

CHAPTER VI

THE TIES BECOME CLOSER
1961-1971

(U) The relationship between ADC and the ANG changed significantly on 1 July 1960 when ADC assumed responsibility for the supervision of training and the inspection of ANG squadrons. ADC also assumed jurisdiction over the aircraft accident prevention program. The National Guard Bureau retained supervision over logistics, budget administration and personnel. The change made General Atkinson much happier over the role of the ANG in air defense. "Under the new system," he wrote in a magazine article in the summer of 1960, "ANG training directives will be identical to those used daily by squadrons of the regular establishment. The training program will continue to be under the direction of the state Adjutants General, but now in accordance with Air Defense Command manuals."¹

~~(S)~~ Operating on the theory that ANG units should be trained, so far as possible, to the same level of proficiency as regular squadrons, ADC launched a rigorous training program. The ANG squadrons were required to participate in six training exercises every calendar quarter,

1. Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Atkinson, "Mission: Teamwork," Air Force Magazine and Space Digest, Jul 1960, p 113.

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the same requirement placed on squadrons of the regular force. Also, ANG squadrons were required to undergo the same periodic tactical evaluation required of ADC units. Further, flights (six aircraft) of ANG interceptors were sent to the ADC Weapons Employment Center at Tyndall for a week of the same type of firing practice offered regular squadrons. Between August 1960 and the end of the year, 16 flights from seven ANG F-89J squadrons--the 116th, 126th, 132nd, 134th, 178th and 179th--made the training trip to Tyndall.²


[REDACTED] The next step was to reorganize the ADC/ANG interceptor force into a smaller, but more tightly knit, organization. The existing force of 40 ANG squadrons was reduced to 29 during the first half of 1961, with three of these scheduled for transfer (the 103rd and 158th to MATS and the 181st to TAC) in 1962 and 1963. The 198th in Puerto Rico remained in the ADC fold, but was given no air alert responsibilities. The remaining 25 squadrons were given a larger share of responsibility for air defense when the entire group was directed to assume around-the-clock alert status on 1 July 1961. Each ANG squadron was allocated nine active-duty aircrews, with the understanding that the

2. Col. Paul Fojtik (ADC Assistant DCS/O for ANG Affairs), "The Guard Joins ADC," Interceptor, Sep 60, p 10; 1st Ind (Ltr, ADCIO-H to ADOOP, "Weapons Center Training," undated), ADOOP-WI, ADC, to ADCIO-H, 24 Mar 61 (Doc 200 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960).

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alert duty was to be rotated among the 30 aircrews authorized for each squadron. Active duty tours ranged from two days to the allowable maximum of 59 uninterrupted days. The average was 10 days. The alert requirement was for two operationally-ready aircraft and two combat-ready aircrews on five-minute alert, with a second pair of aircraft and crews to be ready in one hour. The 25 ANG squadrons charged with this duty on 1 July 1961 (and including the five squadrons already on around-the-clock alert) are listed in

(b)(3) 42 USC § 2162 (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)




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3. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, pp 178-180.
4. ADC Hist Study No. 20, 'Nuclear Armament: Its

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(b)(3), 42 USC § 2162 (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)



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4. (cont) Acquisition, Control and Application to Manned Interceptors, 1951-1963," pp 83-89.
5. Ibid.

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~~(C)(Sp 4)~~ The alert schedule was upset somewhat when three ANG F-104 squadrons (the 151st at Knoxville, 157th at Eastover and the 197th at Phoenix) were federalized on 9 October 1961 and transferred to TAC for overseas duty during one of the recurrent crises over Berlin. They were returned to the United States and ADC jurisdiction in the summer of 1962, but the Phoenix squadron traded its F-104 aircraft for C-97 transports and was assigned to MATS. After the Cuban Crisis of October 1962, the 151st and 157th surrendered their F-104 aircraft to the regular ADC force (one group of aircraft was used to reequip the 319th FIS at Homestead AFB, Florida, the other the 331st FIS at Webb AFB, Texas) and received F-102A interceptors in return. Meanwhile, in 1962, the 181st (Dallas) and 198th (Puerto Rico) began alert duty, bringing the total to 26.⁷

6. Msg, ADCCR 100, ADC to USAF, 17 Jan 61 (Doc 366 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960); Msg, AFOOP-DE 64760, USAF to ADC, 25 Sep 61 (Doc 462 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961); Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1965, p 70.

7. Msg, NG-AFOTM 742884, NGB to ADC, 5 Feb 63 (Doc 2); Msg, ADMLP 384, ADC to NGB, 5 Feb 63 (Doc 3); Msg, ADOTT-D 647, ADC to 26 AD, 5 Mar 63 (Doc 4); Msg, ADOOP-WI 842, ADC to USAF, 20 Mar 63 (Doc 5); Msg, ADOTT-D 890, ADC to NGB, 22 Mar 63 (Doc 6); Msg, ADOOP-WI 712, ADC to 26 AD, 11 Mar 63 (Doc 7).

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~~(C)(Sp-4)~~ Although earlier planning had scheduled the transfer of the 181st to TAC in 1963, it was not actually accomplished until 1965. Moving out of the air defense field in 1964 were the 151st (Knoxville), 173rd (Lincoln), 188th (Albuquerque) and 198th (Puerto Rico). The ADC/ANG air defense force in 1965 therefore amounted to 21 squadrons. At the end of that year 12 of these 21 ANG squadrons were equipped with the Century Series F-102A jet interceptor, second-line to be sure since the regular ADC force was flying, primarily, the more advanced F-101B and F-106A aircraft, but still eminently usable for air defense purposes.⁸

~~(C)(Sp-4)~~ When, in November 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara made the pronouncement that the regular interceptor force would be reduced to 20 squadrons in FY 1969, the importance of the ANG interceptor force immediately grew. At the apex of the growth of the regular interceptor force, in 1957, ADC controlled 69 squadrons. At the time of the McNamara announcement, that force stood at 42 squadrons, a slimming-down brought about by fiscal pressures that severely limited the number of advanced F-106 interceptors to be purchased.

~~(S)(Sp-4)~~ At any rate, plans current at the end of 1965 outlined an ANG alert force of 21 squadrons, all to be

8. Msg, ADLPP 990, ADC to Air Div, 17 Mar 64 (Doc 8); Msg, ADOOP-P 1001, ADC to 30 AD, 17 Mar 64 (Doc 9); Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1965, p 70.

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eventually equipped with F-102A interceptors, all armed with nuclear weapons and all obligated to provide four aircraft on five- and fifteen-minute alert (an improvement over the 1961 requirement of two on five-minute alert and two on one-hour alert) at all times. This ADC/ANG force of 84 alert Century Series interceptors was planned to continue into the indefinite future as an increasingly larger proportion of air defense against the manned bomber.

~~(C)(Sp 4)~~ The main cloud on the ANG horizon (and it had hung there for several years) was the provision of nuclear storage facilities (and modern alert hangars) for the 21 ANG squadrons. Money, as usual, was the problem. In December 1965, OSD pared the NGB request for \$24 million in the FY 1967 construction budget for nuclear storage and alert hangars to \$9.4 million. This meant, for one thing, that only 10 of the 21 ANG squadrons would be provided with the necessary facilities for the storage of nuclear weapons.⁹

~~(C)(Sp 4)~~ Furthermore, OSD was studying the relative kill-probability of nuclear weapons as opposed to conventional armament. If this study indicated that the kill-probability of conventional weapons was anywhere near that of nuclear armament, it was unlikely that OSD would ever approve the expenditure of any funds for additional nuclear

9. Msg, ADODC-A 4252, ADC to USAF, 13 Dec 65 (Doc 131 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1966).

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storage capacity at ANG bases. In a counter-attack, ADC, in April 1966, issued a statement which claimed that failure to provide nuclear storage and alert hangars for the total ANG F-102A interceptor force would degrade ANG air defense capability anywhere from 6 to 30 percent, depending on the type of attack made on the United States.¹⁰

~~(C)(S)~~ In the event that the protest against the reduction in ANG construction funds was unsuccessful, ADC began to prepare a fall-back position. A study of the possibility of moving ANG squadrons into bases recently vacated by regular ADC F-102 squadrons--Travis AFB, California, and Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, came immediately to mind--was begun. Such bases were already equipped with nuclear storage facilities and alert hangars.¹¹

~~(S)(C)~~ The deployment of two F-102A squadrons to the Western Pacific in the spring of 1966, and the emergence of an ADC plan to sequester three F-102A squadrons into a Mobile Air Defense Package (MADPAC) for use in "brush fire" wars anywhere in the world, threatened to slow the pace of ANG conversion to the F-102A. Failure of OSD to approve

10. Msg, ADOOP-T 1494, ADC to USAF, 28 Apr 66 (Doc 134 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1966); Msg, ADLPP 1917, ADC to ADC Special Weapons Office (Kirtland), 7 Jun 66 (Doc 135 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1966); Wkly Acty Rprt, Plans, 5 Jan, 21 Feb and 27 May 1966 (ADC Documentary Hist No. 3).

