

70017

ADC HISTORICAL STUDY NO. 25

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

K410.041-25
1961-1964
Gy 1

INTERCEPTOR DISPERSAL 1961 - 1964

by THOMAS W. RAY

AF/HQB TAW E.O. 13526
DATE: 20100819

FOIA EXEMPTION 3.3(b)(3)
REFER: DOE pp 32-33 - ~~REDACTED~~
27 MAY 2015

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE
The information contained in this document will not be disseminated to foreign nationals or their representatives.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY Group 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SHO-S-64/281-2

1-2290-2

[REDACTED]

ST. MARY'S
HOSPITAL

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
~~DATA~~
~~ENERGY~~
~~SECRET~~

This Document Contains Information Affecting the National Defense of the United States Within the Meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. Its Transmission or the Revelation of Its Contents in Any Manner to an Unauthorized Person is Prohibited by Law.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

AF/HOH LAW E.O. 13526
DATE, 20100819

FOIA EXEMPTION 3.3(b)(3)
REFER: *DOES* p 32-33 - **REDACTED**

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~
The information contained in this document shall not be disclosed to foreign nationals or their representatives.

CIOH-21
Copy No. 15

~~SECRET~~

5110-3-64/281-2

[REDACTED]

10/1/34

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~RESTRICTED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INTERCEPTOR DISPERSAL 1961 - 1964

by THOMAS W. RAY

REDACTED

**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE**
The information contained in this report will
not be released to foreign nationals or their repre-
satives.

**EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY Group 1**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1111

REMOVED

1

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Formulating the Concept and Early Planning (1961)	1
Increased Alert (1962)10
Phase I and Phase II Interim Dispersal13
Phase III Permanent Dispersal.19
Interceptor Force Programming Changes.24
1963 - 1964.28
Future Dispersal53
APPENDIX A: FIGHTER DISPERSAL STATION LIST, 15 December 1961.57
APPENDIX B: DISPERSAL BASES, 15 January 1963.60
APPENDIX C: ADC FIGHTER DISPERSAL ALIGNMENT, 1 January 1964.64
APPENDIX D: DISPERSAL BASE PHASE-IN SCHEDULE, 1 January 1964.68

1870

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

1878

1879

1880

1881

1882

1883

1884

1885

1886

1887

1888

1889

1890

1891

1892

1893

1894

1895

1896

1897

1898

1899

1900

Formulating the Concept and Early Planning. In 1961, at USAF's behest, the Air Defense Command embarked on a program designed eventually to deploy, in preparation for emergency situations, sizeable portions of the interceptor force to pre-selected, specially prepared dispersal bases otherwise enjoying little or no target value to attacking enemy forces. Contrary to the traditional military practice of concentrating forces in face of an enemy to repel his attack, interceptor dispersal called for spreading them thinner to survive his initial blow. A great deal was at stake, since Defense Department war games had revealed that an ICBM attack, such as the Soviet Union might be able to mount by 1965, could annihilate most, and perhaps all, of ADC's regular interceptor force as then deployed. It was calculated that an attacking enemy would first shower SAC

bases (containing retaliatory weapons), then SAGE direction and combat centers, with a barrage of ICBM's pocketing nuclear warheads. Since 28 of ADC's then 41-squadron interceptor force (amounting to 68 per cent) were at the time collocated with SAC units or SAGE installations, it followed that most were vulnerable to such attack. Furthermore, the other 13 squadrons would possibly be objectives of a second or third-wave of ICBM's. Because it was also anticipated that the initial ICBM attacks would soon be followed by waves of manned bombers, it was important that an appreciable part of the interceptor force survive the missiles intact in a combat ready condition, to offer a stiff defense against the bombers. USAF, therefore, in the spring of 1961, directed ADC to undertake the interceptor dispersal program for farming out, during an emergency, weapons over a widespread area of North America, lessening chances of total obliteration to the point where, as expressed in a subsequent ADC dispersal plan, "a minimum of 50 per cent of the interceptor force [will] survive [the] impact of the initial ICBM attack."¹

1. ADC Plan, "Support Concept and Requirements for Fighter Interceptor/War Readiness Survivability Program," undated, ca. August 1961 [Doc 403 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC OPLAN 20-61, "Fighter Dispersal/Increased Alert Plan," 30 Nov 1961 [Doc 404 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961].

Criteria for the selection of dispersal bases were as follows: bases were to be situated away from primary target areas, at least 15 nautical miles from projected blast areas, outside of heavy fallout areas where possible, and within 200 miles of a Mode III GCI center having communications with the dispersal base. Each base was to have a nearby TACAN facility and a runway at least 7,000 (originally stated as 6,000) feet long, but preferably 8,000 or more. Military bases, including those assigned major Air Force commands (excepting SAC), the ANG, and the U.S. Navy were to receive priority over civilian airfields. In Canada, bases belonging to the RCAF or the Department of Transport were preferred. Eventually, dispersal bases, according to original plans, were to be capable of accomodating as much as half of a squadron's aircraft and provision them with enough nuclear and conventional armament, as well as fuel and ground support items, for eight combat sorties in a five-day period. Since it would take years to build up to this goal, the program was developed into a three-phase project. The first phase involved personnel familiarization and would require of dispersal bases only the capacity to reservice (i.e., refuel and relaunch without loading missiles) one-third the parent squadron's aircraft on a one-time recovery

basis. Planning called for this capability to be achieved in early 1962. The second phase in the original plan, scheduled for completion in late 1962 and early 1963, called for achievement of the capacity to reservice one-third (later one-half) of the squadron's aircraft and re-arm them with enough conventional weapons to support two sorties per aircraft for a 24-hour period. The third phase was to be completed at a much later date.²

Dispersal was expected to occur upon warning of an ICBM attack. Upon receipt of this warning, interceptors were assumed to have 15 minutes or less in which to become airborne. Those that were successful were to rendezvous at predetermined orbit points and remain there until the ICBM attack ended. Then they would either return to home base, if still intact, or recover at the dispersal base.³

An important corollary to the dispersal plan involved increasing the alert status of interceptor squadrons. The traditional alert posture called for two interceptors armed

2. ADC Plan, "Support Concept and Requirements for Fighter Interceptor/War Readiness Survivability Program," undated [Doc 403 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC OPLAN 20-61, 30 Nov 1961, and Annex C, 15 Dec 1961 [Doc 405 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961].

3. NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC OPLAN 20-61, 30 Nov 1961, and Annex C, 15 Dec 1961 [Doc 405 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961].

solely with secondary (non-nuclear) weapons to stand continuous five-minute vigils at each squadron, while two other interceptors, armed with primary (nuclear) weapons, served on backup alert for emergency action. This alert posture was clearly impractical if one-third of the interceptor force -- later to be expanded to one-half in accordance with the original plan -- was to be ready to disperse on 15 minutes notice. ADC, therefore, directed that, beginning in 1962, interceptor squadrons would maintain one-third of their tactical aircraft on a 15-minute (or less) alert status. While two of them as before, would stand a five-minute alert with conventional weapons, all others in the alert contingent would be armed with both primary and secondary weapons. These aircraft would assume a 15-minute-alert readiness posture.⁴

Late in 1961, the "one-third alert" plan was tested in the 25th Air Division at the 322nd FIS (Kingsley -- F-101B), the 64th FIS (Paine -- F-102A) and the 318th FIS (McChord -- F-106A). The test revealed that work schedules had to be

4. NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC OPLAN 20-61, 30 Nov 1961 [Doc 405 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg 30NOPS S-5964-61, 30 NORAD Rgn to NORAD, 13 Nov 1961 [Doc 406 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg 64OOP 6-L-229, 64 AD to ADC, 6 Dec 1961 [Doc 407 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADMME-DE 2847, ADC to Air Divs, 19 Dec 1961 [Doc 408 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961];

~~SECRET~~

drastically re-arranged and considerable overtime worked in order for the normal squadron, unaugmented with either personnel or equipment, to maintain one-third of its aircraft on 15-minute alert. It was also necessary to allow aircraft armed with nuclear weapons to park closer together than was permissible under existing safety rules. Further, it was necessary to ask the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) to provide more expeditious supply service in order to maintain the required number of serviceable aircraft.⁵

Therefore, the basic dispersal plan, including the increased alert aspect, was expected to have considerable impact on ADC and USAF resources. Manning tables and equipment lists for Phases II and III of the dispersal plan involved sizeable increases in the number of technicians, and

[Cont'd] RESTRICTED DATA, Msg ADMME-DE 2879, ADC to MATS, 20 Dec 1961 [Doc 409 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADODC 2946, ADC to Air Divs, 28 Dec 1961 [Doc 410 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961].

5. Msg ADMDC 1727, ADC to all ADC units, 3 Nov 1961 [Doc 411 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADMME-DE 2549, ADC to Air Divs, 15 Nov 1961 [Doc 412 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; RESTRICTED DATA, Msg ADMME-DE 2701, ADC to Air Divs, 4 Dec 1961 [Doc 413 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADCCS 2802, ADC to Air Divs, 14 Dec 1961 [Doc 414 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg 29CMO 440, 29 AD to ADC, 13 Dec 1961 [Doc 415 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg 28MSS-A 1C531, 28 AD to ADC, 13 Dec 1961 [Doc 416 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADMDC 2932, ADC to AFLC, 27 Dec 1961 [Doc 417 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; ADCM 65-6, "Logistic Support Plan for Improving ADC Alert Posture," 1 Jan 1962 [Doc 418 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961].

~~SECRET~~

the repositioning of large quantities of equipment at dispersal bases. Maintenance, armament and fire control technicians as well as security guards were among the support personnel required for the last two phases. Approximately 70 additional people were estimated to be required to support Phase II dispersal operations of a single squadron. More than 120 would be required in Phase III. Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE), conventional and nuclear weapons and other war readiness materiel, station equipment and food would have to be placed at the dispersal bases. Alert hangars, nuclear weapon storage buildings and other facilities would have to be constructed at some of the bases. It was estimated that more than 45 million dollars would be needed to finance the initial costs of the three-phase dispersal plan, with operating expenses amounting to an additional two million annually. It was also anticipated that the aircrew ratio, fixed at 1.2 aircrews per mission aircraft for the past several years, would have to be raised before one-half the tactical aircraft of interceptor squadrons could be placed in 15-minute-alert status, as foreseen by the original dispersal plan. Though USAF approved the dispersal concept drafted by ADC, it did not, as of the end of 1961, provide the funds needed to carry it out. Interceptor squadrons

were cautioned to keep within existing personnel and equipment resources until further notice. Meanwhile, the command investigated the possibility of filling many of the jobs created by the dispersal plan with ANG and Air Force Reserve personnel. In conjunction with CONAD, ADC intended to test Reserve capabilities in early 1962, when Reserve units would "turnaround" increments of F-101B and F-106A squadrons at two different dispersal bases.⁶

The actual selection of dispersal bases was aggressively pursued during the last half of 1961. Siting teams used targeting studies, fallout studies, tactical requirement analyses and division-level surveys and recommendations in establishing optimum dispersal sites. Beginning in late June 1961, preliminary site surveys of proposed dispersal bases were conducted by logistics plans officers from the air divisions. By July, a list of tentative sites had been compiled for the 28 first-priority squadrons collocated with

6. NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC OPLAN 20-61, 30 Nov 1961, and Annex C, 15 Dec 1961 [Doc 405 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; ADCM 65-6, "Logistic Support Plan for Improving ADC Alert Posture," 1 Jan 1962 [Doc 418 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP 2114, ADC to Air Divs, 29 Sep 1961 [Doc 419 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADPDC-A 2249, ADC to CONAC, 13 Oct 1961 [Doc 420 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADOOP-P 86, ADC to NGB, 11 Jan 1962 [Doc 421 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Rehearsal of ADC presentation to Annual National Guard Conference at Knoxville, Tennessee, 24-27 Apr 1962, 20 Apr 1962.

