

MICROFILMROLL P0810 IRIS Number 00467279

822 AIR DIVISION
SEPT 1960

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SEPT 1960

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MEMORANDUM

OF THE

8221 AIR DIVISION

1 - 30 September 1960
(Unclassified Title)

(Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia)

This history is [REDACTED] because it reveals the use of [REDACTED] as defined by the [REDACTED]

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91-6906-6
3067-16

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[REDACTED]

INTRODUCTION

Located at Turner Air Force Base (AFB) Georgia, the 32nd Air Division supervises, correlates, coordinates, and provides staff support for the training activities of the 4135th, 4137th, 4139th and 4241st Strategic Wings. The Air Division determines the state of combat readiness of each assigned wing through frequent staff visits and analysis of recurring reports, supervising rather than directing their training activities. [REDACTED]

The 4135th Wing, located at Eglin AFB, Florida, has the following mission:

- a. Be prepared to perform those tasks assigned in current emergency plans and related operations orders. [REDACTED]
 - b. Organize and train a force capable of immediate and sustained long-range offensive bombardment operations on a global scale, using the latest technical knowledge, advanced weapons, and procedures. [REDACTED]
 - c. Support USAF System Operational Test and Evaluation (SOTE) of selected guided air missiles (GAM), as directed. [REDACTED]
 - d. Conduct check-out training on GAMs for selected SAC combat crews as directed. [REDACTED]
 - e. Train and administer assigned reserve personnel and units. [REDACTED]
 - f. Participate in disaster relief and other domestic emergencies when required. [REDACTED]
 - g. Perform such special missions and assignments as may be
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER 1

PERSONNEL

4135th Wing Strength:

Officer strength dropped by one to a figure of 260 on 30 September in the 4135th Wing, while airman strength rose by four to a figure of 1195.² Of 18 officers eligible for regular commissions, only 10 applications were received or 55 percent.³ [REDACTED]

Both direct support, and indirect support manning in the 4135th Wing were low during the May-August period of 1960. Primarily, this was due to people having lower skill levels than called for and also due to reassignment and discharge actions. On the job training (OJT) was to take care of upgrade actions, while complete lack of airmen, in certain cases, was brought to the attention of SAC, who explained they were aware of the problem.⁴ [REDACTED]

4137th Wing Strength:

An increase of nine officers brought the 4137th Wing officer strength to 243 by September's end, and an increase of 52 airmen raised the airman strength to 1,076 by 30 September 1960.⁵

2. Msg, 4135 to SAE, "Military Strength Summary, RCM: AF-172 as of 30 Sep 60," 4 Oct 1960. Exhibit 1.

3. Msg, SAE to WICKET, ZULU, "Regular Officer Augmentation," 12 Sep 1960. Exhibit 2.

4. Analysis of MCS Data for May-Aug 1960, 4135th CW, 20 Sep 1960, in files, HQ 822AD.

5. Msg, 4137 to SAE, "Military Strength Summary (RCM: AF-172) as of 30 Sep 60," 4 Oct 1960. Exhibit 3; and 4137th Programming Plan and Progress Report as of 30 Sep 60," 11 Oct 1960, in files, HQ 822AD.

[REDACTED]

5

[REDACTED]

directed by higher headquarters. [REDACTED]

The mission of the 4137th, 4138th and 4241st wings was the same as outlined in a, b, f, and g, above, and to organize and train a force capable of immediate and sustained long-range offensive bombardment and air-to-air refueling operations on a global scale, using the latest technical knowledge, advanced weapons, and procedures.¹ [REDACTED]

UNITS ASSIGNED - 30 SEPTEMBER 1960

<u>Strat No</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Subordinate Units</u>
4135th	Eglin AFB, Fla.	15 F-52Gs	301st Bomb Sq
4137th	Robins AFB, Ga.	4 F-52Gs*	342d Bomb Sq
4138th	Dunnell AFB, Ga.	17 F-52Gs 10 KC-135As	336th Bomb Sq 919th ARPS
4241st	Seymour- Johnson AFB, N.C.	15 F-52Gs 10 KC-135As	73d Bomb Sq 911th ARPS** [REDACTED]

1. BAF Regulation 23-10, Hq BAF, 10 Aug 1960; BAF Regulation 23-11, Hq BAF, 10 Aug 1960; and SAC Regulation 20-15, Hq SAC, 31 Aug 1960.

* Tp with Major Gerard R. Finnegan, 822AD Ops Staff Officer, by Historian Dowd, 31 Oct 1960.

** Ltr, BAF to QUEBEC, et al, "General Officer Review [REDACTED] 22 Sep 1960.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Regular officer augmentation eligible numbers 174, of which 70 have been applied for for regular commission by 30 September 1960.⁶ Included for the 4130th Wing strength report are 12,000 and 12,000 respectively, on 30 September 1960.⁷ [REDACTED]

4130th Wing Strength:

Rising to a strength of 420 officers, the figures for the 4130th Wing showed an increase of four; meanwhile, aircraft figures increased by 17 to a strength of 2,926 by September's end.⁸ At Turner AFB there were 43 officers eligible for regular commission; however, only three had applied by 30 September 1960.⁹ [REDACTED]

4130th Wing Strength:

Showing a drop of two, aircraft strength in the 4130th Wing was 288 on 30 September 1960 while a drop of 41 aircraft brought the figure to a strength of 1,844 aircraft at September's end.¹⁰ Of 27 eligible, 24 had applied for regular commission by 30 September 1960.¹¹ [REDACTED]

6. Msg, SAG to WPC/WHY, TULH, "Regular Officer Augmentation," 12 Sep 1960. Exhibit 2.
7. 4137th Wing Programming Plan and Progress Report, as of 30 September 1960, 11 Oct 1960, in files, 2, HQ 822AD.
8. Strength Report as of 30 September 1960 for 4130th Wing, 4130th Combat Support Group's Tenant Units, n.d. Exhibit 4.
9. Msg, SAG to WPC/WHY, TULH, "Regular Officer Augmentation," 12 Sep 1960. Exhibit 2.
10. Msg, SAG to SAG, "AF-472, Military Strength Summary, as of 30 Sep 60," 3 Oct 1960. Exhibit 5.
11. Msg, SAG to WPC/WHY, TULH, "Regular Officer Augmentation," 12 Sep 1960. Exhibit 2.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Retention:

The regular officer application period came to an end on 30 September 1960. Earlier in the month, Eighth Air Force commanders to insure that this program be given proper attention because of the new number of applications received. Of 40 eligible at Turner, only three had applied; of 18 eligible at Eglin, 10 had applied; of 48 eligible at Seymour-Johnson, only seven had applied; and of 22 eligible at Robins, 24 had applied.¹² [REDACTED]

Officer retention in SAC was rated four times greater than the rest of the Air Force. However, Lieutenant General Walter C. Sweeney Jr, Eighth Air Force Commander, felt that some bases had not kept pace; Turner retained only five from a total of 21 eligible.¹³ [REDACTED]

Selective Reenlistment Program:

In order to produce the desired results in the 50/48 (Selective Reenlistment) program, SAC needed to reenlist a total of 5,771 first term airmen. During the first cycle, final results of which were available in August 1960, SAC retained only 28 percent of a figure of 2,193 first term airmen. General Thomas G. Power, SAC's Commander-in-Chief, believed that effective leadership and command emphasis were the answer; so he informed Eighth Air Force of this, and that first term airmen retention was again placed

12. Maj, GAF to WHISKEY, ZULU, "Regular Officer Augmentation," 12 Sep 1960. Exhibit 2.

13. Ltr, Sweeney to Davis, "Officer Retention Program," 31 Aug 1960. Exhibit 6.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

in the management control system.¹⁴ [REDACTED]

General Swenev agreed with General Power and expected "all personnel to give their full support to this program and that every effort will be made to motivate quality airmen to make the Air Force a career."¹⁵ On two occasions, Colonel (b) (6)

Eighth Air Force Director of Personnel, spoke to groups to whom he put the question, "How many of you feel they know enough about the current 56-45 Airman Retention Program to discuss it with a young 'first-term airman'?" Four hands were raised in the first group (these men were personnel specialists) and none in the second group. He believed that supervisors were not properly indoctrinated and this directly reflected in the poor showing on airman retention to that time.¹⁶ [REDACTED]

Brigadier General Austin J. Russell, 822d Air Division Commander, explained the problem to his four "wing Commanders", saying, "If we want to retain the experience we possess, we must first: thoroughly indoctrinate all supervisors, and second, continuously place the facts before our eligible airmen."¹⁷ [REDACTED]

14. Ltr, BAF to 4138, "Motivation of First Term Airmen to Re-enlist," 6 Sep 1960. Exhibit 7.

15. Ibid.

16. Ltr, 822 to 4138, et al., "Airman Retention," 4 Oct 1960. Exhibit 8.

17. Ibid.

[REDACTED]



CHAPTER II

OPERATIONAL TRAINING

EWC Capability:

Since a wing crack condition existed in the B-52D aircraft, the two wings in the 822nd Air Division having this type aircraft were affected. The 4138th Wing was to have an average of 12.4 aircraft available per day from 1 October through 30 December 1960, while the 4241st Wing was to have 12.5 available per day from 1 October through 30 November 1960, because of that problem. ¹⁸ (C)

In effect, this condition limited the EWC capability of the two wings. On the other hand, the 4138th Wing used the B-52D aircraft which was not affected by wing cracks. Consequently, the 4138th Wing was to remain fully capable of performing its EWC during the period. ¹⁹ (C)

The 4137th Wing was still in development stages and had no EWC commitment during September 1960. ²⁰ (U)

Golden Hour Tango Standings:

During the May-August 1960 period, Golden Hour Tango Standings for the 822nd Air Division wings were: 4241st Wing, second with a

18. Ltr, DM to C, Hq 822AD, "EWC Capability, 4138th SW, Eglin AFB, Florida (reference Paragraph 2, 822nd Air Division Report of Staff Visit, dated 5 October 1960)," 5 Oct 1960. Exhibit 9; and Ltr, DM to C, Hq 822AD, "EWC Capability, 4241st SW, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina (reference Paragraph 2, 822nd Air Division Report of Staff Visit, dated 22 September 1960)," 4 Oct 1960. Exhibit 10.

19. "Staff Visit to 4138th Strategic Wing," 7-13 Sep 60, by 822DC, 15 Sep 1960. Exhibit 11; and "Staff Visit to 4138th Strategic Wing (U)," by 822DC, 13 Sep 1960. Exhibit 36.

20. "Staff Visit to 4137th Strategic Wing, 26-28 Sep 60," by 822DC, 4 Oct 1960. Exhibit 12.





score of 91.7 percent; 4135th Wing, 100% with a score of 92.4; and 4135th Wing, 14th AFB, a score of 93 percent. Turner's support group of 14th AFB, 14th AFB, with a score of 91.0, while none of the other Air Division units in that category placed.²¹

SKY SHIELD:

The 4135th Wing estimate of mission success in Sky Shield was completely successful. One aircraft was lost in fighter attack due to the low level portion of the mission beginning too late, and fighters were vectored to the bombers using the guard channel and recovery channel which were not jammed. The Wing considered this to be unrealistic.²²

SAC received congratulations from Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff, USAF, for its outstanding participation during exercise Sky Shield. SAC's Commander, General Thomas S. Fower was impressed by the superior manner in which the mission was planned and executed; he passed congratulations to his subordinate commanders.²³

GAM Programs

Some changes in the GAM program took place since June 1960. Now (September) 13 units, instead of 12, were to equip with the GAM-77; equipment was to be on a basis of 12 GAM-77 missiles (instead of

21. Msg, BAF to COMC, at al, "Golden Hour Tango," 3 Sep 1960. Exhibit 13.
 22. Msg, 4135th Wing to BAF, "M-27/BAF OPRD 11-61/4135/SKY SHIELD," 13 Sep 1960. Exhibit 14.
 23. Msg, Personal to all Commanders from Commander Sweeney, "Sky Shield," 22 Sep 1960. Exhibit 15.



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the former 16.)²⁴ [REDACTED]

Delays in the GTE program caused the air launch schedule to lag.²⁵ [REDACTED]

Although the GAM-77 missile was not combat ready, Plans Division, SAC, felt that the 4241st Wing should (b) (1) (A) [REDACTED] This was to acquire information for SAC, as planners, because additional information was needed concerning the GAM-77 on airborne alert.²⁶ [REDACTED]

EO 13526 3.3b1

GAM-72/77 Manning:

Officer requirements were filled for the 4135th, 4137th and 4241st Wings.²⁷ Airman requirements for 4241st Wing's GAMs-77 had been completed in June, but six additional men had to be trained because they had been authorized additionally.²⁸ [REDACTED]

GAM training on the GAM-72 was delayed because no training GAM has been received, nor has the buildup rack been installed. This caused a lack of practical training which could require additional training at a later date if SAC could not resolve the problem prior to mid-September 1960.²⁹ [REDACTED]

24. Progress Report 15 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 10-59, "GAM-77," and Progress Report 14 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 11-59, "GAM-72," 3 Sep 1960. Exhibit 16.

25. Ibid.

26. Memorandum for the Record, by Gen Russell, "Carrying of GAM-77s During 'Downfield,'" 8 Oct 1960. Exhibit 17.

27. Progress Report 15 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 10-59, "GAM-77," and Progress Report 14 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 11-59, "GAM-72," 3 Sep 1960. Exhibit 16.

28. History of 822AD for June 1960, p. 6 & 7.

29. Progress Report 15 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 10-59, "GAM-77," and Progress Report 14 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 11-59, "GAM-72," 3 Sep 1960. Exhibit 16.

[REDACTED]

The Eighth Air Force Missile Panel which met in July 1960 to evaluate the progress of the program, (b) (1) (A) time was (b) (1) (A) (S).

EO 13526 3.3b1

(b) (1) (A)

EO 13526 3.3b1

A facility power check at the 4135th Wing was completed on 29 July 1960. A second guidance station, mentioned previously,³¹ has been approved for all GAM organizations; Eglin was to receive theirs in November 1960.³² (U)

For planning purposes, SAC mentioned that Eglin (GAM-77 equipped in April 1960) was to inactivate the GAM-77 program in February 1963 and equip with GAM-87³³ in September of that year.³⁴ (S)

GAM-87:

Known as "Sky Bolt," the GAM-87 was an Air Force air-to-surface ballistic missile. Built by Douglas Aircraft Company, the missile had a range of 1,000 nautical miles at hypersonic speed. It was to be located at SAC and Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Royal Air Force Bases in England. Versatile, this missile was capable of being launched from bombers, tankers, and transports. Nortronics, the guidance system contractor, made the stellar inertial guidance system. Both booster and sustainer portions were

30. History, 822AD for Jul-Aug 1960, p. 8.

31. History, 822AD for Jun 1960, p. 10.

32. Progress Report 15 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 10-59, "GAM-77," and Progress Report 14 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 11-59, "GAM-72," 3 Sep 1960. Exhibit 16.

33. GAM-87 is explained below.

34. Progress Report 15 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 10-59, "GAM-77," and Progress Report 14 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 11-59, "GAM-72," 3 Sep 1960. Exhibit 16.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

produced by Aerojet and used solid propellant. The re-entry vehicle, built by General Electric, was to carry a nuclear warhead.³⁵ [REDACTED]

GAM Trainings:

Believing that top proficiency of instructors would only be realized through a stabilized instructor force, Colonel Robert J. Nolan, 4135th Wing Commander, requested that his GAM instructors be retained for a minimum of two years. [REDACTED]

Although Eighth Air Force agreed with this concept, operational requirements were such that available resources might not permit 100 percent retention.³⁶

Ground training on the GAM-77 was given by mobile training unit (MTU) in 1959. One year old now, this training has not been put to use in the air; consequently, refresher training was indicated, possibly from 4135th Wing resources since sufficient qualified people were on hand. Colonel Nolan requested permission to do that, stating, "This approval would realize an appreciable dollar savings in temporary duty (TDY) funds for these new crews that must be sent elsewhere for MTU training. (C) Eighth Air Force and SAC approved this plan on a one-time basis and also approved a plan for the Wing to conduct initial training for new crews at

35. James Baar, "World Missile/Space Encyclopedia, 1960," Missiles and Rockets, (Jul 18, 1960), p. E7.

36. Replies to Wing and Squadron Commander's Remarks in the Air Training Report for the Month of August 1960 (U)," 8AF to 37AD, et al, 7 Oct 1960, in files C. 822AD.

[REDACTED]

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.³⁷

Effectiveness of Flying Time:

General Russell analyzed the bombing, navigation, air refueling and pilot proficiency accomplishments of the 4138th, 4135th and 4241st Wings for August 1960. Of 321 items scheduled by the 4138th Wing, 287 were accomplished for 90 percent utilization; 34 other items were accomplished or 26 percent of schedule. The 4241st Wing scheduled 221 items and accomplished 194 for 88 percent; an additional three other items were performed for one percent of schedule. Eighty-one percent was achieved by the 4135th Wing with an accomplishment of 203 items from 252 scheduled; 23 other items accomplished produced nine percent of schedule.³⁸

Heads Up Competition:

In the Heads Up competition the 4138th Wing placed 10th, the 4135th Wing placed 11th and the 4241st Wing placed 13th for August 1960. For the May-August period, the standings were: 4138th Wing-eighth, 4135th Wing-tenth, and 4241st Wing-twelfth place.³⁹

Major League:

Having attained an air refueling proficiency of 95 percent or higher during the training period ending 31 August 1960, the 911th

37. Replies to Wing and Squadron Commander's Remarks in the Air Training Report for the Month of August 1960 (U), BAF to BWAD, et al, 7 Oct 1960, in files, C, 822AD.

38. Ltr, (b)(6) to (b)(6) to (b)(6) to (b)(6) "Analysis of T-1s," n.d., Exhibit 18.

39. Msg, BAF to XRAY, YANKEE, "August and May-August 'Heads Up' Final Standings," 23 Sep 1960. Exhibit 19.

[REDACTED]

Air Refueling Squadron was awarded Major League status and was authorized to mark its aircraft as such.⁴⁰ [REDACTED]

Major General Selsel Trophy:

For achieving 100 percent points in all phases of the Team Scrimmage exercise during the May-August period, the 4135th Wing won the Major General Selsel Trophy and the personal congratulations of the Eighth Air Force Commander, General Sweeney, and his Deputy, Major General Hunter Harris.⁴¹ [REDACTED]

4138th Wing OPLAN 44/50-61:

Although the general overall condition of the combat operations and intelligence sections of the 4138th Wing was considered satisfactory, there were minor discrepancies noted. The Wing operations orders 44/61 and 50/61 lacked certain information which could have, in the event of emergency, caused confusion. In the EWO operations branch it was found that crews were placed on alert without having completed the required target study first. In fact, some crews went on alert covering a new sortie without prior study at all.⁴² [REDACTED]

EWO Combat Mission Folders 4241SW:

EWO combat mission folders of the 4241st Wing were examined by the 822d Air Division Staff in mid-September 1960. Overall, the

40. Msg, 8AF to 822AD, "Major League," 21 Sep 1960. Exhibit 20.

41. Msg, 8AF to 4135, "Team Scrimmage Trophy," 9 Sep 1960. Exhibit 21.

42. "Operations Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, 12-16 Sep 1960, by 822AD," 21 Sep 1960. Exhibit 22.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

course was 100 percent operational although a few training aids had not arrived. The emergency war order alert plan was being published, domestic target folders were 90 percent completed in the 4137th Wing.⁴⁶ [REDACTED]

Big Blast Requirements:

During September 1960, Big Blast requirements for aircraft were reduced from three to two for 15 unit-equipped B-52 units. However, units were urged to combine sorties with other units to produce more realistic penetrations of NORAD facilities.⁴⁷ [REDACTED]

Safety:

On a safety inspection of the 4136th Wing it was found that there were discrepancies between the operator's permits and the records on file in the base drivers school. Some people were driving vehicles not authorized by their permits. On the other hand, the Wing was complimented for taking adequate and stringent action involving traffic offenses. The 322d Air Division director of Safety, Major (b)(6) [REDACTED], recommended that the traffic violator clinic be placed under the Deputy Commander for Law Enforcement because of the clinic's punitive nature.⁴⁸ [REDACTED]

Nuclear Safety Survey:

Conducted by a team from the Directorate of Nuclear Safety

46. 4137th Programming Plan and Progress Report as of 30 Sep 1960, 11 Oct 1960, in files, C, 322AD.

47. Msg, SAC to VICKR, et al, "Big Blast Mission Requirements," 12 Sep 1960. Exhibit 25.

48. Staff Visit to 4137th Strategic Wing, 6-8 September 1960, by 322AD SAFF, 21 Sep 1960. Exhibit 26.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

condition of the folders was excellent; however, some exceptions existed: incomplete last report working computations, lack of some post strike and alternate post strike base data, duplications of information and contradictory information between pilots' and observers' flimsys.⁴³ [REDACTED]

Ground Trainings:

Feeling that both unit capability and morale would benefit, SAC believed that duty periods while on alert, reflex, airmail, or TDY should have been used to conduct ground training. Thus, efficient use of alert time was to free aircrew personnel for other activities during non-alert periods. Numbered air force commanders were to insure that SAC flight crews and missile launch crews were granted compensatory time off upon completion of alert duty tours. However, when alert tours were three days or less, the commander was able to fly them for one sortie--after which the time off was to begin. One-half of this time off was to be during normal duty days.⁴⁴ The concept of flying one sortie after the alert duty tour was evaluated at the end of September 1960. Reactions of wing commanders and comments of numbered air force commanders were requested by SAC.⁴⁵ [REDACTED]

4137th Wing Trainings:

Ground training procedures were completed, special weapons

43. Ibid.

44. Msg, CINCPAC to ALFA, et al, "Interim Change 1 to SACM 27-1, July 1960," 15 Aug 1960. Exhibit 23.

45. Msg, SAC to ALFA, "Flying Immediately Following Alert," 20 Sep 1960. Exhibit 24.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

14

(b) (1) (A)

Co-Pilots as Safety Observers:

Approval by SAC has been granted to use co-pilots as safety observers on pilot proficiency sorties; but, no provision made for him to log flying time. The 4135th Wing asked that flying time be logged: aircraft commander log "P" time; co-pilot on crew log "P" time, and safety observer log "OP" time. Eighth Air Force recommended that the co-pilot be the safety observer with no requirement for additional co-pilot; and stated, "SAC has indicated probable approval but no firm policy as yet."⁵⁰ [REDACTED]

Synthetic Trainers:

The 421st Wing has not received the T-40-10F Special Weapons trainer due in fiscal year (FY) 1960. The T-2A navigation Trainer

49. "Nuclear Safety Survey," prep by Dir of Nuclear Safety Research, USAF, 29 Sep 1960. Exhibit 27.

50. Replies to "log and Squadron Commander's remarks in the Air Training Report for the Month of August 1960" by SAC to SACB, at al, 7 Oct 1960, in files, C, 622AL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

arrived and was operational, but limited due to lack of a part on which its delivery date was known. The DCA 110 remote electronic scorer was on base but not installed due to relocation and/or range modification. Delivery date of the TA-10F was not known at SAC; SAC was trying to obtain the necessary part for the T-24; Eighth Air Force had sent the data necessary to install the DCA-110 scorer.⁵¹ [REDACTED]

^{51.} Ibid.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER III

MAINTENANCE AND FACILITIES

Missile Carriage Malfunction:

Following the launch of a GAM-72 missile (Quail) over the Eglin Gulf test range on 23 September 1960, the lower carriage, to which the missile had been attached, was jettisoned because the carriage switch was left in the normal position. That fact had been unnoticed by the missile operator instructor. This carriage broke the structure to which it had been attached; this would have precluded the extension of carriage number 2 and its attached missile. If GAM-72 equipment change proposal (ECP) 54 had been completed, this incident would not have happened.⁵² [REDACTED]

GAM-77 Facilities at Turner:

Design of GAM-77 facilities at Turner was stopped by the design agency because a definite site has not been resolved. In the past, design money and effort was used on two other occasions. The design agency stated, "No further action is contemplated by this office until formally approved siting has been received through proper channels."⁵³ [REDACTED]

Headquarters USAF had recommended sites for location of these GAM-77 facilities and asked for a cost differential. The design agent could not develop this in the time period allowed and waited

52. Msg, SACPC Eglin to SAC, et al, "GAM-72 Launch Gear," 23 Sep 1960. Exhibit 28.

53. Msg, Atlanta SE to USAF, "GAM-77 Facilities, Turner AFB," 13 Sep 1960. Exhibit 29.

[REDACTED]

21

[REDACTED]

for siting resolution.⁵⁴ [REDACTED]

SAC recommended a site for the facilities on 30 August and the design was to proceed, assuming that SAC was to furnish Headquarters USAF with additional justification for that siting.⁵⁵ [REDACTED]

GAM Program Problems:

At Eglin on 28 September 1960, General Tweency was briefed on the GAM program. The briefing outlined the principle problem areas of the guidance system⁵⁶ and the related bottleneck at maintenance stations 1 and 2. [REDACTED]

The General felt that the Category III FCTE would not provide sufficient data as to reliability or suitability of the GAM-77. He recommended an expanded program of additional captive flights and test launches. [REDACTED]

Late September 1960 found that the category III testing was about two months behind schedule. A spares problem existed in that there were parts not yet manufactured.⁵⁷ [REDACTED]

Project Flash was a joint ECF/TOC (technical order compliance) program. This project was completed during the first week of September and showed improved performance of the guidance

54. Msg, USAF to CINCSAC, "Siting GAM Facilities, Turner AFB," 15 Sep 1960. Exhibit 30.
55. Msg, USAF to CINCSAC, "Siting GAM Facilities, Turner AFB," 19 Sep 1960. Exhibit 31.
56. History of 822d Air Div for May 1960, p. 3 & 4; History of 822d Air Div for Jun 1960, p. 6, & 9-11.
57. Memo for General Russell, by Col Farrer, 822d, "Visit to 4135th Strategic Wing by Lt Gen Tweency and Staff, 27-28 September 1960," 7 Oct 1960. Exhibit 32.

[REDACTED]

system.⁵⁸ [REDACTED]

Limitation of BAC Capability:

Two wings, the 4135th and the 4201st, were to be limited in their BAC capability during October and November 1960. Although the problem (wing cracks) existed in all B-52G wings, the two mentioned above were the only units affected in the 822d Air Division. During October the 4135th Wing was to have an average of 12.1 aircraft available per day while the 4201st Wing was to have 11.8 aircraft available per day. In November the 4135th was to have an average of 11.6 available and the 4201st an average of 13.1 available per day until the 20th of the month when the full 15 aircraft would be available again. The 4135th was to have an average of 13.5 available per day in December, until the 7th of the month, when all 15 would become available. The problem was due to a wing crack condition which affected this type aircraft, and required depot modification.⁵⁹ [REDACTED]

4135th Wing Maintenance:

As of 23 September 1960, the 4135th Wing launched nine aircraft subsequent to home alert. Prior to the first sortie, three of these aircraft required maintenance. This was considered unsatisfactory

58. "Staff Visit to 4135th Strategic Wing, Taini AFB, Florida, 27-28 September 1960," by G2224, 3 Oct 1960. Exhibit 30.

59. Ltr, SAC to C, in G2224, "BAC Capability, 4135th, Taini AFB, Florida (reference Paragraph 2, 822nd Air Division Report of Staff Visit, dated 5 October 1960), 3 Oct 1960. Exhibit 9; and Ltr, SAC to C, in G2224, "BAC Capability, 4201st SA, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina (reference Paragraph 2, 822nd Air Division Report of Staff Visit, dated 22 September 1960)," 3 Oct 1960. Exhibit 17.

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by Eighth Air Force standards. 822d Air Division recommended in-
creased maintenance for KC-135 aircraft. The report also
noted that the maintenance and performance of the aircraft
concerning maintenance and performance of aircraft require
maintenance prior to flight after taking off alert. [Redacted]

4241st Wing Maintenance:

The maintenance of KC-135 aircraft in the 4241st Wing
requires maintenance prior to flight. The report also
noted that the maintenance and performance of the aircraft
concerning maintenance and performance of aircraft require
maintenance prior to flight after taking off alert. [Redacted]

4135th Wing Maintenance:

Lack of a mobile maintenance truck needed to change light bulbs
and for radio maintenance on the rudder and vertical fins of B-52
and KC-135 aircraft, hampered maintenance in the 4135th Wing. The
vehicle on loan from the tower, used as a substitute, required ex-
cessive maintenance to remain operational. Eighth Air Force

60. "Staff Visit to 4135th Strategic Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida,
27-29 September 1960," by 822DA, 5 Oct 1960. Exhibit 33.

61. "Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour-Johnson AFB,
North Carolina, 12-16 September 1960," 22 Sep 1960. Exhibit 35.



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anticipated delivery of the 65 foot high-reach mobile maintenance trucks (two authorized) by November 1960.⁶²

On 27 September 1960, the prefinal inspection of the newly completed chapel annex at Turner AFB was held.⁶³

Supply Problem, 4241st Wing:

The apparent ineffectiveness of Supply to prevent the unsatisfactory history of priority and emergency procurement actions during this reporting period is attributable to a succession of events over several months which resulted in a depletion of base stocks. An attempt by Base Supply (AFB 4809) during May, June and July to reconcile B-52/MC-135 due-in/due-out status with CCMA resulted in an inability to affirm 92 percent of approximately 4,300 requisitions standing in the Base Supply Register. These requisitions were for weapons system support and were mostly dated prior to 15 March. This situation has been amply documented and passed to 8th Air Force for assistance (reference message AFBM 07-0570, 29 July 1960, from AFB 4809 to 8th Air Force and CCMA, attached) indicated that Col Mail, DM, and Col Silver, DMS, were handcarrying the problem to CCMA for resolution. New requisitions completely supplanting those cancelled in the above action have been submitted by AFB 4809. Since Base Supply was closed during the month of August for RAMAC conversion, except for Maintenance Priority 1 through 5 requirements, the bulk of re-established requisitions has been submitted within the last two weeks. The gradual depletion of base stocks, ending with the closing of Base Supply in August, created a condition in which all permissible procurement was emergency and of the highest priority. Action which has been taken by the Wing Director of Supply, Base Supply and the WSO in identifying the critical items involved and pressing for procurement action had been vigorous and aggressive. The Director of Supply has been assured that an approach to normalcy of base stocks should be realized by mid-October."

62. Replies to Wing and Squadron Commander's Remarks in the Air Training Report for the month of August 1960, BAF to 57AF, at al, 7 Oct 1960, in files, C, 822AD.

63. Msg, USAF Civ Eng to SAC, "Prefinal Inspection, Chapel Annex, Turner AFB, Ga," 13 Sep 1960. Exhibit 34.

[REDACTED]

Directly related to the above problem⁶⁴ which included a high cannibalization rate of B-50G aircraft spares, was poor repairable parts processing in the field maintenance repair activities. This was partially because the 4241st Wing was in tenant status on the base. Under the tenant support agreement the base supply was to furnish a repairable processing operation. This service has not been furnished. Development of the maximum repair capability was a USAF, SAC, 8th Air Force command special subject personally generated by General Curtis E. LeMay, Deputy Chief of Staff, USAF; General Thomas E. Power, Commander-in-Chief, SAC; and Lieutenant General Walter C. Sweeney, Commander, Eighth Air Force.⁶⁵ [REDACTED]

64. "Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina, 12-16 September 1960," 22 Sep 1960. Exhibit 35.
65. "Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina, 12-16 September 1960," 22 Sep 1960. Exhibit 35.

