

D00035596

Department of Energy Declassification Review	
1 st Review Date: <u>8-13</u>	Determination: (Circle Number(s))
AU-60 Reviewer: <u>qu brother</u>	1. Classification Retained
Authority: <input type="checkbox"/> DC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DD	2. Classification Changed To: <u>NSI</u>
Derived From: _____	3. Contains No DOE Classified info
Declassify On: _____	4. Coordinate With: _____
2 nd Review Date: <u>05/14/98</u>	5. Declassified
AU-60 Reviewer: <u>[redacted]</u>	6. Classified Info Bracketed
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(UNCLASSIFIED)

HISTORY

30th BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM

BARKSDALE AIR FORCE
BASE LA.

1-29 FEBRUARY 1956






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HISTORY
OF THE
301ST BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM
BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA

1 February 1956 - 27 February 1956

ASSIGNED UNITS

301st Headquarters Squadron Section
32nd Bombardment Squadron
352nd Bombardment Squadron
353rd Bombardment Squadron
301st Field Maintenance Squadron
301st Periodic Maintenance Squadron
301st Air Refueling Squadron
301st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron
301st Tactical Hospital

TYPED BY:

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S/SGT., USAF

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2NDLT, USAF
Historical Officer

APPROVED BY:

(b) (6)

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Colonel, USAF
Commander

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
SECOND AIR FORCE
FOURTH AIR DIVISION

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AUTHORITY

This history has been prepared in accordance with the following regulations and supplemental directives:

AFR 210-3, 11 March 1955
AFM 210-1, 13 September 1953
SAC Manual 210-1, June 1951
SAC Regulation 210-1, 29 August 1955
2AF Regulation 210-1, 1 July 1954

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 31 February 1956)

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL
(as of 31 February 1956)

Commander	Colonel Everett W. Holstrom
Deputy Commander	Colonel Kenneth S. Steele
Director of Operations	Colonel Charles D. Lewis
Director of Material	Colonel Robert H. Borders III
Director of Personnel	Major Sidney L. Neal, Jr.
Chief of Plans, Division	Major Norbert A. Zwicke
Chief of Maintenance	Lt Colonel Ellsworth A. Powell
Chief of Intelligence	Major Lincoln D. Relyea
Comptroller	Major Gerald W. Shirey
Adjutant	Major Curtis C. Corley
Chief Bombardment Division	Major Fred Duquette
Logistics Officer	Major Daniel F. Duke, Jr.
Chief Target Intelligence Branch	Major William F. Cumiskey
Commander, Headquarters Squadron	Lt Enoch H. Edgerton
Commander, 32 BOMBON	Lt Colonel Elmer T. Harsbarger
Commander, 352 BOMBON	Lt Colonel Dayton R. Taylor
Commander, 353 BOMBON	Major William R. Goade
Commander, 301 ABS	Lt Colonel Alann A. Iathan
Commander, 301 A&BON	Major William R. Charlton
Commander, 301 FMS	Major Charles D. Huckleberry

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 31 February 1956)

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL (Con't)
(1 February - 31 February 1956)

Commander, 301 BMS	Major Mac C. Hemphill
Commander, 301st Tactical Hospital	Major Roy R. Patterson
Chief of Nursing Service	Lt Colonel Edith M. Patient
Director of Safety	Major Driskill B. Horton
Chief of Communications and Electronics Division	Major Thomas H. Hardin
Chief of Predictions and Targets Branch	Major Ernest W. Liverman
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt Colonel Samuel T. Battalio
Report and Analysis Officer	Unoccupied at Present Time
Special Weapons Officer	Major Robert E. Hoskins
Gunner Officer	Captain Harold E. VanWormer
Munitions Officer	Unoccupied at Present Time

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History, 301st Bombardment Group (H)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
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INTRODUCTION

The primary mission of the 301st Bombardment Wing, Medium, is the conducting of long range bombardment operations in any part of the world at any time, either independently or in cooperation with land and sea forces.

The responsibility of the 301st Bombardment Wing, Medium, is:

- (1) maintain assigned units in a state of readiness to permit immediate operations either alone or jointly with other forces against enemies of the United States;
- (2) Organize, train, and stage, as directed, appropriate combat service, and supporting units for theatre or other overseas deployment;
- (3) Train bombardment crews, refueling crews and units for performance of global bombardment operations;
- (4) support the Air Reserve and National Guard Program in accordance with instructions received from Headquarters, Second Air Force;
- (5) Perform such special missions as the Commanding General, Second Air Force, may direct.

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CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

STAFF CHANGES - There were no staff changes in the 301st Bombardment Wing during the month of February.¹ (UNCL)

NEW REGULATIONS - Three new regulations were published during the month of February. The first resulted in establishing a panel to review the findings of the Wing Radar Prediction Team and make final determination of aiming point selection in connection with EWP and/or evaluation. This 301st Bombardment Wing Regulation, 55-905 applies to Operation Directorate and tactical squadron. When available target materials have been fully exploited by the Wing Radar Prediction team, the panel will convene. They will consider every conceivable factor and resolve any variances of opinion. Final determination of aiming point under consideration will be made by the panel before adjournment.² (UNCL)

A check with the wing radar target intelligence section reveals that no one man is qualified to select the aiming point on EWP or evaluation so the regulation provides a panel composed of the best qualified personnel in the wing to pick the aiming point. (UNCL)

The second regulation which was published for the wing during this reporting month was entitled "Inventory of Selected Air Force Property Installed in Aircraft," dated 15 February 1956. This regulation establishes a procedure for the preparation and reporting the inventory of Selected Air Force Property installed in aircraft. The regulation

1. BOBO, Jeff D, Interviewed via telephone by 2MELT Jack W. Grier, 29 Mar 56.
2. HQ, 301HQBWG(M) Regulation No. 55-905, 1 Feb 56, Exhibit 1.

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

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applies to all organizations possessing aircraft who are assigned or attached to the 301st Bombardment Wing (M). Those responsible for the implementation of this regulation or the 301st Armament and Electronics Squadron Commander, 32nd Bombardment Squadron, 352nd Bombardment Squadron, 353rd Bombardment Squadron, 301st Air Refueling Squadron, Engineering Officers, and OIC of base flight.³ (UNCL)

The third regulation 66-4, "Ground Power Equipment Responsibility", was established to supplement the procedure outlined in SAC Manual 66-6. The regulation is directive upon all personnel concerned with the operation, inspection, and maintenance of ground power equipment assigned to the 301st Bombardment Wing.⁴ (UNCL)

FLYING SAFETY - A numerous number of aircraft incidents were reported to the flying safety officer during the month of February with no accidents resulting. Only a few of these incidents were of mentionable importance. One incident occurred when the drag chute of a B-47 failed to blossom on touchdown. Number one and number 2 throttles were placed in cutoff position. The aircraft commander thought he was placing number five and number six throttles in cutoff position, but since number six was already in cutoff number four and five were placed in cutoff instead.⁵ (UNCL)

3. HQ, 301BOMWG(M) Regulation No. 65-2, 15 Feb 56, Exhibit 2.

4. HQ, 301BOMWG(M) Regulation No. 66-4, 15 Feb 56, Exhibit 3.

5. Aircraft Incident Report #14, from 352nd Bomb Squadron flying safety officer to Commander, 301st Bomb Wing, 20 Feb 56, Exhibit 4.

