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AF-2419

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OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION RECAPITULATION

RECAPITULATION "TABLE 1000"

UNIT		DATE		TIME		LOCATION		REMARKS	
NO.	NAME	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	REMARKS	NO.	NAME	DATE	TIME
1	2
3	4
5	6
7	8
9	10
11	12
13	14
15	16
17	18
19	20
21	22
23	24
25	26
27	28
29	30
31	32
33	34
35	36
37	38
39	40
41	42
43	44
45	46
47	48
49	50
51	52
53	54
55	56
57	58
59	60
61	62
63	64
65	66
67	68
69	70
71	72
73	74
75	76
77	78
79	80
81	82
83	84
85	86
87	88
89	90
91	92
93	94
95	96
97	98
99	100

NOTES: (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ... (5) ... (6) ... (7) ... (8) ... (9) ... (10) ...

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WESTOVER AIR FORCE BASE
MASSACHUSETTS



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: IG

6 September 1963

SUBJECT: (U) Operational Readiness Inspection Test of the 465th
Bombardment Wing, Robins AFB, Ga

TO: 465 BombWg (C)
822 AirDiv (C)
BAF (CS)
IN TURN

I. AUTHORITY AND COMMAND INSPECTED

A. An Operational Readiness Inspection Test of the 465th Bombardment Wing and its assigned units was conducted by Colonel Earl L. Johnson, Inspector General, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, during the period 3 - 6 September 1963. Authority for the inspection is contained in Air Force Regulation 123-9. (U)

B. The unit inspected was the 465th Bombardment Wing, commanded by Colonel James M. Keck since 13 August 1962. (U)

C. Major General James H. Walsh, Deputy Commander Eighth Air Force, Brigadier General Woodrow P. Swancutt, Commander 822 Air Division, Colonel James M. Keck, Commander 465th Bombardment Wing and key staff members, with maximum attendance by unit personnel, were present at the critique held 6 September 1963. (U)

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ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954

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BAF 25413

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
II. <u>OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION REPORT</u>					
A. <u>MESSAGE REPORT</u>					
PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (See)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE	
ACTION PRIORITY	BOOK MULTI SINGLE				
INFO ROUTINE	X	AF			
FROM BAF IG ROBINS AFB GA			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS		
TO CSAF WASH DC					
DEP IG FOR INSP MORTON AFB CALIF					
SAC					
BAF WESTOVER AFB MASS					
822AIRDIV TURNER AFB GA					
465 BOMB WG ROBINS AFB GA (MESSENGER)					
INFO: 2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA					
15AF MARCH AFB CALIF					
1 CMTEVALGP BARKSDALE AFB LA					
/SECRET/BAF IG 25414 . PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT. FOR USAF, AFXOPS AND AFCIG. FOR SAC, IG, DDOIC AND DM4D. FOR BAF IG, CS, DO AND DM. MESSAGE IN SIX PARTS. PART I. IDENTIFICATION. A. AN UNANNOUNCED OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION TEST OF 465 BOMBARDMENT WING, ROBINS AFB, GA, WAS CONDUCTED BY COLONEL EARL L. JOHNSON, BAF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DURING THE PERIOD 3 SEPT THROUGH 6 SEPT 63. UNIT IS COMMANDED BY COLONEL JAMES M. KECK.					
SYMBOL		SIGNATURE			
IG		<i>Charles H. McConnell</i>			
TYPED <i>Charles H. McConnell</i>		TYPED (Printed NAME AND TITLE)			
C. H. McCONNELL, COL, USAF.DIG		<i>Earl L. Johnson</i>			
PHONE 25414		Colonel, USAF			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		Inspector General			
SECRET					

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

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FROM

8AF IG ROBINS AFB GA

E. PRIMARY REFUELING SUPPORT FOR THE BOMBER AIRCRAFT WAS PROVIDED BY KC-135 TANKERS OF THE 912 AIR REFUELING SQ. UNIT DID RECEIVE ORIT CREDIT.

C. A CAPABILITY INSPECTION OF THE 64 MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQ WAS NOT CONDUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ORIT.

PART II. GENERAL EVALUATION.

A. THE 465 BOMBARDMENT WING PASSED THE ORIT, UNDER THE CURRENTLY APPROVED USAF READINESS CRITERIA. THE UNIT IS CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF ACCOMPLISHING THE GENERAL MISSION REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE USAF UNIT TRAINING STANDARDS. THE 912 ARFLSQ PASSED THE ORIT, UNDER THE CURRENTLY APPROVED USAF READINESS CRITERIA. THE UNIT IS CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF ACCOMPLISHING THE GENERAL MISSION REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE USAF UNIT TRAINING STANDARDS.

B. EVALUATION OF 1-AF-V-14 REPORT AS OF 2400, 28 AUG 63, COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF C-1 FOR B-52 AIRCRAFT IS CONCURRED IN BY THE 8AF INSPECTOR GENERAL. EVALUATION OF 1-AF-V-14 REPORT AS OF 2400, 28 AUG 63, COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF C-1 FOR KC-135, IS CONCURRED IN BY THE 8AF INSPECTOR GENERAL.

C. THIS ORIT WAS INITIATED AT 2130Z, 3 SEPT 63 BY FAST REACTION MESSAGE FROM HQ SAC.

D. A SIMULATED "BROKEN ARROW" (DISASTER CONTROL EXERCISE) WAS NOT CONDUCTED.

E. CRITIQUE FOR COMMANDER, 465 BOMBARDMENT WING, WILL BE CONDUCTED ON 6 SEPT 63, BY COLONEL EARL L. JOHNSON, INSPECTOR GENERAL.

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RAF IG ROBINS AFB GA

PART III. OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION TEST.

A. SUMMARY

1. GENERAL RECAP

a. UNIT	465BW	912ARFLSQ
b. TYPE ACFT	B-52G	ND-135
c. POSSESSED	15	15
d. EN ROUTE REFLEX	N/A	N/A
e. AVAILABLE IAW SACM 50-5	13	14
f. ON ALERT O/S	0	0
g. ON ALERT ZI	8	7
h. TOTAL ACFT SCHED FOR EXEC	8	8
i. SCHED BOMBER WX SCOUT	0	N/A
j. ASSIGNED CREWS	26	27
k. USEABLE CREWS	25	24
l. ALERT CREWS O/S	0	0

2. OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION TEST EVALUATION

a. MAINTENANCE EFFECTIVENESS.

(1) UNIT	465BW	912ARFLSQ
(2) ALERT FORCE	EXCELLENT	EXCELLENT
(3) NON-ALERT FORCE	SATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY
(4) REGENERATION OF ALERT FORCE	SATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY

b. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS 465BW 912ARFLSQ

(1) ALERT ACFT	8	6
(2) REINSTATED DUTIES	0	2

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(3) TOTAL SCHED	8	8
(4) EFFECTIVE	8	8
(5) NONEFFECTIVE	0	0
(6) NONCOMPUTED	0	0
(7) MISSION EFFECTIVENESS	OUTSTANDING	OUTSTANDING

c. SHORT LOOK LARGE CHARGE BOMBING

(1) TOTAL REQUIRED	8	
(2) TOTAL RELIABLE RUNS	8	
(3) TOTAL UNRELIABLE RUNS	0	
(4) SYNCHRONOUS RUNS	8	
(5) SYNCHRONOUS RUNS RELIABLE	8	
(6) EMERGENCY RUNS	0	
(7) EMERGENCY RUNS RELIABLE	N/A	
(8) SYNCHRONOUS CEA	1376.3 FT	1972.5 FT
(9) EMERGENCY CEA	N/A	N/A
(10) OVERALL CEA	1376.3 FT	1972.5 FT
(11) SYNCHRONOUS BOMBING	OUTSTANDING	
(12) SHORT LOOK LARGE CHARGE BOMBING LAST TRAINING		

PERIOD NUMBER 249, CEA 1587 FT 2730 FT, RELIABILITY 96.6% 95.3%

d. HIGH ALTITUDE FIXED ANGLE BOMBING

(1) TOTAL ATTEMPTED	8
(2) TOTAL RELIABLE RUNS	6
(3) TOTAL UNRELIABLE	2

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8AF IG ROBINS AFB, GA

(3) TOTAL SCHED	8	8
(4) EFFECTIVE	8	8
(5) NONEFFECTIVE	0	0
(6) NONCOMPUTED	0	0
(7) MISSION EFFECTIVENESS	OUTSTANDING	OUTSTANDING

c. SHORT LOOK LARGE CHARGE BOMBING

(1) TOTAL REQUIRED	8	
(2) TOTAL RELIABLE RUNS	8	
(3) TOTAL UNRELIABLE RUNS	0	
(4) SYNCHRONOUS RUNS	8	
(5) SYNCHRONOUS RUNS RELIABLE	8	
(6) EMERGENCY RUNS	0	
(7) EMERGENCY RUNS RELIABLE	N/A	
(8) SYNCHRONOUS CEA	1376.3 FT	1972.5 FT
(9) EMERGENCY CEA	N/A	N/A
(10) OVERALL CEA	1376.3 FT	1972.5 FT
(11) SYNCHRONOUS BOMBING	OUTSTANDING	
(12) SHORT LOOK LARGE CHARGE BOMBING LAST TRAINING		

PERIOD NUMBER 249, CEA 1587 FT 2730 FT, RELIABILITY 96.6% 95.3%

d. HIGH ALTITUDE FIXED ANGLE BOMBING

(1) TOTAL ATTEMPTED	8
(2) TOTAL RELIABLE RUNS	6
(3) TOTAL UNRELIABLE	2

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(d) DAY INTERGRATED NER 8 CEA 6.6 NM
CELESTIAL GRID

(2) LOW ALTITUDE

(a) TOTAL REQUIRED 8

(b) TOTAL EFFECTIVE 8

(c) RELIABILITY OUTSTANDING

F. ELECTRONIC JAMMING

(1) LOCAL DEFENSE

(a) TOTAL ATTEMPTED 16

(b) EFFECTIVE 16

(c) RELIABILITY OUTSTANDING

(2) BOMBER DEFENSE RUNS

(a) TOTAL ATTEMPTED 8

(b) EFFECTIVE 8

(c) RELIABILITY OUTSTANDING

(3) RADAR SIMULATOR RUNS

(a) TOTAL ATTEMPTED 15

(b) EFFECTIVE 13

(c) RELIABILITY SATISFACTORY

(d) SPECIFIC REASON FOR EACH UNRELIABLE

RUN.

5 1. CREW E-37 IN AIRCRAFT 519 DECLARED

A TYPE I ABORT ON BOTH ROR RUNS DUE TO NO HORIZONTAL SWEEP ON THE

APR-9 RECEIVER CAUSED BY AN IMPROPERLY WIRED HORIZONTAL SWEEP

MOTOR CIRCUIT IN THE CV-43 WHICH CAUSED FUSE F901 TO BE IN SERIES

WITH THE SWEEP MOTOR. PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS FAILURE IS

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FROM

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B. SYSTEM 4 HAD A CHAFF JAM BETWEEN THE ANGLE RIGHT AND THE FRONT PLATE OF THE MAGAZINE WHICH CAUSED THE A/C CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO POP. THIS IS A RECOGNIZED WEAKNESS OF THE ALE-24 SYSTEM PRESENTLY BEING INVESTIGATED BY HQ SAC FOR WHICH AN AUTHORIZED FIX IS NOT YET AVAILABLE. MATERIEL FAILURE. B-43-P

H. AIR REFUELING

(1) TOTAL REQUIRED 8

(2) EFFECTIVE 8

I. FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM

(1) NUMBER OF SORTIES THAT THE FCS RADAR WAS RELIABLE. 6

(2) NUMBER OF SORTIES THAT THE FCS RADAR WAS MARGINAL. 1

(3) NUMBER OF SORTIES THAT THE FCS RADAR WAS UNRELIABLE. 1

(4) SPECIFIC REASONS FOR EACH UNRELIABLE FCS RADAR.

