

STANDARD TIME 70-14

2 OCT 69

NUMBER

PAR 171

MISSION FLIGHT PLAN										LDR		TIME		H-52H	
TOPDOWN PT	CR	ALT	ASL	FLY	WIND	TEMP	WIND	TEMP	ETA	ATA	REMARKS	REMARKS			
5522N 0602W															
5447N 5532W	CR 152	+7	159	+33	192	140	77	170	2095	1:29	37	0659			
5110N 6500W	CL 150	+6	156	+33	189	150		170	2130	1:35		0705			
5230N 5600W	CR 198	+8	206	+30	236			115	2211	1:50	119	0720			
5100N 5600W	CR 178	+8	186	+29	215			140	2334	5:09		0733			
4900N 6900W	CR 233	+5	238	+27	305			100	2514	5:28		0758			
4700N 7000W	CR 196	+8	201	+24	228			125	2611	5:45		0815			
PLR 095/60									317	5:22	162				
4500N 7200W	CR 211	+7	220	+18	238			105	2788	6:07		0837			
BOS 315/75									121	5:17	127				
4300N 7220W	CR 189	+8	197	+16	211			125	2809	6:21		0851			
HKX 162/97									162	5:28	174				
4040N 7415W	CR 208	+7	215	+12	227			115	2931	6:38		0918			
SIX 119/19									98	5:11	102				
3900N 7425W	CR 181	+8	191	+10	201			135	3070	7:01		0931			
OVE 110/06									160	5:28	210				
3800N 7800W	CR 249	+1	252	+8	260			180	3250	7:30		1000			
EMW 236/53									156	5:30	224				
3715N 8200W	CR 256	+2	258	+1	262			190	3116	8:00		1030			
FIP 166/70									98	5:15	133				
3730N 8100W	CR 278	-1	277	+1	278			185	3511	8:25		1045			
IND 137/35									152	5:22	166				
3530N 8600W	CR 322	-7	315	-1	314			105	3696	8:37		1107			
IND 319/11									62	5:09	67				
4030N 8630W	CR 339	-8	331	-1	330			120	3758	8:46		1116			
KES 185/88									128	5:20	111				
4200N 8830W	CR 311	-6	308	+2	306			100	3886	9:06		1136			
ME 238/85 EEP									68	5:11	80				
4228N 9000W	CR 291	-3	288	-5	283	150		190	3951	9:17		1117			
MC (LO)20									118	5:21	167				
4320N 9300W	CR 326	-7	319	-7	312	50		105	4102	9:38		1208			
PAR 100/36									236	5:35	260				
4631N 9600W	CR 326	-7	319	-7	312	390		105	4338	10:13		1213			
PAR 166/35									73	5:15	80				
4721N 9715W	CR 310	-5	305	-8	297	390		105	4411	10:28		1258			
PEN & LAND															

FUEL RESERVE
51.0M

2 DEC 1969 PAGE 2 BAR 170

MISSION FLIGHT PLAN

L67M 319RM R-52H

2 DEC 69

ORIGIN PT	DEST	CR	FLY	WIND	TEMP	TA	TIME	ETA	REMARKS
5527N 6602W									
5117N 6512W	CR 152	+7	159	+37	192	435	170	105	38
5410N 6600W	CR 204	+8	212	+31	243	435	170	106	42
5300 6700W	CR 206	+8	214	+30	244	450	170	106	42
5130N 6700W	CR 178	+8	186	+28	214		170	106	42
5000N 6900W	CR 230	+6	236	+25	261		170	106	42
4800N 7050W	CR 210	+8	218	+20	238		170	106	42
4720N 7200W	CR 229	+6	235	+18	253		170	106	42
4500N 7300W	CR 195	+8	203	+16	219		170	106	42
4300N 7320W	CR 182	+8	190	+12	202		170	106	42
4200N 7500W	CR 230	+6	236	+11	217		170	106	42
4030N 7500W	CR 179	+8	187	+10	197		170	106	42
3930N 7600W	CR 216	+7	223	+8	231		170	106	42
3920N 7900W	CR 266	+1	267	+6	273		170	106	42
3750N 8200W	CR 237	+5	242	+2	244		170	106	42
3600N 8130W	CR 301	+5	296	0	296		170	106	42
3430N 8515W	CR 338	+8	330	0	330		170	106	42
3300 8930W	CR 298	-1	291	-3	291		170	106	42
3200N 9000W	CR 290	-3	287	-5	282		170	106	42
3100N 9200W	CR 260	-3	267	-5	262		170	106	42
3000N 9235W	CR 362	-8	331	-6	328		170	106	42
2900N 9520W	CR 316	-6	310	-7	303		170	106	42
2721N 9715W	CR 284	-2	282	-8	274		170	106	42
PEN & LAND									

FUEL RESERVE 53M

APPENDIX IV
ANNEX A
"RECAPITULATION SHEETS"

PEACETIME EXERCISE RECAPITULATION SHEET - BOMBARDMENT										UNIT		OPERATIONS ORDER NUMBER		MISSION NAME		LAUNCH OPTION		DATE PREPARED		PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES	
TARGET DATA										AIR REFUELING DATA											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
LAUNCH TIME	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED
1700	30000	10000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1710	30000	10000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1720	30000	10000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000

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PEACETIME EXERCISE RECAPITULATION SHEET - BOMBARDMENT (CONTINUATION)										UNIT		OPERATIONS ORDER NUMBER		MISSION NAME		LAUNCH OPTION		DATE PREPARED		PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES			
TARGET DATA										MISSION INFORMATION										DESTINATION AND ALTERNATE INFORMATION		MISSION NOTES	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22		
LAUNCH TIME	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED	LAUNCH ALTITUDE	LAUNCH WEIGHT	LAUNCH SPEED		
1700	30000	10000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000		
1710	30000	10000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000		
1720	30000	10000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000		

SAC FORM 181A

HEADQUARTERS, 319TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H) (SAC)
Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota
2 December 1969

APPENDIX V

ANNEX A

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

1. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL:

a. All aircraft will monitor FAA/DOT ARTCC's discrete VHF or UHF frequency at all times. If appropriate, this may be done by using the omni receiver.

b. Do not request any altitude change from ATC unless absolutely necessary. However, if you are directed to change altitude, it must be complied with.

2. IFF/SIF PROCEDURES:

a. Flight plans, SAC Form 121/121a (altitude reservations) and the classified Communications Flimsy have the exact point where the normal IFF/SIF will be turned off/on/standby, and where the PTC discrete IFF/SIF will be turned on/off.

b. For unsafe target, and when fighter interception is not desired (i.e., while in weather) squawk Mode 3 code 50.

c. All requests for "STOP BUZZER" change IFF/SIF during penetration phase must be recorded. Indicate "BAR" number, coordination, Zulu time, EOM band(s)/channel(s) and IFF/SIF mode and code. Include requesting agency.

d. When in Canadian territory, maintain course within plus or minus 10 nautical miles of route center line.

3. ATC position reports are not required after the HHEL unless specifically requested in the final CARF approval message. (See SAC Form 121/121a (altitude reservation) for REP reports to ARTCC).

a. You will be informed at the Pre-takeoff briefing of the contents of the final approval message.

APPENDIX V
ANNEX A
319BW CREW FLIMSY
SNOWTIME 70-3-C
2 December 1969

b. Normal position reports are required to the HNCI and from the lead element (REP) to destination. Canadian progress reports are not required unless requested in the CANZ/ARCC alt com amendment or approval.

c. During the strike phase from the HNCI to the Red Exercise Point, reporting procedures will be as requested by the Center concerned.

d. Aircraft will utilize FAA/DOT centers VHF frequencies at all times.

e. At the REP enroute IFF/SIF 1450 for 101 minute from 1/24 until directed otherwise by ATC.

4. AIRCROW GENERAL:

a. Precise navigation is extremely critical for this exercise. It is mandatory that all resources be utilized to maintain TRACK and TIMING.

b. Navigation must comply with the Evaluation and Analysis requirements of the Flimsy and should plot the necessary fixes.

c. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Takeoff order will be as follows: BAR 169, 170, and 171.

NOTE: IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE CELL INTEGRITY BE AS OUTLINED. OTHER POINTS AND ALTITUDE CHANGES MUST BE MADE GOOD AS LISTED IN THE AIRCROW RESERVATION TO PREVENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CELLS OF OTHER UNITS INVOLVED IN THIS MISSION.

APPENDIX VI
ANNEX A
"ALTITUDE RESERVATIONS"

ALTITUDE RESERVATION FLIGHT PLAN (CONTINUED)						MISSION NAME, PRECEDENCE SNOW TIME 70-3-C/4	
NEAREST TO ALL CALL AR 169, 170, 171				AIRCRAFT NO. AND TYPE 3 B-52H			
ORIGINATOR RMDR							
PROPOSED DEPARTURE TIME							
TIME	NO	TIME (If Known)	ACMIS	COLOR	NO	TIME (If Known)	ACMIS
		03 DEC 69Z					
	3	0221Z EARLIEST	1				
		0231Z PLANNED					
		0241Z AVANA					
G. TAS 444 KT							
PASS TO ADC RADAR			PRIMARY REFUELING - AREAS TRACKS		ALT REFUELING - AREAS TRACKS		
SITE NAME	YES	NO					
NO PAR			N/A		N/A		
EEM CORRIDORS				REFUELING WITH			
START HICL	STOP EEP			N/A			
BAR 169: 0705Z 5410N 6700W	1223Z PMB 062/44			REFUELING AREA AND/OR AIRSPACE RESERVATION			
BAR 170: 0705Z 5410N 6600W	1135Z NKE 267/76			Cleared by Controlling Agency			
BAR 171: 0705Z 5410N 6500W	1147Z NKE 238/85			YES	NO	RESP OF CALCULATING AGCY	
MULTI-AREA PROCEEDURE COORDINATED WITH NSP		ARTC		CHURCHILL B & C	X		2AF
				CND-604	X		2AF
				W107	X		2AF
				R4006	X		2AF
				R4001	X		2AF
				R6611	X		2AF
				R6613	X		2AF
				R5503	X		2AF
				R5504	X		2AF
				R4301	X		2AF
				R3401	X		2AF
				R6901	X		2AF
				R6903	X		2AF
LIABILITY PERIOD "E" HOUR 03 DEC 1969Z							
PILOT OFFICER MAJ. JAMES H. TILLER III		ORGANIZATION 319BW (DCOTSP) RAND FORKS AFB ND 48201		OFFICE PHONE 6477		HOME PHONE 772-4157	
DATE THIS FORM ACCOMPLISHED 21 OCT 69							
REMARKS 1. ADVISE ALL SNOW TIME 70-3-C BAR ACFT ENTIRE ROUTE. 2. PLUS OR MINUS 10 MIN TRKF TO HICL, THENCE PLUS OR MINUS 5 MIN. 3. REPORT EN-CAN, EX-CAN TO U.S. ARTCC. 4. REPORT ARTCC FREQUENCY AT ALL TIMES.							

ZNY AUCO ZIM ZNY ZIC ZOR ZID ZIU ZIO; ZII

ALTITUDE RESERVATION FLIGHT PLAN			
SYMBOL	CLASS	REMARKS	CLASSIFICATION
SHOW TIME 70-3-C	4		SAC
A. UNIT TACTICAL CALL SIGN	B. AIRCRAFT (no. and type)	C. POINT OF DEPARTURE	
BAR 169 170 171	3 B-52H	RDR	
1	200/270 TROP NORTH OR SOUTH CHURCHES FERRY #3 DPTR LVLOF AT RDR TACAN 284/58 4820N		1
2	9845N 0017 (0248Z) DRCT FAR 245/48 4630N 9800W 0034 (0305Z) MSP 245/96 4436N 9535W 0053		2
3	(0324Z) TEST 1P (IFF/SIF 3/6200 BAR 169 ONLY) DRCT DLH 041/55 4727N 9114W 0125 (0355Z)		3
4	DLH 031/99 4810N 9046W EX-CAN 0131 (0401Z) (CALL MSP ARTCC) DRCT 5114N 8845W 0157 (0427Z)		4
5	(BAR 169 IFF/SIF NORMAL) CLMB 360/370 LVLOF W/I 20NM DRCT 5500N 8550W 0230 (0500Z)		5
6	5800N 8300W 0255 (0526Z) 5812N 7500W 0325 (0556Z) CLMB TO 390/400 LVLOF W/I 15NM DRCT		6
7	5800N 6830W 0350 (0621Z) ORBIT 20NM LEFT OF TRACK FOR 0010 DPRT ORBIT AT 0400 (0631Z)		7
8	CLMB TO 430/440 LVLOF W/I 25NM DRCT 5522N 6602W 0423 (0654Z) CONDON ROUTE ENDS.		8
9	BAR 169: 430 DRCT 5446N 6633W 0430 (0700Z) CLMB TO 450 LVLOF AT 5410N 6700W HNCI 0435		9
10	(0705Z) (IFF/SIF 3/6200) DRCT 5230N 6900W 0453 (0723Z) 5000N 7000W 0515 (0745Z) 4800N		10
11	7235W 0539 (0809Z) 4600N 7400W 0558 (0828Z) MSS 081/20 4500N 7415W EX-CAN 0607 (0837Z)		11
12	(CALL BOS ARTCC) DRCT MSS 178/55 4400N 7430W 0615 (0845Z) HNK 271/30 4200N 7600W 0635		12
13	(0905Z) PSB 136/89 4000N 7630W 0652 (0922Z) AGC 133/30 4000N 7930N 0714 (0944Z) CRW		13
14	315/15 3830N 8200W 0736 (1006Z) ROD 176/37 3940N 8460W 0754 (1024Z) CRL 268/68 4200N		14
15	8500W 0815 (1015Z) MKE 028/27 4330N 8800W 0839 (1109Z) ODI 089/63 4350N 9000W ECM OFF		15
16	0853 (1123Z) DRCT DLH 4648N 9212W 0921 (1151Z) PMB 062/44 4900N 9630W EEP 0953 (1223Z)		16
17	DSND TO 350 LVLOF W/I 30NM IFF/SIF 3/5000 FOR ONE MINUTE THEN 3/2400 CALL ARTCC DRCT		17
18	RDR TACAN 166/35 4721N 9719W 1007 (1237Z) LAND RDR.		18
19	BAR 170: 435 DRCT 5447N 6532W 0429 (0659Z) 5410N 6600W HNCI 0435 (0705Z) (IFF/SIF 3/6200)		19
20	CLMB TO 450 LVLOF W/I 20NM DRCT 5300N 6700W 0446 (0716Z) 5130N 6700W 0459 (0729Z) 5000N		20
21	6900W 0516 (0746Z) 4800N 7050W 0537 (0807Z) 4720N 7200W 0546 (0816Z) MSS 100/75 4500N		21
22	7300W EX-CAN 0607 (0837Z) (CALL BOS ARTCC) DRCT MSS 124/70 4430N 7315W 0611 (0841Z) HNK		22
23	C 103 4300N 7320W 0624 (0854Z) HNK 119/14 4200N 7500W 0638 (0908Z) SIE 002/84 4030N		23
24	7500W 0650 (0920Z) SIE 303/61 3930N 7600W 0702 (0932Z) FRR 297/40 3920N 7900W 0724		24
25	(0954Z) CRW 202/32 3750N 8200W 0749 (1019Z) FLN 335/22 3900N 8430W 0810 (1040Z) PDM		25

(If additional space is needed for any item, continue on blank 8" x 11" sheets and identify item.)

