

NO 840 IRIS Number 0045 7319

~~SECRET~~

This document is classified SECRET since it reveals
FNU combat capability information

T
S-33807

509TH BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM

1-31 OCTOBER 1961

(UNCLASSIFIED TITLE)

Prepared by:

Approved by:

Alfred H. Lazarchick
A2C Alfred H. Lazarchick
Wing Historian

A. D. Whitley
1/Lt. A. D. Whitley
Wing Historical Officer

APPROVED BY:

Donald G. Ferguson
DONALD G. FERGUSON
Colonel, USAF
Commander

817TH AIR DIVISION

EIGHTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

1-7956

DOWNGRADED AT 10 YEAR
INTERVALS, NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED, DDP DIA 1282 IS

Copy 1 of 4 copies.

CLASSIFICATION BY DATE INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED BY DATE INTERVALS
DDP DIA 1282 IS

~~SECRET~~

75068

5-3007-3

0005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I	
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION	1 - 3
Foreword	1 - 2
Mission	2
Organization	3
CHAPTER II	
PERSONNEL	4 - 8
Introduction	4
Manning	5
Crew Resource Build-Up	5
Spruce Up Personnel Reaction	6 - 7
Scheduled Discontinuation of 830th BS	7
Summary	8
CHAPTER III	
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING	9 - 21
Introduction	9 - 10
Tree Trimmer NBS Express	10 - 11
Sky Shield II	11 - 12
Spruce Up	13
Big Jump Reflex Activities	14 - 15
Home Alert Force	16 - 17
Air Training Program	17
Wing Commander's Remarks to Air Training Report	18 - 19
Air Refueling Squadron Commander's Remarks	19
Crew Testing	20 - 21
Summary	21
CHAPTER IV	
MATERIAL	22 - 25
Introduction	22
Production Summary	22 - 23
Big Jump reflex problems	23
Project Red Barn	24
MADRS System	24
Supply	25
Summary	25
LIST OF EXHIBITS	
REGISTER OF KEY PERSONNEL	
APPENDIX	1 - 56

ONE
I

CHAPTER I
ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

The 509th Bombardment Wing, Medium (H) Operations in October 1961 continued to accomplish "Big Jump" reflex activities which first started to gather momentum in September in view of the Berlin crisis and Russia's continued testing of multi-megaton explosives in the atmosphere. Increased tension over the Berlin border stirred Russia and the United States and the Free Western nations to the brink of war in October while Russian public boasts of strategic military advantages aggravated the situation even further. To counteract the possibility of an allout war with Russia, the U.S. and its Strategic Air Command (SAC), directed the 509th Wing to continue its "Big Jump" reflex activities which were first initiated in September when Russia threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, thereby sealing off access to Berlin completely. (U)

While these reflex actions were the major responsibility of the Wing Commander, Colonel Donald G. McPherson, in October, other higher headquarters directed mission such as Tree Trimmer Radar Bomb Scoring Express (bombing against strange mobile targets), Sky Shield II (North American Continent-wide defense exercise) and Spruce Up (simulated wartime maintenance base operation) were major training operations of the wing. (U)

In order to attain maximum operational readiness by a unit of SAC, the 509th was responsible to maintain a force capable of immediate and long-range offensive bombardment and air-to-air refueling operations in any part of the world. To meet this requirement, Colonel McPherson exercised the Wing Tanker Force of the 509th Air Refueling Squadron (ARS) throughout the month. (U)

Colonel McPherson was also responsible to be prepared to perform those tasks assigned in current emergency plans and related operations orders. In other words, he directed his staff and related Reserve units and personnel to perform any special Emergency War Order (EWO) task as might be directed by higher headquarters. In time of domestic emergency and a need for domestic relief, he would completely attribute all possible resources, personnel and equipment as deemed necessary to overcome any critical disaster situations that might occur. (U)

Assigned to the Wing in October were nine squadrons on which Colonel McPherson placed certain specific responsibilities in fulfillment of the primary mission. Of these nine, four

3

were tactical bombardment units, three maintenance squadrons,
an air refueling unit and one administrative squadron. More
Specifically, these were: (U)

509th Headquarters Squadron Section (HSS)

509th Air Refueling Squadron (ARS)

509th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron (AEMS)

509th Field Maintenance Squadron (FMS)

509th Organizational Maintenance Squadron (OMS)

393rd Bombardment Squadron, Medium (BS)

715th Bombardment Squadron, Medium (BS)

830th Bombardment Squadron, Medium (BS)

661st Bombardment Squadron, Medium (BS) (U)

CHAPTER III

PERSONNEL

CONF II

Introduction

Personnel activities in October 1961 were highlighted by operations in both reflex and base defense situations. Operation 'Spruce Up' revealed unsatisfactory to outstanding results of personnel actions under fallout conditions while reflex 'Big Jump' activities continued to deploy and redeploy personnel, mostly in the maintenance and combat areas, to Spain. A decrease in Airman Unit Manning Document (UAD) authorizations was experienced during the month, while future KC-97 school assignments foresaw a critical projected officer manning status in the Wing and at base level. (U)

Manning

Officer manning was at 105.4 percent in the Wing by the end of the month, comparing assigned strength with authorized figures, while only 55.6 percent of the officers assigned the Wing were present for duty due to reflex activities. The Wing experienced a loss of 14 Airman UAD authorizations in October but 98.6 percent of the Airman authorized were assigned and only 84 percent of these were present for duty -- also due to reflex. (U)

1. Strength Summary, Hq 509AW, 31 October 1961. Exhibit 2.
2. Ibid. No explanation for this loss could be found by the Historian and Base Manning Section also did not have the answer.
3. Ibid. Compared to September 1961 Strength figures, the following is how the above percentages were prepared:

	Sep	Oct	Sep	Oct	Sep	Oct
	Off	Off	Assn	Assn	Off	Assn
	Authorized	Authorized	Assigned	Assigned	Present for Duty	Present for Duty
	461	461	477	469	265	1197
	1558	1508	1449	1420	858	1122

Crew Resource Build-Up

In lieu of SBF's newest proposal for the withdrawal of support officers in critical manning areas at Pease Air Force Base (AFB) and in support of the crew resource build-up, Brigadier General A.J. Beck, 817th Air Division (AD) Commander replied: (U)

"I fully appreciate the pressure resulting from retention of the medium force and am making every effort to improve utilization of resources. Nonetheless, the deteriorating officer manning position is of the greatest importance to me and I earnestly request assistance." (U)

His reaction was caused by an SBF resolution to phase pilots into the B-47 and KC-97 Combat Crew Training Schools (CCTS) as to build-up crew resources and insure 1.8 to one manning. The courses were programmed for 24 October through 17 December 1961. (U)

In reply to the projected assignments, General Beck reviewed the support officer manning authorizations and determined certain critical deficiencies. These additional withdrawals aggravated the situation even further and were particularly protested because of the shortage of support officers and the crew resource build-up. (U)

4. Msg, 817AD to SBF, C-11-3, 9 Oct 1961. Exhibit 4.
5. Msg, SBF to KRAY, et al, DPO 16692, 6 Oct 1961. Exhibit 5.
6. Same as 4 above. In view of the General's reply, SBF honored an suggestions or recommendations as to previous training aquired and/or personal hardship involved.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Spruce Up

On 6 October, the Wing, along with the other units at Pease, was tested on how it reacted under enemy attack and wartime fall-out conditions.⁷ The Wing Command Post (CP), the nerve of the operation, communicated satisfactorily but encountered a few problems, some which were disastrous.⁸ Personnel reaction to the test conditions were generally pre-planned since this was not a no-notice test.⁹ Coordination to simulated disasters was slow but once a situation was reported, quick corrective action was taken.¹⁰ (U)

When communications were termed 'destroyed' and major damage was inflicted on the airfield, it took 30 minutes to notify SAC of the situation and an hour and a half more to report capability information to that headquarters.¹¹ (U)

Command-wise, Eighth noted that the shelter of personnel was not up to par and specifically directed Personnel Control Procedures. An excessive amount of shelters - sometimes as high as 75 - existed at some bases throughout the command and to control so many was impractical. Also, a few shelters were planned for personal convenience instead of maximum protection and residual numbers were incorrectly indicated. The end result was for each Commander to review his plans and insure that corrective action

7. Ltr, S17D, to S17CSG, (U) "Empire's Report of Spruce Up Exercise", 28 Oct 1961. Exhibit 9.

8. Ibid. Some of the operations under simulated wartime plots could have been disastrous if were the real thing. See Chapter III for complete details on the operation.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

be taken to alleviate these discrepancies. ¹² ~~13~~

Discontinuation of 830BS

On 3 October the Wing was alerted for the discontinuation of the 830th Bomb Squadron (BS), Medium (M), effective 1 January 1962. Personnel and equipment were programmed to be absorbed in other SAC units (661st, 715th and 393rd BS). ¹³ (U)

Reasons for this action could not be explained since the Wing Commander as well as his staff expected the phasing out of the 661st BS, the most recently activated squadron of the Wing. When word first came, through the grapevine, that the phasing out of one of the squadrons was due in 1962, staff and personnel of the 661st prepared for the move. By the middle of the month, they had completed the majority of the task and had infiltrated personnel and equipment with the other three bomb squadrons of the Wing and were ready for discontinuation. ¹⁴ (U)

If orders were not changed to affect the 661st, the Wing Commander felt that to rebuild the 661st and phase out the 830th would entail a great deal of administrative effort and more seriously, create a substantial morale problem in the Wing. ¹⁵ (U)

By the end of the month, no word had been received that affected the situation in any way due to different chain of command channels in which paperwork had to pass. ¹⁶ (U)

12. Msg, SVP to UNIFORM, DO 20305, 22 Sep 1961. Exhibit 9, Part II.
13. SO 3-121, Bq SAC, 3 Oct 1961. Exhibit 9.
14. Interview, Historian with Wgpt. Craig, 30904, 15 Oct 1961.
15. Msg, SIVAD to SAC, SIVD)C 11-10-2, 10 Oct 1961. Exhibit 9.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

Colonel McPherson, assigned to the Pease Task Force in October,¹⁶ directed his personnel in the accomplishment of the primary mission and operated with 44 less airmen USD authorizations while 44 percent of the officers and 16 percent of the airmen were committed to reflex. The build-up of combat crew resources posed the biggest problem in Personnel activities in October but "Spruce Up" personnel reaction¹⁷ rated satisfactory. IPT results were high in October while¹⁸ Education and retention activities¹⁹ remained similar to past month results. (U)

16. SO p-4, Hq 817AD, 13 Oct 1961. Exhibit 10.
 17. Ltr, 817BDF to 509C, "Test Results" (U), 19 Oct 1961. By 19 Oct 100percent (10 of 10) Wing personnel passed SKP (Skill Knowledge Tests) in the training cycle which began on 1 Oct 1961. The 100th BW scored a similar mark while 57 of 58 trainees passed at base level.
 18. Interview, Historian with Magt. Craig, 509SM, 19 Oct 1961.
 19. Officer and Airmen Manning and promotions, Project Best Man and the crew resource problem plus other pertinent areas of concern affecting unit activities were discussed at various conferences conducted in October. Of these, "Starring Role" (SAC Commander's Conference), Chief of Training Conference and BAF Monthly Conference highlighted this fact. See Exhibits 7, 29, 30 and 31 for detailed account of these activities.

CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Introduction

October 1961 proved to be the most realistic operational training period of the Wing's total strength under peacetime conditions yet experienced in 1961. Operations continued to gain increased emphasis on special BWO missions as directed by USAF, SAC, SAG and the 817th Air Division (AD). This was mainly due to increased tension in world political and military events by Russia's intervention in the Berlin Crisis, continued testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere which reached 41 blasts by the end of the month with the last recorded blast reaching a detonation of approximately 100 million tons of TNT, and Soviet indication of not lessening her grip of terror on the world crisis. Big Jump reflex activities were the Wing's rigid adherence to higher headquarters action taken to combat these critical actions. (U)

Other special training missions performed by the Wing during the month included Free Trigger BWS Express against strange mobile targets which won first place in SAG, Sky Shield II, a continent-wide defense operation which the Wing contributed

1. Msg, SAGDI to 509C, (U) "Public Statements by Soviet Military Leaders", 23 Oct 1961. This document shows SAC's Intelligence interest in comments of Soviet military leaders during Sep and Oct 1961. Exhibit 8.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10

outstanding operational capability, and Spruce Up, a simulated wartime practice exercise designed to test unit reaction under enemy attack and radioactive fallout conditions. (U)

Free Trimmer

One of the best examples of continued missions was the RBS Express low-level bombing mission flown against totally unfamiliar and mobile targets, day and night in good or bad weather. These SAC directed large-scale missions not only tested combat crew ability but proved a unit's professional competence of performing such realistic bombing missions. (U)

The Wing proved their outstanding performance by the Free Trimmer mission flown from 1 September through 27 October. Although the Wing placed first in SAC in the initial Tune Up RBS Express, it had the best bombing reliability of any other BAF unit in the Free Trimmer operation. The Wing's reliability was 95.6 percent while the Circular Error Average (CEA) was 1345 feet off target.² Free Trimmer came close to the 509th performance set in Tune Up (97.8 percent) but the CEA of 1345 feet bettered that set in the June 1961 operation which was 1358.³ (U)

2. (U) "Free Trimmer Report", Hq BAF, "Unit Standings", n.d.; and (U) "Free Trimmer Report", Hq 509BW, "Crew Standings", n.d. Exhibit 12.

3. 509BW Historical Data Report (AU-D5), June-July 1961, Chap III, pag 13 - 18.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8

Compared to the 381st Bomb Wing (M), which placed second to the 509th and scored a 95 percent reliability, had a CEA of 1425 feet. The 100th placed sixth with 88.3 percent and a 2170 foot CEA. ⁴

These RBS missions were scheduled as far as the end of 1960 with "Rock Bed", "Here's How" and Rough Game planned for November, and January and April 1962 respectively. Also, in April, the Wing would enter the 8AF training quarter and become vulnerable for the "Bar None" exercise, a pre-planned CBI by 8AF of a units RBS Express mission capability. If the Wing kept its pace set thus far in Tune Up and Tree Trimmer, the Bar None test should prove successful. ⁵ (u)

Perhaps the most important large scale test of this country's military functions came on 14 October at 0406 hours ZULU (0806 local) ⁶ with the initial execution order for the SAC/NORAD annual 'Sky Shield II' operation. A continent-wide operation, Sky Shield II involved aircraft from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Royal Canadian Air Force Air Defense Command (RCAPADC), USAF Air Defense Command (ADC), Air Training Command (ATC) and SAC. All of these except SAC directly, flew their planes against the North American defense system and the early warning radar detection system. While these teams concentrated major efforts on the defense part of the operation, SAC launched its bomber and tanker

8

1. Msg, SAC to 8AF, et al, DODIS, 11 Jul 1961. Exhibit 13.
2. HHPD msg, 10-514-11 Oct 1961.
3. EXTRACT, SAC 8AF, 21 Sep 1961, (u) "Sky Shield II", 20 Sep 1961, Exhibit 15.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Alert Forces which acted as the departing retaliatory force which exercised the safe passage concept. All non-essential aircraft were grounded for the 12 hour duration of the exercise which involved four tankers and their crews of the Home Alert Force. ⁷ →

Due to the national importance of this exercise, proper emphasis and command guidance were key roles which expressed the professionalism of this country's military team. In SAC, all members were effective in their brief releases on their reports and maintained SAC standards while, if not maintained, would present false capability commitments of this command. ⁸ U)

All participating units, crews, staff and maintenance personnel of the entire command displayed outstanding efforts to achieve this national objective. The results of these efforts proved that the operations and requirements of the Peace Task Force were fully adequate and supported with professional knowledge and skill. In the Wing, four sorties were launched and operated effectively, totalling 10.5 hours in the air. ⁹ U)

7. Ibid.

8. MEM, SAC to UNIFORM, DC 604394, 12 Oct 1961. Exhibit 15.

9. Ltr, 817ADC to SAC, U) "Peace Task Force Commander's Report (E-27)", 19 Oct 1961. Exhibit 15.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13

Spruce Up

One week before the Sky Shield II operation, on 6 October, Pease participated in an SAR simulated wartime enemy nuclear attack of its own involving fallout and radioactive conditions for 24 hours. This exercise was nicknamed "Spruce Up". Operations under these conditions saw the Wing battle staffs effectively manned, communications satisfactory and disaster actions unsatisfactory to outstanding. Wing aircraft (follow-on) and Home Alert Tankers simulated their retaliatory launch (not actual) capability and did not fly while maintenance teams performance under the specified conditions revealed a definite lack of knowledge on the subject. Combat units were initially slow to evaluate their remaining capabilities after destruction had occurred but when accomplished, proper action was taken to utilize their remaining resources. ¹⁰ (U)

The execution of near miss disaster conditions was generally satisfactory, but in a few instances, disastrous actions were not responded to in order to prevent that condition. Failure to evacuate when a time bomb had been planted exemplified this termination while a nuclear weapon aboard a Navy aircraft was reported experiencing a simulated unsuspected malfunction and improperly reported by the receiver of the situation. ¹¹ (U)

10. Ltr, S1700 to S1700, EXTRACT (U) "Spirits Report of Spruce Up", 28 Oct 1961. Exhibit 9.

11. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14

Reflex

Although the Wing reflex bombers seemed to be in the limelight in October, the reflex tankers operated successfully each time they deployed to Goose Air Base (AB) in Labrador. At the initial execution of Sky Shield II, these four planes and crews deployed to Goose and were inspected by the SAC IG and performed outstanding operations. While this Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) exercised all elements of the Goose Task Force during the preparation and generation phases, it also test the support forces and functions. Command leadership and control of the force were also rated outstanding. (U)

At the same time, the Wing bombers and tankers participated in a Pease Task Force ORI on the 14th. Although they were not scored officially, the 817th Air Division staff evaluated Wing operations and rated them satisfactory. Results proved maintenance and mission effectiveness satisfactory while air refueling operations were outstanding. The maintenance and mission effectiveness rating was based on three non-effective aircraft due to air, ground and camera-attack aborts. In the bombing reliability, the average CEA was 930 feet with crew 2-14 scoring a 250 foot bomb off target.

12. Msg, 8AF IG to 8AF, et al, IG 30779, 18 Oct 1961. Exhibit 25.
13. Msg, 8AF IG to 8AF, et al, IG 30769, 18 Oct 1961. Exhibit 26.
14. Ltr, 817AD to 509C, (U) "Pease Task Force ORI", 17 Oct 1961. Exhibit 27.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

15

The initial "Big Jump" reflex operation which first began on 7 September in view of the Soviet threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, continued its activities in October due to the seriousness of the world crisis, with the 509th operating 19 bombers, 10 to Big Jump activities at Zaragoza and 9 to normal reflex at Torrejon. The total operation at all times involved 31 combat crews which included six crews (three from each base) ready to redeploy at all times while the same amount readied to deploy from Pease at all times. ¹⁵ ~~(S)~~

One of the repeat problems of the crews while performing this special mission was brought to the Wing Commander's attention by the SAC ID OHI (September) was the knowledge of Tactical Doctrine and results of exams on this subject. In fact, of the three areas which were tested (positive control, Tactical Doctrine and Special Weapons), all areas were excellent except Tactical Doctrine. All ten Big Jump crews were tested. ¹⁶ ~~(S)~~

In lieu of the test results, a new lesson plan and training aids were initiated. Almost half of the crews received a special course on Tactical Doctrine and all were interviewed as to improvement made. ¹⁷ (U)

-
15. Attention is invited to ~~_____~~ Supplement to 509SW History for Sep 1961 in which the detailed extent of Big Jump is discussed. Note that the 10 crews which deployed was the initial execution order.
16. Msg, SAC to 509SW, et al, ID 61-509, 4 Oct 1961. Exhibit 22.
17. Msg, SAC to SAC, et al, D- 9-16, 13 Oct 1961. Exhibit 18. Note reflex and home alert crews problems brought to attention of Wing Commander's attention for review and how they were reviewed, i.e. Ltr, 509C to All Combat Crews, 509SW, "Action on Crew Comments", 5 Oct 1961. Exhibit 24.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

002

~~SECRET~~

16

Another major problem area involved crew rest times and flight planning¹⁸ prior to redeployment. Previously, crews received one day rest before redeployment from alert stauts. On 13 October (effective 1 November), this was changed by SAC so that crews could redeploy directly from alert status. In this way they would receive seven days of continuous Rest and Rehabilitation (R&R) time instead of six and then went back into alert status. After completion of alert duty, they would redeploy.¹⁹ ~~(S)~~

In order to maintain the Home Alert Force at peak operational readiness in October, Colonel McPherson exercised the four tankers of his alert force in seven practice alert exercises. Of these, (no-notice) five were BRAVO alerts which readied aircraft to taxi; one was a COCO alert which readied for take-off; and, one was a DELTA which flew the planes. Alert times were generally good throughout the month; only one problem really hampered alert reaction times and that came on 22 October with an incomplete broadcast from SAC.²⁰ ~~(S)~~

-
18. Msg, SAC to 8AF, et al, DO 309-10, 13 Oct 1961. Exhibit 18.
19. Ibid. Note example Usage of type training Wing reflex crews received at the forward base crew study briefings in Exhibit 17. Also, see emergency situation procedures used if a crew would encounter any problems while flying near politically sensitive or possibly unfriendly areas in Exhibit 22.
20. Wing Alert Results, Hq 509BW, (U) "509BW Alert Crews", Oct 1961. Exhibit 21. Note that the SAC mishap caused one Wing sortie deviation and 21 minutes to BRAVO.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17

July was the month which first initiated major activities now found in Wing operations and was also the month which SAC directed its units to increase the alert posture to 50 percent. This meant that half of the Wing's bombers would be placed in the alert status and would only be exercised at the discretion of higher headquarters directions or by the Wing Commander for the practice alerts. The 50 percent alert concept came as a result of Russia's actions to drop her iron curtain to initiate the Berlin crisis and thus dividing the city of Berlin in two, and thus tightened her grip on the East German people's access to free Western Sector of Berlin. (U)

This increased alert concept also encountered the same crew rest problem as Big Jump mission and effected the one day of crew rest after alert status in the first place.

Air Training

Air training priorities were the same in October as in previous months but on a more extensive scale due to the special higher headquarters missions. But the Wing's biggest problem on the Local Defense Runs (LDR) at Watertown IBS site was finally solved. The Wing encountered this problem ever since it was discovered back in August but no solution, until now, could be found.

21. See 509BW History for June-July 1961 which covers the initial start of the increased alert concept.

22. Msg, SAC to UNIFORM, C 18727, 11 Oct 1961. Exhibit 23.

23. Interview, Historian with 1/Lt Whitley, 509BWS, 8 Dec 1961.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18

Although this problem was discovered, it still accounted for a major part of the unreliable HCS runs and LDR activities. In fact, 16 LDR's against the Watertown site were charged to crew errors and unknown reasons (outside activity). ²⁴ ~~24~~

The Wing Commander learned that this problem was caused by an unknown jamming source in the Watertown area interfering with Wing LDR activity. Results of a Staff visit to the site revealed the difficulty was caused by B-52's making simulated bomb drops and LDR runs on a nearby site using the same frequency as Wing bombers. This B-52 activity was causing the Watertown site to confuse the B-52's with the Wing B-47's and resulted in erroneous scores as recorded by the site... ²⁵ ~~25~~

Colonel McPherson felt that bombing against this target was not completely fair to the Wing since other units competing in the SAC MCS program were not faced with such a problem and thus, could attain a higher unit reliability factor than the 50th. He further recommended that the Wing be waived for unit reliability against the site until such time as the problem was corrected. ²⁶ ~~26~~

24. Wing Commander's Remarks to Air Training Report, (1-SAC-112), Hq 50th AW, 8 Nov 1961. Exhibit 37.
25. Interview, Historian with Lt. Whitely, 50th AW, 7 Dec 1961.
26. Ibid, and same as 24 above. Attention is invited to BOM activity (directive) in msg, SAC to ALFA, et al, DDOKOD 7251, 28 Jul 1961. Exhibit 40.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19

By the end of the month there were no Wing B-47's committed to the Home Alert Force due to the 19 reflex commitments. Seventy combat ready crews had an EMO mission assignment by the end of October, had completed minimum monthly EMO study requirements and were certified on their assigned sorties, while the Wing had 65 percent of its annual training completed. ²⁷

At the same time, the 50th ARS Commander reported three KC-97's were committed to the Home Alert Force and six to the Goose reflex activities. Thirty-one combat ready crews had EMO assignments and were certified on their assigned air refueling missions. Although the Air Refueling Efficiency fell below minimum standards during the month, due to aircraft malfunctions, the unit had completed 92 percent of its annual training requirements. ²⁸

Outstanding problems affected the ARS operations in October were heavyweight refueling activities and aircraft malfunction. ²⁹ The heavyweight refueling contact time (15 minutes) seemed impractical to the Squadron Commander since only 45 minutes was allowed in the broken belt refueling area on reflex deployment. Since the major completion of training requirements depended upon this unit's heavyweight refueling on reflex deployment, a request for optional times in the belt

27. Wing Commander's Remarks to Air Training Report (I-SAC-112), 50 ARS, 8 Nov 1961. Exhibit 37.

28. Squadron Commander's Remarks to Air Training Report (I-SAC-112), 50 ARS, 8 Nov 1961. Exhibit 38.

29. Wing Commander's Remarks to Air Training Report (I-SAC-112), 50 ARS, 8 Nov 1961. Exhibit 39.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

was submitted.³⁰ But SAC further defined SAC 50-8 directives and revealed that misinterpretation of them was the only problem in this case.³¹ (U)

As discussed in the preceding pages of this chapter, combat crew knowledge, especially Tactical Doctrine,³² was an area of extreme concern to the Wing Commander and his staff in the month. Special emphasis was placed on crew BMD mission knowledge and combat mission study briefings due to the extent of importance of each mission performed.³³ (U)

Golden Hour Tango (HGT) crew testing was another area of concern in the combat crew training indoctrination. Bomber crews were tested on positive control, authentication (OAT), execution and oral crew knowledge of these subjects while tanker crews were tested on the same plus the reaction principles.³⁴ (U)

Although the HGT alert had not been exercised in October, the Wing Commander felt that his combat crews should be ready when the SAC IC came. At that time, the HGT would be initiated and after the base alert force had been generated, follow-on aircraft would be dispatched by ready to fly in a certain reaction generation times.³⁵ (U)

-
30. Msg, SAC to WHISKEY, DAF 04010, 21 Oct 1961. Exhibit 35.
31. Msg, SAC to WHISKEY, et al, DAF 04900, 21 Oct 1961. Exhibit 36.
32. Ibid.
33. Msg, SAC to ALPHA MI, et al, DAF 02816, 14 Oct 1961. Exhibit 41.
34. Ltr, BIVAC to BIVAC, 1 Nov 1961. Exhibit 38.
35. Ltr, BIVAC to SAC, 30900's 10-11-61, 20 Oct 1961. Exhibit 39.
36. Msg, BIVAC to SAC, 30900's 10-11-61, 19 Sep 1961. Exhibit 39.
37. Ltr, BIVAC to SAC, by Maj. Brown, 30900's to members of Wing Staff meeting, 25 Oct 1961.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1

Celestial Grid Navigation was performed satisfactory over the last two training quarters by the Wing. Although failures did occur from time to time, no problem was too severe as to affect any major area. Retraining and rechecks by standardization crews counteracted these failures and proved excellent corrective results. (U)

Summary

8

In summary, the 509th Wing fulfilled its primary air training priorities, met its BMO commitments, maintained an effective Tanker Alert Force, responded satisfactorily to the Pease Task Force exercises, participated in defensive and offensive higher headquarters directed mission to combat Russian threats and military advances in the Berlin crisis, won first place in SAF for RBS Express Free Trimmer and was rated as successfully prepared to meet no-notice operational readiness inspections by Eighth AF and SAC Inspector Generals. At the same time, the Wing maintained reflex deployment and redeployment activities to the Spanish complex and continued upgrading combat crews under its effective air training program. (U)

36. Msg, 811AD to 8AF, 509DCOS 10-11-J, 10 Sep 1961. Exhibit 39.

CHAPTER IV

MATERIAL

Introduction

Wing Material activities in October 1961 supported Wing operations activities at Pease and in Spain with major efforts expended to the maintenance of aircraft and equipment in order to accomplish the primary mission. No major difficulties were experienced as to affect primary mission performance throughout the month although maintenance performed on reflex bombers in Spain did experience a variety of problems. Supply functions supported the needs of Material activities with only minor problems experienced while projects such as MADREC and Red Barn flexed improvement and routine problem areas of Material. (U)

Maintenance

The Wing had 48 B-47 type bombers (B-47) assigned by the end of the month which flew 246 sorties for 1998 hours of flying time, an increase in sorties and decrease in flying time as compared to September figures. The bombers, which experienced seven take-off cancellations due to weather and two to material in October, were charged with four late take-offs (Material) during the month. September figures revealed that besides the 22 cancellations caused by weather difficulties in that month, material cancellations remained the same while there was an

GROUP IV

increase in late take-offs (material).¹ (U)

The KC-97C tankers, on the other hand, had 22 assigned by month's end totaling 71 1/2 hours in the air for 77 sorties. This was the exact opposite situation than that of the bombers since September figures had 698 flying hours for 71 sorties, a decrease in both areas. One cancellation to weather and two to material composed the tanker take-off times during the month, compared to the two cancellations (Material) in September, while late take-offs increased by two over that month.² (U)

Material problems experienced by Big Jump reflex crews in October were general in nature and corrected by maintenance personnel of the Wing and of Zaragoza, the Big Jump reflex base in Spain. Of these, sextant malfunctions, oil pressures and engine problems were repeat discrepancies.³ Supporting this increased workload in Spain, 30 to 35 maintenance technicians of the Wing saw TDY action in Spain during the month.⁴ (U)

-
- 1. Maint.-Production Summary (AP-d25), Hq 509BW, September 1961. Exhibit 54. Exhibit 46 of Sep 1961 509BW Historical Data Report, (APD-5).
 - 2. Ibid.
 - 3. Attention is invited to Exhibits 47 through 50 which cover, in detail, the numerous discrepancies reported by reflex crews during October.
 - 4. Ltr, 509DCM to 509C, (U) "Unit History for October", 15 Nov 1961.

14

A project which began on 25 October and was scheduled for completion of nine Wing bombers involved by the end of 1962, was "Red Barn", an IRAN winterized overhaul program. ⁵ Since this was the best period to complete and schedule this project, due to reflex activities, the input of additional aircraft to IRAN was optional. The project, due to reflex activities, was vulnerable to be disrupted by the middle of completion so this increased input, it was felt (CAF) would eliminate that possibility. ⁶ ECM equipment was left behind for Wing AEWB technicians to check while each aircraft departed to IRAN and by the end of the month, no problems were experienced on 52-528, (tail-number), the first bomber to be involved. (U)

Another area of concern in October was the Malfunction Detection and Recording System (MADREC) which was first implemented into Wing maintenance operations at the end of July. This system was a proven airborne test system, which recorded accurate data concerning the performance of electronic subsystems under all airplane environment conditions. ⁸ (U)

In October, difficulty was experienced by units of 2AF as to the early operating hours of the equipment but no problems of this nature had been experienced by the Wing.... In fact, the system was producing effective results in the findings of maintenance work. ⁹ (U)

5. Msg. SIVAD to CAF, 509D001 26-14-1, 26 Sep 1961. Exhibit 43.
6. Msg. SIVAD to SAC, et al, 509D001 8-7-1, 8 Sep 1961. Exhibit 42.
7. Msg. CAF to XRAY, DREB 54358, 25 Oct 1961. Exhibit 44.
8. Msg. SIVAD to SAC, et al, 509D001 2-5-3, 2 Oct 1961.
9. Exhibit 26 of Historical Data Report (AF-05), by 509WV, Aug 1961.
9. Msg. CAF to XRAY, DREB 44254a, 27 Oct 1961. Exhibit 51.

