Volume VI
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
Docs. No. 298 - 385

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Std Publication Form
Under par 3e, ADCSM
(-) No

Prepared by Mrs. Carvill/ht
Telephone 2727-2739
Date 20 May 1955

AF HQ Form 11
Feb 54 Revised
4706-1

NAFD

Excluded from General Declassification Schedule

298

24 MAY 1955

ADOOT-C

SUBJECT: (UNCLD) Qualitative Operational Requirement

COMEBACK COPY
Not requested, not furnished
Furnished 24 MAY 1955
(Date) (Initials)

TO: Director of Requirements
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The following Qualitative Operational Requirement is submitted in accordance with AF Reg 57-3, dated 28 May 1951.

a. Introduction.

(1) The currently proposed configuration of the F89H interceptor will not permit the launching of GAR-1B (infrared Falcon) guided rockets without full operation of the E-9 Fire Control System. This means that GAR-1B's cannot be launched successfully at very low altitudes (where ground clutter reduces the effectiveness of the fire control system), against targets using electronic countermeasures, or in the event of a fire control system malfunction. Thus, limitations are imposed upon the weapon by the fire control system which are not inherent weapon limitations; i.e., this weapon (GAR-1B) can operate effectively under the above conditions if no restrictions are imposed by the fire control system.

b. Objective.

(1) To provide a mode of operation for utilization of GAR-1B guided rockets which is completely independent of the fire control system, and which will take maximum advantage of the capabilities of this weapon.

c. Description.

(1) Nomenclature. A mode of operation which will take full advantage of the capabilities of GAR-1B guided rockets.

Excluded from General Declassification Schedule

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This correspondence is classified ____ in accordance with Par 45b, AFR 205-1, 24 Jul 53, or for the reason (c) stated.

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ADDE-C, Subj: (Unclf) Qualitative Operational Requirement Contd.

(2) Purpose. The proposed mode will permit launching GAR-1B guided rockets at low flying targets, in the presence of hostile electronic countermeasures, or in the event of a fire control system malfunction during day or night VFR conditions.

(3) Performance. The proposed mode must have a high degree of reliability, a kill probability commensurate with the capabilities of the weapon, and should not add significantly to the weight of the aircraft. Complexity should be avoided to facilitate maintenance.

(4) Design Features. The present optical sight should be fitted with an infrared feature similar to that proposed for the F-104. The fire control system should be altered to permit launchings with an inoperative FCS. Detailed design features and drawings are not available at this headquarters.

(5) Special Features. None.

(6) Proposed Basis of Issue. Each F89H interceptor assigned to this command should incorporate this feature in consonance with the availability of the weapon (GAR-1B).

(7) Methods of Meeting the Requirement. Each F89H interceptor should be modified at field, depot, or factory level, as appropriate, to provide the required capability.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. J. BIRMELE
LT COL., USAF
[illegible] Adj

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

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Hq USAF AFDRQ-AD Subject: (C) Large Unguided Air-to-Air Rocket

ADOPR (9 Mar 55) 1st Ind 31 MAR 1955

HQ AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Director of Requirements, DCS/D, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. This Command has closely followed the development of the "Bird Dog" rocket and plans to fully utilize this weapon in optimized systems.

2. Prior to any re-evaluation of our previously stated requirement, it is requested that we be furnished the latest information on the following matters:

a. The feasibility of the "Bird Dog" installation on all current and programmed series of the following aircraft:

F-84	F2H
F-86	F9F
F-89	F7U
F-94	F4D
F-100	F3H
F-101	F8U
F-102	FY1
F-105	A1D
F-107	

b. The effect upon aircraft performance when these rockets are installed on the above aircraft.

c. A comparison of kill probability between the weapon systems utilizing such rockets and the existing systems.

3. Upon receipt of this information this Headquarters will immediately study and resubmit a validated requirement for "Bird Dog" weapon systems.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

COMEBACK COPY

_____Not requested, not furnished

_____Furnished (Date) (Initials)

W. J. BIRMELE
LT COL., USAF
Asst Cmd Adj

V-24416/55

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This correspondence is classifie (b)(1) in accordance with Par 22c, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

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EAOPR-5

17 JAN 1955

SUBJECT: Training Facilities and Equipment for the CAR-1 Missile (Qualitative Operational Requirement) (Unclassified)

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Introduction: In fiscal year 1956, this command is programed to receive interceptor aircraft equipped to employ the Falcon missile (CAR-1). The capability to destroy attacking enemy aircraft with this weapon depends primarily upon the proficiency of the interceptor aircrew-controller team. Proficiency is the product of effective training, and effective training is possible only to the extent that adequate facilities and equipments are made available. Prior to the assignment of these interceptors, an urgent requirement exists for the facilities and equipments necessary to provide air defense units with the capability to train aircrews on the CAR-1 and associated systems.

2. Objective: To increase the air defense potential by providing the capability for realistic training in the employment of the CAR-1 missile.

3. Description:

a. Nomenclature: Training Facilities and Equipment for the CAR-1 Missile.

b. Purpose: To provide air defense units with the facilities and equipments necessary to accomplish training in the use of the CAR-1 missile and associated systems.

c. Performance: The following facilities and equipments are deemed necessary for adequate training in the employment of the CAR-1 missile:

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M14-1

[redacted] Training Facilities and Equipment for the GAR-1 Missile (Qualitative Operational Requirement) (Cont'd) (Unclassified)

(1) Existing flight simulators must be modified to provide the capability of presenting all flight problems associated with the GAR-1 missile.

(2) Adequate practice ranges must be provided.

(3) Suitable targets must be provided for synthetic and live firing of the missile. In addition, targets must be propelled at realistic speeds and altitudes.

(4) Adequate recording and assessing equipments must be provided.

(5) Equipments for ground handling and servicing of the missile and associated systems must be provided.

(6) A unit proficiency directive for aircrew training must be provided.

(7) The training system should provide for any additional facility or equipment that operational training may dictate.

d. Design Feature: Not applicable.

e. Special Feature: Not applicable.

f. Proposed Basis of Issue: As required.

g. Method of Meeting the Requirement: The development of certain facilities and equipments for training may be resolved within Air Defense Command resources. Highly technical problems will necessitate assistance from industry and/or Air Research and Development Command.

4. This correspondence is classified Confidential in accordance with paragraph 24a(7), AFR 205-1.

M. R. NELSON
Major General, USAF
Commander

2

H14-2

1st Ind, Hq EADF, EADOR-5, Subject: Training Facilities and Equipment for the GAR-1 Missile (Qualitative Operational Requirement) (Unclassified)

ADOOT-C (17 Jan 55) 1st Ind

19 FEB 1955

HEADQUARTERS AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Eastern Air Defense Force, Stewart Air Force Base, Newburgh, New York

FILED FALCON

1. The problems to be associated with GAR-1 missile training have been of vital concern to this headquarters for some time. Present plans are that we will use both Tyndall and our new base at Fort Myers, Florida, to provide realistic training for the units equipped with these weapons.

2. Design specifications for ground handling equipment, with the exception of missile loaders, have been submitted to Headquarters USAF. Missile-loading equipment design has been undertaken by the aircraft contractors. Command requirements for modification of flight simulators and for recording equipment have also been submitted to Headquarters USAF for programming, development, and procurement. It is anticipated that this equipment will be available to units prior to their receipt of missile-equipped aircraft.

3. Factory training courses will be available for training of guidance system, fire control system, and armament technicians; Air Training Command will provide courses for guidance system and fire control system mechanics. Only a limited number of armament supervisors will be given factory ground handling instruction, and they will be responsible for OJT of their subordinates at squadron level. ADC has been allotted seven spaces for the initial class at the contractor school for guidance system technicians (3117GE). The defense force quotas have been forwarded. Tentative plans will provide for twelve more spaces within three months. Further details pertaining to the training courses are unavailable at this time. Additional information will be forwarded as it is finalized.

4. While a unit proficiency directive for use in the GAR-1 program does not exist at this time, it is under continuous study and will be in the field before any of our units convert to aircraft employing the missile.

5. Your continued interest in this matter will be appreciated. Any additional comments or recommendations on this matter will be favorably received.

M/R: Not necessary

Maj Chandler/gjl
2890
14 Feb 55

FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

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This correspondence is classified ... Par ..., AFR 205-1, 28 May 53, or for the reason (s) stated. ... SIGNATURE

AF-ADC-COLO. SPRINGS, COLO

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Will be Confirmed in

Std Publication Form

Under par 3a, ADCSM

5-3 No

Prepared by Mr. Carvill/2727-2739/ht

Telephone

Date 1 June 1955

M536-1

XC HQ w 11
Feb 54 Revised

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ADOCT-C

SUBJECT: (UNCLD) Plan for a Unit Proficiency Training and Evaluation Program for Interceptors Equipped with GAR (Falcon)

TO: Director of Operations
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference your message AFOOP-OP-D 59019, dated 15 March 1955. This command must acquire a high level of combat readiness within the shortest possible interval following delivery of Falcon-firing aircraft. The proposed program, which is outlined in detail in Inclosure 1, is designed to meet this requirement. It is based upon the limited technical and operational knowledge currently available on the complete Falcon system; therefore, some features are sufficiently flexible to permit any deviations necessitated by knowledge accumulated during the development and testing phases. Inclosure #1 establishes, within the above-noted limitations, the quantitative requirements and the basic philosophies of the program. The concepts of combat team training, centralized training, and realistic training embodied in the current Team rocket-firing program are to be continued. It is intended that after a short home base familiarization period each squadron receiving Falcon equipment will be deployed to a weapons training center for initial indoctrination. Further, squadrons should return annually for periodic training to maintain and evaluate the unit proficiency level.

2. Successful implementation of the proposed program is dependent upon the availability of the specialized equipments necessary for its support. Prime requirements are for a target system and assessing equipment to measure weapon miss distance. A requirement for a drone target squadron to be attached to the 4750th Air Defense Wing has been submitted and approved by your headquarters. The operational plan for this squadron is being prepared. Drones and an assessing equipment should be available concurrently with the initiation of the program.

3. To insure an effectual unit training program, this command requests that the following actions be taken:

MEMO FOR RECORD NOT NEC.

This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par 5b, AFR 205-1, 24 Jul 53, or for the reason (s) stated. _____
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AF-ADC - COLO SPRINGS, COLO

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Ltr, Subj: (USCSB) Plan for a Unit Proficiency Training and Evaluation Program for Interceptors Equipped with GAR (Falcon) (Contd)

a. The qualitative and quantitative requirements of and for the program as outlined in Inclosure #1 be approved.

b. That appropriate action be taken to insure development of the support elements outlined in Section VII of Inclosure #1, required by the program.

c. That these support elements be programmed concurrently with th missile weapon system.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. F. [illegible]
Major, USAF
Asst Comdr [illegible]

Incl
Falcon Trg Program
(3 copies)

1 be Confirmed in

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or par 3a, ADCSM

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This correspondence is classified_____in accordance with Par_____, AFR 205-1, 24 Jul 53, or for the reason (s) stated. _____
SIGNATURE

AF - ADC - COLO. SPRINGS, COLO

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COMDR ADC

ROUTINE DEFERRED

COMDR, ARDC, BALTIMORE, MD

X

COMDR, 4750TH AIR DEF WG (WPNS)
YUMA CO APRT, ARIZ
CofS, HQ USAF, WASH 25, D.C.

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ADOOT-C 3334. This comd is programmed to receive F-89F intcp equipped with Falcon rkts in 3rd Qtr FY 56. A rapid build-up of Falcon firing F-89H, F-102, and F-101 will fol. ADC has an urgent rqr for adequate tgt sys to supp the ADC Falcon Tng Program. We have programmed a Drone Sq which is capable of supp the initial tng for F-89H sqs. A towed sys would be more desirable if it proves feasible. This comd does not envisage a drone-towed tgt as the solution to tgt sys rqr. Req your comd conduct tests in the immed future to detm if Falcon rkts can be safely fired at a tgt towed by a manned acft.

1 1

Maj Johansen/ht

ADOOT-C 2727-2739

12 MAY 1955

ADOPR

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Falcon Missile Planning Deficiencies

TO: Director of Operations
Headquarters USAF
ATTN: Operational Plans Division
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference your Secret letter, 25 April 1955, subject as above, requested comments are as follows.

a. Ref para 1. As noted in your letter, the present ADC Operational Plan for Fighter Interceptor Squadrons Equipped with GAR-1 Falcon, dated 1 October 1953, is out of date and no longer useful as a planning guide. A new plan pertaining only to Falcon-equipped aircraft will not be written since all future ADC operational plans for fighter interceptors will contain the concept of operations for the aircraft with all types of armament for which it has a capability, including guided and unguided air rockets.

b. Ref para 2. The estimated annual requirements for firing Falcon for training are:

(1) Sampling of manufacturers lots will require firing of 5% of each lot annually.

( ) Twenty missiles per assembly and maintenance crew per year.

(3) Two radar and one infrared missile per year per aircraft.

(4) Two radar and one infrared missile per year per aircrew. This will be based on 37 aircrews per squadron or a total of 74 radar and 37 infrared missiles per squadron per year.

(5) Requirements Nos. 1, , and 3 above can be met in conjunction with require... at

This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

M669-1

Hq ADC ADOPR Subject: (Uncl) Falcon Missile Planning Deficiencies

No. 4, therefore the quantities stated in No. 4 will be adequate to meet all requirements.

c. Ref para 3. The only aircraft with a Falcon carrying capability presently programmed within the augmentation forces is the F-102 which is to be located at Tyndall AFB. Falcon requirement for these aircraft will be the same as for ADC aircraft, 45 Falcon each. No facilities for Falcon storage have been programmed to support these augmentation force requirements because programming guidance restricts programming to missions as they appear in the P.D. This command has sought approval for such construction in the past but has been refused by Headquarters USAF.

d. Ref para 4. It is assumed that the term "alternate base" refers to bases which will be used for recovery of interceptors should return to home base be precluded by reason of weather, low fuel on interceptor or other operational considerations. Recovery bases have been designated to recover aircraft of the same type as are operating from the base and current planning factors allow for rearming recovered aircraft.

e. Ref para 5. Present plans for utilization of Falcon require a proportion of two radar missiles to one infrared missile.

f. Ref para 6. Current planning factors have changed the numerical requirement for squadrons equipped with Falcon. The requirement for wartime operations has been set at 45 missiles per aircraft thus changing the figure to 1125 missiles for a full squadron and 585 for a half squadron. Some half squadrons may have 14 Falcon carriers requiring 630 missiles. No firm commitment can be made at this time regarding aircraft possessing a dual Falcon-Ding Dong capability since this project is still in the development stage.

g. Ref para 7. Recent communications with Hughes Aircraft Corp. indicate that this subject is being restudied. The removal of temperature restrictions stated in this paragraph pertained to the missile motor but it has

Hq ADC ADOPR Subject: (Uncl) Falcon Missile Planning Deficiencies

since been noted that low temperatures adversely affect the hydraulic flight control system and at present no change in original requirements for temperature control is indicated. [redacted].

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. J. BIRMELE
LT COL., USAF
Asst Comd Adj

COMMANDER'S COPY

[redacted] furnished

12 MAY 1955

Maj E J Monaghan/rg
2933
10 May 55

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609-3

This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par 22c, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

APR 1955

SUBJECT: Falcon Missile Planning Deficiencies

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado

1. A series of planning deficiencies are presently evident in the F-89H, IF-101, F-102 weapon systems as pertain to the Falcon missile. Further action can be taken by this Headquarters only after current ADC operational planning factors are known.

2. Desire you forward appropriate comments on each of the items contained in inclosure #1, prior to 15 May 1955.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

S. D. Kelsey, Col

HUBERT ZEMKE
Colonel, USAF
Acting Chief, Operational Plans,
Directorate of Operations, DCS/O

1 Incl
Falcon Missile
Planning Deficiencies

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Inclosure.

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HQ USAF

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4609-4

FALCON MISSILE PLANNING DEFICIENCIES

1. The ADC Operational Plan for Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons Equipped with GAR-1 Falcon, dated 1 October 1953 contains much outdated information. For example, the live and bulk storage requirements listed on page 7 are not in accordance with current planning. It is recommended this plan be rewritten or revisions published and distributed at an early date.

2. Although the requirement to fire Falcon missiles as a part of unit training has been established, the numerical quantity to be fired per squadron per year has not been determined. As a result no Falcons to meet training requirements have been programmed. The number and type Falcons to be fired annually for training must be established as soon as possible.

3. No Falcon requirements for Augmentation Forces have been programmed. If on D-Day, interceptor squadrons with a GAR-1 capability are to be utilized in support of the air defense mission, Falcons must be readily available for their use. A program should be established to firm up this requirement if one exists. Therefore, desire you state requirements for GAR-1 for use by augmentation forces.

4. No Falcons are presently programmed to meet alternate base servicing requirements. If present planning requires Falcon rearming of ADC aircraft landing at alternate bases, provisions for additional quantities of Falcons at these bases (including additional storage) must be made.

5. No reference is made in USAF programming documents to the infra-red Falcons (GAR-1B, 1C). If mixed loads of radar GAR and infra-red GAR are now a part of firm operational planning, this Headquarters will be so notified in order that differentiation between these types in program documents may be made.

6. The RG-57 currently carries a requirement of 390 missiles for the F-89H half squadrons and 750 missiles for full squadrons of other aircraft. In the event this squadron authorization requirement has changed numerically this Headquarters will be so advised in order that steps may be taken to align war planning data with programming data. In addition the Falcon numerical requirement for a fighter-interceptor with a Ding Dong capability should be made known.

7. A recent letter from Hq ARDC indicated that missiles can be loaded into aircraft for immediate take-off at a minimum temperature 0°F. This would permit a reduction in the minimum 70°F currently planned for the live and bulk storage buildings. Since the missile can be operated satisfactorily from 0°F to 130°F, ARDC recommended the live storage building allowable temperature range be between 20°F and 110°F. The letter also stated that dead storage temperatures as low as -40°F are allowable provided the GAR's are warmed prior to checkout and loading on the aircraft. They therefore recommended that temperature limits in the dead storage building be from -40° to 110°F. Althou the above ARDC recommendations would effect considerable dollar savings in Falcon storage construction, there are other operational factors which must be considered. For example, the temperature limitations possible for personnel working in the storage areas must be considered. Further, the requirement for use of the dead storage area for additional live and ready missiles must be stated. Since construction of these Falcon storage facilities will begin in

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the near future, a final position should be established regarding the temperature humidity limitations required for the live and bulk storage buildings based on recent Falcon developments.

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Will be Confirmed in 3rd Publication Form Under Par 3e, ADC Ltr

5-3

Prepared by

Telephone

Date

Refers to Footfold No.

Form 11 (REV)

301.9

25 JUN 1955

ADOOP

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Falcon Missile Planning Factors

TO: Director of Operations
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to your message AFOOP-OP-D 54685 and our Secret letter, subject, "(Unclassified) Falcon Missile Planning Deficiencies," 13 May 1955.

2. Utilization and expenditure rates, extracted from Part I, Annex C, ADCOMP 1-55, 1 April 1955, which provide planning factors for missile requirements contained in paragraph 1f, cited letter, are:

UTILIZATION RATES

TOTAL SORTIES (per inventory aircraft)

1st day	3
2d thru 6th day (per day)	1
7th thru 30th day (per day)	1
2d thru 3d month (per month)	15

EXPENDITURE RATES (# of sorties expending ammunition)

COMBAT AMMUNITION

1st day	30
2d thru 6th day (per day)	25
7th thru 30th day (per day)	10
2d thru 3d month (per month)	5

3. Based on the sortie and utilization rates, the total missile requirements to conduct the decisive phase of the war are computed as follows:

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This correspondence is classified [redacted] accordance with Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

M573-1

Hq ADC, ADOPR Subject: (Unclassified) Falcon Missile Planning Factors

a. Per aircraft:

(1)	3 sorties (1st day) x .80 expenditure	= 2.40
(2)	5 sorties (2d thru 6th day) x .25 expenditure	= 1.25
(3)	24 sorties (7th thru 30th day) x .10 expenditure	= 2.40
(4)	30 sorties (2d thru 3d month) x .05 expenditure	= 1.50
	Unit factor	- 7.55

b. The unit factor of 7.55 x 6 missiles per aircraft determines the 45 missile requirement stated in the cited letter. This provides the basis for the total missile requirements, based on 25 aircraft per squadron.

4. The Falcon missile requirement will remain subject to review pending Ding Dong development and its integration in F-102A/B and F-101B type aircraft. The programmed storage facility of 750 Falcons per squadron is considered adequate for F-89H squadrons, as these aircraft will be at half squadron strength and combined with F-89D/J half squadrons.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
Asst Command Adj

COMEBACK COPY

Not requested, not furnished
PtR Furnished 28 JUN 1955 (Date) (Initials)

Maj R R Bonebrake/rg
2933
21 Jun 55

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This correspondence is clas[illegible] accordance with Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (a) stated.

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NORTON AIR FORCE BASE
SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

305

SBMTB-2b

MAR 10 1955

SUBJECT: GAR-1 Falcon Missile Cycling Requirements

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
ATTN: ADMAC-5
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

305 55a

1. With reference to maintainability and reliability of all GAR-1 field replaceable components, it is a maintenance objective, that for the planned life of GAR-1 Missiles, there should be a minimum amount of inspection, adjustment and maintenance. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. Early in the GAR-1 Missile program it was determined that live storage missiles should be cycled through the checkout console at 60 day intervals. This was primarily due to; (a) predicted inability of the guidance Unit to sustain proper vacuum for a longer period of time, and (b) short life expectancy of the Battery. (b)(1)

3. Subsequent to the above established cycle period, a new type battery has been adopted and is being installed in production missiles. Also characteristics of the guidance unit have improved to a point where proper vacuum can be maintained for periods considerably longer than 60 days. In the event no other reasons have developed for retaining a 60 day cycle period, we propose advancing to a 120 day cycle period. The inspection cycle would then be progressively revised to coincide with specific failure rates as established [illegible] including Phase VII Operational Suitability Tests. (b)(1)

4. Advantages gained as a result of less frequent inspections or cycling operations of the GAR-1 Missile would be:

a. Reduction of maintenance workload at squadron level.

b. General reduction and leveling of the spares requirements during the first nine to 12 months of missile life.

c. Easement of the rapid build up of a maintenance overhaul capability. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

774-1.

SSSB-1509

027C

HQ SBAMA, SBMTB-2b, Subject: GAR-1 Falcon Missile Cycling Requirements

5. Accepting that characteristics of the Guidance Unit and Battery were chiefly responsible for the 60 day inspection requirement, it is now possible we may advance to a 120 day cycle without a significant loss in the missile reliability rate. (b)(1)

6. It is requested that your comments and recommendations on the above be forwarded this Air Materiel Area, Attention: SBMTB-2b, as soon as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DELBERT H. ELLIS
Major, USAF
Chief, Maintenance Engineering
Services Division

(b)(1)

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Will be Confirmed in 3rd Publication Form Under par 3e, ADCM 53-1

no

Major A.H. Allred/ADMAC-SC/laj
2594
23 March 1955

ADC HQ AFSC, 11

M 1-3X

R/ltr MBAMA, Norton AFB, Calif., Subj: GAR-1 Falcon Missile Cycling Requirements

ADMAC-SC (10 Mar 55) 1st Ind

23 MAR 1955

HEADQUARTERS AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, San Bernardino Air Material Area, ATTN: MSMTB-2b, Norton Air Force Base, San Bernardino, California

1. This Headquarters has carefully considered a change in the recycle rate of the GAR-1 missile. To date it is believed that there has not been sufficient experience in checkout of the missile to justify a lengthening of the recycle period.

2. No information has been received from the manufacturer or from Wright Air Development Center stating that missile reliability has reached a point which will allow a lengthened recycle period. On the other hand, it has been stated that the hydraulic actuators should be exercised every 60 days to insure continued proper functioning.

3. In reference to the number of spares required, it is believed that even though field experience may show an overage of spare components these overages can be subtracted from future procurement and thus will not be wasted.

4. In conclusion, this Headquarters does not believe that Air Defense Command's combat capability should be jeopardized by changing the recycle rate at this time. Results of the GAR-1 Operational Suitability Test and/or early ADC field experience should allow us to ascertain the recycle rate most suitable.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

John R. Bell Maj USAF
(Date) (Initials)

None for record not required
Reference basic correspondence

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classifi[illegible] accordance with Par 24, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

0213

ADMAC-5C 8 Feb 1955

SUBJECT: (Uncl) ADC Ground Handling Requirements for GAR-1

DOC 306 ADCHR 55a

TO: Commander
Air Materiel Command
ATTN: Col. Marion G. Ferguson, Jr.
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Ohio

1. Reference is made to a letter from this Headquarters dated 24 November 1954, Subject: Falcon Loading System for the F-89H and F-102 Aircraft.

2. The present Air Defense Command plan for the ground handling of the GAR-1 and 2.75" FFAR rockets is identical, both for the F-89H and F-102 squadrons.