SAC

121

SAC-DAER

ZNY ACO ZNY ZNY ZNY ZOR ZID ZM INFO ZFI

ALTITUDE RESERVATION FLIGHT PLAN			
SYMBOL	CLASS	MODE	CLASSIFICATION
SYMBOL 70-3-C	CLASS 4	MODE X	CLASSIFICATION SAC
A. UNIT TACTICAL CALL SIGN BAR 169 170 171	B. ALTITUDE (ASL and Feet) 3 B-52H	C. POINT OF DEPARTURE RDR	

1 200/270 TROP NORTH OR SOUTH CHURCHES FERRY #3 DPTR LVLOF AT RDR TACAN 284/58 4820N 1

2 9845W 0017 (0248Z) DRCT FAR 245/48 4630N 9800W 0034 (0305Z) MSP 245/96 4436N 9535W 0053 2

3 (0324Z) TEST IP (IFF/SIF 3/6200 BAR 169 ONLY) DRCT DLH 041/55 4727N 9114W 0125 (0355Z) 3

4 DLH 031/99 4810N 9046W EX-CAN 0131 (0401Z) (CALL MSP ARTCC) DRCT 5114N 8845W 0157 (0427Z) 4

5 (BAR 169 IFF/SIF NORMAL) CLMB 360/370 LVLOF W/I 20NM DRCT 5500N 8550W 0230 (0500Z) 5

6 5800N 8300W 0255 (0526Z) 5812N 7500W 0325 (0556Z) CLMB TO 390/400 LVLOF W/I 15NM DRCT 6

7 5800N 6830W 0350 (0621Z) ORBIT 20NM LEFT OF TRACK FOR 0010 DPRT ORBIT AT 0400 (0631Z) 7

8 CLMB TO 430/440 LVLOF W/I 25NM DRCT 5522N 6602W 0423 (0654Z) COMMON ROUTE ENDS. 8

9 BAR 169: 430 DRCT 5446N 6633W 0430 (0700Z) CLMB TO 450 LVLOF AT 5410N 6700W HHCL 0435 9

10 (0705Z) (IFF/SIF 3/6200) DRCT 5230N 6900W 0453 (0723Z) 5000N 7000W 0515 (0745Z) 4800N 10

11 7235W 0539 (0809Z) 4600N 7400W 0558 (0828Z) MSS 081/20 4500N 7415W EX-CAN 0607 (0837Z) 11

12 (CALL BOS ARTCC) DRCT MSS 178/55 4400N 7430W 0615 (0845Z) HNK 271/30 4200N 7600W 0635 12

13 (0905Z) PSB 136/89 4000N 7630W 0652 (0922Z) AGC 133/30 4000N 7930N 0714 (0944Z) CRW 13

14 315/15 3830N 8200W 0736 (1006Z) ROD 176/37 3940N 8400W 0754 (1024Z) CRL 268/68 4200N 14

15 8500W 0815 (1045Z) MKE 028/27 4330N 8800W 0839 (1109Z) ODI 089/63 4350N 9000W ECM OFF 15

16 0853 (1123Z) DRCT DLH 4648N 9212W 0921 (1151Z) PMB 062/44 4900N 9630W EEP 0953 (1223Z) 16

17 DSND TO 350 LVLOF W/I 30NM IFF/SIF 3/5000 FOR ONE MINUTE THEN 3/2400 CALL ARTCC DRCT 17

18 RDR TACAN 166/35 4721N 9719W 1007 (1237Z) LAND RDR. 18

19 BAR 170: 435 DRCT 5447N 6532W 0429 (0659Z) 5410N 6600W HHCL 0435 (0705Z) (IFF/SIF 3/6200) 19

20 CLMB TO 450 LVLOF W/I 20NM DRCT 5300N 6700W 0446 (0716Z) 5130N 6700W 0459 (0729Z) 5000N 20

21 6900N 0516 (0746Z) 4800N 7050W 0537 (0807Z) 4720N 7200W 0546 (0816Z) MSS 100/75 4500N 21

22 7300W EX-CAN 0607 (0837Z) (CALL BOS ARTCC) DRCT MSS 124/70 4430N 7315W 0611 (0841Z) HNK 22

23 C 103 4300N 7320W 0624 (0854Z) HNK 119/14 4200N 7500W 0638 (0908Z) SIE 002/84 4030N 23

24 7300W 0650 (0920Z) SIE 303/61 3930N 7600W 0702 (0932Z) FRR 297/40 3920N 7900W 0724 24

25 (0954Z) CHN 202/32 3750N 8200W 0749 (1019Z) FLM 335/22 3900N 8430W 0810 (1040Z) PNM 25

(If additional space is needed for any item, continue on blank B** & 101** sheets and identify item.)

26 166/52 4130N 0543W 0833 (1103Z) MKE 259/55 4300N 8900W 0901 (1141Z) MKE 267/76 26

27 4300N 9000W EEP 0905 (1135Z) HFF/SIF 3/5000 FOR ONE MINUTE THEN 3/2400 ARTCC ODI 27

28 233/27 4360N 9200W 0919 (1149Z) MSP 098/36 4500N 9235W 0931 (1201Z) DSND to 370 28

29 LVLOF W/I 30NM DRCT FAR 067/62 4700N 9520W 0956 (1226Z) DRCT RDR TACAN 166/35 29

30 4721N 9719W 1011 (1241Z) LAND RDR. 30

31 BAR 171: 440 DRCT 5447N 6532W 0429 (0659Z) CLMB TO 450 LVLOF AT 5410N 6500W 31

32 HBCL 0435 (0705Z) (HFF/SIF 3/6200) DRCT 5230N 6600W 0450 (0720Z) 5100N 6600W 32

33 0503 (0733Z) 4900N 6900W 0528 (0758Z) 4700N 7000W 0545 (0815Z) PLB 095/60 4500N 33

34 7200W EX-CAN 0607 (0837Z) (CALL BOS ARTCC) DRCT BOS 315/78 4300N 7230W 0624 (0854Z) 34

35 BHK 162/97 4040N 7415W 0648 (0918Z) SIE 119/19 3900N 7425W 0701 (0931Z) GVE 110/06 35

36 3800N 7800W 0710 (1000Z) BHM 236/53 3715N 8200W (1030Z) FLM 169/70 3730N 8400W 36

0815 (1055Z) IND 137/25 3930N 8600W 0837 (1107Z) IND 349/41 4030N 8630W 0846 37

38 (1116Z) MKE 185/68 4200N 8830W 0906 (1136Z) MKE 238/85 4228N 9000W EEP 0917 38

39 (1147Z) HFF/SIF 3/5000 FOR ONE MINUTE THEN 3/2400 CALL ARTCC MCW 040/20 4320N 39

40 9300W 0938 (1208Z) DSND TO 390 LVLOF W/I 30NM DRCT FAR 100/36 4634N 9600W 1013 40

41 (1243Z) DRCT RDR TACAN 166/35 4721N 9719W 1028 (1258Z) LAND RDR. 41

7. 2AF (DOT) will obtain appropriate approval through all danger, restricted, restricted warning, and military flying areas including Churchill Rocket Range.

8. 2AF (DOT) will issue EOM ratification message. ARCC will be the only Canadian addressee.

9. Each SAC unit is directed to thoroughly check the flight plan contained in this booklet against original flight plans to determine changes which may have been made since the detailed planning conference.

10. The procedures in the above paragraphs have been coordinated with US/Canadian FAA, DOT, SAC, and NORAD personnel.

ANNEX B
319BW CREW FLIGHT
SNOWTIME 70-3-C
2 December 1969

QUARTERLY FLYING HOURS

B-52H AIRCRAFT

OCTOBER	281 Hours Flown	
NOVEMBER	485 Hours Flown	1371 Hours ALLOCATED
DECEMBER	465 Hours Flown	

QUARTER: 1231 Total Hours Flown

KC-135A AIRCRAFT

OCTOBER	291 Hours Flown	
NOVEMBER	328 Hours Flown	732 Hours ALLOCATED
DECEMBER	366 Hours Flown	

QUARTER: 985 Total Hours Flown

UH-1F (Helicopter) AIRCRAFT

OCTOBER	538 Hours Flown	
NOVEMBER	508 Hours Flown	1620 Hours ALLOCATED
DECEMBER	474 Hours Flown	

QUARTER: 1486 Total Hours Flown

VC-47D Aircraft

OCTOBER	41 Hours Flown	
NOVEMBER	68 Hours Flown	125 Hours ALLOCATED
DECEMBER	34 Hours Flown	

QUARTER: 143 Total Hours Flown

VT-29D AIRCRAFT

OCTOBER	70 Hours Flown	
NOVEMBER	65 Hours Flown	170 Hours ALLOCATED
DECEMBER	80 Hours Flown	

SOURCE: Machine-run format record of flying hours, prepared by Deputy Commander of Operations office, Flight Records Section; filed in 319 DCOTRF.

TRUE EXTRACT

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
 HEADQUARTERS 4TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION (SAC)
 GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA 58001

REPLY TO
 ATTN OF: C

25 November 1969

SUBJECT: Report of Follow-up of Operational Readiness Inspection, 319th
 Bomb Wg, 321st Strat Msl Wg

TO: 2AF (IC)

1. Authority and Command Inspected: In compliance with paragraph 2b(1)(3), SAC Sup 1 to AFR 123-1, a follow-up inspection was conducted by 4 Strategic Aerospace Division, 27-31 October and 3-21 November 1969, to verify the status of each asterisked item contained in the basic report of the Operational Readiness Inspection of the 319BW and 321SMW, Grand Forks AFB, conducted by the SAC I-4, Major General, 24-25 August 1969.

2. The Division team reviewed the corrective action on each asterisked item in the basic report of inspection. All items were found to be satisfactorily corrected except as follows:

Discrepancy: Para P3b. Not all non-rated personnel who have been or are presently on flying status are accomplishing the 5th level for flying personnel. For example: Six personnel in 319th OMS did not test on the correct level.

Findings: An audit of 319OMS training records revealed that TSgt Franks did not test on his proper level. The Squadron Training Officer correctly identified TSgt Franks as on flying status but PC personnel did not test him at proper level. Test results from PC indicate all other personnel tested at proper level however, this is not always indicated on the GMT monthly print out. Some personnel tested at the flying status level are not coded "Y" and the proper test level is not indicated.

Corrective Action: Audit of GMT printout will be corrected by 15 December 1969.

Discrepancy: Para P3b (1). The control and safeguarding of GMT test material is unsatisfactory. For example: 804SVC stores test material in a storage locker which cannot be locked. In addition, 804 SVC could not account for 16 missing test booklets.

Findings: Test pamphlets are now stored under lock and key. However, there are now 17 missing test booklets. The 80430I quarterly staff visit of 16 Sep 69 discovered the loss of 17 booklets but it was impossible to determine if an additional booklet was lost or there was a miscount during the ORI. All booklets had been stored and locked, and no additional tests had been given since the ORI. The 804 Svc Commander considers the booklets as lost.

Corrective Action: Control of test pamphlets to be issued 1 January 1970 will be IAW AFM 86-16 and adequacy will be reviewed on first quarter staff assistance visit (OY 70).

Discrepancy: Para P4a. The following discrepancies are noted in the administrative procedures concerning work orders, SAC Form 83, Photo/Litho/Cartographic Technical Support Requirements:

(2) The date the project was requested is not entered on work orders 2623, 2199, 2236, 2300 or 2333.

Findings: The work orders referred to were corrected. An inspection of all work orders for month of October revealed the same discrepancy on work orders 3719, 3729, 3752, 3859, 3908 and 3952.

Corrective Action: A review of all work orders will be completed by 31 December 1969.

Discrepancy: Para P5a (2). SAC Forms 232, Disaster Control Training Record, for the following Hazard Survey Force members do not reflect required quarterly training for March - June 1969.

(a) SSgt Davis, 321 SMW

(b) Sgt Czaplinski, 321SMW

Findings: The members identified by the IG have had their quarterly training reflected for the March-June quarter, however, quarterly training for July-September was not reflected on SAC Forms 232 for over 50% of the hazard survey force. This training had been accomplished in Sep 69 but not posted.

Counting Station: Checked during visit. Completed 21 Nov 1969.

Discrepancy: Para F5a (3). Required aircraft, ground surveys of the following base unit have not been performed in the last 12 months, 331MMS, 804 Trans Sq, 26 Weather Sq, 2026 Comm Sq.

Finding: The organizations identified have been surveyed. However, subsequent surveys of other base units were not performed in the 12 month period required by Para 4-26(3) (c), AFM 355-1. A schedule of surveys is in effect to complete all units by the end of the year. For example:

1. 02 not surveyed in 1969 scheduled 25 Nov 69.
2. 59MMS surveyed 15 Sep 69, scheduled 25 Nov 69.
(14 months)
3. 903ARS surveyed 29 Sep 68 and 3 Nov 69 (14 months)
4. 321 HSS surveyed 6 Sep 68 and 4 Nov 69 (14 months).
5. 2026 Comm Sq. surveyed 11 Aug 68 and 8 Oct 69 (14 months).