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
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Since the aircraft commander had landed with help of GCA he touched down farther down the runway than normally would have been made without GCA. After reducing speed to taxi speed, the aircraft turned off the runway and stopped on a taxi strip in order to attempt a ground start on number four engine. The ignition switch was placed to the normal position and the start selector and over-ride switch were activated with no immediate result. The fire button had not been pulled after landing so another attempt was made to start number four engine again. This time a loud explosion was heard and fire was observed at number four engine. Fire was probably caused by fuel accumulation resulting from number four engine throttle not being completely in cutoff position prior to attempted start. The drag chute failed to blossom because it probably caught on the guns which were approximately five to ten degrees below the horizontal. The recommended procedure to prevent recurrence of this type of incident is not attempting an engine start without an adequate fire guard, paying particular attention that the check list is accomplished prior to engine starts.⁶ (UNCL)

A second incident was caused by a faulty gear indicator. The indicator failed to give a down indication on the first attempt to lower the gear. A recycling of the gear still failed to produce a down indication. The gear was finally lowered by putting the aircraft into a steep dive, pulling back sharply on the control column and dropping

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
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the gear at the same time. The trouble was found to be a faulty gear indicator. To prevent recurrence of similar incidents a closer inspection by maintenance and aircrews is recommended.⁷ (UNCL)

A restriction to landings on runway 32 continues to exist at Barkedale AFB. The restriction is caused by pecan trees extending up into the clear zone thereby rendering the first 1,600 feet of runway unusable for landing because glide angle criteria cannot be met. Negotiations with the property owner for removal of the pecan trees has proved unsuccessful. On 15 February 1956, the Corps of Engineers, Little Rock District, forwarded formal condemnation proceedings through their channels to the Justice Department. Based upon information furnished by the Corps of Engineers, a court order granting right of entry to the property should be received about 15 April 1956.⁸ (UNCL)

The sweepers now being used to keep the ramp, taxiways and runway free of foreign matter have long proven less than satisfactory. Keeping the airframe free of foreign matter is a must to prevent damage to jet engines. A materiel member present advised that a new vacuum type sweeper is presently under procurement but no anticipated delivery date was given.⁹ (UNCL)

During the recent SAC IG inspection, an inspection of the taxiways, ramps and run-up areas revealed that they were covered with all sizes of rocks and mud. In several sections of the taxiway the concrete is

-
7. Aircraft Incident Report #15, from 353rd Bomb Squadron Flying Safety Officer to Commander 301st Bomb Wing, 20 Feb 56, Exhibit 5.
8. Minutes of January Safety Committee Meeting, 29 Feb 56, Exhibit No. 6
9. Letter from 301C to Base Commander dated 7 Feb 56, Foreign Objects Damage, Exhibit No. 7

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
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starting to break. The weakness of the concrete and the abundance of foreign objects has proven to be a costly and dangerous item.¹⁰ (UNCL)

In the month of January the 301st had nine engine changes on B-47's due to foreign objects damage. It cannot be assumed that the total damage from foreign objects was caused by the condition of the ramps and taxiways.¹¹ (UNCL)

The chairman of the Safety Committee Directed that all commanders and supervisors continue to emphasize ramp cleanliness. The best sweeping equipment would not be able to get to close to the aircraft so individual and collective emphasis continues to be one of the most important aspects on ramp and airbase cleanliness.¹² (UNCL)

GROUND SAFETY - An automobile accident involved Airman Second Class Harold L. Trivett and two other airman who were returning from Minden, Louisiana on U.S. 80, when the right rear tire blew out. The vehicle swerved to the left and skidded sideways across the highway, off the shoulder and into a culvert which caused the vehicle to turn over three times. Airman Trivett was thrown from the vehicle when it turned over the first time. Both passengers were still in the vehicle when it stopped rolling.¹³ (UNCL)

The tires on the vehicle were badly worn and should have been replaced. It was possible that the airman was driving too fast for weather conditions which affected control of the vehicle after the blowout.¹⁴ (UNCL)

10. IBID.

11. IBID.

12. Minutes of January Safety Committee Meeting, 29 Feb 56, Exhibit No. 6

13. Supervisors Report of Ground Accident, AF Form 122, signed by Major Charles D. Huckleberry of the 301st Field Maintenance Squadron, BAFB. Filed in Flying Safety Office Bldg 21. Photograph of accident inclosed as Exhibit 8.

14. IBID.

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History, 301st Bombardment Sqn ()
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

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Airman Trivett received six fractured right ribs, a laceration of the liver, and two lacerations on the neck as a result of the accident. The two airmen riding in the car with Trivett received only general bruises and abrasions.¹⁵ (UNCL)

M/Sgt Harry L. Harper of the 31st Tactical Hospital ran into the rear of another vehicle which was parked at the curb, Second Street East, Berkendale AFB, Ia.. Heavy damage was done to the right front of Sergeant Harper's automobile and the left rear of the other vehicle suffered heavy damage. The airman was reported intoxicated.¹⁶ Sergeant Harper was charged with violation of Article 134 UCMJ, tried by Summary Court Martial on 28 February 1956 and found guilty. He was reduced to grade of P/Sgt and fined fifty dollars.¹⁷ (UNCL)

Another ground accident involved Airman Third Class Elton C. Nystrom, of the 301st Field Maintenance Squadron who suffered minor burns on the face. Airman Nystrom struck a match preparatory to lighting a gas burner. The gas was on, unbeknown to the airman and a minor explosion occurred burning him.¹⁸ (UNCL)

These three accidents being the only ground accidents during February other than minor first aid cases shows a strong decrease in accidents from the previous month.¹⁹ (UNCL)

15. IED.
 16. Supervisor's Report of Ground Accident, AF Form 122, signed by Major Roy R. Patterson, 301st Tactical Hospital. Filed in Flying Safety Office, Bldg 21.
 17. 1st Indorsement to Offense Report of M/Sgt Harry L. Harper, Office of the Provost Marshall, Berkendale AFB, Ia., 9 February 1956.
 18. Supervisor's Report of Ground Accident, AF Form 122, signed by Major Charles B. Huckleberry of the 301st Field Maintenance Squadron, filed in Flying Safety Office, Bldg 21.
 19. KNOWLTON, John R., 1STLT, interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier, 4 Apr 56.
- ~~SECRET~~

