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in the regions with only fair results and inconclusive evidence with which to support a new operations procedure. The regions, however, were still on test locations, attempting to obtain test data that would prove their concepts. NORAD, ADC, and NAVFORCONAD were attempting to prepare a new operations plan that would satisfy everyone.

By July, a new operations plan (3-58) had been written and submitted to the regions, ADC and NAVFORCONAD for review.* The concept of operations in the plan was based on the following assumptions: NORAD would receive tactical early warning from CINCEUR, CINCPAC and the Atlantic and Pacific Barriers; and contiguous air defense had to be based on equidistant defense in depth of specific target areas.

The locations of the seaward elements were to be based on providing the following: (1) providing equidistant coverage from vital coastal bomb release lines to the periphery of surveillance capabilities; (2) continuous tracking of hostile aircraft at both high and low altitudes; (3) destruction of hostile aircraft by interceptors about 150-180 miles from the beach; (4) stationing aircraft and airships between the shore-based radars or Texas Towers and the picket ships to fill in the low altitude radar gaps from the surface to 20,000 feet; and (5) stationing picket ships to get the maximum use of their high altitude capabilities.

NORAD pointed out to the recipients that the proposed plan did not provide full coverage of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Calculated risks had to be taken on some isolated targets. NORAD stated also that the plan did not attempt to correct all deficiencies in the contiguous system. Means of correcting many of these deficiencies were still being searched for.

The plan never reached the printing presses. Only ADC was in favor of it. Western Region said it believed further testing of

* The operations plan was written by NORAD. Although USAF ADC and NAVFORCONAD had been asked to write a plan, it was never completed. The two commands reached an impasse in developing a concept of operations and did not meet the deadline set by NORAD for submission of the plan. NORAD then took over preparation of a plan on its own.

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Maximum Readiness, the last condition, was ". . . the highest state of preparedness that . . . /could/ be continually sustained whereby all military and civilian air defense measures . . . /were/ readied for implementation and . . . /were/ prepared for the declaration which establishe/d/ the transition of the air defense system from peace to war."

A declaration of Maximum Readiness was to be accompanied by either a declaration of Air Defense Readiness or Air Defense Emergency. A condition of Maximum Readiness (Air Defense Readiness) was "the highest state of preparedness by the military forces whereby all air defense weapons systems /were/ readied for combat employment." It could be declared or terminated by CINCNCRAD, Deputy CINCNCRAD, or a designated representative.

(b)(1)

The three degrees of warning established by the regulation were: Air Defense Warning Red (attack by hostile aircraft/missiles imminent or taking place); Air Defense Warning Yellow (attack by hostile aircraft/missiles probable); and Air Defense Warning White (attack by hostile aircraft/missiles not considered immediately probable or imminent).

(b)(1)

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Alert Requirements. The alert requirements set up by the new NORAD 55-3 established a requirement for two interceptors on five-minute alert at all bases. This increase was considered fundamental to maintaining a better alert posture for carrying out the primary mission. This improved interceptor status can be noted in the following: under the CONAD regulation, some 97 interceptors were on five-minute alert; using the NORAD regulation, some 140 interceptors were expected to comprise the five-minute alert force.

Other changes included setting up a standard alert pattern for the U.S. and Canada and providing alert requirements for all elements of the NORAD system (to include picket ships, Sentinel aircraft and AEW squadrons) for the first time. The old CONAD regulation on alert requirements specified alert requirements for a Normal Preparedness condition only. NORAD had found that this was unsatisfactory from its experience in the Middle East crisis. At that time, if it wanted an increase in alert, messages had to be sent to each commander outlining the desired increase by number and location. With the new regulation, an automatic alert standard was provided for every readiness condition and a declaration of a condition of readiness by CINCNORAD to the subordinate commanders was all that would be needed.

The alert requirements for Normal Readiness and Increased Readiness are shown in Tables 13 and 14. Additional provisions laid down in the new regulation provided that the NORAD Region commanders could, as necessary, levy, waive, or adjust alert requirements for their units when equipment conversion, training and test requirements, special commitments, or such other activities were imposed. Region commanders could also prescribe alert requirements for all augmentation aircraft when they came under CINCNORAD's operational control.