[REDACTED]

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

822nd AIR DIVISION

(b) (6)

Brig Gen	Commander
Col	Dir of Materiel
Col	Dir of Operations
L/Col	Dep Dir of Operations
L/Col	Staff Maintenance Officer
L/Col	Executive Officer
L/Col	Staff Supply Officer
Major	Dir of Safety
Major	Armament Staff Officer
Major	Operations Staff Officer
Major	Operations Staff Officer
Captain	Administrative Officer

COMMANDERS OF ASSIGNED UNITS

(b) (6)

Col	4135th Strat Wing
Col	4137th Strat Wing
Col	4138th Strat Wing
Col	4241st Strat Wing

LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. Msg, 4135 to BAF, "Military Strength Summaries, RCR: AF-P72 as of 30 Sep 60," 4 Oct 1960.
2. Msg, BAF to MILKEY, ZULU, "Regular Officer Augmentation," 12 Sep 1960.
3. Msg, 4137 to BAF, "Military Strength Summary (RCR: AF-P72) as of 30 Sep 60," 3 Oct 1960.
4. Strength Report as of 30 September 1960 for 4138 Strat Wg, 4138th Combat Support Group & Tenant Units," n.d.
5. Msg, 4241 to BAF, "AF-P72, Military Strength Summaries, as of 30 Sep 60," 3 Oct 1960.
6. Ltr, Sweeney to Davis, "Officer Retention Program," 31 Aug 1960.
7. Ltr, BAF to 4138, "Motivation of First Term Airmen to Reenlist," 6 Sep 1960.
8. Ltr, 822 to 4135, et al, "Airman Retention," 4 Oct 1960.
9. Ltr, DM to C, Hq 822AD, "EWG Capability, 4135th SW, Eglin AFB, Florida (reference Paragraph 2, 822nd Air Division Report of Staff Visit, dated 5 October 1960,)" 5 Oct 1960.
10. Ltr, DM to C, Hq 822AD, "EWG Capability, 4241st SW, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina (reference Paragraph 2, 822nd Air Division Report of Staff Visit, dated 22 September 1960)," 4 Oct 1960.
11. "Staff Visit to 4138th Strategic Wing," 7-13 Sep 60 by 822DC, 15-Sep 1960.
12. "Staff Visit to 4137th Strategic Wing, 26-28 Sep 60," by 822DC, 8 Oct 1960.
13. Msg, BAF to ROMEQ, et al, "Golden Hour Tango," 3 Sep 1960.
14. Msg, 4135 to BAF, "B-27/2AF OPRD 11-61/4135/SKY SHIELD," 13 Sep 1960.
15. Msg, Personal to all Commanders from Commander Sweeney, "Sky Shield," 22 Sep 1960.
16. Progress Report 15 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 10-59, "GAM-77," and Progress Report 14 to BAF Supp to SAC PP 11-59, "GAM-72," 3 Sep 1960.
17. Memorandum for the Record, by Gen Russell, "Carrying of GAM-77s during 'Downfield,'" 8 Oct 1960.
18. Ltr, Russell to Davis, to Nolan, to Jones, "Analysis of T-1s," n.d.
19. Msg BAF to XRAY, YANKEE, MAUGUST and May-August Heads Up Final Standings," 23 Sep 1960.
20. Msg, BAF to 822AD, "Major League," 21 Sep 1960.
21. Msg, BAF to 4135, "Team Scrimmage Trophy," 9 Sep 1960.
22. "Operations Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, 12-16 Sep 1960 by 822AD," 21 Sep 1960.

List of Supporting Documents (Cont'd)

23. Msg, CINCPAC to ALFA, et al, "Interim Change 1 to SACM 27-1, July 60," 15 Aug 1960.
24. Msg, SAC to ALFA, "Flying Immediately Following Alert," 20 Sep 1960.
25. Msg, BAF to VICTOR, et al, "Big Blast Mission Requirements," 12 Sep 1960.
26. "Staff Visit to 4138th Strategic Wing, 6-8 September 1960," by 322 SAFE, 21 Sep 1960.
27. "Nuclear Safety Survey," prep by Dir of Nuclear Safety Research, USAF 20 Sep 1960.
28. Msg, SACPO Eglin to SAC, et al, "GAM-72 Launch Gear," 23 Sep 1960.
29. Msg, USAF to USA F, "GAM-77 Facilities, Turner AFB," 13 Sep 1960.
30. Msg, USAF to CINCPAC, "Siting GAM Facilities, Turner AFB," 15 Sep 1960.
31. Msg, USAF to SAC, "Siting GAM Facilities, Turner AFB," 19 Sep 1960.
32. Memo for General Russell by Col Farrar, 322AD, "Visit to 4135th Strategic Wing by Lt Gen Sweeney and Staff, 27-29 September 1960," 7 Oct 1960.
33. "Staff Visit to 4136th Strategic Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida, 27-29 September 1960," by 322DM, 5 Oct 1960.
34. Msg, USAF Civ Eng to SAC, "Prefinal Inspection, Chapel Annex, Turner AFB, Ga," 13 Sep 1960.
35. "Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina, 12-16 September 1960," 22 Sep 1960.
36. "Staff Visit to 4138th Strategic Wing (N)," by 322DU, 13 Sep 1960.

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4135TH [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

SAP WESTOVER AFB MISS

[REDACTED] UFAB [REDACTED] IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED. ACTION

SAP (DORS2). SUBJECT: MILITARY STRENGTH SUMMARIES, REG

AF-P72 AS OF 30 SEP 60.

SECTION I.

SECTION II

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	262	262	6	30	3	1	26
2	4	4	8	13	0	0	13
3	1195	1195	9	3	0	0	3
4	1461	1461	10	1	1	0	0
			11	13	2	1	17
			14	17	0	0	17

NOTE: 7 OFFICERS TD 507 WITH DOS 30 SEP 60 SET BY US-7 ARE REPORTED IN LINE 11.

OCT 1960

UFAB

(b) (6)

4135

[REDACTED]

TOP
12/20/59



NUMBER: DP-10		TOTAL: 15	
INFO:			
DC	700	BSD	BSDH
DO			BDCO
DE			BDCS
DF			BDCD
DP			
DS			

IS 12/15/50
 DE RJEKDH 191
 R 121900Z ZEX ZFF-2
 FM SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
 TO WHISKEY
 ZULU
 INFO ROMEO ✓

REGULAR OFFICER AUGMENTATION. COMMANDERS ARE REMINDED
 THAT REGULAR AUGMENTATION APPLICATION PERIOD FOR LINE OFFICERS ENDS
 31 DECEMBER 1959. FOLLOWING STATISTICS ON CURRENT STATUS OF THE PROGRAM IS
 FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ACTION.

	TOTAL ELIGIBLE	APPLICATIONS
AFSAF	96	49
AFSAF-1	100	10
AFSAF-2	211	15
AFSAF-3	100	36
AFSAF-4	27	15
AFSAF-5	171	29
AFSAF-6	79	3
AFSAF-7	25	10
AFSAF-8	15	1
AFSAF-9	14	1
AFSAF-10	157	1
AFSAF-11	100	12

PAGE TWO	160	39
PEASE	13	17
HOMESTEAD	24	1
HARMON	14	6
GOOSE	76	26
LORING	28	10
BAHEY	46	7
NCCOY	141	83
PLATTSBURGH	93	72
DOH	48	3
DOH	57	1
BRADY	18	10
SMITH	45	7
SMITH-MOOR-JOHNSON	11	7
ASST SUPPORT SQ	8	3
RESERVE ISLE	27	11
OTTS	21	11
MCQUIRE	19	13
COYER	29	24
ROBINS	1429	416
TOTALS		

INFO
 SO'D
 TO
 IN SV
 DE
 BY

THREE RJEXDM 191
 THESE FIGURES SHOW THIS COMMAND TO BE FAR BELOW THE DESIRED APPLICATION RATE. EACH COMMANDER MUST ASSURE THAT PROPER ATTENTION HAS BEEN GIVEN THIS VITAL PROGRAM. SPECIAL EMPHASIS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND APPLICATION OF THOSE TOP QUALITY OFFICERS YOU FEEL ESPECIALLY DESERVING OF REGU-

LAR STAFF
 BT
 12/1967 SEP RJEXDM



21	01-00	10000
DC		
INAGE		
2000		
1000		
500		
250		

JOINT MESSAGEFORM			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (C-1-A)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO
DEFERRED <i>Priority</i>		SINGLE		AF	ICM2 72406
ACTION	INFO	FROM	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE		
487TH STRAT WG BOMB AFB GA TO: 2AF BOMB AFB MAE INFO: 222 AIR DIV TURNER AFB GA (AIR MAIL) FROM: 487TH STRAT WG <u>2452</u> , FOR: ICM2, YOUR: ICM2 72406 QRG: MILITARY STRENGTH SECURITY (REG: AF-P-72) AS OF 2400 HOURS 30 SEP 60 FOR 487TH STRAT WG. SECTION I: LINE 1: B-2/C-242/D-NEG/ B-NEG/ LINE 2: B-1/C-1/D-NEG/B-NEG/ LINE 3: B-2/C-1076/D-NEG/ B-NEG/ LINE 4: B-1319/C-1319/D-NEG/B-NEG/ SECTION II: LINE 6: B-4/ F-NEG/D-NEG/B-4/F-NEG/G-NEG/H-NEG/ LINE 8: B-2/C-NEG/D-NEG/B-2/ F-NEG/G-NEG/H-NEG/ LINE 11: B-4/C-NEG/D-NEG/B-4/F-NEG/G-NEG/H-NEG/ LINE 14: B-11/CID-NEG/E-11/F-GRH-NEG/ FOOTNOTES: OFF GAINS: SAC-2/ USAF-2/PACAF-1/COMAC-1/ OFF LOSSES: SAC-1/ AIRMAN GAINS: AMC-1/ SAC-22/ATC-2/PACAF-2/MATS-1/COMC-3/ADC-3. AIRMAN LOSSES: SAC-2/ MATS-1/ATC-1/COMAC-1.			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS		
			DATE		
			03		
			MONTH		
			1967		
			YEAR		
			AFB		
			60		
			TIME		
			08		
			HOURS		
			00		
			MINUTES		
			00		
			SECONDS		
			00		
SYMBOL			(b) (6)		
SENDER NAME AND TITLE (Signature is required)			(b) (6) 2LT USAF		
PHONE			PAGE 1		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			PAGE 1		

DD FORM 173
1 MAY 58

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED


STRENGTH REPORT AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1960 FOR 4138 STRAT WG
4138TH COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP & TENDR UNITS

UNIT	AIRMEN											
	AUTH	ASCD	ATCH	PPD	PNFD	SK	LV	TOT	O/L	AMOL	CONF	SK
4138 COS GP	38	36		31		1	2	1	1			1
4138 PD SVS	2	2		2		1	1	1				1
4138TH SUPPLY SQ	2	2		2		1	1	1				1
4138TH COM DEF SQ	2	2		2		1	1	1				1
4138TH CIVIL ENGR	3	3		3		1	1	1				1
4138TH OPER SQ	13	10		10		1	1	1				2
4138TH TRAIN SQ	4	4		4		1	1	1				2
4138TH A/C SQ	3	3		3		1	1	1				2
82ND AIR DIV	10	12		9		3						
TOTAL	83	80		68		1	4	6	1	1296	1193	3
922 MED GP	39	42		35		3	3	3	1	1225	112	2
82ND MOB MAINT	5	5		4		1	1	1	1	54	43	2
4138TH ASG SQ	6	7		7		1	1	1	1	126	132	5
4138TH STRAT WG	52	57		54		1	2	2	1	198	188	2
336TH BN SQ	123	169		139		6	6	22	1	27	33	3
4138TH CM SQ	7	5		4		1	1	1	1	284	286	1
4138TH FM SQ	7	6		5		1	1	1	1	318	343	1
918TH AR	52	61		48		4	4	8	1	19	23	1
TOTAL	291	352		296		1	15	26	4	1151	1142	3
1370TH FM WG	27	28		23		1	1	1	1	84	82	1
1371ST MAC SQ	88	87		51		1	1	1	1	92	101	1
1372ND MAC SQ	13	13		9		1	1	1	1	119	107	1
1374TH MAC SQ	14	13		9		1	1	1	1	276	310	2
1375TH MAC SQ	66	62		44		1	1	1	1	56	65	1
1376TH MAC SQ	5	2		4		1	1	1	1	550	503	1
1370TH SUPRON	5	6		4		1	1	1	1	75	71	1
TOTAL	218	215		146		1	9	55	2	1352	1269	3
242RD AMCS	9	6		6		1	1	1	1	58	58	1
12TH RES SQ	2	2		2		1	1	1	1	32	33	1
345TH MEA SQ	5	6		5		1	1	1	1	21	18	1
45TH TFD	1	1		1		1	1	1	1	26	27	1
463 AFB GEN	1	1		1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1
463 AFB SQ	14	16		12		1	1	3	1	74	75	1
4 BATTERY	8	8		8		1	1	1	1	110	118	1
4TH SIG DET	8	8		7		1	1	1	1	110	115	1
TOTAL	51	51		42		3	3	6		4	3	1
GRAND TOTAL	643	698		552		4	31	103	7	4235	4052	6
						1	4	31	7	3522	3522	14
												16
												17
												133
												330
												52
												1
												12
												3

38

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00 037502
 DE RJEXFK 1
 FM 4241STRATWG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
 TO RJEKXDB/SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
 INFO RJEKSR/822AD TURNER AFB GA
 BT



DCRS 3214. IMMEDIATE. FOR DCRS2-P, SAF, AND DEK, 822AD.
 SUBJECT: AF-PTL. MILITARY STRENGTH SUMMARIES, AS OF 30 SEP 60.

SECTION I ASSIGNED BY FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY GROUPING:

LINE NUMBER	COLUMN A	COLUMN B	COLUMN C	COLUMN D	COLUMN E
1. OFF		500	500	0	0
2. 4-0		3	3	0	0
3. 21L		1540	1540	0	0
4. TOTAL		1670	1670	0	0

SECTION II

COLUMN A	COLUMN B	COLUMN C	COLUMN D	COLUMN E
1.	1	1	0	0

PAGE TWO RJEXFK 1

5.	1	1	0	0
6.	20	2	0	24
7.	10	0	0	10
8.	2	0	0	2
11.	9	3	0	0
14.	22	0	0	22

BT
03/14452 OCT RJEXFK

ACTION:		TOTAL: 7
INFO: 3		
DC	DCO	BDCM
DO	DCM	DDO
DM	DCS	EDCS
WC	SAF	SUCO
DP	BC	
DS	BFM	BUCS

MAX/MIN IAW SAFE LIST

NNNN

31 August 1960

Colonel (b) (6)
Commander
4138th Strategic Wing
Turner Air Force Base
Georgia

Dear (b) (6)

I recently received a letter from General Power concerning the results of the Officer Retention Program for Fiscal Year 1960. He was pleased with the strong emphasis most commanders and retention people had placed on this vital program and pointed out that we had achieved a rate four times greater than the rest of the Air Force.

Attached is the standing of each of our bases. As in the past, some of our least sought-after bases have done outstanding jobs, while some highly desirable bases have not kept pace. The development and maintenance of an aggressive quality Officer Retention Program is our best means of obtaining a professional, stable officer corps. I am confident your efforts in this area will not diminish.

The current early release program for rated DOS officers will affect about 60 of our tanker navigators. Reports indicate one station is doing an outstanding retention job with this group. I want every effort made to retain as many of this group as possible.

Please convey to your commanders, supervisors and key staff my appreciation of their fine efforts. I know you will encourage them to beat the FY 60 record.

Sincerely

W. C. SWEENEY, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
As stated

Copy, 877 117

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SAC RETENTION RATE FY 60 - 32%

EIGHTH AIR FORCE (33%)

BASE	ELIG	RET	RATE
1. ELLIN (b) (6)	3	3	100%
2. S. JOHNSON (b) (6)	4	3	75%
3. CRIPPISS (b) (6)	6	3	50%
4. PRESQUE ISLE (b) (6)	7	3	43%
5. WESTOVER (b) (6)	12	4	33%
6. MACDILL (b) (6) Hand	17	14	38%
7. MCCOY (b) (6)	23	8	35%
<hr/>			
8. HOMESTRAD (b) (6)	51	17	33%
9. LOCKEDRONE (b) (6)	71	23	32%
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>			
10. PEASE (b) (6)	63	19	30%
11. HUNTER (b) (6)	58	17	29%
12. PLATTSBURGH (b) (6)	55	16	29%
13. DOW (b) (6)	52	15	29%
14. TURNER (b) (6)	21	5	24%
15. LORING (b) (6)	36	8	22%

Units Below the 35% Goal,
But Meeting the SAC Average.

----- Units Below the SAC Average

* Senior Commander for Major Portion of FY 1960

Atch # 1

A

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October 1951

The attention of the command is directed to the fact that the command is to be held responsible for the maintenance of the highest standards of discipline and efficiency. It is the responsibility of the command to ensure that all personnel are properly trained and that all equipment is maintained in a state of readiness. The command is to be held responsible for the performance of all personnel and for the maintenance of all equipment.

Respectfully,
Lieutenant Colonel
Commander



45

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA



REF: DP

SUBJECT: Motivation of First Term Airmen to Reenlist

TO: 8AF
Westover AFB, Mass

1. I have recently received the final results of the first cycle of the 55/45 (Selective Reenlistment) program. I am disappointed with this command's showing. Only 38% (2193) of the assigned quota (5771) was achieved. This represents retention of only 15.5% of those eligible. Some major commands did better. This is a marked regression from our previous record as this command has continually led the Air Force in reenlistments.
2. The most important objective of the Selective Reenlistment Program is to provide for selection of the best quality first term airmen for reenlistment into the career force. In administering the first term airmen reenlistment quota for FY 61, competition for selection was realized in only one career field. The quality control program has been very effective in weeding out the trouble maker, the non-producer, and otherwise low calibre airmen (both first term and career). Therefore, the first termers eligible for reenlistment during each cycle of the Selective Reenlistment Program should be the cream of the crop and provide for the selectivity desired. The problem is that first term airmen were simply not career motivated in sufficient numbers to permit selectivity. Effective leadership and command emphasis at all levels is our answer. Our squadron commanders and senior non-commissioned officers must clearly understand the objectives and importance of this program and fully carry out their responsibilities in the motivation and counseling of first term airmen.
3. You know that I am aware of major problems affecting the attitude of these airmen. I have and will continue to press for more promotions, better housing and increased benefits for these individuals. I am convinced, however, that more can be done to motivate these young men toward reenlistment through establishing an atmosphere of belonging and providing the job satisfaction of being an important member of a vital defense team.

1101 11/11/54

4. During the test cycle of this plan, assets will be allocated to each major responsibility. Under this procedure, you will have firm goals. A more effective program will result as commanders will be able to accomplish these established goals by early identification and counseling of those airmen they desire to retain. To establish the command's emphasis and support desired for this program, I am again placing first team airmen retention in the Management Control System.



THOMAS S. POWER
General, USAF
Commander in Chief

COORDINATION COPY
 225D AIR DIVISION
 United States Air Force
 Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

C

4 October 1959

Airman Retention

- 4125 Strat Wg (C)
- 4127 Strat Wg (C)
- 4128 Strat Wg (C)
- 4241 Strat Wg (C)

1. I am in receipt of a letter from the Director of Personnel, Headquarters, United States Air Force, expressing his concern about the lack of knowledge of the 25/45 Airman Retention Program among our supervisors. This was emphasized during the recent findings conducted at the headquarters for visiting officers and non-commissioned officers.

2. I believe the poor showing as evidenced thus far in the 25/45 Program, can be corrected if you make best use of knowledge our supervisors have to supply this vital program. I strongly urge you to take aggressive action to indoctrinate or reinductivate all supervisory personnel concerning this program. To date, USAF has published two briefings with slides on the 25/45 Program, and Headquarters USAF has published one with slides. Titles are (1) Selective Reenlistment for First Term Airman, 15 Dec 58 (USAF); (2) Optimum Career Airman Structure, 15 Mar 59 (USAF); and (3) Airman's Outlook, 25 Aug 58 (USAF). As recently as 18 September 1959, Headquarters Strategic Air Command forwarded briefings for first term airman and non-commissioned officers. You must utilize these facts.

3. You are reminded that failure to provide good "first lessons" will only result in those personnel being retained with insufficient personnel at some later date. If we want to retain the supervisors we desire, we must first thoroughly indoctrinate all supervisors, and second, continuously place the facts before our eligible airman.

A. J. RUSSELL
 Brigadier General, USAF
 Commander

mailed 15 Oct 60

COORDINATION	
OFFICER STATUS	LAST NAME

Dir Miller

OFFICE OF RECORD	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF ACTION OFFICER	PHONE NO.	TYPIST	DATE TYPED
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES				

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WESTOVER AIR FORCE BASE
MASSACHUSETTS

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DP

SUBJECT: Airman Retention

TO: Brigadier General Austin J. Russell
#22 Air Div 111

Dear General Russell:

1. About two weeks ago I had occasion to brief the NCO Academy students on personnel matters. Recently, I presented a similar briefing to the conferees attending the Directorate of Materiel conference in this headquarters. During both briefings, I asked to see a show of hands of those people who felt they knew enough about the current 55-45 Airman Retention Program to discuss it with a young "first-term" airman. In the NCO Academy group I had four people who raised their hands, and they were all personnel specialists. In the DM conference group not one of the conferees indicated sufficient knowledge.

2. I believe this to be evidence of the fact that we are not sufficiently indoctrinating our supervisors, and this failure to indoctrinate is directly reflected in the poor showing thus far in airman retention. As you know, airman retention is being returned to the SAC MCS system, and you will be scored next December. I urge that you undertake an aggressive program to indoctrinate or reindoctrinate all supervisory personnel.

3. I am sure you need not be reminded that failure to reenlist good "first termers" will only result in these experienced people being replaced with new recruits at some later date. If we want to retain the experience we possess, we must get in and work for it. Please let me know if there is anything I can do to assist in this regard.

Sincerely

(b) (6)

Colonel, USAF
Director of Personnel

[REDACTED]
Headquarters
822ND AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DM

5 October 1960

SUBJECT: EWO Capability, 4135th SW, Eglin AFB, Florida (reference Paragraph 2, 822nd Air Division Report of Staff Visit, dated 5 October 1960)

TO: Commander
822nd Air Division

1. The B-52G EWO capability for the 4135th SW will be limited until 5 December 1960. The depot modification to correct a wing crack problem requires that all of the B-52Gs assigned to the 4135th SW be modified at OCAMA. The tail number schedule to accomplish this work was developed jointly by SAC and OCAMA.
2. The total number of B-52s available to the Commander, 4135th SW, by day, during the months of October, November and December is set out below:

a. October

1-4:	13
5-7:	12
8:	11
9-12:	12
13-15:	13
16-19:	13
20:	13
21-28:	12
29:	11
30-31:	12

b. November

1:	12
2:	11
3-8:	12
10:	11
11-14:	12

[REDACTED]

43F-J-60-2550

52

[REDACTED]

15:	11
16-17:	12
18:	11
19-21:	12
22:	11
23-24:	12
25:	11
26-27:	12
28:	10
29:	12
30-31:	13

c. December

1-2:	13
3-6:	14

3. When the wing crack modification program ("High Stress") is completed, the normal depot TOC program ("Fast Fix") will be resumed, which commits the wing to one aircraft away from the station on a continuing basis.

(b) (6)

Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

Copies to:
4135 Strat Wg (C)
822 Air Div (DO)

**Headquarters
822ND AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia**

**REPLY TO
ATTN OF:** DM

4 October 1960

SUBJECT: EWO Capability, 4241st SW, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina (reference Paragraph 2, 822nd Air Division Report of Staff Visit, dated 22 September 1960)

TO: Commander
822nd Air Division

1. The B-52G EWO capability for the 4241st SW will be limited until 21 November 1960. The depot modification to correct a wing crack problem requires that all of the B-52Gs assigned to the 4241st SW be modified at WRAMA. The tail number schedule to accomplish this work was developed jointly by SAC and OCAMA.

2. The total number of B-52s available to the Commander, 4241st SW, by day, during the months of October and November is set out below:

a. October

1-4:	11
5-6:	10
7-8:	11
9:	10
10-11:	11
12-16:	12
17:	13
18:	12
19-20:	13
21-23:	12
24-26:	13
27:	13
28-31:	13

b. November

1-5:	13
6:	12
7-10:	13

FBI 2501

[REDACTED]

11: 12
12-16: 13
17-20: 14
21 and on: 15

3. When the wing crack modification program ("High Stress") is completed, the normal depot TOC program ("Fast Fix") will be resumed, which commits the wing to one aircraft away from the station on a continuing basis.

(b) (6)

Colonel, USAF
Director of Material

Copies to:
4241 Strat Wg (C)
822 Air Div (DO)

Headquarters
822ND AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO

15 September 1960

SUBJECT: Staff Visit to 4138th Strategic Wing

TO: Commander
822nd Air Division

1. A staff visit to the 4138th Strategic Wing was performed during the period 7-13 September 1960, by the following named personnel:

Lt. Col. (b) (6)
Maj. (b) (6)
Maj. (b) (6)

2. Personnel contacted:

Col. (b) (6)	Commander, 4138th SW
Lt. Col. (b) (6)	DCO
Lt. Col. (b) (6)	Chief, Training
Lt. Col. (b) (6)	Chief, Combat Operations
Lt. Col. (b) (6)	Chief, Intelligence
Lt. Col. (b) (6)	336th Bomb Squadron Operations
Lt. Col. (b) (6)	919th AREFS Operations
Lt. Col. (b) (6)	Chief, Reports and Analysis
Maj. (b) (6)	Chief, Command Post
Capt. (b) (6)	Bomb-Nav Section

3. The 4138th SW is fully capable of performing their EWO commitments.

4. The Wing Training Division has assumed the entire responsibility for the scheduling of both air and ground training. This has relieved the tactical squadrons of this time consuming burden and has improved the overall efficiency of the training program.

5. Two pilots, Maj. (b) (6) and Capt. (b) (6) have very little flying time for their length of service. If these pilots do not

concentrate on obtaining flying time, they will be subject for consideration by the Central Flight Selection Board.

6. Col. Davis was briefed on this report 14 September 1960, by the under signed.

(b) (6)

Lt. Colonel, USAF
Operations Staff Officer

1 Atch
Report of Staff Visit

DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR OPERATIONS

Personnel contacted: Lt. Col. (b) (6)

1. Lt. Col. (b) (6) is well qualified to perform the duty of the DCO. He is well aware of his duties and responsibilities.
2. The combination for the safe in the administrative office has not been changed since there was a change in the DCO of the wing. Recommend compliance with AFR 205-1.

COMMAND POST

Personnel contacted: Maj. (b) (6)

1. The Command Post of the 4138th SW is a highly efficient and competent organization. Shift scheduling within the Command Post is most efficient, with personnel averaging approximately 43 hours a week. A training program has been established to insure all assigned personnel are familiar with existing directives and the latest changes.

2. The only minor discrepancy noted was that the takeoff and landing time on the daily launch board was posted in Eastern Standard Time. SACM 55-2 requires this time to be posted in Zulu time.

TRAINING DIVISION

Personnel contacted: Lt. Col. Wilkerson

1. Management Guide is not current in accordance with SACR 25-2. Presently assigned personnel do not have 8AF Forms 154. Most of the guide is obsolete. EWO assignment is not in this guide, nor are the EWO duties of personnel in this division.

Recommendation: That the Chief of Training bring this guide up to date in accordance with SACR 25-2.

2. This division is operating in accordance with SACM 20-10. The presently assigned personnel are newly assigned to their duties, and they are attempting to accomplish their duties in accordance with existing higher headquarters directives.

3. The Training Period Plan for the period September - December 1960 has been published in accordance with 8AFM 50-1. The plan is incomplete, since it has only the September operational requirements. October, November and December sortie requirements were omitted.

Recommendation: That this plan be amended to include all known sortie requirements for each month of the training period.

4. The Chief of Training has established the operational requirements for the training period as follows:

<u>B-52</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Maintenance Capability Sorties</u>
Sep	61	491	63
Oct	70	530	69
Nov	67	515	54
Dec	<u>64</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>53</u>
Total	262	2036	239

There is a deficit of 23 sorties for the B-52.

<u>KC-135</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Maintenance Capability Sorties</u>
Sep	53	312	53
Oct	57	350	52
Nov	56	348	45
Dec	<u>56</u>	<u>348</u>	<u>50</u>
Total	222	1363	200

There is a deficit of 22 sorties for the KC-135.

5. 8th Air Force has allocated 1785 B-52 hours for the October - December quarter and 1170 KC-135 hours. This is more than the wing anticipated for the quarter; therefore, additional sorties will be required or extension of sortie length.

6. The Air Training Branch is operating with two officer overages; Maj. (b) (6) and Maj. (b) (6) - in the existing UMD.

Recommendation: The Chief of Training establish a review board to meet at least once a month to review all air and ground training accomplished in the wing. The chiefs of all the branches in this division should be prepared to give a detailed analysis on the training accomplished, with particular emphasis placed on the weak areas in the program.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS

Personnel contacted: Lt. Col. (b) (6)

1. Lt. Col. (b) (6) Chief of the R&A Branch is experienced and capable of accomplishing his assigned duties. The personnel assigned to his section are in the process of learning their duties.
2. The personnel in this section are required to perform many extra assignments over and above the duties outlined in SACM 20-10. Mostly, the assignments are making detailed studies of operations orders, manuals and regulations. These studies are time consuming and prevent the assigned personnel from analyzing training accomplishments and problem areas in the air training program. The Training Division has taken some of these additional duties from the R&A Section in September.

Recommendation: The branch chiefs in the Training Division prepare the analysis of their particular specialty and submit the Wing Commander's remarks for the T-12. The branch chiefs should also make all the detailed studies of operations orders, manuals and regulations as they pertain to their particular field of specialty.

3. Forms 5 that were required to be completed in June are not finished as of this date. No entries have been made on the July and August work sheets. This is because the section has too much of a workload for the personnel assigned, and they have placed priority on the important items. This section is required to maintain 351 Forms 5. Normal manpower requirement established by the Director of Flight Safety Research, Norton AFB, California, for maintenance of forms is one Form 5 Clerk for 50 Forms 5, with a maximum of 75 Forms 5 for one man to maintain.

Recommendation: A change in the existing UMD to provide additional clerical help on a full time basis is necessary to maintain the Forms 5 in the 4138th SW.

4. The Chief of R&A has had to work evenings and week-ends to accomplish the workload in this section. This is primarily because he lacked adequate help in performing his duties. The month of June Lt. Col. (b) (6) worked 367:50 hours and had a four-day leave. This amounts to approximately 46 eight-hour workdays. The month of July this officer worked 404:10 hours, which equals 50.5 workdays.

Recommendation: Considerations should be given to relieving Lt. Col. (b)(6) of some of his workload or giving him more help in the R&A Branch to accomplish his duties. Any help given this section should be on a full time basis, because it takes time to train personnel in their duties before they can be of much help to the section.

5. Reviewing the training accomplishments for the last training period (May - August), revealed the following training items were below the 8th Air Force reliability standards:

a. High Altitude Synchronous RBS. Nine of the 154 runs accomplished were unreliable for the following reasons:

Six runs due to crew procedures and synchronization.

One run due to materiel malfunction.

Two runs unknown.

b. Fix Angle RBS. Eight of the 33 runs accomplished were unreliable due to crew procedures.

c. High Altitude Large Charge. Four of the 17 RBS runs accomplished were unreliable for the following reasons:

Two due to improper use of the DTO (Double Target Option) switch.

One because the tracking handle came apart at approximate time of the bomb release.

One due to materiel.

d. Long Look RBS. Three of the 25 accomplished were unreliable:

Two due to target identification.

One because of a tone malfunction.

BOMB-NAV SECTION

Personnel contacted: Capt. Ahistedt

1. In the temporary absence of Maj. (b) (6) Chief of the section, who is on emergency leave, Capt. (b) (6) Acting Section Chief, and Capt. (b) (6) Target Study Officer, were contacted.
2. Manning: The Bomb-Nav Section is presently manned by three officers as against two authorized on the UMD. However, this headquarters and Headquarters 8th Air Force recognize the need for a minimum of three officers in this section. Until such time as SAC is able to obtain increased manning for this section, it is recommended that its current strength be maintained.
3. A considerable improvement was observed in both the physical layout of this section and in its operation.
 - a. Target Folders. Bomb-Nav, in coordination with the Target Materials Section, has developed new domestic target folders in accordance with 8AFR 200-2. The suspense date established by 8th Air Force for completion of this project was 1 September 1960. This date was met.
 - b. Film Strips. The bulk of the film strips used in domestic target study is less than one year old and of good quality. A few strips on the less frequently used RBS sites, dated 1958, were noted. These are being replaced as photography of good quality becomes available.
 - c. Records. A record of all RBS runs is being maintained on operators, aircraft and RBS sites. This gives all concerned a ready reference on areas of weakness on the part of the operator, reliability of equipment and validity of IP-TGT combinations on bomb runs. Records of target study, bombing analysis and critique are being kept on Turner AFB Form 214. Several incomplete forms were on file. One of these was an unreliable bomb. While there is no doubt that this bomb run was thoroughly analyzed and critiqued, this record did not show the causes of the error or bear the operator's signature. Recommend an operations memorandum be developed to establish the desired method to be used in maintaining this record, in order to obtain the maximum benefit from its use.

6. A review of the Mission Accomplishment Forms in the last training period indicated in some instances Pilot Proficiency Missions were scheduled with RBS runs and navigation legs on the same missions. This is in violation of paragraph 14, SACR 50-8.

