N0772

465th Bomb wing
Operation crosstie
September 1963

~~SECRET~~
RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

465-63-1984

~~SECRET~~ RESTRICTED DATA [redacted]
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

UNITS ATTACHED TO THE [illegible] AIR DIVISION AND [illegible]:

HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON SECTION, [illegible] BOMBARDMENT WING, H

[illegible]TH ARMAMENT AND ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON

[illegible]TH AIRBORNE MISSILE MAINTENANCE SQUADRON

[illegible]TH ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE SQUADRON

[illegible]TH MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON

[illegible]1ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON, HEAVY

[illegible]TH FIELD MAINTENANCE SQUADRON

[illegible]TH COMBAT DEFENSE SQUADRON

[illegible]TH AIR REFUELING SQUADRON

FOREWORD

The [illegible] Bombardment Wing (H) (Sixth Bomb Wing) operated as a [illegible] unit of Walker Air Force Base, Roswell, throughout the [illegible]. It was a component unit of the [illegible] Air Force (SAC), Strategic Air Command (SAC), Eighth Air Force (8AF), and the Second Air Division (2DAD). Colonel James M. Hess, Wing Commander, exercised command jurisdiction over assigned units and personnel. (U)

As mentioned in the previous historical studies, the format and content of all histories were changed. This twenty first volume of wing history continues under that general plan: to emphasize the wing's progression and/or regression during the period under discussion.

This detailed, frank, and objective discussion covers only those activities relative to presenting a realistic description of the unit's major facets of operation. Also illustrated was the proficiency with which the wing accomplished its assigned mission. Since this comprehensive study and analysis was made to determine the wing's effectiveness, not only outstanding areas are presented but also areas of weakness.

Although devoted exclusively to the activities occurring during the period mentioned, the historians have attempted to preserve the continuity established in previous installments.

This historical study was prepared and written by Master Sergeant Billy G. Stewart and A/C Jack H. Jenkins. Like any historical

work, this study is subject to revision in the light of evidence that may be discovered or become available in the future. Any suggestions, questions, and/or criticisms will be welcomed by the writer.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

MISSION - OPERATIONS - MAINTENANCE

It is by presence of mind in untried emergencies that the native metal of a man is tested.

Author Unknown

Introduction. [illegible] within the wing [1] was brought to a significant degree throughout the period under discussion. However, it seemed as though this complacent attitude began to decline somewhat before the month ended. It was the opinion of the Wing Commander, Colonel James M. Knox, that three things brought the wing to its senses. [2] First, the wing underwent an unannounced Operational Readiness Inspection Test (ORIT) in early September and a satisfactory performance [3] seemed to be the "shot in the arm" that was needed to return it from its position of obscurity. Unfortunately, this attitude had become so deeply entrenched that it was not destined to be eliminated so easily. Therefore, complacency continued to plague the wing until the month ended. (1)

Next, the wing's decline in performance caused many to doubt its mission capability. Staff visits occurred more frequently and an excessive number of discrepancies were noted. Of course, these brought stern criticism to the wing from all levels of command. This

---

1. History, [illegible]BW, 1-31 Aug 1963, pp. 1-3.
2. Interview, MSgt B. G. Stewart, Wing Historian, with Col. J.M. Knox, Wg Comdr, 20 Nov 1963.
3. Rpt, HAF (IG) to [illegible]BW (C), et al, "Operational Readiness Inspection Test of the [illegible]BW, Robins AFB, Ga., 1-7 Sep 1963", 9 Sep 1963. Exhibit A.

culmination of staff visits, obvious problems, and criticism seemed to shame the majority of the wing's personnel. The shock of falling from a position of prominence to one of embarrassment came to bear on their commitment. Thus, a period of rededication seemed to be approaching. Only time would tell whether or not the wing was determined enough and its personnel to return to a leading position among SAC's "Best of the Best". [4]

In conclusion, the wing commander and new staff members became more proficient in identifying local internal problem areas and instituting corrective action. Neither the commander nor these staff personnel were able to do this until they had become fully job oriented. (U)

Even though the activities and events engaged in by the wing were both numerous and varied, significant ones did not occur daily. Among the noteworthy activities discussed in this study are: an Operational Readiness Inspection Test (ORIT), quarterly Management Control System (MCS) performance, major Alert Force activity, tanker support, Security Readiness Evaluation (SRE) Test, restoration to commission status of aircraft number 192, Munitions Evaluation Standardization Test (MEST) visit, and supply support. Each of these topics either directly or indirectly affected the wing's mission performance. They will be discussed as near as possible in chronological order. (U)

---

4. History, 465BW, 1-31 Aug 1963, pp. 41-42.

Mission. Overlooking all its recent shortcomings, did the 465th Bomb Wing still possess the ability to execute its assigned mission? The wing's peacetime and wartime missions, as applicable to the furtherance of national objectives (deter aggression and maintain world peace), remained unchanged. Based on continuing retrogression, there were serious doubts early in the month by the writers whether or not it could still "get the job done". Just what was the wing's mission and were its various aspects successfully accomplished? (U)

Higher headquarters, in publishing the directed mission of the wing, designated certain primary functions and areas of responsibility.[5] Its assigned wartime mission required that it organize and train a force capable of immediate and sustained long-range offensive bombardment and air-to-air refueling operations on a global scale and be prepared to perform those tasks assigned it in current emergency plans and related operations orders. (U)

To insure that it had the capability to accomplish this part of its mission, the wing made sure that all assigned personnel knew when, where, and how their specific duties (as specified in applicable emergency war orders and supporting orders) were to be executed. (U)

As in previous months, the flying and ground training accomplished by the wing emphasized the importance placed upon the task

---

5. History, 465BW, 1-31 Jul 1963, Exhibit 2.

which required it to organize and train a capable striking force. The wing was aware that how effectively these tasks were accomplished was being observed closely by higher headquarters. These results were particularly instrumental in evaluating the wing's overall mission effectiveness. (U)

Its peacetime mission required the training and administering to assigned reserve personnel and units, participation in disaster relief or other domestic emergencies, and performing such special missions and assignments as might be directed by higher headquarters. (U)

That portion of the wing's mission which required it "to train and administer to assigned reserve personnel and units" was not tested during September as it was during the preceeding month.[6] Although there were no reserve units or personnel attached during September, no one doubted the wing's ability to repeat August's outstanding performance. (U)

As a member of the civilian community, the wing was very cognizant of its moral, as well as military, obligations to provide assistance in any domestic emergency that might occur. No assistance of this type was required or requested during the period. (U)

To perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters encompassed many tasks not readily apparent in conducting daily activities. Included in this broad function was the help

---

6. History, 465TM, 1-31 Aug 1963, pp. 4-6.

and coordination afforded units within SAC, other major commands, and separate services within the Department of Defense. The wing's performance in support of these has been discussed in the succeeding pages. (U)

Operational Readiness Inspection Test (ORIT). No doubt this was the most significant event to occur during the month that involved the wing. An exercise of this type was once described as the most significant event in which an operationally ready unit can participate.[7] To stress this point even further, the individual went on to say: (U)

> "It is the nearest thing to actual combat remaining, of course within the boundaries dictated by peacetime restrictions and related considerations. The results of an ORIT tell more about your unit's actual capability than other self evaluations, exercises, or staff reports combined...The present interval of once per year is such that commander's should take full advantage of each ORIT to practice the unit's EWO mission with the maximum degree of realism possible".

An unannounced Operational Readiness Inspection Test was initiated at 1630 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST) on 3 September 1963 by Headquarters SAC.[8] Colonel Earl L. Johnson, SAF Inspector General (IG), and an SAF Inspection Team conducted this inspection during the period 3-6 September 1963. Code name for the evaluation was 'HIGH PASS'. (U)

---

7. Msg, SAF (C) to UNIFORM, et al, C-84229, 2 Aug 1963. File: Wg Comdr's Office.
8. Rpt, SAF (IG) to 465BW (C), et al, "ORIT of 465BW, Robins AFB, Ga., 3-6 Sep 1963", 6 Sep 1963. Exhibit 6.

