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A HISTORY of the

817TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)
and . . .
817th Air Base Group
For the month of
October, 1958
(Unclassified Title)

Prepared by : Information
Services Office, First Lieutenant John
R. Dell Isola, Historical Officer, and
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torical Technician, for . . .

W. E. Arnold
FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF

WALTER E. ARNOLD
Brigadier General USAF
Commander
817th Air Division

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G l o s s a r y

AACS	Airways and Air Communications System
AB	Air Base
AB Gp	Air Base Group
AC	Aircraft Commander
AD	Air Division
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADS	Aviation Depot Squadron
A&E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
APRON	Air Police Squadron
AREFS	Air Refueling Squadron
ATO	Assisted Take Off
AVNDEPRON	Aviation Depot Squadron
BW	Bomb Wing
C or CONF	Confidential
CAS or CAFS	Completely Assembled for Strike
CBR	Chemical, Biological, Radiological
CINCSAC	Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command
CMB	Chief, Munitions Branch
COL	Colonel
COMDR	Commander
D/	Director or Directorate
DAF	Department of the Air Force

G l o s s a r y		(Continued-3)
DNIF		Duty not to include flying
ECM		Electronic Countermeasure
EDCSA		Effective Date Change of Station Accountability
FY		Fiscal Year
EWO		Emergency War Order
FDSVRON		Food Service Squadron
FAK		Flyaway Kit
GCA		Ground Controlled Approach
HHCL		"H" Hour Control Line
HQ		Headquarters
INSTLRON		Installations Squadron
JATO		Jet Assisted Take Off
LOX		Liquid Oxygen
Lt		Lieutenant
MAP		Manpower Authorization Program
MCP		Military Construction Program
MCS		Management Control System (Statement)
MATS		Military Air Transport Service
MIRS		Manning In Required Specialties
MRP		Maintenance Readiness Plan
NCO		Noncommissioned Officer
NGOIC		Noncommissioned Officer in Charge
n.d.		Not Dated
NH		New Hampshire

G l o s s a r y		(Continued-3)
OIC		Officer-in-Charge
OJT		On-the-job-training
OPLAN		Operations Plan
OPORD		Operations Order
OPRON		Operations Squadron
PAFB		Pease Air Force Base
PCS		Permanent Change of Station
POL		Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants
PSYTRNGFLT		Physiological Training Flight
RBS		Radar Bomb Scoring
RAPCON		Radar Approach Control
RD		Restricted Data
SAC		Strategic Air Command
SACM		SAC Manual
SACR		SAC Regulation
S or SEC		Secret
SI		Storage Inspection
SOP		Standard Operating Procedure
TDY		Temporary Duty
T/O		Table of Organization
TOC		Technical Order Compliance
TRANSPRON		Transportation Squadron
U or UNCL		Unclassified
UAL		Unit Authorization List
UMD		Unit Manning Document

G l o s s a r y (Continued)

UME	Unit Mission Equipment
USE	Unit Support Equipment
WX	Weather
Z or GMT	Greenwich Mean Time

Chapter 1
BACKDROP for READINESS

Sometime next year, more than 150 of our big strategic aircraft will be operating from these runways. We will have some 90 B-47 Stratojet bombers, 40 KC-97 tankers . . . along with other support and liaison planes. This will give this base more airplanes than you might find in the entire fleet of one of our major commercial airlines. (U)

-- Donald A. Quarles, 30 June 1956¹

The "runways" referred to were those of the Strategic Air Command's (SAC's) newly constructed airbase in New Hampshire. Occasion for the statement was the "formal opening" of this multi-million dollar² establishment on 30 June, 1956.³ Two years later, and nearly a year beyond the original target date made public by Secretary Quarles, the projection was fulfilled. On 1 July, 1958, the 817th Air Division (817AD) at Pease Air Force Base (PAFB) was assigned a second medium bombardment wing.⁴ (UNCL)

Actual movement of the 509th Bombardment Wing (Medium), from Fifteenth Air Force's Walker Air Force Base, New Mexico, to Eighth Air Force's Pease Air Force Base, was accomplished over a three-month period - - from July

1. From the text of an address made by Sec'y of AF Donald A. Quarles during "opening day" ceremonies at "Portsmouth" AFB, 30 June 1956; full text appears in The Viking (Portsmouth AFB, N.H.), 6 July 1956, p.3.
2. Original appropriation for base, \$45,000,000; Real Estate and Facilities, as of 30 June 1958, valued at \$51,452,000; see "A Chronology of PAFB, N.H., July 1949-September 1958," prep by Hist. Sect., Hq 817ABGp, 1 Oct 1958; rpt, "Eighth Air Force Capital Value and Annual Operating Cost-as of 30 June 1958," prep by Fin. Svs. Div., D/Compt, Hq 8AF, n.d.
3. An account of the ceremonies is contained in The Viking (Portsmouth AFB, N.H.), 6 July 1956.
4. Msg, CINCSAC to Comdr 8AF, DPLMC 53224, 14 June 1958; msg, CINCSAC to Comdr 15AF, DPLMC 48914, 29 May 1958.

through August, 1958.⁵ By 1 September, of the same year, the 509th Bombardment Wing (509BW) was considered to be "fully operational" from its new location at Pease Air Force Base.⁶ (UNCL)

Upon the assignment of the 509th Bombardment Wing, the 817th Air Division became a typical SAC air division on a two-wing station.⁷ No changes in the basic mission of the 817th Air Division or of the prime functions of the 817th Air Base Group accrued as a result of the arrival of a second wing at Pease. The Division was still charged with supervising, directing, correlating and coordinating the operations of its assigned units as directed by Headquarters, Eighth Air Force and in accordance with policies established by SAC. These responsibilities, as formalized by published directive in June, 1956, were summarized as follows:⁸ (UNCL)

. . . the Commander, 817th Air Division will: . . .
 Supervise the organization and training of a force capable of immediate and sustained long-range offensive bombardment and air-to-air refueling operations in any part of the world, utilizing the latest technical knowledge and advanced weapons. . . . Be prepared to perform those tasks assigned in current emergency plans and related operations orders. . . .
 Supervise the participation of assigned units in

5. Operation Order 418-58 (LONG WAIT), Hq 509BW, 12 June 1958; "Reception Plan-509th Bombardment Wing," Hq 817AD, 1 July 1958, Exhibit 13 in the History of the 817th Air Division, June 1958; "Recapitulation of 509th Bomb Wing Move," Hq 509BW, 29 Aug 1958, Exhibit 25 in History of the 509th Bombardment Wing, July-August 1958; msg, Comdr 817AD to Comdr 8AF, ZIPPO 07-536, 29 July 1958, Exhibit 53 in the History of the 817th Air Division, July 1958.
6. Operation Order 520-58, Hq 817ABGp, 1 Sept 1958, Exhibit 4 in the History of the 817th Air Division, August-September 1958.
7. SAC Regulation 20-15, Hq SAC, 24 Dec 1957.
8. 8AF Regulation 23-32, Hq 8AF, 15 June 1956.

disaster relief and other domestic emergencies when required. . . . Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters. (U)

