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Operation Iron Bar, Brave Star, Rain Storm

Unclassified

H I S T O R Y

OF THE

4080D STRATEGIC WING

GOOSE AIR BASE

1 October 1957 - 31 December 1957

For the
Commander

The information contained in this history was compiled by T/Sgt James S. Henderson Jr., Historical Technician, 4080d Strategic Wing, 28 April 1958.

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

RM 58-5282

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CHAPTER I

COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

The Location:

Prior to World War II Labrador was relatively unsettled. The small white population was of Scot and Old English stock and there were a number of Indians and Eskimos. There were no industries in Labrador except the fur trade and the cod and salmon fisheries. The people were primarily trappers and fishermen.

Since about 1945 the country has been visited by many prospectors, surveyors, timber men and hydro-electric engineers. There have been discoveries of mineral deposits, and two pulp cutting operations were in the process of getting under way. A vast iron mine at Burnt Creek, on the Labrador-Quebec border was in operation and supported a mining town linked to the Gulf of St. Lawrence by rail, and produced the richest ore mined on this continent. Workable deposits of copper and uranium had been found and were expected to be developed in the near future. Grand Falls, twice the height of Niagara and with a four million horsepower potential was planned to be harnessed. Carefully planned agricultural experiments were also being made.

Happy Valley, a town that grew up adjacent to Goose Air Base was Labrador's largest community, and approximately 1500 people lived there. This figure was expected to double by late 1959. Happy Valley was Labrador's first incorporated township, and numbered among its population, Newfoundland, Mainland Canadian, French, German and Scandinavian families, as well as Labradormen.

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1. Information furnished by Town Manager, Happy Valley, Labrador.

The Labrador of 1957 presented a picture as follows:

The population of Labrador, not including military personnel, consisted of approximately 6,000 people, including about 400 Eskimos and 300 Indians. Newfoundland, which was geographically the smaller half of the province had a population of approximately 340,000. In Labrador the main source of income resulted from employment at Goose Air Base and the subsidiary installations along the coast. Iron, copper, and uranium mines were in the process of development, and one iron mine, pulp operations and a salmon fishery were producing. Proposed for the future were more mines, development of hydro-electric power and further timber operations. There was a total of 21 miles of roads completed, exclusive of the air base, and another 35 miles of roads were under construction. Travel was primarily by boat, dog-team, snowshoe, or bush aircraft. The climate was dry and clear with winter temperatures down to -40 degrees F and summer temperatures up to + 95 degrees F. Snowfall for the winter of 1956 was approximately 17½ feet but the normal was considered about six feet.[2]

Goose Air Base, Labrador, one of the largest airfields in the world was located on a large sandy plateau situated 53° 17' 30" North and 60° 25' West at the head of Goose Bay, approximately 140 nautical miles from the Atlantic Ocean.[3]

Construction of Goose Air Base was the result of an investigation by American and Canadian officials into the possibility of establishing an air route and area of defense for aerial transport service between the

2. Ibid
3. History, 6606th ABWg, Jan-Jun 1955

United States and England. This investigation began in 1941, following passage of the 1941 Land-Lease Act. Plans were made to use bases in Greenland, Iceland, and Newfoundland, with an intermediate base in Labrador for use as a stop-off point. These bases, with their outlying radio and weather facilities, were to serve three purposes; first, to provide necessary landing, staging and servicing points on the North Atlantic ferrying route then being developed: second, to have bases for carrying out operations against hostile submarines in northeastern waters: and third, to accommodate land-based area defense forces when necessary.[4]

The search for a suitable airfield site in Labrador was carried out at the same time by the Royal Canadian and U.S. Army Air Forces. The first recorded survey mission over Goose Bay, Labrador, was made by Mr. Eric Fry of the Dominion Geodetic Survey in June 1941. This expedition, which included an RCAF photo detachment, explored the eastern coast of Labrador in the area around Northwest river. As a result of the one-month survey, the present site of Goose Air Base was chosen, primarily due to the weather which was condusive to flying activities and the site's accessibility to ocean going vessels.[5]

An American survey team, headed by Captain Elliott Roosevelt of the USAF, was engaged in a search for a suitable airfield site during the same time that the Fry survey was being made. This team made aerial survey of a large portion of Labrador and Baffin Island, using B18A aircraft. The two teams agreed on the Goose Bay site for the same reasons.[6]

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Upon completion of the survey, the RCAF sent engineers to Goose Bay to formulate plans for the new airfield, and in September 1941, the Canadian Government awarded a contract to the McNamarra Construction Company for initial work on the Labrador site. The first supply ship docked near the propo[redacted] on 29 September 1941, and, on 9 December 1941, the first aircraft landed at Goose Bay.[7]

While basic construction work was being completed, U.S. authorities made plans for establishment of aircraft ferrying service from Moncton, New Brunswick to Goose Bay. On 31 January 1942, after two runways 3,000 feet in length had been plowed and rolled from snow, a contract was agreed on by the U.S. Government and Northeast Airlines for aircraft service from Presque Isle, Maine to Newfoundland and Labrador, with other landing points to be specified at a later date. The first USAAF officer arrived at Goose Bay in February 1942 to make plans for construction of a weather station. The first U.S. unit to be assigned to Goose Bay was an 8th Army Airways Communications System detachment, which arrived on 9 April 1942. This organization was followed by additional detachments from the 15th Ferrying Squadron, the 311th Materiel Squadron, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, the 94th Air Base Group, and the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps. By 5 June 1942, Colonel Albert D. Smith arrived to assume command of all assigned American personnel. At that time, the base had seven officers and 21 enlisted men assigned, with 24 enlisted men attached and 40 more awaiting transportation to Greenland or the United Kingdom.[8]

The first major change in unit organization occurred on 4 August 1942, when the 29th Ferrying Squadron was formed. The new unit of the

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

8th Ferrying Group consisted of all personnel previously assigned to the different detachments of the old provisional squadron. At that time, all USAAF units at Goose Bay were under the command of the North Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command.[9]

Aircraft ferrying operations began in June 1942 with the movement of aircraft and personnel from the United States to England for a build-up of resources. Although base facilities were relatively undeveloped, large numbers of aircraft began using the new airfield. From June to September 1942, a total of 662 tactical aircraft passed through Goose Bay.[10]

By May 1943, there were 51 officers and 686 enlisted men assigned to the 29th Ferrying Squadron at Goose Bay. This unit was redesignated the 29th Transport Squadron in June 1943 and was finally disbanded on 1 September of that year. All personnel assigned at that time were transferred to the 4th Detachment, North Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command. On 7 July 1944 the North Atlantic Wing became the North Atlantic Division of the Air Transport Command.[11]

In August 1944, the North Atlantic Division was reorganized and all former detachments were redesignated as Army Air Force Base Units. The installation at Goose Bay continued to operate under the North Atlantic Division until March 1946, when it was placed under the control of the Newfoundland Base Command. On 1 June 1948 the Newfoundland Base Command was assigned to the Military Air Transport Service, formerly known as the Air Transport Command.[12]

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.

In early 1948 the 1383d Air Force Base Unit was discontinued at Goose Air Base and the 538th Air Base Group was organized to take its place. This was the first Table of Distribution unit to be activated at the station. The 538th was made up of a Headquarters unit, Maintenance and Supply Squadron, and Air Base Squadron, and a Medical Squadron. This unit also had detachments stationed at Fort Chimo in Quebec, about 400 miles northeast of Goose Bay and at Frobisher Bay, on the southern coast of Baffin Island.[13]

The base at Goose Bay supported additional detachments at Padloping Island, off the southeast coast of Baffin Island, Cape Harrison on Labrador's northeast coast about 125 miles from the main base; Mecatina, located on an island on Lake de Mariben in Quebec, 127 miles southeast of the base; Indian House Lake, Quebec, 250 miles northeast of Goose Bay and 40 miles west of the Labrador and the Quebec border; and River Clyde, on the east coast of Baffin Island, near the head of Patricia inlet.[14]

On 1 August 1948, the 538th Air Base Group was redesignated as the 1227th Air Base Group. The 1227th Air Base Group was reorganized on 19 October 1948, and became the 6603rd Air Base Wing, having an Air Base Group, Maintenance and Supply Group, and a Medical Group. In the meantime, the Newfoundland Base Command was relieved from its assignment to the Military Air Transport Service and was known as the Northeast Air Command from 1 October 1950.[15]

The 6606th Air Base Wing was organized 1 June 1954 at Goose Air Base, Labrador, in accordance with authority and instructions contained in General Order 31, Headquarters, Northeast Air Command, 10 May 1954.

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.

This new major base unit replaced the 6603rd Air Base Group which was discontinued by the same authority. All personnel and equipment of the 6603rd were absorbed and utilized by the 6606th units.[16] The 6606th was authorized an initial strength of 115 officers, 1,298 airmen and 911 civilians.

Effective 1 April 1957, the 4082d Strategic Wing was designated and organized at Goose Air Base and assigned to Eighth Air Force. The 6606th Air Base Wing was discontinued effective the same date.[17]

The Commander of the 4082d Strategic Wing was responsible for exercising command jurisdiction over and administering such units and installations as might be assigned. The primary mission of the wing was to train a force capable of performing those base functions and services which were required to support SAC emergency plans and tactical training operations, provide air base and route support for units staging through or deploying from the assigned area; perform the duties of task force commander of the Goose Task Force; exercise operational control over all SAC units on rotation and all SAC crews which may land in his area of responsibility; provide facilities and services to non-SAC units, personnel and civilian contractors stationed or operating in his assigned area; in coordination with the Commander, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Station, Goose Bay, provide for local surface defense of Goose Air Base and other USAF facilities; exercises control of forces committed to the base defense plan; support responsibilities at RCAF Station, Frobisher Bay, and assist in the local surface defense of RCAF Station, Frobisher Bay, as may be requested by the Commander of the RCAF Station as prescribed

16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.

in applicable international agreements and USAF directives; support Canadian Government agencies in accordance with established U.S.-Canadian agreements and directives of Headquarters Eighth Air Force or higher headquarters.[18]

United States Air Force use of lands at Goose Air Base and Frobisher Bay was set forth in agreements between the Governments of the U.S. and Canada. Goose Air Base had originally been acquired by Canada during World War II, and the base had been a joint U.S.-Canada station from its inception. It has continued to be a joint U.S.-Canada base. In general the RCAF facilities were located on one side of the landing area, and the United States facilities on the other, so that there existed the so-called "Canadian Side" and the "American Side".[19]

Proposed Reorganization

In reference to the proposed reorganization of tactical wing and air base group structures, the 4082d Strategic Wing Commander felt that the "wing - base" organization should be reexamined. This was in view of the fact that dispersion of forces requirements would make the necessity for a completely separate staff for the tactical operation and another for the support function appear questionable. Additionally, the original "wing - base" organization was believed to have been, in large measure, an outgrowth of the mobility concept of its day. With the increasingly radical departure from that concept to the present alert tactics, the

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18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

need for a honogenous "housekeeping holding" force at the home base appeared largely negated.[20]

It was suggested that the single wing stations, or the equivalent, combine into a single monolithic organization using the Deputy Commander concept and a purely functional organization. The major duties of the Air Base Group Commander would be assumed by a Deputy Commander for Base Services who would have under his operational control the Transportation, Food Service, Installations and Air Police Squadrons. The Deputy for Operations would then control the Operations Squadron along with the tactical elements and use this addition in the training of combat crews and in supervision of operational elements of the airfield, communications, navigational aids, and other areas pertaining to operations. The Supply Squadron along with the maintenance units would be controlled by the Deputy for Materiel. It was belived this organizational alignment would provide excellent control, give required emphasis to the combat role, eliminate duplication of effort, clarify and functionally group responsibilities and affect a material saving in skilled personnel.[21]

With respect to the two-wing station, it was suggested that the Air Division absorb the present Air Base Group structure and provide from Air Division level those services required by subordinate tactical wings. In this case, the tactical wings would not include service activities, supply, and base-type operations services.[22]

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20. Ltr, Hq 4082d StratWg to Comdr SAF, "Proposed Reorganization of Tactical Wing and Air Base Group Structures," 14 Dec 1957. Exhibit 1.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.

The Deputy Commander concept was generally favored and was considered essential where command span of control was broad. Withdrawal of flight line maintenance personnel from the tactical squadrons along with assignment of aircraft to the maintenance organization was considered practical. It was, however, believed that the efficiency and effectiveness of this move would depend largely on the means used for identifying individuals or maintenance teams with the performance of specific aircraft or groups of aircraft. Should such identification be lost completely, it was believed that the improvement in quality standards possible from pooling the maintenance resource would be offset by the loss of individual or group motivation and pride of accomplishment.[23] Elimination of the individual aircraft crew chief was not favored.

The elimination of the periodic inspection and substitution of a running inspection was not favored. It was believed a complete and thorough inspection of the entire aircraft and its systems should be continued. Periods between inspections could be extended which would permit a more thorough and searching periodic without an increase in personnel.[24]

It was considered desirable to retain an administrative capability in the tactical squadrons even with the degree of centralization indicated by the proposed reorganization plan. The assignment of all personal to a unit command under the Deputy Commander for Personnel was not favored. This "mass" of personnel would seem to impose serious management

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23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.

problems. The elimination of squadron organizations was not favored either; however, pooling of functions to form larger and more flexible squadrons might be desirable.[25]

The first chart following this page indicates the organization considered the most desirable for this wing, while the second chart indicates the organization which would be the most practical from the point of view of personnel savings. Either would provide adequate organizational structure. The third chart shows the organization of the wing as it was during this period. That organization was considered inadequate.[26]

On 12 December 1957 General Orders were published effecting the inactivation of the 752d Air Force Band at Goose Air Base, Labrador. This action was to be effective on 8 February 1958.[27]

Effective 4 December 1957, Colonel Archie S. Hayes assumed command of the 4082d Air Base Group[28] replacing Colonel Irby V. Tedder. Lieutenant Colonel Frank Metheney assumed duties as Director of Operations of the 4082d Strategic Wing during this period and Colonel James F. Shilke became the Director of Materiel; Major Robert L. Hughes was assigned as Maintenance Control Officer; Major Alpheus M. Jennings assumed duties as Commander of the Operations Squadron replacing Lieutenant Colonel Clement B. Charbonneau, who became Food Service Squadron Commander. Major Ray W. Murphy was assigned as Commander of the Transportation Squadron.[29]

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25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. GO 70, Hq SAC, 12 Dec 1957. Exhibit 4.
28. GO 6, Hq 4082d ABGru, 4 Dec 1957. Exhibit 5.
29. Telecon, Wg Historian with WEOIC, Officers Pers. Sec., Apr 1957.

40820 STRATEGIC WING




4082D STRATEGIC WING
WING COMMANDER
DEPUTY COMMANDER
HQSQDC
ADJUTANT
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL
DIRECTOR OF COMPTROLLER
DIRECTOR OF PLANS
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL
22 D HELICOPTER SQ
ROTATIONAL SQ
4085TH AB SQ
COMMANDER 4082 D ABW
4082 D USAF HOSPITAL
PER MAINT SQ
DEPUTY COMMANDER
ISO
CHAPLAIN
HQSQDC
ADJUTANT
DIRECTOR OF SAFETY
SJA
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL
DIRECTOR OF COMPTROLLER
DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
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TRANSPORTATION SQUADRON
INSTALLATIONS SQUADRON
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
8TH AIR FORCE
WING COMMANDER
DEPUTY COMMANDER
BASE COMMANDER
DEPUTY COMMANDER

CHAPTER II

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

Authority was granted during this period for the 4082d Strategic Wing to submit to Headquarters Eighth Air Force a complete realignment of the total manpower spaces authorized, provided that the proposed realignment of Unit Manning Documents did not exceed the Wing's overall authorizations by grades of military and category within fund projects of civilians. Additionally, that table of organization spaces where currently authorized by grades of military and category within fund projects for civilians and spaces where currently authorized remained unchanged. The proposed realignment was to include all change requests submitted subsequent to the freeze on unit manning document changes which was originally imposed on 20 June 1957.[1]

The October 1957 authorizations, excluding table of organization spaces was one general, four colonels, 12 Lieutenant colonels, 39 majors, 78 captains, 51 lieutenants, and 15 warrant officers for a total of 200 officers. The authorization included 119 master sergeants, 176 technical sergeants, 451 staff sergeants, 629 airmen first class, 395 airmen second class and 18 airmen third class for a total of 1,788 airmen. The authorization for civilians included 30 G-458, 925 N-458, 2 G-478, 8 N-478, 2 C-020, 53 N-020, and 4 N-400 for a total of 1,024 civilians.[2]

Authority was granted for the hire of five positions requested by the Wing provided that hiring action of five N-458 positions in function

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1. TWX, Hq 8AF to Comdr 4082d StratWg, "Realignment of Manpower Authorizations," 7 Nov 1957. Exhibit 4.
2. Ibid.

code 43200 was withheld and the overall civilian ceiling was not exceeded.[3]

An intense on-the-job training program continued during this period. Frequent inspections were made in the operating sections and discrepancies noted were either corrected or the spot or recommendations were made for improvement.[4] Program status was as follows:

ON-THE-JOB TRAINING PROGRAM

	October	November	December
Number in training	448	384	344
Number tested	86	54	59
Number passed	65	45	49
Number upgraded	62	62	64
Number assigned with unauthorized AFSC not on O-J-T	5	3	4

PERCENTAGE	October	November	December	SAC GOAL
In training	100%	100%	100%	99%
Upgraded	13.4%	13.8%	16.7%	13%
Passed Test	75.6%	83.3%	83.1%	90%

Of the number assigned with unauthorized AFSC's in the first tabulation, one airmen was being reclassified in accordance with Air Force Manual 35-1, and waivers were not submitted on the remainder due to instructions from higher headquarters.[5]

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3. Ibid.
4. Interview, Wg Historian with Base OJT Officer, Apr 1958.
5. Ibid.

The following tabulation indicates average assigned strength as of December 1957.

Organization	Average assigned
Headquarters, 4082nd Strategic Wing	64
4082nd Consolidated Air Maintenance Squadron	457
4082nd United States Air Force Hospital	159
4085th Air Base Squadron	215
22nd Helicopter Squadron	178
SUB TOTAL STRATEGIC WING	873
Headquarters, 4082nd Air Base Group	325
4082nd Air Police Squadron	164
4082nd Operations Squadron	99
4082nd Installations Squadron	93
4082nd Supply Squadron	250
4082nd Food Service Squadron	121
4082nd Transportation Squadron	225
7th Aviation Depot Squadron	93
753rd Air Force Band	5
SUB TOTAL 4082D Air Base Group	1375
GRAND TOTAL 4082D Strategic Wing	2248
Rotational Refueling Unit	435
TOTAL SAC UNITS	2683
4732nd Air Defense Group	11
59th Fighter Interceptor Squadron	443
4739th Radar Evalution Electronic Counter Measure Flight	65
SUB TOTAL ADC UNITS (on base)	519
641st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron	284
TOTAL ADC UNITS	803
4733rd Air Defense Group	26
920th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron	130
922nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron	169
923rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron	157
924th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron	147
926th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron	124
SUB TOTAL ADC UNITS (off base)	753
GRAND TOTAL ADC UNITS	753

AVERAGE ASSIGNED STRENGTH REPORT (Continued)

Organization	Average assigned
54th Air Rescue Squadron	128
1932nd Airways & Air Communication Service Squadron	453
Det #1, North West Point	32
Det #2, Frobisher	25
1623rd Support Squadron	156
1876th Radio Relay Squadron	32
Det #4, 5th Weather Group	31
Det #11, 5th Weather Group	2
TOTAL MATS UNITS	859
Det #3, Office of Special Investigation	7
Det #4, 6th Postal Squadron	10
Det #7, 6th Postal Squadron	2
1031st Auditors (Air Force)	5
TOTAL MISC AF UNITS	24
Det #2, 7278th Transportation Terminal Command	48
Corps of Engineers	12
Other Army Units (attached)	—
TOTAL ARMY POPULATION	60
TOTAL NAVY PERSONNEL	None

Civilians Employed	On Base	Off Base
Appropriated Funds (Other than (American Nationals)	919	149
Non-Appropriated Funds	281	N/A
Department of the Air Force (American Nationals)	32	0
SUB TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE	1232	149
*Civilian Contractors	493	328
TOTAL CIVILIAN STRENGTH	1725	477

AVERAGE ASSIGNED STRENGTH REPORT (Continued)

Dependents	
Military Dependents	1309
Civilian Dependents	66
TOTAL DEPENDENTS:	1375
Transient Personnel	
Officers (Including Warrent)	190
Airmen	301
TOTAL TRANSIENT PERSONNEL	491
Miscellaneous Personnel	
Technical Representatives	15
Red Cross	2
TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS	17
AWOL'S reported for Month	0

Unclassified

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Operation Brave Star

On Operation Brave Star, the 90th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing deployed three RB-47E aircraft and crews, with necessary support personnel, to Goose Air Base. This unit was scheduled to perform weather recce functions for the air refueling of two deployments, and upon completion, were to redeploy the aircraft and crews to Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas.[1]

The scheduled aircraft arrived at this base on 24 September 1957 and the first sorties were flown on 25 September. A total of 12 sorties were flown during the exercise, with one late take-off and one air abort due to radio failure. One of the RB-47E aircraft, 51-15946, went out of commission on the first scheduled sortie and was ineffective for the entire exercise. It was replaced by aircraft 52-735 on 30 September and was returned to Forbes Air Force Base on 2 October. The remaining aircraft redeployed to Forbes on 4 October.[2]

During this operation, the chief operational problem noted by the unit was the matter of scheduling. The unit felt that the insistence of the Task Force Commander that each sortie be backed up by an aircraft and crew made it almost impossible to comply with SAC Regulation 62-19 on crew rest. In order to comply, it was usually necessary for the Detachment Commander to do a large portion of the preliminary mission planning. It was noted that this took him away from the flight line at a time when

1. W-27 Report, 90th Strategic Recon Wg to Comdr 4082d Strategic, n.d./[illegible]/, Exhibit
2. Ibid.

Unclassified

he should have been assisting the maintenance personnel in readying his aircraft for the mission. On this exercise the execution order directed the time of take-off of the first aircraft only, leaving the second take-off essentially uncontrolled take-off. This gave the Task Force Commander and Weather Scout Commander much more flexibility and was recommended by the 90th as a standard procedure. In the latter phase of the exercise, the second take-off was planned to overlap the first by one hour. With this one hour pad, it was necessary to back up the second sortie with an aircraft only, since in case of an abort, this crew could change aircraft and be off within 45 minutes, thus providing continuous weather scouting. This also relieved the third crew for mission planning duties. Since each exercise is different in terms of timing, weather, distance to refueling areas and other factors, only general recommendations were made by the unit; however, it was recommended that the Task Force Commander and Weather Scout Detachment Commander be given as much leeway as possible regarding take-off times, mission length, and other details of the operation.[3]

The Weather Scout Team reported that the only type of ATC clearance obtainable in the Eastern Canada area was a constant altitude. This was listed in the final report as hampering the mission in that the various tactical doctrines and Eighth Air Force Manual 55-1 on weather scouting could not be followed, and the value was greatly reduced which limited the capability and flexibility of the weather scout mission.[4]

The airlift for support of personnel and flyaway kits was provided the the 302d Air Division. Support personnel and equipment which was

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

scheduled to arrive at Goose Air Base not later than 0830 local time on 25 September did not arrive until 1700 local time. This required the launching of the first two sorties with only two crew chiefs and would have seriously hampered the mission had either aircraft required maintenance.[5]

Maintenance support for B-47 type aircraft at this base was considered very limited by the 90th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing weather scouts. Physical facilities were limited in that the assigned parking area was approximately one-half mile from maintenance control with no radio vehicle available. Support was provided by transient alert, which was considered unsatisfactory by the unit. It was noted that routine requests for power units, brake chutes, oxygen, compressors, and other items were delayed for several hours, and when delivered were often in unserviceable condition. When these matters were brought to the attention of supervisory personnel, corrective action was prompt and effective, but it was necessary many times to contact supervisory personnel, i.e., Chief of Maintenance, on strictly routine matters which could have been handled on a lower level. It was indicated that the Chief of Maintenance and his staff cooperated to the extent of their capability in assisting the unit.[6]

No spare parts for B/RB-47 aircraft were available. It was recommended that a stock level of spare parts be maintained at base supply commensurate with projected use of the base. In event this recommendation was not feasible, it was felt that consideration should be given to the assignment of a fourth aircraft to weather scout missions to provide a pad for unanticipated maintenance difficulties.[7]

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5. Told.
6. Told.
7. Told.

