

SECRET

PART IV  
EMERGENCY AIR DEFENSE FORCES  
1946-1954

SECRET

ADC HIST Study #5

# SECRET

## FOREWORD

Our national military strategy must list as the number one task the insuring of national survival. ... This being so, it seems to me almost a case of high treason not to make sure that the first enemy attack is met by the most intense hail of defensive fire the United States can muster. Every radar that can pick up a blip; every aircraft that can shoot a machinegun, cannon, or rocket; every surface weapon that can fire a projectile skyward should be counted as available. Neither you nor I, nor the nation, cares about the insignia or the shape of the wings, or the type of power plant, or the uniform worn by the pilot of the aircraft which knocks down a TU-4. If it and enough like it, do the job when needed, the nation survives. If not the nation dies. That's talking pretty cold turkey, but to me, it is the only answer that makes sense.

General Chidlaw\*

An integral part of the work which went into the building of a post-war air defense system was an effort to assure that all weapons, whether they were Air Force, Navy, Army, Air National Guard, or Reserve, would be used and used effectively against the first attack by an enemy. The importance of this effort can not be under-rated, for at no time in the eight years covered by this study were the assigned defensive forces large enough to successfully counter an initial enemy attack if delivered on the scale expected. In the first years of post-war air defense, the forces belonging to other agencies would have constituted practically the sole defensive force, for those charged with air defense had only a token force of their own. But as the force

---

\* From a draft of an address to the Air War College, dated 19 Dec 1952 (HRF 51).

# SECRET



**SECRET**

assigned specifically to air defense increased, so did the strength of the enemy. In the early years, it was uncertain as to exactly what would happen in an emergency, for although from the beginning of post-war air defense the creation of an integrated air defense system comprising forces from other commands and services was envisaged, it took many years and the relentless efforts of air defense commanders to realize this goal even partially. The purpose of this study is to record these efforts and to show the detailed preparations made for the use of forces wherever they were found in meeting the first enemy attack.

In so short an account of so large a theme, the problem of selection was a fundamental one. Consequently, it was necessary to recall only the essential past events. For the reader who wishes additional details, a large amount of documentation from which this study was drawn is available, and at various points in the work, guides to additional histories on the subject are given. Also, however, certain elements of the broader story, considered by the author to be peripheral to this study, were omitted. Left to another accounting were Navy picket vessels and air early warning aircraft, and the forces of the Army Antiaircraft Command. The story of the Air National Guard fighter and radar units, which were federalized and assigned to ADC, during the period of their federal service was not included; in this period these units were an integral part of the system rather than purely emergency forces.

Four ADC Headquarters staff officers generously assisted the author during the course of research on the subjects in which they were

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

iii

expert: Major E. W. McKennie, USAF and Navy aircraft; Major J. E. Guynes, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve; and Majors G. W. Taylor and P. W. Brownfield, Augmentation Radar. To each of these gentlemen, the author wishes to express his indebtedness. Full responsibility for any errors or defects in the work is assumed by the author and notification of any errors found by any reader will be greatly appreciated.

Lydas H. Russ  
Directorate of Historical Services

Colorado Springs, Colorado  
30 June 1954

**SECRET**

0 4 1 7



SECRET

CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
FOREWORD .....	1
LIST OF APPENDICES .....	ix
CHAPTER ONE - 1946 to 1949	
The First Post-War Air Defense Command: Emergency Air Defense Forces In Embryo .....	1
Activation and Responsibilities of the Air Defense Command .....	1
Need for Use of Other Command and Service Forces .....	2
Army Air Force Headquarters Views on Use of Forces of Other Services .....	3
ADC's Lack of Authority .....	4
Establishment of Policy for Use of Strategic Air Command and Tactical Air Command Forces .....	6
The Air National Guard In Air Defense .....	7
Allocation of the ANG to Emergency Air Defense .....	7
Organization of the ANG and ADC's Responsibility .....	8
Navy Forces In Air Defense .....	11
CHAPTER TWO - 1949 to 1951	
Merger Of Forces Under The Continental Air Command .....	13
Training Of The ANG .....	14
Authority For Mobilization Of The ANG .....	19
President Given Authority to Mobilize the Military Reserves .....	19
Delegation of the Presidential Authority to ADC .....	21
Federalization Of The ANG Fighter Squadrons .....	22

v

SECRET

0418

**SECRET**

	<u>PAGE</u>
ANG Fighters Units In Air Defense .....	25
Provisions For Use Of Navy Forces .....	27
Policy Statement of the Chief of Naval Operations .....	28
Agreements with the Sea Frontiers .....	28
Training and Status of Navy Forces .....	31
CHAPTER THREE - 1951 to 1953	
The Second Post-War Air Defense Command .....	33
Agreements For Use Of Other Command Forces .....	34
Agreement with Tactical Air Command .....	34
Defense Force Planning for Use of TAC Forces .....	35
Agreement with Strategic Air Command .....	36
Agreements with Air Training Command, Air Proving Ground Command, and Air Research and Development Command .....	37
Emergency Employment Plans .....	38
TAC Aircraft On Alert .....	44
Training Of Other Command Units .....	45
Operation SIGN POST .....	46
Training Of Navy Forces .....	49
New Agreements With The Sea Frontiers .....	51
Navy Policy On Air Defense .....	52
Augmentation Radar .....	53
Substitution Of Mobile Sites For Augmentation Radar .....	57
Lack of Assigned Radar in the 35th Air Division .....	57
CADD's First Plan .....	58
Readying ANG Fighter Squadrons For Air Defense .....	61
ANG Training .....	62
ANG Mobilization Assignment .....	64

**SECRET**

0419



SECRET

vii

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER FOUR - 1953 to 1954	
Assurance Of Support From Other Air Force Commands .....	67
New Agreements with Other Commands .....	68
Inclusion of Air Defense Responsibility in Other Command Mission Regulations .....	69
Aircraft At Factories .....	71
Operation TAIL WIND .....	71
Radar For Other Command And ANG Fighters .....	73
Navy Fighters In Air Defense .....	74
Augmentation Radar In Place Of Mobile Sites .....	77
CADF's Proposal .....	78
Authority to Use Other Command Radar .....	80
Agreement Between CADF and 9th Air Force .....	83
Agreement Between USAF Headquarters and Navy .....	84
Augmentation Radar Available In Emergency .....	85
ANG Pilots On Active Duty .....	86
Lapse Of ANG Mobilization Authority .....	91
ANG Training .....	93
Assignment To ADC Of All ANG Fighter Squadrons .....	94
Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Wings .....	96
APPENDICES .....	97
REFERENCE NOTES .....	129
Chapter One .....	131
Chapter Two .....	132
Chapter Three .....	135
Chapter Four .....	141
INDEX .....	149

SECRET

0 + 2 0

SECRET

ix

LIST OF APPENDICES

	<u>Page</u>
I. Station List - Air National Guard: February 1947 .....	97
II. Federalized Air National Guard Fighter Squadrons Assigned in the Air Defense Command .....	110
III. Air National Guard Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons Assigned to the Air Defense Command .....	111
IV. ADC's Plan for Emergency Deployment of Major USAF Command Forces Allocated to Air Defense - December 1951 .....	112
V. Status of USAF, Navy, and ANG Fighter Forces as of 15 December 1952 .....	113
VI. Status of USAF, Navy, and ANG Fighter Forces as of 15 January 1954 .....	117
VII. ADC's Plan for Emergency Deployment of Major USAF Command Forces Allocated to Air Defense - February 1954 .....	118
VIII. Availability of Augmentation Radars as of 1 December 1953.	120
IX. Air National Guard Assigned and Programmed Aircraft .....	124
X. Mobilization Assignment of Air National Guard Fighter Wings and Squadrons - January 1954 .....	127

SECRET

0 + 2 1



# SECRET

CHAPTER ONE

1946 to 1949

The First Post-War Air Defense Command:  
Emergency Air Defense Forces In Embryo

In the spring of 1946, the Army Air Forces reorganized its continental command structure and established a Strategic Air Command, a Tactical Air Command, certain service organizations, and an Air Defense Command. \* Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, late of the China-Burma-India theater, was placed in command of the new air defense organization and told to "organize and administer the integrated air defense system...exercise direct control of all active measures and coordinate all passive means of air defense... and train units and personnel in the operation of the most advanced methods and means designed to nullify hostile aerial weapons...." <sup>1</sup> To meet these responsibilities, General Stratemeyer found himself with four fighter squadrons, with a few radars, and with virtually nothing else. Almost all of the existing AAF weapons had been given to the other two major tactical commands.

Because of the lack of forces of his own and the direction to

---

\* This was the first of two post-war Air Defense Commands. The first ADC, activated in March 1946, was abolished in July 1950. Prior to its abolition, from 1 December 1948, this ADC served as an operational command under the Continental Air Command. The second post-war Air Defense Command was activated on 1 January 1951.

SECRET

**SECRET**

organize an "integrated" air defense system, General Stratemeier concluded that he should and would be given the forces of other commands and services in an emergency. Shortly after taking office, he told his air force commanders:

The Air Defense Command, with its subordinate Air Forces, will have primary interest in the repelling of an air attack, and we should therefore have at our command all air, ground, and sea forces which may be necessary to repel such an attack.

General Stratemeier also included the Air National Guard, which was being organized in the spring of 1946, and the Air Reserve in the forces which he assumed would be made available for emergency air defense. This seemed to be a natural implication from the requirement in his mission directive to "maintain units of the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve in a highly trained and operational condition of readiness."<sup>3</sup> A few weeks after taking over air defense, General Stratemeier told his superiors that "the means available to the Air Defense Command for the purpose of implementing the mission of that command are the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve programs."<sup>4</sup> He was immediately rebuffed in this, however, for Washington replied that the ANG and the Air Reserve constituted a total AAF reserve and that other commands as well as ADC might receive their units and personnel.<sup>5</sup> For the immediate future this actually mattered little, for the ANG, in the early stages of formation, was hardly more than a paper force; even General

<sup>3</sup> Six air forces were assigned to ADC at the time of its activation. These were the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 10th, 11th, and 14th.

**SECRET**



SECRET

3

Stratemeyer discounted it as an effective force before 1948 in his plans for air defense. As for the Air Reserve, it was to be 1953 before this organization had sufficient aircraft to attract the attention of air defense planners.

In June 1946, Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, AAF Deputy Commander, established definitely that ADC was to work with other commands and services to set up an integrated air defense system, but he did not throw any light on how this was to be done or exactly what was to happen in an emergency. ADC's commander, he said, had the responsibility for "coordination within the United States the means available from other services for air defense," and AAF Headquarters thought that effective coordination could only be achieved by assignment of operational control of these units to ADC in an emergency. This seemed to imply that in an emergency ADC would be given operational control of the forces of outside agencies for employment, but General Eaker went on to say that in the event of a sustained attack, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would probably declare a theater of operations, appoint a theater commander, and allocate suitable forces to this individual whom he felt would be someone else than the ADC commander. This confused the issue of precisely who would be responsible for the direction of air defense operations at the outset of an attack. Further, although General Eaker indicated that operational control of other agency forces should be given to ADC during emergency periods for "effective coordination," no authority for such assumption of control was provided.

SECRET

4

## SECRET

General Stratemeyer felt that he should be given control of outside forces and employ them initially in an emergency, but with these rather opaque instructions and no authority he could accomplish nothing in this direction. This was shown when he broached the subject to the Tactical Air Command. Following his discussions with TAC, he reported to his superiors:

...it became clear that the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, and myself differ in our understanding of my responsibilities for the provision of the air defense of the Continental United States. You have indicated that a theater commander is expected to be appointed in any area of the United States which is attacked or threatened with attack. My concern is for the period between the time hostile action occurs or is first expected to occur, and the time a theater commander has actually been appointed and assumes responsibility in the area.

No further authority or instructions were supplied by AAF Headquarters, however.

A short while later, General Stratemeyer outlined to AAF in detail just exactly how he might accomplish his mission. To carry out the requirement to organize an integrated air defense system, he would prepare overall plans for air defense, in conjunction with other air, ground, and Navy commands; determine the requirements for additional forces and prepare to integrate these forces into the air defense system; put into force as much of the plan as possible; and test the plan and preparations periodically. Headquarters AAF "favorably considered" General Stratemeyer's proposals, but furnished no other authority, leaving him to his own devices to secure any agreements necessary.

AAF approval at least served to confirm directions already issued by General Stratemeyer to his Air Force commanders to prepare

0 + 2 5

## SECRET



SECRET

5

preliminary plans for the integration of additional military forces. One of the assumptions upon which these plans were to be based was that "additional units will be allocated to the Air Forces for air defense purposes by the CG, AAF or higher authority."<sup>9</sup>

Toward the end of 1946, ADC prepared a short term plan of its own for the period to January 1948 in which the area responsibility of the six air forces was outlined. Under this plan, air defense was to be provided by the assumption of control over all available forces in the area, regardless of command or service assignment, by the ADC air forces.<sup>10</sup> The plan had little effect, however, for there was no approval from higher authority. ADC informed its field commanders that because of the lack of authorization and high level agreements the short term plan could only be used as a guide in the preparation of the area defense plans.

This continued absence of authorization and clear cut responsibility plus the lack of any assigned force to speak of was apparently causing some bitterness in ADC Headquarters, if the words of one high ranking officer can be accepted as indicative. In a strong personal plea for action to Brigadier General Lincoln of the War Department General Staff, Colonel John Cary, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans at ADC, declared:<sup>11</sup>

My purpose in forwarding this to you is to point out the present apparent complete lack of delineation by the War Department of the responsibilities and authorities involved in the air defense of the United States. It appears to us, on the receiving end, that the War Department is afraid that another Pearl Harbor might conceivably occur in the United States and although the War Department is unwilling to take

SECRET

0 + 2 8

## SECRET

any alternative action - prevent such a contingency, in the event the bulk of the line is that a contingency will be executed if necessary.

An entire year was to pass before any definite provision was made for emergency coordination of forces to AD or clear responsibility within AD for the direction of air defense operations. The War Department and the AD, in the matter of reorganization, took no action and it was not until after the service unification and the creation of a separate Department of the Air Force that satisfactory steps were taken. In December 1947, the new Department of the Air Force formed AD that in an emergency it could be pulled forces from other commands and that at least initially the AD commander would be the one responsible for direction of Air Force air defense operations.

The following principles will govern coordinated AD action in the event of an emergency and will be used as a basis for planning within the United States Air Force. Upon directive from this or higher headquarters, or in the event of the detection of potentially hostile forces:

The Commanding General, Air Defense Command, will initially be assigned operational control of such specific units of the Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command as have been designated for employment in defense against hostile air attack, such operational control to be terminated by direction of the Chief of Staff, or higher authority. For present planning purposes, these units will include all fighter units and all aircraft warning units, with their supporting services....

It was not, then, until over a year and one-half after the creation of AD that any definite policy was established for the use of other command forces in an emergency, and it was to be several years before an integrated air defense system became a reality.

Six months after enactment of this policy, USAF directed SAC and TAC to train their forces in air defense. This resulted from a request

## SECRET



SECRET

7

of General Strateneyer's for an increase in his own force, which was prompted by the poor showing of his forces in a maneuver held in the Northwest in the spring of 1948.<sup>13</sup> He asked an increase by one of two means: direct assignment of two SAC fighter wings, two TAC wings, and one fighter wing of the Caribbean Defense Command, or, if this was not possible, assignment of a secondary mission of air defense to these units and deployment of them to locations better suited for air defense.<sup>14</sup> Washington turned both proposals down, but offered to direct SAC and TAC to train their forces in air defense. This action was carried through early in July.<sup>15</sup> There is no indication that any great strides were made immediately in this direction, however. The resources of the other commands were too limited and they were too much occupied with their own training to engage to any extent in air defense training.

The Air National Guard in Air Defense

On the same day that Air Force Headquarters directed the allocation of SAC and TAC forces to emergency air defense, it also provided for the use of the Air National Guard:<sup>16</sup>

In the event of war or national emergency, initially all Air National Guard Units will be available to the Air Defense Commander, and until other requirements develop which necessitate their employment elsewhere, you will have the full use thereof.

Notwithstanding the fact that there exists certain restrictions which limit the control which the United States Air Force can exercise over the Air National Guard, you will make plans to integrate the Air National Guard to the fullest extent possible in your Air Defense planning, training, and operations.

SECRET

9

## SECRET

For an understanding of this problem of control mentioned by USAF, which became increasingly important, as well as what the ANG comprised and its state of readiness, it is necessary to consider the creation and organization of the ANG and ADC's responsibility to it. Organization of the ANG began on 25 April 1946 when authority was given by the War Department to the National Guard Bureau for establishment of an ANG.<sup>17\*</sup>

Under the original plan, the ANG was to consist of 514 units among which were to be seventy-two fighter squadrons and thirty-two aircraft control and warning squadrons.<sup>18\*\*</sup> Distribution to the states was made on the basis of one tactical unit to each state and the remainder allotted according to a population ratio of men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. In this way the populous eastern states received the greatest number of units.

When organized, the fighter squadrons received P-47 and P-51 fighter aircraft and the ACW squadrons received a variety of World War II equipment such as the SCR-527 and SCR-270 search radar sets. As late as the end of

\* Prior to World War II, there were twenty-nine observation squadrons in the National Guard, primarily in infantry divisions. These squadrons were federalized with the rest of the Guard at the outset of the war and saw duty throughout. Prior to the defeat of Japan, General Marshall and other military leaders saw the need for a post-war national guard and appointed a committee to study the problem. This study resulted in a plan which was approved by the Secretary of War on 13 October 1945. The Air National Guard was an outgrowth of this plan.

\*\* Organization of the 141st Fighter Squadron in Alaska later increased the number of fighter squadrons to seventy-three. This squadron, plus the 198th at San Juan, Puerto Rico and the 199th at Honolulu, Hawaii were never included in air defense plans.

SECRET



SECRET

9

1949, these types plus the small AN/TPS-2 search sets were the mainstays of the ANG AC&W squadrons. In 1949, a few of the AN/TPS-1Ps and AN/CPS-5s which were authorized, were beginning to arrive.

Organization by the states of Guard units began upon receipt of authority for establishment by the national bureau. On 30 June 1946, the first unit of the ANG was given federal recognition - the 120th Fighter Squadron at Denver, Colorado.<sup>20</sup> By early 1947, most of the fighter and AC&W squadrons had been organized and federally recognized.

The agency through which the AAF, and later USAF, discharged its responsibility to the ANG was the Air Defense Command. Just prior to the activation of the latter, it was given an interim mission which, as we have seen, assigned the duty of maintaining units of the ANG and the Air Reserve in a trained and operational condition of readiness. This responsibility was obviously too broad for ADC to accomplish and early in June the mission was narrowed to discharging the responsibility of the AAF "with respect to organization, administration, training and maintenance of the Air National Guard and Air Reserve, subject to the policies from the Commanding General, AAF."<sup>21</sup> For the ANG, ADC actually had much less responsibility than this directive implied, however, AAF explained that the organization, administration, and maintenance part of the mission pertained only to the Air Reserve, with the single exception that any maintenance beyond the capabilities of the ANG would be handled<sup>22</sup> by ADC. Other than this, therefore, ADC was left with the one duty of supervising the training of the ANG.

\* See Appendix I for a list of the ANG units organized and federally recognized in February 1947.

SECRET

0 - 3 0

**SECRET**

ADC's responsibilities in this respect consisted of drawing up a training program which was promulgated by the National Guard Bureau, appointing of regular Army instructors to advise the ANG units, conducting periodic inspections, and holding summer encampments of two weeks duration. The only means of controlling the program was ADC's authority to recommend the granting or withdrawal of federal recognition.

The training program itself was geared to the concept that the ANG was an all-purpose force even though ADC was to have initial use after mobilization. This meant that little was accomplished toward insuring that the ANG could perform effectively in air defense. In subsequent years more and more training time was to be devoted to air defense, but it was not until 1954 that the training of ANG fighter squadrons came to be devoted almost exclusively to air defense.

ANG summer encampments were held in 1947 and 1948. Late in the latter year, a combined ANG field training maneuver was held in the northeast involving a complete ANW system, defensive fighters, and light bombardment offensive units. Similar wing-level exercises, though not on as large a scale, were held in the mid-west and on the west coast. However, training during those years was far from being uniform due to the lack of proper equipment and facilities by some units. The greatest deficiency for the fighter squadrons was the lack of gunnery ranges in all areas which resulted in some squadrons being able to fly only simulated gunnery runs.

Another important problem in the utilization of the ANG in air defense was the slow mobilization process which negated the Guard as an immediately ready force. About this we shall hear more in subsequent chapters.

**SECRET**



SECRET

11

Navy Forces In Air Defense

General Stratemeier had also wanted the use of Navy forces in an emergency and as early as May 1946 had authorized the 1st and 4th Air Forces to make local agreements with Navy organizations for this purpose even though there was no guidance from Washington in this direction. He followed this up in late summer with instructions to each of his other field commanders to contract agreements with Navy commands.

The 4th Air Force pioneered the way, reaching an agreement of sorts with Western Sea Frontier in 1946. Following this, similar discussions were conducted in other areas and agreements concluded in many cases. Lacking high level direction, none of these agreements were realistic, however, and at best were bare outlines of proposed action. General Stratemeier continued to press for action to be taken on the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. Integration of Navy forces seemed to him "impractical of accomplishment on <sup>25</sup>any other level<sup>26</sup>".\*

The first high level attention paid to Air Force-Navy cooperation in air defense with any concrete results was at the Key West conference of the Secretary of Defense with the Joint Chiefs of Staff held in the spring of 1948. In the functional statement resulting from this meeting the Navy agreed:

To provide sea-based air defense and the sea-based means for coordinating control for defense against air attack, coordinating with the other services in matters of joint concern.

To provide naval (including naval air) forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SECRET

0 + 3 2

**SECRET**

Upon this statement of fact, it were to be based a succession of agreements with Navy organizations for the use in emergency air defense of their forces. In none of these agreements, concluded during the period covered by this study, were Navy commanders to give the desired degree of assurance that Navy forces would be forthcoming when needed. The reason was that no guarantee could be given without authorization by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unfortunately, the JCS approved "doctrines and procedures" envisaged here never materialized.

**SECRET**

0 4 3 3



# SECRET

## CHAPTER II

1949 to 1951

### Merger of Forces Under The Continental Air Command

The existence of the first post-war ADC as a major command ended on 1 December 1948 when it and the Tactical Air Command were reduced to operational commands and assigned to the newly created Continental<sup>1</sup> Air Command. General Stratemeyer took over the latter organization and Major General Gordon P. Saville became commander of ADC. ConAC assumed the air defense mission formerly held by ADC and the tactical support mission of TAC, and into this organization went the resources of both commands as well as some forces reassigned from SAC. Pooled under ConAC were ten wings: the 4th, 33rd, and 56th from SAC; the 1st, 20th, and 31st from TAC; and the 14th, 52nd, 78th, and 325th from ADC. Of these wings, eight were given air defense as a primary mission and

\* ADC's commander was made responsible to the ConAC commander for air defense planning and for the conduct of the active air defense of the United States with the means made available by ConAC. The two TAC Air Forces, the 9th and 12th, and the four ADC Air Forces, the 1st, 4th, 10th, and 14th, were assigned to ConAC and all units and stations formerly assigned to ADC and TAC were transferred to the Air Forces. It is to be noted that earlier, in mid-1948, an ADC reorganization and boundary relocation reduced its Air Forces from the original six to four. The 2nd and 11th Air Forces were inactivated. The four ADC Air Forces were, under ConAC, given responsibility for air defense until the Eastern and Western Air Defense Liaison Groups took over nominal responsibility for the conduct of air defense at the time of their activation, 1 March 1949. The tactical units remained assigned to the Air Forces, however, for the time being. Full responsibility for air defense as well as the resources was gradually

# SECRET

**SECRET**

tactical support as a secondary mission.<sup>2</sup> The 20th and 31st, former TAC Wings, retained tactical support as their primary mission and were given air defense as a secondary mission.

Although this was not the means envisaged by General Stratemeyer for increasing his force when he had requested earlier the assignment of certain other command units, this merger had the same effect. Overnight the fighter forces available for air defense were more than doubled -- from four wings of ten squadrons to eight wings of twenty-two squadrons.<sup>3</sup> This increase in the force which could be used for air defense was one of the aims in the creation of ConAC. By uniting most continental resources under one roof, a much greater force could be made available either for air defense or for tactical support. As publicly announced, "Through it, [The Continental Air Command] the Air Force will be able to throw the full weight of the combined units either to the Air Defense Command<sup>4</sup> or to the Tactical Air Command, as circumstances may require."

#### Training Of The ANG

The amalgamation of forces did nothing to lessen the importance of the Air National Guard in emergency air defense. In 1949, the Guard's seventy continental-based fighter squadrons amounted to approximately two-thirds of the total numerical fighter strength in the United States.<sup>5</sup> There was full realization of this as shown by the fact that both of the

<sup>2</sup>(Cont'd) placed under the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces, which were activated on 1 September 1949. For a detailed account of the air defense organization from 1945 to 1951, see ADOR # 1, Chapter 5, pp 207 to 217.

**SECRET**



SECRET

15

ConAC emergency war plans of 1949 and 1950 counted heavily on the ANG as an augmentation force.

In its planning, ConAC believed that the first enemy attacks would probably come with little or no warning and would be saturation raids.<sup>6</sup> To counter these blows, ConAC felt it imperative that its regular fighter forces be augmented as soon as possible with ANG fighters. During all of 1949 and most of 1950, however, ANG squadrons could not have been brought into action for several days and then only ineffectively.

To increase the readiness time and the effectiveness of the ANG fighter forces, ConAC, which received the supervisory responsibility for the ANG and the Air Reserve formerly held by ADC, had two major problems to overcome. The first was the cumbersome mobilization procedures. The Guard could be called into service only by Congressional authorization such as might be given if an attack occurred or by a "call" issued by the President to the state governors.<sup>7\*</sup> Both required considerable time. As late as the end of 1949, it was estimated that from three days to two weeks was required to bring the ANG into service.<sup>8</sup> This inordinate amount of time resulted partly from the second problem, that of lack of control over the Guard units, which was discussed earlier. The latter not only prevented ConAC from assuring that this force was being effectively trained, but also

---

\* Such a call was authorized by an act of January 21, 1903. In 1953, this act again becomes important; see Chapter IV, this study.

SECRET

0 + 3 0

**SECRET**

prevented the establishment of procedures for immediate employment upon mobilization. Under the circumstances, the ANG fighter squadrons could only be considered as a force which could be employed at some undetermined time after an emergency was declared. As expressed by Lieutenant General Denis C. Whitehead who succeeded Stratenoyer as commander of GodAG in April 1949, "... at best the ANG represents aircraft in flyable storage."

Because changes in the mobilization procedure and in the ANG command channels would have required Congressional legislation which appeared to be unlikely of attainment in 1949, air defense planners tried other means initially to increase the ANG's effectiveness and acquire more rapid use of it in an emergency. The earliest attempts to find a way to provide more realistic training were made by the Commanding General of the Eastern Air Defense Force, Major General Robert M. Webster. In October 1949, General Webster proposed to the Adjutant General of New York that certain of the state's fighter squadrons be designated for training with the air defense system and that these squadrons be placed under the operational control of EADFF:

This control will not usurp the ANG commander's command prerogatives nor violate Federal and/or State constitutional rights. It is solely to permit smooth transition from peacetime air defense training within an air defense system to actual employment against an enemy at a moment's notice. Obviously if the agency for air defense did not possess the above, it may well find us with another Pearl Harbor of far greater consequences.

After coming to terms with New York, General Webster intended to gain similar concurrence from all of the states in his area. He never got beyond New York, however, for the states did not have the legal authority to make their forces available. The New York state Adjutant

**SECRET**



SECRET

17

General told General Webster that his suggestion was impractical.

11  
Among the reasons he gave were the following:

The state would be liable for damage to property, personal injury, and loss of life, incident to the operations of National Guard fighter aircraft while under the operational control of the Eastern Air Defense Force.

The laws of the State of New York do not empower the Governor to employ the National Guard for operations of the character contemplated except under conditions where attack is imminent.

This ended General Webster's efforts to gain operational control through local arrangement. Instead, he requested ConAC to propose passage of federal legislation providing for the integration of the ANG with the air defense system.  
12

General Whitehead had already made a suggestion of this nature a few weeks earlier. He asked USAF to obtain permission from the National Guard Bureau to allow at least the ANG fighter squadrons located within the active defense net to be employed under the operational control of the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces both for practice and actual air defense missions.  
13  
The National Guard Bureau had no more authority than the states for granting operational control, however, and nothing came of the request.

Following this, ConAC gave up in its efforts to place the Guard operationally under the Defense Forces and turned instead to securing as effective training as possible within the allowable limits. ConAC noted to EADF that since efforts in other directions had failed, an attempt would now have to be made to provide increased air defense training during the summer encampments and during

SECRET

0 4 3 8

**SECRET**

weekend inactive-duty periods.<sup>14</sup>

Early in 1949, the National Guard Bureau had agreed to permit ANG units to participate in training with the air defense system whenever local commanders would agree to do so.<sup>15</sup> It was not until mid-1950, however, that ConAC turned all of its attention to this training means. ConAC had considered this to be too limited and had sought a standard nation-wide procedure, but also it was not until early in 1950 that all of the states agreed to permit training of their Guard units in this manner.

In June 1950, ConAC directed its Defense Forces to establish a training program which would provide for participation of ANG units in training with the air defense system whenever local commanders would permit it, and to attempt to integrate ANG units into the air defense system for training during the summer encampments.<sup>16</sup> There is little information on the amount of training engaged in by ANG units with the air defense system, but overall it was probably not extensive except for the summer training periods. Also, the extent of training varied widely with the location of the ANG squadrons. Many squadrons, both fighter and AC&W, were located too far from regular air defense units to exercise with them. The 10th Air Force, for example, reported that the only ANG forces in its area so located that they could participate in training with regular units were one fighter group and one AC&W squadron, both based in Michigan.<sup>17</sup> A few ANG fighter squadrons participated in the SAC-ConAC bomber-interceptor training program known as "Big Photo," in late 1950.<sup>18</sup> Under WADF auspices, both fighter and AC&W squadrons took part in the air defense exercises held in the northwest in 1949 and 1950.

