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98TH Bomb wing UNIT HISTORY  
AUGUST 1957

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NO: AU-DJ

98th Bomb Wing (C)  
1-31 August 1957

This Document was prepared  
by S/Cpt Donald J. Under  
under the supervision of  
Major John A. Bushe  
Information Services Officer  
Lincoln Air Force Base  
Lincoln, Nebraska

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
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GEORGE WILSON R WOOD  
COMMANDER 9<sup>TH</sup> BOMBARDMENT WING (M)  
LINCOLN AIR FORCE BA B, NEBRASKA





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HISTORY OF THE  
98TH BOMBARDMENT WING (B)  
1 AUGUST - 31 AUGUST 1957

CHAPTER I - ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

SECTION I - Mission Developments

The present 98th Bombardment Wing (B) was first physically activated on 16 February 1942 as the 98th Bombardment Group at Berkdele Field, Louisiana. After receiving the necessary training in the utilization of the B-24 Bomber, the wing departed for North Africa, where it flew its first combat mission over Mersruh, Egypt. (U)

The most famous of the 98th Bomb Wing's World War II missions was its participation in the low level bombing raids at Floceti, Romania. The 98th furnished nearly one-third of the total 175 B-24 bombers that dropped their bombs from an altitude less than 300 feet. (U)

During the entire period of World War II, the 98th Bomb Wing received two presidential citations, one for its mission accomplishments in the Middle East, North Africa and Italy, and the other for its participation in the raids on the Floceti Oil Fields. (U)

The wing returned to the United States after Germany's surrender in 1945, where it was deactivated in November of that year. After reactivation in September of 1947 at Spokane, Washington, the wing was equipped with B-29 aircraft. In August of 1950, the wing departed for Japan and Combat action in Korea. (U)



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After flying its first mission over Korea on 7 August 1950, the wing remained operational ready for 20 out of the remaining 24 days in August. During the entire period of the wing's duty over Korea, the B-29's of this unit dropped 167,100 tons of bombs on North Korean targets. (U)

The 98th Bomb Wing returned to the United States after the close of the Korean Conflict and assigned to its present location, Lincoln Air Force Base, Nebraska in July 1954, and began a transition program from the B-29 to the Medium Jet Bomber, the B-47. The wing was declared combat ready in June 1955 and intensive training began to reach the maximum in combat effectiveness. (U)

Two Strategic Air Command rotational movements have been executed by the wing since its arrival at Lincoln, the entire wing deploying to the United Kingdom in November of 1955, and the second with just the 98th Air Refueling Squadron deploying to Farnon Air Force Base, Newfoundland in December of 1956. (U)

The most recent of the 98th Bomb Wing's accomplishments was its participation in Operation "Cobra Miller", a No-Notice Unit Simulated Combat Mission, executed on 19 August 1957 which was considered very successful. Another recent mission was Pace Setter VIII, an Eighth Air Force Bombing and Navigation Competition. The wing placed fifth in this operation out of ten participating units. ~~████~~

MISIO: The mission of the 98th Bombardment Wing (B) is: (U)

To organize, man, train, and equip assigned units for the purpose of conducting long-range bombardment operations. (U)

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To develop a mobility capability and train subordinate units to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world by these units. (U)

To develop and maintain the capability to engage in effectiveness air refueling operations. (U)

To prepare units to participate in disaster relief and other domestic emergencies that might arise. (U)

To perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters. (U)

#### SECTION II - Command

COBRA KILLER: A no-notice Unit Simulated Combat Mission was executed by the 98th Bomb Wing during August 1957 as Operation "Cobra Killer" was flown on 19 August with 41 aircraft of the wing participating in a joint maneuver with the 307th Bomb Wing, both wings representing the 818th Air Division. The 98th Bomb Wing's participation in the operation was considered successful from an overall operational standpoint, the wing receiving a percent score of 85 percent in the execution phase, while the 98th Air Refueling Squadron received a percent score of 97 percent. (U)

This operation is covered more thoroughly in Chapter III, Section I of this history. (U)

PAGE SEPTER VIII: Once again the 98th Bomb Wing was required to participate in an Eighth Air Force Bombing and Navigation Competition, Page Letter VIII, flown on 26 and 30 August 1957. Out of ten participating units, the 98th Bomb Wing placed fifth, performance was excellent as improvement was noted



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in just about all phases in cooperation with the accomplishments of the last  
face letter Mission. For further details on Face Letter VIII, reference  
is made to Chapter III, Section I of this History. (S)

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CHAPTER II - PERSONNEL

SECTION I - Military Personnel

STATUS: Officer and Airmen strength figures made little change during August, at the end of the month the 98th Bomb Wing had a total authorized strength of 1917 Officers and Airmen, and an assignment of 1967 personnel. For the officers, 401 were authorized and 422 assigned as of 31 August, indicating a decrease of six assigned officers compared to last month. Airmen assigned figures was posted at 1545, four less than last month, against an authorization of 1516.<sup>1</sup> Organizations of the 98th Bomb Wing were authorized and assigned the following number of personnel as of 31 August 1957. (U)<sup>2</sup>

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>AIRMEN</u>	
	Auth	Assigned	Auth	Assigned
Hq, 98th Bomb Wing	61	61	142	151
343rd Bomb Squadron	71	76	93	91
344th Bomb Squadron	71	75	93	77
345th Bomb Squadron	71	76	93	80
98th Air Refueling Squadron	98	106	219	218
98th Field Maintenance Squadron	8	10	415	419
98th Periodic Maintenance Squadron	3	3	106	110
98th A & E Maintenance Squadron	10	10	325	374
98th Tactical Hospital	<u>8</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	401	422	1516	1545

1. "Lincoln Air Force Base Strength Report", prep by Stat Services for July 1957. Exhibit 1.

2. Ibid



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SECTION II - Crews

CREW STATUS: The 98th Bomb Wing tactical units had an aggregate total of 51 combat ready B-47 crews at the end of August along with 17 non-combat ready crews. An organizational breakdown of these crews was as follows: (U)

943rd Bomb Squadron

Select Crews	3	
Lead Crews	2	
Combat Ready	11	
Non-Combat Ready	6	IN Crews 0

944th Bomb Squadron

Select Crews	0	
Lead Crews	4	
Combat Ready	14	
Non-Combat Ready	2	IN Crews 1

945th Bomb Squadron

Select Crews	3	
Lead Crews	2	
Combat Ready	12	
Non-Combat Ready	6	IN Crews 0

Crew status figures for the 98th Air Refueling Squadron remained the same throughout the month of August, 25 combat ready crews and five non-combat ready crews. (U)

CREW STATUS CHANGES: Two crews were formed in the wing tactical units during August, 11-45 and 11-46 while lead crews 1-02 had to be disbanded to better

3. Extracted from Combat Crew Status Board, Combat Crew Resources Office, and Interview, L/Sgt (b) (6) Historian, with Capt (b) (6) OIC, Combat Crew Office, 1 September 1957.

4. Ibid

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utilize crew resources, and crew 1-34 had to be downgraded to II status resulting from the loss of the co-pilot. Two non-combat ready crews were upgraded to combat ready status, N-2<sup>5</sup> and N-36, and lead crew 10 was upgraded to select crew status.<sup>6</sup>

B-17 CREW PROJECTION: August 1957 was another month where the majority of projected combat ready dates were not met. Of the seven crews scheduled for upgrading during August, only two were projected as scheduled. The five crews that failed to be upgraded was caused by their not completing standboard, due to the no-notice UCGM "Cobra Killer", and the rescheduling of Face Setter VIII. This delay caused these crews' projection dates to be changed as indicated below, along with other projection dates changed: (U)<sup>7</sup>

<u>Crew Number</u>	<u>Projected Combat Ready Date</u>
N-67	15 September 1957
1-24	30 September 1957
1-66	30 September 1957
1-76	30 September 1957
1-99	30 September 1957
N-24	31 October 1957
1-25	31 October 1957
1-42	31 October 1957

5. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PARC IV to "Air Training Report (RQ: 5-246-12)," August 1957, Hq 90 34, n.d. Exhibit 2.
6. Interview, C/Lt Donald J Unger, Historian, with Capt (b) (6) /10, Combat Crew Office, 1 September 1957.
7. "Non-Combat Ready Crew Upgrading Projection", (RQ: 5AF-11), as of 31 August 1957, Hq 90 34, n.d. Exhibit 3.