It was indicated that the troubles encountered by the Weather Scout Team were generated by the unit commander's refusal to accept the responsibility for the necessary tools and equipment available to him at Loose Air Base for the support of his mission.[1] Since the B-47 kit available to support the team was not utilized, the weather scouts were forced to rely upon transient alert, which was not equipped to support a unit of this nature in addition to its transient traffic, i.e., 324 aircraft arrivals and departures during the period when the weather scouts were at Loose Air Base.[8]

Operation Rainstorm

Operation Rainstorm provided for the rotation of the 40th Air Refueling Squadron to Loose Air Base for a period of 90 days temporary duty. All aircraft departed Schilling Air Force Base, Kansas, and arrived at this base on time. Immediately upon arrival here, a turn-around operation was staged. During the unit's stay at Loose Air Base, the primary operational requirement was to support Operation "Reflex Action", which was accomplished with 100 percent effectiveness. The 40th Air Refueling Squadron also participated in a unit simulated combat mission (USCM) during their temporary duty period at this base and completed their requirements with complete effectiveness. Redeployment of the unit was accomplished on schedule without incident. The squadron commander noted, upon completion of the training period, that, "The 40 ARFS was given outstanding support by the

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8. Ibid; Draft Comments on Operation Brave Star, located in D/ Materiel Files, n.d.

4082 Strategic Wing under the command of Colonel A. J. Beck."[9]

No operational problems were encountered by the 40th Air Refueling Squadron during the period and support from the base in this area was noted as being excellent. Aircraft were available to operations, due to what the unit termed "outstanding maintenance support." All higher headquarters directed commitments were fulfilled by the unit with no problems. Training during the temporary duty period presented no problems. The Goose Air Base facilities were utilized and found to be very satisfactory by the unit. The 50-24 Combat Crew Training, Phase II, was completed on all personnel accompanying the unit to this base.[10]

Maintenance and supply support for the deployment was excellent. Aircraft departed their home station and arrived at this base on time, all aircraft being in-condition upon arrival. Receipt of incoming aircraft presented no problems with respect to refueling, parking and minor maintenance. Cargo handling and unloading and processing of incoming personnel was considered adequate.[11]

Operation Iron Bar

The 4082d Strategic Wing Operations Plan for Operation Iron Bar provided for the air refueling support of the 321st and 340th Bombardment Wings on their deployment to and redeployment from the United Kingdom. Refueling was to be accomplished by the 2d Air Refueling Squadron which was on temporary duty at Goose Air Base.[12]

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9. Ltr, Hq 40 BomWg to Comdr 4082d StratWg, "M-27 Report (U) (SECRET)," 28 Oct 1957/CONFIDENTIAL/. Exhibit
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. M-27 Report, Operations Plan 39-57, Hq 4082d StratWg, n.d./SECRET. Exhibit

Unclassified

Operation Iron Bar was conducted during a period of eight days, from 26 November to 3 December 1957. Some difficulty was experienced in the launching of the first wave of KB-97 aircraft due to a severe snowstorm at Goose Air Base; however, exceptional effort and cooperation on the part of both flight crews and ground support succeeded in making the [illegible] effective. The mission was carried out according to plan without exception, other than the postponement of Waves II, V, and VI by higher headquarters due to weather conditions. Rendezvous and refueling procedures outlined in SAC Manual 55-10 were followed. Although no unusual difficulties were encountered in completing rendezvous on the exercise, it was considered that communications could have been improved. In some waves, cells were scheduled with the same communications/rendezvous plan, with rendezvous times less than one hour apart. Since these aircraft were using the same interplane frequency, some confusion resulted. Additionally, on the fifth wave, Second Air Refueling Squadron tankers assigned to the Country Club Ann refueling area had difficulty with overlapping ultra high frequency between their cell and another cell working another refueling area.[13]

It was recommended that different interplane frequencies be assigned to each cell when two or more cells are utilizing the same rendezvous point with rendezvous times less than one hour apart. This would avoid interference on the common frequency as listed in SAC Manual [illegible]-1. It was also believed that when two or more refueling areas within ultra high frequency and rendezvous range of each other are being utilized at the

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13. Ibid.

Unclassified

same time, the operations order should clearly designate separate communications/rendezvous plans to preclude interference.[14]

Following this operation, it was noted by the squadron that security was questionable when a mission of this magnitude was being conducted. The amount of activity on the flight line and the number of people moving about on the ramp made it difficult for guards or crew members to check every individual. This was found to be especially true during periods of severe weather which required full utilization of arctic wear.[15]

The 2d Air Refueling Squadron, on rotational temporary duty at Goose Air Base, lost 15:30 hours of flying time during December 1957 due to freezing rain and icy taxiways. Restrictive directives received by the unit during December included a SAC directive requiring manual turning of propellers prior to flight, and a directive stating that no KC-97 aircraft would be flown in excess of 145,000 pounds actual gross weight.[16]

During the month of December 17 individual refueling sorties were confirmed. Of these, eight sorties were airborne; the difference in the number confirmed versus number airborne being due to five receiver cancellations, one receiver abort, two tanker cancellations, and one tanker abort. Four of the sorties completed electronic rendezvous and four did not complete rendezvous. Two of these were due to rendezvous equipment malfunctions, one was due to a receiver abort, and one was due to weather.

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14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Air Training Report, 9 SAS T-12, Hq 2d ANDPS, Dec 1957/[illegible] Exhibit

Unclassified

Twenty-five mass night cell sorties were confirmed during the month and all sorties were airborne. Six of the sorties completed electronic rendezvous and 19 sorties completed multiple pattern rendezvous. The required fuel load was transferred by 21 sorties. Twenty Reflex Action (Day Cell) sorties were confirmed during December; however, only five were airborne due to higher headquarters cancellation of the remaining 15 sorties. Four of the tankers transferred the required fuel load and one receiver aborted, which accounted for the fifth tanker not transferring his fuel.[17]

Refueling accomplishments for the 2d Air Refueling Squadron for the month were as follows:[18]

Receiver Unit	Refueling Scheduled	Accomplished
321 Bomb Wing	25	21
384 Bomb Wing	2	1
380 Bomb Wing	9	2
376 Bomb Wing	5	1
26 Strat Recon Wing	1	1
306 Bomb Wing	5	0
379 Bomb Wing	5	0
305 Bomb Wing	5	0
308 Bomb Wing	5	4
	62	30

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

Unclassified

In addition, two tankers were scheduled for make-up receivers on 3 December 1957 and one additional sortie was scheduled by the tanker unit for maximum utilization of receivers on 5 December. Sortie losses in the preceding tabulation were due to three receiver aborts, 22 receiver cancellations, three tanker aborts, two tanker cancellations, and two weather cancellations or aborts.[19]

Training Programs and Facilities

Eighth Air Force Regulations 23-37, 23-38 and 23-39 assigned responsibility for air and ground training of SAC temporary duty units to the strategic wing commander concerned. To insure continuity of training and facilitate smooth transition from home base to temporary duty station for the rotational unit, the strategic wing commander was to establish and maintain a brochure of training aids and facilities at the base with respect to the requirements of SAC Regulations 50-[illegible] and 50-24 for bombardment, reconnaissance and refueling units. Detailed information concerning the existing and forecast status and capability of each facility was to be included. This brochure would then be furnished the unit scheduled for rotation to this base, who would in turn submit his program of air and ground training desired during the TDY period to the the strategic wing commander. The strategic wing commander would then prepare a training program for the unit and forward it to them prior to their rotation.[20]

As a result of a quality control inspection which was performed on

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19. Ibid.
20. Ltr, Hq 8AF to Comdr [illegible] Strategic, "TDY Training Programs and Facilities," 4 Oct 1957. Exhibit 9.

all aircraft assigned to the 4082d Strategic Wing, only the hours as indicated were flown during December 1957:[21]

C-47	138 Hours
SA-16	132 Hours
L-20	29 Hours
H-21	189 Hours

Permission was requested during December to turn back the following flying hours to Eighth Air Force:

C-47	277 Hours
SA-16	104 Hours
H-21	192 Hours

22D Helicopter Squadron

The 22d Helicopter Squadron had an index figure of six for overall readiness at the end of this quarter, which remained below the minimum acceptable for combat readiness. The limiting factors were low in-commission rate, insufficient pilots assigned and combat ready. The manning of the squadron with mechanics directly affected in-commission status. In the 431XO field body manning of the squadron reflected a shortage of nine personnel, or approximately 20 percent. Within the skill level structure, however, the squadron was approximately 40 percent short at the seven level. Sixteen of the 20 seven level personnel were crew members. On 1 December 1957, a unit manning document skill level revision to the previously authorized USAF Semi-United Organizational Table 1-37, reduced

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21. TWX, Hq 4082d Strategic Wg to Comdr 8AF, "Flying Hour Allocation," n.d. Exhibit 10.

the skill structure in the critical areas. As of the end of December, 12 additional helicopter technicians were scheduled to be lost due to normal rotation with the earliest available forecast for replacement personnel in March. Shortage of two authorized 42XX1 personnel could not be relieved locally.[22]

Equipment on hand in the squadron was up to 87 percent at the end of December. Of the 1,624 items not on hand, approximately 1,140 were hand tools of Federal Classes 5110 and 5120. Federal Classes 8405 and 8415 represented about 250 clothing items which were needed. Requisitions for all shortages were being processed. Shortages of sensitive items included four socket torque wrenches, two tensiometers, 16 six-man pneumatic rafts, three aircraft maintenance slings, and three engine maintenance adaptor kits (T-21). Supply difficulty letters on these items had been forwarded.[23]

Although a sufficient number of aircraft were possessed, the distribution was considered out of line with the authorization. These were as follows:[24]

Type	Authorized	Assigned
H-21	16	14
SA-16	5	9
C-47	2	1
L-20	2	1
TOTAL	25	25

22. Quarterly Operational Readiness Report, HQS: 1-AF-V2, 31 Dec 57. Exhibit 11.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.

The overall in-commission status for the squadron during the month of December 1957 was 46.0 percent. Five SA-16 aircraft were out of commission undergoing transfer inspection to the Air National Guard and one C-47 aircraft had been grounded for the entire month pending [illegible] on long-range fuel system selector valves and a complete quality control inspection brought about by accidents involving C-47 aircraft. Two H-21 aircraft located at Presbisner Bay were out of commission for the major portion of the month pending delivery of engines by C-124 aircraft of another SAC unit. Additionally, all H-21 aircraft were grounded during the last week of the month for replacement of control cables in compliance with technical order 1H-21-507.[25]

The status of aircraft crews in the Helicopter Squadron was as follows.

Type	Authorized	Assigned	Combat Ready	Shortage
H-21	16	11	11	5
SA-16	5	2	2	3
C-47	2	1	1	1
L-20	2	0	0	2
Total	25	14	14	11

The squadron was scheduled to lose five SA-16 aircraft in the coming quarter while gaining none which, coupled with the projected crew status was below the minimum required for combat readiness. The unit was projected to lose two and one half H-21 crews and to gain eight H-21 crews which would give them 16 and one half crews in the H-21.[26]

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25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.

Aircraft Accidents

On 4 September 1957, an L-20 aircraft was dropped while in the process of being loaded on to a flatbed truck. Damage to both floats resulted. A sling had been attached to the airplane lifting lugs provided on top of the fuselage. Thirty foot tag lines were attached to the floats at four points and one man was placed on each line to control the airplane and prevent it from swinging into the crane. The sling was then hooked to the crane, spreader bar inserted and the crane boom raised sufficiently to take up the slack. At this point, the spreader bar was also checked for slippage. The aircraft was raised to remove padding from beneath the floats to place it on the truck to protect the floats. The aircraft was then raised an additional one and one half feet to allow sufficient clearance for removal of the padding and the sling cables parted simultaneously and the aircraft dropped to the ground, striking two timbers that were placed under the padding forward of the floats.[27]

The sling being used was made of one-quarter inch cable with socket connections and had a breaking strength of 5,400 pounds per cable. Two cables were used to make the sling. The spreader bar was locally manufactured from a section of one and three-eighths inch conduit pipe with notched ends to receive the cables.[28]

Cause of the accident was due to the use of the wrong type sling and spreader bar. The proper sling had been requisitioned; however, it had never been issued and the requisition was apparently lost in base supply.

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27. Ltr, Hq 4082d Strategic Wg to Comair SAF, "Aircraft Ground Accident," n.d. Exhibit 12.
28. Ibid.

An inspection of all aircraft slings at the base was directed and any shortages of proper slings were to be immediately requisitioned.[29]

On 13 September 1957, an L-20 aircraft received major damage in a water landing accident at Unnamed Lake, Labrador. On the date of the accident the weather at Goose Bay and at Unnamed Lake was excellent with only scattered clouds and calm winds. On arriving at his destination, the pilot circled the area and elected to land in a southeasterly direction, adjacent and parallel to the shoreline and in the direction of the capsite there. It was the pilot's intention to use the shoreline and trees as an altitude reference for flare out purposed. However, flare out was commenced late and the aircraft contacted the water in a flat or slightly nose-low attitude. A loud noise was heard followed by veering of the aircraft to the right. Application of power and left rudder effected a momentary correction; however, realizing there had been float or strut damage, the pilot cut power and the aircraft came to rest on the beach.[30] All personnel evacuated with no injuries.

Inspection of the failed fuselage wire pulls revealed elongation of bolt holes to a size almost double the original diameter of the holes. The statement of two civilian mechanical engineers was to the effect that this elongation was progressive and had occurred over a relatively long period of time. It was their opinion that failure of these parts was inevitable and had only been hastened by the hard landing. The apparent defects in the float assembly on the aircraft caused great concern and an inspection of appropriate Technical Order indicated that instructions were inadequate. Specific recommendations were forwarded to the Air

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29. Ibid.
30. Ltr, Hq 4080D Stratwg to CINC SAC, 7 October 1957. Exhibit 13.

Materiel Command, and in the interim period, initial installation instructions were being followed for periodic inspection of the floats.[31]

Due to the nature and extent of damage to the L-20, it was found necessary to disassemble the aircraft and attempt to return the components to Goose Air Base. The wings, empennage components, engine, and propeller were removed and transported to Goose Air Base by H-21 helicopter. An attempt was made in October to transport the fuselage with float assembly removed, by means of the H-21 cargo sling. The fuselage was slung successfully, and the helicopter commenced the 50-mile trip to the base; however, approximately 20 miles from Goose Air Base, the helicopter cargo sling hook released and allowed the fuselage to drop from an indicated altitude of approximately 3,000 feet.[32]

Extensive aerial search of the area in which the fuselage was dropped failed to locate the wreckage. The extremely rugged and inaccessible terrain and the large area involved precluded other search methods.[33]

Subsequent board investigation failed to disclose the cause for the cargo hook releasing without actuation of either the manual or the electrical release system.[34]

Navigational Aids

A joint Goose Approach Control and Goose Area Control Center agreement was finalized, containing the procedures for the control of IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) traffic under the jurisdiction of the Goose Approach Control Unit. The Goose Approach Control Area consisted of

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31. Ibid.
32. Memorandum, Hq 4082d Strateg, 27 Dec 1957. Exhibit 14.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.

of the airspace extending upwards from 700 feet above the surface of the earth lying within a 50 statute mile radius of the Goose Range Station.[35]

Goose Approach Control was to provide control service to all IFR flights within the Goose Approach Control Area at or below a specified altitude released to Approach Control by the Goose Center and mutually agreed upon between the approach control and center controllers from time to time. This altitude would normally be the highest approved altitude occupied by inbound arriving aircraft. The Goose Center was to attempt to have all inbound arriving aircraft properly sequenced, time and altitude wise, for expeditious handling by approach control. Goose Approach Control was to have the final decision in determining the number of aircraft they could accept from the Goose Center at any one time, based upon traffic conditions, and the Goose Center was to stack and control the remaining traffic, if any, at a mutually agreed upon holding fix until they could be released to Goose Approach Control.[36]

At least 15 minutes prior to the time a clearance was issued for an aircraft to enter the Goose Approach Control Area, Goose Center was to coordinate with Goose Approach Control and determine the altitude, holding fix, control and transfer point, and frequency to be used. Whenever weather conditions were such that there was a possibility that an aircraft under Goose Approach Control jurisdiction might be unable to effect a landing, Goose Approach Control was to advise Goose Center in order that

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35. Joint Goose Approach Control and Goose Area Control Centre Agreement, n.d. Exhibit 15.
36. Ibid.

the Center would be prepared to issue appropriate clearance to alternate airport.[37]

The Goose Approach Control was to effect coordination with Goose Center prior to authorization of an IFR flight into the Goose Center Control Area. Goose Center was to issue instructions necessary to provide standard separation between aircraft under Goose Center's jurisdiction and departing aircraft. Goose Approach Control was then to add any further instructions necessary to provide standard separation between departing aircraft and other aircraft under Goose Approach Control's jurisdiction. Goose Approach Control was then to issue the coordinated clearance to the departing aircraft.[38]

Procedures for the transfer of control of aircraft by use of radar was to be developed by agreement between the Goose Center, Goose Radar Approach Control and the Goose Ground Controlled Approach Unit.[39]

A meeting was held in November 1957, for the purpose of coordinating Instrument Approach Procedures and discussing Air Traffic Control problems. The dissatisfaction of the Canadian Air Traffic Control agencies was expressed relative to the manner in which Instrument Approach Procedures had been presented to them. They had received proposed procedures from SAC, Air Defense Command, Military Air Transport Service, and Airways and Air Communications Service, and it was very difficult to determine which of the proposals were bonafide requirements. The Eighth Air Force representative at the meeting explained that the 40th Strategic Wing Commander

37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.

was responsible for formulating Instrument Approach Procedures for all United States military agencies. Therefore, any procedures submitted by agencies other than representatives of the Wing Commander were not to be considered.[40]

On 30 October 1957 seven Instrument Approach Procedures which had been established as a SAC requirement for this base, were presented to Canadian Air Traffic Control Agencies for their consideration. These were:[41]

Low Altitude Air Direction Finder Procedures

Low Altitude VHF Omnidirectional Range

Two Low Altitude TACAN Procedures

High Altitude Air Direction Finder/Instrument Landing System Procedures

High Altitude Air Direction Finder Procedures

High Altitude TACAN Procedures

It was determined that the Goose middle marker beacon was unsatisfactory for use as a terminal aid due to its low power output. For this reason, the proposed low altitude Air Direction Finder procedure was withdrawn. Headquarters Eighth Air Force was requested to initiate action to increase the power to 50 watts in an effort to provide this facility as a terminal aid. The high altitude ADF/ILS procedure was revised to use the low frequency radio range as a penetration fix rather than the middle marker as previously proposed. The Canadian representatives at

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40. Memorandum For the Record, Hq 4082d StratWg, "Air Traffic Control Procedures for Goose Air Base," 7 November 1957. Exhibit 16.
41. Ibid.

the meeting stated that they had not had time to study the proposed TACAN procedures and requested that these procedures be deferred for resubmission on a later date to allow for a study of capability of the equipment and approach techniques used. The remainder of the procedures were considered acceptable with minor changes and were being prepared for official submission.[42]

Motorola Corporation representatives and a representative of AMC arrived at Goose Air Base in August 1957 to install the MRR-4, Microwave link between the CRC-6B at 64lst Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron and the Radar Approach Control building. A meeting was then conducted with representatives from the Canadian Department of Transport, RCAF, and Air Defense Command to discuss what type of information was desired at the Radar Approach Control building, what could be furnished by the CRC-6B at the 64lst AC &W Squadron and the possibilities of the MRR-4 to transmit this information. All aspects of the operation were discussed and it was decided that the information desired could be furnished over the system. During the meeting, the 64lst AC&W Squadron Maintenance Officer raised the question of compatability of the MRR 4 system with the CRC 6B.[43]

Since the Motorola representative and personnel from the Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron both indicated that the systems were compatable, the 64lst AC&W Squadron Maintenance Officer was requested to research the matter further to determine if his request for the installation of an isolation system with the MRR-4 was necessary. The Air Defense

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42. Ibid.
43. D/F. C&E Off to D/Ops, "MRR-4 Memorandum For The Record," 3 Sep 1957. Exhibit 17.

personnel concluded that the MRR-4 would draw power causing an error voltage to be introduced in the CPS-6B Amplidyne Circuit causing a hunting condition with damage resulting to the CPS-6B. Further that this consumption of power would overload the synchro causing them to burn out, thus rendering the CPS-6B inoperative. It was indicated that the two systems could not be tied together.[44]

The MRR-4 was installed and made ready for an acceptance inspection with the exception that it was not tied to the CPS-6B nor was there an OA-99 scope in operation at the Radar Approach Control. The Motorola installation team was refused access to tie in the MRR-4 facility to the AC&W Radar facility.[45]

Headquarters Eighth Air Force queried the 64th Air Division as to why that headquarters concurred in this action which contravened the Installation Letter of Agreement which had been signed by a former commander of the AC&W Squadron.[46]

The 64th Air Division replied that work stoppage on the MRR-4 system was due to the equipment not being compatable with the azimuth servo system of the AN/CPS-6B radar at the 641st AC&W Squadron. Provision had not been included in the MRR-4 equipment to receive azimuth servo system data without interruption of the AN/CPS-6B azimuth drive control system. Since the letter of agreement stated that the installation would be on a non-interference basis, it was not considered that the action contravened the original agreement.[47]

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44. Ibid. 45. Ibid.
46. TWX, Hq 8AF to COMADIV 64, et al, DOC3 78255, "MRR-4 Installation at Goose AB," 26 Aug 1957. Exhibit 18.
47. TWX, Hq 64 ADIV to Comdr 8AF et al, ADMEL-M 26265, 30 Aug 1957. Exhibit 19.