3. The following minimum requirements are considered essential for the ground handling of the missiles and rockets between the live storage area and the aircraft service area.

a. For F-89H Squadrons. Truck, 1½ ton - Specialized Missile and Rocket Transport (8 ea. plus 2 spares). Description: This truck must be capable of carrying 42 2.75" rockets and 2 pallets containing 3 GAR-1's each. The pallets will be side loaded on the truck at the live storage building by a fork lift. The rockets and GAR's must also be readily removable for placement in the pod loader. This necessitates a flat bed which is as low as possible. A suitable rack for the rockets should be placed at the forward end. The dimensions of each pallet to contain three missiles in the shipping and storage container must be approximately 66" x 90". These pallets must be placed side by side in order that each missile may be hoisted out of its container into theloader. Suitable space must be provided on the truck bed at each end of the storage case for a man to stand as the upper half of the storage case must be removed before removing the missile. Each truck should be equipped with a light boom or jib crane type hoist. (See Inclosure 1).

b. For F-102 Squadrons. Truck, 1½ ton - Specialized Missile and Rocket Transport (8 ea. plus 2 spares). Description: Same as in paragraph a, except in the case of the F-102 squadron the crane

(b)(1)

lift the entire shipping and storage cane from the pallet for placement into the loader.

c. For F-89H and F-102 Squadrons. Crane, boom or jib type, 500 pound (minimum lifting capacity). (One each required per truck). Description: This crane in addition to being able to lift at least 500 pounds, should be capable of 360° swing, lifting the load to a height of 10 feet above the ground, and electrically operated from power generated on the truck. Manual operation in case of electrical failure is necessary and the crane should operate with moderate speed. The boom must be able to deposit the load 6 feet from one side of the truck. The crane should be permanently mounted to the bed of the truck.

d. For F-89H Squadrons. Hook Assembly- (2 ea. required per truck). Description: This hook should be of the "ice tong" or groppling hook type and will be used with the crane to hoist the missile from the storage case to the loader. It should attach to the missile at the base of two fine and at the center of gravity. The hook should be readily detachable from the crane. A hook assembly of this general type is used by the Hughes Aircraft Co. for manual handling of the GAR-1.

e. For F-102 Squadrons. Hook Assembly - (2 ea. required per truck). Description: This should be a hook or sling assembly capable of attaching to the crane and each end of the storage case.

4. It is requested that this Headquarters be kept advised as to the development and procurement of the above items.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. J. BIRMELE
Lt Col, USAF
Asst Comd Adj

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FILE NUMBER 307

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AFR C-5

9 MAY 1955

SUBJECT: (Uncl) ADC Ground Handling Requirements for GAR-1

TO: Commander
Air Materiel Command
Attn: Col. Marion C.Ferguson, Jr., MCSEpt requested, not furnis
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Ohio

Furnished 9 MAY 1955 (Date) (Initials)

COMEBACK COPY

1. Reference is made to a letter from this headquarters dated 8 February 1955, Subject: ADC Ground Handling Requirements for GAR-1.

2. Requirements for F-89H squadrons remain the same as stated in the referenced letter, with the following exceptions:

a. Paragraph 3d. Hook Assembly - delete.
This hook assembly is no longer required since the F-89H loader was designed to utilize the missile squadron storage case.

b. Hook Assembly - 2 ea required per truck.
Description. This should be a hook or sling assembly capable of attaching to the crane and each end of the storage case. The entire storage case containing the missile will be hoisted from the truck onto the loader.

3. Recent GAR-1 loading tests conducted on the F-102 at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, has necessitated a re-evaluation of the GAR-1 ground handling equipment requirements for this aircraft.

4. All equipment required for the F-102 as stated in referenced letter should be disregarded and the following substituted therefor:

a. Trailer - Missile or Rocket Transport.
Flat bed, 2500 lb. capacity, 18" maximum bed height, spring suspension front and rear, wheels must not extend above or outside of the bed. Bed dimensions 7' wide, 11' long. 20 each per squadron. (16 for missile and 4 for rocket). Convair has been requested t study and make a proposal on this trailer.

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MAJ A M Allred/AMAC-5/mld Memo for record not required.

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This correspondence is classified ____ in accordance with
Par 23, AFR 205-1, 24 Jul 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

SIGNATURE

Form 1
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b. Truck, 3/4 to 1½ ton, 4-wheel drive, (M-37 weapon carrier or Dodge power wagon) for towing trailers described in paragraph a. 6 each per squadron.

c. CAR-1 Missile Loading Frame - designed and produced by Convair, San Diego, California. 16 each per squadron.

d. Hook and Bar Assembly - 16 each per squadron. Convair was requested, at the loading tests mentioned in paragraph 3 above, to study and design a tool to slip over the fins of the missile at the C.G. which would enable 2 men to lift the missile out of the storage container and place it in the loading frame. This tool is needed to preclude any handling of the missile by hand during the loading operation.

5. It is requested that headquarters be kept advised as to development and procurement of the above items.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HECTOR C. DACUS
Captain, USAF
Asst Comptroller

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Comdr, SMAMA
Comdr, AMC
Comdr, WPAFB
Convair
Northrop Acft

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(b)(1) ADMAC-1B 12203 . Reurmsg SBSWAl-5-164. Fol is tentative calendar year 1955 Falcon shipping sked: Griffiss AFB 33 Sep; 34 Oct; 33 Nov; and 50 Dec. Otis AFB 33 Sep; 34 Oct; 33 Nov; and 50 Dec. Wurtsmith AFB 34 Sep; 30 Oct; 36 Nov; and 50 Dec. Minn-St. Paul AFB 45 Oct; 55 Nov; and 50 Dec. Yuma AFB 45 Oct; 59 Nov; and 40 Dec. This sked is tentative and subj to revision. Sked is made on assumption that missiles on both contr compl interchangeable. If assumption incorrect please advise EPD.

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M/Sgt A. L. Yelverton/fo (b)(1)

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This correspondence is classified ____ in accordance with
Par 23, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

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

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The nose end of the containers must be placed against the wall to prevent the missiles from moving in the event a rocket motor should ignite. The pallets should be stacked 4 high since the live storage buildings have been designed to hold 4h missiles per bay.

The above procedure describes the flow of missiles using one check-out console. It will be duplicated when using two consoles.

b. A fairly complex record system must be kept on the GAR-2 missile. It is known that for a time after the missiles reach the field, certain information must reach the headquarters as well as the contractor and prime Air Material Areas. Some of the items of information which must be readily available at all times are as follows:

1. Location of each missile, especially after it has been processed to a live condition. (This should include the aircraft the missile is installed on or the pallet station and bay of the live storage building where it may be stored).
2. TAF assigned to each missile.
3. Serial number of each missile.
4. Serial number of all major components.
5. Date missile was received.
6. Date of original check-out and each subsequent check-out.
7. Serial number of each component replaced and that of the replacing component.
8. Malfunctions and the remedy.
9. Modifications.
10. TRAN dates.
11. Time power was on the missile while installed on aircraft.
12. Flight hours while installed on aircraft.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
Asst Command Adj

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1. [redacted]
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13 July 55

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ADC Hq-O-AG-Form 22
April 53

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This document consists of___
This is copy No.____of____

(b)(1)

COPY

FILE NUMBER 368 311

20 May 1955

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Nuclear Warheads for Interceptor Missiles

TO: Director of Requirements
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The following Qualitative Operational Requirement is submitted under the provisions of AFR 57-3.

2. Attention is invited to the following pertinent references:

a. Letter ADOPR 381, Headquarters Air Defense Command, 23 March 1953, subject: (b)(1) Requirement for Development of Atomic Warheads for Air Defense Weapons.

b. Headquarters Air Defense Command, 1 July 1954, "Operational Plan for F-99."

c. Headquarters Air Defense Command, 1 July 1954, "ADC Requirement Plan 54-60."

d. Message ADOPR 3151, 22 December 1954, to Headquarters USAF, for Director of Requirements.

3. Introduction:

a. The letter referenced in paragraph 2a above stated a general requirement for the development of atomic warheads for Air Defense weapons. In the intervening period of time since this letter, was written, the research and development in this area has progressed to the stage whereby a more definitive requirement can be stated. In addition, with the advent of an enemy thermonuclear capability, it become imperative that both the weapon and the bomb load be destroyed. With the present development trends, it appears that this kill can be accomplished only through the use of nuclear warheads.

b. The yield of the warhead should be optimized to the weapon system, taking into consideration such factors as CEP's, tactical deployment and probable geography of kill area. With the advent of two stage fusion weapons, the limiting factors of fissionable materiel quantities, and gross weights are greatly reduced. Consequently, each warhead should be optimized to provide the necessary effects to accomplish a weapon kill.

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Hq ADC Subj: (b)(1) Nuclear Warheads for Interceptor Missiles

c. The Air Defense Command has previously stated its policy of utilizing atomic warheads in optimum quantities. This requirement is submitted in consonance with this policy.

4. Objective:

a. To develop suitable nuclear warheads for carriage by interceptor missiles.

b. To provide and standardize, if possible, a nuclear warhead to facilitate the orientation of the interceptor missile development program to provide for a ready interchange of warheads between missiles.

5. Description:

a. Nomenclature: A nuclear warhead, similar in construction to the IN-25 WASP, which can be installed in any interceptor missile.

b. Purpose:

(1) To increase the effectiveness of air defense by providing an extended kill to include the enemy weapon along with the carrier.

(2) To shorten the time to operational availability by permitting initial relaxation of the present stringent terminal guidance requirements imposed by the high explosive warheads. The larger lethality of nuclear warheads could provide an operationally acceptable interceptor missile at an earlier date than would be possible with the high explosive warheads. The accuracy required in the ultimate system would not be relaxed, but rather would be necessary to place the enemy target within the fireball of the nuclear detonation, thereby definitely destroying the enemy bomb.

c. Performance: The present flight characteristics requirement of the interceptor missiles must not be affected by the inclusion of nuclear warheads.

d. Design Features:

(1) The nuclear warheads should be designed with the same sealed unit principle utilized in the IN-25

(b)(1)

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Hq ADC Subj: Nuclear Warheads for Interceptor Missiles

WASP warhead. Once assembled, the warhead can be mounted in the missile and remain there in a ready condition for extended periods of time. The warhead should be designed for an optimized yield, as determined by design studies.

e. Special Features: The fuzing and firing circuits of the warhead should contain safe separation and self-destruction features. The ballistic and mechanical features should allow placement into the presently designed interceptor missile configurations. Insofar as is practicable, the warhead should be interchangeable between the various interceptor missiles.

f. The promise of weapon kill offered in the use of nuclear warheads requires that all interceptor missiles be equipped with these warheads.

g. Methods of Meeting the Requirement: By placing necessary emphasis on the current research and development trends in nuclear warheads and interceptor missile design programs.

6. It is recommended that this requirement be rapidly validated and the necessary action initiated.

a. The priority for this project should be 1-B as defined by AFR 80-11.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/t/ KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Major General, USAF
DCS/Operations

312

ADCPR

SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) Review of Military Characteristics

TO: Commander
Air Research and Development Command
P. O. Box 1395
Baltimore 3, Maryland

DOC 312 ADCHR 55a

1. Reference is made to your letter, subject: (U) "Transmittal of Military Characteristics," dated 11 January 1955. The attached Military Characteristics for an Atomic Warhead are presently being studied by this Headquarters.

2. In general, it is believed that the proposed military characteristics adequately specify the type of warhead that is needed for use in the proposed RING DOMB weapon.

3. There are certain statements in the subject document, however, that do not clearly recognize the operational requirement for daily, frequent and repeated flights with these warheads. Specifically, the pertinent statements are contained in the following paragraphs:

a. Technical Design--Paragraph 8.

b. Environmental Criteria--Paragraph 9.

c. Storage Handling and Testing--Paragraph 20.

4. These particular paragraphs contain statements that cannot be reconciled with the planned operational use of the warheads.

5. In order for this Command to formulate a judicious position on these military characteristics, clarification is requested on the following matters:

a. It is stated that "the weapon will be kept in a ready-to-operate condition without test for a period of at least 30 days." Since these weapons will be loaded on the alert aircraft and off-loaded when the aircraft goes out of commission, it does not seem feasible to state this type requirement on the basis of days. It would seem that any restrictive parameters should be stated in terms of loadings or flights.

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classified in accordance with
Par 23c, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (a) stated.

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Hq ADC ADOPR Subject: (UNCLASSIFIED) Review of Military Characteristics

b. The paragraph referenced in 3b stipulates an environmental criteria of single mission flight time of two hours for a total of 50 hours. This, too, is in conflict with the planned operational use. Under the present operations of this Command, the weapon might be alert for a period of four hours. With the present alert conditions, the total flight time can occur within 50 days. In addition to this severe restriction, we do not have any indication as to what is required in the way of test, inspection, etc., at the completion of this period.

c. The "Storage, Handling and Testing" paragraph delineates a requirement for two-year storage without deterioration. The plans of this Command envision complete inventory storage at each operating base. Since these weapons are justified and allocated on the number of enemy targets and since all targets may arrive within a short period of time, we have a requirement for the availability of every weapon within a few hours after alert. This requirement precludes any resupply of weapons or packaged storage conditions.

6. The procedures of other commands, in the field of special weapon maintenance, indicates a need for a surveillance inspection program on all weapons during a specified time interval. If the proposed weapon will not require such a surveillance program, it is recommended that the design specifications clearly indicate cognizance of this fact. In the event that the weapon will require some type of surveillance, it is recommended that the design be such as to maximize the time interval between the required inspections, and that the military characteristics specifically delineate this criterion.

7. This Command has additional comments on the proposed characteristics. However, it is believed that the above represents the most important considerations. Based on the information and clarification furnished, all comments will be consolidated and forwarded as soon as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
Agst Command Adj

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Will be Confirmed in Std Publication Form Under par 3a, ADCM

S-3 [illegible]
Prepared by Maj N B Bodinger/jh
Telephone 2143
Date 1 Mar 55
Ref No Symbol No.

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This correspondence is classified in accordance with Par 23c, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

M 8-2

Post Office Box 1395
Baltimore 3, Maryland

IN REPLY ADDRESS COMMUNICATION TO COMDR. ARDC, ATTENTION FOLLOWING OFFICE SYMBOL

RDTDAC

JAN 1 1 1955

SUBJECT: (U) Transmittal of Military Characteristics

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado

1. Forwarded for your review and comment are proposed Military Characteristics for an Atomic Warhead for use in the High Velocity Guided Air-to-Air Atomic Rocket, as proposed by this Command. (b)(1)

2. Copies of the Inclosure have already been forwarded to Headquarters, USAF in order to expedite the initiation of Department of Defense approval action. Since you have already concurred with the concept of non-nuclear safing described in Paragraph 13 of the Inclosure (ADC Message Cite ADCPR 3014, dated 4 December 1954), which fact we have conveyed to Headquarters USAF, only the remaining portions of the characteristics will merit your close review. (b)(1)

3. We request that you forward your comments to this Headquarters as soon as possible, with an information copy to Headquarters USAF, Attention AFDRD-GC/3. Early DOD approval of the characteristics is required, if the Atomic Energy Commission is to meet their time scales for development of the warhead. (b)(1)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN R. V. DICKSON
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of Development
Deputy Commander/Technical Operations

1 Incl
MC's for Atomic Warhead for Air-to-Air Rocket (2 cys)

(b)(1) classified as in accordance with Paragraphs 23b and 56, AFR 205-1

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

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

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

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

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b. For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the [redacted] questioned film be re-printed and that emphasis be placed on [redacted] with an enemy warhead as the primary installation.

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
ENT AIR FORCE BASE
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

ADOPR

2 MAY 1955

SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) Weapon Kill

314 55a

TO: Director of Requirements
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

Comeback Copy for DCS/O

1. This command has always been confronted with the problem of how to increase our kill effectiveness. One very important facet of this problem has always arisen in our deliberations - namely, that of killing the nuclear weapon rather than the weapon carrier. There has been insufficient factual information to resolve this problem in the past. Lately, however, various developments have emphasized the necessity and revealed the possibility to kill the weapon rather than the weapon carrier; they follow:

a. The revelation of the extensive and lethal fall-out effect of the thermonuclear weapon.

b. The programmed development of nuclear armament in air defense weapons.

c. Information of the possibility of vaporization of the enemy weapon by use of nuclear warheads.

2. The extensive fall-out created by the detonation of a thermonuclear weapon on or near the surface suggests that the carrier kill is insufficient. The destruction of the enemy carrier actually delivers his weapon for him ahead of the desired target point, for there is no reason to believe that the weapon will not be fused for contact detonation. A premature detonation of a conventional high explosive weapon merely creates a localized condition, whereas the fall-out from a thermonuclear detonation will create a radioactive hazard over areas in excess of 8,000 square miles.

3. It is generally recognized that the destruction or detonation of a weapon at heights exceeding one fireball

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radius will not cause any significant fall-out. Consequently, destruction of the weapon at altitude affords the first opportunity to attack the problem of fall-out -- by eliminating the source. Programmed expansion of the air defense system to include LRI aircraft will permit the possibility of enemy aircraft destruction and weapon destruction beyond the boundaries of the United States. This is another step in solving the problem.

4. In view of the above, it is recommended that the following policies be approved:

a. The requirement for a weapon kill will be established as a goal for all future air defense weapon systems. All weapon systems or components, now under development, should be re-evaluated in the light of ability or promise to bring us closer to achieving this goal.

b. An intensive research and development program will be initiated to determine:

(1) What constitutes a weapon kill, and

(2) The optimum system to achieve such a kill.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Major General, USAF
DCS/Operations

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
ENT AIR FORCE BASE
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

FILE NUMBER 308.2
315
21 [illegible] 1955

SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) Utilization of Atomic Weapons on F-89D/H

TO: Director of Requirements
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

DOC 315 ADDRESS 55a

1. Reference is made to the following documents:

a. Military Characteristics - 374(ADI 51-1-M-1).

b. Technical Memorandum Report SWVS4-102, 22 November 1954, by Special Weapons Center.

2. The stated objective of Air Defense Command is to utilize atomic weapons to the maximum possible extent. In pursuance of this objective, we have recently studied the desirability of placing the DING DONG weapon on the F-89H aircraft. This study, plus the ARDC feasibility reports, indicates that this combination of aircraft and armament is a simple and worthwhile effort.

3. The development contract for the DING DONG weapon calls for complete development, through OST, by 1 July 1956. Headquarters USAF and ARDC have stated that the first operational weapons will be available to ADC on 1 January 1957. In order for this Command to possess a DING DONG capability by this date, a complete weapon system - compatible aircraft and FCS - must be available at that date. At the present time, it appears that while the F-89H aircraft will be readily available on 1 January 1957, the modification required on the F-102 may cause it to slip as much as a year beyond this target date. This is further discussed and delineated in Tab A.

4. It is therefore requested that a development program for the installation of the DING DONG weapon on the F-89H be immediately approved and initiated. This development program, including aircraft bailment and flight test, should be concurrent to and carry equal priority with the F-102 modification program.

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Hq ADC Subject: (UNCLASSIFIED) Utilization of Atomic Weapons on F-89H

5. This Command has received informal information that it is entirely feasible to modify the E-6 Fire Control System thereby providing the F-89D with a Ding Dong capability. If this information is correct, then the above requirement should be extended to include both the F-89D and F-89H aircraft.

1 Incl
Tab A (dup)

7/2/55

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TAB - A

1. It is the consensus of opinion within Headquarters USAF, WADC and this headquarters that the F-102 modification program will probably not provide an operational DING DONG aircraft prior to 1 January 1958. This date assumes that no great technical difficulties are encountered.

2. The nature and extent of the F-102 modification necessary to permit internal carriage of the DING DONG has not yet been determined. A first look at the task indicates:

a. Rework of the airframe structure will be required.

b. The modification will destroy the FALCON capability of the aircraft.

c. There is a large area of doubt in regard to the feasibility of firing a large rocket in such close proximity to the intake of the engine induction system.

3. In contrast to the above, the external installation of the DING DONG on the F-89H is a fairly simple job, requiring only the mounting of a pylon under each wing. The addition of these pylons would not eliminate the FALCON capability.

a. This type of mounting under the wing would be sufficiently removed from the intake of the engine induction system so as to eliminate any problems with this portion of the aircraft.

4. To complete the weapon system a compatible fire control system is needed by 1 January 1957. A study of this phase has produced the following factors:

a. The MA-3 FCS presently designed for the FALCON missile can be modified to fire the DING DONG. Because of the short development time, however, the first modified MA-3 systems will eliminate the FALCON capability in favor of a DING DONG solution.

b. The engineering required to provide the MA-3 with a DING DONG capability is equally applicable to the E-9 fire control system. This modified system, however, hereinafter referred to as an E-9X, could be fitted into the F-89X without additional rework of the airframe.

c. To convert an F-89X from a FALCON to a DING DONG carrier would then require:

(1) Installation of the weapon onto the modified pylon.

(2) Removal of the E-9 FCS and replacement with the E-9X.

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36-3

(3) This changeover could be accomplished at the squadron level provided the initial modification design included these parameters.

5. Since the time schedule for a modification is directly proportional to the simplicity of work required, we can see that our best hope for obtaining a DING DONG weapon system by 1 January 1957 lies in utilizing the F-89H. This does not imply a de-emphasis of the F-102 program but it is rather a parallel effort to insure an early capability which the F-102 does not promise at this time.

6. The sum of the foregoing factors provides the following conclusions:

a. The F-89H aircraft, with an E-9A FCS, could provide a DING DONG weapon system at an earlier date than the F-102.

b. The placement of DING DONG on the F-89H will not destroy that aircraft's FALCON capability. It is expected that the conversion from one weapon to the other will be feasible at the squadron level requiring only a few man-hours of labor.

c. This ease of conversion will allow a changeover from FALCON to DING DONG at the same rate that the new weapon is received, thereby maintaining a FALCON readiness right up to the day DING DONG is available.

d. A simple interchange between FALCON and DING DONG would permit readjustment of the ratio between the two weapons as dictated by operational and logistical requirements.

e. An initial DING DONG weapon system can be achieved without dependence upon a major aircraft modification program and its attendant indefinite time scales.

7. If the E-6 Fire Control System can be modified to fire the DING DONG at the expense of the small rocket mode, then the foregoing analysis applies equally well to the F-89D.

536-4

B/Ltr fm ADC, subject: (U) Utilization of Atomic Weapons on F-89D/H, dtd 21 February 1955

AFDRQ-AD 1st Ind.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, HQ USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 28 MAR 1955

TO: Commander, Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. At the time of receipt of the basic letter, this headquarters was waiting for the results of the DING DONG studies which were being conducted by the Air Research and Development Command. The object of the studies was to provide an acceptable DING DONG configuration in a weapon system by January 1957. The studies included the F-86D, F-89D/H and the F-102.

2. On 3 March 1955, ARDC presented the results of their study to the Air Staff with the following recommendations:

a. Modify the F-89D to carry two DING DONGS. ARDC estimates that 25 F-89Ds could be modified to meet the operational capability date of 1 January 1957. If during engineering study, it becomes feasible to add other armament to the new weapon system without compromise to the operational date, then such additional armament is desirable. The use of this aircraft for the first DING DONG capability results in a minimum risk program.

b. Eliminate further consideration of DING DONG on the F-89H. Engineering changes to this aircraft at this time would seriously jeopardize the first air defense guided aircraft rocket weapon system, which is already being conducted on a critical production phasing schedule.

c. Continue the F-102 in its present development and test program which will lead to an acceptable DING DONG configuration at the earliest possible date. An acceptable F-102 configuration appears to be two DING DONGS plus supplementary armament; i.e., 2" rockets or IR FALCONS, with interchangeability between DING DONGS and FALCONS at squadron level. At the present time, it is expected that the first DING DONG/F-102 configuration will be introduced in production F-102B aircraft.

d. Eliminate any further consideration to the F-86D principally because of major engineering problems and severe performance penalties.

3. After examining ARDC's recommendations and your study on the F-89D/H, this headquarters has concurred in the ARDC recommendations in paragraph 2 above. Since the F-89H is the first weapon system to utilize the FALCON missile in air defense, this headquarters does not wish to jeopardize the F-89H weapon system if there is another method of introducing the DING DONG into the inventory. In addition, ARDC has concurred in your comments concerning the F-89D in paragraph 5 of basic letter and stated that

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36-5 AFDRQ 712 /55

1st Ind to ADC, subj: (U) Utilization of Atomic Weapons on F-89D/H (Cont'd)

it was feasible to modify the E-6 fire control system either through circuity changes or through utilization of E-9 production components. The determination of which method will be the most advantageous has not as yet been confirmed; however, either method is acceptable and feasible.

4. In addition to the program as defined in paragraph 2, DING DONG feasibility studies are being conducted on the IF-101 to include various acceptable armament configurations. The results of these feasibility studies are to be made available in sufficient time to select a DING DONG configuration for the IF-101 mock-up.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl: n/c
(1 cy w/d)

Gilbert L. Meyer

Deputy Chief of Staff, Development

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FILE NUMBER 303.7

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MESSAGE TRANSMITTED
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20 JUN 1955

ADOPR 4444. For AFDRQ-AR/F. This COMD desires INSTL of two 600 GAL tip tanks on F-89J ACFT. It is realized this will PVNT simultaneous carriage of FFAR and Ding Dong but two Ding Dongs will give high probability of kill on two SNP passes. Additional fuel will enhance combat and loiter capability. Northrop states radius of action with these tanks is increased from 300 to 515 nautical miles and combat ceiling from 44,000 to 45,500 FT. RCR interchangeability of 600 GAL tip tanks and dual-rocket pods at lowest possible ECH in [redacted] MIN time.

Maj. John Green
OFT-E

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P.P.R Furnished 20 JUN 1955
(Date) (Initials)

Will be Confirmed in Std Publication Form Under par 3b, ADCOM

S-3

Prepared by Maj RT Merrill/rm

Telephone 2003

Date 11 Jun 55

Refers to Freefield No.

R. T. MERRILL, III, Major, USAF

(b)(1)

ADOPR This correspondence is classified in accordance with Par 23c, AFR 205-1, [illegible] reason (c) stated.

RECTOR C. DACUS
Captain, USAF
Asst Command Adj

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
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RECTOR C. DACUS
Captain, USAF
Asst Command Adj

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FILE NUMBER 308

318

[illegible] 1955

Lt General Thomas S. Power
Commander
Air Research and Development Command
Baltimore 1, Maryland

318 ADDR 55a

Dear Tom,

I consider the meeting which we held at your headquarters on the [illegible] of March as being very constructive. Our C&E people are working [illegible] our views and recommendations on an interim solution to the high [illegible]altitude coverage deficiency. We are studying closely the use of the type [illegible]dars now available in the USAF inventory, and I feel certain that we [illegible]n fulfill our part of the bargain within two or three weeks. We [illegible]rtainly share your feeling that the dollars involved should not in any [illegible]y deter us from getting on with the job, and that we should apply [illegible]roughout the electronics field the effort, drive and support which we [illegible]ve for many years given to the aircraft and related weapons field.