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1-70	31 October 1957
1-74	15 November 1957
1-31	15 November 1957
1-27	30 November 1957
1-30	30 November 1957
1-32	30 November 1957
1-29 11-45 11-46	Unknown

10-37 CREW PROJECTIONS: The projected combat ready date of non-combat ready crews 1-30, 1-31 and 1-32, all previously projected to become combat ready 1 September, were changed during August. These changes were caused by the aircraft commander on crew 1-30 departing TDY to Squadron Officers School; and the aircraft commander and co-pilots on the other crews being assigned to combat ready crews to prevent crew regression. As of the end of August, the new projection date of crews 1-30, 1-31 and 1-32 was 1 November, for crew 1-32 it was 15 September, and for crew 1-31, the new projection date was 1 December 1957. (U)

98th AIR REFUELING SQUADRON CREWS: The 98th Air Refueling Squadron's standard crews made no changes during the month, crews 1-05, 1-10, 1-40, 1-41, 1-49, 1-74 and 1-75 were still assigned for the 1-47. (U)

The 98th Air Refueling Squadron had one standard crew change during August, combat ready crew 1-15 replacing 1-12. At the end of August, crews

8. "Non-Combat Ready Crew Upgrading Projection", (RC: SAR-71), p. of 31 August 1957, Eq 98 AW, n.d. Exhibit 3.
9. "Crew Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (RC: 3-340-11)," August 15, 7, Eq 98 AW, n.d. Exhibit 2.

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T-01, T-09 and T-15 were standboard crew for the KC-17 areas. <sup>10</sup>

SECTION III - Officers

Summary: A new list of critical officer shortages was made up by the wing during August, which indicated the wing was still undermanned in Aircraft Performance Engineers and Supply Officers to name the major shortages. At the end of the month, the wing was short two aircraft performance engineers (4324), three supply officers (6424), two medical officers (9356), one squadron commander (4316), one aircraft maintenance staff officer (4316), two quality control officers (4354), one production control officer (4355), one personnel equipment officer (1435), one administration officer (7424), one general surgeon (9416), one armament systems superintendent (32000), and one personnel superintendent (73000). <sup>11</sup>

Incomplete combat maintenance crews were still filling positions other than their primary duty such as squadron commander, aircraft maintenance officer, quality control officer and production control officer. <sup>12</sup>

WARNING: During the month of August there were 396 officers required for the 98th Bomb Wing with 383 in the required specialty, resulting in 96.7 percent authorized in the required specialty. There were 416 officers assigned against the 383 in the required specialties which gave the wing 91.4 percent assigned in the required specialty. <sup>13</sup>

- 10. "Squadron Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report," (PCS: 9-SAC-112), August 1957, Hq 98 AF, n.d. Exhibit 4.
- 11. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (PCS: 9-SAC-112)," August 1957, Hq 98 AF, n.d. Exhibit 5.
- 12. Ibid
- 13. "Management Control Statement," (PC: 9-SAC-32), August 1957, Hq 98 AF, n.d. Exhibit 5.

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SECTION IV - Airmen

SHORTAGE: The critical AFSC airmen shortages in the wing during August were mainly in the 411XB/E career field. A reasonable input of these personnel was and still is being projected into the wing, but it was anticipated that this shortage will continue to be a major problem until more airmen reenlist in this career field, and those that take the AIT test upon completion of OTI can qualify. <sup>14</sup>

Further information on the OTI and Retention Programs within the 401-- career field is available in Section V, Special Project, of this History. (U)

Another critical wing shortage was in the 321XG career field where seven level airmen were needed. Other airmen shortages were as reported on the RCB: 1-3AC-112 report prepared for the month of August and listed as exhibit two. <sup>15</sup>

MANNING: For airmen in Direct Support Skills, with 1119 authorized and 1116 assigned, the percent of the authorized was 99.2, and the percent of the assigned that were in the required specialties was 94.4 percent. A total of 942 airmen were assigned in the required specialty for the month of August. <sup>16</sup>

In the In-Direct Support Skills there were 397 airmen authorized, 438 assigned and 338 in the required specialties. This provided a rating of 85.1

14. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (RCB: 1-3AC-112)," August 1957, Hq 98 BW, n.d. Exhibit 2.
15. Ibid
16. "Management Control Statement," (RCB: 1-3AC-135), August 1957, Hq 98 BW, n.d. Exhibit 3.

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percent of the authorized being assigned in the required specialties and 77.2 percent of the assigned being in the required specialties. <sup>17</sup>

ON-THE-JOB TRAINING: On-the-job training within the 98th Bomb Wing for the month of August showed great improvement as compared to previous months, the wing receiving an OJT effectiveness percent score of 91 percent. For the month of August, out of 413 airmen eligible, 412 were on OJT producing a percentage of 99.8 percent. In the testing phase, the wing scored a percentage of 90.9 as 39 airmen passed the required test out of 42 tested. <sup>18</sup> The Base OJT Staff Officer personally checked test failures in the entire 98th Air Division, noting that most airmen failed because of taking the test and not on OJT; airmen taking the test prior to completion of OJT; airmen's low reading ability; written phase test not being accomplished; airmen not trained in all areas of his Air Force Specialty; and the lack of control over who should be tested or who should not. <sup>19</sup>

The wing scored a total of 91 points out of a possible number of 100 in the OJT Rating System for August as compared to a Division average of 76 points. This was considered an excellent accomplishment. <sup>20</sup> (U)

REERLISTMENT: The 98th Bomb wing reenlistment rate dropped to a new low for the month of August, posted at 24 percent including both first term and

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17. "Management Control Statement," (RC: 1-340-195), August 1957, 14, 58 SW R.I. Exhibit 5.

18. Ibid

19. "On-The-Job Training Report", August 1957, prep by Base Personnel. Exhibit 6.

20. Ibid

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career airman.<sup>21</sup> A contributing factor to this low reenlistment rate was that the majority of the airman eligible took early out to attend civilian schooling.<sup>22</sup> (U)

A total of 25 airman were eligible to reenlist during the month but only six elected to remain in the Air Force. Of the six reenlisting, one was in the aircraft and engine maintenance career field, three airman in the aircraft Mech-Jet over 2 engine career field, one Munitions and Weapons Maintenance man and one airman reenlisting in the Fabric, Leather and Rubber career field.<sup>23</sup> This indicated five airman reenlisting in the Direct Support Skills.<sup>24</sup>

AWOL: The AWOL rate of the 98th Bomb Wing was fairly low for the month of August, resulting from an average strength of 2075 Airman and only four going absent without leave, giving the wing a percentage of 1.9 per 1000 personnel.<sup>25</sup>

SECTION V - Special Project (APC 431XR)

MEMORANDUM NOTE: Although this outline deals exclusively with the 431XR career field, it can be accepted as applicable to all career fields, and accepted as the wing's methods of On-The-Job Training improvements and retention program. If the reader will note, prior to the concern over the loss of 431XR personnel, the 98th Bomb Wing's OJT and retention rate were only

21. "Management Control Statement," (SC: 1-40-755), August 1957, Pg 98 BW, n.d. Exhibit 5.
22. Interview, 12/21 (b) (6) Historian, with Capt (b) (6) CIO, 98 BW Airman's Branch, 3 September 1957.
23. "Separation and Reenlistment Report", August 1957, prep by Base Reenlistment Office. Exhibit 7.
24. "Management Control Statement," (SC: 1-40-755), August 1957, Pg 98 BW, n.d. Exhibit 5.
25. Ibid



mechanics, but after the necessary steps of improving COT and Retention Programs as a result of these losses, the wing's COT and reenlistment effectiveness showed great improvement. This improvement was reflected on the wing's climbing reenlisting percentages for the last few months, and the COT improvement as noted on the wing's COT effectiveness for the month of August 1957. (U)

AFSC 411X1B: The continued loss of jet aircraft mechanics, although a problem area in the past, was first really emphasized in June 1957. Higher headquarters conducted a survey to determine the number of 411X1B's eligible for separation through April 1958. This survey revealed that units of the 81st Air Division would experience exceedingly high discharge losses in this career field, especially at the "5" level. Eighth Air Force provided "3" level resources to fill these vacancies and stated that advanced planning had to be initiated to avoid regression in maintenance capability, and this to be accomplished by maintaining a high standard of on-the-job training and a higher retention and extension of enlistment rate. (U)

This notice from Eighth Air Force was quickly acted upon by the 98th Bomb Wing Commander, sending a letter to all squadron commanders and the Director of Material urging renewal of reenlistment efforts and the direction to provide a higher standard of on-the-job training for all untrained resources. (U)

26. Ltr. by 98 BW to Comdr 340th Bomb Sq, et al, 98BW. "Projected Mechanics Losses of Jet Aircraft Mechanics," 20 Jun 1957. Exhibit 8.

