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ADC HISTORICAL STUDY NO. 38

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THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD IN AIR DEFENSE

(U)

1946-1971



by RICHARD F. McMULLEN

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CHAPTER I

THE FALSE START 1946-1950

(U) When the Air National Guard was established after the end of World War II, the War Department anticipated that a considerable portion of the new force would be dedicated to the air defense mission. The first mission given to the new Air Defense Command, in March 1946, said that ADC would "organize and administer the integrated air defense system of the Continental United States;...[and] maintain units of the Air National Guard...in a highly trained and operational condition of readiness;...."¹

(U) The new command actually assumed official life on 27 March 1946 at Mitchel Field, New York. The first commander was Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, wartime commander of Army Air Forces, China Theater. General Stratemeyer was almost immediately dubious about the value of the ANG, although he surmised, correctly, that ADC would have to depend almost completely on the ANG since the original allotment of regular combat forces to ADC amounted to two Night Fighter squadrons, one of which was

1. Ltr (U), AAF to ADC, "Interim Mission," (Doc 7 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951).

a completely paper organization. The second consisted of one officer and two airmen, but no aircraft. General Stratemeyer found it difficult, he wrote AAF on 16 April 1946, to consider the citizen-soldiers of the ANG as part of the first line of defense, no matter how well organized and trained. It was, of necessity, an augmentation force to supplement the regular forces on some future mobilization day.²

(U) Nevertheless, General Stratemeyer resolved to make the best of the situation and had already (15 April 1946) written Maj. Gen. Butler B. Miltonberger, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, of his concept of the ADC/ANG relationship as regards air defense. "The mission of the air national security for the continental United States," he wrote, "has been assigned in large measure to the Air National Guard. By reasons of the important roles assigned to the civilian air components...the Air Defense Command was originated to place under one commander the primary responsibility for the efficiency and effectiveness of the Air National Guard. This responsibility must be accomplished by greater authority in dealing with Air National Guard matters. In general, I feel I must be responsible for organizing and administering the Air National Guard in its federally recognized status."³

2. Ltr (U), ADC to AAF, "Problems Confronting ADC in Dealing With Civilian Air Components," 16 Apr 46 (App IX to Hist of ADC, "Evolution of the Mission," Mar 1946-Jun 1947).

3. Ltr (U), Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, CG, ADC

(U) Activation of postwar ANG units was begun by the states on 25 April 1946. The plan in effect at that time called for the creation of 72 fighter squadrons, capable of either air defense or the support of ground forces. Each squadron was to be equipped with 25 aircraft. Some were to be supplied with the F-47 Thunderbolt, others with the F-51 Mustang. The federal government was to provide aircraft, instructors, supplies and pay. The states were to furnish bases, people, and storage facilities. Operational control, short of federalization, was to rest with the governors of the several states through their adjutants general. The National Guard Bureau was the intermediary between the states and the U. S. Army. Reestablishment and reequipping of the ANG was scheduled for completion by June 1947.⁴

(U) The position of the AAF was confirmed on 20 May 1946 when General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, told the House Appropriations Committee that air defense forces would come "principally" from the ANG and the Air Force Reserve. He also requested that the ANG

3. (cont) to Maj. Gen. Butler B. Miltonberger, Chief, NGB, 15 Apr 1946, as cited in Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947, p 6.

4. Hist of ADC, "Evolution of the Mission," March 1946-June 1947, pp 33-40.

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be provided with 84 fighter squadrons rather than the 72 specified in earlier plans.⁵ (copy?)

(U) The states did not prove amenable to the type of direct ANG control General Stratemeyer had in mind and on 10 May 1946 AAF found it necessary to inform ADC that existing federal statutes (which had been cited by state authorities) made it necessary for ADC to limit its control over the ANG. While ADC was encouraged to maintain close liaison with the National Guard Bureau and conduct discussions with the states, no agreements resulting from such contacts were to be binding prior to approval by AAF. Furthermore, as regards the selection of bases for ANG units, ADC was to act only in an advisory capacity. On 5 June 1946 the "interim" mission of ADC was revised to direct a more cautious approach to the ANG. The new directive read that ADC would merely discharge the responsibilities of the AAF with respect to the organization, training and maintenance of the ANG, subject to policies laid down by AAF.⁶ In short, ADC responsibility for the ANG covered only training.

(U) As a result, General Stratemeyer, who had not been

5. House Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for FY 1947, 20 May 1946, pp 407, 408, and 414.

6. Ltr (U), AAF to ADC, "Special Directive on Methods and Procedures," 10 May 1946 (App VIII to Hist of ADC, "Evolution of the Mission," Mar 1946-Jun 1947); Ltr (U) AAF to ADC, "Interim Mission," 5 Jun 1946 (App II to Hist of ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947).

convinced of the efficacy of the ANG as a usable air defense weapon from the beginning, but had attempted to make the best of the situation, grew increasingly disillusioned with his state-oriented auxiliary. On 25 September 1946 he felt impelled to write General Spaatz:⁷

Our present national security, and particularly our security five to ten years hence, depends to a large extent on States accepting the responsibility for creating Air National Guard units which can immediately be called into Federal service for effective use on the outbreak or threat of hostilities. If, as happens to be the case at present, they are not disposed to accept this responsibility, I believe the War Department should recommend another system for providing national defense in the air.

(U) Progress toward the goal of 84 squadrons, as indicated by General Stratemeyer, was painfully slow. To achieve federal recognition an ANG unit had to show a strength of at least 25 percent of the required officers and 10 percent of the required enlisted men. By the early spring of 1947 only 30 ANG fighter squadrons within the United States had achieved this status. These were:⁸

7. Ltr (U), Stratemeyer to Spaatz, 25 Sep 46, as quoted in Hist of ADC, "Evolution of the Mission," March 1946-June 1947, pp 46-47.

8. Ltr (U), AAF to ADC, "Interim Ceiling on National Guard Organization," 14 Mar 47 (App X to Hist of ADC, "Evolution of the Mission," Mar 1946-Jun 1947).

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
101	Boston, Massachusetts
104	Baltimore, Maryland
109	St. Paul, Minnesota
110	St. Louis, Missouri
118	Windsor Locks, Connecticut
120	Denver, Colorado
121	Washington, D. C.
123	Portland, Oregon
124	Des Moines, Iowa
127	Wichita, Kansas
128	Marietta, Georgia
132	Bangor, Maine
134	Burlington, Vermont
142	Wilmington, Delaware
153	Meridian, Mississippi
154	Little Rock, Arkansas
155	Memphis, Tennessee
157	Columbia, South Carolina
158	Savannah, Georgia
159	Jacksonville, Florida
173	Lincoln, Nebraska
174	Sioux City, Iowa
175	Sioux Falls, South Dakota
178	Fargo, North Dakota
187	Cheyenne, Wyoming
190	Boise, Idaho
191	Salt Lake City, Utah
195	Los Angeles, California
196	San Bernardino, California
197	Phoenix, Arizona

(U) It was perhaps just as well that federal recognition came slowly, because it became apparent in February 1947 that the planned number of ANG fighter squadrons could not be financed from funds available during FY 1947. In addition to the 30 squadrons already in receipt of federal recognition, only seven more could be brought to that status in that year. These were the 111th at Houston, Texas; the 113th at Indianapolis, Indiana; the 125th at

Tulsa, Oklahoma; the 148th at Reading, Pennsylvania; the 162nd at Columbus, Ohio; the 165th at Louisville, Kentucky and the 119th at Newark, New Jersey.⁹

(U) This policy was relaxed somewhat in May 1947 when the number of ANG fighter squadrons which could be given federal recognition was increased by 13, bringing the approved total of fighter squadrons to 50 by the end of the fiscal year. These fell into three categories:

(1) units inspected and recommended for federal recognition; (2) those which had requested inspection, and (3) those which had requested permission to organize, but had not yet requested inspection. In the first category were: 105th (Nashville, Tennessee), 113th (Indianapolis, Indiana), 131st (Springfield, Massachusetts), 133rd (Manchester, New Hampshire), 167th (Charleston, West Virginia), 181st (San Antonio, Texas), and 185th (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma).

Four squadrons fell into the second category: 126th (Milwaukee, Wisconsin), 149th (Richmond, Virginia), 169th (Peoria, Illinois), and 186th (Butte, Montana). Finally, the third category included the 176th (Madison, Wisconsin) and the 188th (Albuquerque, New Mexico).¹⁰

9. Ibid.

10. Ltr (U), AAF to ADC, "Policies Governing Organization of the Air National Guard," 26 May 47 (App XI to Hist of ADC, "Evolution of the Mission," Mar 1946-Jun 1947).