Supply

Periscope Sextants, the only major problem area of the Wing Supply functions over the last six months, had 16 in stock over that period that had been abnormally damaged. The origination of this damage was not revealed. The Sextants, which were stored in cases aboard tankers and in special brackets on the bombers (2 each), totalled 24 in the FMS Pre-Issue Section. Coordination between this section and the Wing Director of Supply was initiated as a check and recheck of the equipment to prevent future occurrence of the problem which could not be solved. (U)

Summary

Wing Material functions saw a slight increase in activities over previous months while Maintenance personnel continued to deploy to Spain under the Big Jump operation; airplanes and equipment were maintained in a satisfactory manner with only minor problems encountered during the month; the first bombers of the Wing were deployed to IRAN under Project Red Barn, the winterization overhaul program; and, the Alert Force Operations Maintenance and service functions, special activities of maintenance and supply, were maintained properly and supported Wing aircraft for the 41st ICS training program. (U)

- 10. Ltr, 509DBUP to 509C, (U) "Periscope Sextants", n.d. Exhibit 45. Reference is made to 509BW Historical Data Reports (AF-DS) dated back as far as May 1961.
- 11. Msg, 817AD to SAC, et al, 509SAFE 3-1-1, 20 Oct 1961. Exhibit 50. Msg, 8AF to XMY, 18F 88030, 4 Oct 1961. Exhibit 53. Both these documents deal with the Special Handling of inflight problems experienced by some combat crews during Oct 1961.
- 12. Ltr, 817AW to 509C, 1000 and 4188C, (U) "Programming ICS Requirements", 18 Sep 1961. Exhibit 46. The Wing provided aircraft (3-47) for ICS training program in Oct 1961.

LIST OF EXHIBITS

1. Officers Roster, Hq 509BW, Sep 1961.
2. Monthly Strength Summary, Hq 509th BW, 31 Oct 1961.
3. Msg, 8AF to XRAY, et al, DPO 16692, 3 Oct 1961.
4. Msg, 817AD to 8AF, 509C 7-J, 9 Oct 1961.
5. SO C-121, Hq SAC, 3 Oct 1961.
6. Wing Policy 35-4, Hq 509BW, 10 Oct 1961.
7. Msg, SAC to ALFA II, et al, CS 2580, 6 Oct 1961.
8. Ltr, 8AF DI to 509C, (U) "Public Statements by Soviet Military Leaders", 23 Oct 1961.
9. Ltr, 817DO to 817CSGC, (U) "Umpire Report of 'Spruce Up' Exercise of PAFB, N.H.", 28 Oct 1961.
10. SO P-4, Hq 817AD, 13 Oct 1961.
11. Msg, 8AF to XRAY and YANCER, DOTS 20311, 11 Oct 1961.
12. "Tree Trimmer Report", Hq 509BW, n.d.
13. Msg, 8AF to WHISKEY, DOGIB 61185, 11 Jul 1961.
14. Ops. Ord. 3-61, Hq NORAD, "Sky Shield II", 20 Sep 1961.
15. Msg, 8AF to UNIFORM, DC 60439A, 12 Oct 1961.
16. Ltr, 817ADC to 8AF, (U) "Peace Task Force Commander's Report (I-27) for Sky Shield II, SAC Operations Order 11-62, 19 Oct 1961.
17. Msg, 16AF to WHISKEY, et al, DO 1617, 10 Oct 1961.
18. Msg, 7AD to SAC, DO 309-10, 13 Oct 1961.
19. Ltr, 509C to 509th Combat Crews, (U) "Action on Crews Comments", 5 Oct 1961.
20. Msg, SAC to ALFA II, et al, DO 3175, 26 Oct 1961.

21. Wing Alert Results, Hq 509BW, 509th Alert Force, Oct 1961.
22. Msg, SAC to 509BW, IG 61-539, 4 Oct 1961.
23. Msg, 8AF to UNIFORM, C 18727, 11 Oct 1961.
24. Msg, 8AF to UNIFORM, DM 9805, 16 Oct 1961.
25. Msg, SAC to 8AF, IG 30779, 18 Oct 1961.
26. Msg, 8AF to 817AD, IG 30769, 18 Oct 1961.
27. Ltr, 817ADC to 509C, (U) "Personal", 17 Oct 1961.
28. Wing Sup 1 to SACR 55-11, Hq 509BW, 4 Oct 1961.
29. Ltr, 509DCCF to 509C thru 509DCC, (U) "Chief of Training Conference, 8AF Hq", 27 Oct 1961.
30. Ltr, 509C to All Commanders and Staff Members, (U) "General Sweeney's Remarks - Commanders Conference", 9 Oct 1961.
31. Ltr, 509DCCFB to 509C, et al, (U) "8AF Monthly Conference", n.d.
32. Ltr, 817ADOD to 509C and 100C, (U) "Combat Crew EWC Knowledge", 1 Nov 1961.
33. Ltr, 817ADOD to 817ADC, (U) "GHF Crew Resting", 20 Oct 1961.
34. Msg, 817AD to 8AF, 509DCCFB 10-8-J, 9 Oct 1961.
35. Msg, 8AF to WRIGHTY, DOT 64010, 21 Oct 1961.
36. Msg, 8AF to SAC, DOT 64960C, 21 Oct 1961.
37. Wing Commander's Remarks to Air Training Report (1-SAC-T-12), Hq 509BW, 8 Nov 1961.
38. Squadron Commander's Remarks to Air Training Report (1-SAC-T-12), Hq 509ARS, 8 Nov 1961.
39. Msg, 817AD to 8AF, 509DCCB, 10-11-J, 10 Sep 1961.
40. Msg, SAC to ALFA, et al, DDOFOD 7251, 28 Jul 1961.
41. Msg, SAC to ALFA II, et al, DOT 2816, 14 Oct 1961.
42. Msg, 817AD to SAC, et al, 509DCCB R-9-I, 8 Sep 1961.
43. Msg, 817AD to SAC, et al, 509DCCB 26-14-I, 26 Sep 1961.
44. Msg, 8AF to XRAY, DMSB 54358, 23 Oct 1961.
45. Ltr, 509DBEP to 509C, (U) "Periscope Sextants", 28 Oct 1961.

46. Ltr, 817ADM to 509C, et al, (U) "Programming for MSB Requirements during October 1961", 18 Sep 1961.
47. Msg, 397CSG to 509BW, CANS 4-436-66, 4 Oct 1961.
48. Msg, 387CSG to 509BW, CANS-9-542-61, 12 Oct 1961.
49. Msg, 397CSG to 509BW, CANS 9-471-61, 18 Oct 1961.
50. Msg, 397CSG to 509BW, CANS 9-481-61, 27 Oct 1961.
51. Msg, 8AF to XRAY, DM5A, 27 Oct 1961.
52. Msg, 817AD to SAC, et al, 509SAFE 3-1-J, 2 Oct 1961.
53. Msg, 8AF to XRAY, DSP 88230, 14 Oct 1961.
54. Aircraft and GAM Production Summary (AF-825), Hq 509BW, Oct 1961.
55. Aircraft/Missile Operational Data Report (1-AF-A1), Hq 509BW, as of 31 Oct 1961.
56. Management Control Data Report (1-SAC-R-35), Hq 509BW, Oct 1961.

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>INCUMBENT</u>	<u>INCLUSIVE DATES OF COMMAND</u>	
		<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Commander	Colonel Donald G. McPherson	16 Aug 1960	-
Vice Commander	Colonel Archie S. Adair	25 Jul 1961	-
D/Comdr for Operations	Lt. Colonel Howard W. Slaton	25 Jul 1961	-
D/Comdr for Maintenance	Colonel Robert E. Dinwiddie	9 Aug 1959	-
Director of Administrative Services	Major Jack R. Stanley * Captain George V. Teft	21 Jul 1961 3 Oct 1961	3 Oct 1961 -
Comptroller	Major Henry F. Fischer	13 May 1959	-
Director of Safety	Major George R. Schmidt	30 Apr 1958	-
Director of Supply	Major Joe M. Gold	4 Apr 1960	-

SQUADRON COMMANDERS

393rd Bombardment Squadron	Major R. E. Johnson	25 Jul 1961	-
830th Bombardment Squadron	Lt. Colonel Charles B. Hodges	9 Aug 1960	-
661st Bombardment Squadron	Major Mark J. Gilles	15 Jun 1960	-
715th Bombardment Squadron	Major Thomas E. Carter	1 Mar 1959	-

* Additional Duty. Captain Teft was the 509th Headquarters Squadron Commander.

Headquarters Squadron Section	Captain George V. Teft	15 Dec 1959	-
509th Air Refueling Squadron	Major Jack H. Ingram	26 Jul 1961	-
509th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron	Lt. Colonel Virgil R. Hyperson	21 Nov 1960	-
509th Organizational Maintenance Squadron	Lt. Colonel Clyde L. Grow	29 Jul 1961	-
509th Field Maintenance Squadron	Lt. Colonel Harold F. Horton	2 Sep 1960	-

509TH BOMBARDMENT WING (SAC)
 United States Air Force
 Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

RCS: 8AF-Pl

ROSTER OF OFFICERS

20 October 1961

AIRCRAFT QUALIFICATION CODES

Name	1 - Pilot, B/BB-47	4 - Pilot, KC-135	7 - Pilot, Twin Engine
AFSM	2 - Pilot, B-52	5 - Pilot, AirObsrBmbr	8 - Pilot, Four Engine
Date of Rank	3 - Pilot, KC-97	6 - Pilot, Single Engine	9 - Pilot, Indefinetely Suspended

ADD PREFIX: P - Pilot, S - Senior Pilot, C - Command Pilot

Air Crew Data
 A - Navigator B - Navigator Bombardier C - Navigator, Indef Suspended

Duty Title
 ADD PREFIX: N - Navigator, S - Sr Navigator, M - Master Navigator

Organisation
 EC - ECM Officer FS - Flight Surgeon AM - Acft Observer, Medical
 DW - Weapons Officer NO - Radar Operator EP - Acft Performance Engineer
 AO - Acft Observer SO - Sr Acft Observer MO - Master Acft Observer
 Authorized UMD Position OS - Acft Observer Suspended XI - Non-Rated

GRADE CODES

Foreign Service
 Selective Dates 7 - Gen 5 - Lt Col 3 - Capt Spot Promotion
 6 - Col 4 - Maj 2 - Lt Code: Z

Date Departed Last
 Duty Station/DEROS

MONTH CODES

Duty Phone	1 - January	5 - May	9 - September
Home Phone	2 - February	6 - June	X - October
	3 - March	7 - July	J - November
	4 - April	8 - August	K - December

ERRORS ON THIS ROSTER SHOULD BE REPORTED BY CALLING EXTENSION 2409

COMPONENT	BASE PERSONNEL			ASST.			TRAVEL PER UNIT		
	OFF	ARM	NAV	OFF	ARM	NAV	OFF	ARM	ASST-TOTAL
81TH AIR DIV	10								
81TH MED SQ	25								
81TH SIG SQ	1								
81TH PSYCHRON	2								
81TH C E SQ	4								
81TH LIFELN	14								
81TH BATTAL	5								
81TH TRANSPORT	4								
81TH AERON	4								
SUB-TOTAL	103								
81ST BOMB	71								
100TH AERON	112								
100TH AERON	5								
349TH BOMB	50								
350TH BOMB	65								
351ST BOMB	65								
418TH BOMB	65								
100TH ORDNANCE	10								
100TH FLDMAINT	7								
SUB-TOTAL	461								
41ST MAINT	8								
AG. SQ	169								
81ST BOMB	71								
509TH AERON	112								
509TH AERON	7								
393RD BOMB	65								
715TH BOMB	73								
830TH BOMB	62								
861ST BOMB	63								
509TH ORDNANCE	10								
509TH FLDMAINT	7								
SUB-TOTAL	471								
UNALLOCATED (BASE)									
BASE TOTAL	1,000								
101ST RES AID	1								
1917-2 AID	7								
DET 6, 8TH WEAPON	4								
DET 105, 1ST CSI	4								
202ND FLDMAINT	4								
SUB-TOTAL	20								
TOTAL	1,020								

NOTES: *NOT INCLUDED IN TOTALS
 81ST TRANSPORT AUTHORITY OVERSIC...
 202ND FLDMAINT...

5160

OMAA41DHG578T
 FM RJEAGH
 DE RJEXDH 423
 ZNR
 P 032210Z
 FM JAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
 TO ARAY
 RJEAKK/1981MWS WHEATLAND AFB FLA
 RJEXFH/4010MBWG LORING AFB ME
 RJEXDP/4038STRATAG HOW AFB ME
 RJEXGF/4039STRATAG GRIFFISS AFB MO
 RJEXHQ/4047STRATAG MCCOY AFB FLA
 RJEKDR/4138STRATAG TURNER AFB GA
 ZEN/07AIBDIV WESTOVER AFB MASS
 RJEKDG/19AIBFLSA OYIS AFB MASS
 ZEN/4305SP154 WESTOVER AFB MASS
 INFO RJEKKL/11AIBRFLSO DOVER AFB DEL

BT
 UNCLAS DFO 10692. SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS.
 WITHDRAWL OF SUPPORT OFFICERS IN SUPPORT OF B-47 AND KC-
 97 PROGRAMS. AS BRIEFED AT THE RECENT COMMANDER'S CONFER-
 RENCE A REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR THIS COMMAND TO ENTER PILOTS
 INTO THE B-47 AND KC-97 CCTS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENTS
 FOR ATTRITION LOSSES IN THE PERIOD FORCE AND TO INSURE
 MAINTENANCE OF 1.5 TO 1 RATIO. THESE COURSES OCCUR
 BETWEEN THE PERIOD 24 OCT 61 AND 17 DEC 61. IN THE CASE
 OF OFFICERS ATTENDING THE KC-97 COURSE, THEY WILL BE
 EVENTUALLY ASSIGNED TO THE STATIONS INDICATED. AMT ASSIGN-

PAGE TWO RJEXDH 423
 COMMENTS FOR PERSONNEL ATTENDING THE B-47 COURSES ARE NOT
 KNOWN. ADDITIONAL PILOT COMMITMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED DURING
 EARLY 1962. WE ARE LIMITED BY A TIME FACTOR AS WELL AS
 THE AREA OF WITHDRAWAL. WE CANNOT DRAW FROM DAFCO AREAS
 IN THE COMBAT AND OPERATIONS FIELD, 3XXX, 40XX, 54XX OR
 ANY USAF LIMITED RESOURCE AFSC. THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS
 ASSIGNED YOUR COMMAND HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED FROM OUR RECORDS
 AS POSSESSING THE MINIMUM REQUISITES FOR ENTRY INTO TRAIN-
 ING AS INDICATED:

A. PCS TO 4347 CCTS, MCCONNELL AFB, KANSAS
 CLASS 62-9H REPTG 24 OCT 61:

POSITION	GRADE	NAME	AFSC	UNIT
A/C	LTCOL	(b) (6)	40794940	198W
A/C	MAJOR		43300A	804ADIV
CP	CAPT		49111A	81 ADIV
CP	1LT		49971A	82 ADIV
CP	1LT		402210605	4195W
CLASS 62-10M RE				
A/C	LTCOL		13011A	198W
A/C	MAJOR		40601203	804ADIV

CP CAPT (b) (6)
CP CAPT
CP CAPT
CLASS 1-110 20
A/C LTJG
A/C MAJOR
A/C MAJOR
CP CAPT
CP MAJOR
CLASS 1-120 21
POSITION GRADE
A/C LTJG
A/C CAPT
CP CAPT
CP CAPT
A. TRY TO 439740W HANJOLN APT. 1778N, 151° 10' W
(19 OCT 61)
PMS GRADE NAME
A/C MAJOR WALTERS L E MORGENTHAU

PAGE FOUR BOLLEN 411
A/C MAJOR WELLS C C
A/C CAPT CUSLEY J R
A/C MAJOR WAGNER I C
CP 1LT COLLIN G A
CP MAJOR MICHAEL B Y
CP MAJOR GARROLD J J
CLASS 1-130 22
A/C MAJOR WORMLEY E R
A/C MAJOR WOODRUFF E J
A/C MAJOR (b) (6)
CP 1LT
CP 1LT
CLASS 1-140 23
PMS GRADE NAME
CP CAPT
CP MAJOR
CLASS 1-150 24
A/C MAJOR
A/C MAJOR
A/C MAJOR

PAGE FIVE BOLLEN 411
A/C CAPT (b) (6)
CP CAPT
CP MAJOR
CP CAPT
CLASS 1-160 25
A/C MAJOR
A/C MAJOR

RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THE POLICY OF THE
WILL BE THE POLICY OF THE
MAJOR [REDACTED] TO MAINTAIN THE
PROPERTY
SAC AS PART OF THE POLICY OF THE
RATIONALITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE
GRADE MARKING, THE POLICY OF THE
THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN THE
EXAMINATION OF THE POLICY OF THE
DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE
YOUR POLICY OF THE POLICY OF THE
OF SUPPORT OF THE POLICY OF THE
IT SHOULD BE THE POLICY OF THE
MANAGING OF THE POLICY OF THE
LATION. IN ANOTHER POLICY OF THE
THE POLICY OF THE POLICY OF THE
SATISFACTORILY. A POLICY OF THE
OF POLICY OF THE POLICY OF THE
IN POLICY OF THE POLICY OF THE
ADDITION, THE POLICY OF THE
TO REMAIN AT THE POLICY OF THE
A POLICY OF THE POLICY OF THE
A. J. [REDACTED]

9 1961
Oct -

JOINT MESSAGEFORM CONTINUATION SHEET

UNCLASSIFIED

817 AIR DIV PEASE AFB NH

WILL FURTHER AGGRAVATE THIS SITUATION. THE LOSS OF MAJOR (b) (6) TO MISSILES AND MAJOR (b) (6) TO SAC ARE PARTICULARLY PROTESTED AND ARE DIFFICULT TO RATIONALIZE IN THE LIGHT OF BEST MAN, OUR LOW FIELD GRADE MANNING, THE SHORTAGE OF SUPPORT OFFICERS AND THE REQUIREMENT TO BUILD UP CREW RESOURCES. MAJOR (b) (6) WAS WITHDRAWN FROM CREW RESOURCES TO FILL A CRITICAL MAINTENANCE POSITION. HIS LOSS TO MISSILES, A JOB FOR WHICH HE IS NOT QUALIFIED, WILL NECESSITATE WITHDRAWAL OF AN OFFICER FROM CREW RESOURCES AS HIS REPLACEMENT. SIMILARLY, MAJOR (b) (6) WAS WITHDRAWN FROM E-47-CREW RESOURCES FOR DEPT IN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS SKILL AND THE NEED FOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICERS, I UNDERSTAND HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO MOTOR VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, AT-646. HIS LOSS WILL DICTATE ANOTHER WITHDRAWAL FROM CREW RESOURCES. I MOST URGENTLY REQUEST THAT THESE OFFICERS BE PERMITTED TO REMAIN AT PEASE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A MORE FAVORABLE MANNING POSITION HAS BEEN ATTAINED.

PART II. WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFICERS NAMED

C

2

6

UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM CONTINUATION SHEET

UNCLASSIFIED

817 AIR DIV PEASE AFB NH

SPECIFICALLY IN REFERENCED MESSAGE, THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED:

A. MAJOR (b) (6) HAD ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED FOR RETURN TO CREW DUTY UNDER BEST MAN. HE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE; HOWEVER, I DO NOT RECOMMEND HIS UTILIZATION AS AIRCRAFT COMMANDER. THIS VIEW IS CONFIRMED BY COLONEL D. P. WOOD, THE OFFICER WHO REASSIGNED MAJOR (b) (6) FROM CREW ASSIGNMENT IN SEP 1966. MAJOR (b) (6) GRADUATED FROM AOB AND B-47'S IN 1956 AND HAS ACCRUED 1,000 HOURS OF MULTI-JET TIME. SHOULD YOU DESIRE TO UTILIZE HIM IN THE B-47 PROGRAM RETURN THROUGH CCTS APPEARS TO BE UNNECESSARY.

B. CAPTAIN (b) (6) HAS BEEN REASSIGNED TO THE CREW FORCE WITH A VIEW TO UPGRADING TO AIRCRAFT COMMANDER. HE COMPLETED THE CREW COMMANDER B-47 TRANSITION COURSE IN 1957, HAS THREE YEARS CREW EXPERIENCE, AND 950 HOURS MULTI-JET TIME. HIS PCS WOULD INCUR AN UNNECESSARY EXPENSE. IN THE EVENT A CO-PILOT RESOURCE IS REQUIRED FOR CLASS (2-9M) RECOMMEND THAT A PROGRAMMED INPUT TO PEASE BE DIVERTED FOR THIS PURPOSE, OR THAT MAJOR EARNEST A HEADBERG, 28265A DAFSC 6441, BE ASSIGNED TO CCTS IN HIS STEAD.

C

J

L

UNCLASSIFIED

DB 173-1

JOINT MESSAGEFORM CONTINUED ON SHEET

UNCLASSIFIED

817 AIR DIV PEASE AFB NH

MAJOR (b) (6) HAD BEEN LOCALLY IDENTIFIED AS A
CREW RESOURCE UNDER PROJECT BEST MAN. MAJOR
(b) (6) RETURN TO PEASE IS DESIRED IF POSSIBLE.

C. LT (b) (6) IS ASSIGNED AS ASST BASE OPERATIONS
OFFICER, AFSC 1435. SHOULD HIS PCS TO DOVER REMAIN
FIRM, A RATED REPLACEMENT WILL BE REQUIRED AND THIS
PROBABLY MUST COME FROM OPAW RESOURCES. I CONSIDER
THE BASE OPERATIONS ACTIVITY AT PEASE MARGINAL AT
BEST AND IT'S MANNING IS IMPERATIVE.

D. EXCEPT FOR MANNING DEFICIENCIES, CONCUR IN
ENTERING MAJOR SINCLAIR INTO THE KC-97 CREW FORCE
AS PROGRAMMED.

E. EXCEPT FOR MANNING DEFICIENCIES CONCUR IN
THE ENTRY OF CAPTAIN CAMIDGE INTO THE KC-97 CREW
FORCE. HOWEVER, HE HAS BEEN ON STATION ONLY 10
MONTHS. IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMY IT IS REQUESTED
HE ATTEND CCTS IN TDY STATUS AND RETURN TO PEASE.
CREW COMMANDER INPUT PROGRAMMED TO PEASE SHOULD
BE REALLOCATED TO LOCKBOURNE IN HIS STEAD.

F. LT (b) (6) IS PRESENTLY TDY TO T-33 SCHOOL AT
RANDOLPH AND HAS A DIRECTED DUTY ASSIGNMENT TO
MARCH 02 BECAUSE OF ATTENDANCE AT COURSE OBE-7321.

UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173-1

0

UNIT AIR DIV PLEASE REFER

HE HAS LESS THAN ONE YEAR OF SERVICE, AND HAS
RECENTLY PURCHASED A HOME IN THE AREA. IN THE
INTERESTS OF ECONOMY AND TO AVOID PERSONAL HARASSMENT
IT IS RECOMMENDED HE ATTEND COURSE IN TRY STATUS AND
THAT MAJOR (b) (6) A PROJECTED INPUT FROM WEST-
OVER UNDER THIS PROGRAM BE ASSIGNED TO LOCKBOURNE
IN HIS STEAD. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, OUR REQUIREMENT IS
FOR KC-97 CO-PILOTS, CREW COMMANDER INPUTS PLUS PUP
WILL MEET CREW COMMANDER REQUIREMENTS, DBA WAIVER
ON LT WYMAN'S ASSIGNMENT.

G. EXCEPT FOR MINOR DEFICIENCIES, CONCUR IN
ENTRY OF MAJOR DALBY IN CO-PILOT POS AS PROGRAMMED.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WITH DEPARTURE OF MAJOR
(b) (6) THE DIRECTORATE OF PERSONNEL
HERE WILL BE SHORT FIVE OFFICERS. THERE IS NO RESOURCE
AVAILABLE FROM WHICH TO ALLEVIATE THIS DEFICIENCY.
THIS DIRECTORATE IS CURRENTLY SHORT THREE OFFICERS
AND I ALREADY CONSIDER ITS OPERATION MARGINAL AT BEST.

H. LT (b) (6) HAS A DESIRED DUTY ASSIGNMENT
TO MAY 1962 FOR ATTENDANCE AT COURSE 14211 AND H-41-B
TRAINING. WAIVER OF DBA WILL BE REQUIRED.

117 AIR DIV PLEASE ADVISE

PART III. I FULLY APPRECIATE THE PRESSURE RESULTING FROM RETENTION OF THE MEDIUM FORCE AND AM MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO IMPROVE UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES. NONETHELESS, THE DETERIORATING OFFICER MANNING POSITION IS OF THE GREATEST CONCERN TO ME AND I EARNESTLY REQUEST ASSISTANCE, FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF THE ACTIONS INDICATED IN PART I AND II WILL BE MOST HELPFUL.

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
United States Air Force
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

3 October 1961

SPECIAL ORDER
G-121

1. The following units are discontinued effective 1 Jan 62. Concurrently the Air Force controlled units revert to the control of the DAF. Personnel and equipment will be absorbed in other SAC units. Records will be disposed of in accordance with paragraph 040406, AFM 181-5.

Bombardment Sq. Medium
408, 413, 415, 418, 419, 423, 424, 427, 428, 429,
448, 489, 515, 531, 547, 657, 658, 660, 630

Operations Squadron
2, 6, 9, 11, 19, 22, 42, 68, 72, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97,
305, 306, 310, 340, 379, 4038, 4047, 4123, 4126,
4130, 4138, 4141, 4170, 4228, 4238.

2. The 34th Air Refueling Sq. Heavy, Offutt AFB, Nebr. is reorganized under an appropriate unit manning document with capability as cited in organizational table R13158, 1 Jun 61, par 1 & 2c, Part I (Part II D), effective 1 Jan 62. Equipment authorization is cited by letter in par 3, below.

3. The 866th Technical Training Sq, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Ala. is discontinued effective 25 Jan 62. Concurrently this unit will revert to the control of the DAF. Personnel rendered surplus by this action will be absorbed in other SAC units. Equipment rendered surplus will revert to stocks. Records will be disposed of in accordance with par 040406, AFM 181-5.

4. Par 4, SO G-57, this Hq, 17 May 61, pertaining to the designation and organization of Hq 4111 Strat Wg, Little Rock AFB, Ark. is revoked.

5. The 12th Bombardment Sq. Medium having been redesignated as the 12th Strategic Missile Sq (ICBM-Minuteman), activated and assigned to Strategic Air Command is organized effective 1 Mar 62, at Minot AFB, Mont. under an appropriate unit manning document with capability as cited in organizational table R17158, 1 Nov 60, par 1 & 2c, Part I (Part II G), and is further assigned to the 341st Strat Mail Wg (ICBM-Minuteman).

upon organization the 12th Strat Mel Sq (ICBM-Minuteman) is entitled to the history and to any battle honors, colors and emblem belonging to the 12th Bombardment Sq, Medium, inactivated 25 Jun 61. Unit history with information provided by the Director of Military Personnel Headquarters USAF concerning the existence of battle honors, colors and emblem will be forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command by the USAF Historical Division, Air University through automatic distribution. Requisition for the appropriate colors can then be made as prescribed in AFR 45-25, 29 Jan 54.

6. So much of par 2, SO G-418, this Hq, 20 Sep 61, pertaining to the reassignment of the 4080th Supply Sq to the 4080th Strat Wg, is revoked.

7. Authority for above actions: Ltr, DAF, AFOMO 631m, Subject: Inactivation of 866 Tech Tng Sq; Certain Other USAF Unit Actions, 3 Aug 61; AFOMO 658m, Subject: Inactivation of 408th Bomb Sq, (M); Certain Other USAF Unit Actions, 22 Sep 61; AFOMO 659m, Subject: Activation of 12th Strat Mel Sq (ICBM-Minuteman), 22 Sep 61 and AFR 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Robert J. Kneeland
 ROBERT J. KNEELAND
 Major, USAF
 Directorate of Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION

78 - Hq SAC Distribution	1 - Hq USAF (AFCTG)
20 Each Bomb Wg (H) 6, 19, 42, 72, 92, 93, 95, 97, 179	2 - Hq USAF (AFSCG)
	1 - Hq USAF (AFOMO)
	1 - Hq USAF (AFQCP)
20 - Each Bomb Wg (M) 2, 9, 22, 68, 40, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 107, 110, 121, 140, 176, 180, 184, 109	1 - Hq USAF (AFPMF)
	1 - Hq USAF (AFPMCI)
	2 - ARRC, 3800 York St, Denver 5, Colo
	2 - AFIC (MCSDE)
20 - Each Strat Wg 4038, 4047, 4080, 4111, 4123, 4126, 4130, 4138, 4141, 4170, 4228, 4238, 4321	2 - AFIC (MCJ-Library)
	35 - 2AF
	35 - 8AF
	35 - 15AF
	35 - 16AF
10 - 866 Tech Tng Sq	35 - 3 Air Div
10 - 341 Strat Mel Wg	35 - 7 Air Div
1 - Hq USAF (AFCAS-5)	35 - 1st Strat Aerospace Div
1 - Hq USAF (AFASC-5P-1)	35 - SAC Systems Office, AF Unit Post Office, Los Angeles 45, Calif
6 - 1902 AB Wg	2 - 544 Recon Tech Gp

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

AF

UNCLAS

EIGHTH AIR DIVISION PLEASE ADVISE
SAC HEADQUARTERS OFFUTT AFB NEB.
INFO CAP WESTOVER MASS (SEE MAIL)

DISTRIBUTION:
317C
31700
507000

BT/DO 11-10-J

REFERENCE SAC SPECIAL ORDER G-12R DATED 3 OCT 1961 AND RY MESSAGE
DOWNSIDE DATED 1 SEPT 1961. SUBJECT: DISCONTINUATION OF 66TH
BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON.

PART I.

REQUEST RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER TO DISCONTINUE THE 66TH BOMB-
ARDMENT SQUADRON MENTIONED ON 1 JAN 1962; AND REQUESTED THE 66TH BOMB-
ARDMENT SQUADRON NUMBER BE DISCONTINUED IN LIEU OF. THIS REQUEST
IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

1. THE 66TH SQUADRON IS THE MOST RECENTLY ACTIVATED SQUADRON IN
THE WING AND IS THE ONLY SQUADRON WITHOUT AN APPROVED HISTORY.
2. EIGHTH AIR FORCE MESSAGE DOWNSIDE DATED 1 SEPT 1961 AUTHORIZED
THE FORMAL DISCONTINUATION. PURSUANT TO THESE INSTRUCTIONS, MOST OF
THE PERSONNEL OF THE 66TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON HAVE BEEN TRANS-

10 1600
OCT 1961

BT/DO

HOWARD D. HOWARD, COLONEL, 31700
311

UNCLAS

817 AIR DIVISION PHASE AND IN

PLACED INTO THE OTHER SQUADRONS OF THE WING.

3. TO REBUILD THE 661ST AT THIS TIME AND PHASE OUT THE 830TH WOULD REQUIR A GREAT DEAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORT AND, MORE SERIOUSLY, WOULD CREATE A SUBSTANTIAL HUMAN PROBLEM IN THE WING.

PART II.

REQUEST PARAGRAPH 1 OF SAC SPECIAL ORDER G-121, DATED 3 OCTOBER 1961 BE AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: "SO MUCH OF PARAGRAPH 1 AS WORDS 830 IS RESCINDED, 661 IS ADDED TO THE LIST OF SQUADRONS TO BE HIGH-CONSIDERED."

BT

2

8

UNCLASSIFIED

END

Wing Policy
Number 35-4

HEADQUARTERS 509TH BOMBARDMENT WING
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire
10 October 1961

Newly Assigned Personnel

1. The purpose of this policy is to establish a procedure for introduction and interview of newly assigned personnel.
2. It is the responsibility of each unit commander to insure that all newly assigned officers and senior non-commissioned officers (E7 thru E9) are formally introduced and interviewed by the Vice and Wing Commander.
3. Within 7 days after duty assignment is made, unit commanders will insure that an appointment is made and personnel are escorted to my office for interview and introduction.