CHAPTER II

PERSONNEL

TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH - The total assigned officer strength as of 31 January 1956 was 365¹ with a listing of 368 assigned officers as of 29 February 1956 according to the statistical services semi-monthly strength report.² This increase of 3 officers was rated personnel assigned to two of the bomb squadrons.³ (UNCL)

The assigned airman strength was 1,574 as of 31 January 1956⁴ and 1,537 as of 29 February 1956. This was a decrease of 37 airmen in the 301st Bombardment Wing during the month of February.⁵ This decrease of airmen was caused by routine airman separation from the Air Force with the failure of the airmen to re-enlist.⁶ (UNCL)

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH - The authorized strength for officers remained the same during the period of this history. The officer authorization for the 301st Bombardment Wing as of 29 February 1956 was 424.⁷ (UNCL)

The authorized airman strength as of 29 February 1956 was 1,590, the same as 31 January 1956.⁸ (UNCL)

RELATIONSHIP OF ASSIGNED TO AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL - As of 31 January 1956 this command was short 65 officers.⁹ (UNCL)

1. Exhibit 5 of 1-31 January 1956 History.
2. Statistical Service Semi-Monthly Strength Report as of 29 Feb 56, Exhibit 9.
3. KING, John R, S/Sgt Interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier via telephone 9 Apr 56.
4. Exhibit 5 of 1-31 January 1956 History.
5. Statistical Services Semi-Monthly Strength Report as of 29 Feb 56, Exhibit 9.
6. FARLEY, Daniel, W/C Interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier via telephone 9 Apr 56.
7. Statistical Services Semi-Monthly Strength Report as of 29 Feb 56, Exhibit 9.
8. IBID.
9. Exhibit 5 of 1-31 January 1956 History.

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

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As of 29 February 1956 this shortage was decreased to 56 officers.¹⁰ (UNCL)
This shortage mainly consists of rated personnel.¹¹ (UNCL)

PERSONNEL SHORTAGES - The 301st Bombardment Wing has a critical shortage of painters (552X1) and ground power (472X0) personnel. This shortage in ground power is partially caused by a loss of qualified personnel who are not re-enlisting after separation from the Air Force.¹² The ground power shop is authorized 36 men, but have only 21 assigned. These men are spread over the maintenance shop and the dispatch section in hanger 10. Mechanics are serving as drivers, dispatchers, and clerks.¹³ (UNCL)

A shortage of personnel still exists in the following fields: B-47 Aircraft Maintenance Technician (43171B) K-Systems Technician (32170E), Dope and Fabric Shop Technicians, and trained clerks in the administrative field.¹⁴ (UNCL)

RE-ENLISTMENTS - During the month of February 1956, a total of 43 airmen were discharged from this wing who were eligible to re-enlist. Nineteen, or 44% of such eligible airmen accomplished re-enlistment during that period.¹⁵ This is higher than the re-enlistment rate of 23.8% for the month of January 1956. The re-enlistment rate is still low due to termination of four year enlistments for non-career personnel who enlisted in the Air Force rather than being drafted into the United States Army.¹⁶ (UNCL)

10. Statistical Services Semi-Monthly Strength Report as of 29 Feb 56, Exhibit 9.
 11. BOBO, Jeff M/Sgt interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier via telephone 9 Apr 56.
 12. FARLEY, Daniel, W/O interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier, 9 Apr 56.
 13. Monthly Activities Report from 301DWSB to Col Borders, 4 Feb 56 Filed in Maintenance Control Section
 14. FARLEY, Daniel, W/O interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier, 9 Apr 56.
 15. SHIREY, Gerald W, interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier, 9 Apr 56.
 16. IBID.
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CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

MISSION - The mission of the 301st Bombardment Wing (M) is to train strategic aircrews and sufficient accessory personnel in order to maintain a state of readiness for immediate and sustained operations in any part of the world either independently or in conjunction with other air elements and/or land or naval forces in accordance with direction from higher headquarters. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the maintenance of proficiency of strategic crews and units to successfully deliver atomic and other weapons as directed by prescribed tactics and procedures in the event that Emergency War Plans (EWP's) should be placed into effect.¹ (UNCL)

TRAINING OBJECTIVE - The ultimate training objective has been to ". . . . develop all bombardment crews and units to a state of proficiency which will permit their immediate engagement in effective offensive operations against an enemy" of the United States in accordance with the approved tactical doctrine.² (UNCL)

PROGRESS TOWARDS TRAINING GOAL - The mission of the 301st Bombardment Wing (M) during the month of February was to accomplish maximum training requirements under supplement XI, SAC Regulation 50-8 and SAC Regulation 50-24, win the SAC Evaluation Exercise, upgrade a maximum number of non-combat ready and combat ready crews and maintain a high level of

1. SAC Reg 50-8 and Suppl. thereto, Filed in Adj. Sec. 301BOMWG(M).
2. Extract, SAC Reg 50-8, Suppl. 1, 24 Dec 54, Filed in Adj. Sec. 301BOMWG(M).

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
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proficiency of combat ready, lead, and select crews. The month of February included two scheduled missions, Operation "SNOW BANK", a SAC Evaluation Mission and Operation "ROAD AGENT", a unit planned USOM. A third mission was also performed on the last part of January and first of February. The third operation was the 301st Operations Plan 400-56, a mission with minimum of advance notice.³ (UNCL)

OPERATION "SNOW BANK" - A night radar bombing SAC evaluation exercise was conducted by the 301st Bombardment Wing during the nights of 22 and 23 February 1956.⁴ The mission was to accomplish a simulated radar evaluation mission against a BRAVO type target located near Rhindlander, Wisconsin with the following objectives.⁵ ~~(CONF)~~

1. To determine SACs' radar bombing capability during winter months against an airfield located in northerly latitudes, utilizing only target material based on 15-17 year old photography. ~~(CONF)~~
2. To exercise and evaluate wing staff and aircrew capability to plan and accomplish assigned missions. ~~(CONF)~~
3. To exercise and appraise ability of aircrews to perform the specified Breakaway maneuver. ~~(CONF)~~
4. To exercise and appraise Wing Photo Interpreters ability to score bomb impact points from radar scope photography.⁶ ~~(CONF)~~

3. HQ, 301BOMWG(M) Operation Plan 400-56, 3 Jan 56, Exhibit 10.
4. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report To COMAF 2, 29 Feb 56, Exhibit 11.
5. 301BOMWG Operations Order 401-56, 23 Jan 56, Exhibit 12.
6. IBID.