(U) For a while, in this period, primary attention was diverted to the AAF struggle for independence, an effort which culminated in the passage of the National Security Act on 16 July 1947. The United States Air Force (USAF) was created on 18 September 1947. In December 1947 the new USAF provided ADC with a mission statement to replace the "interim" statement of March 1946, as revised in June 1946. In recognition of the patently unready state of the ANG, this statement directed that ADC plan use of the ANG whenever it was ready. It was still intended that the ANG constitute the major element of the manned interceptor force, since USAF alone let it be known that if Congress authorized a regular Air Force of 70 groups only 12 squadrons of interceptors would be allocated to ADC. In a 55-group Air Force only nine such squadrons would be so allocated. At the end of 1947 ADC controlled seven squadrons of regular Air Force interceptors.¹¹

(U) The ANG fighter force contained, theoretically, 50 squadrons, but it added no in-being strength to the Air Defense Command in 1948. The lines of communication were hopelessly snarled. Some squadrons were the darlings of state governors who were not disposed to accept any sort of direction from ADC. There was no coordination between the

11. Ltr (U), USAF to ADC, "Air Defense," 17 Dec 1947 (Doc 17 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951); ADC Hist Study No. 22, "Air Defense and National Policy," 1946-1950, p 38.

training programs of the 48 states. Every ANG squadron with an air defense mission suffered from individual inefficiency and a gross lack of readiness for combat operations. Also, as World War II faded further into the background the number of qualified fighter pilots declined. Above all, there was little disposition on the part of Congress to provide the National Guard Bureau with the funds that might have helped relieve the situation. It became increasingly obvious that the ANG was not a usable weapon. Near the end of 1948 Secretary of Defense James Forrestal put the matter bluntly to President Harry Truman: "The situation is...complicated by the impracticability of attempting to organize, operate and train effective [ANG] combat forces when the components are under the control of forty-eight 'commanders-in-chief'."¹²

(U) Unfortunately, 1948 was also the year that East-West tension began to increase. On 24 February a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia added that country to the Soviet buffer zone of satellites in Eastern Europe. On 5 March General Lucius Clay, U.S. Commander in Berlin, noted increasing difficulty in dealing with his Russian counterparts. On 8 March, observers on the scene predicted that

12. Memo (U), Secretary of Defense Forrestal for President Truman, 7 Dec 1948 (HO files).

Chiang Kai-shek would lose China to the Communists. On 12 March the British, sensing a change in the international climate, expressed the need to discuss Atlantic security with the United States. All this brought about increased anxiety over the safety of the Atomic Energy Commission plant at Hanford, Washington. General Carl Spaatz, USAF Chief of Staff, therefore ordered ADC, on 27 March 1948, to establish an active air defense system in the Pacific Northwest. The results were not encouraging, since the SAC F-51 aircraft deployed to the area were not manned by crews with experience in ground-controlled interception and the ground radar technicians were mostly inexperienced trainees.

(U) In spite of the patent failure in the northwest, ADC was directed, on 23 April 1948, to extend makeshift air defenses to the northeastern United States and the Albuquerque area. The total result was not impressive.

(U) Therefore, since the ANG was not likely to offer much, if any, assistance and the regular air defense establishment, as it stood, was not large enough or ready enough to assume the responsibility, a reorganization of the regular Air Force was ordered. On 1 December 1948 the Continental Air Command (ConAC) was formed. This new command included ADC and the Tactical Air Command, plus nine fighter squadrons formerly assigned to SAC. The rationale behind this

action was that all fighter units should be trained for both tactical and air defense action, thereby greatly increasing the number of aircraft available for both missions. ConAC also had supervision, insofar as Air Force influence could be applied, over the training of the ANG.¹³

(U) Neither did the situation as regards the ANG improve in 1949 for the simple reason that the ANG was not amenable to ConAC control or even suggestion. Since Congressional action was required to federalize any portion of the ANG, it was unlikely that any ANG fighter squadron would be available in less than two weeks from the beginning of an emergency. And then there was no assurance that the ANG unit would be ready for immediate air defense use. This situation prompted Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, who assumed command of ConAC from General Stratemeyer in April of 1949, to note, on 12 November 1949, that "at best the ANG represents aircraft in flyable storage."¹⁴

(U) The continuing failure to create a credible air defense force of that portion of the ANG assigned that mission was not for want of trying, however. In October 1949,

13. Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York, 1962), pp 40-41; Executive Order 10,007, 15 Oct 1948; ConAC GO No. 3, 1 Dec 1948.

14. Memo (U), Whitehead to Maj. Gen. Charles T. Myers, VC, ConAC, no subj, 12 Nov 49 (Attachment to ConAC Air National Guard Study, 15 Jan 1950--DOC 1).

for example, Maj. Gen. Robert M. Webster, commander of ConAC's recently established Eastern Air Defense Force (EADF) proposed to the Adjutant General of New York that those New York ANG squadrons with an air defense mission be given training to familiarize them with the then-building air defense system and that such squadrons be placed under the operational control of EADF. "This control," General Webster contended, "will not usurp the ANG commander's command prerogatives nor violate Federal and/or State constitutional rights. It is solely to permit smooth transition from peacetime air defense training within an air defense system to actual employment against an enemy at a moment's notice. Obviously, if the agency for air defense did not possess the above, D-Day would find us with another Pearl Harbor of far greater consequences."¹⁵

(U) After reaching an agreement with New York, General Webster hoped to come to similar agreements with other states in the northeastern United States. This effort came to naught, however, when Maj. Gen. Karl F. Hausauer, Chief of Staff to the Governor of New York, characterized the proposal as impractical. "The laws of the State of New York," General Hausauer replied, "do not empower the

15. Ltr (U), EADF to Adjutant General, State of New York, "Utilization of ANG Units in Air Defense," 7 Oct 49 (Doc 4 to Hist of EADF, Sep-Dec 1949).

Governor to employ the National Guard for operations of the character contemplated except under conditions where attack is imminent."¹⁶

(U) Even before the negative reaction from New York, however, ConAC and USAF had decided that the battle for more control of the ANG was a losing one and that the ANG should be considered an M-Day force (available after the beginning of general war mobilization) rather than a D-Day force (available immediately) and that it should be given a tactical support mission rather than an air defense mission. It was concluded that to regard the ANG as an air defense force established a position of false strength. These conclusions were reached during a meeting at USAF on 5 January 1950.¹⁷

(U) This did not come to pass, however, and in June of 1950 ConAC directed the Defense Forces (Western Air Defense Force--WADF--in addition to EADF) to establish training programs that would provide for ANG training within the air defense system whenever local commanders would permit it. Very little such training was accomplished, however, except during ANG summer encampments. During the summer of 1950 several ANG squadrons worked closely with ConAC,

16. Ltr (U), Maj. Gen. Karl F. Hausauer, C/S to the Governor (NY), to Webster, no subj, 9 Jan 50 (Doc 6 in ADC Hist Study No. 5).

17. Statement (U), "Results of Meeting in General Fairchild's Office on 5 January 1950," (Attachment to ConAC Air National Guard Study, 15 Jan 1950--DOC 1).

although two weeks was hardly sufficient time to train proficient interceptor aircrews.⁸

(U) The relationship between the Air Force and the ANG changed dramatically following the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. Earlier in 1950 Congress proposed to replace the Selective Service Act of 1948 (which expired on 9 July 1950) with legislation which continued the proviso that reserve units (including the ANG) could not be called into Federal service without Congressional approval. There were a number of disagreements over the wording of this legislation and by the weekend of 25 June it had not been passed. When Congress resumed deliberations on Monday, it was hurriedly decided not to attempt the passage of a new selective service bill, but merely to extend the coverage of the 1948 law for one year. It also added, as Section 21 of the new Selective Service Act of 1948, a proviso that the President be allowed, without Congressional approval, to call to active Federal service for 21 months, any member or unit of any of the reserve forces. This amendment was passed by Congress on 30 June 1950.¹⁹

18. Ltr (U), ConAC to Defense Forces, "Employment of Air National Guard Aircraft in Air Defense Mission," 9 Jun 50 (Doc 10 in ADC Hist Study No. 5); Hist of EADF, 1950, pp 195-206; Hist of 10 AF, Jul-Dec 1950, p 279.

19. Public Law 599, 81st Congress, 30 June 1950; Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 27 Jun 1950, pp 9289-90.

(U) ConAC immediately began to make plans for use of the war powers conferred on the Chief Executive, since they offered an opportunity to draw closer to the pool of fighter aircraft controlled by the ANG. Barely two weeks after the enactment of this legislation, Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, ConAC Deputy for Operations, proposed that 20 ANG fighter squadrons be federalized to strengthen ConAC's air defense posture.²⁰

(U) This proposal was not approved by USAF on the grounds that it was ready to increase the number of regular Air Force allocated to air defense and that it preferred to have regular units, rather than federalized ANG squadrons, assigned to this mission. ConAC then took a somewhat different tack. On 27 September 1950, ConAC asked that its Defense Forces be given the authority to federalize ANG squadrons in the event of imminent or actual enemy attack. This request was also refused, USAF explaining that the Secretary of the Air Force desired to retain the federalization power in his own hands.²¹

20. Ltr (U), Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, D/O, ConAC to USAF, "Air Defense Augmentation," 15 Jul 50 (Doc 91 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951).

21. Ltr (U), ConAC to USAF, "Use of ANG Fighter Units in Air Defense," 27 Sep 50 (Doc 15 in ADC Hist Study No. 5); Ltr (U), USAF to ConAC, "Emergency Employment of ANG Fighter Squadrons," 2 Nov 50 (Doc 14 in ADC Hist Study No. 5).

