

DETERRENCE IS NOT ENOUGH

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P-983

Rev. 4 June 1958

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The **RAND** Corporation

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DETERRENCE IS NOT ENOUGH

For twelve tense years the United States has been wrestling with the problems resulting from Soviet power expansion. "Collective Security," "Containment," "Massive Retaliation" have become shopworn slogans describing a succession of policies which have been heatedly argued, seldom fully employed, and after a while largely discarded. Now the popular word is "Deterrence" expressing an idea neither new nor dynamic--one which, uncritically accepted as the panacea for all Communist threats, could endanger our survival.

This highly touted "new" word of the nuclear era, with its policy of seeking to prevent war by convincing potential foes that their attack will fail disastrously, is as old as man. Older forms can be readily recognized in China's Great Wall, the Roman Wall in Britain, and England's balance of power and sea-supremacy policies. These, and many similar measures of ancient and modern times were, like our present purpose, defensive--the preservation of the status quo. The Great Walls of history never attacked anyone. Even England's mighty fleets eventually assumed the essentially defensive role that characterized their performance in the first World War.

Quite naturally deterrence has most often been espoused by those men and nations blessed in their time with more of the world's goods than their neighbors--the "have's" seeking to ward off the depredations of the "have-nots." Often they were hypnotized into believing that they could maintain peace by passive defense measures alone, thus inviting defeat by nations with a more dynamic military policy.

The frequently misunderstood Clausewitz did not err either in calling defense the stronger form of warfare or in proclaiming that victory could be won only by the "flashing sword of avenging counter offensive." Deterrence has long been a sound ingredient in the military policy of the rich and prosperous nations. Judiciously mixed with skillfully practiced offensive maneuvers, it aided both Rome and Britain to impose extended periods of (comparative) world peace. Pursued to the exclusion of more positive measures, deterrence ultimately brought death to nations and civilizations.

How much validity actually remains of the historical analogy in today's nuclear age? At last man wields weapons whose fiery breath and stealthy aftermath can achieve in hours the destruction that cost Rome a hundred years of warfare to wreak upon Carthage--destruction greater than hordes of Goths and Huns perpetrated upon Rome over the course of several centuries. In today's setting, deterrence must needs be infallible. Our current efforts are consequently aimed at the long-sought bar to war itself, especially that kind of war Clausewitz termed absolute, "violence pushed to its utmost bounds." Should those bounds include thermonuclear weapons, war could become a "policy" of utter madness, mutual suicide for nations.

If we, perhaps prematurely, accept that grim nuclear postulate as true, what "infallible deterrent" to war between nations can exist? Twentieth-century man, unready to embrace a world state, lacks even the precarious stability of a delicate world power-balance under which a number of "great nations" prevent or limit wars from self interest. Instead there are but two nations capable of waging war in the dread total-nuclear-pattern. One of these actively pursues a goal of world conquest, involving the destruction of the other, which currently seeks deterrence and peace.

Communist doctrine bluntly rejects continuance of a world half slave and half free while we ponder "co-existence." They adroitly seek to amass additional "slaves," preferably without full-scale nuclear war, but they would not reject it if their opponents' weakness promised an easy nuclear victory. Under these conditions, is deterrence really possible?

The choice of shotguns at six paces for an impending duel, credited to the young Abraham Lincoln, served as an absolute deterrent. This certainty of mutual suicide has continued a permanent bar to shotgun duels, but not to the successful employment of shotguns for assassinations. Deterrence to formal hydrogen bomb warfare therefore looks promising. With perpetual vigilance, it can probably also safeguard against national assassination, altogether too feasible with megaton weapons. But, as protection from the equally fatal, slow poison of creeping aggression, deterrence requires a more searching investigation.

#### THE BIRTH OF DETERRENCE

There is little question that "Massive Retaliation" was the father of Deterrence. The mother of this concept, however, was the political sensitivity of our British allies who characteristically cloaked "retaliation" with a more attractive label. At its inception, in 1947, the Strategic Air Command constituted history's most notable example of deterrence through overwhelming retaliatory force. SAC's virtual monopoly of atomic bombs (the "absolute weapon" of the pre-fusion period) and enough heavy bombers to insure delivery comprised a hitherto unequalled, tailor-made support for meeting a major international crisis and achieving a political settlement of the East-West struggle.

By joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States served notice on the Communist bloc that aggression (at least by armed force) was definitely off limits in NATO countries. Unparalleled efforts to built up Soviet air power showed that the Kremlin recognized our potent capability to retaliate. Our will to do so was doubtless the subject of soul searching there, then as now. The absence of specific prohibitions in remote areas of the globe may have been responsible for the cautious testing attempted by the Communists in Asia.

In the broad view, it is all to the good that this country's initial venture into deterrence went overboard on the side of retaliation. The staid, judicial (British) Economist warned, in 1955: "Danger of war coming through too much bellicosity on the part of the democracies is virtually negligible. The only real danger is that the democracies will allow doubt to arise about their united strength and resolution."

Today SAC can mount vastly more powerful weapons in improved delivery agencies, but gone is the former superiority (though not necessarily forever).<sup>\*</sup> In fact, at a time when the world balance seems to be shifting away from us deterrence based so largely on massive retaliation must be reappraised. The Soviet long-range bombing force, grown swiftly to gigantic proportions, plus Soviet ballistic missiles, present a "counter-deterrent" equal to ours. Now that nuclear parity between the U.S. and the USSR exists, the international version of the shotgun duel with the resultant extinction of both nations has arrived.

<sup>\*</sup> A technological breakthrough in either defense or offense could reward the side which discovers it with a decisive, though temporary, advantage.

The British Government's "Defense Statement" for 1956 recognized that, under nuclear parity, deterrence might fail to prevent war on a gigantic scale even though it forestalled an all-out exchange of megaton weapons at the war's start. Nuclear parity thus seems to spell, to the British at least, not deterrence but "nuclear neutralization," a very different matter. Unfortunately, rather than "peace through nuclear terror," neutralization implies "nuclear blackmail"--a surge of Communist aggression and a threat to deluge Western Europe (and perhaps the U.S.) with megaton bombs should the NATO nations employ atomic weapons in even a "tactical" role.

Russia's continued efforts to "outlaw" all nuclear weapons, her acknowledged superiority in ready, conventional forces argue the plausibility of such a move. The dilemma for the NATO nations lies in their response, should the threat occur. Nuclear neutralization puts the shoe neatly on the democracies' foot. From this emerges the crucial question: To what degree might fear of nuclear war paralyze national policy on both shores of the Atlantic Ocean?

In this country General LeMay, SAC's first commander, bluntly defined his mission before the 1956 Congressional Subcommittee Hearings on Air Power. "The main object of the Air Force in the past has been to maintain a deterrent force, because I think we all understand that if we get into a war we all lose. A deterrent force is one that is large enough and efficient enough that no matter what the enemy force does, either offensively or defensively, he still will receive a quantity of bombs or explosive force that is more than he is willing to accept. Therefore, he never starts a war." Peripheral conflicts, were also to be forestalled by the same instrument because "only foolhardy nations would base their strategy upon the doubtful assumption that what began as a local conflict would remain either local or limited."

Thus delineated, our deterrent force, in effect SAC, presented a beautiful picture. Freedom-loving nations everywhere devoutly hoped for its truth. But a larger and larger public already convinced of Soviet ruthlessness was chilled by doubt as the enormous implications of nuclear parity and the deadliness of megaton bombs were revealed. Soviet sputniks, coursing through the autumn skies of 1957, shattered the illusion of incontestible American technological supremacy on which the whole deterrent policy rested.

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH TWO SETS OF GLASSES

Even before the sputniks western spokesmen were declaring, "There is no alternative to peace." If accepted at face value, these views (practically "massive retaliation" in reverse) would freeze U.S. policy into a rigid mold.

This prospect of peace through mutual terror has apparently been accepted by leaders of all nations except Russia. There Malenkov's single, and promptly recanted, assertion that a nuclear war meant the end of civilization was the only exception to Soviet bravado propaganda. In radical contrast to the "impending disaster" theme of the American and European press, "Pravda" and "Red Star" have steadily belittled the dangers of nuclear weapons to Russia, calling them "exaggerated by the enemies of peace to intimidate people." But the remarkable growth of the Soviet long-range air force, granted independent status under the Defense Ministry; the succession of nuclear tests in Siberia; the swarms of short-range fighter aircraft and, finally, Soviet achievements in guided missiles all indicate unstinted attention to atomic offensive and defensive measures. There is every reason to believe that the Kremlin accurately appreciates international realities in the nuclear age.



