AL4015 IRIS NUMBER 00198554

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RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
ATTACHED AS (TAB) [illegible]

HISTORY

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

1949

Volume V

Supporting Documents

Exhibits 130-145

and

Miscellaneous Data

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Subject: Report of [illegible] Inspection, [illegible] Bomb Group (VH), Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

([illegible] 13) (14 Jan 49) 2d Ind

Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas, 7 [illegible] 1949

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska

1. In view of telephone conversation between Director of Operations, Strategic Air Command and Director of Operations, Eighth Air Force, no letter has been drafted for reply to Headquarters United States Air Force.

2. The following comments are made for your consideration:

a. Section III, paragraph 6c. Strategic Air Command Regulation 50-[illegible] and Eighth Air Force Regulation 51-1 adequately cover minimum requirements to be accomplished to attain a desired proficiency.

b. Section III, paragraph 6d. The recent special [illegible] of this [illegible] being [illegible].

c. Section [illegible], paragraph [illegible]. [illegible] Congressional show at [illegible] Air Force [illegible] Air Force Anniversary at Carswell Air Force Base.

d. Section III, paragraph [illegible] the Eighth Air Force [illegible] their own schedules in compliance with Eighth Air Force Regulation 51-1 and Strategic Air Command Regulation 50-[illegible].

[illegible]:

1 Incl
n/c

[illegible],
Colonel, USAF,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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[illegible] Operational, [illegible], Carswell [illegible], Texas

The Inspector General, [illegible]

Inspector [illegible], [illegible] 1 (contd)
[illegible] Force Base, [illegible]

lending themselves to finding ways and means of improving or alleviating unfavorable conditions known to exist, and have accordingly placed greater emphasis on this concept of inspection.

III. [illegible].

5. Administration and Personnel.

a. The administrative procedures and practices of the group were conducted in an excellent manner by personnel possessing high experience levels. The scores given relative to both administration and personnel were considered fair with the following exceptions:

(1) Adjustments due to "last minute" disqualification of personnel for overseas movement because of expiration of enlistment, compassionate reasons, etc, which is a continuing problem in all units, was not considered nor reflected in the evaluation of the [illegible] score on overseas qualification. It was the interpretation of the [illegible] team that only limited service individuals could be considered in the scoring of overseas qualifications.

(2) Although morale and discipline in a whole were good, they could not be considered to be [illegible], as reported in [illegible] report.

6. Operations and Training

a. The score [illegible] points out of a possible [illegible] points given by the [illegible] team was considered excessive. [illegible] of [illegible] assigned aircraft the group was able to get 11 aircraft off the ground on each mission. Calculating this item on the basis of the unit's ability to keep [illegible] of assigned aircraft in the air during the [illegible], the score would be actually 77; however, other things should be considered in arriving at the final score on this item. Of the 11 aircraft airborne on the first mission, only [illegible] aircraft were able to bomb. The average circle of error was 11,750 feet. Again on the second mission, only 6 bombs were dropped, one from each aircraft. Bomb were released on incorrect

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[illegible] of [illegible] Observations, 7th Bomb Group (VH), Carswell [illegible], Ft. Worth, Texas

The Inspector General, USAF — 25 Apr 49

Inspector General, Third Region [illegible] Air Force Base, Texas — Comment #1

I. [illegible]

1. Pursuant to provisions of [illegible], as amended, an [illegible] was performed on 7th Bomb Group (VH), Carswell AFB, Fort Worth, Texas, by representatives of Headquarters, Strategic Air Command and observed by representatives of The Inspector General, USAF, during the period [illegible] April 1949.

II. [illegible]

2. The [illegible] was effective in that it [illegible] to the [illegible] that this group was not prepared for combat [illegible]. [illegible] of [illegible] was shown to the [illegible] report, [illegible] of this unit [illegible] as to their flying [illegible] training [illegible].

3. It is the [illegible] opinion of [illegible] observers that there was [illegible] the conduct of the [illegible] required [illegible] inspection was [illegible] generated. [illegible] was held with the [illegible] Group Commanders, [illegible] officers, nor [illegible] field order or similar written directive presented [illegible] the specific missions to be run, and [illegible] the realism of wartime conditions. Only an abbreviated, [illegible] informal "[illegible]" was held with the Group Commander at the outset of the [illegible] during which the [illegible] Chief "jotted down" what [illegible] to be covered in the [illegible] missions to be flown. The [illegible] report [illegible] to record the results was one prepared by SAC. It was [illegible] of that supplied by [illegible] with different [illegible] [illegible] particularly under operations which [illegible] [illegible] over the Hq USAF form.

4. The [illegible] personnel were alert to, and cognizant of [illegible] facing this group. They were qualified in their particular field of inspection and enjoyed friendly relations with the [illegible] Group Commanders as well as officers and airmen of the squadrons. [illegible] made during this [illegible] indicated a spirit of helpfulness rather than one of looking for unfavorable conditions [illegible] to report. [illegible] of inspection appeared to be

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Report of [illegible] Observations, 7th Bomb Gp (VH), Carswell [illegible], Ft Worth, Texas

The Inspector General, USAF

Inspector General, Third Region
[illegible] Air Force Base, Texas

1 (contd)

trucks 150 and 155 are being fully utilized. They roam the ramps and runways, always alert to any emergency. Reliable reports place responsibility of (four [illegible]) engine compartment on failure of alternators. Just how this failure occurs was not fully determined; however, evidences indicated that one inverter exploded just before takeoff was attempted and the airplane returned to the line. Another caught fire on ground at conclusion of second mission. This fire was believed caused by hydraulic oil [illegible]. The first fire which occurred prior to ORT did extensive damage to engine and entire section, and some damage to airplane structure. [illegible] will be a complete loss, judging from condition observed during disassembly. Reports were circulated that certain hydraulic fluid used in this aircraft [illegible] at operating temperature [illegible] with flash point of [illegible]. [illegible] believe this fluid [illegible] is [illegible] in part responsible for these fires. This, however, [illegible] proven.

[illegible]

8. This group was not in operationally ready [illegible] for the test at this time.

9. The [illegible] was not a true test of this unit's expected capabilities.

10. The score of [illegible] combat effectiveness cannot be used by Hq USAF in planning because it does not correctly reflect the actual ability of this group to go into combat. It is the studied opinion of each of the [illegible] observers that the combat effectiveness score of this group could not, at present, exceed [illegible].

11. This group [illegible] receiving its B-36 aircraft at Carswell AFB approximately [illegible] months ago. To date, despite an all out effort on the part of the [illegible] and the 7th Bomb Group personnel to correct the many deficiencies and shortages associated with the maintenance and operation of the B-36, only a small part of the total task has been accomplished. The aircraft is yet so experimental and in such test status, that [illegible] operation and tactical training has not been possible.

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[redacted]
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

OPT 353.01 4 May 1949

SUBJECT: Draft Lead Crew Training Directive

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. Herewith is a draft of the Lead Crew Training Directive, prepared in accordance with your instructions and policies outlined and accepted in conference on 29 April at your headquarters.

2. Because of the short time available before training is to begin, organization and manning for the program as proposed in the draft has already been initiated. Accordingly, it is requested that changes made in the draft be held to the minimum consistent with the desires of your headquarters.

3. Attention is invited to slight deviation from conference plans regarding Standardization Board Crews. The draft directive increased requires the employment of Standardization Board Crews together with instructors in preparation and instructors proficiency flying phases. It is believed that at the end of these preparation phases, the Standardization Board Crews will be at least as proficient as instructors and can be employed to greatest advantage in work with crews remaining at home bases. It is intended to direct the Standardization Board Crews of this Air Force to accomplish an intensive flying program for two weeks following their duty at the Lead Crew School. During this program these crews will demonstrate to all other crews in their organizations that effective radar bombing can be accomplished by careful attention to air procedures, techniques, and tenents of air discipline.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

1 Incl
Draft Lead Crew Training
Directive w 4 Annexes

s/t/ W. H. BLANCHARD
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

Copies furnished
CO, 15th AF
CO, 2d BG
CO, 7th BG
CO, 43d BG
CO, 97th BG
CO, 93d BG
CO, 97th BG
CO, 301st BG

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8 July 49

Major General J. M. Atkinson
Headquarters 311th Air Division
Forbes Air Force Base
Topeka, Kansas

Dear Mapp,

In regard to your letter of 16 June, I agree that an outfit which is in top shape should score at least 90 points. In the case of the 23d Reconnaissance Squadron, their deficiencies in high altitude reconnaissance operations and the lack of effective training on RBS units are phases to be given more emphasis.

My training people have just returned from Washington where a conference on the Operational Readiness Test was held. If our proposed changes to the ORT Report Form are accepted, the test will give in the future a more accurate picture of a unit's capability.

Sincerely,

CURTIS E. LeMAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding

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Training time for each student crew will be 160 working hours to be completed in a 30-day period. The first class will arrive for training at Walker Air Force Base on 1 June. The second class will arrive at Walker on 1 July. The first two (2) weeks in August will be utilized in transferring the school to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base and in preparing for B-50 and AF-73A and AF-24 training. On 15th August, the third class consisting of B-50 crews will arrive for training with a completion date for the program of 15 September.

* * * * * * *

4. Aircraft. Each trainee crew will arrive and depart in its own aircraft. Each Standardization Board crew and Instructor Aircraft Commander will bring one aircraft to be used in the preparation period. At the end of the preparation periods, standardization board crews will depart the lead Crew School station in their aircraft, and partial crews, with the necessary augmentation from home bases, will ferry to home bases aircraft brought by Instructor Aircraft Commanders.

All aircraft arriving for use in lead crew training will depart their home bases with at least 95 hours remaining before another 100-hour inspection is required. Aircraft will be accurately calibrated before leaving home stations.

Any aircraft which cannot be used in training for a period three (3) working days will be replaced by the training organization.

5. Curriculum. General utilization of training time will be as follows:

Subject	Hours
Flying	70
Briefing	20
Critique	30
Lectures	18
Introduction	12
Total Hours	160

Detailed curriculum and syllabus preparation, including selection and test-flying of ten (10) missions, will be accomplished under squadron staff supervision by standardization board crews and instructors during the periods allotted before each training phase.

6. Schedule. Trainee crews will accomplish one (1) mission every other duty day. Radar instructors will accompany crews on two (2) of each three (3) flights. Aircraft Commanders, Navigators, and Bombardiers will accompany crews on at least three (3) of their ten (10) flights.

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

SUBJECT: Directive for Interim Lead Crew Training

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas
Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Purpose. It is required to train within the Strategic Air Command fifty four (54) B-29 and B-50 lead crews in the period before 29 September, 1949. In the training of these crews, emphasis is to be placed primarily on the improvement of radar bombing capabilities. Considerable attention is also to be given to proficiency in controlled-ground speed navigation. The greater portion of training time will be devoted to air training, with each crew flying ten (10) missions carefully planned to improve crew proficiency in the subjects to be emphasized. The maximum practicable number of bomb runs will be scored using both radar scoring facilities and cameras.

2. Program Plan. The training of the fifty four (54) lead crews will be accomplished by the Eighth Air Force. To minimize personnel and equipment difficulties, training has been divided into two (2) phases. The first phase to be accomplished during June and July, will consist of training at Walker Air Force Base of thirty six (36) crews using B-29 aircraft and AN/APQ-13 radar; the second phase, to be accomplished during the period 15 August to 15 September, will consist of the training at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base of eighteen (18) crews using B-50 aircraft and two (2) types of radar AN/APQ-23A and AN/APQ-24. A provisional Lead Crew Training Squadron will be formed and attached to the 509th Wing until 1 August, when it will be attached to the 43d Bombardment Wing. Services of the Air Base and Maintenance and Supply Groups at the bases to be used will be available for employment in support of lead crew training because of the overseas rotation of the 509th Bomb Group through July 31, and of the 43d Bomb Group beginning 1 August.

Prior to the beginning of each phase, the instructors and available standardization board crews, will carry out an intensified flying and discussion program to advance the development of procedures and to insure that instructors are qualified for their tasks.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

12 October 1949

Lieutenant General Curtis E. LeMay
Headquarters Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

Dear Curt:

It is my opinion that the lead crews can be maintained at a higher degree of proficiency if the distinction of "Strategic Air Command Lead Crew" status was obtained for those crews who have successfully completed the course of instruction with the Lead Crew Training Squadron (Prov). In order that this [illegible] be recognized, an identifying lead crew badge authorized [illegible] the emblem is considered a desirable means of designating those crew members who have earned this high status of proficiency.

The purpose of special recognition of lead crews is to instill a spirit of competition in all combat crews to become squadron flight leaders and Strategic Air Command lead crews. This should stimulate pride and encourage leadership among all crews to improve their bombing technique and accuracy.

The principal objective in the authorization of a lead crew badge is the incentive for air crews to work hard and attain a higher degree of proficiency. This objective can be accomplished by assigning lead crew flight commanders to each squadron. Although the crews from the Lead Crew School may currently be the most proficient in bombing technique and would be authorized to wear the lead crew badge, it is conceivable that other crews in the squadron may attain a higher state of proficiency by constant ground and air training. At this later date, consideration might be given to a procedure by which the up-and-coming crews could be given an opportunity to become lead crews. Possibly a check ride and/or special missions supervised by the Lead Crew School would be of merit as a selection medium.

The idea in mind is to have not only the lead crews, which have graduated from the Lead Crew School, wear the Strategic Air Command Lead Crew badge over the Air Force patch, but also any other crews which can

In general, critique will be accomplished the next duty morning following each flight, but in no case will critique be conducted until scoring data are available. Briefing will be accomplished the day before each mission, employing data similar to that expected to be available on targets of possible enemy nations. Lectures will be given between critiques and briefings.

7. Evaluation and Special Reports. Ranking of crews of each class from 1 through 10 will be accomplished in accordance with weights as follows:

Radar Error (CEP)	40%
Technique and Procedure	30%
Estimate of Aircraft Commander's ability to command and develop an integrated crew	30%

Crew standing will be reported to Strategic Air Command at the completion of the training of each class.

With the assistance and guidance of the operations analyst, an evaluation of the progress made by the Lead Crew School in accomplishing its objective will be prepared semi-monthly and forwarded to Strategic Air Command.

22 October 1949

Major General Roger M. Ramey
Headquarters Eighth Air Force
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

Dear Roger,

Thanks for your letter of 12 October concerning special recognition for lead crews.

I agree with the basic purpose of your proposal. If such a system is to be of real and lasting value, however, the details concerning qualification requirements must be carefully worked out from the beginning.

In receiving comments from Gosy and also from members of my staff. I shall write you further on this subject in the near future.

Sincerely,

[illegible]
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding

Originator

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meet the standards set by the school. This will be a goal for every crew in the organization to endeavor to attain. The recognition would denote proficiency of the crew but would not jeopardize security as the degree of proficiency could not be ascertained.

In short, I believe we can qualify additional lead crews in all the outfits without sending them to lead crew school, except for an examination in ground and flight work.

Sincerely,

/s/ ROGER M. RAMEY
Major General, USAF
Commanding

In connection with this - it is desired that strong emphasis be placed on briefing methods and materials.

2. The immediate problem of improving bombing accuracy in this command is of vital importance. Unit commanders will study this problem and submit their recommendations to this headquarters for further consideration.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

/s/ Thomas S. Power
THOMAS S. POWER
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Commander

SAC 353
Subject: Radar Bombing Training

CDF 353 (3 Dec 48) 1st Ind

Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas 20 JAN 1949

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Fort Crook, Nebraska

1. This headquarters and the commanders of subordinate units agree with the fundamental precepts of the basic communication with the following exceptions, recommendations and suggestions:

Reference paragraph 1, a, - This headquarters concurs with evaluation based on bombing above 25,000 feet absolute, with a further breakdown to show performance on first runs. Further, this headquarters is stressing training on industrial targets not instrumented by RCS, utilizing radar scoring of strike photos. These camera attacks are reported in conjunction with RCS runs, and are credited the same way. In this way, the diversity of targets is increased, and better training and information result.

Reference paragraph 1, b, - This headquarters is in complete agreement with the provisions of this paragraph with the exception of the recommendation as to the use of demolition bombs.

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Offutt Air Force Base
Fort Crook, Neb.

OOC3A

SAC 353 (3 Dec 48) 3 December 1948

SUBJECT: Radar Bombing Training

TO: Commanding General
Eighth Air Force
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

1. The following policies and requirements are established for Strategic Air Command bombardment crews for radar bombing training:

a. Only scored RBS runs flown at 25000 feet absolute will be considered in evaluating the bombing capabilities for Strategic Air Command units. It is not the intent of this policy to discourage the attainment of proficiency by crews in bombing at lower altitudes on industrial targets, when complying with SAC Teletype CDC3AI-8347, 25 October 1948, requiring 20 RBS runs per month, per crew. Every effort will be made to effect this bombing on as many diversified RBS sites and targets as possible.

b. The attainment of the necessary degree of coordination and a thorough knowledge of the correct standing operating procedures on a radar bombing run can be effectively developed by practice bombing on reflector targets. Such runs, preferably using demolition bombs, will be encouraged until crews are capable of maintaining circular errors of 1000 feet or less from 25000 feet absolute. Reflector target bombing will be construed as a training aid for RBS industrial target bombing and will not be directly evaluated in assessing combat bombing capability of Strategic Air Command crews.

c. The value of simulating combat conditions in the briefing and during the strike is recognized. The withholding of certain briefing materials such as scope photos, accurate large scale maps and air photographs of approaches and targets, helps to simulate combat bombing conditions we may expect to encounter. However, until crews have attained lead crew standards, this material will not be withheld in the general training program except for designated special projects designed to evaluate the immediate bombing capabilities of Strategic Air Command crews.

c. Tests such as the present Dayton strikes are of great value only if the necessary information is disseminated to the wing commanders in order that they may decide on proper corrective action. Because of the lack of information between the first and second strikes on Dayton, the value of the second strike as far as training bombing teams is dubious.

d. Constant target study and training in predictions of PPI presentation must be directed. This program has been implemented in the units of this command, and all reports indicate great benefit to the radar observers.

e. Consideration should be given to the establishing of a central, standard school for the radar observers of this command. This school would be for refresher purposes for experienced observers, and for indoctrination of newly reporting radar observers. A central school would provide for standardization of procedures and techniques, and would penalize the command very little in the use of qualified instructor personnel. Because of the ideal training available, and because of the plans for pilot and flight engineer transition at MacDill Air Force Base, it is suggested this school be established at that station. Said school would also provide training in bomb approach techniques for pilots, which training would make for more efficient bombing teams in future.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ W. H. Blanchard
W. H. BLANCHARD
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

Demolition bombs on reflector targets are against present policy because of the great expense involved in case of near hits and/or hits. Although this headquarters is against the use of demolition bombs on reflectors, it is requested that directive be sent to this effect if the use of said bombs is desired.

Reference paragraph 1, c, - The general provisions of this paragraph are in effect in the present training program of the Eighth Air Force. This headquarters considers it the prerogative of wing commanders to decide the level of training of the various crews in their command. For this reason, the training program in effect calls for the use of reflectors and "easy" industrial targets, with a gradual, steady progression toward the attacks on difficult unfamiliar targets with a minimum of briefing materials. It is strongly recommended that all future training regulations and policies include this type of progression, regardless of the specialty involved. In this way alone can the responsibility for training be placed on the wing commander, where it belongs.