(a) CREW B-27 IN AIRCRAFT 519 HAD AN UNRELIABLE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM DUE TO FAILURE TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE AN OPERATIONAL MODE CHECK WITHIN ONE HOUR PRIOR TO LANDING. THE RANGE GATE WOULD NOT LOCK ON TO THE RANGE MARKERS CAUSED BY A SHORTED TRACK RADAR PULSE CABLE IN THE AMMUNITION WELL. MATERIEL FAILURE.

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j. AGM/ADM

(1) ADM 20C

- (a) TOTAL REQUIRED 4
(b) EFFECTIVE 3
(c) RELIABILITY SATISFACTORY
(d) SPECIFIC REASON FOR EACH UNRELIABLE

ADM 20C.

MISSILE 640 ON AIRCRAFT 229 FAILED
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM CHECK AT STEP NO. 83D. CAUSE WAS A MAL-
FUNCTIONING PITCH MODULE IN THE FLIGHT CONTROL AMPLIFIER, AND IS
CHARGED TO MATERIEL.

(2) AGM 28A

- (a) TOTAL REQUIRED 12
(b) NR GROUND EVALUATED 0
(c) NR EFFECTIVE N/A
(d) NR AIR EVALUATED 12
(e) NR EFFECTIVE 7
(f) RELIABILITY SATISFACTORY
(g) SPECIFIC REASONS FOR EACH NONEFFECTIVE

AGM 28A.

1. MISSILES 125 AND 221 ON AIRCRAFT
519 FLOWN BY CREW E-27 RECEIVED UNRELIABLE IMPACT SCORES.
MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS UNCOVERED A FAULTY POWER SUPPLY WHICH
MISALIGNED THE STABLE PLATFORM IN MISSILE 125 AND A MALFUNCTIONING

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ASTROTRACKER IN MISSILE 221. MATERIEL FAILURE.

2. MISSILE 225 ON AIRCRAFT 229 FLOWN BY CREW E-24 RECEIVED AN UNRELIABLE IMPACT SCORE. CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE A MALFUNCTIONING DIGITAL COMPUTER. MATERIEL FAILURE.

3. MISSILES 107 AND 108 ON AIRCRAFT 200 FLOWN BY CREW E-13 RECEIVED UNRELIABLE IMPACT SCORES. MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS FAILED TO REVEAL CAUSE OF UNRELIABILITY DURING PERIOD OF INSPECTION. FINAL DETERMINATION IS LEFT WITH WING COMMANDER.

(h) PRIMARY MODE OF OPERATION

1. NUMBER LAUNCHED/EFFECTIVE

PRIMARY 8/6

2. NUMBER LAUNCHED/EFFECTIVE

SECONDARY 4/1

3. RELIABILITY SATISFACTORY

3. SUPPORT EVALUATION

a. SUPPLY RESPONSIVENESS OUTSTANDING

(1) NUMBER OF REQUESTS 141

(2) NUMBER OF ISSUES 134

(3) PERCENT OF FILL 95

(4) AVERAGE DELIVERY TIME 9.6 MINUTES

b. TRANSPORTATION SATISFACTORY

c. BASE FUELS SATISFACTORY

d. SUPPORT TEAM EXERCISE SATISFACTORY

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PART IV. MAJOR LIMITING FACTORS. NOT APPLICABLE

PART V. NUCLEAR WEAPON SUPPORT EVALUATION.

A. TRANSPORTING, LOADING AND MATING CREWS DID OBSERVE REQUIRED PROCEDURES.

B. THE CONDITION AND MAINTENANCE OF TRANSPORTING, LOADING, MONITORING, CONTROL, LAUNCH AND SUSPENSION, AND RELEASE EQUIPMENT ARE SATISFACTORY.

C. AIRCREW AND LAUNCH CREW KNOWLEDGE OF ASSIGNED NUCLEAR WEAPON(S), ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT, AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES ARE SATISFACTORY.

D. AIRCREWS DID ADHERE TO APPROVED DELIVERY PROCEDURES.

E. ADHERENCE TO NUCLEAR SAFETY PRACTICES IS SATISFACTORY.

F. PHYSICAL SECURITY EXERCISED DURING THE CONDUCT OF THE ORIT WAS SATISFACTORY.

PART VI. INSTRUCTIONS.

THIS REPORT WILL BE PROCESSED IAW PARA 7, AFR 1-3-6 AND PARA 43, SACM 50-5.

SIGNED COLONEL EARL L. JOHNSON, BAF INSPECTOR GENERAL.

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B. END PREPARATION

1. GENERAL

a. CREW END PROCESSING

SATISFACTORY

(4) Crew assembly and assignment to non-alert sorties was IAW unit alerting procedures. (U)

(7) Crew processing at the END Center was effectively controlled by a well-planned crew flow chart. (U)

(3) EAO briefings and study were conducted IAW BAW 52-7, Vol II. (U)

F. COMBAT MISSION FOLDERS

(1) BOMBER

SATISFACTORY

* (a) Classification stamps were not placed on SAC Form 624a (Minimum Fuel Requirements) in the folders for sortie #9. (U)

* (b) Planned side step maneuver data for overflight of known defenses was not completed and included in the CMF folders. (PARA 6, PAGE 4, SAICD, ANX A). (S)

* (c) The FCI block on SAC Form #13, Timing Data, in the CMFs for sortie #9 was not completed. (S)

(2) TANKER

EXCELLENT

No discrepancies were noted in the tanker CMFs. (U)

c. CREW DEBRIEFING

(1) OPERATIONS

OUTSTANDING

The post-mission debriefing of combat crews was conducted in an outstanding manner. Crews were processed in an orderly manner in a minimum of time. The debriefing staff was well prepared and obtained all required information essential to the correct assessment of mission results. (U)

(2) MAINTENANCE

SATISFACTORY

* (a) Nine systems on the SAC Form 124 were coded by the maintenance debriefers as 2 although the discrepancies indicated the system operation was unsatisfactory and should have been coded as 3. Examples: (U)

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1. KC-135 #3615 System 42, HF is inoperative; turns itself off on all bands prior to completing tuning cycle. (U)

2. B-52 #4419 System 45, HF radio cuts out when transmitting. (U)

3. B-52 #2047 System 49, APR #74170, no signals present, no crystal current. (U)

2. EXAMINATIONS

a. BOMBER

(1) TACTICAL DOCTRINE

EXCELLENT

Tactical Doctrine testing was excellent with one failure of 40 tested. (U)

(a) High 100 percent.

(b) Low 76 percent.

(c) Average grade 97.2 percent.

(d) General areas of weakness were:

1. Receiver post-takeoff abort procedures. (4)(U)

2. Low altitude flight-planned airspeeds. (7)(C)

(2) SPECIAL WEAPONS

OUTSTANDING

Special weapons testing was outstanding with no failures of 30 tested. (U)

(a) High 100 percent.

(b) Low 88 percent.

(c) Average grade 97.2 percent.

(d) General areas of weakness were:

1. Primary item to check when the warning light is on after burst option selection. (10) (U)

(5) (SRO)

2. No press-to-test on armament warning light.

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ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954

(3) LAUNCH AND EXECUTION

OUTSTANDING

Launch and Execution testing was outstanding with no failures of 30 tested. (U)

- (a) High 100 percent.
- (b) Low 100 percent.
- (c) Average grade 100 percent.
- (d) No areas of weakness noted. (U)

b. TANKER

(1) TACTICAL DOCTRINE

OUTSTANDING

Tactical Doctrine testing was outstanding with no failures of 18 tested. (U)

- (a) High 100 percent.
- (b) Low 96 percent.
- (c) Average grade 98.2 percent.
- (d) No areas of weakness noted. (U)

(2) LAUNCH AND EXECUTION

OUTSTANDING

Launch and Execution testing was outstanding with no failures of 18 tested. (U)

- (a) High 100 percent.
- (b) Low 100 percent.
- (c) Average grade 100 percent.
- (d) No areas of weakness noted. (U)

c. CONTROLLER

SATISFACTORY

Four officer and five NCO controllers were administered the Launch and Execution Lane Tests and written examinations. There were no failures. (U)

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3. CREW INTERROGATIONS

a. BOMBER

(1) Four of the B-52D aircrews on alert at A-Hour were orally interrogated on their assigned sortie and related EWO knowledge. Results are as follows: (C)

<u>CREW NR</u>	<u>CREW COMMANDER</u>	<u>RATING</u>
B-07	Wol Gessner, W. T.	SATISFACTORY
E-13	Capt Carman, F. R.	SATISFACTORY
E-20	Capt Wertz, C. F.	SATISFACTORY
E-24	Capt Joiner, J. L.	<u>EXCELLENT</u>

(2) The following areas of general weakness should be emphasized in future EWO study programs:

* (a) Crews were unaware of a recent change permitting one officer to accept the launch message from the commander in a comm-out situation. (CHANGE 2 to SACM 55-2, Vol II) (S)

* (b) Crews were unaware that ADM 20 missiles should be released at M.80. (BAF EWO 50-63) (S)

* (c) Crews were not familiar with CMF seal numbers, and, therefore, could not have effectively detected seal substitution during the daily CMF seal checks required by SACM 55-2, Volume III. (S)

(3) Crew B-07 was weak in the following areas:

* (a) The gunner was not completely familiar with emergency bomb release procedures. (C)

* (b) The crew was not familiar with route track tolerances. (C)

(4) Crew E-13 was weak in the following areas:

* (a) The crew would have cycled IFF/GIF to emergency in event of friendly SAM lock-on, during I.D. turn, instead of using appropriate true track setting. (S)

* (b) The pilot was not aware of the use of the "Valid Green" terminology. (BAF EWO 44-63) (S)

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* (c) The gunner requires additional instruction in emergency bomb release methods. (C)

* (d) The crew believed the high altitude penetration from WHCL inbound was based on flying at Mach. 81. (SACTD Vol II) (C)

(b) Crew B-22 was generally slow in response, in addition to the weaknesses listed below:

* (a) The crew was not certain as to disposition of WFE/PCE/POCDs when aircraft is unlocked. (U)

* (b) The crew did not know criteria for computation of takeoff distance for EWO launch. (SADM 2-7, Vol III) (U)

* (c) The pilots were not familiar with visual air refueling signals. (U)

* (d) The crew was not familiar with flight planning cruise requirements as listed in code in the mode column of the master flight plan, i.e., TAS and mach number. (C)

* (e) Crew would have descended at Mach .90 to low level entry. (C)

b. TANKER

(1) Four of the KC-135 aircrews on alert at A-Hour were orally interrogated on their assigned sortie and related EWO knowledge. Results are as follows: (U)

<u>CREW NR</u>	<u>CREW COMMANDER</u>	<u>RATING</u>
T-14	Capt Cirillo, P. E. (Spare C/C)	SATISFACTORY
I-17	Capt Krause, D. G.	EXCELLENT
I-26	Capt Grepert, D. R.	SATISFACTORY
I-27	Capt Boston, R. E.	SATISFACTORY

(2) The following areas should be emphasized in future EWO study programs: (U)

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* (3) All crews were unaware of the change permitting one officer to accept the launch message in a comm-out situation. (CHANGE 2 to SACM 5 -2, Vol II) (S)

(4) Crew I-14 was weak in the following areas:

* (a) The crew did not know correct mode 1 IFF/SIF settings for emergency squawk. (SACM 5-4, Vol I) (C)

* (b) The crew believed the EWC launch takeoff criteria to be based on 1000 nautical miles. (SACM 5-7, Vol III) (C)

* (c) Crew I-26 requires additional briefing and study on their support team airlift mission. (C)

(5) Crew I-27 was weak in the following areas:

* (a) Addressees to be used in combat reports. (U)

* (b) Safe passage abort procedures. (U)

C. MAINTENANCE EFFECTIVENESS

1. BOMBERS

a. ALERT FORCE

EXCELLENT

All eight B-52 alert aircraft launched within the established timing criteria and were reliable. Seven aircraft systems failed due to materiel failure or maintenance error causing the loss of 8 mission requirements. Three of the 12 AGM-79s on alert were non-effective due to materiel failure. One of the four ADM-109s evaluated failed the flight control console and harness check due to materiel failure. (See message report for details on materiel failures and maintenance errors.) (S)

b. NON-ALERT FORCE

SATISFACTORY

(1) Five B-52 aircraft were declared available for generation and all aircraft met their scheduling timing requirements with effective systems. The following discrepancies were noted: (U)

