SAC 353 (11 Oct 49) 1st Ind [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 9 NOV 49

TO: Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, March Air Force Base, California

1. Authority for manning the Lead Crew School is contained in 3d Indorsement to letter [illegible], Headquarters 306th Bomb Group, Medium, subject: "Personnel Requirements for the 306th Bomb Group". For reporting procedures, the T/O 6E for a Medium Bomb Group will apply; however, the proposed T/D included in the above letter will be used for manning this unit.

2. This headquarters has allocated one (1) officer, SSN 8501, to the 306th Bomb Group from the graduates of the October Graduating Class at Lowry Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado. In addition to the above, this headquarters has taken action to assign Captain John A. Lippard, 7529A, SSN 8508, from the 97th Bomb Wing to the Lead Crew School on temporary duty with subsequent PCS assignment at such time as Headquarters United States Air Force approves the proposed T/D for the 306th Bomb Group, Medium.

3. Sources from which instructor personnel can be obtained are outlined in letter, SAC 352, this headquarters, subject: "Directive for Establishment of Combat Crew Standardization School."

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL [illegible]:

s/ Colonel Bell
J. A. Bell
Colonel, USAF
Acting Comptroller

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24 October 1949

Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr.
Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear Rosy,

I am attaching a copy of a letter from Roger on the subject of special recognition for lead crews. You will agree, I feel certain, that if such a system is to be of lasting value details concerning qualification requirements must be very carefully worked out before the plan is put into operation.

One proposal now being considered is to establish a quota of eleven vacancies for peace strength units and eighteen for war strength units. These vacancies would be filled by the graduation of the lead crew school plus those other crews which are certified as competent by our wing commanders. We feel that some kind of distinctive insignia is desirable - at least the blue cloth rectangle behind the aviation badge.

Also under consideration is the matter of establishing radar and visual accuracy standards for lead crews. Our general approach is to allow wing commanders as much latitude as possible in view of the numerous factors entering into the proper selection of lead crews.

Knowing that you have given these matters considerable thought, I would like your comments.

Sincerely,

CURTIS E. LeMAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding

1 Incl
Cy ltr fr Gen Ramey to Gen LeMay, 12 Oct 49

P. S. Rosy--Curt left for his UK trip before this letter was completed.

T.S.P.

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29 November 1949

Colonel Wiley D. Ganey
Director of Operations
Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force
March Air Force Base, California

Originator

Phone

Dear Wiley,

This letter will acknowledge your letter of 29 September 1949 wherein you stated your thoughts regarding the standard of measurement of crews capable of their primary mission.

As you have noted from recent correspondence from this headquarters, we are doing away with the term "crews capable of their primary mission" and are adopting the term defined in paragraph 5, AF letter 55-51, as "combat ready crews." We amplified that definition in TWX, this headquarters, number D04A-5156, dated 8 November 1949, and letter this headquarters, subject: Revision of Flying Training Program, dated 19 November 1949. In that letter we further defined our current thinking on the term "lead crews."

As you have noted from the above correspondence, we have stayed away from using a CEP or CEA as a standard for the following reasons:

a. The standards would have to be different for each type of radar and we do not have sufficient data on the [illegible] to arrive at an appropriate standard.

b. The standard would have to be different for altitude differences in visual bombing in the event we go to higher altitudes for various types of aircraft, as we almost had to do recently. Here again we do not have adequate statistics to arrive at appropriate standards for any altitude above 35,000 feet.

I hope our new approach to this problem meets with your approval. We are relying entirely on the judgment of the unit commander in determining when a crew should be classified "combat ready" or "lead", knowing that he has a proper understanding of the problem which confronts us. I would appreciate any favorable or unfavorable reaction from the field which you may note.

Sincerely,

J. B. MONTGOMERY
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Operations

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
Colorado Springs, Colorado

22 FEB 1949

SUBJECT: Operational Efficiency Commentary Report
(AF-SC-U14)

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. Explanations for low indices reported in Tactical Flying Unit Operational Efficiency Report (AF-SC-U13) as of 15 February 1949 are as follows:

a. 28th Bombardment Group:

(1) Low indices resulted from lack of proficiency in newly assigned personnel and the low number of complete crews. This is further reflected in the Commander's Estimate of Operational Efficiency.

(2) Low percentage of aircraft in commission was due to weather extremes.

b. 98th Bombardment Group:

(1) Indices for Training Completed and Overall Efficiency were lowered to 6 by transfer of personnel to the 22d Bombardment Group for its period of TDY. Replacement personnel has not arrived.

(2) Aircraft grounded for landing gear corrosion investigation lowered the percentage of aircraft in commission.

c. 306th Bombardment Group:

(1) Combat crew and maintenance personnel were transferred to 307th Bombardment Group for its TDY mission. This caused lower indices. The low priority of this group dictates the overall low efficiency.

(2) The personnel transfers already mentioned is reflected in the percentage of aircraft in commission.

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Subject: Operational Efficiency Commentary Report

2. Internal corrective action is as follows: Personnel policies are being followed in accordance with priorities set up by higher Headquarters.

3. Recommended action by higher Headquarters:

a. Recommend all units of the 28th Bombardment Wing be manned and equipped in accordance with Arctic Peace columns of the applicable T/O & E's.

b. No action deemed necessary for 30th Bombardment Group since its designation as a Transition Training School. Combat crew personnel unnecessary in this type of school are being transferred from this Group to alleviate shortages existing in other units of higher priority in this Air Force.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ R. F. BRITT
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

IGDS-A13 10 November 1949

SUBJECT: Report of Observation of ORT of the 97th Bombardment Group (H), Biggs Air Force Base, Texas

THRU: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

TO: The Inspector General, USAF
Headquarters U. S. Air Force
ATTN: The Air Inspector
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Under the provisions of AFR 123-1, an observation of the Operational Readiness Test of the 97th Bombardment Group (H) was conducted by representatives of The Inspector General, USAF, during the period 31 October to 5 November 1949.

2. The general conduct of the ORT, the thoroughness of coverage, as rendered by representatives from Headquarters Strategic Air Command, was adequate. Staff officers from Headquarters Eighth Air Force were present during conduct of the ORT. The staff officers performed a cursory followup on the annual Inspection of the 97th Bomb Group and verbally discussed major items with members of the ORT team. The combined efforts by representatives from the two headquarters assisted in the evaluation of the 97th Bomb Group. The cooperation, interest, and attainment of mutual agreement is noteworthy.

3. It is desired to emphasize certain items that appear in the ORT report as being key items that are affecting attainment of maximum combat efficiency.

a. Housing.

(1) Increased rentals, resulting from rental decontrol, and shortage of housing are seriously interfering with personal well being and stability of assigned personnel. Effective 1 November 1949 rentals in the area were increased 100 percent and higher. In one unreasonable instance, rent was increased from $60.00 per month to $200.00 per month. The

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overcrowded condition is caused in part by the ground force installation which has increased in strength from 12,000 to over 40,000 troops. As a means toward eliminating the housing shortage, bids and housing development plans are at present being surveyed by interested Biggs Air Force Base personnel.

b. Personnel.

(1) The shortage of radar mechanics, SSN 867, definitely affects the operational readiness of the bomb group. OJT efforts by the bomb group to remedy this situation are commendable, however, in this instance it is believed the OJT product cannot possibly measure up to the standards of a graduate from a specialized school.

