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
CHAPTER 6

Operational Requirements & Procedures

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

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
ALERT

Change to Fighter Alert Commitment. In November 1958, NORAD established (in NORAD Regulation 55-3) a minimum alert requirement during a Normal Readiness condition of two interceptors on five-minute alert at all bases. This increase was considered fundamental to maintaining a better alert posture for carrying out the primary mission.

The requirement had been in force for a little over a month when Eastern Region asked NORAD to modify it so that more personnel and equipment would be available for proficiency training.

Central Region also asked that it be allowed to revise the alert requirements of certain of its squadrons. It pointed out that since the Eastern ADIZ had been eliminated there was no ADIZ policing needed from three of its squadrons. CNR proposed waiving the five-minute alert for these squadrons during normal duty hours. Revision of the alert standards, CNR felt, would provide more training, an increased capability for maintaining alert at "critical" places during conversions and deployments, and a better capability to support special projects in fighter operations and tactics.

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NORAD told CNR that a study of the five-minute alert requirements was being made. But NORAD pointed out that the CNR commander was already authorized to levy, waive, or adjust alert requirements as needed under the provisions of NORADR 55-3.

On 14 July 1959, NORAD issued revised alert commitments to the field. NORAD said that the elimination of the Eastern and Western ADIZ's,* combined with the requests from CNR and ENR had caused it to re-evaluate the normal alert requirements for those fighter units which did not have an ADIZ to police. Also, NORAD stated that it concurred in the use of the aircrews, aircraft, and support personnel not actively engaged in an identification function in the remaining ADIZ's to obtain more training.

The new requirements for Normal Readiness were as follows. All squadrons (non-nuclear-capable and nuclear-

The Eastern and Western Domestic ADIZ's were eliminated on 1 April 1959 as a result of a NORAD and USAF ADC effort to realign the ADIZ structure and standardize identification criteria. The first step in the realigning of ADIZ's took place on 1 February 1959. The Atlantic ADIZ was extended around the coast of Florida and connected to the Gulf of Mexico Coastal ADIZ, also established on this date. At the same time, the Southern Border ADIZ was extended eastward along the 26th parallel and connected to the Gulf of Mexico Coastal ADIZ. Later, NORAD received approval to establish a standard identification criteria for use in the Domestic ADIZ's. The new criteria were that aircraft operating in a Domestic ADIZ at a speed of 150 knots or less and at altitudes of 3,000 feet (4,000 feet in Alaska) or less did not have to be identified.

The standardization of criteria made the Eastern, Western, and Hope Security Identification Zones (SIZ's) unnecessary and they were not used. The Eastern, Western, and Presque Isle ADIZ's were also considered unnecessary and they were eliminated.

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capable) within or adjacent to an existing ADIZ were to keep two aircraft on five minute alert at all times. The aircraft of nuclear-capable squadrons on alert were not to be armed with nuclear weapons. At all other bases, two aircraft were to be maintained on five-minute alert during non-duty hours. The 30 minute requirement for nuclear-capable squadrons and the one-hour and three-hour requirement for non-nuclear-capable squadrons was to remain the same as prescribed in November 1958.

NORAD provided that when more than one type of squadron was available for identification in a particular area of an ADIZ, the Region Commander could release from the five-minute status the aircraft that were nuclear capable, but unarmed. Region commanders were also authorized to relieve squadrons of the five minute alert requirement on an individual basis for a limited time for training. But the one-hour alert was to be maintained at all times and emphasis was to be placed on an alert recall plan.

Surface-to-Air Weapons Alert. The alert requirements for surface-to-air weapons fire units remained the same, with one exception, as stipulated in NORAD Regulation 55-3 -- 25 per cent on 15 minutes and 75 per cent on three hours under Normal Readiness conditions.* The one exception was a lowering of the requirement on 28 January 1959 for 75mm gun units to one-third on 30 minutes and two-thirds on three hours.

However, a change was under consideration to increase the alert for surface-to-air weapons. Eastern NORAD Region proposed a change in March 1959 to bring the requirement for the latter more in line with the requirement for interceptors. On 6 April, NORAD asked ARADCOM to comment on a study made of increasing alert requirements. NORAD said it wanted to keep the Hercules fire units on a state of alert that would make their

* Increased Readiness co ed alert for all forces, see UNCLASSIFIED	onditions required increas- NORADR 55-3, 3 November 1958.
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