11. Msg, ADLPP 792, ADC to USAF, 4 Mar 66 (Doc 132 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1966); Msg, ADLPP 883, ADC to TAC, 11 Mar 66 (Doc 133 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1966).

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the MADPAC proposal, however, put the conversion plan back on the tracks again. By the middle of 1966 the 176th FIS at Madison (Truax Field), Wisconsin, had received more than half of its allotted 18 F-102A aircraft. Conversion dates for the other five squadrons still not equipped with the F-102 were established as follows:

178th FIS	Fargo (Hector Field), North Dakota	October 1966
186th FIS	Great Falls, Montana	December 1966
179th FIS	Duluth, Minnesota	February 1967
124th FIS	Des Moines, Iowa	April 1967
132nd FIS	Dow AFB, Maine	June 1967 ¹²

~~(S)~~(S, 4) The question of atomic armament for the ANG was left hanging for the remainder of 1966. In the autumn, however, the Secretary of Defense did disapprove an NGB request for the additional active duty personnel needed to provide a nuclear capability for ANG squadrons. Nevertheless, ADC seized upon the word "additional" in the rejection and announced, in late November 1966, that it intended to proceed with the provision of nuclear armament to those 10 ANG squadrons which had access to adequate nuclear storage facilities. These, and the fiscal quarter in which they

12. Msg, ADOIC 3381, ADC to NGB, 7 Oct 65 (Doc 136 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1966); Msg, ADOOP-P 1683, ADC to USAF, 13 May 66 (Doc 137 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1966); Msg, ADOTT-D 2152, ADC to 4756 AD Wg (Tyndall), 6 Jul 66 (Doc 138 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1966).

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were to receive AIM-26A (the former GAR-11) missiles for their F-102A interceptors, were as follows:¹³

123rd FIS	Portland, Oregon	February 1967
116th FIS	Spokane, Washington	March 1967
134th FIS	Burlington, Vermont	March 1967
176th FIS	Truax Field, Wisconsin	March 1967
178th FIS	Hector Field, North Dakota	March 1967
186th FIS	Great Falls, Montana	April 1967
179th FIS	Duluth, Minnesota	April 1967
124th FIS	Des Moines, Iowa	February 1968
132nd FIS	Dow AFB, Maine	February 1968
182nd FIS	Kelly AFB, Texas	February 1968

~~(S)(Cp 4)~~ Although the ANG stake in air defense was growing, there were always moves to have it do more. This time, the prime mover was Dr. Theodore C. Marrs, Deputy Secretary of the Air Force for Reserve and ROTC Affairs. Dr. Marrs asked USAF, in July 1966, to evaluate the possibility of shifting much of the responsibility for air defense to the ANG in order to free the regular forces for tactical and reconnaissance missions. This, it must be remembered, was at a time when the Air Force involvement in Southeast Asia was steadily increasing. The ADC reaction to this proposal, as it had been to earlier suggestions that

13. Msg, ADCCS 3511, ADC to USAF, 24 Nov 66 (Doc 272 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1966).

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the ANG be provided BOMARC interceptor missiles, was decidedly negative. Where, Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, ADC commander, wanted to know, was the ANG going to find the personnel to man squadrons at such locations as Minot, North Dakota; Glasgow, Montana; Klamath Falls, Oregon, and other isolated locations? In sum, General Thatcher wrote General John P. McConnell, USAF Chief of Staff, on 31 August 1966, the Marrs proposal "suggests ridiculous thinking and I would hope that the first team is at work countering the suggestion."¹⁴ In a formal reply, ADC added that long experience with the ANG had shown continuing difficulty in recruiting people for specific jobs. Long after the ANG expected to provide full manning for the interceptor squadron at Portland, Oregon, for example, ADC found it necessary, for a while, to supply security guards. And what about Dispersed Operating Bases (DOB) that were even more isolated than many home bases? And what about Canadian DOBs in the event Canada should accede to the U. S. request for such sites? The list of similar questions was long.¹⁵

~~(S)~~(Sp-1) As General Thatcher had hoped, the "first

14. Pers ltr, Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, Cmdr, ADC to Gen. John P. McConnell, C/S, USAF, no subj, 31 Aug 66 (Doc 267 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1966).

15. Msg, ADLDC 2647, ADC to USAF, 30 Aug 66 (Doc 268 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1966).

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team" was indeed at work on this matter. General McConnell, in a reply of 15 September 1966, outlined USAF reasoning:¹⁶

It was evident from the study thus far conducted that ANG assumption of additional fighter interceptor missions would provide no manpower resources for the tactical forces or SEA in the near term and would have some serious long-term disadvantages. It appears that it would require a departure from the basic philosophy of the reserve forces.

For these reasons, and because the study to date has provided sufficient basis for an evaluation of Dr. Marrs' proposal, further study is unnecessary. Certain of the data developed will be used in a reply to Dr. Marrs pointing out that ANG assumption of additional fighter interceptor missions does not appear feasible at this time.

No more was heard of this proposal.

~~(C)~~(Cp 4) The total equipage of the 21 ANG interceptor squadrons with F-102A aircraft was delayed in late 1966 when it was decided to provide two squadrons of F-102A interceptors to Greece and Turkey under the Military Assistance Program. This meant that the 124th at Des Moines and the 132nd at Dow would retain F-89J aircraft until FY 1969. Nevertheless, the 178th at Hector Field and the 186th at Great Falls got Century Series interceptors before the end of 1966 and the 179th at Duluth was so equipped in early 1967.¹⁷

16. Pers ltr, McConnell to Thatcher, "ANG Replacing ADC Fighter Interceptor Units," 15 Sep 66 (Doc 269 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1966).

17. Msg, ADOOP-P 2695, ADC to NGB, 2 Sep 66 (Doc 262 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1966); Msg, ADOOP-P 2900, ADC to NGB, 27 Sep 66 (Doc 263 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1966); Msg,

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(U) The increasing proportion of air defense capability being provided by the ANG was underlined on 2 February 1967 when Dr. Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force, told the Senate subcommittee on Defense appropriations that during the preceding year the ANG had provided 26 percent of air defense alert capability.¹⁸

~~(S)(Op 1)~~ The anticipated OSD action as regards nuclear armament for ANG F-102A interceptors occurred in February 1967. On 6 March 1967 USAF made the decision known to ADC. No AIM-26A missiles were to be provided for ANG aircraft. Therefore, only the ANG squadrons at Des Moines and Dow AFB (F-89J aircraft) were provided with nuclear armament.¹⁹

~~(S)(Op 4)~~ Although ADC had previously concluded that the non-nuclear AIM-26B was unsatisfactory for use with the F-102A, the denial of the atomic missile to the ANG touched off a renewal of interest in the AIM-26B. The possibility was thoroughly explored again, but ADC was once more forced to conclude that the AIM-26B was simply not feasible as armament for the F-102A. There were many reasons. When

17. (cont) AFOAP 93668, USAF to ADC, 30 Dec 66, as quoted in Msg ADLPP 6, ADC to Numbered Air Forces, 3 Jan 67 (Doc 264 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1966).

18. Hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1968, 2 Feb 1967, p 854.

19. Msg, AFOAP GB 90023, USAF to ADC, 6 Mar 67, as quoted in Msg ADOOP-P 637, ADC to Numbered Air Forces, 7 Mar 67 (Doc 230 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1967).

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included in an armament load that also contained AIM-4A and AIM-4D (non-nuclear FALCON missiles), it was discovered that the AIM-26B could be fused during flight by the very presence of companion missiles. On the other hand, the AIM-26B was likely to provide an infra-red source that attracted companion missiles. In short, there was a good chance that the two types of missiles would destroy each other. Also, the fuse of the AIM-26B was found to be fatally deficient in that it (1) could be activated by ground radar clutter at low altitudes, (2) could be activated by chaff, because it operated independently of guidance information, and (3) performed erratically in tests. All thoughts of substituting the AIM-26B for the AIM-26A were therefore abandoned.²⁰

~~(C)~~(Gp-1) From the very beginning of the ADC/ANG relationship, the rapidity of ANG reaction to air defense emergencies had been a matter of some concern to ADC. While the establishment of the ANG around-the-clock alert force had improved the day-to-day situation, the matter of utilization of complete squadrons was a matter of continuing discussion. One of the earliest attempts to insure prompt ANG reaction was the ADC publication of standing special orders which were continually held by ANG squadrons, but

20. Msg, ADODC 1091, ADC to 10 AF, 19 Apr 67 (Doc 232 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1967).

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were not to be given effect until ADC notified the ANG unit of mobilization. At that moment, the ANG squadron was federalized and thereafter had the same status as regular Air Force squadrons.