I was caught a little cold on the Ding Dong situation and should [illegible]like to outline here the stand of this headquarters to insure that our [illegible]discussions on the 2d lead to no misunderstanding:

a. We agree at this time that a limited number of F-102As [illegible]should be modified or built to an armament configuration providing for [illegible]two Ding Dongs or, if that is impossible, one Ding Dong and two GAR-B [illegible](Infrared) Falcons with appropriate fire control modifications.

b. We are opposed to committing any substantial portion of [illegible]the 102A inventory to the configuration outlined in "a", above, pending [illegible]thoroughgoing tests. Incidentally, our analysis of the kill potential of [illegible]the armament combination suggested is lower than that presented by [illegible]WADC on the 2d of March.

c. We do not desire to sacrifice the Falcon capability in the [illegible]F-[illegible], and recommend that no modification program be undertaken to [illegible]incorporate Ding Dong into this weapons system.

F-8624

Maj Gen F/H Smith, Jr/jk
2283
14 Mar 55

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Will be Confirmed in
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Lt General Thomas S. Power
Page 2

d. We are impressed with what appears to be the relative simplicity of fire control modifications to incorporate two Ding Dongs in the F-89D airplane. We recommend that this weapons system be pushed vigorously, accepting any necessary dilution of Hughes' effort on the F-102A fire control modification, as well as the inherent altitude deficiencies of the F-89D. The advantages inherent in avoiding engine difficulties due to outboard suspension of the armament, and the relative ease with which the fire control system can be modified, indicate to us at this point the desirability of planning for the modification of the entire ADC inventory of F-89D aircraft.

Sincerely,

FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

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VC Furnished 12/3/55 (Date) (Initials)

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Form 11 This correspondence is classified in accordance with

HEADQUARTERS
CENTRAL AIR DEFENSE FORCE
GRANDVIEW AIR FORCE BASE
GRANDVIEW, MISSOURI

308.4

PGB-2

27 MAY 1955

SUBJECT: Fighter-Interceptor Program

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

DOC 319 ADOHR 55A

1. The concept in this headquarters of optimum interceptor deployment in the Central Air Defense Force region of responsibility visualizes assignment of long range interceptors at bases nearest the outer periphery of contiguous radar coverage, particularly along the northern continental United States border.

2. This concept is felt to be a logical development of the air defense system by making it possible to engage the enemy as far away as possible from critical target areas, and to subject him to continuing attack as long as possible along the approach route of his selection.

3. It is the opinion of this headquarters that no part of the continental United States lends itself more suitably to the effective employment of long range interceptors than that part of the northern border which falls within this region's area of responsibility. This opinion is based on the following:

a. Available and programmed radar coverage.

b. The early warning which can be provided by the Dew and McGill lines.

c. The early warning to be provided by Ground Observers in Canada.

d. Lack of point defended areas in this part of the country.

e. Probable approach routes to critical target areas.

4. This headquarters regards Great Falls and Duluth Air Force Bases as logical key bases for long range interceptors. Glasgow,

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Hq CADF P&R-R Subject: Fighter-Interceptor Program

Minot, and Grand Forks Air Force Bases, when constructed, will prove vital additions to this part of the system.

5. It is believed logical to assume that the long range manned interceptor of the future will be a relatively large two-place aircraft. In working toward the long range interceptor deployment concept, it is felt that interim interceptor programming should be consistent with the ultimate objective. With this thought in mind, it is suggested that the interim interceptor most nearly resembling the long range interceptor in size, range, and crew requirements be assigned to each of the following northern bases: Duluth, Minneapolis, Grand Forks, Minot, Glasgow, and Great Falls.

6. The F-89D/H appears to be the closest approach to the long range interceptor in the present Air Force inventory. The F-101, when available, appears to be the best interim long range interceptor.

7. It is therefore recommended that until more suitable long range interceptors become available that the ADC Fighter-Interceptor Program be amended as follows:

a. Reorganize and equip with F-89D/H aircraft as soon as possible the 29th, 11th, and 337th Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons.

b. Equip the squadrons programmed for activation at Glasgow, Minot, and Grand Forks Air Force Bases with F-89D/Hs concurrently with beneficial occupancy.

c. When F-101 aircraft become available, convert the squadrons at Glasgow, Minot, and Grand Forks to F-101s, and also convert to F-101s, the 29th, 11th, and 337th Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons.

8. The proposed programming of F-101s for Minot, Glasgow, and Grand Forks is heartily concurred in by this headquarters. In the interest of aircraft standardization and in support of the long range interceptor deployment concept outlined above, it is requested that F-101s be programmed for Duluth, Minneapolis, and Great Falls. Such action would aid substantially to our air defense capability by extending weapon range and reducing logistical support and turn-around problems through standardization by aircraft type.

9. Among other things, the program changes suggested above might well eliminate the need for moving the 337th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Truax as presently programmed.

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Rq CADF PGR-R Subject: Fighter-Interceptor Program

10. Consideration of these proposals is requested. The concept is believed to be sound, and the interim program changes suggested are in the direction established by this concept.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CLIFFORD H. REES
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy for Operations

(b)(1)

15-1-3

HQ CADF P&R-R Subject: Fighter-Interceptor Program

ADOOT-B2 1st Ind

HQ AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Central Air Defense Force, Grandview Air Force Base, Grandview, Missouri

1. This headquarters concurs with your concept expressed in paragraph 1 through 5 of basic; however, F-89D/H squadrons have been withdrawn from consideration as interim long range interceptors because of their greater capability as "Ding Dong" carriers.

2. Recent studies indicate that the "Ding Dong" fighters should not be located where they can be by-passed by enemy aircraft. It was further considered advisable to build a concentrated "Ding Dong" defense around the northeast industrial complex because it is probable that large hostile formations would be employed there rather than against isolated targets. The threat of the "Ding Dong" destructiveness should cause the enemy to employ a dispersed attack. This would render our other fighter interceptors much more effective against lone raiders than against a mass raid.

3. Current plans call for Great Falls, Glasgow, Minot, Grand-forks, and Duluth to receive F-101B's in your command. Bases to receive F-101B's in other defense forces will be Burlington, Kinross, Presque Isle, Dover, and Otis in EADF; and Castle, Oxnard, McChord, Geiger, and Klamath Falls in WADF. The limited availability of the aircraft will not allow the complete conversion of all of these bases to F-101B's until the end of FY 60.

4. In view of the high precedence placed on utilization of F-89's as "Ding Dong" carriers, this headquarters cannot implement your recommendations of basic as pertains to locations for F-89D/H squadrons.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

MEMO FOR RECORD:

CHARLES R. BOND, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Acting DCS/Operations

DCS/O
C C A
C & E
M & O
O C D
Ops Analys
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CAA

NC
Maj Littlejohn/lc
2603,4
7 June 55
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ADC HQ

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This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par b/1, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

DOCUMENT NO. 320

See Document No. 325

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
ENT AIR FORCE BASE
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

FILE NUMBER 308.4
321

AIR DEFENSE COMMAND COUNCIL MEETING REPORT

1. Subject considered.

A. FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM

2. A meeting of the Air Defense Command Council was held at 1500, 14 June 1950, in the Commander's Conference Room.

3. The following members were present:

Major General F. L. Smith, Jr., Chairman
Brig Gen L.F. Teal, Chief Inspector General
Brig Gen R. L. Ridgway, DCS/Comptroller
Colonel John K. McClain, representing DCS/I
Colonel L. A. Schweinler, representing DCS/M
Colonel L. L. Green, representing DCS/O
Colonel R. M. Clark, representing DCS/P

The following interested persons were present:

Colonel E. B. Hughes, P&R
Colonel G. E. Hinkle, DCS/P
Colonel Clay Tice, Asst for Prog
Colonel W. D. Campbell, DCS/M
Lt Col J A Cartwright, P&R
Lt Col C J Bunker, P&R
Major R. E. McKinnie, Off Asst for Prog
Major R. T. Merrill, P&R
Major R. D. Littlejohn, O&T
Major L. V. Myers, O&T
Major P. E. Wise, P&T

4. Fighter-Interceptor Program. Colonel Green explained to the Council that the purpose of the meeting was to acquaint Council members with the latest developments in the Fighter-Interceptor Program and to request approval of the program as presented. At this point, he turned the presentation over to Major Littlejohn.

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a. Major Littlejohn stated that in the development of the program, the objectives used had not changed and that an endeavor had been made to meet as many of the objectives as possible in each programming action. In many cases, however, it was not possible to meet all objectives due to conflict with other objectives, e.g., types of aircraft have been mixed on several bases in order to get the most desirable locations for the Ding Dong. He went on to say that since the last presentation of the Fighter-Interceptor Program on 1 Oct 54, three major changes had been introduced. The first was the introduction of the F-89 Ding Dong capability beginning 3d Qtr, FY 57. It was decided that the Ding Dong should be employed at locations which would assure the greatest kill with these weapons. To do this, we proposed to use Ding Dong in areas where the enemy would most likely employ a mass type attack. Balance of ADC bases with Ding Dong was considered most desirable, but not possible because of the limited number of F-89J aircraft. A chart was shown which depicted Ding Dong defense around the Eastern, Western and Northern sides of the Northeast target complex and a point type of Ding Dong defense around the three major West Coast targets. The second major change to the program was the introduction of F-102B squadrons. It is planned to initially use it to provide high level defense of the same target areas as the F-89J. The third major change is the initial appearance of F-101B squadrons in the force structure set forth by Headquarters USAF. In determining the locations for these squadrons, we applied to available or programmed bases the approved concept of perimeter deployment for long-range interceptors. By use of a large map of the United States, Major Littlejohn gave a running account of new activations, conversions, deployments and equipping of squadrons from the current time period through FY 60. Following are the main points brought out during the presentation:

(1) At the end of FY 56, Air Defense Command will have:

46	F-86D Squadrons
8	F-94C Squadrons
5	F-89D Squadrons
9	F-89D/H Squadrons
68	Total ADC Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons

(2) During the 1st Qtr, FY 57, the 94th FIS at George was scheduled to convert from F-86Ds to F-102As, with the 11th FIS at Duluth converting to F-102As during the same time period. George AFB had been set up as the first base to receive F-102As because of its accessibility

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
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

b. At the conclusion of the presentation, Major Littlejohn requested approval of the ADC Fighter-Interceptor program as presented.

c. Council Action. The AD Command Council approved the Fighter-Interceptor program as presented.

d. There being no further business to come before the Council, the meeting adjourned at 1000.

FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USAF
Commander
(Chairman, AD Command Council)

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DOCUMENT NO. 322

See Document No. 325


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DING DONG (PUP)

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25 MAY 1955

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AMSO-2 3755.

Ding Dong

a nuclear air unguided atomic warhead carrying rkt is to be employed by this comd in the air def of the US. To successfully employ this wpn it is mandatory that it be loaded on base and carried on our acft while flying on opr flt. The storage and [illegible] wpn will require five storage magazines aprx one hundred and thirty four ft each plus one maint and assy bldg, one air police bldg, sety [illegible] and acc access roads. Since the 76th FIS, Dover AFB, Dover, Del has been [illegible] the sq to receive this wpn early in 1957 it is req permission be granted [illegible] to send a site survey team to Dover AFB sometime during the month of [illegible]56 to site the instl fac and prep a dtl program. Your comd will be advised [illegible] date team will arr at Dover AFB.

Memofor the record not required.

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PERMISSION NOT REQUIRED BEFORE DECLASSIFYING.

Not requested, not furnished

Furnished 25 MAY 1955 SECRET

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E. F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
Asst Command Adj

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This correspondence is classified [illegible] cordance with Par 23 b, AFR 205-1, 24 Jul 53, or for the reason (s) stated

SIGNATURE

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26 APR 1955

SUBJECT: (Shel) Revised Fighter Interceptor Squadron

COMEBACK COPY

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

Not requested, not furnished
Furnished 26 APR 1955 (Date) (Initials)

1. In view of the imminence of the "Ding Dong" and its attendant high kill effectiveness, a complete re-evaluation has been made of our currently programmed fighter interceptor deployment designed for the most effective defense using Falcons and 2.75 inch rockets only. For example, the F-89B/H Squadrons were initially programmed for perimeter defense because of their long range and weather flying characteristics. However, since the F-89D has been selected by your headquarters as the only "Ding Dong" carrier from the third quarter of FY 57 until about the first quarter FY 59 a review of our capability appears in order. From this study it was determined that the following flaws are created in our defense deployment by the introduction of this weapon:

a. Current programmed locations for F-89D's can be avoided by enemy bombers enroute to our vital targets. Bases which can be most easily by-passed are Geiger, Glasgow, Grand Forks, Duluth, and Kinross.

b. Fallout from thermonuclear weapons is a more vital problem to the industrial-population complexes than in the outlying areas of the northeast, midwest, and south. The probability of vaporizing the enemy weapon in the "Ding Dong" fireball, thus eliminating fall out, makes this weapon more desirable for the northeast complex than, for example, along the northern border where most of our F-89's are currently programmed.

c. It is expected that the threat of total destruction of his formations by "Ding Dongs" will force the enemy into a dispersed type attack. This tactic will greatly enhance our rocket firing fighters and Nike, which operate most effectively against individual aircraft.

d. Facilities for storage, testing, and maintenance of these weapons have not been approved or programmed because of the unexpectedly rapid progress of the "Ding Dong" program. It is understood this matter is under study by your headquarters at this time.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

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This correspondence is classified [illegible] in accordance with Par 23b, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (e) stated.

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HQ ADC Subject: (Unal) Revised Fighter Interceptor Squadron

2. Since this command obviously will not have enough "Ding Dong" carriers in the critical time period (third quarter FY 57 - first quarter FY 59) to defend all of the U. S. the matter of target selection became a subject of much discussion. The defense of SAC bases versus the industrial-population complexes became a very controversial matter. In the final analysis, however, the decision was based on what was possible rather than desirable.

3. Insufficient F-89D's are programmed to build a solid wall of "Ding Dong" capability around the U. S. Likewise, SAC bases are too numerous and scattered for us to provide adequate defense for their aircraft and personnel with "Ding Dong". Further, the anticipated size of the threat against these bases is too small to warrant a full "Ding Dong" FIS at each location. Based on the assumptions that the use of large formations would be most likely employed against the northeast heartland; that the "Ding Dong" could achieve the greatest kill in defending this area; and that survival of this area would be a most predominant factor in national survival and subsequent victory; our revision of F-89D deployment was aimed toward the defense of that complex.

4. Subsequently, a revised fighter interceptor program was developed, making only those changes required directly or indirectly by the new "Ding Dong" deployment. This new deployment ensures that the maximum number of "Ding Dongs" will get into the air battle, tends to minimize the amount of fall-out in the northeast target complex, and forces dispersal of the enemy attack.

5. Several major problems are anticipated in the use of nuclear warhead air defense weapons. They are as follows:

a. Approval and construction of necessary facilities before availability of the tactical weapon.

b. Community reactions to having these weapons stored and flown in the near proximity to their homes.

c. Logistical and maintenance problems associated with the operation of unlike fighters from the same base.

It is believed that these problems and other minor ones can be resolved in the time span available providing this program is approved by your headquarters and immediate special action is begun to assure construction of facilities at bases shown on the attached proposed programs.

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[redacted]

EQ A86 Subject: (Encl) Revised Fighter Interceptor Squadron

6. Approval of the fighter interceptor program as proposed is recommended. It is very urgent that expeditious action be taken to obtain funds and build the required facilities.

FOR THE CHAIRMAN

1 Encl
Proposed F/I
Program (Maps)

Memo For Record

Rewritten to change addresses, ~~subscripts~~.
Re-coordination with agencies having
previously coordination not required since
no significant changes have been made.

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

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

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[redacted]

WALTER W. ROBINSON
Colonel, USAF
Command Adjutant

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DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

(b)(1)

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FILE NO.

SUBJECT

Radioactive Fall-Out

Attached as [illegible]

TO

Commanding General Army
Antiaircraft Command
Commander Naval Forces
DCS/O
DAT

FROM

ADJMX

DATE

26 Jan 55

COMMENT NO. 1

(b)(1)

[redacted]

2 Route
Notes (If any)

R. K. Pierce

RUSSELL E. PIERCE, JR
Colonel, USAF
Staff Weather Officer
Hq 1AD

TO: CA - CA/C

FILE:

ACTION: Ltr TO

USAF

SIGNATURE: K B Waterman

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NOTES ON RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT

Up until the time of the testing of the thermo-nuclear devices in the Pacific during the spring of 1954, radioactive fall-out was not considered as a major effect of bombs. The CASTLE-Bravo shot, however, showed that huge areas may be made lethal.

Unfortunately, this has been the only test so far in which even a meager amount of data has been collected during explosions of multi-megaton weapons. The test did not yield enough information to answer all of the questions. The winds aloft were westerly up to about 40,000 feet, and easterly above that level. This made it impossible to determine whether the fall-out came mostly from the stem or from the mushroom. Fall-out occurred over a few islands upon which instruments had been placed, but most of it was lost, unmeasured, over the ocean.

The test was in the tropics. We can only guess that effects the mid-latitude tropopauses and frontal inversions would have upon the height and shape of the mushroom cloud. The tests over Nevada sand and Pacific coral, do not allow generalizations about fall-out of particles from a burst over an average United States city.

The almost instantaneous ignition of the combustible material in a large city would add energy to the explosion, approaching in magnitude that of the bomb. The effects of this additional energy upon fall-out have not been determined.

Numerous agencies, besides Air Weather Service are working on the problems of fall-out. These include the Atomic Energy Commission, Office of Naval Research, Naval Radiation Defense Laboratory, Army Signal Corps, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Air Research and Development Command, RAND Corporation, Technical Operations Incorporated, and the United States Weather Bureau.

Because of the paucity of observational and experimental data, these agencies arrive at many diverse answers to the problems. Some points of non-agreement are:

1. The height attained by a typical cloud.

2. The proportion of radioactive material in the stem and cloud. Estimates vary from 0% in stem and 100% in cloud to 5% in stem and 95% in cloud.

3. The amount of surface material that is vaporized.

4. The distribution of radioactivity within a particle (whether the radioactivity is uniformly distributed throughout the mass of the particle, uniformly over the surface of the particle, or neither).

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For single bomb bursts, such as in the testing program, evacuation from the forecast fall-out area is in the interest of safety, and

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it is safe for most practical purposes. This is an effective procedure for concrete surfaces such as ramps and runways.

b. Removal of dirt by vacuuming (on roofs of buildings) or by bull dozing or scraping an area.

c. Reduce ingestion of radioactivity by breathing filtered air (a gas mask or face filter is ineffective because the radioactive particles stay dangerously close to the body), drinking uncontaminated water and eating uncontaminated food. Although ingestion is a hazard, it is only a minor contribution to the total dose in most instances.

d. Bathe and change to uncontaminated clothing as often as possible.

These counter measures, together with the unexpectedly of fall-out [illegible] point to the radiation detector as an essential tool of survival. Each military activity should have total dose recorder and rate meters at several locations. In addition, each person should have a total cumulative dose device which he could check frequently.

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR FORCE SPECIAL WEAPONS CENTER
AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
Kirtland Air Force Base
New Mexico

308.2

OFFICE OF THE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE

SWE

SUBJECT: (UNCLD) Ding Dong Explosive Safety Criteria

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
ATTN: ADOPR
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. The Air Force Special Weapons Center is planning for the placement of an additional requirement on Douglas Aircraft Company under Contract AF 29 (601)-138, to conduct a test program for the determination of several factors which affect the safety criteria for storage and handling of the air-to-air rocket. Action is being initiated with Douglas to accomplish preliminary planning for such a test program. Douglas is being requested to submit a proposal for a test program which would provide qualitative answers to the following:

a. What is the probability of rocket propellant of the rocket motor being exploded by (1) high explosive detonation effects, (2) accident, such as dropping the motor, cook off by an aircraft fire, or a sneak circuit in the motor firing system? (Explosion is defined in this case as an instantaneous combustion of the total quantity of rocket propellant.)

b. If the rocket motor can be exploded, what is its HE equivalent?

c. If the rocket motor can be exploded by accident would it set off an HE detonation system in close proximity to the rocket motor?

2. The discussions with Douglas Aircraft Company will emphasize that the minimum test program, which will provide answers to the above questions as soon as possible, is required for effective Air Force planning.

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Hq AFSWC, KAFB, NM, SWE, Subj: (U) Ding Dong Explosive Safety Criteria

3. The Douglas proposal will cover, in detail, the following:

a. The comprehensiveness of the test program and number of rocket rounds required.

b. Types of tests to be accomplished.

c. Cost estimate of entire program.

d. Time schedules.

e. Location and facility requirements.

f. Feasibility of utilizing an XW-25 warhead in connection with these tests.

4. Since the Douglas people are aware of these problems some preliminary planning may have been accomplished for such a program and Douglas will be asked to submit a proposal by the first week in July 1955.

5. Although representatives of this office have discussed these problems with AFSWC and Douglas personnel, it is suggested that interested staff agencies of Headquarters Air Defense Command review this proposed test program to determine its adequacy. Your comments and any specific questions concerning explosive safety criteria for the air-to-air rocket associated with the use and employment of this rocket are requested. Such information should be received by this office not later than 5 July 1955 to insure inclusion in the finalized test program.

6. This document is classified CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the provisions in paragraph 24, AF Regulation 205-1.

CHARLES D. SLOCUMB, JR
Colonel, USAF
ADC Resident Representative

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[redacted]

...Arming and Safety (U) Ring Jump Explosive Safety Criteria.

...MCMAD-1B (undated) 1st Ind 7 JUL 1955

...AIR MATERIEL COMMAND, Wright Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio

...Commander, Air Force Special Weapons Center, Attn: Office of the Air Deputy Chief of Staff, Representative, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico

1. This headquarters agrees that the proposed tests will provide essential data pertaining to the arming and safety of the new system. In addition, it is believed that detonation and ignition tests should be conducted in aboard or actual aircraft environment to substantiate arming or establish safe quantity distance criteria applicable to aircraft parking areas.

2. Based on field experiences and previous tests of other munitions, developed by or for this command, answers to the following are desired from the proposed tests:

a. Will the motor detonate when dropped from varying heights?

b. Will the propellant crack when dropped from varying heights certain temperatures?

c. Can the motor be induced to detonate "high order"? If so, how much primer is required?

d. Will the H.E. portion of the warhead detonate if the motor detonates?

e. Will the motor detonate if the H.E. portion of the warhead detonates?

f. Can the motor be accidentally ignited? By malfunction of ignition system or under illumination of radio or radar energy now in use within the Air Force.

g. What would be the effect of an accidental motor ignition? In storage? In aircraft?

h. In event of an aircraft fire, will the motor detonate? Will the warhead detonate? Or both?

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3. Although Air Defense Command has a vital interest in the results of the proposed tests, Headquarters Air Materiel Command is charged with the responsibility to conduct special tests as required to verify and/or develop explosive safety and surveillance criteria. Your attention is

...Mr. R... K... LT COL L. R. WALKER
Forney/ADMAC-1B/fo
...529
6 July 55

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SEE BASIC LETTER

...requested, not furnished. 7 JUL 1955 (Date)

This correspondence is classified CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with ... For ..., AFR 205-1, 28 Jul 53, ...

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Hq AFSWC SWE Subj: (U) Ding Dong Explosive Safety Criteria

AFMAC-13 (undated) 1st Ind (Con'd)

invited to paragraph 3b(7), AFR 136-6, 3 January 1955. The symbol of the contact office at Headquarters Air Material Command is MCTRMH. Further, the Armed Services Explosives Safety Board also is concerned with all tests of this type, since the Board is the final authority on establishment of explosives safety criteria. Unless these agencies validate the data obtained from the tests this command, by regulation, will be unable to utilize the results in its planning.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
Asst Command Adj

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ADOPR

SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) Ding Dong Weapon Development

TO: Director of Requirements
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The Ding Dong weapon, with its promise of high kill, will be the primary Air Defense armament in the 1957-1961 period. The heavy reliance upon this weapon requires that every effort be made to insure its availability at the earliest possible date.

2. The Air Research and Development Command, and the Air Force Special Weapons Center, have indicated that the most critical factor affecting the Ding Dong weapon effectiveness is performance of the rocket motor. However, the requirements of the present development contract for this weapon are fulfilled with selection of one subcontractor to develop the rocket motor.

3. It is strongly believed within this headquarters that the probability of obtaining the best rocket motor within the required time would be greatly increased by competitive, concurrent development among the several potential rocket motor manufacturers.

4. Therefore, it is suggested that the development program for the Ding Dong weapon include independent and concurrent rocket motor development by a minimum of three qualified manufacturers.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Extray

KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Major General, USAF
DCS/Operations

No
Lt Col TM Scott/lv
2143
21 Jan 55
(Nuclear Armament Br, Wpns Div)

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AFDRQ-AD

SUBJECT: (U) Protective Devices for Aircraft and Air Crews Engaged in Atomic Warfare

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Consistent with the development of atomic weapons for offensive and defensive operations, consideration has been given to the protection required for our aircraft and air crews to operate effectively while engaged in atomic warfare. It has been established that the most critical problem to aircraft and air crew is the thermal and gamma radiation resulting from the bomb burst.