Corrective Action: All future staff surveys will be accomplished AFM 355-1. Completion date 31 Dec 69.

Discrepancy: Para F6 (1) and (2):

"(1) The projection equipment maintenance facilities are not adequate. The work bench is too small and the work area cannot be secured.

"(2) There are no racks provided for the storage of projection equipment. This equipment is presently stacked in the corner of a storeroom."

Fixing: A work order has been submitted to construct a partition which will separate the Photo Lab from the Film Library. This will provide the required security and storage area. Estimated completion date is 1 February 1970.

Corrective Action: Supervision must be increased. Orders should be checked again at the log prior to being filed. Completed 21 November 1969.

Discrepancy: Para 8-4-1. The facility utilized by the surface freight and freight section is inadequate. Bioenvironmental engineer letter of 18 Feb 69 states that the speech interference levels are too high and their letter of 22 Jul 69 recommends corrective action to eliminate both noise level and temperature control problems. Work request 176-9 was approved by the PUB Board and assigned project number CRP 89-9. This project should be reviewed to possibly meet or receive a waiver to the requirements outlined in 2AF (DDI) letter of 26 Jul 69.

Findings: A letter dated 8 Sep 69 was sent to Base Supply requesting a noise trailer be placed next to the freight section for office space. This has been approved by the Base Commander, coordinated with the Commander of Civil Engineering and will satisfy speech interference problems as well as temperature control. This will be completed by 1 December 1969.

Resolution: The trailer has been disapproved. The Transportation Commander, Base Commander and Civil Engineers should decide on what action is going to be taken and a new estimated completion date established. A change to the ORI answers will have to be sent to Higher Headquarters by 1 December 1969.

Discrepancy: Para 3-2c(4). Inspectors are not accompanied by personnel from another agency for inspection of the classified document handling process. (Para 24.1c(3), AFM 207-1, SAC Sup 1).

Findings: Inspectors were accompanied by personnel from SCAS on only one of the eleven inspections conducted during Sep and Oct.

Corrective Action: Qualified personnel to accompany inspectors are not available from SCAS. Request for waiver will be submitted by 15 Nov 69.

Discrepancy: Para USG(4). A parking lot for POW's is located within 30 feet of the weapons storage area fence line. (Para 35b(3), APM 207-3).

Findings: BCP has completed a cost estimate for relocating the parking lot of \$12,000. Request for waiver has not been submitted pending alternate suggestions.

Corrective Action: BCSP was instructed to submit request for waiver immediately. Completed on 24 Nov 69.

Discrepancy: Para V-2c(3)(a) Personnel are serving as members of classification boards (CB) are not appointed on special orders. (Para 8, APM 35-1). For example: MSgt R. Cleaver.

Findings: Personnel serving as members of classification boards are not appointed on special orders. Boards which met on 13 Oct 69 seated SMSgt Barrett and MSgt Teague as members although neither had been appointed.

Corrective Action: Orders were published on 6 Nov 69 and checklist including this item is used in convening classification boards.

Discrepancy: Para V-2c(5). The monthly listings of personnel with returned checks are not screened to determine if proper investigation and resolutions have been completed on all personnel involved. (Para 2, SACR 35-6). For example: Nine personnel listed in 8 July report from the Base Exchange.

Findings: September listing of personnel with returned checks from the Base Exchange contained eight personnel where resolution had not been completed.

Corrective Action: Follow up action was taken immediately and procedure established to screen monthly. Completed 21 Nov 69.

Discrepancies: Para 10(B). Proper follow-up action is not taken to insure that suspense dates are complied with or extensions are granted. (Para 3-1a, AFM 39-02/SAC Sup 1 and SAC CSFO TFS 3-0-2). For example: eleven overdue reports from MIMS.

Findings: Follow up action was not taken on overdue reports with suspense dates in September and October in 834HSS and 84012.

Corrective Action: Responsibility for follow up on reports approaching suspense has been assigned to one specific individual to be performed daily. Completed 21 Nov 69.

Discrepancies: Para 2(a). Although reports of survey are made up with 30 days of the loss, they are being held in the installing organization for up to two months before submitting them to the approving authority. This prevents them from being processed in a timely manner. (Para 1003, AFM 177-11). For example: Reports of Surveys Number 17, 22 and 24.

Findings: Three of four reports being processed were more than 30 days old. Letters of explanation were attached but reasons for late reports were available.

Corrective Action: Continued program to expedite requirements. Action is continuing.

Clifford W. ...
Clifford W. ... Major General, USAF
Commander

Distr:
2AF (C) (c)
4SAD (c)
3138W (c)
321SMW (c)
834CSO (c)


47

C
Flying Safety

30 December 1969

4C

In response to your letter, Flying Safety, dated 23 December 1969, we have taken the following actions as shown in the attached letter which was sent to my DCO and DCM, thus reducing flying hazards for January 1970.


SAMUEL G. TAYLOR, JR., Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch.
Memo to DCO, DCM,
dtd 30 Dec 69

see message C AC 162 2342 Dec

C

30 December 1969

Memo on Flying Safety

DCO DCM

On 29 December, the 4SAD Commander reiterated the following guide lines to be observed in the Accident Prevention Program for January 1970.

- a. DCO personally will brief all Aircraft Commanders of this program prior to their first flight from GFAFB in January 1970.
- b. All crews on their first flight in January 1970 will have an evaluator (pilot-type) on board. After the lengthy standdown, plan a less complicated mission for the first mission of the training period.
- c. The Wing Commander's Bi-Weekly Safety Luncheons will stress the emphasis of this program to make January an accident free month.
- d. DCM will stress ground safety throughout his staff and squadrons, i.e., refueling, towing, vehicle operation on the ramp, over-all supervision to forestall accidents/incidents.
- e. Staff supervision to stay ahead of the weather (WX briefings 0745 and 1600 daily).
- f. DCO scheduling limit B-52 operations to the period 0830 through 0200. KC-135 operations to the period 0830-2400 with exception of ~~and~~ directed missions. With exception of profiles, limit B-52 flights to 8 + 30.
- g. Discourage lengthy secondary missions on the KC-135 in January. Augment secondary missions with additional pilot when such missions are required.
- h. Program to underfly the B-52 allotted flying time by approximately 50 hours.
- i. First flight in January will be briefed by crew to either DCO, ADCO, Squadron Commander or Squadron Ops Officer.
- j. No Nite's will be planned for January.
- k. FD-109 training flights will require maximum supervision. Until aircraft commanders have completed 5 missions, they will limit their operations to 300'/ 3/4 mile for takeoff and landings. FD-109 equipped A/C will not be scheduled against ~~and~~ requirements until qualified

crew availability no longer necessitates this restriction.

SAEJEL G. TAYLOR, JR., Colonel, USAF
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 4TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION (SAC)
GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA 58201




REPLY TO
ATTN OF: C

23 December 1969

SUBJECT: Flying Safety

TO: 319 Bomb Wg (C) ✓ 410 Bomb Wg (C)

1. Since the accident potential is unusually high in January, because of severe weather, the pressure of a new training period, newly-assigned KC-135 crews in the case of the 319th Bomb Wing, and recovery from reduced activity during the holidays, I want you to personally reevaluate all January maintenance and flying schedules to see if the accident potential can be reduced to the irreducible minimum.
2. Use your wisdom and experience, plus all wing assets, to find practical ways of reducing accident exposure. You should at least consider flying less complicated sorties, flying more pilot proficiency missions; using instructors and evaluators more liberally; flying shorter sorties; terminating during the better times of the flying day, minimizing exposure to the worst flying periods of the day, and curtailing or cancelling activities or sorties without concern for completion of training requirements.
3. Inform me when you have completed your reevaluation of January's schedule and advise me of the areas where you feel a reduced exposure has been achieved.


CLIFFORD W. HARGROVE, Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

Info Cy: 4DS

OPERATIONAL HAZARD REPORT											
Flying Safety Officer						FROM <i>Wg. Capt. B. Leasing</i>					
LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE/HAZARD <i>General, 1456</i>						DATE <i>30 Sept 69</i>					
IF HAZARD OCCURRED WHILE IN AIRCRAFT, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING						TIME OF OCCURRENCE DAY <input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> DAY <input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>					
ORIGIN FROM <i>Randolph AFB</i>			DESTINATION <i>CFR AFB</i>			MISSION <i>CCTM</i>					
OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED <i>319th B. Co</i>						AIRCRAFT TYPE <i>B52H</i>		AIRCRAFT ADT SERIAL NO. <i>61033</i>		AIRCRAFT TAG NO. <i>22</i>	
CLEARANCE			COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES			ALTITUDE		WEATHER CONDITIONS			
LOCAL	VFR DD 175	IIR DD 175	YES	NO	<i>51000'</i>		<i>UFR</i>				
CREW POSITION											
PILOT	CO-PILOT	INSTRUCTOR PILOT	NAVIGATOR	ENGINEER	Other (Specify)						
PHASE OF FLIGHT											
PRE-FLIGHT	STARTING	RUNUP	TAXI	TAKE OFF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLIMB	<input type="checkbox"/> CRUISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DESCENT	<input type="checkbox"/> LANDING	<input type="checkbox"/> TAXI	<input type="checkbox"/> GATE	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL HAZARD											
<p>As power was applied on climb out from low level a loud explosion occurred resulting in a jarring of the aircraft. Simultaneously the No 2 engine fire warning light came on and engine 1+2 was shut down. Thirty seconds after the explosion the oil temperature indicator for No. one engine was pegged at 180° engine No. 2 oil temperature maintained 18-20° after shutdown.</p> <p>After the explosion the left external tank gage indicated a steady drop from full to empty in a period of 30 minutes. Oil pressure after shutdown on eng 1+2 was 35-40 psi. All other indications were normal for a shutdown condition.</p> <p>Visual observation with the signal lamp revealed no apparent damage.</p> <p>The right external tank was emptied into all main tanks to equalize lateral balance.</p> <p>A six engine approach and landing was made without further incident.</p>											
DATE <i>30 Sept 69</i>			SIGNATURE OF REPORTING PERSON (If initial)								

TRUE TRACT 49

UNRECORDED
INFORMATION NOVEMBER 16 2752457-3000--NUMBER.
END 3000
R 122/122 OCT 69
FM 227 BARRS 2 AFB IA
TO 4 STRATEGIC/DT/31/500/GRAND FORK AFB WENT
BT
URGENT 0116
FOR DT (INFO). SUBJ: INCIDENT INVOLVING NO 2 ENGINE ON
B-52H S/N 61-153.
REF TELECON MR MOERIDE, DMLD THIS HQ, AND COL MASON,
2 OCT.
SUSPECT DIFFUSER CASE BURN-THROUGH MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY
EXCESSIVE WEAR OF COMBUSTION CHAMBER LUGS AND MATING
RECESSES IN COMBUSTION CHAMBER FRONT CASE, ALLOWING COMBUS-
TION CHAMBER TO SLIP APT OFF FUEL NOZZLE CLUSTER. PLEASE ADVISE
ASAP AMOUNT OF WEAR FOUND ON THESE PARTS. ALSO, FORWARD
PHOTOGRAPHS.
BT
/5116

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

HISTORIAN'S NOTE: The date change reflected below was made prior to dispatch of the message.

UNCLASSIFIED EPTO

XXX

2
04 2104 2046

ROUTINE

4STRATAEROSPACDIV GRAND FORKS AFB ND

CBAF

DIR OF AEROSP SAFETY/APLAS/NORTON AFB CA

SAC/DOSD

1 OBG BARKSDALE AFB LA

AIG 667/DS

PIA DIV
315/DS ANDERSEN AFB GUAM

CCAMA/CCMA/TINKER AFB OK

WTFB
ASD/WRE/2-SWETURSON AFB OH

ATLC/MCRM

AIG 754/2/DS

AIG 755/3/DS

UNCLAS E F T O 310DS

FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY. (SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. SEE AFR 127-4.)

SUBJECT: USAF B-52 AIRCRAFT INCIDENT PRELIMINARY REPORT 319 BW
A.I.R. #69-09.

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION		
INFO		
<p>1. 30 Sept 69, night at 0153 hrs. CCTM</p> <p>2. Isflight</p> <p>3. A 521, 5481-33</p> <p>4. SAC, 2AF, 3170th Sq, USAF, ND</p> <p>5. Aircraft incident - route to be determined by NCCM</p> <p>6. (b) (6)</p> <p>or survival equipment used. (b) (5)</p> <p>furnished on request.</p> <p>and B. A/A</p> <p>CCTM, IPK clearance 1/1 1630L, total time 9 plus 14.</p> <p>Destination, Grand Forks AFB, ND</p> <p>10. Climb out from low level route (74-71)</p> <p>(b) (5)</p>		
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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
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INFO		

(b) (5)

12. VFR. weather was not a factor.
13. Material failure. ESR exhibit being held by OLS. for further investigation. B19JCMCS requested technical repair assistance from Mr McBride, OMA3, OOMA/COMIL/Will AFM. Info sent to SAC BMSB. 2AF. OONA/GONPSI/OONA/licker AFM. The technical repair assistance requested was arrived at Grand Forks AFB, ND.
14. Not applicable at this time.
15. None reported.
16. a thru g unknown
17. (b) (6) MAJOR, USAF, Director of Safety. Duty phone 6535. Home phone (b) (6)

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
			CLASSIFIED BY	

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED INFO

DDI

PRIORITY

032045Z OCT 69

4STWICABR03P03V GRAND FORKS AFB ND

2 AF/DS, BARNESDALE AFB LA

UNCLAS EWT 2 0 31903


SUBJECT: TECHNICAL ENGINE ASSISTANCE

THE 319 GRAND FORKS ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD REQUEST TECHNICAL
ENGINE ASSISTANCE, REGARDING 319 BOMB WING INCIDENT

AIR 69-09.



6535



Director of Safety

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO

XIX

09 2220 Z Oct 69

ROUTINE

-319BOMBWING GRAB FORMS AFB ND
 CSAF/ASD
 DIR OF AIRCRAFT SAFETY/AFLAS/NORTON AFB CA
 SAC/DOED
 AIG 674/DE (RECEIPT 319BOMB WING)
 GCCM/OCMA/TINKER AFB OK
 SARMA/SANL/KELLY AFB TX
 AFSC/SCIZ
 ASD/WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH
 AFLC/NCM

PREPARED WITH
 PREPARED WITH



COORDINATING OFFICER	
OFFICE	LAST

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO 319DS
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. (SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. SEE AFR 127-4.)

