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July-Dec. 1957
Vol. II



7TH AIR DIVISION

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

VOLUME IV

TM-58-5429

4-2347-4

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(UNCLASSIFIED)

HISTORY

OF

7TH AIR DIVISION

1 July to 31 December 1957

VOLUME IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

This document is classified
SECRET since it portrays 7th
Air Division activities for
the period July to December
1957

Headquarters
7th Air Division
Strategic Air Command
APO 125 New York, New York

SECRET

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
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OPERATIONS

0592

S E C R E T

Headquarters
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125 New York, New York

DOP

20 Mar 1957

SUBJECT: (UNCL) Report of Liaison Staff Visit

123

TO: Commander
7th Air Division
APO 125, US Air Force

1. DATA ON VISIT:

- a. Organization visited: Headquarters CINCEASTLANT, Northwood./C/
- b. Date of visit: 22 March 1957. (Unclas)
- c. Visiting personnel:
 - Eede, G. J. Colonel
 - Beckley, R. E. Lt Colonel
 - Carrson, K. R. Major

d. Personnel contacted:

Wing Commander D. S. Lindsay	Wg Cdr Air
Wing Commander A. M. Ruston	Air Plans 1
Wing Commander G. L. Matthey	Wg Cdr Ops
Wing Commander Lillywhite	HQCC (C.A. T.C.O.)
Commander C. W. Herbert	EASTLANT
Commander R. J. Hanson	Air Plans 1A
Sqdn Leader D. H. Jones	Air 1 HQCC
Sqdn Leader M. G. Fountain	Sigs 6
lt Cdr E. G. B. Anniss, R.M.	S.O.P. (C3)

e. The purpose of the visit was to discuss:

(1) Control and identification procedures for SAC aircraft over flying the EASTLANT area. (Secret)

(2) Staff action necessary to insure early preparation and publication of agreed procedures. (Unclas)

f. CINCEASTLANT was not contacted upon arrival and there was no requirement to brief him on departure. (Unclas)

2. The following items were discussed:

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

Hq 7th AD, Subj: (Unclass) report of Liaison Staff Visit

ITEM 1: The flight plan data on S.A.C. overflights would be given to the Northwood A.I.C. by S.A.C. Liaison Officers. How would this information be transmitted to naval forces in the EASTIAFT area to insure the maximum security. (Secret)

COMMENT: It was agreed that:

a. Flight plan data would be provided by a SAC Liaison Officer not less than 2 hours and not more than 4 hours in a case of S.A.C. penetration of EASTIAFT area. (Secret)

b. It would be the responsibility of A.I.C. Northwood to extract flight plan data of interest to COMSTRIKEFIT and pass this data by a secure method of transmission protecting it according to the classification placed on it by S.A.C. (Conf)

c. 1 June 1957 will be the target date for readiness of the system and assignment of Liaison officers. (Secret)

d. A communications test, between A.I.C. Northwood and PEPPER CORN Control, will be conducted subsequent to 1 June 1957, at a time and date to be agreed upon by both headquarters. (Conf)

ITEM 2: Air refueling areas for S.A.C. aircraft would be given to the Northwood A.I.C. by S.A.C. Liaison Officers. Is it necessary to pass this information to naval forces, if so the same security as ITEM 1 would be needed? (Secret)

COMMENT: It was agreed that:

a. Location and planned operational periods would be passed to AIC Northwood, in the same manner as flight plan data, by the SAC Liaison Officers. (Secret)

ITEM 3: What are the implications of S.A.C. aircraft not being able to circumnavigate the COMSTRIKEFIT at sea? (Secret)

COMMENT:

a. It was explained that tactical considerations generally will not permit circumnavigation on east-bound tracks. Westbound flights will be diverted to avoid COMSTRIKE FIT at sea whenever practicable. (Secret)

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(Unclass) Report of Liaison Staff Visit

Flight plan data on S.A.C. overflights would be given to A.I.C. by S.A.C. Liaison Officers. How would this information be relayed from the EASTLANT area to ensure the maximum security? (Secret)

It was agreed that:

Flight plan data would be provided by a SAC Liaison Officer not more than 24 hours in advance of S.A.C. penetration. (Secret)

It would be the responsibility of A.I.C. Northwood to extract information of interest to COMSTRIKEFIT and pass this data by a secure liaison protecting it according to the classification placed on it. (Conf)

June 1957 will be the target date for readiness of the system of Liaison Officers. (Secret)

A communications test, between A.I.C. Northwood and PEPPER CORN conducted subsequent to 1 June 1957, at a time and place to be determined by both headquarters. (Conf)

Refueling areas for S.A.C. aircraft would be given to A.I.C. by S.A.C. Liaison Officers. In it necessary to pass this information to naval forces, if so the same security as ITEM 1 would be maintained. (Secret)

It was agreed that:

Flight and planned operational periods would be passed to A.I.C. in the same manner as flight plan data, by the SAC Liaison Officers. (Secret)

It was the implications of S.A.C. aircraft not being able to be identified by COMSTRIKEFIT at sea? (Secret)

It was explained that tactical considerations generally will require navigation on east-bound tracks. West-bound flights will be restricted to COMSTRIKEFIT at sea whenever practicable. (Secret)

2

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Hq 7th AF, Subj: (Unclass) Report of Liaison Staff Visit

ITEM 4: What identification and authentication procedures are required between surface vessels and S.A.C. aircraft? (Secret)

COMMENT: It was agreed that:

a. Headquarters 7th Air Division would prepare a draft manual outlining instructions for control and identification of SAC aircraft overflying the EASTLANT area. This manual will be forwarded to CINCPACFLT in approximately 15 days for review and concurrence. When instructions set forth therein are approved by CINCPACFLT and COMAIRDIV 7 the draft manual will be forwarded to CINCPAC for final approval and publication. (Secret)

b. Identification procedures will be based on selective use of IFF codes for specified period of time, with frequent changes of code. In addition, a coded voice challenge system will be incorporated using HMF and AFSAI. (Secret)

ITEM 5: How will the movements of naval forces in the EASTLANT area be passed to the S.A.C. Task Force Commanders for search and rescue purposes? (Secret)

COMMENT: It was agreed that:

a. The SAC Liaison Officer would pass movements of Naval forces in the EASTLANT area to PEPPER CORN Control, where the information would be passed to SAC Task Force Commanders by a secure transmission system affording the security required by the classification of the information. (Secret)

3. CONCLUSIONS:

a. There was no disagreement on any agenda item. (Unclass)

b. Early publication of the manual mentioned above will provide a system of identification where presently none exists. (Confidential)

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That publication of the draft be expedited by the 7th Air Division staff. (Unclass)

b. That the system be exercised in the September NATO exercise, "COUNTER PUNCH". (Secret)

/s/ David I. Liebman
DAVID I. LIEBMAN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

C-2087

3

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0594

0595

40th Bomb Wing SAC Regulation 50-8
Accomplishments

C

DO

19 Jul 57
Maj Alloway - 395
A/IC Morris - 395

1. The period of this report is 4 through 15 July 1957.
2. The following tabulation shows the percentages of SAC Regulation 50-8 training accomplished:

QUARTERLY ACCOMPLISHMENTS
(1 May - 15 Jul)

C/R 63.2% NC/R 41.7%

Par is 81%

UK ACCOMPLISHMENTS
(4 Jul - 15 July)

C/R 86.2% NC/R 60.5%

Par is 40.7%

3. The wing has been going all out to complete the requirements of SAC Regulation 51-26. They still have (as of the end of flying 17 July) 28% of the minimum requirements to accomplish. The break down, by individual items, is as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ITEM STILL REQUIRED</u>	<u>% TO GO</u>
Radar RBS	94	31
Visual RBS	25	49
Night Celestial	30	29
Grid Celestial	25	25
Gunnery	6	12
Mass Refueling	1	2
Air Weapons	9	18
Pilot Proficiency	22	43

The wing feels that they will be able to finish the bulk of the above items, barring any great misfortune. Some items will of course have to be abandoned, such as the one mass refueling, as uneconomical to complete. It will be impossible to expend a great deal of extra time on crews getting in trouble with low RF. The visual requirements would ordinarily cause concern, but now that visual RBS is no longer a quality item under SAC regulation 51-26 they can be run under doubtful weather conditions.

4. The crew status as of 15 July is as follows:

	<u>STAND BOARD</u>	<u>INSTRUCTOR</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Select	5	1	4	10
Lead	3	5	10	18
Ready			27	27
Non-Ready			4	4
Totals	8	6	45	59

LOUIS M. SOWERS
 Colonel, USAF
 Director of Operations

40th Bomb Wing Flying Training
Accomplishments

C

DO

4 Sep 57
Maj Alloway - 395
A/IC Morris - 395

1. The period of this report is 1 August through 31 August 1957, the second free training month of the current calendar year. The flying training program within the 40th Bomb Wing was originally given the following priorities

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>COMMITMENT</u>	<u>HOURS PROGRAMMED</u>
1	AFR 60-2	0:00
2	Higher Headquarters directed missions	403:00
3	Up-grade training (both crews and individual).	500:00
4	Combat ready crew proficiency training	<u>747:00</u>
	Total	1550:00

Included in the above program was an intensive program of staff proficiency flights and standardization board checks.

2. During the period of this report the wing scheduled a total of 278 sorties for 1550:00 hours of flying time. They were able to execute 276 sorties for a total 1478:15 hours. This time was divided as follows:

<u>TYPE CREW</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Combat ready and above	1025:50
Non-combat ready	175:30
5X and individual "IN" crew members	260:10
Test flights	16:45

The above statistics show that the wing accomplished more combat ready crew training than had originally been planned specifically for these crews (378:50) hours and somewhat less upgrade training than was specifically planned for these crews (64:20 hours). The apparent discrepancy in the combat ready flying time can be explained by the total of 400 hours that was allocated to higher headquarters directed missions.

3. A great deal of emphasis was placed on RBS training, especially on runs involving Mach .81 with IBDA and breakaway. Considerable emphasis was placed on such items of training as navigation, dry refueling contacts (79 for combat ready and 92 for Non-combat ready crews), practice touch and go landings for combat ready co-pilots and GCAs.

4. Crew status at the end of the reporting period was:

	<u>15 AUG</u>	<u>31 AUG</u>	<u>CHANGE</u>
Select	11	11	0
Lead	15	18	+3
Combat Ready	<u>24</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>-3</u>
	50	50	0
N		5	
IN		5	

Four Select and three Lead crews are assigned duties with the standardization section.

LOUIS M. SOWERS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

T-17 Report on 40th Bomb Wing For Period
1-30 September 1957

C

DO

10 Oct 57
Captain Reese - 395
A/10 Morris - 395

1. This report covers SAC Regulation 50-8 training accomplishments of the 40th Bomb Wing for the period 1-30 September 1957.

2. Total sorties planned - 238
Total sorties flown - 258

3. Flying time for period:

1282:00 Hours for combat ready and above crews
258:00 Hours for non-combat ready crews
18:00 Hours test flights
1558:00 Total

4. SAC Regulation 50-8 quarterly requirements and items accomplished during the period of this report are as follows:

COMBAT READY CREWS			NON-COMBAT READY CREWS		
<u>TLT ITEMS REQ</u>	<u>ITEMS ACCOMP</u>	<u>% OF COMP</u>	<u>TLT ITEMS REQ</u>	<u>ITEMS ACCOMP</u>	<u>% OF COMP</u>
2964	1795	60.4	891	438	49.2

5. The proportionate share of 50-8 requirements to be accomplished in the United Kingdom for this 30 day period are as follows:

COMBAT READY CREWS			NON-COMBAT READY CREWS		
<u>TLT ITEMS REQ</u>	<u>ITEMS ACCOMP</u>	<u>% OF COMP</u>	<u>TLT ITEMS REQ</u>	<u>ITEMS ACCOMP</u>	<u>% OF COMP</u>
988	1795	100+	297	438	100+

6. Combat crew breakdown:

<u>30 September</u>	<u>On Arrival</u>
5 Select	10 Select
12 Lead	18 Lead
21 Ready	27 Ready
9 Non-ready	4 Non-Ready
5 IN Crews	59 Total
52	
6 Select StandBoard Crews	
58 Total	

7. The following additional training was accomplished by this unit during re-deployment to the ZI on 2-3 and 4 October 1957: 42 day celestials, 30 grid celestials, 13 radar grid, 32 pressure patterns, 43 optional refuelings, 14 APN 1276 rendezvous, 164 hours of formation above 30,000 feet, 82 hours of formation at 10,000 feet or below, 118 dry contacts, 46 take-offs and landings, 41 GCA landings, 3 PPI approaches and 2 gyro out approaches.

8. Training accomplishments of stand board and instructor crews during re-deployment are included in those listed in Paragraph 4 above.

LOUIS M. SOWERS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

DOT _____

S E C R E T

3919TH AIR BASE SQUADRON (SAC)
 United States Air Force
 APO 129, US Air Force

BOP

15 Jul 1957

SUBJECT: B-27 Report

TO: Commander
 7th Air Division (SAC)
 APO 125, US Air Force

1. This is a final mission report on the 3919th Air Base Squadron's participation in "Operation Looking Glass." (S)
2. On 8 July 1957, thirteen B-47's of the 40th Bombardment Wing were scheduled to land at RAF Fairford for post-strike support. Five of these were diverted to Greenham Common. The remaining aircraft landed during the period 1236Z to 1608Z. The last aircraft departure was 1745Z. The longest on-ground time from parking to take off was 2:54 and the shortest was 1:16. The average on-ground time from parking to take off was 1:50. (S)
3. Weapons dearming required an average of 12 minutes per aircraft. Film pickup and delivery required an average of 9 minutes from aircraft to photo lab. All film was delivered to the 3921st RTS, West Drayton, at 1915Z. (S)
4. Discrepancies noted and recommendations for improvement are as follows: (U)
 - a. Aircrews are not familiar with requirement for announcing aircraft maintenance category and procedures for preliminary CBR contamination check. Recommend all aircrews TDY to 7th Air Division bases be thoroughly briefed on 7th Air Division Manual 65-2 prior to flying their first mission and be required to comply with it. (C)
 - b. Preliminary debriefing at the post-strike base imposes an additional burden on the aircrews and does not provide adequate training for Interrogation Teams of the post-strike base. Recommend that the participating Wing provide personnel to assist the interrogation team of the post-strike base in a complete debriefing, to include collection of all forms and logs for the wing records. (C)
 - c. Discrepancies were noted in the listing and location of items in the pre-post-strike kit provided by Greenham Common. These discrepancies, with recommendations, are contained in 3919th Air Base Squadron BMA Letter to D/Mat, your headquarters, Subject: Pre-Post Flyaway Kit Maintained by Greenham Common, dated 10 July 1957. (C)

S E C R E T

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986/57

S E C R E T

BOP, 3919th ABRON, Subject: B-27 Report

d. 7th Air Division Operations Order 205-57 was considered to be inadequate in covering reports requirements. To avoid erroneous reporting, recommend that future orders specify the reports required by number designation and the type of distribution required. (U)

/s/ William M Crampton
WILLIAM M GRAMPTON
Colonel, USAF
Commander

THIS DOCUMENT CLASSIFIED SECRET IAW PARAGRAPH 30B AFR 205-1
BECAUSE IT REVEALS THE EWP CAPABILITY OF THIS BASE.

S E C R E T

Copy 1 of 3 copies
with 3 pages

SECRET

DIT 1-9-2-3

Camera Scores 40th Bomb Wing

DC
DCI
CS
DC
(IN TURN)

DI
19 Jul 57
Major Nelson - 382
A/IC Kuczaj - 387

1. The 3921st RTS has evaluated all available radar scope and visual photography taken by the 40th Bomb Wing IAW 7AD Ops Order 205-57 "Looking Glass," The Orientation-Evaluation Mission was scored, and SAC Form 44a's were prepared IAW SAC Reg 50-42. (SECRET)
2. A total of 53 aircraft were scheduled on 5, 8, 9 and 11 July 1957; all aircraft made runs on camera scoring targets at Paris and Edinburgh, and the RBS site at London. (CONFIDENTIAL)
3. The photo scoring results of this mission are as follows: (UNCLASSIFIED)
 - a. Edinburgh: 34 aircraft were scored with a CEA of 1911 feet and a CEP of 1220 feet. (SECRET)
 - b. Paris: 34 aircraft were scored with a CEA of 1460 feet and a CEP of 910 feet. (SECRET)
 - c. London: 43 aircraft were scored with a CEA of 1199 feet and a CEP of 450 feet. The RBS scored CEA was 3888 feet and the CEP was 2020 feet. Plotting the range and deflection errors of both the RBS site and the 3921st RTS gives a scoring error average (sea) of 2418 feet, and a scoring error probable (sep) of 2000 feet. (SECRET)
4. DI Comments. (UNCLASSIFIED)
 - a. The high percentage of non-scorable runs was due primarily to the lack of, or error in, information on the SAC Form 284 (Radar Scope Photo Log). The remainder of non-scorable runs was due to equipment malfunction, observer technique, and other causes. (CONFIDENTIAL)
 - b. Of the radar film obtained 83% was rated good quality and 17% poor quality. (CONFIDENTIAL)
 - c. Only 38% of the aircraft obtained visual photography and of that, 30% was good quality, 8% was fair quality and 62% was of poor quality. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SECRET

DI, Subject: Camera Scores 40th Bomb Wing

d. Photography, either radar or visual, is the primary method in fact the only reliable method of obtaining IBDA Data. Based on the photographic results of this mission SAC would have to restrike 48 of the 159 targets because no one could say with certainty that the objective had been hit and/or destroyed. (SECRET)

e. The "Looking Glass" Ops Order, paragraph 3X(6)(a)2 required the 40th Bomb Wing to submit a detailed explanation for all aircraft not accomplishing either O-15 or K-38 photography. Nine aircraft did not take O-15 photography and 33 aircraft did not take K-38 photography yet the 40th Bomb Wing gave a brief explanation for only 2 aircraft not taking O-15 photography and 9 aircraft not taking K-38 photography. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Recommendations: (UNCLASSIFIED)

a. Request added emphasis be placed on rotational unit crew training to comply with obtaining 1st phase IBDA photography with special attention to complete and accurate photo log data. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. This disposition form has been classified SECRET because it contains information concerning unit capabilities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CHARLES J. COOKE
Colonel, USAF
Director of Intelligence

This document consists of 2 pages
copy no 2 of 4 copies

2

7AD0063DI

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York

DCT

1 Aug 1957

SUBJECT: Evaluation Mission of the 40th Bomb Wing

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Nebraska

1. The subject mission was flown on 5,8,9,10,12 and 16 July 1957 in conjunction with the UK orientation mission executed by this wing. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. During the mission the wing scheduled a total of 60 sorties: 56 by combat ready crews and 4 by non-combat ready crews. The following CEAs, CEPs and RFs reflect the scores of the 48 combat ready crews making record runs and 4 non-combat ready making record runs. Two malfunction runs were scored by combat ready crews. (SECRET)

	<u>CEA</u>	<u>CEP</u>	<u>RF*</u>	<u>GROSS ERRORS</u>
Combat ready crews	2119	1835	83.3%	3
Non-combat ready crews	10575	3050	75%	1

*RF based on CEs of 3500 feet or less.

3. The following tabulation shows the disposition of aircraft and crews on this mission: (CONFIDENTIAL)

Number of sorties scheduled	60
Number of air aborts	5*
Number of ground aborts	3
Abort rate (including ground aborts)	13.3%

*Includes two crews who made malfunction runs on the evaluation target

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Hq 7AD, DOT, Subj: Evaluation Mission of the 40th Bomb Wing

Primary reasons for aborts:

Air aborts:

Basic radar failure or malfunction	3
Radar power failure or malfunction	1
Radio failure or malfunction	1

Ground aborts:

Structural failure within aircraft	1
Aircraft jet engines malfunction or failure	1
Fumes in the crew compartment	1

Number of record runs completed by:

Combat ready crews	48
Non-combat ready crews	4

Percentage of combat ready crews effective (either record or malfunction runs on the evaluation target with scores of less than 5500 feet, gross error limit) 83.9%

4. Photography: (UNCLASSIFIED)

a. The 3921st RTS scored 43 aircraft on the London target with a CEA of 1199 feet and a CEP of 450 feet. The RBS scored a CEA of 3888 feet and a CEP of 2020 feet for the same aircraft. Plotting the range and deflection errors of both the RBS site and the 3921st RTS gives a scoring error average (SEA) of 2418 feet and a scoring error probable (SEP) of 2000 feet. (SECRET).

b. The camera logs were not complete in every detail in many cases, such items as bombs away time, bombs away frame, air-speed, wing, etc., were omitted. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. The radar film showed a high percentage of defects such as fussy returns, spoking, blooming and ground clutter. (UNCLASSIFIED)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

HQ 7AD, DOT, Subj: Evaluation Mission of the 40th Bomb Wing

d. A full analysis of the photography, from an IBDA point of view, shows that of the 159 target strikes analysed on this mission, 48 would have to be re-struck because the photography failed to prove that the target had been destroyed. (SECRET)

e. It is recommended that the future emphasis on first phase IBDA training be maintained at least at the present level or increased. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. This document classified SECRET because it reveals unit capability. (UNCLASSIFIED)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DLEBERT L. BROWN
Captain, USAF
Asst Adjutant

Cy 7 of 7 copies

3

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

5 JULY 1957

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 3D RUISLIP ENGLAND
TO: CINCOSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
INFO: COMDRAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS
COMDRBOING 40 GREENHAM COMMON ENGLAND

SECRET FROM DOTF 7-2513. SUBJECT: USCM CREDIT FOR 40TH BOMB WING.
Reference my message DOTF 7-2127 dated 11 June 1957 and DOTF 10121 dated 27 June 1957. Our basic request remains valid however concept of operation is changed as follows: It is proposed to obtain USCM credit when the 40th Bomb Wing participates in "Counter Punch" 19-23 September 1957. A. 30 Aircraft will make preplanned strikes. B. There will be three waves, two cells each. C. Minimum timing on take off between aircraft - 1 minute; cells - 15 minutes; waves - 1 hour. D. Take-off will be approximately 8 hours after receipt of "R" hour as announced by SACEUR. E. In addition to above 30 aircraft there will be approximately 8 on-call targets. It is pointed out that "R" hour, as determined by SACEUR may not permit 40th Bomb Wing to obtain night cell tactics as previously planned, however, it is felt by this Headquarters that above plan is more closely related to their EMP mission. Request your concurrence in allowing 40th Bomb Wing USCM credit in conjunction with "Counter Punch."

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DOTF
MAJOR GEORGE L. HARMON

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

5 JULY 1957

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 30 RUISLIP ENGLAND
 TO: CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 INFO: COMDRAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS
 COMDRBOMBWG 40 GREENHAM COMMON ENGLAND

SECRET FROM DOTF 7-2513. SUBJECT: USCM CREDIT FOR 40TH BOMB WING.
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195

DOTF
 MAJOR GEORGE L. HARMON

J. W. WHITAKER
 Major, USAF
 Asst Adjutant

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Headquarters
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125 U. S. Air Force

EM

13 August 1957

SUBJECT: Report of Mid Tour Visit

THRU: Commander
40th Bomb Wing (SAC)
APO 167 US Air Force

TO: Commander
3909th Air Base Group (SAC)
APO 167 US Air Force

1. Data on Mid Tour Visit is as follows: (U)
 - a. Units visited: 40th Bomb Wing
3909th Air Base Group (U)
 - b. Dates of visit: 1 and 2 August 1957. (U)
 - c. See Tab A for list of team members. (U)
 - d. Colonel Andrew S. Low, Jr. and Colonel Arthur S. Creswell, and key staff members, were briefed upon arrival at RAF Station Greenham Common. (U)
 - e. The purpose of the visit was to check the status and progress of the 40th Bomb Wing, and the support provided by the 3909th Air Base Group. (U)
 - f. A final critique was held with team members and Colonel Donald C. McPherson, Colonel Arthur S. Creswell, and key staff officers 1 August. 2 August 1957 was utilized to screen 3909th Air Base Group EWP organization SOP and checklists. (U)
2. Findings.
 - a. The 40th Bomb Wing is a highly efficient organization, and extremely conscious of the value of timely scheduling. The efficiency of this organization can best be shown by their low deviation rate (4.5%) in aircraft flown versus scheduled. (U)
 - b. Flight line activities were lax in providing operators and fire guards for power units. The Wing Commander and Chief of Maintenance briefed all squadron commanders and staff personnel on compliance with SAC Regulation 66-17. Follow-up on this deficiency will be made by the Chief of Maintenance. (U)

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S E C R E T

5106

S E C R E T

Subject: Report of Mid Tour Visit

c. 40th Bomb Wing reported GCA controllers at Mildenhall and Chelveston were changing frequencies on final approach. Action was taken with AACS to eliminate this hazardous procedure as soon as possible. (U)

d. 3909th Air Base Group is providing excellent support for the 40th Bomb Wing. A few minor deficiencies are listed. (U)

(1) Vehicles were noted travelling at excessive speed on flight line and driving indiscriminately from paved to unpaved areas, bringing foreign objects onto the taxiways. Rigid control of vehicular traffic regulations should be enforced by the Air Police. (U)

(2) Repair of mess hall equipment did not meet the desired standards for reliability, and requires too much time. A system should be established to repair Food Service Equipment promptly, with a minimum of administrative work. Areas of responsibility should be clearly defined, and Food Service personnel briefed on procedure to obtain necessary repair service quickly.* (U)

(3) Numerous leaks in Hangar Number 2 are a source of irritation to all personnel working on second floor. In addition, the water pouring through the roof is causing damage to office and communication equipment. Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to repair this hangar roof; nevertheless, a priority project should be established to reroof the entire area if necessary.* (U)

e. Considerable improvement was noted in motor maintenance activities. (U)

3. Conclusion. Both organizations are capable of efficiently executing their portions of the SAC EWP. (C)

4. Reply. A reply to items marked by asterisk will be forwarded to this headquarters no later than 1 September 1957. (U)

5. This report is classified because it indicates EWP capability of organizations involved. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

T Incls
 1-Tab A, Visiting Personnel
 2-Tab B, DME
 3-Tab C, DNS
 4-Tab D, DI (Secret)
 5-Tab E, DOT (C)
 6-Tab F, DP
 7-Tab G, SD (C)

EVERETT DAVIS
 Colonel, USAF
 Director of Materiel

IAW AFR 205-1 when Incl 4
 is w/d this rpt will be
 classified Conf.

2

S E C R E T

TAB A

Visiting Personnel:

Colonel Everett Davis, 3762A, DM
Lt Colonel Lobdell P. Brown, 2491A, SD
Major Millard C. Alloway, A07366827, DOT
Major Norman W. Baker, 9409A, DME
Major Merle K. Bare, A0838602, DM
Major Milford J. Grutsinger, A0736134, DS
Major Edgar H. Main, A0433250, DME
Major Robert F. Nelson, A0757911, DI
Major James Seacord, A0560323, DMS
Captain John J. Groos, A01904691, D/ENG
Captain Richard L. Morton, A01554056, DP
Mr. Barton Gearhart, DAF, D/ENG
M/Sgt Jay L. Brundage, AF12310124
M/Sgt Floyd P. Gilliland, AF6550835, DMS
T/Sgt Ernest Ballou, AF20367093, DMS

TAB B

Matériel - Armament-Electronics

The 40th A-E Maintenance Squadron is well organized and operating effectively in accordance with SAC Manual 66-4 and other pertinent maintenance directives. This squadron has a shortage of officers and NCOs; however, this situation is prevalent among all A-E Maintenance Squadrons. This situation has been overcome with a combination of an outstanding training program within the squadron, an aggressive re-enlistment program, and excellent maintenance planning throughout the wing.

The only outstanding problem is storage area within the A-E building for ECM and aircraft UAI aeronautical equipment. Storage space is now inadequate; however, this will be relieved when base supply buildings now under construction are completed.

The squadron has no other outstanding problem.

A complaint was received at the general briefing concerning availability of the T-3 trainer located at Upper Heyford. According to AF-E-7 Report received from Upper Heyford for the month of July, there were 29 training hours scheduled and 29 training hours operated. There were no hours lost for lack of parts or maintenance. The T-3 trainer was in commission throughout the month of July.

TAB C

Material - Supply

1. Food Service support was considered generally satisfactory. Complaints concerning lack of variety received during the early portion of the TDY had been adequately dealt with.
2. In-flight lunch support was very satisfactory.
3. Work in progress on one dish-washer room slowed down service somewhat in the airman's side of the consolidated dining hall.
4. Re-tiling project in the Officers Field Ration Mess affected the appearance and cleanliness of the facility, but did not apparently affect the service.
5. Arrangements had been completed to permit purchases in the commissary by TDY personnel.
6. Various discrepancies noted during previous staff visits were not corrected. Although they indirectly affected the overall support, it is not believed that they are appropriate to this report. They are noted here for your information:
 - a. Delay was still being encountered in repair of coffee urns. New faucets were received on the day of the visit.
 - b. Dish-washing rooms still required steam vents. This is a fairly large project and considerable additional delay may be anticipated.
 - c. Several screen doors and windows require repair. It appears that the dining hall facilities are not receiving proper work priority in Air Installations.
7. Sales in the Clothing Sales Store had more than doubled during the first month of the TDY. With the exception of raincoats, stocks were adequate. A shipment of raincoats had been received the day before the staff visit.

S E C R E T

TAB D

Intelligence

1. Wing-Base relationship was good; no major problem areas existed in the intelligence field. (U)
2. The Wing will deliver all O-15 radar film to the 3921st RTS on a weekly basis instead of monthly. (U)
3. EMP Target study was being conducted; all crews had completed target planning folders (TPFs) and combat mission folders (CMFs) on assigned rotational targets. Air Order of Battle Data was posted and being utilized. The Wing Director of Intelligence reported numerous combat crew complaints about the effective utilization of the T-2 trainer at Upper Heyford. This item was referred to Materiel and Operations for action. (S)
4. An active ESE Program was being conducted with monthly individual crew briefings. ESE kits were complete. (S)
5. Wing accomplishment of IBDA photography was limited. A special training program is being conducted for all crews during August. The wing will fly IBDA mission against selected UK targets. This photography will be used by 7th Air Division for training of 3921st RTS Photo Interpretation Personnel in accordance with SAC directive. (S)
6. This correspondence is classified Secret because it reveals rotational unit capability. (U)

S E C R E T

C O N F I D E N T I A L

T A B E

Operations

1. Air training in the Wing had progressed very satisfactorily during the period of July. Concentration had been directed toward completion of the requirements of SAC Reg 51-26 items. At the end of the training period only two crews out of a total of 50 crews responsible for 51-26 had failed to accomplish the required training items satisfactorily. Crew R-11 wound up the Wing two RBS runs - these items had been scheduled for completion, but malfunctioning bombing equipment prevented completion. Crew R-17 wound up needing one visual RBS run, one pilot proficiency flight and one mass refueling. Due to the lack of available tanker support in the UK, it was next to impossible to complete this crew. Priority had been withdrawn from this crew and re-directed toward other crews who had better chances of avoiding probation. Nevertheless, Crew R-17 accomplished a very creditable amount of training during the training quarter. The Wing was able to accomplish 95% of the required training IAW SAC Reg 50-8. (U)
2. The Wing has had a rather large number of gross bombing errors during July with a total of 15. Preliminary information showed that the bombing equipment was responsible for only four of these errors, the balance of eleven being crew errors. This is considered a high percentage of gross errors to be charged to personnel. Positive action has been taken in each case to reduce this relatively poor record during the next training period. The corrective action has taken the form of re-training and additional target study. (C)
3. There was some complaint about the T-3 ultrasonic trainer at Upper Heyford. The trainer in question is equipped with K-system bombing components and will not simulate MA-7 bombing techniques, so is of no value for crew training. A message had been sent to SAC requesting that the 40th Bomb Wing be relieved of the requirements of getting ultrasonic trainer runs IAW SAC Reg 50-11. (U)
4. No recommendations are made as a result of this Staff Assistance Visit. (U)
5. This correspondence is classified Confidential because it reveals unit capability. (U)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TAB F

Personnel

1. Major Robert J. Nealon, 3909th Air Base Group Director of Personnel, and Captain Robert J. Berg, 40th Bomb Wing Director of Personnel, were contacted. The following areas were checked with findings as indicated:

a. Cooperation: This area is in excellent condition. Complete liaison is maintained between both units.

b. Air Base Group Support Type Personnel: Major Nealon stated the 3909th Air Base Group is very pleased with the types and numbers of Abgru Support Type Personnel brought by the 40th Bomb Wing. The Abgru feels that the Wing showed excellent planning in this area.

c. Wing Type Personnel: Captain Berg stated they had no problems relative to manning in this area.

d. Morale-Food-living Conditions: The Wing and ABGRU personnel officers are in agreement that they have no problems in this area. Morale of troops is very high. A cross-section of the Wing Airmen were interviewed by the Personnel representative making visit and none had any complaints as to food or living conditions. All appeared well satisfied.

e. Personnel Services Activities: This area was considered in excellent condition by both the Wing and the Abgru. The only exception was the ball diamond located on the far side of the base by the Officers Club. Some personnel claimed that transportation to and from the area was a problem. Dance activities and tours have been increased.

2. The only other problem raised was that of officer crew members who bring considerable baggage including golf clubs, bowling balls, etc., and are subsequently sent back to the ZI in a PCS move, e.g., B-52 transition. These officers usually go back by MATS aircraft and are limited to 65 pounds. This allowance doesn't begin to cover their amount of baggage. Neither the base nor the wing had a readily available solution.

3. Captain Berg stated the Wing was well pleased with the cooperation they had received from various Directorates of 7th Air Division.

4. Conclusion. There are no major problems, personnel-wise, between the 3909th Abgru and the 40th Bomb Wing.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TAB G

Security

1. Findings. A. Total of 106 Air Police and 2 officers were deployed with the 40th Bomb Wing. (U)

b. The experience level of deployment Air Police appeared to be satisfactory. No record accompanied Air Police; therefore, the qualifications and familiarization of weapons could not be determined. (U)

c. Deployed Air Police have been integrated in the 3909th Air Police Squadron. All deployed Air Police were being utilized in security of Category I items. (U)

d. A total of 23 personnel arrived who were not properly cleared. Appropriate action has been taken to obtain necessary clearances. (U)

e. Living quarters of deployed Air Police were excellent. (U)

f. No serious incidents have occurred involving 40th Bomb Wing Air Police personnel. (U)

g. Off-base behavior of 40th Bomb Wing thus far has been excellent. (U)

h. Base support provided by Air Police is excellent. (U)

(1) Security of Category I elements appeared satisfactory. (C)

i. Only 2 deployed personnel are in confinement - sleeping on post, and grand larceny. (U)

2. This document is classified CONFIDENTIAL since it contains defense information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation. (U)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

S E C R E T

Headquarters
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125 New York, New York

CS

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EWP Exercise of
Greenham Common Task Force

TO: Commander
40th Bombardment Wing
ATTN: Task Force Commander
APO 167, US Air Force

1. This report covers the results of the "No-Notice" EWP exercise conducted on 19 August 1957, by Headquarters, 7th Air Division. The purpose of the exercise was to test the capability of the Greenham Common Task Force for carrying out emergency war plan commitments contained in 7th Air Division Operations Orders 40-58, 44-58, 50-58 and 500-57. (Confidential)

2. Key commanders at the time of this exercise were:

Colonel Andrew S. Low, Commander, 40th Bombardment Wing,
and Commander, Greenham Common Task Force.

Colonel Arthur S. Cresswell, Commander, 3909th Air Base
Group, and Deputy Commander, Greenham Common Task
Force.

Major Charles W. Rhodes, Commander, 4th Aviation Depot
Squadron.
(Unclassified)

3. OVERALL EVALUATION. The 40th Bombardment Wing and the 3909th Air Base Group are completely capable of carrying out the EWP commitments levied upon the Greenham Common Task Force in 7th Air Division Operations Orders 40-58, 44-58, 50-58 and 500-57. (Secret)

4. COMMENTS AND DISCREPANCIES.

a. Operations.

(1) Wing and Base telephone alerting procedures were adequate and effectively implemented; however, the general base alert utilizing the siren was not sounded until approximately fifteen minutes after initiation of the alert. (Confidential)

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

* (2) Aircraft recall procedures contained in 7AD Operations Plan 240-58 were not fully understood by Base Operations personnel. (Confidential)

(3) The facility for pre-strike combat crew briefings was marginal. (Confidential)

* (4) Pre-strike crew briefings did not contain enough detail. Although the crews may be presumed to have thorough knowledge of their individual missions, a prepared briefing which reviews the important highlights of the operation should be presented. For practice exercises, realism in the crew briefings should be stressed, as was actually done in the Escape & Evasion portion of the presentation. (Secret)

(5) Crew folders, wing flight plans and Forms 175 were satisfactory. (Unclassified)

(6) Debriefing facilities were not ready at the start of the crew debriefing phase; however, this fault was corrected later. (Unclassified)

* (7) No medical personnel were present for crew debriefings. (Unclassified)

* (8) No aircraft observed had flash curtains installed. At least four crews reported no flash curtains, or incomplete assemblies, aboard their aircraft. (Secret)

(9) Combat reporting during this exercise was excellent. (Unclassified)

(10) The Control Room was staffed by highly qualified personnel and operated efficiently throughout the exercise. (Unclassified)

* (11) The granting of take-off clearances and climb out and cruise instructions from the Control Tower is not compatible with realistic EWP operations. Radio transmissions can perhaps be eliminated entirely except for major deviations from the pre-planned take-off schedule. (Secret)

S E C R E T

7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

*(12) The loading of vertical cameras aboard strike aircraft was completely overlooked during the preparation phase of the exercise. (Secret)

(13) The loading of chaff and ECM equipment aboard strike aircraft was slow in many instances. Some errors in chaff loadings were observed. (Secret)

b. Communications.

(1) ECM:

(a) It was noted that the Base Supply delivered chaff to the 40th Bomb Wing over two hours late. It is recommended that an SOP be established in accordance with SAC Regulation 137-9, and implemented immediately. (Secret)

(b) The Base Supply did not deliver to the proper aircraft. It is recommended that supervisory personnel insure that closer liaison is maintained between the Wing Job Control and Base Supply. (Secret)

(c) It was noted that there was no apparent difference between the RR-39 and RR-44 chaff inserts. It is believed that if a color code system was employed to differentiate between the types of chaff, this situation would be alleviated. (Secret)

(d) There was a shortage of fork lifts. It is recommended that the Base Supply make two fork lifts available to the rotational wing at the time of any future alerts. (Secret)

*(e) It was noted that no entry was made in the DD Form 781-2 to certify quantities and types of chaff installed. It is recommended that A&E personnel be properly indoctrinated. (Secret)

*(f) It was observed that the chaff was loaded in aircraft number 181 upside down on both sides. A requirement for closer monitoring of chaff loading by A&E supervisory personnel is indicated. (Secret)

*(g) It was also noted that aircrafts 2313, Blue, and number 485 had RR-44 loaded on both sides. As before mentioned, color coding should alleviate this problem. (Secret)

S E C R E T

7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of No-Notice EWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

(2) Base Communications and Navigational Aids. The actions taken by Base and Wing Communications to support the requirements of this alert and the 40,44,50 and 500 plans were generally very satisfactory. It can be stated that the preparatory actions taken by the Base Communications Section, as well as their knowledge of combat reporting and air operations, was exceptional. The AACS Commander, as well as those supervisory personnel under his jurisdiction, were cognizant of their responsibilities in support of the SAC mission and can be rated as excellent. (Secret)

(a) At the time the alert was called, two communications personnel were on duty at the telephone switchboard and two in the Base Communications Teletype Section. Within one and one half hours, there were 12 personnel on duty at the switchboard and 5 in the Teletype Section; result - satisfactory. (Secret)

(b) Minimize was placed in effect at the Communications Center and telephone switchboard immediately upon notification of the alert. Each squadron was allowed only five off-base telephone calls to activate the "Pyramid" alerting system. (Secret)

(c) A situation was presented to the Base Communications Section simulating the loss of their primary teletype circuit to the 485th Relay Center, High Wycombe. The spare circuit was activated fully operational within three minutes; result - excellent. It was noted, however, that this section did not have sufficient communications security gear to operate the spare circuit simultaneous with the primary circuit. Action is being taken by Headquarters 7th Air Division to make this equipment available. (Secret)

(d) The Base Communications Section had SOPs and check lists covering all of their responsibilities, available at the beginning of the alert. There was no indication of any personnel being unfamiliar with his required duties during an alert. (Secret)

(e) Personnel required to deploy to FRE during a situation simulated by this mission were indicated on a current listing posted in the Administrative Section, showing name, rank and serial number of personnel involved. (Secret)

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7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

(f) All base navigational aids were operational at the time of the alert. The 40th Bomb Wing Maintenance Control Officer stated that the four vehicular radios authorized in Maintenance Expeditor Section vehicles were not sufficient. This is contrary to all previous reports on this facility; therefore, Headquarters, 7th Air Division, C&E Division will investigate this allocation. If additional non-tactical radios are required, Headquarters SAC will be requested to increase the authorization. (Secret)

(g) Checks were made at various facilities to determine outage time which would be incurred if both primary and secondary commercial power were rendered inoperative. These checks showed that the Control Room switched to the auxiliary power unit in 50 seconds, the Control Tower in one minute and 40 seconds, and the GCA in three minutes. These times are considered to be good to excellent. It was noted that the Base Communications Officer started the diesel power unit at the beginning of the alert, anticipating the loss of all commercial power. (Secret)

(h) A situation was presented to the Base Operations Officer, simulating a requirement to recall 3909th Base Flight aircraft. When presented this situation, the Base Operations Officer stated the 7AD Operations Plan 240-58 had not been made available to him. This discrepancy should be shared by the 3909th Administration and Operations Divisions, who were responsible for not making this document available to Base Operations. The 40th Bomb Wing Communications Officer was familiar with the plan and stated that all squadrons within his wing were familiar with its content. It is recommended that this plan be made available to the Base Operations Section immediately and procedures contained therein be incorporated in pilots filmsies. (S)

(i) SAC Manual 400-1A requires that the rotational unit deploy 31 Communications personnel (including 2 Communications Officers) to augment the forward base. This requirement is extremely excessive. Since the Unit Manning Documents for main bases and standby bases in the UK are different, the requirements for Communications personnel augmentation are different. This headquarters has made a recommendation to Headquarters SAC to decrease Communications Personnel augmentation at 7AD bases to 12 airmen for a main base and 1 officer and 15 airmen for a post-strike base. (This figure includes 9-291X0 AFSCs for a main base and 12-291X0 AFSCs for a standby base.) The 40th Bomb Wing deployed 12 Communications personnel (1 officer, 3034, and 11 airmen, 2-70230, 2-64151, 1-30453A, 2-30453B, 3-36152, 1-36350). These AFSCs were in excess of base requirements, and with the exception of teletype and radio maintenance personnel, were being utilized as switchboard operators. The services of the Communications Officer could not be fully utilized since 2 Communications Officers

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were assigned to the base. The required 291XO personnel were not deployed. It is recommended that on future deployments the Communications personnel augmentation be more closely scrutinized to preclude deployment of personnel whose services cannot be properly utilized. Our requirements for augmentation are primarily in the 291XO field. These are necessary to handle the increased telephone and teletype traffic load created by a rotational unit being in place. (Secret)

c. Intelligence.

*(1) Lack of an adequate check list resulted in the failure to install aerial cameras in strike aircraft. Current check-lists should be re-evaluated to preclude recurrence. (Confidential)

*(2) Untidy condition of Photo Lab and improper storing of photo lab equipment could result in serious accidents to personnel and damage to equipment which is vital to the successful accomplishment of the EWP mission. (Confidential)

*(3) Lack of coordination between 40th Bomb Wing A&E personnel resulted in unacceptable delay in aerial and radar film pick-up from returning strike aircraft. (Confidential)

d. Materiel.(1) Aircraft Maintenance.

*(a) Preplanning and SOPs for initiating action throughout the maintenance organization was excellent although in all cases schedules were not adhered to, i.e., sequence of arrival of fuel, water and weapon. (Secret)

(b) All charts and postings in job control were outstanding and conformed strictly with SAC Manual 66-13. (Secret)

(c) Pre-strike aircraft had been selected in advance and all interested agencies notified by maintenance control. (Secret).

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7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

*(d) EWP flow charts for maintenance and operations are not compatible for most effective generation of post strike aircraft. Take-off sequence should be in accordance with capability of maintenance organizations to service and load the aircraft. (Secret)

(e) Maintenance control was operating by E+30 minutes. (Secret)

(f) Maintenance personnel in all shops were immediately placed on a twelve hour two shift basis. (Secret)

*(g) Ground power units were not located at full cable length from aircraft and fireguards did not stay in the immediate area but sometimes lounged 50 to 100 feet away. (Secret)

(2) Armament-Electronics.

(a) A&E shop power was not turned on until the proper UK civilian was located at 0440. (1 + 25 delay) (Secret)

1. Recommend that IEO train and qualify airmen to assume this function during emergencies. (40th BWg A&E recommended this by DF, 13 Jul 57, but to date no action has been taken) (Secret)

(b) Loading of initial chaff delivered by base supply was delayed approximately 2 hours. Fork lift truck required to lift heavy chaff inserts into aircraft arrived approximately 4 hours late. There is no base SOP outlining base responsibility in this matter. The policy of delivering wooden boxes to the aircraft is also considered unsatisfactory. (Secret)

1. Recommend that an SOP be published requiring base supply to uncrate chaff in the warehouse and deliver it in its smallest carton. It should be delivered to aircraft in the same order as scheduled take-off. This delivery should be effected immediately after commencement of alert. If chaff "inserts" are to be used, this SOP should automatically provide for dispatch and utilization of "fork lifts," one or two for each squadron area. Since only ten are on hand on the base, an increased authorization may be necessary. Headquarters 7th Air Division will indorse additional requirement. (Secret)

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7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

(c) Some ECM equipment was not completely installed in the earlier aircraft. 6 of the first 13 aircraft were spot checked. 5 were incomplete; this was mainly due to rushing to complete the job before start-engine time, and incomplete briefing of the A&E mechanics. Some were not completed due to insufficient time. Others were not completed because the men were not told to connect all cables. (Detailed spot check inclosed.) (Secret)

1. Recommendations:

- a. Train plenty of ECM personnel.
- b. Brief them thoroughly before allowing them to work.
- c. Provide adequate SOPs. (Secret)

(d) The 40th A&E had an excellent flow chart; however, it was not always kept up to date. Color codes indicated loading times of weapon, ECM, Ammo and Cameras. (Secret)

1. Recommendations:

- a. Constantly post flow chart so that supervisors will always have an up-to-date picture of present status.
- b. Suggest ECM loading status be designated by two different color codes: one for chaff, and one for components.
- c. Suggest that systems out of commission also be posted on flow chart, especially on those a/o where time is becoming critical.

(Secret)

(e) MA-7A status: 0400 - 22 out of commission
 0600 - 20 "
 0700 - 14 "
 0900 - 11 "
 1100 - 9 "
 1300 - 7 "

(Secret)

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7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Unc1) Report of "No-Notice" BWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

(3) Special Weapons.

(a) There was laxity in fire guard and fire safety. Examples:

1. a/c #2293 at 0445 - MD3 running no fire guard.
2. a/c #32029 at 0558 no fire extinguisher - MD3 in operation.
2. a/c #293 no fire guard MD-3 operating. Same #2530.
4. SAC Reg 66-17, 17 Jan 57, para 7.d, "Fire Extinguishers for a/c and one for unit. Position MD-3 at maximum distance from aircraft permitted by ground powered cable length."
5. a/c #526 - man entered bomb bay without safety stops installed. Was only there short time - but long enough.
6. ADS did not use red flags on towing vehicles. Reference 7AD Manual 136-1, Section VI. Red flags required front and rear of vehicle.
7. Fire symbols were not used in most cases at aircraft during loading. Reference SACTP 136-4, para 6.b. ADS responsibility.

(b) ADS does not have a man in Maintenance Control. Recommend a representative of the ADS remain in Maintenance Control. At present difficulties are reported from the loading area to the ADS to Maintenance Control. (Secret)

(c) A great deal of difficulty was encountered in controlling transfer paper work of the unit from the ADS. Recommend that ADS review this area. (Secret)

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7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" RWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

(d) Recommend vehicles and trailers be checked at the main ADS gate prior to departure for the flightline for fire extinguishers in trucks, safety pins in pintle hooks, and red flags on trucks. (Secret)

(e) Two inserts of chaff fell off trailer as truck was turning to a/c. Chaff was not tied down. (Secret)

(f) At 0410 only one visitor line pass available in Visitor Control. Man with apparently the only key to cabinet had not arrived. (Secret)

(g) See Inclusion #2 for report of individual a/c checks. (Secret)

(4) POL.

(a) Lack of coordination between Refueling and Maintenance Control. (Secret)

*1. Water Alcohol. Procedure called for Maintenance to provide tail numbers of wing aircraft to POL section by E+30 minutes. Info was secured by POL phone call E+4 hours. It was found that mixing was accomplished twice as fast as previously thought possible by base personnel. (8,000 gal/hr vs 4,000 gal/hr.) No servicing difficulties were encountered during the exercise. (Secret)

*2. Aircraft improperly parked so refueling trucks could not be placed parallel with wing trailing edge. Aircraft that were parked properly were not serviced with refueling rig IAW SOP (Parallel to wing). (Secret)

*3. One ground power equip operator not licensed (a/c #2524). (Secret)

*4. Motor scooters and private vehicles driving too close to a/c. (Scooter #SNK 196, Volkswagen #NJB 649.) (Secret)

*5. Refueling checklist not kept by designated refueling officer, and filled in flightline maintenance area (SACR 66-5). (Secret)

*6. It was recommended that the POL officer command post move into maintenance control during exercises or actual operations. (Secret)

*7. Equipment, proficiency of personnel, dispatch procedures, and refueling operations were otherwise satisfactory. (Secret)

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7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

(5) Post Strike Kits.

- 0345 Instructions received from Control Room to deploy 3 kits.
- 0405 Truck tractors arrived at base supply.
- 0435 Trucks and trailers departed base supply.
- 0440-0500 Delay at base headquarters awaiting special orders for personnel.
- 0515 3 trucks arrived at designated rendezvous area.
- 0530 Drivers had gone to barracks and got clothes, and kits were ready to go.

Elapsed time - one hour and 45 minutes (Satisfactory)

Additional notes:

- (a) 2 qualified supply personnel accompanied each kit.
- (b) Kits were complete as follows:
One Pre-Post Kit - 83%
Two Post Strike - 80%
- (c) Special orders for Fairford Kit ordered personnel to Brize.
- * (d) All 3 kits poorly packed. 2 kits had loose items which would have been lost enroute. Instruments, fuel probes, and delicate items were not cushioned for maximum protection.
- (e) A spot check of 20 items revealed 100% accuracy on location records, One wheel was rusty and not taped for dust protection. One defrost valve was overdue for inspection since March 1957. (Secret)

(6) Aircraft Service Unit. 29 call-ins for aircraft supplies were handled up to 1500 hours, with 60% fill rate. Delivery times ranged from 10 minutes to 40 minutes with the average at 23 minutes. No problem items developed. (Secret)

(7) Base Supply Chaff Handling. Two M-5 bomb trailers were pre-loaded for 8 aircraft, with inserts. One additional trailer had EWP chaff load. Base supply had chaff promptly delivered at aircraft but A&E had failed to secure fork lifts for loading teams. To assist, base supply provided one fork lift, the only one available. (Secret)

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7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EWP Exercise of Greenham Common Task Force

(5) Post Strike Kits.

- 0345 Instructions received from Control Room to deploy 3 kits.
- 0405 Truck tractors arrived at base supply.
- 0435 Trucks and trailers departed base supply.
- 0440-0500 Delay at base headquarters awaiting special orders for personnel.
- 0515 3 trucks arrived at designated rendezvous area.
- 0530 Drivers had gone to barracks and got clothes, and kits were ready to go.

Elapsed time - one hour and 45 minutes (Satisfactory)

Additional notes:

- (a) 2 qualified supply personnel accompanied each kit.
- (b) Kits were complete as follows:
One Pre-Post Kit - 83%
Two Post Strike - 80%
- (c) Special orders for Fairford Kit ordered personnel to Brize.
- *(d) All 3 kits poorly packed. 2 kits had loose items which would have been lost enroute. Instruments, fuel probes, and delicate items were not cushioned for maximum protection.
- (e) A spot check of 20 items revealed 100% accuracy on location records. One wheel was rusty and not taped for dust protection. One defrost valve was overdue for inspection since March 1957. (Secret)

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7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EWP Exercises of Greenham Common Task Force

e. Security.

(1) Security afforded tactical aircraft and other Category I items was generally found to be effective; however, in some instances, Wing personnel were found to be in doubt as to their specific security duties. In checking tactical aircraft being afforded protection by using organizations, it was found that out of twelve (12) aircraft checked, four (4) crew chiefs were in doubt as to their specific security responsibility, and one (1) aircraft was unguarded. (Confidential)

(2) Transition from normal security measures afforded tactical aircraft to security measures provided under emergency alert conditions was accomplished with a minimum of delay. A "quick freeze" and positive identification of personnel was established within all restricted areas. By E + 30 minutes, tactical aircraft had been pointguarded by Air Police personnel and all other security posts were doubled. Wing personnel had assumed security of all tactical aircraft by E + 1 hour + 15 minutes. Upon Air Police personnel being relieved by using organizations, a two-flight system was established for sustained security operations. All Air Police personnel contacted during the course of this exercise appeared fully cognizant of their duties and responsibilities. (Confidential)

(3) Both the Mobile Strike Force and Reserve Force was exercised and successfully concluded situations which had been developed by the Director of Security, 7th Air Division. (Uncl)

(4) Implementation of unit recall plans was considered adequate. At E + 30 minutes, 45 per cent of base personnel were present for duty; at E + 180 minutes, 84 per cent were present for duty. At E + 360 minutes, and conclusion of reporting period, 95 per cent were present for duty. (Confidential)

(5) Spot check of ground and air crew personnel failed to reveal any undue delay caused by established security procedures. (Uncl).

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7AD Ltr, CS, Subj: (Uncl) Report of "No-Notice" EMP Exercise
of Greenham Common Task Force

5. The items contained in this report that are preceded by an asterisk (*) require a report of corrective action taken. A suspense date of 16 September 1957 is established for the receipt in this headquarters of your report of corrective action. (Uncl)

6. This letter is classified SECRET because it reveals EMP planning and procedures. (Uncl)

2 Incls

1. A&E Spot Check
of A/C (S)
2. Spec Wpns A/C
Discrepancies (S)

/s/McLyle G. Zumwalt
MCLYLE G. ZUMWALT
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 30 RUISLIP ENG 4 Sep 1957
 TO: COMDRWEASQ 28 BUSHY PARK ENG
 COMDRAACSRU 1821 30 RUISLIP ENG (COURIER)

SECRET FROM D000 7-3081. SUBJECT: COUNTER PUNCH. Exercise Counter Punch is the annual NATO exercise and will be supported by 40th Bomb Wing from Greenham Common. X-Day is 19 September 1957. Concept of mission is for SHAPE to announce on R-Hour on X-Day and all take-off will begin approximately three to six hours after R-Hour. Specific take-off times cannot be given at this time. General route of B-47's follows:

FROM: Greenham Common
 TO: 5000N-0600W
 TO: 4600N-0600W
 TO: Valencia, Spain
 TO: 3830N-0800E
 TO: Cagliari
 TO: Target area (Southern France)
 TO: 4600N-0600W
 TO: Torquay
 TO: Keevil
 TO: Greenham Common

Approximately 38 sorties will be flown by 40th Bomb Wing. 30 of aircraft will depart Greenham Common in waves of 10 aircraft with one hour between waves. 8 aircraft will depart on individual sorties. Routes of these 8

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aircraft will not follow general route given above, but will be as directed by SHAPE. However, target area for these aircraft will be Southern France and route will probably be direct to target area and return.

MAJ CHARLES R. HAMMACK

DOOO

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

FROM: COMDRBOMWG 40 GREENHAM COMMON ENG

25 Sep 57

TO: COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENG
 COMDRAF 8 WESTOVER MASS
 CINCOSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 COMDRAIRDIV 802 SCHILLING AFB KAN

S E C R E T ZIPPO 09-113/B-27/206-57/7AD/COUNTER PUNCH. 2. Conclusion:
 A. Estimate of mission success: Good. This was first 40BW USCM to be
 scored under change 1 to SAC TP 170-1A, Aug 57. Lessons learned. Scoring
 system under referenced guide requires accurate detailed timing reports
 on numerous activities. C. Recommendations: USCM planning should parallel
 EWP planning as closely as possible. Deviation via ground rules cause con-
 fusion and reduce realism of effort. F. Base facilities: adequate. 4. - .
 Aircraft maintenance and supplies: Adequate. B. Communications and ECM.
 Provisions for strike reporting with HF use restricted are slower than
 normal. E. Weather: Adequate. No problems. F. Navigation: Excellent.
 G. Flight Engineering: Excellent. H. Bombing: Results generally good.
 I. Tactics: Saturation tactics at Brize Norton were occasionally marginal.
 Aircraft holding altitudes were not always assigned in accordance with
 arrival times, thus creating some improper separation. J. Remarks: 40th
 Bomb Wing estimates success of this mission 100 per cent of maximum score.

BT

24/1200Z SEPT RJDLGJ

3918

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S E C R E T

SECRET.

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Condensed Action Report (M-28)

TO: DCC FROM: DOT DATE: 23 Dec 57 COMMENT NO. 2
Major Alloway - 395

1. Reference paragraph 2a. Concur in conclusion and action taken. (U)
2. Reference paragraph 3b. Records of this office do not indicate that any additional flying or ground training commitments were laid on the 40th Bomb Wing other than those by higher headquarters. (U)
3. Reference paragraph 3c. The firing range for .38 Caliber weapons is located at Brize Norton approximately 1 hour's bus time from Greenham Common. This is not considered excessive in view of existing local conditions here in the UK. At present, the firing range is undergoing some modification to extend its' capabilities. .38 ammunition was available in adequate quantities for support as was requested, at the time the 40th Bomb Wing was located in the UK. No ammo requirement was laid on by 40th survey team and so was not programmed for. When it was asked for, it was supplied in sufficient quantity and ample time to complete firing requirements. Several schedules were planned with a "no show" response by 40th personnel. This worked a hardship on the training shop as well as range personnel and caused a considerable foul up in scheduling for other organizations desiring to use the range facility. (U)
4. Reference paragraph 3d. 7th Air Division message DOT 12397, Subject: Utilization of T-3 Trainer, 12 August 1957 requested that 40th Bomb Wing be relieved of provisions of paragraph 4b(9) of SAC Regulation 50-11, 23 May 1957. 40th Bomb Wing was info addressee on both 7th Air Division message and SAC Confidential message DOPLM 4375, same subject, 29 August 1957 which refused waiver of requirements of the above cited SAC regulation. One trailerized trainer has been received in the command and another is expected in the very near future. The trailerized trainer on hand will be converted to MA-7 configuration at an undetermined date in the future. The trainer being shipped in the near future will be in MA-7 configuration. (U)
5. Reference paragraph 3e. Permanent facilities are not as yet available for the physical conditioning and combative measures training. Greenham Common does not have a gymnasium. It is, therefore, necessary to locate and use whatever space may be available at the time needed. No permanent solution to this problem is foreseeable. There are sufficient number of tumbling mats and pads now on hand. (U).

/s/t/ Hillard C. Alloway
Major, USAF, Chief, Training Division

1 Incl
n/c

SECRET.

SECRET.

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Condensed Action Report (M-28)

TO: DM FROM: DOC DATE: 30 Dec 57 COMMENT NO. 3
DCCC Maj Speirs - 611
S/Sgt Meador - 286

Reference paragraph 3a. Recent authorization by HQ SAC for 7AD bases to lease maintenance expeditor mobile radio equipment should alleviate the cited conditions. Contractual arrangements are being made with British industry to fulfill this requirement. Consumption of these arrangements will allow 7AD bases to be fully supplied with their authorized maintenance expeditor radio equipment. It is anticipated that the utilization of UK commercial equipment will also permit the assignment of additional radio frequencies. This will greatly assist the operational picture as the joint utilization of the presently assigned frequencies by 7AD bases has presented many problems. (U)

1 Incl:
n/c/s/t Robert M. Perry
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Communications-
Electronics Division**SECRET.**

SECRET.

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Condensed Action Report (M-28)

TO: D/ENG

FROM: DM

DATE: 6 Jan 58

COMMENT NO. 4

T/Sgt Garcia/372

1. Reference paragraph 3f. 7CAC-806250 Test Fuel Gauge and 7CAC-801950 Tester Inverter. The annual UAL In-Use Inventory as of 30 September 1957 shows one each authorized and one each on-hand. This was confirmed by M/Sgt Bush, per telephone conversation, on 21 November 1957. (U)
2. Reference paragraph 3g. The present parachute shop is equipped with a 48' table which is two feet short for adequate handling of the B-5 parachute. A parachute drying tower is currently under construction and should be complete in one year. Additional plans have been programmed for lengthening the parachute quonset huts. This problem was not made known during the unit's rotation. (U)
3. Reference paragraph 3h. There is no requirement for B-47 units to repair control surfaces in paint shops. An exhaust fan is installed; however, the area to be exhausted is too large. The 3909th AECRU is installing partitions to restrict the area to be exhausted. (U)
4. Reference paragraph 3j. This headquarters concurs with the recommendation made by Hq 8th Air Force and the 40th Bomb Wing. The SOP at Greenham Common states that commercial transportation will deliver cargo to the organization. Action will be taken to insure that SOP is followed during future operations. (U)
5. Reference paragraph 3k. Supply. Action has been taken to inspect and dispose of reparable and/or excess items in open storage at Base Supply, 3909th Air Base Group. Remaining items in open storage are protected against the elements. (U)
6. Reference paragraph 3l. Twenty-five (25) F-6 refueling units were available at Greenham Common to support the 40th Bomb Wing. If properly utilized, this equipment would dispense approximately 125,000 gallons per hour. Based on information recorded on the refueling dispatch logs, the major delays were attributed to refueling crews arriving at the aircraft after refueling equipment had arrived. Refueling equipment and operators were adequate during this TDY. No aircraft was delayed from taking off on schedule due to refueling. Close supervision and adherence to schedule will be accomplished by all 7AD POL Sections. Water alcohol facilities for bulk blendings are scheduled for completion in January 1958. Gauge referred to is a meter at the water source for metering water into MD-3 units. This meter was out-of-commission for a few hours and water had to be metered out from a vehicle used as a water carrier. Completion of water alcohol facilities will eliminate future trouble of this type. Metering of water from the source approximately doubles the normal blending capability of MD-3 units. (U)

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SECRET.

7. This DF classified CONFIDENTIAL because it reveals total number of F-6 refueling units and the total number of gallons of fuel that can be dispensed per hour at Greenham Common. (U)

1 Incl
n/c

s/by W. E. Burrill
for t/ EVERETT DAVIS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET.

SECRET.

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Condensed Action Report (11-28)

TO: DP FROM: D/ENG DATE: 9 Jan 58 COMMENT NO. 5
 Major Perez/Ext 172
 (SSgt Bridges/172)

1. Reference paragraph 3i. The floor of hangar No. 2, along with other hangars and the maintenance apron, is scheduled to be strengthened by overlapping during calendar year 1958. This work is funded (FY 1953 MCP, AO30, \$450,000.00), but has been delayed due to the transfer of the Aviation Engineer Battalion that had been doing pavement work at Greenham Common and the resultant necessity to initiate Air Ministry contract action. An O & M project (GRE-204-58) in the amount of \$37,000 has been approved and funded for the necessary roof repairs. Estimated completion is 28 February 1958. (U)

2. Reference paragraph 3m. Stabilized taxiway shoulders, including unpaved areas in certain of the parking areas, are scheduled for construction during calendar year 1958. This work is funded (FY 1954 MCP, AO46, \$1,513,000.00), but has been delayed due to the transfer of the Aviation Engineer Battalion that had been doing pavement work at Greenham Common and the resultant necessity to initiate Air Ministry contract action. (U)

1 Incl:
 n/c

/s/t Francis C. McVay
 Lt Colonel, USAF
 Dir of Instl Engr

COORDINATION:

D/ENGC R. C. Perry

If inclosure 1 is withdrawn the classification of this correspondence will be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED in accordance with AFR 205-1.

SECRET.

SECRET

CONDENSED ACTION REPORT (M-28)
ON
40TH BOMBARDMENT WING
FOR
OPERATIONS ORDER 26A-57 "SHARP POINT"
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
WESTOVER AIR FORCE BASE, MASSACHUSETTS

201

SECRET

SECRET.

Condensed Action Report (M-28) on 40th Bombardment Wing, Eighth Air Force Operations Order 26A-57 "Sharp Point".

1. General Concept of Mission as Planned and as Conducted:

- a. Deploy the 40th Bombardment Wing to RAF Station Greenham Common, England for a period of approximately ninety (90) days TDY.
- b. To familiarize unit personnel with operating conditions while in a forward area.
- c. To conduct higher headquarters missions as assigned by Headquarters, 7th Air Division.
- d. To exercise base facilities at RAF Station Greenham Common, England.

2. Unit Problems and Recommendations, Significant Conclusions and Action Taken by this Headquarters:

- a. The unit stated that during period of TDY the number of air refueling support missions was far below that required to maintain B-47 crew proficiency, support crew upgrading and standardization activity. They recommended that an air refueling squadron be stationed in the United Kingdom while a B-47 unit is TDY there.

Conclusion: This headquarters does not concur with the unit recommendation. It is realized that air refueling training suffers for TDY period under this operational concept, however, positioning a tanker squadron in the United Kingdom decreases the Emergency War Plan posture for initial strike. And, since air refueling is not required by the United Kingdom TDY force to effectively carry out their Emergency War Plan, refueling training must be reduced while units are TDY in this area.

Action Taken: None.

- b. The unit stated that the Unit Mobility Plan was adequate for deployment, and was improved by changing to machine run listings for personnel and cargo while in the United Kingdom. This caused less confusion and administrative difficulty, and more accurate accounting upon the return trip. They recommended that all wings in SAC adopt this method of maintaining the Unit Mobility Plan.

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SECRET.

CONDENSED ACTION REPORT (M-28)

Conclusion: This headquarters is in full agreement with the mechanization of certain portions of the mobility plan.

Action Taken: A study has been in progress since June to determine the best possible utilization and methods of mechanization. Proposals for improved procedures will be consolidated and forwarded when this study is completed.

c. The unit stated, that in accordance with SAC Regulation 400-3, military personnel records did not accompany the wing to TDY station. Since these records were not available, many difficulties were encountered in conducting an effective personnel program.

Conclusion: Preplanning by unit prior to departing home station would have precluded these difficulties.

Action Taken: None.

3. Problems, Significant Conclusions and Recommendations for Action by Headquarters Strategic Air Command:

a. The unit stated that maintenance communications facilities were of marginal adequacy, i.e., job control could not contact the base supply service unit or monitor the service unit action on priority requirements. Also, the number of radio vehicles was not sufficient, and the VRC-19 radio equipment was not considered of sufficient reliability.

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit recommendation that the radio communications between job control and the aircraft service unit should be properly established. Further, that the full number of authorized radio vehicles should be made available to TDY unit, and that a radio providing necessary reliability and performance be utilized.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to correct this problem in manner recommended.

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CONDENSED ACTION REPORT (M-28)

b. The unit stated that considerable difficulty was encountered in making good a preplanned monthly flying schedule due to late commitments being received from higher headquarters. This interrupted the planned schedule and resulted in a great deal of replanning and, in most instances, loss of training by the combat crews.

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit recommendation that Headquarters 7th Air Division dispatch a message to TDY units by the 16th of each month, giving all flying and ground training commitments for following month. This will enable the wing to incorporate them into the monthly schedule and maximum training can be planned around these commitments.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to establish this recommended procedure, and that Headquarters Eighth Air Force be information addressee on these messages.

c. The unit stated that the handgun qualification program was limited by inadequate range facilities and a lack of .38 caliber training ammunition. The nearest firing range was Brize Norton and this range had insufficient firing positions.

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit recommendation that the number of firing positions at the Brize Norton range be increased, and that the .38 caliber training ammunition stock be increased to support the training requirements of the TDY unit.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to resolve this problem.

d. The unit stated that the use of the T-3 trainer at Upper Heyford was not considered a profitable utilization of time. This trainer has the Blue Square K-System components; only about thirty (30) nautical miles maximum range, single offset capability, limited offset range, small radar scope, and at times poor target definition, especially at shorter ranges when trainer is set to pickup maximum ranges. More than three hours per round trip was needed for transporting crew members to and from Upper Heyford.

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CONDENSED ACTION REPORT (M-28)

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit recommendation that TDY units to 7th Air Division area be relieved of the requirements for the T-3 trainer until such time as a portable trainer can be provided with MA-7 components.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command favorably consider this recommended relief from training requirements.

e. The unit stated that there was not a suitable location for combative measure or physical conditioning available at the TDY station.

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit recommendation that a permanent facility be provided for the accomplishment of the requirements of physical conditioning and combative measures.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to provide these required facilities.

f. The unit stated that the following base support equipment was needed and not available:

(1) Fuel quantity gauge tester, variable capacitance
Type MC-1 7CAD-806250.

(2) Inverter tester, type L-1A 7CAC-801950.

Conclusion: Concur that this equipment was needed and that it should have been available.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command bring this problem to the attention of Headquarters 7th Air Division for their resolution.

g. The unit stated that the base parachute shop was overcrowded in trying to handle A-5 chutes in the small quonset hut provided.

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs that more space should be provided.

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CONDENSED ACTION REPORT (M-28)

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to program for construction of an adequate parachute shop.

h. The unit considered the base paint shop inadequate in that there was no exhaust and heating system, no static ground spark proofing, and not enough space to handle control surface repair.

Conclusion: The inadequacies associated with the present base paint shop should be corrected.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to correct these reported deficiencies.

i. The unit stated that the floor in Hangar Number 2 would not support a B-47 with more than a minimum fuel load. Large faults in the flooring are appearing at each of the entrance doors. The offices and shops on both sides of the hangar have leaky roofs. Water caused damage to some files in the Wing Maintenance Control before leaks were located.

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit recommendation that a project be established to make the necessary repairs to this hangar roof and floors prior to deployment of another unit to Greenham Common.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to program for these recommended repairs.

j. The unit stated that when the cargo was off-loaded from the aircraft upon arrival, it was placed in one central location and each organization was required to move it from this location to the place of use. Because of the shortage of equipment for handling heavy and bulky items, the squadrons were unable to move the items to their area expeditiously.

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit recommendations that commercial transportation, after unloading the cargo from the aircraft and segregating it according to organization in a central location, then deliver the cargo to each squadron.

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CONDENSED ACTION REPORT (M-28)

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to insure that subordinate air base units provide this service when TDY organizations arrive on station.

k. The unit stated that some of the large bulky items of supply, such as ailerons, were in open storage. Inspection of items obtained from this open storage revealed that items were in an unserviceable condition due to corrosion.

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit recommendation that all items in open storage at this station be inventoried and inspected for condition, and that a program of scheduled inspection of this property be established to preclude stockage of condemned or reparable property.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to insure that this action is completed and that the recommended program is put into effect.

l. The unit stated that POL servicing was a problem throughout the entire TDY period. Servicing units were frequently behind schedule and required continuous monitoring by the job control section. Reseriving of a large wave of aircraft (30 aircraft) required too much time. Only one gauge was available on the water/alcohol tank. When this gauge broke, as it did during an EWP exercise, water/alcohol servicing had to be discontinued until it was repaired.

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit conclusions that closer supervision, and attention to schedules, is the key to solving the POL problems. Also, that a spare gauge should be installed on the water/alcohol tank for emergency standby during important missions.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to insure that this recommended action is taken.

m. The unit stated that the shoulders of the taxiways are not stabilized in all areas. This resulted in a high increase in number of tire changes required, and incidents of foreign object damage. Too, parking areas were not deemed adequate. The aircraft had to be backed into position, and positioning was such that refueling operations were hampered. In some cases, an aircraft had to be moved before servicing trucks could get behind aircraft to service.

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CONDENSED ACTION REPORT (M-28)

Conclusion: This headquarters concurs with unit recommendation that the shoulders of all taxiways be stabilized. Also, that the unpaved areas in the center of the parking area be surfaced. This would permit aircraft to be taxied into position and in such a manner that servicing could be properly accomplished.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command effect necessary coordination with Headquarters 7th Air Division to program for this recommended construction.

n. The unit stated that the 7th Air Division requirement for 300' and one (1) mile visibility before any pilot could take off caused the wing to have numerous late take-offs and a few cancellations. They recommended that this restriction be removed and that take-off minimums be in accordance with AFR 60-16.

Conclusion: The 7th Air Division restriction fails to recognize the increased proficiency of green card instrument pilots that is acknowledged in paragraph 38c(1), AFR 60-16. Further, paragraph 3c(3), AFR 60-16 specifies additional safety factors that will be utilized when departures are being conducted under conditions below the lowest published instrument minimums.

Recommendation: That Headquarters Strategic Air Command direct Headquarters 7th Air Division to re-evaluate these restrictions to instrument departures, and give consideration to the utilization of AFR 60-16 specifications.

SECRET.

S E C R E T

FROM: COMAIRDIV 7 SOUTH RUISLIP ENGLAND

11 Jul 57

TO: CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
COMAIRDIV 5 SIDI SLIMANE MOR

SECRET FROM DO 7-2495. SUBJ: (UNCL) Exercise of Forward Bases.
5th Air Div message DOD 1466-575, 9 Jul 57. This message consists
of four parts. Part 1. For all. Alfa. This headquarters realizes
the importance of training support personnel and exercise of
facilities at forward bases. It also recognizes the load placed
on one U.K. rotational bomb wing to carry out mid-east, Spanish and
U.K. base exercises. Reasonable compromise is essential to carry
out such exercises and still allow the wing to meet SAC training
and up grade requirements. It would be desirable to have post
strike aircraft available for cross training personnel one full
day following landing at base; however, the time required to carry
out such a program at each of the bases would preclude the bomb
wing being able to meet its own training and up grade requirements.
This headquarters proposes schedule which will have aircraft on
ground at each base approximately 21 hours. Experience here has
proved this to be adequate for exercise of facilities and cross
training of personnel if adequate preplanning and scheduling is
effected. Our proposal involves 60 aircraft days per quarter for
exercise of mid east bases whereas 120 aircraft da s would be required

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by referenced 5AD message. Bravo. Regarding airlift support, this headquarters reaffirms the requirement for two C-124 aircraft as essential to conducting the mid east base exercises. Use of 5 KC97 aircraft of rotational AREPS is not considered feasible for reason that between the U.K./Moroccan rotational AREPS the very best that can be expected for support of U.K. rotational bomb wing air refueling training is 82 sorties. This includes, 30 sorties from tankers enroute from Lajes to Morocco which will be very difficult to consummate. Any proposal which would further reduce the air refueling training sorties is considered inadvisable. Part II. For SAC. Request C-124 aircraft be provided as requested in my message DOOB 7-2435, 5 July 57. Further request C-124 crews have passports and visas for Dhahran. For 5AD. Request your concurrence with schedule outlined my above referenced message which provides 21 hours ground time at each of the three post strike bases. Part IV. For all. Expeditious replies will aid in being able to carry out exercises during free training month of August. Times required for diplomatic clearance and notifications understood here.

DO

COL LOYD D. GRIFFIN, Chief Cur Ops Div

DELBERT I. BROWN
Captain, USAF
Asst Adjutant

2 of 2

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

FROM: COMAF 16 MADRID SPAIN
 TO: CINCOSAC OFFUTT AFB OMAHA NEBR
 COMAIRDIV 5 SIDI SLIMANE MOR
 COMAIRDIV 7 SOUTH RUISLIE ENG
 COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
 COMAIRDASEGP 3970TH MADRID SPAIN
 COMAIRBASEG 3974TH ZARAGOZA

/SECRET/DO5230. Reference 5 ADIV message DOD 1517-578, 7 Aug 57, same subject. This message in four parts. Part I. Ability to exercise Torrejon prior to 15 Oct limited by following operational and administrative factors: lack of communications, nav aids, housing, messing, etc. Current planning of move of 3970th ABGP to Torrejon on 14 Sept precludes support ability of August and September exercises. Approximately one month shake down of facilities and equipment required prior to first exercise. After Oct 57, base can support 15 B47 aircraft exercise monthly on an RON basis. DOD of 2D barracks is Dec 57; DOD of BOQ is Feb-Mar 58. This headquarters will advise on future changes in listed planning factors A EPD. Part II. Zaragoza AB ability to support RON mission during August extremely limited by lack of housing and facilities. This headquarters does not recommend commercial housing or seaweek tents during Exercise Firebox. Previous planning precludes ground rule change for Firebox this date. Recommend no RON prior to September mission. Anticipate that September capability at Zaragoza can support RON monthly exercises. Part III. "Dark

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Night", this headquarters planning participation IAW subject
OPORD. Zaragoza full support planned. Torrejon can support
Dark Night by housing personnel under extremely austere
conditions. Detailed planning factors will be forwarded
following receipt of 2d AF OPSORD and study of operations
requirements. Part IV. Contents this message supercedes W3
message DOC 5 dated 16 July 57.

12/1014Z AUG RJFKBE

SECRET.

SECRET.

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENG
 TO: COMDRAIRDIV 5 SIDI SLIMANE MOR
 INFO: CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 COMDRAF 16 MADRID SPAIN
 COMDRAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
 COMDRABSQ 3974 ZARAGOZA SPAIN
 COMDRABGRU 3970 TORREJON SPAIN

SECRET FROM DMLP 7-3077. SUBJECT: SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

Reference your message DML 2569-575, dated 27 August 1957, subject as above. This message in three parts. Part I. Spanish Base Requirements. Deployment of fifteen (15) each B-47 aircraft through Torrejon and Zaragoza for remainder of FY 1958 except for large scale exercise in October and February will require following expendable support: 1. POL, 80,000 pounds on load per aircraft. 2. LOX, limited resupply required approximately six (6) liters per aircraft. 3. WAI, 600 US gallons per aircraft. 4. Housing and messing for seventeen (17) officers and forty-seven (47) airmen support personnel and sixty (6) crewmen for number of meals and nights indicated in our referenced schedule. Part II. Mid-East requirement for April 1958 exercise remain the same as given in our message

4 1030

SEP 1957

DMLP (J. Freed - 372)

MAJ JAMES F. GALL, JR. Ch Plans Br

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DM 1160, 10 August 1957 exercise "Boot Camp". Part III
Sea Weed Equipment. Past exercises through Zaragoza has
required extensive 7th AD airlift of MD-3 generators, 50
gallons LOX tanks, Joy compressor, 50 ton jack and 60 foot
refueling cables. Request we be advised date cited AEE will
be in place at two Spanish bases. Suggest relocation of AEE
from your standby bases to Zaragoza and Torrejon.

DMLP (J. Freed- 372)

SECRET.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125, US Air Force

DM

19 July 1957

SUBJECT: Report of Liaison Staff Visit

TO: Commander
7th Air Division (SAC)
APO 125 US Air Force

1. Data on Visit. (Uncl)

a. 16th Air Force, Zaragoza and Torrejon. (Uncl)

b. 10 - 12 July 1957. (Uncl)

c. Visiting personnel: Col Wilson E. Burrill
Lt Col Anthony Quesada
Lt Col Levin P. Tull
Maj B. H. Davidson
Capt Eugene F. Brooks
Capt Charles H. Vancil
CWO Franklin I. Dionne (Uncl)

d. Key personnel contacted: 16th Air Force and 5th Air Division Directors of Operations and Materiel, and staff; Zaragoza Base Commander and staff; Torrejon Air Force construction representative. (Uncl)

e. Purpose of visit - survey of the above listed Spanish bases to determine base capability to support B-47 exercise. (Uncl)

f. Briefing was held at 16th Air Force and Zaragoza. No military personnel were available at Torrejon. (Uncl)

2. Findings. a. Organization. Programmed manning for Zaragoza and Torrejon will parallel 7th Air Division bases. Torrejon has been designated as a main base with an Air Base Group, and Zaragoza a post-strike with an Air Base Squadron. Maintenance personnel will be authorized in approximately the same number as 7th Air Division. In-put of the hard core type will not begin before October 1957, with the build-up through December. Total manning for both bases will exceed that of 7th Air Division, primarily because additional support responsibilities in the Spanish area must be assumed by 16th Air Force bases. (Uncl)

b. Construction. Major construction is in progress at both installations. However, runways and taxiways, together with adequate parking aprons, have been completed. POL sites,

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DM, Hq 7AD, Subj: Report of Liaison Staff Visit

including hydrant outlets in parking areas, are essentially 80 - 90% completed; however, valve assemblies in hydrant outlets are not installed. It is estimated that some hydrants will be available during the second quarter of 1958. (Uncl)

c. Zaragoza. Base is capable of supporting B-47 exercise, if the following limitations are recognized and properly supported; (Uncl)

(1) Navajds.

(a) Permanent tower available August 1957. Mobile control is available with UHF and VHF frequency. (Uncl)

(b) TVOR suitable for homing only. (Uncl)

(c) GCA unit available - crew is not located on station nor familiar with B-47 aircraft. Crew will be deployed from San Pablo. (Conf)

(2) Maintenance facilities.

(a) Maintenance control facilities are not operational (estimate second quarter of FY58.) (Uncl)

(b) There are no maintenance shops or equipment ready for use (estimate second quarter of FY58.) (Uncl)

(c) Armament and Electronics facility is occupied by base headquarters. No Armament and Electronics equipment has been installed. (Uncl)

(d) No drag chute drying or parking facility. (Uncl)

(3) Absolutely essential equipment for B-47 aircraft.

(a) The base cannot provide oxygen (liquid or gas) thrust augmentation or ground power. It is anticipated this support will be available during the second quarter of 1958. (Conf)

(4) Housing and messing are not available at this time; however, using a field kitchen, and doubling up existing housing, 50 to 60 personnel can be accommodated. Permanent messing and housing facilities will be available by latter part of September. (Uncl)

d. Torrejon. With the exception of the runway, taxiway and parking apron, Torrejon is not capable of supporting a B-47 exercise. There is no housing available on the installation and no military personnel are quartered there at this time. Air Base Group personnel assigned to this installation are now living in

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Madrid, and commuting to and from the base. Primary function of these people at the moment is receiving and storing Sea Weed equipment, which is beginning to arrive in large quantities. Exercises on this installation before October do not appear practical; however, by quartering bomb wing support personnel in Madrid, providing lunches, drinking water, and ground support equipment, such an operation can be accomplished. (Secret)

e. For details of base capability, see Tabs A and B. Other data, including base layout, photos, and construction progress reports, are on file in the Logistics Division, Directorate of Materiel. (Uncl)

3. It is recommended that:

a. RON type missions not be scheduled at Zaragoza until October, and Torrejon December or January. This will provide time for housing and messing facilities to be completed. (Uncl)

b. Exercises conducted in Spain be restricted VFR until adequate nav aids are available. (Conf)

c. Missions be scheduled over a two day period of 7 and 8 aircraft each day. (Uncl)

d. Only Category "A" aircraft as defined in 7th Air Division Manual 65-2 land at either base.

4. This correspondence is classified because information contained in this report involves EMP capability of Spanish bases. (Uncl)

5 Incls
 Tab A-Operations (Secret)
 Tab B-Maintenance (Secret)
 Tab C-SOCS
 Tab D-SACCOMNET
 Tab E-List of Conferees

WILSON E. BURRILL
 Colonel, USAF
 Deputy Director of Materiel

S E C R E T

TAB A

Operations

1. The following information regarding status of navigational aids and communications facilities at Spanish bases is submitted for inclusion in report. (Uncl)

a. Zaragoza. (1) The present status of navigational aids at this base is a major limiting factor in its ability to accept tactical aircraft. (Secret)

(2) The status of nav aids at the base are as follows:

(a) Tower: the permanent tower construction is scheduled for completion 1 Aug 57. As an interim measure, a mobile control tower is being used. (Secret)

1. Mobile Control Tower: a. 2 ea AN/GRC-27 UHF; Freq: 257.8, 243.0; 2 ea AN/ARC-3 VHF; Freq: 118.1, 132.3; Power Source: Auxiliary power.

b. Remarks: No spare parts for mobile tower radio equipment. No back-up power available. No light guns or flare guns in mobile tower. Remote telephone capability through auxiliary tower providing lines to Weather, Operations, Base Switchboard and to GCA. The permanent tower scheme is complete. It is anticipated that this facility will be operational on 1 Oct 57. (Secret)

(b) GCA:

<u>1. Equipment</u>	<u>Frequencies</u>	<u>Power Source</u>
AN/MPN-11C	344.0-Search	Auxiliary Power only
	385.4-Final	2 60 KW Generators
	126.18-Search	
	140.58-Final	

2. Remarks: The GCA is operational and on four hour request status. AACS personnel to man this facility are located at San Pablo and must be deployed to Zaragoza to operate the facility. (Secret)

2. The GCA unit is being operated from auxiliary power source. No commercial power available. There are no spare parts for the GCA unit. It is anticipated that these will be received within the next three months. The C-E scheme for the GCA is complete. The tentative date for this facility to be fully operational is 1 October 57. (Secret)

(c) TVOR:

<u>1. Equip</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>Ident</u>	<u>Power Source</u>
Radio Set	115.0	ZAR	Auxiliary Power only
Dual 50W VOR (Uncl)			

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Tab A - Operations (Continued)

2. Remarks: TVOR installed and operational. Has been flight checked and found unreliable on two legs. It is suitable for homing only. There is no commercial power source available for the facility and four hour notice is required for operation. It is anticipated that this facility will be fully operational 1 Oct 57. (Secret)

(d) LF Beacon: 1. Equip Freq Ident
Spanish Beacon 389 Kc SZ

2. Remarks: AN/URN-5 LF beacon programmed for Nov 58. The C-E scheme for this facility is complete. (Secret)

(e) TACAN: This facility scheduled for operation FY59. Construction is approximately 40% complete. C-E scheme scheduled for completion 1 Aug 58. This date has been slipped from original CBOD of May 57. (Secret)

(f) ILS: C-E scheme for this facility has been cancelled. (Uncl)

(g) UHF/DF, Programmed for FY 1958. 16AF plans advise 1 Oct operational date for this facility. (Secret)

(h) Pilot to Forecaster: None programmed. (Uncl)

(i) Tactical Control: 2 AN/GRR-7/GRT-3 UHF equipment on hand. Anticipated date of operation is Oct 57. (Secret)

(3) Telecommunications: (a) Teletype:

1. 1 Full-duplex TTY landline (SACCOMNET) operational.(U)

2. 1 Full-duplex TTY AIRCOMNET (to Madrid) operational. (Uncl)

3. 1 Ex circuit receive only. (Uncl)

(b) SOCS Telephone: 1. Two circuits to 16AF. (Uncl)

2. One circuit to SAC Liaison Madrid. (Uncl)

(c) Administrative telephone: Adequate trunks and tie lines to meet base requirements. (Uncl)

(d) ATC Circuits: 2 direct lines to Perequales. (Uncl)

b. Torrejon: Only facility operational at this base is a mobile control tower containing two channels of UHF and two channels of VHF. This facility is operated, using auxiliary power - no commercial power available. Tower frequencies are as

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Tab A - Operations (Continued)

follows: 117.9 mcs control tower primary, 126.18 control tower secondary, 257.8 mcs control tower primary, 243.0 mcs emergency. An AN/MPN-11C GCA is located on base. This facility has no power. The following facilities are programmed to be operational on 1 Oct 57. (Secret)

Permanent Control Tower
GCA
TVOR (Limited)
TACAN
UHF/DF
Radar Beacon

(1) Telecommunications:

(a) Teletype: 1 full-duplex TTY circuit to 16AF (SACCOMNET).
1 full-duplex TDY circuit (AIRCOMNET) to Madrid. (Uncl)

(b) SOCS; 1 SOCS circuit to 16AF. (Uncl)

(c) The Communications Center at Torrejon is to be located in the Base Headquarters Building. No firm date for completion of this facility is known. At present the Communications Center is located at the temporary GLOBE-AIRCOM Station on base. (Secret)

2. This Tab is classified SECRET since it contains information of a logistical nature regarding capability of SAC bases to support tactical aircraft.

S E C R E T

MAINTENANCE ANNEX

I. SANJURJO/VALENZUELA AIR BASE, ZARAGOZA, SPAIN

1. This is essentially a dual station with a runway on each side. Upon completion, the Valenzuela side of the field will be known as the bomber side and the Sanjurjo side of the field will be known as the fighter base. Some of the buildings on the Sanjurjo side are modified structures which have been in place since the Spanish Civil War in 1934-35. All of the Valenzuela structures will be new buildings, part of the Spanish construction program now underway. (Confidential)

a. Space for maintenance control and job control is available and these offices are being set up at the present time. The project will probably be completed about September 1957; however, communications will be limited to telephones only. Radios and inter-communication equipment will be installed some time in the future. (U)

b. The field maintenance shops will be located in Building 53. Some shop equipment is positioned, but nothing is operational, due to lack of electrical power. All shop equipment is being placed in its appropriate shop immediately after it arrives on the station. The project for wiring Building 53 is almost complete; however, the machines are not connected to power junction boxes and electrical power from the base plant will not be available for some time. If temporary power could be provided from stationary generators, the shops could probably reach an operational capability by October or November 1957. (Conf)

c. Two A&E buildings are essentially completed. The building on the Valenzuela side of the field is being used as a base headquarters. Electrical power to support A&E functions is not available in either building. Commercial electricity for lighting is available. The utilities portion of these buildings, which consists of a plant for heat, hot water, etc., is not completed in either building. (Conf)

d. There is an ADS area which is approximately 80 percent complete. The area includes eight standard storage igloos and one 8-bay segregated storage building. (Confidential)

e. There is very little aircraft maintenance equipment on the station at the present time. (See attached survey list.) The Chief of Maintenance was keeping daily contact with the Sea Weed Officer and picking up aircraft support equipment as it arrived on the station. The most critical shortages were aircraft ground power equipment, oxygen servicing equipment, maintenance stands, jacks, and high pressure air compressors. (Confidential)

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MAINTENANCE ANNEX (Continued)

f. Three aircraft nose docks are programmed for this station. A construction team is scheduled to arrive late in July to start this project. 1 January 1958 was given as the expected completion date. (U)

3. Jet-type maintenance personnel will commence arriving on the station in October 1957. At the present time, approximately seven hundred people (supply, installations, air police, cooks, bakers, and motor vehicle maintenance personnel) constitute the base complement. Some of these people have received a certain amount of cross training on poststrike maintenance of B-47 aircraft. Any missions scheduled to Zaragoza prior to arrival of the jet mechanics in October will have to be supported by these personnel. (Confidential)

II. TERERON AIR BASE, MADRID, SPAIN

1. No maintenance facilities, personnel, nor equipment are ready for use at this time. The A&E building has been completed, but no electrical power of any kind is available. Some equipment has arrived on the station, but no personnel are available to uncrate, inspect, and position this material. Exactly what is or is not available could not be determined. (Confidential)

2. For the next few months, any operation to this base would have to be supported by equipment and personnel from outside sources. In addition, no housing nor messing facilities exist at this time. Billeting arrangements would have to be made for personnel on the downtown economy in Madrid. (Confidential)

3. This document classified SECRET because of inclosure which shows airfield capabilities. When inclosure is withdrawn or not attached, this document is downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL as it discloses future SAC Operations.

1 Incl
Rpt of Airfield Capabilities (1 cy only)
SECRET

2
SECRET

S E C R E T

MAINTENANCE ANNEX (Continued)

f. Three aircraft nose docks are programmed for this station. A construction team is scheduled to arrive late in July to start this project. 1 January 1958 was given as the expected completion date. (U)

3. Jet-type maintenance personnel will commence arriving on the station in October 1957. At the present time, approximately seven hundred people (supply, installations, air police, cooks, bakers, and motor vehicle maintenance personnel) constitute the base complement. Some of these people have received a certain amount of cross training on poststrike maintenance of B-47 aircraft. Any missions scheduled to Zaragoza prior to arrival of the jet mechanics in October will have to be supported by these personnel. (Confidential)

II. TEREHON AIR BASE, MADRID, SPAIN

1. No maintenance facilities, personnel, nor equipment are ready for use at this time. The ABE building has been completed, but no electrical power of any kind is available. Some equipment has arrived on the station, but no personnel are available to uncrate, inspect, and position this material. Exactly what is or is not available could not be determined. (Confidential)

2. For the next few months, any operation to this base would have to be supported by equipment and personnel from outside sources. In addition, no housing nor messing facilities exist at this time. Billeting arrangements would have to be made for personnel on the downtown economy in Madrid.. (Confidential)

3. This document classified SECRET because of inclosure which shows airfield capabilities. When inclosure is withdrawn or not attached, this document is downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL as it discloses future SAC Operations.