2. The problem of improving bombing accuracy, while immediate and urgent, has no quick remedy to provide overnight improvement. Bombing accuracy can only be increased by intensive, well directed training. The conception that "bombing is improved by bombing" has long been an axiom of most personnel engaged in training. That this is erroneous is proven by the fact that bombing has not improved in the USAF in the last six years. The following recommendations are made with a view toward implementing a program that will result in improved bombing in this command, and provide the necessary data for the evaluation of the bombing capabilities of this command.

a. Attention is invited to the suggestions contained in letter, this headquarters, file 373.363, subject, "Radar Bombardment Training", 22 November 1948 and inclosure thereto.

b. The training policies suggested in letters referred to, have been generally agreed to by your headquarters, with the exception of the provisions for interrogation and analysis of bombing teams and their errors. Without analysis of errors, all bombing will necessarily be haphazard and aimless, with no means for improvement. Provision must be made for practical, comprehensive analysis of all radar and visual bombing, with as much individual critique as practicable. Qualified personnel must be authorized and provided for this work, and standard records must be kept. A bombing team should never take off to bomb until all previous bombing has been thoroughly analyzed and the bombing team briefed on the elimination of these errors. The analysis, critique and corrective briefing is the key to constant improvement in bombing.

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 11 Oct 49

accomplishments contribute to the aggregate score of its group. After reaching the initial point there were no dry runs allowed except for legitimate weather aborts on visual runs only. Consequently, many visual drops were made with ten to twenty seconds sighting runs and a good number of the radar runs were made under turbulent thunder storm conditions. Equal weight was given to radar and visual bombing accomplishments.

A study is underway in my headquarters not only of the actual results but of the equipment, personnel, and other factors influencing the results. I believe this will be of value in directing the SAC efforts toward maximum bombing capability.

It would be very helpful to me in maintaining the emphasis I am placing on bombing if you would acknowledge your interest by sending a letter of congratulations to the winner. Colonel Robert A. Terrill commands the 93d Wing and Major William S. MacDonald of the 28th Wing was the airplane commander of the crew who won the individual award.

Sincerely,

[illegible]
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding

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11 October 1949

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Van,

I would like to bring to your attention a few significant points observed at the 1949 SAC bombing Competition conducted last week at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.

The individual bombing proficiency award went to a B-36 crew of the 28th Group, which turned in a visual average circular error of 441 feet on three targets from 25,000 feet and a radar average circular error of 1,053 feet on three industrial targets again from 25,000 feet. The radar targets included one considered comparatively easy and two considered difficult. It is interesting to note this group is just in the process of receiving its first B-36's. The results of intensive ground training and preparation for the changeover, I believe, are apparent here. The B-36 performance was particularly gratifying to me.

The 93rd Wing, which won the group competition with a visual ACE of 503 feet and a radar ACE of 2,845 feet under the same conditions, was in the midst of equipment conversion from B-29's to B-50's. Leaking tanks in the B-50's forced the unit to revert to the 2-13 equipped B-29 aircraft for the competition. I consider their showing remarkable in view of the fact that their recent efforts had been concentrated on adapting to the B-29 equipment. It indicates to me that equipment conversion does not necessarily mean complete loss of combat effectiveness for lengthy periods.

Particularly impressive to me was the intense competitive spirit exhibited by the crews and their commanders during the course of the competition. Some outstanding maintenance feats were performed, and the attitude of the crews operating under pressure reflected their eagerness to win. At the same time, the example of good sportsmanship exhibited by the losers was worthy of note. Deep disappointment and determination to leave no stone unturned to win the next time were evident almost without exception.

To obtain realistic conditions, the rules of the competition heavily penalized equipment malfunctions. A crew which failed to drop any bomb, either visual or radar, on the assigned target by reason of malfunction or misidentification did not receive a score as a crew, nor did its

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OPTI
Subject: Combat Crew Training School

b. Train lead crews at a rate of approximately five crews per month for the purpose of providing a greater degree of standardization within the command and to raise the combat effectiveness of all units. Training in this school will provide the know-how, organization, and equipment for other phases of combat crew training required after D-Day. Lead crew training prior to D-Day will considerably raise the operational proficiency of combat units. Combat crew doctrine can be most effectively formulated, disseminated, and standardized under a centralized system of training. Concentration on perfection of lead crew techniques is best achieved in the atmosphere found in a central school designed for such activities rather than in the normal squadron or group organization where other more diversified training and administrative commitments must be met.

c. Re-train and evaluate selected members of Reserve crews at a rate of approximately ten crews per month, in accordance with the Corollary Reserve Program proposed. A separate letter, subject: Strategic Air Command Plan for Training of Corollary Units, dated 28 February 1949, has been submitted which indicated the objectives and methods of the reserve training to be accomplished in the Transition School.

4. It is the opinion of this command that all functions required immediately after D-Day should be operative prior to D-Day. The school will provide Strategic Air Command with the know-how required to operate a combat crew training school immediately following D-Day. Establishment at the capacity described in the foregoing paragraph will provide an adequate base for expansion in the event of mobilization.

5. It is proposed that under the 48-Group Program the school be continued as a [illegible] unit. The manpower requirements are substantially the strength of a medium bomb group less approximately sixty officers. The current augmentation of the services of the 307th Bomb Wing for the support of the 306th Group are also required.

6. It is recommended that:

a. The USAF recognize the requirement for the school as outlined above;

b. Provision be made in the USAF program for FY 1950 for its continuance.

7. Since planning for the training of assigned crews, for the implementation of the current Reserve Program, as well as for mobilization, is in each case dependent upon your decision, it is requested that your approval of the foregoing recommendations be granted as promptly as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

~~CLAIRE L. CHENNAULT~~ s/t/ THOMAS S. POWER
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

~~SECRET~~ 137

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND OPLI
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

26 February 1949

SUBJECT: Combat Crew Training School

TO: Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

1. This headquarters by letter, subject: "Transition Training School," dated 14 February 1949, directed the Fifteenth Air Force to establish a Transition Training School within the 306th Medium Bomb Group at MacDill Air Force Base. The school will begin operation 14 March 1949, and is expected to transition forty teams per month until the additional crew requirements of units scheduled for activation and units scheduled for augmentation to war strength are met.

2. The combat crew strength of the Strategic Air Command will be doubled within the next few months if M-Day authorizations are reached. The combat crew strength of units projected for war strength will be tripled. A transition load of this magnitude can only be accomplished within the reinforcement wings at the expense of the training of currently assigned crews and consequently at a substantial expense to the operational effectiveness of the units concerned.

3. The establishment of the Transition Training School will satisfy the immediate crew training requirement of the Strategic Air Command which will be met by October 1949, subject of course to the flow of additional combat crew personnel to the command. However, it is maintained that a long range requirement exists for a school of this nature and that provision should be made now within the USAF program for its continuation on a permanent basis. The school should ultimately have the capacity required to:

a. Transition an estimated fifteen crews per month required to maintain the units of the Strategic Air Command under stabilized peace-time requirements. Since this training function must be performed at an even greater rate immediately following D-Day in order to provide replacement crews to Strategic Air Command, it appears most wise to institute centralized school system at this time. Transition of Strategic Air Command combat crews in a centralized school will insure that equipment is provided, personnel are selected, and that the training establishment is in being prior to D-Day.

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AGTG JUN 1949

SUBJECT: Revision of the Mobile Training Unit Program.

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. In the near future, this headquarters contemplates the revision of that part of Air Force Regulation 50-9 which pertains to the Mobile Training Unit Program. This revision is deemed necessary for the following reasons:

a. To clarify the mission of the Mobile Training Unit.

b. To fully utilize the capabilities of the Mobile Training Unit in connection with:

(1) Maintenance and flight crew transition training.

(2) Maintenance and flight crew proficiency training.

(3) Advanced specialized training.

(4) Basic training.

c. To establish a procurement program for one (1) Mobile Training Unit per each light, medium, and heavy Bomb Wing; one (1) Mobile Training Unit for the first twenty-five (25) transport aircraft (inclusive of troop carriers) of a specific type to be supplemented by additional units as required; and one (1) fighter type Mobile Training Unit for each two (2) Fighter Wings. This procurement program is deemed necessary to accomplish the training as stated above.

2. Under Air Force Regulation 50-4, the present Mobile Training Unit program is considered as a part of special training. Under this regulation, the using agency may establish the special training requirements but can only recommend that the training be accomplished by a Mobile Training Unit. When considering the Mobile Training Unit as a part of special training, the potentialities of this training instrument are definitely limited because the capabilities of the Mobile Training Unit cannot be fully utilized without clarification of the mission.

AFOOP 1st Ind

Department of the Air Force, HQ, USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 5 APR 1949

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska

1. This Headquarters recognizes the need for a Transition Training School in your Command. However, troop basis authorizations are not available in the FY 1950 48 Group USAF Troop Program to permit the allocation to SAC of the required authorizations for the Transition Training School. In the FY 1951 48 Group USAF Troop Program, provision will be made for the school as an additional activity in your Command.

2. In order to provide during FY 1950 troop basis authorizations required for the Transition Training School, you are requested to submit to this Headquarters the reductions (by grade and MOS) from the Bomb Wing force necessary to equal the number of officer and airmen authorizations required for the school. It is considered that since full manning with training crews of the Bomb Wings is dependent upon and will follow the establishment and operation of the Transition Training School, the sources for the required authorizations should be those which will be manned by the product of the Training School.

3. Further information is needed here prior to the reallocation of the troop basis spaces involved. It is necessary that you forward to this Headquarters your detailed organizational plan for the Transition Training School, including proposed T/O's and an organization Chart indicating the unitstructure for the school organization. These T/O's should include the total requirements for the Transition Training School. A separate set of T/O's is also desired which cover the normal station operating requirements as distinguished from the Transition Training School.

4. It is not planned to provide additional aircraft to your Command for the Transition Training School. Such aircraft as are needed must come from those now on hand in your Command.

5. In the event that an Air Force Program of 57 or more groups is approved for FY 1950, one of the medium bomb wings planned for your Command must provide the transition training. Under such a program it is also contemplated that the wing selected to conduct such training will operate under reduced T/O&E's and it is believed that the information requested in Paragraph 1 above can be used by this Headquarters as the basis for determining the reductions to applicable T/O&E's.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ [illegible]
Major General, U.S.A.F.
Assistant for Programming

[illegible]

Basic ltr fr Hq USAF, dtd 1 June 49, subj: "Revision of the Mobile Training Unit Program

SAC 353 (1 June 1949) 1st Ind DC482

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska 21 JUN 49

TO: Director of Training and Requirements, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

Originator
Capt Tracy/me
Phone 2290
20 June 49

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1. This headquarters concurs with the plan to establish and reorganize the Mobile Training Unit Program under a separate Air Force Regulation. It has been the belief of this command for some time that Mobile Training Units are one of the most effective means of training available and should be utilized as a nucleus for the ground training program at stations of this command. With the procurement of new type aircraft since World War II, it has been found that Mobile Training Units are required for all transitional, proficiency and advanced training at a station, due to the fact that they provide an essential source of competent instructors and the only means of training aids for the respective aircraft.

2. It is requested that consideration be given the following in establishing the Mobile Training Unit Program:

a. With reference to paragraph 4a, basic letter, it is believed that a lag in training will be involved if the using agencies advise on the technical composition of a Mobile Training Unit. It is suggested that the following plan be implemented to offset any possible delay in training:

(1) On mockup inspection of a new type aircraft, a special board of personnel, assigned either to Air Training Command or Air Materiel Command, qualified in all components of an aircraft and the training problems involved, should inspect the aircraft and prepare a consolidated report on the training required, by individual AFSNs, to operate and maintain the aircraft and its component equipment. This report should include information on the composition of the Mobile Training Unit and the factory training required (when it is believed that only key personnel requiring training, or when the equipment is highly technical to the point where it is believed that factory training is the most expeditious and practical means of training). This report should be forwarded to the interested major commands for study and evaluation.

Subject: Revision of the Mobile Training Unit Program

3. At the present time, all formal maintenance training is being generalized, and is not geared to produce a technician proficient on a specific type aircraft. The Mobile Training Unit should be used to specialize the general course graduate on a specific type aircraft.

4. It is planned to establish the Mobile Training Unit Program under a seperate Air Force Regulation which will include the following:

a. A long range policy of providing Mobile Training Units as outlined in paragraph 1c, with the using agencies advising on technical composition of the unit.

b. A clear definition of the types of training which the Mobile Training Unit is capable of accomplishing.

c. Requests for Mobile Training Units to be approved or disapproved by this headquarters and forwarded to the Air Training Command for necessary action.

d. The Air Training Command will be responsible for conducting the Mobile Training Unit Program, in accordance with instructions from this headquarters. This will include transportation, standardization of instruction, manning, determination of specifications for equipment, and storage.

e. This headquarters will establish the number of Mobile Training Units, by type, based on the policy outlined in paragraph 1c, for inclusion in the budget estimates.

5. The above proposed changes in the Mobile Training Unit program will assure full utilization of the Mobile Training Unit potential. It is requested that your comments and recommendations be furnished this headquarters on or before 1 July 1947.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

LOUIS S. CRIBA
Colonel, USAF
Deputy, Training Division
Directorate of Training & Requirements

XXXX
Subj: Revision of the Mobile Training Unit Program

command has the facilities and the organization to offer greater standardization of instruction and the pool of instructors essential to accomplish the program. However, to accomplish such an extensive program, it is believed that Headquarters USAF should establish priority by assigning personnel and the essential funds specifically for the Mobile Training Unit Program. It is further requested that the movement orders for a Mobile Training Unit, issued by Headquarters USAF, indicate action at the Mobile Training Unit group level in cases where an immediate requirement exists for the assignment of a Mobile Training Unit to avoid needless waste of time and training facilities caused by the delay of processing movement directives through normal channels.

d. To effect maximum utilization of the Mobile Training Unit facilities, it is believed essential that a minimum standard of utilization be specified. This command presently requires fighter type Mobile Training Units and B-29 Mobile Training Units to be utilized at least 5,000 man hours per month. B-50 and C-36 Mobile Training Units must be utilized at least 10,000 man hours per month. To assure this utilization, it is believed that action should be taken when the Mobile Training Unit is not utilized properly at a station, to move instructor personnel and any equipment requiring modification back to the Mobile Training Unit Group to retrain the instructor personnel and effect any technical order changes or modifications to the equipment. However, this period of retraining and re-equipping should not exceed a period of two months and the station which did not fully utilize the Mobile Training Unit will be required to move the personnel and equipment to and from the Mobile Training Unit Group. To prevent any delay in training programs at stations fully utilizing Mobile Training Unit facilities, it is believed that a rotational policy should be established by the Mobile Training Unit Group to assure the standardization and proficiency of instructor personnel. To assure the equipment remaining current in the Mobile Training Unit, it is believed that a modification team, with the necessary supplies, should be related to the various bases to effect technical order changes and essential modifications.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

JUSTIN TREVISON, JR.
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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(2) Upon completion of this study, each major command would submit a training requirement for its command of the recommended method of accomplishment to Headquarters USAF. In the case of this command, the study would be based on the conversion of one wing assigned.

(3) Upon evaluation and approval of the requirements by Headquarters USAF, all means of training, (factory training and training aids constituting the Mobile Training Unit should be incorporated in the future aircraft procurement contract based on the number of aircraft constituting a wing. For example, if one hundred (100) quotas for factory training and one (1) Mobile Training Unit are required to convert one (1) wing of thirty (30) aircraft for a war strength heavy bombardment wing, this consolidated means of training should be contracted for on the basis of every thirty (30) aircraft produced. In addition, this procurement should be effected for any major modifications in the aircraft. For example, the pod installation on the B9-9c. If this program were instituted, cancellation of an aircraft procurement contract would result in a cancellation of the procurement of the means of training. Thus the full means of training would be available to the commands, yet, economy would be preserved.

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b. With reference to paragraph 4c, basic letter, it is believed that once approval for the assignment of a Mobile Training Unit has been granted by your headquarters, the Mobile Training Unit, under the jurisdiction of Air Training Command, should be assigned PCS to a station to eliminate unnecessary requests for extension of TDY. In the event a shortage of Mobile Training Units of a certain type exists, which should be precluded by the procurement policy outlined in paragraph 1c, basic letter, the major air command will submit the present training requirements, when required, to your headquarters for evaluation in respect to requirements from other major commands.

c. Reference paragraph 4d. It is believed that Air Training Command should be responsible for conducting the Mobile Training Unit Program due to the fact that that

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25

AFOAI(30)

1 MAY 1949

SUBJECT: On-the-Job Training Material

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebr.

1. It has been observed at various stations under your jurisdiction that an unusually good On-the-Job Training Program is in effect. This program is understood to be command-wide.

2. It is requested that The Inspector General, USAF be furnished copies of pertinent directives, guides, and forms issued by Strategic Air Command and subordinate commands governing the OJT Program, as a basis of information for the purpose of standardization of the Air Force OJT Program.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ R. A. [illegible]
Colonel, USAF
Deputy, The Air Inspector

AAG 353 (15 MAR 49) 1st Ind D 482

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 31 MAY 49

TO: The Inspector General, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. This headquarters is presently revising the entire On-the-Job Training Program, since experience has indicated that further standardization and improvement of the mechanics of the program are essential for proper monitoring of training by this command and to assure the best possible training for our personnel.

2. Therefore, it is requested that forwarding of the directives concerning the Strategic Air Command On-the-Job Training Program be delayed until the new program is published.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ MONTIE TROTTER, JR.
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

1192

2d Ind AFCAI(3D)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, U.S., USAF, WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 11 APR 1949

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska

It is requested that you retain basic correspondence and forward copies of material which you consider appropriate at such time as the new program for On-the Job Training is published.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ [illegible]
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Executive, The Air Inspector

140

DOAZ

SAC 353 (7 Apr 49)

7 April 1949

SUBJECT: Long Range Tactical Missions

TO: Commanding General
Eighth Air Force
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

Originator

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1. The Long Range Tactical Missions outlined herein are directed as minimum training requirements. In order to permit maximum training in the planning and execution of these missions, only the basic requirements of the mission are established. Special emphasis will be placed on procedure training and on the exact execution of the mission in accordance with established procedures, and tactical doctrine. To achieve maximum training all aspects of simulated combat missions will be incorporated. A minimum of two aircraft will be scheduled on these missions.

2. The following general requirements are established for Long Range Tactical Missions.

a. Group Briefing. The planning and briefing of the mission will be conducted on group level.

b. Takeoff. Takeoff will be at controlled intervals. The intervals will be determined by the interval of aircraft over target.

c. Pre-IP. A pre-IP point will be established. Mission will be planned that aircraft will overfly point at a controlled time at established intervals.

d. Target Times. From pre-IP to target, aircraft will fly controlled airspeed to maintain interval at target.

e. Return. Return will be accomplished by individual aircraft.

f. Post Flights Interrogation and Analysis. A post flight interrogation and analysis will be conducted at group level.