SUBJECT: USAF B-52 AIRCRAFT MINOR ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT.
 1. 20 September 1969, night at 0153 hrs.
 2. Three miles SW Geneva, Nebraska
 3. B-52H, SN61-033
 4. SAC, 2AF, 319Bomb Wg, GRAFB, ND

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

6535

RICHARD H BEVER, Maj, USAF
 Director of Safety

RICHARD J HUDSON, Colonel, USAF

PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION				
INFO				

5. Final determination of total man hours to repair aircraft 61-033 was 294 hrs. Determination was made by Boeing engineers, Mr. Ralph P. Johnson and Mr. Paul J. Dunn.

6. thru 12. No change.

(b) (5)

13.

(b) (5)

14. No change

15. Offutt AFB, Recovery Team, indicates that no damage claims will be made against the Air Force. Recovery Team estimated total property damage of less than fifty dollars.

16a. Recommend that OCMA conduct a study to determine the requirement for a more frequent and critical inspection and repair of the TP-39-P3 engine combustion and turbine section after the first 1600/2000 hour engine reconditioning cycle. Further recommend that consideration be given to the installation of a heat shield/deflector between the main fuel line and the engine diffuser case.

16b. Wreckage recovered and will be processed through supply channels for disposition.

16c. thru 16g. No change.

17. RICHARD J HUDLOW, COLONEL, USAF, Board President, Duty phone

6433. (b) (6)

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PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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4. SAC, 2AF, 319ER, OPAFB, MD
5. Accident classification for incident A.I.R. 69-09 is upgraded to a Minor Accident. Best estimate of man hours required is 250 hrs for aircraft repair.
6. Major (b) (6) FSC1235C, Total pilot time 4485 hrs, total first pilot time 2695 hrs, total instructor/pilot time this model 1039 hrs, total first/instructor pilot time last 90 days 51. No safety or survival equipment used.
- 6a. B-05
- 6b. Date of last standard check and results:
 AC, Major Waring, George E., 9 May 69, unqualified in instruments, 13 May 69, qualified.
 CP, Capt. (b) (6), (b) (6) 18 July 69 qualified.
 NR, Major (b) (6), (b) (6) 8 Sept 69 qualified.
 N, Capt (b) (6), (b) (6) 17 April 69, initial instructor check, qualified.
- (b) (6)
 EWO, 1Lt Karlson, Peter E., 019-34-4711FV, 8 Aug 69 qualified.
 AC, TSgt Smith, Roscoe, NR411-20-8853, 14 April 69 conditionally

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 qualified in FCS operation procedures 24 April 69 26 May 69 qualified
 6c. Date of last instrument check; Maj Waring 9 May 69 unqualified,
 13 May 69 qualified. Capt. Yonner 10 Sept 69 unqualified, 23 Sept
 69 qualified.
 6d. Date assigned to crew:
 AC-3 Feb 69
 CP-31 July 69
 RN-6 Jun 69
 N-9 Jun 69
 EWO-25 Aug 69
 AS-13 Dec 68
 6e. Date of Initial SACM 51-4 qualification check, AC 17 Oct 1960,
 CP 15 Dec 1966.
 6f. Summary of pilots flying time:

	Maj Waring	Capt Yonner
Total Flying hrs	4485	1589
Total Jet hrs	3834	410
Total 1st/pilot/Ip hrs	2695	742
Total 1st/pilot/Ip hrs this model	1039	92
Total 1st pilot/Ip hrs last 90 days	51	61
Total 1st pilot/Ip hrs last 90 days this model	51	61

CONTROL NO.	TCR/TCB	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

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and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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INFO		


Total 1st pilot/1p hrs and hood last 30 days	7	13
Total pilot hrs night last 90 days	29	42
Total pilot hrs last 30 days	27	27
Total 1st pilot/1p hrs last 30 days	19	18
Total 1st pilot/1p hrs last 30 days this model	19	18

- 6g. No substitutions
- 7. thru 15. No change
- 16a. ~~Dispositional action taken on component~~ Unknown
- 16b. ~~Disposition of wreckage~~ Cowling parts returned to Grand Forks AFB, ND.
- 16c. Not required
- 16d. None
- 16e. Not applicable
- 16f. No news release has been made nor contemplated.
- 16g. None
- 17. RICHARD J HUDLOW, COLONEL, USAF, Board President, Duty phone 6433, Home phone (b) (6) BOARD CONVENED ON 30 SEPT 89.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
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ACTION				UNCLASSIFIED EFTV
INFO				

- 4. SAC, 2AF, 319Bomb WG, CPATS, ND
- 5. No change in the estimated w/hrs previously reported. Number 2 engine: lower and upper body cowl, and 75% of engine tail pipe. Number 1 engine: lower body cowl. Left external fuel tank and leading edge of the left wing (inboard and outboard of number 1 pod area) damaged. Number 1 pod strut damaged and recommended to be replaced.
- 6. thru 12. No change



(b) (6)

- 15. Information on request of 3902nd AMW.
- 16a. AFPC action: Ref EUR's.
- 16b. No change

0610457 0169

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
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REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

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and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	FILE
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- 16c. Not required
- 16d. None
- 16e. Not applicable
- 16f. No change
- 16g. None
- 17. RICHARD J HUDLOW, COLONEL, USAF, Board President, Duty phone 6433, Home phone (b) (6)

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CONTROL NO.	TCR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
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REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER			
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UNCLASSIFIED E F T O							
TYPE/NO		BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
PRECEDENCE							
ACTION				PRIORITY			
INFO				DATE/TIME			

FROM: 4STRAT AEROSP DIV GRAND FORKS AFB ND

TO: 3902 ABMC/DS OFFUTT AFB NEB

INFO: 2AF/DS BARKSDALE AFB LA

UNCLAS E F T O 319DS

SUBJECT: A.I.R. 69-09

- 1. REF 319DS 022102Z Oct 69, and 319DS 040115Z Oct 69.
- Request any available information regarding property damage and/or claim caused by falling aircraft parts.

DATE	TI
MONTH	Y.
PAGE NO	N. P.

DISTRIBUTION	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	RELEASE
	(b) (6)	5535	
	(b) (6)		RICHARD J HUDLOW, Colonel, USAF

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RHHHCECTDA247

RHHHCECTDA247 2022343-2222--RHHHCECTDA..

ZNY 2222

RHHHCECTDA247 OCT 69

FM 39/2AB WG (BDS)

TO RHHHCECTDA/1STRAT AEROSP DIV (DS) GRAND FORKS AFB ND

RHHHCECTDA/319BOMBWG (DS) GRAND FORKS AFB ND

INFO RHHHCECTDA/2AF (DS) BARKSDALE AFB LA

BT

UNCLAS E F T O BDS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW AFR 127-4.

SUBJECT: A.I.R. 69-49.

REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE #1735 OCT 69. AIRCRAFT PARTS FELL ON A FARM OWNED BY ██████████ AND A NEIGHBORING FARM, OWNER UNKNOWN. PARTS FELL IN A PLANTED WHEAT FIELD AND IN THE YARD ON THE FARM OWNED BY ██████████. SSGT ██████████ OF THE RECOVERY TEAM STATED THAT DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COUNTY SHERIFF AND MR. GRIESE NO MENTION WAS MADE REGARDING PLACING A CLAIM AGAINST THE AIR FORCE FOR DAMAGES. AS OF THIS DATE NO CLAIM HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY THE OFFUTT AFB CLAIMS OFFICE. SSGT ██████████ STATED THAT IN HIS OPINION TOTAL DAMAGE TO CROPS, ETC., WOULD BE LESS THAN FIFTY (50) DOLLARS.

BT

#3985

57

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO

XXX

ROUTINE
ROUTINE

4STRATAMOSP DIV GRAND FORKS ND

-CSAF/AFCS

-DIR OF AEROSP SAFETY/AFLAS/NORTON AFB CA

-SAC/DOSH

1 CEG BARNESDALE AFB LA

AIG 667/DE

WRAMA/ROBINS AFB GA

- AIG 661/3/DE

- AIG 652/2/DE

GCMA/TINER AFB OK

ASD/WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH

AFLC/TORONTO

- COMMANDER NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER USNAS
NORFOLK VA

- DIRECTOR UNITED STATES ARMY BOARD FOR AVIATION
RESEARCH FORT RUCKER ALA

UNCLAS E F T O 31906

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. (SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. SEE AFR 127-4.)

SUBJECT: USAF UR-1F INCIDENT MESSAGE REPORT. 319 BOMB WING

A. I. R. #11.

6535

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

PREPARED



CODED BY
OFFICE SYMBOL
(b) (6)

DISTRIBUTION

40

319

30

30

30

(b) (6)

DEC 1969

OFFICE OF SAFETY

RICHARD E. WOLFENSPERGER, Col, USAF

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	APPROVED BY	INITIALS	DATE FORWARDED	ADMIN SERVICE (Date/Initial)
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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PROB
ACTION			
INFO			

JOHN B. BROWN

1. 27 vember 1969, 0930L, Day
2. 2 1/2 miles N.W. Inkster ND
3. CHIF, SN6587952, Missile support to sites A, E, and G.
4. SAC, 2AF, 319BW, GRAPE ND
5. INCIDENT. Transmission seal came loose inflight. 1 man hour r/r and no damage to helicopter.
6. (b) (6), no injury, (b) (6), 1025D. No life support equipment used. Operator experience not a factor. Will forward on request.
7. None
8. (b) (6) (b) (6) no injury. (b) (6) Capt., (b) (6), no injury. (b) (6) 2Lt, (b) (6), no injury. (b) (6) Maj, (b) (6) no injury. (b) (6) 2Lt, (b) (6) no injury. (b) (6) Maj., (b) (6) no injury. (b) (6), Capt., (b) (6) no injury. No survival equipment used.
9. A-1 (scheduled missile support), VFR, 0912L, Site A, 3+10 hours.
10. Cruise

(b) (5)

ENTAC
VFR
0912L

CONTROL NO.	TOR TOD	PAGE NO.	NO OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
		2		3/9/03 02 2209 X W 006?
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
UNCLASSIFIED EFTO				

GRID OF CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	UNCLASSIFIED INFO
ACTION			PHO
INFO			

(b) (5)



12. VFR (clear and 50 miles visibility) wind 160/12 G20.

(b) (5)



15. No damage to wheat field.

16a. Operational Supplement T.O. 1M-1(U)F-2-15-29, dated 17 July 1969, states that adhesive RTV-154(MFR code 99971) Silastic-140 SN 8040-995-0590 or R15-752(MFR code 71984) SN 8040-833-9563 is the new type of adhesive to use. All UH1Fs in the 319BW have been resealed according to T.O. 1M-1(U)F-2-15-29 as of 28 November 69.

CONTROL NO	TOR/TOC	PAGE NO	NO OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
		3	4	02 210940S.069
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
UNCLASSIFIED INFO				

and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PROF
ACTION			
INFO			

16d. t.m.d e. N/A

16f. None contemplated

16g. N/A

17. (b) (6) [redacted] Maj, USAF, Director of Safety, Duty Phone

6535, Home Phone. (b) (6) [redacted]

CONTROL NO.	TOR TOB	PAGE NO.	NO OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
		4	4	02 1107210465
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGRADEING INSTRUCTIONS	
UNCLASSIFIED EFTO				

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
 HEADQUARTERS SECOND AIR FORCE (SAC)
 BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA 71110



REPLY TO
 ATTN OF: DM4E

6 Nov 1969

SUBJECT: Annual Explosives Safety Survey of Grand Forks Air Force Base,
 North Dakota

TO: 4 Strat Aerosp Div (319C) (10)

1. Pertinent Data

- a. Name and location of installation surveyed: Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota.
- b. Inclusive dates of survey: -29-30 October 1969.
- c. Name, title and headquarters of individual performing the survey: Mr. Reginald C. East, Jr., Ammunition Inspector, Headquarters Second Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.
- d. Date of last survey of this installation and name of individual performing the survey: 15-19 April 1968, by Mr. Reginald C. East, Jr., Ammunition Inspector, Headquarters Second Air Force.
- e. Authorization: AFR 127-100, SAC Supplement 1 dated 11 July 1969.
- f. Tenant organization visited during the survey: None. The 18th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was undergoing a DASA inspection and the Explosive Safety Officer was not available.

2. Commanders Organization for Explosive Safety

- a. A comprehensive explosive safety program has been developed in accordance with SAC Supplement 1 to AFM 127-100. A munitions officer has been appointed Wing/Base Explosive Safety Officer. The explosive safety program has been included in the Wing/Base Safety Plan. Each squadron involved in handling, storing, maintaining, installing/removing or functioning of munitions has appointed an explosive safety officer and NCO who conduct the unit explosive safety program.
- b. The wing explosive safety officer attends the monthly Safety Council Meetings and briefs on explosive safety items of interest. Unit explosive safety officers/NCOs are conducting monthly inspections as required. Copies of these inspection reports are furnished the wing explosive safety officer. Semiannual inspections are conducted by the wing explosive safety officer.

Peace is our Profession

MMS COPY
 Attach 2

The main media for explosive safety education have been lectures, motion pictures and bulletin board posters. Lesson plans have been prepared and training is properly documented.

3. Deficiencies or irregularities with recommendations for corrective action: None.

4. Deficiencies or irregularities not reported above and covered by a SAC-approved waiver:

a. Inhabited building distance from the missile transfer holding pads to base small arms range. This deviation is covered by SAC-GFAB Waiver 69-W4 through W7. This waiver expires August 1970; however, renewal action must be taken as the project to correct the deficiency was disapproved.

b. Nose docks 601, 603 and 605, utilized for loading/downloading operations during inclement weather do not meet the inhabited building quantity distance criteria. This deficiency is covered by SAC-GFAB 69 W1 through W3. This waiver expires 25 January 1970; however, renewal action will be required as corrective action cannot be taken without the expenditure of a large quantity of funds.