27. 1219



Reply, and recommendations to the wing commander varied little throughout the wing. Most of the squadrons stated that emphasis would be continually placed on CJT at Commander's Cell and squadron meetings, along with all eligible personnel being placed on CJT and their progress being closely monitored by the supervisor and CJT officer. One of the major recommendations was from the 945rd Bomb Squadron where it was recommended that a formal CJT school be formed within the wing on a temporary basis with "A" level personnel attending on a part time basis, and the remainder of their time being spent in on-the-line training. In conjunction with this, the squadron further recommended that MID personnel and the present supervisor personnel be utilized as instructors. <sup>28</sup> (U)

Another contribution to the CJT Program in solving this problem was the 90th A & B Maintenance Squadron's plan of pinpointing specific personnel, based on present rank, demonstrated proficiency and future potential, and expediting their training. <sup>29</sup> From the 90th Periodic Maintenance Squadron came this: The lack of phase tests had been a past area of weakness. To alleviate this, the test are now obtained by having the trainees submit one multiple choice question complete with answer for each phase. The questions are then reviewed, corrected, consolidated and administered by the supervisors. It was the squadron's thought that the research required in the

28. Incl 1: DF, 90E to 90C, "Projected Discharge Losses of Jet Aircraft Mechanics," 12 Jul 1957, filed in 9. D/Pers Office.

29. Incl 4: DF, 90E to 90C, "Projected Discharge Losses of Jet Aircraft Mechanics," 12 Jul 1957, filed in 9. D/Pers Office.



individuals' formulation of the question, produced a valuable tool in the learning field. <sup>30</sup> (U)

The reenlistment portion of reducing the loss of jet aircraft mechanics also received good contributions and recommendations from the squadrons. More frequent interviews was the main tactic of the squadrons, along with improving living and working conditions plus recognition of meritorious work. Recruiting posters and reenlistment literature displayed throughout the squadron area was another tactic, and lectures on "Esprit de Corps" still another. The 34th Bomb Squadron forwarded a good recommendation to the program, stating a specific aid to reenlistment might be a weekly article in the base newspaper featuring some airman who has just reenlisted, and he in turn, stating why he chose an Air Force career. <sup>31</sup> (U)

Comments from the Wing Director of Materiel, Major (b) (6) also came in. It was his consensus that the retention of aircraft mechanics could be improved through further perusal of the supervisors. He stated, "We can put up posters, have systematic interviews, and lecture on "Esprit de Corps"; however, if we and the commanders do not look into the ability and foresight of these supervisors, we have missed a great reenlistment potential". He went on to say that there could be some doubt as to whether or not the supervisors now in that position are the best qualified to act as

30. Incl 6: DF, 98DF to 98C, "Projected Discharge Losses of Jet Aircraft Mechanics," 12 Jul 1957, filed in 98 D/Fers Office.

31. Incl 1: DF, 98DF to 98C, "Projected Discharge Losses of Jet Aircraft Mechanics," 12 Jul 1957, filed in 98 D/Fers Office.



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ambassadors with the goal of the Air Force in mind.<sup>32</sup> (U)

Another point brought up by the Director of Material was officer air crew members, who have aircraft assigned, associating with their respective crew chiefs, assistant crew chiefs and on down and becoming familiar with the problems associated with the average airman.<sup>33</sup> (U)

For improved On-The-Job Training, it was brought up that during the slack in periodic inspections, all newly assigned 451M1 personnel with the wing, were reassigned to the 98th Periodic Maintenance Squadron. This enabled them to receive additional training prior to being permanently assigned to the tactical squadrons. Through this training period, the individual was prepared for the job that he was assigned to and with less loss of manpower once he was assigned to a tactical squadron. But, as the Director of Material pointed out, the wing returned to a full periodic maintenance schedule, this situation could not be handled by one squadron, placing the burden upon the squadron maintenance officers.<sup>34</sup> (U)

#### SECTION VI - Safety

The 98th Bomb Wing was without a major or minor aircraft accident during the month of August 1957. The flying percent score for the month was posted at 100 percent with no accidents during 2512 flying hours. The ground safety percent score was also 100 percent and no government motor vehicle accidents

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32. Comment #2, DF, 98BF to 98C, "Projected Discharge Losses of Jet Aircraft Mechanics," 18 Jul 1957. Exhibit 9.

33. Ibid

34. Ibid

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were reported in driving 21,700 miles during the 31 day period. <sup>35</sup> (C)

TOPIC VII - Key Personnel

One key personnel position was changed in the 98th Bomb Wing during August as Colonel (b) (6) was assigned as the Wing Deputy Commander vice Colonel (b) (6) <sup>36</sup> effective 10 August 1957. (U)

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- 35. "Management Control Statement," (RCS: 1-AG-195), August 1957, Hq 98 BW, n.d. Exhibit 5.
  - 36. GO 5, Hq 98 BW, 5 August 1957. Exhibit 10.



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CHAPTER III - OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

SECTION I - General

"COBRA KILLER" (8-27): A no-notice Unit Simulated Combat Mission was one of the main highlights for the 98th Bomb Wing during August as Operation "Cobra Killer" was executed on the 19th of the month. The mission, exactant execution date anytime between 1 August and 30 November, was to conduct a UCMJ for the purpose of exercising the 318th Air Division, represented by the 98th and 307th Bomb Wings, for the continuation of training of combat ready B-47 crews with a review towards maintaining proficiency in accordance with Air Force Regulation 50-8. <sup>1</sup>

The requirement for the Air Division was to launch 80 aircraft in three waves, the first and second wave composed of eight cells each, three aircraft per cell, and the third wave consisting of ten cells, three aircraft per cell with the exception of two cells having four aircraft each. The waves were to be launched at 12 hour intervals with either 20 or 40 minutes between cells and one minute between aircraft. <sup>2</sup>

The requirement for the 98th Bomb Wing tactical units was to furnish 40 or 41 B-47 aircraft of the total number, and one other B-47 to act as a weather scout in the "Caldwell" or "Tall Corn" air refueling area. The air-

\*. Although a Crew Filmay was published for the 98th Bomb Wing's participation in "Cobra Killer", it was the Historian's concenses that a more complete and accurate "Picture" of this mission could be provided utilizing the information contained in the 318th Air Division Operations Order. Henceforth, the information contained herein is extracted exclusively from the Division Operations Order and amendments thereto. For the benefit of future informational reference, the 98th Bomb Wing Crew Filmay for this mission is enclosed as Exhibit 11.

1. Operations Order 300-57, Hq 318AD, n.d. Exhibit 12.

2. Ibid



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craft of the wing were divided into 13 cells, the first 12 cells of three aircraft each and the 13th cell composed of four aircraft. <sup>3</sup>

The mission's general route was from Lincoln to Caldwell Refueling Area or to alternate refueling area Tell Corn, thence to Grand Forks, Minn, to 56-211 88-00W, to 52-551 82-10W, to the cell breakup points. At this point the route extended to where it divided into two cell breakup points, Ann Cell and Betty Cell. Ann Cell was at 43-341 92-17N, and Betty Cell was 44-421 86-03E. From here it was target assignments. In the Ann Cells, camera attacks were to be at Burlington, Iowa by the lead aircraft at 34,500 feet, Des Moines Municipal Airport, Iowa by number two aircraft at 35,500 feet, and the number three aircraft at Rock Island at an altitude of 35,000 feet and then returning to Lincoln. For the Betty Cells, the lead aircraft were to perform a camera attack on Peoria Municipal Airport, Ill at 34,000 feet, the number two aircraft on Peoria Municipal Airport, Ill at 35,000 feet, and the number three aircraft on Fort Wayne Municipal Airport, Ind at 34,500 feet, then returning to Lincoln. <sup>4</sup>

Thirty-seven aircraft of the 98th Bomb Wing participated in the mission with all phases considered excellent. Base Facilities were satisfactory; Target Materials and other Intelligence Data considered satisfactory; Internal Security was adequate; Communications were considered satisfactory; ECM activity was satisfactory although some difficulty was encountered due to

3. Operations Order 300-17, HQ 812AO, n.d. Exhibit 12.

4. Amendments Number 1 and 2 to Operations Order 300-17, HQ 812AO, n.d. Exhibit 13.



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no fighter support and lack of CBI clearances caused by adverse weather; photography and Photo Equipment were satisfactory except for the film scoring lost on two aircraft due to a non-developed roll of film being delivered to photo intelligence and the over exposure of one roll of 0-15 camera film; Gunnery equipment preparation was also considered satisfactory. <sup>5</sup> (S)

