319th F-106 aircraft were dispersed to Volk Field, Wisconsin and were, thus, under the operational control of the Sault Ste Marie Sector.

Following the loss of the 325th, the 30th Division requested that ADC seek the federalization of the Air National Guard Fighter Interceptor units to augment the remaining regular forces. This request was denied by
30
USAF.

DISPERSAL

30th Air Division Dispersal Plan. On January 31, 1962, all of the ADC fighter squadrons placed one-third of their possessed aircraft on fifteen minute alert. This increased alert was ordered to permit a larger number of fighters to become airborne in the event of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) attack. It was assumed that in a general war with the Soviet Union, the U. S. would be subjected to

30. 30 AD, 30 OOP-M, Historical Resume, DOC 8, this chapter.

a "substantial ballistic missile attack...directed primarily against U. S. strategic retaliatory forces and secondarily against defensive, population centers and government control centers." ³¹ The warning of such an attack might not exceed fifteen minutes.

Many ADC fighter-interceptor squadrons were collocated with SAC units and would thus be in primary ICBM target areas. Other fighters were collocated with SAGE control facilities and would be in secondary target areas. In the 30th, for example, seven fighter interceptor squadrons were collocated with strategic forces and the other two squadrons were on a station with a Direction Center or a Combat Center. ³² Therefore, all of the 30th Air Division fighter units had first ³³ priority for dispersal.

31. 30 AD, Ops Plan 2-62, Interim Fighter Dispersal/ Increased Alert Plan, 12 Feb 1962 w/Chgs 1, 2 and 3 and Annex C (Logistics).

32. Military targets within the 30 AD included Bunker Hill AFB, Ind. (SAC); Kincheloe AFB, Mich (ADC with SAC tenants); K.I. Sawyer AFB, Mich (ADC with SAC tenants); Lockbourne AFB, Ohio (SAC); Selfridge AFB, Mich (ADC with SAC tenants); Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio (AFLC); Wurtsmith AFB, Mich (SAC); Blytheville AFB, Ark (SAC); Clinton County AFB, Ohio (CONAC); Little Rock AFB, Ark (SAC); A Combat Center and a Direction Center was located at Truax Fld, Wisc, and Direction Centers were located at Custer AFS, Mich; Duluth MAP, Min; K. I. Sawyer AFB, Mich; Ibid. Appendix 2 to Annex A.

33. Ibid., p. B-2.

30TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

Dispersal Field Assignments

<u>FIS</u>	<u>Acft</u>	<u>Home</u>	<u>As of Feb 62*</u>	<u>As of Jul 62*</u>	<u>Ultimate**</u>
11	106	Duluth	Volk	Hector, Fargo, N. D.	RCAF Stn Portage La Prairie
62	101	K.I.Sawyer	Phelps- Collins	Phelps- Collins	Hector
71	106	Selfridge	Volk	Volk	Volk
94	106	Selfridge	Volk	Hulman	Volk
87	101	Lockbourne	Clinton County	Phelps- Collins & Clinton County	Phelps- Collins
319	106	Bunker Hill	Hulman	Des Moines & Hulman	Des Moines
325	102	Truax	Des Moines or Capital (111)	Des Moines or Capital	Des Moines
438	106	Kincheloe	Phelps- Collins	Volk	Volk
445	101	Wurtsmith	Phelps- Collins	same	same

* SOURCE: 30th Air Div, Op Plan 2-62, 12 February 1962, Appendix 1 to Annex B.

** SOURCE: Ibid., Change 3, 1 Jul 1962.

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The existing dispersal plans envisioned a number of dispersal bases in the 30th Division to which the alert aircraft might be scattered. These bases would, in the initial phase be expected to provide only recovery and turn-around facilities (i.e., refueling and starting equipment). Planned refinement (Phase II) of dispersal operations required the dispersal bases to be manned and equipped to provide, in addition to turn-around, a twenty-four hour operation with two sorties per aircraft. Ultimately, the dispersal bases were to be capable of supporting the deployed aircraft for five days and eight sorties per machine. This final phase (Phase III) would require the construction of fairly elaborate facilities, including nuclear storage.

Initially the 30th Division was assigned seven dispersal bases for its nine fighter squadrons. These were Air National Guard or municipal airports in Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois and Michigan.

The dispersal plans were instituted under two handicaps. Firstly, it was necessary that they be funded and manned within existing Division resources. This placed obvious restrictions upon the project as only limited quantities of money, manpower and equipment were available. Secondly, the dispersal bases assigned were tactically far from ideal.

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The Division, in cognizance of its tactical doctrine, would prefer to deploy its alert aircraft northward, toward the anticipated manned bomber attack. However, the most likely dispersal bases to the north lay in Canada. Until the Canadian government agreed to participate in this plan these bases could not be utilized.

The first phase of the dispersal plan was, as has been noted, inaugurated at the end of January 1962. The more elaborate phases were to be implemented when the manpower and money became available.

The dispersal plans provided for two warning contingencies. In the event that the air defense system received only a fifteen minute "tactical" warning, the alert aircraft were to be scrambled or "flushed" and recovered at a surviving base or a dispersal base. If, however, a "strategic" warning of twelve hours or more was received, then the interceptors were to be "dispersed" to the pre-designated dispersal bases.

The cost of supporting the new alert and dispersal plan was high. Placing one third of the possessed aircraft on alert made those machines unavailable for normal training. Thus, in addition to producing enough operational aircraft to meet the alert requirement, the maintenance organization

was expected to provide sufficient operational aircraft to meet the training requirements.

This additional burden was placed on a maintenance and supply system which was already hard pressed. While the aircraft modification programs were nearing completion by early 1962 and while the supply picture showed gradual improvement, aircraft maintenance was still operating under a number of handicaps. The material failure rate -- particularly in the F-106 fire control system -- remained high. The shortage of supervisory level aircraft maintenance personnel showed little improvement.

Because of these handicaps, the new alert status was entered upon with considerable reservations. The preliminary testing of the concept in late 1961 tended to support these doubts.³⁴ However, on January 31, 1962, one third of the possessed tactical aircraft did go on 15-minute alerts and this status was maintained thereafter. Moreover, the fighter units did continue to meet their training requirements while maintaining the alert commitment.³⁵

34. See Hist of 30 Air Div, Jul-Dec 1961.

35. ADC/CONAC Test Directive, 3 Jan 1962.

The original dispersal concept envisioned the use of the existing Air Force Reserve Recovery units to service the aircraft on the dispersal bases. In February and March 1962 this concept was tested at Volk Field, on ANG installation located in Wisconsin.³⁶ Tests were conducted on February 10, March 3 and March 16 using F-101 aircraft from K. I. Sawyer and AF Reserve Recovery Squadrons from Wisconsin and Minnesota.

These tests were not an unqualified success. Although the reserve units were given considerable advance warning, it still required two to three hours for them to muster the personnel and transport them sixty to one hundred miles to Volk Field. Once in place, the reservists proved to be only "minimum qualified" in servicing the aircraft. They were, moreover, dependent upon the Wisconsin Air National Guard employees at Volk for considerable indirect support. The Guard provided the facilities and had the ground support equipment ready when the Reservists arrived.³⁷

Although the performance of the Reserve Recovery Squadrons improved as they became more familiar with the

36. 2481 AF Reserve Sect (Minn), Report of Joint ADC/CONAC Volk Fld Service Tests, Feb-Mar 1962.

37. Ibid.

task, the 30th Air Division, after three tests, opposed the continuation of the test program.

In April 1962 the Division reported to ADC that the tests conducted during February and March 1962 "proved that...lacked equipment and trained people in the right skills to support our requirements." It was also pointed out that further tests might jeopardize our good relations with the Air Guard who resented the use of their facilities and equipment by the Reserve units. Moreover, the test program was another drain upon TDY funds which were already in short supply. ADC agreed and cancelled the remaining tests.
38

In a letter to ADC written in March 1962, the Division pointed out that all of the Dispersal Bases in the 30th Division had active Air National Guard installations,* with the exception of Clinton County AFB which was owned by CONAC. The Guard had a permanent party of 22 and 120 men on each base. They had agreed, in each instance, to support the dispersal requirement and it was expected that the CONAC

38. Msg 30 AD to ADC, ADC/CONAD Test, 3 Mar 1962; Ltr, ADC to 30 AD, Phase II Test of Dispersal Capability, 4 Jun 1962.

* Volk, Hulman, Phelps-Collins, Alpena, Des Moines.

forces at Clinton County would agree to support dispersal there. The Division did not, therefore, require any additional support to accomplish Phase I of the Dispersal Plan.³⁹

The Division did expect, however, that Phase II and III of the Dispersal Plan would be beyond the support capabilities of the Air National Guard. Phases II and III would require augmentation personnel to serve as vehicle drivers, refueling operators, medics, and security guards. These personnel, it was suggested, could be supplied by the AF Reserve Recovery units assigned to the Commander of the ANG installation.

The Division also expected that the later phases of the Dispersal Plan would require additional technician spaces -- engine and airframe mechanics, fire control technicians and armament specialists. It was recommended that these personnel could be best obtained by an increase in the ANG manning documents. The AF Reserve Recovery units were not allotted these skills and it was expected that they would have difficulty in recruiting people with such skills. They did not, moreover, have the type of training program that would be necessary to keep such technicians proficient.⁴⁰

39. Ltr, 30 AD to ADC, Support of the Interceptor Dispersal Program, 20 Mar 1962.

40. Ibid.

The Division recommended, therefore, that ADC, USAF, the ANG Bureau, and CONAC arrange to augment the existing Guard detachments at Volk, Alpena, Des Moines, and Fargo (Hector Field) with full-time technicians and emergency AF Reserve support. It further recommended that all these forces be subordinate to the ANG base commander.⁴¹

In the spring and summer of 1962 a number of large scale "No Notice" dispersals were carried out during live exercises. These dispersals were valuable in exposing potential problems and deficiencies associated with the dispersal plans.

During Shock Wave IV, an exercise held in May 1962, fourteen interceptors were "flushed" from Kincheloe, Wurtsmith and K. I. Sawyer and recovered at Phelps-Collins Field in Michigan.⁴² The "flush" order went out to the Sault Ste Marie Sector at 1813 and the first interceptor arrived at Phelps-Collins sixty-seven minutes later. The last interceptor did not arrive until 2105. "Turn around" was completed shortly after the arrival of this last bird.

Among the problems highlighted by this exercise were incomplete and inadequate pre-positioned ground support

41. Ibid.

42. Memo, 300OP-PR, No Notice Dispersal, Phelps-Collins Fld, 3 May 1962.

equipment. There were not, for example, enough ladders or tow bars for each type of aircraft involved. The lighting was poor and this hampered the servicing of the aircraft. It was recommended that portable lights be placed at all dispersal bases. Half of the aircrews arrived without the required lock pins, external tank jettison pins and tail lock safety pins. The ANG ground crews had to improvise
43
pins and this took time.

The aircrews failed, in some instances, to report their arrival to the Sector as they were instructed to do. They appeared, in general, to be disorganized and tended to stand around waiting for someone to service their aircraft. Half of the aircrews said they were not capable of re-
44
packing their dragchutes. As one observer put it:

The average crew member is not aware of his responsibilities to insure that his plane is serviced properly and its status reported to the controlling agency. He is used to having many things done for him at home base and takes it for granted that the same set-up exists at dispersal bases. This dispersal operation is a shoestring, pea patch operation and they should be made aware of it if only for their own personal safety.

Some of the planning deficiencies denoted in this dispersal were beyond the control of the air or ground crews.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

The interceptors were not, for example, permitted to land as soon as they arrived at the dispersal base but were required to remain aloft until their fuel had been reduced below a certain maximum. Communications were in general, complex and faulty. Although requested to issue airborne orders with a thirty minute lapse to allow for the inadequate equipment and primitive conditions at the dispersal base,⁴⁵ the Sault Sector scrambled all the fighters:

As a result some hairy scenes developed on the ramp when pilots attempted five minute scrambles with no cockpit ladders, minimum qualified ground crews to start them and over a mile of winding, unlighted taxiway to negotiate. Scramble time averaged seven to eight minutes under these conditions.

Despite the problems which arose the exercise did prove that it was possible to disperse a large number of interceptors to an ANG base and turn them around with only the simplest equipment and with ground crews unfamiliar with the aircraft. The reports were, moreover, enthusiastic about the ANG crews.⁴⁶

The mission was considered a success and a lot was learned....The cooperation, proficiency and effectiveness of the ANG people at Phelps-Collins was noteworthy. They did a fine job and would be capable of handling twice the number of interceptors in a one-shot effort.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

In July 1962 during exercise Shock Wave VI, 12 F-106's from Selfridge were dispersed to Hulman Field, Terre Haute, Indiana, where they were serviced by ground crews of the 113 TFS. In this case the ANG were not even given advance notice that they were expected to service the aircraft. However, they fell to with a will and although they were unfamiliar with the F-106, all 12 aircraft were turned around in about ninety minutes. Again it was noted that communications between the dispersal base and the Sector were inadequate and that the aircrews "did not possess an adequate knowledge of the operational concept."⁴⁷

In addition to the "No Notice" dispersals held during exercises, the "flush" technique of the 15 minute aircraft was tested by the Inspector General on a number of occasions as part of the Capability Inspections. The fifteen minute birds (representing one-third of the possessed aircraft) were expected to become airborne within that time limit to prevent their loss in the event of a BMEWS warning. In practice, this requirement proved difficult to meet. At a

47. Memo, 300OP, No Notice Dispersal, 1st Ftr Wg, Selfridge to Hulman, 13 Jul 1962. Memo, 30MME-B, Report of Trip to Hulman, 12 Jul 1962.

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test held at Selfridge in July, it took the 1st Fighter Wing (71st and 94th FIS) fifteen minutes to get all the pilots strapped in the aircraft.⁴⁸ At Duluth in August the 343rd Fighter Group (11th FIS) required nineteen minutes⁴⁹ to get all of the pilots in their seats.

Although the birth of the Increased Alert/Dispersal Operation was, as has been noted, far from painless, Phase I was a going operation by mid-1962. It was made to work, moreover, in less than five months.

By June 1962 support agreements had been concluded at six Phase I dispersal bases -- Volk, Phelps-Collins, Des Moines, Hulman, Capital and Hector. (An agreement was not signed at Clinton County AFB because the CONAC Troop Carrier unit there had an M-Day assignment elsewhere and could not agree to support the dispersed aircraft in war-time). Ground support equipment had been pre-positioned at all of the seven bases listed above. No personnel were pre-positioned as the ANG was willing and able to supply the ground crews to service the aircraft.⁵⁰

48. 30 AD, ORI Report, 1st Ftr Wg, 27 Aug 1962.

49. 30 AD, ORI Report, 343 Ftr Gp, 23 Aug 1962.

50. Msg 30AD to ADC, 300OP-PL-06-11-135, 13 Jun 1962.

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All of the dispersal bases had a two-hour turnaround capability and 99 per cent of the combat aircrews had completed dispersal training. The number of Phase I dispersal sorties completed by June 1962 was impressive:

Volk	86
Phelps-Collins	94
Des Moines	42
Clinton County	36
Hulman	42
Capital.	12

At mid-1962, therefore, the command had been keeping one-third of its interceptors on 15-minute alert for five months. The "flush" and "dispersal" plans were complete. The preparations were complete and training was well under way.

Dispersal -- October 22, 1962. When CONAD increased the alert status to DEFCON 5 Delta at 1830Z on October 22, 1962, all available interceptors were loaded with primary armament in accordance with NORADR 55-3 and placed on 5-minute status. All of the units completed this task within an hour and a half. At 1939Z CONAD ordered the fighters dispersed and within minutes one-third of the available U. E.

51. Ibid.

52. 30 AD, 30NOCC, Historical Resume, DOC 9, this chapter.

aircraft were scrambled from Truax, Duluth, K. I. Sawyer, Kincheloe, Wurtsmith, Bunker Hill, Lockbourne and Selfridge. 53

The 30th Air Division Dispersal Plan, as it stood in October 1962, envisioned the use of Volk Field, Wisconsin; Des Moines, Iowa and Alpena (Phelps-Collins), Michigan as primary dispersal bases. Volk was to accommodate aircraft from the 11th, 438th and 1st Wing. Des Moines was to receive aircraft from the 325th and 319th. Alpena was to be utilized by the 62nd, 445th and 87th. Unfortunately, this arrangement 54 proved impracticable at the time dispersal was ordered.

On the afternoon of October 22, Volk was already weathered in and the weather was rapidly closing in on Alpena. Moreover, runway construction at Des Moines made that airport unsafe for interceptors heavier than the F-102.

The decision was made, therefore, to recover aircraft of the 319th FIS and the 1st Wing at a secondary dispersal

53. 56 Ftr Wg, Historical Resume, DOC 10, this chapter; 507 Ftr Wg, Hist Resume, DOC 11, this chapter; 87 FIS, Hist Resume, DOC 12, this chapter; 319 FIS, Hist Resume, DOC 13, this chapter; 445 FIS, Hist Resume, DOC 14, this chapter; Duluth Sector, Hist Resume, DOC 15, this chapter; Detroit sector, Hist Resume, DOC 6, this chapter; 343 FIS Hist Resume, DOC 17, this chapter; Chicago Sector, Hist Resume, DOC 18, this chapter; Sault Ste Marie Sector, Hist Resume, DOC 19, this chapter.

54. 30CVC, Dispersal Briefing, DOC 20, this chapter; 30-OOP, Historical Resume, DOC 21, this chapter.

base -- Hulman Field in Terre Haute, Indiana. The 325th FIS sent its F-102's off to Des Moines as planned and the 62nd, 438th and 445th FIS went into Alpena. There was not enough time for the 87th to get to Alpena before the weather closed in so it was diverted to Clinton County AFB, Ohio. The 11th was sent westward to Hector in North Dakota, which lay in the area of the 29th Region.⁵⁵

The initial dispersal pattern changed almost immediately as the 30th began to move the aircraft to their primary dispersal bases. The 11th FIS aircraft were flown from Hector to Volk on October 23rd. Two days later, the 1st Fighter Wing aircraft at Hulman Field were also moved to Volk. On November 6 these elements were joined at Volk by 319th FIS machines, previously at Hulman. The deployment of the 327th Fighter Group to Florida on the 27th of October resulted in the withdrawal of their dispersed aircraft from Des Moines. After October 27, therefore, only Volk, Alpena and Clinton County were used as dispersal bases.⁵⁶

55. See Table, Dispersal, this chapter.

56. See Table, Dispersal, this chapter; The 87th FIS was left at Clinton County, rather than transferred to its primary base (Alpena) as Clinton County proved handy and easier to support from Lockbourne. 87 FIS, Hist Resume, DOC 12, this chapter.

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The number of U. E. aircraft at the dispersal bases fluctuated almost daily as the figure was based on the total number of machines "available." Up until October 26th about 45 aircraft were located at the dispersal bases. The deployment of the 327th Fighter Group on October 27th⁵⁷ reduced that number to 35 or 40.

After November 6th there were normally fourteen to sixteen F-106 aircraft at Volk, eight F-101's and four F-106's⁵⁸ at Alpena and four F-101's at Clinton County. On November 18th the Region was given permission to bring the dispersed birds back home. After that date no additional aircraft were sent to the dispersal bases and those machines on regular rotation were not returned to dispersal. As a result, the number of dispersed aircraft began to decline thereafter. The final withdrawal was delayed by weather so that the last aircraft did not arrive back at the homebase until November 22nd. Two of the dispersal bases -- Volk and Alpena -- were kept manned on a one hour alert basis until after November 27 when the air defense alert status was reduced⁵⁹ to DEFCON 5 (normal).