5. Comments

a. Quantity distance criteria are maintained on all explosives on hand except as noted above.

b. No munitions were stored in the control tower.

c. The base master plan was annotated to indicate the clear zone required for munitions storage facilities and explosive-loaded aircraft.

d. Explosive and personnel limits were posted in each storage and munitions maintenance facility.

e. Fire symbols were properly posted to facilities used to store munitions.

f. Storage of munitions was outstanding. Storage facilities were clean and the munitions were stored in stable stacks.

g. Technical data covering explosive operations were being utilized.


h. A limited explosive ordnance disposal range is available.


6. The contents of this report were discussed with Colonel G. H. Mason, 319th Bomb Wing DCM, Lt Colonel D. E. Wing, 59th Munitions Maintenance Squadron Commander and Lt H. L. Slack, Wing Explosive Safety Officer.

7. Commendation

The Wing Explosives Safety Officer is commended for his efforts in establishing an outstanding explosives safety program, and the guidance provided base units in training and inspection criteria applicable to their organizations.

8. This report contains no discrepancies; however, the report must be indorsed (in five copies) to reach this headquarters on or before 4 December 1969.


REGINALD C. EAST, JR.
Ammunition Inspector


EUGENE D. MINIETTA, Colonel, USAF
Assistant DCS/Materiel

(b) (1) (A)



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Revised copy *1/11/70*

DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY
FIELD COMMAND SANDIA BASE
Office of the Inspector General
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO 87115

13 November 1969
Suspense to DASA:
17 February 1970

59

SUBJECT: Technical Standardization Inspection Report, 59th Munitions
Maintenance Squadron (U)

Commander
Field Command, DASA
Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87115

COMMAND INSPECTED

1. (U) A team from the Office of the Inspector General, Field Command, DASA, conducted a Technical Standardization Inspection of the 59th Munitions Maintenance Squadron at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, during the period 27-29 October 1969, under the authority contained in Department of Defense Directive 5105.31, 22 July 1964.

EVALUATION

2. (U) The Squadron was capable of performing that part of its mission included in the scope of the inspection and received a rating of SATISFACTORY. Only Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory are considered in the overall evaluation. Definitions of the ratings used in specific areas evaluated are included in paragraph 6, Tab A, of this report.

SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

3. (U) Technical Operations.

a. Technical operations were conducted in an outstanding manner for the W56 Warhead operation and in an acceptable manner for the Mk 28 Bomb operation. (Para 2, Tab B)

b. The deficiencies listed in Tab B would not have resulted in an unreliable weapon.

c. There were some deviations from standard procedures for the test and maintenance of weapons, associated components, and equipment.

GROUP 1. Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification.

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When Approved Data is Form 100-100
Section 140b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

5425

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FCIG 13 November 1969
SUBJECT: Technical Standardization Inspection Report, 59th Munitions
Maintenance Squadron (U)

d. Performance of the weapon technicians was outstanding for the W56 Warhead operation and acceptable for the Mk 28 Bomb operation. (Para 2, Tab B)

e. Supervision of the technicians was outstanding for the W56 Warhead operation and acceptable for the Mk 28 Bomb operation. (Para 2, Tab B)

f. Production control functions were accomplished in an excellent manner.

g. Breakout, movement, and handling operations were accomplished in an excellent manner.

h. Convoy operations were accomplished in an excellent manner.

i. The external condition of the weapons and component containers in storage was excellent. Storage monitoring was being performed properly. Weapon records were accurate. Stockpile reporting was accurate and timely.

j. Calibration and maintenance records of test and handling equipment and tools were current, and calibration procedures were in accordance with directives.

k. The condition of the war reserve weapons and trainers used during technical operations was excellent.

l. Tools and handling equipment were maintained in an excellent condition.

4. (U) Safety.

a. The safety consciousness of personnel and overall compliance with safety directives were indicative of an excellent safety program.

b. Safety devices and equipment were properly marked and readily available to operating personnel. Signs concerning safety were in accordance with directives.

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Section 140b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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FCIG
 SUBJECT: Technical Standardization Inspection Report, 59th Munitions
 Maintenance Squadron (U)

13 November 1969

5. (U) Security.

a. The security measures contained in the weapon system safety rules were implemented properly. Individuals questioned had essential knowledge of the rules.

b. The security measures for the limited and exclusion areas were excellent, except as noted in paragraph 3, Tab B.

c. Guard personnel were security conscious and demonstrated an excellent standard of performance during the inspection.

d. Classified documents were controlled properly.

6. (U) Associated Activities.

a. The Human Reliability Program was implemented properly.

b. Emergency plans were complete and current.

c. The technical training program, including plans and records, was excellent.

d. Administrative support was excellent.

e. Supply support was outstanding.

f. The Maintenance and Inspection Building and weapon storage facilities were maintained in an excellent condition.

g. Present manning in AFSC 46370 (Nuclear Weapons Technician), in the grades of Master and Technical Sergeants, is approximately 44 percent. This is below the Strategic Aerospace Command's projected average of 91.7 percent. No other critical shortages of personnel, equipment, or publications existed or were anticipated which would detract from the capability of the Squadron to perform that part of its mission in the scope of the inspection.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. (U) It is recommended that the Commanding Officer, 59th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, be requested to:

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When Filled, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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FCIG

13 November 1969

SUBJECT: Technical Standardization Inspection Report, 59th Munitions
Maintenance Squadron (U)

- a. Correct the deficiencies listed in Tab B.
 - b. Include in his indorsement specific comment as to the action taken on the answerable deficiencies.
8. (U) It is recommended that the Commander, 4th Strategic Aerospace Division, be requested to take cognizance of the deficiency listed in paragraph 3, Tab B.

CLASSIFICATION

9. (U) Some paragraphs of this report are marked Unclassified; however, they may become classified when associated with the Squadron and its location. Therefore, addressees are reminded to use caution when discussing or extracting any of the information.

James H. Hiley
 JAMES H. HILEY
 Colonel, USAF
 Assistant Inspector General
 Team Chief

APPROVED:

William M. Black
 WILLIAM M. BLACK
 Colonel, USAF
 Inspector General

4

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification under Executive Order 12958, Section 1.4, and Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FCIG
 SUBJECT: Technical Standardization Inspection Report, 59th Munitions
 Maintenance Squadron (U)

13 November 1969

TAB A - GENERAL INFORMATION

1. (U) The inspection was conducted to determine the degree to which the Squadron was adhering to weapon system safety rules and the procedures prescribed in Joint Atomic Weapons Publications and applicable directives regarding the handling, transporting, modification, assembly, disassembly, test, maintenance, inspection, storage, and monitoring of nuclear weapons, associated components, and equipment.
2. (U) Weapons safety procedures and security, together with the attitude of personnel toward these subjects, were made matters of special interest during the inspection.
3. (U) Trainers (TR) used during the inspection were simulated to be war reserve (WR). The following operations were observed:
 - a. Breakout, disassembly, inspection, Limited Life Component (LLC) exchange, ALT 289, and assembly of a Mk 11B Mod 3 WR Re-entry Vehicle, serial number 963433.
 - b. Receipt inspection, removal of Mod 7 Fuze, LLC exchange, pressure test and installation of Mod 7 Fuze on a Mk 28 FI (B28Y2-7-2-OF1) WR Bomb, serial number 700266.
 - c. Preparation for strike and parachute exchange on a Mk 28 Type 3A TR Bomb, serial number 8859.
 - d. Convoy operation of two MDU 23 A Ballasts, serial numbers 131 and 145.
4. (U) The war reserve weapons and storage facilities were examined for factors which might limit employment of the weapons or affect their status including the storage environment and the external condition of containers and associated components. Weapon records were checked for accuracy. Stockpile reports were examined for accuracy and timeliness of submission.
5. (U) Weapon transport vehicles, test and handling equipment, tools, and associated records were examined for accomplishment of required maintenance and calibration. Supply, training, administrative procedures, and other associated activities were reviewed for those matters which might affect the capability of the Squadron to maintain the nuclear weapons and components in its custody.

TAB A

5

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 Authority: Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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Revised 1/1/1971

FCIG

13 November 1969

SUBJECT: Technical Standardization Inspection Report, 59th Munitions
Maintenance Squadron (U)

6. (U) The rating system used in this report consists of an overall rating of either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory for the total inspection results. Additionally, ratings ranging from outstanding through unacceptable are awarded to specific areas, such as technical operations, performance of technicians, team supervision, quality control, handling, safety, and convoy operations. The ratings and their definitions are as follows:

Outstanding: Operations or procedures conducted completely as prescribed in appropriate directives. Superior performance. Very minor or no suggestions for improvement.

Excellent: Operations or procedures accomplished with a high degree of professionalism and no significant deviations from appropriate directives.

Acceptable: Satisfactory accomplishment of requirements, but with obvious room for improvement.

Marginal: Significant deviations from appropriate directives. Requires immediate command attention.

Unacceptable: Minimum standards of performance not met. Major or critical deviations from appropriate directives. Failure to comply with directives.

7. (U) The mission of the Squadron was to provide nuclear weapons support to the 319th Bomb Wing and 321st Missile Wing. The Squadron was authorized four officers and 71 enlisted men in nuclear weapons duties, and had five officers and 91 enlisted men assigned. Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Wing, USAF, assumed command on 1 May 1969.

8. (U) Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, Strategic Air Command, conducted an Operational Readiness Inspection of the Squadron during the period 25-29 August 1969, and assigned a rating of Satisfactory.

9. (U) A critique was held at the conclusion of the inspection. The Commander and key personnel of the Squadron, and the Commander and representatives of the 319th Bomb Wing attended the critique.

10. (U) A draft copy of the inspection report and a list of Minor Deficiencies were furnished the Squadron Commander.

TAB A

6

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Authority: E.O. 11652, 11653, 11654, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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FCIG 13 November 1969
 SUBJECT: Technical Standardization Inspection Report, 59th Munitions
 Maintenance Squadron (U)

TAB B - DEFICIENCIES

1. (U) A reply is required regarding the corrective action taken on the deficiencies identified with an asterisk.

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

- *2. ~~(U)~~ During maintenance and test operations on the Mk 28 WR Bomb, the technicians deviated from required procedures as follows:
- a. During preparation for Limited Life Components exchange, disassembly operations were started before the replacement components were unpackaged and checked as required. (Para 3-2, TO 11N-W28-1A)
 - b. When the pressure test following the Limited Life Components exchange was performed, the technicians allowed a proper stabilization period. (b) (3) (A)
 psig. [REDACTED]
 (b) (3) (A)
 - c. The preformed packing for the polar cap of the warhead was cleaned with trichloroethylene instead of alcohol as required. (Para 3-4.7.1, TO 11N-35-51)

SECURITY

- *3. (U) The soil beneath the Security Fence is of such composition as to be easily excavated by hand. There are several rabbit holes, approximately 12" wide and 5" - 6" deep, beneath the fence. A work order submitted in May 1968, requesting that a concrete curbing be poured, was rejected. In July 1968, a work order requesting a 24" fence extension be laced to the existing fence bottom and buried underground was also rejected. Another work order was submitted in August 1968, requesting soil stabilization. This one was also rejected. (Para 38b(1), AFM 207-1)

TAB B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FORMERLY CONFIDENTIAL
 AUTHORITY: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 148b, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 148b
 5435

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FILE DISPOSITION

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Ref: Ins to FCIG Ltr, 17 Nov 1969, Technical Standardization Inspection Report, 59th Munitions Maintenance Squadron

PREPARED WITH



2 Jan 1970

DAF, SAC, (59MIS)

TO: 519MS(C)

MC

DAF(C)

CGMCAC

DASA(FCIG)

IN TOUR

1. The following action has been taken to correct deficiencies listed in TAB B of subject report.

TAB B Deficiencies

A. TAB B 2 a (U) All technicians have been briefed on the intent of paragraph 3-2, T.O. 11A-26-1A. Our procedures have been changed to perform the unpackaging and to check the components immediately prior to starting disassembly. This is in addition to checking the components upon initial receipt.

B. TAB B 2 b (U) The technicians have been retrained on the proper procedures to be used while performing a 24 hour procedure to. Additionally, this specific area is to be an item of special interest for section supervisors and team chiefs to continually monitor.

C. TAB B 2 c (U) All technicians have been instructed on the proper method and material to be used in cleaning preformed packing to prevent recurrence technicians will refer to T.O. 11A-35-51 for cleaning operations when the cleaning agent is not specified in the particular technical order for the maintenance being performed.

Security

D. TAB B 3 (U) The work order to stabilize the soil under the fence has been resubmitted and approved by the Real Property Resource Review Board. Completion will be expedited as early in 1970 as weather permits.

2. This page is unclassified when attachments are removed.


DONALD E. KING, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Inspection Report

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

Table with columns for coordination and file copy tracking, including fields for name, date, and initials.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS SECOND AIR FORCE (SAC)
BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA 71110



10 November 1969

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: C

SUBJECT: Consolidated Staff Visit to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota

TO: 4 Strat Aerosp Div (C) (20)

1. In accordance with 2AF 11-14, a consolidated staff visit (Group II) was conducted at Grand Forks Air Force Base, 28-31 October 1969. Team Chief was Colonel William B. Cofield. Purpose of the visit was to provide assistance to units of the 4th Strategic Aerospace Division.
2. This report is provided for your information and guidance. Items appear in this report in the sequence outlined in Atch 5, AFR 123-1/SAC Sup 1, 24 January 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER

K. S. Steele
K. S. STEELE, Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

1 Atch
Consolidated Staff VisitCy to: 2AF Major Staff Agencies,
DOTC, DCRM, DM4A

SUMMARY OF VISIT:

Maintenance activities of the 319th Bombardment Wing and 321st Strategic Missile Wing, and Materiel and Civil Engineering functions in 804th Combat Support Group were checked.

a. The bomb wing is in good condition. Top management attention to AGE maintenance, supervisory inspections, and specialist availability reporting will resolve the major problems. Particularly noteworthy activities are the Avionics, Munitions Maintenance, and Airborne Missile Maintenance Squadrons.

b. The missile wing has an essentially trouble free maintenance program. Continued refinement of combat targeting team management in DCMT and emphasis on retaliatory degradation reporting will improve the maintenance organization. The wing ceremonies for graduation of maintenance teams is a noteworthy innovation.

c. Supply, services, and procurement have all shown marked improvement during 1969. Transportation has solved its significant management problems and, although still red in the CMS, Vehicle Maintenance Downtime, VDM area, is improving. BCE is operating well. Continued top management emphasis is required in the Operations and Maintenance Branch. Rapid response to work order call-in will greatly improve customer relations.

