


4815

ADC HISTORICAL STUDY NO.23



KALIO-011-23
1946-1964
cy 1

THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD MANNED INTERCEPTOR FORCE 1946 - 1964

by **THOMAS W. RAY**

AF/NOH 1AW E.O. 13526
DATE, 2010 0819

FOIA EXEMPTION 3.3 (b)(3)
REFER: DOE # 7681

REDACTED
27 MAY 2015

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE
The information in this document will
not be released to foreign nationals
without prior approval.~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY Group 1



8740 S. 64/164

2-255-12

[REDACTED]

STACIA
S.M. 2012

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This Document Contains Information Affecting the National Defense of the United States Within the Meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Sections 793 and 794. Its Transmission or the Revelation of Its Contents in Any Manner to an Unauthorized Person is Prohibited by Law.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

~~NOT AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~
The information contained in this document is not to be released to foreign nationals or their representatives.

AF/HON LAW E.O. 13526
DATE, 20100819

FOIA EXEMPTION 3.3(b)(3)
REFER: DOE pp 76-81

→ REDACTED
27 MAY 2015

[REDACTED]

COPY NO. 1
CONTROL NO. CIOH-15

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2 AS 1972
- REJECTED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





F-102A Delta Daggers of the 182nd FIS (San Antonio, Tex.)

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

**THE
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
MANNED INTERCEPTOR
FORCE
1946 - 1964**

by **THOMAS W. RAY**

REDACTED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~
The information contained in this document will not be disclosed to foreign nationals or their representatives.

**EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY Group 1**

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

REMOVED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.	1
1946: Year of Inception and Disillusionment.	3
1947 - 1950	13
1951 - 1954	24
1955 - 1960: Ripening to Maturity.	49
1961 - 1964: The Harvest Years	66
Nuclear Armament for the ADC/ANG Force.	76
APPENDIX A: ADC/ANG Force, 1 January 1953.	82
APPENDIX B: Total Tactical Aircraft Authorized the ADC/ANG Force, 1957-1964	85
APPENDIX C: Characteristics of Representative ADC/ANG Fighters and Interceptors, 1946-1964.	86

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

In 1963, the ANG played a significant role in the U.S. air defense structure. * For certain sections of the country -- in areas where enemy bomber forces were less likely to attack -- the ANG interceptor fleet constituted the first line of defense. Elsewhere, it provided formidable reinforcements for ADC's regular manned interceptor force. Some of the ANG interceptor squadrons were equipped with atomic missiles; other were expected to get them by 1965.

* This monograph covers ADC/ANG activities to 31 March 1964.

~~SECRET~~

Each ADC/ANG squadron maintained two interceptors on round-the-clock, 5-minute alert every day of the year. Having already passed through several generations of fighter-interceptor aircraft, nearly a third of the ADC-assigned ANG force was fitted with supersonic, all-weather F-102A first line interceptors, with bright prospects that more squadrons would gain them in the future. Moreover, there was promise of more innovations. For instance, the ADC/ANG force, during 1963-64, was being seriously considered for participation in the ADC interceptor dispersal program, which was designed to thin out the command's manned interceptors for surviving a first-blow ICBM nuclear attack. If incorporated in ADC's dispersal plan, much of the ADC/ANG force (by deploying early in an emergency to preselected bases enjoying a relatively low-priority target value) would be saved to help battle ensuing waves of enemy manned bombers. There also was under discussion a plan to increase the ADC/ANG alert commitment, particularly at squadrons equipped with nuclear armament. Yet, it took 18 years of painstaking planning and building so that this plateau of development might be reached.

~~SECRET~~

1946 -- YEAR OF INCEPTION AND DISILLUSIONMENT

When America emerged from World War II, thoughts regarding the U.S. military posture turned to demobilization of the wartime force. No longer was America threatened with attack. So thought most Americans, weary of war and yearning for the comforts and pleasures of peacetime pursuits. This climate of opinion was shared, for the most part, by Congress and the administration. The military leadership, accordingly, prepared to establish a professional, but comparatively minuscule, peacetime armed force. The Army Air Forces, of awesome proportions at the close of World War II, were virtually dismantled: pilots and trained crewmen were discharged in droves; aircraft were mothballed by the base-load. Remaining vestiges of the AAF were reshuffled to outfit 55 of a projected 70 groups. When this shrunken force was divided among SAC, TAC and ADC after their creation on 21 March 1946, only a few of the groups were doled out to ADC. In terms of total AAF manpower, ADC was first allocated only two per cent; in subsequent years, this proportion was hiked to about eleven per cent. Air defense simply did not command the

~~SECRET~~

prestige that others, particularly SAC bomber offensive
1
forces, enjoyed.

This did not mean air defense was ignored. Indeed, the lessons of World War II regarding air defense had left a deep impression on AAF planners that another Pearl Harbor-like attack could be launched. That America, in this early post-war period, still monopolized atomic bomb production provided the saving edge respecting air defense plans. An enemy would not dare risk atomic obliteration at the hands of SAC by attacking the United States with conventional weapons. While this advantage was to be short lived, a grace period of several years would obtain, predicated on the belief that this much time would elapse before the Soviets developed an atomic capability of their own, together with bombers sufficiently advanced to insure their delivery via the polar route. For this reason as much as any other, planning devoted to air defense measures looked

1. USAF Historical Study No. 126, The Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, pp. 1-7; ADC Historical Study No. 22, Air Defense and National Policy 1946-1950. The latter study discusses in considerable detail the important formative years, during which USAF separated from the Army (1947) and ADC was created (21 March 1946), then was absorbed by Continental Air Command (ConAC) (1 Dec 1948), finally to re-emerge as an independent command (1 Jan 1951).

~~SECRET~~

forward to establishing a radar chain that would help meet a future threat, rather than creation of a fair-sized regular interceptor force to combat an existing threat.

Here was where the ANG came in. To fill this vacuum in U.S. early post-war defenses, the ANG interceptor fleet being rebuilt and refitted at this time was especially fingered for the privilege.

Testifying before Congress on 20 May 1946, General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, recommended that in lieu of allocating a significant portion of the regular AAF to ADC, the ANG should be expanded to 84 squadrons, largely so it could handle the task, under ADC's direction, of stopping any manned bomber attack, unlikely as this prospect seemed at the time. In the autumn of 1946, ADC had only three regular fighter squadrons to its name. The command was told, moreover, not to expect more than twelve regular squadrons in all, to total one group of three squadrons of day fighters and three groups of nine all-weather fighter squadrons. Taking stock of the limited resources provided him, Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, commander of ADC, surmised he would have to scrimp along as

2. USAF Historical Study No. 126, op. cit., pp. 8-30; ADC Historical Study No. 22, op. cit.

~~SECRET~~

best he could, depending chiefly on the ANG and the Air Reserve -- two part-time outfits created not so much to man the first-line defenses as to furnish, on M-Day, fully equipped and trained augmentation forces for re-inforcing regulars. His suspicions were confirmed when higher headquarters told ADC it would have to rely on the ANG for the largest part of its combat weapons.³

Just how useful might the ANG have been at this time for air defense purposes? Admittedly, the aviation branch of the National Guard enjoyed a heritage dating from 1908, but it had experienced virtually no air-defense oriented duty. Between wars, National Guard aviation squadrons, for the most part, flew observation aircraft for performing surveillance work in support of Army ground troops. For that matter, prior to World War II, the art of air defense was a fairly esoteric specialty practiced by few, even of the regulars.⁴ During World War II, National Guard air units were assimilated into the bloodstream of the expanded wartime air

3. Cy ltr, ADC to AAF, "Problems Confronting ADC in Dealing with Civilian Air Components," 16 Apr 1946 [HRF]; USAF Historical Study No. 126, op. cit., pp. 8-13; ADC Historical Study No. 22.

4. Memo, Vice C/S USAF to DCS/O, USAF, "Mission of the Air National Guard," 16 Nov 1949 [HRF]; ADC Historical Study No. 22.

~~SECRET~~

forces. Soon after the war, the Air National Guard was established similar in jurisdictional control to its pre-war status, i.e., unless federalized during an emergency for service with the U.S. government, subject to the control of state governors and their deputies, the state adjutants general, with the National Guard Bureau of the War Department acting as intermediary.⁵

On 25 April 1946, activation of Air National Guard units commenced among the then 48 states. Originally 12 wing headquarters were planned that would control, besides 12 light bombardment squadrons, 72 fighter squadrons capable of air defense interception as well as other assigned missions. Each fighter squadron was to be equipped with World War II vintage aircraft: P-47 Thunderbolts or P-51 Mustangs, to a number of 25 per squadron. The federal government was to furnish the airplanes, associated supplies, instructors and pay; the states were to supply the people, bases, and storage facilities. Predictions called for a total personnel strength numbering between 57 and 58 thousand officers and enlisted men, with each state allocated a quota determined by the size of its male population between 18 and 35 years of age.

5. House of Representatives, Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1957, p. 1338; Hist of ADC, Evolution of the Mission, March 1946-March 1947, pp. 43-45.

Aircraft bases, when possible, were to be located near large population centers to facilitate recruiting. Scarcely more than a year was allowed for accomplishing this build up, with 30 June 1947 set as the target date. Once established, the ANG was expected, as regards air defense, "to furnish units fit for service...trained and equipped to defend critical areas of the U.S. against...airborne invasion." Air Defense Command, which stood to become the prime beneficiary of the ANG program, was delegated the task of overseeing its completion insofar as the AAF's responsibility was concerned.*

Forces authorized and forces actually realized have not always coincided; so it was with the ANG during this period. The resulting gulf between ANG forces programmed and accomplished grew considerable, chiefly because of budgetary cuts in early 1947. Instead of 84 tactical squadrons (72 fighter; 12 light bombardment), the ANG could, for the time being, support but 42 squadrons, to be raised later to 60 squadrons when funds would allow.

* This responsibility was originally defined (12 March 1946) as maintaining "units of the Air National Guard...in a highly trained and operational condition of readiness...." Ltr, AAF to ADC, "Interim Mission," 12 Mar 1946, App 1 to Hist of ADC, Evolution of the Mission, Mar 1946-Mar 1947, p. 118; Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947, pp. 33-51; Hist of ADC, Evolution of the Mission, Mar 1946-Mar 1947, pp. 43-59; Cy of Memo, Gen. Fairchild to Deputies, Hq ConAC, "Mission of the Air National Guard," 16 Nov 1949 [HRF].

6. Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947, pp. 33-51; Hist of ADC, Evolution of the Mission, Mar 1946 - Mar 1947, pp. 43-59;

But ADC found this reduction of its air defense resources less vexing than the rebuff encountered when first it endeavored to follow the course thought best for the nation's welfare. In April 1946, General Stratemeyer viewed the importance of the Air National Guard, and the relation of Air Defense Command to its development, as follows:

...the mission of the air national security for the continental United States, the responsibility for which I have been charged by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, has been assigned in large measure to the Air National Guard.

The organization of the Air National Guard into wings, groups and squadrons, equipped with modern type combat equipment is air power in its broadest sense. It is entirely different from the prewar concept of Air National Guard observation squadrons working directly with and under ground commanders.

By reasons of the important roles assigned to the civilian air components, in plans for national defense, the Air Defense Command was originated, to place under one commander the primary responsibility for the efficiency and effectiveness of the Air National Guard. This responsibility must be

[Cont'd] Cy of Memo, Gen. Fairchild to Deputies, Hq ConAC, "Mission of the Air National Guard," 16 Nov 1949 [HRF].

7. Ltr, Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, CG, ADC to Maj. Gen. Butler B. Miltonberger, Chief, NGB, 15 Apr 1946 (cited in Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947, pp. 38-39).

~~SECRET~~

accomplished by greater authority in dealing with Air National Guard matters. In general, I feel I must be responsible for organizing and administering the Air National Guard in its federally recognized status.

Acting on criteria established by AAF, ADC undertook to help mold the ANG in the image of a competent air defense weapons force. Hereupon ADC ran afoul of state prerogatives and federal statutes. Voicing its preference for certain air bases that, because of location and configuration, would best suit the needs of air defense, ADC apparently irked some state officials, including governors and their adjutants general, for one of two reasons. Either ADC's selections conflicted with the interests of commercial air lines seeking to control the same bases, or, as in the case of several governors, they aroused suspicions that a new parasitic expense was being foisted on the state that ever afterward would thirst insatiably for state funds to pay continuing, unrelenting base maintenance and support costs. In desperation, AAF was forced to reverse one of its previous rulings and, in certain instances to pacify state objections, permit ANG units to locate on established AAF bases.⁸

8. Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947, pp. 33-51; Hist of ADC, Evolution of the Mission, Mar 1946-Mar 1947, pp. 43-59;

~~SECRET~~

Opposition from state officials was not the only obstacle ADC encountered. The actual allocation of federally-owned aircraft and equipment, by law, was vested in the hands of the War Department's National Guard Bureau (NGB). Obviously disgruntled over the predicament of having to deal with the ANG through an intermediary not particularly sympathetic with ADC's wants, General Stratemeyer, in April 1946, proposed that NGB's functions respecting the ANG be transferred to ADC. His plea came to nought, however; whereupon ADC dickered with NGB for some smattering of control, plus the privilege of exercising direct lines of communication between ADC and the state governors. Except for minor privileges grudgingly conceded, the effort, for the most part, was in vain. Nothing less than an act of Congress seemed capable of unravelling the knot.

