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307th Bomb Wing (B)

1-31 August 1957

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HISTORY OF THE
307th BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M)
1-31 AUGUST 1957

CHAPTER I - OVERSEA AND AID MISSIONS

SECTION I - Mission Developments

In April of 1942, the 307th Bombardment Group was formed under orders of President Roosevelt. Formed at Meizer Field, Washington, the group was furnished with B-17 aircraft. In May 1942, they were reassigned to Ephrata, Washington, and were assigned the mission of defending the coast of Alaska against the enemy forces of Japan. (U)

In December of 1942 they were again reassigned, this time to the Islands of Hawaii. The 307th Bombardment Group participated in all Central Pacific Campaigns until the end of the war in 1945. Two Presidential Unit Citations were awarded to the Group, one for action in the bombing of the Island of Truk, the most heavily defended and strongly fortified Japanese base in the Pacific. This daring raid, made on 29 March 1944, neutralized the Islands airfields, making possible long range flights without fighter protection. The other Presidential Unit Citation was awarded for the successful strike at the Kailashapan oil Refinery in Lorne on 30 September 1944. The 307th had to fly their B-24 bombers 17 1/2 hours for a round trip of 2,610 miles, the longest non-stop flight mission ever flown by this type aircraft. (U)

It was actions such as described above that won the 307th Bomb Group the now famous nickname "Long Rangers". (U)

In November 1945 the 307th Bomb Group was deactivated, but with the Air Force's policy of preserving the names of the top fighting units of World War II, the 307th Bomb Group was reactivated as the 307th Bombardment Wing, on 4 August 1946. Assigned to MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, and furnished with B-29 aircraft, the 307th Bomb Wing took part in all Strategic Air Command operations until the outbreak of the Korean conflict in July 1950. (U)

After a successful campaign in Korea, where they received another Presidential Unit Citation for their extraordinary services in action against an enemy of the United Nations* and a Citation from President Syngman Rhee of South Korea, the 307th Bomb Wing returned to the United States. (U)

In October 1954 they were assigned to Lincoln Air Force Base, Nebraska, and began their conversion to B-47 type aircraft. After a period of 15 months they had attained their combat readiness. The actual date of combat readiness was 1 April 1956. (U)

In July 1956 the 307th Bomb Wing began their participation in a three month rotational training period to the United Kingdom. (U)

Reserve training prevailed upon their return until March 1957. At

* During the period 11 to 27 July 1953 they flew 93 sorties and dropped 800 tons of bombs on targets at the Gimjeon rail bridge complex and the Gimjeon Air field, where despite severe icing, intense enemy anti-aircraft fire and coordinated search light-fighter opposition, they rendered the airfield unserviceable. They also contributed to the stabilization of U.N. positions by striking 17 aiming points of enemy troop concentrations in a high level night attack.

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this time the Wing was placed in a four month stand down training period and was to upgrade all non combat ready crews to a combat ready status. This upgrading period was not a complete success however, due to a cut in flying hours imposed by higher headquarters which prevented the necessary flying training required to upgrade crews. The effects of the cut are included in Chapter III, Operations and Training. (U)

In July, the 307th Air Refueling Squadron departed for a three month rotational training movement to Thule Air Base, Greenland. Partial results of their activities during this period will be included in each monthly historical report, and a full report will be included upon their return. (U)

The month of August 1957 was a special training month and emphasis was to be placed on upgrading non combat ready crews to a ready status. (U)

Mission: The mission of the 307th Bombardment Wing (B) is to:

Organize and train a force capable of immediate and sustained long range offensive bombardment and air to air refueling operations in any part of the world, utilizing the latest technical knowledge and advanced weapons.

Be prepared to perform these tasks assigned in current emergency plans and related operations orders.

Train and administer assigned reserve personnel and units.

Participate in disaster relief and other domestic emergencies when required.

Perform such special missions and assignments as may be directed by higher headquarters.

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SECTION II - Command

ADVISORY COUNCIL: The first meeting of the Junior Officer Council was held on 21 August 1957, with Colonel Eldins Lead Jr., the 307th Bomb Wing Commander, presiding. New business included such recommendations as a Trailer Court on the base; permission for officers to take more than 15 days leave at one time; (the wing had no established leave policy for officers as long as the current Emergency War Plans were not adversely affected); and for flying time for -47 co-pilots who have to ride the back seat. The council mentioned the possibilities of a B-33 aircraft. Colonel Lead advised that that new instructions were forthcoming that would provide some front seat time for co-pilots. Other items recommended were of a morale nature and included such items as more room for officers in the Bachelor Officers Quarters, a stag room for bachelor officers to relax in, and facilities for them to eat in during scheduled parties at the Officers Open Mess. ¹ (U)

EXHIBIT: The 307th Bomb Wing won the Base Readiness Trophy in August for the fourth time in eight months. Colonel Perry W. Washington II, the 81st Air Division Commander, presented the trophy to Colonel Lead for the 307th's readiness average during August of 6.2 percent. ² This marked the eighth month in a row that the 307th maintained a better than 60 percent average. (U)

1. Ltr, Col Lead to et al, 307th, 21 August 1957, "Minutes of 307th Wing Junior Officer Council." Exhibit 1.
2. Photo, "Col Lead receiving trophy for best Readiness Rate for the month of August 1957" 81stAD, 9 Sep 57. Exhibit 2.

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FACE LETTER VIII: The 307th Bomb Wing had the honor of having the Outstanding Crew of Face Letter VIII. Commanded by Captain William H. Hoffman, other crew members and ground crew personnel included Captain Gordon H. Mack, pilot, Captain Edward A. Cardwell, ³aviator, Staff Sergeant Gerald J. Otten, ⁴Crew Chief, and Airman First Class John W. Puckett, Crew Chief. The crew and aircraft were all assigned to the 371st Bomb Squadron. (U)

For details and accomplishments of the Face Letter VIII mission, your attention is directed to Chapter III, Operations and Training.

3. Photo "The Outstanding Crew of Face Letter VIII" 307th, August 1957. Exhibit 3.
4. Photo "Crew Chiefs that provided victory assist in Face Letter VIII", 307th, August 1957. Exhibit 4.

SECTION I - Military Personnel

SUMMARY: The average authorized aggregate strength figure for the 307th Bomb Wing during August 1957, was 1,946. The authorized strength for officers and airmen did not change during the month and remained at 410 and 1,536 respectively. ¹ (U)

The aggregate assigned total was 2,017. This was four less for the officers, who had 409 assigned, and 23 less for airmen, of whom only 1,588 were assigned. ² (U)

A break down of the various squadrons of the 307th Bomb Wing indicated the following authorizations and assigned figures. ³ (U)

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Officers</u>		<u>Airmen</u>	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
Hq, 307 Bomb Wing	61	60	142	160
370th Bomb Squadron	74	80	96	87
371st Bomb Squadron	74	84	96	91
372nd Bomb Squadron	74	79	96	90
307th Air Refig Sq	98	100	219	211
307th Field Maint Sq	3	9	415	414
307th Per Maint Sq	3	3	106	99
307th W & E Squadron	10	9	336	406
307th ACS Hospital	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>30</u>
Total	410	409	1536	1588

1. "Lincoln Air Force Base Strength Report", prep by Capt Dye, HQ 307th, for August 1957. Exhibit 5.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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EARLY QUOTE: Word was received by the Wing, on 8 August, that the Air Force had been directed to reduce its' strength to 900,000 by 1 December 1957. Airmen in grades E2, E3, and E4 whose term of service was to expire in Fiscal Year 1958; airmen not intending to reenlist; first term airmen carried as surplus or special surplus in accordance with Air Force Regulation 39-41, except those qualified to remain into scarce or needed fields; and airmen completing two years active duty between 30 June and 30 November 1957 who possessed a helper level (O1O) Air Force Specialty Code who could not absorb training or who did not have the aptitude or ability to be trained; were all eligible for separation. (U)

After a survey of airmen falling into one or more of the provisions of this message, the 307th Bomb Wing determined that approximately 273 airmen were eligible for the early out, and it was anticipated that only 90 airmen would be released from the Wing. (U)

Reserve Officers serving on extended active duty that had an established date of separation were also included in the economy measure. Officers desiring separation were to make application. However, if the too early release would cause deterioration to a unit's capability, authority to hold the officer in service could be requested. (U)

None of the eligible officers in the 307th Bomb Wing were desirous of an immediate release, and only three requested a new date of separation from their date of election. These three were co-pilots on B-29 aircraft.

