



Both ALCOM and NORAD felt the JCS policy too restrictive. In March 1959, NORAD asked the JCS to change the policy. NORAD pointed out that because of Alaska's strategic location, the short reaction time available, climatic conditions, and the limited facilities available, it was essential that under a condition of Increased Readiness, ALCOM have authority to scramble nuclear-capable interceptors.

On 22 December 1959, the JCS advised NORAD that authority had been granted for flying F-89J, F-101B, and F-106 aircraft equipped with the MB-1/MK-25 air-to-air rockets in Alaska under Increased Readiness Conditions.


Overflight of Canada with Nuclear-Equipped Aircraft. On 30 June 1959, the agreement with Canada allowing interceptors to overfly the Canadian border with the MB-1 was to expire. NORAD had learned, however, that an informal agreement existed with Canada to continue operations using the provisions of the old agreement until renewal negotiations had been completed. Under this informal arrangement, authority was continued for U.S. interceptors armed with the MB-1 to overfly the Canadian border to 54 degrees North Latitude and longitudinally to the full extent of Canadian territory including the Coastal CADIZ. Such overflight was restricted to periods of Air Defense Warnings Yellow or Red.

It was August before NORAD learned that a new agreement had been signed. The agreement became effective for a one year period on 30 June 1959. The new agreement contained important changes. All geographical restrictions had been removed. Also, all reference to overflight with the MB-1 during a condition of Air Defense Warning Yellow and Red had been deleted.

The new agreement authorized U. S. interceptor aircraft, under the operational control of NORAD, to carry nuclear air-to-air defense weapons over Canada and to enter Canadian air space whenever a condition of Air Defense Readiness, or higher condition, was declared by CINCNORAD. Aircraft were authorized, as before, to land at, and take-off from, military airfields in Canada. The rules for interception and engagement of hostile

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aircraft over Canadian territory were to be those established by the Canadian government for Canadian military aircraft or those established by CINCNORAD and approved by the two governments.

On 16 October, the NORAD subordinate commands were informed of the provisions of the agreement. And on 1 December an amendment to NORADR 55-3 was issued containing the new provisions.

READINESS PROCEDURES

Uniform Readiness Conditions. Effective 0001Z, 1 November 1959, the JCS established for use by all specified and unified commands a system of Uniform Defense Readiness Conditions (DEFCON's). Standardization of readiness conditions had been under consideration since 1958. The readiness conditions that had been in use varied from command to command. This multiplicity of directives, it was recognized, could have resulted in great confusion and misinterpretation in an emergency.

The system, as approved on 25 August 1959, established five so-called DEFCON's and Defense Emergency. CONAD was a unified command and was bound by the JCS directive, but NORAD, which established the readiness conditions for NORAD/CONAD forces (NORAD Regulation 55-3, 3 November 1958), was a Canadian-U. S. integrated command. However, the JCS agreed to an arrangement whereby such international commands could key their readiness conditions to the JCS conditions. NORAD decided to continue to use its regulation for the time being, but adopted a plan for keying all of its communications between its COC and the JCS on readiness conditions and exercises to the JCS system.

The interim plan worked out was as shown on the following page.

In December 1959, NORAD told the Chief of the Air Staff, RCAF, as Executive Agent for NORAD, of the new JCS system. NORAD pointed out that it was studying the system to see if it could be adopted throughout the

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NORAD system. On 12 January 1960, NORAD forwarded a new 55-3, which proposed the adoption of the readiness conditions of the JCS system, to the COSC for approval.

CURRENT NORADR 55-3	UNIFORM READINESS CONDITION	EXERCISE TERM
Normal Readiness	DEFCON 5	Fade Out
Normal Readiness (Increased Intelligence Watch)	DEFCON 4	Double Take
Increased Readiness Condition 1 Condition 2	DEFCON 3 Alpha Bravo	Round House
Increased Readiness Condition 3 Condition 4	DEFCON 2 Charlie Delta	Fast Pace
Maximum Readiness (Air Def Readiness)	DEFCON 1	Cocked Pistol
Maximum Readiness (Air Def Emergency)	Defense Emergency Air Def Emergency	Hot Box Big Noise

Governmental Agreement on Increasing Readiness of NORAD Forces. In October 1959, NORAD was informed by General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the JCS, that Canada and the U. S. had signed an agreement on increasing the operational readiness of NORAD forces during periods of international tension. The joint agreement became effective on 2 October 1959.

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
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It would be the responsibility of the COSC and the JCS in consultation with their respective political authorities, to reach agreement for increasing the conditions of readiness of NORAD forces during periods of international tension when factors of overriding political significance were involved. In such circumstances, parallel consultations between the political authorities would be conducted to reach an agreement. And CINCNORAD would be continuously provided with the best information regarding the world situation to assist him in anticipating any requirements for increasing or decreasing operational readiness conditions.

In the event a decision was made to authorize CINC-NORAD to order an increase in readiness during joint consultation, agreement would be reached also on the desirability of making a public announcement and the terms of such announcement. The governments also agreed that the JCS and COSC would be informed in advance, whenever possible, or any important training exercise so that each government might be in a position to handle any public comment. Provision was also made that either government might make additional proposals if it considered more detailed arrangements necessary.




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SAC/NORAD AGREEMENTS AND PROCEDURES

SAC/NORAD Agreement on Take-Off Priorities at Joint-Use Bases. On 29 June 1959, General Thomas S. Power, CINCSAC, wrote CINCNORAD that he felt some action should be taken to preclude conflicts in take-offs from bases jointly occupied by SAC/NORAD aircraft. If CINC-NORAD concurred, he continued, the staffs should develop mutually acceptable procedures. CINCNORAD concurred.

Before the two staffs met, each conducted an independent study of the problem. NORAD directed its units operating at joint-use bases to forward the take-off priorities they were using. A study of these procedures revealed that a variety of circumstances existed. Some bases had written agreements, some had verbal agreements, others had no agreements at all. Even the agreements differed. Take-off priorities in some cases favored SAC, others gave priority to NORAD aircraft.

SAC's study of the problem disclosed that during an actual alert situation no conflicts existed during the initial launch of its alert forces. However, there might be possible conflicts during the follow-on phases. This was not considered too serious because of the greater take-off intervals of SAC aircraft in the follow-on force. The study also revealed there would be conflicts involving peacetime scrambles and SAC exercises, but

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