The mission of the 817th Air Base Group (817ABGp), while lacking specific definitive expression, could be accurately derived from information contained by SAC Regulation (SACR) 20-15. Within the concept of this regulation, the air base group was "responsible for supplying base support to the combat wings," and for "all matters pertaining to base services."⁹ (UNCL)

The 817th Air Base Group¹⁰ was the SAC "housekeeping" organization at Pease Air Force Base. The squadrons and units comprising this organization were the 817th Air Police, Food Service, Installations, Operations, Supply, Transportation, and Headquarters Squadron Section. Other units assigned to the air base group and responsible for performing specialized support functions included the 41st Aviation Depot Squadron (41ADS)¹¹ and the 4018th United States Air Force (USAF) Dispensary.¹² Attached to the Dispensary was the 13th Physiological Training Flight.¹³ This completed the list of units embodying the Air Base Group during October 1958.¹⁴ (UNCL)

The 817th Air Base Group was a combat-ready support organization. As such, priorities and emphasis in the

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- 9. SAC Regulation 20-15, Hq SAC, 24 Dec 1957.
 - 10. GO 27, Hq SAC, 21 May 1956.
 - 11. GO 67, Hq SAC, 14 Dec 1956.
 - 12. GO 62, Hq SAC, 29 Aug 1955.
 - 13. GO 24, Hq SAC, 9 May 1956; GO 10, Hq 817AD, 5 June 1956.
 - 14. "Daily Strength Summary-5, 15, 25 October 1958," prep by Statistical Services Office, Hq 817ABGp, n.d.

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Group, during October, continued to be directed toward further developing maximum capabilities to support SAC Emergency War Operations (EWO).¹⁵ The 817th Air Base Support Plan¹⁶ provided basic guidance for support of EWO operations of the tactical organizations stationed at Pease and also those scheduled to stage, therefrom. The Support Plan also spelled out specific responsibilities for each of the group squadrons to insure an EWO readiness of the air base group. (UNCL)

Broadly summarized, the SAC EWO and the respective 817th Air Division, 100th and 509th Bombardment Wings, and 817th Air Base Group plans reflected the following commitments upon the 817th Air Division and its units:¹⁷ (UNCL)

a. Prepare and launch 45 B-47 aircraft of the 100th and 509th Bombardment Wings on their strike assignments. (UNCL)

b. Prepare and deploy four KC-97 aircraft of the 100th and 509th Air Refueling Squadrons in support of Eighth Air Force Operations Order 44-59. (UNCL)

c. Prepare and launch 16 KC-97 aircraft of the 100th and 509th Air Refueling Squadrons on LEAP FROG¹⁸ missions in support of SAC Operations Order

15. Operation Order 521-58, Hq 817ABGP, 1 Oct 1958, Exhibit 1; "Notes on Air Base Group Staff Meeting -23 September 1958 (Commander's Remarks)," Hq 817ABGP, n.d., p. 33, History of the 817th Air Division, August-September 1958.
16. See Exhibit 3 (Basic Plan) and Exhibits 6, 7 (Amendments #1 and 2), History of the 817th Air Division, August-September 1958; Amendments #3, 4, 5, Exhibit 2, this history.
17. Rpt, "Annual Inspection 817th Air Division, Pease AFB, 22 Oct-7 Nov 1958," prep by IG, Hq 8AF, 24 Nov 1958, Exhibit 3; see also, applicable 44/50-59 series plans.
18. SAC Manual 55-7, Hq SAC, Apr 1958, p. 6; History of the 817th Air Division, July 1958, pp. 1-6.

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14-59. ✓

d. Prepare for deployment one mobile recovery team from each wing.¹⁹ ✓

e. Prepare to receive, recycle and launch 35 KC-97 aircraft of the 2d and 308th Air Refueling Squadrons for YO-YO²⁰ missions in the "Wonder" area. ✓

f. Prepare to receive an AMC (Air Materiel Command) "B" team. ✓

g. Support post strike refueling as directed by the Dow (AFB, Maine) TAGR FORCE commander. ✓

The essence of these commitments was that they must-- if they were to be effectively implemented--presuppose the capability of the SAC support and tactical forces at Pease AFB to react surely and immediately,²¹ when called upon to do so.²² The services and facilities which must be provided by the air base group encompassed a broad area. These requirements were summarized in the Base Support Plan, as follows:²³ (UNCL)

(1) A fully operational SAC airfield with required runways, ramp, nav aids, lighting, and other flying facilities available on a 24-hour basis. (U)

(2) A fully operational base installation

19. Mobility requirements are detailed in the "817th Air Division Mobility Plan, Hq 817AD, 1 July 1958, Exhibit 15 in History of the 817th Air Division, June 1958; Amendments #1, 2, 3, Exhibits, 8, 9, 10, in History of the 817th Air Division, August-September 1958; Amendment #4, Exhibit 4, this history.
20. Generation rates and definitions are contained in SAC Manual 55-7, Hq SAC, Apr 1958; brief discussion may be found in History of the 817th Air Division, July 1958, pp. 1-6.
21. SAC Manual 55-12A, Hq SAC, Aug 1958; 8AF Manual 55-3, Hq 8AF, 1 June 1958.
22. SAC Manual 55-7, Hq SAC, Apr 1958.
23. Base Support Plan, Hq 817ABGP, 1 July 1958, Exhibit 3 in History of the 817th Air Division, August-September 1958.

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with buildings, roads, facilities, and utilities operational on a 24-hour basis. (U)

(3) Orderly reception and processing of all personnel, cargo, and aircraft arriving at PAFB during EMO operations. (U)

(4) Transportation (including GENERAL and SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES) required by tactical and supporting organizations to execute the plan. (U)

(5) Complete POL servicing for all tactical and support aircraft; including JP-4, AVGAS, OIL, ADI, WATER/ALCOHOL and LCK. (U)

(6) Aircraft parts and supplies and all other parts and supplies required by tactical and support organizations to execute the plan. (U)

(7) Emergency alternate sources of electrical power for critical operating sections and facilities. (U)

(8) Snow-cleared runways and essential roads in usable condition at all times. (U)

(9) Quarters for all assigned personnel and additional personnel using PAFB during EMO operations. (U)

(10) Complete weapons servicing (including primary weapon, ammunition and ATO). (U)

(11) Meals, in-flight and sack lunches for all personnel. (U)

(12) ATC (Air Traffic Control) Clearances, local Air Traffic Control, Administrative passenger/cargo airlift, and transient aircraft services. (U)

(13) Local Air Rescue (Helicopter) service, and rescue coordination with other agencies as necessary. (U)

(14) Complete ground communications required to execute the plan. (U)

(15) Positive Security for aircraft and all elements essential to the operations of the Bomber strike force. (U)

(16) Routine and emergency medical support

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for all military personnel of the 817th Air Division. (U)

(17) All administrative services essential to operations of the Task Force. (U)

(18) Additional augmentation personnel required by operating sections to accomplish assigned supporting tasks. (U)

(19) Specialist staff support to the Task Force Commander. (U)

(20) Emergency operations (CRASH, FIRE, CBR, DISASTER, etc.) required to prevent loss of EWO capability. (U)

The separate annexes of the Base Support Plan--prepared, tested and reworked by key personnel and supervisors during the months from May through October 1958--established, in broad outline, procedures whereby EWO tasks might best be performed. In addition, each participating agency was required to prepare and maintain up-to-date and detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) to further develop the Support Plan by insuring that all personnel fully understand and be able to perform their separate EWO tasks efficiently and without question.²⁴ (UNCL)

Other unclassified plans prepared and revised during the months immediately following May 1958, included a division mobility plan,²⁵ internal protection plan,²⁶ and disaster control plan.²⁷ Each of these plans were to have had two things in common: (1) Direct or indirect support of the EWO, (2) Base of handling within the functional areas.