57. See Table, Number of Acft Dispersed, this chapter.

58. Ibid.

59. 30 AD, Staff Mtg Notes, 21 & 22 Nov 1962, DOC 4, this chapter.

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Considering the short notice and poor weather, the initial dispersal went off surprisingly smoothly. The record was marred, however, when an F-106 out of Selfridge engaged the barrier on landing at Hulman. The runway was only 7,000 feet and in poor condition. There was a severe cross-wind and the drag chute failed. There was only minor damage, however, to the main gear fairing doors and the nose gear. The damaged aircraft was, after minor maintenance at Hulman, flown back to Selfridge for repair.⁶⁰

Other than this incident, however, no problems were encountered and the dispersal was successfully carried out in a remarkably short time. The 1st Fighter Wing received orders to disperse six aircraft at 2100Z. The sixth aircraft took off at 2149Z and all had landed at Hulman at⁶¹ 2215Z.

60. 1st Ftr Wg, 1WODC, Historical Resume, DOC 3, this chapter.

61. Ibid.

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30TH AIR DIVISION

Dispersal

22 October - 22 November 1962

<u>Dispersal Bases</u>	Units <u>22 Oct</u>	Units <u>27 Oct-22 Nov</u>
Hulman, Ind	319, 1	
Volk, Wisc		319*, 1*, 11*
Alpena, Mich	62, 438, 445	62, 438, 445
Clinton City, Ohio	87	87
Des Moines, Iowa	327*	
Hector, North Dakota	11	

* Changes to Dispersal -- 20 October - 27 October

23 October - 11th FIS aircraft moved from Hector to Volk.

25 October - 1st Ftr Wg aircraft moved from Hulman to Volk.

27 October - 327th Ftr Gp deployed to Homestead AFB, Florida --
including dispersed aircraft at Des Moines.

6 November - 319th FIS aircraft moved from Hulman to Volk.

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30TH AIR DIVISION

Number of Aircraft Dispersed

<u>Date</u>	<u>Available</u>	<u>Dispersed</u>
26 October	108	45
29 October	106	39*
7 November	97	37
14 November	101	32
21 November	106	18**

* Reduction in dispersed aircraft the result of southern deployment of 327th Fighter Group.

** Reflects withdrawal of interceptors to home bases which began after 18 November.

Disposition of Dispersed Forces as of 7 November 1962.

<u>Base</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Acft No./Type</u>
Volk	11	6/106
Volk	319	4/106
Volk	1	4/106
Alpena	62	4/101
Alpena	438	4/106
Alpena	445	4/101
Clinton County	87	4/101

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Facilities at the Dispersal Bases. The preparation of alternate dispersal bases -- Hulman, Clinton County and Capital -- paid off on October 22 when the weather prohibited the use of Volk and restricted the use of Alpena.⁶² However, none of the dispersal bases were extensively equipped. On the basis of the original plan, the dispersal sites had only a Phase I capability in October 1962. There were sufficient facilities and equipment in place to refuel and restart the aircraft. This function could be accomplished initially by the Air National Guard personnel stationed at most of the dispersal bases. The plan was based primarily on the assumption that the aircraft would remain on dispersal for only a few hours before being recovered at a regular base somewhere.

The dispersal bases in the 30th Region were not, in other words, prepared to support an extended dispersal. No funds had been made available to provide the manning or equipment for even minor maintenance. No provision had been made to provide housing, mess facilities or recreation for the crews. Communications between the dispersal bases and the Sectors were frequently primitive. The Air National Guard

62. 30 AD, 30-CVC, Dispersal Briefing, DOC 20, this chapter.

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did not have the men or, in many cases, the facilities to provide much assistance. Their obligation to provide any assistance at all was not clearly defined.⁶³

Although the "contingency operations" of October and November 1962 were a contingency not provided for in Phase I of the Dispersal Plan, the problems were resolved. Provisions were made to feed and house the people at the dispersal bases. However, conditions were considerably short of luxurious. At Hulman, for example, ADC air ground crews worked, slept and ate in a hangar alongside the F-84 aircraft of the Indiana Air National Guard.⁶⁴ Housing at Clinton County was initially austere and located at some distance from the ramp.

By November 6, as has been noted, all of the dispersed aircraft were located at Volk, Alpena or Clinton County where the facilities were adequate. The host unit at Clinton County, the 302nd Troop Carrier Wing (Air Force Reserve), was

63. Volk and Alpena were Air National Guard installations manned by personnel technically employed by the states of Wisconsin and Michigan. These Guard units were not called into federal service during the Cuban Crisis.

64. See photos taken at Hulman of aircraft and crews of 319 FIS, 1 Nov 1962, DOC 22, this chapter; SAC crews on dispersal at Hulman had motel accommodations.

mobilized on October 28, 1962, and the base was put into full operation. The mess hall, officers' open mess, base exchange and theater were opened. As a result, living conditions for the 87th FIS crews there improved considerably. ⁶⁵

Although sufficient equipment, parts and maintenance personnel were ultimately transported to the dispersal bases, nothing could be done about the operational facilities there. The runway at Hulman was in poor condition and the barrier was poorly placed -- circumstances which may have contributed to the aircraft incident on October 22. ⁶⁶

The taxi-way lighting at Alpena was found to be inadequate and it had to be reinforced with flare pots and white bean bag lights. ⁶⁷ The existing snow removal equipment was not in working condition and had to be repaired at Air Force expense. ⁶⁸

Maintenance facilities were inadequate or non-existent. There was an available hangar at Volk, for example,

65. 30 AD, Staff Meeting Notes, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 4, this chapter; 87 FIS, Historical Resume, DOC 12, this chapter.

66. 30 AD, Staff Meeting Notes, October 26, 1962, DOC 4, this chapter.

67. 30 AD, 30 MDC, Historical Resume, DOC 23, this chapter.

68. 30 AD, 30 AAC, Historical Resume, DOC 5, this chapter.

but its doorway proved to be eighteen inches lower than the vertical stabilizer of an F-106.⁶⁹ Providentially, the weather in October and November 1962 was mild. Although freezing temperatures occurred at Volk and Alpena, precipitation was slight and extensive ice and snow did not develop. Snow removal was not, hence, a problem. More important, loading and minor maintenance could be accomplished at the dispersal sites on the open ramps. If the aircraft had remained on dispersal on into the winter, operations would probably have been jeopardized. Of particular concern was the maintenance of the MB-1 rockets on the dispersed aircraft. These weapons were supposed to be maintained at a certain temperature and no really adequate devices were available for keeping them warm while installed on an alert aircraft.⁷⁰ Also in short supply at the dispersal bases was heated storage for the ground support equipment (AGE). At Volk, for example, if the one hangar was to be used for aircraft maintenance, the AGE would have to be pushed out in the cold.⁷¹

69. 30 AD, 30 MDC, Historical Resume, DOC 23, this chapter.

70. 30 AD, Staff Meeting Notes, 23 Oct 1962, DOC 4, this chapter.

71. 343 Ftr Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 17, this chapter.

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Navigation Aids -- Dispersal Bases. To permit all weather operation, the dispersal bases should have complete navigational aids (TACAN, ADF beacon, ILS and a control tower) manned and maintained on a 24-hour basis. Many of the dispersal bases allotted to the 30th Region did not meet this criteria. The municipal airports (Des Moines, Hulman and Capital) were fairly well equipped but the Air National Guard bases (Volk and Alpena) and the AF Reserve base at Clinton County had only limited NAVAIDS. Moreover, Volk, Alpena and Clinton County were fully operational only during the summer months when annual training was conducted. The 30th had requested that additional NAVAID equipment and manning be provided as a requirement of the Dispersal Plan but the situation had not changed when the Cuban Crisis occurred.⁷²

After the dispersal in October 1962, therefore, this Headquarters asked ADC to provide mobile Air Force communication Service (AFCS) equipment (GCA or TACAN) and manning for Alpena, Volk and Clinton County. ADC was also asked to do what it could to expedite the installation of a programmed FAA VORTAC at Capital Airport in Springfield, Illinois.

72. 30 AD, 30 OAC, Historical Resume, DOC 16, this chapter.

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There was also a scramble to locate control tower operators to provide 24-hour manning at the dispersal bases. Sufficient operators were finally obtained from Division and AFCS resources.

The request for a separate TACAN at Clinton County was rescinded on 5 November 1962, when it was decided that the let down procedures established off the Patterson AFB VORTAC were adequate to the task. USAF would not grant the request for the installation of GCA equipment at Volk and Alpena.
73

Communications -- Dispersal Bases. Communications between the Sectors and the dispersal consisted, in most cases, of single, non-tactical lines. In the cases of the Chicago and Sault Ste Marie Sectors, there were no means which would permit the sending of crypto material by teletype to the dispersal bases. On 22 October 1962, the 30th Division communications and electronics people placed orders for full period voice and teletype (TWX) circuits where required. ORION crypto systems were also ordered for two of the dispersal bases. These actions were taken under emergency authority. The orders for TWX service were

73. Ibid.

repudiated after the fact by ADC which found the TWX service
74
to have been "neither warranted or justified."

Security. The scattering of thirty or forty fully armed interceptors all over the countryside represented a Security Officers' nightmare. Air Policemen were already in short supply and the security provisions such as fencing at the dispersal sites left something to be desired. The ramp at Hulman, for example, lay cheek by jowl with a main highway.

Guards for the dispersed aircraft were obtained from the home bases and replaced by "augmentee" airmen called from other assignments. As of October 26, there were 84 Air Policemen and five trained augmentees on duty at the dispersal bases. Manning and equipment (radios, vehicles) were marginal but all bases were regarded as meeting the
75
requirements of ADCM 205-2.

The withdrawal of Air Policemen from the bases to provide guards for the dispersal sites, coupled with the requirement of increased security precautions at all instal-
76
lations, spread the regular security forces pretty thin.

74. Ibid. The authority was ADC Supp 1 to AFM 100-22.

75. Memo, 30CIG-S to 30 CIG, Security of Dispersed Units, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 24, this chapter.

76. In October 1962 there were 759 Air Policemen

After the aircraft alert requirement was increased (to one-third on 15 minutes) in January 1962, it was found necessary to continuously "borrow" Air Policemen on Temporary Duty (TDY) from the radar sites to patrol the flight lines at the bases. These men were transferred to the bases for periods of 30, 60 or 90 days -- an expensive and cumbersome process.

The increased requirement for security forces during the Cuban Crisis was met by putting the regular Air Police on a twelve hours on, twelve hours off schedule and by drafting a number of airmen to serve as "augmentee" police. This caused some problems. The 507th Fighter Wing Chief of Maintenance noted: "the loss of personnel to Air Police augmentation created a hardship on the sections involved. It is suggested that the least number of maintenance augmentees be taken from the maintenance complex as possible."

[Cont'd] (AFSC 711XO) authorized in the 30 AD and 695 assigned. As was noted, more than 10 per cent of these were at the dispersal bases.

77. Info obtained from 30-CIG-SE. With six or more armed aircraft on 15-minute alert at each squadron, the machines were frequently kept on the ramp for the want of alert shelter space. This increased the number of patrols and posts necessary to provide security. Moreover, two-men patrols were required with nuclear armed interceptors.

78. 507 Ftr Wg, Historical Resume, DOC 11, this chapter.

There were, during the Cuban Crisis, several sabotage alerts, all of which proved, upon investigation, to have been groundless. The most spectacular penetration occurred at the Duluth Sector Direction Center at 0500Z on October 26 when a guard fired upon a figure which was attempting to climb the fence. The whole system was alerted. Further investigation, however, resulted in the conclusion that the intruder was a large animal -- probably a bear.

This sabotage alert had repercussions from Duluth to the Pine Tree Line. When the alert klaxon went off at Duluth, for example, the 11th FIS was unable to identify the signal and, deciding that discretion was the better part of valor, "flushed" the alert aircraft. While the situation was clarified and the F-106's recalled prior to becoming airborne, the incident led to changes in the alert klaxon system at Duluth, designed to prevent a recurrence.

Personnel on Dispersal. When the dispersal was ordered on October 22, some 70 officers and 330 airmen were transferred

79. 30 AD, 30 NOCC, Historical Resume, DOC 9, this chapter.

80. 343 Ftr Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 17, this chapter.

to five dispersal bases. With the southern deployment of the 327th Fighter Group on October 27, eight officers and fifteen airmen were withdrawn from Des Moines. When the 1st and 319th aircraft were shifted from Hulman to Volk on October 25th and November 6th, some (but not all) of the personnel who were at Hulman were moved to Volk.⁸¹ By November 20, just before the dispersal ended, there were 73 officers and 317 airmen at Volk, Alpena and Clinton County.

While living conditions and recreational facilities at the dispersal sites were far from ideal, morale was high in the first few weeks.⁸² After that, despite rotation, boredom began to take its toll. The dispersal was maintained even after the naval quarantine of Cuba was lifted on November 20. Moreover, there was no indication of how long the situation would last.

81. 30 AD, Staff Meeting Notes, Oct 26, DOC 4, this chapter.

82. As aircraft were rotated from the dispersal base their MB-1 weapons were, normally, removed and loaded on the replacement aircraft. After the first two weeks it was necessary to rotate the nuclear weapons so that those at the dispersal base could receive periodic maintenance. Hence, in November "Hazardous cargo" ferry flights were daily events. These flights were flight followed and routed over less densely populated areas.

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Safety. Conditions surrounding the dispersal operations were not conducive to safety. Interceptors, many of them carrying nuclear weapons, were rotated between the bases and the dispersal sites daily. Runways, NAVAIDS and other facilities at the dispersal sites were, as has been noted, less than ideal. Nuclear weapons were, by necessity, downloaded at the dispersal bases with minimum manpower and equipment.

On November 7, for example, the Detroit Sector Chief of Safety visited Volk Field. He found a number of deficiencies which "hampered...the effectiveness and safe conduct (operation) of an all-weather interceptor force." Among these were the lack of a GCA unit, airborne fire suppression equipment (helicopter), runway overruns, adequate runway barriers, aircraft shelters, heated AGE shelter, aircraft de-ice equipment, required number of explosive disposal personnel (EOD) and recreation facilities.

During the week of November 13, a USAF Deputy IG for Safety team visited the dispersal bases in the 30th Region and found no discrepancies in weapons handling. The team did recommend, however, that the tower and GCA at Clinton County, which was operating only 13 hours a day, be put on

83. Detroit ADS, Historical Resume, DOC 6, this chapter.

~~SECRET~~

a 24-hour basis. They also recommended that the ramps at Clinton County be kept swept and that a jet barrier be installed.
84

However, in the final analysis, the safety record at the dispersal bases was excellent. The minor aircraft accident, already described, that occurred at Hulman on October 22 was the only aircraft accident directly attributable to the emergency operations.
85

The Strategic Air Command Dispersal. On October 23, 1962, the day following the dispersal of ADC aircraft, SAC dispersed its bombers. This development came as a complete surprise and something of a shock to the air defense system. With little or no warning SAC B-47 aircraft landed at a number of airports and bases in the 30th Region, including Duluth, Milwaukee, Hulman and Clinton County. A B-47 being a difficult object to hide, the presence of the bombers at

84. 30 CSA Memo, Dispersal Bases, 26 Nov 1962, DOC 25, this chapter; 30 IDC Historical Resume, DOC 26, this chapter.

85. 30 CSA. There were two other aircraft accidents between 22 Oct and 27 Nov. An F-10 burned up at Wurtsmith (445 FIS) on November 8 when the cap on the external tank failed and spilled fuel into the air intake. An 11 FIS F-106 ran into the barrier at Duluth on 19 Nov when the pilot aborted his takeoff but wouldn't stop the bird in time.

the municipal airports in Duluth and Milwaukee did not go unnoticed by the local press.

Information Officers in the 30th Region were not in a position to explain SAC activities, being rather vague on the situation themselves. As a result, headlines such as "Four Mystery Bombers at Milwaukee,"⁸⁶ and "Jet Bombers Arrive Here...Reportedly Armed."⁸⁷ The B-47's not only plunked themselves down in Milwaukee but also joined the dispersed interceptors at Hulman and Clinton County, thus adding to the woes of the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units who had neither invited nor expected either of them. In addition to the four bombers at Milwaukee, four at Hulman and four at Clinton County, eight B-47's arrived at Duluth at 0734Z on October 23. The resulting situation as one account put it, "definitely resulted from a lack of specific agreements and coordination." The eight bombers from the 307th Bomb Wing, Lincoln, Nebraska and the 45 support personnel: "came as a complete surprise to the Duluth Municipal Airport and to the Minnesota Air National Guard Unit....It

86. Capital Times (Madison, Wisc), 24 Oct 1962.

87. Milwaukee Journal (Milwaukee, Wisc), 24 Oct 1962.

also became evident that the incoming personnel were not aware of local conditions such as hazardous runways and taxiways...weight limitations of runways and taxiways and the scarcity of housing and mess facilities." 88

The SAC aircraft were parked in the Air National Guard area as the ramp and taxiways would not sustain their weight (the ANG fighters were moved to a closed runway). Refueling, transportation, security, messing and billeting were provided, not without difficulty, by the base. Beds and bedding were flown in from Richards-Gebaur and K. I. Sawyer. SAC personnel were first billeted in the base gymnasium and were later moved to a downtown hotel. 89

Although SAC teams had visited Duluth in 1960 and 1961 and although the 343rd Fighter Group had once possessed a copy of SAC Dispersal Operations Order 38-61, code name "Clutch Pedal," neither ADC or the ANG units at Duluth had made any prior commitments for the support of dispersed SAC aircraft. 90

88. 343 Ftr Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 17, this chapter.

89. Duluth ADS, Historical Resume, DOC 15, this chapter.

90. 343 Ftr Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 17, this chapter. A second and more significant problem which was related to the unexpected SAC dispersal was that of identification. The 30th Region did not in Oct 1962, possess all

BOMARC UNDER DEFCON 3

The two BOMARC "B" Air Defense Missile Squadrons (ADMS) assigned to the 30th Region -- the 37th and the 74th -- normally kept 26 to 28 of their 29 authorized missiles in ready storage. Their operationally ready rate was, in other words, very close to 100 per cent. There was, therefore, little room for improvement under an advanced state of air defense readiness. These units did, however, bring all available missiles up to operational status within a few hours and maintained a very high combat ready rate during the entire emergency.

The 37th ADMS at Kincheloe, for example, had 24 missiles in ready storage at the time DEFCON 3 was ordered. Two of the four missiles not available were undergoing shelter sealing modification, another was Not Operationally Ready for Maintenance (NORM) and the fourth was Not Operationally Ready for Supply (NORS). Of the two missiles in the shelters under modification, one was returned to ready storage in one hour and the other in two hours and fifteen minutes. Within ten hours the NORM missile was brought up.

[Cont'd] of the SAC strike route information necessary to provide "sage passage" for the SAC aircraft through the air defense system. This problem is discussed in detail in this chapter.

The 28th Weapon became available on October 24th when the required part (a target seeker system) was received from the manufacturer. Thereafter, the 37th kept 26 to 28 missiles in ready storage for the duration of the emergency. In late October ADC was asked to provide an additional war-head for each squadron so that they might put their 29th missile in operational configuration.

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The BOMARC units also increased security precautions and provided 24 maintenance manning. As a result, there were a good number of persons on the site both day and night and the demand for sleeping facilities and food service was higher than normal. The BOMARC sites were located at a considerable distance from their support bases (Duluth and Kincheloe) and the prolonged advanced state of air defense readiness demonstrated certain deficiencies in the support system.