DONALD G. McPHERSON
Colonel, USAF
Commander

CONFIDENTIAL

SAA 75081 PWS
PP R JEXGM
DE R JEXGM 2050
S 062205Z 61
FM SAC O/FUTT AFB AFB
TO ALFA TWO
ALFA THREE
BRAVO ONE
BRAVO TWO
BRAVO THREE
EJFYNO/4713AIDIV MOUNTAIN AIRBORNE
RJBWJR/21AIRDIV MALDEN AFB MONT
BT

C-1
BC-1
1000-1
5090-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (S) 8-129
STAFFING ROLE. THIS MSG IN 3 PARTS, PART I, REFERENCE
BY CS 1862 (CONFIDENTIAL), 12 SEP 61, AND CS 2483
(CONFIDENTIAL), 30 OCT 61, PART II, THE FOLLOWING AGENCY
ITEMS ARE PROGRAMMED FOR THURSDAY, 12 OCT 61: DIRECTORATE
OF PERSONNEL - AIRMAN MANNING AND PROMOTIONS, OFFICER
MANNING PROMOTIONS, PROJECT "BEST MAN," PERSONNEL
SERVICES; DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE - TIMING FOR
GENERAL WAR; CHAPLAIN - AIR FORCE MORAL LEADERSHIP;
DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS - P10 FEASIBILITY; DIRECTORATE

PART TWO RJBWJR 295
OF INFORMATION - SAC INFORMATION PLAN 61-4 - SAC MISSILE
FORCE; DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL - MONEY TREK, PROJECT
CHEAP WHEELS, "CONTRACT TECHNICAL SERVICE PERSONNEL"
PROGRAM, PAPERWORK REDUCTION, IMPROVED MAINTENANCE
PROGRAM, MAINTENANCE FACILITIES, MISSILE REPAIR MODERNIZATION,
FULL FORCE; SURGEON - CREW PROFESSIONAL FILE; DIRECTORATE
OF PLANS - OCLA, STATUS OF ATLAS AND TITAN PROGRAMS,
CURRENT STATUS OF APPROVED MAINTENANCE FORCE, PART III.
THIS MSG MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED 13 OCT 61.
BT
06/2059Z OCT RJBWJR

NNNN

A paraphrase is not required except prior to Category B declassification.
Physically remove all internal references by date - time group prior to declassification.

CONFIDENTIAL

0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE
BY R/READN 78
ON R/READN 78
P/1740Z 22PT A
FM SAC WILMINGTON AFB TEXAS
TO CUBRIC
ADWEN
R/RECLASSIFIED NAME AFF 78

THIS MESSAGE IS PART 1 OF 2. PART 2 WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE
INFORMATION FURNISHED CONCERNING THE UNIFORMS TO BE WORN BY
THE UNIFORM FOR THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE CLASS A. 1. COTTON
JACKET FOR FORMAL OCCASION WILL BE WORN UNDER THE SLACK
JACKET. PART 2. FOR COMMANDERS TO BE WORN WITH THE SPOL-
DURING SAC MESSAGE, CONFIDENTIAL. ON 2301. 1 OCTOBER 1962
IS QUOTED IN PART 2. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS
AND PROGRAMMED FOR THURSDAY, 1000Z AT DIRECTORATE OF
PERSONNEL: SAINT MARYS AND PROVISIONS, OFFICE HALLING

ONCE THE R/READN 78
AND PROMOTIONS, SPECIAL ASSISTANTS, PERSONNEL SERVICES
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND RECONSTRUCTION
DIAPYLAIR: AND FOR THE MORAL LEADERSHIP, DIRECTORATE OF OPERA-
IONS: ENG PREVIOUSLY, DIRECTORATE OF INFORMATION SAC
INFORMATION PLAN 21-4. SAC WILL BE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
MATERIAL: MONEY TREE, PROJECT USE OF MONEY, CONTINUED
TECHNICAL SERVICE PERSONNEL: PLANING, SANITARY ATLAS
APPROVED HEALTH CARE PROGRAM, WILMINGTON FACILITIES NEEDED
SITE ACTIVATION: SPULL FORCE, ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES NEEDED
FILE; DIRECTORATE OF PLANS: SELL STATUS OF ATLAS A/B TRIP
PROGRAMS, CURRENT STATUS OF APPROVED AIRTELIN FOR T.
NOTE. PART 2. THIS MESSAGE WILL BE DOWNLOADED TO THE
DECLASSIFIED 19 OCTOBER 1961.

01/1740Z OCT R/READN

1-6-78

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WESTOVER AIR FORCE BASE
MASSACHUSETTS

23 OCT 1961

REPLY TO
ATTN OF DI

SUBJECT: (U) Public Statements by Soviet Military Leaders

TO: 509 Bomb Wg ~~(S)~~

1. Coincident with the preparation and delivery of the briefing "Insight to War with Russia" presented to the Commanders' Conference, 25 September 1961, the chiefs of the Soviet military forces made six announcements over a 20-day period which are attached.
2. Since each of these personalities were discussed in the briefing, it might be of interest to you what each had to say.
3. This letter is classified Confidential because it shows SAC Intelligence interest in the comments of foreign military leaders. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Fritz L. Bordeker, Jr.
FRITZ L. BORDEKER, JR.
Captain, USAF
Directorate of Administrative
Services

1 Atch
Extracts of Recent Public
Statements by Soviet
Military Leaders (U), 1 cy

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

1-6 966
BAF 2464

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Peace... is our Profession

General Alexei Zhakov, Deputy Commander Soviet Land Forces
Article in Red Star - 12 September 1961

"Our rocket units are capable of striking powerful blows over great distances and at any time. They are highly mobile and are equipped with the most up-to-date devices for preparing and maintaining fire in any weather and at any time of the year. Soviet tanks can hit any tank or other target on the first shot in daylight or at night. The tanks can move at great speeds and operate successfully in radio-active contaminated areas".

Admiral I. Golovko, Soviet Admiral
Article in Red Star - 29 September 1961

Russia has "just as many rocket-carrying nuclear submarines as the United States -- and faster ones too". The Soviet fleet is "armed with nuclear rocket weapons".

Marshal S. Sviridov, Commander PVO (Soviet Defense Forces)
Article in Soviet Newspaper "Soviet Russia" - 3 October 1961

Russian anti-aircraft defense could "destroy the U.S. Strategic Air Force" before it got "near enough to attack". This was proved by the "destroying of the American U-2 plane" piloted by Gary Powers in May 1960. Soviet anti-aircraft batteries are equipped with "powerful rockets and first-class radar. We have all the necessary means for combating the U.S. Strategic Air Force".

EXTRACTS FROM RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS
BY
TOP SOVIET MILITARY LEADERS

Marshal K. S. Moskalov Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Article in Red Star September 1951

Russia has long range ballistic missiles "invulnerable to counterattack and capable of wiping entire countries off the map". Also in the Soviet arsenal are new multi-stage rockets capable of "delivering nuclear warheads even more powerful than the 100 ton hydrogen bomb". Soviet long range nuclear missiles can "strike mighty blows anywhere in the world regardless of the time of year or weather conditions". In addition, Soviet rocket troops "can exercise an effective influence not only on the course but also on the outcome of the war as a whole". The long range missiles are not necessary to take care of NATO bases now in the Soviet area - "tactical rocket weapons can do that".

Marshal Sergei Malinovsky Soviet Defense Minister
Article in Communist Star October 1951

Russian people must be aware of a very important tactical and exceptionally important matter. We have now nuclear warheads in our hands that can reach any point on earth. We have now weapons that can do that.

Marshal K. Voronov Chief of the Air Force
Article in Soviet News October 1951

The Air Force is now equipped with a new type of rocket-propelled aircraft. This type of aircraft will bring it down on the target area of the enemy's rear bases.

at 2

HEADQUARTERS
817TH AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO *[Signature]*

28 October 1961

SUBJECT: Umpire Report of "Spruce Up" Exercise of Pease Air Force Base,
New Hampshire, 6 October 1961

TO: 817th Cmbt Spt Gp *[Signature]*

1. This report is submitted in accordance with SAC Regulation 55-14, "Annual Disaster Control Exercise," February 1961, and Operation "Spruce Up," Eighth Air Force Operations Order 19-61. Contained herein are observations and comments from all exercise umpires.

2. Umpires observing various activities were positioned as follows:

<u>Nr. Umpires</u>	<u>Activity</u>
2	Cmbt Spt Gp Command Post
3	509th Maintenance/Job Control
2	100th Maintenance/Job Control
2	100th Bomb Wg Command Post
2	509th Bomb Wg Command Post
1	Personnel
3	BDCL/CDF/CSC
3	Medical Command Post
1	Information Services Office
2	Civil Engineering
3	Dissemination Center & GBR
1	Transportation
3	POL
1	File Chief
1	Services
1	Communications Center
1	Base Deputy Cmdb for Materiel

3. Mission Narrative Comments:

a. Operation "Spruce Up," Eighth Air Force Operations Order 19-61, was scheduled by Eighth Air Force for the 817th Combat

sounded at 0903 ZULU, when the Pyramid Alert was initiated. This, plus use of mobile loudspeakers, resulted in quick response and excellent reporting to Emergency War Order stations.

b. The Division, both Wings and the Combat Support Group Command Posts were effectively trained by their Battle Staffs within thirty minutes after execution of the Operation. The Division Task Force Command Post acted as higher headquarters during this Exercise for the receipt of all required reports initiated by base agencies.

c. The Alert Force was simulated launched at "E" plus 0017, however, no T-8 Report was dispatched to reflect the launch. All other reports, until loss of communications, were satisfactory.

d. Disaster actions varied from unsatisfactory to outstanding. Lack of mental conditioning of many individuals contributed to an unsatisfactory evaluation for Disaster Control. Additionally, the majority of units did not have a trained Disaster Control Officer, very few personnel were familiar with assembly areas, decontamination building was not properly identified nor did it function properly, and the designation of fallout shelters was inadequate. Personnel actions and control during fallout revealed that there is a general lack of knowledge on the subject. More firmness, initiative and leadership could have been displayed by supervisors in enforcing basic disaster control in some instances. There were areas, however, that performed outstandingly. The Base Maintenance activity is organized to cope with any disaster. The Dispensary and medical aid programs were very effective.

e. The execution of the exercise through the NUDET mechanism was generally satisfactory. All NUDET disasters, the base lost most of its operating capability, however, for only necessary emergency actions were safely demonstrated. Combat units were initially slow to reveal their remaining capabilities, although when it was accomplished, a combat action was taken to utilize what remained of their resources.

was reported to the Command Post at 0430. The aircraft was reported to be in the vicinity of the Command Post. The aircraft was reported to be in the vicinity of the Command Post.

Westover Air Force Base. Eighth Air Force should have been queried for more specific information.

(2) As radiation increased, a flight crew was ordered to cut down on exposure. Several crews reported for pre-flight prior to maintenance generation due to lack of coordination. Lack of current crew access rosters also delayed some flight crews at access points. Once reported, the Command Post took quick corrective action on these items.

(3) At "E" plus 0445 a possible time bomb was reported in the building adjacent. No attempt was made to evacuate the building to a nearby shelter. The Air Police searched three minutes later, searched the building to a and discovered it clean. The Air Police carried no radiation cards and were issued none while in the shelter.

(4) At "E" plus 0440, the Command Post was informed that a Navy fighter wanted to land. He was reported to have fifteen minutes of fuel, an unspecified malfunction, and a nuclear weapon aboard. Instructions were issued to land the aircraft. This aircraft actually had a armed weapon aboard and was improperly reported to the Command Post. The information given, however, should have aroused suspicion enough to question the source for more information. The net result of this situation was to place the entire base in danger of destruction.

(5) When the NUDET occurred at E plus 1000, all above ground commercial communications were destroyed and major damage was done to the airfield. At approximately that time, Eighth Air Force was contacted by relay through a radio vehicle and aircraft SSB. Capability information was reported approximately at 0445 and a few minutes later. Only one bomber was reported to be in a suitable condition and was assigned a line number. However, the reported location of this aircraft was not reported promptly to the Command Post due to conflicting information received from the line.

(6) Recommendations

(a) All flight crew should have a possible effect on the flight's capability should be reported to the Command Post immediately.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACCOM: DO-1

INFO C-1

1000-1

5090-1

80-1

2000-1

A-771
Q24227ND572
RR UNIFORM
ZE RJEKDN 93
R 221300Z ZEN
FM 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO UNIFORM
BT

DO BASIS FOR DO (U) SHELTER OF PERSONNEL DURING FALL OUT. PART I OF THREE PARTS. REF ANNEX J, OPLAN 500-KX. PURPOSE OF ANNEX IS TO IDENTIFY BEST SHELTERS AVAILABLE FOR PERSONNEL UNDER RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS AND TO SPECIFY PERSONNEL CONTROL PROCEDURES. THIS OBJECTIVE HAS NOT BEEN MET BY ALL UNITS. THIS DO RECOGNIZES COMMAND WIDE SHELTER DEFICIENCIES. HOWEVER, EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO UTILIZE TO ADVANTAGE BEST AVAILABLE FACILITIES. COMMON ERRORS NOTED IN REVIEW OF UNIT PLANS AREA A. EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF SHELTERS *146390*

A photocopy of this document should not be made without the permission of the original source. This document is classified "CONFIDENTIAL" and its use is restricted to authorized personnel only.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO RJEKDH 53

DESIGNATED, SOMETIMES IN EXCESS OF 75. BARRS CANNOT MAN
EQUIP NO CONTROL PERSONNEL IN THESE MANY LOCATIONS. B.
SHELTERS DESIGNATED FOR CONVENIENCE HAVE A HIGHER DEGREE OF
PROTECTION AFFORDED. C. RESIDUAL HEADERS INDICATED ARE
NOT CORRECT. PART III BOMBING RESPONSIBILITY COMMANDERS
DIRECT IMMEDIATE REVIEW OF UNIT PLANS TO INSURE: A.
TOTAL NUMBER OF SHELTERS REDUCED TO CONTROLLER'S LEVEL.
B. ELIMINATION OF CONVENIENCE SHELTERS UNLESS PROTECTION
IS ON PARITY WITH OTHER BASE BUILDINGS. C. RESIDUAL
NUMBERS ARE CORRECT FOR DESIGNATED SHELTERS. D.
FACILITIES ARE MARKED IAW SACR 85-4. E. IMPROV KITTS ARE
LOCATED IN/OR EASILY ACCESSIBLE TO SHELTERS. QUANTITY
TO BE PREDICATED UPON PERSONNEL UTILIZATION IN FUTURE (MUN).
F. MAXIMUM UNIT EFFORTS BE EXPENDED TO EVALUATE THE NEED
FOR (IN COOPERATION WITH MEDICAL SERVICES) AND TO EQUIP
SHELTERS WITH RATIONS, WATER, WASTE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL,
LITTERS, ETC. G. MAXIMUM USE IS MADE OF EXISTING
COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES BETWEEN SHELTERS. CH'S AND WORK
LOCATIONS. H. SHELTER COMMANDERS ARE AWARE OF RESOUR-
CIBILITIES AND PREPARED TO ASSUME CONTROL DURING A IAW

PAGE THREE RJEKDH 53

SHELTER CONDITION. PART III - BOMB SHELTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS
REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONS DID NOT MEET OR EXCEED THE
ATTAIN CONDITIONS ARE GENERALLY INDICATED THROUGHOUT THE
USAF. HIGHER HQ IS AWARE OF THESE PROBLEMS AND SHELTER
STUDIES ARE UNDER WAY. ATC IS PRESENTLY DETERMINING
COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS FOR HQ USAF. DURING INTERIM,
EACH COMMANDER MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM
PROTECTION FOR ASSIGNED PERSONNEL. 2634

BT
22/14152 SEP 1953

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPACE BELONGS TO THE COMMUNICATION CENTER

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG	ACCOUNTING	ORIG OR REFER TO	CLASSIFICATION						
ROUTINE	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>ANY</td> <td>MULTI</td> <td>SINGLE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>X</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	ANY	MULTI	SINGLE	X			AF		
ANY	MULTI	SINGLE								
X										

FROM: AAF WESTOVER AFB MASS 111750

TO: XRAY

1. KLE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

100DCR-3
 109DCR-10
 100DAS-1
 109DAS-1
 RECR-6
 100DGO-6
 1000-1
 DO-1

REF ID: A1 (DOT) 10311.

" RBS EXPRESS RELIABILITY LIMITS, EFFECTIVE 1 OCT 61,
 SACP 170 1A WILL REFLECT A SEPARATE RELIABILITY CIRCLE
 SIZE TABLE TO BE USED FOR RBS EXPRESS BOMBING ACTIVITY.
 THIS APPLIES TO SYNCHRONOUS RUNS ONLY.

	MA7	MA6	ASQ38
SHORT LOOK	4500	4000	3400
SHORT LOOK LARGE CHARGE			
1ST RELEASE	4500	4000	3800
2D RELEASE	4700	5,000	5000

SCP-4

DATE	TIME
11	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) TREE TRIMMER REPORT. FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL REPORT ON TOTAL TREE TRIMMER SHORT LOOK LARGE CHANGE SYNCHRONIZATION ACTIVITY UNITS SHOULD CHECK THIS REPORT AGAINST THEIR RECORDS AND FORWARD ANY DISCREPANCIES TO THIS HQ ATTN DOT-3 FOR REVIEW.

UNIT	SCORED	REL	PERCENT R/F	CEP
508RW	91	97	95.6	1345
321	19	18	95.0	1418
4127	97	34	81.1	1335
306	118	100	81.5	1135
2	174	150	80.4	1983
100	102	90	88.2	2170
4128	41	38	87.3	1440
280	97	84	84.6	2028
42	58	49	83.1	1280
4241	39	34	82.6	2578
99	61	50	82.0	2590
4947	34	26	70.6	2400
4838	28	21	75.0	2890
72	34	28	67.6	3200
SAF B-47	800	548	96.8	1090
SAF B-62	323	263	81.4	2000
SAF TOTALS	826	611	87.6	1845

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TREE TRIMMER STANDINGS

DATE

Based on best CEA for first run over Target.

#	S/C	P	NAV	DATE	SCORES	CEA	ADDITIONAL SCORES
1.	(b) (6)				280		
✓ 2.	(b) (6)			20 Oct	280	250	
3.	(b) (6)				380		
4.	(b) (6)			12 Oct	300	275	2000
5.	(b) (6)				420		1550
6.	(b) (6)			18 Oct	480	435	820
7.	(b) (6)				570		
8.	(b) (6)			11 Sept	460	510	
9.	(b) (6)				370		
10.	(b) (6)			5 Oct	750	560	
11.	(b) (6)				720		2150
12.	(b) (6)			18 Oct	470	560	1200
13.	(b) (6)				550		1420
14.	(b) (6)			11 Oct	620	585	870
15.	(b) (6)				350		
16.	(b) (6)			11 Sept	800	625	1650
17.	(b) (6)				720		1120 1340 980
18.	(b) (6)			7 Sept	550	535	700 1700 1800
19.	(b) (6)				600		2150
20.	(b) (6)			11 Sept	720	640	450
21.	(b) (6)				820		770 870
22.	(b) (6)			20 Sept	750	685	
23.	(b) (6)				600		
24.	(b) (6)			23 Oct	370	605	
25.	(b) (6)				970		3470
26.	(b) (6)			10 Oct	420	595	270
27.	(b) (6)				1020		1730 1750
28.	(b) (6)			18 Sept	420	720	420
29.	(b) (6)				370		470 3720
30.	(b) (6)			21 Sept	820	745	650 3020

	C/C	P	NAV	DATE FLOW	SCORE	CEA	ADDITIONAL SCORES
16.	(b) (6)			5 sept	870	810	
					1480		
17.				28 Oct	820	820	
					820		500
18.				13 sept	1180	805	
					970		370
19.				5 sept	870	920	
					1150		970
20.				29 Oct	750	780	
					450		1120
21.				6 sept	1500	975	1300
					590		
22.				12 sept	1120	1010	
					1300		
23.				4 Oct	800	1060	
					1020		1500 320
24.				8 sept	1100	1080	
					1370		370
25.				17 Oct	770	1070	
					1700		1000 1150
26.				9 Oct	500	1150	
					1120		
27.				18 Oct	1350	1185	
					1220		
28.				17 Oct	1350	1285	
					1450		1500
29.				28 sept	1150	1300	
					1370		1500
30.				29 sept	1380	1310	
					1950		520
31.				28 sept	850	1400	

O ¹	S/C	F	NAO	DATE FLOWN	SCORE ₂	CLA	ADDITIONAL SCORE ₁
32.	(b) (6)				1470		
✓ 33.				16 Sept	1450	1450	
34.					1120		1100 220 900
✓ 35.				22 Sept	1800	1400	1650 1430 1350
36.					1550		
✓ 37.				16 Oct	1370	1400	
38.					1320		
✓ 39.				8 Sept	1770	1545	
40.					1720		
✓ 41.				26 Oct	1450	1585	
42.					1720		
✓ 43.				15 Oct	1570	1645	
44.					1700		
✓ 45.				12 Sept	1570	1635	870
46.					2570		
✓ 47.				1 Oct	900	1725	
48.					2350		
✓ 49.				20 Sept	1220	1785	1000
50.					900		
✓ 51.				5 Sept	2820	1880	
52.					1250		
✓ 53.				1 Sept	2510	1985	
54.					470		14870
✓ 55.				21 Sept	1580	1910	11170
56.					1190		1500
✓ 57.				14 Sept	1870	1935	770
58.					2170		700
✓ 59.				29 Sept	1240	2050	520
60.					2320		1010
✓ 61.				4 Oct	1370	2005	400
62.					1390		12270
✓ 63.				12 Sept	2500	1100	1180 BRAVO
64.					2800		
✓ 65.				6 Sept	1370	2115	840

NO	C/C	F	NAV	DATE FLOWN	CORR	CEA	ADDITIONAL SCORES
					2620		
49.	(b) (6)			6 Sept	3250	2125	1200
					3370		
50.				28 Oct	1230	4850	750
					1150		
51.				7 Sept	2640	2340	810
					2350		
52.				27 Oct	3550	3450	
					3700		1450 970
53.				8 Sept	1940	4810	
					1900		450
54.				1 Sept	2700	2650	710
					2450		
55.				18 Oct	3350	2900	
					2700		
56.				19 Sept	5120	4810	
					5090		TYPE III 1000
57.				26 Sept	4000	3500	500
					4400		
58.				5 Oct	4150	4275	
					5100		1-2
59.				11 Sept	5950	5175	
							470
60.				1 Sept	TYPE III		1000
					1000		1210 780
61.				27 Sept	1500	1150	310 300
				TYPE III			
					2100		1320
62.				18 Oct	5470	4280	1210
					5920		
63.				23 Oct	3350	4390	
					7100		
64.				1 Sept	8120	6610	

CONFIDENTIAL

WISKEY
R/11KA/ADMINISTRATIVE ERNEST HARMON 11/17/51
INFO BOMEO
R/WXER/SAC
R/EXAD/DOX VESTONER APR 1951

OF
UNCLAS DODD 0115. BAR NONE EVALUATION
EXERCISES. THIS MESSAGE IS FIVE PARTS. PART 1. THE
MESSAGE ANNOUNCES THE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF BAR
NONE EXERCISES. THE PURPOSE WILL BE TO REPRESENTATIVELY
ACCESS TOTAL UNIT EWO CAPABILITY THROUGH EVALUATION
OF ALL ASSIGNED COMBAT READY BOARDING UNIT CREW AND
AIRCRAFT. THE EXERCISES WILL REPLACE 1951 SCREWMAIL
AND THE SAC ANNUAL EVALUATION MISSION AND
WILL COMPLEMENT RATHER THAN DUPLICATE THE 19 ORT
OPERATIONS. PART 2. BAR NONE WILL BE

PAGE TWO R/EXON 400
ACCOMPLISHED BY EACH BOARDING UNIT DURING IT'S
NUMBERED AS TRAINING PERIOD ON A PRE-PLANNED NOTICE
BASIS BEGINNING 1 JUL 51. UNIT PLANNED BOMBING STRIKE
MISSIONS APPROVED BY NUMBERED AT'S, WILL BE FLOWN.
ALL MISSIONS WILL BE FLOWN WITHIN A DESIGNATED FIVE
WEEK PERIOD AND WILL INCLUDE PARTICIPATION BY ALL
ASSIGNED COMBAT READY CREWS AND AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT.
APPROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD OF THE SORTIES WILL BE FLOWN
THE FIRST WEEK, ONE-THIRD THE THIRD WEEK AND THE
REMAINING THIRD 5TH WEEK. CEG WILL SELECT, ON AN
UNANNOUNCED BASIS, ONE OF THESE THREE WEEKS IN WHICH
TO CONDUCT FLIGHT EVALUATION OF ITS OWN CHOICE OF
25 PERCENT OF THE UMD AUTHORIZED CREWS. CHOOSING
FROM THE CREWS SCHEDULED THAT WEEK. CEG PROFICIENCY
FLIGHTS WILL BE FLOWN THE FOLLOWING WEEK IAW SACR
51-24. THE NORMAL SSG (CEG) UNIT STANDARDIZATION
ADMINISTRATION EVALUATION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.
PART 3. MISSION REQUIREMENTS WILL INITIALLY BE AS
FOLLOWS AND WILL CHANGE PERIODICALLY IN CONSONANCE
WITH CHANGING TACTICS AND EWO REQUIREMENTS: (A)
CONTROLLED TAKEOFF TIME. (B) LOW ALTITUDE NAVIGATION
LEG. (C) RBS ATTACK USING UNIT PRIMARY ALERT FORCE
TACTIC ON RBS EXPRESS. (D) CELESTIAL GRID NAVIGATION
LEG. (E) HIGH ALTITUDE FIXED ANGLE RBS RUN. (F) SIX
CAM 72/77 SORTIES PER APPLICABLE UNIT. (G) REPLY/VOU
AND MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE INFIGHT CROSS WEIGHT AIR
REFUELING ACCOMPLISHED DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.
(H) ECM FOR 2-24'S: ADP. BDR. RBR AGAINST RBS, LOW
GEAR AGAINST NIKE AND A MANUAL SITE RUN AGAINST GCI.
FOR 2-27'S: RBR AND BDR AGAINST RBS. (I) RADAR
MONITORED APPROACH. PART 4. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS
WILL BE INCLUDED IN A SAC MANUAL BEING DEVELOPED AT
SAC HEADQUARTERS WHICH WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO UNITS
NOT LATER THAN 1 AUG 51. AN SAP OPORD WILL BE IN UNIT
HANDS BY 1 SEP 51. UNITS SELECTED WILL BE INFORMED
OF SCHEDULED TIMES BY 15 JUL 51. PART 5. THIS IS
PRELIMINARY DATA IN CONSONANCE WITH SAC DCO
CONFERENCE IN UNIT FOR CURRENT AIRCRAFT

1000-
Do-
File-
28
100 DCM - 5
509 DCM - 5
BDOF - 1
100 DCR - 1
509 DCR - 1

11/10/51

~~SECRET~~

HQ. NORAD
OPERATIONS ORDER 3-61
(TITLE: UNCLASSIFIED)

Sky Shield II



20 SEPTEMBER 1961

HEADQUARTERS NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

Ent Air Force Base, Colorado

~~SECRET~~

1-1981
DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS,
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS,
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONS

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

To conduct air defense operations in response to a simulated attack against the NORAD complex at an entry, and to analyze selected portions.

a. Field Objectives

- (1) Exercise the NORAD system in defense against a simulated attack conducted within a realistic ECM environment.
- (2) Exercise battle staff.
- (3) Exercise combat intelligence collection, evaluation and dissemination.
- (4) Exercise all available means of communication (see Annex C).
- (5) Exercise the "safe passage" procedures of Strategic Air Command traffic and identification procedures in general.
- (6) Exercise public information policies and media relations procedures.

b. Hq NORAD Objectives

- (1) Exercise processing and display of operational information.
- (2) Exercise battle staff.
- (3) Exercise all communications facilities available to the NORAD complex to serve operational and public information needs.
- (4) Evaluate and analyze specific functions of the NORAD system as outlined in Annex F.

8. EXECUTION (U)

a. Concept of Operations. NORAD commanders will conduct air defense operations in accordance with ADNAC 1-61.

b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) "Sky Shield II" is a NORAD-directed exercise, and maximum participation of NORAD Forces, including augmentation forces, is desired.
- (2) Exercise of full battle staff is mandatory.
- (3) Participating commands and other interested agencies may appoint personnel to observe the exercise. Observers will be kept to a minimum as each air defense facility to avoid interference with operations. Observer's name, rank, serial number, service clearance, defense facility to be visited and desired post of observation should be forwarded to Headquarters NORAD, Attn: N-151, no later than 1 October 1961.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(4) Observers for this exercise will be treated as NORAD observers, regardless of service or command affiliation, and will be granted expeditious entry to their post of observation upon identification.

(5) Each NORAD region/sector will be required to furnish trusted agents at each MDC and AADOP to identify the faker force. Trusted agents at all levels will be furnished complete stake route information under separate cover.

(6) This exercise will be conducted under Category III, Priority II, in accordance with letter, subject: CINCNOAD Policy on Priorities for Air Movement of Military Aircraft, dated 10 February 1960, and Attachment 1, thereto. Detailed procedures for handling non-exercise air traffic will be promulgated separately.

(7) To facilitate safe separation of air traffic when operating under IFR conditions, i.e., in clouds or in areas of reduced visibility below AFR 00-10 minimums, faker aircraft will adhere to IFR/STP procedures contained in Appendix 1, Annex A.

(8) The safe passage concept for SAC EWO aircraft and aborting EWO aircraft will be exercised.

(9) Safe passage flight plan information will be in accordance with current strike Route Information Books (SRIBs). Standard and non-standard SAC EWO departure routes will be as listed by participating units in Appendix 2, Annex A. Safe passage tracks will be designated "YOKE ALPHA CHARLIE" (YAC).

(10) Air defense forces will not be degraded by simulated enemy action.

(11) Synthetic inputs will be used to augment threat warning.

(12) Faker tracks will be classified in accordance with NORAD Manual 55-1, 1 March 1961, except as modified in paragraph 7, Annex A.

(13) Recall words are contained in paragraph 1, Appendix 1, Annex C.

(14) NORAD region commanders will be prepared to present verbally a "Commander's Summary" briefing of their command's participation in Exercise "Day Shield II" at a Commander's Conference to be held at Otis Air Force Base, Mass., approximately ten days after completion of exercise. Written Commander's Summary Reports and Exercise Summary Reports (NORAD Form 2) will be forwarded to Headquarters NORAD, Attn: NOEV, within ten days after completion of exercise. Copies of both reports will also be made available to CINCNOAD during Commander's Conference.

(15) Additional reports will be rendered as outlined in Annex F.

(16) Headquarters NORAD will issue "Fade Out" instructions to indicate completion of the exercise.

(17) This operations order is effective upon receipt.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS (U)

a. Messages generated in the conduct of this exercise will be classified in accordance with provisions of Army Regulation 380-9, Navy Security Manual 5810-1B, AFR 205-1 and USAF CAP 405, and prepared in accordance with Tab A to Appendix 1, Annex C.

~~SECRET~~

ASSACHA299

DWD524
RR UNIFORM
DE RJEYDH 66
R 121339Z 28X 2874
FM SBY WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO UNIFORM
RJEYHG/1 DET AGGRSTRATAC SONDRESTROM AB CANLD
BT

U N C L A S E F I C DC 68439A. SKY SHIELD II. DUE TO
THE NATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF SKY SHIELD II IT IS
IMPERATIVE THAT PROPER EMPHASIS AND COMMAND GUIDANCE
AND PROVIDED ALL PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THIS EXERCISE.
CREW PROFESSIONALISM MUST BE STRESSED IN ALL AREAS,
ESPECIALLY FLYING SAFETY, ECM DISCIPLINE, NAVIGATION,
AND STRICT OBSERVANCE OF CONTROL TIMES. EVERY
SOMMER AIRCRAFT MUST MAKE AN EFFECTIVE BOMB RELEASE
BY ANY AUTHORIZED MEANS UNLESS FLYING SAFETY
REQUIRES OTHERWISE. IF ANY AREA OF SKY SHIELD II

PAGE TWO RJE 28 66
DOESN'T MEET SAC STANDARDS THE MISSION OBJECTIVES
WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED AND A FALSE PICTURE OF OUR
CAPABILITY WILL BE PRESENTED.
BT
12/13/67 OCT 2874 12-3-74

110010-10
503 500-10
Info on
10001
50001
8000
0000
1000
1000
1000
1000

HEADQUARTERS
817TH AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: C

19 October 1961

SUBJECT: Pease Task Force Commander's Report (T-27) for Sky Shield II,
SAC Operations Order 11-62

TO: 8th AF

1. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. Estimate of mission success: Outstanding.

The 8AF ORI evaluation of the Pease Task Force, conducted in conjunction with SAC Operations Order 11-62, Sky Shield II, was rated outstanding. All participating units, crews, staff and maintenance personnel displayed a thorough understanding of the Pease Task Force operations and requirements.

- b. Lessons learned:

Current operating procedures and support plans are adequate and all units of the Pease Task Force are capable of supporting the assigned EWO mission.

2. ADEQUACY OF SUPPORT ITEMS:

- a. Communications and Electronic Equipment.