SAC units or SAGE facilities. The list was subsequently revised and expanded in collaboration with NORAD planners so that by August it included tentative dispersal bases for all squadrons concerned. Authorization to survey Navy bases proposed as dispersal bases was not granted until late that same month; and not until September were surveys permitted of proposed dispersal bases in Canada. As the months progressed, and suitability surveys continued, the dispersal list underwent considerable revision. Fallon Naval Air Station was dropped, for example, because the Navy intended to use it in connection with a Navy dispersal plan. Though further changes were probable in 1962, suitable dispersal sites had been picked for the majority of squadrons by the end of 1961. Of 36 dispersal bases selected (certain bases would serve two squadrons), 14 were in Canada and belonged to either the Department of Transport or the RCAF. Six of those in the U.S. were assigned various commands of USAF, five were controlled by the Navy, a like number were ANG bases, another five were civilian airfields and one belonged to the Marine Corps. * Where agreements permitted, familiarization and turnaround flights were conducted to test dispersal base facilities and services.

* See Appendix A, Fighter Dispersal Station List, 15 Dec 1961.

7. ADC Plan, "Support Concept and Requirements for

~~SECRET~~

Increased Alert. The command's dispersal program, and the increased alert posture necessitated to realize the objectives of dispersal, profoundly affected the activities and programming of ADC's manned interceptor force during 1962-63.

Soon after the turn of the year (1962), the increased alert program, which helped determine the success or failure of the interceptor dispersal program, began in earnest. Before a third of each squadron U.E. aircraft could disperse on short notice to survive an ICBM attack, it was clear, as

[Cont'd] Fighter Interceptor/War Readiness Materiel Survivability Program," ca. August 1961 [Doc 403 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC OPLAN 20-61, "Fighter Dispersal/Increased Alert Plan," 30 Nov 1961, and Annex C, 15 Dec 1961 [Doc 405 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; ADCM 27-2, Vol II, 15 Apr 1961, Chg G, 18 Oct 1961, and Chg I, 19 Dec 1961 [HRF]; Msg ADOOP 1651, ADC to Air Divs, 7 Aug 1961 [Doc 422 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADODC 1787, ADC to Air Divs, 24 Aug 1961 [Doc 423 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADMLP 1824, ADC to AFLC, 30 Aug 1961, [Doc 424 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADMDC 1845, ADC to Air Divs, 1 Sep 1961 [Doc 425 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP 1935, ADC to Air Divs, 13 Sep 1961 [Doc 426 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-PT 2337, ADC to 28 AD, 24 Oct 1961 [Doc 427 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADOOP-PT 2368, ADC to TAC, 25 Oct 1961 [Doc 428 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg 30 OOP S-6352-61, 30 AD to ADC, 1 Dec 1961 [Doc 429 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-PT 2786, ADC to AFLC, 12 Dec 1961 [Doc 430 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADMLP-A 1981, ADC to Air Divs, 18 Sep 1961 [Doc 431 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961].

~~SECRET~~

mentioned above, that considerably more interceptors would have to be placed on standby alert than the few traditionally assigned this duty. Accordingly, starting in February 1962, one-third the possessed interceptors of each squadron assumed an alert status of 15 minutes or less, with two of them standing the usual five-minute identification alerts equipped with non-nuclear armament while the others (numbering generally four in 18 U.E. and six in 24 U.E. squadrons) were armed with primary nuclear weapons. Division commanders were permitted to reduce the alert commitment of a squadron, however, for purposes of accomplishing tests, conversions, training programs, modifications, and ORI's requiring use of more tactical aircraft than obtainable from the squadron's reserve of uncommitted interceptors. Along with increased alert came a substantial increase in overtime to support the additional workload, about which commanders were cautioned not to work individuals more than 75 hours per week, if possible.⁸

8. NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADCCR 157, ADC to Air Divs, 19 Jan 1962 [DOC 1]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-WI 274, ADC to Air Divs, 31 Jan 1962 [DOC 2]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-WI 424, ADC to Air Divs, 13 Feb 1962 [DOC 3]; Msg ADMDC 465, ADC to USAF, 15 Feb 1962 [DOC 4]; Msg ADOOP-WI 948, ADC to USAF, 10 Apr 1962 [DOC 5]; ADCM 65-6, "Logistic Support Plan for Improving ADC Alert Posture," 1 Jun 1962 [DOC 6].

To evaluate each squadron's ability to maintain one-third of its effective force on full-time alert, travelling inspection teams conducted Alert Force Capability Tests on interceptor units without benefit of advance notice. Only those aircraft and aircrews assigned to alert duty were involved. Armament rails were checked and evaluated, written examinations were given aircrews on alert, and alert aircraft and aircrews, with nuclear armament removed, were scrambled against high and low-altitude targets. Alert Force Capability Tests were conducted on six squadrons during late 1962, with overall success rates ranging from 25 to 100 per cent, averaging out at 63 per cent for all six.

What tribulations experienced in implementing the increased alert program seemed mild compared to those endured while trying to realize an effective dispersal program. The extensive programming and scheduling that dispersal entailed involved not only major readjustments to the existing interceptor force (like that caused by the increased alert portion), but also revamping of the air defense superstructure,

-
9. NOFORN, Msg ADCIG 2326, ADC to 30 AD, 31 Aug 1962
[DOC 7]; NOFORN, Msg ADCIG 2325, ADC to 29 AD, 31 Aug 1962
[DOC 8]; NOFORN, Msg ADCIG 2794, ADC to 28 AD, 19 Oct 1962
[DOC 9]; NOFORN, Msg ADCIG 2797, ADC to 28 AD, 19 Oct 1962
[DOC 10]; NOFORN, Msg ADCIG 3466, ADC to 28 AD, 13 Dec 1962
[DOC 11]; NOFORN, Msg ADCIG 2795, ADC to 28 AD, 19 Oct 1962
[DOC 12].

involving the acquisition of more people, facilities and money. Eventually, dispersal spelled an end to two of ADC's interceptor squadrons, and uprooted and relocated several others. Elements of the Air Force reserve were affected as well.

*

Phase I and Phase II Interim Dispersal. Although dispersal bases had been selected by the beginning of 1962 (as stipulated in ADC Operations Plan 20-61, 30 Nov 1961), which could satisfactorily fill Phase I requirements -- the reservicing of one-third the tactical aircraft of a parent squadron on a one-time basis -- ADC, nevertheless, was faced with a need to select and use certain interim bases. Over half the 36 dispersal bases listed as acceptable at the beginning of 1962 (on the basis of preliminary surveys, fallout studies and targeting reports) belonged either to Canada or the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Until USAF could consummate formal agreements with Canadian and U.S. Navy officials regarding these bases, ADC was directed to pick interim bases in the United States for use as substitute dispersal bases

* Phase I Dispersal: Personnel familiarization with dispersal base and capacity to turnaround (i.e., refuel and relaunch without loading missiles), within two hours, one-third the aircraft from the parent squadron on a one-time recovery bases, so as to enable them to accomplish one sortie apiece with existing armament loads. Phase II Dispersal: Capacity to reservice one-third of the aircraft from the

during Phase I, and as events turned out, Phase II of the dispersal program, particularly for those squadrons collocated with SAC units. The interim plan called for ADC to develop a two-hour turnaround capability at about 15 dispersal bases. USAF thereupon authorized \$1,066,000 for Aerospace Ground Equipment in support of Phase I dispersal; so before the AGE could be requisitioned for prepositioning, ADC was forced to grapple anew with the problems of choosing dispersal bases. Before spring arrived, however, the worst of the difficulties had been ironed out. By doubling up at certain bases previously selected (with sometimes as many as four squadrons assigned a single dispersal base) and adding certain new ones, including Hector Field at Fargo North Dakota and Logan Field, at Billings, Montana, 12 bases were designated to serve as dispersal bases for 24 squadrons collocated with SAC units, which met with USAF approval for use during the first two phases of dispersal. As time went on, the list was revised and expanded to include more squadrons. In certain cases, notably fighter squadrons based near the U.S.-Canadian border, interceptors were required to disperse

[Cont'd] parent squadron within two hours, and re-arm them with one reload of conventional (non-nuclear) armament to support two sorties per aircraft during a 24-hour period. See Appendix B, Dispersal Bases, Including Interim Bases, effective 15 Jan 1963.

southward instead of the preferred northerly direction. By the end of 1962, 22 dispersal bases had been designated to accomodate portions of 32 squadrons. * Since formal agreements for use of Canadian and Navy-Marine Corps bases were still pending at the end of 1962, the interim arrangement had to serve for whatever interceptor dispersals were actually ordered during 1962. By the autumn of 1962, a Phase I capability was attained at the 12 paramount dispersal bases for handling interceptors from 24 squadrons collocated with SAC units. Other dispersal bases reached a Phase I capability besides. In preparation for achieving Phase II interim dispersal in 1963, funds were released for requisitioning second-phase AGE. By year's end, 72 per cent of Phase II AGE was available.¹⁰

Meanwhile, Phase I and II dispersal tests had been scheduled chiefly to evaluate the use of Air Force Reserve

* See Appendix B, p. 4 for list of interim dispersal bases and the parent squadrons whom they served.

10. NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADCVC 305, ADC to Air Divs, 2 Feb 1962 [DOC 13]; Msg 97834, USAF to AFLC, 1 Feb 1962 [DOC 14]; Msg ADODC 673, ADC to 29 AD, 9 Mar 1962 [DOC 15]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-P 698, ADC to USAF, 13 Mar 1962 [DOC 16]; Msg ADOOP-P 1688, ADC to SAC, 20 Jun 1962 [DOC 17]; Msg ADMDC 2046, ADC to MOAMA, 1 Aug 1962 [DOC 18]; Msg ADMDC 3327, ADC to Air Divs, 30 Nov 1962 [DOC 19]; Msg ADMLP-A 3172, ADC to USAF, 19 Nov 1962 [DOC 20]; Msg ADMLP-A 40, ADC to USAF, 4 Jan 1963 [DOC 21]; ADC, Prog Mgt Div, Weekly Act Rept, 20-26 Jul 1962 [HRF].

~~SECRET~~

Recovery units (AFRR) to furnish most of the manpower for servicing interceptors at dispersal bases. Phase I tests were conducted in early 1962 at Walla Walla City-County Airport, Washington, where AGE was positioned and about 15 ADC supervisory personnel were sent to assist the Reservists. Approximately six F-102A's at a time from the 460th FIS (Portland) were rotated to Walla Walla at various times between February and April. Despite their cooperativeness, eagerness and willingness to learn, the Reservists first proved awkward, and unskilled in performing the turnaround functions. Both the F-102A and its ground support equipment were alien to them. At the beginning, only five of more than 50 participating Reservists were qualified to perform the tasks assigned them, emphasizing the vital need for extensive formal training. As the Reservists at Walla Walla gained more knowledge about their jobs from ADC supervisors, and gained more familiarity, from experience, with the aircraft and equipment, their performance improved. This was evidenced by the sharp decline in average turnaround time from 59 minutes, during the earliest tests, to 18 minutes at the end of the test period, by which time the Reservists were capable of handling 90 per cent of the turnaround functions. The Phase I test, therefore, demonstrated that

~~SECRET~~

Reservists could perform an important role in the dispersal
11
program if given adequate OJT and practice.