It was also indicated that an identical situation would exist at Harmon Air Force Base, as regarded the non-compatability of the equipment. It was requested that action be taken to obtain the required modification to effect a permanent fix at both Goose Air Base and Harmon.[48]

Support of Cape Christian

During this period Headquarters Eighth Air Force was informed that the commitment for this command to air support Cape Christian could not be safely accomplished with the assigned twin-engine aircraft. The location of Cape Christian was such that it appeared the requirement could easily be met by the 4087th Air Transport Group, utilizing C-54 aircraft on a regularly scheduled basis. It was requested that the 4082d Strategic Wing be relieved from this comditment effective 1 January 1958.[49]

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48. Ibid.
49. TWX, Hq 4082d StratWg to Comdr SAF, DO 016148, "Support of Cape Christian", n.d. Exhibit 20.

CHAPTER IV

MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY

The 40th Air Refueling Squadron, on temporary duty at this station found maintenance and supply supports excellent. Supply support for the unit during their stay at this base was satisfactory as evidenced by an AOCP (aircraft out of commission for parts) rate of two percent. Approximately 80 percent of the items ordered by the unit through project Big Tin were received. Average delivery time for this material was 13 days.[1]

The unit indicated that maintenance support during the period was outstanding and that the flight line maintenance activities of the in-place squadron were exceptional. Specialists and support personnel accompanying the unit were effectively integrated into their respective base activities. The squadron was assigned two nose dock hangars at this base, one of which was used for dock inspections and the other for postflight inspections. In addition the squadron had access to one large hangar for retraction tests, weight and balance tests, and specialist work that required the use of a larger facility. The work area assigned was considered excellent by the squadron.[2]

On Operation Iron Sar, the 81 Air Refueling Squadron, operating from Moody Air Base during November and December encountered some difficulty when snow accompanied by high winds at freezing temperatures created an

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1. M-27 Final Mission Report, Hq 40th Bomb Wing to SAC, et al, 28 Oct 1957. See Exhibit 6, this history.
2. Ibid.

aircraft icing condition which taxed the capability of kill-frost and MB-3 trucks to the maximum. Quantities of kill-frost required to de-ice the aircraft necessitated the equipment being turned-around for a second trip. The slow rate at which the units could be filled from drums also added to the difficulty. During severe icing such as was encountered on this operation de-icing equipment is required for each aircraft just prior to take-off. It was believed that this would present a severe problem if all take-offs were spaced closely together.[3]

To alleviate this problem during the remainder of Operation Iron Mar, an P-6 refueling unit was utilized to service kill-frost on the ramp and an P-3 unit was used to service Freon when required by the KC-3 units.[4]

Project SEA FERD

At Goose Air Base, the scheduled utilization was for 80 tankers, 15 B-52's and 51 B-47's. The only varied authorization at this base was the possibility of 20 KC-97 and 20 KC-135's instead of all KC-97's. The base was designated in the USAF MPC document as a staging base only, although more SAC activity was scheduled through this base than any other of the Northeast bases. This staging designation of Goose Air Base had been presented to Headquarters USAF for change to an operating designation but had been disapproved. Goose Air Base was therefore authorized a Medium/Heavy Staging Basic Str. An arctic augmentation was authorized for 80 KC-97's, 60 B-47 aircraft and 15 B-52 aircraft. To support the

3. B-47 Final Mission Report, Hq 3d AREFS, n.d., see exhibit 7, this history.
4. Ibid.

Unclassified

bomber peculiar aircraft requirements, the base was authorized Appendix III, Column B (45 B-47 Medium Staging) and Appendix V, Column A (45 B-52 Pre-Strike) augmentations. To meet the tanker aircraft requirements, three times Column C, Appendix IV (1 Squadron KC-97 Staging) and the maximum quantity of items determined by a comparison between Column C, Appendix IV (1 Squadron KC-97 Staging) and Column C, Appendix VI (1 Squadron KC-135 Staging) were authorized.[5]

Goose Air Base was the only station in the Northeast Area authorized an Air Refueling Squadron (Fighter Bomber) Station Set. This set authorized the requiredBase Support Equipment items necessary to support a TAC Air Refueling Squadron deploying with its Unit Essential Equipment. Two times Part II of Equipment Component List 67-00-18 was authorized. Peculiar items of equipment, necessary because of extreme climatic conditions, were included. Arctic augmentation items required could be submitted to Headquarters SAC in accordance with SAC Regulation 400-8 for approval and forwarding to Headquarters USAF. Equipment Component List 67-00-3 assets had been authorized to fill this requirement where applicable.[6]

Military Air Transport Service Station Sets, ESL 67-00-4 were authorized to all Northeast stations; however, certain variance was authorized for each station based on type of aircraft and number of landings per month. All these bases were authorized Section I, Base Common Equipment; Section II, Common Aircraft Support Equipment; and Section IX, Climatic

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5. Report of Project Sea Wind Conference, Hq SAF to Comair 4302d Strat Wg, et al, 24 Oct 1957.
6. Ibid.

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Augmentation. Sondrestrom and Thule Air Bases were authorized this equipment for 51-150 aircraft landings per month, while Goose Air Base was authorized the equipment for 301-500 landings, and Harmon for 551-950 landings. Peculiar aircraft augmentations were authorized as follows: C-54 at Harmon for 51-150 Landings per month; C-118A at Thule for 0-50 landings, Sondrestrom for 51-150 Landings, Goose Air Base for 151-300 landings and Harmon 301-500 landings; C-124 and C-124C at Sondrestrom and Thule for 0-50 Landings, Goose for 151-300 landings and Harmon for 301-500 Landings; C-133, 0-50 Landings at Harmon. Section X, expendable supplies for support of MATS transport aircraft, was automatically authorized each station in the same columns as authorized for Sections I and II.[7]

Housekeeping Sets, SSL 67-96- were authorized all Northeast bases. A 500-man Set and a 250-man Set at Sondrestrom; a 2,000-man Set at Thule; a 2,000 and a 100-man Set at Harmon, and Goose Air Base was authorized a 3,500-man and a 1,500-man Set. Attachments 1, 3, 5, and 7 of SSL 67-00-6 were authorized for Goose as well as the other Northeast bases. Attachment 1 contained Basic Equipment; Attachment 3, Laundry Equipment and Supplies; Attachment 5, Building Equipage; and Attachment 7, Arctic Augmentation. Expendible supplies listed in Attachments 2 and 3 were to be used to establish reserve levels. Housekeeping sets were authorized to provide support for personnel who would deploy to the base after D-Day. Base complement personnel were to be supported both pre and post D-Day from Unit Allowance List assets.[8]

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7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

Unclassified

Unclassified

As of 15 December 1957, Project Sea Weed equipment on hand at Goose Air Base was as follows:[9]

Aircraft Supported	Command	Percent of Absolute Essential Equipment On Hand
KC-97 Tanker	SAC	65%
KC-135 Tanker	SAC	25%
B-47 Bomber	SAC	45%
B-52 Bomber	SAC	30%
Basic (Support All Aircraft)	SAC	86%
Arctic Augmentation	SAC	88%
C-118 Transport	MATS	100%
C-124 Transport	MATS	9%
Basic (Support All Aircraft)	MATS	61%
KB-50	TAC	33%
Housekeeping Set	All Commands	52%

Aviation Fuel

Listed below is the aviation fuel and aviation lube requirements for units of the Eighth Air Force and Second Air Force refueling from Goose Air Base for the periods indicated:[10]

Type	December	January	February	March	April	
115/145	442,000	490,000	611,500	661,500	547,600	Gallons
JP-4	2,100,000	1,597,000	1,246,300	730,900	0	Gallons
1100	4990	6,950	4,710	4,510	11,253	Gallons
1010 or 1105	0	25	0	32	0	Gallons
78 08	0	3	161	3	0	Gallons

9. D/F, Proj Sea Weed Off to ISO, "Info for Hist," 10 Apr 58.
10. TWX, Hq SAP to Comdr 4062d Strat Wg, et al, "RCS: S-35 Report," DMS ID/MTLAI/ 22 Nov 1957. Exhibit 21.

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In addition to the fuel requirements listed on the preceding page, 20 KC-97 aircraft were scheduled to stop at Goose Air Base on or about 4 December 1957, 20 KC-97's were scheduled to stop on or about 28 December and 20 KC-97's were scheduled to stop at the base on or about 2 April 1958. Each of these increments of aircraft would require approximately 80,000 gallons of 115/145 aviation fuel which was in addition to the forecast shown on the preceding page.[11]

Aircraft Out of Commission Rate

In December 1957 the Air Inspector indicated his great concern over the continuing high AOCP (Aircraft Out of Commission for Parts) rate experienced at this base. Experience indicated that the high rate was in large measure attributable to poor supply practices and discipline at unit level rather than simply a lack of support by the Air Material Command. It was believed that greater command attention at squadron level would aid in solving this problem.[12]

It was noted that aircraft reported as AOCP had been flown by the unit concerned; which led to the belief that there existed either a misunderstanding of the use of AOCP priority or gross indifference on the part of operating personnel.[13]

Since a high AOCP rate reflected directly on the operating unit, it was directed that the squadron commanders give their personal attention to the problem and analize the reason behind each AOCP.[14]

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11. Ibid.
12. Ltr, Hq 4082d Strategic Wg to Flying Sq's, "High AOCP Rate," 16 Dec 1957. Exhibit 22.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

Unclassified

CHAPTER V

4085TH AIR BASE SQUADRON
FROBISHER BAY

Assistance Team Visit.

A maintenance and supply assistance team from Headquarters Eighth Air Force visited Frobisher Bay and found that the supply support for the base was marginal. However, the supply improvement program appeared to be progressing ahead of schedule. Non-receipt and long delays were encountered in obtaining local purchase items from the Area Purchase and Contracting Office at Ernest Harmon Air Force Base. Most of the supply support furnished by the base at Frobisher was direct DEW Line support and, since this was supply precedence category I support, adequate funding had been available. It was recommended that Eighth Air Force initiate a complete program to aid in expediting all local procurement items purchased by the Ernest Harmon Air Force Base Procurement office.[1]

The base supply at Frobisher was hampered by both quality and quantity of covered storage space. Indoor facilities could not accomodate limited materiels handling equipment. The situation was aggravated when SUREC requisition receipts were received. It was indicated that a minimum of 8,000 square feet of base supply covered storage of standard storage space was required.[2]

Considerable improvement had been made in the unit supply program since trained SAC supply personnel had been assigned. However, lack of

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1. Memorandum, Hq 8AF to Comdr 4085th ABS N, "Assistance Team Comments and Recommendations," 17 Oct 1957. Exhibit 23.
2. Ibid.

appropriate publications, ECL's, manuals, stock lists, and other items was hampering the unit supply mission. Tools, tool kits, and ship equipment, most of which was local purchase, were urgently needed for motor pool and installation engineer shops. It was recommended that each operating section review with unit supply their authorizations, requirements and the substitutes on hand.[3]

The automotive maintenance facilities were inadequate for the quantity and type of vehicles maintained. A more systematical arrangement could have been made in the vehicle maintenance area; however, this would not have relieved the lack of maintenance shop space. Drainage was lacking, which caused water to freeze on the floor during the cold season. Heating was inadequate in the shop area, and arrangements were being made with Goose Air Base to furnish two large heaters for the facility. The space available could not accomodate the authorized maintenance equipment to be installed. During the winter season, disassembled vehicles on which maintenance was being performed had to be removed each evening from the inside maintenance areas so that emergency type vehicles could be placed in the heated area overnight.[4]

Lack of replacements for certain uncommercial reparable specialized equipment was causing an unnecessary maintenance work load. Among the items urgently needed was one L-6 oil servicing truck as a replacement for an F-3 truck, three D-7 Caterpillar tractors as replacements for an

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

inoperative D-8 which required major overhaul, and one M-62 Wrecker as replacement for an inadequate WW II vintage second echelon A-frame mounted on a truck. It was recommended that Eighth Air Force furnish assistance in obtaining and shipping these vehicles to Frobisher at an early date.[5]

Aircraft maintenance at Frosher was limited to servicing and turn-around of transient aircraft, plus the support of the 22nd Helicopter Squadron Detachment which operated from the base. Manning for the maintenance function was considered satisfactory but more tools, equipment and common bench stock items were needed. Items such as radio test equipment, a high stage air compressor for inflating struts, a limited set of sheet metal tools, one set of drill bits, parking wands, multimeter (PSM-6) soldering iron, ground lights for night work and a limited bench stock consisting of safety wire, gasket paper, "O" Ring seals, masking tape, nuts and washers were needed by the aircraft mechanics. Only one tool box was available for the 12 assigned mechanics. It was recommended that tool kits be procured as follows: four mechanics kits, one electricians kit, hydraulic mechanics kit, one instrument mechanics kit, and one airborne radio mechanics kit. A limited Technical Order Set was being maintained but was not complete and more binders were necessary. Arrangements were made by the team for Goose Air Base to furnish the required publications, tool kits, equipment and bench stock spares.[6]

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5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

The 22 Helicopter Squadron Detachment was found adequately manned and it was indicated that they were receiving the required support from the squadron at Goose Air Base. Of the three aircraft assigned, two were incommission and one out for control cables at the time of the visit. Certain additional tools were recommended for use of the detachment and it was recommended that a sheet metal mechanic be placed on duty with the detachment.[7]

7. Ibid.

Construction Equipment Availability

The Department of Transport resident at Frobisher Bay Airport had taken an inventory of all construction equipment available at that base in an effort to ascertain available equipment in place that could be utilized in pavement construction operations. Included in the inventory was USAF equipment SCAKWAF equipment and items whose ownership could not be readily ascertained.[5]

The ability to effect an early start of the construction effort at Frobisher during the 1958 season would depend upon the availability to the contractor of a maximum of construction equipment, from other USAF/RCAF own sources, since the contractor could not receive his equipment until such time as the shipping lanes opened — normally about July. Any such that could be made available was to be included in the construction contracts as government furnished equipment. It was indicated that due to the status of design and the necessity for contract status not later than January 1958, it was mandatory that the available equipment be transferred to the Department of Transport (Canadian), as the contracting agent, as early as practicable prior to formulation of advertisement documents.[6]

To gain the full advantage of the 1958 construction season, most expeditious handling was necessary. Should the equipment not be made available, actual construction would not commence until sea lanes were open, which would produce sufficient delay so as to preclude a planned two-year construction phase at the base. This would delay operational readiness of

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5. Ltr, Hq S&C Instl Liaison Offc, Ontario, Canada to 1702 SAS, "Construction Equipment Availability, Frobisher Bay," SCSLCF/, 3 Oct 1957. Exhibit 24.
6. Ibid.

Unclassified

Frobisher pending pavement completion until the fall of calendar year 1960.[10]

Headquarters SAC directed Eighth Air Force to take the necessary action as requested by the SAC Installation Liaison Office at Victoria Island, Ottawa, Ontario Canada.[11]

This wing was directed to account for the equipment and issue it to the Canadian Department of Transport. All equipment required by that agency was to be individually itemized in the contract and the contract was to stipulate the approximate duration of use of the equipment and the procedure for return to the base. For the purpose of establishing accountable control, the Supply Officer of the Installation Squadron was the USAF Accountable Officer for all vehicles and equipment to be issued to the Department of Transport. As the Control Officer, he was to insure that all vehicles and equipment issued were on a hand receipt basis to a qualified recipient and that all items issued were itemized in the contract.[12]

Trespass At Frobisher

In reply to a query from Headquarters SAC, it was indicated by Eighth Air Force that they had no knowledge of a second Mallory Team visiting Frobisher Bay to assist in cataloging of equipment spares and other material on hand at that base. A Mallory Team of two individuals had visited the station in June 1957 for the purpose of providing disposition instructions for certain excess unserviceable vehicles and allied equipment. This

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10. Ibid.
11. 1st Ind, to above ltr, Hq SAC to CONAD 8, "Construction Equipment Availability Frobisher Bay," SECRET, 15 Oct 1957. Exhibit 25.
12. 2d Ind, to above ltr, Hq 8AF to Comdr 4082d Strat Wg, "Construction Equipment Availability Frobisher Bay," SECRET, 5 Nov 1957. Exhibit 26.

Unclassified

was the same equipment which Headquarters SAC had directed be held for the coming construction season. It was indicated that other construction material and supplies were available at Frobisher Bay that might be of value to future construction. The materials were excesses from former contractors on the DEW Line and also some accumulated USAF excesses. It was recommended that an individual from the SAC Liaison Office for Installations visit Frobisher Bay with a proposed future bill of material to determine if any portion of the available excesses could be used on future projects. Frobisher and Goose Air Base were requested to cooperate fully in assisting the SAC Liaison Office in reducing the cost to the U.S. Government in future construction.[13]

Support of Resolution Island

In October 1957 Wheeler-Dorval indicated that they could furnish air support of Resolution Island from Frobisher Bay. The cost for this support furnished by an Otter aircraft would be based on a round trip of 478 statute miles at $1.35 per mile. The minimum monthly guarantee required by the company was $7,270, which they stated was necessary to cover the cost of the operation in the north. Positioning the aircraft from St. Jovite Quebec to Frobisher would involve a ferry charge of $1,866.80 based on 1,435 miles at $1.50 per mile. The same support by a DC-3 aircraft which would only be able to operate when an ice strip was available — normally mid-December to mid-May — would be $1.65 per

13. TWX, Hq 8AF to CINC SAC, et al, "Excesses At Frobisher Bay," D'S2 45125, CONFIDENTIAL, 12 Dec 1957. Exhibit 27.

mile with a minimum monthly guarantee of $15,000. Positioning and repositioning costs from St. Jovite to Frobisher would be 2,782 miles at $1.50 per mile, which was included in the guarantee costs.[14]

The Frobisher Commander considered the only feasible offer to be that for support of Resolution Island by an Otter aircraft. Another possible solution would be to support the Island by ship during the open water months of August, September and October; by paradrop or helicopter during the two months preceding and following this period; then by C-47 from Goose Air Base during the remainder of the year.[15]

RCAF Liaison Officer

When control of Frobisher Bay Airport was handed over to the Canadian Department of Transport on 1 September 1957, the Royal Canadian Air Force establishment was deleted and an RCAF Liaison Officer position was established. The RCAF Headquarters desired to know if a real requirement for the position existed and, if so, at what rank level.[16]

It was the opinion of this headquarters that a Liaison Officer representing the RCAF should be assigned to Frobisher. It was considered desirable that the officer be in the grade of Squadron Leader or above and that he function in a liaison capacity between the Department of Transport and the 4085th Air Base Squadron Commander.[15]

The Commander of the 4085th Air Base Squadron was instructed to utilize the RCAF Liaison Officer as an intermediary to effect any coordination with the Department of Transport.[16]

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14. Ltr, RCAF Goose Bay to Comdr 4082d StratWg, "Frobisher Bay - Liaison Officer," 3 Dec 1957. Exhibit 30.
15. Ltr, Hq 4082d StratWg to Comdr RCAF Station Goose Bay, "Frobisher Bay Liaison Officer," 10 Dec 1957. Exhibit 31.
16. Ltr, Hq 4082d StratWg to Comdr 4085th ABSQN, "Liaison Officer Frobisher Bay," 10 Dec 1957. Exhibit 32.

Unclassified

CHAPTER VI

SEVENTH AVIATION DEPOT SQUADRON

Operational Readiness

The quarterly operational readiness report of the 7th Aviation Depot Squadron as of 30 September 1957 indicated in [illegible] as follows:[1]

C-Overall Readiness	6
D-Manning	10
E-Capability of Personnel	7
P-Unit Mission Equipment and 538 Equipment	9
S-Readiness of Authorized Equipment	[illegible]

The regression in item C was due to a lack of trained personnel due to rotation and non-replacement of one loading officer; an inflow of untrained lower grade airmen in the loading section, and adequate training could not be accomplished due to insufficient aircraft for loading training. One aircraft per month was normally scheduled for 96 hours training duty at Goose Air Base, while normal training requirements called for a minimum of two aircraft to accomodate E, F, and/or G configuration for at least 96 hours per month.[2]

Although non-combat readiness was indicated in item C, it was the Squadron Commander's opinion that the EWF commitment of the unit could be fulfilled. The Eighth Air Force Evaluation Team rated three crews ready and five crews non-ready on configuration F and G; however, the Squadron Commander felt that six crews were ready and two crews were non-ready. A

1. TWX, HQ 4082d Strat Wg to 31 SAD & COMAF 8, "Quarterly Operational Readiness Report RCS: 1-AF-72, [illegible] 4 Oct 1957. Exhibit 33.
2. Ibid.