2. Listed below are devices which have been considered effective in reducing or monitoring this radiation hazard.

a. Dosimeters - A dosimeter is an instrument which measures the amount of gamma radiation received by the individual. It provides medical personnel with the information required to effectively monitor established radiation tolerances or treat excessive radiation cases. The Air Surgeon has recently confirmed the necessity of providing non-self reading dosimeters as against self-reading dosimeters for all air crews. The DT-60, a non-self reading dosimeter, is available at San Antonio Air Material Area for requisition under TA 1-1 and ECL 20-99-4. The CP-95, which reads the DT-60 dosimeter, will be available in the very near future. The dosimeter and the reader are not on an automatic issue basis. It appears that the application of the CP-95 reader for air defense will have to include some provision for a mobile unit due to the size and weight of the instrument. In addition, some change in the normal ratio of dosimeters to readers will be necessary to maintain effective turn around times for your command.

b. Thermal Curtains - The thermal curtain is similar to the sun shade in a B-25. It consists of white duck material and its reflective properties depend on the cleanliness of the cloth. The curtain is manually operated and can be stowed or accordioned behind the pilot. Its benefit is vested in its ability to degrade thermal radiation and in particular, the increased thermal reflectivity from cloud layers after detonation of a nuclear device. The curtain and attachments weigh approximately ten pounds. Provisions have been made to install this curtain on F-84, B-45, B-36 and B-47 aircraft.

c. Flash Blindness Goggles - The flash blindness goggle is designed to reduce the possibility of flash blindness. Interim prototype protective devices are scheduled for field test in USAFE in the spring of 1955. This is considered the short term approach to the problem and will consist of various visual restrictors. A long term approach is also under study to provide electronically polarized glasses.

d. Thermal Paint - Thermal paint has the property to reduce the effect of thermal radiation on aircraft structures. The B-66, B-57, F-84F, F-101A, B-47E and B-52 aircraft will be instrumented and exposed to high-yield detonations in Operation REDWING, presently scheduled to be conducted at the Pacific Proving Ground in the spring of 1956, to further study the thermal effects on aircraft. It is expected that recommendations for painting and such other modifications as may be required will be made by ARDC upon completion of data reduction from these tests. However, the results of CASTLE tests indicate the advantage of providing aircraft with this protection. The Navy plans tentatively to paint all aircraft uniformly with reflective (thermal) paint regardless of the aircraft's operational capabilities. The standard coating, which the Navy is contemplating, will be white on the underneath surfaces and gray on upper surfaces. Based on the results of Operation CASTLE, Strategic Air Command has scheduled the B-36, B-47 and B-52 to have thermal paint applied only to the surfaces most vulnerable to thermal radiation.

4. Request your command consider the above protective devices and submit your requirements to this headquarters in accordance with AFR 57-3.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Hq USAF AFDRQ-AD Subject: (U) Protective Devices for Aircraft and Air Crews Engaged in Atomic Warfare

ADOPR (8 Apr 55) 1st Ind 12 MAY 1955

HQ AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Director of Requirements, DCS/D, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. This Command is prepared to state that dosimeters will definitely be required for our aircrews. However, such factors as type of instrument and basis of issue are yet to be resolved.

2. The necessity or logic behind the requirement for thermal paint is not clearly understood by this headquarters. However, we plan to take immediate action to investigate this area in order that we may accurately assess the requirement for this protective device.

3. It is believed that the problem of flash blindness requires a great deal of study prior to a decision as to the advisability of mechanical goggles. The light from the detonation of our own and enemy weapons, occurring at intermittent intervals, unknown to the pilot, can definitely cause a temporary flash blindness. If the battle is conducted at night, the usefulness of a goggle is questioned. Since this problem is not unique to this Command, it is suggested that your headquarters convene a conference of the major commands, in the near future, to allow a rapid interchange of ideas and information on this subject.

4. Our early thoughts on this problem of flash blindness indicate that perhaps the first solution to the problem would be to completely enclose the cockpit with a light-proof type of woven material. If this proves practical, it might well be that this same material could protect against the thermal as well as the light radiation.

5. As the study on each one of these items is completed, the validated requirement will be submitted in accordance with AFR 57-3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. J. BIRNELE
LT COL., USAF
Asst Comd Adj

Info cy
Comdr AFSWC, ATTN:
ADC Resident Rep

DOWNGRADED: Not required
DAILY DIGEST ITEM: No.

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Furnished 12 May 55
(Date) (Ini

This correspondence is classified in accordance with Par 22c, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

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12 MAY 1955

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Electronic and Armament Configuration for Augmentation Aircraft

TO: Director of Requirements
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. References.

a. Letter AFDRQ-AD/F, Headquarters USAF, 19 January 1955, subject: (Unclassified) Electronic and Armament Configuration for Augmentation Aircraft.

b. First Indorsement AFDRQ-AD, Headquarters USAF, 23 September 1953, to Letter ADOIR, Headquarters Air Defense Command, 1 September 1953, subject: (Unclassified) Increasing the Kill Effectiveness of Augmentation Aircraft.

c. First Indorsement AFDRQ-AD/C, Headquarters USAF, 25 June 1954, to letter ADOIR, Headquarters Air Defense Command, 13 May 1954, subject: (Unclassified) Data Link Installation in Interceptors.

d. Letter ADOIR, Headquarters Air Defense Command, 16 March 1955, subject: (Unclassified) Air-to-Air Electronic Identification Capability, to Headquarters USAF.

2. This Headquarters strongly recommends that consideration be given to the capability of performing an air defense mission in the design and development of future fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft of other Commands. It is essential that these aircraft be capable of penetrating inclement weather and of intercepting enemy aircraft in clear air masses, day or night. It is incomprehensible that we could afford to face mass attacks by bombers carrying nuclear weapons, without employing every available aircraft with an air defense potential. The Air Defense Command 1954-1960 Requirements Plan outlines, in detail, the force structure and deployment of Air Defense Command interceptors. This is a minimum force structure designed to provide defense in depth around the vital areas of the United States. The effective use of additional forces to bolster this strength can greatly increase our capability to destroy attacking forces. In addition, due to overall force limitations for the United States Air Force, it appears

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This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with
Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

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doubtful that the needed structure will be realized. Therefore, utilization of fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft from other Commands to provide added defense becomes an increasing part of the basic defense requirement.

3. The augmentation force is composed of all weather interceptors available from Air Training Command and Navy, and fighters and fighter-bombers from other Commands. The latter aircraft, which make up the larger portion of the augmentation force, possess no capability at night or in inclement weather. The 1954 air defense exercise "Check Point" pointed out this deficiency. It is estimated that 3,000 augmentation aircraft, reported available for "Check Point," could not be utilized under these conditions.

4. It is the purpose of this letter to provide guidance for the projection of these requirements (reference paragraph 2) into the design of the future day-fighters, escort fighters and fighter-bombers of other Commands. It is felt their final configurations should reflect the Air Defense Command requirements with little sacrifice in performance characteristics for the primary mission. Should performance degradation result, the decision must be made by Headquarters USAF as to concessions necessary to attain an acceptable configuration.

5. The aircraft electronic and armament configuration required to permit the employment of fighter aircraft under direct control of the air defense system is as follows:

a. Fire Control System. The fire control system must be an integral component of the aircraft, capable of detecting targets at ranges that will enable the air crew to complete the attack within the performance capability of the aircraft. The final phase of the attack may be completed by optical sight, IR sight, or by flying the attack presentation on the radar scope.

b. Armament.

(1) The armament load should be sufficient for two firing attacks with a very high kill probability against bombers on each attack.

(2) It would be most desirable if the armament supplied for the primary mission of the aircraft could meet the above requirement. If not, this command feels that an alternate armament should be provided which meets the air defense requirement. Armaments to be considered are the large unguided rockets, air-to-air rockets with simplified infrared guidance system, or other similar weapons.

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Hq ADC Subj: (Unclassified) Electronic and Armament Configuration for Augmentation Aircraft

(3) If armament selected for the air defense mission is different from the armament required for the primary mission of the aircraft, the conversion of armament and fire control systems must be accomplished at squadron level in one hour. This conversion would include the necessary adjustments (preferably "in-cockpit" adjustments only) of the fire control systems in order to fire the air defense type armament, and also the installation of the armament (initial air defense armament loads from ready storage to installation on aircraft). Further, the aircraft must be capable of being re-armed within 15 minutes, after returning to the re-servicing area, for each subsequent air defense mission.

c. Communications.

(1) Standard UHF Command Radio.

(2) A ground-to-air data link compatible with that used in the air defense ground environment; the method of portraying necessary data-link information to the air crew will be dictated by the parent command. The data link is to receive directions from scramble to off-set point and from off-set point to target detection. After completion of the attack, the system must receive directions for re-attack or return to base.

(3) A medium frequency (300-1600 kilocycles) receiver is required for the purpose of receiving BR FICON transmissions.

d. Navigation. It is necessary that these aircraft be provided with radio navigation equipment that will enable them to execute remote control tactics, patrol operations and return to base with minimum or no direction from the air defense ground environment. The equipment installed should be compatible with the programmed short range navigation equipment for the time period, either the AN/ARN-14 or AN/ARN-21.

e. Approach and Landing. These aircraft should be capable of an ILAS or GCA approach.

f. Identification. Air-to-ground and air-to-air identification systems, compatible with the air defense systems, will be installed on these aircraft. Reference paragraph 1.d. above.

6. The equipment outlined above will provide an increase in the air defense capabilities of future augmentation aircraft. The full kill capability provided by the addition of radar detection and tracking, and by more potent armament loads, can only be realized with

This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

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Hq ADC Subj: (Unclassified) Electronic and Armament Configuration for Augmentation Aircraft

a continuous air defense mission training program for air crews and maintenance personnel. Strong consideration should be given the design of the equipment, other than that used for the primary mission, so that minimum additional training is required for these personnel. Insofar as possible, the maintenance of this equipment should not require the addition of personnel to the squadrons of the other commands. However, if it is necessary to augment the organizations with additional personnel, it should be realized that this cost is small in comparison to the value of adding these squadrons to the air defense strength.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Major General, USAF
DCS/Operations

Info cy
COMDR ARDC
COMDR TAC
COMDR SAC
COMDR ATC ------ Not requested, not furnished
Chief, NGB* Furnished 12 MAY 1955 (Date) (Initials)
AFCRF** Furnished (Date) (Initials)

COMEBACK COPY

CHARLES R. BOND, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Asst DCS/Operations

* National Guard Bureau, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.
** Office Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

MEMO FOR RECORD

~~ADC letter referenced in paragraph 1.b. established the requirement for~~ light weight search radar system to be installed on augmentation aircraft to increase their air defense capability at night in clear air masses.
To fulfill this requirement Hq USAF and ARDC established a 3-phase program:
Phase I. Light weight search radar pod installation on present fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft. ARDC and APGC are evaluating LWSR systems and pod installations on 2 F-84F and 2 F-86F aircraft for this phase. It is estimated that production items of this equipment will be available in 1958.
Phase II. The development of a LWSR system as integral component of the aircraft such as the MA-10 in the F-104.
Phase III. Systems for future fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft.

This letter restates this Command's position as to the recommended electronic and armament configuration, to increase the air defense capabilities of future fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft assigned as augmentation forces to ADC.

Preble
2052
Apr 55

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This correspondence is classifie[redacted] accordance with
Per 23c , AFR 205-1, 15 [redacted] reason (a) stated.

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DISPOSITION FORM

LE NO. | SUBJECT (Uncl) Electronic and Armament Configuration of Augmentation Aircraft

TO DCS/R | FROM P&R | DATE 5 May 55 | COMMENT NO. 1

Maj W E Preble/2852/jh 2

1. The actual intent of the subject letter is to provide Hq USAF, ARDC and the using commands with the necessary guidance to develop fighter and fighter-bomber weapon systems with equipment designed to perform the Air Defense mission integrated into the aircraft. Although the original letter from Director of Requirements, Hq USAF, requested that we name specific items of equipment, it was felt that this procedure was not feasible nor would it provide satisfactory solutions to the using commands. The intent is to state the capabilities required by the Air Defense system for effective system design, and yet allow margin for ARDC and the using commands to arrive at compatible configurations. Paragraph 4 of the ADC letter states this particular point and suggests that any areas of incompatibility be resolved between the using commands, ARDC and Hq USAF.

2. In reference to the specific items mentioned in Comment No. 1, paragraph 5b(3) actually requests that the selection of the armament to be fired be accomplished in the simplest manner, preferably by "in-cockpit" selection. Paragraph 5a previously stated that it was desired for the fire control system to be an integral part of the aircraft. In addition, it is felt that the requirement for data-link communication to be part of the weapon system is valid. The majority of the affected commands are planning for data-link transmissions, e.g., Tactical Air Command. As many of the messages necessary for Air Defense use are basic commands, such as, Command Heading, Airspeed, Altitude, Target Bearing and Distance, and would be applicable to other missions, it is reasonable to assume that the design of the specific systems could be accomplished so that they are compatible inter-Command-wise.

3. ~~This Command has already achieved a measure of success in the accomplishment~~ of the requirements stated in this letter. The development of the MA-1O fire control system for the TAC F-10N is partially the result of requirements stated by this command for a TAC fighter with this capability. It is important that ADC take a strong position on the capabilities which the aircraft from the other commands must demonstrate in order that a potent force will be realized from their contribution. This position has been fully coordinated with the staff agencies closely interested in this problem and it is felt that this guidance must be given to Hq USAF. It is recommended that any concessions in this requirement be made only as they become apparent.

CHESTER J. ANTCHER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Chief, Weapons Div
Ext 2851

for David Chafitz, Maj
ROBERT B. HUGHES
Colonel, USAF
Acting Director, Plans & Requirements
Ext 2216/7

1 Incl
n/c

M311-5X

(b)(1)

341

(b)(1)

COMDR
ADC

ROUTINE ROUTINE

X

X

GOPS USAF WASHDC

COMDR ARDC BALTO
COMDR TAC Langley AFB VA
COMDR SAC Offutt AFB NEBR
COMDR ATC Scott AFB ILL
Chief SSNGB HQ USAF WASHDC

(b)(1)

ADOPR 3274. For AFDRQ-AD. INFO for AFOCF. REF PHONECON 3 JUN 1955 BTWN CAPT C. V. Hunter HQ USAF and CAPT J. P. Acre HQ ADC SUBJ LTR HQ ADC 12 May 1955 SUBJ (Unclassified) ELCT and ARMT Configuration for AUGM ACFT. SUBJ LTR does not cancel ADC REQR for suitable and timely LT [redacted] weight search radar installation in present FTR and FTR BMR ACFT. Such installation would increase effectiveness of AUGM ACFT PERF air DEF MSN.

MSG FOR INFO:

1. This message re-affirms ADC's position that a Light Weight Search Radar (LWSR) installation in present fighter and fighter bomber aircraft is necessary to perform the air defense mission. Captain [redacted], Air Defense Div, Director of Requirements office, Headquarters USAF, called on Col [redacted], Chief of Weapons Division, WDD, to ascertain [redacted] position on this installation and changed.

(Continued on next)

Capt JP Acre/rm
2852
3 Jun 55

(b)(1)

1 1

8-13-11

J. P. ACRE, Captain, USAF

1118454

45-1 ADOPR

This correspondence is declassified _____ in accordance with Par 23c, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (a) stated.

R. B. Hughes Lt Col

0348

(b)(1)

342

COMDR ADC

ROUTINE

COMDR CADF GRANDVIEW AFB GRANDVIEW MO X

X

342, 55a

(b)(1)

ADOOT-B3 _____. MYLLASLTR 19 July 55, Subj: Perrin Air Def Msn. Msg received from Hq ATC indc impl date for Perrin alert msn of 1 Oct 55. This hq has concurred in that date. Desire early compl and forwarding of mutual agreement.

COMEBACK COPY

Not requested, not furnished

Furnished 28 JUL 1955 MEMO FOR RECORD: Not Req
(Date)

B-6-28 251352

1 1

27 Jul 55

Maj Officer/cm

ADOOT-B3 2175-55

(b)(1)

This correspondence is class ... with Par 24b, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (a) stated.

(b)(1)

43

339.7

COMAIR ADC

COMAIR CAAF RANDOLPH AFB TEXAS

DEFERRED X

DEFERRED X

COMAIR CADF GRANDVIEW AFB GRANDVIEW MO
COMAIR AFC SCOTT AFB ILL
COMAIR 33RD ADIV TINKER AFB OKLA

1e JUL 1955

(b)(1)

ADOOT-33 3528. UNCLASSIFIED, Subj: Perrin Air Def Msn, 30 Jun 55. Mutual Agreement for Perrin msn has been fwd to CADF for appr and signing. In regard to your proposed date of beginning msn, urge you reconsider. We believe that 25 Jun 56 is unrealistic in that negotiations for the Perrin msn were begun in June of 54. Info avail to this hq in that counter air def fgn a/c sought in 2nd qtr FY 56; 25 F-86D sqft were made avail your comd within proj TCSP-677 for the Perrin msn; and pers spaces were made avail to you for 1 Nov 55 manning. We urge temp of msn to begin msn on 1 Sep 55.

MEMO FOR RECORD: Not Required.

CYFS 18 JUL 1955 DAC 1 1

Maj Cupiano/cm

(b)(1)

ADOOT-33 2275-85

This correspondence is classi
Par 23h, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (a) stated.

F. HUG[illegible]
Jor, USAF
t Command Adj

37-1X

B/L fr ATRC, Subj: "(U) Mission for Perrin Air Force Base," dtd [illegible]

AFOOP-OP-D 2nd Ind 17 JAN 1955

DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE, HQ USAF, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

TO: Commander, Air Defense Command, Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. The plan for the Air Training Command to perform the air defense mission in the Perrin Air Force Base area has been reviewed. This plan expresses an additional requirement for personnel and equipment approaching that required for an additional air defense squadron. This is not in consonance with FY 57 objectives.

2. It had been anticipated that the air defense effort at Perrin Air Force Base would be primarily devoted to the identification function, and in the event of an emergency at least a portion of the Perrin AFB capability would be made available to augment the defense forces.

3. Based upon the assumption that any additional requirements over that to be obtained from ADC and ATRC sources would be minor, action has been taken to obtain approval of K.I. Sawyer as a two-squadron base. The FY 56 Public Works Program for Perrin AFB has also been revised to reflect only those requirements indicated as necessary by ATRC.

4. The USAF is presently over authorized personnel ceilings. Every effort must be made to meet requirements within established ceilings.

5. In view of the above, it is desired that a re-evaluation be made of the requirements outlined in basic letter, and an effort made to eliminate or reduce the requirement from outside sources. The contribution of already established base resources to the defense requirement must be considered along with the possibility of integrating the defense requirement into normal flying operations in lieu of establishing a separate detachment with the specific mission of performing the alert requirement.

6. It is desired that this re-evaluation be expedited and an answer forwarded as soon as possible.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

[illegible]
Brig. General, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

2 Incls
w/d 1 cy ea

669-27

(b)(1)

Hq ADDS ED Subject: (Unsk) Mission for Perrin AFB

ADCOS-ED (24 Nov 54) 1st Ind

18 FEB 1955

HQ AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Air Training Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

1. In view of preceding information, we doubt that we can obtain favorable action from Headquarters USAF on the requirements for the Perrin alert mission unless the manpower requirements are greatly reduced. Since we still have a requirement to man the squadron which was relocated as a result of your manning the alert commitment at Perrin, we are unable to make manpower resources available from this command.

2. We are reluctant to reduce the alert commitment below the ADC standard, but we believe further action to obtain the manpower spaces appraisal is basis will be fruitless. Therefore, we will reduce the alert commitment to two aircraft on five standby alert twenty-four hours daily. The augmentation force capability at Perrin as outlined in current ADC augmentation plans can provide the "back-up" force required. With this reduction, we believe the manpower requirements to support the two-ship commitment can be met within your command or reduced to limits acceptable to USAF. The F-86Ds to be transferred to your command from ADC "Pull-Out" assets under project 7C5F-279 will meet the aircraft requirement for the ADC alert mission at Perrin.

3. Although we realize the delay in returning this correspondence to you may make it difficult to meet the target date presently established, we urge that every effort be made to do so. If it is impossible to meet this date, request we be notified immediately so that adjustments in plans may be made.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
n/c

KENNETH P. DEMPSTER
Major General, USAF
DCS/Operations

cc: Comdr OAAF
Comdr 33rd AADiv

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: Proj 7C5F-279 releases 52 F-86Ds fr ADC "Pull-Out" assets to ATRC. These acft are older models - Category II & III which were to be phased out of ADC anyway. 16 of these acft are to meet ATRC attrition; 21 are in exchange/chase acft; & 15 are for the Perrin alert. Release of these acft permits us to gain newer models as well as permitting ATRC to meet "Pull-Out" input requirements. If ATRC does not meet input requirements, we must make up the deficiency.

Confirmed in Notification Form for Jt. ADCSA
no
MajGuynes/cm=adg
2175-85
15-16 Feb 55
F-01972

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classified in accordance with Par 23 b, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

69-1 255123

(b)(1)

339

HEADQUARTERS
CREW TRAINING AIR FORCE
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE
RANDOLPH FIELD, TEX.

339.4

30 JUN 1955

REPLY REFER TO: CTF

SUBJECT: Perrin AFB Defense Mission

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. The inclosed mutual agreement for providing air defense of the Fort Worth-Dallas-Oklahoma City area is forwarded for execution.

2. Headquarters USAF has approved request by Air Training Command for 8 officers, 56 airmen and 5 F-86D aircraft required to conduct the air defense mission from Perrin AFB.

3. F-86D training at Perrin AFB is being greatly increased and a large instructor upgrade training program will be in progress for the next six months. Experienced instructors cannot be withdrawn to support the defense mission until after 1 January 1956. As a result of the above, it is suggested that a realistic target date of 15 January 1956 be established for implementation of Perrin AFB defense mission.

4. The Commander, Perrin AFB, will be designated to represent the Commander, Air Training Command, in coordinating detail arrangements, plans, procedures and communications necessary to implement this mission.

5. Upon final approval by Commander, Air Training Command, request copy of executed agreement be furnished this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Frank Smith

0552802

FRANK SMITH
Capt. USAF
Asst. Adj.

1 Incl
Mutual Defense Agreement (quad)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

AEOOP-33

19 JUN 1955

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Perrin Air Defense Mission

TO: Commander
Central Air Defense Force
Grandview Air Force Base
Grandview, Missouri

1. The inclosed Mutual Agreement for Providing Air Defense of the Fort Worth-Dallas-Oklahoma City area has been reviewed by this headquarters. Request your review and signature of the agreement, if approved. All copies will be returned to this headquarters for forwarding to Air Training Command.

2. Crew Training Air Force has proposed that the air defense mission at Perrin Air Force Base be undertaken on 15 January 1956. We believe this date to be unacceptable and have urged Air Training Command to begin the mission at an earlier date. You will be advised of further developments.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

L 82859/0122

C. F. [redacted]
Major, [redacted]
Asst [redacted]

1 Incl (Incl not required for AG files)
Mutual Agreement
(4 copies)

Info Cy:
Comdr, 33rd ADiv

Memo for Record; not required

COMEBACK COPY

.....Not requested, not furnished
ITB Furnished..... 18 JUL 1955
(Date) (Initials)

(b)(1)

This correspondence is cl[redacted]e with
Par 2.8P AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 51, or for the reason (a) stated.

0354

FILE NUMBER 355.6

DOC 346 ADCHR 55a

(b)(1)

[redacted] [redacted]

X

X

[redacted]

(b)(1)

28 MAR 1956

[redacted] 1008, Rpt Dir of Ops. Ref ADC dtd msg [redacted], 24 Mar 56 (Info ag Harm your action) and ADC ltr, subj: (Unit) Mtn Sur Perrin AFB, 24 Mar 56 and Intls thereto. In order to reduce manning rqr for the air def sqn to be perf by ADC at Perrin AFB, this cmd has reduced the Perrin alert rqr to two a/c on five-min alert 24 hr a day. As a result, ADC has reduced pers and manpower rqr to that stated in subj msg. Req your appr of ADC suspense and pers rqr for the Perrin msg however, as pt out in ref ltr, such ADC rqr are not avail from ADC resources.

DECLASSIFICATION NOT REQUIRED

MESSAGE TRANSMITTED
WITH FOLLOWING DATE TIME GROUP
3-2-56 281853Z

[redacted] 1 1

Major Guymon/ms

ADOOT-83 2175-85

(b)(1)

[redacted]

ROBERT C. DACUS
Captain, USAF
Asst Command Adj

mcap

17-1X

347 55a

FILE NUMBER 347

ARDOR-SB

29 APR 1955

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Combat Readiness of Air Training Command Aircraft

TO: Commander
Air Training Command
Scott Air Force Base
Illinois

1. From a review of the ARS T-10 Reports, "Report of Aircraft and Aircrews for Air Defense", submitted by organizations of your command, we have noted the air defense combat of your forces on D-Day is considerably higher than your indicated availability rate. Realizing that your forces contribute a large percentage of the air defense force in the event of an emergency, we fear that our planning is unrealistic in that we are over committing your forces.

2. Statistics submitted in the T-10 reports by organizations of your command during the last five months indicate the following:

T-10 Report as of	Tactical A/C Assigned (excluding T-33's)	Combat Ready and Available	Percent Available
25 Dec 54	1018	656	64%
25 Jan 55	1021	633	62%
25 Feb 55	1018	636	62%
25 Mar 55	1016	650	64%
25 Apr 55	907	566	62%

3. It is possible that the structure of the T-10 report erroneously reflects your aircraft availability. It seems likely, however, that the percentages shown above are correct and are caused by conversion or other factors. If the latter case is true and the trend will continue for an extended period, we must revise our planning. Therefore, we request your comments or recommendations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. J. BIRMELE
LT COL., USAF
Asst Comd Adj

E-10025 /sd

MEMO FOR RECORD: NO REQUIRED

COMEBACK COPY

Not requested, not furnished

Furnished 29 APR 1955 (Date) (Initials)

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classified [redacted] in accordance with Par 2b, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

0356

(b)(1)

240

Basic Ltr fr CINCAD, subj: (Encl) D-Day Deployment of TAC Ftr Wings dtd 29 Jan 55

AFOCH-SP-B 1st Ind 11 MAR 1955

Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. The Tactical Air Command's 366th and 401st Fighter Bomber Wings referred to in the basic communication are NATO committed forces and are operating under current rotation plans. These wings are scheduled for deployment to Europe as soon as possible after D-Day. This information will be reflected in WDS 55-2.

2. It must be borne in mind that the USAF has a number of general war commitments in addition to air defense. Although the validity and timeliness of fulfillment of some of the commitments may be questionable for various reasons, such as base availability, these units must be indicated as deploying on D-Day because of international and joint agreements.

3. It is desired that all available forces in or immediately adjacent to the Continental United States, having an acceptable air defense capability, be at the disposal of CINCONAD on D-Day. It is not, however, considered desirable to change the primary mission of augmentation forces in order to secure availability for air defense on D-Day. The assignment of a priority D-Day task of air defense should suffice.

