
HISTORY



57TH FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR WING MAY — JUNE 1950





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HISTORY

OF

57TH FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING

ELMENDORF AIR FORCE BASE

MAY -- JUNE 1950

Cost Preparation Data:

Total Manhours Expended: 216

Total Cost: \$181

Prepared by:

O. J. TWEDT

Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

Approved by:

D. R. HUTCHINSON Brigadier General, USAF Commanding

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INTRODUCTION

Emphasis placed on improvement and expansion of facilities at Elmendorf in previous months paid dividends during May and June 1950. Most evident to the observer was the extensive road-paving accomplished at the base during the period.

Among top priority Wing requirements during May and June was the elimination of crippling facility and personnel shortages within the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron.

The primary mission of the entire Alaskan Air Command was one of air defense of the Alaskan area, requiring coordinated use of three main components of air defense, namely: early warning radar, anti-aircraft weapons and fighter aircraft. The 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group, tactical unit assigned to the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing, was one of the two fighter units in the Alaskan theater, whose function was interception of invading aircraft. The 51th Troop Carrier Squadron imparted mobility to the fighter units, and the aircraft control and warning squadrons (one located at Elmendorf and one at Ladd) comprised the commun-

The beginning of the 60-day period covered in this narrative was one of "limited emergency" at Elmendorf, a condition which was proclaimed by the base commander to assist installations personnel effect a switchover in the central heat and power plant from old generating equipment to a new generator and additional switch gear. The limited emergency amounted to a call for strict conservation of electricity, resulting in a virtual brown-out. The Wing commander pointed out that although this brownout was occasioned by a peacetime operation, conditions imposed closely approximated those resulting from hostile action or sabotage. The ability of Elmendorf and Fort Richardson to operate under such

^{1 /} Alaskan Air Command Budget Estimate for Fiscal Year 1952.

^{* /} See page 26, this history, for further discussion relative to the 625th AC & W Squadron.

conditions was studied.

A highlight during May was the celebration of newly proclaimed Armed Forces Day -- 20 May -- by military personnel of Elmendorf and Fort Richardson in cooperation with civilians of surrounding areas. In cooperation with Mayor Z. J. Loussac of Anchorage, military officials planned and executed a parade in Anchorage beginning at 1000 hours. _* / "Open house" at the military reservation began at 1200 hours and civilians were treated to an air show featuring F-80C jets of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing. _2 /

Memorial Day services were held at the Fort Richardson Post Cemetary at 1100 hours 30 May. Participating in ceremonies were General Hutchinson, Chaplains Roy C. Davis and John K. Connelly, the post band, representatives of local patriotic organizations and 313 officers and men from military organizations at the base.

3 /

Among notables to visit Elmendorf during the period were
Lieutenant Generals Lauris E. Norstad and John R. Hodge and Major
General W. H. Turner, who arrived in the territory on 22 June for
an official air force visit. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson

^{* /} See front cover.

^{2 / 57}th Ftr-Intep Wg 00 #2-50, dtd 12 May 50.

^{3 /} Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, file 57HOP 006, Subj: Memorial Day Services, to CO, All Orgs, Elmendorf, undtd.

and General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, passed through Elmendorf on 23 June 1950, enroute from the Orient to Washington, D. C.

As June came to an end Elmendorf participated in a general alert along with all Alaskan military installations, and the Wing stood by in a state of combat readiness. Grim news from the Far East on 26 June had added an overdose of reality to what was officially described to the public as another of the practice "alerts" to test combat preparedness of military units. 4

Among measures taken by the Wing as a result of the international situation was the sending of radiograms to commanding officers of the Wing's satellite stations -- Cape, Amchitka, Thornbrough and Naknek -- advising them that North Korea had invaded South Korea. In view of lack of defense capabilities of the chain stations and the planned closing of Cape and Amchitka, it was directed that the four stations maintain 24-hour duty sections for the purpose of sending or receiving information of intelligence value. Personnel were to carry weapons and field equipment if available. However, it was directed that positive steps be taken to prevent hysteria, and personnel were to be informed that no information was available to indicate any inference

^{4 /} See page 35 et seq for a discussion of practice alerts at Elmendorf in May--June 50.

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other than that a local situation existed. 5 /

Plans also were completed and conveyed to civilian dependents of military personnel regarding their evacuation to the Zone of Interior in the event of an emergency.

^{5 /} Radiogram 57HCG 2663, dtd 26 Jun 50.

Chapter I

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Organization

The structural organization of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing underwent no fundamental changes in May-June 1950. In common with all air force wings organized in conformance with the Wing-Base plan of organization, the Wing continued to consist of a Wing headquarters, a tactical group, an air base group and a maintenance and supply group, plus supporting units. These consisted of a troop carrier squadron and an aircraft control and warning squadron. The former imparted mobility to the tactical group and the latter was an augmentation due to the Wing's primary mission of aircraft interception. Designations of subordinate units of the Wing were:

57th Fighter-Interceptor Group 57th Air Base Group 57th Maintenance and Supply Group
54th Troop Carrier Squadron
625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron

An agreement expected to as ist the Wing and other organizations at Elmendorf--Fort Richardson in the accomplishment of their missions was reached and published in the latter part of May: an agreement on the division of responsibilities in the operation of separate army and air force installations at the combined army and air force base by Headquarters United States Army, Alaska, and Headquarters, Alaskan Air Command.

The purpose of the joint agreement was to delineate responsibilities of the U. S. Army (USARAL) and Alaskan Air Command (AAC) in connection with the establishment and operation of a separate army installation at Fort Richardson, Alaska, on or about 1 July 1950. The agreement included information as to the extent of joint utilization of existing services and facilities and responsibility for their operation, the extent and method of budgeting for cross-servicing of jointly utilized facilities, and the definition of boundaries dividing the military reservation into two separate and distinct installations: Fort Richardson and Elmendorf Air Force Base.

As to exact delineations of separate and joint use of services and facilities, attention is invited to the below-referenced

written agreement. 6 /

Mobility of the Wing-Base plan of organization as applied to a fighter organization was tested when the commanding general of Alaskan Air Command ordered the deployment of 16 F-80C and one T-33 aircraft of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing to Ladd Air Force Base for a period of about 30 days service. In addition to training personnel of the 449th Fighter-All Weather Squadron in the operation and maintenance of jet fighter aircraft preparatory to conversion of the 449th to F-94A jet aircraft and to increasing the air defense potentialities of Ladd and Eielson Air Force Bases, another purpose of the move was to decrease the vulner-ability of fighter aircraft at Elmendorf Air Force Base. 7

The Wing made the deployment of jet aircraft of the 57th
Fighter-Interceptor Group to Ladd Air Force Base on 13--14 June,
and at month's end 32 officers and airmen and 17 jet aircraft of
that group were still at that location. 8

Administration

During May representatives of the Wing Air Inspector visited

6/ Joint Agreement between Hq USARAL and AAC, dtd 26 May 50.

^{7 /} AAC Radiogram AAGOC-8719, dtd 16 Jun 50.


the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group, including its subordinate squadrons; the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron; and the 54th Troop Carrier Squadron. Inspections of these units included both administrative and technical matters.

Minor administrative and technical discrepancies were uncovered by the inspectors and corrected by the units. Personnel of Fighter Group headquarters were commended by administrative inspectors for the excellent condition of enlisted qualification records.

Through the means of repeated special inspections by the Wing Air Inspector, facilities at Elmendorf set aside for transient personnel were improved. As a result of special subject inspections by personnel of the Wing Air Inspector's section action was also taken to insure that all organizations realized the importance of acquiring and keeping in top condition all equipment required for survival in event of an emergency.

In June Wing inspectors conducted administrative and technical inspections of the 57th Medical Group, the 57th Maintenance and Supply Group, and the four chain stations of Cape, Naknek, Thornbrough and Amchitka. Discrepancies were largely of a routine and minor nature.

Accented late in June was the proper handling of classified material. Violations of security regulations in regard to



military construction and the necessity for tightening security procedures in general prompted this action. 9/

9/ AAC Radiogram AAPIO 9520, dtd 20 Jun 50.

Chapter II

PERSONNEL

In May and June certain officers who had occupied important posts within the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing left Alaska for new assignments in the Zone of Interior. Among these were Lieutenant Colonels T. C. Davis, Wing Staff Finance Disbursing Officer; R. C. Love, Commanding Officer, 57th Medical Group; and Major C. B. Hill, Wing Air Provost Marshal. Replacement of these officers altered the staff of officers assisting Brigadier General D. R. Hutchinson as of 30 June 1950 as follows:

Lieutenant Colonel A. N. La Grippo

Colonel K. A. Harcos

Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Bond

Lieutenant Colonel C. R. Heffner Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Gerzin Wing Executive Officer

Director, Maintenance & Supply

Director, Personnel & Administration

Director, Operations & Training

Wing Inspector General

Major H. M. Galbraith

Major H. A. Gilbert

Chaplain (Major) R. C. Davis

Captain J. L. Biles, Jr.

Captain D. L. Anderson

Captain J. F. Bagnell

Captain J. E. Davenport

Captain S. Sloan, III

Colonel B. T. Kleine

Colonel H. O. Wangeman

Colonel J. T. Posey

Lieutenant Colonel L. F. Mathison

Major G. P. Basel

Major Z. J. Baczewski

Wing Adjutant

Wing Legal Officer

Wing Chaplain

Wing Staff Finance Officer

Budget & Fiscal Officer

Judge Advocate

Base Food Supervisor

Public Information Officer

Commanding, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group

Commanding, 57th Air Base Group

Commanding, 57th Maintenance and Supply Group

Commanding, 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron

Commanding, 51th Troop Carrier Squadron (H)

Commanding, 57th Medical Group

Since April (covered in the immediately preceding historical installment) the Wing had moved closer to its personnel manning objective of 100 per cent utilization of authorized personnel spaces. On 28 April the Wing was 98 per cent manned in officer strength and 79 per cent manned in airmen strength. The 625th

Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron suffered greater personnel shortages than any other unit under jurisdiction of the Wing, having only 52 per cent of authorized officer strength and 39 per cent of authorized airman strength on 28 April. By the end of June officer assigned strength had risen to 54 per cent and airman strength to 58 per cent of authorizations. The low manning percentage of this unit was due to lack of sufficient facilities to require full manning, as well as to a shortage of specialists. The overall effect of this situation on the Wing's mission was

The Wing as a whole had gained to 108 per cent of authorized serious. 10/ officer strength by 30th June, and to 87 per cent of authorized airman strength. These percentages are a reflection of a gain of seven officers and 148 airmen, bringing the Wing up to a total assigned personnel strength of 378 officers and 385h airmen as of 30 June 1950. 11/

The acute shortage of personnel in the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron was felt keenly by that unit during

^{10 /} See pgs 26 & 38 , this historical installment.

^{11 /} a-57th Ftr-Intop Wg Officers Termination Rpt, 28 Apr 50. b-57th Ftr-Intop Wg Airmen Termination Rpt, 28 Apr 50. b-57th Ftr-Intep Ng Airmen Termination Rpt, 28 Apr 50. c-57th Ftr-Intep Ng Officers Termination Rpt, 1 Jun 50. d-57th Ftr-Intep Ng Airmen Termination Rpt, 1 Jun 50. e-57th Ftr-Intep Ng Officers Termination Rpt, 30 Jun 50. f-57th Ftr-Intep Ng Airmen Termination Rpt, 30 Jun 50.

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the period under discussion because of an expansion of the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) of this unit, which required a restudy of personnel requirements for this organization.

Specific expansion in facilities included the incorporation of a movements identification section into the ADCC. Function of this section was to afford the maximum consideration of flight plan information originating with Air Traffic Control (Civil Aeronautics Authority) and Air Force Flight Service as it existed in the Territory of Alaska, and to determine the identity of reported air traffic and declare it accounted for (friendly) or unaccounted for (enemy).

The Air Defense Control Center had operational control over two Ground Controlled Interception stations employed in the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing's area of responsibility and, in addition, it had been delegated the responsibility of acting in the capacity of a theater control center. Considering these commitments and the radar expansion program contemplated for the future, assignment of additional personnel was indicated.

The commanding officer of the 625th had pointed out late in April 1950 that 112 additional personnel were required to sustain effective aircraft control and warning operations; almost half of these being Information Center Operators (SSN 510).

Inasmuch as the 625th had less than half of its authorized

personnel assigned at the time this period began, Lieutenant Colonel L. F. Mathison, commanding the unit, stated in a letter to the Wing that if the critical personnel situation in his unit continued to exist, aircraft and warning activities in the Elmendorf area would be seriously curtailed. Expanding facilities coupled with a serious decrease in personnel precluded any reasonable degree of operational effectiveness for his unit, Colonel Mathison stated. This commander's estimates of the combat effectiveness of his unit as of 10 May and 10 June 1950 are indicated on pages 22-24 of this history.

The Wing forwarded the letter written by Colonel Mathison to Alaskan Air Command in May and received information from that headquarters indicating that the airmen specification serial numbers peculiar to aircraft control and warning activities were being forecast in greater numbers during the months of May and June 1950 and that the Wing would receive a proportionate share of these personnel, thereby alleviating the situation in the 625th unit. This information was passed on to the 625th. Result of incoming personnel assignments to the 625th in May and June is indicated earlier in this chapter by increased assigned strength percentages. 12/

^{12 /} a-Scc page 26, this historical installment, for further discussion of 625th AC & W Sq.
b-Ltr, Hq 625th AC & W Sq, file 25 WS/C, Subj: Personnel requirements, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, dtd 26 Apr 50.
c--See pages 41 and 83 et seq, History of the 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, 1 Jan-31 Mar 50 & page 11, History of the same unit, April 1950.