[Cont'd] Cy of Ltr, ADC to AAF, "Problems Confronting Air Defense Command in Dealing with Civilian Air Components," 16 Apr 1946 (Appendix IX to Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947).

9. Ltr, Lt. Gen. G.E. Stratemeyer, CG, ADC to Maj. Gen. Butler B. Miltonberger, Chief, NGB, 15 Apr 1946 (cited in Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947, pp. 38-39, also see pp. 33-51); Hist of ADC, Evolution of the Mission, Mar 1946-Mar 1947, pp. 43-59.

Growing impatient with the controversy thus engendered,

10

AAF ordered ADC:

In the selection of National Guard Air Stations, the action of the Air Defense Command is advisory only. The rights and prerogatives of the National Guard Bureau, the Adjutant Generals of the States, and this office will be carefully observed and no commitments will be made without prior approval of the normal War Department Agencies.

Soon this was followed by a change in mission direc-

11

tive, curtailing ADC's responsibilities as follows:

Discharges the responsibilities of the Commanding General, AAF, with respect to the organization, administration, training and maintenance of the Air National Guard..., subject to policies from the Commanding General, AAF.

A four-way tug-of-war had ensued, with state officials, the NGB, ADC and AAF all pulling in the direction construed as their rightful way. ADC wound up on the losing end, being told, eventually, to stick strictly to the role of supervising ANG training and inspecting its units.

Less than six months from the time he had extolled the potential worth of the ANG to air defense, General Stratemeyer,

10. Ltr, Gen. Carl Spaatz, CG, AAF, to CG, ADC, "Special Directive on Method and Procedure," 10 May 1946 (App VIII to Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947).

11. Ltr, AAF to ADC, "Interim Mission," 5 Jun 1946 (App 2 to Hist of ADC, Evolution of the Mission, Mar 1946-Mar 1947, p. 119).

now thoroughly disillusioned with the ANG contribution taking shape, and longing for something more substantial to take its place, warned AAF:

12

Our present national security...depends to a large extent on States accepting the responsibility for creating Air National Guard units which can immediately be called into Federal service for effective use on the outbreak or threat of hostilities. If, as happens to be the case at present, they are not disposed to accept this responsibility, I believe the War Department should recommend another system for providing National defense in the air.

1947 - 1950. On this tone, a note of bitterness was struck on which ANG-ADC/ConAC relations reverberated till readjusted in 1950 by the Korean crisis -- bringing to a close the period when the ANG was esteemed the weapons force most likely to stave off manned bomber attacks against the U.S. ADC thereupon turned to TAC and SAC for exploiting, in emergency situations, what fighter squadrons they controlled on an augmentation basis. ANG elements, no longer considered the first-line stand, lapsed to an augmentation

12. Ltr, Lt.Gen. Stratemyer, CG, ADC to Gen. Spaatz, CG, AAF, 25 Sep 1946 (cited in Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947, pp. 46-47).; Hansen Baldwin, military analyst for the New York Times, characterized ADC's dependence on the ANG as "part and parcel of the country's postwar military, policy based fundamentally upon the maintenance of relatively small professional forces backed up by large semi-trained part-time forces....[and placing] major responsibility for the air defense of this country upon semi-trained, part-time, 'week-end

capacity to be counted on possibly for some help in an emergency, and assuredly for federal duty on M-day plus 12 -- practically two weeks after an initial attack! But for reasons additional to the inability of augmentation forces (TAC's and SAC's as well as the ANG's) to mount an effective resistance against oncoming waves of manned bombers, higher headquarters, beginning in 1948, increased to upwards of 20 squadrons (by 1950) the number of full-time regular squadrons primarily on call for the air defense mission. Intensification of the "Cold War" by the Soviet Union substantially occasioned this change of heart, so that a strengthened full-time, in-being, combat ready force would be on hand, awaiting any aerial attack the Soviet's cared to launch.

Where had the ADC/ANG problem most glaringly miscarried? One historian aptly summarized the dilemma as the "incongruity of adhering to an anachronistic doctrine of

[Cont'd] warriors,' who -- despite all the will in the world -- cannot be instantly ready for action in an emergency, as any efficient air force must be in the atomic age." New York Times, 2 Feb 1947.

state's rights in an age of global air war."* Congress was partly to blame also for failing to change existing statutes when asked. The locus of air defense weapons shifted thereafter to an expanding regular force, but because of the undercurrents of worsening world conditions no less than ANG lethargy. While the ANG, paradoxically, had seemingly spurned the very mission it owed much of its existence to, ANG importance was destined to be eclipsed somewhat whether or not it responded to air defense needs. The necessity for maintaining a sizeable regular force on uninterrupted standby alert had, by this time, grown increasingly evident. 13

Meanwhile, ADC tackled as best it could the ANG training aspect to which it had been confined, issuing in August 1946 a manual for ANG instructors, and by March 1947, directives covering ANG training at home base and at the summer encampments.

By this same month (March 1947), 31 fighter and 7 light bomber ANG squadrons had been organized and had achieved federal recognition -- the condition granted when

13. *Hist of ADC, Evolution of the Mission, Mar 1946-Mar 1947, p. 43; ADC Historical Study No. 22; Address by Gen. Stratemeyer to the Air War College, 15 Oct 1946 [HRF].

~~SECRET~~

an ANG unit met certain AAF standards and was manned by a minimum of 25 per cent of its officer strength and 10 per cent of its enlisted strength. The 38 squadrons were

14

located as follows:

Fighter Squadron, Single Engine

No.	Location	Date Federally Recognized
101	Boston, Mass.	23 Aug 1946
104	Baltimore, Md.	17 Aug 1946
109	St. Paul, Minn.	14 Sep 1946
110	St. Louis, Mo.	23 Sep 1946
118	Windsor Locks, Conn.	7 Aug 1946
120	Denver, Colo.	30 Jun 1946
121	Washington, D.C.	2 Oct 1946
123	Portland, Ore.	30 Aug 1946
124	Des Moines, Iowa	23 Aug 1946
127	Wichita, Kansas	7 Sep 1946
128	Marietta, Ga.	20 Aug 1946
132	Bangor, Maine	(1 Dec 1946 org)
134	Burlington, Vt.	14 Aug 1946
142	Wilmington, Del.	6 Sep 1946
153	Meridian, Miss.	12 Sep 1946
154	Little Rock, Ark.	24 Sep 1946
155	Memphis, Tenn.	(1 Nov 1946 org)
157	Columbia, S.C.	(28 Sep 1946 org)
158	Savannah, Ga.	13 Oct 1946
159	Jacksonville, Fla.	
173	Lincoln, Nebr.	26 Jul 1946
174	Sioux City, Iowa	(12 Sep 1946 org)
175	Sioux Falls, S.D.	20 Sep 1946

14. Ltr, AAF to ADC, "Interim Ceiling on National Guard Organization," 14 Mar 1947, (App X to Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947). On 20 Dec 1946, the prospective ANG role was officially clarified as being that of an M-day force. Not to be ruled out, of course, was the likelihood that M-Day (mobilization day) and the day of initial combat (D-Day) would be one and the same.

~~SECRET~~

Fighter Squadron, Single Engine [Cont'd]

No.	Location	Date Federally Recognized
178	Fargo, N.D.	
187	Cheyenne, Wyo.	11 Aug 1946
190	Boise, Idaho	13 Oct 1946
191	Salt Lake City, Utah	
195	Los Angeles, Calif.	29 Sep 1946
196	San Bernardino, Calif.	
197	Phoenix, Ariz.	
199	Honolulu, T.H.	

Bombardment Squadron (Light)

No.	Location	Date Federally Recognized
106	Birmingham, Ala.	
107	Detroit, Mich.	29 Sep 1946
108	Chicago, Ill.	
112	Cleveland, Ohio	
115	Los Angeles, Calif.	8 Oct 1946
122	New Orleans, La.	
180	St. Joseph, Mo.	22 Aug 1946

The manning of these 38 federally recognized aircraft squadrons, together with over 150 other support units and AC&W sites also recognized at this time, amounted to 1,746 officers and 3,652 enlisted men, totaling 5,398 -- a far cry from the 57,000-plus originally authorized before budgetary cuts precipitated short-term program reductions. Notwithstanding this, total manning in only a matter of months practically doubled to 10,127, inching its way upward toward the goal of some forty or so thousand to fill out projected ANG units. The fighter squadrons were equipped

with about 500 aircraft; the release of extra F-51's therefore reserved for the Air Reserve Program, which had experienced a similar reduction in its program, hastened replacement of less vigorous F-47 models at certain ANG fighter squadrons.

Enough ANG units had been federally recognized by 1947 to enable holding the first two-week training program that summer. As was expected, the results, from an air defense standpoint, were plainly unsatisfactory. ¹⁵

Everyone in position to know seemed in agreement: the ANG in the post-war late 1940's failed to realize the expectations aspired for it. General Stratemyer said so, or words to this effect, as indicated above. Reflecting the views of Secretary of the Air Force Symington as well as the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, in December 1948, informed President Truman:*

The situation is...complicated by the impracticability

15. Hist of ADC, Evolution of the Mission, Mar 1946-Mar 1947, pp. 57-58; Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947, pp. 42-46; Cy of Ltr, ADC to Maj Gen E. E. Partridge, 11 Aug 1947 [HRF]; House of Rep, Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1953, p. 349.

* Cy of Memo for President Truman from Secy Def Forrestal, 7 Dec 1948 [HRF].

of attempting to organize, operate and train effective [ANG] combat forces when the components are under the control of forty-eight different 'commanders-in-chief.'

Headquarters ConAC, charged with the air defense of the U.S. from 1 December 1948 to 31 December 1950, found not only that the channels of communications were unmanageably tangled, but even that ConAC's responsibilities over ANG activities -- relegated to supervising and inspecting ANG training -- were unaccomplishable under the existing arrangement. Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Command (EADF) complained repeatedly over EADF/ANG relationships together with the futility of trying to gear ANG units, in an augmentation capacity, for the air defense mission. Among ANG faults catalogued besides the bothersome, ambiguous command-control situation (but rising, in part, from it), were: (1) uncoordinated training programs for the 48 states; (2) low rate of unit and individual efficiency and readiness; (3) increasing shortage of qualified fighter pilots in certain areas of the country; and (4) lack of funds. While an H-hour combat capability was most desired from ANG fighter squadrons, ConAC was willing to settle for an effective combat capability as late as two hours after the first warning of attack, but even this was not forthcoming. Estimates ran

chorus of ANG critics raised a lusty cry for Congressional legislation to correct these and other abuses, chiefly by investing ANG operational control in proper USAF channels. But Congress continued treading water, remaining unresponsive to requests seeking this end.

In frustration smacking of bitterness, USAF and ConAC, near the end of 1949, offered an alternative solution: snatch the ANG out of the air defense business and give it, as a sop, a troop transport role or something. At least two things combined to prevent this, however. For one thing, the whole problem was fraught with political undertones; Congress and state officials, it was rightly deduced, simply would never condone pitching the ANG into comparative obscurity. The second factor was caused by ever-worsening world conditions, as manifested by the Berlin Blockade, detonation by the Soviets of their first atomic bomb (August 1949), and culminating, in June 1950, with outbreak of the Korean Conflict. The undercurrents of international crises that had helped ease ANG importance down from its pedestal in late 1946-47, paradoxically helped resurrect it in 1950-52, wherewith ANG prestige, while subject to minor fluctuations, was thereafter redeemed. Besides a strong regular

interceptor force to bar attacks by enemy manned bombers, an ANG augmentation force turned competent would be of im-
16
measurable value as a back-up force.

Meantime, the avalanche of criticism heaped upon the ANG in no way stunted its growth. Indeed, manning, among other things, multiplied by leaps and bounds, climbing from the 10,127 officer and enlisted personnel reported on June 1947 to 28,953 one year later, then to 41,431 by June 1949, and by June 1950 -- the month the Korean Conflict erupted, to 44,974. Besides being funnelled into hundreds of support and ACW squadrons, they helped swell the ranks of about 70 ANG fighter and fighter bomber squadrons, presumably enhancing their air defense capability somewhat in the process. Over 2,000 aircraft were controlled by the ANG. In addition

16. Cy of Memo for President Truman from Secy Def Forrestal, 7 Dec 1948 [HRF]; Cy of Ltr, ConAC to USAF, "The ANG Program," n.d., ca. 1949 [HRF]; Cy of Ltr, EADF to ConAC, "ConAC Fighter Forces Committed to EADF for Emergency Air Defense Operations," 21 Oct 1949 [HRF]; Cy of Memo for Harold C. Stuart from Lt. Col. T.G. Lanphier, Air Force Reserve, "The Mission of the ANG," 29 Nov 1949 [HRF]; Cy of Ltr, ConAC to USAF, "Employment of ANG Fighter Aircraft in Air Defense Missions," 22 Dec 1949 [HRF]; Cy of EADF Policy Sheet, "Air National Guard," 27 Dec 1949 [HRF]; Cy of Ltr, ConAC to 9th AF, 6 Jan 1950 [HRF]; Cy of Ltr, Maj Gen Robert M. Webster to ConAC, "Employment of ANG Fighter Units in Active Air Defense," 16 Jan 1950 [HRF]; ADC Historical Study No. 22; Hq USAF Staff Study Atchs, "Mission of the Air National Guard," 22 Nov 1949 [DOC 1]; USAF Study No. 126, pp. 33-34.

to F-51's and F-47's, several squadrons received jet fighters: F-80 "Shooting Stars" and F-84 "Thunderjets." All-weather interceptors, according to 1949 plans, were in the offing as they became available in the 1950's. Exclusive of the annual two-week summertime encampments, air defense training, per se, remained a nebulous quantity. Occasional use of ANG fighter elements was obtained during air defense exercises conducted in 1949 and 1950; but by and large, the results were not notably praiseworthy.¹⁷

The advent of the Korean Conflict 25 June 1950 spelled dramatic changes for the ANG fighter force. Within days, the 81st Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1950 (Public Law 599) empowering the President, without having to contend with Congressional channels, to federalize ANG units for 21 consecutive months. First to show interest in mobilizing ANG fighter squadrons for continental air defense was General Herbert Thatcher, then ConAC Deputy for Operations,

17. Cy of Memo for DCS/Operations, et al, from V/C of Staff, ConAC, "Mission of the Air National Guard," 16 Nov 1949 [HRF]; Cy of Ltr, ConAC to USAF, "Employment of ANG Fighter Acft in Air Defense Missions," 22 Dec 1949 [HRF]; Cy of Ltr, ConAC to USAF, "Use of ANG Units in the Air Defense of the U.S.," 6 Dec 1950 [HRF]; House Hearings, USAF Appropriations for FY 1953, p. 349; ADC Historical Study No. 5, "Emergency Air Defense Force, 1946-1954," 30 Jun 1954; Hist of ConAC, Jan-Jun 1950, Vol 5, Materiel, pp. 1-9, 20-21, and Vol 6, Operations and Training, pp. 79, 83-86.