The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate the capability of the wing and its assigned units to accomplish their EWO mission. It was the first time the wing had been evaluated under the new inspection program criteria mentioned in August's historical study.[9] The entire evaluation was conducted under the provisions of SAF Operations Order 3000-63A, JET STREAM OpPlan, and USAF Unit Training Standards. (U)

Eight B-52G bomber aircraft of the Ground Alert Force were launched within the established timing criteria and were reliable. The mission effectiveness of these eight sorties was considered as outstanding.[10] Their bombing reliability was spread from one extreme to the other. Low level (Short Look Large Charge) effectiveness was outstanding; all eight runs attempted were reliable. The overall first release Circular Error Average (CEA) was 1376.3 feet and the second release CEA was 1972.5 feet. On the other hand, high altitude fixed angle bombing reliability was unsatisfactory.[11] Eight runs were attempted, but only six were reliable (CEA 10,422.5 feet). Bomber number 594 (Crew E-22) lost radar presentation prior to the High Altitude Pre-IP. A celestial timing run was attempted; thusly, an unreliable impact occurred because of a miscalculated bomb release point. This unreliable run was attributed to crew error. The other unreliable fixed angle bomb run (Crew E-24 in B-52G number

---

9. History, 465BW, 1-31 Aug 1963, pp. 15.
10. Rpt, 8AF (IG) to 465BW (C), et al, "ORIT of 465BW, Robins AFB, Ga., 3-6 Sep 1963", 6 Sep 1963. Exhibit 6.
11. Ibid.

209) was attributed to improper crew procedures. (S)

The only other unsatisfactory area of performance involved chaff dispensing.[12] Eight dispensing attempts were made, but only five were reliable. This rating was the result of three aircraft failing to dispense 288 packages of chaff from ALE-1 and ALE-24 systems. Two material failures and one maintenance error caused these systems not to function properly. One dispensing system (System Number four) experienced a chaff jam between the angle right and front plate of the magazine which caused the aircraft's circuit breakers to open. This weakness in the ALE-24 system was under investigation by Headquarters SAC; however, there was no authorized repair available at that time. (S)

Navigation reliability and air refueling proficiency were outstanding during the ORIT.[13] All 16 navigation legs and eight refuelings were effective. Overall navigation CEA was 4.6 Nautical miles (NM). (S)

In evaluating the electronic jamming portion of the ORIT, three outstanding as well as one satisfactory ratings were given.[14] The satisfactory performance was the result of Crew E-27 (B-52 Number 519) making two unreliable Radar Simulator Runs (RSR). A Type I abort was declared on the RSR attempts because of no horizontal sweep on the APR-9 receiver. Primarily, this was a maintenance error;

---

12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

however, it was an operator's error to some degree because he did not attempt any portion of the runs with remaining equipment. (S)

First Control System (FCS) radar was evaluated on all sorties launched. Six were reliable, one was marginal, and one was unreliable.[15] The FCS on F-50 number 179 was declared unreliable because an operational mode check was not successfully completed one hour prior to landing. Its range gate would not lock onto the range markers. Due to a materiel failure, this malfunction was attributed to a shorted track radar pulse cable in the ammunition well. (S)

Overall, Airborne Guided Missile (AGM) performance was satisfactory.[16] Twelve AGM-28's were air evaluated; only seven were effective. Three of the AGM-28's were non-effective because of materiel failure. Why the remaining two were unreliable was not determined; it was left to the wing commander's discretion to decide. (S)

Similarly, the wing's Air Defense Missile (ADM) program was rated satisfactory.[17] One of the four ADM-20's evaluated failed the flight control console and hangar check due to materiel failure. Its failure was caused by a malfunctioning pitch module in the flight control amplifier. (S)

The wing's bomber maintenance effectiveness ranged from excellent (Alert Force) to satisfactory (Non-Alert Force and regeneration).[18] Five follow-on sorties were declared available for their

---

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

generation and each one met its scheduled timing requirements with reliable systems. Several discrepancies were noted; the most serious involved using an improper generation sequence. Other deviations concerned: improper completion of forms, delinquent inspections, non-effective static grounds, and dirty/greasy landing gears. None were significant enough to elaborate upon. (U)

The 915th Air Refueling Squadron's ORIT performance will be discussed in the tanker activity portion of this study. Needless to say it passed the ORIT and was considered capable of accomplishing its general mission requirements. (U)

One operational area evaluated very closely was EWO preparation.[19] Two excellent, five outstanding, and four satisfactory ratings were given. Not included in these were two excellent and six satisfactory ratings given during tanker and bomber crew interrogations. Naturally, there were some general weaknesses noted; they were to be emphasized in future EWO study. (C)

Both the Support Team and EWO Security aspects of the ORIT were rated satisfactory.[20] Four discrepancies lowered the Support Team's performance to satisfactory. They were: control of immunization currency, insufficient base and security listings in Recovery Mission Folders, confusion concerning location of off-base assembly points, and incomplete EWO assignment cards. (U)

Reaction time for the Combat Defense Force (CDF) to transform

---

19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

to a sabotage alert configuration was 30 minutes, far better than the SAF average. Other areas observed and exhibiting excellent performance were: Comm/Plotter functions, response of Mobile Strike Teams (MST) and perimeter position manning. Several discrepancies were noted, but none warranted full discussion in this narrative. (U)

The wing earned an overall rating of satisfactory and was considered capable of accomplishing its EWO mission.[21] Its performance in the ORIT can be attributed to two things; strong leadership from the wing commander and the staff inspired the assigned personnel to rise to the occasion. Also, the personal desire of each individual to demonstrate to the Inspection Team that the wing was not really in as bad a shape as it appeared. Each individual was certainly aware of the vital importance of the exercise to the wing and the important part it played in the overall effectiveness of the Air Force in general. (U)

On 16 September 1963, the wing was congratulated for its fine performance during the ORIT, 3-6 September 1963.[22] Lieutenant General Joseph J. Nazzaro stated that, "You and the personnel of the 465th Bomb Wing are to be congratulated on the fine results achieved during the recent ORIT". He also revealed that the inspection was a considerable improvement over the last exercise, especially in the bomber tactical doctrine and tanker EWO sortie knowledge areas. (U)

---

21. Ibid.
22. Ltr, SAF (C) to 465BW (C), "Congratulation on ORIT", 16 Sep 1963. Exhibit H.

Corrective actions for all deficiencies or irregularities noted were taken either immediately or were programmed into the wing's future activities. Both the basic inspection report and the wing's [illegible] were included in this historical study not only as supporting documents, but as [illegible]. (U)

Management Control System (MCS) performance. Seldom in one month does a unit have its "native metal" tested more than once. Even more astounding was the fact that one performance gave a most favorable impression and the other showed the unit to be on the edge of disaster. Nevertheless, this was the case with the 465th Bomb Wing during September 1963. Its tests were the ORIT and the conclusion of three months (July-September) of MCS evaluation. The former was discussed previously and the latter will follow in the succeeding pages. (U)

Colonel Keck continued to stress integrity in MCS reporting. By so doing he felt that whatever performance was shown, it was a true picture of the wing's accomplishments during the period. This does not imply that other unit commander's condon "pencil pushing" to stay on top in the MCS competition.[23] (U)

Bomber (B-52G) MCS performance during the July-September 1963 period was alarmingly low.[24] In the operations area during the first

---

23. Interview, MSgt B. G. Stewart, Wing Historian, with Col. J.F. Keck, Wing Commander, 465BW, Nov 1963.
24. Rpts, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Jul-Sep 1963", 465 DCRM to SAF (DCRME), no date. Exhibits 2, 3, and 4.