A cut in officer authorizations in tables of distributionaugmentation for the Wing went into effect on 1 June 1950. These cuts had been anticipated by the Wing since February, 1950, 13 / and the losses affected hits of the Wing as indicated:

Hq & Hq Sq, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing		6	
Headquarters, 57th Air Base Group		8	
57th Communications Squadron		1	
57th Installations Squadron		2	
Headquarters, 57th Maintenance and Supply Group		2	
57th Supply Squadron		5	
57th Motor Vehicle Squadron	7	1	
57th Medical Group		2	

Specification serial numbers eliminated are contained in correspondence referred to below. <u>14</u> / Total table of distribution-augmentation personnel authorization for the Wing after this cut was 75 officers, 2000 airmen and 1053 civilian spaces. Table of organization and equipment personnel authorizations amounted to 274 officer and 2405 airman spaces, bringing total authorizations to 349 officer, 1405 airman and 1053 civilian spaces. <u>15</u> /

^{13 /} See page 23, History of the 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, 1 Jan--31 Mar 50, and page 15, History of the 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, April 50.

^{14 /} Ltrs, Hq 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, file 57HOR 320.3, Subj: Changes in Tables of Distribution-Augmentation, to CG, AAC, dtd 2 Jun 50.

^{15 /} a--Authorized Military Strength, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, as of 1 Jun 50. b--NOTE: Reference 11d, this history, is inaccurate as to total authorized strength.

This slash in officer spaces was 10 less than the 37 which the Wing had been alerted to expect in February 1950.

Earlier, in May, the Wing had requested that Alaskan Air Command approve the establishment of a table of distribution-augmentation for the 51th Troop Carrier Squadron of four spaces, military occupational specification number 747, and one space, military occupational specification number 750. This action was believed necessary as a result of a transfer of two C-82 type aircraft from the 57th Air Base Group to the 51th Troop Carrier Squadron on May 5th. The transfer of aircraft was made as part of a process of consolidation of theater airlift equipment within the Wing to more efficiently utilize available aircraft.

It was stated by the 5hth that if the request for the additional five spaces were approved that five spaces would be deleted from the table of distribution-augmentation of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 57th Air Base Group, to provide for the spaces required. However, Alaskan Air Command did not favorably consider the transfer of personnel, as it was felt that the assignment of the crew and maintenance personnel would solve only a local situation, whereas the 5hth Troop Carrier Squadron should be manned with the objective in mind of achieving 100 per cent assigned strength. Upon attaining this objective, it was thought that if the additional two-engine aircraft were still on hand the

question of augmentation of personnel might then be reconsidered.

Another unit which had personnel troubles was the 57th

Maintenance and Supply Group, which had assumed responsibility for
the function of a consolidated base transportation office on 1

April 1950 17 / and suffered from a lack of sufficient number
of personnel within this activity. When the base transportation
office was organized, 40 spaces had been authorized to establish
a central shipping and receiving section for all units at Elmendorf,
but as of the last of May only four people had been received to
fill these spaces, and this function had not been placed in
operation. Lack of assignment of personnel to fill these 40 spaces
also precluded the establishment of the air freight warehouse.

18 /

On the Wing level, the Wing Classification Board completed in May the conversion of "old" specification serial numbers to corresponding ones in the new career program. In June, however, a number of airmen arrived from the Zone of Interior who had not met a reclassification board and therefore had to be processed by the Wing

- 16 / Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intep Wg, file 57HOR 320.3 x 322, Subj:

 Request for Table of Distribution-Augmentation Authorization, to CG, AAC, dtd 3 May 50.
- 17 / See page 8 et seq., History of 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, 1 Jan-
- 18 / Itr, Hq 57th M & S Gp, file 57HCO 510 x 500, Subj: Status of Base Transportation, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, dtd 26 May 50.

board.


The Wing was allotted a quota of 23 promotions late in May, to consist of 6 promotions to staff sergeant and 17 promotions to sergeant. The six promotions to staff sergeant were utilized but 10 of the promotions to sergeant had to be returned to higher headquarters due to a lack of suitably qualified corporals. The time-in-grade limitation was the interceding factor preventing utilization of the entire quota. Only exceptions permitted to time-in-grade requirements 19 / were in cases of airmen possessing critically short specification serial numbers as outlined in the pertinent air force regulation. 20 / A sufficient number of airmen possessing these critical specialties was not present in the Wing.

Early in June Alaskan Air Command provided the Wing with a copy of a radiogram outlining United States Air Force's desire for suggestions from the field concerning the most effective measures which could be used to obtain the maximum use of civilian space authorizations. Suggestions accordingly were solicited from the Wing. 21

^{19 /} AFR 39-30, dtd 24 Mar 50.

^{20 /} AFR 35-34, dtd 17 Feb 50.

^{21 /} Ltr, Hq AAC, file 333 x 320.3, Subj: Basic Manpower Authorization, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg, dtd 8 Jun 50.



Later in the month the Wing made the recommendation that on the first of each July (beginning of the new fiscal year) the base commander be accorded considerable flexibility in the matter of civilian personnel ceilings and the transfer of funds between object classes. This would permit the accomplishment of the mission so far as civilian personnel were concerned, by the most expeditious means available, whether by contract, purchase and hire, local purchase, or the employment of additional temporary civilian personnel. 22

^{22 /} Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intep Wg, file 57HOR 230, Subj: Basic Manpower Authorizations, to CG, AAC, dtd 28 Jun 50.

Chapter III

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Combat readiness of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing as a whole remained constant from 10 April to 10 May 1950, as may be determined by comparing the combat readiness index below with that contained in the April 1950 historical installment. 23 / Combat readiness of the Wing and its subordinate units as of 10 May 1950 is indicated by the following table: 24 / 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing /7/7/8/8/ 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group /8/8/9/9/F-30C/75/75/60/69/0/76

^{23 /} See page 18, History of the 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, April, 1950.

^{24 /} a--Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, file 57HOP-1 370 x 319.1, Subj:
Combat Readiness Report (RGS AF-SC-Cl), to CG, AAC, dtd
18 May 50. (Secret)
b--See Cheer 2, AAC Manual 15-1, for interpretation of

numerical symbols. (Secret)



57th Maintenance and Supply Group /8/8/8/7/7/

57th Air Base Group

/7/7/7/8/8/

57th Medical Group

/7/8/7/8/9/

54th Troop Carrier Squadron

/7/7/8/9/c-54D/10/10.45/5.03/8/8/0/8/

625th AC & W Squadron

14/4/4/7/6/

Regression as pertains to personnel of the 57th Air Base Group is due to rotation of personnel without replacement and, in some cases, replacement by semi-skilled or unskilled personnel. Deterioration of the equipment situation in the same unit came about because of the unserviceable and unreparable condition of communications equipment which had been declared salvageable through normal supply channels.

Regarding the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, the limited number of assigned personnel and radar sites restricted the effectiveness of the unit. Existing installations did not at this time require complete manning to authorized level. The age of this unit's equipment and its constant use necessitated continual maintenance.

Combat readiness of the Wing improved during May, as indicated by the symbols below, in the matter of "authorized personnel assigned," reflecting the generally improved personnel situation within the Wing. Combat readiness of the Wing as an entity and of its subordinate units is evidenced by the table which follows:

As of 10 June 1950

/7/8/7/8/8/ 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing

57th Fighter-Interceptor Group

/9/9/9/8/9/F-80C/71/72/61/68/0/74/

57th Maintenance and Supply Group /8/8/8/7/7/

57th Air Base Group

/8/8/7/8/8/

57th Medical Group

/7/8/7/8/9/

54th Troop Carrier Squadron H

/7/8/7/8/9/c-54D/10/10/5.97/7/0/7/

625th AC & W Squadron

/4/6/5/7/7/

Although the overall personnel situation in the Wing did improve in May and June there still existed a shortage of certain specialists, as, for example, a shortage of navigators within the 54th Troop Carrier Squadron, a fact which is reflected by the combat readiness table for this unit. The 625th continued to suffer an inadequate number of radar sites, and new personnel which had been assigned since April 10th had not had time to demonstrate their levels of skill. Lowering of the "unserviceable T/E equipment (other than aircraft)" symbol for the fighter group was caused by receipt of a new unit property record and equipment list that required additional equipment to be procured by the unit. 25 / Other symbols composing the index of this unit rose, and

General F. A. Armstrong, Commanding General of Alaskan Air Command,

^{25 /} Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, file 57HOP 370, Subj: Transmittal of Combat Readiness Report, to CG, AAC, dtd 15 Jun 50. (Secret)

expressed pleasure with this increase and the general state of readiness of the fighter group during the year ending 30 April 1950. Colonel B. T. Kleine was personally commended for the excellent showing of his group. __26_/

Instrumental in maintaining the combat efficiency of the Wing's tactical group was gunnery training and simulated operational intercepts of enemy aircraft. On 1h June a typical training mission was executed, with 1h aircraft of the 65th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron (a subordinate unit of the fighter group) taking off for the Blair Lake Gunnery Range, Alaska. One aircraft aborted and fired out at Eagle River Flats, but over Talkeetna at 1h,000 feet the rest of the 65th fighters were recalled and ordered to fire on Eagle River Gunnery Range. All 13 aircraft fired and returned to base, with the last aircraft landing at 1305. The 64th and 66th squadrons flew the same mission against Eagle River Flats, taking off at 1345 and 1425, respectively.

At 1546 on this same date four aircraft of the 65th were scrambled for an identification flight. The unidentified aircraft proved to be a C-32 type aircraft. Four additional intercepts were made and all intercepted aircraft were found to be friendly.

_26 / Ltr, Hq AAC, file AAGCG 320, Subj: Operational Effectiveness of the 57th Ftr-Intcp Gp, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, dtd 3 May 50. (Secret)

Eight aircraft of the 65th were dispatched to Homer, Alaska, and returned to act as "hostile" bombers for a practice intercept.

At 1720 hours, 28 aircraft of the 6hth and 66th squadrons took off to intercept the approaching "bogies." Aircraft control was unable to vector the interceptors to the target aircraft, but at 1800 hours the 6hth aircraft's pilots visually sighted four aircraft of the 65th squadron at low altitude. An attack was made over Palmer and Birchwood. The 6hth Squadron landed at 1835, followed by the remaining airborne aircraft.

Missions such as those described were significant as training to increase the combat readiness of the tactical group.

The fact that the low combat readiness of the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron was of major import to the overall combat readiness of the Wing was underlined by a study of this organization's capabilities in May. The study was made by the office of the Wing Air Comptroller in conjunction with a staff study of the fighter group's F-80C combat preparedness. Emphasis was placed in this paper upon lack of facilities and personnel in the 625th. In the words of the report: "the 625th Aircraft (Control) and Warning Squadron, which is to provide early warning and control

^{27 /} Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intcp Gp, file 57FGI 370, Subj: Periodic Operational Intelligence Report, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, 15 Jun 50.

interceptions in case of an emergency, is operating at approximately 40 per cent combat readiness..."

This finding, if valid, may be evaluated as to importance when the primary mission of the Wing is considered. As expressed in the staff study, the primary mission of the Wing was to "man, train and equip, in accordance with priorities established by the Alaskan Air Command, such combat units and their associated services as are assigned. Maintain these units in a state of training and indoctrination with the latest equipment necessary to permit immediate fighter operation, as directed by higher authority."

Immediate fighter operation in an emergency would depend in part upon adequate early warning of attacking aircraft and proper controlling of interceptions.

Recommendations included in the study as to how the Wing might overcome obstacles to full implementation of its primary mission were that the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron be brought up to a strength of 31 officers and 425 airmen as urged by the commanding officer of that unit; that adequate quarters be assigned all air and ground crewmen of the fighter group to insure that they would be present and available for immediate combat in case of attack; that more refueling units and transportation facilities be furnished the fighter group by the Motor Vehicle Squadron; that the 5039th Air Depot Wing make every effort

to furnish the fighter group with all supplies necessary for all types of operation; that one additional fighter-interceptor group be stationed at Elmendorf, and that bases such as Naknek, Nome, and Gulkana be used to provide dispersed fighter cover. __28 /

In regard to the recommendation regarding increase of personnel in the 625th unit, it should be noted that Lieutenant Colonel
Mathison, commanding this unit, believed that even if his organization were furnished personnel as recommended in the study, and if other basic problems impeding the efficient operation of the existing aircraft control and warning system at Elmendorf were solved, that the basis for a sound and thoroughly operational system would have been established. In other words, to quote Colonel Mathison, "based on the present operational radar sites, the effectiveness of the radar system in this theater will still be practically non-existent because of the limited coverage obtainable."

It may be observed by reference to the attachments to the staff study (appended) that Colonel Mathison was aware that current air force plans did not include provisions for an adequate operational radar system in Alaska until the Fall of 1952, when

^{28 /} Survey of F-80 Combat Preparedness, 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, Elmendorf AFB, prepared by Office of Air Comptroller, 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, undtd. (Secret)

all new sites would be integrated into the proposed aircraft control and warning system. 29 /

Efforts were made by Colonel Mathison and Wing headquarters to improve the facility and personnel situation in the 625th.

Colonel Mathison was placed on temporary duty with Headquarters

Alaskan Air Command for the purpose of preparing a table of organization and equipment for units required to operate the 1952

Alaskan Aircraft Control and Warning Program. This project was completed in the latter part of June and Colonel Mathison was sent to Headquarters, United States Air Force, to present aircraft control and warning requirements for the Alaskan theater. However, Colonel Mathison's T/O&E was not favorably considered, since United States Air Force had prepared a table of organization

(T/O 1-2100) which was to be published in the near future. A comparison of the tentative Alaskan table of organization and table of organization 1-2100 revealed no major discrepancies.