DOAR
Subj: Long Range Tactical Missions

b. When no bombs are carried, a simulated radar bombing attack will be accomplished on an industrial target scored by RBS method.

4. Medium bombardment combat crews will accomplish one long range tactical mission per quarter period.

5. The following specific requirements are established for long range tactical missions:

a. Medium bombardment missions for stripped B-29 and B-50 will consist of a round robin flight of 4020 nautical miles. Take-off will be accomplished with 8,055 gallons of fuel, 10,000 lb bomb load, and 500 rounds of ammunition per gun; target will be approximately 2010 nautical miles distant. If temperature, wind and altitude conditions permit, take-offs will be made from home base. After take-off, minimum altitudes will be maintained consistent with safety to obtain optimum cruise control conditions. Thirty minutes before "bombs away", 25,000 feet will be obtained. Rated power will be used for 10 minutes before "Bombs away". After breakaway, an altitude of 25,000 feet will be maintained until a long range descent is required. All distances are considered "no-wind" distances. Landing reserve will be 800 gallons.

b. Medium bombardment mission for standard B-29 aircraft will be same mission as be above, however no bomb load will be required. Two hundred and fifty rounds per gun will constitute the ammunition load.

c. Medium bombardment mission for B-29 tanker aircraft will consist of an actual refueling mission, with refueling being completed at 1000 nautical miles from base, at 10,000 feet altitude. Amount of fuel transferred will be 4300 gallons. Take-off gross weight will be limited to 140,000 pounds. In each rendezvous the air-to-air rendezvous equipment will be used.

d. Medium bombardment mission for B-29 and B-50 combat receiver crew will consist of two long range two-way refuelings and two long range one-way refueling missions each year. Take-off gross weights will be planned so that receipt of 4300 gallons of fuel at 10,000 feet and 1000 nautical miles out will fill the system to capacity. Predicted

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landing reserves will be 750 gallons. In the case of two-way refueling, predicted reserve at the point of contact with the second tanker (1600NM out) will be 1,000 gallons. These missions will be coordinated with the missions outlined in (c), insofar as possible.

e. Until such time as B-36 performance data is available, B-36 units are authorized to plan and execute long range tactical missions at their discretion, however, the missions will be both tactical and realistic in nature with emphasis directed toward maximum performance of the aircraft and combat crew procedure training.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEMAY:

MONTIE THOMPSON, JR.
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
[illegible] AIR FORCE BASE [illegible]
[illegible], Nebraska

[illegible] (25 Aug [illegible]) [illegible] August 1949

SUBJECT: Long Range Tactical Missions

TO: Commanding General
Eighth Air Force
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

1. The Long Range Tactical Missions outlined herein are directed as minimum training requirements. In order to permit maximum training in the planning and execution of these missions and to reveal the capabilities of the unit and their equipment, only the basic requirements of the missions are established. Special emphasis will be placed on procedure training and on the exact execution of the mission in accordance with established procedures, and tactical doctrine. To achieve maximum training, all aspects of simulated combat missions will be incorporated. A minimum of two aircraft will be scheduled on these missions.

2. The following general requirements are established for Long Range Tactical Missions:

a. Group Briefing: The planning and briefing of the mission will be conducted at Group level.

b. Take-off: Take-off will be at controlled intervals. The intervals will be determined by the interval of aircraft over target.

c. Pre-IP: A pre-IP will be established. Mission will be planned so that aircraft will cross this point at a controlled time at established intervals.

d. Target Run: From pre-IP to target, aircraft will fly controlled airspeed to maintain interval at target.

e. Return: Return will be accomplished by individual aircraft.

f. Post Flight: A post flight interrogation and analysis will be conducted at Group level.

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DOLAC 353 25 Aug 49
Subj: Long Range Tactical Missions

3. When no bombs are carried, a simulated radar bombing attack will be accomplished on an industrial target, scored by RBS method.

4. The following specific requirements are established for <u>Basic</u> Long Range Tactical Missions:

a. Medium Bombardment missions for stripped B-29 aircraft will consist of a round robin flight of 4000 nautical air miles. Take-off will be accomplished with 8,055 gallons of fuel, 10,000 pound bomb load and 500 rounds of ammunition per gun; target will be approximately 2000 nautical air miles distant. After take-off, minimum safe altitudes will be maintained to obtain optimum cruise control conditions. An altitude of 25,000 feet will be attained at the pre-IP. After breakaway, 25,000 feet will be maintained until a long range descent is required. Landing reserve will be 500 gallons.

b. Standard B-29 and B-50 aircraft: Mission will consist of a maximum range round robin flight with maximum fuel load in built-in fuel cells. No bomb load will be required. Ammunition load will be 250 rounds per gun. Mission will be accomplished as specified in paragraph 4.a, above.

c. Tanker aircraft: Take-off at 1[illegible],000 lbs, refueling a receiver type aircraft at optimum refueling point, to provide greatest range for that particular receiver aircraft. Refueling will be accomplished at an altitude of 10,000 feet. In each refueling, the air-to-air rendezvous equipment will be used. Landing reserve will be [illegible] gallons.

d. Receiver aircraft: Maximum load take-off (B-29 limited to 140,000 pounds). 10,000 pound bomb load. No refueling except as listed in sub-paragraph 4.c, below. Maximum range will be accomplished as specified in paragraph 4.a, above.

e. The receivers used in conjunction with the basic tanker missions will [illegible] maximum range for all fuel has been [illegible] and be granted credit for their basic long-range mission. An abort by a receiver aircraft after successful transfer does not cancel credit for tanker mission.

f. Jet Aircraft: Until such time as performance data and standard operating procedures are established, the planning and execution of basic long range tactical missions will be at the discretion of unit commanders; however, the missions will be both tactical and realistic in nature with emphasis placed upon maximum performance of the aircraft and combat crew procedure training.

$$R_2 = R_1 \frac{F_2 - \frac{F_2}{F_1}}{F_1}$$

where R_2 = Adjusted range. Product of formula

R_1 = Basic Range as prescribed in paragraph 4 above.

F_1 = Fuel load for basic Mission. (See Par 4)

M_2 = Same as M_1, except that the figures will be based on a take off gross weight adjusted in accordance with paragraph 5 (a) above.

1202

[illegible]
SUBJECT: Long Range Tactical Missions for B-[illegible] and B-5[illegible] Aircraft

rigid specifications for long range missions that are not held to be real[illegible]stic. [illegible] as Inclosure [illegible] is this headquarters' proposed directive for long range tactical missions.

[illegible]. It is believed that the recommendations made at this time are in general agreement with the [illegible] expressed by General [illegible] at the [illegible] Air Force Commanders' Conference. It is further requested that this Air Force be granted authority to [illegible] long range tactical mission training, as recommended herein, for the balance of this fiscal year in order to prove, or disprove, the correctness of the recommended concept.

s/ Cecil [illegible], Combs
for [illegible]
Major General, [illegible]
Commanding

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or range. This mission will be referred to as a basic long range tactical mission. This basic mission may require that the aircraft be staged from a more suitable station. The remaining three (3) missions will be flown as specified, and adjustments will be permitted for cross wind and range, based on local density altitude, so that the aircraft may operate from the respective home stations. These missions will be referred to as adjusted missions.

b. Procedures: Special emphasis will be placed on procedure training and on execution of the mission as briefed.

c. Flexibility: Each mission will be planned to include every factor that may be encountered during the actual combat mission and will, insofar as possible, duplicate or simulate these factors.

d. Pre-IP: A pre-IP will be selected for every mission and each aircraft will overfly the pre-IP at a controlled time, and at controlled intervals if more than one (1) aircraft participates in the mission.

e. Target Time: Each aircraft will arrive at the target at a controlled time and the route from the pre-IP to IP thence to target will be flown at a controlled airspeed.

f. Briefing: The briefing of each mission may be conducted at either group or squadron level, however, the unit presenting the briefing will be responsible for all mission planning.

g. Interrogation: Each crew will be interrogated immediately after landing from each long range tactical mission, regardless of whether or not the mission was successful, however, those crews aborting the mission can be interrogated at the time such interrogation would have been accomplished had the mission been successful. Every effort will be made at all interrogations to gather sufficient data so that a thorough analysis can be accomplished for each mission. The unit which briefed the mission will conduct the interrogation and prepare the mission analysis.

h. Analysis: Each mission will be completely analyzed to determine if the pilot's, navigator's, bombardier's, radar operator's, flight engineer's, radio operator's, gunner's, and refueling operator's standard operating procedures were fully complied with and that the mission was flown exactly as briefed.

[illegible] 373.5
Subject, Revision of Long Range Tactical Mission Requirements(Cont'd)

altitude [illegible] nautical air miles before the primary target. The primary target will be at the midpoint of the total distance flown. Cruise to the [illegible] at long range airspeeds. Cruise to target from [illegible] at [illegible] true indicated airspeed. Immediately upon bomb release perform a tactical break-away maintaining [illegible] feet density altitude. Cruise at [illegible] feet density altitude for a minimum of [illegible] nautical air miles after the target. Cruise thereafter at the optimum altitude, but not lower than [illegible] feet density altitude, for the remainder of the mission.

8. [illegible] modified as receivers will [illegible] the above listed requirements in the [illegible] [illegible] the tanker aircraft [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the total [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the total [illegible] [illegible] basic or adjusted mission [illegible] the distance flown from take-off to break-away after refueling. The point of bomb release for these missions will be at the mid-point of the total distance. Should the mission fail through fault of the tanker before or during fuel transfer, the tanker will receive no credit for the mission, however, the receiver may continue and receive credit for a long range mission but its total distance required must be based on the total available fuel. In the event the receiver aborts after a successful fuel transfer, the tanker will receive full credit for the mission but the receiver must then again fly another mission involving refueling or an adjusted or basic mission.

[illegible]. The tanker aircraft crews will accomplish long range tactical missions [illegible] [illegible] to include the following additional [illegible] [illegible]:

a. Fuel load: the fuel load will be the maximum permissible with take-off gross weight limited to [illegible] pounds for a basic mission and adjusted to the local density altitude for an adjusted mission.

[illegible] AIR FORCE
[illegible], TEXAS

[illegible]

SUBJECT: Proposed Directive for Long Range Tactical Missions

TO: All Units

1. Each bomber and tanker aircraft crew will accomplish long range tactical training missions for four (4) per year:

a. To gain training and proficiency in long range cruise control.

b. To gain training and proficiency in maximum gross weight operations.

c. To obtain aircraft performance data so that aircraft may be maintained capable of equaling or exceeding the published performance data.

d. To accomplish simulated combat missions of a realistic nature so that all crews may develop and maintain crew coordination.

2. Each training mission flown for long range tactical mission credit must simulate an actual combat mission and will include briefing, flight planning, controlled take-off time, controlled altitudes, a specific primary target, controlled landing time, interrogation and critique.

a. The briefing will be as governed by existing regulations.

b. The flight planning will include a detailed flight engineer's plan and a detailed navigator's flight plan.

c. The take-off time will be as controlled by the appropriate local commander and, if more than one (1) aircraft participates, will be as directed by the tactical doctrine.

d. The aircraft will be flown at the predicted altitudes and such altitudes will be as determined by the flight planners before the takeoff is accomplished.

e. The specific primary target will be as determined by the local commander and must be determined before the takeoff is accomplished. As many other secondary targets may be selected as desired by the appropriate unit. The primary target, as applied to tanker aircraft, will be construed to mean the primary refueling point.

f. The controlled landing time will be as determined from the flight engineer's and navigator's flight plans and will be established before the takeoff is accomplished.

g. The interrogation will be as required by current directives.

h. The deliverie will be as required by current directives.

3. The following conditions are established as the minimum requirements for all long range tactical missions.

a. All combat and all tanker crews will accomplish one (1) long range tactical mission per quarter under the following conditions:

(1) All B-52 and B-58 long range tactical missions must exceed 3,000 nautical air miles' range.

(2) All tanker long range tactical missions must exceed 2,000 nautical air miles' range.

(3) All B-52 long range tactical missions must exceed 5,000 nautical air miles' range.

(4) All bombing, or simulated bombing, accomplished during long range tactical missions in B-52 and B-58 aircraft must be from altitudes not lower than 35,000 feet pressure altitude.

(5) All refueling accomplished by tankers on long range tactical missions must be from altitudes not lower than 20,000 feet pressure altitude.

(6) All bombing, or simulated bombing, accomplished during long range tactical missions in B-58 aircraft will be from altitudes not lower than 40,000 feet pressure altitude.

OOA
SUBJECT: Proposed Directive for Long Range Tactical Missions

(14) All crews will fly their respective aircraft at long range airspeeds at all times throughout the mission, including all periods of actual or simulated bombing.

(15) The bomb load for all types of aircraft will be as determined by the local commander; however, visual, radar or camera bombing, either actual or simulated, must be accomplished at the primary target.

4. It is the intent and objective of this directive to have the quarterly training requirements for all crew members included to the maximum extent possible during the missions prescribed herein. The long range mission itself may be modified in any manner desirable to facilitate the accomplishment of these other minimums, provided that the minimum requirements for range, bombing and fuel reserve are not compromised.

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Subj: Summary of Special Projects - Sept 1948 - Sept 1949

indications at the time of the failure, hours of airplane operation, and hours of engine operation. This report includes the unsatisfactory report of each of the failures, a copy of report made by the Boeing Technical Representative on this base, and results of the Airplane Engine Disassembly Inspection Report forwarded this station after Depot inspection.

DESCRIPTION OF WORK PRESENTLY BEING PERFORMED: Collecting data on engine failures, preparing for an engine operational test of the effect of the installation of filters in the oil system.

RESULTS: The engine test program has not been completely set up; consequently no test results have been obtained. Results are expected to be obtained from the test program showing actual oil analysis of the oil in the engine, what impurities are found, and the quantity; their effect on lubrication, and a possible way of eliminating them.

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PROJECT: B-50 Ultimate Range (War Emergency Power Schedule)

PROJECT ENGINEER: Mr. John Sandelius

DESCRIPTION OF WORK COMPLETED: An extensive study has been made of the factors associated with engine detonation.

DESCRIPTION OF WORK PRESENTLY BEING PERFORMED: A proposed test program is in the process of being drafted.

RESULTS: The object of this program is to produce ultimate range data for the B-50A. This data will contain power schedule, fuel flow, nautical miles per pound, and range versus gross weight curves. In addition, research will be made to ascertain the effects of exhaust back pressure upon engine detonation at altitude.

- - - - -

PROJECT: Cruise Control Presentation to Assistant Secretary for Air

PROJECT ENGINEER: Captain Norris J. Ansell

DESCRIPTION OF WORK COMPLETED: A master composite chart showing graphic comparisons between jet and propeller driven aircraft, using AMC performance data, was used as a lecture aid. A large map served to illustrate the advantages of in-flight refueling and heavy bomber capabilities in range.

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HEADQUARTERS 93D BOMBARDMENT WING (M)
Castle Air Force Base, California

CDC 28 DEC 1949

SUBJECT: B-50D Predicted Performance Data

TO: Commanding General
Fifteenth Air Force
March Air Force Base
California

1. The B-50D predicted performance data available to this Command is based on the B-50A flight test information. Since external configuration of the B-50D does not conform identically with that of the B-50A, efficient application of the B-50A fuel curves to the B-50D is doubtful.

2. Utilizing the consumption and predicted data obtained from the Eighth Air Force Operational Engineering Section, Walker Air Force Base, and the Boeing Aircraft Company, this Command is conducting an analysis of actual long range B-50D cruise control flights to determine the validity of the fuel flow charts available.

3. In order to compile this B-50D performance and operational data as expeditiously as possible it is requested that this Command be permitted to place Staff Flight Engineers on TDY with one B-50D aircraft, at Headquarters, AMC, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base to obtain additional and current data. Should this request be favorably considered, the following items will be discussed with the AMC Project Engineers:

a. Cruise control data for the B-50A, compiled by the AMC Flight Test Section, purportedly in publication at this time.

b. Predicted performance data for the B-50D.

c. Performance data for the B-50D which may have been compiled from actual flight test and including high gross weight takeoff.

d. Major changes in aircraft components which are anticipated by AMC.

e. Results of bomb bay tank tests.

f. Current operational limitations of the B-50D.

g. Operating limits of the R-4360 engine.

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CDC
Subj: B-50D Predicted Performance Data

b. New type sensitive engine instruments.

4. This Command desires to dispatch the necessary personnel to Wright Patterson AFB as soon as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ Stanley F. Jacobs
STANLEY F. JACOBS
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

462 1st Ind CDCTF

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, March Air Force Base, Calif, 20 JAN 1950

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebr

1. Recommend approval.

2. It should be noted that to date no performance data on the B-50D has been published by higher Headquarters or other commands; therefore, the 93d Bomb Wing is of necessity required to formulate the conversion factors which must be applied to B-50A performance data as published in SAC Technical Pamphlet 60-6.

3. The best available information to date indicates that the B-50D with external droppable tanks and uncovered turbos will have 5 per cent less range than the B-50A. When the turbos are covered, the range decrease is approximately 2.7 percent from the B-50A. At the present time, all important engine instruments are being calibrated on the B-50D by the 93d Bomb Wing and it will then be possible to more closely check the aforementioned approximations of range decrease.

4. In view of the above mentioned facts, it is recommended by this Headquarters that immediate action be taken to obtain permission from Air Material Command to perform the necessary TDY by the 93d Bomb Wing personnel to obtain the necessary information and cruise control data.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ Stanley M. Simkins
STANLEY M. SIMKINS
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj General

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25 Nov 49

In this memorandum we have attempted to set forth briefly certain data bearing on the purpose of your visit to this headquarters. We have outlined operational and flying safety programs, policies and procedures designed to further the cause of flying safety.

During the past year, General LeMay has placed continuous emphasis on flying safety, stressing to all his staff and command personnel the fact that since the mission of the command demands that the highest performance be obtained from both equipment and personnel, stringent safety procedures must be followed.

General points of interest. Since last January, the accident rate of Strategic Air Command has steadily declined from a high index of 26 to a low of 11.5.

To strengthen flying safety supervision at this headquarters, the Flying Safety Branch was increased from one Captain to three officers: a Lieutenant Colonel, Major, and Captain. SAC was screened for experienced pilots to fill these positions and by July 1949 the Branch was completely and satisfactorily manned.

To strengthen flying safety supervision at base level, a study was forwarded to [illegible] in September 1949, emphasizing

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the need to authorize a full-time officer for Flying Safety in the Wing TO&E. (See Tab A) To date no action has been taken and this function is being handled by Wing Operations Officer as additional duty.

SAC Regulations pertaining to Flying Safety are attached as Inclosure B.

Standing Operating Procedures, including Emergency Procedures, are contained in Pilots Manuals published by this headquarters. (Inclosure C) During the past 12 months much effort has been devoted to improving procedures and manuals have continuously been revised. In the spring of 1957 a period of one week was set aside for S.O.P. indoctrination and action was taken by all unit commanders to see that all crews were familiar in detail with Emergency Procedures and other SOP affecting flying safety.