~~SECRET~~

who proposed in mid-July 1950 that 20 ANG fighter squadrons be federalized to strengthen ConAC's air defense posture. USAF, which meanwhile had authorized another increase of regular fighter squadrons for this same purpose, at first declined. But USAF complied when ConAC, after the Chinese intervened in Korea (November 1950), again appealed for ANG federalization to bolster U.S. air defenses till completion of the increased regular force program, which would take over a
18
year.

1951 - 1954. In February 1951, 15 ANG fighter squadrons were formally federalized, then accordingly integrated into the full-time regular forces of Air Defense Command, which had been re-established as a separate USAF command the month before. In March, another six ANG fighter

18. Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, Dep for Operations, ConAC, to Chief of Staff, USAF, "Air Defense Augmentation," 15 Jul 1950 [Doc 91 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951]; ADC Historical Studies 5 and 22; Ltr ConAC to USAF, "Use of ANG Units in the Air Defense of the U.S.," 6 Dec 1950 [Doc 92 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951]; ConAC and the Korean War, Jun-Dec 1950, pp. 27-28, 129.

~~SECRET~~

squadrons were federalized for use by ADC, making 21

*

squadrons in all, as follows:

ANG Squadrons Federalized in February 1951:

<u>Sqdn</u>	<u>Home Station</u>	<u>Type Acft</u>
113 Ftr Sq	Stout Fld, Ind.	F-51
116 Ftr Sq	Geiger Fld, Wash.	F-84
118 Ftr sq	Bradley Fld, Conn.	F-47
121 Ftr Sq	Andrews AFB, Md.	F-84C
123 Ftr Sq	Portland Aprt, Ore.	F-51
132 Ftr Sq	Dow AFB, Maine	F-80C
133 Ftr Sq	Grenier AFB, N.H.	F-51D/ 47D
134 Ftr Sq	Burlington Muni Aprt, Vt.	F-47D
142 Ftr Sq	New Castle County Aprt, Del.	F-84C
148 Ftr Sq	Reading Muni Aprt, Pa.	F-51/47
163 Ftr Sq	Baer Fld, Ind.	F-51
166 Ftr Sq	Lockbourne AFB, Ohio	F-84
172 Ftr Sq	Kellogg Fld, Mich	F-51
176 Ftr Sq	Truax Fld, Wisc	F-51
188 Ftr Sq	Kirtland AFB, N.M.	F-51

ANG Squadrons Federalized in March 1951:

105 Ftr Sq	Berry Fld, Tenn.	F-47D/N
109 Ftr Sq	Holman Fld, Minn.	F-51
126 Ftr Sq	Mitchell Fld, Wisc.	F-80A
136 Ftr Sq	Niagara Muni Aprt, N.Y.	F-47D
175 Ftr Sq	Sioux Falls Muni Aprt, S.D.	
179 Ftr Sq	Duluth Muni Aprt, Minn.	F-51

Soon after ADC was re-established, a survey team was sent to seven of the federalized ANG squadrons to evaluate

* Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951, pp. 127-33; ADC Historical Study No. 5; One of the 21 squadrons was subsequently shipped overseas for duty with another command; the remaining 20 stayed with ADC until released from active duty.

~~SECRET~~

their existing worth and their future needs. Results of this survey reflected in some measure the status and accomplishments of the ANG fighter force as of early 1951. By this time, the ANG fighter force had been adapted to conform to the USAF wing-base organization, implemented previously by the regular force for solidifying and streamlining administrative, support and operational aspects of tactical units. While conditions discovered by the survey team differed from state to state, all seemed to some extent shortchanged on equipment authorized by the Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E), qualified personnel, aircraft spare parts, shop equipment and air base facilities. Barracks for housing enlisted personnel were found to be substandard, for instance, at Stout Field, Indianapolis, Indiana (where the 113th Fighter Squadron was based), Bradley Field, Connecticut (where the 118th Fighter Squadron was based), and Baer Field, Fort Wayne, Indiana (where the 163rd Fighter Squadron was based). Manning levels ranged from 96 per cent at the 113th Squadron (Stout Field, Ind.), where 30 officers and 124 airmen were authorized, to only 61 per cent at the 121st Fighter Squadron (Andrews AFB, Maryland), where, because no support group was available to it on base, 36 officers and 309 airmen were authorized. Job skills and

~~SECRET~~

experience were woefully low in the aircraft maintenance field at three squadrons. Nevertheless, aircraft maintenance was assessed as fair to satisfactory at practically all of the squadrons surveyed. About half of them lacked 40 per cent their authorized T/O&E equipment, and two squadrons had no flying safety program to speak of. The squadrons possessed about 20 fighters each and an average of 31 pilots to fly them, two-thirds of whom had experienced some combat during World War II. Pilot training weaknesses were most evident in instrument flying and gunnery. The survey team concluded in April 1951 that federalized ANG squadrons "have not, as yet, materially increased our air defense potential." * So that the one-time ANG pilots would be better versed in ground control interception procedures, they were subjected to a rigorous 120-day training period soon after becoming federalized.

Once 21 ANG squadrons had been federalized for active duty with ADC and numerous others were mobilized for use with other commands, the ANG fighter force was reduced to

* Rpt, ADC, AVC to AAG, "Survey of Former ANG Units now Assigned to ADC," 12 April 1951 [DOC 2]; Ltr, ConAC to USAF, "Use of ANG Units in the Air Defense of the U.S.," 6 Dec 1950 [HRF]; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951, pp. 132-33, 191.

~~SECRET~~

18 squadrons remaining under state control. Sixteen of these squadrons continued M-day assignments to ADC, located as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Station</u>
101 Ftr Sq	Logan Intl Aprt, Mass.
119 Ftr Sq	Newark Muni Aprt, N.J.
131 Ftr Sq	Barnes Aprt, Mass.
152 Ftr Sq	Theodore F. Greene Aprt, R.I.
137 Ftr Sq	Westchester County Aprt, N.Y.
138 Ftr Sq	Hancock Fld, N.Y.
139 Ftr Sq	Schenectady County Aprt, N.Y.
104 Ftr Sq	Harbor Fld, Md.
146 Ftr Sq/147 Ftr Sq	Greater Pittsburgh Aprt, Pa.
162 Ftr Sq	Dayton Muni Aprt, Ohio
164 Ftr Sq	Mansfield Muni Aprt, Ohio
194 Ftr Sq	Hayward Muni Aprt, Calif
195 Ftr Sq	Metropolitan Aprt, Calif.
169 Ftr Sq	Peoria Muni Aprt, Ill.
181 Ftr Sq	Hensley Fld, Tex.

Apprehensive that war with Russia was imminent sometime in 1951, General Whitehead, ADC commander, favored mobilizing these 16 squadrons, too. Plans to this end were correspondingly formulated, but the nearest thing to federalization happening to them was delegation of authority to the three ADC defense forces, EADF, WADF, and CADF, to federalize, during an emergency, any or all of the ANG fighter pool within their geographic area of control for use at their home bases. Since there occurred no attack, or threat of attack, by manned bombers -- the condition for declaring

~~SECRET~~

an emergency -- the 16 squadrons lasted out the Korean Conflict in their M-day augmentation capacity. They were equipped, for the most part, with F-51's. ConAC, after the split with ADC on January 1, 1951, was still charged with supervising and inspecting ANG training; but on orders from USAF, training of the 16-squadron ANG fighter force was emphasized in the air defense category. Combat pilots were expected to complete at least 125 hours of flying training annually. By the end of 1952, each of the 16 ANG squadrons could ready 12 F-51H's for combat within four to eight hours, according to estimates then obtaining.

Viewing the future disposition of the ANG fighter force after the federalized units were returned from active duty, ADC, USAF and the NGB prepared the groundwork in 1951-52 that spelled a more meaningful role for the ANG beginning in 1954. Having proved its worth during the Korean crisis, the ANG force, if ADC could help it, was not to revert

19. Ltr, Gen. Whitehead to Gen. Twining, 10 Jan 1951 [HRF]; Ltr and Ind, EADF to ADC, "Use of ANG Fighter Units for Air Defense of U.S.," 10 May 1951 [HRF]; Ltr, ADC to CADF, "Use of ANG Fighter Units for Air Defense," 20 Jul 1951 [HRF]; Memo for Chief, NGB, from Gen. Twining, "Use of ANG for Air Defense," 22 Jan 1951 [Doc 64 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1951]; Ltr, USAF to ConAC, "Mission of ANG Squadrons in the U.S.," 14 Feb 1951 [HRF]; ADC Historical Study No. 5; House Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1952, pp. 667-99, and FY 1953, pp. 346-71.

~~SECRET~~

to its pre-Korean lethargy marred by the complications of mixed USAF, state, and NGB control. First, ADC sought to reconstitute the force at 52-squadrons strong. While scattered nationwide, most were to be concentrated in and around the industrial northeast. Acceding to this, USAF approved a program calling for 30 ANG squadrons in EADF, 13 in CADF and nine in WADF, all with mobilization assignments to ADC. The only hitch involved transferal of 33 to 34 of the 52 squadrons, after D plus three months, from ADC's to TAC's jurisdiction, whereupon ADC would be left with the remainder.

Most were scheduled to convert to jet fighters beginning in 1954. In anticipation of this, construction on runway extensions was undertaken at many of the bases to enable jet fighters, requiring a minimum runway 7,000-feet in length, to operate. New hangars, parking areas and fuel-storage facilities were ordered for certain bases as well. Figuring that approximately 25 per cent of the personnel would stay in ANG units after completing their 21 months

* In 1953, the 52-squadron force changed slightly in distribution, so that CADF controlled 14 and WADF, eight, while EADF continued its 30-squadron complement. See Appendix A.

~~SECRET~~

active duty, the ANG, in close cooperation with USAF, inaugurated an aggressive ANG pilot-training program, utilizing the same USAF training facilities, programs and criteria employed for training pilots of the regular force. * Since ANG fighter units to be released from active duty would be deprived of their aircraft and equipment, which would be used to equip regular fighter squadrons activated to replace the released ANG squadrons, ANG officials budgeted for refitting the ANG fighter force during its reconstitution. **

In November and December 1952, the federalized ANG units assigned to ADC, having served 21 consecutive months, were released from active duty. Some 10,000 air national guardsmen were released in the process. As expected, the

* From 1952 to 1956, about 500 ANG pilots were turned out each year by USAF pilot-training centers, after which a reduction was effected, graduating just enough to meet replacement needs.

** Funds appropriated for rebuilding and further developing the entire ANG amounted to \$87.9 million for FY 1952 and \$106 million for FY 1953. House of Rep Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1952, pp. 667-99, and FY 1953, pp. 346-71; Ltr and Inds, ADC to USAF, "Air National Guard Fighter Squadron Program," 9 Feb 1952 [Doc 93 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952]; Ltr and Ind, USAF to ADC, "Mission of ANG Fighter Units," 6 Oct 1952 [Doc 14 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1952]; IOC, ADC, DCS/O to C/S, "Progress Rpt on Use of Inactive ANG Units for Air Defense," 15 Nov 1952 [Doc 15 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1952]; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1951, pp. 66-70, Jan-Jun 1952, pp. 117-24 and Jul-Dec 1952, pp. 68-69; Air Force Times, 28 Nov 1962, p. 10.

squadrons were returned to state control without aircraft and equipment. Notwithstanding this loss, the 52-squadron concept was implemented immediately afterward, as planned.