month, there were three items that were below the desired standard (ACM-28 reliability-82.6 percent, ECM reliability-95.8 percent, and HAR HOME effectiveness). After two months of activity, the number of low scoring areas had risen to four; HAR ARMM reliability (94.9 percent) had been added. By the end of the scoring quarter, this figure had climbed to five; bombing reliability (94.4 percent) was the newest addition. Low performance in these areas was caused by many things. The major cause was being unable to recover from poor performance early in the quarter. (U)

Both high and low altitude bombing were below the SAC average.[25] Eight high altitude bomb runs were unreliable out of 119 attempted. Five were attributed to operations and three to materiel. Nine low level RBS runs were unreliable out of 329 attempted. Six were attributed to operations and three to materiel. (U)

Of 69 ACM-28 reliability attempts, 11 runs were charged as unreliable.[26] Four were attributed to operations and seven to materiel. (U)

ECM reliability was below average primarily due to low gear performance.[27] The wing was required to complete 52 low gear MPR's. There was no activity in this area in September. Of three runs lost, one was caused by materiel failure and two by operator error.

---

25. Rpt, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Sep 1963", HQ SAC DCRM to SAF (DCRME), no date, Exhibit 4.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.

Reliability in this area was not really as bad as the percentage rate (96.1 percent) indicated on 30 September. (U)

One unreliable rendezvous out of 105 attempted pulled the wing's B-52 NAV-RAMD reliability rate down to 99.9 percent.[28] This unreliable rendezvous was caused by the boom transmitter [illegible] malfunctioning on both the bomber and tanker. (U)

SAC HONE effectiveness has been discussed elsewhere in this study. However, tanker MCS performance (Operations/Maintenance) was presented elsewhere. (U)

From a maintenance standpoint, four bomber maintenance areas were low at the end of July.[29] These were: Bomb-Nav systems capability, ACM-28 systems capability, First Sortie After Ground Alert (FSAGA), and on-time takeoffs. After two months the only change was the loss of the on-time takeoff item and the addition of Nav-Aids systems capability.[30] When the quarter ended, one other item had been added: Chaff system reliability.[31] In some ways, performance in these areas was like it was in operations, make one mistake and you cannot recover until a new quarter begins. A thorough analysis of these areas of weak performance has been made in the

---

28. Ibid.
29. Rpt, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Jul 1963", 465 DCRM to SAF (DCRME), 7 Aug 1963. Exhibit 2.
30. Rpt, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Aug 1963", 465 DCRM to SAF (DCRME), no date. Exhibit 3.
31. Rpt, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Sep 1963", 465 DCRM to SAF (DCRME), no date. Exhibit 4.

supporting documents. (U)

The wing's July-September 1963 MCS performance was probably the lowest in its history. Compared with other B-52/KC-135 units in SAC, its performance left a great deal to be desired. Performance of this type was indicative of a unit with a problem; such as one engulfed in accomplishing its day-to-day tasks with a minimum amount of effort. Thusly, it would bring about a severe complacent attitude. (C)

The wing commander requested that a special study be made to determine the individual performance of each squadron in the wing in both major and minor areas.[32] The study revealed that when a unit's performance was good in minor areas (Blood Drives, On-the-Job Training/OJT, suggestions, United Givers Fund, etc.) its performance would be good in all SAC Management Control System (MCS) and local management control system (BLACK KNIGHT DERBY) areas. Colonel Keck stated, "by studying a unit's participation in the minor areas, I can almost predict that same unit's MCS performance." The study revealed that in the preceeding eight months, the three largest squadron's had the lowest overall MCS performance. (U)

BAR NONE Effectiveness. While at SAC for the "CROSS FEED" Conference, Colonel Keck became impressed with the increased emphasis the CINCSAC had placed on BAR NONE effectiveness. General

---

32. Ltr, [redacted] (DCR) to [redacted] (C), "Special Study on Squadron Performance", 14 Nov 1963. File: [redacted] DCR.

Power felt that BAR NONE results, like ORET performance, indicated to wing commander's their unit's SWO capability. It realistically assessed a unit's SWO capability by evaluating all combat ready aircraft and crews. [33]

As in the past, command attention continued to be centered on BAR NONE activity throughout the month of September. Overall effectiveness in this area after two months (July and August) of activity was 97.3 percent.[34] Performance rose slightly during the last month of BAR NONE activity (September-97.5 percent).[35] Out of a possible 300 points, only 271.5 were earned by the wing's aircrews. Nevertheless, this was a small increase over August's rating (270.5 percent).[36] Low performance was attributed to three unreliable sorties out of 26 scheduled. The first unsuccessful mission was caused by an unreliable low level bomb run on RHS Express "CROSS TIE". Incorrect crew procedures, along with a heading error, constituted the main discrepancies. A second non-effective sortie was due to an unreliable Lay Down Large Charge bomb run. Operator error and target mis-identification were recorded as causing the unreliable sortie. To conclude, a third mission was aborted for safety because

---

33. Rpt, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Jul-Aug 1963", 465 DCRM to SAF (DCRME), no date. Exhibits 2 and 3.
34. Rpt, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Sep 1963", 465 DCRM to SAF (DCRME), no date. Exhibit 4.
35. Ibid.
36. Rpt, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Aug 1963", 465 DCRM to SAF (DCRME), no date. Exhibit 3.

of heating system failure immediately following air refueling. This material failure caused the cabin temperature control to fall in the full cold position. (U)

In August's history, it was stated that since the wing's SRAM MGM missiles effectiveness was low, the score could not be significantly improved during the July-September 1963 scoring quarter. A comprehensive review of the wing's performance was to be made during the upcoming period to insure better overall performance.[37] (U)

Alert Force Activity. Ground alert commitments during September 1963 consisted of eight B-52G and six KC-135 aircraft. Both bomber and tanker alert crews alternated between three and four days on alert prior to changeover. (S)

Wing crews on ground alert (B-52 and KC-135) responded to three BRAVO exercises during September 1963.[38] One bomber aircraft on 23 September 1963 was unable to start the number one engine and therefore, it failed to meet the timing criteria.[39] Another bomber sortie (Oh) was delayed on 30 September 1963 due to the failure of number one and number two engines to successfully fire.[40] (S)

It was revealed on 27 September 1963 that SAC was preparing to analyze non-optimum runway use by computer.[41] To support the study,

---

37. History, 465BW, 1-31 Aug 1963, p. 2h.
38. Chart, "Alert Force Reaction Time, 1-30 Sep 1963", 465BW, Robins AFB, Ga. Appendix B.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Msg, SAF to UNIFORM, et al, EFTO DOX-66265, 27 Sep 1963. File: 465 IDO.