Communications between Boston FAA and inbound aircraft was difficult during penetration due to the volume of transmission on Guard Channel.

- b. Pertinent Items - Recap.

(1) 100th Bomb Wing:

Type aircraft	KC-97
Sorties scheduled	4
Sorties airborne	4
Sorties effective	4
Total flying hours	20:00

(2) 509th Bomb Wing:


Type aircraft	KC-97
Sorties scheduled	4
Sorties airborne	4
Sorties effective	4
Total flying hours	20:05

(3) Deployment & Redeployment:

Sorties	22
Total flying hours	162:55

(4) Support of Goose Task Force:

Sorties	3
Total flying hours	16:00


A.J. BECK
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

0

1

Type	Count
Positive	1
Negative	1
Total	2

0M733DLE
 OR RJEKX
 DE RJEKDL 101
 ZNR

R 202056Z
 FM 40NDSTRATWG GOOSE AC LABE
 TO RJEKX/70 AIRFLG 50 LISTEN-ROCK 470 480
 RJEKX/300AIRFLG 50 WHITENHORN 70
 RJEKX/100AIRFLG 50 BARKSDALE 470 480
 RJEKX/100AIRFLG 50 PEASE 470 480
 RJEKX/500AIRFLG 50 PEASE 470 480
 RJEKX/50AIRFLG 50 WESTOVER 470 480

C-1
 1002-1
 1003-1
 1004-1
 1005-1
 1006-1
 1007-1
 1008-1
 1009-1
 1010-1
 1011-1
 1012-1
 1013-1
 1014-1
 1015-1
 1016-1
 1017-1
 1018-1
 1019-1
 1020-1

BT
 UNCLAS FROM C 1902, FOR COMMANDER, 40ND
 SKY SHIELD II. I WISH TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR
 THE OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF YOUR CREW AND MI-
 CRAFT IN THE RECENT SKY SHIELD II EXERCISE WHICH
 RESULTED IN AN OVERALL OUTSTANDING SCORE IN THE CUI
 OF THE GOOSE TASK FORCE. THIS PERFORMANCE CLEARLY
 DEMONSTRATES PROFESSIONALISM AND DEDICATION OF THE
 KC-97 CREW AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL.
 BT
 20/2100Z OCT RJEKDL

UNCLAS

SECRET
INFO RJEKXN/10000-1
OO RJEKXN
FM RJEKXN 105
O 10:54Z
FM 16AF TORREJON AB SP
TO WHISKEY
RJEKXN/SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
INFO RJEKXN/4AF BAYOVN AFB MASS
RJEKXN/817AD TRASK AFB NE
RJEKXN/50986 TRASK AFB NE
RJEKXN/10824 TRASK AFB NE
BT

10000-1
50900-1
100002-1
509002-1
INFO C-1
1000-1
5090-1
10-1

~~SECRET DO 1007.~~
REG JUMP STUDY AND CONSPIRATION. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART 1. THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT REG JUMP STUDY FORCED TO GO. CREW WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR HOME STOPY AND DEPARTURE UNTIL THE WEEK OF 23 OCT. PART 2. DURING THIS INTERIM PERIOD PROCEDURES FOR CREW WELFARE, SECURITY AND IDENTIFICATION AT SPANISH BASES AS ESTABLISHED IS FOLLOWED AS SOON AS ARRIVING CREW HAS BEEN RECEIVED. CREW LIST WILL BE PROVIDED. IMMEDIATELY HEREAFTER THE CREW WILL BE GIVEN

PAGE TWO RJEKXN 105
SUPERVISED TWO STUDY ON THE REG JUMP MISSION TO INCLUDE, WHEN APPLICABLE, OPTION 1, IF NOT PREVIOUSLY STUDIED AT HOME. THE ABOVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN PRIOR TO A CREW'S ASSUMPTION OF REG JUMP ALERT RESPONSIBILITY. WITHIN 24 HOURS SUBSEQUENT TO ASSUMING ALERT SORTIE RESPONSIBILITY, THE CREW WILL BE IDENTIFIED BY THE REFLEX COMMANDER AND NOTATION OF IDENTIFICATION WILL BE MADE ON APPROPRIATE FORM. PART 3. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS IS AN INTERIM MEASURE AND HAS BEEN ADOPTED SO AS TO PREVENT CHANGES TO DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES AND/OR LOGIC DEGRADATION AS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY SOME UNITS OF THIS COMMAND. PART 4. FOR SAC. REQUEST CONSIDERATION OF THIS INTERIM MEASURE. SCP 4.
BT
16/16832 OCT RJEKXN

1-6670

A document is not required except when so designated
Physically remove all internal references by date - time group prior to declassification.

SECRET

0734

509VC
509DAS
CORSM

GMA470
S
EAA1312AJ125
RRRJETGM
DE RJDJGW 38
R 131257Z
FM 7AD HIGH WYCOMBE ENG
TO RJWZBR/SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
INFO RJEBKF/2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA
QUEBEC
RJEXDHB/8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
RJWBKN/15AF HARCH AFB CALIF
RJEXBO/801AD LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO
RJEXGM/817AD PEASE AFB NH
RJBGD/818AD LINCOLN AFB NEBR
RJWBJG/819AD DYESS AFB TEXAS
RJEXHM/820AD PLATTSBURGH AFB NY
RJBECRCXIWAD LITTLE ROCK AFB ARK
RREBKH/68BW CHENNAULT AFB LA
RJWBJG/96BW DYESS AFB TEXAS
RJBGD/98BW LINCOLN AFB NEBR
RJEXGM/100BW PEASE AFB NH
RJEXBO/101 LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO
RJEXBO/376BW LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO
RREBKH/380BW PLAV
75

100000-10
19000-10
10000-10

UNCLAS E F T O 309-13.
REFLEX CREW SCHEDULES. THE REQUIREMENT FOR PROVIDING ONE DAY FOR
CREW REST AND FLIGHT PLANNING PRIOR TO REFLEX REDEPLOYMENT WAS
AFFIRMED BY YOUR MESSAGE DOOROP AFB, DATED 2 JULY 1961, P. 10.
EXPERIENCE SINCE THEN INDICATES CREWS ACTUALLY RECEIVE LESS CREW
REST AND ARE PHYSICALLY LESS PREPARED THAN THEY WOULD BE BY
DEPLOYING IMMEDIATELY AFTER ALERT REPLACEMENT. THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO
YOUR CONCURRENCE, IT IS PROPOSED THAT EFFECTIVE 1 NOVEMBER 1961
REFLEX CREWS REDEPLOY DIRECT FROM ALERT STATUS AND THIS DAY BE ADDED
TO THE CONTINUOUS OFF DUTY R/R TIME AVAILABLE. THIS WILL BE THE

PAGE TWO RJDJGW 38
PROVIDE THE SEVEN DAYS OF CONTINUOUS OFF DUTY R/R TIME WHICH WE
BELIEVE IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE INTENT AND SPIRIT OF PARA 11B,
CHAP 2, SACM 27-1. PARENT UNITS CONTACTED AS WELL AS CREWS IN
GENERAL HQ
WE REQUESTED AND EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR THIS PROPOSAL

BT
13/134720CT RJDJGW

12/1 1010

HEADQUARTERS
509TH BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM
United States Air Force
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 509C

5 Oct 1961

SUBJECT: Action on Crew Comments

TO: All Combat Crews, 509th Bomb Wing

1. PROBLEM: Unable to plug into the commercial telephone system for long distance phone calls from Torrejon.

ANSWER: Using the SOCS in conjunction with long distance phone calls is contrary to existing FCC Regulations. I have tried before to get this service for our personnel and it is impossible. It is just against regulations and there isn't anything that can be done about it.

2. PROBLEM: The numerous stops necessary before and after flying.

ANSWER: I have my staff working to alleviate the stop to pick up and return classified information. With classified involved, this problem will take a little time to resolve.

3. PROBLEM: Request for the base gym to be placed on limits.

ANSWER: The gym was originally placed off limits because of the number of injuries incurred by alert personnel participating in activities at the gym. However, it has been placed on limits for a trial period through 15 November. Bodily contact activities should be avoided. If injuries start recurring, the gym will again be taken off limits.

4. PROBLEM: Request for return to the 48 hour alert tour.

ANSWER: The 2 and 3 day tours have been tried before. The 7 day tour has worked best at Pease for the following reasons: The weather which we experience here constantly presents a problem in scheduling alert tours and just makes it tougher with the short tour. Trying to keep track of who accomplishes what on alert creates an impossible bookkeeping problem. It is

virtually impossible to do ground training on the shorter tour, and we are attempting, as you know, to do all ground training while in alert. It is almost an impossible task in the short tour to keep track of who is responsible for what sortie. For the above reasons, we will remain on the 7 day tour on home alert.

5. PROBLEM: Request for daily intelligence briefing.

ANSWER: The Wing Intelligence Officer has standing instructions to brief the alert crews whenever a significant item of intelligence comes to his attention. Intelligence people naturally do not feel that they need to cover items disseminated through commercial news channels.

6. PROBLEM: Crews should have arctic clothing aboard their aircraft.


ANSWER: The DCO will take action to establish the requirements and see that they are complied with.

7. PROBLEM: Crews should never be assigned squadron duties.

ANSWER: As you well know our squadron staffs have been pared to the bone. I am sure that the people who wrote our UMD envisioned crew personnel assisting the squadron staff. I see no bonafide basis to relieve crew members from squadron duties provided the squadron assures the officer his required time off.

8. PROBLEM: The 60-9 schedule "loads" a mission too heavy:

ANSWER: I have no real sympathy for this comment after reviewing the current Wing standing in the SAC MCS. Despite everything we have done so far we still finished third or fourth in 8AF. If we are to continue to fly a five day week and still compete with other units, we will have to load the missions even heavier. In other words, we should schedule everything legally possible to insure that it will be attempted and accomplished, but if there is a legitimate reason for not accomplishing scheduled training, no further action will be taken. The end result is we are still being whipped by other outfits so their missions must be even more heavily loaded.


DONALD G. MCPHERSON
Colonel, USAF
Commander

OM 617DAA 2240RFLSS
PP RJEXCM
DE RJWXBK 447C
P 2 2352 7EX
FM SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO ALFA TWO
ALFA THREE
DELTA TWO
DELTA THREE
DELTA FOUR
RJBKL/ICMBTEVALCP PARKSDALE AFB LA

*Action 100000-10
30400-10
240 00-1
2-1
100-1
350-1*

~~SECRET~~ (S) 3173. IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED.
(U) INTERIM TUX AMENDMENT TO SACTD. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS WILL BE INSERTED IMMEDIATELY AS PAR 470, CHAPTER 5, VOLUME I, SACTD; PAR 43A(2)(E), CHAPTER 6, VOLUME II SACTD; AND PAR 271, CHAPTER 5, VOLUME III, SACTD (ENTIRE AMENDMENT IN BOLD PRINT, EXCEPT VOLUME I):
"OCCASIONS (FOR EXAMPLE, AIRBORNE ALERT OPERATIONS) MAY ARISE WHEN SAC AIRCRAFT, FLYING WITHIN POLITICALLY SENSITIVE AREAS, ARE SUBJECTED TO HOSTILE INTERCEPT ACTION BY UNKNOWN AND POSSIBLY UNFRIENDLY FORCES. SHOULD SUCH INTERCEPTS OCCUR, THE FOLLOWING ACTION WILL BE TAKEN:

PAGE TWO RJWXBK 447
A. COMMUNICATE POSITION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INCIDENT TO NEAREST USAF FACILITY. (CR. IF/ALIF TO EMERGENCY).
B. DEFENSIVE ACTION SPECIFIED ABOVE, INCLUDING EVASIVE ACTION ELECTRONIC JAMMING AND CRAFT, WILL BE TAKEN IF AN AI RADAR LOCK-ON OCCURS. IF A VISUAL FIRING PASS OCCURS, OR AN AI RADAR ATTACK CONTINUES IN SPITE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES, AND THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER DETERMINE HE IS UNDER ATTACK, THE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM WILL BE USED TO DEFEND THE AIRCRAFT." (SCP 4) 1-7001

BT
25/2340Z OCT RJWXBK

NNNN

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER

A paraphrase is not required except prior to Category B expiration.
Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

~~SECRET~~

509TH BOMB WING ALERT RESULTS
OCTOBER 1961

~~SECRET~~

DATE/TIME	TYPE	NO. A/C	TYPE A/C	BRAVO		COCO		DELTA		REMARKS
				1ST	LAST	1ST	LAST	1ST	LAST	
02/1116Z	BRAVO	8	KC-97	03	05					OK
05/1601Z	COCO	8	KC-97	03	04	10	11			All Wing Tankers had wrong series KAA-29
10/1631Z	DELTA	8	KC-97	02	04			3:40	4:50	OK
14/1700Z	BRAVO	8	KC-97	03	04					OK
19/1530Z	BRAVO	8	KC-97	02	04					OK
22/1610Z	BRAVO	8	KC-97	03	21					Incomplete Blue Dot 4 from SAC, had to broadcast BRAVO - 509 sortie 104 deviated
27/2030Z	BRAVO	8	KC-97	03	04					OK

1. This exercise was result of incomplete transmission of a Blue Dot 4 from Drop Kick. After part II without time or authorization, Klaxon had been sounded and crews responded and given a Green Dot 5 BRAVO broadcast.

~~SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

DE RUFARN
P 201500

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

TO RJEEDR/34084 34084 ABN AFB
RJEIGH/30984 PEASE AFB MO
INFO RJEHBR/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
RJEKRF/JAF PARKSDALE AFB LA
RJEEDHR/SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
ZEN/16AF TORREJON AB SPAIN

100-100-2
80-1

BT
REFLEX CREW AT ZARAGOZA AB, SPAIN. THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTED VERBATIM FROM SAC IG INSPECTION REPORT FOR YOUR ACTION. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE SUSPENSE TO 16AF IS 15 OCT 61. REQUEST INFO COPY BE FURNISHED HQ SAC, ATTN: IG A DO. AIRMAIL COPIES OF MESSAGE BEING FORWARDED THIS DATE. PART I.
ALERT FORCE. NINE B-47 CREWS FROM THE 34TH

PAGE TWO RUFARN 129
BOM WING (WHITEMAN AFB, MISSOURI) ARE ON REFLEX ALERT AT ZARAGOZA AB, SPAIN. IN ADDITION, TEN BIG JUMP B-47 CREWS FROM THE 308TH BOMB WING (PEASE AFB, NEW HAMPSHIRE) ARE ON ALERT.

- A. THE ALERT CREW FACILITY IS EXCELLENT:
 - (1) CREW QUARTERS ARE AIR-CONDITIONED, CLEAN AND ATTRACTIVELY FURNISHED.
- B. ALERT FORCE SUPERVISION IS EXCELLENT/ HAVE PERSONNEL AND TDY REFLEX SUPERVISORS FROM THE HOME UNITS ARE CLOSELY MONITORING ALERT ACTIVITIES.
- C. ALERT CREW KNOWLEDGE:
 - (1) SIX 34TH BOMB WING ALERT CREWS WERE INTERROGATED ON KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR ALERT DUTY AND NORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES. CREWS INTERROGATED AND RESULTS ARE:
 - (A) CREW B-47 CONSIDERABLY SATISFACTORY.
 - (B) CREW B-47 CONSIDERABLY SATISFACTORY.
 - (C) CREW B-98 CONSIDERABLY SATISFACTORY.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

(E) CREW E-13 COMDR CPT PARKER -
SATISFACTORY.

(F) CREW R-14 COMDR CPT BURNS -
SATISFACTORY.

(2) ALL NINE 36TH BOMB WING CREWS WERE
EXAMINED ON POSITIVE CONTROL PROCEDURES, TACTICAL
DOCTRINE AND SPECIAL WEAPONS.

(A) POSITIVE CONTROL - MARGINAL (ASTERISK
ITEM).

1. FOUR CREW MEMBERS FAILED.

(ASTERISK ITEM).

(B) TACTICAL DOCTRINE - UNSATISFACTORY.
(ASTERISK ITEM).

1. HIGH GRADE - 100 PERCENT

2. LOW GRADE - 70 PERCENT

3. AVERAGE - 81.4 PERCENT

4. THIRTEEN CREW MEMBERS FAILED.

PAGE FOUR RIJXBN 129

(ASTERISK ITEM).

(C) SPECIAL WEAPONS - MARGINAL (ASTERISK
ITEM).

1. HIGH GRADE - 100 PERCENT

2. LOW GRADE - 80 PERCENT

3. AVERAGE - 91.5 PERCENT

4. SIX CREW MEMBERS FAILED.

(ASTERISK ITEM).

(3) FIVE 36TH BOMB WING BIG JUMP CREWS
WERE INTERROGATED ON KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR ALERT SORTIE
AND NORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES. CREWS INTERRO-
GATED AND THE RESULTS ARE:

(A) CREW N-27 COMDR 1LT BURNS -
EXCELLENT.

(B) CREW E-13 COMDR CPT PARKER -
EXCELLENT.

(C) CREW E-91 COMDR CPT GRAHAM -
EXCELLENT.

(D) CREW R-58 COMDR LT LUNDIN -
EXCELLENT.

A prohibition is not required except prior to Category 2 destruction.
Physically remove all internal references by date 1. Class group prior to declassification.

SECRET

EXCELLENT.

(4) ALL TEN SOUTH BOMB WING REC JUMP CREWS WERE EXAMINED ON POSITIVE CONTROL PROCEDURES, TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND SPECIAL WEAPONS:

- (A) POSITIVE CONTROL - EXCELLENT
- (B) TACTICAL DOCTRINE - UNSATISFACTORY.

(ASTERISK ITEM)

- 1. HIGH GRADE - 100 PERCENT
- 2. LOW GRADE - 60 PERCENT
- 3. AVERAGE - 80 PERCENT
- 4. TWELVE CREW MEMBERS FAILED.

(ASTERISK ITEM)

(C) SPECIAL WEAPONS - SATISFACTORY.

- 1. HIGH GRADE - 100 PERCENT
- 2. LOW GRADE - 72 PERCENT
- 3. AVERAGE 85.4 PERCENT
- 4. TWO CREW MEMBERS FAILED

(ASTERISK ITEM)

D. CREW INTERROGATION AND EXAMINATION REVEALED

BT
94/1524Z OCT RJFXHM

(2)(2)

C4(c)4

1-6512(2)

A procedure is not required except prior to Category B unclassification.
Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

SECRET

TO RJEEDR/3422N WHITMAN AFB
RJEIGM/5000N PEASE AFB MS
INFO RJEEDR/CPCOAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
RJEENF/2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA
RJEEDR/8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TEN/1CAF TORREJON AB SPAIN
BT

REF ID: A1-533, SEC 11 OF ITI, FOR SAC IG 1 30.
THE FOLLOWING ARE WEARNESS:

(1) 342TH BOMB WING
(A) INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF HOW MUCH
DEGRADATION OF TACTICS WOULD RESULT FROM AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS FAILURE SUCH AS FAILURE OF ONE GEAR TO RETRACT,
FAILURE OF ONE TIP TO FEED, OR EARLY DROPPING OF TIP
TANKS. (ASTERISK ITEM).
(B) INADEQUATE PILOT KNOWLEDGE OF
TIMING BOMB RUN PROCEDURES. (ASTERISK ITEM).

PAGE TWO RJJFABN132

(C) INABILITY OF SOME NAVIGATORS TO
DRAW TARGET PREDICTION WITH ACCEPTABLE ACCURACY.
(ASTERISK ITEM).

(D) INSUFFICIENT PRACTICE OF RADAR
DIRECTED APPROACH PROCEDURES. IT IS NOTeworthy THAT
EACH CREW HAS AN EXCELLENT RADAR DIRECTED APPROACH
PLATE IN THE COM FOR THE POST STRIKE BASE WHICH IS
EASILY ADAPTABLE TO USE FOR PENETRATIONS FOR OTHER
BASES. HOWEVER, ACTUAL PRACTICE OF THIS TYPE APPROACH
IS LACKING. (ASTERISK ITEM).

(E) LACK OF PROFICIENCY IN POSITIVE
CONTROL PROCEDURES, TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND SPECIAL
WEAPONS. (ASTERISK ITEM).

(2) 505TH BOMB WING
(A) LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH RADAR
DIRECTED APPROACH PROCEDURES. (ASTERISK ITEM).

(B) INADEQUATE TACTICAL DOCTRINE
KNOWLEDGE. (ASTERISK ITEM).

(3) LACK OF FORMAL EDUCATED CRITICAL
AREA INSTRUCTION AND STUDY PROGRAMS FOR ALERT CREW.

A paragraph of text required access prior to Category 2 classification.
Physically remove all internal references by date. Use group prior to declassification action.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE RJFXBN 130

(ASTERISK ITEM).

(4) THE 509TH BOMB WING CREWS DISPLAYED EXCELLENT KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR BIG JUMP MISSION. THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE MISSION AND PROFESSIONALISM IN PRESENTATION IS PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY.

(5) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(A) THE 340TH AND 509TH BOMB WINGS TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES AND WEAKNESSES REVEALED THROUGH EXAMINATION AND INTERROGATION. (ASTERISK ITEM).

(B) IMMEDIATE ACTION BE TAKEN TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION AND STUDY OF CRITICAL AREA SUBJECTS. (ASTERISK ITEM).

PART II. FOLLOWING IS A RECAP OF EXAMINATION SCORES ATTAINED BY MEMBERS OF YOUR ORGANIZATION:

340BW

GRADE	NAME	H	PC	TD	SW
1/LT	WEISBECK, SE.M.		R-02	100	90

ft #
Para
(S)(A)
Para
(S)(B)

PAGE FOUR RJFXBN 130

1/LT	(b) (6)	R-02	100	84	90
1/LT	(b) (6)	R-02	100	88	90
MAJ	(b) (6)	E-03	FAILED	90	100
1/LT	(b) (6)	E-03	100	88	90
1/LT	(b) (6)	E-03	100	92	84
CAPT	(b) (6)	R-10	100	88	84
1/LT	(b) (6)	R-10	FAILED	80	88
CAPT	(b) (6)	R-10	100	92	88
CAPT	(b) (6)	R-27	100	90	84
1/LT	(b) (6)	R-27	100	88	88
CAPT	(b) (6)	R-27	100	100	100
CAPT	(b) (6)	R-34	FAILED	84	100
1/LT	(b) (6)	R-34	100	80	90
1/LT	(b) (6)	R-34	100	90	90
1/LT	(b) (6)	R-00	100	84	100
1/LT	(b) (6)	R-00	100	70	84
CAS	(b) (6)	R-00	FAILED	80	84
1/LT	(b) (6)	E-04	100	84	90

~~SECRET~~

1/1LT (b) (6)
1/1LT
CAPT
1/1LT
1/1LT

1/1LT
1/1LT
1/1LT
CAPT
1/1LT
1/1LT
MAJ
1/1LT
1/1LT
CAPT
1/1LT
CAPT
CAPT
ST

48/15242 OCT RJFIBN

E-04	100	04	24
E-05	100	04	24
E-06	100	04	24
E-07	100	04	24
E-08	100	04	24
E-09	100	04	24
E-10	100	04	24
E-11	100	04	24
E-12	100	04	24
E-13	100	04	24
E-14	100	04	24
E-15	100	04	24
E-16	100	04	24
E-17	100	04	24
E-18	100	04	24
E-19	100	04	24
E-20	100	04	24
E-21	100	04	24
E-22	100	04	24
E-23	100	04	24
E-24	100	04	24

1-6552

A paraphrase is not required except prior to Category 3 transcription.
Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

~~SECRET~~

TO R/JXBR/348WLNKITEMANLATE
 R/JXGM/509EM PEASE AFB NH
 INFO R/JXBR/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 R/JEKF/2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA
 R/JEDHR/8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
 ZEN/16AF TORREJON AB SPAIN
 BT

IC 61-539, FINAL SEC OF II. FOR SAC IC & DO.

50/DM

GRADE	NAME	CREW NBR	PC GRADE	TD GRADE	SM GRADE
1/LT	(b) (6)	E-47	100	96	72
1/LTL	(b) (6)	E-47	100	96	86
1/LT	(b) (6)	R-68	100	100	100
2/LT	(b) (6)	R-68	100	100	76
2/LO	(b) (6)	R-68	100	100	88
CAPT	(b) (6)	E-80	FAILED	96	92

PARAFIXN 131

1/LT	(b) (6)	E-80	100	100	98
CAPT	(b) (6)	E-80	100	88	96
MAJ	(b) (6)	S-87	100	96	80
1/LT	(b) (6)	S-87	100	88	92
1/LT	(b) (6)	S 3	100	96	96
CAPT	(b) (6)	E-91	100	92	84
1/LT	(b) (6)	E-91	100	100	84
1/LT	(b) (6)	E-91	100	100	96
CAPT	(b) (6)	E-97	100	96	84
1/LT	(b) (6)	E-97	100	84	96
1/LT	(b) (6)	E-97	100	84	96
SCP-4	(b) (6)				

BT
 04/1524Z OCT R/JFXBN

NRNN

A paraphrase is not required except prior to Category S encryption.
 Physically remove all internal references by date - time group prior to declassification.

~~SECRET~~

FOR 1961 IS. INFORMATION IS BEING OBTAINED FROM THE...
PART II OF... 9...
OF REFLEX... AT...
PART TWO...
AT PARAGUAY...
REFERENCE PART I PARAGRAPH (E) & A NEW TACTICAL...
TRAINING AIDS WILL BE UTILIZED BY ASSIGNED...
1961. APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF OF ASSIGNED...
IN TACTICAL...
BEEN INTERVIEWED AND...
IS EXAMINATIONS. REFERENCE PART I PARAGRAPH (E), THE TWO...
FAILED SPECIAL WEAPONS WILL BE...
PRIOR TO...
1961. REFERENCE PART II PARAGRAPH (A)...
THE... APPROACH...
BEEN MADE A SPECIAL... AT THE DAILY...
REPLY

REFERENCE PART II PARAGRAPH (D)...
PART II PARAGRAPH (D). FORMAL...
PROGRAMS WILL BE...
WILL ALSO BE...
PART II PARAGRAPH (A). A...
IS BEING...
REFERENCE PART II PARAGRAPH (A)...
PROGRAM OF...
IS BEING...
REFERENCE PART II PARAGRAPH (A)...

~~SECRET~~

14-00000
UNIFORM
RJEKDH 111
116002 2FF4
WESTOVER AFB MASS
UNIFORM
14000/DET 1 4002STRATRQ COMDRESTRON AB GNLB
1400 RJEKAD/DOX

10000
5900
E - 1
1000
009C -
10 -

~~SECRET~~ - C 18727, IMMEDIATE ATTN REQUIRED.
(1) ALERT POSTURE. THIS MSG IN 3 PARTS. PART 1. SAC
SECRET MSG C-2656 IS QUOTED FOR YOUR ACTION. QUOTE
PART 1 OF 4 PARTS. THIS MSG CLARIFIES AND SUMMARIZES
PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN MAINTAINING 50 PERCENT
ALERT POSTURE. ALPHA. THE ALERT CYCLE IS A DEFINITIVE
TIME PERIOD AND CREW COMPENSATORY TIME OFF IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THAT PERIOD OF TIME IS MANDATORY. EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY NO FLIGHTS WILL BE FLOWN AT THE COMPLETION
OF ALERT DUTY EXCEPT FOR REDEPLOYING REFLEX. BRAVO.

PAGE TWO RJEKDH 111
WHILE IT IS DESIRED TO MAINTAIN THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE
ALERT IT WILL NOT BE DONE AT THE EXPENSE OF CREW
SACRIFICE. UNTIL MANNING IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE
COMPLETE ALERT CAPABILITY THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES
WILL APPLY: (1) 74 HOURS WILL BE MAXIMUM AVERAGE WORK
WEEK BASED ON A MONTH PERIOD. (2) AUTHORITY IS
GRANTED TO FLY TRAINING SORTIES WHILE ON ALERT STATUS
AND DEGRADE THE AFFECTED ALERT SORTIE FOR THE PERIOD
OF TIME OF THE TRAINING SORTIE WHEN NECESSARY TO
CONFORM TO THE MAXIMUM OF 74 HOURS. (3) ONLY THE
CREW WILL BE DEGRADED IN CONFORMING WITH (1) & (2) ABOVE. THE
AIRCRAFT WILL BE MAINTAINED IN ALERT STATUS. (4)
WHENEVER A SORTIE IS DEGRADED FOR FLYING IT WILL BE
REPORTED BY SUPPLEMENTAL 1 SAC V-1 WITH SUBSTANTIATING
REASONS. PART 2. THE PROCEDURE OF FLYING WHILE ON
ALERT AND THUS DEGRADING THE ALERT CAPABILITY MUST BE
RECOGNIZED AS THE EXCEPTION AND NOT THE RULE. IT WILL
NOT BE USED AS A COVER FOR POOR SCHEDULING AT UNIT
LEVEL. PART 3. PROCEDURES WILL BE DEVELOPED TO
COORDINATE ANY REQUIRED DEGRADATION TIMES BETWEEN

4-6686

A paraphrase is not required except prior to Category B and C.
Physically remove all internal references by date - time group prior to declassification.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE RJEKDH 111
BOMBERS AND THEIR SUPPORTING TANKERS. PART A.
COMMANDERS WILL ADVISE AND EDUCATE ALL CROW PERSONNEL
OF MANAGEMENT CRITERIA CONCERNING THE WORK WEEK. END
QUOTE.

PART II. TIME OFF FOR CREWS WHILE AT THE REFLEX
STATION WILL NOT BE COUNTED AS DUTY HOURS. ONLY
ACTUAL WORK HOURS WHILE TDY WILL BE CONSIDERED AS
DUTY HOURS. PART III. A RECENT SURVEY OF 26 S&F
SQUADRONS CONCERNING CREW DUTY HOURS SHOWS THAT SOME
UNITS ARE CONDUCTING A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF GROUND
TRAINING WHILE CREWS ARE OFF ALERT DUTY. THIS
PRACTICE MUST BE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM WHENEVER
POSSIBLE, ALL GROUND TRAINING SHOULD BE CONDUCTED
WHILE CREWS ARE ON ALERT DUTY. (SCP-4).

BT
11/16/52 OCT RJEKDH

1-6686

A permission to use required except prior to Category 2 information.
Physically remove all internal references to date. Also group prior to declassification.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

A 47865A932DHC212
FM UNIFORM
BE RJEXDH 81
M 161440Z ZEX
FM 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO UNIFORM
BT

ACTION 509DCM
100 DCM
INFO 00 - 1
509C-1
100C-1
C-1

~~SECRET~~ DM 9805 FOR: DM, DCM. (U) GROUND CREWMEN FOR
ALERT AIRCRAFT. SAC SECRET MSG DM 2534, 5 OCT 61,
IS QUOTED FOR YOUR ACTION. QUOTE. EACH HOME ALERT
AIRCRAFT WILL BE PROVIDED AT ALL TIMES WITH ONE MAINTENANCE
TECHNICIAN, FIVE SKILL LEVEL OR HIGHER, QUALIFIED
TO LAUNCH THE PARTICULAR MODEL AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONAL
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH CURRENT
PUBLISHED LAUNCH AND RECOVERY CHECKLISTS WILL BE DETERMINED
BY THE TACTICAL UNIT COMMANDER, BASED ON LOCAL
CLIMATE CONDITIONS AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. APPROPRIATE

PAGE TWO RJEXDH 81
OPERATIONAL ORDERS WILL SPECIFY NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
REQUIRED TO SUPPLEMENT REFLEX AND AIRMAIL TOLIS. SACM
27-1, DATED 1 SEP 61, WILL BE AMENDED TO REFLECT THE
ABOVE MENTIONED POLICY. UNQUOTE. SCP-2.
BT
16/1546Z OCT RJEXDH

1-6803

NNNN

A paraphrase is not required except prior to Category B classification.
Physically remove all internal references by date - time group prior to declassification.