(2) Additional personnel are continually being required for accomplishment of base functions. A continual drain through the borrowing of personnel from the 97th Bomb Group by the Air Base Group, and its affiliated services, plus the shortages indicated in the ORT report, has created a burden over and above the normal bomb group workload requirements.

(3) Case Report, Special, subject: "Surplus Airmen Possessing an Acute PDS," was submitted.

c. Technical and Logistical.

(1) The 97th Bomb Group does not have all the one (1) man, C-24 pneumatic life rafts, required. It was noted that there was a difference between the number required by SAC Manual 57-50-4 and those authorized by T/O&E 1-1113 as changed by T/ &E 1-4001D, 1 May 1949. It appears that the T/O&E takes into consideration only the normal crew per B-29 type aircraft, whereas SAC movement plans call for twenty (20) personnel being on board on an overseas movement. Requisitions had been submitted to no avail because of lack of authorization. It was stated by the Base Supply Officer that rafts required for overwater flight could be obtained on a loan basis only. In order to meet emergency commitments, insufficient time would exist to effect borrowing of the life rafts.

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Subj: Report of Observation of OIT of the 97th Bombardment Group (H), Biggs Air Force Base, Texas, dtd 10 Nov 49

(2) B-29 aircraft, the aircraft assigned to the 98th group and carried in storage status, continues to present a serious maintenance and supply problem to a point incompatible with combat efficiency. Inclosures No. 1 and 2 are indicative of a workload which will require withdrawal of personnel from the bomb group in its accomplishment. The task of meeting a deadline for transfer of aircraft by 1 January 1950, in accordance with Section3, Technical Order 01-25-8, presents not only a drain on available personnel, but also presents a difficult problem insofar as pertains to a report of survey since uncontrolled procurement of parts from storage aircraft was indicated.

3 Incls
1. Aircraft Status Report
2. Parts required for acft in storage status
3. Cpy OIT Report, 97th Bomb Group (H)

HERBERT C. CHANDLER
Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

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Basic ltr fr HQ USAF, dtd 10 Nov 49, Subj: Report of Observation of OJT of the 97th Bombardment Group (H), Biggs Air Force Base, Texas

SAC 333 (10 Nov 49) 1st Ind DX4A3

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 23 DEC 49

Wtn 9 Dec 49

TO: The Inspector General, USAF, Headquarters United States Air Force, ATTN: The Air Inspector, Washington 25, D.C.

Originator
Lt Col Gregg
Phone
2288 / rsc

1. (3,a) Housing-

a. On 31 October 1949, 11 proposals for the construction of 818 units of family housing under the Wherry Act at Biggs AFB were received and evaluated by the base commander. These proposals were forwarded by Headquarters SAC to Headquarters USAF on 14 November 1949, with a recommendation that El Paso Homes, Incorporated, be accepted as the sponsor for the entire project. It is anticipated that this construction can begin on 1 February 1950 and provide substantial relief for the families at Biggs AFB by the end of June 1950.

b. The 1950 new construction authorizations for the Air Force include for Biggs AFB $1,564,000 for the erection of 96 family quarters and area utilities therefor. It is estimated that the actual funds will be appropriated for this project in February 1950 and that the construction of these units can be completed by contract by 31 July 1951.

2. (3,b) Personnel -

a. (1) The shortage of radar maintenance personnel in Air Force worldwide. It is anticipated that the shortage will be alevviated beginning in January 1950 when graduates from the Air Training Command are received. This headquarters agrees there is no substitute training for radar maintenance other than at the Air Training Command school. A policy is being issued prohibiting radar maintenance OJT other than for airmen who complete the radar course at a formal technical school.

b. (2) It is believed that diversion of personnel from the tactical units to the Air Base Group functions is limited to food service since the station is overstrength in all other base function SSNs. This condition is prevalent at other stations and is considered unavoidable due to the shortage of airmen SSN 062 (Mess Attendant).

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BAC 333 (10 Nov 49) 1st Ind DO4A3
Subj: Rpt of Observation of OMT of the 97th Bomb Gp (M),
Biggs AFB, Texas

3. (3.c) Technical and Logistical -

a. (c.1) (1) Reference paragraph 3c (1). Special authorization for one-man life rafts has been requested from Headquarters USAF. The Requirements Division, Headquarters USAF, advised that action is being taken to include this item in T/O&E's, and that special authorization pending T/O&E changes would be forthcoming by 15 November 1949. The special authorization however, was not received on 15 November 1949 and follow-up is being made.

(2) Headquarters AVC has been advised by message the number of persons that are carried in each type aircraft when moving overseas.

b.(c.2) (1) Reference paragraph 3c (2). The aircraft mentioned are assigned to the Bomb Group. The aircraft should have been maintained in accordance with letter, this headquarters, subject: "Maintenance and Reporting of Assigned Medium Bomb Aircraft," as revised 2 November 1949. Aircraft movement projects have been established to move excess B-29's from Biggs to other units of the Air Force.

(2) The status of the aircraft mentioned was brought to the attention of the 97th Bomb Group (M) and action was being initiated to correct these discrepancies at the time of the OMT. This item has been extracted and will be investigated on the next field visit.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

3 Incls
n/c

THOMAS S. POWER
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AFCAI-IJ 30 November 1949

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Report of Observation of Operational Readiness Test of 2d Bomb Group (M) Chatham AFB, Georgia

TO: Commander General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

TO: The Inspector General, USAF
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Under the provisions of AFR 123-1, an observation of the Operational Readiness Test of the 2d Bomb Gp (M) was conducted by representatives of The Inspector General, USAF, during the period 13 - 19 November.

2. Paragraph 4A of AFR 123-1 states that the commanders of the major commands will require their Inspectors General to supervise the conduct of operational readiness tests. Strategic Air Command has set up a permanent ORT team under the Director of Operations to conduct the ORTs of SAC units. The individual team members are very well qualified in their individual specialties but lack background experience in inspection procedures, and since they work under the Director of Operations their channels of communication are between corresponding staff sections in the subordinate levels of the command. This tends to bypass the Inspector General of SAC and completely divorces the Inspectors General of the lower echelons from ORT activities.

3. The ORT of the 2d Bomb Gp (M) was well conducted by the SAC ORT team and enthusiastically carried out by the Group, but it was poorly reported. There are grave differences between the status of the group as reported in the attachments and the numerical values given the items. Although individually well qualified their results as a team is not effective, and the value of the report is weakened by inconsistencies and mistakes in arithmetic.

a. The following are samples of inconsistencies noted in the report:

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(1) Under remarks and conclusions this statement is made, "Operationally, the group can carry out its mission." Yet, part of the group's mission, as stated in the ORT Report, is air to air refueling, and this organization does not have tanker aircraft.

(2) Part II, Item 13, Simulated Combat Training, indicates 36 aircraft participating on the 14th and 17th November whereas Item 28, Operations, indicates that only 35 aircraft were scheduled on each of those two dates.

(3) Item 6c, Shortages, indicates shortages of critical personnel but a score of 15 out of a possible 15 is given.

(4) Item 11, Individual Training, indicates that all of the officers are technically qualified in their duty assignments while Item 9, Air Crews, shows only 31 of 45 combat crews trained, and Item 6A, Shortages, states that 1034's, 1035's, and 0142's are performing the duties of 1037's.

b. The following arithmetical errors were noted in the ORT Report:

(1) In the summary of ORT scores, page 1, the total of the figures under Unit Status is 790, rather than 760, but the total of the points scored in the report equals 799.

(2) The total score given under operations is 375 rather than 365.