1 Incl
Rpt of Airfield Capabilities (1 cy only)
SECRET

2
S E C R E T

TAB E

List of Conferees

at

16th Air Force Headquarters

Col Vernon K. Cammack, Director of Operations, 5th Air Division
Col Arthur L. Tschepf, Director of Materiel, 5th Air Division
Lt Col Charles A. Green, Communications, 5th Air Division
Lt Col Thomas A. Heydon, Director of Operations, 5th Air Division
Major Lewis W. Thompson, Director of Materiel, 5th Air Division
Col R. M. Hansen, Director of Materiel, 16th Air Force
Major G. E. Cichy, Operations, 16th Air Force
Major Fuller, Materiel, Zaragoza
Warrant Officer Isom, Chief of Maintenance, Zaragoza

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
40TH BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM
APO 167, US FORCES

40DO

19 July 1957

SUBJECT: 40th Bombardment Wing, Medium Operations Plan "BRUSH FIRE"

TO: See Distribution

1. Inclosed is 40th Bombardment Wing, Medium, Operations Plan "BRUSH FIRE."
2. Unclassified nickname is "BRUSH FIRE."
3. The overall classification of this Operations Plan is "SECRET."

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/D. M. BROWN
Major, USAF
Adjutant

1 Incl
40BWM: OPNPLAN "BRUSH FIRE"
19 July 1957

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BRUSH FIRECREW INSTRUCTIONS

1. Maximum landing gross weight is 120,000 pounds. Aircraft will be serviced to 60,000 pounds of fuel at Zaragosa.
2. Aircraft which have known maintenance malfunction will not land but will return to Greenham Common.
3. Take-Off and landing minimums at Zaragosa are 5,000 feet ceiling and 5 miles visibility.
4. Navigational aids at Zaragosa are limited. GCA is available but the Operators have limited experience with B-47 aircraft and with terrain characteristics. GCA will be used as a Cross - Check Only.
5. Zaragosa Tvor frequency is 115.0, identification ZAR. It has not been AACSS flight - checked. A local flight check has been completed; however, it will be used with extreme caution. The Tvor is located on the Base.
6. Field elevation is 833 feet. Minimum safe altitude within 100 nautical miles is 13,200 feet. Use extreme caution and check instructions issued by the tower and GCA operators. Letdown and approach will be monitored by use of airborne radar.
7. Jet penetration is as follows: Initial penetration is 20,000 feet or above. All headings are magnetic, outbound heading is 90 degrees descending, then a right penetration turn at 14,000 feet within 25 nautical miles to a heading of 300 degrees. Recross the Tvor at 4633 feet indicated. Runway heading is 310 degrees. Tvor is on the base and the field elevation is 833 feet.
8. Missed Approach: Maintain 4633 feet altitude on a heading of 300 degrees. Turn left within 5.3 nautical miles to a heading of 90 degrees and then home on the Tvor. Minimum safe altitude within 100 nautical miles is 13,200 feet and within 10 nautical miles of the Tvor its 3050 feet.
9. Runway Data: Two runways are located at Zaragosa and they are staggered and

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parallel, aligned on a magnetic heading of 310 degrees and 130 degrees. No markings of any kind have been made on these runways. The southeast runway is 9,800 feet by 200 feet. The runway on the northwest side of the field is 12,200 feet by 200 feet. OVERRUNS on both runways consist of levelled soft dirt. The runway in use will be 31R - 13L length 9800 feet. A portable control tower is used and will be located near the landing end of the runway being used. It is recommended that the approach chute be used on landing.

10. Security Guards for B-47 aircraft will be furnished by Zaragosa personnel.

11. No liquid or gaseous oxygen is available at Zaragosa. Oxygen tanks and bottles will be airlifted in by support aircraft. An enroute maintenance team will be provided by the 40th Bomb Wing.

12. Except for reasons of flying safety, no aircraft will land at any Spanish base if maintenance required precludes an immediate takeoff.

13. Although provisions have been made in the flight plan for gunnery, no ammo will be carried on any aircraft and there will be no firearms carried on the mission.

14. Water for thrust augmentation will not be available at Zaragosa.

15. Extensive construction is in progress at Zaragosa and extreme care must be exercised during taxi and ground maneuvering to prevent damage from rocks, foreign objects and construction equipment.

16. A spare brake chute, ground refueling panel, interphone cord and checks will be carried aboard each aircraft. A spare parachute and bail out bottle will be carried, and if available the crew will carry a spare approach chute. Dust covers will be carried.

17. Maintenance and other support personnel at Zaragosa are unfamiliar with the B-47 aircraft and will be working under the supervision of our enroute maintenance

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team. Therefore it would be advisable that flight crew monitor and supervise work on the aircraft whenever possible:

<u>Tower & App Cent.</u>	<u>GCA</u>
257.8 (Prim)	344.0 Search
243.0 (Sec)	385.4 Final

a. The low frequency tower operates on 389 KC, identification SZ, and is physically located on the base. The power output is 500 watts.

19. Crews are cautioned that high gusty winds, sometimes exceeding 60 knots, are prevalent at Zaragosa in the afternoons. Captain Harrington, 45th Bomb Squadron will be stationed in the tower to supervise all landings and takeoffs and to advise on weather and runway conditions.

20. The primary purpose of this mission is to exercise the Zaragosa support capabilities, particularly maintenance and supply. Another function of this mission is to instruct and familiarize these people in all phases of B-47 operation. Crews are reminded that all aircraft servicing and maintenance by Zaragosa personnel will be supervised and controlled by authorized specialists.

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40TH BOMB WING MAINTENANCE TASK FORCE INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATION

"BRUSH FIRE"

A. RECOVERY CONCEPT:

1. Immediately upon arrival, the 40th Bomb Wing Task Force Commander, in coordination with the Zaragoza Base Commander, will organize the Post Strike Teams and assign specific duties to all participants. Personnel provided by the forward base will be intergrated into the Recovery Teams and given maximum training and indoctrination possible prior to arrival of Tactical Aircraft, expecially on such items as Lox Servicing, safety precautions, jet aircraft hazards, and operation of ground power equipment.
2. Refueling will be accomplished with a view toward achieving maximum training of Base Personnel.
3. Brake chutes will be repacked by Base Personnel, under the supervision of Task Force Instructors.
4. Maintenance in accordance with 7AD Manual 65-2 GO/NO Go Check List, will be the responsibility of the 40th Bomb Wing Task Force Commander, Base Recovery Teams made available by the Base Commander will be given maximum training commensurate with page three.
5. Special emphasis will be placed on the following factors during indoctrination of Spanish Base Personnel.
 - a. Aircraft Fuel and Oil Servicing.
 - b. Safety precautions prior to servicing.
 - c. Positioning and operation of ground power equipment, fire guards, fire extinguishers and installations of static grounds.
 - d. Operation of SPR System and General Description of aircraft fuel system.
 - e. Oil servicing procedures.

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SUBJECT: 40TH BOMB WING MAINTENANCE TASK FORCE INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATION
"BRUSH FIRE"

- f. Lox Servicing. Operation of servicing and buildup valves.
Safety precautions and hazard involved in handling Lox.
- g. Location of emergency air accumulators and required air charge.
- h. Location of Hydraulic reservoir. Checking of fluid level and type fluid to be used procedures for servicing.
- i. Drag chute ground handling, repack and installation.
- j. Towing and ground handling of aircraft. Positioning of personnel, use of Tow Bars, operations of aircraft steering ratio selector, location of emergency hydraulic switch and battery switch, operating limitation of emergency hydraulic pump procedure for disconnect of outrigger torsion link to permit full swivel, and towing speeds and turning radius.
- k. Installation of checks, down locks, engine plugs, and wheel covers.
- l. Ground crew engine starting procedures:
- (1) Positioning of ground power units in relation to aircraft.
 - (2) Procedure for plugging in power units.
 - (3) Position of Fire Guards.
 - (4) Interphone procedure.
 - (5) Engine starting sequence.
 - (6) Normal starts "HOT" starts.
 - (7) Post Engine Start Procedure.
 - (8) Responsibility of Base Commander at Zaragoza:
 - (a) Provide up to 16 MJ-1 or F-6 Refueling Vehicles if possible. Vehicles should be unpickled to meet this requirement if necessary.
 - (b) Provide as many personnel as possible for cross training by the 40th Bomb Wing Task Force Commander.
 - (c) Provide housing and messing for aircrews and task force personnel.

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SUBJECT: 40TH BOMB WING MAINTENANCE TASK FORCE INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATION
"BRUSH FIRE"

(d) Provide transportation as required.

(e) Assist in unloading and reloading of task force support and Tactical Aircraft.

B. Housing, Messing, and Personnel Instructions:

1. BILLETING: Personnel may be housed with Base Force. Use of double bunks will probably be required.
2. MESSING: A Butler Building with Field Kitchen equipment is the primary messing facility. A very acceptable snack bar is also available.
3. CLOTHING: Summer uniforms are mandatory. For off-base, conservative civilian clothing must be worn. A tie and coat are required if personnel go to town.
4. FIREARMS: Firearms and ammunition will not be carried by anyone.
5. The 40th Bomb Wing will exercise Spanish Bases periodically throughout the TDY. Personnel are therefore encouraged to maintain the best possible relations with Base Force Personnel and particularly be careful not to antagonize any of the native populace.
6. FOOD & DRINKS: - Be extremely careful of the water you drink and of all the dairy products you may eat. Most Americans are very susceptible to parasites in these foodstuffs. They cause stomach cramps and frequently diarrhea and vomiting.
7. The Task Force Commander will assure that GO-NO-GO and ACCELERATION CHECKLINES are made available for aircraft taking off. The runways are unmarked, so firetrucks or motor vehicles will be set up at the checkline intervals, probable 3000' and 5000'.

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HEADQUARTERS
40TH BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 167, US Air Force

4000

2 August 1957

SUBJECT: First Phase of Operation "BRUSH FIRE"

TO: Commander
7th Air Division (SAC)
APO 125, US Air Force

Forwarded as requested in Message DOOB 7-2558, dated 16 July 1957 (SECRET)
from your headquarters, is the report from the 40th Bombardment Wing Task Force
in the First Phase of Operation "BRUSH FIRE."

1 Incl:
Report on Operation
"BRUSH FIRE"

/s/Andrew S. Low
ANDREW S. LOW
Colonel, USAF
Commander

Copies Furnished:
Cmdr, 16AF, APO 285
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OUTLINE FOR REPORT ON OPERATION
"BRUSH FIRE"

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| 2. OPERATIONS PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | Page 1 & 2 |
| 3. MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | Page 3,4, & 5 |
| 4. PERSONNEL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHMENTS | Page 5 & 6 |
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NARRATIVE OF MISSION REQUIREMENTSPART I

1. Operation "BRUSH FIRE" was established and implemented by 7th Air Division Message DOOB 7-2558 (SECRET) dated 16 July 1957. The purpose of this operation was three-fold. First, to exercise the facilities, materiel, and personnel at Zaragoza Air Base, Spain. Secondly, to turn around fifteen (15) B-47 aircraft in three hours or less and finally, the most important objective to provide familiarization and instruction on B-47 aircraft ground handling to personnel of Zaragoza Air Base.

2. In order to achieve this goal a 40th Bomb Wing task force consisting of four officers, including a Task Force Commander, twenty-five airmen, and necessary support equipment, was flown to Zaragoza Air Base on the 22 of July 1957. The actual exercise of seven B-47 aircraft on the 23rd of July and seven additional aircraft on the 24th of July took place without any major problem areas. The 40th Bomb Wing Task Force, returned to Greenham Common Air Base, England by air on 25th July 1957.

3. The following sections of this report will outline, in more detail, the operational aspects of this exercise and offer several areas of suggested improvement.

OPERATIONS AND TRAININGPART II

1. General Operational Summary for "BRUSH FIRE" scheduled on 23 and 24 July 1957 was fifteen (15) aircraft scheduled, fourteen (14) aircraft completing the mission as briefed. Accomplishments were as follows:

- 24 RBS Runs.
- 31 Radar Camera Attacks.
- 14 Navigation Legs.
- 2 Pilot Proficiency Missions.

2. On 23 July 1957, seven (7) aircraft were airborne as scheduled from Greenham Common, United Kingdom, and landed at San Jurjo completing the mission as briefed. After post strike exercise all aircraft were airborne as scheduled from San Jurjo and landed at Greenham Common completing the return mission as briefed. On 24 July 1957 a similar operation was scheduled with eight aircraft. Seven (7) aircraft completed the mission as briefed. The eight aircraft ground aborted at Greenham Common with a fuel leak.

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OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **PROBLEM:** All taxiways at San Jurjo are badly in need of stabilization. The long taxiway parallel to the runway was not utilized at all due to the risk of foreign object damage to engines. For this reason, each aircraft was taxied down the runway and taken off before subsequent aircraft were taxied. This did not cause late takeoffs due to the fact that aircraft were spaced at ten minute interval; however if closer interval had been scheduled it would have made use of the long taxiway mandatory. Under these conditions chances of engine damage from foreign objects would have been great.

a. **RECOMMENDATION:** All taxiways should be stabilized as soon as possible. Due to the hardness of the soil in the locality it is believed that oiling twenty five feet on both sides of taxiways would be sufficient as an interim measure.

2. **PROBLEM:** The entire 9800 foot runway is surfaced with asphalt. On 100% power stabilization, #1 and #6 engine blast and heat caused superficial damage to the runway surface. This necessitated employment of a slow rolling 100% power check which presented no problem on takeoff at this weight (approximately 145,000) and temperature (approximately 70 degrees). At heavy gross weights and high temperatures, severe damage to the runway could occur by in place stabilization checks of numerous aircraft. It is understood that this runway will ultimately be considered as a landing runway only; however this may not always be the case and the San Jurjo runway could have heavy service as both a takeoff and landing runway.

a. **RECOMMENDATION:** One thousand foot over-runs at each end of the runway are soft dirt. It is suggested that these over-runs be finished in concrete, thereby eliminating the aforementioned problem.

3. **PROBLEM:** The GCA unit experienced trouble in controlling B-47 aircraft for a right hand pattern to the San Jurjo runway (31 Right). This was evidently due to ground clutter and the higher terrain to the East. Experimental runs using a left hand pattern to 31 Right were tried on the second day of the operational and improvement in controlling was noted.

a. **RECOMMENDATION:** Feasibility of a left hand pattern must be further studied and more runs by both conventional and jet aircraft should be made. Particular attention should be paid to terrain clearance on all legs utilizing this pattern. B-47 Pilots making left hand patterns considered altitudes were too low.

MISCELLANEOUS RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A Wing "T" or "Tetrahedron" should be located adjacent to the runway. The present Wing "Sock" is inconspicuously located and is difficult to see.

2. B-47 aircraft using the Zaragoza complex should plan to release Brake Chutes on the runway due to the strong winds generally existing. This should eliminate the possibility of damage to Brake Chute Doors. The procedure worked very well for landing interval of ten (10) minutes. For close landing interval, fast recovery of chutes would be necessary.

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MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONSPART III

1. While no major difficulties in maintenance developed during the course of the exercise, there were several problem areas that must be resolved prior to the proper utilization of Zaragoza Air Base in its capacity as a post strike base. The following is a brief description of those areas.

a. **PROBLEM:** Shortage of ground power units presented a problem in power availability for refueling and maintenance. Four MD-3 units supplied by the 40th Bomb Wing were the only ones capable of delivering the full range of power requirements. Of the three units possessed by Zaragoza, two were capable of delivering DC Power only while the third was in a completely unserviceable condition.

(1) **RECOMMENDATION:** That MD-3 Power units be in place at Zaragoza for the use of B-47 turnaround. Airlift of power units into the base for exercise is not satisfactory both from the point of usage of training. Ground power personnel should be assigned for maintenance of these units. If possible, a Tech Rep should be brought in for a period of instruction and training on the maintenance and operation of the MD-3 Power units. At the time of instruction, a load bank for the power units should be made available.

b. **PROBLEM:** Air Compressors for air servicing was not available in Zaragoza equipment. One Joy Air Compressor was flown in with the 40th Bomb Wing Task Force and was utilized during the course of the exercise.

(1) **RECOMMENDATION:** Units in place are a must for high pressure air compressors. Compressors should be available in sufficient quantity to provide adequate units for a quick servicing of the turnaround aircraft. Recommend that every effort be made to insure that a minimum of three high pressure air compressors are in place and available for use.

c. **PROBLEM:** Liquid Oxygen of its related servicing equipment was not available at the exercise station. While a filled liquid oxygen cart was flown in with the Task Force, the problem of venting in flight and the constant loss of liquid oxygen due to leakage makes this a most unsatisfactory arrangement.

(1) **RECOMMENDATION:** While reserivicing of liquid oxygen on turnaround aircraft depends on mission length and rate of leakage from the aircraft system, some liquid oxygen servicing will be required. At least two or three servicing units with replacement parts should be on hand, along with a source of liquid oxygen. If no commercial source is available, the possibility of obtaining a field generating unit should be explored.

d. **PROBLEM:** Although water alcohol servicing equipment is available, the water alcohol mixture is not. Possible heavy weight takeoffs with corresponding high runway temperatures would make the use of water alcohol a necessity.

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(1) RECOMMENDATION: It was the understanding of the 40th Task Force that the lack of proper water was the problem in obtaining water alcohol mixture for aircraft servicing. If adequate water supply cannot be obtained from local sources, it is recommended that the possibility of obtaining a field distillation unit for water be investigated.

e. PROBLEM: While the personnel assigned Zaragoza indicated an earnest willingness to learn and cooperated with the 40th Bomb Wing Instructors in every way, their total of training or experience precludes the obtaining of a high degree of efficiency in ground handling of B-47 aircraft.

(1) RECOMMENDATION: While it is realized that trained maintenance personnel are projected for assignment to Zaragoza, it is recommended that such assignment be made as rapidly as possible to insure adequate post-strike capability of the base.

f. PROBLEM: Difference in fuel requirements presented a problem in refueling. While refueling was accomplished with strict observance to proper procedures and with a high degree of efficiency, the necessity for top-off requiring an additional MJ-1 truck unit doubled the refueling time required. This factor would limit the capacity of refueling additional aircraft within the desired time limits.

(1) RECOMMENDATION: When the refueling pit hydrant system becomes operational the time factor for varying fuel loads will be solved. However, until the system is placed in use, it is recommended that aircraft exercising the Zaragoza base be refueled with a standard fuel load. Time factors can then be adjusted to the number of units required and refueling times can then be determined.

g. PROBLEM: Lack of a centralized maintenance control without proper radio and telephone communications facilities resulted in a lack of control over maintenance being performed on the line. Delays of varying amounts were encountered in obtaining maintenance discrepancies from the flight crew after landing.

(1) RECOMMENDATION: Installation of radio communications for both the aircraft control room and the maintenance control room, in addition to flight line radio vehicles, is a must for successful turnaround operation. SOP's for turnaround aircraft should be written providing for major maintenance discrepancies to be relayed to the maintenance control section via the wing control room prior to the aircraft landing. In this way specialist support can be provided immediately to the parking area. These SOP's should provide specific instructions on sequence of events to be followed to insure rapid handling of turnaround aircraft.

(a) In the absence of radio communications a special maintenance debriefing team should be set up to meet each aircraft upon landing and immediately determine its maintenance requirements. All specialist requirements should be coordinated through this maintenance debriefing team. They should be the sole agency for controlling maintenance requirements.

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(b) In future exercises, it is recommended that a sequence of events chart similar to an EWP flow chart be prepared, indicating the sequence of events to be followed by maintenance line number. Aircraft numbers can then be inserted when sequence of landing times become known. These charts, reduced in size, can be distributed to all concerned personnel, showing them exactly what is to be done and when it is to be done.

h. PROBLEM: Proper positioning of aircraft in parking locations in relationship to fuel pits was difficult without painted guide lines for the main gear. In several instances, the outrigger gear was run over the raised hump of the refueling pits. Aircraft were stopped at different locations in relation to their SPR point and the fuel pits.

(1) RECOMMENDATION: That ramp area guide lines be painted to provide the proper parking location of aircraft in relation to pit positions. A block type box area should be painted to indicate the proper position for the forward main gear stopping point. In this way each aircraft could be properly positioned for fast and efficient refueling from the ramp pit positions.

PERSONNEL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHEDPART IV

1. Training was accomplished in the following fields:

a. Ground power specialist, to include maintenance, safety and operation of assigned units. Personnel that were used as operators only were trained in safety and operational procedure while at the aircraft.

b. Drag-Chute - Personnel were instructed in repack of both drag and approach chutes. Training progressed at such a pace that all chutes had been repacked and delivered to the aircraft on an average of one and one half hours after the aircraft landing time. Average time for all chutes was twenty minutes per-chute.

c. Refueling progressed without difficulty. Refueling personnel were very capable and indicated that ample instruction plus experience was available locally.

d. Liquid oxygen servicing was accomplished under the supervision of experienced personnel. Instruction in proper safety was given and the use of protective clothing was stressed to prevent possible injury. After one day's instruction, local personnel serviced aircraft with adequate skill.

e. Ground operation of aircraft by crew chief type personnel - Personnel were given opportunity to perform all ground operation from landing until taxi. Since very little maintenance was required, only routine ground handling operation was given. This included refueling, after flight inspection, pre-flight, refueling operation in the cockpit, towing, fire guard, engine start, and taxi procedures. A special team of local personnel handled all taxi and parking * in an excellent manner. The safety aspect was included and stressed in all training.

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f. With a definite lack of maintenance skills among Zaragoza personnel, a good job was accomplished with cooks, bakers, and clerks. However, this Task Force does not recommend reliance on such personnel to perform the necessary tasks under expanded type exercises. Highly skilled maintenance personnel would be required to adequately supervise the safe ground handling of aircraft at all times while this type of unskilled personnel is used.

REFUELING AND MAINTENANCE TIME FACTORSPART V

1. Refueling time factors has been previously discussed under maintenance problems. As was pointed out, the varying fuel load requirements with the necessity for providing extra refueling units in some cases doubled the time factor for refueling individual aircraft. An average of the time elements involved for refueling the fourteen (14) aircraft that landed at Zaragoza indicates that 59.5 minutes were required for refueling.
2. Maintenance requirements in accordance with 7th Air Division go-no-go check lists were very minor. Several reported malfunctions that were not safety of flight items, could not be corrected because of limitation of specialists, equipment, or supplies. For those malfunctions that were corrected during the period of aircraft down time, the average maintenance time was 25 minutes.
3. Attached as annex "A" to this report is a breakdown by aircraft serial number of the various time factors involved in ground handling of the aircraft at Zaragoza Air Base

SECURITY OF AIRCRAFTPART VI

1. The system of point security guards, as utilized during the exercise, was not satisfactory. While it is recognized that the number of guards that could be posted is limited by personnel availability, it would be more desirable to have a guard for each aircraft.
2. The perimeter of the point guards used was too close to the aircraft to prevent the free flow of maintenance traffic from one aircraft to another. As a result, the aircraft parking area was congested with vehicle traffic passing, or parked in close proximity to the aircraft.
3. If personnel are not available to provide individual guards for each aircraft, it is suggested that the security perimeter be expanded to a point that would provide a free flow traffic area around the four sides of the aircraft parking area. Such action could be accomplished without compromising the security of the aircraft.
4. Sufficient access points should be established to prevent the holdup of maintenance traffic entering and leaving the aircraft parking area.

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONSPART VII

1. From the point of obtaining the objective of the primary purpose of the first phase of Operation "BRUSH FIRE" the mission can be considered a success. The primary objective of training Zaragoza personnel in safe ground handling of aircraft on post-strike type turnaround was achieved. Fourteen (14) B-47 aircraft were recovered, refueled, prepared for flight, and launched within the allotted time limit. However, this can only be considered a small beginning toward the utilization of Zaragoza for its primary purpose of post-strike recovery.

2. It must first be remembered that only category "A" aircraft landed. In addition, no major maintenance problems developed during the period the aircraft were on the ground. These factors undoubtedly contributed greatly to the success of the initial mission and this success should not be used as a criteria on what can happen during varying operating conditions.

3. Because of the lack of inplace ground servicing equipment, ground power units, and skilled personnel, Zaragoza Air Base cannot at this time be considered capable of supporting a no notice type of exercise. Much remains to be accomplished in future training, obtaining of necessary equipment and skilled personnel before Zaragoza will be able to support its primary mission.

4. This organization wishes to express its appreciation for the splendid spirit of cooperation and help it received from all the personnel at Zaragoza Air Base. With the proper equipment and skilled personnel, their extremely high morale and "willingness to do" well insure the success of any mission they are given.

1 Annex
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OPERATION BRUSHFIRE

Aircraft Number	Landing Time	Score-Park Time	Refueling Time	Maintenance Time	Pre-Flight	Taxi	Take Off							
Time Limits			30	30										
53-2032	1217	1223	66	30	1530	1540	1600	Fuel Leak						
2531	1234	1239	48	0	1535	1545	1610							
2526	1245	1251	69	20	1545	1555	1620	Hydraulic Leak						
545	1300	1306	104	25	1600	1610	1630	#2 Fuel flow meter fluctuates 200 lbs per hour constantly						
524	1315	1321	54	0	1615	1625	1640							
530	1329	1340	65	0	1625	1635	1650							
2313	1350	1356	69	0	1630	1650	1700							

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OPERATIONS BRUSH FIRE

Aircraft Number	Landing Time	Score-Park Time	Refueling Time	Maintenance Time	Preflight	Taxi	Take off							
Time Limits			30	30										
52-170	1215	1220	17	0	1530	1543	1600		Radio operates Int					
53-2313	1245	1250	95	0	1535	1547	1610							
53-2298	1255	1300	25	0	1555	1605	1620							
52-480	1305	1310	40	0	1600	1610	1630		#2 Gen will not stay in line					
52-334	1318	1323	60	0	1605	1617	1640							
52-539	1333	1340	61	0	1610	1630	1650							
52-181	1425	1430	60	0	1645	1666	1710							

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FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENG

2 Aug 1957

TO: COMDRAIRDIV 5 SIDI SLIMANE MOROCCO
 COMDRAF 16 MADRID SPAIN
 COMDRAIRDIV 2 DHAHNAN SAUDI ARABIA
 COMDRBOMWG 40 GREENHAM COMMON ENG
 CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY
 COMDRABGRU 3909 GREENHAM COMMON ENG
 CFLTCONAIRDIV 7 HIGH WYCOMBE ENG

INFO: CINCUSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 COMDRAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
 COMDRAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS
 COMDRAIRDIV 802 SCHIILING AFB KAN
 COMDRAREPS 44 BEN GUERIR MOROCCO
 COMDRAREPS 44 DET 1 MILDENHALL ENG
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TASK ORGANIZATIONS: (See Paragraph 3)

1. GENERAL SITUATION: A requirement exists to conduct training exercise at certain middle East Bases. Exercise is designed to provide ground graining for personnel at these bases, and to test base capabilities, and potential. Unclassified nickname is BOOT CAMP.

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a. Intelligence - omitted.

b. Friendly Forces:

(1) USAFE:

(a) Will provide necessary base facilities, equipment and personnel at Night Crawler (Conf), Dhahran and Wheelus for SAC forces participating in this exercise.

(b) Insure that IOX, ADI, WAI and allied servicing equipment is operational, and available, prior to arrival of first tactical aircraft.

(c) Advise this headquarters by operational immediate teletype of any deficiencies at post-strike bases which would interfere with planned ground time.

(d) Provide point guards for Security of SAC tactical aircraft as required by the Task Force Commanders. (See paragraph 3X 16)

(2) Fifth Air Division:

(a) Provide necessary base facilities in event any B-47's are diverted to Fifth Air Division Bases.

(b) Provide four (4) KC-97's for airlift support from resources of 44th AREFS (Morocco Element). Aircraft to be in place at Greenham Common not later than 22 August 1957.

(c) Provide this headquarters, not later than 15 August 1957, with names of observers from your headquarters that will participate in this exercise.

(d) Insure that at least three of the four KC-97 crews (from Morocco Element) assigned to this exercise have passport requirements necessary for entry into Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

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(See paragraph 3X 15).

(e) Provide tanker spares and equipment support from 44th AREPS assets in place in Morocco, 1000 pounds per KC-97 authorized.

(3) Sixteenth Air Force:

(a) Provide Class CX Control Teams at Night Crawler (C) Dhahran and Wheelus. Teams to consist of one (1) operations specialist AFSC 60170, one communications officer, AFSC 3034, one (1) cryptographic technician AFSC 29250 or 29270, and one (1) Controller.

(b) Provide this headquarters with names of members of control teams, not later than 15 August 1957.

2. MISSION: To conduct training exercise at Middle East Bases employing 15 B-47 aircraft and crews, plus support personnel and aircraft. Personnel to receive post-strike training will be supplied from resources of each base. Maximum training and indoctrination will be given base personnel with special emphasis given to such areas as LOX, ADI, and WAI servicing, safety precautions; jet aircraft hazards and operation of ground power equipment.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

a. 40th Bomb Wing:

(1) Deploy 15 B-47 aircraft, crews and support personnel in accordance with instructions contained herein.

(2) Provide 1 B-47 aircraft on Standby at Greenham Common for purpose of airlifting spare parts to Forward Areas if requested.

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(3) Designate two officers in grade of Lieutenant Colonel to be Task Force Commander for Task Force Able and Task Force Baker. Task Force Able will deploy to Night Crawler (6) and Wheelus, Task Force Baker will deploy to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

(4) Insure that all personnel are thoroughly briefed on expected conduct at exercise bases.

(5) Provide one (1) aircraft maintenance officer, AFSC 4344, for duty on each Class CX Control Team.

(a) 7th AD Flight Control:

(1) Will monitor status of aircraft and progress of exercise.

(2) Secure necessary diplomatic clearances for all overflight of foreign territory during this exercise.

c. 3909 ABGRU:

(1) Provide base facilities and services as requested by Commander, 40th Bomb Wing during period of this exercise.

d. 3913 ABSQ:

(1) Provide two (2) KC-97 aircraft for airlift support from 44th AREFS (UK Element). Crews will meet SAC passenger carrying requirements.

3X. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) X day for this exercise is 26 August 1957, unclassified nickname is BOOT CAMP.

(2) Personnel deploying to Saudi Arabia will be thoroughly screened to preclude entry to this base of any personnel of Jewish faith or nationality. Importation into Saudi Arabia of liquor, weapons and ammo is forbidden by Saudi Arabia law. Summer uniforms are authorized and

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recommended for wear at Night Crawler (C), Dhahran and Wheelus.

(3) All landings by B-47's at exercise bases will be made during daylight hours.

(4) Crew rest will be in accordance with SAC Reg 62-19.

(5) Flying safety will receive primary consideration throughout this exercise.

(6) American dollars only are used at Night Crawler (C). MPC cannot be used.

(7) Schedules:

X minus 4 - 6 KC-97 arrive Greenham Common

X minus 2 - 3 KC-97 depart Greenham Common for Night Crawler (C) so as to arrive during daylight hours.

3 KC-97 depart Greenham Common for Wheelus (RON)

X minus 1 - 2 KC-97 depart Wheelus for Dhahran

X day - 15 B-47 depart Greenham Common for Night Crawler (C) RON

X plus 1 - 15 B-47 depart Night Crawler (C) for

3 KC-97 depart Night Crawler (C) for Wheelus (RON)

X plus 2 - 15 B-47 depart Dhahran for Wheelus (RON)

3 KC-97 depart Dhahran for Wheelus (RON)

X plus 3 - 15 B-47 depart Wheelus for Greenham

Common

6 KC-97 depart Wheelus for Greenham

Common

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(8) Timing:

(a) KC-97's deploying from Greenham Common to Dhahran, via Wheelus, will arrive Dhahran not later than 1500Z, X minus 1.

(c) KC-97's deploying from Night Crawler (C) to Wheelus will arrive Wheelus not later than 2300Z X plus 1.

(d) KC-97's redeploying from Dhahran to Greenham Common, via Wheelus, will depart at direction of Dhahran Task Force Commander.

(e) First B-47 aircraft will arrive Night Crawler (C) 0900Z X day.

(f) First B-47 will depart Night Crawler (C) at 0600Z X plus 1, for Dhahran.

(g) First B-47 will depart Dhahran 0700Z, X plus 2 for Wheelus.

(h) First B-47 will depart Wheelus 1000Z, X plus 3, for Greenham Common. Take-off interval for B-47 aircraft from Greenham Common, Dhahran and Wheelus will be at discretion of Commander, 40th Bomb Wing, but will not exceed 10 minutes between aircraft. Take-off interval from Night Crawler (C) will be a minimum of 10 minutes between aircraft.

(9) Routes:

(a) B-47 (Greenham Common to Night Crawler (c)

1 Depart Greenham Common

to 3600N-1500E

to 3600N-2500E

to 3600N-3400E

to Mersin 6

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to Night Crawler (C)

2 Night Crawler (C) to Dhahran

Depart Night Crawler (C)

to Elazig Turkey - (3840N-3914E)

to Siirt, Turkey - (3758N-4159E)

to Zakhe

to Kirkuk

to Baghdad

to Abadan

to Dhahran

3 Dhahran to Wheelus

Depart Dhahran

to 2530N-4630E

to 2103N-3715E

to 2100N-2500E

to Wheelus

4 Wheelus to Greenham Common at discretion of

Commander, 40th Bomb Wing.

(b) KC-97 Routes:

1 Greenham Common to Night Crawler (C)

Depart Greenham Common

to 3600N-1500E

to 3600N-2500E

to 3600N-3400E

to Mersin

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to Night Crawler (C)

2 Night Crawler (C) to Wheelus

Depart Night Crawler (C)

to Mersin

to 3600N-3400E

to 3600N-2500E

to Wheelus

3 Greenham Common to Dhahran

Depart Greenham Common

to Wheelus (RON)

to 2100N-2500E

to 2103N-3715E

to 2530N-4630E

to Dhahran

4 Dhahran to Greenham Common

Reciprecal route:

(10) Task Force Commander at each base will check as to line speed markings on runway. If no line speed markings are installed, necessary steps will be taken to position a vehicle or other object at points along side of runway so B-47 crews will have visual line speed checks. Runways will be marked 1000 feet from landing end to provide safe touchdown reference.

(11) Reports:

(a) Permanently required reports in accordance with paragraph 6a(1), SAC Manual 55-8.

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(b) M-2, M-10, M-15, M-17 reports will be submitted for bomber and tanker aircraft movement.

(c) Applicable T series reports will be submitted on tanker operations involving refueling, if any.

(d) Commander, 40th Bomb Wing will submit narrative type B-27 report, which will inclose narrative reports from Task Force Commanders. All aircraft movement reports will be submitted, distribution "A".

(12) Commanders will insure that all medical regulations pertaining to required inoculations for personnel deploying to exercise areas are complied with.

(13) Overflight of Saudi Arabia towns is prohibited.

(14) Emergency inflight refuelings:

(a) KC-97 support aircraft will be used at each landing base for strip alert. Specific times for crew and aircraft to be on alert will be established by Task Force Commanders. Aviation gas may be used as necessary for strip alert, to preclude requirement of surging tanks for long range flight.

(b) Information pertaining to emergency inflight refueling follows:

1 Night Crawler (C)

Orbit/Point - Adana Omni (112.1 Dan)

Orbit altitude - 16,500 feet

Rend Point - 3710N-3603E

Refueling Altitude - 16000

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True Course from Rendz - 072 degrees

Altitude Set. - 29.92

C/r Plan.

SAC Manual 100-1

April 1957 - Ann - Atlantic

Europe

2 Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

Orbit - Bahrein OMNI - 115.3 (BI)

Orbit Altitude - 16,500

Rendz Point - 2552N-5101E

Refueling Alt - 16000

TC from Rendz - 138 degrees

Alt. Set. - 29.92

C/R Plan -

SAC Manual 100-1

April 1957 Europe

2 Wheelus

Orbit - Tripoli RBN - (CB 352 KGS)

Orbit Alt - 16,500

Rendz Point - 3250N-1230E

Refueling Alt - 16000

TC from Rendz - 286 degrees

Alt. Set. - 29.92

C/R Plan - Ann Atlantic

SAC Manual 100-1 Europe

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4 To request emergency A/R at Night Crawler

(C) call Local USAF Tower on UHF frequency - 257.8, 305.4, 243.0.

To request emergency A/R at Dhahran call Dhahran tower on 257.8, 275.8, 243.0. To request emergency A/R at Wheelus call Wheelus Tower on 257.8, 275.8, or 243.0.

(15) Passport and Visa Requirements:

(a) Night Crawler (C) and Wheelus.

No passports or visas required for entry into these bases.

(b) Dhahran: A valid passport is required for entry into this base. Military personnel departing a country without a Saudi Arabia Legation, may be granted transit visas upon arrival at Dhahran Aerodrome, provided they do not remain more than 24 hours at any enroute location having a Saudi Arabia Legation. Rome, Italy is only point in this theater presently credited as having a Saudi Arabia Legation. (Authority: USAFE message, PMPP 125224). No visas will be required for this exercise, but personnel deploying to Dhahran will require passports.

(16) Security:

(a) Guards for SAC aircraft will be supplied from base personnel at each landing base. Task Force Commanders will survey designated parking areas and coordinate with local base Commander as to specific number of guards desired.

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(17) Request Commander USAFE insure that base personnel scheduled to receive training during this exercise are available for full day's training on following dates:

- (a) Night Crawler (C) - X minus 1
- (b) Dhahran - X day
- (c) Wheelus - X plus 2

(18) All KC-97 aircraft crews specified in paragraph 1b(2)(b) will meet SAC passenger requirements.

(19) Request Commander, USAFE insure that adequate operations control rooms and maintenance control rooms are available at Night Crawler (Conf), Dhahran and Wheelus, and that these facilities will be available for use by SAC Task Force Control personnel.

(20) Pilots participating in this exercise will accomplish minimum of two (2) jet penetrations and/or range letdowns (on instrument trainer) plus GCA's, utilizing procedures at each primary landing base.

(21) Alternates:

- (a) Night Crawler (C): Diyarbakir primary, Esenboza, secondary.
- (b) Dhahran: Bahrain primary, Beirut secondary.
- (c) Wheelus: Brindisi (Italy) primary, Amendola (Italy) secondary. These bases will be used in emergency only.

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4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:

A. Supply.

- (1) Eight thousand pounds of aircraft spares and equipment (to include ramp lighting, 60 feet refueling cables and one 50 ton jack) are authorized for each Task Force Team. Spares will be selected from the 40th Bomb Wing (M) FAK and/or Greenham Common Base assets and should be those which will support the 7th AD Manual 65-2 Go-No-Go Check List. Spares required at post-strike bases and not available in airborne kits will be requisitioned directly from the 3909th Air Base Group by the most expeditious means available, information copy to this headquarters, ATTN: DMS. One B-47 aircraft will be available on standby at Greenham Common to provide resupply airlift support as required. Each KC-97 tanker will carry one thousand (1000) pounds of tanker support equipment and spares.
- (2) Individual tool kits will accompany maintenance personnel on support aircraft.
- (3) All AEE equipment listed in Chapter 4, Section I to SAC Manual 400-1A in support of fifteen (15) aircraft post strike operation is available at all three post-strike bases in equal or greater than required quantities.
- (4) Seven (7) J-47 power packs will be carried in tactical aircraft.
- (5) Aircraft POL loads will be as directed by the Task Force Commander.

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b. Maintenance:

(1) Two (2) Task Force maintenance and control teams will be provided by the 40th Bomb Wing (M) and/or 3909 Air Base Group. Each Task Force Team will not exceed one hundred and ten (110) PAX, including control, five (5) KC-97 maintenance personnel per KC-97 aircraft and headquarters representatives. Each team will be transported by three (3) KC-97 aircraft provided by the 44th AREPS from North Africa and UK. Movement and operation of the two Task Force maintenance teams will be as follows:

(a) Task Force Able. Three (3) KC-97 aircraft with total of 110 PAX, 8000 pounds B-47 spares and equipment and 3000 pounds tanker support will depart Greenham Common to arrive Night Crawler (C) before 1600Z, 24 August 1957. After the departure of last tactical aircraft 27 August 1957, team Able will depart Night Crawler (C) for Wheelus. After departure of last tactical aircraft from Wheelus, 29 August 1957, team Able will depart for Greenham Common.

(b) Task Force Team Baker. Three (3) KC-97 aircraft with total of 100 PAX, 8000 pounds, B-47 spares and equipment and 3000 pounds tanker support will depart Greenham Common to arrive Dhahran 1500Z, 25 August 1957. After the departure of last tactical aircraft, 28 August 1957, team Baker will depart Dhahran for Greenham Common via Wheelus.

(2) Prior to arrival of tactical aircraft, the Task Force Commanders, in coordination with the forward base commanders,

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will schedule the GO-NO-GO base teams and the subsequent maintenance teams which will train base personnel and ready the aircraft for its next flight. Maximum training and indoctrination of base personnel will be done during this period with special emphasis given to such areas as IOX, ADI or WAI servicing, safety precautions, jet aircraft hazards and operation of ground power equipment.

(3) Post-strike maintenance performed by both Task Forces will be in accordance with 7th AD Manual 65-2 within the three (3) hour ground time specified in SAC Manual 55-7. Actual servicing and maintenance of tactical aircraft during this three hour ground time specified in SAC Manual 55-7. Actual servicing and maintenance of tactical aircraft during this three hour period will be performed by base personnel under direct supervision of Task Force Team personnel. After completion of Go-No-Go Check list or three hour period, whichever is sooner, aircraft will be released to Task Force Team for intensive training of base personnel as outlined in 5th AD Operations Order 501-57.

(4) If time permits after departure of last tactical aircraft, Task Force Commanders will critique the Base Commanders and personnel as to areas where further training and indoctrination would strengthen their post-strike capability.

c. Reports:

(1) Task Force Commander will submit final mission reports to 7AD with info copies to 5th AD, 16th AF and base commanders concerned. Reports should contain such information as problem areas, recommendations, scope of training given to base personnel and time factors for aircraft servicing and completion of

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Go-No-Go Check. Reports to 7AD will contain base survey check lists detailing standard base capability to land, park, service and launch aircraft. This check list will include statistics on servicing equipment, Nav-Aids, housing, messing, POL, LOX, WAI, AND ADI capability. Special notes in final mission report on deficiencies should be also indicated on survey check lists for each post-strike base.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS MATTERS:

a. Command. Normal

b. Communications:

(1) General:

(a) JANAPs, ACPs, SAC CEI, 7AD CEI, Radio Facility Charts, Supplementary Flight Information Documents and appropriate SAC Manuals in the 55-3 series apply unless modified herein.

(b) Emergency procedures will be in accordance with ACP 130 and ACP 135, Radio Facility Charts and Supplementary Flight Information Documents.

(c) IFF will be in accordance with Chapter 14, 7AD CEI.

(d) The collective call sign for this mission is SKY KING, meanings: ALL SAC AIRCRAFT COPY.

(e) The recall word for this mission will be BOOK CASE.

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(f) Authentication will be in accordance with KAC-1.

(g) Headquarters 7th Air Division, ATTN: DOCC, will be an information addressee on all messages and correspondence concerning communications aspects of this Operations Order.

(2) Administrative Communications: These on-call and/or patch through circuits necessary to transmit operational traffic in support of this exercise will be activated by stations concerned.

NOTE: Dhahran has a SSB radio Station, a part of the SAC SSB Net, which can be employed if required.

(3) Frequencies:

(a) UHF channelization for the USAFE area will be as follows:

<u>CHAN</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>USE</u>
1	269.8	Combined Fighter Guard
2	232.2	SAC ADC Common
3	344.6	Pilot to Forecaster, or Tactical
4	*	Tactical or as required
5	*	Tactical or as required
6	*	Tactical or as required
7	317.5	UHF/DF Common
8	*	Squadron Operations
9	*	Wing Operations
10	353.8	Combined Air Traffic Control

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11	*	Local Tower
12	*	Local Approach Control
13	362.3	Combined Approach Control
14	257.8	Combined Tower
15	385.4	Combined GCA Final
16	344.0	Combined GCA Search
17	*	Local GCA
18	*	Local GCA

(b) The below listed frequencies will be installed in channels as indicated for destination/departure and/or alternates:

<u>CHAN</u>	<u>BRIZE NORTON</u>	<u>GREENHAM COMMON</u>	<u>UPPER HEYFORD</u>
2	361.2	352.4	355.5
11	282.4	282.4	282.4
12	254.4	363.6	296.4
13	290.2	270.5	301.6
14	264.7	343.2	280.2

DHAHRAN

<u>CHAN</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>USE</u>
2	257.8	Control Tower
11	275.8	Approach Control
12	_____	
13	344.0	GCA Search
14	355.4	GCA Final

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WHEELUS

<u>CHAN</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>USE</u>
2	257.8	Control Tower
11	362.3	Tripoli Approach Control
12	_____	
13	344.0	GCA Search
14	385.4	GCA Final

NIGHT CRAWLER (CONF)

2	257.8	Control Tower
12	_____	
13	344.0	GCA Search
14	385.4	GCA Final

Emergency or Diversionary Bases:

BAHRAIN (ILS available, see Facility Chart)

	118.1-3023.5	Control Tower
11	275.8	Dhahran Approach Control (Used if Bahrain Tower frequencies will not suffice)

BEIRUT (ILS available, see Facility Chart)

118.1-3023.5 Control Tower (Cross Band)

ATHENS

2	233.8	Control Tower
11	362.3	Approach Control

BRINDISI

(Campe, Casale)

2	257.8	Control Tower (See Remarks in Facility Chart)
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<u>CHAN</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>USE</u>
11	270.4	Approach Control (See Remarks in Facility Chart)

(c) VHF Channelization will be in accordance with current applicable Radio Facility Charts.

(4) Call Signs:

(a) AACS airways RF air/ground stations as listed in current Radio Facility charts.

(b) Special Unit Tactical Call Signs:

1. 40th Bomb Wing - DARWIN

(5) Airborne Procedures:

(a) SAC monitoring procedures ALFA as outlined in SAC CEI 2101.4a(2) applies. In event of recall ground will transmit recall message during scheduled periods.

(b) In the interest of security, HF radio silence will be maintained except for FIR position reporting, recall, diversion and emergencies.

(c) Procedures ALFA (SAC Manual 55-8M) applies for position reporting. Procedures as outlined in SAC CEI 2101.4a are prescribed.

(6) DIR Reporting - United Kingdom: FIR reports are used to satisfy Air Defense requirements and to generally inform a foreign government of a flight through its area of responsibility. They are not used to satisfy an Air Traffic Control Requirement.

(a) Mandatory reporting required to satisfy

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ADIZ FIR and ICAO requirements for this mission will be in accordance with 7th Air Division Brochure, dated 1 November 1956, as amended, and current with Radio Facility Charts. Emphasis will be placed on the information included in the Special Notice Section of the current Radio Facility Chart.

(7) (a) All crews are cautioned to check NOTAMS immediately prior to execution of this mission.

(b) ALL NAVAIDS at NIGHT CRAWLER (CONFIDENTIAL) as listed in current Facility Charts, except the AD low frequency radio beacon, are listed correctly and are reliable. The AD radio beacon listed as a 1200 watt facility is actually only a 25 watt beacon and is unreliable. No conditions exist which will effect the use of the runway.

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HEADQUARTERS
40TH BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 167, US Air Force

4000

10 September 1957

SUBJECT: Narrative Reports on Operation "Boot Camp"

TO: Commander
7th Air Division (SAC)
APO 125, US Air Force

1. Forwarded, as requested in 7th Air Division Operations Order 207-57, dated 2 August 1957 are the narrative reports from the 40th Bombardment Wing Task Force Commanders (Able and Baker) covering Operation "Boot Camp."

2. This letter classified SECRET in accordance with 7th Air Division Message DOOB 7-2761, dated 2 August 1957.

2 Incls
(Able & Baker) Narrative
Rpts on Operation "Boot
Camp"

/s/Andrew S. Low
ANDREW S. LOW
Colonel, USAF
Commander

Copies Furnished:

Comdr, 2AD, APO 616
Comdr, 5AD, APO 117
Comdr, 16AF, APO 285
Comdr, 17AF, APO 231
Hq TUSLOG 1, APO 254 (Please forward to Incirlik AB)

A TRUE COPY:

Doris E. Krudener
DORIS E. KRUDENER, DAF
Command Historian

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NARRATIVE OF MISSION REQUIREMENTS-TASK FORCE "ABLE"

Part I

1. Operation "Boot Camp" was established by 7th Air Division Operation Order number 207-57 and implemented by Headquarters 40th Bomb Wing OPORD 207-57 dated 15 August 1957. The purpose of this operation was to:
 - a. Exercise the facilities, materiel, and personnel at three Middle East Air Bases.
 - b. Recover and relaunch fifteen B-47's from each of these bases on successive days.
 - c. To provide familiarization and instruction on ground handling of the B-47 for the personnel of the three exercised bases. Task force "Able" was charged with carrying out the 40th Bomb Wing responsibilities at Incirlik, and Wheelus Air Bases.
2. Task Force "Able" consisting of eight officers, seventy-six airmen and the necessary support equipment was flown to Incirlik on 24 August 1957 and to Wheelus on 27 August 1957 by three KC-97's. Task Force "Able" returned to Greenham Common by air on 30 August 1957.
3. The fifteen B-47's were recovered and relaunched from both Incirlik and Wheelus. No major problems were encountered.
4. The following sections of this report brief the operational aspects of this exercise and recommendations of the Task Force Commander for improvement as given the Commanders at Incirlik and Wheelus in the critique conducted prior to the departure of the Task Force from the exercised base.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

PART II

I. Incirlik Air Base.

1. Fifteen B-47 aircraft were scheduled into Incirlik on 26 August landing at 10 minute intervals starting at 0600Z. Fourteen aircraft landed as scheduled and the fifteenth aircraft landed approximately two hours late due to fire warning light difficulties at Greenham Common. On 27 August, fourteen aircraft were airborne as scheduled. The fifteenth aircraft was delayed four hours due to starter generator change.

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Problem: There were no numerals along the sides of the runway to indicate distance remaining.
 - a. Recommendation: New signs were placed at 1000' mark for this exercise. Signs for each 1000' mark should be placed along both sides of runway. Reflector paint should be used for the numerals.

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2. Problem: Runway was not painted to indicate 1000' mark from ends of runway.
- a. Recommendation: That a white stripe approximately fifteen feet wide be painted across the runway 1000' from each end of the runway.
3. Problem: The taxi ways are too narrow and the asphalt stabilizing surface is badly cracked and broken around the outer edges of all taxi ways.
- a. Recommendation: That taxi lanes be widened sufficiently to insure that outer engines of B-47's are over stabilized surface. The outer edges of asphalt areas should be repaired immediately in order to prevent possible serious aircraft damage due to pieces of flying asphalt.
4. Problem: Approach control, penetration patterns and GCA handling were unsatisfactory in that too much time was required by ground personnel in properly clearing aircraft into their penetration. Some confusion on handling B-47 aircraft was experienced.
- a. Recommendation: That control and GCA personnel be exercised at least once every quarter by B-47 making practice approaches and GCA patterns, in order to enable them to gain the necessary experience in handling jet type aircraft.
5. Problem: The control room does not contain the necessary communications equipment. One telephone was installed. Message center next to control room was adequately equipped for this exercise.
- a. Recommendation: That necessary communications equipment be procured and installed in console type desk. Equipment should include all items as provided for in SAC Reg 55-15.
6. Problem: Control room, briefing and de-briefing areas are not sufficiently secure to permit required discussions of classified information. It was necessary to post security guards inside the control area to provide an acceptable degree of security.
- a. Recommendation: The present building provides adequate space for all control functions. Partition walls should be raised to the ceiling and the area provided with proper ventilation. At present, even the windows in the control room must be raised to provide ventilation.
7. Problem: Billeting was adequate for this type exercise. Fourteen new buildings are being erected to provide better housing facilities. Check in and locator procedures were not adequate for this type exercise.
- a. Recommendation: That sign in-out cards be filled in with billeting information prior to arrival of the task force personnel. Personnel would then fill in name, rank, etc., thus providing a central source locator file.

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8. Problem: Taxing and parking lines are not provided. This is especially critical in view of the narrow taxiways.

a. Recommendation: Lines be painted on all taxiways and in parking areas.

9. Problem: Base did not have adequate written SOP's to cover this type maneuver.

a. Recommendation: All activities should be covered in detail in writing, SOP's flow charts and other required pre-planning activities should be adequately covered in such a manner as to enable any reasonably qualified person to follow a check-list for successful completion of all activities.

II. Wheelus Air Base

1. Fifteen B-47 aircraft were scheduled into Wheelus on 28 August landing at 10 minutes intervals starting at 0730Z. All aircraft landed as scheduled. On 29 August, fifteen aircraft were airborne as scheduled for the return trip to Greenham Common.

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Problem: Approach control caused unnecessary delays and confusion in clearing the aircraft for penetration and landing.

a. Recommendation: Wheelus to work out procedures with approach control to insure the orderly flow of incoming B-47 traffic.

2. Problem: Base has insufficient number of fire trucks to adequately cover their varied and widespread operations.

a. Recommendations: That an adequate number of fire trucks be procured as rapidly as possible.

MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part III

I. Incirlik Air Base

1. Problem: No maintenance control facilities were available. Radio trucks and dispatch boards were non-existent.

a. Recommendation: That appropriate SAC Manuals of the 66 series be requisitioned and facilities be set up in accordance with these manuals. Sufficient room is available in the present control quonset to set up these facilities.

2. Problem: There are no parts available to support any B-47 requirements. A copy of the dash 4 tech order for the B-47 was not available.

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a. Recommendation: Task Forces of B-47's should carry adequate fly-away kits to support their every requirement. A complete stock of tech orders should be maintained for all types of aircraft expected to exercise this base.

3. Problem: Base LOX equipment was inoperative. Indigenous equipment was utilized for servicing aircraft on this mission.

a. Recommendation: Repair parts for LOX equipment should be made available as expeditiously as possible. Adequate equipment is available if it were in proper repair.

4. Problem: There was not a sufficient number of maintenance personnel available to carry out any activities other than towing aircraft and fuel servicing.

a. Recommendation: Any unit exercising this base should provide sufficient maintenance personnel to meet their requirements. The base is not manned with sufficient skilled personnel to meet any but the most minor maintenance requirements.

5. Problem: Vehicles were generally in poor repair and in need of a general overhaul.

a. Recommendation: Overhaul program, using native facilities and personnel, is presently underway. This program should receive a high priority and be pushed to the fullest possible extent.

MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

II. Wheelus Air Base

1. Problem: Some aircraft were allowed to remain on the pits after refueling awaiting tug. This also delayed maintenance effort to some extent.

a. Recommendation: Coleman drivers be more thoroughly briefed as to their duties and on the importance of timely completion of their duties.

2. Problem: Flight line and maintenance control set up in accordance with SAC procedures and policies of two years ago.

a. Recommendation: Up to date manuals be furnished base in order to enable them to establish their activities in accordance with the latest procedures.

PERSONNEL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED

Part IV

I. Incirlik Air Base

1. Training was accomplished in the following fields.

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S E C R E T

- a. Control room personnel submitted required reports in a superior manner. (CINCSAC - Zippo 08-253)
- b. Intelligence debriefing team organized and functioned adequately. Forms were made up by the debriefing team to provide for this exercise.
- c. Weather briefing was adequate and information provided in accordance with SAC procedures.
- d. Refueling was very satisfactory. An average time of 21 minutes was required to on load approximately 48,000 pounds of fuel. Safety precautions were stressed in training.
- e. Towing and parking of aircraft very satisfactory. Safety precautions were stressed.
- f. Chute recovery was handled most expeditiously. However, there was not a sufficient number of personnel available to carry out repack and installation training.
- g. Ground power personnel are proficient in their duties. Fire and safety precautions were stressed.
- h. Three B-47's were post flighted and the available base personnel were instructed in procedures. Actual work was accomplished by 40th Wing maintenance personnel.

PERSONNEL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED

II. Wheelus Air Base

1. Training was accomplished in the following fields: control room operation, debriefing, weather briefing, briefing, refueling, maintenance procedures, and ground handling. Training conducted in these areas consisted of minor corrections and refinements only.

SECURITY OF AIRCRAFT

Part V

I. Incirlik Air Base

1. Base Security: The entire base complex is surrounded for a depth of approximately seven miles by units of the Turkish Army. Anti-Aircraft units are in place and manned. In the event of actual conflict these units would provide excellent protection against local attacks or penetration attempts. Turkish guards are also utilized for guarding various base installations.

2. Ramp Security: Due to the limited number of guards available and the total area to be covered, ramp security, according to SAC standards, can only be considered marginal satisfactory.

S E C R E T

There is no security fence in place and the base has experienced considerable difficulty with petty thievery. An example would be the loss of the batteries for the emergency power source which were stolen shortly before this task force arrived. The seriousness of this situation is further pointed up by the failure of all regular power facilities just prior to the arrival of the KC-97's on the 24th. There was no power available for tower operation or other emergency facilities.

SECURITY OF AIRCRAFT

II. Wheelus Air Base

1. Adequate base and aircraft security was provided for this exercise. Individual guards were placed on each aircraft immediately after landing and this system was maintained until aircraft departed.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

PART VI

I. Incirlik Air Base

1. Incirlik Air Base is capable of recovering and refueling a limited sized task force. Operations over an extended period of time or involving large numbers of aircraft would seriously tax their ability to satisfactorily accomplish the job.

2. The base does not possess the capability to perform any but the most minor maintenance on B-47 type aircraft. Any aircraft that could not depart immediately after refueling would probably have to remain there until a maintenance team equipped with adequate spare parts was flown in.

3. It is recommended:

a. That flow charts for personnel, reports, maintenance and aircraft movement be constructed for each phase of activity.

b. That any future training team be given at least three full work days prior to the actual operation to brief and instruct base personnel.

c. That 7th Air Division take the necessary steps to provide Incirlik with a complete set of SAC maintenance and operation manuals and directives. In addition, a team of experts in the operations and maintenance fields should be sent to Incirlik on TDY for the purpose of aiding the base personnel in setting up their control and maintenance procedures in accordance with SAC standards.

d. That funds be made available for the satisfactory completion of control room and maintenance control facilities. Adequate building space is presently available and in use for these facilities.

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4. The personnel at Incirlik are to be commended for their attitude and ready willingness to do their utmost to carry out the objects of this mission. They were available and ready to perform duty on a twenty-four hour a day basis and in fact did perform their duties on such a schedule. Sunday, 25 August had been declared a normal work day prior to our arrival. This was indicative of the efforts put forth by the base to insure the success of this mission.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

II. Wheelus Air Base

1. Wheelus Air Base personnel and facilities are adequate in every respect to support their EWP mission. The personnel are unusually well informed and highly motivated toward their SAC support mission. In my opinion this base could support their mission from an operations standpoint without the aid of any outside agency. From the maintenance standpoint some specialist supervisors would be required, however, the base personnel could perform any but the most major maintenance items from within their own resources.

2. It is recommended:

a. That up to date operation and maintenance manuals and directives be forwarded to Wheelus immediately. Their personnel are fully qualified and motivated to bring their procedures in line with the latest directives without requiring outside assistance.

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S E C R E T

NARRATIVE OF MISSION REQUIREMENTS - TASK FORCE "BAKER"

PART I

1. Operation "Boot Camp" was established by 7th Air Division Operations Order number 207-57 and implemented by Headquarters 40th Bomb Wing OPORD 207-57 dated 15 August 1957. The purpose of this operation was to:

- a. Exercise the facilities, material, and personnel at three Middle East Air Bases.
- b. Recover and relaunch fifteen (15) B-47's from each of three Middle East Air Bases on successive days.
- c. To provide familiarization and instruction on B-47 ground handling by personnel of the three exercised Bases. Task Force "Baker" was charged with carrying out the 40th Bomb Wing responsibilities at Dhahran Air Force Base, Saudi Arabia only - this was the second of the three Bases exercised.

2. Task Force "Baker" consisting of eight officers, seventy nine airmen and the necessary support equipment was flown to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on 24-25 August 1957. The fifteen B-47 aircraft were recovered at Dhahran on 27 August as scheduled. No major problem areas were encountered. Task Force "Baker" returned to Greenham Common by air on 30 August 1957.

3. The following sections of this report brief the operational aspects of this exercise and recommendations of the Task Force Commander for improvement as given the Commander, Second Air Division, in the critique conducted in his Headquarters at Dhahran Air Force Base on 28 August 1957.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

PART II

1. Fifteen B-47 aircraft were scheduled into Dhahran on 27 August landing at ten minute intervals starting at 06:00Z. Fourteen aircraft landed as scheduled and the fifteenth aircraft landed approximately three hours late due to starter difficulty at the take off base. On 28 August the fifteen aircraft were airborne at ten minute intervals starting at 02:00Z.

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Problem: The numerals along the sides of the runway indicating distance of runway remaining are too small for high speed traffic.
 - a. Recommendation: New signs be erected that have numerals 4' by 4' painted on them.
2. Problem: The white stripe painted across the runway 1000 feet from each end is too narrow for high speed traffic.
 - a. Recommendation: This stripe be at least 15 feet wide.

S E C R E T

3. Problem: The entire 10,000 foot runway is surfaced with asphalt. At heavy gross weights and high temperatures, severe damage to the runways will occur due to in place stabilization checks by numerous aircraft.

a. Recommendation: A concrete mat at least 200 feet in depth be laid on each end of the runway.

4. Problem: The taxiways are narrow and even with the number 1 and number 6 engines shut down, sand and gravel were kicked on to the taxiway. This condition can cause severe damage to engines and tires.

a. Recommendation: That the areas immediately adjacent to the taxiways be stabilized with either asphalt topping or oil to a depth of at least 25 feet on each side.

5. Problem: Approach control, penetration patterns and GCA handling were unsatisfactory in that too much time was required by ground personnel in clearing aircraft into their penetration and GCA. Delays up to twenty minutes were reported.

a. Recommendation: Control personnel and GCA personnel be briefed on B-47 airspeeds (270 knots for penetration, slowing to approximately 170 knots inbound to facility for GCA pickup) and distances (up to 10 miles outbound) in order to get the aircraft on the ground in a minimum time. Also GCA should be able to handle more than one aircraft at a time and as a maximum one every 10 minutes.

6. Problem: Transportation for crews from aircraft to debriefing to quarters using shuttle buses only is not adequate.

a. Recommendation: For fifteen B-47's at least six pickup's are needed to transport crews from aircraft to debriefing and three buses or truck buses to shuttle between debriefing and crew quarters. This plan was utilized and worked very well. S/Sgt Jones of the Motor Pool acted as trouble shooter on the transportation and did an outstanding job in keeping it moving properly.

7. Problem: Billeting was extremely good, however normal check in and out procedures are too slow.

a. Recommendation: Billets should be assigned by aircraft tail number and crews prior to arrival of aircraft. Sign in cards can be left in the rooms for the crews to fill out and return to the desk.

8. Problem: Control room was not adequately set up.

a. Recommendations: An ARC-27 UHF set be installed in the control room as soon as possible for control of all aircraft procedures, i.e., start engines, taxi, take off, on course reports, etc - this is not intended to supercede control by the tower but will keep the Task Force Commander minutely informed of all tactical aircraft movement also a switchboard connecting with the tower, weather, maintenance control, fire station, transportation, alert and commanding officer should be installed. The brown paper charts should be reproduced in more permanent form, i.e., black india ink on white background and covered with plexiglass so temporary entries can be made with grease pencil.

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MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART III

1. Problem: Communications net for maintenance control was not adequate.
 - a. Recommendation: At least four radio equipped vehicles (preferably 3/4 ton trucks) be made available to maintenance control and netted in with maintenance control central to expedite positioning of parts and technicians. This is especially important during "hacked" take-offs.
2. Problem: Armament and electronics facilities and equipment were practically non-existent.
 - a. Recommendation: Test equipment, mock ups and adequate bench stock peculiar to the equipment in the B-47 type aircraft should be procured, set up and personnel trained in its use.
3. Problem: Aircraft were parked down the ramp in the unlighted area thus handicapping night maintenance and security.
 - a. Recommendation: That the parking area for the aircraft be moved into the flood lighted area.
4. Problem: Control of the Base personnel was difficult. This was due to the fact that each person did not know what his specific job was on this type operation.
 - a. Recommendation: Personnel to be utilized each be given a specific task force assignment, briefed on the details of the job expected of him, and be cross trained on B-47 techniques as much as possible prior to actual arrival of the aircraft.

PERSONNEL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED

PART IV

1. Training was accomplished in the following fields:
 - a. Control room personnel submitted the required reports and did a superior job. This was recognized by CINCSAC in his ZIPPO 08-253.
 - b. Intelligence debriefing team performed in a superior manner.
 - c. Weather briefing and survival techniques were given by base personnel at the pre-take off briefing and were very satisfactory.
 - d. Refueling was very satisfactory. Personnel were very capable and should have no difficulty in future operations.
 - e. Water alcohol personnel were entirely adequate.

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f. Personnel were instructed in repacking both drag and approach chutes and should be perfectly capable in this capacity.

g. Personnel in the ground power section know their business and functioned excellently.

h. Three B-47's were post flighted and instruction was given to base personnel while 40th Wing maintenance men actually did the work.

REFUELING AND MAINTENANCE TIME FACTORS

PART V

1. Refueling and servicing with water alcohol averaged 31 minutes per aircraft.

2. Post flights averaged four hours.

SECURITY OF AIRCRAFT

PART VI

1. The perimeter guard system during the periods that 40th personnel were working on the aircraft plus the addition of point guards after departure of 40th Wing personnel was entirely satisfactory.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

PART VII

1. The recovery and relaunching of the 15 B-47 aircraft, the reception plan utilized, billeting and messing facilities, transportation and control room procedures were all successful. It is felt that this Base can satisfactorily accomplish this type of mission provided the problem areas mentioned above are solved.

2. It is recommended:

a. That the personnel flow charts, work flow charts, maintenance flow charts and aircraft movement flow charts be constructed detailing each phase of the operation.

b. That personnel involved in the Operation be briefed on their specific duties and cross trained.

c. That any future training team be given approximately three working days prior to the actual operation to brief and instruct base personnel.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
40TH BOMBARDMENT WING, MEDIUM (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 167, US Air Force

4000

20 September 1957

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Operation "East Wood"

TO: Commander
7th Air Division (SAC)
APO 125, US Air Force

1. Forwarded, as requested in 7th Air Division message D000 7-2976 (SECRET) dated 23 August 1957 is the narrative report from the 40th Bombardment Wing Task Force Commander covering Operation "East Wood."
2. This letter classified SECRET in accordance with 7th Air Division Message D000 7-2976, dated 23 August 1957.

1 Incl
Narrative Report on
Operation "East Wood"

ANDREW S. LOW
Colonel, USAF
Commander

Copies Furnished:

Comdr, 16AF, APO 285
Comdr, 3974ABSQ, APO 286

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S E C R E T

NARRATIVE OF MISSION REQUIREMENTS

PART I

1. Operation "East Wood" was established by 7th Air Division Operations message number D000 7-2976 (Secret) and implemented by Headquarters 40th Bomb Wing Operations Plan "East Wood" dated 4 September 1957. The purpose of this operation was to:
 - a. Exercise the facilities, materiel and personnel at Zaragoza Air Base.
 - b. Recover, RON and relaunch fifteen B-47's.
 - c. To provide familiarization and instruction on ground handling of the B-47 for the base personnel.
2. A maintenance task force consisting of 4 officers, 39 airmen and the necessary support equipment was flown to Zaragoza on 9 September 1957. Task force returned to Greenham Common on 12 September 1957.
3. The following sections of this report brief the various aspects of this exercise and recommendations of the Task Force Commander for improvements as given to the Base Commander at Zaragoza in the critique conducted prior to the departure of the Task Force from the exercised base.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

PART II

1. On 10 September 1957, fifteen aircraft were airborne from Greenham Common, United Kingdom. Thirteen aircraft completed the mission as scheduled and landed at San Jurjo. One aircraft returned to Greenham Common due to loss of #3 engine. One aircraft was airborne late due to engine change and flew direct to San Jurjo.
2. After post strike exercise and RON, all aircraft were airborne as scheduled on 11 September 1957. Return mission to Greenham Common was altered due to predicted adverse weather at scheduled landing time.

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Problem: Ground areas adjacent to landing runway have not been leveled and contains numerous ditches holes and mounds of dirt. In the event that an aircraft should run off the runway, major damage or complete destruction could be incurred.
 - a. Recommendations: If operational considerations make it advisable to use this base with the above known hazards, the violation of Flying Safety considerations must be accepted. Special emphasis should be given to the earliest possible correction of the above discrepancies. For this exercise the Base Commander had the dirt mounds immediately adjacent to the runway removed. The ditches along side of the runway could not be filled.

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2. Problem: Prepared taxiways at San Jurjo were designed to handle fighter type aircraft, not bombers. The outboard pods of the B-47 extend out over the unstabilized dirt shoulders. The rocky surfaces make it highly probable that engine damage from foreign objects would occur if it became necessary to use the main taxiways. The ten minute interval between take-offs on this mission allowed aircraft to taxi down the active runway to take-off position. Fortunately, local incoming traffic (none) did not interfere with this procedure. If take-offs at closer intervals became necessary, the long taxiway would have to be used and the resultant engine damage risk accepted.

a. Recommendation: All taxiways should be asphalt stabilized at earliest possible date if this base is to be used to handle bomber aircraft. Present plans do not include project to complete required stabilization. The Base Commander utilized all available sweepers, water trucks and rollers to improve conditions before and during the B-47 operation phase of this mission.

3. Problem: The entire length of the 9800 foot runway is surfaced with asphalt. Previous B-47 mission take-off (approximately twenty-nine) have caused blast and heat damage to the end of the runway. Take-offs were planned to employ a rolling 100% power check to minimize additional damage. At higher gross weights and/or temperatures it would not be possible to utilize these procedures.

a. Recommendation: Run-up pods and a one thousand foot extension should be constructed on each end of the runway. Concrete should be used in order to eliminate the blast and burning problem.

4. Problem: Control Room and maintenance control do not have proper communications equipment.

a. Recommendation: Adequate communications equipment is programmed for these functions. However, the delivery date for this equipment is unknown. Base has adequate space to install this equipment on a temporary basis, if delivery can be expected.

5. Problem: There is no lighting available for taxiways. Runway lighting consists of temporary installation of strings of lights. Power for these lights is dependent upon one generator with no power back up. Approach lights have been installed on ends of runway; however, they have not been flight checked for adequacy and accuracy of guide angle. The absence of any taxiway or ramp lighting makes any contemplated night operation extremely hazardous.

a. Recommendation: Base Commander is attempting to provide a back up power source. Permanent runway lighting is being installed. Prior to any attempt to complete night missions to or from this base, permanent runway and taxiway lighting should be installed. Temporary runway lighting is adequate for night take-offs and/or emergency landings.

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MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART III

1. Problem: Refueling of eight aircraft was handled most effectively. However, the last six refuelings were delayed up to 1½ hours due to wait for refueling trucks. This accrued due to availability of only one truck refueling hydrant.

a. Recommendation: The completion of the refueling pit hydrant system will eliminate this problem. This system is nearly complete and should be flushed and made ready for use in the near future (30-45 days). As an interim measure, it is recommended that some MJ-1 truck units be refueled at pumps which are available on other side of base. While this procedure would entail a considerable further haul, it would relieve some of the back-up at the one available pump at San Jurjo Base.

2. Problem: There is no radio vehicle or maintenance control section set up for expediting dispatch of specialists or parts.

a. Recommendation: Maintenance control section should be set up in accordance with SAC 66 series manuals.

3. Problem: Liquid oxygen and/or its related servicing equipment was not available at Zaragoza. Due to weight limitations only one oxygen servicing unit was deployed with the maintenance task force. Due to the limited amount of oxygen available as compared to the need for servicing, it was impossible to refill aircraft systems to a minimum level until immediately priority to take-off. Consequently, no oxygen servicing training could be given to base personnel. Also no protective clothing was available on the base.

a. Recommendation: Base should have on hand a minimum of three servicing units and a source of supply of liquid oxygen. From the limited training given to the base personnel it appeared that they were capable of properly servicing B-47's with liquid oxygen.

4. Problem: Shortage of qualified maintenance personnel.

a. Recommendation: Maintenance personnel in varying degrees of skill are scheduled into base in October and November. It would be most beneficial to all concerned if a single B-47 type aircraft were made available on a continuing basis for ground instruction purposes. The flight crew and three or four fully qualified B-47 maintenance personnel should be made available as instructors.

PERSONNEL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED

PART IV

1. Training was accomplished in the following fields: Ground power equipment, towing, refueling, Go-No-Go check list, engine start, ground interphone procedures, parking, oxygen venting and drag chute repacking and installation.

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S E C R E T

- a. All personnel concerned displayed a most commendable attitude and were most receptive of all training given.

SECURITY OF AIRCRAFT

PART V

1. The guard personnel were alert and fully cognizant of their responsibilities. However, ramp lighting is practically non-existent which makes it practically mandatory that each aircraft be guarded by an individual guard.
2. Perimeter guards were used and they were spaced as well as could be expected with the number of guards available. Portable lighting fixtures around the perimeter would greatly aid in providing adequate security.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

PART VI

1. Aircraft requiring major maintenance were not allowed to land at San Jurjo during this exercise. Minor maintenance problems were cleared up without difficulty and all aircraft could have taken off within three hours after landing.
2. Base construction program is progressing satisfactorily. However, the many hazards present on the airdrome due to this construction makes it extremely important that crews be thoroughly briefed on these hazards prior to flying into this base.
3. The ground power units that were in-place were operational. However, only four units are in-place. There is no LOX equipment in-place. These deficiencies should be corrected at the earliest possible date.
4. Support of an effort of this size required that practically all other base functions must cease or be seriously curtailed. The Base Commander had his people working the entire week-end preparing for the mission.
5. The Base Commander should be commended for the excellent support and extra effort expended to make this mission a success. His personnel are highly motivated, eager to learn and willing to work. They do need help on securing the necessary equipment and supplies to enable them to fully and adequately support their mission.

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SECRET.

211

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENG
 TO: CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

SECRET FROM DPLP 7-2913. SUBJECT: UTILIZATION OF
 BURTONWOOD. References: (A) Your Secret message DPLCO
 3357, 1 August 1957 and (B) Your Secret Letter, control #272
 15 May 1957, same subject. This message in three parts.
 Part I. Reference B stated that the B-52 conversion and
 equipping schedule converts our last B-36 wing during
 second quarter FY 59. Part II. Reference A indicated that
 the B-52 equipping and conversion schedule has changed and
 subsequent to 1 JULY 1958 no requirement will exist for the
 reassignment of Burtonwood's B-36 staging mission. Part III.
 Request information on whether the requirement will exist to
 transfer this mission to another UK base effective 1 July 1958
 or if it is contemplated that it will be deleted.

15 1330
 AUG 1957

DPLP (Mike Mueller - 390)
 Major W. H. Adams, Jr.

SECRET.

SECRET

FROM: COMUSMACV OFFICE AFB WERDASHA
 TO: COMAFS ORLANDO AFB FLA
 COMAF 2 PARKSDALE AFB LA
 COMAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS
 COMAF 15 MARCH AFB CALIF
 COMAF 16 MADRID SPAIN
 COMAIRDIV 3 ANDERSEN AFB GUAM
 COMAIRDIV JT SIDI ELHANE MOROCCO
 COMAIRDIV 7 30 RUISLIP ENG
 COMARGRP 3 STEAD AFB NEV

/SECRET/DOTRPO (02). SUBJECT: JOINT SAC-ARS RECOVERY EXERCISE.
 This message in five parts. Part I. Due to de-activation of two
 ARS Squadrons and reorganization of the remaining two units, no
 SAC-ARS exercises will be conducted until October 57. Part II.
 Schedule for calendar year 1957 as follows: October - Communica-
 tions cycle only with 2 AF crews. November - 63 ARS deploy to UK,
 will exercise with SAC UK rotational unit. 64 ARS staging out of
 Whiteman AF will exercise with 8 AF crews. December - communica-
 tions cycle only with 15AF crews. Calendar year 1958 ZI schedule
 will be provided when finalized; however, present planning is to
 run complete exercise in January and October with 15AF, April with
 2AF and July with 8AF. Communications cycle only the remaining
 months with 15AF scheduled for June and August, 2AF February,
 September and November and 8AF in March, May and December. Part
 III. Calendar year 1958 overseas tentative plan is to deploy the
 two air rescue squadrons once each year for forty-five days period.

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SECRET

Tentative schedule is to deploy the 64 AFS to Naha AFB Okinawa, in March, deploy 63 AFS to East Kirkby United Kingdom in October. Part IV. The Minimum number of crews to be provided will be as prescribed in SAC Reg 90-10. When a communications cycle only is scheduled additional crews may be provided if unit workload permits. Any increase will be at discretion of numbered air force concerned. Part V. For COMARS, Orlando AFB. Request complete finalized schedule be provided this headquarters and each SAC addressee.

BT

20/2332Z AUG RUEDAH

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: CINCASAC OFFUTT AFB NEBRASKA
 TO: COMAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS
 COMAF 15 MARCH AFB CALIF
 COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
 COMADIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENGLAND
 COMAIR 3 ANDERSEN AFB GUAM
 COMAF 16 MADRID SPAIN
 COMDRABW 3902 OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 COMDRBOMBVORGP 1 CARSWELL AFB TEX
 COMSTRATEVALGP 3909 MACDILL AFB FLA

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/CONFIDENTIAL/DO 4310. SUBJECT: FISCAL YEAR 1958 FLYING HOUR PROGRAM, SERIAL NBR 7. This message in four parts. Part I. This command has just received a restoration of 3.7 million dollars F-410 funds to be utilized in the first quarter FY 58. So that this money may be allocated in a most equitable and realistic manner it is requested that each addressee forward by Zippe to this headquarters at earliest possible date by aircraft type, model, series, and assignment code additional flying hours desired for 1st quarter FY 58. Part II. Maximum hours will be programmed for combat crew training. It is suggested that CRT flying be returned to approximately original allocation rates. Part III. To spread this increased allocation over a longer time basis, you are hereby authorized to immediately begin flying at increased rates commensurate with your recommended program. Part IV. A revised 1st quarter FY 58 allocation program based upon recommendations will be dispatched from this headquarters as soon as possible. This message transmitted to Alfa, Bravo, Charlie.

27/2340Z AUG RJEDMH

CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

Headquarters
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 241 New York, New York

DIT

SUBJECT: Critique on Exercise "Game Time"

TO: COT

1. The Directorate of Intelligence problem areas for Exercise "Game Time" were as follows:

a. Target Intelligence Branch.

(1) The B-11 and B-15 reports do not have the aircraft call sign and sortie number. If the B-10 is not received or is garbled, the strike results cannot be posted until the B-51 is received. (The B-10 and B-51 have call sign and sortie number.) Recommend B-11 and B-15 also carry call sign and sortie number.

(2) We transmit ATPOS on all aircraft scheduled to post-strike in 7th Air Division areas. This includes those that abort in the ZI or enroute. It is recommended that this procedure continue. It has helped to eliminate inquiries from FRE and interested commands.

(3) The 26 SRW reports were incomplete, inaccurate and usually late. The messages were poorly prepared and were not in SAC Manual 55-8 format which resulted in loss of time for interpretation of the message contents. The aircraft call sign could not be tied to the sortie number.

(4) The 100 Bomb Wing submitted B-51 reports in addition to the 3921st RTS B-51 Report Team. 7AD Ops Order 70-57 stated that only the B-51 Report submitted by the B-51 Report Team would be transmitted. Headquarters SAC changed SAC Ops Order 70-57 for this procedure and also sent messages to each SAC Air Force Headquarters with these instructions.

(5) The Wing Representatives at Bruntingthorpe did not provide or enter the required target data in the photo logs for the B-51 Report Team to make the B-51. Headquarters SAC changed SAC Ops Order 70-57 requiring this procedure and sent messages to each SAC Air Force Headquarters.

(6) DIT has insufficient working space. During all peak loads movement within the working space is almost at a complete standstill. This restriction to movement often delays ATPOS messages as much as two hours. At least 100 sq ft of additional space required. This problem will not exist when wall is removed.

b. Operational Intelligence Branch.

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S E C R E T

(1) 7AD did not receive the expected load of initial buildup messages from SAC. No intelligence buildup messages were received during the period 4-6 August. The backlog was finally overcome on 7 August, when messages of 4, 5 and 6 August were received.

(2) CID's were too lengthy; short summaries would be much more realistic for alert/wartime situation.

(3) SAC intelligence buildup immediately prior to initiation of hostilities was a little unrealistic. Until queried by D/I, 7AD, SAC had not indicated why the execution order (50-58) was finally issued. In sorting out the facts, it appears that the SAC order to implement the EWP was issued (08/0442Z) approximately 10 hours before the enemy committed the overt act which was to result in the execution order, namely, the A-bombing of Ankara, Turkey (08/1430Z).

(4) Combat reporting, while generally fair, was weak in the following respects:

(a) It frequently took a little imagination to decipher what the sender was trying to impart in the remarks section of the M-12, M-14 and M-20.

(b) Reports incomplete. In many cases even minimum information was omitted from M-reports and B-30 in particular. Canned B-30 reports were repetitious in character and remarks, and failed to show any "effort." More care should be exercised by participating agencies regarding proper message format, care in working, etc.

(5) Many M-12 reports which indicated that enemy jet bombers were heading toward the UK from points within the Soviet Union, the North Sea, etc. were not received in this headquarters until 4-6 hours after sighting. It is recognized, however, that the M-12 is not necessarily the primary medium for EW information.

(6) Who is responsible for notifying other commands/services when a "sighting" is obviously of primary interest to organizations outside of SAC? An example here would be certain reported Soviet naval activities in the North Sea or Atlantic Ocean. Does SAC notify such agencies as NMIM or LANT, or is it our responsibility? Perhaps some re-emphasis of CIRVIS and M-12 reporting procedures is in order.

(7) A SAC injected situation generated a requirement for jamming in a specific frequency band. The capabilities of the equipment available to the TDY Bomb Wing was not readily available. In future this information should be available at the Operations Block during exercises and/or actual EWP.

S E C R E T

(8) Improper addressing of reports was noted in receipt of R/B-30 reports. Some required addressees were left off the reports. In some cases, generation of resultant RT-31 reports by the 3921st RTG was affected. Proper reference to report distribution instructions in the pertinent Operations Order will preclude this on future exercises or EMP.

S E C R E T

T-8584

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Major Items Regarding GAME TIME Exercise

DO

DOC

14 Aug 57
Col Perry - 371
N. Ross - 236

1. From a communications standpoint, GAME TIME was a success. Some major problems developed during the CPX and are listed below: (U)

a. Circuits utilized by FRE became unuseable. Therefore, approximately 800 FOG COUNT messages were handled by the 485th Relay Center. These messages would normally not be handled through the 485th Relay and, therefore, placed a heavy workload upon the Relay Center. (C)

b. The radio teletype circuits to the ZI experienced a large amount of outages. A large backlog of traffic was prevented only by utilizing the KO-6 circuits with 5 teletype channels into Headquarters SAC. (C)

c. Brize Norton experienced a heavy load of traffic which resulted in a backlog of traffic. This could have been prevented had Brize Norton connected their spare equipment to the other available circuit into High Wycombe, thereby making an additional half duplex circuit available. (C)

2. Recommendations or Actions: (U)

a. Reference paragraph 1a above. Recommend a study be made to determine the adequacy of communications circuits available to FRE for conducting their JCC mission. 7AD will conduct this study and forward any recommendations arising therefrom. (C)

b. Reference paragraph 2a above. Recommend Hq SAC take the following actions: (U)

(1) Obtain one full period circuit in the FPIS circuit from 7AD to Headquarters SAC. (C)

(2) Obtain one on-call circuit from 7AD to Headquarters SAC in the new submarine cable, to be used in conjunction with the KO-6 to transmit 300 to 600 WPM teletype. This on-call circuit from 7AD to Headquarters SAC in the cable is to be called up for CPX type exercises and during the EWP. (C)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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GAME TIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(3) Retain the present cable and radio teletype circuits as presently planned. (U)

3. This Disposition Form classified CONFIDENTIAL as it reveals communications capabilities of this command. (U)

/s/ Robert M. Perry
ROBERT M. PERRY
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Communications-
Electronics Division

C O N F I D E N T I A L

T-8584

S E C R E T

(Confidential) Final Report, Base Capabilities
Division, Exercise Game Time

DO

DM

10 Aug 57
Col Phillips - 372

1. The Base Capabilities Division became operational at 1500Z, 5 August 1957 (E-Hour) with 100 percent manning. Operations continued on a fully manned basis until 1100Z, 8 August 1957 at which time reduced manning became necessary as a result of the medical situation. Base Capabilities Division ceased Operation at 1800Z, 10 August 1957. (C)
2. The purpose of 100 percent manning was to give EWP training and cross training to the large number of new personnel. This was completely successful. In addition, many internal procedures, data presentation methods, and functional responsibilities have been modified, clarified and simplified to improve the efficiency of the organization. (C)
3. Reports covering the operations of each branch are attached as inclosures for record purposes and for information of those in the peacetime organization who are concerned with activities of the various branches. Matters pertaining to internal division activities will be handled, and coordinated as necessary, by DML. (U)
4. Problems and recommendations requiring coordinated action with other divisions and peacetime Directorates are summarized in inclosure number 1.
5. The Base Capabilities Division is capable of accomplishing its EWP functions. (S)

9 Incls

1. Summary (S)
2. BCF Rpt (C)
3. BCP Rpt (C)
4. BCC Rpt (C)
5. BCS Rpt (C)
6. BCB Rpt (C)
7. BCA Rpt (S)
8. BCM Rpt (C)
9. BCT Rpt (C)

/s/ Everett Davis
EVERETT DAVIS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

S E C R E T

T-8584
1222

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(Confidential) Final Mission Report, Exercise
"Game Time"

BC

BCC

10 Aug 57
Major Lepp1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

a. An analysis of the 7th Air Division communications network during this exercise reveals that our present circuitry is adequate to meet our EWP requirements providing a high degree of circuit efficiency can be maintained. (C)

b. At the time of the exercise, all required circuits were operational. Circuits available to SAC included two (2) cable circuits, four (4) radio teletype circuits and the KO-6 circuit which has the capability of providing five (5) teletype channels. An additional two (2) radio teletype circuits to Headquarters SAC were activated at 1400 hours on the 6th of August. (c)

c. At 1600 hours on the 5th of August, the circuit efficiency to the ZI dropped to 74% and continued to drop until 1600 hours on 6 August when it reached 72.1 percent. During this period JCC exercise traffic (Fog Count) was extremely heavy and the three available circuits between High Wycombe and FRE were saturated. At one time a 90 minute backlog of traffic had accrued at FRE. Since Fog Count traffic took precedence over Game traffic, a backlog of Game Time traffic was building up in the High Wycombe relay center. To compensate for extreme circuit outage between High Wycombe and the ZI at this time, it was necessary to utilize the KO-6 circuits for teletype traffic and restrict telephone conversations to priority 1 calls. At 2400 hours on the 6th of August, the circuit efficiency between High Wycombe and the states started to improve. During the peak period 082400Z, when 787 Game Time messages were transmitted to the ZI from the High Wycombe relay center, the circuit efficiency rose to 86.8 percent. The overall in-station handling time at High Wycombe during the peak period was 11.6 minutes per message. Backlog in traffic occurred at Greenham Common and Brize Norton. Brize Norton was backlogged a maximum of 23 messages between 0730 and 1145 on 9 August. Greenham Common experienced their peak period from 1930Z on 8 August to 0400Z 9 August. Backlog ranged from 20 to 25 messages at the peak. An additional half-duplex circuit would have minimized the backlog of messages during peak periods at Greenham Common and Brize Norton. (C)

d. Statistics:

- (1) Overall circuit efficiency UK 90.42% (UNCLAS)
- (2) Overall circuit efficiency to SAC 83.78% (UNCLAS)
- (3) Average in-station time High Wycombe 9.8 min (UNCLAS)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

BCC, Subj: (C) Final Mission Report, Exercise "Game Time"

- (4) Overall handling time to SAC 25 min. (UNCLAS)
- (5) Cumulative average time per 6.8 min (UNCLAS)
- (6) Cumulative average time per 58.3 min (UNCLAS)
- (7) Total game time transmission to ZI 2593 msgs (UNCLAS)
- (8) Total fog count transmissions 586 msgs (UNCLAS)
- (9) Percentage messages transmitted 98.0% (UNCLAS)
within one (1) hour

2. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:

- a. Generally Nav-Aids and ATC operation remained reliable throughout the exercise. (U)
- b. An actual outage was encountered on the Chelveston VOR, but with radar at Brize Norton using IFF turnover to Chelveston GCA without the aid of the VOR was possible. In fact, this is the most effective method of reducing landing intervals at Chelveston. (U)
- c. The Mildenhall VOR was also inoperative for a short period but this was backed up by the Lakenheath VOR. (U)
- d. Radar at Lakenheath RAPCON was off for a time and conventional control was utilized. (U)
- e. None of the available Nav-Aid assets were called into play for deployment.

3. CONCLUSION:

- a. UK land line circuitry was extremely satisfactory. (C)
- b. Minimize was very effective. Little difficulty was experienced in placing operational calls to bases. Telephone service was excellent. (C)
- c. No known security compromises were committed. (C)
- d. The success attained by the High Wycombe relay center in the transmission of traffic to the ZI is attributed to the availability and reliability of the KO-6 system. Without this system, teletype communication with the Zone of Interior would have been unsatisfactory due to the excessive circuit outages accruing on the radio teletype circuits to the ZI. (C)

KENNETH E. LEPP
Major, USAF
Chief, Communications Branch

S E C R E T

Critique Comments on Game Time by Flight Control

COT

DOFC

10 Aug 57
Lt/Col Linebaugh
S/Sgt Michaud

1. The following comments on exercise "Game Time" are submitted:
 - A. Distribution on amendments to 7AD Operations order 70-57 was sad. Flight Control was left off as an addressee on the amendments after the second one.
 - B. The absence of rich names or code names for some bases presented a problem of destination and identification to Flight Control that would not be present under the actual execution of the EWP.

Recommended all classified bases be identified by code names in all future exercises.
 - C. Due to the several calls received from the bases during the exercise relative to the wording of the execution order, it is thought by Flight Control that in future operations orders where execution of the operations orders as such is not given, that an explanation be included in the operations order.
 - D. Combat Reports received during this exercise have not been standard in the interpretation by all units. Some B-10's and B-15's have been coming in listing sorties and some by call sign alone, others listing both. EAM listings throughout SAC are by sortie number. This should be the governing factor on all reports. Call signs change and are not reflected on B-2's nor are they required on B-15's.

Recommend unit designator and sortie number only be used on all B-10 and B-15 reports.
 - E. Future exercises.

Recommend EAM branch be augmented by message interpreter personnel and flight following be accomplished off of machine listings. (Flight Control will still get copies of all appropriate messages in case of machine breakdown).

BUILT BY WAO

/s/John H. M. Linebaugh
JOHN H. M. LINEBAUGH
Lt/Col, USAF
Flight Control Branch

S E C R E T

T-8584

S E C R E T

FROM: COMDR KEFLAVICK TASK FORCE ICELAND
 TO: COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB IA
 COMDRAIRDIV 7 HIGH WYCOMBE ENG
 CINCASAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

19 Aug 57

S E C R E T ZIPPO 08-364/T-27/GAME TIME ACTUAL/70-57/

"GAME TIME"

1. 2AF/KEFF/Game Time 10 day report.
 2. A. Success of mission was excellent at Keflavik. B. Communications facilities and control room facilities at Keflavik are marginally satisfactory for CPX exercises. C. Recommend immediate completion of control room facilities, including pony circuits for teletype machines, at Keflavik. 3. A N/A B. N/A C. N/A D. Messages received at Keflavik indicate the following MATS support did not materialize
- | TRIP NR | TYPE ACFT | CARGO | ENG. | PASSENGERS |
|---------|-----------|-------|------|------------|
| 2176 | C-124 | 16.6 | 4(R) | 2 |
| 2178 | C-124 | 14.6 | 5(R) | 7 |
- E. Base facilities at Keflavik are adequate for CPX activity.
 - F. Intelligence data provided in the basic operations order, Second Air Force 70-57, was adequate. G. Internal security at Keflavik is extremely marginal due to the current restrictions imposed by NATO agreement. Armed Guards are not provided at the Base communications center even when top secret material is being handled. Inadequate facility is provided at Keflavik for receipting for and storage of top secret material in accordance with SAC Regulation 205-15. H. Other items pertinent to future CPX: (1) Formats for scenarios

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should be standardized to include SAC tactical call signs, sortie numbers, refueling area rendezvous time, and call position. (2) Operations orders should specify the exact number of copies of canned messages to be furnished each senior controller. (3) Ground rules or procedures specified by intermediate headquarters should be held to a minimum. When necessary to promulgate additional rules, thorough coordination with all interested agencies should be effected prior to execution. (4) Tracer messages should not be initiated until thorough investigation of communications back-log has been accomplished. Tracers should be held to a minimum. (5) TT Keflavik Task Force, when in position, is under operational control of 7AD. During the Game Time CPX, several conflicting messages were received from 2AF controller CG UAD controller. Recommend this be considered in future exercises. (6) All Headquarters should be cautioned to send personnel on CPX exercises who are normally assigned to the Task Force. (7) Message drafters are not using correct address for Keflavik Task Force. Inasmuch as KEPTF does not operate from a SAC base, it is essential that all messages be addressed to "COMKEPTF." Any other address confuses communications center personnel and delays delivery of messages. (8) Recommend that SAC Manual 55-3B, and 55-8R be changed to include the alphabetical refueling area designator immediately following the sortie number; E. G., BULLDOG 2134/R/WEAPON/CAP/ETC. This alphabetical designator (see page 33 SAC Manual 55-7) will materially assist task force commanders in determining which sorties are applicable to them in multiple addressed, lengthy, 3-10 reports.