Tests to determine if AFRR units could accomplish Phase II dispersal tasks (involving the rearming of interceptors with conventional GAR rockets) were cancelled partly because of this lack of formal training and partly because of inadequacies in the AFRR manning structure. A high priority was assigned to the training of AFRR units in servicing "dispersed" ADC interceptors during their two-weeks summer encampments. The results of such training as was given during July and August left something to be desired, chiefly because so few Reservists were selected for the training. ADC, meanwhile, in collaboration with ConAC, drafted plans that envisioned the assignment of at least one AFRR unit, redesignated DARR (Dispersal Aircraft Recovery Reconstitution) unit to each dispersal base. Advance interceptor support training and practice proved its worth later that year when, in October 1962, both DARR and ANG elements were jointly tested at

11. Msg 97834, USAF to AFLC, 1 Feb 1962 [DOC 14];
Msg 250OP 87-G, 25 AD to ADC, 15 Feb 1962 [DOC 22]; Msg
25OPP 242-G, 25 AD to ADC, 26 Apr 1962 [DOC 23].

Fresno. Both demonstrated the feasibility of cooperatively supporting an ADC dispersal posture with combined reserve¹² forces.

Phase I dispersal received its severest test from 22 October to 27 November 1962, during the Cuban crisis. Not only were interceptors from several fighter squadrons deployed to bases in Florida to stave off any attacks emanating from Cuba, but also about one-fifth of the regular interceptor force -- 169 nuclear-armed interceptors -- deployed from 28 squadrons on an emergency basis to 16 dispersal bases to enhance interceptor survivability in event of an ICBM attack.* Although each dispersal base, in lacking advance preparations, presented problems of some kind to the dispersed contingents, no difficulties proved so formidable as to be unresponsive to change. A satisfactory working relationship was established

12. Msg ADOOP-P 1371, ADC to Air Divs, 18 May 1962 [DOC 24]; Msg ADOOP-P 1521, ADC to Air Divs, 5 Jun 1962 [DOC 25]; Msg ADPDP-PW 287, ADC to Air Divs, 29 Jan 1963 [DOC 26]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADOOP, "Primary Interest for Dispersal Recovery and Reconstitution (DARR) Unit Support of ADC Dispersal Concepts," 2 Jan 1963 [DOC 27].

* For a complete account, see ADC Historical Study No. 15, The Air Defense Command in the Cuban Crisis, October-December 1962.

at all dispersal bases within a short time after the arrival
13
of dispersed contingents.

*

Phase III Permanent Dispersal. While the subject of interim Phase I and II dispersal sites and activities was virtually settled by mid-1962, the more important question of what actually constituted Phase III was aired for the rest of the year. Permanent dispersal sites, including those in Canada, were involved, because fixed facilities, such as ready aircraft shelters and armament storage and test installations for nuclear weapons, were programmed for construction between mid-1963 and mid-1965, at a cost figuring in millions of dollars.

Earlier in the year, ADC had introduced for USAF and DOD approval a substantial change in the concept of Phase III dispersal, which allowed for the eventuality that 15 minutes

13. ADC Draft, "Remarks at Commanders' Conference,"
29 Nov 1962 [DOC 28].

* Phase III Dispersal: Capacity to reservice four to six aircraft continuously deployed, on a rotational basis, at each dispersal base, and provision them with enough nuclear as well as conventional armament, together with fuel, oxygen and other ground support items, to enable each interceptor to conduct eight combat sorties during a five-day period. Moreover, to accommodate an additional third of the parent squadron's interceptors in the event 12-hour strategic warning time is available.

~~SECRET~~

advance warning of an ICBM attack (upon which all phases of dispersal had originally been premised) might not be forthcoming after all. Foreseeing the possibility of an attack by submarine-launched missiles (SLBM's) fired simultaneously with ICBM's arcing their way across the north polar region (the presence and course of which would be detected, and announced by the BMEWS network), but impacting on target a good deal sooner than the land-launched ICBM's, ADC preferred to implement "permanent," as opposed to emergency, Phase III dispersal. Instead of "flushing" half a squadron's interceptors from home base upon receiving early warning, for recovery at either home base or the dispersal base (depending on which survived), as Phase III dispersal plans originally called for at the end of 1961, nearly one-third of the interceptors from each squadron collocated with SAC or SAGE elements would be based continuously, on a rotating schedule, at the squadron's dispersal base. Furthermore, this would preclude ADC interceptors, during emergency situations, having to yield to SAC bombers for aircraft flushing priority at those bases housing elements from both commands. Interceptors so deployed, numbering either four (from squadrons assigned 18 U.E. aircraft) or six (from squadrons assigned 24), would be rotated every 48 hours, with half the contingent trading places each

~~SECRET~~

day with replacements from home base. While home base, during this third and final phase of dispersal, would probably maintain two interceptors on five-minute alert, the full contingent of the dispersed aircraft would be capable, if directed by NORAD, of being placed on 15-minute alert status at the dispersal base. They might be "flushed," similar to that stipulated in the preceding Phase III dispersal plan, if warning of an ICBM attack was provided, but they would flush from the dispersal base instead of from home base, then recover at whichever survived.

The two aircraft on five-minute alert at home base would also be flushed, then recover at the surviving base too. Moreover, in accordance with ADC thinking, if strategic 12-hour advance warning was available, an additional third of the parent squadron's tactical aircraft would disperse to the Phase III dispersal base, leaving, in effect, less than half the interceptors originally based at top-priority targets facing the prospect of destruction. Thus about one-third with some advance warning, and over half with strategic warning, of the entire interceptor force would survive obliteration by first-wave and perhaps second-wave ICBM attacks for combating ensuing waves of manned bombers approaching from any or all directions. As for the servicing requirements spelled out in the Phase III dispersal plan, as revised, practically

everything remained unchanged: permanent Phase III dispersal bases were to contain facilities, armament and ground support personnel enough to refuel, service and provision each dispersed interceptor with conventional and nuclear armament for undertaking eight combat sorties per aircraft during a five-day period. To fit the new permanent dispersal concept within the budgetary framework established by the JCS, ten less dispersal bases and five less squadrons than previously planned were included in the revised proposal, so that, instead of contingents from 39 squadrons dispersing to 36 Phase III dispersal bases, elements from 34 squadrons would deploy to 26 dispersal bases. The formative reasons and logic justifying these and other changes, together with a list of squadrons and dispersal bases, were embodied in the ADC Operation Plan 20-62, published 1 May 1962 and thereupon submitted for approval.¹⁴

* Twenty of the 34 squadrons were collocated with SAC bombers or missiles; the other 14 were collocated with SAC tankers, SAGE Centers or were situated near important urban areas. Of the 26 dispersal bases, 9 were in Canada and 17 in the U.S., five of which belonged to the Navy and Marine Corps, nine to civilian authorities and three to the Air Force and Air National Guard.

14. NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC OPLAN 20-61, "Fighter Dispersal/Increased Alert Plan," 30 Nov 1961 [Doc 404 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; ADC Briefing re: Revised Dispersal Plan, 27 Apr 1962; NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC OPLAN 20-62, "Fighter Dispersal/Increased Alert Plan," 1 May 1962 [HRF].

A test of the Phase III permanent dispersal plan, as outlined in the new plan, was conducted from 24 July through 4 August 1962. A contingent of F-101B's from the 75th FIS (DOW) was continuously deployed, on a rotating basis, at Niagara Falls Municipal Airport to ascertain whether or not the manning, facilities, equipment and operating concepts, as stipulated in Plan 20-62, were in accord with actual needs. The process of flushing and recovering the dispersed F-101B's (along with the two at home base on five-minute alert) was tested, as was the process of accomodating another third of the F-101B's from the 75th FIS when 12 hour strategic warning was given. All facets of the test proved out satisfactorily. Aircrew training at home base was found adequate despite the loss of interceptors to Niagara; alert commitments both at Dow and Niagara were successfully met; interceptor sortie effectiveness remained high; and the equipment, spares and personnel prepositioned at Niagara proved sufficient. Among the recommendations stemming from the test was one to hike the aircrew ratio from 1.2 to 1.5 aircrews per plane to help reduce the workload and excessive overtime confronting aircrews at Phase III dispersal sites. Further tests of Phase III

permanent dispersal, to include an F-102A and F-106A squadron¹⁵ besides an F-101B squadron, were planned for 1963.

Programming Changes for the Interceptor Force in 1963.

ADC's revised dispersal plan was eventually approved but not without first encountering strong opposition from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, undergoing conspicuous changes, and exacting a formidable toll on the ADC interceptor force of the future. When first considering ADC's revised dispersal plan, the DOD balked at swallowing the permanent dispersal concept, which it promptly disapproved. Concerned, moreover, lest 26 dispersal bases not be enough to save the flower of the nation's interceptors, the DOD insisted on readying 30 dispersal bases instead. To top it all, DOD wanted four brand new home bases besides, removed far from the dangers of an initial ICBM attack, where four F-101B/F-106A squadrons then collocated with SAC bombers could transfer permanently. But costs to provide four new air bases fully fledged to support an air defense mission were staggering; ADC estimated it would take nearly 190 million dollars -- about four times

15. Msg ADOOP-SS 1906, ADC to TAC, 18 Jul 1962 [DOC 29]; Msg 26MLP7-212, 26 AD to ADC, 19 Jul 1962 [DOC 30]; 26 AD, Test Report 62-19 Phase III Dispersal/Increased Alert ADC Operations Plan 20-62 (1 May 1962) 13 Aug 1962 [DOC 31].

more than what ADC's revised plan calling for permanent dispersal, would cost. Approximately 45 million dollars was actually approved by USAF for the program about this same time (although Congress had not, as of then, appropriated any funds for interceptor dispersal). ADC countered early in November with a plan that was accomplishable within USAF's authorized funding figures, yet would satisfy DOD's hankering for more dispersal bases. The compromise plan, which was approved by USAF and DOD in December, (1) ruled out the procurement of four new home bases, (2) reinstated the Phase III goal for permanent dispersal, and (3) provided for permanent dispersal of 38 (of 40) squadrons to 30 dispersal bases rather than 34 (of 42) squadrons to 26 dispersal bases. The 30 dispersal bases would house the facilities and manpower to fulfill essentially the same mission requirements spelled out in the previous plan, including the interceptor alert postures both at the home bases and dispersal bases, the plan for rotating the contingent of 4 to 6 interceptors continuously deployed at dispersal sites, and the provision for dispersing another third of the parent squadron's interceptors in case 12-hour strategic warning was available. To pay for this expanded program in terms of both money and manpower, ADC agreed to make several sacrifices in a giant checker-like game

~~SECRET~~

stretching clear across country, involving squadron jumps from base to base and two squadrons -- the 83rd FIS (flying the F-101B at Hamilton) and the 76th FIS (flying the F-102A at Westover) -- by discontinuing in 1963 -- being totally counted out. As an integral part of this compromise, ADC announced it would evacuate two bases vulnerable to an ICBM attack: Andrews AFB because of its nearness to Washington, D.C.; and Spokane International Airport because of its collocation with SAC retaliatory forces. During 1963, the 98th FIS would transfer its F-101B's from Dover to Suffolk and double up with the 2nd FIS (then flying F-101B's at Suffolk) to make way for the 95th FIS (stationed at Andrews) to transfer its F-106A's to Dover. About the same time, the 498th FIS would foresake Spokane as its home base to double up with the 318th FIS, another F-106A squadron, at McChord. As soon as USAF and DOD had approved ADC's revised dispersal plan, as amended, these changes, together with the remaining unchanged portions approved, were incorporated in ADC Operation Plan 20-63, published 15 January 1963. A test of Phase III portions of Plan 20-63 was scheduled to take place in 1963. The sum of 45 million dollars was included in the President's budget request for building facilities during FY 1964 at the 30 Phase III dispersal bases, nine of which

~~SECRET~~

were in Canada and 21 in the U.S. Although surveys of the Canadian bases were conducted at mid-1962, negotiations for their use, and for use of Navy bases in the U.S., were still incomplete at year's end. Predicated on the belief that these negotiations would soon end satisfactorily, a target date of 1 July 1963 was established for beginning permanent dispersal, about the same time that construction of Phase III fixed facilities was supposed to get underway. At the turn of the year (1962-1963), 1300 manning spaces were authorized to carry out portions of the dispersal program, and a detachment for each of the 30 dispersal bases, comprised for a time of only one officer and one airman, was organized effective 1 January 1963.