It was learned by Colonel Mathison that the troop program as established by United States Air Force for Alaskan aircraft control and warning requirements called for activation of one group headquarters and one squadron in addition to the two already in the theater. This was considered inadequate by Colonel Mathison and he submitted a proposal which set forth the require-

^{29 /} For previous discussions of 625th AC&W Sq, see pages 34 and 83 et seq, History of 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, 1 Jan--31 Mar 50 & pg 11, History of 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, Apr 50. (Secret)

ments for one group and two squadrons in each area (Elmendorf and Ladd areas of responsibility). Combined strength of the two groups was to total 208 officers and 2074 airmen. This proposal was informally approved by Headquarters United States Air Force, with formal approval expected soon to be forthcoming.

Colonel Mathison learned that a program was established to provide necessary personnel concurrent with the completion of planned construction, availability of radar and communication gear, and the actual date operation of the completed new system would begin, which was scheduled for 1 October 1952. It was planned that the existing strength of the two aircraft control and warning squadrons would suffice until 1 July 1951, when the overall theater aircraft control and warning strength would increase to 106 officers and 962 airmen. On 1 April 1952 strength was to increase to 158 officers and 1378 airmen, with the final increase on 1 October 1952 to bring assigned strength up to final figures of 208 officers and 2074 airmen. Agreement was also reached on equipment necessary for operation of the 1952 aircraft control and warning system.

However, no consideration was given by United States Air
Force to any emergency measures which might accelerate construction
or necessitate expansion of the existing aircraft control and
warning system. It was assumed that increases under emergency

conditions would be made by an overall increase in the entire air force. 30/

None of the above actions promised to provide Alaska with adequate aircraft control and warning service until the Fall of 1952. Since acceleration of construction of facilities which would be required to provide such service was beyond the capabilities of military commanders in the Alaskan theater, all possible was being done by Wing officers to use existing aircraft control and warning system with maximum effectiveness.

As to specific recommendations contained in the staff study, the Wing took action to implement all of them except the proposal to house all combat and ground crews of the fighter group on the base. Transfer of an additional fighter group to Elmendorf required action by higher headquarters, of course.

Number of hours flown by units of the Wing in May 1950 are listed below: 31/

	Unit		Type a/c	No a/c ON Hand	Hrs flown
64th	Ftr-Intep S	iq ·	F-800 & T-33A	27	815
65th	Ftr-Intop S	q	F-80C; T-33A; C-47	26	928

^{30 /} Information obtained by interview with Lt Col L. F. Mathison, CO, 625th AC&W Sq, by S/Sgt L. Harris, same unit. (Secret)

__31 / Daily Reports of Selected Aircraft Operations for Units Concerned, as of 2400 hours, 31 May 50.

Unit	Type a/c	No a/c on hand	Hrs flown
66th Ftr-Intop Sq	F-80C	24	742
57th Air Base Group	C-47A; C-47D; C-82A; SA-10A; C-45F*	10	518
54th Troop Carrier Sq	C-514D; C-82A	12	461
	June 1950 _ 32 /		
64th Ftr-Intop Sq	F-80C & TF-33A	25	683
65th Ftr-Intop Sq	F-80C; TF-33A; C-47A	27	712
66th Ftr-Intop Sq	F-80C	23	562
57th Air Base Gp	C-47A; C-47D; VG-47D SA-10A; C-45F*	; 13	632
54th Troop Carrier Sq	C-54D; C-82	12	695

In reply to a request from Alaskan Air Command as to the factors which in the past had precluded the full utilization of flying hours allocated to the Wing, a letter was forwarded to the higher headquarters early in July explaining that non-utilization of hours was due to two primary factors: lack of maintenance personnel and inadequate hangar facilities for cold weather maintenance. In view of these obstacles it was strongly recommended that the lease of Alaska Airlines on hangar seven be terminated

^{* /} Does not include hours of C-45F, which were on DS to Naknek, Als.

__32 / Daily Reports of Selected Aircraft Operations for units concerned, as of 2400 hours 30 June 1950.

and that funds for a suitable warehouse be authorized to allow hangar D-lh to be used as originally intended: as hangar space for Wing aircraft. In the meantime, the Wing assured its next higher echelon, every effort would be exerted to completely expend the adjusted allocation of flying hours. 33/

A number of major aircraft accidents occurred to Wing aircraft during the months of May and June 1950. Reports were submitted to higher headquarters on six major accidents involving F-80C aircraft, and two on C-1:7D airplanes. Only one of these resulted in fatal injury to personnel; this being one which occurred at Elmendorf on 2 June. Pilot was Second Lieutenant L. J. Boney, A01 908 500. 31/

Training

In order to establish operational procedures affording maximum utilization of available ground controlled intercept facilities at Elmendorf, and in order to increase the operational effectiveness of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group and the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, the Wing published a directive setting up training procedures calculated to insure

^{33 /} Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intep Wg, file 57HOP 360, Subj: Non-Utilization of Allocated Flying Hours, to CG, AAC, dtd 3 Jul 50.

^{34 /} Ltrs, Hq 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, file 57HOP 360.33, Subj: Transmittal of AF Form 14, to higher headquarters concerned.

that the operating personnel of the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron attained the highest possible degree of proficiency in performing their assigned mission, and that each pilot of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group was proficient in the procedures to be followed for a successful ground controlled interception.

This directive from the Wing required that the Air Defense Control Center, Elmendorf, in conjunction with the 57th Fighter Group Operations Section, effect a minimum of two simulated combat missions (scrambles) per week for the interception of any military aircraft within the area of responsibility of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing. The directive also required a maximum number of ground controlled intercepts by the 57th Fighter Group in conjunction with the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron.

In accordance with the provisions of an Alaskan Air Command training directive 36 / the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group was engaged in a mutual fighter pilot and ground control approach controller cross training program, to establish a better understanding between fighter pilots and controllers.

Included in this program were lectures given by aircraft control and warning controllers to pilots of the group and tours

__35 / 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg Ltr #2, Subj: Utilization of Ground Controlled Intercept Facilities at Elmendorf AFB, undtd. (Conf)

^{36 /} AAC Ltr 355-2, dtd 18 Apr 50.

of the radar sites. In addition, the program included lectures to aircraft control and warning controllers on characteristics and operational limitations of F-80C aircraft, and flights in T-33 aircraft on intercept missions by controllers. __37 /

A new base defense plan to defend Elmendorf from enemy ground, air or airborne attack was published on 20 May 1950 by the Wing. 38 / The plan was intended primarily to provide a method of defense against an airborne attack made without prior intelligence warning; an airborne attack made with prior intelligence warning; and an airborne attack made outside the base proper, necessitating an enemy force fighting its way onto the landing strip.

The new plan superseded the base defense plan which had been published on 2 January 1949. It involved a changed concept of defense, a new tactical organization, modified logistical responsibilities, and revised weapons, communications and transportation requirements. * /

A base limited alert was conducted beginning at about 1300 on 29 May 1950 to test the new plan for soundness and feasibility.

_____37 / Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intop Gp, file 57FG0-353, Subj: Fighter Pilot & GCI Controller Cross Training, thru Wing, to CG, AAC, dtd 1 May 50.

_38 / 57th Ftr-Intep Wg 00 #1-50, dtd 20 May 50.

^{* /} See page 52, History 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, 1 Jan-31 Mar 50.

The all-clear signal sounded about 1500 hours on the same date. 39 / During another alert, on 7 June 1950, Elmendorf was subjected

to numerous straffing attacks by three F-82 Twin Mustang aircraft from Ladd Air Force Base, Alaska, part of a force of seven of this type fighter. Two airborne routine combat patrols of four F-80C aircraft each which were operating north of the field were ordered to return to the field and engage the attackers. At 1105, one flight of the F-80's engaged two C-47 aircraft northwest of Elmendorf over Cook Inlet, "destroying" both. In the meantime, the F-82 aircraft had completed approximately five passes and the base alert signal apparatus had signalled all personnel at Elmendorf into a phase I alert status. The base defense system was tested on the ground as a flight of F-80's succeeded in attacking the aggressor F-82's. After making two passes at the F-82's the F-80's were ordered to discontinue their attack. Three additional-F-82's were engaged by the four F-80's over Cook Inlet after they had completed a third pass against the two C-47 aircraft. A successful attack was made which ended in the destruction of the three F-82 aircraft.

the grounded F-80's, with partial destruction of several achieved.

As implementation of the base ground defense plan progressed a flight of F-80's was scrambled at 1335 and straffed the pistol range. At 1403 a flight of four F-80's straffed targets in the Sunflower Village area; the attack being against a "small enemy patrol." _40 / The alert was called off at 1452 hours on 7 June.

During this alert all administrative procedures which would have been required if the event had been an actual emergency were accomplished on a "dry-run" or simulated basis. Included among these were the calling to extended active duty of mobilization-day assignee officers, requisitioning of additional airman personnel to place the Wing on a war-time personnel basis, effectuation of procedures for evacuation of dependents, and cancellation of passes, leaves and normal rotation of personnel. Simulation of elimination of all activities not contributing to the Wing's primary mission was undertaken. All units under tables of organization and equipment were considered as organized under the war column.

The final alert of the period came on 25 June, when alert condition II was ordered by the Commanding General, Alaskan Air Command. Phase I was announced at 2320Z hours on 27 June. 41

_40 / Hq, 57th Ftr-Intcp Gp, file 57HGI 370, Subj: Periodic Operational Intelligence Report, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, dtd 8 Jun 50. (Secret)

At month's end the alert status continued.

During the alerts held in the months of May and June a major deficiency was the limited radar coverage provided by the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron. This limitation was locally irremediable, being basically attributable to inadequate warning facilities and a lack of operating personnel in the 625th.

42 /

The alerts also revealed a general inefficiency in the operation of crew-served weapons such as .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. This condition was directly predicated upon the fact that most air force personnel participating as members of the base defense force were non-combat trained specialists or technicians. This situation was met in some units by contact with army units, who provided army personnel to instruct in stripping and firing the machine gun and other weapons. In some units experienced personnel were present to act as instructors. In certain units training classes in various weapons were planned for the near future but had not actually been undertaken by the end of June, while in other units considerable training had already been accomplished. An example of the latter was the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group, which had 7h combat-ready crews as of 19

June, and had 90 per cent of all personnel qualified in individual

^{42 /} a--Ltr, Hq 625th AC&W Sq, file 25wS/2 319.1, Subj: Progress
Report, to CG, 57th Ptr-Intep Wg, dtd 17 Jun 50.
b--See page 26 et seq, this historical installment.

weapons. However, only 33 per cent of combat crews were qualified in gunnery. 43 /

All the above-mentioned alerts may be considered as training exercises intended to prepare Elmendorf personnel to carry out procedures which would become necessary in the event of an attack upon the base by an aggressor force.

Another action fitting into the broad picture of preparations for the defense of Alaska in case of hostilities was the movement of 16 F-30C and one T-33 aircraft of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group to Ladd Air Force Base, Alaska on 13 June 1950 for the purpose of training personnel of the 449th Fighter-All Weather Squadron at that station in the operation and maintenance of F-80C type aircraft. This action was taken by the Wing with the initiative coming from Headquarters, Alaskan Air Command and was part of a program undertaken by Alaskan Air Command to train personnel of the 449th in operation of jet-type aircraft. A related project was the training of selected 449th personnel in maintenance of jet-type aircraft by the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group, which took place at Elmendorf during the period under discussion. 444 / In addition to the purpose of training personnel of the 449th in jet aircraft operation, the move to Ladd was intended to augment

^{44 / 5001}st Composite Wg SO #80, Ladd AFB, Als, 25 Apr 50.

fighter strength north of the Alaska Range of mountains and, in addition, to reduce the vulnerability of jet aircraft located at Elmendorf.

Upon arrival at Ladd, the detachment from the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing was attached to the 449th Fighter-All Weather Squadron for administration, operational control and logistic support, to include housing and messing. 45 /

A total of 16 officers and 20 airmen plus supplies and equipment were airlifted to Ladd on 13 June 1950 by the 54th

Troop Carrier Squadron with aircraft consisting of one C-82 and two
C-54's.

The F-80C type aircraft making the move to Ladd were furnished by the 64th, 65th and 66th Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons. Names of personnel and serial numbers of aircraft sent to Ladd are included as attachments to this historical installment. 46 / The F-80C type aircraft were airborne at about 1500 nours and landed without incident at Ladd one hour later. Excessive time enroute was taken in order to burn fuel from the tip tanks and lighten the gas load for landing.

^{45 / 57}th Ftr-Intep Wg FO #4-50, dtd 13 Jun 50.

^{46 /} a-Roster of Personnel. b--Serial numbers of F-800 aircraft.

Personnel from Elmendorf soon found that messing facilities provided for them at Ladd were superior and living accommodations excellent for both officer and airman personnel. In general, relations with all members of the 449th were most congenial.