As long as the West had a decisive nuclear superiority, Soviet strategists successfully worked around these weapons by piecemeal aggression. At the same time, Soviet scientists and engineers made a prodigious effort to equal and, if possible, surpass the United States' nuclear achievements. Their sputnik-revealed progress in other fields is no longer a matter of conjecture save for technical details. To predict future Soviet strategy, we must assess their achievements as they effect not only Soviet capabilities but also Soviet intentions.

Regarding the latter we may derive comfortless guidance from innumerable statements of Communist leaders. Perhaps typical is Lenin's dictum that if half the Russian people had to die to further the triumph of Communism the price would not be excessive. This suggests that if Soviet military strength attains a level which assures the destruction of the U.S., while retaining intact a bare minimum of their population and power apparatus, the Kremlin would not hesitate to clinch a nuclear victory.

Such a "victory" would mean the destruction of erstwhile dangerous adversaries and strong neutrals. In such a war the grievously hurt survivor might indeed have won world hegemony. The recent advances of science do not preclude the possibility. "If technology alone determined the character of warfare...all wars in history would have become progressively more destructive. This evidently is not true. The nature of war depends...to a large extent upon belligerents' notion of victory."\*

The last sentence dampens the hope aroused by historical reflection. We must reckon with the Communists' desire for world conquest fully as much

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\* Speier, Hans, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November, 1955.

as with their H-bomb technology. Until we have tangible evidence of a fundamental change of heart (and policy), not merely of gestures, behind the Iron Curtain total war remains a possibility.

#### SIGNALS FROM THE KREMLIN

Soviet long-range strategy since 1946 has aimed at the gradual isolation of the U.S., encouraging neutralism everywhere. Specifically, the Kremlin has sought the closure, by political means, of U.S. overseas bases which now make "B-47's and carrier-based bombers count as much as the HB-52...and multiply the number of directions from which Russia can be attacked."\* Similarly the Soviet Union will use every possible pressure to prevent NATO countries from setting up intermediate range missiles on their soil. Direct Communist assault on the U.S. is apparently to be postponed in conformance with Lenin's precept: "The soundest strategy in war is to postpone active operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy."

Since military power forms the essential base of Soviet expansion and since atomic weapons are the modern quintessence of military power, all significant internal policies of the repudiated Stalin have been continued. The great emphasis on the buildup of a heavy industrial base goes on. Soviet armed forces still receive an extremely high proportion of the Soviet economy's output. Dropping Stalin overboard served a symbolic function in the establishment of a new line, under new circumstances, but not a new philosophy or an altered goal.

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\* Economist (London), July 14, 1956. Recent developments in intermediate-range-ballistic-missiles reinforce this argument, particularly while inter-continental missiles remain in a more nebulous technological status.

Although there are fewer armed clashes of the Korea, Indo-China types, there are increased incidents of the Egyptian, Indonesian and Algerian stamp, all too easily fomented by covert Communist armies. On occasion, it has been plausible to brand the democracies' efforts on behalf of peace as "aggression." In others, such as South African racial struggles, those efforts have been negated by private squabbles inside one country.

"Creeping expansion" of Communism whether by local use of force or by subversion and insurrection with the potential sanction of force, can in time prove as deadly to free peoples as nuclear assault on the U.S. Each time this Communist strategy gains ground its chances of complete success increase. Each time the free world yields "unimportant" bits of territory to Communism, neutralism becomes more popular, the fence-sitters more inclined to jump to the Red side, and the myth of Communist invincibility, the "wave of the future," gains new adherents.

It is true that in 1956 after ten years of Communist indoctrination, satellite revolts tarnished that myth, at least temporarily. Kremlin policy wavered initially between concessions to outraged nationalism and brutal military repression. In choosing the latter it reverted to unadulterated Stalinism, despite smoke-screen charges of "capitalist-instigated counter revolution." Even with world attention unfortunately diverted by Anglo-French actions at Suez, Communist savagery shocked anew those with short memories. The martyrdom of Hungary offered would-be neutrals another lesson in the Communist definition of "peace." Despite the subsequent intra-Kremlin power struggles, the Soviets have weathered worse storms without forsaking their long-term strategy.

Renewed Communist expansion could compound the free world's difficulties through progressive curtailment of markets and raw materials. Should the progression become significant, the United States would ultimately become an unsought "fortress America" confronted with twin evils: a precarious existence with growing encroachment or a near hopeless war against the Communist octopus.