16. Msg AFOOP-BW 85527, USAF to ADC, 25 Sep 1962 [DOC 32]; Msg ADOOP-P 2950, ADC to USAF, 30 Oct 1962 [DOC 33]; Msg AFOOP-DE 93740, USAF to ADC, 30 Oct 1962 [DOC 34]; Msg AFOOP-DE 93982, USAF to ADC, 31 Oct 1962 [DOC 35]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADCCS 3075, ADC to USAF, 8 Nov 1962 [DOC 36]; Msg ADMLP-A 3172, ADC to USAF, 19 Nov 1962 [DOC 37]; Msg AFOOP-DE 61225, USAF to ADC, 11 Dec 1962 [DOC 38]; Msg AFOOP-BU 61901, USAF to ADC, 13 Dec 1962 [DOC 39]; Msg AFOOP-DE 63453, USAF to ADC, 20 Dec 1962 [DOC 40]; Msg ADMLP-A 40, ADC to USAF, 4 Jan 1963 [DOC 41]; NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC OPLAN 20-63, "Fighter Dispersal Plan," 15 Jan 1963 [DOC 42]; ADC, Prog Mgt Div, Weekly Act Rept, 26 Oct-1 Nov and 30 Nov-6 Dec 1962 and ADLSP-P, 14 Dec 1962 [HRF]; ADC Daily Staff Digest No. 195, 27 Dec 1962 [HRF]; FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA, USAF, Current Status Reports, Nov 1962, p. III-2 [DOC 43]; and January 1963, p. III-1 [DOC 44]; FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA, ADC to ADC Staff Agencies, "USAF Current Status Report, Oct 1962," 30 Nov 1962, p. 1 [DOC 45].

~~SECRET~~

1963 - 1964. By early 1963, the outlook for the dispersal program looked bright. The Secretary of Defense had carefully pondered, then approved, ADC's compromise for achieving the ultimate goal of permanent dispersal. Ostensibly, everything was heading toward an early, happy, fulfillment. What actually ensued, however, differed from this hopeful prospect; the path to permanent dispersal proved thorny. Trouble sprang from several directions, involving not only SAC and the Canadian government, but also a fast-changing domestic situation. Personnel and equipment requirements needed further straightening out. Much energy, and considerable time, were expended working out ways for engineering dispersal bases so as to accommodate, for the least cost, the most in facilities. Discontented with restrictions imposed on the tactical-ferrying (by interceptor) of nuclear armament, ADC sought to relax the grip of directives governing such matters. While beset by these and similar problems, which set off whole trains of rethinking, replanning and, sometimes, reprogramming, ADC found that none of them were so insuperable as to permanently thwart, let alone disable and end, progress leading toward permanent dispersal. Nevertheless, they slowed down the processes. The July 1963 target date set for Phase III implementation was missed by a wide margin of

~~SECRET~~

time -- shoved back at least a year from realization. ADC, however, enjoyed the consolation of knowing that the permanent dispersal concept had itself become firmly entrenched doctrine along the spectrum of command, to remain, with few exceptions, practically the same as expounded in ADC Operation Plan 20-63 (January 1963). Secretary of Defense McNamara, who all along had endorsed a dispersal program of some sort for ADC, stressed the necessity for permanent dispersal to members of Congress. Indeed, even President Kennedy himself went on record as favoring ADC's dispersal program. With this kind of support, how could the dispersal program lose? ADC could also rest comfortable in the assurance that an early-phase dispersal had actually been accomplished during the Cuban crisis -- resulting in an interceptor posture that, because it was spread thin, was capable of surviving a sudden ICBM attack. Moreover, this particular dispersal, which had involved nuclear armaments, was carried out without abnormally endangering lives or property, or causing other provocations that might jeopardize the program by stirring doubts among civilian authorities in the Pentagon and White House.

17

17. John F. Kennedy, "Statement on National Defense in the FY 1963 Budget," Army, Navy Air Force Journal, Vol 99 (20 Jan 1962), pp. 4, 13; St. Louis Post Dispatch, 7 Feb 1962;

Troublesome Times. As if competing to see who could stick the sharpest thorn in ADC's side, Canada and SAC offered all kinds of complications to the dispersal program. Canada, for its part, was not quite certain what it wanted; SAC was all too sure. Problems with SAC arose during the emergency dispersal resulting from the Cuban crisis of late 1962. No sooner were numbers of ADC interceptors settled (though none too comfortably) at certain dispersal bases, than SAC bombers, without ADC's advance knowledge, swarmed to four of them to take refuge, too. Contingents of SAC bombers turned up at six of ADC's home bases, besides, again unannounced (and uninvited), wanting the dispersal treatment. * It seemed as if the primary cause precipitating the departure of large portions of ADC's interceptors was following close on their heels, to hound them wherever they took refuge -- a case of

[Cont'd] Robert S. McNamara, Statement of Sec of Def on FY 1965-69 Defense Program and FY 1965 Defense Department Budget, n.d., ca. Feb 1964, p. 48, Robert S. McNamara, House of Representatives, Hearing of Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1964, n.d. ca., Mar 1963, Part 1, p. 123; House Hearings on Defense Department Appropriations for FY 1963, Part 1, 19 Jan 1962, pp. 370-71.

* Admittedly, SAC's dispersal needs were considerably less than ADC's, lasting, as they did, only a few hours, and comprising, in effect, a brief layover with recourse to but minimum servicing.

the fire chasing evacuees trying hard to escape getting burned. The question was also raised by the Cuban operation as to whether or not interceptors ordered to be flushed at home bases containing SAC units, could indeed become airborne within 15 minutes following BMEWS warning. Since SAC bombers were also dispersing under the same threat conditions from the same bases, there existed the aspect of runway congestion, and even of runway monopolization, by the huge bombers. With one-third of the interceptor force permanently dispersed once Phase III dispersal was completed, this second problem would, for the most part, become academic. But the first problem, despite ADC's strongest objections during 1963 and USAF's sympathetic responses, was destined to dog the command for as long as SAC felt a need to employ certain ADC home and dispersal bases for its bombers. SAC, fortunately, showed signs of mitigating part of the difficulty by reducing the
18
number of bases involved.

18. Msg ADODC, ADC to Air Divs, 18 Sep 1962 [DOC 46]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADOOP, "Commander's Visit to East Coast Bases," n.d., ca. Oct 1962 [DOC 47]; Ltr, ADC to Air Divs, "Fighter Flushing at ADC/SAC Collocated Bases," 8 Oct 1962 [DOC 48]; Msg ADODC 720, ADC to USAF, 11 Mar 1963 [DOC 49]; Msg ADODC 721, ADC to 30 AD, 11 Mar 1963 [DOC 50]; Msg AFXOPC 85874, USAF to ADC, 20 Mar 1963 [DOC 51]; Msg DOPLP 6996, SAC to ADC, 14 Sep 1963 [DOC 52]; Msg ADODC 5074, ADC to SAC and USAF, 24 Sep 1963 [DOC 53]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADODC 5448, ADC to USAF, 23 Oct 1963 [DOC 54]; Checklist, ADOOP, "Collocation of Other Commands with ADC Dispersal Bases," 14 Oct 1963




~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT~~

~~1054~~

~~SECRET~~




~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT~~

~~1954~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



As if things were not complicated enough by the SAC and Canadian situations, a whole flurry of changes were generated among the 21 dispersal bases inside continental United States. Either certain bases were disqualified from use, like the San Clemente Island Naval Air Base, California (because of air traffic volume), and Grenier Field, New Hampshire (for reasons of safety and economy), or, as in most instances they were traded between squadrons (because of Division and SAGE boundary realignments and squadron moves). Near the end

[Cont'd] "Dispersal Base Requirements in Canada," n.d., ca. 6 Feb 1963 [DOC 64]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-P 450, ADC to USAF, 9 Feb 1963 [DOC 65]; NOFORN, Msg AFOAP 80238, USAF to ADC, 28 Feb 1963 [DOC 66]; NOFORN, Msg ADOOP-P 644, ADC to Air Divs, 5 Mar 1963 [DOC 67]; Talking Paper, ADOOP, "ADC Dispersal Bases in Canada," n.d., ca. 22 May 1963 [DOC 68]; Msg AFXOPN 66602, USAF to ADC, 31 May 1963 [DOC 69]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADAAC, et al, "Joint ADC/RCAF Operations," n.d., ca. 31 May 1963 [DOC 70]; Ltr, ADCCR to Lt Gen David Burchinal, ca. 18 Jun 1963 [DOC 71]; RESTRICTED DATA, Msg ADCCR 2040, ADC to USAF, 4 Jun 1963 and Atch [DOC 72]; NOFORN, Msg ADCCR 2138, ADC to USAF, 13 Jun 1963 [DOC 73]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADODC, "Fighter Dispersal," ca. 13 Jun 1963 [DOC 74]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-P 2574, ADC to Air Divs, 1 Jul 1963 [DOC 75]; Msg ADOOP-P 2696, ADC to Air Divs, 14 Jul 1963 [DOC 76]; NOFORN, Msg ADCIG-S 5170, ADC to USAF, 3 Oct 1963 [DOC 77]; Memo for Record, ADOOP, "Future Development of Namao," 4 Oct 1963 [DOC 78]; Msg AFXOPN 68770, USAF to ADC, 5 Nov 1963 [DOC 79]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADODC 5896, ADC to USAF, 12 Dec 1963 [DOC 80]; IOC, from ADOOP-P, "Canadian Fighter Dispersal Program," ca. Mar 1964 [DOC 81]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADCCS, "Request for Briefing Canadian Fighter Dispersal Program," 18 Mar 1964 [DOC 82]; Ltr and Atch, ADC to USAF, "Aircraft Dispersal," 30 Mar 1964 [DOC 83]; ADC, ADOAC, Weekly Act Rept, 13-19 Dec 1963 [HRF].