~~(C)(Cp 1)~~ Even so, the federalization of ANG squadrons required Presidential or Congressional declaration of a national emergency or state of war and there could possibly be occasions when NORAD operational control of ANG units would be desirable prior to complete federalization. Solution of this problem required agreement between ADC and the states involved. All necessary agreements had been completed by early 1967 and it was possible to publish the procedures to be followed in such short-of-war situations. Upon NORAD declaration of DEFCON 2, the states agreed that NORAD could assume full operational control of ANG Air Defense Alert Detachments. These were the ANG people who normally stood air defense alerts, although they were under state control and only advised by ADC personnel. The number of ANG personnel in the various detachments varied from day to day and the number was controlled by the active-duty orders published by the ADC advisory group attached to each ANG interceptor squadron. At NORAD declaration of DEFCON 1, the NORAD region commander was to so inform the Adjutants General of the states concerned and request that they ask the Governors to put into effect the agreements between ADC


and the individual states. Under this authority, NORAD was to be given operational control of the ANG squadron for a period not in excess of 15 days. If the period of emergency exceeded 15 days, further operational control of the squadron required complete federalization action. Through use of this method it was hoped NORAD would have effective operational control of ANG squadrons from the inception of the emergency until the federalization machinery was put into motion and complete federal control was established.²¹ As of the spring of 1971 it had not been necessary to make use of this authority.

~~(S)~~(Cp-4) Despite the long partnership of ADC and the ANG, their exact relationship was regularly misunderstood, even within ADC. To counter such lower echelon misunderstanding, ADC found it necessary to explain, again and again, that while ANG interceptor squadrons were normally anxious to cooperate in such operations it was necessary to realize that ANG personnel were in reserve status (and under state control) and could not be directly ordered to do anything.²²

~~(S)~~(Cp-3) Although the dispersal of regular ADC interceptor squadrons had been directed by OSD in the early sixties, it was not until 1967, when the ANG began to shoulder

21. Msg, NOOP-P X2-019, NORAD to JCS, 17 Feb 67 (Doc 234 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1967); Msg, ADODC-A 536, ADC to 14 AF, 23 Feb 67 (Doc 235 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1967).

22. Msg, ADODC 725, ADC to 14 AF, 15 Mar 67 (Doc 236 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1967).



an ever-larger proportionate share of the air defense mission, that the dispersal of ANG squadrons began to receive consideration. In this instance ADC took the initiative and began to solicit USAF support for ANG dispersal at DEFCON 1. The recommended ANG dispersal was vastly different from that involving regular ADC squadrons. ADC squadrons were directed to undertake the permanent dispersal of a portion of squadron strength, with dispersal bases permanently manned and equipped to service a major portion of the squadron in an emergency. It was not anticipated, however, that ANG squadrons would disperse until the emergency had arrived. ANG dispersal bases, therefore, were not to be manned and were to be equipped with only a minimum of supplies. The main purpose, in short, was to provide a place, other than the main base, where ANG interceptors might refuel and be "turned around" for reentry into the air battle. By early March of 1967 the ANG dispersal concept had been approved by USAF and the Secretary of the Air Force and submitted to OSD for decision. In the absence of concrete OSD disapproval, and using the authority provided by ADC responsibility under USAF and NORAD plans for Survival, Recovery and Reconstitution, ADC proceeded to survey the possibilities of ANG dispersal by asking the numbered air forces to suggest possible dispersal locations.²³

23. Wkly Acty Rprt, ADOOP-P, 24 Feb and 6 Mar 1967 (ADC Documentary Hist No. 5).

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~~(S)(Gp 4)~~ After evaluating the replies, ADC included a tentative list of ANG dispersal bases in the ADC Weapon Survival and Reconstitution plan of 15 June 1967. All 21 ADC/ANG interceptor squadrons, except the 157th at McEntire ANGB, South Carolina, were assigned a dispersal base. McEntire was considered relatively safe from attack and an alternate was not considered necessary. The first tentative listing is given in Table 6.

~~(S)(Gp 4)~~ Further study of ANG dispersal, however, revealed a number of other ANG squadrons, besides the 157th, that were sufficiently isolated from SAC bases and centers of population that they did not require dispersal bases. When the "tentative" list of ANG dispersal bases was again published in September 1967, seven other squadrons were removed from the list--those at Bradley Field, Burlington, Fresno, Boise, Des Moines, Sioux Falls and Fargo. There were also several changes in the locations of the dispersal bases of the 13 squadrons it was still believed needed to disperse. The September 1967 listing is shown in Table 7.

~~(S)(Gp 4)~~ Since the transfer of F-102 aircraft to Greece and Turkey was going to delay the equipment of the ANG squadrons at Des Moines and Dow, ADC produced an alternative proposal in the spring of 1967. Why not, General Thatcher wondered in April, equip these two squadrons with F-101B interceptors to be made available by the inactivation

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of two ADC squadrons? Such conversions would be particularly trouble-free at these two locations, he reasoned, because both already had the nuclear storage facilities needed for the GENIE rocket used as armament not only by the F-89J aircraft they currently operated but also by the F-101B. Furthermore, both squadrons had good inspection records and both were adequately manned with experienced personnel. The ADC proposal received the blessing of USAF, but not that of OSD.²⁴ The ANG eventually received F-101B interceptors, but not nearly as soon as ADC proposed in April 1967.

~~(S)(Gp 3)~~ The feeling that the ANG should be contributing more to the defense of the nation, whether or not that feeling was fostered by the politically potent Guard, continued to gnaw at USAF. It was regularly suggested that air defense was a particularly fruitful place for increased use of the ANG, because installations were fixed and it might well be possible for a reservist to sell shoes with one hand and help the air defense with the other. Over the years, it had been proposed that the ANG might operate BOMARC interceptor missiles, assume responsibility for ADC's

24. Msg, ADCCR 1080, ADC to USAF, 19 Apr 67 (Doc 239 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1967; Msg, ADLPP 1163, ADC to USAF, 26 Apr 67 (Doc 240 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1967); Air Defense Command Aerospace Objectives, 1967-1982, 30 Jun 1967, p A-1-10 (HO files).

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Dispersed Operating Bases, provide airlift support for the regular forces, or support the B-57 force ADC used to evaluate the ground radar system. In every instance there had proved to be good reasons why the ANG could not be so used. In some cases the operating locations were so remote that sufficient ANG personnel could not be recruited. In other instances, ANG could not be provided with the required skills without a massive training effort. In still other cases, study indicated that it would cost as much to operate under ANG sponsorship as it would by continuing to use regular forces. Generally, too, ANG operation could not offer the flexibility required in an instant-reflex situation.

~~(S)(Cp 1)~~ Nevertheless, USAF commissioned the prestigious RAND Corporation, in the autumn of 1966, to undertake an in-depth study of the role of the ANG. Published in October 1967, the RAND study reviewed the earlier attempts to find a suitable additional mission for the ANG and, in the main, reached the same conclusions earlier studies had reached. In summary, RAND concluded that the ANG was a valuable supplement to ADC and recommended that (1) ANG interceptor squadrons be moved to more advantageous locations, generally oriented northward and closer to the borders of the country; (2) the two F-89J squadrons receive F-101B aircraft and other ANG squadrons be supplied with the F-101B as soon as

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possible; (3) the Air Force work toward the day when the ANG could assume the entire peacetime identification mission, with the regular force of ADC F-12 interceptors furnishing the main air defense capability and surveillance of supersonic air traffic (the ANG receiving ever-more-modern interceptors--F-101B, F-106A and possibly F-4); ~~(4)~~ the ANG be given the mission of providing the routine and contingency airlift requirements of ADC. It added that there seemed to be no worthwhile reason for full-time ANG operation of present and projected atmospheric defense functions, since ANG people would merely replace personnel of the regular forces with no advantage in either cost or capability.²⁵

~~(S)(Gp 1)~~ Although the RAND study was not formally published until October 1967, USAF asked ADC to comment on the proposed conclusions and recommendations in August 1967. ADC generally concurred with RAND, with some exceptions. ADC, of course, agreed that the two ANG squadrons with F-89J interceptors should receive the F-101B, having already made such a proposal, but warned against further improvement of the ANG force at the expense of regular F-101B units on the grounds that it would result in a degradation of the total interceptor force. It also warned that the general upgrading

25. R. J. Lew, The Air Reserve Forces Study, Vol VI: Continental Air Defense Forces (RAND Memo, RM-5331-PR, Santa Monica, 1967), pp 22-25 and 39-40.