#### THE GRAND DETERRENT'S ROLE

Despite the Soviet penchant for an indirect strategy, our chief danger is usually considered a Soviet surprise attack, an attempted international assassination by megaton bombs. Hence the pre-eminent concern for the status of SAC and its twin capability to withstand hostile assault and still deliver prompt, crushing retaliatory blows.

As safeguard against lightning-swift disaster, this deterrent policy is sound but incomplete, for its basic premise requires strengthened air defense of military installations and vastly improved civil defense to minimize loss of life. Unless our whole country, not merely SAC, presents a "hard" type target our deterrence tends to become an actual "attractant" to an enemy in periods of severe international tension. Nevertheless the efforts devoted to maintaining America's strategic air power have been justified by Soviet abstention from military operations, involving Russian armed forces, beyond the Iron Curtain. Closing this avenue of Communist expansion must always be a fundamental of U.S. policy.

Consequently some of General LeMay's 1956 testimony before the Symington Committee and subsequent revelations of our lowered defenses were disquieting. The General reported that "under current intelligence estimates

and approved plans and programs (for SAC) the Soviet long-range air force will be relatively stronger than the Strategic Air Command by 1960 at the latest."

Of course, simple comparison of "relative strengths" (U.S. vs. Soviet strategic air force) does not evaluate their deterrent capability. That is measured, as General LeMay stated, by the ability to shatter the enemy nation "no matter what the enemy force does, either offensively or defensively," or in Field Marshal Montgomery's phrase, the "capacity to physically destroy an aggressor in any set of circumstances." This concept implies that the possession and protection of delivery systems for megaton weapons need not be infinitely expanded. Nations, no less than individuals, can be "killed" only once.

Consequently, the specter of a Soviet long-range air force "relatively stronger than SAC" does not necessarily weaken our ability to deter an all-out nuclear assault on the U.S. But such nuclear neutralization may help Soviet atomic blackmail in other forms of Communist aggression, equally deadly though slower acting.

Worse yet, our confidence in SAC, the Great Deterrent, "alert" and capable of devastating any assailant, "no matter what the enemy force does", suggests an unrealistic fixation on the strategy of that "enemy." During the tense years while our capability for long-range delivery of decisive numbers of nuclear weapons was poorly matched by the Communist bloc that single element of deterrence was regarded as wholly adequate. Nevertheless it did not prevent the loss of China, the conflicts in Korea and Indo-China, the shadow-war in Greece and Malaya, the Berlin blockade, or Soviet penetration of the Middle East through arms deals with Egypt and Syria.

It is now profitless to consider how the Great Deterrent might have been exploited. The suspicion lingers that the Kremlin gambled, on the whole conservatively, that the U.S. would not resort to all-out nuclear warfare except to retaliate for direct aggression against vital areas (at that time Europe in addition to the continental U.S.).

How much assurance against all forms of aggression can the Great Deterrent offer us today as Soviet nuclear-armed, strategic air power challenges, perhaps equals, our SAC? If our response to megaton bomb attacks on New York and Los Angeles seems certain, is it equally certain if the targets were Paris and Bonn? And what have we in mind as retaliation (since SAC cannot deter it) for a Communist, but non-Russian, enemy's march on Seoul, Saigon or Bangkok? Can we in cold fact seriously contemplate showering atomic bombs on the teeming millions of China's Fukien coast to make good our guarantee to Formosa? Disregard humanitarian considerations if you will, but realize that U.S. cities and their populations (to say nothing of rural areas subjected to radioactive fallout) are for the first time vulnerable to Kremlin "counter-retaliation" for our use of nuclear weapons.

This single-deterrent policy is reminiscent of our outworn, unworkable isolationism now termed "fortress America." Highly motivated by fear of war (however camouflaged by words like "abhorrence"), such a concept ignores historical truth. Excessive fear of war ends in subjugation by the foe who fears war less. When we define peace as the absence of overt aggression and equate it with "national security," we are almost inviting Communist covert aggression, aggression by proxy, atomic blackmail. If we allow the Kremlin to take the initiative for all forms of conflict our world situation

would become hopeless unless the Communists were to commit a whole series of glaring errors.

#### A BROADER SPECTRUM

Nevertheless the Grand Deterrent, now represented chiefly by SAC, bolstered by a Strategic Missile Submarine Attack Force or intercontinental guided missiles, remains the indispensable pillar on which a solid American military structure should rest. Sole reliance on it, however, would invite disaster.