Thirty-six aircraft of the 37 participating from the 98th completed reliable Grid Celestial Navigation legs. The failure of one aircraft to complete the requirement was caused by no stabilization of picture during and after slight turns as picture rotated and sectored on scope. The crew was able to maintain cell tactics while performing inflight maintenance and make successful bomb run, but celestial work would have jeopardized cell tactics and possibility of bomb run. <sup>6</sup> Of the 36 aircraft completing navigation legs, 27 were night Grid Celestial legs with a CEA of 16.59M which was considered very satisfactory. Nine other aircraft of the 36 completed day Grid Celestial legs, recording a CEA of 10.66 M which was also considered very satisfactory. <sup>7</sup>

All 37 aircraft completed Long Range Cruise Controls, 14-Minute Turnover and runs on assigned targets, with 33 of the targets drops reliable. Bombing was considered excellent for the mission while the tactics were satisfactory. <sup>B</sup> The average graded score for all aircraft of the wing was 98.6 percent. ~~SECRET~~

5. Final Mission Report, 013AD OpOrd 300-37, Pg 98B, n.d. Exhibit 14.

6. Cobra Killer Report, prep by 98th Bomb/Nav Section, 21 Apr 1957 Exhibit 15.

7. Final Mission Report, 013AD OpOrd 300-37, Pg 98B, n.d. Exhibit 14.

8. Ibid

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The 98th Tenth Wing made several recommendations after the mission, recommending that care be exercised in mission planning to prevent flights thru ill-weather areas and over-flight of heavily populated areas. It was further recommended that future like missions with a category one priority, be authorized to change refueling areas up to launching time of any given wave with expeditious approval by CAA. This request for change would be based on the weather scout's recommendations. <sup>9</sup>

"COBRA KILLER" (30-17): The 98th Air Refueling Squadron also had a share in performing Operation "Cobra Killer" as the squadron was to provide air refueling support for the participating B-47. <sup>10</sup>

Using the refueling tactics and procedures in accordance with AC Manual 50-10, the KC-97 aircraft were to be launched in three waves, four cells per wave and three aircraft per cell with the exception of the third wave which had five cells, three aircraft per cell except for one cell that had four aircraft. The KC-97's were to refuel the Ann Cell at the primary refueling area, "Caldwell", Grids 42-271 100-108, and rendezvous at 43-341 99-461. <sup>11</sup>

The overall success of the 98th Air Refueling Squadron's part in Operation "Cobra Killer" was estimated at 97.2 percent. A tanker air short, resulting in the failure to refuel the receiver, was the cause for the squadron not receiving a 100 percent rating. <sup>12</sup>

9. Final Mission Report, 818AD OpOrd 300-57, Hq 98FW, n.d. Exhibit 14.

10. Operations Order 300-57, Hq 818AD, n.d. Exhibit 12.

11. Amendments Number 1 and 2 to Operations Order 300-57, Hq 818AD, n.d. Exhibit 13.

12. Final Mission Report, 818AD OpOrd 300-57, Hq 98AW, 26 Aug 1947, Exhibit 16.

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Base Facilities were considered adequate for support along with aircraft maintenance and supply support. Communications and Electronics equipment operated effectively for 100 percent electronic rendezvous effectiveness. It was pointed out that cell leaders did an exceptionally fine job of circumnavigating the adverse weather and accomplishing 100 percent off-loads as briefed. <sup>13.</sup>

FACE SETTER VIII: August 1957 marked the execution of Face Setter VIII, Operations Order 232-57, by the 98th Bomb Wing. The operation objective was to exercise and assess the 98th Bomb Wing's capability in Radar Bombing; Hi-Jinks maneuver; GPI techniques; Lite Celestial Grid navigation; Staff Planning; Radar Target Analysis; Unit Briefing; Aircraft and Radar Maintenance Support; IEDA Capabilities; and EW effectiveness. <sup>14.</sup>

The mission was originally scheduled for 22 and 26 August but with the no-notice UACM, "Cobra Killer", Face Setter VIII was rescheduled for execution on 26 and 30 August 1957. <sup>15</sup> The mission planning and targets were as follows: <sup>16</sup>  
The 98th Bomb Wing was to launch a minimum force of 70 percent of possessed aircraft not on TDY ordered by higher headquarters. The wing scheduled the operation in two waves, one on the 26th and the other on the 30th of August. The route tactics were a normal takeoff and acceleration of three minutes and 10 miles, climbing at 93 percent power and flying the route with ten minutes

13. Final Mission Report, 818AD OpOrd 300-57, Hq 98ABW, 26 Aug 1957. Exhibit 16.

14. Operations Order 232-57, Hq 98BW, 23 - 27 Aug 1957. Exhibit 17.

15. Lsg, Comdr SAG to Comdr 818AD, et al, JOCIB 257/1, 20 Aug 1957. Exhibit 15.

16. Operations Order 232-57, Hq 98BW, 23 - 27 Aug 1957. Exhibit 17.

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and 2000 feet separating aircraft, and making bomb runs at Mach .74 and Mach .81. <sup>17</sup>

The first target, Seymour, was an offset bomb run to be made at Mach .74, at an altitude of 33-35,000 feet, with pre-initial point at Hanksville, Ill, Initial Point at Crewfordsville, Ind and Ground Position Indicator at Weir-Cook Air Field. <sup>18</sup>

The second target, Charlotte, N.C., was also to be made at Mach .74 and an altitude of 33-35,000 feet, but a Direct bomb Run with pre-initial point at Cherokee Reservoir Dam, initial point at Ashville, N.C., and ground position indicator at Shelby, N.C. <sup>19</sup>

The third target, Richmond, Va, was another offset bomb run but flown at Mach .81 at an altitude of 33-35,000 feet, and a hi-jinks maneuver to the left with I.D.A. procedures. The pre-initial point was at Pearce, Va, Initial point at Lynchburg, Va, and ground position indicator at Farmville, Va. After the run on Richmond, a Grid Celestial Navigation Leg was to begin at Winchester, Va and terminate at 43-11 N 92-30W, thence returning to Lincoln. <sup>20</sup> (B)

The results at the end of the mission were considered successful from an overall operational standpoint as the 98th Bomb Wing made improvements in just about all phases in comparing with the last Face Getter mission. The

17. Operations Order 232-57, Hq 98BW, 20 - 27 Aug 1957. Exhibit 17.

18. Ibid

19. Ibid

20. Amendment Number 1 to Operations Order 232-57, Hq 98BW, 20 - 27 Aug 1957. Exhibit 15.

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21  
Following phases of planning and execution were graded as follows: ( )

Base Facility	No problem areas
Target Materials and Intelligence Data	Adequate
Internal Security	Excellent
Aircraft General Maintenance	Adequate
Supply Support	Adequate
Communications	Satisfactory
ECM	Not evaluated due to lack of jamming equipment
CIA Reporting	Good
Weather Data	Adequate
Navigation Reliability	Outstanding as the average termination error was only 0.322%
Flight Engineering	Excellent
Bombing Reliability	Satisfactory
Hi-Jinks Maneuver	Successful as 21 crews completed and only one was unsafe

The following was the Summary of Unit Results for the 9th Bomb Wing's participating in Face Letter VIII: (S)

	<u>SEYDUR</u>	<u>CHARLOTTE</u>	<u>RICHMOND</u>	<u>ALL TARGETS</u>	<u>NAV LED</u>
RUNS SCHEDULED	32 / 0	32 / 0	30 / 0	94 / 0	32
RUNS SCORED	29 / 0	28 / 0	26 / 0	83 / 0	30

21. Final Mission Report, 98BW OpOrd 232-57, Hq 98BW, 6 Ser; 19,7. Exhibit 20.
22. Summary of Unit Results, 98BW OpOrd 2,2-57, Hq 98BW, 26 - 30 Aug 1957. Exhibit 21.

