



## UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

JUL 15 2016

HQ USNORTHCOM/CS  
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016  
Peterson Air Force Base CO 80914-3801

Mr. Cory Newman  
210A North Massachusetts Ave  
Atlantic City NJ 08401

Dear Mr. Newman


We received your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated 22 August 2015. Your request was assigned USNORTHCOM FOIA case number 16-R-056. In your request letter you asked for the following: Declassification of pages 78-85 of NORAD Historical Summary for July-December 1957.

After performing a search of our systems of records we found the responsive pages. Upon review of the pages we have determined that portions of the pages are currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526 and should remain exempt from public disclosure under FOIA exemption (b)(1). The authority for this exemption can be found in the United States Code, Title 5, Section 552(b)(1).

As a requester in the "All Others" fee category, you received the first two hours and 100 pages of records at no cost; therefore, there are no assessable fees for processing your request. If you have any further questions concerning your request, please do not hesitate to contact our FOIA Request Service Center at the above address.

If you are not satisfied with this action, you have the right to appeal to the appellate authority, Ms. Joo Chung, Director of Oversight and Compliance (ODCMO), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The appellate address is: ODCMO Directorate for Oversight and Compliance, 4800 Mark Center Drive, ATTN: DPCLTD, FOIA Appeals, Mailbox #24, Alexandria, VA 22350-1700. As an alternative, you may use the OSD FOIA request portal to submit your appeal electronically at the following link: <http://pal.whs.mil/palMain.aspx> or email your appeal to [OSD.FOIAPolicy@mail.mil](mailto:OSD.FOIAPolicy@mail.mil). If you use email, please have the words "FOIA Appeal" in the subject of the email. Your appeal should cite our case number 16-R-056, be postmarked within 90 days of the date of this response, and be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal" on the request. You also have the right to seek dispute resolution services from

USNORTHCOM's FOIA Public Liaison, Mr. Jim Hogan at (571) 372-0462 or [OSD.FOIALiaison@mail.mil](mailto:OSD.FOIALiaison@mail.mil).



PEGGY C. COMBS  
Major General, USA  
Chief of Staff

Attachment:  
Responsive Document

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

At year's end, four separate directives provided for enemy engagement by NORAD forces. These four directives were: (1) CONAD Regulation 55-6, issued on 13 May 1957; (2) ALCOM Supplement No. 1 to CONADR 55-6; (3) RCAF ADC Air Staff Instructions (ASI) 2/5, dated 15 June 1957; and (4) the "Thule Rules of Engagement...." The procedures for intercepting and engaging an enemy force laid down in the four directives are described below.

CONAD REGULATION 55-6

(b)(1) [Redacted text block]

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted text line]

(b)(1) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Hold Fire was to be imposed only as a temporary measure to permit friendly aircraft operations in or through predetermined corridors, altitudes, or sectors in instances where any other state would prove impractical.

Hold Fire could be ordered by CONAD Division commanders or their representatives. The authority could be delegated by the division commander to senior directors at an ADDC. In instances where a Hold Fire was ordered by a director, the state had to be relayed to and confirmed immediately by the division commander; otherwise, the surface-to-air units were automatically released from the condition.

The AA status was designated by the CONAD Division commander who had operational control over all weapons in his sector. All orders and information were to be given directly to the AA commanders at the AADCP's, communications permitting; otherwise, the orders were to be issued through the ADDC. If there was a complete breakdown of communications in a sector, the AA defense commander could designate the weapons control status.

(b)(1) [Redacted]

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED

[Redacted]

80

(b)(1)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


UNCLASSIFIED

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED




(b)(1)



CANADA'S ASI 2/5


Canadian authority to intercept and engage unknown aircraft over Canada was contained in Air Staff Instruction 2/5, issued on 15 June 1957.<sup>28</sup> The procedures established by the regulation were also applicable to American aircraft operating over Canada.

(b)  
(1)



UNCLASSIFIED





(b)(1)



Antiaircraft Rules for Canadian Operation. Procedures for the use of American surface-to-air missiles over Canada were set up in June 1957. The two countries agreed that operational control over surface-to-air units was to be exercised by or through the CONAD Division commander, in whose sector the weapons were located, with the concurrence of the Canadian division/sector commander, over whose territory the weapons were to be employed.

The operations of the five border defense areas in the United States were to be controlled in the following manner. The defenses at Port Huron and Detroit, Michigan, and Niagara Falls-Buffalo, New York, were to be controlled by the commander of the 30th Air Division. To engage a target over Canada, the commander of the 30th Air Division was to get permission from the sector commander of the 3d ADCC in Canada. The Canadian sector commander, under normal conditions, was to authorize engagement of specifically designated targets -- a condition of Discreet Fire. When the tactical situation dictated either more or less fire than that provided by the Discreet Fire state, the sector commander was to permit either a Weapons Tight or Weapons Free condition.