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of ANG units should not be undertaken until the regular force had definitely received advanced interceptors. ADC did not believe it would ever be desirable or feasible to turn over the entire peacetime identification function to the ANG.²⁶

~~(S/NORON FYCAN)~~ (Gp 4) The campaign to obtain the F-101B for the ANG continued. Again in January of 1968, ADC requested that the 132nd FIS at Dow be supplied with this aircraft, but decision was deferred with the explanation that the whole ADC/ANG structure was under study. This study was completed at mid-year, but even more important was the economy-induced accelerated inactivation of seven ADC F-101B squadrons in 1968. This action produced a surplus of 163 F-101B interceptors. USAF proposed to convert 30 of these aircraft to reconnaissance configuration (RF-101) for use by TAC. It also proposed to allocate 66 of these aircraft to Canada to replace earlier-model F-101B aircraft previously supplied to the northern partner in NORAD. Such allocations left a residue of 67 aircraft for storage at Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona. ADC recommended, in August 1968, that these relatively modern interceptors (plus some of those returned by Canada) be used to equip five ANG squadrons, specifically the 132nd at Dow, 179th at

²⁶. Msg, ADLDC 2376, ADC to USAF, 22 Aug 67 (Doc 62 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1967).

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Duluth, 116th at Spokane, 123rd at Portland and 186th at Great Falls.²⁷

~~(S/NOFORN EXCERPT)~~(Op 3) The ADC recommendation was again disapproved by USAF, however. It was the USAF position that the surplus F-101Bs could best be used by ANG reconnaissance squadrons. Such a USAF request was subsequently forwarded to OSD, but denied. This denial gave ADC another opening and the request for the transfer of these aircraft to ADC/ANG units was revived in January 1969. But, as had happened so many times before, the request was not honored at USAF.²⁸

~~(S)(Op 3)~~ Finally, however, ADC desires in this regard were achieved. When the fiscal pressures generated by Project 703 (an Air Force program to reduce expenditures in FY 1970 by \$3 billion) made it necessary for ADC to prepare for the inactivation of three of the six remaining F-101B squadrons in the regular interceptor force, ADC again recommended that the air defense capability of these aircraft be retained by giving them to the ANG. The major stumbling block to the approval of this request, USAF

27. Msg, ADOOC I734Z, ADC to USAF, 26 Jan 68 (Doc 103 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1968); Ltr, ADC to USAF, "ANG Conversion to F-101B Aircraft," 13 Aug 58 (Doc 124 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969).

28. Ltr, ADC to NGB, "Air National Guard Interceptor Forces," 22 Nov 68 (Doc 125 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969); Msg, ADOOP 1820Z, ADC to USAF, 16 Jan 69 (Doc 126 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969); Ltr, ADC to USAF, "ANG Conversion to F-101 Aircraft," 27 Jan 69 (Doc 127 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969); Msg, ADOOP-P 2250Z, ADC to USAF, 31 Jan 69 (Doc 128 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969).

revealed in September of 1969, was the provision to the ANG of the nuclear GENIE rocket carried by the F-101B. Although a dozen ANG squadrons had at one time been equipped with the F-89J interceptor and authorized to utilize the GENIE, many of these had been located on ADC bases that also supported regular ADC squadrons and where the stockpile of nuclear rockets could be closely controlled by USAF personnel. Separate ANG nuclear storage was provided at very few locations--Fargo and Des Moines, for example. A further complication was that USAF advisors were removed from ANG squadrons at about the same time because of the pressing need for pilots in Southeast Asia. Thus there was likely to be nobody at the ANG squadron who was authorized to have custody of the nuclear armament.²⁹

~~(S)(Sp 3)~~ But ADC was tenacious and suggested at least a partial answer to the USAF dilemma. Nuclear storage igloos were available at DOW (132nd), Spokand (116th) and Fargo (178th), ADC explained in October 1969, so one hurdle could be jumped if the ANG F-101B squadrons were placed at these locations. Dow offered the fewest problems, since ADC had a DOB there and an earlier joint use agreement could easily be reestablished. At Fargo and Spokane the nuclear

29. Pers ltr, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Jr., DCS/P&O, USAF, to Lt. Gen. Arthur C. Agan, Cmdr, ADC, no subj, 22 Sep 69 (Doc 139 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970).

storage areas had lain unused for several years, but ANG commanders at both locations were confident that the storage igloos could be refurbished and the necessary electronic security devices provided within six months of notice of conversion to the F-101B. As to the custody problem, ADC estimated that 18 USAF personnel would be required at each nuclear storage site. At the same time it was suggested that perhaps the change in the status of ANG civilian technicians from that of state employees to Federal employees (effective in January 1969) might make it possible to reduce or eliminate the requirement for regular USAF personnel. Also, on 17 October 1969, ADC requested that rated (flying) advisors be returned to ANG squadrons.³⁰

(U) This time there was no objection from either USAF or OSD and the three ANG squadrons under consideration were approved for conversion to F-101B interceptors. All three stopped standing alert with F-102A aircraft between 10 November and 10 December 1969.³¹

(U) Neither was there any objection from higher authority when the last three ADC F-101B squadrons were inactivated

30. Pers ltr, Agan to Clay, 6 Oct 69 (Doc 140 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970); Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Return of Rated Advisors to Air National Guard Units," 17 Oct 69 (Doc 141 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970).

31. Msg, ADMME-AVDO 2040Z, ADC to NGB, 30 Oct 69 (Doc 142 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970); Msg, ADODC-A 2323Z, ADC to NORAD, 3 Nov 69 (Doc 143 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970); Msg, ADMSS-W 1836Z, ADC to SAAMA, 4 Nov 69 (Doc 144 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970).

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and the aircraft passed along to ANG units in FY 1971. The ANG squadrons which benefitted from this action were the 123rd at Portland, Oregon, the 179th at Duluth and the 136th at Niagara Falls. The 136th gave up a TAC mission to resume an air defense mission. The 123rd began the conversion to the F-101B on 15 March 1971 and the other two squadrons were to begin conversion on 12 April 1971.³²


~~(S)~~~~(S-1)~~ The mere assignment of F-101B aircraft to the ANG did not assure immediate air defense capability, however. The establishment of authority to store and handle nuclear weapons was probably the thorniest problem. Although USAF and OSD had approved the transfer of the first F-101B aircraft to the ANG in October 1969, as late as mid-September 1970 none of the first three squadrons so equipped had yet been supplied with GENIE rockets. At this time, however, ADC was hopeful that all three would soon be ready to undergo an Initial Capability Inspection (ICI), the first step along the road that led to authority to store nuclear weapons. It was anticipated that the 178th at Fargo would be ready for inspection before the end of September. The 132nd at Dow (which had recently become Bangor IAP) was expected to be ready in October, the 116th at Spokane in November. One source of delay was difficulty in getting the necessary approvals for nuclear safety rules as they applied to the ANG.³³

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32. Msg, DOTE 1700Z, ADC to Air Divs, 19 Mar 71 (Doc 10).
33. Msg, DMMM 1449Z, ADC to USAF, 16 Sep 70 (Doc 11).

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(b)(3) 42 USC § 2162 (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)



DOE
(b)(3)

34. Initial Capability Inspection of the 119th Ftr Gp (ANG-Fargo), 9 Oct 1970 and 26 Mar 1971 (included in volume of inspection reports accompanying Hist of ADC, FY 1971); Msg, CS 2045Z, ADC to USAF, 20 Nov 70 (Doc 12); Msg, 24DM 1430Z, 24AD to ADC, 10 Dec 70 (Doc 13); Msg, SEGM 2230Z, ADC to 24AD, 3 Feb 71 (Doc 14).

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(b)(3) 42 USC § 2162 (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)

DOE
(b)(3)

~~(S)(C)~~ The matter of custody over the nuclear weapons required for ANG F-101B interceptors was also a problem not easily solved. There had been no such problem during the days when several ANG squadrons were equipped with the F-89J and armed with the GENIE rocket, because these squadrons were either located on the same base with a regular ADC squadron or were provided with an ADC advisor. In either event, ADC had direct control of the nuclear warheads. But senior ADC advisors had been removed from ANG squadrons when the war in Southeast Asia demanded the services of rated officers and none of the ANG squadrons proposed for conversion to the F-101B was located on the same base with an ADC squadron. OSD vetoed the idea of vesting custody in

35. Initial Capability Inspection of the 101st Ftr Gp (ANG-Bangor), 7 Nov 1970 and 141st Ftr Gp (ANG-Spokane), 29 Jan 1971 (included in volume of inspection reports accompanying Hist of ADC, FY 1971).