After the implementation of DEFCON 3, for example, the personnel on duty at the remote 37th ADMS site were threatened with the necessity of going on short rations. Although the number of persons being fed at the site doubled,

91. 37 ADMS, Historical Resume, DOC 27, this chapter.

92. 30 AD, 30-MDC, Historical Resume, DOC 23, this chapter.

the squadron was, for three days, unable to get additional rations from Kincheloe simply because no procedure had ever been established for providing additional rations under such circumstances. After this experience the unit took steps to have established its own separate ration account. ⁹³

The additional manhour requirements of the extended alert also placed a heavy burden on the personnel resources of the missile squadron. The 37th recommended, after this experience, that their wartime augmentation be increased to include additional cooks, drivers, air police, missile maintenance officers, electronic maintenance men, armament technicians, launch area personnel and civil engineering maintenance types. ⁹⁴

NIKE

The NIKE batteries in the 30th Region (5th Region, U. S. Army Air Defense Command), like the BOMARC units normally maintained a high state of readiness. The increase in air defense readiness did not, therefore, result in any momentous changes in their operations. Security precautions (G-2) were increased. All batteries kept more than the

93. 37 ADMS, Historical Resume, DOC 27, this chapter.

94. Ibid.

normal number of men on the site. Some installations had
95
personnel living and sleeping in the launch areas.

When the emergency developed, the Army made an effort to bring all fire units undergoing maintenance or modification up to operational condition. For the duration of DEFCON 3, the units were permitted only 48 hours every 30 days for maintenance. Nearly 100 per cent of the NIKE Hercules were maintained on 15-minute status. The NIKE AJAX installations, manned by the National Guard, were not officially placed on an advanced alert status. Unofficially, however, most of them went on a three-hour status and some
96
maintained a 15-minute alert.

The Annual Service Practices (SNAP) were continued during the Cuban Crisis. Those fire units on SNAP went
97
on three-hour status.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND THE CUBAN CRISIS

The relationship between the 30th Region and the Air National Guard (ANG) units therein was both complex and

95. 5 Rgn, ARADCOM, Historical Reports, DOC 28, this chapter.

96. 30 Rgn, Staff Mtg Notes, 31 Oct 1962, DOC 4, this chapter.

97. Ibid., 14 Nov 1962.

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vague. The four ANG fighter interceptor squadrons in the Region -- the 179th at Duluth, the 124th at Des Moines, the 176th at Truax and the 151st at McGee-Tyson -- had an M-Day assignment to the 30th NORAD Region. The 30th Air Division (SAGE) had a responsibility to inspect these units and to supervise their training. There were, also, some eight ANG Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS) with an M-Day assignment to the 30th Region. Neither the Division nor Region had any responsibility for the training of these units.

The ANG FIS and TFS squadrons in the 30th Region were not called into federal service during the Cuban Crisis. Their status or situation was not, therefore, changed by the increase in air defense readiness. The Duluth ANG unit had two armed F-89J's on alert prior to the Cuban emergency. The ANG alerts were maintained but not increased during the emergency. With the southern deployment of part of the 1st Fighter Wing and the entire 325th FIS, the ANG FIS increased in relative importance. In fact, the Region requested, at one point, that the 30th ANG interceptor units be called into federal service to replace the aircraft lost to the South.⁹⁸ This request was denied by USAF. After the deployment of

98. 30 AD, 30-OOP, Historical Resume, DOC 1, this chapter.

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the 325th, however, the 176th FIS (ANG) was the only unit on alert at Truax.

The 124th FIS (ANG) at Des Moines began conversion from F-86L's to F-89J's in April 1962. This unit was not, therefore, combat ready in October 1962 when the Cuban Crisis began. A combat capability evaluation was held November 14-17, 1962 and the unit was found to be capable⁹⁹ of performing its mission and was declared combat ready.

If the ANG FIS units were not affected by the increase in air defense readiness, the ANG personnel at Volk, Alpena and Hulman were. As a result of the dispersal of ADC and (in some cases) SAC aircraft, the ANG permanent parties at these bases were called upon to perform a support function for which they were neither manned nor equipped. Although there was initially some confusion when the dispersed aircraft arrived, (sometimes unannounced) the Guard did, in fact, cheerfully assume the additional burden.¹⁰⁰ The extended dispersal operation could not have been so easily and successfully supported without their assistance.

99. 30 AD, 30-CIG, Historical Resume, DOC 24, this chapter.

100. The unexpected arrival of the 11 FIS acft at Hector Fld, on 22 Oct apparently threw confusion into the ranks of the ANG there. Support there was considered to be "inadequate." 343 Ftr Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 17, this chapter.

THE GROUND ENVIRONMENT ON DEFCON 3

The Cuban Crisis and the increase in Air Defense Readiness to DEFCON 3 did not have as great an impact upon the ground environment as it did upon the fighter units.

The Combat Center established a Command Post on October 21, 1962, which was manned 24 hours a day by a duty officer until November 28. The Combat Center and the Direction Center Battle Staffs were fully manned on October 22. This position was maintained for a period of 48 hours. Thereafter, and for the duration of DEFCON 3, skeleton crews were maintained. ¹⁰¹ On October 22 all computers were ordered into duplex operation. On the 23rd, it was decided that simplex operation with a five minute recovery would be permitted to allow maintenance and customer usage.

Because of the slim manning at the radar units, there were few people to bear the additional burden. All sites placed their personnel on 15 or 30-minute recall, cancelled all leaves and recalled some key personnel from leave.

101. 30-NOCC, Duty Officers Log, 21 Oct - 28 Nov 1962, DOC 9, this chapter.

Most site personnel worked a seven-day week during the
102
crisis and many worked twelve-hour shifts.

Security precautions were increased. Additional guard posts were manned, alternate Sabotage Alert teams formed and area lighting increased. Many units coordinated with local civil defense and law enforcement agencies on emergency measures. Some units prepared and stocked emergency fallout shelters for personnel and their dependents. Others sandbagged or otherwise improved the fall-out protection of their operations buildings so that site functions could be carried on in the event of nuclear fallout.

All radar units provided 24-hour communications and electronics maintenance. Most of the gap filler radars were manned with maintenance personnel. Beyond this, there was little that the Radar Squadrons (SAGE) could do. Their primary function was the security and the maintenance of the radar and communications equipment on the site.

102. Historical Resumes, Radar and AC&W Squadrons, 639, DOC 29, this chapter; 661, DOC 30, this chapter; 664, DOC 31, this chapter; 665, DOC 32, this chapter; 674, DOC 33, this chapter; 676, DOC 34, this chapter; 692, DOC 35, this chapter; 707, DOC 36, this chapter; 752, DOC 37, this chapter; 753, DOC 38, this chapter; 754, DOC 39, this chapter; 755, DOC 40, this chapter; 782, DOC 41, this chapter; 783, DOC 42, this chapter; 784, DOC 48, this chapter; 788, DOC 43, this chapter; 790, DOC 44, this chapter; 791, DOC 45, this chapter; 798, DOC 46, this chapter; and 913, DOC 47, this chapter.

The AC&W units on the Pine Tree Line were not part of the SAGE system and still had a control function. At such installations full surveillance and control manning was maintained throughout the emergency. These demands were met but not without difficulty. The seven-day weeks and twelve-hour shifts began to affect morale. A significant deficiency as far as many field units were concerned was the virtual absence of intelligence information relating to the anticipated duration of DEFCON 5. This dearth of official information was not felt in the first month. But after the government declared itself satisfied that the Soviets had removed their missiles from Cuba (November 20) and lifted the quarantine, the popular press did not in itself provide sufficient justification for the continuation of the advanced state of air defense readiness. Personnel working 12-hour shifts with no time off found it difficult to understand why this extraordinary effort continued to be necessary. If their efforts were necessary and justified, they were never told why.

As one observer at a Pine Tree AC&W site described
103
it:

...throughout this entire period, except for operations training, all business went on as usual. That is, normal daily military routine was maintained. The maintenance of guards and augmented

103. 639 AC&W Sq. Historical Resume, DOC 29, this

D. C. crews caused a considerable drain on manpower available to perform the necessary routine duties. Although the situation was met and all personnel performed additional duties without hesitation, it became obvious that the increased alert posture would be most difficult to maintain for an extended period of time.

Another serious problem grew throughout the build-up period and that was one of morale. It soon grew obvious to all personnel by various news media that the Cuban Crisis was cooled down and that no threat existed, yet we remained on a high state of alert. The alert build-up soon lost its meaning because all personnel could easily see the discrepancy between the actual world situation and the state of alert of the military forces. Furthermore, there was no intelligence information to indicate that the high state of alert should be maintained. The overall effectiveness of this unit would have been greater had the states of alert followed more closely the world situation as indicated by news sources and intelligence reports.

Some of the radar squadrons (SAGE) were slated to become Manual Control Centers under the Back Up Interceptor Control (BUIC) Plan. When this program was completed, the control centers would have the communications and equipment to manually control fighters in a Mode III (non-SAGE) environment. In October 1962, however, BUIC was still in its early stages and none of the Control Centers were operational. Some of them did make the supreme effort and attain a limited manual capability during the emergency.

[Cont'd] chapter; At one point 30 Rgn Intelligence queried NORAD on why information appeared on the News service wires before it became available through intelligence channels. 30 OIN, Historical Resume, DOC 49, this chapter.

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On October 22, 1962 the 692nd Radar Squadron (SAGE) at Baudette, Minnesota, had most of the equipment necessary to function as an alternate manual control center but some of the newly installed equipment had not been connected, peaked or tested and personnel training had not been completed. The Commander, Lt Colonel Lindberg, decided to attain an operational capability as soon as possible. By 1400Z, October 23 a vertical plotting board had been assembled and painted, equipment was connected, peaked and tested, manual operation crews were chosen, duties and procedures were established and an area of responsibility was determined. At this point the unit was prepared to operate in an emergency in a Mode IV BUIC configuration although they did lack any identification capability. After October 24 they began to receive identification information from the Duluth Direction Center.

On October 27 the 692nd received two fighters for intercept training, and controlled their first intercepts from Baudette. After November 5, the unit began to receive identification information from both Duluth and Grand Forks. On November 6 they were placed on the regular Sector intercept training schedule.

104

104. 692 Rdr Sq, Historical Resume, DOC 35, this chapter.

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Although no authentic instances of sabotage occurred in the 30th Region during the Cuban Crisis, there were a number of false alarms. The excitement occasioned by the bear at Duluth, already mentioned, resounded throughout the entire system and resulted in dozens of sabotage alert squads being ejected, fully armed, into the cold. A number of sites also suffered occasional and temporary communications loss or temporary loss of commercial power -- instances which also resulted in sabotage alarms. The Pine Tree sites (639th and 913th) each lost their land lines and maintained, for a short time, tenuous communications with the Sector.

When the 913th lost contact with the Sault Ste Marie Sector on October 25, the site commander got through on a commercial line and made arrangements for a C-47 to be orbited over the station as a communications (radio) relay. Although the telephone communications were restored before this idea could be implemented, the idea was filed away for future reference.

105

105. 913 AC&W, Historical Resume, DOC 47, this chapter.

In addition to the additional manhours required for guard duty and increased maintenance, a few radar units were subjected to personnel levies to support the southern deployment or the dispersal program. The 661st at Selfridge, for example, sent two senior directors to Florida and the 798th at Belleville, Illinois loaned two weapons controllers¹⁰⁶ to a radar installation at Key West. The 782nd Radar Squadron at Rockville, Indiana assumed the responsibility for supporting the dispersed aircraft and crews at Hulman Field in Terre Haute, Indiana. From October 23 to November 8, 1962, the radar squadron provided cooks, rations, linen, towels, soap, BX service and recreational equipment for the personnel at Hulman. The 782nd also furnished a cryptographic technician for Hulman.¹⁰⁷ The 788th at Waverly, Iowa sent one cook TDY to Rockville and a crypto airman to Des Moines,¹⁰⁸ to assist the dispersed forces there.

As a result of the Cuban Crisis some modifications to the ground environment were held up to permit full

106. 661 Rdr Sq, Historical Resume, DOC 30, this chapter; 798 Rdr Sq, Historical Resume, DOC 46, this chapter.

107. 782 Rdr Sq, Historical Resume, DOC 41, this chapter.

108. 788 Rdr Sq, Historical Resume, DOC 43, this chapter.

operations during the emergency. Other modifications or equipment conversions were pushed to provide an improved surveillance or control picture. For example, DLM (pre-SAGE testing) was delayed at Lowther (C-119) and the installation of ECP-91 at Sioux Lookout (C-16) was also held up so that the WECO testing could be accelerated and the Duluth BOMARC's utilized further north. The lack of SAGE Control Capability at the Pine Tree Line had restricted the employment of the BOMARC "B" at its maximum range to the north.

The ground environment of the 30th Region operated in a commendable fashion during the entire period of DEFCON 3 (October 22-November 27, 1962). Radar performance reached an all-time high and communications were excellent. Ground environment personnel showed considerable initiative and ingenuity in keeping the system operating and in making emergency arrangements to provide for all possible contingencies.

WHITHER SAC?

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered an advanced state of alert for all United States military forces on

109. 30 AD, 30-OAC, Historical Resume, DOC 16, this chapter.

~~SECRET~~

October 22, 1962 they were presumably motivated by the assumption that the danger of war had increased. An attack on the United States or its allies would, in the normal course of events, have resulted in strategic reprisal. The outbound SAC bombers would necessarily pass through the CONAD defensive system on their way to foreign targets. It was mandatory, therefore, that the system have foreknowledge of their strike routes so as to guarantee their "safe passage." At the time that DEFCON 3 went into effect neither the 30th Region, nor the rest of CONAD, had complete information available on SAC Strike Routes. This situation had come about through changes in the methods and procedures whereby such information was furnished.

The Cuban Crisis developed when the air defense system was in the middle of this transition. CONAD was caught, in other words, with its SRIB's (Strike Route Information Book's) down -- a condition that vastly complicated the identification of and safe passage of SAC aircraft.

The 30th Region made frantic efforts to obtain from SAC the creation sheets necessary to complete the Regional SRIB's. This project was not completed, however, until early November when the final creation sheets were compiled and forwarded to the sectors.

110

110. Ibid.

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ALERT STATUS, TRAINING AND TRANSPORT

Alert Status. The alert status actually underwent several modifications during the Cuban Crisis. Prior to October 22, 1962 all forces in the 30th Region were on DEFCON 5, Alpha. All of the ADC fighter squadrons were maintaining two aircraft on five-minute identification alert and one third of their possessed aircraft on 15-minute alert for dispersal purposes. At 1830Z on October 22nd the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) ordered all U. S. forces brought up to Delta status with primary armament. The status or armament of the five-minute birds did not change.

Approximately one hour later CINCONAD ordered the implementation of the dispersal plan and one-third of the available machines were dispersed. At 2100Z CONAD directed that a unit, upon attaining "Delta" status, might be reduced to Charlie at the discretion of the Region Commander. The forces of this Region were so reduced.

At 2300Z CONAD ordered DEFCON 3. NORAD, as has been previously noted, followed suit at 1734Z on October 24. On November 3rd NORAD reduced weapons status to DEFCON 3 Bravo. This condition was maintained until November 27 when DEFCON 5 Alpha (normal) was restored. After November 18,

however, the 30th Region began, with NORAD's permission, to
111
withdraw its interceptors from the dispersal bases.

Training. On October 22 when the Region went to Delta status, all exercises were faded and training stopped. After DEFCON 3, Charlie went into effect all exercises, both intra and inter-Regional were cancelled or postponed as the techniques of running training exercises under a DEFCON 3 environment were unexplored. The possibility of someone mistaking a simulated input for an actual air defense picture was too horrible to contemplate. NORAD subsequently prohibited all training exercises which might
112
"tend to degrade air defense capability."

As the DEFCON 3 status continued, however, with no end in sight, it became apparent that some sort of training schedule was necessary if the personnel in the Direction Centers and the Combat Center were to be kept at full efficiency. Therefore, procedures were worked out to prevent confusion between the real and simulated thing and crew training SSTM's were resumed on November 14. They were continued for the duration of DEFCON 3. It was discovered that

111. MINICOM was ordered on 22 Oct and lifted on 15 Nov. 30 AD, 30-NOCC, Historical Resume, DOC 9, this chapter.

112. 30 Rgn, 30-NOEV Historical Resume, DOC 50, this chapter: Staff Mtg Notes, 24 & 31 Oct, DOC 4, this chapter.

if need be, a live picture could be restored in less than 15 minutes. No intra-Regional exercises were held during the advanced state of air defense readiness. "Think Ahead" and "Quick Time" exercises were cancelled. A NORAD evaluation of the 30th Region, (MUTE IV) scheduled for January 1962 was also postponed on November 20.¹¹³

The 30th Air Division Inspector General also cancelled all inspections and evaluations on October 22, 1962. His schedule was resumed in mid-November with the combat capability evaluation of the 124th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (Iowa ANG) at Des Moines.¹¹⁴

The conditions of DEFCON 3, Charlie, made aircrew training virtually impossible. After the alert commitments were met, there were few, if any, aircraft left for training flights. On October 22, for example, the 11st FIS had 17 F-106's available. All were uploaded and placed on five-minute status. The same day seven machines were dispersed and the remaining ten placed on fifteen-minute. On October 23rd two aircraft were removed from fifteen-minute alert,

113. Ibid.

114. 30 AD, CIG, Historical Resume, DOC 24, this chapter.

had their primary weapons downloaded and were put on five-minute for identification purposes. Four other aircraft were reduced to thirty-minute status. The seven machines on dispersal were maintained on 15-minute alert with the crews on one-hour. This situation remained unchanged until November 7 when air defense readiness was reduced to DEFCON 3 Bravo and one aircraft on fifteen at Volk was returned to Duluth and went on three-hour status.

The maintenance of such a complex alert schedule was demanding. It could also be confusing. To quote one
115
comment on the alert status at the dispersal bases:

...the 15-minute aircraft alert status, combined with a one-hour (aircrew) alert status was unrealistic. This configuration caused confusion and would, with inclement weather, preclude to a great extent the aircraft preparation and supporting AGE. The establishing of a one-hour weapon status would permit the lowering of ladders, closing of canopies, installation of pilot covering, etc....

More importantly, with all aircraft on five, fifteen or thirty-minute alert, there were no machines available for flying training. As the DEFCON 3 condition continued week

115. 343 Ftr Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 17, this chapter.

after week the command began to become increasingly concerned with the affect of this inactivity upon aircrew proficiency.

This problem was partially resolved with the establishment of aircraft and aircrew rotation between the dispersal bases and the home base. Under this system each aircraft was flown every 72 hours. However, even this flying represented only about 25 per cent of normal schedules. The resumption of some sort of flight training was contemplated. However, the staff was reluctant to train out of the dispersal bases which suffered from minimum facilities and, in some cases, inadequate NAVAIDS.

Aircrew training was increased after November 3, 1962 with the change from DEFCON 3 Charlie to DEFCON 3 Bravo, which resulted in the reduction of a few interceptors to a three-hour status. However, the problem of maintaining flying proficiency under such conditions was never satisfactorily resolved.

A similar problem developed in reference to the weapons loading teamd who accompanied the 1st Fighter Wing detachment to Patrick AFB, Florida. Primary weapons (MB-1) were not utilized there and for the want of practice loadings,

116. 30 AD, Staff Meeting Noes, 31 Oct 1962, DOC 4, this chapter.