BT

19/1923Z AUG RJWFKL

2943

T-8584

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENG

21 Aug 1957

TO: CINCASAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

SECRET FROM D000 7-2948. First B-28/70-57/SAC/7AD/Game Time.

This message in four parts. Part I. This exercise pointed out several minor problem areas which affect EMP operations that can and are being resolved locally. Items major in nature that concern EMP execution requiring CINCASAC action are contained in ensuing parts. Part II. Combat Reporting: It was noted Combat Reports received at this headquarters varied widely in format and content. Specific recommendations for improvement are:

"GAME TIME"

(a) All reports which now require use of tactical call sign and/or sortie number be revised to require the unit tactical designator (i.e. SARPY) and two digit sortie number (i.e. 01) to comprise the tactical call sign (i.e. SARPY 01). This procedure would eliminate problems of (Marrying) a sortie number to a tactical call sign to determine target information for ATPOS reporting. Further, it eliminates another set of numbers which will simplify flight following.

(b) SAC Manual 55-8M be revised to require sortie number reporting such as recommended in (a) above, to enable Task Force Commanders of a pre-strike base to know the status of deploying force as pertains to sorties which will be pre-strike from his base.

(c) SAC Manual 55-8R be re-written to conform in format with the new 55-8B.

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(d) An intermediate landing report be added to the 55-88 series. Aircraft which post strike at bases within the AFNE and AFCE area in many cases will have only limited telephone capability or insecure telegraph or teletype facilities with which to communicate with respective task force commanders. If this report contained tactical call sign (as recommended in (a) above) strike results, aircraft status, ETD, destination and outside assistance required to launch aircraft to scheduled recovery base, it could be transmitted unclassified and would afford the area task force commander and higher headquarters a better knowledge of the status of these particular aircraft and sorties. Adding a report of this nature to SAC Manual 55-88 would insure desired dissemination.

Part III. Communications: From a communications standpoint, Game Time was a success, however, major problems developed during the CPX are listed below:

(a) The radio teletype circuits to the ZI experienced a large amount of outages. A large backlog of traffic was prevented only by using the KO-6 circuits with five teletype channels into headquarters, SAC. The KO-6 is normally a voice circuit and during EWP it would be very desirable to have as such. In view of this, recommend the following:

- (1) Obtain a full period circuit in the FPIS circuit from 7AD to Headquarters SAC.
- (2) Obtain one on-call circuit from 7AD to Headquarters SAC in the new submarine cable, to be used in conjunction with the KO-6 to transmit 300 to 600 WPM teletype. This on call circuit to

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be called up for CPX type exercises during EWP.

Part IV. During the exercise a few situations developed that were questionable as to command responsibility for aircraft pre-strike staging in the United Kingdom and aircraft that are pre-target aborts that land in the 7th Air Division area of command. An example was the situation where new guided missile sites were discovered and a different operating frequency for SAM sites was determined. In a situation of this type, would it be the responsibility of the Commander, 7AD, or the parent air force to direct the pre-strike staging Bomb Wings to change their ECM equipment frequencies if required; also could the Commander, 7AD alter the routes of these aircraft to avoid overflying heavily defended areas if deemed advisable. On the question of relaunching pre-target aborting aircraft that land in the 7AD area of command, for an example, if an aircraft is a pre-target abort and lands at a 7AD base and the aircraft is destroyed on the ground, but the weapon is recovered intact, would it be the responsibility of the 7AD Commander to relaunch this weapon against its originally scheduled target as soon as possible, utilizing post-strike staging aircraft and crew of another bomb wing if necessary? Suggest SAC Manual 55-7 be amended to specify prerogative of forward area commanders in situations of this nature.

D000

T-8584

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 SOUTH RUISLIP ENGLAND
 TO: CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

4 Sep 1957

SECRET FROM D000 7-3092. B-28/70-57/7AD/Blanchard Game Tim.
 This message in 8 parts. PART 1. The mission as concerned
 7th AD was considered successful. The following recommendations
 are made for future CPX operations. PART 2. A falacy in the
 present concept of Command Post Exercises is that very limited
 exercise is afforded any agency except the communication network
 and communications personnel. Because the Wing Representatives
 bring pre-canned messages and put them into the communications
 system at the time designated on his submission schedule, Control
 teams and small Task Force Commands receive practically no
 exercise. PART 3. This command had a CPX in March 57 based on
 55-57, plan which utilized EAM listings of the complete aircraft
 movement chronology, non-effective aircraft, target and strike
 information. These listings were made using comptroller equipment
 and sent to the field in sealed envelopes with instructions not to
 open until execution of the exercise, there-by precluding any
 pre-canning of messages. To establish a reporting sequence, 7AD
 recovery base control teams actually sent simulated B-2 and B-10
 reports for units departing from the states. They then picked up
 the aircraft recovering to their bases and reported them in
 accordance with the machine scenario. For security reasons, each
 controller had only machine scenarios for aircraft scheduled to

"SAME TIME"

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S E C R E T

recover at his base only. Also, for situations play, there was a pre-determined number of aircraft (24) on which all base controllers had scenarios. This was to enable him to report strike results and further movement of any aircraft which may be diverted to his base.

PART 4. Advantages of this system are: (a) Enable commander of Task Forces and Control Teams that are normally only activated on CPX or EWP (i.e. Keflavik and Lajes) to actually determine if personnel assigned, administrative and operations procedures are compatible with required EWP work load. (b) Afford a more realistic workout and provide valuable training for personnel who will actually be making out the combat reports during EWP operation. (c) Machine listings would enable Major Subordinate Commands to easily check on the accuracy of the reporting from the field.

PART 5. Recommend Headquarters SAC consider using machine scenarios as a basis of information to generate required message traffic and exercise of Task Force and/or Control Team. If desired, this Headquarters can furnish information on formats on machine listings and procedures employed setting up for CPX referenced above. PART 6. During this exercise, submission of reports simulating arrival and departures at classified post strike bases in the AFNE area, cause confusion. To facilitate reference to these bases during CPX and peacetime operations, request SAC establish and publish a list of confidential code names for these bases. PART 7. REPORTS: (a) B-11 reports were submitted individually on this exercise. This is unrealistic in this area since most probably all strike reports will be received by Croughton Airways and relayed to Peppercorn Control in groups.

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Recommend in future CPXs at least six of them be consolidated on one report. (b) B-30 reports submitted during this exercise were not realistic in length of message or transmission schedule. At Brize Norton, reports were being submitted at one and two minute intervals after the B-15 and B-11, which is unrealistic considering ECM personnel compile this report and submit it after B-11 and B-15 during actual operations. Recommend the B-30 reports be submitted more realistically and within the capability of ECM personnel to prepare such reports. (c) The 100th Bomb Wing submitted B-51 reports in addition to the 3921st RTS B-51 team. This was contrary to instructions contained 7AD 70-57 and instructions sent to the numbered Air Force Headquarters by CINCSAC. Suggest, as a CPX criteria for this area, 7AD B-51 teams be responsible for submitting all B-51's on all post striking aircraft. (d) Certain discrepancies in reports contained in 7AD Supplements to SAC Manual 55-3M were noticed. These reports will be reviewed and revised as required. Part 8. Request this headquarters be on distribution for five (5) copies of future CPX operation orders. In preparation of 7AD Game Time it was found three (3) copies were insufficient as there were several different staff agencies that required copies to work with in preparation of their part.

MR: Ref Part 1 thru 5. The lack of operational exercise is particularly true of out bases. They have the responsibility to post strike, recover and relaunch aircraft to the ZI and are seldom afforded an opportunity to really work out their system. Exercise "Fixed Star" gave them this opportunity and judging from results of that exercise SAC could benefit by employing the same system. Believe the suggestions contained in the first four parts of this report will receive favorable consideration since SAC is really getting into the EAM business as pertains to operations. Ref Part 6. Lakenheath reported much confusion on reporting for classified bases. Assignment of these code words

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would also be expedient for peace time operations. Ref Part 7. B-11 is a strike report. This causes unrealistic communications load when sent individually. Part 7. B-30 (Initial Electronic Intercept Report) is a fairly lengthy report which is compiled after the B-15, and B-11 and hot news have gone in. Submission of this report right along with the others is unrealistic and causes a communications back log. Ref Part 7. B-51 (Immediate Photo Intelligence Report) should be submitted by 3921st RTS B-51 teams only. Ref Part 7. In many of the report sent in from the field inadequacies and discrepancies of these reports were indicated. Mention of it here is way of letting SAC know we are going to do something about it. Part 8. We did not have enough copies of SAC Same Time.

S E C R E T

FROM: COMUSMACV OFFICE AFB NEBRASKA
 TO: COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
 COMAF 6 WESTOVER AFB MASS
 COMAF 10 MARCH AFB CALIFORNIA
 COMAIRDIV 3 ANDERSEN AFB OLAH
 COMAF 16 MADRID SPAIN
 COMAIRDIV 7 SO WUISLIP ENGLAND

/SECRET/ FROM DOTS 4537. SUBJECT: UNIT CAPABILITY PROBATION.

This message in V Parts. Part I. In view of the flying hour restrictions imposed upon units during 4th quarter FY 57 and policies outlined in the Director of Operations Serial number messages, the criteria established for minimum acceptable unit combat ready crew strength by my message DOTS 9504 dated 18 June 57 is waived until 1 November 57. Part II. During the interim period the following assigned combat ready crew strength by type unit is considered the minimum necessary for being declared fully capable.

A. B-52, B/RE-47 units - 40 crews. B. B-36 units - 25 crews.
 C. DC-97 units - 20 crews. Part III. This change in unit capability probation criteria does not relieve B-47 and B-52 units from the SWP commitment of 45 sorties. Part IV. The minimum assigned combat ready strength of 40 for the 376 bomb wing and 91st SRW remains firm. Part V. For 2A. This answers USMSG DO 12944 dated 20 Aug. This message transmitted to Alfa and Bravo.

BT

03/2338Z SEP RJJDMH

SECRET

S E C R E T

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENGLAND 30 Oct 1957

TO: COMDRABGRU 3909 GREENHAM COMMON ENGLAND
 COMDRABGRU 3920 BRIZE NORTON ENGLAND
 COMDRASSQ 3919 FAIRFORD ENGLAND
 COMDRABSQ 3914 CHELVESTON ENGLAND
 COMDRABSQ 3913 MILDENHALL ENGLAND
 COMDRABSQ 3917 EAST KIRKBY ENGLAND
 COMDRCOMTSQDIV 485 HIGH WYCOMBE ENGLAND

S E C R E T FROM DOCC 7-3728. SUBJECT: (UNCIAS) COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS FOR SAC EXERCISE NICKNAME IRON BAR. During the forthcoming exercise, scheduled for 25 November, and 10-12 days subsequent to that date, considerable emphasis will be placed on all your communications support activities. Since this exercise will be executed and directed by HQ SAC and involve the actual deployment and redeployment of strike forces through the 7AD area of responsibility, accurate and expeditious communications must prevail. Request you review your communications capabilities anticipating any problem which might contribute to your inability to provide anything but the most rapid handling of this exercise traffic. At the time this exercise is executed, all 7AD tributary stations involved will have equipment for one full duplex terminal plus one half duplex spare. At this time, the half duplex spare COMSEC equipment should be set up for send operation, giving the station the capability of two send and one receive teletype terminals. It is suggested that all teletype and

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COMSEC equipment be inspected and all possible preventative maintenance performed by your communications machine repairmen, who should also be capable of switching your B-2 tables from send to receive in a minimum of time.

DOCC

MAJOR F. E. STANT, Ch, TeleComm Br

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 30 RHISLIP ENGLAND
 TO: CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 INFO: COMDRAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
 COMDRAIRDIV 806 LAKE CHARLES AFB LA
 COMDRCONWG 68 BRIZE NORTON ENGLAND

CONFIDENTIAL FROM DOT 7-3964. ATTN: DM, DP, DOTPS AND COA. 218

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON OCTOBER AIR TRAINING REPORT OF THE 68TH BOMB WING (RCS: 5-SAC-T12). Concur in wing commanders remarks with following additional comments: Reference paragraph 1g: Concur in recommendation, authority has been given to program for funds required to support commercial type radios. Motor vehicles and radio maintenance is performed after duty hours in order to provide maximum service to the wing. Reference paragraph 1h(1). Second section of this paragraph will be reworded in the wing's report for November to read as follows: "Quantity of off base tanker support is presently inadequate. During October, only 26 B-47E refueling sorties could be scheduled. Twelve of these sorties were ineffective. Ten sorties were lost due to four tanker cancellations. This includes only the month of October in the United Kingdom." (This change made in accordance with 68th Bomb Wing Confidential message 68DOTRA 228-57, 14 November 1957, Subject: 5-SAC-T12 Report for October 1957.)

DOT (A/10 Morris - 395) 15 1200Z
 Major Hillard C. Alloway NOV 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FROM: COMDAIRDIV 7 SO WILTSHIRE ENG
 TO: COMDRABGRV 3909 GREENHAM COMMON ENG
 COMDRABGRV 3910 LAKENHEATH ENG
 COMDRABGRV 3911 WEST DRAYTON ENG
 COMDRABGRV 3918 UPPER KEYFORD ENG
 COMDRABGRV 3920 BRIZE NORTON ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3912 BRINTINGHORPE ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3914 CHELVESTON ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3917 EAST KIRBY ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3919 FAIRFORD ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3929 HIGH WYCOMBE ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3930 STANSTED ENG
 COMDAIRDIV 7 DET 2 HIGH WYCOMBE ENG

SECRET FROM DO 7-3968. SUBJECT: TIME TEST MESSAGES.
 FOR COMMANDER'S IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. SAC ZIPPO 11-039, 7 Nov
 57, established a procedure for testing base acknowledgement
 times to SAC EWP practice execution messages. Results of
 tests to date have been unsatisfactory. Average time to receive
 acknowledgements from 7AD stations on 15 Nov test was thirty-
 five minutes. Some stations required well over one hour. These
 times are entirely unacceptable and must be reduced drastically.
 The importance of immediate receipt, deciphering and acknowle-
 dgement of such messages cannot be over-emphasized. It is imperative
 that immediate repeat immediate action be taken to insure that
 properly indoctrinated personnel and appropriate deciphering and
 authenticating documents are constantly available to receive,
 decipher and acknowledge understanding of these messages. Acknow-
 ledgement of receipt and understanding of this message is requested.
 Colonel Louis M. Sowers

16
 NOV 1957

SECRET

SECRET



**OPERATIONS
ORDER**

39-57

"IRON BAR"

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

COPY 95 OF 112 COPIES

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 64 PAGES

SECRET

JOINT MESSAGEFORM			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER				
3114100ctZ				
PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL
ACTION	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	ORIG. OR REFERS TO
INFC		X		AF
FROM:	COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENG			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO:	COMDRAP 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA (MAIL) (2 Cys)			<u>INTERNAL</u>
	COMDRAP 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS (MAIL) (2 Cys)			1 CY EA:
	COMDRAP 15 MARCH AFB CALIF (MAIL) (2 Cys)			DS DS
	COMDRAIRDIV 5 SIDI SLIMANE MOROCCO (MAIL) (1 Cy)			ADJ DP
	COMDRBOMWG 321 PINECASTLE AFB FLA (MAIL) (2 Cys)			OI DO
	COMDRSHW 26 LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO (MAIL) (3 Cys)			DOC DOP
	COMDRBOMWG 310 SCHILLING AFB KAN (MAIL) (3 Cys)			DOFC
	COMDRBOMWG 340 WHITEMAN AFB MD (MAIL) (2 Cys)			2 CYS EA:
	COMDRBOMWG 68 BRIZE NORTON ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			DI
	COMDRAREFS 376 DET 1 GREENHAM COMMON (MAIL) (1 Cy)			3 CYS EA:
	COMDRAREFS 376 BENGUERIR MOROCCO (MAIL) (1 Cy)			DM
	COMDRABGRU 3909 GREENHAM COMMON ENG (MAIL) (2 Cy)			5 CYS EA:
	COMDRABGRU 3910 LAKENHEATH ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			DOO
	COMDRABGRU 3911 WEST DRAYTON ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			COORDINATION
	COMDRABSQ 3913 MILDENHALL ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			DO <i>Eng</i>
	COMDRABSQ 3914 CHELVESTON ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			DOO <i>Thomas</i>
	COMDRABSQ 3917 EAST KIRKBY ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			Secret - reveals detailed info of SAC Large Scale Exercise Copy of 112 copies
SYMBOL	DOO			DATE
WRITER	<i>E. F. Brooks</i>			TIME
TELETYPE	CAPT E. F. BROOKS			31 1500Z
PHONE	403	PAGE NR.	NR. OF PAGES	MONTH
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				HAROLD J. GEBHART
				1st Col, USAF
				Adjutant

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

MESSAGEFORM — CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
		SECRET	
COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENG			
COMDRABGRU 3918 UPPER HEYFORD ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			
COMDRABSQ 3919 FAIRFORD ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			
COMDRABGRU 3920 BRIZE NOTON ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			
COMDRECONTECHSQ 3921 WEST DRAYTON ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			
COMDRABSQ 3929 HIGH WYCOMBE ENG (MAIL) (2 Cys)			
COMDRBOMWG 341 DYESS AFB TEX (MAIL) (2 Cys)			
INFO: CINCOSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR (MAIL) (8 Cys)			
COMDRAF 16 MADRID SPAIN (MAIL) (2 Cys)			
CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY (MAIL) (1 Cy)			
COFS USAF WASH DC (MAIL) (1 Cy)			
COMDRAIRDIV 4 BARKSDALE AFB LA (MAIL) (1 Cy)			
COMDRAIRDIV 801 LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO (MAIL) (1 Cy)			
COMDRAIRDIV 802 SCHILLING AFB KAN (MAIL) (1 Cy)			
COMDRAIRDIV 819 DYESS AFB TEX (MAIL) (1 Cy)			
COMDRAIRDIV 806 LAKE CHARLES AFB LA (MAIL) (1 Cy)			
SR REPR SAC 2 PARIS FR (MAIL) (1 Cy)			
COMDRABSQ 3912 BRUNTINGTHORPE ENG (MAIL) (1 Cy)			
COMDRWEARON 28 BUSHY PARK ENG (ANNEX F ONLY) (MAIL) (25 Cys)			
COMDRWEAWG 2 BITBURG GERMANY (ANNEX F ONLY) (MAIL) (2 Cys)			
FORM	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
DDO	2		SECRET
DD FORM 1 MAY 58 13-1			INITIALS

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SECRET/DOOO 7-3736. IRON BAR. Special handling required. Not releasable to Foreign nationals. Reproducing, extracting and/or paraphrasing information contained in this document is authorized, however, the original classification of affected items will be maintained. Dissemination of information herein will be on a "Need To Know Basis". This document must not be downgraded unless specifically authorized by this headquarters, but may be destroyed (AFR 205-1 will apply) subsequent to completion of the exercise and/or when no longer required.

TASK ORGANIZATIONS: See Para 3

1. GENERAL SITUATION: SAC will conduct a large scale training exercise, including special weapons maneuver, involving multiple SAC units which will exercise certain operational concepts of Strategic Air Operations. E Hour/Day will be 25/1400Z November 1957. Timing concept of E plus 72 hours mass launch option will be utilized. Unclassified nickname is IRON BAR.

- a. Intelligence: See Annex B this OPORD.
- b. Friendly Forces:
 - (1) USAFE
 - (a) Provide necessary search and rescue support within applicable areas of aircraft movement.
 - (b) Provide EOD services within applicable areas of aircraft movement as outlined in USAF message AFMSS - AR 657/56, 3 Apr 56, USAFE Reg 136-7, USAFE Atomic Weapons Directive Nbr 6, and AFR 136-10.

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(2) MATS:

(a) Provide airlift support as outlined in SAC OPORD 39-57.

(b) Provide "On Call" search/rescue and normal communications support within applicable areas of aircraft movement.

1. Military flight service will not pass departure/arrival message by HF circuiting for SAC tactical aircraft participating in this exercise.

(3) 2AF Will:

(a) Deploy approximately 40 B-47 aircraft, crews and necessary support personnel of 321st BW to United Kingdom for approximately 10 days TDY. B-47 aircraft will conduct prestrike operations at Mildenhall, participate in simulated strike phase of this exercise, conduct post strike operations at Mildenhall, thence redeploy to home station.

(b) Obtain necessary block altitude clearances for deployment of 321st BW aircraft.

(c) Prior to departure from home station insure that all crews have been thoroughly briefed on letdown procedures at United Kingdom destinations, entry route into United Kingdom and the necessity for extreme caution while overflying United Kingdom with weapons aboard.

(d) Maintain operational responsibility of 321st BW aircraft and issue execution orders for redeployment to home station.

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(e) Provide task force commander at Mildenhall IAW
7AD OPORD 40-58.

(f) Accomplish other related tasks as outlined in
SAC Opord 39-57.

(4) 8AF Will:

(a) Deploy 20 KC-97's of 310th AREFS, 18 RB-47's
of 26 SRW, 25 B-47 of 340th BW, crews and necessary support personnel
to United Kingdom for approximately 10 days TDY.

1. 310th AREFS will deploy to East Kirkby for
purpose of providing air refueling support and strip alert during period
of this exercise.

2. 26th SRW will deploy 3 RB-47 aircraft to
Fairford for purpose of conducting air refueling area weather recon-
naissance during period of this exercise and an additional 15 RB-47 air-
craft to Fairford for purpose of participating in simulated reconnaissance
strike phase of this exercise.

3. 340th BW will launch 25 B-47 aircraft from
prestrike base on simulated strike mission with post strike operations
at Brize Norton.

(b) Obtain necessary block altitude clearances from
appropriate ATC agency for deployment of above aircraft.

(c) Develop plans and coordinate this mission with
concerned agencies. Following areas will be covered:

1. General deployment/strike/redeployment
routes, altitude and target areas for all participating units.

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2. Designate air refueling areas, rendezvous points, refueling tracks, altitudes and communications procedures for all air refueling task forces utilized by units of more than one numbered air force.

(d) Prior to departure from home station insure that all crews have been thoroughly briefed on letdown procedures at United Kingdom destinations and alternates, and, where applicable, the necessity for extreme caution while overflying United Kingdom with weapons aboard.

(e) Maintain operational responsibility for all 8th Air Force units and issue execution orders for redeployment to home station.

(f) Accomplish other related tasks as outlined in SAC Opord 39-57.

(5) 15AF Will

(a) Deploy 36 B-47 aircraft of 341st BW, crews and necessary support personnel to United Kingdom for approximately 10 days TDY.

1. 341st BW will launch 36 B-47 aircraft from prestrike base on simulated strike mission with post strike operations at Chelveston. (8 B-57 aircraft of 341st BW will air refuel in East Kirkby area.)

(b) Obtain necessary block altitude clearances from appropriate ATC agencies for deployment of above aircraft.

(c) Insure that all crews participating in this exercise have been thoroughly briefed on letdown procedures and entry

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routes to United Kingdom and necessity for extreme caution while overflying United Kingdom with weapons aboard.

(d) Maintain operational responsibility for all 15AF units and issue execution orders for redeployment to home stations.

(e) Accomplish other related tasks as outlined in SAC Opord 39-57.

(6) 5AD Will:

(a) Provide normal base support in event any participating aircraft this exercise are diverted to North African bases.

(b) Accomplish other related tasks as outlined in SAC and numbered air force Opord 39-57

(7) 16AF Will:

(a) Monitor United Kingdom portion of this exercise for information purposes and provide necessary base support in event any participating aircraft this exercise are diverted to 16AF bases. Aircraft will be diverted to Spanish bases in extreme emergencies only.

(8) 2nd Weather Wing: Provide weather support for this exercise, SAC Manual 105-1 will apply. (See Annex E, Separate Distribution, etc.)

(9) United Kingdom AACCS Region: Insure that GCA and tower facilities, at each of the following 7AD bases, are on 24 hour operation during period of this exercise:

Brize Norton

Mildenhall

Greenham Common

Oliver King 7

East Worthy

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Chelveston
Lakenheath
East Kirkby
Fairford

2. MISSION:

- a. To conduct a large scale training exercise with multiple SAC B/RB-47 and KC-97 aircraft units as outlined in SAC Opord 39-57.
- b. To conduct special weapons exercise with participating B-47 aircraft IAW instructions contained in Annex E, this Opord, to be forwarded NOTAL.
- c. To exercise forward bases pre/post strike support personnel utilizing participating SAC aircraft, for testing of base support turn around capability IAW SAC Manual 55-7.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- a. 68th BW
 - (1) Plan and conduct USCM, to include special weapons exercise, utilizing 40 B-47 aircraft IAW instructions contained herein. Mission will resemble EWP planning factors as closely as possible, tempered by peace time practicability and flying safety. 2nd Air Force Oplan 300-57, SAC Manual 55-12 and SAC Reg 50-4 will be utilized as basic planning guides.
 - (2) Accomplish strike photography IAW instructions contained in paragraph 3e(1), Annex B.
 - (3) Prepare and submit B-51 reports IAW paragraph 3x(7), Basic Opord.
 - (4) Co-ordinate with 3920th ABGRU Intelligence Officer in support of 7AD Reg 200-6.

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(5) All strike film obtained in connection with this exercise will be marked IAW paragraph 3e(3), Annex B and disposed of IAW paragraph 3e(4), Annex B.

(6) Provide 3920 ABGRU with necessary information for obtaining required clearances.

(7) Perform other related tasks as outlined herein.

b. 26th SRW:

(1) Upon arrival in United Kingdom perform weather scout reconnaissance utilizing 3 RB-47 aircraft IAW 8AF Opord 39-57 and instructions contained in Annex A, this Opord.

(2) Participate in simulated reconnaissance strike phase of this exercise utilizing 15 RB-47 aircraft IAW 8AF Opord 39-57 and instructions contained herein.

(3) Provide 3919 ABRON with necessary information for obtaining required clearances.

c. 310th AREFS:

(1) Upon arrival in United Kingdom assume strip alert responsibilities during period of this exercise, utilizing 5 KC-97 aircraft.

(2) Provide air refueling support for strike and redeploying B/RB-47 aircraft during period of this exercise, IAW air refueling schedule outlined in paragraph 7, Annex A, utilizing 15 KC-97 aircraft, as follows:

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(a) Simulated Strike Phase:

8 air refueling sorties in support of 341st BW.

14 air refueling sorties in support of 68th BW.

(b) Redeployment Phase:

3 air refueling sorties in support of 26th SRW
weather scout aircraft.

15 air refueling sorties in support of 26th SRW
aircraft.

25 air refueling sorties in support of 340th BW.

(NOTE: All times listed in paragraph 7, Annex A
are approximate and will be adjusted so as to permit making good
rendezvous time.)

d. 3909 - Greenham Common

(1) Provide support as required by 376th AREFS during
period this exercise.

(2) Insure that 376th AREFS performs strip alert
responsibilities during period of this exercise.

(3) Provide special weapons loading teams as outlined
in Annex E, at may be diverted to Greenham Common.

(4) Maintain capability for supporting and launching any
aircraft that may be diverted to Greenham Common. Diverted aircraft
may be required to launch on flight to pre/post strike base, on simulated
strike mission or IAW contingency plan, as directed by Commander 7AD.

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(5) Execute movement designator "Farm" IAW Appendix II, Annex B, 7th Air Division Opord 40-58 to be in place not later than 25/1200Z Nov 57.

(6) Perform other related tasks as outlined herein.

e. 3910 - Lakenheath

(1) Provide necessary base support in the event any participating aircraft are diverted to Lakenheath.

(2) Maintain capability for supporting and launching any aircraft that may be diverted to Lakenheath. Diverted aircraft may be required to launch on flight to pre/post strike base, on simulated strike mission or IAW contingency plan as directed by Commander 7th Air Division.

(3) Deploy two, 15 man, air police teams (771X0) to Mildenhall to arrive not later than 25/1200Z Nov 57. Air Police personnel will remain at Mildenhall until all B-47 aircraft have redeployed to home station.

(4) Provide special weapons loading support as required in accordance with instructions contained in Annex E.

(5) Provide fire fighters and equipment as outlined in Annex C.

(6) Brief personnel of 1979th AACS on concept of this exercise.

f. 3911 - West Drayton

(1) Provide support for 3921st RTS IAW 7AD Opord 40-58.

g. Mildenhall Task Force

(1) Provide necessary base facilities and support for approximately 40 B-47 aircraft, crews and support personnel of 321st BW. (Support personnel will include 45 aircraft pre-post strike team.)

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(2) Assume responsibility for all pre/post strike maintenance on 321st BW B-47 aircraft IAW 7AD Opord 44-58.

(3) Provide Intelligence support IAW Annex A, 7AD Opord 44-58 (Reference Annex B this Opord).

(4) Position base commander, deputy base commander or operations officer in control tower for all B-47 aircraft take-offs and landings during this exercise.

(5) Provide secure storage in accordance with SAC Regulation 205-15 for EWP Combat Mission Folders deployed by participating units.

(6) Obtain necessary flight clearances as required by 321st BW during simulated strike phase and redeployment to home station.

(7) Provide necessary base personnel to assist in load/off load of support aircraft.

(8) Perform other related tasks as outlined herein.

h. Chelveston Task Force

(1) Provide necessary base facilities and support for approximately 36 B-47 aircraft, crews and support personnel of 341st BW. (Support personnel will include 45 aircraft post strike team.)

(2) Assume responsibility for all post strike maintenance on 341st BW aircraft IAW 7AD Opord 44-58.

(3) Provide Intelligence support IAW Annex A, 7AD Opord 44-58 (reference Annex B, this Opord).

(4) Position base commander, deputy base commander or operations officer in Control Tower for all B-47 aircraft take-offs and landings during this exercise.

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(5) Provide secure storage in accordance with SAC Regulation 205-15 for EWP Combat Mission Folders deployed by participating units.

(6) Obtain necessary flight clearances as required by 341st BW for redeployment to home station.

(7) Provide necessary base personnel to assist in load/off load of support aircraft.

(8) Perform other related tasks as outlined herein.

i. East Kirkby Task Force

(1) Provide necessary base facilities and support for approximately 20 KC-97 aircraft, crews and support personnel for 310 AREFS during period of this exercise. (Support personnel will include class C 20 aircraft team.)

(2) Obtain necessary flight clearances as required by 310 AREFS during period of strike and redeployment phase of this exercise.

(3) Provide necessary base personnel to assist in load/off load tanker aircraft.

(4) Perform other related tasks as outlined herein.

j. 3918 - Upper Heyford

(1) Deploy 2, 15 man air police teams (771X0) to Chelveston to arrive not later than 28/1200Z Nov 57. Air police personnel will remain at chelveston until all B-47 aircraft have redeployed to home station.

(2) Provide fire fighters and equipment as outlined in Annex C this Opord.

(3) Provide salvage appraisal personnel as outlined in Annex E.

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(4) Provide special weapons loading teams as outlined in Annex E.

k Fairford Task Force

(1) Provide necessary base facilities and support for approximately 18 RB-47 aircraft, crews and support personnel of 26SRW. (Support personnel will include 15 aircraft pre/post strike team.)

(2) Provide Intelligence support IAW Annex a, 7AD Opord 44-58 (reference Annex B this Opord).

(3) Provide secure storage in accordance with SAC Regulation 205-15 for EWP Combat Mission Folders deployed by participating units.

(4) Provide courier and submit FC-1 report IAW paragraph 3X(7) basic Opord.

(5) Position base commander, deputy base commander or operations officer in Control Tower for all B-47 aircraft take-offs and landings during this exercise.

(6) Obtain necessary flight clearances as required by 26SRW during A/R weather recon, strike phase and redeployment.

(7) Provide necessary base personnel to assist in load/off load of support aircraft.

(8) Perform other related tasks as outlined herein.

l Brize Norton Task Force

(1) In addition to support presently afforded the 68th BW, provide necessary base facilities and support for approximately 25 B-47 aircraft, crews and support personnel of 340th BW IAW 7AD Opord

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44-58. (Support personnel will include 15 aircraft post strike team.)

(2) Assume responsibility for all pre/post strike maintenance for 68th Bomb Wing and for all post strike maintenance on 340th BW aircraft IAW 7AD Opord 44-58.

(3) Provide Intelligence support IAW Annex A, 7AD Opord 44-58 (reference Annex B, this Opord).

(4) Provide secure storage in accordance with SAC Regulation 205-15 for EWP Combat Mission Folder deployed by participating units.

(5) Position base commander, deputy base commander or base operations officer in Control Tower for all B-47 aircraft take-offs and landings during this exercise.

(6) Obtain necessary flight clearances as required by 340 BW for redeployment to home station.

(7) Return 7AD personnel presently on TDY from Chelveston, Fairford, Mildenhall and East Kirkby to home stations prior to beginning of exercise. These personnel will return to Brize Norton TDY after completion of exercise.

(8) Provide necessary base personnel to assist in load/off load of support aircraft.

(9) Brief personnel of 1970th AACS on concept of this exercise.

m. 3921st RTS

(1) Deploy B-51 Report Teams to 3913th (Movement Designator Mist), 3914th (Movement Designator Chap), and 3920th (Movement Designator Brat) in accordance with 7th Air Division Opord 40-58. Deployment

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schedules and target assignments will be forwarded by priority message prior to execution date.

(2) B-51 Report Teams prepare and submit B-51 reports IAW 7AD OPORD 69-58 and paragraph 3X(7) this opord.

(3) Provide 3920th Support TIC with additional Nav/ATMP material as requested.

(4) Reconnaissance Technical reports required by SAC Manual 55-8C will be prepared but not transmitted.

(5) Process and dupe all reconnaissance film and logs received from the 26th SRW.

(6) Ship dupe positives of reconnaissance film and logs to 544th RTS, Offutt AFB, Nebraska within 2 working days following receipt of last reconnaissance film.

(7) Original reconnaissance film will be disposed of in accordance with AFR 95-18 after dupe positives of film/logs have been made and shipped to 544th RTS.

(8) Screen all strike film and logs received from strike units and dupe that retained for inclusion in the 7AD Exercise Target catalog. Original film/logs will be shipped to home station of originating unit upon completion of above action.

n. 3929 - High Wycombe

(1) Provide transportation and support as required for manning 7th Air Division Command Post. (DOA will provide 3929th ABRON with transportation requirements at a later date. (See paragraph 3X(8))

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o 7th Air Division Flight Control

(1) In the event any participating aircraft this exercise are diverted to North African or Spanish bases, obtain necessary clearances as required for overflight of Spain and provide 16AF and 5AD with ETA's.

(2) Upon receipt of execution order, advise all United Kingdom addressees this Opord plus 28 Weather Squadron, Bushy Park, Detachment 40 High Wycombe and UK AACS Region, Eastcote of E hour and aircraft ETA's. (This notification will be by phone with a follow-up message.)

(3) Monitor procurement of ATC clearances, by appropriate 7AD ABGRU/RON, as required by participating units during weather reconnaissance, strike and redeployment phase of this exercise.

3X. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) SAC Manuals 55-3, 55-3A, 55-5, 55-5A, 55-10, 55-12, 55-14, 100-1 and SAC Reg 50-8 will apply.

(2) Planning Factors:

(a) During period of this exercise in addition to bases in the ZI, North Africa, Northeast and Azores, the following United Kingdom bases will be exercised:

1. East Kirkby (KC-97)
2. Fairford (RB-47)
3. Greenham Common (KC-97)
4. Brize Norton (B-47)
5. Chelveston (B-47)

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6. Mildenhall (B-47)

(b) Upon receipt of execution order for 7AD Opord 39-57 the following tasks forces will be activated in accordance with 7AD Opord 44-58. Task force personnel of units not participating in this exercise will not be utilized.

1. Brize Norton Task Force
2. Chelveston Task Force
3. Mildenhall Task Force
4. Fairford Task Force
5. East Kirkby Task Force

(c) Task Force Commanders, plus staff personnel, pre and/or post strike teams, and enroute maintenance teams will be utilized to a maximum extent commensurate with mission requirements. Maximum effort will be made by Task Force Commanders and key staff personnel at bases being exercised to familiarize the required base support personnel with their support responsibilities. Participation of support personnel will be as specified in applicable task force plans. Task Force commanders will prepare a contingency plan for supporting SAC 40/44/50-58 emergency war orders during this exercise. Necessary planning data will be submitted by Commander 7AD under separate cover. Direct communications authorized between task force commanders and participating units regarding augmentation details.

(d) Operations of participating units will resemble EWP planning factors as closely as possible, tempered by peacetime

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practicability and flying safety considerations. Deployment and simulated strike mission air operations will be based on "E plus 72 hours mass launch option", with air movements as outlined in SAC Opord 10/50-58, Exception: 341 BW will be launched in three equal increments, 24 hours apart, so as to land United Kingdom during daylight and better weather hours.

(e) USCM Credit: All units participating in this exercise will receive USCM credit and will be scored IAW SAC Tech Pamphlet 170-1 as amended. In those cases where instructions contained in SAC/7AD Opord 39-57 preclude accomplishment of all individual training items required for USCM's by SAC Reg 50-8, Unit Commanders will include a statement in the remarks section to the USCM recap sheet outlining those items not accomplished.

(f) Delays for crew rest will be IAW SAC Reg 62-19, except as outlined herein:

1. Post Strike: B/RB-47 aircraft up to 48 hours.
2. KC-97 Air Refueling Missions: 12 hours turn around.

(3) Responsibilities:

(a) Headquarters SAC will issue execution orders and will control deployment and strike phase this exercise.

(b) Parent Air Force Headquarters exercising operational responsibility will issue execution orders and control recovery and/or redeployment phase this exercise.

(c) Hq 7AD will dispatch weather reconnaissance missions from Fairford IAW instructions contained herein. (See Annex A)

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1. Due to ever present possibility of adverse weather and/or other unforeseen circumstances affecting this exercise, task force commanders will closely monitor all phases this exercise.

(d) Operations Orders:

1. Participating units will forward their operations orders, IAW instruction contained in appropriate parent AF Opords.

2. Opords will be published by duplimate or mimeograph in the standard five paragraph format with Annexes/Appendices as required.

3. Unit Opord will contain the following information (See SAC Man 55-7):

a. Route Picture: A general route chart will be prepared on SP-7, JN series or suitable outline map indicating the general common routes from takeoff thru air refueling areas(s) to post strike base. Annotation will indicate major turning/check points, giving altitude and time from launching at each point identified. If necessary to portray detailed strike routes, targets and force composition. All pictures will be submitted in standard 8" X 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ " size. One copy of each picture will be included in the Opord. In addition, 5 copies will be forwarded, under separate cover, to CINCONAD, ATTN: COC, plus one copy each to EADF, CADF, CFECR, STEWART AFB AND CFCCR, Richards-Gebaur AB.

b. Flight Plans will be prepared on SAC Form 1A or 1B. Critical wind components will be computed and entered for each leg of mission. One copy of flight plan will be included in the Opord.

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In addition, 5 copies will be forwarded under separate cover to CINCONAD, ATTN: COC plus one copy each to EADF, CADF, CFEGR AND CFCCR.

c. "Post Strike and Redeployment Recap Sheet", (SAC Form 141), as applicable, will be forwarded to Hqs SAC as follows: One copy included in Opord and 5 additional copies forwarded under separate cover to CINCONAD, ATTN: COC.

d. "ECM Recap Sheet", "Communications Recap Sheet" and "SSS Recap Sheet" as applicable, will be forwarded in one copy included with Opord.

e. "Strike Mission Recap Sheet" (SAC Forms 275, 275A and 275B) to be forwarded to Hq SAC as follows: One copy included in Opord and 5 Copies (Column F info omitted) forwarded under separate cover to CINCONAD, ATTN: COC. Tanker task forces will prepare SAC Form 498 with same distribution as above.

f. Altitude reservation request (See SAC Reg 55-3) will be forwarded in one copy included with Opord.

g. "Nuclear Weapons Recap Sheet" will be included in Special Weapons Annex.

h. Classification: Opord, Annexes and Appendices thereto will be classified IAW content thereof. It is desirable that Top Secret data and/or information as concerns restricted data, atomic energy act 1954, be contained in separate Annexes or Appendices to the basic Opord forwarded under separate cover to concerned agencies only.

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- (4) Routes, schedules, air refueling: See Annex A.
- (5) Special Weapons: Annex E (limited distribution).
- (6) Security: Security will be of paramount importance during entire period of this exercise. Task Force Commanders will insure that all participating personnel are aware of the importance of security during this exercise.
- (7) Reports:
- (a) Submit permanently required reports in accordance with paragraph 6a(1), SAC Manual 55-8.
- (b) Deployment Phase: Distribution "A".
M-2, M-9, M-10, M-15, M-36
- (c) Strike Phase, Distribution "A".
1. Bombardment Units:
 - a. B-2, B-9, B-10, B-15, B-17, B-21, B-81,
M-36
 2. Reconnaissance Missions:
 - a. R-2, R-9, R-10, R-15, R-17, R-21, R-81,
M-36
 3. Air Refueling Units:
 - a. T-2, T-10, T-11, T-15, T-17, T-18, T-81,
M-36
- (d) Distribution "B".
1. B-51 and R-51
- (e) M-5 and M-22 reports will be submitted in accordance with SAC Manual 55-8M as required.

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(f) Task Force Commanders will submit report required by 7AD Supplement 1 to SAC Manual 55-8M.

(g) All units participating in this exercise including task forces, will submit a M-27 report with headquarters SAC as an info addressee. Format will be as outlined in applicable portion of SAC Manual 55-8, however, mandatory comments are not required. This report is intended to supplement B/T-27 reports to provide staff comments and/or recommendations concerning major problem areas encountered in the accomplishment of the mission. Participating Task Forces and 68th BW will submit m-27 reports to 7th AD info SAC. Other participating units will submit these reports as outlined in parent AF Ops Order with 7AD as added info addressee.

(8) 7th Air Division Command Post will be activated at High Wycombe for purpose of implementing this operation.

(9) 7th Air Division will deploy observers to 7th Air Division bases for purpose of observing exercise. Bases will be notified at a later date of personnel selected to visit each base.

(10) Weather Instructions: See Annex F

(11) Public Information: Chapter 1, paragraph 19c(2), SAC Manual 55-12, Aug 57 will apply.

(12) Special Alert Instructions: All participating SAC units in this exercise who have an alert requirement in SAC TS message cite DOPLM B-62807, dated 20 September 1957 are relieved from these alert requirements from period E Hour/Day this exercise until 36 hours subse-

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quent to return of first wave of bomber aircraft. Tanker aircraft will resume alert requirements 24 hours after return of aircraft supporting last bomber wave this exercise.

(13) Appropriate 7AD ABGRU/RON will obtain approvals for all Round Robin and redeployment flights of participating units. 8AF will be info addressee on all messages containing altitude reservation requests or changes thereto. Additional info regarding Air Traffic Control contained in Annex A.

(14) Portions of this Operations Order pertaining to altitude reservation and flight clearance requests may be extracted and handled as unclassified.

(15) Safety will be of paramount importance during this exercise.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:

See Annex C.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS MATTERS:

a. Command Normal

b. Communications - See Annex D.

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quent to return of first wave of bomber aircraft. Tanker aircraft will resume alert requirements 24 hours after return of aircraft supporting last bomber wave this exercise.

(13) Appropriate 7/D ABGRU/RON will obtain approvals for all Round Robin and r deployment flights of participating units. SAF will be info addressee on all messages containing altitude reservation requests or changes thereto. Additional info regarding Air Traffic Control contained in Annex A.

(14) Portions of this Operations Order pertaining to altitude reservation and flight clearance requests may be extracted and handled as unclassified.

(15) Safety will be of paramount importance during this exercise.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:

See Annex C.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS MATTERS:

a. Command Normal

b. Communications - See Annex D.

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ANNEX A TO OPS ORD 39-57 "IRON BAR"

AIR OPERATIONS

1. Concept: 340th/68th/321st/341st EWs and 26SRW will launch aircraft on a USCM, simulating, as closely as possible, the units current EMP. Task forces of 7AD bases listed in paragraph 3X(2)(a) Basic will be exercised to maximum extent possible.
2. Execution: At E Hour all participating units will commence preparation for support/execution of the 40/44/50 plans.
3. Fuel Pads: Time and fuel pads will be included in all strike flight plans to insure making good air refueling RDZ times. Recon aircraft will make HHCL times good.
4. Tactics: Participating units will conduct simulated radar attacks, ECM and chaff dispensing IAW instructions contained in appropriate parent AF OPOBDS. (68th EW will not conduct ECM or chaff dispensing)
5. Outline of Events:
 - a. Deployment
 - (1) 310th AREFS will arrive UK beginning approximately 1200Z/26 Nov 57.
 - (2) 321st EW will arrive UK beginning approximately 0530Z/26 Nov 57. First aircraft will arrive in cell of six with subsequent arrivals in two aircraft increments at one hour intervals.
 - (3) 26SRW will arrive UK beginning approximately 1030Z/26 Nov 57. First aircraft will arrive in cell of 2 with subsequent cells of 4 arriving at one hour intervals.

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b. Strike:

(1) 341BW will launch first wave of 12 aircraft beginning 0040/29 Nov 57 arriving UK 1148Z/29 Nov. Subsequent takeoffs will be two equal increments with 24 hour separation between waves.

(2) 321st BW will launch 6 B-47 aircraft on strike mission at E plus 72 hours with subsequent take-offs at 10 minute intervals beginning at E plus 72:20 hours thru E plus 74:00 hours in increments of two aircraft. Beginning at E plus 74:05, single aircraft will take-off at 5 minute intervals.

(3) 68th BW will launch first cell of 4 aircraft on strike mission at E plus 72:00. Subsequent take-offs will be at 15 minute intervals in increments of 4 aircraft, thru wave 6. Wave 7, 8, 9, 10 will take-off at 30 minute intervals. (First, third, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth cells will be A/R by 310th AREFS)

(4) 26SRW:

(a) Recon Strike Missions: Aircraft will be launched on Recon Strike Mission in increments of 4, 4, 4, and 3. First take-off will be at 0918Z/29 Nov 57. Subsequent take-offs will be at 10 minute intervals within each increment and 20 minute intervals between increments.

(b) Air Refueling Area Weather Reconnaissance Aircraft will be launched as directed by Commander 7th Air Division and in accordance with instructions contained herein. (See paragraph 10b this Annex)

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(5) 340EW will launch 25 B-47 aircraft on strike mission beginning at E plus 72:00 hours arriving UK beginning 0130Z/29 Nov. Aircraft will be launched in 2 waves with 24 hour separation between waves.

(6) 310 AREFS: Will launch KC-97 aircraft for air refueling support as outlined in paragraph 7 this Annex.

c. Redeployments:

(1) 321EW will redeploy beginning 1600Z on E plus 5 days. Aircraft will be launched in 3 waves with 24 hour separation between waves.

(2) 26SEW:

(a) Reconnaissance aircraft will redeploy beginning 0900Z on E plus 6. Aircraft will be launched in 2 waves with 48 hours separation between waves.

(b) Weather aircraft will redeploy beginning approximately 24 hours after completion of last A/R sortie.

(3) 341 EW will redeploy beginning 1300Z on E plus 6. Aircraft will be launched in 3 equal waves with 24 hour separation between waves.

(4) 340EW will redeploy beginning 0835Z on E plus 5. Aircraft will be launched in 2 waves with 48 hours between waves.

6. Routes

a. 26SEW

(1) Deployment -- 15 Recon aircraft and 3 weather Scout aircraft

Dept: Lockbourne

To: Fairford

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(2) Strike

(a) Common route

Dept: Fairford
TO: 5008N 0532W
TO: 4800N 0600W
TO: 4400N 0600W HHGL
TO: Appropriate Strike Route
TO: 4630N 1000W
TO: 5007N 0533W
TO: St Mawgan VOR
TO: Keovil TVOR
TO: Fairford

(b) Strike route number one

TO: 4235N 0539W Target
TO: 3928N 0622W Target
TO: 3815N 0000
TO: 4200N 0330E
TO: 4230N 0335E
TO: 4329N 0128W Target
TO: 4400N 0100W
TO: La Rochelle

(c) Strike route number two

TO: 4227N 0219W Target
TO: Barcelona Target

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TO: 4200N 0330E
TO: 4230N 0335E
TO: 4314N 0017W Target
TO: 4400N 0000
TO: La Rochelle

(d) Strike route number three

TO: 4318N 0255W Target
TO: 4144N 0148E Target
TO: 4151N 0300E
TO: 4200N 0330E
TO: 4230N 0335E
TO: 4313N 0004E Target
TO: 4400N 0000
TO: La Rochelle

(e) Strike route number four

TO: 3830N 0508W Target
TO: 3747N 0047W Target
TO: 4200N 0330E
TO: 4230N 0335E
TO: 4323N 0025W Target
TO: 4400N 0000
TO: La Rochelle

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(3) Redeployment:

Dept Fairford

TO: One Rose A/R

TO: Ice Boat A/R

TO: Lockborne

b. 310 AREFS:

(1) Deployment:

Dept Schilling AFB

TO: Goose AB (RON Optional)

TO: East Kirkby

(2) Strike/Redeployment A/R Support:

(a) Main Gate A/R area in support of 68th Bomb Wing.
(2 receivers/tankers)

(b) Hedge Hop A/R area in support of 341st BW.
(1 receiver/tanker)

(c) One Rose A/R area in support of 340th BW and 26SRW.
(1 receiver/tanker)

(3) Redeployment:

Dept East Kirkby

TO: Goose AB (RON)

TO: Schilling AFB

c. 321 BW

(1) Deployment:

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(a) Route Alfa

Dept: Pinecastle

TO: Fighting Fox A/R Area

TO: Mildenhall via UK entry route echo

(b) Route Bravo

Dept: Pinecastle

TO: Sundial A/R Area

TO: Mildenhall via UK entry route Foxtrot

(2) Strike

Dept: Mildenhall

TO: St Eval

TO: 4900N 0600W

TO: 4913N 2150W

TO: 4415N 2215W

TO: 4347N 0740W HHCL

TO: 4339N 0552W IP

TO: 4327N 0401W Target

TO: 4800N 0500W

TO: 4900N 0500W

TO: 5000N 0245W

TO: Mildenhall

(3) Redeployment

Dept Mildenhall

TO: St Eval

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TO: Fighting Fox or Sundial A/R Area
TO: 4310N 7345W (Start ECM)
TO: 3600N 8400W
TO: 3400N 8315W (End ECM)
TO: Pinecastle

d. 340 EW

(1) Deployment/Strike

Depart: Whiteman AFB
TO: Cloud Bank A/R Area
TO: Baker Shop A/R Area
TO: Faroe Islands
TO: Targets (Orkney Island)
TO: Tiree REN
TO: Isle of Man
TO: Gloucester
TO: Brize Norton

(2) Redeployment

Depart: Brize Norton
TO: 5320N 0319W
TO: 5712N 0416W
TO: One Rose A/R Area
TO: Egilsstandir REN, Iceland
TO: Ice Boat A/R Area
TO: Churchill
TO: Whiteman AFB

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e. 341 BW

(1) Deployment/Strike

(a) Common all aircraft

Depart: ~~Dyess~~ AFB

TO: A/R Area as outlined in 15th AF Opord

TO: Rockall Island

TO: 5700N 0735W PIP

TO: 5630N 0700W IP

TO: Targets

TO: Chelveston as directed by Brize Norton Rapcon

(b) Aircraft utilizing A/R areas other than UK:

TO: Isle of Man BCN

TO: Upper Heyford via UK entry route Bravo

TO: Chelveston as directed by Brize Norton Rapcon

(c) Aircraft utilizing UK A/R area:

TO: 5439N 0515W

TO: 5038N 0515W

TO: Hedge Hop A/R Area

TO: 4659N 0859W

TO: 4503N 0730W

TO: 4632N 0430W

TO: 4828N 0506W IP

TO: 5003N 0542W Target

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TO: Upper Heyford via UK entry route Echo

TO: Chelveston as directed by Brize Norton Rapcon

(2) Redeployment

Depart: Chelveston

TO: Isle of Man ECN

TO: Long Bow A/R Area

TO: Book Mark A/R Area

TO: Dyess AFB

f. 68BW:

(1) Non Air Refueling Aircraft:

Depart Brize Norton

TO: 5423N 0422W

TO: 5837N 0500W

TO: 6338N 1625W

TO: 5438N 1033W

TO: 5322N 1425W

TO: 5200N 1100W

TO: 5117N 1000W

TO: 4855N 0619W Target

TO: Brize Norton

(2) Air Refueled Aircraft:

Depart Brize Norton

TO: Main Gate A/R Area

TO: 5958N 0118W

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- TO: 6400N 1400W
- TO: 5438N 1033W
- TO: 5322N 1425W
- TO: 5200N 1100W
- TO: 5117N 1000W
- TO: 4955N 0619N Target
- TO: Brize Norton

(NOTE: Routes as listed herein give major turning points only, and will be modified as necessary to accomplish the mission and to avoid populated and prohibited areas when WR weapons are carried.)

7. Air Refueling Schedule (UK): Air Refueling support to be provided by 310th AREFS. SAC Manual 55-10, 100-1, 55-14C apply.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO ACFT</u>	<u>A/R AREA</u>	<u>RDZ</u>	<u>OFF LOAD</u>	<u>C/R PLAN</u>
68BW	4	Main Gate	28/1550Z	22M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	Main Gate	28/1620Z	22M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	Main Gate	28/1650Z	22M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	Main Gate	28/1720Z	22M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	Main Gate	28/1750Z	22M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	Main Gate	28/1820Z	22M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	Main Gate	28/1850Z	22M	Atlantic/Europe
340BW	4	One Rose	30/1000Z	42M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	One Rose	30/1030Z	42M	Atlantic/Europe

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	4	One Rose	30/1100Z	42M	Atlantic/Europe
341EW	4	Hedge Hop	30/1154Z	30M	Atlantic/Europe
26SRW	4	One Rose	01/1020Z	35M	Atlantic/Europe
	3	One Rose	01/1050Z	35M	Atlantic/Europe
341EW	4	Hedge Hop	01/1154Z	30M	Atlantic/Europe
340EW	5	One Rose	02/1000Z	42M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	One Rose	02/1030Z	42M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	One Rose	02/1100Z	42M	Atlantic/Europe
26SRW	4	One Rose	03/1020Z	35M	Atlantic/Europe
	4	One Rose	03/1050Z	35M	Atlantic/Europe
	3	One Rose	04/1020Z	35M	Atlantic/Europe

8. Air Refueling Areas UK:

<u>Primary</u>	<u>Alternate</u>
Main Gate	Mud Flat
One Rose	Main Gate
Hedge Hop	Ping Pong

9. Emergency Air Refueling:

a. Strip alert will be provided by 5 tankers at East Kirkby and 5 tankers from Greenham Common.

b. Emergency A/R areas as follows:

(1) Apple Jack. (Primary)

Blue Bell (Secondary)

(2) Procedures: If emergency air refueling is needed, contact Peppercorn Control on 311.0 or 243.0 MCS. If unable to contact Peppercorn,

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contact Brize Norton Rapcon, Lakenheath Rapcon, any USAF (UK) tower, any SAC Control Room, or Croughton airways and request relay of info to Peppercorn Control.

10. Missed Air Refueling (68th BW): In event of missed air refueling, aircraft will continue on scheduled route and fly route until such time as aircraft weight is low enough so that by proceeding to Brize Norton an immediate landing may be made. Entry route Foxtrot as outlined in 7AD Supplement 1 to SAC Manual 55-12 will be used. In no case will aircraft orbit over UK area to burn fuel off prior to landing.

11. Schedule for Weather Scout Aircraft. (UK Area)

a. SAC Manual 55-5, 55-10, 55-12, 55-14c, 100-1 and applicable portions of SAC Opord 40-58 will apply.

b. Weather Scout Schedule: Weather Scout aircraft will be launched from Fairford for purpose of performing air refueling area weather reconnaissance in Main Gate, One Rose and Hedge Hop Air Refueling Areas as required for support of strike and redeploying aircraft this exercise. Alternate Air Refueling Areas, as listed in paragraph 8 above will be scouted in accordance with instructions contained in SAC Manual 55-5. All times listed in following air refueling weather scout schedule are approximate and will be adjusted so as to permit weather scout aircraft making good requirements as listed in SAC Manual 55-5.

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(1) E + 3

Refueling area - Main Gate (P), Mud Flat (S)

Unit - 68th Bomb Wing (28 B-47s)

Rendezvous Time (1st cell) - 1550Z

Tanker T.O. Time - 1430Z

Weather Scout T.O. (Marginal Forecast) - 0600Z

Weather Scout T.O. (Favorable Forecast) - 1000Z

(2) E + 4 & 5

Refueling Area - Hedge Hop (P), Ping Pong (S)

Unit - 341 EW (4 B-47s)

Rendezvous Time - 1154Z (E + 5)

Tanker T.O. - 1030Z (E + 5)

Receiver T.O. - 0040Z (E + 5)

Weather Scout T.O. (Marginal Forecast) - 1640Z (E + 4)

Weather Scout T.O. (Favorable Forecast) - 0630Z (E + 5)

(3) E + 5 & 6

(a) Refueling Area - Hedge Hop (p), Ping Pong (s)

Unit - 341 EW (4 aircraft)

Rendezvous Time - 1154Z (E + 6)

Tanker T.O. - 1030Z (E + 6)

Receiver T.O. - 0040Z (E + 6) First Cell.

Weather Scout T.O. (Marginal Forecast) - 1640Z (E + 5)

Weather Scout T.O. (Favorable Forecast) - 0630Z (E + 6)

(b) Refueling Area - One Rose (P), Main Gate (S)

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Unit - 340EW (13 aircraft)

Rendezvous Time - 1000Z (E + 5)

Tanker T.O. - 0830Z (E + 5)

Receiver T.O. - 0835Z (E + 5) First Cell

Weather Scout T.O. (Marginal Forecast) 2335Z (E + 4)

Weather Scout T.O. (Favorable Forecast) 0435Z (E + 5)

(4) E + 6.

Refueling Area - One Rose (P) Main Gate (S)

Unit - 26 SEW (7RB-47)

Rendezvous Time - 1020Z

Tanker T.O. - 0840Z

Receiver T.O. - 0900Z

Weather Scout T.O. (Marginal Forecast) 0100Z (E + 6)

Weather Scout T.O. (Favorable Forecast) 0400Z (E + 6)

(5) E + 7

Refueling Area - One Rose (P) Main Gate (S)

Unit - 340 EW (12 aircraft)

Rendezvous Time - 1000Z (E + 6)

Tanker T.O. - 0830Z (E + 6)

Receiver T.O. - 0835Z (E + 6)

Weather Scout T.O. (Marginal Forecast) 2335Z (E + 5)

Weather Scout T.O. (Favorable Forecast) 0435Z (E + 6)

(6) E + 8

Refueling Area - One Rose (P) Main Gate (S)

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Unit - 26SEW (8 RB-47s)

Rendezvous Time - 1020Z

Tanker T.O. - 0840Z

Receiver T.O. - 0900Z

Weather Scout T.O. - (Marginal Forecast) 0100Z (E + 8)

Weather Scout T.O. - (Favorable Forecast) 0440Z (E + 8)

12. Air Traffic Control:

a. Flight Plans will be prepared and submitted to ATC agencies in accordance with SAC Reg 55-3 and SAC Manual 55-12, except as modified herein, utilizing category 1 precedence.

b. For purpose of filing altitude reservation flight plans, and position reporting the following will apply:

(1) Altitude reservation flight plans will be filed in standard format prescribed by:

(a) SAC Reg 55-3

(b) Special air traffic and position reporting procedures contained in Section III SAC Manual 55-12 when applicable.

(2) Altitude reservation flight plans will include both primary and alternate route/refueling area information. ATC approval will be requested for both routes.

(3) Aircraft call signs for position reporting purposes will consist of following elements in the order listed:

(a) Aircraft tactical call sign

(b) Mission nickname

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(c) Cell Designator

(Example: Red Cap 10, Iron Bar, Blue 4)

(4) Information required for submitting altitude reservation, (Air Refueling, simulated strike and redeployment clearances) will be provided appropriate 7AD bases by participating units a minimum of 30 days prior to exercise.

(5) For units operating out of UK on Round Robin flights and on redeployment flight, the following will apply:

(a) Appropriate 7AD ABGRU/ROB will submit flight plans, as required, sufficiently in advance to obtain necessary approval.

(b) 26SRW Weather Scout aircraft will utilize individual flight plans for weather scout activities and redeployment.

(c) Altitude reservation flight plans authorized for formation of B/RB-47 aircraft when air refueling is scheduled.

c. Canadian Overflight Messages will be submitted, if required, in accordance with SACR 55-18 and 5 days in advance of first aircraft movement. Headquarters SAC/8AF/7AD will be info addressees on all overflight messages and changes thereto originating in the UK.

13. Weather Minima and Alternates:

Minimums for this mission will be in accordance with SAC Manual 55-12 or as directed by parent AF Opord. Alternates will be Greenham Common Primary and Lakenheath Secondary for UK and Ben Guerir in North Africa. Spanish bases will not be used as alternates except in extreme emergency.

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Following UK/European bases have capability of handling B-47 aircraft
but are not SAC bases and will be used as last resort only:

Manston England

Burtonwood England

Sculthorpe England

Chateauroux France

14. Fuel Reserves:

SAC Manual 55-12 will apply.

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ANNEX B TO OPS ORD 39-57 "IORN BAR"

INTELLIGENCE

1. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: As stated in SAC Operations Order 40-58 and 50-58.
2. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: Reference BIRG, Vol 1, Section VII.
 - a. Applicable portions of Chap. 1, Section III, paragraph 18 of SACM 55-12 will apply.
3. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:
 - a. Maps - Target Materials.
 - (1) Navigational materials as required.
 - (2) Target Materials: Provided by ZI based units; UK rotational unit supported by 3920th TIC as required.
 - b. Evasion and Escape: Reference BIRG Vol I, Section V .
 - c. Capture Intelligence: Reference BIRG Vol I, Section VI.
 - d. Reports - Distribution: See Basic, paragraph 3X(7).
 - e. Photography:
 - (1) Radar and aerial photography will be accomplished by strike units so that Phase I and IBDA requirements are satisfied.
 - (2) 7AD Form 114 and Time Study Format (instructions for completion of Time Study are included in 7AD Manual 95-1) will be completed and forwarded to Headquarters 7th Air Division Directorate of Intelligence within 48 hours after last mission aircraft lands.

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(3) All camera magazines removed from aircraft will be clearly marked with aircraft tail number to insure return to proper aircraft; unit designation and aircraft tail number will be marked on exposed portion of film in film magazine. Photo log(s) will be attached to the radar camera magazine and all film magazines from one aircraft will be handled as a unit. Film cans containing processed film will be marked with unit designator and aircraft tail number and photo log(s) attached to radar film can. (U)

(4) On completion of B-51 reporting action and return of film/logs to base photo lab, all strike film/logs will be packaged for shipment to the 3921st RTS within 24 hours after termination of the mission. (U)

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ANNEX C TO OPS ORD 39-57 "IRON BAR"

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

1. Administrative and Logistical instructions contained in SAC Regulation 400-3, 6 May 1957, will apply as follows:

- a. Section I - General: This section applies in its entirety.
- b. Section II - Supply: This section applies in its entirety except as noted below.

(1) Reference paragraph 5.

(a) Conventional bomb racks and shackles will not be deployed.

(b) Material will be deployed commensurate with type of team to be deployed by each unit as directed in paragraph 1d(2) below.

(2) Reference paragraph 6.

(a) Volume XVI, AFM 67-1, Project designators are as follows:

310 AREFS to East Kirkby	BIG TIN 299
26 SEW to Fairford	BIG TIN 304
321 BW to Mildenhall	BIG TIN 307
340 BW to Brize Norton	to be forwarded
341 BW to Chelveston	BIG TIN 309

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c. Section III - Armament and Electronics: This section applies to all units in its entirety.

d. Section IV - Maintenance.

(1) This section applies to all units in its entirety.

(2) Reference paragraph 22b, staging teams will be deployed

as follows:

(a) 310th AREFS - Class C 20 Aircraft Team to East Kirkby.

(b) 321st BW - 45 aircraft pre-post strike team to Mildenhall.

(c) 340th BW - 15 aircraft post-strike team to Brize Norton.

(d) 341st BW - 45 aircraft post-strike team to Chelveston.

(e) 26th SRW - 15 aircraft pre-post strike team to Fairford. Will also support three weather scout aircraft.

e. Section V - Transportation:

(1) This section applies to all units in its entirety.

(2) Total cargo involved will not exceed the quantities authorized herein without prior approval of SAC Headquarters. Cargo is authorized as follows:

(a) 310th AREFS - 56.3 tons

(b) 26th SRW - 23.9 tons

(c) 321st BW - 93.7 tons

(d) 340th BW - 11.8 tons

(e) 341st BW - 32.7 tons

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(3) Reference paragraph 30. Airlift will be provided as outlined on pages 3 and 4 of the Logistics Supplement to the United Kingdom Air Operations and Logistics Schedule, dated 9 September 1957.

f. Section VI - Medical:

- (1) 310th AREFS will deploy LX part II AD, SAC UMD 2907, Medical personnel equipment equivalent to East Kirkby.
- (2) 26th SRW will deploy LX part II AD, SAC UMD 2907, Medical personnel equipment equivalent to Fairford.
- (3) 321st BW will deploy LX part II AD, SAC UMD 2907, Medical personnel equipment equivalent to Mildenhall.
- (4) 341st BW will deploy LX part II AD, SAC UMD 2907, Medical personnel equipment equivalent to Chelveston UK.
- (5) 340th BW Post-Strike Team will be supported by local resources at Brize Norton.

g. Section VII - Personnel.

- (1) This section applies to all units in its entirety.
- (2) Reference paragraph 37. Total personnel involved will not exceed the quantity authorized in column E, pages 3 and 4 of Logistics Supplement to the United Kingdom Air Operations and Logistics Schedule, dated 9 September 1957.

h. Section VIII - Adjutant.

- (1) Reference paragraph 50, only 50b will apply.
- (2) Reference paragraph 52, mail will be held at home base pending return of affected personnel.
- (3) All other paragraphs of this section apply as written.

i. Section IX - Comptroller.

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- (1) This section will apply to all units in its entirety.
- (2) Reference paragraph 54. Funding information will be forwarded by separate message.

j. Section X - Judge Advocate. This section will apply to all units in its entirety.

k. Section XI - Security.

- (1) This section will apply to all units in its entirety.
- (2) Air police will be deployed by all units in accordance with the provisions of appropriate SAC Manuals of the 400-1 series.

l. Section XII - Miscellaneous. This section will apply to all units in its entirety.

m. Special Instructions.

(1) Maintenance:

(a) The first three (3) hours after aircraft land at Brize Norton, Fairford, Mildenhall and Chelveston will be used to test pre and post strike procedures and capabilities at each base as applicable. Pre and post strike operations will be in accordance with applicable portions of 7AD Operations Order 44-58, 7AD Pre/Post Strike Manual 65-2, and respective Task Force Operations Orders 44-58.

(2) Supply:

(a) Sources of spares support.

1. First source of spares support for staging aircraft will be unit FAK except for the 26th SRW at Fairford which will be from Mobile Support Kit Number 1.

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2. Second source of spares support will be the supply points indicated in paragraph 1g, 7AD Administrative Order 1-57. The 340th BW will use 68th BW (M) FAK as second source.

3. Third source of spares support will be the opposite supply point listed in paragraph 1g, 7AD Administrative Order 1-57 with the exception of the 310th AREFS which is Volume XVI, AFM 67-1 procedures.

4. The final source of spares support for all tactical units is the ZI depot under Volume XVI, AFM 67-1 procedures.

(b) Submission of Requirements.

1. Aircraft spares requisitions will be transmitted in accordance with 7AD Administrative Order 1-57 and Volume XVI, AFM 67-1 procedures.

2. An information copy of all Volume XVI requisitions will be submitted to DMSA, Headquarters 7th Air Division.

(3) Transportation.

(a) All movements of personnel and materiel directed under tasks for subordinate units will be dispatched by government vehicles so as to arrive at destination during daylight hours.

(b) Transportation for deploying personnel and materiel will be the responsibility of the shipping base. Return transportation will be the responsibility of the TDY base.

(c) All personnel and materiel will be returned to home station upon completion of this exercise.

(d) EC-3 reports will be submitted to Hq 7th AD upon

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departure and arrival for both deployment and return phases of all movements made in accordance with Appendix II, Annex B, 7th AD Operations Order 40-58. A similar message type report will be made for the additional surface movements directed by this Operations Order.

(4) Security.

(a) The 3918th Air Base Group will provide two (2) Air Police emergency elements to the 3914th Air Base Squadron in accordance with 7AD Regulation 125-3. Elements to be in place RAF Chelveston not later than 28/1200Z November 1957 to remain until departure of last tactical aircraft for CONUS.

(b) The 3910th Air Base Group will provide two (2) Air Police emergency elements to the 3913th Air Base Squadron in accordance with 7AD Regulation 125-3. Elements to be in place RAF Mildenhall not later than 25/1200Z November 1957 to remain until departure of last tactical aircraft for CONUS.

(c) Each element will be composed of one (1) 77150 level and fourteen (14) 77130 and/or 77110 level airmen.

(d) Air Police will deploy with those essential elements of the security winter uniforms prescribed by paragraph 4d, SAC Regulation 35-11. Functional equipment will be as prescribed by paragraph 4f, SAC Regulation 35-11. Ammunition will not be deployed.

(5) Firefighters and Equipment.

(a) The 3910th Air Base Group will provide the following firefighters and equipment:

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DURATION</u>
1	57170		3917th ABSQ	25 Nov - 4 Dec
2	57150		3917th ABSQ	25 Nov - 4 Dec
7	57130		3917th ABSQ	25 Nov - 4 Dec
1		O-11A	3917th ABSQ	25 Nov - 4 Dec

(b) The 3911th Air Base Group will provide the following firefighters:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DURATION</u>
1	57170	3914th ABSQ	27 Nov - 30 Nov
4	57150	3914th ABSQ	27 Nov - 30 Nov

(c) The 3918th Air Base Group will provide the following firefighters and equipments:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DURATION</u>
1	57170		3919th ABSQ	27 Nov - 30 Nov
2	57150		3919th ABSQ	27 Nov - 30 Nov
7	57130		3919th ABSQ	27 Nov - 30 Nov
1		O-11A	3919th ABSQ	27 Nov - 30 Nov

(d) The 3929th Air Base Squadron will provide the following firefighters:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DURATION</u>
2	57150	3914th ABSQ	27 Nov - 30 Nov

(e) Personnel for Chelveston to be in place not later than 28/1200Z. Personnel and equipment for Fairford to be in place not later than 25/1200Z. Personnel and equipment for East Kirkby to be in place

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not later than 26/1200Z. All personnel and equipment to remain until departure of last tactical aircraft to CONUS or as directed by the Task Force Commander.

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ANNEX D TO 7AD OPOD 39-57 "IRON BAR"

COMMUNICATIONS

1. GENERAL:

a. SACCEI 7AD CEI, appropriate JANAPs, ACPs, Radio Facility Charts and Supplementary Flight Information Documents apply except as modified herein.

b. Authentication will be in accordance with current edition of the KAC-1.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE COMMUNICATIONS:

a. Those on-call circuits as listed in SACCEI (T-listings) will be activated by station concerned to transmit operational traffic.

b. Minimize will be in effect on the 7th Air Division SOCS system during the exercise.

c. Exercise traffic will bear flag word "IRON BAR" as first words of the text and bear a minimum classification of Confidential.

d. Exercise traffic, and other traffic relating to the movement of aircraft bearing a precedence of Operational Immediate or higher, will receive preferential handling.

3. AERONAUTICAL COMMUNICATIONS:

a. Call Signs:

(1) Unit tactical call signs will be in accordance with current temporary call sign list GOLF.

(2) Unit Control Room call signs will be as follows:

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COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENG

- (a) 7th Air Division -- Peppercorn
- (b) Brize Norton -- King Kong
- (c) Chelveston -- Fox
- (d) Fairford -- Griddle Cake
- (e) Greenham Common -- Restrain
- (f) East Kirkby -- Midshipman
- (g) Mildenhall -- ~~Seabell~~ ~~Fourteen~~

b. Frequencies:

(1) UHF channelization will be in accordance with SACCEI B200.19. Aircraft will be channelized for the Brize Norton or Lincolnshire areas as required.

(2) Tower, Approach Control, RAPCON Pickup, Feeder and GCA frequencies for destination and/or alternate bases are listed below:

<u>Base</u>	<u>Tower</u>	<u>RAPCON Pickup</u>	<u>Feeder</u>	<u>GCA</u>	<u>GCA</u>
Brize Norton	321.7	282.4	254.4	290.2	264.7
Chelveston	365.3	-----	*292.0	261.2	355.0
East Kirkby	245.6	-----	*253.6	238.6	347.4
Fairford	350.8	282.4	314.8	304.0	399.3
Greenham Common	352.4	282.4	363.6	270.5	343.2
Mildenhall	352.0	356.0	398.0	294.0	300.2
Lakenheath	350.0	356.0	240.4	272.0	379.4

* Approach Control Frequencies. Chelveston is served by Alconbury Approach Control.

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(3) Control Room Frequencies:

(a) Peppercorn

	<u>P</u>	<u>UHF</u>		<u>P</u>	<u>VHF</u>
	311.0	S	321.0	138.42	S
					133.56

(b) Unit Control Rooms

	<u>P</u>	<u>UHF</u>		<u>P</u>	<u>VHF</u>
	321.0	S	317.0	133.56	S
					138.42

(4) VHF Channelization will be in accordance with current Radio Facility Charts. VHF equipped aircraft landing in the United Kingdom will contain complete crystal kits as outlined in SACCEI 5206.4d.

c. Aircraft reporting procedures will be in accordance with SACCEI and SAC Manual 55-12.

d. IFF will be operated in accordance with Chapter 14, 7AD CEI.

e. Recall Instructions:

(1) The recall words for this mission with related meanings as indicated will apply:

- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| (a) GOLD FISH | ALL SAC AIRCRAFT. |
| (b) GOLDFISH TANGO | 310 AREFS. |
| (c) GOLDFISH ALPHA | 376 AREFS (UK DET). |
| (d) GOLDFISH ZULU | 91 AREFS. |
| (e) GOLDFISH FOXTROT | 321 AREFS. |
| (f) GOLDFISH CHARLIE | 2 AREFS. |
| (g) GOLDFISH JULIETT | 340 AREFS. |

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(h) GOLDFISH BRAVO	384 AREFS
(i) GOLDFISH YANKEE	307 AREFS
(j) GOLDFISH INDIA	26 SW Wx Scout (Thule)
(k) GOLDFISH ONE	26 SW Wx Scouts (Deploying to and from Goose)
(l) GOLDFISH KILO	26 SW Wx Scouts (Goose Ref Area)
(m) GOLDFISH ROMEO	26 SW (Harmon Ref Area)
(n) GOLDFISH LIMA	90 SW Wx Scout Lincoln AFB
(o) GOLDFISH XRAY	26 SW Wx Scout Fairford
(p) GOLDFISH DELTA	26 SW Recon Mission Thule
(q) GOLDFISH WHISKEY	26 SW Recon Mission Fairford
(r) GOLDFISH MIKE	26 SW Wx Scouts Lockbourne
(s) GOLDFISH UNIFORM	90 SW Wx Scouts Westover
(t) GOLDFISH OSCAR	40 AREFS
(u) GOLDFISH TWO	55 SW Wx Recon Mission Forbes
(v) GOLDFISH ECHO	321st BW
(w) GOLDFISH NOVEMBER	340 BW
(x) GOLDFISH GOLF	341st BW
(y) GOLDFISH VICTOR	68 BW
(z) GOLDFISH THREE	40 AREFS.

(2) The recall words are further suffixed, as indicated, for the purpose of designating a specific landing bases:

- (a) Westover - FIVE
- (b) Goose - SIX

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- (c) Harmon - SEVEN
- (d) Sondrestrom - EIGHT
- (e) Loring - NINE
- (f) Biggs - ALFA
- (g) Walker - BRAVO
- (h) Altus - CHARLIE
- (i) Lockbourne - DELTA
- (j) Keflavik - ECHO
- (k) Schilling - FOXTROT
- (l) Ellsworth - GOLF
- (m) Lakenheath - HOTEL
- (n) Greenham Common - INDIA
- (o) Upper Heyford - JULIETT
- (p) East Kirkby - KILO
- (q) Brize Norton - LIMA
- (r) Chelveston - MIKE
- (s) Benguerir - NOVEMBER
- (t) Nouasseur - OSCAR
- (u) Burtonwood - PAPA
- (v) Madrid - (BARAJAS) - QUEBEC
- (w) Madrid (GETAFE) - ROMEO
- (x) Fairford - SIERRA
- (y) Zaragoza - TANGO
- (z) Chateauroux - UNIFORM

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(aa) Sidi Slimane - VICTOR

(bb) Portsmouth - WHISKEY

(cc) Flattsburgh - XRAY

EXAMPLE: To recall the 2d AREFS and divert them to Loring, the following message would be transmitted: "GOLDFISH CHARLIE NINE".

(3) The recall message will be transmitted using the Foxtrot method (Do not answer) to the collective call sign "SKY KING", meaning all SAC aircraft copy. Aircraft commanders will insure monitor of best usable HF air/ground frequency for stations serving area of operation during periods of 05 to 08, 25 to 28 and 45 to 48 minutes past the hour.

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ANNEX E TO OPS ORD 39-57 "IRON BAR"

SPECIAL WEAPONS - SEPARATE DISTRIBUTION (NOTAL)

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 39-57 "IRON BAR"

WEATHER

1. GENERAL: The 2d Weather Wing will provide weather support for this exercise through the facilities of 28th Weather Squadron in accordance with SAC Manual 105-1, April 1957, and special support procedures outlined herein.
2. DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL: Forecaster and observer personnel will be deployed by task organizations in accordance with the following instructions.
 - a. Transportation will be provided by the base supporting deploying personnel.
 - b. Deploying personnel will not be issued weapons or field equipment during this exercise and will not carry with them those individual personnel records maintained at base of assignment.
 - c. Detachment 8, 28th Wearon, will deploy one (1) weather observer, AFSC 25251, to Detachment 10, 28th Wearon on X plus 5.
 - d. Detachment 9, 28th Wearon, will deploy one (1) weather observer, AFSC 25251, to Detachment 10, 28th Wearon, on X plus 5.
 - e. Detachment 12, 28th Wearon, will deploys
 - (1) Two (2) forecasters, AFSC 25370, to Detachment 24, 28th Wearon, on X plus 1.
 - (2) Two (2) weather observers, AFSC 25251, to Detachment 24, 28th WEaron, on X plus 1.

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 39-57 "IRON BAR"

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 - a. Transportation will be provided by the base supporting deploying personnel.
 - b. Deploying personnel will not be issued weapons or field equipment during this exercise and will not carry with them those individual personnel records maintained at base of assignment.
 - c. Detachment 8, 28th Wearon, will deploy one (1) weather observer, AFSC 25251, to Detachment 10, 28th Wearon on X plus 5.
 - d. Detachment 9, 28th Wearon, will deploy one (1) weather observer, AFSC 25251, to Detachment 10, 28th Wearon, on X plus 5.
 - e. Detachment 12, 28th Wearon, will deploy:
 - (1) Two (2) forecasters, AFSC 25370, to Detachment 24, 28th Wearon, on X plus 1.
 - (2) Two (2) weather observers, AFSC 25251, to Detachment 24, 28th Wearon, on X plus 1.

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- f. Detachment 25, 28th Wearon, will deploy:
 - (1) Two (2) forecasters, AFSC 25370, to Detachment 29, 28th Wearon on X day.
 - (2) Two (2) weather observers, AFSC 25251, to Detachment 29, 28th Wearon, on X day.
- g. Detachment 40, 28th Wearon, will deploy:
 - (1) Two (2) forecasters, AFSC 25370, to Detachment 10, 28th Wearon, on X plus 5.
 - (2) Two (2) weather observers, AFSC 25251, to Detachment 10, 28th Wearon, on X plus 5.
 - (3) Two (2) weather observers, AFSC 25251, to Detachment 24, 28th Wearon, on X plus 1.
3. High Wycombe Center will provide:
 - a. Terminal forecasts for aircraft deploying to UK.
 - b. AR area forecasts for UK AR areas for deployment, redeployment and strike missions.
 - c. Planning and operational route forecasts from UK base to ZI destination in accordance with paragraph 9b(5) SAC Manual 105-1.
4. Weather Detachments at Chelveston, Fairford, Mildenhall and Brize Norton will provide:
 - a. Weather Briefings and flight films for strike missions and/or redeployments to ZI station. Strike mission forecasts will include route, terminal and target forecasts as outlined in paragraph 9b(5) SAC Manual 105-1.

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COMDR 7AD

- b. Met watch for aircraft landing at respective bases.
- c. The weather detachment at Fairford will be responsible for briefing weather scout missions on X plus 2, X plus 3, X plus 4 and X plus 5. The forecasts for the AR area will be issued by HWFC.
- 5. Westover Forecast Center will provide:
 - a. Planning and operational forecasts for NEAC AR areas for deployment and redeployment in accordance with SAC Manual 105-1.
 - b. Planning and operational route forecasts for deployments of 8th Air Force units to UK destination.
 - c. Terminal forecasts for ZI destination for 8th Air Force aircraft redeploying to ZI.
- 6. Barksdale Forecast Center will provide:
 - a. Planning and operational route forecasts for deployment of 2d Air Force units to UK destination.
 - b. Terminal forecasts for ZI destination for 2d Air Force units redeploying to ZI.
- 7. Communications:
 - a. All weather messages will be transmitted over SACCOMNET with classification of SECRET.
 - b. Addresses on all messages will be as follows:
 - (1) Offutt Weather Central will be an addressee on all messages.
 - (2) Terminal forecasts will be addressed to base of departure and the forecast center supporting the arrival base.

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COMDR 7AD

(3) Planning and operational forecasts will be addressed to base of departure and the forecast center supporting arrival base.

(4) AR Area forecasts will be transmitted to base of departure and forecast centers supporting arrival and departure bases.

(5) COMBARS will be submitted in accordance with SAC Manual 55-8.

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ANNEX G TO 7AD OPS ORD 39-57 "IRON BAR"

CONTINGENCY PLAN (Separate Distribution)

SECRET

DISPOSITION FORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (if any) SECRET	
FILE NO.		SUBJECT (History) Medical Preparations for "Iron Bar"	
TO OIH	FROM SU	DATE 7 Nov 57	COMMENT NO. 1
		M/Sgt Baker - 75	
		Miss Conway - 75	
<p>In compliance with your classified DF, 4 November 57, subject: "Iron Bar", the following instructions have been issued to medical personnel at the units involved in "Iron Bar". (UNCLASSIFIED)</p> <p>" 1. In recognition of the greatly increased risk of aircraft accidents to be expected during the forthcoming exercise 'Iron Bar', and the large influx of crews and support people who may require medical care, the following steps will be taken. (SECRET)</p> <p>a. Bases normally manned by only one medical officer will be reinforced with one Flight Surgeon and one medical airman from within the command. In addition, one Flight Surgeon and three corpsmen are programmed to come with each deployed unit. (CONFIDENTIAL)</p> <p>b. Two ambulances, at least one of which will be radio equipped, will be stationed on the flight line at all times. One Flight Surgeon and complete crash kits will be aboard. (UNCLASSIFIED)</p> <p>c. Dispensaries concerned will be fully manned and alerted 24 hours a day. Doctors will sleep in the Dispensary. (UNCLASSIFIED)</p> <p>d. Dispensary crash wards will be prepared for immediate use. (UNCL)</p> <p>e. Flight Surgeons will pay especial attention to the problem of crew rest. (UNCLASSIFIED)</p> <p>f. Where bases are isolated from large hospitals C-47's equipped with litters and other necessary air-evacuation equipment have been requested to stand by. (UNCLASSIFIED)</p> <p>g. All medical personnel concerned have been briefed regarding their responsibilities in regard to the operation and any resultant aircraft accidents. (UNCLASSIFIED)</p> <p>h. The exercise will be monitored by medical officers from this office who will be touring bases involved. (UNCLASSIFIED)</p>			
<p>This document consists of pages copy no. 1 of 4 copies</p> <p>This DF class "Secret" since it reveals planning for forthcoming exercise.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>A.W. Eldridge</i> A.W. ELDRIDGE Capt, USAF (MC) Acting Surgeon</p>			

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48 WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET

Air Force—USAF, Wdn, Gcr-45-3146

S E C R E T

FROM: COMDRAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENGLAND

22 Nov 1957

TO: COMDRAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA
 COMDRAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS
 COMDRAF 15 MARCH AFB CALIF
 COMDRAIRDIV 5 SIDI SLIMANE MOROCCO
 COMIRBOMWG 321 PINECASTLE AFB FLA
 COMDRSRW 26 LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO
 COMDRBOMWG 310 SCHILLING AFB KAN
 COMDRBOMWG 340 WHITEHENT AFB MO
 COMDRBOMWG 68 BRIZE NORTON ENG
 COMDRAREFS 376 DET 1 GREENHAM COMMON ENG
 COMDRABGRU 3909 GREENHAM COMMON ENG
 COMDRABGRU 3910 LAKENHEATH ENG
 COMDRABGRU 3911 WEST DRAYTON ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3914 CHELVESTON ENG
 COMDRAREFS 376 BEN GUERIR MOROCCO
 COMDRABSQ 3913 MILDENHALL ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3917 EAST KIRKBY ENG
 COMDRABGRU 3918 UPPER HEMFORD ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3919 FAIRFORD ENG
 COMDRABGRU 3920 BRIZE NORTON ENG
 COMDRRECONTECHSQ 3921 WEST DRAYTON ENG
 COMDRABSQ 3929 HIGH WYCOMBE ENG
 COMDRBOMWG 341 DYESS AFB TEX
 CFLTCNAIRDIV 7 HIGH WYCOMBE ENG

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

INFO:

CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 COMDRAF 16 MADRID SPAIN
 CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY
 COFS USAF WASH DC
 COMDRAIRDIV 4 BARKSDALE AFB LA
 COMDRAIRDIV 801 LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO
 COMDRAIRDIV 802 SCHILLING AFB KAN
 COMDRAIRDIV 819 DYESS AFB TEX
 COMDRAIRDIV 806 LAKE CHARLES AFB LA
 COMDRABSQ 3912 BRUNTINGTHORPE ENG
 SR REPR SAC Z PARIS FR

SECRET FROM D000 7-4068. SUBJECT: IRON BAR. This is amendment Nr 3 to 7AD Opord Iron Bar. (Amendment Nr 2 was NOTAL.) CHANGE I. Ref para 3a(1) basic. Change to read: Plan and conduct USCM, to include special weapons exercise, utilizing 40 B-47 aircraft IAW the following instructions:

- (a) Conduct "Coco Alert" utilizing 9 aircraft of "Alert Force."
- (b) Conduct strike mission utilizing 31 B-47 aircraft. (11 aircraft will be empty and may be ECM configured aircraft). (See Annex E.)
- (c) Mission will resemble EWP planning factors as closely as possible, tempered by peacetime practicability and flying safety.
- (d) 2AF Oplan 300-57, SAC Man 55-12 and SAC Reg 50-4 will be utilized as basic planning guides.

CHANGE II. Ref 3X(12). Add: Exception 68th BW.

CHANGE III. Ref Annex A, para 5B(3), change to read: 68th BW will

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launch first cell of 4 aircraft on strike mission at 2 plus 72:00 hours. Subsequent take-offs will be at 15 minute intervals in increments of 4 aircraft thru wave 3. Wave 4,5,6,7 and 8 will take off at 30 minute intervals. (Wave two will not be air refueled.)

CHANGE IV. Ref Annex A, add as para 15: During deployment/strike/ redeployment phase of this exercise, in the event it becomes necessary for any participating aircraft to burn off excess fuel in order to comply with landing weight requirements, aircraft will not repeat will not orbit over United Kingdom land mass with weapon aboard. CHANGE V. Ref Annex D, para 3a(2). Add as sub para (h). (h) In enheath - Embargo.

DOO

CAPT E. F. BROOKS

S E C R E T

SECRET

FM COMBOMBWG 68 BRIZ E NORTON ENGLAND

4 DEC 57

TO RJDLCG/COMADIV 7 HIGH WYCOMBE ENGLAND
 INFO RJEDBR/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 RJWFKL/COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA

/SECRET/ZIPPO 68DO-12--086/B-27/39--57/7AD/68/DW/IRON BAR/ THE 68TH BOMB WING RESULTS WERE EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT THE PREPARATION AND LAUNCH PHASE OF THE IRON BAR MISSION. ALL AIRCRAFT SCHEDULED WERE LAUNCHED AS SCHEDULED AND SUCCESSFULLY BOMBED ASSIGNED TARGETS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SIX AIRCRAFT WHICH HAD NO AIR REFUELING SUPPORT. RECOMMEND THAT THE EXECUTION ORDER FOR ALL SAC ALERTS FOLLOW THE STANDARD FORMAT OUTLINED IN SAC 50 SERIES OPERATIONS ORDERS. 7AD ZIPPO 11-197 DATED 25 NOV CAUSED SOME CONFUSION IN THAT IT APPEARED TO BE ONLY A DEPLOYMENT EXECUTION ORDER. ALSO IT MADE REFERENCE TO A BASE REFERENCE HOUR AND NO "E" HOUR EXECUTION WAS FORTHCOMING. THE TANKER SUPPORT WAS INADEQUATE IN SOME AREAS. THE TWO TANKERS SCHEDULED FOR ORANGE CELL WERE EIGHTEEN MILES APART AT THE RENDEZVOUS TIME. ELECTRONIC RENDEZVOUS WERE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF PPR APN 69 RECEPTION. BLACK CELL HAD NO TANKERS AIRBORNE; HOWEVER A BEACON SIGNAL WAS PICKED UP AND A RENDEZVOUS ATTEMPTED. IT DEVELOPED THAT THE SIGNAL WAS COMING FROM A FORMATION THAT HAD COMPLETED REFUELING BUT HAD NOT TURNED OFF THEIR BEACON. THREE TANKERS ABORTED THEREFORE SIX B-47 SORTIES WERE LOST. BASE FACILITIES AND SUPPORT WERE ADEQUATE. TARGET MATERIALS WERE ADEQUATE. ALL MATERIALS NEEDED FOR REPRODUCING RADAR FILM AND ALL TARGET MAPS WERE SUPPLIED BY BASE PHOTO AND TARGET INTELLIGENCE CENTER. THE INTERNAL SECURITY WAS SATISFACTORY. THE AIRCRAFT POINT GUARD WAS EXCELLENT. THE GENERAL ALERTNESS APPEARED TO REVERT TO CONDITION NORMAL AFTER THE PREPARATION PHASE. FROM THE MAINTENANCE STANDPOINT THIS WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL MISSION. THE GENERATION OF AIRCRAFT WAS COMPLETED AS SCHEDULED AND ALL AIRCRAFT WERE LAUNCHED ON SCHEDULED TIME WITHOUT THE UTILIZATION OF SPARE AIRCRAFT. BASE FACILITIES WERE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT A MISSION OF THIS TYPE. HOWEVER AN IMPROVEMENT COULD BE MADE IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS THAT WOULD INSURE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF ALL FUTURE OPERATIONS: ALL TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES ARE OLD AND REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE MAINTENANCE AT TIMES. REPLACEMENT OF THESE WORN OUT VEHICLES WOULD INSURE A SMOOTHER OPERATION AT ALL TIMES. THE RADIOS IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND IN THE RADIO VEHICLES ARE OF AN OLD STYLE (BRC-19). REPLACEMENT BY NEW G.E. TYPES COMPARABLE TO THOSE USED IN THE ZI WOULD INSURE BETTER COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVIDE A MORE POSITIVE CONTACT TO THE MAINTENANCE AREAS. SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT PARTS AND/OR SPARES WAS ADEQUATE. ALL ECHELONS OF SUPPLY COOPERATED VERY WELL IN THE REQUISITIONING, RESEARCH AND DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES AND SPARES. ALL AIRCRAFT REQUIRING SUPPLY ACTION WERE ABLE TO MEET THE GENERATION AND LAUNCHING TIMES WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. ECM ACTIVITY BY THE FIVE PHASE V CAPSULE AIRCRAFT AGAINST IADF RADAR SITE WERE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. COMMUNICATIONS WERE EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT. PRACTICE RECALL MESSAGES WERE DISPATCHED VIA HF. ONE OR MORE AIRCRAFT IN SEVEN OF THE EIGHT CELL RECEIVED THE RECALL MESSAGE. ALL AIRCRAFT HAD GOOD RESULTS WITH O-15 CAMERAS. ALL BOMB RUNS WERE SCORED EFFECTIVELY AND NO CAMERA MAL-

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FUNCTIONS WERE REPORTED. WEATHER IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE REFUELING AREA MADE IT NECESSARY TO MOVE THE RENDEZVOUS POINT. THIS CAUSED SOME OF THE TANKERS TO PROCEED DIRECTLY ON COURSE. HOWEVER, RENDEZVOUS WERE STILL EFFECTED. ONE CELL WAS AIRBORNE DURING TWILIGHT FOR ONE HOUR AND THIRTY MINUTES, THUS PRECLUDING ANY CELESTRAL NAVIGATIONS. NONE OF THE OTHER CELLS EXPERIENCED ANY DIFFICULTY AND ALL AIRCRAFT MADE THEIR CONTROL TIMES. THE BOMBING WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. CEA WAS 407 FEET AND THE RELIABILITY FACTOR WAS 100 PERCENT. NO FUEL PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED. FUEL LOGS COMPARED FAVORABLY TO THE PRE-- DITIONS. THE ON FOR TWO REFUELING TACTICS WORKED WELL EXCEPT THE WING LOSES TWO BOMBER SORTIES FOR EACH TANKER FAILURE.