Standardization Boards, consisting of an expert instructor crew were established at Air Force and Wing level throughout SAC in November 1956 for the purpose of standardizing emergency procedures and operating techniques and insuring that all crews follow the prescribed procedures. Those crews failing to pass checks by local boards are placed on student status and given appropriate training until they become proficient. This practice has been rigidly followed for the past year and, in our opinion, has been in a large measure responsible for the decreasing accident rate. Air Force Standardization Boards visit the bases and check the Wing Boards to be sure that instruction

is uniform and up to standards. An additional function of the Standardization Boards is to pass judgement on the adequacy of briefings and take necessary action. (Tab D)

The Operational Readiness Test team from this headquarters has also given special attention to briefing procedures being followed by our combat units.

A Transition Training School was established in April 1949, at MacDill Field to provide formal standardized transition to Airplane Commander-Pilot-Engineer teams. New or refined procedures developed by the school are incorporated in SAC Manuals. Emphasis has been placed on emergency procedures at the school. To date 29 crews have been processed through the school, plus 37 newly assigned staff officers. The school is an important source of procedure development and indoctrination. When the B-47's are delivered to SAC we plan to put the first few in the Transition School to permit us to develop the best pilot procedures for incorporation in SAC Manuals. Pilots of units operating the B-47 will be processed through MacDill. This will permit us to maintain tight control on the delicate problem of transitioning pilots on this new high speed airplane.

22A. All pilots of this command are required to make all landings by GCA as a standing procedure. "Wittles" experts have been requested from AFS to assist us in establishing GCA procedures for rapid and

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safe landing of squadrons and groups under adverse weather conditions. This project is progressing satisfactorily.

Pilot Techniques. As a result of Colonel Lindbergh's visit several months ago, Wing and Group Commanders have been directed to supervise personally the landing techniques of their pilots. Colonel Lindbergh observed that approaches for landing were in many cases made at too high an airspeed which placed undue stress on equipment and enhanced the danger of running off end of landing strip. Special attention is being given this matter and a progress report will be made shortly after first of the year. (Tab E).

The R-3350 Engine has been a source of trouble of long standing. The modified engine has been an urgent requirement. Numerous messages, strongly stating the facts of the case of the R-3350, have been forwarded to AFF and [illegible], Wash. Pertinent messages are attached as Tab F.

Failure of propeller feathering mechanisms on B-29 aircraft at high altitudes has been a condition of major concern. Information relative to corrective action initiated by this command is contained in file attached as Tab [illegible].

The B-29 accident at Fort Worth has been definitely attributed to reversed propellers on two symetrically positioned engines. As corrective action, a mechanical device, offering a positive check against such

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a repeat accident, has been developed by AMC and factory officials, and is being installed in B-36 aircraft. Additionally, a ground procedure has been put into use whereby symetrical pairs of engines are run up simultaneously and brakes released. Should one or more propellers be in reversed position, the condition can be detected immediately by either a backward movement of airplane or a positive yaw. As a final preventative, an acceleration check is being developed whereby the co-pilot will measure airspeeds during early part of ground roll against a stop-watch. Should acceleration be below specified minimums, the take-off will be abandoned at an early stage of the roll. (Tab B)

The need for additional technical staff personnel in wings, groups, and squadrons has been apparent for some time. The purpose of this increase is to more thoroughly train and supervise the specialist such as flight engineers, bombardiers, navigators, radar operators, and other crew members. This requested increase in staff personnel would give the organizations sufficient personnel to conduct briefing, training, supervision without using combat crew members as additional duty. Often time combat crew members are required to fly long missions and are also required to prepare briefing prior to flight and mission reports after the flight. In time of emergency or sustained operation the work load on these additional duty specialists is so great as to hamper the efficiency of the unit. Therefore, this

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Memorandum for Col Bernard (Continued

command has initiated action to increase the technical staff of these combat units. (See Tab F).

The Stockton accident. On the day of this accident, representatives of this headquarters were sent to the scene of the accident and later to Spokane to conduct a special investigation. Their report is being prepared at this time. Instructions have been issued to combat units to the effect that no two aircraft engaged in a bombing mission at night or under instrument conditions will be assigned same bombing altitude. The Stockton accident will be analyzed in detail and every action taken to eliminate the possibility of recurrence. Additional study of this accident is considered necessary prior to arriving at definite conclusions. (See F)

The Bermuda accident. Our Flight Safety Officer, plus an assistant, were sent to Bermuda the day of the accident. They remained there until survivors were recovered and assisted in organizing and coordinating search activities. A detailed investigation is being made and appropriate action will be taken. Definite evidence is on hand to indicate the need for more reliable communications facilities at Bermuda, and a message has been forwarded to H.Q., USAF on this subject. Also, we see the need for immediate action to replace defective emergency equipment of bombardment-type aircraft. One of the two life rafts carried internally by the B-29 which ditched off Bermuda failed

Memorandum to Col Moreland - Continued

to inflate automatically. The raft had to be inflated manually by the crew. One of the life raft's canopy blew away due to deterioration of the canvas, exposing personnel to the elements for the entire period. Since February 1948 this headquarters has tried to obtain new life rafts. (See Tab C) Action has been taken to bring this condition to the attention of our units and AFF. We have further directed our combat units to intensify dead reckoning and celestial navigation, using radio compass only in emergency. This has been a standing policy in SAC, but the need for re-emphasis is indicated.

Due to the difficulty in abandoning medium bombardment aircraft forced down at sea, we have directed that no more than 16 men will be carried in B-29-type aircraft and no more than 15 in B-50-types. (See Tab D). This will naturally call for additional air transportation to support the rotation of crews to the UK, but in peacetime, we feel this is justified from a safety standpoint.

Finally, at risk of expounding the obvious, let me point out that the mission of this command is such as to enhance the possibility of accidents. To simulate conditions which we will inevitably encounter should we go to war, our crews must operate their aircraft under high performance conditions, including: gross weight take-offs; high altitude operation; long range cruising; night, instrument, and weather flying; unit missions involving controlled climbs, etc. The only way

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Memorandum for Col. [illegible], Continued

to train our crews and shake the bugs out of the equipment is to actually do this type of flying. For over a year, our standard bombing altitude has been 25,000 feet, and simulating combat conditions as closely as practicable. Had we not prescribed high altitudes, it is possible that the R-3350 defects, with the resultant modification program, would not have materialized. In peacetime, we can afford to ground the force and fix the trouble. In wartime, such cannot be done; crews are lost and the successful accomplishment of the mission unnecessarily placed in jeopardy. Although all possible safety measures are being taken, General LeMay feels that only through realistic type training can we be assured that both crews and equipment will be in shape to do the job.

Attached hereto are copies of [illegible] regulations covering training requirements, plus [illegible] accident rate trends. ([illegible]).

J. B. [illegible]
Brigadier General, [illegible]
Director of Operations

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MISCELLANEOUS DATA

DOAA2

SAC 353 (25 Aug 49)

25 August 1949
(Identical letter
to 8th AF)

SUBJECT: Long Range Tactical Missions

Originator

Phone

TO: Commanding General
Fifteenth Air Force
Mat Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

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1. The Long Range Tactical Missions outlined herein are directed as minimum training requirements. In order to permit maximum training in the planning and execution of these missions and to reveal the capabilities of the unit and their equipment, only the basic requirements of the missions are established. Special emphasis will be placed on procedure training and on the exact execution of the mission in accordance with established procedures and tactical doctrine. To achieve maximum training, all aspects of simulated combat missions will be incorporated. A minimum of two aircraft will be scheduled on these missions.

2. The following general requirements are established for Long Range Tactical Missions:

a. Group Briefing: The planning and briefing of the mission will be conducted at Group level.

b. Take-off: Take-off will be at controlled intervals. The interval will be determined by the interval of aircraft over target.

c. Pre-IP: A Pre-IP will be established. Mission will be planned so that aircraft will overfly point at a controlled time at established intervals.

d. Target Times: From pre-IP to target, aircraft will fly controlled airspeed to maintain interval at target.

e. Return: Return will be accomplished by individual aircraft.

1234

DOAA2 353 25 Aug 49
Subj: Long Range Tactical Missions

f. Post Flight: A post flight interrogation and analysis will be conducted at Group level.

3. When no bombs are carried, a simulated radar bombing attack will be accomplished on an industrial target, scored by RBS method.

4. The following specific requirements are established for Basic long Range Tactical Missions:

a. Medium bombardment missions for stripped B-29 aircraft will consist of a round robin flight of 4020 nautical air miles. Take-off will be accomplished with 8,055 gallons of fuel, 10,000 pound bomb load and 500 rounds of ammunition per gun; target will be approximately 2010 nautical air miles distant. After take-off, minimum safe altitudes will be maintained to obtain optimum cruise control conditions. An altitude of 25,000 feet will be attained at the pre-IP. After breakaway, 25,000 feet will be maintained until a long range descent is required. Landing reserve will be 500 gallons.

b. Standard B-29 and B-50 aircraft: Mission will consist of a maximum range round robin flight with maximum fuel load in built-in fuel cells. No bomb load will be required. Ammunition load will be 250 rounds per gun. Mission will beaccomplished as specified in paragraph 4, a, above.

c. Tanker aircraft: Take-off at 140,000 lbs, refueling a receiver type aircraft at optimum refueling point, to provide greatest range for that particular receiver aircraft. Refueling will be accomplished at an altitude of 10,000 feet. In each refueling, the air-to-air rendezvous equipment will be used. Landing reserve will be 500 gallons.

d. Receiver aircraft: Maximum load take-off (B-29 limited to 140,000 pounds). 10,000 pound bomb load. No refueling except as listed in sub-paragraph b, c, below. Maximum range will be accomplished as specified in paragraph 4, a, above.

e. The receivers used in conjunction with the basic tanker missions will continue until maximum range for

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DOLAZ 353 25 Aug 48
Subj: Long Range Tactical Missions

all fuel has been achieved and may receive credit for their basic long-range mission. An abort by a receiver aircraft after successful transfer does not cancel credit for tanker mission.

f. B-36 aircraft: Until such time as performance data and standing Operating Procedures are established, the planning and execution of long range tactical missions will be at the discretion of B-36 unit commanders, however, the missions will be both tactical and realistic in nature with emphasis directed toward maximum performance of the aircraft and combat crew procedure training.

* * * * *

6. This letter supersedes 3rd Letter 353, subject as above, dated 7 April 1948.

BY DIRECTION OF COMMANDING GENERAL:

SAM D. MILLER
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
Fort Worth, Texas

OAT-OPO 6 MAY 1949

SUBJECT: Long Range Tactical Missions

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. Reference is made letter SAC 353, your headquarters, "Long Range Tactical Missions", 7 April 1949.

2. The B-29 and B-50 Bombardment Units of this Air Force were invited to make comments and recommendations on the subject letter. The comments and recommendations of each unit are attached as inclosures 1 through 5 inclusive.

3. In view of the comments and recommendations on the attached inclosures the following requests are made:

a. Change the requirement for the ten (10) minute period immediately prior to the bomb release from rated power to 190 true indicated air speed. See paragraph 1,a,(1) of inclosure 5 and paragraph 5,a of the Strategic Air Command letter.

b. Classify the new modified stripped B-29 as a standard B-29. See inclosure 5, paragraph 1,b,(1) and paragraph 5,a and 5,b of the Strategic Air Command letter.

c. Provide an alternate requirement for bomb loading since some airplanes can accomodate a 10,000 pound bomb load only if it consists of an M-107 and all crews are not cleared to handle this equipment. See inclosure 4, paragraph d.

d. That provision requiring 140,000 pound take-offs seems unduly hazardous for those tankers not equipped with jettisonable bomb bay fuel and/or reversible propellers. Therefore, the take-off weight should be reduced for those airplanes.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

5 Incls
Incl 1 - 5 Recommendations
from each of the Wings

/s/ H. E. Blanchard
H. E. BLANCHARD
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

BASIC: SAF ltr, [illegible], 15 Apr 49, subj, "Recommendations on Long Range Tactical Mission"

2133 373.8 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS 22 BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M), Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas

1. This organization concurs in the stripped B-29 and B-50 tactics as stated in basic communication. However, comments and recommendations pertaining to the feasibility of accomplishing a 4020 nautical mile flight with 8055 gallons of fuel cannot be made at this time as flights of this nature utilizing the B-50 aircraft have not been attempted.

2. Long range tactical missions as directed in basic communication will be scheduled upon arrival of the 22 Bombardment Group at Chatham Air Force Base. These flights will be thoroughly analyzed and the results furnished your headquarters.

1 Incls
n/c

[illegible], JR.
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

CCT-AFT 373.5 (Hq SAF)
Subject: Recommendations on Long Range Tactical Mission (13 Apr 49)

AS 1st Ind EAL/hwm

Hq 7th Bomb Wing (H), Carswell Air Force Base, Ft Worth, Tex, 21 Apr 49

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Ft Worth, Tex

In compliance with par 2 of basic letter the following comments are submitted, reference SAC letter 353.

a. The requirements of par 1, 2, 3, and 4 are concurred in as being applicable to B-36 type aircraft.

b. Reference par 5 a and b, a simulated combat mission applicable to the B-36 could consist of the following:

(1) Round-robin flight of 7800 nautical miles.

(2) Target: 3200 nautical miles.

(3) 23,800 gals of fuel (wings and one bomb bay).

(4) No expedition (none available at present).

(5) 8,000 lbs of bombs: drop only one 800 lb bomb at target. This will approximate carrying 10,000 lbs to the target and will effect a considerable savings in bombs.

(6) Landing fuel reserve: 600 gals.

(7) Maximum take-off weight: 310,000 lbs.

(8) As further cruise control techniques and technical changes are made distances can probably be increased.

c. Requirements of par 5 c and d are not applicable to B-36 type aircraft.

d. Reference par 5e, this headquarters will continue to plan and direct the execution of long range tactical missions with a view toward establishing standard tactical procedures.

1 Incl
n/c

ALAN D. CLARK
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS 43RD BOMBARDMENT WING (M)
Office of the Commanding Officer
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base
Tucson, Arizona

AS 373.5

SUBJECT: Long Range Tactical Missions with Air-to-Air Refueling

TO: Commanding General
Eighth Air Force
Fort Worth, Texas

1. Reference your letter, CDT-[illegible] 373.5, 13 April 1949, subject "Recommendations on Long Range Tactical Mission," a study has been completed and the following information is submitted:

a. B-50 type aircraft could possibly take-off from this station, but tanker aircraft could not. At present, maximum gross weight take-offs are limited to 140,000 for the B-50 type aircraft and 120,000 for B-29 aircraft, due to the altitude of the field, high temperature, and length of runways.

b. Tanker aircraft (un-modified) flying off Davis-Monthan Air Force Base grossing over 120,000 creates an unsafe condition without droppable tanks and reversible propellers.

c. Tanker aircraft would have to be staged through some other base to comply with this directive, complicating maintenance and supply problems in addition to transporting maintenance personnel to staging bases.

d. Tanker aircraft would have to average fifty-four long range refueling missions per quarter to complete the requirements of receiver crews. That averages almost one flight per day, considering about sixty-five duty days per quarter.

e. To date, detailed performance data has not been received on tanker aircraft from Walker Air Force Base, Flight Test Section.

f. Rendezvous equipment is not considered reliable due to the nature of the equipment, as well as to the experience level of operators and maintenance personnel.

2. In view of the above, the following recommendations are made:

AS 370.5
SUBJECT: Long Range Tactical Missions with Air-to-Air Refueling

a. That emphasis be placed on short range missions, stressing the number of hook-ups; rendezvous equipment to be utilized as their primary source of contact.

(1) A better utilization of flying time would result from coordinated air refueling short range missions, i.e., at present three tankers are scheduled daily to refuel receivers which are scheduled for an ORI Site.

(2) Reference your COF-23 which amplifies SAC Reg. 50-3 and 8th AF Reg. 51-1 by listing the minimum percentages of flying time to be allocated to various types of training.

b. That the establishing of a training program be delegated to the Wing in order to establish the capabilities of refueling operations and to further develop tactics and techniques.

c. That only one long range mission per year for each crew, with air-to-air refueling be accomplished. (This should be a double refueling mission). That this mission be classified as a maneuver in that the operation could be staged from other bases of necessity.

[illegible] C. Filer Jr.
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

[illegible] 373.6 1st Ind
Subject: Recommendations on Long Range Tactical Mission (18 Apr 49)

AG 373.2
HEADQUARTERS, 97TH BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM, Biggs Air Force Base,
Biggs Field, Texas 22 APR 1949

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Carswell Air Force Base,
Fort Worth, Texas

In compliance with paragraph 3, basic letter, the inclosure thereto has been examined by this headquarters, and the following comments and recommendations are submitted:

a. The use of the pre-IP is not fully understood by this headquarters. If a controlled time is designated for arrival at the pre-IP, the use of a pre-IP seems superfluous, in that the controlled time could be designated for arrival at the IP. However, if only a controlled interval is desired, the use of a pre-IP is understood.

b. If a specific target time is designated, the success of the mission would depend to a large extent upon the accuracy of the winds aloft forecast. If a specified interval is designated, the accuracy of the forecast would assume a lesser role, but a means of communication between the aircraft must be established at the sacrifice of radio silence.

c. In reference to the comments in "a" and "b" above, it is recommended that the intervals between aircraft be controlled, but that the actual target time be determined by the winds experienced.

d. This headquarters possesses standard and stripped B-29 aircraft at the present time. However, in a short time the entire complement should be stripped aircraft. Facilities are not presently available at this station to load ten thousand pounds of bombs on the stripped aircraft, nor are the correct type of practice bombs available.

e. Terrain difficulties of a local nature together with the provision that targets be approximately 2010 nautical miles distant will require that missions be staged from a more suitably located airfield.

f. It is recommended that each station be required to submit a flight plan for the standard aircraft assigned to its tactical

CDI-CFS 373.6
Subject: Recommendations on Long Range Tactical Mission (13 Apr 40)
AG 373.6 1st Ind continued

organizations. This flight plan would be used as a basis for long range mission requirements of the organization. In its compilation, consideration would be given to the terrain difficulties imposed by nature at the specific station.

1 Incl
n/c

D. M. [illegible]
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding

373.6 3rd Ind MO/hAF/eeg
SUBJ: Recommendations on long Range Tactical Mission

Headquarters 509th Bomb Wing (M), HAFB, Roswell, New Mexico, 25 Apr 40

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, CAFB, Ft Worth, Texas
ATTN: Director of Operations

Your attention is invited to the 2nd Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl
n/c

[illegible] L. [illegible], Jr.
Major, USAF
Adjutant

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[illegible] 373 (16 Mar 49) — 14 JUN 49

SUBJECT: Range Extension

TO: Director of Training and Requirements
Headquarters USAF
ATTN: Major General [illegible], Chief
Operational Requirements Division
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference letter this headquarters to Headquarters USAF, subject "Range Extension", dated 17 February 1949 and 1st Ind to [illegible] dated 10 March 1949, copies attached as Inclosures 1 and 2 respectively.

2. The [illegible] investigation of the "Floating Wing Tip" principle and the Republic Aviation Corporation contract for "Wing Tip to Wing Tip Coupling" of F-84's to a B-29 noted in 1st Indorsement have been given careful study.