24. The need for wider dissemination of pertinent information at the functional level is made the subject of the 817th Air Division History, June 1958.

25. Exhibit 15, History of the 817th Air Division, June 1958.

26. Exhibit 16, History of the 817th Air Division, June 1958.

27. Exhibit 11, History of the 817th Air Division, August-September 1958.

Their most significant contribution to the Division's capability, then, would be to correct a serious weakness made evident during the May 1958 SAC Inspector General (IG) inspection of Pease AFB. In part, this weakness had been expressed, as follows:²⁸ (UNCL)

The lack of an adequate, comprehensive, detailed 44-Plan. By this is meant the present 44-Plan does not contain a sufficiently detailed plan so that each agency in the Air Base Group, the Wing and the Division staff knows what its specific interrelated duties are during the aircraft generation of an BMP. (U)

The problem at Pease AFB, during May, did not appear to be unique in Eighth Air Force. This point was brought out in a June, 1958, message to Eighth Air Force commanders. The message referred to the Support, Mobility and Maintenance Readiness plans then being prepared by subordinate units. The establishment of three support plans, rather than one, Headquarters Eighth Air Force explained, was to permit "ease of handling within the functional areas." The message cautioned, however, that support of the war order was one subject and the "three plans must be integrated parts of a whole task." The suspense date for completion of this work was established as 1 July 1958.²⁹

In essence, the Pease AFB plans were completed, as directed, and distributed shortly thereafter. Subsequent recall of the plans for security purposes and minor revision, somewhat delayed their utility value at the "functional

28. Ltr, Col Close to Comdr 817ABGp, et al, C, "Correction of Existing Deficiencies," 19 May 1958, Exhibit 10 to History of the 817th Air Division, May 1958.

29. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 817AD, et al, DML1 39160, 11 June 1958.

level," however.³⁰ It wasn't before late August or early September 1958 that all of the plans were cleared or otherwise made available for widespread distribution. In the meantime, the 509th Bombardment Wing arrived permanent change of station (PCS) from Walker AFB, New Mexico. With its arrival, the latent EMO capability of the Division was increased. The tactical units forming the SAC force at Pease AFB were now as follows:³¹ (UNCL)

100th Bombardment Wing (Medium)

Headquarters Squadron

349th Bombardment Squadron (M)

350th Bombardment Squadron (M)

351st Bombardment Squadron (M)

100th Armament & Electronics Maintenance Squadron

100th Field Maintenance Squadron

100th Periodic Maintenance Squadron

100th Air Refueling Squadron

100th Tactical Hospital

509th Bombardment Wing (Medium)

Headquarters Squadron

393d Bombardment Squadron (M)

715th Bombardment Squadron (M)

830th Bombardment Squadron (M)

509th Armament & Electronics Maintenance Squadron

30. A reference in the Support, Mobility, and Readiness plans to "Pease Task Force," necessitated recall of the plans.

31. "Daily Strength Summary," 5, 25 Oct 1958, Hq 817ABGp, Exhibit 5.

509th Field Maintenance Squadron
 509th Periodic Maintenance Squadron
 509th Air Refueling Squadron
 509th Tactical Hospital (U)

Tenant units at Pease AFB were the 1031st Resident Auditor; Detachment 2, 1917th Air and Airways Communication System (AACS); Detachment 27, 5th Weather Group; 202d Field Training Detachment, and Detachment 105, 1st District Office of Special Investigation.³² Off-base units and/or installations receiving logistical support from Pease AFB included Air Defense Command (ADC) installations: Topsham Air Force Station (AFS), Sedgewick AFS, and Brunswick AFS, Maine; Rye AFS, New Hampshire, and the 654th Aircraft and Warning (ACAW) Squadron at Brunswick AFS, Maine.³³ (UNCL)

Commander of the 817th Air Division was Brigadier General Walter E. Arnold, (b) (6). Commanding the remaining major units on Pease AFB were the following:³⁴ Colonel Silas R. Richards, (b) (6) 817th Air Base Group; Colonel Clifford F. Macomber, (b) (6) 509th Bombardment Wing; Colonel Winton R. Close, (b) (6) 100th Bombardment Wing.

No changes in key staff personnel of the Division or Air Base Group were made during October 1958. (UNCL)

These were the organizations and key personnel who comprised the latent capability of the new SAC force at

³². Ibid.

³³. "Installations Brochure-July 1958," prep by D/ Install Engr, 817ABGP, n.d., Exhibit 1 in History of the 817th Air Division, June 1958.

³⁴. See Roster of Key Personnel, this history; "Roster of Officers -31 October 1958 (RCS: 8AF-P1)," Hq 817ABGP, 100BW, 509EW, n.d., Exhibit 6.

Pease AFB. The existing SAC concept, however, was predicated upon dynamics. The dynamics of the preceding months at Pease had been partially reflected by the Air Base Group Commander, Colonel Richards at an air base group staff meeting held on 23 September 1958.³⁵ (UNCL)

We are currently faced with a series of exercises under various names. It is not necessary to know the names, all we need to do is generate the M4-59 Plan during an alert. Don't wait--this will require intimate knowledge of the Plan. . . . We must memorize the Plan and be cognizant of everybody's part in it. Be sure that the proper type individuals are assigned to augmentation jobs and teach them. (U)

Colonel Richards was speaking for the air base group. But with minor variation, he might have been speaking for all units at Pease AFB. One of the exercises he had in mind was the Unit Simulated Combat Mission (USCM), BIG JUMP. This exercise would employ both tactical units at Pease. It had also been six months since the May, 1958, SAC IG inspection of the base. The ultimate test of corrective measures taken since this inspection would become evident during this exercise. Indeed, the intent, if not the words of Colonel Richards, transcended the confines of the air base group conference room this day in September. (UNCL)

Chapter 2
The Hurdle

In planning all USCMs, unit commanders will simulate combat operations as closely as possible. Except for the most unusual or exceptional circumstances, all operations will adhere strictly to procedures in the tactical doctrine.