The day after arrival at Ladd, officers of the 57th were greeted and briefed by the commanding officer of the 449th, and a plan of operation formulated, based upon gaining maximum benefit from the knowledge of pilots of the 57th. Since the 449th had eight pilots who were not checked out in F-800 type aircraft, these pilots were assigned to pilots of the Wing for instruction in the operation of this type aircraft. Remaining 57th personnel were assigned to squadron duties, such as operations officer, flight commander, engineering officer, armament officer and gunnery officer, with members of the 449th who held like positions. In this manner the organizational structure was such that the unit was operational on a dual basis, i. e., the 449th personnel controlled operations of the F-82's, while the 57th personnel controlled operations of the F-80's. Both 57th and 449th personnel were under jurisdiction of the commanding officer of the 449th. All airmen, both 57th and 449th, were briefed on the general mission by the commanding officer of the 149th, a Major Bruce. The F-80's and their ground crews were assigned to the two flights already established in the 449th, and were expected to remain with

their aircraft until rotated back to home base. This organizational plan was adopted to allow the F-80C crews to supervise the crews of the 449th.

By the 21st of June all pilots of the 449th had been checked out in the F-80C aircraft.

Problems encountered by personnel of the 57th at Ladd involved lack of sufficient parts in the flyaway kit, inadequate refueling of aircraft, and supply channels.

The flyaway kit difficulty was attributable to the hurried fashion in which it was assembled, causing it to be lacking in hydraulic system parts, tail pipes and other equipment. Two F-80C engines were included in the kit by mistake, as they were scheduled for installation in aircraft based at Elmendorf and contained airframe parts from those aircraft. It was necessary for a C-82 to bring two J-33-23 engines from Elmendorf to replace these engines.

As to refueling of the F-80's, personnel at the advanced base had little conception of the large quantities of fuel used or the proper techniques of rapid refueling. But the main difficulty centered about the lack of airman personnel to operate the refueling unit tractors. An investigation into the refueling situation by officers of both squadrons on the 21st of June revealed that extra details were keeping airmen away from their assigned duties with the refueling units. After being briefed on the necessity for combat readiness in all 449th operations, the commanding officer

of the Ladd Air Force Base motor vehicle squadron instructed his non-commissioned officers to accord top priority to the refueling needs of F-80 aircraft. After this, refueling operations went more smoothly.

As to supply procedures, officers with the personnel at Ladd believed that experiences there exposed the fact that there was no such thing as a "shoe-string" operation with jet aircraft. Aircraft in commission at Ladd dropped steadily after 10 days of sustained operations. Original plans were to open supply channels at Ladd in order that future operations with F-94 type aircraft could be carried on without any breaks in the flying program. However, when the mission of the unit was changed in the latter part of June to place emphasis on combat readiness in view of the worsening international situation, parts were airlifted from Elmendorf to sustain operations on a 24-hour basis.

A lack of adequate power units also somewhat slowed down operations at times. It was not possible for a flight to start at one time without ships making battery starts, an undesirable procedure. Only two power units were available.

The "out of commission" aircraft situation is reflected by the following figures: (16 a/c were on hand until 15 June, when the last aircraft joined the others at Ladd).

Date	No. a/c out of commission	Reason
14 June 1950	2	Tire change.
15 June	0	

	Date	No. a/c out of con	mmission Reason	
16 Ju	ine	1	Bucket change	
17 Ju	ine	0		
18 Ju	ine	No operation	S	
19 Ju	ine	2	Engine change; bucket change.	
20 Ju	ine	4	Engine change; low hydraulic protire change; broken brake lin	
21 Ju	ine	6	Hydraulic pump the faulty emergency switch; engine of faulty landing gretraction; 25-h inspection; 50-h inspection.	fuel hange; ear our
22 Ju	ine ·	14	Engine change; 25-hour inspecti 50-hour inspecti faulty trim tab	on;
23 Ju	ine	1	Tailpipe replace	ment.
24 Ju	ine	No operations		
25 Ju	ine			
26 Ju	ine	T-33 9910 replaced T-33 9907.		
27 Ju	ne	4	Four a/c out of ission at variou for minor replace parts.	s times
28 Ju	ine	3	AOCP; 25-hour in 100-hour inspect	
29 Ju	ine	3	AOCP or maintena	nce.
30 Ju	ine	2	AOCP	
		1414		

Names of personnel who accompanied the initial move to Ladd have been listed previously. Changes occurred during the month of June. On 15 June Staff Sergeant E. H. Rankin and Corporal T. A. Gwinn returned to Elmendorf. On 17 June Second Lieutenant R. L. Combe, AO-1908407, replaced Lieutenant Ericson, who returned to duty with the 65th Squadron. The next day Second Lieutenant S. J. Richards, AO-1908444, replaced Lieutenant W. W. Gray, and First Lieutenant F. A. Moser, 15141A, replaced Lieutenant Miller. On the 20th Captain J. B. Smith, 13747A, relieved Captain Faison and First Lieutenant W. C. Olden, AO-736316, replaced Captain Deckman. Both relieved officers returned to home station.

On 20 June the commanding officer of the 66th sent the following replacements for personnel on detached service with the 44:9th:

Replaced	Replacement
1st Lt W. C. Holden A0-736316	Captain Deckman
Captain W. A. Mason AO-792724	Captain Faison
1st Lt J. R. Rawson A0-5148677	lst Lt Bernhard
1st Lt R. H. Bartow AO-934883	lst Lt Keller
1st Lt A. W. Atkinson 17339A	1st Lt McConnell, Jr.

All replaced pilots returned for duty with the 66th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron.

On 26 June a number of replacements relieved a corresponding number of personnel at Ladd, and in the last days of June a few other replacements arrived. As of the last day of June the personnel

on detached service at Ladd were as indicated on the appended list. 47 /

Information contained in this disucssion was obtained from a report compiled by officers involved in the mission. 48 /

Continuing during the two-months period covered by this narrative was the on-the-job training program. As of the last day of May a total of 880 airmen were undergoing on-the-job training in all units of the Wing, amounting to 28 per cent of Wing assigned personnel. By the end of the following month the number had risen to 986; this figure still being about 28 per cent of an increased Wing personnel strength.

The Military training school conducted by the 57th Air Base Group continued to conduct classes in ground training.

During May 189 airmen completed the course, while in June 224 finished it. 49 /

Other training of Wing personnel included that accomplished by the F-30-2 detachment of the 3497th Mobile Training Squadron (Fighter), which spent most of June at Elmendorf training members of the fighter group in the latest engineering principles per-

_47 / Roster of Personnel DS to Ladd AFB, Als, as of 30 Jun 50.

^{48 / 57}th Ftr-Intep Gp Summary of Opns while on DS with the 449th Fighter-All Weather Squadron, Ladd AFB, Als, undtd. (Secret).

^{49 /} Ltrs, Hq 57th ABGp, file 57ATN, Subj: Attendance at Military Training School, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg, dtd 18 May & 25 Jun 50.

taining to F-80C type aircraft. This unit departed Elmendorf on the 30th of June and first of July 1950. The C-54-4 Mobile Training Detachment had completed its training of 54th Troop Carrier Squadron personnel early in May. Both units returned to their home base of Chamute Air Force Base, Rantoul, Illinois, upon completion of their missions.

A classification and assignment school was conducted for the training of certain administrative personnel of all units within the Wing in June, starting date being 17 June. Also, training of mobilization day assignees by on-the-job and lecture methods progressed satisfactorily.

Chapter IV

SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE

Shortage of personnel hindered fulfillment of the maintenance and supply mission at Elmendorf during the months of May and June 1950, as it had for some time in the past, although the situation had improved somewhat by June 30th. At the end of April the 57th Maintenance and Supply Group had been 80 per cent manned in airman strength; by 1 June it had gained to 88 per cent of authorized strength; and on 30 June the percentage had soared to 91 per cent. This figures reflect a strong movement toward full airman manning of the Wing's supply, maintenance and motor vehicle units which, if continued, would soon wipe out the personnel obstacle in the maintenance and supply organization. *

A cure for the personnel shortage disease in the 57th

Maintenance and Supply Group could be expected to solve a problem

^{* /} See attachments lla thru f, this history.

which had assumed major proportions, as is borne out by the fact that for about a six-months period of time prior to the beginning of May 1950 an average shortage of 340 airmen had existed in the maintenance and supply group—a daily shortage of 2,720 man hours. Using a forty-four hour week as a yardstick, the total shortage of manhours for this period of time amounted to 388,960.

A crippling lack of maintenance and supply facilities also was suffered by the maintenance and supply group during the May-June period.

Each unit commander of the maintenance and supply group wrote and forwarded letters to Colonel James T. Posey, Group Commander, outlining personnel and facility inadequacies, and urging action to alleviate these hampering factors. The group commander concurred in the desire to man his group to 100 per cent of personnel authorizations and the plea for additional facilities, and early in May forwarded the unit commanders letters to the Wing commander, who in turn requested assistance of Alaskan Air Command in removing the personnel and facility impediments to efficient functioning of the vital supply and maintenance activity. 50

^{50 /} Ltr, Hq 57th M & S Gp, file 57SCO 200, Subj: Personnel, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, dtd 4 May 50.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Supply

The Wing learned early in June of an Alaskan Air Command program to aid in correcting existing supply deficiencies in the Alaskan Theater by the establishment of a team of supply technicians possessing the basic qualifications essential to rapid absorption of supply procedures and techniques.

The plan when implemented would place team members from Alaskan Air Command stations on detached service with the 5039th Air Depot Wing, where they would be placed for duty with the area activities section of that organization for a period of training in general supply procedures. Essentially, these men would be trained to become specialists in warehousing, inventory, identification and property accounting. Upon completion of this training the team would be assigned for duty with each Alaskan Air Command station, in rotation, to assist in the reconstruction of the station property account.

It was anticipated that the team would be made up of airmen arriving on the boat due to arrive in the Alaskan Theater on or about 29 May 1950. Airmen selected from Elmendorf would total 21, specification serial numbers as follows: __51 / SSN 821, 10; SSN 826, 4; SSN 835, 4; SSN 242, 1; SSN 348, 0; SSN 581, 1; SSN 815, 1; SSN 848, 0; for a total of 21.

^{51 /} Ltr, Hq AAC, file AAMSD hoo x 200, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg, dtd 1 Jun 50.

On the eighth of June six airmen possessing supply specification serial numbers were placed on temporary duty to the 5039th Air Depot Wing. Six were sent rather than the planned 21 since only six personnel with the desired qualifications arrived from the Zone of Interior. Concurrence in this action was obtained from higher headquarters. 52

Acquiring and maintenance of organizational equipment by unit commanders remained a matter of major concern to the Wing Commander and wing supply officers during the period. In March Alaskan Air Command had advised the Wing that certain of the Wing's units would require equipping with 100 per cent of table of organization and equipment material, while equipment modification lists were to be submitted by the remaining units of the Wing. 53

Late in May the Wing again underlined the importance of obtaining organizational equipment and maintaining it in service-able condition. This emphasis was placed by means of a letter to all unit commanders within the Wing, wherein it was pointed out that the responsibility for obtaining this equipment for each unit rested with the unit commander and could not be delegated.

Manner of making changes in tables of organization and equipment,

^{52 / 57}th Ftr-Intep Wg SO #98, par 12, dtd 8 Jun 50.

^{53 /} See page 56 et seq, History of the 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, 1 Jan-31 Mar 50.

tables of organization, and supply kits and sets was mentioned.

It was directed that each unit commander certify by indorsement that all authorized equipment either was in possession of his unit or was listed on a valid and current requisition and that organizational copies of requisitions for items which had not been received were certified as not available on the station by the appropriate supply officer, and that changes in applicable supply tables had been made where desirable, or requests for such changes submitted. 54/

A technical liaison visit was made to Air Force 1961 SO, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing, by Colonel Ben J. Peck, one other officer and three civilians on 23-24 May 1950. Purpose of this visit was to render technical assistance of a general nature. General Hutchinson, Colonel Brogger (A-4, Alaskan Air Comand), Lieutenant Colonel Posey (Commanding Officer, 57th Maintenance and Supply Group), and five other officers were contacted by the inspecting officers, who were from Headquarters, Sacramento Air Materiel Area, McClellan Air Force Base, McClellan, California.

Upon conclusion of the visit a conference was held at which general matters observed were discussed with the commanding general of the Wing. Recommendations made by the inspecting officers

consisted of suggestions as follows: that stock record cards be closely examined for excess property and that this be returned to the 5039th Air Depot Wing or the Alaskan General Depot, as appropriate; that submission of stock balance reports be discontinued until such time as inventory had been completed, since existing balances of stock record cards and in warehouses were in disagreement, rendering the balance report of little value; that current stock list and technical service catalogs be procured. 55/

The Wing Commander sent a letter to each major unit commander within the Wing in May, stressing again the importance of economizing by military personnel in every possible way, in particular by proper utilization of supplies and equipment.

Emphasized was the fact that in Alaska military personnel were dependent upon supplies and equipment shipped in from the Zone of Interior, such shipment being in the nature of things exceptionally expensive, and accordingly it was more than ordinarily important that each and every individual officer and airman conserve materials to the best of his ability.

Pointed out was the fact that the combat conception of supplies and equipment wherein obtaining and utilizing supplies was of primary importance had passed, and a period of time had arrived

when the American citizen, burdened with taxes, expected the greatest possible national security for his military tax dollar.

All commanders were enjoined to emphasize the matter of conservation of material with all means at their disposal. 56 /

The supply squadron was unable to accomplish re-establishment of accountability during May and June because 125 supply personnel were required above existing personnel authorizations, as indicated below:

4 Inspectors, Supply, Engineer (R&U)
4 Inspectors, Supply, Ordnance, Automotive
2 Inspectors, Supply, Signal
5 Inspectors, Supply, Air Force
45 Supply Technicians, Warehousing
45 Supply Technicians, Property Accounting
20 Supply Technicians, Duty Soldier

In addition to impeding re-establishment of accountability, the lack of sufficient supply people retarded normal supply functions due to manning of such services as the commissary, laundry and dry-cleaning activities, and packing and crating of household goods. Pointing up this condition was a letter sent to Alaskan Air Command by the Wing on May 29th. On this date the morning report strength of the supply squadron was 332 assigned, 307 present for duty, as compared with an authorized strength of 430. 57/

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^{56 /} Hq, 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, file 57HDM 400, Subj: Conservation, to CO, Wing Units, dtd 25 May 50.