4. Reg, SAC SAC to et al, AF 11135, 8 August 1957. Exhibit 6.
5. Interview, 1/Sgt Kenneth Stevens, Historian, with Lt. Col Edward T. Lundak, Personnel Directorate, HQ 307th, 19 September 1957.
6. Reg, Comdr SAC to Comdr 512AD, CS 23577, 9 August 1957. Exhibit 7.

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The Wing did not anticipate any crew regression and therefore did not protest their release.⁷ (U)

Twelve other officers had dates of separation prior to 1 March 1958, and four of these requested extensions because of applications submitted for regular Air Force commissions. The remaining eight have asked to remain until their normal dates of separation.⁸ (U)

SECTION II - Crews

Sixty six B-47 crews and 27 KC-97 crews were reflected as the combat availability of the 307th Bomb Wing in August. The above figures included 21 non ready B-47 crews and 45 combat ready B-47 crews.⁹

The following figures constitute a break down of lead, ready and non ready crews per squadron.¹⁰ (U)

<u>370th Bomb Squadron</u>		<u>371st Bomb Squadron</u>	
Lead Crews	3	Lead Crews	4
Ready Crews	11	Ready Crews	11
Non Ready Crews	9	Non Ready Crews	6
<u>372nd Bomb Squadron</u>		<u>307th Air Refueling Sq.</u>	
Lead Crews	3	Ready Crews	22
Ready Crews	13	Non Ready Crews	5
Non Ready Crews	6		

7. DF, 307BFC to H1800, "Early Release of Reserve Officers with a DCS", 21 Aug 1957. Exhibit 8.

8. Ibid.

9. "Consolidated Unit Availability Report (CUB: 8-145-VI)," Worksheet prep by D/At, sq 307B, 3 Sep 1957. Exhibit 9.

10. "Combat Crew Master," prep by D/Pers, sq 307B, 3 Sep 1957, filed in Combat Crew Section, D/Pers, sq 307B.

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Crew 8-15 was disbanded due to the permanent change of station of the aircraft commander to Plattburgh Air Force Base, New York. Crew 8-10 was downgraded because of the addition of a non combat ready co-pilot. Five crews were upgraded during August. Upgraded from a non ready status to a ready status were crews numbered 8-19, 8-23, 8-54, and 8-32. Crew 8-34 was upgraded to a lead status. Crew 8-12 was up-¹¹graded to 8-127 (Electronic Counter-Measures Crew), on 19 August. (U)

The Wing lost two F-47 aircraft commanders through permanent change¹² of station transfers, and lost one EC-97 Radio Operator during August.¹³ One aircraft commander, two co-pilots, and one Electronic Counter-Measure Observer were gained for F-47 crews while there were no gains in crew¹⁴ members for EC-97 aircraft. (U)

SECTION III - Manning

OFFICER: There were 405 officers required during August, 423 assigned, and of these 383 were assigned in the required specialties. Ninety five percent of the required officers were assigned, and 89 percent of those¹⁵ assigned were in the required specialties. (U)

Forty nine officers were not in the required specialties, 31 due to being assigned as a combat crew member. Four of the remaining were the

11. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (AG: 4-343-712 and 5-343-112)," Aug 1957, pg 30734, n.d. Exhibit 10.
12. Ibid.
13. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report (AG: 4-343-712)," Aug 1957, pg 30734, n.d. Exhibit 11.
14. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART III and PART IV to "Air Training Report (AG: 4-343-712, 5-343-712, and 4-343-712)," Aug 1957, pg 30734 n.d. Exhibits 10 and 11.

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vacant officers that are not counted as being in the required specialties, five were carry overs from last month that are awaiting reassignment or are in the only AFSC for which they were qualified, and the remaining nine were officers that had recently entered active duty, were involved in Operation Bootstrap, or were officers for which there were no authorized positions for their specialties.¹⁵ (U)

The effective manning for the three tactical squadrons remained at 77 percent during August, and the 307th Air Refueling Squadron remained at 98 percent. The 307th Tactical Hospital dropped again to a low effective manning of 38 percent.¹⁶ (U)

Shortages in the officer ranks were in the 20 career field, where only 85 percent of the authorized were assigned; in the 32 career field, where 80 percent were assigned; the 64 career field had only 70 percent assigned; the 70 career field 60 percent; the 73 career field 60 percent; and the 93 career field had only 50 percent.¹⁷ (U)

The critical career field was determined as one where body manning¹⁸ was below 80 percent, or where 60 percent or more were at the entry level. (U)

The projected loss of two navigators in September and two in November was altered somewhat with an anticipated loss of five in October and two more in December. Crew replacement could be avoided but this would have

15. DF, DPO to DCR, HQ 307th, "Officer Manning as of 31 Aug 57", 4 Sep 1957. Exhibit 12.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

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necessitated the disbanding of some in training ready crews to maintain the "T" crew status. ¹⁹

Photo Intelligence officers¹⁹ were badly needed in the Wing during August. The work load was more than one man could handle. Two were authorized but only one was assigned. ²⁰ (U)

Another soft spot in the manning was the lack of an Armament operations officer, AFSC 3244. In the past months an officer was used that did not have the responsibility to warrant further crew training. The Headquarters Eighth Air Force Assistance Team and Headquarters Strategic Air Command inspection teams did not think this system was satisfactory because it promoted only instability. They also stated that more emphasis should be given in the manning of this section. The only resource within the Wing that could have been used to fill the vacancy was free crew personnel. ²¹ (U)

ABG: Body manning for the Wing was 100 percent in the 29, 45, 47, 58, 60, 68, and 98 career fields during August. Although there were skill shortages in most of these fields, all authorized personnel had been placed on On-the-Job Training. The effective manning was 83.3 ²² percent, and was an improvement of 1.4 percent of July. (U)

19. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report (ASB: 9-343-112)," August 1957, HQ 30724, n.d. Exhibit 11.
20. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (ASB: 4-243-112 and 9-343-112)," August 1957, HQ 30724, n.d. Exhibit 10.
21. Ibid.
22. Information extracted from learning reports, August 1957, filed in S/Per, HQ 30724.

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The projected manning in hard core areas for the next three months included an anticipated loss of 26 airmen from the 30 career field. With the expected input, this would leave an overall shortage of 30. The 34 career field was not quite so bad, here they had a projected loss of 47, with an anticipated shortage of nine. In the 43 career field the projected shortage was more heavy. The Wing anticipated losing 54 airmen from this field which would leave a shortage of 112.²³ (U)

There were 1,132 airmen required in direct support skills and 1,170 were assigned. Nine-hundred and fifty-eight of those assigned were in the required specialties. This was 85 percent of the required, and 82 percent of the assigned.²⁴ (U)

In the indirect support skills there were 404 required with 426 assigned. Of the 426 assigned, 329 were in the required specialties. This was 81 percent of the required, and 77 percent of the assigned.²⁵ (U)

SECTION IV - Recruitment and AMOL

Recruitment: Through the ardent efforts of the entire 307th Bomb Wing,* the reenlistment rate of the Wing was again raised to a high level. For the month of August, the rate climbed to 70 percent. Ten first term airmen

* Captain Marian E. Seawards, 307th Adjutant, indicated that no one effort had contributed to the high reenlistment rate, and that credit was due entirely to the close cooperation and efforts of all supervisory personnel.