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ANG civilian technicians in January 1971: There was no other way, USAF concluded, but to furnish a force of active duty Air Force personnel to control nuclear weapons.³⁶

~~(C)(Sp 1)~~ This proved to be difficult, because the nuclear stockpile agreement of 20 March 1967 between the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Department of Defense specified that the Munitions Accountable Supply Officer (MASO) having custody of AEC-produced material must bear either the AFSC 6425 (or be a non-commissioned officer with AFSC 645X0). The staff of the ADC advisor to ANG squadrons did not include such a person. ADC proposed to solve this riddle by having the ADC advisor appoint the ANG MASO, with the concurrence of the ANG commander, as the advisor's accountable agent. Detailed instructions as to the manner in which the air advisor would monitor all activities with respect to the GENIE were drawn up by ADC in April 1971, but final approval awaited formal concurrence of higher authority with the still-in-draft-form safety rules for ANG use of nuclear weapons in conjunction with the F-101B interceptor.³⁷

36. Msg, DMMN 2215Z, ADC to USAF, 17 Dec 70 (Doc 15);
Msg, SSSMA 2107Z, USAF to ADC, 8 Jan 71 (Doc 16).

37. Msg, DMMM 1800Z, ADC to 24AD and 25AD, 31 Mar 71 (Doc 17);
Msg, DMMM 2340Z, ADC to USAF, 2 Apr 71 (Doc 18);
Msg, DMMM 2300Z, ADC to NGB, 15 Apr 71 (Doc 19);
Msg, DMMM 1745Z, ADC to Air Divs, 16 Apr 71 (Doc 20).

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(S)(~~Op 4~~) Another of the innumerable attempts to give the ANG a still larger share of the responsibility for air defense came along in April of 1970 when USAF broached to ADC an OSD proposal to not only improve the capability of the ANG, but also reduce the total ADC/ANG interceptor force by eight squadrons. In detail, it was proposed that ADC transfer to ANG four F-106 squadrons and two F-101B squadrons while the ANG closed out eight F-102A squadrons. Over the years, the answers to such proposals had become almost routine. In this instance, ADC believed that the most important objection was that the loss of six regular and two ANG squadrons would spread the interceptor force much too thin. The predominance of ANG squadrons would reduce the ability of NORAD to react promptly to an attack since the existing agreements with the individual states precluded full mobilization of ANG squadrons prior to a declaration of DEFCON 1. Training would be much less thorough, because most ANG personnel were available only on weekends. The ANG, ADC added, would find it difficult to maintain Dispersed Operating Bases because most were remote from major cities, the major source of ANG personnel. The capacity of ADC to respond to overseas deployment requirements, such as COLLEGE CADENCE, would be greatly reduced. Speaking generally, ADC was convinced that the apparently widely held supposition that ANG squadrons were inherently less expensive to operate than equivalent regular units needed critical examination. ADC

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was convinced that when an ANG unit was expected to perform the same functions as a regular unit the difference in cost was negligible. While ADC readily admitted that many ANG squadrons were highly competent, thoroughly trained and capable of high scores on Operational Readiness Inspections, the fact remained that many members of the ANG had divided loyalties.³⁸

~~(S)(C-1)~~ The position of the ANG was that the Air Force did not really accept the ANG as a full partner in the defense effort and that the reason was primarily one of money. At a meeting of the Executive Council of the National Guard Association of the United States on 9-10 November 1970 it was concluded that a massive effort was required to educate the Air Force and Congress as to the real capability of the ANG and convince both of the need to continue the ANG as a viable, combat-ready force. At any rate, the discussion that began in April of 1970 continued into November, but no concrete action, other than the transfer of three additional squadrons of F-101B aircraft to the ANG, was taken by the late spring of 1971.³⁹

38. Ltr, USAF to ADC, "Program Proposals for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard," 21 Apr 70 (Doc 157 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970); Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Program Proposals for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard," 29 Apr 70 (Doc 158 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970).

39. Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Support for Guard and Reserve Forces," 27 Oct 70 (Doc 21); ADC, "Talking Paper" on "Air National Guard Assumption of the Air Defense Mission," 11 Nov 70 (Doc 22); The National Guardsman, Dec 1970, pp 16-17.

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(U) Nevertheless, there did prove to be another function closely related to air defense where the ANG could provide assistance. Air-to-air refueling was that area. From the days of the initial COLLEGE CADENCE deployments to Korea, ADC F-106A interceptors in increasing numbers were equipped for air-to-air refueling. By 1970 all such ADC F-106s had been so equipped. This capability placed an added burden on SAC KC-135 fuel tankers, however, as increasing numbers of ADC aircraft required that this capability be periodically exercised. Enter the ANG, which had earlier-model KC-97 tankers released by SAC when it was supplied with the more modern KC-135. The possibilities were raised with NGB in May of 1970 and the NGB response was favorable. In July 1970, therefore, ADC requested that the 136th Air Refueling Wing (Dallas) support the deployment of F-106s from Kingsley Field, Oregon, to Tyndall AFB, Florida, in August. This deployment was accomplished, but when ADC proposed further F-106/KC-97 continuation training, beginning in October 1970, USAF balked on the grounds that it did not have sufficient funds to finance the active duty pay of the necessary ANG personnel. This difficulty was overcome in early 1971, however, and regular ADC/ANG refueling training began.⁴⁰

40. Msg, DO 2129Z, ADC to NGB, 17 Jul 70 (Doc 23); Msg, DOTW 1754Z, ADC to 25AD, 2 Oct 70 (Doc 24); Msg, DO 1330Z, ADC to USAF, 21 Oct 70 (Doc 25); Msg, DO 1406Z, ADC

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(U) A new type of summer encampment was inaugurated by the ANG in August 1968 when the 196th FIS (Ontario) flew F-102 aircraft to Alaska for two weeks of intensive flying and concentrated air defense training. This experiment was so successful that two more ANG F-102 squadrons (the 123rd at Portland and the 178th at Fargo) similarly deployed in August of 1969. Fund shortages, however, prevented a similar COOL RIDE deployment in 1970.⁴¹

(U) With the continuing diminution of the training capacity of ADC, the ANG also found it necessary to assume another new role. The 111th FIS (147th Fighter Group) at Ellington AFB was reorganized as an F-102 Combat Crew Training School (CCTS) on 1 January 1970, although it continued to hold a combat mission (see below). There were several good reasons for the selection of Houston as the CCTS site. The 111th had a good, long record of operations with the F-102 and was well supplied with experienced F-102 pilots. Also, the weather was excellent for training. Besides, the 111th was being forced out of the active air defense business because the ADC radar site utilized by the 111th for ground-controlled interception was inactivated. The

40. (cont) to Air Divs, 22 Dec 70 (Doc 26); Msg, DOT 2256Z, ADC to NGB, 8 Jan 71 (Doc 27).

41. Msg, ADODC 0131Z, ADC to NGB, 31 Jul 68 (Doc 137 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969); Msg, ADODC 2355Z, ADC to TAG (California), 1 Aug 68 (Doc 138 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969); Interceptor, Feb 1969, pp 5-7; Activity Report, DCS/O, ADC, 5, 18 and 30 Aug 1969 (Sup Doc Vol I in Hist of ADC, FY 1970).

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radar of the inactivated ADC 747th AC&W Squadron at Ellington, however, were absorbed by the 147th Fighter Group (parent of the 111th FIS) and the radar was used in the training of ANG F-102 and F-101B aircrews. The training offered at Ellington was therefore comparable to that previously given by ADC at Perrin (F-102) and Tyndall (F-101B). The ANG CCTS began operations in March of 1970 and produced 16 combat-ready F-102 pilots during the first eight months of operations. When the last three ADC F-101B squadrons were inactivated in the spring of 1971, the ANG CCTS at Ellington also assumed the responsibility for the training of F101B aircrews. This shift of the F-102/F-101B training mission to the ANG also produced a reversed situation in which ADC found it necessary to ask the ANG for the training quotas needed to produce the F-102 and F-101B pilots required by ADC. The regular 57th FIS in Iceland was still equipped with F-102 aircraft, so, in April 1971, ADC requested that the ANG train 12 ADC F-102 pilots in FY 1972 for use as replacements for the 57th and for use as ADC advisors to ANG squadrons. It also asked that the ANG train six ADC F-101B crews in FY 1973 for advisor duty.⁴²

~~(S/NOFORN EXCAMP) (C-3)~~ Despite the conversion of the Houston ANG squadron to a peacetime CCTS function, there were still plans to put it to combat use in an emergency.