**SECRET**



SECRET

19

During the summer encampment periods, ANG fighter and ACGW squadrons worked very closely with the regular forces. In the 1950 summer training, regular strike missions were flown by ConAC, ANG and even SAC forces so that a well-rounded though brief training was provided. The degree of proficiency continued to vary widely, however, Some ACGW units were so lacking in qualified personnel that they could not operate effectively. Pilot gunnery proficiency in many of the fighter squadrons was nil because of the lack of a sufficient number of ranges for ANG use during the year. Many pilots could fire gunnery only during the summer encampment and camera equipment was usually insufficient to allow much camera gunnery.

Authority For Mobilization Of The ANG

The position of the Air National Guard in air defense was transformed overnight by the onslaught North Korea delivered upon its southern neighbors in the early morning hours of 25 June 1950, and by the immediate American reaction. Because of the emergency situation, legislation was passed on June thirtieth which empowered the President, on his own judgement, to order into active service for a period not to exceed twenty-one months any member or unit of the military reserve components.

\* This provision, part of Public Law 599 (62 Stat. 605, 50 U.S.C., Sup III, 319), became Section 21 of the Selective Service Act of 1948. The latter act was to expire on 9 July 1950 and a new act had been proposed prior to the outbreak of the Korean War under which the President could have ordered the reserve components into service only with Congressional authorization. Disagreements arose between the House and Senate over various points in this act and nothing was accomplished prior to the weekend of June 25th. When Congress again

SECRET

0 + 4 0

## SECRET

The rapid mobilization of the ANG so long desired by air defense commanders was now possible. With procedures and considerations established, almost immediate availability of the ANG could be obtained.

Shortly after passage of this legislation, ComAC told its Defense Force commanders that there was now "a basis for more realistic planning for the utilization of ANG units for air defense," and that a plan should be developed

whereby your controllers can scramble ANG fighters just as quickly as you now scramble Regular USAF interceptors. Certain ANG fighter squadrons now located within the existing radar coverage areas in your command should be used to augment the Regular Air Defense Forces in countering an enemy air attack. It is desired that each such squadron should keep as many aircraft available as possible in combat readiness, and the number of aircraft available for scramble purposes will depend on the number of pilots present. These requirements are sure to vary from state to state and the acceptance by the ANG of your desired SOP's is an important factor.

EADF felt that the number of ANG fighters which could be employed against an initial attack would be limited and would vary considerably from squadron to squadron. The Eastern commander foresaw delays caused by such factors as inefficiently located equipment and supplies at ANG bases and the time required for pilots to travel from their homes or places of business. Considering all of the difficulties, EADF estimated

\* (Cont'd) met, it was decided, because of the emergency, not to attempt to modify the proposed new selective service act, but to completely scrap it and extend the existing law for one year. In addition, the decision was made to give the President authority to order the Reserve into service without Congressional authority. (Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 98:7 (June 27, 1950), 9739-40.) Prior to the date of expiration, Section 21 was extended to July 1950. (Public Law 51 (52 Stat. 319, 50 U.S.C., Sup I) 17

SECRET



SECRET

21

that no more than three aircraft per squadron could be made available for scramble within thirty minutes from the time an alert was received by a squadron.<sup>22</sup>

To further shorten the time required for bringing ANG units into action, ConAC pressed Washington for delegation of the mobilization authority, which Congress had provided the President, as far down as Defense Force level.<sup>23</sup> Under an emergency condition, which ConAC defined as an actual or imminent enemy air attack, the latter command wanted its Defense Forces to be able to immediately issue authoritative orders to any ANG squadron in its area. This could be accomplished only if the Defense Force commanders had the authority to federalize the ANG unit at the same time that they gave operations orders to them. ConAC was turned down, however, because the Secretary of the Air Force had decided to retain this authority.<sup>24</sup>

The question would perhaps have not been reopened, at least not as soon, had not it not been for a sudden turn of events in the Korean War. Early in November 1950, as United Nations' forces were advancing in North Korea, several divisions of Communist Chinese troops attacked in a tremendous offensive. All during November and December, U.N. forces were steadily pushed back with heavy losses. In the United States there was great fear that a general war was imminent. For example, Senator A. Willis Robertson, Democrat from Virginia, said on November 28, "I think the next three days will determine whether we are to be at war with China and Soviet Russia."<sup>25</sup>

SECRET

0442

**SECRET**

Early in December, ComAC asked that its proposal be reconsidered and on 29 January 1951 the mobilization authority was delegated. This was three weeks after the creation of the second post-war Air Defense Command (see Chapter III) and the authority was given to the latter with the provision that it could be redelegated to the Defense Forces, but no further. ADC immediately passed it along. Air Force Headquarters agreed with ComAC's concept of an emergency, defining it as "an actual or imminent enemy air attack where time is of the essence and in your opinion a request to this Headquarters for approval of the use of units of the ANI of the United States would unnecessarily delay the utilization of such units in active air defense."<sup>23</sup>

Federalization Of ANG Fighter Squadrons

While ComAC was striving to establish procedures and obtain authority for immediate mobilization of the ANI in an emergency as one solution to the need for a larger force, it was also urging the immediate federalization of a number of fighter squadrons for active service in the air defense system. The fear of the imminence of a global conflict engendered by the outbreak of the Korean War caused ComAC to believe that the air defense force had to be increased immediately.

Prior to the beginning of the Korean War, part of a ComAC plan to build up the air defenses to what was considered the minimum acceptable level, which included sixty-one fighter squadrons, had been

\* In July 1951, the First Air Defense Command had been dissolved.

**SECRET**



SECRET

23

<sup>29</sup> approved. This expansion program, however, was phased over a considerable period of time. By July 1951 there was to be an increase of only six to nine interceptor squadrons over the twenty-three currently <sup>30</sup> possessed. With the outbreak of the Korean War, ConAC felt that the nation could not afford to wait and asked that the air defense forces <sup>31</sup> be increased immediately.

The only immediate source of fighter strength was the ANG, and ConAC asked in July 1950 that twenty squadrons, which were located within radar coverage, be called to active duty. <sup>32</sup> This was to meet initial requirements only, ConAC noted, and additional squadrons would be requested later when more radar stations were added. ConAC emphasized that no interference with the previously scheduled increase in the regular air defense force was intended. This was purely an emergency measure.

As with the request for delegation of the mobilization authority, USAF turned the first proposal down, pointing to the already approved plan for deployment of ConAC's squadrons and for an increase of twelve squadrons during fiscal year 1951. <sup>33</sup> As we have already seen, the circumstances were suddenly altered early in November by the entrance of the Communist Chinese into the Korean War and the consequent fear of a general conflict. On top of this was a weakening of the eastern defenses caused by the movement of the 4th Fighter Wing to the Far East Air Forces made necessary by the grave crisis in <sup>34</sup> Korea. The combination of factors caused General Whitehead to appeal <sup>35</sup> for help:

SECRET

0 + + +

**SECRET**

A review of the present international situation compels me to seek ways and means of immediately increasing the strength of the Air Defense Forces.... The fighter forces must be increased, and they must be increased quickly. This can be done by employment of the ANG fighter units.

General Whitehead listed thirty-eight ANG squadrons which when added to the twenty-three regular squadrons assigned him would bring the total up to sixty-one, the number considered to be the minimum required to provide adequate air defense. <sup>36</sup> Of the ANG squadrons, he wanted the fifteen which were located within radar coverage and had adequate facilities at their home bases to accommodate operations federalized immediately. The remaining twenty-three, most of which were located within the radar net, but none of which had sufficient facilities for full scale operations, were to be held in reserve. Each of the thirty-eight ANG squadrons had at this time an average of sixteen fighters assigned; four of the fifteen which General Whitehead wanted federalized, and six of the twenty-three he wanted held in reserve, were jet equipped (F-80s and F-81s). <sup>37</sup>

Presumably Washington, no less than ConAC, was anxious about the situation for approval was given in December for federalization of the first fifteen squadrons. <sup>38</sup> Meanwhile, ConAC apparently considered the international situation to have worsened sufficiently to warrant immediate federalization of additional squadrons regardless of their lack of facilities. On 29 December an addition of twenty-three squadrons was requested. <sup>39</sup> Two of the twenty-three squadrons on General Whitehead's original roster had been set aside for the Air Training Command, so ConAC added one more ANG squadron to its list and

**SECRET**



SECRET

25

suggested the activation of a regular squadron. In part, this request was approved also. Besides the original fifteen ANG squadrons, which were to be federalized on 1 February 1951, USAF advised that six additional squadrons would be brought into service on 1 March for assignment to ADC. USAF at first said that another sixteen would be federalized on 1 April, but a few days later decided to defer this action pending authorization for additional Air Force build-up. These sixteen squadrons were to remain earmarked for ADC, however. The other twenty-one squadrons were federalized on the dates proposed. During this same period, the other ANG fighter squadrons in the continental United States (not including the sixteen set aside for ADC) were also federalized and assigned to other commands.

#### ANG Radar Units In Air Defense

At the same time that action was underway for readying the ANG fighter units for an emergency air defense role, plans were being made for the emergency employment of ANG aircraft control and warning forces. One of the earliest of these plans was for the use of ANG AC&W units in a radar system envisaged by Headquarters USAF in a plan which was developed in the fall of 1947, called SUPREMACY. This plan was drawn on a grand scale and proposed the deployment of 374 basic radar stations and fourteen control centers over a period of five years. During peacetime, only partial manning of this system was to

\* See Appendix II for a list of the twenty-one squadrons, their home stations, and the type aircraft possessed at the time of federalization.

SECRET

0 4 4 5

**SECRET**

be accomplished. At the outset of an emergency, it was planned that the Guard would be mobilized and the personnel of its ACGW units used to fully man the sites in this system. The Air Force was unable to put SUPREMACY through Congress, however, and it was dropped in the summer of 1948.

Following upon the heels of this plan came a less ambitious program, also developed by USAF. The first part of this plan, termed the "Interim Program," called for a total of sixty-one basic radar stations and ten control centers. To increase coverage, a second part was added which called for fifteen more basic radar stations. The latter was termed the "First Augmentation," and both together became the "Permanent System," the radar network actually constructed. Early in 1949, after creation of the Continental Air Command, approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense was obtained and Congress passed legislation authorizing construction. In its bill, USAF deleted one basic radar station, leaving a total of seventy-five.

Initially, the ACGW units figured prominently in the full-scale implementation of this plan as they did in SUPREMACY. As conceived at this time, the nation was to be divided into eight large air defense areas with a control center in each. All of these eight control centers were to be manned by regular USAF personnel. Each of these eight large areas was to be further sub-divided one or more times so that there would be twelve smaller areas, or twenty sectors of responsibility in all. The twelve small areas were to remain inactive, however, until manned by ACGW groups in wartime. Prior to mobilization of the Guard, the eight USAF control centers were to be responsible

**SECRET**



SECRET

27

for the ANG areas. This plan for use of the ANG AC&W forces was discarded also, however, primarily because more and more personnel and equipment for the permanent system was received and because the ANG units were both chronically understrength and poorly equipped. This early scheme to set up eight areas and sub-divide these was itself dropped and the nation eventually was divided into eleven sectors all manned by regular personnel.

As with the fighter forces, ANG AC&W units were brought into federal service during 1951. The Air Defense Command was assigned initially twenty-eight of these squadrons.  
\*

Provisions For Use Of Navy Forces

At the Key West conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it will be recalled that the Navy agreed to provide forces for air defense in accordance with doctrines and procedures to be issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following the conference, the Chief of Naval Operations issued an interim statement of policy on emergency employment of naval forces in air defense to act as a guide ~~until a policy was~~<sup>47</sup> established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS failed to make a pronouncement on the subject, however, and the basic principles laid down at this time were to serve for many years to come.

---

\* See Appendix III for a list of these squadrons, their home stations, and the date of their assignment to ADC. The information available at ADC Headquarters shows the assignment of twenty-eight squadrons to this command, but it is not known whether this was the total number federalized.

SECRET

0 4 4 8

**SECRET**

First, the CNO stressed that naval forces could be employed on an emergency basis only and that availability would be determined by the cognizant naval commander. Naval forces could be trained and prepared for emergency air defense participation, but no "routine and continuing peacetime operational commitment of naval forces to continental air defense," was possible. The Fleets, the Sea Frontiers, the Naval Districts, the Naval Air Training Command including the Naval Air Reserve Training Command, the Naval Airship Training and Experimental Command, and the Marine Corps Supporting Establishments and Air Reserve Training Command were all listed as sources of emergency forces. The Sea Frontiers were established as the major direct link between the Navy and Air Force organizations. Interim procedures for emergency employment should be established, the CNO continued, by mutual agreement between the Navy and appropriate Air Force commands. Training was the responsibility of the Navy commanders and joint Navy-Air Force training was permissible at the option of Navy commanders.

Because of Navy command structure and establishment of the Sea Frontiers as the agencies responsible for making the arrangements for and directing participation in air defense, it was necessary that the Air Defense Forces, as the command echelon most nearly equivalent to the Sea Frontiers, make all agreements for use of Navy forces. The first agreement to be made following the CNO's policy statement was concluded on 29 December 1949 between the Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF) and the Eastern Air Defense Force. Under its terms, the ESF commander agreed to allocate Navy and Marine forces under his jurisdiction, which

**SECRET**



SECRET

29

were not more urgently needed by the Navy, to the operational control of the EADF commander in an emergency. <sup>49</sup> These forces were to include fighters, antiaircraft artillery, shore-based radar, airborne early warning aircraft, radar picket ships, and electronic jamming devices. So that naval forces would participate effectively, the ESF commander agreed to coordinate with the various commanders concerned to insure training of all elements in air defense operations. The agreement provided further that it was the responsibility of the local commanders to see that their crews were familiar with air defense operating procedures.

After reaching the agreement, procedures for employment of naval fighters in air defense were worked out between the two commands. As established by these procedures, which were formally issued by EADF in the summer of 1950, when Navy support was required, the EADF commander was to request allocation from the ESF commander. After allocation was made, EADF was to inform the Air Divisions concerned and the latter was to assume operational control of the Navy forces in their area. This control did not include authority to move Navy fighters from one base to another. Requests for deployment could be made, but the decision to do so was at the option of the Navy commander concerned.

At this time also, the procedures for integration of antiaircraft artillery were established. The agreement with ESF had provided that Navy antiaircraft fire was to be placed under the operational control of the commander of an Army antiaircraft defended area whenever the two forces were interfering or supporting each other. In

SECRET

0 + 3 0

SECRET

30

July 1950, EADF established that where an Army Antiaircraft Operations Center existed, orders to release fire were to be issued by the ADC GCI station through the AAOC to the Naval Antiaircraft Control Station. In areas where no AAOC was established, direct lines were to run from the ADC GCI station to the Naval AA Control Station. Navy AA units located within an organized air defense area and not in communication with a GCI station were not to engage an aircraft unless it was in the process of committing or had committed a hostile act. AA weapons aboard merchant vessels were not to engage aircraft under any circumstances.

An agreement similar to that made with ESF was concluded by WADF with the Western Sea Frontier (WSF) in May 1950. Under it, the WSF commander agreed to insure training of the forces in his area and to allocate these forces to emergency air defense if they were not needed elsewhere. The forces in the western area were to be made available also for joint training with the air defense system when they could be released. The WSF commander added the note that this agreement was only an interim measure pending the issuance of directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Neither this agreement nor the one with ESF provided for any specific commitments of naval forces. Only when a request for allocation was made would a commitment of available forces be given. This prevented advance planning for use of any specific Navy forces either by location or numbers.

The arrangements made by WADF with the Navy for carrying out its agreement provided that in an emergency or for training, the WADF commander was to ask the Sea Frontier commander for allocation of forces.

SECRET

0 4 5 1



SECRET

31

When these were supplied, direct communications between all lower echelons of the two commands was automatically authorized for the purpose of integrating the Navy forces into the air defense system. Operational control was to be vested in the local Air Force operating activity. However, Navy and Marine GCI stations were to actually scramble and control fighters whenever possible. As with ESF forces, operational control did not include movement authority. The WSF commander stipulated that his approval was necessary for any deployment of Navy forces.

By mid-1950, the Defense Forces had succeeded in establishing procedures for both emergency employment and for joint training in air defense with the Navy. During 1950 communications were established to a number of Navy fighter stations and by the end of the year scramble lines had been installed to the following bases: Atlantic City NAS, New Jersey; Floyd Bennett NAS, New York; Quonset Point NAS, Rhode Island; Norfolk NAS, Virginia; Oceana NAS, Virginia; San Point NAS, Washington; Moffett NAS, El Toro MCAS, and San Diego NAS, California. Both EADP and WADF had received, since early 1950, periodic status reports from the respective Sea Frontiers on fighters, antiaircraft, and radar present in the United States.<sup>54\*</sup>

In the spring of 1950, there were enough regular and reserve Navy fighters in the United States to equal 120 squadrons of sixteen

---

\* For an example of the reports sent to the Defense Forces, see reference note number fifty-four.

SECRET

0 4 5 2

**SECRET**

to twenty aircraft each. <sup>55</sup> These included both day and all-weather conventional and jet types. At this time, there were 357 Navy radar sets of various types and in various degrees of operation around the country. Finally, in eighteen coastal areas there was some degree of naval anti-aircraft capability. Because of the continual movement of ships, the latter was very transitory in nature.

In both the eastern and western areas, Navy forces participated to a great extent during 1950 in joint training such as the SAC-ADC "Big Photo" exercises. EADF negotiated a special agreement with ESF in September to place training on a regular basis. By the terms of the agreement, EADF made the ADC AC&W system available for training at the request of the Navy commanders. <sup>56</sup> The Air Division commanders were authorized to approve requests for training in "Big Photo" missions, procedural familiarity exercises, and joint exercises.

**SECRET**

0 4 5 3



# SECRET

## CHAPTER III 1951 to 1953

### The Second Post-War Air Defense Command

On 1 January 1951, the second post-war Air Defense Command was created. To this command went the air defense mission which had resided in ConAC since 1 December 1948 and all the tactical forces and organizations assigned that mission. Supervisory responsibility over the Air National Guard and Air Reserve, however, remained with ConAC. Lieutenant General Ennis Whitehead moved from ConAC to the command of ADC.

Included in the mission of the new ADC were responsibilities for organizing an integrated air defense system which were quite similar to those given to the first ADC in 1946, but by this time they acquired some meaning. ADC was charged with "the carrying out of joint air defense training and joint air defense exercises and maneuvers...utilizing units of other components of the Department of Defense that may be available," and "establishment and maintenance of liaison with...other Air Force commands for the purpose of coordinating joint matters pertaining to air defense...." A month after ADC's activation, USAF broadened these responsibilities with instructions to make arrangements for use in an emergency of all forces possessing an air defense capability.

SECRET

0 4 5 4

**SECRET**Agreements For Use Of Other Command Forces

USAF specifically directed that contact be made with the Tactical Air Command, which had been restored to major command status on 1 January 1951, and it was to this organization that ADC made the first overtures. An agreement was signed with TAC on 21 April which provided in general terms for the use of that command's fighters and tactical control groups in an emergency. Under its terms, TAC agreed to be responsible for providing ADC with information on the location, composition, and capabilities of its units which were available for employment; to insure that its forces could be employed as quickly as possible; to make plans for participation in air defense maneuvers; and to maintain adequate levels of ammunition and fuel. A clearly defined training responsibility<sup>3</sup> was lacking. TAC agreed only to the statement that its forces should be trained for air defense employment whenever primary responsibilities allowed and to the requirement to plan for participation in air defense maneuvers. In an emergency, available TAC forces were to be placed ~~under~~ the operational control of ADC. The agreement was termed interim in the sense that it was applicable for the period from the beginning of an emergency to such time as TAC recalled its units. When the latter happened, it was expected that some other arrangements would be made, probably by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the purposes of the agreement, a condition of emergency was to exist automatically if an attack occurred or appeared imminent, or when declared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other competent authority, or by mutual agreement between the signatories.

**SECRET**



SECRET

35

In the TAC agreement, as in all the others signed with Air Force commands during 1951, a reservation was attached which made dependability in an emergency very uncertain. This provision was that in an emergency, availability of TAC forces "shall be in consonance with requirements and commitments for execution of their assigned primary missions."<sup>4</sup>

The agreement with TAC established only the concept and terms for emergency employment in air defense. ADC thought at first that it could leave to the Defense Forces the entire job of working out the plans and procedures for carrying out the agreements and immediately after the TAC commander's signature had been obtained, directed its field commanders to begin work on these details.<sup>5</sup>

In carrying out ADC's instructions, representatives from Central and Eastern Air Defense Forces met jointly with TAC officials.<sup>\*</sup> In these talks, informal agreements for training, emergency, integration,<sup>6</sup> and even deployment of TAC fighters were reached. WADF went a step further and drew up an operations plan for emergency employment of TAC units in its area.<sup>7</sup>

No approval was given by ADC to these actions, however, and further development of operations plans on the Defense Force level languished. The reason ADC did not tell the field commanders to go ahead with their plans was, as will be seen, because of the realization that operations plans made on a regional level for use of the augmentation forces which happened to be in that area without regard to any overall priority might result in a waste of these forces.

---

\* The Central Air Defense Force was activated on 1 March 1951.

SECRET

SECRET

36

Meanwhile, ADC had sent a similar agreement to the Strategic Air Command. SAC Headquarters accepted all of the procedures and responsibilities proposed including the somewhat more definite training requirement to prepare plans for insuring "adequate unit training and adherence to air defense policies and procedures," but insisted upon additional reservations. It was the desire of SAC, whose war plans required early deployment of fighters to forward bases in an emergency, to have complete control over the participation of its units in air defense. For this reason, the procedure which TAC had accepted whereby the Defense Force commander would determine the need for use of available forces was modified to a requirement for the Defense Force commander to make his request through the Commander of ADC. The reason for this change was that SAC wished to make certain that its units scheduled for early movement overseas would not be deployed for air defense prior to the issuance of SAC orders. Furthermore, in addition to the reservation carried in the TAC agreement that availability would depend upon the requirements and commitments of the primary mission, SAC spelled out its position with the statement that "all Strategic Air Command Forces will be or may be deploying to forward bases on the first day of hostilities.... It is specifically recognized that deployment of fighter-escort forces in support of the SAC war plan will take precedence over air defense commitments."

At first, SAC apparently had little expectation of actually participating in air defense, for when ADC asked for periodic status reports for the purpose of preparing deployment plans, SAC refused, reminding ADC of the clause in the agreement that deployment of its

SECRET

0457



SECRET

37

forces in support of its war plan would take precedence over any air defense commitments.<sup>12</sup> ADC persisted, however, pleading that while there was a possibility that SAC forces would not be available there was also the chance that they could be used for a short time:<sup>13</sup>

The possibility of your units assisting in air defense of this country even for just a few days after the outbreak of hostilities, might well be the deciding factor in survival of the nation.

SAC conceded the point and furnished ADC with the desired status reports.

After conclusion of the agreement with SAC in May, ADC directed its Defense Forces to make detailed arrangements for employment and training of SAC forces.<sup>14</sup> Similar activity to that with TAC was undertaken by the field commanders. WADF even produced another operations plan. As before, no final approval was given by ADC to the Defense Force plans, however.

In mid-summer, ADC negotiated agreements with both the Air Training Command and the Air Proving Ground Command and in November reached an agreement with the Air Research and Development Command.<sup>\*</sup> The TAC accord was used as a guide and each of these agreements was similar to it with the exception of a more definite training responsibility. These three commands agreed, as had SAC, to prepare orders and plans which would insure adequate training of their units in air defense policies and procedures.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>\*</sup> ARDC had no aircraft capable of performing in air defense. It did, however, have radar which ADC wished to use. See page 54ff, this chapter.

SECRET

0 + 5 8

## SECRET

38

### Emergency Employment Plans

After studying at some length the arrangements made by the Defense Forces for employing TAC and SAC forces and comparing the fighters available from all of the other commands with the targets to be defended, ADC decided that to allow the employment of augmentation forces within each region simply because they were located in that area would be an uneconomical use of this augmentation.<sup>16</sup> Effective use required allocation on a basis of priority of targets, forces available for defense of these targets, and the capability of these forces. This could only be accomplished by ADC Headquarters itself. For this reason, late in October ADC informed the field commanders that it was preparing an overall operations plan which would allocate the fighters of other commands on a national basis.<sup>17\*</sup> These were to be issued monthly and each Defense Force was in turn to prepare detailed employment plans for the forces to

\* A second function was added before the first operations order appeared, that of instructing the Defense Forces on operations for a particular month (such as alert and training requirements) and of providing other commands with a concept of ADC operations. The second operations order (2-52, 1 January 1952) included instructions (within the framework of existing agreements) for the emergency employment of Navy and Air National Guard forces and also operating instructions to, and the status of, the Army Antiaircraft Command forces. This combination of all elements in one volume was continued to the end of 1952 when it was decided that the one document was too bulky for use. Beginning in 1953, three separate publications were issued -- one for the forces of other Air Force commands, one for the ANG, and one for the ARACOM. Also in late 1952, it was decided that there was not sufficient change each month to warrant the issuance of a new operations order and so the last one for this year was issued in October. With the separation of the three parts into separate publications, it was possible to carry this even further. One plan, with amendments as necessary, served for all of 1953. Entirely new plans were issued for 1954.

SECRET

0 + 32



SECRET

be deployed to their areas.

The first JOC operations plan for augment force was issued on 1 December 1951. The status reports from other commands upon which this plan was based indicated a total of 307 aircraft on main bases available for air defense. Included were twenty-four JOC fighter-escort aircraft, 126 T-45 fighter-bombers, and 153 T-28 aircraft. In its plan, JOC divided the total allocated into twenty-three detachments, of which twenty-two were to deploy to eighteen bases in an emergency (one JOC detachment stationed at George AFB, California was to remain there).<sup>18</sup> Seven bases in the northeast area, four in the northwest, four in California, and three isolated point targets were to receive augmentation forces in an emergency.

Nearly all of the instructions required for deployment were provided in JOC's plan. Each participating command was to provide its own personnel, supplies, and equipment for support of five days of sustained operation. This did not include, of course, such items as fuel, oil, oxygen, and food, but referred to ground handling equipment, spare parts, hand tools, auxiliary power units, and so on. After deployment to a base for an actual emergency, supply support was to be started at that base for the detached unit. This was to be arranged directly by the defense command at bases and through coordination with commanders of bases not directly JOC. Until additional supplies (for the period beyond five days) arrived, the necessary material was to be airlifted from the unit's base base or the nearest base having

<sup>18</sup> See Appendix IV for the deployment plan provided in this operations order.

SECRET

0 4 6 0

**SECRET**

supplies. As much air transport as possible was to be provided by each command and the additional airlift needed was to be furnished by TAC troop carrier units. The materiel required for five days of operation was to be maintained at readiness at all times at the home stations of each unit.

All deploying aircraft were to leave their home stations with a full combat load of ammunition, if possible. For air-to-ground communications, the commands were to install crystals in their aircraft when deployed for the GCI common frequency of 133.20 megacycles. In addition, the ADX radar stations were to store crystals of designated frequencies of the augmentation units. Finally, each command was instructed to have its forces at the bases of deployment and ready for air defense operations within twelve hours after notification. Later, ADC changed this requirement to "will depart home station within six hours after notification, with a shorter delay if possible."<sup>20</sup>

Implementation of the plan was to be accomplished by a request from the Commander of ADC to the Commanders of the other commands. Such a request was to be made only in event of an actual or imminent air attack, by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other competent authority, or by mutual agreement between commands for training or testing the plan.

It was to be the responsibility of the Defense Forces to provide the services and supplies for the units allocated to their areas which they could not bring themselves, such as ammunition, fuel, oil, oxygen, food, and housing. These items were to be supplied at ADC.

**SECRET**



SECRET

41

bases, and the Defense Forces were to coordinate with the other commands to see that they were provided at bases not belonging to ADC. To assist in the training of other command forces, the Defense Forces were to send indoctrination teams to the units scheduled for their areas to give lectures on air defense policies and procedures. Also, the Defense Forces were to provide and maintain a current file of all operational publications at the home bases of the deploying units.

As soon as ADC's plan appeared, SAC Headquarters forcibly objected to the proposed deployment of its units. The status reports which had been sent to ADC were not intended to be a commitment of the aircraft listed, SAC told ADC. SAC again brought up the clause in its agreement which stated that deployment of fighter-escort forces in support of its war plan would take precedence over air defense, concluding that because of a current shortage of aircraft no fighters could be considered for air defense for the time being:

It is considered essential by this command that every escort fighter available to this command must deploy immediately to the forward area to provide the minimum acceptable escort support to planned early strike missions. In view of the paucity of our fighter escort forces, it is clearly apparent that no fighters assigned to SAC can be committed to air defense tasks at this time.

It is requested that subsequent operations plans of the 14-51 series exclude the participation of SAC fighter units until such time as available SAC fighter forces exceed initial requirements for escort missions.

ADC considered the latter request but suggested a compromise solution, which SAC accepted. In future operations plans, SAC forces would be scheduled for deployment only to nearby SAC bases. In this

SECRET

0 + 0 2

**SECRET**

way, a defense of SAC bases would be provided and at the same time the fighter escort forces would be immediately available for performance of their primary mission. ADC went on to point out that no positive commitment of forces was intended and that it was recognized that SAC fighters might not be available, but "even remote possibilities of their employment by the Air Defense Command can not be overlooked."<sup>23</sup>

At first, ADC provided in its plans only for deployment of other command fighters as the means of using these aircraft in an emergency. Deployment required a number of hours; therefore considerable advance warning of an attack was necessary for the plan to be carried out. ADC soon realized that a separate plan of action was needed to take care of the possibility of enemy aircraft hitting the air defense system with little or no warning. Beginning in March, ADC issued, along with its deployment plan, a plan for the use of the forces of the other commands for defense of the area in which they were based by operating from their home stations.

A complete in-place or local defense was impossible because of the lack of radar control capabilities in many areas where fighters of other commands were located. Included in the plan at this time, however, were the TAC fighters at Godman AFB, Kentucky; George AFB, California; Clovis AFB, New Mexico; and Dow AFB, Maine; and the ATRC aircraft at Tyndall AFB, Florida (using the ATRC radar at Tyndall AFB tied into the 35th Air Division ADCC).<sup>24</sup> The aircraft at Clovis AFB were considered to be on the opposite side of the target from the logical enemy approach route and were, therefore, to move up to Kirtland AFB under this plan.<sup>25</sup>

**SECRET**



SECRET

43

More bases were to be added as either ADC or other command radar became available. At the bases where fighters of other commands were located, but where there was no radar capability, ADC directed that under this plan preparations be made for the scheduled deployment which would be ordered when possible. During this waiting period, ADC suggested that two to four aircraft at a time be placed on combat air patrol in defense of their bases.