Unclassified

projected increase in indices was expected as a result of an accelerated training program, but this was contingent on arrival of additional aircraft for training purposes.[3]

A Unit Change report was submitted due to the receipt of Unit Allowance List 1101-4485 during December 1957. By 27 December 1957, 95 percent of the shortages of equipment were on requisition and the 100 percent completion date was established as 3 January 1958. In December 77.8 percent of the required equipment was on hand and the equipment on requisition was not critical and did not affect the unit capability. The squadron was capable of meeting the assigned commitments.[4]

As of 31 December 1957 the squadron readiness index was as follows:[5]

C - Overall Readiness	6
D - Warning	10
T - Capability of Personnel	8
F - Unit Mission Equipment and 538 Equipment	8
G - Readiness of Authorized Equipment	6

At the end of December, 1,066 items authorized on the squadron's new Unit Allowance List were not on hand. Of these, 886 items were in Class 17S. The shortage of authorized tools was the primary factor in the regression of the percent of equipment on hand. It was indicated that the ability of the squadron to meet its commitments did not justify providing the unit with priority over other supply actions.[6]

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3. Ibid.
4. TAC, Hq 4082d Strategic Gp (SAC), "Unit Change Report [illegible]: 1-AF-72," 28 Dec 1957, [redacted] Exhibit 34.
5. TAC, Hq 4082d Strategic Gp (SAC), "Quarterly Operational Readiness Report RCS: 1-AF-72," 2 Jan 1958, [redacted] Exhibit 35.
6. TAC, Hq 4082d Strategic Gp (SAC), [illegible] 1958, [redacted] Exhibit 36.



Training activities for the 7th Aviation Depot Squadron for the months of October, November and December 1957 were as shown on the following page.

DOE 6.2(a)

DOE 6.2(a)


DOE 6.2(a)


DOE 6.2(a)

Unclassified

31 December 1957

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

4082d STRATEGIC WING

NAME	RANK	POSITION
A. J. BECK	Colonel	Commander
WILLIAM C. ARMSTRONG	Colonel	Deputy Commander
FRANK MCSHENEY	Lt. Colonel	D/Operations
JAMES F. SHILKE	Colonel	D/Material
JOHN W. GORDON	Lt. Colonel	D/Personnel
ROBERT W. HANSON	Lt. Colonel	Comptroller
ROBERT L. HUGHES	Major	Maint Control Officer
SUMNER A. CHESEMAN	Major	Surgeon
MORRIS MALIN	Major	Intelligence Officer
JOHN J. EVANS	Major	Comdr, CAMS/DATAMATION
GEORGE N. PAYNE	Colonel	

4082d AIR BASE GROUP

ARCHIE S. MAYES	Colonel	Commander
ALAN L. BLUM	Lt. Colonel	Deputy Commander
ALTON E. WHITE	Lt. Colonel	D/Material
VERNON P. TERRY JR.	Major	Adjutant
DANIEL C. KUSHNER	Major	Comdr, Det 2.
WILLIAM M. LONG	Lt. Colonel	Comdr, 7th ABS
ALPHEUS M. JENNINGS	Major	Comdr, OPERON
CHARLES I. DAVIS JR.	Lt. Colonel	Comdr, SUPRON
CLEMENT B. CARRONEAU	Lt. Colonel	Comdr, FESVRON

Unclassified

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ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL (Cont'd)

NAME	RANK	POSITION
RAY W. MURPHY	Major	Comdr, TRANCHON
FREDERICK F. DEAN	Major	Comdr, AMON
ROBERT J. KALINA	Major	Comdr, HEADQUARTERS
FRANK G. LORD	Lt. Colonel	Comdr, INSTALLATION

C 14 December 1957

SUBJECT: Proposed Reorganization of Tactical Wing and Air Base Group Structures

TO: Commander
Eighth Air Force
Westover Air Force Base, Mass.

1. In compliance with letter, Headquarters 8th Air Force, dated 13 Nov 1957, Subject Proposed Reorganization of Tactical Wing and Air Base Group Structures, the following is submitted:

a. General Comment

(1) All organizational proposals appear to be based on the assumption that two or more wings will be assigned each station. In view of dispersion of force requirements it is assumed that this is not intended as a permanent arrangement. If this assumption is correct the requirement for completely separate organization and staff for the tactical operation and another for the air base support function appears questionable.

(2) The original "wing-base" organization is believed to have been, in large measure, an outgrowth of the mobility concept of its day. With the increasingly radical departure from this concept to present alert tactics the need for a homogeneous "house-keeping holding" force at the home base would appear largely negated.

(3) Among other reasons for the "wing-base" organization were (1) the desire to free the tactical commander of concern over the support function, and (2) the avoidance of time consuming actions required of base commanders by law. It is believed that time and testing has proved that the senior commander must be cognizant of all phases of his operation and that the wing-base organization does not relieve him of concern or responsibility in the support area. Additionally, the requirements actually imposed by law are relatively minor and not overly time consuming.

(4) In view of the above it appears that the "Wing-Base" organization and staffing relationship should be re-examined.

(5) It is suggested that single wing stations, or the equivalent, combine into a single monolithic organization using the Deputy Commander concept and a purely functional organization. The major duties of the Air Base Group Commander would be assumed by a Deputy Commander for Base Services who would have under his operational control the Transportation, Food Service, Installations and Air Police Squadrons. The Deputy for Operations would then control the Operations Squadron along with the tactical elements and use this addition in the training of combat crews and in supervision of operational elements of the airfield,

communications, navaids, etc. The Supply Squadron along with the Maintenance units would be controlled by the Deputy for Materiel. It is believed this organizational alignment will provide excellent control; give required emphasis to the combat role; eliminate duplication of effort; clarify and functionally group responsibilities and effect a material saving in skilled personnel.

(6) With respect to two wing station it is suggested the Air Division absorb the present Air Base Group structure and provide from Air Division level those services required by subordinate tactical wings. In this case the tactical wings would not include service activities, supply and base-type operations services.

b. Specific Comment and Recommendation

(1) The Deputy Commander concept is generally favored and is considered essential where command span of control is broad.

(2) Withdrawal of flight line maintenance personnel from the tactical squadrons along with assignment of aircraft to the Maintenance Organization is practical. The efficiency and effectiveness of this move will depend largely on the means used for identifying individuals or maintenance teams with the performance of specific aircraft or groups of aircraft. Should such identification be lost completely, it is believed that the improvement in quality standards possible from pooling the maintenance resource will be offset by the loss of individual or group motivation and pride of accomplishment.

(3) See (2) above.

(4) Elimination of the individual crew chief is not favored. Reasoning is essentially the same as in (2) above.

(5) Subject to examination of test results, elimination of the periodic inspection and substitution of a running inspection is not favored. It is believed a complete and thorough inspection of the entire aircraft and its systems should be continued. The above does not preclude extending periods between inspections will permit a more thorough and searching periodic without an increase in personnel.

(6) The Little Rock Plan (Plan #2) is favored in the Materiel area, however; Deputy for Maintenance title should be changed. It is suggested that the Director of Supply be dropped from the Wing Commander's staff and this function included under the changed title of Deputy Commander for Materiel. It is believed these functions are so closely related that any separation or division tends toward confusion and delay in attaining the desired end product; quality aircraft. Use of Chief of Maintenance is not sufficiently in either plan to afford a basis for comment.

(7) The material provided does not provide sufficient information on which to base complete comment. Assuming Standardization and Air Crew Quality are synonymous and Operations Plans and Combat Operations perform similar functions, Plan #1 and #2 provide essentially the same functional breakdown. Neither plan reflects establishment of Safety as a Division, Branch, or Section. It is suggested that Safety remain a Directorate.

(8) It is considered desirable to retain an administrative capability in the Tactical squadrons even with the degree of centralization dictated by Plan #2 (Little Rock AFB).

(9) The elimination of squadron organizations is not favored; however, pooling of functions to form larger and more flexible squadrons may be desirable.

(10) The assignment of all personnel to a unit command under the Deputy Commander for Personnel is not favored. This "mass" of personnel would seem to impose serious management problems. The details of the Little Rock Plan are not spelled sufficiently to permit a clear understanding of the supervisory chain employed.

(11) The functional alignment under the Deputy Commander for Services in the Little Rock Plan is considered desirable. However, the comment in b (9) above applies.

(12) The consolidation of tactical unit supply activities is favored. This is a practical and highly desirable move from the point of view of personnel savings as well as general efficiency.

2. Attached as Incls 1 and 2 are proposed organization for the 4062d Strategic Wing presented to the SAC-USAF Manpower Survey Team who visited this station 26 Nov to 27 Nov 57. The organization presented by Inclosure 1 is considered most desirable; while that of Inclosure 2 the most practical from the point of view of personnel savings. Either provides adequate organizational structure. The present organization of the 4062d Strategic Wing is shown in Inclosure 3 and is considered inadequate.

3 Incls
a/s

A. J. HUGH
Colonel, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

[signature]
Capt USAF

2

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
United States Air Force
Offutt Air Force Base
Nebraska

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 70)

12 December 1957

SECTION

I. REORGANIZATION OF UNITS OF THE 11TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY, AND CERTAIN OTHER USAF UNITS. 1. Effective 8 March 1958, the following units are reorganized, as indicated:

UNIT	ORGANIZATION TABLE COMPOSITION
Headquarters, 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy	OT 2502, 31 December 1955, paragraphs 1 and 2c, part I (part IIC)
11th Armament-Electronics Maintenance Squadron	OT 2234A, 31 December 1955, paragraphs 1 and 2e, part I (part IIC)
11th Field Maintenance Squadron	OT 3374F, 31 December 1955, paragraphs 1 and 2c, part I (part IIC)
11th Periodic Maintenance Squadron	OT 4544A, 31 December 1955, paragraphs 1 and 2e, part I (part IIC)
96th Air Refueling Squadron, Heavy	OT 1554, 31 December 1955, paragraphs 1 and 2b, part I (part IIB)

2. Unit manning documents will be prepared in accordance with Strategic Air Command Regulation 28-1. The table of organization portion of these documents will reflect strengths as contained in the Strategic Air Command Manning Authorization Program.

3. Equipment is authorized by letter cited in paragraph 5, below, and/or separate instructions furnished by this headquarters.

4. Appropriate remark will be entered in the organizational status table of the morning report in accordance with Air Force Manual 171-6, as amended.

5. Authority: Letter, Department of the Air Force, AFOMO 583k, subject: Reorganization of the Headquarters, 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, and Certain Other USAF Units, 1 November 1957.

II. INACTIVATION OF CERTAIN AIR FORCE BANDS. 1. Effective 8 February 1958, the following Air Force bands, at stations indicated are inactivated and revert to the control of the Department of the Air Force:

524th Air Force Band, Loring Air Force Base, Maine
537th Air Force Band, Schilling Air Force Base, Kansas
540th Air Force Band, Brize Norton RAF Station, England
585th Air Force Band, Carswell Air Force Base, Texas

Air Force-SAC, Offutt

611th Air Force Band, Walker Air Force Base, New Mexico
612th Air Force Band, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota
753d Air Force Band, Goose Air Base, Labrador

2. Personnel rendered surplus by this action will be absorbed to the maximum extent by the units reorganized in section III below, and/or disposed of in accordance with instructions that may be furnished by this headquarters.

3. Equipment rendered surplus by this action will revert to stock to fill present and future requirements. Musical instruments will be reported to the Office of Bands and Music, Office of Information Services, SAFS, Washington 25, D. C., and to the Shelby Air Force Depot, Shelby, Ohio, and held at the base pending distribution instructions.

4. Organization records and unit funds will be disposed of in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 23, Air Force Manual 181-5, 1 July 1956, and Air Force Regulation 176-2.

5. Concurrently with inactivation of the above units, assigned unit authorization lists are voided.

6. Appropriate remark will be entered in the organizational status table of the morning report in accordance with Air Force Manual 171-6, as amended.

7. Authority: Headquarters USAF message AFOMO-M-1 108373, 1 November 1957.

III. REORGANIZATION OF CERTAIN AIR FORCE BANDS. 1. Effective 8 February 1958, the following Air Force bands are reorganized under organization table 2117, 30 June 1957, as indicated:

UNIT	ORGANIZATION TABLE COMPOSITION
823d Air Force Band	Paragraphs 1 and 2, part I (part IIC)
702d Air Force Band	Paragraphs 1 and 2, part I (part IID, less 1 Officer, plus 1 Warrant Officer)

2. Unit manning documents will be prepared in accordance with Strategic Air Command Regulation 26-1, with the organization table portion reflecting strengths as contained in the Strategic Air Command Manning Authorization Program.

3. Equipment is authorized by message cited in paragraph 5, below, and/or any separate instructions furnished by this headquarters.

4. Appropriate remark will be entered in the organizational status table of the morning report in accordance with Air Force Manual 171-6, as amended.

5. Authority: Headquarters USAF message, AFOMO-M-1 108373, 1 November 1957.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND OFFICIAL

FORREST A. BRANDT
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
M
plus
30 HEDUSAF, DIR ADM SVCS, ATTN: PUB DIV

HEADQUARTERS
4082D AIR BASE GROUP (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 677, New York, N.Y.

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 6)

4 December 1957

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, as amended, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 4082D Air Base Group, effective this date.

/s/t ARCHIE S MAYES
Colonel, USAF
Commander

DISTRIBUTION
A

A TRUE COPY:

JOHN A. KINZER
Captain USAF

FROM: COMAF 8 WEST VA

TO: [illegible]

UNCLAS/EFT /[illegible] FILE 64762

SUBJECT: [illegible]. REFS: [illegible] 64727 DATED 18 OCT 1957 AND [illegible] 15202 DATED 27 OCT 57. THIS IS IN TWO PARTS. [illegible] 1. [illegible] GIVES IT FOR AID TO [illegible] M-458 MORTARS TO [illegible] CIVILIAN [illegible].

PART II. REF A IS [illegible] BY MARSHALLS AND CAN BE TO [illegible] OCT DATED 11 [illegible] 1957. [illegible] REF B, [illegible] 64727, 18 OCT [illegible] 1957, [illegible] TO THIS GOVERNMENT'S [illegible] PROVIDE: (a) [illegible] OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION [illegible] PROVIDING OF GIFTS AID. () T/O [illegible] OF MILITIA AND GENDARMERIE [illegible] [illegible] 1 [illegible] 1 [illegible] REF A, PARAGRAPH [illegible] 15202, 27 OCT 57 [illegible] CHANGE WHICH WOULD [illegible] 20 JUNE 1957. [illegible] FOR OFFICERS 1957 [illegible] 4 SQUADRONS, 12 [illegible], 39 [illegible], 78 [illegible], 51 [illegible], 15 [illegible] 305 62+ 10 A33, [illegible] 2 C-624, 53 H-62, 4 [illegible].

7/17352 NOT [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

A TRUE COPY:

[illegible]

Capt [illegible]

Unclassified

HEADQUARTERS
90TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING, M
Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas

FINAL MISSION REPORT

FOR

GOOSE AIR BASE WEATHER SCOUT TEAM

FOR

EIGHTH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS PLAN

26A-57, DIRECTIVE #2 "BRAVE STAR"

Unclassified

Unclassified

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISTRIBUTION:

CINCSAC	1
COMAF 8	2-5
COMSTRATWG(SAC) 4081st	6
COMSTRATWG(SAC) 4082d	7-8
COMAIRDIV 802	9
COMAIRDIV 21	10-11
COMSTRATRECONWG 90	12-14

Unclassified

Unclassified

SECTION I

NARRATIVE

The 90th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing's portion of Operation "Brave Star" consisted of deploying three (3) RB-47E aircraft and crews, with necessary support personnel, to Goose Air Base, Canada, performing weather scout functions for air refueling of two (2) deployments, and redeploying the aircraft and crews to Forbes Air Force Base. All RB-47E aircraft arrived at Goose Air Base on 24 September 1957 as scheduled. The first sorties were flown on 25 September 1957. A total of twelve (12) sorties were flown during the exercise, with one (1) late take-off, and one (1) air abort for radio failure. Aircraft 51-15846 went out of commission on the first scheduled sortie and was ineffective for the entire exercise. It was replaced by aircraft 52-756 on 30 September 1957. Aircraft 51-15846 was redeployed to Forbes Air Force Base on 2 October 1957 and all other aircraft on 4 October 1957.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

No major personnel problems were encountered, however, almost all airmen drew partial pay at Goose Air Base. It is recommended that advance per diem be paid prior to departure on future exercises. (UNCLASSIFIED)

SECTION III

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. The chief operational problem encountered was the matter of scheduling. The insistence of the Task Force Commander that each sortie be backed up by an aircraft and crew makes it almost impossible to comply with SAC Regulation 62-19 on crew rest. In order to comply, it is usually necessary for the Detachment Commander to do a large portion of the preliminary mission planning. This takes him away from the flight line at a time when he should be assisting the maintenance personnel in readying his aircraft for the mission. On this exercise the execution order directed the time of takeoff of the first aircraft only, leaving the second takeoff essentially an uncontrolled takeoff. This gives the Task Force Commander and Weather Scout Commander much more flexibility and is recommended as a standard procedure. In the latter phase of the exercise, the second takeoff was planned to overlap the first by one hour. With this one hour pad, it was necessary to back up the second sortie with an aircraft only, since in case of an abort, this crew could change aircraft and be off within forty-five (45) minutes, thus providing continuous weather scouting. This also relieves the third crew for mission planning duties. Since each exercise is different in terms of timing, weather, distance to refueling areas, etc., only general recommendations can be made. It is recommended that the Task Force Commander and Weather Scout Detachment Commander be given as much leeway as possible regarding takeoff times, mission length, etc.

2. In the Eastern Canada area, the only type of ATC clearance obtainable was a constant altitude. This seriously hampered weather scouting in two (2) ways: [ ]

a. It was impossible to follow the procedures outlined in the various tactical doctrines and Eighth Air Force Manual 55-1 on weather scouting. For example: At 15,000 constant altitude the aircraft might be in an overcast and reporting unfavorable weather for refueling when the tops of the clouds might be at 17,000 with perfect conditions above. [ ]

b. At 15,000 the range is greatly reduced which limits the capability and flexibility of the weather scout mission. [ ]

SECTION IV

LOGISTICS

1. Airlift for the support of personnel and flyaway kits was to be provided by the 802d Air Division as per Operations Plan 26A-57, Directive Number 2, and was to arrive at Goose Air Base not later than 0830 local time on 25 September 1957. The support personnel did not arrive at Goose Air Base until 1800 local time on 25 September 1957. This required launching the first two (2) sorties with only two (2) crew chiefs and would have seriously hampered the mission had either aircraft required maintenance. Stronger emphasis must be placed on positioning support personnel in place at least one day prior to the first sortie and the organization responsible to airlift support personnel by Eighth Air Force Operations Order adhere to the timings and schedule.

2. Maintenance support for B-47 type aircraft is very limited. Physical facilities are limited in that the assigned parking area was approximately one-half mile from maintenance control with no radio vehicle available. Support was provided by transient alert, which proved to be unsatisfactory. Routine requests for power units, brake chutes, oxygen, compressors, etc., were delayed for several hours and when delievered were often in unserviceable condition. When these matters were brought to the attention of supervisory personnel, corrective action was prompt and effective, but it was necessary many times to contact supervisory personnel, i.e., Chief of Maintenance, on strictly routine matters which could have been handled on a lower level. The Chief of Maintenance and his staff

cooperated to the extent of their capability. Conversation with the Chief of Maintenance, Goose Air Base, indicates that action is underway to correct the above listed deficiencies by:

a. Re-organizing the transient alert section. (U)

b. Assigning a different parking area to RB-47E weather scouts. (U)

c. Assigning a radio vehicle to the weather scout detachment. (U)

3. No spare parts for B/RB-47 aircraft were available. Recommend that a stock level of spare parts be maintained at Base Supply commensurate with projected use of this facility. The fly-away kit of necessity contains a bare minimum of parts. If the above recommendation is not feasible, consideration should be given for the assignment of a fourth aircraft to weather scout missions to provide a pad for unanticipated maintenance difficulties.

4. The weather scout maintenance team composition should be changed to delete one (1) bomb-nav "K" systems mechanic, AFSC 32150E, and to add one (1) automatic pilot specialist, AFSC 42350R. For weather scouting only search radar is required and one (1) technician is adequate. The present weather scout plan does not include a qualified N-1 compass specialist who is badly needed.

SECTION V

SECURITY

Security was adequate. (UNCLASSIFIED)

SECTION VI

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended. (UNCLASSIFIED)

a. That one (1) combat "K" systems mechanic, AFSC 32150E, be deleted and one (1) automatic pilot specialist, AFSC 42352R, for N-1 compass maintenance be added to the weather scout maintenance team. (U)

b. That the execution order for weather scout missions assign the first takeoff time only, leaving subsequent takeoff times to the discretion of the Task Force Commander. (U)

c. That the headquarters publishing the execution order make every effort to obtain block altitudes so that the procedures outlined in Eighth Air Force Manual 55-1 can be followed.

d. That support personnel and flyaway kits be in place at least by the time of arrival of the first RB-47.

e. That a maintenance plan for weather scouts at Goose Air Base be established and strictly followed to preclude unnecessary delays due to lack of coordination. (U)

f. That B/RB-47 spare parts be stocked at bases where the aircraft is to be utilized.

g. That at least four (4) aircraft and crews be sent on weather scout missions if adequate spare parts are not available for stocking these bases.

HEADQUARTERS
2D AIR REFUELING SQUADRON
United States Air Force
Goose Air Base, Lab.