42. Hist of ADC, FY 1970, p 121; "Houston Guard Goes CCT," Interceptor, Nov 1970, pp 16-19; Msg, DO 2315Z, ADC

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This concept resulted in the COLLEGE TANG operations plan, initially published on 1 July 1970. Early thinking on this matter suggested that the unarmed CCTS aircraft be deployed, in flights of four, to such ANG bases as McEntire, Jacksonville, and Pittsburgh as well as to such ANG dispersal sites as Mansfield, Ohio, and Savannah, Georgia. It was anticipated that the necessary armament would be pre-positioned at COLLEGE TANG deployment sites. The published plan, however, contained several options, any one of which could be chosen by NORAD at DEFCON 3 or higher states of readiness. The Houston interceptors, according to the formal plan, were to be fully armed with conventional weapons prior to departure from Ellington. Under the first option (Alpha), the Houston interceptors were to deploy, as a unit, to any one of 11 ADC interceptor bases vacated by an ADC squadron temporarily serving outside the continental United States. Option Bravo would send the COLLEGE TANG aircraft, as a unit, to Elmendorf AFB (Alaska), Kincheloe AFB (Michigan), Moose Jaw (Saskatchewan), or North Bay (Ontario). Option Charlie called for the deployment of four armed F-102 interceptors from Houston to Grant County Airport (Washington), Austin-Straubel MAP (Wisconsin), Mansfield, Bradley Field

42. (cont) to NGB, 23 Apr 71 (Doc 28).

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(Connecticut) and Savannah. The plan was amended on 25 August 1970 to remove Moose Jaw and North Bay from Option Bravo.⁴³

~~(S/NOTFORN EXCAN)(Sp 8)~~ The loss of the ADC F-101B squadron at K. I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, in the spring of 1971 caused some second thoughts about the use of COLLEGE TANG, however. While an F-106 squadron was to be moved from Duluth to K. I. Sawyer, the F-106 did not have the range of the F-101B, thereby creating what NORAD considered a dangerous gap in interceptor coverage between the Canadian CF-101B base at Val D'Or, Quebec, and K. I. Sawyer. NORAD suggested to Canadian officials that COLLEGE TANG might be used to fill this gap in an emergency and generally augment the interceptor strength available to the 22nd NORAD Region. The Canadians expressed interest in this proposal, but there had been no formal change in COLLEGE TANG deployment at the end of April 1971.⁴⁴

~~(S/NOTFORN EXCAN)(Sp 8)~~ Continuing study of the dispersal of ANG squadrons revealed a dwindling need. When the original listing of ANG dispersal bases was made in June of 1967,

43. Msg, ADODC 2143Z, ADC to USAF, 7 Nov 69 (Doc 153 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970); Msg, ADODC 1935Z, ADC to USAF, 18 Dec 69 (Doc 154 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970); ADC OPLAN 24-70, COLLEGE TANG, 1 Jul 70 (HO files); Change 1 to ADC OPLAN 24-70, COLLEGE TANG, 25 Aug 70 (HO files); Msg, DOT 1910, ADC to NGB, 28 Jul 70 (Doc 29); Msg DOT 1400Z, ADC to AAC, 13 Oct 70 (Doc 30).

44. Msg, DO 1909Z, ADC to USAF, 28 Apr 71 (Doc 31).

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dispersal sites numbered 20. By September 1967 the list had decreased to 13. In April of 1968 the number was further decreased to six and stood at that point in the spring of 1971. There were, however, some changes in the designation of the ANG squadrons expected to disperse. The April 1968 group included the 116th (Spokane to Grant County Airport), 123rd (Portland to Grant County Airport), 146th (Pittsburgh to Mansfield, Ohio), 159th (Jacksonville to McEntire ANGB, South Carolina), 179th (Duluth) to Austin-Straubel Airport, Wisconsin) and the 186th (Great Falls to Logan Field, Montana). At the end of FY 1970, the 116th was no longer included in the list, but the 122nd (New Orleans to Gulfport, Mississippi), and 196th (Ontario to Edwards AFB) had been added, while the dispersal base for the 159th had been changed from McEntire to Savannah. When the 122nd was removed from the air defense network in December 1970, the number of ANG squadrons expected to disperse was again back to six.⁴⁵

~~(S/NOFORN EXCIN)~~(GP 4) The same economic factors which dictated a severe reduction in the regular ADC interceptor force also encompassed the ANG, although there was a

45. Change 4 to ADC OPLAN 300-67, "Weapons Survival and Reconstitution," 11 Apr 68 (Doc 120 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1968); Msg, ADOOP 2329Z, ADC to 4AF, 20 May 68 (Doc 124 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1968), Msg, ADOOP-P 1458Z, ADC to SAC, 5 Jun 68 (Doc 125 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1968); ADC OPLAN 300-70, "Weapons Survival and Reconstitution," 1 Jan 70 (Doc 172 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970).

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significant difference in the manner in which the reductions were applied to the ANG interceptor force. ADC was instructed, in 1967, to plan a decrease in the ANG force by eight squadrons--from 21 to 13--in FY 1970. Six of these (111th at Ellington, 122nd at New Orleans, 152nd at Tucson, 175th at Sioux Falls, 182nd at Kelly AFB and 196th at Ontario) were selected for discontinuance because associated long-range radars were to be closed. The loss of the 118th at Bradley Field (Connecticut) was to occur because of simple redundancy in the northeastern United States. The 124th at Des Moines was included because there was no satisfactory aircraft available to replace the obsolescent F-89J. Then, in mid-1968, came an OSD proposal to save even more money by accomplishing these reductions during FY 1969.⁴⁶

(S//NOFORN EXCAT)(Op 4) The ANG, however, enjoyed the sort of "grass roots" political support that ADC did not command, so ANG units were not slashed as drastically as had been planned. Only two ANG squadrons left the ADC stable in FY 1969 and these were given TAC missions. The 152nd at Tucson ceased standing air defense alert on 1 May 1969, with the 124th at Des Moines following the same path on 15 May. Plans in effect at the end of FY 1969, though,

46. Msg, ADODC I734Z, ADC to USAF, 26 Jan 68 (Doc 103 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1968); Bureau of the Budget Brief on Project 693, "Air Defense," 7 Jun 68 (Doc 104 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1968); Msg, ADLAD-W 2302Z, ADC to ESD, 3 Jul 68 (Doc 105 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1968).

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still outlined a massive loss of ANG support for ADC. Scheduled to go in FY 1970 were the 182nd (Kelly) and 175th (Sioux Falls). Four more were to leave in FY 1971--the 118th (Bradley), 122nd (New Orleans), 111th (Ellington), and 196th (Ontario). Three years later, in FY 1974, five others were to go--the 190th (Boise), 194th (Fresno), 146th (Pittsburgh), 157th (McEntire), and 176th (Truax)--leaving the ADC/ANG interceptor force at eight squadrons at the end of FY 1974.⁴⁷

~~(S)~~~~(S)~~ 4) Attrition was somewhat faster than planned in FY 1970. While the 111th Ellington was not totally lost, it assumed a CCTS mission in January 1970 and could no longer be considered actively alert. The training it conducted was directed by ADC's Air Defense Weapons Center (Tyndall), however, and it was obligated to fulfill COLLEGE TANG requirements when directed by NORAD. The other two squadrons earmarked for loss--the 175th at Sioux Falls and the 182nd at Kelly AFB--were duly lost in May of 1970.⁴⁸

47. Change 2 to ADC Programming Document 71-1, 1 Jul 69 (HO files); Msg, ADLPP 2202Z, ADC to CONAD, 27 Feb 69 (Doc 130 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969); Msg, ADOOP-E 1535Z, ADC to ADC Computer and Systems Training Office (Santa Monica), 2 Jun 69 (Doc 131 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969); Msg, ADLPP 2150Z, ADC to Numbered Air Forces, 1 Apr 69 (Doc 132 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969); ADC Programmed Action Directive 69-8, 20 Apr 69 (Doc 133 in Hist of ADC, FY 1969).