Following development of the second method of utilizing augmentation forces, ADC established a streamlined procedure for setting it, as well as the deployment plan, in motion. It will be recalled that originally deployment was to occur only on request of the Commander of ADC made to the Commanders of the other commands and this request was to be made only on threat of attack or by direction of the JCS or other competent authority. This provided no preliminary states of warning which would allow advance preparations for either in-place use or deployment. In May, ADC provided a means for bringing augmentation units up to a maximum state of preparedness in advance of a specific request for implementation of either one of the plans.

Each participating command headquarters was to be notified when an Air Defense Readiness, a Military Emergency, or an Air Defense Warning Yellow (attack probable) or Red (attack imminent) was declared by ADC. Upon receipt of any of these alerts, the augmentation forces were to prepare immediately for in-place defense. ADC's alert notification was to be followed, as soon as possible, with a second message requesting either in-place use or deployment. Each of the commands was

SECRET

0 4 6 4

**SECRET**

responsible for notifying their subordinate units with the exception of the ATRC. The headquarters of the latter and its subordinate units were to be notified by ADC Headquarters and in addition the ATRC units were to be alerted by the Defense Forces.<sup>27</sup>

TAC Aircraft On Alert

Upon establishing the in-place utilization plan, ADC approached the Tactical Air Command with the suggestion that it put suitably located forces on regular air defense alert.<sup>28</sup> ADC proposed that at least two fighters be placed on a five minute readiness status during the period from one hour before sunrise to one hour after sunset at Dow AFB, Maine; Langley AFB, Virginia; Godman AFB, Kentucky; and George AFB, California. TAC accepted the proposal except for the unit at Langley AFB which TAC said was too occupied with other activities.<sup>29</sup> For two months, from 1 May to 1 July, alert was maintained, in so far as possible, at the three other bases.<sup>30</sup> The unit at Dow AFB was withdrawn at the end of two months, but the alert was continued at the remaining two bases until the first of September.<sup>31</sup> At that time, these units were also withdrawn because of a pilot shortage.

While TAC fighters were standing alert, ADC required the pilots and aircraft to meet the same criteria established for its own force.<sup>32\*</sup>

\* TAC crews were to meet the requirements of paragraph 4, ADC Regulation 55-2, 21 February 1952, which required forty hours flying time in unit aircraft, three night sorties, three successful ground controlled interceptions, the ability to fly instruments, and possession of a current instrument card. In September, after TAC units had gone off alert, the requirement for three ground controlled interceptions was waived for augmentation crews. /ADC, Diary, 5 Sep 1952/ TAC aircraft were to be rated combat ready in accordance with paragraph 6 of this regulation which required the aircraft to be in commission and have all guns, the gunsight, the oxygen system, a VHF and UHF transmitter and receiver, and all flight and engine instruments installed and operational.

**SECRET**



SECRET

45

If an aircraft or pilot did not meet the requirements, an alert was considered to be a training operation only.

Training Of Other Command Units

The first year (1951), then, was taken up by negotiations with other commands, experimentation with planning by Defense Forces, and the development of operations plans by ADC. It was not until after establishment of instructions and requirements by ADC in its operations plans that any extensive or coordinated indoctrination and training of augmentation units could begin.

By April 1952, each Defense Force had reported initiation of indoctrination programs in accordance with ADC's instructions. WADF said that it had sent all pertinent regulations, communications operating instructions, photographs of the bases to be used, and the instrument landing procedures for each base to its Divisions.<sup>33</sup> The latter included these in a packet containing their own publications and other data of local interest and distributed them to the units of other commands scheduled to come to their areas. Following this initial distribution, the Divisions sent all changes and revisions to each unit. WADF also reported sending briefing teams to each unit periodically.

Similar programs were launched by CADF and EADF. CADF required its Divisions to give briefings at the home station of each unit at least once every ninety days or whenever there was a large turnover of personnel or a major change of policy.<sup>34</sup> By the first week of April, all augmentation units in the EADF area had been given lectures and

SECRET

0 + 6 6

**SECRET**

a current file of air defense publications.<sup>35</sup> EADF directed its wings to give briefings at intervals frequent enough to keep these forces current in all phases of air defense operations.<sup>36</sup>

ADC suggested to the other major commands in April that this indoctrination was not enough and that they allow their fighter units to engage in actual intercept training with the Air Division to which they were to be sent in an emergency.<sup>37</sup> At least ATRC and TAC were able to accept the proposal at this time, and the Defense Forces were directed to carry out such training whenever possible. The Air Divisions contacted the units scheduled for their areas and prepared for receiving and training small detachments of them periodically.<sup>38</sup> A great amount of practical training was made possible through this means.\* For example, a detachment of the 140th Fighter-Bomber Group, stationed at Clovis AFB, New Mexico, which went to Williamson-Johnson Airport, Duluth, Minnesota, was given briefings, visited a GCI station,<sup>39</sup> and engaged in several practice scrambles and intercepts.

#### Operation SIGI POST

The first test of the augmentation plan in its entirety was provided in Operation SIGI POST, a nation-wide air defense exercise held from 24 to 28 July 1952. This exercise marked the first execution of the augmentation plan, and it was the first time that forces from the other USAF commands participated to any extent in an exercise as defenders. Participation and test of the augmentation forces was

---

\* The extent to which augmentation units took advantage of this training is not known.

**SECRET**



SECRET

47

one of the objectives of the exercise stated by General Chidlaw,  
<sup>40</sup>  
ADC's Commander.

Our objectives were... to test the functioning of our augmentation plans which involve the use of fighter aircraft of other commands. This was of great interest to us, both in the direct operational phase and in the proving out of previously laid plans for movement of these forces to their deployment bases, and the handling of the necessary support functions.

ADC forces were augmented for this exercise by a total of 324 aircraft, 147 from TAC and 177 from ATRC. This entire force was in place twelve hours after ADC issued the deployment order.<sup>41</sup> Only two units reached their deployment bases in less than ten hours, with all others requiring from ten to twelve hours. In addition to this time, an average of two hours was required by each unit after arrival at deployment bases before any of their aircraft were ready for scramble. Over twelve hours were required, therefore, for augmentation aircraft to be ready for action.

Once in place, many units were hampered by lack of proper supplies. Some units deployed to WADF did not receive airlift support<sup>42</sup> for thirty hours. At the most, only one or two sorties could be flown before support arrived. Some aircraft could not fly at all. For example, at O'Hare AFB, Illinois, eight out of sixteen augmentation F-51s and five out of twelve F-84s were out of commission upon arrival and repair parts were not available locally.<sup>43</sup>

In addition to support deficiencies, the indoctrination of augmentation units proved to have been inadequate. At O'Hare AFB, for instance, it was necessary to spend over two hours in briefing

SECRET

0 + 6 B

**SECRET**

44  
pilots before they could be used on alert. In other cases, pilots were unfamiliar with local terrain, did not know recovery methods, and had not been briefed on air defense procedures or rules of engagement. Numerous minor irritants also cropped up which showed a lack of coordination between the augmentation units and the airbases to which they deployed. As an example, at some bases adaptors for different pressure oxygen systems were not on hand, and local maintenance personnel were unfamiliar with deployed equipment.

Despite these hindrances, augmentation aircraft flew a total of 631 sorties during the exercise and the overall contribution was considered to have been significant.<sup>45</sup> In at least one case, a raid upon Chicago, it was felt that the forces of the other commands turned the tide of battle.

In the final analysis, Exercise SIG: POST indicated that the augmentation plan was workable and that a great contribution could be made by the forces of other commands. It also revealed that much more careful planning and thorough indoctrination was necessary. ADC recognized that more intensive coordination at the lowest levels was necessary. As a result, ADC directed each Defense Force to re-indoctrinate all of the augmentation forces in their areas.<sup>46</sup> The briefing teams to be sent out were to include an operations officer or qualified flight leader, a controller, and a base supply officer. ADC specified that the briefing teams were to include landing procedures in their presentations and were to furnish copies of these procedures to all of the units of other commands. In its operations plans issued after this exercise, ADC put in the exact

**SECRET**  
0 4 0 9



SECRET

49

fuel, oil, and ammunition requirements which were to be stockpiled at each deployment base. Each major command was encouraged to send as many aircraft as possible, in the future, to the deployment bases for training.

Training Of Navy Forces

At the same time that these preparations were underway, similar actions were being taken for the use of Navy forces in an emergency. One important aspect of this was joint training. During 1951, Navy forces participated in all of the seven Defense Force-wide exercises (four in WADF, three in EADF). In many of these exercises, Navy fighters, antiaircraft artillery, and radar took part as defender forces.

Generally, Navy and Marine radar stations controlled their own fighters. For example, in WADF Exercise 2-51 which was held in the first week of February, the El Toro Marine GCI station was assigned its own area of responsibility and control of its fighters.<sup>47</sup> This operation proved very successful with the El Toro station running seventy-one intercepts of which fifty-five were completed. In another case, an EADF exercise held from 22 to 24 June, the Navy GCI station at Glenview NAS, Illinois, controlling its own fighters, completed ten of twelve intercepts attempted.<sup>48</sup>

In 1952, coincident with the initiation of training of the forces of other USAF commands, increased emphasis was placed upon the training of Navy forces. Especial attention was given to the Naval Reserve Training Units which had heretofore been somewhat neglected. There were some

SECRET

0 4 7 0

SECRET

twenty-five stations in the United States having Reserve units on them.<sup>\*</sup> These organizations were equipped primarily with conventional aircraft of the F-47 and F-51 class (F6Fs, F8Fs, FG-1Ds), although a few had day jets of the F-80 class (F2Hs, FHs, etc.). Most of the Reserve units could make the bulk of their aircraft operationally ready within twelve hours.<sup>49</sup> The Navy Reserve components were, of course, subject to the same mobilization law as the Air Force Reserve.

Navy Reserve units in the coastal areas had participated in local air defense training and in many of the exercises held during 1951, but not until 1952 was there a concerted effort to thoroughly indoctrinate these organizations and to integrate all of them into the air defense system. Included in this program was the establishing of close relations with the Reserve organizations, arranging for regular intercept training, installation of scramble lines to the Reserve stations if none existed, and distribution of all pertinent air defense publications.<sup>50</sup> ADC even made arrangements for the participation of Reserve units in the SAC-ADC "Big Photo" exercises.<sup>51</sup>

Most of the Navy Reserve units in the Central Air Defense Force area had never been contacted before and that command launched the most intensive program of all. In January 1952, CADF told its Divisions that "the goal must be complete indoctrination of the Naval Reserve fliers now and not just prior to any joint training."<sup>52</sup> One of the results of

<sup>\*</sup> See Appendix V for a list of the Navy regular and reserve squadrons in the United States at the end of 1952.

SECRET



SECRET

51

this program was a formal agreement between CADF's 31st Air Division and the Reserve organizations at Minneapolis, Minnesota and Lincoln, Nebraska in which both Reserve commanders pledged to train their units and to be prepared to integrate their forces into the air defense system in an emergency.<sup>53\*</sup>

New Agreements With The Sea Frontiers

In the closing months of 1951, the Defense Forces negotiated new agreements with both Western and Eastern Sea Frontiers. No significant changes in concept or procedure were made; the purpose being to bring the agreements up to date by including the latest command and boundary organizations.<sup>54</sup> The new agreement with Eastern Sea Frontier was made jointly by EADF and CADF and included the territory of both commands. So that the Navy would have to deal with only one command, the agreement provided that EADF would also represent CADF. The ESF commander was to submit information on the status of Navy forces to both Defense Forces, however. EADF also renewed its training agreement with ESF in December 1951. The only changes were the inclusion of picket vessels and the authorization to Air Division commanders to approve requests for any type training within the capabilities of the units concerned.<sup>55</sup> The previous agreement had listed specific types of training which could be approved.

---

\* For a detailed account of the training provided Naval Reserve units in the CADF, see History of CADF, 1 Jan to 30 Jun 1952, pp 83-120 and 1 Jul to 31 Dec 1952, pp 56-75.

SECRET

0 + 1 2

**SECRET**Navy Policy On Air Defense

In September 1952, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Fichteler, issued a statement of policy on Navy participation in emergency air defense for the purpose of reaffirming and bringing up to date the previous statements of policy. No basic change was made or could be made, as Admiral Fichteler pointed out, until the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued instructions:

...notwithstanding the fact that naval forces, surface and air, have participated in the past with elements of the Air Defense Command of the U. S. Air Force in exercises conducted to test the effectiveness of the present ability to defend the U. S. from air attack in simulated emergencies, there has been no specific allocation of Naval forces by the JCS for the express purpose of air defense of the continental U. S. Further, there is no JCS approved concept of how the air defense of the U. S. should be conducted nor does there exist any jointly approved plan for this purpose. Such plans as have been employed to support past exercises and any which represent themselves as governing for future use must be considered as purely interim in nature.

Admiral Fichteler stated, however, that despite this situation, the temporary employment of Naval forces which were shore-based or temporarily in port in air defense in an emergency was possible and a policy could be established for this purpose. In line with this, he declared that it was his desire that Navy forces "provide maximum practicable assistance, consistent with primary missions, to appropriate Air Force agencies," and that Navy commands "insure that these forces are trained and prepared to effectively reinforce or augment forces regularly assigned for air defense of the U. S." This did not mean, Admiral Fichteler iterated, a routine and continuing commitment of Navy forces to air defense. Such a commitment could only be directed

**SECRET**



SECRET

53

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In commenting to Air Force Headquarters on Admiral Fechteler's statements, ADC pointed out that they only emphasized the temporary nature of the participation of Navy forces. "While this statement conforms with current Department of Defense policy," ADC stated, "it guarantees nothing in air defense augmentation. Therefore, it is not practicable to consider the Navy's capability (except incidentally) in the development of current and future air defense plans." ADC<sup>58</sup> requested that something be done to secure a JCS policy statement which would provide uninterrupted employment of Navy forces at least during the initial attack.

Augmentation Radar

The agreements made with other Air Force commands during 1951 provided for the use of their radar facilities as well as for their fighters. This was also true of the agreements made by the Defense Forces with the Navy Sea Frontiers in 1949 and 1950 and the renewal of these in 1951.

As shown earlier, little was accomplished during 1951 toward preparation for the use of other Air Force command forces beyond exploratory contacts and planning. The Defense Forces had discussed the employment of the radar groups of TAC with this command, and WADF had included tactical control groups in its operation plan for TAC (which ADC rejected). CADF went a step beyond the other two Defense Forces in 1951 by making a study of the AIRC radar at Keesler AFB,

SECRET

0 4 / 4

SECRET

Mississippi and Tyndall AFB, Florida, and the APGC radar at Eglin AFB, Florida.<sup>59</sup> CADF felt, after looking at these sets, that they were comparable to ADC equipment and suggested immediate integration to ADC Headquarters. The latter responded by placing a requirement in its operations plans for ATRC and APGC to integrate their Keesler, Tyndall, and Eglin facilities into the 35th Air Division in an emergency.

The reason CADF was prompted to investigate these installations was its concern over the lack of any ADC radar in the southeastern corner of the United States. ADC, developing its system from the target outward and providing defense along the logical strike routes of the north and the coasts first, had deferred development of the defenses of the southeast. The 35th Air Division was activated on 1 July 1951, however, for this area (Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Mississippi) and ADC planned to place a number of radar sites in this sector as part of the "Mobile Radar Program."<sup>60</sup> The latter was designed for the purpose of providing early warning for a number of SAC bases and to fill gaps in the coverage of the Permanent system. ADC thought at first that this program would be implemented in 1952, but it was 1954 before the first of the Mobile sites in the 35th Air Division became operational (other than the ADCS at Dobbins AFB, Georgia<sup>61\*</sup> which became operational in August 1952).

\* Also in August, the 663rd AC&N Squadron, Cross Mountain, Tennessee, which had been under the control of EADF's 30th Air Division, was transferred to CADF. The 663rd was equipped with an AN/SPS-10.

SECRET



SECRET

55

In contrast to the lack of activity with respect to other Air Force command radars during 1951, Navy radar installations were employed in nearly all of the Defense Forces exercises. A different situation prevailed as to the latter, however, in that provision for training and temporary emergency use of Navy radar had been in force since the first agreements, and this activity was only an expansion of that which had begun in 1950. As we have seen, in many cases integration of Navy radar was highly successful during exercises and much valuable training was accomplished.

Early in 1952, coincident with the general effort which crystallized at this time for acquiring the use of outside forces in an emergency, ADC attempted for the first time to determine exactly what radars of other commands and services existed, the characteristics of these sets, and the requirements for integration. To get this information, each Defense Force was asked to survey its area and the major commands were requested to report on such of their radar facilities as might be used in emergency air defense. <sup>62</sup> Neither query produced more than piecemeal information, however. A second request for information was sent to the Defense Forces in July which resulted in greatly expanded <sup>63</sup> lists of information.

EADF listed eight Navy stations with radar which might be used in air defense, of which five were tied into its system. <sup>64\*</sup> In all,

\* The five stations were: the Fleet Training Center, Beavertail, Jamestown, R.I.; NAS Atlantic City, N.J.; FIC Norfolk, Va.; NAS Glenview, Ill.; and the CIC Team Training Center, Boston, Mass.

SECRET

0 + 7 0

SECRET

EADF reported, there were 135 Navy radar facilities in the eastern area. Other than the eight mentioned none could not be used either because of their location (many of the Navy sets were sited for training purposes only), or lack of sufficient range, or inadequate manning and infrequent periods of operation.<sup>65</sup> The number of radar facilities of other USAF commands in the eastern area was more limited. EADF listed the ARDC radars at Jamestown, Ohio, Verona, New York, and Cambridge, Massachusetts.<sup>66</sup> The Jamestown radar, a CPS-6, was tied into the ACGW net and plans were being made for integrating the other two.<sup>67\*</sup> As to the value of these radars, ARDC pointed out that its facilities were not suitable for air defense, for they were used in research and test projects and were shut-down much of the time for installation of special components.<sup>68</sup>

WADF furnished a list of some twenty Navy installations (in the 27th and 28th Air Division areas) which had radar on them, two ARDC bases (Holloman AFB and Kirtland AFB, New Mexico), and one Army facility (White Sands, New Mexico).<sup>69</sup> No indication was given by WADF as to which of these radar facilities, if any, were tied into the ACGW net. Some of these radars would have had only limited value in air defense because of poor siting for air defense purposes and low ranges.

The Central Air Defense Force provided a list of fourteen Navy stations and six bases of other USAF commands having radar facilities which might be used in air defense.<sup>70</sup> Of these, the AIRC radar at Keesler AFB, Mississippi and Tyndall AFB, Florida, the APGC radar at Eglin AFB,

\* The equipment at Verona, New York, an AN/CPS-4 and an AN/CPS-5, was tied into the ACGW system early in 1953.

SECRET



SECRET

57

Florida, the Naval Reserve radar at Fargo, North Dakota and Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and the Navy radar at Key West, Florida had been tied into the air defense system for emergency use by the end of 1952, and by early 1953, the TAC radar at Pope AFB, North Carolina, the Navy radar at Jacksonville NAS, Florida, and the Marine radar at Cherry Point,<sup>71</sup> North Carolina were tied into the system.

Substitution of Mobile Sites For Augmentation Radar

Most of the other command and Navy radar facilities listed by CADF was located in the 35th Air Division. By the time of CADF's report (September), extensive investigations and plans for using outside radars in the 35th had already been made. Lacking any radar of its own, the 35th had aggressively sought the use of other command and Navy radar. As early as February 1952, this division had surveyed all of the radar facilities in its sector and in a report to CADF had listed some twenty-four Navy and USAF stations having radar facilities.<sup>72</sup> If agreements could be made for use of all of these radars, the 35th commander pointed out, the southeast would have complete radar coverage.

At this point, the possibility of using radar of the other commands or the Navy in place of some of the Mobile sites programmed for the 35th Air Division occurred to CADF. With this in mind, CADF Headquarters representatives went to the division to determine exactly which of the facilities listed by its commander had adequate performance for use in air defense.<sup>73</sup> Coverage data was not available on all of the stations listed, but from the information on hand the CADF officers concluded that the radar at four Navy stations and six USAF bases would

SECRET

0478

SECRET

meet air defense requirements. The Navy installations were: NAS Mayport, Florida (a detachment of Jacksonville NAS) which had an SPS-6B search set and an MPS-4 height finder; NAS Key West, Florida which had an SX search set and an MPS-4; NAS Atlanta, Georgia which had an AN/TPS-1B; and MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina equipped with three AN/CPS-5 search radars and three AN/MPS-4s. The Air Force bases were: TAC's Pope AFB, North Carolina which had an AN/CPS-5 and an AN/CPS-4 height finder and Shaw AFB, South Carolina equipped with an AN/CPS-5; ATRC's Tyndall AFB, Florida and Keesler AFB, Mississippi both of which were equipped with a variety of radar including an AN/CPS-6; and ARDC's Eglin AFB, Florida which had a large number of radar sets including an AN/FPS-3.

On the basis of their findings, the CADF Headquarters officers visiting the 35th Air Division reported that there was a possibility of eliminating five of the Mobile sites planned for the 35th's sector and using radar owned by other agencies in their place.<sup>74</sup> The CADF officers estimated that if the plan proved feasible and was adopted, a saving of \$5,000,000 could be made. The stations to be omitted were: M-113, Bull Island, South Carolina; M-114, Mayport, Florida; M-116, Gulrock, North Carolina; M-117, Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina; and M-124, Lemon Springs, North Carolina.\*

CADF followed up this preliminary study with directions to the

\* Later, the location of nearly all of the Mobile sites were to be changed. At the end of 1953, the three sites mentioned above which were eventually to be considered by ADC for replacement by other agency radar facilities, M-114, M-116, and M-124, were programmed for Fernandina Beach, Florida, Englehard, North Carolina, and Aberdeen, North Carolina, respectively.

SECRET



SECRET

59

35th to resurvey the radars which had been determined adequate for use in air defense. The 35th was asked to find out all the requirements for continuous operation in the air defense system, but was cautioned not to indicate to these agencies that any agreements had been made for such:

Existing agreements which provide inter-service and inter-command support between Air Defense Command and Navy and other major commands become effective during emergency only. Official agreements do not exist which provide such support during peaceful conditions. It is important that 35th Air Division representatives selected to coordinate the integration of units... on a twenty-four hour augmentation basis during peaceful conditions, do not represent the plan as one that has been authorized by inter-service and inter-command agreements. The prescribed approach is that these representatives are collecting information from units of the Navy and other commands.

This plan for replacement of Mobile sites remained entirely within CADF and no formal proposal for such was made to ADC Headquarters until the following year. During the remainder of 1952, CADF and the 35th Air Division gathered information about the characteristics of the radars, the uses to which they were being put, and the requirements for integration and operation on a continuous basis. In addition, they began negotiating with the controlling agencies for use of their radar. CADF secured agreement in June from Eastern Sea Frontier for use of the radars at Cherry Point, Mayport, and Key West on a basis of "non-interference with primary naval missions."

While CADF was independently compiling the information needed for, and sounding out the various agencies on, the continuous use of their radar, the Plans and Requirements Directorate at Headquarters ADC began giving consideration to the use of some radar of other organ-

SECRET

0 + 8 0

**SECRET**

izations in place of Mobile sites. In August, this office asked the Operations and Training Directorate for all of the information available on the radar of other commands and services.<sup>77</sup> In planning the establishment of Mobile sites, P&R observed, the location of these facilities should be considered. "Proper utilization of radars of other commands may enable us<sup>78</sup> to omit certain planned radars at a considerable saving in manpower." The O&T Directorate did not agree with this idea, considering it unlikely of accomplishment. It replied to P&R that "it is not considered advisable to attempt to operate their radar on a 24 hour basis by augmenting with ADC personnel. It is unlikely that other command radar may be substituted for planned stations in that functions of these other commands will not<sup>79</sup> be able to provide 24 hour operation regardless of personnel augmentation."

P&R persisted, however, pointing out their belief that the radar of other agencies would fall into two categories: those which might be used in an emergency only, and those which, with personnel augmentation<sup>80</sup> by ADC, might be used on a continuous basis in place of some Mobile sites. O&T replied in mid-October that if P&R could obtain written agreements which specifically permitted integration as envisaged, they would cooperate in<sup>81</sup> further planning. It was only at this time that the first results of the Defense Force surveys ordered earlier were available and this information was now forwarded to P&R. No formal action was taken by the latter on its plan until early in 1953, however.

**SECRET**



SECRET

61

Readying ANG Fighter Squadrons For Air Defense

All but sixteen Air National Guard fighter squadrons were federalized in the early months of 1951. \* USAF planned at first to call these units up sometime in the following year for assignment to ADC, but in January 1952, decided against the federalization of any more Guard units. <sup>82</sup> Early use of these squadrons in an emergency was possible, however, as a result of the mobilization authority delegated to ADC and passed on to the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces at the beginning of 1951 and to CADF early the following year.

Shortly after re-delegating the mobilization authority to EADF and WADF, ADC instructed them to prepare plans in coordination with ConAC which provided for indoctrination of the ANG squadrons in air defense procedures in order to prepare these squadrons for immediate mobilization and for effective participation in air defense. <sup>83</sup> Actual training of the ANG during 1951 was the responsibility of ConAC, but <sup>84</sup> USAF directed that ANG training be primarily in air defense.

WADF's operations plan for the two ANG squadrons in its area, drawn up in July, instructed these units to maintain a ten-day level of supplies and certain minima of fuel and ammunition on hand, directed them to prepare for combat operations and to keep abreast of WADF directives, established the procedures for mobilization, and provided <sup>85</sup> for monthly briefings for the commanders and pilots. EADF, which had responsibility for preparing plans for mobilization of all of the

---

\* See Appendix V, for a list of the sixteen ANG squadrons.

SECRET

0482

**SECRET**

ANG squadrons on inactive status except the two in WADF's area, had by May drawn up similar plans and secured the approval of nearly all of the state governors concerned.<sup>86</sup>

A small number of the ANG squadrons not on active duty participated in at least three of the Defense Force exercises held in 1951. In the WADF exercise held in February, both the 194th and the 195th Squadrons took part, and in the April exercise, the 194th participated.<sup>87</sup> Three ANG squadrons in the eastern area, the 138th, 146th, and 147th, took part in the EADF exercise conducted in June.<sup>88</sup>

#### ANG Training

In December 1951, Air Force Headquarters modified the training and supervisory responsibility for the ANG. The Continental Air Command was still named as the one responsible for the actual training and inspection of the ANG, but other commands were to provide assistance. The ANG units were to be assigned for emergency mobilization to the major commands. Each of these commands was to prepare, in coordination with ConAC, the summer active duty training directive for the units assigned to them and to assume operational control of these units during the summer training periods.<sup>89</sup> In addition, each command with units assigned to it for mobilization was to submit requirements for the yearly inactive duty training to ConAC and then the latter was to combine all of these requirements into an overall program.

Following this realignment of training responsibility, USAF assigned for emergency mobilization all of the ANG fighter units, both

**SECRET**



SECRET

63

those on active duty and those still under state control. In January 1951, it will be recalled, Air Force Headquarters had given a blanket authorization to ADC to call up all ANG units in an emergency. USAF now made specific mobilization assignments and allotted a majority of the units to other commands. No change was to be made, however, until the federalized units returned to state control. Up to this time, all sixteen squadrons on inactive status were assigned to ADC for mobilization. After return of the federalized units, a total of only six wings (nineteen squadrons) were to be assigned to ADC. This was to be increased very shortly, however, following a vigorous protest from ADC. <sup>90</sup>

In the meantime, ADC notified the Defense Forces of the change in training responsibility and of the sixteen units having a mobilization assignment to them prior to the return of all of the squadrons to state control. EADF was made responsible for twelve squadrons located in its area. CADF for two, and WADF for two. CADF had taken over responsibility for one squadron in its region earlier, the 181st at Dallas, Texas, but it was only at this time (June) that the second squadron, the 169th at Peoria, Illinois, was assigned and plans made for it by CADF. <sup>91</sup> <sup>92</sup>

In July, while the first summer encampments held under the aegis of the Defense Forces was underway, USAF again altered the ANG training responsibility. Rather than operational control during the summer en-

---

\* All of the ANG AG&W units were to be assigned to the Tactical Air Command for emergency mobilization upon release from federal service.

SECRET

0 + 8 4

**SECRET**

campment, the commands scheduled to receive ANG units in an emergency were to assume only supervisory responsibility over their assigned units.<sup>93</sup> The training program for the summer encampment was still to be established by the major commands, but the yearly inactive duty program was to be prepared by ConAC from criteria furnished by the other commands.

ANG Mobilization Assignments

In February 1952, a month before USAF made the mobilization assignments of the ANG, ADC had informed Washington that in its opinion no less than fifty-two ANG squadrons would be needed to provide adequate air defense.<sup>94</sup> USAF was undecided about this proposal and pointed out that to give ADC what it wished would mean reducing drastically those ANG units scheduled for the Tactical Air Command.<sup>95</sup> Full justification was requested and the suggestion made that perhaps ADC would be satisfied with something less than seventeen wings (which totalled fifty-two squadrons), possibly a total of eleven wings. ADC disagreed, reiterating the need for seventeen wings.<sup>96</sup>

With the atomic capability of the USSR increasing, it is possible in the near future to end or stalemate a war in one deadly mass air strike. To counter this threat the Air Defense Command must have available all forces capable of an air defense role, at least for a short period of time on or after D-Day.

It is reiterated that in order to fill the gaps in the programmed regular squadron deployment, and to build defense in depth, 52 Air National Guard fighter squadrons with the primary mission of air defense is the minimum acceptable number for the air defense mission.

It was not until October that a decision was made on the subject. A compromise was worked out whereby ADC would get fifty-two squadrons and

**SECRET**



SECRET

65

TAC would not be deprived either. A permanent mobilization assignment of nineteen squadrons with a fighter-intercept mission was made to ADC and an additional thirty-three squadrons were given a dual mission and an initial mobilization assignment to ADC.<sup>97\*</sup> The latter squadrons were to come to ADC for the initial phase of hostilities (considered to be a period of three months) and then were to be assigned to TAC. The squadrons with a single mission of fighter-intercept were, of course, to remain with ADC for as long as necessary. ADC had the same training responsibility for the dual mission squadrons as it had for those permanently assigned.