(3) The total of figures listed under the maximum column of Item 28, Part I, equals 415.

c. The errors, mentioned in 1 and 2 above, change the final ORT Rating.

d. The USAF observer team believes that the following items were scored too high:

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B/ltr to TID, USAF, Wa USAF, Wash 25 DC, subj, "(Unclas) Rpt of Observation of ORT of 2d Bomb Gp (M) Chatham AFB, Ga.", dtd 30 Nov 49 (Contd)

(1) Item 5, Shortages, 48 points given out of a possible 50. 92% of the total possible points were given to the organization and then an attachment was written which indicated a shortage of two hundred and twenty-three (223) critical AFSC's. In discrepancies in assignments, a check of Forms 66 indicate that officers possessing the MOS of Observer and Navigator are assigned duties in non-rated AFSC's. Although these duties are primary in nature, they have been assigned as additional duties which prevents the individuals from obtaining the non-rated MOS.

(2) Item 13, Simulated Combat Training, 100% of the possible points given. The number of aircraft that the attachment lists as participating on the 14th and 15th of November is in error. The attachment to Item 13 indicates that no visual bombing was practiced, under simulated combat conditions, during the ten (10) month period of January through October.

(3) Item 23b, Technical Order Compliance. The ORT Report states that an average of thirty (30) TO's per aircraft have not been complied with. The Command Summary of SAC for October 1949 shows the 2d Bomb under B-50 aircraft as having an average of 10.5 TO's not complied with, and the average for the status of outstanding technical orders for all SAC units with B-50 or B-29 aircraft as less than seven (7) per assigned T/E aircraft.

(4) Item 23d, indicates a satisfactory average daily percentage FITAMC assigned aircraft in commission during the 60 days just prior to ORT when the Command Summary states that the October, November and December goal is 70%.

(5) Item 24, Allied Equipment. The 100% given to maintenance of radar and communications equipment implies that no malfunctions occurred.

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(6) Item 25, Ground Equipment, indicates perfect maintenance of all ground equipment. If no other exception were taken, exception to the 100% credit for maintenance of synthetic trainers (reference Item 14c) which the group does not posseas would be taken.

(7) Item 26 (2), Bombing. Exception is taken to giving thirty (30) points out of a possible forty (40) points for visual bombing when the navigator, bombardier, and radar operator did not work as a coordinated team, and failed to locate the target on the first run on the Avon Park, Target.

(8) Item 26, (3), Formation, 66% of the available points is considered too high for the following reasons, which are in addition to those mentioned in the attachment to this item:

(a) Near collision of a bomber and a C-47 during takeoff.

(b) Inability to form in the final area without circling.

(c) Four (4) individual aircraft observed landing nose wheel first after Mission 2.

(9) Item 26 (4), Navigation. The use of radio aids by the lead navigator and missing the IP by fifteen (15) miles should have eliminated all of the points allowed for navigation on Mission 2.

(10) Item 26 (5), Instrument Flying. During the group's attempt at a weather penetration on the second mission, the pilots did not simulate instrument conditions by putting up hoods and the results of attempting it while flying with visual reference to the other planes should have made the points given for instrument flying less than 100% of the points available.

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(11) Item 28 (14). Mission Planning. The Group Operations Officer had the group attempt a new weather penetration, without practice, on what was supposed to be a simulated combat mission.

4. The command ORT team scored a combat effectiveness of 40% and give more than eighty (80) percent of the maximum score to a group that cannot perform the air to air refueling requirement of its mission, is short over two hundred (200) specialists, has critical shortages of spare parts, missed an IP by fifteen (15) miles after using radio aids to within one hundred and fifty (150) miles of the target, and was unable to identify a circular target at a known position in good weather. The Combat Effectiveness Score should be based on the "hardest line" principle and no points should be given for "trying hard". The navigators failed what should have been an easy test of their ability to put aircraft directly over the IP and the lead combat crew did not function as a team. Couple these personnel weaknesses to a group crippled by shortages in supply and you do not have a force capable of worthwhile sustained long range bombardment from Chatham Air Force Base let alone from any part of the world.

5. The demonstration of poor navigation, by the 2d Bomb Group during its ORT, points out the need for training in navigation without the benefits of radio aids. The importance of this deficiency should not be under emphasized.

6. It is recommended that the Inspector General of SAC exercise close supervision of all ORTs given within the command and that he indoctrinate the members of the ORT team with the need for being accurate and consistent in their reports.

JOHN S. [illegible]
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

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Basic ltr fr Hq SAC, dtd 30 Nov 49, subj: "(Unclassified) Report of Observation of Operational Readiness Test of 2d Bomb Group (H), Chatham AFB, Georgia"

SAC 333 (30 Nov 49) 1st Ind XX

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 6 FEB 50

TO: The Inspector General, USAF, Headquarters United States Air Force, ATTN: The Air Inspector, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The following paragraphs correspond to the same numbered paragraphs in the basic letter:

2. Although the Team Captain is under the Director of Operations at this headquarters the remainder of the team is composed of personnel from other staff agencies at this headquarters and from operating Groups in this command. Conduct of ORT's is fully coordinated with the Inspector General this headquarters. In the past circumstances indicated the desirability of placing responsibility for conduct of ORT's under the Director of Operations this headquarters. At present this headquarters is contemplating delegation of this responsibility to the numbered Air Forces with the Inspector General this headquarters actively supervising the program.

3. a. (1) It is the policy of this headquarters to use ORTs as a method of determining the readiness of the unit to carry out its mission in the existing war plan. The current war plan for the 2d Bombardment Group does not require tanker operations at this time.

(2) This was a typographical error and had no bearing on the score.

(3) Critical shortages affecting the group are those which fall under AFR 35-34 and as such were properly listed in item 6a where deduction was made. Under 6b there were no other critical shortages and full credit was given.

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SAC 333 (30 Nov 49) 1st Ind 304
Subj: Rpt of Observation of ORT of 2d Bomb Gp (M), Chatham AFB, Georgia

(4) This headquarters considers that officers who possess a rated MOS are individually technically qualified in that specialty, although they may not have the desired degree of proficiency required of a combat crew officer on a combat ready crew. In addition, some air crews might not be considered trained because airmen on those crews are not fully qualified. Regarding the comment on shortages, units of this command are authorized to use 1034s, 1035s, and 0142s in the place of 1037s.

b. The arithmetical errors are noted. More care will be exercised in the future.

c. The final ORT rating for this group was corrected before the report left this headquarters.

d. (1) Shortages. The shortages listed in attachment amounted to 111 since the shortage of 1037s is alleviated by the assignment of 1034s, 1035s and 0142s as noted on attachment. The shortage in 1037s therefore, is in MOS only and not applicable to the readiness of the unit. With reference to the assignment of observers to additional non-rated duties, this is an approved practice as set forth on page one, T/O&E 1-1113 applicable to the unit.

(2) Simulated Combat Training. This headquarters is of the opinion that RBS, SCM, and interception missions fall under the heading of Simulated combat missions. The RBS runs on industrial targets are definitely more similar to combat missions than are visual drops on circular targets. Visual drops are made as part of crew and individual training.

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SAC 333 (30 Nov 49) 1st Ind D.4
Subj: Rpt of Observation of ORT of 2d Bomb Gp (M), Chatham AFB, Georgia

(3) Technical Order Compliance. The number of TOs outstanding reported on the ORT were taken from the TOC charts maintained in the Base TOC section; however, the number of outstanding TOs reported to this headquarters by the base was fifteen (15). Although this is a lower figure it is still an unsatisfactory condition.