04/1610Z DEC RJD LGU

SECRET

FROM 68 BRIZE NORTON

TO 7 HIGH WYCOMBE

INFO CINCSAC OFFUTT

BT

/SECRET/ZIPPO 68DO-12-179/M--27/39--57/68BW/IRON BAR/ (1) FINAL MISSION REPORT FOR OPERATION "IRON BAR", 7AD OPSORD 39--57. (2) THIS OPERATION COMMENCED AT 1400Z 25 NOVEMBER. AT THIS TIME PREPARATION UNDER THE 40/50 PLAN COMMENCED. FORTY FIVE AIRCRAFT WERE PREPARED AND ACCEPTED IN TIME TO MEET THE EWP GENERATION RATE SCHEDULE. THE USCM WAS LAUNCHED UNDER THE E PLUS 72 CONCEPT. STARTING AT 1400Z ON 28 NOVEMBER 1957, 32 AIRCRAFT WERE AIRBORNE AS SCHEDULED WITHOUT ANY SUBSTITUTIONS. ALL AIRCRAFT SUCCESSFULLY BOMBED ASSIGNED TARGETS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SIX WHICH HAD NO AIR REFUELING SUPPORT. FIVE ECM AIRCRAFT SUCCESSFULLY JAMMED THE RADAR SITE IN ICELAND. THIS WAS A ROUND ROBIN FLIGHT, BRIZE NORTON TO BRIZE NORTON. ALL AIRCRAFT COMPLETED THE MISSION WITHOUT INCIDENT. (3) SINCE THIS OPERATION DID NOT INVOLVE A DEPLOYMENT AS AN INTEGRAL PHASE THERE WERE NO PERSONNEL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE OPERATION. (4) THIS WAS SINGLE AIR REFUELED MISSION. THE TWO FOR ONE REFUELING TACTICS OUTLINED IN THE TACTICAL DOCTRINE WERE FOLLOWED AND NO DIFFICULTIES WERE ENCOUNTERED. BOMBING RESULTS WERE EXCELLENT. THE CEA WAS 407 FEET AND THE RELIABILITY FACTOR 100 PERCENT. (5) SINCE THIS OPERATION DID NOT INVOLVE A MOVEMENT ALL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WERE IN PLACE AND NO MOBILITY PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED. BASE FACILITIES WERE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT A MISSION OF THIS TYPE. HOWEVER, AN IMPROVEMENT COULD BE MADE IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS THAT WOULD INSURE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF ALL FUTURE OPERATIONS: ALL TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES ARE OLD AND REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE MAINTENANCE AT TIMES. REPLACEMENT OF THESE WORN OUT VEHICLES WOULD INSURE A SMOOTHER OPERATION AT ALL TIMES. THE RADIOS IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND IN THE RADIO VEHICLES ARE OF AN OLD TYPE (VRC-19). REPLACEMENT BY NEW G.E. TYPES COMPARABLE TO THOSE USED IN THE ZI WOULD INSURE BETTER COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVIDE A MORE POSITIVE CONTACT TO THE MAINTENANCE AREAS. SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT PARTS AND/OR SPARES WAS ADEQUATE. ALL ECHELONS OF SUPPLY COOPERATED VERY WELL IN THE REQUISITIONING, RESEARCH, AND DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES AND SPARES. ALL AIRCRAFT REQUIRING SUPPLY ACTION WERE ABLE TO MEET THE GENERATION AND LAUNCHING TIMES WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. (6) THE INTERNAL SECURITY WAS SATISFACTORY. AIRCRAFT POINT GUARD WAS EXCELLENT. THE GENERAL ALERTNESS APPEARED TO REVERT TO CONDITION NORMAL AFTER THE PREPARATION PHASE. (7) CONSOLIDATED LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS. (A) A NEW AND BETTER RADIOS FOR FLIGHT LINE VEHICLES. (B) INSTALL MORE APPROVED GROUND TERMINALS ON HARDSTANDS. SOME ARE WITHOUT. (C) REPLACEMENT OF WORN OUT KLI 518 vehicles.

17/1430Z DEC RJDLGU

SECRET

FROM: COMAIRDIV 801 LOCKBOURNE AFB OHIO
TO: COMAF 8 WESTOVER AFB MASS (AIRMAIL)

INFO: CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBE (AIRMAIL)
COMAIRDIV 7 SOUTH RUISLIP ENGLAND (AIRMAIL)
COMABRON 3919 FAIRFORD ENGLAND (AIRMAIL)
COMSTRATWG 4083 THULE AB GREENLAND (AIRMAIL)
COMSTRATWG 4082 GOOSE AB LABRADOR (AIRMAIL)

/SECRET/1. 26DOP M-0158, M-27/39-57/8AF/26SRW/IRON-BAR 2. MISSION
INVOLVED FORTY (40) RB-47 AIRCRAFT AS FOLLOWS:

THREE (3) WEATHER SCOUT - LOCKBOURNE
EIGHT (8) WEATHER SCOUT - GOOSE
THREE (3) WEATHER SCOUT AND EIGHT (8) STRIKE - THULE
THREE (3) WEATHER SCOUT AND FIFTEEN (15) STRIKE - FAIRFORD

a. PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT:

- (1) FORTY FIVE (45) AIRCRAFT EWP CONFIGURATED AT E \neq 35 HOURS.
- (2) THE FORTY (40) MISSION AIRCRAFT COMPLETED EWP READINESS AT E \neq 15 HOURS AND LAUNCHED AS SCHEDULED, EXCEPT FOR ONE GROUND ABORT AND ONE 28 MINUTE LATE TAKE-OFF.
- (3) SIX (6) AIRCRAFT AIR-ABORTED AND RETURNED TO LOCKBOURNE. ON SUBSEQUENT RELAUNCHING SIX (6) PROCEEDED TO DESTINATION. ONE (THULE) AIRCRAFT AIR-ABORTED AND DUE TO TIMING ELEMENT WAS DELETED FROM THE EXERCISE.
- (4) TANKER SUPPORT OF THE 801 AIRDIV (321 AFRES) WAS OUTSTANDING. AN ADDITIONAL TEN (10) SORTIES OVER THE OPORD REQUIREMENT WERE PROVIDED IN SUPPORT OF THULE DEPLOYMENT FORCE.

b. STRIKE PHASE: REPORTED ON 26 SRW/R-27/REPORT.

c. REDEPLOYMENT PHASE:

- (1) WEATHER PRECLUDED FULL TANKER UTILIZATION AND INITIAL LANDING AT HOME STATION; HOWEVER NO PERTINENT DIFFICULTIES WERE ENCOUNTERED.
- (2) ONLY TWELVE OF THE SCHEDULED EIGHTEEN REFUELING SORTIES WERE COMPLETED BY THE 91ST AFRES AND 310TH AFRES DUE TO WEATHER AT THE 310TH BASE.

3. UNIT AND TASK FORCE PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION WERE ADEQUATE AT ALL STATIONS.

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4. MISSION AFFORDED REALISTIC OPERATIONAL TRAINING.
5. THE SUPPORT PERSONNEL LISTED IN 400-1C SHOULD BE MODIFIED BY UNITS FOR PEACETIME DEPLOYMENT USCM'S, SUBSTITUTING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE SPECIALISTS FOR CERTAIN OTHER PERSONNEL THAT CANNOT BE FULLY UTILIZED, I.E. CBR, ADMINISTRATION.
6. INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES WHERE AUTHORIZED WAS ADEQUATE. FAIRFORD HAS NOT AUTHORIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL OR TARGET MATERIALS.
7. INTERNAL SECURITY WAS ADEQUATE AT ALL STATIONS.
8. A. THE AGE COMPONENTS OF FAK PRE-POSITIONED BY 7AD REQUIRED EXCESSIVE REPAIRS PRIOR TO UTILIZATION. THE 3919TH AGE BRNCH CHECKED FAK COMPONENTS PRIOR TO 26TH ARRIVAL AND ARE SUBMITTING SPECIFIC DATA AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

SECRET

FM COMABRON 3919 FAIRFORD ENGLAND
 TO COMAIRDIV 7 SO RUISLIP ENGLAND
 INFO CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

/SECRET/BC 1873/57. SUBJECT: M-27 REPORT. FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL MISSION REPORT FOR 7TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS ORDER 39-57 "IRON BAR" WHICH IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3X. (7) (G) OF THE BASIC ORDER.

2. DURING THE PERIOD 25 NOVEMBER 1957 TO 8 DECEMBER 1957 THE 26TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING DEPLOYED AND OPERATED 18 RB-47 AIRCRAFT AT RAF FAIRFORD AND 15 OF THESE AIRCRAFT FLEW A RECONNAISSANCE "STRIKE" MISSION ON 30 NOVEMBER 1957. THREE RB-47 AIRCRAFT OPERATED AS WEATHER SCOUTS IN SUPPORT OF OTHER "IRON BAR" OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AREA. THE PARENT WING ALSO DEPLOYED A 15 MAN PRE-POST STRIKE AUGMENTATION TEAM BY MATS AIRLIFT. ALL TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL WERE REDEPLOYED TO THE ZI BASE BY 8 DECEMBER 1957.

3. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION. SUPPORT PERSONNEL WERE PROCESSED IN, ASSIGNED BILLETS AND GIVEN AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARRIVAL. JOB ASSIGNMENT WAS ACCOMPLISHED EFFECTIVELY EXCEPT THAT A DELAY OCCURRED IN LOCATING SEVEN PERSONNEL FOR WORK ASSIGNMENT. A PLAN IS NOW IN EFFECT TO ISSUE DUPLICATE BILLETING CARDS BY AFSC, WITH ONE COPY TO BE FURNISHED TO THE SUPERVISOR. THIS SYSTEM WILL ELIMINATE ANY DIFFICULTY IN LOCATING PERSONNEL.

4. OPERATIONS. FAIRFORD TASK FORCE PROVIDED A CLASS "X" CONTROL TEAM, WEATHER FACILITIES AND AACS FACILITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS. ALL NAVIGATIONAL AIDS REMAINED OPERATIONAL DURING THE EXERCISE. THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES RELATING TO OVERALL OPERATIONS PLANNING WERE NOTED:

A. FAIRFORD TASK FORCE HAD NOT BEEN ADVISED THAT A RESTRICTION HAD BEEN IMPOSED ON THE USE OF ZARAGOSA AIRFIELD AS AN ALTERNATE DURING THIS EXERCISE.

B. THE 26TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING OPERATIONS ORDER INDICATED THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT DATE FOR SUPPORT PERSONNEL WOULD BE 3 DECEMBER 1957. THIS WAS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH MATS PLANNING.

5. LOGISTICS

A. ALL PHASES OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE WERE ACCOMPLISHED ON POST-STRIKE AIRCRAFT WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TIME LIMITS. AVERAGE TURN AROUND TIME FOR CATEGORY "A" AIRCRAFT WAS 2 HOURS, 8 MINUTES. TWO AIRCRAFT WERE CLASSIFIED IN CATEGORY "C" UNDER CRITERIA LISTED IN 7TH AIR DIVISION MANUAL 65-2 AND WERE OUT OF COMMISSION FOR A TOTAL OF 37 HOURS, 48 MINUTES.

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B. A FLYAWAY KIT AND MASK WAS DEPLOYED FROM GREENHAM COMMON, AND 61 PERCENT OF ALL AIRCRAFT PARTS AND COMPONENTS USED WERE PROVIDED FROM THIS SOURCE. THE REMAINDER WAS DELIVERED FROM UPPER HEYFORD, GREENHAM COMMON AND BRIZE NORTON.

C. TEN PERSONNEL AND TWO O-11A VEHICLES WERE DEPLOYED FROM UPPER HEYFORD TO AUGMENT THE BASE FIRE DEPARTMENT DURING THE EXERCISE. TWO ASSIGNED O-11A VEHICLES WERE DEADLINED FOR PARTS DURING THE EXERCISE.

6. INTELLIGENCE.

A. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE DEPLOYED WITH THE TDY WING. THESE PERSONNEL WERE ASSISTED BY MEMBERS OF THE IN-PLACE INTERROGATION TEAM IN DEBRIEFING OF AIRCREWS. RECONNAISSANCE FILM WAS COURIERED TO THE 3921ST RTS, WEST DRAYTON, FOR PROCESSING AND REPORTING.

7. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. ALL TELETYPE TRAFFIC WAS PROCESSED WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY AND WITHOUT ANY EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN FOR THE DURATION OF THE EXERCISE.

B. A RADIO COMMUNICATIONS DEFICIENCY CONTINUED TO EXIST AT THIS BASE, DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM BRIZE NORTON OPERATING ON THE SAME VRC-19 FREQUENCY. AUTHORIZATION OF AN ADDITIONAL FREQUENCY WOULD ELIMINATE THIS DIFFICULTY.

B. REPORTS. THE REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN RECURRING REPORTS LISTED IN 7TH AIR DIVISION SUPPLEMENT I TO SACM 55-8 APPEARS TO BE UNREALISTIC WHEN THE REPORT CONTENT REMAINS UNCHANGED FROM ONE REPORTING PERIOD TO THE NEXT. A RECOMMENDATION ON THIS SUBJECT IS INCLUDED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. TWO ADDITIONAL O-11A VEHICLES SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THIS BASE, DUE TO LACK OF PARTS AND PAST EXPERIENCE WITH IN-COMMISSION RATE.

B. A HIGH-LIFT TRUCK SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO FACILITATE OFF-LOADING OF EQUIPMENT FROM AIRCRAFT, SINCE LOADING RAMPS ARE NOT NORMALLY BROUGHT BY MATS.

C. THE TASK FORCE OPERATING BASE SHOULD BE ON DISTRIBUTION FOR PERTINENT EXTRACTS OF THE MATS OPERATION ORDER IN SUPPORT OF ALL EXERCISES.

D. SEVENTH AIR DIVISION SUPPLEMENT I TO SACM 55-8 SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATION IN REPORTING. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL REPORTS LISTED IN THIS SUPPLEMENT BE REQUIRED ONLY AFTER A CHANGE OCCURS AFTER THE INITIAL REPORT.

19/1115Z DEC RJDLGZ

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FM COMDRABSQ 3919

TO RJDGB/COMDRAIRDIV 7

INFO RJEDBR/CINCSAC

BT

/UNCLASSIFIED EFTO/BC 1--6. SUBJECT: M-27 REPORT. REFERENCE MY
MESSAGE BC-1073/57, DISREGARD PARAGRAPH 4A.

BT

02/1500Z JAN RJDGZ

SECRET

FM COMDR TASK FORCE EAST KIRKBY

19 DEC 57

TO CINCSAC OFFUTT
 OAF WESTOVER
 2AF BARKSDALE
 7 HIGH WYCOMBE
 802 SCHILLING

/SECRET/ 1. ZIPPO 12-268/T-27/39--57/SAC/310 AREFS/IRON BAR.
 CONCLUSIONS. A. ESTIMATE OF MISSION SUCCESS GOOD TO EXCELLENT.
 B. LESSONS LEARNED FROM MISSION. CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE WAS GAINED
 BOTH ON THE PART OF EAST KIRKBY PERSONNEL ON HANDLING KC-97 AIRCRAFT
 AND 310TH PERSONNEL ON OPERATING FACILITIES AT EAST KIRKBY. ONE ITEM
 OF CONCERN PRIOR TO MISSION WAS ABILITY OF EK POL CAPACITY AND RE-
 SUPPLY FACILITIES TO SUPPORT SUSTAINED OPERATION. THIS WAS FAVORABLY
 RESOLVED, WITH POL STOCKS NEVER FALLING BELOW 67 PER CENT OF BEGINNING
 INVENTORY. SOME DOUBT PREVIOUSLY EXISTED CONCERNING STATUS OF NAV-
 AIDS; THESE PROVED ADEQUATE. C. RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) THAT A PERCENT-
 AGE OF THE UK R-4360 ENGINE RESOURCES BE MAINTAINED IN THE KC-97
 CONFIGURATION. (2) TOOLS FOR THE NEW 34660 PROPELLOR SHOULD BE PRE-
 POSITIONED IN THE UK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 3. COMMENTS ON ADEQUACY
 OF SUPPORT ITEMS. A. FIGHTER ESCORT - N/A B. AIR RESERVE - N/A
 C. FERRET - N/A D. MATS OR SS SUPPORT: MATS AIRLIFT FOR ENROUTE
 MAINTENANCE TEAM WAS SEVERAL HOURS LATE ARRIVING SCHILLING, THIS
 DELAY RESULTED IN PLACING AN ADDITIONAL HARDSHIP ON THE ENROUTE
 MAINTENANCE TEAM IN THAT NEGLIGIBLE TIME WAS AVAILABLE PRIOR TO
 ARRIVAL OF AIRCRAFT STOPPING AT GOOSE FOR REST. E. BASE FACILITIES
 ADEQUATE, ALTHOUGH LACK OF INDOOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SPACE CREATED
 SOME HARDSHIP DUE TO NIGHT WORK OUTDOORS IN RAIN AND LOW TEMPERATURES.
 F. INTELLIGENCE DATA: N/A G. INTERNAL SECURITY: SECURITY WAS GOOD
 COMMENSURATE WITH EXISTING FACILITIES. H. OTHER PERTINENT ITEMS:
 DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH A SEEMINGLY HIGH RATE OF ENGINE CHANGES
 HAVE BEEN STUDIED, AND WILL RECEIVE MORE STUDY WHEN RECORDS ARE
 AVAILABLE FOR COMPARISON WITH PAST PERFORMANCES; POSSIBILITY OF THE
 NEW PROPELLER HAVING A RELATIONSHIP TO ENGINE FAILURES HAS RECEIVED
 CONSIDERATION, AND FINDINGS WILL BE SUPPLIED TO APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
 ON RETURN TO SCHILLING AFB. 4. COMMENT ON EFFECT OF FOLLOWING ON
 SUCCESS OF PRIMARY MISSION: A. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLIES:
 (1) A MUCH LARGER AMOUNT OF HEAVY MAINTENANCE WAS ENCOUNTERED THAN
 WAS ANTICIPATED DUE TO ENGINE CHANGES, RETRACTION TEST AND BROKEN
 STUDS IN NOSE SECTIONS. A TOTAL OF 38 POSTFLIGHT INSPECTIONS WERE
 PERFORMED. IT IS BELIEVED THAT MAINTENANCE CAN ADEQUATELY HANDLE
 EMP COMMITMENTS. (2) SUPPLY SUPPORT WAS EXCELLENT. DELIVERY TIME
 FROM ACFT SERVICE UNIT TO ACFT WAS CONSISTENTLY BETTER THAN ANTI-
 CIPATED. COOPERATION OF LAKENHEATH AND 7 AD WAS VERY GOOD REGARDING
 SUPPLY MATTERS. B. COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT: (1)
 COMMUNICATIONS WERE ADEQUATE THROUGHOUT THE MISSION. NO SIGNIFICANT
 BREAKDOWNS OCCURRED WITH EITHER AIR COMMUNICATIONS OR GROUND COMMUNI-
 CATIONS. THE SYSTEM DEVISED FOR RELAY OF WEATHER SCOUT REPORTS
 PROVED ADEQUATE TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. C. (1) WEATHER WAS A

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DECIDING FACTOR IN THE DELAYED ARRIVAL OF SEVERAL DEPLOYING ACFT. ON ORIGINAL DEPARTURE FROM SCHILLING AFB 50 PER CENT OF THE ACFT SCHEDULED WERE DELAYED BECAUSE OF HIGH SURFACE TEMPERATURES. 24 DEGREE ABOVE NORMAL MADE THE EQUIVALENT GROSS WEIGHT ABOVE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE FOR TAKE OFF. (2) INACCURATE WIND FORECAST FOR 26 NOV RESULTED IN 6 ACFT LANDING AT ALTERNATES FOR FUEL. A TAIL WIND FORECAST TO BE EFFECTIVE AT LABRADOR COAST BUT THE FUEL DECISION POINT DID NOT DEVELOP FOR 1100 MORE MILES. D. NAVIGATION PROVED DIFFICULT ON DEPLOYMENT. CLOUD CONDITIONS PRECLUDED CONSENT CELESTIAL FIXES, AND AURORA BAUREALIS INTERFERED WITH LORAN AND RADIO RECEPTION, MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO ACCURATELY PLOT WIND AND POSITION. NO NAVIGATIONAL PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED ON REFUELING MISSIONS. E. FLIGHT ENGINEERING: AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE DURING DEPLOYMENT PROVED BETTER THAN A PREVIOUS TEST PROFILE MISSION FLOWN TO DETERMINE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 34660 PROPELLER, BUT NOT AS GOOD AS CHARTED. F. TACTICS: IN CONFORMANCE WITH TACTICAL DOCTRINE.

19/1713Z DEC RJD LGF

SECRET

DISPOSITION FORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any) SECRET
FILE NO. <i>110000</i>	SUBJECT Observer Team Visit to Chelveston during Exercise "Iron Bar".	
TO IG THRU DO	FROM DOO	DATE 9 Dec 57 COMMENT NO. 1 Maj Millin - 269 J. Basham - 360
<p>1. <u>Team Members:</u></p> <p>Major Robert E. Millin (Team Captain) Capt James L. Mulligan - Operations M/Sgt Max L. Ryan - Maintenance (Unclassified)</p> <p>2. <u>Daily Diary:</u></p> <p><u>29 November 1957 - Friday:</u></p> <p>0900 arrived Chelveston - reported to Base Adjutant and Base Commander, Colonel Robertson. (U)</p> <p>Reported to tower to observe landing activity. However, due to number of people already in the tower; Capt. Green, the Base Operations Officer, suggested we wait until following day to visit tower. We complied with his request. Observed landing activities and all airdrome activity throughout the day. Checked on post strike (3 hour) status of airplanes. Observed crew interrogation and de-briefings. (S)</p> <p><u>30 November 1957 - Saturday:</u></p> <p>0800 - Checked control room activity and obtained ETA's of second wave aircraft. Reported to tower at 1030 and observed arrival of aircraft. (U)</p> <p>1300 - Observed crew interrogation and de-briefings. (U)</p> <p>1400 - 1630 - Visit each aircraft on flight line to determine post strike status. (C)</p> <p><u>1 December 1957 - Sunday:</u></p> <p>Spent day observing Control Room, Tower, and flight line activities. Spot checked post strike status of aircraft that had arrived in third wave. Attend redeployment briefing of 341st B-47 crews. Redeployment of 1st wave to ZI was delayed 24 hours because of weather in NEAC refueling area. (S)</p> <p><u>2 December 1957 - Monday:</u></p> <p>attended pre-take off briefings of 1st wave redeploying to ZI.</p>		

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AUTH: COMDR. 7AD

FORM 1, FEB 50... REPLACES FORM 1, OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED

DATE... 9 Dec 57... INCL #2

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Observed take-offs, ramp control and ATC clearance coordination with Alconbury Control. 341st Bomb Wing personnel were in the tower coordinating the B-47 activity with tower personnel. After 1st wave of redeploying aircraft had departed made final check with maintenance control to obtain specific figure on refueling and maintenance times. Checked out with Colonel Robertson and departed station at 1700Z. (U)

3. Check List Summary (Operations):

- a. The preparation for receiving, parking, and servicing of landing aircraft was excellent. Parking was controlled from the tower by Capt Green, the Base Operations Officer, utilizing a radio hookup with three alert Jeeps. The hardstands are small and extreme caution is necessary in parking the B-47 to prevent outriggers getting off hard surfaces. (C)
 - b. There was a qualified B-47 pilot (Capt Green and Bomb Wing personnel) in the tower during landing operation. GCA was operational. Fire and crash personnel were in proper position. (U)
 - c. Ground handling, parking, and taxi supervision was good. (U)
 - d. Adequate transportation was available for crew pick-up. (U)
 - e. Control Room operation was satisfactory. (C)
 - f. Briefing and de-briefing facilities were satisfactory. Base Operations coordination with ATC agencies was good. (U)
 - g. Weather support was excellent. (C)
 - h. Tower supervision during landings and take offs was excellent. (U)
 - i. Security was excellent, point guards on aircraft double checked all personnel approaching the aircraft. (C)
 - j. Classified material carried by crew members was processed and stored properly. (U)
 - k. Air Base personnel were working and coordinating maintenance activities so as to ready aircraft for execution of contingency plan. The Base C-47 was dispatched to Burtonwood to obtain parts for an AFNE aircraft. (C)
 - l. Reports were being submitted in accordance with SAC Manual 55-83. (U)
4. The following are observations made during the exercise "Iron Bar". These observations are listed in numerical order as outlined on the check list prepared by Materiel Directorate. (Unclassified)
- a. The Job Control Section was manned with personnel from 3914th ABRON and the 341st Bomb Wing, this function was established for a continuous

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24 hour operation. The 3914th personnel were organized into three flights for flight line operation and were not set up for a continuous type operation but to prepare the aircraft on a first come first service basis. (C)

- b. The equipment was in satisfactory state of condition and ready for immediate use with the exception of equipment for the dispensing of kill frost or de-icing fluid. This kill frost dispensing equipment will be prepared and maintained in accordance with 7AD Regulation 66-7. As an interim the M31A De - Contamination truck was serviced with 300 gallons of deicing fluid. (S)
- c. The aircraft parking plan for first days arrival had been worked out to afford maximum use of hydrant refueling system. The parking plan was established for remaining aircraft on a day to day basis as requirements were known. These plans when established were followed by the parking control personnel. (C).
- d. Qualified maintenance personnel were assigned to meet and service each aircraft, these people interviewed the flight crews to determine the maintenance requirements and if the aircraft could under EMP conditions be deployed after fuel service and minor adjustment and on maintenance. (S)
- e. Safety precautions were exercised at each aircraft regarding the positioning and grounding of equipment, placement of CO2 fire extinguishers. (U)
- f. The Job Control Section was advised by means of radio equipped jeeps, hardstand telephone the status of each aircraft as soon as the information became available to flight line personnel. This information was relayed to Operations Control Room by a direct line to Operations Control Room. (C)
- g. Aircraft with the least amount of work requirements were afforded highest maintenance priorities to place them in commission as soon as possible. Aircraft requiring boost pump charges, retraction tests, and those having fuel leak were turned over to 341st personnel for required maintenance. (C)
- h. See f above.
- i. The Job Control was operating in accordance with SAC Manual 66-13, with the exception of field maintenance dispatch. Field maintenance specialists were dispatched from Job Control via Base PBX and field phones to the shops. (C)
- j. The G.P.E. was prepositioned by GPE personnel and was controlled by GPE dispatch section. Crews were maintained to service this equipment during slack periods when electrical power was not required on the aircraft. (U)
- k. Spot check of aircraft DD Form 731-2 revealed that servicing entries and maintenance accomplishments were being accomplished as prescribed by current directives. (U)
- l. Flew Charts were not used. (U)

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m. The maintenance plan for receiving and processing the aircraft is considered to be thorough and efficient with the exception of the dispensing unit or units for kill frost or deicing fluid. (S)

n. The supply of parts from bench stocks, 7th Air Division mobile parts kit, was considered adequate for post strike operations, however, due to the requirement by the 341st wing to prepare the aircraft for the return portion of the mission the 341st FAK had to be utilized. Due to the delay in one of the C-124 support aircraft only a portion of the FAK were in place. The Chief of Maintenance, 3914th ABRON, suggested that for future operations the deploying organization deploy a pre-post strike FAK. The average time for delivery of parts was 30 minutes. (S)

o. The average time of refueling from start of refueling to completion of refueling was: 49 minutes. (S)

p. The post strike aircraft were not serviced with LOX by 3914th. These aircraft were serviced with LOX by 341st personnel prior to return flight to Dyess AFB. (U)

q. There was not an accurate log of unscheduled maintenance performed as the aircraft were prepared by the 3914th ABRON personnel for deployment in accordance with the go/no go check list in 7.D Manual 65-2. Any additional work required was performed by 341st personnel with aid of 3914th personnel.

r. Of the 34 aircraft arriving, (7, 29 November; 15, 30 November; 11, 1 December; and 1, 2 December) all could have met the 3 hour turnaround criteria with the exception of two (2) aircraft 52-030 and 52-077. B-47E S/N 52-030 had the rudder-elevator PCU inoperative requiring the replacement of the hydraulic pump motor. B-47E S/N 52-77 had a fuel leak upon landing and could not be corrected in time to meet the 3 hour criteria. (S)

5. This DF classified Secret because it reveals EMP capabilities of 7AD Base. (Unclassified)



Robert E. Mullin
 ROBERT E. MULLIN
 Major, USAF
 Team Captain

4
SECRET

DISPOSITION FORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any) SECRET
FILE NO.	SUBJECT Observer Team Report Operation Iron Bar - Fairford	
TO: <i>Handwritten initials</i>	FROM: DCO	DATE: 9 Dec 57 COMMENT NO. 1 Maj Mullin - 269 J. Basham - 360

1. Team Members:
 Major Robert E. Mullin, (Team Captain)
 Capt James L. Mulligan - Operations
 N/Sgt Max L. Ryan - Maintenance (Unclassified)

2. Daily Diary:
24 November 1957 - Sunday
 Arrived 0800, checked into BOQ and checked quarters that were to be assigned to arriving crews. Quarters were clean, well heated and entirely satisfactory. (Unclassified)

1030
 Observed arrival of two (2) C-124 support aircraft. These were handled by base personnel in a very efficient manner. (U)

1300
 Accomplished general check of Base Operation and airdrome facilities. These were all in order preparatory to arrival of tactical aircraft. This was a very inactive day, no tactical aircraft were scheduled to arrive, the two support aircraft arriving generated about the only airdrome activity. (U)

25 November 1957 - Monday
 0800 - Reported to Base Commander, Colonel Crampton.
 0930 - Observed arrival of two (2) C-118 aircraft with support personnel. The processing of these personnel was conducted in a very efficient manner with minimum delay. (U)
 1030 - Checked in with Base Operation Officer and also the Control Room. (U)
 1300 - Observed Control Room operation and discussed Iron Bar with 266SW personnel. (U)
 1400-1600 - Read 8AF and 266SW Operation Order "Iron Bar". (U) 767E

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DD FORM 1311 (REV. 1-56) REPLACES FORM 1311, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED
 DATE: 4 Dec 57... 52512

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- d. Qualified personnel were assigned to receive aircraft and to interview the flight crews to determine maintenance status and establish work requirements. (U)
- e. Safety precautions were observed and all personnel were cognizant of safety requirements. Fire fighting equipment, O-11 AEs and 50 # CO2 cylinders were properly positioned. Static grounding was properly accomplished. Power units (C-26) were properly positioned during refueling. (U)
- f. The Job Control Section, FRC-27 transmitter, was inoperative at 0800 25 November 1957, Ground Communications personnel (1 A/3C and 1 A/2C) were attempting to repair the equipment. A new FRC-27 was obtained from Sea Weed - this transmitter was also inoperative. As a result of this communications problem Job Control was not aware of an exact up to minute status or completion times of maintenance and servicing being accomplished on flight line. (C)
- g. Due to the type of operation being accomplished, all work orders were afforded the highest priorities (1A). (U)
- h. The Job Control Section was established in accordance with SAC Manual 66-13. However, there was very little information available and posted on specialist dispatch boards regarding outstanding work orders and number and type of specialists dispatched. (C)
- i. Ground power equipment was pre-positioned and was to be serviced and replaced if necessary by night shift personnel. (U)
- j. Aircraft servicing entries were being properly entered in Form 781. (U)
- k. Flow Charts were established but due to communications failure these were not used and were non-effective. (C)
- l. The maintenance plan for receiving and processing aircraft was thorough and efficient with the exception that there was no alternate plan to cope with the communication failure in the Job Control Section. (C)
- m. The supply portion of this check list could not be evaluated, very few items were requested prior to scheduled departure of control team. The 7AD mobile parts kit from Greenham Common was in-place in addition to the PAK of the 26 SFW. The 7AD kit had several items that required bench check and repair prior to issue. This difficulty has been brought to the attention of 7AD Director of Materiel and Greenham Common. (C)
- n. Specific averages for refueling times were not available due to breakdown in Communications and Flow Charts. However, several aircraft were personally visited after three (3) hour post strike period. All aircraft visited had been refueled. (S)
- o. Aircraft were not serviced with LOX, the base was prepared to do so immediately but to conserve LOX this was to be accomplished prior to pre-flight for strike mission. (U)
- p. Average unscheduled maintenance time was not available at

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
team's scheduled departures. (U)

q. All aircraft that were spot checked by team and had landed without major maintenance could have been ready for flight to EI at end of three hour post-strike phase. (S)

COMMENTS: Major Gorden, 26th SSM Field Maintenance Squadron, as Senior Maintenance Officer stated: "I have never seen a more eager bunch of people and as cooperative, we are sure glad to have it".

5. This DF classified Secret because it reveals overall EWP capabilities of 7AD base. (Unclassified)

Robert E. Mullin
ROBERT E. MULLIN
Major, USAF
Team Captain



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3921ST RECONNAISSANCE TECHNICAL SQUADRON (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 197, New York, New York

3921RS-TIBD

10 December 1957

SUBJECT: Operation "Iron Bar"

TO: Commander
7th Air Division (SAC)
Attn: DIT
APO 125, US Air Force

1. In compliance with instructions contained in 7th Air Division Operations Order 39-57 the inclosed report is submitted.
2. When the inclosure is withdrawn or detached this letter will be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED in accordance with AFM 203-1.

1 Incl
Rpt on Iron Bar (Cys 1,2,
5 pgs) (2)

JOHN M BANE
Lt Col, USAF
Commander

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Iron Bar

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3921ST RECONNAISSANCE TECHNICAL SQUADRON (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 197, New York, New York

3921RTS-TIPD

10 December 1957

SUBJECT: Operation "Iron Bar"

TO: Commander
7th Air Division (SAC)
Attn: DIT
APO 125, US Air Force

1. Mission Assigned: To support a SAC USOM as directed by 7th Air Division Operations Order 39-57. (Secret)

2. Tasks Assigned:

a. To deploy support teams to three UK post strike/recovery bases in accordance with 7th Air Division Operations Orders 40-58 and 39-57. (Secret)

b. Provide 3920th Support TIC with additional Nav/AMP material as requested. (Confidential)

c. Process and dupe all film received from the 26th SEM. (Secret)

d. Prepare and submit R-51, B-51 and RT-66 reports on all film received from the 26th SEM. (Secret)

e. Prepare and retain RT-53 and RT-55 reports as required by SAC Manual 55-8C. (Secret)

f. Ship dupe positives of reconnaissance film and logs to the 544th RTS, Offutt AFB, Nebraska within 2 working days after the termination of the exercise. (Confidential)

g. Dispose of original reconnaissance film and logs in accordance with AFR 95-1E. (Unclassified)

h. Screen all strike film and logs received from strike units and dupe that retained for inclusion in the 7th Air Division Exercise Target Catalog. Ship original strike film and logs to the originating unit upon completion of above action. (Confidential)

i. Render final report outlining 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron participation in this exercise to 7th Air Division Director of Intelligence within five working days after termination of the exercise. (Confidential)

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SECRET because it reveals
a portion of a SECRET Ops
Order.

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3. Preparation:

a. Photo Interpretation and Photo Lab personnel to comprise the three support teams were selected and briefed on reporting procedures and tasks assigned. (Secret)

<u>Name</u>	<u>PI Officers</u>	<u>PI Airman</u>	<u>PI Airman</u>
Mildenhall	1	4	4
Brize Norton	2	8	4
Chelveston	1	4	4

b. 26th SRW reconnaissance and bomb targets were extracted from the 26th SRW Operations Order 39-57 and appropriate maps, charts, and intelligence reports were given to the Photo Intelligence Branch for advance target study. (Confidential)

c. RB-47 camera configurations and expected film accomplishments were received from 7th Air Division upon request. The Photo Lab adjusted their equipment and personnel to meet these requirements and test runs were made to insure that all equipment was in proper repair. (Confidential)

d. Specialized briefings were conducted for the Photo Intelligence personnel who were scheduled to accomplish the requirements at West Drayton. (Unclassified)

e. Operational control boards were prepared in the Operations Division at West Drayton to control and monitor reports and production. (Confidential)

4. Execution:

a. Support Teams were deployed as follows: (Secret)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Time of Departure</u>	<u>Time of Arrival</u>
Mildenhall	1200Z, 28 Nov 57	1510Z, 28 Nov 57
Brize Norton	1245Z, 28 Nov 57	1600Z, 28 Nov 57
Chelveston	0525Z, 29 Nov 57	0610Z, 29 Nov 57

b. Support Teams were redeployed as follows: (Secret)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Time of Departure</u>	<u>Time of Arrival</u>
Mildenhall	1345Z, 29 Nov 57	1745Z, 29 Nov 57
Brize Norton	1815Z, 30 Nov 57	2100Z, 30 Nov 57
Chelveston	1415Z, 02 Dec 57	1700Z, 02 Dec 57

c. The following is a time study of the B-61 Reports submitted by the deployed teams: (Secret)

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	<u>Widneshall</u>	<u>Prize Norton</u>	<u>Chelveston</u>
Number Reports	35	55	34
Fastest	1 hr, 29 min	2 hrs, 28 min	1 hr, 50 min
Slowest	3 hrs, 33 min	5 hrs, 04 min	4 hrs, 45 min
Average	2 hrs, 43 min	3 hrs, 46 min	2 hrs, 55 min

d. A total of ninety (90) rolls of visual film and twenty-three (23) rolls of radar film were received from the 26th SRW. The first 5 sorties arrived at 1925Z, 30 November 1957. Five (5) more sorties arrived at 2110Z on 30 November and the last five (5) sorties arrived only five minutes later at 2115Z on 30 November. Although the couriers departed Fairford fifty (50) minutes apart they arrived here only five minutes apart. (Secret)

e. R-51 and B-51 Reports were prepared on each of the fifteen (15) sorties received. (The R-51 covered the first two targets on each sortie while the B-51 covered the last target on each sortie). (Confidential)

(1) All B-51 Reports were submitted well within the four hour time limit. (Secret)

(2) Two (2) B-51 Reports were twenty (20) and ten (10) minutes late respectively. A total of six incomplete R-51 Reports were submitted on time with completed supplements submitted as soon as possible thereafter. (Secret)

(a) These late and incomplete reports were due to the receipt of sixty (60) rolls of visual film in a five minute period. R-51 Reports were also delayed because the two reconnaissance runs and the bomb run were on the same roll of G-15 radar film. (Confidential)

f. Four (4) RT-53 and twelve (12) RT-55 Reports were prepared and will be retained for thirty (30) days and then destroyed IAW AFR 205-1. (Secret)

g. Photo Lab processing and printing accomplishments were as follows: (Secret)

Radar: Processed 23-100 foot rolls
 Duped 28-100 foot rolls
 Prints 52 (for RT-53 Reports)

Visual: Processed 90-370 foot rolls
 Duped 24-370 foot rolls
 Prints 72 (for RT-53 and RT-55 Reports)

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(1) Nine rolls of radar were completely blank and subsequently destroyed. One (1) set of acceptable dupes were furnished to 7th Air Division in accordance with 7th Air Division Work Order 57-159. Ten (10) of the fourteen (14) acceptable rolls of radar film were duplicate cover. (Confidential)

(2) Twelve (12) rolls of visual film were completely blank and were subsequently destroyed. Fifty-four (54) rolls of visual film were duplicate cover and therefore not duped. (Confidential)

h. On 10 December 1957 the following film and logs were shipped VIA MATS to the 544th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron:

Visual

21 dupe positive rolls with photostat logs
54 original rolls with original logs

Radar

7 dupe positive rolls with photostat logs
11 original rolls with original logs

i. The best radar and visual coverage of the four routes flown were retained and will be disposed of IAW AFR 95-18. (Unclassified)

j. All acceptable film (78-300 foot rolls of visual and 14-100 foot rolls of radar) were titled before duping and/or shipment to the 544th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron. No difficulties were encountered in titling the radar. The titling of the 78 rolls of visual film offered two problems and required approximately five twenty-four (24) hour days to accomplish. The problems encountered were: (Confidential)

(1) Poor photography and even poorer maps on the area greatly delayed pinpointing the coordinates on the first and last exposure of each run as required by AFR 95-7. (Unclassified)

(2) Further difficulty was encountered in coordinating exposure numbers of the three camera positions on the tri-net fan due to the lack of synchronization of the three cameras involved. (Unclassified)

k. No request for Nav/ATSP materials were received from the 3920th Support TIC. (Unclassified)

l. As there were no strike film which covered "E" targets no screening for "E" target coverage was accomplished. As per verbal instructions received from 7th Air Division three rolls of C-15 radar were picked at random from each strike unit involved. These three rolls were duped and are on file in this organization pending further instructions from your headquarters. (Unclassified)

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n. All original film and logs from the 321st Bomb Wing were returned to the wing and subsequently returned to the states. Strike film from the 340th, 341st, and 428th Bomb Wings is on file in this organization and will be returned to the originating unit as soon as all 7th Air Division requirements are determined and completed. (Confidential)

n. A mix up occurred in cell call signs and aircraft tactical call signs required on R-51 and B-51 reports which resulted in three supplemental reports. Neither the cell call sign nor the aircraft tactical call sign appeared on the photo logs or in the 7th Air Division Operations Order. The 26th SRW Operations Order listed some information regarding these call signs but even this was incomplete and confusing. If Captain Redmond of the 26th SRW had not personally given this organization the two digit part of the call sign all R-51 and B-51 Reports would have been transmitted without the aircraft tactical call sign. (Confidential)

o. Two (2) RT-66 Reports were prepared and transmitted with no difficulties encountered. (Confidential)

5. Conclusion: The 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron is capable of supporting exercises of this type; however, the titling and plotting requirement could not be accomplished if full EMP deployment were required. (Secret)

6. Recommendations:

a. The cell call signs and aircraft tactical call signs be placed on the logs and/or be furnished in the 7th Air Division Operations Order. (Unclassified)

b. When sorties are scheduled to fly both reconnaissance and bomb runs, recommend a separate call magazine be used for the bomb run. (Unclassified)

c. Arrangements be made, if possible, to courier the film to this station so as to arrive in smaller quantities and at more frequent intervals to preclude processing back logs. (Confidential)

d. Observers be briefed on indicating bombs away photograph. Approximately 45% of the bomb runs accomplished by the 341st Bomb Wing had no clock, no data plate, no exposure number and did not flood the scope nor switch delay off at bombs away. (Secret)

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9. The management Branch also could, because of decreased workload based on the use of EAM listings, release two augmentation personnel.
NOTE: One of these was made available to the EAM Section during "Iron Bar".
(Unclassified)

10. In summary, this Directorate can release, based upon use of EAM, seven of its eleven assigned augmentation personnel. This will leave four augmentation personnel in the Management Branch. (Unclassified)

2 Incls

1. ATPOS SOP (U)
w/Sample Listings (3)
2. B-51 SOP (U)

No Incl w/copy

DIT

B-28 DI Comments for Exercise "Iron Bar"

DO

DI

2 Jan 58

Maj Nelson-362
A/C Copeland-387

1. The following intelligence items are submitted for inclusion in the B-28 report covering exercise "Iron Bar":

a. Analysis of Base Photo Lab performance indicates all film was scoreable and processed in sufficient time to allow timely submission of B-51's. (Unclass)

b. Special emphasis should be placed on compliance with SAC Manual 55-8 by tactical units. Reporting of tactical call sign alone or by acrtis number alone on the B-15 and B-51 reports resulted in some confusion in identifying aircraft which required direct contact with the unit, and retransmission of corrected reports. (Unclass)

HISTORICAL

Int'l

C-6

HEADQUARTERS
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125, New York, New York

10 December 1957

SUBJECT: Operations "Iron Bar" Observer Team Report for Brize Norton

TO: Inspector General
Headquarters 7th Air Division (SAC)
APO 125, New York, New York

1. General.

a. The Headquarters 7th Air Division Observer Team for Operations "Iron Bar", composed of the following personnel, was in place at Brize Norton at 1200Z, 24 November 1957:

Lt Colonel Earle E. Sweetland, DPL
Major George J. Benedict, IG
Major John A. Mercer, IG
M/Sgt D. H. Register, IG

b. In general, the operation, from the standpoint of both support rendered by the 3920th Air Base Group and the overall effectiveness of the 68th Bomb Wing, can be rated as highly successful. The Team observed the Operation from the arrival of the first MATS airlift component on 25 November 1957 through the departure to the ZI of the first wave of the Post Strike Organization on 30 November 1957. Never during this period was any "hitch" observed in the operation. Everything went off as planned and briefed. All 32 aircraft scheduled by the 68th were off on the "hack" as briefed. With the exception of six of the 68th's B-47s, all aircraft flew the mission as briefed. Mission aborts by the tanker force prevented six receivers from accomplishing the air refueling phase of the mission. No aircraft radar aborts were experienced on the mission by the 68th on 28 November 1957.

c. Excellent support was provided the 68th Bomb Wing by the 3920th Air Base Group. 68th Bomb Wing staff personnel had nothing but praise for the support they were receiving.

2. Operations.

a. The Task Force Control Room was operated in an efficient manner. Aircraft control was effective and the controller personnel were highly qualified in their duties.

b. The Deputy Commander of the 68th Bomb Wing and one other qualified officer were on duty in the Air Traffic Control Tower during all takeoffs and landings of the bomber force. Supervision was effective.

c. A very effective reception plan was used in meeting and handling combat crews upon landing. Transportation was provided for each crew at the aircraft. Aircraft and radar maintenance personnel were on hand to check aircraft discrepancies with the individual aircraft commanders. Aircraft commanders and observers were taken to Task Force Operations Building for de-briefing by the Task Force DI. Classified material carried by crew members was processed and stored in a satisfactory manner.

d. The reception provided for MATS support flights by the 3920th Air Base Group was outstanding. The Master Sergeant from the 3920th Air Base Group in charge of this particular phase of the operation is to be commended for the highly effective manner in which he carried off his job. Personnel and cargo from the MATS flight were off-loaded and processed in the minimum of time with no problems experienced.

e. All Nav Aids and communications facilities were operational. GCA and Rapcon were operational during all arrivals and departures.

f. Fire and crash personnel were in position and briefed prior to aircraft arrivals and departures. Coordination between the Control Tower, Fire and Crash Crews, and Task Force Control Room was effective.

g. Adequate weather briefings and facilities were provided. Close coordination was maintained between the Weather Office and the Task Force Control Room.

h. Required reports were submitted on schedule and the Reports Team on the Task Force Staff appeared to be well qualified. In this regard, the 68th Bomb Wing staff had high praise for the support provided by the 3920th Air Base Group in this area. Questions were raised on the following:

(1) Why did Headquarters 7th Air Division require quarter-hourly B-10 and B-15 reports information when the hourly and two-hourly reports in these two areas were required? These quarter-hourly reports appeared to be redundant and placed an additional workload on the Reports Team.

(2) Why is the BC-2 report required when the same information is contained in the B-10 report? This appears to be another case of unnecessary duplication.

1. Briefing facilities and Base Operations support were satisfactory. Flight plans were satisfactory and coordination with ATC agencies was adequate.

3. Maintenance.

a. The operation of the Maintenance Control Section was satisfactory. Maintenance flowcharts were available, and were kept up to date.

b. Specialist Dispatch was excellent.

c. Close coordination was maintained between the radio vehicles and maintenance control.

4. Ground Handling, Taxiing, and Parking Supervision, Including Aircraft Servicing, POL, LOX, etc.

a. A realistic plan was formulated for servicing and maintenance of the aircraft, prior to arrival. Servicing and maintenance support was considered excellent. Safety precautions were observed on all servicing and maintenance, including isolation of aircraft with fuel booster pump changes.

b. The average refueling time was one hour and five minutes.

5. Housing and Messing.

a. Housing was considered adequate.

(b) b. The Officers Club Mess was a snack bar type of operation. During rush hours, excessive waiting in line was experienced. In addition, the steam table and cooking area did not have a clean and neat appearance. The cooks did not appear as clean and neat as they should. This mess was considered unsatisfactory. This rating was not given only by the team members, but also by the majority of 68th Bomb Wing personnel who are presently TDY at RAF Brize Norton.

(c) c. Two midnight meals were eaten at the Airman's Dining Hall. The dining hall was considered unsatisfactory. Food handlers, in many instances, had an untidy and dirty appearance. Tables, chairs, and the floor of the dining hall were dirty. The food was below normal standards. 7th Air Division Command Letter 146-1, 26 Sep 57, should be emphasized at this station.

6. Recommendations.

Recommend that during future operations better vehicle control be maintained around the incoming aircraft to allow more space for servicing vehicles to move into the refueling position.

DISPOSITION FORM		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any) SECRET
FILE NO. 17-1	SUBJECT Report of Observation of Exercise Iron Bar at RAF Mildenhall - 3913th Air Base Squadron	
TO IG	FROM DPL	DATE 17 Dec 57 COMMENT NO. 1 Lt Col Irish - 396 Mr. Millard - 396
<p>1. The following report covers the observation of exercise Iron Bar at RAF Mildenhall during the period 24 Nov to 30 Nov 57. Members of the observing team were:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Lt Col James P. Irish - DFLM Major A. E. Weidenbusch - DFLM MSGT R. C. Lewis - D/M</p> <p>2. <u>General</u></p> <p>a. The team captain was notified approximately 1430, 22 Nov 57 that he was on the team and would be in place at RAF Mildenhall the morning of 24 Nov. No operations order on the mission was available and the team proceeded to Mildenhall generally in ignorance of the requirement. The 3913th Air Base Squadron furnished a copy of the 7th Air Division operations order and a generalized briefing was gained from this order. The base had not been notified of the names of the members of the team.</p> <p>b. Exercise Iron Bar was conducted and supported in an excellent manner. Base support of the deployment, pre-strike, strike and post strike was excellent. Discrepancies noted in this report were generally minor and would not have interfered with the execution of the mission. The majority of discrepancies reflected rustiness due to lack of exercise with aircraft. Most areas improved rapidly as the mission progressed.</p> <p>3. <u>Major Discrepancies</u></p> <p>a. The 321st Bomb Wing arrived without 10 Plan folders or preparation. If 10 Plan had been executed shortly after their arrival it is doubtful they could have evacuated the base with any degree of success. Upon becoming aware of the discrepancy the Wing and the Base quickly devised a 10 Plan briefing for the crews. Subsequently the base prepared data for the Wing to complete a 10 Plan folder. The 7th Air Division Operations order places responsibility on the rotational or deploying wing to have folders prepared. This unit particularly should have had 10 Plan folders.</p> <p>b. The 3913th Air Base Squadron Operations Plan used on E hour other than that specified in the 7th Air Division Operations Order. The 7th Air Division Operation Order specified an E hour of 1400Z 25 Nov. The 3913th Operations order specified E hour as 1400Z 23 Nov. Although this difference</p>		
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REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48 WHICH MAY BE USED

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DPL, 10 Dec 57, Subj: Report of Observation of Exercise Iron Bar at RAF Mildenhall - 3913th Air Base Squadron

In stating E hour was present, no possibility of error on the part of the base was evident as a very detailed time phasing plan was used, based on the proper E hour. The difference in E hours was equivalent to the E + 72 launch option. Although the 7th Air Division Operations Order referred to an E hour the order of execution referred to a Base Reference Hour. Both E hour and Base Reference Hour are used in reference to the same time factor 1400Z 25 Nov.

c. Air Police security requirements resulted in 33 maintenance personnel being detailed as aircraft point guards. The amount of Air Police deployed by the 321st Bomb Wing was less than had been expected by the base but was in accordance with a recent change to 400-1 which the base had just received prior to arrival of the wing. The unusually clean maintenance condition of the aircraft permitted this to be accomplished without interference with the mission, however, it is felt that security requirements and/or work schedules (SPO) should be reevaluated.

4. Minor Discrepancies

a. Aircraft parking plan was worked out in advance and followed by personnel. Rapid landing of aircraft on post strike plus a few aircraft landing without communications caused deviations from the plan. Such conditions are realistic and provide excellent exercise and evaluation of plans.

b. Safety precautions were observed during refueling and operation of ground powered equipment. However, basic parking plan for refueling did not take into account a wind factor. A strong wind factor could place the aircraft in an undesirable position for placement of ground power units during refueling. Six pits have outlets situated on the side of the hardstand which restricts the location of aircraft with relation to wind direction.

c. Although flow charts were available prior to the mission they were not in evidence in maintenance control or the operations control room during the actual exercise.

d. "B" radio net was not in operation as such. The base claims that the net is available but must work on "A" net frequencies. Such operation clutters the air and reduces the efficiency of the maintenance effort. ✓

e. Lack of training on installation of AIC racks was evident and has been recognized by the base. Lack of training opportunity with B-47 aircraft reduces this capability. One airman was injured slightly when a rack accidentally released. Lack of opportunity to train with racks and actual aircraft plus lack of a suitable cradle or dolly for handling racks is a problem.

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RPL, 10 Dec 57, Subj: Report of Observation of Exercise Iron Bar at
 R F Mildenhall - 3913th Air Base Squadron

5. Miscellaneous

a. C-47 mission requirements under ETP place a burden on small units such as Air Base Squadrons. Normally the qualified flight personnel are also key operations and Task Force personnel. A mission requirement for dispatch of a C-47 could take key personnel away at a time that they are most needed.

b. Task Force control room did not display graphically sufficient information for use of the Task Force.

c. Although all serviceable aircraft were prepared for strike and one time flight to ZI within three hours one refueling delay was experienced by qualified refueling personnel (co-pilot or crew chief) not being available in a few instances.

6. Recommendations

a. The areas mentioned above were discussed with the Base Commander, Col Warden. In almost all cases these deficiencies had already been noted and corrective action was in effect or had been completed.

b. Operations should emphasize strongly the responsibility for preparation of IO Plan folders and procedures.

c. Common language should be used in reference to E hour.

d. Air Police requirements should be reevaluated. If requirements are valid it is recommended that units deploying to a normal Air Base Squadron size base bring a 400-1 complement equivalent to a Non-SAC base deployment.

e. Frequencies for "B" net radio operation be secured for the bases.

f. Aircraft be provided to bases with a strike or recycle requirement for the purpose of providing APO rack loading training. Also, provision for a cradle or dolly be made for expeditious handling of racks with a minimum of personnel. Drawings of a converted dolly for such a cradle have been brought back to D/M.

g. Local base maintenance personnel be qualified in refueling B-47 aircraft.



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G. W. JOHNSON
 Colonel, USAF
 Director of Plans

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DISPOSITION FORM

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE NO. **17-1** SUBJECT Report of Observation of Exercise Iron Bar
 TO DO ON RAF East Kirkby
 FROM IG DATE 11 Dec 57 COMMENT NO. 1
 Col Schurter-164
 Miss Harris-98

1. The following report covers the observation of Exercise Iron Bar at RAF East Kirkby during the period 25 November through 5 December 1957. Members of the observing team were Colonel Oris O. Schurter, Major Merle M. Bane, and Major Jack E. Swickard. (UNCL)
2. The base reception plan was considered thorough and efficient. Maintenance flow charts for receiving, parking and servicing of landing aircraft were satisfactory except for JP-4 servicing of the first wave deploying, which is described below. The initial personnel processing line developed a bottleneck during processing of the first two aircrafts' passengers. However, this bottleneck was detected by base personnel and corrected on the spot. The remainder of this operation was smooth and efficient. (CONF)
3. The aircraft parking and unloading plan was executed as planned. Every aircraft was positioned by tail number as planned. The unloading of arriving aircraft was well planned but was not considered orderly during arrival of first wave, particularly equipment positioning. Base personnel recognized the need for improvement in this area and corrected same prior to arrival of remaining aircraft. (UNCL)
4. A requirement existed for the tactical unit to appoint officers to coordinate on such matters as messing, transportation, billeting, security, and adjutant. A coordinated effort would prevent base staff personnel from having to anticipate requirements of the tactical unit. (UNCL)
5. Transportation was considered adequate. The transportation officer was not coordinated with by tactical unit personnel on special requirements such as special briefings, etc. Vehicle maintenance is not completely satisfactory as evidenced by weak batteries, rough running engines, etc. (UNCL)
6. The tanker unit commander in the pre-takeoff briefs emphasized safety. He urged aircraft commanders to make certain refueling units were checked to prevent their rolling into aircraft. He warned them not to place maintenance stands under or too near aircraft. Directed wing walkers for all aircraft taxiing in parking areas. Briefed them on how to cross runways safely and told them to take no chances but to play everything safe. (CONF)
7. Security in the control room was initially lax but, after the first day, armed guards were utilized in the Communications Building, and entry to the control room was controlled by a roster and personal recognition. Operation of the control room improved after the exercise progressed to the point where it was satisfactory, considering the limited space available. The charts, as originally used in the

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18. Report of Observation of Exercise Iron Bar, IAF East Base, 11 Dec 57

control room, do not contain adequate information to insure positive control of aircraft involved. Lack of experience of base personnel in reflexion operation caused this deficiency. (CONF)

8. Base operations support was satisfactory. However, briefing facilities of sufficient capacity were not properly pre-planned. The base took immediate action to correct the deficiency. (UNCL)

9. Tower supervision during takeoffs and landings was satisfactory. (UNCL)

10. The Task Force mistakenly thought they had a stand-down order for their second mission of the exercise and only learned they were to fly as originally scheduled in the course of a chance conversation with TAD control. (CONF)

11. POL Section's performance was well above expectations. Refueling check lists were not available at the beginning. A supply of forms was immediately printed and used during the remainder of the operation. Safety procedures were followed and only minor fuel spillage occurred. One incident occurred which marred an otherwise excellent operation. A refueling unit was reversed into an aircraft while being caused, minor sheet metal damage. All subsequent refuelings were made safely pre-positioning a safety truck on the ramp and not separating the refueling unit into position. The average refueling time per refueling unit was 25 minutes pumping time. Total turnaround time, which includes travel and refueling time, was 40 minutes. The tanker squadron commander stressed the need for the line immediately upon landing in order to permit expedited refueling and return of base to stores and obviate POL storage later in the exercise. (UNCL)

12. Supply support was considered excellent. Due to late arrival of RVN (24 hours late), supply action was slow until the third day (24 November 1957). Daily delivery times averaged 1 1/2 minutes on 20 November 1957. Delivery time of items received from Lakenheath averaged approximately 3 hours and 15 minutes. The following chart reflects supply statistics for the 26 November through 2 December 1957:

Date	No. of Del. Ins	Avail. on Base	Not Avail. on Base	Days Out	Days Base Out	Days In- line	UNCL
26 Nov	17	1	1	1	1	1	1
27 Nov	21	6	15	1	6	14	2
28 Nov	24	9	15	1	9	14	1
29 Nov	75	41	34	1	41	34	10
30 Nov	40	27	13	2	27	14	1
1 Dec	75	43	32	2	43	14	1
2 Dec	47	35	12	1	35	11	0
	308	162	146	14	177	114	17 (UNCL)

13. Maintenance was organized and operated generally in accordance with current directives. Pre-planning was thorough and efficient. The following are items requiring greater emphasis and improvement:

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13. Report of Observation of Exercise Iron Bar, TAP East Korea, 11 Dec 57

a. The Chief of Maintenance should have a better understanding of mission requirements from an operational viewpoint. He must understand that missed tanker sorties usually must be rescheduled. (CONF)

b. Job Control Unit must receive aircraft status of landing aircraft as expeditiously as possible. This status must be plotted and maintained current throughout the operation. (UNCL)

c. Maintenance priority of aircraft was not consistent. The priority of aircraft varied between specialist shops. (UNCL)

d. Job Control should maintain a log of calls and directives. On several occasions seemingly unimportant calls become important. Late servicing of engine oil was due to the failure of Job Control to maintain record of calls to RWL. The failure to log calls to RWL created minor delays in aircraft fuel servicing. (UNCL)

e. Fuel servicing of aircraft should be controlled by the Chief of Maintenance. It is a practice in the 110th AREFS for operations, through the flight crews, to control fuel servicing. In many instances maintenance was not aware of the fuel load without first checking the aircraft form for amount in tanks. This situation hampered the maintenance effort. (UNCL)

f. Job Control should maintain file copies of all EC-2 reports. This information was needed on several occasions but the only file copies available were in the operations control room. (CONF)

g. Greater restrictions should be placed on the number of personnel permitted access to Job control. Unauthorized personnel only created confusion. (UNCL)

14. The untimely arrival of aircraft jeopardizes the overall operation. This, coupled with an excessive number of engine failures, increased the tension and workload of all personnel involved. Only eight aircraft arrived as scheduled. Nearly half of the aircraft were two to four days late. These late arrivals created many handicaps, i.e., no prop tools for engine changes, FVA not in position, late arrival of specialists and enroute maintenance team, an accelerated post-flight program (partially due to unpredicted adverse winds enroute) and insufficient aircraft for adequate coverage of first mission. (CONF)

15. An analysis of the excessive engine failure rate failed to show any pattern. A total of 14 engines failed during the exercise, including two failures during redeployment. Engine failure information is as follows: (CONF)

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Exercise Data Report - 10/1/54

ITEM	QTY	TIME	REASON
51-111	1	1:00	Oil by no down state
51-112	1	1:00	Bearing failure (metal) it was
51-113	1	1:00	Motor pump failure
51-114	2	2:00	Excess metal from disassembly
51-115	1	1:00	Metal in pump
51-116	1	1:00	Broken shaft at lower section and a loose
51-117	1	1:00	case.
51-118	1	2:00	Insulator damage assembly
51-119	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-120	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-121	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-122	1	2:00	Turns disintegrated
51-123	1	2:00	Turns disintegrated
51-124	1	2:00	Turns disintegrated
51-125	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-126	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-127	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-128	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-129	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-130	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-131	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-132	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-133	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-134	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-135	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-136	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-137	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-138	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-139	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-140	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-141	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-142	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-143	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-144	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-145	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-146	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-147	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-148	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-149	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-150	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-151	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-152	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-153	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-154	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-155	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-156	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-157	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-158	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-159	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-160	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-161	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-162	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-163	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-164	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-165	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-166	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-167	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-168	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-169	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-170	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-171	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-172	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-173	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-174	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-175	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-176	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-177	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-178	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-179	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-180	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-181	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-182	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-183	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-184	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-185	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-186	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-187	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-188	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-189	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-190	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-191	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-192	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-193	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-194	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-195	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-196	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-197	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-198	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-199	1	2:00	Metal in pump
51-200	1	2:00	Metal in pump

16. The format and status information for submission of the SC-2 report is clearly defined in TAP Manual No. 1. However, during this exercise extra reports were placed on the Task Force for hourly detailed information. Varied requests from the Air Division Headquarters called for additional information on an untimely schedule. In many instances, the personnel contacted were not directly involved or were unqualified in supplying correct information. Much of the information requested was of little or no value to the recipient. These extra demands for information created considerable confusion and placed an extra burden on an overworked force. It is suggested that either the information required in the SC-2 report be expanded or that a separate report for critical and important be established.

17. There was some question of the ability to possibly of the design of the command and control the tanker unit. (C/N)

18. This DP is classified Confidential because it reveals the capabilities of the base. (C/N)

Eric S. Hunter
 ERIC S. HUNTER
 Colonel, USAF
 Inspector General

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DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: "Iron Bar" Critique

TO: DO FROM: DOFC DATE: 12 Dec 57 COMMENT NO. 1
Lt Col Linebaugh- 325
SSgt Daniels - 324

1. The problems encountered by DOFC during "Iron Bar" are as follows:

a. Machine listings did not cover M/B-2 changes nor information covered by M/B-17. Arrangements have been made with EAM to either indicate info off of above messages or forward subject messages to Flight Control.

b. EAM listings should also cover only deviations to the pre-plan run rather than complete runs all the time. "Flagging" deviations is always good.

2. Happenings by wing are attached for your info.

1 Incl
Recap of Iron Bar
Operations (Secret)

s/t/ JOHN H. J. LINEBAUGH
Lt Colonel, USAF
Chief, Flight Control
Division

If inclosure is withdrawn the classification of this correspondence will be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED in accordance with AFR 205-1.

S E C R E T

341st BW

- 29 Nov - 12 acft scheduled KC Dyess to Chelveston
 12 acft airborne
 1 acft returned to Dyess with engine out
 2 acft landed at Loring due to missed refueling
 7 acft arrived Chelveston
- 30 Nov - 12 acft scheduled KC Dyess to Chelveston
 12 acft airborne
 1 acft landed at Goose Bay due to missed refueling
 11 acft arrived Chelveston
- 4 acft scheduled KC Loring to Chelveston
 4 acft airborne
 4 acft arrived Chelveston
- 1 Dec - 13 acft scheduled KC Dyess to Chelveston
 13 acft airborne
 1 acft returned to Dyess due to missed refueling
 1 acft landed at Plattsburg due to missed refueling
 1 acft landed at Pease due to missed refueling
 10 acft arrived Chelveston
- 2 acft scheduled KC Chelveston to Dyess
 2 acft cancelled due to WX
- 1 acft scheduled KC Goose Bay to Chelveston
 1 acft airborne
 1 acft arrived Chelveston
- 2 Dec - 1 acft scheduled KC Pease to Chelveston
 1 acft airborne
 1 acft arrived Chelveston
- 12 acft scheduled KC Chelveston to Dyess
 12 acft airborne
 1 acft landed at Lockbourne
 11 acft landed at Dyess
- 3 Dec - 12 acft scheduled KC Chelveston to Dyess
 12 acft airborne
 1 acft returned to UK due to pressurization trouble. Landed at
 Lakenheath due to weather at Chelveston
 11 acft landed at Pease due to missed refueling in second refueling
 area.
- 4 Dec - 10 acft scheduled KC Chelveston to Dyess
 1 acft scheduled KC Lakenheath to Dyess
 11 acft delayed 24 hours due to WX in UK

S E C R E T

- 5 Dec - 10 acft scheduled KC Chelveston to Dyess
1 acft scheduled KC Lakenheath to Dyess
11 acft delayed 24 hours due to WK in UK
- 6 Dec - 10 acft scheduled KC Chelveston to Dyess
1 acft scheduled KC Lakenheath to Dyess
10 acft airborne
1 acft ground aborted due to fuel pump change.
1 acft airborne abort due to tip tanks not feeding - landed
Chelveston.
9 acft arrived in ZI
- 9 Dec - 2 acft scheduled KC Chelveston to Dyess
2 acft airborne
2 acft landed at Goose Bay due to adverse winds to second
refueling area.

All acft in ZI

S E C R E T

310th ARREPS

- 25 Nov - 20 acft scheduled KC Schilling to East Kirkby
 11 acft delayed at Schilling due to runway temperature
 9 acft airborne
 1 acft airabort and landed at Goose due to mechanical trouble
 3 acft arrived East Kirkby (from 26/1157Z to 1555Z), however, one
 acft landed at Prestwick due to shortage of fuel and then
 arrived East Kirkby a few hours later.
- 26 Nov - 11 acft scheduled KC Schilling to East Kirkby
 11 acft airborne
 2 acft returned to Schilling due to: 1. Prop trouble. 2. Oil leak
 #2 engine. One of these acft departed Schilling again on 26
 Nov.
 2 acft landed at Keflavik due to shortage of fuel
 6 acft landed at Goose Bay due to: 1. Transmitter out. 2. #3
 eng out. 3. Fuel decision. 4. Engine trouble. 5.
 Ignition #3 eng and #4 turbo. 6. Low on fuel.
 2 acft arrived East Kirkby, however, one acft landed at Prestwick
 due to shortage of fuel and then arrived East Kirkby a few
 hours late. Both acft arrived on 27 Nov.
- 27 Nov - 4 acft scheduled KC Goose Bay to East Kirkby
 4 acft airborne
 4 acft arrived East Kirkby on 28 Nov.
- 2 acft scheduled KC Keflavik to East Kirkby
 2 acft airborne
 2 acft arrived East Kirkby on 28 Nov.
- 1 acft scheduled KC Schilling to East Kirkby
 1 acft airborne
 1 acft landed at Westover due to engine trouble.
- 28 Nov - 3 acft scheduled KC Goose Bay to East Kirkby
 2 acft cancelled due to maintenance trouble
 1 acft airborne
 1 acft landed at East Kirkby on 29 Nov.
- 1 acft scheduled KC Westover to East Kirkby
 1 acft cancelled due to engine change (this acft never did arrive in UK)
- 13 acft scheduled R/R East Kirkby
 1 acft cancelled due to mag drop on #4 engine
 12 acft airborne
 2 acft airabort due to: 1. Loss of engine #2. 2. Lost of #3
 on take off.
- 29 Nov - 1 acft scheduled KC Goose Bay to East Kirkby
 1 acft airborne
 1 acft returned to Goose Bay with #2 engine out.

S E C R E T

30 Nov - 3 acft scheduled XC Goose Bay to East Kirkby
 2 acft airborne
 2 acft arrived East Kirkby

12 acft scheduled R/R East Kirkby
 12 acft airborne
 - 1 acft air abort due to loss of engine.

1 Dec - 10 acft scheduled R/R East Kirkby
 1 acft cancelled due to receiver abort.
 9 acft airborne. (one of these acft ground aborted due to #3 engine
 starter malfunction, however, this acft was rescheduled
 later and was launched to replace the one aborted)
 1 acft airabort due to loss of #4 engine.
 2 acft test hops scheduled and flown

2 Dec - 10 acft scheduled R/R East Kirkby
 10 acft airborne
 10 acft arrived East Kirkby

3 Dec - 9 acft scheduled R/R East Kirkby (includes one airborne spare)
 9 acft airborne
 9 acft arrived East Kirkby

4 Dec - 6 acft scheduled R/R East Kirkby
 6 acft cancelled due to WX in UK

5 Dec - 6 acft scheduled R/R East Kirkby
 6 acft cancelled due to WX in UK

6 Dec - 4 acft scheduled R/R East Kirkby (includes two test hops)
 4 acft airborne
 4 acft landed at East Kirkby

9 Dec - 10 acft scheduled XC East Kirkby to Goose Bay
 10 acft airborne
 1 acft airabort due to #2 engine out - returned to East Kirkby
 8 acft landed at Goose Bay
 1 acft landed at Harmon

10 Dec - 9 acft scheduled XC East Kirkby to Goose Bay.
 9 acft airborne
 1 acft airabort due to #4 engine out - returned to East Kirkby
 8 acft arrived Goose Bay

2 acft in UK with maintenance as of 12 Dec.

S E C R E T

19th BW

24 Nov - 32 scheduled 1/2 strike Base Norton
32 airborne
32 arrived at Base Norton

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

340th BW

- 28 Nov - 12 acft scheduled KC Whiteman to Brize
12 acft delayed 36 hours due to terminal weather
- 29 Nov - 13 acft scheduled KC Whiteman to Brize
13 acft airborne
2 acft aborted. 1 returned to Whiteman due to radio-out.
1 landed at Goose Bay due to no tip tank feed.
11 acft arrived Brize
- 30 Nov - 13 acft scheduled Whiteman to Brize
13 acft airborne
2 acft landed at Goose due to: 1 missed tanker and 1 due to
fuel transfer failure.
11 acft arrived Brize
- 11 acft scheduled KC Brize to Whiteman
11 acft airborne
2 acft aborted: 1 acft had gear trouble. 1 acft missed tanker.
Both acft returned to Brize.
9 acft arrived at Whiteman
- 2 Dec - 13 acft scheduled KC Brize to Whiteman
12 acft ground abort due to: 1 no water and 1 had low oil pressure.
11 acft airborne
11 acft arrived at Whiteman
- 3 Dec - 2 acft scheduled KC Brize to Whiteman
2 acft cancelled due to: 1 acft water alcohol refused to fire, 1 acft
due to weather in UK
- 4 Dec - 1 acft scheduled KC Brize to Pease
2 acft delayed due to WX in UK
- 5 Dec - 2 acft scheduled KC Brize to Pease
2 acft cancelled due to WX in UK
- 6 Dec - 2 acft scheduled KC Brize to Pease
2 acft airborne
2 acft arrived at Goose Bay due to WX in ZI

All acft in ZI

S E C R E T

S U M M A R Y

8th XV

- 16 Nov - 11 acft scheduled KC Lockbourne to Fairford
 1 ground abort
 17 acft airborne
 1 acft aborted and returned to base because of engine
 or failure.
 16 acft arrived Fairford
- 17 Nov - 2 acft scheduled KC Lockbourne to Fairford
 1 acft airborne
 2 acft arrived Fairford
- 18 Nov - 1 acft scheduled R/R Fairford as K scout
 2 acft airborne
 1 acft arrived Fairford (one acft landed at Lockbourne due to K
 at Fairford and then returned to Fairford 1 1/2 hours later)
- 20 Nov - 16 acft scheduled R/R Fairford (this includes one K acft)
 1 acft (K scout) cancelled due to K at Fairford
 15 acft airborne
 15 acft arrived Fairford
- 1 Dec - 4 acft scheduled R/R Fairford (K scouts)
 4 acft airborne
 4 acft arrived Fairford
- 7 acft scheduled KC from Fairford to Lockbourne
 1 acft cancelled due to tanker abort
 6 acft airborne
 1 acft landed at Plattsburg due to no refueling
 1 acft landed at Thule by order of a Col Reynolds
 4 acft landed at Lockbourne
- 2 Dec - 2 acft scheduled R/R Fairford (K scouts)
 2 acft airborne
 2 acft arrived Fairford
- 2 Dec - 2 acft scheduled R/R Fairford (K scouts)
 2 acft airborne
 2 acft arrived Fairford
- 3 acft scheduled KC Fairford to Lockbourne
 3 acft airborne
 1 acft returned to Fairford due to fuel in cockpit
 7 acft landed at Plattsburg due to K at Lockbourne
- 4 Dec - 4 acft scheduled KC Fairford to Lockbourne
 4 acft delayed due to K in UK
- 7 Dec - 4 acft scheduled KC Fairford to Lockbourne
 4 acft delayed due to K in UK
- 7 Dec - 4 acft scheduled KC Fairford to Goose Bay
 4 acft airborne
 4 acft arrived Goose Bay

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

25 Nov - 12 acft scheduled KC Pinecastle to Mildenhall
 12 acft airborne
 2 airborts returned to Pinecastle due to missed refueling
 10 acft arrived Mildenhall on 26 Nov.

26 Nov - 27 acft scheduled to depart Pinecastle
 27 acft airborne
 1 acft returned to Pinecastle due to short load of fuel
 1 acft landed at Loring due to short load of fuel
 1 acft landed at Plattsburg
 6 acft landed at Pease: 2 acft due to no refueling, 1 acft due to fuel leak, 1 acft due to main booster pump, 2 acft reason unknown.
 18 acft arrived Mildenhall.
 1 acft of the 18 acft landed at Goose Bay due to refueling system out, however, this acft was airborne a short time later on 26th.

27 Nov - 4 acft scheduled KC Pease to Mildenhall
 1 acft scheduled KC Plattsburg to Mildenhall
 1 acft scheduled KC Loring to Mildenhall
 6 acft airborne
 6 acft arrived Mildenhall

28 Nov - 34 acft scheduled strike R/R Mildenhall
 34 acft airborne
 1 acft airbort due to radar cut.

30 Nov - 11 acft scheduled KC Mildenhall to Pinecastle
 10 acft airborne
 1 acft ground abort due to cracked windshield
 10 acft arrived Pinecastle

1 Dec - 14 acft scheduled KC Mildenhall to Pinecastle
 14 acft delayed 24 hours due to weather in the refueling area.

2 Dec - 14 acft scheduled KC Mildenhall to Pinecastle
 13 acft airborne
 1 acft ground abort due to bomb bay trouble
 2 acft landed at Goose Bay due to IFR malfunction
 11 acft arrived Pinecastle

3 Dec - 11 acft scheduled KC Mildenhall to Pinecastle
 11 acft airborne
 11 acft arrived Pinecastle

All acft in ZI

S E C R E T

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HEADQUARTERS
340TH BOMBARDMENT WING (MEDIUM) (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri

DO

17-11-57

SUBJECT: Final Mission Report (M-27) - BAF Operations Order 39-57

TO: [unclear] Distribution.

1. This correspondence constitutes a Final Mission Report (M-27) for Operation "Iron Bar", BAFORD 39-57. The following is a concise summary of events which occurred during the overseas TDY portion of this mission:

a. Mission: The mission of this Wing under cited Operations Order included the re-deployment of 25 post strike B-47 aircraft from Brize Norton AFB, U.K. The number of aircraft actually re-deployed was reduced to 22 due to air aborts during the strike phase of the mission. Aircraft were returned to Whiteman AFB as follows:

(1) Eleven aircraft were launched 30 November 1957. (Two aircraft returned to Brize Norton AFB for maintenance.)

(2) Eleven aircraft were launched and successfully returned to Whiteman AFB 2 December 1957. Two aircraft remained at Brize Norton AFB and were designated as stragglers. These aircraft have subsequently returned to the home station.

b. Personnel and Administration: A Post Strike Team of 16 officers and 130 airmen were deployed to Brize Norton AFB by MATS aircraft. Personnel manning was in proper strength and AFSC to support post strike activities. No significant problems were encountered in these areas except as noted in sub-paragraph d below under "Logistics":

c. Operations and Training: Delay in arrival of aircraft at Brize Norton necessitated close co-ordination and rescheduling of tankers for redeployment refueling. Assistance received in co-ordination of tankers from 7th Air Division and the Air Refueling Squadrons concerned was excellent. No difficulties in refueling tactics were encountered with either U.K. unit.

(1) Of a scheduled 11 aircraft on the first redeployment increment all were airborne on time. Two aircraft air aborted, one with a right outrigger gear failing to retract and the other aircraft receiving insufficient fuel from malfunctioning tankers to arrive at the second refueling area with the required reserve. Both aircraft landed at Brize Norton and were rescheduled into the last increment for return.

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(2) Of a scheduled 13 aircraft in the last increment, two aircraft were ground cancelled due to excessive maintenance delay. One aircraft aborted two takeoffs with water alcohol failing to fire and the other aircraft had a #4 oil transmitter inoperative. These two aircraft were thereupon classified as "Stragglers".

(3) The two straggler aircraft from the last increment were greatly assisted by the 68th Bomb Wing and 7th Air Division in obtaining required refueling and clearances to redeploy to Goose Bay. Lack of refueling support in the NEAC area prohibited a non-stop flight to Whiteman and generated a requirement for two additional sorties.

(4) The three aircraft that pre-target aborted and landed at Goose Bay were given excellent assistance in preparation for their return flight to Whiteman.

(5) Maximum training was scheduled and accomplished by all redeploying aircraft.

d. Logistics:

(1) Maintenance:

(a) The overall maintenance support was provided by the in-place rotational B-47 unit and the forward base turn-around team was considered adequate. The attitude and cooperation of both the base and the in-place rotational unit was excellent. Several areas requiring attention are listed below:

1. Oil was furnished in 55 gallon drums with no facilities for getting oil out of the drums. Recommend that hand pumps be included in equipment to be deployed.

2. Several outages occurred of maintenance vehicle radios and the maintenance control ground station.

(2) No difficulties were encountered in the armament, ADS and weapons area.

(3) Supply: Supply support of aircraft spares was excellent. Twenty-four items were requested with 13 being available in the 340 FAK, 4 available in the 68th FAK and 7 available in Brise Norton Base Supply. It is noted that the 11 items available in the 68th FAK and Base Supply were not authorized in the post strike portion of the B-47 FAK and were not required for immediate redeployment under a go-no go condition. These eleven items were used to bring aircraft to a complete operationally ready condition after a go-no go condition was determined. Delivery time of aircraft spares was satisfactory.

(4) Transportation was considered adequate.

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- (5) Base installations and facilities were adequate.
- (6) The unit mobility is adequate and presented no problems in deployment or redeployment.
- (7) The Brize Norton reception plan was adequate. The processing of personnel and baggage was handled expeditiously.
- (8) MATS support was considered minimum satisfactory. Trip 1273 departed Whiteman AFB 22 hours after scheduled departure. This aircraft also off-loaded a portion of the PAK at Harmon AFB. This off-loaded portion did not arrive in time to be used had the need arisen. Trip 1277 departed Whiteman 13 hours 27 minutes after scheduled departure. All return flights were delayed past scheduled departure time. The MATS operations order did not provide sufficient airlift capacity to return all cargo from the U.K., i.e., two C-54's were provided with a 16,000 lb. capacity whereas 24,000 lbs were required to be returned.

e. Intelligence: Support rendered by the Intelligence Division, 58th Bomb Wing, in place at Brize Norton AFB, was outstanding. No significant problems were encountered.

f. Security: The security of aircraft with classified cargo and storage facilities for classified material were excellent.

2. The following recommendations are submitted based upon the information contained in paragraph 1 above:

a. Recommend the most reliable communications equipment procurable for use of Maintenance sections, i.e. Mobile trucks, Maintenance control, etc, be made available to forward bases.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 cy - Comdr SAC
- 16 cys - Comdr 8AF
- 1 cy - Comdr 2AF
- 1 cy - Comdr 7ADIV
- 1 cy - Comdr 68EW
- 4 cys - ISO
- 1 cy - DC
- 1 cy - RUT
- 1 cy - DCR
- 1 cy - BCRS

Robert O. Corson
 ROBERT O. CORSON
 Captain USAF
 Adjutant

SECRET

Headquarters
819TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Dyess Air Force Base, Texas

341C

74 DEC 39

SUBJECT: Final Mission Report 341st Bombardment Wing, Operations
Order 39-57 (M-27)

TO: Commander
Fifteenth Air Force
March Air Force Base
California

1. Mission Narrative.

a. The 341st Bombardment Wing was required to conduct a unit simulated combat mission with appropriate build-up of aircraft and launching of thirty-six (36) B-47 aircraft. The aircraft were to be launched in three (3) waves of four (4) cells each with a wave separation of twenty-four (24) hours. These aircraft were to utilize refueling support in the Midwest and in the NEAC area with one cell of four aircraft receiving refueling support in the vicinity of the United Kingdom. All aircraft were scheduled to post-strike at Chelveston RAF Station. A forty-five B-47 post-strike staging team was to be deployed in support of this operation. The ability of the forward area to support SAC aircraft and redeploy the aircraft to the United States was to be exercised. Redeployment was to be accomplished in three equal increments with twenty-four (24) hours between increments commencing at E plus six days. For each increment, forty-eight (48) hours were to be allowed at Chelveston for maintenance and crew rest before redeployment.

b. Thirty-eight (38) aircraft were launched from Dyess Air Force Base with thirty-four (34) aircraft over the target. Two of the thirty-four (34) aircraft over the target were ineffective; one was ineffective due to loss of radar, and one was ineffective due to a camera malfunction. The first cell of the first wave was diverted to Horing Air Force Base due to weather in the primary and secondary refueling areas. This cell subsequently successfully continued the mission. Sorties failing to complete the mission as briefed experienced the following difficulties: one fire warning light remained on after takeoff, one aircraft's flaps would not retract after takeoff, one aircraft lost all oxygen pressure two hours after takeoff. In the second refueling area one aircraft's tanker lost its hydraulic pumps after transferring 10,000 pounds. This aircraft then took an additional 5000 and 7000 pound offload from two other tankers in the cell; however, sufficient fuel was still not available to continue the mission, and this aircraft was forced to land at Plattsburg Air Force Base. Number four aircraft, third cell, second wave, landed at Goose Air Force Base after loss of UHF receiver and marginal HF receiver. This aircraft successfully

SECRET

A. J. 3317
A. J. 6019

SECRET

341C, Hq 819th ADiv (SAC), Dyess AFB, Tex, Subj: Final
Mission Report 341st Bombardment Wing, Operations Order 39-57

continued the mission with the third wave. The number four aircraft, third cell of the third wave, was diverted to Pease Air Force Base due to insufficient fuel. The receiver descended early and made a late hook-up with the tanker. The tanker was unable to stay with the receiver due to fuel shortage. This aircraft continued the mission as part of the third wave and completed the mission successfully. All aircraft were redeployed successfully. Adverse weather conditions delayed the redeployment to Dyess Air Force Base.

2. Mission Support.

a. Personnel and Administration. The personnel and administration phase of this deployment was satisfactory.

b. Operations and Training.

(1) Some difficulty was experienced in navigation by one cell due to inaccurate weather forecast in the United Kingdom. The head wind component was approximately one hundred (100) knots in error.

(2) Satisfactory celestial results were not obtained on the redeployment due to an extended period of time being flown in daylight.

c. Logistics. The 341st Bombardment Wing was directed to deploy a forty-five aircraft post-strike team for redeployment support. The SAC Manual 400-1A specifies 269 people and 33 tons of cargo. For peacetime operations it is not safe to assume that we could turn aircraft around without modifying the structure of the post-strike team. This had to be done with waivers in order to insure that the safety of flight type of maintenance was performed (particularly on the in-flight refueling system and the MA-7A bombing system) and that certain necessary ground-handling equipment and tools accompanied the movement. With the modifications that were approved, our post-strike team was successful. It should be noted that the timing provided ample opportunity for rest with 24 hours between waves. If the wing had been moved in one (1) period, with 45 aircraft in one day, our maintenance problems would have been considerably more critical. With the timing we were allowed, the modified team worked well.

d. Base Facilities. Base Facilities at Chelveston were considered satisfactory for the execution of their EWP requirement and the execution of a peacetime turnaround exercise. Aircraft maintenance and supply were considered excellent. Base transportation was satisfactory and messing was satisfactory. Housing was considered satisfactory for emergency conditions, but marginal by normal peacetime standards.

e. Intelligence. Target materials, prediction, mission support and other intelligence data were considered very adequate.

2
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3914TH AIR BASE SQUADRON (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 243, US Air Force

24 DEC 1957

BDO

SUBJECT: M-27, Final Mission Report for 3914th ABRON Operations
Order 39-57, SAC

TO: Commander
7th Air Division
APO 125, US Air Force

1. This final mission report on Operations Order 39-57, "Iron Bar" is only intended to supplement the M-27 report from the 341st Bomb Wing and pertains only to those items related to base support activities and our primary EWP commitment, i.e., post strike operations. This was the first mission wherein tactical aircraft deployed nonstop from the Zone of Interior to RAF Chelveston. Thirty four B-47s and one 45 aircraft post strike team arrived at this station from the 341st Bomb Wing at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas. Within three hours after the arrival of each tactical aircraft, 31 aircraft could have redeployed back to the Zone of Interior under the "Go-No-Go" concept of operation. Of the three aircraft that could not be turned around within three hours one was caused by a malfunction in the base hydrant system which delayed refueling, one required the changing of an elevator power control package and one landed with a fuel leak. The mission was considered to be successful. (S)

2. There were no major difficulties encountered that would require assistance from higher headquarters. Many lessons were learned and valuable training was provided for all base personnel. All corrective actions from lessons learned can be resolved at this level. There were indications of overages in the number of personnel available to the Task Force Commander in certain fields and indications of shortages in other fields; however, since this was the first mission of this type and on a limited scale, valid conclusions and recommendations cannot be made at this time. Several similar type missions that are planned for this station in the near future will provide further statistical information in those areas in question. These areas will be closely analyzed during these missions and recommendations made accordingly. (S)

3. This correspondence is classified SECRET as it reveals the EWP capability of this base. (U)

Copy Furnished: Comdr SAC

Robert T. Robinson
ROBERT T. ROBINSON
Colonel, USAF
Commander

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CS7/3/1329

CONFIDENTIAL3913TH AIR BASE SQUADRON (ABQ)
United States Air Force
APO 127, US Air Force

C 46

BDO:

SUBJECT: Final Mission Report (M-27) for 7AD Operations Order
39-57, "Iron Bar".TO: Commander
7th Air Division (3AC)
APO 125, US Air Force

1. Mission Summary

A. For the 3913th Air Base Squadron, the execution of this mission commenced at 0300Z, 25 November 1957, with the arrival of the first MATS-support aircraft. Three C-118's and two C-124's arrived that day with approximately 160 passengers and 30 tons of cargo. The remaining four C-118's and four C-124's arrived on the 26th of November 1957, with 220 passengers and 60 tons of cargo. All passengers and cargo were taken to hangar three. Passengers were processed immediately with a short orientation briefing followed by sign-in, issue of APEX rations, money conversion, billet assignment and customs. /C/

B. The B-47 aircraft began arriving at 0616Z, 26 November 1957. Aircraft were parked and serviced immediately upon arrival. Thirty-three aircraft required little or no maintenance. The average turn-around time for these was 2 hours and 8 minutes. One aircraft required considerable maintenance but was ready for strike in 7 hours and 55 minutes. /C/

C. Crews were taken to building 243 for interrogation, simulated briefing for the strike mission, processing (same as for passengers), turn-in of mission folders and weapons and refreshments. Crews were then returned to their aircraft for preflight (prior to simulated take-off on the strike mission). /C/

D. Of the 34 aircraft scheduled for the strike mission, 33 took off on schedule on 28 November 57; one returned early with radar out. Venice 31 did not make the original take-off time so was re-scheduled and completed the mission at the end of the stream. Upon return from the strike mission, all aircraft were serviced and prepared for immediate simulated redeployment. Crews were taken to building 243 for interrogation and simulated weather briefing for immediate redeployment before returning to the aircraft for preflight in accordance with the "GO-NO-GO" checklist of 7ADM 65-2. Thirty-three post-strike aircraft were received. Of these, 28 were in category "A" or "B" and were prepared for one-time flight in an average of three hours and 48 minutes. This high turn-around time

3913TH AB8Q 57-1929

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... when tactical units ... a ... strike ... and with
... personnel ... a minimum of two ...
... aircraft. If this is not ... SAC ...
... permit a ... of ...
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... present ... procedures ... be studied with a view
... their methods to ...
... arrivals. ...

... This letter is classified ... because it reveals
... details of ...
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Headquarters
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125 New York, New York

9 January 1958

CONDENSED ACTION REPORT (M-28)

FOR
7th AIR DIVISION
ON
SAC OPERATIONS ORDER 39-57 "IRON BAR"

In accordance with paragraph 29, SAC Manual 55-2M the Condensed Action Report for operations conducted in accordance with SAC Operations Order 39-57 is submitted as follows: (Unclassified)

1. General Concept of Mission as Planned and as Conducted:

- a. Conduct a large scale training mission with multiple SAC B/RB-47 and KC-97 aircraft units. (Unclassified)
- b. Pre-strike and post-strike 18 aircraft of the 26th SWW, 34 aircraft of the 341st Bomb Wing and 32 aircraft of the 68th Bomb Wing at Fairford, Mildenhall and Brize Norton respectively. (Confidential)
- c. Post-strike 22 aircraft of the 340th Bomb Wing and 34 aircraft of the 341st Bomb Wing at Brize Norton and Chelveston respectively. (Confidential)
- d. Support operations of 20 KC-97 aircraft of the 310th AREFS at East Kirkby. (Confidential)

2. Significant Conclusions, Recommendations and Action Taken by this Headquarters. (Unclassified)

- a. It has been concluded from this operation that bases of this Command which, up to now, have not participated in rotations or major exercises, are fully capable of performing their EWP assignment. Future large scale exercises will serve to improve, through realistic practice, the EWP capability of this Command. (Confidential)

3. Significant Conclusions and Recommendations for Action to be Taken by this or other Headquarters. (Unclassified)

- a. The 310th AREFS commitment, prior to the exercise, appeared to be excessive. Due to delay in deployment, excessive maintenance and engine changes, the 376th AREFS, which was assigned strip alert during the exercise, was required to accomplish five air refueling sorties for the 310th AREFS. (Confidential)

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CONFIDENTIAL

M-28 Report Cont'd

b. In view of the above, recommend SAC review the tanker commitments for EWP and large scale exercises to be sure they are not over committed. (Unclassified)

4. This correspondence classified Confidential because it reveals the EWP capability of 7th Air Division and reveals units and bases which participated in this exercise. (Unclassified)

George S. Sowers
for LOUIS M. SOWERS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Final Mission Report "Iron Bar"

TO: DI DP DOC DCO FROM: DO DATE: 16 Jan 58 COMMENT NO. 1
 IN TURN Capt Smith - 360
 A/2C Cain - 360

1. Attached is a consolidation of Final Mission Reports for units which participated in operation "Iron Bar".
2. This document is being forwarded for your information and action that you may deem appropriate.
3. Request each agency comment briefly on any significant item on which action is taken or recommended, to enable this directorate to forward the Chief of Staff a consolidated report.
4. To expedite distribution request each agency not retain the report over four working days.
5. Upon withdrawal of Inclosure 1 this document will be downgraded to Unclassified.