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History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
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The task organizations for the mission were as follows:

32nd Bombardment Squadron	Lt Col E. T. Harshberger
352nd Bombardment Squadron	Lt Col D. R. Taylor
353rd Bombardment Squadron	Major W. R. Goade
301st Field Maintenance Squadron	Major C. D. Huckleberry
301st A&E Maintenance Squadron	Major W. H. Charlton
301st Periodic Maintenance Squadron	Major M. C. Hemphill
301st Tactical Hospital	Major R. R. Patterson ⁷ (UNCL)

The crews were instructed not to discuss or exchange information with crews of any other wing until other units had completed participation.⁸

(UNCL)

There were a total of 33 crews scheduled for participation in operation "SNOW BANK"; sixteen select crews, seven lead crews, nine combat ready crews and one non-ready crew. Of these 33 crews 17 were scheduled for 23 February and 16 were scheduled for 24 February.⁹

Mission planning was considered to be very thorough and effective. The offset aiming point selected was a wood pulp mill located in the west central part of Rhineland, Wisconsin.¹⁰ The target was the intersection of two runways at the Rhineland airport. The offset point selected was predicted to be the strongest, most reliable return in the area. An analysis of the mission has confirmed this prediction.¹¹

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7. IBID.

8. IBID.

9. "SNOW BANK" critique notes, Filed in HQ 301BOMBWG Bombardment Office

10. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report to COMAF2, 29 Feb 56, Exhibit 11.

11. "SNOW BANK" critique notes, Filed in HQ 301BOMBWG Bombardment Office

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An EWP type examination and target identification test was required of each observer participating in the mission. It is a proven fact that bombing accuracy and consistency is directly proportional to the quality of target study.¹² ~~(UNCL)~~

Thirty-two select, lead, and combat-ready crews of the wing accomplished a total of 31 scored record runs and one malfunction run. One of the scored record runs was made using fixed angle emergency bombing procedures because of loss of bomb computers between IP and target resulting in a gross error. In addition, two non-ready crews made scored runs. Another gross error received was due to aircrew error of incorrectly inserting offset valves in the radar equipment.¹³ ~~(UNCL)~~

A bombing analysis indicates that 55 per cent of the bombing error can be ascribed to erroneous wind synchronization and approximately 45 per cent to final positioning of crosshairs on the exact offset aiming point. Final positioning of crosshairs was rendered difficult by radar return pattern break-up and improper use of scope expansion, tilt and receiver gain adjustments for optimum radar target resolution.¹⁴ ~~(UNCL)~~

Three observers were commended for their technical know-how and prompt action in performing inflight maintenance and thereby saving their mission and adding to the wings overall standing.¹⁵ (UNCL)

12. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report to COMAF 2, 29 Feb 56, Exhibit 11.

13. IBID.

14. IBID.

15. "SNOW BANK" critique notes, Filed in HQ 301BOMWG Bombardment Office

Captain McGeachy, crew L09, aircraft 3373, had fuse 2309 blow out at the IP. He immediately knew what the trouble was and replaced the fuse, continued on the bomb run making a record run for 1,700 feet.¹⁶ ~~(cont)~~

Captain Heimann, crew R56, aircraft 2198, had part of his RT unit go out shortly after his bomb equipment check at Memphis which limited his range to 40 miles. He flew the rest of the mission with only 40 miles range and successfully completed a record run for 2,070 feet.¹⁷ ~~(cont)~~

Captain Maloy, crew L70, aircraft 3350, lost bomb computers 35 miles from the target. He immediately set up and completed a fixed angle run for 10,000 feet.¹⁸ ~~(cont)~~

The best score the first night was a CE of 170 feet which belonged to aircraft commander, Lt Col John C Lewis and his observer, Lt Col Oscar L Black. The best score the second night was a CE of 200 feet made by aircraft commander Captain John F. Adams and his observer, Captain Peter J Chille.¹⁹ ~~(cont)~~

Overall effectiveness of operation "SNOW BANK" was estimated at 86%, 31 out of 36 aircraft scheduled and airborne were effective aircraft (operational radar) over the target. All five non-effective aircraft were due to radar malfunctions or radar aborts.²⁰ ~~(cont)~~

OPERATION ROAD AGENT - Operation "ROAD AGENT" was a unit planned USCM which was cancelled because 301st Bomb Wing was given USCM credit on

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17. IBID.

18. IBID.

19. IBID.

20. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report to COMAF 2, 29 Feb 56, Exhibit 11.

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
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the SAC IG mission, operation "TAILGATE".²¹ A copy of the operation order on operation "ROAD AGENT" is included in this history as exhibit 13.²² (UNCL)

OPERATION TAILGATE - Operation "TAILGATE" was a mission with a minimum of advance notice to launch a simulated nuclear bombardment attack against selected targets, supported by required air refueling sorties. A capability to launch a quick strike force is required. Two corollary missions that were accomplished were an air weapons exercise and maximum 50-8 training.²³ ~~(SECRET)~~

The requirement existed for the 301st Bombardment Wing to accomplish a USOM, including an Air Weapons Exercise in conjunction with an EWP Evaluation Inspection. X-Day was set at any date during the period 30 January - 31 May 1956.²⁴ ~~(SECRET)~~

The SAC IG conducted an inspection of the 301st Bombardment Wing in conjunction with operation "TAILGATE". The inspection evaluated the capability of this wing to execute a unit planned USOM, with particular emphasis on a realistic minimum of advance notice.²⁵ (UNCL)

The operations plan 400-56 became an operations order upon receipt of the order of execution. (UNCL)

The execution of the plan went into effect when the 301st Bomb Wing received the execution order from the SAC Inspector General at 1800Z 30 January 1956.²⁶ ~~(SECRET)~~

21. RELYEA, Lincoln D, interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier, 9 Apr 56.
22. HQ 301BOMWG(M), Operations Order 402-56, 23 Jan 56, Exhibit 13.
23. HQ 301BOMWG(M), Operations Plan 400-56, 3 Jan 56, Exhibit 14.
24. IBID.
25. IBID.
26. IBID.

~~SECRET~~

The Quick Strike was planned to be either a separate effort or an integral part of the first wave. The order of execution specified a force launching to include a Quick Strike as a separate effort.²⁷ ~~(SECRET)~~

The tactical concept of the operation was for a minimum of elapsed time from receipt of initial alert to launching of forces. A multiple-wave strike effort, using one pre-target air refueling was planned.²⁸ ~~(SECRET)~~

The 301st Bombardment Wing launched a Quick Strike of six aircraft at 1639Z on 31 January 1956, 22 hours and 39 minutes after the alert was called.²⁹ This large amount of elapsed time was due to a ground rule injected by the SAC inspection team allowing the B-47 crews to have 12 hours of rest prior to flying the USCM.³⁰ ~~(SECRET)~~

Each of the Quick Strike aircraft successfully on-loaded the briefed amount of fuel³¹ from six 301st Air Refueling Squadron KC-97's which were launched at 1755Z on 31 January 1956.³² The six Quick Strike B-47's effectively bombed their assigned targets and returned to Barksdale.³³ ~~(SECRET)~~

Severe weather conditions forced a delay of Wave I, because of the delay, Wave III was combined with Wave II for a total force composition of 16 aircraft. Weather again forced another delay of 28 hours for Wave I. Wave II take-off times remained the same as ARTC clearance had already been approved. This change now had Wave II scheduled to be launched prior to Wave I. Sixteen bombers (Wave II) were launched at 1240Z on 3 February 1956. Severe weather conditions necessitated constant inflight planning and final

27. IBID.

28. IBID.

29. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report to COMAF 2, 7 Feb 56, Exhibit 15.