-- SAC Manual 50-5, Sept. 1958¹

Among the several methods used by the Strategic Air Command to realistically evaluate the war capability of its tactical units was the Unit Simulated Combat Mission (USCM). The value of the USCM could be ascertained from its stated purpose, "to evaluate a unit's capability to perform its assigned EMO mission." To facilitate such an evaluation, the USCM was conceived to "exercise all practicable phases of the unit EMO."² (UNCL)

Two USCMs were accomplished by each unit during each fiscal year. One of the exercises was planned and directed by the parent numbered air force of each unit. The other was planned and directed by Headquarters SAC. All USCMs were normally executed on a "no-notice" basis, further validating the significance of the results obtained. The unit vulnerability period for a numbered air force directed USCM was for the entire fiscal year. However, the vulnerability period was not to start until 60 days after the unit received the numbered air force operations order. The

1. SAC Manual 50-5, "Unit Simulated Combat Missions," HQ SAC, Sept 1958.

2. Ibid.

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1. SAC Manual 50-5, "Unit Simulated Combat Missions," Hq SAC, Sept 1958.
2. Ibid.

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unit vulnerability period for execution of a SAC directed USCM was 30 days.³ Commencing 1 October 1958, the 817th Air Division and its units became vulnerable to such a mission, BIG JUMP,⁴ the operation's unclassified nickname, seemed to exclaim and/or challenge at least one recent development within SAC; the integration of a second bomb wing into the Pease AFB combat force. It was, indeed, a kind of operation for which the base had been preparing, since May 1958--at least.⁵ (UNCL)

Preliminary thinking toward the large scale SAC exercise was accelerated, at the unit levels, during May 1958. In a message to all participating commands, Headquarters, Second Air Force advised that it had been given primary planning responsibility for BIG JUMP and announced a pre-planning conference to be held at Barksdale AFB on 24-26 June. Unit representation at the conference, the message stated, was to be held to one person from each division or strategic wing and to two persons from each participating bomb wing and refueling squadron.⁶ ~~CONF~~

Conferees were to have a working knowledge of their unit Emergency War Plan (EWP) and be familiar with any anticipated problem areas, launch or recovery peculiarities of their operating bases and operational restrictions

3. Ibid.

4. Operations Order 21-58, Hq SAC, n.d.

5. See Histories of 817AD since April 1958.

6. Msg, Comdr 2AF to Comdr 817AD, et al, DODT 10480, 16 May 1958, Exhibit 23.

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expected. In addition, each conferee was to have with him necessary equipment to "compute 90 percent wing feasibility flight plans" for their units' assigned routes, either prior to or during the conference.⁷ ~~(S)~~

Mission concepts brought out at this time envisioned bomber aircraft flying round robin--home station to home station--following EWP routes through peacetime refueling areas close to each individual unit's EWP area. Assigned weapons were to be carried if certain prevailing aircraft structural restrictions were lifted in time of the mission execution. Tanker aircraft participating in the mission were, likewise, to approximate their EWO commitments; "leap-frogging", hose or rotational refueling, as required.⁸ ~~(S)~~

Specifically, the 100th Bomb Wing mission was envisioned, at this time, as a non-refueled flight from Pease AFB to Newfoundland and return, via an East Coast penetration in the New York area. The early concept involving the 509th Bomb Wing envisioned aircraft refueled by KC-97s from Goose AFB, "leap frogging" to Sondrestrom, using "Red Lion" as a primary refueling area and "Dirty Word" as a secondary; and thence, returning to Pease AFB. Headquarters, Second Air Force, pointed out that these routes were for preliminary planning only and that specific routes would be resolved at the planning conference.⁹ ~~(S)~~

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

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Within a week, following receipt of this information, Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, confirmed the planning factors outlined by Second Air Force and advised its participating units to insure that "responsible" conferees be selected for the pre-planning conference at Barksdale. Eighth Air Force wished to stress this importance to its units, in that "routes, timing, altitudes, flight plans, etc.," established at the conference would be "final."¹⁰

While the Division and its only tactical unit, at this time, selected their representatives to the conference, additional planning guidance was received from Barksdale. Strategic Air Command had advised Second Air Force that B-47 wings participating in the exercise would complete their wing inspections and repair by 30 September and; therefore, planning would be conducted for "maximum allowable peacetime take-off weight of unit aircraft with water augmentation." With the correction of aircraft wing modifications expected to be complete by 30 September, the carrying of assigned weapons by the participating units was resolved, affirmatively.¹¹

The Division representative chosen to attend the pre-planning conference was Major Alden W. O'Brien,

10. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 817AD, et al, DODIS 17606, 23 May 1958, Exhibit 25.
11. Msg, Comdr 2AF to Comdr 8AF, et al, DODT 10654, 29 May 1958, Exhibit 24.

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(b) (6), Air Operations Staff Officer. Captains Edward A. Spellis, (b) (6), Wing Performance Officer and John G. Stinson, (b) (6), Staff Bombardment Officer for the 100th Bomb Wing were also delegated to attend the pre-planning conference.¹² On 19 June, Eighth Air Force advised Second Air Force that its representatives, including the conferees from Goose, Loring and Pease AFBs, would arrive at Barksdale about 23 June 1958.¹³ (UNCL)

The conference was held, as planned. It was here that more detailed, if still broad, guide lines were resolved and established for subsequent individual and detailed flight planning by the several participating units. In essence, all thinking was channeled toward one objective: To conduct SAC directed USCMs that would simulate, as closely as peacetime limitations would allow, the unit EMO through the first refueling area.¹⁴ Neither the 509th nor 100th Bomb Wings required refueling on their EMO strike or deployment missions. The USCM concept presented before the conference, however, had envisioned refueling of the 509th Bomb Wing. This inconsistency was verbally resolved by SAC during the conference, in favor of a non-refueled mission.¹⁵ ~~(S)~~

As subsequently incorporated in the Second Air Force operations order, the following were a few of the pertinent

12. Memo, Col Shirey to Maj O'Brien, 20 May 1958; Memo, Col Cafarelli to Col Shirey, 6 June 1958.

13. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 2AF, et al, DOO1 20017, 19 June 1958.

14. Operations Order 21-58 (Basic Plan), Hq 2AF, 21 July 1958, Exhibit 45.

15. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 817AD, DOO1 22478, 8 July 1958, Exhibit 26.

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planning instructions to be considered by participating units in making their plans.¹⁶ (UNCL)

1. EWO Option 4 was to be utilized to plan launch timing.¹⁷
2. Each Bomb Wing was to launch a minimum of 30 bombers.¹⁸
3. Alert requirements were to be maintained throughout the exercise.¹⁷
4. A "Positive Control" point was to be selected for each sortie launched under "Positive Control" ("quick strike" expanded to Option 4 strength), on this exercise.¹⁹
5. Routes listed in the order were for planning purposes. Minor deviations were authorized to avoid overflight of restricted, danger and prohibited areas; however, any alteration that might conflict with another unit's route must be coordinated with Second Air Force, prior to change.¹⁰(U)

The general routes to be flown by the 100th and 509th Bomb Wings were established during the pre-planning conference at Barksdale and, later, incorporated in the Second Air Force Plan. The 509th Bomb Wing, however, had not yet arrived at Pease AFB and the 817th Air Division had been given the responsibility for insuring "that 100th and 509th Bomb Wing Routes" did not conflict.¹⁹ The Division, therefore, queried Headquarters, Eighth Air Force for information concerning flight planning, launch, performance and target data pertaining to 509th Bomb Wing participation in operation BIG JUMP.²⁰