(U) Whatever form the expansion of the air defense force took--creation of additional squadrons of the regular Air Force or federalization of the ANG--it was decided in October 1950 that an independent Air Defense Command should be re-established to administer and control it. The new ADC began operations at Colorado Springs in early January 1951. Meanwhile, in early November 1950, a new dimension was added to the Korean War when Chinese Communist troops crossed the Yalu River into Korea. On 6 December 1950, because of what appeared to be a deepening threat to the security of the United States, General Whitehead repeated his request for federalization of the ANG.²²

(U) Whitehead requested federalization of 38 ANG squadrons, 12 less than the 50 planned for possible air defense use at the end of Fiscal Year 1947. Since the end of FY 1947 the face of the ANG air defense force had been altered considerably. Units planned for air defense use had been given other responsibilities or had been disbanded. Others, not considered in 1947, had been added to the air defense roster. At any rate, assured of USAF approval, General Whitehead listed 15 ANG squadrons he thought should be

22. Ltr (U), ConAC to USAF, "Use of ANG Units in the Air Defense of the United States," 6 Dec 50 (Doc 92 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951).

federalized first, because they were located in areas where radar coverage was available and were based where adequate support facilities were located. At that time (December 1950), the 38 ANG squadrons listed were assigned an average of 16 aircraft. Four of the 15 priority squadrons had jet fighters (F-80 and F-84), as did six of the 23 squadrons he proposed to hold in reserve. The others were equipped with F-47 and F-51 aircraft left over from World War II.²³

(U) Before the end of 1950, however, Whitehead apparently had come to the conclusion that the international situation had worsened. On 29 December 1950, in one of his last official air defense acts before the new activation of the new ADC, he requested that the other 23 ANG squadrons assigned an air defense mission be federalized as soon as possible, regardless of their lack of facilities.²⁴

23. Ibid.; Memo for the Record, ConAC, "Planning Committee Meeting," 7 Dec 50 (Doc 16 in ADC Hist Study No. 5).

24. Msg (U), ConAC to USAF, 29 Dec 50 (Doc 17 in ADC Hist Study No. 5).

CHAPTER II

FEDERALIZATION OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD
1951-1952

(U) The final ConAC request for federalization of the remaining 23 ANG squadrons was only partially approved. After reactivation of Air Defense Command, USAF furnished, on 22 January 1951, instructions for the federalization of the first 15 ANG squadrons on 10 February, with six more to be brought to federal service on 2 March. Those federalized in February 1951 were the following:¹

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
113	Stout Field, Indiana	F-51
116	Geiger Field, Washington	F-84
118	Bradley Field, Connecticut	F-47
121	Andrews AFB, Maryland	F-84
123	Portland, Oregon	F-51
132	Dow AFB, Maine	F-80
133	Grenier AFB, New Hampshire	F-51/F-47
134	Burlington, Vermont	F-47
142	New Castle County, Delaware	F-84
148	Reading, Pennsylvania	F-51/F-47
163	Baer Field, Indiana	F-51
166	Lockbourne AFB, Ohio	F-84
172	Kellogg Field, Michigan	F-51
176	Truax Field, Wisconsin	F-51
188	Kirtland AFB, New Mexico	F-51

1. Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Use of ANG Units for Air Defense," 22 Jan 51 (Doc 64 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951); Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951, pp 127-133.

Added in March were:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
105	Berry Field, Tennessee	F-47
109	Holman Field, Minnesota	F-51
126	Mitchell Field, Wisconsin	F-80
136	Niagara Falls, New York	F-47
175	Sioux Falls, South Dakota	F-51
179	Duluth, Minnesota	F-51

(U) Sixteen other ANG squadrons were held in reserve status and not federalized. One other squadron included in the earlier number of 38 was transferred to Air Training Command. The 16 reserve ANG squadrons were located as follows:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Base</u>
101	Logan Field, Massachusetts
104	Harbor Field, Maryland
119	Newark, New Jersey
131	Barnes Field, Massachusetts
137	Westchester County, New York
138	Hancock Field, New York
139	Schenectady, New York
146	Greater Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
147	Greater Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
152	Providence, Rhode Island
162	Dayton, Ohio
164	Mansfield, Ohio
169	Peoria, Illinois
181	Hensley Field, Texas
194	Hayward, California
195	Los Angeles, California

(U) Although the federalization of 21 ANG squadrons in early 1951 doubled the size of the air defense interceptor force--from 21 to 42 squadrons--within a month, this increase was not pure gain. What was added was a large measure of air defense potential. Because of the arms-length

stance of the regular Air Force and the ANG over the years preceding federalization, the ANG units had not received adequate training in air defense procedures. Many of the newly acquired squadrons were badly positioned for defense against an attack by manned bombers. Finally, Congress and the national military establishment had not been overly generous in the provision of equipment for the ANG. Most of the federalized force was equipped with surplus fighter aircraft from World War II.

(U) It was necessary to put each of the federalized ANG squadrons through an intensive 120-day period of training and organization prior to the assumption of full partnership in the air defense mission.²

(U) To improve the positioning of the new addition to the air defense force, and in many cases, to improve support facilities, 9 of the 21 federalized ANG squadrons had been directed to change location before the middle of 1951. The changes were as follows:³

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
105 FIS	Berry Field, Tennessee	McGhee-Tyson Field, Tennessee
109 FIS	Holman Field, Minnesota	Wold-Chamberlain Field, Minn.
113 FIS	Stout Field, Indiana	Scott AFB, Illinois
118 FIS	Bradley Field, Conn.	Suffolk County AFB, New York
126 FIS	Mitchell Field, Wis.	Truax Field, Wisconsin
148 FIS	Reading, Pennsylvania	Dover AFB, Delaware

2. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1951, p 133.

3. Hist of CADF, Jan-Jun 1951, p 59; Hist of WADF, Jan-Jun 1951, p 8; Hist of EADF, Jan-Jun 1951, pp 7-18.

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
172 FIS	Kellogg Field, Michigan	Selfridge AFB, Michigan
175 FIS	Sioux Falls, S. Dak.	Ellsworth AFB, S. Dak.
188 FIS	Kirtland AFB, New Mex.	Long Beach, California

(U) In August 1951 the 116th FIS was moved from Geiger Field (Spokane) to England and in March 1952 the 163rd FIS was moved from Baer Field, Indiana, to Sioux City Airport, Iowa. Also, during Fiscal Year 1952, six of the federalized ANG squadrons received improved aircraft. During the last half of 1951 the 121st FIS (Andrews), 142nd FIS (New Castle) and 148th FIS (Dover) traded their F-84A day fighters for F-94A all-weather interceptors. During the succeeding six months the 123rd FIS (Portland) received advanced F-86A day fighters in place of World War II F-51 Mustangs; the 126th FIS (Truax) gave up its F-80 jets--the initial jet fighter--for F-86A aircraft and the 176th FIS (also at Truax) substituted F-89B interceptors for F-51s.⁴

(U) In accordance with federal law, 14 of the ANG squadrons federalized in February 1951 were released from federal service on 1 November 1952; the fifteenth squadron (116th FIS) was overseas and was released by USAFE. The six federalized in March 1951 were released on 1 December 1952. All that was returned to the states, however, was the squadron designation. The aircraft and whatever former ANG

4. Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1951, table following p 49; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952, Chart No. 22.

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personnel preferred to remain in federal service were retained by ADC. In effect, then, all that happened in November and December 1952 was a change in designation of 20 fighter squadrons. Three, however, were also re-sited to better locations. The changes are given in Table 1.

CHAPTER III

CREATION OF THE ALERT FORCE
1952-1956

(U) The 16 ANG/ADC fighter squadrons not federalized in 1951 were not brought into the regular force because ADC reached the conclusion that the addition of more propeller-driven aircraft (F-47/F-51) to the active force would not appreciably improve the value of the total air defense force while adding to the support burden. ADC planned, however, in early 1952, to use these 16 squadrons as the nucleus for an expanded ANG air defense force of 52 squadrons to be created after the 21 squadrons currently in federal service were released near the end of 1952. In addition to the unfederalized 16 squadrons and the 21 squadrons currently on active duty (a total of 37 squadrons), it was planned to add the following units:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
110	St. Louis, Missouri
111	Houston, Texas
125	Tulsa, Oklahoma
149	Richmond, Virginia
153	Meridian, Mississippi
158	Savannah, Georgia
159	Jacksonville, Florida
165	Louisville, Kentucky
170	Springfield, Ohio
196	San Bernardino, California

Additional, but as yet undesignated ANG squadrons were planned for Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Sumter, South Carolina; Tampa, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; and Seattle, Washington.¹

(U) While the Air Staff gave preliminary approval to the ADC proposal, certain questions were raised. It was unlikely, for example, that runways could be extended sufficiently to permit the ANG to operate jet fighters at such locations as Schenectady, New York; Providence, Rhode Island; Peoria, Illinois; Baltimore, Maryland; Hayward, California; and Mansfield, Ohio. ADC was also asked, in March 1952, to prepare "fall back" positions to consider the commitment of 47, 33, or 18 ANG squadrons to air defense. It was also necessary to consider a situation in which ANG fighter squadrons would be used initially in the air defense role, but would later assume a fighter-bomber responsibility. This would require, of course, that ANG units receive training in both air defense and fighter-bomber techniques.²

(U) A new concept with regard to the use of ANG units not on active federal duty surfaced in May of 1952 when Maj. Gen. George G. Finch, Deputy for ANG Affairs, ConAC,

1. Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Air National Guard Fighter Squadron Program," 9 Feb 52 (Doc 93 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952).