But considerably more than this was in prospect. Establishing the 52-squadron superstructure was scarcely more than restoring the old order of things. Post-Korean innovations were introduced, besides, the most important of which concerned new ways of exploiting the ANG fighter force. While ConAC still retained responsibility for ANG training supervision, ADC prepared the training curricula, procedures and standards, and drafted plans for integrating ANG units into the regular force on D-day. More important, ADC was given complete operational charge of the 52 ANG fighter squadrons during their summertime active duty training periods in the field. At last the logjam of command-control was, in some measure, broken, for ADC could exercise this prerogative at least two full-time weeks each year.²⁰

Most significant, however, was the spade work performed that led to the inception of an alert commitment

20. Ltr, ADC to WADF, "Mobilization Assignment of Air National Guard Units," 12 Jun 1952 [Doc 95 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952]; Ltr and Ind, USAF to ADC, "Mission of ANG Fighter Units," 6 Oct 1952 [Doc 14 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1952].

levied, with modifications, on ANG fighter squadrons to this day. Certain geographic areas recently brought under electronic surveillance by ADC's growing radar network were then in need of fighter coverage supplemental to that afforded by ADC's regular manned interceptor force. The threat, to all intents and purposes, was still posed by the Stalinist-dominated block of Communist nations, particularly the atomically-armed Soviet Union, whose manned bombers, like our own, were constantly undergoing changes to improve speeds, altitudes, bomb loads and ranges. This threat, indeed, continued during all the period covered by this study. In early 1952, the question was therefore raised: why not let ANG fighter units scramble aircraft for identifying unknown targets too? Since much of ADC's lifetime was spent transitioning squadrons of its regular interceptor force into improved interceptor models, during which periods the regular squadrons were practically impotent, the ANG force might sometimes serve as a useful substitute. Furthermore, the experience would serve as extra training to enhance ANG air defense competence in case M-day federalization again resulted.


Hereupon air defense logic came into play. If assigned the more purposeful mission of scrambling, under orders


of an ADC GCI site, on unknown targets, then the squadrons of the ANG fighter force involved must, perforce, stand alerts not unlike those performed by the regular interceptor force. How else remain combat ready for flying, on a moment's notice, identification missions, unless ANG squadrons maintain two aircraft readied and manned to accomplish a scramble within five-minutes time? Since the aircraft assigned the ANG force in the early 1950's lacked radar and other navigational devices to render them all-weather, around-the-clock interceptors, such alert postures, essentially, must be confined to the daylight hours, viz. one hour before sunrise until one hour after sunset, or dawn-to-dusk.

Again the old nemesis, command-control responsibility, cropped up. Obviously, ADC would have to exercise this prerogative to make ANG alerts and identification scrambles meaningful. Furthermore, a distinction had to be made to differentiate clearly between federal and state service performed by ANG personnel, so that liability for ensuing accidents, fatalities, and property damages might be accessed against the party rightfully liable. This latter problem had long been a bone of contention among state officials, who believed their state should be relieved of responsibility for damages resulting from ANG units performing federal service.




F-104 Star Fighter of the 157th FIS (Eastover, So. Carolina)





F-89J Scorpion of the 103rd FIS (Phila., Pa.)



30625

30870


24232

S. C. AIR GUARD

S. C. AIR GUARD

S. C. AIR GUARD

F-86 Sabrejets of the 157th FIS (Eastover, So. Carolina)



To this, USAF agreed, but enabling legislation had yet to be enacted making provisions for this, or for that matter, for USAF, short of actual mobilization, even to assign a federal mission to ANG reserve units owing primary allegiance, until federalized, to their states. Despite these and other obstacles, both USAF and the National Guard Bureau concurred, when urged by ADC, that alert tests, for experimental purposes, should be conducted with ANG fighter units during 1953, figuring it well worth while to make at least one try. Accordingly, USAF, by the end of 1952, approved ADC's plan to conduct alert tests at two ANG squadrons during the spring of 1953, with the 138th Fighter Squadron (Syracuse, New York), and the 194th Fighter Squadron (Hayward, California), situated at either end of the U.S., picked for the privilege. To the end of maintaining two aircraft on continuous alert at both bases during the daylight hours, USAF authorized five ANG pilots placed on active duty at
21
the two squadrons.

21. Ltr, ADC to ConAC, 6 Jun 1952 [Doc 98 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952]; Ltr, 4 AF to ConAC, "Utilization of Inactive ANG Aircraft and Crews to Perform ADC Mission," 25 Jun 1952 [Doc 99 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952]; Ltr, ConAC to ADC, 7 Jul 1952 [Doc 100 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952]; IOC, ADC, SJA to O&T, 7 Aug 1952 [Doc 101 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952]; Ltr and Ind, ADC to USAF, "Use of Inactive ANG Units for Air Defense," 12 Aug 1952 [Doc 102 in

By the time the experimental alerts commenced in March 1953 (discussed below), the F-51H's belonging to the 16 squadrons not federalized were being redistributed among the returning units, so that each squadron contained five to six of them by mid-year. According to schedules of the time, ANG fighter squadrons were supposed to possess 16 U.E. fighters by mid-1954, and 19 by mid-1955, taking in account an average five per cent annual aircraft attrition. By the same token, many of the F-51's would be traded for jet model fighters, beginning in 1954-55, including all-weather F-94B's and F-86F day jets. The F-51 "Mustang," while fast, as conventional fighters go, lacked an all-weather capability, not to mention the fire-power requisite for downing thick-plated bombers. The problem of obtaining pilots for jet-powered aircraft was solved, in part, by recruiting from the new generation of jet-experienced Korean veterans and, in part, by the stepped-up pilot-training program mentioned

[Cont'd] Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952]; IOC, ADC, DCS/O to C/S, "Progress Report on Use of Inactive ANG Units for Air Defense," 15 Nov 1952 [Doc 15 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1952]; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1952, p. 50; Ltr, EADF to ConAC, "Employment of ANG Fighter Units in Active Air Defense," 16 Jan 1950 [HRF]; Ltr, ConAC to USAF, "Use of ANG Fighter Units for Air Defense," 20 Sep 1950 [HRF]; Memo for Gen. Johnson from Maj. Gen. G.C. Finch, USAF, 20 May 1952 [Doc 96 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952].

above. Altogether, the ANG was aiming to achieve a strength aggregating 559 units in all, for which Congress, in 1953, appropriated another \$147 million for FY 1954 funding. A grand total of 27 2,000-man wings, containing 85 flying squadrons -- 52 having M-day assignments with ADC -- was to result from the program. About this time, five bases located near gunnery ranges were especially designated as permanent ANG training sites, with others, besides, in the offing. Here, the fighter units, several of which had experienced little, if any, live firing practice for want of a place to shoot, were thereafter assured of a range for target practice during their 15-day summer encampments.

ANG gunnery efficiency, accordingly, jumped from five to twenty-five per cent in the early 1950's. One-fourth of the 125 flying hours required yearly of each combat pilot was calculated as logged during the summer encampments when so much of the live firing was accomplished. The other three-fourths was logged on weekends and nights, counting toward the 48 part-time drill periods required annually at home base apart from the summer encampments away
22
from home.

22. House Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1954, pp. 191-225; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1953, pp. 108-114.

Everyone concerned seemed enthusiastic about the first ANG alert tests to be conducted at Hayward, California and Syracuse, New York during early 1953. If successful, ADC pictured ANG alerts as becoming a permanent fixture of the air defense system. USAF, to this end, promised to allocate manpower spaces enough to place two aircraft on alert at 15 ANG bases in FY 1954 and 30 bases in FY 1955, contingent on satisfactory test results. The NGB, no doubt, realized²³ the lustre this would add to its role.

Beginning 1 March 1953, and lasting four months, two F-51's were placed on daytime, five-minute runway alerts at Hayward and Syracuse for all seven days of the week. At both sites, the F-51's were frequently scrambled for intercepting and identifying unknown targets and for flying combat patrols during air defense exercises. Those at Syracuse under EADF's aegis performed service considered unique in value for intercepting slow-flying or low-flying targets. Despite difficulties with the location of its scramble shack, the 194th Fighter Squadron at Hayward, California managed to score 165 interceptions out of 180 ordered, logging, in all, some 820 flying hours during the test period. WADF found the F-51 unit

23. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1953, pp. 108-114.

especially useful for conducting long-range interceptions. So pleased was ADC over test results that it seized on them as prima facie evidence for implementing permanent ANG runway alerts then and there. But both the NGB and USAF, when asked by ADC to underwrite an air defense alert program at 15 ANG squadrons, starting in mid-1953, expressed second thoughts on the matter, the NGB over the dearth of aircraft available to ANG fighter squadrons at this time, and USAF over the dearth of manpower available because of certain reductions it faced in its overall troop authorization. Consequently, the advent of active air defense alerts for the ANG fighter force was put off another year. Disappointment came from another source besides, for Congress failed to extend beyond 30 June 1953 that privilege enabling ADC to activate, during an emergency, those 16 ANG squadrons as yet not federalized in the early 1950's.²⁴

Just how good other ANG squadrons were, by comparison, in the air defense business at this time (operating on a strictly part-time basis, however, without advantage of five pilots on full-time active duty like those at the two

24. Hist of EADF, Jan-Jun 1953, pp. 133 (including fn. 335) and 134; Hist of WADF, Jan-Jun 1953, pp. 20-23; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1953, pp. 108-13.

test squadrons), was exemplified by the observations of Major General Earl T. Ricks, Chief of the NGB's Air Force Division. Testifying before the House of Representatives subcommittee reviewing the proposed USAF budget for Fiscal Year 1954, General Ricks replied 20 May 1953 as follows to Congressman Scrivner's question "...how alert, when you get your equipment and your planes, will the Air National Guard be in case, as some people fear, a bomb raid is made by Russia?"

I think that I am the only one in the room that can answer that, and I cannot answer it except from my own personal experience. Of course, you know in the city of New York, for instance, they would be a little longer in getting squadrons in the air than they would, say, in my home, Little Rock, Ark. I pulled a ready alert on the squadron at Little Rock, and it was completely unknown to them. I got the squadron at Memphis to pull a simulated attack on the city of Little Rock without any alert whatsoever other than calling to the Arkansas squadron and telling them they were being attacked. It is only about a 35-minute flight, and by the time the Memphis squadron got there the Arkansas squadron had, I think, 20 aircraft at about 20,000 feet and ready to do business.

The business boy downtown in Little Rock, Ark., can be at the airport in 10 minutes. If the technicians have his plane ready to go, with no further adieu he climbs in and he is gone. It was very successful.... I pulled another one down in Jacksonville, Fla., with the squadron commander there, and we got 16 jets in the air in about the same length of time. It is a

25. House Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1954, pp. 220-21.

bit rough on these boys. One kid had a client on about a \$25,000 to \$30,000 real-estate deal, and when he got the call he ran over his clients and very nearly lost the business. We had one kid who was a telephone man. He was on the poles. He got the call and he hit that jet with his spurs still on. They were at 20,000 feet and intercepted the bombers, and a good job was done. We can do it better than people think we can, frankly, but of course they all nearly got arrested coming to the airport, needless to say, but it did demonstrate to me what I wanted to know.

While plans for immediate implementation of an active ANG alert had been thwarted by the NGB and USAF, ADC had but 12 or so months to wait. Meantime, in November 1953, the number of ANG units singled out to respond, in an emergency, to ADC's call, was hiked from the 52 squadrons first designated, to all 70 fighter interceptor and fighter-bomber squadrons belonging to the ANG. That same month, USAF, finding its manpower resources not drastically dwindling after all, agreed to make available the active-duty spaces necessary to place about 15 ANG fighter squadrons on day-light alerts beginning in 1954. Personnel thus placed on active duty would come under ADC's operation control, precluding for once and all time the possibility of tangled command-control lines, and granting ADC the system it had long desired and needed. That ANG personnel on active duty were volunteers who consequently became, in a sense, federal employees helped clarify two long-standing problems: property damage

~~SECRET~~

liability for their accidents and mistakes would be assessed against the federal government instead of state governments; and Congressional laws already in force, specifically Section 233-D of the Armed Forces Reserve Act (1952), enabled state ANG units to perform active air defense missions while officially in an inactive duty status. Supervisory control of ANG personnel assigned to active duty remained vested in the ANG, while administrative control, like training supervision except during summertime encampments, was handled by ConAC. When queried months later whether or not it wished to assume from ConAC this latter training function, ADC declined on grounds that the existing arrangement had proved satisfactory enough, while the additional burden (if given ADC), might interfere with ADC's tactical mission. Since one of the underlying purposes for having an active ANG alert commitment, apart from gaining additional air defense coverage, was to provide ANG units with first-hand air defense experience that would better equip them to cope with actual air battles, it was worked out so that no individual could serve more than 59 consecutive days on active duty. Consequently, the five active-duty pilot positions per squadron were made rotating positions, enabling

~~SECRET~~

all ANG pilots to have a turn performing full-time day-light
26
alerts.