The nineteen squadrons to be retained permanently included eleven which had been called to active duty and assigned to ADC and five from those not federalized. The other three were squadrons which had been federalized and assigned to another command. Of the total fifty-two squadrons with an ADC mobilization assignment, thirty were in EADF, fourteen in CADE, and eight in WAEF.<sup>98</sup>

#### Return of ANG Squadrons To State Control

In the closing months of 1952, all of the federalized ANG units completed their twenty-one months of active duty and were returned to state control. On 1 November, fourteen of the fighter squadrons assigned to ADC were released from active duty and on 1 December, the remaining

---

\* The remaining eighteen ANG fighter squadrons in the continental United States were given a single fighter-bomber mission and a permanent mobilization assignment to the Tactical Air Command.

SECRET

0 + 8 6

**SECRET**

six went back to the states. <sup>99\*</sup> The organization itself, plus the personnel who did not volunteer for extended active duty, were all that were returned to the states. The aircraft and equipment remained under federal control. Upon returning to the states, the ANG units absorbed an auxiliary flight which had been created at the time of federalization, and which had a small cadre of personnel and one or two administrative aircraft and trainers. <sup>100</sup> The sixteen squadrons which had not been called up distributed their aircraft among all of the squadrons and also tactical aircraft were supplied through Guard channels. As a result of this division of aircraft among all of the squadrons, for many months the ANG squadrons, including the aforementioned sixteen, had only a small number of aircraft.

---

\* One of the squadrons assigned to ADC, the 116th, was transferred to Europe in August 1951. This squadron was also released at this time and was assigned to ADC for emergency mobilization on a permanent basis.

**SECRET**



# SECRET

## CHAPTER IV 1953 to 1954

### Assurance Of Support From Other Air Force Commands

ADC had never felt confident that the forces of any other Air Force command would actually be allocated in an emergency. There was nothing binding these other commands to provide their forces except ADC's agreement with them. Furthermore, these agreements had a large loophole in them, in the form of a reservation that availability of forces for air defense would depend upon primary mission requirements. Under the circumstances, ADC could not plan for future use of other-command forces with any confidence that the plans would be carried out. For this reason, early in January 1953, the ADC Chief of Staff, Major General Jarred V. Crabb, appealed to Washington to direct the major commands concerned to give ADC definite assurances that their forces would be made available for emergency employment.<sup>1</sup> Also, he wanted these commands directed to train their forces for air defense and to have their units immediately available for all-out emergency operations. If this were done, General Crabb concluded, "it will permit this command to prepare with considerably more accuracy plans for present and future air defense operations."<sup>2</sup>

General Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, agreed with this argument and informed ADC that in March his Vice Chief, General Twining,<sup>3</sup> had told each of the commanders:

# SECRET

## SECRET

I feel the Air Force's position will be untenable if an attack occurs without our having planned for employment of every available and potentially available means to counteract it.

To this end, it is my desire that a definite and continuing commitment of increasing proportions of any air defense means available to you be made to the Air Defense System. Such commitment should provide for the necessary training and I envision that forces in your command should start standing regular alert as soon as their training status permits, as agreed between you and Ben Chidlaw.

With the way thus paved, ADC made new agreements with all of the commands except the Air Research and Development Command. The latter had only radar facilities to contribute to air defense and ADC felt that the 1951 agreement was adequate to provide for their use.

In the new agreements, the Air Training, Air Proving Ground, and Tactical Air Commands gave ADC unequivocal pledges that their forces would be allocated to emergency air defense, at least for the initial attack. The only reservation in any of the three agreements was in regard to the length of time that their units could remain with ADC. Each of these commands stipulated that the duration would be the "shortest time consistent with air defense requirements and the primary mission of... [the commands]." The second main change in the agreements with these three commands was the establishment of a more definite training responsibility. Each command promised to "insure that the forces... [made available] are trained for the mission of air defense...."

The requirement of the Strategic Air Command for movement of its units to forward bases early in an emergency did not permit it to grant such unqualified pledges as had the other commands. Rather than

SECRET



SECRET

69

any statement of specific allocation, SAC agreed only that "fighter units of SAC, by virtue of their organization and equipment, possess a capability in air defense."<sup>7</sup> SAC promised to maintain a list of units which were available for emergency air defense, but injected its earlier reservation that availability would depend upon requirements of the primary mission. SAC also agreed to insure that its units were trained for the mission of air defense, but "with the understanding that training for the primary mission of Strategic Air Command will, of necessity, take precedence over air defense training."<sup>8</sup>

ADC was not successful in securing provision for fighter alert commitments in its agreements. Only the Air Proving Ground Command pledged itself to stand alert and this command's aircraft were located at bases where alert would have been of little value. No commitment was asked from the AFGC for ADC felt that the former's research work, upon which alert would have been a drain, was more important.<sup>9</sup> The other commands refused on the grounds that it would have been too great a burden upon them at that time. TAC, which had stood alert previously, was converting its units from conventional to jet fighters.<sup>10</sup>

In the late summer, ADC again asked the Tactical Air Command to assume an alert, this time in place of ADC squadrons taking gunnery training at the Yuma, Arizona training center.<sup>11</sup> TAC refused, however, pleading that so doing would raise its commitments to a prohibitive level.<sup>12</sup>

While these agreements provided assurances from the other commands of support in an emergency, they were, after all, only pledges between commands. ADC wanted a specific requirement placed upon these commands

SECRET

0 + 9 0

**SECRET**

by Air Force Headquarters both for commitment of force and for training. In August, ADC asked USAF to include in the Air Force regulations which provided the mission and responsibilities of the major commands concerned, the responsibility for providing forces to the operational control of ADC in an emergency and for training their forces for employment in air defense. ADC suggested that the provision in the SAC regulation be qualified with the words "<sup>13</sup>Forces that... are not re-<sup>14</sup>quired for immediate participation in strategic air operations...."

Air Force Headquarters accepted this proposal completely, even to the wording suggested by ADC. Changes were issued to the regulations for the Air Training Command, the Air Proving Ground Command, the Air Research and Development Command, and the Tactical Air Command in<sup>15\*</sup> October which added to their responsibilities the following:

Upon notification by the Air Defense Command or higher authority that an air attack upon the United States is imminent, provide to the operational control of the Air Defense Command... forces that have an air defense capability and are located in or immediately adjacent to the continental United States.

Train all units that possess an air defense capability for employment in the air defense of the United States. When appropriate, such units will be provided with auxiliary air defense equipment.

The SAC regulation, issued in March 1954, provided as a secondary responsibility the same requirements as for the other commands, but<sup>16</sup> with the qualifying statement suggested by ADC.

\* A new regulation was issued for ADC on 5 April 1954 which included responsibility for "preparation for the employment of forces and facilities from other Air Force commands assigned a secondary mission of air defense or capable of contributing to air defense," and "preparation for the employment of such units of the Army and Navy as may be made available for the air defense of the United States." See reference note number fifteen.

**SECRET**



SECRET

71

Aircraft At Factories For Air Defense

Leaving no stone unturned, ADC instituted a study early in 1953 of the possibility of using Air Force aircraft awaiting delivery at factories in an emergency. A several months investigation by WADF of the plants in southern California proved that the plan, as first envisaged, was not feasible.<sup>17</sup> WADF found that the only communications available to the factories was the long distance telephone, that supplies needed for combat operations were not available, and that there were only a few Air Force pilots at the factories and these were not trained in air defense operations.

As an alternative, the 27th Air Division suggested that in an emergency, ADC pilots pick up suitable aircraft at the plants and put them into operation in the squadrons. ADC accepted this proposal and directed WADF to make agreements for this purpose with the Air Force plant representatives at the North American, Lockheed, and Northrup<sup>18</sup> factories.

Operation TAIL WIND

The second great test of the augmentation plan came in July 1953 when Operation TAIL WIND, the second nation-wide air defense exercise, was held. During this exercise, a total of 182 aircraft<sup>19</sup> were made available by ATRC, APGC, TAC, and SAC. The number was not as large as it might have been because of extensive conversion programs underway at this time plus heavy losses to overseas.

The deployment time averaged eight hours and twenty-two minutes, which was an improvement over the ten to twelve hours required the

SECRET

0492

**SECRET**

previous year in Operation SIGM POST. <sup>20</sup> Primarily, this reduction in time was due to the deletion of several long flights made in the 1952 exercise and to the higher speeds of jet fighters used in TAIL WIND, rather than to any improvement in methods. Much less time was required for briefing the deployed crews than in SIGM POST, however, indicating an improvement in the indoctrination effort during the year.

The crippling problem of lack of adequate support found in SIGM POST remained. In some cases in the 1953 exercise, support personnel and equipment did not arrive at the deployment bases for twenty-four hours. At many bases, deployed detachments did not have sufficient auxiliary power units, fueling units, and maintenance equipment and personnel during this time. <sup>21</sup> The greatest delays in arrival of support were at bases in the western United States because of the distant location of TAC's 18th Troop Carrier units which supplied the augmentation forces at Memphis, Tennessee. In the future, this was not expected to be as much of a problem because the troop carrier forces moved to Ardmore, Oklahoma in the latter part of 1953.

As one means of improving the supply for augmentation units, ADC conceived the idea of deploying aircraft to bases having like types of fighters, as far as possible, where supplies would be available. <sup>22</sup> This became one of the main considerations when the deployment plan for 1954 was devised. Another plan being considered for overcoming the supply problem was a pre-stocking of materiel at the deployment bases. Base surveys were to be conducted as soon as possible to determine the requirements and formal authority for such requested from USAF.

**SECRET**



SECRET

73

As of January 1954, a total of 675 aircraft were designated as available in other commands for emergency air defense. ADC's plan for deployment of these aircraft in an emergency, issued early in 1954, scheduled the movement of thirty-nine detachments to twenty-seven bases. Another change made in the 1954 deployment plan, in addition to the attempt to send aircraft to bases having the same type, was the movement of all aircraft from one base to just one Defense Force area. Previously, aircraft from one base, such as Nellis AFB, Nevada, had been scheduled for two Defense Force regions. The reason for this change was to provide a single contact for the deploying units so that they would not be receiving instructions from more than one agency.

In TAIL WIND direct alerting from ADC Headquarters to the tactical units deploying was tried and the communications times were greatly reduced. Following the exercise, ADC worked out a plan with all the commands except SAC which established on a definite basis a procedure whereby orders for either in-place utilization or deployment could be given directly by ADC Headquarters to the tactical units. SAC Headquarters only was to be notified by ADC and then the former was to pass the order to its own units.

Radar For Other Command And ANG Aircraft

With the exception of a small number of all-weather fighters in

---

\* See Appendix VI for a listing of these aircraft, by type and by command.

\*\* The complete deployment plan is listed in Appendix VII.

SECRET

**SECRET**

the Air Training Command and the Air Proving Ground Command, the aircraft of other USAF commands were capable of operating only in daylight and good weather. Realizing that the enemy would probably attempt to make an attack at night or in bad weather, ADC suggested that the day aircraft of the other commands and the Air National Guard be equipped with a light-weight search radar which, while not making all-weather fighters out of these aircraft, would at least give them increased capability.<sup>25</sup> In addition, ADC proposed that auxiliary armament such as the 2.75" or the Aerwolf rockets be provided the fighters of other commands and the ANG. ADC asked that both the radar and the armament be available in the field by July 1955. Air Force Headquarters approved these requirements<sup>26</sup> and advised ADC that the 1955 date could probably be met.

#### Navy Fighters In Air Defense

During the first six months of 1953, the Defense Forces and the Navy's Frontiers again rewrote their joint agreements for air defense.<sup>27</sup> The primary purpose of this second revision was to include the statements of policy laid down by the Chief of Naval Operations in the fall of 1952. Although the CNO had made no basic changes in policy, he had stated that temporary employment of shore-based units or units temporarily ashore was possible and that it was his policy that such forces should provide as much assistance as was compatible with primary missions. The CNO's specific statements were included in the new agreements and as a result the agreements became fairly well standardized. Another purpose of the revision was to bring the agreements up to date by including the changes in Defense Force boundaries made in February 1953.

**SECRET**



SECRET

75

During 1953, a high degree of cooperation, within the framework of Navy policy, was attained with local and regional Navy commands. One outstanding example was the offer early in the year of a Naval Reserve squadron to deploy in an emergency from its home station to a base where it could be used more effectively. Prior to a change in Air Defense Force boundaries in February 1953, the commander of a squadron at Denver NAS had approached WADF and with the latter had made informal plans for the movement of his unit to Great Falls AFB, Montana in an emergency. Following the reorganization of ADC which placed Colorado within the area of CADF, the latter made definite plans for deploying this reserve squadron to Great Falls. <sup>28</sup>

Of the twenty-four F8F fighters in this squadron, the commander estimated that at least twenty could be made available within twenty-four hours. <sup>29</sup> The squadron commander made it clear that availability would depend upon requirements imposed by higher Navy authority and that his squadron could serve as an augmenting force at most for only a few days. Regardless, ADC considered this offer an important one, for it was the first such action of its kind by a Navy unit. ADC told CADF to do everything possible to make the plan a success: <sup>30</sup>

For the first time, a Naval unit has considered automatic deployment for emergency air defense purposes. The continuation and expansion of this plan to include Naval units from other ZI bases may well depend upon the adequacy of our support at the deployment bases.

From this point, relations with the Denver squadron were left in the hands of CADF. \* Before the close of the fiscal year, one training trip

\* For a more detailed account of this subject see History of CADF, 1 Jan to 30 Jun 1953, p 547ff.

SECRET

0 + 9 0

**SECRET**

had been made to Great Falls by the Navy organization.

Also in the spring of 1953, negotiations were begun by EADF and CADF with Eastern Sea Frontier to establish a definite policy and procedure for deployment of Navy fighters from remote locations to critical areas. A deployment agreement was completed on 9 October and made a part of the ESF air defense agreement. For the first time, the procedure for deployment, or redeployment as the Navy termed it, was clearly established. The ESF commander, whose authorization for deployment still had to be obtained, pledged to ensure the immediate temporary movement of available Navy and Marine Corps fighters, when requested, to areas designated by the Commanders of Central and Eastern Air Defense Forces, and to keep each informed of the status of available forces.<sup>31</sup> When the fighters were moved to naval stations, support was to be furnished by the Navy. The Air Force was to provide as much support as necessary at its bases when Navy fighters were moved onto them. Airlift of support personnel and equipment was to be furnished primarily by the Navy, but the Air Force was to assist if necessary.

Navy forces participated extensively in the nation-wide air defense exercise TAIL WIND. A total of 270 Navy and Marine fighters from nineteen stations took part in the exercise which was actually more than from other Air Force commands.<sup>32</sup> In addition, three Navy radars were integrated into the air defense net. Aircraft from one Marine squadron was deployed for

---

\* As defined in this agreement, deployed meant located at home air station. Redeployed meant located at other than home air station.

**SECRET**



SECRET

77

the exercise. This resulted in an outstanding example of interservice and intercommand cooperation for air defense. Aircraft from the 2nd Marine Air Wing moved from its home station at Cherry Point, North Carolina to TAC's Pope AFB, North Carolina and was controlled by the TAC radar which was tied into the ADC AC&W net.

At the end of 1953, there was a total of 1252 Navy fighters (614 in the eastern area, 266 in CADF, and 372 in the western area) on hand which could have been made available for air defense.\* Of the total, less than half were jet fighters. Only forty-two of the jets and seventy-seven of the conventional aircraft were equipped for all-weather operations.

Augmentation Radar In Place Of Mobile Sites

By May 1953, CADF had completed an extensive investigation of the radar facilities in the 35th Air Division belonging to outside agencies in connection with its plan for using some of these facilities in place of Mobile radar sites. CADF had finally settled upon three Mobile sites in this area which it felt could be eliminated by the joint use of radar facilities already in existence. The object was a saving of money. Although additional personnel, equipment, and buildings would have to be furnished by ADC, CADF calculated these savings at a large amount. On forwarding a formal proposal for this substitution at this time, Major General Delmar T. Spivey pointed

---

\* See Appendix VI for a listing of the Navy fighters present in the United States at the end of the year.

SECRET

**SECRET**

out that his study represented not only a thorough investigation of the equipment and base facilities, but also negotiation with the local personnel concerned. CADF and 35th Air Division officers had visited each station, he continued, and "according to all of them there are not any problems which can not be readily overcome at the working level." General Spivey concluded that it was his belief "that it would be a good thing for the Air Force to be able to state that we have done all that we possibly can to comply with directives concerning better utilization of manpower, equipment, and monetary savings."<sup>33</sup>

CADF proposed that M-114, planned for Fernandina Beach, Florida, be replaced by the Navy radar at NAS Jacksonville, Florida; M-116, planned for Englehard, North Carolina, be replaced by the Marine radar at Cherry Point, North Carolina; and M-124, planned for Aberdeen, North Carolina, be replaced by the TAC facilities at Pope AFB, North Carolina.<sup>34</sup> Each of these radar facilities of other agencies, CADF explained, were adequate for air defense operations, gave coverage similar to that planned for the Mobile sites they would replace, were located on bases having sufficient housing and messing for any additional ADC personnel needed, had land for any new construction necessary, and could be used for air defense without serious interference with their primary missions.

For full time operations, CADF determined that one AN/TPS-1D search radar and one AN/TPS-10D height finder would be needed at both Cherry Point MCAS and Pope AFB, but no additional radar would be necessary at Jacksonville NAS. These radar sets would cost a total of \$307,954 according to CADF's figures, but the radar programmed for the three Mobile

**SECRET**



SECRET

79

sites would cost \$2,162,883, making a net saving of \$1,854,929 on radar alone. CADF estimated that nearly another million dollars could be saved on construction. A total of \$442,000 would be needed for additional facilities at the two Navy stations and one Air Force base, but the cost of construction and real estate for the three Mobile sites would amount to \$1,400,000 which meant a saving of \$958,000. Finally, CADF estimated that three additional officers and ten airmen would be needed at Jacksonville, six radar maintenance technicians at Cherry Point, and six officers and fifty-eight airmen at Pope. The three Mobile sites would require a total of twenty-four officers and 261 airmen, for a net saving of fifteen officers and 187 airmen. In monetary terms, this meant a saving of \$1,266,000 per year. In all, CADF calculated that replacement of the Mobile sites by the facilities suggested would save \$4,028,929 the first year.

CADF's proposal arrived in Colorado Springs at just about the time that thinking had crystallized and action was to be taken on this subject at ADC Headquarters and therefore fitted in very nicely with the latter's plans. General Smith, ADC's Vice Commander, replied to General Spivey that "it is gratifying to know that you and your staff have arrived at the same conclusion and recommendations that we have here.... Your study comes at a most opportune time since my staff is in the process of preparing a letter to Headquarters USAF on this subject." <sup>36</sup> General Bergquist, Deputy for Operations for ADC, also agreed with General Spivey's contention that an attempt should be made to integrate these outside facilities in order to achieve the most

SECRET

**SECRET**

effective use of manpower and equipment, but felt that the savings envisaged in CADP's study were too optimistic.<sup>37</sup> General Bergquist pointed out that the radar could not be included in the net saving because ADC did not intend to delete these stations from its system, but planned to relocate them in other areas. Secondly, he felt that more people would be needed than CADP had figured, but that most of the support personnel could be saved. The latter accounted for about half of the total complement of an ADC ADMM organization.

In the last week of May, General Smith proposed to Washington that authority be obtained which would enable ADC to use radars of other commands and services in place of Mobile sites which were planned for locations near to existing radar installations, if all the necessary requirements could be met. General Smith made it clear that ADC did not want to delete the Mobile sites replaced by other facilities, but wished to relocate them in other high priority areas. "This headquarters is firmly convinced," he concluded, "that with proper cooperation such an arrangement is workable with no detriment to our Air Defense capability and little or no inconvenience to other commands and services."<sup>38</sup>

USAF accepted ADC's proposal entirely. The only immediate action that higher headquarters could take, however, was to direct the other Air Force commands to enter into agreements with ADC for this purpose. Use of Navy facilities on a continuous basis would have to await agreement by the Navy. In July, Air Force Headquarters told each major command concerned:<sup>39</sup>

**SECRET**



SECRET

61

...the Commander ADC, has been granted authority by this Hq to consummate the necessary agreements with your Headquarters, whereby ADC will assume operational control of radars of your Command that possess an air defense capability. It is desired that your Command cooperate fully with ADC in reaching detailed agreements that will establish mutually acceptable procedures permitting your radars to perform both missions.

Prior to receiving this dispensation and in anticipation of it, ADC directed each of its Defense Force commanders to survey their areas to determine if any radars belonging to other agencies could be used in place of any of the Mobile sites.<sup>40</sup> Both WADF and EADF reported that no Mobile sites planned for their areas could be replaced. EADF said that no radars of other commands or the Army Antiaircraft Command were located near to any of the Mobile site locations.<sup>41</sup> Two Navy radars at Portsmouth, New Hampshire were near to the site programmed for Ft. Dearborn, New Hampshire, but the Navy sets were for navigation and gun-laying and could not provide adequate surveillance information. WADF explained that the Navy radars in its area were not properly sited for air defense purposes and offered little in coverage.<sup>42</sup> Antiaircraft radars were better located, but were subject to redeployment and WADF felt that radars replacing Mobile sites should be permanent installations. No radar facilities of other Air Force commands in the WADF area duplicated the coverage of any Mobile site.

On looking again, CADF found another facility which could be used in place of a Mobile station. This was the TAC radar at Alexandria AFB, Louisiana. CADF recommended that ADC site M-125, programmed for Esler Field, which was adjacent to Alexandria AFB, be moved onto the

SECRET

0 3 3 2

**SECRET**

<sup>43</sup> letter. Because the radar at Alexandria AFB, an AN/CPS-1, was old and in poor working condition, CADF proposed that ADC furnish the equipment planned for M-125.

Upon receipt of directions from USAF to make an agreement with ADC for joint use of radar facilities, each of the major commands concerned contacted ADC Headquarters. The latter, on the basis of the reports from the Defense Forces, told all except the Tactical Air Command that at least for the present, none of their installations was needed except for emergency use and that no additional agreements would be necessary. TAC was asked to direct one of its Air Forces to work out arrangements with CADF for the use of the facilities at Pope AFB and Alexandria AFB.<sup>45</sup>

It was to be April 1954, however, before an agreement was reached for the joint use of TAC facilities. In the meantime, a number of changes in sites were made. CADF learned in December that TAC's 507th Control Group was deploying AC&W squadrons to: Camp Mackall, North Carolina (near Pope AFB); Shaw AFB, South Carolina; and Robins AFB, Georgia.<sup>46</sup> Each of these squadrons was to be equipped with an AN/MPS-7 search set and an AN/MPS-14 height finder as primary equipment and an AN/TPS-1D and an AN/TPS-10D as back up radars. Because of this development, CADF proposed that Mobile site M-124 be replaced by the Camp Mackall facility instead of the Pope AFB radar as originally suggested, and in addition recommended the replacement of two other Mobile sites. CADF proposed that the Shaw AFB radar be used in place of site SM-159 which was programmed for Aiken, South Carolina and the Robins AFB facility be used

**SECRET**  
0 2 3 3



SECRET

83

in place of site SM-148 which was planned for Dublin, Georgia.

CADF's plan for using Alexandria AFB had also to be altered for the TAC unit there was to be deployed overseas. Because considerable savings in construction costs would accrue by locating the Mobile site on the base, M-125 was programmed for relocation on Alexandria AFB.

On the basis of site survey reports, early in April 1954 ADC approved in principle the use of the facilities at Camp Mackall and Robins AFB, but rejected the Shaw AFB radar as not providing adequate coverage.<sup>47</sup> The installations at Camp Mackall and Robins AFB, ADC advised, would be augmented by an AN/TPS-1D and an AN/TPS-10D supplied by ADC for emergency use when TAC radar was in place and for primary use when the TAC organization was on maneuver. ADC was to still use the original site numbers for these stations in order to provide for their portions of the stations.

An agreement was consummated between TAC's 9th Air Force and CADF on 15 April 1954 which provided that the 9th Air Force would perform the air defense mission at these stations, within the manning and equipment capabilities of assigned units, on a continuous basis,<sup>48</sup> except during maneuvers and maintenance periods. The 9th Air Force was to notify CADF thirty days in advance of any redeployment, if possible. Operational control of all TAC units committed by the agreement was to remain under the 9th Air Force. Administrative support for all CADF personnel stationed on 9th Air Force bases was to be supplied by the latter. For its part, CADF was to provide personnel, communications equipment, and wire circuits for the necessary liaison

SECRET

0304

**SECRET**

with the 35th Air Division, and to provide radar, associated communications, security, and personnel for operation and maintenance when any 9th Air Force units were redeployed. OADF was also to pay any additional costs incurred by construction required to implement the agreement. The detailed operational plans and requirements were to be worked out by the 35th Air Division and the 507th Tactical Control Group.

While this activity was progressing toward a successful conclusion, ADC was attempting to get a similar commitment for the use of Navy radar facilities. In August 1953, ADC again asked Headquarters USAF to obtain a formal agreement from the Navy for the joint use of the radar at Jacksonville NAS, Florida (in place of M-114) and at Cherry Point MCAS, North Carolina (in place of M-116).<sup>49</sup> Several months elapsed before USAF was able to secure such an agreement, however, and in the meantime ADC discovered that the Marine radar at Cherry Point did not provide the necessary coverage after all.<sup>50</sup> In the first week of May 1954, ADC advised USAF of its findings and asked that no further negotiations be conducted with the Navy for the use of this radar and that construction of M-116 at Englehard, North Carolina be approved as previously programmed. Air Force Headquarters replied on 13 May that a conference had already been held with the Navy and an agreement reached.<sup>51</sup> A formal agreement for joint use of facilities was being processed through channels. In view of this and the fact that at both Cherry Point and Cecil Field (Jacksonville) AN/FPS-8 radars were programmed, USAF did not approve ADC's proposal to go ahead with M-116 at Englehard. ADC iterated that Cherry Point was unsatisfactory for air defense requirements because surrounding buildings

**SECRET**



SECRET

85

and trees interfered with performance of the radar and the base was located too far south and inland to provide the required seaward and overlap coverage.<sup>52</sup> A final answer to this question had not been made by the time of the conclusion of this study.

Augmentation Radar Available In Emergency

In November 1953, ADC asked each Defense Force for a report on the radars of other commands and services which were tied into their system and available for emergency augmentation. CADF reported a total of twelve radar installations of other commands, all of which were located in the 33rd and 35th Air Divisions, and seven Navy radars, all located in the 35th Air Divisions except one in the 29th Air Division.<sup>53\*</sup> EADF listed one radar of another USAF command (ARDC radar at Verona, New York) and five Navy radar facilities, four of which were along the east coast and one in Illinois.<sup>54\*\*</sup> WADF listed no radars, explaining<sup>55\*\*\*</sup> that:

Past surveys of radars of other commands and services conducted by this headquarters revealed that our radar coverage cannot be augmented reliably by their use. Also, the primary

\* In addition, there was one Army Antiaircraft radar in the CADF area, at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. For further information on the integration of ARAACOM radar into the air defense system, see ADC Study No. 4, "Army Antiaircraft in Air Defense." All of the CADF augmentation radar available at this time is listed in Appendix VIII.

\*\* EADF listed eleven radars of the ARAACOM in addition. All of the EADF augmentation radars are listed in Appendix VIII.

\*\*\* Eight ARAACOM radars tied into the WADF system at this time are listed in Appendix VIII.

SECRET

**SECRET**

mission of these radars, together with the manning, makes it impossible to tie them into our system without personnel augmentation. For these reasons, this headquarters has no augmentation radar units presently committed by agreements.

ANG Pilots On Active Duty

Back in May 1952, Major General George Finch, Deputy for Air National Guard Affairs at Headquarters USAF, suggested to Lieutenant General Leon Johnson, Commander of the Continental Air Command, the placing of a few ANG pilots on active duty at certain ANG bases to stand regular alert and engage in intercept missions.<sup>56</sup> General Johnson passed the idea along to General Chidlaw at ADC who completely endorsed it. A month later, Major General William Hall, Commander of the 4th Air Force, made the alternate suggestion of using ANG pilots and aircraft for intercepts, but only in an inactive status during training periods.<sup>57</sup> ADC liked the latter proposal best for it required no additional personnel spaces as would active duty for ANG pilots, but sent both suggestions to Air Force Headquarters.<sup>58</sup>

USAF would not consider the use of ANG pilots and aircraft in an inactive status because of the legal problems involved in such matters as active duty pay and government liability for accidents and damages. It concluded that "if ANG personnel are to be utilized in the performance of the Air Defense Command mission, they should be ordered to active duty under existing authority."<sup>59</sup> Discussion of the two proposals continued throughout the remainder of the year with ADC standing by its contention that active duty for ANG pilots was unsatisfactory if no additional manpower spaces were allocated.<sup>60</sup> At the end of November, USAF

**SECRET**

0 5 0 7



SECRET

87

promised to make the spaces available. For the last half of Fiscal Year 1953, ten additional officer spaces were to be provided so as to test an ANG alert augmentation at two bases. If the test proved successful, USAF agreed to authorize seventy-five additional officer spaces for Fiscal Year 1954 so as to place aircraft on alert at fifteen ANG bases and 150 spaces for Fiscal Year 1955 in order to increase the alert to 30 bases.<sup>61</sup> ADC was agreeable to this and immediately began preparations to get the test started.

By the end of December, ADC had selected the 138th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron at Syracuse, New York and the 194th Fighter-Bomber Squadron at Hayward, California for the test.<sup>62</sup> ADC informed the National Guard Bureau that five pilots were to be placed on active duty at each of these bases to maintain a two-ship five minute alert from one hour before sunrise to one hour after sunset. The alert was to run until 30 June 1953 as a test of the possibility of establishing an ANG alert regularly. The NGB replied that there would be a delay of from sixty to ninety days while volunteers were secured and the plan coordinated with the two states.<sup>63</sup>

While this was being done, the two Defense Forces installed the communications required, supplied complete files of operational directives, and attempted through lectures to acquaint the squadrons with all air defense operations and procedures.<sup>64</sup> By 1 March, all preparations had been completed and two aircraft went on alert at each squadron under the operational and administrative control of the divisions in which they were located (the 28th and 32nd).