1 Incl /s/t/ LOUIS M. SOWERS
 Final Mission Colonel, USAF
 Rpt "Iron Bar" Director of Operations
 57 pages. Cy 1 of 1 cy

TO: DP FROM: DI DATE: 29 Jan 58 COMMENT NO. 2
 Lt Colonel Hall - 373
 B. Darch - 373

1. Intelligence procedures in effect during Operation "Iron Bar" proved effective. (Uncl)
2. No follow action by this directorate is deemed necessary. (Uncl)

1 Incl: s/t/ WILLIAM L. HALL
 n/c Lt Colonel, USAF
 Acting Director of
 Intelligence

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Final Mission Report "Iron Bar"

TO: SD FROM: DP DATE: 3 Feb 58 COMMENT NO. 3
Captain Morton/waj/39

1. Reference paragraph 5c and 6g, Report of Observation of Exercise Iron Bar at RAF Mildenhall - 3913th Air Base Squadron. Training of base personnel in refueling of B-47 aircraft appears adequate. In addition to 37 assigned petroleum supply specialists (643x)A, the 3913th ABRON has an additional 9 trained personnel in AFSC 641xO for EWP augmentation, and 5 aircraft maintenance personnel who graduated from the Single Point Refueling course conducted by the B-47-7 MTD at Upper Heyford last year. Quarterly Report of EWP Requirements and Training, RCS: 7AD-PD-T1, submitted by the 3913th ABRON for the period 1 Oct - 31 Dec 57, indicated no further requirements existed for training refueling personnel and made special mention of the fact that considerable experience was gained by POL augmentation personnel during Exercise Iron Bar.

2. It is the belief of this directorate that training requirements for refuelling personnel at Mildenhall can be met locally; however, in the event more formalized training is desired, we will schedule a Single Point Refueling course at the B-47 MTD. Mildenhall will be advised as to the availability of this course and their requirements requested.

3. No further action or follow-up by this directorate is deemed necessary.

1 Incl
n/c

/s/t/ OLIVER C. DOAN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Personnel

If inclosure #1 is withdrawn
the classification of this
correspondence will be downgraded
to UNCLASSIFIED IAW AFR 205-1.

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Final Mission Report "Iron Bar"

TO: DOC

FROM: SD

DATE: 5 Feb 58 COMMENT NO. 4
Captain Chambers - 519
Mrs. Fricks - 68

1. Reference comments (3913th Air Base Squadron) concerning shortage of security personnel: Headquarters SAC has been informed of the deficiencies which exist in SACM 400-1 and concurred in the opinion of this headquarters that aircraft should be provided individual protection due to the dispersal type parking system and the sensitivity and susceptibility to covert damage of the material involved. This headquarters has been advised that action is being taken to revise the existing staging team tables in order to increase the number of Air Police which would be deployed under this type exercise.

2. No further action by this directorate is deemed necessary at the present time.

3. This Disposition Form contains no classified information and if Inclosure 1 is withdrawn will be downgraded to Unclassified in accordance with AFR 205-1.

1 Incl
n/c

/s/t/ L. P. BROWN
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Security

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Final Mission Report "Iron Bar"

TO: DOC FROM: DOC DATE: 13 Feb 58 COMMENT NO. 5
DOCC CWO Dionne - 611
N. Ross - 286

1. Reference is made to Comments from 3913th ABSq and 68th Bomb Wing regarding non-tactical radio systems.
2. Additional frequencies for non-tactical systems have been sent to the field. Frequencies have been reassigned to eliminate interference between bases and systems.
3. The Director of Materiel has been asked to provide this office with information as to the quantities of non-tactical radios that would be required if we were to lease. Upon receipt of this information, this office will determine cost and take the necessary steps to lease equipment from local sources. It is not anticipated that any leased equipment could be procured before the 3rd quarter of '59.

1 Incl:
n/c

/s/t/ ROBERT M. PERRY
Colonel, USAF
Communications-
Electronics Division

HISTORYDIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONSTRAINING DIVISION

1 July - 30 September 1957

1. FLYING TRAINING:

a. The 40th Bomb Wing arrived in the United Kingdom in July and have done an outstanding job in so far as Flying Training is concerned. Most all of the training in July was expended on SAC Regulation 51-26 training requirements. The month of August was a free training month with Air Force Regulation 60-2 commitments receiving first priority, higher headquarters directed missions were next, upgrade training (both crews and individuals) was third and combat crew proficiency training fourth in priority. During this month the wing scheduled 278 sorties for 1550:00 hours of flying time. They actually flew 276 sorties for a total of 1478:15 hours. Emphasis was placed on RBS training especially on bomb runs requiring Mach .81 with IBDA and breakaway. Over 250 attacks were made on the London RBS Site during the first 15 days of August. RBS personnel have reported that this was the highest rate of utilization for one wing, that they have on record. It is interesting to note that 100 of these runs were made by staff crews and IN Navigators flying as 5X Crews. Further emphasis was placed on navigation training and dry refueling contacts. 171 dry contacts were made during August with combat ready crews making 79 and non-combat ready crews making 92. (Uncl)

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b. The final reports for September have not been received as of this writing, however, the first 15 days of this new training quarter have been recorded and again the wing has done an excellent job. For instance, there are a total of 3311, 50-8 items required for combat ready crews to accomplish during the full training quarter. Of this number, the combat ready crews of the 40th Bomb Wing accomplished 924 items, or 27.8%, in this 15 day period. The non-combat ready crews have a total of 882 items required for the quarter and they have accomplished 218 or 24.8% of them in this same 15 day period. On the basis of a proportionate share of total requirements to be accomplished while in the United Kingdom, the combat ready crews are 83.9% complete and the non-combat ready crews are 74.1% complete. In view of the above and baring some unforeseen difficulty, it is believed safe to assume that the 40th Bomb Wing will be 100% complete, or very close to that point, on their United Kingdom 50-8 requirements prior to their rotation to the XI. (Uncl)

c. The 44th Air Refueling Squadron Detachment at Mildenhall also were quite successful in their training accomplishment for the three month period of July, August and September. They scheduled 84 sorties, flew 82 and completed 73 for an 86.9% accomplishment rate. They scheduled 63 refueling missions, flew 63 and completed 60 for a 95.6% accomplishment rate. (Uncl)

d. Some difficulty has been experienced with the U-61 Reports (Standardization activities) from the various bases. The general problem seems to be one of not thoroughly understanding the requirements of SAC Manual 51-4. A message was sent out to all units requesting that they become familiar with 51-4 and submit their U-61 accordingly. Future reports will be monitored closely to assure that applicable regulations are being complied with and reports submitted reflect the information required. (Uncl)

2. GROUND TRAINING:

a. Synthetic Training Devices: (Uncl)

(1) 7th Air Division's second of the two Trailerized C-11 Instrument Trainers being provided this command has been received during this reported period. Both trainers have been assigned to the 3920th Air Base Group and both are in an operational status. (Uncl)

(2) Ogden AMA has advised this Headquarters that the replacement of our static T-3 Trainers with trailerized units is making progress. Delivery of the first trainer was expected during the month of September. However, delivery was not made and DME has taken follow-up action. (Uncl)

b. Air Rescue Training: (Uncl)

(1) 7th Air Division Operations Plan 242-56, "Duffle Bag" has been reviewed and revised during this reported period in preparation for the next exercise to be conducted in this command.

Further, East Kirkby and the 68th Bomb Wing have been advised of their responsibilities in this activity. This training will be conducted during the month of November 1957. The 68th Bomb Wing will provide a minimum of 15 B-47 crews to serve as "downed Crews" in the exercise. (Secret)

c. Ground Training General: (Uncl)

(1) The command ground training program for 7th Air Division units continues at a steady and satisfactory pace. Effective 1 September 1957 command wide ground training completion was 68.3% - required 67%. (Uncl)

3. CBR Defense Branch:

a. A special CBR Defense indoctrination program was initiated in July 1957. The program was scheduled to go into full operation in September. Following the preparation of the training materials at this Headquarters in July, a meeting of base CBR personnel was held on 1 August 1957. During this meeting all bases were furnished a program folder which consisted of the outline and complete lecture for a base CBR indoctrination training program, sample CBR SOPs and check lists for team duties, decay factor charts, stay time charts and attenuation factor charts. The complete program was explained at the meeting and all program folder materials were reviewed. 7th Air Division Command Letter 355-2 was prepared to document the program and was published on 16 September 1957. The special CBR Defense indoctrination program was discussed at the 7th Air Division Commander's Conference held on 9 September 1957 and the

specific requirements were outlined by the Commanding General.
(Uncl)

4. This document classified SECRET because it reveals the
date of SAC Exercise. (Uncl)

Hillard C. Alloway
HILLARD C. ALLOWAY
Major, USAF
Chief, Training Division

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HISTORY

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

TRAINING DIVISION

1 October - 31 December 1957

1. FLYING TRAINING:

a. The 68th Bomb Wing from Lake Charles AFB, Louisiana arrived in the United Kingdom in October for a three months TDY period. This wing was operating under SAC Programming Plan 9-56 during October and November. The wing concentrated on combat crew upgrading rather than SAC Regulation 50-8 training under this plan. In the month of December the wing was back under SAC Regulation 50-8 training, however December was a free training month. In the months of October and November, while under the SAC Programming Plan 9-56, the wing scheduled 492 sorties and flew 431. They flew 1273 hours in October and 1172 hours in November. In the month of December they scheduled 272 sorties and flew 208. Flying time for the month of December was 1342 hours. All together for the three months TDY period they scheduled 744 sorties and flew 639 for a total flying time of 3787 hours. On the basis of the above data, the 68th Bomb Wing flew 86% of their scheduled sorties. It should be pointed out that in addition to their normal training requirements, the 68th Bomb Wing was saddled with the additional burden of committing 10 aircraft and crews daily to the alert force. This effectively took 10 aircraft each day out of their training program.

In an analysis of the scheduled sorties vs sorties airborne and sorties completed as briefed, it has been determined that the alert force requirements reduced the training potential of the wing by some 19 to 20 percent. It should also be pointed out that the weather in the United Kingdom during the period of this TDY also has an important bearing on the sorties scheduled vs sorties airborne figure. The emphasis is placed on upgrading non-combat ready crews under the 9-56 program. Monthly schedules are made up with a predominance of sorties for non-ready crews. The weather minimums for non-ready crews are, of necessity, much higher than those for ready crews. As a result many sorties have had to be cancelled because weather conditions were not up to non-ready crew minimums. There was some slippage in the upgrading program of the wing during the month of November. They were scheduled to upgrade four crews that month but only upgraded one. The wing attributed this slippage primarily to lack of sufficient tankers for air refueling support of the training program, with other factors such as alert force requirements, weather cancellations and higher headquarters directed missions, contributing to the slippage. Despite these difficulties the records indicate that the wing did extremely well on their training accomplishments and compare very favorably with the other wings that have been TDY to the United Kingdom and with the SAC average. (S)

b. Air refueling Training: The 376th Air Refueling Squadron Detachment also were quite successful in their training

accomplishments for the three months period of October thru December 1957. They scheduled 85 sorties and flew 73. Of the 85 sorties scheduled 75 were refueling sorties. Of the 75 they completed 62 for an accomplishment rate of 83 percent. Weather cancellations were a prime factor in sorties not completed. (C)

c. Standardization activities at the various bases has improved to a great extent. Operations personnel seem to be gaining a more thorough understanding of SAC Manual 51-4 and an upswing of standardization activity is the result. Monthly SAC U-61 Reports are monitored quite closely and deviations are called to the attention of units concerned as soon as they are noted. (U)

2. GROUND TRAINING:

a. Synthetic Training Devices:

(1) The first of the trailerized versions of the T-3 Trainers arrived during this reporting period. It was assigned, and is now operating at 3920th Air Base Group. It is not entirely satisfactory for our purposes due to its limited range. MA-7 components are needed and promised at an unspecified later date. The second of the T-3 units is due late in January 1958 and will be equipped with the MA-7 components by Ogden AMA prior to shipment. One static T-3 Trainer was returned to the ZI in November, by the 3910th Air Base Group. The static T-3 at 3918th Air Base Group has been disassembled and awaits shipping instructions. (C)

(2) Considerable speculation exists on the feasibility of providing a synthetic training program for Reflex crews in the United Kingdom. It would appear that such a program would be

too extensive for the available equipment and of little relative value due to the brief duration of crew assignments in the United Kingdom. This training could be better accomplished at the home base of assignment, where pressure of being on alert status does not interfere, as it would here in the United Kingdom. (C)

b. Air Rescue Training: All the requirements for air rescue training have been postponed indefinitely for 7th Air Division. This is in accordance with SAC message DOTRPG 6237, 15 October 1957. (U)

c. Ground Training, General:

(1) The new revised SAC Regulation 50-24 and Annexes was received in December. There have been a number of changes in the regulation, particularly reducing the total requirements. This materially assists the base training program by the adoption of a more realistic look at training needs. (U)

(2) It is anticipated that there will be some difficulty in meeting the handgun firing requirements due to a lack of adequate facilities. SAC Manual 50-24A outlines a program of handgun training which requires an FBI type training course range. Such ranges are not now available. A survey is to be made to ascertain whether such courses can be constructed, or found, elsewhere in the command. (U)

(3) Aquatic training immersion requirements were waived for 7th Air Division units due to lack of necessary pool facilities to accomplish the training as outlined. This waiver is in accordance with SAC message DOTRPG 52481, 24 December 1957. (U)

(4) No problems exist which are of any large concern within the ground training branch. Progress by the bases is adequate. A conference of ground training officers of the United Kingdom SAC bases is to be scheduled in January to discuss and resolve ground training problems for the coming calendar year. (U)

3. CBR Defense:

a. Prior to November 1957 the United Kingdom SAC bases had encountered some difficulty in justifying the establishment of a CBR Defense Command Post. On 13 November 1957 7th Air Division Supplement 1 to SAC Regulation 355-1 was published and distributed to the bases. This supplement establishes a standardized CBR Command Post. It also lists the equipment desired to evaluate, predict, and notify the commander of possible fallout. The 7th Air Division Supplement 1 also sets up the RCS: 7AD-DC-UI Report. This report advises this headquarters of equipment status, personnel training, and CBR team strength. (U)

b. The additional training required by Command Letter 355-2 dated 16 September 1957 has been 95 percent completed. (U)

4. Classified secret because it reveals alert force requirements. (U)

J. H. Race Capt
for HILLARD C. ALLOWAY
Major, USAF
Chief, Training Division

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COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS HISTORY1 July 1957 to 30 September 19577AD VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

The installation of the 7AD Video Communications System was started in July. There were delays involving building construction which delayed the completion of the job approximately twenty-three days. The date of completion is now set at 18 October. (UNCLASSIFIED)

BLOCK INTERCOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Installation commenced about the first of July. Delays were encountered due to building construction. Estimated date of completion is now 2 October. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMANDER'S VEHICULAR RADIO

Installation of a two-way radio system for the Commander, 7AD, staff car was started during this period. The ground station at High Wycombe was completed approximately 15 September. Installation of the vehicular equipment was expected in late September; however, contractor delays slipped the completion date of this installation to 2 October. Technical problems concerning reinstallation of the ground station antennae will delay the overall completion of this facility to approximately 15 October. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AT BRUNTINGTHORPE

Communications facilities at Bruntingthorpe have been implemented so as to afford this base minimum EWP capabilities. The SOCS (Peppercorn) telephone circuit is now operational. The vehicular radio systems are now operational. Communications Center facilities are being operated from a temporary location pending completion of the new Communications building. (CONFIDENTIAL)

INCREASE OF BASE TELETYPE CAPABILITY TO 1½ DUPLEX

Action is being taken to enable 7AD bases to have 1½ duplex operation on the SACCOMNET. Some COMSEC equipment will be reallocated to bases not having this capability. It is expected to have this in place as soon as equipment reallocation is completed. (CONFIDENTIAL)

PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS

The public address system at Brize Norton has been installed and is now operational. It is planned to have the contractor install the system at the other five bases as soon as equipment and base requirements are in place. No estimated time of completion is available at this time. (UNCLASSIFIED)

KL-7 TRAINING

Training of operator and maintenance personnel at 7AD bases is progressing satisfactorily. The KL-7 system is

now being considered as the primary off-line system for all 7AD bases. The Net Control Station at High Wycombe is acting as crypto guard for the Division. Training in this facility will be continued until all personnel are qualified. (SECRET)

HIGH WYCOMBE-STURGATE-EAST KIRKBY CIRCUITRY

The teletype circuitry At Sturgate has been reterminated from the High Wycombe direct circuit and tied into East Kirkby. It is now a $\frac{1}{2}$ duplex operation with East Kirkby acting as relay with Sturgate and High Wycombe. This arrangement releases a termination capability at High Wycombe which can be utilized for other purposes.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

OMNI RANGES

Four dual-type Wilcox units were received from USAF sources for Greenham, Upper Heyford, Brize Norton and Lakenheath. The Collins units (3) released by this action will be sent to Stansted and two classified locations. The replaced MRN-10 at Lakenheath will be sent to Sculthorpe. Action required to complete this program is site testing and the provision of allied construction at UK bases. At the two classified locations, USAF is handling the negotiations for permission to install and operate.

The Bruntingthorpe and East Kirkby units were made operational. However, Kirkby experienced a transformer failure and remains off the air pending replacement from the ZI. (UNCLASSIFIED)

RATCC'S (RADAR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS)

Wattisham - Construction work proceeded to a point of about 60% completion and a BOD of January 1958.


Upper Heyford - The contract was awarded in September and construction scheduled to start in October with a BOD of June 1958. (UNCLASSIFIED)

ILS

Relatively little progress was realized during this period. The land problems at Greenham were solved. But all other bases have outstanding land requirements to such an extent that BOD's cannot be reasonably "guesstimated". Also the date for completion of final type drawings remains obscure. These drawings are required before final site drawings can be prepared, revised and approved, which is required before contracts for construction can be let - if the land problems were solved. (UNCLASSIFIED)

GCA

All active bases are now equipped with IFF equipped GCA's. We still have three CPN-4's which are not IFF equipped, but these are not currently active at primary units. There is no firm delivery date on the required modification kits. (UNCLASSIFIED)


ROBERT M. PERRY
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Communications-
Electronics Division

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COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS HISTORY

1 October 1957 to 31 December 1957

VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Installation and testing of this system was completed during the first week in December. The system was satisfactory. Several changes in the system are anticipated though no changes are planned until personnel are more familiar with the system. Final acceptance of the system will be made as soon as inspection and acceptance certificates are received. (UNCLASSIFIED)

BLOCK INTERCOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

This system was completed in November and accepted as operational. Changes in this system are also anticipated and will be made as necessary. This system has been performing satisfactorily. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS

The public address systems were installed and are now operating on the six 7AD bases covered by the USAF contract. Bases with this system are: Mildenhall, Lakenheath, Brize Norton, Fairford, Greenham Common and Upper Heyford. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMANDER'S VEHICULAR RADIO

Installation of the two-way radio system in the Commander's staff car was completed during this period. Interference from foreign sources on the assigned frequency have resulted in

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changing the operating frequency of the system. The crystals for the new frequency have been ordered and are due for installation during the second week in January 1958. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PURCHASE OF TELEPHONE KEYBOARDS AND INTERCOMMS

The GPO has been pressing the Air Force, over the past three years, to purchase keyboards and intercomms outright rather than renting them. 3AF has agreed with this and has obtained approval through USAFE and USAF. GPO offers the only alternative to outright purchase of a guaranteed rental contract for 5 years. We are not authorized to enter into such a contract. Hq SAC has been advised and a determination requested. Cost of these keyboards and intercomms would be approximately \$30,000.00. (UNCLASSIFIED)

INCREASE OF BASE TELETYPE CAPABILITY TO ONE AND ONE HALF DUPLEX

Communications security equipment has been reallocated to provide a minimum of one and a half duplex teletype circuit capability at all 7AD bases except Chelveston, Stansted and Sturgate. Chelveston has enough equipment for a 1½ duplex circuit capability but has only one circuit to High Wycombe. (UNCLASSIFIED)

KL-7 TRAINING

Training of teletype operators in the operation of the KL-7 Cryptodevice at 7AD bases is progressing satisfactorily.

The KL-7 system is now being used in the Communications Centers and is considered the primary off-line system for all 7AD bases. Eighty percent of all personnel are presently considered qualified to operate this device. Training will continue until all 291X0 personnel are trained. (SECRET)

ILS

1. An extensive review of the program has been made by Third Air Force with the Chief Engineer, AMDGW. This indicated that land acquisition is still a problem, primarily at Lakenheath and Mildenhall and for the middle marker site at Brize Norton. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. The following schedule of completion dates has been established by Third Air Force: (UNCLASSIFIED)

<u>Base</u>	<u>Completion Date</u>
Greenham Common	1 May 1958
Upper Heyford	1 May 1958
Fairford	1 May 1958
Brize Norton	15 July 1958
Mildenhall	1 June 1958
Lakenheath	1 October 1958

TACAN

1. The installation of TACAN on 7th Air Division bases is slightly behind schedule because of priority work orders. (UNCLASSIFIED)


a. TACAN installations will be categorized as follows: (UNCLASSIFIED)

(1) Category I: Fully operational facility, suitable for unrestricted use, consists of URN-3 and TRN-6 installed complete with back-up units, monitor, test equipment, cable harness, modification kits, primary and back-up power, and remote control cable. (UNCLASSIFIED)

(2) Category II: Limited operational facility, suitable for IFR use in accordance with published limitations, and consisting of the same as Category I with the following exception: Back-up unit may or may not be installed and modification kits not installed. (UNCLASSIFIED)

(3) Category III: Test operational facility, suitable for VFR use only, consisting of the same as Category II with the following exception: Monitor and/or control cable not installed and power may be either primary or back-up, or both. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. 7AD TACAN will fall in Category III. At the present time we have AN/TRN-6 units installed at Brize Norton, Lakenheath, and an AN/URN-3 unit installed at Bruntingthorpe. (UNCLASSIFIED)


ROBERT M. PERRY
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Communications-
Electronics Division

HISTORY
 CURRENT OPERATIONS DIVISION
 1 July 1957 - 30 September 1957

1. Headquarters SAC originally authorized the 7th Air Division to resume flying based on time programmed by this Headquarters for first half Fiscal Year 1958. During the first part of August this flying time allocation was reduced by some 300 hours O-47 time. This was caused by reduction in funds allocated to flying, however, by the first part of September the original allocation was again restored due to an increase in funds. (Unclassified)

2. During period 5 through 10 August 1957, Operations "Game Time" (S.O. CIX) was conducted. For this exercise selected EMI equipment was moved from the 7th Air Division Comptroller shop to the Command Post at High Wycombe, and operational procedures utilizing this equipment were tested. It was determined from this exercise that use of EMI in compiling, tabulating, and recaping information from Combat Reports is a very worthwhile operational expedient which will contribute to an efficient overall operation. (Confidential)

3. One exercise of the Spanish Base Zaragoza was conducted during July, August and September utilizing TDY Bomb Wing Tactical aircraft. These exercises afforded extensive training for SAC personnel in Spain as well as for the rotational wing crews and support personnel. (Confidential)

4. During period 24 to 29 August 1957 Operations "Boot Camp" (Exercise of Mid-East Bases) was carried out very satisfactorily. This operations provided base personnel of Night Crawler (Conf), Dhahran and Wheelus an opportunity to train utilizing B-47 aircraft.

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At the same time, participating crews and support personnel obtained valuable orientation and training requirements. (Confidential)

5. A "No Notice" alert was conducted on 19 August 1957, involving the 40th Bomb Wing and 3909th AGRU. The overall exercise was completed very satisfactorily. (Confidential)


6. During the period 19 thru 21 September 1957, this Headquarters participated in exercise "Counter Punch" (NATO Autumn Exercise). The 40th Bomb Wing actively participated in this exercise and flew a successful USCM with 32 aircraft. The 7th Air Division portion of this exercise, other than the USCM, only comprised CPX of 13 on-call targets. (Confidential)

7. On 1 August 1957, Col. Loyd D. Griffin, Chief of Current Operations Division, took command of 3912th Air Base Squadron and was replaced by Col. Glen J. Thomas. Also during the month of July Captain Elliott W. Porter rotated to the XI. During the month of August, Major Louis A. Garvin was transferred from Current Operations Division to Operations Plans Division. (Unclassified)

8. During September the entire Current Operations Division underwent a reorganization and functional realignment, ~~_____~~. Prior to this time, flying time allocation, ~~_____~~ monitor and publishing letdown procedures and other allied functions were performed by this Division. With a reduction of personnel, these functions had to be assigned elsewhere within the Operations Directorate. The Division now contains three branches; administrative, bomber and reconnaissance branch. This reorganization gives each major position an operating counterpart which insures

that all functions are covered. (Unclassified)

9. Classified Confidential because it reveals WP capabilities of the 7th Air Division. (Unclassified)



GLEN J. THOMAS
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Current Operations Division

HISTORY
 CURRENT OPERATIONS DIVISION
 1 October 1957 - 31 December 1957

1. The 68th Bomb Wing arrived on 5, 6 and 7 October and flew an orientation and evaluation mission. A total of 57 sorties were flown in accomplishing this mission. The 68th Bomb Wing was scheduled to remain in the UK until replaced by the 100th Bomb Wing in the first part of January. During this period, the 68th Bomb Wing was required to maintain nine B-47 aircraft on immediate alert at all times. (Confidential)
2. Lt. Col Blood of this Division was assigned responsibility for coordination of matters pertaining to Reflex Action activities scheduled to start in 7th Air Division in January. He also wrote and published 7th Air Division Operations Order 96-57 (Reflex Action) which was distributed the first part of December 1957. (Confidential)
3. SAC Large Scale Exercises "Whale Train" and "Rough Game" were being prepared for during this period. Both exercises are "No Notice" type which requires considerable additional planning coordination, etc., as compared with exercises in which the date is known. Major Hamack and Captain Brooks are project officers and have written both of the 7AD Operations Orders during the period of this report. (Confidential)
4. On 25 November 1957 the Large Scale Exercise "Iron Bar" was executed. This exercise was considered very successful and afforded valuable training for the Command Post, Chelveston, Fairford, Mildenhall and East Kirkby Task Forces. This was the first time Chelveston and East Kirkby had received large numbers of B-47 and KC-97 aircraft to exercise and test their EMP capability. Both stations performance was very satisfactory. (Confidential)

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5. During "Iron Bar" the EAM capability was tested on an operational exercise. The EAM equipment had been moved to its permanent operating location in the block and due to the recent augmentation and reorganization, the listings produced on this exercise were complete and timely. All of the necessary machines are not as yet in place, however, they should be in place not later than 15 January 1958. (Unclassified)

6. Current Operations Division moved to High Wycombe on 23 November 1957. The office was established in room 304 of Command Post. (Confidential)

7. On 3 December 1957, 6 B-47 aircraft of the 68th Bomb Wing participated in exercise "Dart Board", a joint USAF - Royal Navy exercise to check feasibility of surface elements of the Royal Navy performing radar and missile intercepts on "attacking" aircraft. Committed for this exercise were 12 B-47 aircraft, six to be flown each of two days. The first six aircraft flew the mission as planned, however, the other six aircraft did not participate due to bad weather at Brize Norton. The Royal Navy expressed their appreciation for the 68th Bomb Wing's splendid co-operation in accurately flying the mission as scheduled the first day of the exercise. (Confidential)

8. A portion of the 68th Bomb Wing was involved in exercise "Block Chain" (Exercise of Spanish Bases) from 5 to 9 November 1957. (Unclassified)

9. Classified Confidential because it reveals EWP capabilities of the 7th Air Division. (Unclassified)



GLEN J. THOMAS
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Current Operations Division

SECRET

Headquarters
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125 New York, New York

DOO

16 December 1957

Subject: United Kingdom Air Operations and Logistics Schedule

TO: See Distribution

1. The inclosed United Kingdom Air Operations and Logistics Schedules supersede the schedules dated 9 September 1957 and amendments 1 and 2 thereto. (Uncl)
2. Removal of Inclosures 1 and 2 will downgrade this letter to unclassified in accordance with AFR 205-1, dated January 1956. (Uncl)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

- 2 Incls
1. UK Air Opns Sked (S)
 2. Logistics Sked (S)

for George Jones Col
 LOUIS M. SOWERS
 Colonel, USAF
 Director of Operations

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Sheet # 1

UNITED KINGDOM AIR OPERATIONS SCHEDULE (PEACETIME)
 SEPTEMBER 57 THRU JULY 58

PART I: ROTATIONS

DATE	UNITS INVOLVED	FRM	TO	ACFT	ENROUTE STATIONS	APPROXIMATE DAYS TDY
4 Jan	100BW	Pease	Brize Norton	46 B-47	(AR Goose)*	90
5 Jan	68BW	Brize Norton	Lake Charles	45 B-47	(AR Harmon)	--
2 Jan	90 AREFS	Forbes	Brize Norton	2 KC-97	Harmon	90
10 Jan	376 AREFS	Greenham Com	Barksdale	5 KC-97	Lajes	--
OPS DIRECTIVE #3 "BUCK BOARD"						
4 Apr	68AREFS	Brize Norton	Bunker Hill	2 KC-97	Goose	--
OPLAN 26A-57 OPS DIRECTIVE #4 "PRIZE FIGHT"						

* 15 aircraft to exercise Keflavik

7AD
 SECRET AUTH: COMDR 7AD
 DATE: 11 Dec 57 INITIALS: Cade

Page 1 of 11 pages

Classified Secret because it reveals rotations of SAC aircraft.

7AD C-7755

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PART II LARGE SCALE EXERCISES

DATE	UNITS INVOLVED	FROM	ACFT	A/R PRIOR TO PRESTRIKE	ENROUTE STOP	1st A/R	2nd A/R	TO	NR DAYS TDY
<u>JANUARY 1958</u>									
E Day	90 AREFS	Lajes	4 KC-97(ROT)	-	-	-	-	Brize Norton (SA)	-
E+7	90 AREFS	Brize Norton	4 KC-97(ROT)	-	-	-	-	Lajes	-
E+6	90 AREFS	Brize Norton	2 KC-97(ROT)	-	-	-	-	-(SA)	-
E Day	43 EW	*Davis Monthan	30 B-47	-	Dow	Harmon	Keflavik	Chelveston**	15
E+4-E+6	43 EW	Chelveston	30 B-47	-	A/R Kef	Thule	Malmstrom	Davis Monthan	15
E Day	303 EW	*Davis Monthan	35 B-47	-	-	Malmstrom	Thule	Mildenhall**	15
E+4-E+6	303 EW	Mildenhall	35 B-47	-	A/R Kef	Thule	Malmstrom	Davis Monthan	-
E Day	301 EW	*Barksdale	35 B-47	-	-	Dow	Goose	Lakenheath**	15
E+4-E+6	301 EW	Lakenheath	35 B-47	-	-	Goose	-	Barksdale	-
E Day	301 AREFS	Barksdale	19 KC-97	-	-	-	-	Keflavik	-
E+8	301 AREFS	Keflavik	19 KC-97	-	(Goose Optn)	-	-	Barksdale	-
3 Jan	26 SRW	Lockbourne	3 RB-47	-	-	-	Goose	Keflavik(Wx Scout	-
E+7	26 SRW	Keflavik	3 RB-47	-	-	-	Dow	Lockbourne	-
SAC OPLAN 11-58									
MULE TRAIN									

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PART II LARGE SCALE EXERCISES CONT'D

DATE	UNITS INVOLVED	FROM	ACFT	A/R PRIOR TO PRESTRIKE	ENROUTE STOP	1st A/R	2nd A/R	TO	NR DAYS TDY
<u>FEBRUARY 1958</u>									
E Day	90 AREFS	Brize Norton	2 KC-97(ROT)	-	-	-	-	Brize Norton(SA)	-
E Day	90 AREFS	Lajes	4 KC-97(ROT)	-	-	-	-	Brize Norton(SA)	-
E+7	90 AREFS	Brize Norton	4 KC-97(ROT)	-	-	-	-	Lajes	-
E Day	42 BW	*Loring	22 B-52	-	-	-	-	Brize Norton**	15
E+2	42 BW	Brize Norton	22 B-52	-	-	-	-	Loring	-
E Day	310 BW	Schilling	30 B-47	Flattsburgh	G. Commen*	-	-	Greenham Cem**	15
E+4-E+6	310 BW	Greenham Cem	30 B-47	-	-	-	-	Schilling	-
E Day	40 BW	*Schilling	8 B-47	-	-	Goose	Flattsburgh	Mildenhall**	15
E Day	40 BW	*Schilling	10 B-47	-	-	Goose	-	Mildenhall**	15
E Day	40 BW	*Schilling	17 B-47	-	-	Flattsburgh	Goose	Mildenhall**	15
E+4-E+6	40 BW	Mildenhall	35 B-47	-	-	Flattsburgh	-	Mildenhall**	15
E Day	380 BW	*Plattsburgh	5 B-47	-	-	Goose	Flattsburgh	Schilling	-
E Day	380 BW	*Plattsburgh	16 B-47	-	-	Flattsburgh	Goose	Chelveston**	15
E Day	380 BW	*Plattsburgh	14 B-47	-	-	Goose	-	Chelveston**	15
E+4-E+6	380 BW	Chelveston	35 B-47	-	-	-	-	Chelveston**	15
E Day	100 BW	*Brize Norton	10 B-47(ROT)	-	-	Harmen	-	Flattsburgh	-
E Day	100 BW	*Brize Norton	20 B-47(ROT)	-	-	-	-	Brize Norton**	-
E+3	100 BW	Wheelus	20 B-47(ROT)	-	-	9 A/R Lajes	-	Wheelus**	-
				-	-	Terrejen/Zaragoza	- (10 ea)	Brize Norton	-
SAG OPLAN 12-58 "ROUGH GAME"									
<u>MARCH 1958</u>									
E Day	68 AREFS	Lajes	8 KC-97(ROT)	-	-	-	-	Brize Norton	-
E+7	68 AREFS	Brize Norton	8 KC-97(ROT)	-	-	-	-	Lajes	-
E Day	68 AREFS	Brize Norton	2 KC-97(ROT)	-	-	-	-	-(SA)	-
E Day	44 BW	Lake Charles	14 B-47	-	-	*Loring	-	Mildenhall**	15
		Lake Charles	7 B-47	-	-	*Loring	Keflavik	Mildenhall**	15
		Lake Charles	4 B-47	-	-	*Loring	Harmen	Mildenhall**	15
		Lake Charles	5 B-47	-	-	*Loring	Harmen Keflavik	Mildenhall**	15

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PART I LARGE SCALE EXERCISES CONT'D

DATE	UNITS INVOLVED	FROM	ACFT	A/R PRIORITY TO PRESTRIKE	ENROUTE STOP	1st A/R	2nd A/R	TO	NR DAYS TDY
MARCH 1958 CONT'D									
E+4	Thru E+6 44 BW	Mildenhall	30 B-47	-	-	Harmon	Dew	Lake Charles	-
E Day	68 BW	*Lake Charles	29 B-47	-	-	Dow	Harmon	Chelveston**	15
E+4	68 BW	*Lake Charles	6 B-47	-	-	Dow	Keflavik	Chelveston**	15
Thru E+6	2 BW	Chelveston	23 B-47	-	-	Goose	Dew	Lake Charles	-
E Day	2 BW	*Hunter	12 B-47	-	-	Harmon	Dow	Lake Charles	-
		*Hunter	18 B-47	-	-	Dow	-	Lakenheath**	15
		*Hunter	10 B-47	-	-	Harmon	-	Lakenheath**	15
		*Hunter	2 B-47	-	-	Dow	Harmon	Lakenheath**	15
E+4	Thru E+6 2 BW	Lakenheath	30 B-47	-	-	Goose	-	Hunter	-
E Day	308 BW	*Hunter	17 B-47	-	-	Dow	-	Greenham Com**	15
		*Hunter	6 B-47	-	-	Harmon	-	Greenham Com**	15
		*Hunter	5 B-47	-	-	Harmon	Keflavik	Greenham Com**	15
		*Hunter	2 B-47	-	-	Dow	Harmon	Greenham Com**	15
E+4	Thru E+7 308 BW	Greenham Com	30 B-47	-	-	Harmon	-	Hunter	-
E Day	98 BW	*Lincoln	14 B-47	-	-	Goose	Keflavik	Bruntingthorpe**	15
		*Lincoln	3 B-47	-	-	Goose	-	Bruntingthorpe**	15
		*Lincoln	9 B-47	-	-	Dow	Goose	Bruntingthorpe**	15
		*Lincoln	4 B-47	-	-	Harmon	-	Bruntingthorpe**	15
E+4	Thru E+6 98 BW	Bruntingthorpe	30 B-47	-	-	Keflavik	Thule	Lincoln	-
E Day	307 BW	Lincoln	30 B-47	-	-	Goose	-	Fairford**	15
E+4	Thru E+6 307 BW	Fairford	12 B-47	-	-	Keflavik	-	Lincoln	-
		Fairford	18 B-47	-	-	Goose	-	Lincoln	-
E Day	376 AREFS	Barksdale	19 KC-97	-	-	-	-	Keflavik	-
E+8	376 AREFS	Keflavik	19 KC-97	-	-	-	-	Barksdale	-
3 Mar	26 SRW	Leckbourne	3 RB-47	-	-	Goose	-	Keflavik(WX Scout)	-
E Day	26 SRW	Leckbourne	1 RB-47	-	-	Goose	-	Keflavik(WX Scout)	-
E+7	26 SRW	Keflavik	4 RB-47	-	-	-	-	Leckbourne	-

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SAC OPLAN
"SNOW FLURRY"

7AD

- REMARKS:
1. *Prestrike Base
 2. **Poststrike Base
 3. A/R - Air Refueling
 4. (SA) Strip Alert Aircraft
 5. (WX) Weather Scout
 6. (ROT) Rotational Unit
 7. A no-notice exercise for SAC units at various intervals of this period. Interested non-SAC agencies will be informed of E Day by separate correspondence. Necessary action should be taken by these non-SAC agencies to preclude date of E Day from reaching SAC Agencies.
 8. SAC units will submit J-2 reports based on E Day.

7AD

Page 5 of 11 pages

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PART III FORWARD BASE EXERCISES

BASE TO BE

EXERCISED	FREQUENCY	AIRCRAFT	RESPONSIBLE HEADQUARTERS	SOURCE OF AIRCRAFT	REMARKS
Keflavik	Quarterly	15 B-47	7AD in conjunction with parent numbered Air Force of redeploying aircraft	Redeploying rotational UK bomb wing	Redeployment of aircraft from UK and through Keflavik to be under operational control of parent numbered Air Force as specified in SAC Man 55-12
Wheeler	Quarterly	15 B-47	16AF*	UK retal bomb wing	Minimum necessary support aircraft to be provided by Lajes retal AREFS. Control Team personnel to be provided by 16AF.
Dhahran	4th Quarter FY 58 Only	15 B-47	16AF*	UK retal bomb wing	
Terrejon	Monthly	5 B-47	16AF*	UK retal bomb wing	
Zaragoza	Monthly	5 B-47	16AF*	UK retal bomb wing	
San Pablo	Monthly	5 KC-97	16AF*	Moroccan retal AREFS	" " " "

- REMARKS:
1. Bases will not be exercised (under this commitment) during the applicable period when subject base is exercised in conjunction with a SAC large scale exercise.
 2. * 5AD will be responsible for conducting these exercises until such time as 16AF assumes operational responsibility of SAC interests in the areas concerned. At that time, 16AF assumes operational responsibility of these exercises.

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PART IV 7AD FORWARD BASE EXERCISES (SPAIN & MIDDLE EAST)

DATE	UNIT	FROM	TO	ACFT	NUMBER DAYS
<u>AUGUST 1957</u>					
13	40 BW	Greenham Common	Zaragoza	7 B-47	Rtrn same day
14	40 BW	Greenham Common	Zaragoza	8 B-47	Rtrn same day
26	40 BW	Greenham Common	Nightcrawler (C)	15 B-47	RON
27	40 BW	Nightcrawler (C)	Dhahran	15 B-47	RON
28	40 BW	Dhahran	Wheelus	15 B-47	RON
29	40 BW	Wheelus	Greenham Common	15 B-47	---
7AD OPS DIRECTIVE "FIRE BOX"					
<u>SEPTEMBER 1957</u>					
10	40 BW	Greenham Common	Zaragoza	15 B-47	RON
11	40 BW	Zaragoza	Greenham Common	15 B-47	---
7AD OPS DIRECTIVE "EAST WOOD"					
<u>OCTOBER 1957</u>					
No exercises scheduled					
<u>NOVEMBER 1957</u>					
5	68 BW	Brize Norton	Terrejen	8 B-47	RON
6	68 BW	Brize Norton	Terrejen	7 B-47	RON
7	68 BW	Terrejen	Brize Norton	8 B-47	---
8	68 BW	Terrejen	Brize Norton	7 B-47	---
8	68 BW	Brize Norton	Zaragoza	15 B-47	RON
9	68 BW	Zaragoza	Brize Norton	15 B-47	---
7AD OPORD 211-57 "BLOCK CHAIN"					
<u>DECEMBER 1957</u>					
10	68 BW	Brize Norton	Terrejen	5 B-47	RON
11	68 BW	Terrejen	Brize Norton	5 B-47	---
12	68 BW	Brize Norton	Zaragoza	5 B-47	RON
13	68 BW	Zaragoza	Brize Norton	5 B-47	---

7 AD OPORD 212-57 "CASH BOX"

7AD

SECRET

SECRET

PART IV 7AD FORWARD BASE EXERCISES (SPAIN & MIDDLE EAST) CONT'D

DATE	UNIT	FROM	TO	ACFT	NUMBER DAYS
<u>JANUARY 1958</u>					
21	100 BW	Brize Norton	Torrejon	5 B-47	RON
22	100 BW	Torrejon	Brize Norton	5 B-47	---
23	100 BW	Brize Norton	Zaragoza	5 B-47	RON
24	100 BW	Zaragoza	Brize Norton	5 B-47	---
7AD OPORD 202-58 "GUN BAY"					

FEBRUARY 1958
LARGE SCALE EXERCISE

<u>MARCH 1958</u>					
4	100 BW	Brize Norton	Torrejon	5 B-47	RON
5	100 BW	Torrejon	Brize Norton	5 B-47	---
6	100 BW	Brize Norton	Zaragoza	5 B-47	RON
7	100 BW	Zaragoza	Brize Norton	5 B-47	---
7AD OPORD 203-58 "MODERN TIMES"					

PART V OVERSEAS AIR DEFENSE AND SUPPORT EXERCISES

DATE	UNITS INVOLVED	AIRCRAFT	PURPOSE	OVERSEAS COMMAND
19-22	7AD	38 B-47	ASP 1-57 Exercise	SACEUR
Sept 57 Rotational Wing				
Jun 58	7AD	38 B-47	ASP 1-58 Exercise	SACEUR
Rotational Wing				

PART VI EMP BASE SURVEYS

EMP BASE SURVEYS

15 May - 15 June 1958

Emergency War Plan Base Surveys

- REMARKS:
1. All Zone of Interior and overseas SAC bases, and non-SAC bases from which a Task Force Operations, will be surveyed.
 2. Surveys to be in accordance with SAC Reg 55-41.

7AD

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PART IV 7AD FORWARD BASE EXERCISES (SPAIN & MIDDLE EAST) CONT'D

REMARKS CONT'D: 3. Airlift of personnel to be provided by administrative and KC-97 aircraft.

FREQUENCY	ADS CONCERNED	LOCATION	ACFT REQUIRED (4 Days in place)	HQ RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING AIRCRAFT
(Commencing 1 Jul 57)				
Monthly	2	Brize Norton	1 B-47	7AD - From rotational resources
Monthly	4	Greenham Common	1 B-47	7AD - From rotational resources
Monthly	8	Lakenheath	1 B-47	7AD - From rotational resources

PART VIII AIR DEMONSTRATIONS

DATE	PLACE	OCCASION	AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS		#AF PROV ACFT	#AF WITH AIR SHOW RESPON
			FLYBY	STATIC		
19 May 58	All Bases	Armed Forces Day	3 B-52, 3 B-47, 3 B-36, 2 KC-135, or 2 KC-97 each wing or AREFS (as applicable)	2 B-52, 2 B-47, 2 B-36, 2 KC-135, 2 KC-97, or 2 C-124 each wing, AREFS or SS Sqdn (as applicable)	ALL AF and overseas Air Divisions	ALL AF and overseas Air Divisions

REMARKS: a. SAC Operations Order 96-57 will have an Unclassified nickname of "Reflex Action" and will contain instructions applicable to the movement and TDY of participating SAC Bomb Wings including all areas of operation and will be effective from 3 December 1957 until 30 June 1958. Each area and its respective participating Bomb Wings will be identified by a separate unclassified nickname.

b. Commencing with the date established in the above schedule, participating Bomb Wings will deploy the indicated number of B-47 aircraft and crews on each succeeding week for the remainder of FY-58. Commencing one week after the initial deployment date and each succeeding week throughout FY-58, participating Bomb Wings will redeploy the indicated number of B-47 aircraft and crews from TDY base to home station.

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REMARKS CONT'D:

c. Necessary maintenance and supervisory personnel from the applicable units will be rotated from TDY base to home station approximately every 90 days. To establish an overlap of rotating personnel, approximately one third of the support personnel will be rotated on each of the 30th, 60th and 90th days, thence each 90 days thereafter.

d. Rotation of aircraft and personnel will be accomplished so as to maintain the in-place capability at all times.

e. The following priority for use of airspace, tanker aircraft, and base facilities will apply: (1) SAC Directed Large Scale Exercise; (2) Other SAC Directed overseas rotations of wing strength; (3) SAC directed forward base exercises; (4) SAC OPORD 96-57; (5) Other, as assigned by the numbered Air Force/Air Divisions having operational or area control.

f. During "Reflex Action" deployments/redeployments, the parent numbered Air Force will retain operational responsibility of their respective subordinate unit aircraft. During the period of TDY the applicable numbered Air Force or overseas Air Division controlling the "Reflex Action" base through the EWP Task Force Commander or his deputy commander, in-place, will assume operational responsibility of applicable participating aircraft. Support personnel will be integrated into the applicable EWP Task Force Commander's organization.

g. Movement dates and routes:

(1) PEASE AREA, "WHITE OAK". 5 B-47 aircraft will be deployed each Tuesday. Replaced aircraft will redeploy each Wednesday. Routes will be non-stop as directed by the parent Numbered Air Force. Air refueling, for training purposes, may be provided from the resources of the parent Numbered Air Force.

(2) PLATTSBURGH AREA, "NORTH CLIFF". 5 B-47 aircraft will be deployed each Thursday and replaced aircraft redeployed each Friday. Routes will be non-stop as directed by parent numbered Air Force. Air refueling, for training purposes, will be provided from resources of parent numbered Air Force.

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REMARKS CONT'D:

(3) LORING AREA, "SADDLE CREEK". 3 B-47 aircraft will be deployed each Tuesday and Wednesday. Replaced aircraft will redeploy, 3 B-47 aircraft, each Wednesday and Thursday. Routes will be non-stop as directed by the parent numbered Air Force. Air refueling, for training, may be provided from the resources of the parent numbered Air Force.

(4) UNITED KINGDOM AREA, "WILD CAT".

(a) 10 B-47 aircraft, 5 from 2nd Air Force and 5 from 8th Air Force, will be deployed each Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. The 10 deploying B-47 aircraft will be scheduled so that 5 land at Fairford and 5 land at Greenham Common each applicable day. Replaced aircraft will redeploy, 10 B-47 aircraft, each Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Redeployment schedule will be planned so that 5 redeploy from Fairford and 5 from Greenham Common on each applicable day.

(b) ROUTES:

1. The primary deployment route will be from home station non-stop to the UK with air refueling in the NE US area. Eighth Air Force units will, when possible, utilize the route home station to UK with air refueling in the Lincoln and Thule areas as primary deployment route.

2. The primary redeployment routes will be from UK non-stop to home station with air refueling in the Geese/Harmon areas.

3. Alternate deployment/redeployment routes will be as directed by the parent numbered Air Forces, as coordinated between 2nd and 8th Air Forces, to include staging thru Geese or Loring or other bases as directed and coordinated by parent numbered Air Forces.

4. Additional air refueling for training purposes may be provided from the resources of the parent numbered Air Force.

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SAC UK AIR OPERATIONS (PEACETIME)
LOGISTIC SUPPLEMENT
January 1958 Thru June 1958

PART I: ROTATIONS

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
LINE	UNIT	FROM	TO	A/L SP BY	DATE	PERS/TONS	ER SP	A/C IN PLACE	REMARKS
1.	100 BW	Pease	Brize Norton	MATS	27/12/57	60/3.0	-	-	ADVON
2.	100 BW	Pease	Brize Norton	MATS	3/1/58 11/1/58	1260/177.0	1 C-124 (8 Days)	2/1/58	(Total Pers 1500)
3.	68 BW	Brize Norton	Lake Charles	MATS	2/1/58	60/3.0	-	-	ADVON
4.	68 BW	Brize Norton	Lake Charles	MATS	6/1/58 13/1/58	1444/198.3	1 C-124 (8 Days)	6/1/58	(Total Pers 1684)
5.	90 AREFS	Forbes	Brize Norton	Integral	9/1/58	131/8.6	-	-	-
6.	376 AREFS	Gr. Common	Barksdale	Integral	12/1/58	131/8.6	-	-	-
(CONFIDENTIAL) OPLAN 26A-57 OPS DIRECTIVE #3 "BUCK BOARD"									
7.	100 BW	Brize Norton	Pease	MATS	24/3/58	60/3.0	-	-	ADVON
8.	100 BW	Brize Norton	Pease	MATS	30/3/58 6/4/58	1260/177.0	1 C-124 (8 Days)	29/3/58	(Total Pers 1500)
9.	308 AREFS	Hunter	Gr. Common	Integral	2/4/58	131/8.6	-	-	-
10.	90 AREFS	Brize Norton	Forbes	Integral	5/4/58	131/8.6	-	-	-

(CONFIDENTIAL) OPLAN 26A-57 OPS DIRECTIVE #4 "PRIZE FIGHT"

Classified Secret because it reveals Logistic Support for rotations of SAC aircraft.

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LOGISTIC SUPPLEMENT TO SAC UK AIR OPERATIONS SCHEDULE - CONTINUATION

PART II: LARGE SCALE EXERCISES

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
LINE	UNIT	FROM	TO	TOTAL PERS.	APRX DAYS TDY	DATE	A/L SP BY	PERS/TONS CARGO	ER SP	REMARKS
1.	308 BW	Sidi Slimane	Fairford			2 Jan	5AD	18/0		
	(SECRET)	OPORD 36-57	"REFLEX ACTION"							
2.	301 AREFS	Barksdale	Keflavik	391	15	E-Day	MATS	156/36.5	-	20 acft Class
3.	301 AREFS	Keflavik	Barksdale	-	-	E+7	MATS	20/22.5	-	"C" tm. 4 R4360 1 C-124 E+5 (For redeployment only)
4.	90 AREFS	Lajes	Brize Norton	81	10	E-Day	Integral	-	-	5 acft Class "A" less engines & Medical
5.	26 SRW	Lockbourne	Keflavik	28	15	2 Jan	MATS	12/3.0	-	3 RB-47 WX
6.	26 SRW	Keflavik	Lockbourne	-	-	E+8	MATS	12/3.0	-	Scout Team
7.	307 BW	Lincoln	Bruntingthorpe			<u>C A N C E L L E D</u>				
8.	307 BW	Bruntingthorpe	Lincoln			<u>C A N C E L L E D</u>				
9.	301 BW	Barksdale	Lakenheath	301	15	E-Day&E+1	MATS	166/21.7	-	30 acft post
10.	301 BW	Lakenheath	Barksdale	-	-	E+7&E+8	MATS	166/21.7	-	strike tm (130 par must deploy E-Day)
11.	303 BW	Davis-Monthan	Mildenhall	350	15	E-Day&E+1	MATS	230/23.1	-	30 acft post
12.	303 BW	Mildenhall	Davis-Monthan	-	-	E+9&E+10	MATS	230/23.1	-	strike tm (130 par must deploy E-Day)
13.	43 BW	Davis-Monthan	Chelveston	350	15	E-Day&E+1	MATS	230/23.1	-	30 acft post
14.	43 BW	Chelveston	Davis-Monthan	-	-	E+9&E+10	MATS	230/23.1	-	strike tm (130 par must deploy E-Day)

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LOGISTIC SUPPLEMENT TO SAC UK AIR OPERATIONS SCHEDULE - CONTINUATION

PART II: LARGE SCALE EXERCISES

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
LINE	UNIT	FROM	TO	TOTAL PERS	APRX DAYS TDY	DATE	A/L SP BY	PERS/TONS CARGO	ER SP	REMARKS
1.	376 BW	Barksdale	Keflavik		<u>C</u> <u>A</u> <u>N</u> <u>C</u> <u>E</u> <u>L</u> <u>L</u> <u>E</u> <u>D</u>					
2.	376 BW	Keflavik	Barksdale		<u>C</u> <u>A</u> <u>N</u> <u>C</u> <u>E</u> <u>L</u> <u>L</u> <u>E</u> <u>D</u>					
3.	376 BW	Barksdale	Fairford		<u>C</u> <u>A</u> <u>N</u> <u>C</u> <u>E</u> <u>L</u> <u>L</u> <u>E</u> <u>D</u>					
4.	376 BW	Fairford	Barksdale		<u>C</u> <u>A</u> <u>N</u> <u>C</u> <u>E</u> <u>L</u> <u>L</u> <u>E</u> <u>D</u>					
(SECRET) OPOD 11-58 "MULE TRAIN" (JANUARY)										
5.	818AD	Lincoln	Gr. Common	200		2 - 4 Jan	MATS	170/35.0		
6.	307 BW	Lincoln	Gr. Common		<u>C</u> <u>A</u> <u>N</u> <u>C</u> <u>E</u> <u>L</u> <u>L</u> <u>E</u> <u>D</u>					(Consolidated with line 5 above)
7.	310 BW	Schilling	Gr. Common	96		2 - 4 Jan	MATS	81/28.0		
8.	2 BW	Hunter	Fairford	480		2 - 4 Jan	MATS	100/35.0		Figure in column E is total for all three 2AF units
9.	308 BW	Hunter	Fairford			2 - 4 Jan	MATS	100/35.0		
10.	384 BW	Little Rock	Fairford			2 - 4 Jan	MATS	100/10.0		
(SECRET) OPOD 96-57 "REFLEX ACTION"										
11.	90 AREFS	Lajes	Brize Norton	81	10	E-Day	Integral	-	-	5 acft Class
12.	90 AREFS	Brize Norton	Lajes	-	-	E+7	-	-	-	"A" less power packs & medical
13.	42 BW	Loring	Keflavik		<u>C</u> <u>A</u> <u>N</u> <u>C</u> <u>E</u> <u>L</u> <u>L</u> <u>E</u> <u>D</u>					
14.	42 BW	Keflavik	Loring		<u>C</u> <u>A</u> <u>N</u> <u>C</u> <u>E</u> <u>L</u> <u>L</u> <u>E</u> <u>D</u>					
15.	42 BW	Loring	Brize Norton	442	15	E-Day	MATS	310/53.9	-	20 acft post
16.	42 BW	Brize Norton	Loring	-	-	E+5	MATS	310/53.9	-	strike team
17.	310 BW	Schilling	Gr. Common	406	15	E-Day	MATS	286/62.3	-	11 acft pp
18.	310 BW	Gr. Common	Schilling	-	-	E+8	MATS	286/62.3	-	30 acft pre-post team

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LOGISTIC SUPPLEMENT TO SAC UK AIR OPERATIONS SCHEDULE - CONTINUATION

PART II: LARGE SCALE EXERCISES

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	
LINE	UNIT	FROM	TO	TOTAL PERS	APRX DAYS TDY	DATE	A/L SP BY	PERS/TONS CARGO	ER SP	REMARKS	
1.	40 BW	Schilling	Mildenhall	330	15	E-Day	MATS	200/23.6	-	30 acft post	
2.	40 BW	Mildenhall	Schilling	-	-	E+9&E+10	MATS	200/23.6	-	strike team	
3.	380 BW	Plattsburgh	Chelveston	330	15	E-Day	MATS	170/23.6	-	30 acft post	
4.	380 BW	Chelveston	Plattsburgh	-	-	E+8	MATS	200/23.6	-	strike team	
5.	100 BW	Brize Norton	Torrejon	62	10	E-Day	MATS	31/7.6	-	Enroute team	
6.	100 BW	Torrejon	Brize Norton	-	-	E+4	MATS	31/7.6	-		
7.	100 BW	Brize Norton	Zaragoza	31	10	E-Day	MATS	31/7.6	-	Enroute team	
8.	100 BW	Zaragoza	Brize Norton	-	-	E+4	MATS	31/7.6	-		
9.	100 BW	Brize Norton	Adana	<u>C A N C E L L E D</u>							
10.	100 BW	Brize Norton	Wheelus	238	10	E-Day	MATS	146/11.8	-	15 acft post	
11.	100 BW	Wheelus	Brize Norton	-	-	E+4	MATS	146/11.8	-	strike team	
12.	100 BW	Gr. Common	Wheelus	<u>C A N C E L L E D</u>							
13.	100 BW	Wheelus	Gr. Common	<u>C A N C E L L E D</u>							

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(SECRET) OPORD 12-58 "ROUGH GAME" (FEBRUARY)

14.	818AD	Lincoln	Gr. Common		4 Feb		MATS	48/0		Rotation of
15.	818AD	Gr. Common	Lincoln		7 Feb		MATS	48/0		"Reflex Action"
16.	802AD	Lincoln	Gr. Common		4 Feb		MATS	22/0		support personnel
17.	802AD	Gr. Common	Lincoln		7 Feb		MATS	22/0		8AF will provide
										a/l from Schilling
										to Lincoln and
										return
18.	38AD	Hunter	Fairford		4 Feb		MATS	90/0		Rotation of
19.	38AD	Fairford	Hunter		7 Feb		MATS	90/0		"Reflex Action"
										support pers

(SECRET) OPORD 96-57 "REFLEX ACTION"

LOGISTIC SUPPLEMENT TO SAC UK AIR OPERATIONS SCHEDULE - CONTINUATION

PART II: LARGE SCALE EXERCISES

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
LINE	UNIT	FROM	TO	TOTAL PERS	APRX DAYS TDY	DATE	A/L SP BY	PERS/TONS CARGO	ER SP	REMARKS
1.	376 AREFS	Barksdale	Keflavik	400	15	E-Day	MATS	217/40.7	-	20 acft Class
2.	376 AREFS	Keflavik	Barksdale	-	-	E+8	MATS	20/22.5	-	"C" tm. 4 R4360
								1 C-124 (8 Days)		
3.	90 AREFS	Lajes	Brize Norton	81	10	E-Day	Integral	-	-	5 acft Class
4.	90 AREFS	Brize Norton	Lajes	-	-	E+10	-	-	-	"A" less engines & medical
5.	26 SRW	Lockbourne	Keflavik	28	15	E-Day	MATS	12/3.0	-	3 RB-47 WX
6.	26 SRW	Keflavik	Lockbourne	-	-	E+8	MATS	12/3.0	-	Scout Team
7.	44 BW	Lake Charles	Mildenhall	120	15	NO AIRLIFT REQUIRED. Air crews only. Support pers furnished by 321BW.				
8.	321 BW	Pinecastle	Mildenhall	200	15	E-Day	MATS	200/24.1	-	30 acft post
9.	321 BW	Mildenhall	Pinecastle	-	-	E+8	MATS	200/24.1	-	strike team supporting 44BW
10.	68 BW	Lake Charles	Chelveston	350	15	E-Day	MATS	230/23.1	-	30 acft post
11.	68 BW	Chelveston	Lake Charles	-	-	E+8	MATS	230/23.1	-	strike team
12.	2 BW	Hunter	Lakenheath	320	15	E-Day	MATS	200/23.4	-	30 acft post
13.	2 BW	Lakenheath	Hunter	-	-	E+8	MATS	200/23.4	-	strike team
14.	308 BW	Hunter	Gr. Common	292	15	E-Day	MATS	202/22.4	-	30 acft post
15.	308 BW	Gr. Common	Hunter	-	-	E+8	MATS	202/22.4	-	strike team
16.	98 BW	Lincoln	Bruntingthorpe	330	15	E-Day	MATS	210/23.6	-	30 acft post
17.	98 BW	Bruntingthorpe	Lincoln	-	-	E+7&E+8	MATS	210/23.6	-	strike team

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LOGISTIC SUPPLEMENT TO SAC UK AIR OPERATIONS SCHEDULE - CONTINUATION

PART II: LARGE SCALE EXERCISES

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
LINE	UNIT	FROM	TO	TOTAL PERS	APRX DAYS TDY	DATE	A/L SP BY	PERS/TONS CARGO	ER SP	REMARKS
1.	307 BW	Lincoln	Fairford	305	15	E-Day	MATS	230/23.1	-	30 acft post
2.	307 BW	Fairford	Lincoln	-	-	E+8	MATS	230/23.1	-	strike team

(SECRET) OPORD 13-58 "SNOW FLURRY" (MARCH)

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7TH AIR DIVISION

7AD MANUAL 65-2

PRE-POST STRIKE MANUAL

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 35 PAGES
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HEADQUARTERS
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
AFO 125 New York, New York

7AIRDIV MANUAL)
NUMBER 65-2)

1 July 1957

PRE/POST STRIKE MANUAL

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE.

a. This manual has been published for guidance of 7th Air Division Bases and Tactical Units in planning for pre-post strike operations in support of the Emergency War Plan. It is based on the concept that 7th Air Division bases must be able, in the shortest possible time, to service and prepare aircraft for pre-strike launch to target or one time flight to the ZI, without the assistance of tactical wing staging teams, equipment and supplies. (S)

2. AMENDMENTS.

a. Amendments will be published as required. This manual is printed in looseleaf form to enable insertion of amended pages as required. (U)

b. Recommendations for improvement, additional procedures to be included or changes in procedure, are encouraged from all units and individuals, and will be submitted through channels to this headquarters. (U)

3. GENERAL. SAC emergency reaction time requires that personnel and equipment must be in a constant state of readiness. EWP check lists for all personnel, together with SOPs which have been proven by exercise, will materially improve the turn around capabilities of our tactical forces. (U)

4. This Manual supersedes 7th Air Division Manual 65-2, dated 1 September 1956, which will be removed from files and destroyed in accordance with AFR 205-1. (U)

5. This Manual is classified Secret because it discloses 7th Air Division plans for supporting the SAC EWP. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Oliver C. Doan

OLIVER C. DOAN
Colonel, USAF
Acting Chief of Staff

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NUMBER 65-2

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Comdr 8AF	-	Copies 54 thru 56
818 AD, Lincoln, Neb	-	Copies 57 thru 62
801 AD, Lockbourne, Ohio	-	Copies 63 thru 65
45 AD, Ioring, Maine	-	Copies 66 thru 68
820 AD, Plattsburgh, N.Y.	-	Copies 69 thru 71
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SECTION I

OPERATIONS

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5	Go/No-Go Check List.	1 - 5 to 1 - 10

1. Aircraft Status Reporting. a. After aircraft has turned off of runway and taxied to radiological monitoring position, tower will advise frequency and call for reporting aircraft status. This frequency and call should be pre-planned and included in Operations Order 44-58. (C)

b. The following code will be used in reporting aircraft status: (U)

(1) Category "Alpha" - Indicating the aircraft can be refueled immediately after landing and that only minor maintenance is required. (C)

(2) Category "Bravo" - Indicating that maintenance will have to be performed prior to refueling but both maintenance and refueling can be accomplished within three (3) hours for B/RB-47 aircraft, five (5) hours for B/RB-36 aircraft or six (6) hours for B/RB-52 aircraft. (C)

(3) Category "Charlie" - Indicating that major maintenance is necessary and will require longer than three (3) hours to accomplish for B/RB-47 aircraft, five (5) hours for B/RB-36 aircraft or six (6) hours for B/RB-52 aircraft. (C)

c. As an additional means of conveying aircraft status to the Parking Control Officer, visual signals will be used for signaling the maintenance brevity code from the aircraft to the follow-me jeep as follows: (U)

(1) Category "Alpha" and "Bravo" aircraft extend and light left landing light. (C)

(2) Category "Charlie" aircraft extend and light right landing light. (C)

(3) Aircraft with atomic or thermonuclear weapons aboard or with known or suspected radiological contamination extend and light both landing lights. (C)

2. Recovery.

a. During arrival of aircraft in the United Kingdom, the Base Commander or Deputy Commander will be present in his respective control tower. (S)

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SECTION I

b. During the period peacetime deploying aircraft are in vicinity of a 7th Air Division RAFCON, the Base Commander, Deputy Commander, or Air Base Group Operations Officer of base which controls RAFCON, will be present in the RAFCON for purpose of monitoring overall activities. (C)

c. Each peacetime TDY base is responsible for procuring block altitude clearance for redeploying aircraft in accordance with SAC Regulation 55-3. Appropriate 7th Air Division Operations Orders will contain category (Para 5c(4) of SAC Regulation 55-3) which will determine time flight plans should be presented to ATC agencies. Information regarding redeployment routes, altitudes, cell structure, and timing must be obtained from TDY unit. (C)

d. Under EWF, clearance will be in accordance with SAC Manuals of the 55-4 series. (U)

3. Ground Control of Aircraft.

a. The Base Operations Officer or his designated representative should be the Parking Control Officer. (U)

b. A parking plan must be designated to facilitate servicing and other maintenance requirements and be sufficiently flexible to accommodate unpredictable situations. Individual aircraft mobility and capability of rapid launching are prime considerations. (S)

(1) For location and control purpose, parking spaces should be numbered in accordance with their relative location to servicing and maintenance facilities, without regard to specific areas. (U)

(2) Category "A" aircraft should be parked in those spaces which are nearest and most accessible to servicing and maintenance activities. Individual aircraft mobility must be a prime consideration. (U)

(3) Category "B" aircraft should be parked in the less desirable spaces from servicing and maintenance standpoint. (U)

(4) Category "C" aircraft should be parked, where possible, so as not to interfere with recovery of "A" and "B" aircraft. (U)

(5) Should status of an aircraft not be determined, it should be parked in either the Category "A" or "B" areas. This will prevent loss of valuable time should aircraft be parked in Category "C" area and later determined to be Category "A" or "B". (U)

(6) Off loading area for aircraft which have unexpended weapons must be provided, using distance factor established by applicable regulations. (U)

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(7) Provide parking area for contaminated aircraft. (U)

(8) MATS aircraft parking and loading/off loading areas must be designated. (U)

c. Operating Procedures: (U)

(1) The Base Operations Officer will brief follow-me vehicle drivers as to the locations of aircraft monitoring sites, and will brief tower operator to instruct aircraft commander to cut engines 1, 2, 5, and 6 and reduce power to idle on remaining engines prior to being monitored. (U)

(2) Upon receipt of the aircraft status report, the control tower operator will inform the Parking Control Officer who will determine the parking location of each aircraft based on category status and availability of vacant parking spaces and/or hydrant refueling pits. If no report is received from tower operator, follow-me vehicle driver will advise Parking Control Officer, status of aircraft as determined by visual method and request parking area. (U)

(3) The aircraft will be led to the radiological monitoring site for initial monitoring (Reference 7AD Supplement 1 to SAC Atomic SCF 55-13). If not contaminated, the aircraft will be led to its designated parking area or hydrant refueling pit as per original instructions. If the aircraft is contaminated, the follow-me jeep will notify the parking control officer, then lead the "hot" aircraft to a predetermined contaminated aircraft parking area. (U)

(4) The Parking Control Officer will also advise the Refueling Dispatcher of parking instructions given for each aircraft and direction for dispatch of refueling units. (U)

(5) Upon completion of refueling operations at a hydrant refueling pit, aircraft will be taxied or towed, depending on the situation prevailing at the time, to its final parking space for maintenance accomplishment. (U)

4. Tactical Radiological Countermeasures. (U)

a. General. In accordance with existing directives, each base commander is responsible for maintaining a tactical radiological countermeasure program capable of supporting EWF commitments at his installation. Air Base Group Commanders will assist satellite bases in developing this capability. (U)

b. Procedures. (U)

(1) All supervisory CBR defense personnel will be trained as outlined in paragraph 3, Annex V, SAC Regulation 355-1 or paragraph 4a, Annex 1, SAC Regulation 50-24. (U)

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(2) Monitoring-decontamination teams will be organized in accordance with SAC Regulation 55-43 and team member will be assigned on special orders. (U)

(3) All equipment necessary in accomplishing tactical radiological countermeasures will be procured as soon as possible and maintained in a ready status at all times. (Ref: T.O. OO-110A-3). (U)

(4) The base CBR defense officer will prepare and maintain current standing operating procedures on the following: (U)

- (a) Aircraft and equipment monitoring. (U)
- (b) Aircraft and equipment decontamination. (U)
- (c) Contamination control. (U)
- (d) Personnel decontamination and dosimetry. (U)
- (e) Radiation tolerances and contamination reporting. (U)
- (f) Radiation exposure control and casualty processing. (U)
- (g) Check lists for supervisors pertaining to their assigned operation. (U)

(5) The CBR defense officer will determine when aircraft contamination is sufficiently reduced to permit crews to make return flight to ZI without excessive exposure. (U)

(6) The following facilities will be maintained in a ready status to insure an operational tactical radiological countermeasures capability on short notice: (U)

- (a) Aircraft monitoring site. (U)
- (b) Aircraft decontamination site. (U)
- (c) Contaminated aircraft parking and isolation area. (U)
- (d) Personnel decontamination stations with a minimum of six (6) showers with provisions for furnishing sufficient clothing to replace contaminated clothing, etc. (Ref: Appendix 1, SAC Manual 355-11. (U)

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SECTION I5. Go/No-Go Check Lists:

a. Following is a B/RB-47 Go/No-Go Check List to be used as directed by the Commander concerned. (U)

- (1) All power plants (deployment to the ZI only). (U)
- operative. (U)
 - (a) Minimum five engines, both out-board engines
- (2) One engine driven alternator. (U)
- ATO. (U)
 - (3) Fuel system - all tanks except forward auxiliary or
 - (4) Oil system - except instruments. (U)
 - (5) Any two boost pumps on any main tank and one boost pump on auxiliary tanks (if either forward auxiliary or ATO tank out both boost pumps must be operative on bomb bay tank). (U)
 - (6) Rudder - elevator and one aileron power control. (U)
 - (7) Flight controls. (U)
 - (8) Landing gear (Normal or emergency retraction and extension). (U)
 - (9) Canopy lock. (U)
 - (10) Flaps (normal or emergency retraction and extension). (U)
 - (11) Brakes (except anti-skid). (U)
 - (12) Hydraulic system (either main or emergency pump). (U)
 - (13) Pressurization system or oxygen system (if oxygen only, enough fuel for flight at 30,000 feet.) (U)
 - (14) Bomb bay doors up and locked. (U)
 - (15) Spoiler door or canopy and ejection seats. (U)
 - (16) Nose wheel steering (Taxi position only acceptable). (U)
 - (17) Any three generators. (U)
 - (18) Both bus bars capable taking DC load. (U)

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- (19) Any two of three main inverters. (U)
 - (20) Main or spare instrument inverters. (U)
 - (21) UHF. (U)
 - (22) N-1 compass. (U)
 - (23) Altimeter, Flight indicator, normal or emergency turn and bank indicator, and airspeed meter on the same panel - either pilots or co-pilots. (U)
 - (24) VOR or ADF. (U)
 - (25) EGT and RPM indicators. (U)
 - (26) Fuel quantity gauges. (U)
 - (27) AIC - 10 interphone system. (U)
 - (28) Maximum possible aircraft in each cell returning to ZI must have operational IFF. Buddy system will be used to return those aircraft having inoperative IFF to the ZI. In no case will more than one aircraft with inoperative IFF be escorted by a single aircraft having operative IFF. (C)
 - (29) Arm tail turret as required. (U)
 - (30) Radiological, biological, or chemical contamination level low enough to permit crew to make return flight without receiving incapacitating exposure dosages. (C)
- b. Following is a B-52 Aircraft Go/No-Go Check List to be used as directed by the commander concerned. (U)
- (1) Seven (7) engines - minimum - 7 engines under controlled conditions. (U)
 - (2) Two (2) alternators (any two). (U)
 - (3) All fuel tanks except external tanks. For emergency evacuation all main tanks with one boost pump in each tank plus any three (3) auxiliary tanks with one boost pump per tank provided CG is within limits. (U)
 - (4) Transfer or refuel system. (U)

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- (5) One (1) boost pump in each main tank. (U)
- (6) Two (2) transfer pumps in each auxiliary tank. (At least one in each cell). (U)
- (7) Oil systems for operating engines except pressure gauges. (U)
- (8) RPM ~~of~~ RPR or fuel flow gauge for each engine. (U)
- (9) One (1) battery. (U)
- (10) Three (3) T/R units forward. (U)
- (11) One (1) hydraulic pack in each wing. (U)
- (12) Hydraulic packs #1 or #3 and #3 or #4. (U)
- (13) Emergency pumps on inoperative hydraulic packs #1 and #2 and #5 and #8. (U)
- (14) Hydraulic packs ~~9~~ or #10. (U)
- (15) Landing gear (normal or emergency retract and extend). Main gear for emergency evacuation. (U)
- (16) One (1) tire on each strut (main gear - minimum of three (3) forward and three (3) aft. (U)
- (17) All blown tires removed. (U)
- (18) 3/4 of brakes (anti-skid unnecessary). (U)
- (19) Flight controls except aileron trim. (U)
- (20) Flaps (normal or emergency retract and extend). (U)
- (21) Bomb bay doors closed and locked. (U)
- (22) Pressurization or oxygen for 10 hours. (U)
- (23) Air speed, altimeter, artificial horizon, turn and slip indicator (normal or emergency), operating on the same panel - either pilot or co-pilot. (U)
- (24) N-1 compass or sextant w/mount. (U)

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- (25) UHF. (U)
 - (26) VOR or ADF. (U)
 - (27) AIC - 10 Interphone System. (U)
 - (28) Maximum possible aircraft in each cell returning to ZI must have operational IFF. Buddy system will be used to return those aircraft having inoperative IFF to the ZI. In no case will more than one aircraft with inoperative IFF be escorted by a single aircraft with operative IFF. (C)
 - (29) Arm tail turret as required. (U)
 - (30) Radiological, biological, or chemical contamination level low enough to permit crew to make return flight without receiving incapacitating exposure dosages. (C)
- c. B/RB-30 Go/No-Go Check List to be used as directed by the commander concerned. (U)
- (1) Four (4) operational reciprocating engines plus four (4) jet engines or five (5) reciprocating engines and two (2) jet engines. (Applicable to gross weight of aircraft). (U)
 - (2) Engine Instruments: Fuel flow indicator, oil pressure indicator, manifold pressure indicator, carburetor air temperature, cylinder head temperature indicator, RPM indicator. (U)
 - (3) Airspeed Indicators (either pilot or co-pilot operational). (U)
 - (4) Artificial Horizon (both pilot and co-pilot operational). (U)
 - (5) Altimeters (either pilot or co-pilot operational). (U)
 - (6) Bank and Turn Indicator (either pilot or co-pilot operational) Caution: All altimeters, air speed indicators and bank and turn indicators must be operational on the same instrument panel. (U)
 - (7) Minimum of two engine-driven alternators. (Inoperative alternators must be disconnected). (U)
 - (8) Fuel system tanks operational as required. Tanks must be isolated and drained if leaking. (U)

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(9) Fuel tank boost pumps operational as required (minimum of four (4) boost pumps). (U)

(10) Manifold system completely operational (electric or manual operation). (U)

(11) Fuel tank shut-off valves operational as required (either electrical or manual). (U)

(12) Oil system and instruments completely operational, less oil quantity gauges. (U)

(13) Engine fuel and oil shut-off valves operational (electric or manual). (U)

(14) Flight controls completely operational. (U)

(15) Normal main landing gear retraction and extension system operational. (U)

(16) Nose gear (normal or emergency system operational). (U)

(17) Wing flaps (normal or emergency system operational). (U)

(18) Hydraulic System. (U)

(a) Bomb-bay doors closed and locked (normal or emergency system operational). (U)

(b) Brakes (normal or emergency system operational). (U)

(c) Selector valve control (normal or emergency system operational). (U)

(d) Nose gear steering (normal or emergency system operational). (U)

(19) Pressurization system or oxygen system (if oxygen is used, quantity must be sufficient for 14 hours duration when route weather conditions preclude low level flights).

(20) All bus bars AC or DC must be operational, or split bus for sufficient power requirements. (U)

(21) Radio receiving and transmitting sets operational, either UHF, VHF or HF. (U)

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- (22) Operational IFF set. (U)
- (23) One (1) operational navigational aid (radar, radio compass, or OMNI set). (U)
- (24) Interphone system operational. (U)
- (25) Fuel quantity gauges must be operational on tanks used. (U)
- (26) Propellers: Minimum of two (2) systems must be operational. Automatic and emergency or manual and emergency). (U)
- (27) Operational tail turret if necessary by tactical situation. (U)
- (28) Radiological, biological, or chemical contamination level low enough to permit crew to make return flight without receiving incapacitating exposure dosages. (C)
- (29) M41 compass. (U)

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TACTICAL UNIT AND AIR CREW RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Numbered Air Forces have directed Tactical Unit and Aircraft Commanders to assure the following: (U)
 - a. That refueling panels, when aircraft configuration requires their use, accompany the first group of aircraft scheduled to arrive. (C)
 - b. That ground crew inter-communication cords, headsets and microphones are aboard all aircraft in a readily accessible location for use by ground crew during refueling and starting operations. (C)
 - c. That all crew members are thoroughly qualified to operate either external or cockpit refueling panels as required and that a crew member will be available to do this immediately after aircraft is parked. Unless properly released this crew member will remain with aircraft until refueling is completed. (C)
 - d. That aircraft status be reported in accordance with paragraph 1b(1), (2) or (3), Section I, so that aircraft can be parked on that basis. (U)
 - e. That crews evacuate aircraft immediately after parking so that refueling hook-up can be made as soon as possible after engines are cut. (U)
 - f. After debriefing, aircraft commanders will remain in vicinity of aircraft in order to be readily available to perform acceptance check and accept aircraft immediately upon completion of servicing and maintenance required for one-time flight. (C)
 - g. Aircrews will be briefed on provisions of SAC Atomic SOP 55-22 and procedures outlined in 7AD Supplement 1 to SAC Atomic SOP 55-22. (U)

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SUPPLY

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1. Aircraft Spares. (U)

a. F-47 Type Aircraft Spares have been assembled into trailer-mounted mobile pre/post-strike kits and post-strike kits at Greenham Common and Upper Heyford, and will be dispatched by 7th Air Division wherever required. Each kit is manned by one truck driver and two supply personnel, and is maintained in a constantly ready condition. Base plans must include integration of this kit into the already existing Base Supply Service Unit. (C)

(1) These kits are set up so that immediate issue of certain parts to maintenance shops for pre-installation check can be made. (U)

(2) Back-up for these kits is the regular Supply Points and Burtonwood, using existing telephone and telex nets. (U)

b. B-36, B-52 and KC-135 Type Aircraft Spares: Peculiar spares for the aircraft are not stocked by this theater. Common spares may be obtained by using the Base Supply - Supply Point - Burtonwood sequence of supply, using the already existing telephone net. Fly-away kits will be deployed by the tactical units for B-36 and B-52 aircraft. (S)

2. FCL. (U)

a. Development of speedy refueling technique is an area which requires maximum command and staff attention. Speed must be achieved without sacrificing any facet of ground safety. Refueling plans will include use of hydrant systems as fill stands and/or for single point servicing of aircraft in the best combination to provide maximum speed in refueling aircraft. Some areas that require constant attention to develop expeditious refueling technique are as follows: (C)

(1) Communications and control of aircraft and refueling facilities. (U)

(2) Pre-arranged resupply and reserve stockage of aircraft fuels and lubricants. (U)

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(3) Day-to-day maintenance and testing of refueling equipment to insure constant readiness. (U)

(4) Cross-training of personnel. (U)

b. Listed below are recommendations which should eliminate delays in aircraft servicing: (U)

(1) Refueling Unit Servicing. (U)

(a) All required refueling units should be prepositioned to assure maximum control with minimum dispatch time. Refueling units will be under the supervision of the Parking Control Officer who will direct drivers to aircraft when ready for refueling. When the refueling unit has expended its load, the driver will proceed to fill stand for reloading. When refilled, unit may be dispatched from fill stand or dispatcher's stand to aircraft or pre-positioned at hardstand as required by Parking Control Officer. Parking Control Officer and FOL dispatcher will maintain complete control of refueling units at all times. (C)

(b) In event radio communications fail, hardstand phones will be utilized for communication between maintenance control team, maintenance control, and FOL dispatcher. (C)

(c) Refueling unit maintenance will have a mobile standby team with spare nozzles and necessary tools, etc., to accomplish immediate maintenance on refueling units at hardstands. (C)

(2) Hydrant Servicing. (U)

(a) Air Materiel Command has concurred in permitting aircraft to taxi "to or from" the hydrant hardstands. Aircraft will not be taxied or towed to or from a hydrant site where spillage of fuel has occurred until the Installation Fire Department is called and the area rendered safe. (U)

(b) When the refueling section has been notified of impending aircraft landings, the following action should be taken: (C)

1. Inspect communication system from hardstand to base refueling section and maintenance control for proper operation.

2. Check all refueling hardstands to insure they are free of all fuel spillage and vapors. (U)

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3. Pre-position equipment, including hydrant lighting equipment, prior to aircraft landing. (U)

a. Insure that power units with extension cables and fire extinguishers are in place prior to aircraft reaching hardstands. (U)

b. Arrange immediate availability of Coleman Tractors and tow bars with maintenance control. (U)

4. Parking Control Officer should thoroughly brief the refueling section on parking plan to insure complete utilization of all personnel and equipment. (U)

(c) The Base Refueling Section should originate, through appropriate channels, the following projects: (U)

1. Procurement of "drip pans" to be used in servicing of aircraft. When a jet engine is shut down, approximately two to three quarts of jet fuel are spilled on the hardstand. The use of drip pans to catch this fuel will permit continuous use of the hardstands for hydrant refueling. (U)

2. A work order for "yellow taxi lines" should be initiated for each hydrant hardstand in an effort to position the aircraft on the hardstand in the same place each time. This will simplify the pre-positioning of the ground equipment and obtain uniform accessibility to aircraft at each hydrant. (U)

(d) Each base should, at the earliest opportunity, arrange to taxi an aircraft to each hydrant hardstand in order to effect a definite plan for pre-positioning of all equipment used in safe, expeditious accomplishment of aircraft refueling. (U)

c. Commanders are encouraged to initiate a cross-training program to provide an additional source of personnel. The amount of training to be given would have to be determined as local requirements demand. It is suggested that qualified petroleum personnel be spread throughout the shift operation in order to provide maximum utilization of experienced operators. The balance of shift requirement should be furnished from personnel cross-trained in the refueling field. The cross-trained personnel would additionally provide the necessary manpower to act as drip-pan handlers, fire guards, assist in equipment handling, etc. Utilization of personnel in this manner will permit the qualified petroleum personnel to carry out their responsibilities more effectively. Selection of personnel to receive such training must be accomplished carefully. The magnitude of the petroleum function requires carefully screened assistants. (U)

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d. Each refueling section should initiate individual SOP's for each function used to accomplish servicing of aircraft by fuel servicing trailers or hydrant systems, i.e.: Pump House Operator, Pit Operator, Hydrant Cart Operator, Drip Pan Handler, Fuel Servicing Unit Operator, Dispatcher, Bulk Storage Operator, and Fill Stand Operator. (U)

e. A Ground Safety Aircraft Servicing File should be initiated and maintained by refueling section, composed of the following publications: (U)

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| (1) AFM 32-3 | Accident Prevention Handbook |
| (2) AFM 67-14 | Handling of Aircraft Fuel |
| (3) SAC Manual 67-2 | Aviation Fuels Operations Handbook |
| (4) SAC Reg 66-17 | Officer Supervision of Aircraft Ground Refueling |
| (5) T/O 00-25-172 | Policy Regarding Ground Servicing of Aircraft |
| (6) 7AD Manual 67-2 | Supply Petroleum Operation |
| (7) T/O 37A-1-101 | Operation and Service Instructions on Fuel and Oil Handling Equipment and Mechanical Fuel Segregators |
| (8) T/O 37A-1-1 | Handling Petroleum Products |
| (9) T/O 36A-1-4 | Procedures for Discharging Accumulated Static Electricity |
| (10) AFM 85-2 | Fire Hazard Preventive Maintenance Procedures |
| (11) T/O 36-1-121 | Policies Regarding Ground Servicing of Aircraft |
| (12) T/O 1B-47-511 | Single-Point Ground Refueling of B-47 Type Aircraft with Hydrant System |
| (13) SAC Reg 65-5 | Aircraft Refueling and Defueling Procedures |

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3. Food Service. Mobile kitchens will be used wherever feasible to enable feeding of crews and support personnel at the aircraft. (U)

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MAINTENANCE - ENGINEERING

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1. Purpose. The purpose of this section is to provide guidance for establishing a pre/post-strike maintenance support plan for B/RB-47, B/AP-36 and B/RB-52 aircraft. In developing the Base Maintenance Support Plan, maximum use of available personnel and equipment is required during the first few days of EWP until the Tactical Unit Staging Teams arrive from the Zone of the Interior.

2. General.

a. Pre-strike Requirements.

(1) SAC planning is based on the premise that approximately 86% of pre-strike aircraft will land in-commission at forward bases. Both SAC and this headquarters realize that facilities to support pre-strike operations are limited; however, the following action can be taken to increase the in-commission rate of pre-strike aircraft when necessary. (S)

(a) B/RB-47 aircraft engaged in pre-strike operations will normally arrive with a minimum of two mechanics aboard. These mechanics will be integrated into the task force maintenance organization. (S)

(b) Preparation of pre-strike aircraft will take priority over post-strike and recovery aircraft. (U)

(c) Cannibalization of Category C post-strike and recovery aircraft to satisfy pre-strike requirements is authorized. If none of these aircraft are on the station, cannibalization of selected pre-strike aircraft is also authorized. (U)

(d) A&E test equipment possessed by the in-place TDY wing will be available to support pre-strike aircraft. Aircraft requiring these facilities will be flown to the base where the equipment is located. This procedure is only effective if test equipment possessed by the TDY wing is compatible with the configuration of pre-striking aircraft. (U)

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(e) Grounded aircraft in post-strike recovery or pre-strike category may be used as test benches, if necessary. (U)

(2) The standard aircraft pre-flight check list will be used to determine in-commission status. Any deficiencies encountered will have to be measured against the mission requirements to determine if the aircraft is capable of being launched on a pre-strike mission. This determination will be made by the aircraft commander and maintenance officer, with final decision being referred to the task force commander, if necessary. (U)

3. Organization. (U)

a. The organization and functions for the pre/post-strike maintenance organization should be: (U)

(1) Chief of Maintenance. (U)

(a) Will organize and supervise the entire maintenance effort in a manner which will insure a maximum number of aircraft ready for further flight in the minimum length of time. (U)

(b) Is responsible for the organization and manning of the maintenance control branch, flight line activity, field maintenance shops, and the armament and electronics facilities, with available personnel and equipment. (U)

(c) Will prepare parking plans in coordination with operations that will afford the most expeditious type of servicing and maintenance. (U)

(d) Will have the ground power equipment, maintenance stands, and servicing equipment pre-positioned so that minimum time is lost in the accomplishment of the pre/post-strike servicing and maintenance. (U)

(e) A maintenance representative will meet each tactical aircraft, check the DD Form 781-2 for pilots remarks and discuss with the aircraft commander the work required to prepare aircraft for strike mission or post strike one time safe flight to Zone of the Interior as required. He will then confirm or change the category status given by the Aircraft Commander through the control tower. (C)

(2) Maintenance Control Branch. The Chief of Maintenance will designate the Base Flight Maintenance Officer, or other qualified officer, as the Maintenance Control Branch Officer. (U)

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(a) The Maintenance Control Branch Officer will organize and man the maintenance control branch with available personnel and equipment, i.e., radio, telephones, inter-communications system, status boards, and parking plans. (U)

(b) Will be responsible for keeping a detailed, accurate, and up-to-the-minute aircraft status. (U)

(c) Will have the primary responsibility for the submission of reports to operations control regarding aircraft status and status of maintenance in progress as required by Operations Control or Lancer Control. (U)

(d) Will be responsible for the establishment of priorities for the dispatch of specialists for the pre/post-strike maintenance support. (U)

(3) Flight Line. (U)

(a) Aircraft maintenance teams will be organized from the aircraft and engine mechanics in the base flight, aircraft structural repair, and propulsion branch. These men will be dispatched in the numbers necessary and to the aircraft designated by the control branch. Pre-flight inspections will be a joint effort between maintenance teams and the flight crew of the aircraft. (U)

(b) These teams must perform a visual inspection of all aircraft as battle damage could have been sustained unknown to the flight crew. (U)

(c) Up-to-the-minute status of all aircraft must be maintained for obvious reasons, but primarily in order that the dispersal capability can be evaluated at all times. When any change in status occurs on the aircraft, maintenance personnel must immediately relay the information to the control unit by the most expeditious method. (C)

(4) Field Maintenance. The Field Maintenance Officer in the supervision of his shops must direct the efforts of all his personnel toward the goal of placing the aircraft in commission as soon as possible. He should be the final authority on structural repairs, both temporary and otherwise. Field maintenance specialists will remain in shops and will be dispatched to the aircraft by the Maintenance Control Branch. (U)

(5) Armament and Electronics. (U)

(a) Armament and electronics specialists will remain in their shops and will be dispatched to the aircraft by the control branch. (U)

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(b) An A&E dispatch man will be furnished the control branch to assist in this function. (U)

(c) The Rotational Wing A&E Maintenance Squadron and Base A&E personnel, with the assistance of the ADS or Ammunition Section, will be responsible for arming/de-arming of aircraft firing system if the tactical situation demands hot weapons. (C)

(d) Armament - Electronics flight will be responsible for chaff loading if the tactical situation demands this function. For the performance of this function the A-E flight will be augmented by base teams previously trained in chaff loading operation. Chaff loading teams will remain on alert in the A-E dispatch section until dispatched for the loading operation. Chaff will be delivered in accordance with SAC Regulation 137-9.