of 1962, USAF instructed the command to premise subsequent dispersal planning on an AFLC survivability study released 5 October 1962. This sent ADC scurrying for added dispersal base coverage (within the 30-base limitation) since the AFLC study included all ADC bases as ICBM targets after FY 1964, necessitating dispersal even for the one or so ADC interceptor squadrons in the U.S. theretofore exempted. Certain dispersal bases in the program, like Niagara Falls MAP, New York, were classed by this same study with top priority targets having little likelihood of surviving an ICBM attack. This gave dispersal planners second thoughts about them, causing them to consider substitute bases (though in the case of Niagara, no suitable substitute was found). The readjustments to the overall interceptor force structure (spelled out in detail above) were implemented in 1963. And the consequent loss of two squadrons along with the relocation of others, obviously, created corresponding alterations in the dispersal picture. Division commanders wanted still further revisions, due to dissatisfactions of one kind or another. Changes and proposed changes had come so thick and fast that it became easier to count the few dispersal bases unaffected by substitutions, by realignment, by elimination, or by the interim base program, than the multitude that were, including some, like Siskiyou,

that changed hands several times. In the 27 or so months between January 1962 and April 1964, not over half a dozen of the original group in all the U.S. and Canada -- about one-fifth -- escaped changes of some sort. ADC, of course, profited by these changes, obtaining at some places -- notably in Canada -- well-equipped substitute bases originally ruled out as prospective bases because they had contained SAC retaliatory forces, but later eligible because the SAC units had moved elsewhere. But each change, and proposed change, regardless of what advantages accrued, necessitated extensive soul-searching, often combined with expensive surveys, since costs averaging over 1.5 million per base were involved before Phase III permanent dispersal could be realized. Proposed changes meeting with ADC's favor had then to run through the gantlet of USAF, DOD and Congressional scrutiny before final authorization and funding were consummated. Worried lest USAF grow exasperated at this constant rearrangement of a seemingly fluid dispersal program, ADC tried hard to call a halt to it late in 1963. ADC told each division, in effect, not to ask for further revisions to the program unless issues of momentous import were at stake. Things soon calmed down, so that the program, by early 1964, began to assume a more lasting shape. Notwithstanding this, a decrease

of \$6 million in FY 1964 MCP funds for dispersal forced
 *
 still other changes in the total dispersal structure, which
 USAF, in May 1964, accepted on condition that no further
 20
 changes would follow.

* Compare dispersal programs over a three-year span, as reflected in Appendices A (15 Dec 1961), B (15 Jan 1963) and C (1 Jan 1964). Since the last schedule dated 1 Jan 1964, Grenier and Gander have been dropped and Patrick seriously considered for deletion.

20. Ltr and Atchs, ADC to Air Divs, "ADC Fighter Dispersal Program," 3 Jan 1963 [DOC 84]; Msg AFOOP-PC 67748, USAF to SAC, 11 Jan 1963 [DOC 85]; Ltr and Atch, ADC to Maj Gen Thomas Gent, Jr., 32 AD, "Fighter Dispersal," Jan 1963 [DOC 86]; ADC, Mins of Mtg, "Fighter Dispersal Conference - 13 Feb 1963," n.d., ca. 15 Feb 1963 [DOC 87]; IOC, ADOOP-P to Ftr Disp Working Group, "Home Base/Dispersal Base Realignment," 15 Feb 1963 [DOC 88]; Msg AFOAP-BU 75730, USAF to CNO, 11 Feb 1963 [DOC 89]; Msg ADOOP-P 850, ADC to USAF, 21 Mar 1963 [DOC 90]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADLSP, "Annual Revision of Vol II (ADC Operaion Program), ADCM 27-2, ca. Mar 1963 [DOC 91]; Msg ADOOP-P 1659, ADC to USAF, 25 Apr 1963 [DOC 92]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADOOP et al, "Fighter Dispersal," 5 Apr 1963 [DOC 93]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADODC, "28 Air Div Deployments," ca. 18 Apr 1963 [DOC 94]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADOAC, "Fighter Dispersal," 29 Apr 1963 [DOC 95]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-P 2053 and Atch, ADC to 25 and 28 Air Divs, 28 May 1963 [DOC 96]; Msg ADOOP-P 2013, ADC to USAF, 31 May 1963 [DOC 97]; Ltr and Atchs, ADC to USAF, "USAF Basic Dispersal List," 13 Jun 1963 [DOC 98]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADODC, "USAF Basic Dispersal List," ca. Jun 1963 [DOC 99]; Msg ADOOP-P 2031, ADC to 26 AD, 4 Jun 1963 [DOC 100]; Msg ADOOP-P 2929, ADC to USAF, 9 Aug 1963 [DOC 101]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADODC, "Fresno Dispersal Base," 27 Aug 1963 [DOC 102]; Msg ADOOP-P 4066, ADC to USAF, 11 Sep 1963 [DOC 103]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADOOP, "Fighter Dispersal Survey, Patrick AFB and Marathon Flight Strip, 26-29 Aug 1963," 5 Sep 1963 [DOC 104]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-P 4096, ADC to 28 AD, 11 Sep 1963 [DOC 105]; Ltr and Atch, ADC to Col. Leon Gray, 25 AD "Fighter Dispersal," 30 Sep 1963 [DOC 106]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADODC 5014 and Atch, ADC to 25 and 28 AD, 13 Sep 1963 [DOC 107]; Msg 2600P-W,

Against this background of wholesale reshuffling and, in part, due to it, scheduled construction and installation work lagged drastically behind forecasts and projections. Originally, ADC was hopeful that such construction as was necessary for Phase III dispersal would get under way at mid-1963. At least three bases in the U.S., besides others in Canada, already contained enough facilities to satisfy, or practically satisfy, Phase III demands. Most of the 30 dispersal bases, however, required some very significant additions. Indeed, ADC estimated \$51 million, averaging out at \$1.7 million per base, as essential for amortizing dispersal

[Cont'd] 26 AD to ADC, 23 Sep 1963 [DOC 108]; Draft Msg and Atch, ADOOP-P, 25 Sep 1963 [DOC 109]; Ltr, ADC to Air Divs, "Changes to the ADC Fighter Dispersal Program," 7 Oct 1963 [DOC 110]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADMDC et al, "Changes to the ADC Fighter Dispersal Program," Oct 1963 [DOC 111]; Ltr, ADC to 26 AD, "Fighter Dispersal Program," 6 Nov 1963 [DOC 112]; Msg ADCCS 321, ADC to USAF, 28 Jan 1964 [DOC 113]; Msg ADMLP-AA 460, ADC to Air Div Prov 26, 10 Feb 1963 [DOC 114]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP 721, ADC to USAF, 19 Feb 1963 [DOC 115]; Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Fighter Dispersal," 23 Mar 1964 [DOC 116]; ADC Daily Staff Digest No. 123, 23 Sep 1963 and No. 58, 1 May 1964 [HRF]; ADCPD 64-69, ADC Program Document Bases, Units and Forces 15 Apr 1964, 2-1 to 2-5 [HRF]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-P 1189, ADC to Air Divs, 6 Apr 1964 [DOC 117]; Msg ADCCR 1477, ADC to USAF, 1 May 1964 [DOC 118]; Msg 26OOP-WF 6405-277, 26 AD to ADC, 14 May 1964 [DOC 119]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADODC, ADC to 26 AD, ca. 15 May 1964 [DOC 120]; Ltr from ADOOP-P, "Fighter Dispersal," 18 May 1964 [DOC 121]; Ltr, ADOOP-P to ADOIN, et al, "ADC OPLAN 20-64, Fighter Dispersal," 15 May 1964 [DOC 122].

base construction and installation. USAF and DOD subsequently reduced this amount to \$45 million for FY 1964 MCP spending, which, in March 1963, was accordingly forwarded to Congress for final approval and funding.

The money was to buy a variety of things to enable continuous round-the-clock, all-weather operations by a one-third detachment of interceptors. These included nuclear armament storage facilities, more Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) and other support equipment, and at certain bases, runway extension and repairs. Where absent, TACAN and GCA navigation apparatus, mobile tower facilities, and added communications circuits, were to be installed; where needed, snow removal equipment was to be furnished. BAK-type arresting barriers were to be strung up at several bases.

Anticipating nuclear storage needs, ADC engineers designed a new type of multiple-cell magazine that was comparatively inexpensive and, following detonation tests conducted in April 1963, promised to confine within the immediate vicinity any damage resulting from explosive propagation. The cells were made of an arch of metal resting on a concrete foundation, covered by a layer of earth spread two feet thick over their tops. Each cell was separated from the others by a minimum of 16.5 feet, with fill dirt sandwiched

in between. While 21 AIR-2A's (MB-1's) and AIM-26A's (GAR-11's) would satisfy the requirements of a six-interceptor complement of F-106A's and F-102A's, respectively, it would take 38 AIR-2A's to equip the same number of F-101B's, since the "Voodoo" carried two AIR-2A's per mission.

Around the middle of 1963, the approved force changes were accomplished so that the 76th and 83rd squadrons closed shop and discontinued, while the 95th, 98th and 489th squadrons found new homes. Apart from these force changes -- expressly put into play to save manpower and funds for funnelling into the dispersal program and to pluck squadrons out of top-priority target areas -- the 319th was transferred from Bunker Hill to Florida and, along with the 331st FIS at Webb, re-equipped with F-104's for helping combat the Cuban threat. Despite the manpower and money savings made by these rearrangements, figuring at \$9.5 million annually together with 1580 manpower spaces, construction work could not get going on time. Uncertainties of the Canadian situation combined with the fluid-like conditions at home respecting the dispersal base program, kept planners in a dither trying to stay abreast of the fast-changing scene. On the one hand, all but about five or six per cent of Phases I and II AGE was available for most squadrons by mid-1963,



while on the other, final approval for dispersal base use, together with base support agreements (to insure continuity of housing, messing and other services), were still hanging fire at mid-1963 at a number of places. Worse than this, Congress could not be budged into hastening the appropriation of funds for FY 1964 dispersal construction projects, breeding some degree of anxiety with respect to the financing aspect. After nearly half of FY 1964 had elapsed, Congress, in November 1963, authorized \$45 million for dispersal, but appropriated only \$39 million for FY 1964 MCP use. This \$6 million reduction in expected funding triggered, in late 1963-early 1964, another round of revisions and delays in the construction program. In May 1964, ADC received USAF's approval to postpone for another year construction at two or three bases as well as USAF's authorization to make substitutions for two other bases, in order to reconcile FY 1964 construction costs with the limited \$39 million appropriation. By waiting six months, from October 1963 until March 1964, before finally approving ADC's recommended Communications and Electronics Implementation Plans (CEIP) for dispersal bases, USAF aided in delaying construction progress. Once USAF approval was accomplished in the spring of 1964, GEEIA engineers began conducting dispersal base surveys, thereby opening the way to installation of navigation

facilities later in the year. Personnel to operate and maintain dispersal-base navigation and communications equipment were expected to be in place by 31 July 1965. Indeed, it was this date, 31 July 1965, that was postulated as the new time when a full Phase III capability would exist at all U.S. dispersal bases. ADC aimed to implement a modified Phase III permanent dispersal months beforehand, however, by using substitute facilities and temporary resources.