23. Advanced copies of Orders directing reassignment of personnel to Lincoln Air Force Base. Filed in 315400 D/ops.
24. "Management Control Statement," (MCS: 1-340-136), August 1957, 34 30720, S.S. Exhibit 13.
25. Ibid.

and three career airmen were all able for immediate reenlistment,²⁶
 and of these, seven first termers and two career airmen reenlisted. (U)
AWOL: The absent without leave rate jumped to two per thousand during²⁷
 August. Four airmen went AWOL and the average strength was 2,817. (U)

SEC. JOB V - Awards

The outstanding maintenance man of the month for the 307th Bomb
 Wing was Airman First Class Robert L. Gray, 307th Armament and Electronics²⁸
 Squadron. (U)

Airman First Class Donald S. Willis, 307th Field Maintenance Squadron
 was selected as the Wing Maintenance Man for the month of June, and also²⁹
 received the award of Eighth Air Force Maintenance Man for June. (U)

The awards for the Non Commissioned Officer, and the Airman of the
 Month for the month of August had not been presented at this writing
 and will be included in the 307th Bomb Wing historical report for Sep-
 tember.

SECTION VI - Safety

The 307th Bomb Wing marked up another aircraft accident free month³⁰
 in August by having no accidents during the 2,271 hours flown. (U)

Three military disabling injuries were reported in August giving

26. "Separation & Reenlistment Rate for August 1957," prep by Base Reenlistment Office, HHSAB, n.d. Exhibit 14.
27. "Management Control Statement," (HCS: 1-343-35), August 1957, HQ 307th, n.d. Exhibit 13.
28. Ltr, Col Reed to A/1C Gray, 10 Sep 1957, Filed 3073.
29. Ltr, Col Reed to A/1C Willis, 10 Sep 1957, Filed 3073.
30. "Management Control Statement," (HCS: 1-343-35), August 1957, HQ 307th, n.d. Exhibit 13.

a percentage of 4.76 per 100,000 man hours exposure. Two of these
injuries happened in July and were not reported until August.³¹ (U)

No government vehicle accidents or civilian accidents were record-
ed during August that would raise either percentage score from zero.³² (U)

SECTION VII - Key Personnel

Two changes were made in the key personnel during August. Major
Charles A. Frier was assigned as the Commandant, 307th Headquarters
Squadron, on 5 August 1957, replacing Captain Robert W. Cottler.³³ (U)

Another staff assignment was made on 6 August, when Captain John
Nesser was assigned as the Wing Director of Safety. Captain Nesser
relieved Major Leuan Merridge, effective on 1 August 1957.³⁴ (U)

SECTION VIII - On-the-Job Training

With the stepped up emphasis on OJT, all squadrons within the Wing
were surveyed to determine shortages of training guides and training
aids. Records were also screened to determine if any airman was on OJT
longer than the recommended period. The airmen that were found to be
in this category were to be tested or reclassification action was to be

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. A 6, HQ 307SW, 5 August 1957. Exhibit 15.

34. A 7, HQ 307SW, 6 August 1957. Exhibit 16.

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initiated. A survey was also conducted to determine the number of men who had passed tests but had not been upgraded. In this case, the Air Force Form 1098 was to be submitted immediately. (U)

The importance of taking the phase tests were also proven by one of the squadrons. As an example, in May 1957, ten airmen took proficiency tests and seven failed to pass. After the initiation of the phase tests in August, eight airmen took the tests and eight passed, all in category A. With the use of the phase tests the high failure rate, particularly in the hard core specialties, could be eliminated. (U)

To make sure the man gets upgraded, the 81st Air Division Director of Personnel, Colonel Wigh W. Wood, initiated a system that would require a man to take his classification action request and his formal OOT record with him when reporting to the testing center. In the event they were not completed the airmen must have a Disposition Form from his Commander indicating that he feels the airmen is qualified for testing. After the scores are received, they would be forwarded to the appropriate section for publication of orders. (U)

The Air did not fare too badly during the last quarter. The quarterly

35. 1st Ind to DF, DF to et al, W 30714, "Training Discrepancies," 5 September 1957. Filed D/Pers, W 30714.

36. Report, " roster of Airmen Proficiency Test Scores" prep by the 2200th Testing Squadron for August 1957, n.d., filed in D/Pers. W 31414.

37. DF, 81st D to et al, "SAC Commanders (OOT) Scoreboard," 19 Aug 57, filed D/Pers, W 31414.

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score was 69 percent effective on the WJT and the Strategic Air Command average was only 50 percent. (U)

There were 459 airmen on OOT against 464 eligible for an over all score of 98.9 percent. In the testing phase, 37 airmen were tested and 31 passed. This gave the Wing a 81.7 percent score. Only two airmen were upgraded in August, and for points, this gave the Wing zero. With the new system initiated by Colonel Bond, this last score should pick up considerably. (U)

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38. Report, "3124D Squadron Commanders Rating System," June 1957, prep by L/Ser, 34 3124D, Exhibit 17.
39. DF, 3124F to et al, "OOT Report for Month of August," 6 Sep 57. Exhibit 17.

PARAGRAPH III - TRAINING AND READINESS

PARAGRAPH 1 - General

Paragraph 1, subparagraph 1: A survey was completed in August covering the effects the curtailment of flying time had on the wing's combat capability during the special upgrade training program conducted from 1 March through 31 July. The wing was placed under a drastic cut in flying hours, imposed by higher headquarters for economy reasons, that severely hindered the upgrade program and was the basis for errors committed by some of the better combat ready crews.¹ (U)

The cut imposed a two month delay in the upgrade program which consequently prohibited the attainment of a ready status, which in turn prohibited the assignment of all targets to ready and higher category crews. Two aircraft commanders failed refueling standardization checks, two aircraft commanders failed pilot standardization checks, and a ready and a lead crew registered gross errors of more than 20,000 and 10,000 feet respectively. These failures and errors were all attributed directly to the inactivity brought about by the flying hour restrictions.² (U)

The start and late take off rate for July, from a maintenance standpoint, were the lowest in more than a year. This was also attributed to the inactivity created by the cut in flying hours.³ (U)

1. DA, 10774, to 11106, "Effects of Curtailed Flying Program," 2 Aug 57. Exhibit 19.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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The above information was submitted through channels at the request of the Eighth Air Force, to aid them in a study which was to be prepared for General Terrell, outlining the effects of the cut on the combat capability of the Eighth Air Force. ⁴ ~~(S)~~

DISPERSAL AIRFIELD: A new dispersal base for B-27 aircraft was required due to the increased Air Defense Command activities at the Sioux City Municipal Airport. A replacement dispersal airport was provided at the Des Moines Municipal Airport, Iowa. All bases within a 300 mile radius were screened and this site provided the best facilities while being only marginal satisfactory for B-27 operations. ⁵ ~~(S)~~

The longest of the runways was 7,500 feet by 150 feet, and the shortest was 4,500 feet by 100 feet. One short runway, number A-22, was under construction at the time of the survey and was being lengthened to 5,400 feet. The longest was of six inch concrete with a dirt over run that would be unsuitable during wet weather. The taxi way would necessitate the shutting down of engines one, two, five and six, and with any continued use would probably break down. The lighting was determined to be adequate, as were landing and approach facilities, communications, and weather service. There were no obstructions observed, and the airport was only four and one half miles southwest of Des Moines. Also available was a 60,000 gallon petroleum, oil and lubricant storage area.

4. HQ, 8th AF to et al, DC 2777, 29 July 1957. Exhibit 30.
5. Interview, 2/Lt Kenneth Stevens, Historian, with Major Warren D. Griffin, Operations Directorate, HQ 307th, 12 September 1957.