(4) Lack of attainment of the goal was reflected by the deduction in this item.

(5) Allied Equipment. Noted.

(6) Ground Equipment. Maintenance, Item 25 as effects Operational Readiness of the Combat Group was satisfactory. It is not felt that points should be deducted simply because no opportunity existed to observe maintenance of synthetic trainers.

(7) Bombing. Fifty percent of the points used for visual procedures were deducted. It is felt that this is sufficient considering that it was the error of one person.

(8) Formation. It has always been the practice for a Bombardment Group to circle while assembling. Points were deducted on formation for reasons mentioned in the ORT report. If planes landed nosewheel first it would seem to be a matter of individual technique and not one affecting the formation flight. This faulty technique, as reported by the USAF observer, was not noticed by the ORT team.

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DAU 333 (30 Nov 49) 1st Ind DGL

Subj: Rpt of Observation of ORT of 2d Bomb Gp (M), Chatham AFB, Georgia

(9) Navigation. Points were deducted for this. However, main emphasis is given to the individual night RBS missions which more closely approximate missions in the war plan.

(10) Instrument Flying. It is not believed necessary to utilize hoods on a practice frontal penetration.

(11) Mission Planning. Higher priority training prohibits group formation flying and practice penetration to any great extent.

4. The results of the Operational Readiness Test of the 2d Bombardment Group, as reported by the ORT team of this headquarters immediately upon its return from Chatham Air Force Base, caused considerable concern regarding the capability of this unit to carry out its assigned mission. It is believed that the estimate of combat effectiveness of 60% given by the ORT team, which is composed of experienced tactical personnel, is a fair estimate of the capability of the unit in its present condition. Every step possible is being taken by this headquarters to improve the condition of this group.

5. This headquarters has recently revised its training program and a great deal more emphasis has been placed on navigation training, particularly navigation without the use of radio aids or loran. Most of the crews of this group demonstrated excellent navigational ability on the individual night RBS mission which was performed in the ORT. All ORT missions are being revised to more closely approximate the specific missions of the units in the war plan.

6. ORTs are fully coordinated with the Inspector General, Strategic Air Command.

2. Paragraph 7b, Air Force Letter 121-1 states that representatives of the Inspector General, USAF, when necessary, will aid and instruct the ORT team which they are observing. At no time during the ORT or critique of the 2d

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SAC 333 (30 Nov 49) 1st Ind DO4
Subj: Rpt of Observation of ORT of 2d Bomb Gp (M), Chatham AFB, Georgia

Bombardment Group was any suggestion or comment made by the observer from USAF. Nor were any missions flown by the observer. It is requested that the views of the USAF observer be presented at the critique of the unit for the benefit of both the unit inspected and the ORT team.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

THOMAS D. POWER
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

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Subject: Operational Readiness Test Report

ROT No.1 (15 Nov 49) 24 Inst 2 DEC 1949

Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas

TO: Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

TO: Inspector General, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C. ATTN: The Air Inspector

Operational Readiness Test Report of the 2d Bombardment Wing has been noted and the following comments are submitted:

a. Reference summary of ORT scores: Compilation of scores indicate that the 2d Bomb Wing accumulated a total of 789 points rather than 789 out of a possible 970. This raises the final ORT rating to 81.3% rather than 79.1% as indicated. The combat effectiveness of 80% is not understood by this headquarters. A study of the scores for all items rated would indicate a much higher rating.

b. Reference Item 1. Administration, and Item 2. Records: Action taken and policy established by Commanding Officer, 2d Bomb Wing considered satisfactory.

c. Reference Item 3. Medical: This Headquarters is aware of the acute shortage of flight surgeons at Chatham Air Force Base. At a recent conference at Headquarters Strategic Air Command, the Air Surgeon of this Headquarters was assured that additional medical personnel would be assigned prior to the end of the year. The assignment of additional medical officers, plus the renovation of hospital buildings now in progress will bring the medical facilities of the 2d Bomb Wing up to standard.

d. Reference Item 4. Mess: Action taken by Commanding Officer, 2d Bomb Wing considered satisfactory.

e. Reference Item 5. Shortages: Shortages listed are prevalent throughout the Command. However, despite these shortages are alleviated by "on-the-job" training and the various school graduates. This Headquarters monitors shortages and keeps the various units "leveled off" in accordance with existing manning priorities.

f. Reference Item 6. On-The-Job Training: Policy outlined by Commanding Officer, 2d Bomb Wing to standardize the On-The-Job Training program and examination, together with a survey of the program by the On-The-Job-Training coordinator, this Headquarters, is expected to bring it up to standard.

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[illegible] 319.1 (19 Nov 49) 2d Ind
Subject: Operational Readiness Test Report

T/O&E 1-1113 to include an additional Supply Officer, and one Personnel Equipment Officer for each medium bomb squadron. (SAC letter, [illegible] 320 (1 Jul 49), Subject: "Officer Requirements", and 1st Indorsement this Headquarters, [illegible] 320 (1 Jul 49), dated 2 August 1949.)

o. Reference Item 22. Special Supply and Equipment Problems: The supply situation on B-50 critical parts in the 2d Bomb Wing is a matter of grave concern to this Headquarters. As all commands are acquainted with this problem, it is recommended that upon assignment of new type aircraft to tactical organizations, adequate funding be provided for the support of both equipment and supplies for these aircraft. If the support funding program is initially curtailed, it may be well to curtail the production of such aircraft, and divert enough funds to maintain and supply parts for the number that are manufactured.

p. Reference Item 23. Aircraft Engines and Accessories: 23a and 23b noted. Action taken by Commanding Officer, 2d Bomb Wing considered satisfactory. Item 23c: It is requested that this Headquarters be furnished further information of the procurement and installation of Sperry Engine analyzers or equivalent thereof for use on all B-50 aircraft.

q. Reference Item 26. Maintenance: Noted. It is believed that if the decision is made to move the 2d Bomb Wing to Hunter Field, this condition will be greatly alleviated.

r. Reference Item 26-1. Formation: Noted. This Headquarters realizes the deficiency of this unit in formation flying; however, due to the emphasis being placed on Radar Bomb Scoring Sites, and the low in-commission rate due to lack of supplies, formation flying has been necessarily limited to air shows, etc.

s. Reference Item 26-6. Navigation: Increased emphasis on navigation training is being directed by this Headquarters. An Eighth Air Force memorandum is being prepared which will restrict the use of the radio compass by navigators.

t. Reference Item 26-7. Emergency Procedures: Noted. Action being taken as outlined in 1st Indorsement considered satisfactory.

u. Reference Item 26-9. Aerial Gunnery: Noted. Action being taken as indicated in 1st Indorsement considered satisfactory.

v. Reference Item 26-10. Cruise Control Technique: A conference of staff flight engineers from all wings was held at this Headquarters 1 Dec 49 and corrective action on the items mentioned in

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report were discussed. As a result of this conference a new Flight Engineers log was prepared and is being sent to all units for a 60 day service test period, after which it will become standard if it proves satisfactory. All Staff Flight Engineers were thoroughly briefed on the importance of maintaining accurate logs and directed to emphasize this to all Flight Engineers in their respective units.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl
n/c

W. J. [illegible]
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

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Basic ORT Report Format, 2d Bombardment Group (M), Chatham Air Force Base, dtd 19 November 1949

SAC 333 (19 Nov 49) 3d Ind TO4A3

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 23 DEC 49

TO: The Inspector General, USAF, Headquarters United States Air Force. ATTENTION: The Air Inspector, Washington 25, D. C.