Since more aircraft, meanwhile, were pouring into ANG fighter squadrons, the objections of the NGB were satisfied. Not only did the NGB endorse inaugurating the ANG air alert plan, but the Bureau circulated a letter to the states warmly extolling it. While most fighters possessed by ANG fighter squadrons in late 1953 were still in the F-51 class, some jet models were trickling in. On 15 January 1954, 546 ANG aircraft were reported available for augmentation use, half of which could be airborne within three hours, and the rest within 24. Of the total amount, 409 were F-51's, 57 were F-84's and 80, F-80's. Eight months later (September 1954), this pool of ANG augmentation aircraft, grown another 67 per cent in size, counted 912 assigned fighters, including 102 F-94A's and B's and 200 F-86

26. House of Rep, Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1957, pp. 1340-41; IOC, ADC, DCS/O to Cmdr, "Visit by Gen Wilson," 15 Jul 1954 [Doc 308 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Air National Guard Personnel Participating in Air Defense Augmentation Program," 3 Nov 1954 [Doc 313 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Ltr, ADC to CADF, "Air National Guard Air Defense Augmentation," 18 Apr 1954 [Doc 314 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Memo for Record, ADC, "Items to Discuss during Staff Visit to ANG at Van Nuys," 19 Nov 1954 [Doc 316 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Ltr, Gen Chidlaw to Gen White, 7 Aug 1953 [Doc 328 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; IOC, ADC, DCS/O to Cmdr, "Progress Report on the Air National Guard," 16 Nov 1953 [HRF].

day jets besides 460 F-51's, 81 F-80's and 69 F-84's. Nearly 50 F-89B's were gained within a few months, too. But introduction of the F-89 and F-94 contained disadvantages as well as the advantage of fitting certain ANG squadrons with the ANG's first all-weather models. Being a two-place airplane, the F-89 and F-94, in addition to the pilot, carried a radar operator, recruits for which were extremely hard to come by. Nevertheless, the ANG managed, with ADC's help, to get a radar observer training program underway that promised relief from this quarter.

27

With a view to tuning up ANG squadrons for their new alert assignment, ANG training was intensified in 1953-54, with more active participation in air defense exercises encouraged. Considerable attention was devoted to air defense methods during the summertime active-duty training periods starting in June 1954. In July, some 577 fighters from 47 ANG squadrons were given an air defense workout

27. Ltr, NGB to Adj Gen of Wisc, et al, "Air National Guard Air Defense Augmentation," 24 Dec 1953 [Doc 315 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; IOC, ADC, DCS/O to Cmdr, "Progress Report on the ANG and AFRES," 18 Nov 1954 [Doc 331 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; IOC, ADC, DCS/O to Cmdr, "Progress Report on the Air National Guard," 16 Nov 1953 [HRF]; ADC Historical Study No. 5; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954, pp. 94-99.

during exercise Checkpoint (10-11 July 1954), reckoning in the process an appreciable number of interceptions. Communications were established between ANG squadrons to be assigned an alert responsibility and the ADC division headquarters in charge. Copies of pertinent ADC directives, regulations and manuals were distributed among the ANG squadrons, while the aircraft were conditioned to meet the new ordeal. ADC liaison officers were attached to ANG squadrons for indoctrinating ANG personnel and helping to monitor their air defense program. Command-line responsibilities and ADC/ANG relationships were carefully defined and fully codified as regards the ANG alert posture, postulated as two aircraft on readiness alert at 15, raised subsequently to 17, squadrons from 0600 to 2000 hours every day of the week. The 17 squadrons, for the most part, were concentrated at bases clustered inside or near the industrial northeast. All but seven fell within EADF's jurisdiction: five were located within CADF's control, and two, within
28
WADF's.

28. IOC, ADC O&T to DCS/O, "Air National Guard Training," 3 Nov 1953 [HRF]; IOC, ADC, DCS/O to Cmdr, "Progress Report on the Air National Guard," 16 Jul 1954 [Doc 307 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Ltr, USAF to ADC,

~~SECRET~~

At first USAF thought in terms of 1 April 1954 as the starting date for ANG alerts. But this proved optimistic by several months for a couple of reasons, most predominant of which was lack of authorization to place a suitable number of enlisted ANG technicians and mechanics on full-time active duty to perform the added workload entailed by maintaining two aircraft on alert. After dickering with USAF, ADC and ANG in the spring of 1954 managed to squeeze out authorization for 170 Air Technician spaces, allowing ten for each of the 17 squadrons. Hence, besides five pilots, and in certain squadrons, five radar operators, each squadron was allowed five aircraft and electronics mechanics plus an armorer and a radio mechanic, along with three others. Lesser problems caused other delays; but none were so time-consuming as to postpone things more than a few weeks at a time. Finally, on 15 August 1954 eight of the 17 ANG squadrons began their daytime, runway alerts. Six weeks

[Cont'd] "Air National Guard Personnel Participating in Air Defense Augmentation Program," 3 Nov 1954 [Doc 313 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Ltr, ADC to CADF, "Air National Guard Air Defense Augmentation," 18 Apr 1954 [Doc 314 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Ltr, NGB to ADC, "Air National Guard Air Defense Augmentation," 5 Jan 1954 [Doc 315 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; IOC, ADC, DCS/O to Cmdr, "Progress Report on the ANG and AFRES," 18 Nov 1954 [Doc 331 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954].

~~SECRET~~

later, beginning 1 October 1954, the other nine joined them. The 17 squadrons thus standing five-minute alerts were as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
101 FIS	Boston, Mass.	F-94
115 FBS	Van Nuys, Calif.	F-86F*
126 FIS	Milwaukee, Wisc.	F-86A
131 FIS	Westfield, Mass.	F-94
133 FIS	Manchester, N.H.	F-94
137 FIS	White Plains, N.Y.	F-94
138 FIS	Syracuse, N.Y.	F-94
158 FBS	Savannah, Ga.	F-84D*
163 FBS	Ft. Wayne, Ind.	F-51D
164 FBS	Mansfield, Ohio	F-80
166 FBS	Columbus, Ohio	F-80
170 FBS	Springfield, Ill.	F-86E*
172 FBS	Battle Creek, Mich.	F-86E
175 FIS	Sioux Falls, S.D.	F-51D*
178 FIS	Fargo, N.D.	F-51D*
181 FBS	Dallas, Tex.	F-80B*
194 FBS	Hayward, Calif.	F-86A*

By arranging to take off from their regular jobs and working weekends, the aircrews attached to each squadron (about 30 pilots) managed a number of active duty tours during various parts of the year, each ranging from one day's duration to the maximum 59 consecutive days allowed -- averaging 5 to 10 days per tour. In keeping the five rotating active duty pilot

* Aircraft programmed for first quarter FY 1955, according to program forecasts dated 12 Nov 1953.

positions filled, all aircrews shared the alert commitment and profited from the air defense experience.

Each squadron was instructed to scramble at least one fighter every day, unless weather conditions were below a 5,000-foot ceiling and 5-mile visibility. All air defense forces, when queried after a few months of operations, unanimously agreed that the ANG alert had noticeably bolstered their air defense capability, particularly in the category of low and medium altitude VFR interceptions.

One of the many ANG pilots who experienced this period of transition made the following comment:

Our "one-weekend-a-month," or "when-I-can-find-time," flying days were over. Regulations from command level down to squadron level had to be adhered to; schedules for alert and for local flying had to be

29. Msg AFOOP-OP-D REUR ITR, USAF to ADC, 27 Jul 1954 [Doc 306 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; IOC, ADC, DCS/O to Cmdr, "Progress Report on the Air National Guard," 16 Jul 1954 [Doc 307 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Msg ADOOT-B2 1339, ADC to EADF, CADF and WADF, 30 Jul 1954 [Doc 310 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Air National Guard Personnel Participating in Air Defense Augmentation Program," 3 Nov 1954 [Doc 313 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954, pp. 96-97; Hist of EADF, Jul-Dec 1954, p. 96, fn 236; Hist of WADF, Jul-Dec 1954, pp. 279-80; Hist of CADF, Jul-Dec 1954, p. 97; Ltr, ADC to CADF, "Air National Guard Air Def Augmentation," 18 Apr 1954 [Doc 314 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Msg ADOOT-B2 ADC to EADF, CADF and WADF, ca. Oct 1954 [Doc 318 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Msg 27000 274, Ltr & Atch, WADF to ADC, "Evaluation of ANG Plan," 20 Nov 1954 [Doc 321 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Ltr, EADF to ADC, "ANG Air Alert Plan," 16 Nov 1954 [Doc 321 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Ltr, CADF to ADC, "ANG Air Alert Plan," 19 Nov 1954 [Doc 322 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954].

30. Maj W.B. Staudt (Cmdr, 182 FIS), "The Commander

adhered to; schedules for alert and for local flying had to be established and met; aircraft availability became an important factor to the pilots, because now aircraft had to be kept in commission to meet our alert requirements. Scheduling, maintenance, regulations, and pilot proficiency were just a few of the larger problems encountered during this transition period.

1955-1960 Ripening to Maturity. Contrasted with the first nine years of the ADC-ANG force's lifetime (1946-1954), which had been fraught with tumultuous disagreement, vehement disapproval, and expectations turned sour, then reversed by the Korean episode into a turnabout and ensuing redemption, the next nine years skipped by with relative smoothness and ease. During six of these nine years, from 1955 through 1960, things, for the most part, remained stabilized fairly much along the lines established in 1954, with refinements and improvements added from time to time to modernize and tighten the ADC-ANG force and enhance its air defense role. A concept had been postulated and tested: units of the ANG, when reshaped with a view to meeting ADC's needs, could serve two useful purposes. The total ANG Ready Reserve force assigned ADC could, as an M-day entity, offer considerable help from many quarters -- at least half their personnel

[Cont'd] Speaks on the Weekend Warrior," Interceptor, Vol 4, No. 3 (Mar 1962), p. 16.

~~SECRET~~

and aircraft within two to three hours of a manned bomber attack, and the balance within 24 hours. * A select nucleus from this force, properly equipped, conditioned, manned and disposed for standing 14-hour daylight alerts, could contribute a ready force for helping oppose, upon a few minutes warning, the very first onslaught of a daytime bomber attack. Having subsequently been validated, this concept was firmly adopted and continued, with what changes that occurred revolving primarily around the quantity, quality and location of the ADC-ANG force, both the alert part and the two-hour back up part. The die, once cast, stamped out a product thereafter of considerable merit and importance to air defense, later making contributions in areas of the country where ADC's regular interceptor force could not, because of its absence, furnish much aid. With its role and

* A test of the ANG's M-day capability conducted during April 1955 (Operation Minuteman) resulted in 76 per cent of the ANG being on hand in two hours, and 82 per cent in three hours. A subsequent ANG recall exercise (Operation Stop Watch, October 1955) turned out 51 per cent of the ANG M-day force in two hours, improved to over 60 per cent in this same time during the next year's test. In Operation Cracker Jack (5-6 December 1955), an ADC nationwide test of its air defense capabilities, the ANG participated and reaped glowing reports, proving again its worth as a ready augmentation force. During the USAF worldwide air-to-air weapons meets, ANG entries, beginning in 1955, consistently scored high, often to the embarrassment and chagrin of participating regulars. In 1956, for example, an ANG fighter unit achieved a second place, as other ANG fighter units later

~~SECRET~~

aims thus thoroughly cut and dried, the ADC-ANG force figuratively romped through its next six years unscathed by serious obstacles and major pitfalls.

While 1955 opened with the same 70-squadron M-day base, 17 of which performed daytime alerts, 1960 closed with an M-day base of 40 squadrons, 22 of which stood alert commitments. The number of ANG aircraft available, during an emergency, to air defense correspondingly dropped from a high of over 1,500 in the mid-1950's to about 1,000 in 1960. In between times, obviously, the M-day base was sharply reduced, while the alert contingent underwent certain changes of its own. The entire process was tightly dovetailed with the aircraft modernization program, since this latter made possible the former. In 1956-57, ADC recommended, and USAF approved, streamlining the ADC-ANG force by cutting its size to about 40 squadrons (by transferring the remainder to other commands over a period of years) and equipping ADC-ANG squadrons with all-weather or day fighter aircraft of the F-100 variety. As more jet

[Cont'd] did in 1959 and 1961, in their particular category of competition. Better still, first-place standing were won by ANG interceptor units in 1958 and 1963. Indeed, in 1963, F-102A's of the 146 FIS (Greater Pittsburgh) not only scored highest in their class, but amassed the largest score achieved among all interceptor classes.

~~SECRET~~

models, mostly all-weather specimens (generally of second-line quality, but often SAGE compatible, retired from the regular force) were exchanged for aged F-51's, F-80's and F-84's, a reduction was afforded in the size of the then strengthened force. This waxing, then waning, of total size in conjunction with the phasing in of high-speed, all-weather, rocket-armed jet aircraft affording considerably more and better air defense coverage per squadron, was similar to the fluctuations experienced in the size of the regular force in this same regard, particularly after its conversion to century-series interceptors. By 1957, the ADC/ANG force was completely jet-equipped: the last of the F-51's had phased out, for which more F-94A and B and F-89B and C replacements, among others, had been traded, that, in their turn, gave way to improved models in 1958-59.