A. FOLLOW-UP ON PAST ORI, CSV, CMS, AUDITS AND OTHER REPORT DISCREPANCIES:

*During this visit, 584 discrepancies as identified in past reports were checked. Three discrepancies had not been corrected. These were:

	<u>Page</u>
1. Supervisory Inspections, DM-ORI REPEAT	E-1
2. Corrosion Control Program Records, DM-ORI REPEAT	E-5
3. MPOs on Assignment of Govt Quarters, DM-ORI REPEAT	I-2

PAGE INDEX BY ORGANIZATION

804 CMBS SPT GP	Pages H-1 thru H-6; I-1 thru I-2; J-1 thru J-7; K-1 thru K-9; O-1 thru O-2
319 BOMB WG	E-1 thru E-21
321 STRAT MSL WG	E-22 thru E-28
MISCELLANEOUS	R-1 thru R-3

NOTE: Asterisks in the body of the report indicate items briefed to the Wing Commander and staff during exit briefing prior to departure.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF/MATERIEL

TEAM CHIEF: Lt Col Robert L. Filson

319th Bomb WingE. DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR MAINTENANCE:1. GENERAL:a. 2AF MATERIEL SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS:

*(1) COMSEC TESTING, #1: The Communications Security Test was given to 80 maintenance personnel of which 80 obtained a passing score for an overall passing rate of 100.0 percent.

(2) CONDITION OF AIRCRAFT SECONDARY STRUCTURE (FALLING OBJECT PREVENTION (FOP) PROGRAM), #3: Good condition of structure was observed. Personnel are knowledgeable and an effective training program is being conducted.

(3) INSPECTION AND OVERHAUL PROGRAM FOR B-52 FLAP SYSTEM, #2: The flap systems of representative B-52 aircraft were checked and the systems were found in good condition.

*(4) REPAIR AND PROPER MAINTENANCE OF MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON TEST EQUIPMENT, #8: The general condition of several items of test equipment revealed that greater maintenance efforts are required in this area. The specific discrepancies were discussed with the responsible personnel. In order to prevent recurrence of noted discrepancies, it was recommended that supervisors establish procedures to insure preventive maintenance is accomplished on a timely basis.

(5) TRIM OF INSTALLED JET ENGINES, KC-135/B-52, #9: The 319 Bomb Wg is in receipt of the latest message relative to engine trims from this headquarters. Trim teams have been formed within the engine conditioning section and are dispatched by Job Control as a combined unit. One complete PWA 15222 trim kit and associated electrical harness was checked and found to be complete and properly calibrated. A written test formulated by this headquarters to be used in evaluating and qualifying trim personnel was given to both QC&E and shop personnel. The results obtained will be used to validate the test prior to its general use in evaluation of engine trim personnel throughout 2AF.

*(6) MSET PROBLEM AREAS/FMS, #10: Increased emphasis is required to insure supervisory inspections by level one supervisors are accomplished within the branches. No level one supervisory inspections were found for the Propulsion Branch, the IFR Shop, or the Corrosion Control Shop. (ORI REPEAT.)

(7) KC-135 AIRLINE SEATS ON YOUNG TIGER AIRCRAFT. #11: Seats are being installed in accordance with deployment requirements. On-hand seats were checked and found to be well maintained and "bit and piece" ordering well managed.

(8) DELAYED DISCREPANCIES. #12: The 319 Bomb Wg is in compliance with SAC policy in that they have no policy establishing the "maximum number" of delayed discrepancies that can be recorded for any aircraft at any one time.

(9) B-52 BRAKE MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION. #14: OMS personnel are knowledgeable of requirements for inspection at any time wheels are removed. Job Control automatically dispatches hydraulic and electric shop personnel to perform inspections at any time a tire change is accomplished.

(10) OPERATIONAL CHECKS OF B 52 WEAPONS RELEASE CRITICAL CIRCUITS. #15: An active program has been established to insure all aircraft returned from depot have received an operational checkout of the weapons release system.

(11) TOP THREE PROGRAM. #16: There is an adequate program in effect. All Top three personnel are knowledgeable of and active in the program. Committees have been established and monthly meetings are conducted.

(12) QC&E ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION. #18: QC&E is adequately manned with the required AFSCs and skill levels. The previous experience of each individual would indicate satisfactory qualifications.

(13) STORAGE OF CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS. #19: Conventional munitions are being stored as required by technical data and supervision of responsible personnel is adequate.

(14) EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL. #22: Efficient utilization of maintenance personnel was noted throughout the maintenance complex.

(15) B-52 HF RADIO PERFORMANCE. #26: Review of B-52 HF radio performance for the past six months reflects that unit capability is above the 2AF standard.

(16) FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM FIREOUT PERFORMANCE. #27: FCS fireout performance for the past six months is 7% above the established 2AF standard. An effective gun and ammo feed system inspection program is evident.

(17) CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF KC-135 INTERIORS. #30:
The care and maintenance of four KC-135 aircraft was checked and all were found to be in good condition.

*(18) AIRCRAFT STATUS REPORTING. #31: The 319 Bomb Wing is not properly reporting aircraft status when they are AWP against engines that are installed on aircraft. During the month of October 1969 at least eleven cannibalizations took place where parts were removed from spare engines and installed on aircraft and were reported as "maintenance convenience" cannibalizations. The replacement part was then ordered against the AWP engine. These parts should have been ordered against the tail number of the aircraft on a priority "2" and only cannibalized to either preclude a NORS or to satisfy a NORS condition. Under this condition the aircraft would have been in a NORS status instead of a NORM status. All responsible personnel were briefed on the proper procedures of reporting the aircraft, ordering the needed parts, and how to document the cannibalization if needed. *DCMC*

(19) KC-135 ENGINE COWL MAINTENANCE. #32: Supervisors and maintenance personnel are aware of the danger involved and the necessity for proper maintenance and installation of engine cowling. No significant discrepancies were noted.

(20) MAINTENANCE SPECIALISTS STANDBY. #34: There were no indications that the 319 Bomb Wg was using specialists in a standby status for launch of routine training sorties. There were no routine training sorties flown during the period of this staff visit.

(21) DAILY REVIEW OF UNIFORM MATERIEL MOVEMENT AND ISSUE PRIORITY SYSTEM (UMMIPS). #35: An effective program is in being in the maintenance area. The check list in Atch 3, Vol 11, SACM 66-12, is being utilized daily to insure proper verification. The DCM is signing the report after review and forwarding it to the Document Control Section of the CSUP activity.

*(22) PERSONNEL PROCESSING. #36: Indications are that additional attention is required in this area. Incoming personnel are being delayed from completing their in-processing by awaiting security badges as long as 60 days.

b. SACM 66-4. ITEMS FOR SPECIFIC COMMENT:

*(1) PARA 5-1, OMS REORGANIZATION: The recovery functions are not producing "IN-COMMISSION" aircraft prior to turning the aircraft over to the flight line activity. The SAC

Form 164, Aircraft Recovery Schedule, is not being properly annotated nor analyzed to facilitate proper support during recovery actions. Plans and Scheduling personnel and OMS recovery personnel were briefed on the proper utilization of the form and how it can improve their recovery actions.

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*(2) PARA 5-2, SPECIALIST PLANNING, SCHEDULING AND CONTROL: Maintenance Squadrons are not scheduling specialists based on known workload nor actual availability. The SAC Form 274, Specialist Availability Forecast, for AMS, forecasted only 61 specialists available for dispatch on Both A and B shifts on 28 Oct 1969; however, a total of 152 personnel were actually assigned. Work Center supervisors were not being reported as available in accordance with paragraph 3-12f, Vol II, SACM 66-12. The Maintenance Control Officer and squadron supervisors must assure accurate forecasting on the SAC Form 274. All appropriate personnel were briefed as to proper procedures in using the SAC Form 274.

PROBLEM: Information in the 2AF Materiel Facts Bulletin, 2AFRP 65-1, is not reaching all the activities for which it is intended. This monthly publication covers aircraft, avionics, and missile maintenance, supply, transportation, procurement, and logistics functional areas, and is written for the individuals working in these specialties, as well as for supervisors and managers. Current distribution made by the 804 Combat Support Group PDO follows:

4SAD DM	- 4	321SMW DCMA	- 5
319EW DCM	- 6	DCMT	- 2
AMS	- 7	MIMUA	- 26
AMMS	- 6	804CSG SPS	- 1
59MMS	- 2	SSA	- 1
		TSA	- 5
		BPR	- 1

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Base activities should review the following recommended distribution against the above distribution listing. Coordinate with the BASE PDO to establish/delete/revise distribution as follows:

4SAD DM	- 1	59MMS	- 5
319EW DCMA	- 6	804CSG SSA	- 6
AMS	- 5	TSA	- 5
AMMS	- 5	BPR	- 2
FMS	- 5	321SMW DCMA	- 8
OMS	- 5	MIMUA	- 25

ALL SQ DS

2. MAINTENANCE CONTROL DIVISION:

a. JOB CONTROL BRANCH:

PROBLEM: Radio call signs are not properly used when transmitting over the nontactical radio net in that the "function" portion of the call sign is not being used. (Para 6-22, Vol II, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Personnel were briefed on the importance of and the proper use of call signs.

PROBLEM: Job Control is not monitoring nor following the intent of the work order priority system on support aircraft. At 1900 hours, 28 Oct 1969, the C-47 and T-29 aircraft were listed as priority 3, when in reality they were a priority 4. (Para 3-3, Vol II, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Proper priorities were annotated on the spot.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Job Control must monitor all priorities and insure that appropriate priorities are assigned in accordance with established guidance.

b. PLANS AND SCHEDULING BRANCH:

***PROBLEM:** The Corrosion Control Program records keeping needs improvement. The SAC Forms 9b, Corrosion Control Inspection Record, require auditing. Forms were checked on five bombers and five tankers, and four forms were in error. (Para 4-2, SACM 400-3.) (ORI REPEAT)

ACTION TAKEN: Personnel were instructed on the proper procedure for maintaining the SAC Forms 9b. All forms were audited and corrected where necessary. It was recommended that the Julian date of accomplishment be used and 120 days added to proper forecasting of next due. The Julian date is then converted to a calendar date.

c. MATERIEL CONTROL BRANCH:

***PROBLEM:** The supply priority system is being abused on requests for nontactical aircraft. Materiel Control was using a force activity designator (FAD) Code II for the C-47 and T-29 aircraft. A FAD Code III is the highest designator authorized. (Para 8-6a(1), Vol II, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Appropriate personnel were briefed on specifically asking for a FAD Code III on requests for nontactical aircraft parts.

*PROBLEM: Cannibalization procedures are not being adhered to. Cannibalizations from spare engines for installed engines are being treated and reported as maintenance convenience cannibalizations and delete code "N" is being utilized on the AF Form 991. Delete Code 4 or 8 should be used on the AF Form 991 and these cannibalizations should not be treated as "maintenance convenience cannibalizations." (Para 8-14, Vol II, SACM 66-12, and T.O. 00-20-10-7.)

ACTION TAKEN: All appropriate personnel were briefed and shown the proper procedures for reporting cannibalizations from engines which must be handled as equipment end items.

3. QUALITY CONTROL DIVISION:

COMMENT: The inspection activity of this division is providing the DCM and Commander with comprehensive reports detailing the capabilities and procedural compliance of each maintenance activity. The evaluation program is adequate, and the findings indicate that QC&E has been effective in identifying problems in the wing.

PROBLEM: An excessive number of personnel are being evaluated on at least 50% of their annual requirements during the last month of the evaluation period. This practice will adversely affect the quality of evaluations. (Chap 2, Vol VII, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Each squadron and shop is advised by QC&E of requirements; however, the shop supervisors are not cooperating in making the individual available for evaluation. Emphasis by all squadron commanders is necessary to improve the schedule.

PROBLEM: The SAC Forms 1049, Maintenance Task Qualification Records, and SAC Forms 4, Maintenance Evaluation Report, are not accurate in all cases. The following examples were extracted from a sampling of records in each function: (Para 10-11 and 10-12, Vol VII, SACM 66-12.)

a. The level of supervisor is not entered in the rating column of the SAC Form 1049.

b. The date that personnel are assigned to a particular level of supervision is not annotated on the SAC Form 1049.

c. SAC Forms 4 were missing for annual evaluation requirements.

d. SAC Forms 1049 were missing even though SAC Forms 4 were available.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: A procedure should be adopted to insure immediate and complete documentation of each evaluation action.

PROBLEM: The level of supervision identified on QC&E records does not always agree with the actual assignment within the specialist shop. (Para 10-12b(11), Vol VII, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: A procedure must be established to insure each supervisor advises QC&E of changes as they occur.

PROBLEM: Newly assigned personnel are not always reporting to QC&E for accomplishment of SAC Form 1049. (Para 10-12, Vol VII, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: The present clearance form includes QC&E; however, it is sometimes overlooked. Therefore, additional controls must be established.

PROBLEM: The QCDR/UK exhibit suspense file does not readily identify the number of days an item has been retained in storage. (Para 6-2a, Vol VII, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: The suspense system must include information to prevent retaining an exhibit beyond a 30-day period.

4. ANALYSIS DIVISION:

COMMENT: The 319 Bomb Wg Maintenance Analysis staff is adequately manned; assigned personnel being well qualified and mission oriented. The Analysis Branch is producing excellent "Pre-Alert Aircraft Histories" exceeding the requirements of paragraph 3-2i, Vol VI, SACM 66-12. These analyses are performed on every aircraft scheduled to go on alert, covering weapon systems performance over the six preceding sorties, and reviewed by the DCM, Wing Commander, and key staff four days prior to final commitment of a specific aircraft to the wing alert force.

PROBLEM: Several examples of erroneous/incomplete data were found in RCS: 1-SAC-US2 computer listings for Aug-Sep 1969 for 319 Bomb Wg B-52/KC-135 weapon systems.

a. B-52H 0030 is known to have had a "bad bomb" on a profile sortie on 5 August. Entries in the U-82 report indicate four malfunctioning components on this sortie, but no entry was made in Block 70 to indicate the WUC which caused the "bad bomb." (Para 5h, Vol II, SACR 66-7, and para 2-2, SACM 66-4, 20 Oct 1969.)

b. Blocks 66-67 do not reflect the position number for malfunctioning equipment: (Para 5f, Vol II, SACR 66-7.)