Since NATO is still the core of the U.S. alliance system, we should not forget that in Europe the menace of air-delivered nuclear devastation is matched by the threat of atomic-armed Communist ground forces. A "conventional" Soviet land assault in Europe might follow a declaration that Russian nuclear weapons would destroy the major cities of Europe if NATO employed such weapons for any purpose. That strategy could place the U.S. in a dangerous dilemma. We would have to: relinquish our nuclear-air capability and wage, under current capabilities, an unequal contest on the ground; withdraw from Europe; invoke total war by attacking Russia; or, relying upon SAC's deterrent strength, implement NATO plans to counter invasion with tactical atomic weapons.

This points up the true mission of deterrence. The potential foe must be kept militarily uncertain of the outcome of any aggressive move he may want to start. His uncertainties must extend equally to peripheral (limited) war, nuclear blackmail, internal subversion and sabotage, or economic psychologic cold war.

These are scarcely "lesser" aggressions, save in speed of accomplishment, than even nuclear Armageddon. Equally fatal to the U.S. potentially,

they spell slow, rather than sudden, death to Western civilization. Inadequate deterrence against these alternatives could be in the long term as disastrous to the U.S. as SAC shorn of either its striking power or its base defense.

In belated recognition of the multi-headed danger the United States is gradually raising its deterrent sights. Our growing Continental Air Defense Command and the still neglected Civil Defense function are recognized as partners with SAC in deterring total nuclear war. We also find tangible evidence of "graduated deterrence" in the world-wide mobility of the Navy's carrier air power and amphibious marines, and in the elements of the Army and the Tactical Air Command committed to outpost positions, originally attained through our sea power and tenable only so long as that power remains invincible. Here we draw a distant "first line of defense" against all forms of creeping aggression, at thousands, not scores, of miles from our seacoast.

In an age when there "can be no mobilization under a hail of atomic bombs," we mark our second line as that portion of the Army and Air Force in instant readiness for, and possessing the means of, rapid (air) movement to any trouble-spot in the world. Such a force, equipped and trained to fight with both nuclear and conventional weapons, must be adequate to meet strength the enemy can marshal against it and our first line shield. We do not possess such a force in adequate strength today.

Viewed functionally, U.S. military deterrence needs present three aspects: the passive (continental air defense, civil defense); the counter-attack (mobile, joint forces to defeat an invader and conduct "hot pursuit"); and punitive deterrence (massive retaliation to appropriate degree at places



and times of our choosing). The first functions automatically if aggression occurs. The second requires a national policy decision--whether to counter-attack, when to strike, and in what force. The third, punitive, deterrent demands a complicated decision--what degree of punishment to mete out? to whom? and when? This last decision would be painfully constrained by an enemy's capability to "re-retaliate," particularly if U.S. home defenses (passive deterrence) cannot stop Soviet air assaults.

Possession of all three forms of military deterrence commensurate with hostile capabilities is essential. Deterrence is the product, not the sum of its components. If any component is zero, the product is zero.

Yet not even such a "total" military deterrent will suffice because it is, by definition, defensive. Since we rightly dislike starting both "preventive war," and limited conflicts of the Korean type, we can develop an offensive sting only in dynamic political-economic-psychologic policies which keep opponents off balance. We cannot forever give an assailant the first punch and always win by counterattack.

It is natural that American faith in technology and wealth expects to discover security in even more powerful weapons. Even our shocked reaction to the Soviet sputnik centered on mending our scientific and technological fences. But we must realize that the Soviets have been widening the gap in political warfare while closing that gap in technology. Consequently the path to total deterrence is by no means simply a matter of money and manpower. Genius in ideas, research, development, and imaginative diplomacy are equally vital in today's technological world. Therein may be the explanation for American fumbling and procrastination in many features of deterrent power.

The requirements of more and bigger bombs, continuously improved delivery systems (whether piloted aircraft or robot missiles), and less vulnerable bases are readily understood, however difficult to fulfill. Lack of clear-cut programs hamper the other deterrents such as effective employment of our economic and ideologic resources; a practical civil defense program; joint task forces for peripheral wars, foreign aid that builds self-reliant nations, not resentful pensioners. Eliminating all zero components from this list may cost less, or more, than nuclear air power but money alone cannot achieve the required results.