3. The research was found to be similar to that proposed in the basic recommendation in that aircraft are linked at the wing tips [illegible] their effective combat radius.

4. The research was found to be different from that proposed in that [illegible] in these units, a [illegible] aircraft with the auxiliary floating wings. The objective is [illegible] escort fighters or linked [illegible] rather than the direct range extension of a fleet of bombardment aircraft.

5. To accomplish linked flight, analytical and experimental research must find the solution to four basic types of problems: structural, stability, aeroelastic, and the techniques of the linkage process. A study outlined in Inclosure 3 indicates that the solutions found for these problems in the "Floating Wing Tip" case will not in general be applicable to the case of linked bombardment aircraft. Upon successful completion of the Republic contract it will still be necessary to initiate research (which will begin at essentially the same point that research could begin today) in order to assess the practicability of linking a fleet of bombardment aircraft. A concurrent paper study of this problem initiated immediately would thus save at least nine months of the time required to develop linked fleets.

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SAC 353 (11 Aug 49) 11 August 1949

SUBJECT: Cruise Control Instruction in B-29 Mobile Training Units

To: Commanding General
Technical Division
Air Training Command
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

Originator
Maj Harvey/mc
Phone 2290
4 Aug 1949

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1. Reference your letter AG (T) 353 MT, 28 April 1949. This command has a present requirement to train airmen in B-29 Cruise Control in On-the-Job Training and Refresher Training categories. These requirements are listed in paragraph 2, by station.

	MT	Refresher	
2. 92d Bomb Wing, Spokane Air Force Base	35	30	
301st Bomb Wing, Smoky Hill Air Force Base	4	56	
* 307th Bomb Wing, MacDill Air Force Base	23	56/ 440	pilots
97th Bomb Wing, Biggs Air Force Base	6	30	
5th Reconnaissance Group, Mountain Home Air Force Base	32	40	
55th Reconnaissance Wing, Forbes Air Force Base	5	40	
91st Reconnaissance Wing, McGuire Air Force Base	5	12	
Total	112	272	

* Pilots are required in 307th Bomb Group Combat Crew Training School to receive Cruise Control instruction.

[illegible] 353

11 Aug 49

Subj: Cruise Control Instruction in B-29 Mobile Training Units

3. All bases listed have B-29 Mobile Training Units assigned, except the 5th Reconnaissance Group at Countain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, and 91st Reconnaissance Wing at McGuire Air Force Base. The latter will be converting to B-50 type aircraft in the near future.

4. Reference paragraph 2, your letter, stating a portion of the flight engineers training may have been accomplished in this command. The only training conducted on Cruise Control has been intensive flight training. This flight training has been augmented by squadron instruction but no formalized ground instruction has been given.

5. Recommended plan for accomplishment of Cruise Control Training is to assign cruise control instructors to all Mobile Training Units: B-50, B-36, B-29, F-80, F-82, C-82, C-54, C-97, to conduct Cruise Control classes. Request classes conducted for both groups place emphasis on cruise control procedures, as most 737s are qualified mechanics.

6. It is requested that Mobile Training Units reinitiate Cruise Control into the course of instruction in view of the requirements established in paragraph 2. All flight instruction will be accomplished by the Air Force activity concerned.

[illegible]

[illegible]
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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[illegible]

[illegible], Nebraska

[illegible] Cruise Control Techniques for Jet Bombardment Aircraft

To: Commanding General
Air Materiel Command
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio

1. This command is concerned with the problems that will be encountered in obtaining the maximum range from jet bombardment aircraft scheduled for future delivery. Special emphasis is placed on B-47B aircraft.

2. Contrary to the common belief that the inherent characteristics of the jet engine generally preclude cruise control techniques, it is believed that careful application of airplane efficiency and propulsive efficiency will afford appreciable gains in range. In-flight replenishment will doubtlessly be necessary on a majority of missions and will be encountered by air refueling. Although somewhat simplified, the same degree of cruise control accuracy that is applied to conventional type pursuit aircraft is considered necessary for the jet type. Upon consideration that the B-47B carries only three crew members and that missions requiring a minimum of ten hours will be common practice, cruise control may present a serious problem.

3. Your comments on the subject with respect to your experience to date, results of studies and recommended implementation are solicited.

[illegible]

s/t/ [illegible]
Major, USAF
Asst Adjutant

~~RESTRICTED~~

Basic ltr Hq SAC, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Neb., dtd 17 Aug 49, subj: Cruise Control Techniques for Jet Bombardment Acft.

1st Ind MCREXA9/JSM/vd

Hq AMC, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, 1 September 1949

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska

1. Experience to date based on both theory and flight tests indicates that cruise control techniques for jet aircraft are mainly functions of Mach Number, or Calibrated Airspeed, and altitude. This will require operating procedures somewhat different from those presently used by flight engineers in reciprocating engine aircraft.

2. In order that the Strategic Air Command may be provided with data that is compatible with the best jet cruise control techniques and tactical usage thereof, representatives of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces have been invited to Headquarters Air Materiel Command on 12 September 1949 to discuss the B-47 requirements. It is planned also to visit the Boeing Airplane Company at Seattle for further discussions regarding cruise control techniques for the B-47 and future jet bombardment aircraft.

3. Comments covering results of discussions mentioned in paragraph 2 above will be forwarded to Headquarters, Strategic Air Command approximately 1 October 1949.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

2 Incls:
1. Ltr to CG 8th AF dtd 26 Aug 49
2. Ltr to CG 15th AF dtd 26 Aug 49

s/t/ GEORGE F. SMITH
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Aircraft Projects Section
Engineering Division

~~RESTRICTED~~

2AFOB

353 10 DEC 1949

SUBJECT: Long Range Tactical Mission (Reconnaissance)

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. Reference 3AC Letter, file 353, dated 22 April 1949, Subject: Long Range Tactical Mission (Reconnaissance). Request Paragraph 3a as pertains to bomb bay tanks be changed to read two (2) bomb bay tanks instead of four (4). This decreases the range approximately 150 miles but will permit the accomplishment of night photo flash photography on long range tactical missions.

2. It is also requested that Paragraph 3a as pertains to 30,000 foot altitude be changed to read 25,000 feet indicated altitude. The above recommended changes in the specifications of long range tactical missions will enable units of this command to complete a greater percent of the attempted missions and avoid the creation of an additional maintenance burden.

BY [illegible]:

[illegible]
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj General

Basic ltr fr Hq 2d AF, Barksdale AFB, La, subj: Long Range Tactical Mission (Reconnaissance), dtd 10 Dec 49

SAC 353 (10 Dec 49) 1st Ind DO4A2

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 23 DEC 49

TO: Commanding General, Second Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana

1. The SAC letter referred to in paragraph 1 is rescinded this date.

2. The minimum long range mission requirement for Strategic Reconnaissance crews is being established as one mission per quarter. The range, gas load, altitude, routes, individual training and other planning details will be the responsibility of the Second Air Force or the unit commander if the responsibility is delegated. A letter requiring these missions will be sent to your command in the near future.

3. The intent of the long range mission requirement is to provide the unit commander an opportunity to schedule simulated tactical missions during which emphasis will be placed on prescribed cruise control and navigation practice.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

RICHARD T. LIFFORD
2d Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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[illegible]
9773 [illegible], [illegible]
[illegible] Air Force Base, Texas

~~SECRET~~
Auth: C.G., 8th AF
Initial: GLR
Date: 18 Oct 49

DOS-3 319.1 13 OCT 1949

SUBJECT: Long Range Tactical Mission Report

TO: Commanding General
Eighth Air Force
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

1. The attached Flight Engineers log, prediction, and flight progress curves, Mission Summary report, and analysis are forwarded in accordance with SAC Letter Long Range Tactical Mission Report, file number 353, date 21 April 1949.

2. These logs and Flight Plan have been examined and discrepancies in technique and procedures have been noted and brought to the attention of personal concerned.

[illegible]

2 Incls
1. Long Range Mission Report
34lst Bomb Squadron (3 cys)
2. Long Range Mission Report
342nd Bomb Squadron (7 cys)

s/t/ [illegible]
1st Lt., [illegible]
Asst. Adjutant

COT-DPR 373.2 (13 Oct 49) 1st Ind

Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas, 19 OCT 1949

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

Forwarded in accordance with SAC letter 353, 21 April 1949, subject as above.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

2 Incls.
1 - Mission Summary Rpt
34lst Bomb Sq. 97th BG.
w/3 Flight Engineers log analyses
2 - Mission Summary Rpt
342nd Bomb Sq. 97th BG, w/7
Flight Engineers log analyses

s/t/ W. H. BLANCHARD
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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ADJUSTED

LONG RANGE TACTICAL MISSION

SUMMARY REPORT

[illegible]

GROUP 97th Bomb Group
341st Bombardment Squadron

Date 31 September 1949

DATE	1 CREW NO.	2 ACFT TYPE AND NO.	3 PRE-DICTED AIR MILES	4 AIR MILES ACT-UAL	5 GROUND MILES ACT-UAL	6 FUEL USED CALCU-LATED	7 FUEL USED ACT-UAL	8 T.O. GROSS WEIGHT	9 FUEL LOAD-ING	10 CALCULATED NAV ERROR IN
29 Aug 49	4102	44-86394	4285	4008	4052	3057	3192	127647	46777	.031
29 Aug 49	4108	44-86430	4325	4121	4173	5491	5261	132485	47495	.486
25 Aug 49	4106	44-86346	4346	4301	4308	2285	2101	127835	47180	.403

Indicate lead crew by asterisk
NOTE:

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[illegible]

LONG RANGE TACTICAL MISSION

SUMMARY REPORT

[illegible]

GROUP 97th Bomb Group
342nd. Bomb Sqdn.

DATE 31 September 1949

DATE	CREW NO. 1	ACFT TYPE AND NO. 2	PRE-DICTED AIR MILES 3	AIR MILES ACT-UAL 4	GROUND MILES ACT-UAL 5	FUEL RES CALCU-LATED 6	FUEL RES ACT-UAL 7	T.O. GROSS WEIGHT 8	FUEL LAND-ING 9	CALCU-LATED ERROR IN 10
17 Aug 49	4203	44-86384	4280	4399	4364	2780	2675	127,620	48,000	..0023
20 Aug 49	4204	44-86439	4191	4262	4122	2567	2840	129,200	47,270	.0061
23 Aug 49	4207	44-86382	4241	4381	4237	2163	1848	128,500	48,000	.0068
20 Aug 49	4213	44-27304	3941	3913	3723	3399	3065	131,500	47,495	.0074
26 Aug 49*	4212	44-86439	4354	4410	4501	3951	3974	127,697	47,524	.0005
[illegible] Aug 49*	4201	44-86384	417[illegible]	[illegible]	4127	3087	3210	12[illegible],000	48,000	.0028
30 Aug 49	4214	44-86401	4359	4338	4241	2723	2973	12[illegible],405	47,7[illegible]	.0055

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HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND DPLl
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE
OMAHA, NEBRASKA

SAC File 353 [28 Feb 49] 28 February 1949

SUBJECT: Strategic Air Command Plan for Training of Corollary Units

TO: Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The concept expressed by the Strategic Air Command in Staff Exercise "DOUBLEDOM" and generally accepted within the USAF demanded that priority be accorded to missions and functions in order of time-phased requirements. Under this concept, units of the Strategic Air Command have been accorded a priority commensurate with our mission to deliver the initial offensive. The concept, expressed more fully, recognizes the requirement to plan for subsequent phases of operations, but requires that no preparatory action be taken at the expense of the means required for initial operations.

2. A study of the proposed Corollary Reserve Program for the Strategic Air Command as outlined to representatives of this Headquarters has been accomplished. The conclusions reached are:

a. That the program as currently outlined will make in-roads into the operational effectiveness of regular units.

b. That the failure to allocate manpower, equipment, and funds directly to the support of Strategic Air Command Reserve Program is not consistent with the concept expressed above. The replacement crew requirements of the Strategic Air Command after D-Day should be accorded a high priority within the total Reserve Program if priority is accorded to missions and functions in order of time-phased requirements.

3. Although the most obvious alternate solution is the direct allocation of manpower, equipment, and funds for the support of Strategic Air Command units, it is realized that such action would require complete revision of the USAF Reserve Program. Therefore, an alternate plan (Inclosure No. 1) is proposed which in the opinion of this Headquarters does not vary radically with the USAF program; will produce a minimum of interference with the training of the parent units; and will produce an effective reserve. The alternate plan:

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To: CSUSAF
Subj: SAC Plan for Training of Corollary Units

a. Eliminates unit training deemed unessential.

b. De-emphasizes local training of Reservists in the Strategic Air Command.

c. Emphasizes centralized training for Reserve crews within the Strategic Air Command.

4. It is recommended that:

a. The attached plan be approved, generally as outlined.

b. The minor requirements of personnel and equipment indicated in the plan be satisfied by the USAF.

c. Provision be made for continuation of the Strategic Air Command Transition Training School at MacDill Air Force Base in the event the 306th Bombardment Wing is inactivated under the 45-Group Program. (Continuance of this school is the subject of a separate request to USAF which will be more fully justified on the basis of the requirement to train combat crews for parent units).

1 Incl:
SAC Plan for Training
of Corollary Units
w/3 incls (Tabs A, B,
and C)

s/t/ [illegible]
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

~~SECRET~~

Basic Ltr, subj: Strategic Air Command Plan for Training of Corollary Units, dtd 28 Feb 49, from SAC

1st Ind

Dept. of the Air Force, Hqs, U. S. Air Force, Washington 25, D. C., 13 Apr 1949

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska

1. Your proposed plan has been given careful consideration by the Air Staff. The Chief of Staff recognizes the cost to the Strategic Air Command in implementing the Corollary Unit Training Program. He feels, however, that the many other factors which must be considered in the overall Air Force picture preclude favorable consideration of your proposal.

2. You are directed to implement the Corollary Unit Training Program at the appropriate time with the means available to you.

1 Incl
n/c

s/t/ MUIR S. FAIRCHILD
General, United States Air Force
Vice Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

13 October 1949

SUBJECT: Career for Atomic Crew Members

TO: Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The requirement placed upon the Strategic Air Command to develop and maintain a strategic striking force in being fully capable of executing on a moment's notice its primary mission, the atomic offensive, has prompted us to explore all possible means of improving the effectiveness of the individual combat crews which constitute the fighting nucleus of this force. Serious study of this problem over the past six months has served primarily to emphasize the growing complexity of the overall problem and to bring into focus certain basic factors which must be recognized in its solution.

2. We are now convinced that among the more important of these factors are those which fundamentally tend to limit, either by termination or by protracted interruptions of the tactical training cycle, the extent to which an individual combat crew member may develop proficiency in his specialty. These factors may be divided into two broad categories--those which may be directly controlled by this headquarters, and those over which this headquarters has no direct control. With regard to the former category, we will continue to do everything within our power to insure that the effectiveness of our crews is preserved. Concerning factors of the latter category, however, little can be done within the Strategic Air Command to lessen or eliminate their retarding effect other than to bring them to the attention of the controlling agency for remedial action. The attached study has been prepared for that purpose.

3. The study deals only with the effect of certain current administrative policies established by Headquarters United States Air Force which, in our opinion, are worthy of early review and modification. We feel that this study is particularly pertinent at this time, since it appears that the United States Air Force is likely to be limited to a 48-group structure for some time to come. We believe that this limited structure henceforth necessitates full recognition of a basic change which must take place in the strategic philosophy of the Air Force.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Career for Atomic Crew Members

4. Heretofore, the generally accepted concept of a 70-Group Air Force made it practical to assume that the strategic units over and above those specifically required for the atomic phase would be immediately available upon the outbreak of war as a firm basis for further mobilization to carry out any succeeding phases that war plans may envisage. On the other hand, the 48-Group structure does not permit maintenance of any mobilization cushion, since it provides in being only sufficient groups to accomplish the minimum requirements of the atomic phase.

5. With the number of its units thus limited, it is our feeling that the United States Air Force must place greater emphasis than ever before on quality, for it now stands that only through quality of effort can even the minimum requirements of the atomic phase be met. Since even the best of combat equipment is no better than the personnel who operate it, it is the quality of the combat crews which in the final analysis determines the effectiveness of the striking force.

6. Our study is based on the premise that the latter statement is an indisputable fact and therefore a principle that must be constantly borne in mind throughout the entire process of selecting and training combat crew personnel. If this process is to continue to provide an acceptable degree of quality in the end product, it must be progressively modernized to keep pace with changing technological conditions. For example, the study clearly indicates that we must have pilots also qualified as observers in order to overcome the crew space limitations in aircraft we will soon be manning. This requirement may in itself simplify certain other problems of primary concern--such as the procurement of high-quality individuals to undergo observer training only. However, the advantages which will accrue from fulfilling this requirement will most certainly be nullified unless adequate provisions are made throughout the new training program to insure that the multi-qualified pilot will be fully capable of assimilating his new responsibilities.

7. I concur in the recommendations contained in the attached study and urge that they be given priority consideration by your staff.

1 Incl
Study - Career for Atomic Crew Members

CURTIS E. LeMAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

Col Westover elb/3215
Rm 213A 18 Oct 49

21 OCT 1949

Major Genral A.P. McNaughton
Director of Training
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Ken,

We have examined your study, "Career Plan for Officer Combat Crews of the Strategic Air Command," which was informally given to Montgomery, and are returning it with our comments. Also attached is a copy of a study which we have prepared on the same general subject.

In comparing our studies, you will note that one complements the other. In our study, we have developed the need for a career plan which will keep personnel in combat crew assignments up to twenty years. In your plan, on the other hand, there is developed the mechanism for such a career.

There are a few points in your plan which we recommend be changed. For example, you have proposed that graduates of pilot school be assigned to the major commands as pilots for three or four years before attending 1034 school. Insofar as the Strategic Air Command is concerned, we are opposed to this proposal since we will not have the facilities to accommodate unseasoned pilots during this period. A better proposal would be for the other major commands to receive all fledgling pilots and in return provide this command with pilots who are sufficiently seasoned to occupy positions in B-47 and B-52 crews.

We also question the wisdom of sending all pilots to 1034 school, since the Strategic Air Command will have no requirement for such a qualification. It is suggested, as an ultimate objective, that all pilots destined for combat crew positions in this command complete 1017 training prior to their assignment. This will permit us to form crews with personnel who already possess the basic crew qualifications.

Your proposal to guide reconnaissance personnel through the 7888 school should, we believe, be reconsidered. As we see it, the concept for mutual training within a crew should not be extended beyond those functions on which the safety of the aircraft depends. To include an unrelated function in

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General McNaughton

our cross training will tend to reduce the return which the Air Force can realize from its training program. Therefore, it is believed that the RCM function should be continued as a specialty within itself.

There is one other point in which your career plan differs from ours. We have proposed that the senior grade authorized in a combat crew be that of lieutenant colonel. In Tab A to your plan you established the senior grade for crew members as that of major and reserve the grade of lieutenant colonel for squadron commander. In order to insure that the continuation of temporary promotions will not act as a bar to the retention of highly qualified personnel in a combat crew position, we suggest that consideration be given to raising the highest crew grade to that of lieutenant colonel.