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The available oxygen supply was low pressure only. There were four P/7 servicing units available, four AD-3 and four AD-4 ground power units available. Maintenance facilities consisted of one hanger that could not accommodate B-47 aircraft. In general, all facilities were limited and the field would be considered marginal until all programmed construction on runways and taxiways were completed. ⁶

PERSONNEL ALLOCATION: A drastic cut in flying hours was imposed upon the Strategic Air Command due to a reduction in flying hour funds by Headquarters USAF. It was believed that the reduction would limit the number of crews that could be maintained either as combat ready, or in training for a combat ready status. ⁷

Funding procedures were also changed with Headquarters USAF allocating funds to Headquarters SAC by the quarter. Tight controls were established to prevent over flying of allotted quotas, and the Wing was required to designate an officer to monitor the program. ⁸

The Fiscal Year 1958 flying hour allocations, for tactical and non-tactical aircraft, that were allotted in June were cancelled on 14 August. This was the signal for a drastic cut in the combat ready and crew upgrading program in which the Wing was placing so much emphasis. ⁹

On 16 August the 307th Bomb Wing also received word that funding for

6. Report, "Airfield Evaluation," prep. by S/As, 307th, A.F. Exhibit 21.

7. Asg, Comdr SAC to et al, O 27922, 13 August 1957. Exhibit 22.

8. Ibid.

9. Asg, Comdr SAC to et al, O 28924, 14 August 1957. Exhibit 23.

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Fuel and oil was also cut approximately 9.4 percent of that which has been used. This placed additional emphasis on not over flying the programmed flying hours. To expedite the programming of the new flying hours Eighth Air Force forwarded priorities for scheduling of the tactical aircraft. First, they wanted each combat ready crew assigned to the Wing to fly 25 hours. The second priority was that a proportionate share of G-2 requirements would have to be met by personnel assigned to tactical units who were required to maintain proficiency in assigned aircraft. Any remaining time was to be used to provide selected available non combat ready crews 30 hours per month. ^{10.} →

The above priorities were subsequently changed, and priority one was designated as providing flying time to combat crews. Co-equal with priority one was that time which would be provided for the non ready crews that would need be upgraded to offset attrition of combat ready crews. Priority three was changed to give time to non combat crew members who were potential selectors for upgrading. They were to be given enough time to meet G-2 requirements if practical. Non combat ready crews not yet engaged in upgrading were to receive G-2 flying in combat aircraft if possible and if safety standards could be met. If not, they were to receive G-2 time in administrative type aircraft. ^{11.} →

Based on information available at Headquarters Eighth Air Force, it appeared that there was time remaining for the training of only one out

10. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 8AF, 1 28634, 16 August 1957. Exhibit 24.

11. Msg, Comdr 8AF to et al, 33 29889, 21 August 1957. Exhibit 25.

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of three non-combat ready crews. In-as-much as quantity was being sacrificed for quality, it behooved all Commanders, Operations and Maintenance Officers to produce the maximum training capability. ¹²

Quotas were received on 16 August allocating 2,447 hours for B-47E aircraft and 59 hours for T-47 aircraft for the months of August and September. The Air Refueling Squadron received 994 hours as their allocation for July, August and September. ¹³

Upon receipt of the above quotas, confirmation was forwarded to Headquarters Eighth Air Force that included the following: Forty-five bombardment crews were scheduled to receive 25 hours per month for the first quarter of fiscal year 1958; 100 hours were programmed per month during August and September which would insure a proportionate share of 80-2 time for personnel other than combat ready or non-combat ready personnel who were required to fly tactical aircraft; five available non-combat ready bombardment crews were scheduled to receive 30 hours per month during the first quarter fiscal year 1958; 1,475 hours were programmed for B-47E aircraft during August and 1,172 hours during September; and five and 10 hours respectively were programmed for T-47 aircraft during August and September. These figures were provided by assuming Pace Better VIII was flown on schedule, which it was. ¹⁴

12. Ibid.

13. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 810AB, C 20634, 16 August 1957. Exhibit 24.

14. Ltr, Col (Assignment) to Comdr 8AF, 8100, "Flying Hour Allocation First Quarter Fiscal Year 1958," 21 August 1957. Exhibit 26.

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Once submitted in the above requested report, these hours were to become the approved tactical flying hour program. On 24 August, a new allocation of flying hours was received reducing the hours scheduled for B-47 aircraft to 2,527, and increasing the allocation for B-57 aircraft 39 hours for a new total of 1,927 hours. ¹⁵ ~~16~~

GAME TIME: The 307th Bomb Wing participated in the Eighth Air Force Operations Order 70-57, "Game Time", from 5 August through 13 August 1957. This was a Command Post exercise designed to test the capability of the communications network to support SAC Emergency War Plan traffic. The mission of the operation was to familiarize personnel with current Emergency War Plans, by simulating emergency war plan deployment, strike and recovery in accordance with Operations Orders 44-58 and 50-58, logistical supply and reporting procedures, handling and evaluation of combat reports, the incapacitation of SAC headquarters, and situations resulting from enemy actions against the Strategic Air Command or supporting facilities which would exercise planning staffs at all levels of emergency war planning problem solving techniques. Another facet in the mission of "Game Time" was to exercise the SAC combat reporting systems in accordance with SAC Manual 55-8. ¹⁷ ~~18~~

The tasks of the Wing were handled by the Plans Division, and personnel

15. Wg, Comdr 307 to et al, O 28430, 16 August 1957. Exhibit 27.
16. Wg, Comdr 307 to Comdr 818AD, DC 30285, 24 August 1957. Exhibit 28.
17. Operations Order 70-57, Wg, 307, 29 July 1957, filed in D/ops, Wg 818AD.

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of three non combat ready crews. In-as-much as quantity was being sacrificed for quality, it removed all Commanders, Operations and maintenance officers to produce the maximum training capability. ¹²

Quotas were received on 16 August allocating 2,447 hours for B-47E aircraft and 55 hours for T-47 aircraft for the months of August and September. The Air Refueling Squadron received 994 hours as their allocation for July, August and September. ¹³

Upon receipt of the above quotas, confirmation was forwarded to Headquarters Eighth Air Force that included the following: Forty-five bombardment crews were scheduled to receive 25 hours per month for the first quarter of fiscal year 1958; 100 hours were programmed per month during August and September, which would insure a proportionate share of 60-2 time for personnel other than combat ready or non combat ready personnel who were required to fly tactical aircraft; five available non combat ready bombardment crews were scheduled to receive 50 hours per month during the first quarter fiscal year 1958; 1,475 hours were programmed for B-47E aircraft during August and 1,172 hours during September; and five and 10 hours respectively were programmed for T-47 aircraft during August and September. These figures were provided by assuming Pace Better VIII was flown on schedule, which it was. ¹⁴

12. Ibid.

13. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr SACB, C 20634, 16 August 1957. Exhibit 24.

14. Ltr, Col Weisington to Comdr 8AF, SACB, "Flying Hour Allocation First Quarter Fiscal Year 1958," 21 August 1957. Exhibit 26.

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had to be provided to run the 815th Air Division Class "M" Control Team. Control Team liaison officers had to be deployed to certain assigned areas overseas, and "covered" messages and/or reports had to be prepared to cover all requirements of the exercise war plan.¹⁸

Lt. Colonel Donald D. Letter and 1/Lt Albert J. Peacock, of the Intelligence Division and carried all "covered" messages to Headquarters Eighth Air Force for final review.¹⁹

The overall reporting effectiveness of this mission was considered good, however, there were too many late reports received without apparent reason. Data Time Groups for submission of reports were included in the operations order, and were also checked and corrected when necessary after they were read and carried to the 307th Bomb Wing for review. Only those reports that were late which actually affected the overall reporting effectiveness on this exercise were listed in the critique, and along with them were factors which contributed to each discrepancy.²⁰

COMBAT MISSION: The requirement existed for a combat mission to be conducted some time between 1 August 1957 and 30 November 1957. This mission was designed to exercise the 815th Air Division, of which the 307th Bomb Wing was an integral part, so as to continue the training of B-29 combat crews with a review toward maintaining combat

18. Ibid.

19. Interview, 1/Lt Colonel Steven, Interview, 1/Lt Colonel Bill Francis Operations Directorate, 307th, 12 August 1957.

20. Ltr, 307 to Comdr 815th, 22 Aug 57, "Combat Reporting Mission Critique," 22 Aug 57, 1st and 2nd Inf sheets. Serial 29.