#### THE MILITARY FOUNDATION OF ACTIVE DETERRENCE

In the nuclear age SAC furnishes the modern counterpart of Britain's Grand Fleet in WW I. That Fleet's offensive strength went unused at Jutland because "Jellicoe was the one man who could lose the war in an afternoon." The parallel is infinitely truer of today's SAC, whose tremendous service to the U.S. is rendered by remaining "alert" on its far-flung bases. If it has to be sent into action "we both lose." By definition, therefore, we need other means--military, political, economic, ideologic to deter--or defeat--other forms of aggression. Possessed of such well-balanced might, the United States can assume the inevitable risks involved in wrestling the initiative from the enemy.

The timid wrongly think that seizing the initiative will bring preventive war, blundering ultimatums, and rash military ventures. It does, however, require skilled maneuvers and courageous leadership in the pursuit of a long-range dynamic policy. "Calculated risks" have their place in national, no less than in military, strategy. Notable victories have never been won in battle or politics by a succession of improvised rear guard actions.

The Kremlin has ably demonstrated this principle in the past decade by aggressively "detering" the West's attempts at positive action without provoking a major war. The Communists waged open war in Korea and Indo-China, flaunting all threats of massive retaliation, while the Soviets simultaneously launched "peace campaigns." Whatever advances their goal of world domination--peace, war or strange mixture of both--is looked upon as good tactics. At advantageous moments, even sheer military power has won the Kremlin non-military gains in the cold war.

Deterrence alone cannot combat such tactical versatility joined to relentless policy, least of all when the deterrence is "massive" rather than flexible. We have created a serious problem by advertising a single-track strategy, while leaving the opponent free to shift at will. Yet a flexible deterrent power, like Britain's one-time mastery of the sea, can be skilfully maneuvered to keep the foe off balance, uncertain as to the outcome of its diverse aggressions, big or small, warlike or covert. By such means we might exploit contradictions inherent within the Communist bloc, contradictions as striking as those between Communism and the free world.

Because we lead an oceanic confederation, U.S. deterrents to peripheral wars rest primarily on sea power just as our continental defense depends upon air and missile power. Add to that naval strength, enough Army and Marine divisions with tactical aviation to intervene quickly in remote areas, and we glimpse a modern counterpart of British sea-power in the days when the sun never set on the white ensign.

But there is one tremendous difference, to our disadvantage. Pax Britannica functioned in a world noted for its delicately maintained multi-

power balance. Britain's allies supplied the bulk of the land armies in wars too large for small expeditionary forces to handle. Unlike the nineteenth century, our situation, a bi-power teeter-board, lacks the dependable balance of "great powers" and allies who can provide strong armies.

Consequently we must protect our allies against Communist aggression as England guarded her far-flung empire, though we ourselves are confronted by a threat to our own security such as England, until 1914 never knew. We hear arguments that the U.S. economy "cannot afford two military establishments," one for total war, another for lesser conflicts. It would be as well to advise a young couple that they cannot afford both fire and burglary insurance for their home. We have always managed the huge, wasteful expenditures in haste resulting from wars for which we were unprepared. Today we "afford" the expense of our passive and punitive deterrents knowing that without them we court not the initial reverse of a Pearl Harbor but irretrievable national disaster. Realization that gradual erosion of the free world means equal disaster, merely slower paced, compels adequate steps to avert it, too.

The deeper we delve into the truths underlying real deterrence, the more sure we become that no "one weapon" or "one service" can suffice; the clearer our minds that the answer cannot be found in acrimonious disputes, guided missiles vs. manned bombers, aircraft carriers vs. overseas airfields. The warning that not even the U.S. can make a foreign policy out of morality alone daily becomes more evident. An incongruous admixture of humanitarian pronouncements and the capability, like the blind Samson's, to strike only blows which demolish friend and foe alike makes a mockery of the free world's defense when confronted by a wiley foe. Kremlin threats include more than Stalinist stark brutality, its bayonets probing for weak spots and a "how-

many-divisions-has-the-Pope" mentality. Wiles must be fought with superior astuteness, withholding fire to fight fire.

Moreover, despite the expense of erecting a technologically up-to-the-minute, balanced defense establishment, such a considerable achievement cannot safely be regarded as an end-all. We must be as alert to breakthroughs in strategy and tactics as those in research and development.

Only when we construct a capability to fight any kind of war at "times and places of our own choosing" can we expand Soviet uncertainties by several orders of magnitude. They must then reckon with our intentions to exercise capabilities no longer bound by strait-jacket alternatives of nuclear devastation or bootless words.