You will note that no mention is made in our study of careers for observers. We avoided this issue for two reasons. First, we had been led to believe, from talking with officers from your headquarters, that this was under study in Washington; and secondly, we do not believe that we will have a sufficient requirement for observers after today's aircraft are retired to warrant an observer career plan, as such. What little requirement we will retain can be filled by reserve officers on extended active duty. As for utilization of our regular observers, the B-36 will permit their employment in combat crews for some time. Ultimately they can be absorbed in various staff positions or in command of support organizations.

We have been informally advised that consideration is being given to exclude majors from attending Nather. We are strongly opposed to the initial establishment of such arbitrary barriers to the training of otherwise qualified combat crew personnel. As you will note in our study, we desire, as the optimum, that all officer positions in the B-47 and B-52 crews be filled by pilots having UPT training. The adoption of a grade limitation below that of major will defer the attainment of our objective.

As we see it, a combat crew career system appears to be the best solution to our problem of reaping a full harvest from the seeds of our training program. The cost and complexity of modern equipment together with our present concept of waging war preclude our maintaining in the force in being as large a proportion of inexperienced crews as we are now forced to do.

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CONFIDENTIAL

General McNaughton

We have already forwarded copies of our study to the Chief of Staff and to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations.

Sincerely,

CURTIS E. LeMAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding

2 Incls
1. Memo for Vice Chief of Staff dtd 12 Sep 49 w/Combat Crew Study
2. Cy of study - Career for Atomic Crew Members, SAC dtd 7 Oct 49

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE   CDCTA
Colorado Springs, Colorado

353   1 Jun 49

SUBJECT: Corollary Unit Training Program

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. The program for corollary training as outlined in AFL 45-12 has been studied and the following comments and recommendations are made:

a. [illegible], the program seems to be feasible and workable. As with every program in its initial stages, the problems of administration and operation are large. As the program continues, administrative problems can be handled to a satisfactory degree, but the problems of operation, even though large now will continue to increase. The efficiency of the parent unit will continue to decrease as the strength of the corollary unit increases. As an example, Smoky Hill Air Force Base will have one bombardment squadron assigned with an estimated 30 pilots that must get a minimum of [illegible] logged hours annually. With two corollary and one regular pilot on board, a total of 1350 aircraft hours must be flown. This is approximately 113 aircraft hours per month and with the training to be conducted two consecutive days means that a minimum of 56 aircraft hours per day or an absolute minimum of 16 aircraft must be furnished each of the two days.

Example II, [illegible] Air Force Base will have two bombardment squadrons with approximately 63 corollary pilots to fly a minimum of [illegible] hours annually. This requires [illegible] aircraft hours per month or [illegible] aircraft hours each of the two training days each month. An absolute minimum of [illegible] aircraft must be flown [illegible] hours each day to obtain only the minimum required.

b. In [illegible] at the cost of the program as presented in USAF manual titled, "[illegible] Reserve Program for Fiscal Year 1950," while comparing the B-29, the C-54, and the T-6 aircraft:

	Fly Hrs	Total Cost
B-29	37,[illegible]	[illegible],199,357
C-54	41,[illegible]	2,314,482
T-[illegible]	67,[illegible]	1,035,1[illegible]0

Subject: Corollary Unit Pay Program

Any study of the above figures will easily show that from a financial standpoint, the [illegible] and the [illegible] are much more economical when compared to the [illegible].

c. Strategic Air Command training requirements for tactical units will have to be reduced proportionately to the effort involved to efficiently conduct the corollary program. It appears impossible to increase the flying load as planned and continue to meet present training requirements.

2. Comments by paragraph of the proposed Air Force letter:

a. Reference paragraph 5b. Suggest a definite procedure be incorporated in future instructions for the current transfer of Reserve personnel records so they will be readily available for screening.

b. Reference paragraph [illegible].

(1) It is suggested that in order to minimize the loss of efficiency of parent units that the 4 required training unit assemblies be incorporated in a two-day continuous training schedule once each month. The two consecutive training days ensure two pay periods each day for corollary assignees and means two days only each month duty for parent personnel involved.

(2) Of the two proposed methods of conducting the training, this Headquarters favors group level training for tactical units only and like unit level training for other units. As an example, at MacDill Air Force Base, the 307th [illegible] Group, should be assigned for training to the corresponding unit.

c. The main problem in training operations appear to be the difficulties that would be encountered by the extra burden that would be placed on various parent units in which the training is to be accomplished by causing their present program to slow down. Using a broad approach to this problem, it can be seen that the extra work involved in actual training, if the training is done at group level, would be to impose upon one squadron 4 extra days each calendar year. This is based upon a 5-day working week. The numerous administrative difficulties that will be encountered can be solved as they arrive. It is noted, however, that to remain operational over a weekend there must be full base support: maintenance shops must be open, supervisory personnel present, and supply facilities operating.

Subject: Corollary Unit Training Program

1. What are the responsibilities for corollary units assigned to units of other commands (MATS) stationed on Strategic Air Command bases?

2. Are the problems encountered for rated 8-day and corollary unit assignees other than pilots?

s/t/

Adjutant General

204AG 7 April 1949

SAC 353 (7 Apr 49)

SUBJECT: Minimum Training Requirements (Reconnaissance)

TO: Commanding General
311th Air Division
Topeka Air Force Base
Topeka, Kansas

1. Letter this headquarters, subject, "Minimum Training Requirements", dated 19 January 1949, is rescinded. The following minimum training requirements are established for long range Strategic Reconnaissance crews for the period 1 April 1949 through 30 June 1949.

2. a. Radar Scope Photography - 1,000 linear miles of acceptable photography.

b. Tri-Metrogon Photography - 800 linear miles of acceptable photography.

c. Large Scale K-22, K-18 Photography - 120 acceptable negatives.

d. Night Exposures - 4 acceptable negatives.

e. RBS runs between 8,000 and 10,000 feet. Six first runs. 12 total runs. [illegible] 8,000 feet.

f. Aerial Gunnery - 800 rounds of ammunition and 50 feet of scorable gun camera film per gunner.

g. One long range tactical mission.

3. A first run on an industrial RBS target is defined as follows:

a. A bombing run on a briefed target which is made after having followed a briefed course over a briefed IP for the first time on any single flight. In making a first run the RBS station will be contacted when the aircraft is approaching the IP, and informed that the run will be a first run. In the event of malfunction, either airborne or ground, the run will not be a first run and the run over

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DOMAE 353
Subj: Minimum Training Requirements

that target will be classed as a first run short. Aircraft may make as many first runs as desired on any one flight, provided only one first run is made on any one RBS site.

3. Pending issuance of further instructions on long range tactical missions, units are authorized to plan and execute such missions at their discretion; however, the missions will be both tactical and realistic in nature with emphasis on precise navigation and cruise control techniques directed toward attaining maximum performance of the aircraft and engines.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

MORTIN THOMPSON, JR.
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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29 June 1949

SAC 353 (29 Jun 49)

SUBJECT: High Altitude Gun Camera Interception Training

Wtn 27 Jun 49
Originator
Lt Col Dunham
Phone 2167 Wpc

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

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1. A recent conference held at this Headquarters discussed the tactical and training benefits to be derived by both fighter and bombardment units from a coordinated planned program of joint fighter bomber gun camera interception missions. Bombardment gunners have an urgent requirement for continuous training in the operation of central fire control equipment under realistic combat interception conditions. Likewise, fighter units may receive maximum training in tactics and techniques of high altitude interception when engaged in joint fighter bomber maneuvers.

2. Previous experience with this type of training has led this Command to the conclusion that maximum mutual benefit can be obtained only if interceptions are carefully planned and controlled from a single operations point. Fighters and bombers must be located at the same station for the entire maneuver period in order that joint planning, combined briefing and simultaneous comparison of results may be effected. Assessment of exposed gun camera film must occur within a maximum period of twenty-four hours after exposure and fighter film should be compared with bomber film to facilitate training and to improve interception tactics. Efficient operation of such a program dictates therefore that a complement of fighters be placed on TDY status at each bombardment station, where complete operational facilities are available.

3. Due to the great disparity between number of assigned bombardment units and assigned fighter units, this command is unable to support the desired program within its own available resources. Consequently fighter aircraft must be

30445
Ltr Hq SAC Subjt: High Altitude Gun Camera Interception Training

obtained from some source outside the Strategic Air Command if the full benefits of high altitude interception training are to be realized. In this regard the views of Continental Air Command Headquarters, as to the desirability of placing Continental Air Command Fighters on Strategic Air Command Bombardment Stations to accomplish mutual interception training, would be appreciated. Should this proposal be favorably considered within your headquarters, operations personnel of this command are prepared to discuss the plan in detail at your convenience.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

J. B. MONTGOMERY
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Operations

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

AFPT-11 JUL 7 1949

SUBJECT: Cross Training of Critical and Acutely Short Specialists

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebr.

1. The following policy regarding cross training of critical and acutely short specialties will be included in the forthcoming revision of AFR 35-1:

a. Officers and Airmen who possess a critical MOS will not be trained into an acutely short or non-critical MOS.

b. Officers and Airmen who possess an acutely short MOS will not be trained into a MOS which is neither critical nor acutely short.

c. Training of Officers and Airmen from a currently held critical MOS into another critical MOS, or from a currently held acutely short MOS into another acutely short MOS will be limited to related MOS in the same field of skill. Such cross training may be approved by major command headquarters concerned, and indicated in special orders detailing personnel to training.

2. Selection of students for training will be governed by the foregoing. Students improperly selected for non-critical courses in violation of paragraphs 1a and 1b above will be screened at the Air Training Command school for entry into courses leading to critical MOS in consonance with paragraph 1c. Improperly selected students will be returned to proper station only when additional training in a critical field is not available at the training station receiving such students.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ WILLIAM L. FOX
Major, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personnel

TXAA2

22 December 1949

SAC 353 (22 Dec 49)

SUBJECT: Minimum Training Requirements (Reconnaissance)

Rtn: 13 Dec 49
Maj VanVliet/id/2276
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TO: Commanding General
Second Air Force
Barksdale Air Force Base
Louisiana

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1. Letter this headquarters, subject: Minimum Training Requirements, Reconnaissance, dated 7 April 1949 is rescinded. The following quarterly minimum training requirements are established for Strategic Reconnaissance Crews, effective 1 January 1950.

2. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE COMBAT READY CREWS (MEDIUM):

a. Flying Time - 120 hours.

b. Long Range Tactical Mission: One (1) mission.

c. Radar Scope Reconnaissance: Three (3) missions covering a total of at least twelve (12) targets, of which IP-Target Radar Scope Photography is obtained in accordance with Strategic Air Command Radar Reconnaissance and Bombardment Standing Operating Procedures.

d. Night Photo Flash Photography: One (1) mission on which a total of at least six (6) negatives are exposed.

e. Radar Bomb Scoring Runs: Five (5) first runs, twelve (12) total runs, above 5,000 feet pressure altitude.

f. Fighter Intercept - Camera Gunnery: One (1) fighter intercept mission; each gunner expending 100 feet of gun camera film.

g. Aerial Gunnery: One (1) mission on which 200 rounds of ammunition will be expended by each gunner. Fighter attacks will not be accomplished on the same mission as live gunnery.

DOAA2
Subj: Minimum Training Requirements (Reconnaissance)

h. Range Gunnery: One (1) period of Gr Gunnery training per gunner, where range facilities are available to the unit.

NOTE: In aircraft partially armed only those gunners assigned operational gun positions are required to meet Strategic Air Command minimum training requirements. Other gunners assigned to these aircraft will maintain the highest gunnery proficiency practicable in relation to gunnery equipment available.

i. Large Scale Photography: Two (2) missions photographing a total of at least six (6) industrial targets, with long focal length cameras, obtaining pin-point coverage of briefed IP and target from the maximum altitude possible considering weather and equipment limitations.

j. Tri-Nitrogen Photography: Six (6) charting strips each at least fifty (50) miles in length.

k. Zonne Photography: Two (2) strips each at least five (5) miles in length.

l. Single Lens Mapping Photography: One (1) mosaic with at least four (4) flight lines, each a minimum of twenty-five (25) miles in length. Desired side lap is 40% and desired forward lap is 60%.

m. Navigation:

(1) One (1) complete navigation instrument calibration mission.

(2) Ten (10) hours grid navigation.

(3) One (1) celestial navigation mission including at least three (3) fixes using three (3) stars each.

(4) Three (3) fixes (3 stars each) each week from ground positions.

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DO442
Subj: Minimum Training Requirements (Reconnaissance)

NOTE: Emphasis will be placed on navigation training without the use of radio aids when practicable.

3. ELECTRONIC RECONNAISSANCE COMBAT READY CREWS (MEDIUM)

a. Flying Time - 120 hours.

b. Long Range Tactical Missions: One (1) mission.

c. Radar Scope Reconnaissance: Three (3) missions covering a total of at least twelve (12) targets, of which IP-Target Radar Scope Photography is obtained in accordance with Strategic Air Command Radar Reconnaissance and Bombing Standing Operating Procedures.

d. Electronic Reconnaissance: Five (5) missions, total of 1,000 linear miles of electronic reconnaissance, during which no less than three-fourths (3/4) of installed ECM observer positions are in full operation.

e. Airborne Electronics Recording: Complete recording of the characteristics of four (4) different electronic emissions for each intercept operator using normal pulse analysis equipment installed at the operator's station.

f. Radar Direction Finding: location by each Radar Observer, [illegible], assigned as crew member, of one (1) ground radar station or other land based pulse transmitter operating in the [illegible]-1000 megacycle range, using AN/APQ-17 or similar D/F equipment.

g. Mission Reports: Five (5) mission reports containing first echelon signal analysis, to include frequency, pulse length, pulse recurrence frequency, rate of antenna sweep, and general location of at least two (2) electronic signals per operator each mission. This does not preclude additional information being reported but is intended to establish a minimum acceptable standard for an electronic reconnaissance training sortie in the [illegible]

h. Fighter Intercept - Camera Gunnery: One (1) fighter intercept mission: each gunner expending 100 feet of gun camera film.

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Subj: Minimum Training Requirements (Reconnaissance)

i. Aerial Gunnery: One (1) mission on which 200 rounds of ammunition will be expended by each gunner. Fighter attacks will not be accomplished on the same mission as live gunnery.

j. Range Gunnery: One (1) period of 02 Gunnery training per gunner, where range facilities are available to the unit.

NOTE: In aircraft partially armed only those gunners assigned operational gun positions are required to meet Strategic Air Command minimum training requirements. Other gunners assigned to these aircraft will maintain the highest gunnery proficiency practicable in relation to gunnery equipment available.

k. Navigation:

(1) One (1) complete navigation instrument calibration mission.

(2) Ten (10) hours grid navigation.

(3) One (1) celestial navigation mission including at least three (3) fixes using three (3) stars each.

(4) Three (3) fixes (3 stars each) each week from ground positions.

NOTE: Emphasis will be placed on navigation training without the use of radio aids whenever possible.

4. SHORAN MAPPING CREWS: The Shoran Mapping Crews will be required to accomplish all minimums established for Strategic Reconnaissance Combat Ready Crews (Medium) with the exception of tri-metrogon and single-lens photography. In lieu thereof, Shoran Mapping Crews will be required to accomplish:

a. Five (5) line crossings.

b. Two (2) weather soundings.

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Subj: Minimum Training Requirements (Reconnaissance)

a. One (1) mission, ten (10) flight lines each at least twenty-five (25) miles in length, of Shoran-controlled photography using the straight line indicator.

d. One (1) mission of at least five (5) flight lines of Arc Photography (single ground station).

5. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE COMBAT CREWS (HEAVY)

a. Flying time - 120 hours.

b. Long Range Tactical Missions: One (1) mission.

c. Radar Scope Reconnaissance: Three (3) missions covering a total of at least twelve (12) targets, of which IP-Target Radar Scope Photography is obtained in accordance with Strategic Air Command Radar Reconnaissance and Bombing Standing Operating Procedures.

d. Night Photo Flash Photography: One (1) mission on which a total of at least six (6) negatives are exposed.

e. Radar Bomb Scoring Runs: Five (5) first runs, twelve (12) total runs, above 5,000 feet pressure altitude.

f. Aerial Gunnery: One (1) mission on which 200 rounds of ammunition will be expended by each gunner. Fighter attacks will not be accomplished on the same mission as live gunnery.

g. Fighter Intercept - Camera Gunnery: One (1) fighter intercept mission; each gunner expending 100 feet of gun camera film.

h. Range Gunnery: One (1) period of Gr Gunnery training per gunner, where range facilities are available to the unit.

NOTE: In aircraft partially armed only those gunners assigned operational gun positions are required to meet Strategic Air Command minimum training requirements. Other gunners assigned to these aircraft will maintain the highest gunnery proficiency practicable in relation to gunnery equipment available.

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DO442
Subj: Minimum Training Requirements (Reconnaissance)

i. Weather:

(1) Two (2) missions preparing and reporting one (1) complete weather observation every 100 nautical miles during each mission.

(2) Three (3) aerial dropsonde releases including the recording and computing of data.

j. Large Scale Photography: Two (2) missions photographing a total of at least six (6) industrial targets, with long focal length cameras, obtaining pin-point coverage of briefed IP and target from the maximum altitude possible considering weather and equipment limitations.

k. Tri-Metrogon Photography: Six (6) charting strips each at least fifty (50) miles in length.

l. Forward Shooting Photography: Two (2) strips each at least twenty-five (25) miles in length.

m. Single Lens Mapping Photography: One (1) mosaic with at least four (4) flight lines, each a minimum of twenty-five (25) miles in length. Desired side lap is 40% and desired forward lap is 60%.

n. Navigation:

(1) One (1) complete navigation instrument calibration mission.

(2) Ten (10) hours grid navigation.

(3) One (1) celestial navigation mission including at least three (3) fixes 3 stars each.

(4) Three (3) fixes (3 stars each) each week from ground positions.

NOTE: Emphasis will be placed on navigation training without the use of radio aids whenever practicable.

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Subj: Minimum Training Requirements (Reconnaissance)

o. Electronic Reconnaissance: Three (3) missions, total of 1,000 miles of electronic reconnaissance, during which no less than three-fourth (3/4) of installed ECM observer positions are in full operation.

p. Airborne Electronics Recording: Complete recording of the characteristics of three (3) different electronic emissions for each intercept operator using normal pulse analysis equipment installed at the operator's station.

q. Radar Direction Finding: Location by each Radar Observer, RCM, assigned as crew member, of one (1) ground radar station or other land based pulse transmitter operating in the 30-11000 megacycle range, using AN/APC - 17 or similar D/F equipment.

r. Mission Reports: Three (3) mission reports containing first echelon signal analysis, to include frequency, pulse length, pulse recurrence frequency, rate of antenna sweep, and general location of at least two (2) electronic signals per operator each mission. This does not preclude additional information being reported but is intended to establish a minimum acceptable standard for an electronic reconnaissance training sortie in the AF.