Meanwhile, in 1957, the first dramatic change in the ANG structure was facilitated. The total M-day force, which had stood at 70 squadrons until 1956, dipped to 69 squadrons for a year, then in early 1957 picked up another eight squadrons to reach its peak, 77 squadrons, later that same year abruptly dropping to 55 squadrons. For its part, the daytime alert contingent remained at 17 squadrons until 1956, rose to 19 squadrons that same year and stayed at that level for several years. All-weather F-86D's began

~~SECRET~~

entering the ADC-ANG inventory in late 1956, to become for years, along with its F-86L cousin, a mainstay of ANG fighter interceptor squadrons. The preponderant amount of all ANG units, manned with personnel numbering in the sixty thousands, was during this period committed to some form of air defense assignment. Fighter bomber squadrons assigned to ADC on M-day were redesignated fighter interceptor squadrons; and the interceptor wing structure was reorganized so that each ANG interceptor base contained a self-sustaining support group. Facilities, such as F-86D flight simulators, simulator buildings, and runway extensions, were constantly being added, to accommodate the incoming, more complicated jet models; and T/O&E equipment was proportionately increased to bring it nearer the authorized level, in keeping with a continuing program to equip the ANG force on a planned schedule. Pilot recruitment was furthered by legislation enabling regulars returning to civilian life, as well as potential draftees, to discharge a large part of their military obligation by serving with the ANG. The enlisted ranks prospered, too, by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 -- legislation that also authorized the President to federalize up to 1,000,000 men of the Ready Reserve, including the ANG, during an emergency. Both officer and enlisted

~~SECRET~~

personnel were integrated in sufficient numbers to round out the manning tables, many receiving extensive training in USAF-owned and operated pilot, radar observer, electronics and mechanic schools. Aircrews were given 36 more paid training periods to compensate for extra time required of them to train and check out in jet interceptors. To strengthen and preserve continuity in aircraft maintenance, which had to be beefed up considerably to meet increased maintenance workloads demanded for the support of jet-model interceptors, the Air Technician Program was fully utilized. A select number of highly skilled, long-experienced craftsmen, technicians and mechanics were made civilian employees of their state (paid, however, from Federal funds), as well as military members of the unit, thereby assuring their full-time employment for aircraft maintenance and support. The Air Technician Program, indeed, was frequently alluded to as the backbone of the system, enabling ANG units to fulfill their air defense mission. By 1958, the last of the F-80's, F-84's, F-86A's, E's and F's and F-94A's and B's, had gone, followed by F-89B's and C's. In addition to F-86D/L replacements, atomic-capable F-89J's, together with century F-100A's and F-104A's, began filtering in during 1959-60. The overall M-day force, meanwhile, contracted to 41 (from 55)squadrons

~~SECRET~~

in 1958, losing another in late 1960 to bring it down to 40 squadrons at the end of that year. The alert part of this M-day force was hiked to 22 (from 19) squadrons in early 1959, which, with but slight variations, settled at this level till 1961.

One of the most striking changes characterizing this period of ANG activity, however, was the alteration of this very alert structure. While the alert contingent had gradually climbed in number, from 17 to 22 squadrons, as noted above, swapping old planes for newer ones in the process, it conspicuously shifted its geographic orientation. First of all, beginning in 1956-57, the daytime alert squadrons were rotated throughout the entire M-day force, resulting, in part, from mounting pressure by non-participating ANG units to expand the alert program so they, too, could participate; in part from a desire to spread the air defense training advantages and experience across the whole

31. House of Rep Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1957, pp. 5, 1280-1341, and for FY 1958, pp. 10-11, 553-601, and FY 1963, p. 592; Semiannual Rpts, Secy of Defense, 1 Jan-30 Jun 1956, pp. 21, 262, 1 Jul-31 Dec 1956, pp. 15-16, 19 and 1 Jul-31 Dec 1957, pp. 11, 18; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955, pp. 95-97, Jul-Dec 1955, pp. 112-13, Jan-Jun 1956, p. 59, Jul-Dec 1956, pp. 127-29, Jan-Jun 1957, pp. 155-60, Jul-Dec 1957, pp. 119-25, 1958, pp. 144-46, Jan-Jun 1959, pp. 189-94, Jul-Dec 1959, pp. 107-10, Jan-Jun 1960, pp. 97-104, Jul-Dec 1960, pp. 171-77.

~~SECRET~~

spectrum of the M-day ANG air defense force; and in part from an endeavor to provide better coverage in areas of the nation lacking protection by ADC's regular interceptor force. Generally speaking, alert duty assignments gravitated from ANG squadrons located in the northeast and far west, where coverage by the regular force was already strong, to squadrons in mid-western, southeastern and southwestern areas, where regular force coverage was weakest. Subsequently, the ADC regular interceptor force, becoming strengthened by conversions to century series aircraft and F-89J interceptors equipped with atomic MB-1 rockets, began about 1958 to shrink in size, falling in three years from 71 assigned squadrons to 41 squadrons concentrated mostly around the industrial northeast and west coast, and spread somewhat thinly along the northern borderline. The southeast and southern border, for all practical purposes, was left in an interceptor vacuum. Yet, about this same time, radar coverage was extended along the Gulf coast, and the southeasternmost Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of the U.S., in April 1959, was moved farther southward to embrace parts of the Gulf of Mexico contiguous with the Gulf Coast, and other portions of the U.S. southern border. The possibility existed, admittedly remote, that long-range enemy bombers would

~~SECRET~~

launch a sneak attack on the U.S. from a southerly direction, instead of over the north polar region. Therefore ANG squadrons, at ADC's behest, stepped in to fill this interceptor vacuum. Beginning in 1957-58, a trend was set in motion to ring the Gulf Coastal regions and U.S.-Mexican border with ANG squadrons on alert. In late 1958-early 1959, this trend was consummated in having six ANG interceptor squadrons -- five strung along the southern border and the sixth near the Canadian border in the mid-west -- being allocated four extra aircrews (totalling nine apiece) for standing continuous, round-the-clock alerts seven days each week. These six squadrons were as follows:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
197	Phoenix, Ariz.	F-86L
182	Kelly AFB, Tex.	F-86D
122	New Orleans, La.	F-86D
159	Jacksonville, Fla.	F-86L
111	Ellington AFB, Tex.	F-86L
178	Fargo, N.D.	F-89D

While the 13 squadrons assigned the 14-hour daylight alert, hiked to 16 in 1960, continued on a rotating basis, generally for a year's period each time round, the above six squadrons were put on full-time 5-minute alerts permanently. In conjunction with associated ACW squadrons on the ground to direct them, these six squadrons comprised the first line of air defense within their respective areas,

~~SECRET~~

scrambling on and intercepting those unknown targets detected in the portion of the ADIZ they were responsible for policing. More and more attention was showered on these full-time alert squadrons (which had appreciably enhanced ADC-ANG value and importance), particularly with respect to aircraft conversions. When first-line F-102A interceptors were to become available to the ANG in 1961, four of the permanent alert squadrons were singled out to receive first priority in getting them. Another was given F-104A's. The total M-day force, as noted above, had diminished to 40 squadrons by the end of 1960, making the proportion of those contributing 5-minute alerts, both the rotating day-light kind and the permanent round-the-clock variety, amount to over fifty per cent. Manning of the ADC-ANG force figured at 31,663 (3,953 officers and 27,710 airmen) -- close to half the total numbers composing all ANG elements at this time.

32

32. ADC ADLMO-A, Weekly Act Rept, 31 May 1960 [HRF]; Ltr, Maj. Gen. K. Bergquist, ADC DCS/Operations, to Maj. Gen. W. Ganey, Dir of Ops, DCS/Ops, USAF, 9 Dec 1954 [Doc 319 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954]; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, p. 59, Jul-Dec 1956, pp. 127-29, Jan-Jun 1957, pp. 155-60, Jul-Dec 1956, pp. 119-25, 1958, pp. 144-46, Jul-Dec 1960, pp. 171-77; House of Rep Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1957, pp. 1280-1341, and FY 1958, pp. 10-11.

~~SECRET~~

Just how close ANG/ADC relations were from 1955 through 1960 was exemplified in part during Congressional hearings. Testifying on 22 March 1956, for example, Major General Winston P. Wilson, Chief of the Air Force Division of the National Guard Bureau at this time, was able to boast in reference to the daytime alert program:

33

In the 17 months that this program has been in operation, Air National Guard aircrews have flown 31,979 hours under the direction of the Air Defense Controller and in so doing performed 12,525 scrambles and effected 27,580 successful intercepts in addition to performing air-combat patrol. The Air Defense Command is so well pleased with the results of this augmentation that it has requested expansion of the program...the success of the Air Defense Command augmentation is indicative of the very close relationship which exists between Air National Guard fighter units and Air Defense Command.

The expansion program General Wilson alluded to was an ADC proposal made in 1955 to place 36 ANG squadrons on daytime alert, 19 permanently and 17 rotationally on a yearly basis from the pool of 50 other squadrons then available. The plan came to nought because USAF could not spare the additional spaces and funds entailed by this proposal.

33. House of Rep, Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1957, p. 1286; Gen Wilson later became, and as of this writing still serves as, Chief of the NGB.

34. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955, p. 95; Hist of ADC,

Next year, on 10 April 1957, General Wilson claimed:

We had 100 per cent participation by the aircrew personnel of the 17 squadrons [on alert for ADC]. We flew close to 20,000 combat-ready hours under direction of the ADC controllers and we accomplished over 18,000 intercepts, any one of which could have been an intruder aircraft.

When later asked if he thought General Wilson had, at any time, overstated the case for the ANG, Maj.Gen. William E. Hall, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, USAF, ³⁶ replied:

I am extremely proud of the Air National Guard, and I agree with him [Gen. Wilson] it is the best of the Reserve components anywhere within the Department of Defense. We work very, very closely together....

While the NGB and USAF appeared to agree on the significance of the ANG role, this view was not always shared by ADC. General Joseph H. Atkinson, ADC commander in 1959, sounded a note of discord in May of that year, showing that all was

[Cont'd] Jul-Dec 1955, p. 112; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, p. 59; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1957, p. 123-24; Maj Gen Wilson "The Air Guard's New Mission," Air Force, Vol 38, No. 9 (Sep 1955), pp. 165-69.

35. House of Rep, Hearings on USAF Appropriations for FY 1958, p. 566.

36. Ibid., p. 600.

not harmonious with respect to ADC/ANG relations. Blaming the training aspect, for the most part, General Atkinson complained as follows to General Thomas D. White, USAF Chief of Staff:

I put little dependence on the ANG as emergency interceptor augmentation. Extensive experience convinces us that air defense is a full-time system job. Part-time training, mostly isolated from the system and unresponsive to the Air Defense Commander, simply will not produce successful system performance in sudden emergency. Expected return does not justify the high cost of this role for the ANG.

38

To this, General White replied:

I appreciate your concern in this matter, and the difficulties inherent in dealing effectively with forces not under your fulltime control. However, Reserve Forces have demonstrated a substantial capability to support certain Air Force commitments.

I believe the Air Force position in this matter should be to take what ever steps are necessary to increase the capability of ANG air defense units so that they may become more responsive to ADC operational requirements.

37. Ltr, Gen Atkinson to Gen White, "Policy on Reserve Forces," 25 May 1959 [Doc 252 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959]; At this very time EADF headquarters begged for use of more ANG squadrons because the EADF regular interceptor force was undergoing extensive conversions to new aircraft (see Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959, pp. 192-93 and supporting docs thereto).

38. Ltr, Gen White to Gen Atkinson, 25 Jun 1959 [Doc 255 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959].

Along this same line, General White, about nine months later, voiced a partial solution to General Atkinson's objections, during an Congressional inquiry:

39

...the [Air] National Guard in jet-type aircraft have done extraordinarily well. This is based partly on the fact that we now feel that we can really give them first-line equipment [F-102A's] and give them a big mission in the air defense field. We have certain changes in the Reserve organization which we hope to institute which will give them practically a first-line status by placing these units under the Air Defense Command instead of under ConAC so they will be directly in the operational command chain.

Not five months elapsed before ADC, beginning 1 July 1960, supplanted ConAC as the agency responsible for supervising training and inspecting ADC/ANG units, in accordance with a USAF plan to establish closer ties between ANG units and the commands to which they owed their M-day assignments. Air Force Advisors theretofore serving as ConAC representatives were reassigned to the ADC division or sector concerned. In addition to supervising training and inspection functions, ADC assumed responsibility for the aircraft accident prevention program at ADC/ANG units.

39. House of Rep, Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1961, p. 74.

The National Guard Bureau retained its jurisdiction over
logistics, budget administration and personnel. That
same month, General Atkinson welcomed the change, prophe-
syng.

I now foresee an improved air defense posture as a result of the...transfer of responsibilities for supervision of training and inspection....[Heretofore] channels of communications...placed these [ANG] units far away from Air Defense Command so far as training was concerned.

Under the new system, training directives and manuals will be distributed through Air Defense Command air divisions to the using units following coordination with National Guard Bureau. These directives will be identical to those used daily by squadrons of the regular establishment. The training program will continue to be under the direction of the state Adjutants General, but now in accordance with Air Defense Command manuals.