(1) B-52H 1024, 2 Sep 1969, profile sortie cancelled due to a turbojet engine component.

(2) B-52H 1020, 9 Sep 1969, LTO due to turbojet engine component.

(3) B-52H 1028, 29 Sep 1969, LTO due to engine tachometer generator.

(4) B-52H 0059, 30 Sep 1969, LTO due to turbojet engine component.

c. KC-135A 1496 had inoperative TACAN and APN-59 search radar equipment on a turnaround sortie, 8 Sep 1969. The TACAN malfunction is listed against the block for the APN-59 and vice versa. Additionally, this sortie entry reflects the wrong code for a COTM sortie generated away from home station. (Vol V, SACR 66-7, SECRET.)

d. Sorties on 319 Bomb Wg aircraft launched from Barksdale AFB do not reflect the correct code for Barksdale. (Part V, Vol I, AFM 300-4.)

e. SAC Forms 126 completed on cancelled sorties charged to higher headquarters do not always show adequate explanation as to why the cancellation is charged to NAF or SAC. The form for KC-135A 8076 for a sortie on 15 September is an example of a properly explained higher headquarters-caused cancellation, while the SAC Form 126 for this same aircraft on 25 September is an example of an incomplete/improper narrative. (Para 5a(12), Vol II, SACM 66-7.)

ACTION TAKEN: These discrepancies were traced back to the original debriefing entries on SAC Forms 126 and 126-1. Each problem was discussed with the DCMA staff and NCOIC of Debriefing. Several misunderstandings regarding the provisions of referenced directives were resolved.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: The Debriefing NCOIC will place greater emphasis on the areas in which errors and omissions have been identified. The Analysis staff is instituting closer daily checks of SAC Forms 126 received from Debriefing. These actions should substantially improve RCS: 1-SAC-U82 quality.

PROBLEM: Some analysis of the base self-sufficiency program is being performed; however, NRTS trends by cause and work center and possible solutions are not being analyzed. (Para 3-2a, Vol VI, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Analyses of NRTS trends by item and work-center must be provided to the DCM and maintenance activities, especially those work centers showing an adverse self-sufficiency trend or not achieving a self-sufficiency rate comparable to the rest of the maintenance organization. Expansion of the self-sufficiency and NRTS data provided in the Monthly Maintenance Summary published by DCMA, should enable DCMA to fulfill the SACM 66 12 requirements in this area.

PROBLEM: Cannibalization trends and evaluations of problem type end items are not being given adequate emphasis. Only the monthly cannibalization rates and the identification of repeat cannibalizations for the current month are being disseminated to the DCM and maintenance activities. (Para 3-2j and 3-2p, Vol VI, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Maintenance Analysis will expand the cannibalizations historical portrayal to the past three months and discuss actions required, taken, or projected to resolve individual systems and end items problems, in their Monthly Maintenance Summary.

5. TRAINING CONTROL DIVISION:

COMMENT: The Training Control Division is effectively monitoring and controlling the wing maintenance training requirements. The squadron visit reports are thorough and do include recommended action that would preclude recurrence of major problems.

6. LOGISTICS DIVISION:

COMMENT: The Logistics Division is providing adequate support to the DCM and is effectively monitoring the overall mobility program. Minor deficiencies were corrected during the course of the visit.

7. ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE SQUADRON:

COMMENT: The Organizational Maintenance Squadron is operating under Service Test 2-69. Therefore, Support Branch has been renamed Mission Support Maintenance Branch, and Mission Support/Transient Branch has been renamed Missile Support Aircraft Maintenance Branch.

a. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORS:

PROBLEM: SAC Form 164 is not being properly or accurately maintained during aircraft recovery. (SAC Form 164, Maintenance Planning and Control Schedule.) (Para 4-7d, Vol XI, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Problem was discussed with squadron supervisors.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Supervisors should place more emphasis on proper and accurate documentation of Form 164 and stress its significance as a management tool.

PROBLEM: Aircraft LOX servicing documentation and conservation are not practiced as required. Example: Two of the current AFIO Forms 134 checked on three carts did not reflect servicing compatible with refill quantities. Copies of AFIO Forms 134 are not retained the required two weeks after last entry. (Para 2-20c, Vol XI, SACM 66-12, and NOTE to para 3-21, T.O. 42B6-1-1.)

ACTION TAKEN: Discrepancies reviewed with branch supervisors.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Supervisors must insure that all maintenance personnel practice LOX documentation and conservation.

PROBLEM: Branch supervisors are not identifying T.O. Familiarization Program requirements. Monthly listing is being furnished by QC&E. (Para 2-2r, Vol XI, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Current QC&E listing was reviewed and annotated at the time of visit.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Special emphasis is required to insure the T.O. Familiarization Program is accomplishing desired objectives.

b. TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATION BRANCH:

PROBLEM: An outdated SAC Supplement to AFM 127-101 was on file. (Para 2-2r, Vol XI, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Supplement was removed from file at the time of visit.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: A review of SAC Supplements is required to insure currency of file.

c. MISSION SUPPORT MAINTENANCE BRANCH:

PROBLEM: AF Form 623 does not show current qualifications

for taxi of T-29 and C-47 aircraft. TSgt Mitchell is overdue and Sgt Mulder has no record of qualification although his supervisor stated that Sgt Mulder has been certified by an I.P. (Para 1f(2), AFR 60-11.)

ACTION TAKEN: This problem was discussed with the maintenance superintendent as well as the immediate supervisor.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: All AF Forms 623 must be reviewed for annual qualification checks with emphasis on the taxi certification.

PROBLEM: The condition of nonpowered AGE requires improvement. Six pieces of AGE were checked, and 11 discrepancies were discovered. (Para 6-4, Vol XI, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Personnel from other CMS Branches were placed on loan to assist in improving the condition of specific AGE.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Continuous emphasis is required in this area. A program to insure quality AGE is a must in any maintenance organization.

d. BOMBER MAINTENANCE BRANCH:

COMMENT: In all areas observed, the Branch is giving adequate support to the unit mission.

e. TANKER MAINTENANCE BRANCH:

PROBLEM: Class IB modification of urinal pan and mount assembly EC/KC/RC-135 aircraft is not completed with or partially complied with on four aircraft checked. (SAC DM4B letter, 15 Oct 1968, and SAC DM4B 072240Z Apr 69.)

ACTION TAKEN: Work orders were initiated immediately.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Special emphasis is required to insure prompt compliance with all directed modifications and accurate documentation of completed/incomplete actions.

f. ALERT BRANCH:

PROBLEM: An emergency action checklist (Fire in Alert Area) was incomplete and inadequate. The checklist did not contain requirements to notify crew chiefs or flight crews on duty or procedures for movement of aircraft if necessary. (Para 5-7f, Vol XI, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Inadequacy of checklist was brought to the attention of Branch Chief and Maintenance Supervisor.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: OMS Supervisor will formulate a new "Fire in Alert Area" checklist. Periodic review of all emergency action checklists should be accomplished.

g. MISSILE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BRANCH:

COMMENT: In all areas observed, the Branch is giving adequate support to the unit mission.

8. FIELD MAINTENANCE SQUADRON:

a. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION:

PROBLEM: Increased emphasis is required to insure supervisory inspections by level one supervisors are accomplished within the Propulsion and Aerospace Systems Branches. (para 3-38, Vol I, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: All specific incidents noted were identified and discussed with the applicable supervisors and the FMS Commander.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: The DCM has directed that a weekly briefing be prepared to include the amount of documented level 1 and 2 supervisory inspections accomplished for the preceding week.

b. TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATION BRANCH: Not checked.

c. PROPULSION BRANCH:

PROBLEM: Housekeeping and supply discipline within the Branch are below acceptable standards. Engine parts were scattered on the shop floor with no identification or status. (T.O. 00-20-3.)

ACTION TAKEN: Items were identified to the Propulsion Branch Chief at the time of inspection.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: It is recommended that an area within the shop be identified as a holding and/or storage area for maintenance stands and large built up fixtures when they are not in use. It is also recommended that trash containers be utilized in each work area for residue normally allowed to drop on the floor.

PROBLEM: Special tooling was found in the tool crib on the shadow boards in a reparable condition. (Para 2-4, Vol XIV, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: The discrepant tools noted were pointed out to the tool room personnel and the suggestion was made that they be identified by use of AF Form 350.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: It is recommended that all tooling be inspected for serviceability, and those tools found to be discrepant be repaired and/or replaced. It is further suggested that an inspection be performed on each tool as it is returned from use prior to replacement back in stock.

PROBLEM: Excessive shortage was noted in the Propulsion Branch bench stock bins. (Para 3-3n, Vol XIV, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: This condition was discussed with the Branch Chief.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: It is recommended that a program be established by the Branch Chief to insure expeditious action is taken by Base Supply when the fill rate drops below 75%.

PROBLEM: Nonpowered AGE requires a firm and continuous program. Defects noted on previously inspected equipment are without proper documentation. (Para 3-6e(3) and (4), Vol XIV, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: These discrepancies were pointed out to concerned individuals.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: A program designed to acquaint individuals responsible for inspection of nonpowered AGE with their responsibilities for documentation of defects at the time they are noted should be inaugurated.

COMMENT: Comments relative to the bearing room and conditions of space and lighting as reported by the ORI report have not been corrected; however, these items are under work orders for correction.

d. AEROSPACE SYSTEMS BRANCH:

PROBLEM: One test set, P/N 976J086-1, was found in the Electrical Shop out of calibration. (Para 2-4c, Vol XIV, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Research indicated the test set had been dropped from the PMEL Master Report No. 9 since the last calibration cycle. This equipment was routed to PMEL for calibration at the time of discovery.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: The serial number of the test set should be entered in the Master Report No. 9 for future control. This item is considered to be an isolated case due to the fact that no other out of calibration equipment was found throughout the Field Maintenance Squadron.

PROBLEM: Test tool, FSN 5120-593-3565, and a locally fabricated brake tool were found to be in a reparable condition. (Para 2-4, Vol XIV, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Defective tooling was removed from service.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Recommend all tooling be checked for serviceability prior to return to tool crib.

PROBLEM: Action resulting from comments reported by the last ORI relative to the Tire Shop have not been completed.

ACTION TAKEN: The ECM and his staff have initiated a program to move the tire shop to another building. This action is currently being processed by the local CE group.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: It is recommended that aggressive followup action be taken that will insure that the program for relocation of this facility is accomplished at the earliest possible date.

e. FABRICATION BRANCH:

PROBLEM: Condition of the equipment in the Machine Shop indicated improvement was needed to insure adequate lubrication is used on the sliding surfaces (ways) of all machine equipment. (Para 2-4, Vol XIV, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: This condition was discussed with the Fabrication Branch Chief, and action was taken to lubricate the ways at the time of the inspection.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Request this be included as a daily user maintenance item.

PROBLEM: Cutting tools, such as drill bits, milling cutters, etc., were chipped and in need of sharpening. (Para 2-4, Vol XIV, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: All cutting tools were checked, and those in need of sharpening were separated for repair action.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: It is recommended that a program be developed that will insure only serviceable tools are returned to the storage areas.

f. AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIPMENT BRANCH:

PROBLEM: A serious safety hazard exists in the AGE Shop in that equipment undergoing maintenance and ready for dispatch contains fuel and oil and are parked and towed between the only exit and the area where heavy maintenance is performed. In the event of fire, personnel could be trapped in an area having no windows or doors. (AFM 127-101, and NFPA, para 15-3111, Vol IV.)

ACTION TAKEN: A work order has been submitted to have a fire exit door put in the rear wall of the shop area.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: This project should be followed closely.

PROBLEM: The area utilized for maintenance and storage does not have adequate ventilation for indoor operation of engines during periods of adverse weather when engines cannot be run outside of building. This condition creates a serious health hazard due to exhaust gas fumes. (AFM 127-101, para 0307.3.)

ACTION TAKEN: Work orders to provide adequate ventilation have been forwarded to Base CE Squadron for installation of adequate ventilation equipment.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: The responsible supervisory personnel must insure that continuing followup actions are taken until such time that this discrepancy is corrected.

PROBLEM: Repairable special tooling, such as tubing cutters, bearing pullers, and a pipe wrench were found commingled with serviceable tooling in the tool storage area. (Para 2-4, Vol XIV, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: This discrepant tooling was separated at the time of inspection.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: It is recommended that an inspection program be developed that will insure that the tools are serviceable before they are returned after usage.

g. NON DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION BRANCH: Not checked.

9. AVIONICS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON:

a. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION:

PROBLEM: Adequate sampling of maintenance/inspections is not being performed in all sections by level one supervisors. Adequate level two supervisory inspections are not being performed in the ECM Branch. (Para 3-38c, Vol 1, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Adequate inspections must be performed to insure that work is done correctly and directives are followed.

b. TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATION:

PROBLEM: SAC Forms 14, System Historical Records, for Bomb Nav system, Tab B, Terrain Avoidance, are not documented properly. Codes 1 for terrain avoidance inflight functional checks are being entered as "System Not Exercised." (Para 3d, Vol XIII, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: System Historical Records must include the appropriate capability code for each entry.

PROBLEM: SAC Forms 14, System Historical Records, for Bomb Nav Systems, Tab B, Terrain Avoidance, are improperly documented. Malfunctions discovered on either the inflight functional check or the TA calibration check are being entered as one write-up. (Fig A1-1, Atch 1, Vol XIII, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: The proper coding for both the TA inflight functional check and the TA calibration check must be entered separately on the System Historical Records. Also system discrepancies must be entered as a result of either the TA inflight functional check or the TA calibration check.

c. PRODUCTION CONTROL BRANCH: No problems noted.

d. BOMB/NAV BRANCH:

PROBLEM: Maximum utilization of the MADREC recorders is not being obtained. For the past four months the unit had the lowest percentage utilization in 2AF. The MADREC program, as outlined by 2AF DM4D letter, Subject: 2AF MADREC Program, 6 Aug 1969, is being ineffectively implemented. (Para 3-19, Vol I, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Commanders and supervisors must insure continued emphasis is placed on the MADREC program. The primary use of MADREC is to insure aircraft/ACM-28 quality. To meet this objective, it must be utilized on every available sortie.