^{57 /} Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, file 57800 h00 x 200, Subj: Additional Personnel Required to Accomplish Re-establishment of Accountability, to CG, AAC, dtd 29 May 50.

A low level of aviation gasoline was reached in May, due to discrepancies in reports of gasoline on hand. Action was taken by the Wing to preclude a recurrence of this serious situation.

A low level of gasoline on hand could result in complete inability of the Wing to accomplish its mission if an emergency should ever arise wherein sustained jet operations was required. 58 /

The problem caused by inadequate refueling vehicles continued to hamper operations of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group during this time. Action was being taken, however, to solve the difficulty by substituting larger refueling units for the ones on hand on a one for one basis, and by using a zinc-cromating process on refueling units which would prevent them from being deadlined from time to time due to deterioration.

During May and June there were in operation the following fuel and oil servicing units at Elmendorf: one F-1 unit for 115/145 aviation gasoline, one F-1A unit for 100/130 aviation gasoline, two F-2A units for 100/130 aviation gasoline, two F-3 units for 1120 oil, and 12 F-2A units for JP-2 fuel. However, in view of the amount of refueling services required, the units listed above were inadequate.

Complicating the problem was the fact that approximately three servicing units were usually deadlined within any 20-day

_____58 / Ltr, Hq AAC, file 460, Subj: Aviation Fuels, to Brig. Gen. D. R. Hutchinson, dtd 19 May 50. (Secret)

period. The zinc-cromating processing, when completed, was expected to largely eliminate this situation, but it would not be until receipt of the larger 4000-gallon refueling units that the inadequacy of refueling units would be completely eliminated as a hindrance to efficient operation of the fighter group. 59

Plans were being formulated by the Wing during June for the acceptance of responsibility for handling and storage of strategic air ammunition from the 5039th Air Depot Wing. Attention centered on the non-availability within the Wing of qualified personnel to properly inspect, store, and accomplish surveillance tests as required under current directives.

The Wing had a total authorization of two MOS 505's and 12
901's to receive, store, inspect and issue not only strategic air
reserve ammunition but all other types of ground ammunition for
base defense and training. Lacking also were personnel to fuze
bombs being carried on the strategic ammunition plan. Therefore,
recommendation to Alaskan Air Command was made that a minimum of
three 505's capable of assembling ammunition and bombs so listed
be assigned to the 57th Supply Squadron. These personnel could
instruct armament personnel in handling, assembling and setting of
fuzes. Besides the recommendation asking for the above personnel,
consideration was also urged for the allocation of additional table
59 / Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, file 57HDM 463, Subj: Refueling
Status, to CG, AAC, June 50.

of distribution-allowance spaces to the Wing for 26 additional supply personnel (principally SSN 901's and 505's).

Through authorization of the above-named personnel it was believed that delivery of training and/or combat ammunition and bombs could be made to the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group, thereby enhancing the efficiency of the tactical organization. 60 /

Alaskan Air Command announced late in June, however, that the transfer of strategic air reserve ammunition was to be postponed pending further instructions from that headquarters.

According to Alaskan Air Command, it was anticipated that responsibility for storage and maintenance of all stocks of ammunition currently being stocked by the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing would be transferred to the 5039th Air Depot Wing in the near future because a recent survey of ammunition storage and maintenance conditions within the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing had indicated that such action was necessary in the interests of adequate maintenance and insurance of maximum utilization of available storage facilities. It was stated that when all stocks of ammunition were in condition one, properly stored, and adequate ammunition-handling personnel were available to the Wing to insure continuance of such conditions, that then responsibility for the maintenance and storage of all stocks of ammunition could be

^{60 /} Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, file 57HDM 471 x 200, Subj:
Ammunition Supply Personnel, to CG, AAC, dtd 22 Jun 50. (Secret)

reassumed by the fighter wing. However, responsibility for security of the ammunition storage areas would be retained by the Wing.

It was planned to hold a conference attended by representatives of the fighter and depot wings early in July to iron out difficulties arising from the above decisions. 61 /

A decision to establish a sales store in building number 22, in which the 5039th Air Depot Wing had TORE equipment stored resulted in a problem of supply for the air depot wing. Solving of this problem required either provision of quonset huts in or near the air depot area or the utilization of a warehouse in the dispersal cantonment or army area of Fort Richardson. The former solution was favored by the air depot in its communication to Alaskan Air Command, however, that headquarters reserved its opinion until a survey had been completed by the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing as to the comparative feasibility of the recommended alternatives. 62

Activities in connection with the "phasing out" or closing of certain satellite station, or "chain station" functions continued during May and June. In this connection permission was received by the Wing from Alaskan Air Command about the first of

^{61 /} Ltr, Hq AAC, file AAMSD-9C 633 x 470, Subj: Strategic Air Reserve Ammunition, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, dtd 26 Jun 50. (Secret)

^{62 /}aLtr, Hq 5039th ADW, file h00, Subj: Requirement for Storage of TORE Property, thru CG, AAC, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, Elmendorf AFB, Ft Richardson, Als, dtd 3 May 50. b-See page 36, History of 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, April, 1950.

June to pick up and return to Elmendorf all special services equipment and furniture. 63 /

During this period airmen of the Wing and satellite chain stations were measured for the issuance of the new blue air force uniform, which was expected at the station for issue about 1 September 1950.

The Wing learned about the middle of May that a priority requisitioning procedure to be called "ANCR" (Aircraft Not Combat Ready) had been established for requisitioning parts other than aircraft spare parts covered by "AOCP" (out of commission for lack of parts) components or equipment required to make combat type aircraft combat operational in flight. "ANCR" requisitions would be initiated when above indicated supplies were not available from local base resources. Such requisitions would be identified with the abbreviation "ANCR" as a prefix to the requisition number.

"ANCR" procedure was restricted to authorized combat units designated by Headquarters, USAF, and comprised the following organizations within the Wing: 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group and 54th Troop Carrier Squadron. 64

^{63 /} Ltr, Hq AAC, file AAPPS-3 h13 x h00, Subj: Transfer of Special Services Equipment, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, dtd 25 May 50.

^{64 /} Ltr, Hq AAC, file AAMSD 452, Subj: "ANCR" Supply Priorities, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg, dtd 18 May 50.

Wing units experienced difficulty in obtaining survival equipment, that is, bomber bailout kits, sleeping bags and survival kits (3 man--15 day). These items were on requisition to the 5039th Air Depot Wing, but in view of their non-availability, and in order for units to comply with directives relative to survival equipment, the Wing requested of Alaskan Air Command that assistance be given in obtaining the items, and Alaskan Air Command pledged continued efforts to obtain them. __65_/

Representatives of the Seattle Quartermaster Market Center,
Lieutenant Colonel Homer D. Barnes, Quartermaster Corps, and Mr.

L. E. Davis, Purchasing Agent, visited Elmendorf on 30 April—1

May 1950, and were primarily concerned with the post commissary,
which they inspected on 1 May. The visitors conferred with the
base commander and other officers during the inspection and learned
of the desire of all concerned to improve commissary facilities at
the Base. Especially desirable, it was found, would be an increase
in amount and variety of perishables for resale to military personnel. Fresh vegetables available in civilian communities
usually were sold at high rates, the visitors were told, precluding
the purchase of this type of food by most military personnel, unless it was on hand in the commissary. 66

_65 / Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, file 57HDM 452.16, Subj: Survival Equipment, to CG, AAC, dtd 26 May 50.

_66 / Ltr, QM Mkt Ctr, PO Box 3225, Pier 91, Seattle, 14, Wn, file QMSSS 319.1, "Report of Official Travel of Lt Col H. D. Barnes & Mr. L. E. Davis," dtd 12 May 50.

Maintenance

Alaskan Air Command directed the Wing to implement a policy whereby no unit on the base would effect the buildup of engines to be installed upon their organizational aircraft, which was believed to be uneconomical due to a duplication of labor, facilities and parts. It was desired that when engine buildup kits were procurable that the maintenance squadron build up engines for both assigned and tenant organizations at Elmendorf. Only when engine buildup kits were not procurable for certain type aircraft would the unit to which the aircraft was assigned accomplish the necessary engine buildup and installation. Only units to be exempted from this policy were organizations concerned with testing of aircraft on an experimental or service test status.

To implement this policy the Wing was asked to take action to cause all units at Elmendorf, whether assigned or attached, (with exceptions as mentioned above), to turn in all engine buildup kits on hand so that they could be reissued to the maintenance squadron. Further, such units would thereafter be required to procure build-up engines from the maintenance squadron. 67 /

In compliance with the provisions of Air Force Letter 66-3,

^{67 /} a-Hq AAC, file AAMMD-7 452, Subj: Aircraft Engine Buildup, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, dtd 9 May 50.
b--Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, file 57HDM 452, Subj: Aircraft Engine Buildup, to CO, 10th Rescue Sq, dtd 19 May 50.

dated 9 March 1950, which emphasized the necessity of improving maintenance capabilities of maintenance personnel three officers and 18 airmen of the Wing completed the prescribed engine conditioning program consisting of five hours of classroom lectures and 35 hours of actual engine conditioning. One of the officers was a member of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing, while the other personnel involved belonged to the maintenance unit of the 57th Maintenance and Supply Group. 69

To promote effective utilization and control of vehicles assigned to the Air Installations Officer, and to insure that the air installations squadron received the best possible service from its authorized daily dispatched vehicles, the Wing requested of the 57th Maintenance and Supply Group commander that when each general purpose vehicle assigned to the installations officer had been salvaged that requisitions for replacements be submitted and immediately upon receipt assigned to this unit.

It was the opinion of the Wing that the Air Installations
Officer was operating with a minimum number of general purpose
vehicles and it was thought to be imperative that all vehicles
assigned to his unit be dispatched daily, except those out of

^{69 /} Ltr, Hq AAC, file AAMMD-7 452.3, Subj: Engine Conditioning Training, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg, dtd 20 May 50.

commission for maintenance or inspections. _70 /

The Air Police Squadron, a subordinate unit of the 57th
Air Base Group, was assigned 15 one-fourth ton command reconnaissance vehicles about the first of May to bring the base
security patrol and city patrols up to required transportation
requirements.

Proper use and maintenance of these vehicles was considered of sufficient importance to require special emphasis being placed on these factors at the time the vehicles were turned over to the air police unit. In view of the necessity for this unit to have adequate transportation at its disposal at all times, stress was placed upon the desirability of all air police vehicle operating personnel taking measures to keep their automotive equipment in the best possible condition. _71/

^{70 /} Hq 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, file 57HDM 451, Subj: Vehicles
Dispatched to Air Installations, to CO, 57th M & S Gp,
dtd 8 May 50.

^{71 /} a--Itr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, file 57HDM 451, Subj:
Assignment of Vehicles, thru CO, 57th ABGp, to CO, 57th
Air Police Sq, dtd 2 May 50.
b--See page 74 et seq, History of 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, 1 Oct31 Dec 50, for a discussion of vehicles of air police sq.

Chapter V

FACILITIES

A copy of Alaskan Air Command 1952 Fiscal Year New Construction Budget was received by the Wing in May. The budget listed and described projects scheduled for construction at Elmendorf, if approved, amounting to a total of \$59,341,000. 72/

At the 15 May 1950 meeting of the installations planning board a discussion occurred concerning projects requested for Elmendorf in the 1952 fiscal year budget request. The board was informed of the priority Alaskan Air Command had accorded various projects which originally had been submitted to that command by the Wing. __73_/

^{72 /} a--AAC FY 1952 New Construction Budget, May 50. (Secret) b--See page 76, History of 57th Ftr-Intep Wg, 1 Jan--31 Mar 50, for summary of FY 1951 projects.

^{73 /} Minutes of Meeting of Installations Planning Board, Flmendorf AFB, 15 May 50. (Secret)

Alaskan Air Command furnished the Wing with a copy of a report of a staff visit covering the findings of the Assistant Director of Installations of that headquarters during his visit to Headquarters United States Air Force and Chief of Engineers. This report was of particular interest in that it outlined the latest principles established by Headquarters United States Air Force for planning at Alaskan Air Force installations. It was suggested by higher headquarters that the general planning principles embodied in this report be utilized in the preparation of revised master plans, future construction budgets and construction plans for Elmendorf.

Among matters discussed in this report was that of providing more privacy for airmen living in barracks by modifying existing structures and constructing others to permit from two to four individuals to live in a room.

Perhaps of greater significance was the trend toward construction of facilities of non-permanent type which would have a life expectancy of about 15 years, in order to meet minimum housing and operational requirements for accomplishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs' mission in Alaska while insuring the greatest and most economic utilization of available funds.

This report also stated that major expansion of existing

Air Command stations in Alaska was not contemplated beyond

existing Joint Chiefs of Staff requirements. 74 /

Plans and data concerning Fiscal Year 1950 fund construction at Elmendorf were being formulated by the Wing during this period, to be forwarded as completed to Alaskan Air Command and used as a basis for preparing preliminary plans and outline specifications for each project. It was learned, in connection with this planning, that wherever it was feasible the Alaskan Air Command favored the use of frame construction in lieu of concrete ones, making it possible in many cases to obtain considerably more urgently needed space. 75

Funds were requested of Alaskan Air Command by the Wing in the form of "post requests" for a number of projects.