16. Annex A, Operation Order 21-58, Hq 2AF, 21 July 1958.

17. See para 3x(2)(c)1, Operation Order 21-58 (Basic Order), Hq 2AF, 21 July 1958, Exhibit 45.

18. Appendix 2 to Annex A, Operations Order 21-58, Hq 2AF, 21 July 1958.

19. Ibid.

20. Msg, Comdr 817AD to Comdr 8AF, DO 81903, 25 June 1958.

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Eighth Air Force advised the Division that the 509th Bomb Wing planned a mission similar to the one planned by the 100th Bomb Wing, with routes and targets varying but slightly.²¹ At the same time, however, Eighth Air Force queried the 47th Air Division for specific data regarding the 509th Bomb Wing mission, as currently planned. The "extreme importance" of receiving this information was such that were it not at Eighth Air Force by 21 July, the 509th Bomb Wing might have to utilize routes and targets planned by the 100th Bomb Wing and conform to launch times, as specified by the 817th Air Division.²² A message containing the desired information was forwarded to Eighth Air Force and the Division on 19 July 1958.²³ Eighth Air Force Operations Order 21-58 was published nine days later, on 28 July 1958. ~~(S)~~

The Eighth Air Force operations order, as initially issued, tended to expand but followed the Second Air Force order closely. Basic commitments placed on the 817th Air Division and its tactical units remained firm. The 817th Air Division was still required to provide a minimum of 30 B-47 aircraft from the 100th and 509th Bomb Wings, for a total of 60 aircraft. Strike air operations for the exercise continued to be based on the timing concept of Option 4 and the Alert Force was to

21. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 817AD, DOO1 22476, 8 July 1958, Exhibit 26.

22. Msg, Comdr 8AF to 47AD, DOO1B 23277, 16 July 1958, Exhibit 27.

23. Msg, Comdr 47AD to Comdr 8AF, Info to Comdr 817AD, 81628, 19 July 1958, Exhibit 28.

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be exercised to "Coca."²⁴ ~~(S)~~

Task Forces and support personnel were to be exercised, in words of the Eighth Air Force order, "to the maximum extent possible." At A-Hour, all participating units were to commence preparation for support and execution of 44/50 Orders. Units were to begin launching aircraft in accordance with procedures established in Option 4, as modified in the operations order. The Command pointed out that actual launch rates were not to be accelerated to exceed the preparation rates prescribed in SAC Manual 55-7. The times, indeed, might be adjusted to a slower rate to allow better correlation between units, to insure that flying safety would not be jeopardized and to minimize air traffic problems.²⁵ ~~(S)~~

Detailed routes and flight plans still remained the responsibility of the individual tactical units. Routes listed in the Second and Eighth Air Force orders indicated major turning points only, and might be modified by units, as necessary, to accomplish the mission and to avoid populated areas when WR weapons were to be carried. Strike unit commanders were to be responsible for safe separation of aircraft throughout the mission. The Commander, 817th Air Division, remained responsible for insuring and coordinating adequate separation between 100th and 509th Bomb

24. Operations Order 21-56 (Basic Order), Hq 8AF, 26 July 1958.

25. Annex A to Operations Order 21-56, Hq 8AF, 28 July 1958.

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Wing aircraft.²⁶ ~~_____~~

The Issuance of the Second and Eighth Air Force BIG JUMP operations orders might, ordinarily, have marked two decisive steps taken in implementing a successful large scale USCM. If the volume of intercommand correspondence or the scope of seemingly extraneous actions paralleling the development of unit level orders was indicative, such was not precisely true. The problem at Pease AFB appeared to stem from two primary sources. The first factor was really two. As has been shown, the Division had been assigned the responsibility for arbitrating route conflicts between the 100th and 509th Bomb Wings. Certainly, much of the period during which the 509th Bomb Wing was transferring from Walker to Pease AFB might have been used to good advantage in planning and coordinating their BIG JUMP activities at the Pease Task Force level. The real need for altitude and/or distance safety criteria in planning for the 100th and 509th Bomb Wing portions of the USCM engendered widespread reconsideration and revision of existing orders or those under preparation.²⁷ ~~_____~~

A second factor appeared to involve EMO simulation, as depicted in the SAC USCM Manual 50-5, dated March 1958, and conflicting concepts reflected in the manual which superceded it, effective 1 September 1958. Further

26. Ibid.

27. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 817AD, DOOIB 31559, 17 Sept 1958, Exhibit 31; msg, Comdr 817AD to Comdr 8AF, DO 82556, 18 Sept 1958, Exhibit 32; Msg, Comdr 817AD to Comdr 8AF, 100DOTB 82566, 19 Sept 1958, Exhibit 33; msg, Comdr 2AF to Comdr 817AD, DODT 11696, 12 Aug 1958; msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 2AF, DOOIB 26128, 18 Aug 1958.

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compounding this untoward situation was a late hour decision by SAC to revise even the September manual.²⁸ Quite understandably, unit commanders possessed an educated regard for the rule book used to gauge their EMO prowess. In light of an impending USCM vulnerability, the changing of ground rules and/or confusion surrounding what the ground rules actually were tended to have an adverse effect upon planning efficacy. In one way or another, the problems seemed to revolve--at one time or other--about three areas of responsibility: exercise of the alert force, sorties required, weapons. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 18 September, the Division requested Headquarters for "assistance and guidance in resolving" some of these problems, as follows:²⁹ (UNCL)

Reference the requirement to exercise the Alert Force to "Coca." When this is done, Par 18B of SACH 50-3 requires this force to continue in the alert posture. This means approximately 34,000 pounds of JP-4 fuel to be re-serviced for bombers plus topping off of water alcohol. To meet this, we must divert POL personnel and equipment thus our EMO on 4th Plan capability for at least 2 to 3 hours. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Since, under realistic conditions, the Alert Force would not be a burden, generation wise, the Division suggested three alternatives for command consideration. These were as follows:³⁰ (UNCL)

1. That the Alert Force not be placed on a fully

28. Msg, CINCASAC to 8AF, DOOPW 5744, 2 Oct 1958; msg, Comdr 8AF to UNIFORM, DOOL 31573, 3 Oct 1958, Exhibit 38; msg, CINCASAC to Comdr 817AD, DOOPO 3091, 16 Sept 1958; msg, CINCASAC to 8AF, et al, DOTBMP B-2-11-32247, 13 Oct 1958.
 29. Msg, 817AD to Comdr 8AF, DO 8-3556, 18 Sept 1958, exhibit 32.
 30. Ibid.

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capable stature for at least 12 hours after
"A" Hour. ~~was~~

2. That the Alert Force be relieved of its responsibilities under the provisions of Par 10C, SACM 50-5. ~~was~~
3. That the force only be executed to ALPHA. ~~was~~

The latter procedure was especially recommended since it would test crew timing, would not require re-generation of the aircraft, and would keep the force intact and prepared for any emergency which might arise. ³¹ ~~was~~

It was also recommended by the Division that action be taken to cause an amendment to the Second and Eighth Air Force operations orders to select Options 5 or 6 in lieu of Option 4, as presently planned. The Division pointed out that existing operations orders directed the immediate launch of four expanded sorties, while under the Division's present alert stature only two of the required four sorties could be launched. Under the recommended plan suggested by the Division, four aircraft could be made available for immediate BIG JUMP launch and still keep the Alert Force in being. ³² ~~was~~

The Division also pointed out, at this time, that plans were being concentrated on an all out generation of B-47 aircraft during BIG JUMP; that the Division could not foresee the generation of the tanker force during this USOM. Eighth Air Force was queried, however,
³¹. Ibid.
³². Ibid.