* (a) Non-alert aircraft were not generated in the proper sequence. The first aircraft to be generated was an alert changeover aircraft that had been replaced on alert. This aircraft was configured prior to "A" hour. The two aircraft to be fully configured were generated after this aircraft. (PARA 22a(5), SACM 5-5) (U)

~~SECRET~~

* (b) Line #9, B-52 aircraft #193 AFIO Form 781 indicated that the next scheduled phased inspection was due at 1825 hours. Aircraft time was 1833 hours. Aircraft was not carried on red dash as overdue phased inspection. (U)

* (c) The last inspection performed on installed personal equipment aboard B-52 aircraft #193 was 12 Aug 63. (U)

* (d) Line #12, B-52 aircraft #197 AFIO Form 781 exceptional release and ground area pre-flight were not aligned out. (U)

* (e) The last inspection performed on installed personal equipment aboard B-52 aircraft #197 was 19 Jul 63. (U)

* (f) The aircraft static grounds located on B-52 #226, #223, and #294 were not making contact with the ramp. (U)

* (g) The main landing gears on all B-52 aircraft were dirty and greasy. (U)

c. REGENERATION OF ALERT FORCE SATISFACTORY

2. TANKERS

a. ALERT FORCE EXCELLENT

(1) The KC-135 alert force consists of seven KC-135 required sorties. One sortie was obligated to support another unit and did not participate in the exercises. The remaining six alert KC-135 aircraft launched within the established timing criteria. All systems required for the mission were effective. (S)

b. NON-ALERT FORCE SATISFACTORY

(1) Seven KC-135 aircraft were declared available for generation. Four of these aircraft were scored for maintenance effectiveness on their participation in the ORII. Two other aircraft were scored for maintenance effectiveness for support of a higher headquarters directed sortie. One aircraft, #298, was generated to participate as a non-alert sortie. Approximately five hours prior to launch, when aircraft #298 was being towed to a new parking location, aircraft landing gear indicator went to the intermediate position. This aircraft was then removed from the line-up for maintenance and replaced with another aircraft.

c. REGENERATION OF ALERT FORCE SATISFACTORY

~~SECRET~~

D. SUPPORT TEAM EXERCISE

SATISFACTORY

1. The Wing demonstrated a satisfactory capability to deploy the required Bomber Support Teams.

* 2. Control exercised over the maintenance of immunization currency was inadequate. Only two of the team members processed did not require one or more shots. (U)

* 3. Recovery Mission Folders did not list all of the other than Top Secret areas and bases. (U)

* 4. Some Start Team members were not certain of the off base assembly point location. (U)

* 5. The maintenance of SAC Forms 18 was inadequate. In many cases, the EWO assignment of the team member was incorrect or left blank and the block pertaining where the team member would report upon notification of a SAC alert was incorrectly posted. (U)

E. ALERT FORCE EXERCISE

NOT RATED

~~SECRET~~

F. EWO SECURITY

SATISFACTORY

1. The 465th Combat Defense Squadron implemented Annex A of the Local Operations Plan (190-64) at 1630 hours local on 3 September 1963. Reaction time for the CD force to transform to a sabotage alert configuration was 30 minutes, far better than the Eighth Air Force average. The Comm/Plotters performed their assigned duties in an excellent manner. The Mobile strike team swept the taxiways, key distant perimeter positions were manned and additional WTs were formed as required by SACM 205-5. Discrepancies noted were: (U)

* a. In many cases WCOs were permitted to authenticate the SAC Form 380 (Alert Aircraft Access List), when Combat Defense officers were available. (PARA 845(4), SACM 205-5) (U)

* b. Two access lists were being prepared for each alert aircraft, in violation of paragraph B4b(1), SACM 205-5. One contained the names of alert aircrew and the other the names of the alert ground crew. (U)

* c. The operation NCOIC was not armed or dressed in the same uniform as required for sentries under his jurisdiction. (PARA 12c, SACM 205-5) (U)

* d. A temporary barrier was not established around B-52 aircraft 592 until approximately twenty minutes after uploading operations commenced. (PARA 70d, SACM 205-5) (U)

* e. A SAC Form 380 (Access List) was not furnished the access controller for aircraft 592 and 490 at the start of the uploading operation. Further, the ground crew chief or his assistant was not present at aircraft 591 to permit access of maintenance specialists. (PARA 70d, SACM 205-5) (U)

* f. Two sides of the alert tacker area were enclosed by a physical barrier; however, the back side barrier had deteriorated and the front side did not contain a knock-down type barrier. (PARA 118(b)(1)(b), SACM 205-5) (U)

* g. Of six close-in sentries checked on post in the B-52 alert area, only one had a flashlight. (PARA 12e(2), SACM 205-5) (U)

G. AMMUNITION SUPPORT - 64WMS

SATISFACTORY

Teams were observed loading/downloading MK26FI and MK32/2 weapons, W8 warheads and GAM 77 (ADM-05) missiles. Technical, safety, and security procedures were satisfactory. (SRG)

20

~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954

RAF-20413

THE REMAINING PORTION OF THIS REPORT
CONTAINS NO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

III. REVIEW INSPECTION

A review inspection of the areas rated marginal or unsatisfactory during the previous inspection (18-25 Feb 63) were found to be satisfactory.

IV. EXAMINATIONS

A. OPERATIONS

EXAMINATION TITLE	Nr Ques	Nr Tested	Nr Fail	High Score	Low Score	Avg Score
<u>Bombers</u>						
Pilot Launch & Execution	13	8	0	100	100	100
Co-Pilot Launch & Execution	13	8	0	100	100	100
Rad-Nav Launch & Execution	13	8	0	100	100	100
EWB Launch & Execution	13	8	0	100	100	100
Pilot Special Weapons	25	8	0	100	96	98.0
Co-Pilot Special Weapons	25	8	0	100	92	95.5
Rad-Nav Special Weapons	25	8	0	100	92	98.0
Nav Special Weapons	25	8	0	100	88	96.0
Pilot SACTD	25	8	0	100	96	99.5
Co-Pilot SACTD	25	8	0	100	96	98.5
Rad-Nav SACTD	25	8	0	100	92	97.5
Nav SACTD	25	8	0	100	92	96.5
EWB SACTD	25	8	1	100	76	94.0
<u>Tankers</u>						
Pilot Launch & Execution	12	6	0	100	100	100
Co-Pilot Launch & Execution	12	6	0	100	100	100
Nav Launch & Execution	12	6	0	100	100	100
Pilot SACTD	25	6	0	100	96	98.0
Co-Pilot SACTD	25	6	0	100	96	99.3
Nav SACTD	25	6	0	100	100	100
<u>Controller</u>						
Officer Launch & Execution	16	4	0	100	100	100
NCO Launch & Execution	16	5	0	100	100	100
Officer Written	50	4	0	100	94	98.0
NCO Written	50	5	0	100	94	97.2

V. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

A. The SECRET classification is required on this report for the protection of information which reveals the military capabilities and/or state of preparedness of a SAC unit. The ~~RESTRICTED~~ DATA classification has been assigned specific paragraphs of Section II of this report in accordance with CC-DOC 71 Weapons Classification Guide and AFR 205-1.

B. When Section II is withdrawn or not attached, the remainder of the report will be automatically coded and stamped Group 4 by the holder in accordance with PARA 7, AFR 205-2.

C. ALL UNCLASSIFIED paragraphs are For Official Use Only.
(AFR 11-30)

VI. PROCESSING INSTRUCTIONS

A. By Commander, 465th Bombardment Wing:

1. The reply will be made as an indorsement, numbering paragraphs of the indorsement so as to coincide with the paragraph numbers of the reported deficiencies.

2. Corrective action will be indicated in clear, concise statements for all deficiencies or irregularities preceded by a single asterisk. Those deficiencies preceded by a double asterisk are for primary action of the Eighth Air Force Staff, but will be commented upon by the Commander, 465th Bombardment Wing and 822 Air Division as well as the Eighth Air Force Staff.

3. Deficiencies not indicated by asterisks are minor in nature and need not be commented on in the indorsement.

4. In the event action to correct deficiencies or irregularities is not completed by the time of the indorsement, the estimated date of completion will be reported.

5. Fifteen copies of the inspection report are forwarded for your use and retention. Forty-five copies of your indorsement will be forwarded to Commander, 822 Air Division, not later than 7 October 1963.

B. By Commander, 822 Air Division:

1. Five copies of the Inspection Report are forwarded for your use and retention.

2. Request your indorsement indicate your review and concurrence in action taken. Your comments should be made by second indorsement. Forty copies of your second indorsement along with forty copies of the first indorsement will be forwarded to BAF (IG) not later than 17 October 1963.

Earl L. Johnson

EARL L. JOHNSON
Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

DISTRIBUTION

6 Air Div - 1	USAF DEP IG for Inspec - 1
397 Bomb Wg - 1	Norton AFB, Calif
416 Bomb Wg - 1	SAC (IG) - 13
19 Air Rflg Sq - 1	2AF (IG) - 1
17 Bomb Wg - 1	ICEG (DAN) - 1
45 Air Div - 1	15AF (IG) - 1
42 Bomb Wg - 1	
4081 Strat Wg - 1	
4082 Strat Wg - 1	
57 Air Div - 1	
99 Bomb Wg - 1	
499 Air Rflg Wg - 1	
11 Air Rflg Sq - 1	
305 Air Rflg Sq - 1	<u>INTERNAL</u>
801 Air Div - 1	DI 2
301 Bomb Wg - 1	DS 1
376 Bomb Wg - 1	DM 10
817 Air Div - 1	DO 8
100 Bomb Wg - 1	DCR 2
509 Bomb Wg - 1	IG 3
820 Strat Aerospace Div - 1	IGS 1
380 Bomb Wg - 1	
497 Air Rflg Wg - 1	
822 Air Div - 5	
39 Bomb Wg - 1	
465 Bomb Wg - 15	
484 Bomb Wg - 1	
68 Bomb Wg - 1	
823 Air Div - 1	
19 Bomb Wg - 1	
306 Bomb Wg - 1	
72 Bomb Wg - 1	
13 Strat Msl Div - 1	
389 Strat Msl Wg - 1	
451 Strat Msl Wg - 1	
17 Strat Aerospace Div - 1	
381 Strat Msl Wg - 1	
340 Bomb Wg - 1	
351 Strat Msl Wg - 1	

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WESTOVER AIR FORCE BASE
MASSACHUSETTS

7 SEP 1963

DOX

Combat Report Critique - Exercise Jet Stream 'High Pass'

465 Bomb Wg (DCO)

1. Combat reports effectiveness for this exercise is rated outstanding.

2. This rating is based on points lost in the areas shown below:

a. Total Point Loss	0
b. Reports Required	27
c. Percentage of reporting effectiveness	100%

3. Reporting effectiveness on this exercise demonstrates that your command post has a superior understanding of this important part of wartime operations. We are pleased to note this outstanding performance. Convey our appreciation to those responsible. Because of the high quality of your combat reporting, the indorsement required by SACM 55-8, Volume I, Paragraph 62b(8) need not be submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JOHN M. ANDERSON
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of
Operations

Copy to:
SAC (DOCCOR)
822 Air Div (DO)

Self Inspection Report 1963

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
WESTOVER AIR FORCE BASE
MASSACHUSETTS

to DCO
DCM
16 September 1963

K
7
B

Colonel James M. Keck
465th Bombardment Wing
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia

Dear Jim

You and the personnel of the 465th Bombardment Wing are to be congratulated on the fine results achieved during the recent ORIT.

This inspection was an improvement over the last exercise, especially in the bomber tactical doctrine and tanker EWO sortie knowledge areas.

I am concerned, however, with the poor showing in high altitude bombing and chaff dispensing. Corrective action in these areas must be initiated promptly.