7. Crew No. R-03, Pilot Monahan, logged hood time during the hours of darkness on a Pilot Proficiency Mission on 29 August 1960. This is in violation of paragraph 2c(5)g, SACR 51-12.

8. The Forms 781 checked indicated the following discrepancies:

- a. Operations is not certifying the forms as being correct.
- b. Maintenance is not certifying all the forms as being correct and the time transferred to the Form 781B.
- c. GCA being logged without logging hood or weather time.

9. Capt. (b) (6) is not current as an IP in accordance with SACR 60-7. He is short two of the required three landings to maintain currency.

136TH BOMB SQUADRON

Personnel contacted: Lt. Col. (b) (6)

1. Critiques of training missions are practically non-existent in accordance with SACM 20-10. The crews receive a maintenance debriefing, and then the squadron reviews the mission accomplishment form the next morning. When questions pertaining to the mission accomplishment form occur, the crew is called in to explain the problem.

Recommendation: That a squadron critique be scheduled for each crew the day following a flight. This will enable the staff to improve the mission planning and analyze the type of training performed.

2. The Weather Officer is not giving the weather briefing for the squadron briefings. The Weather Section gives the information to the Squadron Navigator, and he briefs the forecast weather for the mission from a weather slide.

Recommendation: That a Weather Officer give the weather briefing.

3. Control of classified material (manuals, operations orders, regulations, etc.) is accomplished by combat crew members, Maj. (b) (6) and Capt. (b) (6).

Recommendation: That squadron staff assume this responsibility and control. Lt. Col. (b) (6) is starting this project.

4. Lt. Col. (b) (6) has recently taken over as Squadron Operations Officer and is in the process of making many changes in the squadron procedures to improve the overall operation of the squadron.

5. Leave policy for combat crews is programmed in two increments each year. They must take leave as a crew and take one half each six months. Consideration is given for crews that desire leave to go home when great distances are involved.

7. NCR Training.

Capt. (b) (6) reported from Castle without survival training. He is programmed to take over Maj. (b) (6) crew, E-37, about 15 October.

d. T-3 Trainer. No improvement has been made in the operating condition of the T-3 trainer. Excessive spoking at ranges greater than 25 NM and excessive ground clutter at ranges less than 25 NM limit the value of this trainer as a training aid. It is apparent that local technicians are unable to locate the cause of the trouble. It is therefore recommended that assistance from 8th Air Force and/or Ogden AMC be requested. (See paragraph 4)

e. Navigation Replot Program. An active and aggressive navigation replot program is being conducted. Minor clerical errors noted.

4. Bombing Reliability: During the training period concluded 31 August, the wing's bombing reliability was below 8th Air Force standards. The greatest single cause of error was operator. Personnel errors continue to occur in spite of personnel changes, improved facilities and target materials. Only four crews, E-11, E-27, E-34 and E-37, completed the training period without an unreliable bomb. All other ready, senior and select crews contributed in varying degrees to the wing's low reliability.

Recommendation: T-3 trainer runs should be made an integral part of the target study program. During the period May through August, this trainer was utilized for 32 hours (reference SAC E-7 Report). The use of this device for target study would not interfere with other requirements for this trainer.

T. O. 1B-52B-1 does not specifically state the number of range and bearing drift corrections to be obtained in the multiple drift method of solving drift problem in fixed angle bombing. It is therefore recommended that an operations memorandum requiring drift corrections at 60, 40 and 20 NM ranges be developed and published.

919TH AIR REFUELING SQUADRON

Personnel contacted: Lt. Col. (b) (6)
Lt. Col. (b) (6)

1. The squadron is establishing their operation at Turner in a very fine manner. They are still in the process of moving in and obtaining all necessary publications and equipment.
2. The Squadron Operations Officer briefs and critiques all training sorties. When he is not available, a flight commander accomplishes this activity. Lt. Col. (b) (6) requires his airplane commanders to write out all problems encountered on the mission, such as ATC clearance, traffic delays, maintenance problems on preflight or when airborne, refueling difficulties, etc., on the back of the Mission Accomplishment Form. This enables the Operations Officer to obtain this information immediately when he reports to work each morning.
3. The Forms 5 for the 919th AREFS are maintained in the Wing R&A Section in accordance with SACM 20-10.
4. No problem is anticipated in completing the SACR 50-8 requirements for the training period September - December.
5. The squadron has developed a very fine safety program. They have a most effective method for aircrew personnel to maintain currency with safety information, changes to flying regulations, etc.

Maj. (b) (6) will take over Maj. (b) (6) crew, S-57, who is going to the wing staff as Air Operations Officer.

Maj. Mulkey is programmed to take over Maj. (b) (6) crew, E-98. Maj. (b) (6) will be the Wing Safety Officer.

Headquarters
822D AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

Reply to
Attn Of: DO

4 October 1960

SUBJECT: Staff Visit to 4137th Strategic Wing

TO: 822 Air Div (C)

1. A staff visit was performed 26-28 September 1960 to the 4137th Strategic Wing by the following named personnel:

Lt Colonel (b) (6)
Major (b) (6)

2. Personnel contacted in the 4137th Strategic Wing were:

Colonel (b) (6)	Commander
Lt Col (b) (6)	Chief of Training
Lt Col (b) (6)	Special Ass't to Wing Commander
Major (b) (6)	Sq Ops Officer
Major (b) (6)	Chief, Command Post
Major (b) (6)	Chief, Comm/Elect Div
Major (b) (6)	Chief, Standardization Division
Major (b) (6)	Chief, Bomb Nav Section
Major (b) (6)	Squadron Navigator
Major (b) (6)	Chief, Grd Trng Branch
Capt (b) (6)	Chief, Report & Analysis Section

3. Personnel in the 4137th Strategic Wing Operations Staff are not as familiar with AFR 205-1, as required. Recommend all personnel study this regulation and comply with the contents in this document.

4. The Pyramid Alert System is not adequate. A telephone alert system has been designed, but at the time of this visit there had been no provisions made to devise a no-communication alert plan. Recommend compliance with paragraph 49, SACM 55-2, in establishing the Pyramid Alert System.

5. The 4137th Strategic Wing is required to help Robins AFB support a Tactical Air Command exercise on 4 October 1960.

The Wing is required to furnish ramp space, ground power, and oxygen. One dock is to be made available, if needed. The 30 TAC aircraft will be at Robins from 26 September through 4 October 1960. Practice for this Joint Civilian Orientation Conference will be 60 sorties per day.

6. Operations progress has been satisfactory in the 4137th Strategic Wing. There are many plans in progress to improve the overall efficiency of the Wing.

(b) (6)

Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

1 Atch
Staff Visit Rpt, 4137SW,
26-28 Sep 60

Headquarters
822D AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

4 October 1960

SUBJECT: Staff Visit Report - 4137th Strategic Wing, Robins AFB,
Ga., 26-28 September 1960

WING OPERATIONS:

Personnel Contacted: Lt Colonel (b) (6)

1. A non-combat ready upgrade training program has been published. Flying training is being scheduled in accordance with this plan. Amendments to this plan will be published, as required.
2. Message distribution to the Operations Staff is not satisfactory. Many interested agencies are not being informed of changes to regulations, etc., that will effect the overall mission on the Wing.
Recommend multilith tape be used on the communication machines. The hard copy of each message may then be used to reproduce as many copies of the message as required. This will expedite the transmission of information to all interested agencies.
3. The Operations Staff is monitoring the Squadron briefings. The briefing attended on this visit was considered good. One very fine feature incorporated by the Wing is to have the airplane commander meet with all personnel flying on the mission immediately subsequent to the briefing. At this time, the crew "ground flies" the entire planned mission to insure that all personnel are familiar with the procedures to be used for accomplishing the intended training.
4. Colonel (b) (6) DCO, is qualified in the B-52G.

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION:

Personnel Contacted: Major (b) (6)

1. Security - Adequate security has been established for the equipment installed. The only significant problem area is that

75

assigned personnel are not filling out the SAC Form 402, Classified Storage Container Check Sheet, properly. The custodian was signing off the safe as being locked and he was also signing the book as safe check officer.

Recommend personnel study AFR 205-1 and comply with the contents of the regulation.

2. At the present time, there is a shortage of authorized personnel in the Communications and Electronics Division.

3. OJT - This program is just being established in this Division.

4. All required Tech Orders, Regulations, and Manuals are not available, however, the missing documents have been requisitioned.

5. This Division is preparing the C&E annexes for all the Operations Orders, Plans, and Films published. The Division Chief is on the EWO Planning Staff.

6. All changes to communications publications in the airplanes are being posted by the C&E personnel.

7. All reports submitted by the Command Post are logged and monitored for the timeliness of the reports. There is no problem in this area at this time.

8. The Management Guide of Major (b)(6) is in the formulation stage at this time.

ECM:

There was no officer assigned to this Branch at the time of this visit, so no comments are made in this report.

GROUND TRAINING:

Personnel Contacted: Major (b)(6)

1. An excellent Ground Training Program is being conducted at the 4137th Strategic Wing. The Chief of this Branch is very aggressive and has initiated a strong program.

2. Problems:

a. Combative Measures - There are no instructors available at Robins AFB for this program. Major (b) (6) has requested 8AF help to obtain qualified judo instructors at Robins AFB.

b. Handgun Qualification - The Wing is encountering difficulty in qualifying personnel in small arms. AFR 50-8, dated 25 November 1959, reduced the size of the target to be used approximately one-third of the previous target. The "bulls eye" has been reduced from eight inches to three inches in size. Approximately 15 percent of the personnel qualify the first time. The personnel attempting to qualify are just not good enough marksmen to pass the minimum score required. The Wing is running short of ammunition trying to qualify the men.

c. A very interesting fact was discovered when giving the aquatic survival course. Crew members jumping into the water from a ten feet high board found the present life preserver, LPU, to be tearing upon contact with the water. A UR was submitted and a fix is being made on the life preserver at this time.

COMMAND POST:

Personnel Contacted: Major (b) (6)

1. The management guide is in the formulative stages at this time.
2. This Division is fully manned with six officers and seven airmen. An excellent training prospectus has been published to train all assigned personnel. Individual training folders will be maintained on each person assigned to this Division.
3. All the required SOP's are published and they are considered very good.
4. The Command Post is still under construction. A great amount of self-help, by the personnel assigned, is being used to build the required charts and panels. The majority of required equipment is installed at this time.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS BRANCH:

Personnel Contacted: Captain (b) (6)

1. A considerable amount of time was spent with Captain (b) (6) in going over the required reports submitted by this Branch. Emphasis was placed in the methods of cross-auditing the reports submitted. Recommendations were made in the method of monitoring information required in these reports.
2. At the present time, the room assigned to this section is not adequately secure for classified information. All charts used have to be placed in the safe at night. Recommend this room be made secure so charts do not have to be placed in the safe at night.
3. Captain (b) (6) is signing the SAC Form 402 on the safe as the custodian and check officer both. Recommend he study AFR 205-1 and comply with the instructions in "Storage of Classified Material."
4. Personnel in this branch were not aware of their EWO assignment. Recommend the DCO brief the personnel in their EWO assigned duties.
5. Pilots are logging GCA and ILS on the Form 781A's without logging weather or hood time. Recommend the DCO brief the pilots in the Wing as to the proper procedure for logging accomplishments on the AF Form 781A.
6. The 781A's are not being certified in the block designated for maintenance as being transcribed to the Form 781B. Operations is not certifying in the block designated as being legible and correct.

BOMB/NAV SECTION:

Personnel Contacted: Major (b) (6)

1. The Bomb/Nav Section is fully manned in accordance with the UMD. Major Thines, Section Chief, has qualified in the unit aircraft. Captain (b) (6) Target Study Officer, has completed the requirements of SACR 51-19 and requires only a standardization check to become qualified in the aircraft.
2. Required publications have been procured. Work is progressing satisfactorily on the development of domestic target study folders, however, lack of suitable photography has slowed this program. As unit flying activity increases, suitable photography

will become available. The 4137th is participating in an exchange of film with other units of the Division which should enhance the effectiveness of the target study programs of all concerned.

3. A permanent domestic target study area has not been designated due to lack of floor space. Target study is being conducted in the EWO target study rooms in the target intelligence area; while this arrangement presents no problem at the present time, it will present a problem as the unit approaches its combat ready date.

STANDARDIZATION DIVISION:

Personnel contacted: Major (b) (6)

1. A review of standardization folders revealed no major discrepancies on the part of 4137th DCOS, however, forms are coming in from CCTS with signatures and/or comments missing.
2. The standardization division is housed in the alert facility due to the existing shortage of office space.
3. The DCOS requested assistance in obtaining TO 1B-52-1259, single motion downward ejection seat. This T.O. was mailed to them on 30 September 1960.

342D BOMB SQUADRON:

Personnel Contacted: Major (b) (6) & Major (b) (6)

1. At the time of this visit, Major (b) (6) was acting Squadron Commander. Lt Colonel (b) (6) the new Squadron Commander, will report approximately 1 November 1960.
2. There is no crew lounge for combat crews nor any available space for these personnel to gather. The briefing room is partitioned by a sliding curtain that separates the flight planning room from the briefing room. This flight planning room is very small and will accommodate a maximum of three crews. More flight planning space will have to be made available soon to accommodate the crews in mission planning.
3. The first two crews in training are progressing very fast and will be ready for a SACM 51-4 standardization check within a month.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

(100)
 5DH0579
 RJEXSR
 RJAADH 178
 001735Z ZEX AFPC
 TO SAG WESTOVER AFFAIRS
 FM HONED
 DTGREC ✓
 TANGO ✓
 VICTOR
 WHISKEY ✓
 BT

Tur
 18306
 CCN

████████████████████

ACTION: 44000-3
 DIV OPS-1
 WFC-1
 DIV C-1

████████████████████ 034513. SUBJECT: GOLDEN HOUR TANGO. THIS MSG
 IN THREE PARTS. PART I. UNIT STANDINGS FOR THE PERIOD MAY THROUGH
 AUG 68 ARE AS FOLLOWS: A. WIG COMPETITION. 1. 379 HOMESTEAD
 96.8; 2. 4241 BAYNOR-JOHNSON 96.7; 3. 133 PEACE 96.5; 4. 539
 PEASE 96.2; 5. 19 HOMESTEAD 94.8; 6. 4238 DOW 92.7; 7. 136 MAC-
 DILL 92.2; 8. 4339 GRIFFISS 91.4; 9. 321 MCCOY 90.5; 10. 4133 KIM
 89.4; 11. 72 NAMEY 88.3; 12. 99 WESTOVER 85.4; 13. 2 HUNTER 85.1;
 14. 4138 TURNER 84.3; B. REFUELING UNITS. 1. 303 KIMBLEY 93.9;
 2. 4238 WESTOVER 92.1; 3. 19 OTIS 90.2; 4. 11 DOVER 90.3; 5. 317
 MCCUIRE 71.0. C. COMBAT SUPPORT GROUPS (SAC). 1. DOW 99.0;

PAGE TWO RJEXDH 178
 2. TURNER 96.2; 3. PEASE 96.0; 4. HUNTER 94.8; 5. MCCOY 94.0;
 C. MACDILL 93.1; 7. NAMEY 92.7; 8. HOMESTEAD 92.3; 9. WESTOVER
 90.3. PART II. THE FIRST PLACE "R" PENNANT AND STREAMER IS AWARDED
 TO THE 379BOMB WG, HOMESTEAD AFB, FLA. FIRST PLACE "READINESS"
 PLAQUES ARE AWARDED TO THE 313 AIR RFL SQ, KINDLEY AFB, BERMUDA AND
 THE 4038 CHBT SPT GP, DOW AFB, MAINE. PART III. THE OVERALL
 IMPROVEMENT NOTED IN UNIT SCORES OVER THE LAST TESTING CYCLE IS INDEED
 GRATIFYING AND INDICATIVE OF CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN EWG CAPABILITY.
 CONGRATULATIONS TO EACH WINNER. ARRANGEMENTS FOR PRESENTATION OF
 AWARDS WILL BE MADE BY SEPARATE COMMUNICATION.
 BT
 03/1749Z SEP RJEXDH

████████████████████ 4138-C-60-1793

R

82

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
			822 ADIY 28			
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER						
PRECEDENCE	TYPE	MSG	NO.	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION AIR MAIL						
FROM	4195TH STRATEGIC WING, ...				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO	PAC WESTOVER AFB ...					
<p>██████ DEPT 3211 ...</p> <p>SKY SHIELD ...</p> <p>MISSION SUCCESS ...</p> <p>MISSION FOR THIS UNIT ...</p> <p>OFFENSIVE ...</p> <p>A COMPLETELY ...</p> <p>CONSIDERED ...</p> <p>EXAMPLES ...</p> <p>PARTICIPATING ...</p> <p>AND OTHER ...</p> <p>LEARNED FROM ...</p> <p>CAPABILITY ...</p> <p>(?) ONE AIRCRAFT ...</p> <p>LOW LEVEL ...</p>						
SYMBOL		SIGNATURE		DATE		
DCOT		(b) (6)		13 1300		
(b) (6)		(b) (6)		MONTH YEAR		
ONE 22136				SEP 60		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION						

DD FORM 173 MAY 55

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 54 WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

4158-560-2355

84

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM — CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
FROM: 125TH STRATEGIC WING, FORT MEADE, FLA.		[REDACTED]
ALLOWING ATTACKING FIGHTERS TO MAKE CONTACT AT 50,000 FT RATHER THAN IN A LOW LEVEL COMBAT AREA. THE RESULTS OF THIS MISSION AND THE EXCELLENT TRAINING ACCOMPLISHMENT, A REQUIREMENT FOR AT LEAST ONE LARGE SCALE MISSION OF THIS TYPE EXISTS ON A YEARLY BASIS.		
PART II COMMENTS ON ACCURACY OF SUPPORT ITEMS IN EFFECT OR SUCCESS OF OPERATIONS: A. TRAINING: NONE REQUIRED. B. COMMUNICATIONS: ALL COMMUNICATIONS WERE VERY GOOD. THE 41 DEFENSE CHANNELS WERE EFFECTIVELY VECTORED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ON THE BOMBING, UTILIZING THE GUARD CHANNEL AND RECOVERY CHANNEL WHICH WERE NOT JAMMED. ALL OTHER CHANNELS WERE EFFECTIVELY JAMMED. C. PHOTOGRAPHY AND PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT: NONE REQUIRED. D. NAVIGATION: NAVIGATION PHASE OF THE MISSION WAS OUTSTANDING WITH A SEA OF FIVE NAUTICAL MILES. E. FLIGHT ENDURANCE: NOT REQUIRED. F. BOMBING: SOME PORTION OF THIS MISSION WAS VERY GOOD. G. TACTICS: TACTICS EMPLOYED IN THIS MISSION WERE VERY GOOD. H. WEATHER: WEATHER SUPPORT WAS CONSIDERED EXCELLENT. WEATHER AS BRIEFED FOR THIS MISSION HELD TRUE DURING THE FULL LENGTH OF THE SORTIE. I. BASE FACILITIES: ALL AIRCRAFT WERE GENERATED AND AVAILABLE FOR THE MISSION AT THE PRESCRIBED TIME. J. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY: THE AIRCRAFT		
SYMBOL: DCOT	PAGE NO. [REDACTED]	NR OF PAGES [REDACTED]
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		INITIALS
[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]

85

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

JOINT MESSAGE SHEET	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
4135TH STRATEGIC WING, F-15 IN AFB FLA	
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR THIS MISSION WAS GOOD. K. GUNNERY EQUIPMENT: NOT REQUIRED. L. MAPS AND/OR SS SUPPORT: NONE REQUIRED. M. AIR RESCUE: NONE REQUIRED. N. TARGET MATERIALS AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE GUIDES: TARGET MATERIALS FOR THIS MISSION WAS GOOD. O. INTERNAL SECURITY: NONE REQUIRED. P. CRYPTIC: NONE REQUIRED. Q. OTHER PERTINENT DATA: NONE PART III: AIRCRAFT TYPE: NONE	
SYMBOL DCCT	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]

DD FORM 1754

SRA166DHC128
 RRRR JEXSR
 DE RJEXDH 75
 R 221465Z ZKX ZFFZ
 FM SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
 TO ROMEO

QUEBEC
 RJEXHN/28HWG HUNTER AFB GA
 RJEXFH/42HWG LORING AFB ME
 RJEXDS/506BW MACDILL AFB FLA
 RJEXFO/321HWG HOOBY AFB FLA
 RJEXHH/300HWG PLATTSBURGH AFB NY
 RJEXGH/4039STRATWG GRIFFISS AFB NY
 RJEXGL/4135STRATWG EGLIN AFB FLA
 RJEXSE/4138STRATWG TURNER AFB GA
 RJEXFK/4241STRATWG SEYDOR JOHNSON AFB NC

ACTION: Dg-3		TOTAL: 10	
INFO: WIC-5			
DC	DCO	BSO	BDCM
DC	DCM	BJA	BDCO
DM	DCR	BCH	BDCS
WC	SAFE	BDAS	SUCO
DF	DC	BISO	
DS	EFM	BDCE	
MAX/MIN LAW SAFE LIST			

BT
 C 66636. PERSONAL TO ALL COMMANDERS
 FROM COMMANDER SWEENEY. CINCORAC UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE
 C23619, DATED 15 SEP 60, IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION
 AND DISSEMINATION TO ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO YOUR
 COMMAND. QUOTE: PERSONAL FOR GENERALS SWEENEY, OLD,
 MCCONNELL FROM GENERAL POWER. SUBJECT: "SKY SHIELD"
 I HAVE RECEIVED PERSONAL MESSAGES FROM SECRETARY OF THE
 AIR FORCE DOUGLAS AND GENERAL WHITE CONGRATULATING THE
 COMMAND ON ITS OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE DURING EXERCISE
 "SKY SHIELD". OF SPECIAL NOTE TO ME WAS THE SUPERIOR

PAGE TWO RJEXDH75
 MANNER IN WHICH THIS MISSION WAS PLANNED AND EXECUTED.
 THE PLANNERS ARE TO BE COMMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORT. THE
 EXCEPTIONALLY LOW ABORT RATE, AIR AND GROUND, OF TWO
 PER CENT IS INDICATIVE OF THE HIGHEST MAINTENANCE
 STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES AND AGAIN DEMONSTRATES THIS
 COMMAND'S CAPABILITY TO MEET ITS REQUIREMENTS. THE
 PERFORMANCE OF THE B-58 AND SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT
 ARE WORTHY OF SPECIAL NOTE FOR THEIR EXCELLENCE OF
 PERFORMANCE. I WISH TO PASS ON TO ALL PERSONNEL
 CONCERNED MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR A DIFFICULT JOB
 WELL DONE. UNQUOTE. PLEASE CONVEY MY PERSONAL
 CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL OF YOUR OFFICERS AND AIRMEN. IT
 WAS PRIMARILY THROUGH YOUR EFFORTS THAT THIS EXERCISE
 BECAME AN OUTSTANDING SUCCESS.

BT
 22/1613Z SEP RJEDH



SRA166DHC128
 RRRRJKSR
 DE RJKXDH 75
 R 221455Z ZEX ZFF2
 FM 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
 TO ROMEO
 QUEBEC

RJKXNH/28HWG HUNTER AFB GA
 RJKXPH/42HWG LORING AFB NE
 RJKXDH/306BW MAODILL AFB FLA
 RJKXFG/321HWG MCCOY AFB FLA
 RJKXHH/308HWG PLATTSBURGH AFB NY
 RJKXGH/4059STRATWG GRIFFISS AFB NY
 RJKXGL/4135STRATWG EGLIN AFB FLA
 RJKXSK/4138STRATWG TURNER AFB GA
 RJKXPK/4241STRATWG SRYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC


ACTION: D4-3		TOTAL: 10	
wc-5			
INFO:	DCO	BSO	BDCM
DC	DCM	BJA	EDCO
DO	DCR	BCH	EDCS
DM	SAFE	EDAS	SUCO
WC	BC	BISO	
DP	BPM	EDCE	
DS			
MAX/MIN IAW SAFE LIST			

BT
 66536. PERSONAL TO ALL COMMANDERS
 FROM COMMANDER SWEENEY. CINCAS UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE
 025619, DATED 15 SEP 60, IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION
 AND DISSEMINATION TO ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO YOUR
 COMMAND. QUOTE: PERSONAL FOR GENERALS SWEENEY, OLD,
 MCCONNEL FROM GENERAL POWER. SUBJECT: "SKY SHIELD"
 I HAVE RECEIVED PERSONAL MESSAGES FROM SECRETARY OF THE
 AIR FORCE DOUGLAS AND GENERAL WHITE CONGRATULATING THE
 COMMAND ON ITS OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE DURING EXERCISE
 "SKY SHIELD". OF SPECIAL NOTE TO ME WAS THE SUPERIOR

PAGE TWO RJKXDH75
 MANNER IN WHICH THIS MISSION WAS PLANNED AND EXECUTED.
 THE PLANNERS ARE TO BE CONMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORT. THE
 EXCEPTIONALLY LOW ABORT RATE, AIR AND GROUND, OF TWO
 PER CENT IS INDICATIVE OF THE HIGHEST MAINTENANCE
 STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES AND AGAIN DEMONSTRATES THIS
 COMMAND'S CAPABILITY TO MEET ITS REQUIREMENTS. THE
 PERFORMANCE OF THE 3-58'S AND SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT
 ARE WORTHY OF SPECIAL NOTE FOR THEIR EXCELLENCE OF
 PERFORMANCE. I WISH TO PASS ON TO ALL PERSONNEL
 CONCERNED MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR A DIFFICULT JOB
 WELL DONE. UPON YOU. PLEASE CONVEY MY PERSONAL
 CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL BY YOUR OFFICERS AND AIRMEN. IT
 WAS PRIMARILY THROUGH YOUR EFFORTS THAT THIS EXERCISE
 BECAME AN OUTSTANDING SUCCESS.

BT
 22/1613Z SEP RJKXDH





HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
 WESTOVER AIR FORCE BASE
 MASSACHUSETTS




REPLY TO
ATTN OF DCRM


Forwarded to C/S 3 Sept 60


SUBJECT Progress Report #15 to 8AF Supp to SAC PP 10-59, "GAM-77" and
Progress Report #14 to 8AF Supp to SAC PP 11-59, "GAM-72" 

TO See Distribution

BACKGROUND

Thirteen units will equip with GAM-77 (Hound Dog) Weapons System and eight with the GAM-72 (Quail) decoy. Category III. AFR 80-14 testing for both systems will be conducted at Eglin AFB. 

Equipage will be on a basis of squadron UE of 18 GAM-77 missiles. GAM-72 initial operating stocks will be 31 missiles. 

Chanute and Amarillo AFBs are the prime training centers for GAM-77 and GAM-72 maintenance and support personnel. Local training for maintenance personnel and aircrews will be conducted by Mobile Training Detachments. 

HIGHLIGHTS

1. Significant Changes in Program: SAC Message, 9 August 1960 advised the following GAM-77/87 program should be used for planning. The following GAM-72 equipage schedule has been approved:

Base	Unit	GAM-77 Equipage	GAM-77 inactivate	GAM-87 Equipage
Eglin	301BS	Apr 60	Feb 63	Sep 63
Seymour-Johnson	73BS	Jul 60		
Ramey	60BS	Jul 60		
Dow	341BS	Oct 60	Sep 63	Apr 64
Loring	70BS	Nov 60	Jul 63	Feb 64
Griffiss	75BS	Dec 60	Oct 63	May 64
Robins	342BS	Jan 61		
Loring	69BS	Jan 61	Aug 63	Mar 64
Homestead	28BS	Feb 62		
Turner	336BS	Mar 62		
McCoy	9BS	May 62		
Westover	346BS	To be GAM-77 equipped in later years.		

8AF 0527

4138-5-60-2294

Westover

468S

To be GAM-77 equipped in later years.