Among these was one for funds for the contractural rehabilitation of eight standard mobilization-type barracks. Scope of this work included floor covering, wall covering, painting, provision of cubicles of plywood partitions, an additional latrine and other work as depicted on accompanying plans. This work was required to provide satisfactory living accommodations for flight crews of airmen. Another request was for funds to

^{74 /} Ltr, Hq AAC, file AAMAI-1 319.1, Subj: Report of Staff Visit to Headquarters USAF, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, 12 May 50 & Incl. (Secret)

^{75 /} a--Hq AAC, file 600.113 x 600.1, Subj: Priorities for FY
1950 Construction for AAC, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg &
other units, dtd 5 May 50.
b--Hq AAC, file AAMAI-5 600.113 x 600.1, Subj: FY 1950
Construction for AAC, thru C-in-C, Als Cmd, to Dir.
of Instls, Hq USAF, Wn 25, D. C., file cy undtd.

provide for the contractural accomplishment of the standardization of dight post buildings to be used as quarters for bachelor officers. The number of officers assigned made it mandatory to provide additional quarters unless it was planned to begin paying station allowance to bachelor officers and authorizing them to live off the base. 76 /

Plans were being formulated through coordination by all interested command agencies at the installation to establish a line of demarcation between Elmendorf and Fort Richardson, and to establish a definitive operating and service agreement between the army and air force concerning the use of facilities located at the base.

In May officers of the Wing conferred with representatives of Alaskan Air Command and United States Army Alaska as part of this attempt to come to definite conclusions about the use of various facilities. As a result of this and other planning activities, a tentative operating and service agreement reached the Wing in May and was coordinated by officers of the

^{76 /} a--Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, file 57HAI 600.12 x 600.1, Subj: Post Req. 3127, Remodeling of Eight Mobilization Barracks, to CG, AAC, dtd 17 May 50. b--Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intcp Wg, file 57HAI 600.12, Subj: Post Req #126, to CG, AAC, dtd 19 May 50.

Wing. This agreement included sections pertaining to the Alaska District Engineers, Alaska Communication System, Officers

Mess and Club, Non-commissioned Officers' Mess and Club, Service

Clubs, recreational facilities, schools, post exchanges, commissary, laundry and dry cleaning facilities, packing and crating services, fire protection, quarters, medical service, repairs and utilities, organization and field maintenance of engineer equipment, engineer troop supply, quartermaster services for army troops, ordnance supply and maintenance support, port of Anchorage, the Fort

Richardson Utility Railroad, budget and fiscal and finance service, handling of casual personnel, civilian personnel administration, postal service, chaplain's activities, and military police activities. 77 /

During June the Wing surveyed an airfield in western Alaska for use by F-80 aircraft. As a result, Galena Air Force Base was suitable for use by jet aircraft on an emergency basis. Minimum support equipment authorized to be placed at Galena for emergency use was as agreed upon by the Commanding Officer of the 5001st Composite Wing at Ladd Air Force Base, Alaska, and the Commanding General of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing. 78/

^{77 /} Tentative Agreement, file 160, Operating and Service Agreement, Elmendorf AFB--Fort Richardson, Als, undtd.

^{78 /} AAC TWX AAOTN-29140, dtd 29 Jun 50. (Conf)

By May a number of discrepancies had become evident in the construction of the new 500-man barracks, including numerous deficiencies both in the buildings proper and in the equipment with which they were furnished. All these were called to the attention of higher headquarters, with the note added that further malfunctions were to be expected in the buildings and appurtenances as time went on. It was believed that the list of changes, recommendations and comments included in this communication and others to come later would be useful if studied, and errors corrected in the construction of similar structures. __79_/

The urgent necessity of the "Adak" shop building at Elmendorf, which was to have been assigned to the 925th Engineer Aviation

Group for execution, but which, it was found, could not be accomplished by that unit because of manpower limitations, required that other plans be made for its construction. The Wing suggested, therefore, that the project should nevertheless be assigned to the 925th Engineer Aviation Group, with operational and technical control vested in the commanding general of the Wing.

This would permit the screening of airmen's classification records within the Alaskan Air Command to select about 25 carpenters, who would be placed on detached service with the Wing to supervise

labor accomplished by personnel of the 925th. Wing Air Installations Officer would furnish the necessary technical assistance.

80 /

82 /

Upon initiative of Headquarters United States Air Force
the Wing began development of word descriptions of buildings and
structures required by Wings of the Wing-Base type. Suggestions
received from organizations based upon actual experience criteria
were to be used in future design of facilities concerned, it was
understood. 81/

The Wing received recommendations from Alaskan Air Command, based on a survey conducted by that headquarters, concerning the corrosion of the condensate return lines of heating systems at the station. The Wing had brought the excessive corrosion of the steam distribution systems to the attention of the higher echelon in January, and recommended a survey by a qualified technician.

Investigation of the causes of corrosion had, through direct observation and chemical analyses, been identified as the excessive amounts of dissolved gases, namely, carbon dioxide and oxygen,

^{80 /} Ltr, Hq 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, file 57HDM 600.12, Subj:
Assigned Project 925th Engineer Aviation Group, Erection
of "Adak" Shop Building, to CG, AAC, file cy undtd.

^{81 /} Ltr, Hq AAC, file AAWAI-5 600.1, Subj: Building Design Requirements, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, dtd 26 May 50.

^{82 /} Page 92, History of 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, 1 Jan-31 Mar 50.

present through each system. Control of corrosion could be obtained only by eliminating these gases from the systems, it was concluded.

Further studies were undertaken to determine the exact methods which could best be utilized to eliminate the introduction of carbon dioxide and oxygen into the steam systems, and it was planned to attempt to control the corrosion at the earliest practicable date, even though such measures would be costly. For the cost of correction, though large, would not be great in comparison to the expenditure of funds which would be required to replace the steam systems completely. 83

A fire occurred in the cold storage warehouse at Naknek
Air Force Base at 0155 hours, 30 May 1950 with damage to contents
estimated at \$10,487.59. No injury or loss of live was
sustained. __84 /

^{83 /} Ltr, Hq AAC, file AAMAI-8-674 x 670, Subj: Corrosion of the Condensate Return Lines of Fort Richardson Heating Systems, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, dtd 8 May 50.

^{84 /} TWX KD 0288, dtd 21 May 50.


Chapter VI

SPECIAL SUBJECTS

Two officers and three airmen of the 625th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron observed an unusual flying object at 2330 hours (Alaskan Standard Time), 5 May 1950. Names of personnel who witnessed the occurrence follow:

Captain Marcellus D. O'Sullivan 1st Lt William J. Reisinger Technical Sergeant Ehrle W. Peterson Technical Sergeant Melvin H. Dexter Corporal Benny Lipson

Witnesses substantially agreed upon the following description of the phenomenon: the object was an unusual light, reddishorange in color, and of a constant intensity. After remaining overhead for a period of five minutes it suddenly and with increasing rapidity began to move in the direction of 220 degrees from Elmendorf on a heading of 040 degrees, disappearing over the horizon.



SECRET

The sky was completely overcast with the base of the clouds at 7000 feet; moon and stars were not visible. No sound was heard and no acrobatics took place. No explanation of this phenomenon was offered by any of the observers. 85

^{85 /} Ltr, Hq 625th AC & W Sq, Subj: Report of Umusual Occurrence, to CG, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg, dtd 8 May 50. (57th Ftr-Intop Wg Intelligence Files, Elmendorf AFB, Als.) (Secret)

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SUBSTANTIATING

DATA

1

1 4 4

ELMENDORF AFB Fort Richardson, Alaska 12 May 1950

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 2-50

CHARTS AND MAPS: As desired.

TASK ORGANIZATIONS:

1. Armed Forces Day Troops - Colonel Carroll Alaska General Depot - Major Mason - Major Basil 2. Aerial Review Force 57th Air Base Gp 3. Area Air Transport 54th Trp Carr Sq - Major Larkin 5039th Air Depot Wg L. Static Display

1. GENERAL SITUATION:

This command conducts Armed Forces Day Program in "Report to the Public". All Armed Forces personnel participating.

2. MISSION:

This command conducts Armed Forces Day parade, open house, display of static exhibits and aerial review.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- a. Troops will parade through downtown Anchorage (Annex 1)
- b. Exhibits of Armed Forces equipment and material will be displayed in hangar number one and adjacent parking apron (Annex 2)
- c. Aerial Review over Elmendorf AFB will be conducted commencing 1430 (Annex 3)
- d. Air Transport to place participating units in position will be provided by 54th Troop Carrier Squadron. (Annex 4)

4. ADMINISTRATIVE:

- a. Personnel Annex #5
- b. Materiel Annex #6

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS:

- a. Command Post.

 - Commanding General, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing
 Project Commander Colonel H. O. Wangeman, CO, Air Base Gp

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HUTCHINSON:

ANNEXES:

Annex 1 - Order of Parade

Annex 2 - Exhibits

Annex 3 - Itinerary of Ftr Gp Annex 1 - 51th Trp Carr Airlift Annex 5 - Personnel Annex 6 - Materiel

HEFFNER Initialed:

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

Captain,

11

HEADQUARTERS, 57TH FTR-INTOP WING
ELMENDORF AFB, FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA 28 April 1950
AS OF DATE

OFFICERS TERMINATION REPORT

*		* AUTH	ASGD	% Pres Manning
Hq & Hq Sq, 57th Air Base Communications Sq Food Service Sq Air Police Sq Installations Sq 752d Air Force Band Hq Maintenance & Supply Gp Supply Sq Maintenance Sq Motor Vehicle Sq Hq 57th Fighter-Intop Sq 65th Fighter-Intop Sq 66th Fighter-Intop Sq 67th Medical Group 5hth Troop Carrier Sq	Flt 1 Flt 2 Flt 3 Flt 4 Gp	43 44 13 33 54 10 1 8 20 9 7 11 30 30 30 31 43	514 55 88 44 22 162 17 10 18 26 26 26 19	126 125 160 100 200 127 100 80 170 100 138 105 78 113 161 87 87
625th AC&W Sq	-	380	371	98
RECA	PITULAT	TON BY GI		,,
AIR BASE GROUP MAINT & SUPPLY GROUP FIGHTER GROUP 54TH TROOP GARRIER SQ	*	58 144 101 143	73 49 96 37	126 111 95 86

7 officers pending EDCSA

OFFICE A TROPE EXTRACT COPY:
OFFICE AND L. STATE AND THE STATE ASSET Adj, Hq 57th Ftr-Intep Mg

ъ HEADQUARTERS, 57TH FTR-INTOP WING ELMENDORF AFB, FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA

28 April 1950 AS OF DATE

AIRMEN TERMINATION REPORT

*	*				*
UNIT		AUTH	ASGD	% Pres Manning	
Hq Sq, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg Nakmek Air Force Base, Flt 1 Thornbrough AF Base, Flt 2 Cape Air Force Base, Flt 3 Amchitka AF Pase, Flt 1 Hq Sq, 57th Air Base Gp Communications Sq	*	1147 58 88 62 21 366 114	17h 57 96 69 2h 3h9 83	118 98 109 111 114 96 73	*
Food Service Sq Air Police Sq Installations Sq 7526 Air Force Band 57th Maintenance & Supply Gp Supply Sq Maintenance Sq Motor Vehicle Sq	*	199 283 261 34 57 430 341 472	137 188 207 48 49 345 265 378	69 66 79 1/1 86 80 78 80	*
57th Fighter-Intep Group 64th Fighter-Intep Sq 65th Fighter-Intep Sq 66th Fighter-Intep Sq 57th Medical Group 54th Troop Carrier Sq	*	60 164 164 164 110 202	66 1144 136 139 94 117	110 88 83 85 85 73	*
625th ACEN Sq		538 4337	31406	<u>39</u> 79	*
AIRMEN TO					

Air Base Group	*	1261	1012	80
Maint & Supply Group	*	1300	1037	80
Fighter Group	*	582	485	88
Shith Troop Carrier Sa		202	147	73

* Indicates 11 airmen pending EDCSA

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ORIGINAL THEOR

Captain, 58AF

Adjutant, (Hq & Hq Sq, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg)

Hq, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg

11 HEADQUARTERS, 57TH FTR-INTCP WING ELMENDORF AFB, FORT RICHARDSON ALASKA

1 June 1950

OFFICERS TERMINATION REPORT

*	*		% Pres
	AUTH	ASGD	Manning
Hq & Hq Sq, 57th Ftr-Intep W	g ~140	52	128
Naknek Air Force Base, Flt	1 3	5	167
Thornbrough AF Base, Flt	2 3	8	267
Cape Air Force BAse. Flt	3 2	4	200
Amchitka AF Base, Flt	4 2	2	100
Ho & Hq Sq, 57th Air Base Gp	25	45	172
Communications Sq	4	5	125
Food Service Sq	4	4	100
Air Police Sq	5	4	80
Installations Sq	7	16	229
752nd Air Force Band	1	2	200
Hq Maintenance & Supply Gp	6	12	200
Supply Sq	15	19	127
Maintenance Sq	9	7	78
Motor Vehicle Sq	se 6	9	150
Hq 57th Fighter-Intep Group	11	17	155
64th Fighter-Intop Sq	30	27	90
65th Fighter-Intep Sq	30	30	100
66th Fighter-Intop Sq	.30	27	90
57th Medical Group	27	22	81
54th Troop Carrier Sq	243	40	93
625th AC & W Sq	*46	25	54
	3149	382	109