Sincerely

Joseph J. Nazario
JOSEPH J. NAZZARO
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	INFO	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
ROUTINE	ROUTINE		X	AF			
FROM: 165BOMBWG ROBINS AFB GA						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO: SAC							
INFO: 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS							
1CMBTEVALOP, BARKSDALE AFB LA							
822AIRDIV TURNER AFB GA							
CRET DOOTR <u>227</u>							
FOR SAC, DOOTC; INFO 8AF, DOOTC, 1 CSG DAN; 822AIRDIV DO. RCS:							
SAC-T54 BAR NONE REPORT.							
A. GENERAL							
1. 165BOMBWG							
2. 9 JULY 63. "THIS IS THE FINAL BAR NONE REPORT".							
3. 26							
4. 15							
5. N/A							
B. LAUNCH							
1. 26							
2. 26							
SYMBOL 1COTB/24/1545Z					SIGNATURE		
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) ROBERT N ROB RT. 1/COL. USAF					TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE 465 63 1448		
PHONE 3001					PAGE 2 OF 9		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION							

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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FROM

465BOMEWG ROBINS AFB GA

A. NONE

3. 23

4. 3

5. (A) 17 JUL, CREW E-24; ACFT NR59-2595; NON-EFFECTIVE DUE TO AN UNRELIABLE LOW LEVEL BOMB RUN ON RBS EXPRESS CROSS TIE. UNRELIABLE RUN WAS CHARGED TO CREW PROCEDURES, HEADING ERROR (SACR 50-23, CODE: 16)

(B) 26 JUL, CREW E-21; ACFT NR58-0173; NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIE DUE TO AN UNRELIABLE LAYDOWN LARGE CHARGE BOMB RUN. UNRELIABLE RUN WAS CHARGED TO OPERATOR ERROR, TARGET MISIDENTIFICATION (SACR 50-23, CODE: 1)

(C) 1 AUG, CREW E-19, ACFT NR59-2592; MISSION ABORTED FOR SAFETY OF FLIGHT DUE TO HEATING SYSTEM FAILURE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING AIR REFUELING. MATERIEL FAILURE CAUSED CABIN TEMP CONTROL TO FAIL IN FULL COLD POSITION. THERMASTOR AND ANTICIPATOR ON NR 2 POD REPLACED.

C. LOW ALTITUDE NAVIGATION:

1. 25/25

2. 25

3. NONE

4. N/A

5. N/A

6. N/A

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

465 63 1448

SYMBOL

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465BOMFWG ROBINS AFB CA

D. LAY DOWN LARGE CHARGE:

1. 25/25
2. 23/24
3. 2/1
4. 24/0
5. 23/ N/A
6. 1/25
7. 0/24
8. 1472/ N/A; 1150/ N/A
9. 16550/2774; 16550/1900
10. 2075/2774; 1200/1900
11. ONE
12. (A) REF PARA D6; ONE FIRST RELEASE WAS DOWNGRADED TO A PILOT TIMING RUN BECAUSE OF ERRATIC COUNTERS AND HEADING ON N-1 COMPASS, MAGNETIC COMPASS AND CO-PILOTS COMPASS DISAGREEING BY AT LEAST TEN DEGREES WITH EACH OTHER.
- (B) REF PARA D6; 25 SECOND RELEASES WERE ACCOMPLISHED USING TIMING PROCEDURES; THIS UNIT TIMES ALL SECOND RELEASES ON LARGE CHARGE RUNS.
- (C) REF PARA D11; REF PARA B5 (C)

E. EFFECTIVE RELEASE:

1. N/A
2. N/A

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FROM:

L65BOMBWG ROBINS AFB GA

F. AIR REFUELING:

1. 26
2. 26
3. NONE
4. N/A

G. ETA AT HHCL:

1. 25
2. 25

H. HIGH ALTITUDE INTEGRATED GRID:

1. 25/25
2. 25
3. 6.9
4. 6.7
5. 7.8
6. NONE
7. ONE, REF PARA B5 (C)
8. N/A
9. N/A

I. ELECTRONIC JAMMING:

1. LOCAL DEFENSE RUNS (LOW ALTITUDE)

- (A) 25
- (B) 25
- (C) NONE

(D) ONE LDR NOT ACCOMPLISHED; REF PARA B5 (C)

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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465BOMBWG ROBINS AFB GA

2. BOMBER DEFENSE RUNS (LOW ALTITUDE)

(A) 24

(B) 24

(C) NONE

(D) 17 JUL, CREW E-24; ACFT NR59-2595; ONE BDR NOT ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO TYPE II ABORT. ONE BDR NOT ACCOMPLISHED. REF PARA B5 (C).

3. RADAR SIMULATOR RUNS (LOW ALTITUDE)

(A) 24

(B) 24

(C) NONE

(D) 25 JUL, CREW R-30; ACFT NR522592; ONE RSR NOT ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO TYPE I ABORT; REF PARA K2. ONE RSR NOT ACCOMPLISHED; REF PARA B5 (C).

4. N/A

J. AGM 28A

1. 11/9

2. 10/8

3. 1/1

4. 10/9

5. 9/8

6. 1/NONE

7. 1/ N/A

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
EXPIRATION DATE 12 YEARS
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8. 14,734/5206; 3125/2450
9. 4350/ N/A; 4350/ N/A
10. 13790/5206; 3150/2450
11. 4
12. (A) REF PARA J6; ONE AGM, MISSILE ASTROTRACKER OUT.
(B) REF PARA J11; ONE AGM, ELECTRIC OUT LITE ON; ONE
AGM, WAIT LITE ON; TWO AGMS ABORTED FOR SAFETY OF FLIGHT;
REF PARA B5 (C).
13. N/A
14. 26
15. N/A

A. SPECIFIC REASONS AS RELATED TO MALFUNCTIONING SYSTEMS
DURING "BAR NONE" PARTICIPATION:

B-52; 1. ACFT 595, 17 JUL. CREW EXPERIENCED VARIOUS HEADING
DIFFICULTIES AND REPORTED THEM TO MAINTENANCE. THE COMPASS
SYSTEMS WERE COMPLETELY GROUND TESTED, NO DISCREPANCIES WERE
FOUND AND NO MAINTENANCE PERFORMED. FLIGHT TEST OF SYSTEM ON
NEXT SORTIE REVEALED NO HEADING ERRORS, HOWEVER ORIGINAL
DIFFICULTIES OCCURRED ON SUBSEQUENT SORTIE. AIRCRAFT AND RECORDS
HAVE SINCE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO MODIFICATION DEPOT; THEREFORE FINAL
CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ACTION IS NOT AVAILABLE. REF PARA D12 (A).

2. ACFT 592, 25 JUL, TYPE I ABORT OF RSR.

(A) T-608 (76KQD)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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FROM 465BOMBWG ROBINS AFB GA

(B) INTERNAL FAILURE

(C) INFLIGHT

(D) REMOVED AND REPLACED CONVERSION AND CONTROL

(62130), AUTO/ NAV POWER SUPPLY (62150).

(E) CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION WAS MATERIEL.

3. ACFT 592, 1 AUG, MISSION ABORTED FOR SAFETY OF FLIGHT
AFTER HEATING SYSTEM FAILURE.

(A) AIR BLEED ANTICIPATOR (45BEE), AIR BLEED THERMO-
STAT 45 (BEP).

(B) INTERNAL FAILURE

(C) INFLIGHT

(D) REMOVED AND REPLACED AIR BLEED ANTICIPATOR AND
AIR BLEED THERMOSTAT.

(E) CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION WAS MATERIEL.

AGM-28A 1. AGM 123, 17 JUL, UNRELIABLE IMPACT.

(A) CONVERSION AND CONTROL (62130), AUTO/ NAV
POWER SUPPLY (62150).

(B) FAILS^{ED} DIAGNOSTIC/ AUTOMATIC TEST.

(C) INFLIGHT.

(D) REMOVED AND REPLACED CONVERSION AND CONTROL AUTO/
NAV POWER SUPPLY.

(E) CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION WAS MATERIEL.

DISPOSITIONED AT YEAR INTERVALS

12 YEARS

RECLASSIFIED TO 10.10

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~~SECRET~~

465BOMBWG ROBINS AFB GA

2. AGM 123, 22 JUL, SECONDARY ALINEMENT.

- (A) DIGITAL COMPUTER (62170)
- (B) FAILED TO OPERATE.
- (C) INFLIGHT
- (D) REMOVED AND REPLACED DIGITAL COMPUTER.
- (E) CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION WAS MATERIEL.

3. AGM 221, 24 JUL, UNRELIABLE IMPACT.

- (A) GUIDANCE (GENERAL) (62000)
- (B) FAILED DIAGNOSTIC/ AUTOMATIC TEST.
- (C) INFLIGHT
- (D) RECALIBRATED GUIDANCE SYSTEM (62000)

4. AGM 224, 25 JUL; MISSILE NOT PROGRAMMED, CONTINUOUS ELECTRIC-OUT LITE.

- (A) AC/DC GENERATOR (34110)
- (B) BEARING FAILURE.
- (C) UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE.
- (D) REMOVED AND REPLACED GENERATOR.
- (E) CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION WAS MATERIEL.

5. AGM 175, 2 AUG, MISSILE NOT PROGRAMMED, CONTINUOUS "WAIT" LITE.

- (A) FORWARD EQUIPMENT COMPARTMENT BODY SEAL (1131R)
- (B) LEAKING
- (C) SIMULATED COUNTDOWN (COMBINED SYSTEMS CHECKOUT).

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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DD FORM 173-1

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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FROM:

465BOMBWG ROBINS AFB GA

(D) SERVICED FORWARD EQUIPMENT BODY SEAL.

(E) CAUSED OF MALFUNCTION WAS MATERIEL.

L. MAP MATCH ANALYSIS: NONE GP-4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SYMBOL

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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DD FORM 173-1

465 63 1448

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
465TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H) (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia

4 Oct 63

COMMANDER'S REMARKS (RCS: 1-SAC-T12) FOR 465BW (H), FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 Sep 63: (U)

WAIVER OF TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: Terrain Avoidance Navigation Legs (Code D-02) and Hooded Terrain Avoidance Time (Code I-07) waived for this training period; Ref Unclass msg SAC DDOA 60466, dated 8 Jul 63. (U)

- 2. DELINQUENT COMBAT-READY CREWS/SPARE CREW MEMBERS: Not applicable. (U)
- 3. CREW PROBATION: None (U)
- 4. ALERT CYCLE: Crews alternate between 3 and 4 days on alert cycle prior to changeover. (U)
- 5. UNRELIABLE RBS RUNS: (U)
 - a. RBS runs in ACS computations

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TRAINING ITEM NR</u>	<u>CREW NR</u>	<u>SITE</u>	<u>SPECIFIC REASON</u>
11 Sep	A-14	E-06	LAUREL	1
18 Sep	A-01	E-27	LAUREL	28 Improper maneuver
19 Sep	A-01	E-08	LAUREL	28 Improper maneuver
21 Sep	A-07	S-04	WASHINGTON	8
24 Sep	B-03	E-15	LAUREL	16
25 Sep	A-14	E-16	LAUREL	21

- 6. UNRELIABLE GA. RUNS: (U)
 - a. Operations: 1
 - b. Materiel: 4
 - c. Other or Unknown: None
- 7. UNRELIABLE ECM RUNS: (U)
 - a. Operations: 5
 - b. Materiel: 3
 - c. Other or Unknown: 1
- 8. FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS ACTIVITY: (C)
 - a. SACG 50-8 FCS Fireout:
 - 1. 9
 - 2. 4
 - 3. 81%
 - 4. 10,800/8748

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MANDER'S REMARKS (RCS: 1-SAC-T12) FOR 465BW (H), FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 Sep 63: (U)

b. SACM 50-8 Radar Reliability:

1. 48
2. 5
3. 2
4. 11 sorties, Instr Irng and Test, systems not operated

c. AAI FCS Activity: Not applicable.

d. Flight Evaluator/Operator Training: Non -availability of FEO tape precluded flying FEO missions during the month. Tape has been on emergency order since 2 Aug; delivery expected 3 Oct.