SAC required the maximum allowable tailwind component for each type of aircraft at each base for different conditions of temperature and pressure attitude. A report was requested by 8AF to be submitted and should include EMAR exercise required response times and also the timing criteria for the last aircraft to taxi.[42] Each site specific failing to complete the EMAR exercise within time limits would have to be fully explained. It was further revealed in a new directive from 8AF on 27 September 1963 that "launch times continued to receive command attention at this headquarters".[43] The wing was required to keep higher headquarters informed as to its progress toward compliance with the desired timing. Eighth Air Force was especially interested in reports from units that achieved the timing criteria and how or in what manner it had been accomplished. A successful program of reducing the time element was of paramount importance and any proposals that did so may have applicability SAC wide. In other words, many units could possibly utilize a program initiated by another organization. (U)

The wing complied with both SAC and 8AF's request for information in the above area. On 7 October 1963, an informative report was submitted to 8AF Headquarters, Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts.[44] This report was divided into two distinct sections-B-52G and KC-135 aircraft. The report's major topic concerned allowable

---

42. Msg, 8AF to BOMED, et al, DOX-12093, 27 Sep 1963. Exhibit 15.
43. Msg, 8AF to BOMED, et al, DO-12098, 27 Sep 1963. Exhibit 16.
44. Msg, 4135W to 8AF, Zippo (C)-13-42, 7 Oct 1963. Exhibit 17.

tailwind components for each type of aircraft under varying conditions, such as weather, temperatures, and malfunctioning equipment. One interesting note revealed in the report was the fact that only 9[illegible] percent (10,150 feet) of the runway (12,700) was available for use during the period under discussion. (U)

To think that so much effort was being expended by numerous people, known or unknown, in the solution to the timing problem was almost unbelievable. Much effort has been focused on this area and will continue as long as the problem continues. A solution is available; only steadfast searching will produce the right one. As was noted in August's history, the ultimate solution would be the construction of a tanker alert parking area and adjacent living quarters. However, at the present time, this was in the engineering stage and was to be submitted as a construction project at a future date. No matter what the eventual solution, the 465th Bomb Wing was not alone in its quest! (U)

Air Refueling Activity. Primary refueling support for the wing's bomber aircraft during the ORIT, 3-6 September 1963, was provided by tankers from the 912th ARS. The unit received full ORIT credit for its participation and performance. During the inspection, there were three excellent, one outstanding and four satisfactory ratings given.[45] The only outstanding rating was given to

45. Inspection Rpt, "(SRD) Operational Readiness Inspection Test", 465BW, Robins AFB, Ga., 3-6 Sep 1963. Exhibit 6.

Tactical Doctrine testing, where out of 18 personnel tested, no failures were realized. (U)

Seven KC-135's were required to serve as alert sorties; however, one aircraft was needed to support another unit and did not participate in the exercise. Consequently, six alert tankers were launched within the specified timing criteria, and all systems required for the mission were effective. As a result of the above information, the alert force (KC-135) received an excellent rating as a whole. (S)

In the area of tanker follow-on sorties, seven aircraft were available for generation. Four of the above tankers were scored for maintenance effectiveness on ORIT participation. Two other aircraft were scored on their performance in support of other higher headquarters directed missions; aircraft number 298 was generated to participate as a non-alert sortie. However, upon being towed to a new parking location, the tanker's landing gear indicator went to the intermediate position and had to be replaced with another aircraft. Because of the landing gear malfunction, primarily, the non-alert force received a satisfactory rating. The regeneration of KC-135 aircraft was successfully accomplished and a satisfactory rating was received. (U)

In addition to supporting the wing's ORIT, the 912th ARS also participated in the 397th Bomb Wing's readiness test.[46] Air refueling

---

46. Rpt, Timing Control Schedule PAPA, "LAND GRAB", 16 Sep 1963. Exhibit 31.

support, provided by wing aircraft, was given to bomber aircraft operating from Dow Air Force Base, Maine on 16 September 1963. Two primary tankers were scheduled for support, with one additional KC-135 utilized as a spare. The unclassified nickname for the operation was "LAND GRAB". Each rendezvous was accomplished without accident or incident in the "FARMER B/T" air refueling area. (U)

On 19 September 1963, the Commander, 19th Bomb Wing, made the following remark: "...professionalism displayed and cooperation given by the staff and crews of your command contributed significantly to the success of the...ORIT".[47] All personnel concerned with the support of Dow's ORIT were to be congratulated for a 'job well done! (U)

Refueling activity during September was busy as revealed by another support program accomplished by the 912th ARS. Three primary tankers and one spare were scheduled to participate in refueling bombers from the 19th Bomb Wing, Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, on 18 September 1963.[48] Only the three primary aircraft were needed to successfully accomplish the refueling in the "GUN POST" and "GUN POST WEST" rendezvous area. All activities were performed in an efficient and safety conscious manner. One interesting note of historical significance noted that even though the 912th ARS provided augmentation refueling support, no ORIT credit was given.[49] This

---

47. Msg, 397BW (S) to 465BW (S), C-2178A, 19 Sep 1963. Exhibit 22.
48. Rpt, Tiring Control Schedule HOTEL, "LONG HAUL", 18 Sep 1963. Exhibit 19.
49. Msg, 3AF (IG) to 465BW, et al, IG-21359, 20 Sep 1963. File: Wing Commander's Office.

was due to the fact that the 465th Bomb Wing's ORIT, which the 912th ARS supported, had earned for it maximum credit. (U)

The Commander of the 19th Bomb Wing was very pleased with the exemplary performance of the 465th Bomb Wing in assisting Homestead toward a successful ORIT. [50] He stated that "it was always a pleasure to hear our mission support 'mission accomplished'". On behalf of the 19th Bomb Wing, the Commander expressed his personal thanks for the excellent support program and sincere cooperation. (U)

KC-135 aircraft assigned to the wing's air refueling squadron were required to support B-47 aircraft returning from overseas bases during September 1963. [51] Support was provided on 4, 11, 13, 18, 25 September; two sorties per day were scheduled for aerial refueling. Accomplishment of all air refueling was in the "SEA SCAPE" rendezvous area, just off the coast of Bermuda. All support was performed without accident or incident, and the program was so successful it was termed routine. (U)

On 3 September 1963, the 912th ARS provided reflex airlift support from Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas to Greenham Common, England; additional support was given in order to airlift personnel from Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio to Torrejon Air Base, Spain. Reflex airlift was a program by which personnel supporting deployed aircraft were airlifted to the necessary installation. (U)

---

50. Ltr, 19BW (C) to 465BW (C), "Favorable Communication", 25 Sep 1963. Exhibit 20.
51. Weekly Aircraft Utilization and Maintenance Plan (60-9), 465BW, Robins AFB, Ga., 1-30 Sep 1963. File: 465 DOM.

Refueling assistance was provided by the 912th ARS to the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Twelfth Tactical Fighter Wing, 31st TFW and the 363rd TFW during September 1963. On the 4th of September, a scheduled mission to support the 4th TFW was cancelled due to the 4 [illegible] recall, [illegible] receivers were scheduled to be refueled by the 912th ARS. However, due to various reasons, only 12 receivers were effectively refueled. Some of the various reasons included: weather, radio failure, probe line inoperative, receiver malfunction, boom doggies and afterburner failure.[52] Some compensation for these losses was realized due to the arrival of unscheduled receivers during the refueling operation. A total of 335,000 pounds of fuel had been scheduled for offloading. Only 283,000 pounds were actually offloaded in this TAC support due to aborts, unsuccessful hook-ups and other causes. (U)

It was mentioned in August's historical report that the 912th ARS was below minimum requirements in the air refueling area.[53] A shortage of available receivers was listed as the major cause for the deficiency. It had previously been suggested that dual refueling missions with the wing's own receivers be initiated. General opinion revealed that an improvement date was partially dependent upon assistance from higher headquarters. (U)

During September, the entire picture of refueling activity in

---

52. Rpt, RCS: SAC-65, "SAC/TAC Air Refueling Report", 912ARS to SAC (DOOTC), Sep 1963. Exhibit 25.
53. Ibid.
54. History, [illegible], 1-31 Aug 1963, p. 27.

the above area had brightened considerably. Instead of being below SAC's desired standard, the 912th ARS was well above the required criteria. This increased activity was possible because of the actions implemented by the wing. First of all, dual refueling missions were significantly increased, utilizing the wing's own receivers. Secondly, higher headquarters was contacted concerning the problem and by the middle of September refueling support was appreciably expanded.[55] An example of this assistance from higher headquarters was exemplified by the fact that in August only two evidences of TAC support were recorded; however, during September eight support projects were scheduled and all of them were completed to a large degree. (U)