4. In order to establish a firm augmentation force and to assist in war time planning by all concerned, those forces suitable for air defense which also have an overseas deployment mission, should be committed to CINCONAD for a specific period of time prior to undertaking the primary war time mission, i.e., forces scheduled for overseas deployment during the periods (a) D-Day to D + 30 days committed to air defense for period agreed to by source Command and CINCONAD, (b) D + 30 to D + 60 days committed to air defense for period of 20 days, and (c) D + 60 to D + 90 days committed to air defense mission for 45 days unless sooner released by CINCONAD. Those forces not scheduled for overseas deployment should also have definite periods established (i.e. 60 days unless sooner released) when they would be available for air defense purposes. Your comments and recommendations on the above are desired.

5. In order to identify these forces, it is necessary to develop a definition or "yardstick", considering the threat, of what criteria is required before a force will be considered as having an acceptable

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Basic Ltr fr CSAF, subj: (Final) D-Day Deployment of TAC Ftr Wings dtd 19 Jun 55 (1st Rel Cent)

and useable air defense capability. In establishing and defining such criteria, equipment capability, state of proficiency and ability to efficiently utilize the forces must be considered. It is desired that you develop this criteria to identify forces and capability required for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

R. E. KOON
Brig. General, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

347

Subj: Rpt by Hq USAF, subj: (Final) D-Day Deployment of TAC Ftr Wings dtd 19 Jan 55

AFOCP-OP-D 1st Ind 11 MAR 1955

Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado

DOC 349 ADCHR 53a

1. The Tactical Air Command's 366th and 401st Fighter Bomber Wings referred to in the basic communication are NATO committed forces and are operating under current rotation plans. These wings are scheduled for deployment to Europe as soon as possible after D-Day. This information will be reflected in WDS 55-2.

2. It must be borne in mind that the USAF has a number of general war commitments in addition to air defense. Although the validity and timeliness of fulfillment of some of the commitments may be questionable for various reasons, such as base availability, these units must be indicated as deploying on D-Day because of international and joint agreements.

3. It is desired that all available forces in or immediately adjacent to the Continental United States, having an acceptable air defense capability, be at the disposal of CINCONAD on D-Day. It is not, however, considered desirable to change the primary mission of augmentation forces in order to assure availability for air defense on D-Day. The assignment of a priority D-Day task of air defense should suffice.

4. In order to establish a firm augmentation force and to assist in war time planning by all concerned, those forces suitable for air defense which also have an overseas deployment mission, should be committed to CINCONAD for a specific period of time prior to undertaking the primary war time mission, i.e., forces scheduled for overseas deployment during the periods (a) D-Day to D + 30 days committed to air defense for period agreed to by source Command and CINCONAD, (b) D + 30 to D + 60 days committed to air defense for period of 20 days, and (c) D + 60 to D + 90 days committed to air defense mission for 45 days unless sooner released by CINCONAD. These forces not scheduled for overseas deployment should also have definite periods established (i.e. 60 days unless sooner released) when they would be available for air defense purposes. Your comments and recommendations on the above are desired.

5. In order to identify these forces, it is necessary to develop a definition or "yardstick", considering the threat, of what criteria is required before a force will be considered as having an acceptable

4-3 3555

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Basic Ltr fr CONAD, subj: (Final) D-Day Deployment of 2AD Ftr Wings dtd 19 Jan 55 (1st 2nd Cont)

and useable air defense capability. In establishing and defining such criteria, equipment capability, state of proficiency and ability to efficiently utilize the force must be considered. It is desired that you develop this criteria to identify forces and capability required for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

R. E. KOON
Brig. General, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

3

(b)(1)

CONAD Subj: (Uncl) D-Day Deployment of TAC Fighter Wings

COOOT-B3 (19 Jan 55) 2nd Ind 1 APR 1955

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colo Springs, Colo.

TO: Director of Operations, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. We concur with the criteria established in paragraph 4, preceding indorsement. In applying this criteria to the organizations having an overseas deployment mission as outlined in the latest Strategic Capabilities Plan available to us (b)(1) Short Title: (Uncl) WPC 54-2-III), the following time periods for ADC operational use have been established:

Force	D-Day Plus
366th FBW, Alexandria AFB (TAC)	10 days
401st FBW, Alexandria AFB (TAC)	10 days
479th FBW, George AFB (TAC)	45 days
405th FBW, Langley AFB (TAC)	45 days
31st SFW, Turner AFB (SAC)	10 days
407th SFW, Great Falls AFB (SAC)	10 days
27th SFW, Bergstrom AFB (SAC)	45 days

2. As indicated in paragraph 2, preceding indorsement, many variables will effect the overseas deployment of TAC and SAC fighter forces; therefore it is desirable to extend the time periods indicated above for logistical planning purposes. It is possible that these forces will be available to us for longer periods than we have indicated and it is essential that sufficient logistical support is available to them. Therefore, the time periods, established in paragraph 4 preceding indorsement, have been expanded for logistical planning purposes as follows:

Forces having a Wartime Overseas Mission of	Logistically Plan for Air Defense
D-Day to D plus 30	D-Day plus 15 days
D plus 30 to D plus 60	D-Day plus 45 days
D plus 60 to D plus 90	D-Day plus 60 days
No indicated wartime mission	D-Day plus 90 days

Similar planning will be applied to all augmentation forces upon receipt of the forthcoming WPC 55-2.

3. As requested in paragraph 5, 1st Indorsement, the following criteria are used by this command to identify fighter forces of other commands as having an acceptable and usable air defense capability:

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classified [redacted] in accordance with Par ~~83b~~, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

BASIC AFR

0361

COMAD Subj: (Unsl) D-Day Deployment of TAC Fighter Wings

a. Jet aircraft equipped for all-weather operation, carrying rocket armament and equipped with a lead-collision type fire control system are considered the most effective and capable aircraft of other commands to augment air defense. A very limited number of these aircraft are possessed by other commands, therefore;

b. All other jet aircraft carrying rocket or conventional armament and possessing a sighting capability for air-to-air combat must be considered the "back-bone" of air defense augmentation aircraft.

4. Generally, fighter aircrews and ground crews of other commands are able to carry out air defense missions with little additional training. When units of other commands are given a D-Day air defense mission, their personnel and equipment status is reviewed by this headquarters. Assistance and periodic briefings are also given these units to insure training in line with air defense procedures. Type of equipment is more a limiting factor than personnel when determining the air defense capability of a fighter unit. The following equipment and pilot standards are necessary:

a. Equipment: (In line with progress and changing situations)

(1) Operating armament

(2) Operating gunsight or fire control system

(3) Sufficient instrumentation to permit weather penetration and night flying

(4) VHF or UHF air-to-ground communications facilities.

b. Pilot qualifications:

(1) Current in the primary mission aircraft

(2) Proficient in the operation of the armament and sighting system of the primary mission aircraft

(3) Familiar with Joint Army-Navy-Air Force codes, terminologies and GCI procedures.

5. Request your comments or approval as apply to our proposed criteria.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classified [redacted] in accordance with [illegible] for the reason (s) stated.

0362

DOCUMENT NO. 55

THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE FOUND IN VOLUME 9 OF THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS TO THIS HISTORY.

(b)(1)

FILE NUMBER 356

Air Defense Augmentation Plans (Operations Plans 4-55)

DCS/C

DCS/O 1 June 55
Maj Osgood/2375/ca

1. Reference preceding comment, we now have a regulation in coordination which will require ADC Air Divisions to perform periodic briefings of the augmentation forces. An additional regulation will require aforementioned dissemination of information to these forces. When this program is fully under way, we believe the augmentation forces will be much more familiar with ADC policies and procedures.

2. Reference your paragraph 4. We agree that it would be desirable to have alternate deployment plans so that we could shift our active forces to one area to meet an attack; however, this is an impossible [illegible] installation of engineered communication circuitry, which we believe is to be impracticable. Further, it is quite likely that we might shift all of our forces to one area to meet an attack that [illegible] another part of the country and we would not be in position to meet that second attack. As a result, we have attempted to deploy the augmentation forces to areas where an attack is most likely to occur. As the battle develops we may be required to shift forces to various areas to meet newly developed attacks. This provision is contained in our augmentation plans and is a contingency which is expected by both our own forces and the augmentation forces.

[redacted]
Major General, USAF
DCS/Operations

TO: CA - CA/O

FILE:

ACTION: Destroy

SIGNATURE:

(b)(1)

COPY 352.

COMMANDER, AIR DEFENSE COMMAND 29 Mar 55

COMMANDER, TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

(UNCLASSIFIED) ADOOT-B3 12483. Reference phone conversation between Lt Col Gaines, Fighter Division, your headquarters, and Captain Jorgensen, this headquarters. This message in two parts, Part I. To be ready for air defense augmentation fighter pilots should be proficient in primary mission aircraft as follows: A. Minimum of 30 hours total time. b. Night operation. c. Conduct 5 GCI missions each 90 days. d. Operation of armament and sighting system for air to air combat. Part II. Suggested training peculiar to air defense; a. 4 hours ground training per month in air defense procedures. Briefing guides and material to be supplied by air divisions (defense) concerned. b. 8 hours each 90 days to accomplish the 5 GCI missions mentioned in Part I. Missions to include scramble, climb, perform interception, recover to a home base under radar control and accomplish turn around.

Morning Report: TAC wants our suggestions as to number of additional hours they should include in their training directives so as to cover necessary training for air defense augmentation committments.

353

CONAD 55-4

CONAD REGULATION)
55-4)

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colo.
5 July 1955

OPERATIONS

Briefing of Augmentation Units

1. Purpose. This Regulation prescribes standardized and periodic briefings of forces earmarked to augment Continental Air Defense Command in the event of hostilities.

2. Responsibility. It will be the responsibility of joint air defense divisions to prepare and conduct briefings prescribed herein.

3. General. To insure that forces from other commands and services scheduled to augment Continental Air Defense Command in time of hostilities are familiar with procedures and policies of this command, it is necessary that periodic briefings of such forces be provided. These briefings must be well prepared, detailed in nature, and standardized to the maximum degree possible. The primary objective of these briefings will be to acquaint personnel of the augmentation forces with the air defense mission, procedures, and policies which would normally not be available to them. Further, these briefings will serve to familiarize augmentation force personnel with conditions to be expected when operating under the control of CONAD units. Briefings should be directed toward the personnel of the units that will actually participate in air defense operations with the joint air defense division concerned.

4. Definitions. The term "augmentation forces" referred to in this Regulation includes the following:

a. Forces made available for air defense by the USAF commands.

b. Forces made available for air defense by the Navy/Marines.

c. Air National Guard units which have mobilization assignments to this command.

d. Air Force Reserve fighter bomber squadrons which will be under the operational control of this command on D-Day.

5. Briefing Teams. Joint air defense division briefing teams will include:

a. Division level operations officer familiar with all operational problems and employment of augmentation forces within the concerned joint air defense division.

b. An operations officer or experienced flight commander from an all weather fighter interceptor squadron.

c. Division level supply or logistics officer who is regularly appointed by the joint air defense division to assist augmentation units.

d. Division staff fighter interceptor officer who is regularly appointed by the joint air defense division to assist augmentation units.

e. An experienced aircraft director to brief on Intercept Tactics and Techniques and other ACW matters.

f. Division level intelligence officer familiar with all intelligence communications facilities available to CONAD and well-versed in the procedures for collection and dissemination of combat intelligence.

g. Deployment base augmentation project officer or his alternate.

6. Briefing Material. The briefing will include the following:

a. Mission of Continental Air Defense Command.

b. General description of CONAD and Force Structure.

c. How augmentation forces fit within this structure and the mission they are expected to perform.

d. Operational procedures and policies with which the augmentation force must be familiar.

e. If appropriate, a description of the route, navigational aids, implications of SCATER and CONELRAD, emergency procedures and bases, en route refueling etc., for flight to deployment base.

f. Detailed operational and logistical (parking, hangars, alert areas, etc.) briefing concerning the deployment base.

g. Procedures for the collection and dissemination of combat intelligence, to include communications systems available, the "Hells Bells" procedure, and the current essential elements of information.

h. Review of Augmentation Information Folder and such other special subjects as may be appropriate and relevant. Review will include a current check of the index and contents of AIF.

i. Details concerning housing, messing, entertainment, and personal affairs facilities for augmentation personnel. Where possible, training aids should be prepared and used during the briefings to attain clarity and retainability of material given.

7. Frequency. The above briefing will be accomplished semi-annually.
(COODO)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

GEORGE F. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

W. J. BIRMELE
Lt Col, USAF
Asst Comd Adj

DISTRIBUTION:
A; Navy List I

(AF-ADC, Colorado Springs, Colo.)

CONADR 55-5

C[illegible] D REGULATION)
55-5)

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colo.
5 July 1955

OPERATIONS

Augmentation Information Folder (AIF)

1. Purpose. This Regulation prescribes a standardized folder of information for use by augmentation force units which will place all necessary regulations, SOPs, documents, and special instructions pertinent to the air defense mission at their disposal. Insofar as this Regulation is concerned, "NAVFORCONAD INSTRUCTIONS" for Naval augmentation forces will suffice as an AIF for Navy/Marine augmentation forces.

2. Responsibility. It shall be the responsibility of the joint air defense division to prepare, distribute, and monitor Augmentation Information Folders as prescribed herein.

3. Definitions. The term "augmentation forces" referred to in this Regulation includes the following:

a. Forces made available for air defense by the USAF commands.

b. Forces made available for air defense by the Navy/Marines.

c. Air National Guard units which have mobilization assignments to this command.

d. Air Force Reserve fighter bomber squadrons which will be under the operational control of this command on D-Day.

4. General. Training directives applicable to the primary mission of forces of other commands selected to augment CONAD in time of hostilities normally include much of the training required by their pilots to carry out an air defense mission. It is intended that the Augmentation Information Folder contain only that information which would not be found in applicable training directives currently used by the augmentation force, and which will be required to train and prepare those units for an air defense mission. Material to be placed in the Augmentation Folder should be closely reviewed and emphasis placed on applicability of material. Where possible, material should be extracted, digested, and edited to reduce voluminous effects and to assure comfortable and effective reading. For example, complete COIs and CEIs should not be placed in the information folder - only such portions that are required by the augmentation unit concerned. Similarly, only the applicable portions of joint agreements, operations plans, etc., should be placed in the information folder.

5. Structure of the AIF. The Augmentation Information Folder will be compiled in two parts: Part I to include all classified material, and Part II to include all unclassified material. Separating the folder into classified and unclassified sections will lend to ease of handling and place a larger portion of the folder material (unclassified) readily available to pilots and other concerned personnel. A separate index of contents will be prepared and maintained for each section of the information folder. A master copy of the AIF with applicable index will be maintained by the joint air defense division. A duplicate copy will be prepared and forwarded to each augmentation unit scheduled to function under the operational control of that joint air defense division.

6. Content of the AIF. The Augmentation Information Folder will include material of the following nature:

a. Applicable CONAD, ADC, JADF, ADF, JADDIV and ADIV regulations in the 50, 55 and 200 series; and other required directives, policies and procedures.

b. Appropriate portions of COIs, CEIs and JANAPs which may apply.

c. Detailed maps, sketches, or photographs to cover deployment routes, refueling bases, approach and departure procedures for alternate en route bases and operating areas at deployment bases when the unit is scheduled to deploy.

d. Necessary scramble and recovery procedures for deployment bases.

e. Necessary combat intelligence information and instructions covering interrogation of aircrews at U.S. and (when applicable) Canadian bases. Also, required reports during exercises and hostilities based on selected portions of CONADR 200-2 and ADCM 200-2, "ADC Intelligence Handbook."

f. Special section covering messing, billeting, health, welfare, entertainment and personal affairs activities at deployment bases when applicable. This section will also contain names and telephone numbers of augmentation project officers at both the deployment base and the en route refueling base (when applicable). (CCODO)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

W. J. BIRMELE
Lt Colonel, USAF
Asst Comd Adj

GEORGE F. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
A; Navy List I

(b)(1)

FILE NO. 330 356

2 Mar 1955

ADCMA

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) ADC Comments on USAF Study of Augmentation Forces

TO: Director of Management Analysis
Headquarters, USAF
Attention: Mr. Foy D. Watford
Washington 25, D. C.

1. As an overall comment on the attached study, it is recommended that an attempt be made to reduce specific detail and that where it is necessary to use numbers, they be rounded off in approximation. It is preferable that the study deal with the basic philosophy of augmentation, the areas in which additional support is desired, the sources from which this support may be obtained, and the problems encountered in obtaining this support. As presently written, the study is involved in specifics. The detailed situation or the numbers and types involved may change before the study is in print.

2. The following are specific comments on the attached study:

a. Reference page 2, Logistic Support.

(1) Recommend the paragraph underlined in red pencil be reworded to read substantially as follows:

"The equivalent of one C-119 wing of TAC is allocated to provide airlift for the deploying augmentation forces. The remainder is to be provided by ATRC and ADC. It is noted that the C-119's belonging to ADC are flown by crews having other primary jobs in the air defense structure - jobs which undoubtedly require their maximum attention on D-Day. It is questionable, therefore, whether ADC airlift crews would be readily available when they are needed most, i.e., on D-Day. In this regard it would appear that ADC has a valid manning requirement for the authorization of "primary duty" crews for its C-119 aircraft."

(2) Recommend that a statement reading substantially as follows be inserted at the end of the second paragraph:

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Subject: (Unclassified) ADC Comments on USAF Study of Augmentation Forces

> "In this light, there appears to be a definite requirement for the assignment of organic airlift (and crews) to bases deploying augmentation forces. This would not only reduce airlift time to approximately 12 hours (an acceptable figure assuming augmentation fighters require an average of 6 hours to deploy) but would give augmentation detachments a high degree of mobility should a need arise for subsequent re-deployment during the air battle. In addition, this would materially reduce the heavy airlift burden already placed on TAC by other War Plans."

b. Reference paragraph marked in red pencil on page 3. Recommend the figures pertaining to Air National Guard aircraft be reviewed. These appear to be out of date. Further recommend the sentence which reads: "It appears at this time that the ANG would possess very little air defense capability" be revised to say that the ANG air defense capability is limited due to the type and age of aircraft possessed.

c. Reference page 4. Recommend the paragraph pertaining to Naval aircraft be reworded somewhat as follows: "Of the aircraft the U. S. Navy has reported having an air defense capability, approximately 64% are jet fighters. Of this 64%, about 0% have an all-weather capability. It must be assumed that the remaining 36% possess a very limited air defense capability since these aircraft are World War II tyme fighters or attack bombers."

d. Reference page 4. Recommend that all reference pertaining to the kill effectiveness be deleted. Kill effectiveness is based upon many variables. These variables would not necessarily hold true during many given situations and thus could be misleading for the purpose of the study.

e. Reference page 11, portion labeled Strategic Air Command. Recommend paragraphs 1 and 2 of this section be rewritten somewhat as follows: "96 F-84F's will deploy from Bergstrom AFB, Texas and Turner AFB, Ga. on D-Day. These aircraft belong to four wings which possess a total of 303 F-84F aircraft. The remainder of 207 aircraft will be used in-place or as a backup reserve at their home bases. Aircraft from the other two SAC fighter wings, (Tinker AFB, Oklahoma and Great Falls AFB, Montana) will be used in-place and as a fighter reserve to be used as a tactical situation dictates." Further, recommend statements pertaining to the operational readiness of units be based upon current situation.

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Subject: (Unclassified) ADC Comments on USAF Study of Augmentation Forces

f. Reference section entitled Tactical Air Command, pages 11 and 12, be revised somewhat as follows: "Five Tactical Air Command fighter wings are included in ADC augmentation plans. Four of these wings consist of two fighter groups each. (Their equipment should be based upon current figures.) The availability of these wings is questionable at present, due to a D-Day NATO mission. Current plans state that these wings will deploy to NATO within 72 hours after D-Day. With this deployment, it is doubtful that these wings could contribute much to the air defense mission within the Continental United States. However, these wings are still included in ADC augmentation plans, but due to their questionable availability will be utilized in-place at their home bases."

g. Reference section entitled Air Training Command, pages 12 and 13. Recommend this section be reworded somewhat as follows: "____ jet fighter aircraft will be available from six ATRC flying training wings to augment the Air Defense Command on D-Day . Under current plans, ____(Number) of these aircraft will deploy from their home bases on D-Day.____(Number)of these aircraft have an all-weather capability. In addition to this force, there is an additional____ jet fighters available for backup reserve. None of these reserve aircraft will have an all-weather capability. There is also a large number of T-33 aircraft made available by ATRC. Some of these aircraft will be used by the Air Defense Command to transport additional pilots and crew chiefs to support initial operation at deployment bases until airlift arrives. Once deployed, these T-33's can be used as courier or trailer aircraft , or for CAP purposes." (The remainder of that section is OK.)

h. Reference page 14. Recommend unit designation, aircraft type and number, be revised to reflect the current situation. Further recommend the columns be revised as follows:

(1) Under "Aircraft", column titled "available" be changed to read "assigned," and column titled "committee" be changed to read "to be utilized."

(2) Under "Aircrews", column titled "available" be changed to read "assigned," and column titled "committee" be changed to read "to be utilized."

i. Reference page 16. Recommend paragraphs 1 and 2 reworded somewhat as follows: "All 70 ANG Fighter Squadrons have mobilization assignments to the Air Defense Command. As of _____(date) , these squadrons possessed____aircraft. These squadrons will remain in-place initially. Redeployment will be ordered only as the tactical situation requires.

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Subject: (Unclassified) ADC Comments on USAF Study of Augmentation Forces

j. Reference pages 17 and 18. Recommend type aircraft number be revised to reflect the current situation. Further recommend column titled: "available" under "Aircraft" be changed to read: "possessed"; and column titled "committed" be eliminated. The column titled "available" under "Aircrews" should read "assigned"; and the column titled "committed" be eliminated, since all the ANG fighter squadrons will be assigned to ADC.

k. Reference page 21. Recommend aircraft types and number be revised to reflect current situation. Further recommend the column titled "aircraft committed" be eliminated.

l. Reference page 24. Paragraph titled "Airlift of Augmentation Forces." Recommend first paragraph to reworded substantially as follows:

> "The Tactical Air Command will provide the equivalent of one medium troop carrier wing (C-119) for airlift of the augmentation forces on D-Day. The remainder of the airlift aircraft will be provided by ATRC and Air Defense Command. (Refer to previous comment on ADC's request for C-119 crews.)"

m. Recommend paragraph titled "AFR and ANG Airlift Support" be eliminated.

3. Other recommended changes have been made in red pencil throughout the study. Incorrect statements have been lined out in black pencil.

FOR THE COMMANDER

1 Incl
Hq USAF Study of Augmentation Forces (SECRET)

W. J. BIRMBLE
Lt Col, USAF
Asst Comd Adj

(b)(1)

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

9 Mar 55

Major General Kenneth P. Bergquist
DCS/Operations
Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command
ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear General Bergquist:

1. I have received your letter of 15 February 1955 which forwarded copies of correspondence on the status of organization of JWADF and copies of Colonel Charlie Bond's CONAD presentation. This information, in part, can be put to good use in further developing the JWADF organization. In the meantime, however, I believe we have made some progress toward getting JWADF established and organized. Actions which we have taken are as follows:

a. In accordance with the provisions of CONAD General Order Number 1, the Commander, JWADF and the Commanders of each Air Division (Defense) assumed their appropriate Joint Commands, effective 1 September 1954.

b. An initial study was accomplished in September 1954 of the organization concept of JWADF. This was based on guidance contained in CG [illegible]-688-54 and letter, Headquarters Air Defense Command, dated 27 August 1954, subject: Proposed Policies Governing Support To be Rendered by ADC to Headquarters CONAD and the Naval Elements Thereto. Our study, of course, was limited due to the broad nature of the referenced documents. It was confined principally to command and operational control relationships between the respective component parts of the Joint structure. It also undertook the study of the relationships between personnel assigned for joint duties and those assigned for pure uni-service duties in the component headquarters. Subsequent letters from your headquarters have borne out some of the conclusions reached at that time. However, there are still problems that need further resolution as indicated in your letter of 15 February 1955. I believe those problems to be primarily concerned with:

(1) The need for a clear and concise policy governing the allocation and assignment of augmentation units from all forces within the military Establishment.

(2) The need for a clear and concise policy governing the exercise of operational control by each commander in the chain of command who may have such forces allocated to his command.

TO: CA - CA/C
FILE:
ACTION:

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Hq JWADS to Maj Gen Kenneth P. Bergquist

I realize, however, that action along this line is contingent upon JCS approval of the plans prepared and submitted by your Headquarters.

Respectfully,

Clayton Claassen

CLAYTON B. CLAASSEN
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Operations

(b)(1)

1536-57

50-2632

Colonel Clayton B. Claussen
Deputy for Operations
Western Air Defense Force
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

Dear Clay:

In regard to your letter of 9 March 1955, the policy governing the allocation and assignment of augmentation units from all forces within the military establishment is:

a. USAF Forces.

(1) The major USAF commanders were directed in 1953 by General Twining to provide a continuing commitment of increasing proportions of any air defense assets available to the air defense system. Based upon this directive, General Chidlaw consummated agreements with these commanders for the use of their forces during an emergency. (We are renegotiating the agreements with the USAF commands. When these agreements have been consummated we will forward copies for your information.)

(2) The allocation of the USAF augmentation forces has been made from this headquarters upon the recommendations of the air defense forces. We are now projecting our USAF augmentation plans through FY 58 and the allocation will be based upon targets to be defended. You will have an opportunity to comment on this plan before it is submitted for JCS approval.

b. Navy/Marine Forces.

(1) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03080.2 states that "In an emergency, units of the Operating Forces which may be in part or temporarily based ashore, units of the Reserve Fleets, and Facilities (including aircraft) of the Naval Shore Establishment not regularly allocated to continental air defense, but having air defense capabilities, shall provide maximum practicable assistance, consistent with primary missions, to the Continental Air Defense Command, and to appropriate Air Force agencies." Based upon this directive, we are preparing a Navy/Marine augmentation plan for the use of such forces.