Part III of

Air Training Report for December 1957

RCS: 9 SAC T-12

Unclassified

(2) (a) Hours flown performing missions ordered by higher headquarters: None

(b) Test Hops:

1. Number of sorties: 14

2. Hours flown: 21:25

(c) Weather or local conditions:

1. 15:30 hours lost due to freezing rain and icy taxiways.

(d) Restrictive directives:

1. SAC Message DM4011-259163, dated 3 August 1956, requiring magnaflux of propellers prior to flight.

2. SAC Message DO 1842, 9 July 1956, directed that no KC97 would be flown in excess of 155,000 lbs. actual gross weight.

(e) Crew data:

1. Combat crewmember gains and losses:

a. Combat crewmembers gained:

Aircraft Commanders: 0

Pilots: 2

Navigators: 1

Flight Engineers: 0

Radio Operators: 0

Boom Operators: 2

b. Combat crewmembers lost:

Aircraft Commanders: 1, returned to spare status

Pilots: 3, 1 PCS to SES, 2 separated from the service

Navigators: 2, 1 to spare status, 1 separated from service

Flight Engineers: 1, PCS to MAAS

Radio Operators: 1, to spare status

Boom Operators: 3, 2 to spare status, 1 DNIF for indefinite period with possible grounding.

Unclassified

0091

Unclassified

2. Crewmember changes:

Aircraft Commanders: 2

Pilots: 3

Navigators: 5

Flight Engineers: 1

Radio Operators: 3

Boom Operators: 3

3. New Crews: None

4. Incomplete Combat Maintenance Crews: N/A

5. Crew status changes:

a. T-34 disbanded 16 December 1957; flight engineer PCS to MEAF, no replacement available.

6. Standardization crews:

Crew No.	Date assigned to duty
T-42	25 October 1956
T-16	31 October 1956
T-43	25 October 1956

(f) Refueling data:

1. Individual sorties.

a. Number of refueling sorties confirmed: 17

b. Number of sorties airborne: 8 (5 rcvr canx, 1 rcvr abort, 2 tanker canx, 1 tanker abort)

c. Number of sorties completing electronic rendezvous: 4

d. Number of tanker sorties completing electronic rendezvous on double refueling missions: 0

e. Number of sorties not completing rendezvous: 4

No Attempt: 2 (1 rcvr abort, 1 due to weather)

Rendezvous Equipment Malfunction: 2

f. Number of sorties transferring required fuel: 5

g. Number of tanker sorties transferring required fuel on double refueling missions: 0

h. Number of sorties failing to transfer required fuel: 3

No attempt: 3

i. Remarks: None

Unclassified

Unclassified

2. Mass Night Cell sorties.

a. Number of refueling sorties confirmed: 25

b. Number of sorties airborne: 25

c. Number of sorties completing electronic rendezvous: 6
(plus 18 Multiple Pat. Rendz)

d. Number of sorties completing electronic rendezvous on double refueling missions: 0

e. Deleted

f. Number of sorties transferring required fuel: 21

g. Number of sorties transferring required fuel on double refueling missions: 0

h. Deleted

i. Remarks: Day Cell missions under Reflex Action are shown in paragraph (h)2 below.

3. Fuel transferred: 1,155,150 pounds

(g) Material and personnel problems: None

(h) Comments or recommendations of unit commander:

1. Reference message from 2nd AD (RCO, subject: Navigation replots and Critique program, dated 4 June 1957:

a. Total number of navigation legs which were replotted and critiqued with crew members of combat ready crews: 0

b. Number of navigation legs replotted and critiqued for non combat-ready crew members: 0

c. Total spares in student status: 8

2. Refueling data for Reflex Action (Day Cell):

a. Refueling sorties confirmed: 20

b. Sorties Airborne: 5

c. Sorties completing electronic rendezvous: 1 (plus 4 Mul.Pat.)

d. Sorties transferring required fuel: 4 (1 receiver aborted)

e. Remarks:
Only 5 aircraft airborne due to higher headquarters cancellation

(i) Non combat-ready crews with projected combat-ready dates:

Crew No.	Projected CR date
M-48	15 February 1958. Crew flew standboard in December but failed to complete all phases.
M-58	15 February 1958
IM-59	15 February 1958

Unclassified

2AREPS, Air Training Report for December 1957 (RCS: 9 SAC T-12)

(4) Tanker Unit refueling data report in compliance with 8AF TWX DOT 63907 dated 05/1919Z DEC. (due to space limitations, the following code is used to represent the bombardment wings as indicated. A-321BW, B-384BW, C-380BW, D-376BW, E-26SRW, F-306BW, G-379BW, H-305BW, J-308BW)

(a) Tanker schedule.

		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J
1.	Receiver units scheduled	23	1	9	5	1	5	5	5	5
2.	Tanker 8AF Schedule	25	2	9	5	1	5	5	5	5
3.	Tanker Schedule	21	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	4
4.	Effective tanker sorties									

5. Remarks. Two additional sorties scheduled by tanker unit for make-up receivers on 3 Dec 57. One additional sortie scheduled by tanker unit for maximum utilization of receivers on 5 Dec 57. Reasons for non-effective sorties are listed below by unit in paragraph (b).

(b) Sortie losses.

1.	Receiver aborts	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
2.	Receiver cancellations	1	0	5	0	0	5	5	5	1
3.	Tanker aborts	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
4.	Tanker cancellations	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.	Weather cancellations or aborts	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0

6. Remarks. None

(c) Texaco Schedule

1. Number of Texaco Tankers airborne: None

2. Number of receivers utilizing Texaco Tankers: None

3. Number of hours utilized by receivers on Texaco Tankers: None

4. Number of pounds transferred by Texaco Tankers: None

5. Remarks. None

GORDON D. MCRAIN, JR.
Major, USAF
Commander

Unclassified

40TH AIR REFUELING SQUADRON
40TH BOMBARDMENT WING MEDIUM
Schilling Air Force Base
Kansas

Commander 40 AREFS 28 October 1957

SUBJECT: M-27 Report (RAINSTORM)

TO: Commander-In-Chief
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Nebraska

1. This is the final mission report (M-27) for the 40th Air Refueling Squadron, Schilling Air Force Base, of Operation "Rainstorm", 40th Bomb Wing (M) 16A-57, dated 21 June 1957.

2. The mission of Operation "Rainstorm" was to rotate the 40th Air Refueling Squadron to Goose Air Force Base, Labrador, for a period of ninety days TDY. All aircraft departed Schilling and arrived at Goose on time and upon arrival at Goose a turn-around operation was staged. The primary operational requirement was to support Operation "Reflex Action", which was completed 100%. The unit participated in a USCM "Brave Star" in September with 100% effectiveness. Redeployment was accomplished on schedule without incident. The 40 AREFS was given outstanding support by the 4082 Strategic Wing under the command of Colonel A. J. Beck.

3. Personnel and Administration:

a. Airman Retention Program: In order to complete DD Form 4, Enlistment Record, and DD Form 214, Report of Separation, on personnel who desired to reenlist, messages had to be sent to the home base for necessary information. Also, the individuals records were late in arriving and personnel had almost changed their mind as to reenlistment.

b. On-The-Job-Training: AFM 35-1 requires AF Form 7, Airmans Military Records or photostats for all classification board actions. In order to obtain the necessary forms and/or personnel data, information had to be requested from the home base.

c. Airman Promotion: 40th Bomb Wing (M) promotion board considered and promoted personnel in the grades of M/Sgt, T/Sgt, and S/Sgt. No problems were encountered and all promotions were accomplished successfully and on time.

d. Personnel Administration: Considerable personnel administrative confusion and problems would have been eliminated with the assignment of a full time non-combat crew administrative officer to the squadron during the TDY.

4. Operations and Training:

a. Operations encountered no problems during the TDY. The 4082nd Wing gave excellent cooperation. Aircraft were available to operations due to outstanding maintenance support. Higher Headquarters directed commitments were fullfilled with no problems.

Unclassified

Commander 4[illegible], 40 [illegible], [illegible], Subj: [illegible] Report (RAINCROW)

b. Training encountered no problems during the TDY. A good swimming pool was available on base for aquatic survival training. The small arms range was good. The 50-24 Combat Crew Training, Phase II was completed on all personnel accompanying the squadron at Goose AB. A P-3 link was available on a daily schedule for the 40th Air Refueling Squadron. The 4082 Wing gave complete cooperation to training.

5. Logistics:

a. Maintenance and supply support for the deployment was excellent. Aircraft departed home station and arrived at deployment base on time. Receipt of incoming aircraft presented no problems with respect to refueling, parking or maintenance. All aircraft were in commission upon landing. Cargo unloading and processing of incoming personnel was adequate.

b. Supply support during the TDY period was satisfactory as evidenced by an AOCP rate of 2%. Approximately 80% of the items ordered through project "Pig Tin" were received. Average delivery time was 13 days.

c. Maintenance support during the TDY period was outstanding. The flight line maintenance activities of the in-place squadron was exceptional. TDY specialists and support personnel were effectively integrated into their respective base activities.

d. Personnel were processed on the day prior to departure. Processing was completed on schedule without incident. Cargo was loaded one day prior to departure and completed on schedule. On redeployment to Schilling, personnel processing and cargo loading was accomplished one day prior to departure, as scheduled. Support by base facilities was excellent.

e. Hanger facilities were excellent. The in-place squadron was assigned two nose dock hangers, one of which was used for dock inspections and the other for postflight inspections. In addition, they had access to one large hanger for retraction tests, weight and balance tests, and specialist work that required the use of larger hanger.

f. POL servicing presented no problem. Ample pits and POL personnel were available to support all units on the base.

g. Parking of aircraft was no problem. Ample space was available on the heavy bomber ramp.

h. Housing for Officers and Airman was adequate.

6. Security: Security of aircraft was excellent. In addition to furnishing excellently trained personnel the 4082nd Air Police furnished security training for deployed combat crews and Air Police.

7. Intelligence: Intelligence facilities were adequate. Sufficient space to conduct pre-take-off briefings and combat crew study was available.

Unclassified

Commander 40ARRFS, 40 Bomb Wing, 28 Oct 57, Subj: M-27 Report (RAINSTORM)

P. Recommendations:

a. Personnel and administrative recommendations:

(1) That records of airman be sent with the deployed Squadron.

(2) That a non-combat crew administrative officer be deployed with the Squadron.

b. Operations and Training recommendations: None.

c. Logistics recommendations: None.

d. Security recommendations: None.

e. Intelligence recommendations: None.

THOMAS S. BOHMAN
Lt/Col USAF
Commander

Unclassified

Unclassified

FINAL MISSION REPORT FOR 97 AIR REFUELING SQUADRON
WORLD STRATEGIC WING OPERATIONS PLAN 39-57

Unclassified

Unclassified

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Under 4082d Strategic Wing Operations Plan 39-57 Nickname "Iron Bar" it was the responsibility of the 2d Air Refueling Squadron to furnish air refueling support for the 321st and 340th Bombardment Wings on their deployments to and redeployments from the United Kingdom.

This was accomplished over a period of eight days, from 26 Nov 57 through 3 Dec 57. Although the launching of the first wave of KC-97's was a real test due to a severe snowstorm here at Goose Air Base, hard work and cooperation on the part of both flight crews and ground support succeeded in making this USOM effective.

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

No comments deemed necessary./U/

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. The mission was carried out according to plan without exception other than the higher headquarters postponement of Waves II, V, and VI due to weather conditions.

2. Rendezvous and refueling procedures outlined in SAC Manual 55-10 were followed. Although no unusual difficulties were encountered in completing rendezvous in this exercise, communications could have been better. In some waves, cells were scheduled with the same communications/rendezvous plan with rendezvous times less than one hour apart. Since they were using the same interplane frequency this caused confusion. In addition, on the fifth wave [illegible] tankers assigned to Connie Club Ann had some trouble with overlapping UHF between their cell and another cell working WEAC Ann in another refueling area. This caused some confusion on the part of both cells.

LOGISTICS

1. During the first wave of this mission snow accompanied by high winds at freezing temperatures created an aircraft icing condition which taxed the capability of kill-frost and MB-3 trucks to the maximum. Quantities of kill-frost required turn around of equipment. Slow fillrate from drum to units added to the difficulty. During severe icing conditions such as were encountered on this wave de-icing equipment is required for each aircraft just prior to takeoff. This would present quite a problem if all takeoffs were spaced closely together.

Unclassified

b. When two or more refueling areas within UHF and rendezvous range of each other are being utilized at the same time, the operations order should clearly designate separate communications/rendezvous plans to preclude interference.

DOT: 4 Oct 1957

SUBJECT: TDY Training Programs and Facilities

TO: Commander
4082d Strategic Wing
APO 677, New York, NY

1. Eighth Air Force Regulations 23-37, 23-38 and 23-39, 13 July 1957, and Chief of Staff message WG 43996, 5 July 1957, assign responsibility for air and ground training of Strategic Air Command TDY units to the strategic wing commander concerned. The following action is directed to insure continuity of training and facilitate smooth transition from home base to TDY station for the rotational unit:

a. Each strategic wing commander will establish and maintain a current brochure of training aids and facilities at his base with respect to the requirements of Strategic Air Command regulations 5-[illegible] and 5-24 for bombardment, reconnaissance and air refueling units. Detailed information concerning the existing and forecast status and capability of each facility will be included.

b. Sixty days prior to the scheduled rotation, five (5) copies of the brochure will be forwarded to the parent wing of the TDY unit. The parent wing commander will be requested to submit his program of air and ground training desired during the TDY period to reach the strategic wing commander 60 days prior to rotation. Coordination will be effected to insure maximum accomplishment of training at home station in those phases that cannot be adequately supported during the TDY period.

c. Forty-five days prior to the scheduled rotation, the strategic wing commander will forward the finalized training program for the TDY unit to this headquarters and the parent wing.

2. Training programs established for TDY units must recognize the requirements of missions directed by higher headquarters. TDY air refueling units will be required to support the Eighth Air Force Tanker-Receiver Schedule. Additional air refueling activity desired for a TDY air refueling squadron will be requested from this headquarters.

3. Five (5) copies of the brochure required by paragraph 1a, above, will be forwarded to this headquarters, Attention: DOT, as soon as completed. Subsequent changes will be forwarded as they occur to assure current information in this headquarters.

4. Request you initiate action to implement this program at the earliest practical date. This headquarters will render all possible assistance. Queries should be marked attention: ICF.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Clifford A. WIDNEY
Major, USA
Assistant Adjutant

A TRUE COPY:

[signature]
[illegible]
Asst. Adjutant

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

COMSTRATWG 4082 GOOSE AB, LABR PRIORITY

COMAF 8 WESTOVER AFB, MASS.

/UNCLASSIFIED/E F T O/DO 016147. ATTN: DOOLA. SUBJECT: FLYING HOUR ALLOCATION. DUE TO A QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION BEING PERFORMED ON ALL AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED 4082ND STRAT WG THE FOLLOWING HOURS WILL BE FLOWN DURING DECEMBER:

C-47 138

SA-16 132

L-20 29

H-21 189

REQUEST PERMISSION TO TURN BACK THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF HOURS:

C-47 277

SA-16 104

H-21 192

UNCLASSIFIED 1 1

S/
GEORGE J. STINCHCOMB, CAPTAIN, USAF VERNON P. TERRY, JR., MAJOR USAF

A true Copy;

JOHN A. KINGER,
Captain, USAF
Office of Information Services.

QUARTERLY OPERATIONAL READINESS REPORT
(RCS: 1-AF-V2)

[illegible], Lt Colonal
Commander

[illegible] 1 M
15 Mar 53

AS OF 2400 HOURS 31 DEC 57

Unclassified

	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
[illegible]	[illegible]	6	10	8	9	8	NLT	10	5	6	6	6	6	6

Item C - The overall [illegible] figure reflects below the minimum acceptable for combat readiness (6). The following factors are present: Item B, low in commission status; Item E and M, insufficient [illegible] and cannot fly. Complete explanation of these under appropriate item remarks. Although Item E meets the [illegible] requirements, the [illegible] shortage in the 43 career fields are, in [illegible] factors which directly affects the in commission status as reflected under Item B.

Item D - [illegible] percent.

Item E - [illegible] Item E only reflects a shortage of nine personnel, or approximately [illegible] percent. However the skill level structure the shortage is 40, at the seven level. Shortage of the [illegible] 7 level [illegible], are crew chiefs. The 1 December 1957 skill level reduction to the previously authorized [illegible] of the 1775 Organization reduced the skill structure in the critical areas. It is likely that twelve aircraft technicians will be lost in normal rotation. Earliest available forces for replacement is for eleven unknown skill levels in March. Shortage of the two authorized skill [illegible] are not to be relieved locally.

Item F - [illegible] on hand is now up to 87%. Of 1,524 items not on hand, approximately 1,410 are hand tools of [illegible] Classes 5110 and 5120. Federal Classes 5405 and 5415 represent about 25% cost in type items. [illegible] shortages are being processed.

Item G - Shortages of sensitive items include 4 socket torque wrenches, 2 tensiometers, 16 six bar pneumatic [illegible], 3 aircraft maintenance slings, 3 engine maintenance adaptor kits (R-4). Supply difficulty letters on these items have been forwarded.

Unclassified

0110

SAC FORM 124, RCS: 1-AF-V2, as of 31 Dec 57 (Cont'd)

Item I - Although a sufficient number of aircraft are possessed, the distribution is out of line with authorization.

TYPE	AUTHORIZED		ASSIGNED
B-21	16	Unclassified	14
SA-16	5		3
C-47	2		1
L-20	2		1
TOTAL	25		25

Item J - The overall in commission status for the month of December was 46.%. Five SA-16 aircraft are out of commission undergoing transfer inspection to Air National Guard on project Add SA44. One C-47 aircraft possessed has been grounded the whole month pending check on long range fuel system selector valves and complete quality control inspection brought about by recent C-47 accidents. Two B-21 aircraft at Problem 8 were out of commission the major portion of the month pending delivery of engines by C-124 aircraft of another SAC unit. All B-21 aircraft were grounded during the last week of the month for replacement of control cables, reference TO-1B-21-616.

Item K & L - Based on 1:1 to 1 crew to aircraft ratio. Present crew status:

TYPE	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED	C/A	SHORT
B-21	16	11	11	5
SA-16	5	3	2	3
C-47	2	1	1	1
L-20	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	25	14	14	11

Item M, N & O - At this time, the projection for the three coming months is below the minimum required for combat readiness. Of particular concern are aircraft and crews as shown below:

		AIRCRAFT			
TYPE	AUTH	ASG	LOSING	GAINING	BALANCE
B-21	16	14	0	0	14
SA-16	5	9	5	0	4
C-47	2	1	0	0	1
L-20	2	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	25	25	5	0	20

Unclassified

AC Plan 124, ACS: I-AF-42, as of 31 Dec 57 (Cont'd)

TYPE	AUTH	ASGD	ATTG	SUBTG	EFFECS
H21	16	11	2½	0	16½
L-16	5	2	0	0	2
C-47	2	1	0	0	1
L-20	2	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	25	14	2½	0	19½

The H-21 pilots are projected in during late January and February. The upgrading of these to a combat ready status is projected to be April at the earliest.

Headquarters
4062d Consolidated AMG
United States Air Force
APO 619, New York, N.Y.

C

SUBJECT: Aircraft Ground Accident

TO: Commander
Eighth Air Force
ATTN: Director of Safety
Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts

1. In accordance with telephone conversation between Chief, Ground Safety Division, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, and Ground Safety, this Headquarters, on 6 September 1957, the following narrative report is submitted regarding an aircraft ground accident which occurred at Goose Air Base.

2. Description of accident circumstances:

a. At approximately 1445 hours local time, 4 September 1957, an L-20 aircraft C/F 16490 was dropped while in the process of being loaded on to a flatbed. Damage to both floats resulted. This accident occurred at the sewer docks on the loading side of Goose Air Base.

b. Events leading up to the accident: At approximately 1345 hours local time, a 20-ton truck mounted crane, operated by S/Sgt John A. Johnston of the 4062d Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, was being used to load an L-20 aircraft C/F 16490 on to a flatbed truck for movement to Hangar No. 6 for an engine change from the sewer docks on the Canadian side of Goose Air Base, Labrador. This action was directed by Captain Robert F. Boge, Assistant Maintenance Officer of the 2nd Helicopter Squadron. S/Sgt Gordon E. Miller of the 42nd Helicopter Squadron and Flight Chief of the L-20, stated that a sling was attached to the airplane lifting lugs provided on top of the fuselage. Thirty foot tag lines were attached to the floats at four points and one man was placed on each tag line to control the airplane and prevent it from swinging into the crane. The sling was then hooked to the crane, spreader bar inserted and the crane boom raised sufficiently to take up the slack. At this point the spreader bar was also checked for alignment. Next, the aircraft was raised to remove the pulling (mattresses) from under the floats. The pulling was to be placed on the flatbed to protect the floats. After checking, it was found that the aircraft was not raised high enough to allow pulling the mattresses from under the aircraft. The aircraft was then raised approximately one to one and one-half feet off the ground. At this point the sling cables separated simultaneously and the aircraft dropped to the ground, striking the sky by six timbers that were placed under the pulling forward of the floats. Some attempts were then made to prevent

the aircraft from moving over during the periodic maintenance inspection that was performed prior to the accident. The sling being used was made of one-quarter inch steel cable with swaged sleeves and has a breaking strength of 2,400 pounds per cable. Two cables make up the sling. The spreader bar was locally manufactured out of a section of one and three-eighths inch conduit type pipe with arched ends to receive the cables. An inspection of the sling was conducted by Sgt Miller prior to use and he states that no broken strands were noted and that the cables appeared to be in serviceable condition.

3. Cause of the accident: The use of the wrong type of sling or spreader bar is considered the primary cause and, while the sling had been used on previous occasions, the following observations are submitted:

a. The cables pinched at the point where the spreader bar was inserted.

b. The weight of the aircraft at lifting exceed 2.5 pounds.

c. The thin steel edges of the spreader bar would exert a cutting action on the cables.

d. Metal fatigued at the points of cable separation is possible due to repeated use of the sling with the spreader bar in the same position.

e. A 22I-331 sling assembly, stock number [illegible], is listed in applicable technical orders as the sling to be used while lifting this aircraft. This sling has a built-in spreader bar which places an additional strain on the cables. This sling was requisitioned from Tech Supply during February 1956 and the requisition was forwarded to Base Supply for issue. The requisition was returned to Tech Supply from base Supply with back order voucher number 560/0/0 and was never issued. A check with Base Supply revealed that they had no record of the requisition going to depot and it was apparently lost in base supply.