In November 1963, ADC directed that regular monthly practice test-flights be flown between parent and dispersal bases, to help facilitate the upcoming permanent dispersal posture. Twenty-eight squadrons of ADC's interceptor force were calculated, in early 1964, to have access to Phase I turnaround service or better, at 19 dispersal bases in the U.S., including two interim ones. While Williams, Edwards and Key West dispersal bases were the only three capable of accommodating permanently deployed units at this time, the others, presumably, would not have long to wait. An estimated 65 per cent of Phase III AGE was on hand, and some personnel

were assigned. By 1 February 1964, a manpower force totaling
21
463 officers and airmen were deployed as follows:

<u>BASE</u>	<u>PCS</u>	<u>TDY</u>
Siskiyou	20	0
Walla Walla	25	0
Niagara	0	36
Clinton County	28	0
Atlantic City	28	0
Key West	50	0
Olmsted	25	0
Fresno	12	0
Williams	73	17
Edwards	75	1
Grand Island	0	4
Reese	0	8
Logan	0	4
Volk	41	0
Hulman	16	0

21. RESTRICTED DATA/NOFORN, ADC Historical Study No. 20, p. 49; IOC, ADODC to ADCCS, "Short-Range Dispersal Requirements," n.d. ca. Nov 1962 [DOC 123]; Msg ADMLP-A 195, ADC to AFLC, 22 Jan 1963 [DOC 124]; Msg ADMLP-A 487, ADC to Air Divs, 14 Feb 1963 [DOC 125]; Msg AFOCEJB 86071, USAF to ADC, 20 Mar 1963 [DOC 126]; FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA, Msg ADMME 879, ADC to 28 AD, 22 Mar 1963 [DOC 127]; Memo for Col Harris from ADOOP, "Financial Savings," 1 Apr 1963 [DOC 128]; Msg ADOAC-AN 1870, ADC to Air Divs, 17 May 1963 [DOC 129]; Msg ADOOP-S 1948, ADC to USAF, 24 May 1963 [DOC 130]; Msg ADOOP-S 1976, ADC to USAF, 28 May 1963 [DOC 131]; Memo for Record, "Fighter Dispersal Plan," n.d., ca. Jun 1963 [DOC 132]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADLPP-G, "Field Memorandum, Operational Capability Inspection of Air Defense Command (Project 4-63-1)," 17 Jul 1963 [DOC 133]; Msg ADMLP 5070, ADC to Air Divs, 23 Sep 1963 [DOC 134]; Msg 30-MLP-1383/63, 30 AD to ADC, 25 Sep 1963 [DOC 135]; Msg 29MLP 0569, 29 AD to ADC, 26 Sep 1963 [DOC 136]; Msg 25MOP 531-G, 25 AD to ADC, 27 Sep 1963 [DOC 137]; Msg 28MLP-A-9-3112, 28 AD to ADC, 28 Sep 1963 [DOC 138]; Msg ADMDC 5151, ADC to Air Divs, 2 Oct 1963 [DOC 139]; Msg 30-MLP-S-1418-63, 30 AD to 56 Ftr Wg, 5 Oct 1963 [DOC 140];

But these dispersal base personnel detachments represented only a fraction -- about ten per cent -- of the total force forecast to support permanent dispersal in early 1965. Between 4,000 and 4,700 officers and airmen would be needed to sustain Phase III permanent dispersal at the 30 dispersal bases, boosting averages per base (originally estimated at about 125 to 130), in the neighborhood of 134 to 155 per base, according to revised manning tables published, together with accompanying updated information, in ADC Operation Plan 20-64 (1 January 1964). As already noted, 1580 manpower

[Cont'd] NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADODC 5487, ADC to Air Divs, 1 Nov 1963 [DOC 141]; Msg ADOAC-AN 5882, ADC to AFCS, 11 Dec 1963 [DOC 142]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADLDC et al, "FY 64 Fighter Dispersal," n.d. ca. 16 Dec 1963 [DOC 143]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADODC 6077, ADC to Air Divs, 27 Dec 1963 [DOC 144]; Ltr, ADC to USAF, "ADC Fighter Dispersal Program," 14 Jan 1964 [DOC 145]; Msg ADOOP-P 1246, ADC to USAF, 9 Apr 1964 [DOC 146]; IOC and Atch, ADOOP-P, "Annex R, ADC OPLAN 20-63," 22 Jul 1963 [DOC 147]; IOC and Atch, ADOOP-P to ADOOP, "ADC Unit Moves and Deactivations," 30 Apr 1963 [DOC 148]; Memo for Col Harris from ADOOP, "Current Status of Fighter Dispersal," 11 Mar 1964 [DOC 149]; Rpt, ADC to USAF, "Current Status Presentation," AMA 64-0515, 10 Mar 1964, p. 23 [DOC 150]; ADC, ADOAC, Weekly Act Repts, 21 Dec 1962-3 Jan 1963, 12-18 Apr 1963, 21-27 Jun 1963, 19-25 Jul 1963, 1-7 Nov 1963, 22 Nov-5 Dec 1963, 20-26 Dec 1963, 17-23 Jan 1964, 31 Jan-6 Feb 1964, 13-19 Mar 1964, 20-26 Mar 1964, 27 Mar-2 Apr 1964, 3-9 Apr 1964 [HRF]; Ltrs, ADC to ADCCS et al, "Program Information Center Summary of Status," 17 Jan 1964 and 27 Mar 1964 [HRF]; Msg ADCIO 1030, ADC to Air Divs, 4 Apr 1964 [DOC 151]; NOFORN, Msg ADCIG 1266, ADC to Air Divs, 10 Apr 1964 [DOC 152]; NOFORN EX CANADA, ADC, Annex R to ADC OPLAN 20-64, 15 May 1964 [DOC 153].

spaces had been saved by reconfiguring, as described above, the over-all interceptor force structure. About 40 per cent of the total dispersal personnel force, as well as 43 per cent of dispersal equipment, were to be drawn from existing resources of the parent squadrons. Personnel spaces remaining to be made up from other resources, therefore, were reduced to less than 28 per cent. What amount of this 4,000-plus dispersal force would be composed of Canadians could figure upwards of 22 per cent, since ADC, in early 1964 (as previously mentioned), had resigned itself to integrate up to 80 per cent of support detachments assigned the nine Canadian dispersal bases from native sons.²²

During an emergency, ADC's dispersal force could rely on AFLC technicians to supplement its efforts about five days, more or less, after initial attacks. But considerably more help was expected to arrive, and much sooner, from Dispersal Aircraft Recovery and Reconstitution (DARR) units composed of part-time Air Force reserve troops under ConAC's aegis. Just how much ADC could expect from them, where they

22. Msg ADPDP-PW 57, ADC to Air Divs, 7 Jan 1963 [DOC 154]; Msg ADPDP 2818, ADC to Air Divs, 26 Jul 1963 [DOC 155]; Ltr, ADC to Maj Gen Dolf Muehleisen, 29 AD, 10 Jan 1964 [DOC 156]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-P 1234, ADC to 28 AD, 8 Apr 1964 [DOC 157]; ADC OPLAN 20-64, "Fighter Dispersal," 1 Jan 1964 [DOC 158].

would serve, and how soon report were, in part, ironed out during 1963, and, in part, were still under discussion in 1964. Before that, they had proved their helpfulness at three ADC dispersal bases, Billings, Fargo and Grand Island, during the emergency dispersal late in 1962 caused by the Cuban crisis. ADC asked for, and was granted, authority to employ them (when mobilized because of an emergency) at dispersal bases for interceptor support. ADC envisioned the DARR role primarily as providing relief to the regular dispersal force during the long arduous combat operations following attack. When ConAC hinted, early in 1963, that many would not be able to report until 24 hours after the first attack and that only non-USAF air bases would be assigned DARR units, ADC protested. The command wanted to cut availability time in half, to 12 hours, for DARR units located near ADC dispersal bases. Furthermore, certain dispersal bases, notably Williams, Clinton County, and Olmsted, were USAF-owned, and ADC wanted them to benefit also by DARR augmentation. ConAC agreed to these terms and was convinced by ADC that intensive, concentrated training of DARR units should await a Phase III attainment by dispersal bases, so the regular force would have its full complement of personnel and could therefore devote more time to training functions. Meantime, manning tables were drawn up and approved, calling for a 90-man DARR force per

base, comprised of two officers and 88 enlisted men. And approval was sought, and granted, to align certain existing DARR units with specific dispersal bases in their vicinity. ²³

DARR contributions to dispersal was one of a host of subjects to be measured, tested, validated or amended by Phase III tests in 1963. Apart from DARR support, other subjects of investigation included basic dispersal concepts, techniques and operations, together with dispersal equipment, facilities, and manpower structure -- all to be tested under various degrees of warning. In the spring and summer of 1963, from 1 April to 30 June 1963, the 28th Air Division conducted the tests at three dispersal bases: Edwards and Williams Air Force Bases and Fresno Air Terminal. The first two accommodated contingents of F-106A's from the 329th FIS

23. IOC, ADOOP-P to ADOOP-W, "Narrative on ADC Missions," 20 Sep 1962 [DOC 159]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADAAF-Q2, "GAO Visit," 23 Oct 1962 [DOC 160]; Msg ADOOP-P 3147, ADC to Air Divs, 16 Nov 1962 [DOC 161]; Msg ADOOP-P 3286, ADC to USAF, 28 Nov 1962 [DOC 162]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Ltr, ADC to USAF, "USAF Survival, Recovery, and Reconstitution Plan (DRAFT)," 11 Mar 1963 [DOC 163]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADPDP, "Dispersal Recovery and Reconstitution (DARR) Support of Command Requirements," 13 Jun 1963 [DOC 164]; Msg OTR-SU 114, ConAC to ADC, 28 Feb 1963 [DOC 165]; Msg ADOOP-P 734, ADC to ConAC, 12 Mar 1963 [DOC 166]; Msg ADOOP-P 3000, ADC to ConAC, 22 Aug 1963 [DOC 167]; Msg ADODC 3031, ADC to ConAC, 27 Aug 1963 [DOC 168]; Ltr and Atch, ADC to USAF, "Air Force Reserve Recovery Program," 23 Sep 1963 [DOC 169]; Msg ADODC 5603, ADC to ConAC, 14 Nov 1963 [DOC 170]; Msg ADMDC 5615, ADC to AFLC, 15 Nov 1963 [DOC 171].

(George) and F-101B's from the 15th FIS (Davis-Monthan), respectively. Fresno serviced F-102A's from the 82nd FIS (Travis), besides furnishing the only ANG and DARR augmentation of all three. Actually, this did not amount to very much simply because arrangements had not been completed in time to assure their most effective employment; most DARR reservists, consequently, had accomplished their annual two-week active duty requirement before the tests began, rendering them unavailable on a full-time basis.