9. AGM 28 INFORMATION: (C)

- a. 26/26
- b. 0/0
- c. 4: DCOT, SAFE, BSC and BSO
- d. 53
- e. 43
- f. 2 missiles ground abort: Maintenance, 8 runs lost when 4 sorties cancelled by Higher Headquarters.
- g. 40
- h. 3 scheduled runs airborne, but not attempted. (1 run not attempted due to missile malfunctions prior to programming; 2 runs not attempted due to BNS malfunctions.)
- i. 40
- j. None
- k. 23
- l. 11
- m. 12
- n. 18.2
- o. Unreliable GAM Impacts: 9


DATE	CREW NR	RUN TYPE	CE	SITE	SPECIFIC REASON
5 Sep	E-27	WAK	31720	LAUREL	B-07
5 Sep	E-27	XAH	99990	LAUREL	A-03
5 Sep	E-24	XAQ	79400	LAUREL	B-07
5 Sep	E-13	WAH	20700	LAUREL	B-07
5 Sep	E-13	XAK	27250	LAUREL	B-08
11 Sep	E-17	WAK	TYPE III ABORT	STATESBORO	A-03
11 Sep	E-17	XAK	41400	STATESBORO	B-13
18 Sep	S-09	WAH	99990	TURNER	B-14
18 Sep	S-09	XAH	99990	TURNER	B-14

10. RBS/MIKE INFORMATION FOR REFLEX: Not applicable (U).

11. PROFILE MISSION EFFECTIVENESS: (U)

- a. None
- b. None

12. AIRCREW GROUND TRAINING: None. (U)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMANDER'S REMARKS (RCS: 1-SAC-T12), FOR 465BW (H), FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 SEP 63:

13. NEW UNIT INFORMATION: Not applicable. (U)
14. TERRAIN AVOIDANCE RADAR: (C)
 - a. Aircraft ACR equipped: 15
 - b. Crews qualified: 15
 - c. ACR flights scheduled: 12 Accomplished: 12
 - d. Problems: None.
 - e. Programmed date for all crews to be fully ACR qualified: 31 Oct 1963.
15. SPECIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: None (U)
16. COMMENTS OF THE WING COMMANDER: None (U)
17. This report is classified "CONFIDENTIAL" in accordance with SACR 50-23.

James M. Keck
JAMES M. KECK
Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
BAF Atch #1 (5 pgs) (U)



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8 ATTACHMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S REMARKS (1-SAC-T12) FOR 465BW FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 Sep 1963

SECTION A - TRAINING ITEMS REQUIRED AND COMPLETED

Area Code	Training Area Identification	MPR Rqr	MPR Acc	PERCENT MPR Acc	MPR/CT Rqr	MPR/CT Acc	Percent MPR/CT Acc
A	Hi Alt RBS	156	111	71.2	286	225	78.7
B	Lo Alt RBS	416	320	76.9	650	394	60.6
C	Hi Nav	156	110	70.5	234	136	58.1
D	Lo Nav	104	90	86.5	182	168	92.3
E	Air Refueling	208	177	85.1	312	218	69.9
F	Hi EQ	364	270	74.2	546	367	67.2
G	Lo EQ	936	833	89.0	1534	1138	74.1
I	Pilot Pro	364	347	95.3	N/A	N/A	
J	Rendezvous	104	104	100.0	156	156	100.0
K	Miscellaneous	858	710	82.8	N/A	N/A	
L	Instrument Trng	1404	1000	71.2	N/A	N/A	
M	AGM 28A	78	58	74.4	156	90	57.7
N	Fighter Int Det	26	20	76.9	104	98	94.2
P	Def Coord Ex	104	98	94.2	156	130	83.3
Q	Intercept Act	52	37	71.2	364	298	81.9
R	WRSR-SAGE	208	170	81.7	312	212	67.9
S	NIKE Def Runs	104	69	66.3	156	76	* 48.7
U	Profiles	130	111	85.4	260	159	61.2

* Below Minimum Requirements

atn 1'

8AF ATTACHMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S REMARKS (1- SAC-T12) FOR 465BW FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 SEP 1963

SECTION B - NARRATIVE COMMENTS

1. MINIMUM PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT COMPLETION: No areas deficient.

2. MINIMUM PROFICIENCY/CONTINUATION TRAINING COMPLETION:

a. Nike Defense Run

b. Seven scheduled Nike Defense Runs were lost during months: 5 runs aborted for materiel malfunctions, 1 Type V abort, and 1 unreliable run.

c. Two additional Nike Defense Runs would put us on the curve. No difficulty is anticipated in making - up this small deficiency.

d. 30 October 1963

3. PROFILE MISSION COMPLETION:

a. (1) 130

(2) 159

(3) 100.0%

b. Not Applicable

4. BOMBING AND AGM 28A RELIABILITY:

a. (1) 97.3%

(2) 93.3%

(3) 95.6%

(4) 84.1%

b. (1) Low altitude bombings: 9 unreliable RBS runs (6 charged to operations and 3 charged to materiel) have caused the reliability for this area to be below the SAC average.

(2) Corrective action has included more emphasis on timing procedures, a more intensive target study program with each crew being briefed on previous crew errors, more rigid supervision of the "Ground - Flying" of the missions during flight planning, and removal from Rader - Navigator duties of the one operator that accounted for 3 of the 6 unreliable Low Altitude Runs charged to operations.

(3) Recovery to SAC average is not possible this training period.

c. (1) High Altitude Bombings: 8 runs (5 unreliable due to circular error and 3 unreliable due to improper tactics) charged to operations has caused the reliability to be below the SAC average.

air 12

8/ ATTACHMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S REMARKS (1- SAC-T12) FOR 465BW FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 SEP 1963

(2) Corrective action has included a more intensive target study program with emphasis on previous crew errors and thorough briefings of crews on the proper accomplishment of Side - Step and Combat Break - Away tactics. Crews are now directed to accomplish the Side - Step Tactic without a period "Straight and Level" between maneuvers and thus preclude the ground site from having a "Straight and Level" indication when actually the aircraft is rolling into or out of a turn.

(3) Recovery to SAC average is not possible this training period.

d. Overall bombing MCS reliability is below the SAC average due to both High and Low Altitude Bombing being below the average. Corrective action is as outlined above. Recovery is not possible this training period.

e. (1) AGM 28A Reliability is below the SAC average due to 11 runs being charged as unreliable; 4 of the runs are charged to operations and 7 runs charged to materiel.

(2) The following action has been taken to improve AGM Reliability:

(a) All AGM programming legs are "Canned" and are briefed as thoroughly as a normal bomb run.

(b) Target folders are issued for In - Flight use on AGM legs and all check point fix points are target studied.

(c) T-2 trainer is utilized for AGM procedural training with emphasis on crews flying MFR activity; a minimum of one AGM leg is accomplished on the trainer the day prior to the AGM flight.

(3) 15 Nov 63.

5. EQ RELIABILITY:

a. (1) RSR 93.8%

LDR 96.8%

Low Gear 94.4%

BDR 98.2%

NDR 98.6%

(2) 96.1%

b. Low Gear

(1) The reliability in the Low Gear area is low due to 3 unreliable runs of 54 attempted; two of these unreliable runs were charged to operator error and one to materiel malfunctions.

8. ATTACHMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S REMARKS (1- SAC-T12) FOR 465BW FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 SEP 1963

(2) The two unreliable runs charged to operator error were caused by the Nike sites operating outside the authorized frequency band. Operators are briefed to search and jam 100 mcs above and below the authorized band to take care of the discrepancy between bomber and site equipment frequency calibration.

(3) Recovery to the SAC average is impossible due to the number of MPR's; max attainable is 94.5%.

6. NAVIGATION/RENDEZVOUS RELIABILITY:

a. 99.9%

b. N/A

7. OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION/TEST EFFECTIVENESS:

a. (1) 100

(2) 75

(a) 25

(b) 25

(c) 25

(3) 25

8. BAR NONE EFFECTIVENESS:

a. (1) 88.5%

(2) 92.0%

(3) 81.8%

(4) 100.0%

b. (1) Mission Effectiveness

(a) Below SAC average due to two unreliable low altitude bomb runs and one mission that aborted for safety of flight after heating system failed.

(b) Corrective action has been more emphasis on timing procedures, with a more thorough "Ground Flying" of the mission to include precise action to be taken in cases where any activity is downgraded from that originally planned, and a more intensive target study program has been initiated.

(c) This is a final standing and recovery to above the standard is impossible.

attach 1

8. ATTACHMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S REMARKS (1-SAC-T12) FOR 465BW FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 SEP 1963

(2) Bombing Reliability

- (a) Below SAC average due to 2 unreliable low altitude bomb runs.
- (b) Corrective action is as outlined in para 4 b (2) above.
- (c) Recovery is impossible this Bar None Exercise.

(3) AG Reliability

- (a) Below average due to 4 non - effective runs of 22 attempted; these 4 non effective runs were due to various missile malfunctions.
- (b) More emphasis is being placed on missile calibration of missiles being processed through the maintenance hanger, and more emphasis is being placed on maintenance data collection to more readily identify problem areas.
- (c) Recovery is impossible: Final standing.

9. NON COMBAT - READY CREW/CREW MEMBER UPGRADING:

a. 200.0 points (100.0%)

- (1) N/A
- (2) N/A
- (3) N/A

10. OVERALL OPERATIONS MCS SCORE:

- a. 96.3%
- b. N/A

11. SAC AVERAGES: DOOTTC 9647, 27 Sep 63

12. COMMENTS OF THE WING/UNIT COMMANDER: NONE.

atch 1

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HEADQUARTERS
465TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H) (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia

4 OCT 63

COMMANDER'S REMARKS (RCS: 1-SAC-T12) FOR 912ARS, FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 SEP 63: (U)

1. WAIVER OF TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: None (U)
2. DELINQUENT COMBAT-READY CREWS/SPARE CREW MEMBERS: Not applicable (U)
3. CREW PROBATION: None (U)
4. ALERT CYCLE: Crews alternate between 3 and 4 days on alert prior to changeover. (U)
5. UNRELIABLE RBS RUNS: Not applicable (U)
6. UNRELIABLE GAM RUNS: Not applicable (U)
7. UNRELIABLE ECM RUNS: Not applicable (U)
8. FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS ACTIVITY: Not applicable (U)
9. GAM 77 INFORMATION: Not applicable (U)
10. RBS/NIKE INFORMATION FOR REFLEX: Not applicable (U)
11. PROFILE MISSION EFFECTIVENESS: None (U)
12. AIRCREW GROUND TRAINING: None (U)
13. NEW UNIT INFORMATION: Not applicable (U)
14. TERRAIN AVOIDANCE RADAR: Not applicable (U)
15. SPECIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: None (U)
16. COMMENTS OF THE WING COMMANDER: None (U)
17. This report is classified "CONFIDENTIAL" in accordance with SACR 50-23

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FROM THE AIR FORCE HISTORY
DOCUMENTS IS

James M. Keck
JAMES M. KECK
Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
SAF Atch #1 (2 pgs) (U)

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SAF ATTACHMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S REMARKS (1-SAC T-12) FOR 912ARS FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 SEP 63

(3) Recovery to above the average is impossible due to reliability being base on a fixed number of MPR.

7. OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION/TEST EFFECTIVENESS:

a. 100.0

(1) 200

(2) 140

(a) 70

(b) 70

(c) N/A

(3) N/A

b. N/A

BAR NONE EFFECTIVENESS: N/A

9. NON-COMBAT READY CREW/CREW MEMBER UPGRADING:

a. 300.0 Points

(1) 0

(2) N/A

(3) N/A

10. OVERALL OPERATION MCS SCORE:

a. 99.9%

b. N/A

11. SAC AVERAGES: DOOTIC 9647, 27 Sep 63

12. COMMENTS OF THE WING/UNIT COMMANDER: NONE

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8AF ATTACHMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S REMARKS (1-SAC T-12) FOR 912ARS FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 SEP 63

A. TRAINING ITEMS REQUIRED AND COMPLETED

Area Code	Training Area Identification	MPR Rqr	MPR Acc	Percent MPR Acc	MPR/CT Rqr	MPR/CT Acc	Percent MPR/CT Acc
C	H1 Nav	300	258	86.0	450	339	75.3
E	Air Refueling	400	361	90.3	600	412	68.7
I	Pilot Pro	350	329	94.0	N/A		
J	Rendezvous	250	230	92.0	375	305	81.3
K	Miscellaneous	250	224	89.6	N/A		
L	Instrument Trng	1350	1199	88.8	N/A		
U	Profiles	125	125	100.0	253	243	96.0

B. NARRATIVE COMMENTS

1. MINIMUM PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT COMPLETION: No areas deficient.
2. MINIMUM PROFICIENCY/CONTINUATION TRAINING COMPLETION: No areas deficient.
3. PROFILE MISSION COMPLETION:
 - a. Profile missions:
 - (1) 120
 - (2) 243
 - (3) 100.0
 - b. None.
4. BOMBING AND GAM-77 RELIABILITY: N/A
5. ECM RELIABILITY: N/A
6. NAVIGATION/RENDEZVOUS RELIABILITY:
 - a. 99.4%

b. (1) Area below average due to one unreliable Integrated Day Celestial Navigation Leg charged to Navigator error in failing to meet SACM 50-4 requirements, and two unreliable rendezvous due to material malfunction.