4. Extent of damage, costs of materials to effect repairs: Damage to the aircraft consisted of an lower bending of both flaps, including the keel. Following is the breakdown of labor and material cost in effecting repairs:

a. Material:

Aluminum Alloy	.4#	3 sq ft	$1.20
Rivets	1 lb	$1.45 per lb	1.45
			$2.65

b. Labor:

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
7/Sgt	3 1/2	$2.11	$ 7.11
3/Sgt	32 1/2	1.70	55.25
1/2C	2 1/2	.9	4.25
4/SP	16	.75	68.00
	54 1/2		$ 134.36
			2.02
		TOTAL LAB	$ 136.42

a diagram of the accident and photographs of the crane are inclosed.

5. There were no injuries to personnel.

6. Corrective action:

a. A new requisition has been submitted for the proper sling. Follow-up will be made on this requisition.

b. A heavier sling has been manufactured locally to use during the interim. The sling is made of three-eighths inch steel cable and an improved spreader bar has been provided with rounded edges to lessen against a cutting action.

c. An SOI has been written covering safe hoisting of [illegible] flight equipment aboard aircraft (Incl 4 refers).

d. All maintenance personnel have been briefed as to the cause of this accident.

e. An inspection of all aircraft slings at this station has been directed. This inspection is to cover both serviceability of slings and the correct type as outlined in applicable technical orders. I have also directed that a re-use inspection of all slings be conducted and that this requirement be included in SOP's. Further, I have directed that requisitions be submitted for the items of any shortages and follow-up through Base Supply to accomplish.

3 Incls.

1. Diagram of Accident
2. Photographs of Damage
3. SOI (Hoisting - [illegible] a/c aircraft)
4. Diagram of Sling
5. Statement.

/s/ [illegible]
C I and I, USAF
Commander

Copy to:
[illegible]
Asst [illegible]

7 October 1957

General T. S. Power
Commander in Chief
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

Dear General Power:

At 0955Z on 13 September 1957 L-20 aircraft No. 10491 assigned to this command received major damage in a water landing accident at Unnamed Lake, Labrador.

The aircraft departed the Torrington Main Dock, Goose Bay, at 0900 on 13 September with three passengers and 230 pounds of cargo. This was the first of three flights scheduled on 13 September in support of Special Services activities.

The pilot was First Lieutenant Robin L. Jones, [illegible] USA. Lieutenant Jones has 2312 hours total flying time with 142 hours in the L-20 aircraft. His record reflects that he has flown the L-20 on floats for 116 hours during the 90 days preceding this accident and accomplished 172 water landings during that period.

On the date of the accident the weather at Goose Bay and at Unnamed Lake was excellent with only scattered clouds and calm winds. On arriving at his destination, Lieutenant Jones circled the area and elected to land in a southeasterly direction, adjacent and parallel to the shoreline and in the direction of the campsite. This decision was predicated, at least in part, on the existing complete calm and the "glassy" water surface. Lieutenant Jones states it was his intention to use the shoreline and trees as an altitude reference for flare out purposes.

On turning to his base leg, the pilot completed his before landing check list. During final approach he lowered flaps to "landing position" and established a power off glide at 70 knots indicated air speed. The approach was into the direction of the sun and some glare was experienced. Aware of the problem of depth perception on "glassy" water landings, Lieutenant Jones states he continued to cross check shore line references to insure timely flare out. Notwithstanding, flare out was not commenced in time and the aircraft contacted the water sooner than expected and in flat or slightly nose low attitude. A loud noise was heard followed by veering of the aircraft to the right. Application of power and left rudder effected a momentary correction; however, realizing there had been float or strut damage, Lieutenant Jones cut power and the aircraft came to rest on the beach. All personnel evacuated with no injuries.

Inspection of the aircraft revealed failure of three fuselage wire pulls and in turn the failure of the right intermediate and rear strut fork ends. The aircraft then was free to drop on the right float assembly in a right wing down and tail low attitude. Damage was sustained by the strut and float assembly, the right elevator and horizontal stabilizer, the right wing, wing tip and the right aileron.

Inspection of the failed fuselage wire pulls revealed elongation of bolt holes to a size almost double the original diameter of the holes. The statement of two civilian mechanical engineers is to the effect that this elongation was progressive and had occurred over a relatively long period. It was their opinion that failure of these parts was inevitable and had only been hastened by the harder than normal landings of the aircraft. The failed parts have been submitted to Air Material Command for further examination and metallographic analysis. Subject to the findings of Air Material Command it is considered that the primary cause of the accident is material failure.

A contributing cause of the accident is pilot error. The evidence quite clearly indicates that Lieutenant Jones touched down before he was "ready"; i.e., he misjudged his altitude. There is also some evidence to the effect that the aircraft was in a slight crab to the right at touchdown. Judgment of altitude over "glassy" water is notoriously poor and while the technique of landing close to a shore under "glassy" water conditions is suggested by T.O. 01-1-11, Lieutenant Jones did not take full advantage of water line references available to him. His direction to land into the sun and with the shore line to the right of the aircraft reduced his visibility and partially obscured the reference area. Lieutenant Jones has been downgraded to student status.

I am greatly concerned that the apparent defects in the float assembly on this aircraft existed over a period of time without being detected. A review of Technical Orders pertaining to the L-3C indicates inspection instructions are inadequate. Inspection requirements, including the periodic do not call attention to the failed components or direct inspection tear down to the point that defects would be visible. Further, no instructions are given for adjustment of wires or rigging of the float assembly once floats are installed. Initial float installation instructions appear adequate and had these procedures been followed for inspections or rerigging, the defective wire pulls would have been detected. Specific recommendations are being forwarded to Air Material Command. In the interim period the requirements of the initial installation instructions contained in T.O. 1 L-3C-2 are being followed for periodic inspection of the float assembly.

Sincerely,

J. A. Lohr
Colonel, USAF
Commander

John A. Klinger
Capt USAF

Headquarters
4082d STRATEGIC WING
United States Air Force
APO 677, New York, N.Y.

27 December 1957

Aircraft L-20A, Serial Number 51-16491 sustained major damage in a water landing accident on 13 September 1957 at Unnamed Lake, Labrador, approximately 50 miles southeast of Goose Air Base, Labrador. Due to the nature and extent of damage, it was necessary to disassemble the aircraft and attempt to return the components to Goose Air Base.

The wings, empennage components, engine, and propeller were removed and transported to Goose Air Base by H-21 helicopter. On 2 October 1957, an attempt was made to transport the fuselage with float assembly removed, by means of the H-21 cargo sling. The fuselage was slung successfully, and the helicopter commenced the fifty mile trip to Goose Air Base. Approximately twenty (20) miles from the Base, the helicopter cargo sling hook released and allowed the fuselage to drop from an indicated altitude of approximately 3,000 feet.

Subsequent board investigation failed to disclose the cause for the cargo hook releasing without actuation of either the manual or electrical release system.

Extensive aerial search of the area in which the fuselage was dropped failed to locate the wreckage. The extremely rugged and inaccessible terrain and the large area involved precluded other search methods.

Components other than the fuselage assembly have been turned over to the Reclamation Officer for repair and disposition.

Loss of the fuselage assembly was not due to any unauthorized action.

J.J. BECK
Colonel, USMC
Commander

ACTING CHIEF:

J.H. [illegible]
Captain USN

JOINT GOOSE APPROACH CONTROL AND GOOSE AREA CONTROL CENTRE AGREEMENT

SUBJECT - GOOSE APPROACH CONTROL

EFFECTIVE - AT TIME YR A.C.C. (DOMESTIC) COMMISSIONED

A. GENERAL

A.1 This agreement contains procedures for the control of IFR traffic under the jurisdiction of the Goose Approach Control Unit. Standard separation as outlined in Department of Transport Manual of Operations Chapter C, Parts 1, 2 and 6 shall be applied to civil aircraft and between civil and military aircraft.

A.2 The Goose Approach Control area consists of the airspace extending upwards from 700 feet above the surface of the earth lying within a 50 statute mile radius of the Goose Range Station.

B. RESPONSIBILITY

B.1 Goose Centre shall provide control service to all IFR flights except as specified in para B.2.

B.2 Goose Approach Control shall provide control service to all IFR flights within the Goose Approach Control Area at or below a specified altitude released to Approach Control by the Goose Centre and mutually agreed upon between the approach control and centre controllers from time to time. This altitude will normally be the highest approved altitude occupied by inbound arriving aircraft. Goose Centre will at all times attempt to have inbound arriving aircraft properly sequenced, time and altitude wise, for expeditious handling by approach control. Goose Approach Control will have the final decision in determining the number of aircraft they can accept from the Goose Centre at any one time, based upon traffic conditions and the Goose Centre will stack and control the remaining traffic, if any, at a mutually agreed upon holding fix until they can be released to Goose Approach Control.

B.3 Goose Centre normally will arrange the altitude of "over" flights so as to prevent any confliction with stacked aircraft.

C. FIXES AND CONTROL TRANSFER POINTS

C.1 Fixes - The following are the fixes to be used as required:

Primary -
(a) L/F Range Station, Goose, Code YR, 257 kcs.
(b) NDB, Goose, Code MR, 300 kcs.
(c) VOR, Goose, Code YR, 117.3 mcs.

Secondary -
(a) NDB, Lake Eon, Code EO, 227kcs.
(b) Range Station, Cape Harrison, Code CF, 344 kcs.
(c) Any agreed upon geographical position that can be positively determined by radar coverage by both Goose Approach Control and Goose Centre.

Note: C.1 secondary (a) and (b) will be used by Goose Centre for holding and then only if two way VHF or UHF R/T has been established prior to the time a fix has been reached by the inbound aircraft. C.1 secondary (c) will be used as a control transfer point only.

C.2 Control Transfer Points -
(a) Normally aircraft cleared to enter the Goose approach control area by Goose Centre shall be instructed to contact Goose Control at the 50 statute mile approach control boundary.

(b) Any of the fixes noted in C.1 primary or C.1 secondary, subparagraph (c) may be used as control transfer points following coordination between Goose Approach Control and Goose Centre.

(c) For large movements of military aircraft, control transfer points, other than those listed in C.2 paras (a) and/or (b) shall be coordinated between Goose Approach Control and Goose Centre prior to commencement of such a movement.

C.3 Holding Patterns -
(a) L/F Range Station - Standard two minute hold pattern on southwest course.

(b) NDB Goose - Hold north, two minute pattern, inbound heading 170 deg. M, non-standard left hand turns.

(c) VOR - Hold north two minute pattern, inbound radial 170 deg. M, non-standard left hand turns.

Holding patterns for the secondary fixes are:
(a) NDB, Lake Eon - Hold northeast standard two minute hold pattern.

(b) L/F Range, Cape Harrison - Hold southwest, standard two minute hold pattern.

(c) Orbit, right or left hand rate one turn (3 deg. per second), at a radar determined point.

D. <u>CO-ORDINATION</u>

D.1 Arrival Procedures

D.1.1. At least fifteen minutes prior to the time a clearance is issued for an aircraft to enter the Goose Approach Control Area, Goose Centre shall co-ordinate with Goose Approach Control and determine the altitude, holding fix, control and transfer point, and frequency to be used.

D.1.2. Whenever weather conditions are such that there is a possibility that an aircraft under Goose Approach Control jurisdiction may be unable to effect a landing, Goose Approach Control shall so advise Goose Centre in order that the Centre will be prepared to issue appropriate clearance to an alternate airport.

D.1.3. Goose Centre shall provide Goose Approach Control with the following information on all aircraft that will come under Goose Approach Control jurisdiction.

Identification and Type
Departure Point
Appropriate Estimate
Altitude Information
Any other information that may be requested by approach control.

D.1.4. Goose Approach Control will keep Goose Centre advised of vacated altitudes.

D.2 DEPARTURES

D.2.1. Goose Approach Control shall effect coordination with Goose Centre prior to authorization of an IFR flight into Goose Centre Control Area. Goose Centre shall issue instructions necessary to provide standard separation between aircraft under Goose Centre's jurisdiction and departing aircraft. Goose Approach Control will then add any further instructions necessary to provide standard separation between departing aircraft and other aircraft under Goose Approach Control's jurisdiction. Goose Approach Control will then issue the coordinated clearance to the departing aircraft.

E. SPECIAL VFR

E.1 Authorization of special VFR will be entirely the responsibility of Goose Approach Control.

F. RADAR CONTROLLED APPROACHES

Procedures for transfer of control of aircraft by use of radar willbe developed by agreement between Goose Centre, Goose Radar Approach Control and Goose GCA Unit.

G. IFR FLIGHT PLANS

G.1. All flight plans will initially be given by the flight planning agency to Goose Centre, who will advise Goose Approach Control of relevant parts of these flight plans.

Chief Controller
Goose Area Control Centre

Senior Flying Control Officer
Goose Approach Control

Supervisor Area Control
Montreal District

Supt. Air Traffic Control
Department of Transport
Ottawa

Director of Air Services
RCAF Headquarters
Ottawa

A true copy:

JOHN A. KINZER,
Capt. USAF
Office of Information Services.

HEADQUARTERS
4082D AIR BASE GROUP
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 677, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

7 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Air Traffic Control Procedures for Goose Air Base

1. On 6 November 1957 a meeting was held in the Goose RAPCON for the purpose of coordinating Instrument Approach Procedures and discussing Air Traffic Control problems. The meeting was attended by Major Hugh A. Payne, Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, Major William M. Wright, S/L D. L. Snowden, Senior Flying Control Officer, F/L E. McConvey, OIC of RAPCON, Mr. H. R. Merritt, Chief Controller ATC Goose, F/L M. Casselman, Dep. Chief of Operations and F/L T. J. Pidgeon, Training Officer RAPCON. The general discussion was opened by Mr. Merritt expressing the dissatisfaction of the Canadian Air Traffic Control Agencies in the manner which Instrument Approach Procedures had been presented to them. He stated that they had received proposed procedures from SAC, ADC, MATS and AACS and it was very difficult to determine which of the proposals were bonafide requirements. Major Payne explained that the USAF Wing Commander for Goose Air Base is responsible for formulating Instrument Approach Procedures for all United States military agencies. Therefore, any procedures submitted by agencies other than representatives of the USAF Wing Commander should not be considered. Major Payne further stated that he would request the USAF Wing Commander to provide a letter to Canadian aircraft control agencies outlining the policy stated above anddesignating a representative and alternate to represent him in the Air Traffic Control matters and further notify non-SAC tenant units of this policy.

2. On 30 October 1957 seven Instrument Approach Procedures were presented to Canadian Air Traffic Control agencies for their consideration. These procedures had been established as a SAC requirement for Goose Air Base. These included:

a. Low Altitude ADF Procedures.
b. Low Altitude VOR Procedures.
c. Two Low Altitude TACAN Procedures.
d. High Altitude ADF/ILS Procedures.
e. High Altitude ADF Procedures.
f. High Altitude TACAN Procedures.

3. It was determined that the Goose middle marker beacon was unsatisfactory for use as a terminal aid under its present power output. Therefore, the proposed low altitude ADF procedure was withdrawn. Headquarters, Eighth Air Force was requested to initiate action to increase the power to 50 watts in an effort to provide this facility as a terminal aid. The high altitude ADF/ILS procedure was revised to use the low frequency radio range as a penetration fix rather than the

middle marker as previously proposed. The Canadian representatives stated that they have had insufficient time to thoroughly study the proposed TACAN procedures and requested that these procedures be deferred for re-submission on approximately 1 December to allow for a study of the capability of the equipment and approach techniques used. The remainder of the procedures were considered acceptable with minor changes and are being prepared for official submission.

WILLIAM M. BRIGHT
Major, USAF

A true copy;

JOHN A. KINZER
Captain, USAF

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: MRR-4 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

COMMENT NO.1

TO Wing Director of Operations FROM 4082D C & E DATE 3 Sept 57.
4082D Strategic Wing.

1. Mr. Edward R. Brunks, James Patterson and Belton-Nord Alper, contract personnel from the Motorola Corp. and Mr. Herbert Miller from Olmsted Air Force Base, Pa., (AMC) arrived at Goose Bay, Labrador, 3 August 1957, to install the MRR-4 (Microwave link between the CPS-6B at Pinetree and the RAPCON building). The installation of the system was discussed with me and a decision was made to conduct a meeting consisting of representatives from DOT, RACAF, AC&W, Motorola and Base Communications.

2. This meeting was for the purpose of discussing what type of information was desired at the RAPCON building, what could be furnished by the CPS-6B at the 641ST and the possibilities of the MRR-4 to transmit this information. All aspects of the operation were discussed and it was decided by all parties present that the information desired could be furnished RAPCON over the system. It was at this point that Lt. Orloff, Maintenance Officer of the 641st Squadron, raised the question of compatibility of the MRR-4 system to the CPS-6B.

3. Mr. Brunks assured him that the systems were compatabile, but if desired by Lt. Orloff, that he would install the Isolation System that had been used to tie in the MRR-4. This was desired by Lt. Orloff, and I was to coordinate with the local AACS Squadron to get the Isolation System.

5. The meeting was adjourned and the MRR-4 installation proceeded - I contacted Capt. McGinnis, Maintenance Officer, of the 1932D AACS Squadron to arrange for this Isolation System. A discussion of the compatibility of the systems ensued and I was informed that the isolation transformer would not be available as it was an intregral part of one of the OA-99 Scopes required to tie in the system, and would be used to restore the scope - further the MRR-4 had been engineered to tie straight in to the CPS-6B.

6. This information was passed on to Lt. Orloff and he was advised to look into the system farther to determine if it could be tied straight in. After further research by Lt. Orloff and two Marconi Rada Technical Representatives, on the CPS-6B, the following conclusions were reached. The MRR-4 will draw power causing an error voltage to be introduced in the CPS-6B Amplidyne Circuit causing a hunting condition with damage resulting to the CPS-6B. Further that this consumption of power will overload their synchro causing them to burn out. Thereby rendering the CPS-6B inoperative. Therefore the two systems could not be tied together.

7. 23 August 1957, Mr. Alper reported that MRR-4 was installed and ready for an acceptance inspection with the exception that it was not tied to the CPS-6B nor was there an OA-99 scope in operation at the RAPCON. I discussed with Mr. Alper the requirements under TO-31-1-8 for acceptance of a facility and a meeting was arranged with the local AACS Sqd. who have Maintenance responsibility for the installed facility. It was at this meeting that a decision was reached to call the

CONT'D

SUBJECT: MRR-4 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

TO Wing Director of Operations, 4082D Strategic Wing. FROM 4082D C&E DATE 3 Sept 57 COMMENT NO.1 CONT'D

C&E OFficer at 64th Air Division to determine the possibility of tieing the system in.

8. Major Swanson was appraised of the existing situation and he stated that he would call the local AC&W Commander and advise him to allow the MRR-4 be tied to the CRS-6B. After Major Swanson's call to the Commander of the 641st, I was called and told that permission was granted to tie in the system. Arrangements were made with Motorola personnel to proceed to Pinetree the following morning. The following morning the previous orders of Major Swanson had been countermanded by Col. Burns of the 64th Air Division, based on information he had received from Lt. Orloff, of the 641st.

9. It was then decided that the problem must be resolved by AMC and Motorola. A call was placed to AMC by Mr. Miller, and a call to Motorola by Mr. Alper, each stating that access to tie on to the CRS-6B had been denied by the 64th Air Division. I placed a call to Col. Parker, Director of Communication Headquarters 8th Air Force, and explained the circumstances. I was informed by Col. Parker to stand by, while he looked into this situation.

10. A message was sent to 64th Air Division from 8th advising them to take immediate action to allow the completion of the MRR-4 system. The 64th Air Division sent Major Ogden to Goose Bay with an isolation system to tie in the MRR-4. A message was received from the Commander, Olmsted, stating that the MRR-4 was to be turned off, the Installation team was to proceed to the next scheduled base and return to Goose Bay at a later date to place the MRR-4 in operation. The message further requested that the using agency refrain from contact with the MRR-4 as it was not an accepted facility.

11. After reading this message Major Ogden proceeded back to Pepperrel - The AMC Representative and Motorola installation team turned off the equipment as requested and checked in to traffic for Thule.

12. 29 August 1957 a message was sent from 8th Air Force to Commander, Olmsted, info 4082D Wing requesting that immediate action be taken to resolve the alleged incompatibility problem that exists on the MRR-4.

13. Any further action on the part of completing this install tion must be taken by AMC and Motorrola.

S/ E.T. BROOKS
Capt., USAF
C&E Staff Officer

A true Copy;

JOHN A. KINGER,
Captain USAF
Office of Information Services.