Aside from a minor re-arrangement at Edwards, where the F-106A detachment was forced to move to another operating area after several weeks of activity, the tests, by and large, were carried off smoothly. Highly satisfactory conclusions resulted from them, and indeed, the detachments, except in certain categories, exceeded expectations. Operational concepts were successfully validated. The three detachments stood continuous alerts, scrambled on "unknowns," and regularly exchanged a few interceptors daily with the parent squadron, according to a rotating schedule. Ability of each detachment to mount eight sorties per interceptor within a five-day period was thoroughly demonstrated. The 15th FIS detachment, for instance, managed to fly 54 sorties in four days, scoring 56 M/A's out of 78 attempts in the

~~SECRET~~

process; the 329th FIS detachment performed 56 sorties in four days, achieving 37 M/A's out of 55 attempts. All the while, interceptor OR rates surpassed the 75 per cent standard. Much that was known or suspected became confirmed. For example, as in the 1962 tests, a 1.5 to 1 aircrew-to-interceptor manning ratio was found preferable to the 1.2 to 1 ratio then obtaining. Aircrews were required to average 75 hours of duty weekly at the old 1.2 rate. To reduce this workload meant, perforce, adding three-tenths of one per cent to the aircrew ratio, which ADC accordingly recommended. While the tests showed that navigation equipment, as called for by planning documents, were sufficient for permanent dispersal, they revealed an obvious need to add several more communications circuits. One of the more glaring revelations came in the security area. It was discovered that the number of air police allotted by manning tables considerably shortchanged dispersal bases. Instead of 40 or so per unit, it was surmised that 55 would come nearer to filling actual needs. ADC subsequently asked for an extra 570 air police spaces, to hike the total dispersal force (along with extra spaces requested in other fields), as noted above, to about the 4,700 level. USAF promptly disapproved, whereupon ADC appealed for reconsideration. The subject was still pending in early 1964. These

~~SECRET~~

and other recommended improvements and changes were incorporated in the revised dispersal ADC Operations Plan 20-64, published 1 January 1964.²⁴

But ADC did not need these Phase III test results to remind it that all was not right with respect to nuclear armament transportation. Ever since late 1962, ADC had sought a formidable change in the safety rules governing nuclear weapons, to enable F-101B's and F-106A's to flight ferry AIR-2A's (MB-1's). Already the F-102A, by early 1963, was privileged to ferry the tactical AIM-26A (GAR-11) if directed by CINCNORAD/CINCONAD, providing they were disarmed, with rocket motor igniter disconnected, to preclude an inadvertent launch. But F-101B/F-106A's equipped with AIR-2A's were restricted to ground duty until a DEFCON 1 or an Air Defense Emergency was declared. It seemed only reasonable to ADC that "Genie" loaded interceptors, too, should be

24. NOFORN EX CANADA, Rpt, 28 AD to ADC, "Final Report; Phase III Dispersal Test," 31 Jul 1963 [HRF]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOOP-P 210, ADC to USAF, 23 Jan 1963 [DOC 172]; Msg ADPDP-PW 343, ADC to ConAC, 1 Feb 1963 [DOC 173]; Mins of Mtg, ADOOP-P "Phase III Fighter Dispersal Test Conference," 14 Feb 1963 [DOC 174]; Msg ADOOP-P 1779, ADC to 28 AD, 7 May 1963 [DOC 175]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADOAC et al, "Fighter Dispersal Working Group Visit to Dispersal Bases," 9 May 1963 [DOC 176]; Msg 28OTN-I 5-1096, 28 AD to ADC, 9 May 1963 [DOC 177]; Msg 28OPP 6-1033, 28 AD to ADC, 5 Jun 1963 [DOC 178]; Msg 28OPP 6-1032, 28 AD to ADC, 5 Jun 1963 [DOC 179]; IOC, ADOOP-P to ADODC et al, "Phase III Test Report," n.d., ca. Jul 1963 [DOC 180]. IOC, ADOOP-P to ADOOP-EO, "ADODC Dining-In Talk,"

~~SECRET~~

allowed to become airborne, when directed by CONAD, during periods of normal readiness (DEFCON 5), for purposes of ferrying tactical AIR-2A's to dispersal bases. For safety's sake, the rocket motor igniter would be disconnected, as in the case of the AIM-26A, to preclude an unauthorized launching in transit. ADC, furthermore, hankered for the privilege of scrambling interceptors loaded with armed AIR-2A's for identification and dispersal missions, under the aegis of CONAD, at the DEFCON 3 rather than the DEFCON 1 level. Here again the AIM-26A-loaded F-102A was one step ahead, already being authorized this prerogative. By late 1963, both aims had been approved by AEC, USAF, and DOD, and only awaited the President's signature for final approval. Final approval was granted in 1964.

Meanwhile, arrangements had been completed to transport unassembled AIR-2A's by cargo aircraft. Furthermore,

[Cont'd] 28 Aug 1963 [DOC 181]; Memo, ADOOP-P, "Aircrew Workload Comparison," 22 Oct 1963 [DOC 182]; Memo, ADOOP-P, "Brief on Fighter Dispersal Limiting Factors," n.d., ca. Jan 1964 [DOC 183]; ADC, ADOAC, Weekly Act Rept, 30 Aug-5 Sep 1963 [HRF]; ADC OPLAN 20-64, 1 Jan 1964 [DOC 158].

~~SECRET~~

not only would ADC's 4650th Combat Support Squadron fly AIR-2A's to dispersal bases by transports when an emergency situation arose, but also the equivalent of four ConAC Reserve Troop Carrier Wings, flying some 154 C-119's, would be released by TAC to ADC for this purpose. In early 1964, these Reserve units started special training in the handling of nuclear weapons, for which they were expected to fully
25
qualify by June.

Future Dispersal. In 1963-64, plans were being hatched for expanding the dispersal concept to embrace considerably more than one-third or so of ADC's regular interceptor force. In USAF's Survival, Recovery and Reconstitution Plan printed in June 1963, USAF, in effect, directed ADC to pick another set of thirty dispersal bases in low target areas, where the next, or second, third of each squadron's aircraft could fly on a "safe haven" basis. This meant that the barest of facilities, apart from navigation equipment,

25. RESTRICTED DATA, NOFORN, ADC Historical Study No. 20, op. cit., pp. 51-54, 78-79; ADC, Wartime Basic Plan (ADC-WPB), Annex R, "Combat Support Airlift," 15 Sep 1963 [HRF]; Memo for Record, ADOOP-P, 15 Oct 1963 [DOC 184]; Memo for ADCCR (Col Montgomery) from ADOOP-P, "Authority for Tactical Ferry of Nuclear Armed Aircraft," 18 Oct 1963 [DOC 185]; Memo and Atch for ADOOA from ADOOP-P, "Nuclear Accident Potential," 28 Jan 1964 [DOC 186]; FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA, Msg ADMME-906, ADC to 28 AD, 25 Mar 1963 [DOC 187]; Msg ADOOP-S 1081, ADC to

~~SECRET~~

would be required, since interceptors deploying to them would simply alight and await instructions either to return home or fly to the squadron's permanent dispersal base. While actual execution of the plan was not foreseen prior to 1966 (in view of the existing, and growing, Soviet threat), ADC planners worked up a tentative list of bases for USAF's consideration. Moreover, ADC planners figured that some construction and O&M costs, while small by permanent dispersal-site standards, would nevertheless be involved. Airlift facilities would, of necessity, have to be increased, too.

Some attention was given in late 1963 to a possible dispersal posture for portions of the AEW&C fleet, probably on a continuous or permanent basis, to insure that some measure of it, too, would survive an ICBM attack. Plans were afoot, additionally, to provide a network of dispersal bases for most ADC/ANG interceptor squadrons. Indeed, interceptor dispersal figured prominently even in ADC's plans for the much-desired, yet still unauthorized, proposed Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI). If and when an IMI fleet became

[Cont'd] TAC, 27 Mar 1964 [DOC 188]; Msg ADOOP-S 1082, ADC to TAC, 27 Mar 1964 [DOC 189]; Msg ADOOP-S 1269, ADC to Air Divs, 10 Apr 1964 [DOC 190]; Msg ADMLP 1287, ADC to Air Div Prov 26, 13 Apr 1964 [DOC 191]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADODC 1485, ADC to 28 AD, et al, 1 May 1964 [DOC 192].


~~SECRET~~

available between fiscal years 1967 and 1969, the 12 hoped-for IMI squadrons would have not one, but two dispersal bases apiece. Besides six IMI home bases to house the 12 squadrons, there would be 24 well-provisioned dispersal bases, according to ADC plans, where elements of each parent IMI squadron would be permanently dispersed for maintaining continuous alerts.²⁶

Dispersal, so it would seem, had progressed far from the talking stages of 1961 to become, by 1964, a permanent fixture -- and no mean one at that -- in the over-all panorama of U.S. air defense. Once equipped and established to accommodate permanent aircraft contingents, the network of dispersal bases would impart added resiliency to the interceptor force, enabling it immediately after an ICBM attack to pounce

26. ADC, Deployment and Employment Concepts for the Improved Manned Interceptor, 12 Oct 1962 [DOC 193]; Memo for ADCVC from ADOOP-P, "Fighter Dispersal and Proposed IMI Program," 9 Jan 1963 [DOC 194]; Msg ADOOP-P 1612, ADC to Air Divs, 22 Apr 1963 [DOC 195]; Msg ADOOP-P 2779, ADC to Air Divs, 23 Jul 1963 [DOC 196]; Rept of Staff Study, ADOOP, "ANG Dispersal," 17 Sep 1963 [DOC 197]; Mins of Mtg, Subcommittee Working Group Mtg, 4 Oct 1963 [DOC 198]; Msg ADOOP-P 5227, ADC to USAF, 9 Oct 1963 [DOC 199]; Msg ADOOP-P 5432, ADC to 29 AD, 29 Oct 1963 [DOC 200]; Briefing data, ADOOP, "Secondary Dispersal Fields," n.d., ca. 22 Oct 1963 [DOC 201]; Msg ADOOP-P 248, ADC to USAF, 21 Jan 1964 [DOC 202]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADCCR 519, ADC to 26 AD, 14 Feb 1964 [DOC 203]; Rept, ADC to USAF, "Current Status Presentation," AMA 64-0515, 10 Mar 1964, p. 24 [DOC 204]; ADC, ADOAC, Weekly Act Rept, 4-10 Oct 1963, pp. 4-5 [HRF].

~~SECRET~~

on follow-up waves of attacking bombers. Eventually, the AEW&C, and ADC/ANG forces, and if ever it materialized, the IMI fleet, might similarly be protected from ICBM destruction for ready-use against oncoming bombers.

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX A

FIGHTER DISPERSAL STATION LIST
15 December 1961

UNIT	A/C TYPE	HOME STATION	DISPERSAL BASE	OWNED BY
<u>25 Air Div</u>				
64 FIS	F-102	Paine	Comox	Canada
318 FIS	F-106	McChord	Comox	Canada
322 FIS	F-101	Kingsley	None	--
498 FIS	F-106	Spokane (Geiger)	Calgary	Canada
460 FIS	F-102	Portland	Walla Walla	Civilian
<u>26 Air Div</u>				
2 FIS	F-101	Suffolk	Greenwood	Canada
27 FIS	F-106	Loring	Chatham	Canada
48 FIS	F-106	Langley	Cherry Point	MCAS
49 FIS	F-101	Griffiss	Trenton, Ont.	Canada
60 FIS	F-101	Otis	Brunswick, Me.	Navy
75 FIS	F-101	Dow	Bagotville	Canada
76 FIS	F-102	Westover	Summerside, N.B.	Canada
95 FIS	F-106	Andrews	Patuxent	Navy
98 FIS	F-101	Dover	Atlantic City	Civilian (ANG)

(ANNEX C
LOGISTICS
ADC OPLAN 20-61)