RECAPITULATION BY GROUPS

Air Base Group	46	76	161
Maint & Sup Group	36	47	131
Fighter Group	101	101	100
54th Troop Carrier Sq	43	40	93

* 12 officers asgd pending EDCSA

CHATIFIED A TRUE EXTRACT COPY: ORLEAN IN TWEDT

d HEADQUARTERS, 57TH FTR-INTCP WING ELMENDORF AFB, FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA

1 June 1950 AS OF DATE

AIRMEN TERMINATION REPORT

UNIT	AUTH	ASGD	% Pres Manning
Hq & Hq Sq, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg Naknek Air Force Base, Flt		203 63	137 109
Thornbrough AF Base, Flt		103	117
Cape Air Force Base, Flt		74	119
Amchitka AF Base, Flt		26 1116	124
Hq & Hq Sq, 57th Air Base Gp	*368 164	85	52
Communications Sq Food Service Sq	199	125	63
Air Police Sq	283	197	70
Installations Sq	261	200	77
752nd Air Force Band	34	113	126
Ho Maintenance & Supply Gp	* 77	180	234
Supply Sq	430	329	77
Maintenance So	341	274	80
Motor Vehicle Sq	472	381	81
Hq 57th Fighter-Intep Group	* 60	189	315
64th Fighter-Intop Sq	164	14	88
65th Fighter-Intop Sq	164	1145	88
66th Fighter-Intop Sq	164	146	89
57th Medical Group	*110	90	82
54th Troop Carrier Sq	*202	180	89
625th A C & W Sq	*538	310	58
	4408	3933	89

RECAPITULATION BY GROUPS

AIR BASE GROUP	1309	1056	84
MAINT & SUPPLY GROUP	1320	1164	88
FIGHTER GROUP	552	624	113
514TH TROOP CARRIER SQ	202	180	80

**indicates 48 airmen DS to 813 Avn Engr Bn, Shemya AFB, Nome. *indicates 483 airmen asgd pending EDCSA

CESTLETED A TRASE EXTRACT COPY:

1446

HEADQUARTERS, 57TH FTR-INTOP WING
FIMENDORF AFB, FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA 30 June 1950
AS OF DATE

OFFICERS TERMINATION REPORT

*	*		* % Pres
UNIT	AUTH	ASGD	Manning
Maintenance & Sapsiy op Maintenance Sq Motor Vehicle Sq Hq 57th Fighter-Intop Group 64th Fighter-Intop Sq 65th Fighter-Intop Sq 66th Fighter-Intop Sq Hq 57th Medical Group 54th Troop Carrier Sq 625th ACCW Sq	* 15 * 15 9 6 * 17 * 18 * 19 * 11 * 30 30 30 27 43 43 46 31,9	54 4 7 4 2 4 7 1 2 2 2 1 4 2 9 2 8 2 8 2 0 4 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1	135 133 233 200 100 188 125 80 214 200 200 93 78 183 127 97 93 93 714
Indicates 11 office RECAPITUI	ers pending	ROUPS	
AIR BASE GROUP MAINT & SUPPLY GROUP FIGHTER GROUP SUTH TROOP CARRIER SQ	16 36 101 143	78 144 99 141	170 122 98 95

CERTIFIED A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

ORLEAN LAND THEOT Captain, WSAF Ass't Adjutant, Hq, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg

f 11

HELDQUARTERS, 57TH FTR-INTOP WING ELWENDORF AFB, FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA

30 June 1950 AS OF DATE

AIRMEN TERMINATION REPORT

*	*			*	
UNIT		AUTH	ASGD	% Pres Wanning	
Hq & Hq Sq, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg Maknek Air Force Base, Flt 1 Thornbrough AF Base, Flt 2 Cape Air Force Base, Flt 3 Amchitka AF Base, Flt 4 Hq & Hq Sq, 57th Air Base Gp Communications Sq Food Service Sq Air Folice So Installations Sq 752d Air Force Band Maintenance & Supply Gp Supply Sq Maintenance Sq Motor Vehicle Sq 57th Fighter-Intop Group 6hth Fighter-Intop Sq 65th Fighter-Intop Sq 65th Medical Group 5hth Troop Carrier Sq 625th AC&W Sq	新 养	148 58 66 62 21 373 164 199 283 261 34 77 430 341 472 60 164 164 110 202 538	214 62 89 64 22 396 90 110 209 204 41 68 372 338 417 69 160 164 167 36 176 306	145 107 102 103 105 107 555 71 74 73 121 88 87 99 115 98 100 102 78 87	*
		4412	3851	87	

* Indicates 7 airmen asgd pending EDCSA
** Indicates 63 airmen DS to Shemya and Nome

RECAPITULATION BY GROUPS

AIR BASE GROUP	1314	1080	82
MAINT & SUPPLY GROUP	1320	1195	91
FIGHTER GROUP	552	560	101
5hTH TROOP CARRIER SQ	202	176	87

THE A THE EXTRACT COPY:

Captain, USAF Asst Adj, Hq, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg

15

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH

57TH FIGHTER--INTERCEPTOR WING

	OFF T	AMN /O&E	OFF T/1	AMN D—A	TO!	ral AMN
Hq & Hq Sq, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg	30	68	20	308	56	376
Hq, 57th Air Base Group	9	61	16	305	33	366
57th Air Police Squadron	3	90	2	193	5	283
57th Communications Squadron	4	61	0	103	5	164
57th Installations Squadron	4	122	3	139	ò	261
57th Food Service Squadron	4	136	0	63	14	199
Hq 57th M & S Group	4	10	2	67	8	77
57th Maintenance Squadron	9	150	0	191	9	341
57th Supply Squadron	7	138	8	292	20	430
57th Motor Vehicle Squadron	4	234	2	238	7	472
Hq 57th Ftr-Intep Group	11	30	0	30	11	60
64th Ftr-Intep Squadron	30	164	0	0	30	1.64
65th Ftr-Intop Squadron	30	164	0	0	30	164
66th Ftr-Intep Squadron	30	164	0	0	30	164
752d Air Force Band	*1	34	0	0	1	34
57th Medical Group	5	39	22	71	29	110
54th Troop Carrier Squadron	43	202	0	0	43	202
625th AC&W Squadron	46	538	0	0	46	538
TOTALS	274	2405	75	2000	376	5005

DATA EFFECTIVE AS OF 1 JUNE 1950

STORE!

SURVEY OF F-80 COMBAT PREPAREDNESS 57TH FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR WING ELMENDORF AIR FORCE BASE

THIS STUDY AND INCLOSURES THERETO CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

Captain, USAF Historical Officer

Prepared by:

Office of Air Comptroller 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing Elmendorf Air Force Base

conner

Purpose:

To determine the degree of ability of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing to perform its primary mission.

Source of Information:

57th Statistical Services Office, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing A-4, and 625th Aircraft & Warning Squadron.

Primary Mission of 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing:

Man, train, and equip, in accordance with priorities established by the Alaskan Air Command, such combat units and their associated services as are assigned. Maintain these units in a state of training and indoctrination with the latest available equipment necessary to permit immediate fighter operation, as directed by higher authority.

Findings:

- 1. The 625th Aircraft & Warning Squadron, which is to provide early warning and control interceptions in case of an emergency, is operating at approximately 40% combat readiness due to:
- ment, it is necessary that the 625th AC & W be manned to authorized strength. At the present time it is impossible to maintain 100% operation on a 2h hour day basis. Teletype machines and telephone connections have been installed to increase effectiveness through closer control, but these communications are lying idle because of the lack of operators.
- b. War Surplus Equipment: The radar equipment presently in use is a hangover from World War II. Although this was excellent equipment then, post war advancement in the radar field makes it highly desirable that the Aircraft and Warning organization be equipped with more up-to-date sets.
- c. Location: Due to the terrain surrounding the present location, the range of the 625th set is very limited in certain directions. Operation under present conditions makes the value of the 625th Aircraft and Warning organization questionable. Any warning given by them would be virtually after the fact in case of an armed attack. (Par 4, Incl 2)
- 2. The 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group has a total of 75 planes and 68 crews assigned, of which 80% (60) of the planes and 95% (6h) of the crews are normally available during duty hours. (Par 2b, Incl h) This means that on a moment's notice we can exect sixty (60) planes to be available for an interceptor mission between the hours of 0700 and 1800 on week days. This number will drop to approximately thirty-two (32)

(Survey of F-80 Combat Preparedness - Cont'd)

after 1800 each day and on week ends due to the fact that many of the pilots and ground crewmen reside off the military reservation and are not readily available in case of an alert after normal duty hours. Lack of adequate communications and transportation facilities makes it practically impossible to notify these personnel and get them to the field in time to do anything about an emergency interception of an enemy formation.

- 3. Ground equipment (refuelling units, transportation etc) are limited to such an extent as to hamper operations. Lack of sufficient refuelling units causes much lost time between missions. This loss of time is greatly increased by cold weather. A shortage of transportation to transport flying crews and their equipment from operations to their planes increases the time lag between briefing and actual take-off.
- 4. Supplies for the Fighter Group are available with the exception of certain items which are critically short. (Example: slave gyros) Transportation again is a problem since the fighter squadrons must transport their bombs and ammunition from the storage igloos to the aircraft. (Incl 1)
- 5. To double or treble our effectiveness for normal peace time operation (i.e., planes available for intercept missions) by adding another fighter group, the following estimate is furnished by the Logistics section, Ah, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing: One more hangar for present righter Group and two (2) hangars for additional Fighter Group. Increase parking area by 1,500,000 feet. Install hydrant refueling system and increase station fuel storage to fit hydrant system. Install 220 volt to 24 volt conversion units for starting, utilizing a system of transformer vaults on edge of pavement. Construct four (h) more amminition igloos with rail spur and dock. Add 15% to present food storage and handling facilities. Construct one more 500 man barracks and one administration building. The total initial cost of the above would be approximately \$59,000,000 and would increase our monthly operating cost 5% to 8%. This presupposes that fighter pilots would be available to man the added aircraft by making available quarters on the Base for the fighter pilots.
- 6. Other possibilities for increasing combat effectiveness while reducing costs could be readily arrived at in the event of an emergency. For example, by simply utilizing the strips at Naknek, Gulkana, and Nome for three combat squadrons on a TDY basis combat effectiveness could be doubled with comparatively small additional expenditures.

By utilizing hard stands and temporary building of crew chief shacks at hard stand locations, the removal of civilian air lines from the Base, enough additional ramp space and hangar space could be made available for the addition of another fighter group. This could be accomplished at very little extra cost.

(Survey of F-30 Combat Preparedness - Cont'd)

By furnishing depot maintenance from the States, removal of dependents from this theater, reducing Elmendorf Air Force Base to its war time essentials, a tremendous savings could be effected at no reduction in combat effectiveness.

It has been estimated that 85 to 90% of the cost of the activities of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing is spent in supporting "each other" in non-tactical activity.

Recommendations:

- That the 625th Aircraft & Warning Squadron be brought up to a strength of 31 officers and 425 airmen as recommended by Lt. Colonel Mathison. (Par 7e, Incl 2)
- 2. That adequate quarters be assigned all air and ground crewmen of the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group to insure that they will be present and available for immediate combat in case of attack.
- 3. That more refueling units and transportation facilities be furnished the Fighter Group by the Motor Vehicle Squadron.
- h. That Air Depot make every effort to furnish the Fighter Group all supplies necessary for all types of operation.
- 5. That one additional Fighter-Interceptor group be stationed at Elmendorf Air Force Base and bases at Naknek, Nome, and Gulkana be utilized to provide dispersed fighter cover.

SECRET

AUTH: CO 625th AC&W Sq

INT:

DATE: HEADQUARTERS

625TH AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SQUADRON Elmendorf Air Force Base, Fort Richardson APO 942, US Army

25MS/C

18 March 1950

SUBJECT: Effectiveness of Aircraft Control and Warning System

Commanding General TO: 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing Elmendorf Air Force Base, Fort Richardson APO 942, US Army

- 1. In the process of evaluating and implementing the present and proposed expansion program for Aircraft Control and Warning facilities in Alaska, it has become evident that concomitant improvements are necessary in various supporting facilities and allied agencies. In some instances top level coordination is needed to effect a practicable operational procedure with civilian and military agencies. It is felt, also, that a concerted effort must be made to re-examine the position of the AC&W Squadrons with respect to the scope of their authority and responsibilities. The Elmendorf Air Defense Control Center is not permitted at present, to assume control over interceptor aircraft without prior permission from the Wing A-3 office. This procedure is considered unwieldy and dangerously slow in the event of an actual raid. The present sttus of identification procedures does not justify interception of each unidentified target, but as pointed out in succeeding paragraphs the identification problem can and should be solved in the near future. At that time, it is felt a revision of intercept procedures will be necessary. The division of responsibility between the 632nd ACRW Squadron (and the 625th ACEW Squadron)* has never been clarified by official correspondence. is necessary that this situation be considered and operating procedures established by higher headquarters. Until that is accomplished the duty controller will be understandably confused in his efforts to coordinate activities with the Ladd Control Center. The resolution of these problems is felt to be imperative to justify and protect the present as well as the future investment in Aircraft Control and Warning.
- This organization has initiated arrangements to obtain all available flight plan information from the CAA for use at the Elmendorf Air Defense Control Center. This data, in addition to that obtained from the AACS, comprises the total of all flights plan information presently available concerning both military and civilian aircraft. This data is to be used to identify aircraft "Seen" by the radar scopes. Needless to say, the size and color of a hostile aircraft, as seen on the scope, is no different from the indication given by a friendly target. Consequently, the effectiveness of the early warning system depends entirely upon electronic and other means of identification to determine the status of a plane. Present identification data is insufficient for positive early
- * Omitted in file cy on which this true cy is based.