~~SECRET~~

01400001000
 PP RJKXN
 ZEL RJKXN
 H.D.000
 PP RJKXN8 RJKXN1 RJKXN2 RJKXN3 RJKXN4 RJKXN5 RJKXN6 RJKXN7 RJKXN8 RJKXN9
 DE RJKXN 3
 P 172300Z ZEK
 FM SAF IG TEAM GOOSE AB LABR
 TO RJKXN8/SAF LESTOVER AFB MASS
 RJKXN/45 AD LORING AFB ME
 INFO RJKXN/823 AD HOMESTEAD AFB FLA
 RJKXN/6 AD DOW AFB MI
 RJKXN/817 AD PASK AFB MI
 RJKXN/820 AD PLATTSBURGH AFB NY
 RJKXN/100 DE PEASE AFB NH
 RJKXN/309 BN PEASE AFB NH
 RJKXN/306 BN MCDILL AFB FLA
 RJKXN/4241 STRATOC SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
 RJKXN/4100 ARW PLATTSBURGH NY
 RJKXN/19 AIRRFLSG OTIS AFB MASS
 RJKXN/100 AIRRFLSG PEASE AFB NH
 RJKXN/309 AIRRFLSG PEASE AFB NH
 RJKXN/911 AIRRFLSG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
 RJKXN/306 AIRRFLSG MCDILL AFB FLA
 BT

Handwritten notes:
 2400 01 00
 1000 01 00
 5090 01 00
 5000 01 00
 1000 01 00
 5090 01 00

16 30779. SECTION ONE OF TWO FOR USAF, AFOP AND AFIC.
 FOR SAC, DOTAS, BMD AND IG. THIS MESSAGE IN SIX PARTS.
 PART 1. IDENTIFICATION.
 A. AN UNANNOUNCED OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION
 OF THE GOOSE TANKER TASK FORCE, GOOSE BAY, LABRADOR,
 WAS CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD 14 OCT 61 THROUGH
 25 OCT 61. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE TASK FORCE WERE
 EXERCISED DURING THE PREPARATION AND GENERATION PHASES
 TO TEST ALL SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
 B. KC-97 ACFT OF THE 78 ARKTS, 100 ARKTS, 301 ARKTS, 16874

A paraphrase is not required except prior to Category B classification.
 Typically source all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

SECRET

PAGE TWO RJEKID 3
348 ARKFS, 369 ARKFS, COMPOSED THE GOOSE REFLEX
FORCE. BUILD-UP OF THE GOOSE TASK FORCE WAS
ACCOMPLISHED BY ARRIVAL OF "LEAF PROG" KC-97 ACFT
FROM THE 817 AB, PEASE AFB, NH; 306 ARKFS, WEDDILL AF
FLA; 911 ARKFS, SEYDOUR-JOHNSON AFB, NC.

PART II. GENERAL EVALUATION.
A. THE GOOSE TASK FORCE DEMONSTRATED AN OUTSTANDING
CAPABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE USAF MISSION AS ESTAB-
LISHED IN THE UNIT TRAINING STANDARDS AND USAF APPROVED
READINESS CRITERIA. THE GOOSE TASK FORCE PASSED THE
ORI.

B. THE IN-PLACE UNIT'S PERFORMANCE SUBSTANTIATED THE
UNIT'S LATEST SAC V-3 REPORT.

C. THE ORI WAS INITIATED AT 1700Z 14 OCT 61 BY A FAST
REACTION MESSAGE FROM HQ SAC.

D. COMMAND LEADERSHIP WAS OUTSTANDING. CONTROL OF
THE TANKER TASK FORCE DURING THE EXERCISE WAS
EFFECTIVELY MAINTAINED BY THE ACTIONS OF KEY
PERSONNEL IN THE COMMAND POST, JOB CONTROL AND
THROUGHOUT THE OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

PAGE THREE RJEKID 3
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS AGENCIES WAS
SATISFACTORY.

E. A SIMULATED "BROKEN ARROW" (DISASTER CONTROL, EER-
CISE) WAS CONDUCTED AT 1151Z, 17 OCT 61. RESULTS OF THIS
EXERCISE WERE EXCELLENT. THE SITUATION PRESENTED
CONSISTED OF A C-124 STRATEGIC SUPPORT ACFT TAKING
OFF WITH ONE (1) WEAPON ABOARD WHICH CRASHES ON TAKEOFF.
THE POINT OF IMPACT WAS LOCATED ON THE SOUTHEAST
PARKING RAMP. THIRTEEN CASUALTIES WERE SIMULATED.

F. CRITIQUE FOR COMMANDER AND KEY STAFF MEMBERS
WITH MAXIMUM ATTENDANCE BY UNIT PERSONNEL WILL BE
CONDUCTED ON FRIDAY, 20 OCT 61 BY COLONEL JOHN W.
FARRAR, SAF INSPECTOR GENERAL.

PART III. OPERATIONAL TEST. THE OPERATIONAL TEST
IN SUPPORT OF THE ORI WAS HQ SAC OPERATIONS ORDER
SKY SHIELD II 11-62 DATED 13 SEP 61.

A. GOOSE TASK FORCE.

1. GENERAL RECAP:

A. UNITS

B. TYPE ACFT

4962 STRATEGIC GOOSE TASK FORCE
KC-97

A paraphrase is not required except prior to Category II assignment.
Physically remove all internal references by date - time group prior to declassification.

SECRET

D. SORTIE REFLEX	N/A
E. ANGEL LAZ SACH 39-5	33
F. ON ALERT O/S	N/A
G. ON ALERT (REFLEX)	23
H. TOTAL ACFT SCORED FOR EXECUTION (5 SORTIES CANCELLED BY HIGHER PRIORITY (8 SORTIES CANCELLED BY HIGHER PRIORITY DUE TO EX IN "EAST PARK" REFUELING AREA))	17
I. TANKER SUPPORT SORTIES	0
J. SCHED NUMBER RE SCOUT	N/A
K. ASSIGNED CREWS	68
L. AVAIL CREWS	68
M. ALERT CREWS O/S	N/A

2. OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION EVALUATION:
 A. MAINTENANCE EFFECTIVENESS: ALL REFLEX AIRCRAFT WERE GENERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SACH 39-7 AND THE UNIT READINESS PLAN. SEVENTEEN OF THE TWENTY FIVE REFLEX AIRCRAFT WERE LAUNCHED AS SCHEDULED AND COMPLETED THE MISSION AS BRIEFED. EIGHT AIRCRAFT WERE CANCELLED BY HIGHER HQS. FIFTY

PAGE FIVE B. JEDD 3

PROPERTY OF THE FORCE RECOVERED AT GOOSE AIR BASE WAS REGENERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SACH 39-7 GENERATION RATES AND SIMULATED LAUNCH ON TIME.

B. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

(1) UNIT	GOOSE TANKER TASK FORCE
(2) ALERT ACFT SCORED FOR EXEC	17
(3) EFFECTIVE	17
(4) NONEFFECTIVE	0
(5) MISSION EFFECTIVENESS	OUTSTANDING

C. AIR REFUELING OPERATIONS

(1) TOTAL REQUIRED	17
(2) NOT SCORED	1
(3) EFFECTIVE	16
(4) RELIABILITY	OUTSTANDING

(A) REASON FOR THE NOT SCORED SORTIES:
 ACFT 134, CREW 9-43, DID NOT OFFLOAD REQUIRED FUEL. RECEIVER TOGGLE SWITCHES COULD NOT LATCH ON TO THE BOOM IN NORMAL AND IN EMERGENCY BOOM LATCH. POST MISSION ANALYSIS OF THE TANKER REVEALED NO MALFUNCTIONS OF THE INFLIGHT AIR REFUELING SYSTEM.

BT
 18/6102 OCS-2/11/11

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

BIAN

0MA189DLB253
 RJEKGM
 RJEKDL 9
 01152 ZEK
 SAF IG TEAM 600SE AB LABR
 RJEKDH/COFS USAF
 RJEKDH/SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
 RJEKDH/817 AD PEASE AFB NH
 RJEKDH/2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA
 RJEKDH/57 AD WESTOVER AFB MASS
 RJEKDL/11 AIRRFLSQ DOVER AFB DEL
 RJEKDH/305 AIRRFLSQ MCGUIRE AFB N J
 BT

ATOM 10000-3
 50900-3
 INFO 0-1 00-1
 1000-1
 5090-1 DM-1
 10000-1 000-1
 50900-1 000-1

0769. SECTION ONE OF TWO. FOR USAF, AFOP AND AFCIG. FOR
 SAC, DOTAS, DMAD AND IG. THIS MSG IN SIX PARTS.

PART I. IDENTIFICATION.

- A. AN UNANNOUNCED OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION OF PEASE TANKER TASK FORCE, PEASE AFB, NEW HAMPSHIRE WAS CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD 14 OCT THROUGH 19 OCT 61. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE TASK FORCE WERE EXERCISED DURING THE PREPARATION AND GENERATION PHASES TO TEST ALL SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
- B. KC-97 ACFT OF THE 100 AREFS AND 309 AREFS, PEASE

PAGE TWO RJEKDL 9

AFB COMPOSED THE PEASE ALERT FORCE. BUILD-UP OF THE PEASE TASK FORCE WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY ARRIVAL OF "LEAP FROM" KC-97 ACFT FROM THE 11 AREFS, DOVER AFB, DELAWARE AND 309 AREFS, MCGUIRE AFB, NEW JERSEY.

PART II. GENERAL EVALUATION.

- A. THE PEASE TASK FORCE DEMONSTRATED AN OUTSTANDING CAPABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE USAF MISSION AS ESTABLISHED IN THE UNIT TRAINING STANDARDS AND USAF APPROVED READINESS CRITERIA. THE PEASE TASK FORCE PASSED THE ORI.
- B. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SAF CONCURS IN THE COMMANDER'S AF-V-14 REPORT INDEX OF C-1 FOR THE 100/309 AREFS. IN ADDITION THE IN-PLACE UNITS PERFORMANCE SUBSTANTIATED THE UNIT'S LATEST SAC V-1 REPORT.
- C. THE ORI WAS INITIATED AT 1700Z 14 OCT 61 BY A FAST REACTION MSG AGE FROM HQ SAC.
- D. COMMAND LEADERSHIP WAS OUTSTANDING. CONTROL OF THE TANKER TASK FORCE DURING THE EXERCISE WAS EFFECTIVELY MAINTAINED BY THE ACTIONS OF KEY

1-68520

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE RJKXDL 9

PERSONNEL IN THE COMMAND POST, JOB CONTROL AND THROUGHOUT THE OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS AGENCIES WAS SATISFACTORY.

D. SIMULATED "BROKEN ARROW" (DISASTER CONTROL EXERCISE) N/A.

E. CRITIQUE FOR COMMANDERS B/GEN A. J. BECK, COMMANDER 817 AD, COL R.D. REINBOLD, COMMANDER 100 BOMB WING, COL D. G. MCPHERSON, COMMANDER, 509 BOMB WING AND KEY STAFF MEMBERS WAS CONDUCTED ON 15 OCTOBER 61 BY LT COL LEWIS E. COURSON, TEAM CHIEF, SAF (IG)

F. PART III. OPERATIONAL TEST. THE OPERATIONAL TEST IN SUPPORT OF THE ORI WAS HQ SAC OPERATIONS ORDER SKY FIELD II 11-62 DATED 13 SEP 61.

G. PEASE TASK FORCE.

H. GENERAL RECAP:

A. UNITS	PEASE TASK FORCE
B. TYPE ACFT	KC-97
C. POSSESSED (100 AND 509 AREFS)	45

PAGE FOUR RJKXDL 9

D. ENROUTE REFLEX N/A

E. AVAIL IAW SACH 50-5 (100 AND 509 AREFS) 23

F. ON ALERT O/S 21

G. ON ALERT (ZI) 6

H. TOTAL ACFT SCHED FOR EXECUTION 8

I. TANKER SUPPORT SORTIES 0

J. SCHED BOMBER W/ SCOUT N/A

K. ASSIGNED CREWS 64

L. AVAIL CREWS 42

M. ALERT CREWS O/S 22

N. ACFT INPUT FROM

11 AREFS 10

305 AREFS 10

2. OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION EVALUATION:

A. MAINTENANCE EFFECTIVENESS:

OVERALL MAINTENANCE EFFECTIVENESS IS RATED SATISFACTORY. KC-97 NBR 715 DID NOT LAUNCH DUE TO A FAULTY 14850

THE BOX CAUSING ALL PROPS TO BE UNAVAILABLE TO
 NORMAL POSITION. MATTERING FAILURE. 10-23-52
 AS A BOUNDING BOX. 10-23-52
 1. THREE BARRIERS
 2. BARRIERS IN THE COMPANY
 3. THROUGH THE OPERATIONAL
 4. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 5. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 6. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 7. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 8. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 9. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 10. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 11. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 12. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 13. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 14. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 15. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 16. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 17. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 18. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 19. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 20. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 21. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 22. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 23. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 24. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 25. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 26. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 27. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 28. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 29. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 30. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 31. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 32. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 33. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 34. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 35. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 36. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 37. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 38. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 39. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 40. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 41. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 42. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 43. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 44. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 45. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 46. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 47. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 48. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 49. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 50. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 51. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 52. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 53. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 54. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 55. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 56. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 57. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 58. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 59. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 60. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 61. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 62. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 63. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 64. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 65. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 66. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 67. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 68. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 69. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 70. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 71. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 72. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 73. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 74. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 75. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 76. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 77. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 78. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 79. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 80. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 81. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 82. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 83. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 84. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 85. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 86. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 87. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 88. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 89. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 90. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 91. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 92. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 93. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 94. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 95. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 96. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 97. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 98. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 99. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS
 100. BARRIERS THE BARRIERS

FACTORY. 10-23-52 WAS THE BARRIERS TO A BARRIERS
 OVERALL MAINTENANCE EVALUATION IS BARRIERS
 A MAINTENANCE EVALUATION
 2. OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION EVALUATION
 3. BARRIERS
 4. BARRIERS
 5. BARRIERS
 6. BARRIERS
 7. BARRIERS
 8. BARRIERS
 9. BARRIERS
 10. BARRIERS
 11. BARRIERS
 12. BARRIERS
 13. BARRIERS
 14. BARRIERS
 15. BARRIERS
 16. BARRIERS
 17. BARRIERS
 18. BARRIERS
 19. BARRIERS
 20. BARRIERS
 21. BARRIERS
 22. BARRIERS
 23. BARRIERS
 24. BARRIERS
 25. BARRIERS
 26. BARRIERS
 27. BARRIERS
 28. BARRIERS
 29. BARRIERS
 30. BARRIERS
 31. BARRIERS
 32. BARRIERS
 33. BARRIERS
 34. BARRIERS
 35. BARRIERS
 36. BARRIERS
 37. BARRIERS
 38. BARRIERS
 39. BARRIERS
 40. BARRIERS
 41. BARRIERS
 42. BARRIERS
 43. BARRIERS
 44. BARRIERS
 45. BARRIERS
 46. BARRIERS
 47. BARRIERS
 48. BARRIERS
 49. BARRIERS
 50. BARRIERS
 51. BARRIERS
 52. BARRIERS
 53. BARRIERS
 54. BARRIERS
 55. BARRIERS
 56. BARRIERS
 57. BARRIERS
 58. BARRIERS
 59. BARRIERS
 60. BARRIERS
 61. BARRIERS
 62. BARRIERS
 63. BARRIERS
 64. BARRIERS
 65. BARRIERS
 66. BARRIERS
 67. BARRIERS
 68. BARRIERS
 69. BARRIERS
 70. BARRIERS
 71. BARRIERS
 72. BARRIERS
 73. BARRIERS
 74. BARRIERS
 75. BARRIERS
 76. BARRIERS
 77. BARRIERS
 78. BARRIERS
 79. BARRIERS
 80. BARRIERS
 81. BARRIERS
 82. BARRIERS
 83. BARRIERS
 84. BARRIERS
 85. BARRIERS
 86. BARRIERS
 87. BARRIERS
 88. BARRIERS
 89. BARRIERS
 90. BARRIERS
 91. BARRIERS
 92. BARRIERS
 93. BARRIERS
 94. BARRIERS
 95. BARRIERS
 96. BARRIERS
 97. BARRIERS
 98. BARRIERS
 99. BARRIERS
 100. BARRIERS

~~SECRET~~

04246DLB279
FF RJEKGM
VS RJEKDL 10
180115Z ZEX
SAF IC TEAM GOOSE AB LAFB
RJEZHQ/COTS USAF
CDHR/2AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
EXCM/617 AD PEASE AFB NH
TO RJEKFF/2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA
CDHR/27AD WESTOVER AFB MASS
EXKL/11 AIRRFLSQ DOVER AFB DEL
EXFM/305 AIRRFLSQ MCCUIRE AFB NJ

30749. FINAL SECTION OF TWO.
- A. WEATHER SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE 45 STRAT
FIGHTER WING WAS SATISFACTORY.
 - B. RECEPTION PLAN, THE RECEPTION OF PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED "LEAP FROG" AIRCRAFT WAS OUTSTANDING.
TEAM MEMBERS WERE PROCESSED QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY,
REPORTING TO THEIR PLACE OF DUTY WITH MINIMUM DELAY.
 - C. COMMUNICATIONS SATISFACTORY
 - D. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SATISFACTORY
 - E. MISSION PLANNING & INTER-COMMUNICATION SATISFACTORY

191405

11111 AIR DIVISION
11111 11111 11111
11111 11111 11111


17 October 1961

Colonel Donald G. McPherson
Commander
509th Bombardment Wing
Pease Air Force Base
New Hampshire

Dear Don:

1. Although your B-47's were not scored during the Pease Task Force ORI on 14 October, I asked my staff to evaluate your operation for my information. (U)
2. Utilizing ORI scoring rules in SACM 50-5, you were rated satisfactory in Maintenance and Mission Effectiveness, and outstanding in Bombing Reliability and Air Refueling. The "satisfactory" in Maintenance was based upon the one ground abort and in Mission Effectiveness on three non-effective aircraft: Plebe 60, air abort; Plebe 54, ground abort; and Plebe 76 for failure to obtain a picture on the camera attack. Based upon the PI scores, your CEA was 930 feet. Crew E-14, Captain (b) (6) is to be commended for a score of 250 feet. ~~0.6~~
3. Your overall rating was satisfactory; however, I hope that the 509th can attain outstanding when you are officially scored in an ORI. (U)

Sincerely,


A. J. BECK
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1-6807

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SACR 55-11/509th BW Sup 1

509TH BW SUPPLEMENT 1 HEADQUARTERS 509TH BOMBARDMENT WING
TO: SACR 55-11 Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire
4 October 1961

Operations

AIRDROME SUPERVISION AND SUPERVISOR OF FLYING

SACR 55-11, dated 17 Feb 1961 and 8AF Supplement 1, dated 24 Jul 1961, are further supplemented as follows:

1a. The Supervisor of Flying is the direct representative of the Wing Commander on all aspects of tactical flying. The Maintenance Launch Control Officer is the direct representative of the Wing Commander for all unscheduled maintenance occurring within one hour of scheduled takeoff time. In the execution of this authority, they must consider the urgency of the particular situation. They must not hesitate to take timely, positive action in any situation where time is of the essence in preventing injury to personnel or damage to aircraft or material. On the other hand, whenever time permits, they must confer with and secure approval from the responsible command or staff section prior to implementing action affecting safety of flight, aircraft emergencies, weather phenomena, late takeoffs, aircraft cancellations, flight line emergencies, deviations from the published schedule or launch of aircraft with less than fully operational equipment.

1b. Nothing in this regulation will be interpreted as relieving any command or staff agency of its assigned authority or responsibility for the supervision of tactical flying.

2a(3). The Supervisor of Flying and the Operations Launch Control Officer will report to the Command Post at 0800 hours or two hours prior to the first scheduled takeoff, whichever is later. The Supervisor of Flying will be relieved when tactical flying is terminated or at 0800 hours the following day. The Operations Launch Control Officer will be relieved when the last scheduled aircraft is launched during his duty day which also ends at 0800 hours the following day.

This supplement supersedes 509th BW Regulation 55-2, 17 May 1961
OPI: 509DCO
DISTRIBUTION: DAS - 1, DSAFE - 1, DCM - 10, DCO - 25

4 October 1961

2a(4). The general tour for the Maintenance Launch Control Officer will be between 0800 hours of one day to 0800 hours of the following day. The Maintenance Launch Control Officer will report to Base Operations where the Operations Launch Control Officer will meet him at the start of their tour of duty for weather briefing and final maintenance status determination.

2a(5). Joint Responsibilities. The Operations Launch Control Officer and the Maintenance Launch Control Officer will be in the Wing Launch vehicle for all takeoffs; during periods when no aircraft are being launched they will keep each other advised of their locations as well as the Command Post.

(a) Not later than 40 minutes prior to launch time, the launch vehicle will monitor the Command Post frequency and the Launch Control Officers will be available to render assistance to the flight crews as necessary.

(b) For maintenance discrepancies, the Launch Control Officers will obtain sufficient information to give Job Control enough information to implement required actions. Job Control has overall responsibility for assuring timely accomplishment of unscheduled maintenance. The Maintenance Launch Control Officer will keep Job Control advised as to the status of the aircraft.

2f(1). The Supervisor of Flying and the Operations Launch Control Officer will report to the Command Post to obtain last minute instructions on tactical flying projected during their duty tour. The Chief, Control Division, will brief the Supervisor of Flying on routine duties, flying, missions, and alert force communication out procedures. The DCO and/or ADCO will brief special projects and/or actions required each specific duty period. The Supervisor of Flying will normally perform his duties in the Command Post, but he should not hesitate to remove his duty post to the tower, GCA facility, launch control vehicle or any location necessary to assure adequate control and supervision of flying activities.

2f(2). No duties will be performed or assigned which do not pertain to the Supervision of Flying. The Supervisor of Flying and Launch Control Officers must be intimately familiar with all aspects of every flight conducted during their tour. They must be able to perform a service to flight crews as well as to the supervisors to whom they are responsible.

4 October 1961

They must be aware of flight conditions expected to be encountered during all phases of flight. From their position on the ground, with access to the facilities at their disposal, they can and must react to any situation which might affect the safety of crews or aircraft or the success or failure of the mission. They will issue advisories to the aircraft in flight of information which may avert difficulty or contribute to the success of the mission. Their duties must include, but may not be limited to, the following:

(a) Proceed to the weather station periodically for briefing on existing and forecast weather for route, terminal and recommended alternate.

(b) Check NOTAM's for terminals and designated alternates.

(c) Check airfield and runway conditions, lighting, navigation and approach aids.

(d) Become familiar with the missions of all scheduled aircraft by personal contact with appropriate squadron staffs. Secure copies of MAR's to assist in determination of alternate missions if dictated by weather or aircraft malfunction.

(e) Institute appropriate action on any known or suspected overdue aircraft.

(f) If necessitated by weather or other reasons, act as tower officer. If due to circumstances, this is not deemed advisable, the standby IP will be used for this purpose. (See PAFBR 55-1, 1 Aug 61, for tower officer requirements.)

(g) Supervise the diversion of aircraft due to weather or airfield condition.

(h) During MITO's the Supervisor of Flying will perform duties as follows:

1. Obtain a MITO flimsy from the training division and become familiar with the procedures outlined.

2. Attend the pre-takeoff MITO briefing at Base Operations and insure that all crews thoroughly understand the provisions listed in the flimsy.

4 October 1961

3. Insure that a qualified IP, for the type aircraft making the MITO, is located in the tower during the MITO takeoff.

4. Place the Supervisor of Flying vehicle at the first taxiway from the takeoff end of the runway. Monitor the tower MITO takeoff frequency and guard frequency and be prepared to fire the veri-pistol if an abort is called by a MITO aircraft.

5. Make a detailed written report to the DCO if any unusual incident occurs during the MITO.

(i) When Klaxons sound or the Supervisor of Flying determines from any other means that an alert is in progress, he will proceed directly to the Command Post. He may be required to relinquish his vehicle to the Officer Controller on duty and safeguard the Command Post during the controllers absence. (This would only be implemented during EWO communications out procedures.)

2f(3). The attached checklist is furnished as a guide for the Supervisor of Flying. At the end of his tour of duty, he will report as necessary on Item No. 10 to the Chief, Control Division.

2f(4). Officers designated by the Wing Commander as qualified to perform duty as Supervisor of Flying are B-47 instructor Pilots and staff officers who are qualified B-47 Crew Commanders. They will be on special orders prior to performing this duty.

2f(5). Officers qualified to perform duty as Operations Launch Control Officer will be 51-19 qualified B-47, or KC-97 Crew Commanders, or Co-Pilots.

2f(6). Officers qualified to perform duty as Maintenance Launch Control Officer are maintenance officers who are designated as qualified by the Wing DCM.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Jack R. Stanley
JACK R. STANLEY
Major, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

1 Atch
Checklist

SUPERVISOR OF FLYING

CHECKLIST

ITEM

1. Briefing by the Command Post.
2. Briefing by the DCO/ADCO.
3. Read SOP file.
4. Weather Briefing.
5. Check NOTAMS
6. Check maintenance status of scheduled aircraft
7. Check 60-9 and MAR's.
8. Check Airfield runway conditions, lighting, navigation aids. (NOTE: During the 1st to the 15th of each month, recommend airfield status report to the DCO and/or Wing Commander.)
9. Check assigned vehicle.
10. Aircraft late takeoffs and cancellations. (Give detailed reason and fix responsibility. i.e., Aircrew, maintenance, weather, FAA, etc. This should be in sufficient detail to justify decision for responsibility on each aircraft so involved.)

Atch 1

TO: SAC, CGT

FROM: Chief of Training Conference, SAC Headquarters (4)

TO: SAC

THRU: SAC/CGT

1. The DOW conference at SAC convened on the 17th of October. The objective of this conference was to discuss, with the various Chiefs of Training, the home alert concept used by the units of 8th AF and the methods employed to meet the 50% increased alert concept issued by SAC Headquarters in July.

2. The 309th Bomb Wing was one of the 4 wings selected to review their methods in meeting these two problems. (4)

3. Colonel Young, Chief of Training, SAC, opened the conference. He discussed the problem of units hoarding drop times. It seems that some wings have been suspected of retaining low level drop times that they knew they could not cover. I have discussed this subject with Major Harris and he assures me that we have never practiced this concept in the 309th. Col Young discussed briefly the CEO probation rates in SAC and it appears that this is primarily the result of the ground training, or now referred to as collateral training. It seems that crews are having little or no difficulty in the air phase. All failures have been a result of Weapons Knowledge and Tactical Doctrine and Emergency Procedures testing prior to the flight. He reviewed the following SAC MCB standings:

B-47

1st 30th Bomb Wing

2nd 304th Bomb Wing

3rd 309th Bomb Wing

EC-97

1st 309th Bomb Wing

2nd 309th Bomb Wing

*Dates made
10 Oct 61*

HEADQUARTERS
509TH BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM
United States Air Force
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 509C

9 Oct 1961

SUBJECT: General Sweeney's Remarks - Commanders Conference

TO: All Commanders and Members of the Staff

1. At the last Commanders Conference, General Sweeney gave us some remarks on command leadership. The following are the points which he covered:

a. Integrity.

(1) It goes without saying that all commanders should have integrity. However, his point on this subject was that the commander's subordinates will also have integrity. In other words, you don't want a brigand working for you unless you are engaged in brigandage.

b. Commander must be known by his subordinates.

(1) This means what it says. Your subordinates should know you, and the bigger the command, the greater the job in accomplishing this.

c. Communications.

(1) Our greatest problem always is communications, both up and down, to insure that everyone has the word and knows in which direction we are trying to go.

d. Know the mission of the command.

(1) Here it is important that the mission of the command is known by all of the members of that command - not just the commanders. A short, concise, inclusive statement of the mission is particularly important.

e. Demonstrate interest in individuals.

(1) This doesn't mean have an interest in individuals. It means do something to demonstrate an interest in individuals.

i. Quality force.

(1) Don't put up with "meatheads" - get rid of them.

g. Know status of command in detail.

(1) This means exactly what it says and, of course, in addition you must have a system to get the status.

h. Command control.

(1) The military is not a democratic organization. Get all the advice you need and want from your staff but remember you're the commander and you're running the show.

i. Instant readiness.

(1) Be ready to accomplish your mission with no lost motion.

j. Right man on the right job.

(1) This goes along with the quality force. However, in addition here we are talking about putting a man where he can do the most good.


k. Operate in good facilities and areas.

(1) General Sweeney feels that people just naturally operate better if they operate out of good facilities and he's talking about facilities which they themselves have helped improve. This develops pride in your facilities as well.


2. To the above, I would add the following:

a. Follow up - make sure what you want to be done is being done.

b. See what is coming out of the end of the pipe. Frequently your instructions passing down through the chain of command become watered down or changed. If you go down to the guy who has to do it and find out he's doing what you want him to do, you can be sure that your policies are being placed into effect properly.


DONALD G. McPHERSON
Colonel, USAF
Commander

HEADQUARTERS
509th BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

File Copy

509C
509K

REPLY TO: 509DCOTB/Major Harris/2463
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: SAF Monthly Conference

TO: C DOD DCOT 283BS 661BS 716BS 806BS

1. Col Young, DOT, ask that Units go in with "C" messages only after unsatisfactory or unanswered routine approach.
2. Lt/Col (b) (6) DOT-4, gave brief recap of SAC Standings of Numbered AF's for current period. SAF appears to be well in front of 2AF & 15AF in all phases.
3. Major (b) (6) Flying Time, stated next quarter allocation would be approximately same as this quarter. Units were asked to stay within the allowable \pm or - 2%. Allocation should be out to the field during week 11th-15th Sept.
4. Col McConnell, Current Ops:
 - a. SAF did not have "Sky Shield" Ops order from SAC as of 8th Sept.
 - b. Increased requirement for ORI WX Scout. Amendment went out to Units.
 - c. "Bar None" Manual is being revised. Scoring criteria should ease, possibility of using Unit CEP for passing in bombing phase. "Bar None" results against RBS Express will dictate whether or not Express will be utilized for ORI.
 - d. Commanders Conference scheduled for 25-27th Sept.
 - e. Next "All Out" is programmed for after the first of the year, this will be practice for "Spring Thaw" which is scheduled for Apr 62.
 - f. SACM 55-12 (Air Operations Peasetime) is being rewritten. No completion date this time.
 - g. SAF Opord 225-62 (Big Blast) due out within next two weeks. The route planning conference, two man teams from each Unit, is scheduled for week of 2 Oct 61. Routes will be planned from T.O. to Landing vs present concept of ECM penetration.

5. Major Palmer, RBS:

a. Units are not authorized direct communication with Nike/RBS except to cancel scheduled activity.

b. Oilburner Hangover route goes to 18 hrs operation Oct 31. FAA won't buy day light operation of Oilburner routes on week-ends due to high density traffic of light aircraft.

c. Philadelphia Nike will close 1 Oct to provide RBS personnel for extended operating hours on Oilburner routes.

d. SAC is presently working on a semi-mobile RBS site. Site would be relocated every two weeks within a 100 mile radius of a DOD installation.

e. 508BW & 104BW each have 4 "Tree Trimmer" sorties per day except for the 6th & 13th, during month of Oct. Next RBS Express is "Beck Bed" effective 4 Nov - 28 Dec 61 with entry & exit at Buffalo VOR. Route should be published in Oct 15 issue of Airman's Guide.

f. Low Level over water route "Red Robin" should be available 1 Oct.

6. Lt/Col (b) (6) B/B:

a. Low Level activity against Nike sites should be available in the near future.

b. RBS Express will have increased circle size for Short Look synchronous and Large Charge runs eff 1 Oct 61.

c. Effective 1 Oct Nike activity will have increased incentive points for emergency runs and no reliability on any type run.

d. Looks like new training ballistics will not go into effect on 1 Oct as programmed. Look for something from SAC in near future.

7. Major (b) Air Training:

a. SACR 50-6 has been deleted, information is contained in new SACR 50-8.

b. Any crew operating on the "one crew member TDY" waiver of SACR 50-6, is authorized an additional substitution in the event of DNF or emergency leave of one of the remaining members.

c. Spare crew members will accrue points based on their own activity rather than on the activity of basic crew. No change on incentive points for Staff activity.

d. The "weak crew" concept has been deleted.

e. Transmitters and receivers may assume incentive points for Boom Operator Training (students) :15 minutes of contacts and disconnects.

f. No basic instruments at site under the hood.

g. Crews need one full quarter after upgrading before they are required to accomplish annual issues.

John P. Harkin
JOHN P. HARKIN
Major USAF
Chief, Bomb/Nav Section

1 NOV 1961

DO

Combat Crew EWO Knowledge

100th Bomb Wg (DCO)

509th Bomb Wg (DCO)

INTO: 100C
509C

Reference: RAF CONFIDENTIAL message DOP 18747, 25 Oct 61.