2. 1st Ind (Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Air National Guard Fighter Squadron Program," 9 Feb 52), USAF to ADC, 3 Mar 52 and 2d Ind, ADC to USAF, 21 Mar 52 (Doc 93 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952).

suggested that more use might be made of ANG units assigned an air defense mission if a "small number of pilot officers at each strategically placed ANG unit [were placed] on active duty with the unit for the purpose of performing... intercept missions."³ This suggestion was passed along to ADC and was favorably received. After study within ADC and further consultation with ConAC, this proposal was passed along, with ADC blessing, to USAF on 1 August 1952. The USAF Judge Advocate, however, came to the conclusion, in October 1952, that existing law did not permit ANG aircraft to stand an air defense alert unless the ANG unit had been federalized.⁴

(U) Nevertheless, ADC persisted, suggesting that a small number of ANG pilots be put on active federal duty with otherwise state-controlled ANG squadrons to permit immediate response to an air defense emergency. In December 1952 USAF authorized ADC to put 10 ANG pilots on active duty in order to test the ANG alert concept at two locations. Before the end of 1952 ADC had decided that the test would be conducted by the 138th FIS at Hancock Field, New York,

3. Memo, Maj. Gen. George G. Finch, Deputy for ANG Affairs, ConAC for Maj. Gen. Leon W. Johnson, Cmdr, ConAC, "ANG," 20 May 52 (Doc 96 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952).

4. Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Use of Inactive ANG Units for Air Defense," 1 Aug 52, 1st Ind, USAF to ADC, 8 Oct 52 and 2d Ind, ADC to USAF, 20 Oct 52 (Doc 102 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1952).

and the 194th FIS at Hayward, California. Neither squadron had seen active duty in 1951-52.⁵

(U) Because of the retention of ANG aircraft by ADC at the end of ANG federal service in late 1952, the ANG fighter force was almost negligible in 1953. It was necessary to spread the aircraft of the 16 unfederalized squadrons among the 21 returned to the states. Also, it was necessary to provide aircraft for the 15 additional ANG squadrons with a mobilization assignment to ADC (a total of 52 squadrons). At the end of June 1953, therefore, the total of 298 F-51 aircraft allocated to the ANG gave an average of between five and six per squadron. Plans called for increasing the number of aircraft available to the ANG from 298 to 830 (including 94 F-94B all-weather interceptors and 208 F-86F jet fighters), but that lay in the future and was only a planning figure.⁶

(U) Meanwhile, the test of the ANG alert concept was conducted in the spring of 1953. When the pilots and aircraft at Hancock and Hayward were ready, each of the two squadrons maintained two aircraft on five-minute alert from

5. Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Use of Inactive Air National Guard Units for Air Defense," 4 Dec 52 (Doc 463 in Hist of 32nd Air Div, Jan-Jun 1953); Memo, DCS/O, ADC to Cmdr, ADC, "Progress Report on Use of ANG Units for Air Defense," 23 Dec 52 (Doc 86 in ADC Hist Study No. 5).

6. Memo, Operations and Training Division, ADC for DCS/O, ADC, "ANG Augmentation Plan," 16 Jun 53 (Doc 99 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1953).

one hour before sunrise to one hour after sunset each day. The test was somewhat slow in getting started, since the National Guard Bureau explained that 60 to 90 days would be required to obtain the required volunteers and obtain agreement from the states of California and New York. After the test actually began on 1 March 1953, however, ADC was enthusiastic about the results. The two ANG alert squadrons performed in a highly satisfactory manner and ADC was anxious to have the alert concept expanded to include other ANG squadrons.⁷

(U) By 18 May 1953 ADC was ready with a list of the 13 additional ANG squadrons it wanted to bring into the alert program as soon as possible. These, it informed the NGB were the following:⁸

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
101	Boston, Massachusetts
103	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
104	Baltimore, Maryland
115	Van Nuys, California
126	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
133	Manchester, New Hampshire
137	White Plains, New York
148	Reading, Pennsylvania
165	Louisville, Kentucky

7. Ltr, ADC to ConAC, "Test of Inactive Air National Guard Units for Air Defense," 28 Jan 53 (Doc 87 in ADC Hist Study No. 5); Ltr, 28th AD to WADF, "Use of ANG Units for Air Defense Test," 24 Feb 53 (Doc 88 in ADC Hist Study No. 5); Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1953, pp 109-110.

8. Ltr, ADC to NGB, "Air National Guard Defense Augmentation," 18 May 53 (Doc 102 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1953).

SquadronLocation

169	Peoria, Illinois
172	Battle Creek, Michigan
175	Sioux Falls, South Dakota
178	Fargo, North Dakota

(U) These ADC hopes vanished, however, when the NGB informed ADC, on 8 June 1953, that the continuing shortage of ANG aircraft would not only make it impossible to expand the number of ANG squadrons standing alert from two to 15, but would also make it necessary to discontinue the test at Hancock and Hayward on 30 June. USAF also balked at providing the 75 active-duty positions needed for an ANG alert force of 15 squadrons. ADC was forced to conclude, in August 1953, that the plan for alert ANG crews and aircraft would have to be held in abeyance until the necessary personnel and aircraft were available.⁹

(U) In October 1953, however, USAF decided that it would, after all, be possible to allocate ADC the 75 personnel authorizations needed to put 15 ANG squadrons on dawn-to-dusk alert. There was also increasing evidence that the ANG would have sufficient numbers of jet aircraft by the

9. Ltr, ADC, thru USAF, to NGB, "Air National Guard Air Defense Augmentation," 9 Jun 53 and two indorsements thereto (Doc 101 to Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1953).

end of Fiscal Year 1954 to support the alert stance favored by ADC.¹⁰

(U) Meanwhile, ADC had changed its mind about how to utilize the proposed ANG alert force. By the end of Fiscal Year 1954 seven ANG squadrons were scheduled to receive F-94A/B all-weather interceptors, the first specific air defense aircraft ever assigned to the ANG. The F-94 was a two-place interceptor, so ADC requested that the number of active duty personnel authorized the ANG be increased from 75 to 90 for Fiscal Year 1954 in order to make possible the placing of 15 radar observers at three of the F-94 squadrons. If this was done, ADC proposed that ANG squadrons begin standing alert again on 1 April 1954. USAF agreed to increase the ANG active duty authorization for FY 1954 to 90 and for FY 1955 to 151 (eight two-man crews at each of six around-the-clock F-94 bases and five crews at 11 day-fighter bases).¹¹

(U) While preparations for the ANG alert were going forward, the number of ANG squadrons under ADC cognizance was increased, in November 1953, from 52 to 70. Every

10. 3d Ind (Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Air National Guard Air Defense Augmentation," 9 Jun 53), USAF to ADC, 29 Oct 53 (Doc 91 in ADC Hist Study No. 5).

11. 4th Ind (Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Air National Guard Air Defense Augmentation," 9 Jun 53), ADC to USAF, 7 Dec 53 (Doc 92 in ADC Hist Study No. 5); 5th Ind (Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Air National Guard Air Defense Augmentation," 9 Jun 53), USAF to ADC, undated but about 5 Jan 54 (Doc 93 in ADC Hist Study No. 5).

fighter squadron allocated to the ANG was included. Nineteen of that number were fighter-interceptor squadrons (FIS), intended solely for air defense use. The remaining 51 were fighter-bomber squadrons (FBS) that held a dual mission. Although their initial combat action was expected to be air defense, it was understood that they would later be used in the fighter-bomber role. The squadrons comprising both groups are shown in Table 2.

(U) It did not prove possible to commence the revived ANG alert on 1 April 1954. The reasons were many. One involved the inability of the ANG to recruit radar observers for the F-94. The National Guard Bureau believed the difficulty lay in the fact that prospective recruits could see no future for the radar observer when his days of active flying were through. Also, radar observer training took 10 months and very few ANG members could spare 10 months away from their civilian jobs. The ANG had received only two applications for radar observer training by the end of October 1953.¹²

(U) The most important reason for failure to realize the April 1954 goal, however, was NGB insistence that 10 civilian technicians would be required to support each ANG squadron holding alert responsibility--a total of 170 people.

12. Ltr, NGB to ADC, "Air National Guard Air Defense Augmentation," 12 Apr 54 (Doc 94 in ADC Hist Study No. 5).

Granting that the need probably existed, ADC requested that the NGB pursue the matter with USAF. Meanwhile, the 1 April 1954 date passed without authorization of the technicians and NGB informed ADC that alert would never be possible until these people were made available. In June 1954, though, USAF informed ADC that the cost of the 170 technicians would be financed in Fiscal Year 1955, although that cost would be charged to the ADC budget. With this roadblock removed, the NGB was ready to promise the establishment of a regular ANG alert force by September or October 1954.¹³

(U) Actually, the first eight ANG squadrons began standing alert on 15 August 1954. The initial group included the following:¹⁴

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
163 FBS	Fort Wayne, Indiana	F-51D
164 FBS	Mansfield, Ohio	F-80
166 FBS	Columbus, Ohio	F-80
170 FBS	Springfield, Illinois	F-86E
175 FIS	Sioux Falls, South Dakota	F-51D
178 FIS	Fargo, North Dakota	F-51D
181 FBS	Dallas, Texas	F-80
194 FBS	Hayward, California	F-86A

The remaining nine squadrons assumed alert status on 1 October 1954:

13. Memo, DCS/O, ADC for Cmdr, ADC, "Visit by General Wilson," 15 Jul 54 (Doc 308 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954).

14. Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954, pp 96-97; Msg ADOOT-B2 1339, ADC to Defense Forces, 30 Jul 54 (Doc 310 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954).

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
101 FIS	Boston, Massachusetts	F-94
115 FBS	Van Nuys, California	F-86F
126 FIS	Milwaukee, Wisconsin	F-86A
131 FIS	Westfield, Massachusetts	F-94
133 FIS	Manchester, New Hampshire	F-94
137 FIS	White Plains, New York	F-94
138 FIS	Syracuse, New York	F-94
158 FBS	Savannah, Georgia	F-84D
172 FBS	Battle Creek, Michigan	F-86E

(U) While ADC was pleased with the added air defense capability provided by the ANG alert force, there was an uncomfortable feeling within the regular Air Force that the politically oriented ANG might be harboring ideas of picking up the air defense ball and running with it. Major General Wiley D. Ganey, Director of Operations for HQ USAF expressed some misgivings in a November 1954 letter to Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, ADC DCS/Operations. General Ganey wanted ADC to consider the possibility that the ANG might, by political pressure, seek more modern equipment and thereby lay claim to a significant segment of the air defense mission. General Bergquist replied that ADC was well aware of the political clout wielded by the ANG, but that the ANG alert program had provided an increase in total air defense at relatively little cost and was eminently worthwhile. Nevertheless, despite the apparent desire of the NGB, and some elements in USAF, to expand ANG participation in air defense, General Bergquist assured General Ganey that ADC would think long before expanding the ANG alert force

beyond the 17 squadrons currently participating. "We will try," he concluded, "to walk the tightrope between our requirements and the increased influence of the Guard."¹⁵

(U) Prior to 1954, responsibility for the training and inspection of ANG units was borne by ConAC. In 1954, however, a campaign to transfer the training and inspection function to the using command (such as ADC) was begun. Apparently the impetus behind this campaign came from the ANG. Against rising pressure, USAF took pains to confirm, in March 1954, that these functions continued to rest with ConAC. But the campaign did not stop. ADC strongly opposed such a transfer of function and in August 1954 General Benjamin W. Chidlaw, ADC commander, found it necessary to point out to USAF that the principal reason for the separation of ADC from ConAC in 1951 was that ConAC was becoming too embroiled in reserve activities. General Chidlaw was of the opinion that ADC should concentrate on air defense and that the training and inspection of ANG units would dilute that concentration. The ADC position had not changed at the end of 1954, although the issue was far from settlement.¹⁶

15. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, DCS/O, ADC to Maj. Gen. Wiley P. Ganey, Dir/Operations, DCS/O, USAF, no subj, 9 Dec 54 (Doc 319 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954); Ganey to Bergquist, 18 Nov 54 (Doc 319 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954).

16. Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Responsibilities for the Training of the Units of the Air Reserve Forces," 12 Mar 54 (Doc 323 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954); Gen. Benjamin W. Chidlaw,

(U) Tactical Air Command, which would take control of the ANG fighter-bomber squadrons 90 days after mobilization on D-day, perceived a unique contradiction in the situation as it existed in late 1954. While ADC was interested only in the squadrons themselves as an air defense resource, the parent ANG Wings would come under TAC jurisdiction immediately upon federalization, while the subsidiary squadrons would not be available until 90 days later. It was the TAC position, made known to USAF on 11 October 1954, that the administrative integrity of the ANG Wings should be maintained from peacetime, through the 90-day air defense period after mobilization and into the wartime fighter-bomber phase. In short, TAC felt the whole ANG fighter-bomber complex should be controlled by one command, not split two ways.¹⁷

(U) ADC did not disagree with TAC, arguing only that it could find no place within the ADC organization, either in peace or war, for the ANG Wing. So long as it was assured that the ANG squadrons would be available to it on D-day, or for peacetime alert status, ADC did not really

16. (cont) Cndr, ADC to Gen. Thomas D. White, C/S, USAF, no subj, 7 Aug 54 (Doc 328 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954); Msg, ADHCS 134, ADC to Ramey AFB, P. R. (site of USAF Commanders' Conference), 18 Jan 55 (Doc 329 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954).

17. Ltr, TAC to USAF, "Mobilization Mission for Air National Guard Fighter-Bomber Squadron and Wings," 11 Oct 54 (Doc 341 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954).

care who had administrative control of the ANG Wings and their support squadrons.¹⁸

(U) The anomaly continued, however, and in March 1955 USAF broached a solution that involved designating the 51 ANG squadrons currently carried as "fighter-bomber" squadrons to "fighter-interceptor" squadrons as soon as all-weather interceptor aircraft were available. Meanwhile, USAF proposed, these squadrons would continue to train as day-fighter squadrons. ADC agreed, in May 1955, to assume mobilization jurisdiction over the 70 ANG fighter squadrons and their parent Wings, with the proviso that the Wings would not be federalized when the squadrons were mobilized. Wing personnel were to be called to active duty, as individuals, to fit the requirements of the air defense system.¹⁹

(U) The 17 ANG squadrons which provided two aircraft on five-minute dawn-to-dusk alert beginning 1 October 1954 were still doing so at the middle of 1955, but ADC had plans for changing the ANG alert procedure. In the spring of 1955, ADC prepared a tentative alert plan which would place 19 ANG squadrons on "permanent" alert, with 48 other squadrons

18. 2d Ind (Ltr, TAC to USAF, "Mobilization Mission for Air National Guard Fighter-Bomber Squadrons and Wings," 11 Oct 54), ADC to USAF, 12 Jan 55 (Doc 341 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1954).

19. Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Designation of ANG Fighter Units," 2 Mar 55 (Doc 381 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955); Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Air National Guard Reorganization," 13 May 55 (Doc 379 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955).

on "rotating" alert. The 19 permanently alert squadrons would not necessarily include all 17 of those currently in this status, but would use squadrons located in areas where the interceptor coverage provided by the regular ADC fighter force was thin or non-existent. The 48 rotating squadrons would stand alert in groups of 16, with the mission rotated every year. Under this plan, all of the 48 rotating squadrons would have alert responsibility one year in every three. The ANG squadrons located in Denver (120th), Cheyenne (187th) and Salt Lake City (191st) were not included in either group, because no search radar was programmed for construction within 200 miles of any of these cities and alert was therefore impractical. This plan was forwarded to USAF on 13 May 1955.²⁰

(U) The revised ADC plan for the ANG alert force was eventually accepted by both USAF and the NGB, but only after long months of study. Finally, on 15 October 1955, USAF directed ADC to proceed as outlined, effective 1 July 1956. The 70 ANG fighter squadrons were all designated "fighter interceptor" squadrons, regardless of the type of aircraft available. The 19 "permanent" ANG alert squadrons in the new plan included only four of the 17 which began alert

20. Memo, Dir/Operations and Training, ADC for DCS/O, ADC, "Air National Guard Air Alert Program," 9 Mar 55 (Doc 375 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955); Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Revision of the Air National Guard Air Alert Plan," 13 May 55 (Doc 374 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955).

operations in 1954--the 170th at Springfield, Illinois; 175th at Sioux Falls, South Dakota; 178th at Fargo, North Dakota; and 181st at Dallas, Texas. The 13 more scheduled to join the permanent alert force on 1 July 1956 were:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
111	Houston, Texas
124	Des Moines, Iowa
125	Tulsa, Oklahoma
127	Wichita, Kansas
128	Marietta, Georgia
132	Bangor, Maine
156	Charlotte, North Carolina
165	Louisville, Kentucky
173	Lincoln, Nebraska
182	San Antonio, Texas
192	Reno, Nevada
194	Fresno, California
197	Phoenix, Arizona

The other two selections were only tentative. The 159th FIS at Jacksonville, Florida, was expected to assume alert operations 1 October 1956 if the nearby radar installation (M-114) became operational on schedule. Similarly, the 190th at Boise, Idaho, was to assume alert status on 1 January 1957 if the radar at Baker, Oregon (SM-149) was ready.²¹

(U) The remaining 50 ANG fighter squadrons²² were divided

21. Incl 1 to 1st Ind (Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Revision of the Air National Guard Air Alert Plan," 15 Oct 55), ADC to USAF, 23 Nov 55 (Doc 284 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955).