The wing's refueling squadron provided assistance for the bi-annual rotation of TAC forces during 14-21 September 1963.[56] An unclassified code name, "FOX ABLE" was assigned to this support project. A SAC composite force was assembled on 12 September 1963 at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, to which the 912th ARS supplied one KC-135 aircraft and crew. From that point, the composite group, composed of three cells, departed for Zaragoza Air Base, Spain. On 14 September 1963, the force supported a deployment of 20 F-100's (353rd TFS and 27th TFW) from Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina to Incerlik, Turkey. All support was well and

55. Interview, A2C Jack H. Jenkins, Asst. Wing Historian, with Colonel Larrie E. Moses, 912th ARS Commander, 5 Dec 1963.
56. Msg, SAC to 465BW, et al, DOOTOS-77766, 26 Aug 1963. File: 912th ARS.

safely accomplished. Upon returning from the above mission, the tankers were not scheduled for additional assistance until the 17th of September. However, on the 17th they supported the redeployment of 18 F-100's (35lth TFW) departing from Incerlik, Turkey to Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina. Once again, the assistance was efficient and executed in a timely manner. (S)

MCS Performance (KC-135). Speaking from an MCS standpoint, the 916th ARS performed well in some areas and not so well in others. During the first two months of scoring (July-August), KC-135 NAV-REND reliability was 99.3 percent, and 99.4 percent, respectively.[57] Maximum scoring was not achieved due to two unreliable navigation legs out of 239 attempted (66 in July and 173 in August). Corrective action was taken to preclude recurrence of the problem areas. All the above ratings were in the 'red' MCS wise, but they showed a slight improvement over June's score of 99 percent.[58] When the quarter ended on 30 September 1963, a 99.4 percent score was revealed in this area.[59] One bad navigation leg, of 198 attempted, and two bad rendezvous of 215 attempted, accounted for the above score. (U)

One particular interesting area concerned KC-135 on-time take-offs. During July, the rate was 95.7 percent as compared with 99.7

---

57. Rpts, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Jul-Aug 1963", 465 DCRM to SAF (DCRME), no date. Exhibits 2 and 3.
58. History, 465BW, 1 May-30 Jun 1963, Exhibit 6.
59. Rpt, RCS: 1-SAC-T35/Parts I & II, "Management Control Data and Analysis, Sep 1963", 465 DCRM to SAF (DCRME), no date. Exhibit 4.

percent shown in August. In the last month of the scoring quarter, September, a score of 96.1 percent was noted. Therefore, a slow and gradual improvement in this area was evident. (U)

In the area of First Sortie After Ground Alert (FSAGA), KC-135 performance showed a very much improved rating throughout the scoring quarter. July's rating was [illegible] percent reliable; six sorties were scheduled but one was unreliable due to a late start. August had a 71.7 percent score because of one unreliable sortie out of 18 scheduled. A malfunctioning generator caused the aircraft to be late. The biggest increase in performance was realized during the last month of the period. September's FSAGA was rated as 96.2 percent. Of 26 scheduled sorties only one was unreliable due to a generator failure. When the previous quarter's score (100 percent) was compared with the present percent (96.2) however, a regression was evident in this area. The wing hoped to increase this reliability in the coming months. (U)

During the April-May-June quarter, profile mission effectiveness was 100 percent.[60] In July, which commenced a new scoring period, 62.3 percent reliability was revealed. However, in reality this percentage was a progressive one in that it was only the amount of sorties flown up to and including the month of July. Naturally, if only part of the allocation was flown, then the figures drop. In essence, performance was still satisfactory, and as time progressed

---

60. History, 465TW, 1 May-30 Jun 1963, p. 41.

a rise in the percentage scored was inevitable. The tankers finished the last two months of the quarter (August-September) with a 100 percent score. (U)

As in the past, a 100 percent rating was given in the area of air refueling systems capability.[62] At the end of September 1963, this area had been rated 100 percent for nine consecutive months. Although this was an enviable record, the wing continued to place emphasis in this area to preclude a regression or the formation of a complacent attitude. (U)

Flying Hours/Sorties. During September 1963, the wing's B-52 crews and aircraft flew a total of 68 sorties.[62] Total flying hours expended for the same period was 517.[63] B-52 flying allocation for the quarter was 1902 hours of which a proportionate share was flown in the third month (September) of the First Quarter Fiscal Year.[64] (U)

Air refueling activity in this area included a total of 128 sorties in September.[65] KC-135 flying hours for the aforesaid period were 534.[66] Tanker crews flew a proportionate share of the quarterly allocation (1744) during September 1963.[67] (U)

Aircraft and Combat Crew Data. The 465th Bomb Wing, during

---

61. History, 465BW, 1 May-30 Jun 1963, p. 41.
62. Chart, "Hours Flown vs Hours Allocated-(KC-135, B-52)", 1-30 Sep 1963. Appendix E.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.

September 1963, was in possession of 15 B-52G aircraft.[68] However, only 13 were considered operationally ready. This was due to aircraft 58-249 and 58-192 being out of commission for routine maintenance. A total of 31 AGM-69A's were available and operationally ready. DOE 6.2(a) The reason for this was one missile out due to inoperative generator and an additional one unsuitable because of necessary hydraulic maintenance. (U)

A total of 26 combat crews was formed and ready for operation. Only 23 were ready and available, however, due to leaves, transfers, etc. Also noteworthy was the fact that 15 aircraft and 27 combat crews were authorized the wing. (S)

Statistics relative to KC-135 aircraft assigned and combat ready presented the following picture. As of late September, 15 tankers were physically assigned to the 465th Bomb Wing.[70] Of this total, 13 were considered as operationally ready for duty. One tanker was out for routine maintenance, and the remaining one required a technical order compliance (TOC). A total of 28 aircrews was formed during the month, with 27 considered operationally ready and available. The wing, which was authorized 15 tankers, possessed the full authorization (15) during the month of September. The same statement could also apply to the 27 aircrews authorized

DOE 6.2(a)

70. Msg, 465BW to SAC, B00M-420 (S), 30 Sep 1963. Exhibit 18.

and assigned to the wing. (U)

<u>B-52 Strut Replacement</u>. As mentioned in previous histories, B-52 aircraft number 192 experienced severe strut damage.[71/] Consequently, a new one was requisitioned and eventually found at San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SAAMA). The strut was then shipped to Boeing Aircraft Company, Wichita, Kansas, where repairs were made in order to make it ready for service. (U)

On 10 September 1963, a request was made by 8AF for airlift support to transfer the repaired strut from Boeing to Robins Air Force Base.[72/] The strut was successfully airlifted on 19 September 1963. Since the aircraft had been physically relcocated to the WRAMA maintenance depot area, all work was accomplished across the base from the SAC wing. Maintenance was completed on 20 September and on the following day a 'test hop' was flown without accident or incident. Consequently, on 21 September aircraft number 192 was officially declared in operational status. (U)

<u>Munitions Maintenance Performance</u>. A capability inspection of the 64th MMS was not conducted in conjunction with the wing's ORIT. However, loading teams were observed loading/downloading MK-28FI and MK-39/2 weapons, W-28 warheads, and GAM-72 (ADM-20B) missiles.[73/]

---

71. History, 465BW, 1-31 Jul 1963, pp. 6-9; History, 465BW, 1-31 Aug 1963, pp. 19-21.
72. Msg, 8AF to 465BW, et al, DOOTS-6382A, 10 Sep 1963. File: Wing Commander's Office.
73. Rpt, 8AF (IG) to 465BW (C), et al, "ORIT of 465BW, Robins AFB, Ga., 3-6 Sep 1963", 6 Sep 1963, Exhibit 6.