(6) ADS - Ammunition Section. (U)

(a) ADS loading and salvage teams and equipment will remain on alert at ADS control point and will be dispatched to the aircraft by ADS control immediately upon release of aircraft by Maintenance Control for loading. (C)

(b) All necessary equipment and documents required to safe, off-load and receive nuclear weapons and components should be readily available. (C)

(c) Current operations orders will designate specific Aviation Depot Squadrons to provide special weapons support to bases where no ADS is assigned when these bases are assigned a B-47 or B-36 post-strike mission. (C)

(d) If turrets require arming, the Ammunition Section or the ADS, when assigned, will be responsible for delivery, loading and assisting the A&E personnel in arming/de-arming of aircraft firing systems as required. (C)

(e) If JATC units are required due to the tactical situation, delivery and loading will be accomplished by the ADS or the Ammunition Section upon notification from Maintenance Control. (C)

(f) The Aviation Depot Squadron will be responsible for off-loading weapons, as required, from post-strike aircraft. (C)

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SECTION IV**4. Type of Maintenance to be Accomplished. (U)**

a. Aircraft will be placed in maintenance categories in accordance with the maintenance brevity code used for reporting aircraft status. (Reference paragraphs 1b(1)(2) and (3), Section 1, of this Manual) No manhours will be expended on category "Charlie" aircraft until categories "Alpha" and "Bravo" aircraft have been returned to "safe for one-time flight" condition. Priorities must be established numerically within the three (3) alphabetical categories so that those aircraft requiring the least amount of maintenance will be completed first. (Note: Aircraft items and systems as shown in Go/No-Go Check Lists must be operational for one time flight to the ZI. (C)

b. The following is a list of equipment on the B/RE-47 aircraft that normally would fall within the post-strike maintenance concept. These items can be analyzed, repaired, or replaced, as personnel, equipment, and availability of spares would permit. (U)

(1) Power Plant: Fuel flow divider, fuel nozzles, fuel pump, stop-cocks, starter generators, alternator, ignition transformers, ignition vibrators, fire warning temperature bulbs, exhaust gas temperature (EGT) harness and thermocouples, oil pump, oil cooler, hydraulic pump, tail pipe, tail cone, shroud ring, and combustion chamber. (U)

(2) Aircraft Fuel System: Booster pumps. (U)

(3) Electrical System: Voltage regulators, reverse current relays, transfer relays, inverters, change-over relays, battery, voltmeter, ammeter, frequency meter, flap motors, landing gear motors. (U)

(4) Hydraulic System: Emergency hydraulic pump, surface control pumps, surface power packs actuators, nose wheel steering, brake system components, anti-skid detector system components, hydraulic pressure gauges. (U)

(5) Airframe: Main and outrigger tires, canopy closing and latching components, oxygen regulators, flow indicators, pressure gauges, pressure warning lights. (U)

(6) Instruments: (U)

(a) Engine. Tachometer, exhaust gas temperature (EGT) oil pressure, fuel pressure. (U)

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(b) Flight Instruments. Altimeter, airspeed, attitude gyro, directional gyro, bank and turn indicator, rate of climb, compass indicators. (U)

(7) Armament - Electronics: (U)

(a) Arm fire control system in accordance with paragraph 5a(29), Section I, and de-arm those aircraft in Category C in conjunction with ADS or Ammunition Section personnel as applicable. Category A and E aircraft will stow weapons at full up elevation and necessary precautions taken to preclude accidental firing of weapons. (C)

(b) Removal of camera magazine from aircraft and immediate delivery to Base Photo Lab. (U)

(c) Analyze, repair, and/or replacement within A&E maintenance flight capability of following equipment: (U)

1. Radio Set AN/ARC-27 (UHF). (U)
2. Radar Set AN/APX-6 (IFF). (U)
3. AN/ARN-14 OMNI Receiver/ARN-6 ADF Receiver. (U)
4. Compass N-1. (U)
5. Interphone AIC 10. (U)
6. Arm Fire Control System (See paragraph 5a(29), Section I). (C)

(d) Repair other communication and navigation aid equipment that will not interfere with the minimum time of placing other aircraft in commission. (U)

c. The following is a list of equipment on the B/RB-52 aircraft that normally would fall within the post-strike maintenance concept. These items can be analyzed, repaired, or replaced, as personnel, equipment and availability of spares would permit. (U)

(1) Power Plant: JFC-12 fuel control, fuel nozzles, fuel pump, starter, starter valve, fire warning thermocouple, exhaust gas temperature thermocouple, oil pump, oil cooler, tail pipe, tail cone and combustion chambers. (U)

(2) Aircraft Fuel Systems: Booster pumps, fuel transfer pumps and fuel valves. (U)

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(3) Electrical System: Alternator regulators, battery, voltmeter, ammeter, frequency meter, TR units, flap motor, watt var meter, load contactors, alternator circuit breakers and alternator relay. (U)

(4) Hydraulic System: Standby hydraulic pump, spoiler actuators, steering and brake system components, anti-skid components, hydraulic pressure gauges, hydraulic valves and fuses, brake metering valves, accumulators, four-way valves, de-boost valves, O-rings and back-up rings. (U)

(5) Pneudraulic Systems: Air conditioning pack, alternator drives and hydraulic pecks, gaskets and flexible ducts. (U)

(6) Airframe: Main and tip protection gear tires, oxygen regulators, converters, pressure gauges, pressure warning lights, entrance doors and escape hatches. (U)

(7) Instruments: (U)

(a) Engine. Tachometers, exhaust gas temperature gauges, oil pressure, fuel pressure, fuel flow and engine pressure ratio gauges. (U)

(b) Flight Instruments. Altimeter, airspeed, attitude gyro, directional gyro, bank and turn, rate of climb and compass indicator. (U)

(8) Armament and Electronics: (U)

(a) Arm fire control system in accordance with paragraph 5a(29), Section I, and de-arm those aircraft in Category C in conjunction with ADS or Ammunition Section personnel as applicable. Category A and B aircraft will stow weapons at full up elevation and necessary precautions will be taken to preclude accidental firing. (C)

(b) Removal of camera magazines and immediate delivery to base photo lab. (U)

(c) Analyzing, repair and/or replacement within A&E maintenance flight capability of following equipment. (U)

1. Radio Sets, (UHF) ARC-27. (U)
2. Radar Set (IFF) AFX-6 or AFX-25. (U)
2. OMNI or ADF Receiver. (U)
4. N-1 Compass. (U)

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2. AIC-10 Interphone. (U)

6. (HF) ARC-21. (U)

(d) Repair other communications and navigation aid equipment that will not interfere with the minimum time of placing other aircraft in commission. (U)

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SECTION V

LOGISTICS

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
1	Pre-Post-Strike Support	5 - 1
2	Equipment and Personnel Deficiencies	5 - 1
	1. <u>Pre/Post-Strike Support.</u> (U)	
	a. 44-58 Operations Orders prepared by each base will be used, insofar as possible, on all peacetime exercises involving the use of aircraft. (C)	
	b. 7AD Form 109 (Materiel time form for post-strike exercises) has been designed as a management tool for peacetime use and will be used as directed. (U)	
	2. <u>Equipment and Personnel Deficiencies.</u> In exercising the post-strike staging plan, particular attention will be directed to the adequacy of equipment and personnel authorizations. In all cases where deficiencies exist, as disclosed during operation of the plan, these deficiencies will be forwarded to Headquarters 7th Air Division, with justification for necessary changes to authorization documents and/or T/D's. (C)	

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SECTION VI

INTELLIGENCE

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
1	Purpose	6 - 1
2	Reports	6 - 1

1. Purpose.

a. The 7th Air Division post-strike bases have the following four basic intelligence support missions to perform prior to deployment of wing support personnel. The directives for implementing the functions listed below are contained in 7th Air Division 40 and 44 series operations orders. (C)

- (1) Interrogation and furnishing intelligence information to reporting teams. (U)
- (2) Courier requirements. (U)
- (3) PI support. (U)
- (4) Photo lab. (U)

b. In addition to the functions listed above, Brize Norton, Chelveston, and Lakenheath have the following additional support missions: (U)

- (1) Target Intelligence Center (U)
- (2) Intelligence Documents Library (U)

2. Reports. There are no special reports required by the Directorate of Intelligence. Reports will be submitted in accordance with SAC Manual 55-8, and as directed in 7th Air Division Operations Orders of the 40 series. (U)

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SECTION VII

TRANSPORTATION

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
1	Commercial Transportation.	7 - 1
2	Vehicles	7 - 1

1. Commercial Transportation. Commercial transportation services in support of peacetime exercises will be furnished by the responsible Commercial Transportation Officer. He will monitor all shipments of spares and insure the most expeditious means of transport available is utilized to deliver spares to their destination. (U)

2. Vehicles. Vehicles required for necessary transportation of crews, supporting personnel and material will be provided by maximum use of motor pool resources and vehicle maintenance personnel. Vehicle maintenance will be limited to emergency vehicles only during support of the mission. Due to limited personnel resources, base functions requiring vehicles will furnish drivers to the maximum extent possible. (U)

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SECTION VIII

PERSONNEL

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
1	Purpose.	8 - 1
2	Authority.	8 - 1

1. Purpose. (U)

a. Cross-Training of EWP Personnel to fulfill the requirements of this command in supporting a pre/post-strike operation is of vital concern. The objective is to provide a trained team that will be able, in the shortest possible time, to service and prepare aircraft for pre-strike launch to target or one-time flight gas station type service and minor maintenance for flight to the ZI for the number of aircraft involved in the EWP mission. Expansion of the cross-training program is encouraged as far as resources and equipment allow. It is not intended that the pre/post-strike maintenance personnel be capable of extensive or prolonged maintenance. (S)

b. Training of Individuals will be the responsibility of Base Commanders. Training will be conducted with the TDY bomb wing present on the station, and continued, added to, or deleted from, by successive TDY bomb wings as the EWP mission may require. Qualified supervisors of the TDY unit will be utilized as instructors. (U)

2. Authority. The EWP Cross-Training Program will be conducted in accordance with 7th Air Division Regulation 50-3, dated 18 February 1957. (U)

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SECTION IX

SECTION IX

SECURITY

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
1	General.	9 - 1
2	Security	9 - 1
3	Defense.	9 - 2

1. General. The following instructions are furnished for security planning purposes in the execution of a pre/post-strike staging operation. (Reference is made to Annex "L", 7th Air Division Operations Order 44-58). (C)

2. Security. (U)

a. During peacetime Air Police are not pre-positioned to provide point security for aircraft in the United Kingdom or in other post-strike staging bases. Total of 2 officers and 40 airmen have been pre-positioned at post-strike bases to provide marginal internal security defense and law enforcement functions. (C)

b. Area security is provided for local fixed Category I items. (C)

c. Under EMP conditions aircraft will be on the ground a minimum time necessary to prepare for pre-strike launch to target, or for a one-time return flight to the ZI. Security requirements must be met by crew and maintenance personnel working on the aircraft. (C)

d. Emergency deployment of Air Police necessitated by unforeseen changes in pre/post-strike operations may be accomplished as prescribed in 7AD Reg 125-3. Air Police deployed from parent stations to satellite stations will be equipped insofar as possible in accordance with SAC Manual 400-1. (C)

e. A two-shift schedule will be utilized by Air Police during peacetime exercises. (U)

f. Special security measures governing the security of special weapons and their components, and personnel connected with their employment will be as outlined in Annex "E", 7th Air Division Operations Order 44-58 and SAC Reg 205-7. (S)

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3. Defense. (U)

a. Each air base commander will be responsible for defense plans developed in accordance with current directives that will be implemented as required. (U)

b. Under EWP conditions, primary responsibility for external defense of the base is incumbent upon British Forces as outlined in British Defense Plan, "Knock-Out". (C)

c. A limited holding action base defense capability will be established comprising a nucleus of Air Police personnel within the limits of available manpower and equipment. (C)

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SECTION X

SURGEON

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
1	General.	10 - 1
2	Responsibilities	10 - 1

1. General. Under the present concept of operational flying for prolonged periods of time, the problem of excessive crew fatigue is of the greatest importance. The problem is further aggravated when crew members, who have been airborne for many hours, land at a base and are committed to be airborne again in a very short period of time for another long period of flying. The medical aspects in such a situation are numerous and varied. The Base Surgeon must be prepared to utilize all his resources to provide the best professional care possible for these crew members in this short, critical period on a twenty-four hour basis. (C)

2. Responsibilities. (U)

a. It will be the responsibility of the Base Surgeon: (U)

(1) To insure that sufficient medical personnel and equipment will be ready for use on the line. Insure the availability of facilities from which to operate at or near the operations area. (U)

(2) To supervise or monitor the proper feeding of crew members on a twenty-four hour basis. The operation of any flight line kitchen will be carefully supervised to insure the maintenance of only the highest sanitary standards. (U)

(3) Supervise and monitor all crew rest facilities. (U)

(4) Study current methods used for interrogation, briefing and de-briefing and make pertinent recommendations designed to afford all crew members the maximum amount of time for crew rest. (U)

(5) Establish local SOP's designed to combat fatigue of all aircrew members as well as flight line maintenance personnel. (U)

(6) To insure that a flight surgeon or medical officer general duty, meets all incoming crew members and renders on-the-spot medical advise and treatment as required or arranges immediate first aid care and further medical evacuation if required. (U)

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SECTION XI

SECTION XI

CHAPLAIN

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
1	General.	11 - 1

1. General.

a. Base Chaplains will furnish the following support to personnel on staging operations: (U)

(1) Establish in addition to normal religious program a period of worship and acts of religion. (U)

(2) During landings and departures of aircraft, one Chaplain at each base will be available on the flight lines for emergencies, and one Chaplain will be available in the Base Hospital for assistance to sick or wounded. (U)

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7AIRDIV SUPPLEMENT-1)
TO SAC REG 50-42)

SAC REG 50-42/7AIRDIV SUP-1
DC
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York, 7 August 1957

TRAINING

Bombing and Evaluation Missions
(RCS: SAC T-27)

(Supersedes 7th AirDiv Sup 1, 22 May 56 to SAC REG 50-42)

NOTE: File in front of SAC REG 50-42, 11 Feb 55.

See paragraph 1.

To establish procedures for conducting the 7th Air Division Orientation and Evaluation Mission. This mission is designed not only to evaluate the crews on London RBS Site, but to familiarize the crews and staff with United Kingdom and French terrain, traffic control and letdown and approach procedures.

See paragraph 3.

This Supplement applies to all rotational bombardment and reconnaissance wings while TDY to the United Kingdom.

See paragraph 4.

- d. (Added) The wing commander will take action to:
- (1) Insure that provisions of this supplement are complied with.
 - (2) Insure that the wing staff adequately briefs crews on the targets assigned.
 - (3) Insure that detailed mission planning is accomplished by individual crews in accordance with SAC Manual 50-12.
 - (4) Insure that adequate security measures are taken during all target study periods, Ultrasonic Trainer periods and briefings.
 - (5) Insure that 7th Air Division Testing Team receives 100% crew participation on Navigator examinations.

See paragraph 5.

c. (Added) As a result of the distance limitations in the United Kingdom, the flight restrictions outlined in paragraph 5a above cannot be complied with. However, crews will not be scheduled for other training missions

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SAC REG 50-24/7AIRDIV SUP-1
Page 2

after arrival in the United Kingdom until they have completed the 7th Air Division Orientation/Evaluation Mission.

See paragraph 6.

f. (Added) Parent Air Force Headquarters will issue RBS target materials on London Bomb Plot to units prior to deployment. Units will be expected to prepare their own target folders from these materials. Materials as follows will be furnished for the London Complex.

- (1) RBS target data sheet.
- (2) Series 100TCC, annotated with targets.
- (3) Series 25 TCM, as required.
- (4) Large scale annotated aerial photography on each target or off-set aiming point.
- (5) Small scale aerial photography.
- (6) Selected APQ-24, K-System or MA 7 radar scope photos.
- (7) Selected 35MM radar scope film strips with logs.
- (8) Available ground photos of each target and off-set aiming point.

See paragraph 9f.

Since the 7th Air Division Orientation/Evaluation exercise is the first mission flown by a new unit in this theater and is primarily for the purpose of area indoctrination and familiarization it will be planned so that landings occur during the best weather period. This in effect means that radar bombing will be conducted during daylight hours.

See paragraph 10b(2)(b) and (d)

Due to distance limitations in the United Kingdom, aircraft which approach no closer than the IP will be counted as air aborts but, if scheduled time permits, may be rescheduled for another mission against this target and receive evaluation credit.

See paragraph 14c.

(3) (Added) The reports in (1) and (2) above will be submitted through this Headquarters.

SAC REG 50-42/7AIRDIV SUP-1
Page 3

(4) (Added) In addition to the above report the following information will be furnished to Operations Training Division, this Headquarters (Peppercorn Ext 9, Ring 1), not later than 1700 local on each day the Orientation/Evaluation Mission is in progress:


- (a) Number of aircraft scheduled.
- (b) Number of air aborts.
- (c) Number of ground aborts.
- (d) Number of aircraft scored by London Bomb Plot.

19. (Added) Observer Examinations: Immediately upon the wings arrival in the United Kingdom a 7th Air Division team will administer a written examination to all bombardment navigators scheduled to participate in the Orientation/Evaluation Mission. The examination is designed to measure the observers knowledge of the RBS target assigned for the evaluation. It will be graded by the 7th Air Division team and must be completed with a minimum grade of 70%.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION: S Plus X

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 HQ 2AF
 HQ 8AF
 HQ 15AF


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

7AD SUPPLEMENT-2)
TO AFR 55-34)

AFR 55-34/7ADSUP-2
OI
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
7 October 1957

OPERATIONS

Reducing Flight Disturbances that Cause Adverse Public Reactions

NOTE: File in front of AFR 55-34, 29 June 1955.


See AFR 55-34.

9. (ADDED) COORDINATION WITH THIS HEADQUARTERS. Commanders, including commanders of TDY units, will send copies of all written noise complaints and a brief synopsis of all verbal noise complaints to this headquarters, attention: Chief of Information, as soon as possible after receipt. A follow-up report of action taken by the Commander or noise abatement committee on complaints, plus any other pertinent factors bearing on noise problems also will be sent to this headquarters.

10. (ADDED) RECORDS DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS. Written noise complaints and follow-up reports will be destroyed after 2 years, paragraph 618, AFM 181-5, 1 July 1956.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

STAFF MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 55-2)

7ADSM 55-2
DO
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
28 October 1957

OPERATIONS

Utilization of 7th Air Division Command Aircraft

(EFFECTIVE 1 NOVEMBER 1957)

1. **PURPOSE.** To outline procedures for use of 7th Air Division Command aircraft based at Northolt.
2. **SCOPE.** The provisions of this Staff Memorandum apply to all staff agencies and pilots of this headquarters.
3. **PROCEDURE.** a. Use of Command aircraft will normally be restricted to the Command Section and Staff Directors. Directors requiring use of Command Section aircraft will forward request to the Chief of Staff. If approved, the Office of the Chief of Staff will provide the Flight Control Division with the following information: (The same information will be provided for Command Section flights).
 - (1) Purpose of flight.
 - (2) Complete itinerary.
 - (3) Take off landing times for complete itinerary.
 - (4) Crew (Pilot and Co-Pilot) if available.
 - (5) Passenger list.
 - (6) Office and phone of agency originating request.
4. **DUTIES OF FLIGHT CONTROL, OPERATIONS BRANCH.** a. After receiving notification from the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Operations Branch of Flight Control Division will:
 - (1) Assign crew, if none were listed in original request.
 - (2) Advise administration section, DO of names of aircrew and itinerary so that flight orders may be requested.
 - (3) Advise Northolt RAF of scheduled flight and make all arrangements for customs, immigration, weather briefing, etc.

7ADSM 55-2

(4) Be the only agency to contact RAF Northolt for all changes that may occur after submission of flight request.


5. GENERAL. a. All changes i.e. Take off times, dates, routes etc., will be phoned to the Flight Control Division by the aircraft commander or original requesting staff agency. Any significant change in itinerary must be approved by the Chief of Staff.

b. If crew members are not included in original request, they will be assigned by Flight Control from available pilots or in accordance with 7AD Staff Memo 55-6, as amended. Staff agencies assigned responsibility of manning Northolt based aircraft in accordance with above Staff Memo may substitute similar qualified pilots from their own agency if departure of listed pilot would adversely affect the agency efficiency.

c. Only pilots completely checked out with filing, clearances, approach and landing procedures at Northolt are eligible to act as aircraft commander.

d. Names of crew members must be submitted sufficiently in advance to allow preparation of flight orders. Using agency will be responsible for requesting letter orders for entire personnel involved, including airmen crew members, if required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

7AD REGULATION)
NUMBER 60-3)

*7ADR 60-3
DS
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
29 October 1957

FLYING

Minimum Weather Requirements

(EFFECTIVE 15 NOVEMBER 1957)

1. PURPOSE. To establish procedures to insure safety of flight at all 7th Air Division bases.
2. SCOPE. The limitations prescribed by this regulation apply to all pilots operating aircraft assigned to 7th Air Division organizations excluding tactical units.
3. PROCEDURE.
 - a. Take-Off minimums:
 - (1) White card pilot - 300' ceiling, one mile visibility (AFR 60-16).
 - (2) Green card pilot - Published field let down minimum when GCA is operational, or 100' ceiling, 1/4 mile visibility with acceptable alternate within 100 miles.
 - b. Landing Minimums: All Pilots. Published letdown minimums.
 - c. Pilots will call GCA prior to take-off in IFR conditions to insure two-way radio contact with the unit, should an immediate return to the field become necessary.
 - d. Pilots are responsible for insuring that adequate radio crystals are aboard aircraft to satisfactorily perform proposed flight.
 - e. Cross wind Take-Off and Landing Limitations.
 - (1) All pilots operating aircraft assigned to 7th Air Division will comply with the below listed take-off and landing chart. When wind velocity (including gusts) exceed these figures, such pilots will not take off or land except during an emergency condition which is of the nature to preclude other courses of action.

*Supersedes 7ADR 62-2, 21 Aug 57.

7ADR 60-3

TAKE-OFF AND LANDING WIND CHART

Acft	Wind Direction in Deg of Crosswind	Max Wind	Crosswind Angle					Maximum Wind Component
			15°	30°	45°	70°	90°	
C-47	Wind Velocity Limitations	35	35	30	22	17	15	15
C-119 or C-54	Wind Velocity Limitations	60	50	45	40	35	30	30


(2) When wind conditions exceed the figures shown in the above chart, the tower operator will advise pilots that the wind condition is above field limitations.

(3) Pilots not assigned or attached to this command will be advised that existing wind conditions exceed limitations established by this command and that landing or take-off will be at the pilot's discretion.

(4) Landings and take-offs will normally be made as nearly as possible into the wind. Only under emergency conditions will they be made downwind above the calm wind component.

4. VIOLATIONS. Violations of this directive will be reported to this headquarters by the Air Base Commander within 72 hours.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


 HAROLD J. GEBHART
 Lt Colonel, USAF
 Adjutant

7ADR REGULATION)
NUMBER 60-4)

*7ADR 60-4
DS
TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
5 New York, New York
29 October 1957

Pilot C
for Flight

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1. PURPOSE. To
flight plan/record and
qualified prior to flight
aircraft assigned to t

or a standard
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2. SCOPE. The provisions of this regulation apply to all
pilots operating aircraft assigned to this command.

3. PROCEDURES. a. Flight Plans and Logs.

(1) Before take-off on all flights outside the local
flying area, the aircraft commander will complete the flight plan
section of USAFE Form 178, Flight Plan and Record.

(2) The flight log section of the flight plan/log
will be accomplished by the co-pilot during the progress of the
planned flight.

(3) A duplicate copy of the flight plan signed by
the aircraft commander will be submitted to operations with the
original copy of the DD Form 175 or ICAO Flight Plan.

b. Pilot Qualifications.

(1) Prior to being cleared as aircraft commander of
aircraft assigned to this command, newly assigned and/or attached
pilots will be required to demonstrate to an Air Base instructor
pilot proficiency in instrument flying procedures and technique,
normal operation of the aircraft and knowledge of emergency pro-
cedures.

(2) Before being cleared for flight operations out-
side the local flying area as aircraft commander, newly assigned
and/or attached pilots will perform co-pilot duties on a minimum
of one flight involving useage of USAFE Form 178.

*Supersedes 7ADR 62-7, 2 Dec 54.

7ADR 60-4

(3) Before being considered qualified as aircraft commander in Base aircraft, each newly assigned and/or attached pilot will complete a three hour link trainer course to include radio range orientation, ADF and aural null homing, and one cross country flight on airways in a congested area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

DECLASSIFICATION

7ADR 60-4

SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONS BY AIR BASE GROUP OR AIR BASE SQUADRONS	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 3909ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3918ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3910ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3920ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3911ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3917ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3913ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3919ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3914ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/>			ORGANIZATION 1ST AVN DEPOT SQ 2D AVN DEPOT SQ 4TH AVN DEPOT SQ 6TH AVN DEPOT SQ 3915TH AIR BASE SQ 3928TH AIR BASE SQ 3929TH AIR BASE SQ 3930TH AIR BASE SQ 3921ST RECON TECH SQ 485TH COMM SQUADRON TDY WING TDY DETACHMENTS DISPENSARY TOTAL TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT (columns 2 and 3) FOR STOCK SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION AIR UNIVERSITY 1 Copy HISTORIAN 3 Copies SAC 5 Copies
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D/OPERATIONS	1	BASE D/OPERATIONS	3	BASE D/OPERATIONS	3	3929TH AIR BASE SQ	1
D/MATERIEL	1	BASE PERSONNEL		BASE PERSONNEL		3930TH AIR BASE SQ	1
D/PLANS	1	CHAPLAIN		CHAPLAIN		3921ST RECON TECH SQ	1
D/INTELLIGENCE	1	INFORMATION SERVICES		INFORMATION SERVICES		485TH COMM SQUADRON	1
D/SECURITY	1	JUDGE ADVOCATE		JUDGE ADVOCATE		TDY WING	1
CHAPLAIN		HEADQUARTERS SQ	1	PROVOST MARSHAL		TDY DETACHMENTS	1
D/COMPTROLLER	1	OPERATIONS SQUADRON	1	DISPENSARY			
INSPECTOR GENERAL	1	AIR POLICE SQUADRON					
JUDGE ADVOCATE		FOOD SERVICE SQ					
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SURGEON	1	TRANSPORTATION SQ					
HEADQUARTERS SQ SEC	1	SUPPLY SQUADRON					
D/SAFETY	3	DISPENSARY					
D/INS-ENG	1	FIELD MAINT SQ					
DETACHMENT 1	1						
Stock	10	Stock	2	Stock	1		
TOTAL	29	TOTAL	10	TOTAL	7		
REMARKS							
TOTAL							10
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION							10

11Q 7AD FORM 8
7 JUN 57

7AD SUPPLEMENT-1)
TO AFR 55-22)

*AFR 55-22/7ADSUP-1
DO
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
6 November 1957

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OPERATIONS

Operations of Air Force - Ground-Controlled Approach System

(RCS: 7AD-DO-U16)

(EFFECTIVE 15 NOVEMBER 1957)

NOTE: File in front of AFR 55-22, 1 May 1957.

See paragraph 2b(8).

(a) (Added) Aircraft commanders of aircraft with high explosives aboard will comply with AFR 55-14 and TO-11N-20-1001.

(b) (Added) When notified by this headquarters, commanders of rotational bomb wings and refueling wings in the United Kingdom will, insofar as practicable, schedule practice runs at the 7th Air Division station(s) requiring runs for the period.

(c) (Added) Base Commanders will monitor their GCA facilities throughout the month to ascertain that the minimum number of runs required by AFR 55-22 are being obtained. If at the 20th of the month the base commander determines that it is not within his capability to obtain the minimum runs required he will request aid by telephoning "Peppercorn Control".

(d) (Added) Each 7th Air Division base on which a GCA unit is located, and operational, will be required to report to this headquarters by letter each month:

1. Total number of GCA runs made by all types of aircraft during the month.

2. Total number of GCA runs made by B-47 aircraft during the month.

3. Total number of GCA runs made by C-47 aircraft during the month.

4. Total number of landings made by all types of aircraft during the month.

5. Remarks: Indicate what action has been taken to obtain additional GCA runs and the success and/or extenuating circumstances contributing to the inability to obtain the desired number of runs, if applicable.

*Supersedes SACR 55-1/7ADSUP-1, 2 Aug 56.

AFR 55-22/7ADSUP-1

(e) (Added) This report will be prepared as of the last day of the month and dispatched by mail so as to arrive at 7th Air Division Headquarters, ATTN: DOFC, not later than the 7th calendar day following the as-of date.

(f) (Added) Records Disposition Instructions:

1. Reports retained by preparing and intermediate headquarters will be destroyed after 6 months, paragraph 6Ob, AFM 181-5, 1 July 1956.


2. Copies retained by the requesting activity will be disposed of in accordance with paragraph 60a, AFM 181-5, 1 July 1956.

7. (ADDED) Report required in paragraph 2b(8)(e) above, this supplement, is assigned Reports Control Symbol: 7AD-DO-U16.

8. (ADDED) "D" DAY STATUS. a. In the event of hostilities the report required in paragraph 2b(8)(e) above will be discontinued. (Code D)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION: S


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

7AD SUPPLEMENT-1)
TO AFR 60-16)

*AFR 60-16/7ADSUP-1
DS
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
14 November 1957

241

FLYING

Air Traffic, Basic Clearance and General Flight Regulations

(EFFECTIVE 1 DECEMBER 1957)

NOTE: File in front of AFR 60-16, 23 Jul 56.


See paragraph 22.

c. (Added) The attached Check List will be placed in each aircraft assigned to this Command. This Check List will be used when briefing passengers in accordance with paragraph 22b of AFR 60-16.

d. (Added) Records Dispositon Instructions for Check List as required by this Supplement are as follows: Check Lists will be destroyed after they have served the purpose for which they were created, paragraph 56, AFM 181-5, July 1956.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Check List


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

*Supersedes 7ADR 62-3, 3 Nov 55

DISTRIBUTION				FILS ORIGINALS DIRECTIVE AFR 60-16/7ADSUP-1	
SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3909ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3918ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3910ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3920ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3911ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3917ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3913ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3919ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3914ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
AGENCY		ORGANIZATION		ORGANIZATION	
NR	CYS	NR	CYS	NR	CYS
CHIEF OF STAFF	1	ADJUTANT	3	ADJUTANT	3
ADJUTANT	2	BASE COMPTROLLER		BASE COMPTROLLER	
D/PERSONNEL	1	BASE MATERIEL		BASE MATERIEL	
D/OPERATIONS	1	BASE D/OPERATIONS	3	BASE D/OPERATIONS	3
D/MATERIEL	1	BASE PERSONNEL		BASE PERSONNEL	
D/PLANS	1	CHAPLAIN		CHAPLAIN	
D/INTELLIGENCE	1	INFORMATION SERVICES		INFORMATION SERVICES	
D/SECURITY	1	JUDGE ADVOCATE		JUDGE ADVOCATE	
CHAPLAIN		HEADQUARTERS SQ	1	PROVOST MARSHAL	
D/COMPTROLLER		OPERATIONS SQUADRON	3	DEPENSARY	
INSPECTOR GENERAL	1	AIR POLICE SQUADRON			
JUDGE ADVOCATE	1	FOOD SERVICE SQ			
OFF OF INFORMATION	1	INSTALLATIONS SQ			
SURGEON	1	TRANSPORTATION SQ			
HEADQUARTERS EQ SEC	1	SUPPLY SQUADRON			
D/SAFETY	3	DEPENSARY			
D/INS-ENG	1	FIELD MAINT SQ			
DETACHMENT 1	1				
Stock	10	Stock	2	Stock	1
TOTAL	29	TOTAL	12	TOTAL	7
REMARKS					
TOTAL					9
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION					142

HQ TAD FORM 8
7 JUN 57

PASSENGER BRIEFING CHECK LIST

1. Pre-flight Briefing
 - a. Use of seat belts.
 - b. Location and use of emergency exits.
 - c. Proper fit and use of parachutes.
 - d. Use of flotation and survival equipment.
 - e. Smoking rules.
 - f. Alarm signals and emergency procedures.
 - g. Enroute altitude.
 - h. Destination and alternate.
 - i. Weather conditions.
 - j. Time to destination and alternate.
2. In-flight Information
 - a. Flight engineer designated jumpmaster.
 - b. When to smoke and when not to smoke.
 - c. When to fasten safety belts.
 - d. When to wear life vests and survival equipment.
 - e. Location of latrine and sick cups.
3. Post-flight Information.
 - a. Unloading of baggage.
 - b. Transportation facilities.
 - c. Customs procedures as necessary.
 - d. Reporting place and time for takeoff if passengers are remaining with the aircraft.

Incl 1 to 7ADSUP-1 to AFR 60-16

SECRET7AD REGULATION)
NUMBER 50-6)*7ADR 50-6
DO
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
15 November 1957

TRAINING

242

APD-4 Operating Procedures

(EFFECTIVE 1 DECEMBER 1957)

1. PURPOSE. To establish a standing operating procedure for correlation of data intercepted by conventional intercept equipment with that data recorded by the AN/APD-4 electronic intercept system. (C)
2. SCOPE. This directive is applicable to all reconnaissance units under control of 7th Air Division possessing aircraft equipped with the AN/APD-4 system, as well as other intercept receivers. (C)
3. PROCEDURES. Every effort will be made to associate priority intercepts logged from normal intercept receivers, and auxiliary equipment capable of high order accuracy, to data recorded by the APD-4 system. The following procedures will be used to effect this result. (S)
 - a. A separate log will be maintained for the APD-4 system. (See Inclosure 4). Form will be prepared locally. (U)
 - b. All antennas will be operational in sensitive area unless unwanted signals become so numerous as to saturate the display. (U)
 - c. Accurate entries of time on and off of audio recorders will be noted. (U)
 - d. Entries in the log of specific signals of interest will include channel designator, time of observation, antenna number, polarization, coincidence marker, sweep rate, associated signal number and magnetic heading. (U)
 - e. Data card will be exposed during each turn, whenever practicable. (U)
 - f. Audio Recording: (U)
 - (1) Aircraft having a single audio recorder for use by APD-4 and other intercept equipment will follow procedures as outlined in 7AD current 60 plan and SAC Regulation 55-21. (U)

*Supersedes Annex I, ECM SOP No. 5, February 1956

7AD C-7372

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3 PAGES**SECRET**

7ADR 50-6

SECRET

(2) Aircraft equipped with an audio recorder for use only with APD-4 system will operate as follows: (U)

(a) The audio recorder will remain in continuous operation during the time that the aircraft is in the sensitive area. SAC Regulation 55-21, will apply to all voice annotations. (S)

(b) In the event of malfunctioning of recording camera, the antenna assembly that is not looking towards the sensitive area will be turned off, and the audio recorder will remain on for the duration of the reconnaissance. (S)

(c) A time annotation at the beginning of the audio recording, and at ten minute intervals thereafter during the recording, will be made by the operator. Sign off of the recording will include appropriate voice annotations as outlined in SAC Regulation 55-21. (U)

(d) Recording magazines will be numbered (consecutively and noted by serial number in remarks column of the log). (U)

(e) Voice identification of specific signals of interest during the course of a mission will include time of observation, antenna number of the highest pulse, polarity, and associated signal number from other equipment, if available. For clarity of recording, interference from other radars may be reduced by antenna assembly selection. Recording of specific signals of interest will follow SAC Regulation 55-21 and 7AD current 60 plan. (U)

g. Camera Recording - To provide a rapid method of editing film recordings, the following procedures will apply: (U)

(1) The data card will be exposed during each major turning point. (U)

(2) Recording clocks will be closely checked and synchronized with navigation clocks prior to going on watch. Time lost or gained during on watch will be indicated on log. (U)

(3) Data card will include mission number, aircraft tail number, date of mission, and operator's name. (U)

4. LOGGING PROCEDURES. (S)

a. Enter channel on which signal of interest appears. (U)

b. All time entries will be GMT. (U)

c. Enter antenna closest to point of maximum deflection. If equal on two antennas, enter both. (U)

d. Enter polarity observed on APD-4. (U)

SECRET


SECRET

7ADR 50-6

- e. Enter an "X" if co-incidence marker appears. (U)
- f. Enter sweep rate in seconds between major lobes. (U)
- g. Enter associated signal number from the position producing the co-incidence mark. (U)
- h. Enter times when recorder is turned on. (U)
- i. Enter magnetic heading from repeater compass. (U)
- j. In the remarks section, record the recording magazine numbers and any other data, as appropriate, to aid in the reduction of the raw material to Intelligence, i.e., any change in mode of operation. (S)
- k. In the attenuation column, enter the time, channel and gain of new setting whenever the gain of a channel is changed. (U)
- l. When a channel is interrupted, or when a tracking signal is present, the time of start and stop of interruption sequence will be noted in appropriate column. (S)
- m. Place a dash (-) in any column for which no information was obtained. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Inclosure (Uncl)
APD-4 LOG


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

*SACR 66-13/7ADSUP-1

7AD SUPPLEMENT-1)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)

TO SACR 66-13)

DM
APO 125 New York, New York

21 November 1957

MAINTENANCE-ENGINEERING

(Unclassified) Combat Readiness-Aircraft Bombing Systems

(EFFECTIVE 1 DECEMBER 1957)

NOTE: File in front of SACR 66-13, 27 Apr 56.

7. (ADDED) REPORTS. (U)

a. Within ten days subsequent to arrival of a rotational wing in the United Kingdom, the Aviation Depot Squadron will inspect all aircraft bomb suspension systems to insure their capability to meet EWP commitments. (C)

b. A report will be submitted to the Wing Commander listing the aircraft not capable and reasons. An information copy of this report will be forwarded by message (TWX) to this headquarters. (U)

c. If all aircraft are determined capable, this headquarters will be notified accordingly by message (TWX). (U)

8. (ADDED) EXCEPTIONS. This Supplement is not applicable to aircraft participating in Operation Reflex Action. (U)

9. (ADDED) RECORDS DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS. Reports required by this directive will be destroyed when they have served the purpose for which created, paragraph 56, AFM 181-5, 1 July 1956. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Harold J. Gebhart
HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

7AD C-6344

*Supersedes 7ADR 137-3, 23 Mar 55, and 7ADR 137-3A, 20 Mar 56.

COPY 53 OF 63 COPIES

1 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION						PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE 7ADJOP-1 to SACN 66-13	
SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED BY AN AIR BASE GROUP OR AIR BASE SQUADRON	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3909ABGP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3918ABGP	<input type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ	<input type="checkbox"/> 3917ABSQ	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3910ABGP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3920ABGP	<input type="checkbox"/> 3913ABSQ	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3919ABSQ	1ST AVN DEPOT SQ	3
		<input type="checkbox"/> 3911ABGP		<input type="checkbox"/> 3914ABSQ		2D AVN DEPOT SQ	3
		<input type="checkbox"/>				4TH AVN DEPOT SQ	3
		<input type="checkbox"/>				6TH AVN DEPOT SQ	3
AGENCY	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	3915TH AIR BASE SQ	
CHIEF OF STAFF		ADJUTANT	3	ADJUTANT	3	3928TH AIR BASE SQ	
ADJUTANT	2	BASE COMPTROLLER		BASE COMPTROLLER		3929TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/PERSONNEL		BASE MATERIEL	1	BASE MATERIEL	1	3930TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/OPERATIONS	1	BASE D/OPERATIONS		BASE D/OPERATIONS		3921ST RECON TECH SQ	
D/MATERIEL	1	BASE PERSONNEL		BASE PERSONNEL		485TH COMM SQUADRON	
D/PLANS		CHAPLAIN		CHAPLAIN		TDY WING	
D/INTELLIGENCE		INFORMATION SERVICES		INFORMATION SERVICES		TDY DETACHMENTS	
D/SECURITY		JUDGE ADVOCATE		JUDGE ADVOCATE		TOTAL	12
CHAPLAIN		HEADQUARTERS SQ		PROVOST MARSHAL		TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT (coln 2 and 3) FOR STOCK	
D/COMPTROLLER		OPERATIONS SQUADRON		DISPENSARY		SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION	
INSPECTOR GENERAL		AIR POLICE SQUADRON				AIR UNIVERSITY 1 Copy	
JUDGE ADVOCATE		FOOD SERVICE SQ				HISTORIAN 3 Copies	
OFF OF INFORMATION		INSTALLATIONS SQ				SAC 5 Copies	
SURGEON		TRANSPORTATION SQ				Hq 15AF 1 Copy	
HEADQUARTERS SQ SEC		SUPPLY SQUADRON				Hq 2AF 1 Copy	
D/SAFETY		DISPENSARY				Hq 8AF 1 Copy	
D/INS-ENG		FIELD MAINT SQ					
DETACHMENT 1							
Stock	10	Stock	1	Stock	1		
TOTAL	14	TOTAL	5	TOTAL	5		
REMARKS							
						TOTAL 12	
						TOTAL DISTRIBUTION 63	

HQ 7AO FORM 8
7 JUN 67

7AD REGULATION)
NUMBER 92-3)

7ADR 92-3
D/ENG
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
25 November 1957

FIRE PROTECTION AND AIRCRAFT RESCUE

Fire Department Response Procedures

(EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1958)

244

1. PURPOSE. To establish and standardize procedures within this command for the accomplishment of:
 - a. The assignment of fire priority response numbers in sequence consistent with the value to the war effort of the building, area, and/or contents involved.
 - b. Implementing a fire department pre-plan of all fire-fighting operations by preparing a written and graphic plan covering all buildings or areas within the base.
 - c. Initiation of a running card assignment system consisting of a master card system wherein individually numbered cards require the response of certain apparatus or companies in sequence to a given location.
2. SCOPE. This regulation is applicable to all Installations of this command which are protected by USAF fire departments.
3. RESPONSIBILITY.
 - a. The Commander of each Installation will assure compliance with the provisions of this regulation and will establish a Board to assign Fire Priority Response Numbers.
 - b. The Base Installations Engineer and Fire Chief will be charged with the final completion, executing, and periodic review of the system outlined herein.
4. PROCEDURE.
 - a. Establishment of Fire Response Priority Numbers.
 - (1) The assignment of fire response priority numbers will be made by a Board consisting of the Base Defense Officer, Base Operations Officer, Director of Materiel, Installations Engineer, the Fire Chief and/or other individuals as deemed necessary or expedient by the Base Commander.
 - (2) Fire response priority numbers will be assigned to buildings, areas or activities (herein after referred to as "Unit") based on the following:

7ADR 92-3

(a) Priority Number 1. Only those units the loss of which would completely nullify the base EWP mission capability.

(b) Priority Number 2.

1. Units the loss of which would seriously hamper the base EWP mission capability.

2. Units where the possibility of the loss of numerous lives would usually or frequently be present, i.e.; dependent schools, hospitals, clubs, theaters, etc.

(c) Priority Number 3.

1. Those Units the loss of which would have an adverse effect on the efficient accomplishment of the EWP mission.

2. Those Units where the destruction of the building and/or contents by fire would result in a monetary loss in excess of \$50,000 (paragraph 6, AFR 92-3).

(d) Priority Number 4. The Units not covered above which contribute to the normal requirements of morale, health, and welfare of base personnel.

(e) Priority Number 5. All other units.

b. Pre-plan of Firefighting: In order that a realistic and comprehensive pre-plan of firefighting may be determined it will be necessary for the fire department to physically survey each unit to determine the best routes of approach for the first alarm apparatus; water sources to be used; building peculiarities, i.e., entry points, interior partitions and/or obstructions, material which may be burning, etc.; hose laying methods applicable to the physical layout of streets (or the lack of streets), barriers or obstructions; direction of prevailing winds and various other items typical to the "size-up" of a fire situation.

c. Running Card Assignment System: To facilitate quick and adequate but not excessive dispatch of fire companies to any emergency requiring the assignment of multiple fire companies will necessitate a degree of pre-planning based on the physical layout of the base in the vicinity of the building or area to which response is to be made; the hazard likely to be encountered based on the priority number, contents, physical layout inside the building, building constructions, etc. distance to water sources and the quantity of water which may be expected from them, how many and types of fire apparatus available for

7ADR 92-3

response; and numerous other factors peculiar to the Installation. SAC Regulation 92-12, will be used as one of the guides in determining vehicle assignments. The original planning for the first alarm assignment will be based on the assumption that only one emergency will occur at any one time. The possibility of a second and distinct emergency will be provided for in the "cover-in" column. The assignment of vehicles for this purpose will be consistent with the type and number available and their suitability for the kind of emergency to be expected at that Unit. Consideration will be given to alerting and later requesting the response of mutual aid fire brigades.

d. 7AD Form 28 , Fire Department Response Card.

(1) Two sets of completed 7AD Form 28 will be established.

(2) One set of cards, indexed by unit numbers, will be completed for each building or area (as indicated in paragraph 4d(4) below). This set will constitute the permanent alarm-room file, and will be for the exclusive use of the alarm operator/dispatcher. The use of this file will insure the prompt response of the correct apparatus as established by the running card assignment system. The only standard exception to the dispatch of equipment in accordance with the running card assignment system will be as outlined in paragraph 4f of SAC Regulation 92-12.

(3) A similar set of cards for use of the Chief in charge of the first responding companies will be prepared as above in paragraph 4d(2). This second set will have attached, to the reverse side, a section of the base plan showing the building or area indicated by the top (or reference) line of the form. The chief in charge of the first responding companies will secure the appropriate card and take it with him while responding to any applicable emergency. The information will be used to plan his actions on arrival at his destination. If there is sufficient opportunity all the card will be read, however, in any event the items shown in read (see Inclosure 1) and the plan attached must be checked and these items used to the fullest extent possible. It is not the intent of this requirement to usurp the prerogative of the Chief in charge at any emergency but only to assure that the information made available by prior comprehensive study of a situation will be readily available and known to him so it may be used as circumstances dictate.

(4) Two 7AD Forms 28 , will be prepared for:

(a) Each major building. A major building will ordinarily be considered as being one larger than small prefabricated types. However, a small building may be considered as "Major" because of assigned priority.

7ADR 92-3

(b) Each group of identical smaller buildings not having a high priority number. Large groups of smaller buildings should be divided into additional groups when different approach routes and/or water sources would normally be used.

(c) Each POL storage or dispensing area, not including single point aircraft rapid refueling areas.

(d) Each aircraft rapid refueling area, except that one card may be prepared for all similar single point aircraft refueling areas where firefighting operations would be approximately the same.

NOTE: Those areas where fire hydrants or EWS tanks are available would require different operations as distinguished from those where no additional water was within reach of the fire trucks.

(e) Each aircraft parking area, except that one card may be prepared for all dispersed aircraft parking hardstands where firefighting operations would be similar. See "NOTE" in (d) immediately above.

(f) Each open storage dump or area.

(g) Aircraft traffic areas.

(h) Any other buildings, areas, facilities or functions not included above or which may require special consideration because of unusual or peculiar circumstances.

(5) In order to insure rapid and adequate response of necessary support equipment, which will usually be required in the areas covered in paragraphs 4d(4)(c) through 4d(4)(g) above, close coordination with the Chief of Aircraft Maintenance and/or Maintenance Control will be necessary. A base standing operating procedure, written jointly by the Fire Department and the Chief of Maintenance, will be established and will include detailed plans for the response of towing vehicles and tow bars to remove all aircraft, auxiliary equipment, or any critical apparatus which may be endangered by exposure to an existing fire emergency. Attention should also be given to any item which may have to be removed in order to eliminate a deterrent to the fire suppression operation. The base Fire Chief will determine the priority for the actual removal of exposed equipment.

7ADR 92-3

5. REFERENCES.

AFR 92-1	SACR 92-2	SACM 85-2
AFR 92-3	SACR 92-12	SACM 85-4
AFR 92-4		7AD Admin Order 1-57

6. SUPPLY OF FORMS. a. An initial supply of 7AD Form 28 will be distributed by this headquarters.

b. Stock replenishment of 7AD Form 28 will be procured from the Base Publications Distribution Officer.

7. RECORDS DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS. a. Fire Department Response Cards will be destroyed after they have served the purpose for which created, paragraph 56, AFM 181-5, 1 July 1956.

b. SOP's written jointly by the Fire Department and Chief of Maintenance will be "case filed" and retained as current records until the publication is rescinded, superseded in its entirety, or declared no longer applicable; they will then be removed from the current file, placed in an inactive file, and retired in annual blocks to the records staging area and will be destroyed 5 years after placement in the inactive file, paragraph 606a, AFM 181-5, 1 July 1956.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Instructions for
Completing 7AD Form

Harold Gebhart
 HAROLD GEBHART
 Lt Colonel, USAF
 Adjutant

Detailed Instructions for Completing 7AIRDIV Form Number 28

1. The "Run Card", 7AIRDIV Form Number 28, fills three requirements: Pre-planning of firefighting per AFR 92-1; a running card assignment per SAC Manual 85-4; and a priority for structural fire response per 7AD Administrative Order 1-57. The Pre-plan function of the form gives what would ordinarily be the ideal fire suppression operation under desirable operating conditions. The running card part will, in addition to assuring an adequate response of equipment within the base capability, enable the chief of charge at the fire to know what equipment will be dispatched for each call for additional equipment. It will also serve to check the efficiency of the alarm room operator and assure notification of units or organizations particularly concerned. The section dealing with priority response numbers will determine fire apparatus response in case of multiple alarms. For instance, if the department is fully engaged on a priority 3 assignment and an alarm is received for a priority 1 building, enough apparatus would be disengaged immediately to cope with the fire in the higher priority building. In addition, the cards will furnish much valuable information for training of fire department personnel.

2. The cards, as printed, do not have index tabs attached. It is suggested that convenient tabs numbered to correspond to the unit the card covers be attached to each unless the cards are to be used in a "Kardex" type file.

3. Individual items (printed side) of 7AIRDIV Form No. 28, are to be completed on two each cards for all buildings and areas (units) as indicated in paragraph 4d(4) of the basic regulations:

a. Building Number: Self explanatory, enter in RED.

b. Area: Self explanatory, enter in RED.

c. Priority Number: The number determined as specified in paragraph 4a of the basic regulation, enter in RED.

d. Serious exposure: State any exposures, whether external or internal which would have particular bearing on a fire in the Unit. An example of an internal exposure would be a warehouse building divided by a combustible or otherwise substandard partition on the other side of which was stored costly or dangerous material. An example of a serious external exposure would be any nearby building having a high priority number. A nearby building of frame construction would be another example. Aircraft traffic and/or maintenance areas may have special or unusual exposures. Enter in RED.

Incl 1 to 7ADR 92-3, dtd 25 Nov 57

e. Running Card Assignments: This item is largely self explanatory. Include provisions for alternating the local fire brigade in the first alarm column and making the actual call for assistance in the next or second alarm column. Under "notify" list units, organizations, or personnel to be called by telephone not included in the regular notification SOP in the alarm room. The Chief of Aircraft Maintenance and/or Maintenance Control will always be called for emergencies in the airfield site. In order to save space, structural companies can be referred to as E1, E2 and E3; crash companies, C1, C2, C3, etc.; water distributors, T1, T2; and Rescue Vehicles as R1. These designations are not intended to refer to any specific vehicle but to a vehicle and crew of firefighters which together constitute a company.

f. Construction and Occupancy Data: This item is also largely self explanatory. However, under "SPECIAL HAZARDS" any information which would be of special concern in firefighting should be included, i.e., potentially dangerous storage, unusual lack of adequate emergency water, highly combustible constructions, etc. Hangars and/or concentrations of aircraft impose special hazards. Enter in RED.

g. Water Supply Data: This item is self explanatory. If rivers, streams, or other sources of water are available the information should be typed in at the bottom of the card.

4. One card, completed as above for each Unit detailed in paragraph 4a, of the basic regulation, will become part of a permanent file to be located in the alarm room. This card will be used by the alarm room operator for the dispatch of fire apparatus. He will refer to the card for all apparatus dispatch except as paragraph 4f of SAC Reg 92-12 is applicable.

5. The second card will have attached to the reverse side a section of the base plan showing the building or area by hash lines or color. The plan will be large enough to permit showing each water supply point as indicated in the Water Supply Data section on the front side of the card. The routes of approach and ideal hose laying methods will be indicated in a manner similar to that shown on the sample below. The first due fire apparatus approach route should be shown: -O-O-O-; and that of the second apparatus: - - - - -; if ozalid prints are used black or blue lines would likely be hard to distinguish, especially when responding under emergency conditions. It is, therefore, suggested that the approach routes be drawn in RED.

6. EXAMPLE:

a. Front

*Bldg.No: _____ *Area: _____ *Priority No: _____ *Serious Exposure: Bldg #70-25' East

I. RUNNING CARD ASSIGNMENTS:

1st.Alarm	2d.Alarm	3d.Alarm	Cover-in	Mutual Aid	Notify
<u>E1-E2</u>	<u>C1-C2</u>	<u>E3-</u>	<u>1st Cl-Stal</u>	<u>Notify on 1st</u>	<u>Mr Swain</u>
	<u>Kingsley</u>				<u>236-R4</u>

II. CONSTRUCTION AND OCCUPANCY DATA:

- TYPE CONSTRUCTION: Ext. Walls Brick Int.Walls Plaster Ceiling F-Board
Roof Frame Unp Metal Roof Cover Tile-Boards No. Floors 1 Attic? Yes-Open
Basement? No Open Stairs No Fire Escapes No Total Area 2800 Sq.ft.
- HEATING: M-41 Stoves Yes-6 Elec. _____ Forced Air _____ Central _____ Other _____
- OCCUPANCY: Unit Base Hq _____ Use Of Files _____ / Communications _____
- STORAGE: None
- APPROX. PERSONNEL: Day 28 Night 2 Max. Capacity _____
- SPECIAL HAZARDS: Electrical Equipment-water damage-cut power

III. WATER SUPPLY DATA:

- EWS TANKS:


No. <u>4</u>	Location <u>1st Ave - 4th St</u>	Distance <u>300</u>	Capacity <u>22,000</u>
No. <u>5</u>	Location <u>1st Ave - Black St</u>	Distance <u>625</u>	Capacity <u>22,000</u>
No. <u>7</u>	Location <u>2nd Ave - Supply Rd</u>	Distance <u>550</u>	Capacity <u>22,000</u>
- HYDRANTS:

No. <u>14</u>	Location <u>4th St - 50' E of 2nd Ave</u>	Distance <u>100</u>	GPM Flow <u>125</u>
No. <u>18</u>	Location <u>2nd Ave - Bet 4th St & Circle Rd</u>	Distance <u>225</u>	GPM Flow <u>140</u>
No. <u>21</u>	Location <u>1st Ave - Black St</u>	Distance <u>575</u>	GPM Flow <u>150</u>

7AIRDIV Form No. 28

*These items to be entered in RED when the card is filled out.

b. Reverse



7. The methods and considerations outlined above should be followed as closely as possible consistent with local conditions. In this manner the 7AIRDIV Forms No. 28, in use at all command bases, will be uniform and readily understandable to personnel transferred from one base to another and to inspectors from this and other headquarters.

AD SUPPLEMENT 1)
TO SACR 55-15)

*SACR 55-15/7ADSUP-1
DO
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
27 November 1957

OPERATIONS

Command Posts

(EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1958)

NOTE: File in front of SACR 55-15, 21 June 1957.

245

See paragraph 1.

c. (Added) Standardizes procedures and associated activities for Command Posts of 7th Air Division stations during Peace and War Time activities.

See paragraph 2.

f. (Added) Each 7th Air Division Base with the potential for launching or recovering combat aircraft.

g. (Added) Each war only base, and stations where adequate facilities do not exist for a permanent Command Post, will comply with this supplement by:

(1) Preparing and stock piling the items required for utilization under EWP conditions.

(2) Designating and training the personnel required to accomplish war time commitments.

See paragraph 3b(5).

(a) (Added) 7th AD Manual 55-1, 6 Sep 57 and Inclosure 3 to SAC Reg 55-16, 20 Aug 57, outlines certain Charts and equipment to be prepared for Control Team Kits. Recommend these items be prepared according to the size and formats indicated below:

- ATTACHMENT 1 1. Flow charts and mission summary board (30" X 40")
- ATTACHMENT 2 2. Combat Report control chart (30" X 40")
- ATTACHMENT 3 3. Emergency evacuation board (30" X 40")

*Supersedes SACR 55-15/7ADSUP-1, 24 Jan 57 and SACR 55-15/7ADSUP-2, 11 Jun 57.

SACR 55-15/7ADSUP-1

ATTACHMENT 4

required.

4. Weather information board (30" X 40")

5. Maps and Charts for route planning as

6. Control Team sign.

7. Senior Controller and assistants.

8. Sign in and sign out board.

9. Mission summary sheet ATTACHMENT 5

10. Aircraft status board, peace (format as directed by TDY Wing)

(b) (Added) Aircraft status board will be prepared according to format directed by TDY Wing, and covered with acetate or plexi-glass. The actual drawing and labeling of columns will be at the discretion of the TDY Wing, when in-place for peace time operation.

(c) (Added) Sufficient number of each 30" X 40" chart will be produced to permit continuity and tabulation of data from E-hour throughout the complete operation. This preplanning action will preclude the need for transcribing the information to a permanent form, revising the same chart, and permit photographing for file record copies at termination of an exercise.

(d) (Added) The requirements outlined above pertain only to those units in the categories listed in paragraph 2 of this supplement.

See paragraph 3c.

(5) (Added) A base control team for the operation of an EWP control room, will consist of no less per shift than the number and type delineated below; however, individual Base Commander may increase the number as operational commitments dictate.

(a) Operations Officer Senior Controller-Field Grade Officer (Pilot)

(b) NCOIC Control Section AFSC 27170

(c) Typist AFSC 70250

(d) Combat Reports Officer (Assistant Controller)

SACR 55-15/7ADSUP-1

- | | |
|--------------------------------|------------|
| (e) NCOIC Combat Reports | AFSC 70270 |
| (f) One Typist | AFSC 70250 |
| (g) One Poster Control Section | AFSC 70250 |
| (h) Materiel Representative | AFSC 43170 |
| (i) Security Representative | AFSC 77170 |

See paragraph 5c(1).


(a) (Added) To include intended route of flight plotted on a chart and marked off in hourly sequence from take-off, to be able to furnish location of tactical aircraft to ADC agencies in minimum time. (Peace Time)

See paragraph 5c.

(13) (Added) Equipment required as follows:

- (a) 20 position telephone switchboard.
- (b) Radio (See ATTACHMENT 8)
- (c) Base intercom to all main points, i.e., Base Operations, Maintenance Control, etc., where service is not already provided by existing systems.
- (d) Control of Base Alert alarms (on bases maintaining an active Control Room). Alternate control as desired by the Base Commander.
- (e) At least one (1) electric clock in prominent view indicating time in GMT (Z) time.
- (f) Where adequate space dictates a control podium equipped and located in accordance with the plan in ATTACHMENT 7.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


 HAROLD J. GEBHART
 Lt Colonel, USAF
 Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION						SACR 55-15/7ADSUP-1	
SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATION SUPPORTED BY 7TH AIR DIVISION GROUP OR AIR BASE SQUADRON	
		ORGANIZATION	HR CYS	ORGANIZATION	HR CYS	ORGANIZATION	HR CYS
CHIEF OF STAFF	1	ADJUTANT	3	ADJUTANT	3	1ST AVN DEPOT SQ	
ADJUTANT	2	BASE COMPTROLLER	1	BASE COMPTROLLER	1	2D AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/PERSONNEL	1	BASE MATERIEL	1	BASE MATERIEL	1	4TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/OPERATIONS	5	BASE D/OPERATIONS	2	BASE D/OPERATIONS	2	8TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/MATERIEL	2	BASE PERSONNEL	1	BASE PERSONNEL	1	3915TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/PLANS	1	CHAPLAIN		CHAPLAIN		3928TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/INTELLIGENCE	1	INFORMATION SERVICES		INFORMATION SERVICES		3929TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/SECURITY	1	JUDGE ADVOCATE		JUDGE ADVOCATE		3930TH AIR BASE SQ	
CHAPLAIN		HEADQUARTERS SQ		PROVOST MARSHAL	1	3921ST RECON TECH SQ	
D/COMPTROLLER	1	OPERATIONS SQUADRON	1	DEPENARY		485TH COMM SQUADRON	
INSPECTOR GENERAL	1	AIR POLICE SQUADRON	1			TDY WING	
JUDGE ADVOCATE		FOOD SERVICE SQ				TDY DETACHMENTS	2
OFF OF INFORMATION		INSTALLATIONS SQ				TOTAL	2
SURGEON		TRANSPORTATION SQ				TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT (cols 2 and 3) FOR STOCK	
HEADQUARTERS SQ SEC		SUPPLY SQUADRON				SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION	
D/SAFETY	1	DEPENARY				AIR UNIVERSITY 1 Copy	
D/INS-ENG	1	FIELD MAINT SQ				HISTORIAN 3 Copies	
DETACHMENT 1						SAC 5 Copies	
Stock	10	Stock	2	Stock	2		
TOTAL	20	TOTAL	12	TOTAL	11		
REMARKS							
						TOTAL	9
						TOTAL DISTRIBUTION	154

HQ 7AD FORM 8 7 JUN 57

7ADSM 55-6

b. Flight Control Division will be responsible for:

(1) Rotating designated personnel on an alert roster and placing a monthly schedule in the 7th Air Division Information Bulletin for three (3) days at the beginning of each month.

(2) Contacting applicable personnel whenever it is necessary to provide crew members for a flight.

c. Designated personnel will be responsible for:

(1) Being available for flying duties during their designated tour.

(2) Coordinating, with their Directorate Chief, on any and all substitutions.

(3) Advising Flight Control (Peppercorn Ext 111) of substitutions, or changes in their status.

(4) Insuring that they have completed necessary questionnaires, flight checks etc., prior to participating as primary crew members.

4. QUALIFICATIONS. a. C-54 co-pilots: Best qualified personnel will be selected by directorates. Previous four engine time is desirable, however not mandatory.


b. C-54 observers: Only observers with previous radar navigation experience will be designated.

c. C-47 Instructor-pilot: Selected personnel must have minimums outlined in SAC Regulation 60-7 and be completely familiar with clearance procedures peculiar to Northolt RAF station.

d. C-47 pilots: Selected personnel must have minimums outlined in SAC Regulation 51-19 and be completely checked out on clearance procedures peculiar to Northolt RAF station.

e. C-47 co-pilots: Best qualified personnel will be selected by directorates.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION				PUBLICATION DIRECTIVE 7ADJG 55-6			
SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED BY AN AIR BASE GROUP OR AIR BASE SQUADRON	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 3909ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3918ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3910ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3920ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3911ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3917ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3913ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3919ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3914ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		ORGANIZATION	NR CYS
AGENCY	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	1ST AVN DEPOT SQ	
CHIEF OF STAFF	1	ADJUTANT		ADJUTANT		2D AVN DEPOT SQ	
ADJUTANT	2	BASE COMPTROLLER		BASE COMPTROLLER		4TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/PERSONNEL	1	BASE MATERIEL		BASE MATERIEL		8TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/OPERATIONS	5	BASE D/OPERATIONS		BASE D/OPERATIONS		3915TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/MATERIEL	2	BASE PERSONNEL		BASE PERSONNEL		3928TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/PLANS	1	CHAPLAIN		CHAPLAIN		3929TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/INTELLIGENCE	1	INFORMATION SERVICES		INFORMATION SERVICES		3930TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/SECURITY	1	JUDGE ADVOCATE		JUDGE ADVOCATE		3921ST RECON TECH SQ	
CHAPLAIN		HEADQUARTERS SQ		PROVOST MARSHAL		485TH COMM SQUADRON	
D/COMPTROLLER	1	OPERATIONS SQUADRON		DEPENSARY		TDY WING	
INSPECTOR GENERAL	1	AIR POLICE SQUADRON				TDY DETACHMENTS	
JUDGE ADVOCATE	1	FOOD SERVICE SQ				TOTAL	
OFF OF INFORMATION	1	INSTALLATIONS SQ				TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT (column 2 and 3) FOR STOCK	
SURGEON		TRANSPORTATION SQ				SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION AIR UNIVERSITY 1 Copy HISTORIAN 3 Copies	
HEADQUARTERS SQ SEC		SUPPLY SQUADRON					
D/SAFETY	1	DEPENSARY					
D/ENG-ENG	1	FIELD MAINT SQ					
DETACHMENT 1	1						
Stock	10						
TOTAL	31	TOTAL		TOTAL		TOTAL	
REMARKS							
						TOTAL	
						TOTAL DISTRIBUTION	31

HQ 7AD FORM 8
7 JUN 57

SECRET

7AD SUPPLEMENT-1)
TO SACR 55-10)

*SACR 55-10/7ADSUP-1
DO
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
26 December 1957

OPERATIONS

Unit Capability Report

(RCS: 1-SAC-V1, 2-SAC-V1, 3-SAC-V1)

(EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1958)

NOTE: File in front of SACR 55-10, 25 October 1957.

See paragraph 7b.

Aircraft and crews TDY to North Africa and other UK bases will be included in the appropriate time block of the EWP forecast based on an estimated time to return aircraft and crews to UK TDY base and prepare them for launching. (C)

NOTE: The total number of ready crews reported in Column L of the 2-SAC-V1 will normally approximate the number of crews available for the last reported time period of Column E. Any listed time period should reflect the total number of aircraft and ready crews that could be launched at that time. The number of crews and aircraft need not coincide with each other and should not be limited to the 40 series requirements for that period. (C)

See paragraph 7i.

This entry will include crews on TDY to other UK or North African bases. (C)

See paragraph 7n.

This entry will include crews TDY to other UK or North African bases. (C)

COPY 111 OF 121 COPIES
3 PAGES

*Supersedes SACR 55-10/7ADSUP-1, 27 May 1957

SECRET

7173

SECRET

SACR 55-10/7ADSUP-1

See SACR 55-10.

14. (ADDED) The following information will be transmitted to this headquarters only. It is applicable to all units (KC-97, B/RB-47, B/RB-36, etc). It will be added as the final portion of the 2-SAC-VI Report and designated "For 7th Air Division". (U)

a. Of the total number of aircraft assigned (aircraft reported in Column D of the 2-SAC-VI) report the total number of aircraft not included in the final EWP forecast time block outlining by serial number the difficulty that precludes forecasting an aircraft in Column B of the 2-SAC-VI and the estimated time in hours to make the aircraft available. (S)

b. For each non-available ready crew (difference between Columns K and L of the 2-SAC-VI) list reasons of non-availability and estimated time in hours to make crews available. (U)

c. Report the total number of sorties airborne that did not complete briefed training (difference between Columns X and Z) giving specific reasons for non-completion for each sortie. (U)

d. Report number of sorties which were launched out of sequence (additions) which completed the mission as briefed. (U)

e. Report the reason and number of minutes late for each late take-off listed in Column Z of the 2-SAC-VI. (U)

f. Report the reasons for each deviation, whether cancellation or addition, identify by type, i.e., weather, maintenance, higher headquarters and explain the reason therefore.

NOTE: Each deviation is analyzed at this headquarters, therefore it is imperative that detailed information be provided. For example, if the deviation was caused by a fuel leak, explain the location and any other particulars that would be applicable. (U)

g. Additional items required by parent numbered Air Force will be included in this paragraph. (U)

15. (ADDED) This supplement classified SECRET because it reveals key for EWP forecast. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Harold J. Gebhart
 HAROLD J. GEBHART
 Lt Colonel, USAF
 Adjutant

SECRET

7173

DISTRIBUTION						PRO SCHEMATIC AND CHECKLIST 31-10/10/77-1	
SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED BY AN AIR BASE GROUP OR AIR BASE SQUADRON	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3909ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3918ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3910ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3920ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3911ADGP <input type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3917ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3913ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3919ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3914ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		ORGANIZATION	NR CYS
AGENCY	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	1ST AVN DEPOT SQ	
CHIEF OF STAFF		ADJUTANT	3	ADJUTANT	3	2D AVN DEPOT SQ	
ADJUTANT	2	BASE COMPTROLLER	3	BASE COMPTROLLER	1	4TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/PERSONNEL	1	BASE MATERIEL	1	BASE MATERIEL	1	8TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/OPERATIONS	4	BASE D/OPERATIONS	1	BASE D/OPERATIONS	1	3915TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/MATERIEL	4	BASE PERSONNEL	1	BASE PERSONNEL	1	3928TH AIR BASE SQ	1
D/PLANS		CHAPLAIN		CHAPLAIN		3929TH AIR BASE SQ	1
D/INTELLIGENCE		INFORMATION SERVICES		INFORMATION SERVICES		3930TH AIR BASE SQ	1
D/SECURITY		JUDGE ADVOCATE		JUDGE ADVOCATE		3921ST RECON TECH SQ	
CHAPLAIN		HEADQUARTERS SQ		PROVOST MARSHAL		485TH COMM SQUADRON	
D/COMPTROLLER	1	OPERATIONS SQUADRON		DBPENSARY		TDY WING	1
INSPECTOR GENERAL	1	AIR POLICE SQUADRON				TDY DETACHMENTS	1
JUDGE ADVOCATE		FOOD SERVICE SQ				TOTAL	5
OFF OF INFORMATION		INSTALLATIONS SQ				TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT (coln 2 and 3) FOR STOCK	
SURGEON		TRANSPORTATION SQ				SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION	
HEADQUARTERS SQ SEC		SUPPLY SQUADRON				AIR UNIVERSITY 1 Copy	
D/SAFETY		DBPENSARY				HISTORIAN 3 Copies	
D/INS-ENG		FIELD MAINT SQ				SAC 5 Copies	
DETACHMENT 1							
Stock	10	Stock	2	Stock	1		
TOTAL	23	TOTAL	11	TOTAL	8		
REMARKS							
TOTAL							9
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION							121

HQ 7AD FORM 8
7 JUN 67

SPECIAL STAFF

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
United States Air Force
APO 125, New York, New York

DCRM

30 July 1957

SUBJECT: Analysis of Management Control System for June 1957

TC: Commander, 7th Air Division

Highlights

1. Command score regressed 3 percentage points to 77 percent.
2. West Drayton achieved their highest score since July 1956 - 87 percent. This was top score for June.
3. Brize Norton attained 98 percent for materiel sub-total.
4. Air Force Service Store turnover rate improved to .34.
5. High accident cost and high number of injuries responsible for low scores in Ground Safety.
6. Only 3 out of 1,835 reports (.16%) were late.

248

If Inclosures 1 and 2 are withdrawn or not attached, this correspondence will be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

Dennis P. Kelly
DENNIS P. KELLY, JR
LtCol, USAF
Director of Comptroller

- 2 Incls
1. Analysis MCS (S)
2. Statement MCS (C)

DISTRIBUTION:

Hq 7AD
CS-1 DO-1 DP-2
SD-1 DM-3 OI-4
DPL-1 DCR-2 D/ENG-1
cc: CINGCSAC-----1
EA ABGRU-----5 3914ABRON--1
3913ABRON-----5 3919ABRON--1

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1 Page

SECRET

7AD C-4865

SPECIAL STAFF 4/18/89

SECRET

DCRM, Subj: Analysis of Management Control System for June 1957

1. OVERALL REGRESSION

7AD Command Score regressed from 80% in May to 77% for June. (80% was the highest attained since July 56) Improvement was noted in ten of the twenty-seven items measured. (Unclassified)

West Drayton achieved the high score of 87% to attain their highest score since July 1956. Brize Norton earned 93% in the "Personnel" sub-total and 98% in "Materiel" sub-total. 98% is the highest attained by any base since September 1955, in this area. (Unclassified)

2. RETENTIONS

All bases scored excellent using the new method introduced in May. Six of the eight bases scored recorded perfect scores for June. The June command retention index was 73.1%. (Unclassified)

3. MAJOR AND MINOR INCIDENTS

Command score regressed from 69% to 68%. The Major Incident Rate increased from .17 in May to .42 for June -- increase of three incidents over May. Minor Incidents increased from 9.3 -- 108 incidents to 11.8 -- 139 incidents. Proportion of vehicle accidents to total number of incidents decreased from 60% in May to 58% for June. (Unclassified)

4. ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

Command score regressed from 51% to 41%. Regressions occurred at five bases in June. Percent passing tests decreased from 78.1 in May to 69.3 for June. Percent upgraded regressed from 11.8 in May to 10.0 for June. (Unclassified)

5. AIR FORCE SERVICE STORES

Turnover rates improved at all bases except West Drayton for the month. The command turnover rate increased from .30 in May to .34 for June. This improvement is attributed primarily to an 11% increase in sales for the month. (Unclassified)

6. SEA WEED EQUIPMENT COMPLETENESS

For the command, there were 42 sets for an average completeness of 79%. The new UALs are still affecting scores. The major shortages occur in the augmentation sets. The command AEE capability was 91.6%, as of 31 July 1957. (Secret)

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3 Pages

7AD C-4865

Incl 1

SECRET

SECRET

DCRM, Subj: Analysis of Management Control System for June 1957

7. GROUND SAFETY

Command score regressed from 83% in May to 52% for June. Command Ground Safety Index increased from 4.30 in May to 9.69 for June while the Accident Cost Index increased from \$0.79 in May to \$10.68 for June. Number of military injuries increased from 12 to 27 and number of government vehicle accidents increased from 2 to 4. The high accident cost is primarily caused by the three fatalities that occurred at Lakenheath. (Unclassified)

8. LATE REPORTS

There were three reports received late during June for a total of 30 days late. This is a decrease of 12 reports late from May and 32 day decrease in number of days late. Of the 1,835 reports, excluding Morning Reports, submitted from bases of this command for June, .16% were charged as late. This low percentage is considered excellent. (Unclassified)

9. CONTROL OF FUNDS OBLIGATION RATE

Command score regressed from 56% to 41%. Low scores are attributed primarily to the effort expended to effectively utilize all available funds prior to the close of the fiscal year. In addition, to insure maximum fund utilization, authority to transfer funds between bases under the same fiscal station fund account number during the latter part of June was authorized by this headquarters. (Unclassified)

10. MORNING REPORT ACCURACY

Command score regressed from 68% to 59%. Scores regressed at five bases. There were 157 errors charged against 7th Air Division units during June. The type of errors detected indicates lack of attention to detail on the part of the preparing agency and incomplete audit on the part of Statistical Services. (Unclassified)

11. INVENTORY ACCOUNTING (MONETARY)

Command score regressed from 55% in May to 53% for June. The percent of credit balances increased from 17% to 34%; percent of invalid classes increased from .41 to .43; percent of excessive adjustments over 5% decreased from 35% to 1%. All bases are below the satisfactory level of performance in this area except West Drayton and Fairford. (Unclassified)

SECRET

SECRET

DCRM, Subj: Analysis of Management Control System for June 1957

12. EFFECTIVE DATES ON MORNING REPORTS

Evaluation is based on number of effective dates (other than late EDCSA on ZI gains) reflected on June Morning Reports. Item is not included in computing base scores, but will be next quarter. IG inspections and staff visit reports indicate lack of effective sign-in and sign-out procedures as a major contributing cause of unsatisfactory performance in this area. Proper suspending methods, prompt publishing of PAMs and improvement in general operating procedures are measures which can reduce the number of effective dates to an acceptable minimum. (Unclassified)

13. COMMAND PROGRESS JAN - JUN 57

There has been substantial improvement in nine areas of evaluation and the command score has trended upward from 65% in January and February to 80% in May (June's score regressed 3 percentage points to 77%). Problem areas common throughout the command have been steadily reduced from 14 in February to 5 in June. Four of these, CJT, Control of Funds, Ground Safety and IAM are continuing problems. The increased emphasis placed on these programs should result in considerable improvement during ensuing months. Management Analysts at all echelons are being charged with performance of extensive analyses in these low areas with the objective of eliminating the basic causes. The fifth item, Sea Weed Assets, is considered a short range temporary problem created by recent changes in authorization. The stockage level in the "Absolutely Essential Equipment" items indicates no major problem. (Secret)

This document classified SECRET in order to protect 7AD Sea Weed Capability. (Unclassified)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DCRM, Subj: (U) Analysis of Management Control System for June 1957

7AD MANAGEMENT CONTROL STATEMENT FOR JUNE 1957

ITEM	WEIGHT	GREENHAN COMMON	LAKEN- HEATH	WEST DRAYTON	UPPER HEYFORD	BRIZE NORTON	STURGATE	MILDEN- HALL	CHELVES- TON	FAIRFORD	COMMAND SCORE-JUN
TOTAL PERCENT OF MAXIMUM SCORE											
		10	74	87	77	86	NS	73	66	63	77
A. PERSONNEL:											
Officer MIRS	30	100	90	80	100	100	NS	50	70	90	84
Airmen MIRS	50	100	100	90	100	100	NS	100	80	70	93
Retentions	30	80	100	100	100	90	NS	100	100	100	96
Officer Messes	25	40	60	100	30	90	NS	100	70	70	71
NCO Messes	25	100	100	90	100	90	NS	90	100	70	94
Maj & Minor Incidents	30	75	50	80	55	100	NS	70	85	80	68
On-The-Job Training	30	50	15	65	30	70	NS	35	0	60	41
Officer Effectiveness Reports	20	100	95	100	100	100	NS	100	100	100	99
"PERSONNEL" SUB-TOTAL	240	81	78	88	79	93	NS	81	75	72	81
B. MATERIEL:											
Line Items Processed per M/H	20	50	90	100	80	100	NS	NS	NS	NS	84
Avg Time for Proc On/Base Iss	20	100	100	100	100	100	NS	NS	NS	NS	100
Avg Time for Proc Off/Base Rec	20	100	100	100	100	100	NS	NS	NS	NS	100
Line Items Stocked	20	100	90	100	60	100	NS	NS	NS	NS	90
Supply Effectiveness	30	80	100	90	100	100	NS	NS	NS	NS	94
Pipeline Time for Base Purchases from Coml Vendors	20	100	80	100	80	100	NS	NS	NS	NS	92
AF Service Stores	30	95	100	95	100	95	NS	NS	NS	NS	98
Clothing Sales Stores	30	80	100	100	100	100	NS	NS	NS	NS	96
Commissary Sales Stores	30	51	92	76	48	98	NS	NS	NS	NS	73
Food Service Management	30	80	0	60	30	100	NS	100	60	0	54
* Sea Weed Completeness	30	70	50	50	60	90	NS	60	60	50	61
Ground Power Equipment Status	40	100	85	100	100	100	NS	100	95	100	98
"MATERIEL" SUB-TOTAL	320	83	81	88	80	98	NS	88	74	55	84

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2 Pages

CONFIDENTIAL 7AD C-4865

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DCRM, Subj: (S) Analysis of Management Control System for June 1957

7AD MANAGEMENT CONTROL STATEMENT FOR JUNE 1957

ITEM	WEIGHT	GREENHAM COMMON	LAKEN- HEATH	WEST DRAYTON	UPPER HEYFORD	BRIZE NORTON	STURGATE	MILDEN- HALL	CHELVES- TON	FAIRFORD	COMBAND SCORE-JUN
C. GENERAL:											
Ground Safety	30	100	5	100	60	100	NS	20	5	10	52
General Ground Training	30	100	100	100	100	100	NS	100	100	100	100
Reporting Accuracy (Morning Reports)	30	90	70	90	40	50	NS	70	60	0	59
Late Reports	30	100	70	60	100	100	NS	100	100	100	91
Inventory Acctg (Monetary)	50	12	44	98	44	48	NS	58	26	90	53
Control of Funds Oblig. Rate	50	30	60	70	80	0	NS	0	20	20	41
Effective Dates on M/R	NS	0	0	0	0	0	NS	10	40	0	0%
Construction Non-Completion	NS	80	40	20	60	80	NS	90	80	90	68
* Construction Progress	NS	10	100	100	100	100	NS	20	20	40	61
* Photo Lab Capability	30	91	84	NS	92	85	NS	90	100	90	90
"GENERAL" SUB-TOTAL	250	76	60	86	72	62	NS	58	53	58	65

NOTE: Maximum points Obtainable for Chelveston 590; Mildenhall and Fairford is 590; West Drayton 780; all others 810. Construction non-completion and construction progress scores not included in totals.

Over half the stations scored better than those underlined.

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HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
United States Air Force
APO 125, New York, New York

DCRM

31 October 1957


SUBJECT: Analysis of Management Control System for Quarter Ending September 1957.

TO: Commander 7th Air Division
CINCSAC
3909ABGRU (5) 3912ABRON (5)
3910ABGRU (5) 3913ABRON (5)
3911ABGRU (5) 3914ABRON (5)
3918ABGRU (5) 3917ABRON (5)
3920ABGRU (5) 3919ABRON (5)

Highlights

1. Command score of 73% primarily held down by low performance in A/C Bench Stock Status, Reporting Accuracy and Inventory Accounting (Monetary).
2. RAF West Drayton achieves 92% retention index.
3. Twenty-six injuries due to Private Vehicle Accidents.
4. For every one thousand assigned personnel, there were fifty-one effective dates reported.
5. Only 103 out of 5,592 reports (1.8%) were late.

If Inclusion 2 is withdrawn or not attached, this correspondence will be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.


DENNIS P. KELLY, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Comptroller

- 2 Incls
1. Analysis MCS (U)
 2. Statement MCS (C)

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DP (2) D/ENG
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7AD C-7172

DCRM SUBJ: Analysis of Management Control System for Quarter Ending September 1957.

1. OVERALL

The 7AD Command Score of 73% was equivalent to the average 7AD FY 57 score. Out of a potential 253 scores, 29% were maximum scores and 30% were below the 7AD standard of 70%.

2. RETENTIONS

Excellent performance for the quarter resulted in perfect scores by all bases. This is the best performance since this item was included in the 7AD Management Control System (May 1957). All bases improved their index as the quarter progressed except RAF Lakenheath and RAF Fairford. The highest index for the quarter was achieved by RAF West Drayton - 92% - and the lowest was 66% at RAF Lakenheath.

3. MAJOR AND MINOR INCIDENTS

Command Score improved from 70% in July to 77% for the quarter. Minor incidents decreased from 121 in July to 76 in September. Only two bases, RAF Bruntingthorpe and RAF East Kirkby, with 50%, received less than 70% of score. Of the 294 minor incidents for the quarter, 72% were vehicle accidents.

4. ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

Command score improved from 59% in July to 64% for the quarter. There is still only one problem area - too many personnel have failed OJI tests (percentage failing for quarter - 23%). The percent passing tests increased from 74% in July to 77% for the quarter.

5. LINE ITEMS PROCESSED PER MANHOUR

Command score improved from 42% in July to 55% for the quarter. For the command 159,153 items were processed for the quarter, or .561 items were processed per manhour available. The main problem is that when a base does not have a unit in place, there are not as many items issued although the personnel are still required for restocking and routine administrative duties.

6. A/C BENCH STOCK STATUS

Poor performance at all bases resulted in low scores for this new item. Although the change that occurred in authorizations in August had an adverse effect on scores, emphasis by base personnel will help to alleviate this condition in future quarters.

Incl 1

7AD C-7172

DCRM SUBJ: Analysis of Management Control System for Quarter Ending September 1957.

7. FOOD SERVICE MANAGEMENT

Command score improved from 54% in July to 58% for the quarter. The Air Base Group cost for serving 1,124,201 meals for the quarter was \$218,344, or \$0.19 per meal (optimum \$0.17 per meal); the Air Base Squadron cost for serving 380,377 meals for the quarter was \$88,461 or \$0.23 per meal (optimum \$0.20 per meal).

8. GROUND SAFETY

There was a total of 50 military injuries for the quarter, of which 26 were due to Private Vehicle Accidents; eight to Government Vehicle Accidents. The total cost of ground accidents was \$115,630 caused by three fatalities (two car accidents and one drowning) during the quarter. Continuing emphasis by base personnel will be required in forthcoming months to prevent the normal increase in accidents which results from winter weather driving.

9. EFFECTIVE DATES ON MORNING REPORTS

This item was used in scoring Reporting Accuracy for the quarter. Poor performance at all bases except RAF Upper Heyford and RAF Fairford resulted in low scores. For the quarter there were 50.7 effective dates per 1000 assigned personnel. The majority of effective dates appearing on the Morning Reports are a result of leave and TDY remarks appearing on the Morning Report after the effective date. More stringent control over sign-in, sign-out procedures utilizing an effective suspense system will eliminate this type of effective date.

10. LATE REPORTS

For the command there were 103 reports late for the quarter for a total of 519 days late or an average delay of five days for each late report. Of the 5,592 reports, excluding Morning Reports, submitted from bases of this command for the quarter, 1.8% were charged as late. RAF Bruntingthorpe and RAF East Kirkby were responsible for 34% and 28% respectively of the total late reports.

11. INVENTORY ACCOUNTING (MONETARY)

All bases are below the satisfactory level of performance in this area except RAF stations Lakenheath, West Drayton and Chelveston. The percent of credit balances decreased from 34% to 22%; percent of invalid classes increased from .43 to .68; percentage of erroneous documentation increased from 3.29% in July to 4.08% for the quarter; percent of excessive adjustments over 5% increased from 6.5% in July to 20.1% for the quarter. This is a reversal of the improvement trend noted during the latter half of FY 57. A Materiel - Comptroller team has started a series of visits to the bases to straighten out the increasing deficiencies in this area.

DCRM SUBJ: Analysis of Management Control System for Quarter Ending September 1957.

12. OCM CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS

Command score improved from 36% in July to 79% for the quarter. This improvement is attributed to completion of projects funded in FY 55 and 56. RAF Mildenhall made the greatest improvement for the quarter by reducing their prior fiscal years projects from \$90,030 in July to \$33,690 at the end of the quarter. RAF Bruntingthorpe is the only base in the command that has completed all projects in FY 55 and 56.

7AD MANAGEMENT CONTROL STATEMENT FOR QUARTER ENDING SEPTEMBER 1957

	ITEM WEIGHT	3909 ABGRU	3910 ABGRU	3911 ABGRU	3918 ABGRU	3920 ABGRU	3912 ABRON	3913 ABRON	3914 ABRON	3917 ABRON	3919 ABRON	COMMAND AVG SCORE - SEP QTR
TOTAL PERCENT OF MAXIMUM SCORE		74	76	81	77	71	57	80	74	65	69	73
A. PERSONNEL:												
Officer MIRS	30	80	80	80	80	<u>70</u>	90	<u>70</u>	100	<u>40</u>	90	78
Airmen MIRS	50	80	<u>70</u>	90	80	90	<u>40</u>	30	<u>60</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>70</u>	70
Retentions	30	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Officer Messes	25	100	<u>70</u>	90	<u>60</u>	<u>40</u>	NS	90	80	100	<u>60</u>	77
NCO Messes	25	100	100	100	100	<u>40</u>	100	100	100	100	<u>80</u>	92
Major & Minor Incidents	30	85	<u>75</u>	85	100	80	<u>50</u>	100	<u>70</u>	<u>50</u>	80	78
On-The-Job Training	30	95	85	<u>60</u>	70	<u>50</u>	<u>40</u>	70	<u>70</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>60</u>	64
Officer Effectiveness Reports	20	100	<u>95</u>	100	100	<u>95</u>	100	100	100	100	100	99
"PERSONNEL" SUB TOTAL	240	91	83	88	85	73	69	88	82	66	79	81
B. MATERIEL:												
Line Items Proc per M/H	20	70	70	80	60	<u>30</u>	<u>20</u>	100	<u>50</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>40</u>	55
% of 1-5 Priority Immediate Requisitions	20	100	<u>70</u>	100	100	<u>90</u>	100	<u>70</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>80</u>	100	90
Aircraft Bench Stock Status	20	0	20	NS	20	0	0	0	0	NS	0	5
Line Items Stocked	20	100	<u>70</u>	100	<u>20</u>	100	100	100	100	100	100	96
Supply Effectiveness	30	100	100	90	90	90	<u>60</u>	100	<u>40</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>70</u>	82
Pipeline Time for Base Purchases from Coml Vendors	20	100	100	<u>80</u>	<u>60</u>	100	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	88
Air Force Service Stores	30	<u>55</u>	<u>30</u>	100	100	75	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	73
Clothing Sales Store	30	100	<u>70</u>	100	90	<u>70</u>	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	86
Commissary Sales Store	30	<u>91</u>	100	97	<u>68</u>	100	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	91
Food Service Management	30	80	<u>55</u>	60	<u>55</u>	80	85	70	<u>30</u>	<u>35</u>	0	58
* Sea Weed Equipment Completeness	30	70	70	NS	70	90	<u>50</u>	<u>60</u>	70	90	<u>70</u>	71
Ground Power Equipment Status	40	<u>80</u>	90	NS	90	100	<u>65</u>	<u>90</u>	100	<u>50</u>	<u>85</u>	83
"MATERIEL" SUB TOTAL	320	80	72	90	76	80	61	76	62	68	59	73

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 DCRM SUBJ: (U) Analysis of Management Control System

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DCRM SUBJ: (U) Analysis of Management Control System

7AD MANAGEMENT CONTROL STATEMENT FOR QUARTER ENDING SEPTEMBER 1957

ITEM	WEIGHT	3909 ABGRU	3910 ABGRU	3911 ABGRU	3918 ABGRU	3920 ABGRU	3912 ABRON	3913 ABRON	3914 ABRON	3917 ABRON	3919 ABRON	COMMAND AVG SCORE - SEP QTR
C. <u>GENERAL:</u>												
Ground Safety	30	<u>45</u>	90	70	<u>60</u>	<u>55</u>	70	70	70	100	100	73
Ground Training	30	100	100	<u>71</u>	100	100	<u>0</u>	100	100	100	21	79
Reporting Accuracy	30	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	43	60	<u>13</u>	<u>0</u>	23	<u>10</u>	17	73	24
Late Reports	30	95	<u>45</u>	95	<u>0</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>0</u>	95	100	<u>0</u>	100	60
Inventory Accounting (Monetary)	50	<u>36</u>	70	88	<u>40</u>	<u>26</u>	56	<u>50</u>	78	56	56	56
Control of Funds	50	<u>60</u>	100	<u>20</u>	100	<u>40</u>	<u>20</u>	90	70	90	70	66
* OGM Construction Progress	40	<u>25</u>	90	95	90	95	100	90	95	<u>60</u>	<u>50</u>	79
* Photo Lab Capability	30	<u>80</u>	<u>85</u>	NS	100	99	<u>90</u>	95	<u>90</u>	NS	100	93
"GENERAL" SUB TOTAL	290	53	75	68	70	59	43	77	77	62	69	65

NOTE: Maximum points obtainable for 3917ABRON 690; 3912ABRON 715; 3911ABGRU 730; 3913ABRON, 3914ABRON, 3919ABRON 740; all others 850.

_____ Over half the stations scored better than those underlined.

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COMPTROLLER

7AD MANUAL 170-1



**7TH AIR
DIVISION**

LY 24

250

**MANAGEMENT
CONTROL SYSTEM**

JULY 1957

Headquarters
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125 US Air Force

C

1 July 1957

SUBJECT: Management Control System

TO: All 7th Air Division Managers

1. You will find in the following pages a system of performance measurement of some of your activities which I and my staff are using as an aid in gauging the effectiveness of 7th Air Division operations.

2. I wish to make it clear to you that this system is also for your benefit. Through analysis of your performance, I expect you to provide me with information relative to the effect that policies and procedures dictated by this or higher headquarters or by international agreements are having upon your capability to perform your job. In all cases I expect this information to be constructive.


3. By using this system, we will all have a common basis for evaluating status and performance in the measured activities against established standards. Where excellent performances are recorded, I should like to encourage interchange of information reference methods and procedures so that overall capability of the command can be improved.

4. The system is intended to be dynamic and therefore I expect you to examine the system regularly and critically with the view of suggesting practical means for improving the validity of measurements contained therein and of enlarging the scope of activities covered by this system.

5. The system has been changed to a quarterly basis in order (1) to allow sufficient time for corrective action to be taken by my staff and by you as the result of information pointed up by the analysis of the system and (2) to give a more valid measurement of the trend of performance. However, this does not mean that review of performance in the system should be neglected during the first two months of the quarter. A continuing effort must be made to isolate and correct poor performance areas.

DISTRIBUTION:

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3912, 3913, 3914,
3917, 3919 ABRONS-- 5
EA 7AD Staff Agency-- 2
D/Comptroller, 7AD---30


W. H. BLANCHARD
Major General, USAF
Commander

7AIRDIV MAN 170-1
July 1957GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Seventh Air Division Air Base Groups will be evaluated quarterly according to the provisions of this manual. Quarters will be as follows: First quarter - July, August and September, Second quarter - October, November and December, Third quarter - January, February and March, Fourth quarter - April, May and June.
2. 3912th, 3913th, 3914th, 3917th and 3919th ABRONs will also be evaluated except for: (a) Materiel items 1f and 1g, 2a and 2b; (b) Finance Operation.
3. Aviation Depot Squadron experience will be included with that of their parent Air Base Group.
4. Major and Minor Incidents will include all tenant personnel experience as reported on the reports covered by these two items.
5. The 3910th Air Base Group evaluation will include experience of the 3930th ABRON except in Mess Areas, Materiel sub-section, O&M Construction Progress and Photo Lab Capability.
6. The 3911th Air Base Group evaluation will include experience of the 3929th ABRON except in Mess Areas, Materiel sub-section, Finance Operation, Control of Funds, O&M Construction Progress and Photo Lab Capability. The 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron will be included in all areas except for Manning in Required Specialties and Photo Lab Capability. The 485th Communications Squadron will be included in all areas except Ground Safety.
7. In computing scores, all calculations are carried one more decimal place than indicated in the scoring table and then rounded. If the decimal to be dropped is 5 or more, the final figure is rounded to the next highest number; e.g., in scoring Minor Incidents, a rate of 2.35 would be rounded to 2.4 and a rate of 2.64 would be rounded to 2.6.
8. The Air Division Director of Comptroller will be responsible for continuing development of this system and preparation of quarterly Management Control Statements. Comments and suggestions for improvement are invited. Questions or requests for official interpretation of the system will be addressed to Commander, Seventh Air Division, ATTN: Director of Comptroller.
9. Management Control Statements will be classified in accordance with the provisions of AFR 205-1, as amended. Bases are reminded that analyses of the statements in which a relationship is indicated between particular bases and specific types of augmentation sets will be classified at least SECRET.
10. This manual supersedes 7th Air Division Manual 170-1, dated September 1956, as amended.