22. The total number of ANG fighter squadrons was reduced from 70 to 69 when the 152nd FIS at Providence, Rhode Island, was disbanded in 1955. Also, the designation of the 1st FBS (Fort Dix, New Jersey) was changed to 141st FIS and that of the 7th FBS (Philadelphia) was changed to 117th FIS. Further, the locations of squadrons within states were occasionally changed.

into three groups of 16 or 17 squadrons, each group to carry alert responsibility one year at a time. The squadrons at Denver, Cheyenne and Salt Lake were put back into the rotational alert program after it was established that the ANG would operate radar stations at Boulder, Colorado, and Salt Lake. The first rotational group was to stand alert during FY 1957, the second during FY 1958, the third during FY 1959. Then, presumably, the sequence of rotations would be repeated. Therefore, when all 19 of the permanently alert squadrons became operational the air defense system would be augmented by 35 or 36 alert ANG squadrons. The initial rotational group (FY 1957) was as follows: ²³

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
113	Terre Haute, Indiana
116	Spokane, Washington
117	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
118	Windsor Locks, Connecticut
120	Denver, Colorado
126	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
131	Westfield, Massachusetts
139	Schenectady, New York
142	New Castle, Delaware
164	Mansfield, Ohio
166	Columbus, Ohio
172	Battle Creek, Michigan
179	Duluth, Minnesota
185	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
188	Albuquerque, New Mexico
195	Van Nuys, California

(U) The alert group for FY 1958 included: ²⁴

23. Incl 2 to 1st Ind (Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Revision of the Air National Guard Air Alert Plan," 15 Oct 55), ADC to USAF, 23 Nov 55 (Doc 284 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955).

24. Incl 3 to 1st Ind (Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Revision of the Air National Guard Air Alert Plan," 15 Oct 55), ADC to

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
101	Boston, Massachusetts
103	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
121	Andrews AFB, Maryland
123	Portland, Oregon
134	Burlington, Vermont
136	Niagara Falls, New York
137	White Plains, New York
141	Fort Dix, New Jersey
146	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
157	Eastover, South Carolina
162	Springfield, Ohio
168	Chicago, Illinois
171	Detroit, Michigan
174	Sioux City, Iowa
176	Madison, Wisconsin
187	Cheyenne, Wyoming
196	Ontario, California

(U) The third group of rotating alert squadrons (FY 1959):²⁵

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
104	Baltimore, Maryland
107	Detroit, Michigan
108	Chicago, Illinois
109	St. Paul, Minnesota
112	Akron-Canton, Ohio
115	Van Nuys, California
119	Newark, New Jersey
133	Manchester, New Hampshire
138	Syracuse, New York
147	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
148	Reading, Pennsylvania
158	Savannah, Georgia
163	Fort Wayne, Indiana
167	Charleston, West Virginia
169	Peoria, Illinois
186	Great Falls, Montana
191	Salt Lake City, Utah

24. (cont) USAF, 23 Nov 55 (Doc 284 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955).

25. Incl 4 to 1st Ind (Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Revision of the Air National Guard Air Alert Plan," 15 Oct 55), ADC to USAF, 23 Nov 55 (Doc 284 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955).

(U) With all ANG fighter squadrons assigned an air defense mission, it could be assumed that all ANG units would eventually be equipped with all-weather interceptors. But only a handful were so equipped (mostly F-94A/B aircraft) at the end of 1955 and it was becoming fairly obvious that not all ANG fighter squadrons would ever be so equipped. National Guard Bureau planning at that time forecast that no more than 46 of the 69 ANG fighter squadrons would receive all-weather interceptors.²⁶

(U) Although ADC assumed that it would have the authority to order ANG fighter squadrons to active duty in an emergency, such authority, in fact, did not exist in late 1955. While the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 (Public Law 305), passed by Congress in the summer of 1955, gave the President the authority to order a million reserves to active duty, ADC was not clear as to how this authority could be applied quickly with respect to ADC/ANG fighter squadrons. The problem arose from the proviso in the 1955 legislation that this authority could not be exercised until a national emergency had been proclaimed by either the President or Congress. In November of 1955, USAF was

26. Memo, DCS/O, ADC for C/S, ADC, "ANG Aircraft Equipping Program," 29 Sep 55 (Doc 290 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955); 1st Ind (Ltr, CADF to ADC, "Re-equipping of Air National Guard Squadrons with All-Weather Aircraft," 28 Dec 55), ADC to CADF, 9 Jan 56 (Doc 291 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955).

preparing a proposed procedure by which the commander of ADC could order ANG units to active duty immediately upon the Presidential or Congressional declaration. ADC, however, did not think this provision was adequate since the required declaration might not be forthcoming for hours or even days after an attack. Meanwhile, ADC told the Air Defense Forces that immediately upon the entry of hostile bombers into the air defense surveillance system, ADC would request the declaration of a national emergency. At the same time, the commanders of air defense divisions (subordinate to the Air Defense Forces) were to request ANG squadron commanders to execute their recall plans. Hopefully, by the time the recall action was complete the required national emergency would have been declared. Though the ADC plans were not strictly legal, Maj. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr., ADC vice commander, wrote Maj. Gen. Roy H. Lynn, WADF commander, on 25 November 1955, that "we all know that if hostile aircraft are detected en route to our country we will act first and think of the legalities later."²⁷ Operation STOP WATCH, the ANG recall test of October 1955, led ADC to the

27. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr., V/C, ADC to Maj. Gen. Roy H. Lynn, Cmdr, WADF, no subj, 25 Nov 55 (Doc 287 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955); Ltr, Smith to Lt. Gen. Frank F. Everest, DCS/O, USAF, no subj, 8 Oct 55 (Doc 285 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955); Ltr, Everest to Smith, no subj, 7 Nov 55 (Doc 286 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955).

conclusion that about half the ANG force could be ready for combat within two hours of notification.²⁸

(U) The plans for an augmented ANG alert force of 35-36 squadrons foundered on the rock of personnel shortages in the spring of 1956. USAF announced, in March, that it could support only the "permanent" alert force of 19 squadrons. This redeployed force was generally in position by the planned date of 1 July 1956. At that time only five squadrons of the new alert force were not ready. The 158th (Savannah) was to continue on alert status in place of the 128th (Marietta) until 30 September 1956 or until such time as the ground radar in the Atlanta area became operational. Similarly, the 115th (Van Nuys) was to substitute for the 190th (Boise) until another radar was ready, probably about the end of 1956. The other three delays involved aircraft conversions. The 166th (Columbus) would probably remain in place of the 182nd (San Antonio) and the 163rd (Fort Wayne) in place of the 159th (Jacksonville) until the end of 1956 for that reason. Finally, replacement of the 133rd (Manchester) by the 165th (Louisville) was likely to be delayed until June 1957 because of the conversion problem.²⁹

28. Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955, p 113.

29. Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Revised ANG Air Alert Plan," 5 Mar 56 (Doc 309 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956); Permanent Alert Plan, ADC, undated but about July 1956 (Doc 305 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956).

(U) At the middle of 1956 the ANG fighter squadrons were equipped with about 1,500 aircraft. Less than half (24 squadrons) possessed all-weather (F-86D, F-89B/C/D or F-94A/B/C) interceptors. Forty others had day jets of the F-80, F-84 or F-86A/E types. Five squadrons were still equipped with the propeller-driven F-51 Mustang.³⁰

30. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, p 59.

CHAPTER IV

REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
1956-1958

(U) It was not until 1956 that Congress came to a full realization of the immense cost of the air defense system planned in the early fifties. In earlier years, while the various types of equipment were still under development, the cost was not large. But when firm production contracts were written for the actual hardware required in the improved air defense system, it became obvious that the cost was too great in terms of any defense budget Congress was likely to approve. Nearly every aspect of the air defense program suffered fund-induced reduction in 1956.

(U) So far as the ADC-oriented portion of the ANG was concerned, this was first recognized in the spring of 1956 when USAF revealed that it could not finance the cost of active-duty ANG aircrews in the numbers required for the ADC "rotational" alert program. As the year went along, plans for the equipping of the major portion of the ANG fighter force with all-weather interceptors also came under review. In early 1956 it was planned to equip 58 of the 69 ANG squadrons with all-weather interceptors by 1960. By November of 1956, however, ADC had come to the conclusion

that if funds were to become scarce and priorities had to be established the regular force should take precedence over the ANG. Therefore, ADC began to oppose equipping ANG squadrons with complicated missile-firing interceptors that were probably beyond the capability of the ANG to maintain and operate effectively. Instead, ADC recommended (in a complete change of direction from earlier recommendations) that no more than 30 percent of the ANG fighter squadrons receive all-weather interceptors, with another 30 percent receiving day fighters of the proposed F-100 and F-104 types. The remainder, in the ADC view, should be diverted to air rescue and air transport missions. Also, ADC recommended that the ANG interceptor force of the future be limited to F-86D, because the F-89D and F-94C required two-man crews and were difficult for the ANG to man.¹

(U) ADC also managed, in late 1956, to obtain relief from one onerous chore as regards the ANG--the provision of facilities and personnel for the maintenance of ANG mobilization reserve materiel (MRM). Because of shortages of funds and personnel, ADC asked to be relieved of this responsibility and USAF and the National Guard Bureau agreed. Henceforth, ADC was obligated only to prepare quantitative requirements, indicate where and when materiel should be

1. Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Air Defense Command Policy on Reserve Components in Air Defense," 14 Nov 56 (Doc 199 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956).