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ONF	2350	775	1785	1420	4 1/2
ORA	3649	1045	2050	2339	8.88
GROSS ERRORS	5	None	1	6	None
GROSS ERROR RATE	17.24%	0%	3.84%	7.23%	0%
RELIABILITY FACTOR	72.41%	96.43%	88.16%	85.54%	100%
ABORTS	3	4	4	11	2
ABORT RATE	9.37%	12.50%	19.33%	11.70%	6.25%

Reference Runs Scheduled and Scored Above - The 98th Bomb Wing scheduled 94 bomb runs and made 83 releases, receiving a bombing reliability of 85.5 percent, an improvement of a half percent over Face Letter VII. This percentage was just satisfactory and produced an area of concern. The main area of weakness on this mission was the Seymour target which had eight unreliable and five gross errors. There was one unreliable on Charlotte and three unreliable and one gross error on Richmond. <sup>23</sup> Seymour was a very difficult bomb run, requiring the maximum from the aircrew operator's techniques using tilt, gain and video. It was felt that a higher bombing reliability could have been scored if the failure of many navigators to keep the Offset Aiming Points tuned on the scope had not prevented final synchronization and final crosshair placement. Another factor precluding a higher score was the bombing equipment which did not hold function as well as on Face Letter VII, where the equipment had very little operating time. This was reflected on the equipment reliability which was scored a marginal <sup>24</sup> 87.3 percent. ↙

23. OP, 98DOT to 98IX, "Eight Air Force Face Letter VII Critique 23 Sep 57, 10 Sep 1957. Exhibit 22.

24. Ibid

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reference gross errors - Out of a total of six gross errors, three were caused by target mis-identification; two bomb/nav system malfunctions; and one lost Offset Aiming Point. <sup>25</sup>

Reference Aborts Above - Of the 11 aborts listed, five were due to bomb/nav system malfunction; three due to bomb/nav Computer malfunctions; and three due to losing the crosshairs and Sector Scan. There were also two site aborts caused by IFF Fuse Flown and losing Offset Aiming Point. <sup>26</sup>

The wing's mission summary was further broken down into the accomplishments and scoring of each tactical units participation, along with the top crews of the mission, a comparison with the last Face Letter mission, and a comparison between the 98th and 307th Bomb Wings. This information is contained in Exhibit 23 of this history. <sup>27</sup>

Although the standings of the Eighth Air Force units participating in Face Letter VIII were received in the middle of September, they were available to include in this history for August. The 98th Bomb Wing placed fifth out of ten units executing the mission, receiving a total of 846.50 points as compared to the winning wing, 310th Bomb Wing receiving 915.54 points. <sup>28</sup>

FLYING HOUR ALLOCATION: Once again Strategic Air Command received a large reduction in flying hour funds. In a message from Eighth Air Force it was

25. DF, 98007 to 9800, "Eighth Air Force Face Letter VIII Critique 29 Sep 57. 19 Sep 1957. Exhibit 25.
26. Summary of Unit Results, 98BW OpRpt 302-57, Pg 93BW, 26 - 30 Aug 1957. Exhibit 21.
27. Face Letter VIII Critique, prep by Dept H A Julten, 98BW bomb/nav Off. 1.4. Exhibit 23.
28. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 81 AD, 21 21, CG 3.316, 17 Sep 1957. Exhibit 20.

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stated that this command reduction necessitated limiting the number of crews which could be maintained throughout the fiscal year including both combat ready flying and the training of crews for combat ready status. The message further pointed out the imperative need that the limitations on commitments and obligations be adhered to, to insure against an overfly of the allocated flying hours, and to insure against underflying the allocated hours. It was the desire of higher headquarters that each wing commander designate one officer from the Directorate of Operations to be responsible for the monitoring and control of the flying hour allocation program, and this officer in turn, to ensure each wing commander daily personal appraisal of his units' flying hour utilization.

Shortly after the wing's receipt of the above notice, word was received that the Fiscal Year 1958 flying hour allocation program guide lines for the first quarter Fiscal Year 1958 were no longer valid and that combat ready and crew upgrading programming was drastically reduced. In view of this, it was suggested that all tactical flight planning be withheld until receipt of the reduced flying hour allocation for first quarter of Fiscal Year 1958. (C)

While waiting for the new allocation the wing received further emphasis from higher headquarters on the restrictions placed on the command which prohibits an overfly of the allocated hours. In previous correspondence from higher headquarters, reference was made to the overflying of allocated hours

29. Leg. Comdr USAF to Comdr USAF, et al., O 2042, 17 Aug 1957. Exhibit 29.

30. Leg. Comdr USAF to Comdr USAF, et al., O 2044, 14 Aug 1957. Exhibit 28.

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constituting a violation of Section 3679 of Revised Statutes. This Section was quoted in part, "No officer of the United States shall make or authorize an expenditure from or create or authorize an obligation under any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available therein".

After several changes, the priorities for tactical aircraft flying was received, placing priority one on flying time being given to combat ready crews; priority two, but as equally important, was that flying time be given to the non-ready crews that must be upgraded to offset attrition of combat ready crews; and priority three, given to the non-ready crew members who are potential selectees for upgrading, and if possible, these non-ready crews be given enough time to meet Air Force Regulation 60-2 requirements.

It was computed by higher headquarters that only sufficient hours would be available to train approximately one out of every three available non-ready crews within the command. It was again emphasized the necessity of continued, concentrated effort by commanders, operations and maintenance officers at every echelon to produce the maximum training capability within the limited hours available. It was pointed out that this reduction in hours would not effect the quality of the force, and that this quality would be maintained at the expense of quantity.

The 98th Bomb Wing received its flying hour allocation for the first quarter in Fiscal Year 1958 the 16th of August, but this allocation was

31. Msg, Comdr IAF to Comdr B19AD, et al, C 20630, 16 Aug 1957. Exhibit 27.
32. Msg, Comdr IAF to Comdr B19AD, et al, CF 29889, 21 Aug 1957. Exhibit 2.
33. Msg, Comdr IAF to Comdr B19AD, et al, C 20630, 16 Aug 1957. Exhibit 27.
34. Msg, Comdr IAF to Comdr B19AD, C 20630, 16 Aug 1957. Exhibit 27.

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revised a week later, and the new revised allocation indicated the B-47E aircraft of the 98th received 263<sup>35</sup> flying hours for the months of August and September 1957, and the 98th Air Refueling Squadron's KC-97 aircraft received 1264 flying hours. The wing was authorized to exchange allocated hours in some cases to provide the maximum flexibility of these allocated hours, and if the allocated hours were not flown, the direction to refund any hours in excess of the unit's requirements.<sup>36</sup>

After receipt of the flying hour allocation, the 98th Bomb Wing was requested to furnish the following data pertaining to programming and flying during the first quarter Fiscal Year 1958.<sup>37</sup> The wing's reply was as indicated below:<sup>38</sup>

Number of combat ready crews programmed to receive 25 hours per month for first quarter fiscal year 1958 - 52 B-47 and 23 KC-97 crews.

Number of tactical hours being assigned per month during August and September to insure proportionate share of ATR 60-2 for personnel other than combat ready or non-ready crews who are required to fly in tactical aircraft - One-hundred sixty hours for B-47 and 42 hours for KC-97's.

Number of available non-ready crews programmed to receive 30 hours per month for the first quarter fiscal year 1958 - Three B-47 crews and two KC-97.

Total number of B/RB-47 hours to be flown in August - 1520 for B-47 and

35. Msg, Comdr USAF to Comdr SIBAD, DC 30265, 24 Aug 1957. Exhibit 30.

36. Msg, Comdr USAF to Comdr SIBAD, et al, C 28436, 16 Aug 1957. Exhibit 27.

37. Ibid

38. Ltr, Hq SIBAD to Comdr USAF, S, "Flying Hour Allocation First Quarter Fiscal Year 1958," 21 Aug 1957. Exhibit 31.

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 26,000 hours for TE-47. For KC-979 aircraft, 6,500 hours. ~~40~~

Total number of E/RK-47 hours to be flown in September - E-478 aircraft was 11,900 hours, for TE-47, 1,200 hours. The KC-979 aircraft was to fly 5,670 hours during September. ~~41~~

Higher headquarters pointed out that the hours reported by tactical and tanker commanders to be flown by month, would be the approved tactical flying hour program for that unit. ~~42~~

SPECIAL TRAINING PROGRAM (E-47): The Special Training Program of the 98th Bomb Wing tactical units for the month of August was formulated and submitted to higher headquarters for approval, programming the allocated flying time of 10,500 hours to: AFR 60-2 requirements, Strategic Evaluation, 36 hours; standardization checks, 240 hours; Operation "Devil Tail", 120 hours; Operation "Lock On", 20 hours; Face Letter VIII, 180 hours; Integral non-ready crew training, 110 hours; and non-ready crew training for individuals, 110 hours. ~~43~~

The wing forecasted 50 combat ready crews by the end of August, and an average aircraft availability of 46 for the month. Compared to the requirement of 61 combat ready crews by this time the wing's forecast was short, but this requirement was later changed to 50 crews as a result of the restricted flying time in May and June hindering the upgrading program. ~~44~~

In other major programming, the wing had eight combat ready crews

39. Lt. Col. Comdr SAF to Comdr 818AD, et al., O 2830, 16 Aug 1957. Exhibit 27.

40. Lt. Col. Comdr 818AD to SAF, 98BX 7-787-C, n.d. Exhibit 32.

41. Ibid

42. Lt. Col. Comdr SAF to Comdr 818AD, DOTI 25065, 13 Jul 1957. Exhibit 33.

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scheduled to accomplish SAC Resurrection 30-34 training during the month, 32 combat ready co-pilots to be available to complete 71a Gunnery training, and 21 spaces to be filled at Skilling Air Force Base for physiological training. <sup>43</sup>