6. Combat Crew Definition. For training purposes, reconnaissance combat crews will be divided into two categories combat ready and non-combat ready.

a. A combat ready crew is defined as a complete combat crew, either T/O&E or Non T/O&E, which, in the opinion of the unit commander, is capable of performing a reconnaissance mission under combat conditions. In addition to having the ability to obtain reconnaissance data within reasonable limitations as determined by the judgment of the unit commander, the crew should be capable of performing associated tasks required on a combat mission, such as navigation within reasonable limits, ability to obtain average performance from aircraft in possession of unit, etc. Only those crews which a commander would not use in actual combat operations should be excluded from this classification. (Reference paragraph 5 r, AF Letter 55-51, dated 22 September 1947).

b. A non-combat ready crew is a complete T/O&E or non T/O&E crew not classified as combat ready. In order

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Subj: Minimum Training Requirements (Reconnaissance)

to provide the unit commander with complete latitude insofar as training non combat ready crews is concerned, the specific minimums outlined in this letter will not apply to their training except that they will be required to fly 30 hours per quarter desired for all crews.

c. The Standardization Board Crew in each group will be held responsible for only 50% of SAC minimum training requirements

7. MISSIONS OUTSIDE ZONE OF INTERIOR

a. On all missions outside ZI, the foregoing training requirements will apply only to the extent of available facilities and will not interfere with operational commitments.

b. Reports of accomplishments during operational missions will be submitted as training accomplished where applicable.

c. Commanding officers will make appropriate comments on reports indicating any major factors limiting accomplishment of training minimums.

7. Paragraph 3b of Supplement IV Strategic Air Command Regulation 50-8 is amended to read, "SAC 357 (22 Dec 49), subject, 'Minimum Training Requirements, (Reconnaissance)', dated 22 Dec 49."

8. It is planned to revise reconnaissance training supplements to Strategic Air Command Regulation 50-8 effective 1 July 1950 in order to establish training minimums which will reflect the increased reconnaissance potential expected by that date. Comments and recommendations pertaining to this proposed revision relative to air and ground training are encouraged.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL [illegible]

s/ H. T. Wheless

J. B. MONTGOMERY
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Operations

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OOT 353 2 FEB 1949

SUBJECT: Interim Training Program for A. A. F. Officers

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. It is requested that this command be exempted from compliance with the training program as outlined in Air Force letter, [illegible], 3 May 48, subject, "Interim Training Program for A. F. Officers," for the following reasons:

a. To date this headquarters has received six (6) copies of handbook as outlined in paragraph 2 of above letter, which is not sufficient to equip all units for outline purposes. Manual cannot be obtained by requisition.

b. Due to the priority requirements of combat crew training, individual air training, ground school for all crew specialists, [illegible] the Job Training program and influx of new personnel which makes it practically impossible to schedule the interim training program effectively.

[illegible]

s/ J. K. Thompson, Lt Col USAF
for [illegible]
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

Basic Ltr fr Hq [illegible], subj: "Interim Training Program for A.A.F. Officers" dtd 2 Feb 49

SAC 353 (2 Feb 49) 1st Ind [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 22 FEB 1949

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. A recently completed survey of this command has indicated that the results achieved in comparison with the time expended in conducting the Interim Training Program for Air Force Officers have been negligible.

2. Units of this command have been handicapped by such factors as:

a. Personnel turnover.

b. Temporary Duty of tactical organizations.

c. Transitional Training in new aircraft.

d. Priority for combat crew training.

e. Influx of recalled personnel.

f. Additional ground duties.

3. While it is agreed in all units that the intent of the program has merit, it is believed that no more than sixty (60) percent of the officers assigned to this command can complete this program prior to the expiration of Air Force Letter 50-45.

4. It is recommended that this command be exempted from compliance with directives on the Interim Training Program and that sufficient copies of proposed manuals on Air Force leadership be made available at such dates as to enable wise distribution to all officer personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

s/t/ [illegible]
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

[illegible] Ltr fr Hq [illegible] AF, to CG, SAC, dtd [illegible] Feb 49, subj: "Interim Training Program for A.A.F. Officers."

[illegible] Ind

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C., MAR 9 1949

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska

1. Reference is made to recision of Air Force Letter 50-15 effective 7 March 1949. All commands are relieved from further compliance with subject letter.

2. Appropriate distribution of Air Force Leadership Manual 35-15 is currently being effected.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ H. B. [illegible]
Major, USAF
Executive, Training Division
Directorate of Training & Requirements

Drtn: 4 Feb 49
Col. Roberts/atm/2189

8 February 1949

SAME LETTER TO:

Major General S. O'Donnell
Fifteenth Air Force
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Major General M.M.Raney
Eighth Air Force

Brig. General P.T.Cullen
Eilth Air Division

Dear Rosie,

As a result of recent visits to bases of the Strategic Air Command, I am convinced that the training situation, for both air and ground personnel, requires vigorous action to bring it up to satisfactory standards. In several instances I have encountered a lack of clear direction on the part of personnel responsible for accomplishing training at the stations. Records showing the standards of proficiency desired and attained are, in most cases, lacking -- in no case standard.

I desire uniform training programs, reporting procedures and maintenance of records throughout the units of this command. I have instructed my staff to consult with your representatives to plan the attainment of this objective as quickly as possible.

Sincerely,

CURTIS E. LeMAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE FEDAS
Colorado Springs, Colorado

351 8 March 1949

SUBJECT: Training Requirements, Officer and Airmen

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. This Headquarters is planning an intensive program to provide trained personnel to meet existing and anticipated requirements. The program will include technical training courses and on-the-job training. It is proposed that the maximum personnel possible will be trained at technical schools, and the OJT program will be geared to train those personnel for whom quotas cannot be obtained.

2. Shortages in certain fields, such as communications, radar, aircraft maintenance, and food service, are general throughout most commands; and heavy requirements may be expected to be placed on Training Command schools.

3. In order that this Headquarters may intelligently plan a training program, it is requested that information be furnished as to technical school quotas by field of skill, both officer and enlisted, this command may anticipate during the current calendar year.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

JOHN E. ALLEN
Major, USAF
Adjutant General

SAC 353 (8 Mar 49) 1st Ind DPXC2

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 16 MAR 1949

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. At the present time no information is available in this headquarters as to the number of personnel you will be required to send to technical training courses over and above those quotas requested by your headquarters. Headquarters United States Air Force has been queried on the training requirements expected of this command and upon receipt of this information, your headquarters will be advised of the quotas you may expect over and above your requirements in the next few months.

2. The training requirements as established by Headquarters United States Air Force are determined by a world-wide shortage in the various RSN's and on the requests made by major air commands for school training. Since these two factors determine the school courses established by Headquarters United States Air Force, and since these two factors vary considerably from time to time, Headquarters United States Air Force does not know more than three to six months in advance what their school capacity will be in any specific course.

3. It is suggested that your headquarters estimate the school quotas required by your command to meet its operational requirements for the next three to six months and forward these requirements to this headquarters. This headquarters is at the present time making a study of the command training requirements for the next six months, and upon completion of this study, Headquarters United States Air Force will be advised of our estimated requirements to aid them in planning the capacities for the various school courses. Your estimate will enable this headquarters to make a more accurate breakdown of actual requirements for presentation to Headquarters United States Air Force.

4. Any information received by this headquarters that will aid in planning your command's training program will be forwarded to your headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

b/e attached

MONTIE THOMPSON, JR.
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

Originator

Phone

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[illegible]-1 353 3 NOV 1949

SUBJECT: Change in OJT Procedure

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Nebraska

1. Numerous queries have been received regarding the need and value of maintaining SAC Form 50-11-1 on personnel receiving OJT from semi-skilled status to skilled. These queries have referred particularly to those individuals who have just completed OJT from potential to semi-skilled status within the same organization and not those individuals indicated in paragraph 3a, SAC Regulation 50-11, who were received from formal training schools, other commands, or other organizations, who are in a semi-skilled status.

2. It is believed that the benefits derived from maintaining records on these individuals are not sufficient to warrant the exceptional amount of time, effort and administration involved. The trainee is already undergoing a comprehensive rigid OJT program in order to qualify as semi-skilled. The training from semi-skilled to skilled will not normally include new duties or subject material but will consist of training on the same subjects. The differentiation between skilled and semi-skilled being in the degree of supervision necessary.

3. Paragraph [illegible]b (3), SAC Regulation 50-11, provides authority for excluding instruction on those subjects that the semi-skilled individual is qualified in, however, it still requires the completion of SAC Form 50-11-1. It is further believed that if the trainee has satisfactorily completed all the requirements for a semi-skilled rating, including an examination and satisfying the classification board, he no longer needs the same close supervision. The time spent in continued supervision and administration can be better utilized by concentration on improving the OJT program for the fewer people concerned.

4. If your headquarters concurs with these ideas permission is requested to discontinue maintaining SAC Form 50-11-1 on personnel who have just completed OJT from potential to semi-skilled

DDT-1
Subject: Change in JT Procedure

and are now undergoing JT to skilled status within the same organization.

[redacted]

[redacted]
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

Basic ltr fr Hq 8th AF, dtd 3 Nov 49, subj: "Change in OJT Procedure"

SAC 353 (3 Nov 49) 1st Ind DOAB

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 15 NOV 49

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

1. This headquarters believes that it is essential to maintain records on all personnel undergoing on-the-job training to retain standardization in the overall program and to furnish a constant record of the training effort in the individual organization.

2. SAC Regulation 50-11, including SAC Form 50-11-1, is being reviewed by this headquarters.

3. Since records must be maintained, your recommendations as to the best solution are solicited.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

DONALD DOWNEY, JR.
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

Originator
Capt Tracy/mc
Phone 2290
18 Nov 49

CG
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HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
MARCH AIR FORCE BASE
CALIFORNIA

OOCTP

352

17 November 1949

SUBJECT: B-29 Transition Training School Report
(RCS: SAC-OT-P25)

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Nebraska

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with 353, your Headquarters, 28 April 1949, subject as above:

a. Class Number - 12

b. Starting Date - 3 October 1949

c. Completion Date - 28 October 1949

d. Source of Student Crews:

(1) 8th Air Force - 4

(2) 15th Air Force - 4

(3) 311th Air Division - 4

e. Number of Crew Personnel who Failed Course:

(1) Aircraft Commanders - 0

(2) Pilots - 0

(3) Flight Engineers - 0

f. Total Hours Flown:

(1) Total Hours Day:

(a) Aircraft Commanders - 440:00

(b) Pilots - 308:00

(c) Flight Engineers - 581:00

(2) Total Hours Night:

(a) Aircraft Commanders - 46:45

(b) Pilots - 44:40

(c) Flight Engineers - 33:30

(3) Total Hours Instrument:

(a) Aircraft Commanders - 191:10

(b) Pilots - 7:15

g. Average Ground School Grades:

(1) Aircraft Commanders - 87.5

(2) Pilots - 82.6

(3) Flight Engineers - 89.6

h. Number Aircraft Commanders who passed Instrument Check - 12

i. Comments and Recommendations: None.

FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

s/t/ STANLEY W. SIMKINS
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj General

~~SECRET~~

353 CDCP 23 JUN 1949

SUBJECT: Plans for the Incorporation of B-50 Type Aircraft in the Transition Training School and Lead Crew School at MacDill Air Force Base.

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

In compliance with verbal orders from your Headquarters, the attached plan for the incorporation of B-50 type aircraft in the Transition Training School presently being conducted at MacDill Air Force Base, and in the Lead Crew School upon its establishment, is forwarded for your information and approval.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl
Plans for the Incorporation of B-50 Type Aircraft in the Transition Training School, and Lead Crew School at MacDill AFB.

JOHN S. COCKSON, Jr.
1st Lt., USAF
Asst Adjutant General

~~SECRET~~

Ltr, Hq 15th AF, ODCP, 353, 23 Jun 1949, Subj: Plans for the Incorporation of B-50 type Aircraft in the Transition School and Lead Crew School at MacDill Air Force Base, to: CG, SAC, Offutt AFB.

SAC 353 (23 June 49) 1st Ind DO&A

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska 6 JUL 49

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. The proposed plan for the incorporation of B-50 type aircraft into the Transition School is approved.

2. This headquarters has taken or will take the following action based on your recommendations:

a. Ten B-50 type aircraft will be assigned to the Transition School from the 2nd Bomb Wing when the 2nd is re-equipped with B-50D aircraft. It is anticipated that these aircraft will be assigned in August of this year.

b. Your headquarters is authorized direct communication with Headquarters Eighth Air Force for the purpose of establishing plans to train the necessary maintenance personnel at Chatham Air Force Base. It is recommended that the radar personnel selected for training on the APQ-24 be trained at Carswell Air Force Base. Carswell has, at the present time, an operating school for the APQ-24 Radar Set.

c. A B-50 Mobile Training Unit will be assigned the Transition School whenever it is deemed practical. This headquarters will take the necessary action to procure and assign a mock-up of the APQ-24 Radar Set by October 1949.

d. The student load of the Transition School will be reduced by one-third when arrangements have been completed with the Eighth Air Force to train the 306th Bomb Group personnel.

e. The Director of Material, this headquarters, will take the necessary action to establish the B-50 supply channels for MacDill Air Force Base.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

1 Incl
n/c

F. H. BRANDSTETTER
2d Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

Originator
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Ltr, Hq 15 AF, OD-P, 353, 23 Jun 1949, Subj: Plans for the Incorporation of B-50 Type Aircraft in the Transition School and Lead Crew School at MacDill Air Force Base, to: CG, SAC Offutt AFB.

353 (23 Jun 49) 2d Ind. CBKT

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colo. 19 JUL 1949

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas.

1. In accordance with 1st Ind and tentative arrangements made between Lt Colonel Gaff, this Headquarters and Lt Colonel Thompson, your Operations Division, it is requested that your command provide training for the 306th Bomb Group maintenance and flight crew personnel on B-50 aircraft at Chatham Air Force Base. The following plan of training is proposed:

a. Provide MTU ground phase training for 5 crews of the 306th Bomb Group to begin approximately 1 Aug 49.

b. Provide flight check-off transition training for 2 of those 5 crews in order that they may ferry aircraft being assigned to the 306th Bomb Group, and be able to check-off other 306th crews.

c. Provide MTU ground phase training for an additional group of 5 crews after the first group of 5 crews are completed.

d. Provide MTU and practical training for selected maintenance personnel of the 306th Bomb Group beginning approximately 1 Aug 49.

2. Provided your Headquarters concurs with this proposed plan, it is requested that Chatham Air Force Base be authorized direct communication with MacDill AirForce Base for the purpose of arranging details of SSN's, numbers of personnel, and training schedules.

3. Request information as to when AN/APQ-24 radar training can be provided for selected radar maintenance personnel of the 306th Bomb Group. This training will be necessary prior to the establishment of the lead crew school at MacDill Air Force Base. It is tentatively planned for the lead crew school to begin operation at MacDill Air Force Base in October 1949. Therefore, it is believed that training of maintenance personnel should commence no later than 1 Sep 49.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ S. S. WESSEL
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Staff

353

Subject: Plans for the Incorporation of B-50 Type Aircraft in the Transition Training School and Lead Crew School at MacDill Air Force Base.

CDT-1 353 (23 Jun 49) 3d Ind

Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas 29 JUL 1949

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, Mat Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. In accordance with 2nd Indorsement and tentative arrangements made between Lt Colonel Gaff, your headquarters and Lt Colonel Thompson, this headquarters and in agreement made with Lt Colonel Hefner of the 307th Bomb Wing, the following schedule of training has been arranged:

1 - 13 Aug 1949	- 10 Airplane Commanders 10 Flight Engineers
15- 17 Aug 1949	- 2 Aircrews to receive transition
1 - 14 Aug 1949	- 15 Maintenance personnel
8 - 26 Aug 1949	- 15 Maintenance personnel
15Aug - 2 Sep '49	- 15 Maintenance personnel

2. Aircrews will receive 65 hours of ground training requiring ten (10) work days. Maintenance personnel will receive 60 hours of ground school requiring fifteen (15) work days. The school breakdown is as follows:

Subjects	Days of Instructions Aircrew	Maintenance
Airplane General	2	3
Instruments	1	2
Propeller	1	2
Hydraulic	1	2
Electrical System	2	3
Engines	2	3
Auto Pilot	1	None

3. Personnel scheduled to attend this course should receive the following information:

a. Personnel to arrive at least one day prior to classes to make arrangements for housing.

b. Officers will live in town

c. Airmen will live on the base

d. Those scheduled to fly to bring their own flying suits.

SIGNED

OBT-1 353 (23 Jun 49)
Subject: Plans for the Incorporation of B-50 Type Aircraft in the Transition Training School and Lead Crew School at MacDill Air Force Base.

e. As many copies as possible of the Technical Orders on the B-50 should be acquired at their home station for personnel study as additional personal copies are not available at Chatham Air Force Base.

4. Information requested on APQ-24 radar training for radar maintenance personnel at Carswell Air Force Base will be provided as soon as existing schedules and facilities are reviewed. This correspondence is not delayed to acquire this information due to the short period of time remaining for scheduling the training at Chatham Air Force Base.

5. Direct correspondence between 2d Bomb Wing and 307th Bomb Wing authorized for detailed information relative to this arrangement, with information copy provided this headquarters. If the schedule offered is too soon to be effectively utilized the schedule may be moved back, however, if this is desired, immediate notification is requested so that present schedule can be utilized by 2d Bomb Wing and 91st Reconnaissance personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl
w d

Copy furnished CG SAC
CG 2d BW
CG 307th BW

JOHN A. [illegible]
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

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PLANS FOR THE INCORPORATION OF B-50 TYPE AIRCRAFT IN THE TRANSITION TRAINING SCHOOL AND LEAD CREW SCHOOL AT MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE

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PLANS FOR THE INCORPORATION OF B-50 TYPE AIRCRAFT IN THE TRANSITION TRAINING SCHOOL AND LEAD CREW SCHOOL AT MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE

I STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To establish a Lead Crew School at MacDill Air Force Base on or about October 1949.

2. To determine a method of incorporating B-50 type aircraft in the Transition Training School now being conducted at MacDill Air Force Base, and in the Lead Crew School upon its establishment.

II GENERAL

In accordance with the Strategic Air Command reequipment program, by October 1949, of the fourteen (14) bombardment groups in Strategic Air Command, four (4) will be B-50 groups and six (6) will be B-29 groups. The remaining B-29 groups are scheduled for conversion to either B-47, B-50, or B-36 type aircraft at a later date. From these figures, it appears logical and necessary that planning action be taken immediately to establish B-50 type aircraft in the two schools at MacDill Air Force Base.

III BASIC LIMITATIONS

1. That B-36 type aircraft will not be considered for use in the Lead Crew School at this time.

2. That in the event B-50 type aircraft can be made available to MacDill Air Force Base this year, the only models available will be B-50-A's and B's.

3. That aircraft equipped with AN/APQ-24 radar equipment at the time the Lead Crew School is established will be in such a minority that training on such radar equipment will not be necessary.

4. That the Lead Crew School will be established on the predication that all Strategic Air Command combat crews will eventually become lead crews. In other words, the school will be established to train all crews within Strategic Air Command over an indefinite period of time.