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combat ready proficiency. The requirements of the 307th Bomb Wing were to provide 40 or 41 B-47 aircraft, plus one for use as a weather scout in the "Bellwell" or "Ball Court" air refueling area. ²¹

Three waves were to be launched from the Air Division, with the first and second waves to be of eight cells each and the third wave of 10 cells. The wave spacing was to be 12 hours between waves, and cell spacing was to be 20 or 21 minutes between cells. The 307th Bomb Wing aircraft were divided into 10 cells of three aircraft each, with one additional cell of four aircraft. Electronic Counter Measures aircraft were to be included in the first, fourth, eighth, tenth and thirteenth cells. ²²

The general route for this mission was from Lincoln to the Air Refueling Area, to Grand Forks, Minnesota, to $52^{\circ}11'N$ $91^{\circ}00'W$, to $52^{\circ}55'N$ $92^{\circ}10'W$, to the cell breaking points. From there the route extended to where it divided into two cell break up points, Ann Cell and Betty Cell. Ann Cell was at $45^{\circ}34'N$ $92^{\circ}17'W$, and Betty Cell was $41^{\circ}48'N$ $86^{\circ}03'W$. The Ann Cells had a target for the lead crews at Burlington, Iowa, from 34,500 feet. The number two aircraft were to lead Des Moines Municipal Airport, from 32,500 feet, and the number three aircraft of each cell had Rock Island as a target from an altitude of 30,000 feet. The Betty Cell's lead aircraft had Joliet, Illinois, as their target and the heading altitude was 34,000 feet. The number two

21. Operations Order 308-07, 4, WISD, 24 July 1957. Exhibit 30.

22. Ibid.

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aircraft of each cell was assigned the Peoria, Illinois Municipal Airport from 35,000 feet, and the number three aircraft bombed West Wayne, Indiana Municipal Airport from 34,500 feet. ²³

Due to a higher headquarters directed mission control ready crew available to compete in unit simulated combat mission, only 25 aircraft were available for "Sears Miller." Twenty eight combat ready crews were on hand that were available upon receipt of the execution order. Twenty seven aircraft completed the mission and two aircraft aborted after approximately two hours due to the lack of oxygen in the Electronic Counter Measures Pod. ²⁴

The overall estimate of the success of the mission was considered excellent. ²⁵ Navigation scores were good, with the average circular error average being approximately 11 miles. The lowest circular error average was two miles and the highest was 19 miles. ²⁶

The Electronic Counter Measures was a relative new area to all crews and it was determined that extreme close coordination would be necessary to insure the success of any mission using this equipment. ²⁷

23. Ibid.

24. Msg, Comdr BAF to Comdr HRRB, 33 27984, 6 July 1957. Exhibit 31.

25. Msg, Comdr HRRB to Comdr BAF, 3170 09-069/1-27/300-57/BAF/30724/Sears Miller, 26 Aug 1957. Exhibit 32.

26. Ibid.

27. Report, "Unit Simulated Combat Mission Debrief Sheet," prep by D/ops Reports & Analysis Section, 31 30724, n.d., filed in D/ops, 31 30724.

28. Msg, Comdr HRRB to Comdr BAF, 3170 09-069/1-27/300-57/BAF/30724/Sears Miller, 26 Aug 1957. Exhibit 32.

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The one phase V aircraft that aborted due to the malfunction in the oxygen system located in the pod, and its mission completed successfully by another phase V aircraft in the cell. The requirement for the all-V equipment and settings which were contained in the operations plan, and were briefed to headquarters Eighth Air Force were erroneous and were subsequently corrected. ²⁹

The reliability of the mission as a simulation of the Emergency War Plan was reduced by a change in launching procedures which provided even sized cells. It was recommended that Unit Simulated Combat Missions follow as much as possible the Wings' Emergency War Plan, with a deviation only to provide the peace time crew rest criteria. ³⁰

Four hours before take off time, the wing received a forecast of possible thunderstorms along the primary refueling track and attempted to change to the secondary area. They were unable to get a change primarily because the Air Training Command required a 12 hour notice. Coordination problems such as this with Air Training Command could prejudice the success of a mission. In this instance, the mission was successful and only minor weather difficulty was encountered. It was recommended that close liaison should be maintained with weather agencies and that prior arrangements be made with the Air Training Command for changing air refueling areas if necessary. The necessary previous notification should be provided the Air Defense Command to that command

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

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fighter attacks may be permitted without hindering the mission. ³¹

PAGE SEPTER VIII: On 29 and 30 August 1957, the 307th Bomb Wing participated in a Face Better mission in which the entire Eighth Air Force participated. This was the eighth in a series of bomber stream missions and the fifth participated in by the 307th Bomb Wing.

Targets for this mission included North Vernon, Indiana, Charlotte, North Carolina, and Richmond, Virginia. Navigation included a grid leg, with celestial fixing, which was to begin at Winchester, Virginia, and to end at $43^{\circ}-1'N$ $92^{\circ}-30'W$. The turning point for the navigation leg was at $41^{\circ}-45'N$ $76^{\circ}-17'W$. Odd slots flew at the scheduled 25,000 feet and even slots at 33,000 feet. ³²

The route used was from Lincoln to Beatrice, Nebraska, on acceleration, and from Beatrice they were to turn and level off at $40^{\circ}-12'N$ $95^{\circ}-00'W$ and head for Hicksville, Iowa. From there their course took them over Davenport, Iowa, then to Rockford, Illinois. The A-four Control Point and the Pre-Initial Point were both located near Rockford, Illinois, the Initial Point at Crawfordsville, Indiana, and the target at North Vernon, Indiana. The course altered slightly to $36^{\circ}-10'N$ $83^{\circ}-30'W$, and to the next Pre Initial Point, the Cherokee Reservoir. The Initial Point was at Asheville, North Carolina, and the target was Charlotte, North Carolina. They flew next over the Omni Range Radio aid at Pulaski, then on to the next Pre Initial Point at Beanoke, Virginia.

31. Ibid.

32. Operations Order 238-57, sq 30724, August 1957. Exhibit 35(a)

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Lyonsburg, Virginia, was the final initial point, and Diamond, Virginia was the final target. They turned then to a north westerly course of $39^{\circ}-10'N$ $78^{\circ}-10'W$ toward Winchester, Virginia, where they started their navigation phase of this training. The turning point in the navigation phase was at $41^{\circ}-05'N$ $75^{\circ}-17'W$, and from there they continued on to $43^{\circ}-11'N$ $92^{\circ}-30'W$, where they ended the navigation phase. Upon completion of the navigation phase the aircraft returned directly to Lincoln Air Force Base, Texas.

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There were 27 aircraft scheduled for each target. Twenty six aircraft scored on targets one and three, and 27 scored on target number two and the navigation leg. The circular error probable on all three targets was 1,550 feet, and the circular error average was 1,000 feet. On the navigation leg the circular error probable was 10 nautical miles, and the circular error average was 10.1 nautical miles. The best circular error average for all targets was posted by Captain William H. Jefferson's crew. On target number one they posted 230 feet, target number two 370 feet, and on target number three they had 770 feet.

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The use of malfunctioning equipment raised the circular error considerably. In order to evaluate more accurately the units emergency war plan capability, it was suggested that more use of emergency base procedures be made.

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33. Ibid.

34. Ltr, HQ 307th to Comdr 307th, 307th, "Final Mission Summary," 10 September 1957. Exhibit 33(b).

35. Msg, Comdr 312th to Comdr 307th, 312th/307th/1-1045/1-27/130-17/312th/307th/Para Letter VIII, 17 September 1957. Exhibit 34.