(2) Corrective action for the Navigation Leg included additional instruction in proper fulfillment of requirements for various types of navigation legs as required by SACM 50-4 and the replotting of a number of navigation legs until proficiency in the various requirements was demonstrated.

Att 1

~~SECRET~~

BNJW3BNJW3ZCZCMA977
RR RUCCQN
DE RUCCQM 6
R 30/0000
FM 3RD NORAD REGION GUNTER AFB ALA
TO RUMGALB/NORAD ENT AFN COLO

BT

S E C R E T (UNCLASSIFIED) FOR NOF AT RUMGALB ADDRESS; FOR NOF AT SAC ADDRESSES; FOR G-3 AT CD ARADOM. SUBJECT: BIG BLANT "JULIET".
THE FOLLOWING BIG BLANT MISSION REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAC/NORAD REG. 11-2. PART I-3RD NORAD REGION, 17 AUG 61. PART II-BIG BLANT "JULIET", 23 AUG 61. PART III-14/12- ALL SAC. PART IV-12/12. PART V-NONE. PART VI-2. PART VII-N/A. PART VIII-2. PART IX-A. THE MISSION PROVIDED VALUABLE TRAINING FOR UNITS IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PART OF MOADS. THE TECHNIQUES USED BY BAR 64, 65 AND 66 WERE QUITE EFFECTIVE UNTIL THE AIRCRAFT WERE OVER LAND. MOADS EXPERIENCED CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN TRACKING THOSE AIRCRAFT. THE CHAFF CORRIDOR ASSISTED DETECTION DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE MISSION BUT IT CAUSED SOME SCREENING EFFECT AFTER TRACKS WERE ESTABLISHED. B. ECM HAD CONDITION MEDIUM ON SEARCH AND HEIGHT FINDER RADARS; CONDITION LIGHT ON ADA AND AIRBORNE FCS RADARS. ECM WAS EFFECTIVE IN ALL CASES EXCEPT FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES AFTER BAR 63 THEN 66, WERE ESTABLISHED. C. NONE OF THE F. D. SEARCH RADARS PARTICIPATED IN THIS MISSION. TWO OF THE SEARCH RADARS COVERING THE BAR 63-66 CELL HAD EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS DURING THE MISSION. PART X. RECOMMENDED MORE MISSION OF THIS TYPE WITH MORE TARGETS.

BT

17/2215Z AUG RUCCQM

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

Waldon R. Kerns
WALDON R. KERNS
2nd Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

~~SECRET~~

WGS-63-1324

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 ARNUTITFA07
 BHAJ16
 RR RUTIN
 DE RUTIN J1 13/08PQZ
 R 0111/00
 FM SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
 TO XRAY
 YANKEE
 GEN/STAINBUT WESTOVER AFB MASS
 INFO NAMED ONE
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCERPTS ONLY. NOT FOR DISSEM AND NOT STRAY INFO
 BE DISSEMINATED. PART 1 OF 2 PARTS. FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL SUMMARY OF
 ACTIVITY FROM 22 SEP ON RES EXPRESS CROSS TIR. ONLY RECORD LOW LEVEL
 ACTIVITY HAS BEEN INCLUDED AND NO X-RAY ACTIVITY HAS BEEN INCLUDED.

UNIT	TOTAL RUNS	TOTAL REL	PERCENT
1400W	58	56	96.6

PART 2. ANY DISCREPANCIES NOTED IN ABOVE FIGURES SHOULD BE BROUGHT
 TO THE ATTENTION OF SAF DOOTS. GP-1.
 BT

NNNN

A TRUE EXTRACTED COPE:

Waldon P. Kerns
 WALDON P. KERNS
 Maj Lt., USAF
 Historical Officer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT MESSAGE FORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
SECRET				SECRET	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO
ACTION ROUTINE		BOOK MULTI SINGLE		AF	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
INFO ROUTINE		X			
FROM: 145BOMBWG ROBINS AFB GA				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO: SAC					
INFO: 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS					
822AIRDIV TURNER AFB GA					
SECRET DDOCTR 225					
SAC DORSO, INFO 8AF DCRM, 822AIRDIV DO. (U) UNIT OPERATIONAL					
READINESS REPORT B-52G RCS: 1-AF-VII FOR PERIOD ENDING 2400 HOURS					
25 SEP 63.					
A. 145 BOMB WG/ B. ROBINS AFB, GA. /					
C. (1) B-52G C. (2) ADM 20 C C. (3) AGM 28A					
D. (1) 15 D. (2) 31					
E. (1) 13 E. (2) 31					
F. 26/ G. 26/ H. 25/ I. 15/27/ J. C-1/ K. N/A					
L. REMARKS (1) LINE "E" (1) B-52G ACFT 58-249 OUT FOR ROUTINE					
MAINTENANCE; B-52G ACFT 58-192; OUT FOR ROUTINE MAINTENANCE.					
(2) LINE E (3): AGM 28, ACFT 61-2120 OUT FOR DUE TO INOPERATIVE					
GENERATOR; (1) AGM 28A, ACFT 62-2172 OUT FOR HYDRAULIC MAINTENANCE.					
SYMBOL				SIGNATURE	
DDOCTR/27/2300Z				A TRUE COPY:	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature if required)				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
ROBERT N ROBERT, L/COL, USAF				WALDON R. KERNS	
PHONE 3901				2nd Lt., USAF	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				Historical Officer 465-63-1476	
SECRET				FRD	

~~SECRET~~

ARN3931R/INTFD305
VV BMA305
RR HUETIN
DE HURTHB 67 27/1411Z
R 27/1411Z
FM SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO ROMEO ONE
ROMEO TWO
UNIFORM
WHISKEY
ZEN/FAIRDIV WESTOVER AFB MASS
HURTHB/ADMINSTRATWG ERNEST HARMON AFB AF
HURTHB/ADMINSTRATWG BOOSE AB LARR
HURTHB/DET 1 ADMINSTRATWG SONDRESTROM AFB GREENLAND
INFO HUCSIR/SAC
BT

SECRET DOX 12/23. SAC FOR DOOCH. (U) BRAVO EXERCISE RE-
QUIRED RESPONSE TIMES. PART ONE OF FIVE. CANCEL EIGHTH AIR FORCE
SECRET MESSAGES DOX 12/15, 46/1445Z JUL 63 AND DOX 12/25, 15/1915Z
JUL 63, SUBJECT, ALERT FORCE TIMING STANDARDS. PART TWO. AIRCRAFT
UNITS. REPORT BRAVO EXERCISE REQUIRED RESPONSE TIMES FOR EACH
BRAVO (INCLUDING DOWNGRADED COCO EXERCISES) IN ITEM FOUR OF THE
BRAVO/COCO RESULTS REPORT. ITEM FOUR WILL CONTAIN RUNWAY SIMULATED
AS USED (OPTIMUM OR NON-OPTIMUM) AND BRAVO EXERCISE REQUIRED RES-
PONSE TIME FOR THE LAST ALERT AIRCRAFT. THIS TIME IS COMPUTED BY
SUBTRACTING FREE FLOW TAXI TIME FOR THE RUNWAY SELECTED FROM THE
LAST AIRCRAFT COCO EXERCISE REQUIRED RESPONSE TIME FOR THAT RUNWAY.
COCO REQUIRED RESPONSE TIMES ARE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAC
SECRET ZIPPO 48-275, 22/2353Z, AUG 63, SUBJECT: SACM 55-8, VOL I
(BRAVO/COCO REPORT). FREE FLOW TAXI TIME IS THE TIME REQUIRED FOR
THE MOST DISTANT TWO CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT TO TAXI FROM THE ALERT
PARKING AREA TO THE HOLD LINE OF THE RUNWAY SIMULATED AS USED. PART
THREE. MISSILE UNITS. MISSILE BRAVO EXERCISE REQUIRED RESPONSE
TIME IS THE TIME OF THE FIVE SECOND PAUSE PRECEDING PART ONE OF THE
FAST REACTION MESSAGE PLUS FIVE MINUTES. PART FOUR. FOR ALL. EACH
AIR VEHICLE FAILING TO COMPLETE THE BRAVO EXERCISE BEFORE THE BRAVO
EXERCISE REQUIRED RESPONSE TIME WILL BE EXPLAINED IN ITEM 7, REMARKS,
OF THE BRAVO RESULTS REPORT. PART FIVE. THE EIGHTH AIR FORCE CON-
TROL DIVISION (DOX) REMAINS THE OPR FOR CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINING
TO ALERT FORCE EXERCISES. "GP-1".
BT

A TRUE COPY:

Waldon R. Kerns
WALDON R. KERNS
2nd Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

44-63-1467

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ADMN 23075
BHALPL
PPRUETHN
DE RUMTHB 211 27/2246Z
P 272043Z
FM CAP WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO ROMEO ONE
UNIFORM
WILDEY
EN/1 ATRODY WESTOVER AFB MASS/MESSENGER
RUMTHB/1 IN/1 STRATWO EN/1 ST WARMUN AFB NY
RUMTHB/1 IN/1 STRATWO 0300Z AF LANS
RUMTHB/1 IN/1 STRATWO 0300Z AF LANS
BT

SECRET DO 1200Z. (U) ALERT FORCE REACTION TIMES. REFERENCE
SAC SECRET MESSAGE DO 5571, 17 JUL 63 AND SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENTS
ON THIS SUBJECT. PART ONE OF THREE. HEADQUARTERS SAC HAS DIRECTED
A REEVALUATION OF THE COGO TIMES SUBMITTED BY UNITS AS A RESULT OF
HAF SECRET MESSAGE DO 12001, 23 JUL 63. REQUEST THIS INFORMATION
BE SUBMITTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS BY ZIPPO REPORT AS OUTLINED IN
PART TWO OF THIS MESSAGE NOT LATER THAN 0200Z, 1 OCT 63. CRITERIA
FOR DETERMINING THE COGO TIMES IS AS FOLLOWS: CRITERIA. TIMES ARE
ELAXON TO RUNWAY HOLD LINE. TWO REQUIRED (PLANNED) ALERT FORCE WILL
BE USED TO FIND LAST COGO TIMES. APPLY ALL CHANGES YOU HAVE PLACED
IN EFFECT AS OF THE DATE OF YOUR REPLY. DO NOT INCLUDE CHANGES SUB-
MITTED TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED. BASE
TIMES ON NORMAL SUMMER CONDITIONS, DO NOT INCLUDE PADS FOR EXTREME
OR DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS. CHECK TIMES SUBMITTED AGAINST ANY PREVIOUS
NON-OPTIMUM COGO RESULTS. IF PREVIOUS NON-OPTIMUM COGO RESULTS WERE
BETTER THAN YOUR ESTIMATE, EXPLAIN. PART TWO. ZIPPO REPORT. TITLE:
"COGO TIMING". ITEM 1. FIRST/LAST COGO TIME ON THE OPTIMUM RUNWAY
(MINUTES AND SECONDS) SHOW FOR ENTIRE ALERT FORCE NOT BY TYPE AIR-
CRAFT. ITEM 2. FIRST/LAST COGO TIME ON THE NON-OPTIMUM RUNWAY (MINUTES
AND SECONDS) SHOW FOR ENTIRE ALERT FORCE NOT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT. IF
PROCEDURES ARE IN EFFECT TO LAUNCH BOMBERS AND TANKERS IN OPPOSITE
DIRECTION GIVE TIMES FOR THIS SITUATION. ITEM 3. UNITS WITH MORE
THAN ONE TYPE AIRCRAFT GIVE ORDER OF LAUNCH ON: A. OPTIMUM RUNWAY.
B. NON-OPTIMUM RUNWAY. ITEM 4. HOW WERE TIMES DETERMINED? (ESTI-
MATE, TEST WITH VEHICLE, TEST WITH SINGLE AIRCRAFT, ACTUAL COGO TEST,
ETC.) ITEM 5. LIST ANY NON-OPTIMUM COGO'S ACCOMPLISHED IN THE LAST
TWO YEARS WHICH BETTERED THE FIRST TIME SHOWN IN ITEM 3. GIVE A
BRIEF REASON, (I.E. CREWS PREFLIGHTING AT COGO EXECUTION). ITEM 6.
UNITS WITH SEVERE WEATHER PROBLEMS DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
AND GIVE THE ADDITIONAL TIME FOUND NECESSARY THROUGH EXPERIENCE. EX-
AMPLE: "SECRET ZIPPO 12-315/COGO TIMING: 1. 12/11/62. 2. 12/25/
1962. 3. A. B-57/NO-135. B. NO-135/B-57. 4. TEST WITH VEHICLE.
5. 12/11/62, OCT 63. CREWS PREFLIGHTING AT EXERCISE EXECUTION. 6.
NOVEMBER TO APRIL. SNOW PRODUCES SLIP SPOTS ON ROAD AND AIRFIELD
SURFACES THAT LIMIT CREW REACTION, REDUCES TAXI SPEEDS AND INCREASES
INTERVALS. FIRST AIRCRAFT COGO IS DELAYED APPROXIMATELY THREE MINUTES.
WING SEPARATION INCREASES TO TWENTY-FOUR SECONDS". PART THREE. LAUNCH