IV RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

1. Solution to the problem outlined in paragraph 1 above will be approached in the following manner. First, by proposing the method and problems incident to the incorporation of B-50

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type aircraft in the Transition Training School, presently in effect. Second, by proposing the method and problems incident to the incorporation of B-52 type aircraft in the Lead Crew School, scheduled for establishment on or about October 1962.

a. Incorporation of B-52-A aircraft in the Transition Training School

(1) It is recommended the present SAC re-equipment program which provides for the assignment of eight (8) or nine (9) B-52A type aircraft to the 306th Bombardment Group approximately September of this year, be changed to increase the number of B-52A aircraft to a total of ten (10). The reason for this is to enable the 306th Bombardment Group to completely equip one squadron with this type aircraft. This squadron can then be assigned the sole mission of conducting transition training in B-52 aircraft while the remaining two squadrons continue B-47 transition training.

(2) Action should be taken immediately to establish supply channels for B-52 aircraft so that there will be no collapse in flying time in the Transition Training School at the time these aircraft are assigned.

(3) Effective immediately, and definitely no less than forty-five (45) days prior to the receipt of the first B-52-A aircraft, the student load of the Transition Training School should be reduced approximately one-third (1/3). This action necessary to enable the one squadron designated to receive the B-52-A aircraft to prepare existing B-47's for transfer and train instructors and maintenance personnel in B-52 type aircraft.

(4) Concurrent with number (3) above, it is necessary that a training program for flight instruction and maintenance personnel be established. To meet this training requirement, the following is proposed:

(a) A B-52 T.A., if at all available, should be established at MacDill Air Force Base concurrent with the student load reduction and start of the B-52 training program.

(b) An AN/APQ-24 radar mock-up should be established at MacDill Air Force Base.

(c) If (a) or/and (b) above cannot be carried out, it is proposed that the Eighth Air Force establish a thirty day course at Chatham Air Force Base to train both maintenance personnel and flight and ground instructor personnel in B-50-A type aircraft and equipment.

c. Interpretation of B-50-D aircraft in the Lead Crew School:

(1) First, it is proposed that one other squadron within the 308th Bombardment Group be designated to carry out the function of the Lead Crew School. The final result will then be as follows: One squadron conducts transition training in B-29 aircraft, one squadron conducts transition training in B-50-A aircraft, and the remaining squadron conducts the Lead Crew School (as will be outlined in the following paragraphs.)

(2) Inasmuch as the 308th Bombardment Group presently has a shortage of bombardiers, navigators, and radar observers due to its presently assigned mission, and inasmuch as such AC's will be required in the Lead Crew School, Headquarters 15th Air Force has already taken steps to assign these personnel to the 308th Bombardment Group. It is possible that Headquarters Strategic Air Command will be called upon for assistance in the procurement of such personnel.

(3) A training program must be established for personnel in (2) above. It is suggested a training program be established by the Eighth Air Force at Chatham Air Force Base in conjunction with the training program previously established for personnel from the Transition Training School. The most important additional phase to this training will be training of radar observers in AN/APQ-24 radar equipment. It is believed the timing can be such that training at Chatham Air Force Base can be carried on concurrently for personnel from both the Transition Training School and Lead Crew School. Timely assignment of instructor bombardiers, navigators, and radar observers to the Lead Crew School is therefore a necessity.

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(a) Briefly, training will be carried on in both B-29 Aircraft and B-50-D aircraft as follows: Training in B-29 aircraft will be done in unit equipment of the 306th Bombardment Group. Students arriving from B-29 groups for training will bring their own aircraft, maintenance personnel and maintenance equipment. The burden of maintaining B-50 aircraft will, therefore, not fall upon the 306th Bombardment Group. Minimum qualifications for condition of B-50 aircraft coming into the school, will be established somewhat along the following lines:

(1) Aircraft will have just completed a 100 hour inspection before arrival at MacDill Air Force Base.

(2) No aircraft will have more than 250 hours time on any one engine.

(b) Ultimately, it is desired that B-50-D aircraft be permanently assigned the 306th Bombardment Group Lead Crew School, but (a) above is based on the assumption that such equipment will not be available until a later date.

V TRAINING PROGRAM

1. Very briefly, the training program for the Lead Crew School will be that which is presently being utilized in the Lead Crew School conducted by the Eighth Air Force at Roswell Air Force Base and will incorporate all recommended changes and improvements. It is proposed that this curriculum will be studied and supplied at a later date at which time this Headquarters should know the adequacy of the curriculum that is presently being conducted in the Lead Crew School at Roswell Air Force Base. The 307th Bombardment Wing has representatives at this School who will remain with the school through its course of instruction at Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona. It is believed that these representatives will be able to give us complete detailed information on recommended curriculum.

2. It is contemplated that the peak load of both the Transition Training School and Lead Crew School will remain at 40 crews per month, the same as exists in the Transition Training School today.

VI CONCLUSIONS

That in order for Strategic Air Command combat crew personnel to remain abreast of the trend of the USAF reequipment program,

SECRET

B-50 type aircraft must be established within both the Lead Crew School and the Transition Training School as soon as possible.

VII RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Strategic Air Command immediately consider changing the Strategic Air Command requipment program to allow the assignment of ten (10) B-50-A aircraft to the Transition Training School at MacDill Air Force Base as soon as possible.

2. That the Eighth Air Force immediately establish plans for the training of future instructor personnel and ground maintenance personnel in B-50 type aircraft at Chatham Air Force Base as outlined in this plan. This recommendation is based upon the belief that B-50 MTU and AN/APQ-24 radar equipment mock-up will not be available for assignment to MacDill Air Force Base at this time.

3. That Strategic Air Command make plans for the assignment of a B-50 MTU and an AN/APQ-24 radar mock-up to MacDill Air Force Base as soon as possible.

4. That concurrent with the establishment of a training program in B-50 type aircraft at Chatham Air Force Base, the student load of the Transition Training School be reduced approximately one-third (1/3).

5. That immediate action be taken to establish the required B-50 supply channels for MacDill Air Force Base.

Lt Col Catton/mkm/3245
Rm 2138/Bldg A/11 Feb 49

DPL

SAC 353 (14 Feb 49)

14 February 1949

SUBJECT: Transition Training School

TO: Commanding General
31th Air Division
Topeka Air Force Base
Topeka, Kansas

Orig to: CG 15th AF w/incls
CG 8th AF w/incls

Originator	
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ADJ GEN	

1. Expansion of the Strategic Air Command to meet the objective outlined in the Strategic Air Command Development Program dated 17 January 1949 presents a considerable problem of combat crew training.

2. In order to meet this problem effectively and simultaneously retain and increase our operational efficiency, a Transition Training School will be established at MacDill Air Force Base.

3. Effective this date, the primary mission of the 306th Medium Bomb Group will be the conduct of a Transition Training School. Its secondary mission will be to organize and train its units to be capable of long range strategic bombardment.

4. The Fifteenth Air Force will establish the Transition Training School as outlined in Tab A and provide the curriculum outlined in Tab B.

5. Strategic Air Command units will provide trainee teams as outlined in Tab A.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

THOMAS S. POWER
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

2 Incls
1. Tab A - "Medium Bombardment Transition Training School"
2. Tab B - "Curriculum for Medium Bombardment Transition Training School"

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND DOLA2
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE 15 March 1949
OMAHA, NEBRASKA

SAC 353 (23 Feb 49) 23 February 1949

SUBJECT: Proficiency and Procedure Training
(Identical ltrs to 8th AF and 311th Air Div)

TO: Commanding General
Fifteenth Air Force
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Recent staff visits to units of this command have revealed a definite laxity on the part of several units in the training and in the standardization of procedures of certain crew members.

2. The inconsistency in the training of co-pilots was one of the most obvious discrepancies. Upon attainment of the required degree of proficiency by airplane commanders, co-pilots will be given sufficient take-offs and landings to insure their capability of handling the aircraft in the event of emergency. Standardization teams will determine the proficiency of co-pilots while conducting procedure training missions.

3. The procedures contained in SAC Manuals of the 50-126 series will be followed for all procedure training. Responsibility for the revision of these manuals has been delegated to the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces as follows:

a. Pilots' Manual - Eighth Air Force

b. Flight Engineers' Manual - Eighth Air Force

c. Radar Operators' Manual - Eighth Air Force

d. Bombardiers' Manual -Fifteenth Air Force

e. Gunners' Manual -Fifteenth Air Force

f. Radio Operators' Manual -Fifteenth Air Force

Revisions of above manuals are due to reach this headquarters no later than 15 March 1949.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

THOMAS S. POWER
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

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7 April 1949

SAC 353 (7 Apr 49)

Identical ltr to CG 8th AF

SUBJECT: Bombing Training

TO: Commanding General
Fifteenth Air Force
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, File 353, subject: "Radar Bombing Training," dated 3 December 1948 and message, this headquarters, DOMAB 5205, dated 14 January 1949.

2. An analysis of the bomb scoring reports and information obtained from the 3903d Radar Bomb Scoring Squadron indicates that all units of your command are not clear as to the policy and requirements of this headquarters in regard to qualified first runs. For analysis purposes it is mandatory that all first runs be made in accordance with the above references.

3. Recurring discrepancies noted are first runs made below the required minimum altitude, the attempt to make more than one (1) first run on an RBS site per flight by alternating visual and radar runs and switching bombing teams.

4. Radar Bomb Scoring sites will not score runs as qualified first runs if not made in compliance with the references mentioned in paragraph 1. Therefore, it is desired that the above be brought to the attention of all units of your command to prevent further recurrence.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

MONTIE THOMPSON, JR.
1st Lt., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

Originator
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1903d Radar Bomb Scoring Squadron
Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

16 August 1949

SUBJECT: Discrepancies in RAS Statistical Summary - June 1949

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska
ATTN: Director of Operations

1. In reference to your classified TAX RWA2 5232, the following is submitted:

a. The RAS Statistical Summary for June 1949 accurately reflects the results for the scoring reports received at the time the summary was completed.

b. Subsequent to compilation of the summary, the following additional runs have been received concerning the Lead Crew School:

(1) One report scored as the 97th Bomb Group was changed to the Lead Crew School. This increases the number of runs scored on Phoenix Bomb Plot by the Lead Crew School to 70, 48 of which are radar and 22 visual.

(2) One page of the scoring report for 6 June, recording ten runs on Fort Worth Bomb Plot by the Lead Crew School, was not received until 11 August 1949. This brings the total runs on Fort Worth Bomb Plot to 107, including 83 radar and 24 visual.

(3) The Bomb Scoring reports, Denver Bomb Plot, for 14 and 15 June credit 7 radar runs and 9 visual runs to the 509th Bomb Group, that were scored by the Lead Crew School. The Detachment Commander, Denver Bomb Plot, claims the aircraft reported on the range as the 509th Bomb Group.

2. A list of radar runs made on Fort Worth during June by the Lead Crew School is inclosed herewith.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

353.41 16 Aug 49
Subj: Discrepancies on RAB Statistical Summary - June 1949

3. The CEP for the Lead Crew School for June is 6195 for 175 radar runs.

4. The following procedure is being adopted to preclude repetition of these incidents:

a. Each detachment commander will forward the last scoring report of the month to each agency receiving distribution of the Bomb Scoring Report by letter of transmittal, indicating the number and type of runs scored, by date, for each activity during that month.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl
1GS Radar Runs on
F.E. Bomb Plot

/s/t/ JAMES R. COX
CWO, USAF
Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR PROVING GROUND
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

CG AIR PROVING GROUND
30 NOV 1949 ET
(Date) (Initials)

O/OPTD

T:P:HSH:mbb

30 NOV 1949

SUBJECT: Results of Bombing, APG Project No. 14916---5

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

Reference your teletype dated 22 November 1949, transmitted herewith are the results of all Purple Bombing Mission drops to date on APG Project No. 14916---5.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl
Bombing Results
(Proj No 14916---5)

s/t/ EMORY YEAGER, JR.
Major, USAF
Asst. Adjutant General

If enclosure No. 1 is withdrawn (or not attached) the classification of this correspondence will be cancelled (or changed to Unclassified) in accordance with Par. 25e AFR 205-1.

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BOMB RESULTS

PROJECT NO. 1491B---5

DATE	AT SIGHT	BOMBARDIER	ACTUAL C. E.	RDO C.E.	DIFFERENCE
5/11	2065	Butler	1540' Direct		
		Butler	1580' Direct		
		Roberson	2625' Visual		
		Arnold	2295' Direct		
		Arnold	3230' Direct		
		Jones	450' Visual		
	2055	Mooney	1710' Direct		
		Mooney	1975' Direct		
		Lyle	1720' Visual		
		Carrigan	830' Visual		
6/11	2051	Walsh	Lost Direct	5670'	----
7/11	2052 Eglin A/C	Linehan	455' Visual	----	
		Hornick	370' Direct	1080'	710'
		Mulder	1650' Direct	1800'	142'
		Mulder	Lost Offset	1975'	----
		Hornick	Lost Offset	2630'	----
10/11	2083	Seay	1545' Offset	7080'	5535'
		Chas	1640' Visual	1650'	10'
		Chas	1330' Visual	450'	870'
		Seay	725' Direct	1110'	385'
		Benner	1270' Direct	1650'	380'
		Benner	1782' Offset	1830'	48'
16/11	2085	Jones	570' Visual	990'	220'
		Roberson	730' Visual	840'	110'
		Arnold	1700' Offset	840'	860'
		Arnold	900' Offset	750'	150'
		Butler	2545 Offset	2400'	145'
		Butler	1875' Offset	1620'	255'
17/11	2077	Mitchell	660' Direct	1050'	390'
		Mitchell	7385' Offset	7380'	5'
		Brazino	365' Visual	810'	445'
		Walsh	1490' Direct	900'	590'
		Rose	265' Visual	90'	175'
		Walsh	3150' Offset	3810'	660'
	2083	Horner	470' Visual	4350'	3880'
		Chas	670' Visual	630'	40'

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DELIA RESULTS (cont'd)
PROJECT NO. 14916---5

DATE	AIRCRAFT	BOMBARDIER	ACTUAL C. E.	RBS C. E.	DIFFERENCE
18/11	2080	Eisenbrown	3120' Direct	4650'	1530'
		Eisenbrown	Lost Offset	5030'	----
		Bremer	1250' Visual	870'	380'
		Zager	1500' Direct	1410'	90'
		Zager	3295' Offset	2730'	565'
		Eisenbrown	930' Visual	450'	480'
21/11	2052 Delia A/C	Hornick	430' Direct	[illegible]	740'
		Snider	1200' Direct	[illegible]	30'
		Snider	1645' Offset	[illegible]	165'
		Hornick	1400' Offset	[illegible]	260'
25/11	2065	Farrand	1015' Visual	10'	1005'
		Farrand	3130' Visual	930'	2200'
		Corrigan	1035' Visual	1410'	425'
		Corrigan	1130' Visual	990'	140'
26/11	2064	Walsh	1595' Direct	1470'	125'
		Walsh	70' Offset	360'	290'
		Rowe	870' Visual	510'	360'
		Mitchell	3005' Direct	2640'	365'
27/11	2078	Zager	2100' Direct	2250'	150'
		Zager	1510' Offset	1830'	320'
		Kleinwechter	840' Visual	900'	60'
		Denner	4200' Direct Approximately	4170'	~~400~~ 30'
		Denner	2145' Offset	2130'	15'

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HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND DO&M
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

SAC 353 (5 March 49) 5 March 1949

SUBJECT: AN/APQ-24 Training

TO: Commanding General
Eighth Air Force
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

1. Request that this headquarters be furnished, at the earliest practicable date, an evaluation of the present AN/APQ-24 training conducted at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. In the evaluation it is desired that a comparison be drawn between the course as it existed when the training was conducted by the factory representatives and as it exists at the present time.

2. Information in this headquarters indicates that the course has depreciated in value and your opinion is desired so that corrective action may be taken.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEMAY:

/s/t/ F. H. [illegible]
2d Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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SIG 353
Subj: AN/APQ-24 Training

(OAS) 353 (5 Mar 49) 1st Ind 11 MAR 1949

Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska

1. Information available to this headquarters confirms paragraph 2 of basic communication. The Eighth Air Force furnished four (4) students to the first AP-24 course at Keesler Field. There is complete unanimity of opinion among these individuals that the course definitely depreciated in value after the terminations of the factory contract.

2. There can be no doubt that the Western Electric representatives made a sincere and capable effort to conduct the highest type of instruction possible under the circumstances. The closest possible supervision was exercised over classroom and laboratory work, student interest and morale was high and in many cases, individualized instruction was given. Attention is invited to the fact that in a course of this complexity individualized instruction, freely and capably given, is a necessity. After termination of the contract, however, both classroom and laboratory instruction deteriorated. Representatives from this command have specifically cited the following:

a. Classroom instruction: frequent lackadaisical or evasive answers were given to questions and the instructors seemed to be trying to convince themselves rather than the students.

b. Laboratory work: supervision was either intermittent or non-existent. Students were left to their own devices and too much "free time" was permitted.

c. Students felt that the entire last month or so of the course was wasted time which could have been much more effectively utilized back at their home stations.

3. It is the opinion of this headquarters that ordinary, run-of-the mill radar instruction is wholly inadequate to handle such precision electronic systems as the AN/APQ-24. With the advent of the K-1/K-2 systems the problem will be increased. In view of the foregoing, it is strongly recommended that any proposed courses of instruction on this type equipment be raised to a level comparable to that of the Bell Laboratories Course conducted at Whippany, New Jersey during the period June - September 1948.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/t/ CECIL E COMBS
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander

1325

[illegible]

Basic ltr fr Hq SAC, dtd 5 Mar 49, subj: AN/APQ-24 Training

SAC 353 (5 Mar 49) 2d Ind DCS/S

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska 1 APR 1949

TO: Director of Training and Requirements, DCS/O, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The 1st Indorsement to the basic letter confirms both the opinion of this headquarters and information available from other sources that the AN/APQ-24 course conducted at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, is inadequate.

2. Corrective action is recommended.

3. It is believed that assistance must be given the Commanding General, Air Training Command, beyond his present resources to achieve the desired improvement in radar technician instruction.

/s/ CURTIS E LeMAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding

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1st Ind fr Hq SAC, dtd 5 Mar 49, subj: AN/APQ-3A Training

3d Ind

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C.
APR 6 1949

TO: Commanding General, Air Training Command, Barksdale Air Force Base, Shreveport, Louisiana

1. Information this headquarters indicates that although the training contract with Western Electric for subject training was to run to 16 May 1949, it was cancelled on 21 December 1948. If the conditions as outlined in paragraph 2 of first indorsement exist, this headquarters is unable to understand why this contract was cancelled without unquestionable evidence that the course would be satisfactorily continued without the engineering assistance of the manufacturer. It is therefore requested that you furnish this headquarters full justification for recommending cancellation of the contract with Western Electric for training maintenance personnel on the AN/APQ-2.

2. With reference to paragraph 2 of the second indorsement, it is further requested that you outline such corrective action as you contemplate to increase the quality of the subject training to a point which will produce graduates that are acceptable to the Strategic Air Command.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/t/ A. P. [illegible]
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Training Division
Directorate of Training & Requirements.

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