7AIRDIV MAN 170-1
July 1957

CONTENTS

7TH AIR DIVISION MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM

	<u>Maximum Score</u>
A. <u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>240</u>
1. Manning in Required Specialties	80
a. Officer	30
b. Airmen	50
2. Retentions	30
3. Officer and NCO Messes	50
a. Officer	25
b. NCO	25
4. Major and Minor Incidents	30
5. On-the-Job Training	30
6. Officer Effectiveness Reports	20
B. <u>MATERIEL</u>	<u>320</u>
1. Supply Management	160
a. Line Items Processed per Manhour of Personnel on Duty	20
b. Percent of 1-5 Priority Immediate Requisitions	20
c. Aircraft Bench Stock Status	20
d. Line Items Stocked	20
e. Supply Effectiveness	30
f. Pipeline Time for Base Purchases from Commercial Vendors	20
g. Air Force Service Stores	30

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Maximum Score

2. Supply Services	90	
a. Clothing Sales Store Operation	30	
b. Commissary Sales Store Operation	30	
c. Food Service Management	30	
3. Sea Weed Equipment Completeness	30	
4. Ground Power Equipment Status	40	
C. <u>GENERAL</u>		<u>440</u>
1. Ground Safety	30	
2. General Ground Training	30	
3. Reporting Accuracy	30	
4. Late Reports	30	
5. Finance Operation	30	
6. Inventory Accounting (Monetary)	50	
7. Control of Funds Obligation Rate	50	
8. O&M Construction Progress	40	
9. Recurring Maintenance	40	
10. Photo Lab Capability	30	
11. Reserved for Special Subjects	80	
	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	<u>1000</u>

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A. PERSONNEL

1. MANNING IN REQUIRED SPECIALTIES

The index for Manning in Required Specialties will be based on extent to which the Air Base is manned with AFSCs required at the end of each of the three months of the quarter being scored. Only permanent party personnel will be considered. Aviation Depot Squadron will be included with that of their parent Air Base Group. The 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron will not be included with the 3911th ABGRU for this item. Requirements are based on 7th Air Division Unit Manning Documents.

a. Officer Manning in Required Specialties

The provisions of SAC Regulation 36-12 are applicable for this item. In addition all Warrant Officers performing duty in authorized officer and/or warrant officer positions will be considered in this computation.

b. Airman Manning in Required Specialties

The Airmen index will consider the number assigned by Control AFSC in required specialties. In view of the policy to overtrain in higher skill levels, airman overages in higher levels of skill will be credited toward any shortages in lower levels of the same skill. Also any airman overage, regardless of skill level or career field, will be applied against all shortages in the helper level.

Substitution of overages in higher skills for shortages in lower skills will follow the pattern outlined in AF Regulation 35 series. If progression to a 7 level may be from two or more separate Air Force specialties, overages in the 7 level will be applied against shortages in any of the specialties concerned. For example, an overage in AFSC 90670 will be applied against shortages in AFSCs 90650, 90651, 90630 and 90631. If progression from a 5 level of an AFSC can be to either the supervisor or technician 7 level, overages in either the supervisor or technician level will be applied against shortages in the 5 or lower levels of the AFSC. For example, overages in either AFSC 64171 or 64172 may be applied against shortages in AFSC 64150 and 64130. In the Aircraft and Engine Maintenance career field, alphabetic suffixes will be ignored in applying overages to shortages in lower skill levels. Overages in the 70 (supervisor) skill may also be substituted for shortages in technician skills of the same AFSC.

$$\frac{\text{Number MIRS for Quarter}}{\text{Number Authorized for Quarter}} = \text{Percent MIRS}$$

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Apply percent MIRS against Table A-1 below to get percent of score received.

TABLE A-1

<u>Percent MIRS</u>		<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>	
98.0 or more	96.0 or more	100
96.0 - 97.9	94.0 - 95.9	90
94.0 - 95.9	92.0 - 93.9	80
92.0 - 93.9	90.0 - 91.9	70
90.0 - 91.9	88.0 - 89.9	60
88.0 - 89.9	86.0 - 87.9	50
86.0 - 87.9	84.0 - 85.9	40
84.0 - 85.9	82.0 - 83.9	30
82.0 - 83.9	80.0 - 81.9	20
80.0 - 81.9	78.0 - 79.9	10
79.9 or less	77.9 or less	0

Source of Data: Morning Reports and Unit Manning Documents

Example: An Air Base recorded the following experience for the quarter:

	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>Total for Quarter</u>
Number MIRS	1042	1028	1034	3104
Number Auth.	1110	1103	1103	3316
% MIRS (Airmen)				93.6

Table A-1 for Airmen indicates that 93.6% receives 80% of score.

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2. RETENTION

a. Computation is ratio of total number personnel enlisting or extending to complete normal overseas tour for this area or to extend tour versus those eligible for enlistment at time of separation during the quarter being scored. Normal tour is 18 months for personnel unaccompanied by dependents - 36 months for single personnel and accompanied personnel. Use AFR 39-3 to determine eligibles to reenlist.

b. Only SAC personnel (excluding TDY units) considered.

c. Retention index is based on data in Flash Reenlistment Report, RCS: SAC-P65.

d. Compute using following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Reenlistment and Extensions of Enlistments}}{\text{Same as above plus airmen returning to ZI for separation who have not completed a tour}} = \text{Retention Index}$$

TABLE A-2

<u>Retention Index</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
65 or more	100
61 - 64.9	90
57 - 60.9	80
52 - 56.9	70
46 - 51.9	60
39 - 45.9	50
32 - 38.9	40
25 - 31.9	30
18 - 24.9	20
11 - 17.9	10
10.9 or less	0

Source of Data: Flash Reenlistment Report, RCS: SAC-P65

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3. OFFICER AND NCO MESSSES

Officer and NCO Mess efficiency indexes will be computed according to instructions printed on the reverse of 7th Air Division comparative analyses of open messes. Basic data for each item is scored, then points totalled to obtain the Financial Operating Efficiency Index, each month separately. In scoring the individual mess items, optimum must be met to receive points. Therefore, a fraction greater than one-half cannot be rounded to the next higher number. Financial Operating Efficiency Indexes (total point scores) are averaged for the quarter being scored. This average is rounded to the nearest whole number and then scored from the table below to determine the percentage score received. Thus, a quarterly average of 4.7 would be rounded to 5, yielding a score of 50%.

TABLE A-3

<u>Financial Operating Efficiency Index</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
10 or more	100
9	90
8	80
7	70
6	60
5	50
4	40
3	30
2	20
1	10
0	0

Source of Data: Comparative Analysis of Officer and NCO Club Financial Statements.

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July 1957

4. MAJOR AND MINOR INCIDENTS

This item is based on two aspects of state of discipline. To obtain percent of maximum score, total percent earned for parts 4a and 4b, then divide by two.

a. Major Incidents

Serious Crimes (Report of Serious Crimes or Serious Incidents)

Compromise Cases (Report of Compromise)

Average Strength (AF-Y7, Section I, Line 1, MIL Only)

Total the number of serious crimes and compromise cases for the quarter being scored then divide by total average strength for the quarter. (Total of average strength for each of the three months in the quarter).

TABLE A-4A

<u>Rate</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
0	100%
.01 - .30	90
.31 - .70	80
.71 -1.10	70
1.11 -1.50	60
1.51 -1.90	50
1.91 -2.30	40
2.31 -2.70	30
2.71 -3.10	20
3.11 -3.50	10
3.51 & Over	0

Source of Data: Report of Serious Crimes or Serious Incidents, Report of Compromise, Provost Marshal Activities Report, RCS: AF-Y7 (SAC-1).

b. Minor Incidents

Traffic accidents on base, involving government and/or civilian vehicles. Section Vf, add line 90 thru 99, AF-Y7 (SAC-1).

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Traffic accidents off base involving government and/or civilian vehicles. Section Vf, add line 90 thru 99, AF-Y7 (SAC-1).

Total number AWOL's. Section Va, line 75, AF-Y7 (SAC-1).

Total Drunk and/or Disorderly and Insubordination cases. Attachment 1 to AF-Y7 (SAC-1).

Average Strength. Section I, line 1, MIL only, AF-Y7 (SAC-1).

Total the minor offenses for the quarter, then divide by total average strength for the quarter. Multiply this figure by 1000 for the minor incident rate.

TABLE A-4B

<u>Rate</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
0 - 7.2	100
7.3 - 8.0	90
8.1 - 8.8	80
8.9 - 9.6	70
9.7 -10.4	60
10.5 -11.2	50
11.3 -12.0	40
12.1 -12.8	30
12.9 -13.6	20
13.7 -14.4	10
14.5 & Over	0

Source of Data: Provost Marshal Activities Report, AF-Y7, (SAC-1), Drunk and/or Disorderly and Insubordination Cases Report, Attachment 1 to AF-Y7 (SAC-1).

Examples: (a) Air Base XXX reports a strength for the quarter of 5160 and a total of 6 major incidents.

$$\frac{6}{5160} \times 1000 = 1.16 \text{ rate (major incidents).}$$

Table A-4A indicates 1.16 rate = 60% earned.

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(b) Air Base XXX reports a strength for the quarter of 5160 and a total of 42 minor incidents.

$$\frac{42}{5160} \times 1000 = 8.1 \text{ rate (minor incidents).}$$

Table A-4B indicates 8.1 rate = 80% earned.

(c) Part 4a (60%) $\frac{1}{2}$ 4b (80%) = 140

$$\text{Combined } \frac{140}{2} = 70\% \text{ of maximum score.}$$

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5. ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

Score will be based on three phases of unit OJT programs. Scores will be based on accomplishments for each of the three months of the quarter combined into a quarterly average. Each of these items will be scored separately and these scores then added together to obtain the total percentage score for OJT effectiveness.

a. Number of OJT vs Number Eligible

TABLE A-5A

<u>Percent on OJT</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
99.0 or more	20
97.0 - 98.9	10
95.0 - 96.9	5
94.9 or less	0

Computation: $\frac{\text{Total of Items 2, 4 \& 6, SAC-T42}}{\text{Total of Items 1, 3, 5, 7 \& 15, SAC-T42}} = \text{percent on OJT}$

NOTE: The following reported in Item 15, will not be included in the above computation: Unauthorized personnel assigned pending change in UMD or unauthorized personnel on whom requests for waiver of Project Guidance have been submitted and received at this headquarters on helper level (O10) personnel with insufficient aptitude scores to permit entry into training.

b. Number Passing Tests (APT/AFJKT) vs Number being Tested

TABLE A-5B

<u>Percent Passing Tests</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
85.0 or more	50
80.0 - 84.9	40
77.0 - 79.9	30
74.0 - 76.9	20
70.0 - 73.9	10
65.0 - 69.9	5
64.9 or less	0

Computation: $\frac{\text{Total of Items 9B, 11 \& 12, SAC-T42}}{\text{Total of Items 9A \& 10, SAC-T42}} = \text{Percent passing Tests}$

NOTE: Organizations reporting no test scores received during the quarter will receive a score in this area based on the previous quarter score.

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c. Number Upgraded vs Number on OJT

TABLE A-5C

<u>Percent Upgraded</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
15.0 or more	30
13.0 - 14.9	25
10.0 - 12.9	20
7.0 - 9.9	10
5.0 - 6.9	5
4.9 or less	0

Computation: $\frac{\text{Item 14, SAC-T42}}{\text{Item 16, SAC-T42}} = \text{Percent Upgraded}$

Source of Data: Airmen On-The-Job Training Report, RCS:
SAC-T42

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6. OFFICER EFFECTIVENESS REPORT

Scored on number of Officer Effectiveness Reports late and the total number of days late arriving at Headquarters 7th Air Division during the quarter. When these two figures have been determined, the percent of maximum score received will be read from Table A-6 below. Maximum score will be obtained only if there were no late Officer Effectiveness Reports for the quarter.

TABLE A-6

Number of Days Late	Number of Reports Late									
	3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27 & Over	
1 - 9	95	90	85							
10 - 18	90	85	80	75	70	65				
19 - 27	80	75	70	65	60	55	50	45	40	
28 - 36	70	65	60	55	50	45	40	35	30	
37 - 45	60	55	50	45	40	35	30	25	20	
46 - 54	50	45	40	35	30	25	20	15	10	
55 - 63	40	35	30	25	20	15	10	5	0	
64 - 72	30	25	20	15	10	5	0	0	0	
73 - 81	20	15	10	5	0	0	0	0	0	
82 - 90	10	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
91 & over	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Example: The 7th Air Division personnel listing of late Officer Effectiveness reports showed that an Air Base had nine Officer Effectiveness Reports late (a total of 18 days) to 7th Air Division during the quarter. Table A-6 indicates that nine Officer Effectiveness Reports 18 days late, receives 80% of score.

Source of Data: 7th Air Division Director of Personnel.

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B. MATERIEL

1. Supply Management

a. Line Items Processed per Man-hour of Personnel on Duty

The number of line items processed is reported as Item 6, Section V, and the average number of personnel on duty daily is Section VI on the reverse side of the Base Supply Report. Compute quarterly man-hours on duty by multiplying the number of personnel (Military and Civilian in Base Supply only) by the total number of work hours in the quarter. It will be computed on a 40-hour week for both military and civilian personnel, legal holidays excluded. Divide total number of line items processed by the total number of man-hours available for duty in Base Supply during the quarter.

Use Table B-1A below to determine the percentage of maximum points to be scored.

TABLE B-1A

<u>Line Items Processed</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
.850 or more	100
.775 - .849	90
.700 - .774	80
.625 - .699	70
.550 - .624	60
.475 - .549	50
.400 - .474	40
.325 - .399	30
.250 - .324	20
.175 - .249	10
.174 - or less	0

Example: During the quarter the Base Supply Report showed the following information:

	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Total</u>
Line Items Processed	10154	11377	8765	30,296
Pers on Duty Daily	100 X	97 X	100 X	
No. of Work Hours (8 X No. Work Days)	<u>152</u> 15200	<u>168</u> 16296	<u>176</u> 17600	<u>49,096</u>

Total Line Items Processed - 30,296

Total No. of working hrs - 49,096 = .617 or 60% of score for the quarter.

Source of Data: AF-S1 (SAC-1), Base Supply Report.

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b. Percent of 1-5 Priority Immediate Requisitions

Purpose of this item is to control the proportion of Priority 1-5 requisitions to total of all priority classifications.

Method of computation: Establish for each of the three months the number of priority 1-5 requisitions by subtracting from the number of priority 1-5 requisitions shown in Column B, Section I, of the Base Supply Report, the number of: (1) Immediate requisitions submitted for Volume XVI base stock replenishment; (2) Requests for aircraft and other equipment spares to 7AD supply points; and (3) Absolute Essential Equipment items (listed in AFR 67-43). These categories are listed on the 7AD Supplemental page to the Base Supply Report. Add the resulting number for all three months and divide this by the total of all classifications of requisitions reported for the three months. This will give a percentage which is to be applied against the following table to determine percent of maximum score obtained.

TABLE B-1B

<u>Percent of Total Requisitions</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
6.9 or less	100
7.0 - 8.9	90
9.0 -10.9	80
11.0 -12.9	70
13.0 -14.9	60
15.0 or more	0

Source of Data: Base Supply Report, RCS: AF-S1 (SAC-1) and 7AD Supplement.

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c. Aircraft Bench Stock Status

Scoring is based on percentage of bench stock items on-hand to those required for a base during a quarter, i. e., Jan - Mar, etc. (West Drayton and East Kirkby are not included in this scoring).

Computation is as follows: Obtain the total of bench stock items authorized for the base (both B-47 and KC-97 added together or B-47 or KC-97 individually if only one type is stocked at a base) for the last month of the quarter from 7AD-MD-S13 report, and the total on-hand for both B-47 and KC-97 (added together) for the last month of the quarter, then divide the total on-hand by total authorized. Apply the percent on-hand to the following table to obtain percent of score.

$$\frac{\text{B-47 \& KC-97 Stock On-Hand}}{\text{B-47 \& KC-97 Stock Authorized}} = \text{Percent On-Hand}$$

TABLE B-1C

<u>Percent On-Hand</u>	<u>Percent Maximum Score</u>
95.1 or more	100
90.1 - 95.0	80
85.1 - 90.0	60
80.1 - 85.0	40
75.1 - 80.0	20
75.0 or less	0

Source of Data: Percentage of Command Bench Stock Items on Hand, RCS: 7AD-MD-S13.

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d. Line Items Stocked

Score will be based on information reported in Item 14, Section V, Base Supply Report, AF-S1, average number of stock record cards on hand for the quarter.

Ground Rules stipulate that line items in Air Force Service Stores, classes 30A, 30F, and POL will not be included in the Base Supply Report.

The following scoring table will be used in computing the percent of maximum score.

TABLE B-1D

<u>Bomber or Tanker</u>	<u>West Drayton</u>	<u>Post Strike Bases</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
27,800 or less	11,400 or less	7,500 or less	100
27,801 - 28,800	11,401 - 11,800	7,501 - 8,000	90
28,801 - 29,800	11,801 - 12,200	8,001 - 8,500	80
29,801 - 30,800	12,201 - 12,600	8,501 - 9,000	70
30,801 - 31,800	12,601 - 13,000	9,001 - 9,500	60
31,801 - 32,800	13,001 - 13,400	9,501 - 10,000	50
32,801 - 33,800	13,401 - 13,800	10,001 - 10,500	40
33,801 - 34,800	13,801 - 14,200	10,501 - 11,000	30
34,801 - 35,800	14,201 - 14,600	11,001 - 11,500	20
35,801 - 36,800	14,601 - 15,000	11,501 - 12,000	10
36,801 or more	15,001 or more	12,001 or more	0

Example: An Air Base Group reports the following information during the quarter:

<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Average</u>
27,000	28,000	30,000	<u>85,000</u>	= 28,500
			3	

This particular base is classified as a bomber base, therefore the bomber scoring table indicates 90% of score for the unit.

NOTE: Due to a special requirement, 3910th Air Base Group will subtract 8,000 from the quarterly average line items stocked prior to entering Table B-1D to obtain the percent of maximum score.

Source of Data: Base Supply Report, RCS: AF-S1 (SAC-1)

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e. Supply Effectiveness

Score will be based on percent of requested line items which are reported as issued or partially issued in Columns D and E of Base Supply Reports for the quarter. Line Items cancelled (Column G) will be deducted from line items requested (Column C) before computation of the percentages. The following table will be used in computing the percent of maximum score.

TABLE B-1E

<u>Supply Effectiveness Percentage</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
81 or more	100
74 - 80.9	90
67 - 73.9	80
60 - 66.9	70
53 - 59.9	60
46 - 52.9	50
39 - 45.9	40
32 - 38.9	30
25 - 31.9	20
18 - 24.9	10
17.9 or less	0

Example:

	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>
Line Items Issued:				
Issued	6,252	7,334	5,659	
Partially Issued	150	230	241	
Total	6,402	7,564	5,900	19,866
Line Items Requested:				
Total	10,150	10,100	10,194	
Cancelled	50	3	100	
Net Total (Col C - Col G)	10,100	10,097	10,094	30,291

$19,866 \div 30,291 = 65.6\%$ or 70% of score for this unit.

Source of Data: Base Supply Report, RCS: AF-S1(SAC-1)

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f. Pipeline Time for Base Purchases from Commercial Vendors

- (1) Compute pipeline time as follows:
 - (a) Multiply average pipeline time for petty cash purchases by the number of items purchased using petty cash procedures for each month, then add these figures.
 - (b) Multiply average pipeline time for other local purchases by the appropriate number of line items for each month, then add these figures.
 - (c) Total the products of (a) & (b) above.
 - (d) Divide (c) above by the total number of line items obtained through petty cash purchases and other local purchases for the quarter.
- (2) Scores will be determined in accordance with the following table:

TABLE B-1F

<u>Pipeline Time</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
40 days or less	100
41 - 49 days	80
50 - 59 days	60
60 - 69 days	40
70 - 79 days	20
80 - or more	0

Source of Data: Base Supply Report, RCS: AF-S1, SAC-1.

Example:

	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>Avg Time</u>	<u>#L.Items</u>	<u>Avg Time</u>	<u>#Line</u>	<u>L.Items</u>
	<u>Time</u>	<u>Items</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Items</u>	<u>Days</u>
(a) <u>Petty Cash</u>	10 x 5 = 50	2 x 5 = 10	1 x 10 = 10	70	20
(b) <u>All Other</u>	50 x 10 = 500	25 x 10 = 250	30 x 5 = 150	900	25
				970	45
(c)	<u>Total Petty Cash & Other - 970 = 22 days or 100% of score.</u>				
	<u>Total Line Items - 45</u>				

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g. Air Force Service Store Management

To obtain score, add the percentages for parts g(1) and g(2) then divide by two.

(1) Air Force Service Store Inventory Turnover

Scoring is based on sales during the quarter, reported in Analysis of Monetary Inventory Transactions, RCS: 3-SAC-Cl1, (issues Column 5, subtract previous quarter issues from present quarter issues for present quarter sales) - except for first quarter of fiscal year where end month of that quarter is used. Then, as a percentage of the total of the average inventory for each of the three months (average inventory = beginning (previous months ending) plus current month ending inventory, divided by 2).*

$$\frac{\text{Quarterly Total Sales}}{\text{Quarterly Average Inventory}} = \text{Turnover rate for quarter.}$$

TABLE B-1G(1)

<u>Turnover Rate</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
.33 or more	100
.31 - .32	90
.29 - .30	80
.27 - .28	70
.25 - .26	60
.23 - .24	50
.21 - .22	40
.19 - .20	30
.17 - .18	20
.15 - .16	10
.14 or less	0

Example: Total Sales for the quarter were \$42,000 and the total of the average inventory for the three months was \$174,000.

$$\frac{\$42,000}{\$174,000} = .24 \text{ Turnover rate.}$$

Table B-1G(1) will give you 50% of maximum score with a .24 turnover rate.

*NOTE: War Reserve and bulk stocks received from depots which are in excess of operating levels, will be subtracted from the monthly average inventory prior to computing turnover rate. (See Supplement 1 to SAC Regulation 67-26).

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(2) Air Force Service Store Operating Cost

Scoring is based on operating cost during quarter (sub account 42200.1, total column, Monthly Expense Report, RCS: 1-SAC-C11) per dollar value of sales for quarter. (See Part g (1)).

Quarterly Operating Cost = Cost per Dollar Sales for Quarter
Quarterly Sales

TABLE B-1G(2)

<u>Cost per Dollar Sales</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
\$0.11 or less	100
.12	90
.13	80
.14	70
.15	60
.16	50
.17	40
.18	30
.19	20
.20	10
.21 or more	0

Example: Total sales for the quarter were \$42,000 with an operating cost of \$5,775.

$$\frac{\$5,775}{\$42,000} = .14 \text{ cost per dollar sales.}$$

Table B-1G(2) gives 70% of maximum score with a .14 cost per dollar sales.

Source of Data: Monthly Expense Report, RCS: 1-SAC-C11, and Analysis of Monetary Inventory Transaction, RCS: 3-SAC-C11.

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2. SUPPLY SERVICES

a. Clothing Sales Store Management

Score is based on two aspects of clothing sales store management described below. To obtain point score, add the scores earned for parts 2a(1) and 2a(2) then divide by two.

(1) Clothing Sales Store Inventory Turnover

Scoring is based on sales during quarter as a percentage of Class A and combat serviceable inventory multiplied by three for the end of the quarter.

$$\frac{\text{Quarterly Sales}}{\text{End of Quarter Inventory} \times 3} = \text{Turnover rate.}$$

TABLE B-2A(1)

<u>Turnover Rate</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
.250 or more	100
.220 - .249	80
.190 - .219	60
.160 - .189	40
.130 - .159	20
.129 or less	0

Source of Data: Trial Balance (Air Force Stock Fund Clothing Div), RCS: AF-C77

(2) Clothing Sales Store Operating Cost

Score is based on operating cost during quarter (account 424.00 of Monthly Expense Report) per dollar value of sales for the quarter. (See Part 2a(1)).

TABLE B-2A(2)

<u>Cost per Dollar Sales</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
\$0.22 or less	100
.23 - .29	80
.30 - .36	60
.37 - .43	40
.44 - .50	20
.51 or more	0

Source of Data: Monthly Expense Report, 1-SAC-CL1, Trial Balance AF-C77.

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b. Commissary Sales Store Management

Score is based on five aspects of commissary sales store management described below. Each of these items will be scored separately and these scores then added together to obtain the percent of maximum score for base commissaries. The point score is obtained by multiplying the percent earned for parts 2b(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) by the number of points allotted.

(1) Commissary Sales Store Inventory Turnover

Scoring is based on cost of goods sold during the quarter (add accounts 423, 424 and 425, Column 7, Monthly Trial Balance) as a percentage of the average inventory for the quarter. (Add Columns 3 & 5, accounts 143, 144 & 145, Monthly Trial Balance then divide by 2).

$$\frac{\text{Cost of Goods Sold}}{\text{Average Inventory}} = \text{Turnover rate.}$$

TABLE B-2B(1)

<u>Turnover Rate</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
.40 or more	20
.38 - .39	18
.36 - .37	16
.34 - .35	14
.32 - .33	12
.30 - .31	10
.28 - .29	8
.26 - .27	6
.24 - .25	4
.22 - .23	2
.21 or less	0

Source of Data: Commissary Stock Fund Report, RCS: AF-C102.

(2) Commissary Sales Store Operating Cost

Scoring is based on operating cost for the quarter (account 52,000, total column, Monthly Expense Report) per dollar of sales for the quarter (add accounts 401, 412, 416, 417 and 418, Column 8, Monthly Trial Balance).

$$\frac{\text{Operating Cost}}{\text{Sales}} = \text{Cost per dollar sales.}$$

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TABLE B-2B(2)

<u>Cost per Dollar Sale</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
\$0.10 or less	20
.11	18
.12	16
.13	14
.14	12
.15	10
.16	8
.17	6
.18	4
.19	2
.20 or more	0

Source of Data: Monthly Expense Reports, RCS: 1-SAC-C11; Monthly Trial Balance (AF Stock Fund - Commissary Div) AF-C102.

(3) Percent Loss in Grocery Market Subsection

Scoring is based on percentage of inventory adjustments to sales during the quarter. Inventory adjustment is obtained from Account 603, Difference between Book and Physical Inventory, Column 7 or 8, Monthly Trial Balance; Sales, Account 416, Column 8, Monthly Trial Balance.

$$\frac{\text{Diff. between Book \& Phys Inv}}{\text{Sales}} \times 100 = \text{Percent Loss.}$$

TABLE B-2B(3)

<u>Percent Loss</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
0.30 or less loss	20
0.31 - 0.40	18
0.41 - 0.50	16
0.51 - 0.60	14
0.61 - 0.70	12
0.71 - 0.80	10
0.81 - 0.90	8
0.91 - 1.00	6
1.01 - 1.10	4
1.11 - 1.20	2
1.21 or more loss	0
0.05 or less gain	14
0.06 or more gain	0

Source of Data: Monthly Trial Balance (AF Stock Fund - Commissary Div) RCS: AF-C102.

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(4) Percent Gain in Meat Market Subsection

Scoring is based on percentage of inventory adjustments to sales during the quarter. Inventory adjustment is obtained from Account 604, difference between Book and Physical inventory, Column 7 or 8, Monthly Trial Balance; Sales, Account 417, Column 8, Monthly Trial Balance.

$$\frac{\text{Diff. between Book \& Phys Inv}}{\text{Sales}} \times 100 = \text{Percent Gain.}$$

TABLE B-2B(4)

<u>Percent Gain</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
0.35 or less gain	20
0.36 - 0.70	18
0.71 - 1.05	16
1.06 - 1.40	14
1.41 - 1.75	12
1.76 - 2.10	10
2.11 - 2.45	8
2.46 - 2.80	6
2.81 - 3.15	4
3.16 - 3.50	2
3.51 or more gain	0
0.05 or less loss	14
0.06 or more loss	0

Source of Data: Monthly Trial Balance (AF Stock Fund - Commissary Div),
RCS: AF-C102.

(5) Commissary Sales per Card Holder

Scoring is based on sales for the quarter (add Accounts 401, 412, 416, 417 and 418, Column 8, Monthly Trial Balance) per holder of commissary cards for the quarter. (Item 28, Monthly Commissary Operating Statement, RCS: AF-S62 (SAC-1).

$$\frac{\text{Quarterly Sales}}{\text{Quarterly Nr Card Holders}} = \text{Average Sale per Card Holder}$$

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TABLE B-2B(5)

<u>Avg Sale per Card Holder</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
\$34.01 or more	20
32.51 - 34.00	18
31.01 - 32.50	16
29.51 - 31.00	14
28.01 - 29.50	12
26.51 - 28.00	10
25.01 - 26.50	8
23.51 - 25.00	6
22.01 - 23.50	4
20.51 - 22.00	2
20.50 or less	0

Source of Data: Monthly Trial Balance (AF Stock Fund - Commissary Div)
RCS: AF-C102; Monthly Commissary Operating Statement,
RCS: AF-S62 (SAC-1).

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c. Food Service Management

Scoring will be based on two aspects of food service management as described below. Each of these items will be scored separately and these scores then added together to obtain the percent of maximum score achieved for food service management.

(1) Personnel Cost per Meal Served

Cost per meal served will be computed from total Food Service Squadron costs reported in Columns 9, 12, 15 and 17 of the 1-SAC-C11 by dividing this total cost by total number of meals served for the quarter. The total number of meals served will be obtained from the Food Service Officer. Field Ration "A" times 3, snack meals and any other meals served by SAC personnel, where preparation was necessary, will be included in determining total number of meals served. Total costs in Columns 9, 12, 15 and 17, Account 36300 on 1-SAC-C11, will be used for ABRONS. ABGRUs and ABRONS will use appropriate tables below to determine scores earned.

TABLE B-2C(1)

<u>Personnel Cost per Meal Served</u>		<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
<u>ABGRU</u>	<u>ABRON</u>	
.17¢ or less	.20¢ or less	50
.18	.21	45
.19	.22	40
.20	.23	35
.21	.24	30
.22	.25	25
.23	.26	20
.24	.27	15
.25	.28	10
.26	.29	5
.27 or more	.30 or more	0

Source of Data: Monthly Expense Report, 1-SAC-C11.

(2) Cost per Field Ration Served

Cost of the field ration will be computed by dividing the total dollar value of subsistence issued by the commissary officer (or R.D.P.) by the number of rations served as reported by the base in compliance with 7AD letter L46-1 (RCS: 7AD-DM-C3). The cost of the field ration as served will be compared to the field ration allowance and the percent of maximum score obtained from following table.

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TABLE B-2C(2)

<u>Value of Ration as Served</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
Same as field ration allowance	50
.01¢ over or under	45
.02¢ over or under	40
.03¢ over or under	35
.04¢ over or under	30
.05¢ over or under	25
.06¢ over or under	20
.07¢ over or under	15
.08¢ over or under	10
.09¢ over or under	5
.10¢ over or under	0

Source of Data: Food Service Operation, RCS: 7AD-MD-03.

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3. SEA WEED EQUIPMENT COMPLETENESS

This item will be scored quarterly based on the latest bi-monthly report for February, June, August, and December. Score is computed as follows:

- a. Add the total equipment percentages for Basic set, Appendices, and Housekeeping sets.
- b. Divide "a" above by the total number of sets included and apply the percent against the table below:

TABLE B-3

<u>Equipment Percentages</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
95 or more	100
90 - 94.9	90
85 - 89.9	80
80 - 84.9	70
75 - 79.9	60
70 - 74.9	50
65 - 69.9	40
60 - 64.9	30
55 - 59.9	20
50 - 54.9	10
49.9 or less	0

Source of Data: Status Report of Project Sea Weed, RCS: 1-AF-S11.

Example: For the quarter, the Status Report of Project Sea Weed for an Air Base Group reports 85% completion for the Basic set, 75% completion for the Augmentation set, and 90% completion for the Housekeeping set. (Taken from February Report). The total percent completed is 250%. Divide 250% by three (number of sets included). The equipment percentage will be 83.3% or when applied against Table B-3 results in 70% of maximum score.

NOTE: Status Report of Project Sea Weed, RCS: 1-AF-S11, reports will be used for the following quarters: First quarter -- August; second quarter -- December; third quarter -- February; fourth quarter -- June.

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4. GROUND POWER EQUIPMENT STATUS

To obtain score, add the percentage of maximum score for parts 4a and 4b, then divide by two. Computation of percent of GPEDP and GPEDM will be accomplished by dividing total equipment days available into total number of days lost for the quarter.

a. Percent of GPEDP

Scoring is based on percent of days lost due to parts, reported on GPEDP for the quarter

TABLE B-4A

<u>Percent of GPEDP</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
2.0 or less	100
2.1 - 2.8	90
2.9 - 3.6	80
3.7 - 4.4	70
4.5 - 5.2	60
5.3 - 6.0	50
6.1 - 6.8	40
6.9 - 7.6	30
7.7 - 8.4	20
8.5 - 9.2	10
9.3 or more	0

b. Percent of GPEDM

Scoring is based on percent of days lost due to maintenance, reported on GPEDP and/or GPEDM for the quarter.

TABLE B-4B

<u>Percent of GPEDM</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
2.0 or less	100
2.1 - 2.8	90
2.9 - 3.6	80
3.7 - 4.4	70
4.5 - 5.2	60
5.3 - 6.0	50
6.1 - 6.8	40
6.9 - 7.6	30
7.7 - 8.4	20
8.5 - 9.2	10
9.3 or more	0

Source of Data: GPEDP and/or GPEDM, RCS: 7AD-MD-R16.

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C. GENERAL

1. GROUND SAFETY

Score is determined on the basis of accident cost index (per AFR 32-2) and ground safety index (defined below) for the quarter. When these two indices have been computed, the percentage of maximum points received will be read from Table C-1.

Definitions:

a. Ground Safety Index - Military Disabling Injury Rate per 100,000 mandays (on and off duty) plus Civilian Injury Rate per 1,000,000 manhours divided by 10, plus Government Motor Vehicle Accident Rate per 100,000 miles operated.

b. Accident Cost Index - Total cost of ground accidents for the quarter divided by the unit strength for the quarter. This gives an average cost per person for the quarter.

TABLE C-1

<u>Ground Safety Index</u>	\$0.00-	1.83-	2.55-	3.36-	4.16-	6.00 &
	1.82	2.54	3.35	4.15	5.99	Over
0.00 - 4.85	100	95	90	85	80	75
4.86 - 5.48	90	85	80	75	70	65
5.49 - 6.50	80	75	70	65	60	55
6.51 - 7.80	70	65	60	55	50	45
7.81 - 8.60	60	55	50	45	40	35
8.61 - 9.64	50	45	40	35	30	25
9.65 - 11.55	40	35	30	25	20	15
11.56 & Over	30	25	20	15	10	5

Example: An Air Base Group reported the following figures on the Ground Accident Reports:

Strength..... 3750
 Disabling Injury Rate:
 Military..... 5.04
 Civilian..... Zero
 Vehicle Accident Rate..... 1.68
 Accident Cost..... \$1945

(1) Ground Safety Index is $5.04 + 0 + 1.68 = 6.72$

(2) Accident Cost Index is $\frac{1945}{3750} = \$0.52$

(3) In Table C-1 at the intersection of the horizontal column containing 6.72 and vertical column containing \$0.52 a value of 70% of score is read.

Source of Data: RCS: 3-SAC-X1.

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2. GENERAL GROUND TRAINING

Scoring is based on the total percent completed, relative to the percent required for the quarter. Establish the percentage of annual training hours completed using the monthly Ground Training Report, in accordance with the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Total of Column 3}}{\text{Total of Column 2}} \times 100 = \% \text{ training hours completed}$$

If this percent completed figure equals or exceeds the figure in Column A of Table C-2 below, full score will be granted. If the percentage is equal to or below the figure in Column B, zero score will be awarded. Determine point scores in accordance with the following formula:

$$\frac{\% \text{ Training Hours Completed (-) Column B}}{\text{Column A (-) Column B}} = \% \text{ of score achieved}$$

TABLE C-2

Month	"A"	"B"
Mar	25%	19.0%
Jun	49%	41.5%
Sep	73%	64.0%
DEC	97%	86.5%

Example: For the month of March, the Ground Training Report for an Air Base has a column 2 total of 96,444 hours and a column 3 total of 23,206 hours. Percent of training hours complete is:

$$\frac{23,206}{96,444} \times 100 = 24.1\%$$

The 24.1% falls between figures quoted in Column A and B for March, so score for the quarter will be:

$$\frac{24.1\% (-) 19\%}{25\% (-) 19\%} = 85\% \text{ of Maximum Score}$$

Source of Data: Ground Training Report, RCS: 7AD-OD-T5

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3. REPORTING ACCURACY

The purpose is to control the number of errors in reports. Scoring is based on number of errors per base for a month. Reports to be considered will vary from period to period. There will be no advance notification of what reports will be used as a basis for scoring since all units are required to maintain accurate reporting at all times. To compute percent of score earned for the quarter, total monthly scores received and divide by three. This average will be the percent of score that will be reflected for that quarter.

TABLE C-3

(To be developed for each report considered)

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GUIDES AND TABLES USED BY 7AD

a. Morning Reports

To eliminate the number of errors in Morning Reports, scoring is based on the number of errors detected through an audit of M/R's for a 5-day period (to be determined by this headquarters) plus any errors on any day of the month which requires the Morning Report to be returned for corrective action. Computation of score will be as follows: Total errors divided by assigned strength (7th Air Division units only) as of the end of the month. Multiply this figure by 1000 for the error rate. Apply error rate against Table C-3A below to obtain percent of score.

$$\frac{\text{Errors}}{\text{Assigned Strength}} \times 1000 = \text{error rate}$$

TABLE C-3A

<u>Error Rate</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
2.5 or less	100%
2.6 - 5.0	90
5.1 - 7.5	80
7.6 -10.0	70
10.1 -12.5	60
12.6 -15.0	50
15.1 -17.5	40
17.6 -20.0	30
20.1 -22.5	20
22.6 -25.0	10
25.1 or more	0

Source of Data: Morning Reports

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b. Motor Vehicle Reporting

Purpose is to enable statistical services to furnish staff agencies of this, higher and lateral commands, accurate, complete and timely information pertaining to location, operating status, and authorization levels of vehicles assigned to this command. Evaluation is based on accuracy of vehicle data indicated by vehicle change report. Computation of possible errors will be as follows:

- Number of reports x 8 =
- + Number of Section I line items x 13 =
- + Number of Section II line items x 10 =

Total number of possible errors

Actual errors as determined by Attachment 1, 7AD Supplement-1 to AFR 77-1, divided by possible errors equals rate of error.

TABLE C-3B

<u>Error Rate</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
0.5 or less	100%
0.6 - 1.0	90
1.1 - 1.5	80
1.6 - 2.0	70
2.1 - 2.5	60
2.6 - 3.0	50
3.1 - 3.5	40
3.6 - 4.0	30
4.1 - 4.5	20
4.6 - 5.0	10
5.1 or more	0

Source of Data: Vehicle Change Report (AF Form 589), RCS: 1-AF-E27.

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4. LATE REPORTS

Scored on number of RCS and Classification & Audit Lists late and the total number of days late in arriving at Headquarters 7th Air Division during the quarter. (TDY Wing reports will not be included with that of the Air Base). When these two figures have been determined, the percentage of maximum score received will be read from Table C-4 below. Maximum score will be obtained only if there are no late reports.

TABLE C-4

Number of Reports Late

Number of Days Late	3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27 & Over
1 - 9	95	90	85						
10 - 18	90	85	80	75	70	65			
19 - 27	80	75	70	65	60	55	50	45	40
28 - 36	70	65	60	55	50	45	40	35	30
37 - 45	60	55	50	45	40	35	30	25	20
46 - 54	50	45	40	35	30	25	20	15	10
55 - 63	40	35	30	25	20	15	10	5	0
64 - 72	30	25	20	15	10	5	0	0	0
73 - 81	20	15	10	5	0	0	0	0	0
82 - 90	10	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
91 or more	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Example: The 7th Air Division Listing of Late Reports showed that an Air Base Group had nine reports late (a total of 18 days) to 7th Air Division during the quarter. Table C-4 indicates that nine late reports, 18 days late, received 80% of score.

Source of Data: 7th Air Division Listing of Late Reports

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5. FINANCE OPERATION

(To be developed)

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6. INVENTORY ACCOUNTING (MONETARY)

Each of these items will be scored separately and these scores then added together to obtain the percent of maximum score for IA(M).

a. Adjustments to Inventory

Evaluation is based on accuracy of accounting records, reliability and completeness of documentation entering the IA(M) system. Scoring is based on the totals of Inventory Overages and Shortages for the quarter (add line 16 and 29, Monthly Operating Report) as a percentage of the total ending inventory for the quarter.

$$\frac{\text{Total of Inventory Overages \& Shortages}}{\text{Total Ending Inventory}} \times 100 = \% \text{ of adjust to inv.}$$

TABLE C-6A

<u>Percentage of Adjustment to Inv.</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
0.9 or less	20
1.0 - 1.9	16
2.0 - 2.9	12
3.0 - 3.9	8
4.0 - 4.9	4
5.0 or more	0

Source of Data: Monthly Operating Report, RCS: 1-AF-C86.

Example:

Inventory Overages (line 16)	\$349,296.57
Inventory Shortages (line 29)	<u>66,914.28</u>
Total Overages and Shortages	\$416,210.85
Total Ending Inventory	\$28,405,840.14

$$416,211 \div 28,405,840 = 1.47\% \text{ or } 1.5\%$$

Table C-6A indicates 1.5% gives 16% of the score.

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b. Credit Balances

Evaluation is based on accuracy of supply stock records, accuracy of accounting records and the reliability of documentation entering the IA(M) system. Scoring is based on the total number of property sub-classes having credit balances in any condition, or total column, as a percentage of the total number of property sub-classes as reported on the analysis of Monetary Inventory Transactions, RCS: 2-AF-C86.

$$\frac{\text{Total number of credit balances reported}}{\text{Total number of property sub-classes reported}} \times 100 = \% \text{ of Credit Bal.}$$

TABLE C-6B

<u>Percentage of Credit Balances</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
2.0 or less	10
2.1 - 4.0	8
4.1 - 6.0	6
6.1 - 8.0	4
8.1 -10.0	2
10.1 or more	0

Source of Data: Analysis of Monetary Inventory Transactions, RCS: 2-AF-C86.

Example: A base reports six credit balances and there were a total of 286 property sub-classes reported.

$$\frac{6}{286} \times 100 = 2.1\%$$

Table C-6B indicates 2.1% gives 8% of the score.

c. Invalid Property Sub-classes.

Evaluation is based on accuracy and timeliness in reporting federal class conversion and valid Air Force classes. Scoring is based on the total number of invalid property sub-classes identification or incorrectly reported classes as a percentage of total number of property sub-classes as reported on the Analysis of Monetary Inventory Transactions, RCS: 2-AF-C86.

$$\frac{\text{Total number of invalid classes reported}}{\text{Total number of property sub-classes reported}} \times 100 = \% \text{ of Invalid classes.}$$

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TABLE C-6C

<u>Percentage of Invalid Classes</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
.20 or less	10
.21 - .40	8
.41 - .60	6
.61 - .80	4
.81 - 1.00	2
1.01 - or more	0

Source of Data: Analysis of Monetary Inventory Transaction, RCS: 2-AF-C86.

Example: An Air Base reports three invalid property sub-classes and there were a total of 345 property sub-classes reported.

$$\frac{3}{345} \times 100 = .87\%$$

Table C-6C indicates .87% gives 2% of the score.

d. Erroneous Documentation

Evaluation is based on the reliability of documentation entering the IA(M) system. Scoring is based on the total number of discrepancies as a percentage of total number of vouchers checked as reported on Part II, Monthly Operating Report, RCS: 1-AF-C86 for the quarter.

$$\frac{\text{Total number of Discrepancies}}{\text{Total number of vouchers checked}} \times 100 = \% \text{ of erroneous documentation.}$$

TABLE C-6D

<u>% of Erroneous Documentation</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
3.0 or less	40
3.1 - 5.0	32
5.1 - 7.0	24
7.1 - 10.0	16
10.1 - 13.0	8
13.1 - or more	0

Source of Data: Part II, Monthly Operating Report, RCS: 1-AF-C86.

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e. Excessive Adjustments for Cycle Inventories

Scoring is based on total number of adjustments over 5% as a percentage of total number of sub-classes inventoried as reported in Part III, Monthly Operating Report, RCS: 1-AF-C86, for the quarter. When the total adjustment (overage and shortage) to the actual physical inventory (by property sub-class) amounts to over 5% of the dollar inventory balance at the time of inventory, this adjustment will be construed as an excessive adjustment to inventory. Zero score for this section will be given if Categories I and II sub-property classes inventoried as reflected on Base Supply Report are not processed through IAM.

$\frac{\text{Total number of adjustments over 5\%}}{\text{Total number of sub-classes inventoried}} \times 100 = \% \text{ of excessive adjustments.}$

TABLE C-6E

<u>Percentage of Excessive Adjustments</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
10.0 or less	20
10.1 - 20.0	16
20.1 - 30.0	12
30.1 - 40.0	8
40.1 - 50.0	4
50.1 or more	0

Source of Data: Part III, Monthly Operating Report, RCS: 1-AF-C86.

Example: An Air Base reports 30 property sub-classes with total adjustment over 5% and there were a total of 150 property sub-classes physically inventoried.

$$\frac{30}{150} \times 100 = 20\%$$

Table C-6E indicates 20% gives 16% of the score.

COMPUTATION NOTE: Scores in the sub-areas of this section will be determined by the Financial Services Division. The Management Analysis Division will score the IA(M) item by combining sub-area scores.

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7. CONTROL OF FUNDS OBLIGATION RATE

Purpose is to establish a system for assessing management of fund program for Base Operations and Maintenance. Scoring is based on the percentage variance actual to programmed obligations as shown in column H of the Status of Allotment Report, RCS: AF-C31 (SAC-1). All installations may not incur obligation in all budget categories included under P 458 on the fund analysis report. Therefore possible point total is determined by two times number of budget categories in which base incurs obligations. The following ground rules will apply to determine points.

a. For budget categories Ground POL, Other Operating Supplies, Purchased Utilities, Real Property Recurring Maintenance, Commercial Communications and UK Civilian Pay score:

- 2 points for each category with variance 0% - 1.0%
- 1 point for each category with variance 1.1 - 2.0
- 0 points for each category with variance 2.1 or more

b. For all other budget categories score:

- 2 points for each category with variance 0% - 2.0%
- 1 point for each category with variance 2.1 - 3.0
- 0 points for each category with variance 3.1 or more

c. Exception to a and b for any category for which the annual program is less than \$10,000, the following table will be used:

- 2 points for variance 0 - 3.0%
- 1 point for variance 3.1 - 5.0
- 0 point for variance 5.1 or more

d. Each month compute total points earned and total possible points. Total points earned for the quarter and total possible points for the quarter are averaged for the quarter being scored. Divide average points earned by average points possible to determine percentage of maximum points earned. This percent will be applied against the table shown below to obtain the percent of maximum score.

TABLE C-7

<u>Percent of Maximum Pts Earned</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
89.0 or more	100
81.0 - 88.9	90
73.0 - 80.9	80
65.0 - 72.9	70
57.0 - 64.9	60
49.0 - 56.9	40
41.0 - 48.9	20
40.9 or less	0

Source of Data: Status of Allotment Report, RCS: AF-C31 (SAC-1).

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8. O&M CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS

Purpose is to establish control over rate of completion of funded and unfinished O&M projects costing over \$200 at 7AD bases with the view of encouraging 7AD personnel to: 1) Plan base requirements so as to permit placing all orders on Air Ministry in an orderly flow; and 2) To maintain liaison with the Air Ministry incident to the expeditious completion of projects, timely resolution of any design or construction problems arising, and the final completion and acceptance of the project for entry into the base real property inventory.

Method of Computation

First Step. Establish the dollar value of funded and unfinished O&M projects costing over \$200 (to be called O&M projects in future reference to this item) as of the beginning of a quarter, e. g., 1 July.

Second Step. Establish the value of work in place for each of the O&M projects included in Step One as of the first day of each quarter (e. g., 1 July) and total them.

Third Step. Establish the value of work in place as of the end of the quarter for each of the O&M projects listed in the First Step and total them.

Fourth Step. Establish the value of work in place of each of the O&M projects which have been added since the beginning of the quarter as of the last day of the quarter and total them.

Fifth Step. Add the value of work in place in the Third Step and the value of work in place in the Fourth Step to give a total of work in place as of the end of the quarter, e. g., 30 September.

Sixth Step. Subtract the result of the Fifth Step from the result of the Second Step to give the value of work in place accomplished during the quarter.

Seventh Step. Divide the value of work in place accomplished during the quarter (Sixth Step) by the total of the funded and unfinished O&M projects established in the First Step.

Eighth Step. Apply this rate of progress against the table shown below to arrive at percent of maximum score.

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TABLE C-8(1)

<u>Progress Rate</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
11.0 or more	100%
10.0 - 10.9	90
9.0 - 9.9	80
8.0 - 8.9	70
7.0 - 7.9	60
6.0 - 6.9	50
5.0 - 5.9	40
4.0 - 4.9	30
3.0 - 3.9	20
2.0 - 2.9	10
Below 2.0%	0

Source of Data: AF Projects Program Control Plan & Status Reports, RCS:
7AD-MD-K1.

Example: An Air Base has a total of funded and unfinished O&M projects as of 1 July in the amount of \$200,000 (First Step). Value of work in place as of 1 July is \$100,000 (Second Step). Value of work in place on 30 September of O&M projects listed on 1 July is \$110,000 (Third Step). Value of work in place on 30 September for projects started after 1 July is \$5,000 (Fourth Step). Fifth Step, \$110,000 + \$5,000 = \$115,000. Sixth Step, \$115,000 less \$100,000 = \$15,000. Seventh Step, \$15,000 ÷ \$200,000 = 7.5%. Eighth Step, 7.5% equals 60% of score.

In order to emphasize the requirement to complete projects as soon as possible, a penalty is established for having unfinished O&M projects which were funded from a fiscal year prior to the current or previous fiscal year. For example, during Fiscal Year 1958, projects which were funded from Fiscal Year 1956, or prior fiscal years will be considered under the penalty measurement. The method for computation is as follows:

Step One, total the value of all O&M projects which are in the penalty years at the end of the quarter. Step Two, divide this total by the total value of O&M projects as of the end of the quarter. Step Three, apply the resulting percentage against the following table and subtract

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the amount of the deduction shown in the table from the percent of score attained in the section above.

TABLE C-8(2)

<u>Percent of Total in Penalty Fiscal Years</u>	<u>Deduction of Score</u>
Less than 1	0
1 to 10	5%
11 to 20	10
21 to 30	20
31 to 40	30
41 to 50	40
51 to 60	50
61 to 70	75
71 or more	100

Example: An Air Base has a total of O&M projects as of 30 September 1957 of \$200,000. Included in these projects are one project for FY-56 -- value \$10,000 and one project for FY-55 -- value \$10,000, making the total of O&M projects from the penalty years \$20,000. \$20,000 divided by \$200,000, the value of O&M projects as of 30 September (end of the quarter), gives the proportion of 10% which, when applied to the table, results in a deduction of 5%. 5% is then deducted from the score attained in the section above which using the example above, gives the final score for the item of 60% less 5% or 55% of score.

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9. RECURRING MAINTENANCE

(To be developed)

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July 195710. PHOTO LAB CAPABILITY

Purpose is to establish a system for assessing the capability of the Base Photo Labs to process excellent quality film in sufficient time to allow B-51 reports to be submitted within the required time limits. Scoring of test results is determined from computing percentage ratings of film processing time and defects in the processed negative film. For quarter scores, the latest test result will be used.

a. Film Processing Percentage Computation

Aerial and radar test percentages are computed separately using procedures outlined below:

(1) Film Processing Time

(a) Divide the total footage of film provided for the test by the total footage the available equipment is capable of processing in one hour to find the required film processing time.

(b) Subtract the required film processing time from the actual film processing time to find the time difference.

(c) Divide the time difference by the required film processing time to find the time difference percentage. Negative time difference value is zero percent.

(d) Subtract time difference percentage from 100% to find the percentage rating for the film processing time.

Example: $9000 \text{ ft} \div 800 \text{ ft} = 11.25 \text{ hours}$ (required processing time)
 $12 \text{ hrs} - 11.25 \text{ hrs} = 0.75 \text{ hrs}$ (time difference)
 $0.75 \text{ hrs} \div 11.25 \text{ hrs} = .067$ or 6.7% (percentage difference)
 $100\% - 6.7\% = 93.3\%$ (percentage rating)

(2) Negative Defects

(a) Multiply 18 (the number of possible Morgan and Lester negative defects per roll of film) by the number of film rolls provided for the test to find the total number of possible negative defects.

(b) Multiply the total number of possible defects by 10% to find the number of allowable defects.

(c) Subtract the number of allowable defects from the number of defects listed on 7AD Form 18 to find the defects difference.

(d) Divide defects difference by the total number of possible defects to find the defects difference percentage.

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(e) Subtract defects difference percentage from 100% to find film processing negative defects percentage rating.

Example: 18 defects x 90 rolls = 1620 (total possible defects)
1620 defects x 10% = 162 (allowable defects)
285 7AD Form 18 defects - 162 = 123 (defects difference)
123 defects ÷ 1620 defects = .076 or 7.6% (% difference)
100 - 7.6% = 92.4% (percentage rating)

b. Test Final Score Computation

(1) Add percentages ratings for both aerial and radar film processing times and negative defects.

(2) Divide the percentage rating by 4 to find the average percentage rating for the test.

(3) Subtract five percent for each roll of unusable film scored on 7AD Form 18 from average percentage rating to determine percent of maximum score earned.

Example: $93.3\% + 92.4\% + 100\% + 98.0\% = 383.7\%$

$383.7\% \div 4 = 95.9\%$

$95.9\% - 10\%$ (2 unusable rolls) = 85.9% or 86% score earned.

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11. RESERVED FOR SPECIAL SUBJECTS

Special subjects to be considered will vary from period to period. There will be no advance notification of the subjects that will be included as a basis for scoring. The number of points allocated and the tables upon which scoring will be based will be determined at this headquarters.

TABLE C-11

(To be developed for each subject considered)

Headquarters
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125 New York, New York

3 December 1957

*CHANGE 2

TO

7AD MANUAL 170-1, JULY 1957

MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM

(EFFECTIVE 15 DECEMBER 1957)


1. The attached pages constitute Change 2 to 7AD Manual 170-1, July 1957. Recipients will remove the old pages and insert the new pages of the Manual in their proper numerical sequence.

2. This Change consists of the following pages:

14	18
14a	23
17	39

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FOR THE COMMANDER:


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

*Supersedes 7AD Msg DCRM 15666, 8 Oct 57 and 18307, 22 Nov 57.

7ADM 170-1
C2, 1 December 1957

6. OFFICER EFFECTIVENESS REPORTS

Utilizing 7AD Form 104, the following point system of demerits will be applied by this headquarters:

a. Individual Item Weight

(1) To the immediate right of the boxes in the column entitled "7AD USE ONLY" place the following figures: Section I - 7 boxes - 1/1/1/1/3/1/1/1/; Section II - 1 box - /2/; Section III - 2 boxes - 1/1/; Section IV - 8 boxes - 2/1/1/1/2/2/1/1/; Section V - No box appears, however, 1 point is deductable; Section VI - 3 boxes - 1/1/1/; Section VII - 7 boxes - 1/1/2/1/1/1/1/; Other - 5 boxes - 1/2/3/1/1/.

b. Computation

(1) Reports received for the quarter being scored, regardless of the closing date, will determine the number of reports used in the computation.

(2) By adding the total number of item weights for the quarter and dividing by the number of reports received for the quarter, an average of the number of demerits can be obtained and applied to the following table to obtain the percent of maximum score.

TABLE A-6

<u>Average Demerits</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
.25 or less	100
.26 - .50	90
.51 - .75	80
.76 - 1.00	70
1.01 - 1.25	60
1.26 - 1.50	50
1.51 - 1.75	40
1.76 - 2.00	30
2.01 - 2.25	20
2.26 - 2.50	10
2.51 or more	0

Example: For the quarter, a station submitted 39 reports totaling 49 item weights resulting in an average of 1.26 demerits or 50% of possible score. A station submitting 3 reports with an item weight of 1 results in an average of .33 or 90% of possible score.

7ADM 170-1
G2, 1 December 1957

NOTE: Each effectiveness report will be carefully reviewed. In the interest of economy and administrative work load, minor errors that can be corrected by this headquarters will be corrected without referral to units concerned. However, appropriate score will be applied and 7AD Form 104 filed for a period of six months in the event a review is required to justify the score applied.

7ADM 170-1
C2, 1 December 1957

c. Aircraft Bench Stock Status

Scoring is based on percentage of bench stock items on-hand to those required for a base during a quarter, i.e., Jan - Mar, etc. (West Drayton is not included in this scoring).

Computation is as follows: Obtain the total of bench stock items authorized for the base (both B-47 and KC-97 added together or B-47 or KC-97 individually if only one type is stocked at a base) for the last month of the quarter from 7AD-DM-S13 report, and the total on-hand for both B-47 and KC-97 (added together) for the last month of the quarter, then divide the total on-hand by total authorized. Apply the percent on-hand to the following table to obtain percent of score.

$$\frac{\text{B-47 \& KC-97 Stock On-Hand}}{\text{B-47 \& KC-97 Stock Authorized}} = \text{Percent On-Hand}$$

TABLE B-1C

<u>Percent On-Hand</u>	<u>Percent Maximum Score</u>
95.1 or more	100
90.1 - 95.0	80
85.1 - 90.0	60
80.1 - 85.0	40
75.1 - 80.0	20
75.0 or less	0

Source of Data: Percentage of Command Bench Stock Items on Hand,
RCS: 7AD-DM-S13.

7ADM 170-1
C2, 1 December 1957

d. Line Items Stocked

Score will be based on information reported in Item 14, Section V, Base Supply Report, RCS: AF-S1, average number of stock record cards on hand for the quarter.

Ground rules stipulate that line items in Air Force Service Stores, classes 30A, 30F and POL will not be included in the Base Supply Report.

The following scoring table will be used in computing the percent of maximum score.

TABLE B-1D

<u>Bomber or Tanker</u>	<u>West Drayton</u>	<u>Post Strike Bases</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
27,800 or less	11,400 or less	7,500 or less	100
27,801 - 28,800	11,401 - 11,800	7,501 - 8,000	90
28,801 - 29,800	11,801 - 12,200	8,001 - 8,500	80
29,801 - 30,800	12,201 - 12,600	8,501 - 9,000	70
30,801 - 31,800	12,601 - 13,000	9,001 - 9,500	60
31,801 - 32,800	13,001 - 13,400	9,501 - 10,000	50
32,801 - 33,800	13,401 - 13,800	10,001 - 10,500	40
33,801 - 34,800	13,801 - 14,200	10,501 - 11,000	30
34,801 - 35,800	14,201 - 14,600	11,001 - 11,500	20
35,801 - 36,800	14,601 - 15,000	11,501 - 12,000	10
36,801 or more	15,001 or more	12,001 or more	0

Example: An Air Base Reports the following information during the quarter:

<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Average</u>
27,000	28,000	30,000	85,000	28,500
			3	=

This particular base is classified as a bomber base, therefore the bomber scoring table indicates 90% of score for the unit.

NOTE: Due to a special requirement, 3910th Air Base Group will subtract 8,000 from the quarterly average line items stocked prior to entering Table B-1D to obtain the percent of maximum score. 3917th Air Base Squadron will subtract 4,000 from the quarterly average line items stocked prior to entering Table B-1D to obtain the percent of maximum score.

Source of Data: Base Supply Report, RCS: AF-S1 (SAC-1)

7ADM 170-1
G2, 1 December 1957

2. SUPPLY SERVICES

a. Clothing Sales Store Management

Score is based on two aspects of clothing sales store management described below. To obtain point score, add the scores earned for parts 2a(1) and 2a(2) then divide by two.

(1) Clothing Sales Store Inventory Turnover

Scoring is based on sales during the quarter (Line 22, Column 12, Monthly Summary of Clothing Activity, RCS: AF-C78) as a percentage of the total of the average inventory for each of the three months (average inventory = beginning (Line 1, Column 2) plus current month ending inventory (Line 8, Column 2) divided by 2).

$$\frac{\text{Quarterly Total Sales}}{\text{Quarterly Average Inventory}} = \text{Turnover rate}$$

TABLE B-2A(1)

<u>Turnover Rate</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
.250 or more	100
.220 - .249	80
.190 - .219	60
.160 - .189	40
.130 - .159	20
.129 or less	0

Source of Data: Monthly Summary of Clothing Activity. RCS: AF-C78

(2) Clothing Sales Store Operating Cost

Score is based on operating cost during quarter (Account 42400 of Monthly Expense Report) per dollar value of sales for the quarter. (See Part 2a(1)).

TABLE B-2A(2)

<u>Cost per Dollar Sales</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
\$0.22 or less	100
.23 - .29	80
.30 - .36	60
.37 - .43	40
.44 - .50	20
.51 or more	0

Source of Data: Monthly Expense Report, RCS: 1-SAC-C11; Monthly Summary of Clothing Activity, RCS: AF-C78

7ADM 170-1
C2, 1 December 1957

TABLE C-6C

<u>Percentage of Invalid Classes</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
.20 or less	10
.21 - .40	8
.41 - .60	6
.61 - .80	4
.81 - 1.00	2
1.01 or more	0

Source of Data: Analysis of Monetary Inventory Transaction, RCS:
2-AF-C86

Example: An Air Base reports three invalid property sub-classes and there were a total of 345 property sub-classes reported.

$$\frac{3}{345} \times 100 = .87\%$$

Table C-6C indicates .87% gives 2% of the score.

d. Erroneous Documentation

Evaluation is based on the reliability of documentation entering the IA(M) system. Scoring is based on the total number of errors as a percentage of total number of possible errors on vouchers checked as reported on Part II, Monthly Operating Report, RCS: 1-AF-C86 for the quarter.

$$\frac{\text{Total number of errors}}{\text{Number of vouchers checked} \times 9} \times 100 = \% \text{ of erroneous documentation}$$

TABLE C-6D

<u>% of Erroneous Documentation</u>	<u>Percent of Maximum Score</u>
.75 or less	40
.76 - 1.50	32
1.51 - 2.00	24
2.01 - 2.50	16
2.51 - 3.00	8
3.01 or more	0

Source of Data: Part II, Monthly Operating Report, RCS: 1-AF-C86

DISTRIBUTION				PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE 7ADM 170-1			
SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED BY AN AIR BASE GROUP OR AIR BASE SQUADRON	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3909ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3918ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3910ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3920ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3911ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3917ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3913ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3919ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3914ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		ORGANIZATION	NR CYS
AGENCY	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	1ST AVN DEPOT SQ	
CHEF OF STAFF	2	ADJUTANT	2*	ADJUTANT	2*	2D AVN DEPOT SQ	
ADJUTANT	2	BASE COMPTROLLER	10	BASE COMPTROLLER	5	4TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/PERSONNEL	2	BASE MATERIEL		BASE MATERIEL		8TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/OPERATIONS	2	BASE D/OPERATIONS		BASE D/OPERATIONS		3915TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/MATERIEL	2	BASE PERSONNEL		BASE PERSONNEL		3928TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/PLANS	2	CHAPLAIN		CHAPLAIN		3929TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/INTELLIGENCE	2	INFORMATION SERVICES		INFORMATION SERVICES		3930TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/SECURITY	2	JUDGE ADVOCATE		JUDGE ADVOCATE		3921ST RECON TECH SQ	
CHAPLAIN	2	HEADQUARTERS SQ		PROVOST MARSHAL		485TH COMM SQUADRON	
D/COMPTROLLER	20	OPERATIONS SQUADRON		DEPENSARY		TDY WING	
INSPECTOR GENERAL	2	AIR POLICE SQUADRON				TDY DETACHMENTS	
JUDGE ADVOCATE	2	FOOD SERVICE SQ				TOTAL	
OFF OF INFORMATION	2	INSTALLATIONS SQ				TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT (colm 2 and 3) FOR STOCK	
SURGEON	2	TRANSPORTATION SQ				SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION AIR UNIVERSITY 1 Copy HISTORIAN 3 Copies SAC 5 Copies Hq 3AD 1 Copy Hq 16AF 1 Copy Hq 8AF 1 Copy Hq USAFE 1 Copy	
HEADQUARTERS SQ SEC	2	SUPPLY SQUADRON					
D/SAFETY	2	DEPENSARY					
D/INS-ENG	2	FIELD MAINT SQ					
DETACHMENT 1							
Stock	10	Stock	3	Stock	1		
TOTAL	62	TOTAL	15	TOTAL	8	TOTAL	13
REMARKS						TOTAL DISTRIBUTION	190
* Not applicable to TDY Wings							

HQ 7AD FORM 8
7 JUN 67

OIH

HEADQUARTERS
7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 125 New York, New York

15 December 1957

ROSTER OF OFFICERS

RCS: SAC-72

This roster is based upon official records. Please report errors, omissions, or changes to the custodian of the Organizational Officer Records, Extension 229.

1. Marital Status	2. Dependents in area (*) Applied for	3. Name. Alphabetically by grade	4. AFBN	5. Date of rank in temporary grade	6. Date due for Sep (AF Res Off)	7. Aeronautical Rating: Added 3-BR NAV; 4-NAV	8. Primary AFSC Duty AFSC	9. Additional AFSCs	10.	11. Duty Title	12. DEROS DLFCS	13. Duty Phone Home Phone	13. Home address
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
<u>MAJOR GENERAL</u>													
		M YES BLANCHARD, WILLIAM H.	1445A		010152	RegAF A	0002 None	Commander 7th Air Division		70 02-57 High Wycombe		Quarters #A59, High Wycombe	
<u>COLONELS</u>													
		M YES BURRILL, WILSON E.	4901A		140554	RegAF A	0046D 1234P 0046D 6416 1435 MAIL	Deputy Director of Materiel		08-58 34 08-55 GerdaX 2793		WoodLench, Hilcrest Waye, Gerrards Cross	

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COLONELS CONT'D			PAGE 2									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M NO	COCHRANE, CARLOS J.	999A	010545	RegAF A	0066C 1234C 0031D 1044C	2	Director of Operations, FRE, ASGD 1137th USAF SPEC ACTY SQ, FT MYER, VA., ATCHD DET 1.	01-59 SA 07-57 NPH	Government Quarters Bourne End, Bucks			
M YES	COOKE, CHARLES J.	3348A	040455	RegAF 3	1416 1525D 2016 2016	Director of Intelligence	09-58 373 09-56 FieldEnd 7262	79 Worples Way, Raynors Lane				
M YES	CUNNINGHAM, JACK E.	4367A	150453	RegAF A	0066C 1321B 0031D 1224F 1231C 0046D 0031D	SAC Representative FRE	07-60 SA 07-57 Hurley 238	La Pergola, Hurley, Berks				
M YES	DAVIS, EVERETT	3762A	010652	RegAF N-1	0046D 1544 0046D 6416	Director of Materiel	07-58 18 07-56 GerdsX 4051	North Lodge, Marham Lane Gerrards Cross				
M YES	DOAN, OLIVER C.	5183A	070455	RegAF P-C	0016D 7016 0016D	Director of Personnel	07-58 217 07-55 BEA1149	89 Burks Road, Beaconsfield				
M YES	EADE, GEORGE J.	9515A	270356	RegAF A	0036D 1044A 0036D 0066A	Deputy Director of Operations	11-58 S-322 11-55 Farnham Common 358	"Shepards Hey" Farnham Road, Farnham Royal, Bucks				
M YES	JOHNSON, GERALD W.	8671A	011251	RegAF A	0066C 1124F 0071D 0036D 1321G 1231B	Director of Plans	07-60 374 07-57 GerdsX 2179	Cooldara Hill Way, Gerrards Cross				
M YES	PERRY, ROBERT M.	72095A	010652	Indef A	3016 3044 3016 3044	Chief Communications Electronics Division, Directorate of Operations	05-59 371 05-56 314310	Greenwood Gates, 8 Broad- wood Avenue, Uxbridge				

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M YES PHILLIPS, SAMUEL C.	2049A	19069A RegAF B	8415 0041D 0066A 112AG	1044C 8628 Directorate of Material	06-59 179 06-56 1004801	11 Elmwood Road, Beaconsfield
M YES SCHURTER, ORIE O.	2049A	240550 RegAF A	0066C 1416 1234C 1034	1044C Inspector General	09-59 164 09-56 BEA605	24 Westfield Road, Beaconsfield
M YES SOWERS, LOUIS M.	4879A	010851 RegAF A	0066C 0031D 1234C 0036C	1044C Director of Operations	07-59 S-323 07-57 GerdsX 2880	Oak End, Amersham Road, Lower Road, Gerrards Cross
M YES THOMAS, GLEN J.	10369A	270357 RegAF B	0066A 1416 1234C 7516 7016 7311	1234B Chief, Current Operations Division, Directorate of Operations	07-60 S-269 07-57 or 360 Hatch End 2025	52 The Avenue, Hatch End
M YES TOWNER, ALONZO A.	19158A	190151 RegAF J	9230A 9316 1234C	Surgeon	06-59 435 06-56 BEA241	38 Ledborough Lane, Beaconsfield
M YES YANCEY, WILLIAM R.	1883A	160845 RegAF A	0036D 0002 1041B 1121E	1234B Deputy Commander 7th Air Division	01-59 72 01-57 BEA1340	Penn Lodge, Burgess Wood, North Beaconsfield
M YES ZUMWALT, McLYLE G.	4882A	190151 RegAF A	0026B 7011 0066A 1231A 0036G 1231B 7011	1231C Chief of Staff	07-60 7 07-57 GerdsX 3436	"Bramcote" North Park, Gerrards Cross

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LIEUTENANT COLONELS				PAGE 4									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
M YES	BECKLEY, RAYMOND E.	9080A	200251	RegAF B	1416 1416	1321F 1121A 0061A	Chief Operations Plans Division, Directorate of Operations	08-58 S-275 11-54 WOR2676				12 Northwick Circle, Kenton	
M YES	BLOOD, KENETH E.	7087A	030657	RegAF 3	1416 1416	1525F 1525H	Deputy Chief, Current Operations Division, Directorate of Operations	01-59 S-269 01-56 or 360 GerdsK 4514				Brackenway, Daleside, Gerrards Cross	
M YES	BROWN, LOBDELL P.	2491A	020149	RegAF -	7716 7716	0026A	Director of Security	06-60 68 06-57 ARN1628				12 Corringham Road, Wembley Park	
M YES	CUSHMAN, HENRY R., JR.	401295517	160457	Indef B	7316 0071D	1224P 1041C 7324 7021	Chief Plans & Programs Division, Directorate of Plans	04-59 390 04-56 BEA379				Grenfell, Grenfell Road, Beaconsfield	
M YES	DEITCH, RAYMOND R.	11040A	150453	RegAF A	0066A 4316	1234C 4316	Chief Maintenance-Eng- ineering Division, Directorate of Materiel	06-60 S- 06-57 ACO3065				Icarbery Avenue, London, W. 3	
M YES	EGAN, JAMES C., JR.	13638A	250456	RegAF B	2016 2016	1221C 2054 1435 2061	Deputy Director of Intelligence	01-58 385 02-55 RUI8925				94 Broadwood Avenue, Ruislip	
M YES	FOSTER, JOHN W.	6771A	070157	RegAF 3	1416 1416	1525A 7021 0026	Deputy Inspector General	07-60 164 07-57 Little Chalfont 2207				Brome, Burtonway, Little Chalfont, Bucks	
M YES	GIBSON, HARRY J.	0702	140254	RegAF -	00164 7026	7016	Sajutant	06-60 404 05-57 119686				29 Amberst Road, Ealing	

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LIEUTENANT COLONELS CONT'D												
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES	QUESADA, ANTHONY	7040A	140654	RegAF 3	1416 3216	1534P 3016 3216 1554	Chief Armament Elect- ronics Division, Directorate of Materiel	07-59 S- 07-56 UXB4014	Lichfield Lodge, Swakeleys Road, Ickenham			
M YES	SHAFFER, GLEN C.	18748A	200251	RegAF -	7916 7916	None	Staff Chaplain	03-60 232 03-57 SWA2042	32 Lady Gate Lane, Ruislip			
M YES	SMITH, BURREL P.	A0226332	060256	Indef -	3034 3011	7024 3011	Deputy Chief Communicat- ions-Electronics Division, Directorate of Operations	01-59 375 01-56 PAR3209	13 Kinsington Place, London, W. 8			
M YES	SPAULDING, JOHN P.	A0729257	100351	Indef B	7216 7216	1051C 7024	Special Assistant to the Commander (Information Services Staff Officer)	02-59 649 02-56 West Drayton 2138	169 West Drayton Road, Hillington, West Drayton			
M YES	STEPHENSON, OTTIS V.	8603A	010652	RegAF -	0056E 0056D	6766 6884 6736 6866	Deputy Comptroller	09-60 289 09-57 HAR8381	44 Rusland Park Road, Harrow			
M YES	SWEETLAND, EARLE E.	8551A	010652	RegAF A	0076D 0076D 0066A	1231C 1416 0066A	Deputy Director of Plans	07-58 374 07-55 PIN5839	"Dulasmor" S. View Road, Pinner Hill, Pinner			
M YES	TULL, IRVIN P.	A0573622	010851	Indef -	0046C 6416	6416	Chief Supply Division, Directorate of Materiel	08-59 189 08-56 270C	"Golden Manor" Barbry Gardens Sunbury on Thames Sunbury on Thames			
M YES	VIRLIDIS, ALEXANDER	129032	010652	Indef -	6706 6746	None	Chief of Materiel Services Directorate of Materiel	05-60 01 05-57 0052	199 The Airway, South			

LEUTENANT COLONELS CONT'D

PAGE 7

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES WELLS, DAVID G.	A0663681	150157	Indef N-2	7316	None	7316			Chief, Personnel Services Division, Directorate of Personnel	07-58 409	06-55 RUI6629	"Normandie" 13 Westholme Gardens, Ruislip Manor
<u>MAJORS</u>												
M YES ALLOWAY, HILLARD C.	A0736827	010652	Indef 3	1525B	None	1411			Chief, Training Division, Directorate of Operations	03-59 395	03-56 BYR2640	11 Amery Road, Harrow
M YES ANGEL J. ANGEL	A01636930	010453	Indef 4	1416	3024	1531P	3024	3034	ECM Officer, Defense Systems Branch, Combat Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	10-60 407	10-57 UXB4339	110 Vine Lane, Hillingdon
M YES BAKER, NORMAN N.	9409A	141250	RegAF -	3216	3274	3216			Chief Maintenance Procedure Branch, Armament Electronics Division, Directorate of Materiel	12-59 S-	12-56 GerdsX 2475	"Greenup" Milton Avenue,
M YES BARE, MERLE M.	A0838602	290457	Indef C	4344	1231C	4324	4355	4331	Chief, Aircraft Branch, Maintenance-Engineering Division, Directorate of Materiel	10-59 644	10-56 HatchEnd 2184	105 Sylvia Drive, Hatch End
M YES BEHR, ROBERT M.	21515A	150454	RegAF 3	1416	1525F	1416			Operations Staff Officer, FRE. ASGD 1137TH USAF SPEC ACTY SQ, FT. MYER, VA. ATCHD DET 1	04-59 SA	04-56 MAI598	"Rushington" Braywick Road, Maidenhead.
M YES BENEDICT, GEORGE J.	A0540870	010951	Indef A	1416	1231A	1224P	1321C		Chief Operations Inspection Branch, Office of the Inspector General	08-60 164	08-57 GerdsX 2208	The Dove House, Orchidehill Avenue, Gerrards Cross

MAJORS CONT'D												
PAGE 8												
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES	CARMICHAEL, LEON P.	A0559058	070257	Indef -	7336	7321	7336		Chief Manpower & Requirements Branch, Manpower & Organization Division, Directorate of Plans	06-59 396	07-55 FieldEnd 9600	Flat#3, Eastcote Lodge, Eastcote High Road, Eastcote
M YES	CARSON, KENNETH R.	A0682005	010951	Indef 3	1416	1525A	1416		Chief Missions Branch, Operations Plans Division, 1525D Directorate of Operations	05-59 S-363	05-56 PIN5297	464 Rayners Lane, Pinner
M YES	CRUTSINGER, WILFORD J.	A0736134	150251	Indef B	1444	1321C	1444		Chief Office of Safety	07-58 344	07-54 UXB5868	Gospel Oak, Swakeleys Road, Uxbridge
M YES	DAVIDSON, B. H.	22575A	010652	RegAF A	4316	1234C	4316		Chief Procedures Branch, Maintenance-Engineering Division, Directorate of Materiel	08-58 S-	08-55 UXB6215	5 Elm Lane Close, Park Road, Uxbridge
M YES	DeLAP, JOHN E.	A0667260	010951	Indef 3	1416	1525F	1416		Programs Officer, Plans & Programs Division, Directorate of Plans	04-60 642	04-57 Chalfont St. Giles 507	Forders Nightengale Lane, Chalfont St. Giles
M YES	DAUGHTY, RALPH B.	A0832356	300356	Indef B	2016	1041C	2016		Chief Target Materiel Branch, Target Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	01-60 73	11-57 GerdsX 2329	Talland, Fackhorse Road, Gerrards Cross
M YES	EISENHART, WILLIAM E.	A02044712	010652	Indef B	2016	1041C	2016		Intelligence Staff Officer, FREL. ASGD	07-58 SA	02-55 MA13939	"Allfresco" Baylea Road, Maidenhead
						1231C			1137th BSAF SPEC ACTY			
						7021			ST, FT BRID, VC, TORONTO			
									DET 1			

NAMES CONT'D			PAGE 9									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES	FINLEY, EUGENE E.	A01110479	010951	Indef	-	5516	None	Deputy Director of In-	06-58	218	19 The Ridgeway, Ruislip	
						5516		stallations-Engineering	05-55	RUT5827	Manor	
S NO	GALL, JAMES F., JR.	A01591730	130456	Indef	-	6416	6034	Logistics Officer, Log-	09-59	S-	"Beehive Manor", Cox Green La-	
						6416	4341	istics Division, Direct-		MA12293	Maidenhead, Berks	
							6424	orate of Materiel		(Tmg)		
M YES	GARVIN, LOUIS A.	12676A	151251	RegAF	B	1416	1245A	A/O Nav-Embdr, Mission	05-60	S-363	Bluecedars, Dukes Wood	
					4	1521A		Branch, Operations-Plans	05-57	NPh	Drive, Gerrards Cross	
								Division, Directorate of				
								Operations				
M YES	GIBSON, WILLIAM M.	11874A	150251	RegAF	3	1416	1525B	Chief Deployment Branch,	07-59	S-275	138 The Drive, Rickmansworth	
						1416		Operations-Plans Division,	07-56	RUC2429		
								Directorate of Operations				
M YES	GORBY, WILLIAM A.	A01635954	210255	Indef	-	2016	None	Chief Air Estimates	08-58	306	24 Salehurst Close, Kenton	
						2016		Branch, Operations-Intel-	08-55	WOR5729		
								ligence Division, Dir-				
								ectorate of Intelligence				
M YES	GREGORY, HUGH C.	A02074207	131256	Indef	B	1435	1245A	Air Operations Officer,	11-59	S-326	Tudor Close Village Way,	
					4	1435		Flight Control Division,	11-56	Little	Little Chalfont	
								Directorate of Operations		Chalfont		
										2063		
M YES	HAMLIN, ROBERT W.	18084A	010951	RegAF	-	7316	0011D	Chief Programming & As-	07-59	39	Bayshill House, Barnet Lane,	
						7316		signment Division, Dir-	07-56	Elstree	Elstree	
								ectorate of Personnel		2696		
M YES	HAMMACK, CHARLES R.	13669A	180651	RegAF	B	1416	1234B	Chief, Operations Branch,	07-59	S-360	"The Chimes" Duke Wood Drive,	
					2	1416	1541	Current Operations Divis-	07-56	GerdsX	Gerrards Cross	
							1231C	ion, Directorate of Oper-		3599		
								ations				

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MAJORS CONT'D				PAGE 10									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
M YES	HARRICK, JAMES Q	16126A	010453	RegAF B	7316	1224P	Chief Military Personnel	07-60	378			Woodhouse, Windsor Road, Gerrards Cross	
					7316	1041C	Division, Directorate of	07-57	GerdsX				
						7024	Personnel		2434				
						7324							
						1124Q							
M YES	HANDRAN, HOWARD A.	A0688528	250257	Indef B	3211	1224P	Armament Systems Officer,	03-60	S-			4 Heath House, Milton Road, Ickenham	
					2	3234B	Systems Branch, Armament	03-57	SWA2045				
						3054	& Electronics Division,						
						1541	Directorate of Materiel						
						1051B							
M YES	HEINE, JULIAN C.	A0868389	110456	Indef -	5525	5511	Chief Management Division,	11-59	32			23 Hygrove Way, Ruislip	
					5511		Directorate of	11-56	SWA2280				
							Installations-Engineering						
M YES	JACKSON, GORDON S.	A01855936	140654	Indef -	7816	2031	Chief Military Justice	07-58	278			Rosslyn 24 Field Way, Chalfont St. Peter	
					7816		Division, Office of the	07-57	GerdsX				
							Judge Advocate		3976				
M YES	KENDZIORA, FRANKLIN C.	A0682879	210255	Indef B	1435	1044B	Instructor Pilot,	06-58	427			"Kidderpore" Hedsore Road, Bourne End, Bucks	
					1044B	1231C	Command Section	06-54	BOU382				
M YES	KENNEDY, CHARLES E.	A01798160	010453	Indef -	7716	None	Chief Provost Marshal	06-60	359			6 Barn Rise, Wembley Park	
					7716		Division, Directorate of	06-57	ARN4064				
							Security						
M YES	KIMBALL, LORENZO K.	21869A	010951	RegAF -	9016	9034	Chief Administrative	06-60	435			#4, The Orchards, Montpelier Road, Ealing, W. 5	
					9016		Services Division, Office	06-57	PER6960				
							of the Surgeon						
M YES	KNOLTON, HAROLD B.	A0561436	170451	Indef -	6416	None	Chief Supply Operations	07-58	562			78 Draycott Avenue, Kenton Harrow	
					6416		Branch, Supply Division,	09-55	WOR1351				
							Directorate of Materiel						

NAMES CONT'D		PAGE 11									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
M YES LEPP, KENNETH E.	A0572393	010652	Indef -	3016 3015	3044	Chief Navigational Aids & ATC Branch, Communications & Electronics Division, Directorate of Operations	07-68 381 04-54 PER1659				29 Park Hill, Felling, W. 5
M YES LIVINGSTON, ROBERT L.	A01036605	150251	Indef -	3216 3216	None	Armanent Staff Officer, Armanent & Electronics Division, Directorate of Materiel	05-60 77 05-57 WMB2125				141 Belmont Road, Uxbridge
M YES LUNDGREN, CLIFFORD L.	A0739814	191152	Indef B	2016 2016	10440	Chief Defense Systems Branch, Combat Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	07-60 407 07-57 PER0153				17A Carlton Road, ...
M YES MAGERS, JAMES W.	11307A	150251	RegAF 3	1416 5511 5525 0021A	1525F 5511	Chief Plans Division, Directorate of Installations-Engineering	06-60 28 06-57 Chorleywood 245				"Unreads" Berry Lane, Chorlewood
M YES MAIN, EDGAR H.	A0433250	010652	Indef -	3234B 3211	3211 3054	Chief Systems Branch, Armanent & Electronics Division, Directorate of Materiel	07-59 S- 07-56				"Ladywood" Nortoft Road, Chalfont St. Peter St. Giles 3467
M YES MAYVILLE, RAYMOND W.	A0580981	010951	Indef -	7716 7716	None	Chief Ground Defense Division, Directorate of Security	07-58 359 02-57 JCR2160				The Cottage, Jordans
M YES McNEIL, TRAVIS R.	A02094529	170456	Indef B	7224 7011	11124Q 1435	Assistant Chief of Staff	09-60 744 09-57 GerdsX 2130				Hillside, Kingsway, Gerrards Gerrards Cross
M YES MELERDIERCK, JOHN H.	A0807584	260257	Indef B	1416 1435	1124A	Air Operations Officer, Flight Control Division, Directorate of Operations	05-60 S-270 05-57 GerdsX 2443				270 Westcott, The Ridgeway, Gerrards Cross

NAME		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M (S) MURPHY, JOHN A.	0575985	110656	Indef -	6416	None	Chief Materiel Inspection Branch, Inspection Division, Office of the Inspector General	12-58 675	06-57 BAY3933	122 Ludbroke Grove, London, W. 10					
M YES MULLIN, ROBERT E.	131304	010453	Reg AF C 4	1416	1245A 1435	Chief Reconnaissance Branch, Current Operations Division, Directorate of Operations	03-60 S-269	03-57 BEA685	15 Grove Road, High Field, Beaconsfield					
M YES NELSON, ROBERT F.	40757911	010652	Indef N-2	2016	2044 2016	Chief Target Systems Branch, Target Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	06-58 387	12-54 HAR5954	534 Kenton Lane, Harrow Weald					
M YES PEREZ, RICHARD A.	169284	240255	Reg AF C	5516	1041C 1121E	Chief Construction & Facilities Division, Directorate of Installations-Engineering	05-58 172	05-55 RUI3029	30 Larne Road, Ruislip					
M YES REAGAN, RICHARD H., JR.	40801398	150251	Indef N-B	6416	None	Chief Equipment Branch, Supply Division, Directorate of Materiel	10-59 150	10-56 UXB3664	Holly Cottage, Court Drive, Hillingdon					
M YES ROEDER, HELEN J.	661375	150251	Indef C	6736	1041C 6771	Chief Accounting & Finance Branch, Finance & Comptroller's Division, and Comptroller	06-60 199	06-57 UXB372	Seaham Lodge Hotel, Gerrards (Temporary)					
M YES	Indef N-C	6736	6851 6851B	Chief Budget Branch, Finance & Comptroller's Division, and Comptroller	06-58 209	02-55 ...	71 Hunters Green, ...					
M YES	Indef -					

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NAMES CONT'D			PAGE 13									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES SCOTT, THOMAS H.	A0687639	140255	Indef B	2016	1041C	Chief Intelligence	09-59 387					
				2016	2044	ence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	12-56 PIN2522					45 High View, Pinner
M YES SEACORD, JAMES	A0560323	130554	Indef -	6416	6034	Supply Staff Officer,	06-59 398					
				6416	6424	Equipment Branch, Supply Division, Directorate of Materiel	06-56 Slough 22756					"Red Chimney" Church Lane, Wexham
M YES SEWELL, RALPH H.	A0693509	050457	Indef N-C	4316	4355	Chief Shops & Facilities	08-60 644					
			N-2	4316	4364	Branch, Maintenance-Engineering Division, Directorate of Materiel	08-57 POP4575					23 Cole Park, Twickenham
M YES SPEIRS, ROBERT, JR.	A01698060	250155	Indef -	3016	None	Assistant Chief TeleCom-	07-60 611					
				3016		munications Branch, Communications-Electronics Division, Directorate of Operations.	07-57 MILLHill 1286					26 Langley Park, Mill Hill N. W. 7
M YES STAMMER, MILTON C.	A02095797	110255	Indef B	2016	1231C	Executive Officer, Dir-	08-58 385					
				2016	1431	ectorate of Intelligence	08-55 NOR597					17 Wieland Road, Northwood
M YES STANT, FRED E.	A0731690	010951	Indef A	3016	1044B	Chief TeleCommunications	10-59 611					
				3016	1435	Branch, Communications-	10-56 PER1056					12 Winscombe Crescent, Ealing, W. 5
					0021A	Electronics Division, Dir-						
					"I"	ectorate of Operations.						
M YES SWICKARD, JACK D.	11430A	150251	RegAF N-1	6746	1541	Chief Management Analysis	07-58 343					
				6746	7321	Division, Comptroller	07-54 ARN8187					38 The Fairway, Wembley
M YES TAYLOR, WILLIAM J., JR.	A0579434	010453	Indef -	6016	7021	Chief Transportation	11-58 38					
				6016	4381	Division, Directorate of Materiel	11-54 ARN5819					217 Woodcock Hill, Kenton

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MAJORS CONT'D

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES	TRIMBLE, CLAUDE M.	AD269133	150251	Indef -	7316 7344	7516 7344	Chief Special Services Branch, Personnel Ser- vices Division, Direct- orate of Personnel		03-58 133 08-55 GRI1502		134 Uxbridge Road, Harrow Weald	
M YES	TUCK, EIMER L.	AD560423	100251	Indef -	6816 6816	0051C 6884 6746	Chief Statistical Ser- vices Division, Comptroller		07-58 342 01-55 PIN1325		170 Joel Street, Pinner	
M YES	WEIDENBUSCH, ALBERT C.	AD702093	010652	Indef 3	1416 1416	1534P 1531B	Plans Officer, Plans & Programs Division, Dir- ectorate of Plans		01-59 642 01-55 DAT191		Ditton Lodge, Slough Road, Datchet	
M YES	WILTAKER, JOSEPH W.	AD564606	010652	Indef -	7016 7024	None	Chief Publications & Forms Management Division Office of the Adjutant		06-58 627 06-55 RUI8907		20 Milton Court, Ickenham	
<u>CAPTAINS</u>												
S NO	BARTLETT, DOROTHY B.	AD602585	010551	Indef -	7344 7344	7324 7311 7024	Chief Personal Affairs Branch, Personnel Ser- vices Division, Direct- orate of Personnel		07-58 614 07-55 HAR2387		11 Iyon Road, Harrow	
M YES	BASS, CALVIN G.	16631A	010951	Reg. F B 4	1435 1435	1245A 1124Q	Air Operations Officer, Flight Control Division, Directorate of Operations		05-59 S-326 05-56 BEA1412		96 Gregories Road, Beacons- field	
M YES	BJORNING, CLARENCE J.	AD318117	150251	Indef B	1435V 1435V	1224E 2331 3271	Air Operations Officer, (Special Weapons Officer) Deployment Branch, Oper- ations-Plans Division, Directorate of Operations		07-58 S-363 01-55 UKB5315		47 Tudor Way, Hillington	

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CAPTAINS CONT'D			PAGE 15										
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
M YES	BOLTON, WAYNE F.	A0685765	160151	Indef N-2	3034	7021	Communications Officer, ASGD 1137th USAF SPEC ACTY SQ, FT MYER, VA., ATCHD DET 1	3034	7321	08-60 SA 08-57 MTH		Riviera Hotel, Maidenhead	
M YES	BOVEE, DONALD L.	A0567390	150354	Indef -	7524	7511	Chief Ground Training Section, Training Branch, Training Division, Directorate of Operations	7524		05-60 393 10-57 Colmbrook Hporton 2532		Osmington, Hporton Green,	
M NO	BRONAKO, CHARLES A.	A0744239	191250	Indef N-2	3034	3044	Communications Officer, Telecommunications Branch, Communications & Electronics Division, Directorate of Operations	3034		05-58 611 05-55 WOR5116		40 Lindsay Drive, Kenton	
M YES	BROOKS, EUGENE F.	A0765463	130554	Indef 4	1525B	None	A/O Nav-Embr, Operations Branch, Current Operations Division, Directorate of Operations	1525B		06-53 S-360 06-55 SWA2138		26 Breadspear Road, South Ickenham	
M YES	BROWN, DELBERT L.	A01855284	161056	Indef -	7024	7324	Chief Classified Branch, Mail & Message Division, Office of the Adjutant	7024		05-60 149 05-57 BXR5941		17 Whitehall Road, Harrow-on-the-Hill	
M YES	CALAFATO, EUGENE F.	19923A	010453	RegAF -	7324	7024	Administrative Officer, Directorate of Operations	7024	7011	07-58 S- 07-55 NGR3522		27 Wolsey Road, "Ruan" Moor Park, Northwood	
M YES	CHAMBERS, CANTY P., JR.	A02231020	110457	Indef -	7724	None	Air Police Officer, Ground Defense Division, Directorate of Security	7724		04-60 359 04-57 NPH		87 Bury Street, Ruislip	
M YES	CLARK, EUGENE T.	A0768002	010652	Indef C	1435	1231A	Air Operations Officer, Flight Control Division, Directorate of Operations	1435	1224P	06-58 S-326 04-55 High Wycombe 2560		Quarters 71B, USAB, Daws Hill Lane, High Wycombe	