PROBLEM: The APN-179, doppler boresight test fixture, is not being reported on the PME Scheduling Report #9. (Para 3-20c, Vol I, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Supervisors must insure that all items of PME requiring calibration are reported on PME Scheduling Report.

e. ECM BRANCH:

PROBLEM: Operating time of ECM oscillator tubes is not being recorded on the attached decals. (Item 8-8, SACM 66-4, and para 7-11, Vol XIII, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TAKEN: Problem discussed with ECM Branch Chief and assurance received that a program would be initiated to insure immediate compliance.

PROBLEM: Repeat malfunctions are not always flagged on the AFTO Forms 349. The following repeat malfunctions were not marked as repeats: (Para 3-14g(1), Vol II, SACM 66-12.)

Acft 61-1016,	29 Aug 69,	ALT-6B #3	- Repeat #1	Job Control No.	2410318.
"	"	"	#13 - "	"	2410319.
"	"	ALE-24	- "	"	2410317.
"	2 Sep 69,	"	- Repeat #2	"	2450312.
Acft 61-1025,	10 Oct 69,	ALT-13 #2	- Repeat #1	"	2830311.

Other repeat malfunctions were flagged as repeats but did not indicate what number repeat it was.

ACTION TAKEN: Problem discussed with ECM Branch Chief and assurance received that debriefers will comply with this requirement.

f. CMM/NAV BRANCH: No problems noted.

g. PME BRANCH: No problems noted.

h. FLIGHT CONTROL/INSTRUMENT BRANCH: No problems noted.

i. FIRE CONTROL BRANCH: No problems noted.

10. AIRBORNE MISSILE MAINTENANCE SQUADRON:

a. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION:

COMMENT: The general appearance and housekeeping standards throughout the squadron are extremely noteworthy.

b. TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH: No problems noted.

c. AGM MAINTENANCE BRANCH:

COMMENT: Lack of safety discipline displayed during installation of the multi-star dome (MSD). Example: An airman was observed hoisting the MSD onto missile 61-2334 in Hangar Station 1. During the hoisting procedure, the airman disengaged the ratchet dog and proceeded with the hoisting. If the airman's hand had slipped, the MSD could have fallen to the hangar floor, causing thousands of dollars worth of damage to the MSD. Fig 1-2, page 10, T.O. 21AGM28A-2-7C shows a diagram of the hoist and limited instructions; however, the hoist shown is not the type in actual use. The AGM Maintenance Branch Chief was advised of the incident and will take action to prevent its recurrence.

d. MISSILE CONTROL BRANCH:

PROBLEM: The six month pitot static probe alignment check, the 12-month fuel tank dye check, and the 24 month umbilical inspection columns on the calendar inspection status board are not currently posted for 17 of the 20 assigned missiles. (Para 3-5a, Chap 3, SACM 66-12, Vol XII.)

ACTION TAKEN: The Section Supervisor was advised of the problem and immediate action was taken to correct this discrepancy.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Closer surveillance of calendar inspections by the Section Supervisor must be constantly maintained.

e. AGM LINE BRANCH: No problems noted.

f. VACE/AGE BRANCH: No problems noted.

g. COMBINED SYSTEMS BRANCH: No problems noted.

h. ADM MAINTENANCE BRANCH: Not applicable to 319 Bomb Wg.

11. MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON:

a. SUPERVISION:

PROBLEM: The technical order file maintained by Technical Administration Section requires attention to insure correction of several administrative errors as evidenced by the following: (Para 9-3, Vol VII, SACM 66-12.)

(1) Changes to technical orders not annotated on the title page of the basic technical order.

(2) Outdated interim changes filed in copies of 11N series technical orders.

(3) SAC Forms 415 for two work unit code books did not have a current 180-day inspection signed off. Previous inspection was performed August 1968.

ACTION TAKEN: Responsible personnel were briefed on the proper procedures for maintaining technical publications. The majority of these deficiencies were corrected during the staff visit.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Administrative and supervisory personnel continually review these files to insure the availability of current tech data.

PROBLEM: Lubrication intervals of all 4100/3010/3030 trailers were indicated to be "as required" when periodic lubrication chart shows specific times (1, 3, and 6 months) for lubrication of certain portions of the trailers. (Fig 2-3, T. O. 35D3-3-34-11.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Responsible personnel review tech data pertaining to each individual trailer and insure that correct lubrication intervals are posted.

b. MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE BRANCH:

PROBLEM: The condition of several pieces of test equipment revealed that additional emphasis is required to insure proper maintenance. (Para 8-3a, T.O. 32B14-3-1-101.) For example:

(1) Three each T-304C testers within the Munitions Maintenance Section did not have AFTO Forms 256 attached.

(2) C2-43MA-J Box Tester did not have a user calibration sticker attached.

(3) Three torque wrenches possessed by Weapons Maintenance Section did not have the correct colored tape installed for the calibration period.

ACTION TAKEN: Personnel responsible for maintaining test equipment were briefed on the appropriate directives pertaining to proper maintenance.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Supervisors and Shop Chiefs establish procedures to insure that preventive maintenance is conducted on a timely basis in order to prevent further regressions in this area.

c. MUNITIONS SERVICES BRANCH:

*PROBLEM: Semiannual inspections of MHU-7/M trailers are not being accomplished in complete accordance with tech data. For example, cable bushings and rubber grommets on the electrical junction boxes of three trailers were not sealed as required. (Para 5-19, T.O. 11N-H5015A-2.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Insure that semiannual inspections are accomplished in complete accordance with existing tech orders.

*PROBLEM: Several pieces of test equipment are not being properly maintained. For example, a F52875 tester had a bent hinge and case, thus rendering the moisture seal ineffective. Also, a F52836-500 tester had a loose terminal connector, a broken hinge, and was missing a cover fastener. (Para 4-2f, Vol XV, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Test equipment be properly maintained at all times.

PROBLEM: Several outdated safety supplements, operational supplements, and rescinded TCTOs have not been removed from the tech order file. (Para 4-23 and 4-38, T.O. 00-5-1.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: Review the entire tech order file to insure that outdated or rescinded publications have been removed.

PROBLEM: A record of the equipment requiring filter replacement or lubrication is not being maintained. (Para 3-14d, Vol I, SACM 66-12.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: A record of equipment requiring

lubrication or filter replacement be maintained as required.

4. AFK SUPPLY:

PROBLEM: AFTO Form 15, Ammunition Serviceability and Lot Record, needs immediate attention. The following deficiencies were noted: (Fig 4-1, T.O. 11A15-1-167-1, and para 4-9, T.O. 11A-1-10.)

(1) The service and shelf life of gas generators posted on the Form 15 were incorrect.

(2) The on-hand quantities maintained on the back of the Form 15 did not correspond with the quantities on the stock record cards.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: All AFTO Forms 15 be reviewed and updated to insure the information recorded on the form is in accordance with the applicable tech data.

12. EWO SUPPORT TEAM EXERCISE:

PROBLEM: Tanker recovery AGE equipment was not serviced in accordance with AFM 71-4. Three units had empty fuel tanks and one unit had a full tank. (Chapter 6-29, AFM 71-4.)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: LCML must assure that AGE units are checked for proper servicing prior to delivery to the cargo assembly area.

13. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SUMMARY:

The 319 Bomb Wing is supplying adequate support of aircraft maintenance; however, three areas need attention. The condition of the nonpowered AGE within the Organizational Maintenance Squadron has improved since the last Consolidated Staff Visit, but will require continued attention to prevent an unsatisfactory rating during MSET. The Field Maintenance Tire Shop - unsafe conditions within the Powered AGE Branch and housekeeping within the Propulsion Branch, combined with less than desired participation in supervisory inspections of maintenance actions detracts from the overall squadron professionalism. The Avionics Squadron and the Munitions Maintenance Squadron are providing adequate support. The Airborne Missile Maintenance Squadron was the finest we have visited this year in both maintenance and facilities.

TRUE EXTRACT

a. Outstanding - Evident that initiative is used throughout. Maintenance and housekeeping are of exceptional merit. Serves as a model for the Command.

b. Excellent - Clearly evident that degree of maintenance and housekeeping is noteworthy but not outstanding as defined above.

c. Satisfactory - Fulfilling the basic standards of maintenance and housekeeping. Relatively free from discrepancies.

d. Marginal - Minimum degree of compliance with maintenance standards. Avoidable discrepancies throughout.

e. Unsatisfactory - Failing to fulfill basic standards of maintenance and housekeeping. Not good facility management.

SOURCE: Rpt, "Annual Facilities Inspection of Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, prepared by 2AF (CS), 19 Nov 1969.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SUMMARY

The overall base program for facilities reflects adequate support and attention. Facilities as constructed are representative of modern Air Force design and enhance the SAC mission. There are a few exceptions such as the consolidated mail room and the BR A. K.

Space is a problem in some functional areas. The current expansion program in Base Headquarters, Dental and Hospital facilities will relieve associated pressures. We did not permit a review of actions contemplated or planned by a space allocations committee to support what appears as a space adequacy in some functional locations. Such action is needed to enhance management and control.

Outstanding personal initiative, combined with progressive house-keeping principles, were observed in many areas throughout the base. A significant contribution to an already high index overall mission effectiveness rating for the base would result if more personnel would join the drive to enhance the facilities inspection report.


The following statistics represent a consolidation of the report:

Outstanding	<u>18</u>	
Excellent	<u>17</u>	
Satisfactory	<u>71</u>	
Marginal	<u>2</u>	
Line Items -----		107, Mail and Records 108, Reproduction
	<u>3</u>	
Not checked		
Line Items -----		30, Control Tower 124, Launch Facility 128, Launch Control Facility
Not Applicable		
Line Items -----		16, Simulator 19, Small Arms Range

SOURCE: Rpt, "Annual Facilities Inspection of Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, prepared by 2AF (CS) 19 Nov 1969.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 319TH BOMBARDMENT WING (SAC)
GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA, 58201




REPLY TO
ATTN OF: C

26 February 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: DCM DCO

My congratulations to you and your staff on the outstanding support you provided for Major General Huffman and his staff on their orientation visit in December. My personal thanks to all for their efforts to make this such a successful orientation.


SAMUEL G. TAYLOR, JR., Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch.
4C Ltr, 10 Feb 70,
w/4 atchs.

241

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 4TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION (SAC)
GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA 58201



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: C

19 February 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

to: Colonel Samuel G. Taylor, Jr.,
Commander, 319th Bomb Wing

1. The outstanding professional performance by you and your staff during the USAF Orientation Visit 7-11 December insured the success of this important and far-reaching activity. The attached letters from the Senior Army Member of the Weapons System Evaluation Group, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff for the USAF, the CINCSAC and Commander, Second Air Force are rare testimonials to the effectiveness of the visit and the appreciation of the visitors.

2. I extend the appreciation expressed in the attached letters and emphatically add my own. Please convey this expression and congratulations to all personnel involved in the project.

Clifford W. Harcove
CLIFFORD W. HARCOVE, Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

4 Atchs a/s

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS SECOND AIR FORCE (SAC)
BARNESVILLE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA 71116



REPLY TO
ATTN OFF: C


10 FEB 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

to: 4 Strat Aerosp Div (C)

1. I am pleased to note correspondence reflecting the professional performance of individuals within Second Air Force. The comments indicate an impressive effort by the Commander and staff, 321st Strategic Missile Wing and the Commander and staff, 319th Bombardment Wing. The outstanding support given this visitation reflects favorably upon your organization, this command, and the Strategic Air Command.

2. Please convey the thanks of the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, and my appreciation to Colonel Fall and Colonel Taylor and to all staff and combat crew personnel who contributed to this project.


DAVID C. JONES, Lt Gen, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
SAC (CS) Ltr, 30 Jan 70,
w/1 atch

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA, 68113



REPLY TO
ATTN: CS


SUBJECT: Appreciation

8 0 JAN 1970

TO: 2AF (C)

It is a pleasure to forward the attached letter of appreciation. Please express the CINC's appreciation to Colonel Fall and Colonel Taylor for their notable performance.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF


T. J. DACEY, JR., Maj Gen, USAF
Chief of Staff

1 Atch
Ltr fr Gen Carpenter,
AFCCS, 17 Jan 70 w/1
Atch

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.




REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFOS


SUBJECT: Appreciation

TO: CINCSAC (General Holloway)

The Chief of Staff was pleased to receive the attached letter from the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He adds his appreciation to that expressed by General Huffman to Brigadier General James M. Kock, Colonel Gerald G. Fall, Jr., Colonel Samuel G. Taylor, Jr., and Colonel Theodore J. Michel for their outstanding performance of duty during the recently conducted USAF Orientation Visit to Headquarters Strategic Air Command and Operational Missile Facilities.


JOHN W. CARPENTER, III, Lt General, USAF
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

1 Atch
Ltr Fr Gen Huffman,
dtd 12 Dec 69



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20305

12 December 1969


Dear General Ryan:

I have just returned from the USAF Orientation Visit to Headquarters Strategic Air Command and Operational Missile Facilities conducted during the period 7 - 11 December 1969. I want to express my sincere appreciation to those responsible for a most worthwhile and enjoyable tour. This was my first visit to SAC units and I was most impressed with their capabilities and with the dedication of the officers and men with whom we came in contact.

Although many individuals contributed toward making the tour a success, those who spent the most time with us and were most helpful in educating us included Brigadier General James M. Keck of SAC Headquarters; Colonel Gerald G. Fall, Jr., Commander, 321st Strategic Missile Wing; Colonel Samuel G. Taylor, Jr., Commander, 319th Bombardment Wing, and Colonel Theodore J. Michel, Commander, 381st Strategic Missile Wing. Our Escort Officer, Lt Colonel Samuel C. Craig, Headquarters USAF, did an outstanding job handling the administrative arrangements.

I am sure the 15 other members of this orientation visit join me in expressing thanks for a most informative and enjoyable four day tour.

Sincerely,



B. E. HUFFMAN, JR.
Major General, USA
Senior Army Member

General John D. Ryan
Chief of Staff, USAF
Washington, D. C. 20330