stored and furnish the ANG with technical guidance concerning storage and maintenance. The ANG assumed responsibility for funding, construction, security, maintenance and storage of MRM. Pending completion of the MRM project, ADC agreed, in November 1956, to provide two loads of ammunition for each ANG aircraft, plus sufficient additional equipment to permit four combat sorties, wherever ANG bases had the necessary storage space.²

(U) Before the ADC/ANG fighter force got any smaller, however, it got larger. Seven squadrons (for a total of 76 squadrons) were added in early 1957. Those added were the 102nd and 114th at Brooklyn Naval Air Station in New York; 110th at St. Louis, Missouri; 117th at Hutchinson, Kansas; 122nd at New Orleans, Louisiana; 149th at Byrd Field, Virginia; and the 180th at St. Joseph, Missouri.³

(U) Meanwhile, the November 1956 ADC request that no more than 30 percent of the ANG squadrons holding an air defense mission be equipped with all-weather interceptor aircraft drew no immediate response from USAF, so ADC repeated the request on 21 March 1957. The main thrust of

2. 1st Ind (Ltr, USAF to ADC, "MRM for the Air National Guard," 8 Aug 56), ADC to USAF, 14 Aug 56 (Doc 201 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956); Maj. Gen. M. S. Roth, Acting C/S, ADC to Maj. Gen. J. E. Smart, Asst Vice C/S, USAF, 20 Sep 56 (Doc 202 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956); Msg, ADC to USAF, 16 Nov 56 (Doc 203 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956); Msg, ADC to Defense Forces, 23 Nov 56 (Doc 204 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956).

3. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1957, p 156.

the reiterated statement was that insufficient funds were likely to be available to support a large number of ANG squadrons equipped with modern all-weather interceptors, especially those carrying a two-man crew. USAF responded, on 8 April 1957, to the extent of providing ADC a list of 30 ANG squadrons it believed should have priority on available all-weather aircraft, but asked that ADC review the list and justify any changes requested.⁴

(U) As a result of the requested review, ADC asked for the substitution of only one squadron (the 127th at Wichita for the 117th at Hutchinson). This substitution was requested on the grounds that the 127th was a going concern, while the Hutchinson squadron was just being organized. Within the priority listing, ADC requested numerous changes. The comparison is shown in Table 3.

(U) At the middle of 1957 the ANG force dedicated to air defense was large, but not well equipped from an air defense standpoint. Ten of the 76 squadrons had no tactical aircraft at all. Only four had modern interceptors. Two had the F-94C, one had the F-86D and one had the F-89D. Twenty others were equipped with second-line interceptors--F-89B/C and F-94A/B. The remaining 42 squadrons had day

4. Ltr, ADC to USAF, "ADC Command Policy on Reserve Components in Air Defense," 21 Mar 57 (Doc 319 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1957); Msg AFOOP-OC 54573, USAF to ADC, 8 Apr 57 (Doc 320 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1957).

fighters of the F-80, F-84 and F-86 types. ADC was looking forward to the day when the ANG squadrons destined for all-weather interceptors would be equipped with the one-place F-86D. Meanwhile, 19 ANG squadrons continued to stand dawn-to-dusk alert.⁵

(U) The long-standing ADC request to reduce the number of ANG squadrons answerable to ADC to a more manageable total of 30-40 squadrons was partially granted before the end of 1957, although USAF reduced the total only slightly-- to 55 squadrons, about halfway between the ADC request and the total of 76 squadrons which had previously carried air defense responsibility. The 55 ANG squadrons which retained an air defense mission at the end of 1957 are given in Table 4.

(U) The first proposal for air defense use of the Air National Guard in other than the manned interceptor role surfaced in the summer of 1957, when it was suggested that ANG personnel might be useful in the operation of BOMARC, the developing interceptor missile. In the beginning ADC was receptive to such use of the ANG and in August 1957 provided USAF a plan outlining the integration of ANG personnel into BOMARC operations. On second thought, however, ADC reached the conclusion that it not only did not encourage such use of the ANG, but strongly objected to "diversion

5. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1957, pp 156-160.

of the BOMARC missile to reserve components so long as initial models of this weapon constitute a first line resource."⁶ This change in position, ADC informed USAF on 27 December 1957, was based on more mature consideration of such factors as command control and political implications, confidence in operational capability, development and maintenance of a qualified and dedicated corps of regular Air Force technicians for support of this and subsequent air defense missile programs and adverse recruitment, rotational and retention problems which might arise among regulars if the ANG manned some of the more favorable locations. Therefore, ADC felt that any consideration of ANG in connection with BOMARC was several years premature and requested that a planned January 1958 conference on the subject be cancelled.⁷

(U) Although the January meeting was cancelled as requested, National Guard interest continued and the subject was far from being a dead issue in view of the political muscle exhibited by the Guard. Therefore, a discussion of ANG participation in BOMARC did take place at USAF on 15 May 1958. The ADC position was still unchanged from the stance

6. Msg, ADORQ-C 501, ADC to USAF, 27 Dec 57 (Doc 292 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1957).

7. Ibid.

taken in December 1957 and no immediate action was taken to bring ANG into the interceptor missile program.⁸

(U) The size of the ADC/ANG interceptor force shrunk still further in 1958 when 14 fighter squadrons had their M-day allegiance transferred from ADC to TAC. This brought the group responsible to ADC down to 41 squadrons and relatively close to the 1956 ADC recommendation that 30-40 squadrons were probably the ideal number. The squadrons relieved of air defense responsibility were the following:⁹

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
101	Boston, Massachusetts
102	New York NAS, New York
103	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
104	Baltimore, Maryland
115	Van Nuys, California
118	Windsor Locks, Connecticut
121	Andrews AFB, Maryland
131	Westfield, Massachusetts
136	Niagara Falls, New York
137	White Plains, New York
138	Syracuse, New York
139	Schenectady, New York
142	Wilmington, Delaware
167	Martinsburg, West Virginia

All of these, except the 115th at Van Nuys, were located in the densely populated northeast, where regular ADC squadrons were present in considerable numbers.

8. Msg, ADORQ-C 335, ADC to USAF, 14 May 58 (Doc 178 in Hist of ADC, 1958); Hist of ADC, 1958, pp 146-147.

9. Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1957, p 123; Hist of ADC, 1958, p 144.

CHAPTER V

THE CHANGING ALERT FORCE
1959-1960

~~(S)(G-4)~~ At the end of 1958, ADC was generally resigned to the fact that it would be allowed only an ANG alert force of 19 squadrons. Since there was also pressure from the non-alert squadrons to share in this duty, however, eight previously non-alert squadrons replaced currently alert squadrons at various dates in 1958. Thus, in a sense, the rotational provisions of the earlier ADC plan were put into limited operation, although the total number of alert ANG squadrons did not exceed 19. The squadrons involved were:¹

<u>New Alert Squadrons</u>		<u>Replaced Alert Squadrons</u>	
<u>Sq</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Sq</u>	<u>Location</u>
116	Spokane, Washington	124	Des Moines, Iowa
122	New Orleans, Louisiana	132	Bangor, Maine
123	Portland, Oregon	165	Louisville, Kentucky
137	White Plains, New York	170	Springfield, Illinois
151	Knoxville, Tennessee	181	Dallas, Texas
185	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	190	Boise, Idaho
186	Great Falls, Montana	192	Reno, Nevada
191	Salt Lake City, Utah	194	Fresno, California

~~(S)(G-4)~~ Meanwhile, over the years, that portion of the ANG assigned to ADC was almost entirely outfitted with all-weather interceptors. At the middle of 1959 only two

1. Hist of ADC, 1958, p 148.

of these squadrons had day fighters--F-100A. Twenty-seven squadrons flew the F-86D/L, 10 had F-89D/H aircraft and two had the F-94C.

~~(S)~~ The availability of second-line all-weather interceptors brought about a significant change in the nature of the ANG alert force in early 1959, because around-the-clock, rather than dawn-to-dusk, alert became feasible. It cost more, since 24-hour alert required that nine ANG aircrews (instead of the normal five) be retained on active duty at alert squadrons, but both ADC and USAF believed the additional capability justified the added cost. By the middle of 1959 six ANG squadrons were standing the 24-hour alert. Five were located along the southern border where regular ADC forces were spread thin. These were the 111th (Ellington AFB, Texas), 122nd (New Orleans, Louisiana), 159th (Jacksonville, Florida), 182nd (Kelly AFB, Texas) and 197th (Phoenix, Arizona). The sixth (178th at Fargo, North Dakota) was along the northern border. The 122nd and 182nd flew the F-86D, the 111th, 159th and 197th the more modern F-86L (the "L" signified that the aircraft was equipped with data-link components that permitted operation within the SAGE ground environment. The 178th had the two-place F-89D.²

2. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959, pp 191-192.