Base
 Eglin
 Seymour Johnson
 Ramey
 Dow
 Griff
 Robins
 Tilling

GAM-72 Equipage
 Mar - Sep 60
 Aug - Dec 60
 Dec 60 - Jan 61
 Feb 61 - Mar 61
 Apr - Jun 61
 May - Jul 61
 Jul - Sep 61

2. Deficiencies

a. Delays in the SOTB Program have delayed the air launch schedule. SAC Plans is reviewing date schedules published in Annex 2 of SAC GAM 77/72 Training Program.

b. The A&E Squadron at Seymour-Johnson has not received a training GAM-72, neither has the contractor installed the build-up rack in the Maintenance Building. Without training GAMs and the build-up rack A&E and M&S will not receive practical training from the MTD. This could require extensive additional training at a later date if SAC does not resolve this problem prior to 15 September 1960.

c. The following is the GAM 77/72 Missile Box ... as of 19 August 1960

(b) (1) (A)

[REDACTED]

3. Conclusions: The Eighth Air Force Missile Panel is scheduled to visit Bglin the latter part of September 1960. The purpose of this visit is for the panel to evaluate the progress made as a result of the meeting held at Bglin 12-13 July 1960 between SAC, AMC, ARDC, WSMQ and the contractor. At the conference the members agreed to recommendations for corrective action to be taken regarding the GAM 77/72 Program. (C)

This report is classified ~~SECRET~~ because it contains information concerning SAC missile capability. (U)

(b) (6)

Colonel USAF
Director of Comptroller

2 Atch:

1. Staff Comments (S)
2. GSE Status (S)

DISTRIBUTION:

DO	1
DM	4
DPL	3
DE	1
DAS	2
DP	4
DS	1
DKI	5
DCR	3
822 Air Div	2
72 BW	2
820 Air Div	2
4135 Strat Wg	2
45 Air Div	2
75 BS	2

[REDACTED]

STAFF COMMENTS

OPERATIONS

1. Operational and Training Standards are being developed as part of Category III testing. [REDACTED]
2. MTU and other training aids are available and on schedule. [REDACTED]
3. Instructor crew training is being conducted on schedule in conjunction with the Category III test program. Additional serviceable missiles over Category III test needs are not yet available for establishment of a published checkout schedule without the support of the test program missiles. [REDACTED]
4. Delays in the SOTB program have delayed the air launch schedule. SAC Plans is revising date schedules published in Annex 2 of SAC GAM 77/72 training program. [REDACTED]

MATERIEL

1. Contract Technicians: All CTS Personnel in support of GAM-77 have been assigned and are in place at Eglin, Ramey, Seymour Johnson and Dow. All CTS Personnel in support of GAM-72 have been assigned and are in place at Eglin. This project is approximately 75% complete. No slippage. [REDACTED]
2. Missile Deliveries: The GAM-77 UN has been changed to 18. (Reference SAC Message DFLC 0927, 9 Aug 60) Twenty-one GAM-77s are in place at Eglin; two at Ramey; and four at Seymour Johnson. Twenty-one GAM-72s have been assigned and seventeen are in place at Eglin. [REDACTED]
3. Supplies and Equipment:
 - a. Attachment 2 is a summary of data concerning UAL dates, controlled mission equipment and weapons systems spares lay-in starting and in-place dates. On hand percentages are reflected where applicable as well as "as of" dates for initial RCS: AF-S83 and RCS: SAC-5-37 reports. [REDACTED]
 - b. As indicated in previous progress reports, lay-ins for GAM-77 spares have not met programmed dates. SAC recently queried OCAMA on "get well" dates. In reply, OCAMA furnished the following information which includes revised starting and in-place dates for spares lay-in. [REDACTED]

Attachment Nr 1
8AF 0527

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

94

[REDACTED]

<u>Base</u>	<u>OLD</u>		<u>NEW</u>		<u>Get Well</u>
	<u>Start</u>	<u>In Place</u>	<u>Start</u>	<u>In Place</u>	
Eglin	Jul 59	Nov 59	Jul 59	Nov 59	Sep 60
Seymour Johnson	Feb 60	Jun 60	Feb 60	Jun 60	Sep 60
Ramey	Mar 60	Jul 60	Mar 60	Jul 60	Sep 60
Dow	Apr 60	Aug 60	May 60	Oct 60	Oct 60
Loring	May 60	Sep 60	Jul 60	Nov 60	Nov 60
Griffiss	Jun 60	Nov 60	Aug 60	Dec 60	Dec 60
Robins	Jun 60	Nov 60	Aug 60	Dec 60	Dec 60

c. Start and in-place dates have not been changed on the attachment 2 to this progress report as dates reflected on the "Quails and Hound Dogs" chart are extracted from SAC Supply Plans which can only be changed by amendments published by SAC Headquarters. We have queried SAC concerning their plans for amendments to lay-in dates referenced in the OCAMA message. [REDACTED]

d. OCAMA also advised that line items required have been reduced on the GAM-77 spares lay-in at the bases referenced in Paragraph b. above, to 7500 per base with the exception of Eglin where the current requirement is 7727. Overall reduction averages approximately 500 line items per base. Percentage reports reflected in the attachment to this report are based on former requirements, thus all percentages are actually higher than reported. [REDACTED]

e. Three new programs are reported this month for the first time: GAM-72A at Loring (70 IS), GAM-72A at Griffiss, and GAM-72A at Robins. [REDACTED]

f. GAM maintenance procedures [REDACTED] have been distributed to Griffiss and Robins. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. Other Information.

a. A meeting was held at Eglin on 11 July 1960 with AMC, ARDC, SAC, WSFO, and the contractor to establish an investigation team to fix responsibility for the correction of difficulties encountered and to establish target dates for firm fix action. The following actions were agreed upon:

(1) Determine precise configuration of 4135th missiles and select eight of optimum configuration for SOTE. Accomplished 13 July 1960. (OCAMA) [REDACTED]

(2) Convene ECP review board and identify ECPs required for these missiles. Completed 21 July 1960. (OCAMA) [REDACTED]

(3) Bring up to latest approved ECP configuration ASAP. Target date 29 August 1960. (OCAMA) [REDACTED]

(4) Resume launch activities after incorporation of selected guidance ECPs. Dependent on a(3) above. (SACX) [REDACTED]

(5) Resolve disposition of the original SOTE missiles. Target date not determined. (OCAMA & WSFO) (U)

(b) (1) (A)

(7) Facility power check at 4135th completed 28 July 1960. (U) (NAA)

b. The second guidance station has been approved for all GAM organizations. Eglin will receive theirs by Nov 60 and follow on squadrons by Jun 61. [REDACTED]

c. DPL has developed with DM assistance and concurrence a proposed personnel package to augment the GAM manning and provide two shift coverage. This is being coordinated in the headquarters and will be sent to SAC requesting approval. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. **MTD Training:** The GAM-72 MTD is presently at Seymour Johnson conducting class room training. The A&E Squadron has not received a training GAM neither has the contractor installed the build-up rack in the maintenance building. Without training GAMs and the build-up rack A&E and MMS will not receive practical training from the MTD. This could require extensive training at a later date if some action is not taken to solve the problem prior to 15 Sep 60. SAC has been advised of the problem and is endeavoring to ship the necessary equipment to Seymour Johnson by 1 September 1960. [REDACTED]

PERSONNEL

1. **Officer Manning for GAM 72/77:** The GAM requirements have been filled for the following units:

4135 Strat Wg. Eglin AFB
4241 Strat Wg. Seymour Johnson AFB
72 Bomb Wg. Ramey AFB
4038 Strat Wg. Dow AFB
4839 Strat Wg. Griffiss AFB
4137 Strat Wg. Robins AFB
42 Bomb Wg. Loring AFB

Manning for units to be equipped with GAM 77 and 72 later in FY 61 and 62 have not been programmed. These requirements will be filled from additional SAC allocations. [REDACTED]

2. **Airmen - GAM-77 Program:**

a. The programming of airmen to attend formal GAM-77 Missile Technical Training at Chanute AFB for the 69th Bomb Squadron, Loring AFB, has been completed. Graduating dates are scheduled for September and October 1960. Forty-four airmen were programmed to attend Type II formal training courses. Twelve airmen in various missile and missile support specialties are scheduled to receive Type II training and will be provided from ATC Pipeline Technical School graduates. Type III technical trained airmen are scheduled to report to Loring AFB during September and October 1960. [REDACTED]

b. The completion of programming GAM-77 Airmen Missile Technical Training for the 69th Bomb Squadron culminates programming of Type II training of airmen for the eight squadrons assigned to Eighth Air Force equipped with the GAM-77. Subsequent programming of airmen for missile technical training is scheduled to commence during

[REDACTED]

September 1961 to meet class starting dates scheduled for November 1961 for manning and assignment of GAM-77 missile trained airmen at Turner AFB. [REDACTED]

3. Airmen - GAM 72 Program

a. The programming of airmen to attend formal GAM 72, Type II, missile technical training for Dow AFB is continuing as scheduled. [REDACTED]

b. Programming of airmen for GAM 72, Type II, missile technical training for Loring, Robins and Griffiss AFB has not commenced in accordance with scheduled training and equipping dates. [REDACTED]

4. This headquarters queried Headquarters SAC relative to identification of and reporting procedures for airmen who completed GAM 72/77, Type III, missile technical training and subsequently assigned to units of this command scheduled to equip with GAM 72/77. Headquarters SAC has, as a result of this inquiry, issued instructions to all units of SAC amending SAC Manual 30-2 to facilitate the reporting and identification of Type III missile trained airmen. SAC also advised that [REDACTED] Air Force Headquarters will not be furnished input data on these type airman gains. [REDACTED]

CIVIL ENGINEERING

Design or construction status of 72/77 GAM Facilities as of 22 August 1960 was as follows:

Base	Status	% Constr Complete	Completion Date
*Dow	Facilities complete and accepted in Aug 60 except for Ammonia Storage Facility and Power Check Pad which will be completed in September.	98	9-0
*Griffiss	7% behind scheduled progress, but contractor is gaining, according to AFRC representative.	83	12-0

[REDACTED]

Homestead	FY60 MCP. Design instructions have been issued.	0	11-1
*Loring	Complete and accepted	100	7-0
McCoy	FY60 MCP. Design instructions have been issued.		3-2
*Ramey Part I	(Includes all facilities except the combined 72/77 Service Shop). Final inspection conducted 2 August 1960	100	8-0
*Ramey Part II	(Combined Service Shop 72/77). Final acceptance inspection conducted on 2 August 1960	100	8-0
*Robins	Program delayed due to stop order for resiting of missile service shop and bad weather. Base to submit a change for jet engine test pad. Power check pad will not be complete until Sept 60.	75	8-0
*Seymour Johnson	Complete and accepted 10 July 1960	100	7-0
Turner	FY 60 MCP		12-1

*Indicates combined 72/77 Facility. [REDACTED]

INTELLIGENCE

Target Materials: A FREL conference was held at Headquarters SAC to define FREL selection criteria. No changes were made at this time (16-18 August 1960) and continued research is being made by Headquarters SAC. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

QUALITY AND HOWED DOGS		CONTROLLED MISSION EQUIPMENT				WEAPONS SYSTEM SPARES				AS OF 1 AUG 6
BASE	WEAPON	VAL	START	IN PLACE	%	START	IN PLACE	%		
	18 FEB		1 JUL	1 NOV		1 JUL	1 NOV			
EGLIN	72	60	59	59	86	59	59	97		
EGLIN	77	"	1 AUG	1 JAN	87	59	1 JAN	77		
SEYMOUR-JOHNSON	77	"	20 FEB	1 JUN	70	20 FEB	1 JUN	56		
RAMIEY	77	"	1 MAR	1 JUL	65	1 MAR	1 JUL	55		
SEYMOUR-JOHNSON	72	"	1 APR	1 AUG	17	1 APR	1 AUG	46		
DOW	77	"	"	"	62	"	"	42		
LORING (70 BS)	77	18 MAR	1 MAY	1 SEP	28	1 MAY	1 SEP	*1		
ROBINS	77	"	1 JUN	1 NOV	4	1 JUN	1 NOV	*0		
GRIFFISS	77	"	"	"	1	"	"	*0		
RAMIEY	72	1 MAY	1 JUL	1 DEC	10	1 JUL	1 DEC	40		
LORING (69 BS)	77	1 JUN	1 AUG	1 JAN	50	1 SEP	(ADJUST LEVELS)	10 SEP		
DOW	72A	1 JUL	1 SEP	1 FEB	60	1 OCT	1 FEB	10 OCT		
LORING (70 BS)	72A	1 AUG	1 OCT	1 MAR	60	1 NOV	1 MAR	10 DEC		
GRIFFISS	72A	1 SEP	1 NOV	1 APR	60	1 DEC	1 APR	10 JAN		
ROBINS	72A	1 OCT	1 DEC	1 MAY	61	1 JAN	1 MAY	10 FEB		

Atch Nr 2
RAF 0527

NOTE: DATES IN % COLUMNS FOR CHE AND IMPRES ARE "AS OF" DATES FOR INITIAL REPORTS.
% ON PERCENTAGE DUE TO OCMIA PROGRAM CHANGE.

SAC MAY 14 2 10 PM '66
GENERAL PURPOSE WEAPONRY (WAP) (S)

000

[Redacted]

MEMORANDUM
 FOR THE RECORD
 Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

3 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

On Monday, 3 October 1966, I discussed informally with Major Alvin... concerning of GADM TT's during "Dreadful." He said he was familiar with Colonel Wilmore's... reports, and that he was aware that the minute was not available; however, as planned, his office needed more information concerning the GADM TT on airbase alert. He stated that while the GADM could not fly two minutes on every month they would like two minutes from whenever possible. He stated that the determination of what it was possible to fly two minutes on an aircraft during the "Dreadful" was pending and would be advised to Commander, 22nd Air Division, or Commander, 40th Strategic Wing.

In view of the above informal conversation, it appears that the GADM may be required to carry GADM TT's, as available, on "Dreadful."

This information is furnished for necessary action by GADM and information for 22nd Air Division Staff.

A. J. BUNNELL
 Brigadier General, USAF
 Commander

DEX (b) (6)

D/SAFE (b) (6)

Copy to: GADM Staff Wg (C)
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]

D/O CORNER (4) (D/D)

(1) (1+4) =
Info 2

Commander
4136th Strategic Wing
Turner Air Force Base, Georgia

Dear (b) (6)

As President of the Lieutenant Colonel Promotion Board I have spare time. I have reviewed in some detail the B-52 9-1 reports for the month of August. This letter forwards for your information some of my thoughts. It is not a complete analysis.

There are differences in the three wings. The biggest difference is the GAN test support responsibility of the 4135th. I am unable to break out the GAN flying time of the 4135th from the data available to me here at Offutt.

I feel the most progressive step made in the Division recently was the replacement at Turner of mediocre chiefs of Training and Bomb-Nav. This is paying off. Your DCO organization must have aggressive capable officers qualified in the aircraft and experienced in SAC training programs.

I have limited this analysis to Bombing, Navigation, Air Refueling and Pilot Proficiency only.

I offer this data to assist you in evaluating your DCO and staff performance in getting training from available hours during August as contrasted with the other two Division wings. Optimum performance means completion of operational requirements with less strain on maintenance.

Sincerely

AUSTIN J. RUSSELL
Brigadier General, USAF

FILE COPY

copy

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Commander
4135th Strategic Wing
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

Dear (b) (6)

As President of the Lieutenant Colonel Promotion Board I have spare time. I have reviewed in some detail the B-52 T-1 reports for the month of August. This letter forwards for your information some of my thoughts. It is not a complete analysis.

There are differences in the three wings. The biggest difference is the GAM test support responsibility of the 4135th. I am unable to break out the GAM flying time of the 4135th from the data available to me here at Offutt.

I feel the most progressive step made in the Division recently was the replacement at Turner of mediocre chiefs of Training and Bomb-Nav. This is paying off. Your DCO organization must have aggressive capable officers qualified in the aircraft and experienced in SAC training programs.

I have limited this analysis to Bombing, Navigation, Air Refueling and Pilot Proficiency only.

I offer this data to assist you in evaluating your DCO and staff performance in getting training from available hours during August as contrasted with the other two Division wings. Optimum performance means completion of operational requirements with less strain on maintenance.

Sincerely

AUSTIN J. HESSELL
Brigadier General, USAF

105

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Commander
4841st Strategic Wing
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina

Dear (b) (6)

As President of the Lieutenant Colonel Promotion Board I have spare time. I have reviewed in some detail the D-32 T-1 reports for the month of August. This letter forwards to you information some of my thoughts. It is not a complete analysis.

There are differences in the three wings. The biggest difference is the GAN test support responsibility of the 4135th. I am unable to break out the GAN flying time of the 4135th from the data available to me here at Offutt.

I feel the most progressive step made in the Division recently was the replacement at Turner of mediocre chiefs of Training and Bomb-Mov. This is paying off. Your DCO organization must have aggressive capable officers qualified in the aircraft and experienced in SAC training programs.

I have limited this analysis to Bombing, Navigation, Air Refueling and Pilot Proficiency only.

I offer this data to assist you in evaluating your DCO and staff performance in getting training from available hours during August as contrasted with the other two Division wings. Optimum performance means completion of operational requirements with less strain on maintenance.

Sincerely

AUBREY J. RUSSELL
Brigadier General, USAF

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Analysis of T-1

1. Utilization of RBS.

	For August		For Period	
	High	Low	High	Low
4135th	91%	85%	90%	76%
4138th	93%	83%	91%	84%
4241st	86%	86%	83%	81%

Reasonable. Get all we can but turn in unwanted time to Eighth Air Force to avoid being charged for it.

2. Utilization of Flying Time.

August for Bombing, Navigation, Air Refueling and Pilot Proficiency items:

	Sched.	Items Scheduled	Airborne	Accomplished
4135th	557	321	320/100%	287/90%
4241st	594	221	214/97%	194/88%
4138th	513	252	251/100%	203/81%

The 4135th accomplished 23 other items or 9% of schedule.
 The 4138th accomplished 84 other items or 26% of schedule. This looks high.
 The 4241st accomplished only 3 other items or 1%.

Lost inflight to:	Material	Operations	Weather	Other
4135th	14	19 (looks high)	12	3
4138th	12	5	1-	2
4241st	18	2	0	0

Index point performance (Bombing, Navigation, Air Refueling and Pilot Proficiency)

	Scheduled	Airborne	Accomplished
4135th	777	770/99%	650/83% (Low)
4138th	1220	1219/100%	1111/91%
4241st	894	875/98%	811/91%

Points per hour of flight:

4135th	1.25
4138th	1.7 (best)
4241st	1.36

24/07 58

SRA365DHB709
RR RJEXSR
DE RJEXDH 316
R 232000Z ZEX
FM SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO XRAY
YANKEE ✓
INFO ROMEO ✓



ACTION: DCO-15 TOTAL: 27

INFO	DCO	DSO	DECH
DC	DCM	BJA	EDCO
DM	DCR	BCH	EDCS
WC	SAFE	EDAS	SUCO
DF	EC	RISO	
DS	EPM	EDCE	

MAX/MIN LAW SAFE LIST

RR RJEXDH
DE RJEXDH 316
R 232000Z ZEX
FM SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO YANKEE
BT

DOI 64770B. ACTION: XRAY, YANKEE, INFO: ROMEO.
SUBJECT: AUGUST AND MAY-AUGUST "HEADS UP" FINAL STANDINGS. THIS
MSG IN TWO PARTS. PART I. FOLLOWING ARE THE FINAL STANDINGS AND
TOTAL POINTS ACHIEVED IN COMPLETION FOR MAY -AUGUST "HEADS UP"

PLAQUE:

STANDING	UNIT	POINTS
1	379 BOMB WC	2898
2	100 BOMB WC	2839
3	99 BOMB WC	2817
4	509 BOMB WC	1967

100 BOMB WC 2839
99 BOMB WC 2817
509 BOMB WC 1967
379 BOMB WC 2898

100 BOMB WC 2839
99 BOMB WC 2817
509 BOMB WC 1967
379 BOMB WC 2898

PAGE TWO RJEXDH 316

5	2 BOMB WG	1871
6	306 BOMB WG	1843
7	321 BOMB WG	1746
8	4138 STRAT WG	1694
9	19 BOMB WG	1672
10	4135 STRAT WG	1623
11	380 BOMB WG	1572
12	4241 STRATWG	1546
13	42 BOMBWG	1303

PART II. SAME INFORMATION FOR AUGUST "HEADS UP" PLAQUE IS AS FOLLOWS:

STANDING	UNIT	POINTS
1	19 BOMB WG	2091
2	379 BOMBWG	2066
3	509 BOMB WG	2057
4	99 BOMBWG	2029
5	100 BOMBWG	2026
6	380 BOMBWG	1851
7	321 BOMBWG	1782
8	2 BOMBWG	1715
9	306 BOMBWG	1647

PAGE TWO RJEXDH 316

10	4138 STRATWG	1541
11	4135 STRATWG	1517
12	42 BOMBWG	1436
13	4241 STRATWG	1236

BT 25/2019Z SEP RJEXDH III

RECEIVED
 10171 60112 YCHIAED IN COMPELLITION BOO NYE - 100000 REVD2 06
 000 IN 100 00012 0000 1 0000000 000 0000 0000000 000
 000000 00000 000 000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000
 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000

BT
 25/2019Z SEP RJEXDH III
 10171 60112 YCHIAED IN COMPELLITION BOO NYE - 100000 REVD2 06
 000 IN 100 00012 0000 1 0000000 000 0000 0000000 000
 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000
 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000

UNIT	TYPE	DATE	TIME	STATUS
101	101	101	101	101
102	102	102	102	102
103	103	103	103	103
104	104	104	104	104
105	105	105	105	105
106	106	106	106	106
107	107	107	107	107
108	108	108	108	108
109	109	109	109	109
110	110	110	110	110



26
70K
21/00 51

SRA089DHB443
RR RJEXSR
DE RJEXDH 362
R 212020Z
FM 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO 822AIRDIV TURNER AFB GA

BT
DO 64741B. SUBJECT: MAJOR LEAGUE. HAVING
ATTAINED AN AIR REFUELING EFFICIENCY OF 95 PERCENT OR
HIGHER DURING THE TRAINING PERIOD ENDING 31 AUGUST 1960,
THE 911TH AIR REFUELING SQUADRON OF YOUR COMMAND IS
AWARDED "MAJOR LEAGUE STATUS". THIS UNIT IS IMMEDIATELY
AUTHORIZED TO MARK THEIR AIRCRAFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
8AF LTR, 5 NOV 59, SUBJ: MAJOR LEAGUE MARKINGS. THESE
MARKINGS WILL REMAIN ON THE AIRCRAFT UNTIL SUCH TIME
AS THE SQUADRON'S AIR REFUELING EFFICIENCY DROPS BELOW
THE ESTABLISHED PERCENTAGE FOR A TRAINING PERIOD, AT
WHICH TIME THEY WILL BE REMOVED.
BT
21/2047Z SEP RJEXDH



ATTN: DO-5 TOTAL: 1

DO	2	DCD		ESD		ESCH	
NO		DCM		EJA		ESCO	
EN	1	DCR		DCN		ESCS	
WC		WAFS		EDAS		ESD	
OP		EC		ESD			
IS		WFE		ESCH			
LAW STATE LIST							

NNNNM

61
 SRAS85DHB101
 RR RJEXGL
 DE/RJ
 09/2000x

SRAS85DHB101
 RR RJEXSR
 DE RJEXDH 268
 R 091925Z ZEX ZFF Z
 FM SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
 TO RJEXGL/41351RA1WG EGLIN AFB FLA
 INFO RJEXSR/822AIRDIV TURNER AFB GA

BT
 DC 64539B. FOR COMMANDER NOLAN FROM DEPUTY
 COMMANDER HARRIS. CONGRATULATIONS ON WINNING THE MAJOR GENERAL
 SELSER TROPHY FOR "TEAM SCRIMMAGE" EXERCISES DURING THE MAY-
 AUGUST PERIOD. THE 4135TH DISTINGUISHED ITSELF BY SCORING 100 PER
 CENT OF POINTS IN ALL PHASES OF THE MISSION. WE WERE PARTICULARLY
 IMPRESSED BY THE OUTSTANDING OEA ACHIEVED BY YOUR UNIT. PLEASE
 PASS GENERAL SWEENEY'S AND MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL
 STAFF, AIRCREW AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL FOR THEIR PART IN THIS
 EXEMPLARY PERFORMANCE.

BT
 09/1930Z SEP RJEXDH



APPROVED:		TOTAL: 7	
INFO	DCO	DDO	DDM
DC	DCM	BJA	DDN
DD	DCR	DCI	DDC
WC	SAFE	EDAS	DDO
DP	DC	EDS	
DS	DDM	EDC	

NAV/AFV TAV CAP 1ST

NNNN

114

[REDACTED]

Headquarters
822D AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

21 September 1960

Reply to
Attn Of: DO

Subject: Operations Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing

TO: 822 Air Div (C)
4241 Strat Wg (C)

1. A staff visit to the 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB, N. C., was conducted 12 - 16 September 1960, by the following personnel from this Directorate:

Major (b) (6)

2. Personnel contacted:

Colonel (b) (6), DCM, Acting Wing Commander
Major (b) (6) Chief Intelligence Division
Major (b) (6), Chief Combat Operations

3. This staff visit was conducted for the purpose of checking the combat mission folders for the (b) (1) (A) (b) (1) (A) bomber folders and (b) (1) (A) tanker folder were checked for content and accuracy. The overall condition of these folders was excellent with the following exceptions:

a. Last Resort bombing computations have not been completed. These computations are in the process of completion but have been held up due to a lack of complete computation data.

*b. The pilots' jackets (b) (1) (A) (b) (1) (A) required by the 8AF CMF checklist. (b) (1) (A) for the primary Post Strike Base only is contained in the pilots' flimsies. This information should be transferred to the pilots' jackets and the (b) (1) (A) (b) (1) (A) should also be included in the pilots' jackets.

*c. Enroute Emergency Base and Alternate Post Strike Bases are not annotated on the strip charts in some cases. In those

[REDACTED]

4138-C-60-1930

[REDACTED]

instances where these bases are not on the Strip charts, annotations on the High Level Back-Up charts are supposed to be accomplished. The Back-Up charts had not been annotated in any of the folders.

d. (b) (1) (A) Hound Dog Bomb Run Insert, the radar scope montages for (b) (1) (A) and (b) (1) (A) appear to be in reverse order.

e. 8AF Form 21B, Celestial Pre-Computations, has been substituted in many cases for the required SAC Form 289.

f. In several instances, pilots' flimsies were observed to contain incorrect total page counts.

g. There were numerous instances where the wrong route number was listed in the pilots' and observers' flimsies. In most cases, this number was correct in one section and wrong in another.

h. Departure instructions in the pilots' and observers' flimsies include a repeat of much of the information contained in EWO safe passage procedures. This information should be consolidated.

i. The Last Resort bombing data in the pilots' and observers' flimsies contained a bomb run checklist which is already contained in the normal peacetime flight checklists. This is a repeat item.

j. The communications section of the pilots' flimsies did not contain the required Cervis report format.

k. The 8AF checklist requires emergency bomb run data in the strike section of the observers' flimsies. These flimsies had a part of this emergency data in the proper section, but it was labeled Last Resort Bombing. In addition, emergency bombing data contained in the emergency section of the observers' flimsies is no longer required. All emergency bomb run data should be consolidated and placed in the strike section of the observers' flimsies.

l. (b) (1) (A) target ^{(b) (1) (A)} had a 565 foot error in the #2 off-set computation. This error was due to a failure to recompute off-set values upon receipt of an amendment changing the position of DGZ. The DGZ had been replotted in all cases.

[REDACTED]

m. The pilots' flimsies of both the tanker and bomber folders contained a home base taxi map which is not required by the 8AF checklist.

n. Tanker sortie ^{(b) (1) (A)} pilot's flimsy contained an incorrect total page count.

o. Study folders for the bomber sorties need to be brought up to date in accordance with the latest 8AF checklist. The information available, however, was adequate.

NOTE: In those cases where an asterisk appears beside individual discrepancies, it should be noted that the combat mission folder checklist contained in (b) (1) (A) either did not require or was hazy as to what information was required. The new 8AF checklist just recently published was used to inspect these combat mission folders and the personnel of the 4241st Strategic Wing had not had time to review and accomplish the necessary changes.

4. RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the combat mission folders discrepancies listed in paragraphs 3a - 3c be reviewed, corrected, and brought up to date in accordance with the latest 8AF combat mission folder checklist.

(b) (6)

LtCol, USAF
Operations Staff Officer

SP44
 DAB 152230Z
 MM RWXBR
 RWXBR 516
 M 152230Z ZEK
 FM CINCASAC OFFUTT AFB
 TO ALFA
 BRAVO
 CHARLIE
 DELTA
 FOXTROT
 GOLFA
 BT

ACTION: DCO - 10		TOTAL: 2-1	
DO	DCO	DDO	DDCS
DM	DCN	DDA	DDCJ
WC	SAFE	DDM	DDCS
DP	DC	DDO	DDCJ
DS	DDC	DDO	DDCJ
MAY/SEP 152230Z			



MM [REDACTED] DO 13913.
 THIS MSG SENT TO ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA, FOXTROT AND GOLF.
 SUBJECT: INTERIM CHANGE 1 TO SACM 27-1, JULY 69. THIS MSG IN TWO
 PARTS. PART I. PARAGRAPH 11B CHAPTER 2, IS CHANGED TO READ: GROUND
 TRAINING. UNIT CAPABILITY AND MORALE BENEFIT IF DUTY PERIODS ON ALERT,
 REFLEX, AIR MAIL, OR TDY CAN BE USED TO CONDUCT GROUND TRAINING AS
 REQUIRED IN SACM 23-24. MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF THIS TEAM IS URGED TO
 ACCOMPLISH ORGANIZED GROUND TRAINING WHILE CREWS ARE ON ALERT.
 EFFICIENT USE OF ALERT TIME FREES AIRCREW PERSONNEL FOR OTHER
 ACTIVITIES DURING NONALERT PERIODS. TO PROVIDE THIS TRAINING ON TDY,

PAGE TWO RWXBR 516
 ALERT, OR REFLEX REQUIRES THAT THE GROUND TRAINING SCHEDULE (ALONG
 WITH FACILITIES, INSTRUCTORS, AND TRAINING AIDS) BE ADAPTED TO FIT
 THE ALERT, REFLEX, OR AIR MAIL SITUATION. IN PLANNING FOR SUCH
 TRAINING SUPPORT, EACH AGENCY CONCERNED SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING
 FACTORS: (U). SUBPARAGRAPHS (1), (2) AND (3) REMAIN UNCHANGED.
 PART II. PARAGRAPH 17D(1) CHAPTER 2, IS CHANGED TO READ: NUMBERED
 AIR FORCE COMMANDERS WILL INSURE THAT SAC FLIGHT CREWS AND MISSILE
 LAUNCH CREWS ARE GRANTED COMPENSATORY TIME OFF FOR HOME STATION ALERT
 DUTY. THIS WILL NORMALLY BE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ALERT DUTY TOUR.
 IF AIRCREWS PERFORM A SHORT TOUR OF ALERT DUTY WHICH DOES NOT EXCEED
 3 DAYS, COMMANDERS MAY FLY THESE CREWS ON ONE SORTIE IMMEDIATELY
 AFTER THE ALERT TOUR. COMPENSATORY TIME OFF WILL BEGIN UPON
 COMPLETION OF THE SORTIE. THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF TIME OFF IS
 ESTABLISHED AS 50 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ALERT DUTY PERIOD. AT LEAST HALF
 OF THIS TIME OFF WILL BE DURING NORMAL DUTY DAYS. (U) THIS INTERIM
 CHANGE WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL 1 OCTOBER 1969 UNLESS SOONER
 SUPERSEDED BY A FORMAL CHANGE.
 BT
 15/22332 AUG RWXBR

NNNN

2/07402

SRA883
SXB475
MM RJEXSR

ZBK
BRJ422
RR RJEXDHB RJEXBO REXCM REXDH
DE RJWXR 255
M 201700Z ZEX
FM SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO ALFA
INFO INDIA
KILO
JULIET
MIKE
BT



ACTION: DCO-10		TOTAL: 13	
DCO	RJEXDM	RJEXHM	RJEXSR
DC	DCO	BSO	EDCM
NO	DCM	BJA	EDCO
DM	DCR	BCH	EDCS
MC	SAFE	BDAS	SUCO
DP	BC	BISO	
SS	BPM	EDCE	
MAX/MIN IAW SAFE LIST			

BT
BOTPA-24595. SUBJECT: FLYING IMMEDIATELY FOLLOING
ALERT. THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PART I. THIS HEADQUARTERS
RECENTLY AUTHORIZED TECTICAL UNITS TO FLY CREWS ON TRAINING SORTIES
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ALERT TOURS THAT WERE OF NO MAORE THAN THREE
DAYS DURATION (REF UNCLAS D013913, 15 AUG). THIS CONCESSION WAS
WITH ALERT DUTIES, THERBY REDUCING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CREW DAYS
REQUIRED FOR COLLECTIVE SUPPORT OF BOTH THE ALERT PSOTURE AND THE
FLYING TRAINING PROGRAM. AND EVALUATION OF THIS CONCEPT IS NOW DESIRED.
PART II. REQUEST THE FOLLWOING INFORMATION BE SUBMITTED THIS HEAD-


SS - 23 Sep 60
DD - 26 Sep 60

PAGE TWO RJWXR 255
QUARTER, ATTN: DOTP BY 26 SEPT 60: A. LIST OF UNITS THAT HAVE
IMPLEMENTED THE PROPOUED PROCEDURE. B. LIST OF UNITS THAT HAVE NOT
IMPLEMENTED THE PROCEDURE BUT INTEND TO DO SO BY 1 OCT 60. C. LIST
OF UNITS THAT DO NOT INTEND TO USE THE PROCEDUREA. D. SUMMARY OF
WING COMMANDER'S RECTIONS TO THE IDEA. E. THE NUMBERED AIR FORCE
COMMENTS REGARDING THIS PROCEDURE.

BT
20/16472 SEP RJWXR

1 CR
100-15

SR0923DHB249
RR RJEXFK RJEXGF RJEXGL RJ



SR0923DHB249
RR RJEXSR
DE RJEXDH 201
R 121710Z ZEX
FM BAF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO VICTOR
RJEXSA/72BW RAHEY AFB PR
RJEXDP/4038SW DOW AFB ME
RJEXSR/4138SW TURNAR AFB GA

DCO-10 17

DOO	DOO	DOO	DOO
DCN	DCN	DCN	DCN
DCN	DCN	DCN	DCN
SAFE	SAFE	SAFE	SAFE
DC	DC	DC	DC
DC	DC	DC	DC

MAX/MIN LOW SAFE LIST

BT
DOI 64607B
ACTION: VICTOR: 72BW, 4038SW AND 4138SW, ACTION FOR WING
DOO. SUBJECT: BIG BLAST MISSION REQUIREMENTS. PART I OF II
PARTS. THE MINIMUM AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENT FOR EACH ISUE B-52
UNIT ON SACR 50-8 BIG BLAST MISSIONS IS REDUCED FROM THREE (3)
TO TWO (2). PART II. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE URGED TO COMBINE
BIG BLAST SORTIES WITH OTHER UNITS WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO
PROVIDE MORE REALISTIC PENETRATIONS OF MORAD FACILITIES.
BT
12/1846Z SEP RJEXDH

Headquarters
822D AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

Reply to
Attn Of: SAFE

21 September 1960

SUBJECT: Staff Visit to 4138th Strategic Wing, 6 - 8 September 1960

TO: 822 Air Div (C)
4138 Strat Wg (C)

1. A staff visit was conducted to the 4138th Strategic Wing, 6 - 8 September 1960 and 21 September 1960, by the 822d Air Division Director of Safety.

2. Personnel contacted:

Colonel (b) (6)	Commander, 4138 Strat Wg
Major (b) (6)	Dir of Safety, 4138 Strat Wg
Capt (b) (6)	Dir of Safety, 4138 Cmbt Supp Gp
Mr. (b) (6)	Safety Engineer, 4138 Cmbt Supp Gp

3. The following report reflects only a limited portion of the Ground Safety Program of the 4138th Combat Support Group.

4. The Organizational Chart of the 4138th Strategic Wing Safety Office is up-to-date.

Action: None required.

5. All job descriptions are up-to-date and were last signed 30 August 1960.

Action: None required.

6. Orders assigning squadron safety officers are not on file for the 919th Air Refueling Squadron and the 336th Bomb Squadron. A check revealed that the 336th Bomb Squadron does have a Ground Safety Officer assigned and on orders, however, these orders were not forwarded to the Base Safety Office. The same applies to the 919th AREFS.

Action: Comply with 8AFM 32-1 and Base Reg 32-1.

7. The 30 days squadron inspection reports are submitted on Turner Form 14. This is primarily an adjective form wherein an inspector places a check mark in a deficient area. As such, it is evident that either the form is not adequate or is being

improperly used. Several reports reviewed showed no deficiencies, and hence no comments for a complete month within a squadron area.

Action: Safety inspections are an important component of an aggressive Ground Safety Accident Prevention Program. Spot inspections will be conducted by the Wing and Base Safety staffs of respective facilities and activities at least once every 60 days. Reference SACR 59-1 and 8AFM 32-1. This program lacks the necessary activity to make it effective.