This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

45-43

(2) The allocation of Navy/Marine forces will be based upon the home location of such forces since, for the most part, they are well located for air defense purposes. These forces may be redeployed with the permission of the appropriate commander, so if you believe it necessary, you may plan for redeployment where desirable. Such planning will not be inconsistent with our augmentation plan since it will be very broad in scope and will give the Air Defense Forces detailed planning responsibilities.

c. Air Reserve Forces.

(1) The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve fighter units will be assigned to this command upon mobilization. These units located in your area will be further assigned to you.

The essential elements of operational control as defined in Joint Action Armed Forces (JAAF) are contained in our USAF augmentation plans. The air division commander to whom forces are allocated will exercise operational control over such forces. The exception is the Air Reserve Forces. As it now stands, the air division commander (or the wing or group as the case may be) will exercise command control over these forces since they will actually be assigned to him. Recently, however, ConAC has proposed that the AFRES wings be given mobilization assignments to them with operational control of the tactical squadrons vested in us. We concurred with this proposal and expect the forthcoming USAF WPC 55-2 to be changed accordingly.

I realize that I have covered your broad questions sketchily and I will be glad to discuss them in greater length with you when we meet again. In the meantime, if there are further questions, please do not hesitate to call upon me or my staff.

Sincerely,

KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Major General, USAF
DCS/Operations

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This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

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359

16 JUN 1955

COOOT-B3

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Air Defense of the San Diego Area

TO: Commander
Western Air Defense Force
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

1. Attached herewith is the reply by Admiral Martin to letter from the Vice Commander, this Command, which appointed Brigadier General James W. Andrew as the CONAD representative to implement the San Diego alert plan. Attention is invited to paragraph 4, attached letter, which authorizes direct liaison between COMAIRPAC staff and General Andrew and his staff.

2. Request copy of this letter be forwarded to the 27th Joint Air Division (Defense).

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. DACUS
Col, USAF
Asst Command Adj

COMEBACK COPY

Not Furnished, as Furnished
Furnished 16 JUN 1955 (Date) (Initials)

1 Incl
As stated

MEMO FOR RECORD:

COMNAVFORCONAD

NC

Prepared by Maj Guymon/cm
Telephone 2175-85
Date 13 May 55
Folder No. K-00566

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This correspondence is classified in accordance with
Par b(2)c, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

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FF4-1/A16-1/2
COMMANDER AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET Serial: 01193

U. S. Naval Air Station
San Diego 35, California

From: Commander Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commanding General, Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

SUBJ: Air Defense of San Diego, California Area

Ref: (a) CinC CONAD ltr serial 03753 of 29 March 1955

1. Receipt of reference (a) is hereby acknowledged.

2. The implementation of the agreement by which the Navy assumes the defense of the San Diego area is being pushed to a conclusion as rapidly as possible. The many factors connected with instituting this new activity in AirPac have required considerable shifting in AirPac forces. The redistribution will be completed sometime in June and thereafter it is expected that more rapid progress will be made in achieving the desired capabilities of AirPac assuming all of his responsibilities in this respect.

3. Considerable liaison has already taken place between the 27th Joint Air Defense Command and this command. This letter establishing direct liaison is deeply appreciated and will be utilized to expedite the working out of the duties of integrating this Naval Squadron with the Air Defense of this area.

4. Brigadier General James W. Andrew, Commander 27th Joint Air Defense Division will be most welcome at this headquarters at anytime he cares to visit us. Units of his Staff also are invited to establish direct liaison with members of ComAirPac's Staff.

5. ComAirPac appreciates the understanding and cooperation which the Continental Air Defense Command has extended to the Navy.

a/v/ M. M. MARTIN

Copy to:
COMNAVFORCONAD

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DOC 360 ADCHR 55a

Major General Walter R. Todd
Commander, Western Air Defense Force
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

Dear Wes:

General Chidlaw referred your letter concerning the equipment of the San Diego air defense squadron to me for reply. I believe it to be premature to approach the Navy on converting the squadron. Admiral Morehouse's people tell us that the Navy is considering a plan to replace the F3D's with F3H-1N's. This latter aircraft, as you know, will reach 40,000 feet in less than ten minutes with military power and afterburner. It has a combat ceiling of 44,000 feet. If this plan jells, the San Diego squadron will be about as well equipped to perform the mission as our integral ADC units.

I do not believe we should consider transferring USAF interceptors to the San Diego squadron if the plan mentioned above fails to materialize. It is true that over 300 F-86D's will be released into storage this summer; however, we will need approximately half of these for future activations. The remainder of the storage aircraft will be used for USAF-wide attrition replacements. Further, we should give the Air National Guard our releases at the earliest practicable date to enable them to perform the air defense mission if hostilities should occur.

I suggest that we let the matter drop until the San Diego squadron has been operating for at least one year. If by then they have not received better equipment, we can approach the Navy on the subject.

Sincerely,

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: not necessary

FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

Will be Confirmed in 3rd Publication Form Under par 3a, ADCM 53 no

Prepared by Maj Guynes/adg
Telephone 2175-85
Date 13-14 May 1955

ADC HQ Form 11 (Rev)

26 MAY 1955 (Date) (Initials)

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classifi[illegible] accordance with Par 23 b, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (e) stated.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DOC 361 ADCHR 55a
379

DISPOSITION FORM

E NO.	SUBJECT Report of Staff Visit to Navy Air Warfare Symposium 25-26 Jan, Hq USAF 27 Jan, Cherry Point 28 Jan, and Convair Plant, Ft. Worth 29 Jan	
DCS/O	FROM Col Renner	DATE 7 Feb 55 COMMENT NO. 1

1. A complete report of the Navy Symposium on Navy Warfare will be distributed when completed. Some of the highlights from the air defense viewpoint were:

a. The experimental use of TACAN for fighter defense tactics in which the pilot plotted the position of the incoming bogey and his own position on a knee plotting board and with very little practice was able to position himself for a turn into a pursuit curve attack. The same thing could be done with a small amount of practice for a collision course attack.

b. The Navy has also been experimenting with refueling the combat air patrol with an A2J type tanker from the carrier. This has several advantages, the primary one being that the same fighter aircraft can stay on station for four or five hours; however, it is seriously limited by the deck space taken up by the tanker aircraft on the carrier. In actions similar to Korea, it would be very simple to have the combat air patrol over the carrier refueled by a land based tanker.

c. The Navy has entered into an all out program to install TACAN on the carriers and get the complementary equipment installed in aircraft as soon as possible.

d. Most of the new navy fighter aircraft with an air defense capability are being designed to include both guns and rockets. Naturally, this is compromising the design and the question was asked during one of the seminars as to when the Navy was going to make up its mind as to which was more satisfactory, the gun installation or the rocket installation. Apparently both types of armament will be carried until the aerodynamic design requires a decision.

e. Fleet air defense is just as concerned with the performance of their interceptors at altitude as we are. One solution forwarded was snap up tactics and the spokesman on the Sparrow air-to-air guided missile quoted a figure of 20,000 feet snap up capability. It was recognized by the Navy that snap up tactics are undesirable and every effort is being made to obtain fighter performance at 60,000 feet.

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DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96 REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED.

16—64801-8 ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DISPOSITION FORM

E NO. | SUBJECT: Staff Visit (Contd)

DCS/O | FROM: Col Renner | DATE: 2 Feb 55 | COMMENT NO. 1

f. Training problems were discussed and a movie was shown of an aerial target to be towed by jet aircraft which is cheap to construct and capable of being towed at very high speeds and altitudes. It was formed like a dart and had some type of radar reflector incorporated so that it could be used with fire control systems as well as visually.

g. One of the major problems confronting the Navy is the training of attack pilots in both atomic and non-atomic weapons capabilities. Opinion was divided as to whether this dual type of training could be continued without reducing our capability in one field or the other. The concensus voiced at the conclusion of the symposium was that the Navy must concentrate on developing its atomic and thermonuclear capabilities; if necessary, with a reduced capability in conventional weapons.

2. A visit was made to the Bureau of Aeronautics to obtain the latest status on the VFR presentation gyro-horizon. This experimental instrument is now installed in a Navy TV-2 (T-33) and a F9F6 Panther. Both aircraft were down for maintenance which precluded an opportunity to fly the instrument. A film was obtained which will be shown at the CONAD Headquarters and arrangements were made for the Navy to bring its TV-2 with the instrument installed to Peterson Field early in March of this year. This instrument has the advantage of applying what knowledge the pilot has accumulated on visual flight to his instrument flying technique. The Navy has also given Douglas a contract to develop a "go-no go" cockpit. This configuration has been rather highly publicized in both "Aviation Week" and "Aviation Age." It is composed primarily of a throttle and a stick with instruments giving an indication that the power plant, radars, and operating gear are o.k. or not. The windshield is a very thin electronic tube upon which will be projected the instrument flying guide. Also on a desk in the pilot's lap will be a radar tube giving a picture of the terrain. The navigation equipment will appear on the scope in his lap and the fire control data can be projected onto the windshield in the same manner and combined with the instrument flying guide.

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DISPOSITION FORM

NO.	SUBJECT		
	Staff Visit (Contd)		
DCS/O	FROM Col Renner	DATE 2 Feb 55	COMMENT NO. 1

3. Headquarters USMC is interested in NAVFOR staff at Central Air Defense Force. Negotiations have been under way at the working level to send a Marine colonel or lieutenant colonel to Grandview. This is because the majority of the Naval augmentation fighters in Central are at the Marine base at Cherry Point. However, the proposed redesignation of boundaries between EADF and CADF would place Cherry Point and Miami in EADF which would preclude the need for any Marines on the staff at Central.

4. A staff visit to Cherry Point indicated that the Marines are participating in all exercises with Central and that no problems have arisen which cannot be solved locally. One proposal which the Marine staff is studying is broadcast control of offensive fighters against defensive fighters. The Operations Officer at Cherry Point will keep me informed as to any developments in this field.

5. A stop was made at Convair, Fort Worth, to discuss the characteristics of the XB-58 Hustler. This aircraft is much closer to reality than most people realize. The first experimental model is expected to fly in August of 1956. It is interesting to note that this airplane is a further development of the basic 102 design but on a much larger scale. Convair did not submit a proposal on the long range interceptor because they wanted to concentrate on making a success of the XB-58 and also because in looking over the design criteria they felt that the XB-58 will either meet or surpass all the military requirements set forth by Headquarters USAF for LRIX. The airplane is a design Mach 2 airplane with a maximum speed at 58,400 feet of 1150 knots. It is interesting to note that its top speed is limited by 250°F. rather than the utilization of all power available. Under maximum speed of 1150 knots with pod detached, its service ceiling is given as 64,250 feet. The aircraft's bombs and auxiliary fuel are carried in two types of disposable bomb pods, one of which is rocket powered and can be released 170 miles from the target, the other of which is a free fall bomb pod. Were it necessary to obtain a long range interceptor by the 1959-60 period, it appears that this aircraft could be in quantity production. It is realized, however, that if SAC establishes a requirement for a great number of these airplanes some other source than Convair would have to be found. The

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DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96 REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED.

DISPOSITION FORM

FILE NO.	SUBJECT Staff Visit (Contd)		
TO DCS/O	FROM Col Renner	DATE 2 Feb 55	COMMENT NO. 1

Convair Preliminary Design Section has been making some studies on the long range interceptor application of this airframe and when they are completed, ADC will be notified. As previously stated, the aircraft has no bombay and is basically a blown up 102 with four J79 engines. Were the disposable bomb pod utilized for fuel only, it would provide a very high speed long range interceptor of considerable endurance.

6. Texas Towers. The Navy has not been approached to furnish support for Texas Towers and has no plans to do so.

J. N. RENNER
Colonel, USAF
DCS/O Exec Off

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DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96 REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED.

16—64801-2 ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINT

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

3823

08 DEC 1955

General Benjamin W. Chidlaw
Commander in Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear General Chidlaw:

This is to report the action taken thus far in planning for the participation and training of Pacific Fleet Naval Augmentation Forces here on the West Coast.

The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, has designated Commander, Western Sea Frontier as his representative for Continental Air Defense matters wherein Pacific Fleet Forces in port or temporarily based ashore, participate as augmentation forces with the Continental Air Defense Command. Vice Admiral Low, Commander, Western Sea Frontier, called a conference to discuss with Joint Western Air Defense Force and Fleet Air and Surface Commanders the new command relationship and the problems of working out plans and procedures for Pacific Fleet augmentation and training in air defense.

The procedures for the joint training of ComAirPac's Fleet Air Forces based ashore do not appear to be a problem area. Details will be worked out between ComNavWestConAD and ComAirPac. We do have a problem area, however, in obtaining Naval Surface Forces participation. Before we can expect complete participation of available surface forces, the need exists to provide Commander, First Fleet, at this level, with the dates of Continental Air Defense exercises and the type of ships required for the exercise. This appears to be our only stumbling block to date on fleet participation.

Participation of Naval Air Reserve Forces requires additional liaison. With the establishment of Continental Air Defense, CNO shifted the responsibility for coordinating between ConAD and Naval Commanders from Western Sea Frontier to ComNavForConAD. This means that new procedures for the participation of Naval Air Reserve Squadrons as an augmentation force will have to be developed. ComNavForWestConAD is contacting the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training direct to work out these procedures.

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50-089

It was the opinion of my representatives at the conference that Western Sea Frontier and the Fleet Commanders are most anxious to develop an effective Naval Augmentation Force and to participate in Continental Air Defense training with their Naval Forces whenever possible without compromising their primary mission.

I shall keep you advised of further progress.

Sincerely,

Walter E. Todd

WALTER E. TODD
Major General, USAF
Commander

(b)(1)

256-2

(b)(1)

1

B/L fr JWADF WDOPR-1, Subj: (Unal) Naval Augmentation Forces for Continental Air Defense Exercises

CONADOOT-D (10 Feb 55) 1st Ind 15 MAR 1955

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Joint Western Air Defense Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. This Headquarters is cognisant of the problems of deployment and training in air defense for all augmentation forces.

2. The CNO directive that established NAVFORCONAD states that Fleet, Force, Sea Frontier and Naval Air Training Command commanders will coordinate with COMNAVFORCONAD as the regional naval component commanders in planning for joint training of naval augmentation forces. In this respect, it is planned that COMNAVFORCONAD will be informed of dates of all exercises so that other naval commands can be contacted to insure maximum Navy participation commensurate with the type of exercise to be conducted.

3. COMNAVFORCONAD advises that necessary coordination is being effected with Commander, Western Sea Frontier, as well as other naval forces, and that procedures for joint training of CONAC/Pacific Air Forces based ashore do not appear to be a problem area.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

RECTOR C. DACUS
Captain, USAF
Adj

- O&T-D

TO: CA - C1/C

FILE: DISPOSITION

SIGNATURE: Maj.

Maj JA Reding, CAT-D/pc
2724/3
9 Mar 55

2

(b)(1)

B/L

M756-3X

JOINT WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

10 FEB 1955

WDOPR-1

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Naval Augmentation Forces for Continental Air Defense Exercises

TO: Commander in Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. At a recent conference held by Western Sea Frontier, attended by representatives of Joint Western Air Defense Force, one of the primary subjects discussed was the difficulty that Naval Augmentation forces would have in participating in air defense exercises.

2. This difficulty arises from the fact that by higher Naval headquarters directives, (CinCPacFlt), such forces are to participate in exercises, however, only if such participation does not seriously interfere with Naval primary mission readiness training. Naval authorities here indicate that their training schedules are established considerably ahead of time and that to participate in an air defense exercise, it is necessary that they have reasonable advance notification.

3. This situation practically precludes Naval Augmentation participation in this year's annual Air Defense Command exercise which it is understood is to be a surprise exercise insofar as this command is concerned. To alleviate this situation, it is recommended that the Chief of Naval Operations be informed of the problem, together with the dates of the forthcoming annual exercise, and requested to make whatever arrangements would be necessary to gain Naval Augmentation participation. It would be preferable if this could be done without detracting from the surprise benefits of the exercise at the operational levels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/
A. D. FALLONS
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

(b)(1)

COPY

124-2 3051

0390

1st Ind O&T-D (10 Feb 55) 15 MAR 1955

SUBJECT: (Unal) Naval Augmentation Forces for Continental Air Defense Exercises

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Joint Western Air Defense Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. This Headquarters is cognizant of the problems of deployment and training in air defense for all augmentation forces.

2. The CNO directive that established NAVFORCONAD states that Fleet, Force, Sea Frontier and Naval Air Training Command commanders will coordinate with CONAVFORCONAD and the regional naval command commanders in planning for joint training of naval augmentation forces. In this respect, it is planned that CONAVFORCONAD will be informed of dates of all exercises so that other naval commands can be requested to insure maximum Navy participation commensurate with the type of exercise to be conducted.

3. CONAVFORCONAD advises that necessary coordination is being effected with Commander, Western Sea Frontier, as well as other naval forces, and that procedures for joint training of Continental Air Forces based subsonic do not appear to be a problem area.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

RECTOR C. DACUS
Captain, USAF
Asst Command Adj

COMEBACK COPY

_____Not requested, not furnished

O&T Furnished 3/15/55 (Date) (Initials)

NAVFOR

Maj JA Reding, O&T-D/pc
2724/5
9 Mar 55

C-0453L

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classif[illegible]rdance with B/L
Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

M[illegible] 0-1

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
ENT AIR FORCE BASE
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

FF5-20/01:ih
A16
3 March 1955

364

MEMORANDUM

From: Commander Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense Command
To: Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command

Subj: Naval Augmentation Forces for CONAD Exercises

Ref: (a) Disposition Form from DCS/O to COMNAVFORCONAD dated 25 February 1955, same subject, with inclosure
(b) Letter from Major General W. E. Todd to General B. W. Chidlaw dated 8 February 1955

Encl: (1) Reference (a)
(2) Reference (b)

1. Reference (a) requested comments from this Command to be included in the endorsement to Headquarters, USAF, of the letter attached to the Disposition Form. Reference (b) was on the same general subject as the inclosure.

2. It is recommended that the letter from Headquarters JWADF dated 10 February 1955 (inclosure 1 to reference (a)) not be indorsed to Headquarters USAF for the following reasons:

a. The Chief of Naval Operations is already aware of the problems involved in the participation of Naval Augmentation Forces in CONAD exercises.

b. The CNO directive that established NAVFORCONAD states that Fleet, Force, Sea Frontier and Naval Air Training Command commanders will coordinate with COMNAVFORCONAD and the regional naval component commanders in planning for joint training of naval augmentation forces. COMNAVFORCONAD, not CNO, should be informed of the dates of the annual exercises so that other naval commands can be contacted to insure maximum Navy participation.

(b)(1)

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1740-3

0392

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FF3-20/[illegible]
A16
3 March 1955

c. Reference (a) indicates that there is a problem in obtaining any naval augmentation participation in CONAD exercises. Reference (b) states that the problem exists only in relation to surface force participation. I think that the latter viewpoint is correct.

d. I do not believe that enclosure 1 to reference (a) would receive a very favorable reception in CNO. It is signed by the Command Adjutant and there is no indication that it was approved by CJWDF. It is somewhat critical of CINCPACFLT and CNO policy and in standard Navy practice, letters of this kind are signed by the boss man, not the Flag Secretary.

3. I am certain that appropriate action on problems of this nature can be made at this headquarters without reference to Headquarters, [illegible] or CNO.

G. K. Morrison
A. K. MORRISON

(b)(1)

FILE NUMBER 379.1

365

HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL AIR RESERVE TRAINING COMMAND
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
GLENVIEW, ILLINOIS

IN REPLY REFER TO:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

NR/3/1:RE
A16-1
Ser AI-11615A
7 DEC 1954

From: Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training
To: Commander Continental Air Defense Command

Subj: Availability of Naval Air Reserve Training Command Aircraft for Assisting in Air Defense of the United States

Encl: (1) NARESTRACOM Aircraft Assignments 1 April 1955

1. By 1 April 1955 the assignment of aircraft to this command having some air defense capability will be as contained in enclosure (1).

2. The mission of this command is to train naval reserve aviators so that they can be mobilized quickly in case of war. Current plans call for this command to phase out of existence as its squadrons are mobilized during the first six months of war and to be absorbed by the Naval Air Basic Training Command.

3. The 101 squadrons of this command flying fighter type aircraft, fly one weekend per month, alternating in the use of aircraft so that the fighter planes listed in enclosure (1) are usually being flown on each of the first four weekends in a normal month. Each year all squadrons perform a two week tour of active duty.

4. It is believed that this command has certain air defense capabilities which may be useful to the Continental Air Defense Command, and that these capabilities can be exploited from now until perhaps a week after a major war breaks out, without jeopardising the command's major mission.

5. It is considered that reserve fighter squadrons can participate, on weekends, in exercises with ground control stations of CONAD which will be beneficial to all concerned. In case of serious emergency some of these squadrons could probably be mobilized quickly and even redeployed temporarily during the early days of a sudden war.

6. This letter is to advise you of CNARESTRA's readiness and willingness to cooperate in every way practicable in the defense of the United States against air attack. My staff is prepared to consult and cooperate with yours on this matter at any time.

X-00257

D. V. GALLERY

Copy to: CNO, CNATRA,
COMEASTSEAFRON, COMWESTSEAFRON
(b)(1)

0394

(b)(1)

NAVAL AIR RESERVE TRAINING COMMAND AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENTS - 1 APRIL 1955

STATION	F9F	F2H	F4U	TV	AD	AU	*AF	*TBM	*PV	P2V	P4Y	TOTAL
AKRON			24				10	2				36
ANACOSTIA			32				10	2	6			50
ATLANTA			30									30
BIRMINGHAM			14					12			6	32
COLUMBUS	18		30	2							6	56
DALLAS	32			2		14			2	5		55
DENVER	16			2				12	6			36
GLENVIEW	32			2	14						6	54
GROSSE ILE			32		14				6			52
JACKSONVILLE			16				10	2		6		34
LAKEHURST							2	10				12
LINCOLN			14							5		19
LOS ALAMITOS	32		16	2	14		4	4		6		78
MEMPHIS	16			2			8	4			6	36
MIAMI	16			2							6	24
MINNEAPOLIS	18		14	2		14		12		6		66
NEW ORLEANS			16				12					28
NEW YORK	32		32	2			2	10			6	84
NIAGARA FALLS		16		2			2	10	6			36
NORFOLK			16				2	10		6		34
OAKLAND		16		20			12			6		54
OLATHE	16		16	2			2	10			6	52
SEATTLE			32				7	7			6	52
SPOKANE	16			2								18
SOUTH WEYMOUTH	34		16	2			2	10			6	70
ST.LOUIS	18			2	14					6		40
WILLOW GROVE			32	2			12		6			52
TOTAL	296	32	382	50	56	28	97	117	32	46	54	1190

*Anti-submarine aircraft having no offensive capability but available for search and airborne early warning.

(b)(1)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AIR RESERVE TRAINING COMMAND
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
GLENVIEW, ILLINOIS

(b)(1)

From: Commander, Marine Air Reserve Training
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

Subj: Continental Air Defense; participation in by this Command

Ref: (a) Your ltr ser 010-55 of 28 Jan 1955
(b) My ltr ser 956 of 7 Feb 1955

Encl: (1) List of MARTDs and Air Divisions (Defense)

1. Reference (a) recommended that addressees thereto consider the desirability of designating an air defense coordinator at their subordinate commands, and that COMNAVFORCONAD be notified of any such designations. Reference (b) stated that Commanding Officers, Marine Air Reserve Training Detachments, by virtue of their assignments as such, shall coordinate any air defense matters within their commands.

2. It is requested that Commanding Officers, Marine Air Reserve Training Detachments of this Command be authorized to communicate directly with appropriate Division (Defense) Air Commanders (see Enclosure (1)) for coordination of Air Defense matters, to include arrangements for training exercises with Air Defense Direction Centers where feasible. If the above request is approved, it is further requested that Air Division Commanders be so informed in order to assist subordinate Commanders of this Command in effecting the desired liaison.

3. Upon receipt of approval of the above stated request, it is intended that the Commanding Officer of each Marine Air Reserve Training Detachment will be instructed to effect liaison with the respective Air Division (Defense) Commander concerned. In addition, it is [illegible] and that copies of all correspondence covering [illegible] including copies of enclosure (1), will be forwarded to the [illegible] Air Division (Defense) Command.

K. E. [illegible]
Acting

[redacted]

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(b)(1)

LIST OF MARINE AIR RESERVE
DETACHMENTS AND AIR DIVISIONS (DEFENSE)

MARINE AIR RESERVE TRAINING DETACHMENT, MARINE AIR RESERVE TRAINING COMMAND	AIR DIVISIONS (DEFENSE)
NAS South Weymouth NAS Niagara Falls	Commander, 32nd Air Division (Defense) Eastern Air Defense Region Syracuse, New York
NAS New York NAS Willow Grove NARTU NAS Anacostia NARTU NAS Norfolk	Commander, 26th Air Division (Defense) Eastern Air Defense Region Roslyn, New York
NAS Glenview NAS Grosse Ile NAS Columbus NAS Akron	Commander, 30th Air Division (Defense) Eastern Air Defense Region Willow Run Airport Belleville, Michigan
NAS Denver	Commander, 29th Air Division (Defense) Central Air Defense Region Great Falls Air Force Base Great Falls, Montana
NAS Lincoln NAS Minneapolis	Commander, 31st Air Division (Defense) Central Air Defense Region Fort Snelling, Minnesota
NAS Olathe NAS St Louis NAS Dallas	Commander, 33rd Air Division (Defense) Central Air Defense Region Tinker Air Force Base Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
NAS Birmingham NAS Atlanta NARTU NAS Memphis NARTU NAS Jacksonville NARTU NCAS Miami NAS New Orleans	Commander, 35th Air Division (Defense Central Air Defense Region Dobbins Air Force Base Marietta, Georgia
NAS Seattle NAS Spokane	Commander, TU 31.3.3 Naval Air Unit Northern Sector, WSF Western Air Defense Region
NAS Oakland	Commander, TU 31.2.3 Naval Air Unit Central Sector, WSF Western Air Defense Region
NAS Los Alamitos	Commander, TU 31.1.1 Naval Air Unit Southern Sector, WSF Western Air Defense Region

ENCLOSURE (1)

(b)(1)

M9-5

(b)(1)

OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT: Continental Air Defense; participation in by Marine Air Reserve Training Forces

TO: Commander
Marine Air Reserve Training
U. S. Naval Air Station
Glenview, Illinois

1. COMNAVFORCONAD letter serial 0531 of 15 June 1955 recommended that addressees designate an air defense coordinator in each of their subordinate commands to facilitate liaison on air defense matters. COMART letter serial 956 of 7 February 1955 designated Commanding Officers of all Marine Air Reserve Training Detachments as Air Defense Coordinators for those units. COMART letter serial 0531 of 15 June 1955 requested that commanding officers of Marine Air Reserve Training Detachments be authorized to communicate directly with appropriate Air Defense Division Commanders for coordination of Air Defense matters concerning their units and the respective Air Defense Divisions.