The following comments and corrections are submitted on the ORT of the 2d Bombardment Group (M).

1. Reference inferior facilities. Plans are under consideration to move the 2d Bombardment Wing from Chatham Air Force Base to Hunter Field located 10 miles Southeast of Chatham.

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

2. Reference paragraph 1a, 2d Indorsement. Scoring for the test was completely rechecked and revealed that the final score should have been 82.4%. Operations item should have been 375 for a total of 799 points out of 970 possible. The error occurred in the transposition of Item 14, Part II to Item 28, Part I. The item was transposed as 5 Maximum-5 Score and should have been 15 Maximum-15 Score. The Commanding Officer, 2d Bomb Wing, as well as all concerned have been notified of corrected scores.

3. Action taken with respect to Item 1, Administration, is considered satisfactory.

4. Action taken with respect to Item 2, Records, is considered satisfactory.

5. Action taken with respect to Item 3, Medical, as outlined in paragraph 1c, 2d Indorsement, is considered satisfactory.

6. Action taken with respect to Item 4, Pass, is considered satisfactory.

7. Action taken with respect to Item 6D, Assignments, discrepancies in, is considered satisfactory.

8. Action taken on Item 7a and 7b noted.

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SAC 333 (19 Nov 49)
Subj: ORT Rpt Format of 2d Bomb Gp

3d Ind

TRAINING

9. Item 8 thru 17. Indorsements 1 and 2 indicate that necessary action has been taken.

SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE

10. Item 18 thru 21. Noted.

11. Reference Remarks and Conclusions on the first part of ORT Report and paragraph 2 of the ORT Report. Stock control teams from this headquarters and from WRAMA, in joint action, thoroughly review and re-set the stock levels at Chatham during the period 31 October 1949 thru 19 November 1949. In addition, Chatham's AOCP reports are being closely monitored by this headquarters to insure expeditious supply action by the depots.

12. a. Reference paragraph 22b. The figure of 30 TO's outstanding per aircraft was taken from TOC charts maintained in the TOC section at Chatham. A check of TOC report submitted by the base to this headquarters indicates 15. While this, of course, is a considerably lower figure, it still indicates an unsatisfactory TOC condition.

b. Reference paragraph 23c. A letter is being sent to Chatham Air Force Base, thru Eighth Air Force, giving the latest information as to probable availability of engine analyzer.

13. Item 24 thru 26. Corrective measures on action items as indicated in the 1st and 2d Indorsements, are considered adequate.

OPERATIONS

14. Item 27. Noted.

15. Item 28. Reference 1a, 2d Indorsement and paragraph 1, 3rd Indorsement, arithmetical error has been explained and corrected.

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SAC 333 (19 Nov 49) 3d Ind
Subj: ORT Rpt Forest of 26 Bomb Gp

PART II

TACTICAL TEST

16. Item 28-1 & 2. Action taken with respect to these items is considered satisfactory.

17. Item 28-3. Increased emphasis on formation flying will result from a new flying training program to be effective 1 January 1950.

18. Item 28-4. Increased emphasis on navigation flying will result from a new flying training program to be effective 1 January 1950.

19. Item 28-5. thru 28-19. Indorsements 1 and 2 indicate necessary action has been taken.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

1 Incl
n/c

THOMAS S. POWER
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

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AFOOT 25 July 1949

SUBJECT: 98th Bomb Group (H), Spokane AFB, Wash., Washington

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. Reference is made to OGT Report of 98th Bomb Group (H) dated 7 March 1949. It is noted with considerable concern that 30% of assigned aircraft were grounded for overtime on aircraft accessories.

2. Information is desired as to the cause; i.e., replacements not available, trained personnel not available, etc., together with such information as is available as to foresight of the unit in anticipating their requirements based on flying time on aircraft and its relation to replacements to be made in accordance with Technical Order 01-20[illegible].

3. If information can be furnished, it is felt that requested information in paragraph 2 above, to assist this Headquarters [illegible] further discrepancies of this nature, your concern is [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible], USAF, [illegible]
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Maintenance Division, D/MCS
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel

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SAC 333 (25 Jul 49) 1st Ind DM492

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 12 AUG 49

TO: Director of Maintenance, Supply, and Services, Headquarters USAF, ATTENTION: Chief, Maintenance Division, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The grounding of aircraft for replacement of accessories which were overdue for change was SAC-wide and not restricted to the 98th Bomb Group. During the latter part of 1948 and the early part of 1949 an increasing number of aircraft accidents were traced to failure of aircraft and engine accessories due to the fact that the accessories were not replaced at the scheduled replacement periods prescribed by Technical Orders. As corrective action, on 5 February 1949 this headquarters instructed SAC organizations to ground their aircraft until all aircraft and engine accessories that were overdue for replacement were replaced. The result of this action was most apparent during the Operational Readiness Test of the 98th and 301st Bomb Groups, since these Operational Readiness Tests were conducted soon after the grounding order was released.

2. Failure to replace accessories when required was due to supply difficulties, failure to anticipate parts requirements, and to lack of knowledge regarding which accessories required replacement since the AF Form 41B did not provide sufficient space for recording accessory data. This resulted in failure to replace the accessory even when the part was on hand in base supply. As corrective action, an accessory data form which permitted sufficient space for recording all necessary information was provided to SAC organizations. Provisions of a column for entry of when to order the accessory and when to replace the accessory will provide the vehicle for anticipation of parts requirements. Copies of aircraft and engine accessory time data forms are attached as Inclosures 1 and 2.

3. The over-all result of the grounding order has been an ultimate improvement in aircraft maintenance. However, even with provision of forms for recording of aircraft accessory data, a tendency still exists to apply a liberal interpretation to the contents of T.O. 00-20A. The tendency to permit aircraft to fly when accessories are overdue for replacement must be stopped immediately in the interest of flying safety. Therefore, the following interpretation of T.O. 00-20A is being placed into effect immediately in this command:

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SAC 333 (25 Jul 49) DMAS2 1st Ind
Subj: 98th Bomb Group (M), Spokane AFB, Bong, Washington

a. When an accessory is not replaced at the scheduled time period, the aircraft will be grounded until replacement is effected, provided that failure of subject accessory would create a safety of flight hazard. Examples of accessories in this category are turbo-supercharger components, electrical motors, fuel system pumps, master controls, propeller governors, propeller synchronizers, and feathering pumps.

b. Whenever an accessory, the failure of which would not affect safety of flight, is overdue for periodic replacement, the red diagonal symbol will be used.

c. A copy of our letter is attached as Inclosure 3.

4. Implementation of the above procedure will ultimately result in more aircraft in commission and fewer aircraft accidents within this command.

5. The accessory data forms referred to in paragraph 2 above and attached as Inclosures 1 and 2 have been referred to the Air Materiel Command for consideration for use as a standard AF Form. As a result, the new AF Forms 1A, B, C, and D which are to replace present Forms 1, 1A, and 41F contain provision for entry of accessory data information as recommended by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

K. E. TIBBETTS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

3 Incls
1. Cpy of Engine Time Data Form
2. Cpy of Accessory Time Data Form
3. Cpy of ltr, Hq SAC, DMAS2 Subj, "Use of the Red Diagonal, Red Dash, and Red Cross Symbols"

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SAC 335 (9 Sep 49)

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Tests

(SECRET)
AUTH CG, SAC L B
1 Sept 1949.