By early June, ADC had concluded that use of the ANG in this

SECRET

0 5 5 8

SECRET

manner was entirely feasible. The two squadrons had shown themselves capable of performance on a standard very close to that achieved by ADC's regular squadrons.<sup>65</sup> Elated with the prospects of augmenting its forces, ADC asked permission of the Guard Bureau to place ANG fighters on alert at fifteen locations (thirteen plus Hayward and Syracuse) across the nation.<sup>66\*</sup> ADC was disappointed, however, for the Guard Bureau unexpectedly postponed establishment of the alert augmentation, giving the urgent shortage of aircraft as the reason.<sup>67</sup>

Even if the Guard Bureau had not decided to postpone the ANG augmentation, ADC could not, or would not, have put it into effect, for Headquarters USAF had to reverse its decision to provide ten extra man-power spaces. ADC was told that the additional spaces were not available at that time and that spaces would have to be used which were already authorized ADC by diverting them from less essential functions.<sup>68</sup> ADC replied that this was impossible and that the plan would have to be dropped for the time being.

Before the end of the year, USAF was able to advise that they could make the required spaces available and also that the ANG would be well equipped with jet type aircraft by the end of Fiscal Year 1954.<sup>69</sup> By that date, seven of the fighter-interceptor squadrons, all of which were eventually to be equipped with all-weather aircraft, were scheduled to have F-94As and Bs.<sup>70</sup> In order to place aircraft on alert at some of

\* See reference note number sixty six for a list of the fifteen locations.

\*\* See Appendix IX for the assigned and progressed aircraft of the seventy continental United States ANG fighter squadrons.

SECRET



SECRET

89

these F-94 squadrons, which required placing radar observers on active duty as well as pilots, ADC now wished to alter its original plan. ADC wanted to start the alert by 1 April 1954 which was the beginning of the yearly period when an attack was considered more likely than at any other time. By this date, three of the fifteen squadrons previously selected would have F-94s. In order to place five radar observers on active duty at each of the three squadrons, ADC asked USAF to provide fifteen additional spaces over the seventy-five requested earlier for Fiscal Year 1954.<sup>70</sup> ADC did not expect the five two-man crews to provide any more than limited operation, preferring to wait until the following year when the ANG squadrons had gained some experience before instituting full time alert.

ADC had originally asked for 150 spaces for Fiscal Year 1955 to expand the alert augmentation to thirty locations, but with the conversion of some ANG squadrons to all-weather aircraft, ADC decided that it would be more advantageous to restrict the augmentation to a lesser number of bases in this year and use the extra spaces for radar observers. With the addition of only one more space (to 151), ADC figured that it could put two fighters at six squadrons equipped with F-94s on twenty-four hour operation and two aircraft at eleven day fighter squadrons on daylight alert. ADC's plan was to put eight two-man crews on duty at each of the all-weather squadron locations and five pilots, as before, at each of the day fighter squadron bases. By Fiscal Year 1955, two more of the first fifteen squadrons were to have F-94s, and ADC planned to add one more squadron equipped with these aircraft plus one day jet

SECRET

0 5 1 0

**SECRET**

squadron.

Air Force Headquarters approved the request for ninety spaces for Fiscal Year 1954<sup>71</sup> and for 151 spaces for Fiscal Year 1955. The National Guard Bureau agreed to the establishment of operations at fifteen locations in 1954, but delayed the starting date beyond that desired by ADC. At first, the Guard Bureau advised that some units could be placed on active duty in May, but advised later that operations could not begin until June because of delays in receipt of aircraft and equipment and delays in coordination with the agencies concerned.<sup>72\*</sup>

The Guard Bureau was pessimistic about operating F-94 aircraft in other than daylight and good weather before Fiscal Year 1957. The ANG was short of electronic equipment and the people to maintain this equipment, but most important of all, it was not having any success in securing radar observers. At the end of October 1953, the ANG had only two applicants for radar observer training.<sup>73</sup> The Guard Bureau felt that the difficulty in recruiting was caused by the fact that there was very few career prospects for radar observers in the ANG after leaving active flying, and because of the long training period required.<sup>74</sup> Very few people would leave their civilian occupations for the ten months required for training.

This inability to get radar observers was of particular concern to ADC in that all of its six permanently assigned ANG wings were to be equipped with two-place aircraft.<sup>75</sup> By the end of the year, ADC had proposed a number of solutions to USAF among which was a recommendation to assign B-25K aircraft to the ANG squadrons for their use in training former navigators and bombardiers as radar observers.<sup>76</sup>

\* A few changes were made in the ANG locations. For the revised list of fifteen ANG bases, see reference note number seventy-two.

**SECRET**



SECRET

91

Lapse Of ANG Mobilization Authority

The legislation passed immediately after the beginning of the Korean War and extended in mid-1951, which empowered the President to order the reserve components of the military services into active service, expired on 1 July 1953. After lapse of this authority, ADC was still to get its mobilization-assigned ANG squadrons in an emergency, but only after Congressional authorization or through a Presidential "call" to the states concerned. The latter, provided by an act of January 1903, would bring the Guard into service in a militia status. These were the means available for calling up the ANG, it will be recalled, when the Continental Air Command began agitating for a faster mobilization method.

As had ConAC earlier, ADC considered these means of mobilizing the ANG too slow. In order to use the ANG in meeting the first attack, immediate mobilization was necessary. Though at mid-1953 the fighter strength of the ANG was very low, within a year it was to be an important force having over 1200 aircraft. ADC urged that new legislation be passed which would give authority to use this strength immediately in an emergency. Early in 1953 USAF had indicated that it was seeking a renewal of the mobilization legislation or a new act, but in July advised that it had decided not to press for an ANG law because of a Presidential proposal to include the ANG in an overall act dealing with all reserve forces, and because of the low capability of the ANG at that time. <sup>77</sup> ADC requested reconsideration: <sup>78</sup>

Full benefits from the increase in ANG capability can be realized only if this Command is given authority to direct immediate use of that capability. It is strongly urged that the decision not to press for current legislation be reconsidered and the proposal for such action be reinstated.

SECRET

0 1 2

**SECRET**

Air Force Headquarters agreed that such authority was needed, advising that it was attempting to solve the problem by trying to get the Presidential authority to "call" the Guard into service delegated to the Air Defense Command. Nothing ever came of this, however; USAF reported that the proposal did not get out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>79</sup> At the end of 1953, the latter was preparing a bill<sup>80</sup> which included the reserves of all three services.

#### ANG Training

During 1953, the Continental Air Command continued to be responsible for the training of the ANG except for the two-week active duty period in the summer when the other commands having ANG units assigned to them for mobilization supervised the training of their assigned units. ADC established the training program for the summer encampment of the fifty-two fighter squadrons assigned and further assisted in the training by sending liaison teams to the encampment sites. ADC requirements were also included in the yearly inactive duty training directives written by ComAF.

For 1954, ADC planned to further improve the training of its units in air defense and to establish closer relations with them by having the Defense Forces hold semi-annual conferences with the ANG commanders and the ComAF Air Instructors and by requiring the Divisions to offer periodic orientation tours to both.<sup>81</sup> One of the deficiencies in the ANG training, ADC felt, was that few Air Instructors were familiar with air defense operations. ADC planned also to request the Guard Bureau to require the ANG wings to participate in the air defense exercises

**SECRET**



SECRET

93

as far as possible. Previously, participation had been by invitation only. To clear up the confusion in the training of the dual-mission units (fighter-interceptor and fighter-bomber), ADC planned to write the flying training annexes to the ConAC directives rather than to simply submit requirements. These annexes would emphasize intercept training. Finally, it was hoped that authorization could be secured for additional personnel to assign to the ANG program in the Air Defense Command. Writing in November 1953, Major J. B. Guynes, the officer handling ANG affairs at ADC Headquarters, explained the need for more people:

There is still much to be done in establishing better liaison and providing more active assistance to the Guard. One of our greatest limitations is the lack of people. No authorization exists at any level within ADC for personnel to handle ANG affairs. Too often we find that the Guard program in the Defense Forces and Air Divisions is an additional duty of an officer who is already overloaded.

The ANG AC&W units, when released from federal service in 1953, were given a mobilization assignment to the Tactical Air Command. Responsibility for training these units was shared between the latter command and ConAC. Late in 1953, ConAC asked ADC to allow the AC&W units to train at ADC AC&W sites during the summer encampments, to which ADC agreed.

In all there were eighteen ANG AC&W squadrons and flights, each of which was being equipped with AN/TPS-1Ds and AN/TPS-10Ds.

\* For a list of these squadrons, see reference note number eighty-four.

SECRET

0 5 1 4

**SECRET**

In September, CADF suggested that ADC secure an initial mobilization assignment of these units for use as supplemental radar in an emergency. After some study, ADC agreed and presented the proposal to Air Force Headquarters. Although approval was expected -- ADC felt that TAC would not need these units immediately after the opening of hostilities -- it had not been received by early 1954.

Assignment To ADC Of All ANG Fighter Squadrons

We have seen that in the fall of 1952, Air Force Headquarters assigned seventeen ANG wings (fifty-two squadrons) to AIC for use in an emergency. Of these wings, six were given a fighter-intercept mission and were to be retained for as long as needed after mobilization by ADC. The other eleven wings were given a dual mission and were to be retained by ADC for ninety days after mobilization, at which time they were to be assigned to TAC. In addition to these seventeen wings, there were six fighter-bomber wings (eighteen squadrons) in the continental United States, all of which had an initial mobilization to TAC.

At a USAF conference in late 1952 on the use of the ANG, ADC considered requesting authority to use the six wings given to TAC and a few "discreet inquiries on the subject were made." ADC found that TAC wanted to keep these wings and the matter was dropped for the time being. No further attempt was made until the fall of 1953. One of the reasons for delay was a desire not to interfere with the effort being made to get USAF to insure a firm augmentation commitment from the other commands. In September, after a fairly definite commitment from the other commands had been established, the recommendation was made that the six TAC ANG wings be given a dual mission and a mobilization assign-

**SECRET**



SECRET

95

ment to ADC on the same basis as the other dual mission wings, i.e., retention for the first ninety days after attack.<sup>88</sup> On November twenty-first, USAF granted this request, noting that "it is understood that these plus eleven other dual mission wings are available to world wide TAC forces if defense mission is not paramount at initial phase of war."<sup>89</sup> For the first time since early 1951, all of the ANG fighter squadrons in the continental United States were available for use in air defense.

ADC now reassigned these wings to the Defense Forces for mobilization. EADF received two located in its area (the 121st and 122nd) and CADF the remaining four (the 132nd, 136th, 137th, and 140th).<sup>\*</sup> With assignment of these wings, EADF now had a total of fourteen wings in its area, CADF had six, and WADF had three. This did not in every case include all the squadrons of each wing, for ADC further assigned all of the ANG wings and squadrons to the Air Divisions on a geographical basis.<sup>\*\*</sup> Squadrons were assigned to the Air Division in which they were located regardless of whether their parent wing was located in and assigned to another Air Division.<sup>90</sup> To illustrate, the 142nd Fighter-Interceptor Wing was in WADF's 25th Air Division and was assigned to that Division. One of its squadrons, the 166th, was located in CADF's 29th Air Division and so was assigned to the latter Division.

---

\* For the location of the six wings and their assigned squadrons, see reference note number eighty-eight.

\*\* See Appendix X for the mobilization assignment of all twenty-three ANG wings.

SECRET

0 0 1 0

**SECRET**Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Wings

A final area in which ADC sought emergency air defense augmentation was the Air Force Reserve fighter-bomber wings. Until the latter half of 1953, these wings had so few aircraft that ADC had not given them much attention. <sup>91</sup> In late 1953, however, they were being equipped with F-80s and were programmed to receive F-84s in Fiscal Year 1955 and 1956. At the end of the year, there were six Reserve fighter-bomber wings in existence and three more scheduled for organization later. <sup>92\*</sup> ADC was not sure how to use these wings, however, because two were located on bases where there were two ADC squadrons and the others were located in an area where there were both ADC and ANG squadrons available. Deployment in an emergency was not considered satisfactory and so ADC felt that use of the personnel and aircraft as replacements was possibly the answer. At any rate, in December, ADC directed the Defense Forces to investigate the wings located in their areas and to decide upon the feasibility of using them in emergency air defense. <sup>93</sup>

---

\* See reference note number ninety-two for a list of these Reserve wings.

**SECRET**



**SECRET**  
STATION LIST - AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Appendix I

February 1947

WING HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS SQUADRONS

WING	AIR FORCE	STATES INCLUDED	STATION OF WING HQ	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
51st	First	Me., N.H., Vt., Mass., Conn., B.I.	Logan Fld, Boston Mass.	30 Sep 46	15 Oct 46
52nd	First	N.Y., N.J., Del.	New York, N.Y.		
53rd	Eleventh	Pa., Md., Va., D.C.	Harrisburg, Pa.	6 Aug 46	
54th	Fourteenth	N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla., Tenn., Ala., Miss.	Atlanta, (Marietta, Ga.)	8 Jul 46	2 Oct 46
55th	Eleventh	Ohio, Ky., W.Va., Ind.	Columbus, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
56th	Second	Ill., Mich., Wisc.	Chicago, Ill.	8 Oct 46	
57th	Second	Minn., Iowa, Mo., S.D., N.D.	Lambert Fld St. Louis, Mo.	10 Jun 46	3 Jul 46
58th	Tenth	Texas, La., Ark., Okla., N.M.	Dallas, Texas	21 Oct 46	
59th	Second	Wyo., Colo., Kan., Neb.	Buckley Fld Denver, Colo.	1 Jun 46	3 Jul 46
60th	Fourth	Wash., Ore., Idaho, Mont.	Seattle, Washington		
61st	Fourth	Cal., (N. of 35° 47') Nev., Utah.	San Francisco, California		
62nd	Fourth	Cal., (S. 35° 47') Ariz.	Los Angeles, California	15 Aug 46	14 Sep 46

Source: Letter, ADC to CGs, 1st, 2d, 4th, 10th, 11th, 14th AFs, "Station List, Air Defense Command," 10 Feb 1947, 1st Incl, Sec IV, Part II.

**SECRET**<sup>97</sup>

# SECRET

98

## AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING GROUP EQ

ORG	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	DATE	
				AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
151	51st	First	Logan Fld, Boston, Mass.	15 Aug 46	16 Oct 46
152	52d	First	New York, N.Y.		
153	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
154	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	8 Jul 46	6 Oct 46
155	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		
156	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	8 Oct 46	
157	57th	Second	St. Louis, Mo.	22 Sep 46	
158	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
159	59th	Second	Denver, Colo.	1 Nov 46	
160	60th	Fourth	Seattle, Wash.		
161	61st	Fourth	San Francisco, Cal.		
162	62d	Fourth	Los Angeles, Cal.		

## AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SQUADRONS

ORG	OF	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION		
102	151	51st	First	Providence, R.I.		
103	151	51st	First	Hartford, Conn.	1 Jul 46	
107	152	52d	First	Buffalo, N. Y.		
108	152	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
112	153	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
113	153	53d	Eleventh	Washington, D. C.	13 Aug 46	
117	154	54th	Fourteenth	Birmingham, Alabama		
118	154	54th	Fourteenth	Charlotte, N. C.		
122	155	55th	Eleventh	Indianapolis, Indiana	16 Oct 46	
123	155	55th	Eleventh	Cleveland, Ohio		
127	156	56th	Second	Detroit, Michigan	11 Oct 46	
128	156	56th	Second	Milwaukee, Wisc.		
132	157	57th	Second	St. Paul, Minn.		
133	157	57th	Second	Sioux City, Iowa	12 Sep 46	
134	158	58th	Tenth	New Orleans, La.		
136	158	58th	Tenth	Houston, Texas		
138	159	59th	Second	Denver, Colorado		
139	159	59th	Second	Denver, Colorado		
140	160	60th	Fourth	Portland, Oregon	28 Sep 46	30 Aug 46
143	160	60th	Fourth	Seattle, Washington		
144	161	61st	Fourth	Sacramento, Cal.		
146	161	61st	Fourth	San Francisco, Cal.		
148	162	62d	Fourth	Los Angeles, Cal.		
149	162	62d	Fourth	Los Angeles, Cal.		

## AIRCRAFT CONTROL SQUADRONS

ORG	OF	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION		
101	151	51st	First	Boston, Mass.	17 Oct 46	
105	152	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
111	153	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.	1 Jun 46	
116	154	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	8 Jul 46	
121	155	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		

# SECRET

0 0 1 9



SECRET

99

AIRCRAFT CONTROL SQUADRONS

<u>ORG</u>	<u>GP</u>	<u>WING</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED</u>
126	156	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	8 Oct 46	
131	157	57th	Second	St. Louis, Mo.	22 Sep 46	
134	158	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
137	159	59th	Second	Denver, Colorado		
141	160	60th	Fourth	Seattle, Washington		
144	161	61st	Fourth	San Francisco, Cal.		
147	162	62d	Fourth	Los Angeles, Cal.		

AAF COMMUNICATION SQUADRONS

<u>ORG</u>	<u>WING</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>		
101	51st	First	Boston, Mass.		
102	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
103	53d	Eleventh	Harrisburg, Pa.	1 Jun 46	
104	54th	Fourteenth	Atlanta, (Marietta) Ga.	8 Jul 46	9 Sep 46
105	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		
106	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	8 Oct 46	
107	57th	Second	Lambert Fld, St. Louis, Mo.	21 Jun 46	23 Sep 46
108	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
109	59th	Second	Denver, Colorado		
110	60th	Fourth	Seattle, Washington		
111	61st	Fourth	San Francisco, Calif.		
112	62d	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.		

SIGNAL LIGHT CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES

<u>ORG</u>	<u>WING</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>		
101	51st	First	Boston, Mass.		
102	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
103	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
104	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	8 Jul 46	6 Oct 46
105	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		
106	56th	Second	Chicago, Illinois	8 Oct 46	
107	57th	Second	Lambert Fld, St. Louis, Mo.	21 Jun 46	23 Sep 46
108	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
109	59th	Second	Denver, Colorado		
110	60th	Fourth	Seattle, Washington		
111	61st	Fourth	San Francisco, Calif.		
112	62d	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.		

RADAR CALIBRATION DETACHMENTS

<u>ORG</u>	<u>GP</u>	<u>WING</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>		
101	151	51st	First	Boston, Mass.		
102	152	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
103	153	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
104	154	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	8 Jul 46	2 Oct 46

SECRET

0 3 2 0

SECRET

100

RADAR CALIBRATION DETACHMENTS

<u>ORG</u>	<u>GP</u>	<u>WING</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED</u>
105	155	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		
106	156	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	8 Oct 46	
107	157	57th	Second	St. Louis, Mo.	7 Oct 46	
108	158	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
109	159	59th	Second	Denver, Colorado		
110	160	60th	Fourth	Seattle, Washington		
111	161	61st	Fourth	San Francisco, Calif.		
112	162	62d	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.		

AIR SERVICE GROUPS (LIGHT BOMB)

<u>ORG</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>WING</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED</u>
206	HQ	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
206	A	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
206	B	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
206	C (Att 217 AS GP Ftr)			Birmingham, Alabama	1 Nov 46	
206	D (Att 221 AS GP Ftr)			Cleveland, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
211	HQ	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
211	A	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
211	B	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
211	C (Att 236 AS GP Ftr)			New Orleans, La.	1 Sep 46	
211	D (Att 246 AS GP Ftr)			Los Angeles, Calif.	15 Aug 46	8 Oct 46
226	HQ	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	7 Oct 46	
226	A	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	7 Oct 46	
226	B	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	7 Oct 46	
226	C (Att 227 AS GP Ftr)			Romulus AAF Detroit, Mich.	9 Jul 46	29 Sep 46
226	D (Att 231 AS GP Ftr)			Rosecrans Fld, St. Louis, Mo.	21 Jun 46	22 Aug 46

AIR SERVICE GROUPS (FIGHTER)

<u>ORG</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>WING</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED</u>
198	C	54th	Fourteenth	San Juan, P. R.	1 Sep 46	
199	C	61st	Fourth	Honolulu, T. H.	1 Sep 46	
201	Hq	51st	First	Portland (Sanford) Me.	1 Dec 46	
201	A	51st	First	Portland (Sanford) Me.	1 Dec 46	
201	B	51st	First	Manchester, N. H.	7 Oct 46	
201	C	51st	First	Municipal Apt, Burlington, Vt	1 Jul 46	14 Aug 46
202	HQ	51st	First	Logan Fld, Boston, Mass.	15 Aug 46	22 Oct 46
202	A	51st	First	"		23 Aug 46
202	B	51st	First	Springfield, Mass.	17 Oct 46	
202	C (Att 207 AS GP)			Albany, N. Y.		
203	HQ	51st	First	Hartford, Conn.	17 Jul 46	
203	A	51st	First	Bradley Fld, Windsor Locks Conn	1 Jul 46	7 Aug 46
203	B	51st	First	Providence, R. I.		
207	HQ	52d	First	Buffalo, N. Y.		
207	A	52d	First	Buffalo, N. Y.		

SECRET

0 5 2 1



SECRET

101

AIR SERVICE GROUPS (FIGHTER)

ORG	DET	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
207	B	52d	First	Rochester, N. Y.		
207	C	52d	First	Syracuse, N. Y.		
208	Hq	52d	First	Newark, N. J.		
208	A	52d	First	Newark, N. J.		
208	B	52d	First	Trenton, N. J.	28 Oct 46	
208	C	52d	First	New Castle Apt, Wilmington, Del.	10 Jun 46	6 Sep 46
212	Hq	53d	Eleventh	Pittsburgh, Pa.		
212	A	53d	Eleventh	Pittsburgh, Pa.	28 Sep 46	
212	B	53d	Eleventh	Reading, Pa.		
212	C	53d	Eleventh	Scranton, Pa.	28 Sep 46	
213	Hq	53d	Eleventh	Andrews Fld, Wash., D. C.	2 Oct 46	2 Oct 46
213	A	53d	Eleventh	Andrews Fld, Wash., D. C.	2 Oct 46	2 Oct 46
213	B	53d	Eleventh	Baltimore, Md.	6 Aug 46	
213	C	53d	Eleventh	Richmond, Va.		
216	Hq	54th	Fourteenth	Atlanta (Marietta) Ga.	21 Oct 46	
216	A	54th	Fourteenth	Atlanta (Marietta) Ga.	8 Jul 46	
216	B	54th	Fourteenth	Columbia, S. C.	28 Sep 46	
216	C	54th	Fourteenth	Savannah, Ga.	10 Oct 46	13 Oct 46
217	Hq	54th	Fourteenth	Birmingham, Ala.	15 Nov 46	
217	A	54th	Fourteenth	Meridian, Miss.	9 Jul 46	12 Sep 46
217	B	54th	Fourteenth	Mobile, Ala.	15 Nov 46	
217	C	(Att 216 AS GP)		Miami, Fla.		
218	Hq	54th	Fourteenth	Nashville, Tenn.	20 Sep 46	
218	A	54th	Fourteenth	Nashville, Tenn.	20 Sep 46	
218	B	54th	Fourteenth	Memphis, Tenn.	1 Nov 46	
218	C	54th	Fourteenth	Charlotte, N. C.		
221	Hq	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		
221	A	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		
221	B	55th	Eleventh	Dayton, Ohio		
221	C	55th	Eleventh	Toledo, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
222	Hq	55th	Eleventh	Indianapolis, Ind.		
222	A	55th	Eleventh	Indianapolis, Ind.		
222	B	55th	Eleventh	Fort Wayne, Ind.		
222	C	(Att 240 AS GP)		AAB, Lincoln, Nebr.	1 Jul 46	26 Jul 46
223	Hq	55th	Eleventh	Louisville, Ky	22 Jul 46	
223	A	55th	Eleventh	Louisville, Ky	22 Jul 46	
223	B	55th	Eleventh	Charlestown, W. Va.		
227	Hq	56th	Second	Detroit, Michigan	11 Oct 46	
227	A	56th	Second	Detroit, Michigan	11 Oct 46	
227	B	56th	Second	Grand Rapids, Mich.	10 Sep 46	
227	C	(Att 242 ASGP)		Butte, Mont.		
228	Hq	56th	Second	Milwaukee, Wisc.		
228	A	56th	Second	Milwaukee, Wisc.		
228	B	56th	Second	Madison, Wisc.		
228	C	(Att 237 AS GP)		Albuquerque, N. M.		
231	Hq	57th	Second	St. Louis, Mo.		
231	A	57th	Second	St. Joseph, Mo.	21 Jun 46	23 Sep 46
231	B	57th	Second	Peoria, Ill.		
			(Att 226 AS GP 56th Wing) LB			

SECRET

# SECRET

102

## AIR SERVICE GROUPS (FIGHTER)

ORG	DET	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
231	C	(Att 226 AS GP LB)		Springfield, Ill.		
232	Hq	57th	Second	Des Moines, Iowa		
232	A	57th	Second	Mun Apt, Des Moines, Iowa	10 Jun 46	6 Sep 46
232	B	57th	Second	Sioux City, Iowa	12 Sep 46	
232	C	57th	Second	Sioux Falls, Iowa		20 Sep 46
233	Hq	57th	Second	St. Paul, Minn.		
233	A	57th	Second	Holman Fld, St. Paul, Minn.	26 Jul 46	14 Sep 46
233	B	57th	Second	Fargo, N. D.		
233	C	57th	Second	Duluth, Minn.		
236	Hq	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
236	A	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
236	B	58th	Tenth	Houston, Texas		
236	C	58th	Tenth	San Antonio, Texas		
237	Hq	58th	Tenth	Tulsa, Okla.	7 Nov 46	
237	A	58th	Tenth	Tulsa, Okla.	7 Nov 46	
237	B	58th	Tenth	Little Rock, Ark.	15 Jun 46	24 Aug 46
237	C	58th	Tenth	Oklahoma City, Okla.	7 Nov 46	
240	Hq	59th	Second	Denver, Colo.	3 Sep 46	
240	A	59th	Second	Buckley Fld, Denver, Colo.	27 Jun 46	30 Jun 46
240	B	59th	Second	Mun Apt, Cheyenne, Wyo.	17 Jun 46	11 Aug 46
240	C	59th	Second	Mun Apt, Wichita, Kans.	27 Aug 46	7 Sep 46
242	Hq	60th	Fourth	Portland, Ore.	28 Sep 46	
242	A	60th	Fourth	Portland, Ore.	26 Jun 46	30 Aug 46
242	B	60th	Fourth	Spokane, Wash.		
242	C	60th	Fourth	Gowen Fld, Boise, Idaho	26 Jul 46	13 Oct 46
244	Hq	61st	Fourth	Oakland, Calif.		
244	A	61st	Fourth	Oakland, Calif.		
244	B	61st	Fourth	Reno, Nev.		
244	C	61st	Fourth	Mun Apt, Salt Lake City, Utah	27 Sep 46	
246	Hq	62d	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.	15 Aug 46	29 Sep 46
246	A	62d	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.	12 Sep 46	29 Sep 46
246	B	62d	Fourth	San Bernardino, Calif.	12 Sep 46	
246	C	62d	Fourth	Tucson, Arizona	25 Oct 46	

## LIGHT BOMB GROUP HEADQUARTERS

ORG	GP	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION
106		52d	First	New York, N. Y.	
111		53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.	
126		56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	8 Oct 46

## LIGHT BOMBARDMENT SQUADRONS

ORG	GP	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
102	106	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
103	111	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
106	106	54th	Fourteenth	Birmingham, Ala.	1 Nov 46	
107		56th	Second	Romulus AAF, Romulus, Mich.	9 Jul 46	29 Sep 46
108	126	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	7 Oct 46	
112	106	66th	Eleventh	Cleveland, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
114	106	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		

# SECRET

0 5 2 3



SECRET

103

LIGHT BOMBARDMENT SQUADRONS

ORG	GP	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE
						FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
115	111	62d	Fourth	Van Nuys Apt, Los Angeles, Cal.	15 Aug 46	8 Oct 46
		(Att 146 Ftr Gp)				
117	111	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
122	111	58th	Tenth	Mun Apt, New Orleans, La.	1 Sep 46	
168	126	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill		
180	126	57th	Second	Rosecrans Fld, St. Joseph, Mo.	21 Jun 46	22 Aug 46
		(Att 131 Ftr Gp)				

UTILITY FLIGHTS LIGHT BOMBARDMENT SQUADRONS

ORG	GP	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION		
102	106	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
103	111	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
106	111	53d	Fourteenth	Birmingham, Ala.	1 Nov 46	
		(Att 117 Ftr Sq)				
107	126	56th	Second	Romulus AAF, Detroit, Mich.	9 Jul 46	29 Sep 46
		(Att 127 Ftr Gp)				
108	126	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	7 Oct 46	
112	106	55th	Eleventh	Cleveland, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
114	106	52d	First	New York, N. Y.		
115	111	62d	Fourth	Van Nuys Apt, Los Angeles, Cal.	15 Aug 46	14 Sep 46
		(Att 146 Ftr Gp)				
117	111	53d	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
122	111	58th	Tenth	Mun Apt, New Orleans, La.	1 Sep 46	
168	126	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.		
180	126	57th	Second	Rosecrans Fld, St. Joseph, Mo.	21 Jun 46	22 Aug 46
		(Att 131 Ftr Gp)				

FIGHTER GROUP HEADQUARTERS

ORG	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION		
101	51st	First	Portland (Sanford) Me.	1 Dec 46	
102	51st	First	Logan Apt, Boston, Mass.	30 Sep 46	22 Oct 46
103	51st	First	Hartford, Conn.	1 Jul 46	7 Aug 46
107	52d	First	Buffalo, N. Y.		
108	52d	First	Newark, N. J.	15 Aug 46	
112	53d	Eleventh	Pittsburgh, Pa.		
113	53d	Eleventh	Andrews Fld, Washington, D. C.	2 Oct 46	2 Oct 46
116	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	8 Jul 46	9 Sep 46
117	54th	Fourteenth	Birmingham, Ala.	1 Dec 46	
118	54th	Fourteenth	Nashville, Tenn.	20 Sep 46	
121	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
122	55th	Eleventh	Indianapolis, Ind.		
123	55th	Eleventh	Louisville, Ky	22 Jul 46	
127	56th	Second	Romulus AAF, Detroit, Mich.	9 Jul 46	29 Sep 46
128	56th	Second	Milwaukee, Wisc.		