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Gross errors were made at the rate of one per each of the first two targets, and three on the third target. The gross error rates were 50.0 percent, 50.0 percent and 91.7 percent respectively on the three targets, and the gross error rate for all targets was 51.7 percent. There were no gross errors committed on the navigation leg. ³⁶

With the above figures in mind, and the addition of one abort each on targets one and three, the overall reliability factor was 74 percent. In a breakdown, the reliability for target number one was 77.7 percent, target number two was 50.0 percent, and target number three was 77.7 percent. The navigation reliability was 100 percent. ³⁷

Six unreliable runs were made, five on target number one, and one on target number three. One error, at target one, was due to an erratic offset mechanism attributed to a material failure. Another was made when after the navigator was on the briefed aiming point and on the final portion of the run. In rechecking his double offset, the cross-hairs did not traverse to the proper point and did not return correctly when he switched back. Instead of replacing the cross-hairs on the briefed aiming point he left them where they were, thus attributing the error to navigator procedure. This same aircraft had an abort at target number three due to a claim by the Radar Bomb Scoring Site that the aircraft turned just prior to being away. Procedure and synchronization

36. Ltr, Lt, 3-7-57 to Capt R. H. 10710, "Final Mission Summary," 10 September 1957. (Signal 331.4)

37. Ibid.

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were also causes in another error on target number one. The navigator here identified the aiming point too late in the run, failing to place the cross hairs and failing to make a wind run on the aiming point. This crew also made a second error but on target number three. In this instance the cross hairs seemed to be just off the aiming point, but the synchronization was good. As in the error on target one, the observer failed to replace the cross hairs on the aiming point. Scope presentation at the end of the run on target number one required final synchronization and cross hair replacement for another aircraft. A multiple target display, that moved up on the film, confused the navigator. The final error on target one was due to poor definition and target breakup near the end of the run precluding good synchronization, and the cross hairs also drifted off the aiming point. ³⁸

The Armament and Electronics people found two relays frozen in the Computer Amplifier unit that caused the cross hairs to be locked out and inoperative. This in turn caused one crew to make three fixed angle runs. ³⁹

The inclusion of identification (IFF) equipment into base letter missions was still having a bad effect on the Wing's equipment reliability. It was not believed that the loss of identification transmissions in flight were controllable by the crews. ⁴¹

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. History of 307th Bombardment Wing (M), April 1957, p. 11.

41. Memo, Senior WSO to Senior SAC, II FC/307-/-7049/-27/33-57/
WSO/30731/Pass Letter VIII, 17 September 1957. Exhibit 34.

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There were no changes in standing for the 307th Bomb Wing as compared to Pace Letter VII, held in April 1957. At that time they finished fourth with no points listed.⁴² This time they finished fourth and had a total number of points listed as 259.44.⁴³

SECTION II - Special Training

1-47 Crews: Eighth Air Force required the 307th Bomb Wing to program 98 hours for special missions during the month of August. Fifty six hours were programmed for Strategic Evaluation training, and 42 hours for -36 indoctrination. A total of 341 hours were actually used in performing missions directed by Headquarters Eighth Air Force. Operations Order 300-57, "Cobra Killer," a no notice unit simulated combat mission, was programmed to commence any time between 1 August and 30 November, and was flown during August. A total of 456 hours were credited to the accomplishment of this mission, 24 hours toward -36 crew indoctrination,⁴⁴ and 61 hours for the Strategic Evaluation training.

Five training priorities were programmed for the month of August. As usual, priority one was for Air Force Regulation 60-2 requirements that were programmed and accomplished concurrent with other priorities. Priority two was that training listed above as Eighth Air Force directed

42. History of 307th Bombardment Wing (B), May 1957, Exhibit 20.

43. Reg, Comdr SAC to et al, CG 3316, 17 September 1957. Exhibit 35.

44. "Wing Commander's Report," OAF 17 to "Air Training Report (10: 4-540-112 and 5-44-112)," August 1957, n.l. Exhibit 10.

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missions, with the exception of "Cobra Killer" and with the addition of Pace Setter VIII. One hundred ninety five hours were programmed for Pace Setter VIII and 419 hours were accomplished. The third priority was the integral non combat ready crew training that was originally programmed for 682 hours. The requirement to fly "Cobra Killer" during August necessitated the reduction of hours and permitted the accomplishment of only 484 hours. Individual non ready and staff training was programmed for 140 hours and 181 hours were accomplished. The fifth priority was for ready crew training, and for 519 hours. These hours were also changed by the requirements of "Cobra Killer" and they flew a total of 644 hours. Tests and Ferry flights were programmed for 60 hours, and 52 were accomplished. The total hours programmed amounted to 1700, and the wing actually flew 1605 hours.⁴⁵

HC-17 Crews: Contrary to the July Historical Report, information has been forwarded by the 307th Air Refueling Squadron and will be included herein. The 307th Air Refueling Squadron during the month of July flew approximately 117 hours on higher headquarters directed missions. One hundred twelve hours were in support of Operation "Sun Dog", and five hours were for ferry flights.⁴⁶

Four training priorities were listed for July. Priority one was for air force regulation 60-2 requirements that were programmed and accomplished concurrent with other requirements. The non combat ready

45. Ibid.

46. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report (AO: 2-343-112)," July 1957, n.d., filed D/tp, HQ 307th

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crew training occupied the number two priority. Sixty hours were programmed for this training and 77 hours were accomplished. The individual upgrading was also included in this priority for which 45 hours were programmed and 54 hours were accomplished. Combat ready crew training was priority three. This also included the deployment and the support given to "Dun Do". The combat ready crew training portion was programmed for 320 hours and they accomplished 251 hours. The deployment was scheduled for 300 hours and they accomplished it in 281 hours. Support for "Dun Do" was not in their programming but they accomplished 112 hours. Priority four was for test flights, ten hours were programmed for this and 12 hours were accomplished.⁴⁷

During the month of August, the Air Refueling Squadron had 214 hours programmed to support the higher headquarters mission "Dun Do". For this mission they accomplished 206 hours. Two hours were devoted to ferry flights.⁴⁸

A total of 695 hours were programmed for five training priorities during August, of which 661 hours were accomplished. Priority one, Air Force Regulation 50-2 requirements, was programmed and accomplished concurrent with other training. Operation "Dun Do" occupied the number two priority, and as reported above, 214 hours were programmed and 206 hours were accomplished. The third priority was for combat ready

47. Ibid.

48. "Wing Commander's Report," PAR 111 to Air Training Report (101-1-116), August 1957, A-1. Exhibit II.

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crew training for which there were 105 hours programmed and 72 hours accomplished. Individual upgrading shared priority three with the processing of 35 hours and the accomplishment of 92 hours. This commitment was increased in order to upgrade individuals to replace known losses. Combat ready crew training, priority four, was programmed for 306 hours of which they accomplished 176 hours. The fifth priority was for test flights for which they programmed 15 hours and accomplished 14.⁴⁹

The overall failure to accomplish the hours that were programmed was due to the restrictions on flying hours covered in Section 1, of this Chapter.⁵⁰

SECTION III - Training Accomplishments

20-7 (a): Inasmuch as the month of August was a special training month, the 1st Sq was not assigned normal training requirements. Therefore, this was spent on accomplishing training and on 20-3 requirements and brushing up on areas of weakness in each individual crew. The information normally included in this section was not kept for record purposes and consequently could not be located. (U)

20-7 (b): The same reasons contained in the preceding paragraph would also be the exclusion of information for the 307th Air Refueling Squadron. The squadron was still at Hault Air Base, and it was not known if they had scored these accomplishments. (U)

49. Ibid. *

50. Ibid.

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The training accomplishments for the month of July were omitted due to the non availability of the information. It was also stated in the July historical report that the information would not be available until their return to Lincoln Air Force Base. The information for July was received, and is included herein. (U)

The 307th Air Refueling Squadron had only three non combat ready crews to train as of the end of July, to give them a total of 24 combat ready crews. Thirty six hours were provided for these crews and they used a total of 75 hours. ⁵¹

With the 21 combat ready and the three non combat ready crews, they had a reliability of 100 percent on night celestial navigation, and 100 percent on grid celestial navigation, during July. Cruise control and rendezvous were also at a 100 percent reliability. ⁵²

Sixteen wet hoopage were attempted in which all were successful except one, giving them a 94 percent effectiveness figure. ⁵³

SUBJECT IV - Ground Training

7 Crews: A total of 40 combat ready crews were responsible for phase II, of SAC Regulation 50-24 training. During August, three crews were scheduled to attend and none completed. One of the crews did not attend due to the conflict of times with the Pace Setter VIII mission. The other

51. "Management Control Statement," (AOS: 1-343-135), July 1957, HQ 307-A, p.6. Exhibit 36.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

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two crews were not completed due to lack of facilities, instructors, equipment, and other miscellaneous reasons such as lack of handguns, code training, survival intelligence and/or aircraft systems training. ⁵⁴

There were originally 34 combat ready crews scheduled for Special Weapons academic training. Fifteen of these have been completed. A total of 18 were scheduled to complete this training during August, but due to the requirements of "Obra Miller" and Pace Setter VIII, only four crews were able to complete. ⁵⁵

AO-97 Crews: Twenty two combat ready crews were responsible for 50-24 training requirements during July, and six had completed. Six were scheduled in July, six attended, and six completed. ⁵⁶

Six combat ready crews were scheduled for this training during August, eight attended, and eight completed. This brought the total of combat ready crews completed to 14. ⁵⁷

APPENDIX V - Refueling Data

AO-97 Aircraft: There were 104 individual airborne sorties confirmed during the month of August, with 71 of these being airborne. Fifty six sorties effected a complete electronic rendezvous, while 48 did not complete. There were 48 sorties cancelled. Twenty three were due to

54. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV to "Air Training Report (AO: 4-AO-712 and 5-AO-712)," August 1957, n.d., HQ 30754. Exhibit 10.