12 men lost their qualification under the proficiency loading requirements for nuclear weapons. 117

Transport. A critical factor in the success of the dispersal and the southern deployments was the air transport. Although the dispersal bases were all supported in part by ground transport, most of the personnel and material were shipped by air. As a result, the demands placed upon the air transport resources were heavy. The Division-owned support aircraft were used to pick up parts and supply the dispersal sites. The units deployed to Florida, however, depended heavily upon airlift furnished by the 4650 Support Squadron at Richards-Gebaur and the 4611 Support Squadron from Stewart AFB. 118

The demands placed upon air transport by the dispersal is indicated by the records of the two C-47 aircraft assigned to the 507th Fighter Wing at Kincheloe. Between October 22 and November 22 these aircraft carried some 314 personnel and 28,075 pounds of cargo between Kincheloe and Alpena.

117. ADCM 136-1, para 3-7. 1st Ftr Wg, Historical Resume, DOC 3, this chapter.

118. For a detailed log of all transportation requirements during this period, see the transportation Staff Action Registers in the 30-MDC Resume, DOC 23, this chapter.

The necessity for obtaining airlift on a few hours notice resulted in some memorable scrambles and a few arbitrary revisions of priorities. The 1st Fighter Wing was censured by ADC and the Division for diverting a C-123 belonging to the 4650 Support Squadron from a scheduled Florida run to supporting the dispersal to Hulman.¹¹⁹

Although the deployment and the dispersals were adequately supported, the Cuban Crisis demonstrated that the airlift resources were none too large to support an extensive and extended deployment and dispersal.

119. 1st Ftr Wg, Historical Resume, DOC 3, this chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE 32ND AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

By

Jean Martin

"Quarantine of Cuba." Even before the term became a household word, interceptor elements - some of squadron strength - of other air division and CONAD regions joined 32nd units in the deployment to Florida air bases. The initial augmentation of the ADC interceptor force, then consisting of the four F-102's of Detachment 1, 482nd FIS, at Homestead, was ordered by ADC on 19 October. ¹ Simultaneously directed by the Command was a considerable increase of the number of RC-121D "Constellations" of the McCoy-based 966th AEW&C Squadron, with the aircraft to be furnished by the

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1. Msg, ADC, ADCCR 62-261, 19 Oct 1962.

552nd AEW&C Wing, McClellan AFB, California, as well as²
the 966th's parent wing at Otis AFB. On 21 October two
more contingents of century series interceptors were alerted
by ADC for movement to Florida within 24 hours of receipt³
of deployment orders which were dispatched the same day.

In just three days, therefore, the 32nd CONAD Region
could post a net gain of 24 F-106 "Delta Darts" and 32
F-102 "Delta Daggers," respectively dispersed to Patrick
AFB and Homestead, in addition to the eight F-4D "Sky-
raiders" and 14 F-4B "Phantom II's" at Key West NAS.
Placed on alert at Tyndall AFB, Florida, during the same
period were eight "Delta Darts," eight F-101B "Voodoos"
and six F/TF-102's, the two-seat version of the "Delta"
Dagger."⁴

The day preceding the Presidential television and
radio address the 32nd CONAD Region established CONAD Task
Force 32 and Detachment 1, CONAD Task Force 32, with head-
quarters at Key West and Homestead.⁵ Colonel Theo R. Diltz,

2. Msg ADC, ADCCR 62-262, 19 Oct 1962.

3. Msg ADC, ADCCR 62-272, 21 Oct 1962; Msg ADC,
ADCCR 62-274, 21 Oct 1962.

4. MOADS Msg MCOOP-W 2182, 22 Oct 1962. Although
this msg was classified TS, its contents are cited because
later "Secret" status reports prepared by 32 AD AMA revealed
the same information.

5. 32 CR GO-11, 21 Oct 1962, DOC 11, this chapter.

D/O, MOADS, was appointed task force commander while, at Homestead, Colonel Paul H. Kenney took the helm of the detachment.⁶

Hurriedly organized, and with only a handful of personnel assigned,⁷ the two new headquarters were small; hardly large enough to be worthy of the name, but not, as events were soon to show, too small to tackle the big-sized job that lay ahead. Their task: coordinate air defense operations in the military showdown with Castro's Cuba backed by the Soviet ballistic missile and nuclear bomber build-up in the Caribbean island country.

CONAD TASK FORCE 32

CONAD Task Force 32 was established by agreement between General Gent and Brig. General Hubert S. Judy, MOADS commander since 1 August 1962. It had the concurrence of General John K. Gerhart, CINCONAD - also since 1 August, and Lt General Robert M. Lee, ADC commander, who met with Generals Gent and Judy at Ent Air Force Base, 17-19 October. The purpose of their conference was the implementation of CONAD plans in support of national defense measures about to be

6. Ibid.

7. 32 AD SO T-1231, 21 Oct 1962, DOC 12, this chapter.

taken to meet the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba. General contingency plans for military operations under the overall control of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT), had long been made, and CONAD participation in their execution was first discussed by the commanders concerned on 25 March 1962.⁸ It was decided then that whatever the CONAD support activities, they would be directed from Key West, with the responsibility for them vested in a senior CONAD officer. Colonel Diltz, who had attended the 25 March conference,⁹ became that officer.

When, on 18 October, appropriate portions of the CINCLANT, CINCAFLANT and CONAD plans took effect, Colonel Diltz was ordered to Key West where, on 20 October, he was

8. Although reference is made here to TS CINCLANT operation Plans 321-61, 314-61 and 316-61, CONAD support during the crisis was spelled out in corresponding plans under the jurisdiction of the commander-in-chief, Atlantic Air Forces (CINCAFLANT), USAF component commander of the task forces assigned to CINCLANT. Acting in the CINCAFLANT capacity was General W. C. Sweeney, Tactical Air Command (TAC) commander, whose advanced headquarters (ADVON) were located at Homestead AFB. CONAD plans cited are CONAD Ops Plans 1-62 and 2-62 which was superseded by CONAD Ops Plan 3-62 on 5 Nov 1962.

9. Col Diltz' "Narrative Report of Task Force 32 Operations, 19 Oct to 1 Dec 1962," to Cmd, MOADS DOC 13, this chapter; Unless otherwise indicated by documentary citations, the summary of CTF 32 operations is based on information contained in Col Diltz' report and 32 AD historian's interview with Col Diltz at MOADS, 11 Dec 1962.

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named CONAD Task Force 32 commander. A house trailer adjacent to the CONAD CC ("BROWNSTONE") served him as his headquarters and sleeping quarters to assure his availability to the control center commander 24 hours a day. On 23 October Lt. Colonel E. J. Kirschbaum, chief of the 32nd Air Division's ground environment branch, joined the task force as its operations officer.

The problems facing the task force were as complex as the task force and position of its commander were unique. To all intents and purposes, Colonel Diltz' trailer headquarters functioned as a combined forward command post for the 32nd CONAD Region and MOADS in the Key West area. In addition, it was the focal point for the coordination of CINCLANT, CINCLAFLANT and CONAD air operations launched from the naval air station. Although the task force had been organized without regard to a unit structure, its commander was given operational control over all CONAD elements assigned under the Key West CCC. Included was a HAWK battalion whose four batteries were integrated into the "BROWNSTONE" environment subsequent to the battalion's arrival on 24 October, just two days after CONAD forces were placed under Defense Condition (DEFCON) 3.

10. Msg 2nd ARADCOMKWEST Liaison Officer to CG 32 NR, 24 Oct 1962, DOC 14, this chapter.

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Colonel Diltz' authority thus extended to the declaration of "hostiles" and the assignment of specific "hostile" tracks to the HAWK firing units on the basis of established criteria. ¹¹ In this respect, he was instructed to submit safe passage air corridors recommendations to assure maximum protection for friendly air traffic, particularly combat aircraft returning from reconnaissance ¹² (recon) and strategic orbit point (STOP) missions.

Colocated with the CCC at Key West was "TARPON," the Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center (JARCC) which, operated by the Navy, shared the CONAD facility. "TARPON" was responsible for the control of all recon mission aircraft - both CINCLANT and CINCAFLANT - as well as their escort interceptors. In addition to tracking these flights south of the Atlantic Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), "TARPON" also identified these flights for the CONAD center upon their re-entry into the ADIZ. This system worked well until the rapidly increasing scope of recon missions made it impossible for JARCC to maintain positive identification

11. Msg 32 CR, 32COOP 0005, "Plan for Integration of HAWK Battalion in to the Defense of Key West," 23 Oct 1962; Msg 32 CR, 32COOP 10160 citing CINCONAD approval of plan to Key West CCC, 24 Oct 1962, DOC 15, this chapter.

12. Msg 32CR, 32COOP 1143 to CTF 32, 4 Nov 1962, DOC 16, this chapter.

of the air traffic under its control. This situation was compounded by the many low-altitude operations which escaped radar coverage. "BROWNSTONE," as a result, had to carry the additional burden of having to scramble CONAD interceptors for visual identification on growing numbers of "unknowns."

Frequent visual identifications had to be made also on Strategic Air Command (SAC) aircraft engaged in Cuba reconnaissance missions. This became necessary when the SAC liaison officer at Key West was withdrawn on 23 October, leaving "TARPON" to rely on teletype transmissions of SAC flight plans. The messages were invariably late, making it impossible for JARCC to identify SAC aircraft for "BROWNSTONE." Every precaution was taken to insure that the identification intercepts were made according to regulations, but SAC still objected to the air defense measures. CONAD then directed that no radar lock-on was to be made in intercepts of SAC planes.¹³ Not taken into account was the fact that CONAD interceptors were not intentionally scrambled on SAC aircraft; they were sent aloft to identify only "unknowns."

13. Msg MOADS, MNOOP-W 2266, "ID Passes on SAC Aircraft," 7 Nov 1962, DOC 17, this chapter.

The intercepts were made by the F-4B's and F-4D's of the Navy's VF-41 squadron and VFAW-3 detachment, with procedures calling for the lock-on mode. Colonel Diltz, therefore, queried CONAD to determine if the no lock-on instructions constituted a change in the standard practices of these interceptors. No reply was received. The CONAD-SAC difficulties were resolved when a SAC representative returned to Key West and maintained a direct telephone line to his command headquarters for flight plan information on SAC aircraft in the Cuban area.

But another impasse in identification arrangements was building up between "TARPON" and "BROWNSTONE." This one was being caused by the sharp rise in CINCLANT and CINCAFLANT recon operations at the end of October. Both commands were daily conducting from five to eight low-altitude "Blue Moon" missions over western Cuba, involving as many as 12 to 24 escort fighters on patrol 10 to 30 miles south of the ADIZ. The CINCLANT aircraft were controlled by the JARCC; CINCAFLANT's, however, were under no control at all. CONAD interceptors under "BROWNSTONE" control, too, were in the same general area manning six STOP's, while other recon and air-sea rescue planes were engaged in their respective tasks in this vicinity.

Because of the proportions the air traffic had now reached, neither the split control nor the system of identification was effective any longer. To overcome the adversities, the CINCLANT and CINCAFLANT representatives agreed to place their escort aircraft under the operational control of CONAD Task Force 32 and the CCC. Recon operations, on the other hand, continued to be the responsibility of "TARPON." In one instance of departure from this arrangement the CINCAFLANT representative learned the importance of cooperating with the CONAD task force. Attempting to scramble interceptors during instrument flight rule (IFR) weather conditions, he found that in the absence of a TAC-Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) "Agreement for Fighter-Interceptor Operations," instrument take-off clearance had to be obtained first from the FAA. As a result of this incident, CINCAFLANT aircraft were placed under CONAD task force commander's control prior to launch, utilizing CONAD AFIO procedures without exception.

This operational relationship between CINCLANT, AFLANT and CONAD was successfully continued until the end of the contingency operations and Colonel Diltz' return to his normal duties as MOADS deputy for operations. In his narrative report he pointed out that, although clear cut lines of responsibilities between the forces had been established in the

major plans, no such provisions existed in areas where coordinated operations became necessary. Colonel Diltz further noted that as a direct consequence of his agreement with the CINCLANT and CINCAFLANT representatives CONAD Task Force 32 scrambled, controlled and recovered "all fighter aircraft" for the remainder of the crisis. This, he wrote, led to the task force becoming the first CONAD element to "conduct actual military operations against an enemy of the United States."

THE GROUND ENVIRONMENT

The normal Mode I condition in MOADS is the Sector's SAGE/Manual concept of operations in which the two Manual areas are represented by Key West and Jacksonville. The latter's CC is located on M-114 and manned by the 679th Radar Squadron.¹⁴ Until 17 December, when the site became SAGE operational by means of its FST-2, Jacksonville retained its Manual area responsibilities.¹⁵

14. The 679th, formerly an ACW squadron, was redesignated on 1 Oct 1962. One month later its Det 1, Patrick AFB, became the 32nd Air Div's 645th Radar Squadron.

15. 679th RADRON Historical Report, Oct-Dec 1962, on file with USAF Historical Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

Mode I reporting procedures linked the Key West and Jacksonville CCC's directly to the SAGE direction center (SDC) at Gunter AFB, and only in the event of a Mode III - or Manual back-up - condition did they report to the MOADS direction center-Manual (SDC-M) at Tyndall AFB. For the purpose of Cuban contingency operations, however, a special Mode III condition existed under which "BROWNSTONE" assumed operational control of the Manual DC maintained by the 644th Radar Squadron on Z-210, Richmond Air Force Station. But instead of being linked to Tyndall, Key West was to continue its data transmissions to the SDC at Gunter.

This provisional Mode III condition was never actually implemented. Upon the declaration of DEFCON 3 on 22 October, it became immediately apparent that "BROWNSTONE" facilities and equipment were not equal to the task of controlling this many forces in the Key West as well as Miami area. With the concurrence of the MOADS commander, therefore, the system reverted to the Mode I condition, or normal SAGE/Manual configuration.

17. The Modes with options and rosters of forces assigned to CCC's are outlined in Operational Configuration Annex, DOC 18, this chapter, which has been extracted from MOADS Operation Plan 1-62, 19 Oct 1962, later superseded by MOADS Ops Plan 2-62, 28 Nov 1962.

18. Ibid.; See DOC 13, this chapter, Col Diltz'

The Key West CCC. The Key West CONAD Control Center's inability to function effectively under the special Mode III conditions was not surprising. Astonishing, however, was the fact that the center could perform at all, considering its radar dilemma, communications difficulties and space predicament. All of these had been plaguing the 671st ACW Squadron ever since its conversion from Detachment 2, MOADS, on 1 June 1962.

At crisis' onset, the CCC was still located in the TAC furnished operations shelter erected adjacent to the permanent control room which was then being renovated. The controversial Navy FPS-37 search radar, too, was undergoing modifications, leaving "BROWNSTONE" to depend on an MPS-11 set and related equipment supplied and installed by TAC on 10 October along with the operations shelter.¹⁹

Temporary utilization of the mobile facility was first recommended by the 32nd Air Division on 21 September²⁰ to permit repairs of the FPS-37's antenna drive system. The 32nd's recommendation met with the approval of all

[Cont'd] "Narrative Report of Task Force 32 Operations, 19 Oct - 1 Dec 1962," hereafter cited as CTF 32 Narrative.

19. Msg MOADS, MOOCO 2075, "MPS-11 Installation," to CINCONAD, 1 Nov 1962, DOC 21, this chapter.

20. Msg 32 AD, 32 OAC 859 to Cmdr KWEST, 21 Sep 1962, DOC 20, this chapter.

parties concerned, including TAC and USAF. The former was at the time considering the need of a combat reporting center (CRC) at Key West which, with the addition of an MPS-16 height finder, was, in fact, organized later. However, by arrangement between CONAD and TAC, the CRC continued to provide radar back-up for "BROWNSTONE" through the critical period of contingency operations.²¹

On 25 October the CCC was back on the air from its own control room and by means of the FPS-37 and FPS-6 height finder. While this was a marked improvement over the temporary premises, make-shift conditions still prevailed in the accelerated tempo of operations.

In line with previous decisions, the dual command of the 671st ACW Squadron and the CONAD CC was divided and four senior controller positions were added to the center staff. Accordingly, Lt. Colonel Elmer E. McTaggart was appointed CCC commander on 20 October, while Lt Colonel C.A. Kurpiewski remained at the helm of the squadron.²² The four

21. TAC Msg DOC-E 1211: "Operation of TAC CRC at Key West NAS," to CINCONAD, 1 Nov 1962, DOC 21, this chapter.

22. 32 NR CO-10, "Change in Command of Key West NORAD CC," 19 Oct 1962, DOC 22, this chapter.

senior controller slots were filled by Majors DeWitt T. Alfred Jr.; W. E. Orr; John S. Ford, III, and Ralph E. Giles. Their arrival at Key West between 19-21 October permitted the manning of the senior controller's function on a 24-hours-a-day basis.

Colonel McTaggart and the four majors merely spear-headed the influx of personnel being assigned to the 671st, either TDY or as permanent party. The already overcrowded facilities were thus further strained, and while some space was gained when the operations room was extended into the hallway, the relief was negligible.

More than matching the increase of personnel was the flow of communications and electronics (C&E) equipment into Key West. Among the major C&E installations undertaken was a TAC AN/TRC-66 Tropospheric Scatter Communications System between the site and Homestead AF Base. Requested by ADC on 19 October, USAF approved the project the following day. It was agreed that the 30-channel system would be equally divided between CONAD and TAC, and that the latter command would install, operate and maintain both TRC-66 terminals.²³ The Eastern Ground Environment Engineering

23. Msg 32 CR, 32CELC 1077, "Key West TRC-66 Tropo Scatter Circuit," 29 Oct 1962, DOC 23, this chapter.

Installation Agency (GEEIA) assisted in terminating the
²⁴
 30 channels.

But trouble areas, it seemed, developed as rapidly as the variety of C&E gear could be integrated into the Key West environment by joint USAF-Navy crews and civilian contractors. From the TRC-66 to the FPS-37, breakdowns and maintenance problems multiplied at a startling rate. The Tropo Scatter unit arrived by air on 25 October. It consisted of a multiplexing van and two huts, each housing one transmitter and two receivers. The first hut became operational on 28 October, establishing communications with Homestead. Its counterpart, however, defying all efforts
²⁵
 to get it on the air, had to be replaced on 4 November.

On 29 October the 671st forwarded a C&E status report to MOADS. As quoted by the 32nd to ADC, the report showed the FPS-37's A channel to be inoperative because of defects in its parametric amplifier's IF (identification
²⁶
 feature) strip. When repairs proved to be of no avail,

24. Msg EGEEIA, ZMF 62-73 to 32nd CR, 31 Oct 1962, DOC 24, this chapter.

25. 671 ACWRON Historical Rpt, Oct-Dec 1962 [DHR] hereafter cited as 671 Historical Report.

26. Msg 32 AD, 32OAC-ER 79 to ADC, 29 Oct 1962, quoting CCC Msg 671MME 10-62-60 to MOADS, DOC 25, this chapter.

the parametric amplifier was removed and sent to the Zenith Corporation for overhaul. A later model substitute was borrowed from Fort Bliss, Texas, and installed in A channel on 10 November. Upon return of the original six days later, the Army parametric amplifier was shifted to the radar set's B channel to complete the FPS-37 modifications planned and approved five months previously.²⁷

The difficulties encountered with the search radar certainly contradicted a CINCNORAD message of 24 October which stated that "information available this headquarters indicates FPS-37 operating satisfactorily at Key West."²⁸ Nor did the information available to NORAD correspond with the data at the disposal of General Gent who, on 8 November, enumerated the radar's deficiencies in a personal message to General Lee.²⁹ Referring to his letter on the same subject of 5 October, the 32nd commander wrote in part:

"....The design characteristics and the capability of the FPS-37 radar to satisfy normal air defense

27. Ibid.: 671 Historical Report.

28. Msg CINCNORAD, CCRC-C-34 to 32 Cmdr, 24 Oct 1962, DOC 26, this chapter.

29. Msg 32 AD, 32 CCR 1170, Gen Lee from Gen Gent, "Radar Capability at Key West," 8 Nov 1962, DOC 27, this chapter.

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requirements have been in doubt for several months. This headquarters brought the serious deficiencies of this radar to the attention of CONAD and ADC nine months ago. The panacea for the search deficiencies of this set has been the parametric amplifier which the manufacturer has not been able to make work satisfactorily during this period...."