~~SECRET~~

466-43-1485

RECEIVED
12 JUL 63
466-43-1485

~~SECRET~~

TIMING CONTINUES TO RECEIVE COMMAND ATTENTION AT THIS HEADQUARTERS. REQUEST YOU KEEP US ADVISED OF YOUR PROGRESS TOWARD COMPLIANCE WITH THE DESIRED TIMING. WE ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN REPORTS FROM UNITS WHEN THEY ACHIEVE THE ABILITY TO COMPLY AND HOW IT WAS DONE, ACTIONS TAKEN THAT REDUCE TIMING THAT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER UNITS AND JUSTIFIED PROPOSALS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES THAT REQUIRE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ACTION. "TOP-1".


BT

A TRUE COPY:

Walter H. Jones
WALTON H. JONES
1st Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

~~SECRET~~

ZIPPO MESSAGE		PRECEDENCE	CLASSIFICATION	
DATE/TIME (Zulu)		<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>		
FROM:				
TO:				
PART TWO. KC-135 AIRCRAFT.				
TEMP	-500' PA	0' PA	+500' PA	+1000' PA
+10 Deg F	+8 Kts	+6 Kts	+5 Kts	+4 Kts
+20 Deg F	+9 "	+7 "	+6 "	+5 "
+30 Deg F	+8 "	+6 "	+5 "	+4 "
+40 Deg F	+7 "	+6 "	+5 "	+3 "
+50 Deg F	+6 "	+5 "	+4 "	+3 "
+60 Deg F	+6 "	+5 "	+3 "	+2 "
+70 Deg F	+5 "	+4 "	+3 "	0 "
+80 Deg F	+5 "	+3 "	+2 "	0 "
+90 Deg F	+4 "	+3 "	+1 "	0 "
+100 Deg F	+3 "	+2 "	+1 "	0 "
+110 Deg F	+2 "	0 "	0 "	0 "
For temperature +10 Deg F, Component based on dry take-off. For temperatures +20 Deg F to 110 Deg F, Components based on wet take-off.				
Part Three. Data computed utilizing take-off criteria outlined in SACM 55-7, Vol II Par 2A.				
Runway Length	12,000 ft	Runway available (95% of 12,800 ft)		
Overrun	+1,000 ft	12,160 Ft.		
	13,000 ft			
Line-up Distance	-200 ft			
	12,800 ft			
CLASSIFICATION		WRITER		
<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>		MSgt Betts		
PAGE 2 OF		2 PAGES		
		RELEASER		

ZIPPO MESSAGE		PRECEDENCE P	CLASSIFICATION	
DATE/TIME (Zulu) 07 1945Z		CONFIDENTIAL		
FROM: 1455W ROBINS AFB GA				
TO: RAF WESTOVER AFB MASS				
CONFIDENTIAL/ZIPPO 14-012/ALLOWABLE TAILWIND COMPONENTS FOR ROBINS AFB, GA. RUNWAY TRUE HEADING 300 DEGREES. RUNWAY MAGNETIC HEADING 319 DEGREES. PART ONE. B-52-D AIRCRAFT.				
TEMP	-500' PA	0' PA	+500' PA	+1000' PA
10 Deg F	+22 Kts	+19 Kts	+17 Kts	+15 Kts
20 Deg F	+18 "	+15 "	+13 "	+11 "
30 Deg F	+14 "	+11 "	+9 "	+7 "
40 Deg F	+9 "	+7 "	+5 "	+3 "
50 Deg F	+18 "	+16 "	+14 "	+11 "
60 Deg F	+17 "	+15 "	+12 "	+10 "
70 Deg F	+16 "	+14 "	+11 "	+9 "
80 Deg F	+15 "	+13 "	+10 "	+8 "
90 Deg F	+14 "	+12 "	+9 "	+7 "
100 Deg F	+13 "	+11 "	+8 "	+7 "
110 Deg F	+11 "	+9 "	+7 "	+5 "
For temperatures +10 Deg F to +40 Deg F, Tailwind Components based on dry take-off. Temperatures 50 Deg F to 110 Deg F on wet take-off.				
A TRUE COPY:				
 WALDON R. KERNS, 2nd Lt., USAF Historical Officer				
CLASSIFICATION		PAGE 1 OF 2	WRITER	
CONFIDENTIAL		PAGES	MSGT Betts RELEASER	

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO
ACTION	ROUTINE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	AF
INFO	ROUTINE				
FROM: <u>145BOMWING ROBINS AFB GA</u>					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO: <u>SAC</u>					<div style="text-align: right; padding-right: 10px;"> DATE 30 MONTH SEPT YEAR 63 </div>
INFO: <u>8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS</u>					
<u>822AIRDIV TURNER AFB GA</u>					
SECRET DOOTR <u>228</u>					
SAC DCRSO, INFO 8AF DCRM, 822AIRDIV DO. (U) UNIT OPERATIONAL					
READINESS REPORT KC-135A RCS: 1-AF-VII FOR PERIOD ENDING 2400 HOURS					
25 SEPTEMBER 63. CORRECTED COPY.					
A. 912 ARS / B. ROBINS AFB / C. KC-135A / D. 15					
E. 13 / F. 28 / G. 27 / H. 23 / I. 15/29 / J. C-1					
K. N/A / L. KC-135A ACFT 56-3591 OUT FOR ROUTINE MAINTENANCE					
KC-135A ACFT 56-3600 OUT FOR TD.C. GP-1.					
SYMBOL <u>DOOTR/30/1500Z</u>		SIGNATURE			
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature if required) <u>ROBERT N ROBERT, 1/COL, USAF</u>		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE A TRUE COPY: <u>Walden R. Kerns</u> WALDON R. KERNS 2nd Lt., USAF Historical Officer <u>465-63-1489</u>			
PHONE <u>3901</u> PAGE <u>NR</u> NR OF PAGES <u>1</u>					
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET					

TIMING CONTROL SCHEDULE (B) Hotel

MISSION NICKNAME LONG HAUL

DATE 18 SEP 63

<u>SORTIE #</u>	<u>ACFT COMD</u>	<u>ACFT #</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>PARK SPOT</u>	<u>S. ENG</u>	<u>T.O.</u>
131	MACDONALD	610	CHIP 40	18	2212Z	2242Z
132	WHITE	619	CHIP 43	16	2227Z	2257Z
133	KUHNS	302	CHIP 48	14A	2242Z	2312Z
SPARE	WOYTECH	622	CHIP 45	11	2212Z	

REFUELING DATA

A/R AREA GUN POST & GUN POST WEST ARCP AS PER FLT. PLAN C/R PLAN GUN POST WEST "OWEN/ALFA"
GUN POST WEST "OWEN/BRavo"
 OFF LOAD 60,000 ALL SORTIES END A/R POINT _____

<u>SORTIE #</u>	<u>TANKER CONTROL TIME</u>	<u>BOMBER ARCT</u>	<u>TRACK/ALT</u>	<u>BOMBER CALL SIGN</u>
131	2336Z	2351Z	GUN POST/28M (OA)	DEN 11
132	2351Z	0006Z	GUN POST/27M (OB) WEST	DEN 22
133	0006Z	0021Z	GUN POST/28M (OA)	DEN 13

HEADQUARTERS
19th BOMBARDMENT WING (H) (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
HOMESTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

Orig sent

1020

912

File PDM. 2
B.W.

25 SEP 1963

19C

Favorable Communication

465 Bomb Wg
Robins AFB, Ga

1. I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to you and your organization for the exemplary KC-135 refueling support given the 19th Bombardment Wing (H) during our ORI on 18 September 1963.
2. Reviewal of the results of the ORI are indicative of the smoothness of the operation and efficiency of your organization. It is always a pleasure to hear our receivers report "mission as briefed."
3. Again, on behalf of the officers and airmen of the 19th Bomb Wing, please convey our thanks to those who participated for a job well done.

RICHARD R. STEWART
Colonel, USAF
Commander

Is. Stream Page

TIMING CONTROL SCHEDULE (B)

MISSION NICKNAME LAND GRAB

DATE 16 SEP 1963

<u>SORTIE #</u>	<u>ACFT COMD</u>	<u>ACFT #</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>PARK SPOT</u>	<u>S. ENG</u>	<u>T.O.</u>
129	MARLOWE	610	CHIP 40	18	0322Z	0350Z
130	WOYTICH	301	CHIP 45	20	0330Z	0407Z
SPARE	WILLIAMS	302	CHIP 48	14A	0322Z	

REFUELING DATA

A/R AREA FARMER BOY ARCP BRAVO/ALPHA C/R PLAN BB AA

OFF LOAD 66,000# END A/R POINT IAW FLT PLAN

<u>SORTIE #</u>	<u>TANKER CONTROL TIME</u>	<u>BOMBER ARCT</u>	<u>TRACK/ALT</u>	<u>BOMBER CALL SIGN</u>
129	0544Z	0559Z	BRAVO/26M CR PLAN - BB	YAHOO 21
130	0559Z	0614Z	ALPHA/26M CR PLAN - AA	YAHOO 10

BNJ/34CZCBNA687ZCMCC683

RR RUCQBN

DE RUEADP 141 19/2100

ZNR

R 191723Z

FM 397BOMBWG DOW AFB ME

TO RUCQPH/68BOMBWG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC

RUCQBN/68BOMBWG ROBINS AFB GA

RUCQSL/68BOMBWG TURNER AFB GA

INFO RUCQPH/91AREFS SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC

RUCQBN/91AREFS ROBINS AFB GA

RUCQSL/91AREFS TURNER AFB GA

BT

UNCLAS C 2178L. AIR REFUELING SUPPORT. FOR COMMANDER. THE
PROFESSIONALISM DISPLAYED AND COOPERATION GIVEN BY THE STAFF AND
CREWS OF YOUR COMMAND CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE SUCCESS OF
THE 397 BOMBARDMENT WING ORIT. PLEASE CONVEY OUR APPRECIATION TO
ALL CONCERNED.