55. Ibid.

56. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report (AO: 4-AO-712)," July 1957, n.d., HQ 30754, filed B/Lps, HQ 30754.

57. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report (AO: 4-AO-712)," August 1957, n.d., HQ 30754. Exhibit 11.

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"Cobra Killer", nine were from tanker cancellations and aborts, eight from receiver cancellations and aborts, seven due to weather, and one was not attempted due to the nature of the sortie. ⁵⁸

Fifty seven sorties were made where they transferred the required fuel, but none were made on double refueling missions. There were also no mass night cell sorties. ⁵⁹

EC-119 aircraft: Eighteen refueling sorties were confirmed in July, with 18 of them being airborne. Six of these completed a complete electronic rendezvous. Fifteen sorties transferred the required fuel, with only three failing to do so. These were due to aborts, of which two were from aircraft malfunctions, and one was from an equipment malfunction. During July, the 307th Air Refueling Squadron transferred a total of ⁶⁰ 30,360 gallons of fuel. ~~(S)~~

The month of August saw more action from the squadron when 28 refueling sorties were confirmed. Thirty one sorties (including three strip alert aircraft) were airborne. Complete electronic rendezvous were made by 19 sorties. Twenty one sorties, including the three strip alert aircraft and 18 sorties that were in a cell formation, did not complete a rendezvous. Thirty sorties transferred the required fuel and one did not. The one sortie aborted due to an engine malfunction. Total fuel transferred during August was ⁶¹ 59,072 gallons. ~~(S)~~

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report (ASR: 9-242-112)," July 1957, u.d., sq 30734, Filed O/Lps, sq 30734.

61. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART III to "Air Training Report (ASR: 9-242-112)," August 1957, u.d., sq 30734. Exhibit 11.

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SECTION VI - Special Projects

A pamphlet was prepared during July on the revised scoring system to be used on unit simulated combat missions. These were presented to all crew members and maintenance personnel, providing a breakdown of points for each scored item along with the maximum points that could be earned by one crew. ⁶²

Similar guides were of such success during the operation "Cobra Killer" that several crews asked for a like guide for use in Face Letter VIII. ⁶³

The information included a bombing index that gave the score as exposed to the circular error. For example, if the circular error on three targets were 300, 500, and 700 feet, the index totals would be 200, 200, and 187 and the overall total would be 587 points. Divided by the three targets, this would give an overall score for bombing accuracy of 195.66. Similar formulas were included for bombing reliability, gross error reliability, equipment reliability, percent of the required aircraft airborne, percent completing the mission, and for navigation reliability. ⁶⁴

A briefing was also presented to orientate the necessary personnel on steps to be taken to obtain the maximum points on all unit simulated

62. "Analysis of Points Lost," (DOB: SAC-USA(SAF), July 1957, n.d., HQ 30721. Exhibit 37.

63. Ibid.

64. "Face Letter Scoring Guide," prep by DCR, HQ 30721, n.d. Exhibit 38.

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combat missions. Discussed at this briefing were such items reflecting the security, methods and times to report an aircraft ready, and combat reporting. With the use of the pamphlet and the information presented at the briefing, all personnel would better understand how the effectiveness of the wing on similar missions could be raised through their own contributions.

65. "Analysis of Points Lost," (OS: 2-1-54 (RAF), July 1957, v.d., p. 307a. Exhibit 37.

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Subject: - Reception

OFFICIAL 1 - General

Reception Plan: To aid and expedite the return of the 307th Air Refueling Squadron in October, the 307th Bomb Wing published a Reception Plan. The Plan contained instructions that would facilitate the processing of aircraft, crews, personnel, and material. (U)

All efforts were scheduled for the convenience of the incoming Air Refueling Squadron. Transportation was scheduled for both personnel and baggage from the aircraft to the checking point and then if need be, to the barracks. Refreshments were to be provided and arrangements were made to have dependents waiting at the end of the processing line. (U)

The plan was forwarded to the 307th Air Refueling Squadron at Thule, so they could meet the pre redeployment requirements. A redeployment load plan was to be forwarded to the Wing's Logistical Section, containing proposed passenger and material loads. Another list was to contain a roster of passengers, and the phone number and address of the dependent they desired to have notified of the return. (U)

Equipment Problems: The shortage of A1-B generators, that have been reported as a critical item ever since last January, were still listed

1. "Reception Plan for 307th Air Refueling Squadron," prep by S/Lt, 307th, dtd. 30 Sept 54.
2. Idif.
3. Idif.

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In an effort to speed delivery, a message was received however, in a message from Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, indicating that subject generators would be delivered to the 307th Bomb Wing by 15 September 1957. (U)

UNIT II - Operations

Aircraft Status: The 307th Bomb Wing had a total of 45 B-47E aircraft assigned during August 1957. From this number there was an average of 44 available to perform under the current Emergency War Plan. An average of 8.5 aircraft were out of commission for maintenance during August. Of six aircraft that were not operational during the month, three were ready for maintenance, and three were for equipment. Each aircraft had an average availability factor of 34 hours flown during the month. (U)

A total of 15,064 hours were possessed by the Wing and 11,800 of these were operationally ready. Ninety-two percent of the hours possessed were operationally ready and flyable, and 89 percent were airborne as scheduled. (U)

Operations: The 307th Chief of Maintenance (C-9) reported scheduled 273 sorties for 1,750 flying hours during the month of August 1957. Two hundred forty-four sorties were flown for a total of 1,605 flying hours. This included 11 test flights for 43 hours, and 13 ferry flights for 17 hours. Ninety-one potential sorties were lost during August. The

4. "Wing Commander's Report," Part IV to Air Training Report (AR: 1-113-712 and 1-113-713), August 1957, HQ 307th, A.F. Exhibit 10.
5. "Consolidated Unit Capability Report (AR: 1-113-711)," Summary, prep by SAC, HQ 307th, 3 September 1957. Exhibit 9.
6. "Management Control Statement," (AR: 1-113-735), August 1957, HQ 307th, A.F. Exhibit 13.

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programming effectiveness was 67 percent during August, and scheduling effectiveness for the month was 89 percent. The total fleet time hours for the month was 5,187. Seven aircraft completed periodic inspections and were not available to the tactical squadrons for an average of 6.7 maintenance flying days.⁷ (U)

In the opinion of the Aircraft and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel Ralph L. Smith, the most significant contribution of the malfunction Data Collection and Analysis Unit for the month was the excellent manner in which they kept the wing commander posted on the events taking place during both the unit simulated combat missions. This consisted of reasons for late take-offs, information on weapons and gunnery, times aircraft were in commission, reasons for late take-offs, deficiencies encountered, and corrective actions taken.⁸ (U)

Summary: In planning sorties, for each of the three tactical squadrons, the wing programmed 266 sorties for 1,700 flying hours. The 370th Bomb Squadron received 99 sorties for 572 hours, the 371st Bomb Squadron received 88 sorties for 564 hours, and the 372nd Bomb Squadron received 89 sorties for 564 hours.⁹ (U)

The cut back in flying affected the flying hours goal, but not in an excessive degree. The wing flew 244 sorties for 1,485 hours.¹⁰ Squadron

7. "Monthly Maintenance and Flying Activity Report, (AOR: 2-22-16)," August 1957, HQ 307th. Exhibit 40.
8. Ibid.
9. Operations Plan 302-57, HQ 307th, 1 August 1957. Exhibit 41.
10. "Monthly Maintenance and Flying Activity Report, (AOR: 2-22-16)," August 1957, HQ 307th. Exhibit 40.