General Gent further pointed out that, although the 32nd Air Division had stated the requirement for an ECCM fix as early as May 1962, no definite action appears ³⁰ to have been taken to satisfy the need until 3 November. He ended his message to the ADC commander with the request for General Lee's "personal assistance in securing a modernized FPS-20 to include the latest ECCM fixes."

Colonel Diltz, too, called the FPS-37 "completely inadequate" for the job it had to perform. As the crisis gained momentum, the "BROWNSTONE" radar environment was augmented by two AEW&C stations for a total of three by the addition of one USAF RC-121D and a two-engine Navy WF-2 radar aircraft. Radar picket ship stations were simultaneously increased from one to nine, with four of them manned by radar picket destroyers (DDR) serving CINCLANT in a tactical air navigation (TACAN) capacity. ³¹

30. Gen Gent refers here to ADC Msg ALDC 3037, "ECCM Requirement for Ground Radar," USAF, 3 Nov 1962, DOC 28, this chapter.

31. Ibid.; DOC 13, CTF 32 Narrative. 32 COC reported as many as nine DDRs on stations during various time periods.

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This many inputs to an already marginal facility made it virtually impossible to receive and correlate all radar information. The situation was alleviated somewhat when internal control center procedures were established which provided for the filtering of the data transmitted by ultra-high frequency (UHF) and single side-band (SSB) HF radio equipment. By means of this system the information could be correlated and displayed in such a manner as to be of value to the CCC commander.

32

For a two-week period beginning 22 October, 16-hour shifts in the CCC were normal and remained in effect until the arrival of TDY and permanent party personnel. Eight-hour tours of duty, seven days a week, then became the order of the day, and many a CC member worked as many as 40 days without a single 24-hour break. The center's work load is best described in terms of the following statistics for the months of October, November and December:

33

INTERCEPTS CONTROLLED

	CONAD CC	AEW&C	Picket Ships	Unknowns
October	244	31	34	23
November	962	23	4	51
December	1152	88	10	32

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid. : 671 Historical Report.

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Most of the C&E equipment placed at Key West and installed between 8 October and 7 November represented requirements of long standing for the CCC's Phase I - or SAGE/Manual - configuration. The fact that shipment and installation were given unprecedented priority as a result of the Cuban crisis, particularly in the province of communications, helped underline the nearly total lack of the 671st's tools of the trade before that time.

The accomplishments of USAF, Navy and civilian installation teams during the 8 October - 7 November period were marred by circumstances again beyond "BROWNSTONE" control. As the contingency operations gained momentum, for instance, Navy electrical engineers determined that the station did not possess sufficient power to carry the additional load. Thirteen diesel generator units were, therefore, airlifted to Key West to supply both extra prime and back-up power for the additional C&E equipment. Ten of these arrived either wanting in parts or defective to the point of proving un-serviceable. Of the other three, one burned out after only two days of operation. To assist the 671st in putting the power production facility on its feet, and then help maintain it, 10 more airmen from other 32nd Air Division organizations were sent TDY to Z-209, beginning 23 October.

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If its trials and tribulations were many and varied, the 671st did at least have the consolation of knowing that they received attention in the highest quarters. On his trip in late November to the major installations in southern Florida, President Kennedy visited the squadron and the CONAD CC where he was given an extensive briefing on the center's and CONAD Task Force 32 operations by Colonel Diltz. The CCC commander, Colonel McTaggard, briefed the JCS on the same subject. The President, who had been met at Homestead and escorted by General Gent, to Key West, also addressed all "BROWNSTONE" personnel, thanking and praising them personally for a "job well done."³⁴

DETACHMENT 1, CONAD TASK FORCE 32

The functions of Detachment 1, CONAD Task Force 32, headed by Colonel Paul H. Kenney, were of no less importance than those shouldered by Colonel Diltz and his task force. However, there were basic differences in their purposes. The task force was active in the operational environment of Key West, involving certain tactical decisions to be made by the commander. The detachment's responsibilities on the other hand, lay in the realm of liaison, with Colonel Kenney taking the parts of both coordinator for and CINCAFLANT's

34. Ibid.

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advisor on CONAD operations. For this reason, the detachment was represented on the battle staff in the combat center of CINCAFLANT's ADVON at Homestead.

Colonel Kenney was principally assisted by Lt Colonel L. D. Sollenberger, 32nd CONAD Region C&E staff officer, and Lt Colonel N. C. Johnson, chief of MOADS' plans and requirements division. Their headquarters, after several moves, were located in the Homestead barracks of the 644th Radar Squadron.

Established on 21 October, the detachment's activities soon exceeded their originally intended scope and nature. It became, in fact, a sort of clearing house for all problems, large and small, arising in the vital areas of logistics peculiar to the CONAD operations in support of the Navy and TAC contingency plans. To cope with the added chores, Colonel Kenney recommended that two CONAD liaison teams be organized at MacDill and McCoy AF Bases under the jurisdiction of the detachment. This was done upon approval of General Judy on 29 and 31 October, respectively.

Conflicts of mission interests are difficult to avoid when elements of the different military services and major commands share a comparatively small theatre of operations. Southern Florida was such a theatre, and its stage, as represented by Homestead, Key West, Patrick, MacDill and McCoy,

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was filled to more than normal capacity by units and weapons of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The prevention of conflicts - or their expeditious settlement, if and when they did occur - was the prime objective of Detachment 1, CONAD Task Force 32.

Not quite unexpectedly, the most serious difficulties in this respect arose in the CONAD-AFLANT relationship and the utilization of AFLANT, i.e., TAC, fighters for air defense missions as provided for in CONAD-TAC agreements and plans. Despite the fact that the employment of TAC interceptors as Category II air defense augmentation forces was a practice of long standing, the 32nd Air Division had previously experienced TAC reluctance to relinquish aircraft for that purpose. This experience was made a matter of record in early April when the ADC commander visited 32nd headquarters for a thorough briefing on all aspects of the Division's operational life. At the time, the 32nd carried three TAC wings as augmentation sources, each obligated by agreement to furnish 18 interceptors to the Division. Efforts, however, to secure their participation in Division exercises failed to realize more than mere token support. It was, therefore, recommended to General Lee that ADC either intercede to bring about a more

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effective cooperation by TAC organizations or that these units be dropped from the 32nd roster of augmentation forces. 35

The problem confronting the task force detachment was not the availability of AFLANT fighters for CONAD utilization but the question of who would control them while engaged in air defense missions. A top secret TAC message of 27 October placed certain AFLANT F-100 "Super Sabres" at the disposal of CONAD, without, however, making specific references to control procedures. 36

The MOADS commander felt that short of absolute CONAD control from scramble to recovery was acceptable before the F-100s could be employed in a CONAD role. 37 Local AFLANT commanders disagreed, standing on the prerogative of "ownership" and insisting that they decide when and where their "Super Sabres" would be diverted to air defense sorties and alerts.

The disagreement was never quite resolved, although a settlement appeared to be in the offing following the

35. Excerpt from 32 AD briefing given Gen Lee on 5 Apr 1962, DOC 29, this chapter.

36. Msg TAC AFLANT DOCP-SCT-CU-211, 27 Oct 1962. See also Msg CINCONAD COOP 489, pertaining to same subj, 26 Oct 1962.

37. Log entries for 27 Oct 1962 taken from "Report of Events 21-31 Oct," of Det 1, CTF 32, DOC 30, this chapter. The complete report in two volumes covers period 21 Oct - 30 Nov 1962 and is on file in DHR.

intercept on 27 October of a flight of AFLANT-scrambled F-100s from Homestead by two F-106 "Delta Darts" under "BROWNSTONE" control. In the ensuing investigation the F-100 flight leader was relieved, and Colonel Kenney located a CINCAFLANT message directing that two "Super Sabres" be placed under CONAD control at Homestead, McCoy and MacDill. The directive, which originated in the AFLANT ADVON, was rescinded by TAC the same day, perpetuating the CONAD-TAC stalemate for the duration of the contingency operations. At base level, however, closer coordination became reality as a result of improved communications between individual units and briefings on air defense procedures given TAC personnel by CONAD liaison officers.

But the workload of Colonel Kenney and his staff increased at a rapid clip. Because of the AFLANT tendency to go it alone in virtually all phases of operations, the

38. Ibid.

39. Msg AFLANT ADVON, HTA-CP-10-171, 28 Oct 1962, DOC 31, this chapter, and Msg TAC CU-283, 28 Oct 1962. Both msgs cited in log entries for 28 Oct 1962 in detachment's "Report of Events" referenced above.

40. MacDill CONAD Liaison Office "History, 29 Oct - 2 Dec 1962," submitted to Det 1, CTF 32, 3 Dec 1962, DOC 32 this chapter and McCoy CONAD Liaison "Staff Report #1" for period 26 Oct-8 Nov 1962, submitted to Det 1, CTF 32, 10 Nov 1962, DOC 33, this chapter.

task force detachment was kept busy just trying to stay abreast of developments which, while primarily of reconnaissance nature, vitally affected the CONAD forces in regard to type and volume of air traffic. Trouble-shooting was the detachment's order of the day, a task which was rendered more complex by the influx of additional CONAD units into the already heavily congested area. AFLANT's repeated failure to notify CONAD authorities and coordinate with them low-level reconnaissance sorties was also scored by CINCONAD in a "swivel chair" message of 30 October. Stressing that non-receipt of mission information by CONAD forces caused unnecessary intercepts within and outside the ADIZ, CINCONAD again reminded CINCAFLANT that coordination procedures were spelled out in CINCLANT Operations Order 29-62 and had been agreed upon by all agencies⁴¹ concerned.

November showed a marked improvement in AFLANT cooperation. In the MacDill area, TAC elements agreed to participate in low-level Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA)

41. Msg CINCONAD, COOP-P-X503, "Swivel Chair Msg," 30 Oct 1962, DOC 34, this chapter.

exercises, and joint instructions to that effect were signed
on 24 November.⁴² Preparations for the presidential visit
to Southern Florida installations at the end of the month
dominated the detachment's activities for most of November.
Other visitors to Homestead included General Curtis LeMay,
USAF chief of staff, the ADC vice-commander and a host of
other high ranking officers representing the various services.⁴³

When AFLANT ADVON ceased operations per se on 1 Dec-
ember, the task force detachment, too, prepared for dis-
continuation. Detachment personnel returned to their home
stations within just a few days, leaving behind only Colonel
Kenney who remained at Homestead until 6 December. He
stayed to welcome and brief the new commander of the CONAD
fighter detachment, Colonel Vincent P. Gordon, former
inspector general (IG) of the 29th Air Division.⁴⁴

42. Joint TAC/CONAD Operations Instruction 62-1,
"Mission Planning for Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Low
Level Target Requirement," 24 Nov 1962, DOC 35, this
chapter.

43. Det 1 CTF 32 "Summary Reports" (2) covering
period 1 Nov-30 Nov, to Cmdr MOADS, DOC 36, this chapter.

44. Det 1 CTF 32, "Report of Events 1-6 Dec," to
Cmdr, MOADS, DOC 37, this chapter.

THE FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR FORCE

The 32nd Air Division's only USAF/ADC fighter interceptor squadron - the 331st - was directed to deploy 18 of its 22 F-102 "Delta Daggers" to Homestead AF Base in the afternoon of 21 October. Within 40 minutes of receipt of orders the first of six three-F-102 flights was airborne; the last cleared the runway of the unit's home station, Webb Air Force Base, just four hours later. Refueling at Brookley, Alabama, and Tyndall Air Force Bases, all 18 aircraft were in place at Homestead in the pre-dawn hours of 22 October. In the evening of the same day, and within two hours of its move into Homestead's SAC alert area, the 331st had 14 F-102s on five-minute and the remainder on three-hour alert status. In the absence of scramble communication facilities, a two-digit telephone system was installed between the already augmented Detachment 1, 482nd FIS, and the Webb squadron. Necessary scramble communications, however, were made available a few hours later.

Until relieved by the 325th FIS from Truax Field, Wisconsin, on 28 October, the 331st flew a total of approximately 500 hours for 213 sorties. In addition to the 18

45. 331 FIS Historical Report, Oct-Dec 1962, AU-D5, DOC 38, this chapter.

aircraft, 31 officers and 141 airmen had been sent to the southern Florida air base. The group was headed by Lt Colonel Jack C. Price, squadron commander. Ten pilots remained at Homestead when the 331st contingent was ordered back to Texas. Four of them were given TF-102 - or F/TF-102 - flying assignments with the 482nd detachment, while the other six were attached to the 30th Air Division's 325th FIS. All of them rejoined their unit by 13 November.⁴⁶ The withdrawal of the 331st from southern Florida became necessary when CINCONAD, in an effort to improve the low-level intercept capability against low-flying targets in the area, directed the utilization of aircraft armed with FFAR 2.75mm ordnance. Since the Webb "Delta Daggers" had been modified for the GAR-11 nuclear "Falcon" air-to-air missile, their 2.75 capacity was reduced to one half the normal load of 24 of the conventional rockets. Consequently, replacement of the Division's only fighter unit was ordered by ADC on 27 October.⁴⁷

The 331st was first alerted to prepare for movement to an "established F-102 base" on 19 October. Instructions at that time stipulated a minimum of two flights of six

46. Ibid.

47. Msg ADC, ADCCR X-89, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 39, this chapter.

aircraft and sufficient ground personnel to be ready for de-
48
ployment on a three-hour notice. These instructions were
superseded by the previously cited top secret ADC messages
of 21 October.

When outlining its concept of improved low-level
intercept capability, CINCONAD specified that the interceptors
armed with 2.75mm rockets be based in close proximity of
the targets they were intended to defend. Cockpit or "sling
shot" alert status for F/TF-102 aircraft was directed at
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Homestead, MacDill, Patrick and McCoy Air Force Bases.

In response to the CINCONAD request, ADC instructed
the air divisions to furnish the required aircraft from
their resources. With the exception of those belonging to
the 325th FIS, or its parent organization, the 327th Fighter
Group, all F/TF-102s were to be assigned to the Homestead
detachment of the 482nd FIS. The latter was directed simul-
taneously to return its F-102s without full 2.75 ordnance
capability to Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base on a one-for-one
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basis. The F/TF-102 levy imposed in a separate message on

48. Msg ADC, ADOOP-W 3801, "Deployment," 19 Oct 1962, DOC 40, this chapter.

49. Msg CINCONAD, COOP X 497; 26 Oct 1962, DOC 41, this chapter.

50. Msg ADC, ADODC X-88, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 42, this chapter.

the 73rd Air Division's 4756th Air Defense Group at Tyndall included all the Group's available aircraft as well as sufficient ground crews and equipment to sustain the strip alert operations at MacDill, Patrick and McCoy.⁵¹

The Command objective, as relayed to MOADS by the 32nd, was the substitution of 36 "Delta Daggers" at Homestead by an equal number of their two-seat counterparts.⁵² The F/TF-102 strength finally mustered, however, never exceeded 16 aircraft. Nor did the AFLANT F-100s, which were to be made available for CONAD duties ever materialize, forcing MOADS to revise its strip alert schedules at all four bases as planned in a MOADS message to the 32nd Air Division on 27 October.⁵³ Three days later, therefore, MOADS realigned its low-level intercept forces accordingly. At MacDill, a two-plane strip alert manned and maintained by the Tyndall group became reality, while Detachment 1, 482nd FIS, was ordered to take similar measures at McCoy and Patrick Air Force Bases as soon as possible.⁵⁴

51. Msg ADC, ADCCR X-90, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 43, this chapter.

52. Msg 32 AD, 32ODC 1042 to MOADS, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 44, this chapter.

53. Msg MOADS, MOCCR 2282 to 32 AD, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 45, this chapter.

54. Msg MOADS, MCCOP-W 2226, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 46, this chapter.

Beginning with Tyndall's F/TF-102s at MacDill, the low-level interceptors were retained on 24-hour strip alerts at the four Florida bases through most of November. The 73rd Air Division aircraft were withdrawn on 28 November, while the Patrick requirement was removed on the 30th.⁵⁵ McCoy and Homestead followed suit on 3 December.

Despite the fact that the 32nd CONAD Region, through the Montgomery Sector, assumed control of an unprecedented interceptor concentration, the 331st's departure from Homestead left the 32nd Air Division without fighter representation in southern Florida. While utilization of the Division's ANG squadrons was possible only in the event of DEFCON 2 or higher, Texas' 136th Air Defense Wing did instruct its 147th and 149th Fighter Group to take certain steps in line with an "accelerated training program." The measures included cancellation of leave for air technicians, keeping 50 per cent of their F-102s up-loaded with weapons and arranging for the commanders and members of their staffs to be on call at "all times."⁵⁶ In MOADS, the two "Delta Dagger" squadrons of the Florida and Louisiana air guards

55. Msg 32 AD, 32COCC 1278 to Cmd MOADS, 30 Nov 1962, DOC 47, this chapter.

56. Msg 136 ADW, 10-24-21 to Cmd 147 and 149 Ftr Gps, 24 Oct 1962, DOC 48, this chapter.

maintained two aircraft each on five-minute and the re-
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mainder on one-hour alert status. All the Division's
ANG forces were instructed on 26 October to review their
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mobility plans in preparation for possible deployment.

One air guard organization assigned to the 32nd for
training, inspection and tactical evaluation, however, be-
came actively involved in the Cuban contingency operations.
By request of CINCLANT, Puerto Rico's 198th FIS placed four
of its full complement of 25 F-86H "Sabrejets" on forward
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alert at Ramey Air Force Base. CINCLANT further recom-
mended that the squadron's five active duty pilot spaces
for training purposes be increased to nine and that all of
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them be utilized for actual operational alert status.

CONCEPT OF FIGHTER OPERATIONS

At the peak of the Region's interceptor build-up,
the 32nd had 154 ADC and Navy fighters at its disposal. Of

57. MOADS Historical Report, Oct-Dec 1962 [DHR].

58. Msg 32 AD, 320OP 1017, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 49,
this chapter.

59. Msg CINCLANT to SAC, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 50, this
chapter.

60. Msg COMANTDEFCON to CINCLANT, 23 Oct 1962,
DOC 51, this chapter.

this total as many as 137 actually participated in the 3588⁶¹ sorties flown from southern Florida bases and Tyndall. The ADC aircraft engaged in combat operations numbered 115, ranging from the two versions of the "Delta Daggers" to the F-101 and F-106. The Navy's CONAD chores were divided between the 14 F4B "Phantom IIs" of VP-41 and the eight F4Ds belonging to the VFAW-3 detachment at Key West.