Technical, safety, and security procedures were rated satisfactory during this MCS period. (SRD)

An 8AF staff visit was conducted to the 465th Bomb Wing during [illegible]-20 September 1963, at the specific request of the wing commander. This [illegible] will include the findings and recommendations of the team concerning the 64th MMS. Some of the team's findings included: 1) minimum training requirements were not being properly monitored; 2) semi-annual nuclear and explosive safety indoctrination was not being adequately scheduled; 3) production control was not controlling work accomplished by the munitions maintenance personnel; 4) eight War Reserve (WR) components were erroneously put in outside storage. The above discrepancies, among others, were revealed to the wing and corrective action was quickly implemented to preclude recurrence. (U)

Housekeeping of all munitions functions was rated as outstanding. This above rating included both storage facilities and work areas within the munitions building. In conclusion, the 64th MMS was operating in a satisfactory manner, in addition to rendering effective munitions support as it was required. Lastly, the team indicated that this organization (64th MMS) was the best that they had seen. (U)

The above was a preliminary or 'sneak preview' of things to

---

74. Ltr, 8AF (DMA) to 465 (DM), "Report of Staff Visit", 30 Sep 1963. File: 465 DCMA.

come. The 68th MMS underwent a SAC Munitions Evaluation Standardization Test (MEST) during the period 23-27 September 1963. Although this test was a SAC inspection, the team worked out of McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas. An informal report was accomplished by the team chief before returning home.[75] However, a formal survey was completed and revealed detailed information about the inspection results.[76] (U)

Under technical evaluations, six loading operations were inspected; three were rated Highly Qualified, two were rated Qualified and one was rated Unqualified. Four NCO's were evaluated and three were certified safety supervisors. Both a nuclear weapons maintenance evaluator was evaluated and certified, in addition to a 39 maintenance operation being evaluated and rated as Highly Qualified. Of twenty technicians tested, nine received scores higher than the SAC average. Further, comments in the formal report stated that standardization administration in both branches was good and that the maintenance branch had an exceptional technical training program. To sum up, the Munitions Service Branch standardization program was satisfactory, and the maintenance branch program was rated as outstanding. (U)

The only team to receive an unqualified score did so because the wrong bomb bay receptacle pins were used in checking for the

---

75. Msg, 465BW to SAC, MEST, et al, EFTO MMS MEST-2502, 26 Sep 1963. Exhibit 24.
76. Ltr, SAC to 465BW (DOM), "Evaluation Summary", no date. Exhibit 25.

presence of voltage. One Staff Sergeant was not certified as a safety supervisor because he permitted a team member to incorrectly check for a presence of voltage. Concluding remarks by the team consisted of the following: all records were properly maintained; current technical data was readily available; technicians were well versed in job knowledge and complicated operations; housekeeping, tools and equipment were outstanding. (U)

The writers felt that the main purpose of the aforementioned test were twofold: 1) to completely inspect and scrutinize all MMS functions within the wing; 2) to prepare this aspect of the wing's capability for the "really big show" that it hoped would never come. As the MMS looked over its errors and eventually corrected them, a feeling of supreme professionalism slowly emerged. Consequently, it was quite evident that the WEST had served a dual purpose and had once again proven its worth as a scale by which true performance could be measured. (U)

Supply Support. General Earl G. Hedlund, Warner Robins Air Materiel Area (WRAMA) Commander, visited the 465th Bomb Wing during the first part of August 1961.[77] Although General Hedlund was interested in all facilities and functions, he was especially interested in an area that concerned the performance of WRAMA personnel rendering supply support to the local SAC wing. (U)

---

77. Interview, MSgt. B.G. Stewart, Wing Historian, with Mr. Arthur L. Pettis, Chief, SAB-Base Support Division, 20 Nov 1963.

As a result of his tour, the WRAMA Commander was well pleased with the initiative displayed and devotion to duty which the support people exemplified. He remarked to Colonel James W. Thomson, WRAMA Director of Supply and Transportation, that motivation was a prime factor in their job performance. General Holland in this statement that personnel working across the road within WRAMA could learn a great deal from the most base people working within the supply organization supporting the wing. (U)

During the period 16 September 1963 through 1 October 1963, supply effectiveness (expediter, pre-issue, and bench stock) was 91.1 percent.[78] A total of 5407 line items were requested whereas 4956 were either completely or partially issued. Average delivery time was 9.7 minutes for expediter and pre-issue. Bench stock items were procured in an average time of 11.1 minutes. (U)

Pre-issue and bench stock line items on hand were 97.9 percent and 98.9 percent, respectively.[79] There were two cannibalizations during September 1963, with no loss of sorties due to lack of supply support.[80] (U)

In looking at SAC's standard for bench stock and pre-issue items (85 percent), it could well be seen that the wing's figures were well above the desired percentage. In the final analysis, excellent supply support was being given to the wing in almost every

---

78. Rpt, HQS: SAC-S35, "Tenant Supply Report", 16 Sep-15 Oct 1963, 4453M to SAC. Exhibit 27.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.

phase of operation. (U)

During September 1963, numerous facts were revealed to the wing concerning the increased cannibalization rates command-wide. About 50 percent of the cannibalization problem was attributed to a lack of shipping weight routing of replacement requisitions.[82] Problems also existed with a shortage of [illegible] parts due to engineering changes and higher than predicted failure rates. The wing received information on 6 September 1963 that aggressive action to reduce the high cannibalization rate had been taken by the SAF Commander.[83] Emphasis was needed in the area of critical items and routine re-supply, if these areas were to significantly improve. (U)

In vivid contrast to the above problem, the 465th Bomb Wing 'enjoyed' an extremely low cannibalization rate. For the month of September only one cannibalization was revealed for B-52 aircraft. This was compared with other Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) bases where SAC units were stationed: Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (59), and Griffiss Air Force Base, New York (3).[84] The wing experienced no exchange of aircraft parts for KC-135 aircraft or ADM-20's during the month. One cannibalization was noted in AGM-28's, as compared with two for Wright Patterson Air Force Base.[84] (U)

---

81. Msg, SAC to AFLC, et al, DM-7693F, 4 Sep 1963. File: 465 DCMA.
82. Msg, SAC to SAF, et al, DM-79701, 6 Sep 1963. File: 465 DCMA.
83. Ltr, SAF to UNIFORM, "NORS, Cannibalization Trends and Problem Items", 6 Nov 1963. File: 465 DCMA.
84. Ibid.

Highly indicative of the wing's excellent supply support was its low non-Operational Ready Status (NORS) rate for the past six months. During this period, the highest rate was 0.61 percent.[85] This percentage included all areas of the wing's flying program (KC-135, B-52, AGE-[illegible], ASE-[illegible]). For both August and September 1963, the NORS rate for the wing was 0.30 percent. It could again be seen that supply support was one area, in particular, where the wing was not experiencing an immediate problem. The wing's performance was directly attributed to the unusual supply support afforded by the host base and its personnel working within the SAC wing. (U)

Supply support being rendered to the SAC wing by the Special Account Branch (SBE) was outstanding.[86] Approximately 47,000 line items were on hand to support the 465th Bomb Wing, and excellent knowledge was possessed by the supply troops concerning current supply procedures. (U)

The outstanding rating of materiel control was attributed to four main causes: excellent support rendered by the depot Specialty Accounting Branch; physical location of WRAMA and OCAMA Site "C" and storage distribution points; timely lateral support actions by Materiel Control; and excellent working relationships between maintenance and supply. One item of historical significance was the motivation which the civilians working in the SAC area possessed.

---

85. Ltr, SAF to UNIFORM, "NORS, Cannibalization Trends and Problem Items", 5 Nov 1963. File: 465 DCMA.
86. Ltr, SAF to 465 (DM), "Report of Staff Visit", 30 Sep 1963. File: 465 DCMA.