8. A current Safety Committee is functioning and minutes are being published as required by 8AFM 32-1.

Action: None required.

9. The Ground Safety Officer is professionally qualified to perform as a Safety Engineer, however, it is felt that he is devoting too much time to the administrative details of the office.

Action: The Ground Safety Officer could best utilize his skills in the overall Ground Accident Prevention Program by leaving administrative details to the office staff. It is suggested at this time that he accomplish a complete Ground Safety Survey, using the October 1959 8AF Survey as a guide. It was noted during this staff visit that a number of items listed by 8AF have not been corrected. This survey should be presented to the Commander for review and action, if necessary.

10. The SF 46 Operator's Permit, of 11 vehicle operators was checked on the flight line on 6 August 1960. The information taken from these permits was cross-checked against AF Form 504, Driver Training Records, in the Base Drivers School. The following discrepancies were noted:

a. Four of the eleven permits had no records (AF Form 504) in the Driver School files. One of the four was an expired license.

b. Two of the remaining seven records (AF Form 504) were not stamped "Authorized to Drive on the Flight Line."

c. One airman was driving a tug not authorized on his SF 46 or on his AF Form 504. This item was corrected next day.

d. One operator driving a refueling rig did not have such authorized on the AF Form 504.

e. Three drivers SF 46 and their records, AF Form 504, complied with all regulations.

f. The Base Drivers School is not notified of accidents and moving violations by the Provost Marshal. They, therefore, have no way of keeping their AF Form 504's correct and cannot take necessary action to revoke or suspend permits of repeat violators.

11. The only indication of special equipment training in the records are DF's from the squadron stating that the man is qualified and requesting that he be licensed for special purpose equipment. In accordance with SACM 77-2, paragraph 4g, the Base Motor Transport Officer is the only government vehicle license issuing agent. He is responsible for insuring that an applicant is fully qualified before issuing an Operator's Permit. Recommend: As minimum steps to insure that this officer knows the quality of the drivers to whom he issues permits, that he:

a. Check the qualifications of special purpose equipment instructors assigned within each organization.

b. Periodically spot check the actual instruction conducted within the unit.

c. Develop operational safety tests on each different type of special purpose equipment in conjunction with the Drivers' School, the using organization, and the Base Safety Office.

d. Administer these tests at the Base Drivers' School prior to issuing licenses.

12. There are no special purpose equipment operators' tests on file in the Base Drivers' School. Recommendation: See comments above.

13. The Base Drivers' School is without an NCO, and the administrative responsibilities are now being assumed by an Airman Second Class. The records of the School have regressed since the last survey, October 1959.

14. Safe Driver Award, AF Form 192, has not been determined or awarded, despite request to do so by the Office of Safety.

15. Driver Permits, SF 46, are being taken from drivers by parties unknown and sent to the Base Driver School in envelopes without accompanying correspondence in explanation. This information is vital to the maintenance of AF Form 504.

Action:

a. A qualified NCO should be placed in charge of the Base Drivers' School and its records.

b. AF Form 504 and SF 46's should agree and each be complete and compatible with the other.

c. Due to the absence of some driver records, AF Form 504, a complete survey of all driver permits on the base should be accomplished. AF Form 504 should be in the file for each SF 46 issued.

d. SF 46 should not be suspended by any individual without proper coordination with the Motor Pool Officer.

e. Special purpose vehicle programs and testing of instructors for these programs should be a special subject for the Base Drivers' School and its commander. The need for this program is stressed as it reflects on the ability of flight line drivers of special purpose equipment to safely perform their driving.

f. AF Form 504's for all personnel departing on PCS should be picked up by the individual and carried to the new station. This requirement is not now a part of the Base Clearance Form for departure.

16. The minutes of the Traffic Accident Review Board for August were checked and the following notes were made:

a. SSgt (b) (6) 4138 A/C Supp Sq. Off base DUI. Action by Unit: Assessed 12 points under AFR 125-14. This was a second offense so decal was removed by Base Police for 12 months. Airman received Article 15 and was sent to Traffic Violator Clinic.

b. TSgt (b) (6) 4138 OMS. Off base DUI and driving without license. Action by Unit: Assessed 12 points under AFR 125-14, decal removed for 6 months by Base Police. Airman had valid Kansas driver's license, not recognized by Georgia.

c. A1C (b) (6) 4138 CSG Hq Sq, Off base DUI and reckless driving. Action by Unit: Placed on control roster and assessed 12 points under AFR 125-14. Reprimanded. This is a second offense; vehicle was reregistered 11 July; decal was reregistered 2 August for 12 months.

d. A3C (b) (6) 4138 OMS. Running traffic light and no driver's license. Action by Unit: Assessed 6 points under AFR 125-14 and given a written reprimand. The car is not registered on the base.

e. SP-4 (b) (6) B Battery, 2 Missile Bn. 40 MPH in 20 MPH zone by Base Police. Previous offenses: DUI - 1 Jun 60. Action by Unit: SCM, \$40 fine, 21 days restriction. Base Police removed decal 6 August for 1 year.

f. A2C (b) (6) 4138 OMS, 45 MPH on access road by Base Police. Action by Unit: Assessed 2 points under AFR 125-14, and attending Traffic Violator Clinic.

g. SSgt (b) (6) 4138 A&EM Sq. Off base DUI. Action by Unit: Airman found "Not Guilty" by civil authorities.

h. MSgt (b) (6) 4138 OMS, Off Base DUI. Action by Unit: Assessed 12 points under AFR 125-14; decal removed for 6 months.

i. A3C (b) (6) 4138 FMS. 40 MPH in 20 MPH zone by Base Police. Action by Unit: Assessed 4 points under AFR 125-14 and attending Traffic Violator Clinic.

j. A3C (b) (6) 4138 CESq. Off base DUI. Action by Unit: To be tried by civil authorities on 17 Oct. Does not have car registered on base.

k. The Traffic Accident Review Board should be more specific in its recommendation for suspension or revocation of drivers' licenses.

1. The 4138th Strat Wg is to be complimented for taking adequate and stringent action involving a traffic offense.

17. The Traffic Violator Clinic is held monthly in accordance with 8AFM 32-1 and AFR 32-7. The TVC was organized and has functioned under Ground Safety since the 4138th Strat Wg was organized. Hours consumed by this function are at least 20 a month, consisting of clerical work, follow-up, and monitoring. Since this is a remedial or punitive function, it is believed that Ground Safety should not be directly responsible for it.

Action: (Repeat Item) It is strongly urged that the responsibility for the Traffic Violator Clinic be placed on the Deputy Commander for Law Enforcement. In actual operation this clinic is essentially punitive as it requires airmen to attend classes during their off-duty time. Airmen who attend the Traffic Violator Clinic are seldom unskillful drivers. They are detailed to the class for willful violations of traffic rules and regulations. Detailing of airmen to attend this Clinic is punitive action. Punitive action should not be a function of the Office of Safety. Ground Safety should only assist the Traffic Violator Clinic by teaching one off-duty class of the five classes required. Administration of the class should be removed from the jurisdiction of the Office of Safety. This recommendation coincides with the views of 8AF Safety as stated during their Ground Safety Survey visit 19-23 October 1959.

18. A visit to the 919th Air Refueling Squadron revealed that the Ground Safety Program of the squadron has not been completely organized. A Ground Safety Officer has been appointed; however, there was little evidence of any other activity in Ground Safety. It could not be determined how ground safety information was being distributed to flight crews and other personnel. The 919th ARS is using Turner Form 15 for leave purposes. Checking several forms indicated that in some cases, the form is not filled out properly and with little or no information on others that were reviewed. The squadron has just established a Ground Safety Committee, however, they have not had a committee meeting as of this date.

Action: An organized Ground Safety Program must be established within the 919th AREFS. It is recommended that Turner Form 15 be revised to show return date of individual, signature of briefing officer, and a briefing aid on the back side of the form would be useful.

19. The 4138th Motor Pool is well organized, and all operations observed were conducted in a safe and orderly manner. An inspection of buses and trucks that could be dispatched to the flight line revealed that clearance and stop lights on several were not functional. These discrepancies were corrected immediately.

Action: Closer inspection of vehicles by dispatchers and drivers could eliminate these problems. Indoctrination of all drivers in the proper use of AFTO Form 50A is indicated.

20. The contents of this staff visit were discussed with Colonel (b) (6) in the absence of Colonel (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Major, USAF
Director of Safety

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



(UNCLASSIFIED) Informal Report of Nuclear Safety
Survey of the B-52/GBM-77 Weapon System at the
4135th Strategic Wing
4135th Strategic Wing
Melvin AFB, Florida

29 September 1960

1. (SECRET) During the period 20-30 September 1960, a Nuclear Safety Survey of the B-52/GBM-77 nuclear weapon system was conducted at the 4135th Strategic Wing, Melvin Air Force Base, by a team from the Directorate of Nuclear Safety Research, Office of The Deputy Inspector General for Safety, The Inspector General, United States Air Force. The team included a representative of the Directorate of Missile Safety Research and the Air Force Special Weapons Center. It should be noted that the 4135th Strategic Wing, although operational with nuclear bombs, is not operational with the GBM-77. The wing is conducting Category III testing of the GBM-77/B-52 weapon system in cooperation with the SAC Project Office Test Director. The complete weapon system, including maintenance cycling and operational procedures, is included in the Strategic Operational Test Evaluation. The operational data will depend on Category III test results. To date, all missile loadings have been with inert warheads (training or non-tactical instrumentation kits) and no GBM-77's have been loaded on alert aircraft.

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Purpose of the Survey. The primary purpose of the survey was:

a. To determine whether or not the formal safety rules established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the operation of the above nuclear weapon system were in effect.

b. To determine the degree of compliance of the safety rules, design features, and procedures for the operation of the above nuclear weapon system with the recommendations and evaluation of this weapon system by the Air Force Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group.

c. To evaluate the adequacy, workability, and effectiveness of the safety rules, design features, and operational procedures established for the above nuclear weapon system under actual field conditions.

d. To assist the Commander, 4135th Strategic Wing, through an evaluation of his overall nuclear safety program and through appropriate recommendations in the event the survey disclosed deficiencies of a magnitude of substantially hazardous nature.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] Description of Activities of the Survey Team. Following a general discussion with the Deputy Commander for Operations and staff of the 4135th Strategic Wing concerning the purpose and scope of the survey, the survey team was taken to the 54th WSC Area to observe the breakout and inspection of a W-38 training warhead. In the Surveillance and Inspection Building, adapters were fitted for installing the warhead into the GAN-77 missile and the warhead was transported to the warhead mating building on an engine trailer. At the warhead mating building, the warhead was transferred to a type 4100B positioning trailer and the warhead was installed in the GAN-77. The survey team witnessed the transport of the missile to a B-52 and the subsequent loading of the missile on the aircraft. The aircraft was placed on a simulated alert status and "boosted" by the aircrew. Security measures were observed within the storage, maintenance, and loading areas. The warhead maintenance and storage facilities and procedures were investigated. A short questionnaire covering aircrew delivery procedures was given to aircrews checked out in the GAN-77. The 4135th Strategic Wing nuclear safety program was reviewed. Training records, training regulations, and personnel screening methods were reviewed with appropriate staff members. Procedures in effect to prevent an unauthorized launch of the alert force were investigated. At the conclusion of the survey, an informal critique for the Commander and staff was conducted.

4. [REDACTED] Favorable Comments.

- a. [REDACTED] All maintenance, loading, and aircrew work thorough and meticulous in the use of prescribed check lists.
- b. [REDACTED] The survey team members were impressed with the cooperation of all personnel and their evident interest, concern and initiative with respect to the development and maintenance of effective nuclear safety practices.

(b) (1) (A)

6. (SECRET) AF Nuclear Weapons System Safety Program Review Report
Pre-Operational Safety Board of the B-52/GAN-77 Weapon System, dated
11 March 60. No deviations from the features described in the report
were observed. All recommendations of subject report have been
implemented.

7. Areas Requiring Attention.

- a. [REDACTED] Nuclear Safety Program. Air Force Regulation
122-1, dated 15 May 1960, requires the establishment of a Nuclear
Safety Program within all SAC wings. This regulation has not been

[REDACTED]

AFD-66-8-1099/1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

completely implemented within the 4135th Strategic Wing. To be effective, a Nuclear Safety Program must be published, directive in nature, and receive command emphasis. The 4135th Strategic Wing Director of Safety is responsible for the entire safety program including flight, missile, ground and nuclear safety. The wing has only one position authorized for this total responsibility.

Recommendation: It will be recommended that Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, review the unit manning document for strategic wings and include the provision for a Wing Nuclear Safety Officer to serve as staff assistant to the Wing Commander and perform the functions required by Air Force Regulation 122-1, dated 15 May 1960.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the Commander of the 4135th Strategic Wing appoint an additional officer with primary duty as the Wing Nuclear Safety Officer to perform the following functions:

- (1) Prepare and monitor (for compliance) the Wing Nuclear Safety Program.
- (2) Implement and supplement where required, all directives from higher headquarters concerning nuclear activities, with special emphasis on nuclear safety aspects.
- (3) Investigate (including follow-up of corrective action) all nuclear incident/incident reports.
- (4) Conduct periodic nuclear safety meetings with appropriate personnel involved with nuclear weapons.
- (5) Conduct periodic nuclear safety surveys to determine the following:
 - (a) Knowledge by appropriate personnel of the DOD Safety Rules.
 - (b) Knowledge by appropriate personnel of all security aspects, including physical security and security of classified information.
 - (c) Compliance with the SAC two-man system in appropriate areas.
 - (d) Compliance with higher headquarters directives, safety studies, technical orders, check lists, etc.
 - (e) Review of the physical installations for nuclear safety items.
 - (f) Existence of potentially hazardous areas.

accomplish inspections of specific portions of the stockpile (e.g., storage sites, alert crews, mating stations, weapon maintenance, transport and handling vehicles).

[REDACTED] AFM-122-1-1099/ [REDACTED]

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disaster central plans, etc.

- (7) Review and coordinate on all organizational publications concerned with nuclear weapons and nuclear safety.
- (8) Maintain close liaison with ground, missile and flight safety offices.
- (9) Monitor all nuclear weapon OE's for corrective and follow-up actions. Ensure that OE's are submitted in problem areas concerning nuclear safety operations and procedures.
- (10) Monitor specialized job-type check lists for compliance with higher headquarters' directives and policies.
- (11) Be a voting member on the Wing Nuclear Safety Committee.
- (12) Monitor OJT, cross-training, and upgrading programs for nuclear weapon personnel.
- (13) Check to see that nuclear safety supplements and check lists are disseminated, utilized, and up to date.
- (14) Prepare and disseminate nuclear safety educational materials.
- (15) Determine that protective clothing and special safety equipment authorized is being utilized.
- (16) Monitor procedures and security utilized during in-transit shipment of nuclear weapons to include local as well as transit aircraft movements.
- (17) Check to see that the nuclear disaster central portion of the JSS plan is adequate and that appropriate sub-wing SOP's are effective and modified as necessary.

b. [REDACTED] General Nuclear Safety Meeting. Discussion with Eighth Air Force, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Strategic Wing Safety Offices and Special Weapons Offices indicates the desirability of additional published guidance to subordinate units, setting forth the items deemed essential for the establishment of a more effective Nuclear Safety Program.

Recommendation: To improve the effectiveness of the SAC Nuclear Safety Program, it will be recommended that Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, sponsor a command briefing for all numbered Air Force, Air Division and Wing Directors of Safety, Nuclear Safety Offices and Special Weapons Offices, as appropriate, at an early date to spell

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[REDACTED]

out in more detail what is desired regarding implementation of the SAC Nuclear Safety Program. The Directorate of Nuclear Safety Research will provide representatives to such a meeting to assist as desired.

c. [REDACTED] Engine Transport. The engine trailer, Model 2000, was used to transport the warhead from the S&I Building to the warhead mating building. The warhead is 60 inches off the ground and the trailer wheel width is only 54 inches. To prevent rolling, the speed of the trailer is limited to five (5) MPH on turns. Snow, ice or other rough conditions will definitely increase the tendency to roll, and during an actual operation with emphasis on quick reaction time, the nuclear safety hazard will be increased. An administrative limitation can never correct a poor design.

Recommendation: It will be recommended that Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, study the possibility of using the LITCH positioning trailer to transport the warhead.

d. Warhead Mating

(1) [REDACTED] The lighting in the warhead mating building was inadequate in that it was too dim and incorrectly located. Present lights are installed in the ceiling about 15 feet overhead whereas some illumination should be from the side and below the level of the missile warhead compartment.

Recommendation: It will be recommended to Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, that adequate lighting be provided for the warhead mating operation.

(2) [REDACTED] The green plug was not installed on the missile during training warhead mating.

Recommendation: It is recommended that compliance with the safety rules be observed during training operations.

e. Missile Loading

(1) [REDACTED] The Arm/SAFE Panel Arming Selector Switch (Arm/SAFE Selector Switch Control) was not safetied and sealed to prevent selection of the Ground or Air positions at the completion of loading the GAN-77 on the B-58.

Recommendation: It is recommended that compliance with the safety rules be observed during training operations.

(2) [REDACTED] During hoisting of the missile to accomplish loading on the aircraft, it was noted that the noise caused by the power unit and the electro-hydraulic pump in the H2-33A positioning trailer made voice communication extremely difficult. Several times during the loading, the trailer valve control level operator had

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[REDACTED]

to leave his position to obtain and/or verify instructions from the chief of the loading crew.

Recommendation: It will be recommended to Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, that a suitable intercom system be provided for this operation.

(3) [REDACTED] During the loading, the chief of the loading crew (No. 1 crew member) was on top of the B-57 during the hoisting operation to install the aft attach link pin.

Recommendation: It will be recommended that Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, take necessary action to change the procedure for hoisting to require the crew chief to remain in a position where it is possible to observe and direct all hoisting and mating operations.

(4) [REDACTED] The slings (SN 2-3047) used to torque the forward attach links is unsatisfactory in that the square shackles were rounded and the shackles twisted.

Recommendation: It is recommended that an EIR on this item be submitted.

(5) [REDACTED] The fuse boxes were "wet" after the missile had been loaded on the aircraft. In the observed loading conducted in the rain, the test set and operator got wet. Calibration of explosive test equipment is difficult to maintain when allowed to absorb excessive moisture.

Recommendation: Since T.O. 21-2047-2-10, para 3-10, is not clear on the definition of the "Flight Preparation Area", it will be recommended to Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, that action be taken to change the T.O. to authorize this operation in the unhard matting building or at the alert area.

2. [REDACTED] **Ignition Keys.** Although the safety rules governing the installation of the red plug in a missile was generally understood, there was some confusion concerning the (M2, M4, aircraft) which change the plugs and reinsert the red plug at the completion of their maintenance, missile engine or power system checks.

Recommendation: Since the rules require that the aircraft commander or his authorized representative accompany any personnel requiring access to the aircraft with a weapon installed, it is recommended that, for uniformity and positive control, the red plug be found to the aircraft commander at the time he accepts the aircraft for ground alert and that a part of the "loading" procedure be to install the red plug in the B-57. Any subsequent change of the red-green plug for maintenance maintenance while the aircraft is on alert will be controlled by the aircraft commander or his authorized representative.

127-49-8-1699/3

[REDACTED]

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6. [REDACTED] Tactical Ferry.

(1) [REDACTED] The safety rules require the use of the green plug for tactical ferry of the missile. The design of the present green plug with the "Remove Before Flight" red streamer is not compatible with this rule.

Recommendation: It will be recommended that Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, request the development of a green plug which will be suitable for tactical ferry.

(2) [REDACTED] In the aircrew check list (T.O. 13-523 (01)1-1), no mention of the green plug was made concerning tactical ferry operation.

Recommendation: It will be recommended that Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, coordinate with the agency responsible for publishing the various check lists to insure compatibility and compliance with the safety rules.

b. [REDACTED] Information Flow. Aircrew members interviewed had not been briefed on procedures to be followed in the prompt release of public information on accidents involving aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard.

Recommendation: It is recommended that appropriate personnel be briefed on applicable portions of Air Force Information Plan 59-14, Executive Nuclear Accidents, 28 December 1959.

i. [REDACTED] Pre-Operational Nuclear Safety Survey. AFB 123-2 requires the Directorate of Nuclear Safety Research to conduct a Pre-Operational Nuclear Safety Survey on the first unit to employ a new nuclear weapon system. This survey is made just prior to the operational date of the system or at the time the system becomes operational and is for the purpose of assuring that the recommendations of the USAF Nuclear Weapons Safety Study Group, the technical orders with their check lists and safety provisions, the JCS Safety Rules, and the hardware itself, are all in order.

Recommendation: Since this weapon system is not operational and, therefore, not on alert status, it will be recommended that Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, advise the Directorate of Nuclear Safety Research when the system is operational and on alert status. At that time, another nuclear safety survey will be conducted by the Directorate of Nuclear Safety Research to insure that JCS Safety Rules are in effect and to determine the overall adequacy of the 419th Strategic Wing Nuclear Safety Program.

c. [REDACTED] Conclusions. It is concluded that:

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[REDACTED]

4. The safety rules, design features, and procedures for the operation of the B-52/DAG-77 nuclear weapon system are as envisioned by the Air Force Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group.

5. The safety rules, design features and operational procedures established for the B-52/DAG-77 nuclear weapon system are adequate and workable under the actual field conditions observed at the 4139th Strategic Wing.

6. The effectiveness of the Nuclear Safety Program of the 4139th Strategic Wing will be enhanced by the accomplishment of the recommendations contained in previous sections of this report.

7. [REDACTED] Recommendations. For the purpose of clarity and continuity, appropriate recommendations have been made in the preceding text of this report following the comments and discussion leading to the particular recommendation.

(b) (6)
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director

C

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23/22 BY

CZCSL 607 ZCGLA741

PP RJESL

DE RJESGL 73

P 232120Z ZEX

FM SAC PROJECT OFFICE EGLIN AFB FLA

TO RJWBR/SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

RJEXDHB/8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS

RJESGL/822ND AIR DIV TURNER AFB GA

RJEDSO/WADD WPAFB OHIO

RJEDSO/AEROSYS CEN WPAFB OHIO

RJWPK/OCAMA TINKER AFB OKLA

RBEGL/MCDONNELL AIRCRAFT CORP ST LOUIS MO

AFBNC

BT

SACPOH9-25-154.

IMMEDIATE ATTENTION IS REQUIRED BY ADDRESSEES. SAC FOR DORGA, DM4D AND DOT; WADD FOR WVZSF; ASC FOR LNSO; OCAMA FOR OCMM; MCDONNELL FOR MR. C V BRAUN. SUBJECT: GAM-72 LAUNCH GEAR. THIS HSG IS IN III PARTS. PART I. ON 23 SEP 1960 FOLLOWING THE SUCCESSFUL LAUNCH OF GAM-72 MISSILE NBR 59-2255, THE LOWER CARRIAGE WAS AUTOMATICALLY JETTISONED OVER THE EGLIN GULF TEST RANGE. THE MISSILE OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY FOLLOWED THE TACTICAL LAUNCHING PROCEDURE CHECKLIST WHICH LEFT THE CARRIAGE SWICH IN THE NORMAL POSITION. THE OVERSIGHT WAS NOT OBSERVED BY THE MISSILE OPERATOR INSTRUCTOR PRIOR TO LAUNCH.

act	Info
DM-3	DC-2
DO-3	

(9)

PAGE TWO RJESGL 73

PART II. POSTFLIGHT ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT THE UMBILICAL ASSEMBLY, LOWER CARRIAGE BROKE THE CAST ALUMINUM STRUCTURE TO WHICH IT WAS ATTACHED. THE UMBILICAL ASSEMBLY WAS THEN LEFT HANGING ATTACHED ONLY BY THE ELECTRICAL WIRING. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED THE EXTENSION OF CARRIAGE NBR 2 AND ITS ATTACHED MISSILE. UR ACTION WILL BE TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE DIRECTIVES. PART III THE UNSCHEDULED JETTISON OF THE CARRIAGE CLEARLY POINTS OUT THE URGENCY FOR POSITIVE ACTION TO COMPLETE GAM-72 ECP 54 COVERING GAM-72 CTCI RFA 17.

BT

23/2113Z SEP RJESGL



NNNN


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131447
 AF GRNC
 RJESL/COMDR TURNER AFB ALBANY GA
 ZEN/USA ENGR DIV SOUTH ATLANTIC ATLA
 AF GRNC
 BT

FOR AF0CE-C AND AF0CE-EP FROM AF0CE-CA 145. SUBJECT:
 GAN 77 FACILITIES, TURNER AFB. REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE AF0CE-EP
 83841 DATED 8 SEPT 68, SAME SUBJECT. THIS OFFICE HAS STOPPED
 DESIGN ON SUBJECT FACILITIES PENDING RESOLUTION OF SITING. NO
 ASSURANCE OF DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION OR BOO CAN BE MADE IN VIEW OF
 THIS DELAY. DESIGN HAS BEEN STARTED TWICE BEFORE AND RESULTED IN
 WASTED EFFORT AND DESIGN MONEY. NO FURTHER ACTION IS CONTEMPLATED
 BY THIS OFFICE UNTIL FORMALLY APPROVED SITING HAS BEEN RECEIVED
 THROUGH PROPER CHANNELS.

BT
 AFN AF0CE-C AF0CE-EP 145 AF0CE-EP 83841 8 68
 13/18452



NNNN

RECEIVED		TOTAL: 12	
DC 2	DCO	BSO	BDCW
DD 2	DDM	BJA	BDCC
DM 2	DMC	RCH	BDCS
DP 1	SATE	EDAS	SUCO
DS	BC 1	BISO	
	SPM	BDCB 5	

PAY ATTN: TAG OFFICE

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
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CZCSLATIGZCJVA464
 RR RJESSL
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 FM USAF CIV ENGRGN SOUTH ATLANTIC ATLA
 TO R/XXDR/CINC SAC OFFUTT AFB OMAHA NEBR
 R/XXDR/DIRECTORHQ HQ USAF WASHDC
 R/XXDR/COMDRTHAF VESTOVER AFB CHICOPEEFALLS MASS
 R/XXDR/COMDTUNNER AFB ALBANY GA
 R/XXDR/DIST ENGR SAVANNAH GA
 R/XXDR ENGR DIV SOUTH ATLANTIC ATLA
 AF OMAC

FROM AFCE-SA-751. SUBJECT: SITING GAN FACILITIES, TURNER
 AFB. REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE DEDPL 22434 DATED 13 SEPT 68, SUBJECT
 AS ABOVE. CONFIRMING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON 15 SEPT 68 BETWEEN
 MR ROCKFORD AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THIS OFFICE, WE ARE UNABLE TO
 DEVELOP A COST DIFFERENTIAL IN THE TIME LIMIT IMPOSED. OUR
 OPINION AND THAT OF THE SAVANNAH DISTRICT ENGINEER IS THAT THE
 SITES RECOMMENDED BY HQ USAF WILL BE MORE EXPENSIVE. ALL DESIGN
 BEING HELD IN ADEYANCE PENDING SITING RESOLUTION

BT
 CPM AFCE-SA-751 22434 13 68 15 68
 15/2155Z



NO.	NAME	INITIALS	DATE
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FM USAF CIV ENGRGN SOUTH ATLANTIC ATLA
TOHRJVKBR/CINC SAC OPFUTT AFB OMAHA NEBR
INFOHRJEZHQ/DIRCIV ENGRNG DCS/OHQ USAF WASHDC
RJEKDH/COMDR8TH AF VESTOVER AFB CHICOPEEFALLS MASS
RJESSL/COMDR TUNER AFB ALBANY GA
RUEAHB/DIST ENGR SAVANNAH GA
ZEN/USA ENGR DIV SOUTH ATLANTIC ATLA
AF GRNC

BT

DCS/OHQ FOR AFOCE-EP FROM AFRCE-SA757. REFERENCE OUR TWX
AFRCE-SA-751 DATED 13 SEP 68, SUBJECT: SITING GAM FACILITIES, TURNER
AFB. IN ACCORDANCE WITH TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR HUTCHINS,
HQ USAF, AND LT. COLONEL ALLEN OF THIS OFFICE, WE ARE THIS DATE
REQUESTING THE SOUTH ATLANTIC DIVISION ENGINEER TO REINITIATE GAM
DESIGN BASED ON THE SITING FURNISHED BY YOUR LETTER DATED 30 AUG 68,
SUBJECT AS ABOVE, ADDING THAT YOOR HQ WILL FURNISH HQ USAF
ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS SITING

BT

CFN DCS/OHQ AFOCE-EP ^{Accounting} AFRCE-SA757 AFRCE-SA-751 15 68 30 68
19/1859Z

NNNN



INITIALS	DATE	TIME	INITIALS
DCO			DCO
DCM			DCM
DCR			DCR
SAFE			SAFE
DC			DC
DCI			DCI
DCS			DCS

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DM

7 October 1960

MEMO FOR GENERAL RUSSELL

SUBJECT: Visit to 4135th Strategic Wing by Lt. General Sweeney and Staff, 27-28 September 1960

1. Lt. General Sweeney visited the 4135th Strategic Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida, on 27 and 28 September 1960. The following members of his staff accompanied him:

Colonel (b) (6) Director of Operations
Colonel (b) (6) Director of Materiel
Colonel (b) (6) Director of Personnel
Colonel (b) (6) Director of Plans
Colonel (b) (6) Chief of Intelligence
Lt. Colonel (b) (6) Director of Safety

General Sweeney arrived Eglin AFB at approximately 1700 CST, 27 September 1960. He departed Eglin 1840 CST, 28 September 1960.

2. Colonel (b) (6) entertained General Sweeney and his party at an informal dutch treat dinner at the Officers' Club during the evening of 27 September 1960. At that time, arrangements were made with General Sweeney to present the GAM-72/77 briefing in the vault, Headquarters 4135th Strategic Wing, at 0830, Wednesday, 28 September 1960. Personnel attending the briefing, in addition to General Sweeney and his party, were:

Colonel (b) (6) Commander, 4135th SW
Colonel (b) (6) DM, 522nd Air Division
Colonel (b) (6) DCM, 4135th SW
Colonel (b) (6) DCO, 4135th SW
Lt. Colonel (b) (6) Staff Supply Officer, 522nd Air Division
Lt. Colonel (b) (6) Chief of Training, 4135th SW
Lt. Colonel (b) (6) Director of Personnel, 4135th SW

3. Colonel (b) (6) presented the briefing utilizing flip charts. There were excellent charts from a graphic arts point of view. The briefing concerned both GAM-72 and 77. It sketched the history of GAM activity

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[REDACTED]

by the 4135th, highlighted the principle problem areas concerning the guidance system and the related bottle neck at Maintenance Stations 1 and 2. Colonel (b) (6) also presented a resume of 4135th Strategic Wing participation in the Category III SOTE and associated this activity with the normal maintenance and flying activity of the wing and the resultant impact. His briefing was positive in nature, and the approach was clearly "can do".