The proximity to Cuban bases and the fact that daylight was considered to be the most favorable time for attack greatly influenced the concept of fighter operations. The need to reduce CONAD reaction time as much as possible was met by the establishment of 11 strategic orbit points. Seven of these were random-manned by the "dawn patrol" during the crucial early morning hours to minimize the element of surprise in an attack launched at that time. Day and night random-manning extended respectively to three and two of five southern STOPS along the 24th parallel. On 23 October MOADS was directed by the 32nd commander to implement this mode of ADC-Navy fighter deployment. It was stipulated that STOPS 1 and 3 be manned by the F4Bs, and 7 and 11 by the F-102s from Tyndall. All points were to be manned by

61. Included in the total of 154 fighter aircraft are ADC and Navy interceptors on alert at installations other than Tyndall and those in southern Florida.

two interceptors, but utilization of aircraft for the remaining seven STOPS was left to the decision of the MOADS commander.⁶² "Battle station" and "sling shot" alerts for two interceptors each at Key West, Homestead and Patrick were also included in the instructions.

As devised, the mode of STOP manning and attendant alert were to remain in effect for only a short period of time because of the obvious burdens they imposed on unit and aircraft resources. When a much prolonged crisis appeared in the offing, revisions of the system became necessary to permit sustained operations. Pending CONAD approval, Colonel G. G. Atkinson, 32nd Air Division vice commander, tentatively authorized MOADS to substitute "battle station" for "sling shot" commitments at the MOADS commander's discretion.⁶³ CONAD concurred on 27 October, consolidating all previous STOP manning and alert instructions

62. Msg 32 CR, 32CHCR 979, 23 Oct 1962; Msg 32 CR, 32CHCR 991, 24 Oct 1962, DOC 52, this chapter.

63. Msg 32 CR, 32 CCR 1018 to MOADS, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 53 this chapter. Although Col Atkinson did not normally fill a CONAD/NORAD position, he was delegated authority with CINCONAD consent to represent General Gent in the latter's absence and pending the arrival of Maj Gen J. R. Winn, then en route to succeed Maj Gen D. B. Johnson as 2nd USARADCOM Region command and 32 CR deputy commander. (Historian's interview with Colonel Atkinson, 26 Nov 1962).

with appropriate amendments in a message to the 32nd CONAD
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 Region. Alert procedures were further relaxed in subsequent exchanges of verbal and teletype communications between CONAD, the Region and Sector.
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On 6 November the 32nd proposed and outlined to CONAD and MOADS three additional methods of attaining the desired STOP manning and alert posture without detriment to the interceptor force's responsibilities in regard to the CINCAFLANT and CINCLANT plans. Submitted because implementation of certain phases of these plans seemed then imminent, the Region recommended that all four STOP manning and alert patterns be alternated on a daily basis beginning
 66
 7 November. The Region's latest ground rules for STOP manning were adopted and, gradually reducing the daily sortie rate, remained in force until the end of the crisis and declaration of DEFCON 5 on 3 December.

64. Msg CINCNORAD, NCRC-C-66, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 54, this chapter. Msg defined battle station alert as "an operationally ready aircraft in close proximity to the runway, physically manned by combat ready crews capable of becoming airborne in the minimum amount of time and in all cases less than 5 minutes."

65. Msg 32 AD, 32ODC 1121 "For Gen Gent Prior to Beginning of Cmdrs Conference at Hq CONAD," 1 Nov 1962, DOC 55, this chapter; Msg 32 NR, 32NOOP 1140 to Cmdr MOADS, 3 Nov 1962, DOC 56, this chapter.

66. Msg 32 CR, 32COOP 1156, 6 Nov 1962, DOC 57, this chapter. The phases, or options, of CINCAFLANT and CINCLANT

With the easing of political tensions through apparent Soviet willingness to remove its offensive weapons from Cuban soil the implementation of an aerial quarantine and other contingency measures became more remote. This, in turn, permitted the 32nd Air Division to release the 4780th Air Defense Wing from all alert requirements on 10 November. The Wing, which retained an "immediate reaction capability" at Perrin Air Force Base, Texas, was thereby freed from its commitment of 16 combat-ready aircraft to the 32nd. The overall support rendered by the 73rd had already been cut back on 6 November in order to minimize interference with that Division's training mission at Tyndall and Perrin.

[Cont'd] plans referred to pertain to military operations necessary to assure the destruction of Cuba's offensive weapons capability as introduced on the island by the USSR. In addition, the 32nd CR fighter force was committed to CONAD support of CINCLANT's aerial quarantine of Cuba, if and when fully implemented. Ranging from diversion to destruction of aircraft suspect of carrying prohibited materials to Cuba, tasks to be performed by the 32nd and other regions were outlined in CONAD Operation Plan 2-62 sent to regions in message form on 26 Oct 1962, DOC 58, this chapter. 32 CR published its own Ops Plan 2-62, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 59, this chapter, which was rescinded when the CONAD plan was superseded by Oplan 3-62 on 5 Nov 1962.

67. Msg 32 AD, 32ODC 1190 to 73 AD, 10 Nov 1962, DOC 60, this chapter.

68. Msg 73 AD, 73ODC X 596-K to 4780 ADW, 24 Oct 1962, DOC 61, this chapter.

69. Msg 32 AD, 32CCR 1151 to ADC, 6 Nov 1962, DOC 62, this chapter.

The 73rd's participation in 32nd CONAD Region fighter operations is reflected in the total of 498 sorties flown⁷⁰ by the division's various types of aircraft.

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND ARMAMENT

The variety of interceptors dispersed to southern Florida bases alone precluded centralization of responsibility for logistics in the areas of maintenance and armament at any one air division or location. Instead, each unit deployed relied for support on its home base and parent organization. Included were aircraft parts, aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and personnel. When maintenance could not be performed at the dispersal installation, the aircraft was returned home in exchange for another.

The success of the "home support" system hinged in no small measure on the airlift resources available during the critical seven weeks. The lion's share in this respect was borne by ADC's 4650th Support Squadron. In better than 1100 missions and 4700 hours flown during the period, the 4650th carried more than 1400 tons of materiel and 2400 passengers. The 32nd Air Division's contribution consisted of 171 sorties made mostly by T-33, C-47 and U-3 aircraft for an aggregate of 403 flying hours, 6.2 tons and 397

passengers. Corresponding figures for MOADS were 150, 411, 120 and 480. Excluded from this concept of logistics were the F/TF-102s gathered in Florida from throughout the Command. Because of the small quantity of the two-seat "Delta Daggers" involved, Tyndall and the 73rd Air Division could and did assume the respective roles of home base and parent organization for this particular aircraft.

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FAA ACTIVITIES

Air traffic control functions and restrictions assumed and instituted by the FAA in southern Florida precluded many unnecessary identification scrambles on the part of the Region's interceptor force. Without the measures taken by the FAA, the already high fighter sortie rate might have climbed beyond the capabilities of logistical support.

On 24 October the Federal Aviation Agency warned all aircraft of U. S. ownership and registration to avoid Cuban airspace unless prior approval was obtained from the Department of Defense. At the same time, the agency's representatives within the 32nd CONAD Region were directed to deny

70. General Gent's review of air defense build-up during Cuban crisis, as presented in a briefing of ADC commanders at ADC Commander's Conference held in San Antonio, Tex., 24 Jan 1963, DOC 63, this chapter.

Cuban authorities all flight movement data previously reported on a reciprocal basis. This was done in retaliation to Castro's earlier refusal to honor this exchange of information and his establishment of a Cuban Flight Information Region (FIR).

Also on 24 October, the FAA published and put into effect a Special Civil Air Regulation which established the so-called Military Emergency Zone (MEZ) in the airspace over Florida and adjacent waters.⁷¹ All air traffic was barred from this zone unless flight plans had previously been approved by military authority through the FAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTC) either at Miami or Jacksonville, Florida. But even then, all aircraft had to be equipped with functioning navigation and communications gear necessary to maintain two-way contact with air traffic control facilities. The pilot was obligated to monitor radio frequencies specified by the ARTC.⁷² Waivers were granted only under exceptional circumstances, as evidenced by the denial of permission to a privately owned air rescue plane to pick up a ship-wrecked crew within the MEZ. On the other

71. FAA SCAR SR-454, "Special Operating Rule Within Certain Areas of the State of Florida and over Adjacent Waters," 23 Oct 1962, DOC 64, this chapter.

72. Ibid.

hand, CBS was allowed to operate a television relay aircraft in the area to beam Cuban broadcasts into Miami.

Beginning 2 November, when Pan American Airways was permitted five daily flights through the MEZ and Cuban Flight Information Region in which CINCLANT and CINCAFLANT reconnaissance missions were still being conducted, the rules were relaxed and more waivers issued. On 23 November the FAA directive was superseded by another which realigned the MEZ to include only the southern tip of Florida and the ⁷³ Keys. However, the FAA reserved the right to reinstate the total restriction by publishing a "notice to airmen" (NOTAM), although the normal exchange of flight information between the FAA and its Cuban counterpart had since been resumed.

WEATHER SUPPORT

Weather support for CONAD fighter operations during the crisis was provided by the 32nd Weather Squadron and its four detachments commanded by Lt Colonel L. V. Gillespie. Detachments 4 and 2 are colocated with 32nd Air Division and MOADS headquarters, while 5 and 6 operate their weather stations at Tyndall and Perrin AF Bases, respectively. The

73. FAA SCAR SR-454-A, 23 Nov 1962, DOC 65, this chapter.

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meterological data flow from the four detachments was channelled through the MOADS station to the CONAD CC at Key West from where it was flashed to the dispersal and recovery bases of the Region's interceptor force. To eliminate weather as the unknown quantity in fighter operations as much as possible, full utilization was also made of pilot in-flight reports from all installations on the 32nd's tactical weather loop as well as the National Map Center's Radar and Jet Stream analyses.

Both the competence of the squadron's forecasters and the coordination existing between aircraft control points and the staff weather officers at the Region and Sector proved to be excellent. The combination made air defense sorties possible even when occasional below-minimum conditions closed all but one or two of the designated recovery bases.

In his summary of the 32nd Weather Squadron's activities during the critical period, Colonel Gillespie expressed the opinion that the unit had demonstrated its "ability to perform under wartime conditions." Although the organization's operational and administrative working loads reached three times their normal capacity, the commander

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felt that "the results realized fully validated as adequate established weather support procedures for air defense operations."⁷⁴

ARMY AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

The 32nd CONAD Region's first ground-to-air firepower in southern Florida was provided by the World War II vintage self-propelled 40mm guns of Battery B, 1st Battalion, 59th Artillery. Arriving unannounced at Homestead on 25 October, the unit was deployed in close-in, low-altitude perimeter defense of the air base under MOADS control. Because of its very limited capability, its assignment of would-be targets was restricted to low-flying aircraft strafing or bombing Homestead and the immediate vicinity. Engagement was authorized only during daylight hours and at the direction of the battery commander.⁷⁵ Despite its questionable value even in respect to perimeter defense, the ADA contingent remained in position until early December.

74. Interview with 32 Weather Sq Commander, 9 Dec 1962.

75. Msg 32 CR, 32COOP 996, 25 Oct 1963, DOC 66, this chapter.

CONAD, in the meantime, continued to press for the much more sophisticated and versatile HAWK missile at Homestead.⁷⁶ The Command's efforts bore fruit in early November when two batteries of the 8th Missile Battalion, 15th Artillery, were assigned to that installation.⁷⁷ The battalion's remaining two firing units were deployed to Patrick and MacDill in a single integrated battery defense configuration.⁷⁹ The 8th Battalion arrived on 2 November, the same day the 2nd Missile Battalion, 52nd Artillery (Hercules), reached Homestead for introduction into the 32nd's Homestead-Miami air defense environment.⁸⁰ Short one of its regular batteries, the NIKE unit had been requested in a personal message from General Gerhart to the JCS on 27 October. The CONAD commander-in-chief also asked that the missing battery (B) of this ADA element from Ft. Bliss,

76. Msg CINCNORAD, COOP-O NCRC-60 to JCS, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 67, this chapter.

77. Msg 32 NR, 32NOOP 1075 to Cmd MOADS et al, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 68, this chapter.

78. Msg CINCONAD, VCRC-C-88 to Cmd 32 CR, 28 Oct 1962, DOC 69, this chapter.

79. Msg CINCONAD, NCRC-C-106 to Cmd 32 CR, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 70, this chapter.

80. Msg 32 CR, 32COOP 1131 to Cmd MOADS, 2 Nov 1962, DOC 71, this chapter.

Texas, be placed at CONAD disposal as well upon its return⁸¹
from duties outside the continental United States.

The arrival of both the high-altitude NIKE and low-level HAWK weapons completed the ground-to-air missile build-up in southern Florida. The first HAWK battalion, the 6th of the 65th Artillery, had since been deployed in the Key West area where its advance party arrived on 24 Oct-⁸²
ober. Two days later two of the battalion's four batteries, A and B, were already in possession of 18 missiles each, according to a CONAD ADA status report to the JCS⁸³
of 26 October.

On 10 November the operational locations of the Hercules and HAWK firing units in the Homestead-Miami area and at Patrick and MacDill were reported in a 32nd NORAD⁸⁴
Region message to CINCONAD. Still missing was the detached battery of the NIKE unit which, however, was expected to join⁸⁵
its parent battalion about 26 November.

81. Msg CINCNORAD, NOOP-OO/NCRC-CC-68 to JCS, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 70, this chapter.

82. Ibid. See DOC 14, this chapter, 2 ARADCOMKWEST Liaison Officer's Msg to CG 32 NR, 24 Oct 1962.

83. Msg CINCNORAD, NCRC-C-61 to JCS, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 73, this chapter.

84. Msg 32 CR, 32COOP 1188 to CINCONAD, 10 Nov 1962, DOC 74, this chapter.

85. Msg 32CR, 32COOP 1211 to Cmd MOADS et al, 14 Nov 1962, DOC 75, this chapter.

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Two factors bore heavily upon planning the utilization of ADA units in southern Florida. It was imperative, first of all, that one CONAD facility control all ground-to-air weapons being committed within one specific area of responsibility. This was necessary because successful ADA integration into the air defense line-up required the closest of coordination. Secondly, it was of equal importance that the same CONAD agency have surveillance over the ADA's sector of deployment.

Since MOADS operated in a split SAGE/Manual configuration, ADA control, too, was divided between the SDC at Gunter AF Base and the Manual control centers at Jacksonville and Key West. The Jacksonville CC controlled the one HAWK battery at Patrick AF Base by means of two voice circuits between the CC and the firing unit's command post. One of the lines was used for intelligence, and the other for command and control.

The HAWK firing unit at MacDill, on the other hand, operated in Mode I under the SDC. Its communications consisted of one teletype and one voice circuit, respectively used for intelligence and command and control between MOADS and the ADA command post. On 17 December, when Jacksonville became SAGE operational, the Patrick ADA element also converted to that system. In the event of Mode III, however,

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it was to revert to the manual method of control, while its MacDill counterpart would be placed under the Tyndall CCC.

At Homestead AF Base as well, the ADA weapons were controlled by the SDC in the Mode I environment. Under Mode III conditions, the Key West CCC was designated the controlling agency for the Homestead ADA contingents as represented by the NIKE, HAWK and 40mm batteries. Two voice circuits were leased and installed between the Key West and the ADA command posts at Homestead for the purpose of Mode III operations.

The 6th Missile Battalion, 65th Artillery (HAWK), at Key West functioned under "BROWNSTONE" control in the Manual portion of the Montgomery Sector. Two voice circuits formed the communications link between the center and the command post on Stock Island. Command and administrative responsibilities for all ADA units were vested in the 13th Artillery Group whose headquarters were established at
86
Homestead.

The deployment of HAWK to southern Florida was a historical first in the annals of air defense. In view of this, and considering how rapidly the batteries achieved

86. Discussion of Operational Control of ADA in Southern Florida, as prepared by Maj Colello, USA, 32 CR GM Officer, DOC 76, this chapter.

operational readiness, the weapon's integration can be termed an unqualified success. HAWK effectiveness was clearly demonstrated in low-level training conducted by Battery D, 8th Battalion, at MacDill on 27 November. In joint exercises with 12 TAC F-84F and two RB-66 aircraft, all but the latter two were successfully acquired by the HAWK radar and "destroyed." The following day, two out of three similar⁸⁷ missions against ADC B-57s were also accomplished.

Problems arising out of the hurried integration of the Army weapons, such as lack of a surveillance scope at the Key West CCC for full-time ADA use, were solved before⁸⁸ they grew into major issues. Operational procedures as to alert status, target assignments as well as essential⁸⁹ maintenance were also satisfactorily established.

87. Weekly Summary #4, CONAD Lisison Office, MacDill, 1 Dec 1962, DOC 77, this chapter.

88. Msg MOADS, MCADA 2270, "Use of Radar Scope..." 8 Nov 1962, DOC 78, this chapter.

89. The following series of 32 CR and 32 NR msgs, pertaining to ADA operational and maintenance procedures, are included in one supporting document: 32NOPS 1037, 27 Oct 1962; 32CCR 1184, 9 Nov 1962; 32COOP 1229, 16 Nov 1962; 32NOOP 1281, 30 Nov 1962; 32COOP 1294, 4 Dec 1962, DOC 79, this chapter. For HAWK integration at Key West, see also DOC 15, 32 CR Msg, 32COOP 005, 23 Oct 1962, this chapter.

Contrary to the cutback of the 32nd's fighter force to 20 F-102s at Homestead, none of the ADA missile battalions was withdrawn from southern Florida at the conclusion of the contingency operations. The interceptor strength was to be maintained at 20 aircraft by rotation of ADC fighter squadrons, in accordance with the Command's Operations Plan 26-62, dated 21 November. No such arrangement had been made - or was in the making - for the NIKE and HAWK weapons: nor was a target date for their departure established. No one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond crisis' end indicated their permanent installation on the peninsula, but the fact that they were still there was further proof of the success of the ground-to-air weapons' deployment.

FALLING LEAVES

"Falling Leaves," the project of surveillance and detection of Cuban ballistic missile launchings, assigned to the 32nd Air Division its first supporting role in the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). The pertinent operations plan, which was published by the 9th Aerospace Defense Division, linked the AN/FPS-35 frequency diversity (FD) search radar at TM-197, Thomasville, Alabama, to that

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division's space surveillance network. The site is manned and operated by the 32nd's 698th Radar Squadron.

On 26 October ADC advised the air division that necessary modifications to give the FPS-35 missile detection capability would begin the following day. The special sensor equipment needed for that purpose was removed from two radar stations in Pennsylvania and Virginia where it had been used in recent tests.⁹⁰ Included in the installation was a full-period voice circuit from the missile surveillance scope at the Thomasville site to the BMEWS Central Command and Display Facility (CC&DF)⁹¹ at Colorado Springs.

The job of bringing the FD search radar to the desired missile surveillance and detection specifications was done by the Sperry Corporation in cooperation with 698th personnel. It was completed on schedule, 29 October. In the pre-dawn hours of the next morning, the 9th Aerospace Defense Division's Task Force "A" at Thomasville assumed operational

90. Msg ADC, ADOOP-EL 2899, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 80, this chapter.

91. Ibid.

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control of the reconfigured FPS-35, assisted by 20 additional airmen sent to the squadron by the 32nd Air Division. 92
The 698th's BMEWS mission terminated on 5 December when the sensor gear was dismantled and the long-range search reconverted to its original dimensions.

LOW-LEVEL SURVEILLANCE

Low-level radar coverage during the crisis was, in the opinion of many participants and observers, the weakest link in the air defense build-up. Paradoxically, it was the very augmentation of the surveillance forces which most threatened the effectiveness of the coverage. The establishment of additional AEW&C and picket ship stations as well as the deployment of TACAN destroyers taxed existing communications facilities to the danger point. This was

92. 698 RADRON Historical Report, Oct-Dec 1962, DOC 81, this chapter.