#### A HIGHER GOAL

Our deterrence policy has not been altogether successful in the past for more than military shortcomings. Excessive concentration upon defense, preservation of the status quo, avoidance of war above all has often seemed to characterize it. An essentially negative policy can never triumph over a dynamic one in the long term just as militarily the "pure" defensive has never won a war. Famed Fabian tactics defeated Hannibal, but only hearkening to Cato's reiterated thundering, "Carthage must be destroyed" finally freed Rome from more than a century of Punic wars. Russian delaying-actions bled Napoleon's Grand Army. The winter counteroffensive against his still formidable host beginning the retreat from Moscow made certain that he would not return.

Unfortunately our air bases encircling Russia are being utilized too much like another Chinese wall or Maginot line, historically futile attempts to stem aggression by passive defense. The prevailing emphasis upon the

status quo in this country, as well as in western Europe, parallels our exaggerations of individual "prosperity" in the western nations. Preserving our standards of living, rather than militantly upholding the ideas which made us free, wins us neither friends among enslaved Communist nations, nor respect among vacillating neutrals.

"Lethargic," "indifferent," "neglectful" (or whatever adjective you choose) as the American people have been about their military establishment, they have never quailed at efforts costly in blood and treasure, to preserve their freedom--once they recognized the threat and received sound guidance from their leaders regarding measures required to avert it.

Steadily rising living standards are hard to relinquish. Increases in taxes, already high; more and more young men and women devoting years of their youth to military service; greater tension rather than security; these are rough roads to national defense even though that defense is now synonymous with the preservation of freedom throughout the world, not merely for the United States of America. Yet there can be no doubt that whatever the price tag, Americans will pay it when satisfied the article is genuine and guaranteed.

There is no question of what we can afford in our national defense unless we supinely embrace luxury as more important. The Soviets still commit half their labor to agriculture, compared to 10 per cent in the U.S. Yet they plough back one-fifth of their total resources, year after year, into investment--a figure we attain only when our economy, much of it devoted to super-comforts, reaches very high levels. In investment allocation, the divergence becomes more pronounced. Half the Soviet investment is in industry against one-fourth of ours, 15 per cent for housing matching 25 per cent of ours,

nine per cent for "miscellaneous" (largely "luxury" items) compared to 30 per cent for this country.\* The U.S. could "afford" expenditures in an arms' race that would be impossible for Russia to equal.

This may not be true forever. Our present deterrent policy overlooks the shattering possibility that undisturbed growth of Soviet power might eventually exceed American capacity to deter or contain. Purely passive defense (deterrence) may fail to prevent Communism from radically altering our (and the world's) social system--by means other than open attack. Postponement of war is less than a valid policy unless it finally brings either real peace or such an enhancement of U.S. strength as to render all forms of aggression losing ventures. If the full spectrum of U.S. military power is to attain the effectiveness of England's sea power in its hey-day, American guardianship of liberty must have as its ultimate however distant goal, total freedom, not merely total deterrence. A positive conception of American strength would protect us against a weakening of our determination, and would establish a sense of direction for our efforts: liquidation of the conflict as it now exists. The solution of the conflict would be a reduction of Soviet influence and control, a change in the opponent's policy compatible with the aim of free nations. Such a change cannot be counted upon to produce itself, it will have to be brought about.

The Soviet system has serious vulnerabilities as well as great strength. The satellite revolts after a decade of indoctrination reveal inner weakness. People dominated by Communism still detest its rule. Through a strategy of political warfare we could exploit the incompatibility of Communism with

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\* Statistics from American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, January, 1956, J. A. Kershaw.

human aspirations and thereby promote changes in the Soviet bloc favorable to mankind. The choice is not between love of peace on the one side and war on the other. Rather the choice involves different measures for a peace that does not undermine our other basic values.

Deterrence in the nuclear age must be wed to a sophisticated political strategy. Our deterrence to date has been weakened by the lack of a comprehensive, positive political strategy. Little time is left us in which to adopt one. Only by conducting a sustained political-ideological offensive against the glaring weaknesses of the Communist system can we keep our foes off balance and prevent their constant excursions into the free world. Only thus can we avoid being surprised again and again, compelled to fight under crippling handicaps or forced to abandon more people to slavery as we gain only temporary respite on the road to our own national disaster.