48. Hist of ADC, FY 1970, pp 126-128.

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~~(S)(Cp 4)~~ Meanwhile, as might have been anticipated, the plan to reduce the number of ADC/ANG squadrons to eight at the end of FY 1974 was dropped. The program in effect at the end of FY 1970 called for the loss of only two more ANG squadrons by the end of FY 1975--the 118th at Bradley and the 196th at Ontario were scheduled to leave during FY 1972.⁴⁹

~~(S)(Cp 4)~~ Things did not work out quite that way, however. An ADC proposal to move the 122nd from New Orleans to some location further north (Selfridge AFB, Michigan, was suggested) was disapproved at USAF, so the 122nd was phased out of the ANG interceptor force in December 1970. There was really no alternative, since there was no longer an ADC radar in the New Orleans area. ADC also sought to retain the 118th at Bradley in place of the 134th at Burlington, but this request was also denied. Then, unusually enough, ADC gained an ANG squadron when it was decided that the aircraft of the last three F-101B squadrons in ADC would be transferred to the ANG. Therefore, while the 118th at Bradley left the interceptor force before the end of FY 1971, ADC gained the 136th at Niagara Falls, one of the ANG squadrons designated to receive the F-101B. Thus, at least temporarily, it was settled that ADC would have cognizance

49. Ltr, ADC to NGB, "ANG F-102 Unit Structure," 12 Jun 70 (Doc 159 in Hist of ADC, FY 1970); ADC Program Document 72-1, 15 Apr 70 (HO files).

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over 16 ANG units through FY 1976. Six squadrons were equipped with the F-101B. The other nine were expected to make-do with the aging F-102. The ANG squadrons involved are given in Table 8.⁵⁰

(U) For a quarter of a century, as of 1971, ADC and the ANG had been jointly involved in an enterprise dedicated to air defense against the manned bomber. The relationship was sometimes warm, sometimes cool, but the union continued. The ANG began operations with F-47 and F-51 fighters left over from World War II. In 1971 it was equipped with F-101B and F-102A jet interceptors, the best, aside from the F-106A, the United States had to offer. At one time during this period, 70 ANG squadrons were committed to air defense. In 1971 the number had shrunk to 15. For most of these 25 years the ANG was vastly overshadowed by the professional ADC force in terms of advanced aircraft and trained personnel. But as national military priorities forced a great reduction in the professional force, the importance of the relative ANG contribution grew, until in 1971 the ANG interceptor force overshadowed the professional force in terms of

50. Ltr, ADC to NGB, "ANG F-102 Unit Structure," 4 Aug 70 (Doc 32); Pers ltr, Maj. Gen. Arthur G. Salisbury, C/S, ADC to Lt. Gen. George S. Boylan, Jr., DCS/Programs and Resources, USAF, no subj, 27 Nov 70 (Doc 33); Msg, PRPO 2207Z, USAF to ADC, 17 Dec 70 (Doc 34); Msg, DO 2020Z, ADC to USAF, 21 Dec 70 (Doc 35); Msg, PR 2226Z, USAF to ADC, 22 Dec 70 (Doc 36); Msg, XP 1520Z, TAC to USAF, 24 Dec 70 (Doc 37); ADC Program Document 73-1, 1 Apr 71 (HO files).

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aircraft (16 squadrons for ANG as opposed to 12 squadrons for ADC). Never, however, was the wariness of the gifted amateur toward the professional totally overcome. ANG personnel seemed to be haunted by the notion that every time a professional Air Force pilot looked at an ANG pilot he saw, despite the flying clothing, a shoe clerk or real estate salesman in disguise. These apprehensions were perhaps true to some extent, but the ADC/ANG partnership was believed imperative by the makers of national military policy and was likely to continue indefinitely.

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TABLE 1

RELEASED AIR NATIONAL GUARD SQUADRONS
November-December 1952

<u>Released ANG Squadron</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>New ADC Squadron</u>	<u>Air- craft</u>
105	McGhee-Tyson Airport, Tennessee	469	F-47
109	Wold-Chamberlain Field, Minnesota	18	F-51
113	Scott AFB, Illinois	85	F-51
118	Suffolk County AFB, New York	45	F-47
121	Andrews AFB, Maryland	95	F-94A
123	Portland IAP, Oregon	357	F-86A
126	Truax Field, Wisconsin	432	F-86A
132	Dow AFB, Maine	49	F-80
133	Grenier AFB, New Hampshire (re-sited to Langley AFB, Virginia)	48	F-47
134	Burlington Airport, Vermont	37	F-51
136	Niagara Falls Airport, New York	47	F-47
142	New Castle County Airport, Delaware	96	F-94A
148	Dover AFB, Delaware	46	F-94A
163	Sioux City Airport, Iowa	87	F-51
166	Lockbourne AFB, Ohio (re-sited to Youngstown Airport, Ohio)	86	F-84A
172	Selfridge AFB, Michigan	56	F-51
175	Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota	54	F-51
176	Truax Field, Wisconsin	433	F-89B
179	Duluth IAP, Minnesota	11	F-51
188	Long Beach Airport, California (re-sited to Oxnard AFB, California)	354	F-51

Source: Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1952, p 31 and map following
p 40.

TABLE 2

AIR NATIONAL GUARD SQUADRONS ASSIGNED TO
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
November 1953Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
101	Boston, Massachusetts
109	St. Paul, Minnesota
116	Spokane, Washington
123	Portland, Oregon
126	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
131	Westfield, Massachusetts
132	Bangor, Maine
133	Manchester, New Hampshire
134	Burlington, Vermont
136	Niagara Falls, New York
137	White Plains, New York
138	Syracuse, New York
139	Schenectady, New York
175	Sioux Falls, South Dakota
176	Madison, Wisconsin
179	Duluth, Minnesota
186	Great Falls, Montana
190	Boise, Idaho

Fighter-Bomber Squadrons

1	Fort Dix, New Jersey
7	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
103	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
104	Baltimore, Maryland
107	Detroit, Michigan
108	Chicago, Illinois
111	Houston, Texas
112	Canton, Ohio
113	Indianapolis, Indiana
115	Van Nuys, California
118	Windsor Locks, Connecticut
119	Newark, New Jersey
120	Denver, Colorado
121	Andrews AFB, Maryland
124	Des Moines, Iowa

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Table 2 (cont)

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
125	Tulsa, Oklahoma
127	Wichita, Kansas
128	Marietta, Georgia
142	Wilmington, Delaware
146	Coraopolis, Pennsylvania
147	Coraopolis, Pennsylvania
148	Reading, Pennsylvania
152	Providence, Rhode Island
156	Charlotte, North Carolina
157	Eastover, South Carolina
158	Savannah, Georgia
159	Jacksonville, Florida
162	Dayton, Ohio
163	Fort Wayne, Indiana
164	Mansfield, Ohio
165	Louisville, Kentucky
166	Columbus, Ohio
167	Charleston, West Virginia
168	Chicago, Illinois
169	Peoria, Illinois
170	Springfield, Illinois
171	Detroit, Michigan
172	Battle Creek, Michigan
173	Lincoln, Nebraska
174	Sergeant Bluffs, Iowa
181	Dallas, Texas
182	San Antonio, Texas
185	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
187	Cheyenne, Wyoming
188	Albuquerque, New Mexico
191	Salt Lake City, Utah
192	Reno, Nevada
194	Hayward, California
195	Van Nuys, California
196	Ontario, California
197	Phoenix, Arizona

Source: USAF "Programmed Assignment of Aircraft to the Air National Guard," 12 Nov 1953 (App 9 in ADC Hist Study No. 5).

TABLE 3

PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD
INTERCEPTOR FORCE
April 1957

<u>USAF Recommendation</u>			<u>ADC Recommendation</u>	
<u>Prior- ity</u>	<u>Sq</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Sq</u>	<u>Location</u>
1	111	Houston, TX	111	Houston, TX
2	182	San Antonio, TX	182	San Antonio, TX
3	181	Dallas, TX	181	Dallas, TX
4	125	Tulsa, OK	125	Tulsa, OK
5	185	Oklahoma City, OK	185	Oklahoma City, OK
6	117	Hutchinson, KS	188	Albuquerque, NM
7	173	Lincoln, NE	127	Wichita, KS
8	175	Sioux Falls, SD	122	New Orleans, LA
9	178	Fargo, ND	159	Jacksonville, FL
10	188	Albuquerque, NM	158	Savannah, GA
11	120	Denver, CO	128	Marietta, GA
12	187	Cheyenne, WY	173	Lincoln, NE
13	186	Great Falls, MT	124	Des Moines, IA
14	190	Boise, ID	175	Sioux Falls, SD
15	116	Spokane, WA	178	Fargo, ND
16	123	Portland, OR	179	Duluth, MN
17	192	Reno, NV	120	Denver, CO
18	194	Fresno, CA	187	Cheyenne, WY
19	191	Salt Lake City, UT	186	Great Falls, MT
20	115	Van Nuys, CA	116	Spokane, WA
21	152	Tucson, AZ	197	Phoenix, AZ
22	197	Phoenix, AZ	152	Tucson, AZ
23	122	New Orleans	123	Portland, OR
24	159	Jacksonville, FL	192	Reno, NV
25	158	Savannah, GA	194	Fresno, CA
26	128	Marietta, GA	115	Van Nuys, CA
27	157	Eastover, SC	157	Eastover, SC
28	156	Charlotte, NC	156	Charlotte, NC
29	179	Duluth, MN	190	Boise, ID
30	124	Des Moines, IA	191	Salt Lake City, UT

Source: Msg, AFOOP-OC 54573, USAF to ADC, 8 Apr 57 (Doc 320 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1957); Msg, ADOOP-B 1064, ADC to USAF, 17 Apr 57 (Doc 321 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1957).