2. The request made in paragraph 2 of the basic correspondence is approved for direct communication between the Commanding Officers of Marine Air Reserve Training Detachments and Commanders Joint Air Defense Divisions on all matters pertaining to the employment of Marine Air Reserve Training Units in Continental Air Defense.

3. By copy of this letter Commanders Joint Air Defense Divisions are notified of the impending liaison visits of Commanding Officers of Marine Air Reserve Training Units and encouraged to plan maximum utilization of those forces in air defense training.

For the Comdr.

Copy to:

JEADF	29th JADD
JWADF	31st JADD
JCADF	33rd JADD
9th JADD	34th JADD
25th JADD	26th JADD
28th JADD	30th JADD
27th JADD	32nd JADD
	35th JADD

(b)(1)

1 1Mar-6X

Encl (2)

ADCOT-B3

28 JUL 1955

SUBJECT: Continental Air Defense: Participation in by Marine Air Reserve Training Forces

TO: Commander
Marine Air Reserve Training
U. S. Naval Air Station
Glenview, Illinois

FILED ops 8-2-1

1. COMNAVFORCONAD letter serial 0531 of 15 June 1955 recommended that addressees designate an air defense coordinator in each of their subordinate commands to facilitate liaison on air defense matters. COMART letter serial 956 of 7 February 1955 designated Commanding Officers of all Marine Air Reserve Training Detachments as Air Defense Coordinators for those units. COMART letter serial 0531 of 15 June 1955 requested that commanding officers of Marine Air Reserve Training Detachments be authorized to communicate directly with appropriate Air Defense Division Commanders for coordination of Air Defense matters concerning their units and the respective Air Defense Divisions.

2. The request made in paragraph 2 of the basic correspondence is approved for direct communication between the Commanding Officers of Marine Air Reserve Training Detachments and Commanders Joint Air Defense Divisions on all matters pertaining to the employment of Marine Air Reserve Training Units in Continental Air Defense. It is desired, however, that so much of enclosure 1, basic, as pertains to the Western Air Defense Force Region be changed as follows:

a. Commander, MARTU, NAS Seattle to coordinate with the Commander, 25 Air Defense Division.

b. Commander, MARTU, NAS Spokane to coordinate with the Commander, 9th Air Defense Division:

c. Commander, MARTU, NAS Oakland to coordinate with the Commander, 28th Air Defense Division.

d. Commander, MARTU, NAS Los Alamitos to coordinate with the Commander, 27th Air Defense Division.

3. By copy of this letter Commanders Joint Air Defense Divisions are notified of the impending liaison visits of Commanding Officers of

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par 2 b, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

Major USAF

14Jul55

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15208

ADOOT-B3, Subject: Continental Air Defense: Participation in by Marine Air Reserve Training Forces

Marine Air Reserve Training Units and encouraged to plan maximum utilization of those forces in air defense training.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. E. PALMER
Major USAF
Asst Comd Adj

Copy to
JFADF
JWADF
JCADF
9th JADD
25th JADD
28th JADD
27th JADD
29th JADD
31st JADD
33rd JADD
34th JADD
26th JADD
30th JADD
32nd JADD
35th JADD

G-067-G-079
B-11088/0385
A-45053/0395
V-67928/0028

COMEBACK COPY

Not requested, not furnished
ONT Furnished 28 JUL 1955 (Date) (Initials)

(b)(1)

9-2

ENT AIR FORCE BASE
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

FF5-10/N3:de
A6-5
Ser 0983 -55

JUN 29 1955

(b)(1)

From: Commander Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense Command
To: Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
(Attn: DCS/O)

Subj: Commander Marine Air Reserve Training letter; Forwarding of

Ref: (a) COMART ltr ser 0531 of 15 JUN 55

Encl: (1) Copy of ref (a)
(2) Proposed answer to request stated in ref (a)

1. Reference (a) requests direct liaison between Commanding Officers of Marine Air Reserve Training Detachments and Commanders of appropriate Air Defense Divisions for coordination of Air Defense matters.

2. Reference (a) is forwarded as matter under the jurisdiction of Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command.

3. Enclosure (2), a proposed answer to reference (a) is also forwarded herewith.

D. J. Sullivan
D. J. SULLIVAN
Acting

(b)(1)

9-3
CCS 205

G.M. #4

(b)(1)

HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL AIR RESERVE TRAINING COMMAND
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
GLENVIEW, ILLINOIS

In reply refer to
NC/3/N-3.2:RE
A16
Ser PL-0026

27 Jan 1955

From: Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training
To: Commander Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense Command

Subj: Deployment of USAF aircraft to NARESTRACOM stations, comment concerning

Ref: (a) (b)(1) COMNAVFORCONAD Secret ltr FF5-20/N6:ih A4-3/A16 ser 0010-54 of 28 DEC 1954 w/encl

1. Reference (a) requested the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training to comment on the proposal to deploy United States Air Force aircraft to certain NARESTRACOM stations when sufficient strategic warning of an impending air attack on the United States is received.

2. The Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training considers such deployment feasible and will assist it in every way possible.

3. There are no facilities for pre-stocking fuel within the NARESTRACOM. The transition to jet aircraft has strained existing capacity and will require additional construction to support routine jet operation. However when an attack against the United States impends, total supplies includir those obtainable through Navy contract sources would be available.

4. Magazine stowage capacity is limited, particularly for H.E. All operational jet aircraft presently assigned this Command are armed with 20 mm and the minimum required amount of service ammunition maintained on board is restricted to one full load for 80% of total VF. However, th storage of 50 caliber as small arms has been authorized by the Bureau of Ordnance providing much greater capacity for ammunition of this type.

5. The Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training desires to emphasize his readiness to cooperate in every practical way in support of the air defense of the United States. Information concerning logistic and operational capabilities of this Command in designated areas will be forwarded if planning factors are established.

/s/ D. V. GALLERY
D. V. GALLERY
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

Copy to:
CNATRA
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
(b)(1)

Enclosure (1)

0402

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
ENT AIR FORCE BASE
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

FF5-20/N6:es
A4-3/A16
Ser 005-55

FEB 8 1955

From: Commander Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense Command
To: Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command

Subj: (UNCL) Air Defense Command Augmentation Plans

Ref: (a) COMNAVFORCONAD SECRET ltr Ser 0010-54 of 28 December 1954
(b) CINCONAD SECRET Ltr CONAD 007-33 of 14 December 1954

Encl: (1) CNARESTRA SECRET ltr Ser PL-4026 of 27 January 1955

1. Reference (a) forwarded copies of reference (b) to major fleet and training command commanders for consideration and comment.

2. Enclosure (1), the comment from the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training, is forwarded herewith.

A. K. MERCHANT

TO: CA - CS/C
FILE:
ACTION:

X-03165

(b)(1)

21

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
MITCHEL AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK

369

Major General Frederic H. Smith, Jr.
Vice Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear Fred:

25 FEB 1955

It has taken a little while since receipt of your letter of 1 February to get together on a staff position with respect to the training and D-Day employment of the Reserve fighter-bomber units. This was particularly the case, inasmuch as Air Defense Command can effectively employ only the tactical squadrons of the fighter-bomber wings. Tactical Air Command had previously stated, as I told you at Ramey, that for mobilization purposes, it could not train a fighter-bomber wing, minus the tactical squadrons. However, Tactical Air Command is emphatic that the wings, complete with supporting elements, are required in its post D-Day structure.

We recognize, here in ConAC, the validity of all Air Defense Command and Tactical Air Command presentations. We also recognize the over-riding requirements for a recognition of Reserve wings as entities. It is vital to the motivation of the Reserve program (and here I indulge in the psychological approach which is basic to success in any such voluntary organization) that the individuals concerned can identify themselves with a unit which will remain intact during both pre and post D-Day operations.

The only workable compromise which we can envisage entails a D-Day assignment of the fighter-bomber wings to ConAC with operational control of the tactical squadrons passed to Air Defense Command. This would mean that the responsibility for administration, material and maintenance support, and the mobilization and assignment of personnel, would all be discharged through ConAC and the parent wings, while operational control of the tactical squadrons would be by Air Defense Command through Air Defense forces and divisions. We do not envisage that operational orders would pass to the tactical squadrons other than direct from the appropriate air division. However, the squadrons would be responsible to keep the parent wing advised in order that necessary support could be maintained.

All in all, this scheme seems to have a lot of merit, because differences in basic equipment in peace-time would make independent supply channels desirable; and in an emergency, the manning and

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Major General Frederic H. Smith, Jr.

equipping of all elements of the wing, including the squadrons, should be a responsibility of the wings.

The procedure that I have sketchily outlined herein takes care of everything with the exception of peace-time training. We have been conducting all of our unit training with the assistance of other major air commands through the designation of "gaining" commands, and their active assistance is required in conducting live training exercises, particularly for summer encampments. While it involves some stretch of the imagination to consider ADC as the gaining command for the fighter-bomber wings under this concept, it would probably not be an undue burden on ADC to provide advisory service on a wing basis for these problems. The exact extent of mutual participation involved would have to be a matter for resolution between our respective staffs.

While eager to obtain general acceptance of this approach from Headquarters USAF, I wanted you to have first crack at it because of your direct involvement. Conceivably, a similar approach would be applicable to the ANG wings which will not be permanently assigned to ADC. I understand that some concern in this field was voiced during your recent Air Defense Conference which I was sorry to have missed.

I should appreciate your letting me know your reactions to this compromise approach so that we can either iron out our differences or get things going full blast. I am sending Wimpy Wilson a copy of this letter with a request that he give me the ANG reactions to the concept outlined above.

Sincerely yours,

M. J. [illegible]
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

(b)(1)

257-4x

(b)(1)

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Major General Manuel J. Asensio
Vice Commander
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

Dear Manny:

The proposal for the training and D-Day employment of the Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Wings and Squadrons which you outlined in your letter of 25 February appears to be a very workable solution to the problem. We are, of course, interested primarily in the tactical squadrons which will possess an air defense capability on D-Day. Regarding the other elements of the wing, I believe that the assignment of the entire wing to ConAC during the time of the air defense requirements would result in better logistical and administrative support of the tactical squadrons under our operational control than if they remained on an inactive status or were assigned elsewhere.

I do not foresee any difficulties in designating ADC as the "gaining command" for the entire wing. Our advisory function will be primarily tactical in nature to aid in the training of the tactical squadrons. We believe the supporting elements of the wing will be largely self-sufficient in their training.

Regarding the Air National Guard, our organization people are presently studying a USAF proposal for reorganization of the ANG Fighter Wings to a structure more compatible with the present organization of ADC. This plan proposes redesignation of all ANG Fighter Bomber units into Fighter Interceptor units, with subsequent reorganization as soon as sufficient all-weather aircraft became available. For this reason I do not believe we should consider the ANG units within the scope of your proposal.

(b)(1)

This correspondence is cla... in accordance with Par 24, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (e) stated.

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VC
AF
C of S
Comd Adj
Adm
Rcds Mgt
Class
Hist
Pub
Comd Surg
Comd Sr JA
Comd Chap
Comd IG
Insp Svs
Plo
PIO
DCS/C
Bud
Plo
Mgt Anlys
Stat
DCS/P
Civ Pers
Mil Pers
Assets
Spec Act
Res Adm
Enlist Mgmt
Cmls & Rcds
GS
DCS/I
OI
R & E
IR
DCS/O
C C A
C & E
M & O
O C D
Ops Anlys
O & T
P & R
Wea O
DCS/M
Auth
Elect
Gn Sup & Svs
Inspt
Log Plans
Mg Eq Sec
FCDA
CAA

Will be Confirmed in
Std Publication Form
Under par 2a, ADCSO

S-5 _____

Prepared by _____

Telephone _____

_____

Initial Hp. ____

_____

ADC FO [illegible] 11

Major General Manuel J. Asensio

To summarize, we concur in your proposal for the employment of the Air Force Reserve Fighter Bomber Wings and will continue to render advisory assistance within our capabilities during both active and inactive duty training. We are forwarding our training, logistical and communications requirements for the use of your staff in planning and programming for the D-Day mission of these units.

Sincerely,

FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

VC
CAT

Not requested, but furnished
Furnished 17 Aug 1953 (Date) (Initials)

(b)(1)

2

This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

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(b)(1)

COMDR ADC

PRIORITY

X

COMDR CONAC MITCHEL AFB N Y

X

(b)(1) ADOOT-B3 0977 . Ref foncon btwn Col Wildes, your hq, and repr this hq, this comd concurs with the programming of AFRES ftr bmr sq at Indianapolis instead of Offutt AFB, Neb; at Beaumont, Tex instead of Okla City, Okla; and at Tampa, Fla instead of Spartanburg, S.C. In regard to programming a sq at Muskogee, Okla, instead of Lubbock, Tex, the air def needs would be more nearly met if the sq were loc at Birmingham, Ala. However, if the Res potential in the Muskogee area is better than the Birmingham area, this comd concurs with the selection of Muskogee. In regard to the loc of a sq at Griffiss AFB, NY we concur with the selection of the area, but believe Griffiss w/b overcrowded upon activation of the second ADC sq at that base. We concur with the selection of Griffiss only if another base cannot be selected in that immed area.

(b)(1)

1 1

Maj Haynes/cm

ADC: ConAC is unable to move the AFRES sqs to Offutt due to SAC resistance, and to Okla City, Spartanburg and Lubbock because of low Reserve (contd)

ADOOT-B3 2175-85

(b)(1)

This correspondence is class — accordance with

Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

0408

(b)(1)

47

FILE NUMBER 355

18 JUN 1955

JP42-P

SUBJECT: Expansion of Air National Guard Air Alert Plan

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

DOC 37 ADCHR 55a

1. At such time as it is appropriate to review the requirements for Air National Guard Detachments for alert purposes, consideration is requested of the overall requirement in CADF.

2. A detailed study has been made of the Air National Guard air alert plan requirements within this region with consideration given to the following factors:

a. Location of ANG Fighter Squadrons with relation to our assigned AI fighters.

b. Location of Air National Guard Fighter Squadrons with relation to required domestic perimeter ADIZ coverage.

c. Location of Air National Guard Squadrons with relation to United States border security where no ADIZ has yet been established.

d. Location of Air National Guard Fighter Squadrons with relation to present and programmed radar coverage.

e. Fighter force allocations to each Air Division following reorganization brought about by activation of the 20th Air Division (Defense).

f. Requirements for training of Direction Center personnel in sectors having no assigned fighter force.

g. Location of Air National Guard Fighter Squadrons with relation to probable target complexes.

h. Air Defense capability of Air National Guard Fighter

(b)(1)

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65126

JCADF 51-55

(b)(1)

Hq JCADF, JP&R-P, Ltr to CINCONAD, Subj: Expansion of ANG Air Alert Plan

Squadrons with respect to type of equipment assigned, readiness of crews and the attitude of the unit toward this program.

3. As a result of this study a requirement was found to exist for an expansion of this program within Joint Central Air Defense Force. It is recommended that the following Air National Guard units, as a minimum, and in addition to those already authorized, be included in the program at the earliest possible date:

a. 185th Fighter-Bomber Squadron - Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

b. 111th Fighter-Bomber Squadron - Houston, Texas.

c. 182d Fighter-Bomber Squadron - San Antonio, Texas.

d. 197th Fighter-Bomber Squadron - Phoenix, Arizona.

e. 127th Fighter-Bomber Squadron - Wichita, Kansas.

4. The above units are listed in order of priority preferred by this headquarters. The first three Air National Guard Squadrons listed in paragraph 3a, b, and c above, are all situated in the 33rd Air Division (Defense) sector of responsibility, but after the activation of the 20th Air Division (Defense), the 33rd Air Division (Defense) will have no assigned fighter-interceptor forces. The only alert capability presently planned for the 33rd Air Division (Defense) is the proposed Training Command Alert Detachment at Perrin Air Force Base and the Air National Guard Detachment at Hensley Field, Texas. It is believed that some additional interceptor capability is required for the 33rd Air Division, even if only for purposes of training and identification. The Air National Guard Alert Detachments recommended in this sector represent the minimum required.

5. Since each of the Air National Guard Squadrons listed in paragraph 3 is equipped with single place fighter aircraft, only five officer troop spaces per alert unit detachment are required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CLIFFORD H. REES
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy for Operations

(b)(1)

0 4 1 C

49

[redacted] Major Expansion of Air National Guard Air Alert Plan

[redacted] (13 June 55) 1st Ind 8 JUL 1955

(b)(1) [redacted] AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commander, Joint Continental Air Defense Force, Countryview Air Force Base, Countryview, Missouri

1. Reference recommendation in paragraph 3, basic. In March of this year a staff study was prepared concerning the expansion of the existing Air Alert Plan. Recommendations have been forwarded to Headquarters USAF to expand the plan and have been accepted in principle. The plan, however, is now being reviewed by the National Guard Bureau.

2. A copy of this staff study is attached for your information.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl (not rqr for AG files)
As stated

MEMO FOR RECORD: Not required

COMEBACK COPY
Not requested, not furnished
(YTB-3) Furnished 1955
(Date) (Initials)

G-010

[redacted] DO
Maj Nelson/cm
2175-85
6 July 55
X01240

(b)(1) [redacted]

This correspondence is classified [redacted] in accordance with Par Basic, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

M510-3X

DOCUMENT NO. 355

THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE FOUND

IN VOLUME 9 OF THE SUPPORTING

DOCUMENTS TO THIS HISTORY.

(b)(1)

DOC 374 55a

355

13 MAY 1955

ADOOT-33

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Revision of the Air National Guard Air Alert Plan

TO: Director of Operations
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

FEEDBACK COPY
Not requested, not furnished
Furnished 13 MAY 1955
(Date) (Initials)

1. The plan utilizing the Air National Guard to stand active alert has been evaluated and a firm criterion for selecting squadrons for this plan formulated. The criterion is divided into two categories as follows:

a. Category I. Squadrons to be utilized in a Permanent Air Alert Plan. These squadrons will be located in areas where ADC interceptors are not available to scramble on unidentified tracks or to exercise AOAM squadrons.

b. Category II. Squadrons to be utilized in a Rotational Air Alert Plan. These squadrons will be placed on alert primarily to retain ANG personnel in the air defense mission. However, they will also be located in areas where they can be utilized to supplement the air defense mission. To preclude excessive overlapping of fighter coverage, only 16 of the 48 squadrons qualified to participate in the Rotational Alert Plan will stand active air alert at any one time.

2. To provide as much training as possible for the 48 squadrons in the Rotational Air Alert Plan, a period of active alert for one year in each three years is recommended. Three squadrons (Salt Lake City, Cheyenne and Denver) are not included in either plan since ADC radar will not be located in areas within 175 to 200 NM of the fighter squadrons.

3. It is recommended that the Air National Guard Air Alert Plan be revised to conform to the above criterion. This will require a complete revision of the present plan and would eliminate some of the squadrons now standing permanent alert. Additional permanent squadrons would be added however, as portions of the ADC program are implemented. The squadrons to ultimately stand alert, both in the permanent and rotational plan, are indicated on the attached maps (Tabs A B C and D).

13 MAY 1955 15 31

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(b)(1)

This correspondence is classified _____ in accordance with Par 23b, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

2175
6 May 55

96-30-1

Hq ADC Subject: (Uncl) Revision of the AND Air Alert Plan (cont'd)

4. We are fully aware of the political ramification in a program of this nature. However, the increase in air defense requires consideration be given to a plan that will assure full utilization of the Air National Guard.

5. Upon your approval of this plan, dates to phase the Air National Guard squadrons in or out of the permanent program and periods to rotate squadrons will be submitted.

4 Incl (Incls not required a/s for AG files)

FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

Comdr
VC
ADES
Asst Prog
Cond Ad
Adm
Reds Mgr
Class
Mint
Pub
Cond Surg
Cond Sel JA
Cond Chap
Cond IG
Insp Svs
Pw
PIO
DCS/C
Bud
Fin
Mgt Anlys
Stat
DCS/P
Civ Pers
Mil Pers
Assets
Spec Act
Res Adm
Enlist Mgmt
Cols & Reds
GS
Pers Sv
PPR
DCS
OI
R & E
IR
DCS/O
C C A
C & E
M & O
G C O
Ops Anlys
O & T
P & R
Wea O
DCS/M
Auth
Elect
Gn Sup & Svs
Instl
Log Plans
Ms Sy Sec
FCDA
CAA

Will be Confirmed in Std Publication Form Under par 3a, ADCM

S-3 _____
Prepared by _____
Telephone _____
Date _____
R _____ Folded Ms. _____
_____

ADC HQ AFAC, 11

1620 - 2X

This correspondence is classified 2 in accordance with Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.


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

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
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
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

(b)(1)

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DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

(b)(1)

NO.	SUBJECT
	ANG Plan

FROM	DATE	COMMENT NO. 1
O&T DCS/O	15 Apr 55	

1. For some time I have been concerned with the hole in our contiguous cover in the Denver-Salt Lake area. The ANG has a tactical radar squadron at Salt Lake. What can be done to give us complete cover by organizing ANG AC&W squadrons? Can we use ANG radar squadrons with present equipment?

2. The three ANG fighter squadrons in this area are highly thought of by the 34th and 29th Air Divisions. If we can solve the problem in paragraph 1 supra, should they not be included in our plan?

3. Why are some of the ANG squadrons not rotating the duty among all the pilots? Is there a valid reason? Should we specify in our plan that rotation among all pilots is the only reason for putting ANG squadrons on alert?

4. How do we know that one year is the proper period for a squadron to be on duty? Perhaps it should be six months.

5. I think the plan is excellent but would like the answers to these questions before I send it forward.

KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Major General, USAF
DCS/Operations

DOCUMENT NO. 376

THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE FOUND

IN VOLUME 9 OF THE SUPPORTING

DOCUMENTS TO THIS HISTORY.

SS

FILE NUMBER 355.4

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
MITCHEL AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK

DO

8 JUN 1955

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Practice Recall Exercise of ANG Units

TO: Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

377 55a

1. This is in reply to your letter on the above subject, dated 6 May 1955, file ADOOT-B3.

a. An initial reply was contained in our message DO 7737 (Unclassified), dated 2 June 1955, copy of which is attached for your convenience.

b. Additional comments and suggestions are contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this letter.

2. Concurrence for use of Air Advisers as observers for the proposed exercise was contained in message, DO 7737, 2 June 1955.

3. Reference paragraph 3x(5), Operations Plan. To insure maximum security, recommend the advance instructions to Air Advisers contain no reference to time of implementation.

4. Reference Annex C to the Operations Plan. In view of the public interest in an exercise of this type, recommend the Public Information Offices of the National Guard Bureau and this headquarters jointly participate in the preparation of the Public Information Annex and that each headquarters have certain areas of responsibility for publicizing the event.

5. It is realized that the proposed exercise emanates from the requirement of your headquarters to determine certain factors which have a bearing on the air defense capability of the country. With this in mind, and to satisfy certain questions within this headquarters, the following comments and recommendations are made:

(b)(1)

Hq ConAC, DO, Subj: (Uncl) Practice Recall Exercise of ANG Units

a. The ultimate objective of such an exercise is to determine the number of identifiable, armed, combat ready aircraft which can be scrambled under the control of GCI stations in the shortest possible interval of time. Additionally, it would be desirable to determine the turn-around time upon landin and the logistic capability to sustain operations.

b. To accomplish the objective stated in paragraph 5a above, recommend:

(1) Interphone circuits, now on standby status, be energized for the purpose of alerting units for this exercise only.

(2) The scope of the exercise be expanded to require:

(a) Loading of all in-commission, combat ready aircraft with a normal supply of ammunition, except that guns should not be charged.

(b) Operating IFF.

(c) Scrambling aircraft under GCI control and accomplishing an intercept (actual or simulated). Day interceptor aircraft should be scrambled only under day, VFR conditions. AI equipped aircraft should be scrambled under any conditions within their capability.

(d) Servicing aircraft (fuel, oil, oxygen and ammunition) upon landing to determine turn-around time. Rearming could be simulated since it is assumed that would be done concurrently with other reservicing in approximately the same length of time.

c. Provided you concur with "a" and "b" above, the following changes to the Observer Reports are suggested:

(1) Add a paragraph for items of scramble information for each interval of time

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[redacted] (Incl) Practice Recall Exercise of [redacted]

(not cumulative) - 30 minutes, one hour, two hours and three hours after recall as follows:

(a) Number of aircraft scrambled during each interval of time.

(b) Of the aircraft scrambled, during each interval of time, how many were armed; had IFF; contacted GCI on the tactical frequency; accomplished intercept?

(c) Turn around time for in-commission aircraft upon landing for each interval of time.

(2) Add the following to the Remarks:

(a) A statement concerning the immediate availability of ammunition for the initial scramble sorties, as well as the total number of sorties which could be supported with the ammunition supply on hand.

(b) Ability to refuel aircraft upon landing, as well as the total number of sorties which could be supported with the fuel supply on hand.

(c) Other logistics problems which would limit or affect operations -- immediate and sustained.