Due to their physical location within the tenant unit (465th BW), they felt closely integrated with the wing's wartime and peacetime mission. In contrast, support given from a distant locale (such as across base) usually does not work as well as being physically located within the unit served. Working harmoniously together, the wing's maintenance people and support persons from the host base had accomplished an enviable record of performance. Such support could well serve as an example to other units (tenant) of coordination and proficient execution of required tasks. (U)

The support offered by the Special Accounting Branch during the recent SAF Operational Readiness Inspection Test was rated outstanding.[87] The excellent supply support was evidenced by the supply effectiveness and average delivery time. Of 82 requests received, 95.6 supply effectiveness was achieved with an average delivery time of 9.7 minutes. The consistency with which the wing achieved a very high degree of supply performance and a low average delivery time during ORIT exercises indicated the devotion to duty and exceptional motivation of all personnel concerned. The Wing Commander expressed to the host base his sincere thanks for the important part played by them in making the ORIT a success. (U)

After the ORIT was completed, numerous comments were revealed concerning the supply support during the test.[88] A significant and

---

87. Ltr, 465BW (C) to WRB, "Operational Readiness Inspection Test", 13 Sep 1963. Exhibit 26.
88. Ltr, WRAMA to WRSMPP, "Operational Readiness Inspection Test", 11 Sep 1963. File: 465 DCMA.

interesting increase was noted in requests necessary, due to the older model KC-135 aircraft which the wing was in the process of receiving from Loring Air Force Base, Maine. The ORIT Supply Inspector, stated that out of all his supply discussions, not one adverse remark was made against the support given from these supply. This was certainly a compliment for the Special Accounting Branch. A new grading system, recently incorporated within the supply area, was used to measure performance. In the past, items that were to be downgraded by Material Control and Job Control were not counted against supply effectiveness. However, under the new grading system they were counted. Also, pre-issue problems were never graded prior to the new system; nevertheless, they were now graded for supply effectiveness. (U)

As previously mentioned, an 8AF staff assistance team visited the wing from 16-20 September 1963.[89] The purpose of this visit, requested by the wing commander, was to render assistance and guidance to the maintenance squadrons. It was the opinion of the inspection team that overall maintenance activities were capable of supporting the unit mission. Major discrepancies, however, did exist, and could, if not alleviated, have adverse effects upon the quality of the end product being produced. (U)

The areas requiring attention were: DCM Staff, OMS and PMS, AEMS, AMMS activities. Indicative of weak areas were: repeated

---

89. Ltr, 8AF to 4653DM, "Report of Staff Visit", 20 Sep 1963. File: 465 DCMA.

malfunctions, supervisory techniques, lack of basic job knowledge, "quantity not quality", and the inadequacy of corrective actions. These discrepancies, along with others, were covered in detail and proper corrective action outlined in the final report. (U)

Security Readiness Test. The [illegible] Wing experienced a Security Readiness Evaluation (SRE) on 24 September 1963.[90] Although it was a SAC directed inspection, personnel from Blytheville Air Force Base, Arkansas, were responsible for administering the overall evaluation. In Phase I of the Security Field Exercise, the maximum number of points was scored by the wing. However, in Phase II of the test, thirty points were lost due to the unauthorized approach of a suspect at an aircraft. In approaching an aircraft, under the pretense of performing routine maintenance, he was not apprehended. (C)

Administratively speaking, points were also lost because two individuals failed to give the acceptable definitions of Central Security Control (CSC) and a Broken Arrow. In addition, seven CDS personnel fired below the required firearm classification. Therefore, of a possible 855 points, the wing earned 786 points for an overall percentage of 91.9.[91] (C)

Several weaknesses observed by the evaluation team were worthy of inclusion. One concerned the manning of various perimeter guard

---

90. Rpt, SAC to 465BW, "Security Readiness Evaluation of Robins AFB, Ga.", 24 Sep 1963. File: 465 CDSO.
91. Ibid.

posts. The host base, responsible for manning of the posts, simulated the manning during the exercises. However, during this test they were able, with prodding from CDS, to partially man the positions in approximately 20 minutes. Complete manning of all perimeter posts was accomplished in 54 minutes. The situation could have created a serious emergency during authentic crises. (S)

It was recommended by the team that a stronger security indoctrination program (flight line in particular) be developed within the maintenance squadrons. A procedure was also urgently needed with the host base for the purpose of insuring actual manning of all perimeter posts in future exercises. Finally, it was suggested that a small arms requalification program be initiated for all CDS personnel. (C)

PART II

COMMAND - ORGANIZATION - MANNING

All great changes are irksome to the human mind, especially those which are attended with great dangers and uncertain effect.

Letter to Lord's Worth's
April [illegible]
John Adams

Introduction. As mentioned in earlier historical surveys, activity which occurs during each successive month is divided into areas which directly or indirectly affect the wing's Emergency War Order (EWO) capability. This part of September's historical study records information which the writers feel does not adversely affect the EWO plan, but nonetheless should be included because of its possible utility. Therefore, the following areas were adjudged significant enough for inclusion: absence of the Wing Commander, manning, completion of local construction projects, and the 20-Year Active Service Career Program for Officers. (U)

Command. During the period under discussion, 1-30 September 1963, Colonel James M. Keck continued to exercise command jurisdiction over assigned units and personnel. Colonel Keck was on temporary duty assignment (TDY) to SAC Headquarters from 9-11 September 1963 to attend a maintenance conference, nicknamed "CROSS FEED".[1] The responsible officer in charge during his absence was Colonel

---

1. Msg, 4453BW (C) to SAF, C-2275, 6 Sep 1963. File: Wg Comdr's Office.

William C. Lewis, Vice Commander. Similarly, in order to serve on an Officers Selection Board at Headquarters USAF, the Wing Commander was absent during 15-20 September 1963.[2] Upon returning from this selection board, Colonel Beck was on leave from 20-29 September 1963.[3] During both absences, Colonel William C. Lewis was again the responsible officer. (U)

Manning. An authorized officer strength of 318 personnel was revealed during September 1963.[4] Once again it could be seen that the unit manning document figures remained the same as the previous month (318).[5] When compared with the previous quarter's authorized officer strength (312), September's authorization was slightly higher (318).[6] (U)

During September, the assigned officer strength was 326[7] as compared with 332 during August 1963.[8] Consequently, a reduction of six personnel was evident for the new month. During the First Quarter Fiscal Year Unit Manning Documents (UMD's), a considerable and steady decline of assigned personnel was noted. As the wing prepared for its new UMD's on 1 October, it was hoped this trend would gradually terminate. Officer body manning was indicative of the

---

2. Msg, 465BW (C) to CAF, C-2299, 9 Sep 1963. File: Wg Comdr's Office.
3. Ibid.
4. UMD's, 465BW, 1 Jul-30 Sep 1963. File: 465 DP.
5. History, 465BW, 1-31 Aug 1963, Appendix A.
6. History, 465BW, 1 May-30 Jun 1963, Appendices A and B.
7. Morning Reports, 465BW, 30 Sep 1963. File: 465 DP.
8. Morning Reports, 465BW, 31 Aug 1963. File: 465 DP.

decreased number of personnel assigned to the wing. It declined from 104.4 percent in August to 102.5 percent in September. (U)

Overages recorded in September (63)[9] continued a general upward trend. In comparison with August's figures (62), it could well be seen that this was not a significant increase. As mentioned in previous histories, improvement was anticipated in this area upon the completion of the 912th Air Refueling Squadron's (912 ARS's) crew buildup in late August 1963. However, due to various circumstances, the buildup was not completed on schedule and it was revealed that no improvement occurred during September. Even though the refueling squadron had the bulk of these overages for the period under discussion, additional causes were personnel pending retirement and upcoming Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves. These areas, in their total effect, caused the wing to maintain a high number of overages.[10] (U)

The writers were of the opinion that from a manning standpoint 63 overages were somewhat misleading. True, these people were assigned and filling authorized positions. Nevertheless, they were occupying UMD spaces that did not correspond with their AFSC; thusly, every unauthorized individual assigned had to be classified as an overage. Also, various officers were assigned TDY to training schools and since they were still considered as 'wing assets' they