4. General Sweeney commented in various areas as follows:

a. In response to an inference by Colonel (b) (6) that it did not make sense to transfer his instructor crews to Castle during January-February 1961, General Sweeney agreed. He observed that SAC would not be smart to transfer this kind of know how out at a time when they are trying to build their GAM aircrew effectiveness. He asked Colonel (b) (6) to follow up on this matter.

b. After reviewing the Category III activity, General Sweeney stated that it appeared to him that it was going to be necessary to establish better reliability data through increased activity, through the media of more captive flights and test launches. He obviously believes that the Category III program, as it is now constituted, will not provide General Power with valid information concerning the operational suitability and reliability of GAM-72/77.

c. Two or three times during the briefing, Colonel (b) (6) attempted to provide information concerning matters being discussed at the briefing. It appeared to me that on these occasions, he was talking when he should have been listening. On the third occasion, General Sweeney (apparently mildly irritated) asked him to speak up and make his point. In developing his response to General Sweeney, Colonel (b) (6) found that his information was not germane, he so informed General Sweeney and said no more.

d. Colonel (b) (6) asked Lt. Colonel (b) (6), APGC Category I and II GAM Project Officer, who had the Missile Accident Board concerning the GAM-77 that crashed in Alabama, to come in and brief General Sweeney on the board findings. He reported that:

[REDACTED]

(b) (1) (A)

General Sweeney observed that it was wrong to launch toward land, and that he considered SAC had a substantial interest in this matter, because the public reaction would be focused primarily on the SAC aircraft from which the launch had been made.

e. At General Sweeney's request, Lt. Colonel (b) (6) Chief of the SAC Category III SOTE, presented the current status of the Category III program. His basic points were:

- (1) Category III was approximately two months behind schedule.
- (2) There is obviously a spares problem. The parts have not yet been manufactured. OCAMA is analyzing the situation, and they anticipate that adequate corrective action can be effected.
- (3) Recent Category III results with "flash birds" have been encouraging, both as to reliability and accuracy.

f. General Terrell came into the vault about the time Lt. Colonel (b) (6) finished with his discussion, and a brief conversation ensued between General Terrell and General Sweeney, wherein General Terrell made the following observations:

- (1) He was concerned about the effectiveness of the destruct mechanism and that no launches would be made until he was certain it was reliable.
- (2) He agreed with Lt. Colonel (b) (6) that the Category III test has identified the principle area--guidance reliability.
- (3) He noted that Category III (b) (6) and (b) (6) and he agreed with General [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sweeney that the amount of Category III activity experienced thus far, plus that remaining in the program, would not provide information that could be relied upon as being completely valid.

g. Finally, General Sweeney questioned Colonel Nolan and Lt. Colonel (b)(6) at length concerning the desirability of expanding the Category III test so as to provide much more activity and enhance the validity of tactical procedures, maintenance procedures, spare support experience and missile reliability. He discussed SAC experience with the Atlas missile. He stated that that program was in bad shape at this time, and that he and General Power both agreed the biggest mistake made thus far in that program was for SAC to assume that they had an operational capability (b)(1)(A) from Vandenberg more than a year ago. It is apparent that General Sweeney does not want to be caught in the same situation with the GAM-77.

h. General Sweeney stated that he thought it would be wise to relieve the 4135th of most of its present commitments in order to enable the wing to concentrate on GAM activity in association with Category III test. He asked Colonel Nolan to get with him later concerning this problem.

5. Colonel Nolan presented a brief presentation on 50-8 which elicited little or no comment from the General and his staff. After lunch, a tour of the GAM facility and A&E Building took place. The entire group played nine holes of golf, taking off about 1530. They proceeded directly from the golf course to the aircraft and took off at 1840.

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

DM

5 October 1960

MEMO FOR COMMANDER, 822ND AIR DIVISION

SUBJECT: Staff Visit to 4135th Strategic Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida,
27-29 September 1960

1. This directorate conducted a staff visit to the 4135th Strategic Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida, 27-29 September 1960. The following personnel accomplished the visit:

Col. (b) (6)	CMSgt. (b) (6)
Lt. Col. (b) (6)	SMSgt. (b) (6)
Lt. Col. (b) (6)	SMSgt. (b) (6)

2. EWO capability (classified) is submitted separately.

3. There are two repeat deficiencies which require indorsement by the 4135th Wing Commander, in accordance with 822nd Air Division Policy Letter No. 5. They are:

- a. Tool Boxes of Mobility Personnel (A&E, paragraph I, D).
- b. Qualification of Quality Control Officer (Maintenance, paragraph III, A, 1).

4. The comment concerning disaster control, set out in the Maintenance section of this report (paragraph I, H) describes a problem that should be corrected without delay. Paragraph 4f, AFR 355-3, dated August 1960, establishes the DO/DCO at all echelons as the responsible staff agency for assuring effective disaster control plans and procedures. The action required, however, involves all organizational functions. Maintenance organizations in particular are responsible for many detailed actions involving planning, implementation and the necessary practice to assure effectiveness. I therefore consider it appropriate to emphasize this matter.

(b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)

Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

- 4 Atch
1. A&E
2. Maintenance
3. Supply
4. Annex P, OPlan 4-80

Staff Visit to 4135th Strategic Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida, 27-29
September 1960, A&E

Personnel contacted:

Col. (b) (6) DCM
Maj. (b) (6) Synthetic Trainers
Capt. (b) (6) AEMS Maintenance Supervisor
Lt. (b) (6) AEMS Security Officer
Lt. (b) (6) AEMS Analysis and Training Officer
CWO (b) (6) Maintenance Reports and Analysis
CMSgt. (b) (6) AEMS Ass't Maintenance Supervisor
CMSgt. (b) (6) Job Control NCOIC
TSgt. (b) (6) AEMS Analysis NCOIC
TSgt. (b) (6) AEMS Production Scheduling NCOIC and Mobility NCO
SSgt. (b) (6) GAM Branch Production Scheduling NCOIC

I. EWO/USCM.

A. RBS Activity of Alert Aircraft: Those aircraft currently on alert have had reliable RBS activity within 30 days. Action is satisfactory.

B. Gunnery Activity of Alert Aircraft: Current alert aircraft have completed a gunnery mission within 90 days prior to placement on home alert. Action is satisfactory.

C. Status of Last Resort Bombsight (T. O. 1B-52G-585): Aircraft 166, 170 and 195 are modified. Kits are available. Since this is a depot modification, kits are sent with aircraft scheduled for "Fast Fix" modifications. Action is satisfactory.

D. Tool Boxes of Mobility Personnel (repeat item): Tool boxes of those A&E airmen (four each) assigned to mobility recovery teams are 50 to 65 per cent complete. Recovery capability of these team members is questionable with tools presently provided.

Action required: That a special effort be made to issue the authorized tool shortages to members of mobility recovery teams.

E. Refresher Training, Chaff Loading Teams (SACR 137-9): Personnel assigned to chaff loading teams perform an actual loading in both training chaff and EWO chaff at least once a month. Action is satisfactory.

F. Security Motivation (SACR 205-7 and 8AF Supplement thereto): The Squadron Security Officer, Lt. (b)(6) conducts periodic security lectures as required. Training received is documented on appropriate ground training records. Nine airmen were checked for personal possession of 8AF Form 26, "Security Responsibilities and Instructions for Restricted Areas". Six airmen did not have this required form in their possession.

Action required: That a survey be conducted to identify those airmen who require this form and issue same.

II. MCS/8AF COMMAND INTEREST ITEMS.

A. Marginal Areas: All command interest items for the month of August were satisfactory except Home Alert Equipment Readiness and Synthetic Trainer Materiel Effectiveness. These weak areas were covered by the 822nd Air Division Director of Materiel at the Division Commanders Conference on 23 September 1960. Progress in these areas for September indicates the following:

1. Home Alert Equipment Readiness. As of 23 September, nine aircraft were launched subsequent to home alert. Three aircraft required maintenance prior to first sortie (195, 161, 172). The present 67 per cent is considered unsatisfactory by 8th Air Force standards.

Action required: Increased emphasis should be placed on providing trouble free aircraft on ground alert. Detailed follow-up and corrective action should be taken concerning each instance wherein an aircraft requires maintenance prior to first flight after coming off alert.

2. Synthetic Trainer Materiel Effectiveness. No major materiel problems exist at this time.

B. New A&E MCS Items (Change 1, SACP 170-1): This area was discussed with and understood by the A&E Analysis OIC and NCOIC. It was agreed that accurate reporting on the SAC-U15 Report is essential, as it is the basic document from which data is extracted for scoring A&E capabilities.

III. COMPLIANCE

A. Follow-up of Previous Staff Visit:

1. Hot Oil Bath Tank. This project was completed in the last week of August and is fully operational. Action is satisfactory.
2. Ventilation of Power Generator Room. Ducting has been installed to facilitate evacuation of the heat generated.
3. AFTO Form 26M, "A&E Shop Production Credit and Malfunction Analysis Data Record". The local supply of these forms has been exhausted, and AFTO Form 26K is being used as a substitute.

Action required: That AFTO Form 26M be reproduced locally until it becomes available through normal channels. Authority: Paragraph 27, AFM 5-4.

B. Production Management (8AF message DM 4432, 27 August 1960): The authorized Productrol Boards (six each) have been placed on order on 12 September. Back order number is 018-09853. This directorate has been advised that the A&E Production Scheduling Section can fully implement 8AFM 66-3 approximately three weeks after receipt of the authorized Productrol Boards and pegs.

Action required: That the AEMS Maintenance Supervisor initiate follow-up action to determine delivery dates. If delivery dates are not available or are considered unsatisfactory, the Maintenance Supervisor should request supply difficulty action.

C. Manning: No critical shortages exist in the A&E Squadron as authorized on the current UMD.

D. Publications Familiarization Binders (SACR 66-4): A spot check of the PFBs in the Auto Pilot, Comm-Nav and Camera Sections was made. These binders were considered satisfactory.

E. Time Change Items (applicable six T. O. s): A list of A&E time change items has been compiled by the Analysis Section and furnished to the Production Scheduling Section for action. Action is satisfactory.

F. Establishment of Aircraft Folders for Debriefing (SACR 66-11, paragraph 7f): The required folders have been established and contain the current SAC Forms 190, "A&E Systems Sortie Record". Because of the classified nature of these folders, they are kept in the Job Control Room, but are readily available for reference and review at crew debriefings. Action is satisfactory.

G. Identification of Related Specialist Job Records to A&E System Sortie Records (AF Form 922 and SAC Form 190 respectively): In order to relate the corrective action to the reported discrepancy, it is necessary to assign corresponding mission numbers to both forms. This is not being done at present. Reference: SACR 66-11, paragraph 7a.

Action required: In order to facilitate subsequent analysis of A&E discrepancies reported on the 190, that A&E debriefing teams assign corresponding mission numbers to both the SJRs and SAC Form 190.

IV. SAFETY.

A. Missile Grounding: All missiles observed in the Missile Maintenance Shop were properly grounded to static grounds provided.

B. Modification of Power Cords on Test Equipment (T. O. 33-1-501): In order to provide positive ground between test equipment and building static ground, a three connector power cord is provided in above mentioned TOC. The Base Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory is accomplishing this modification when required. The A&E Section is providing the PMEL with necessary kits as required. Approximately 60 per cent of possessed test equipment has been modified. The majority of the test equipment yet to be modified is in the GAM facility. This is being monitored by the Production Scheduling Section. Action to date is satisfactory.

C. Exit Lights: One exit light in the Pre-issue Section of the GAM facility is inoperative.

V. GAM ACTIVITY.

A. Project "Flash": This ECP/TOC modification program was completed in the first week of September. A definite improvement in the

performance of the Guidance System has resulted. Although sufficient data is not available for a comprehensive analysis, the decrease in the maintenance time expended on the Guidance System and the significant decrease in the number of malfunctions reported are encouraging.

B. Missile Activity for August:

1. Captive Flights.

11 - GAM-72
6 - GAM-77

2. Missile Malfunctions during Captive Flights.

9 - GAM-72
3 - GAM-77

3. Successful Captive Flights.

2 - GAM-72
3 - GAM-77

C. Repair Capability - August:

	<u># Components Removed</u>	<u>Repaired</u>	<u>Serviceable</u>	<u>NRTS</u>
GAM-77	74	47	15	12
GAM-72	11	6	4	1

D. Pre-issue Levels:

GAM-72 - 82.3 per cent
GAM-77 - 82.6 per cent

E. CME Levels:

GAM-72 - 88.4 per cent
GAM-77 - 88.2 per cent

Staff Visit to 4135th Strategic Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida, 27-29
September 1980, Maintenance

Personnel contacted:

Col. (b) (6) DCM
Lt. Col. (b) (6) Ass't DCM
Lt. Col. (b) (6) Maintenance Control Officer
Lt. Col. (b) (6) Logistics Officer
Maj. (b) (6) OIC, Training
Maj. (b) (6) OIC, Quality Control
Maj. (b) (6) Commander, OMS
Maj. (b) (6) Workload Control Officer
Maj. (b) (6) OMS Supervisor
Maj. (b) (6) Field Maintenance Supervisor
Capt. (b) (6) OIC, Servicing Branch
Capt. (b) (6) Bomber Branch
Capt. (b) (6) Ground Power Equipment OIC
WO (b) (6) OIC, Records, Reports and Analysis
CMSgt. (b) (6) NCOIC, Workload Control
CMSgt. (b) (6) OMS Supervisor
SMSgt. (b) (6) OMS Supervisor
MSgt. (b) (6) FMS Supervisor

I. EWO/USCM.

A. Fast Ride Vehicles: Authorized four; assigned three (two Ford station wagons and one Plymouth). In addition to the three assigned, the wing has obtained two five-passenger pickup trucks from ARDC for use by the alert crews. A check of the trucks and two station wagons revealed them to be in excellent condition. They were clean inside and well polished outside. One station wagon was being waxed by wing personnel during the time of the staff visit.

B. Alert Aircraft Tires: From 1 September through 29 September, one tire has been changed from Aircraft 172 while on alert. This was a No. 7 tire and was changed on 7 September. The reason for the change was a leaking thermo relief fuse. Materiel failure was the prime factor necessitating the tire change.

Action required: It is recommended that the DCM monitor the frequency of thermo relief fuse failures. If these failures become excessive, corrective action should be taken to obtain a fix to prevent the degradation of the EWO capability.

C. EWO Thermo Nuclear Reflective Curtains: A spot check of five aircraft for condition of thermo nuclear reflective curtains revealed that they were in excellent condition.

D. Currency of Maintenance Resources Board (reference SACM 66-6R, paragraph 67c): The Workload Control Section is in conformance with the reference.

E. Workload Control Check List for Alert Execution (reference SACM 66-6R, paragraph 68b through h, page 48): This check list is well prepared and is in compliance with the above reference.

F. Field Maintenance Supervisors' Check List for Execution of EWO (reference SACM 66-6R, paragraph 67b(1), page 45): Each Field Maintenance shop supervisor has a check list, outlining his responsibilities in EWO execution. CMSgt. (b) (6) this directorate, reviewed these check lists for compliance with above reference. This review determined that the Field Maintenance Squadron is in conformity.

G. OMS Radio Truck Sequence Charts (reference SACM 66-6R, paragraph 67b(2)(a), page 46): A check of these charts revealed that currency is maintained and that the squadron is in conformity.

H. Disaster Control: Existing directives are vague in prescribing direct responsibility for disaster control procedures by SAC tenant units. This situation exists primarily because USAF and SAC have established their directives in this area, with primary responsibility assigned to the combat support group, air base group and/or air base wing. SACR 355-1, paragraph 2c(2), 18 October 1959, states:

"(2) Where SAC is a Tenant. The SAC unit commander concerned will insure integration of the SAC organizational disaster control program in the overall non-SAC base program, except where it would interfere with the primary mission of the SAC unit. If no base disaster control program is in existence, the SAC unit will implement its own disaster control program, using such facilities as are made available. In any event, implementing SOPs will be prepared in lieu of a unit 500 operations plan."

8th Air Force message DOT-2 64450B, 1 September 1960, enjoins all commanders and responsible staff officers to review TIG Brief No. 16, Volume 12, 5 August 1960, subject: "Peacetime Nuclear Accidents". This TIG Brief cites Air Force ineffectiveness in handling a fire that destroyed a ground-to-air missile with nuclear warhead at a missile site located near the host Air Force base. One of the pertinent comments was that the incident could have been handled more effectively if, "base and tenant nuclear accident plans had been closely coordinated and understood by all concerned". Eglin AFB does have a disaster control plan--Operation Plan 4-60. The 4135th SW is a participant in this plan, as evidenced by Annex P (Attachment No. 4) to the plan, dated 30 June 1960, which was prepared by the Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations. This annex requires certain staff actions by the wing organization (paragraph 4a and b and paragraph 7b). The SOPs that paragraph 7b requires the DCM to prepare had not been accomplished as of 29 September. Annex P, paragraph 7b, requires that the above referenced SOPs be furnished the Wing Disaster Control Officer not later than 30 days after receipt of the annex, which is dated 30 June 1960. Since these SOPs had not been prepared, they obviously have not been provided the Disaster Control Officer, Maj. (b) (6) and this was confirmed by him.

Action required: It is considered essential that the 4135th SW DCM require publication of the SOPs for his organization, as required by Operation Plan 4-60, Annex P, paragraph 7b. These SOPs should assure effective, timely action in the event of:

- a. An off-base nuclear disaster involving a SAC aircraft and/or weapon.
- b. An on-base nuclear disaster involving a SAC aircraft and/or weapon.
- c. Definite procedures to continue aircraft EWO generation during the presence of radioactivity.
- d. Specific designation of responsibilities and control procedures.

The entire problem of disaster control, as it concerns the 4135th SW, should be examined in detail by the DCO and DCM and pertinent information

disseminated to all wing personnel. This would be an excellent subject for presentation at Commander's Call. Specific directives include, but are not limited to, SAC Supplement 1 to AFR 66-10, paragraph 7, 1, d and e; SAC Supplement 1A to AFR 66-10; SAC Supplement 1 to Part I, AFM 66-1, paragraph 5d(7); SACR 355-1, paragraph 1b, c and d; Annex P to ARDC Operation Plan 4-60, dated 30 June 1960.

II. MCS/BAF COMMAND INTEREST ITEMS. A review of reportable items indicated there was one unsatisfactory area for the month of August. This area concerned late takeoffs. Two late takeoffs were caused by Aircraft 174 and 163. Aircraft 174 sheared a modulating valve shaft, and Aircraft 163 could not get No. 8 engine started due to a defective starter relay.

III. COMPLIANCE.

A. Deputy Commander for Maintenance:

1. Qualifications of the Quality Control Officer (repeat item).

This item was an 8th Air Force IG discrepancy. The 4135th SW established a checkout date of 1 November 1960, for Maj. (b) (6) and so advised 8th Air Force by TWX DCM 6-163, 13 June 1960. As of 29 September 1960, Maj. (b) (6) had received no flying training toward the checkout commitment of 1 November 1960. It is evident that the 4135th SW cannot upgrade him by that date.

Action required: The 4135th SW should get a waiver from 8th Air Force on the commitment to qualify Maj. (b) (6) or assign a qualified B-52G pilot as Quality Control Officer.

2. MOP for Workload Control Guidance during a "Broken Arrow" Exercise (reference 8AF IG Inspection, 8-14 April 1960). MOP 66-35, 29 July 1960, has been written. This plan is lacking in two specifics:

- a. Dispatch of Euclids by Workload Control needs to be accelerated.
- b. Clarification of command responsibilities at the scene of the "Broken Arrow" exercise.

Action required: Revise the MOP to assure action to dispatch Euclids to the scene of the "Broken Arrow" exercise. Include in the MOP, instructions for all personnel, pertaining to command responsibilities during the exercise at the scene of the exercise.

3. Condition of OMS Servicing Branch Equipment (reference 8AF IG Inspection, 6-14 April 1960). The referenced inspection noted that Servicing Branch equipment was not maintained in the best condition. A check of this equipment during this inspection indicates that this deficiency has been corrected.

4. Approval for Cannibalizations (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Chapter 2, Part I, AFM 66-1, page 3, paragraph 24a). A check of this item reveals that the DCM approves and signs all cannibalizations when he is on the base. In the DCM's absence, the Assistant DCM signs all cannibalizations.

5. Job Standards (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Chapter 6, Part I, AFM 66-1, paragraph 11p and q). These job standards are the best observed in the division to date. No errors or exclusions were noted when they were checked by the Division Maintenance Staff Officer. The RR&A Section has developed two books. One book is exclusively for aircraft job standards, and the other book pertains to shop job standards.

6. Weekly Maintenance Training Schedule (reference 8AF message DMM1 MGT3 43895, 21 July 1960). The Maintenance Training Division is in conformance with this 8th Air Force message.

B. Organizational Maintenance Squadron:

1. Aircraft Washing. Aircraft washing is accomplished on postflight inspections and periodic inspections only. These washings are published on the Monthly Maintenance Order. In the absence of a suitable wash rack, the wing is forced to use a portable solvent truck to dispense the washing agents, along with fire hydrants which furnish the water for the operation. This solvent truck has been deadlined for a front end and a radiator for the past 30 days. The wing's present flying program generates an average of one postflight per aircraft per 99 days, which in turn averages one washing per aircraft per 99 days.

Action required: Although T. O. 1-1-1 and T. O. 1-1-2 do not specify a definite cycle for washing aircraft to prevent corrosion, it is believed that more frequent washing than one washing per aircraft per 99 days is desirable, due to the high salt content in the atmosphere at Eglin. Follow-up action should be taken with the base to obtain the earliest possible in-commission date of the portable solvent truck.

2. Special Orders for Personnel to Work on Egress Systems (reference 8AF Supplement 1 to SACR 66-40). OMS has not published orders authorizing personnel to work on Egress systems.

Action required: Comply with 8AF Supplement 1 to SACR 66-40 and publish orders.

3. Delayed Maintenance Discrepancies.

a. Flight Line.

(1) Aircraft 178. Total discrepancies - 15.

5 - TOC
6 - Awaiting Field Maintenance test equipment
4 - Maintenance

(2) Aircraft 183. Total discrepancies - 8.

2 - TOC
2 - Awaiting test equipment
2 - Supply
2 - Maintenance

(3) Aircraft 172. Total discrepancies - 6.

3 - TOC
2 - Supply
1 - Maintenance

(4) Aircraft 175. Total discrepancies - 8.

2 - Supply
1 - TOC
5 - Maintenance

b. Alert Aircraft.

(1) Aircraft 162 (downloaded on 27 September, forms inspected on 28 September prior to flight). Total discrepancies - 31.

2 - TOC
3 - Awaiting test equipment
20 - Supply
6 - Maintenance

(2) Aircraft 184. Total discrepancies - 7.

3 - TOC
4 - Maintenance

(3) Aircraft 161. Total discrepancies - 15.

4 - TOC
2 - Awaiting test equipment
2 - Supply
7 - Maintenance

Note: Aircraft 161 assumed alert posture on 27 September. On 22 September, a discrepancy was entered on the 781, "FCI rides three degrees right with Bomb-Nav steering engaged and while Auto Pilot engaged". On 15 September, a discrepancy was entered which stated, "Auto Pilot sloppy".

Action required: It is essential that delayed discrepancies be kept to a minimum. Every effort should be made to clear all discrepancies prior to an aircraft entering the alert cycle. It is believed that the two discrepancies (Aircraft 161) should have been cleared prior to placing aircraft on alert.

C. Field Maintenance Squadron:

1. Special Orders for Personnel Authorized to Work on Egress Systems (reference SAF Supplement 1 to SACR 66-40). No orders have been published authorizing personnel to work on Egress systems in compliance with the above reference.

Action required: Comply with above reference.

2. Shop Supervisors Review of AF Form 992 (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Chapter 14, Part I to AFM 66-1, paragraph 14c). AF Forms 992 are being reviewed daily by shop supervisors and maintenance supervisors. Each work order received is cross checked for previous discrepancies.

3. Ground Powered Equipment.

a. SAC Form 408, Daily Status Report of GPE (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Chapter 14, Part I, AFM 66-1, paragraph 29i, page 12). A spot check of SAC Forms 408 indicates the wing is in compliance with the above referenced directive.

b. DD Forms 829 and 829-1 Series (reference T. O. 00-20A-1, paragraph 12-11, 1 July 1960). The above reference requires subject forms to be used on all ground powered equipment. The Ground Power Section has initiated use of the 829 series forms, but action is not complete.

Action required: It is essential that full compliance with the T. O. referenced above be completed as soon as possible.

c. AFTO Forms 781 Series (reference T. O. 00-20A-1, paragraph 12-11, 1 July 1960). The above reference requires the use of AFTO 781 series forms to be used on all ground powered equipment. The shop is not in compliance.

Action required: Immediate action should be taken to initiate the 781 series required on ground powered equipment. It is recommended that a method be devised to protect the forms from weather, since these forms are required to be with the unit at all times.

d. Cannibalization, Ground Powered Equipment (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Chapter 14, AFM 66-1, paragraph 29k(7)). The shop is in compliance with this directive. All AF Forms 991 are being reviewed and signed by the Maintenance Supervisor.

4. Repair Capability.

a. The following is a summary of repair capability of the FMS (inclusive dates 1-23 September 1960):

Total number items processed - 671
 Total number items repaired - 577
 Items NRTS for T. O. - 93
 Items not repaired, other - 1

Note: One item was not repaired due to lack of test equipment and returned to the depot.

b. Breakdown by shops is as follows:

	<u>Processed</u>	<u>Repaired</u>	<u>NRTS</u>	<u>Other</u>
Electrical Shop	35	12	23	0
Instrument Shop	52	25	27	0
Pneudraulics Shop	105	99	6	0
JEBU	60	44	16	0
Machine Shop	8	8	0	0
Repair & Reclamation	36	17	18	1
Structural Repair	65	65	0	0
Welding Shop	310	307	3	0

IV. SAFETY.

A. Squadron List of Vehicle Operators for Operation of Government Vehicles (reference paragraph 4a(2), page 145, 8AFM 32-1): OMS and FMS are in compliance with above reference.

B. Cleanliness of Parking Ramp and Taxiways: A satisfactory program has been established by the wing. Parking ramp and taxiways are being swept every Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

C. Marking of Flight Line Equipment with Reflective Material (reference paragraph 0806, 1(5), AFM 32-3): Flight line equipment is not marked in accordance with this reference.

Action required: Comply with the published directive.

Staff Visit to 4135th Strategic Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida, 27-29
September 1960, Supply

Personnel contacted:

Lt. Col. (b) (6) Logistics
Capt. (b) (6) Director of Supply
Capt. (b) (6) Supply
Lt. (b) (6) Supply
MSgt. (b) (6) NCOIC, Supply
MSgt. (b) (6) Inventory
MSgt. (b) (6) Bench Stock and Pre-issue
MSgt. (b) (6) Receipt, Storage and Issue
MSgt. (b) (6) Maintenance-Supply Liaison
SSgt. (b) (6) Accounting Branch
SSgt. (b) (6) Aircraft Installed Equipment Branch
(b) (6) WSMO

I. EWO/USCM. Supply effectiveness during last "Team Scrimmage"
exercise, June 1960:

A. Number of Items Requested through Expediter System: 33.
Number of items issued was 29, for a fill rate of 88 per cent.

B. Delivery Time: The 49-minute delivery time for Maintenance
Priorities 1 and 2, as reported in the staff visit of 13-15 June, was
reviewed in the light of the remedial action taken by the wing to realize
a SAC standard of 20 minutes. It was found that for the period 15
August to 15 September, normal operations for Priority 1 delivery time
was 25.7 minutes and for Priority 2, delivery time was 38 minutes.
While this is an improvement, it does not meet established criteria.
Effective 3 October, standby personnel qualified to operate the
Centrally Procured Retail Outlet, in which engine parts and bench stock
items are stored (Federal Groups 53 and 59), were scheduled for
assignment during off-duty hours. This action by the Director of
Supply and Base Accountable Officer should further improve delivery
time. The inadequacy of present GAM Weapon System stock lists
to sufficiently identify parts with good stock numbers further contributes
to delay in dispatch.

Action required: That the Director of Supply, in coordination with the Materiel Officer for B-52/GAM support (host base), continue to review the pyramid alert plans for manning the expediter system and assure that qualified personnel will be immediately available to man this critical area. Pending depot purification of Weapon System stock lists for GAM-77 to the point that they are dependable for parts research and identification, it is recommended that the Supply Controller develop a frequently used items (FUI) list in accordance with paragraph 14c, SACM 65-2, which will permit the submission of requests by item number, thus precluding the need for research on items carried on the list. Stock locations might be added to items on this list and thereby further eliminate research within Base Supply. Inasmuch as partial remedial action has been taken, this comment is not construed as a repeat deficiency.

II. MCS/BAF COMMAND INTEREST ITEMS.

Flyaway Kits: Percentage on hand - 88.96. 96 per cent is necessary for SAC Standard and maximum MCS score. All shortages are on valid requisition.

Action required: Continued follow-up is necessary to assure the validity and earliest possible action on all outstanding requisitions. Pending receipt of requisitioned items, a coordinated effort must continue among the FAK Branch, Maintenance-Supply Liaison and WSMO to identify and aggressively procure all acceptable substitute items and repair parts which may be used in lieu of authorized end items.

III. COMPLIANCE.

A. Processing of Reparable and Local Excess Property (reference AFR 121-7 and BAF message DMSI 4756):

1. Reparable Processing. The Reparable Processing Section is a function of Base Supply. Items coded as not reparable this station (NRTS) are being assembled at convenient pickup points throughout the Maintenance area and evacuated daily to the Base Supply Reparable Processing Section. The 4135th SW is furnishing transportation for this service. Items for which local repair is feasible are being processed through Materiel Control for work order assignment to the appropriate

shop. The extent and rate of repair of reparable processed through base shops is a subject covered separately in this report under Maintenance. The system is under continual surveillance of Maintenance-Supply Liaison and is considered satisfactory.

2. Excesses (UAL).

a. Computed from Card Deck #1 PCAM, the 15 September 8th Air Force Supply Improvement Report indicated an excess dollar value of \$800,000.00 on hand and a turn-in since 15 August of \$43,109.29. Since a new UAL was received during September which further reduces equipment authorizations and thereby adds to unauthorized items on hand, the \$800,000.00 figure may be viewed as an approximation.

b. On 1 July, the 54th MMS Supply was integrated with the 4135th SW and brought with it an extensive account of ground support equipment (GSE) items for the GAM program. These items had been forwarded as automatic shipments from the depot for which no authorization existed. Since 1 July, similar shipments have continued to arrive, adding to the unauthorized list. During this period, 4135th SW Supply personnel have assumed that the Eastern Area EELAT would furnish directed UAL changes to justify retention of excesses. Neither the new UAL just received nor the new ECL 356 received this week include excesses in this category. Although no authorization exists, these items are required and are not true excesses.

c. Excesses to authorization on hand not applicable to GAM, which cannot be justifiably retained, have not been identified, but have an estimated value of \$200,000.00.

Action required: An immediate and positive identification of all unauthorized items on hand which were not received in direct support of the GAM program must be determined. Each section possessing such excesses must be afforded the opportunity of screening the list and making the choice of retention or turn-in. If retention is desired, the section possessing the item must furnish Supply with necessary justification to permit the preparation of UAL/ECL change requests, SAC Form 144, in accordance with SACM 400-8. The only alternative to this procedure is turn-in of the excess item for credit.

SAC Forms 144, UAL/ECL Change Requests, must also be submitted for unauthorized items on hand which have been received as automatic shipments in support of the GAM program. This headquarters has contacted the Eastern Area Equipment Evaluation and Audit Team, and they do not intend to provide directed changes to the UAL for these items at this time; therefore, proper course of action is submission of change requests in accordance with provisions of SACM 400-8. Two change requests should suffice to bring this category of items to current authorization status: (1) UAL change request for those items appearing in the ECL 356 source document; and (2) ECL change request for those items on hand which do not appear in the ECL. A blanket justification should be used for each category, with all items listed in a consolidated change request.

With further reference to the true excesses within the 4135th SW, the subject of austere materiel management which includes maximum utilization of repair capability and the purging of all excesses from unit and base stocks is currently a USAF, SAC, 8th Air Force command special subject. Gen. Sweeney's indorsement of this program has placed 15 December 1960, as the target date for completion of excess turn-in. A concerted effort will be required to meet this objective and must have the fullest support of all activities possessing excess items which cannot be justifiably retained. This will be a special subject for continued review by this headquarters until completion.

B. Aircraft Installed Equipment (780) Branch (reference 8AFR 65-9): Items received as installed equipment for the GAM-77 are being stored in the GAM Pre-issue area. The Aircraft Installed Equipment Branch has on file the 780-1 inventory records which were received concurrently with the GAM-77s. A review of the 780-1 inventory records indicated that, with one exception, no inventory was recorded at time of receipt, and that no inventories have been recorded at six month intervals since receipt. Arrangements were concluded at time of visit to transfer all 780 equipment to the Aircraft Installed Equipment Branch during the week of 3 October for physical control, surveillance and security, and that a complete inventory will be conducted and recorded at time of transfer.

Action required: That the Director of Supply monitor the above action to assure completion as scheduled.

C. SAC 310 Supply Inspection (reference SACR 67-32): There is record of only one SAC 310 inspection having been performed by the wing; inspection is dated 6 January 1960. A reports control chart is maintained in the office of the Director of Supply; however, the 310 inspection is not listed. A 310 inspection was scheduled during this visit, to be conducted during the week of 12 October.

Action required: That a 310 inspection be performed by the wing as scheduled and that one copy of the completed inspection form be forwarded to this headquarters for review and file. Further, that the 310 inspection be included in the reports control chart to insure accomplishment on a semi-annual cyclic schedule.