30. DAVISON, Ralph, 2NDLT, interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier, 10 Apr 56.

31. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report to COMAF 2, 7 Feb 56, Exhibit 15.

32. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report to COMAF 2, 7 Feb 56, Exhibit 16.

33. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report to COMAF 2, 7 Feb 56, Exhibit 15.

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

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movement of key rendezvous point Ann from Barksdale AFB to El Dorado
Omni.²⁴ Sixteen tankers were launched at 1337Z on 3 February 1956 in
support of Wave II. Twelve of the sixteen received the briefed on-load
of fuel. Of the remaining four, two bombers had no tankers due to bad
weather preventing them from making orbit good, one aborted prior to
refueling because of loss of radar and being in a force that was short
of tankers, and one received 12,000 pounds of fuel and then disconnected
because of smoke in the cockpit. Three tankers returned to Barksdale
after refueling. The remaining 13 landed at Whiteman AFB because of
weather and traffic causing a two hour delay at Barksdale.³⁵ ~~(S)~~

The remaining twelve bombers successfully bombed their assigned
targets. Because of below minimum weather conditions at Barksdale AFB
and extreme distance to alternates from Barksdale, all twelve bombers
were diverted after target direct to alternate bases. Four landed at
MacDill AFB, four at Hunter AFB, and four at Pinecastle AFB. The
remainder of operation "TAILGATE" was cancelled. In summary a total
of 22 aircraft were launched with 18 of these successfully completing
the mission³⁶ and a total of 18 out of the 22 tankers launched off-
loaded the briefed amount of fuel. Severe weather conditions throughout
the entire period was the major problem encountered during the operation
for both B-47 and KC-97 operations.³⁷ ~~(S)~~

34. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report to COMAF 2, 7 Feb 56, Exhibit 15.

35. COMBOMWG 301 T-27 Report to COMAF 2, 7 Feb 56, Exhibit 16.

36. COMBOMWG 301 B-27 Report to COMAF 2, 7 Feb 56, Exhibit 15.

37. COMBOMWG 301 T-27 Report to COMAF 2, 7 Feb 56, Exhibit 16.

SECRET

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
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A report is at present being completed on the SAC IG inspection in conjunction with operation "TAILGATE" and an attempt will be made to include a resume of this report in next months history. (UNCL)

SES EVALUATION - In the month of February the 301st Bombardment Wing sent four B-47 crews to SES Evaluation. Three crews passed the evaluation and one crew failed. Of the three crews that passed, Major Nelsons' crew S-39 and Lieutenant Colonel Shaws' crew S-42 passed SES fully qualified. Both crews were from the 352nd Bombardment Squadron, Lieutenant Colonel Hodges' crew S-75 from the 32nd Bombardment Squadron was conditionally qualified due to one of the crew members failing to pass the JUDO portion of the course. Major Hortons' crew S-10 from the 32nd Bombardment Squadron failed because of failure to properly accomplish a grid celestial.³⁸ (UNCL)

LOSS OF GUNNERY - During the month of February, 241 sorties were scheduled and 162 sorties flown. Of these only 14 gunnery missions were accomplished. The loss of gunnery missions was due to weather cancellation and/or mission replanning due to weather. The following is a breakdown of the dates. Operation "TAILGATE", 30 January through 4 February 1956, was replanned due to weather and gunnery was excluded. Operation "ROAD AGENT", 6-10 February 1956 was cancelled excluding any gunnery. Operation "SNOW BANK", 20-24 February 1956, was a bombing evaluation mission with gunnery excluded.³⁹ (UNCL)

38. KRIG, Kenneth A, LtCol, interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Grier, 7 Mar 56
39. Letter from 301DGO to 301DGO, Loss of Gunnery During Feb 56, 29 Feb 56.
Signed by Maj Harold L Swanagon, Exhibit 17.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

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The gunnery missions accomplished this month were on individual sorties made possible by a change in SAC Reg 50-8. Previously, SAC Reg 50-8, Supplement XX, forced gunnery to be accomplished on Bomber Stream and USCM only.^{h0} (UNCL)

During the month of March, gunnery will be scheduled on all Air Weapons flight missions and full advantage taken of this change in operations regulation, (SAC Reg 50-8), to schedule gunnery on as many individual sorties as possible to meet SAC Reg 50-8 requirements.^{h1} (UNCL)

NEW TRAINING PROGRAM - A meeting was held on 11 January 1956 in the 301st Director of Operations office to discuss a new training program for the 301st Bomb Wing to be effective on 23 January 1956 and ending 31 March 1956.^{h2} (UNCL)

The program was discussed and approved as follows: During one week, one squadron would fly only one crew per day and perform all block ground training, all base details such as FPBO, AG and OD, and assume all alert crew requirements. The other two bomb squadrons would fly the rest of the operational 301st B-47's. This schedule would rotate once every week with a rotation cycle of three week.^{h3} (UNCL)

This schedule was developed to enable more hours of flying time to be accomplished.^{h4} (UNCL)

^{h0.} IBID.

^{h1.} IBID.

^{h2.} Letter from 301DGO to 3 bomb squadrons, 11 Jan 56, signed by Col Lewis, Exhibit 18.

^{h3.} IBID.