1. Deficiencies in combat crew knowledge, as noted in referenced message, are totally unacceptable.
2. Special emphasis must be placed on crew EWO mission knowledge and the contents of Combat Mission Folders.
3. Areas of combat crew knowledge deficiencies, in addition to launch message authentication/reaction, will be a special subject of inspection during the Division Operations staff visits.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Handwritten signature]

S. D. LORAIN
CWO Wg, USAF

INFO COPY: 509C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GMA435DH9531V
RR UNIFORM
DE RJEXDH 501
R 201951Z ZFX
FM SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO UNIFORM
BT

*Action 2000-3
209010-3
Info 20 - 1*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR USAF. (U) IG INSPECTIONS-
REPORTS BY IG REVEALS THAT COMBAT MISSION FOTTER KNOW-
LEDGE IS WEAK AND NEEDS ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS BY ALL
UNITS. SOME SPECIFICS THAT HAVE BEEN CITED ARE: CREWS
ARE SLOW IN LOCATING INFORMATION WITHIN THE CMF, CREWS
ARE NOT SURE OF EXACT FORMS FOR COMPLETING REPORTS,
CO-PILOTS ARE VAGUE IN EXACT FORM AND CHAFF DISPENSING
PROCEDURES (R-47), CREWS ARE NOT FULLY ACQUAINTED WITH
SAC FORM 16V (CREW INFORMATION INTERROGATION FORM), CREWS
ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE 2 HOT LINE REPORT FORMAT AND

PAGE TWO RJEXDH 501
WITH APPLICABLE SACAT TO USE FOR THIS REPORT AND A
DEFINITE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE DISPLAYED BY MOST CREWS
ABOUT THE EXACT INFORMATION TO BE CALLED IN WHEN
REPORTING THE MAINTENANCE STATUS OF THE AIRCRAFT PRIOR
TO LANDING. EWO STUDY OFFICERS WILL INSURE ADEQUATE
CMF KNOWLEDGE IS ATTAINED BY ALL CREWS DURING STUDY
PERIODS. (SCP-4)

1-6995

BT
25/2027Z OCT RJEXDH

NNNN

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
DECLASSIFIED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YEARS
EOD ON 090310

A paraphrase is not required except prior to Category B exception.
Physically remove all internal references by date - time group prior to declassification.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 October 1961

DO

GHT Crew Testing

1. Major Wells, SAF DIT office, called Captain Young, DOP, at 1500 hours, 19 October 1961 and relayed the following information concerning combat crew testing during GHT:

- a. Fifteen bomber crew members will be tested on positive control, authentication and execution. (tape)
 - b. Fifteen tanker crew members will be tested on authentication and reaction. (tape)
 - c. Three bomber crews tested on oral crew knowledge. (open book)
 - d. Two tanker crews tested on oral crew knowledge. (open book)
 - e. Ten E-47 co-pilots tested on radar signal tapes.
 - f. One crew certification on alert sortie (three phases graded):
 - (1) One-hour preparation.
 - (2) Sequence phase (follow SAF outline).
 - (3) Question phase.
2. Bomber crews tested will be picked at random.
3. Tanker crews tested will be alert crews supplemented by crews picked at random.

EDWARD D. EDWARDS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

JOINT MESSAGE ORM

UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY	TYPE MESSAGE	AFSC (SICRYD)	CLASSIFICATION
ACTION ROUTINE	GROUP	AF	PROPERTY
FROM	TO		

817AIRDIV PEASE AFB NH

TO: 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS

UNCLAS/509EGOTA

FOR 8AF DOT-1. WAIVE OF SACR 50-8 REQUIREMENT. THIS MESSAGE IN TWO (2) PARTS. PART 1. REFERENCE SACR 50-8, ANNEX III, PARAGRAPH 6c(3). REQUEST WAIVER OF FIFTEEN MINUTE MINIMUM CONTACT TIME FOR NIGHT HEAVYWEIGHT REFUELING WHEN SUCH REFUELING IS IN CONJUNCTION WITH REFLEX DEPLOYMENT. PART 2. THIS UNIT DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON REFLEX DEPLOYMENT REFUELING TO FULFILL THE 50-8 NIGHT HEAVYWEIGHT REFUELING MINIMUM REQUIREMENT WITH KC-99's. NORMAL DEPLOYMENT REFUELING IS ON A RATIO OF 1 TANKER TO 3 RECEIVER WITH A PLANNED ONLOAD OF 20,000 POUNDS PER RECEIVER. WITH FORTY-FIVE MINUTES OF AVAILABLE TIME IN SHOKEN BELT REFUELING AREA IT IS NOT ONLY IMPRACTICABLE BUT IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLY WITH THE FIFTEEN MINUTE CONTACT TIME REQUIREMENT FOR EITHER A HEAVYWEIGHT OR AN OPTIONAL REFUELING.

DATE
9
MONTH
OCT 1961

Gordon A. Reynolds
EGOTA

GORDON A. REYNOLDS, MAJIE, USAF
PHONE 2320

UNCLASSIFIED

GENE 13000 707
PR 2110
RE RJEKDH 149
BT
R 211500Z
FM SAC/DWSS/AF
TO WHISKEY
ZLU
R 212007Z SAC
RWD R0030
BT

1951 OCT 21 22 16

Att 100 200-1
505 010 -
Info 00-
Spid

THOMAS DOT 640100. ACTION: FAT UNITS (DOTS),
SAC (DOTOP), SACR 50-S AIR REFUELING INTERPRETATION.
THIS MSG IN THREE PARTS. PART I. SAC MSG DOT 30630.
RE OCT 61 IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ACTION.
QUOTE. PART 2. AS AGREED UPON BETWEEN SAC, DOT AND
NUMBERED AIR FORCES DOT'S DURING THE SACR 50-S CONFERENCE
ON 14-15 OCT THE FOLLOWING INTERPRETATIONS ARE MADE AS
PERTAINS TO AIR REFUELING. A. FOR B-47, R-47 AND E-47
AOFI HEAVYWEIGHT REFUELING. THE TERM MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE
INFIGHT FUEL LOAD IS FURTHER DEFINED AS: (A) (UN

PHASE TWO RJEKDH 149
ALLOWABLE INFIGHT FUEL LOAD COMMENSURATE WITH ALTITUDE
AND PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS OF THE TANKER OR RECEIVER.
WHICHEVER IS THE LIMITING FACTOR. B. FOR B-47, R-47 AND
E-47 AOFI, THE MINIMUM FUEL TRANSFER FOR HEAVYWEIGHT
REFUELING IS 20,000 POUNDS FROM EITHER A KC-97 OR KC-135.
C. FOR ALL ACFT EXCEPT U-2, TO BE CREDITABLE FOR
OPTIONAL REFUELINGS, A MINIMUM OF TEN MINUTES CONTACT
TIME (TOGGLES ENGAGED) WITH EACH TANKER WILL BE MAINTAINED
WHEN MORE THAN A ONE TANKER TO ONE RECEIVER RATIO IS USED.
WHEN A ONE TANKER TO ONE RECEIVER RATIO IS USED THE
TOGGLES ENGAGED TIME IS 15 MINUTES. PART II. THESE
INTERPRETATIONS WILL BE INCORPORATED IN THE NEXT PUBLICA-
TION OF SACR 50-S. PART III. THIS SUPERSEDES MY DOT
23914 AND DOTOP 30630. END QUOTE. PART II. IN ADDITION
TO THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, THE GROUND RULES OUTLINED IN
SAC DOT 449600, 19 OCT 61 CONCERNING AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS
WILL APPLY. PART III. FOR SAC REQUEST CONCURRENCE
WITH PART II ABOVE.
BT
21 1259Z OCT RJEKDH

23-1
1060

WMA674DND412
RR RJXJCM
DE RJEADH 126
R 211359Z
FM 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO RUMBER/SAC
INFO WHILYKEY

RJXJAH/8033AIRLIV HOMESTEAD AFB FLA
RJEKFO/4047STRATING MCCOY AFB FLA
RJEKKA/4081STRATING ERNEST HARMON AFB NF
RJEGRF/2AF BARKSDALE AFB LA
RJBWKN/15AF HARCHHAFB CALIF
BT

UNCLAS E F I D DOT CAPWOW ACTION: SAC (DOT). INFO:
8AF UNITS (DOT): 2AF, 15AF. B-47 HEAVYWEIGHT REFUELING
CONCUR WITH DEFINITION OF A B-47 HEAVYWEIGHT AIR REFUEL-
ING AS AGREED UPON BY SAC, 2AF, 8AF AND 15AF AT THE SACR
50-C CONFERENCE, 10-11 OCT 61, AS FOLLOWS: "MAXIMUM
ALLOWABLE INFLIGHT FUEL LOAD". IN CONFORMANCE WITH THIS
REQUIREMENT THE MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT OF THE RECEIVER WILL
BE COMPUTED INDIVIDUALLY FOR EACH REFUELING AND THIS
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE GROSS WEIGHT WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE
FOLLOWING: BASE ALTITUDE OF THE AIR REFUELING AREA

PAGE TWO RJEADH 126
SCHEDULED AS DETERMINED BY THE AIRMAN'S GUIDE OR EXISTING
WEATHER CONSIDERING: (A) TEMPERATURE AT REFUELING
ALTITUDE. (B) IN LOW LEVEL AREAS, CAPABILITY OF THE
TANKER TO ATTAIN REQUIRED IAS PER PERFORMANCE CHARTS
FROM THE DASH ONE T.O. (C) IN HIGH ALTITUDE AREAS MAXI-
MUM GROSS WEIGHT WILL BE DETERMINED BY BASE ALTITUDE
LIMITATIONS OF THE AREAS AS REFLECTED IN THE AIRMAN'S
GUIDE PER B-47 MAXIMUM IAS CAPABILITY IN CONFORMANCE WITH
THE DASH ONE T.O. AND TACTICAL DOCTRINE. (D) 500 FEET
PER MINUTE DESCENT WILL BE USED IN ALL HEAVYWEIGHT
REFUELING WHEN CONDITIONS WILL PERMIT, OTHERWISE, LOW LEVEL
FLIGHT AIR REFUELING IS AUTHORIZED. APPLICABLE PERFORMANCE
CHARTS WILL BE USED. (E) CREDITABLE HEAVYWEIGHT REFUEL-
INGS REQUIRE A TRANSFER OF AT LEAST 20,000 LBS OF FUEL
AND A MINIMUM OF 10 MINUTES TOGLES ENGAGED TIME, EXCEPT
AS FOLLOWS: (1) TOGLES ENGAGED TIME REQUIREMENT WILL BE
12W SACH 55-7A ON "BAR NONE", "REFLEX", AND ORI. WL
TOGLES ENGAGED TIME ON A TWO FOR ONE BASIS WILL BE A
MINIMUM OF 10 MINUTES PER AIRCRAFT. (F) UNITS WILL
INSURE THAT EACH HEAVYWEIGHT REFUELING IS PROPERLY

PAGE THREE RJEADH 126
DOCUMENTED. VERIFICATION OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT WILL BE
MAINTAINED WITH THE NAVIGATOR'S RECORDS FOR THAT SORTIE.

210ct1961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
509TH BOMBARDMENT WING (MEDIUM)
United States Air Force
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 509C

SUBJECT: Wing Commander's Remarks, October 1961 (U) 8 November 1961

TO: See Distribution

1. Waiver of training requirements: (U)

a. SACR 50-8 navigator requirements for crew E-91, Navigator (b) (6) are waived for period 1 Oct - 31 Dec 61 in accordance with SACR 50-8, Para 5d, dated 16 August 1961.

2. Delinquent Combat Ready Crews: (U)

- a. Total combat-ready crews subject to SACR 50-8 basics - 69
- b. Total crews completed basic requirements of SACR 50-8 - 1
- c. N/A

3. Alert Cycle: No Home Station Alert. -(c)

4. Compensatory Time off for alert crews: -(c)

a. N/A

5. Crewmember upgrading progress: See SAC Form 677. (U)

6. Unreliable RBS Runs -(c)

CE	DATE	RUN TYPE	CREW	RBS SITE	REASON
3670/2000	20 Oct	H1 LC	S-41	Watertown	Equip Malfunction
3970/520	24 Oct	H1 LC	R-01	Watertown	Equip Malfunction
3570/1720	30 Oct	H1 LC	R-55	Watertown	Crew Error
620/4970	9 Oct	LLLC	S-27	Watertown	Equip Malfunction
2350/5300	9 Oct	LLLC	E-84	Watertown	Crew Error
2190/6470	18 Oct	SLLC	E-81	RBS EXPRESS	Unknown
5120/3590	23 Oct	SLLC	E-07	RBS EXPRESS	Unknown
5670/270	25 Oct	SLLC	E-65	RBS EXPRESS	Unknown

7. Unreliable NIKS Runs -(c)

CE	DATE	RUN TYPE	CREW	NIKS SITE	REASON
5850	3 Oct	H1 Synch	E-26	New York	Unknown
6360	18 Oct	H1 Synch	E-26	Boston	Unknown
4750	19 Oct	H1 Synch	E-18	Boston	Unknown
10500	30 Oct	H1 Synch	E-47	Boston	Crew Error
54470	17 Oct	H1 F2	E-03	Boston	Unknown
16300	18 Oct	H1 F2	E-70	Boston	Crew Error
14750	30 Oct	H1 F2	E-47	Boston	Crew Error
14100	30 Oct	H1 F2	E-47	Boston	Crew Error

8. Navigation CE: NC 4.4; NCG 10.3; DCG 11.4; INT SYS 4.3: -(c)

9. Unreliable Navigation: None (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-7352

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS. NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED DOW DNR 820010

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

509th Bomb Wing (1-344-T-12), Wing Commander's Remarks, October 1961

10. Unreliable Local Defense Runs: ~~---~~

<u>SCORE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CREW</u>	<u>SITE</u>	<u>REASON</u>
OXM	4 Oct	E-17	Watertown	Crew Error
9XM	5 Oct	E-08	Watertown	Crew Error
OXD	5 Oct	E-89	Watertown	Material
OXD	5 Oct	E-89	Watertown	Material
OXM	9 Oct	E-88	Watertown	Unknown
OXM	9 Oct	E-26	Watertown	Unknown
9XM	10 Oct	E-70	Watertown	Unknown
9XM	11 Oct	E-26	RBS Express	Material
OXM	12 Oct	E-70	Watertown	Unknown
9XM	12 Oct	E-13	Watertown	Unknown
9XM	12 Oct	E-13	Watertown	Unknown
9AM	12 Oct	E-13	Watertown	Unknown
OXD	17 Oct	E-14	RBS Express	Crew Error
9XM	23 Oct	E-71	RBS Express	Crew Error
OXE	25 Oct	R-11	Watertown	Unknown
OXE	25 Oct	S72	Watertown	Unknown
OXD	26 Oct	E-81	RBS Express	Maintenance
9XM	27 Oct	R-19	Watertown	Crew Error
OXM	27 Oct	R-50	Watertown	Unknown
OXM	31 Oct	R-68	Watertown	Unknown

11. Unreliable Radar Simulator Runs: N/A (U)

12. Fire Control Reliability: ~~(C)~~

a. 30

b. 22

c. 92.7

d. 21,000/19,476

e. 176

f. N/A

g. 14

13. Gallons of Fuel: N/A (U)

14. AGR Crew Information: N/A (U)

15. Wing Commander's Remarks: ~~(C)~~

LOCAL DEFENSE RUNS: At the present time unusual difficulty is being encountered at Watertown RES due to an unknown jamming source in the area interfering with local defense activity. Several crews have been instructed by the site to terminate local defense before they even turned the jammers on. The results of a staff visit to Watertown RBS by the 509th Penetration Aids Officer leads me to believe the problem is definitely caused by an outside source in the Watertown area that has no relation to the Watertown RBS. We are also experiencing difficulty due to undetermined electromagnetic radiations in the Watertown area that are producing signals with characteristics similar to those of the LDR signal. These situations are presenting problems to crews running Watertown that are not common to all RBS sites and is placing us at a distinct disadvantage in competing against Bomb Wings not required to run this site. In view of the adverse affect this situation is

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5400.10

1-7352

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

509th Bomb Wing, (1-SAD-T-12), Wing Commander's Remarks, October 1961

having on the wing reliability under the MCS program, I recommend that ECM activity run at Watertown not be considered for reliability until this situation has been investigated by a technical team and is corrected.

Donald G. McPherson

DONALD G. MCPHERSON
Colonel, USAF
Commander

DISTRIBUTION

SAC-4
SAF-7 (DOT-4 6)
(DCRM-1 1)
1ST CMBT EVAL GP -1
DO-1
DCR-1
509DCR-1
509DCO-5
509DCM-2
509HIST-4

This Report is Classified CONFIDENTIAL IAW Para 2 SACR 50-23.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED GDD DIR 8200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

(When filled in) This form is classified because information is entered relative to the capability of the unit.

1	2	3	CREW MEMBER UPGRADING PROGRESS										15	16		17	18	19	20	21		
			COMBAT CREW TRAINING DATA					BASE TRAINING DATA						DATE REPORTED TO UNIT (MM/YY)	FLYING TRAINING						PERIOD TO THIS REPORT (MM/YY)	PERIOD TO THIS REPORT (MM/YY)
CREW MEMBER NUMBER (if assigned)	CREW POSITION	NAME OF CREW MEMBER (Last Name and Initials only)	LOCATION (if applicable)	DATE COMPLETED (MM/YY)	ACADEMIC ONLY	SORTIES	HOURS	COMPLETE	SURVIVAL	NUC/FAN	PROF. COURSE	SIMULATION (if applicable)	DD SKINNEY (if applicable)	DATE REPORTED TO UNIT (MM/YY)	SORTIES	HOURS	SORTIES	HOURS	PERIOD TO THIS REPORT (MM/YY)	PERIOD TO THIS REPORT (MM/YY)	FORECAST COMBAT READY DATE (MM/YY)	REMARKS/Other comments concerning quality of OETB or any other items which may be noted which are specific to the individual member's training and performance.
		(b)(6)	MC	Jun 61				Yes						July 61	Unk	Unk	4	30:00	3	Nov 61		
			MC	Jun 61				Yes						Aug 61	Unk	Unk	4	31:45	3	Nov 61		
			MC	Jun 61				Yes						Aug 61	Unk	Unk	5	38:45	3	Nov 61		
														Aug 61	Unk	1461.20	5	39:00	0	Nov 61		
														Aug 61	Unk	Unk	8	54:50	0	Nov 61		
														Aug 61	Unk	Unk	9	63:05	0	Nov 61		
														Aug 61		3383.00	6	36:55	3	Nov 61		
														Aug 61		388.05	7	42:50	2	Nov 61		
														Aug 61		245.40	8	51:00	3	Nov 61		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
90TH BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM
United States Air Force
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 509C

SUBJECT: 8th AF Attachment I to Wing Commander's Remarks, October 1961 (U)

1. GUNNERY: ~~(S)~~

a. Difficulties:

(1) Lost To: WEAPON 58.3%
FEEDER 13.5%
AMMO 25.7%
UNK 2.5%

(2) Operations problems: None

(3) Operator Errors: None

(4) Other: None

b. Summary of Results:

	LOADED	FIRED	ATTEMPTED	SUCCESSFUL
(1) Normal	21,00	19,476	30	30
(2) Reflex	16,800	15,521	24	24
(3) NCR or 5X	4,900	3,977	7	7
(4) Other	None			

2. Alert/Reflex Scheduling Effectiveness: ~~(S)~~

a. Number of Aircraft by type:

(1) Alert 0/B-47E

(2) Reflex 15/B-47E

b. Number of Crew Days per month: 1395

c. Deviations from Schedule:

(1) DNIF, HOSP, EMERG 3/.2%
(2) High Hq Directed (USCM, CUI) 0/0%
(3) All other Diviations 1/.1%
(4) Total Alert Crew Sched Deviations 4/.3%

3. EWO Study Reporting: ~~(S)~~

a. 70. (The number of combat ready crews with an EWO mission assignment as of the last day of the month being reported).

b. 70. (The number of combat ready crews that have completed minimum monthly EWO study requirements as outlined in SACM 55-7).

c. 70. (The number of combat ready crews that have been certified on their assigned sortie or air refueling mission as applicable).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED GDS DIR 520010

1-7352

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

509th Bomb Wing, 8th AF Attachment #1, (1-SAC-T-12), Oct 61

- d. Exceptions to para 3b: None
- e. Exceptions to para 3c: None
- 4. Completion of Annual Training Requirements. 65% (U)
- 5. Explanation of Items Falling Below Minimum Guide Lines: (U)
- a. LOCAL DEFENSE RUNS:

(1) Although a computation of our local defense reliability shows us to be 93.4% reliable, there are four runs included in this scoring that are being considered by higher headquarters for removal from the unreliable list. Current directives require that a score be passed to crews at the end of each RBS. One of the runs being investigated was caused by failure to follow this procedure. This resulted in a second unreliable run when a score from the first run would have indicated to the crew that no further runs should have been attempted. The other three questionable runs were acquired because of an oversight on the part of the crew in calling th crew number. A senior crew was called in when the only co-pilot aboard the aircraft was non-combat ready. The crew should have called 5x. If these runs receive favorable consideration our reliability will be raised to 95%.

b. COMBAT RUNS: Percentage primarily due to low activity. Increased activity will result in our reaching the minimum guide line.


DONALD G. MCPHERSON
Colonel, USAF
Commander

This report is Classified CONFIDENTIAL IAW Para 2, SACR 50-23.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS BUT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED GDD DIR 50010

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

509TH AIR REFUELING SQUADRON
509TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H)
United States Air Force
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 509ARSC

SUBJECT: Squadron Commander's Remarks, October 1961 (U) 8 November 61

TO: See Distribution

1. Waiver of Training Requirements: None (U)
2. Delinquent Combat Ready Crews: (U)
 - a. Total combat ready crews subject to SACR 50-8 basics - 31
 - b. Total crews completed basic requirements of SACR 50-8 - 1
 - c. N/A
3. Alert cycle: 3 crews Thursday thru Thursday. (c)
4. Compensatory Time off for Alert Crews. N/A (U)
5. Crewmember upgrading Progress: Not Applicable this report. (U)
6. Unreliable RES: N/A (U)
7. Unreliable Nike: N/A (U)
8. Navigation CE: DCG 9.5; DC 10.0; INT SYS 3.7; NCG 9.4; NC 10.4: (c)
9. Unreliable Navigation: None (U)
10. Unreliable Local Defense Runs: N/A (U)
11. Unreliable Radar Simulator Runs: N/A (U)
12. Fire Control Systems Reliability: N/A (U)
13. Gallons of Fuel: AV GAS 14,733 JP-4 554,150 (c)
14. Comments and Recommendations of the Unit Commander: None (U)

Jack H. Lingham
JACK H. LINGHAM
Major, USAF
Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS. NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5800.10

1-7353

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

509th AREFS, Squadron Commander's Remarks (1-SAC-T-12), Oct 61

15. Wing Commander's Remarks: None (U)

Donald G. McPherson
DONALD G. McPHERSON

Colonel, USAF
Commander

DISTRIBUTION

SAC-4
SAF-7 (DOT-4 6)
(DCRM-1 1)

1ST CMBT EVAL GP -1

DO-1

DCR-1

509DCR-1

509DCM-1

509DCMC-1

509DSUP-1

509AESC-1

509HIST-4

509DCOTR-1

This Report is Classified CONFIDENTIAL IAW Para 2C, SACR 50-23.

RE: (1)
NO (2)
NO (3)
NO (4)

DOWNGRADED AT 15 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

509TH AIR REFUELING SQUADRON
509TH BOMBARDMENT WING (M)
United States Air Force
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 509ARSC

SUBJECT: 8th AF Attachment I to Squadron Commander's Remarks - October 61

1. Gunnery: N/A (U)
2. Alert/Reflex Scheduling Effectiveness: ~~(C)~~
 - a. Number of aircraft by type:
 - (1) Alert 3/KC-97G
 - (2) Reflex 6/KC-97G
 - b. Number of crew days per month: 1350
 - c. Deviations from schedule:
 - (1) DMIF, HOSP, EMERG 4/0.3%
 - (2) High Hq Directed (USCM/ORI) 0/0%
 - (3) All other Deviations 0/0%
 - (4) Total Alert Crew Sched. Dev. 4/0.3%
3. EWO Study Reporting: ~~(C)~~
 - a. 31. (The number of combat ready crews with an EWO mission assignment as of the last day of the month being reported).
 - b. 31. (The number of combat ready crews that have completed minimum monthly EWO study requirements).
 - c. 31. (The number of combat ready crews that have been certified on their crews assigned sortie or air refueling mission as applicable).
 - d. Exceptions to para 3b: None
 - e. Exceptions to para 3c: None
4. Completion of Annual Training Requirements. 92% (U)
5. Explanation of Items Falling below Minimum Guide Lines:
 - a. Air Refueling Efficiency: The reason for excessive loss of Refuelings is due to aircraft malfunctions. (U)
6. Additional Comments of the Unit Commander: None (U)

Jack H. Ingham
JACK H. INGHAM
Major, USAF
Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXEMPTED AT 10 YEAR
INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED GDS DR 5200 10

1-7353

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

509th AREFS, SAF Attachment #1, (1-340-T-12), Oct 61

6. The Air Refueling Report has been reviewed and concurred in. (U)

Donald G. McPherson

DONALD G. MCPHERSON
Colonel, USAF
Commander

This Report is Classified CONFIDENTIAL IAW Para 2C, SACR 50-23.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 8200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION PRIORITY
 INFO AF
 DATE/DOS 644380
 (18 SEP 61)
 UNCLAS

FROM 817AIRDIV PEASE AFB NH

TO 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS

UNCLAS/509000

FOR 8AF DOT AND DOS. STANDARDIZATION REVIEW PANEL. IN REFERENCE
 TO YOUR DOT-DOS 64762P, DATED 31 JUL 61, THE FOLLOWING INFORMAT-
 ION IS SUBMITTED:

PART I. CELESTIAL GRID NAVIGATION RESULTS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY
 ON AN OVERALL BASIS IN THE 509TH BW FOR THE LAST TWO TRAINING
 PERIODS. FAILURES DO OCCUR, BUT NOT ON A SCALE TO DENOTE AN AREA
 OF WEAKNESS. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON THESE FAILURES VARY, BUT AS A
 GENERAL RULE WE DEMAND A RETRAINING PERIOD, FOLLOWED BY A RECHECK.
 RESULTS OF OUR CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SAT-
 ISFACTORY.

PART II. RECORDING OF SUFFICIENT INFORMATION DURING RADAR
 NAVIGATION IS A VERY SMALL PROBLEM AREA. STANDARDIZATION NEW-
 LETTERS AND SQUADRON NAVIGATORS ARE OUR MAIN SOURCE OF EDUCATING
 THE NAVIGATORS ON PROPER PROCEDURES IN PROBLEM AREAS SUCH AS THIS.

DATE	TIME
10	1300L
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	1961

509000

JAMES COOK, CAPT., USAF

2391/2432

UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173

TO ALFA
604F
INDIA
RJEERK/1880CP CARWELL AFB TEX
RJEHKL/3900STRATSTDMCP BARRISDALE AFB LA
BT

UNCLAS REFOD 7091.
LOW FREQUENCY ECM RUN. TO PROVIDE A MEANS OF EVALUATING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF ALT-7 JAMMERS AN ECM RUN UTILIZING THIS EQUIPMENT
WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE SACR 30-3 TRAINING PROGRAM EFFECTIVE 1 OCT
1961. TO INSURE THAT ALL PERSONNEL ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THIS RUN UNITS MAY ACCOMPLISH THIS ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH
RCS ATTACKS ON A TRIAL BASIS EFFECTIVE 1 SEP 1961. NO INCENTIVE
POINTS ARE AUTHORIZED DURING THE TRIAL PERIOD. THE FOR PROCEDURES
ARE AS FOLLOWS: AT LOW FREQUENCY RUNS AN ECM RUN FOR B-57
AIRCRAFT (JAMMERS) IS CONDUCTED WHICH THE ALT-7 TRANSMITTERS

PAGE TWO RJNMR 255J
ARE PRESET IN THE SPOT MODE TO DESIGNATED FREQUENCY VIA TRANSMITTERS
WILL BE ACTIVATED AT THE IP AND A SCORE PROVIDED BY THE GPR-11A
RADAR SIMULATOR. THE ALT-7 T-464 TRANSMITTER WILL BE PRESENT IN THE
SPOT MODE TO 147 MC. THE ALT-7 T-463 WILL BE PRESENT IN THE SPOT
MODE TO 148 MC. ALL PERSONNEL WILL UTILIZE EXTREME CAUTION TO INSURE
THAT TRANSMITTER SETTINGS ARE ACCURATE TO PRECLUDE INTERFERENCE
WITH OTHER FREQUENCIES IN THESE BANDS. THE CO-PILOT WILL ACTIVATE
BOTH TRANSMITTERS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE IP CALL. THE RUN GPR-11A
RADAR SIMULATOR WYL SCORE THE JAMMING AT A RANDOM TIME BETWEEN THE
IP AND INITIATION OF BOMB RELEASE TIME UNLESS SOONER TERMINATED BY
THE RCS SIT. SCORES WILL BE BASED ON WHETHER OR NOT JAMMING IS
OBSERVED WITHIN PLUS OR MINUS FIVE (5) HERTZ CYCLES OF THE PRESCRIBED
CENTER FREQUENCY. SCORES OF ONE (1) WILL INDICATE JAMMING OBSERVED.
X WILL INDICATE NO JAMMING OBSERVED. YH OR HL WILL INDICATE JAMMING
OBSERVED HIGH OR LOW (OUTSIDE THE 5MC LIMIT) FROM THE PRESCRIBED
FREQUENCY. THE T-464 SCORE WILL ALWAYS BE GIVEN FIRST. EXAMPLE
SCORE 1-1 JAMMING SEEN IN BOTH BANDS. SCORE 1-1 JAMMING FROM T-
464 OBSERVED, JAMMING FROM T-463 OBSERVED ABOVE PRESCRIBED LIMIT.
TO BE CONSIDERED SUCCESSFUL JAMMING MUST BE OBSERVED FROM BOTH ALT-7
TRANSMITTERS. BRAVO. SCORES FOR LOW FREQUENCY RUNS WILL BE RE-

PAGE THREE RJNMR 255J
CORDED ON THE SAC FORM 47 UTILIZING COLUMN 10 AND 11 FOR THE T-464
SCORE AND COLUMN 11 AND 12 FOR THE T-463 SCORE. COCD. SAC NO. AF
AND 1 CEC WILL CLOSELY MONITOR THE PROGRAM AND REPORT ANY PROBLEM
AREAS ENCOUNTERED. 1ST CEC WILL SUBMIT A REPORT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS
ON 1 OCT LISTING THE NO. OF RUNS ATTEMPTED, NO. T-464
SUCCESSFUL, NO. T-463 SUCCESSFUL, NO. OF T-463 NO JAMMING, NO. T-464
NO JAMMING, NO. T-464 AND NO. T-463
JAMMING OBSERVED OUTSIDE FREQUENCY LIMITS. ANY PROBLEM AREAS
OR RECOMMENDATIONS. THIS REPORT IS WAIVED FROM RCS IAW PARA 10-11
AFM 174-2. COMPLETE SACR 30-3 REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS
WILL BE FURNISHED.