93. Unless otherwise documented, this chapter cites information contained in 966th Msg 870, as retransmitted 27 Nov 1962, DOC 82, this chapter. Although addressed to its parent unit, 551 AEW&C Wing, with information to 32 AD, cited msg replies to 32 AD msg MDC 1230, "Object Lessons from CONAD OPLAN 1-62," 18 Nov 1962. The 32 AD analysis of 966 msg is contained in 32MLP ltr, same subj, to ADC, 5 Dec 1962, DOC 83, this chapter.

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evidenced by the number of low-flying targets that escaped detection in the Key West CCC's area of responsibility.

Although surveillance, intercept and control techniques were developed with reasonable success, the operational environment remained in jeopardy because of logistical support problems.⁹⁴ This was particularly true of the 966th AEW&C Squadron at McCoy whose aircraft strength was brought from an initial five to 12 RC-121s. The arrival of the 28th Air Division's "Constellations," while enabling the manning of one more station, created a host of difficulties for the 966th and McCoy. The air base, at the time, was already saturated by TAC forces which, the ADC unit was informed, were assembled for exercises not involving airborne early warning and control participation. A few days later the Navy's six WF-2s with crews were also assigned to McCoy until their relocation to Key West was approved at the end of October.⁹⁵

94. Low-level detection tests were conducted by ADC under code name "Mickey Mouse," 23-25 Oct. Piper Comanche, U3A and T-33 targets were flown at 100, 200, 700 and 2600 ft altitudes with radar platform at 16,000 ft. Of 25 controlled F-101 intercepts attempted, 19 MAs, 3VMAs and 3 MIs were posted. Source: ADC Msg ADOTT-D 2972, "Low Altitude Capability..." 31 Oct 1962, DOC 84, this chapter.

95. Msg 32 NR, 32NHCR 1000 to Cmd MOADS et al, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 85, this chapter.

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Many of the logistical difficulties were traced by the 966th to the lack of timely notification, including the RC-121 augmentation and commitment to man two AEW&C stations. It seemed that neither the squadron nor its parent organization, the 551st, was made the recipient of all Cuban contingency operations plans. According to the 966th, the only such document it received was MOADS Operation Plan 2-62, published 19 October, which, however, was not sent to the 551st. Failure to coordinate with the squadron and wing made it impossible for both to meet mission requirements with the utmost efficiency in either the operational area or realm of logistics. Added to this plight was a general disregard of command channels by "higher authority agencies."

Without naming these "agencies," the 966th stated that the unit's next higher echelon was by-passed in direct requests for launching of special missions as well as performance and capability data over and above the required reporting procedures. This particular complaint, along with others, was validated in the 32nd's analysis of the squadron's report on "Object Lessons" and included in the Division's letter to ADC.

96. Ibid.; See DOC 83, this chapter. Because "Object Lessons" were still under Division study at year's end,

When reviewing the air defense build-up for the ADC commanders at the January conference, General Gent spoke about the "unparalleled opportunity to study the problem areas that were generated by the crisis." His enumeration of specific items included the disregard of the normal chain of command which had plagued the 966th AEW&C Squadron as well as the low-level radar coverage.

With reference to the latter, the 32nd commander said that the 2000 foot low-altitude requirement around the coast of Florida from Patrick to MacDill Air Force Base was unrealistic because "the low-level threat against southern Florida is greater than against any other portion of the United States." He further stated that, in view of this threat, the Region had requested a change in the ADC Control and Warning Support System (416L) from the 2000 to a 500 foot minimum "completely around the coastline of Florida."
97

[Cont'd] only those pertaining to low-level surveillance have been included in this narrative and documentation. However, neither the 966th's report nor the 32nd's analysis of its contents should be considered conclusive because both the role of the AEW&C squadron in the 32nd's operational environment and its relationship to the Region and Division were also being reviewed at the time.

97. Ltr, 32 NR, "Change to ADC 416L," to CINCNORAD, 28 Dec 1962, DOC 80, this chapter.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Little, if anything, can be added to General Gent's summary of the air defense build-up in southern Florida, as presented by him at the ADC commander's conference. ⁹⁸ Touching upon both the strength and weaknesses revealed during the seven critical weeks, the Division/Region commander highlighted the assistance rendered the 32nd in the accomplishment of its mission. "It was a wonderful feeling," he said, "to receive, just for the asking, almost everything and everybody we needed." This, he remarked, was especially true "after having lived with a relatively low resources priority for so long." General Gent also paid tribute to the pilots and support personnel whose achievement was best exemplified by better than 11,400 ADC/Navy flying hours logged without a single aircraft accident.

If, because of the short lapse of time, any conclusion as to the future of Florida's air defense posture would amount to no more than speculation, one thing was certain: The 32nd would never be the same again. A new distinction

98. Ibid.: See General Gent's review of air defense build-up during Cuban crisis..., DOC 63, this chapter.

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had been added to its record of singularity among its ADC/CONAD counterparts. Always unique by virtue of the paradoxical relationship between its geographical size and numerical strength, the 32nd had become the first air defense component to be directly under the gun of a self-declared enemy of the United States.

Whether or not this new distinction would be reflected by the addition of new air defense weapons and systems remained to be seen, but in the meantime 32nd officers and airmen could say with justifiable pride that they belonged to an organization that had done the most with the least.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

THE 73RD AIR DIVISION (WEAPONS)

By

Benjamin T. Siler

At 0015 hours CST, on 20 October, the 73rd Air Division directed its Tyndall based units to bring all interceptor aircraft, which included the F-101, F-102 and F-106 series, to alert status including armament and external fuel tanks. In order to recall personnel, a Cocked Pistol¹ was declared at that time.

DEFCON 5 Delta was declared by CINCNORAD at 1142 hours on 22 October. By 1400 hours that afternoon, all Division interceptor aircraft were placed on five-minute alert status

1. Memo to 4756 Air Def Wg Comd from 4756 Air Def Gp Cmd, "Activities History, 18-27 Oct 1962," 30 Oct 1962, DOC 1, this chapter.

and remained at that status until 1722 hours CST on the same day. At that time, MOADS declared DEFCON 3, "Modified" Delta, which required all aircraft on 15-minute status except two on five minutes.²

The first CAP scramble of the crisis period was initiated from Tyndall AFB at 0055 hours CST on 23 October. From Division forces at Tyndall AFB, a total of 145 air defense sorties were flown during the first week of the crisis.³

On 26 October, CONAD made known a requirement for an improved low altitude fighter interceptor capability in the Florida area. The F/TF-102 was selected as most suitable for the mission; however, the availability of CINCAFLANT aircraft was uncertain. The aircraft had to be capable of firing the 2.75 inch rocket. After the matter had been discussed by General John K. Gerhart, NORAD Commander, and Lt. General Robert M. Lee, ADC Commander, it was suggested that all F-102s with such capability be identified. A squadron of the 102s with the capability mentioned above was suggested

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

for Homestead, MacDill, Patrick, and McCoy Air Force Bases,
all located in Florida.⁴

Following through on the low altitude capability plan, the next day the 73rd Air Division was directed by ADC headquarters as follows: the 4756th Air Defense Group was to provide MOADS with all available TF-102 aircraft (modified for rockets) and aircrews in support of MOADS strip alert requirements.⁵

The next day, on 28 October, MOADS directed the deployment of all rocket capable TF-102 aircraft, fully armed including FFARS to Homestead AFB for attachment to Detachment 1, 482nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron deployed there. The aircraft were to be accompanied by ground support equipment and personnel sufficient to support about two sorties per day per aircraft. Preventive maintenance was to be performed at Tyndall AFB.⁶

Regarding the employment of F/TF-102 aircraft at Homestead, on 29 October the 73rd Air Division was directed to select 25 combat ready F-102 pilots for immediate deployment

4. Msg CONADTO COOP X497, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 2, this chapter.

5. NOFORN, Msg ADC, ADCCR X-90, 27 Oct 1962.

6. Msg MOADS, MOCCR 0110, 28 Oct 1962, DOC 3, this chapter.

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to the 482nd detachment, with complete personal equipment⁷ plus parachutes for an indefinite period of temporary duty. The aircrews were drawn from the resources of the 4780th⁸ Air Defense Wing, Perrin AFB, Texas.

On 30 October, an additional requirement for 10 more F-102 pilots for deployment to Homestead was placed upon the 4780th Wing.⁹ The first group of personnel deployed to Homestead remained there until 11 November, at which time¹⁰ the weekly rotation of personnel was begun.

In furtherance of the low-altitude capability, on 28 October the Montgomery CONAD Sector directed the 4756th Air Defense Group at Tyndall to use available UE TF-102 aircraft to maintain two TF-102 aircraft, call sign Echo Kilo on alert at MacDill AFB, Florida, including sufficient ground support equipment and personnel to support about two sorties¹¹ per day and a 24 hour alert. As of 1700 hours CST on 29 October, deployed TF-102's of the 73rd Air Division's

7. NOFORN, Msg ADC, ADCCR X116, 29 Oct 1962.

8. Ibid.

9. NOFORN, Msg ADC, ADODC X-133, 30 Oct 1962.

10. Msg 4780ADW, WODC-T 262L, 9 Nov 1962, DOC 4, this chapter.

11. Msg Montgomery CONAD Sector MCCOP-W 2226, 28 Oct 1962, DOC 5, this chapter.

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4756th Air Defense Group were standing continuous five-minute
12
alert at the Tampa base.

Color was added to the MacDill deployment when the detachment, led by Major James S. Simon, Jr., was nicknamed "Simon's Maruders." After departing Tyndall for MacDill, the detachment to be, consisting of a flight of three TF-102's was diverted enroute for a Homestead recovery. After checking with the ADC Task Force commander, the flight prepared for operational sorties out of Homestead. But, after one sortie and only eight hours on the station, they were again scrambled for deployment to MacDill AFB where the "Maruders" were to spend the remainder of the Cuban
13
crisis, returning to Tyndall on 5 December.

In an effort to provide for crew rest while accomplishing the 73rd's air defense mission at Tyndall AFB, interceptor aircrews were divided into two shifts with 24 hours on duty and 24 hours off. The alert commitment was distributed between two alert flights. "A" flight consisted of Interceptor Weapons School and 4750th Test Squadron aircrews,

12. Memo 4756 Air Def Gp Cmd to 4756 Air Def Wg Cmd, "Activities History, 18-27 Oct 1962," 30 Oct 1962, DOC 1, this chapter.

13. Historical Record 4757 Air Def Sq (IWS), 1 Oct-31 Dec 1962; Memo 4756 Air Def Gp Cmd to 4756 Air Def Wg, "Activities History, 18-27 Oct 1962, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 1, this chapter.

and "B" flight was composed of crews from the 4756th Air Defense Squadron (Weapons) which has since been redesignated¹⁴ the 4756th Combat Crew Training Squadron.

In the execution of the Cuban crisis alert requirements from Tyndall the Interceptor Weapons School, operated by the 4757th Air Defense Squadron (IWS), with its well-equipped operations center and capability of handling the needs of alert aircrews for extended periods, became the combination dispatch desk, combat alert center,¹⁵ and living quarters for all of Tyndall's alert aircrews.

As a general rule, beginning 22 October, MOADS used a DEFCON 3 "Modified" Delta, which required one-half of the interceptors on 15-minute status or less. Usually, this included two on Battle Stations and two on five minutes. With the other half of the interceptor force on three hours, the aircrews were able to rotate the manning of the three-hour interceptors and get some rest. The system worked quite well except that MOADS would declare all aircraft on five-minute status each morning, usually from 0100 hours local until

14. Historical Record 4757 Air Def Sq (IWS), 1 Oct-31 Dec 1962; Memo 4756 Air Def Gp Cmdr to 4756 Air Def Wg Cmd, "Activities History, 18-27 Oct 1962," 30 Oct 1962, DOC 1, this chapter.

15. Historical Record 4757 Air Def Sq (IWS), 1 Oct-31 Dec 1962.

0700 hours local. This necessitated early recall of air-
16
crews on three-hour alert.

Peacetime flying limitation and restriction were
17
waived by Air Defense Command headquarters on 26 October.

On 3 November the 73rd Air Division was directed to
establish a TF-102 pool, consisting of five aircraft at
Tyndall, to support southeast area TF-102 requirements.
The aircraft for the pool were deployed from Perrin AFB
18
(4780th Wing), arriving the following day.

In a message, dated 6 November 1962, from 32nd Air
Division headquarters, confirming a telephone conversation
between Major General Benjamin J. Webster, ADC Chief of
Staff, and Major General Thomas J. Gent, Jr., 32nd Air
Division commander, concerning the utilization of 73rd Air
Division resources in support of 32nd Air Division oper-
ations, it was revealed that the 73rd Air Division's standby
alert requirements at Perrin AFB, Texas, and Tyndall AFB,
Florida, would be reduced to minimize interference with the

16. Memo 4756 Air Def Gp to 4756 Air Def Wg,
"Activities History, 18-27 Oct 1962," 30 Oct 1962, DOC 1,
this chapter.

17. NOFORN, Msg ADC, ADOOP-WI 72, 26 Oct 1962; Msg
73 AD, retransmittal 730OP X598-K.

18. Msg ADC, ADOOP-W 3040, 3 Nov 1962.

73rd's training mission. The agreement stipulated that Perrin's alert requirement would be two aircraft on five-minute alert and two aircraft on one hour alert 24 hours per day. The one aircraft could be flown providing the one hour capability was maintained.¹⁹

Tyndall's requirements were for two aircraft on five-minute alert, 24 hours a day, and STOP manning as required. The five-minute alert requirement could be satisfied during normal training periods with airborne combat loaded aircraft manned with combat ready aircrews. Aircraft on STOP could not satisfy this requirement.²⁰

STOP manning requirements were estimated at 20 sorties per day, provided maximum on station time was obtained after launch from Tyndall by recovery from STOPS at other base such as Homestead (102 aircraft), Patrick (106 aircraft), and MacDill (101 aircraft) for turn around and launch back to a STOP with recovery at Tyndall.²¹

Additional AGE and personnel requirements at turn around base was determined by the 32nd Air Division and supplied from 73rd Air Division or other ADC resources.²²

19. Msg 32AD, 32CCR 1151, 6 Nov 1962, DOC 6, this chapter.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

The message stipulated further that daily requirements were to be furnished the 73rd by MOADS by means of fragmentary order as early as possible so as to permit efficient scheduling and orderly flow to STOPS with minimum disruption to the 73rd Air Division's training program.²³

These arrangements had no bearing on existing 73rd Air Division aircraft and personnel support being provided at Homestead and MacDill Air Force Base.²⁴

On the following day, in a message to ADC, the 73rd Air Division proposed that it guarantee from eight to 12 F-101 and F-106 sorties per day until Combat Crew Training Class 63B started on 19 November in order to properly cover STOP points with economical station range of Tyndall AFB. To cover STOP points in the Southern Tip area, the 73rd proposed to deploy all five F-102 aircraft to the MacDill detachment, where they would be under the complete operational control of MOADS.²⁵

Under the Division's proposal, primary F-102 maintenance would be accomplished at Tyndall.²⁶

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Msg 73AD, 73CCR X41L, 7 Nov 1962, DOC 7, this chapter.

26. Ibid.

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In addition, it was recommended that Tyndall not be required to bring up to five minute status, each morning under DEFCON 3/D, operationally ready aircraft other than those proposed for commitment. The message asserted, that to bring all aircraft up to status as was the case at that time was detracting from combat crew training due to the low²⁷ operationally ready pilot manning at Tyndall.

In reply to the 73rd's proposals for the Division's future air defense support of the crisis, ADC stated it had no objection to the deployment of the F-102's and further informed the Division that the proposals for F-101 and F-106 support were under study.²⁸

As the tension of the crisis eased, the verbal release of the 4780th Air Defense Wing, Perrin AFB, Texas, from all alert requirements at 0344Z, 10 November, was confirmed by a message from 32nd Air Division headquarters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.²⁹ The wing was reminded that it was essential to maintain an immediate reaction capability.

ADC advised CONAD, on 16 November, that it was imperative to re-establish weapons training and weapons test

27. Ibid.

28. Msg ADC, ADODC 3090, 9 Nov 1962.

29. Msg 32 AD, 32ODC 1190, 10 Nov 1962, DOC 8, this chapter.

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programs at Tyndall, necessitating a further reduction of 73rd forces in support of the then waning crisis. Effective 1200Z, 18 November, ADC stated it would withdraw from the operational control of the 32nd Air Division all F-101 and F-106 aircraft of the 73rd Air Division. However, the Division was to continue to provide five F-102 aircraft and three TF-102 aircraft in support of 32nd Air Division strip alert commitments, and five TF-102 aircraft as a maintenance back-up pool for all TF-102 aircraft operating in southern Florida.³⁰

ADC further stated that should DEFCON 1 be declared all facets of the 73rd would be available to CONAD on three hours notice.³¹

A message relating to the above stated intentions was sent by ADC to the 32nd Air Division, and also directed the 73rd to program combat crew training school on a 7-day per week basis.³²

The last air defense sortie in direct support of Cuban crisis operations was flown by division forces at Tyndall on 18 November. A normal air defense alert status was then

30. NOFORN, Msg ADC, ADODC 3144, 16 Nov 1962.

31. Ibid.

32. Msg ADC, ADODC 3145, 16 Nov 1962.

resumed. The 73rd's air defense sorties in support of the crisis from Tyndall AFB and MacDill AFB are shown in Document 9 of this chapter.³³

LOGISTICS

Although unknown to the personnel of the 73rd Air Division at the time, the first activities in support of the Cuban crisis commenced at approximately 1100 hours CST on 18 October. At that time the 4756th Air Defense Group commander at Tyndall AFB was notified by MOADS that the Group would be required to provide turnaround support for one squadron of F-102's and a squadron of F-106's scheduled to arrive at approximately 1300 hours that day.³⁴

To provide a central operating location for the two fully combat ready and equipped squadrons, supposedly deploying on an exercise, a support liaison activity was opened on the Tyndall flightline. One officer and five NCO's were assigned to aid in turnaround of the deploying squadrons and to assist with any required maintenance.³⁵

33. See DOC 9, this chapter.

34. Memo 4756 Air Def Gp to 4756 Air Def Wg, "Activities History 18-27 Oct 1962," 30 Oct 1962, DOC 1, this chapter.

35. Ibid.

The deploying squadrons were the 482nd and 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons. The last aircraft of the two squadrons departed Tyndall for southern Florida bases at 1430 hours on 19 October.³⁶

On that same day, by priority message, the 32nd Air Division requested the immediate integration of the 671st Radar Squadron, Key West, Florida, into the supply support responsibility of the Tyndall AFB Base Supply EACC Section. The squadron was originally scheduled for support by Tyndall on 1 November 1962.³⁷

Also included in the message were requests that all priority requests from the 32nd Air Division ACW/Radar sites supported by the Tyndall EACC be delivered by airlift to the maximum extent, and that U. S. Navy electronic gear located at Key West NAS be supported from available USAF stocks when possible.³⁸

All requests were honored and the EACC Section of Tyndall Base Supply was instructed to comply if at all

36. Memo 4756 Air Def Gp to 4756 Air Def Wg, "Activities History 18-27 Oct 1962," 30 Oct 1962, DOC 1, this chapter.

37. Msg 32 AD, 32MDC 10072, 19 Oct 1962, DOC 10, this chapter.

38. Ibid.

possible with supply requests. Transportation details were forwarded to the appropriate officer within the 73rd Air Division for action.