~~SECRET~~

UNIT	A/C TYPE	HOME STATION	DISPERSAL BASE	OWNED BY
444 FIS	F-101	Charleston	Donaldson	USAF (MATS)
482 FIS	F-102	Seymour-Johnson	Pope	USAF (TAC)
539 FIS	F-106	McGuire	Olmsted	USAF (AFLC)
<u>28 Air Div</u>				
83 FIS	F-101	Hamilton	Siskiyou Co Aprt	Civilian
84 FIS	F-101	Hamilton	Lemoore	Navy
82 FIS	F-102	Travis	Chico	Civilian
15 FIS	F-101	Davis-Monthan	Williams	USAF (ATC)
329 FIS	F-106	George	San Clemente	Navy
437 FIS	F-101	Oxnard	San Nicolas	Navy
456 FIS	F-106	Castle	Fresno	Civilian (ANG)
<u>29 Air Div</u>				
5 FIS	F-106	Minot	Portage la Prairie	Canada
13 FIS	F-101	Glasgow	Saskatoon	Canada
18 FIS	F-101	Grand Forks	Gimli	Canada
29 FIS	F-101	Malmstrom	Edmonton	Canada
326 FIS	F-102	Richards- Gebaur	Grand Island	Civilian
<u>30 Air Div</u>				
11 FIS	F-106	Duluth	Winnipeg	Canada
62 FIS	F-101	K.I. Sawyer	Volk Fld	ANG
71 FIS	F-106	Selfridge	Phelps-Collins	Civilian (ANG)
94 FIS	F-106	Selfridge	Phelps-Collins	Civilian (ANG)

~~SECRET~~

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>A/C TYPE</u>	<u>HOME STATION</u>	<u>DISPERSAL BASE</u>	<u>OWNED BY</u>
87 FIS	F-101	Lockbourne	Clinton County	USAF (CONAC)
319 FIS	F-106	Bunker Hill	Hulman Fld	Civilian (ANG)
325 FIS	F-102	Truax	Springfield, Ill.	Civilian
438 FIS	F-106	Kincheloe	Val D'Or	Canada
445 FIS	F-101	Wurtsmith	Volk Fld	ANG
<u>32 Air Div</u>				
331 FIS	F-102	Webb	Laughlin	USAF (SAC)
<u>64 Air Div</u>				
59 FIS	F-102	Goose Bay	Gander	Canada
332 FIS	F-102	Thule	None	---

DISPERSAL BASES
(Including Interim Bases)
15 January 1963

UNIT/ACFT	HOME BASE	TEMPORARY DISPERSAL BASE
<u>25 Air Div</u>		
64 FIS/102	Paine	*None
318 FIS/106	McChord	*Paine
322 FIS/101	Kingsley	**Siskiyou
460 FIS/102	Portland	**Walla Walla
498 FIS/106	Spokane	*Paine
<u>26 Air Div</u>		
2 FIS/101	Suffolk County	**Grenier
27 FIS/106	Loring	**Olmsted
48 FIS/106	Langley	**Byrd Field
49 FIS/101	Griffiss	*None
60 FIS/106	Otis	*None
75 FIS/101	Dow	*None
76 FIS/102	Westover	*Burlington
95 FIS/106	Andrews	**Atlantic City
98 FIS/101	Dover	**Grenier
444 FIS/101	Charleston	**Clinton County

(APPENDIX 1
ANNEX 0
ADC OPLAN 20-63
15 Jan 1963)

<u>UNIT/ACFT</u>	<u>HOME BASE</u>	<u>TEMPORARY DISPERSAL BASE</u>
482 FIS/102	Seymour Johnson	**New Hanover County Wilmington NC
539 FIS/106	McGuire	**Olmsted
<u>28 Air Div</u>		
15 FIS/101	Davis-Monthan	**Williams
82 FIS/102	Travis	**Fresno
83 FIS/101	Hamilton	*None
84 FIS/101	Hamilton	**Siskiyou
329 FIS/106	George	**San Clemente Island
437 FIS/101	Oxnard	*None
456 FIS/106	Castle	**Edwards
<u>29 Air Div</u>		
5 FIS/106	Minot	*Hector
13 FIS/101	Glasgow	*Logan
18 FIS/101	Grand Forks	*Hector
29 FIS/101	Malmstrom	**Logan
326 FIS/102	Richards-Gebaur	**Grand Island
<u>30 Air Div</u>		
11 FIS/106	Duluth	**Volk
62 FIS/101	K.I. Sawyer	**Phelps-Collins
71 FIS/106	Selfridge	**Niagara Falls
87 FIS/101	Lockbourne	**Clinton County
94 FIS/106	Selfridge	

~~SECRET~~

<u>UNIT/ACFT</u>	<u>HOME BASE</u>	<u>TEMPORARY DISPERSAL BASE</u>
319 FIS/106	Bunker Hill	**Hulman
325 FIS/102	Truax	**Capital Airport Springfield
438 FIS/106	Kincheloe	**Volk
445 FIS/101	Wurtsmith	**Phelps-Collins
<u>32 Air Div</u>		
331 FIS/102	Webb	**Reese
<u>64 Air Div</u>		
59 FIS/102	Goose Bay	*None
332 FIS/102	Thule	**None

* For interim program only.

** For interim and permanent dispersal.

(APPENDIX 1
ANNEX 0
ADC OPLAN 20-63
15 Jan 1963)

~~SECRET~~

INTERIM DISPERSAL BASES BY LOCATION

FIS	DISPERSAL BASE
95	Atlantic City
76	Burlington
82	Fresno
326	Grand Island
5 - 18	Hector
13 - 29	Logan
71 - 94	Niagara Falls
27 - 539	Olmsted
318 - 498	Paine
62 - 445	Phelps-Collins
11 - 438	Volk
15	Williams
84 - 322	Siskiyou
460	Walla Walla
482	Wilmington
2 - 98	Grenier
48	Byrd
456	Edwards
319	Hulman
87 - 444	Clinton County
325	Capital (Springfield)
331	Reese

(APPENDIX 2
ANNEX 0
ADC OPLAN 20-63
15 Jan 1963)

ADC FIGHTER DISPERSAL ALIGNMENT

1 January 1964

<u>UNIT/ACFT</u>	<u>HOME BASE</u>	<u>DISPERSED OPERATING BASE</u>
<u>25 Air Div</u>		
64 FIS/102	Paine	Walla Walla
82 FIS/102	Travis	Siskiyou
84 FIS/101	Hamilton	Siskiyou
318 FIS/106	McChord	Namao, Alta
322 FIS/101	Kingsley	Comox, B.C.
460 FIS/102	Portland	Walla Walla
498 FIS/106	McChord	Namao, Alta
<u>26 Air Div</u>		
2 FIS/101	Suffolk	Grenier
27 FIS/106	Loring	Chatham, NB (**Olmsted)
48 FIS/106	Langley	Byrd Fld
49 FIS/101	Griffiss	Val D'Or, Que (**Burlington MAP)
59 FIS/102	Goose Bay	Gander Nfld
60 FIS/101	Otis	Shearwater, NS
71 FIS/106	Selfridge	Niagara Falls MAP
75 FIS/101	Dow	Bagotville, Que
87 FIS/101	Lockbourne	Clinton County

(APPENDIX 1
ANNEX B
ADC OPLAN 20-64
1 Jan 1964)

<u>UNIT/ACFT</u>	<u>HOME BASE</u>	<u>DISPERSED OPERATING BASE</u>
94 FIS/106	Selfridge	Niagara Falls MAP
95 FIS/106	Dover	Atlantic City MAP
98 FIS/101	Suffolk	Grenier
319 FIS/104	Homestead	Patrick
332 FIS/102	Thule	None
444 FIS/101	Charleston	New Hanover County
445 FIS/101	Wurtsmith	Phelps-Collins
482 FIS/102	Seymour Johnson	Key West NAS
539 FIS/106	McGuire	Olmsted
<u>28 Air Div</u>		
15 FIS/101	Davis-Monthan	Williams
329 FIS/106	George	Edwards
437 FIS/101	Oxnard	*El Centro NAF
456 FIS/106	Castle	Fresno
<u>29 Air Div</u>		
5 FIS/106	Minot	Logan
13 FIS/101	Glasgow	Cold Lake, Alta
29 FIS/101	Malmstrom	Cold Lake, Alta
326 FIS/102	Richards-Gebaur	Grand Island
331 FIS/104	Webb	Reese

~~SECRET~~

<u>UNIT/ACFT</u>	<u>HOME BASE</u>	<u>DISPERSED OPERATING BASE</u>
<u>30 Air Div</u>		
11 FIS/106	Duluth	Volk
18 FIS/101	Grand Forks	Portage, Man
62 FIS/101	K.I. Sawyer	Phelps-Collins
325 FIS/102	Truax	Hulman
438 FIS/106	Kincheloe	Volk

* Approval pending.

** Temporary Dispersal Bases.

~~SECRET~~

DISPERSAL BASE PRIORITY

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Olmsted | 16. Grand Island |
| 2. Byrd Field | 17. Portage la Prairie |
| 3. Phelps-Collins (2) | 18. Clinton County |
| 4. Siskiyou (2) | 19. Williams |
| 5. Volk (2) | 20. Niagara Falls (2) |
| 6. Chatham | 21. Gander |
| 7. Logan | 22. Shearwater |
| 8. Val D'Or | 23. Atlantic City |
| 9. Fresno | 24. New Hanover |
| 10. Patrick* | 25. Walla Walla (2) |
| 11. Bagotville | 26. Grenier (2) |
| 12. Key West | 27. Edwards |
| 13. Namao (2) | 28. El Centro* |
| 14. Cold Lake (2) | 29. Comox |
| 15. Hulman | 30. Reese |

* Approval pending.

(APPENDIX 2
ANNEX B
ADC OPLAN 20-64
1 Jan 1964)

DISPERSAL BASE PHASE-IN SCHEDULE

1 January 1964

DISPERSAL BASE	PHASE I	PHASE II	MODIFIED PHASE III	PHASE III
Atlantic City	I	Jan 64	Oct 64	Feb 65
Byrd Field	I	Jan 64	Dec 64	Jan 65
Clinton County	I	Jan 64	Sep 64	Dec 64
Edwards			I	Dec 64
Fresno		I	Sep 64	Dec 64
Grand Island	Jan 64	Feb 64	Dec 64	Feb 65
Grenier	(1)	(1)	Nov 64	Feb 65
Hulman	I	Mar 64	Dec 64	Feb 65
Key West			I	Oct 64
Logan	I	Feb 64	Dec 64	Feb 65
New Hanover	Jan 64 (2)	Jan 64 (2)	Dec 64	Feb 65
Niagara Falls			I	Feb 65
Olmsted		I	Sep 64	Feb 65
Patrick	Apr 64	Apr 64	Sep 64	Nov 64
Phelps-Collins		I (3)	May 64	Feb 65
Reese	I	Feb 64	Jun 64	Nov 64
Siskiyou	I (4)	Jan 64	Oct 64	Feb 65
Volk	I	Jan 64	Jun 64	Feb 65
Walla Walla	I (4)	Jan 64	Dec 64	Feb 65
Williams			I	Sep 64
Bagotville				
Chatham				
Cold Lake				
Comox				
Gander				
Namao				
Portage				
Shearwater				
Val D'Or				
Burlington (temp)		I	N/A	N/A
Hector (temp)	I	N/A	N/A	N/A

NOTE: I (Phase I and II) - Working capability effected. In most instances, this means that less than required quantity of all assets are in place.

Canadian dispersal to be held in abeyance until further advised.

No dispersal base approved yet for Oxnard (437 FIS).

(APPENDIX 1
ANNEX R
ADC OPLAN 20-64
1 Jan 1964)

- (1) Replacement base being investigated.
- (2) Temporary use of McEntire for Phase I and II under consideration.
- (3) Only Emergency operation during winter months. Personnel, AGE and vehicles not prepositioned.
- (4) Limited operation.

[The main body of the page contains extremely faint and illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the document. The text is too light to transcribe accurately.]

[The bottom section of the page contains faint text, possibly a footer or a concluding paragraph. The content is illegible due to low contrast and bleed-through.]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

REDACTED

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1111

1111

1111