^{h4.} STULTING, Elton R, Interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W Grier, Apr 12, 56.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (H)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

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The schedule prior to this new one involved flying of all three squadrons every week - getting in as much flying time as could be scheduled. The crews attended block ground training while they were not flying.⁴⁵ (UNCL)

GROUND TRAINING REPORT - The attendance of crew members to Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare, Fire Protection, Personal Affairs, and SAC Mobility Plan and AS Defense classes was low because of emphasis placed on more important ground training items.⁴⁶ (UNCL)

Combative measures was slightly low in trained hours but 16 people completed Judo in Block Training on 2 March who were unable to report as complete during month of February.⁴⁷ (UNCL)

Handgun Qualification was a low figure of eight percent trained. This was caused by 38 caliber training that was not available and is to be scheduled later.⁴⁸ (UNCL)

The E-System and Basic Weather courses were low on total trained hours due to B-17 observers attending target study on "Snow Bank."⁴⁹ (UNCL)

There was only one trained hour of In-Flight Maintenance training. This low rate was caused by an inoperative F-1 system for an entire month.⁵⁰ (UNCL)

Survival exercise was low due to emphasis being placed on block and non-block training items.⁵¹ (UNCL)

45. IBID.

46. WCS-2AF T-4 Report for 301st Bomb Wing, BAPB, La., for month of Feb. 56, Filed in Operation and Training, 301st HQ.

47. IBID.

48. IBID.

49. IBID.

50. IBID.

51. IBID.

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

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STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES - During the month of February 1956 the Aircraft Commander and Pilot emergency procedure and proficiency examinations were revised to conform with the new 2AF Form 156A. The Observer's emergency procedure and proficiency examinations are now in the process of being revised according to 2AF Form 146.⁵² (UNCL)

Standardization Crew Training or Proficiency Missions Accomplished are listed in exhibit 19, this history.⁵³ (UNCL)

REVIEW OF STANDARDIZATION PROCEDURES - Colonel Everett W. Holstrom, 301st Bomb Wing Commander, believes that the 301st Standardization Section is operating properly. This was confirmed by the recent SAC IG inspection which found that the section was operating effectively and complying with all applicable directives.⁵⁴ (UNCL)

The 301st Bombardment Wing has a policy whereby any crew member who fails a standardization check meets a board of officers to discuss his failure. This board of officers is composed of the Director of Operations, his Deputy, the Chief of the Training Division, Standardization Section Chief, and squadron commander of crew concerned. If the failing crew member is an observer, the board is augmented by the Chief of the Bomb/Nav Division and the squadron observer. This board examines the records of the failing crew and interviews the standardization section instructor who gave the check, along with the entire crew. The board then recommends corrective action to be taken.⁵⁵ (UNCL)

52. Standardization Activity Report (RGS: 2AF T-3) for Feb 56, Exhibit 19.

53. IBID.

54. 1st Ind of Review of Standardization Procedures from HQ 301BOMBW(M) to HADIV Commander, 17 Feb 56, Exhibit 20.

55. IBID.

SECRET

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(2 February - 29 February 1956)

21

REPORT OF 2AF STANDBOARD STAFF VISIT to 301ST ARS 6-16 DEC 55 - The
following discrepancies, reasons for discrepancies and corrective action
taken are submitted by the 301st Air Refueling Squadron Commander in
reply to the recent 2AF Standardization visit.⁵⁶ (UNCL)

Recurring weaknesses in individual air crew members proficiency
indicate little or no follow up training on recommendations made by
standardization check personnel. This deficiency is answered in two
areas. The first, flying. Over a long period of time this squadron
loses an average of approximately 10 per cent of its flying time to satisfy
ordered commitments. These training hours while not lost are not
available for scheduling crews in known areas of weakness. The second
area, ground training. In addition to normal ground training conducted
under the provisions of SAC REG 50-24 and SAC REG 51-19 a well supplied
and comfortable reading room has been provided. Also to help those who
will not help themselves a follow-up training program is being initiated
within flights.⁵⁷ (UNCL)

A second discrepancy involved standardization crew personnel who
are being given additional duty assignments within the squadron. The
junior crew aircraft commander also acts as a squadron flight commander,
the engineer is assigned as the squadron performance engineer, and the
radio operator is being utilized as an instructor in the ground training
program. The answer to this discrepancy is that the senior Wing Stand-
ardization crew personnel are assigned no additional duties. Squadron
standardization crew personnel have been assigned additional duties which

56. Letter on Report of 2AF Standboard Staff Visit from 301ARSC to 301RO
dated 27 Feb 56, Exhibit 21.

57. IBID.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

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do not interfere with standardization activities.⁵⁸ (UNCL)

A third discrepancy was orders being outdated that designated standardization crews. The answer was that the most recent orders designating standardization crews are dated 2 Feb 56.⁵⁹ (UNCL)

An aircraft questionnaire was not completed and on file in the pilots folder for crew number T-21. This questionnaire was removed for the purpose of cutting a new stencil and has been refilled in the Pilots' folder on Crew T-21.⁶⁰ (UNCL)

Boom operators on crews T-27 and T-15 have no SAC Form 412 (check out certificate) on file. SAC Forms 412 have been completed and filed for the Boom Operators on Crew T-27 and T-15.⁶¹ (UNCL)

SAC Regulation 51-4 is not being complied within that standardization records are not being forwarded when individuals are transferred. Standardization records are now being forwarded on all individuals being transferred.⁶² (UNCL)

The boom operators flight check form 114, for crew T-13 was not on file. This indicates that a check was not administered to this airman prior to his appointment as an instructor operator. The boom operator on crew T-13 was flight checked prior to his appointment as an instructor boom operator; however, due to an oversight, the form 114 was not completed. This form has now been accomplished and filed.⁶³ (UNCL)

-
- 58. IBID.
 - 59. IBID.
 - 60. IBID.
 - 61. IBID.
 - 62. IBID.
 - 63. IBID.

~~SECRET~~

The monthly ZAF Standardization Division Newsletter is not getting maximum dissemination within the standardization section. The Wing Standardization Board was not aware of the Newsletter at the time of the inspection; however it is now available and a master file is maintained by the chief of the standardization section.⁶⁴ (INCL)

Maintenance support of the standardization flight check was substandard. A total of four aircraft were scheduled to accomplish sorties; take-offs of both sorties were delayed due to maintenance trouble encountered. Six experienced crew chiefs have been taken from their aircraft and assigned to the squadron post flight docks in an effort to raise the overall maintenance standards of the squadron.⁶⁵ (INCL)

Pilot's instrument handbooks were not current. They are now being kept current. This was discussed with the communications officer and the discrepancy has been corrected.⁶⁶ (INCL)

AIR REFUELING SQUADRON COMMANDERS REMARKS FOR FEBRUARY - Hours flown performing missions ordered by higher headquarters are as follows:

1. Ferrying cargo and personnel - - - - -	22:05
2. USCH (TAILGATE) - - - - -	75:15
3. Air Refueling Support for 70th B.V. - - - - -	34:15
4. Operation Devilfish Support - - - - -	17:10
TOTAL	150:15
	67

64. IBID.

65. IBID.

66. IBID.

67. 301st Air Refueling Squadron Commanders Remarks for Feb., Exhibit 22.