TABLE 4

AIR NATIONAL GUARD INTERCEPTOR FORCE
31 December 1957

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
101	Boston, Massachusetts
102	New York NAS, New York
103	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
104	Baltimore, Maryland
108	Chicago, Illinois
109	St. Paul, Minnesota
111	Ellington AFB, Texas
115	Van Nuys, California
116	Spokane, Washington
118	Windsor Locks, Connecticut
120	Denver, Colorado
121	Andrews AFB, Maryland
122	New Orleans, Louisiana
123	Portland, Oregon
124	Des Moines, Iowa
125	Tulsa, Oklahoma
126	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
127	McConnell AFB, Kansas
128	Dobbins AFB, Georgia
131	Westfield, Massachusetts
132	Bangor, Maine
133	Grenier AFB, New Hampshire
134	Burlington, Vermont
136	Niagara Falls, New York
137	White Plains, New York
138	Syracuse, New York
139	Schenectady, New York
142	Wilmington, Delaware
146	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
147	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
151	Knoxville, Tennessee
152	Tucson, Arizona
156	Charlotte, North Carolina
157	Eastover, South Carolina
158	Savannah, Georgia
159	Jacksonville, Florida
167	Martinsburgh, West Virginia
173	Lincoln, Nebraska
175	Sioux Falls, South Dakota
176	Madison, Wisconsin

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Table 4 (cont)

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
178	Fargo, North Dakota
179	Duluth, Minnesota
181	Dallas, Texas
182	Kelly AFB, Texas
185	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
186	Great Falls, Montana
187	Cheyenne, Wyoming
188	Kirtland AFB, New Mexico
190	Boise, Idaho
191	Salt Lake City, Utah
192	Reno, Nevada
194	Fresno, California
196	Ontario, California
197	Phoenix, Arizona
198	Puerto Rico

Source: Msg, ADOCP-P 102, ADC to USAF, 12 Sep 57 (Doc 288 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1957); Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1957, pp 122-123.

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Table 4 (cont)

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>
178	Fargo, North Dakota
179	Duluth, Minnesota
181	Dallas, Texas
182	Kelly AFB, Texas
185	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
186	Great Falls, Montana
187	Cheyenne, Wyoming
188	Kirtland AFB, New Mexico
190	Boise, Idaho
191	Salt Lake City, Utah
192	Reno, Nevada
194	Fresno, California
196	Ontario, California
197	Phoenix, Arizona
198	Puerto Rico

Source: Msg, ADOOP-P 102, ADC to USAF, 12 Sep 57 (Doc 288 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1957); Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1957, pp 122-123.

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TABLE 5

AIR NATIONAL GUARD AROUND-THE-CLOCK ALERT FORCE
1 July 1961

<u>Squad-</u> <u>ron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
111	Ellington AFB, Texas	F-102A
116	Spokane IAP, Washington	F-89J
118	Bradley Field, Connecticut	F-100A
122	New Orleans NAS, Louisiana	F-102A
123	Portland IAP, Oregon	F-89J
124	Des Moines MAP, Iowa	F-86L
132	Dow AFB, Maine	F-89J
134	Burlington AFB, Vermont	F-89J
146	Greater Pittsburgh MAP, Pennsylvania	F-102A
151	McGhee-Tyson Airport, Tennessee	F-104A
152	Tucson MAP, Arizona	F-100A
157	Congaree AFB, Eastover, South Carolina	F-104A
159	Imeson Field, Jacksonville, Florida	F-102A
173	Lincoln AFB, Nebraska	F-86L
175	Joe Foss Field, Sioux Falls, South Dakota	F-102A
176	Truax Field, Madison, Wisconsin	F-89J
178	Hector Field, Fargo, North Dakota	F-89J
179	Duluth IAP, Minnesota	F-89J
182	Kelly AFB, Texas	F-102A
186	Great Falls MAP, Montana	F-89J
188	Kirtland AFB, New Mexico	F-100A
190	Boise MAP, Idaho	F-86L
194	Fresno MAP, California	F-86L
196	Ontario IAP, California	F-86L
197	Sky Harbor, Phoenix, Arizona	F-104A

Source: Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, pp 178-180.

TABLE 6

AIR NATIONAL GUARD DISPERSAL
June 1967

<u>Sq</u>	<u>Home Base</u>	<u>Dispersal Base</u>
111	Ellington AFB, Texas	England AFB, Louisiana
116	Spokane, Washington	Larson AFB, Washington
118	Bradley Field, Connecticut	Worcester MAP, Massachusetts
122	New Orleans, Louisiana	Gulfport MAP, Mississippi
123	Portland, Oregon	Larson AFB, Washington
124	Des Moines, Iowa	Cedar Rapids MAP, Iowa
132	Dow AFB, Maine	Brunswick NAS, Maine
134	Burlington MAP, Vermont	Schenectady MAP, New York
146	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	Mansfield MAP, Ohio
152	Tucson, Arizona	Gila Bend, Arizona
159	Jacksonville, Florida	Glynco NAS, Florida
175	Joe Foss Field, South Dakota	Watertown MAP, South Dakota
176	Truax Field, Wisconsin	Green Bay MAP, Wisconsin
178	Hector Field, North Dakota	Portage la Prairie, Canada
179	Duluth IAP, Minnesota	Green Bay MAP, Wisconsin
182	Kelly AFB, Texas	Chase NAS, Texas
186	Great Falls, Montana	Moose Jaw, Canada
190	Boise, Idaho	Mountain Home AFB, Idaho
194	Fresno, California	Edwards AFB, California
196	Ontario, California	Oxnard AFB, California

Source: Tab A to Appendix 5 to Annex B, ADC OPLAN 300-67,
"Weapons Survival and Reconstitution," 15 Jun 1967
(Doc 233 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1967).

TABLE 7

AIR NATIONAL GUARD DISPERSAL
September 1967

<u>Sq</u>	<u>Home Base</u>	<u>Dispersal Base</u>
111	Ellington AFB, Texas	England AFB, Louisiana
116	Spokane, Washington	Grant County Aprt, Washington
122	New Orleans, Louisiana	Gulfport MAP, Mississippi
123	Portland, Oregon	Grant County Aprt, Washington
132	Dow AFB, Maine	Burlington, Vermont
146	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	Mansfield MAP, Ohio
152	Tucson, Arizona	Gila Bend, Arizona
159	Jacksonville, Florida	McEntire ANGB, South Carolina
176	Truax Field, Wisconsin	Austin-Straubel Field, Wisconsin
179	Duluth, Minnesota	Austin-Straubel Field, Wisconsin
182	Kelly AFB, Texas	Webb AFB, Texas
186	Great Falls, Montana	Logan Field, Montana
196	Ontario, California	Edwards AFB, California

Source: Change 1 to ADC OPLAN 300-67, "Weapons Survival and Reconstitution," 15 Sep 1967 (Doc 64 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1967).

TABLE 8

AIR NATIONAL GUARD SQUADRONS ASSIGNED TO THE
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AFTER
FISCAL YEAR 1971

<u>Squad- ron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
116	Spokane IAP, Washington	F-101B
123	Portland IAP, Oregon	F-101B
132	Bangor IAP, Maine	F-101B
134	Burlington IAP, Vermont	F-102A
136	Niagara Falls IAP, New York	F-101B
146	Greater Pittsburgh Aprt, Pennsylvania	F-102A
157	McEntire ANGB, South Carolina	F-102A
159	Jacksonville IAP, Florida	F-102A
176	Truax Field, Wisconsin	F-102A
178	Hector Field, North Dakota	F-101B
179	Duluth ANGB, Minnesota	F-101B
186	Great Falls IAP, Montana	F-102A
190	Boise Air Terminal, Idaho	F-102A
194	Fresno Air Terminal, California	F-102A
196	Ontario IAP, California	F-102A