The wing estimated that 32 combat ready, lead and select crews would attend a four hour survival lecture. <sup>44</sup> This four hour survival training course outlined: The care and use of parachute which included one hour dealing with the method of jumping; Management of the Parachute in the air; parachute landings under various conditions, and factors involved in safe flying such as effects of altitude and hi-speed shock. Another major of the course was survival training which included one hour of weapons, shelters, camp sites, procurement of food and water, and clothing. The third and fourth hours of the course were wartime survival, composed of escape and evasion, further broken down into 45 minutes of escape and evasion under fallout conditions, Rights of the evader and evasion travel. The second part of the wartime survival was communications and pick-up procedures, one hour and 15 minutes to include actual demonstration and practice in the installation and use of the RS-6 and UM-1 radio, Practice in coding and decoding messages utilizing the LOTES 1, and practice in transmitting and receiving messages. The fourth phase of the survival training course was the code of conduct to be conducted in monthly officer's call. The deadline for completion of this training was 30 September 1957 for crews not available in August. <sup>45</sup>

43. Msg. Comdr 815AD to SAC, 98DWT 7-727-C, n.d. Exhibit 32.

44. H44

45. Msg. Comdr 8AF to Comdr 815AD, 21 21. 091 2404. 4 Jul 1957. Exhibit 34.

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The proposed Special Training Program of the 98th Bomb Wing tactical units was approved by higher headquarters, and with the approval came several changes. The required forecast of combat ready B-47 crews by 31 August was changed from 61 to 58 crews for the tactical units. <sup>46</sup>

SPECIAL TRAINING PROGRAM (KO-57): For the 98th Air Refueling Squadron, 646 hours were allocated for August in conjunction with the Special Training Program, placing emphasis on AFR 60-2 requirements; Higher headquarters directed mission to support 8th Air Force Tanker-Receiver Schedule, 400 hours; Standardization checks, 112 hours; Integral non-ready crew training, 175 hours; Non-ready crew training for individuals, 210 hours; and combat ready crew training, 261 hours. The combat ready crew training included two Grid Celestial Navigation Legs with 85 percent reliability; Air Refueling with 80 percent reliability for those crews who did not accomplish the required training during the last quarter, and the necessary emphasis on pilot proficiency. In other programming, four combat ready crews were to accomplish SAC Regulation 50-24 training, while an estimated six spaces for physiological training were scheduled to be filled. <sup>47</sup>

As for the wing tactical units, the proposed program of the 98th Air Refueling Squadron was also approved by higher headquarters. There was some doubt as to the number of hours programmed for integral non-ready crew training, but this was caused by an error in transmitting as the squadron actually reported 175 hours but Eighth Air Force received the figure 715 hours. <sup>48</sup>

46. Msg, Comdr USAF to Comdr 81SAD, DOW 25065, 13 Jul 1957. Exhibit 33.

47. Msg, Comdr 81SAD to Comdr USAF, 98DOW 7-727-6, n.d. Exhibit 32.

48. Msg, Comdr USAF to Comdr 81SAD, DOW 25065, 13 Jul 1957. Exhibit 33.

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SECTION II - Flying Schedule

2-47 TRAINING PRIORITIES: Eighth Air Force training priorities numbered eight to be accomplished by the wing tactical units during August, totaling 1834 flying hours. Higher headquarters directed missions had no hours programmed for the month, but 144 hours were accomplished as a result of Operation "Cobra Killer", a Unit Simulated Combat Mission, flown on 19 August. The training priorities directed by Eighth Air Force were programmed and accomplished as follows: <sup>49</sup> ~~49~~

Priority One - Air Force Regulation 60-2 Requirements - Once again the programming and accomplishing of this priority was in conjunction with other training with particular attention given to proficiency checks. (U)

Priority Two - Strategic Evaluation and Standardization Flight Checks - This priority had 66 hours accomplished against a programming of 54 hours. (U)

Priority Three - Operation "Devil Tail" - The deployment of the 98th Bomb Wing was still indefinite at the end of August although the wing did program 120 hours for its accomplishment. (U)

Priority Four - Race Letter VIII - The wing had 299 hours programmed for this priority and an accomplishment of 220 hours. This mission is further outlined in Section I of this history. (U)

Priority Five - Integral Non-Ready Crew Training - The accomplished hours of this priority, 373, were greatly affected by the execution of Operation "Cobra Killer", after having 450 hours programmed. (U)

Priority Six - Non-Ready Crew Training for Individuals - This priority

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49. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (RCR: 5-340-112," August 1957, Hq 98 BG, n.d., Exhibit 2.



was also affected by "Cobra Killer", as 102 hours were accomplished against a programming of 120 hours. (U)

Priority Seven - Combat Ready Crew Training - Accomplished hours of 571 fell short of the programmed 691 hours. (U)

Priority Eight - Staff Crew Training - Another shortage in accomplished hours as the result of "Cobra Killer", 100 hours were programmed but only 63 accomplished. (U)

The accomplished hours of the above priorities, Operation "Cobra Killer", and test hops, totaled 1769 hours flown by the tactical units for the month of August 1957. The total accomplished hours were also affected by the reduction in flying hours for the first quarter in Fiscal Year 1958.<sup>50</sup> This reduction is recorded in Section I of this Chapter. (U)

AC-97 TRAINING PRIORITIES: Three higher headquarters directed missions and six Eighth Air Force training priorities were the 98th Air Refueling Squadron's objectives during August. The higher headquarters directed missions, "Game Line", BAF OCAIA IRAI, and "Cobra Killer", totaled 193:20 hours flown, while the Eighth Air Force training priorities were programmed and accomplished as follows:<sup>51</sup> (U)

Priority One - Air Force Regulation 60-2 - Programmed and accomplished with other training. (U)

Priority Two - Non-Combat Ready Crew Upgrading - A total of 165 hours were accomplished on this priority against a programming of 171 hours. (U)

50. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PAM IV to "Air Training Report" (RCS: 5-SAC-T12), August 1957, Hq 98 AW, n.d. Exhibit 2.

51. "Squadron Commander's Remarks," PAM III to "Air Training Report" (RCS: 9-SAC-T12), August 1957, Hq 98 AW, n.d. Exhibit 4.



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Priority Three - Standardization Checks - 15 hours programmed and 61:45 hours accomplished. (U)

Priority Four - Combat Ready Crew Training - This priority received major emphasis during the special training month, having 385 hours programmed and 303:45 hours accomplished. (U)

Priority Five - Staff Crew Requirements - No hours programmed or accomplished. (U)

Priority Six - Test Hops - An accomplishment of 14:30 hours against a programming of no hours. (U)

The hours flown performing the above higher headquarters commitments and training priorities totaled 738 hours for the month of August 1957. (U)

SORTIE DELETIONS: The 98th Bomb Wing experienced 65 sortie deletions during the month, after scheduling 259 sorties, 20 test flights and two ferry flights, at the weekly 60-9 meetings. Forty-four deletions were due to higher headquarters directed mission "Cobra Killer", two instrument deletions, one weather, two fuel leak deletions, four deletions due to MA-7 bombing equipment, engine trouble accounted for two deletions, one test hops for two, one compass swing, fire warning light caused one, operations one, three due to booster pump change, one due to starter generator change, and one caused by Oil Pressure. After deletions, 188 sorties were flown as scheduled plus 4 additional sorties, giving the wing a total of 206 E-47 sorties and 1761:35 flying hours. <sup>5</sup>

52. "Squadron Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report, (PC: 9-SAC-T12)," August 1957, Hq 98 AFB, n.d. Exhibit 4.

53. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (PC: 9-SAC-T12)," August 1957, Hq 98 BW, n.d. Exhibit 5.