23/100

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO RJWXR 62
IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO BE SATISFIED:
ALFA, COMPLETE TWO SERIES OF TURNS ON EACH SIDE STEP MANEUVER,
BRAVO, NOT BE IN STRAIGHT AND LEVEL FLIGHT MORE THAN 15 SECONDS
DURING ANY PORTION OF THE TWO SERIES OF TURNS. CHARLIE, MAINTAIN
STRAIGHT AND LEVEL FLIGHT NOT MORE THAN 35 SECONDS AFTER THE FINAL
SERIES OF TURNS AND PRIOR TO BOMB RELEASE. RUNS WHICH ARE ACCEPTABLE
WILL BE GIVEN THE SUFFIX "A" WITH THEIR SCORE. RUNS WHICH ARE
UNSATISFACTORY WILL BE GIVEN THE SUFFIX "U" WITH THEIR SCORE. PART
IV, ONLY ACCEPTABLE RUNS WILL BE CREDITED TOWARD THE REQUIREMENTS
OF SACR 50-8. ALL RELIABLE HIGH ALTITUDE SYNCHRONOUS SIDE STEP
AND HIGH ALTITUDE LARGE CHARGE SIDE STEP RCS RUNS CONDUCTED DURING
THE PERIOD 2-15 OCT 61 WILL BE GIVEN SACR 50-8 CREDIT REGARDLESS
OF MANEUVER EFFECTIVENESS, MEASURED AGAINST CIRCLE SIZES OUTLINED IN
THIS MSG. PART V, THE SYNCHRONOUS RADAR SIDE STEP BASIC REQUIRE-
MENT FOR SACR 50-8 IS NOT AS DIFFICULT AS THE "ON TARGET" EVALUATION
REQUIREMENT WAS. ALFA, THE STRAIGHT AND LEVEL PORTION OF THE RUN
MAY BE 35 SECONDS; HOWEVER, CREWS SHOULD PLAN FOR 30 SECONDS. BRAVO
JAMMING IS OPTIONAL AND FREE STYLE AS DEFINED IN SACR 50-8. PART VI
THE CIRCLE SIZES OUTLINED IN THIS MSG ARE APPLICABLE TO ALL EQUIP-
MENTS AND WILL BE INCORPORATED IN TABLE A-1 SACR 170-1A. THIS

PAGE THREE RJWXR 62
CONFIRMS TELECON BETWEEN LTCOL (b) (6) HQ SAC AND LTCOL (b) (6)
2AF, LTCOL (b) (6) 8AF, AND LTCOL (b) (6) 15AF. (SCP-4)
BT
14/0027Z OCT RJWXR

1-6743

10000-1
29000-1
012-6
1000-1

NNNN M

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY
ROUTINE

317 AIRDIV HEADQ AFM IN

SAC OFFUTT AFB NEB

OSAMA BIN LADEN AFB SAIA

DOUGLAS ACFT CTR. TULSA TIA

INFO: RAF WESTON AFB MASS

UNCLAS//509DCMR

8-9-I

FOR SAC DMCC, OSAMA BIN LADEN, ATTN DOUGLAS. INFO RAF INMOLD.
IMMEDIATE ATTENTION REQUIRED. REFERENCE YOU DMCC 1X003
PROJECT "RED BARN" THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED.
ACFT 52-528A WILL BE AVAILABLE ON 25 OCTOBER 1961 AS
SCHEDULED. REQUEST INPUT OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT, SERIAL
NUMBER 52-500A, DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER IF IT CAN BE
PLACED INTO THE SCHEDULE. PRESENT PLANNING INFORMATION
INDICATES THAT THE LOSS OF AN ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT DURING THIS
PERIOD WILL CAUSE LESS SCHEDULE DISRUPTION THAN A LATER DATE.

8 1515

Ser 61

509DCMR

ROBERT E. DIMWEDDIE, COLONEL, USAF
2445 1 1

UNCLAS

PLANTY
MAY 1962

BY AIRMAIL TO THE U.S.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

NAME INDEX FOR FILE

FOR THE AIR MAIL TO THE U.S.

INDEX MAP SECTION FOR FILE

CIVILIAN SECTION

FOR THE U.S. AIR MAIL TO THE U.S.

FOR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF THE U.S.

FOR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF THE U.S.

FOR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF THE U.S.

PART 10 111 111 111 111 111

111 111 111 111 111 111

111 111 111 111 111 111

111 111 111 111 111 111

111 111 111 111 111 111

111 111 111 111 111 111

111 111 111 111 111 111

111 111

111 111 111 111

111 111

111 111

AGCS
RR RJEKDH
DE RJEKDH 81
ZNR
P 241807
FM SAE WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO TPAT
BT

UNCLAS DMSSE 24556. ECM EQUIPMENT ON "RED BARN" AIRCRAFT. FOR: W.
DSUP, BASO AND AEMS. AUTHORITY IS HEREBY GRANTED TO DEVIATE FROM
PARA 11B, 5 AF RCMP 63-1, 15 AUG 61, IN THE CASE OF B-47 AIRCRAFT
INVOLVED IN PROJECT RED BARN. SPECIFICALLY, WING COMMANDERS MAY,
AT THEIR DISCRETION, LEAVE ALL COMPONENTS OF AN/ALT-58 AND AN/ALT-58
COUNTERMEASURES TRANSMITTING SYSTEMS ABOARD AIRCRAFT TRANSFERRED
UNDER THIS PROJECT FOR AN EXPECTED PERIOD OF TEN DAYS OR LESS.
CAUTION: THIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AUTHORITY FOR ASSETS POSITIONS
BELOW LEVEL REQUIRED FOR FULL EWO SUPPORT. NOYK TO 521ST AIR DIV:
THIS IS ACTION YOUR 374 AEMSC 532, 18 OCT 61. NOT TO SAC: THIS
CONFIRMS TELECON 23 OCT 61 BETWEEN CAPT (b) (6) THIS HQ AND INST

(b) (6) YOUR HQ, DMSA.

BT
20/0914Z OCT RJEKDH

25-3

2187

100200-10
309000-10
000-1
100000-3
507 000-3
00000-1
24 3


5090 *all*
5090

DIRECTOR OF SUPPLY
SOUTH COMBATTANT WING, MEDIUM
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

REPLY TO
ATTN OP: 509DSUP
SUBJECT: Periscope Sextants

TO: 509C

1. During the past 6 months 16 sextants were NRTS'd that were considered to be abnormally damaged. As no special records were maintained during this time it is impossible to determine how, where, or who was responsible for this damage.
2. Sextants are stored in sextant cases aboard KC-97 aircraft. On B-47 aircraft they are stored in special brackets attached to bulkheads, one on the left side of the pilots area and one on the right bulkhead aft of the co-pilots seat. Twenty-four (24) each are maintained in Field Maintenance Pre-Issue Section.
3. Co-ordination between Materiel Control (FMS), and the office of the Director of Supply has been established so that the DSUP will be notified of any abnormal damage or abuse to sextants turned in to the Field Maintenance Instrument Shop. Squadron Commanders and the Wing Commander will be informed.


J. M. GOLD JR
Major, USAF
Director of Supply

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DM

SUBJECT: Programming for MMS Requirements During the Month of October 1961


TO: 100 Bomb Wg (2)
509 Bomb Wg (2)
(Commander)

41 Munitions Maintenance Sq (2)

The following requirements are established to support the 41st MMS training program during the month of October 1961.

- a. The Commander, 100th Bomb Wing, will:
 - (1) Provide one aircraft per day from 0800-1700 during the period 16-20 October.
 - (2) Insure each loading crew receives additional classroom training on weapon/ATO and rack to permit attaining and maintaining the highest degree of loading proficiency.
- b. The Commander, 41st Munitions Maintenance Squadron, will:
 - (1) Insure functional checks are completed prior to loading start time for aircraft provided.
 - (2) Insure maximum training for weapon monitors during clip-in loading training.
- c. The Commander, 509th Bomb Wing, will provide one aircraft per day from 0800-1700 during the period 3, 4, 9, 10, 11 and 12 October.
- d. The Commander, 100th and 509th Bomb Wing, will:
 - (1) Insure crew chief, power unit and qualified operator are in place 15 minutes prior to loading start time.
 - (2) Insure close coordination is maintained between Maintenance Control and MMS Munitions Control.

FOR THE COMMANDER


J. W. MATHIAS
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

Cy to:
DM (2)
DO (2)
100DCMC (2)
100DCOT (2)
100AEMSC (2)
509DCMC (2)
509DCOT (2)
509AEMSC (2)

020017Z OCT 1952
FM RJJFBN
TO RJJFBN 240
INFO ZFM/168: FOREIGN AS STAFF

509 0111-10

BT
NICLA S E E T O-CAMS-2-455-11.
FOR COM 1007 FWD DOW. SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS ON DEPLOYED
REFLEX AIRCRAFT. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART I: DISCREPANCIES
REPORTED BY THE AIRCREW, 8-47 52-1294: (1) NR 3 ENGINE OIL PRESSURE
13 PSI AT 9% PERCENT AND 10.5 AT 20 PERCENT, AND OIL PRESSURE FLUC-
TUATES ONE QUARTER TO ONE HALF PSI INTERMITTENTLY. REQUIRED TRANSMIT-
TER CHANGE. (2) BOMB NAV RADAR PRESSURE LEAK; 8-47 52-1291. (3) LEFT
FORWARD CENTER MAIN BOOST PUMP IMMOBILIZED. PUMP FAILED 3 HOURS AFTER
TAKOFF. (4) LIGHT ON STAND-BY 8-16 COMPASS INOPERATIVE. (5) BOMB
VOLTAGE KNEOSTAT LOCKS, CO-PILOT'S POSITION, COULD NOT DETERMINE

PAPAGE TWO RJJFBN 240
POSITION OF SELECTOR. 8-47 52-1291: (1) THROTTLE FRICTION TOO
TIGHT ON ALL ENGINES. PART II: DISCREPANCIES DISCOVERED DURING
COCKING OPERATION, 8-47 52-1291: NR 3 ENGINE FIRST STAGE ROTOR
BLADE NICKED. 8-47 52-1291: (1) RIGHT FORWARD MAIN FIRE CUT THRU
THE CORD. (2) HYDRAULIC LEAK INSIDE FORWARD MAIN GEAR AILE.
8-47 52-1298: (1) CHANGE OIL FAN RELIEF VALVE ON 3 ENGINE.
(2) RIGHT LOX CONVERTER CHANGE. (3) CO-PILOT'S INTERPHONE IN-
OPERATIVE. (4) UHF WOULD NOT TRANSMIT. PART III: THERE WERE NO
DELAYED DISCREPANCIES SERIOUS ENOUGH TO REQUIRE MAINTENANCE.

51 325

BT
06/13832 OCT RJJFBN

NNNN

A-360
CM40T3VKAARD1 SHND330MM
KG RJEKXN
DE RJYXN 77
R 121122Z
FM 30720N305000P TORREJON AB SP
TO KJHGM/309IN LEAD AFB NH
INFO 254/166F TORREJON AB SP
BT

507 DCM -
Info Dm
Sub

U. S. C. I. A. K. K. E. T. O. CAMS-9-452-81. FORM 800. SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS ON DEPLOYED REFLEX AIRCRAFT. THIS MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS. PART I. DISCREPANCIES REPORTED BY 1. NEW: 9-47 52-360: A. WHEEL FOUR ENGINE OIL PRESSURE TEN PERCENT CRUISE AND 100 PERCENT. B. NUMBER SIX ALTERNATOR FAILED AN HOUR AND A HALF PRIOR TO LANDING. C. COPILOTS SEAT AND AZIMUTH LIGHT INOPERATIVE. 1. AUTOPILOT DROPPED OFF THE LINE ONCE CHATTERS INCESSANTLY. 1. WHEEL USE AT MAXIMUM RANGE. 2-47 52-150: A. NAVIGATORS SEXTANT HEIGHT POWER CABLE TORN LOOSE. B. COPILOTS SEXTANT AVENGER COULD NOT BE THROCK AFTER SHOTS. C. NAVY URM AND SRM TARGET BROKE (PART

PAGE TWO RJYXN 77
INTERMITTENTLY. ALL VOLTAGES APPEARED NORMAL. 9-47 52-524: A. NAVIGATORS SEXTANT PORT DAMAGED. B. NUMBER FOUR GENERATOR TRIPPED OFF THE LINE PRIOR TO LANDING. C. NUMEROUS LIGHTS OUT IN SOTTO POSITION. D. POOR PICTURES IN ALL FUNCTIONS. PART II. DISCREPANCIES DISCOVERED DURING COCKING OPERATION. 9-47 52-160: A. RIGHT GUN CHARGER INOPERATIVE. B. APN 69 PRESSURE PUMP RUNS CONTINUOUSLY. 9-47 52-150: NONE. 2-47 52-524: A. LEFT OUTRIGGER TIRE CUT BY GORD. B. RIGHT OUTRIGGER TIRE VALVE LEAKING. PART III. THERE WERE NO DELAYED DISCREPANCIES SERIOUS ENOUGH TO REQUIRE MAINTENANCE. PART IV. AFTO FORMS 126, AIR VEHICLE MISSION RECORDS, HAVE NOT BEEN RECEIVED FOR AUGUST, SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER FOR AIRCRAFT RE-DEPLOYED FROM THIS STATION. REQUEST THAT THESE FORMS BE FORWARDED TO THIS STATION ATTENTION CAMS-9 ASAP.
BT
12/1159Z OCT RJYXN 12-4 939

4635M86
ZAA1738ND471
RR RJEXGM
RR RJFXM 69
R 231148Z
FM 3970CMBTSPICP TORREJON AB SPAIN
TO RJJEXGM/3800W FEASE AFB MX
INFO ZEN/16AF TORREJON AB SPAIN
BT

Att: 509007-1
Jays: DM - 1
File 3
14

U M C L A S S E F T O CANS-9-471-61. FOR COM. 16AF FOR DMW.
SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS ON DEPLOYED REFLEX AIRCRAFT. THIS
MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART I: DISCREPANCIES REPORTED BY AIRCROW.
B-47 52-489: (1) NR 5 ENGINE SHUTDOWN AFTER 3 HOURS OF FLIGHT.
SPARKS AND FIRE EMITTING FROM TAIL PIPE. (2) NR 2 ENGINE OIL
PRESSURE FLUCTUATED 2 PSI. (3) HEAVY OIL LEAK NR 1 ENGINE.
(4) ID-249 INOPERATIVE, BOTH POSITIONS. (5) UHF WOULD NOT CHANNEL-
IZE AUTOMATICALLY. (6) AIRCRAFT COMMANDER'S INTERPHONE VOLUME COULD
NOT BE ADJUSTED. B-47 52-487: COULD NOT MOVE X-RAIRS TO NORTH
QUAD. B-47 52-473: NR 5 ENGINE INDICATED 88 PERCENT MAXIMUM RPM AND 600

PAGE TWO RJFXM 69
DEGREES EGT WITH ALL OTHER ENGINES READING 98 TO 92 PERCENT RPM AND
508 DEGREES EGT DURING REFUELING. PART II: DISCREPANCIES DIS-
COVERED DURING COCKING OPERATION. B-47 52-489: NAVIGATOR'S TAIL
LAMP SHORTED OUT. (2) NO IGNITION ON NR 5 ENGINE. (3) NR 5 ENGINE
WOULD NOT MOTOR OVER. B-47 52-487: NONE. B-47 52-473: (1) RIGHT
FORWARD MAIN TIRE FLAT, (2) LEFT AFT MAIN TIRE WORN EXCESSIVELY.
(3) 00000(3) AIRCRAFT COMMANDER'S AC POWER INDICATOR LIGHT STAYS ON
CONSTANTLY WITH AC POWER ON. PART III: NO DELAYED DISCREPANCIES
SERIOUS ENOUGH TO BE CORRECTED.
BT

23/1218Z OCT RJFXM

03-3

ACT 005473 6340

01174141366
28 8450H
28 2140M 224
R 271-172
FM 3078 030 TORONTO AB SPAIN
TO 2140M 224 BU PLASE 271 172
INFO 28/1045 TORONTO AB SPAIN
BT

Act 5000
Info 271
224

U. S. C. L. A. F. F. T. O. COMS-0-101-11.
FOR DON. 1407 28/104-4. SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS ON REP-11
AIRCRAFT. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART I: DISCREPANCIES
REPORTED BY THE AIRCRAFT. D-47 50-311 (1) NR 2 NOT OSCILLATED FROM
872 DEGREES TO 400 DEGREES DURING FLIGHT. (2) W/ IF ALTERNATOR
INOPERATIVE. (3) CO-PILOT'S SECTANT ARM IN LIGHT INOPERATIVE.
(4) AUTO-PILOT SUDLER CHANNEL INOPERATIVE. (5) AUTO-PILOT GORC OF-
IN TURN AND OSCILLATES EXCESSIVELY. (6) W/MB/PAY 42 MARK "X" HAS
SECURITY ADJUSTMENT. D-47 50-324 (1) BACK WIRE IN DEFYANT MOUNT
CORD. (2) IT COULD NOT STAY OR CHANNELIZE ON LOWER FREQUENCY.

PAGE TWO R/1728 224
(3) W/IF WOULD NOT TRANSMIT ON GROUND YOUNG FREQUENCIES. D-47
31-2833 (1) RIGHT AFT CENTER MAIN TANK BOOSTER PUMP INOPERATIVE.
(2) W-1 COMPAS PRECEDES 3 DEGREES AN HOUR IN UNSLAVED POSITION.
PART II: DISCREPANCIES DISCOVERED DURING GOING OPERATION. NONE.
PART III: NO KNOWN DISCREPANCIES.
BT
27/1532 OCT R/1728

27 4

0874

B2057

08740
FM RJEVCH
RM RJEVCH 525
ZNR
R270002 ZEK
FM HAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO ARAY
RXXYF/4133STRATMG HCCVW AFB FLA
RXXSR/4133STRATMG TROPER AFB CA
BT

LOCAL INMMA 40251A. FOR VENTC AND MARRCO 100 SET
CUTTING. NA-CA/TA MARRCO SYS. SOME BE TIGHTENED BEING
EXPERIENCED WITH MARRCO SYSTEMS DURING EARLY OPERATING
HOURS. REPRESENTATIVES FROM DAF, LOCKHEED, AND PERMITS
TURBINE A NO OF SAF BASES IN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS.
PENDING INFO IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFO AND ACTION.
(1) CALANQUER LAMP FAILURE DUE TO HANDLING IN TOWING
OF CALANQUER LAMP WITH BANG PAPER. THIS WILL CAUSE BURNING
OF LAMP ENVELOPE AND DEGRADATION OF EARLY FAILURE. IF
TOWING, LAMP MUST BE CLEANED PRIOR TO OPERATION WITH

PAGE TWO RJEVCH 525
COTTON SWAB MOISTENED WITH ETHYL ALCOHOL ONLY.
(2) IMPROPER CALANQUER LAMP CURRENT GAUING LAMP
FAILURE. AMMETERS MUST BE CALIBRATED BY DAF/AFM
WHICH IS FURTHER SET TO INSURE PROPER CURRENT READINGS.
(3) PINS IN 100 PIN AND CONNECTOR PULLING BACK DURING
INSTALLATION. MOA/IA WILL ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO CORRECT
RELIEVE SHOULDERS ON CONNECTOR AND HOLDING ASSEMBLY.
THE INTERIM, EXTREME CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO AVOID
PIN PROBLEM.
(4) 35KV POTENTIAL PENETRATING ON A PIN TO RECORDED
CONNECTOR. TO SHUT OFF VOLTAGE, PRESSURE WITH "STOP"
AND "CODE" BUTTON. ON POU FOR 30 SEC AFTER OFF IS
TURNED OFF.
BT
27/15112 OOI RJEVCH

Handwritten signature

TO: SAC OFFICE AND MEMO
 CAP BAINBRIDGE AFB LA
 CAP BERTOVEN AFB MASS
 15AF WRIGHT AFB CALIF
 16AF WAINWRIGHT AFB
 7 AFB AFB HIGH WYCOMBE ENGLAND
 3 AFB AFB ANDERSON AFB OKLA
 OKLA TULSA AFB OKLA
 DIR FOR SAFETY BOSTON AFB CALIF

UNCLAS//FORNOPS 3-1-5 SUBJECT: SERIOUS OPERATIONAL

HAZARD REPORT 509 BOMB WING. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED (AN F-4E) AND TO AFB 62-14. SEVERAL PILOTS HAVE REPORTED TROUBLE DISENGAGING THE AUTOPILOT IN B-47 AIRCRAFT. WHEN THE AUTOPILOT WAS DISENGAGED USING THE BUTTON ON THE CONTROL WHEEL THE SERVO SWITCHES REMAINED ENGAGED. IN AT LEAST ONE CASE THE PILOT TURNED ON THE AUTOPILOT MASTER SWITCH AGAIN AFTER HE HAD DISENGAGED BY PUSHING THE BUTTON ON THE CONTROL WHEEL, WITH THE SERVO SWITCHES ON THIS RESULTED IN THE AUTOPILOT ENGAGING ALL THREE CHANNELS & SPINDLES. WHEREAS IN THIS INSTANCE NO DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED, OTHER DIFFERENT INCIDENTS STATED THIS MALFUNCTION COULD CAUSE A SERIOUS PROBLEM. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE FORWARD END OF THE GEAR BAR FOR THE SERVO SWITCHES

2 1500
 201 1361

SIGNATURE
 GEORGE F. DUMMETT, CAPT, USAF
 237

UNCLASSIFIED

UNIT MEMORANDUM (FORM 64) (REV. 5-22-64)

INCL. LISTED

SIXTH AIR DIV PHASE 175 BR

WAS BINDING ON THE PLASTIC GUARD AROUND THE SWITCHES. WHEN THE BOTTOM OF THE CONTROL WHEEL WAS PRESSED THE MASTER SWITCH WOULD TURN OFF AND THE AUTOPILOT DISENGAGE, BUT THE SERVO SWITCHES WOULD BE HELD IN THE ENGAGED POSITION. THESE ALL THREE SERVOS WOULD RE-ENGAGE WHEN THE MASTER SWITCH WAS AGAIN TURNED ON. THREE OF ELEVEN AIRCRAFT EXAMINED HAD THE GUARD INSTALLED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE GANG BAR WOULD BIND. THE PLASTIC GUARD WAS INSTALLED IN COMPLIANCE WITH TO 12-47-10-0 AND TO 12-47-10-0A AND SERVES AN EXCELLENT PURPOSE, BUT IN THE THREE CASES MENTIONED IT WAS INSTALLED JUST A FRACTION OF AN INCH TOO FAR TO THE EDGE OF THE PANEL. THIS ORGANIZATION IS CHECKING ALL ASSIGNED B-47 AIRCRAFT, AND IN THOSE CASES WHERE THE GANG BAR BINDS THE SHIELD WILL BE REPOSITIONED. RECOMMEND THAT ALL ORGANIZATIONS POSSESSING B-47 AIRCRAFT TAKE SIMILAR ACTION.

FM NAV WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO USAF
RLNND/48415-STRATMO MOODY AFB TX

BT
UNCLAS BSV 8073. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED FOR PARA
G9 AND 807 28R 02-14. FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS
C
QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO AND IMMEDIATE ACTION. QUOTE: SERIOUS
SERIOUS OPERATIONAL HAZARD REPORT FROM DEPENDENT.
SEVERAL PILOTS HAVE REPORTED TROUBLE DISENGAGING THE
AUTOPILOT IN B-47 AIRCRAFT. WHEN THE AUTOPILOT WAS
DISENGAGED USING THE SWITCH ON THE CONTROL WHEEL THE
SERVO SWITCHES REMAINED ENGAGED. IN AT LEAST ONE CASE
THE PILOT TURNED ON THE AUTOPILOT MASTER SWITCH AGAIN
AFTER HE HAD DISENGAGED BY PRESSING THE SWITCH ON THE

PAGE TWO RUMKDH 173
CONTROL WHEEL, WITH THE SERVO SWITCHES ON THIS RESULTED
IN THE AUTOPILOT ENGAGING ALL THREE CONTROL SURFACES.
FORTUNATELY IN THIS INSTANCE NO DIFFICULTY WAS
ENCOUNTERED. UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES THIS
MALFUNCTION COULD CAUSE A SERIOUS PROBLEM. IN A SITUATION
REVEALED THAT THE FORWARD END OF THE GANG BAR FOR
THE SERVO SWITCHES WAS BINDING ON THE PLASTIC GUARD
AROUND THE SWITCHES. WHEN THE BUTTON ON THE CONTROL
WHEEL WAS PRESSED THE MASTER SWITCH WOULD TURN OFF AND
THE AUTOPILOT DISENGAGE, BUT THE SERVO SWITCHES WOULD
BE HELD IN THE ENGAGED POSITION. FROM ALL THREE SERVOS
WOULD ENGAGE WHEN THE MASTER SWITCH WAS AGAIN TURNED ON.
THREE OF ELEVEN AIRCRAFT EXAMINED HAD THE GUARD INSTALLED
IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE GANG BAR WOULD BIND. THE
PLASTIC GUARD WAS INSTALLED IN COMPLIANCE WITH TO 1B-47
1297 AND TO 1B-47-1000A AND SERVES AN EXCELLENT PURPOSE,
BUT IN THE THREE CASES MENTIONED IT WAS INSTALLED JUST
A FRACTION OF AN INCH TOO FAR TO THE REAR OF THE PANEL.
THIS ORGANIZATION IS CHECKING ALL ASSIGNED B-47 AIR-
CRAFT, AND IN THOSE CASES WHERE THE GANG BAR BINDS THE

PAGE THREE RUMKDH 173
SHOULD BE REPOSITIONED. UNQUOTE. ALL ORGANIZATIONS
POSSESSING B-47 AIRCRAFT WILL TAKE SIMILAR AND IMMEDIATE
ACTION TO CORRECT THIS DISCREPANCY. REQUEST ALL AIR-
CREWS BE BRIEFED ON THIS INCIDENT PRIOR TO NEXT FLIGHT.
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE CONTAINED IN 8TH AF DM
MESSAGE DMMAA 45631.

BT
44/19162 OCT RUMKDH

100 10 -

4-4-

Rfo: C
100C
509C
100DC
509DC
DS
B50
B000
B0000
D0
DM-1
B003
279

BIXO
(Historian)

HQS: AF D25
509th Bomb Wing (H) SAC
Pease AFB, New Hampshire
OCTOBER 1961

Page	Form	Section	Summary
1 & 2	Form 661	Aircraft and GAM	Maintenance Production Summary
3	Form 662	Maintenance	Production Summary, Wing
4	Form 662A	Maintenance	Production Summary, Wing
5	Form 663	Maintenance	Production Summary, Wing
6	Form 663A	Maintenance	Production Summary, Wing
7	Form 665	Maintenance	Production Summary, OMS
8	Form 665	Maintenance	Production Summary, FMS
9	Form 665	Maintenance	Production Summary, M&E
10	Form 666	Maintenance	Production Summary, Wing
11	Form 666A	Maintenance	Production Summary, Wing
12	Form 667	Maintenance	Production Summary, FMS
13	Form 667A	Maintenance	Production Summary, A&E
14 & 15	Section II.		
16, 17, 18	Section III.		
19 & 20	Section IV.		
20	Chart of Direct Labor Documentation.		

INDEX

- Page 1 & 2 Form 661, Aircraft and GAM Maintenance Production Summary
- Page 3 Form 662, Maintenance Production Summary, Wing
- Page 4 Form 662A, Maintenance Production Summary, Wing
- Page 5 Form 663, Maintenance Production Summary, Wing
- Page 6 Form 663A, Maintenance Production Summary, Wing
- Page 7 Form 665, Maintenance Production Summary, OMS
- Page 8 Form 665, Maintenance Production Summary, FMS
- Page 9 Form 665, Maintenance Production Summary, M&E
- Page 10 Form 666, Maintenance Production Summary, Wing
- Page 11 Form 666A, Maintenance Production Summary, Wing
- Page 12 Form 667, Maintenance Production Summary, FMS
- Page 13 Form 667A, Maintenance Production Summary, A&E
- Page 14 & 15 Section II.
- Page 16, 17, 18, Section III.
- Page 19 & 20 Section IV.
- Page 20 Chart of Direct Labor Documentation.

AIRCRAFT AND GMM MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - PARTS I, A, B AND C

AREA	X	SAC ONLY	AIR VEHICLE (Aircraft and GMM)						INSPECTIONS - NUMBER COMPLETED				INSPECTION CLOCK HOURS				PERIODIC ELAPSED	PERIODIC TO PFC FOR CCTM	PERIODIC TO PFC FOR CCTM
			1	2	3	4	5	6	BASIC POSTFLIGHT	PREFLIGHT	HOURLY POSTFLIGHT	PERIODIC	BASIC POSTFLIGHT	PREFLIGHT	HOURLY POSTFLIGHT	PERIODIC			
1	B-47E	47.7	7	10/12	4	CC	246	1998	320	350	174	18	4.7	4.0	4.7	18	54	54	
2											2.5					31.6	52.8	57.6	
3											3.3					16	48	50	
4											4.7					16	48	48	
5											5.4					18	54	54	
6											6.7					26	48	48	
7																			
8																			
TOTAL ALL AIRCRAFT (Exclude GMM)																			

MARKS

REPORTING CONTROL SYMBOL
AF-025

PERIOD OF SUMMARY
45/20

FROM: SOUTH BARRACADE WINGS, 100 F-4U, 100 F-4U, 100 F-4U
AIRCRAFT TYPE AND MODEL
PRIMARY: B-47E
SECONDARY: B-47E

STATUS ON BASE
TENANT TO
HOST TO

TYPE NAME AND GRADE (DCM)
ROBERT E. DUNNIGAN COL. P.E.L. USAF.
SIGNATURE
DATE
22 November 1963

AIRCRAFT AND GAM MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - PARTS I, A, B AND C

AREA: SAC ONLY TENANT TO FROM: 509TH BOMBARDMENT WING (M) F-35B AFB NH PERIOD OF SUMMARY: 13 OCT 96 REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL: AF-D25

TYPE AND MODEL	AIR VEHICLE (Aircraft and GAM)				INSPECTIONS - NUMBER COMPLETED				INSPECTION CLOCKHOURS				PERIODIC ELAPSED PERIODS TO PCFM CCTM	
	NUMBER ASSIGNED	AVERAGE AGE	UNIT EXPERIENCE	MISSION CODE	SORTIES FLOWN	HOURS FLOWN	BASIC POSTFLIGHT	PREFLIGHT	HOURLY POSTFLIGHT	PERIODIC	BASIC POSTFLIGHT	PREFLIGHT		HOURLY POSTFLIGHT
1 KC-97G	21.0	7.5/12	4	CA	77	714	78	82	7	1/1	2.9	3.9	24	96
2										2/1			32	96
3										3/2			24	72
4										5/1			24	72
5														
6														
7														
8														
TOTAL ALL AIRCRAFT (Exclude GAM)														

REMARKS:

TYPED NAME AND GRADE (NAME) _____ SIGNATURE _____ DATE _____

MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - FROM: 509th Bomb Wing (A) Pease AFB, N.H.		PERIOD OF SUMMARY 1-31 OCTOBER 1962					REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL AF-D25				
LABOR CODES AND DESCRIPTION		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
A. MANHOURS AUTHORIZED AND UTILIZED IN CODE 01		O H S	F H S	A & E	SUB TOTAL	D O M	TOTAL COLUMNS 4 & 5	TOTAL COLUMNS 4 & 5	TOTAL COLUMNS 4 & 5	TOTAL COLUMNS 4 & 5	TOTAL ALL ORGNS
1	TOTAL MANHOURS AUTHORIZED (All Labor Codes)	35,320	75,488	1,358	25,774	130,20	2,774	2,774	2,774	2,774	44,276
2	TOTAL MANHOURS ASSIGNED (All Labor Codes)	84,295	70,402	4,270	27,773	122,76	23,769	23,769	23,769	23,769	23,769
3	% ASSIGNED OF AUTHORIZED (1 + 2 x 100)	238.1	89.2	311.2	107.5	94.2	86.1	86.1	86.1	86.1	53.0
4	CODE 01 MANHOURS ASSIGNED	67,774	5,882	1,111	25,002	95,769	2,002	2,002	2,002	2,002	15,303
5	% CODE 01 ASSIGNED OF TOTAL ASSIGNED (4 + 2 x 100)	79.9	76.5	25.8	90.1	77.2	71.3	71.3	71.3	71.3	71.3
6	DIRECT CODE 01 MANHOURS - EXCEPTION TIME	30.3	3,235	228	24.3	3,726	24.3	24.3	24.3	24.3	24.3
7	DIRECT MANHOURS - MAINTENANCE DATA COLLECTION	34.2	28.9	1,250	12.2	1,624	12.2	12.2	12.2	12.2	12.2
8	% MDC OF ETA DIRECT (7 + 8 x 100)	87.2	11.7	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1
9	% MDC OF CODE 01 ASSIGNED (7 + 4 x 100)	30.7	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
B. PRODUCTIVE INDIRECT CODES											
02	ALERT DUTY OR STANDBY	6,772	9,772	3,228	2,228	11,998	2,228	2,228	2,228	2,228	19,720
03	SUPERVISION	5,228	9,228	2,228	2,228	11,998	2,228	2,228	2,228	2,228	19,720
04	MAINTENANCE ADMINISTRATION	1,228	4,228	4,228	10,228	6,228	1,228	1,228	1,228	1,228	17,663
05	MAINTENANCE ON-BASE TRAINING	7,106	2,650	2,525	12,201	11,45	1,346	1,346	1,346	1,346	13,499
06	QUALITY INSPECTION										
07	STANDARDIZATION										
08	MAINTENANCE MEETINGS	81	37	11	129	129	129	129	129	129	129
09	PLANT EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE	1,093	582	150	845	845	845	845	845	845	845
10	CLEANING AND POLICING	455	686	211	1,352	1,352	1,352	1,352	1,352	1,352	1,352
11	VEHICLE AND/OR EQUIPMENT OPERATION	2,047	1,386	2,187	5,620	5,620	5,620	5,620	5,620	5,620	5,620
12	STOCK CHASING	81	60	8	149	149	149	149	149	149	149
13	TOOL CRIB SUPPLY	?	1,041		1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041
14	TOO PROPERTY										
15	CARBIDE LATION										
16	MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT	1,765	825	1,286	3,876	3,876	3,876	3,876	3,876	3,876	3,876
17	DIRECT SUPPORT WPIE OPERATOR (Code 01 Only)	29,187	29,990	17,272	76,449	14,966	8,223	8,223	8,223	8,223	8,223
TOTAL PRODUCTIVE INDIRECT MANHOURS											
% PRODUCTIVE INDIRECT OF AVAILABLE MANHOURS (TOTAL A OR B x 100)		42.6	93.1	46.9	42.9	96.8	47.2	47.2	47.2	47.2	47.2

MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - PARTS II C, D, E AND F		FROM: 599th Bomb Wing (b), Pease AFB, N. H.		PERIOD OF SUMMARY: 1-31 October 1961		REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL: AF-D25					
LABOR CODES AND DESCRIPTION		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
		O H S	F H S	A & E	SUB TOTAL	D C N		TOTAL COLLENS 4 & 5			TOTAL ALL ORIGINS
C. NON-PRODUCTIVE INDIRECT CODES											
30	LAG - ASSISTANCE	18	35	5	58	173		229			229
31	LAG - EQUIPMENT	67	9	1	77			77			77
32	LAG - TRANSPORTATION		64	7	71	2		73			73
33	LAG - WEATHER	105			105			105			105
34	LAG - PARTS		4	1	5			5			5
	TOTAL NON-PRODUCTIVE INDIRECT MANHOURS	190	112	14	316	173		489			489
D. NON-PRODUCTIVE INDIRECT OF AVAILABLE MANHOURS (TOTALS OF D1 & D2)											
1	TOTAL A1 + B1 + C (BYA Available Manhours)	.3	.2	.03	.2	1.2		.3			.3
2	TOTAL A7 + B7 + C (DMG Available Manhours)	68508	65818	40257	174593	14539		189132			189132
3	DIFFERENCE (1 - 2)	63513	56769	37087	157369	14539		171908			171908
		4995	9049	3180	17224			17224			17224
ABSENCE CODES											
30	MILITARY TRAINING	563	629	150	1342	21		1372			1372
31	SQUADRON OR BASE DUTIES	571	1412	614	2597	283		2880			2880
32	FLYING - NON-MAINTENANCE	232	64	28	324	36		360			360
33	TDY MAINTENANCE TRAINING	320	976	366	1662			1664			1664
34	TDY MAINTENANCE DUTY	13424	864	1824	16112			16112			16112
35	TDY OTHER	221	576	16	813			813			813
36	PERSONNEL PROCESSING	298	308	80	686	49		735			735
	TOTAL DUTY ABSENCE MANHOURS (OF DMG 26)	15629	4829	3090	23548	389		23937			23937
40	COMPENSATORY TIME FOR OVERTIME	2111	1396	410	3917	93		4010			4010
41	EXCLUDED FROM DUTY	952	499	106	1557	19		1576			1576
42	LEAVE - OFFICIAL	2241	2081	1728	6050	522		6572			6572
43	SICK LEAVE - CIVILIAN		32		32			32			32
44	MEDICAL - MILITARY	666	107	138	891	195		1086			1086
45	PERSONAL AFFAIRS	237	136	16	389	1		390			390
46	APOL OR CONFINES	38			38			38			38
	TOTAL NON-DUTY ABSENCE MANHOURS (OF DMG 48)	6281	2961	2416	11658	982		12640			12640
	TOTAL ABSENCE MANHOURS (OF 7)	31910	16796	2588	51294	1291		52585			52585

MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY -
PARTS III A, B, C, D AND E

PERIOD OF SUMMARY: 30 Sept 68 to 7 Oct 68
REPLACES CONTROL SYMBOL: AF - D25

FROM: 309th TSBW (MFP), FPO 47B, V.H.
309th TSBW (MFP), FPO 47B, V.H.