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CAPTAINS CONT'D

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES	COGGIOLA, LAWRENCE L.	AO929174	191250	Indef B	6624 6631	1044C 6521	Chief Procurement Branch, Supply Division, Directorate of Materiel	08-60 67 08-57 ARN7760				38 West Hill, Membley Park
M YES	CUMMINS, CLINTON O.	AO2076568	010951	Indef B 4	1444 1435	1321C 1534P 1435	Air Operations Officer, Flight Control Division, Directorate of Operations	02-60 S-326 02-57 MAR272				Kings Lodge, Cookham Dene
M YES	DERRYBERRY, EDWIN C.	AO798261	010453	Indef N-B	7224 7224	1234C 1124P 1441	Information Services Officer, Public Informat- ion Division, Office of the Special Assistant	03-58 64 09-54 PER4223				Apt 3, The Orchard, Montplier Road, Ealing, W. 5
M YES	ELDRIDGE, ALBERT W.	AO3001905	311255	Indef L	9356D 9311	9326	Chief Professional Services Division, Office of the Surgeon	04-60 75 04-57 JOR3196				"Little Dean", Jordans
M YES	GEBHARDT, GEORGE F.	AO745348	311050	Indef B	1234C 7011 7011 2011 2051 7011	7024	Commander, Detachment 1	07-59 SA 07-55 MAIL447				St. Helier's, Harcourt Road, Taplow
M YES	GOODWIN, NORRIS H.	AO1115912	311050	Indef -	5525 5525	5511	Chief Construction & Operations Branch, Construction & Facility Support Division, Direct- orate of Installations- Engineering	10-59 172 10-56 BAY3933				122 Iadbroke Grove, Apt 2, London, W. 10
M YES	GRACE, JOHN J.	AO904691	010453	Indef -	5525 5525	None	Chief Administrative & Finance Branch, Management Division, Directorate of Installations-Engineering	06-59 157 06-56 IN5226				20 High Womble, Rayners

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NAME		SERIAL		GRADE		ORGANIZATION		DATE		RESIDENCE	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
M YES GORRIN, DAN T.	117830	02036	Indef -	7344 7344	7341	Assistant Chief Personnel Staffs Branch, Personnel Services Division, Directorate of Personnel	09-60 614 09-57 100274A	Flat 1, 26 Arling, N. 5			
M YES HARTY, HAROLD G.	40590542	150354	Indef -	7324 7024	7024	Adjutant, 1137th USAF SPEC ACTY SQ, FT MYER, VA., ATCHD DET 1	09-60 34 09-57 EOU553	Fresh Fields, Hookham			
M YES HALICKI, CHESTER J.	26679A	010453	RegAF N-2	7811 7811	7824	Chief Military Affairs Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate	08-60 276 08-57 Iver- Heath 235	"Fernleigh Cottage", Wood Lane, Iverheath			
M YES HOFFMAN, JESS E.	A0677294	120155	Indef -	3034 3034	7524	Communications & Elect- ronics Inspector, Oper- ations Inspection Branch, Inspection Division, Office of the Inspector General	06-60 364 06-57 RUI4407	4 Broadwood Avenue, Ruislip			
M YES HURLBURT, HARRY S., JR.	A0762778	180151	Indef N-2	6454 6454	6424	Petroleum Supply Officer, Aircraft Branch, Supply Division, Directorate of Materiel	06-60 721 06-57 UXB6865	79 Willow Crescent, West Uxbridge			
M YES JACKSON, ROBERT T.	A0590263	010951	Indef 2	3024 3024	2064 3054	ECM Officer, Defense Systems Branch, Combat Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	05-58 407 05-55 GerdaX 3561	Velper Point, Bulstrode Way, Gerrards Cross			
M YES JENSEN, HARLAN T.	A0674497	010551	Indef B	3254 3254R	1044C 1411	CBR Defense Officer, CBR Branch, Training Division, Directorate of Operations	06-68 395 01-55 PIN8739	26 The Close, Rayners Lane			

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES	KING, WILBUR W.	AO587275	110155 Indef -	7324	7341					Chief Assignments Branch, 08-60 146 Programming & Assignments 08-57 RUI2077 Division, Directorate of Personnel	23	The Greenway, Ickenham
S NO	MAGLIONE, ANTONIO P., JR.	AO590979	130554 Indef -	3054	7321					Communications Officer, 02-59 381 Navigational Aids & ATC 02-56 Field- Branch, Communications- End Electronics Division, 9774 Directorate of Operations	4A	Elm Avenue, Eastcote
S NO	McHENRY, GORDON D.	23749A	010951 RegAF B	1234C	8616					Aide to Major General 02-60 14 1234P William H. Blanchard 02-57 KEN8301 1041C Commander 7th Air 4384 Division 2061 7021	912	Nell Gwynn House, Sloan Avenue, Chelsea, S. W. 3
M YES	MERROW, EIMER W.	AO944053	130556 Indef C	1435	1234A					Air Operations Officer, 03-60 S-326 1531P Flight Control Division, 03-57 NPh 7021 Directorate of Operations		Quarters 57A, USAB, Daws Hill Lane, High Wycombe
M YES	MORTON, RICHARD L.	AO1554056	191260 Indef -	7324	7024					Chief Career Guidance 06-59 39 7324 7311 Branch, Programming & 06-56 AIN3253 Assignments Division, Directorate of Personnel	104	Harrow Dene Road, North Wembley
M YES	MULLIGN, JAMES I.	200621	010452 RegAF B	1435	1245					Plans Officer, Plans & 05-60 642 1234C Program Division, 05-57 BOU621 1231B Directorate of Plans		Oak Cottage, Doburn
M YES	MYERS, ARTHUR D.	AO9415	010443 Indef -	6L24	None					Supply Officer, Supply 07-59 562 Operations Branch, Supply 07-56 W15331 Division, Directorate of		Little Orange, Perivale Lane, Greenford

CAPTAINS CONT'D

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		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES PAUL, RAYMOND M.	102912698	010453	Indef -	9041 9041	0925 9034	Chief Medical Materiel Branch, Office of the Surgeon	06-60 15 06-57 UMB4447	35 Belmont Close, Unbrink						
M YES PERKINS, EDWARD G.	A01856949	241056	Indef -	7336 7336	None	Manpower Management Officer, Manpower & Organization Division, Directorate of Plans	06-60 397 06-57 SWA2860	18 Brickwall Lane, Huislip						
M YES PHELPS, WILLIAM D.	A0586858	161155	Indef -	6424 6424	7021	Supply Officer, HEDRONSEC	06-60 208 06-57 PIN667	75 Moss Lane, Pinner						
M YES POLINSKY, HARRY	A0809868	110551	Indef N-C	2054 7024	2011 7024	Commander, HELRONSEC	09-59 207 06-57 BEA1056	Highbank Station Road, Beaconsfield						
M YES PORTER, PHILIP S.	17854A	130554	RegAF N-4	7324 7221	7024 7521 7221	Chief Internal Informat- ion Division, Office of the Special Assistant	09-58 274 01-57 ACC0830	54 Fordhook Avenue, Ealing, W. 5						
M YES PRESTON, ERNEST A.	A0934690	010453	Indef B	6424 6424	1044C	Supply Officer, Supply Operations Branch, Supply Division, Directorate of Materiel	03-59 291 03-56 PER6533	11 Mount Park Crescent Road, Ealing, W. 5						
M YES REESE, HAROLD E.	A0863869	160151	Indef 2	4324S 4324S	8631	Aircraft Performance Eng- ineer, Flying Training Branch, Training Division, Directorate of Operations	07-60 395 07-57 GerdsX 4302	Pendragon Elms Road, Chalfont St. Peter						
M YES ROBERTS, WILLIAM M., JR.	A0678461	100951	Indef N-2	2086 2054	2011 2054	Intelligence Officer, Operations Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	09-58 386 03-55 MOR2000	26 Kewferry Road, Northwood						

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES	SATRIANO, JOSEPH	A01643310	010453	Indef -	2044 2054	2054			Chief Management Branch, Directorate of Intelligence	05-58 380 11-54 ARN3666		2 Priory Gardens, Wembley
M YES	SCHLEUSS, LOUIS F.	23719A	010652	RegAF C	6424 6411	1041C 6411			Chief Aircraft Branch, Supply Division, Directorate of Materiel	05-58 125 05-55 PER0875		Chelwood, 4 Birkdale Road, Ealing
M YES	SMITH, MILFORD T.	A0784585	010951	Indef B	1435 1435	1041A			Air Operations Officer, Reconnaissance Branch, Current Operations Division, Directorate of Operations	05-59 S-269 05-56 PIN1152		"Pillingar" West End Lane, Pinner
M YES	SMITH, RICHARD M.	A02231281	080255	Indef -	7824 7824	7811			Assistant Staff Judge Advocate	03-59 276 03-56 WOR6229		23 Elmwood Avenue, Kenton
M YES	STACKER, FRED H.	A0365142	160151	Indef 1	4324S 1411	4341 1411			Operations Staff Officer, Deployment Branch, Operations-Plans Division, Directorate of Operations	06-60 S-275 06-57 NPh		12 Elm Avenue, Eastcote
M YES	STANFORD, FLOYD B.	A01848692	140554	Indef -	2054 2054	2044			Intelligence Officer, Target Materiel Branch, Target Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	07-59 73 07-56 Little Chalfont 2623		Covemartin, Beechwood Avenue, Little Chalfont
M YES	SUGG, JOHN F.	A0585845	311050	Indef -	3254R 3254R	None			Chief Munitions Branch, Armament & Electronics Division, Directorate of Materiel	06-60 S- 06-57 NOR325		8 Woodfield Avenue, Northwood

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES SWIFT, JOHN F.	A0662613	010551	Indef -	3034 3034	3011	Communications Officer, TeleCommunications Branch, Communications-Electronics Division, Directorate of Operations	06-59 611 06-56 GerdsX 2105					The White House, Lincoln Road, Chalfont St. Peter
M YES VANCIL, CHARLES H.	A0591078	130554	Indef -	6034 6034	4384	Surface Transportation Officer, Automobile Transportation Division, Directorate of Materiel	05-59 38 05-56 ARN4228					279 Woodcock Hill, Harrow
M YES VANDAGRIFF, TREADWELL J.	A01856359	291155	Indef 4	1525B 1525B	1521F	A/O Nav-Embdr, Command Section	08-59 11 08-56 COL8094					37 Queens Walk, Kingbury, London, N. W. 9
M YES VAN GUNDY, DALE, JR.	A01848778	150454	Indef 2	3024 3024	7024	Chief Air Electronics Branch, Communications- Electronics Division, Directorate of Operations	04-59 717 04-56 EDGL445					30 Broomfield Road, Stanmore
M YES WARD, MORRIS J.	19894A	130554	RegAF -	2054 2054	2064	Intelligence Officer, Defense Systems Branch, Combat Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	07-60 251 07-57 RUI6992					88 Broadwood Avenue, South Ruislip
M YES WILEY, THOMAS J., JR.	A0738525	010652	Indef B	7224 7211	1041C 7211	Deputy Chief Information, Office of the Special Assistant to the Commander	06-58 649 02-55 RUI7857					4 Ray House, Milton Road, Ickenham
M YES WILLARD, KENNETH R.	A0936179	010453	Indef B	3034 3034	1044C 3011	Assistant Communications Officer, FRE, ASGD 1137th USAF SPEC ACTY SQ, FT MYER, VA., ATCHED DET 1	04-60 SA 04-57 EOUL292					The Chalet, Flackwell Heath, High Wycombe

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES	WOLFE, JACK S.	A0944509	010453	Indef	N-C	6411 6424	6424		Chief Ground Powered & Photo Equipment Section, Equipment Branch, Supply Division, Directorate of Materiel	07-60 126 07-57 RUI7857	"Camp Cottage", Camp Road, Gerrards Cross	
M YES	WORRELL, ORVILLE D.	A0551164	030255	Indef	-	6844 6844	6834		Chief Machine Branch, Statistical Services Division, Comptroller	07-58 293 07-55 NPH	10 Windbourne Drive, Pinner	
<u>FIRST LIEUTENANTS</u>												
S NO	ABBOTT, PATRICIA A.	AL2229216	290753	Indef	-	2054 2054	7521		Intelligence Officer, Management Branch, Directorate of Intelligence	01-58 380 03-55 FRE6876	27A W. Cromwell Road, London, S. W. 5	
S NO	LIVINGSTON, REGINALD S.	A03018529	170755	Indef	-	6424 6424	None		Chief Armament & Electronics Section, Aircraft Branch, Supply Division, Directorate of Materiel	07-60 244 07-57 RUI8930	6 Rayhouse, Milton Road, Ickenham	
M YES	LUSTIG, SHELDON J.	25160A	020656	RegAF	-	5544 5511	5564		Chief Special Project Section, Plans & Facilities Division, Directorate of Installations-Engineering	02-59 28 03-57 EDG2074	4 Cornbury Road, Canons Park, Edgewood	
M YES	MORAVECK, GEORGE F.	31524A	090656	RegAF	-	6834 6834	7321		Chief Materiel & Operations Branch, Statistical Services Division, Comptroller	11-58 342 05-55 ARN2741	275 Woodcock Hill, Kenton	
M YES	MORRIS, JOHN K.	A01858197	230553	Indef	-	2054 2054	None		Intelligence Officer, Defense Systems Branch, Operations Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence	06-58 S- 06-55 HAY2230	53 Fairdale Gardens, Hayes	

FIRST LIEUTENANTS CONT'D

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
M YES	TABOR, JOHN D.	27955A	010655	RegAF -	7724	None	7724		Air Police Officer, ADD: 07-58 SA Assistant Adjutant & 07-54 MAIL898 Supply Officer, FBE, ASCD 1137th USAF SPEC ACTY SQ, FT MYER, VA., ATCHD DET 1			6 Ferry End, Bray

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICERS

M YES	MC ANEAR, CALVIN L. (CWO W-3)	950899E	030557	RegAF -	20400	None	20400		Intelligence Operations 12-58 382 Superintendent, Targets Sys- 12-55 GRI298 tems Branch, Directorate of Intelligence			47 Marsh Lane, Stanmore
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ROSTER OF OFFICERS REASSIGNED FROM HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC) SUBSEQUENT TO 15 November 1957

COLONELS

M YES	MILLER, LESTER F.	9004A	010652	RegAF A	0076D 1234P				Rsgd to Hq 810 ADiv (SAC) 0076D 0036B Departed this sta 14 Dec 57 0066B EDCSA: 5 Jan 58			
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LIEUTENANT COLONELS

M YES	BAKER, MERLIN W.	9698A	010652	RegAF N-4	7816	None	7816		Rsgd to Hq Cont Div (MATS) Departed this sta 14 Dec 57 1st EDCSA: 20 Jan 58 2nd EDCSA: 9 Feb 58			
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M YES	HEDRICK, WYATT S.	6124A		RegAF 3	1416 1525D				Rsgd to Hq 806th ADiv (SAC) 1416 1525H Departed this sta 23 Sep 57 1st EDCSA: 1 Nov 57 2nd EDCSA: 16 Nov 57			
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ROSTER OF OFFICERS REASSIGNED FROM HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC) SUBSEQUENT TO 15 November 1957 CONT'D PAGE 24

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

MAJORS

M YES ADAMS, WILLIAM H., JR. 11173A	150251	RegAF 3	1416 1416	1525A	Rsgd to 819th ADiv (SAC) Departed this sta 27 Nov 57 1st EDCSA: 4 Jan 58 2nd EDCSA: 24 Jun 58
M YES ALMON, SAM L.	A0790773		Indef A 6416 6416	1041C	Rsgd to 3902d ABG (SAC) Departed this sta 22 Oct 57 1st EDCSA: 1 Dec 57 2nd EDCSA: 21 Dec 57
M YES MORAN, SHERIDAN J.	A0722595		Indef N-2 7016 7016	2016 2054	Rsgd to Hq USAF Departed this sta 9 Nov 57 1st EDCSA: 1 Jan 58 2nd EDCSA: 16 Jan 58
M YES MURPHY, JOHN E.	14169A		RegAF B 1416 1416	1234C 1435	Rsgd to Hq 12th ADiv (SAC) Departed this sta 10 Oct 57 1st EDCSA: 1 Nov 57 2nd EDCSA: 21 Nov 57
M YES STEVENS, CORBIN D.	A0790101	010951	Indef 3 2016 2016	1525B	Rsgd to 6th BWg (SAC) Departed this sta 28 Nov 57 1st EDCSA: 3 Jan 58 2nd EDCSA: 23 Jan 58

CAPTAINS

M YES CORKERY, LOWELL B.	A02037388		Indef - 7344 7344	7535	Rsgd to Hq 3060th AWG (SAC) Departed this sta 3 Oct 57 1st EDCSA: 23 Nov 57 2nd EDCSA: 8 Dec 57
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ROSTER OF OFFICERS REASSIGNED FROM HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION, 15 November 1957 (CONT'D) PAGE 25

CAPTAINS CONT'D

M YES DAVIS, FRANK R.	40562835	Indef -	7524	7274	Reg'd to Hq 924 Bg (SAC) Departed this sta 26 Oct 57 1st EDCSA: 24 Nov 57 2nd EDCSA: 1 Dec 57
M YES FORTE, DON V.	402009569	040156 Indef	7524	7224	Reg'd to 7201st Bg (SAC) Departed this sta 10 Oct 57 EDCS: 1 Dec 57

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICERS

M YES PETRUSO, JOSEPH	4528711	100657 RegAF -	4310	4310	Reg'd to 7201st Bg (SAC) Departed this sta 7 Oct 57 1st EDCSA: 12 Jan 58 2nd EDCSA: 1 Feb 58
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FOR THE COMMANDER:

Harold J. Gebhart
 HAROLD J. GEBHART
 Lt Col, USAF
 Adjutant

ATTACHED THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR DUTY:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

3921st RECONTECHRON O/L this Headquarters

M YES CARTER, FREDERIC L. (Captain)	27676A	010951 RegAF B	2054 2054	1041C 2044	OIC Special Projects Team, Directorate of Intelligence	08-58 73 08-55 PIN9707	5 Albury Drive, Pinner
M YES OWENS, SYLVIA G. (Captain)	A12234988	240156 Indef -	2054 2054	2044	Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Intellig- ence	04-59 386 04-56 NOR786	38 Ducks Hill Road, Northwood

SSO - 6950th RG(H) Attached to this Headquarters

M YES CONLIN, JOHN C., JR. (Major)	A0764114	121256 Indef N-B	2054 2034	1044C 3034 2034	SR SSO	05-59 275 06-56 PIN4368	10 Oakington Avenue, Rayners Lane
M YES NOECKER, DONALD J.	A01910529	230255 Indef N-C	3031 3031	None	Communications Officer, SSO	07-58 251 08-55 WOR4279	73A Streatfield Road, Kenton
M YES GILLESPIE, WALLACE D.	A03018509	160755 Indef -	2034 2034	2051	Assistant SSO	05-60 275 05-57 CH11218	96 Chiswick Village, London, W. 4

7AIRDIV REGULATION) 7AIRDIV REG 23-2
 DPL
 NUMBER 23-2) HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
 APO 125 New York, New York, 24 July 1957

ORGANIZATION - FIELD

Mission - 3917th Air Base Squadron

(Supersedes 7AIRDIV REG 23-2, 3 Apr 57)

1. PURPOSE. To state the mission and responsibilities of the 3917th Air Base Squadron.
2. MISSION. The mission of the 3917th Air Base Squadron is to:
 - a. Prepare RAF East Kirkby to receive, and furnish support to, such Strategic Air Command units, and units supporting SAC as may be deployed to or staged at that station during peace or EWP operations.
 - b. Exercise peacetime operational and administrative control of, and furnish logistic support to, the 3928th Air Base Squadron at RAF Sturgate.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES. As directed by the Commander 7th Air Division and in accordance with policies of higher headquarters the Commander 3917th Air Base Squadron will:
 - a. Exercise command of the 3917th Air Base Squadron and those facilities at RAF East Kirkby as have been or may be made available to the USAF.
 - b. Establish and maintain such SEA WEED station and housekeeping sets as may be authorized. This equipment is to be held in readiness and maintained in condition for immediate use as required by 7th Air Division Operations Plans.
 - c. Man, train and equip all assigned unit (and attached units which are under his operational control) to a state of readiness which will insure their capability to execute assigned mission under Strategic Air Command and 7th Air Division Emergency War Plans.
 - d. Furnish the necessary administrative and logistic support to tenant units as prescribed by AFR 11-4, or as may be directed by this headquarters.
 - e. Establish with the Royal Air Force and other local agencies mutually acceptable and satisfactory working agreements and procedures on all matters with which those agencies are concerned.
 - f. Assist local governmental or civilian agencies as required in the preservation of life and property endangered by disaster or emergency. In any case where utilization of supplies, equipment, funds

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7AIRDIV REG 23-2
Page 2


or manpower in disaster relief actions will jeopardize the unit mission, prior approval of Headquarters 7th Air Division will be obtained.

g. Perform such other services as may be directed by the Commander, 7th Air Division.

4. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. The 3917th Air Base Squadron is a separate squadron under the administrative and operational control of Headquarters, 7th Air Division. It is attached to the 3910th Air Base Group for medical support and board actions in accordance with 7th Air Division General Orders Number 10, 1957. Direct correspondence with the 3910th concerning such matters is authorized.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION: S plus X
5 copies: SAC, ATTN: Programs Div,
Plans Dir


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

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7AD REGULATION)
NUMBER 23-18)

*7ADR 23-18
DPL
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
21 November 1957

ORGANIZATION - FIELD

Mission - 3929th Air Base Squadron

(EFFECTIVE 1 DECEMBER 1957)

1. PURPOSE. To state the mission and responsibilities of the 3929th Air Base Squadron.
2. MISSION. The primary mission of the 3929th Air Base Squadron is to prepare USAB High Wycombe to receive, and furnish required support to such SAC units as are or may be located and/or deployed thereto during peace or EWP operations.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES. As directed by the Commander, 3911th Air Base Group and in accordance with the policies of this and higher headquarters the Commander, 3929th Air Base Squadron will:
 - a. Exercise command of the 3929th Air Base Squadron and those facilities at USAB High Wycombe as have been or may be made available to the USAF.
 - b. Train and equip assigned personnel to a state of readiness that will insure their capability to execute assigned mission under Strategic Air Command and 7th Air Division Emergency War Plans.
 - c. Furnish the necessary administrative and logistic support to tenant and attached units under the provisions of AFR 11-4 or as may be directed by this headquarters.
 - d. Assist local governmental or civilian agencies as required in the preservation of life and property endangered by disaster or emergency. In any case where utilization of supplies, equipment, funds or manpower in disaster relief actions will jeopardize the unit mission, prior approval of Headquarters 7th Air Division will be obtained.
 - e. Perform such other services as may be directed by higher headquarters.


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*Supersedes 7ADR 23-18, 12 April 1956

7ADR 23-18

4. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIP. The 3929th Air Base Squadron is attached to the 3911th Air Base Group for administration, logistic support, and operational control in accordance with Headquarters 7th Air Division General Orders Number 3, 20 February 1956.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


HAROLD S. GEEHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION				7ADR 23-18			
SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED BY AN AIR BASE GROUP OR AIR BASE SQUADRON	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 3909ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3918ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3910ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3920ABGP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3911ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3917ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3919ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3914ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		ORGANIZATION	NR CYS
AGENCY	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS		
CHIEF OF STAFF	1	ADJUTANT	1	ADJUTANT			
ADJUTANT	2	BASE COMPTROLLER	1	BASE COMPTROLLER			
D/PERSONNEL	2	BASE MATERIEL	1	BASE MATERIEL			
D/OPERATIONS	2	BASE D/OPERATIONS	1	BASE D/OPERATIONS			
D/MATERIEL	2	BASE PERSONNEL	1	BASE PERSONNEL			5
D/PLANS	5	CHAPLAIN	1	CHAPLAIN			
D/INTELLIGENCE	2	INFORMATION SERVICES	1	INFORMATION SERVICES			
D/SECURITY	1	JUDGE ADVOCATE	1	JUDGE ADVOCATE			
CHAPLAIN	1	HEADQUARTERS SQ		PROVOST MARSHAL			
D/COMPTROLLER	2	OPERATIONS SQUADRON		DEPENSARY			
INSPECTOR GENERAL	2	AIR POLICE SQUADRON					
JUDGE ADVOCATE	1	FOOD SERVICE SQ					
OFF OF INFORMATION	1	INSTALLATIONS SQ					
SURGEON	1	TRANSPORTATION SQ					
HEADQUARTERS SQ SEC		SUPPLY SQUADRON					
D/SAFETY	1	DEPENSARY					
D/INS-ENG	1	FIELD MAINT SQ					
DETACHMENT 1							
Stock	10	Stock	2				
TOTAL	37	TOTAL	10	TOTAL			
REMARKS							
TOTAL							9
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION							51

HQ 7AD FORM 8
7 JUN 67

HISTORICAL REPORT

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, 7TH AIR DIVISION

JULY - SEPTEMBER 1957

The following activities were accomplished by the Directorate of Intelligence during this reporting period. (Unclassified)

- a. Two telephoto tests were conducted with results indicating a marked improvement in command telephoto efficiency. (Secret)
- b. IEBA testing of 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron personnel was continued. (Unclassified)
- c. A program designed to lower the Scoring Error Average (SEA) of 3921st RTS photo interpreters was instituted. (Unclassified)
- d. The final draft of a new 7AD Manual 200-1 (Target Intelligence Centers) was approved and was sent to the field for comment. (Unclassified)
- e. The first 7th Air Division target materials catalog was completed. (Unclassified)
- f. Staff Briefs were prepared and were presented to the Commander. (Unclassified)
- g. Several administrative programs were initiated and were completed. (Unclassified)

TARGET INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Telephoto Capability: The first bi-monthly telephoto test

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DFC-29-57

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was conducted on 17 July 1957, with all 7AD telephoto net terminal stations participating except Brize Norton. Prints and negatives received by the various stations were forwarded to this directorate for analysis and critique. The results of the critique indicated a satisfactory capability throughout the Command with the exception of SAC(Z) station. This station's poor results were due to poor darkroom techniques. A further test was given during September and the results showed that all stations participating had taken the necessary corrective actions to improve reception and photographic technique. Lakenheath telephoto net did not take part in the September test due to malfunctioning transceivers. (Secret)

IBDA Training:

Two IBDA problems were submitted to the 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron for solution during the reporting period. Photo interpreters in the Reconnaissance Technical Squadron participated either as a part of a team or on an individual basis. Each test was varied with regard to the type of problem presented, thereby giving training in all phases of IBDA procedures. Test number two was based upon the probability of the interpreter having no usable photography with which to work. His results had to be computed from the photo log information plus zone wind data provided by the Weather Officer. In critiquing this problem, it was found that the problem presented only minor computation and plotting differences which tended to be self-compensating as evidenced by the similarity in the AGZ plot. Differences in probability of damage figures averaged only 3.3%, a factor which can be attributed to interpolation of expected-damage-

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probability graphs. (Secret)

A third test was given in September. Again, the results were generally acceptable and indicative of a sound understanding of Phases II and III IBDA procedures. (Secret)

Along with the problem of completing specific IBDA problems, a collateral program was designed to increase efficiency in Phase II IBDA procedures of the 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron photo interpreters. A goal of a 1200-foot SEA was set up for this program. To achieve this result, all 0-15 film received from the rotational unit containing RBS camera attacks are scored by assigned photo interpreters. The scores achieved by the photo interpreters are checked against the T-29 reports (RBS scores) in order to determine SEA. The first evaluation is due in this headquarters 16 October 1957. (Secret)

7AD Manual 200-1:

A draft copy of 7AD Manual 200-1 was published and was sent to all interested agencies for their comments and suggestions. The aim of this manual is to consolidate all directives regarding the operation of the Area and Support TIC's and Base Intelligence Libraries in one volume. A large number of useful comments have been received from field units. Units were directed to implement the manual upon receipt and a revised issue, which is in its final stage of completion, has incorporated in it many of the suggestions received from the bases. (Secret)

Target Intelligence Vault:

The steel lining of the Target Intelligence vault was completed

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Page 3 of 7

during July and was put into immediate use. Upon completion of this work, the vault contents were rearranged to give a cleaner and more efficient utilization of the space. All sections of the Directorate were provided with storage facilities. (Unclassified)

Target Materials Catalog:

The first run of the 7AD Target Materials Catalog was made during September. The format followed the Target Materials Catalog Volume 2, but carried more complete line-item information and also included listings of textual materials. A further revision of the volume is planned with the materials listed by World Aeronautical Chart area and the installations listed in ascending order. This listing will be in the same order as materials are in the files. (Unclassified)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
Dissemination of Military Information:

Staff Briefs were prepared and were presented at the Commander's Staff Meetings on the following subjects: "The Kremlin Furge", "Military Aspects Relating to the Soviet Budget", and "Air Defense of North America". (Confidential)

Additionally, a special 45-minute briefing was presented to 7AD Information Services Officers. The briefing was classified SECRET and covered information on Soviet Aircraft and progress in Soviet aviation. (Confidential)

Other projects undertaken included research on airfields and friendly radar orders of battle for Operations Plans Division; preparation of briefs on Turkey, Libya, and Saudi Arabia to include key personnel for use by the Commander, and the preparation of Daily

SECRET

Page 7 of 7 Pages

Intelligence Briefs covering current military, economic, and political events for key staff members in 7th Air Division. (Confidential)

The TIC at High Wycombe was given the responsibility of maintaining Order of Battle (Air, Radar, and Flak). This is in addition to charts maintained at Hq 7th Air Division. Charts bearing this information have been mounted on panels at the operations bloc. The purpose of this program was to insure, that in case of OBT, OB information was readily available at the operating location. (Secret)

Inspection of Base Intelligence Libraries.

The Base Intelligence Libraries at Brize Norton, Chelveston, and Lakenheath were inspected by an officer of this Directorate in July and all were found to be capable of supporting their OBT commitments and TDY rotational wings. (Unclassified)

During this period SAC had assigned this headquarters the project of compiling two sets of National Intelligence Surveys, Airfield and Seaplane Stations of the World, Bombing Encyclopedias, Evasion Geographies, and Preliminary NIS Gazetteers for Headquarters 16th Air Force. These sets were made up from the materials received from the deactivated Intelligence Libraries at Fairford, Sturgate, Greenham Common, Upper Heyford, and Mildenhall. This material was packed into 31 footlockers and couriered to Headquarters 16th Air Force on 29 August 1957. (Confidential)

Additionally, other NIS's were shipped to Second, Eighth, and Fifteenth Air Forces; Third Air Division; 544th RTS; and Headquarters SAC. The remaining Library Materials were inventoried and

placed in dead storage at the 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron pending final distribution instructions from Headquarters SAC. (UNCLASSIFIED)

ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS

All supervisory personnel assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence completed a Management Guide in accordance with SAC Regulation 25-2. (Unclassified)

All administrative files within the Directorate were screened and were rearranged in accordance with AFM 181-4. (Unclassified)

Special Security Lectures were given to DI personnel on the following subjects: "Covert Threat to SAC", "SAC's Protection Program", "Communications Security", and "Common Administrative Violations to AFR 205-1". Individuals who attended all lectures were given certificates of completion which were placed in their 201 Files. (Unclassified)

REALIGNMENT OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

The Directorate of Intelligence was re-organized during the month of July. This reorganization was the result of suggestions made by the SAC Realignment Board. The Directorate was realigned IAW para j of SAC Reg 20-1, Subj: "Organization of Intermediate Command Headquarters of Strategic Air Command. This brought the organization of the DI, Hq 7AD, in line with other lateral SAC Commands. The Directorate previously had consisted of three divisions; a Program Division, Operational Intelligence Division and Target Intelligence Division. The Programs Division was deactivated and its E & E functions were transferred to the Operational Intelligence Division. All administrative and supply responsibilities were assigned to a newly created Management

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Page 6 7 Pages

Branch which was placed under the direct control of the Director of Intelligence. This type organization has proven to be more efficient and all assigned responsibilities were carried out despite a reduction in personnel assigned to the Directorate. (Unclassified)

This document is classified Secret because it reveals Intelligence-type information pertaining to overall capabilities.

SECRET

Page 7 of 7 Pages

Copy 1 of 6 copies

HISTORICAL REPORT

Williams
14 JAN 58

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1957

The following activities were accomplished by the Directorate of Intelligence during the reporting period. (Unclassified)

- a. 7th Air Division Manual 95-1 was amended to establish procedures for the accomplishment of 16mm cinematography. (Unclassified)
- b. 7th Air Division Manual 200-1 was revised to include changes suggested by using organizations. (Unclassified)
- c. The 7th Air Division Target Materials Catalog was published. (Unclassified)
- d. Plots of Target Materials were distributed to base TICs. (Unclassified)
- e. The IBDA and Photo Interpreter Training was continued. (Unclassified)
- f. Staff Briefs were prepared and were presented to the Commander. (Unclassified)
- g. Intelligence documents required by this Directorate in the event of EWP were prepositioned at the 7th Air Division Command Post. (Confidential)

h. Inspector General inspections were conducted at this headquarters and at 7th Air Division bases.

(Unclassified)

i. Preparations were made to furnish Reflex Action units with required Operational Intelligence items.

(Confidential)

j. Plans were made to transfer the responsibility for electronic reconnaissance. (Secret)

k. Personnel of the Directorate participated in Exercise "Iron Bar", during which EAM listings and closed circuit TV were utilized. (Unclassified)

TARGET INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

7AD Manual 95-1: This manual, subject: "Base Photo Labs", was amended to include a chapter covering procedure and policy for the accomplishment of 16mm cinematography. To meet this new requirement the most qualified photo laboratory technician at each 7th Air Division Base was selected for training in cinematography, based on experience, interest, and technical proficiency. (Unclassified)

The purpose of this new program was to provide Base Information Service Officers with motion-picture film of designated military and civil functions at the bases. The quality of the film obtained must conform to USAF standards for television and newsreel release. (Unclassified)

The exposure of a minimum of 600 feet of film at 24 frames per second (sound speed) is required monthly. Subject film will be edited so as to give a five minute showing and will be accompanied by a narrative covering the event. The narrative and "shooting" of film at 24 frames per second will allow for the subsequent addition of a sound track to the film. (Unclassified)

Special emphasis will be placed on "shooting" technique which will include: The long shot to establish locale, the medium shot to highlight area of interest, the close-up for visual impact; scene length, variety of camera angle, screen direction and sufficient footage to allow for scene shifting during editing. (Unclassified)

To stimulate interest and technical proficiency, it is planned to offer an "OSCAR" each quarter to the base submitting the best film, as well as \$25.00 to the photographer. There is also the possibility of using the film in Air Force News Review Programs. (Unclassified)

A second amendment to 7th Air Division Manual 95-1 was the inclusion of a requirement which had previously been stated in 7th Air Division Letter 95-2, dated 22 June 1955. This requirement stated that Base Photo Labs had the responsibility of accomplishing motion-picture photography of take-offs and landings of all SAC tactical aircraft. Procedures for

handling film covering an accident were outlined. Disposition instructions were given for film covering uneventful take-offs and landings. (Unclassified)

TAD Manual 200-1: The final draft of 7th Air Division Manual 200-1, Subject: "Target Intelligence Centers and Intelligence Libraries", was written and submitted to the Adjutant for publication. Included in the final draft were recommendations made by using agencies. (Unclassified)

Target Materials Catalog: The inventory of target materials on hand in this headquarters was accomplished during November and December. This task was done after receipt of the first run of the 7th Air Division Target Materials Catalog. A first revision of the Catalog based upon changes accumulated over a period of two and a half months was made in the latter part of December. (Unclassified)

Plots of Target Materials: In order to assist units in the field to carry out research, photostatic copies of WAC plots showing 100 Series Chart coverage maintained by this headquarters are in the process of being made. To date all plots through WAC 231 have been reproduced and distributed to Base TIC's. (Unclassified)

IBDA Training: A major project carried on by the Target Systems Branch has been the IBDA and Photo Interpreter Training Program. IBDA Problem #4 was given to the Photo Interpreters

assigned to the 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron with satisfactory results on two of the AGZ's. AGZ "A" revealed a lack of familiarity with DROGUE release plotting procedures. In an effort to correct this deficiency, a request was sent to Headquarters SAC for assistance in obtaining Drogue release source data and MB-4 computers. This request was approved and the needed technical data has been requisitioned. By utilizing the computer and technical data, it is expected that more accurate results will be obtained in future tests. (Secret)

Good results have been obtained in the Photo Interpretation Training Program. Photo Interpreter SEP scores have been lowered considerably because of the practice of scoring ten RBE runs each month by all interpreters. Future evaluation tests will determine the effectiveness of the training program and if the total squadron SEP is reduced, a reduction in the training program may be indicated. (Confidential)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Dissemination of Military Information: Staff Briefs were prepared and presented at the Commander's Staff meetings on the following subjects: "Comparison of SAC and Soviet LRAA Base Systems" and "Soviet Air Order of Battle". (Confidential)

Volume II of the IEI (Intelligence Estimates and Information) was revised and additional sections and chapters were added to make the volume more complete and comprehensive for use in the base Intelligence Libraries. (Unclassified)

Base Intelligence Libraries: Selected library documents were shipped to the 7AD Command Post at High Wycombe from a surplus stock stored at the 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron. Other key library documents needed at the Command Post were requested from Headquarters SAC. (Confidential)

Inspection of Libraries: This headquarters conducted an I.G. Inspection of the Base Intelligence Libraries located at the 3921st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron and at High Wycombe. The inspection of both libraries showed that they were operating in a highly satisfactory manner, and in accordance with pertinent directives. (Confidential)

"Reflex" Action: Preparations were made to furnish "Reflex" Action units with current intelligence, E and E aids and up-to-date order of battle information. This will require additional messages to be transmitted to the field, over and above current requirements. "Reflex" Action units do not deploy with basic order of battle documents. Arrangements have been made whereby changes and new order of battle information are prepared in easy reading text and transmitted to units concerned. (Confidential)

Electronic Reconnaissance: Tentative plans were formed to transfer the responsibility for electronic reconnaissance in the European Theatre from this Headquarters to Headquarters Sixteenth Air Force. (Secret)

EXERCISE "IRON BAR"

All DI personnel participated in Exercise "Iron Bar". During the exercise, both EAM listings and closed circuit TV were used. The EAM listings were received hourly and presented in summary form all combat reports received. The manhours saved by these listings has permitted this directorate to release seven augmentation personnel assigned to the Directorate in the event of EWP. (Unclassified)

The exercise also provided the opportunity to "shake-down" the closed circuit TV. It was determined that only certain size lettering and types of information could be satisfactorily transmitted. As a result, COO Letter Number 12 was written and has been distributed. This letter outlines minimum size lettering and types of presentation that can be transmitted. (Unclassified)

This report is classified SECRET to protect Intelligence activities and capabilities.

HISTORICAL REPORT

DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY

JULY - AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 1957

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Date: 1 October 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

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I N D E X

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3. INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION	7
4. LAW ENFORCEMENT	15

CONFIDENTIAL

HISTORICAL REPORT
DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY
JULY - AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 1957

1. DIRECTORATE:

a. Staff Visits and Annual Inspections were conducted by members of the Directorate of Security during the Third Quarter as follows: (U)

- (1) 3909th Air Base Group - July and August - Staff Visit. (U)
- (2) 3910th Air Base Group - July - Staff Visit and Annual Inspection. (U)
- (3) 3912th Air Base Squadron - August - Staff Visit. (U)
- (4) 3913th Air Base Squadron - July - Staff Visit. (U)
- (5) 3918th Air Base Group - July - Staff Visit, September - Annual Inspection. (U)
- (6) 3919th Air Base Squadron - July - Staff Visit. (U)
- (7) 3920th Air Base Group - July and September - Staff Visit. (U)
- (8) 3930th Air Base Squadron - July - Staff Visit, July - Annual Inspection. (U)

b. Staff Visits and Annual Inspections conducted at 7th Air Division installations during this reporting period indicated a satisfactory capability to support Security, Law Enforcement and Defense requirements established by this and higher headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL

Historical Report - Directorate of Security

Although some minor problem areas were revealed, satisfactory follow-up action has been taken by units concerned to correct these deficient areas. It is felt that the "Concepts of Operations" set forth within 7th Air Division Administrative Plan 1-57, for Air Police elements of this command, were being forcefully and energetically administered by all Provost Marshals. (U)

c. On 10 July 1957, the Commander, 7th Air Division, received a letter from Headquarters SAC, Subject: Special Security Training. The letter was accompanied by a two part course of instruction pertaining to Covert Threat and the Combat Force Protection Program. These lectures constituted a special security training course which was required to be presented to each member of this command who possessed at least an interim secret clearance and a permanently issued SAC restricted badge. The desired learning outcome of this instruction was for each listener to be made aware of the enemy covert threat which confronts Strategic Air Command, and the protection system designed to defend it (SACR 205-5). It was expressly desired that 100% attendance and training completion be accomplished within the command by no later than 30 September 1957. The lesson outlines and lecture material were reproduced in this headquarters and forwarded to all units in the command, including the Bombardment Wing TDY to this area. All training was accomplished as directed by 30 September 1957. (U)

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d. In order to obtain prompt implementation of the requirements of SAC Programming Plan 10-57 and the applicable provisions of SACR 205-5, the Director of Security conducted a conference of command Provost Marshals and Senior Air Police Officers. The conference was conducted at Headquarters 7th Air Division during the period 29 - 30 August 1957. Conferees were presented with sufficient background material to enable them to render their individual staff and commanders a thorough briefing concerning the combat force protection program. The Chief of Staff gave the welcoming address. The following topics were discussed in detail during the period of the conference: (U)

- (1) Project "Hot Point." (U)
- (2) SAC Programming Plan 10-57. (U)
- (3) SAC Regulations 205-1 and 205-5. (U)
- (4) Air Police concept of operations in the United Kingdom including discussions of applicable provisions of 7AD Administrative Order 1-57 and 7AD Manual 20-1. (U)
- (5) Proposed revisions to SAC Manual 400-1 concerning first phase deployment of Air Police. (U)
- (6) Disciplinary rates and trends within 7th Air Division. (U)
- (7) Forthcoming inspection of the 7th Air Division by the SAC Inspector General. (U)
- (8) Discussion of forthcoming revised SAC security testing procedures. (U)

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2. PERSONNEL:

a. During the reporting period, the Directorate of Security experienced a complete turn-over in officer and airman personnel. The present Director of Security, Lt. Colonel L. P. Brown, was transferred to Headquarters 7th Air Division from Headquarters Second Air Force, where he was the Command Provost Marshal. His predecessor, Lt. Colonel George Sagli, was transferred to Headquarters Second Air Force to occupy the position vacated by Colonel Brown. Major Charles E. Kennedy replaced Major Marvin O. Kroeger as Chief, Provost Marshal Division, who was reassigned to Lincoln Air Force Base, Nebraska, as Staff Provost Marshal. Major Kennedy's assignment prior to reporting to Headquarters 7th Air Division was Chief, Internal Security Branch, PM Division (IG), Headquarters Second Air Force. Major Raymond W. Mayville replaced Major W. O. Dickerson as Chief, Internal Security Division, who was reassigned to Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force as Chief, Air Police Branch. Major Mayville's assignment prior to reporting to Headquarters 7th Air Division was Commander, 3910th Air Police Squadron, RAF Station Lakenheath. Captain Canty P. Chambers, Jr., replaced Captain C. A. McKenize as Chief, Air Base Defense and Plans Branch, who was reassigned to Headquarters Eighth Air Force, as Chief, Air Police Branch. Captain Chambers' assignment prior to reporting to Headquarters 7th Air Division was Deputy Provost Marshal, Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. M/Sgt. H. H. Hiltbrand replaced M/Sgt. J. H. Thompson as NCOIC of the Provost Marshal Division, who was reassigned to Headquarters Second Air

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 Force as NCOIC of the Internal Security Branch, FM Division (IG).
 M/Sgt. Hiltbrand's assignment prior to reporting to Headquarters
 7th Air Division was First Sergeant, 803rd Air Police Squadron,
 Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. T/Sgt. I. J. Korb replaced
 T/Sgt. Floyd Powers as NCOIC Provost Marshal Activities Section,
 who was reassigned to Travis Air Force Base, California. T/Sgt.
 Korb's assignment prior to reporting to Headquarters 7th Air
 Division was NCOIC Air Police Branch, FM Division (IG), Headquarters
 Fifteenth Air Force. T/Sgt. C. W. Groves replaced S/Sgt. C. E.
 Rivers as NCOIC of the Inspection and Reports Section on the latter's
 transfer to the Directorate of Personnel, this headquarters. T/Sgt.
 Groves' assignment prior to reporting to Headquarters 7th Air Division
 was NCOIC, Internal Security Branch, FM Division (IG), Headquarters
 Second Air Force. S/Sgt. I. J. Meyerson replaced S/Sgt. Ventry as
 NCOIC, Internal Security Division, on the latter's transfer to the
 Directorate of Materiel, this headquarters. S/Sgt. Meyerson's
 assignment prior to reporting to Headquarters 7th Air Division was
 at Headquarters SAC. (U)

b. Message DM2A 14640, dated 20 August 1957, from
 Headquarters SAC announced changes to Section 4 - Air Police De-
 ployment - to SAC Manual 400-1. Changes became effective 1 October
 1957. This section provides the ground rules and data used to
 determine Air Police personnel and equipment requirements for
 staging and deployment. A review of the changes revealed a re-
 duction of approximately 21 Air Police in the Phase I deployment

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figures. As the result and in view of the forthcoming alert force concept, the Commander, 7th Air Division, forwarded a letter to the Commander in Chief, SAC, on 13 September 1957, in which he stated: "The new program presents a realistic approach to the overall SAC security problem in view of the recent staff study prepared by your headquarters concerning the determination of the covert threat to the nuclear retaliatory capability of the United States. However, in looking over the proposed Air Police mobility changes to SAC Manual 400-1, I was concerned by the fact that there is a contemplated reduction in the Phase I deployment figures of roughly 21 Air Police. As you know, there are no Air Police pre-positioned here to secure the deployed combat force. The Air Police Manning Tables for 7th Air Division are sufficient to provide only for normal law enforcement functions with a limited internal security and defense capability." The Commander pointed out that the strength figures were considered to be satisfactory under EWP; however, the problem of being able to provide sufficient protection to units TDY to this area on normal rotation basis still remains. This is primarily a result of the hardstand/dispersal type parking system utilized in the United Kingdom. The Commander further pointed out that in view of the dispersal parking system the utilization of Air Police as provided for in mobility plans gave the combat force inadequate physical protection. (C)

c. On 10 September 1957, information was received from the Director of Plans that a directive had been received from

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 Headquarters SAC announcing the following personnel changes in
 unit UMDs as indicated. Indicated changes became effective for
 October 1957 Strength reporting. (U)

(1) Headquarters 7th Air Division. Add: One (1)
 Staff Sergeant, AFSC 70250, to Adjutant function and one (1) Staff
 Sergeant, AFSC 73250, to Personnel function. (U)

(2) For 3909th, 3910th, 3918th, and 3920th Air Base
 Groups. Add: One (1) Alc, AFSC 70250, to Adjutant function and
 one (1) Alc, AFSC 73250, to Personnel function. (U)

(3) For 3912th, 3913th, 3914th, 3917th, and 3919th
 Air Base Squadrons. Delete: One (1) Alc, AFSC 77150. (U)

(4) For 3929th Air Base Squadron. Delete: Two (2)
 Alc, AFSC 77150. (U)

3. INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION:

a. Considering the future operational plans of the
 Strategic Air Command, and applying the assertions contained in a
 staff study entitled, "Determination of the Covert Threat to the
 Nuclear Retaliatory Capability of the United States," prepared by
 the security staff at Headquarters SAC, a conclusion was reached
 that certain modifications in the SAC internal security system
 were appropriate at this time. Through an exhausting review of
 annual inspection reports and records of supervisory staff visits,
 it became apparent that the SAC internal security system had
 degenerated to a certain extent, and through a process of evolution,

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no longer afforded a realistic degree of protection for the vital elements of the command. To correct this deficiency, SAC Programming Plan 10-57, Subject: Implementation of Project "Hot Point" (The Reorganization of Air Police Functions and Units in SAC), was developed. This programming plan had two broad objectives: (U)

(1) The realignment of security functions. (U)

(2) The reorganization of Air Police Squadrons within the Zone of Interior. (U)

b. 7th Air Division was required to implement the following: (U)

(1) At the direction of the 7th Air Division Commander, the Personnel Officer at all echelons is to assume full staff responsibility for AFR 35-62 actions and for the local security clearance program under the provisions of AFR 205-6. (U)

(2) At the direction of the 7th Air Division Commander, the Adjutant at all echelons is to assume full staff responsibility for unit censorship, administrative security, and for processing all security compromise actions under the provisions of AFR 205-1. (U)

c. On 19 August 1957, message SD 12787, Subject: SAC Programming Plan 10-57 and SAC Regulation 205-5, was disseminated to all bases of this command. This message directed that effective 1 September 1957 responsibility for administrative processing and monitoring of loyalty investigations (AFRs 35-62 and 40-12) be transferred from the present Air Police Squadrons and/or Air Police Flights to the Personnel Officers of all Air Base Groups and Air Base Squadrons. Base Provost Marshals were instructed to continue

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to provide certain related services; i.e., fingerprinting of applicants. Responsibility for processing reports required by SAC Supplement I to AFR 205-8 was retained by the installation Provost Marshal. (U)

d. Part II of the above message directed all base Adjutants to assume responsibility for unit censorship functions, administrative security to include staff supervision and responsibility for insuring compliance with all sections of AFR 205-1, as amended, including the administrative processing of security compromise cases (reference AFR 205-1 and SAC Supplement 1, thereto). The 7th Air Division Adjutant and Director of Personnel assumed responsibility for all like functions from the Director of Security. (U)

e. One of the prime purposes of Project "Hot Point" was to establish the task of providing physical protection for the SAC combat force as the sole and unobscured function of an organized protection unit. The initial step in achieving this goal was to realign certain security functions assigning them from the present Air Police Squadron to other agencies of the staff where these functions were considered to be more homogenous. (U)

f. SAC Regulation 205-1, "SAC Internal Security System," is the basic directive by which these realignment and reassignment actions were achieved. This regulation directs the establishment and functional responsibility assignment for seven distinct programs, which when combined make up the SAC internal security system. These are as follows: (U)

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- * (1) The Security Intelligence and Estimates Program. (U)
- (2) The Personnel Loyalty and Clearance Program. (U)
- * (3) The Security Motivation Program. (U)
- (4) The Combat Force Protection Program. (U)
- (5) The Administrative Security and Compromise Program. (U)
- (6) The Electrical Communications Security Program. (U)
- * (7) The Security Testing and Evaluation Program. (U)

* Denotes programs which require publication of implementing SAC directives.

g. The directive also generates the requirement for a Staff Provost Marshal on the installation Commanders staff of all SAC bases to which tactical units are assigned. The Staff Provost Marshal is made responsible for maintaining and exercising staff supervision over the entire SAC security system. He has no command functions. This provision is not applicable to 7th Air Division installations. The Commander of Air Police Squadrons or Air Police Flights will continue to exercise staff and command responsibility. (U)

h. To provide a more realistic protection program based on the best known information relating to the covert threat, a new protection system entitled, "Combat Force Protection Program," is outlined in the new SAC Regulation 205-5, which became effective on 1 September 1957. It prescribed the disposition of protection

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forces so that a uniform degree of vigilance is maintained along all possible avenues by which a hostile agent could inflict damage to our vital resources. In effect, it standardizes the minimum number of sentries for particular tasks. In so doing, it serves as a basic blue print for the Commander of the protection forces. The program sponsors a standard system of protection which is designed to produce the maximum degree of vigilance in an indefinite period of time over resources which are vital to the launching of the initial combat strike force. Basically, SAC Regulation 205-5 prescribes the optimum day-to-day disposition of combat defense forces and the degree of participation required by the personnel present within the restricted areas of the installation. To make possible the maximum concentration of combat defense forces for the protection of the most logically vulnerable resources, the directive indicates that only those items which are absolutely indispensable to the launching of the combat strike force and which by nature are susceptible to sabotage or covert-type damage will qualify for CD force protection during non-emergency periods. Such items will be considered as Category I resources. The general scheme of protection prescribed by this directive is based upon the initial requirement for maintaining a 24-hour per day insured capability for the immediate detection of any local ground threat to Category I resources. On each base, personnel other than members of the CD force, are to provide the major portion of this detection capability during the normal working hours for the base.

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The preponderance of combat defense force strength is to be employed in a close-in protection system reinforced by a perimeter "in depth concept" during non-duty periods. At all times, however, the CD force will coordinate the participation of all units in the program and will maintain at CSC a mobile strike team ready to respond to any alarm which may be received. The vigilance to detect the presence of local ground threats must be maintained along every direction of approach leading to the sensitive areas under protection, because logic decrees that a skilled hostile agent could launch a destructive assault from virtually any direction. This principle gives rise to the greatest readily apparent change from the old security system. The new program advocates a new policy of open personnel access gates to the flightline restricted area during normal duty periods. In the past a substantial portion of the manpower of all Air Police security sections has been utilized for individual badge check at personnel access gates. Consequently, a major portion of guard attention was concentrated for this single function leaving other avenues of possible danger virtually unguarded and, also, leaving only a small segment of the guard force to provide the critical after duty hour protection. SAC Regulation 205-5 permits the free passage of authorized personnel with restricted area badges displayed through the flightline access gates during periods of normal duty. Badge check control will be applied during non-duty periods. All personnel are charged by the directive to maintain alertness,

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protect and report the entry or presence of unauthorized persons within restricted areas. (U)

i. This essentially is the prescribed system. During non-emergency periods, the emphasis is to be placed on assuring that any local ground threat to sensitive resources is immediately detected and by application of emergency measures, eliminated before serious damage is sustained. If such a threat or indication of assault is determined to be the work of a hostile agent, then the system will evolve into a sabotage alert or base defense operation of such depth that successful further assault is prevented. Greater emphasis is placed within this program on the immediate flashing of messages by the swiftest, official or commercial means available to appropriate higher headquarters upon detection by an individual of the base of probable hostile ground assault. Consistent with the covert threat analysis the initial detection of the single hostile act may be the first indication of a wide spread coordinated assault against all SAC bases. This requirement demands that the mobile strike team at each base must react to an alarm with maximum speed and swiftly evaluate the cause, because it will be from this type of action that command-wide readiness will emanate. Timely initial warning to all bases on which tactical units are located will permit the implementation of sabotage alert or defense plans and, thus, the assumption of a preventive protection posture capability of neutralizing the effect of anticipated hostile moves. (U)

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j. Effective with the receipt of SAC message IGSP 18510, dated 4 September 1957, Subject: SAC Regulation 205-5, a requirement was established by Headquarters SAC for preparation of an Internal Protection Plan designated as Operations Plan 190-(58). This plan will be maintained current outlining in detail the base combat defense program. The plan is to be published in a standard five-paragraph format described in Appendix I to AFM 205-4, Internal Security of Air Force Installations, and will outline in detail the normal day-to-day protection program, describing the actions of the base security forces as well as those of all other units involved. Annex A of Operations Plan 190-58 will outline required actions by all base units under sabotage alert conditions and describe the general scheme of the sabotage alert operation. Upon publication, each unit of the installation will be furnished a current copy of the plan and its annex. Plans for sabotage alert and local ground defense now contained in Annexes B and C of "Operations Plan 500-(58)" will be removed from the 500 series plan. The 500 series plan will then be provided with Annexes B and C which contain only a statement which cross references these two annexes to Annex A of Operations Plan 190-(58). (U)

k. Simultaneously, SAC published an interim change to SAC Regulation 355-1, concerning implementation of the Strategic Alert System. Two newly devised messages utilizing SOCS, commercial telephone or other available means have been established.

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Code names for these messages are "Seven High" and "Red Skin." (U)

1. A "Seven High" message is an unconfirmed report of an extraordinary event involving suspected or real damage to sensitive resources of the command by sabotage or other covert actions. This report will normally be submitted through controller channels using SOCS. The message will consist solely of the statement "Seven High" followed by the time of occurrence of the event, and the name of the base. This information will be relayed to the headquarters SAC command post. If the incident is determined not to have originated as a result of sabotage or other covert action, the original message will be immediately cancelled by the same method. However, if the incident is confirmed as an act of sabotage or other hostile or covert action, a second coded message "Red Skin" will be initiated in the same manner as the original message and in addition, will contain all known details regarding the situation. A follow-up Zippo message, classified as necessary, will be transmitted within two hours, outlining a detail account of the situation. (U)

4. LAW ENFORCEMENT:

a. A computation of factors that reflect the statistical status of the state of discipline within the command indicates that 7th Air Division "Aggregate Rate of Offenders" has consistently remained higher than the Strategic Air Command averages during the current calendar year. As a result, this headquarters has placed increased emphasis on this problem area to bring the command rate

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down to a more favorable position with the SAC averages. This has resulted in the 7th Air Division "Aggregate Rate of Offenders" being substantially reduced over the past four months period (May - 22.34, June - 19.05, July - 16.56, August - 14.39). Although the aggregate offenders rate reflects a major downward trend, military and civilian (misdemeanors) type offenses, and vehicle accident rates have reflected only minor improvement. In order to effect a more substantial reduction in these problem areas, this headquarters has formulated and disseminated to subordinate commanders new policies for the handling and disposition of offenders, and traffic enforcement techniques. These policies were designed to reduce to an acceptable minimum the "Aggregate Rate of Offenders." (U)

b. On 1 July 1957, this directorate absorbed an additional responsibility. Authority was vested in this directorate to approve/disapprove requests for acquisition, transfer and disposal of privately owned vehicles of personnel assigned and tenant to 7th Air Division bases. This action was in part prompted by the results of a staff study conducted by this directorate which proved exorbitant delays were a fact rather than an exception between initial request and final approval to purchase, sell or otherwise dispose of privately owned vehicles. Under the present system, the average time between submission of request and approval/disapproval is one week. Prior to the advent of the new system, delays of two to four months were not uncommon. Problems were encountered and in some instances,

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inadvertently created; however, all were resolved with a minimum of
delay. Supplemental information and instructions were issued to all
bases within the command virtually eliminating problems and requests
for unorthodox transactions. As of 3 October 1957, six hundred
and ninety eight (698) approvals have been granted by this directo-
rate. (U)

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HISTORICAL REPORT

DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY

OCTOBER - NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1957

Date: 1 January 1958

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DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY
OCTOBER - NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1957

1. DIRECTORATE:

a. Staff Visits and Annual Inspections were conducted by members of the Directorate of Security during the Fourth Quarter as follows: (U)

- (1) 3909th Air Base Group - November - Staff Visit. (U)
- (2) 3910th Air Base Group - November and December - Staff Visits. (U)
- (3) 3911th Air Base Group - October - Staff Visit, November - Annual Inspection. (U)
- (4) 3912th Air Base Squadron - November - Staff Visit. (U)
- (5) 3913th Air Base Squadron - November and December - Staff Visits. (U)
- (6) 3914th Air Base Squadron - November - Staff Visit. (U)
- (7) 3917th Air Base Squadron - October - Annual Inspection, December - Staff Visit. (U)
- (8) 3918th Air Base Group - November - Staff Visit. (U)
- (9) 3919th Air Base Squadron - November and December - Staff Visits. (U)
- (10) 3920th Air Base Group - November - Staff Visit. (U)
- (11) 3928th Air Base Squadron - October - Annual Inspection, December - Staff Visit. (U)
- (12) 3929th Air Base Squadron - October - Staff Visit, November - Annual Inspection. (U)

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(13) 3930th Air Base Squadron - November - Staff Visit. (U)

b. Annual Inspections and Staff Visits conducted at 7th Air Division installations during the period of this report indicated generally a satisfactory capability to support their assigned mission. Although several minor problem areas were revealed, immediate follow-up action was initiated by units concerned to correct the deficient areas. In general, it is felt that the "Concept of Operations" set forth in 7th Air Division Administrative Plan 1-57, for Air Police elements within this command were being effectively administered by Provost Marshal's and/or Senior Air Police Officer, as applicable. (U)

c. Upon completion of the inspection of 7th Air Division by the SAC Inspector General and his staff, it was considered advisable for a representative from the Directorate of Security to visit each installation of the command for the purpose of conducting a briefing of key personnel on the Combat Force Protection Program. It was determined that in order to insure complete coverage of key staff personnel and personnel assigned to supervisory positions that all officers and non-commissioned officers of the first two grades should receive this briefing. Desired result was to insure complete standardization of implementing procedures and to provide a basis of common understanding

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of the many problems involved in effecting the change over to the revised SAC security concept; therefore, commencing on 30 October 1957 and extending through 18 December 1957, a series of briefings concerning the implementation of the revised SAC security concept were conducted by Major R. W. Mayville, Deputy Director of Security. In addition during the same period, three separate briefings were conducted for personnel assigned to Headquarters 7th Air Division. The first briefing was held for the Command Section and all officers assigned to Directorate and Division level and Chiefs of Special Staff Agencies. Following this, two briefings were conducted for officers assigned to Branch level and below and all airmen assigned to Headquarters 7th Air Division. (U)

d. To insure continued compliance with SACR 205-7, dated 21 October 1957, Subject: Security Motivation Program, each station was furnished copies of briefing charts covering the major aspects of the Combat Defense Program as promulgated by SAC Regulations 205-1 and 205-5. Charts were forwarded as inclosure to a cover letter signed by the Chief of Staff, 7th Air Division. It was requested that the briefing charts be used as a guide in the preparation of similar briefings to be presented periodically by unit commanders to insure timely orientation of all assigned airmen. It was further requested that the briefings be conducted at the earliest practicable date following presentation given by the

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representative of the Directorate of Security, this headquarters.
Staff supervisory responsibility for the motivation program was
directed to be vested in the installation Provost Marshal or Senior
Air Police Officer, as applicable. In addition to the above action,
the Commander 7th Air Division expressed the desire that personnel
from staff agencies of this headquarters insure that command emphasis
be maintained on the Combat Defense Program. To accomplish this,
an individual check list on the SAC security concept was prepared
by the Director of Security and copies provided all staff agencies
of the headquarters, with instruction that the check list be used
to conduct informal inspections and discussions on the Combat Defense
Program with those personnel assigned in areas being visited. The
purpose of this action was to ascertain the degree of familiarity
with the above referenced program. (U)

2. PERSONNEL:

During Operation "Iron Bar," during the period 25 November
to 7 December 1957, personnel action was initiated to augment air
police elements at RAF Station Mildenhall and RAF Station Chelveston.
Two Emergency Alert Air Police Elements (30 Air Police) were dis-
patched to each of these installations from RAF Station Lakenheath
and RAF Station Upper Heyford for the duration of referenced exercise.
RAF Station Lakenheath provided the augmentation requirements for
RAF Mildenhall, and RAF Upper Heyford for RAF Chelveston. (U)

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3. INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION:

a. On 13 December 1957, message this headquarters, SD 7-4294, classified SECRET, Subject: Security of Reflex Aircraft, was dispatched to Headquarters Strategic Air Command. In essence, this message expressed the headquarters position concerning inadequacies continued in existing guidance furnished from Headquarters SAC concerning the security reflex aircraft; however, it was pointed out that the vulnerability and sensitivity of aircraft which comprise the reflex force will require individual protection of each aircraft because of the following: (U)

- (1) Dispersal type parking. (U)
- (2) Climatic conditions experienced during winter months. (U)
- (3) The nearness of parking areas to the perimeter of our bases which, in turn, places them from 100 to 200 yards away from main public thoroughfares and in some cases build-up areas. (C)

b. Guidance provided by Headquarters SAC for alert force aircraft requires two (2) guards to each five (5) aircraft to provide perimeter protection, and one (1) guard for three (3) aircraft to provide internal roving type protection with the parking area itself. This concept is considered to be feasible for Zone of Interior type operations where apron or ramp type parking is utilized. In addition to the vulnerability factors enumerated in a, above, one more has recently been added in that

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it is now contemplated that combat mission folders be stored in the aircraft. The sensitivity and vulnerability of these aircraft to either covert or overt attempts to neutralize them as a combat force cannot be questioned. In view of this, it was requested that serious consideration be given to increasing the Air Police support deployed by participating ZI SAC commands from the present figure of 68 to a total of 76 for reflex aircraft staging to installations of this command designated as Air Base Squadrons. The above figure would be sufficient to provide the desired degree of detection as well as protection considered to be the absolute minimum for targets as sensitive and vulnerable as those in question. (SECRET)

c. In reply to our recommendations, Headquarters SAC message IGS2 266 contained requested authority to deviate from security criteria for reflex aircraft contained in SACR 205-5. The concept of individual close-in protection for reflex aircraft was approved. As regards recommended increase in Air Police deployment figures, we were informed that action was being held in abeyance pending the completion of a study to determine the feasibility of providing AP personnel on a PCS basis to meet our reflex security requirements. Until a decision is made, deployment figure will remain constant at 68 AP personnel for 15 aircraft, with additional personnel required being supplied from 7AD bases not supporting reflex operations. (SECRET)

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d. A study of the policies pertaining to the control of access to Restricted Areas was made by this office, and as a result, on 23 August 1957 a message was dispatched to CINCSAC (RADNOTE 13040) outlining this command's recommendations. One of the major recommendations was that the Visitor Control system contained in SACR 205-13 be replaced by individual owner agency control of visitors and that SACR 205-13 be rescinded. By message dated 17 October 1957, cite IGSO 32457, CINCSAC announced the rescission of SACR 205-13, informing all commands that the procedures contained in AFRs 205-1 and 205-6, and in SACR 205-5 would form the basis of visitor control established within SAC units. It was just about this time that a copy of SACSUP-1 to AFR 30-20 was received by this headquarters. A re-examination of the policies contained in these various regulations was made at this headquarters and it was concluded that, as written, the system was conflicting in nature and confusing in intent. On 2 October 1957, a message SD 15318, this headquarters, again presented to CINCSAC a review of the entire program, and recommended that SACR 205-5 and SACSUP-1 to AFR 30-20 be amended to remove conflicting policies and that the system of individual owner unit control be placed in the regulation. CINCSAC concurred, and by message dated 29 October 1957, cite IGSP 35931, announced the change. To assure that all 7AD units understood the policy, and to remove the confusion caused by the rapid succession of policy changes, the entire subject was laid down in a letter

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directive (letter SD, Hq 7AD, 6 November 1957, Subject: Access Control Procedures), which will remain in effect until all pertinent directives have been re-written and published by CINCSAC. A copy of this letter is attached. (U)

e. With the imposition of the requirement for designation of five (5) areas within the operations block as SACR 205-15 protected areas (concurrent with installation of the television scanner system), a study was made of the system in use for controlling access. It was concluded that the system in effect was too cumbersome to assure the availability of required information under emergency alert (practice on EWP) conditions, and, in addition, left much to be desired from the standpoint of operational accuracy. The fact that personnel assigned to the several units located at High Wycombe were being authorized access to the Operations Block under a decal pass system further complicated the situation. (U)

f. To overcome the obvious faults uncovered, the entire access control system was tied to the Restricted Area Badge system which was being changed at that time under CINCSAC directive. All personnel requiring access to the Operations Block and/or areas within the Block were required to submit requests under the newly devised access control system (SACR 205-5), with approval of the owner agency required for each area requested. Information regarding each individual (name, serial number, grade, RAF Number, agency to which assigned, areas authorized, height, weight, date of birth, color hair, color eyes) was then key punched onto IBM cards. These

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cards are utilized to prepare monthly (or emergency) access lists for each restricted area in the Headquarters 7th Air Division complex, rosters of RAB issues by staff agency (for inventory purposes) and for meetings, briefings, etc., as required. (U)

g. In addition to making this operation an EAM system, all personnel assigned to units stationed at High Wycombe who require access to the Operations Block have been incorporated into the headquarters system, utilizing the same badge with different series of numbers. These persons will also be integrated into the EAM accounting system for inclusion on master access lists which can be promptly and efficiently reproduced from the deck maintained on a current basis. (U)

4. LAW ENFORCEMENT:

a. Computation of factors related to the statistical "Status of the State of Discipline" of 7th Air Division reflected a continued downward trend in all reportable areas. The "Aggregate Rate of Offenders" for the period as indicated reflected the following rates: September - 11.36, October - 8.98 and November - 7.97. Rates for the month of December were not available on submission of this report. Although the major problem areas continue to be military and civil type (misdemeanor) offense, and vehicle accidents, a substantial downward trend has been effected in these problem areas. In a continuous effort to bring these problem areas in a more favorable position with the SAC averages, this headquarters has forwarded to all subordinate commands a monthly analysis of statistics reflecting the "State of Discipline" within the command. The purpose

SECRET

Historical Report - Directorate of Security

of this monthly analysis is to provide installation commanders with current statistics as pertains to his command on a comparative basis with other subordinate commands within 7th Air Division, and to point out the major problem areas that effect the over-all command rates. Also, remedial action is recommended when considered appropriate. (U)

b. Headquarters SAC during the period of this report forwarded to this headquarters a survey of the "Status of Discipline," Re: Letter, IGS2, Hq SAC, 24 Sep 57, Subject: State of Discipline, Special Report (RCS: SAC-Y2(OT)). This survey, together with status of discipline statistics pertinent to individual installations of this command was forwarded to commanders concerned for analysis and reply to this headquarters. Analysis of the survey and statistics was to determine major problem areas, and reply was to indicate subsequent action taken to eliminate cause factors. On reply of all subordinate commands to this headquarters, reports received were consolidated and, subsequently, submitted to Headquarters SAC. With the submission of this report, a major change was affected in vehicle accident reporting (see Headquarters SAC message IGS-2/46903, 5 Dec 57) system. Provost Marshal Activities Report submitted subsequent to receipt of referenced message would include only those vehicle accidents in which it had been determined that military personnel were at fault. Previously, all vehicle accidents were reported. This change in reporting requirement should substantially reduce the currently high off-base vehicle accident rate. (U)

This document contains 10 pages 10
 copy no. 1 4 copies

18024

SECRET

HISTORICAL
REPORT

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE'S OFFICE

7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)

APO 125 New York, New York

1 July 1957 through 30 September 1957

PREPARED BY T/Sgt Robert Sharp
FOR THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE'S OFFICE

REVIEWED BY:

Merlin W. Baker

MERLIN W. BAKER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Staff Judge Advocate

256

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Paragraph 1	GENERAL
Paragraph 2	PERSONNEL DISCUSSION
Paragraph 3	FUNCTIONS
Paragraph 4	CONCLUSION

1. GENERAL

Following is the twenty-sixth series in the organizational history for the Judge Advocate's Office, Headquarters 7th Air Division (SAC), APO 125, New York, New York, for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 September 1957.

2. PERSONNEL DISCUSSION

During the reporting period four Judge Advocate officers were gained through PCS transfers to 7th Air Division. They were Major Paul R. Tarbutton, Major Jerome C. Neveloff, Captain Chester J. Malicki and Captain Thomas G. Roberts. Captain Atticus A. Calhoun and Captain Russell Stanley were returned to the ZI upon completion of their overseas tour.

3. FUNCTIONS

The following workload was accomplished during this period:

a. One general court-martial case was reviewed and forwarded to The Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force for final action. Twenty special court-martial cases were reviewed this quarter which is a decrease of 11 cases compared to the number reviewed during the last quarter. A total of ninety-three summary court-martial cases were reviewed and filed.

b. A total of one hundred and eight punishments under Article 15, UCMJ were reviewed and filed. This was a decrease of three cases compared to last quarter.

c. A total of one hundred seventy five legal assistance interviews were accomplished and eighty five legal documents were drawn.

4. CONCLUSION

All functions of the Staff Judge Advocate's office are operating in a satisfactory manner.

HISTORICAL
REPORT

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE'S OFFICE


7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)

APC 125 New York, New York

1 October 1957 through 31 December 1957

PREPARED BY 1/Sgt Robert Scarp
FOR THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE'S OFFICE

REVIEWED BY



GORLON S. JACKSON
Major, USAF
Acting Staff Judge Advocate

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraph 1	GENERAL
Paragraph 2	Personnel Discussion
Paragraph 3	Functions
Paragraph 4	Conclusion

1. GENERAL

Following is the twenty-seventh series in the organizational history for the Judge Advocate's Office, Headquarters 7th Air Division (SAC), APO 125 New York, New York, for the period 1 October 1957 through 31 December 1957.

2. PERSONNEL DISCUSSION

During the reporting period three Judge Advocate officers were returned to the ZI. Lt Colonel Merlin W. Baker was reassigned to Kelly Air Force Base, Texas and 1st Lieutenant Frederick G. Fellam and 1st Lieutenant James Stillwell were released from active duty. Colonel Paul Boucher, from the Office of The Judge Advocate General, Headquarters USAF, is scheduled to fill the Staff Judge Advocate vacancy at this headquarters.

3. FUNCTIONS

The following workload was accomplished during this period:

- a. There were no general court-martial cases during this period. Twenty-one special court-martial cases, three involving punitive discharges, were reviewed during this quarter. This is an increase of one case compared to the number reviewed during the last quarter. A total of sixty-seven summary court-martial cases were reviewed and filed.
- b. A total of one hundred and twenty-four punishments under Article 15, UCMJ, were reviewed and filed. This was an increase of 18 cases compared to last quarter.
- c. A total of one hundred fifty-six legal assistance interviews were accomplished.

4. CONCLUSION

All functions of the Staff Judge Advocate's office are operating in a satisfactory manner.

OFFICE OF SAFETY

Chief of Ground Safety conducted staff visits at the following bases during this quarters: Greenham Common, Lakenheath, Upper Heyford, Mildenhall, Chelveston and Fairford.

Ground safety data for the first 9 months of 1957 compared with the same period of 1956 reveal the following:

	<u>Jan-Sep 56</u>	<u>Jan Sep 57</u>
Military Injury Rates	4.21	4.81
Govt Veh Acct Rates	.60	.51
Cost Per Capita	\$2.25	\$2.99
Fatalities	5	6


SOURCE: AF Forms 122 and SAC Forms 516.

The monthly \$250.00 award authorized by 7th Air Division Supplement to SAC Regulation 32-3 was won by the following bases for the quarter:

- Fairford July 1957
- West Drayton August 1957
- High Wycombe (3929th ABSQ) September 1957

Director of Safety visited the following bases during this quarter: Greenham Common, Lakenheath, West Drayton, Brize Norton, Bruntingthorpe, Mildenhall, Chelveston, East Kirkby and Fairford.

Aircraft assigned or attached to this command were accident free during the period of this report.


 WILFORD J. CHUTSINGER
 Major, USAF
 Director of Safety

OFFICE OF SAFETY

The Chief of Ground Safety conducted staff visits at the following bases during the last quarter of 1957: East Kirkby, Sturgate, West Drayton, Greennan Common and Brize Norton.

Ground Safety data for the year 1957 compared with the same period 1956 reveal the following:

	1956	1957
Military Injury Rates	4.22	4.74
Government Vehicle Accident Rates	.51	.60
Cost per Capita per annum	29.28	32.04
Fatalities	7	7


SOURCE: AF Form 122 and SAC Form 516.

The monthly two hundred and fifty dollar (\$250.00) award authorized by 7th Air Division Supplement One (1) to SACReg 32-3, was won by the following bases for the quarter:

October 1957 Brize Norton
 November 1957 Mildenhall
 December 1957 Upper Heyford

The Director of Safety visited the following bases during this quarter: Brize Norton, Lakenneath, Greennan Common, East Kirkby, Fairford and Cheveston.

Aircraft assigned or attached to this command were accident free during the period of this report.


 WILFORD J. GRUPSIN
 Major, USAF
 Director of Safety

7AIRDIV SUPPLEMENT-1)
TO SAC REG 32-3)

SAC REG 32-3/7AIRDIV SUP-1
DS
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York, 25 July 1957

GROUND SAFETY

Operation Lifesaver
(RCS: SAC-X4)

(Supersedes 7AIRDIV Supplement I, 29 Sep 56, to SAC REG 32-3,
and 7AIRDIV Supplement I, 24 Apr 57, to AFR 32-15)

NOTE: File in front of SAC REG 32-3, 7 May 1957.

See paragraph 6a.

(1) (Added) Personnel newly arrived in the United Kingdom who will be driving private vehicles during their tour of duty in Great Britain will be given a minimum of two hours instruction on British road rules and regulations. This instruction will be based on the "Highway Code" and the Metropolitan Police Driving Manual "Roadcraft" and will be given to personnel within 10 days of arrival on the base.

See paragraph 6b.

(1) (Added) The lower four grade airmen will not be permitted to exceed the following distance and time limitations when using a private conveyance while on pass.

<u>LENGTH OF PASS</u>	<u>MAXIMUM DISTANCE</u>	<u>MINIMUM TRAVEL TIME FOR RETURN</u>
Overnight	50 miles	1½ hours
24 hour	75 miles	3 hours
48 hour	150 miles	6 hours
72 hour	250 miles	10 hours

These restrictions will be posted in a conspicuous place on the Squadron or Detachment bulletin board.

See paragraph 6.

g. (Added) Disciplinary Action. In determining whether further disciplinary action is indicated in addition to action which may already have been taken by civil authorities, commanders will consider whether the incident involved the commission of military offenses over which the civilian court had no jurisdiction.

SAC REG 32-3/7AIRDIV SUP-1
Page 2

h. (Added) Traffic Violators Clinic. Compulsory attendance will be required at a base level Traffic Violator Clinic for all personnel who commit serious moving traffic violations. This school will be conducted during off-duty hours for a minimum period of two hours per week for one month. Personnel will be required to pass an examination with a minimum grade of 70% at the conclusion of the course. Personnel failing the examination will be required to take the test again after consultation with the instructor. The 100 questions contained in separate correspondence to each base will be used for this examination. The questions will be used as a course outline in conjunction with the British Highway Code, the Metropolitan Police Driving Manual "Roadcraft" and 7th Air Division Safety Bulletin Number 5, 31 January 1957.

i. (Added) 7th Air Division vehicle operators responsible for a vehicle accident will automatically lose their on base driving privileges until they have attended the Traffic Violator Clinic and passed the final examination.

See paragraph 7d

(1) (Added) This headquarters hereby established a \$250.00 monthly award from the Command Central Welfare Fund to the 7th Air Division installation having the lowest safety score for the month. Parent organizations with satellite installation will notify this headquarters of satellite exposure.

(a) Penalty Points will be based on the personnel injury rate, government vehicle accident rate and cost per capita (severity). A bonus of 3 points will be deducted from the organization's score for each consecutive reportable accident free month.

(b) Scoring: Injury Rates times 4 = Injury Points
Govt Veh Acdt Rates times 8 = GVA Points
Cost per capita, 10 points per dollar = Severity Points

Total Penalty Points

$\frac{100000 *}{\text{SAC Military Exposure}}$ † Total Bonus
Penalty Points - Points = Total Safety Score

* Represents a constant factor to provide terms for rating.


SAC REG 32-3/7AIRDIV SUP-1
Page 3

(c) Organizations submitting late reports will not be considered for the award for that month that the report was due.

(2) (Added) Money derived from this award will be utilized only for the purchase of non-expendable items.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION: S


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

ANNEX V

SACR 355-1/7ADSUP-1

Annex V

DO

7AD SUPPLEMENT-1)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)

APO 125 New York, New York

13 November 1957

TO SACR 355-1)

DEFENSE

Chemical, Biological and Radiological
(CBR Defense Operations) Monthly CBR Capabilities Report

RCS: 7AD-DO-U1

(EFFECTIVE 15 NOVEMBER 1957)

NOTE: File in front of SAC Reg 355-1, Annex V, 23 August 1957.

See paragraph 4a.

(11) (Added) Establish a CBR Defense Command Post capability in connection with the Base Command Post. It will be situated and equipped so as to permit adequate control of all CBR Defense Teams and to provide the base task force commander with necessary information and recommendations on CBR Defense matters.

(a) The CBR Defense Command Post capability will include the following items:

1. A fallout evaluation capability.
2. A local radiation intensity reporting and prediction capability.
3. Adequate communications to appropriate CBR defense team supervisors.
4. Proper maps, graphs and charts maintained in immediate operational status.
5. A complete set of CBR defense SOPs for the command post, fallout shelters and CBR recovery teams.
6. Rosters of all CBR Defense personnel and location for alerting purposes.

(b) AFSWC-TR-56-31, dated July 1956, Subject: (Unclassified) Defense Against Residual Radiation from Nuclear Weapons, classified Secret, will be used to predict radiation intensities from various size nuclear weapons, as well as furnishing guidance in predicting blast and thermal damage.

SACR 355-1/7ADSUP-1

See paragraph 6e(3).

Local radiation intensity reporting in this theater will be accomplished in accordance with USAFE Regulation 355-4.

See paragraph 7c(2).

An appropriate number of assigned CBR team members will be given duties as Stay Time Controllers for work in fallout shelters during periods of high residual radiation in the area. Stay Time Controllers will assist supervisors of essential functions in assigning work periods in contaminated work areas.

See paragraph 7c.

(6) (Added) 7AD Form 14, Residual Radiation Exposure Stay Time Control, will be used to log all radiation exposures to personnel from residual radiation.

(a) 7AD Form 14 will be placed in appropriate folders ready for use and maintained by the base CBR Defense Officer for distribution to stay time controllers at the initiation of a SAC alert or yellow alert.

(b) Stay time controllers will proceed to pre-designated shelters with stay time folders and other necessary CBR equipment when "take Shelter Alert" is announced.

(7) (Added) Use of 7AD Form 14.

(a) As soon as personnel arrive at shelters, the stay time controller will fill in information on personnel (Name, Rank, etc.,) on the left side of the form up to the exposure reserve column.

(b) Allowable total dose entry will be made as soon as it is furnished from the base command post.

(c) Exposure reserve entry will be made as the result of subtracting any recent previous exposure from allowable total dose.

(d) Radiation in work area column will be filled in for each individual just prior to his entering the work area. This radiation intensity will be computed from intensity information computed to H₁ furnished by the base command post.

SACR 355-1/7ADSUP-1

(e) The stay time controller will then compute allowable stay time by using standard stay time charts or computers. Allowable stay time will be based upon radiation intensity at time of entering work area and the amount of exposure tolerance as indicated in the exposure reserve column. Estimated exit time can then be entered.

(f) Before entering contaminated work areas, workers will be briefed on allowable stay time in the area and any special precautions to be taken in the area.

(g) When workers return from the work area, the actual exit time, actual stay time, dose estimate for work period, total dose estimate and exposure reserve columns will be completed. At this time the workers name and appropriate information will be carried forward to the left side of a new form.

(h) Workers will be monitored by using AN/PDR-27 or AN/PDR-39 Radiac Sets as appropriate and the isolation of contaminated clothing and/or decontamination of personnel will be accomplished to the extent possible.

(i) DT-60 Dosimeters will be read at regular intervals or when possible depending upon availability of the CP-95 Computer Indicator and entries will be made in DT-60 reading columns of the forms.

11. (ADDED) SUPPLY OF FORMS. An initial supply of 7AD Form 14 will be distributed by this headquarters. The CBR Command Post of each Air Base Group and Air Base Squadron of this command will maintain a six months supply of 7AD Forms 14. No stock level authorized at base publications; when stock reaches a four months supply, additional supply of this form will be requisitioned from base publications. Base publications will requisition the required amount from this headquarters following requisition procedures established in 7AD Manual 10-1 as amended.

12. (ADDED) REPORTS. A monthly CBR capabilities report will be prepared by each 7th Air Division base. Reports will be prepared as of the first day of each month utilizing format as outlined in Inclosure 1 and submitted to this Headquarters, ATTENTION: DOTCBR so as to arrive not later than the 7th work day following the as of date. Initial report will be as of 1 December 1957.

a. Records Disposition Instructions. Reports required by this directive will be retained for six months and then destroyed, paragraph 60b, AFM 181-5, 1 July 1956.


b. D-Day Status. In the event of hostilities this report will be discontinued. (Code D).

SACR 355-1/7ADSUP-1

c. Report Control Symbol: Report Control Symbol assigned for the report in paragraph 12 is 7AD-DO-U1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Sample Report


HAROLD J. GEBHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION				7ABSUP			
SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED BY AN AIR BASE GROUP OR AIR BASE SQUADRON	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 3909ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3918ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3910ADGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3920ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3911ABGP		<input type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3917ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3913ABSQ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3919ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3914ABSQ		ORGANIZATION	NR CYS
AGENCY	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS
CHIEF OF STAFF		ADJUTANT	3	ADJUTANT	2	1ST AVN DEPOT SQ	
ADJUTANT	2	BASE COMPTROLLER	1	BASE COMPTROLLER	1	2D AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/PERSONNEL	1	BASE MATERIEL	1	BASE MATERIEL	1	4TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/OPERATIONS	5	BASE D/OPERATIONS	1	BASE D/OPERATIONS	1	8TH AVN DEPOT SQ	
D/MATERIEL	3	BASE PERSONNEL	1	BASE PERSONNEL	1	3915TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/PLANS	1	CHAPLAIN		CHAPLAIN		3928TH AIR BASE SQ	3
D/INTELLIGENCE	1	INFORMATION SERVICES		INFORMATION SERVICES		3929TH AIR BASE SQ	3
D/SECURITY	1	JUDGE ADVOCATE		JUDGE ADVOCATE		3930TH AIR BASE SQ	3
CHAPLAIN		HEADQUARTERS SQ	3	PROVOST MARSHAL		3921ST RECON TECH SQ	
D/COMPTROLLER	1	OPERATIONS SQUADRON		DISPENSARY		485TH COMM SQUADRON	
INSPECTOR GENERAL	1	AIR POLICE SQUADRON				TDY WING	
JUDGE ADVOCATE		FOOD SERVICE SQ				TDY DETACHMENTS	
OFF OF INFORMATION		INSTALLATIONS SQ	1			TOTAL	9
SURGEON	1	TRANSPORTATION SQ				TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT (colun 2 and 3) FOR STOCK	
HEADQUARTERS SQ SEC		SUPPLY SQUADRON	1			SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION	
D/SAFETY		DISPENSARY				AIR UNIVERSITY 1 Copy	
D/INS-ENG	1	FIELD MAINT SQ				HISTORIAN 3 Copies	
DETACHMENT 1	1					SAC 5 Copies	
Stock	10	Stock	3	Stock	1		
TOTAL	29	TOTAL	15	TOTAL	7		
REMARKS							
TOTAL							15
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION							137

HQ TAG FORM 8
7 JUN 67

HEADQUARTERS
 XXXXTH AIR BASE GROUP (SAC)
 APO XX US AIR FORCE

BO

SUBJECT: Monthly CBR Defense Capabilities Report (RCS-7AD-DC-U1)

TO: Commander
 7th Air Division (SAC)
 ATTN: DOTCBR
 APO 125 US Air Force

The following is the XXXth Air Base Group CBR Capability report as of _____.

1. _____ (officer) AFSC _____ is assigned on orders as (primary - additional) duty base CBR officer. (Reference paragraph 3b, Annex V, SAC Reg 355-1).
2. _____ (NCO) AFSC _____ is assigned on orders as (primary - additional) duty base CBR supervisor. (Reference paragraph 3b, Annex V, SAC Reg 355-1).
3. _____ individuals are assigned on orders and trained as CBR team members. (Reference paragraph 5b and d, Annex V, SAC Reg 355-1).
4. _____ individuals are assigned on orders and trained as squadron CBR personnel. (Reference paragraph 4b(2), Annex V, SAC Reg 355-1).
5. _____ % of base personnel have been issued DT-60 dosimeters. (Reference paragraph 4b(1), Annex V, SAC Reg 355-1).
6. _____ % of DT-60 dosimeters issued have been read and recorded in medical records during the past six months. (Reference paragraph 4a(8), Annex V, SAC Reg 355-1).
7. Provisions (have - have not) been made for fallout plotting, fallout evaluation and local radiation intensity reporting at this base.
8. _____ % of radiological defense indoctrination training has been accomplished as required by 7th Air Division Command Letter 355-2, Subject: Radiological Defense Policy. This training was accomplished in addition to that required by Annex 1, SAC Reg 50-24.

Incl 1 to Annex V, SACR 355-1/7ADSUP-1, dtd 13 Nov 57

9. All CBR equipment of TA 1-27 authorized in squadron UALs and CBR expendables authorized by ECL 20101 are on hand except for the following:

10. Remarks:

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN COE
CAPTAIN, USAF
ADJUTANT

HED 7AD SUPPLEMENT-1)
TO AFR 200-9)

AFR 200-9/HED7ADSUP-1
ADJ
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York
14 October 1957

INTELLIGENCE

Disclosure of Classified Defense Information to Foreign Governments
(EFFECTIVE 15 OCTOBER 1957)

NOTE: File in front of AFR 200-9, 4 Oct 57.

See paragraph 7.a.

Information to be disclosed to foreign governments either orally or visually, must first be presented to the Director of Intelligence. Hq 7AD Form 19, Authority for Release of Classified Information to Foreign Nationals, will be attached to the material in one copy and signed by the director of the agency requesting release. If such information is not in violation of the provisions of AF-DCMI, approval will be given by the Director of Intelligence who will sign the Hq 7AD Form 19. The signed form will be retained and filed by the agency releasing the material.

See paragraph 12.

a. (Added) The director of the staff agency preparing the material will sign a completed Hq 7AD Form 19 in two copies. The material will be carried to the Director of Intelligence for approval of release and signature by the director or his designated representative. The documents will then be forwarded to the Adjutant for release. The Hq 7AD Form 19 will be signed by the Adjutant or a designated representative when the material is dispatched. One copy of the form will be retained for file by the Adjutant and one copy returned to the originating agency.


See AFR 200-9.

25. (ADDED) RECORDS DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS. Retained copies of 7AD Form 19 will be destroyed 1 year after the related document is retired, transferred, downgraded or destroyed, paragraph 637, AFM 181-5, 1 July 1956.

AFR 200-9/HED7ADSUP-1

26. (ADDED) SUPPLY OF FORMS. An initial supply of Hq 7AD Form 19 will be distributed by ADJP. Additional supply of this form may be obtained from ADJP in accordance with 7AD Manual 10-1 as amended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


HAROLD J. GEPHART
Lt Colonel, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION						FORM 7AD FORM 8 1 JUN 67	
SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE GROUPS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO AIR BASE SQUADRONS		SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED BY AN AIR BASE GROUP OR AIR BASE SQUADRON	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 3909ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3918ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3910ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3920ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> 3911ABGP <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/> 3912ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3917ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3913ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3919ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> 3914ABSQ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		ORGANIZATION	NR CYS
AGENCY	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS	ORGANIZATION	NR CYS
CHIEF OF STAFF	1	ADJUTANT		ADJUTANT		1ST AVN DEPT SQ	
ADJUTANT	2	BASE COMPTROLLER		BASE COMPTROLLER		2D AVN DEPT SQ	
D/PERSONNEL	2	BASE MATERIEL		BASE MATERIEL		4TH AVN DEPT SQ	
D/OPERATIONS	6	BASE D/OPERATIONS		BASE D/OPERATIONS		8TH AVN DEPT SQ	
D/MATERIEL	7	BASE PERSONNEL		BASE PERSONNEL		3915TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/PLANS	2	CHAPLAIN		CHAPLAIN		3928TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/INTELLIGENCE	2	INFORMATION SERVICES		INFORMATION SERVICES		3929TH AIR BASE SQ	
D/SECURITY	1	JUDGE ADVOCATE		JUDGE ADVOCATE		3930TH AIR BASE SQ	
CHAPLAIN	1	HEADQUARTERS SQ		PROVOST MARSHAL		3921ST RECON TECH SQ	
D/COMPTROLLER	5	OPERATIONS SQUADRON		DEPENSARY		485TH COMM SQUADRON	
INSPECTOR GENERAL	2	AIR POLICE SQUADRON				TDY WING	
JUDGE ADVOCATE	1	FOOD SERVICE SQ				TDY DETACHMENTS	
OFF OF INFORMATION	4	INSTALLATIONS SQ				TOTAL	
SURGEON	1	TRANSPORTATION SQ				TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT (colm 2 and 3) FOR STOCK	
HEADQUARTERS SQ SEC	1	SUPPLY SQUADRON				SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION	
D/SAFETY	1	DEPENSARY				AIR UNIVERSITY 1 Copy	
D/INS-ENG	1	FIELD MAINT SQ				HISTORIAN 3 Copies	
DETACHMENT 1	1					SAC 5 Copies	
EE & AT	1						
Stock	10						
TOTAL	52	TOTAL		TOTAL			
REMARKS							
TOTAL							61
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION							51

7AIRDIV STAFF MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 205-2)

7AIRDIV STAFF MEMO 205-2
SD
HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
APO 125 New York, New York, 9 July 1957

SECURITY

Procedures for Acquisition, Wearing, and Use of Identification Name Tags

1. PURPOSE. To establish an additional means for positive and rapid identification of 7th Air Division personnel in conjunction with the use of the SAC Restricted Area Badge.

2. SCOPE. Provisions of this directive are applicable to all officers and airmen assigned to Headquarters 7th Air Division.

3. GENERAL. a. The use of the Identification Name Tag will enable individuals to associate names with faces, for rapid identification, and personal recognition.


b. Name Tags will be procured by the Commandant and issued through Headquarters Squadron Supply. Each Agency Security Officer will be responsible to insure that all military members of his agency are issued Identification Name Tags.

4. POLICIES. a. Identification Name Tags will be worn on the left breast pocket flap of the uniform, centered, one-quarter inch (1/4") below top seam.

b. Tags will only be worn during duty hours while on the military reservation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION: "M"


J. W. WHITAKER
Major, USAF
Acting Adjutant