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SECTION III - Air Refueling Data

I-17 AIR REFUELING: The 98th Bomb Wing tactical units had 39 confirmed refueling sorties for the month of August, with 31 of these airborne, and 11 sorties completing an electronic rendezvous. Three tanker cancellations, three tanker air aborts, four receiver cancellations, one aircraft malfunction and one tanker delay caused the failure of 12 sorties to complete an electronic rendezvous. <sup>54</sup>

Also during the month, 25 sorties transferred the required fuel while 14 sorties failed the requirement due to four tanker aborts, four tanker cancellations, one tanker delay, four receiver cancellations and one receiver abort. A total of 30 sorties were confirmed for In-Flight Cell Refueling with all confirmed sorties airborne. Of the number airborne, 20 sorties completed an electronic rendezvous and transferred the required fuel. <sup>55</sup>

KC-97 AIR REFUELING: A total of 31 refueling sorties were confirmed for the 90th Air Refueling Squadron for August of which 25 were airborne. Twenty-three sorties completed an electronic rendezvous on single refuelings, and four sorties completed on double refuelings during the month. Twenty-six sorties did not complete a rendezvous due to 20 inadequate separations and three electronic malfunctions. <sup>56</sup>

The transferring of the required fuel was completed by 17 tanker sorties on single refuelings, and seven sorties transferred the required amount on

54. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (ACR: 5-40-112)," August 1957, HQ 98 AWG, n.s. Exhibit 2.

55. Ibid

56. "Squadron Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report (ACR: 5-40-112)," August 1957, HQ 90 AWG, n.s. Exhibit 4.

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double refuelings. Ten tanker aborts caused the failure of ten sorties to complete this requirement. <sup>57</sup>

A total of 16 sorties were confirmed and airborne for mess night cell refuelings during the month, with all 16 sorties completing an electronic rendezvous and transferring the required fuel. The KC-97 tankers transferred a total of 325,748 gallons of fuel during the month of August 1957. <sup>58</sup>

#### SECTION IV - Ground Training

Phase II of SAC Regulation 50-24 Block training was again applicable to the 98th Bomb Wing tactical units and the 98th Air Refueling Squadron during August, composed of five training days for B-47 crews and three days for KC-97 crews. <sup>59</sup> For the wing tactical units, 14 combat ready crews were responsible for Phase II of this requirement, of which the wing scheduled 10 while five crews attended. None of these attending crews completed the requirement because of failure to receive handgun training due to the closing of the base firing range. Five crews failed to attend due to the no-notice USCG, "Cobra Killer", and the rescheduling of Base Letter VIII. <sup>60</sup> (U)

The 98th Air Refueling Squadron had 100 percent completion for the month of August in Block Training, four combat ready crews were scheduled and all four attended and completed the requirements. <sup>61</sup> (U)

57. "Squadron Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report," (RC: 9-SAC-T12), August 1957, Hq 98 ARS, n.d. Exhibit 4.

58. Ibid

59. 98th Bomb Wing Monthly Operations Plan for August 1957. Exhibit 35.

60. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (RC: 9-SAC-T12), August 1957, Hq 98 EW, n.d. Exhibit 2.

61. "Squadron Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report," (RC: 9-SAC-T12), August 1957, Hq 98 ARS, n.d. Exhibit 4.



SECTION V - Special Weapons Training

Eight Combat Ready B-47 crews completed the Special Weapons Academic Training outlined in SAC Regulation 50-24 during August, bringing the applicable four month total to 35, just one short of the responsible number of 36. This one crew failed to complete the training in August due to Operation "Cobra Killer", and the rescheduling of Pace Letter VIII. <sup>62</sup> (U)

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62. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (RCR: 5-SAC-212," August 1957, HQ 95 Ev, n.s. Exhibit 2.

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CHAPTER IV - MATRIEL

SECTION I - General

MOBILITY INSPECTION: Another Mobility Staff Visit was conducted by the 93th Bomb Wing Logistics Section during August, to the 93th Field Maintenance Squadron. As in past cases, the visit was for the purpose of examining and giving assistance to the unit's weak mobility areas.<sup>1</sup> (U)

The assistance team found the mobility concept of the squadron acceptable as a whole and prepared for any Emergency War Plan. The squadron's mobility readiness was contributed to the excellent cooperation of the mobility officer and squadron Non-Commissioned Officers.<sup>2</sup> (U)

There were some weak mobility areas in the squadron pointed out by the assistance team, such as mobility preparation and responsibility being assigned as an additional duty to mobility supervisors; the recent changes in staging concepts; and lack of knowledge of EW by shop supervisors.<sup>3</sup> (U)

3-47 ENGINES: At the end of August, a total of 25 cracked engines had been discovered during inspections, with only one-third of the wing's engines inspected. These cracked engines produced a serious materiel problem in the wing and Eighth Air Force was notified and reports of the engines found cracked were dispatched weekly.<sup>4</sup> Further information on this problem was unavailable

1. Ltr, Hq 93BW to Comdr 93th Field Maint Sq, 937, "Staff Visit to the 93th Field Maintenance Squadron," 25 Aug 1957. Exhibit 36.

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (WGR) 3-440-T12," August 1957, Hq 93 BW, p.4. Exhibit 2.

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at the time of preparation of this history, but more information is expected to be available in the near future, which when received, will be included in the history. ~~4~~

SECTION II - Maintenance

AIRCRAFT STATUS: During the month of August 1957, the 90th Bomb Wing had an average of 46 B-47 aircraft assigned and possessed, and for the 90th Air Refueling Squadron, the average aircraft availability was 21 assigned and 20 KC-97's possessed. <sup>5</sup> ~~5~~

AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY: A total of 22,490 flying hours were possessed by B-47 aircraft during the month of August, and of this total, 20,207 flying hours were operational ready. A total of 246 hours were flyable but not operational ready during the month. The total hours operational ready, plus one-half the hours flyable but not operational ready, against the total hours possessed, produced a percent score of possessed hours of 85.1 for the month of August 1957. <sup>6</sup> ~~6~~

For the 90th Air Refueling Squadron, 15,184 hours were possessed by KC-97 aircraft with 12,952 hours operational ready. As there were no hours flyable but not operational ready during the month, the percent score of possessed hours for August was posted at 84.6. <sup>7</sup> ~~7~~

FLYING PROGRAM AND SCHEDULE: The 343rd Bomb Squadron's flying program was to provide a total of 100 sorties and 674 flying hours for the month of

5. "Unit Capability Report", (RCS: 2-3AC-11), Aug 1957, Pg 98 B, n.d. Filed in 90th BW/D/ Material Reports and Analysis Section.

6. "Management Control Statement," (RC: 1-3AC-135), August 1957, Pg 98B n.d. Exhibit 5.

7. Ibid

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August, composed of 56 sorties totaling 392 hours for normal training; eight sorties and 48 hours for turn-arounds; 190 hours in flying 20 sorties for pilot proficiency; and a total of 104 hours and 16 sorties programmed for higher headquarters directed mission. The flying schedule for the squadron was to produce 100 pre-flights and 25 post flights. (U)

The flying program for the 344th Bomb Squadron was to provide 45 sorties and 343 flying hours for normal training; 10 sorties and 80 hours for turn-arounds; eight sorties totaling 32 hours for pilot proficiency; 13 flying hours in flying three sorties for Strategic Evaluation; and 15 sorties for a total of 97.5 flying hours programmed for higher headquarters directed missions. This gave the squadron an aggregate total of 55 sorties and 570.5 flying hours to be provided by the flying program for August. Ninety-five pre-flights and 18 complete postflights were to be produced by the squadron's flying schedule. (U)

For the 345th Bomb Squadron, the flying program was to provide 59 sorties and 395.5 flying hours, consisting of 48 sorties and 336 flying hours for normal training; eight sorties totaling 48 hours for turn-arounds; 78 hours in flying 12 sorties for pilot proficiency; six sorties and 36 flying hours for strategic evaluation; and 15 sorties totaling 97.5 hours for higher headquarters directed missions. The flying schedule was to produce 89 pre-flights and 25 post flights during the month. (U)

8. 98th Bomb Wing Monthly Operations Plan for August 1957. Exhibit 53.

9. Ibid

10. Ibid



The flying program of the 98th Air Refueling Squadron was to provide 138 sorties and 744 flying hours for the month of August, composed of Air Refueling support sorties, Standboard Sorties, and Crew Proficiency sorties. The squadron's flying schedule was to produce 130 pre-flights and 34 post flights.<sup>11</sup> (U)

MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY (8-17): The 98th Bomb Wing Chief of Maintenance Board scheduled 253 sorties for 1771 flying hours for the month of August. Against this scheduling, 258 sorties totaling 1709 flying hours were flown, which included 20 test flights for 11 hours and two ferry flights totaling two hours. Programming effectiveness for the month was 37 percent while scheduling effectiveness was posted at 90 percent. The total fleet time for the month was 316<sup>12</sup> hours. (U)

The wing lost 133 potential sorties during August as a result of 74 not being scheduled and 59 sorties cancelled. Of the 59 sortie cancellations, 59 were due to higher headquarters, one weather cancellation, one operations, and 13 maintenance cancellations. The maintenance cancellations were caused by instruments accounting for two, two fuel leaks, four B-47 malfunctions, two due to engine malfunctions, two for due test hops, one compass swing, one fire warning light, two caused by booster pump changes, one generator change, and one caused by oil pressure.<sup>13</sup> (U)

A total of nine B-47 aircraft completed periodic inspections during the month with an average turnaround time of 7.6 days. The initiation of a

11. 98th Bomb Wing Monthly Operations Plan for August 1957. Exhibit 36.