A similar arrangement was to exist between the 32nd CONAD Division Commander (i.e., the Loring AFB, Maine, Defense) and the 1st or 2nd Sector Commander in Canada, depending upon the space needed.

Separate provisions were established for the Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, defense (under the 37th CONAD Division). This defense was capable of engaging targets some distance within Canada. Air defense actions by this unit were to be authorized and conducted solely in accordance with instructions of the AOC ADC (RCAF).<sup>29</sup>







THULE RULES


At Thule, a Danish possession, American forces at the end of 1957 were still operating under interim engagement authority. Units under the Northeast Air Command operated under a temporary regulation approved by that command in December 1953. But the regulation had not been approved by either the U.S. State Department or Denmark. Efforts were being made by the State Department to obtain Danish approval of permanent operating procedures.<sup>30</sup>

The base was still using the temporary rules in 1957. The 64th Air Division tried to get formal approval of the temporary regulation. CINCONAD could not approve the rules without JCS or DOD approval. The rules were forwarded by CINCONAD to the JCS for approval in May 1957.<sup>31</sup>

The executive agency replied to CONAD that it could not approve the rules, however. The Department of Defense and the Department of State, it continued, were working on "a set of negotiating instructions" that were to be submitted to Denmark. Without further instructions, in August, CINCONAD directed the 64th CADD to continue using the temporary regulation until formal approval was received.<sup>32</sup>

The so-called temporary rules provided for two sources of engagement authority. The 64th CONAD Division commander could order engagement. And because of limited and unreliable communications facilities between Thule and Pepperrell, the Commander of the 4734th Air Defense Group was designated as deputy commander for the Thule Complex. The delegation of authority to execute the rules was tempered however by the fact that the deputy commander was not to authorize engagement until after every effort had been made, and within a reasonable time, to contact the division commander.

(b)(1)





UNCLASSIFIED

84

(b)(1)

As in other cases of American aircraft operating over Canadian soil, once the aircraft from Thule overflew the Canadian sector, the procedures outlined in ASI 2/5 were to be used.<sup>33</sup>

### CANADIAN AIR RAID WARNING

The policies and procedures for the Canadian air defense warning system were established by two RCAF ADC directives issued in December 1956. These were Air Raid Warning (Air Staff Instruction 2/13) and Air Defence Readiness (Air Staff Instruction 2/14). These directives outlined conditions of warning and preparedness; the methods by which these conditions were transmitted to RCAF ADC echelons, other commands and agencies having collateral air defense responsibilities; and the actions to be taken under each condition.

(b)(1)

UNCLASSIFIED

In the second directive (2/14), there was one advanced preparedness condition -- Air Defence Readiness. This condition would place the entire air defense system in a state of maximum operational readiness. Air Defence Readiness could be called by the AOC or his appointed deputy, i.e., Deputy AOC, D/O, Commander 5th Air Division (within his own area of command), Commander 64th CONAD Division (within his own command and subject to the limitations of the RCAF ADC-CONAD agreement), and such other individuals as the AOC RCAF ADC might designate. A list of agencies to be notified by each command level and actions to build up the force similar to those for the Air Defense Warnings were included in the directive.<sup>35</sup>

Both directives were still in force at the end of 1957. However, plans called for combining the ASI's with the CONAD Regulation (55-3).<sup>36</sup>

#### SECURITY CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC AND ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS (SCATER)

CONAD issued a new SCATER regulation and plan on 11 September 1957. The regulation established CONAD policies and responsibilities for its lower echelons. It also provided general instructions for planning and implementing a new Department of Defense/Department of Commerce (DOD/DOC) SCATER plan. The SCATER plan was developed in coordination with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and consisted of the DOD/DOC SCATER plan and CONAD/CAA supplements. The regulation and plan were designed to aid CAA officials and CONAD commanders in controlling civil and non-tactical military air traffic, air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications (civil and military) during an Air Defense Emergency.<sup>37</sup>

The new CONAD SCATER plan superseded the DOD/DOC SCAT plan of 15 July 1952, Air Division (Defense) SCATER plans, and all previous SCATER instructions. The major changes in the new plan were: (1) it substituted the term Air Defense Emergency for Military Emergency; (2) it dropped the use of Air Defense Warning Conditions Red, Yellow, and White for initiating SCATER actions and instituted specific instructions such as Implement Full SCATER, Terminate Full SCATER, and Apply Emergency SCATER Rules; (3) it dropped simulated air defense warnings for test purposes and made test instructions an integral part of the basic plan; (4) it established emergency SCAT rules and incorporated them within the plan; and (5) it was made applicable to all areas of the United States and the approaches thereto.<sup>38</sup>