TO: Director of Plans & Operations
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

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1. The final drafts of AFI 123 and instructions pertaining to ORT received from USAF contain items at variance with recommendations submitted by this headquarters, and with agreements reached by representatives of Headquarters USAF and Strategic Air Command at a recent conference. It is believed that modification of certain of these recommendations detract from the value of the ORT. In view of experience gained by the ORT team in conducting the first ORT using the new forms and factors, it is felt that certain of the items should be changed to conform with the original recommendations of this headquarters, and that others should be modified if the ORT is to present a true appraisal of the operational readiness of inspected units.

2. Although it was a read at the USAF ORT Conference to devise a standard ORT reporting form for all Air Force tactical units as the ultimate solution to standardization, it is not believed such a form can be effectively applied to such widely diversified unit types as bombers and fighters. The following recommendations for changes are considered essential to accurately report the operational readiness of SAC units in keeping with the high priority mobility aspect of their mission.

1. The following changes are recommended for Strategic Air Command ORT's:

a. AFI 123, paragraph 7b. Conduct of Test Uniformity. Delete the word "instruct" from the phrase "when necessary will call and instruct the ORT team." Aid of representatives of the Inspector General's office will be welcomed, however, it is not felt desirable that they be given authority to instruct the team during an ORT. Uniformity in conducting ORT's is achieved by using basically the same team for all ORT's of units in this command, whereas instruction by representatives

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of higher headquarters, unless given by the same personnel at each ORT, would result in anything but uniformity. Furthermore, since this command has been given responsibility for conducting the ORT's, it desires to retain full authority in conduct of the test.

FORMAT I.

SUPPLY

Item 19. Mobility Equipment. Raise this factor from 25 to 45 points with the points being deducted from Item 18 - Organizational Supplies and Equipment. This would lower Item 18 from 60 to 40 points, and bring the two items into more equitable balance. Mobility Equipment is one of the most important items affecting the unit's Operational Readiness, particularly in view of the operating conditions visualized in the War Plan, whereas major shortages of certain items in organizational supplies and equipment could occur without materially affecting the Operational Readiness or Combat Effectiveness of a unit.

MAINTENANCE

Item 24e. Percent assigned aircraft completing ORT missions. Raise this item from 25 to 85 points with changes as follows: Item 24a Inspection Procedure 25, change to 15; 24b Tech Order Compliance 15; change to 5; 24d Aircraft in Commission, average daily percentage in prior 60 days-45, change to 15; 24e Guns 5 and 24f Turrets and Gun Mounts 10 combined into one item and given credit of 5 points. Percent assigned aircraft completing ORT missions is one of the most logical factors in evaluating maintenance, yet in the draft it has been reduced to the same standing as Inspection Procedure, which, while of recognized importance, does not reflect as true and comprehensive a picture.

OPERATIONS

Item 27. Operational Readiness Tests. Since standard scoring factors are used, it is believed that scores included in the ORT report will provide sufficient information without going into detailed results. These results might well be misinterpreted without first hand knowledge of factors and conditions involved in the missions.

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DO4A2
Subj: Operational Readiness Tests

FORMAT II

Item 28.2. Bombing. a. Instructions are lacking as to the method of scoring if less than 50% of the bombs are within the prescribed distances and, further, it is felt that the standard set for visual bombing, 50% within 1,000 ft, is too low. It is recommended that full credit of 30 points be given for a five hundred foot CEP, computed by MTI, or in case of only lead and Deputy lead aircraft dropping, for 375 ft., GSA. In either case, it is recommended that five points be deducted for each hundred feet or fraction thereof over the desired standard.

b. For Radar Bombing, it is recommended that one point be deducted from the total of 60 for each hundred feet or fraction thereof the CEP is over the standard of 3,000 ft. for well defined targets, or 5,000 ft. for poorly defined targets.

4. Other items and factors appear, with which this headquarters does not completely agree, however the ones mentioned above are major and retention thereof could well result in a distorted picture. It is strongly recommended that the above changes be adopted.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

J. B. MONTGOMERY
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Operations

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1. The equipment requirements for future reconnaissance aircraft have been determined by this command and are herewith submitted in detail. Recommendations are made for the required installation in type of aircraft in accordance with functional requirements as presented by a joint reconnaissance requirements conference held at this headquarters [illegible] (Copy of minutes attached as Inclosure 1).

2. Definitions and objectives of the various classes of strategic reconnaissance are included in Appendix A to Inclosure [illegible] "multiplaces", "combined," or "triple-threat" reconnaissance aircraft are those capable of performing at one flight the tasks outlined as Nos 1 and 17, Target Verification 1 and 17, Damage or Target Development, and Weather Reconnaissance. The term "multipurpose" is used to mean a type aircraft (in this case, [illegible]) and [illegible] designed for this purpose. The designation "special purpose aircraft" refers to individual aircraft which may be modified and fitted with equipment other than that recommended for either multipurpose or [illegible] aircraft.

3. The basic ground on which these conclusions are based and which should be considered in planning the installation of equipment in future reconnaissance aircraft [illegible] are:

a. There is a requirement for an aircraft to carry from [illegible] reconnaissance [illegible] or [illegible] [illegible] 47 and [illegible] travel. The [illegible] aircraft is to obtain radar scope photography, and the tactical mission is to perform such functions as [illegible] and Target Verification 1 and 17. The capabilities of [illegible], however, is not to be curtailed. The [illegible] must be carefully modified.

b. The reconnaissance version of any aircraft must have at least the same maximum possible range as the bomber.

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SUBJ: Reconnaissance Equipment Requirements

e. All aircraft will be capable of obtaining the best quality radar scope photography.

g. Multipurpose aircraft as distinguished from the I aircraft (para-graph 2b, Appendix A, Inclosure 1) will not be required to perform their missions at medium and low altitudes.

h. Aircraft reconnaissance equipment requirements exercise only the minimum equipment needed to perform the functions outlined in Inclosure 1.

f. All camera equipment requirements are to be interpreted as requiring mounts in the aircraft and availability of the type camera recommended. Only those cameras for either day or night (or both) are to be installed as needed for a particular flight.

4. Photographic Equipment Requirements. The following cameras are recommended for installation in the B-47, B-48, B-49 and B-52 type aircraft. These requirements have been determined as the minimum necessary for obtaining required photographic reconnaissance. If superior equipments can be made available without compromising aircraft performance or delaying completion of operational aircraft they should be substituted.

a. Radar Scope Cameras Requirements. The capability of obtaining radar scope photographs should be realized by all strategic reconnaissance aircraft, independent of their primary or secondary missions. It is recommended that standard narrow beam radars be employed which are similar to those planned for use on bomber aircraft; for instance, APQ-24's in B-36, B-45, B-47 and B-52 type aircraft. I-1 or I-2 radar systems are not recommended for reconnaissance aircraft. The I-15 type radar scope camera with 100 foot maximum is satisfactory for all strategic reconnaissance purposes. Although radar scope photography in the past has frequently been poor, it is believed that better results can be obtained by improving the technical proficiency of personnel.

b. [illegible] Cameras Requirements. Following is a tabulation of aerial photographic equipment required to obtain the minimum information needed for intelligence purposes. A detailed discussion of each type camera and its intended use is contained in Inclosure 2.