BT

A TRUE COPY:

Waldon R. Kerns
WALDON R. KERNS
2nd Lt., USAF
Historical Officer

- (1) Mission cancelled due to this Unit's ORIT.
- (2) Two receivers showed in addition to those scheduled. One scheduled receiver aborted and one scheduled receiver could not onload fuel due to a receiver malfunction; toggles were locked in closed position. Extra time spent on station due to receiver malfunction and two addition receivers.
- (3) Two receivers showed in addition to those scheduled. One scheduled receiver took two additional onloads, five scheduled receivers aborted.
- (4) One receiver could not onload his scheduled fuel due to a malfunction; three other receivers took the rest of the offload.
- (5) One scheduled receiver aborted. Two receivers had malfunctions and could not onload fuel. Two receivers did not receive scheduled onload because their requirements were fulfilled with less fuel.
- (6) One receiver onloaded in addition to those scheduled. Three scheduled receivers aborted. Two receivers onloaded less fuel than scheduled fulfilling their requirements. One (non-scheduled) receiver from a different Unit had a dry contact.
- (7) Seven fighters arrived in addition to those scheduled. Six receivers did not onload any fuel: 1 due to afterburner failure, 1 non-scheduled receiver had a radio failure; 1 non-scheduled receiver had a probe lite inoperative, and 3 receivers did not onload fuel because no time was remaining in their waves allotted 30 minute block. 3 receivers also onloaded more fuel than scheduled, one of these was in addition to the schedule. Due to an afterburner failure 2 receivers could not stay on the boom for their scheduled onload.
- (8) One receiver could not onload fuel for two scheduled refuelings. The seven remaining receivers pressured off the boom short of their scheduled onload.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
UNCLASSIFIED EPTO				UNCLASSIFIED EPTO			
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER							
SEP 26 10 16 '63							
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE ROUTINE		TYPE MSG (Check) BOOK MULTI SINGLE		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL AT		ORIG. OR REFERS TO	
ACTION ROUTINE ROUTINE		INFO ROUTINE ROUTINE		FROM: ROUTINE		CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE	
TO: SAC MEST MCCONNELL AFB KANS						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ENCRYPT FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY	
INFO: SAC							
8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS							
822ADIV TURNER AFB GA							
UNCLAS EPTO MMS MEST <u>250?</u>						DATE TIME MONTH YEAR SEP 63	
FOR SAC MEST MESTC. INFO SAC DM12, 8AF DM, 822ADIV DM. SUBJECT:							
CLMCS EVALUATION RESULTS. MEST HAS RATED THE MUNITIONS SERVICE							
BRANCH AS SATISFACTORY AND THE MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE BRANCH AS							
OUTSTANDING. SIX LOADING OPERATIONS WERE EVALUATED AND RATED. THREE						DATE TIME MONTH YEAR SEP 63	
WERE HIGHLY QUALIFIED, TWO WERE QUALIFIED AND ONE WAS UNQUALIFIED.							
THE UNQUALIFIED TEAM DID NOT PERFORM A RELIABLE CCC AND THE SAFETY							
SUPERVISOR WAS NOT CERTIFIED. NAME WAS CERTIFIED. ONE MAINTENANCE							
OPERATION WAS RATED HIGHLY QUALIFIED. FORMAT REPORT TO FOLLOW WITH						DATE TIME MONTH YEAR SEP 63	
DETAILS OF EVALUATION. MEST PLANS TO DEPART ROBINS AFB FOR							
MCCONNELL AFB AT 0830 HOURS 27 SEP 1963.							
UNCLAS EPTO MMS MEST							
SYMBOL MMS MEST/26/1730Z				SIGNATURE			
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) WILLIAM C. SHIRBY, CAPT, MEST				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE			
PHONE 0107				PAGE NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES 1			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED EPTO				DATE TIME MONTH YEAR SEP 63			

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA



SAC MEST, McConnell AFB, Kansas

Evaluation Summary

465 Bomb Wg (DCM)
Robins AFB Georgia 31094

INFO: SAC (DMAE)
SAP (DMAE)
822ADiv (DMQ)

1. This is a summary of the SAC MEST evaluation of the 64th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, Robins AFB, Georgia, conducted during the period 23 through 27 September 1963.

a. Technical Evaluations. Six loading operations were evaluated; three were rated Highly Qualified, two were rated Qualified and one was rated Unqualified. Four NCO's were evaluated and three certified safety supervisors. The nuclear weapons maintenance evaluator was evaluated and certified. A 39 maintenance operation was evaluated and rated Highly Qualified.

b. Examinations. Twenty technicians were tested. Nine scored higher than the SAC average.

c. Comments. Standardization administration in both branches was good. The Maintenance Branch has an exceptional technical training program.

2. The Munitions Service Branch standardization program is Satisfactory. The Munitions Maintenance Branch standardization program is Outstanding.

3. Details and records supporting this summary are attached.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

CHARLES W. RHODES
Lt Colonel, USAF
Chief, SAC MEST

2 Atch
1. Mun Svc Branch Eval Details
2. Mun Mtn Branch Eval Details

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Peace is our Profession

MUNITIONS SERVICE BRANCH EVALUATION

1. Loading Team Evaluations:

<u>Team #</u>	<u>Munition</u>	<u>Rating</u>
1	28	Highly Qualified
1	W-28	Qualified
6	28	Qualified
2	39	Unqualified
5	W-28	Highly Qualified
5	39	Highly Qualified

a. Team two was Unqualified because the wrong bomb bay receptacle pins were used in checking for the presence of voltage.

b. These NCO's were evaluated and certified safety supervisors:

SSgt William A. Russell
SSgt Guy J. Brungard
SSgt Harry Langley

c. SSgt Robert K. Fentem was not certified safety supervisor because he permitted a team member to incorrectly check for the presence of voltage.

2. Examination Results:

<u>AFSC</u>	<u>Number Tested</u>	<u>Average Score</u>	<u>SAC Average</u>
462X0	15	76	81

Technicians were briefed on individual results and those areas requiring additional study.

3. Comments:

- Standardization records were properly maintained.
- Current technical data was controlled and available for loading teams.
- The standardization program is organized and effectively managed by the LET.
- MHU-7/M trailers had minor defects which did not affect the evaluations, but could handicap the standardization program, if not corrected.

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MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE BRANCH EVALUATION

1. Evaluations:

a. SSgt Clarence H. Green was evaluated and is a nuclear weapons maintenance evaluator. MEST evaluated a 39 maintenance operation and rated the NWMH Highly Qualified,

2. Examination Results:

<u>AFSC</u>	<u>Number Tested</u>	<u>Average Score</u>	<u>SAC Average</u>
331X0	3	90	77

Technicians were briefed on individual results and those areas requiring additional study.

3. Comments:

- a. Standardization records were properly maintained.
- b. Current technical data was readily available to technicians, who are effectively assimilating this information.
- c. The standardization program is well managed. Technicians are well versed in technical operations and job knowledge.
- d. The stockpile was in excellent condition.
- e. Housekeeping, tools and equipment were outstanding.
- f. SSgt Green has done an exceptional job of teaching and demonstrating the proper methods of performing maintenance operations. This was also demonstrated during a basic cylinder change.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FILE DESIGNATION
New 1120-2
B.R.

13 September 1963

[illegible]

- JAMES M. KECK
Colonel, USAF
Commander

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)
	C	Sgt. Brown	5195	EW	10/2/63	

SAC FORM 36, OCT 60

TENANT SUPPLY REPORT		REPORTING PERIOD		REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL		
		FROM	TO			
		16 Sep 63	15 Oct 63	SAC - S35		
TO: SAC (DMODID) Info Copies BAF (DMS) AFIC (WCSO) BRANA (WRSW) (WRSB) (WRSBE) B22AD (DM)	PARENT ORGN OF UNIT BEING REPORTED ON SAC	FROM: (Preparing organization) 465th Bombardment Wing (SAC) Robins AFB, Ga.				
BASE FURNISHING SUPPLY SUPPORT						
REQUISITION AND ISSUE DATA						
TYPE REQUEST	NUMBER OF LINE ITEMS		PERCENT EFFECTIVE (B + A)	AVG DELIVERY TIME BY MAINT. PRIORITY (APM 66-1)		
	REQUESTED	COMPLETELY OR PARTIALLY ISSUED		1 & 2	3	
	A	B	C	D	E	
1 EXPEDITER (CONTROLLER - Less Preissue and Bench Stock)	3282	2954	90.0	9.7	11.1	
Controller)						
Preissue (including those through	390	378	96.9			
2 BENCH STOCK (including those through Controller)	1735	1624	93.6			
3 TOTAL (Mission Support to Flt Line & Maint)	5407	4956	91.1			
IV. AUTHORIZATION DATA						
TYPE	NUMBER OF LINE ITEMS		PERCENT ON HAND (B + A)	LATEST DATE REVIEWED OR REVISED		
	AUTHORIZED ON MASTER LISTING	ON HAND AFTER REPLENISHMENT		C	D	
	A	B	C	D		
Preissue	1040	1018	97.9	18 Oct 63		
BENCH STOCK	5766	5732	99.4	18 Oct 63		
III. MISCELLANEOUS DATA						
TOTAL CANNIBALIZATIONS		TOTAL SORTIES LOST DUE TO LACK OF SUPPLY SUPPORT				
4		0				
AWP ITEMS		FIELD MAINTENANCE		A/E MAINTENANCE		
39		14		25		
TENANT ORGANIZATION		PERSONNEL				
AUTHENTIFICATIONS	SIGNATURE	AUTHORIZED			ASSIGNED	
	TYPED NAME, GRADE, AND TITLE	OFFICERS	AIRMAN	CIVILIAN	OFFICERS	AIRMAN
	FRANK R. ROMAN	1	49	0	1	49
	Captain, USAF Material Control Officer					
AUTHENTIFICATIONS	SIGNATURE	COMMENTS: Part IV includes:				
	TYPED NAME, GRADE, AND TITLE	a. 1 Officer and 18 Airmen for SAC Mat Control.				
	ARTHUR L. PETTIS, Chief	b. 19 spaces for B90 Bench Stock Repair Cycle.				
	Special Accounting Branch	c. 12 spaces for Expediter.				
	Base Support Division					

ITEMIZED LISTING OF CANNIBALIZATION SORTIES LOST DATA

TYPE ACFT NO SERIAL NR	STOCK NUMBER	NOUN	(Indicate) C - CANNIBAL- IZATION LS - LOST SORTIE	REQUISITION STATUS
KC135 56-3634	47204051906	Hose	C	Received
KC135A 56 3616	66103456940	Transmitter	C	Received
KC135A 56 3622	66155561979	Alt. Control	C	FKZ-B
KC135A 60 2107	142052091348C	Servo Cylinder	C	FHU-B

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION	
100-10161	B-20

26 September 1963

Colonel J. W. Farrar (DM)
Headquarters 8th Air Force
Westover AFB, Mass

Dear John

As you know, Col Levine and party completed an assistance visit to us on the 20th. Although I was in Washington on a promotion board I was able to sit in on their critique and I have since reviewed their report and have had several meetings with my people concerning the comments and findings.

First, let me say I sincerely appreciate the way they went about the job and I assure you it was time well spent. We will benefit greatly by the emphasis they provided and by their specific recommendations.

In any visit of this type, there is always some disagreement with the way items are commented upon or with some conclusions; however, in this case, these are few in number and relatively insignificant.

There are two general areas I would like to comment on in order to give you my thinking at this point. These comments do not represent answers but may give you a better feel for our status.

Recovery. Without exception, my supervisors and commanders want to stay in the recovery concept we now have. I agree. We have reoriented our supervisors and strongly feel we have a structure, the procedures, and the personnel to do the job. Although we have had far too many cancellations and late take-offs in KC-135 aircraft,

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

our B-52 experience has been highly satisfactory in this area and our KC-135 experience in recent weeks has been much improved. Of course, late take-offs are only one small part of recovery analysis but I feel it is a symptomatic part. We agree with your team with respect to NCO supervision and are following their suggestions.

FMS, AEMS and AMMS. Here again, we agree on the trouble shooting techniques suggested. I honestly feel we have this one in hand with the exception of AMMS. I do not yet have confidence that our aircrews and our maintenance people know all they should about AGM-28s. I believe the only way out of this is to fly the missiles enough to fix them the way we want them. We are now in a position to do this.

In summary, I want to thank you for the help and I want to assure you that the overall situation is under control. I am optimistic concerning all weak areas (except AGM-28). I feel we now have the people we need -- but I'll ask for more help if it is needed.

Best regards

JAMES M. KECK
Colonel, USAF
Commander

cc: 822nd Air Div