12. "Monthly Maintenance and Flying Activity Report", (HQ: 8-AR-W), Aug 1957, Lq 98 BW, n.d. Exhibit 37.

13. Ibid

system to receive more complete and accurate information on deck test hops aircraft was the major contribution to the Malfunction Data Collection and Analysis Unit during the month. The system works whereby the quality Control branch is supplied with the "Armament and Electronic Briefing Record", and they return complete the record after each test hop and forward it to the Malfunction Data Collection and Analysis Unit. This enabled the MDCAL to more accurately evaluate the quality of periodic inspections and test hops crew effectiveness by checking the status of the test hops and flights, after test hops. (U)

MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY (HC-97): For the 9th Air Refueling Squadron, 12 sorties for 730 flying hours were scheduled for the month of August, and against this, 14 sorties were flown totaling 744 hours which included 11 test flights for 15 hours, one ferry flight for five hours and two operational checks totaling four hours. Programming effectiveness for the squadron was 56 percent compared to a scheduling effectiveness of 92 percent. Total fleet time for the squadron was 1544 hours for the month. (U)

A total of 74 potential sorties were lost during August, 35 due to not scheduled and 39 sorties cancelled. Higher Headquarters accounted for 31 sortie cancellations out of the 39, while eight more were due to maintenance cancellations caused by three engine malfunctions, one hydraulic leak, three due test hops, and one for Tech Order Compliance. Two HC-97 aircraft completed periodic inspection during August with an average turn-around time of 3.8 days.

14. "Monthly Maintenance and Flying Activity Report", (PCG: 2-2AF-4), Aug 1957, Hq 98 AF, n.d. Exhibit 37.

15. Ibid

16. Ibid



QUALITY CONTROL: The Quality Control Section of the 98th Bomb Wing administered the 25 percent flight maintenance inspection on one B-47 and four KC-97 aircraft during August, <sup>17</sup> along with inspecting nine B-47's and two KC-97 aircraft following their departure from periodic inspections. <sup>18</sup> (U)

PERIODIC INSPECTIONS: A total of nine B-47 aircraft were scheduled to enter periodic inspection during August, three aircraft from the 343rd Bomb Squadron, four from the 344th Bomb Squadron and two from the 345th Bomb Squadron. The 98th Air Refueling Squadron had three aircraft scheduled for periodic inspection during August. These B-47 and KC-97 aircraft were scheduled for periodic inspection as follows: <sup>19</sup> (U)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>ACFT NO</u>	<u>ENTER DOOPS</u>	<u>TEST FLY</u>
343rd Bomb Sq	52-2305	9 August 1957	22 August 1957
343rd Bomb Sq	52-537	19 August	29 August
343rd Bomb Sq	52-116	29 August	4 September
344th Bomb Sq	52-223	5 August	13 August
344th Bomb Sq	52-217	9 August	21 August
344th Bomb Sq	52-305	15 August	27 August
344th Bomb Sq	52-2309	29 August	11 September
98th Air Rflg Sq	52-2724	7 August	15 August
98th Air Rflg Sq	52-2759	19 August	27 August
98th Air Rflg Sq	52-2734	27 August	4 September

17. Inspection and Analysis Date Chart, prep and maintained in 98th BW Quality Control Office.
18. Test Flight Log, filed in 98th Bomb Wing Quality Control Office.
19. 98th Bomb Wing Monthly Operations Plan for August 1957. Exhibit 35.

345th Bomb Sq	52-494	21 August 1957	3 September 1957
345th Bomb Sq	52-331	29 August	11 September 1957



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G L O S S A R Y

A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFR	Air Force Regulation
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AWOL	Absent without leave
Coast	Coastment
CEA	Circular Error Average
CPE	Circular Error Probability
ECM	Electronic Counter Measures
ibid	In the same place
IC	Not Checked Out
L	Lead Crew (B-47)
M	Non-Combat Ready Crew (KC-97)
(M)	Medium
MDCAU	Malfunction Data Collection and Analysis Unit
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialty
MTD	Military Training Detachment
N	Non-Combat Ready Crew (B-47)
Nav	Navigator or Navigation
OCMA	Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
R	Combat Ready Crew (B-47)
PCS	Reports Control Symbol
S	Select Crew (B-47)
AC	Strategic Air Commander
T	Combat Ready Crew (KC-97)
TCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission

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PERSONNEL OF THE 98th AFSS

Commander	Colonel (b) (6)
Deputy Commander	Colonel
Adjutant	Captain
Director of Operations	Colonel
Director of Materiel	Major (b) (6)
Director of Personnel	Lt Colonel (b) (6)
Director of Safety	Major (b) (6)

SQUADRON COMMANDERS

98th Air Refueling Squadron	Lt Colonel (b) (6)
24th Bomb Squadron	Lt Colonel
24th Bomb Squadron	Major (b) (6)
24th Bomb Squadron	Lt Colonel (b) (6)
98th A & E Maintenance Squadron	Lt Colonel
98th Field Maintenance Squadron	Lt Colonel
98th Logistic Maintenance Squadron	Major (b) (6)
98th Headquarters Squadron	Captain (b) (6)
98th Tactical Hospital	Colonel



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APPENDIX

CONTENTS NUMBER

1. Lincoln Air Force Base Strength Report, as of 31 August 1957.
2. Report, "Wing Commander's Remarks", HCS: 5-343-112, August 1957.
3. Report, "Non-Combat Ready Crew Operating Projection", HCS: 5AF-1, August.
4. Report, "Squadron Commander's Remarks", HCS: 9-40-112, August 1957.
5. "Management Control Statement", (HCS: 1-40-115), August 1957.
6. "On-the-Job Training Report", August 1957.
7. "Separation and Reassignment Report", August 1957.
8. Ltr, Hq 98EW to Comdr 400th Bomb Sq, et al, 98EW, 20 June 1957.
9. Comment 2, DF, 98EW to 98W, 12 July 1957.
10. General Order Number 5, Hq 98th Bomb Wing, 5 August 1957.
11. 98th Bomb Wing Crew Flies "Cobra Killer".
12. Operations Order 300-57, Hq 98ABW.
13. Amendments Number 1 and 2 to Operations Order 300-57, Hq 98ABW.
14. Final Mission Report, 98ABW OpOrd 300-57, Hq 98ABW.
15. Cobra Killer Report, prep by 98EW Bomb/Av Sect on, 21 August 1957.
16. Final Mission Report, 98ABW OpOrd 300-57, Hq 98ABW, 26 August 1957.
17. Operations Order 222-57, Hq 98EW, 23 - 27 August 1957.
18. Ltr, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 98ABW, et al, DCCIB 29741, 20 August 1957.
19. Amendment Number 1 to Operations Order 222-57, Hq 98EW, 23 - 27 Aug 1957.
20. Final Mission Report, 98EW OpOrd 222-57, Hq 98EW, 6 Sep 1957.
21. Summary of Unit Results, 98EW OpOrd 222-57, Hq 98EW, 26 - 30 Aug 1957.
22. DF, 98XOT to 98EW, 13 September 1957.
23. Base Letter VIII Critique, prep by Capt (b) (6) 98EW Bomb/Av Off.

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Exhibit Number (Cont)

24. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr B1BAD, et al, CS 32316, 17 September 1957.
25. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr B1BAD, et al, C 28862, 13 August 1957.
26. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr B1BAD, et al, CS 28914, 14 August 1957.
27. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr B1BAD, et al, C 28630, 16 August 1957.
28. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr B1BAD, et al, CS 29179, 21 August 1957.
29. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr B1BAD, C 28634, 16 August 1957.
30. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr B1BAD, DC 30265, 24 August 1957.
31. Ltr, Hq B1BAD to Comdr BAF, C, 21 August 1957.
32. Msg, Comdr B1BAD to BAF, 98DOW 7-727-C, n.d.
33. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr B1BAD, DOW 25065, 13 July 1957.
34. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr B1BAD, et al, DOW 24094, 6 July 1957.
35. 98th Bomb Wing Monthly Operations Plan for August 1957.
36. Ltr, Hq 98BW to Comdr 98th Field Maint Sq, 98DM, 29 August 1957.
37. "Monthly Maintenance and Flying Activity Report", MO: 2-11-16, August 1957.