D. 8th Air Force Tool Improvement Program (reference SAF message DMS2 53868, 1 July 1960): The Tool Improvement Program was inaugurated as a special effort to alleviate the hand tool shortage by means of three separate showdown inspections of all tool kits and tool cribs, to be performed during July, August and September. The above referenced 8th Air Force message stipulated that each showdown would be unannounced, performed by the maintenance supervisor concerned and monitored by the Maintenance Officer and Organizational Supply Officer for the purpose of determining serviceability, quality and quantity on hand. This procedure was not followed. The Wing Logistics Officer assumed monitorship and directed two inspections, one in July and one in August. Each inspection was known in advance and was so arranged that one half of all personnel having tool kits filed through Supply for each inspection; the remaining one half was inspected in the work area. Resulting shortage lists were placed on requisition, and since the bulk of these requisitions was expected to be filled before the end of September, the September inventory was postponed in order to combine the issue of tools received with the final inspection. Tools have been received against the original requisitions in the amount of \$8,570.00 and are presently being issued.

The end of July inventory indicated a dollar shortage of \$11,986.00; the end of August shortage was \$7,033.25. Requisitions totalling \$4,453.65 remain due in and include \$3,416.00 against the original July shortage and \$937.65 as a result of subsequent inventories.

Although the action taken has resulted in the development of an extensive tool replenishment program, including the computation of needed

funds, literal compliance with 8th Air Force instructions has not been met. There is no evidence that quality or condition were prime considerations during inspection, and the method employed leaves doubt that the effectiveness of an unannounced showdown was achieved.

Action required: In order to determine the full extent of tool serviceability and quality and to insure that each individual tool kit and crib are subjected to an unannounced showdown, it is recommended that each maintenance officer, in coordination with the supply officer, schedule such an on-the-spot showdown during October and that the supervisor concerned conduct this inspection in accordance with the provisions of the referenced message. Results obtained must be made available to Supply for necessary action. It is further recommended that 8th Air Force, Attn: DMS2, be advised that results of the 8th Air Force Tool Improvement Program are inconclusive, that a final showdown including all main points of the program is scheduled for October, and that a final report will be submitted upon conclusion.

E. Inventory Scheduling (reference 8AF Supplement 1, Volume IV, AFM 67-1): A chart is displayed in the Inventory Branch indicating account symbols; however, the chart is not posted to show date of last inventory nor date next inventory is due.

Action required: That dates of last inspection be recorded on chart at completion of each inspection, and that scheduled inventory dates be entered. An inventory has recently been completed satisfactorily to coincide with the 30 September annual UAL inventory (RCS: AF-S32). Scheduled inventories posted to the chart should average 8.5 per cent per month, beginning 1 October, to complete the cycle in one year.

IV. SAFETY: No safety violations were noted in the Supply area.

COPY

ANNEX P

TO

OPERATION PLAN 4-60

DISASTER CONTROL PLAN

4135th Strategic Wing

1. **PURPOSE:** To define the responsibility of the 4135th Strategic Wing in disaster control for any incidents occurring on or near Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

2. **MISSION:** To carry on the primary wing mission and to render such assistance to the host base as can be done without detracting from the capability to execute the primary mission. To date, no tasks have been imposed on this wing in disaster control by the base organization.

3. **RESPONSIBILITIES:**

a. The Wing Commander will appoint a staff officer as Disaster Control Officer for the wing, in an additional duty status. This officer must be thoroughly familiar with operations and maintenance procedures required to launch EWO aircraft. He will serve as liaison officer with the Base Disaster Control Officer. He will keep the Wing Commander informed as to the status of disaster control plans and procedures as they may affect this wing.

b. Each squadron commander will appoint on orders at least one officer and one NCO as squadron disaster control personnel. This assignment will be an additional duty except during actual or expected attack or radioactive fallout condition, when it will be a primary duty. These personnel will be trained by the CBR NCO (46170R) assigned to the Wing Headquarters in courses contained in SACR 50-2.

c. Each squadron CBR section will:

(1) Advise the Squadron Commander on CBR matters.

(2) Plan and direct CBR defensive operations for his unit. This will include CBR training for unit personnel, CBR monitoring, scheduling of unit personnel for shelters, and designation of shelter supervisors per paragraph 4d of Annex II to SACR 355-1.

(3) Maintain records which reflect the CBR training status of each individual in the squadron.

d. Protective masks will be worn or kept immediately available during disaster situations by Combat Defense Force personnel on duty and by such maintenance or other personnel as may be required to be in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear incident.

e. Protective masks for all other personnel will be maintained in the Supply Section and will be available for immediate issue in the event of a disaster situation.

f. The wearing of the DT-60, personnel dosimeter, film badge, or other detection device will be as prescribed by pertinent directives.

g. Each unit commander will insure that each individual assigned to his organization understands his duties and responsibilities in disaster situations. This should be accomplished through training sessions conducted at regular intervals.

4. PROCEDURES:

a. DCM will continue operation as necessary to prepare aircraft for EWO launching. This operation will be limited only by radioactivity of intensity greater than tolerance levels recommended by the surgeon.

b. In the event of an incident in the SAC area, maintenance personnel will evacuate personnel, aircraft, and equipment from the adjacent area as prescribed by Annex IV to SACR 355-1.

c. Combat Defense Force personnel will cordon off the area and evacuate non-essential personnel as prescribed by Annex IV to SACR 355-1. This duty will be carried on until CDF personnel are relieved by Base Air Police.

d. The Deputy Commander for Operations will operate aircraft and facilities as required within the tolerance levels of radioactivity recommended by the surgeon. When contamination is present, combat crews will remain in shelter until time for takeoff, to preclude excessive radiation dosage. Functions normally performed by crew members will be performed by maintenance, munitions or other qualified personnel.

e. Unit commanders and supervisors will insure that personnel not essential to the EWO effort take shelter as required by the presence of radioactivity.

5. **REPORTING:** Reporting will be in accordance with procedures outlined in AFR 136-9 and AFR 355-7. This will be a base responsibility.

6. **INFORMATION SERVICES:** This function will operate in coordination with the Base Section and will be governed by paragraph 4a(7) of AFR 355-7.

7. **GENERAL:**

a. The Command Post for the 4135th Strategic Wing will be in Building 13.

b. Separate SOP's (Unclassified) will be prepared in detail by the following agencies to define operation during a disaster situation:

DCO	DCOI
DCM	DP
DCOCP	SAFETY
DCOC	CDS

These should take into account all possible conditions of disaster, including operation during radioactive fallout conditions and conditions in preparation for fallout. SOP's will be furnished the Wing Disaster Control Officer not later than 30 days after receipt of this Annex.

c. Shelters will be designated and utilized in accordance with Operation Plan 4-60 and amendments thereto.

d. Monitoring procedures will be in accordance with OPLAN 4-60. Special assistance will be furnished the base in this function according to capabilities developed by the wing and subject to manpower limitations, upon request by the Base Disaster Control Agency.

e. Individual CBR training in accordance with SACR 50-24 will be accomplished for all personnel through block training.

(b) (6)
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander for Operations

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708016



COUNT:		TOTAL: 10	
DC	2	DCO	1
DC		DCM	
DC		DCR	
DC	1	SAFE	
DP		BC	1
DS		RFM	
		NSO	
		BJA	
		BCH	
		EDAS	
		BISO	
		EDCS	5
		BAC	
		EDCV	
		ED	
		EDCS	
		BAC	

CZCSLA0002CJUR13
 RR RJESSL
 DE RUEAKD 26
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 FM USAF CIV ENGRGN SOUTH ATLANTIC ATLA
 TO RJWXBR/SAC OFFUTT AFB OMAHA NEOR
 INFO RJEXDHB/STAF WESHOVER AFB CHICOPEEFALLS MASS
 RJESSL/4138THST BHWG TURNER AFB ALBANY GA
 RUEAAB/DIST ENGR SAVANNAH GA
 ZEN/USA ENGR DIV SOUTH ATLANTIC ATLA
 AF GRNC
 BT

FROM AFRCE-SA-744. PREFINAL INSPECTION CONTRACT 3857 LINE
 ITEM 9-003 CHAPEL ANNEX, TURNER AFB GA., WILL BE HELD 0900 HOURS
 27 SEPT 60. AFRCE REPRESENTATION IS PLANNED
 BT
 CFN AFRCE-SA-744 3857 9-003 0900 27 60
 13/1955Z

NNNN

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DM

22 September 1960

MEMO FOR COMMANDER, 822ND AIR DIVISION

SUBJECT: Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour-Johnson AFB,
North Carolina, 12-16 September 1960

1. This directorate conducted a staff visit to the 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina, 12-16 September 1960. The following personnel accomplished the visit:

Col. (b) (6)
Lt. Col. (b) (6)
SMSgt. (b) (6)
SMSgt. (b) (6)

2. EWO capability (classified) is submitted separately.

3. The Supply section of this report, paragraphs IIA, 1, 2, 3 and 4, describes an aircraft spares supply problem which is closely related to ineffective repair activity in the Field Maintenance Squadron. B-52G cannibalization has increased sharply as follows:

19 - June
22 - July
46 - August
49 - 1-15 September

It is evident that intensive effort by the DCM and Director of Supply will be necessary to reverse this trend. Specific areas requiring detailed attention are Field Maintenance Squadron repair activity, Maintenance-Supply Liaison responsibilities and reparable processing procedures.

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

6 Atch
1. A&E
2. Maintenance
3. Supply
4. 4th TFW msg ABBS 07-0570
5. 8AF msg DMS1 47509
6. Ltr, 8AF, 1 Sep 60,
w/atchs

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Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina, 12-16 September 1960, A&E and MMS

Personnel contacted:

Col. (b) (6) DCM
Maj. (b) (6) AEMS Commander
Maj. (b) (6) AEMS Maintenance Supervisor
Maj. (b) (6) GAM Branch OIC
Maj. (b) (6) Job Control OIC
Capt. (b) (6) MMS Maintenance Supervisor
SMSgt. (b) (6) Ass't Maintenance Supervisor
SMSgt. (b) (6) NCOIC, Analysis Unit
SMSgt. (b) (6) MMS
MSgt. (b) (6) AEMS Training NCOIC
TSgt. (b) (6) AEMS Production Scheduling NCOIC

I. EWO/USCM.

A. "Last Resort" Bombsight (T. O. 1B-52G-585): Seven aircraft have the sight installed. All aircraft scheduled to "Fast Fix" are being modified to include this T. O.

B. Training of Chaff Loading Teams (SACR 137-9): Those airmen selected on orders as chaff loaders are being monitored by the Training Section to insure that refresher training is accomplished at least once a month. Action is satisfactory.

C. ECM EWO Configuration Cards (SACR 137-1): A separate card is available for each generation line number. Cards are properly coded, classified and current. ECM specialists understand their use and know their location. Action is satisfactory.

D. RBS and Gunnery Activity of Alert Aircraft: The AEMS Maintenance Supervisor is maintaining a status chart to insure that those aircraft going on alert have had RBS activity within 30 days and gunnery activity within 90 days. This chart is maintained daily by the Analysis Unit.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

II. MCS/BAF COMMAND INTEREST ITEMS

A. Fireout Rate: Outstanding (100 per cent). Four gunnery missions were flown, and all fired 100 per cent.

B. Serviceable Components Removed Rate: Outstanding (6 per cent). 18 components were found serviceable out of 301 processed.

C. AEMS Quality Rating: Satisfactory (90.6 per cent).

D. Bomb-Nav Effectiveness: Marginal (84.4 per cent). Satisfactory is 85 to 95 per cent. An increase in RT unit and antenna failures was a contributing cause. RT unit failures increased from an average of four per month to seven. Antenna failure increased from an average of one per month to four.

E. Home Alert Equipment Readiness: Satisfactory (100 per cent). Of the twelve aircraft that flew after coming off alert, none required maintenance between download and launch on first sortie off alert. Note: A rating below 100 per cent is considered unsatisfactory by 8th Air Force standards.

F. Home Alert Bomb-Nav Activity: Satisfactory (100 per cent). All aircraft off alert were scheduled and completed synchronous RBS activity. A rating below 100 per cent is unsatisfactory by 8th Air Force standards.

G. Home Alert Bomb-Nav Reliability: Outstanding (91.6 per cent). The first run only is considered in this area. Of the twelve sorties flown, one run was unreliable charged to operator error. Standards are as follows: Outstanding 90 to 100 per cent; Satisfactory 85 to 90 per cent; Marginal 80 to 85 per cent; Unsatisfactory below 80 per cent.

H. Home Alert Bomb-Nav Effectiveness: Marginal (81.66 per cent). Of the twelve sorties involved, the systems were rated by the operators as follows: Five reliable for turnaround with no maintenance required; six reliable for turnaround with maintenance required; and one unsatisfactory for turnaround sortie. Standards: Outstanding 95 to 100 per cent; Satisfactory 85 to 95 per cent; Marginal 75 to 85 per cent; Unsatisfactory below 75 per cent.

III. COMPLIANCE.

A. Follow-up of Previous Staff Visit:

1. Harmonization. A&E now has the capability to harmonize the assigned aircraft. The Arma Field Engineer was checked out at Eglin in the use of harmonization test equipment the first week in September. He has trained three NCOs and is in the process of training all assigned gunnery personnel. One aircraft has been harmonized. Two aircraft are tentatively scheduled per week; however, due to limited availability of aircraft (cracked wings), about one harmonization per week is performed. Estimated completion date for harmonizing assigned aircraft is 1 December.

2. Bomb-Nav Status of Aircraft 196. The Bomb-Nav system on this aircraft was unreliable on the last "Team Scrimmage" on 2 August, because the antenna stuck in the down position during the first RBS synchronous run. Although no malfunction was found, the antenna was replaced for preventive maintenance. Tilt trouble did recur on the third subsequent sortie (30 August). The aircraft was repaired at Columbus AFB, Mississippi. No record available of maintenance performed at Columbus AFB. Three sorties have been flown since, and the malfunction did not recur.

Action required: In the event that this malfunction recurs and no trouble can be found on ground check, suggest this aircraft be placed on "Tango" status for AEMS trouble shooting exclusively until a definite fix is established.

3. Procurement of Rubber Matting. The required matting was placed on order on 26 August. The LP Store placed this item on order on 6 September.

Action required: That the AEMS Maintenance Supervisor take appropriate follow-up action, establish delivery dates and/or request supply difficulty action, as necessary.

4. Status of A&E Tool Boxes (SAF message DM 53868, 1 July 1960). The required tool box inspections have been performed and

shortages furnished to Supply. No tools were issued in August because of lack of funds. Funds are now available, and the shortages have been requisitioned.

B. Follow-up of Previous Staff Visit, 53rd MMS:

Qualification of Assigned Personnel in .38 Calibre Pistol. 55 airmen are not currently qualified in the .38 calibre pistol. The Base Range was closed for repairs, but is now back in use. The MMS has one day a week reserved for their use. Ten airmen a week, starting 22 September, are being scheduled to the range. It is estimated that all assigned personnel will be scheduled for the range within six to eight weeks. Reference: SACR 50-24, page 199, paragraph f (see note).

C. A&E Facility: The BOD date has slipped from 15 September to 30 September. At least two more weeks of electrical work is left to be done.

D. Production Management (SAF message DM 4438, 27 August 1960): The recently authorized Productrol Boards (six each) have been placed on order on 7 September, Control No. 60101435. It is believed that 8AFM 66-3 can be fully implemented within two to three weeks after receipt of the Productrol Boards.

Action required: That the AEMS Maintenance Supervisor obtain firm delivery dates from Supply and request supply difficulty action (AFR 67-82) if delivery dates are unreasonable.

E. Manning: A&E manning in the Production Scheduling field is 62 per cent. Because of command emphasis on implementation of 8AFM 66-3, Production Management, a concerted effort to fully man this area is necessary. Eight are authorized in A&E and five assigned. The wing is authorized 17 and has 14 assigned. No inputs are projected within the next 60 days.

Action required: That every effort be made to adequately man this 434XX area. Cross training should be considered.

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F. AFTO Form 26M, "Armament and Electronics Shop Production Credit and Malfunction Analysis Data Record": The 4241st AEMIS is not using this required form for documentation of bench maintenance activities. Use of this form is fully explained in T. O. 00-20A-1 (formerly 00-20-2). Forms have been available for approximately four months. This item has been on order since May and follow-up action accomplished weekly. No due in dates available at this time.

Action required: That the AEMS Maintenance Supervisor determine reason for non-availability of these forms and request command assistance if necessary. Note: 100 copies of AFTO Form 26M have been sent to 4241st AEMS by this directorate on 21 September 1960, which may be reproduced locally until such time as they become available through normal channels. Authority: AFM 5-4, paragraph 27.

G. Special Subject Letter, SAFL 121-4, 19 July 1960, Appearance of A&E and Missile Facilities: Both the missile facility and A&E Aircraft Maintenance facility are taking steps to comply with this special subject. The floors in the missile facility are being painted, charts are being standardized, emphasis has been placed on housekeeping, and coordination is being established with the Base Fire Marshal to determine fire extinguisher needs and proper marking of extinguisher locations. Because the A&E Aircraft Maintenance Branch anticipates moving into their new facility in the near future, full implementation of this special subject is economically unsound at present location.

Action required: This directorate will monitor this special subject on subsequent visits to insure full compliance with SAFL 121-4.

H. Calibration of Test Equipment: 60 to 70 per cent of A&E possessed test equipment is overdue calibration. The base support in this area is considered unsatisfactory. The Wing Commander has advised the 4th Air Base Group (TAC) Commander by letter of this condition on 26 August. No reply has been received on action taken to correct the condition.

Action required: WRAMA assistance should be requested until the Base Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory is operating effectively.

I. Aircraft Wringouts: Status of special weapons wringouts is current and is constantly being monitored by Workload Control. Action is satisfactory.

J. Missile Facilities Status:

1. Projects.

a. **Hardening of 72/77 Runup areas.** This item has been approved by Army CE. Work is scheduled to start on 19 September and is expected to be completed within seven days.

b. **Non-Powered Ground Support Equipment Storage Area.** 12,000 square feet of hard surfaced area has been approved for outside storage of non-powered GSE equipment. Work will start on this project on 19 September.

c. **Enclose Ammonia Storage Facility.** A design deficiency has been submitted the first week in September to fence in this area to provide security and safety. No information on current status of this project available at this time.

d. **Roof Leaks and Storm Damage Repair.** The contractor is scheduled to start repair of roof leaks in the Combined Systems Maintenance Building on 16 September. Hurricane "Donna" loosened the copper weatherstripping around the roofs of both the 72 and 77 Runup Buildings. This is also scheduled for repair by the contractor on 16 September.

e. **Air Conditioning.** Air conditioning for Stations 1 and 2 of the Maintenance Building and Combined Systems Checkout Building is scheduled for April 1961.

f. **Power Generators in GAM-72 Section of Combined Systems Maintenance Building.** These generators are scheduled to be connected within a week by Base Civil Engineering Section.

2. Missile Status. Of the ten possessed GAM-77s, three are in commission. A work stoppage has developed at Station 1 due to

all three authorized auto-collimators being out of commission. Local repair is being attempted on two, and the other has been repaired by the factory and is expected back on 19 September.

3. Aircraft Checkout. An operational check of aircraft pylon adapters has been performed on four aircraft. The guidance phase has not been completed due to non-availability of aircraft. Approximately 36 hours are required per check.

IV. SAFETY.

A. Safety Precautions, ASB-9 Radar: Airmen are periodically briefed on existing radiation hazards. This is also included in check lists and OJT standards. Action is satisfactory.

B. Internal Grounding of Amplifier Test Set, ASB-9 (reference SAC message DM4D3 30034, 2 September 1960): The amplifier tester has been inspected and internally grounded as required. Action is satisfactory.

C. Ear Plugs (reference 8AFM 32-1): Six airmen were checked, and all had ear plugs in their possession. A monthly survey is conducted to insure all personnel working in areas of noise hazard have ear plugs in their possession. Action is satisfactory.

Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina, 12-16 September 1960, Maintenance

Personnel contacted:

Col. (b) (6) DCM
Lt. Col. (b) (6) Ass't DCM
Lt. Col. (b) (6) Maintenance Control
Maj. (b) (6) Workload Control
Maj. (b) (6) Quality Control
Maj. (b) (6) FMS Commander
Capt. (b) (6) FMS Supervision
Capt. (b) (6) Logistics
Capt. (b) (6) OIC, Bomber Branch, OMS
SMSgt. (b) (6) OMS Supervision

I. EWO/USCM.

A. Fast Ride Vehicles: There are seven Fast Ride vehicles assigned to the Alert Section. Three of these vehicles are leased from a civilian concern in Goldsboro. All vehicles were found to be in satisfactory condition with the exception of one station wagon, 58B-958. This vehicle is in need of painting.

B. Alert Aircraft Tires: The problem of cut tires has been experienced on alert aircraft within the 4241st SW. During the period 15 August through 15 September, three tires necessitated change on B-52 aircraft due to being cut beyond limits. Two tires on a KC-135 aircraft were changed for the same reason. In addition to these changes on alert aircraft, one B-52 required three tire changes for cuts prior to alert changeover and after being towed from the normal parking area to the alert area. The Division Maintenance Staff Officer checked the taxiways and parking areas for foreign objects. It was noted that these areas were well policed, and no articles that would damage tires were found at this time. The Alert Section rotates all alert tires one half turn each day in accordance with T. O. 4T-1-3.

Action required: It is recommended that all aircraft preparing for alert duty be required to rotate the tires for a thorough check of their condition prior to actual towing from the normal parking area to the alert parking area.

C. Preparation of Aircraft for Alert Duty: No discrepancies were noted in preparation of aircraft for alert. All aircraft are prepared the day prior to assuming the alert posture and are brought to alert configuration with the exception of the weapons loading at this time.

D. Rotation of Maintenance Personnel on Alert Duty (reference SACM 27-1, paragraph 33b(2)(a)): The crew chief and three Maintenance personnel accompany their aircraft through the alert duty. B-52 personnel are performing approximately 14 days alert duty; KC-135 personnel are performing approximately seven days alert duty. The referenced paragraph above requires the flight chiefs to be rotated "no less than six months per alert tour".

Action required: Although SACM 27-1 does not specify clearly a rotation policy for supervisory personnel, it is believed to be in the best interest of the wing to establish an SOP which clearly outlines the tour of duty for all Maintenance personnel performing alert duty.

E. Base Support Plan Discrepancies (reference 8AF message DML 37380, 1 September 1960): Amendment No. 5 to the 4241st SW Base Support Plan has been forwarded to 8th Air Force on 13 September 1960, for approval. A review of the TWX with the Amendment No. 5 indicates that the 8th Air Force requirements have been satisfied.

II. MCS/8AF COMMAND INTEREST ITEMS. A review of reportable items indicated that there was one marginal item for the month of July. This item was B-52 Late Takeoffs. Aircraft 167 had a late takeoff due to a water separator failure. Aircraft 173 had a late takeoff due to a water line rupture. Both of these items failed on the takeoff roll.

Action required: The Maintenance Analysis Section should check these items to determine the frequency of failure and the possibility of preventing future failure.

III. COMPLIANCE.

A. Deputy Commander for Maintenance:

1. Qualification of the Quality Control Officer in B-52 Aircraft. The wing has started the checkout program for Maj. (b) (6)

the Quality Control Officer. He has flown two missions--one on 23 August and one on 26 August. A check with the Director of Training indicates that he needs 25 landings and six missions to complete his checkout. Although 4241st SW TWX C 2140, 3 August 1960, sets 10 November 1960, as the estimated checkout date for Maj. (b) (6) the current Phase Plan submitted by the wing indicates that Maj. (b) (6) will be checked out by January 1961.

Action required: It is essential that Maj. (b) (6) be checked out as soon as possible. If the 10 November 1960 checkout date is no longer valid, 822nd Air Division Headquarters should be advised.

2. Proper Approval for Cannibalization (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Chapter 2, Part I, AFM 66-1, page 3, paragraph 24a). The wing is in compliance with this directive. All cannibalization slips are signed by the DCM when he is present for duty or by his assistant in his absence.

3. Job Standards (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Chapter 6, Part I, AFM 66-1, paragraph 11p and q). A job standard book has been developed by the wing. This book has been distributed in conformance with the referenced paragraph. A check of this book indicates that deficiencies do exist. As an example, there is no job standard for removal and replacement of tires.

Action required: It is recommended that a complete review of the wing's job standards be initiated to assure a complete publication. This booklet is essential to accurate EWO planning as well as routine planning.

B. Organizational Maintenance Squadron:

1. Aircraft Form 781, Delayed Discrepancies. A spot check of six aircraft was made. The average delayed discrepancies for these six aircraft was 3.3 per aircraft. This is a marked improvement over our previous staff visit, dated 19-22 July 1960. It was noticed on the alert aircraft that there was one KC-135, 034, which had eight delayed discrepancies. One of these discrepancies dated back to 2 May 1960.

Action required: Although there has been a marked improvement in accomplishing maintenance to prevent delayed discrepancies, it is

recommended that continued emphasis be placed in this area by the DCM in order to maintain a minimum number of delayed discrepancies.

2. **Aircraft Washing.** There is no program for washing aircraft established at this time within the 4241st SW. T.O. 1-1-1, paragraph 1-4, page 1, and T.O. 1-1-2, paragraph 3-2, page 3-1, state that, "Aircraft must be periodically cleaned to remove corrosive agents". This item is not considered a repeat item in accordance with Division Policy Letter No. 5; however, it was reported in our staff visit report of 18-20 January 1960.

Action required: Although the wing does not have a suitable wash rack to wash the B-52 and KC-135 aircraft, it is considered essential that a system be developed to use normal fire hydrant facilities with a pressure reducer, and after this system is developed, that a schedule be published and maintained for the accomplishment of washing aircraft to prevent future corrosion problems on wing aircraft.

3. **Compass Calibration, B-52 and KC-135 Aircraft.** All KC-135 aircraft are current in compass calibration. One B-52 alert aircraft, No. 164, is overdue for an N-1 compass swing. Three B-52 aircraft are overdue for a B-16 "standby" compass swing.

Action required: Complete the compass swings on the four aircraft which are overdue and assure that a program is established to prevent future discrepancies of this type.

4. **Qualifications of Personnel to Perform Maintenance on Egress Systems** (reference 8AF Supplement 1, paragraph 3.1b, to SACR 66-40, 16 August 1960). No orders have been published designating personnel qualified to perform maintenance on Egress systems, but the personnel have been trained.

Action required: Designate personnel and publish the orders in accordance with the above referenced 8th Air Force supplement. Safety considerations make it essential that only qualified, designated personnel perform maintenance on Egress systems.

5. **Weight and Balance Personnel.** MSgt. (b)(6) has been assigned the duty of Weight and Balance NCO on Squadron Special Order No. 21, dated 24 March 1960.

6. Disaster Control (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Part I, AFM 66-1, paragraph 5d(7)). Squadron Special Order No. 26, dated 7 July 1960, designates the Disaster Control Officer and NCO. Special Order No. 31, dated 1 August 1960, designates two teams of five men each for duties during a Disaster Control exercise. All of these personnel have attended the 30-hour Disaster Control training course.

7. Conspicuity Paint, KC-135 Aircraft. Two aircraft have been painted--115 and 037. The remaining eight aircraft are scheduled to be repainted by 15 December. A program has been established to renew the paint, as necessary, thereafter.

8. Tool Improvement Program (reference 8AF message DM 53866, 1 July 1960). This squadron is in compliance with the referenced TWX. All personnel requiring a tool box have been issued one. These boxes are 95 per cent complete.

Action required: Perform a tool showdown inspection for the month of September in compliance with 8th Air Force message.

C. Field Maintenance Squadron

1. Repair Capability. This subject is reported on in the Supply portion of this report, paragraph II, B, page 3.

2. Ground Power In-Commission Rate. The Ground Power In-Commission Rate for August was 87.3 per cent. As of 15 September, the rate was 88.4 per cent for the month of September. This is within the 8th Air Force standard of 80 per cent.

3. Disaster Control (reference SAC Supplement 1, Part I, AFM 66-1, paragraph 5d(7)). Squadron Special Order No. 7, dated 2 August 1960, has been published, designating a Disaster Control Officer and two NCOs. These personnel have completed the Disaster Control training program in compliance with the above referenced supplement.

4. Shop Supervisors' Review of AF Form 892 (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Chapter 14, Part I, AFM 66-1, paragraph 14c). A spot

check of work orders within the various shops of Field Maintenance was made. The squadron is in conformance with the above referenced supplement with the exception of two work orders which were noted in the Aircraft Repair Shop that were not properly released by the signature of the crew chief. The work orders were for KC-135 aircraft 023, Job No. 13-81, and B-52 aircraft 188, Job No. 13-24.

Action required: Continued emphasis must be placed on proper releasing of all work orders by the crew chief. Each specialist should make sure that he obtains this release prior to returning to the shop.

5. SAC Form 408, Daily Status Report for Ground Powered Equipment (reference SAC Supplement 1 to Chapter 14, Part I, AFM 66-1, paragraph 291, page 12). The squadron is in conformance with referenced supplement. No errors were noted.

6. Tool Improvement Program (reference SAF message DM 53868, 1 July 1960). 80 per cent of all squadron personnel have been issued tool boxes. Shortages exist in these boxes.

Action required: It is recommended that the FMS Commander assure compliance with 8th Air Force message referenced above for the month of September, in order to obtain a complete listing of existing shortages to aid the Director of Supply in filling these shortages of tools for his personnel. 822nd Air Division DM will follow up on this item during the next staff visit.

7. Personnel Authorized to Operate Hangar Doors. Special Order No. 73, dated 22 August 1960, designates Field Maintenance personnel authorized to operate the hangar doors.

8. Qualification of Personnel to Perform Maintenance on Egress Systems (reference SAF Supplement 1, paragraph 3.1b, to SACB 66-40, 16 August 1960). Special Order No. 75, dated 25 August 1960, lists the personnel who are authorized to perform maintenance on Egress systems in the Field Maintenance Squadron.

9. Weight and Balance Personnel. Special Order No. 74, dated 24 August 1960, designates Field Maintenance personnel who are authorized to weigh aircraft and perform jacking duties.

IV. SAFETY.

A. Emergency Tow Cables for Docks (page 126(14), 8AFM 32-1):

The Wing Director of Safety, Lt. Col. King, was unable to obtain suitable cables for the B-52 aircraft, as indicated in 8AFM 32-1. He did obtain the B-47 tow cable, and this design was utilized by the wing in an attempt to satisfy the requirements of this manual for the B-52 aircraft. A work order has been submitted to FMS for the construction of the towing cables. Upon return to Division Headquarters, this item was discussed with Maj. Carson, the Division Director of Safety. He was advised that the 4137th SW has been verbally informed by 8th Air Force to delete this requirement. Maj. Carson contacted the 8th Air Force Director of Safety's Office and discussed this problem with them on 19 September 1960, at which time, he was advised that the requirement was no longer valid and that a TWX would be forwarded that date, substantiating this verbal approval. Note: 8AF message DSG 88473, 19 September 1960, subject: Emergency Towing Cables, deletes the requirement for towing cables for B-52 and KC-135 aircraft.

B. Squadron List of Vehicle Operators for Operation of Government Vehicles (reference 4a(2), page 145, 8AFM 32-1):

1. FMS. FMS has a published list of personnel who are authorized to operate government vehicles. This list is maintained current as changes necessitate.

2. OMS. OMS has a published list of personnel who are authorized to operate government vehicles. This list is maintained current as changes necessitate.

C. Refueling Operation: The Division Maintenance Staff Officer observed a KC-135 aircraft, No. 037, refueling operation. No errors were noted.