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Subj: Reconnaissance Equipment Requirements

Equipment	Aircraft	B-52	B-47	B-45	B-57
-1, 24", Tri-Set		X	X		X
Cone 75, 24", Tri-Camera				X	X
-1, 12", 3 Camera		X	X		X
-40, 24" Multiple					
-1, 24", Split-Vert				X	
-1, 24", Tri-Camera				X	X
-37, 12", Split-Vert				X	X
Night Camera, 24", Split-Vert		X	X		X
-2, 12", 24", 40", Time		Ia	Ia	Ib	Ib
1-6, 150", Doris		X	X	X	X
0-15, Radar		X	X	X	X
-3, 12", Special		AA	AA		
T-11, Cartographic		AA	AA		
-40, 40", Vertical		A	A		

A = Aircraft is to be so modified that mount and camera can be installed within 24 hours.

AA = Entire installation to be made as required in special purpose aircraft.

Ia = Longest focal length lens possible.

Ib = Longest focal length lens possible with provisions for swing smaller focal length cones.

X = Camera is to be installed as needed for any given flight. Mounts, windows, etc., must be permanently installed.

? = Specify installation indefinite at this time; will be contingent on future device needs.

The above chart has been based upon the assumption that only such cameras as are to be used are carried on a particular mission; e.g., a low altitude night camera would not be carried with high altitude instruments. For this reason, versatility of mounts is imperative, particularly in the case of the B-47 and B-45.

5. NCW Requirements.

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Subj: Reconnaissance Equipment Requirements

a. Ferret Aircraft. In order to fulfill the general ferret requirements prescribed in Appendix C, Inclosure 1, this headquarters established the following specific airborne equipment requirements.

(1) The RB-50B electronics reconnaissance ferret aircraft should provide seven intercept positions instead of the six presently being used in the RB-29 ferret aircraft. Band coverages as currently allocated in the RB-29 aircraft have proven undesirable; the 8-400 mc band is too active for one operator to cover efficiently. Also, the 4400-11000 mc band should be split into bands of 4400-7000 mc and 7000-11000 mc. It is recommended that the band covers e for each intercept position be as follows:

(a) 8 - 40 mc

(b) 40 - 300 mc

(c) 300 - 1100 mc

(d) 1100 - 2200 mc

(e) 2200 - 4400 mc

(f) 4400 - 7000 mc

(g) 7000 - 11000 mc

(2) The equipment requirements are for a detection or search receiver with antennas, an analyzer, direction-finding equipment, and recording equipment, operable throughout 360° in the lower hemisphere beneath the aircraft for each of the seven positions listed above. This headquarters has previously agreed to accept existing types of ESM equipment (AFC conference on RB-50 ferret equipments, 7 December 1949), or those scheduled for delivery within one year from date of the conference. At any time, however, available aircraft should be equipped with the best obtainable equipment for the required mission.

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Subj: Reconnaissance Equipment Requirements

B. Multipurpose Reconnaissance Aircraft.

(1) The [illegible] equipment for [illegible] aircraft should remain as stated in the [illegible] mock-up (letter to Chief of Staff, [illegible], "Report of Mock-up Board on [illegible] and [illegible] Airplanes," dated 14 March 1957).

(2) Future multipurpose (including [illegible]) type aircraft should be provided with two electronic intercept positions. These positions should be so engineered that one of them will accept equipment for any of the first three bands listed in paragraph 5a(1) above, and the other position will accept any one of the equipments for the last four bands. The antennas on the [illegible] for position one must be interchangeable, as must the antennas for the bands covered in position two. There must also be provided a [illegible] for standby the [illegible] equipment when the airborne radar set is tri[illegible].

(3) The basic equipments required for the two positions are as follows:

(a) Position one.

1 each - AN/ARW-[illegible] Receiver
1 each - AN/[illegible]-5 Receiver
1 each - AN/APA-11 or Superior Pulse Analyzer
1 each - AN/APA-36 or Superior Panoramic Adapter
1 each - AN/ARW-1 or Superior Recorder
1 each - AN/APA-[illegible]9 or Superior D/F System
3 each - AN/ARR-8 Panoramic Receivers

(b) Position two.

2 each - AN/ARW-6 Receiver
1 each - AN/APA-11 or Superior Pulse Analyzer
1 each - AN/ARW-1 or Superior Recorder
1 each - AN/APA-[illegible]9 or Superior D/F System

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Subj: Reconnaissance Equipment Requirements

(c) The AN/APA-69 B/F antennas covering the 30 - 1000 mc band (position one) must be interchangeable, as should the antennas covering the 1000 to 12000 mc band (position two). This headquarters is of the opinion that the AN/APA-69 equipment is far from satisfactory and is planning to submit requirements for a new system.

(d) A suitable method of blanking the search receivers when the airborne radar set triggers must be incorporated.

(e) An instantaneous method of stopping the frequency scan of both AN/APA-71's in position two must be incorporated. The system should operate in such a manner that both sets may be stopped, rotated in either direction and then one set released to continue search-ing while the other is transferred to B/F antennas and used to take B/F readings.

b. Other Requirements. In order to fulfill the general weather reconnaissance requirements over and near enemy territory as outlined in Appendix B, of Inclosure 1, the following equipment is recommended(in order of priority)for installation in RB-36 and RB-50 type multipurpose reconnaissance aircraft.

(1) Equipment to determine winds at flight level. Standard radar (paragraph 4b) and navigational equipment is adequate for this purpose.

(2) Air recorder for use by a trained weather observer. His position in the aircraft must be such as to facilitate visual observation of weather. It should be noted that the personnel complement for this purpose cannot be fulfilled by 93X's 784's, since they have only had ground weather training. Experience in Air Weather Service has proven that the accuracy and value of weather data gathered by aircraft is greatly enhanced if the observer is a qualified officer weather forecaster (1319). It should be possible to use qualified enlisted forecasters (7X7's) providing those with several years weather experience are chosen.

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3
Subj: Reconnaissance Equipment Requirements

c. To determine temperature and relative humidity at flight altitude the AN/AMQ-7 equipment is recommended.

d. Equipment to determine absolute altitude to within ± 50 feet. If Air Proving Ground Command tests of the AN/APN-24 radar meter reveal that this accuracy is attainable, the standard radar will be sufficient for this purpose.

e. Drop and monitordropsonde equipments are required for automatic transmission of temperature, pressure and humidity data from flight altitude to the ground. No information is available as to whether the present equipment (AN/AMT-3) is effective when dropped from high speed aircraft at altitudes of 35,000 feet or greater. Should operational tests prove this equipment to have inadequate transmission range this command recommends the development of longer range equipment.

f. There is a requirement for installation of equipment to determine wind velocity above and below flight altitude, and aim for equipment to determine height of base and top of clouds (reference paragraph 27, f, Appendix D, Inclosure 1). Although development of such equipments has not yet been successful, these two items will be of great value for obtaining weather reconnaissance data and are recommended for development.

7. Total weights and cubages of the above reconnaissance equipment should not compromise aircraft performance as compared with that of the bomber version for each type aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDER GENERAL:

THOMAS S. POWER
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

2 Incls
1. Photo Con Rqmts Conference dtd 11 Jul 49
2. Photographic Equipment Rqmts

HISTORICAL COPY NOT TO:
CO, 311th AD

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[illegible] 18 November 1949

SUBJECT: Development of Strategic Reconnaissance Drone

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. Reference is made to letter from this Headquarters dated 29 March 1949, subject "Development of Strategic Reconnaissance Drone" and 1st Indorsement thereto from your headquarters dated 29 July 1949.