(d) A statement concerning air-to-ground communications difficulties. (b)(1)

6. Request observers be required to furnish one copy of the Observer's Report to this headquarters through normal ConAC channels. Further request that this headquarters be furnished information concerning your analysis of the results of the exercise.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(b)(1)

L. M. GUYER
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

1 Incl
Cy of ConAC msg
DO 7737

2 June 1955

HEDCONAC MITCHEL AFB NY

COMDR ADC, ENT AFB, COLO SPRINGS, COLO ROUTINE

FROM: DO 1737

Urltr 6 May, Subj: "Practice Recall Exercise of ANG Units." Concur in your proposal to use USAF Air Advisers as observers in the proposed exercise. Recommend initial instructions to the Air Advisers be transmitted through this hq which in turn will use the normal channel through ConAC numbered AFs and Senior Advisers within each ANG wg to disseminate these instructions. Once the basic instructions have been issued, direct contact with any Air Adviser by any echelon of your command you select is approved in connection with this exercis Additional comments are being forwarded by mail.

J. B. BURWELL
[illegible]er General, USAF
[illegible]f of Staff, Operations

1517-4

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HEADQUARTERS AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1955

OPERATIONS PLAN

Serial No.

CHART AND MAP REFERENCES:

TASK ORGANIZATION:

1. GENERAL SITUATION:

Summary of the Situation: Seventy ANG Fighter Interceptor/Bomber Squadrons are committed to augment existing forces of the Air Defense Command on D-Day. Since early commitment of these forces could have a substantial effect upon the outcome of the initial air battle, rapid manning of these forces after initial recall notification is extremely important. Present planning for the recall of these units is based upon having 50% of assigned aircraft and crews available within three hours after notice of mobilization and the remaining personnel and aircraft available within 24 hours. The alerting system has not been tested, therefore, these figures may not be realistic.

a. Friendly Forces.

(1) Seventy ANG Fighter Interceptor/Bomber Squadrons which have D-Day assignments to the Air Defense Command (Annex A).

2. MISSION:

a. To establish the time required to alert, effectively man and deploy an ANG Fighter Squadron (50% manning) after a state of air defense readiness has been declared by the Air Defense Command.

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Encl 2

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3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

a. AIR DEFENSE FORCES will:

(1) Pass all implementing orders and instructions to Air Defense Divisions.

(2) Consolidate and forward all reports submitted by division observers within five days after receipt.

b. AIR DEFENSE DIVISIONS will:

(1) Provide initial recall notification to ANG units committed for air defense in accordance with existing alert plans.

(2) Consolidate and forward all reports submitted by observers within five days after receipt. Divisions will include times ANG squadrons were alerted and also scramble times in excess of five minutes.

c. AIR DEFENSE DIRECTION CENTERS will:

(1) Place each aircraft committed on five (5) minute alert. Scramble aircraft as flights of two (2) become available. ADDC's will not scramble any one aircraft more than once during this exercise. ANG aircraft will be scrambled only during daylight hours and when existing weather is at or above established ANG squadron minimum.

(2) Control aircraft during entire mission, accomplishing as many practice intercepts as possible.

(3) At the termination of the mission, vector aircraft to base and assist in recovery.

M517-6

(c) Signal for this exercise will be "Operation STOP WATCH".

(d) Headquarters ADC will originate all engineered recordable circuits to ANG units at the same time the alerting order is passed to Defense Forces.

(3) "Operation STOP WATCH" will be conducted in two phases as follows:

(a) Phase I will consist of issuing a recall order to units of the ANG committed to ADC in order to test the time required to communicate the order and to effectively man the ANG unit after the recall order has been received. Phase I will be conducted during duty hours.

(b) Phase II will be identical to Phase I except Phase II will be conducted during non-duty hours.

(4) This order will be implemented and concluded by message or telephone call from Headquarters ADC through Defense Forces and Air Divisions to ANG units in the following manner:

(a) "Operation STOP WATCH" implemented Phase I "Operation STOP WATCH". (Upon receipt of this message, Air Defense Divisions will issue recall orders to ANG units in accordance with existing alert plans.)

(b) "Operation STOP WATCH" concludes Phase I "Operation STOP WATCH". (At this time Air Defense Divisions will notify ANG units that Phase I has been concluded.)

17-7

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(5) Phase II will be implemented and concluded in the same manner as Phase I.

(6) In accordance with Gamid message 30-7757, 2 June 1955, USAF Air Advisors attached to ANG units being tested will act as observers for the exercise. A sealed envelope will be forwarded to each Air Adviser prior to each phase of the exercise containing complete instructions, times of implementation and necessary reports. Observers will not discuss the exercise or indicate implementation times to personnel of the ANG unit prior to the exercise. Upon receipt of the concluding message (paragraph 3a(3)(b)), Air Advisers will complete the report and forward it within 24 hours to the Air Defense Division issuing the recall message. One copy of the report will be made available to the ANG unit commander.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:

a. ADMINISTRATIVE:

(1) Air Adviser observer reports will be consolidated by Air Defense Divisions and will be forwarded so as to reach Defense Forces within five working days after conclusion of each phase of the exercise. Divisions will indicate the time implementing message was received and the time recall order was issued.

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(2) Defense Forces will consolidate Division reports and forward to Headquarters ADC within five working days. Defense Forces will indicate the time implementing order was received and the time implementing order was dispatched to Divisions.

(3) PIO (See Annex C).

(4) All communications referring to this exercise will be prefaced with the words "Operation STOP WATCH".

5. COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMAND MATTERS:

a. Communications - Energise ANG scramble circuits.

b. Command - normal.

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ANNEX A
TO
OPERATIONS PLAN
SERIAL NO.

LIST OF ANG SQUADRONS AND LOCATIONS

4517-10

[redacted] (Navy Publish No)

[redacted]
No
[redacted]
[redacted], NO.

[redacted]

[redacted]

a. The Assigned Squad Unit Designation _____.

b. Number A/C Aircraft Possessed _____.

c. Time Initial recall notification Received by ANG Unit _____.

d. Number A/C aircraft combat ready when recall message received _____.

e.

	*Percent Manning	Number Combat Ready Aircraft	Aircrew
30 min after recall	_____	____	____
1 hr after recall	_____	____	____
2 hrs after recall	_____	____	____
3 hrs after recall	_____	____	____

f.

	Number Aircraft Scrambled	Number Scrambled Aircraft Completing Mission
Within 1 hr	_____	_____
Within 1 hr to 2 hrs	_____	_____
Within 2 hrs to 3 hrs	_____	_____
After 3 hrs	_____	_____

7. Reservice Times (Reservice and Rearm)

a. Maximum time required to reservice one (1) aircraft _____.

b. Average reservice time _____.

8. Amount of combat ammo on hand _____.

* Percent Manning: The percentage of assigned personnel present for duty.

17-11

64

9. Amount of fuel (for T/A aircraft) on hand _____

10. Remarks

a. A statement of the method of recall used and its effectiveness.

b. A statement concerning the immediate availability of radio communication for the recall aerial.

c. Logistic problems that would limit or affect operations.

d. A statement concerning communications distribution, both ground and air-to-ground.

e. Recommendations for improvement of recall plan or procedures.

Distribution:
1 Copy to AFR Squadron Commander
1 Copy to Commanding Air Division
1 Copy to Commander, Guard (thru normal Guard channels)

(b)(1)

COMEBACK COPY

.....Not requested, not furnished

.....Furnished 12 JUL 1955 (Date) (Initials)

MEMO FOR RECORD: Not required.

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classified [redacted] in accordance with Par ____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (s) stated.

(b)(1)

CO-DR
VC
C of S
CG AAA
COMDR CONAD
ECAF
SAGE
Asst Prog
Fin Sfty
COMD ADJ
Adm
Rcds Mgt
Class
Misc
Pub
COMD SURG
COMD STF JA
COMD CHAP
COMD IG
Insp Svs
Pln
OIS
DCS/C
Sec
Fin
Mgt Anlys
Stat
DCS/P
Civ Pers
Mil Pers
Assets
Spec Act
Res Adv
Cols & Rcds
OS
Pers Sv
PR & T
WAF
DO
R & E
MR
DCS/O
OCA
C & E
M & D
OCD
Ops Anlys
O & T
P & E
Wea O
DCS/M
Adb
Sheet
Gn Sup & Svc
Inspt
Log Plans
MS SS SEC
PCDA
CAA

Will be Confirmed in
Std Publication Form
Under Par 3a, ADCSM

S-3 _____
Prepared by _____
Telephone _____
Date _____
Refers to Penfield No. ____
_____

AF ... 11 (REV)

69

Hq ComAC DO Subj: (Uncl) Practice Recall Exercise of ANG Units

3. A revised copy of the plan with the observers report is attached for your information. The initial instructions to air advisers will be forwarded through your headquarters with instructions to furnish one copy of the report to ComAC Headquarters through normal channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. F. HUMPHREYS
Major, USAF
Asst Command Adj

1 Encl
w/d 1 cy
Added 1 Encl
2. Cy revised Opr Plan
"Exercise STOP WATCH"

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classified ____ in accordance with Par _____, AFR 205-1, 15 Dec 53, or for the reason (a) stated.

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ADES	
st Prog	
S	
Adj	
Adm	
Rcds Mgt	
Class	
Hist	
Pub	
Comd Surg	
Comd Stf JA	
Comd Chap	
Comd IG	
Insp Sys	
PM	
Flt Sfty	
PIO	
DCS/C	
Bud	
Fin	
Mgt Anlys	
Stat	
DCS/P	
Civ Pers	
Mil Pers	
Asm Asgmt	
Off Asgmt	
Cols & Rcds	
Spec Actions	
OR	
Pers Sv	
PPR	
WAF	
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C C A	
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M & O	
O C D	
Ops Anlys	
Flt Ops	
F & R	
Wea O	
DCS/M	
Acft	
Elect	
Gn Sup & Sve	
Instl	
Log Plans	
Hq Sq Sec	
FCDA	
CAA	

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) 80
epared by Maj Nguyen 045-00
lephone 2175-6185
te 23 Feb 55

HQ Form 11
Jul 54 Revised
676-1X

87 Feb 55

Brigadier General Winston P. Wilson
Chief, Air Force Division
National Guard Bureau
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Wilson:

In one of the side discussions with you during the AFA convention here on 13-15 February, the validity of our planning factors for mobilization of Air National Guard fighter units was questioned. In our planning we have used a figure of fifty percent of all tactical aircraft and crews becoming available for the air defense mission within three hours after the initial notice has been received by the unit. We expect the remaining fifty percent to be available for use within twenty-four hours after initial notice. You indicated that this factor was not entirely realistic in that the ANG units could actually better this recall time. This is a very important factor since these units constitute a substantial portion of our augmentation force and their early use in the air battle could make a great difference in its outcome.

Therefore, I would like to suggest for your consideration a test to determine a more realistic time interval to be used in our planning. Would it be feasible to conduct an exercise during the months of May and June (so as not to conflict with summer encampment) in which ADC would simulate mobilization of the guard fighter units at certain unannounced times to be determined by ADC? We propose to select the squadrons once during duty hours and once during non-duty hours to make a valid evaluation. I believe that in this manner we can get an accurate determination of the planning factor required in considering the recall of these forces. I realize, of course, that there are many details to be resolved before we could conduct an exercise of this type, but I wanted your reaction to the idea before we started any preliminary planning.

If you feel this proposal merits further consideration, members of my staff can meet with your staff to work out the details.

Sincerely,

KENNETH P. BERQUIST
Major General, USAF
DCS/Operations

(b)(1)

This correspondence is classifie[illegible] in accordance with Par 7 f, AFR 205-1, 14 Jul 53, or for the reason (a) stated.

SIGNATURE

25517

AF - ADC - 6010, 2PCM60, 6010

Comd Adj
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Amn Div
Off Div
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DCS/O
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Gn Sup & Svs
Instl
Log Plans
HQ COMD

Record Evaluation
Permanent
Temporary
Until
ll Be Confirmed
n Std Publication
Form Under par 3a,
AFCSIA 5-3
Prepared by Col Lewis/pw
Telephone 2645
5 May 55

DD Form 11
Revised 15 Aug 53

(b)(1)

379 55a

379
13 MAY 1955

SUBJECT: Air National Guard Reorganization

Director of Operations
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

COMEBACK COPY
..... Not requested, not furnished
Furnished 13 MAY 1955 (Date) (Initials)

1. Reference:

a. USAF letter, subject: (Encl) "Designation of ANG Fighter Units", dated 2 March 1955 and ADC 1st Indorsement thereto, dated 22 March 1955.

b. USAF message AFOOP-OP-D 58712, dated 3 May 1955.

2. Before submitting recommendations contained in our 1st Indorsement referred to above, we carefully considered the impact that mobilization of the Air National Guard fighter squadrons would have on the command structure. Major items of consideration were:

a. The present ADC organization.

b. Programmed organization to be implemented when 16 air divisions (defense) are fully operational (programmed for 3d Qtr FY 56).

c. The organizational structure required for the SAGE system of defense.

d. Compatibility of the ANG wing organization with a, b, and c above.

e. The possibility that ADC would be required to establish and maintain war reserves for the ANG fighter squadrons.

3. The above considerations led us to recommend that the ANG wing headquarters should not be mobilized upon mobilization of their subordinate units. The personnel assigned to these wing headquarters should be called to active duty as individuals and absorbed into the air defense system as required. Our position in this regard has not changed. It is recognized that a considerable administrative and

Incl not nec AG file

13 May 55
Col. Lewis contacted ... Room ... informed ... The ... Maj Smith ... Col Lewis ... Capt ... briefed ... Maj ...

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This correspondence is classified ... in accordance with Par 23C, AFR 205-1, 24 Jul 53, or for Mcomparison, stated ...

JAMES R. ... LT COL USAF
DIR M&O

55571

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Hq ANG, ARNGB, Subject: Air National Guard Reorganization

logistical workload will be generated by activation of the ANG air defense groups and squadrons, however, we believe that retention of the wings would only tend to add to the problem. With the air defense group organization a majority of the logistical and administrative functions are performed at group level, thus the ANG defense groups should be able to perform a majority of this workload upon mobilization.

4. In view of the above, the following is furnished in response to specific requests contained in message referred to in 1b above.

a. Number of ANG air defense wings required - none.

b. Air defense groups and separate squadrons assigned to each wing - not applicable.

c. The division assignment of wings, and if applicable, group and separate squadrons - first portion not applicable, second portion listed in inclosure #1.

d. Type organization, i.e., defense group or augmented squadron for each of the 70 ANG fighter squadrons if all were to be reorganized in accordance with the ADC organization - our proposal for reorganizing the 70 ANG Fighter Squadrons in accordance with the ANG organization is listed in inclosure #1.

5. Reference paragraph 4 of inclosure #1 to our 1st Indorsement referred to in paragraph #1 above. Information is requested as to action being taken regarding our stated manpower requirements for supervision of ANG training. Information is required to facilitate planning actions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WALTER W. ROBINSON
Colonel, USAF
Command Adjutant

1 Incl
Proposed ANG
Reorganization
w/atchmt
(2 cys)

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210-2

PARAPH[redacted] OT REQUIRED

approval of action

COPY OF INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

AG
A-38-3
WA022
PP JEDEN
DE JEPHQ 139
P 0321272
FM HEDUSAF WASHDC
TO COMAIRDEFCOM ENT AFB COLO
BT

12982

ACTION: OGT
INFO: CG, IG, DO
Susp: 9 MAY 55

(b)(1)

// FROM CLN AFOOP-OP-D 52912 REFERENCE LETTER THIS HQ CMM SUBJECT QUOTE PAREN UNCL PAREN DESIGNATION OF ANG FIGHTER UNITS UNQUOTE DATED 2 MAR 55 TO COMMANDER ADC AND 1ST IND HQ ADC CMM DATED 22 MAR 55. PROPOSAL AS CONTAINED IN 1ST INDORSEMENT CONSIDERS THE ASSIGNMENT OF ONLY 22 ANG FIS TO ADC ON A PERMANENT BASIS. PG-57-1 ASSIGNS 23 COMPLETE ANG FI WINGS TO ADC ON A PERMANENT BASIS SUBSEQUENT TO D-DAY. IN VIEW OF NUMBER OF UNITS INVOLVED DESIRE YOUR COMMENTS ON THE RETENTION OF AN AIR DEFENSE WING HQS CMM BOTH FOR PEACETIME AND WARTIME ORGANIZATION CMM IN ADDITION TO AIR DEFENSE GROUPS AND AUGMENTED SQUADRONS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF UNITS OVER AND ABOVE THE REGULAR ADC UNITS WOULD REQUIRE A WING HQ AS AN INTERMEDIATE HQ FOR

USAFSUS 13 MAY

PAGE TWO JEPHQ 139
HQ FOR SUCH SUPPORT. DESIRE YOUR COMMENTS NOT LATER THAN 13 MAY 1955 TO INCLUDE PROPOSAL FOR A COMPLETE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE 70 ANG FIS. THIS SHOULD INDICATE PAREN 1 PAREN THE NUMBER OF AIR DEF WINGS REQUIRED CMM PAREN 2 PAREN AIR DEFENSE GROUPS AND SEPARATE SQS ASSIGNED TO EACH WING CMM PAREN 3 PAREN THE DIVISION ASSIGNMENT OF WINGS CMM AND IF APPLICABLE CMM GROUP E SEPARATE SQUADRONS CMM PAREN 4 PAREN TYPE ORGANIZATION CMM I. E. CMM DEF GROUP OR AUGMENTED SQ. FOR EACH OF THE 70 ANG FIGHTER SQS IF ALL WERE TO BE REORGNNIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ADC ORGANIZATION.
BT
9S/2150Z-MAY JEPHQ

M-10-3X
DC Hq-O-AG-Form 23
9 1 12 53
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This document consists of ___
This is copy No. ___ of ___

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[redacted]

Maj Gen F H Smith Jr/jk

[redacted] typed in office of VC. Last [redacted] was added by Vice Comdr.

1 Feb 55

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

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The foregoing, as you perhaps realize, was written by our C&T [illegible] for my signature. I appreciate your problem in finding a way to [illegible] and to train personnel of your National Guard wings other than those directly involved in the air defense mission. I am hopeful that [illegible] will buy the proposition that these wings which are eventually to [illegible] to them should be assigned to them now, with operational control of their squadrons being vested in this command temporarily. In that [illegible], through staff exercises, CPXs, and the like, TAC could insure that [illegible] training of wing staff personnel in their fighter-bomber duties. If this solution is not bought by TAC, and they are unable to provide [illegible] training in peacetime to the personnel about whom you are concerned, I would be glad to attempt to work out with you some method of employing wing staff personnel as augmentation to our division staffs. [illegible] will not be easy, for as you pointed out, the geographical areas of responsibility of our divisions do not necessarily mesh nicely with the location and state boundaries pertaining to the wing headquarters.

Please let me know how things progress in this field, for I assure you of our desire to help out wherever possible.

Sincerely,

FREDERIC H SMITH, JR.
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

(b)(1)

Will be Confirmed in
Std Publication Form
Under par 3a, AFOOM
S-3_____
Prepared by_____
Telep_____
Date_____

K HQ Form 11

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38

2 March 1955

FILE MUM

Designation of ANG Fighter Units

Commander
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

DO 381 ADCHR 55a

1. Reference is made to USAF PG 57-1, Page 36, paragraph 2b, Page 48, paragraph 36, Page 59, paragraph 14; and Page 64, paragraph 14, concerning ANG Fighter-Interceptor Units.

2. Until sufficient all-weather aircraft are available to equip all ANG Fighter Units, the following actions are proposed to implement the provisions of PG-57-1:

a. All ANG Fighter Units will train and prepare for a day mission of air defense.

b. Air National Guard Fighter Units possessing all-weather A/C and be reorganized in accordance with the Air Defense Command organization.

c. The ANG Units (17 wings) presently designated Fighter-Bomber will be redesignated Fighter-Interceptor but will retain their present organization and D/E aircraft until All-weather Fighter-Interceptor aircraft are available. During the interim period, they will train as Day-Fighters, and their Unit Essential Equipment will be adjusted to fit that role. Six months prior to receiving all-weather aircraft, these units will also be reorganized in accordance with the Air Defense Command organization.

d. Programming for ANG Fighter Units will not include training, operations, personnel, armament or equipment to support a mission other than air defense.

3. Desire your comments on these proposed actions not later than 15 March 1955 to include:

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a. Proposal for incorporating these AIMS units [illegible] Air Defense Command organizational structure.

b. Proposal for equipping units with All-[illegible] This to include priority designations, and level of equipping [illegible] attained in the initial units prior to re-equipping additional units.

ROBERT W. BURNS
Major General, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

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M-764-2

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

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

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

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

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382

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ADMLO-2

1 March 1955

SUBJECT: (UNCLD) Additional Equipment Required for D-Day Support of Certain ANG Units

TO: Commander
Air Materiel Command
ATTN: MCSR
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Ohio

1. Reference paragraph 5, letter Headquarters, USAF, Subject: "(Unclassified) D-Day support for Certain Air National Guard Units", dated 15 October 1954.

2. In complying with the requirements of paragraph 5b(1) and (2) of above referenced letter, the following factors were used:

a. Aircraft by types and numbers programmed for the ANG at end FY 56 as listed in PE-57-1.

b. ADC concept of operation for use of ANG forces on D-Day and subsequent 90-day period.

c. The Air National Guard equipping list (ANGEAL).

d. EAN listings furnished by AMC.

e. Survey of ANG bases conducted by ADC personnel.

3. Equipment requirements of this report were based only on the minimum additional requirements necessary to support the Air Defense mission.

4. Incl 1, (ltr Hq AMC, Subj: (U) Additional Requirements for ANG units, dated 13 August 54), to letter referenced in paragraph 1 above, indicates that $10,056,652 was requested in the FY 56 budget for procuring additional items of equipment to meet ANG D-Day requirements. The additional requirements resulting from a thorough study of the above factors reveals a dollar value of $1,238,057.47. Apparently the data utilized in completing the study covered in the above letter of 13 August 1954 was incomplete. The authorizations listed in the ANGEAL published by the

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Hq ADC, ADMLO-2, Subj: (U) Add Equip Required for D-Day Support of Certain ANG Units

National Guard Bureau in December 1954 are considered adequate to meet ANG D-Day air defense commitments with the exception of items listed in Inclosure #1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:
Rept of Equip
Required to Augm
Specific Bases (quad)

W. J. BIRNEIE
Lt Col, USAF
Asst Comd Adj

Copy Furn:
Dir of Sup & Svs
Hq USAF
ATTN: AFMSS-OP-1

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APHRASE IS NOT REQUIRED

COPY OF INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE NUMBER 339.5

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M HEDUSAF WASHDC
TO COMAIRDEFCOM ENT AFB COLO
BT
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FROM AFOOP-OP-D 54775 RE UR MSG ADMDM 3146 CMM DTD 24MAY 55 AND MY AFOOP-OP-D 50356 CMM 1 APR 55. FOLLOWING IN THREE PARTS CLN PART I. UR INTERIM INTENTION TO PREPOSITION COMBAT AMMO AT NEAREST AFB FOR D-DAY AND POST D-DAY USE BY ANG AUGMENTATION FORCES IS CONCURRED IN. FEASIBILITY OF PREPOSITIONING AMMO AT NEARBY MILITARY INSTALLATION OTHER THAN AF SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHERE SUCH PREPOSITIONING WOULD CONSIDERABLY EXPEDITE D-DAY DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO INDIVIDUAL ANG UNIT. PART II. ADC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FACILITIES CMM STORAGE AND MAINTENANCE OF PREPOSITIONED COMBAT AMMO FOR ANG FORCES REGARDLESS OF STORAGE LOCATION SELECTED. ANG MAINTENANCE SHOULD BE POSSIBLE IN SELECTED INSTANCES IF ADC FUNDS ARE TRANSFERRED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ARMAMENT PERSONNEL FOR ANG UNIT CONCERNED.

10940 ACTION: OM
INFO: (C) IG,
Susp: 14 JunSS

DOC 383 ADCOM 55a

PAGE TWO RJEPHQ 103
PART III. THIS HQ POSES NO OBJECTION TO AND ON CIV BASE STORAGE OF COMBA AMMO WHERE ADEQUATE STORAGE FACILITIES EXIST IN BEING AND ARE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE BY THE ANG.
BT
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AO-AG-Form 29

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FM USAF
RJEDEN/COMAIRDEFCOM ENT AFB COLO
TO RJEDWP/CONAMC WRIGHT PATTERSON AF OHIO

FILE NUMBER 361

16849-A

ACTION: DMY
INFO: C&I, IG
SUSP: 13 JUN 55

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/ FROM AFMSS-OP-1 54732 RE UR MSG ADMLO 3189 DTD 31 MAY
RELATIVE TO CLARIFICATION OF AFL 67-112 IT IS THE INTENT TO EQUI
ITS REMAINING IN THE CONTINENTAL U.S. WITH THE MINIMUM OF ORGANIZATIONA
UIPMENT ESSENTIAL FOR THEIR AIR DEFENSE MISSION AND TRAINING PURPOSES,
E. CAT "D". THIS PLACES THE MAJORITY OF ADC FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR UNITS
TO CAT "D". INASMUCH AS THE ANG FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR UNITS ARE OPERATING
TH ORGANIZATION EQUIPMENT CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN THAT POSSESSED BY
MILAR ADC UNITS, THE EQUIPMENT AUGMENTATION IS DESIGNED TO BRING
[illegible]G FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR UNITS UP TO AIR FORCE EQUIPPING STANDARDS
AMBUTE AND AIR DEFENSE MISSION. THIS EQUIPMENT AUGMENTATION PLUS THE

E TWO RJEPHQ 127
AINING ALLOWANCES IN POSSESSEION OF THE ANG UNITS WILL STILL BE
SS THAN FULL ALLOWANCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT , I.E., UEE,
E AND FSE AS PROVIDED IN THE MEAL. IN VIEW OF THIS, TH ANG UNITS
ULD STILL COME WITHIN THE GROUND RULES ESTABLISHED FOR CAT "D" UNITS.

/28452 JUN RJEPHQ

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[illegible]-O-AG-Form 23