SECRET

SECRET

104

FIGHTER GROUP HEADQUARTERS CONT'D

ORG	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE
					FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
131	57th	Second	Lambert Fld St. Louis, Mo.	10 Jun 46	15 Jul 46
132	57th	Second	Mun Apt, Des Moines, Iowa	10 Jun 46	23 Aug 46
133	57th	Second	Holman Fld, St. Paul, Minn.		
136	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
137	58th	Tenth	Tulsa, Oklahoma	7 Nov 46	
140	59th	Second	Buckley Fld, Denver, Colo.	3 Sep 46	1 Oct 46
142	60th	Fourth	Portland, Oregon	26 Jun 46	30 Aug 46
144	61st	Fourth	Oakland, Calif.		
146	62nd	Fourth	Van Nuys Apt, Los Angeles, Cal.	15 Aug 46	14 Sep 46

FIGHTER SQUADRONS

ORG	GP	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION		
101	102	51st	First	Logan Fld, Boston, Mass.		23 Aug 46
104	113	53rd	Eleventh	Mun Apt, Baltimore, Md	6 Aug 46	17 Aug 46
105	118	54th	Fourteenth	Nashville, Tenn.	20 Sep 46	
109	133	57th	Second	Holman Fld, St. Paul, Minn.	26 Jul 46	14 Sep 46
110	131	57th	Second	Lambert Fld, St. Joseph, Mo.	21 Jun 46	23 Sep 46
111	136	58th	Tenth	Houston, Tex.		
113	122	55th	Eleventh	Indianapolis, Ind.		
116	142	60th	Fourth	Spokane, Wash.		
118	103	51st	First	Bradley Fld, Hartford, Conn.	1 Jul 46	7 Aug 46
119	108	52nd	First	Newark, N. J.	28 Oct 46	
120	140	59th	Second	Buckley Fld, Denver, Colo.	27 Jun 46	30 Jun 46
121	113	53rd	Eleventh	Andrews Fld, Washington, D. C.	2 Oct 46	2 Oct 46
123	142	60th	Fourth	Portland, Oregon	26 Jun 46	30 Aug 46
124	132	57th	Second	Mun Apt, Des Moines, Iowa	10 Jun 46	23 Aug 46
125	137	58th	Tenth	Tulsa, Oklahoma	7 Nov 46	
126	128	56th	Second	Billy Mitchel Fld, Mil Wisc.		
127	140	59th	Second	Mun Apt, Wichita, Kans.	27 Aug 46	7 Sep 46
128	116	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	8 Jul 46	20 Aug 46
131	102	51st	First	Springfield, Mass.	17 Oct 46	
132	101	51st	First	Portland, (Sanford) Me.	1 Dec 46	
133	101	51st	First	Manchester, N. H.	7 Oct 46	
134	101	51st	First	Mun Apt. Burlington, VT	1 Jul 46	14 Aug 46
136	107	52nd	First	Buffalo, N. Y.		
137	107	52nd	First	Rochester, N. Y.		
138	107	52nd	First	Syracuse, N. Y.		
139	107	52nd	First	Albany, N. Y.		
141	108	52nd	First	Trenton, N. J.		
142	108	52nd	First	New Castle Apt, New Castle, Del.	1 Jun 46	6 Sep 46
146	112	53rd	Eleventh	Pittsburgh, Pa.	1 Jun 46	
147	112	53rd	Eleventh	Reading, Pa.		
148	112	53rd	Eleventh	Scranton, Pa.	1 Jun 46	
149	113	53rd	Eleventh	Richmond, Va.		
152	103	51st	First	Providence, R. I.		
153	117	54th	Fourteenth	Key Fld, Meridian, Miss.	9 Jul 46	12 Sep 46
154	137	58th	Tenth	Little Rock, Ark.	27 May 46	24 Aug 46
155	118	54th	Fourteenth	Memphis, Tenn.	1 Nov 46	

SECRET

0520



SECRET

105

FIGHTER SQUADRONS CONT D

ORG	GP	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
156	118	54th	Fourteenth	Morris Fld, Charlotte, N.C.		
157	116	54th	Fourteenth	Columbia, S. C.	28 Sep 46	
158	116	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	10 Oct 46	13 Oct 46
159	116	54th	Fourteenth	Miami, Fla.		
160	117	54th	Fourteenth	Mobile, Ala.	15 Nov 46	
162	121	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		
163	122	55th	Eleventh	Fort Wayne, Ind.		
164	121	55th	Eleventh	Dayton, Ohio		
165	123	55th	Eleventh	Louisville, Ky.	29 Aug 46	
166	121	55th	Eleventh	Toledo, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
167	123	55th	Eleventh	Charleston, W. Va.		
169	127	56th	Second	Peoria, Ill.		
			(Atch 126 LB GP)			
170	128	56th	Second	Springfield, Ill.		
			(Atch 126 LB GP)			
171	127	56th	Second	Detroit, Mich.	11 Oct 46	
172	127	56th	Second	Grand Rapids, Mich.	10 Sep 46	
173	140	59th	Second	AAB, Lincoln, Neb.	1 Jul 46	26 Jul 46
174	132	57th	Second	AAB, Sioux City, Iowa	12 Sep 46	
175	132	57th	Second	Sioux Falls, S. D.		20 Sep 46
176	128	56th	Second	Madison, Wisc.		
178	133	57th	Second	Fargo, N. D.		
179	133	57th	Second	Duluth, Minn.		
181	136	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
182	136	58th	Tenth	San Antonio, Texas		
185	137	58th	Tenth	Okla City, Okla.	7 Nov 46	
186	142	60th	Fourth	Butte, Mont		
187	140	59th	Second	Mun Apt, Cheyenne, Wyo.	12 Jun 46	11 Aug 46
188	137	58th	Tenth	Albuquerque, New Mexico		
190	142	60th	Fourth	Cowen Fld, Boise, Idaho	26 Jul 46	13 Oct 46
191	144	61st	Fourth	Mun Apt, Salt Lake City, Utah	27 Sep 46	
192	144	61st	Fourth	Reno, Nevada		
194	144	61st	Fourth	Oakland, Calif.		
195	146	62nd	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.	12 Sep 46	29 Sep 46
196	146	62nd	Fourth	San Bernardino, Calif.	12 Sep 46	
197	146	62nd	Fourth	Luke Fld, Phoenix, Ariz.	25 Oct 46	
198		54th	Fourteenth	San Juan, P.R.	1 Sep 46	
199		61st	Fourth	Honolulu, T.H.	1 Sep 46	

UTILITY FLIGHTS. FIGHTER SQUADRONS

ORG	GP	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
101	102	51st	First	Logan Fld, Boston, Mass		23 Aug 46
104	113	53rd	Eleventh	Mun Apt, Baltimore, Md	6 Aug 46	
105	118	54th	Fourteenth	Nashville, Tenn.	20 Sep 46	
109	133	57th	Second	Holman Fld, St. Paul, Minn.	26 Jul 46	15 Sep 46
110	131	57th	Second	Lambert Fld, St. Joseph, Mo.	21 Jun 46	23 Sep 46
111	136	58th	Tenth	Houston, Tex.		
113	122	55th	Eleventh	Indianapolis, Ind.		
116	142	60th	Fourth	Spokane, Wash.		

SECRET

0 5 2 8



SECRET

106

UTILITY FLIGHTS, FIGHTER SQUADRONS CONT'D

ORG	GP	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
118	103	51st	First	Bradley Fld, Windsor Locks Conn.	1 Jul 46	7 Aug 46
119	108	52nd	First	Newark, N. J.	28 Oct 46	
120	140	59th	Second	Buckley Fld, Denver, Colo.	27 Jun 46	30 Jun 46
121	113	53rd	Eleventh	Andrews Fld, Washington, D.C.	2 Oct 46	2 Oct 46
123	142	60th	Fourth	Portland, Oregon	26 Jun 46	30 Aug 46
124	132	57th	Second	Mun Apt, Des Moines, Iowa	10 Jun 46	23 Aug 46
125	137	58th	Tenth	Tulsa, Okla.	7 Nov 46	
126	128	56th	Second	Milwaukee, Wisc.		
127	140	59th	Second	Mun Apt, Wichita, Kans.	27 Aug 46	7 Sep 46
128	116	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	8 Jul 46	20 Aug 46
131	102	51st	First	Springfield, Mass.	17 Oct 46	
132	101	51st	First	Portland, (Sanford) Me.	1 Dec 46	
133	101	51st	First	Manchester, N. H.	7 Oct 46	
134	101	51st	First	Mun Apt. Burlington, Vt.	1 Jul 46	14 Aug 46
136	107	52nd	First	Buffalo, N. Y.		
137	107	52nd	First	Rochester, N. Y.		
138	107	52nd	First	Syracuse, N. Y.		
139	107	52nd	First	Albany, N. Y.		
141	108	52nd	First	Trenton, N. J.		
142	108	52nd	First	New Castle Apt, New Castle Del.	1 Jun 46	6 Sep 46
146	112	53rd	Eleventh	Pittsburgh, Pa.	1 Jun 46	
147	112	53rd	Eleventh	Reading, Pa.		
148	112	53rd	Eleventh	Scranton, Pa.	1 Jun 46	
149	113	53rd	Eleventh	Richmond, Va.		
152	103	51st	First	Providence, R. I.		
153	117	54th	Fourteenth	Key Fld, Meridian, Miss.	9 Jul 46	12 Sep 46
154	137	58th	Tenth	Little Rock, Ark.	27 May 46	24 Aug 46
155	118	54th	Fourteenth	Memphis, Tenn.	1 Nov 46	
156	118	54th	Fourteenth	Charlotte, N. C.		
157	116	54th	Fourteenth	Columbia, S. C.	28 Sep 46	
158	116	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta, AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	10 Oct 46	13 Oct 46
159	116	54th	Fourteenth	Miami, Fla.		
160	117	54th	Fourteenth	Mobile, Ala.	15 Nov 46	
162	121	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		
163	122	55th	Eleventh	Fort Wayne, Ind.		
164	121	55th	Eleventh	Dayton, Ohio		
165	123	55th	Eleventh	Louisville, Ky	29 Aug 46	
166	121	55th	Eleventh	Toledo, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
167	123	55th	Eleventh	Charleston, W. Va.		
169	127	56th	Second	Pecoria, Ill.		
			(Atch 126 LB GP)			
170	128	56th	Second	Springfield, Ill.		
			(Atch 126 LB GP)			
171	127	56th	Second	Detroit, Mich.	11 Oct 46	
172	127	56th	Second	Grand Rapids, Mich.	10 Sep 46	
173	140	59th	Second	AAB, Lincoln, Neb.	1 Jul 46	26 Jul 46
174	132	57th	Second	Sioux City, Iowa	12 Sep 46	
175	132	57th	Second	Sioux Falls, S. D.		20 Sep 46
176	128	56th	Second	Madison, Wisc.		
178	133	57th	Second	Fargo, N. D.		

SECRET

0 3 2 7



SECRET

107

UTILITY FLIGHTS, FIGHTER SQUADRONS CONT'D

ORG	GP	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
179	133	57th	Second	Duluth, Minn.		
181	136	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
185	137	58th	Tenth	Okla City, Okla	7 Nov 46	
186	142	60th	Fourth	Butte, Mont.		
187	140	59th	Second	Mun Apt, Cheyenne, Wyo	17 Jun 46	11 Aug 46
188	137	58th	Tenth	Albuquerque, N. Mexico		
190	142	60th	Fourth	Gowen Fld, Boise, Idaho	26 Jul 46	13 Oct 46
191	144	61st	Fourth	Mun Apt, Salt Lake City, Utah	27 Sep 46	
192	144	61st	Fourth	Reno, Nevada		
194	144	61st	Fourth	Oakland, Calif.		
195	146	62nd	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.	12 Sep 46	29 Sep 46
196	146	62nd	Fourth	San Bernardino, Calif.	12 Sep 46	
197	146	62nd	Fourth	Tucson, Arizona	25 Oct 46	
198		54th	Fourteenth	San Juan, P.R.	1 Sep 46	
199		61st	Fourth	Honolulu, T.H.	1 Sep 46	
182	136	58th	Tenth	San Antonio, Texas		

ENGINEER AVIATION UNITS

ORG	HW	WING	(WING ATTCHED TO)	AIR FORCE	LOCATION
152	Hq & Serv	52nd		First	New York, N. Y.
101	152	52nd	51st	First	Boston, Mass.
102	152	52nd		First	Buffalo, N. Y.
153	Hq & Serv	53rd		Eleventh	Phila., Pa.
103	153	53rd		Eleventh	Pittsburgh, Pa.
105	153	53rd	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio
156	Hq & Serv	56th		Second	Chicago, Ill.
106	156	56th		Second	Detroit, Mich 11 Oct 46
107	156	56th	57th	Second	St. Louis, Mo.
109	156	56th	59th	Second	Denver, Colo.
161	Hq & Serv	61st		Fourth	San Francisco, Calif.
110	161	61st	60th	Fourth	Portland, Oregon, 28 Sep 46
111	161	61st		Fourth	Oakland, Calif.
112	161	61st	62nd	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.
104	Sep Co.	54th		Fourteenth	Marietta, AAB, 21 Oct 46
108	Sep Co.	58th		Tenth	Atlanta, Ga. Dallas, Texas.

SECRET

0 5 2 8

SECRET

WEATHER STATIONS (TYPE A)

ORG	WING	AIR FORCE	STATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
101	51st	First	Boston, Mass.		23 Aug 46
102	52nd	First	New York, N. Y.		
103	53rd	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
104	53rd	Eleventh	Baltimore, Md.	6 Aug 46	
105	54th	Fourteenth	Nashville, Tenn.	20 Sep 46	
106	54th	Fourteenth	Birmingham, Ala.	1 Nov 46	
107	56th	Second	Romulus AAFld, Detroit, Mich.	9 Jul 46	29 Sep 46
108	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.		
109	57th	Second	St. Paul, Minn.	26 Jul 46	
110	57th	Second	Lambert Fld, St. Louis, Mo.	21 Jun 46	23 Sep 46
111	58th	Tenth	Houston, Texas		
112	55th	Eleventh	Cleveland, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
113	55th	Eleventh	Indianapolis, Ind		
114	52nd	First	New York, N. Y.		
115	62nd	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.	15 Aug 46	8 Oct 46
116	60th	Fourth	Spokane, Wash.		
117	53rd	Eleventh	Philadelphia, Pa.		
118	51st	First	Bradley Fld, Windsor Locks Conn.	1 Jul 46	7 Aug 46
119	52nd	First	Newark, N. J.	28 Oct 46	
120	59th	Second	Buckley Fld, Denver, Colo.	27 Jun 46	30 Jun 46
121	53rd	Eleventh	Washington, D. C.	13 Aug 46	
122	58th	Tenth	New Orleans, La.	1 Sep 46	
123	60th	Fourth	Portland, Oregon	26 Jun 46	30 Aug 46
124	57th	Second	Mun Apt, Des Moines, Iowa	10 Jun 46	23 Aug 46
125	58th	Tenth	Tulsa, Okla.	7 Nov 46	
126	56th	Second	Milwaukee, Wisc.		
127	59th	Second	Mun Apt, Wichita, Kans.	27 Aug 46	7 Sep 46
128	54th	Fourteenth	Marietta AAB, Atlanta, Ga.	8 Jul 46	9 Sep 46
131	51st	First	Springfield, Mass.	17 Oct 46	
132	51st	First	Portland, (Sanford) Me.	1 Dec 46	
133	51st	First	Manchester, N.H.	7 Oct 46	
134	51st	First	Mun Apt, Burlington, Vt.	1 Jul 46	14 Aug 46
136	52nd	First	Buffalo, N. Y.		
137	52nd	First	Rochester, N. Y.		
138	52nd	First	Syracuse, N. Y.		
139	52nd	First	Albany, N. Y.		
141	52nd	First	Trenton, N. J.		
142	52nd	First	New Castle Apt, Wilmington, Del.	10 Jun 46	6 Sep 46
146	53rd	Eleventh	Pittsburgh, Pa.	28 Sep 46	
147	53rd	Eleventh	Reading, Pa.		
148	53rd	Eleventh	Scranton, Pa.	28 Sep 46	
149	53rd	Eleventh	Richmond, Va.		
152	51st	First	Providence, R. I.		
153	54th	Fourteenth	Key Fld, Meridian, Miss.	9 Jul 46	12 Sep 46
154	58th	Tenth	Little Rock, Ark.	15 Jun 46	24 Aug 46
155	54th	Fourteenth	Memphis, Tenn.	1 Nov 46	
156	54th	Fourteenth	Charlotte, N. C.		
157	54th	Fourteenth	Columbia, S. C.	28 Sep 46	
158	54th	Fourteenth	Savannah, Ga.	10 Oct 46	13 Oct 46
159	54th	Fourteenth	Miami, Fla.		

SECRET



SECRET

109

WEATHER STATIONS (TYPE A) CONT'D

ORG	WING	AIR FORCE	STATION	AUTH DATE OF ORGANIZATION	DATE FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
160	54th	Fourteenth	Mobile, Ala.	15 Nov 46	
162	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio		
163	55th	Eleventh	Fort Wayne, Ind.		
164	55th	Eleventh	Dayton, Ohio		
165	55th	Eleventh	Louisville, Ky	22 Jul 46	
166	55th	Eleventh	Toledo, Ohio	5 Nov 46	
167	55th	Eleventh	Charlestown, W. Va.		
168	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.		
169	56th	Second	Peoria, Ill.		
170	56th	Second	Springfield, Ill.		
171	56th	Second	Detroit, Mich.	11 Oct 46	
172	56th	Second	Grand Rapids, Mich.	10 Sep 46	
173	59th	Second	AAB, Lincoln, Neb.	1 Jul 46	26 Jul 46
174	57th	Second	Sioux City, Iowa	12 Sep 46	
175	57th	Second	Sioux Falls, S. D.		
176	56th	Second	Madison, Wisc.		
178	57th	Second	Fargo, N. D.		
179	57th	Second	Duluth, Minn.		
180	57th	Second	St. Joseph, Mo.	22 Sep 46	
181	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Texas		
182	58th	Tenth	San Antonio, Tex.		
185	58th	Tenth	Okla City, Okla.	7 Nov 46	
186	60th	Fourth	Butte, Mont.		
187	59th	Second	Mun Apt, Cheyenne, Wyo.	17 Jun 46	11 Aug 46
188	58th	Tenth	Albuquerque, N. Mexico		
190	60th	Fourth	Boise, Idaho	26 Jul 46	
191	61st	Fourth	Mun Apt, Salt Lake City, Utah	27 Sep 46	
192	61st	Fourth	Reno, Nevada		
194	61st	Fourth	Oakland, Calif.		
195	62nd	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.	12 Sep 46	29 Sep 46
196	62nd	Fourth	San Bernardino, Calif.	12 Sep 46	29 Sep 46
197	62nd	Fourth	Tucson, Ariz.	25 Oct 46	
198	54th	Fourteenth	San Juan, P.R.	1 Sep 46	
199	61st	Fourth	Honolulu, T.H.	1 Sep 46	

WING BANDS

ORG	WING	AIR FORCE	LOCATION	
51	51st	First	Boston, Mass	
52	52nd	First	New York, N. Y.	
53	53rd	Eleventh	Scranton, Pa	
54	54th	Fourteenth	Atlanta, Ga.	14 Sep 46
55	55th	Eleventh	Columbus, Ohio	
56	56th	Second	Chicago, Ill.	
57	57th	Second	Lambert Fld, St. Louis, Mo.	
58	58th	Tenth	Dallas, Tex.	
59	59th	Second	Denver, Colo.	
60	60th	Fourth	Spokane, Wash.	
61	61st	Fourth	San Francisco, Calif.	
62	62nd	Fourth	Los Angeles, Calif.	27 Sep 46

SECRET

SECRET

Appendix II

FEDERALIZED AIR NATIONAL GUARD FIGHTER SQUADRONS  
ASSIGNED TO THE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

I. Squadrons Federalized on 1 February 1951:

<u>SqDN</u>	<u>HOME STATION</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>
113th Ftr Sq	Stout Fld., Indianapolis, Ind.	F-51
116th Ftr Sq	Geiger Fld., Spokane, Wash.	F-84
118th Ftr Sq	Bradley Fld., Windsor Locks, Conn.	F-47
121st Ftr Sq	Andrews AFB, Washington, D. C.	F-84C
123rd Ftr Sq	Portland Apt., Ore.	F-51
132nd Ftr Sq	Dow AFB, Bangor, Maine	F-80C
133rd Ftr Sq	Grenier AFB, Manchester, N. H.	F-51D/47D
134th Ftr Sq	Burlington Mun. Apt., Vt.	F-47D
142nd Ftr Sq	New Castle Cty. Apt., Del.	F-84C
148th Ftr Sq	Reading Mun. Apt., Pa.	F-51/47
163rd Ftr Sq	Baer Fld., Ft. Wayne, Ind.	F-51
166th Ftr Sq	Lockbourne AFB, Columbus, Ohio	F-84
172nd Ftr Sq	Kellogg Fld., Battle Creek, Mich.	F-51
176th Ftr Sq	Truax Fld., Madison, Wisc.	F-51
188th Ftr Sq	Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque, N. M.	F-51

II. Squadrons Federalized on 1 March 1951:

105th Ftr Sq	Berry Fld., Nashville, Tenn.	F-47D/N
109th Ftr Sq	Holman Fld., St. Paul, Minn.	F-51
126th Ftr Sq	Mitchell Fld., Milwaukee, Wisc.	F-80A
136th Ftr Sq	Niagara Mun. Apt., N. Y.	F-47D
175th Ftr Sq	Mun. Apt., Sioux Falls, S. D.	
179th Ftr Sq	Mun. Apt., Duluth, Minn.	F-51

SOURCE: ADC, GO #13, 6 February 1951; ADC, GO #21, 2 Mar 1951; ADCER #1,  
pp. 130-131.



SECRET

Appendix III

AIR NATIONAL GUARD AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING  
SQUADRONS ASSIGNED TO THE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

<u>SQDN</u>	<u>HOME STATION</u>	<u>DATE OF ASSIGNMENT</u>
147th AC&W Sq	Los Angeles, Calif.	12 May 1951
148th AC&W Sq	Los Angeles, Calif.	12 May 1951
149th AC&W Sq	Los Angeles, Calif.	12 May 1951
138th AC&W Sq	Denver, Colorado	12 May 1951
130th AC&W Sq	Salt Lake City, Utah	1 Jun 1951
132nd AC&W Sq	St. Paul, Minn.	1 Jun 1951
137th AC Sq	Denver, Colo.	1 Jun 1951
139th AC Sq	Denver, Colo.	1 Jun 1951
105th AC&W Sq	Newark, N. J.	1 Sep 1951
106th AC Sq	New York, N. Y.	1 Sep 1951
107th AC&W Sq	Buffalo, N. Y.	1 Sep 1951
108th AC&W Sq	New York, N. Y.	1 Sep 1951
126th AC Sq	Chicago, Ill.	16 Sep 1951
127th AC&W Sq	Detroit, Mich.	16 Sep 1951
128th AC&W Sq	Milwaukee, Wisc.	16 Sep 1951
120th AC&W Sq	Little Rock, Ark.	20 Oct 1951
134th AC Sq	La Porte, Texas	20 Oct 1951
135th AC&W Sq	New Orleans, La.	20 Oct 1951
136th AC&W Sq	Beaumont, Texas	20 Oct 1951
125th AC&W Sq	St. Louis, Mo.	16 Nov 1951
111th AC&W Sq	New Cumberland, Pa.	16 Jan 1952
112th AC&W Sq	State College, Pa.	16 Jan 1952
113th AC Sq	Washington, D. C.	16 Jan 1952
115th AC&W Sq	Birmingham, Calif.	20 Jan 1952
119th AC&W Sq	Knoxville, Tenn.	28 Jan 1952
144th AC Sq	Alameda, Calif.	28 Jan 1952
145th AC&W Sq	San Francisco, Calif.	28 Jan 1952
146th AC&W Sq	Sacramento, Calif.	28 Jan 1952

Source: Assignment Dates from ADC GOs 39, 25 May 1951; 41, 31 May 1951; 63, 28 Aug 1951; 65, 13 Sep 1951; 71, 23 Oct 1951; 76, 21 Nov 1951; and 1, 11 Jan 1952. Home Stations from letter USAF to ADC, "ANG AC&W Groups Being Ordered Into Active Military Service," 9 Apr 1951 (HRF 364).

111

SECRET

0 5 3 2

SECRET

Appendix IV

ADC'S PLAN FOR EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT  
OF MAJOR USAF COMMAND FORCES  
ALLOCATED TO AIR DEFENSE - DEC 1951

	<u>No. &amp; Type Acft</u>	<u>Home Base</u>	<u>Deployment Base</u>
SAC	12 F-84 12 F-84	Turner AFB, Ga. Turner AFB	McGuire AFB, N. J. Hunter AFB, Ga.
TAC	13 F-47 13 F-47 16 F-84 16 F-84 9 F-51 7 F-51 12 F-51 16 F-51 16 F-51 12 F-51 16 F-51	Turner AFB Turner AFB Alexandria AFB, La. Alexandria AFB Cheyenne, Wyo. Buckley NAS, Colo. Salt Lake City, Utah George AFB, Calif. George AFB George AFB George AFB	Burlington AFB, Vt. Presque Isle AFB, Me. Wold-Chamberlain AFB, Minn. Rapid City AFB, S. D. Duluth, Minn. Duluth, Minn. Larson AFB, Wash. McChord AFB, Wash. George AFB Geiger Fld, Wash. Hamilton AFB, Calif.
AIRC	12 F-94 12 F-94 8 F-86 16 F-80 16 F-80 16 F-80 16 F-80 19 F-84 19 F-84 18 F-51	Tyndall AFB, Fla. Tyndall AFB Nellis AFB, Nev. Nellis AFB Nellis AFB Nellis AFB Nellis AFB Luke AFB, Arizona Luke AFB Luke AFB	Selfridge AFB, Mich. O'Hare AFB, Ill. George AFB George AFB Larson AFB Paine Fld., Wash. McChord AFB Castle AFB, Calif. Travis AFB, Calif. Kirtland AFB, N. M.

Source: ADC, Operations Plan Serial Number 14-51, 1 Dec 1951, Annex A.

SECRET

0 5 3 3



**SECRET**

Appendix V

STATUS OF USAF, NAVY, AND ANG  
FIGHTER FORCES AS OF  
15 DECEMBER 1952

I. AUGMENTATION FORCES

The following listing of aircraft, by command, indicates the assigned potential and the combat ready aircraft and aircrews made available by other USAF commands as of the 15th of December 1952 for support of the air defense mission in the event of hostilities.

a. Strategic Air Command

<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Available</u>
129	F-84G	65

The return of the 31st Fighter Escort Wing to Turner AFB is responsible for the increase in F-84G's assigned and available.

b. Tactical Air Command

<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Available</u>
241	F-51	133
49	F-47	24
<u>290</u> TOTAL		<u>157</u>

TAC will provide airlift in support of fighter deployment.

c. Air Training Command

<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Available</u>
69	F-51	13
59	F-80	24
299	F-84	57
134	F-86	60
37	F-94	7
<u>508</u>		<u>161</u>

d. Air National Guard

The following sixteen ANG fighter units, each with a capability of 12 combat ready F-51H 's, are programmed for air defense. These units may be called into active military service by the air defense forces and pass to their operational control. Estimated readiness time for these units is 4 - 8 hours:

Source: ADC, R&R, O&T-F to Mgt. Anal., "Monthly Combat Readiness Commentary," 16 December 1952.

**SECRET**

0 3 3 4

SECRET

114

UNIT

101st Ftr Sq, SE  
119th Ftr Sq, SE  
131st Ftr Sq, SE  
152nd Ftr Sq, SE  
137th Ftr Sq, SE  
138th Ftr Sq, SE  
139th Ftr Sq, SE  
104th Ftr Sq, SE  
146th Ftr Sq, SE  
147th Ftr Sq, SE  
162nd Ftr Sq, SE  
164th Ftr Sq, SE  
194th Ftr Sq, SE  
195th Ftr Sq, SE  
169th Ftr Sq, SE  
181st Ftr Sq, Jet

STATION

Logan Intl Aprt, East Boston, Mass.  
Mun Aprt, Newark, New Jersey  
Barnes Aprt, Westfield, Mass.  
Theodore F. Greene Aprt, Hillsgrove, R. I.  
Westchester Co. Aprt, White Plains, N. Y.  
Hancock Fld, Syracuse, N. Y.  
Schenectady Co Aprt, Schenectady, N. Y.  
Harbor Fld, Baltimore, Md.  
Gtr Pittsburgh Aprt, Corapolis, Pa.  
Gtr Pittsburgh Aprt, Corapolis, Pa.  
Dayton Mun Aprt, Vandalia, Ohio  
Mun Aprt, Mansfield, Ohio  
Mun Aprt, Hayward, Calif.  
Metropolitan Aprt, Van Nuys, Calif.  
Mun Aprt, Peoria, Ill.  
Hensley Fld, Dallas, Tex.

II. NAVY FORCES

a. Eastern Sea Frontier

The regular and reserve navy aircraft within the EADF area are as indicated below. Availability of these aircraft may be limited by the primary naval mission:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. aircraft</u>	<u>Est time airborne</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>
Oceana, Va.	45	Unknown	F9F-2
	31	Unknown	F4U-2
	54	Unknown	F6F-2
Atlantic City	9	Unknown	F2H-2
	6	Unknown	F3D-2
	22	Unknown	F4E-5N AI
Akron, Ohio	16	Unknown	F6F-1
Anna Costia, D. C.	34	Unknown	F6F-1
Columbus, Ohio	27	Unknown	F6F-5
Glenview, Ill.	11	Unknown	F2H-1
	17	Unknown	F6F-1
Grosseille, Mich.	7	Unknown	FE-1
New York, N. Y.	34	Unknown	F6F-5
Niagara Falls	17	Unknown	F6F-2
Norfolk, Va.	18	Unknown	F6F-2
Squantum, Mass.	14	Unknown	F6F-5
Willow Grove, Pa.	30	Unknown	F6F-5
TOTAL	392	of which only 22 are AI Fighters	

SECRET

0 3 3 8



SECRET

115

Increase is due to receipt of the first comprehensive report of facilities received to date.