FDA
031

MDA028

PP RJEDLS RJEDMH RJEODL RJEXCR
DE RJEPEO 272
P 26/17227
IM COMAF S WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO RJEXCR/COMAIRDIV 64 PEPPERRELL AFB NF
INFO RJEDMH/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
RJEDLS/COMMAAMA OLMSTED AFB MIDDLETOWN PA
RJEODL/COMSTRATUG 4082 GOOSE AB LABRADOR
BT
/UNCLAS/E F T O/DOC3 78255. FOR DOCEN AT HQ SAC AND MAMN AT MAAMA. SUBJECT: MRR-4 INSTALLATION AT GOOSE AB. WORK STOPPAGE ON THE MRR-4 INSTALLATION AT GOOSE AB OCCURRED 23 AUG 57 WHEN MOTOROLA INSTALLATION TEAM UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF MAAMA ENGINEER WERE REFUSED ACCESS TO TIE IN MRR-4 FACILITY TO THE AC&U RADAR FACILITY. MRR-4 INSTALLATION IS OTHERWISE COMPLETE. REQUEST THIS HQ AND INFOR ADDRESSEES BE ADVISED WHY YOUR HQ CONCURS IN THIS ACTION WHICH CONTRAVENES THE MAAMA INSTALLATION LETTER OF AGREEMENT DATED 2 OCT 1956 WHICH IS SIGNED BY MAJOR PAUL HANSEN, COMMANDER OF THE 641ST AC&U SQUADRON. THE AACS DETACHMENT COMMANDER, AND BRIG GEN KNAPP, THEN COMMANDER GOOSE AB. INFORMAL INFORMATION IS THAT THE LOCAL AC&U PEOPLE FEEL THAT THE SYSTEM IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR EQUIPMENTS. HOWEVER, WE ARE ADVISED BY BOTH THE MAAMA ENGINEER AND THE MOTORTLA ENGINEER ON THE SITE THAT SUCH INCOMPATIBILITY DOES NOT EXIST. IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT THIS HQ BE ADVISED IF A SIMILAR OBJECTION IS GOING TO BE RAISED BY YOUR HQ AND/OR LOCAL DETACHMENTS CONCERNING THE TIE IN OF THE MRR-4 FACILITIES CURRENTLY IN PROCESS AT HARMON AND THULE AB'S. YOUR IMMEDIATE ACTION IN THIS MATTER IS REQUESTED SINCE A MONETARY LOSS WILL BE OCCASIONED TO THE AIR FORCE UNLESS AN EARLY RESOLUTION IS EFFECTED. FURTHER, FACILITY IS CONSIDERED OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO NORTHEAST AREA AND EXPEDITED ACTION ON THE PART OF MOTOROLA COMPANY WILL BE REQUIRED IN EVENT ALLEGED INCOMPATIBILITY ACTUALLY EXISTS.
BT
26/2227Z AUG RJEPEO

A true Copy;

John A. Kinzer
JOHN A. KINZER,
Captain, USAF
Office of Information Services.

NHHN EOA871 EXE3Ø3Ø GKA824
MM RJEODL RJEOBF RJEPEO RJEDLS
DE RJEXGK 19
M 3Ø15442
FM COMDR 64TH AD D PEPPERRELL AFB NF
TO RJEPEO/COMDR 8TH AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
RJEPLS/COMDR MAAMA OLMSTED AFB PENN
INFO RJEOPB/COMDR 641ST SQ MELVILLE AIR STA LAHR
RJEODL/COMDR 4Ø82ND STRAT WG GOOSE AB LAHR
BT
UNCLASSIFIED FROM ADMEL-M 26265. PART I FOR 8TH AF: REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE O/DOC3-78255, SUBJECT: MRR-4 INSTALLATION AT GOOSE AB. WORK STOPPAGE ON MRR-4 OCCURRED BECAUSE THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE AZIMUTH SERVO SYSTEM OF THE AN/CPS-6B RADAR AT THAT LOCATION WITHOUT MODIFICATION. PROVISIONS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE MRR-4 EQUIPMENT TO RECEIVE AZIMUTH SERVO SYSTEM DATA WITHOUT INTERRUPTIN THE AN/CPS-6B AZIMUTH DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEM. LIKEWISE THIS AN/CPS6B DOES NOT HAVE SUCH PROVISIONS. THIS HEADQUARTERS DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT THE SITE COMMANDERS ACTION CONTRAVENED THE MAAMA LETTER OF AGREEMENT SINCE THE LETTER OF AGREEMENT STATED THAT THE INSTALLATION WOULD BE ON A NON-INTERFERENCE BASIS. ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THIS HEADQUARTERS TO EFFECT A TEMPORARY FIX OF THE ABOVE CONDITION AND A REPRESENTATIVE IS PRESENTLY AT GOOSE AB TO ARRANGE FOR TEMPORARY HOOK UP. AN IDENTICAL SITUATION WILL EXIST AT HARMON AFB, AS REGARDS THE NON-COMPATIBILITY OF EQUIPMENTS. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOUR HEADQUARTERS TAKE ACTION WITH HQ. MAAMA AND/OR MOTOROLA CORPORATION TO OBTAIN THE REQUIRED MODIFICATION TO EFFECK A PERMANENT FIX AT BOTH GOOSE AND HARMON. PART II FOR MAAMA. REFERENCE YOUR MANNR-8-27Ø4, SUBJECT AS ABOVE. THE SITE CONCURRENCE LETTER FOR THIS INSTALLATION PROVIDES THAT THE EQUIPMENT BE INSTALLED ON A NON-INTERFERENCE BASIS TO THE AC&W RADAR SET. THIS CONDITION WILL NOT BE MET UNTIL COMPATABILITY OF THE EQUIPMENTS IS EFFECTED. ADVISE.
BT
3Ø/1738Z AUG RJEXGK 308110

A true Copy;

John A. Kinzer
JOHN A. KINZER,
Captin, USAF
Office of Information Services.

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

COMSTRATWG 4082 GOOSE AB, LAH ROUTINE

COMAF 8 WESTOVER AFB, MASS.

/UNCLASSIFIED/E F T O/DO 016148 .SUBJECT: SUPPORT OF CAPE CHRISTIAN. THE CURRENT COMMITMENT FOR THIS COMMAND TO AIR SUPPORT CAPE CHRISTIAN CANNOT BE SAFELY ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE ASSIGNED TWIN ENGINE AIRCRAFT. THE LOCATION OF CAPE CHRISTIAN IS SUCH THAT IT APPEARS THIS REQUIREMENT COULD EASILY BE MET BY THE 4087TH AIR TRANSPORT GROUP C-54 AIRCRAFT ON A REGULARLY SCHEDULED BASIS. REQUEST RELIEF FROM THIS COMMITMENT EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1952.

UNCLASSIFIED 1 1

S/ FRANK W. METHENEY, LT. COL., USAF VERNON P. TERRY, JR., MAJOR USAF

DO 6108 ADJUTANT

A true Copy;

JOHN A. KINZER,
Capt. USAF
Office of Information Services.

DM
DM-1 ekk
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11573

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1

Unclassified

[redacted]

[redacted]/DNSCA 42212. RQS: [redacted] REPORT. LISTED
BELOW ARE THE AVFUEL AND AVLUBE REQUIREMENTS FOR UNITS OF THIS
COMMAND AS WELL AS 2ND AIR FORCE. ALL REQUIREMENTS ARE IN U.S.
GALLONS.

GOOSE	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR
115/145	442,000	499,000	211,500	201,000	247,500
JT-4	2,100,000	1,[illegible]	1,240,000	720,000	0
1100	4000	3850	4710	4510	11,250
1100R1035	0	25	[illegible]	50	0
[illegible]	0	0	1,101	0	0

[redacted]

PAGE TWO RJEIED 100

NOTE: (A) 22 EACH KC97 AIRCRAFT ARE SCHEDULED FOR AN ESCORT
STOP AT YOUR BASE ON OR ABOUT 4 DEC 57, APPROXIMATELY 68,000 GALS
115/145 WILL BE REQUIRED, (B) 22 EACH KC97 AIRCRAFT ARE SCHEDULED
FOR AN ENROUTE STOP AT YOUR BASE ON OR ABOUT 2 DEC 57, APPROXI-
MATELY 68,000 GALS 115/145 WILL BE REQUIRED, (C) 22 EACH KC97
AIRCRAFT ARE SCHEDULED FOR AN ENROUTE STOP AT YOUR BASE ON OR
ABOUT 2 APRIL 58, APPROXIMATELY [illegible],000 GALS 115/145 WILL BE RE-
QUIRED. FUEL QUANTITIES ARE IN ADDITION TO THE FIVE HOUR POST-
CASE GIVEN ABOVE.

[illegible]

Unclassified

WDD
12-4-15

0141

Headquarters
4082D STRATEGIC WING
United States Air Force
APO 477, New York, N.Y.

16 December 1957

SUBJECT: High AOF Rate

TO: Commander, 22nd Helicopter Squadron
Commander, 5th Fighter Interceptor Squadron
Commander, 54th Air Rescue Squadron
Commander, 4779th Radar Evaluation Flight, RAF
Commander 2nd Air Refueling Squadron

1. I am greatly concerned over the continuing high AOF rate experienced here at Goose Air Base. Experience indicates that high rate is in large measure attributable to poor supply practices and discipline at unit level rather than simply a lack of support by Air Materiel Command. I am convinced that greater command attention at squadron level will aid greatly in solving this problem.

2. In line with this subject, I have noted that aircraft reported A/C have been flown by the operating unit. This leads me to believe that there is either a misunderstanding of the use of AOF priority or gross indifference on the part of the operating personnel. This headquarters is doing everything possible to expedite delivery of AOG items. It not only expends the efforts of supply liaison and base personnel but follows up by message and telephone daily to higher headquarters. Needless to say, the validity of our AOF report is seriously questioned when higher headquarters observes an aircraft changed from A/C to flying status without the requested supply action having been completed.

3. I consider that a high AOF rate reflects directly on the operating unit and reflects a lack of attention, emphasis and analysis on the part of the unit. It is most important that you direct your personal attention to this problem and analyze the reason behind each AOF. Only in this manner can we hope to improve our supply effectiveness.

[illegible]
Colonel, USAF
Commander

cc: D/M

A TRUE COPY:

[illegible]
Capt, USAF

0145

2. [redacted]:

Aircraft maintenance at this station is limited to servicing and turn around of transient aircraft, plus the support of the 22d Helicopter Detachment. Manning for the function is satisfactory but more tools, equipment and common bench stock items are needed. Items such as radio test equipment a high stage air compressor for inflating struts, a limited set of sheet metal tools, one set of drill bits (1-60), parking wands multimeter (RM-6) soldering iron (small point) ground lights for night work and a limited Bench Stock consisting of safety wire, (.032, .041, .025 and copper .025) copper keys, gasket paper, "O" ring sales (common sizes), nesting tape, bolts, nuts, washers in common sizes should be procured for the use of aircraft mechanics. Only one complete tool box is available for the 12 assigned mechanics. Tool kits should be on hand in the following quantities: 4 mechanics kits, 1 electricians kit, hydraulic mechanics kit, 1 instrument mechanics kit, 1 airborne radio mechanics kit. A limited T/O set is now maintained but is not complete and more binders are necessary. Of immediate need is the requirement for T/O's in the 1300 and C-26. Verbal arrangements were made with Goose Air Base to furnish the required publications, tool kits, equipment and bench stock spares but follow-up in writing through channels should be made immediately. The 22d Helicopter Detachment is adequately manned and from all indications receiving the required support from their squadron at Goose Air Base. Of the three aircraft assigned, 2 were in commission and one out for control cables. Some additional tools and parts should be furnished and a list of these was given to Goose Air Base. Recommend also that a sheet metal mechanic be placed on duty with this detachment.

[redacted]
[redacted] Chief Material Section
[redacted] CAPT [redacted] Maintenance
[redacted] CAPT [redacted] Armament and Electronics

[redacted]:

[redacted]
Capt [redacted]

Unclassified

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
United States Air Force
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

SAC INSTL LIAISON OFFICE
VICTORIA ISLAND, OTTAWA, ONTARIO CANADA

D/ENG-L

3 Oct 57

SUBJECT: (U) Construction Equipment Availability, Frobisher Bay

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Strategic Air Command
ATTN: D/ENG-C
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

1. The Department of Transport resident at Frobisher Bay Airport has taken an inventory of all construction equipment available at that base in an effort to ascertain available equipment in place that could be utilized in pavement construction operations. Attached hereto is a listing of that available equipment which is either serviceable or could be easily placed in service to help meet construction equipment requirements. Included are USAF equipment and SCARWAF equipment, as well as items whose ownership cannot be readily ascertained.

2. The ability to effect an early start of the construction effort at Frobisher during the 1958 season will depend upon the availability to the contractor of a maximum of construction equipment, from other than his own resources, until the harbour opens in July and his own can be unloaded. Equipment of this nature that can be made available will be included in the construction contracts as government furnished equipment. Due to the current status of design and the necessity for contract status not later than January 1958, it is mandatory that the availability of existing equipment be known at the earliest possible date, and that transfer of this equipment be made to DOT, as the contracting agent, as early as practicable prior to formulation of advertisement documents.

3. It is requested that action be taken to investigate the availability of all equipment contained in the attached lists for turnover to DOT on a loan basis, the terms of transfer to be established, and the accountable officers for this equipment be directed to effect transfer to the Department of Transport resident at Frobisher at the earliest practicable date. (UNCL)

Unclassified

Unclassified

D/ENG-L, Hq SAC, Subject: Construction Equipment Availability, Frobisher Bay

4. To gain the full advantage of the 1958 construction season, most expeditious handling of this action is necessary. Should this equipment not be made available, actual construction will not commence until sea lanes are opened. This will produce sufficient delay so as to preclude the currently planned two (2) year construction phase, and delay operational readiness of Frobisher pending pavement completion until the fall of calendar year 1960.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Incl (Uncl)
Frobisher Equipment
List - 4 copies

s/Charles E. Zimmer
t/CHARLES E. ZIMMER
Major, USAF
SAC Instl Liaison Off
Directorate of Instl Engr

cc: USAF CCS - Canada
1327A Wellington St.,
Ottawa, Ontario.
w/1 cy Incl.

Unclassified

Unclassified

D/ENG-L, Hq SAC, 3 Oct 57, Subj: (U) Construction Equipment Availability Frobisher Bay

D/ENG-CEE 1st Ind

Hq Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, 18 Oct 57

TO: Commander, Eighth Air Force, Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts

1. Forwarded for continuation of action requested in paragraph 3 of basic letter.

2. Previous associated unclassified correspondence on this subject is as follows:

a. Basic letter from District Engineer, Eastern Ocean District NAESW, dated 7 March 1957, to Commander, Northeast Air Command, Pepperrell Air Force Base, subject: "Transfer of CCARWAF Equipment at Frobisher Bay to Corp of Engineers".

b. Successive indorsements through our eighth indorsement to your headquarters, D/ENG-COE, dated 18 July 1957. In the eighth indorsement action on this problem was assigned your command.

3. Request this headquarters be informed of nature and extent of actions taken.

4. This indorsement does not contain classified information and when withdrawn or not attached, the classification of Secret on this indorsement will be canceled. Authority: Paragraph 37b and 37h(1)(2), AFR 205-1, 3 January 1956, as amended.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

s/G. D. Fremouw
t/G. D. FREMOUW
Colonel, USAF
Dep Director of Instl Engr

1 Incl:
w/d 1 cy

Copies furnished:
SAC Instls LO
Frobisher Bay

3

Unclassified

0152

Unclassified

1/CCS-6, [illegible], 3 Oct 57, SUBJ: (U) Construction Equipment Availability, Problem Key

R/52 21 ENG 5 NOV 1957

Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Westover AFB, Massachusetts

TO: Commander, 4080d Strategic Wing, APO 677, New York, N. Y.

1. The equipment listed in the inclosure required by the Department of Transportation (DOT) will be accounted for and issued to DOT as follows:

a. All equipment required by the DOT must be individually itemized in the contract. Further, the contract must stipulate the [illegible] of use of this equipment by [illegible] to the [illegible] to

Unclassified

Unclassified

1/[illegible]-4, HQ SAC, 3 OCT 57, SUBJ: (U) Construction Equipment Availability, Frobisher Bay

HQ52 2d IND (Continued)

(1) All vehicles and equipment issued to the DOT will be issued on a hand receipt basis to a qualified recipient of DOT. Only those items itemized in the contract will be issued.

(2) All UAL type items issued not now on the UAL of the Installation Squadron will be processed on a SAC Form 144, per SACR 400-8, as a time limit (duration of contract) special authorization. Immediately upon completion of the need for any item by DOT or upon completion of the contract, whichever comes first, another SAC Form 144 will be processed to delete these items.

2. Paragraph 2 of the basic letter indicates that the period of loan may not be required beyond July 1958. If this can be more firmly ascertained and the requirement is not expected to exceed August 1958, the provisions of paragraph 1e(2) will not be necessary.

3. Any available excess spares pertinent to these end items will be issued as government-furnished at the discretion of the Installation Officer of your base.

4. A copy of this indorsement is being mailed to Headquarters SAC and to the SAC Installation Liaison Office at Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. It is desired that your base closely coordinate the contents of this correspondence with the Installation Liaison Officer to insure expeditious completion of the actions outlined in this indorsement.

5. Your base will forward a listing of all vehicles loaned to DOT to this headquarters, Attention: HQ2C. Further, a final letter will be forwarded to this headquarters when all vehicles have been returned by DOT, thereby closing out this correspondence.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN W. [illegible]
Captain, USAF
ASTADJ

1 INCL
1 copy w/d

Copies furnished:
CLC, HQ SAC
SAC Installation
Liaison Office

Unclassified

Unclassified

EOA 178
CMCB144
PP RJEDBR RJEODL RJEODR
DE RJEPEO 172
P 1218452
FM COMAF 8
TO RJEDBRICINCSAC
ZEN/BACAGNDBL LIAISON OFFICE VICTORIA ISLAND
INFO RJEODL/COMSTRATWG 4082
RJEODR/COMABRON 4085
ZEN/CHIEF DEWPO 220 CHURCH ST NY NY
AF GRNC
BT
[redacted]L/DMS2 45125. SUBJ: EXCESSES AT FROBISHER BAY. REF HQ SAC MSG DM3DH8200, 3 DEC 57(CONF), NOT SENT TO INFO ADDRESSEES. BE ADVISED THAT THIS HQS HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF A YECOND MALLORY TEAM VISITING FROBISHER BAY TO ASSIST IN CATALOGING OF EQUPPMENT, SPARES AND OTHER MATERIEL ON HAND. A MALLORY TEAM OF 2 INDIVIDUALS HEADED BY MR. DUNGEN DID VISIT STATION ON 17 JUN 57 FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING "ON THE SPOT" DISPOSITION FOR EXCESS UNSERVICEABLE VEHICLES AND ALLIED EQUIPMENT. THIS IS THE SAME EQUIPMENT YOU HAVE ASKED TO BE HELD FOR THE COMING CONSTRUCTION SEASON. BE ADVISED THAT OTHER CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL AND SUPPLIES

[redacted]

PAGE TWO RJEPEO 172
ARE AVAILABLE THAT STATION THAT MAY BE OF VALUE TO FUTURE CONSTRUCTION. THESE MATERIALS ARE EXCESSES TO FORMER CONTRACTOR "DEWPO" AND WHERE ALSO ACCUMULATED USAF EXCESSES. RECOMMEND INDIVIDUAL FROM SAC INSTALLATION LIAISON OFFICE VISIT FROBISHER BAY WITH PROPOSED FUTURE BILL OF MATERIAL TO DETERMINE IF ANY PORTION OF THESE EXCESSES MAY BE USED ON FUTURE PROJECTS. NOTE TO GOOSE AND SROBISHER: REQUEST YOU COOPERATE FULLY IN ASSISTING SAC LIAISON TO REDUCE COST TO U.S. GOVT IN FUTURE CONSTRUCTION. NOTE TO DEWPO: REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE IN PROPOSED METHOD OF DISPOSING OF YOUR EXCESSES. NOTE TO HQ SAC AND SAC LIAISON OFFICE REQUEST ALL ADDRESSEES BE ADVISED OF YOUR UTLIMATE ACTION.
BT
12/1921Z DEC RJEPEO

Unclassified

DM E-451

WHEELER [illegible] JOINT VENTURE

Interoffice Memo

To: Colonel Payne, Commander U.S.A.F. Base Frobisher Bay.

From: G.S.Mahony. October 14 1957

Resolution Island Charter

Further to my conversation with Captain Tuggle the following details are confirmed.

1. The cost for the Otter operation would be based on a round trip of 470 statute miles at $1.35 per mile.

The minimum monthly guarantee required is $7,200.This is necessary to cover the cost of the operation in the north.

The positioning of the aircraft from St.Jovite Quebec to Frobisher would involve a ferry charge of $1,766.10 based on 1435 miles at $1.30 per mile. The aircraft can be made available fourteen days after confirmation of the charter.

2. The Wheeler Office in Montreal state that they have made the same quotation to Colonel White in Goose Bay by letter on October 2nd.

3. The cost of the DC3 which would only be able to operate when the ice strip was open roughly mid December to mid May, would be $1.65 per mile with a minimum monthly guarantee of $15,000.Positioning and repositioning costs from St.Jovite to Frobisher would be 2782 miles at 1.50 per mile, which is included in the guarantee costs.

3. A year round contract with the Otter would be more economical.

G.S.Mahony.

Area Manager, Frobisher Bay.

Unclassified

16 October 1957

Colonel A. J. Bock
[illegible]
APO 677, New York, New York

Sir:

Reference your telephone call requesting further information as to a proposal from Wheeler Servi for support of Resolution. The attached memo indicates that their only feasible offer would be the "OTTER" with the $7,200.00 minimum. Another possible solution would be by ship during the open water months of August, September and October, by paradrop or helicopter during the two months preceding and following this; then by C-47 from Goose Bay during the remainder of the period. We now have the camp equipment in place and only lack physically erecting it, which can be done in one day. During the past 6 days the weather has not been conducive to helicopter operation. We do plan to make this trip and erect the building in the near future. Resolution has been serviced by ship on a couple of occasions since 1 October and the pilot ship will be departing by way of Resolution within two or three days.

We are now in the process of taking on our last POL product. The contaminated vessel was back loaded with the excellent cooperation of the Imperial Oil Company.

Both oil companies now have their dispensing units ashore and have taken over the servicing of civilian aircraft other than those contracted by Federal Electric.

Our power plant is still not 100% operational and we continue to have partial power failure. We have received two mechanics from Goose to assist in solving our maintenance problems.

Reference the inclosed PA, Dr. Baird of Defence Construction of Canada was here with approximately 20 contractor representatives to assess the future construction requirements. The attached lay-out of the planned buildings is inclosed for your information. As this is an only copy and request, if possible, this be reproduced and a copy returned for our files.

The work in the [illegible] has not been satisfactorily and we should [illegible] by 1 October 1957.

Unclassified

UNCLASS

E-3314

9101

Unclassified

The required T/O Line excess material is being processed into separate bin locations. This is a slow process but it will pay off in the long run.

We have completed our Base Supply Inventory which was 96% accurate, and are continuing using people as follows: Two are assisting in rearranging stock record cards, one is in the T/O Line excess building and one is with the Army in the Engineer's area.