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for any advice they might have to offer on this matter.³³ ~~_____~~

In its reply to the Division, on 23 September, Eighth Air Force gave no indication that such consideration had been given the Division's proposals concerning Alert Force execution. The Command appeared to affirm, rather, that the Division must be prepared to exercise "its Alert Force in a 'Coca' alert."³⁴ ~~_____~~

In retrospect, the significance of this meeting of the minds was that the Division's message possibly contained the only reference made, thus far, to "Coca", in terms of BIG JUMP. If this was so, then Eighth Air Force had made the second reference. As it happened, the Eighth Air Force message was soon corrected -- on 1 October -- to delete the word "Coca" for "Bravo".³⁵ ~~_____~~

The question concerning expanded alert sorties, on the other hand, was being taken care of by amendment one to the Eighth Air Force operations order. The changed order now reflected launch of two rather than the four expanded alert sorties from each wing, as formerly scheduled. Also brought out by Eighth Air Force was that Pease tanker forces would have no requirements during BIG JUMP and would not participate in any phase of the exercise.³⁶ On 1 October, about ten days later, the Division

³³. Ibid.

³⁴. Msg, Comdr 8AF to CINCSAC and Comdr 817AD, DO 32846, 23 Sept 1958.

³⁵. Msg, Comdr 8AF to CINCSAC and Comdr 817AD, DO 33794, 1 Oct 1958, Exhibit 37.

³⁶. Msg, Comdr 8AF to CINCSAC and Comdr 817AD, DO 32846, 23 Sept 1958.

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received another message bearing on the tanker forces. "Tanker Forces from your station," the Eighth Air Force message read, "will be required to prepare and generate in accordance with SACM 55-7, if Inspector General Team is present on your station during operation BIG JUMP."³⁷ (

Most of the so-called problems encountered prior to execution of BIG JUMP were not particularly indicative of a weakness in EMO capability. They were, in some instances, not even problems at all. The special weapons segment of BIG JUMP provided a case in point. The original mission concept for bombers as outlined by Second Air Force envisioned the carrying of special weapons, pending the satisfaction of one condition. The one condition was the lifting of aircraft structural restrictions by the time of mission execution. It was estimated that that aircraft wing and repair of participating units would be completed by 30 September. Planning, therefore, encompassed the concept of SAC Manual 50-5.³⁸ (

On 16 September SAC announced that special weapons would not be carried during the forthcoming large scale exercises BIG JUMP, GRAND SLAM, and FULL FORCE.³⁹ Weapon instructions for these exercises was subsequently received from Headquarters SAC on 2 October and sent out to Eighth Air Force units the next day. In the message sent out by

37. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 817AD, DO 33794, 1 Oct 1958, Exhibit 37.
 38. Msg, Comdr 2AF to Comdr 817AD, et al, DODT 10654, 29 May 1958, Exhibit 24.
 39. Msg, Comdr 8AF to UNIFORM, D001B 33672, 30 Sept 1958.

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Eighth Air Force, Headquarters SAC was quoted, as follows:⁴⁰ ~~_____~~

Weapons will not be flown, loaded aboard aircraft or removed from storage. Even though weapons will not be actually used, it is desirable to exercise ADS personnel to the Maximum. In addition, in order not to compromise timing of the unit's EWG plans for preparation of aircraft, weapons loadings will be simulated ~~_____~~

The simulation of certain weapons procedures involved, primarily, most of the preparation steps, short of the actual breaking out of storage, transporting, and loading the weapon aboard the aircraft. Aircraft were to be moved to the desired loading site and remain there during the period allocated for loading under the unit plan. Bomb bays were to be properly configured and all applicable checks accomplished to include: release system functional checks, flight circuit tests and loading preparation check. The loading crew was to remain at the aircraft during the programmed weapons loading period and commanders were to insure that no maintenance or other aircraft preparation would be accomplished that could not normally be done during an actual weapon loading. All required loading equipment was to be available at the loading site.⁴¹ This information was eventually incorporated into an interim change to SAC Manual 50-5, dated September 1958.⁴² ~~_____~~

There was but one remaining factor which necessitated

40. Msg, Comdr GAF to UNIFORM, D001 31573, 3 Oct 1958, Exhibit 38.

41. Ibid.

42. Msg, CINCSAC to 817AD, et al, DOTEMP B-2-11-32247, 13 Oct 1958.

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additional clarification as the unit vulnerability period approached. Briefly stated, this factor appeared to stem from a rather inflexible choice of words. In the Second Air Force Operations Order 21-58, these words appeared, as follows: "Each Bomb Wing will launch a minimum of thirty (30) bombers."⁴³ ~~_____~~

Taken at face value, this statement was somewhat misleading. This could be explained, as follows. Disposition of the Alert Force of a bomb wing during the USCM, as stated in the BIG JUMP operations order, was to be in accordance with SAC Manual 50-5. Alert aircraft participation in such exercises was prescribed in the manual, as follows:⁴⁴ ~~_____~~

a. Alert aircraft will be considered as available aircraft during the preparation phase of the USCM. These aircraft will perform an engine start (Bravo Alert). Alert aircraft meeting this criteria will be considered as launched aircraft. (U)

b. Alert aircraft will not be counted for or against USCM Launch requirements in the execution phase, and further, they will be treated as not available to launch. These aircraft will not participate in any other phase of the USCM, but, upon completion of the engine start portion of the exercise, they will resume their alert posture. Remaining aircraft of the unit will be prepared and launched and will participate in the USCM as scheduled and in accordance with prescribed requirements). (U)

As may be seen from this discussion, the number of aircraft actually available for launch during the USCM
⁴³. Annex A, Operations Order 21-58, HQ USAF, 21 July 1958.
⁴⁴. SAC Manual 50-5, HQ SAC, September 1958.