ADC thereupon launched a rigorous training program for its ANG units. Adopting the philosophy that ADC/ANG units should be "trained and operationally utilized insofar as possible in the same manner as regular squadrons," the command levied the same requirement for participation in six exercises per quarter as that prescribed for the regular interceptor force. Moreover, the command assimilated ADC/ANG

40. ADC, Supervision of ANG Units, 1 Jul 1960 [HRF].

41. Lt Gen Atkinson, "Mission: Teamwork," Air Force and Space Digest, Vol 43, No. 7 (Jul 1960), p. 113.

units into the ADC Tactical Evaluation Program as part of its revised program. In addition to the quarterly exercises and tactical evaluations, ADC also deployed ADC/ANG squadrons in increments of one flight (six aircraft) sent for a week at a time to the Weapons Employment Center at Tyndall AFB, where ADC's regular interceptor force received its live-firing practice, so ADC/ANG units would get weapons firing training of the first order. Between late August 1960 and the end of that year, 16 flights from seven ADC/ANG F-89J squadrons -- the 116th, 126th, 132nd, 134th, 178th, 179th and 186th -- underwent training at Tyndall.⁴²

The 40 ADC/ANG squadron pool available to air defense in 1960, conversions of which meantime had proceeded unabated, ended the year composed of 19 F-86L squadrons, 11 F-89J squadrons, four F-102A squadrons (three of which were still in transition), three F-104A squadrons and three F-100A squadrons. The squadrons controlled approximately 1,000 interceptors among themselves. Twenty-two of the 40 squadrons

42. Ibid.; Col Paul Fojtik (ADC Asst for ANG Affairs), "The Guard Joins ADC," Interceptor, Vol 2, No. 9 (Sep 1960), p. 10; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960, pp. 174-76, 199-200; Annex I to ADC, Supervision of ANG Units, 1 Jul 1960 [HRF]; Air Force Times, 21 Sep 1960; 1st Ind (ADCIO-H, ADC, "Weapons Center Training," undated), ADOOP-WI, ADC to ADCIO-H, ADC, 24 Mar 1961 [Doc 200 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960].

stood 5-minute alerts, five round-the-clock and 17 dawn-to-dusk. The sixth permanent full-time squadron, the 197th FIS (Phoenix, Arizona) had been relieved of its alert commitment while transitioning from F-86L's to F-104A's. The other permanent members of this full-time contingent had acquired, or were in process of acquiring, the following interceptors:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
182 FIS	San Antonio, Tex.	F-102A
122 FIS	New Orleans, La.	F-86L/ F-102A
159 FIS	Jacksonville, Fla.	F-86L/ F-102A
111 FIS	Houston, Tex.	F-86L/ F-102A
178 FIS	Fargo, N.D.	F-89J

43

The 17 squadrons with a 14-hour daylight commitment were:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
175 FIS	Sioux Falls, S.D.	F-89J
127 FIS	Wichita, Kan.	F-86L
181 FIS	Dallas, Tex.	F-86L
188 FIS	Albuquerque, N.M.	F-100
190 FIS	Boise, Idaho	F-86L
128 FIS	Atlanta, Ga.	F-86L
156 FIS	Charlotte, N.C.	F-86L
158 FIS	Savannah, Ga.	F-86L
108 FIS	Chicago, Ill.	F-86L
126 FIS	Milwaukee, Wisc.	F-89J
176 FIS	Madison, Wisc.	F-89J
179 FIS	Duluth, Minn.	F-89J

43. Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960, pp. 171-77.

~~SECRET~~

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
124 FIS	Des Moines, Iowa	F-89J
134 FIS	Burlington, Vermont	F-89J
103 FIS	Philadelphia, Pa.	F-89J
192 FIS	Reno, Nevada	F-86L
194 FIS	Fresno, Calif.	F-86L

1961-1964 The Harvest Years. During the next three years, ADC/ANG force was further altered to embrace a tighter-knit organization, expanded role and modernized armament as well as improved interceptors. As far as overall quantity goes, the period was marked by more drastic reductions that, together with other changes, were tantamount to a reconstitution of the ADC/ANG interceptor force. As regards quality, the period witnessed dramatic improvements.

Significant changes were in store for the ADC/ANG force in 1961, amounting to a reshuffle in organization and duty obligations. ADC, in collaboration with NORAD, set about to reshape the ADC/ANG by cutting the number of squadrons assigned, but enlarging the air defense responsibilities of the squadrons which remained. By so doing, ADC hoped in some measure to compensate for the reduction of its regular manned interceptor force, bringing the ADC/ANG force into better balance to square with changing air defense realities.

~~SECRET~~

The ADC/ANG force was accordingly cut from the 40 squadrons on hand at the first of the year (1961) to 29 squadrons by mid-year. Beginning on 1 July 1961, 25 of these squadrons began a constant 24-hour, 5-minute alert vigil, including the handful noted above performing this duty since late 1958 along the Gulf Coast, southern border, and at Fargo, North Dakota. Half of the remaining four not placed on alert were destined to go the way of the other eleven departing earlier that year, by transferral to other commands. * No longer were the majority of ADC/ANG squadrons assigned the limited, less-effective 14-hour daytime alert practiced hitherto on a rotating basis. The 25 squadrons designated to perform full-time alerts seven days weekly were authorized 297 active duty officer spaces so each squadron would have nine active duty aircrews rotated among its thirty pilots. The squadrons were distributed geographically as follows:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
111	Ellington AFB, Tex.	F-102A
116	Spokane IAP, Wash.	F-89J
118	Bradley Fld, Conn.	F-100A
122	New Orleans NAS, La.	F-102A

* In early 1962, the 103 FIS (Philadelphia, Pa), and 158 FIS (Savannah, Ga) converted to C-97 transports and were accordingly reassigned to MATS.

~~SECRET~~

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
123	Portland IAP, Ore.	F-89J
124	Des Moines MAP, Iowa	F-86L
132	Dow AFB, Maine	F-89J
134	Burlington MAP, Vt.	F-89J
146	Greater Pittsburg, Pa.	F-102A
151	McGhee-Tyson Aprt, Tenn.	F-104A
152	Tucson MAP, Ariz.	F-100A
157	Congaree AFB, Eastover, S.C.	F-104A
159	Imeson MAP, Fla.	F-102A
173	Lincoln AFB, Nebr.	F-86L
175	Foss Fld, Sioux Falls, S.D.	F-102A
176	Truax Fld, Wisc.	F-89J
178	Hector Aprt, Fargo, N.D.	F-89J
179	Duluth MAP, Minn.	F-89J
182	Kelly AFB, Tex.	F-102A
186	Great Falls MAP, Mont.	F-89J
188	Kirtland AFB, N.M. q	F-100A
190	Boise Air Terminal, Idaho	F-86L
194	Fresno Air Terminal, Calif.	F-86L
196	Ontario Intl Aprt, Calif.	F-86L
197	Sky Harbor MAP, Ariz.	F-104A

Two operationally ready interceptors and two combat ready aircrews sustained the continuous 5-minute alert; a second pair of interceptors and aircrews stood one-hour back-up alerts. They were supposed to fly at least one flight daily, for practice or for active air defense. Upwards of 20,000 hours per year were thereafter logged under ADC control. As before, ANG pilots and radar observers continued rotating the active duty positions, sometimes from one or two days at a time up to a maximum uninterrupted period of 59 consecutive days, depending on the time they could take off from their regular jobs, so that all aircrews benefited

~~SECRET~~

from this air defense experience. The average tour lasted about 10 days per aircrew. The same criteria employed to rate combat readiness of the regular force were made to apply to this reconstituted ADC/ANG force, including the requirement to turnaround interceptors within 15 minutes. Closer working relationships were established between ADC and its assigned ANG units in regard to maintenance, support services, and personal privileges, among other things. In 1962, minimum flight time for combat pilots was raised from 125 to 135 hours per year. ANG squadrons were subjected to ORI's like squadrons of ADC's regular force. In the words of Lt General Robert M. Lee, then commander of ADC,

We have summarily discarded the idea that our Reserve Forces are some sort of reservoir of manpower, held in abeyance to fill the needs which might arise in an emergency. Today in the Air Defense Command, as elsewhere, our Air National Guard...[is] an integral part of our total capability...organized, trained and inspected exactly like our active duty units. Our ANG units...now on 24-hour alert status [are] capable of instant action.

Meantime, a note of tragedy was struck on 7 April 1961, when an F-100A from the 188th FIS (Kirtland, New Mexico) accidentally destroyed a SAC B-52 over New Mexico while practicing air defense interceptions. As a result of

* The Air Reservist, Vol XV, No. 3 (Mar 1962), p. 7.

~~SECRET~~

a short circuit in the F-100A's missile firing circuit, a GAR-8 missile was released. Subsequent investigation disclosed that the ANG pilot had properly accomplished the required armament safety checks before beginning the exercise, and that he was blameless for the accident. After several "fixes" were applied, including installation of mechanical locks for securing GAR-8 missiles to their launchers and waterproofing of GAR-8 firing circuits, F-100A squadrons were again authorized to be armed with GAR-8's.⁴⁴

As a result of the 1961 Berlin crisis and ensuing build-up of U.S. forces in Europe, the three F-104 squadrons on alert (the 151st at Knoxville, Tennessee, 157th at Eastover, South Carolina and 197th at Phoenix, Arizona) were

44. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, pp. 177-82, 250-53; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961, pp. 97-200, 278; ADCR 55-23, "Combat-Ready Requirements for ADC and ANG Fighter Interceptor Squadrons," 5 Jan 1961 [DOC 3]; AFR 20-23, "Relationship of Air Force Commanders to the Air National Guard," 20 Mar 1961 [DOC 4]; ADCR 66-14, "ADC Aircraft Materiel/Maintenance Policy Regarding ANG Units," 6 Nov 1961 [DOC 5]; Msg ADMME-DB 5184, ADC to TAC, 4 Oct 1963 [DOC 6]; Msg ADOOP-WM 5213, ADC to 28 AD, 8 Oct 1963 [DOC 7]; Msg ADOOP-WM 5471, ADC to 26 AD, 31 Oct 1963 [DOC 8]; House of Rep, Hearings on Dept of Def Appropriations for FY 1963, Part 1, pp. 389-430; ADC Ops Plan 10-61, "Air National Guard Alert Plan," 1 Jun 1961 [DOC 9]; ADC Ops Plan 11-61, "Supervision of Training and Inspection of ANG Units," 1 Aug 1961 [DOC 10]; Maj W. B. Staudt, Interceptor, Vol 4, No. 3 (Mar 1962), pp. 16-17.

~~SECRET~~

federalized on 9 October 1961 and transferred to Tactical Air Command for duty overseas. They were returned to the U.S. and to ADC's jurisdiction the following summer, but the 197th at Phoenix soon exchanged its F-104's for C-97's and, effective 1 February 1963, was transferred to MATS. The other two F-104 squadrons returning to Knoxville and Eastover, while put back on ADC's roster of full-time alert interceptor squadrons, were also stripped of their F-104's in 1963, in order to equip two of ADC's regular squadrons with Starfighters. Notwithstanding this, the two ADC/ANG squadrons profited by the transaction in gaining 25 F-102A's apiece in exchange, bringing up to eight the number of ADC/ANG squadrons flying the F-102A. The only interceptor conversions outside these, from 1961 to the end of 1963, involved the 124th FIS (Des Moines, Iowa), which in 1962 traded F-86L's for F-89J's.

Meanwhile, in 1962, the two ADC/ANG squadrons still uncommitted insofar as alert duty was concerned -- the 181st FIS (Dallas, Texas) and 198th FIS (Puerto Rico) -- joined the others in standing full-time 5-minute alerts, hiking the force to 26 ADC/ANG squadrons in all on continuous
45
round-the-clock duty.

45. Msg NG-AFOTM 742884, NGB to ADC, 5 Feb 1963 [DOC 11]; Msg ADMLP 384, ADC to NGB, 5 Feb 1963 [DOC 12]; Msg ADOTT-D 647, ADC to 26 AD et al, 5 Mar 1963 [DOC 13]; Msg ADOOP-WI 842, ADC

As of the end of 1963, the ADC/ANG force of 26 squadrons possessed 538 interceptors divided between six F-86H/L squadrons, nine F-89J squadrons, three F-100A squadrons and eight F-102A squadrons. All enjoyed a fairly high combat ready rate, as revealed in the status report for
46
1-31 December 1963:

Acft Type	No. Acft Assigned	No. Acft Poss	Combat Ready Rate	Utilization Rate	Total Hours Flown
F-86H/L	140	140	80.6	14.3	2007
F-89J	240	231	77.8	14.6	3382
F-100A	73	53	73.2	20.1	1066
F-102A	121	114	74.3	17.3	1974

During calendar year 1963, the ADC/ANG force accomplished over 23,000 interceptions under ADC's direction.

The completed force, as deployed February 1964, was constituted as follows:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
111	Ellington AFB, Tex.	F-102A
116	Spokane IAP, Wash.	F-89J
118	Bradley Fld, Conn.	F-100A
122	New Orleans NAS, La.	F-102A

[Cont'd] to USAF, 20 Mar 1963 [DOC 14]; Msg ADOTT-D 890, ADC to NGB, et al, 22 Mar 1963 [DOC 15]; Msg ADOOP-WI 712, ADC to 26 AD, 11 Mar 1963 [DOC 16]; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, pp. 177-82.

46. Rpt, 1-AF-A1, ADC, "Air National Guard Aircraft Status Report, 1-31 Dec 1963," n.d. (ca. Jan 1964) [DOC 17]; The National Guardsman, Vol 17, No. 12 (Dec 1963), p. 5.