I am in receipt of a vehicle list from Mr. Federuen whereby he requests transfer of vehicles to WT. We have researched the vehicles and are forwarding this request.

During the shipping season we received 24 new dining tables and have shipped the ones from the T/O dining area to Goose, ATTN: Lt Col White.

We received all the service club and day room equipment except parts of a pool table and the 8 washing machines. This information was relayed to Eighth Air Force, INFO: Goose, as directed.

We are finishing the rehabilitation of T-48 which was the last open bay barracks. As it is connected with T-45, we are moving our Billeting Office there which should give us adequate transient facilities located at billeting.

3 Incls:
1. Memo from W/D
2. T/X
3. Layout

GLENN M HAYES
Colonel, USAF
Commander

Unclassified

G 17 December 1957

SUBJECT: Liaison Officer - Frobisher Bay

TO: Commander
4085th Air Base Squadron
AF 263, New York, N.Y.

1. The attached correspondence concerns the assignment of a Liaison Officer to Frobisher Bay is forwarded for your information and necessary action. It is considered feasible that the RCAF Liaison Officer be fully utilized as an interpreter in connection with the Department of Transport, Frobisher Bay Airport.

2. Forward to HQ [illegible] Squadron that the services of a Liaison Officer are no longer required.

2 Incls:
1. Ltr dtd 3 Dec 57 from [illegible]
RCAF Stone Bay, N.W.T.
2. Ltr dtd 10 Dec 57 from [illegible]
Trans. [illegible]

[illegible]
Capt
USAF

Unclassified

7/3007

CONTRACTING HQ 2 COOGI AF LTR PRIORITY PRIORITY

CINCSAC O FITT ATL GTR
COMP 8 MCGUIRE AFB NASS

X X

ICRS4 35118

SUSPENSE 8/7

ADSC 0382 FOR CHIEF DVT OPS DIV SUBJECT: QUARTERLY OPERATIONAL READINESS REPORT RCS: 1-AF-V2. REFERENCE FOR ICRSL 35118 DATED 1 OCT 57 CORRECTED REPORT IS AS FOLLOWS: QUARTERLY OPERATIONAL READINESS REPORT AS OF 2100 HOURS 30 SEPTEMBER 1957, 7AVNDEPRON COOGI AB LATR C/12/1/9/9 FORECAST 6/7/8 REMARKS ITEM C REGRESSION DUE TO LACK OF TRAINED PERSONNEL CAUSED BY: (A) ROTATION AND NON REPLACEMENT OF ONE (1) LOADING OFFICER (B) INFLUX OF NEWLY ASSIGNED LOWER GRADE AIRMEN IN THE LOADING SECTION (C) AIRCRAFT TRAINING CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT AIRCRAFT FOR LOADING TRAINING. OUT (1) AIRCRAFT FOR TRAINING IS NORMALLY SCHEDULED FOR NINETY SIX (96) HOURS TRAINING EVERY AT EACH A/C. NORMAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS CALL FOR A MINIMUM OF TWO (2) AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMPLISH I,T A/C C CONFIGURATION FOR AT LEAST NINETY SIX (96) HOURS PER MONTH. ONE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT FOR ACCELERATED TRAINING WAS REQUESTED IN OUR MESSAGE C0306 [redacted], 30 SEP 57. ALTHOUGH NON-COMBAT READINESS IS INDICATED IN ITEM C IT IS THE OPINION THAT OUR PRESENT ENP CONTINUES CAN BE FULFILLED. INFO: HEADQUARTERS AIRTS A. AVEN: AFSC L617Ø / MOCT FOR (1)/ZEROS SIXTY (7) AND / SAC (1)// DATE CHK (1)/ZEROS SIXTY (7)

1 2

Unclassified

Unclassified

B. AUTH: AFSC L615Ø/3SQIS TWENTY SEVEN (27)/A1C [illegible] (1) ASCD AFSC L615Ø/3SQIS FOUR (4) THREE (3) INF TO ROTATE IN JANUARY/A1C FIVE (5) [illegible] THREE (3) INF TO ROTATE BEFORE JANUARY C. AUTH AFSC L613Ø/3IRO AND L613Ø/12C FOUR (4)/A3C TWO (2) D. AUTH: AFSC 3254/CAPT ONE (1) ASCD AFSC 3254/3IRO 1. [illegible] AN EVALUATION TEAM RATED OUR LOADING SECTION AS FOLLOWS: CONFIGURATION B AND C THREE (3) CREWS READY FIVE (5) CREWS NON-READY CONFIGURATION A WAS NOT RATED, BUT IN THE TEAM CHIEF'S OPINION SIX (6) CREWS ARE READY. TWO (2) CREWS ARE NON-READY. [illegible] A GOOD TO EXCELLENT INCREASE IN INDICES IS EXPECTED AS A RESULT OF [illegible] PROGRAM, BUT IS CONTINGENT ON ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT./ ITEMS C & D WING COMMANDER CONCURS.

Unclassified

2 2

KENNETH R. [illegible], MAJ, [illegible] W. J. [illegible], USAF

ADJC [illegible] 3139 [illegible]

Unclassified

31/1200Z

IP IP

X

X

[redacted] ADVC 0555. [illegible] REPORT: UNIT [illegible] REPORT RCS: 2-AF-V2, FOLLOWS. [illegible] AS OF 1/// HOURS 28 DECEMBER 1957. 7VDEIRON GOOSE AB LABR. 6/1Ø/8/8/9. REMARKS; ITEM F CHANGED BY R [illegible] 1957 TO READ 1191-4485 DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1957. PERCENT OF CHANGE IN ACQUISITION 27 DECEMBER 1957 1ØØ PERCENT COMPLETION DATE 3 JANUARY 1958. EQUIPMENT ON HAND 78.ØØ PERCENT. EQUIPMENT ON REQ-UISITION IS NOT CRITICAL AND DOES NOT AFFECT UNIT CAPABILITY. SQUADRON IS CAPABLE OF MEETING PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE COMMITMENTS./

Bers Lee

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 1 PAGE (S) NO 1 OF 1 COPIES SERIES A EACH

I certify that this message has been [illegible] proper security classification [illegible] by AFR 205-1.

Unclassified

1 1

WILLIAM M. LONG, 1T C/L, [illegible] VERNON E. TERRY JR, MAJOR, USAF

ADC 28 Dec 57 3191 ADJUTANT

Unclassified

CONSTRATAC 1/2 CHOC AT LAIR

CINCSAC OFFUTT AFT, [illegible]

COMAF 86 WESTOVER AFB MASS

[redacted] AISC 1001 PASS TO CHIEF STAFF SUBJECT: QUARTERLY OPERATIONAL READINESS REPORT RCS: 1-AF-72. REPRT AS OF 2100 HOURS 31 DECEMBER 1957, 7 AVIATION, LOOSE AB LAIR. 6/1/0/0/0/9. FORECAST 6/7/0. REMARKS: ITEMS C & P CHANGED BY RECEIPT OF 09 DECEMBER 1957 OF UAL II 91-4405 DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1957. 95% OF SHORTAGES ON REQUISITION 27 DECEMBER 1957. 100% CONSTRUCTION DATE 3 JANUARY 1958. EQUIPMENT ON HAND 70.0% EQUIPMENT ON REQUISITION IS NOT CRITICAL AND DOES NOT AFFECT UNIT CAPABILITY. SQUADRON IS CAPABLE OF FULFILLING PRESENT AND PROBABLE WORLD COMMITMENTS. UNIT OPREP REPORT WAS SUBMITTED ON 28 DECEMBER 1957./

I certify that this [illegible]
proper [illegible]
by AFR 205-1.

Unclassified

1 1

WILLIAM M. LONG, LT COL., USAF COMM [illegible] P. [illegible] JR., MAJOR, USAF

ADSC 2 Jan 58 3131 ADJUTANT

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator) COMTACTG 4002 G[illegible], I[illegible]

DATE TIME GROUP

Unclassified

PRECEDENCE FOR | ACTION RR | INFORMATION RR

TO: COMAF [illegible]

[ ] BOOK MESSAGE [X] ORIGINAL MESSAGE

[ ] MULTIPLE ADDRESS [ ] CRYPTOSECURITY YES [X] NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE

IDENTIFICATION [illegible] 37 58 | CLASSIFICATION [illegible]

INFO:

/SECRET/ADJC [illegible]. R[illegible] [illegible] 37/58. NO REQUISITION SUBMITTED IN CHANGE 6 OF 7AB3 V-2 [illegible] OF 31 DEC 57. CHANGE F REQUISITION IS RESULT OF [illegible] 9 DEC 57 OF DAC II 91-4485 DATED 21 NOV 57. REQUISITIONING WAS [illegible] 3 JAN 58. 1/66 ITEM AUTHORIZED BY THE [illegible] OF [illegible], [illegible] OF [illegible] AND CLASS 170. THIS SHORTAGE OF AUTHORIZED TOOLS IS THE PRIMARY FACTOR IN THE [illegible] OF THE PERCENT OF EQUIPMENT CONSIDERED TO BE /S/, AS INDICATED BY THE MONTHLY /S/ IN SECTION C [illegible] OF THE REMARKS SECTION, REQUIREMENT ON REQUISITION IS NOT CRITICAL [illegible] NOT AFFECT UNIT CAPABILITY. ABILITY OF SQUADRON TO [illegible] FUTURE COMMITMENTS DOES NOT ////// JUSTIFY [illegible] ITEM PRIORITY [illegible] SUPPLY ACTION AT THIS TIME./

D/M [illegible]
B/M [illegible]

Unclassified

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

AUTHOR'S NAME (and signature, when required) WILLIAM H. [illegible], 1T COL, USAF [illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER'S DESIGNATION [illegible] JR., [illegible], USAF

AGENCY ADJC | 9 JAN 58 | TELEPHONE [illegible] 3191 | OFFICIAL TITLE [illegible]

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173 REPLACES AAF FORM 171, 1 MAY 45, WHICH MAY BE USED

[illegible] U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0 1 / /

3/2111

2 JAN 58

Unclassified

COMSTRATNG 4082 GOOSE AB LABR

PRIORITY PRIORITY

CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

x

x

COMAR EXECTOVER AFB MASS

/SECRET/ADSO_____. SUBJECT: RCS: 1-AF-V2 (SAC-1). ATTN: SAC/DMGC, SAR/DMC.

A. ADS CREW AND WEAPON CAPABILITY REPORT

RCS: 1-AF-V2 (SAC-1)

B. 31 DEC 57

C. 7ADS, GOOSE AB, LABR

D. 7/9

E. 0/0

F. 7/8

G. 2/8

H. 7/8

I. 7/8

J. 0/0

K. 7/8

L. 0/0

M. 0/0

N. 0/0

O. 0/0

P. 0/0

Q. 0/0

1

1 1

Unclassified

JOHN W. HOUSTON, Major, USAF

(2 Jan 58) 4169

VERNON P. TURK JR., Major, USAF

Adjutant

Unclassified

MONTHLY AVIATION DEPOT SQUADRON AND MUNITIONS BRANCH REPORT

FOR MONTH OF: Oct 1957 | DATE: 4 Nov 57 | REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL: [illegible]-133

TO: Commander, [illegible] Air Force, [illegible]
ATTN: [illegible]
Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts

FROM: Commander, 7th Aviation Depot Squadron (S C), APO 877, New York, New York

1. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

AFSC	ASSIGNED	WITH FORMAL TECHNICAL TNG	OUT	PROJECTED LOSS (Next 60 days)
3216	0	0	N/A	0
3254	0	0	N/A	0
3274	7	7	N/A	0
5424	1	0	N/A	0
33150	4	4	0	0
33170	2	2	0	1
33130	0	0	0	0
33270	0	0	0	0
46330	2	2	2	0
46350	5	5	0	0
46370	2	2	0	0
64XX	0	0	1	0
46130	6	5	6	0
46150	26	9	2	1
46170	10	4	0	0
46131	0	0	0	0
46171	6	4	0	0

2. ARMAMENT AND ELECTRONICS MAINT (XX Squadron)

Loading Left ATEN Training

	XX MAC	XX NR
PERSONNEL TRAINED AS LOAD MONITORS:		
No's Required		3
PERSONNEL TRAINED FOR ACFT PINOUTS:		
No's Required		3
AIRCRAFT RING DMT CHECKS MADE:		
Total Hours Utilized		264
LOADINGS MONITORED:		
EXT MONITORED:		

DOE 6.2(a)

4. LOADING SECTION

TYPE	NUMBER OF TEAMS NONREADY	NUMBER OF TEAMS READY	LOADINGS PERFORMED NR	LOADINGS PERFORMED AVERAGE TIME
BOMB	1	6		
AMMO	4	0		
JATO	5	2		

DOE 6.2(a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF TEAMS: NONREADY 1, READY 7

5. EQUIPMENT

TYPE	NR ON HAND	NR OF PERSONNEL QUALIFIED TO OPERATE EQUIPMENT
TA-1 OR B-2	1	14
STRADDLE CARRIER	3	6
P-3 TRAILER	0	N/A
MP-4 TRAILER	50	N/A
MP-10 TRAILER	0	N/A
MA-1 CRADLE	5	N/A
RUN "M" AND/OR MB-1	7	35
B-10	0	N/A
MD-3	0	21
C-21	0	N/A

DOE 6.2(a)

7. TYPES OF SALVAGE AND DISPOSAL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED.

See reverse side

1

USE REVERSE FOR REMARKS

AUTHENTICATION (AYNDERRON COMDR OR MUNITIONS BRANCH CHIEF, AS APPLICABLE)

TYPED NAME AND GRADE: WILLIAM N. [illegible], Lt. Colonel, USAF, Commander

SIGNATURE: William M. [illegible]

8AF FORM 242 (1 JAN 57) PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE. REPLACES 8AF FORM 11, WHICH IS OBSOLETE. (When Filled In) FC 5490

Unclassified

0161

Unclassified

The following information is submitted in accordance with message DMM 02969 dated 14 January 1957.

1. Trailers, lifts, and dollies: no change.

2. Aircraft information:

DOE 6.2(a)

c. 1 each B-47 was requested for 96 hours. It was received and utilized for 72 hours in the month of October. Remaining time for training on this aircraft will be covered in the November report.

3. From obverse side paragraph 7:

a. Checked and tested special EOD circuit using electrical initiated squibs.

b. Prepared 310 JATO's and 20 pallets of Grade #3 small arms ammunition for dumping at sea.

c. Disposed of an unidentified Navy type ordnance armed with 1 demolition block (Tetrytol) and 1 each electric blasting cap.

d. Loaded out approximately 300 JATO units and approximately 34,000 pounds Grade #3 small arms ammunition.

e. Inspected 160 each cartridges for S-12 engine starters and put the entire amount (160) in Grade #3 category.

f. Inspected approximately 1,900 each electric blasting caps and squibs.

4. Reference Secret TWX, 8AF DMM3B 39394. Negative report is submitted.

Unclassified

Unclassified

Filled In)

MONTHLY AVIATION DEPOT SQUADRON AND MUNITIONS BRANCH REPORT

FOR MONTH OF	DATE PREPARED	REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL
Nov 47	4 Dec 47	SAF-T33

TO: Commander
Eighth Air Force
ATTN: ____
Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts

FROM: Commander
7th Aviation Depot Squadron
APO 477, New York, New York

1. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

AFSC	ASSIGNED	WITH FORMAL TECHNICAL TNG	OJT	PROJECTED LOSS (Next 60 days)
3216	0	0	N/A	0
3254	0	0	N/A	0
3274	2	2	N/A	0
6474	1	0	N/A	0
33150	4	4	0	0
33170	1	1	0	0
33190	0	0	0	0
33270	0	0	0	0
46330	2	2	2	0
46350	5	5	0	0
46370	2	2	0	0
647XX	2	0	1	0
46130	4	4	4	1
46150	26	0	3	4
46170	10	4	0	3
46731	0	0	0	0
46770	2	2	0	1

2. ARMAMENT AND ELECTRONICS MAINT (By squadrons)

ITEM	[illegible]	[illegible]
Loading Aircraft Training		
[illegible] Aircraft Required		3
[illegible] Aircraft Received		3
[illegible] Total hours Utilized		288
[illegible]		
[illegible]		

DOE 6.2(a)

3. LOADING SECTION

TYPE	NUMBER OF TEAMS NONREADY	NUMBER OF TEAMS READY	LOADINGS PERFORMED NR	LOADINGS PERFORMED AVERAGE TIME
BOMB	5	0	0	N/A
AMMO	8	0	0	N/A
JATO	0	8	8	0:30

TOTAL NUMBER OF TEAMS: NONREADY 0, READY 8

DOE 6.2(a)

5. EQUIPMENT

TYPE	NR ON HAND	NR OF PERSONNEL QUALIFIED TO OPERATE EQUIPMENT
M[illegible] D-2	1	13
STRADDLE CARRIER	3	16
P-3 TRAILER	0	N/A
MP-4 TRAILER	80	N/A
MP-10 TRAILER	0	N/A
MA-1 CRADLE	5	N/A
RUN "W" AND/OR MB-1	7	40
B-10	0	N/A
MD-3	0	21
C-21	0	N/A

DOE 6.2(a)

7. TYPES OF SALVAGE AND DISPOSAL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED
See reverse side

1

1 SEE REVERSE FOR REMARKS

AUTHENTICATION (UNDER RUN COMDR OR MUNITIONS BRANCH CHIEF, AS APPLICABLE)

TYPED NAME AND GRADE: [illegible] Lt. Colonel, USAF, Commander

SIGNATURE: [illegible] E-4316

AAF FORM 242 (1 JAN 46) PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE. REPLACES AAF FORM 11 WHICH IS OBSOLETE. (When Filled In)

Unclassified

File Card 7AD-5

Unclassified

The following information is submitted in accordance with message [illegible] dated 14 January 1967.

1. Trailers, lifts, and tollkits: No change.

2. Average time for M60 loading (from obverse side, paragraph 4) did not include any training on ignitor.

3. Aircraft information:

DOE 6.2(a)

4. From obverse side, paragraph 7:

a. Destroyed 140 each CN DM grenades, 25 at a time on a bed of combustible material using an excelsior train to ignite combustibles.

b. Destroyed 30 each 2.75 FFAR motors by burning. Motors were found on Pana Demolition Range.

c. Functional tested M-14 Incendiary Grenades in accordance with T.O. 11A-1-10-7.

d. Inspected Cartridges M-1 for S-12 engine starters, in accordance with T.O. 11A-13-1-2 and found 5 each unserviceable due to visible bubbles between the restrictor and the propellant surface. The entire lot of 160 each were locally suspended and to be reported on AF Form 191 ADR.

Unclassified

Unclassified

MONTHLY AVIATION DEPOT SQUADRON AND MUNITIONS BRANCH REPORT

FOR MONTH OF	DATE PREPARED	REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL
Dec 57	2 Jan 58	MCS: RAP-733

TO: Commander
Fourth Air Force
[illegible]
Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts

FROM: Commander
7th Aviation Depot Squadron
APO 677, New York, New York

1. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

AFSC	ASSIGNED	WITH FORMAL TECHNICAL TNG	OJT	PROJECTED LOSS (Next 60 days)
3216	0	0	N/A	0
3254	1	0	N/A	0
3274	7	7	N/A	1
6424	1	0	N/A	0
33150	4	4	0	0
33170	3	3	0	0
33230	0	0	0	0
33270	0	0	0	0
46330	2	2	2	0
46350	5	5	0	0
46370	2	2	0	0
641X4	7	0	1	0
46430	3	2	3	1
46450	24	12	0	3
46470	9	3	0	1
46531	0	0	0	0
46571	3	3	0	0

2. ARMAMENT AND ELECTRONICS MAINT (By squadrons)

ITEM	[illegible]	[illegible]
Loading Aircraft Training		
[illegible]		
Aircraft Required		3
[illegible]		
Aircraft Received		2
[illegible]		
Total hours utilized		192
[illegible]		

DOE 6.2(a)

4. LOADING SECTION

TYPE	NUMBER OF TEAMS NONREADY	NUMBER OF TEAMS READY	LOADINGS PERFORMED NR	LOADINGS PERFORMED AVERAGE TIME
BOMB	8	0	0	N/A
AMMO	8	0	0	N/A
JATO	1	7	0	N/A

DOE 6.2(a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF TEAMS

NONREADY	READY
1	7

5. EQUIPMENT

TYPE	NR ON HAND	NR OF PERSONNEL QUALIFIED TO OPERATE EQUIPMENT
A-1 OR B-2	1	9
STRADDLE CARRIER	3	N/A
P-3 TRAILER	6	N/A
MF-4 TRAILER	20	N/A
MF-10 TRAILER	0	N/A
MA-1 CRADLE	10	N/A
RUN "M" AND/OR MB-1	7	35
B-10	0	N/A
MD-3	0	28
~~MMMM~~ C-26	2	28

DOE 6.2(a)

7. TYPES OF SALVAGE AND DISPOSAL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED.

See reverse side

USE REVERSE FOR REMARKS

AUTHENTICATION AVNDEPRON COMOR OR MUNITIONS BRANCH CHIEF, AS APPLICABLE)

TYPED NAME AND GRADE
WILLIAM M. LONG
Lt. Colonel, USAF, Commander

SIGNATURE

SAF FORM 242 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE
REPLACES SAF FORM 11[illegible]
FCL 6430

Unclassified

Unclassified

The following information is submitted in accordance with message [illegible] dated 14 January 1957.

1. Eighth Air Force Form 242 revised 2 December 1957 not available. No alert bombers on this base.

2. Trailers, lifts, and dollies: No change.

DOE 6.2(a)

4. 2 down loadings and reloadings accomplished on Iron Bar aircraft.

5. From obverse side, paragraph 7.

a. Monthly magazine and storage area inspection was accomplished 27 December 1957.

b. Monthly inspection of Special MD circuit was accomplished 24 December 1957.

c. Inspection of commercial and naval explosive items was conducted on 30 December 1957.

d. Four hours special training on hazards of nuclear components was accomplished, reference T.O. 11N-50-1001.

e. A dual primed non-electric detonation was made using two engineer specification blasting caps and a 2½ pound charge of tetrytol to destroy 3 each anti-personnel mines found on demolition range.

Unclassified