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aircraft available for launch purposes would be, in part, dependent upon the number of aircraft comprising or the size of the Alert Force at the time of mission execution. This point was clarified by a Second Air Force message sent to participating units on 5 September. The message explained that to arrive at the number of sorties which would be assigned to wings during the USCM, units must first determine what Alert Posture would exist during October. The total number of sorties committed to the October Alert Force, then, must be deleted from BIG JUMP. Headquarters, Second Air Force reiterated that BIG JUMP had been planned "to resemble the EMO very closely," and that Alert Sorties could be identified and deleted. "Sufficient sorties were originally scheduled," Headquarters said, "to provide for this contingency."⁴⁵

Another factor bearing upon the USCM launch requirement would be aircraft availability during October. Manual 50-5 established the following criteria for determining aircraft "available" in terms of a USCM:⁴⁶ (UNCL)

Available aircraft include all assigned aircraft which are physically on the station except those aircraft awaiting major maintenance, salvage disposition, or major technical order compliance (TOC). However, these aircraft are considered available if the major maintenance or the TOC could be completed in time to prepare the aircraft for its EMO mission before the last applicable generation rate cutoff time. (U)

In addition, the manual listed several conditions

45. Msg, Comdr 2AF to CINCSAC, et al, DOST 12303, 5 Sept 1958, Exhibit 30.
46. SAC Manual 50-5, Hq SAC, September 1958.

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whereby assigned and serviceable aircraft would not be considered available, in terms of a USCM. The exercise was not to interfere with IRAN commitments, for instance, or aircraft and crews on TDY.⁴⁷ (UNCL)

Headquarters Second Air Force appreciated that, under these circumstances, some wings might not have 30 aircraft to launch during October. Since SAC Manual 50-5 also provided for this contingency, Second Air Force did not deem it necessary to change the number of aircraft required by the operations order.⁴⁸ Those portions of the Manual referred to, were as follows:⁴⁹ ~~(UNCL)~~

When the requirements of the operations order exceed the number of available combat-ready crews or the number of available aircraft, the unit will only be required to fly the number of sorties equal to the number of available combat-ready crews or the number of available aircraft, whichever is the lower number. (U)

Following transmittal of Second Air Force's clarification, SAC increased the standing Alert Force. Additional guidance for computing the number of aircraft required for launch during SAC's forthcoming large scale exercises was received from SAC on 19 September. So much in the operations orders that read: "A minimum of 30 bombers will be selected from each participating unit," was changed to read, "Each unit will launch a minimum force of 30 bombers, or the available bomber force minus five, whichever is less."⁵⁰ ~~(UNCL)~~

47. SAC Manual 50-7, Hq SAC, Sept 1958.

48. Msg, Comdr 2AF to CINCSAC, et al, DODT 12303, 5 Sept 1958, Exhibit 30.

49. SAC Manual 50-5, Hq SAC, Sept 1958.

50. Msg, CINCSAC to Comdr 2AF, DoPO 3262, 19 Sept 1958.

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In forwarding this information, Eighth Air Force suggested its subordinate units consider 30 available aircraft as a planning factor in preparing their operations order. To quote an actual figure, so far ahead of an exercise, appeared unfeasible to Eighth Air Force. Units were asked, therefore, to determine -- seven days before the period of vulnerability -- the number of aircraft which could be reasonably expected to be available during this period. Should it be found necessary to drop sorties, units were to notify Eighth Air Force by priority message, with information copies to Headquarters, SAC, and Second Air Force.⁵¹

The 509th and 100th Bomb Wings at Pease AFB complied with this request on 30 September and 1 October 1958, respectively. The 509th Bomb Wing estimated it would have 31 B-47 aircraft available during the period of vulnerability, including a minimum of 26 aircraft to be launched. The wing, therefore, requested six sorties be dropped.⁵² The 100th Bomb Wing, on the other hand, intended to launch 30 sorties, as scheduled. No sorties were dropped by the 100th Bomb Wing.⁵³

By 1 October, considerable progress had been made in achieving a state of readiness for the exercise. While this discussion has dwelled upon the planning for BIG

51. Msg, Comdr 8AF to Comdr 817AD, et al, DODIS 33292, 26 Sept 1958, Exhibit 34.

52. Msg, Comdr 817AD to Comdr 8AF, 509DO 83677, 30 Sept 1958, Exhibit 35.

53. Msg, Comdr 817AD to Comdr 8AF, 100DOT 82688, 1 Oct 1958, Exhibit 36.

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JUMP, it omits the 817th Air Base Group. This has not been an oversight. Wherein preparation for the tactical phase of BIG JUMP was not accelerated until the months immediately preceding the vulnerability date, the group's preparation had been something akin to a continuing drill. The group responsibility has been discussed in Chapter 1, of this history. It has, indeed, been accorded the greater share of attention in all of the 817th Air Division Histories, since May 1958. The reason for this attention was derived from the May 1958 SAC IG inspection of the base. By October 1958, the Air Base Group was ready for the test. (UNCL)

Chapter 3
The Great LEAP

To every member of the 817 Combat Support Group: Words fail me when I try to express my sincere appreciation for a superb job by each of you. Thanks a million. Richards.

-- The Base Commander, 23 October 1958¹

Just four days after Colonel Silas R. Richards addressed these remarks to the Air Base Group, Hydrant Fueling Pumphouse #7 was accepted by the Air Force.² It would become operational just as soon as fuel samples were tested and approved.³ (UNCL)

Just two days later, Brigadier General Walter E. Arnold, the 817th Air Division Commander, received a message from Major General Walter C. Sweeney, Commander of the Eighth Air Force. In part the message read as follows:⁴ (UNCL)

I want to convey to you and all personnel of your command who participated my sincere appreciation for your outstanding performance of duty. (U)

Just five days later, the Pease Air Force Base Noise Abatement Committee met with members of the Sherburne Civic Association.⁵ (UNCL)

1. Ltr, Comdr 509BW to Comdr 817ABGP, C, "Letter of Appreciation," 23 Oct 1958, Exhibit 54.
2. "Military Construction Program Status Report (RCS: 8AF-25)," Hq 817ABGP, 1 Nov 1958, Exhibit 63.
3. Annex G to Rpt, "Annual Inspection, 817th Air Division, Pease AFB, 22 Oct-7 Nov 1958," Hq 8AF, 24 Nov 1958.
4. Msg, Gen Sweeney to Gen Arnold, C 60211, 25 Oct 1958, Exhibit 53.
5. Ltr, Comdr 817AD to staff and wing agencies, DO, "Noise Abatement," 29 Oct 1958, Exhibit 19.

There were approximately 125 civilian members present from the Sherburne residence area. The meeting lasted over two hours wherein the Noise Abatement Committee answered or attempted to explain the reasons for the noise, both air and ground type, to these civilians. (U)

The month of October 1958 had been a gratifying, hectic, and somewhat prophetic period in the history of SAC's Pease Air Force Base. Most of all, it had been an extremely "vulnerable" month in the careers of people assigned there.⁶ . . . and it began quietly. (UNCL)

An aura of unusual tranquility seemed to pervade Pease AFB during the first weeks of October. No where, perhaps, did this appear more evident than at the meetings of the air base group staff. Such continuing items as troop management, retention, on-the-job training, and absent without leave cases received their normal share of attention. Certain subjects, such as NCO Academy Graduate utilization⁷ and selective retention of non-commissioned officers⁸ received special emphasis. For the most part, however, a deceptive quiet -- of inner thought, perhaps -- permeated these gatherings.⁹ (UNCL)

Most of the steps required to insure successful completion of the task confronting these men had been taken earlier, or so it must be assumed at this hour. Only sporadically, now, was a "last minute" weakness

6. "Daily Strength Summary - 3, 13, 23 Oct 1958," HQ 817ADGP, n.d., Exhibit 5.
7. Ltr, Col Richards to staff and squadron comdrs, BC, "Utilization of NCO Academy Graduates," 8 Oct 1958, Exhibit 13.
8. Ltr, Comdr 817AD to staff, BP, "Selective Retention of Noncommissioned Officers," 22 Oct 1958, Exhibit 14; Ltr, Col Richards to staff, BC, "Selective Retention of Non-commissioned Officers," 5 Nov 1958, Exhibit 15.
9. See Staff Meeting Notes, Exhibits 16 and 17.