---

9. Rpt, RCS: SAP-P1, "Roster of Officers", 465BW, Robins AFB, Ga., 20 Sep 1963. Exhibit 1.
10. Interview, A2C Jack H. Jenkins, Asst. Wing Historian, With Maj. Earl T. Estes, Chief, Personnel Actions Division, 465BW, 15 Nov 1963.

were recorded as overages. In the tactical squadrons, a few overages were revealed. They were mainly attributed to extra or spare personnel which were required to prevent crew regression such as officers grounded for medical reasons.[11/] (C)

First Quarter Fiscal Year 1964 airmen authorizations (2,654) were effective during the last month of the quarter, September 1963.[12/] This figure was to remain unchanged pending publication of changes on 1 October 1963. Numerous alterations in the assigned airmen strength were realized throughout most of the squadrons assigned to the wing. Increases over August's figures in assigned airmen strength were noted in Headquarters Squadron Section+4, Combat Defense Squadron+2, Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron+5, and the Airborne Missile Maintenance Squadron+1.[13/] Decreases in the number of airmen assigned during September 1963 included the Field Maintenance Squadron-6, Organizational Maintenance Squadron-6, Munitions Maintenance Squadron-2, and the 761st Bomb Squadron-1.[14/] Only one squadron, the 912th ARS, experienced no change in the number of assigned airmen. Throughout the month of September, body manning was at least 100 percent and the month ended with a rating of 104.6 percent. (U)

All eight civilian spaces were filled during September[15/] with no

---

11. Ibid.
12. UMD's, 465BW, 1 Jul-30 Sep 1963. File: 465 DP.
13. Chart, "465BW Manning Data", 465BW, Appendix A.
14. Ibid.
15. UMD's, 465BW, 1 Jul-30 Sep 1963. File: 465 DP.

change from the previous month. (U)

Facilities. Construction of access roads, Project 49-3 and Project 187-2, which began on 10 May 1963, was to terminate on 15 November 1963.[16] Contracts for both projects were awarded to C. T. Bone Construction Company of Butler, Georgia. As included in the August 1963 history, both access roads were for the purpose of speeding the uploading performance of missile and airweapons crews. One access road was necessary to reduce the reaction time from the alert facility to the alert tankers. As revealed in August's history, a problem had arisen with available parking space for the additional KC-135's; consequently, a contract was let with the aforementioned company to eliminate all wasted space and accomodate increased aircraft. Although the total cost of both construction projects was estimated at $28,753.00, varying circumstances reduced the overall amount to $28,642.00.[17] A final noteworthy point concerned newly planted grass seed adjacent to the roads which were constructed. This was the only portion of the two contracts that was not complete by 30 September 1963. The grass was to eliminate erosion. Complete maintenance of the grass, such as watering rested temporarily with the contracting agency. (U)

One item of historical significance concerned the eventual implementation of an antenna in the SAC area to increase the wing's

---

16. Rpt, RCS: AF-H5, "Maintenance/Repair/Alterations Maintenance Construction, 1-30 Sep 1963", WRAMA (BAE) to AFLC, 30 Sep 1963. File: WRAMA (BAE).
17. Ibid.

single side band radio capability. The antenna was originally to have been installed in December 1962. Funds for the installation were available twice before Fiscal Year 1963 ended; however, they were not utilized and consequently were lost when that fiscal year ended. On 16 September 1963, the wing requested assistance in this area.[18] It was noted that all necessary equipment and antennas were available, but the Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (GEEIA) and base support projects were not complete. As of 30 September progress was at a standstill and also no additional guidance had been received from higher headquarters. (U)

20-Year Active Reserve Program. In continuing a discussion of the 20-Year Reserve Officer Service Program, numerous actions took place in September 1963. As previously mentioned, it was a program under which many officers, after 20 years in reserve, would be automatically retired from the service. Junior grade officers were concerned over the reserve program in general and wanted to know about their future as reservists. Along this same line, the wing requested in early September that a report be submitted to higher headquarters depicting each reserve officer of the wing who would achieve retirement eligibility by December 1964.[19] The report's criteria included officer potential, degree of effectiveness and skills possessed. Based on the above factors, officers were to be aligned

---

18. Msg, 465BW to SAF, DOOCE-2387, 16 Sep 1963. File: 465 DOOCE.
19. Ltr, SAF (DP) to 465BW (C), "Reserve Officer Career Program", 9 Sep 1963. File: 465 DP.

in priority for retention only as they related to the wing's mission. Also requested was an evaluation of the impact which losses would have on the ability of the wing to accomplish its mission. Finally, it was requested that the number of replacements required be submitted along with replacements presently available. (U)

Various viewpoints from the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) were eloquently expressed to a particular officer who was directly affected by the reserve program. General Power brought out the fact that positive action had to be taken to reduce the large number of field grade officers. The action was necessary to prevent total stagnation of promotion opportunities. In order to protect the future of the Air Force, it was compulsory to devise a plan which would prevent ten years without promotion opportunity to be followed by a sudden loss of many officers. As a result of the above problems, the "20-Year Program" was developed as the most feasible solution. Although the number of regular commissions given under the program was small, the opportunity was nonetheless there. To finalize, it may be mentioned that General Power was very cognisant of the uncertainties which surrounded the program's ultimate implementation. The 20-Year plan was only 60 days old; 'pros' and 'cons' from both sides of the question were being carefully weighed and balanced. (U)

General Power gave an address on the "20-Year Active Service" [20]

---

20. Ltr, [illegible] to all squadrons, "Briefing for all Officers", 23 Sep 1963. File: [illegible] DP.

Career for Reserve Officers" on 20 September 1963. The address was designed to answer the many questions on the subject recently submitted by commanders throughout SAC. Since it was such an excellent and timely presentation, the address was taped from the SAC primary alerting system and presented to officers of the wing. The Wing Commander requested that all officers attend one of these briefing sessions during the month. (U)

After the taped interview was presented, a discussion period ensued and questions were raised concerning numerous aspects of the 20-Year Reserve Program. Typical examples of questions asked were: 1) Do we have a program for reducing the Regular Officers?, 2) Where is the incentive necessary for 'better than average' performance?, 3) What must a reservist do in order to make Regular?, 4) Will the "White Charger" program be correspondingly increased to reduce the number of Regulars who will be retained beyond 20 years?, 5) Within SAC, was USAF prepared to replace those men they were losing? These questions, and many like them, were presented as the major feeling which most reserve officers harbored toward the program. A total of 175 officers, within the wing, were assigned controlled dates of separation. Their rank ranged from Second Lieutenant through Colonel. This was a significant number considering the fact that most of the officers assigned to the wing were in a reserve status. (U)

Following the discussion period, Colonel Keck revealed several items of historical significance relevant to retention of reserve

officers. He recommended that the program be limited to a 3 or 5 year period. By so doing, it would eliminate some of the apparent stigma which had been attached to a Reserve officer. Colonel Keck felt that augmentation opportunities should be expanded to include officers with less than 10 years of exemplary service. Further, he felt that all Nine Commanders should be given the opportunity to state both who was and who was not recommended for augmentation purposes. (U)

The 20-Year Active Service Career Program for Officers was, is, and will remain an uncertain program until full details, analyses, and investigations can be completed. As General Power so vividly stated, this solution to the problem of opening new avenues of promotional opportunity was the best that had been formulated at the present time. If and when a more advantageous program was discovered, it would be implemented at the earliest possible time. True is the quotation that "all great changes are irksome to the human mind". Nevertheless, great changes pave the way for greater achievements, and without programmed progress, stagnation and complacency quickly follow. Only time and experience with the new program could prove its full worth. (U)