Naval Air Reserve aircraft within the CADF area are as indicated. Availability of these aircraft may be limited by the primary naval mission:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. aircraft</u>	<u>Est time airborne</u>	<u>Type aircraft</u>
Minneapolis	23	23 A/C - 12 hrs.	F6F-5, Non AI
Lincoln (NAS)	2	2 A/C - 30 min.	F6F, Non AI
	2	2 A/C - 2 hrs.	F6F, Non AI
Dallas (NAS)	32	10 A/C - 3 hrs.	F6D, Non AI
		23 A/C - 12 hrs.	
		32 A/C - 24 hrs.	
St. Louis, Mo. (NAS)	16	4 A/C - 12 hrs.	F6F1, Non AI
		16 A/C - 24 hrs.	
Olathe, Kans. (NAS)	8	2 A/C - 2 hrs.	F6F, Non AI
		8 A/C - 72 hrs.	
New Orleans (NAS)	2	2 A/C - 2 hrs.	FJ, Non AI
	12	6 A/C - 4 hrs.	F6D, Non AI
		12 A/C - 24 hrs.	
Miami (USMC)	16	16 A/C - 10 hrs.	F6D, Non AI
Chamblee, Ga. (NARTU)	10	5 A/C - 12 hrs.	F6D, Non AI
		10 A/C - 24 hrs.	
Birmingham, Ala. (NAS)	8	4 A/C - 2 hrs.	F6F2, Non AI
		8 A/C - 24 hrs.	
Jacksonville, Fla. (NARTU)	8	4 A/C - 40 min.	F6F9, Non AI
		8 A/C - 2 hrs.	
Memphis, Tenn. (NAS)	10	6 A/C - 12 hrs.	F6F, Non AI
		10 A/C - 24 hrs.	
	4	4 A/C - 12 hrs.	F6F2, Non AI

Total aircraft within 4 hours - 40; Total aircraft within 12 hours - 107;  
Total aircraft within 24 hours - 153.

b. Western Sea Frontier

The naval and marine regular and reserve aircraft within the WADF area are as indicated below. Availability of the aircraft may be limited by the primary naval mission:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. aircraft</u>	<u>Est time airborne</u>	<u>Type aircraft</u>
San Diego	13	4 hrs.	F9F-5, Non AI Ftr
Miramar	44	4 hrs.	F9F-5, Non AI Ftr
El Toro	20	4 hrs.	F4U-4, Non AI Ftr
	17	4 hrs.	F4U-5, Non AI Ftr
	8	4 hrs.	F6F-5N, AI Ftr
	34	4 hrs.	F9F-2, Non AI Ftr
	11	4 hrs.	F7F-3N, AI Ftr
	12	4 hrs.	F3D2, Non AI Ftr

SECRET

0 3 3 8

SECRET

116

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. aircraft</u>	<u>Est time airborne</u>	<u>Type aircraft</u>
Los Alamitos	14	4 hrs.	F6F, Non AI Ftr
	4	4 hrs.	F6F-5, Non AI Ftr
	4	4 hrs.	F2H, Non AI Ftr
Alameda	45	4 hrs.	F9F-5, Non AI Ftr
	3	4 hrs.	F9F-2, Non AI Ftr
	18	4 hrs.	F4U, Non AI Ftr
	4	4 hrs.	F4U-4, Non AI Ftr
Moffett	16	4 hrs.	F4U-5N, AI Ftr
	9	4 hrs.	F2H-3, Non AI Ftr
Denver	14	4 hrs.	F8F-2, Non AI Ftr
Oakland	32	4 hrs.	F6F, Non AI Ftr
	2	4 hrs.	F6F-5, Non AI Ftr
Seattle	33	4 hrs.	F6F-1, Non AI Ftr
Spokane	10	4 hrs.	F6F-2, Non AI Ftr

Total within 4 hrs: 330 Non AI  
35 AI  
TOTAL 365

SECRET

0537



# SECRET

Appendix VI

## STATUS OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD, NAVY, AND OTHER MAJOR USAF COMMAND AIRCRAFT AS OF 15 JAN 1954

	Assigned	Type	Available
<b>I. USAF</b>			
A. SAC	170	F-84G	132
B. TAC	211	F-86F	103
C. ATRC	155	T-33	110
	223	F-84	121
	231	F-86F	110
	55	F-94C	27
	142	F-86D	58
	<u>806</u>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>426</u>
D. APOC	4	F-84F	2
	9	F-84E&G	3
	4	F-86F	2
	4	F-86D	2
	5	F-89D	1
	8	F-94B	4
	<u>34</u>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>14</u>

### II. ANG

A total of twenty-three wings (seventy squadrons) were assigned for emergency mobilization to ADC.

57	F-84	3
409	F-51	287
80	F-80	28
<u>546</u>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>318</u>

Commander's readiness estimate: fifty percent of the aircraft available could have been airborne within three hours, and the remaining fifty percent within twenty-four hours.

III. NAVY	Total A/C Possessed		Time to become Airborne
	Jet	A/W	
A. ESF	614	211 3 Jet 46 Conv.	No indication
B. CADF Area	266	22 12 Jet	85 - 4 hrs. 184 - 12 hrs. 266 - 24 hrs.
C. WSP	372	284 27 Jet 31 Conv.	315 - 4 hrs. 372 - 12 hrs.

Source: ADC, Statement of Effectiveness, Jan 1954, pp. 22-23.

# SECRET

0 5 3 8

**SECRET**

Appendix VII

ADC'S PLAN FOR EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT  
OF MAJOR USAF COMMAND FORCES  
ALLOCATED TO AIR DEFENSE - FEB 1954

Unit	Acft	Home Base	Deployment	
SAC 42nd ADiv	F-84G	Bergstrom AFB, Tex.	One-fourth - Bergstrom AFB	
			One-fourth - Walker AFB, N.M.	
40th ADiv	F-84G	Turner AFB, Ga.	One-fourth - Smoky Hill AFB, Kans.	
			One-fourth - Offutt AFB, Neb.	
			One-third - Turner AFB	
			One-third - Lockbourne AFB, Ohio	
One-third - Hunter AFB, Ga.				
TAC 21st Ftr Emr Wg		George AFB, Calif.	George AFB	
			George AFB	
		479th Ftr Emr Wg	F-86F	George AFB
				George AFB
366th Ftr Emr Wg	F-86F	Alexandria AFB, La.	One-third - Shaw AFB, S.C.	
			One-third - Tinker AFB, Okla.	
			One-third - Lake Charles AFB, La.	
405th Ftr Emr Wg	F-86F	Langley AFB, Va.	Langley AFB	
ATRC 3625th Fly Tng Wg	F-86D	Tyndall AFB, Fla.	Tyndall AFB	
3595th Fly Tng Wg	F-86	Nellis AFB, Nev.	One-ninth - Hamilton AFB, Calif.	
			One-ninth - Hamilton AFB	
			One-ninth - Castle AFB, Calif.	
			One-ninth - Larson AFB, Wash.	
			One-ninth - Paine AFB, Wash.	
			One-ninth - Yuma AFB, Ariz.	
One-ninth - McChord AFB, Wash.				

Source: ADC, Operations Plan Serial Number 4-54, 20 Feb 1954, Annex B.

118  
**SECRET**

0539



**SECRET**

Unit	Acft	Home Base	Deployment
ATRAC 3595th Fly (Contd) Tng Wg	F-86	Nellis AFB	One-ninth - Portland Apt., Ore.
			One-ninth - Mather AFB, Calif.
3595th Fly Tng Wg	T-33	Nellis AFB	One-ninth - Yuma AFB, Ariz.
			One-ninth - McChord AFB
			One-ninth - Portland Apt.
			One-ninth - Mather AFB
			One-ninth - Hamilton AFB
			One-ninth - Hamilton AFB
			One-ninth - Castle AFB
			One-ninth - Larson AFB
			One-ninth - Paine AFB
3600th Fly Tng Wg	F-84	Luke AFB	16 - Ellsworth AFB, S.D.
			16 - Great Falls AFB, Mont.
			Reminder - Luke AFB
3555th Fly Tng Wg	F-86D	Perrin AFB, Texas	One-third - Scott AFB, Ill.
			One-third - O'Hare Apt., Ill.
			One-third - Youngstown AFB, Ohio
3645th Fly Tng Wg	T-33	Laughlin AFB	One-sixth - Great Falls AFB, Montana
			One-sixth - Minneapolis Apt., Minn.
			One-sixth - Kirtland AFB, N.M.
			One-sixth - Truxax AFB, Wisc.
			One-sixth - Kinross AFB, Mich.
			One-sixth - Wurtsmith AFB, Mich.
3550th Fly Tng Wg	F-94C	Moody AFB, Ga.	One-half - Wurtsmith AFB
			One-half - Griffiss AFB, N.Y.
3550th Fly Tng Wg	F-89D	Moody AFB, Ga.	All - Moody AFB
APGC 3200th Air Force Op Test Cen		Eglin AFB, Fla.	Combat All - Eglin AFB Acft.

**SECRET**

Appendix VIII

AVAILABILITY OF AUGMENTATION RADARS  
AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1953

I. Tactical Air Command.

Unit	Location	Type Radar	Function	When Used	Reports To
726th TC Gp	Pope AFB, N. C.	None	TACC	Active Air Def	35th ADiv ADCC and P-42
727th TC Sq	Shaw AFB, S. C.	MPS-5 TPS-1D	GCI	Active Air Def	TACC
Det #1	Myrtle Beach, S. C.	TPS-1D	EW	Active Air Def	TACC
Det #2	Camden, S. C.	TPS-1D TPS-10A	EW	Active Air Def	TACC
728th TC Sq	Pope AFB, N. C.	CPS-4 CPS-5	GCI	Active Air Def	TACC
Det #1	Laurinburg, N. C.	TPS-1D TPS-10D	EW	Active Air Def	TACC
Det #2	Goldsboro, N. C.	TPS-1D TPS-10D	EW	Active Air Def	TACC
629th AC&W Sq	Alexandria AFB, La.	CPS-1	GCI	Exercises and Emer-gencies	35th ADiv ADCC

II. Air Research and Development Command.

Rome Air Dev. Center	Verona, N. Y.	FPS-3 FPS-5	ADDC	Emer-gencies	32nd ADiv ADCC
----------------------	---------------	----------------	------	--------------	----------------

III. Air Training Command.

326th Fly Tng Wg	Tyndall AFB Fla.	CPS-6 CPS-5 CPS-4	ADDC	Exercises and Emer-gencies	35th ADiv ADCC
------------------	------------------	-------------------------	------	----------------------------	----------------

Source: ADC, Operations Plan Serial Number 4-54, 20 Feb 1954, Appendices 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 to Annex F.

**SECRET**

0 5 4 1



# SECRET

Unit	Location	Type Radar	Function	When Used	Reports To	121
3380th Test Tng Wg	Keesler AFB, Miss.	CPS-1 CPS-4	EW	Exercises and Emergencies	Eglin AFB GCI	
3555th Tng Wg	Perrin AFB, Tex.	FPS-3	ADDC	Emergencies and Backup	P-78	

#### IV. AIR PROVING GROUND COMMAND

3206th Supt Wg (Test)	Eglin AFB, Fla.	FPS-3 CPS-5 CPS-4	GCI	Exercises and Emergencies	Tyndall AFB ADDC	
-----------------------	-----------------	-------------------------	-----	---------------------------	---------------------	--

#### V. Army Antiaircraft Command

179th AAOD	Norfolk, Va.	3 TPS-1D 12 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-56 thru AAOC	
513th AAOD	Swartmore, Pa.	4 TPS-1D 16 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-54 thru AAOC	
517th AAOD	Broughton, Pa.	3 TPS-1D 12 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-63 thru AAOC	
181st AAOD	Ft Brady, Mich.	4 TPS-1D 15 T-9	EW	24 hr.	P-66 thru AAOC	
503rd AAOD	Washington, D. C.	6 TPS-1D 24 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-55 thru AAOC	
586th AAOD	Catonville, Md.	3 TPS-1D 12 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-55 thru AAOC	
515th AAOD	Ft Banks, Mass.	3 TPS-1D 12 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-10 thru AAOC	
514th AAOD	Chicago, Ill.	5 TPS-1D 20 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-31 thru AAOC	
502nd AAOD	Selfridge AFB, Mich.	4 TPS-1D 16 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-20 thru AAOC	
511th AAOD	Ft Wadsworth, N.Y.	10 TPS-1D 40 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-9 thru AAOC	
56th AAOD	Ft Niagara, N.Y.	2 TPS-1D 8 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-21 thru AAOC	

# SECRET

SECRET

122

Unit	Location	Type Radar	Function	When Used	Reports To
512th AAOD	Ft Lawton, Wash.	3 TPS-1D 12 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-1 thru AAOC
501st AAOD	Camp Hanford, Wash.	4 TPS-1D 16 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-40 thru AAOC
518th AAOD	Ft Barry, Calif.	4 TPS-1D 16 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-38 thru AAOC
35th AAOD	Ft MacArthur, Calif.	3 TPS-1D 12 M-33	EW	24 hr.	P-39 thru AAOC
10th Sky Bn	Fairchild AFB, Wash.	4 TPS-1D	EW	24 hr.	P-43 and P-40
466th Sky Bn	March AFB, Calif.	4 TPS-1D	EW	24 hr.	P-39
459th Sky Bn	Travis AFB, Calif.	4 TPS-1D	EW	24 hr.	P-58
52nd Sky Bn	Castle AFB, Calif.	4 TPS-1D	EW	24 hr.	P-58
531st Sky Bn	Ellsworth AFB, S. D.	4 TPS-1D	EW	24 hr.	P-97

VI. Navy

Mayport Navy Aux Landing Fld	Mayport, Fla	SPS-6B MPS-4	GCI	Emergencies and Exercises	35th ADiv ADCC
Memphis NARTU NAS	Memphis, Tenn.	TPS-1B	GCI	Emergencies and Exercises	35th ADiv ADCC
Atlanta NARTU NAS	Chamblee, Ga.	TPS-1D	GCI	Emergencies and Exercises	35th ADiv ADCC
2nd Mar-1st Air Gs	Cherry Point, N.C.	None			
Mar-1st Air Gs	Cherry Point, N.C.	None	TACC	16 hr. per day Emergencies Exercises	35th ADiv ADCC

SECRET

0 3 4 3



# SECRET

Unit	Location	Type Radar	Function	When Used	Reports To
MCGIS-5	Cherry Point, N.C.	CPS-5 CPS-4	GCI	16 hr. per day Emergencies Exercises	TACC (Cherry Pt)
MCGIS-6	Edenton, N.C.	TPS-1B	GCI	16 hr per day Emergencies Exercises	TACC
MCGIS-7	Camp LeJuene, N.C.	CPS-5 CPS-4	GCI	16 hr. per day Emergencies Exercises	TACC
Navy Res Tng Cen	Fargo, N.D.	SRA	EW	Emergencies and Backup	P-29
Nav Radr Pac	Jamestown, R.I.	SX SK SR SP-1M	GCI	Emergencies and Backup	P-45 P-10
Fleet Tng Cen	Newport, R.I.	SPS-6B SP-1M	EW	Emergencies and Backup	P-45
Atlantic City NAS	Atlantic City, N.J.	SPS-6B MPS-4	GCI	Emergencies and Backup	P-54
Fleet Tng Cen	Norfolk, Va.	SX SPS-6A	EW	Emergencies and Backup	P-56
CIC School NAS Glenview	Glenview, Ill.	TPS-1B SX SP-1M	EW	Emergencies and Backup	P-31

# SECRET

0 2 + +

**SECRET**

Appendix IX

AIR NATIONAL GUARD  
ASSIGNED AND PROGRAMMED AIRCRAFT

Wings & Squadrons	Location	2nd Qtr FY 54 No. A/C	4th Qtr FY 54 No. A/C	4th Qtr FY 56 No. A/C
<u>Fighter Interceptor:</u>				
101st FI Wg	Bangor, Me.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
132nd FI Sq	Bangor, Me.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
134th FI Sq	Burlington, Vt.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
133rd FI Sq	Manchester, N. H.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	23 F-94A/B
102nd FI Wg	Boston, Mass.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
101st FI Sq	Boston, Mass.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
131st FI Sq	Westfield, Mass.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
107th FI Wg	Niagara Falls, N.Y.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
130th FI Sq	Niagara Falls, N.Y.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
137th FI Sq	White Plains, N.Y.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
138th FI Sq	Syracuse, N.Y.	13 F-51H	25 F-94A/B	23 F-94A/B
139th FI Sq	Schenectady, N.Y.	13 F-51H	21 F-51H	23 F-94A/B
128th FI Wg	Milwaukee, Wisc.	18 F-51D	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
126th FI Sq	Milwaukee, Wisc.	18 F-51D	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
176th FI Sq	Madison, Wisc.	18 F-51D	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
133rd FI Wg	St. Paul, Minn.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	23 F-94A/B
107th FI Sq	St. Paul, Minn.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	23 F-94A/B
175th FI Sq	Sioux Falls, S.D.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	23 F-94A/B
178th FI Sq	Fargo, N.D.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	23 F-94A/B
179th FI Sq	Duluth, Minn.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	23 F-94A/B
142nd FI Wg	Spokane, Wash.	18 F-51D	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
116th FI Sq	Spokane, Wash.	16 F-86A	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
123rd FI Sq	Portland, Ore.	18 F-51D	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
106th FI Sq	Great Falls, Mont.	18 F-51D	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
190th FI Sq	Boise, Ida.	18 F-51D	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
<u>Fighter Bomber (Dual Mission):</u>				
103rd FB Wg	Windsor Locks, Conn.	20 F-84D	20 F-84D	17 F-84D
118th FB Sq	Windsor Locks	20 F-84D	20 F-84D	17 F-84D
152nd FB Sq	Providence, R.I.	20 F-84D	20 F-84D	17 F-84D
109th FB Wg	Newark, N. J.	13 F-51H	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
119th FB Sq	Newark, N. J.	13 F-51H	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
1st FB Sq	Fort Dix, N. J.	13 F-51H	25 F-86A	23 F-86A

Source: USAF, "Programmed Assignment of Aircraft to Air National Guard Units for FY 1954, 1955, 1956," 12 Nov 1953 (HRF 361)

**SECRET**

0 5 4 5



# SECRET

Wings & Squadrons	Location	2nd Qtr FY 54 No. A/C	4th Qtr FY 54 No. A/C	4th Qtr FY 56 No. A/C
<u>Fighter Bomber (Dual Mission):</u>				
111th FB Wg	Philadelphia, Pa.			
103rd FB Sq	Philadelphia	18 F-51D	22 F-84E	25 F-86F
7th FB Sq	Philadelphia	18 F-51D	22 F-84E	25 F-86F
112th FB Wg	Harrisburg, Pa.			
146th FB Sq	Coraopolis, Pa.	13 F-51H	22 F-84E	25 F-86F
147th FB Sq	Coraopolis, Pa.	13 F-51H	22 F-84E	25 F-86F
148th FB Sq	Reading, Pa.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	25 F-86F
113th FB Wg	Andrews AFB, Md.			
121st FB Sq	Andrews AFB	14 F-84E	22 F-84E	25 F-86F
104th FB Sq	Baltimore, Md.	13 F-51H	22 F-84E	25 F-86F
142nd FB Sq	Wilmington, Del.	14 F-84E	22 F-84E	25 F-86F
116th FB Wg	Marietta, Ga.			
123th FB Sq	Marietta	20 F-84D	20 F-84D	17 F-84D
157th FB Sq	Eastover, S. C.	13 F-51H	21 F-51H	24 F-86E
158th FB Sq	Savannah, Ga.	20 F-84D	20 F-84D	17 F-84D
159th FB Sq	Jacksonville, Fla.	13 F-51H	21 F-51H	24 F-86E
123rd FB Wg	Louisville, Ky.			
165th FB Sq	Louisville	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	23 F-86A
156th FB Sq	Charlotte, N.C.	18 F-51D	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
167th FB Sq	Charleston, W. Va.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	25 F-86F
125th FB Wg	Chicago, Ill.			
168th FB Sq	Chicago	18 F-51D	17 F-86E	24 F-86E
168th FB Sq	Chicago	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	24 F-86E
169th FB Sq	Peoria, Ill.	13 F-51H	23 F-51D	25 F-86F
170th FB Sq	Springfield, Ill.	11 F-86E	17 F-86E	25 F-86F
120th FB Wg	Detroit, Mich.			
107th FB Sq	Detroit	11 F-86E	17 F-86E	25 F-86E
171st FB Sq	Detroit	11 F-86E	17 F-86E	25 F-86E
172nd FB Sq	Battle Creek, Mich.	11 F-86E	17 F-86E	25 F-86E
144th FB Wg	Hayward, Calif.			
191st FB Sq	Salt Lake City, Ut.	13 F-51H	25 F-86A	23 F-86A
192nd FB Sq	Reno, Nev.	13 F-51H	23 F-51D	25 F-86F
194th FB Sq	Hayward, Calif.	13 F-51H	21 F-51H	23 F-86A
146th FB Wg	Van Nuys, Calif.			
115th FB Sq	Van Nuys	13 F-51H	14 F-86F	25 F-86F
195th FB Sq	Van Nuys	13 F-51H	14 F-86F	25 F-86F
196th FB Sq	Ontario, Calif.	13 F-51H	21 F-51H	25 F-86F
197th FB Sq	Phoenix, Ariz.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	25 F-86F

125  
SECRET

0 5 4 6

# SECRET

Wings & Squadrons	Location	2nd Qtr	4th Qtr	4th Qtr
		FY 54 No. A/C	FY 54 No. A/C	FY 56 No. A/C
<u>Fighter Bomber (Dual Mission):</u>				
121st FB Wg	Columbus, Ohio			
112th FB Sq	Canton, Ohio	13 F-51H	23 F-51D	24 F-84E
162nd FB Sq	Dayton, Ohio	13 F-51H	23 F-51D	24 F-84E
164th FB Sq	Mansfield, Ohio	11 F-80A	22 F-84E	24 F-84E
166th FB Sq	Columbus, Ohio	11 F-80A	22 F-84E	24 F-84E
122nd FB Wg	Indianapolis, Ind.			
113th FB Sq	Indianapolis	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	24 F-84E
163rd FB Sq	Ft. Wayne, Ind.	14 F-84E	22 F-84E	24 F-84E
132nd FB Wg	Des Moines, Iowa			
124th FB Sq	Des Moines	11 F-80A	18 F-80A	22 F-84F
173rd FB Sq	Lincoln, Neb.	11 F-80A	18 F-80A	22 F-84F
174th FB Sq	Sergeant Bluffs, Ia.	11 F-80A	18 F-80A	22 F-84F
136th FB Wg	Dallas, Tex.			
111th FB Sq	Houston, Tex.	13 F-80B	14 F-80B	24 F-84E
181st FB Sq	Dallas, Tex.	13 F-80B	14 F-80B	24 F-84E
182nd FB Sq	San Antonio, Tex.	18 F-51D	23 F-51D	22 F-84F
137th FB Wg	Okla City, Okla.			
125th FB Sq	Tulsa, Okla.	13 F-80B	14 F-80B	24 F-84E
127th FB Sq	Wichita, Kans.	13 F-80B	14 F-80B	24 F-84E
185th FB Sq	Okla City, Okla.	13 F-80B	14 F-80B	24 F-84E
140th FB Wg	Denver, Colo.			
120th FB Sq	Denver	13 F-80B	14 F-80B	25 F-80B
187th FB Sq	Cheyenne, Wyo.	13 F-80B	14 F-80B	25 F-86F
188th FB Sq	Albuquerque, N.M.	13 F-80B	14 F-80B	25 F-86F

126  
SECRET

0 3 4 7



**SECRET**

Appendix X

MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT OF  
AIR NATIONAL GUARD FIGHTER WINGS AND SQUADRONS  
JANUARY 1954

1. 25th Air Division (Defense), McChord AFB, Washington
  - a. 142nd Fighter Interceptor Wing (less the 186th FI Sq)
2. 26th Air Division (Defense), Roslyn, New York
  - a. 103rd Fighter Bomber Wing
  - b. 108th Fighter Bomber Wing
  - c. 111th Fighter Bomber Wing
  - d. 113th Fighter Bomber Wing
  - e. 137th Fighter Interceptor Squadron
  - f. 148th Fighter Bomber Squadron
3. 27th Air Division (Defense), Norton AFB, California
  - a. 146th Fighter Bomber Wing (less the 197th FB Sq)
4. 28th Air Division (Defense), Hamilton AFB, California
  - a. 144th Fighter Bomber Wing (less the 191st FB Sq)
5. 29th Air Division (Defense), Great Falls AFB, Montana
  - a. 186th Fighter Interceptor Squadron
6. 30th Air Division (Defense), Willow Run, Michigan
  - a. 112th Fighter Bomber Wing (less the 148th FB Sq)
  - b. 121st Fighter Bomber Wing
  - c. 122nd Fighter Bomber Wing
  - d. 123rd Fighter Bomber Wing (less the 156th FB Sq)
  - e. 126th Fighter Bomber Wing (less the 169th and 170th FB Sq)
  - f. 127th Fighter Bomber Wing
  - g. 128th Fighter Interceptor Wing
7. 31st Air Division (Defense), Ft. Snelling, Minnesota
  - a. 132nd Fighter Bomber Wing
  - b. 133rd Fighter Interceptor Wing
  - c. 169th Fighter Bomber Squadron
  - d. 170th Fighter Bomber Squadron

Source: ADC to USAF, "Mobilization Assignments of ANG Fighter Wings,"  
26 Jan 1954 (Doc: 107).

127

**SECRET**

0 5 4 8

**SECRET**

8. 32nd Air Division (Defense), Hancock Field, Syracuse, New York
  - a. 101st Fighter Interceptor Wing
  - b. 102nd Fighter Interceptor Wing
  - c. 107th Fighter Interceptor Wing (less the 137th FI Sq)
9. 33rd Air Division (Defense), Tinker AFB, Oklahoma
  - a. 136th Fighter Bomber Wing
  - b. 137th Fighter Bomber Wing
10. 34th Air Division (Defense), Kirtland AFB, New Mexico
  - a. 140th Fighter Bomber Wing
  - b. 191st Fighter Bomber Squadron
  - c. 197th Fighter Bomber Squadron
11. 35th Air Division (Defense), Dobbins AFB, Georgia
  - a. 116th Fighter Bomber Wing
  - b. 156th Fighter Bomber Squadron.

128  
**SECRET**

0 3 4 9



# SECRET

## REFERENCE NOTES

Documents cited in this study are available in the Headquarters ADC Historical Directorate, the Headquarters USAF Historical Division, or in the files of ADC Lower-echelon units. The document location is shown by the following abbreviations:

DOC \_\_\_\_\_. indicates that the document is a supporting document to this study only and is located at the Headquarters ADC Historical Directorate and the Headquarters USAF Historical Division.

ADCHR #\_\_\_\_\_, Doc \_\_\_\_\_. (#1 covers period to June 1951, #2 to December 1951, etc.). indicates that the document has been used as a supporting document to a previous Headquarters ADC Historical Report, as shown, and is located at the Headquarters ADC Historical Directorate and the Headquarters USAF Historical Division.

ADC Unit, Semi-annual Period, Doc \_\_\_\_\_, e.g., WADF, 1951A Doc 235. ("A" refers to the period 1 January to 30 June, "B" to 1 July to 31 December.). indicates that the document has been used as a supporting document in an ADC lower-echelon unit and is located in the particular unit's files, at the Headquarters ADC Historical Directorate, and at the Headquarters USAF Historical Division.

HRP \_\_\_\_\_. indicates that document has not been used in a previous history and is located only in the Headquarters ADC Historical Directorate's Historical Reference Files.

# SECRET

0 5 5 0

# SECRET

## CHAPTER ONE

1. AAF to ADC, "Interim Mission," 12 Mar 1946 (ADCHR #1, Doc 7).
2. Hist of ADC, Mar 1946 to Mar 1947, p 8.
3. As in n 1.
4. As in n 2, p 6.
5. As in n 2, p 6.
6. AAF to ADC, "Investment of Command Responsibilities of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces in Event of an Air Invasion," 10 Jun 1946 (ADCHR #1, Doc 8).
7. ADC to AAF, "Responsibility of the Air Defense Command," 13 Sep 1946 (ADCHR #1, Doc 9).
8. ADC to AAF, "Mission of the Air Defense Command," 5 Aug 1946, with 1 Incl and 1 Ind (DOC 1).
9. ADC to 1st, 2nd, 4th, 10th, 11th, and 14th AFs, "Air Defense of the Continental United States," 12 Aug 1946 (DOC 2).
10. As in n 2, pp 23-24.
11. Col J. B. Cary, Actg A C/S A-5 ADC to Brig Gen G. A. Lincoln, Ch Strat & Pol Gp, Plans & Opns Div, War Dept Gen Staff, 7 Aug 1946 (DOC 3).
12. USAF to ADC, SAC & TAC, "Coordination of Air Defense Command, Strategic Air Command, and Tactical Air Command Operations Under Emergcy Conditions," 17 Dec 1947 (ADCHR #1, Doc 10).
13. ADCHR #1, p 117.
14. As in n 13.
15. USAF to ADC, "Joint Training in Air Defense," 8 Jul 1948 (ADCHR #2, Doc 52).
16. USAF to ADC, "Air Defense," 17 Dec 1947 (ADCHR #1, Doc 17).
17. As in n 2, p 46.
18. Presentation on ANG by Maj Gen Kenneth F. Craner at USAF Headquarters, ca. Jan 1949, p 1 (10th AF, 1 Dec 1948 to 30 Jun 1949, App V, #1).

SECRET



## SECRET

19. 1st Ind, ComAC to USAF, 22 Nov 1949, incl to ANG Study, 16 Jan 1950 (HRF 355).
20. As in n 18, p 2.
21. AAF to ADC, "Interim Mission," 5 Jun 1946 (DOC 4).
22. As in n 8, 1st Ind, AAF to ADC, 19 Sep 1946.
23. As in n 18, p 10.
24. 4th AF, 1 Jan 1949 to 30 Nov 1948, p 100.
25. As in n 2, p 30.
26. As in n 13, p 238.
27. Functional Agreement of the Key West Conference, Mar 1948, p 8 (HRF 50.1).