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discovered which required any great effort to correct.¹⁰
So it was on the morning of 22 October 1958 . . . (UNCL)

Headquarters, SAC, transmitted the alert message at 10⁴²21. Upon receipt of the alert message, the 100th Bomb Wing Command Post initiated a Pyramid Alerting System for notification of personnel. The alert message initiated the exercise under Readiness Condition IV and established A-hour as 1100Z, 22 October 1958.¹¹ ~~(UNCL)~~

The Pease Task Force command post in the Division-Group Headquarters Building was activated with sufficient personnel at 12⁴⁵52, one hour and five minutes subsequent to the sounding of the alert. Boards were posted and communications established as soon as control positions were manned. The task force control teams were briefed at 1315Z by the division operations officer. The 100th and 509th Bomb Wing commander's staff meetings were held at A plus 0015 and 0030, respectively. The 100th Bomb Wing commander's staff meeting had been scheduled for A plus 0030 but was moved ahead to A plus 0015 due to a conflict with the division commander's meeting. As a result, all key staff personnel were not in attendance and it was necessary to conduct an additional meeting at A plus 0100 to insure complete understanding of the situation and the requirements of the exercise.¹² ~~(UNCL)~~

10. General SOP #1, HQ 817ABWP, "Initial BWP Duty Positions," 1 October 1958, Exhibit 44.

11. Ltr, Col G. Budway, 8AF IG to Comdr 8AF, thru Comdr 817AD, IG, "Annual Inspection of 817th Air Division, Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire," 24 Nov 1958, Exhibit 49.

12. Ibid.

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at 1741Z, participating units received the execution message which established E-hour as 1800Z. The execution message initiated a "Bravo" test of the normal alert force and launched the "expanded" portion of this force. The 100th Bomb Wing command post received and decoded the execution message within 32 seconds after it was sent. As the senior command post, the 100th Bomb Wing then alerted crews comprising the entire Pease alert force, who immediately responded to the Klaxon alarm signals. Both 100th and 509th Bomb Wing B-47 alert crews were in position at their aircraft within three minutes of the alert signal and ready to taxi within six minutes. The two 509th Bomb Wing "expanded alert" aircraft and crews, comprising the increase to the Option IV alert force, were launched under positive control at briefed take-off times. The two aircraft and crews of the 100th Bomb Wing "expanded alert" force performed similarly. ¹³ ~~_____~~

The secondary execution message for the follow-on force of the BIG JUMP exercise was transmitted at 1827Z. Of the 42 100th Bomb Wing B-47 aircraft required to be generated, 42 were generated. Forty-one of these aircraft were generated in accordance with SAC Manual 55-7 generation rates. Of the 29 aircraft required, 28 aircraft were launched on time. One aircraft which ground aborted due to failure of one engine to start, was rescheduled 15. Ibid.

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only to abort again. Malfunction of the pitot system caused the second ground abort. Scoring in this area reflected 30 aircraft scheduled and 28 launched, as scheduled.¹⁴

Of the 39 509th Bomb Wing B-47 aircraft required to be generated, 39 were generated in accordance with the established generation rates. Of the 26 aircraft required to be launched, 26 were launched.¹⁵

The performance of the 817th Air Division during the test exercise and the successful EWO generation of all division tactical aircraft in accordance with SAC Manual 55-7, best reflected the capability of this unit to satisfactorily perform a full-scale EWO.¹⁶

The performance of the 817th Air Base Group by direct control from the division command post was generally acceded to be excellent.¹⁷ (UNCL)

Through a great deal of diligent training and professional guidance, the air base group has achieved an excellent state of proficiency. This is especially noticeable during EWO activities. (U)

This sentiment was reflected in letters of appreciation from both wings. Colonel C. F. Macomber, Commander of the 509th Bomb Wing was particularly pleased at the

14: Ibid; also see "Simulated Combat Mission Recapitulation-Preparation (RCS: SAC-T37)," BIG JUMP, Hqs 100 and 509BWs, n.d., Exhibit 3; "Simulated Combat Mission Recapitulation-Execution (RCS: SAC-T37)," Hq 100BW, n.d. (BIG JUMP); Exhibit 50; "Simulated Combat Mission Recapitulation-Execution (RCS: SAC-T37)," Hq 509BW, n.d. (BIG JUMP), Exhibit 51.

15. 8AF IG Inspection Report, Exhibit 49.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.

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attitude of air base group personnel.¹⁸ (UNCL)

I was particularly pleased at the attitude of your people which showed that they were anxious to meet us more than half-way in any problem which developed. A good example of this occurred in the refueling of B-47 Serial Number 52321 when, through a mix-up, this aircraft was not positioned on a pit. I requested your POL Supervisor, Major Barnes, for an F6 Unit in order to maintain the generation rate. This unit was cheerfully and promptly provided, and no delays were incurred in the generation of this aircraft. Likewise, your Flyaway Kit and other Supply personnel gave us better service than could be expected. Your Photo Lab developed the bomb scoring film well ahead of schedule for our BFL reports. The ammunition was carefully prepared. As far as I know at this time, only one aircraft did not have 100% firecut. (U)

Colonel Winton R. Close, Commander of the 100th Bomb Wing was also appreciative of the support rendered during the exercise by the air base group.¹⁹ (UNCL)

The success of the mission was in large measure due to the first-class operation on the part of the Air Base Group. The delivery, and where applicable, the installation of expendables in the aircraft was conducted in a well organized and productive manner. This indicated the existence of a sound plan and the necessary know-how to execute the plan. In addition, your people displayed a fine spirit of cooperation. (U)

Possibly one of the more gratifying observations, from the standpoint of the air base group, was the one proffered by the Inspector General Team with respect to improvements shown within the POL activity.²⁰ (UNCL)

18. Ltr, Col C.F. Macomber to Comdr 817ABGp, 5096, "Letter of appreciation," 23 Oct 1958, Exhibit 52; msg, Comdr 5096W to Comdr 8AF, ZIPPO 10-204/B-27/5096W/BIG JUMP, 29 Oct 1958, Exhibit 58.
19. Ltr, Col W.R. Close to Comdr 817ABGp, 1000, "Letter of Appreciation," 27 Oct 1958, Exhibit 55; msg, Comdr 1000W to CINGSAC, ZIPPO 10-331. B-27/51-28/SAC/1000W/BIG JUMP, 29 Oct 1958, Exhibit 57.
20. 8AF IG Inspection Report, Exhibit 49.

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The limitations previously noted in the petroleum activities have been overcome. The scope and detail of the current POL plan is the best in Eighth Air Force. Through indoctrination of personnel in the complexities of the equipment hydrant operations and the establishment of a POL Control Room, one of the smoothest working POL organizations seen to date has been created. (U)

BIG JUMP was a success. There were few, if any Pease Air Force Base personnel who regretted having made the great leap.