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In August. Hope for delivery is received however, in a message from Headquarters Eighth Air Force, indicating that subject generators would be delivered to the 307th soon. ⁴ (U)

Section 12 - Maintenance

Paragraph 1: The 307th Bomb Wing had a total of 45 B-47B aircraft assigned during August 1957. From this number there was an average of 44 available to perform under the current Air Force War Plan. An average of 8.5 aircraft were out of commission for maintenance during August. Of six aircraft that were not operational during the month, three were ready for maintenance, and three were for equipment. Each aircraft had an average availability factor of 34 hours flown during the month. ⁵

A total of 15,064 hours were possessed by the Wing and 13,700 of these were operationally ready. Sixty-two percent of the hours possessed were operationally ready and flyable, and 89 percent were airborne as scheduled. ⁶ (U)

Paragraph 2: The 307th Chief of Maintenance (C-9) reported scheduled 273 sorties for 1,750 flying hours during the month of August 1957. Two hundred forty four missions were flown for a total of 1,685 flying hours. This included 11 test flights for 43 hours, and 13 ferry flights for 17 hours. Sixty-one potential sorties were lost during August. The

4. "Wing Commander's Remarks," PART IV of "Air Training Report (AR: 4-103-112 and 5-103-112)," August 1957, HQ 307th, A.F. Exhibit 10.
5. "Consolidated Unit Availability Report (AR: 3-103-111)," Headquarters, prep by SAC, HQ 307th, 3 September 1957. Exhibit 9.
6. "Management Control System," (AR: 1-103-100), August 1957, HQ 307th, A.F. Exhibit 11.

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programming effectiveness was 67 percent during August, and scheduling effectiveness for the month was 89 percent. The total fleet time hours for the month was 5,187. Seven aircraft completed periodic inspections and were not available to the tactical squadron for an average of 6.7 maintenance flying days. (U)

In the opinion of the Aircraft and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel Ralph E. Smith, the most significant contribution of the Malfunction Data Collection and Analysis Unit for the month was the excellent manner in which they kept the wing commander posted on the events taking place during both the unit simulated combat missions. This consisted of reasons for late take-offs, information on weapons and gunnery, times aircraft were in commission, reasons for late take-offs, deficiencies encountered, and corrective actions taken. (U)

Summary: In planning sorties, for each of the three tactical squadrons, the wing programmed 266 sorties for 1,700 flying hours. The 370th Bomb Squadron received 89 sorties for 572 hours, the 371st Bomb Squadron received 88 sorties for 564 hours, and the 372nd Bomb Squadron received 89 sorties for 564 hours. (U)

The cut back in flying affected the flying hours goal, but not in an excessive degree. The wing flew 244 sorties for 1,605 hours. Squadron

7. "Monthly Maintenance and Flying Activity Report, (ACC: 8-11-16)," August 1957, HQ 307th, Exhibit 40.
8. Ibid.
9. Operations Plan 202-37, HQ 307th, 1 August 1957. Exhibit 41.
10. "Monthly Maintenance and Flying Activity Report, (ACC: 8-11-16)," August 1957, HQ 307th, Exhibit 40.

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sorties were refueled accordingly, and the 370th West Squadron flew 80 sorties for 537 hours, the 371st West Squadron flew 75 sorties for 512 hours, and the 372nd flew 81 sorties for 590 hours. ¹¹

The 370th West Squadron had only one aircraft scheduled to undergo periodic inspection during August. Aircraft number 224 was scheduled for pre-deck inspection on 8 August, post deck from 9 to 14 August, and test on 19 August. The 371st and 372nd West Squadrons had three and four aircraft scheduled as follows: ¹²

Aircraft Number	Pre-deck	Post Deck	Flight Test
220 371st WS	4 August	9/12 August	13 August
198 371st WS	16 August	19/20 August	27 August
415 371st WS	26 August	3/4 September	5 September
128 372nd WS	31 July	7/8 August	9 August
413 372nd WS	17 August	17/20 August	21 August
417 372nd WS	26 August	27/28 August	29 August
414 372nd WS	28 August	3/6 September	9 September

QUALITY CONTROL: The Quality Control Section inspected four F-42 engine changes in August and found an average of one discrepancy per jet engine. This was much better than the 4.75 discrepancies per engine reported in July. One F-47 engine change was inspected and here again only one discrepancy was noted. ¹³

Thirteen flight tests were conducted, 14 on F-47 aircraft and one on a F-42. There were four F-47 aircraft engine changes, seven F-47

11. Operations Plan 202-57, HQ 307th, 1 August 1957. Exhibit 41.
12. "Aircraft Status and Purpose of Flight," AF Form 119, Aug 57, and "Work Sheet Deck," (33: 1-47-1), Aug 57, w.c., prep and filed by D/Asst, HQ 307th.
13. Ltr, HQC to DI, HQ 307th, "Inspection Analysis Report," 3 Sep 57. Exhibit 42.

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periodic inspections, two "A" tests, two 15 day aircraft, and one operational check. (U)

Ten special investigations or inspections were conducted during the month, along with 291 weapons release inspections. The most common among the weapons release discrepancies was the low air pressure. This has also been a recurring discrepancy. (U)

In undergoing periodic inspections, six F-47 aircraft had an average of 33 discrepancies each. This was 9.5 more per aircraft than were found during July. (U)

SECTION III - Special Projects

Summary: On 13 August, a Disposition Form was received by the Wing from Colonel Jerry A. Boisington, 418th Air Division Commander, outlining the economy program and requesting suggestions from the Wing as to ways of conservation. Several suggestions were made on ways to conserve paper, paper clips and other office materials. (U)

Of more significant importance was a suggestion that the J-47 Dust Excluders should be substituted by 650 x 16 tire tubes that were less expensive, and actually performed the job better. For one thing, they had no rivets to break off and enter the air intakes. Another reason was that the tube made a better contour fit around the nose cone and inner surface of the nose ring cowl. (U)

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. AF, Comdr 418AD to et al, "Emphasis on Economy," 13 Aug 57, filed 6, 418AD, Document 1, to above AF, prep by 6, HQ 307th. Exhibit 43.

18. Ibid.

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Another suggestion was the elimination of nose covers on B-47 aircraft. The navigator window could be effectively sealed to prevent water from leaking in, thus eliminating the nose cover. The nose cover contributed to a corrosive action which required removal by polish and wax that in itself was expensive. ¹⁹ (U)

The 307th Periodic Maintenance Squadron recommended that B-47 engine insulation blankets be removed in the Periodic Maintenance Decks. This would eliminate additional damage caused by snipping through repairable channels. They also estimated a savings of \$1,000.00 ²⁰ per month. (U)

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

STAFF OF THE COMMAND

Commander	Colonel Wilbur Reed Jr.
Deputy Commander	Colonel Robert A. Howell
Adjutant	Captain Charles L. Bennett
Director of Operations	Lt. Colonel Robert A. Reed
Director of Material	Lt. Colonel James Edwards
Director of Personnel	Lt. Colonel Edward B. Lusk
Director of Safety	Captain John Hunter
Comptroller	1/Lt William Gump

ASSIGNED SQUADRONS

307th Air Refueling Squadron	Lt. Colonel Oliver A. Fowler
370th Bomb Squadron	Lt. Colonel W. L. Smith
371st Bomb Squadron	Lt. Colonel James A. Stay
372nd Bomb Squadron	Lt. Colonel William Miller
307th A & B Maint Squadron	Lt. Colonel Ralph A. Smith
307th Field Maint Squadron	Lt. Colonel Herbert A. Millspaugh Jr.
307th Period Maint Squadron	Lt. Colonel Edward A. Jones
307th Headquarters Squadron	Major Charles A. Price
307th Tactical Hospital	Captain Kent Small