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
123	Portland IAP, Ore.	F-89J
124	Des Moines MAP, Iowa	F-89J
132	Dow AFB, Mo.	F-89J
134	Burlington MAP, Vt.	F-89J
146	Greater Pittsburg, Pa.	F-102A
151	McGhee-Tyson Aprt, Tenn.	F-102A
152	Tucson MAP, Ariz.	F-100A
157	McEntire AGB, S.C.	F-102A
159	Imeson MAP, Fla.	F-102A
173	Lincoln AFB, Nebr.	F-86L
175	Foss Fld, Sioux Falls, S.D.	F-102A
176	Truax Fld, Wisc.	F-89J
178	Hector Aprt, Fargo, N.D.	F-89J
179	Duluth MAP, Minn.	F-89J
181	Dallas NAS, Tex.	F-86L
182	Kelly AFB, Tex.	F-102A
186	Great Falls MAP, Mont.	F-89J
188	Kirtland AFB, N.M.	F-100A
190	Boise Air Terminal, Idaho	F-86L
194	Fresno Air Terminal, Calif.	F-86L
196	Ontario Intl Aprt, Calif.	F-86L
198	Puerto Rico IAP, San Juan, P.R.	F-86H

This ADC/ANG force structure would further diminish to 21 squadrons, according to programs current in March 1964. The 151st (McGhee-Tyson Airport, Knoxville, Tennessee), 188th (Kirtland AFB, New Mexico), 198th (Puerto Rico IAP, San Juan, P.R.), and the 173rd (Lincoln AFB, Nebraska) in early 1964, and in early 1965, the 181st (Dallas NAS, Texas), were all scheduled to transfer to TAC's jurisdiction. Moreover, ADC was once again endeavoring to raise the minimum amount of flight time required per ANG combat pilot, this time to upwards of 174 hours annually.

~~SECRET~~


Hopes for more aircraft conversions brightened considerably, too. Lt. General Herbert B. Thatcher, commander of ADC, viewed the combat effectiveness of the F-86L and F-100A somewhat skeptically, noting that the F-86L in particular was "an obsolete aircraft, relegated from the active Air Defense Command inventory years ago," and essentially ineffective as a combat weapon in terms of modern warfare. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, alluding to Project Clearwater (wherein a multitude of F-102A's belonging to USAF interceptor squadrons overseas were being returned to the U.S.), publicly announced in February that the Air National Guard would be equipped with considerably more F-102A interceptors than previously programmed. That same month the ADC/ANG program was formally changed to reflect conversions by six more ADC/ANG squadrons to the F-102A, one in 1964, four in 1965 and one in 1968. Since three F-86L squadrons and two F-100A squadrons, apart from those transferring to TAC, would gain "Delta Daggers," it meant that the ADC/ANG force would be purged of all F-86L/F-100A's. Once rid of its F-100A models, the ADC/ANG force, like the ADC regular force, would become fully all-weather. By mid-1965, the 21-squadron ADC/ANG force would be composed of 12 F-102A and nine F-89J squadrons, changing again in 1968

~~SECRET~~

to 13 and eight squadrons, respectively. Moreover, if another plan hatching in early 1964 came to pass, the ADC/ANG alert commitment would increase to four interceptors on 5 to 15-minute alert status at those squadrons containing nuclear armament. As programmed in March 1964, the future ADC/ANG force would be shaped as follows:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
111	Ellington AFB, Tex.	F-102A
116	Spokane IAP, Wash.	F-89J
118	Bradley Fld, Conn.	F-102A (May 1965)
122	New Orleans NAS, La.	F-102A
123	Portland IAP, Ore.	F-89J
124	Des Moines MAP, Iowa	F-102A (1968)
132	Dow AFB, Maine	F-89J
134	Burlington MAP, Vt.	F-89J
146	Greater Pittsburg, Pa.	F-102A
152	Tucson MAP, Ariz.	F-102A (May 1965)
157	McEntire AGB, S.C.	F-102A
159	Imeson MAP, Fla.	F-102A
175	Foss Fld, Sioux Falls, S.D.	F-102A
176	Truax Fld, Wisc.	F-89J

47. *Denver Post, 2 Oct 1963, p. 45; Air Force Times, 19 Feb 1964, p. 11; Msg ADOOP-P 439, ADC to 25 AD, 7 Feb 1964 [DOC 18]; ADCM 27-2, Vol II, Chg H, 5 Feb 1964 [HRF]; ADC, DCS/Plans, Daily Staff Digest No. 32, 17 Mar 1964 [HRF]; ADC, DCS/Operations, Daily Staff Digest No. 16, 7 Feb 1964 [HRF]; Msg ADCCS 971, ADC to USAF, 15 Mar 1964 [DOC 19]; Msg ADLPP 990, ADC to Air Divs, 17 Mar 1964 [DOC 20]; Msg ADOOP-P 1001, ADC to 30 AD, 17 Mar 1964 [DOC 21]; Interview with Col Pesch, 24 Mar and 2 Apr 1964; ADC, ADLPP-G, Weekly Act Rept, 16 Mar 1964 [HRF].




~~SECRET~~

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
178	Hector Appt, Fargo, N.D.	F-89J
179	Duluth MAP, Minn.	F-89J
182	Kelly AFB, Tex.	F-102A
186	Great Falls MAP, Mont.	F-89J
190	Boise Air Terminal, Idaho	F-102A (Aug 1964)
194	Fresno Air Terminal, Calif.	F-102A (May 1965)
196	Ontario Intl Appt, Calif.	F-102A (May 1965)

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT~~


~~1954~~



~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT~~
~~1954~~

~~SECRET~~




~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT~~

~~1954~~


~~_____~~



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RESTRICTED DATA
[REDACTED] ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
[REDACTED] 1954

[REDACTED]




~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT~~
~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~




~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT~~

~~1954~~



ADC/ANG FORCE, 1 JANUARY 1953

A. EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE:1. Fighter-Interceptor:

101 Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Bangor, Maine
132 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Bangor, Maine
133 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Manchester, N.H.
134 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Burlington, Vt.
102 Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Boston, Mass.
101 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Boston, Mass.
131 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Westfield, Mass.
107 Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
136 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
137 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	White Plains, N.Y.
138 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Syracuse, N.Y.
139 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Schenectady, N.Y.
128 Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Milwaukee, Wisc.
126 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Milwaukee, Wisc.
176 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron	Madison, Wisc.

2. Fighter [Dual Mission - Bomber-Interceptor]:

103 Fighter Wing	Windsor Locks, Conn.
118 Fighter Squadron	Windsor Locks, Conn.
152 Fighter Squadron	Providence, R.I.
108 Fighter Wing	Newark, N.J.
119 Fighter Squadron	Newark, N.J.
141 Fighter Squadron	Ft. Dix, N.J.
111 Fighter Wing	Philadelphia, Pa.
103 Fighter Squadron	Philadelphia, Pa.
117 Fighter Squadron	Philadelphia, Pa.
142 Fighter Squadron	Wilmington, Del.



112 Fighter Wing	Coraopolis, Pa.
146 Fighter Squadron	Coraopolis, Pa.
147 Fighter Squadron	Coraopolis, Pa.
148 Fighter Squadron	Reading, Pa.
113 Fighter Wing	Andrews AFB, Md.
121 Fighter Squadron	Andrews AFB, Ma.
104 Fighter Squadron	Baltimore, Md.
123 Fighter Wing	Louisville, Ky.
165 Fighter Squadron	Louisville, Ky.
167 Fighter Squadron	Charleston, W. Va.
126 Fighter Wing	Chicago, Ill.
108 Fighter Squadron	Chicago, Ill.
168 Fighter Squadron	Chicago, Ill.
127 Fighter Wing	Detroit, Mich.
107 Fighter Squadron	Detroit, Mich.
171 Fighter Squadron	Detroit, Mich.
172 Fighter Squadron	Battle Creek, Mich.

B. CENTRAL AIR DEFENSE FORCE:

1. Fighter-Interceptor:

133 Fighter-Interceptor Wing	St. Paul, Minn.
109 Fighter-Interceptor Sq	St. Paul, Minn.
175 Fighter-Interceptor Sq	Sioux Falls, S.D.
178 Fighter-Interceptor Sq	Fargo, N.D.
179 Fighter-Interceptor Sq	Duluth, Minn.
186 Fighter Interceptor Sq	Great Falls, Mont.

2. Fighter [Dual Mission - Bomber-Interceptor]:

116 Fighter Wing	Marietta, Ga.
128 Fighter Squadron	Marietta, Ga.
157 Fighter Squadron	Eastover, S.C.
158 Fighter Squadron	Savannah, Ga.

~~SECRET~~

159 Fighter Squadron	Jacksonville, Fla.
156 Fighter Squadron	Charlotte, N.C.
169 Fighter Squadron	Peoria, Ill.
170 Fighter Squadron	Springfield, Ill.
191 Fighter Squadron	Salt Lake City, Utah
197 Fighter Squadron	Phoenix, Ariz.

C. WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE:

1. Fighter-Interceptor:

142 Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Spokane, Wash.
116 Fighter-Interceptor Sq	Spokane, Wash.
123 Fighter-Interceptor Sq	Portland, Ore.
190 Fighter-Interceptor Sq	Boise, Idaho

2. Fighter [Dual Mission - Bomber-Interceptor]:

144 Fighter Wing	Hayward, Calif.
192 Fighter Squadron	Reno, Nevada
194 Fighter Squadron	Hayward, Calif.
146 Fighter Wing	Van Nuys, Calif.
115 Fighter Squadron	Van Nuys, Calif.
195 Fighter Squadron	Van Nuys, Calif.
196 Fighter Squadron	Ontario, Calif.

~~SECRET~~

TOTAL TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED THE ADC/ANG FORCE, 1957-1964

Aircraft	1 Jul 57	1 Jul 58	1 Jul 59	1 Jul 60	1 Jul 61	1 Jul 62	1 Jul 63	Jan 64
F-80C	300	50	--	--	--	--	--	--
F-84E	125	25	--	--	--	--	--	--
F-84F	325	375	--	--	--	--	--	--
F-86A/E/F	400	125	--	--	--	--	--	--
F-86D/L	50 (F-86D)	425 (F-86D/L)	675 (F-86D/L)	600 (F-86D/L)	175 (F-86L)	125 (F-86L)	115 (F-86L)	115 (F-86L)
F-86H	--	300	--	--	25	25	25	25
F-89B/C	150 (F-89C)	50	25 (F-89B)	--	--	--	--	--
F-89D	50	150	175	25	--	--	--	--
F-89H	--	50	75	100	--	--	--	--
F-89J	--	--	--	150	225	225	240	232
F-94A/B	350	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
F-94C	125	75	50	--	--	--	--	--
F-100	--	--	50	50	75	75	73	50
F-102A	--	--	--	--	150	150	121	112
F-104A	--	--	--	50	75	75	9	--
TOTAL	1875	1625	1050	975	725	675	583	534

APPENDIX B

CHARACTERISTICS OF REPRESENTATIVE ADC/ANG FIGHTERS AND INTERCEPTORS, 1946-1964

	F-51H/M No. American	F-80C Lockheed	F-84F Republic	F-86A No. American	F-86D No. American
Power Plant	1380 h.p. V-1650-9	4600 lb.s.t. J33-A-23	7200 lb.s.t. J-65-W-3	5200 lb.s.t. J47-GE-13	5700/7630 lb. J47-GE-17
Dimensions					
Span	37'0"	39'11"	33' 7 1/4"	37'1"	37'1"
Length	33'4"	34'6"	43' 4 3/4"	37'6"	40'4"
Height	13'8"	11'4"	14' 4 3/4"	14'8"	15'0"
Type	Single-place	Single-place	Single-place	Single-place	Single-place
Weight (lbs)					
Empty	6585	8240	--	10,495	12,470
Gross	11,054	16,856	28,000	16,357	17,100
Performance:					
Max. Speed (mph/ft)	487/25,000	580/7000	695/0	675/2500	707/0
Cruising Speed mph	380	439	483 (approx)	527	525
Climb	2400 ft/min	6870 ft/min	8200 ft/min	7630 ft/min	17,800 ft/min
Service Ceiling (ft.)	41,600	42,750	45,000 (approx)	48,300	54,600
Ferry Range (miles)	850	1380	2000 (approx)	785	836
Armament	6x0.50-in.	60x0.50-in.	6x0.50-in.	6x0.50-in.	24x2.75-in. FFAR

	F-89D Northrop	F-94C Lockheed	F-100D No. American	F-102A Convair	F-104A Lockheed
Power Plant	2-5440 lb.s.t. 7200 lb. with a/b J-35-A-35	6350 lb.s.t. 8750 lb. with a/b J48-P-5	11,700 lb.s.t. 17,000 lb. with a/b J57-P-21A	17,000 lb.s.t. with a/b J57-P-23/25	14,800 lb.s.t. with a/b J79-GE-3A
Dimensions					
Span	59'8"	42'5"	38'9"	38' 1 1/2"	21'11"
Length	53'10"	44'6"	47'0"	68' 4 1/2"	54'9"
Height	17'7"	14'11"	15'0"	21' 2 1/2"	13'6"
Type	Two-place	Two-place	Single-place	Single-place	Single-place
Weight (lbs)					
Empty	25,194	12,700	21,000	--	12,264
Gross	42,241	24,200	34,832	28,600	24,565
Performance:					
Max.Speed (mph/ft)	636/10,600	585/30,000	864/35,000	825/36,000	1150/35,000
Cruising Speed mph	523	522	565	525	514 (approx)
Climb	8360 ft/min	7980 ft/min	16,000 ft/min	13,000 ft/min	15,500 ft/min
Service Ceiling (ft)	49,200	51,400	51,500 (apprx)	54,000	55,400 (approx)
Ferry Range	1,370	1200	1400 (approx)	1294 (approx)	1535 (approx)
Armament	52x2.75-in. FFAR or GAR Falcon missiles. F-89J carried 2 nuclear MB-1 "Genie" rockets.	48x2.75-in. FFAR	4x20-mm Cannons	6 GAR Falcon Missiles	2 GAR-8