~~(S)~~ Also, in early 1959, sufficient active duty personnel spaces were made available for ANG use to permit an increase in the ANG alert force from 19 to 22 squadrons. As a result, while six squadrons ceased carrying the alert responsibility during the first half of 1959, nine others picked up the burden. The changes, as of 30 June 1959, were as follows:³

<u>Added to the Alert Force</u>		<u>Released from Alert</u>	
<u>Sq</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Sq</u>	<u>Location</u>
109	Minneapolis, Minnesota	125	Tulsa, Oklahoma
120	Denver, Colorado	127	McConnell AFB, Kansas
133	Grenier AFB, New Hampshire	128	Dobbins AFB, Georgia
146	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	137	White Plains, New York
147	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	156	Charlotte, North Carolina
152	Tucson, Arizona	175	Sioux Falls, South Dakota
157	Eastover, South Carolina		
187	Cheyenne, Wyoming		
196	Ontario, California		

~~(S)~~ (S) Despite the increase in the size and capability of the ANG alert force, EADF, in the spring of 1959, recommended to ADC that the responsibilities of the ANG in the provision of alert forces be increased, at least in the EADF jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the ANG continued to press for a stake in BOMARC operations. This combination of circumstances apparently impelled Lieutenant General Joseph H. Atkinson, ADC commander, to assume a bitterly hostile attitude toward the ANG. On 25 May 1959 he laid

3. Ibid.

his position before General Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff:⁴

I am gravely disturbed by talk of equipping the ANG with BOMARC. Apparently a lot of people believe in cheap air defense as a part-time sideline of citizens who comprise the ANG. This is dangerous wishful thinking. It has not yet been applied to offense, although I miss the distinction in ability to man BOMARC, ATLAS or MINUTEMAN.

The Reserve Forces should have no role in the air defense fighting forces. I vigorously oppose equipping them with first line weapons, manned or unmanned. Limited numbers of such weapons require that we guarantee peak performance in emergency. This demands immediate response to command not only in emergency but in the proficiency-building process which precedes it. "Command" by negotiation, persuasion and state politics will not do the job.

I put little dependence on the ANG as emergency interceptor augmentation. Extensive experience convinces us that air defense is a full-time system job. Part-time training, mostly isolated from the system and unresponsive to the Air Defense Commander, simply will not produce successful system performance in sudden emergency. Expected return does not justify the high cost of this role for the ANG.

Reserve Forces belong in minimum cost, minimum support missions which do not materially compete with us for resources. I recommend concerted effort to so employ them.

General Atkinson replied, in similar vein, to the request from EADF.⁵

(S) (S) Whatever the feelings of General Atkinson, however, USAF asked ADC, on 29 May 1959, to participate in

4. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Atkinson, Cmdr, ADC to Gen. Thomas D. White, C/S, USAF, "Policy on Reserve Forces," 25 May 59 (Doc 252 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959).

5. Ltr, Atkinson to Maj. Gen. Edward H. Underhill, Cmdr, EADF, "Emergency ANG Fighter Unit Employment," 30 Jun 59 (Doc 253 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959).

[REDACTED]

a many times-postponed conference on the utilization of, ANG in BOMARC operation. When the time for the conference (late June 1959) approached, however, USAF announced that because of "current uncertainties as to possible extensive reduction in the total BOMARC program"⁶ the scheduled meeting would not be held.

[REDACTED] General Atkinson subsequently discussed the subject of his 25 May letter with General White and reported to General Earle E. Partridge, NORAD commander, on 11 June 1959, that he "received no encouragement and anticipated little, if any, real support for my views."⁷ General White explained his position later in June. The political nature of the problem was simple. "In developing plans for the utilization of Reserve Forces," General White pointed out, "I must also consider that the Administration and the Congress expect our Reserve Forces to perform an active function in U. S. defense. Any action to completely deny Air National Guard participation in air defense with newer weapons systems would meet with considerable opposition."⁸ It was as simple as that.

6. Msg, AFODC 52649, USAF to ADC, 24 Jun 59 (Doc 256 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959).

7. Ltr, Atkinson to Gen. Earle E. Partridge, CINCNORAD, "Utilization of Reserve and National Guard Forces," 11 Jun 59 (Doc 254 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959).

8. Ltr, White to Atkinson, no subj, 25 Jun 59 (Doc 255 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959).


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(C) (S) The long-simmering problem of ANG involvement with BOMARC was finally settled in the late summer of 1959, but in an unexpected manner. Because of the refusal of Congress to provide the funds necessary for the construction and equipment of the planned 32 BOMARC sites, the planned number was reduced to 16. In a BOMARC force of this size there was no place for an ANG unit, at least in the USAF/ADC view. Planning for ANG participation was dropped in August 1959.

9 (b)(3) 42 USC § 2162 (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)

(b)(3) 42 USC § 2162 (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)



XOE
b)(3)

ADC recommended,

in November 1959, that these eight squadrons be limited to

9. Msg, ADLPR C59-131, ADC to USAF, 20 Aug 59 (Doc 93 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1959).

~~SECRET~~

non-nuclear versions of the F-89, but this recommendation received no immediate reaction from any source. Meanwhile, ADC proposed to limit the training of ANG F-89J aircrews to methods of employment of the nuclear armament. No live warheads were to be provided the ANG. Upon federalization, of course, the ANG squadron became part of the regular force and nuclear warheads would be provided in the same manner they were furnished to ADC units.¹⁰

~~(C)(Sp 4)~~ In another area, however, ADC recommended modernization of the ANG interceptor force. Because the F-104 was not adequately equipped for all-weather interception, ADC planned to replace four squadrons flying F-104 aircraft with more suitable interceptors. Nevertheless, the F-104 was a high-speed, high-altitude jet that could counter the anticipated threat under certain conditions, so ADC recommended, again in November 1959, that the F-104 aircraft released by ADC be made available to the ANG.¹¹

(b)(3) 42 USC § 2162 (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)

10. Msg, ADOOP-P 27-H-36, ADC to 30 AD, 27 Aug 59 (Doc 88 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1959); Msg, ADOOP-P 12-K-29, ADC to USAF, 12 Nov 59 (Doc 89 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1959); Msg, ADOOP-WM 51, ADC to 30 AD, 20 Nov 59 (Doc 90 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1959).


11. Msg, ADOOP-P 6-K-19, ADC to USAF, 6 Nov 59 (Doc 91 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1959).

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DOE
(S)(3)

FO
(b)(3) 42 USC § 2162 (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)

DE
(b)(3)



12. Msg, ADI PG-IF 1341, ADC to USAF, 6 May 60 (Doc 169 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1960); Msg, AFOOP-DE 93571, USAF to ADC, 12 May 60 (Doc 170 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1960); Msg, ADOOP-WM 1450, ADC to WADF, 16 May 60 (Doc 171 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1960); Msg, ADOOP-WM 1491, ADC to USAF, 20 May 60 (Doc 172 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1960); Msg, 250DC 332-G, 25 AD to ADC, 27 May 60 (Doc 173 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1960); Msg ADOOP-WI 1802, ADC to 25 AD, 21 Jun 69 (Doc 174 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1960); Msg ADOOP-WM 1812, ADC to

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~~(S) (Cn 4)~~ Three ANG squadrons--the 109th at Minneapolis, 125th at Tulsa and the 133rd at Grenier AFB--were inactivated in early 1960, thus reducing the number of squadrons under ADC cognizance to 39. Since two of these (the 109th and 133rd) were standing alert at the time of inactivation, the number on alert dropped to 19. Earlier action to rotate the alert at Pittsburgh between the 146th and 147th had reduced the alert group from 22 to 21 squadrons. Later in the year the 118th FIS at Bradley Field, Connecticut, was added to the ADC roster to bring the total to 40. By the end of 1960 there had been another thoroughgoing reshuffle of alert squadrons, with the exception of those on 24-hour duty. While the 197th at Phoenix was relieved of this duty, the other five that initiated the 24-hour alert stance were unchanged. The total number of alert squadrons again increased to 22, but the 17 on dawn-to-dusk duty changed considerably. These, at the end of 1960, were the following:¹³

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
103	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
108	Chicago, Illinois
124	Des Moines, Iowa
126	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
127	Wichita, Kansas

12. (cont) NGB, 22 Jun 60 (Doc 175 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1960); Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960, pp 174-176.

13. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1960, p 98; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960, p 177.

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<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
128	Atlanta, Georgia
134	Burlington, Vermont
156	Charlotte, North Carolina
158	Savannah, Georgia
175	Sioux Falls, South Dakota
176	Madison, Wisconsin
179	Duluth, Minnesota
181	Dallas, Texas
188	Albuquerque, New Mexico
190	Boise, Idaho
192	Reno, Nevada
194	Fresno, California

Three of the around-the-clock squadrons were equipped with F-86L aircraft, one with the F-89J and one with the F-102A. Nine of the 17 squadrons on 14-hour alert had the F-86L and seven had the F-89J. The unit at Albuquerque flew the F-100.

~~(S)~~ The remaining 18 ANG squadrons of the group committed to air defense were deployed in this manner:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
116	Spokane, Washington
118	Bradley Field, Connecticut
120	Denver, Colorado
123	Portland, Oregon
132	Bangor, Maine
146	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
147	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
151	Knoxville, Tennessee
152	Tucson, Arizona
157	Eastover, South Carolina
173	Lincoln, Nebraska
185	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
186	Great Falls, Montana
187	Cheyenne, Wyoming
191	Salt Lake City, Utah
196	Ontario, California
197	Phoenix, Arizona
198	San Juan, Puerto Rico

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