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

24

The squadron reported 123 sorties and 490 hours of flying time for February. The average for each of the twenty-one assigned combat ready crews was 23 hours flying time and 5.9 sorties.⁶⁸ ~~(cont)~~

The squadron was 80 hours short of the proposed 586 hours of flying time for the month of February. This was due primarily to flying hours lost due to weather and the high rate of engine losses due to high time engines.⁶⁹ ~~(cont)~~

The squadron accomplished 34 hookups of less than 40,000 pounds that were not reportable on the part 1 of the T-12 report.⁷⁰ ~~(cont)~~

A requirement to launch 12 KC-97's for each night mass air refueling imposes a serious maintenance problem. During this period when the squadron's aircraft are going through the INAN (Inspection and Repair as Necessary) program, the squadron has a maximum of eighteen aircraft available. This makes every night mass air refueling a maximum effort maintenance wise and adversely affects normal training since a one day stand down period is required before and after each mission.⁷¹ ~~(cont)~~

301ST BOMB WING COMMANDERS REMARKS FOR FEBRUARY - Hours flown performing missions ordered by higher headquarters are as follows:

1. Ferry from Castle - - - - - 5:20
2. Goose AB for SWL - - - - - 7:55
3. Eglin AFG Project - - - - - 7:00
4. Palm Tree Project - - - - - 32:35

68. IBID.
69. IBID.
70. IBID.
71. IBID.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

25

5. SRS - - - - -	101:30
6. Devil Fish (Lincoln Lab Project)- - - -	143:05
7. Tailgate (SAC II)- - - - -	181:40
8. Snow Bank (SAC Eval)- - - - -	229:05
9. Transition for Deputy CG 2AF- - - - -	1:40
10. VIP Check-out for W/Gen Bergquist- - - -	15:40

TOTAL 728:30 ⁷² ~~(same)~~

Due to local weather conditions a total of 14 sorties were cancelled, however, 34 sorties were re-scheduled resulting in an overall loss of 10 sorties and 105:00 hours. ⁷³ ~~(same)~~

The SAC II (no notice) inspection was completed on 3 February 1956. During his critique, the team chief (Gen Wade) stated that from past performance and records available the radar bombing capability of the 301st Bombardment Wing compares favorable with any wing in SAC. ⁷⁴ ~~(same)~~

72. JOINTWER Commanders Remarks for February, Exhibit 23.

73. IBID.

74. IBID.

~~SECRET~~

CHAPTER IV

MATERIAL

SUPPLY INSPECTION - A supply inspection of the 253rd Bombardment Squadron was conducted on 17 February 1956. The inspection was performed by Captain E. F. McLean,¹ (UNCL)

Unit Mission Equipment on hand indicated 89 percent complete at the time of the inspection.² (UNCL)

The inspecting officer noted that two airmen, 61010, were on GNT for 6/131. The GNT file indicated that these airmen had completed four phases of training. Questioning revealed that the airmen could not give any correct answers to questions concerning the phases of training they had completed. It was recommended that a more effective GNT program be established for supply personnel.³ (UNCL)

ANALYSIS OF MAINTENANCE - The 1300-593 radial engines on the KC-97's of the 301st Air Refueling Squadron are continually giving trouble due to high time on them. The Air Force must use a higher power setting on KC-97's than civilian airlines which causes the valves to spin at a greater distance and speed. As the engine cycles the valves are made to turn so they will wear even. However, when the engines get high time on them the valves tend to spin instead of turning. This sets up an abrasive action wearing through the hard surface of the valve. The mechanics can adjust the valves but the wear is so rapid after the hard surface of the valve is worn through that it is impossible to keep valves adjusted. The valves

1. HQ, 301BWSG Letter from 301BWS to Commander, 253rd Bomb Squadron, titled "Supply Inspection", dated 5 Mar. '56; Filed in 301DM

2. IBID.

3. IBID.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (H)
(1 February - 27 February 1956)

25

- 5. SWS ----- 101:30
- 6. Devil Fish (Lincoln Lab Project)----- 143:05
- 7. Tailgate (SAC IN)-----184:40
- 8. Snow Bank (SAC Eval)----- 229:05
- 9. Transition for Deputy CG 2AF----- 1:40
- 10. VII Check-out for W/Gen Berquist----- 15:10

TOTAL -----72 ~~(hours)~~
728:30

Due to local weather conditions a total of 14 sorties were cancelled, however, 34 sorties were re-scheduled resulting in an overall loss of 10 sorties and 105:00 hours.⁷² ~~(hours)~~

The SAC IN (no notice) inspection was completed on 3 February 1956. During his critique, the base chief (Gen Wade) stated that from past performance and records available the radar bombing capability of the 301st Bombardment Wing compares favorable with any wing in SAC.⁷⁴ ~~(hours)~~

72. JOINTING Commanders Remarks for February, Exhibit 23.
73. IBID.
74. IBID.

~~SECRET~~

0 3 8 7

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

27

also soon run out of adjustment. When this point is reached, a cylinder change or engine change is necessary. Only seven cylinders can be changed on an engine with more than 750 hours.⁴ (UNCL)

A maintenance depot at San Antonio recommends putting an O-Ring seal around the valve to prevent it from spinning. This worked fine for the civilian airlines because they use a lower power setting than the Air Force but it would not completely solve the problem for the Air Force. At the present time there are two springs on each valve wound in the same direction. A proposed plan is to counterwind these springs which may stop the spinning.⁵ (UNCL)

The Air Refueling Squadron has 20 KC-97's but three or four of the planes are constantly in a depot for inspection and repair as necessary. A continuous filling of this maintenance requirement leaves only 16 or 17 KC-97's to implement its USCF operations which is a shortage creating a hardship on the entire Air Refueling Squadron.⁶ (UNCL)

During the month of February we picked up one additional B-47E from the 93rd Bombardment Wing at Castle AFB, California. This aircraft brought the 301st Bombardment Wing total to 52 B-47's.⁷ (UNCL)

The maintenance section is continually replacing fuel probes in the avion fuel system. This continuous replacement creates a shortage of fuel probes in the 301st Bombardment Wing.⁸ (UNCL)

4. OFFER, Leroy C., Major, Interviewed by ZWELF Jack W. Orier, 4 Apr. 56.

5. IBID.

6. IBID.

7. IBID.

8. IBID.

~~SECRET~~

0 2 2 4

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (W)
(1 February - 29 February 1950)

28

The skin on the drop tank struts has been cracking during some B-17 flights recently creating a maintenance problem.⁹ One incident occurred when the vibration from the side strut on wing tanks caused buffeting and breaking of skin on wing tank side struts and left aileron. The resulting damage was a hole approximately six inches in diameter in the left aileron just outboard of the left wing tank side strut. Plastic inspection covers over electrical disconnects in both main wing tank struts were missing. Various parts of the left wing tank side strut panels had cracked.¹⁰ (UNCL)

It seems that after about 100 hours of flying time the skin on the struts start to crack. These cracks seem to be more prevalent after the aircraft has been subjected to high speed flight such as test hors IPDA maneuver, etc., apparently the material that is used on the skin for drop tank strut fairing is not strong enough to withstand long periods of high speed flight. It is doubtful that the design of the struts will withstand the stress applied by day in and day out flying.¹¹ (UNCL)