2. Request information copy of results of project referred to in par 2 of your indorsement be furnished this office.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

F. L. OSLER
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Commander

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AIR CS BAS
13 DEC 49

SAC 452 (16 Dec 49) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 19 DEC 49

TO: Commanding General, Second Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana

1. Report requested paragraph 2, basic, is a comparative study of several advanced strategic reconnaissance systems. This report is being revised to include study of XB-68 wing tip linked to XB-35 aircraft, also requested by your headquarters.

2. Referenced report will be forwarded under separate cover on or before 23 December 1949.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEMAY:

A. W. KISNER
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Staff

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13 Dec 49

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[illegible] 20 OCT 1949

SUBJECT: Shoran Modified RB-50 Aircraft

TO: Commander General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. The reconnaissance aircraft development program plans the installation of airborne Shoran in the aircraft assigned to the Photo Mapping Squadron. Informal inquiry indicated that fifteen (15) RB-50 aircraft were allocated for Shoran modification. However, inquiry in the Air Materiel Command reveals that there is no project for this modification and in the Headquarters Air Forces, nor is any planning being undertaken in the Air Materiel Command.

2. It is recommended that fifteen (15) RB-50 aircraft be further modified for airborne Shoran operations in connection with precision cartographic photography and mobile surveys. It is recommended that this modification be made on standard RB-50 aircraft and that its strategic reconnaissance capability be retained insofar as practicable. In the event that space provisions force the removal of one of the turrets, it is desired that nose fire power be left on the airplane.

3. It is felt that the Air Materiel Command now has information which will permit a much better Shoran installation than was made in the [illegible]. It is recommended that a project for the modification of 15 [illegible] be formally established and that representatives from this Command meet with representatives of the Air Materiel Command to determine the most suitable installation.

[illegible]
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director

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452 17 May 1949

SUBJ: Assignment of Aircraft

Classification
Change to

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By authority
CG, AAF

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1 Jul 49 - 1 Jul 49 Transmitter
Date Time

C.G., Transmitter
Jul 1, 1949
Lt. Col. Gen.

1. It is recommended that B-29 aircraft be assigned to this Command to replace the obsolete B-17 aircraft. It is recommended that 37 B-29 aircraft be assigned as follows:

9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing
99th Squadron - 12 B-29

55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing - 25 B-29

2. It is recommended that the 25 B-29 aircraft assigned to the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Forbes be applied against the Air Materiel Command Shoran Modification Project SAC 950-31. This project calls for the modification of 44 RB-29 Shoran aircraft. It is understood that the Air Materiel Command will require several months to complete this project and it is recommended that aircraft be assigned to Forbes with authority to ferry to the appropriate Depot upon call.

3. The 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (Mapping) is committed to the accomplishment of photography for cartographic use by the United States Army. Immediate action on Project SAC 950-31 will increase the Air Force capability in this respect.

4. The assignment of the B-29 aircraft recommended above will increase the combat potential of the 311th Air Division and eliminate transition into modern, jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft.

5. The obsolete aircraft are to be disposed and [illegible] and assigned units, and it is recommended that the aircraft be so listed on and after 1 July 1949. Enclosure No. 1 shows the disposition of aircraft if the recommended action is taken.

1 Incl
List of a/c

J. H. [illegible]
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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Lt Col Dutton/mkp/1345
Re 211/Ohio A/5Jun 49

SAC 432 (17 Mar 49) 1st Ind WPil

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 13 JUN 49

TO: Commanding General, 311th Air Division, Topeka Air Force Base, Topeka, Kansas

1. Twelve B-29 type aircraft will be assigned to the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing in accordance with your request.

2. Your request for 25 additional B-29 aircraft for the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing has been reduced to 12 in view of the availability of aircraft for this unit from the 12Bd Squadron when the latter unit is equipped with B-50A aircraft.

3. Members of this Headquarters in conference with representatives of the United States Air Force on 31 May 1949 established the following to be used in the [illegible] of strategic reconnaissance units:

a. Covers in will be in accordance with the attached chart.

b. The B-29's presently assigned to units of the 5th Reconnaissance Group will be retained and winterization of aircraft of the 72nd Squadron will be completed.

c. Special aircraft displaced by the assignment of B-50A's to the 12Bd Squadron will be delivered to the Air Materiel Command for Shoran modification and such BIG's as are necessary prior to delivery to the 55th Group.

d. The current project (SAC 95811) which was established to provide 71 additional RB-29 Duralist modified aircraft will be cancelled; a new project will be established to provide a two-squadron complement of Shoran modified RB-29's for the 55th Group.

e. If USAF Headquarters decides that a specialized squadron is required for ferret operations and troop space for an additional squadron is not available, the function will be absorbed in the 55th Group. In this event, the aforementioned project will be reduced to provide unit equipment for only one squadron. The specialized ferret aircraft made

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SAC 452 (17 Mar 59) 1st Ind (Cont'd)

necessary for the 55th Group by such a decision will be provided by modifying the 15 B-50 types that are excess to the unit assignment and attrition requirements of the 91st Group.

4. You will be notified regarding availability of Shoran modified B-29's when that information is available to this Headquarters in accordance with our request.

FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND:

A. W. KISSNER
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Staff

1 Incl:
Chart, "SAC Aircraft Equipping Program"
(2 copies)

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TWO [illegible] ACFT AND CREW FOR SEVEN FIVE DAYS TDY AT [illegible] FIELD CFB JAMAICA BEGINNING FIVE JANUARY REQUIRED FOR PURPOSE OF [illegible] AND INSTALLATION OF SHORAN [illegible] STATIONS AND PROJECT [illegible] ACFT CREWS REMOTE TO THREE ONE ONE AIR DIV [illegible] ACTION FOR ASSIGNMENT TO NO [illegible] BASE ONE [illegible] ACFT AVAILABLE TO CO [illegible] SECTION PROVIDED [illegible] INDICATE [illegible] OPERATIONAL TO PROVIDING TOW [illegible] ACFT FOR SHORAN OPERATIONS FOR IT IS [illegible] ACFT TO DIRECT COMMUNICATION [illegible] IS AUTHORIZED TO

Paragraph not required. This message may be handled as correspondence of same classification per paragraphs 511 and 70A (4) AF 300-5, 15 August 1947.

PAGE ONE OF ONE PAGE(S)

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CAIRO 7010E

5 JAN

FROM: CG CAIRO [illegible]

TO: CG USAF [illegible]

INFO: CG SAC OFFUTT AFB

CG ANDAOR [illegible]

CG HQ AOR

CG [illegible] AND JAMAICA

[illegible] FOR [illegible] AND AT [illegible] AMES DASH ONE ZERO [illegible] ONE ZERO AT DEW [illegible] CONSTANT [illegible] TO [illegible] AND DASH ONE ZERO IS BEING DISPATCHED TO [illegible] AND JAMAICA ABOUT SEVEN JAN [illegible] /A/ AMES DASH ONE ZERO WILL CONTACT ADVANCE [illegible] OF DASH ONE ZERO FOR OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS [illegible] AMES DASH ONE ZERO WILL BE HELD [illegible] IN ORDER TO INSURE ITS AVAILABILITY IN [illegible] SAC CHANGE EMERGENCY PD

Paraphrase not required. This message may be handled as correspondence of same classification per paragraphs 511 and 60A (4), AR 380-5, 15 August 1954.

[illegible]

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