Staff Visit to 4241st Strategic Wing, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina, 12-16 September 1960, Supply

Personnel contacted:

- Maj. (b) (6) /Supply
- Capt. (b) (6) Consolidated Organizational Supply Officer
- Lt. (b) (6) Aircraft Support Division
- SMSgt. (b) (6) NCOIC, Directorate of Supply
- MSgt. (b) (6) Organizational Supply Division
- MSgt. (b) (6) Bench Stock and Pre-issue
- MSgt. (b) (6) Aircraft Support Division
- TSgt. (b) (6) Accounting Branch
- TSgt. (b) (6) Maintenance-Supply Liaison
- SSgt. (b) (6) 780 Installed Equipment
- AIC (b) (6) PAK
- (b) (6) WSMO

I. EWO/USCM. Supply effectiveness during last Golden Hour Tango exercise:

A. Base Supply Fill Rate - 50 per cent. Unsatisfactory. 90 per cent is required for maximum GHT score.

B. Delivery Time - 17 minutes. Satisfactory.

II. MCS/SAF COMMAND INTEREST ITEMS.

A. Supply Effectiveness:

	Items Requested	Complete or Partial Issue	Percent Effective	Avg Delivery Time	
				Pri. I	Pri. II
Expediter 15 Jul - 15 Aug	787	502	64%	16	25
Expediter 15 Aug - 15 Sep	1077	466	43%	18	22

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B. AOCP, ANFE and Cannibalizations:

	<u>August</u>	<u>1-15 September</u>
AOCP		
B-52	4	5
KC-135	0	0
ANFE		
B-52	13	7
KC-135	5	1
Cannibalizations		
B-52	46	49
KC-135	8	2

1. The apparent ineffectiveness of Supply to prevent the unsatisfactory history of priority and emergency procurement actions during this reporting period is attributable to a succession of events over several months which resulted in a depletion of base stocks. An attempt by Base Supply (AFB 4809) during May, June and July to reconcile B-52/KC-135 due-in/due-out status with OCAMA resulted in an inability to affirm 92 per cent of approximately 4,900 requisitions standing in the Base Supply register. These requisitions were for weapons system support and were mostly dated prior to 15 March. This situation has been amply documented and passed to 8th Air Force for assistance (reference message ABBS 07-0570, 29 July 1960; from AFB 4809 to 8th Air Force and OCAMA, attached). 8th Air Force is fully cognizant of the facts involved, and 8th Air Force message DMSI 47508, dated 2 August 1960 (copy attached) indicated that Col. Wall, DM, and Col. Silver, DMS, were handcarrying the problem to OCAMA for resolution. New requisitions completely supplanting those cancelled in the above action have been submitted by AFB 4809. Since Base Supply was closed during the month of August for RAMAC conversion, except for Maintenance Priority 1 through 5 requirements, the bulk of re-established requisitions has been submitted within the last two weeks. The gradual depletion of base stocks,

ending with the closing of Base Supply in August, created a condition in which all permissible procurement was emergency and of the highest priority. Action which has been taken by the Wing Director of Supply, Base Supply and the WSMO in identifying the critical items involved and pressing for procurement action has been vigorous and aggressive. The Director of Supply has been assured that an approach to normalcy of base stocks should be realized by mid October.

Action required: This supply support is unsatisfactory. The 4241st SW must continue to vigorously exercise every available means to improve the situation. 8th Air Force and OCAMA should be advised that this situation is critical and must be remedied.

2. FMS Repair Capability. The existence of the supply problem presented above, including excessive cannibalization of B-52G aircraft spares, prompted the Maintenance Staff Officer to inquire into FMS shop repair activities. Further, the development of the maximum repair capability is a USAF, SAC, 8th Air Force command special subject personally generated by Gen. LeMay, Gen. Power and Gen. Sweeney (copy attached). Although the problems cited above are contributing factors in producing a high cannibalization rate, the past experience of the 822nd Air Division DM staff has indicated that a high cannibalization rate is directly related to poor reparable parts processing in accordance with SAFR 65-3; AFM 66-1, paragraph 14-20; T.O.s 00-20A-1, 00-25-88 and 00-25-107; and Chapters 2 and 3 to AFM 66-1. It is realized that the 4241st SW being a tenant is not required to comply with SAFR 65-3, dated 14 December 1959; however, in our staff visit report, dated 18-20 January 1960, we recommended that this information be used to record the repair capability of the wing. By the use of this regulation, it was and still is believed to be an excellent method of placing emphasis on the proper procedures for reparable processing. It was noted during the visit that there was an apparent lack of knowledge of proper procedures for reparable processing within the Supervision Section of the FMS, the Maintenance-Supply Section and the Workload Control Section. Although reparable processing is a host base responsibility, the 4241st SW must be cognizant of pertinent data concerning this function in order to evaluate the existing repair capability.

3. The results of a check of three frequently cannibalized items are as follows:

	<u>B-52 Water Separator</u>	<u>Inst Inverter</u>	<u>Gen Control Panel</u>
Can the item be repaired locally?	Yes	No. Maint-Supply was not aware of	Yes
Does the item require parts?	Yes	proper procedure for determining	Yes
Does the item require test equipment?	No	base repair capability of this item.	Yes
Are required parts on hand?	No	Final determination was made with the aid of the Boeing tech rep.	No
Is test equipment on hand?	N/A		Yes
Has the shop established the requirement for bench stock support of these items?	No		No
How long has the requisition been outstanding?	To be submitted 1 Oct 60		1 and 6 Sep 60

4. A comparison of items processed through reparable processing of 822nd Air Division wings is as follows:

	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>
4241st SW	180	353
4138th SW	1,302	1,176
4135th SW	391	544

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Action required: It is recommended that a complete evaluation be made to assure that all 4241st SW personnel involved in reparable processing, directly or indirectly, are in conformance with Section XV, SACM 65-2R; AFM 66-1, Chapters 2 and 3; Chapter 14, paragraphs 14-20, T. O. 00-2A-1; T. O. 00-25-68; and T. O. 00-107. It is again recommended that the Wing DCM utilize 8AFR 65-3, dated 14 December 1959, to aid in determining the results of his repair capability. It is further recommended that Maintenance-Supply Liaison Branch act in accordance with paragraph 28b(3), SACM 20-15, in establishing the necessary relations and procedures to establish an effective operation. Since weakness in this area is highly contributory to the high cannibalization rate, it is imperative that a detailed operation be established to monitor and expedite the routing of aircraft reparable items to the appropriate Supply or Maintenance facility. An SOP to establish procedures for reparable processing should be an immediate item of coordination between all interested SAC and TAC sections, that it be published and closely monitored by the DCM, Director of Supply and Seymour-Johnson Air Base Group personnel. 822nd Air Division DM will follow up on this problem in detail during the next staff visit.

C. Flyaway Kits:

Percentage on Hand	15 Aug	15 Sep
B-52	73.0	74.6
KC-135	85.4	90.3

SAC standard for maximum MCS score is 96 per cent. Although all shortages are on valid requisition, few items were received during August, due to Base Supply conversion to RAMAC.

Action required: Quick, effective action should be taken to apply bits and pieces against end item shortages in the new kits. This means that if you possess bits and pieces required to repair and place in serviceable condition any end item authorized within the kit, that credit for possession of the end item in the kit will apply for MCS purposes. Such bits and pieces should be retained within the Flyaway Kit Section. This will not affect the established FAK priority with AMC. Should clarification be required, contact Capt. (b) (6) DMS3, 8th Air Force, Ext. 21244. Col. (b) (6) called Capt. (b) (6) 20 September 1960.

on this problem, and he stated he would contact Maj. (b) (6) 4241st SW Director of Supply, and clarify existing policy and procedures. The overall FAK problem is presented in detail in the August 1960 8th Air Force Materiel Digest on page 9.

III. COMPLIANCE

A. 8th Air Force Tool Improvement Program:

1. The end of July hand tool shortage for the combined individual tool kits and tool cribs for the wing totaled \$14,410.41. Requisitions covering this shortage were submitted prior to the end of July when Base Supply closed for RAMAC conversion. Approximately \$8,200.00 of the initial requests were returned during August for lack of base funds. SAC funds were cited and returned to Base Supply. To date, \$1,700.00 worth of the \$14,410.00 shortages has been received and issued.

2. ECL tool kit listings attached to AF Forms 538 (Personal Clothing and Equipment Record) were noted to be obsolete in many instances. New ECLs are in file, however, and preparation of new attachments is in progress. It is estimated that adjustments necessitated by these tool kit revisions will require 60 days to complete. All existing tool shortages are GSA procured and should be readily available from that source. According to the above resume, approximately \$12,700.00 worth of tools remains on requisition and has been funded.

Action required: Continued emphasis should be made through Base Supply to assure the necessary procurement action.

B. Excess Items:

1. Excess UAL items as of 1 September totaled \$246,170.03, which included \$91,701.80 brought into the account concurrent with the integration of the MMS account. With the exception of those excesses brought in by MMS, the balance has been largely created by the changes in equipment allowances in recent UALs. Although \$150,000.00 in excesses was on hand in mid August which was residue from an earlier UAL reduction in authorization, another UAL, dated 11 August, has been received which further reduces authorizations and thus added to the excess value.

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2. Preface to the new UAL states that it is based on a new ECL 356 which was revised at a SAC-AMC conference, but which has not been published and distributed to units in the field. A query to the Eastern Area EE&AT by the 4241st SW indicated the new ECL 356 should be distributed in mid September. Since it is probable that many of the excesses created by UAL quantity changes are in error and can be justifiably retained, a reconciliation of such shortages against requirements cannot be effected until receipt of the ECL. Turn-ins are continuing on a scheduled basis for those items which show an excess from previous authorizations. A \$74,291.26 reduction was made in this category since 6 September. Remaining excess amounts to \$171,879.47 and is shown on thermometer graph in the Director of Supply's office.

Action required: Upon receipt of new ECL, research each excess UAL item for retention justification. Where retention is justified under provisions of the ECL, submit SAC Form 144 (UAL Change Request). Where retention is justifiable, but not under provisions of the ECL, submit SAC Form 144 as an ECL Change Request. Where retention is not justifiable, the item must be returned to Base Supply for credit.

C. Security of FAK Engines Stored in Jet Engine Buildup Shop (reference 822nd Air Division Staff Visit Report, 27 July 1960, Maintenance, paragraph C, 1a): Referenced report suggests the vulnerability of built up FAK engines to unauthorized and uncontrolled cannibalization. Repeated visits have been made to JEBU by FAK personnel to assure the completeness of engine configuration. Plans have been drawn for individual canvas engine covers which can be locked in place. Procurement action for these covers has not been made.

Action required: That work orders be submitted for sufficient covers to secure all authorized FAK engines. Until covers are in place, the continuance of a frequent visit schedule is the only assurance that FAK engines are secure.

D. 8AF Supply Improvement Program (reference 8AF letter, 14 January 1960, subject: Eighth Air Force Supply Improvement Program, and Changes Thereto): No RCS assigned. This report is due on a semi-annual cycle, beginning each 15th of June and December and having monthly progress reports due as of the 15th of every month. A review of the wing file on this report indicated.

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1. That the report due as of 15 August 1960, had not been submitted. Although late, this report was prepared and submitted during this visit.
2. That three of the five Supply branches concerned with submitting data for the report (Bench Stock and Pre-issue, Maintenance-Supply Liaison and 780 Aircraft Installed Equipment) did so in a perfunctory manner, their information being incomplete, and failed to follow the format provided in the above reference.
3. That no specific and interested monitor had been assigned to insure the timeliness and accuracy of the report. During visit, an airman (Accounting Branch) was assigned to insure preparation and submission.

Comments:

The items making up the check lists of the Supply Improvement Program are selected for their individual importance in the Supply operation; together, they represent a quick preview of the overall supply effectiveness, both for aircraft support and the major activities within the Organizational Supply Division. Specific operational deficiencies and discrepancies noted include:

Field Maintenance Squadron pre-issue master list in use is dated February 1960; Paragraph 57, SACM 65-2R requires review and republication of master lists at least each 90 days.

The tenant support agreement indicates that Base Supply will furnish a reparable processing operation. This service has not been furnished, however, and is presently being performed by personnel of the wing. Review of the reparable processing status is Item 8, Part III of the SIP report and requires a weekly check by Maintenance-Supply Liaison.

A more detailed study of the SIP check list reveals many important steps which, if thoroughly understood and refined, would improve the overall supply operation. In this respect, the entire check list would be valuable as the basis of a periodic staff meeting between the

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Director of Supply, the respective NCOICs of the Supply branches concerned and the officers in charge of the Aircraft Support Division and Organizational Supply.

Action required: Necessary procedures should be effected to insure timely submission of this report. Further, it should be used as a management tool as discussed above. Consideration is recommended for assigning a monitor who will be acquainted with and interested in the overall data contained therein.

D. SAC 310 Inspection (reference SACR 67-32): The last 310 inspection performed by the 4241st SW is dated 8 February 1960, and the last 310 inspection performed by the 822nd Air Division is dated 20 April 1960. SACR 67-32 requires that the unit perform a 310 supply inspection once each six months on a cyclic schedule. As a matter of policy, the 822nd Air Division also uses the 310 check list as the basis of a semi-annual inspection and timed to fall due half way between wing inspections. It is noted that the Director of Supply has utilized the current edition of SAC 310 inspection check list as a guide in self evaluation, but the 310 inspection due in August was not accomplished.

Action required: That the Director of Supply accomplish the required 310 inspection as soon as possible and not later than 15 October 1960. 822nd Air Division DM will follow up on this problem during the next staff visit.

IV. SAFETY. The 780 Installed Equipment Section does not identify any specific smoking area; however, smoking was noted.

Action required: That the office area be encircled with a red floor stripe, and that "Smoking" and "No Smoking" signs be erected in appropriate areas.

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FM 4TACFTRWG SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC
TO 822AIRDIV TURNER AFB GA

ABBS 07-0570. FOR MSU AT 12AF, FOR TMSU AT TAC, FOR WRSDA AT WRAMA. OUR BASE SUPPLY ORGANIZATION IS THOROUGHLY BEWILDERED, PERPLEXED AND HIGHLY DISTURBED AS A RESULT OF OCAMA ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE RECENT B-52/KC-135 DUE-IN/DUE-OUT RECONCILIATION. THREE ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO AFB 4809 TO RECONCILE B-52/KC-135 DUE-INS AGAINST DEPOT DUE-OUTS AND EACH EFFORT HAS RESULTED IN NOTHING BUT CANCELLATIONS AND THE RESULTANT WASTE OF 600 MANHOURS IN OUR STOCK CONTROL SECTION. BASE SUPPLY FORWARDED APPROXIMATELY 4,900 DUE-IN CARDS TO OCAMA ON 11 MAY (138TH DAY). CARDS FORWARDED WERE IN COLUMN FORMAT COORDINATED WITH OCAMA (OCDD) AND INCLUDED ALL OUTSTANDING DUE-INS UP TO AND INCLUDING THE 74TH DAY. ON 18 JULY (200TH DAY), BASE SUPPLY RECEIVED FROM OCAMA 6,038 CARDS WHICH WERE INTERPRETED AND MATCH-MERGED AGAINST BASE RECORDS WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS: 4,203 DUE-INS MERGED; 2,978 DUE-INS REFLECTED ON AFB 4809 BUT NOT ON DEPOT RECORDS, 1,835 DUE-OUTS ON OCAMA RECORDS BUT NOT IN AFB 4809 FILE. OF THE 4,203 DUE-INS THAT MERGED WITH BASE RECORDS, 3,878 WERE CODED "C5" (CANCELLED) OR 92.2 PERCENT OF THESE DUE-INS. AFB 4809 POSSESSED NUMERIC BACK ORDER STATUS FROM "HC" OR "HD" ON 1,221 DUE-INS, YET, THEY WERE STILL CODED "C5". IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONSTRUCT OR VISUALIZE THE GROUND RULES UTILIZED IN THE MASS CANCELLATION OF THESE DUE-INS. THE ALARMING PART OF THIS SITUATION IS THAT THIS RECONCILIATION ONLY COVERED REQUISITIONS SUBMITTED UP TO 15 MARCH AND IF THIS WIDE DISPARITY OF RECORDS EXISTS ON SUBSEQUENT REQUISITIONS, LITTLE OR NO SUPPLY SUPPORT CAN BE EXPECTED ON BASE REQUISITION SUBMITTED FOR REPLENISHMENT PURPOSES. IT IS REALIZED A MINIMUM OF 2 PER CENT AND A POSSIBLE MAXIMUM OF 5 PER CENT ERROR DISCREPANCY CAN EXIST IN BASE DUE-IN RECORDS, BUT NOT 30 PER CENT. BASE SUPPLY IS IN THE PROCESS OF CONVERTING FROM VOLUME

XVIII PROCEDURES TO IBM 305 RAMAC. AND THIS MASS CANCELLATION WILL POSSIBLY EXTEND OUR PROPOSED CONVERSION DATE OR REQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURE OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OVERTIME. POSITIVE DUE-INS MUST EXIST IF WE ARE TO SUPPORT OUR STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND WING IN THE MANNER TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCUSTOMED. MEET GOLDEN HOUR TANGO DESIRED SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS PERCENTAGES, FILL PAK REQUIREMENTS TO MEET EWO COMMITMENTS, AS WELL AS MAINTAIN PRE-ISSUE AND BENCH STOCK EFFECTIVENESS ABOVE 90 PER CENT. IF FUTURE EDPE RECONCILIATIONS ARE NO MORE EFFECTIVE THAN IN THE PRESENT PROGRAM, PERHAPS WE SHOULD RETURN TO MANUAL PROCEDURES TO PURIFY OUR DUE-INS. ANY FUTURE RECONCILIATIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE CUT-OFF DATE AND NOT PROLONGED FOR OVER 120 DAYS, SINCE IT IS FELT THIS PERIOD OF TIME IS HISTORY. BASE SUPPLY CANNOT CONDONE NOR CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE THESE UNNECESSARY EXPENDITURES OF MANHOURS IN SUPPORT OF OUR B-52/KC-135 PROGRAM. ASSISTANCE AND GUIDANCE IN THIS SERIOUS SITUATION ARE URGENTLY NEEDED.

29/2145Z JUL

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FM 8AF WESTOVER AFB MASS
TO 822AIRDIV TURNER AFB GA

██████████ DMS1 47509. FOR DIV D/M, WG SUPPLY AND BASE SUPPLY OFFICERS. SUBJ: DEPOT CANCELLATION OF BASE BACK ORDERS FOR B52/KC135, REF 4TACFTRWG ABBS 07-0570, 29 JUL 60. ACTION IS IN PROGRESS TO ARRIVE AT A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. INFO SUBMITTED BY SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AND LORING AFB'S IS BEING HANDCARRIED TO HQ SAC BY COL WALL, DM, AND COL SILVER, DMS, THIS HQ 2 AUG 60. YOUR DIV WILL BE ADVISED UPON RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. PENDING FIRM DECISION, RE-REQUISITIONING ACTION ON VALID REQUIREMENTS CANCELLED MUST BE AFFORDED PRIORITY ACTION AS REQUIRED BY VOL II, AFM 67-1.

04/1346Z AUG

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
Westover Air Force Base
Massachusetts

C

1 September 1960

Air Force Materiel Requirements

4241st Strat Wg (C)

1. General LeMay and General Power have emphasized the need for improved materiel management. The attached CINCSAC letter and my reply contain a clear and concise listing of the materiel requirements which must receive commander emphasis.
2. Division Directors of Materiel and Deputy Commanders for Maintenance were briefed on each of the areas listed during the materiel conference conducted 23 - 24 August 1960. Special emphasis was directed toward improvement in all materiel areas, particularly management of aircraft spares assets. The programs cited by CINCSAC are of such vital importance to the mission that they must receive the personal attention of all commanders.
3. I expect each commander to give his continued personal attention to the objectives stated in the inclosed attachments and to periodically advise this headquarters of the progress attained. The Inspector General will give special emphasis to these areas on visits to your base.

W. C. SWEENEY, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

2 Atch
As stated

Copy, 822 Air Div

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HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
United States Air Force
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

C

19 August 1960

Air Force Materiel Requirements

8AF
Westover AFB, Mass

1. I have attached General LeMay's letter of 5 August 1960, concerning the above subject.
2. I will expect continued improvement in materiel management in your command and believe this can best be achieved through personal interest and action by you.
3. Areas which I believe require your attention are as follows:
 - a. Excess materiel on bases.
 - b. Elimination of "rubber stamp" equipment review action at base level to insure that support equipment requirements are austere.
 - c. Insure maximum repair at bases and elimination of "parts changing" as a maintenance practice in lieu of test and repair.
 - d. Inventory accuracy and correct stock balance and consumption reports.
 - e. Continuous review to insure that base funds are expended in the hard core areas.

s/t **THOMAS S. POWER**
General, USAF
Commander in Chief

1 Atch
Ltr fr General LeMay

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
Office of the Commander
Westover Air Force Base
Massachusetts

C

1 September 1960

Air Force Materiel Requirements

SAC (C)

1. Concurrent with receipt of CINCSAC letter, 18 August 1960, regarding materiel management, senior materiel officers from all Eighth Air Force units were participating in a three day materiel conference at this headquarters. The theme and specific purpose of this conference was to improve management of USAF materiel assets. Objectives cited in VC USAF and CINCSAC letters were emphasized to all conferees. Additionally, the stated objectives have been forwarded to subordinate commands for additional emphasis and guidance.

2. With reference to specific areas requiring special attention, the following actions are now in progress or programmed for immediate initiation:

a. Excess property is recognized as a continuing problem. Accordingly, the Supply Improvement Program implemented 30 June has as an objective the purging of all excess property in Eighth Air Force supply accounts on or before 15 December 1960. Excess items have been identified and shipment of property to AMC depots is being accelerated.

b. Materiel representatives work in close harmony with Strategic Air Command EE&AT representatives to eliminate the practice of "rubber stamp" approval of support equipment. Physical inspection of equipment on hand and in use is stressed from an economy and maintenance viewpoint during staff assistance visits and formal inspections. The use of equipment funds are reviewed by a materiel financial evaluation group, as part of Eighth Air Force budget advisory committee procedures to insure proper expenditure.

c. Improved on-base repair capability is a joint supply and maintenance objective which has received close scrutiny during the past seven months. Additionally, a separate panel is reviewing technical

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order limitations imposed on field maintenance functions with the intent to increase repair authorizations and develop a greater shop capability. Review of field maintenance squadron repair procedures has been completed and recommended changes forwarded to your headquarters on 2 August 60. The on-base repair rate of Eighth Air Force units has improved during the past three months and will continue.

d. Inventory errors are caused in a large measure by improper warehousing methods. Accordingly, during the six months preceding Project Count, a re-warehousing program was completed at all bases. This management item will again be included in the next revision to the semi-annual supply improvement program effective 15 December 1960. Inaccurate stock balance and consumption reports were recognized jointly by the Materiel and Comptroller Directorates in January 1960, at which time specific written instructions for corrective action were issued. Follow on instructions with delineation of responsibility were dispatched 20 May 60. Improvement has been noted and close surveillance will continue.

e. Management and control of funds is a continuing process shared by the entire staff. Under Chief of Staff supervision, the Budget Advisory Committee reviews requirements, establishes priorities and provides policy guidance with special emphasis on hard core areas that contribute the most to the Strategic Air Command mission.

3. Although progress has been made in each of the foregoing areas, you are assured of my interest and continuing efforts to further improve materiel management in this command.

s/t W. C. SWEENEY, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

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AFCCS

5 August 1960

Air Force Materiel Requirements

ADC	ATC	ARDC	CONAC	CAIRC	USAFSS
SAC	AMC	MATS	AFAPC	USAFE	PACAF
TAC	AAC	AU	Hq Comd	USAFA	USAF

1. As Commanders, each of you are familiar with the subject of materiel requirements and are fully aware of the magnitude of the Air Force task of meeting the essential needs of your Commands within available resources.

2. This subject of materiel requirements, like security, must be the conscientious daily concern of all our personnel. It is the key to efficient and economical support of Air Force materiel programs. It is appreciated that as Commanders of operating Commands, you are often confronted with such problems as unprogrammed requirements, premature of random materiel failures, changes in force structure, operating programs, and base utilization, to mention a few; each of which directly, or indirectly, has a major impact upon requirements. These aspects, of course, are beyond your immediate control. There are, however, many areas within Command control that contribute directly and significantly influence our materiel programs. The purpose of this letter is to stress three of these areas that are particularly important.

a. Each of you took a very active and genuine interest in Project Count, which was just recently completed. The primary objective of this world-wide inventory was to assure that the Air Force requirement for spares support was based upon a sound foundation; i. e., accurate and complete asset data. Of equal importance is the matter of accurate and timely preparation of the periodic stock balance and consumption reports and the efficient handling, processing and repair of components and equipment. Each year the Air Force "loses" from the materiel record system, many items that were procured and distributed. It is apparent that items issued to meet an anticipated need that did not materialize are being "squirreled away" in the operating unit rather than returned to supply channels.

b. Another area of concern is the proper utilization and control of maintenance spares and spare parts. The Air Force simply cannot

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permit "part changing" as a maintenance remedy, or condone the premature removal of time charge components. In addition, base repair resources must be employed to the maximum degree. In this respect, a Headquarters USAF team is currently in the field conducting a full inquiry at a few selected bases.

c. Unit equipment authorizations has been the subject of many letters and messages from this headquarters, the most recent being 20 July 1960. It is deeply disturbing that this most vital aspect of our materiel requirements program is often a "rubber stamp" process due to fund limitations. It is, therefore, possible that hard core items could be denied while less essential ones survive. This headquarters re-emphasizes that the support equipment and requirements must be austere and that the efficiency of the Air Force system depends upon Command supervision to insure that the UAL/MRAL reports are accurate, timely and reflect essential needs only.

3. In summary, we must all devote much more attention to this business of materiel requirements. The rewards, both tangible and intangible, are unquestionably worthy of rededicated Command effort under your personal attention. A report, periodically from each of you setting forth Command plans and achievements would be appreciated.

s/t CURTIS E. LEMAY
General, U. S. Air Force
Vice Chief of Staff

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[REDACTED]

Headquarters
822ND AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO

13 September 1960

SUBJECT: Staff Visit to 4138th Strategic Wing (U)

TO: Commander
822nd Air Division

1. Attached is the report of staff visit to the 4138th Strategic Wing concerning Combat Operations and Intelligence.
2. The general overall condition is considered satisfactory, but the number of minor discrepancies noted warrant immediate attention.
3. The overall classification of this report is [REDACTED] in accordance with AFR 205-1. It is classified to protect the EWO planning information.
4. If Attachment No. 1 is withdrawn, the classification of this letter will be cancelled in accordance with AFR 205-1. [REDACTED]

(b) (6)

Lt. Colonel, USAF
Operations Staff Officer

1 Atch
Report of Staff Visit

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

218

[REDACTED]

INTELLIGENCE AND COMBAT OPERATIONS

1. The 4138th Wing 44 and 50-61 Operations Orders were reviewed for content and accuracy. Discrepancies were noted and recommendations offered as follows:

a. Operations Order 50-61.

(1) The basic Operations Order did not contain the mandatory sub paragraph (1, c) assumptions (page 3, 8AFM 55-5). [REDACTED]

(2) The basic Operations Order did not list duties for the command section (page 4, 8AFM 55-5). [REDACTED]

(3) The basic Operations Order made reference to other manuals without reference to the particular part, section or paragraph (paragraph 1a Forward, 8AFM 55-5). [REDACTED]

(4) The last page of Annex "B" did not list appendices to Annex "B" (page 45, 8AFM 55-5). [REDACTED]

(5) There were no instructions in Annex "A", Intelligence, concerning the issuance of combat missions folders after notification of a SAC alert, nor was there a reference to where this information could be obtained (page 37, 8AFM 55-5). [REDACTED]

(6) The Communications Section contained no instructions for the issuance of communications documents upon receipt of a SAC alert, nor reference to the supporting document where this information was contained (pages 84 and 85, 8AFM 55-5). [REDACTED]

(7) Annex "B", Operations, did not contain instructions as to the requirement for the wing briefing and planning team to complete unit flight plans and adjusted takeoff times (page 45, 8AFM 55-5). [REDACTED]

(8) Operations Order 50-61 did not contain information as to which units were responsible for refueling 4138th bomber aircraft. A recommendation was offered and accepted to broaden paragraph 1b, Friendly Forces, basic Operations Order, to read: "Friendly and Participating Forces". Under Participating Forces to include the general responsibilities of the two task forces supporting the 4138th with reference to the particular paragraph in the Operations Section, which would include a more detailed summation of these responsibilities. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b. Operations Order 44-61.

(1) Under Command and Communications, the Command Section contained instructions as they pertain to higher headquarters and did not include those for the 4138th SW. [REDACTED]

(2) Both the 44 and 50 plans letters of transmittal show a plan effective date of 15 July 1960. It should have been amended to 31 August 1960. [REDACTED]

(3) The Communications annex did not contain detailed communications instructions as required for the 919th AREFS (page 15, 8AFM 55-4). [REDACTED]

c. The aforementioned discrepancies and recommendations have been incorporated into an amendment which is in the process of preparation. [REDACTED]

2. Combat Operations.

a. EWO Operations Branch - Capt. (b) (6)

(1) Eleven crews have briefed the Commander on their new EWO assignments; 13 briefings remain to be completed. SACM 55-7 requires these briefings to be completed 30 days after the effective date of the plan. All refueling squadron study and briefings have been completed. [REDACTED]

(2) During the period 15 August to 31 August 1960, several crews were placed on alert without completing their required target study first, as required by SACM 55-7. In some instances, crews were placed on alert covering a new sortie without prior study. In these cases, additional study is required. The 4138th Combat Operations Division has been requiring four hours. All crews not given study prior to going on alert were given study at the alert facility while on alert. [REDACTED]

(3) Capt. (b) (6) Crew R-05, was placed on alert 7 September 1960, without being previously qualified on his 50-61 alert sortie assignment. Four hours of target study and briefing were given to him and his crew while on alert. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(4) Tactical Doctrine instruction responsibility has been assumed by the Training Division, as required by Unclassified 8AF DO 66521, 17 August 1960, and SACM 20-10. The new phase plan contains a schedule of instruction broken down to include the staff agency responsible for the particular phase; i. e., ECM, Communications, Special Weapons, etc. [REDACTED]

(5) Four fast ride vehicles were checked for exterior and interior condition at the alert facility. No evidence of abusive treatment was noted. [REDACTED]

(6) The Alert Force facility has a need for an additional safe to store the various volumes of the Tactical Doctrine. Quite frequently, crews ask for a volume of the Tactical Doctrine during periods other than when a representative of Combat Operations is available. The one safe available is being used to store instructional data belonging to Special Weapons. The storage room with the combination lock is not considered adequate for storing classified documents because of the very light material used on the ceiling. [REDACTED]

(7) During a briefing given by the Intelligence Division, a short signal from the Klaxon horns was heard. One bomber crew, Capt. (b) (6) plus the three air refueling crews, went directly to their aircraft in the normal manner. The four remaining bomber crews remained in the building while one of the aircraft commanders phoned the Command Post for verification. A very short period of time was required to obtain the information that a workman in the Control Room had accidentally touched the alarm. During this period of time, the hot line to the Alert Facility was out of order. The crews had been briefed earlier that maintenance was being performed on the lines. [REDACTED]

(8) During the aforementioned briefing, which covered present and future ECM capabilities and which lasted one hour and 15 minutes, three of the five combat crew EW Officers were called out of the briefing to be interviewed for a Regular Army commission. This was a very interesting and important briefing for EW Officers and may be difficult or cause unnecessary work to reschedule these people. [REDACTED]

b. Plans Branch.

Personnel contacted: Maj. (b) (6) [REDACTED] Lt. Col. (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(1) Emergency War Order Review Panel has not been meeting monthly as required by 8AFM 55-4, Forward. [REDACTED]

(2) The order designating the EWO Planning Team is not up to date. This order still lists Col. (b)(6) Col. (b)(6) and Col. (b)(6) (C)

(3) Safe No. 6 has not had a combination change since 6 May 1959; required once per year (paragraph 57d, page 31, AFR 205-1) or when there is a change of personnel. [REDACTED]

(4) Safe No. 177 has not had the combination changed since Lt. Col. (b)(6) transferred to the Training Division. [REDACTED]

3. Intelligence.

Personnel contacted: Lt. Col. (b)(6) [REDACTED]

a. The Intelligence Division is short one officer, 1424, Function Code 2930031, in the Prediction and Photo Interpretation Section. This shortage has always existed. [REDACTED]

b. Combat Mission Folders. Inspection of the Combat Mission Folders was only partially completed at this time. This check will be completed at the first opportunity. Insofar as these folders were inspected, they are in excellent condition. Two minor discrepancies were noted:

(1) Neither the tanker nor bomber CME's contained "I have to go" information, as outlined in paragraph 9a(2), Annex "A", 8AF Operations Order 44-61. [REDACTED]

(2) KC-135 Sortie No. 6 contained two wind flight plans instead of the required one wind and one skeleton flight plan. [REDACTED]

4. Recommendations.

a. Crews not be placed on alert without prior completion of their target study.

b. An additional safe (three combination) be provided the Alert Force Operations Officer.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c. All alert crews go directly to their aircraft and check in on their radio even when there is doubt about the signal from the Klaxon horn.

d. Scheduled briefings for combat crew personnel not be interrupted or personnel taken out of the briefing unless a higher priority necessitates it.

e. Change combinations on classified storage containers each time a person is transferred from the organization and a minimum of once each year, as required by AFR 205-1.

f. Convene the Emergency War Review Panel, as required by 8AFM 55-4.

g. Keep all orders designating personnel assignments and review panels up to date.

h. At the first opportunity, assign an officer to the Intelligence Division to fill the vacancy in Prediction and Photo Interpretation.

i. Include "I have to go" instructions in the Combat Mission Folders. [REDACTED]