It was evident, however, by 19 October, that a crisis was eminent. The Director of Supply and Services, 4756th Air Base Group at Tyndall, was directed by the Group commander to place double decked beds in seven and one-half empty barracks. In cooperation with the Base Equipment Management Office (BEMO) and Base Supply, the project was started and beds, mattresses, sheets and blankets, pillows and pillow-cases were placed in each building. The average number of beds per building was 100. The project was a crash program and eventually to complete, assistance was requested from Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Five vans were sent to Fort Rucker to pick up 560 mattresses and 100 beds on temporary loan in order to fill the buildings. Supply officials at Tyndall stated that the cooperation of Fort Rucker in loaning mattresses and beds was of the finest type. The Tyndall BEMO, with the assistance of 20 Army troops, performed the necessary labor. The additional quarters were used by augmentation troops.

To provide logistical and administrative support as required at staging airfield located at Tyndall AFB, the

Army Staging Area Corps (ASAC) was formed at Tyndall during the first week of the crisis with a total strength of 641 troops.³⁹ Some of the units making up ASAC were the 569th Transportation Company (Terminal Services), 69th Chemical Company, 62nd T Company (Medical Trk), and 2nd Hospital Unit 3rd Field Hospital.⁴⁰

At the same time the Third Provisional Wing of the Tactical Air Command was also being formed at Tyndall. It was composed of combat forces of TAC and the Military Air Transport Service. The mission of the provisional wing was to furnish and coordinate transportation for the deployment of Continental Army Command troops in the event of an emergency. The wing was manned by TDY personnel representing 28 bases in the United States.⁴¹

At Tyndall AFB, which could be considered the focal point of Division operations during the crisis, the 4756th Air Base Group Supply and Services office was given the responsibility of controlling all BOQ, transit airmen and

39. ASAC Mission Statement, Organizational Chart, and Unit and Personnel Status Chart, DOC 11, this chapter.

40. Ibid.

41. Msg 3 Prov Wg, "Proposed News Release, Oct 1962," DOC 12, this chapter.

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barracks spaces assignment. The project was a continuing one. In all cases when individual major air command shipments arrived, they were placed in the double deck barracks type buildings so they could preserve a command integrity and identification.

Due to the anticipated planning for such emergency, no serious problems were encountered, and no complaints were received from the occupants of the various temporary quarters. The average daily figure for quarters occupied by TDY augmentation personnel was 190 officers in BOQ, 15 in VIP quarters, and between 600 and 700 enlisted personnel in either the transit quarters or individual barracks set aside by Supply and Services. The statistics included Army and Air Force officers and enlisted men.

The Tyndall Supply and Services Office was also the center for coordination with materiel project officers for both the Army and the major air commands having forces deployed to the base. Their needs for office furniture for various command posts and points of operations were funneled to the Base Equipment Management Office or, in some cases, direct from the project officer to the BEMO. At the end of the crisis period all needs had been satisfied; however, the point had been reached where the supply of all excess desks, tables, etc., had been exhausted.

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The Maintenance Support Division of the Tyndall Supply and Services Office worked 784 manhours, other than normal duty hours, from 19 October to 21 November in support of the crisis. Approximately 30 hours were used towards research of vehicle parts and technical advice for the Army, with the remaining 754 hours being used to support Base Communications, Civil Engineering and the Transportation Squadron.

On 22 October, MOADS logistics reporting in accordance with MOADR 400-1 was initiated. Reporting was accomplished every two hours. On 25 October, the reporting procedure was changed to once every four hours.

The Aero, Ground, Marine, and Vehicle Division under the 73rd Air Division Deputy for Materiel was notified on 23 October that extra refueling units for Av Gas would be required in support of the Division's support mission at Tyndall AFB. Thirteen F-6 refuel units in storage with a 65,000 gallon capacity were converted for AV Gas. Tractors were brought back in service to support the fueling units.

Beginning a two shift around the clock operation, 12 hours on, 12 hours off, the Base Fuel Supply section had all F-6 fueling units converted and in operation by 24 October. The units were returned to temporary storage on 13 December.

During the crisis period at Tyndall AFB, approximately 2,485,009 gallons of JP4 fuel, 334,798 gallons of 115/145 fuel, and 4,398 gallons of 1100 oil were issued in support of operations. The base had a capability 100,000 gallons of JP and 77,500 gallons of AV Gas available by truck dispensing.

The 73rd Air Division was advised by ADC headquarters on 25 October that due to the operational status of units it was imperative that all WRM (spares and consumables) be brought to maximum percentage of completion, and issued instructions that all shortages would be immediately requisitioned or purchased as applicable.⁴² The message also authorized a new urgency of need designator of "A" to obtain proper priority.⁴³

At the height of the crisis, the following service contracts were procured at Tyndall AFB: (1) emergency lights were procured for runways on 26 October; (2) contracts were let for the rental of 20 sedans to augment Tyndall motor pool resources; and (3) on 29 October, a contract was let for the rental of a ditch digger to accommodate the Army bivouac area.

42. Msg ADC, ADMDC-CP-X-69, 25 Oct 1962.

43. Ibid.

Beginning on 25 October all Tyndall civil engineering activities except those absolutely essential for maintaining base facilities, were geared toward support of the Cuban crisis. They primarily involved readying facilities for TDY Army and Air Force units deployed to Tyndall AFB.

A significant civil engineering feat was accomplished in record time on 28 October. On that date, ADC headquarters ordered the removal from Tyndall's runway of an ATC modified runway barrier for shipment to Patrick AFB, Fla. Instructions were received at 1600 hours. The barrier was moved out and was on the way by 2400 hours.

The following number of Army and Air Force TDY personnel were fed by the Food Service Section of the 4756 Air Base Squadron, Tyndall AFB, during the period 14 October through 21 November:

<u>Army TDY</u>	<u>Meals Served</u>
Breakfast	11,616
Dinner	11,256
Supper	10,765
Total	<u>33,637</u>
<u>Air Force TDY</u>	
Breakfast	5,376
Dinner	4,826
Supper	5,072
Total	<u>15,274</u>

Total Army and Air Force TDY personnel fed: 48,911.

The following cargo, attributable directly to the build-up, was received at Tyndall AFB during the reporting period:

5,428,285 pounds for Army Staging Area Corps
216,847 pounds for TAC Provisional Wing

In addition to the tonnage indicated for the period up to 21 November, there were 655 shipments of electronic spares made to the sites in the MOAD Sector, and 50 military airlifts to support the movements of supplies from Tyndall AFB to other bases.

A total of 18 full period circuits were ordered into service at Tyndall for support of the Cuban crisis. It was necessary to discontinue 15 of the Extended Areas Service (EAS) trunks to Panama City to connect the circuits.⁴⁴

Due to the build-up of forces, it was necessary to recall 30 telephone listings from Tyndall units for re-assignment to TDY units. All units contacted voluntarily⁴⁵ released numbers for the duration of the emergency.

44. Memo 73 AD Dir Comm-Elec to 73 AD Dep for Ops, "Daily Activities Report, 25 Oct 1962," DOC 14, this chapter.

45. Ibid.

Two AN/UPA-35 Scopes were loaned from the 4756th Air Defense Group's GCI Section to the Key West Naval Air Station for the duration of the crisis on 25 October.⁴⁶

Although the "Why?" was not known at the time, communications activities in support of the Cuban crisis began in the 73rd Air Division on 19 October at Tyndall. On that date a telephone call was received by the 73rd Air Division Director of Communications-Electronics from the Military Coordinator of Southern Bell Telephone Company, Jacksonville, Florida, advising that he had an urgent requirement to terminate five circuits for the U. S. Army at Tyndall AFB by midnight Saturday, 20 October.⁴⁷ The circuits were:

30-GT-540	- teletype to Fort McPherson
30-GT-553	- teletype to Homestead AFB
30-GP-1478	- voice 4-wire to Homestead AFB
30-GP-1479	- voice 4-wire to Homestead AFB
30-GP-1446	- voice 4-wire to Fort McPherson

The Southern Bell official further stated that the circuits would terminate in government furnished equipment. He was advised that Tyndall had no equipment on hand to

46. Memo, 73 AD Dir of Comm-Elec to 73 AD Dep for Ops, "Daily Activities Report, 25 Oct 1962," DOC 13, this chapter.

47. Memo, 73 AD Dir of Comm-Elec to 73 AD Dep for Ops, "Emergency Comm Requirement, 22 Oct 1962," DOC 14, this chapter.

terminate the teletype and that some definite location for the voice was needed in order to make installations. However, he stated that he had no information on the Tyndall termination other than GFE. As a result, it was agreed at Tyndall⁴⁸ to terminate on the main frame until further advised.

On 20 October, the Division Communications-Electronics directorate was informed by TAC headquarters that a voice circuit between Langley AFB and Tyndall AFB was being ordered up. That circuit, 30-GP-52235, an engineered voice circuit,⁴⁹ was installed by 0600 hours CST, 22 October.

The Division was further informed on 21 October by TAC headquarters that a C-119 aircraft with 810 pounds of communications equipment would arrive at Tyndall between 0200 and 0800 hours, 22 October. No enlightenment as to the type equipment or any other details of the shipment was given⁵⁰ the 73rd.

An effort was made by the 73rd on 22 October to determine the office of origin on the communications requirements. The Southern Bell Military Coordinator was called and queried. He stated that the Army circuits were ordered by the White

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

House and that the TAC circuits were ordered by TAC headquarters, and then outlined a new TAC requirement for five

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additional circuits as follows:

30-GT-557	-teletype to Homestead AFB
30-GP-1486	-voice to Homestead AFB
30-GP-1487	-voice to Homestead AFB
30-GP-1488	-voice to Homestead AFB
30-GP-1489	-voice to Homestead AFB

Since the new additions were also to be terminated in government furnished equipment, 73rd communications officials called TAC headquarters to see what action was being taken to provide the teletype equipment and what operations plan the circuits were supporting. The 73rd was informed that the requirements were in support of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316 and AFLANT OPLAN 312, and that the plans were at ADC headquarters. No further information could be given without violating security. As a result, the Director of Communications at ADC headquarters was advised of the requirements for new circuits. He was requested to forward any data contained in the referenced operations plans pertinent to Tyndall AFB, but he informed the 73rd that he was not aware of plans, and would look into the subject. He also

51. Ibid.

felt that the requirements should have been coordinated
52
with ADC.

It was necessary to disconnect certain pay station
telephones and out dial trunks on Tyndall to satisfy the
additional circuitry requirements. Two of the circuits
were secured by communications security equipment of a type
foreign to Tyndall communications personnel, necessitating
53
a request to ADC for emergency manning assistance.

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

In the area of aircraft maintenance, the 73rd Air
Division was advised on 28 October by ADC headquarters that
AFLC headquarters had assigned Project Code 425, designated
"Tree House," to expedite and identify initial and follow-up
support of certain ADC units committed in support of oper-
54
ations. The project proved to be a most significant role
played by Tyndall during the remaining days of the crisis.
It involved rear echelon support in the F/TF-102 area from
Tyndall AFB.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Msg ADC, ADMDC-CP-X102, 28 Oct 1962.

Thirty-six F-102's were involved in support of the international situation. Due to the 73rd Air Division's various commitments at Tyndall AFB, it was pointed out that in order to provide rear echelon F-102 support, support personnel and supplies would have to be drawn from other local resources.⁵⁵ Accordingly, the 73rd submitted a request to ADC for a total of 113 personnel by functional code and AFSC.⁵⁶

Materiel management policies pertaining to the "Tree House" project which applied to support of F/TF-102 type aircraft deployed into Homestead and Tyndall Air Force Bases were outlined in a message received from ADC on 30 October 1962.⁵⁷ The 73rd was directed to provide field maintenance support and facilities at Tyndall AFB, a reserve replacement aircraft pool of five TF-102 aircraft and Base Supply support for spares and equipment, beyond Tyndall stock levels, were to be requisitioned from appropriate

55. Memo for Record, 73 AD Dep for Materiel, Col Jam DuBose, Jr., 29 Oct 1962, DOC 15, this chapter.

56. Msg 73 AD, 73ME 517K, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 16, this chapter.

57. NOFORN Msg, ADC, ADMDC-CP X129, 30 Oct 1962.

inventory managers, citing Project Code 425, designated "Tree
58 House."

In support of the aircraft pool required under the
"Tree House" project, on 31 October the 73rd Air Division
was directed to ready five Perrin AFB (4780th Air Defense
Wing) assigned TF-102 aircraft for deployment to Tyndall to
make up the back-up pool. The deploying aircraft had to be
capable of performing intercept missions using 2.75 rockets. 59

The 73rd recommended that back-up aircraft from
Perrin not arrive at Tyndall before 8 November to coincide
with the arrival of AFLC maintenance augmentation personnel. 60

At the same time the "Tree House" back-up aircraft
were being readied, the 73rd requested ADC action to authorize
overtime for AFLC civilian personnel utilized to support
the project. 61 The conditions under which overtime could be
paid were stipulated by ADC on 26 November. 62 In addition,
MOAMA, Brookley AFB, Alabama, was requested by ADC to provide

58. Ibid.

59. Msg ADC, ADMME 2977, 31 Oct 1962.

60. Msg 73 AD, 73MME X527L, 2 Nov 1962, DOC 17, this
chapter.

61. Msg 73 AD, 73MDC X522K, 31 Oct 1962, DOC 18,
this chapter.

62. Msg ADC, ADMME-AB 3239, 26 Nov 1962.

field maintenance support to F-102 aircraft located at Homestead AFB. The request was for a total of 43 people⁶³ to be in place with required tools on 8 November. MOAMA informed ADC that necessary action would be taken to provide the requested support.⁶⁴ Also, for increased engine support, eight 432XO airmen were loaned to Tyndall by Truax AFB.⁶⁵ The requested AFLC personnel arrived from Brookley on 7 November.

On 1 November, the units that Project "Tree House" applied to were identified by a message from ADC headquarters. The message also put the project into effect with the express purpose being to expedite and identify, initial and follow-on support required by the units committed to support CONAD Operations Plan 1-62, dated 18 October 1962. For the 73rd Air Division, "Tree House" also included all AC&W and radar squadrons in the MOADS area.⁶⁶

The deployment of the back-up pool aircraft from Perrin AFB to Tyndall AFB was directed by ADC on 3 November,

63. Msg ADC, ADMME-AB 2970, 31 Oct 1962.

64. Msg MOAMA, MOML 737, 31 Oct 1962, DOC 19, this chapter.

65. Memo for Record, 73 AD Dep for Materiel, "AFLC Augmentation Personnel, 31 Oct 1962, DOC 20, this chapter.

66. Msg ADC, ADMDC-CP-X146, 1 Nov 1962.

and at the same time guidance concerning installation of external tanks was provided.⁶⁷ The five TF-102 for the pool arrived the next day. A program was immediately initiated to install external fuel tanks on each aircraft. Required TCTO kits were obtained from both Perrin and Tyndall assets. A target date of 7 November was established for completion of the installation.

Representatives of the 32nd Air Division and 73rd Air Division arrived at an agreement relative to support of Project "Tree House" during a visit to Tyndall AFB by 32nd personnel on 6 November. In writing, the agreement was titled, "Memo of Visit to 73rd Air Division, Tyndall AFB, Fla," dated 6 November.⁶⁸

Later in the month, on 17 November, the logistical responsibilities in support of F/TF-102 aircraft deployed to the 482nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron detachment at Homestead AFB, were clarified and outlined in a letter from 32nd Air Division (SAGE) headquarters. The letter was a consolidation of agreements made between the 32nd and 73rd on 6 November, with amendments.⁶⁹

67. Msg ADC, ADOOP-W, 3 Nov 1962.

68. Cited Memo, with 1 Atch, DOC 21, this chapter.

69. Ltr 32 AD, 33MDC, "Logistic Responsibilities in Support of ADC F/TF-102 Acft Deployed to Homestead AFB, 17 Nov 1962, DOC 22, this chapter.

The increased number of aircraft supported by Tyndall posed a parking problem. On 19 November ADC was requested to waive aircraft parking restrictions, as set forth in AFM 86-8, for Tyndall to allow parking within 200 feet of centerline of Instrument Runway 13L-31B in order to support CINCLANT Operations Plan 316.⁷⁰ The insufficient parking space was due in part to construction underway at the base. On 26 November, the waiver was granted by ADC until completion of ramp repairs at Tyndall or until the end of the crisis.⁷¹

On 22 October, the 4756th Air Defense Wing at Tyndall was queried by the 73rd Director of Logistics Plans as to what storage facilities were available for GAR missiles. The information was needed so that ADC could instruct MAAMA to skip the missiles.⁷² In the reply, the Division was informed that storage for 60 per cent of the requirements could be accomodated on 7 November 1962, with the remaining portion on 27 November.⁷³

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- 70. Msg 73 AD, 73IDC-X082L, 19 Nov 1962.
 - 71. Msg ADC, ADIRP-M 3242, 26 Nov 1962.
 - 72. Ltr 73 AD, 73 MLP, "Requirements for GAR Missile Storage, 22 Oct 1962, DOC 23, this chapter.
 - 73. Msg 73 AD, 73MLP X046K, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 25, this chapter.

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Accordingly, in a message dated 30 October, ADC was informed that on 7 November, Tyndall would have the capability of storing an additional number of GAR missiles as follows: 195 GAR-1D, 230 GAR-2A, and 25 GAR-4A. On 27 November, the base could store the balance of WRM GAR requirements which were: 182 GAR-1D, 219 GAR-2A, 53 GAR-4A, and 12 GAR-8 missiles. The 73rd requested shipping instructions be issued on the above missiles and that it be notified as to when the shipment would be made.⁷⁴

The Missiles Division chief at Middletown Air Materiel Area headquarters, Olmsted AFB, Pa., informed the 73rd in a letter, dated 6 November, that additional GAR-1D/2A missiles were not available, with the only source being the redistribution of missiles from within ADC inventories. The GAR-8 missiles could not be released pending the outcome of OPLAN 314. Forty-four of each GAR-3A/4A missiles had been previously shipped, and action was being taken to ship an additional 34 of each.⁷⁵

Forty-eight GAR-3 and 92 GAR-4A missiles were received during the crisis period.

74. Msg 73 AD, 73MLP X046K, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 25, this chapter.

75. Ltr MAAMA, MANBOW, "GAR Missile Requirements," 6 Nov 1962, DOC 26, this chapter.

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RETURN TO NORMALCY

As the tension surrounding the crisis lessened, the decision was made on 27 November to send all AFLC personnel identified as excess to anticipated requirements in support of operation "Tree House" to their home station, Brookley AFB, Alabama.⁷⁶ However, on 28 November a representative of MOAMA at Brookley visited Tyndall to negotiate return of all civilian personnel on loan to Tyndall in support of "Tree House."⁷⁷

A return to normal operations with the 73rd Air Division was authorized on 30 November in a message from ADC headquarters concerning the withdrawal of forces deployed in the southeastern area of the United States. The Division was relieved of the "Tree House" support requirement, and the message directed the departure of all augmentation civilian personnel of AFLC prior to 1200 hours, 4 December 1962.⁷⁸

76. Msg 73 AD, 73MME-AB 546L, 27 Nov 1962, DOC 27, this chapter.

77. Memo for the Record, "MOAMA Personnel," 28 Nov 1962, DOC 28, this chapter.

78. NOFORN Msg ADC, ADOOP-WI 3302, 30 Nov 1962.

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A resume of object lessons learned in support of Cuban crisis operations as directed by CONAD Operations Plan 1-62 was prepared by the 73rd Air Division Deputy for Materiel and his staff and submitted to ADC headquarters ⁷⁹ on 27 November.

79. Ltr 73 AD, 73MSS-A, "Object Lesson from Support of CONAD OPLAN 1-62, w/1 Atch (Resume of Conclusions...), 27 Nov 1962, DOC 29, this chapter.

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