It has been recommended that Boeing or WADC make a study to determine if the modified drop tank and strut assemblies are suitable for permanent installation. It was also recommended that until such a time as this test is made that the wings be relieved of the requirement to carry the drop tanks at all times.¹² (UNCL)

Second Air Force Headquarters directs as to leave the drop tanks on. That the tanks could not be left off, train without them, and then put them on at the last minute in case WUP should occur.¹³ (UNCL)

9. IBID.

10. Aircraft Incident Report #20 from 352nd Bomb Sq., to Flying Safety Officer 301st BW, Exhibit 20.

11. IBID.

12. IBID.

13. WUP, Leroy C., Interviewed by 2NDLT Jack W. Orier, 4 Apr. 50.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
History, 301st Bombardment Wing (H)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

27

also soon run out of adjustment. When this point is reached, a cylinder change or engine change is necessary. Only seven cylinders can be changed on an engine with more than 750 hours.⁴ (UNCL)

A maintenance depot at San Antonio recommends putting an O-Ring seal around the valve to prevent it from spinning. This worked fine for the civilian airlines because they use a lower power setting than the Air Force but it would not completely solve the problem for the Air Force. At the present time there are two springs on each valve wound in the same direction. A proposed plan is to counterwind these springs which may stop the spinning.⁵ (UNCL)

The Air Refueling Squadron has 20 KC-97's but three or four of the planes are constantly in a depot for inspection and repair as necessary. A continuous filling of this maintenance requirement leaves only 16 or 17 KC-97's to implement its USCF operations which is a shortage creating a hardship on the entire Air Refueling Squadron.⁶ (UNCL)

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The maintenance section is continually replacing fuel probes in the avion fuel system. This continuous replacement creates a shortage of fuel probes in the 301st Bombardment Wing.⁸ (UNCL)

4. OFFER, Leroy C., Major, interviewed by 2NDLT Jack T. Orier, 4 Apr. 56.

5. IBID.

6. IBID.

7. IBID.

8. IBID.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (H)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

29

The Maintenance section received a shipment of bad booster pumps from a supply depot. Twelve bad pumps were installed before a good one was found. The first 12 pumps would work a few hours and then leak - requiring their being removed and repaired. After this occurrence of trouble, the 301st Wing Maintenance Section refused issue on the rest of the pumps. SCANA of Air Materiel Command worked on the pumps for two months. At first they claimed there was nothing wrong with them but when the pumps were tested in the field the defect was found.¹⁴ (UNCL)

A few of the modulators of the I-System have failed during the past month resulting in in-operative I-Systems.¹⁵ The trouble was due to a faulty design of a rectifier tube, 122, which would not carry the electrical load it was supposed to because it didn't have enough load capacity. The trouble has been corrected by replacing the 122 rectifier tube with a selenium rectifier. There is a maintenance team here at the present which is performing the modification. A failure of the modulator results in a failure of the complete K-System. These failures have caused many malfunctions and aborts, because if the K-System goes out before the plane reaches the target it aborts.¹⁶ (UNCL)

FLYAWAY KITS - A Flyaway Kit board meeting was held on 21 February 1956 in the Office of the Director of Materiel, 301st Bombardment Wing (H).¹⁷(UNCL)

14. IBID.

15. IBID.

16. EPONE, Joseph M., 2ndLt, Interviewed by 2ndLt Jack V. Orier, 4 April 56.

17. HQ 301 BOMB(H) office of DM, Minutes of Fly-Away Kit meeting, dated 23 February 1956, Exhibit 25.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (M)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

30

The current percentage of completion of each kit as of 15 February 1956 are as follows:

1. 32nd Bombardment Squadron - - - - 99.8
2. 352nd Bombardment Squadron- - - - 99.2
3. 353rd Bombardment Squadron- - - - 99.7
4. 301st Air Refueling Squadron- - - - 99.9¹⁸ (UNCL)

The Base Accountable Officer had the Fly-Away Kit Section prepare a shortage list and forward it to the Supply Liaison Officer enabling him to correct critical shortages. The shortage listing was reviewed and 12 items were received. Base supply followed-up on all items that were short and items with one delivery date.¹⁹ (UNCL)

AIRCRAFT TRIM - The trim coordination motors on all B-47 type aircraft of the Wing are being disconnected, and will be connected and operational only after a new control surface is installed, after the control system is re-rigged, or after any change which requires a change in trim condition.²⁰ (UNCL)

Trim Coordination has nothing to do with the normal trim of the B-47, but is concerned with the trim of the airplane at crossover speeds with the power control off.²¹ (UNCL)

MC-97 COMPASS SWINGS - At present, the MC-97's assigned to the 301st APS are all overdue for compass swings and are being carried on a red dash. At the present there are no facilities available at this station for "swinging the above mentioned compasses".²² (UNCL)

18. IBID.
19. IBID.
20. Letter on Aircraft Trim, 20 Feb. '56, from 301 BMB to OO - 32nd, 352, 353rd and 301st FWS Squadrons, Exhibit 26.
21. IBID.
22. Letter on MC-97 Compass Swings from 301 BMB to 301 Chief of Maintenance, Exhibit 27.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

History, 301st Bombardment Wing (H)
(1 February - 29 February 1956)

31

It is a matter of the utmost importance that this be completed as soon as possible due to the impending TOY of the KC-97's into an area of limited navigational aids. The compasses aboard the aircraft are assumed to be unreliable at present, and will of necessity continue to be assumed so until adequate provisions are made to accomplish compass calibrations.²³ (UNCL)

ABORT RATE - The 301st Bombardment Wing Aircraft Malfunction and Abort Record for the month of February was slightly higher than for the month of January. There were 19 B-47 aborts out of 217 sorties flown for an 8.8 percent abort rate. Thirteen KC-97's aborted out of 108 sorties flown for a 12 percent abort rate. Sixteen of the B-47 aborts were air aborts. Twelve were due to I-System, one caused by a faulty radio, one due to IFR system, Cabin pressurization caused one and a hydraulic leak in the IFR system caused one. Of the three ground aborts one was due to engine fire warning and two were due to fuel quantity systems.²⁴ ~~(CONF)~~

The KC-97's had only 3 air aborts. One was due to vibration caused by number three propeller, one was caused by leakage of an IFR by-pass valve due to failure of an "O" ring seal, and one was due to engine failure. Ten ORD aborts occurred. One due to propeller repairing solenoid, one due to IFR fuel contact relay failure and eight due to low torque and engine failure. The increase in ground aborts caused by low torque and engine failure is attributed to high time engines (800-900 hours).²⁵ ~~(CONF)~~

There were 88 B-47 malfunctions and 17 KC-97 malfunctions during the month of February.²⁶ ~~(CONF)~~

23. IBID.

24. Aircraft Malfunction and Abort Report for 1-29 February, 1956, Exhibit 28.

25. IBID.

26. IBID.

~~SECRET~~