## CHAPTER TWO

1. USAF to ComAC, "Establishment of the Continental Air Command and Designation of Air Defense Command and Tactical Air Command as Operational Air Commands," 19 Nov 1948 (HRF 502).
2. ADCIR #1, p 119.
3. As in n 2.
4. USAF Press Release, 18 Nov 1948 (HRF 502.2)
5. ComAC to USAF, "Employment of Air National Guard Fighter Aircraft in Air Defense Missions," 22 Dec 1949 (DOC 5).
6. As in n 5.
7. Maj Gen Karl F. Hausauer, C/S to the Gov of the State of N. Y. to Maj Gen Robert M. Webster, CG EADF, 9 Jan 1950 (DOC 6).
8. EADF, Policy Sheet, "ANG," 27 Dec 1949 (DOC 7).
9. Memo, Whitcomb to Myers, 12 Nov 1949, incl to ANG Study, 16 Jan 1950 (HRF 355).
10. EADF to AG, State of N. Y., "Utilization of ANG Units in Air Defense," 7 Oct 1949 (DOC 8).
11. EADF to ComAC, "Employment of ANG Fighter Units in Active Air Defense," 16 Jan 1950 (DOC 9).

SECRET

0 3 3 2

SECRET

133

12. As in n 11.
13. As in n 5.
14. ConAC to EADF, "Employment of Air National Guard Aircraft in Air Defense Mission," 9 Jun 1950, with 1 incl (DOC 10).
15. As in n 14, incl., HGB to AGs all states, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the D.C., "Channels for Control of Operations for Training ANG Units in Preparation for Readiness for their Federal Mission," 3 Jan 1949.
16. As in n 14.
17. 10th AF to ConAC, "Employment of ANG Aircraft in Air Defense Missions," 8 Jul 1950 (DOC 11).
18. EADF, 1 Jan to 31 Dec 1950, pp 195-106.
19. ConAC, "ANG Study," 16 Jan 1950, p 7 (HRF 355).
20. As in n 19, pp 15-16; 10th AF, 1950B, p 279.
21. ConAC to EADF, "Planning Information Required to Integrate ANG Units into the Regular Air Defense System," 27 Sep 1950, (DOC 12).
22. EADF to ConAC, "Planning Information Required to Integrate ANG Units into the Regular Air Defense System," with 2 incls, 31 Oct 1950 (DOC 13).
23. USAF to ConAC, "Emergency Employment of ANG Fighter Squadrons," 2 Nov 1950 (DOC 14); 2nd Ind, ConAC to USAF, 5 Dec 1950 to ConAC to USAF, "Use of ANG Fighter Units in Air Defense," 27 Sep 1950 (DOC 15).
24. As in n 23, USAF to ConAC.
25. Facts on File Yearbook, 1950, X, 383.
26. TMX, USAF to ADC, 22 Jan 1951 (ADCHR #2, Doc 63); USAF to ADC, "Use of ANG Units for Air Defense," 22 Jan 1951, with 2 incls (ADCHR #2, Doc 64).
27. TMX, ADC to EADF, WADF, 27 Jan 1951 (ADCHR #2, Doc 66).
28. As in n 26.
29. ADCHR #1, pp 126-129.
30. ConAC to USAF, "Use of ANG Units in the Air Defense of the United States," 6 Dec 1950, with 1 incl (ADCHR #1, Doc 92).

SECRET

0 3 3 3



SECRET

31. ConAC to USAF, "Air Defense Augmentation," 15 Jul 1950, with 1 Ind and 2 Incls (ADCHR #1, Doc 91).
32. As in n 31.
33. As in n 31, 1st Ind, USAF to ConAC, 1 Aug 1950.
34. As in n 29, p 128.
35. As in n 30.
36. As in n 30, 1st Incl.
37. As in n 30, 1st Incl.
38. ConAC, Memorandum for the Record, "Planning Committee Meeting, 7 Dec 1950," (DOC 16).
39. TWX, ConAC to USAF, 29 Dec 1950 (DOC 17).
40. ADC, Planning Committee Report #1-51, 22 Jan 1951 (HRF 902).
41. As in n 40, PCR #2-51, 29 Jan 1951.
42. USAF to ADC, "Aircraft Control and Warning Plan for the United States," 19 Jan 1948 (HRF 204).
43. ADC to USAF, "Reorganization of Air National Guard Aircraft Control and Warning Units," 20 Apr 1948, with 4 Incls and 2 Incls. (DOC 18).
44. As in n 29, p 56.
45. As in n 44, pp 71-73.
46. Memo, "The USAF Plan for the M-Day Employment of the ANG ACEW Groups," ca. Jan 1949 (DOC 19); Memo, "Summary Pertaining to ADC Activities," 12 Jul 1949, pp 2-3 (HRF 13).
47. "Interim Statement of the Policy of the Chief of Naval Operations Concerning Emergency Employment of Naval Forces and Facilities in Air Defense of the United States," n.d. (ADCHR #1, Doc 187).
48. As in n 47.
49. EADF and ESF, "Joint Agreement for the Air Defense of the Eastern United States," 29 Dec 1949 (ADCHR #1, Doc 188).
50. EADF and ESF, "Rules of Engagement for Antiaircraft Artillery," 14 Jul 1950 (EADF, 1 Jan to 31 Dec 1950, Doc 48).

SECRET

0554

SECRET

135

51. WADF and WSF, "Bilateral Agreement for the Air Defense of the Western United States," May 1950 (ADCHR #1, Doc 188).
52. WADF to WSF, "Emergency Integration of Naval and Marine Air Defense Capabilities," 6 Jul 1950, with 1 Incl (ADCHR #2, Doc 49).
53. ConAC to USAF, "Present U. S. Navy Air Defense Availability," 9 Oct 1950 (ADCHR #2, Doc 48).
54. WSF to Distribution, "Supply of Data to the Air Defense Force," 3 Nov 1950 (DOC 20).
55. ConAC, Memo, Col Charles R. Bond to Gen Thatcher, "Potential Navy Air Defense Capabilities," 10 Apr 1950 (ADCHR #2, Doc 51); Navy and Marine Radar Stations - West U.S., 6 Jul 1950 (DOC 21).
56. EADF and ESF, "Joint Agreement for the Training of Navy and Marine Corps Units in the Air Defense of the Eastern United States," 25 Sep 1950 (ADCHR #1, Doc 190).

CHAPTER THREE

1. AFR 23-9, "Organization-Air Commands and Air Forces, Air Defense Command," 15 Nov 1950 (HRF 503.1).
2. ADC to SAC, "Air Defense Capability," 19 Mar 1951 (DOC 22); Current Planning Activities, Planning Committee Report #5-51, 5 Mar 1951.
3. TAC and ADC, "Mutual Agreement for the Air Defense of the Continental United States," 21 Apr 1951 (DOC 23).
4. As in n 3, Sec V, b.
5. ADC to WADF, "Utilization of Tactical Air Command Forces in the Air Defense of the United States," 29 Mar 1951 (DOC 24); ADC to EADF, "Utilization of Tactical Air Command Forces in the Air Defense of the United States," 29 Mar 1951 (DOC 25).
6. 1st Ind, CADF to ADC, 29 Jun 1951 to ADC to CADE, "Utilization of Tactical Air Command Forces in the Air Defense of the United States," 28 May 1951 (DOC 26); EADF to ADC, "Utilization of TAC Forces in Emergencies," 17 Jul 1951 (ADCHR #2, Doc 58).
7. WADF Operations Plan Serial No. 5-51, 10 Sep 1951 (WADF, 1951B, Doc 308).
8. SAC and ADC, "Mutual Agreement for the Air Defense of the Continental United States," 23 May 1951 (DOC 27); ADC to SAC, "Mutual Agreement for the Air Defense of the Continental United States," 29 Mar 1951 (ADCHR #2, Doc 54).

SECRET



**SECRET**

9. R&R, P&R to O&T, DO, VC, 10 May 1951 (DOC 28).
10. As in n 9.
11. As in n 8, SAC and ADC Mutual Agreement, Sec VII, (a).
12. TXK, ADC to SAC, TAC, 6 Oct 1951 (DOC 29); TXK, SAC to ADC, 6 Dec 1951 (DOC 30).
13. TXK, ADC to SAC, 11 Dec 1951 (ADCHR #2, Doc 59).
14. R&R, P&R to O&T, 26 Jun 1951 (AGC 381); WADF Operation Plan Serial No. 8-51, 11 Sep 1951 (WADF, 1951B, Doc 308).
15. AFRC and ADC, "Mutual Agreement for the Air Defense of the Continental United States," 9 Aug 1951, Sec V, b., (3) (ADCHR #2, Doc 61); AFRC and ADC, "Mutual Agreement for the Air Defense of the Continental United States," 23 Aug 1951, Sec V, b., (3) (DOC 31); ARDC and ADC, "Mutual Agreement for the Air Defense of the Continental United States," 23 November 1951, Sec V, b., (3) (DOC 32).
16. CADF to ADC, "Utilization of Tactical Air Command Forces in the Air Defense of the United States," 28 Sep 1951, with 2 Inds (ADCHR #2, Doc 62); ADC to WADF, "Operations Plans 5-51 and 8-51," 15 Jan 1952 (WADF, 1951B, Doc 309).
17. As in n 16, 1st Ind, ADC to CADF, 30 Oct 1951 to CADF to ADC; ADC to WADF, "ADC Operations Plan, Serial No. 14-51," 1 Dec 1951 (WADF, 1951B, Doc 310).
18. ADC, Operations Plan Serial No. 14-51, 1 Dec 1951, Annex A (AGC).
19. As in n 18; ADC to EADF, "ADC Operations Order 6-52," 12 Mar 1952 (EADF, 1952A, Doc 353).
20. ADC, Operations Order Serial No. 7-52, 1 Apr 52, App. 1, Annex A, p 6 (AGC Files).
21. SAC to ADC, "ADC Operations Plan Serial No. 15-51," 29 Dec 1951, with 1 Ind (ADCHR #3, Doc 68).
22. As in n 21.
23. As in n 21, 1st Ind, ADC to SAC.
24. ADC, Operations Order Serial No. 6-52, 1 Mar 1952, Appendix 2, Annex A (HRF 59); ADC to EADF, "In-Place Utilization of Augmentation Forces," 8 Feb 1952 (ADCHR #3, Doc 72).

**SECRET**

0 5 5 8

SECRET

137

25. R&R, O&T-F to DO, "Plan for In-Place Utilization of Augmentation Forces," 7 Feb 1952 (ADCHR #3, Doc 73).
26. ADC to ATRC, "Utilization of Augmentation Forces," 7 May 1952 (ADCHR #3, Doc 74); ADC to CADF, "Integration of Augmentation Forces," 27 May 1952 (ADCHR #3, Doc 75).
27. As in n 26, ADC to CADF.
28. ADC to TAC, "Use of TAC Fighter Forces in the Air Defense Role," 6 Feb 1952, with 3 Incls and 1 Incl (ADCHR #2, Doc 59).
29. As in n 28, 1st Incl, TAC to ADC, 29 Feb 1952; 3rd Incl, TAC to ADC, 29 Mar 1952.
30. ADC, Operations Order Serial No. 8-52, Amend. 1, 2 May 1952 (HRF 59).
31. ADC, Operations Order Serial No. 12-52, 1 Jul 1952 (HRF 59); ADC, Diary #154, 18 Aug 1952 (HRF 901).
32. ADC to EADF, "Alert Commitments for TAC Aircraft," 16 Apr 1952 (ADCHR #3, Doc 71).
33. WADF to 25th, 27th, 28th, 29th, and 34th Air Divs, "Air Defense Indoctrination," 8 Apr 1952 (WADF, 1952A, Doc 198); See also WADF to 34th Air Div, "WADF Operations Order 3-52," 13 Feb 1952 (WADF, 1952A, Doc 196).
34. CADF Letter No. 50-5, "Briefing of Deployment Units of Other Major Commands," 18 Apr 1952 (CADF, 1952A, Doc 47).
35. EADF to ADC, "Mutual Agreements for Air Defense of Continental United States," 4 Apr 1952 (EADF, 1952A, Doc 348); EADF, 1952A, p 144.
36. EADF, Operations Order No. 17-52, 12 Nov 1952 (EADF, 1952B, Doc 433).
37. ADC to ATRC, "Training for Air Defense Mission," 9 Apr 1952 (ADCHR #3, Doc 76).
38. 34th Air Div to WADF, "Training of Other Major Command Units for Defense Mission," 8 May 1952 (WADF, 1952A, Doc 203); 32nd Air Div to TAC, "Training for Air Defense Mission," 6 Jun 1952 (ADCHR #3, Doc 77); 31st Air Div to 140th Fighter-Bomber Group, "Training of Units in Other Commands for Air Defense Mission," 24 Jun 1952 (CADF, 1952A, Doc 48).
39. CADF, 1952A, p 98.
40. ADC, Report of Exercise Sign Post, 12 Sep 1952, p 2, (ADCHR #4, Doc 4).
41. As in n 40, **SECRET**

0557

SECRET



**SECRET**

42. As in n 40, p 83.
43. RAR, O&T-F to Mgt Anal, "Augmentation Forces During Sign Post," 4 Aug 1952 (ADCFR #4, Doc 19).
44. As in 43.
45. As in n 40, p 84.
46. ADC, Operations Order Serial No. 18-52, 10 Oct 1952, Amend 1 (HRF 59).
47. WADF, Report of Exercise 2-51 (Feb 1951), p 35 (HRF 60#5).
48. EADF, Report of Exercise, 22-24 Jun 1951, 23 Aug 1951 (no pagination) (HRF 60.8).
49. Report of Naval Air Reserve Units with Aircraft Assigned Within CADF, 25 Mar 1952 (CADF, 1952A, Doc 38); EADF to ADC, "Naval Air Defense Capabilities," 1 Jul 1952 (EADF 1952A, Doc 365).
50. EADF to Air Divs, "Augmentation of EADF by Naval Reserve Units," 8 Apr 1952 (EADF, 1952A, Doc 367); CADF to 35th Air Div, "Naval Air Reserve Units Within CADF," 7 Dec 1951 (CADF 1951B, Doc 289); CADF to 31st Air Div, "Naval Air Reserve Activities Within CADF," 6 Dec 1951 (CADF, 1951B, Doc 287); CADF to 33rd Air Div, "Naval Air Reserve Units Within CADF," 7 Dec 1951 (CADF, 1951B, Doc 288).
51. SAC to ADC, "Naval Reserve Unit Participation in SAC-ADC Interception Maneuvers," 5 Nov 1951 (DOC 33).
52. CADF to 31st Air Div, "Naval Air Reserve Activities Within CADF," 7 Jan 1952 (CADF, 1952A, Doc 36).
53. 31st Air Division and NAS Lincoln and NAS Minneapolis, "Joint Agreement for Exploiting the Air Defense Capabilities of Navy Elements in the Air Defense of the 31st Air Division Sector," 30 Jul 1952 (31st Air Div, 1952A, Attachment 26).
54. WAF and WADF, "Bilateral Agreement for the Air Defense of the Western United States," 23 Nov 1951 (WADF, 1951B, Doc 313); ESF and EADF, "Joint Agreement for the Air Defense of the Eastern and Central United States," 13 Dec 1951 (EADF, 1951B, Doc 1057).
55. ESF and EADF, "Joint Agreement for the Training of Navy, Marine and Air Force Units in the Air Defense of the Eastern United States," 12 Dec 1951 (EADF, 1951B, Doc 1060).
56. CND to Distribution, "Responsibilities and Functions of Naval Commanders with Regard to Air Defense of the United States Under Emergency Conditions," (OPNAV Instruction 003320.3), 23 Sep 1952 (DOC 34).

**SECRET**

0 5 3 8

SECRET

139

57. As in n 56.
58. 1st Ind, ADC to USAF, 25 Nov 1952 to USAF to ADC, "Chief of Naval Operations Function Letter (OPNAV Instruction 003320-3)," 29 Oct 1952 (ADCHR #4, Doc 12).
59. CADF, 1951B, p 14.
60. ADC, Chart, "Excerpts from Air Defense Mobile Radar and Radar Extension Program," 28 Sep 1951 (HRF 207.1).
61. ADC, Program, 15 Feb 1954 (HRF 906).
62. Interview with Maj P. W. Brownfield, ADC O&T, 11 May 1954.
63. ADC to EADF, "Integration of Radar of Other Major Commands," 16 Jul 1952 (DOC 35).
64. As in n 49, EADF to ADC, "Naval Air Defense Capabilities," 1 Jul 1952.
65. As in n 49; EADF to ADC; EADF to ADC, "Integration of Radar of Other Major Commands," 28 Oct 1952, with 1 Incl (DOC 36).
66. EADF, "List of Augmentation Radar Facilities," 29 Aug 1952 (DOC 37).
67. EADF to ADC, "Utilization of Air Research and Development Command Facilities in an Emergency," 22 Apr 1952 (EADF, 1952A, Doc 361); 32nd Air Div, 16 Feb-30 Jun 1953, pp 132-133.
68. ARDC to ADC, "ARDC Participation in Air Defense of the Continental United States," 8 May 1952, with 1 Ind (DOC 38).
69. 1st Ind, WADF to ADC, 2 Sep 1952 with 5 Incls, to ADC to WADF, "Integration of Radar of Other Major Commands," 16 Jul 1952 (DOC 39); WADF to ADC, "Integration of Radar of Other Commands," 14 Nov 1952, with 2 Incls (DOC 40).
70. CADF to ADC, "Integration of Radar of Other Major Commands," 4 Sep 1952, with 3 Incls (DOC 41); CADF to ADC, "Integration of Radar of Other Major Commands," 15 Nov 1952 (DOC 42).
71. 31st Air Div, 1952B, p 222; 35th Air Div, 1953A, pp 9-10; CADF, 1952B, p 87.
72. Col H. C. Woodbury, CG 35th Air Div to Maj Gen G. R. Acheson, CG CADF, 1 Feb 1952 (DOC 43).
73. CADF, Report of Staff Visit to 35th Air Div, 20 Feb 1952 (CADF, 1952A, Doc 68).

SECRET

0 5 5 9



SECRET

74. As in n 73.
75. CADF to 35th Air Div, "Augmentation of Navy and Major Command Radar Units," 20 Mar 1952 (CADF, 1952A, Doc 69).
76. ESF to CADF, EADF, "U. S. Navy Installations; survey of," 18 Jun 1952 (EADF, 1952A, Doc 372-2).
77. RER, P&R to O&T, "Radars of Other Commands and Services," 21 Aug 1952, comment 1 of 4 included (DOC 44).
78. As in n 77, comment 1.
79. As in n 77, O&T to P&R, 25 Sep 1952, comment 2.
80. As in n 77, P&R to O&T, 1 Oct 1952, comment 3.
81. As in n 77, O&T to P&R, 17 Oct 1952, comment 4.
82. ADC, Planning Committee Report, #2-51, 29 Jan 1951; PCR #3-52, 17 Jan 1952 (HRF 902).
83. ADC to WADF, "Use of ANG Fighter Units for Air Defense," 19 Mar 1951 (ADCHER #2, Doc 65); ADC to WADF, "Use of ANG Fighter Units for Air Defense," 20 Jul 1951 (WADF, 1951B, Doc 312).
84. USAF to ComAC, "Mission of the ANG Fighter Squadrons in the United States," 14 Feb 1951 (DOC 45).
85. WADF, Operation Plan Serial No. 4-51, 17 Jul 1951 (WADF, 1951B, Doc 30, Appendix 1).
86. EADF to ADC, "Use of ANG Fighter Units for Air Defense of the United States," 10 May 1951 (ADCHER #2, Doc 67); EADF, 1951B, pp 313-316.
87. WADF, Report of Exercise 2-51 (1-4 Feb 1951), pp 8-10, (HRF 60.5); WADF, Report of Exercise 3-51 (7-9 Apr 1951), p 18 (HRF 60.7).
88. EADF, Report of Exercise (22-24 Jun 1951), pp 1-4 (60.8).
89. USAF to ADC, "Fiscal Year 1953 Air Reserve Program", 19 Dec 1951 (ADCHER #3, Doc 91).
90. USAF to ADC, "Mobilization Assignment of Air National Guard Units," 8 Mar 1952 (ADCHER #3, Doc 94).
91. ADC to EADF, "Mobilization Assignment of ANG Units," 12 Jun 1952 (EADF, 1952B, Doc 434); ADC to WADF, "Mobilization Assignment of Air National Guard Units," 12 Jun 1952 (ADCHER #3, Doc 95); CADF, 1952B, p 117.

SECRET

0 5 8 0

## SECRET

92. As in n 91, CADF 1952B; 33rd Air Div to CADF, "Meeting with 181st FIS, Texas Air National Guard," 24 Jun 1952 (CADF, 1952A, Doc 61).
93. R&R, DCS/O to C/S, "National Guard Pilots, 23 Jan 1953 (DOC 46); ADC, Diary #143, 1 Aug 1952 (HRF 901).
94. ADC to USAF, "Air National Guard Fighter Squadron Program," 9 Feb 1952, with 2 Incls (ADCHR #3, Doc 93).
95. As in n 94, 1st Ind, USAF to ADC, 3 Mar 1952.
96. As in n 94, 2nd Ind, ADC to USAF, 21 Mar 1952.
97. USAF to ADC, "Mission of ANG Fighter Units," 6 Oct 1952, with 1 Ind (ADCHR #4, Doc 14).
98. ADC to EADF, "Mobilization Assignment of Air National Guard Units," 31 Dec 1952 (EADF, 1952B, Doc 440); ADC to CADF, "Mobilization Assignment of Air National Guard Units," 31 Dec 1952 (CADF, 1952B, Doc 34).
99. ADC, GO#45, 1 Oct 1952 (ADCHR #4, Doc 7); ADC, GO#49, 28 Oct 1952 (ADCHR #4, Doc 7).
100. Interview with Capt V. A. Winder, ADC O&T, 16 Jan 1953.

## CHAPTER IV

1. ADC to USAF, "Commitment of Augmentation Forces," 2 Jan 1953 (ADCHR #5, Doc 90).
2. As in n 1.
3. Vandenberg to Chidlaw, 3 Mar 1953, with 1 Incl (ADCHR #5, Doc 91).
4. AFGC and ADC, "Mutual Agreement for the Air Defense of the Continental United States," 3 Apr 1953 (ADCHR #5, Doc 92); ATRC and ADC, "Mutual Agreement for the Air Defense of the Continental United States," 25 Apr 1953 (ADCHR #5, Doc 93); Incl, "Report of TAC-ADC Augmentation Conference," to ADC to TAC, "Air Defense Augmentation from TAC," 27 Jun 1953 (ADCHR #5, Doc 94).
5. As in n 4, AFGC Agreement, Sec VI; ATRC Agreement, Sec VI; TAC Agreement Report, par 2.
6. As in n 4, AFGC Agreement, Sec IV; ATRC Agreement, Sec IV; TAC Agreement Report, par 3, b. (6).

SECRET

0 5 0 1



**SECRET**

7. SAC and ADC, "Mutual Agreement for the Air Defense of the Continental United States," 4 Apr 1953, Sec III (ADCHER #5, Doc 95).
8. As in n 7, Sec IV.
9. Interview with Maj B. E. McKenzie, ADC O&T, 7 Oct 1953.
10. TAC to ADC, "ADC Augmentation Forces," 17 Feb 1953 (ADCHER #5, Doc 96).
11. R&R, O&T-C to O&T-A, "Notes for DO Staff Meeting," 25 Aug 1953 (DOC 47).
12. TAC to ADC, "Air Defense Command Gunnery Training Augmentation," 11 Sep 1953 (DOC 48).
13. ADC to USAF, "Commitment of Augmentation Forces for Air Defense," 13 Aug 1953 (DOC 49).
14. As in n 13.
15. AFR 23-5A, Change, "Organization-Field, Air Training Command," 20 Oct 1953 (DOC 50); AFR 23-8A, Change, "Organization-Field, Air Research and Development Command," 20 Oct 1953 (DOC 51); AFR 23-10A, Change, "Organization-Field, Tactical Air Command," 20 Oct 1953 (DOC 52); AFR 23-14A, Change, "Organization-Field, Air Proving Ground Command," 20 Oct 1953 (DOC 53); AFR 23-9, "Organization-Field, Air Defense Command," 5 Apr 1954 (DOC 54).
16. AFR 23-12, "Organization-Field, Strategic Air Command," 25 Mar 1954 (DOC 55).
17. 27th Air Div to WADF, "Use of Air Force Aircraft at Plants as an Air Defense Augmentation Force," 27 Oct 1953, with 2 Incls (DOC 56); ADC, DCS/O Project Reports, 1 Feb 1954, p 15 (HRF 908).
18. As in n 17, 2nd Incl, ADC to WADF, 24 Nov 1953.
19. ADC, Operation Tail Wind Final Report, 15 Oct 1953, p 65 (ADCHER #6, Doc 42).
20. As in n 19, p 64.
21. As in n 19, p 67; SAC to ADC, Transmittal of Mission Summary Reports," 29 Aug 1953, with 2 Incls (DOC 57).
22. Interview with Maj B. E. McKenzie, ADC O&T, 24 May 1954.
23. ADC, Operations Plan Serial No. 4-54, 20 Feb 1954, p 7 (HRF 339).

**SECRET**

0 5 5 2

SECRET

143

24. As in n 23; TWX, SAC to ADC, 5 Nov 1953 (DOC 58).
25. ADC to USAF, "Increasing the Kill Effectiveness of Augmentation Aircraft," 1 Sep 1953, with 1 Ind (DOC 59).
26. As in n 25, 1st Ind, USAF to ADC, 23 Sep 1953.
27. WSF and WADF, "Bilateral Agreement for the Air Defense of the Western Continental United States," 15 Apr 1953 (DOC 60); ESF and EADF and CADF, "Joint Agreement for the Air Defense of the Eastern and Central United States," (CADF, 1953A, Appendix B).
28. RER, O&T-F to DCS/O, "Use of Naval Forces at Denver for Air Defense," 15 Apr 1953 (ADCHR #5, Doc 97).
29. CO NAS Denver to Comdr WSF, "Employment of Naval Air Reserve Forces at U.S. Naval Air Station, Denver, Colorado," 19 Apr 1953 (DOC 61).
30. CADF to ADC, "Deployment of Naval Reserve Unit at Denver," 15 Apr 1953 (ADCHR #5, Doc 98).
31. Incl, "Redeployment of Naval Fighter Type Aircraft for the Air Defense of the Central and Eastern United States," 9 Oct 1953 to CADF to ADC, "Redeployment of Naval Aircraft for Air Defense," 27 Oct 1953 (DOC 62).
32. As in n 19, pp 14-16.
33. Maj Gen D. T. Spivey, Comdr CADF to Maj Gen F. H. Smith, Jr., VC ADC, 12 May 1953 (DOC 63).
34. As in n 33.
35. CADF, Staff Study, "Elimination of M-sites in 35th Air Division (Defense)," 11 May 1953 (DOC 64).
36. Maj Gen F. H. Smith to Maj Gen D. T. Spivey, 21 May 1953 (DOC 65).
37. RER, ECS/O to VC, "Elimination of M-Sites in 35th Air Division (Defense)," 21 May 1953 (DOC 66).
38. ADC to USAF, "Employment of Radars of Other Commands and Services in Support of the Air Defense Mission," 23 May 1953 (DOC 67).
39. USAF to ATRC, "Employment of Radars of Your Command in Support of the Air Defense Mission," with 1 Ind, 10 Jul 1953 (DOC 68); USAF to APOC, "Employment of Radars of Your Command in Support of the Air Defense Mission," with 2 Inds, 10 Jul 1953 (DOC 69).

SECRET

0 5 6 3



**SECRET**

40. ADC to EADF, "Radars of Other Commands and Services in Lieu of 'M' Site Radars," with 1 Ind, 6 Jun 1953, (DOC 70); ADC to CADF, "Utilization of Radars of Other Commands and Services in Lieu of 'M' Site Radars," 3 Jun 1953 (DOC 71); ADC to WADF, "Radars of Other Commands and Services in Lieu of 'M' Site Radars," with 1 Ind, 6 Jun 1953 (DOC 72).
41. As in n 40, 1st Ind, EADF to ADC, 26 Jun 1953 to ADC to EADF, "Radars of Other Commands and Services in Lieu of 'M' Site Radars," 6 Jun 1953.
42. As in n 40, 1st Ind, WADF to ADC, 9 Jul 1953 to ADC to WADF, "Radars of Other Commands and Services in Lieu of 'M' Site Radars," 6 Jun 1953.
43. CADF to ADC, "Utilization of Other Commands and Services in Lieu of 'M' Site Radars," 3 Sep 1953 (DOC 73).
44. As in n 39, 2nd Ind, ADC to AFGC, 15 Sep 1953 to USAF to AFGC, "Employment of Radars of Your Command in Support of the Air Defense Mission," 10 Jul 1953; 1st Ind, ADC to ATRC, 19 Aug 1953 to ATRC to ADC, "Employment of ATRC Radar Facilities in Support of the Air Defense Mission," 5 Aug 1953 (DOC 74); 1st Ind, ADC to ARDC, 9 Sep 1953 to ARDC to ADC, "ARDC Support of the ADC Mission," 29 Jun 1953 (DOC 75).
45. Brig Gen K. P. Bergquist, ADC DCS/O<sup>4</sup> to Maj Gen D. T. Spivey, Comdr CADF, 21 Aug 1953 (DOC 76).
46. CADF to ADC, "Utilization of TAC Radars in Lieu of Certain ADC Programmed Mobile Sites," with 1 Ind, 16 Dec 1953 (DOC 77).
47. As in n 46, 1st Ind, ADC to CADF, 5 Apr 1954.
48. Incl, "Joint Agreement - Ninth AF and CADF," 15 Apr 1954 to CADF to ADC, "Utilization of TAC Radars in Lieu of Certain ADC I and II Phase Sites," 27 Apr 1954 (DOC 78).
49. ADC to USAF, "Employment of Radars of Other Commands and Services in Support of the Air Defense Mission," 22 Aug 1953 (DOC 79).
50. ADC to USAF, "Utilization of Marine Corps Radar at Cherry Point, N.C. in lieu of M-116, Englehard, N.C.," 18 May 1954 (DOC 80).
51. TMX, USAF to ADC, 13 May 1954 (DOC 81).
52. As in n 50.
53. CADF to ADC, "Augmentation Radars of Other Commands or Services," with 1 Incl, 14 Dec 1953 (DOC 82).

**SECRET**