TO: 309th TSBW (MFP), FPO 47B, V.H.
309th TSBW (MFP), FPO 47B, V.H.

A. FUNCTION	PERSONNEL ASSIGNED			TOTAL	% BY SHIFT			FUNCTION	PERS ASSIGNED			GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE MANNING			MANHOURS			
	OFF	AMN	CIV		A	B	C		OFF	AMN	CIV	A	B	C	ETA 01	MOC 01	CODE 02	CODE 03
1 DEPUTY COMMANDER MAINTENANCE	2	1	1	4	100			1 SUPERVISION										
2 ADMINISTRATION	5	5	5	15	100			2 DISPATCH & CONTROL										
3 QUALITY CONTROL	1	17	100	18	100			3 SERVICING										
4 MAINTENANCE CONTROL	3	57	92	62	75	14		4 UNSCHEDULED MAINT.										
5 REPORTS AND ANALYSIS	3	9	10	22	100			5 DAILY INSPECTION										
6 TRAINING CONTROL	1	6	2	9	100			6 PERIODIC INSPECTION										
7 TOTAL (1 thru 6)	10	74	1	85	82	11	7	7 FIELD MAINTENANCE										
								8 TOTAL (1 thru 8)										

C. PRODUCTION BY FUNCTION AND AIR VEHICLE TYPE AND MODEL

FUNCTION	PERSONNEL ASSIGNED			TOTAL	% BY SHIFT	PRODUCTIVE MANHOURS	AIR VEHICLE TYPE AND MODEL
	OFF	AMN	CIV				
FLIGHT LINE	8	450	88	936	79.9		
PERIODIC	33		94	3980	34.30		
SHOP	2	402	5	15,000	66.00		
FLIGHT LINE							
PERIODIC							
SHOP	7	233	89	14,511	1,851		
BASE FLIGHT							
TOTAL	28	1,118	5	5,079	1,907.5		

D. OTHER WORKLOADS

FUNCTION	MANHOURS		
	PREFIX	SL	SO
MISCELLANEOUS SHOP			
FUNCTION AIR VEH			
NOT IDENTIFIED			
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT			
NON-AERO EQUIPMENT			
TENANT SUPPORT			
OMS			
FMS			
AEME			
OTHER			
TOTAL			

E. MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE

GRADE	AFCS			MEPA			AFCS			MEPA		
	AFCS	MEPA	AFCS	MEPA	AFCS	MEPA	AFCS	MEPA	AFCS	MEPA		
MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE												
OVERALL TOTAL												

MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - PARTS III F & G

FROM: 509th Bomb Wing, (H) Pease AFB, N. H.

PERIOD OF SUMMARY
1-21 October 1961

REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL
AF - D25

DESCRIPTION	1. AIRCRAFT		2. ARRIVALS BY HOURLY INTERVAL							
	PROCESSED	NUMBER SERVICED	REQUIRING MAINTENANCE	MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY	0800 TO 1700	1700 TO 2400	2400 TO 0800	0800 TO 1700	1700 TO 2400	2400 TO 0800
1 SINGLE ENGINE										
2 TWO ENGINE										
3 FOUR ENGINE										
4 SIX ENGINE										
5 EIGHT ENGINE										
6 HELICOPTER										
7 JET TOTAL										
8 RECIPROCATING										
9 SINGLE ENGINE										
10 TWO ENGINE										
11 FOUR ENGINE										
12 HELICOPTER										
13 RECIPROCATING TOTAL										
TOTAL (JET AND RECIPROCATING)										

DESCRIPTION	3. AVAILABLE TRANSPORT (PRODUCTIVE TRANSPORT ALERT (MPC))		4. ASSESSMENT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT		5. OTHER MAINT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT		6. DIRECT MAINTENANCE		7. TOTAL MAINT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	
	AVAILABLE TRANSPORT ALERT (MPC)	PRODUCTIVE TRANSPORT ALERT (MPC)	ASSESSMENT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	OTHER MAINT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	OTHER MAINT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	OTHER MAINT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	OTHER MAINT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	OTHER MAINT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	OTHER MAINT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	OTHER MAINT DIRECT ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
1 JET TOTAL										
2 RECIPROCATING TOTAL										
3 TOTAL										

FORM 683a PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE. REPLACES DA FORM 683 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - PARTS IVA & B														PERIOD OF SUMMARY					REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL
FROM: 509th Bomb Wing (6) Pease AFB, NH.														1-31 October 1961					AF- D25
SQUADRON														PRODUCTIVE MANHOURS BY WORK ORDER PREFIX					
<input type="checkbox"/> Oms <input type="checkbox"/> Jms <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> News <input type="checkbox"/> Ass <input type="checkbox"/>																			
A AIR VEHICLE (Type & Model)	B NON- SCHEDULED MAINT	C BASIC POST- FLIGHT	D PREFLIGHT	E HOURLY POST- FLIGHT	F PERIODIC	G FIELD MAINTENANCE (Physically Performed by Field or AAE Shop)	H REPAIR ORDER	I COMPLIANCE TECH ORDER ACCOMP.	J REPAIR OF AIR VEHICLE PRE-ISSUE	K REPAIR OF PARTS-WAS TER REPAIR DISAPPLY W/O	L MFG OF PARTS, BITS OR PIECES	M JET ENGINE MAINT	N RECIP ENGINE MAINT	O TOTAL ALL COLUMNS					
															S MODIFI- CATION	T TIME	U SA	V SB	W SC
TOTAL ALL AIR VEHICLES																			
1679																			
64.69																			
35.6																			
44.9																			
.2																			
19.0																			
2.1																			
1.0																			
.8																			
.01																			
25.8																			
4678																			
1																			
141																			
71																			
50.8																			
28.0																			
.2																			
27.0																			
181.3																			
100																			
100																			

P SHOP FOR AIR VEHICLE NOT IDENTIFIED SCHEDULED BY NON-AERO	Q REPAIR OF PRE-ISSUE WORK ORDER	R MASTER REPAIR SCHEDULE AND WORK ORDER	S MFG OF AIR VEHICLE AND PIECES	T REPAIR AND MFG FOR AERONAUTICAL SUPPORT EGP	U REPAIR OF NON-AERO- NAUTICAL EGP	V MFG OF NON- AERONAUTICAL EGP	W INSPECTION REPAIR AND PERSONAL EGP	X RECLAIM- TION	Y TECH ORDER COMPARISON (FORM #10)	Z SCHEDULED CALIBRATION PME	AA UNCHEDULED CALIBRATION PME	AB TOTAL ALL COLUMNS
TOTAL												
1405												
23												
1.4												
6.6												
3.3												
1.4												
.01												
.06												
.09												
16.98												
100												
100												

SAC FORM 668 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.
REPLACES SAC FORM 668, 669 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - PARTS V A, B AND C		FROM: 509th Bomb Wing, (M) Pease AFB, N. H.		PERIOD OF SUMMARY: 1-31 October 1961		REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL: AF-D25					
		MANHOURS ASSIGNED		MANHOURS ASSIGNMENT AND UTILIZATION BY LABOR CODE							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8				
LABOR CODES AND DESCRIPTION	MANHOURS ASSIGNED BY CODE	% ASSIGNED EACH CODE OF TOTAL ASSIGNED	MANHOURS BY CODE OF ASSIGNMENT	% OF MANHOURS BY CODE	OVERTIME MANHOURS BY LABOR CODE	% OF OVERTIME MANHOURS BY LABOR CODE	TOTAL MANHOURS EXPENDED BY CODE AS % OF MANHOURS ASSIGNED IN THE CODE				
A. 01 DIRECT LABOR	153083	72.3	99371	64.9	99420	52.6	6246	36.3	64.9	82196	82.7
02 ALERT DUTY OR STANDBY					16720	8.6	6818	41.7			
03 SUPERVISION	22880	10.8	302	1.3	22524	11.9	1528	9.4	98.1		
04 MAINTENANCE ADMINISTRATION	17260	8.2	8	.05	17663	9.1	593	3.6	102.3		
05 MAINTENANCE ON-BASE TRAINING	2296	1.0			19426	7.1	129	.8	581.9		
06 QUALITY INSPECTION	2464	1.2	2	.08	2499	1.3	190	1.0			
07 STANDARDIZATION											
08 MAINTENANCE MEETINGS					129	.6	28	.2			
09 PLANT EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE	1408	.6			2424	1.3	48	.3	172.1		
10 CLEANING AND POLICING					1354	.7	20	.1			
11 VEHICLE AND/OR EQUIPMENT OPERATION	6304	3.0	239	3.8	5630	3.0	80	.5	89.2		
12 STOCK CHASING	64	.1			149	.7	7	.05	232.8		
13 TOOL CRIB SUPPLY	720	.3	18	2.4	664	.6	6	.04	147.8		
14 TOOL PROPERTY					5	.003					
15 CANIBALIZATION											
16 MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT	5680	2.5			5626	3.0	672	4.0	106.5		
17 DIRECT SUPPORT/PIE OPERATOR											
B. TOTAL PRODUCTIVE INDIRECT (CODES 18 thru 24)	56666	27.7	569	1.0	89224	47.2	10085	61.7	147.5		
18 LAG - ASSISTANCE					229	.1					
19 LAG - EQUIPMENT					77	.4					
20 LAG - TRANSPORTATION					73	.4					
21 LAG - WEATHER					105	.5					
22 LAG - PARTS					5	.003					
C. TOTAL NON-PRODUCTIVE INDIRECT (CODES 25 thru 26)					489	.2					
TOTAL (A, B, & C) (CODES 01 thru 26)	211769		99940	47.2	109133		16334		88.0		

MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - PARTS V, D AND E

FROM: 509th Bomb Wing, (A) Pease AFB, N. H.

PERIOD OF SUMMARY: 1-31 October 1961

REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL: AF-D25

LABOR CODES AND DESCRIPTION	MANHOURLY DISTRIBUTION BY ABSENCE CODE				2a
	1	1a	1b	2	
	TOTAL MANHOURS EXPENDED BY ABSENCE CODE	% OF CATE. GORY	% OF TOTAL ABSENCE	OVERTIME MANHOURS BY LABOR CODE	% OF TOTAL
30 MILITARY TRAINING	1373	5.7	3.5	6	1.2
31 SQUADRON OR BASE DUTIES	2880	12.0	7.3	420	79.5
32 FLYING - NON-MAINTENANCE	360	1.5	.9	102	19.3
33 TDY MAINTENANCE TRAINING	1664	2.0	4.2		
34 TDY MAINTENANCE DUTY	16112	67.3	40.8		
35 TDY OTHER	813	3.4	2.1		
36 PERSONNEL PROCESSING	735	3.1	1.9		
D. TOTAL DUTY ABSENCE (30 thru 36)	23937		60.6	528	
40 COMPENSATORY TIME FOR OVERTIME	4010	25.8	10.2		
41 EXCUSED FROM DUTY	1616	10.4	4.1		
42 LEAVE - OFFICIAL	7442	47.8	18.8		
43 SICK LEAVE - CIVILIAN	32	.2	.08		
44 MEDICAL - MILITARY	2036	13.1	5.2		
45 PERSONAL AFFAIRS	328	2.5	1.0		
46 AWOL OR CONFINED	34	.2	.09		
E. TOTAL NON-DUTY ABSENCE (40 thru 46)	11562	100.0	30.5		
TOTAL ABSENCE (D + E)	37499				

MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - PART VI A										PERIOD OF SUMMARY 1-31 October 1962						REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL AF-425			
FROM: 509th Bombardment Wing (B) Pease AFB NH.										SHOP REPAIR DATA									
ITEMS PROCESSED BY ACTION TAKEN CODE (MUC Report Number (1))																			
A	B	C	E	F	G	J	L	X		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	TOTAL TOTAL A, B, C, E, F, G, J, L, X, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8	TOTAL MONTH (A, B, C, E, F, G, J, L, X, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
WORK CENTER																			
1	JET ENGINE SHOP																		
2	RECIPROCATING ENGINE SHOP																		
3	PROPELLER SHOP																		
4	PROPULSION TOTAL (B+C+J)																		
5	REPAIR AND RECLAMATION SHOP																		
6	FUEL SYSTEM SHOP																		
7	GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SHOP																		
8	AERO-REPAIR TOTAL (B thru 7)																		
9	PNEUMATIC SHOP																		
10	INFLIGHT REFUELING SHOP																		
11	ELECTRIC SHOP																		
12	INSTRUMENT SHOP																		
13	MECHANICAL ACCESSORIES (B-19)																		
14	ACCESSORIES TOTAL (B thru 13)																		
15	MACHINE SHOP																		
16	STRUCTURAL REPAIR SHOP																		
17	WELDING SHOP																		
18	PAINT SHOP																		
19	SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT SHOP																		
20	FABRICATION TOTAL (B thru 18)																		
21	FIELD MAINTENANCE TOTAL (B + C + 14 + 20)																		

MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION SUMMARY - PART VI B		FROM: 509th Bomb Wing, (H) Pease Air Force Base, N.H.												PERIOD OF SUMMARY		REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL							
ARMAMENT - ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE (Armament Systems) WORK CENTER		SHOP REPAIR DATA												1-31 October 1961		AF-D25							
		A	B	C	E	F	G	J	L	X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8					
		TOTAL																					
		A.F.G.J. OF MONTH																					
		L AND X TOTAL																					
		%																					
1	COMMUNICATION SYSTEM				5	239					2		3		1		1	17	246	241	97.9	96.8	
2	NAVIGATION SYSTEM	1	20			123			13	17				1		1		29	156	154	98.7	95.2	
3	ECM SYSTEM	1	7	4	1	199	12	69	21	143				8				8	453	445	98.2	96.9	
4	COMMUNICATION - NAVIGATION AND ECM TOTAL (if line 3)	2	69	4	6	561	12	69	34	162		1		10		2		54	855	840	98.2	96.5	
5	BOMB/NAV SYSTEM			58	3														64	364	364	100.0	97.4
6	AUTOPILOT/COMPASS SYSTEM	30	28	2		25	2			1				11				48	69	58	84.0	98.3	
7	PHOTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM																		1	13	11	84.6	100.0
8	FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (B-58)																						
9	BOMB/NAV SYSTEM TOTAL (if line 4)	30	87	7		135	3	3	29	233				13				113	446	443	97.0	99.3	
10	FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM			35		89	18	9	8									12	124	124	100.0	98.3	
11	RELEASE SYSTEM																						
12	ARMAMENT SYSTEMS TOTAL (if line 11)																						
13	ARMAMENT - ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE TOTAL (if line 12)	30	191	11	6	781	35	81	71	125		3		20		2		179	1425	1397	98.0	96.9	
14	ARMAMENT SYSTEMS TOTAL (if line 13)																						

Section II, RCS: AF - D25, October 1961

2. MAINTENANCE DELAYS: There were no maintenance delays during the reporting period.
3. SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS: No aircraft deviated from the flying schedule due to a shortage of parts. There were 4 B-47 cannibalizations and 2 KC-97. The items cannibalized more than once were:

<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Stock Number</u>	<u>B-47E Aircraft</u>	<u>No. Cannibalized</u>	<u>Reason</u>
Door Act. Rod Pressure relief	1AFB-1560-035-0850		2	Not in Stock

KC-97G Aircraft
NONE

4. FDL EFFECTIVENESS: No discrepancies were noted during the reporting period.
5. VARIANCE IN DIRECT MANHOURS: No significant variance in direct manhours was noted for the reporting period.
6. BORROWED AND LOANED MANHOURS: A total of 7,128 manhours were loaned to outside non-reporting activities. No manhours were borrowed from these activities. The following organizations have consistently borrowed more than 176 manhours per month.
 - a. Air Div
 - b. Wing CO
 - c. Sqd COs
 - d. Sqd Orderly Rooms
 - e. CSB
 - f. FID

7. ABSENCE FACTORS: The following is a breakdown for duty and non-duty absence codes:

	<u>Duty absence</u>	<u>% of Assigned</u>	<u>Non-duty Absence</u>	<u>% of Assigned</u>
DCM	248	1.7		6.1
OMS	14962	17.7	5977	7.0
FMS	3189	4.5	5722	8.1
AZE	2820	6.5	2419	5.6
WING TOTAL	21219	10.0	14991	7.0

8. TEX MAINTENANCE DUTY: A total of 15,968 manhours were expended in TDY. The only significant user of TDY was Reflex.

9. CANCELLATIONS: 7 B-47's were cancelled for weather, 1 Yo Yo cancelled due to no operations requirement, and 2 aircraft cancelled for materiel, one of which was a Yo Yo Sortie. 1 KC-97 cancelled due to weather, and 2 cancelled to materiel.

B-47 Materiel Cancellations
(1) 52-150 Discovered on take-off roll. Aircraft would not attain line speed. Pitot Sys. checked no mal. detected.
(2) 53-2032 Discovered 20 minutes prior to scheduled take off. No hydraulic pressure left side. Replaced number 3 engine hydraulic pump and reinstalled an improperly installed hydraulic line on number 3 engine.

KC-97 Materiel Cancellations
(1) 52-2714 Discovered 19 minutes prior to scheduled take off. Number 3 prop went into reverse. Replaced broken wire in "J" box.

(2) 52-2706 Discovered 4:36 prior to scheduled take off. C-6 cylinder dead. Replaced cylinder.

10. LATE TAKE-OFFS

B-47 Aircraft

- (1) 52-483 Discovered 5 minutes prior to take-off. Low oil pressure number 1 engine. Replaced pancake filter.
- (2) 52-149 Discovered 20 minutes prior to take-off. Steering inoperative. Replaced steering metering valve.
- (3) 52-483 Discovered 5 minutes prior to take-off. Low oil pressure on number 6 engine. Replaced deteriorated oil line.
- (4) 53-2333 Discovered 24 minutes prior to take-off. ATO fired before take-off. Installation error.

KC-97 Aircraft

- (1) 52-2706 Discovered 5 minutes prior to take-off. Excessive Mag drop on number 3 engine. Changed coil and harness.
- (2) 52-2716 Discovered 17 minutes prior to take-off. Hydraulic leak in the rudder boost. Seal re-seated itself after re-start.

11. NONE

12. NONE

13. BREAKDOWN OF MANHOURS EXPENDED IN PREPARATION OF THIS REPORT:

a. Collection of data	65
b. Recording data	20
c. Typing	8
d. Reproduction	2
Total	95

Section III, RCS: AP-D25, October 1961

D-1 AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIPMENT:		2 Number of Units	3 Number Required	4 Dispatches Filled	5 Time	6 % in Conn.
1 Noun						
Air Conditioner, A-3		2	0	0	00:00	100%
Air Compressor, MC-2A		15	297	297	594:00	97.5%
Air Compressor, MC-1A		9	160	160	320:00	89%
Generator Set, MD-3		46	840	840	3360:00	92%
Heater, H-1		42	50	50	155:00	100%
Motor Generator, MD-4		3	"	"	320:00	100%
Motor Generator, MD-2		1	"	"	00:00	100%
			SERVI - PERMANENT INSTALLATION			

D-2 GROUND POWER EQUIPMENT ENGINE FAILURES: NONE

F. CREW CHIEF INFORMATION:

B-47E	KC-97C
F-1 47	F-1 22
F-2 N/A	F-2 N/A
F-3 N/A	F-3 N/A
F-4 N/A	F-4 N/A
F-5 N/A	F-5 N/A
F-6 47	F-6 22
F-7 47	F-7 22
F-8 47	F-8 22
F-9 47	F-9 22

I. TECHNICAL ORDER COMPLIANCE:

I-1 WING BASE

1. I. O. Number

Color coding of aircraft alternator wiring 1B-47E-1136
 Installation of cover Assy, B-47 steering mechanism 1B-47E-1138
 Provisions for installation of MAREC 1B-47E-59A
 Inspection and replacement of MGAL and M3A2 thrusters 11P6-16-501

I-2 WING BASE WITH DEPOT ASSISTANCE:

1B-47E-1133 (Red Barn)

I-3 OTHER TOC: NONE

I-4 REMARKS: NONE

I-1 WING BASE TOC:

1. I. O. Number

Installation of access cover, oil tank hopper 1C-97K-561
 Revision of aircraft wiring to provide 1 for 1 instrument landing system frequency pairing 1C-97-612.

I-2. NEGATIVE

I-3. NEGATIVE

I-4. NEGATIVE

2. Units Remaining for each I.O.	3. M/H per unit for each I.O.	4. Total M/H	5. N. of sched next month	6. Comp last Mo. T. O. / MH	7. Status of Parts	8. Responsible Unit
32	1	32	32	109/109	O/H	FMS
3	1	3	3	44/44	O/H	OMS
1	2	2	1	5/10	O/H	FMS
10	1	10	10	37/37	O/H	FMS
44	-	-	4	0	-	-

KC-97G Aircraft

2. Units Remaining for each I.O.	3. M/H per unit for each I.O.	4. Total M/H	5. N. of sched next month	6. Comp last Mo. T. O. / MH	7. Status of Parts	8. Responsible Unit
43	6	258	Done on Engine charge.	0/0	O/H	FMS
13	2	24	13	8/16	O/H	A&L

5. REMARKS:

1. Aircraft and ground power equipment records inspections.
 B-47E
 KC-97G
 HD-3
 H-1

16 Sets inspected. 26.8 average discrepancies per set.
 6 Sets inspected. 22.6 " " " " " "
 8 Units inspected. 7.0 " " " " " "
 2 Units inspected. 6.1 " " " " " "

2. Direct Labor Sub-digit Code Hours.

Labor Code	OMS	FMS	AAE	WING
01.3	10207	12550	3030	26187
01.5	187	398	136	721
01.7		90		90

3. The following information is submitted as requested in 8th AF message DMH 41047, dated 10 Aug 61.

a. Average Maintenance downtime between sorties;
 B-47E 51.4
 KC-97G 68.9


b. Average Maintenance downtime between aircraft going on alert and the last sortie before alert;
 B-47E 60.5
 KC-97G 57.4

4. The following information is submitted as requested in 8th AF message DMH 41178, dated 16 Oct 61:

DCM	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
42430	5 SSgt	4 SSgt, 3 MSgt
42470	3 TSgt, 1 MSgt	1 TSgt, 1 MSgt
43490	1 CMSgt	
Total	10	9
AAE		
42430	3 AIC, 6 SSgt	3 SSgt, 1 TSgt
42470	2 TSgt, 1 MSgt	2 TSgt
Total	12	7
FMS		
42430	1 SSgt	3 AIC, 3 SSgt
42470	2 MSgt	1 TSgt
Total	3	7

To balance skill levels and authorizations all 42430 personnel assigned to this wing with previous DCR Analysis experience are being assigned to the DCR Analysis Division. Records check on all assigned 42430 personnel did not indicate previous experience for any of the assigned personnel, therefore little would be gained by assigning these personnel to the DCR Analysis Section.

Section IV, RCS: AF - 125 October 1964



G.I.G.O.

The outer rootflight section "adjusted" a wing leading edge which had been discovered "missing" while in flight. Fortunately it was short.

The Jet Engine Shop, upon discovering a generator "missing" on a B-47, expended 3 hours "re-sting" and did not consider the job. Shall we order more paint?

Flight #1 expended 40 hours on a fuel fuselage which had "the defect"

we find also, that the Jet Engine Shop is now pulling the flight inspections on both type aircraft.

G.I.G.O. - Analysis and Summary: Section IV, RCS: AF - 125 October 1964

Section IV. RCS: AF-D25 October 1961

SAC Management Control System

H. C. S.

PURPOSE: The Management Control System provides a recurring standard and systematic procedures for evaluating the status and effectiveness of important functions and activities that contribute to attaining and maintaining combat capability.

OBJECTIVES: The objectives of the SAC Management Control System are to:

- a. Determine the status of important functions and programs in relation to command standards and goals.
- b. Evaluate the performance and progress toward attaining and maintaining combat capability.
- c. Relate availability and effective utilization of resources to the requirements of assigned tasks.
- d. Provide the indicators of problem areas which affect the command mission.
- e. Emphasize functions and programs that influence the command objectives.

PRINCIPLES: The principles of the SAC Management Control System are to:

- a. Measure items that should encourage better management and improved utilization of resources.
- b. Include items in the Management Control System only if they can be objectively rated (by statistics) rather than subjectively rated (by opinion).

c. Establish scoring tables that have difficult but attainable goals.

d. Items will normally not be included if the wing or base commander has no control over them.

e. Establish the approximate distribution of Management Control System points as follows:

Operations	45%
Material	35%
Personnel	10%
General	10%
Total	100%

The 509th Bomb Wing Maintenance Organization may earn a total of 1400 points for the current quarter. The graded areas are:

SCHEDULE CANCELLATIONS

a. This item measures the number of chargeable sortie cancellations from the "first sorties of the day" of the weekly aircraft schedule. The purpose is to encourage good planning and orderly execution of aircraft maintenance schedule. (600 Points)

SCHEDULE ADDITIONS

a. This item measures the number of first sorties of the day and turnaround sorties that are chargeable additions to the weekly schedule. The purpose is to encourage good planning and orderly execution of aircraft maintenance schedules. (400 Points)

DEVIATIONS FROM TAKE-OFF TIME



a. This item measures the number of aircraft utilized for operational requirements with actual take-off times that differ more than five minutes early or fifteen minutes later than the scheduled take-off time as reflected on the weekly 60.9 or added schedules. The purpose is to encourage good planning and orderly execution of plans. (100 Points)

SHOP REPAIRABLE PERFORMANCE

a. This item measures the effectiveness of the shop repairable program. The purpose is to encourage maximum repair of spares at unit level. (300 Points)

(All References from SACF 170-1)

SELECT LABOR INDICATORS



NOTE → REVISED REPORT

REPORT OF AIRCRAFT/MISSILE OPERATIONAL DATA								REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL					
ACTING ORGANIZATION 509th Bomb Wg				LOCATION PHEB N.Y.				AS OF DATE 1-31 OCT 61					
TYPE, MODEL, AND SERIES A	REG STATUS CODE B	FLOWN OR CAPTIVE FIRINGS/FLIGHTS C	ON HAND D	OPERATIONALLY READY E	TOTAL HOURS				NOT OPERATIONALLY READY FLYABLE K	NO OF ACFT LANDINGS OR MISSILE LAUNCHINGS L	INVENTORY END OF MONTH M	NO USAF/NO CMD USE	
					SUPPLY F	TECHNICAL ORDER COMPLIANCE G	PERIODIC MAINT AND INSP H	MAX FIRMATION CHECK DEFECTS OF LAW I				OTHER REASONS J	N
447E	CC	1997.45	35276	31419			860	294		297	45		
EC97G	CA	714:00	15600	13655			450	1495		115	22		

MANAGEMENT CONTROL DATA	PERIOD COVERED	PAGE NO	NO OF PAGES	REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL
	Oct 61			1-550-210 (RAF-1)
ORGANIZATION	SOUTH BOMBARDMENT WING (MED)			CURRENT PERIOD (Year Month Day Month)
	PEASE AFB			
ITEM		Set		AVERAGE OR TOTAL
		Points Accrued	Points Allocated	PERCENT
OPERATIONS (BOMB)				
1. Training Minimums		330	550	60
2. Bombing Reliability		575	600	96
3. Unit Reliability		594	600	99
4. Air Refueling Efficiency		347	350	99
5. Incentive Trainings				100
Total Operations (Bomb)		1836	2100	87.43

MANAGEMENT CONTROL DATA	PERIOD COVERED	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL
	OCT 61			AF-340-770 (CAF-1) PART 11
ORGANIZATION	SOUTH BOMBARDMENT WING (MED) PEASE AFB			AVERAGE OR TOTAL
ITEM	OCT			
B-47E				
MAINTENANCE (BOMBER)				
1. Schedule Cancellations-Percent Score				100
a. Chargeable Cancellations	1			1
b. Chargeable Sorties (1st Sortie)	238			238
c. Percent Cancellations	.420			.420
2. Schedule Additions - Percent Score				100
a. Chargeable Additions	0			0
b. Chargeable Sorties (1st & 2nd Sortie)	259			259
c. Percent Additions	0			0
3. Deviation from Take-Off Time-Percent Score				94
a. Chargeable Deviations from Take-Off Time	4			4
b. Chargeable Sorties (1st & 2nd Sortie)	259			259
c. Percent Deviations from Take-Off Time	1.54%			1.54%
4. Shop Repairable Performance-% Score				NS