25%S/C SUBJ: Effectiveness of Aircraft Control and Warning System - Cont'd

LFM/rfd

warning. This is due to the fact that a large percentage of quasi Commercial and private aircraft are not required to file a flight plan with any agency at the CAA. In consequence, all early warning procedures are subject to a large element of chance unless a fighter interception is made on each unidentified target. Either the necessary large number of interceptions must be made, or flight plans on all aircraft must be required and reported to the ADCC. Anything short of these alternatives would render the Air Warning System useless.

- 3. A further omission in present operations that will become even more serious in the future is the lack of liaison with the Navy concerning the tactical flights of naval aircraft in the areas covered by radar surveillance. At present most information concerning aircraft around the perimeter of Alaska is obtained from ground observers and relayed through CAA facilities to the Elmendorf ADCC. A large number of planes so reported are presumably naval aircraft but the lack of naval liaison coupled with incomplete civilian flight plans precludes unequivocal identification. Proposed early warning radar sites will be of little value unless naval activities are reported to the ADCC. It seems possible, too, that coordination with the navy might result in the use of naval aircraft for interceptions or investigations should the need arise. At present it is all too apparent that the ground observer program, although a step in the right direction, is virtually useless due to the inadequacies of identification procedure, slow communications and the ambiguous position of the ADCC in its authority to order interceptions.
- l. In the event that the ADCC was given unrestricted authority to initiate interceptions after exhausting all means of identification, this headquarters is not aware of any provisions that may be in existence or proposed for night interceptions. Further, the capabilities of the F-80 are extremely limited as a night fighter even though they may be made available on a 2h hour basis. This problem, serious now, will be infinitely more important in the future when the early warning system is fully effective. No doubt this problem has already been considered by your headquarters, but it is of immediate concern to the 625th ACCW Squadron since it is difficult to establish operating procedures for aircraft control on a 2h hour basis when aircraft are available for only eight hours per day.
- 5. An additional area of concern to this headquarters is the civilian air raid warning system (CARW). Under conventional operation of a control center a CARW liaison officer is represented. It is understood that there may be no such necessity under present conditions but it is felt that preparation should be made to implement the CARW program contingent upon hostilities. At prement, this organization has no knowledge of the procedure desired by higher headquarters in relation to the CARW and a possible blackout of the city of Anchorage in the event of a known hostile raid. Further, it is considered of paramount importance that such strategic points as the Port of Whittier be alerted in the event of an emergency. In considering civilian activities it is further suggested that the possibilities of coordinated action with Civil Air Patrol be explored at an early date.

25WS/C LFM/rfd SUBJECT: Effectiveness of Aircraft Control and Warning System - Control

This organization is now in existence and could prove a valuable adjunct to the air warning service.

- 6. An additional allied problem is that presented by the operation of civilian broadcasting, radio range and amateur stations in the event of hostilities. Ordinarily an FCC representative is present in the Control Center when in full operation. Again, this may not be necessary at the moment. It is the opinion of this headquarters, however, that some consideration should be given to possible plans to alert the FCC on Alaskan radio stations should it become necessary.
- 7. It is urgently requested that action be taken to formulate plans that will eventually solve the problem discussed above. Further planning or expansion of the ACAN system in this theater will be useless unless these problems can be resolved.
- 8. It is suggested that a conference be held with all interested agencies, including the 625th and 632nd AC&W Squadrons to discuss the overall operation of the Aircraft Control and Warning within this theater.

s/t/LESTER F. MATHISON Lt Col, USAF Commanding

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

/s/ DANTEL E. WILCHER lst Lt, USAF Adjutant

A SERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Captain USAF

Ass't

57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing

STORT

SECRET
AUTH: CO, 625th ACKN Sq
INT:

HEADQUARTERS DATE:
625TH AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SQUADRON
Elmendorf Air Force Base, Fort Richardson, Alaska

25NS/C

28 April 1950

SUBJECT: Radar Coverage in the Alaskan Theater

TO: Commanding General
57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing
Elmendorf Air Force Base
Fort Richardson, Alaska

- 1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated 18 March 1950, subject: Effectiveness of Aircraft Control and Warning System.
- 2. The above referenced letter did in effect point out numerous basic problems which must be resolved before an aircraft control and warning system in any area can be effective. Assuming that these problems are solved in the immediate future the basis for a sound and thoroughly operational system will have been established. However, based on the present operational radar sites the effectiveness of the radar system in this theater will still be practically non-existent because of the limited coverage obtainable.
- 3. Indications are that no additional radar sites will be placed in actual operation until the spring of 1952. For all practical purposes it can be assumed that there will be no operational radar system in Alska until the fall of 1952, when all new sites will be integrated into the proposed ACLN system.
- 4. To accomplish its primary mission, the operation of two GCI stations and one Air Defense Control Center on a 24 hour basis, approximately 27 officers and 351 airmen will be required by this squadron. Assuming these stations were fully manned and operational, the first indication of a hostile attack would be after the attacking force accomplished its mission, the reasons for this being: no early warning system, limited GCI coverage and the time lag inherent in an identification system. The vulnerability of strategic targets in the 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing area of responsibility, also applies to the rest of Alaska because of the non-existence of an adequate Air Defense System.
- 5. As stated above, to accomplish its present mission this squadron will require 27 officers and 351 airmen. The 632nd AC&W Squadron at Ladd Air Force Base has approximately the same requirements. In other words, the overall requirements for AC&W personnel within the Alaskan Theater to operate the present system is 54 officers and 702 airmen. This appears to be an extremely high price to pay for the limited protection available. Actually the only compensation to the Alaskan Theater

25WS/C SUBJECT: Radar Coverage in the Alaskan Theater 28 April 1950

and the Air Force is the training personnel are receiving. It is felt that this training is extremely costly and could be accomplished in the Zone of Interior with a substantial savings to the Air Force.

- 6. It appears that the first step in clarifying the position of the AC&W system in this theater is to definitely determine if such a system is required between now and the fall of 1952. When such a decision has been reached, two courses of action are open; to curtail the present system to a standby status or to expand the system in an effort to improve its capabilities. It seems that action to accomplish the latter would be the more desirable.
- 7. In order that the effectiveness of the AC&W System now being operated by this squadron can be improved, it is requested that authority be granted and action taken to accomplish the following:
 - a. Move the present GCI site in the squadron area to a more desirable location in order to improve the coverage and interception capabilities in the Elmendorf area.
 - b. Install an AN/CPS-5 which will be dismantled at Naknek at a site in the vicinity of Bethel.
 - c. Install an AN/CPS-5 early warning radar at or in the vicinity of McGrath.
 - d. Increase the personnel in this organization to 31 officers and h25 airmen to provide for the installation and 24 hour operation of the above system. Sufficient radar and communication equipment to provide for the above is available within this theater.
- 8. In the event the above installations are approved, it is requested that consideration be given to recommending to higher headquarters that the effectiveness of the system being operated by the 632nd AC&W Squadron in the Ladd Field area also be improved.

1 Incl Map 'E' Alaska s/t/LESTER F. MATHISON Lt Col, USAF Commanding

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

/s/ DANIEL E. WILCHER lst Lt, USAF Adjutant ORLEAN LUSAF Captain, USAF Assistant Adjutant Hq, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg

CERTIFIED TXJE COPY:

Man hrs: 16:30 Cost: \$37.54

HEADQUARTERS, 57TH FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR GROUP Elmendorf Air Force Base, Fort Richardson, Alaska

RH/gv

57FG0-381

13 April 1950

SUBJECT: Study of Combat Effectiveness

TO: Commanding General
57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing
Elmendorf Air Force Base
Fort Richardson, Alaska

- 1. Information requested in document "Information and General Factors to be Considered in Proposed Study of Combat Effectiveness" is submitted in accordance with verbal request of Captain Scurlock of your headquarters.
 - 2. Paragranh 2 d.
 - a. Percentage of aircraft in commission:

Percentage of sircraft in commission for the year 1949 was 78.6% and is expected to be approximately 80% for 1950.

b. Pilots available in relation to aircraft in commission:

Aircraft - 80%

Pilots - 95%

- c. Interceptions: It can be reasonably assumed that this group could fly sixty (60) aircraft on an intercept on the basis that eighty percent (30%) would be in commission. The important factor in this situation would be:
 - (1) Three (3) missions in the above strength would exhaust all the available jet fuel in the aqua system
 - (2) There is no support provided this group by an ammunition squadron as to delivery of ammunition and bombs. At present the squadrons are required to transport ammunition to the aircraft.
 - d. Alert of pilots living in Anchorage:

There are no means of alerting pilots who live in Anchorage except for a few that have telephones. A possible solution to this

57FGO-381 (18 Apr 50) Subj: Study of Combat Effectiveness

problem would be to provide quarters on the base for all combat pilots. At present there would be thirty two (32) pilots of a possible sixty eight (68) available for immediate combat in the squadrons.

- e. If the pilots were asleep in quarters, it would take a flight of four (4) approximately fifty (50) minutes to get to thirty thousand (30,000) feet. Without armament it would take approximately forty (40) minutes.
- f. Approximately forty-five (45) interceptions in flights of. four (4) aircraft could be made in a twenty four (24) hour period. Note: Winter problems would drastically reduce this operation because of hexards to aircraft and all supporting vehicles, and low temperatures affecting efficiency of personnel.

g. Remarks:

- (1) Gunnery Scores 20%
- (2) Health Records: Pilots in good physical condition. Very few pilots in hospital and very small percentage DNIF.
- (3) Formation last six (6) months 1373.
- (h) Instrument time last six (6) months 786.
- (5) Altitude time Approximately 80% of all time is at altitude.

h. Aircraft

WWW

- (4) Critical parts Instruments are not available, need fifty one (51) slave gyros.
- (5) Recommend answers be given by activity concerned.
- (6) Recommend answers be given by activity concerned.
- (7) Ammunition is available in the squadrons. Bombs are available in igloos, in the storage area.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

JOHN F. CLARK 1st Lt., USAF Adjutant Captain, USAF Assistant Adjutant Hq, 57th Ftr-Intep Wg

FILE

SECRET

39 n. . SYTH PIGHTER-LUTURCEPTOR WING ELLILIDORF AFB, FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA 20 May 1950

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 3-50

MAP: See Operations Order No. 1-50

TASK ORGANIZATIONS:

See Operations Order Mo. 1-50

1. GENERAL SITUATION:

A base defense plan (Operations Order No. 1-50) has been approved recently which involves a changed concept, a new tactical organization, modified logistical responsibilities, and revised weapons, communications and transportation requirements. No base alort has been held under the new plan and no concrete test of the adequacy and completeness of the plan has been made.

2. MISSION:

This command will conduct a limited base alert at 1300 on 29 May 1950 in order to test Operations Order No. 1-50 for soundness and feasibility.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

a. Forces "A", "B", "C" and the General Reserve Force will form under the control of the respective Force Commanders at the place and in the manner to be prescribed by the Force Commanders. The information listed below will be obtained during the alert for each unit on the troop list of the Force concerned. This information will be submitted in writing to the Base Defense Force Commander within 48 hours after the termination of the alert.

(1) Strength Report:

- (a) Authorized strength.
- (b) Assigned strength.
- (c) Present for duty strength.
- (d) Number participating in alert as part of a tactical unit.
 (e) Number excused from participating in alert tactically, buty of excused personnel, and authority for being excused.

(2) Materiel Report:

- (a) Shortage of weapons, individual and crew served.
- (b) Shortage of transportation by type and number.
- (c) Shortage of communications equipment and operating personnel.
- (d) Shortage of ammunition in Sector dumps and for issue to individuals.
- (e) Mumber of days of Class "C" rations on hand.

- b. The 57th Medical Group, 57th Installations Squadron, 5005th USAF Hospital, and 39th Ammunition Squadron will report in accordance with paragraph 3a (1) and (2).
- c. The Maintenance and Supply Group, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing, will provide the transportation listed in the Logistical Support Annex to Operations Order No. 1-50. The remainder of the Group will continue on their normal supply and/or service mission.
 - d. The Air Defense Force will be excused from participation in the alert.
- c. All units not listed above will continue on their normal supply and/or service mission.
- x. Action beyond that outlined above may be undertaken by elements of the Base Defense Force at the discretion of the commanders concerned.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE:

No administrative action is required beyond that included in paragraph 3

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS:

- a. Command Posts:
 - (1) Base Defense Force CP Wing Hq. Bldg.
 - (2) Force "A": As reported.
 (3) Force "B": As reported.

 - Force "C": As reported.
 - (5) GRF: As reported.
- b. Porce CP's will be manned during the alert for the purpose of a wire and radio communications check.
- c. The "all clear" signal 'll be sounded at approximately 1500. However, major Force Commenders may continue beyond 1500 if necessary to obtain the required information (see para. 3a above).

HUTCHINSON Commanding General

R E S T R I C T E D

HQ, 57TH FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR WING
ELMENDORF AFB, FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA
27 June 1950

OPERATION ORDER NO. 6-50

MAPS: See Operations Order No. 1-50
TASK-ORGANIZATION: As per Operations Order No. 1-50

1. GENERAL SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces: Omitted
- b. Friendly Forces:
 - (1) The Fort Richardson-Elmendorf AFB area is defended by troops stationed thereat; no reenforcements are available from the ZI or other bases in Alaska.
 - (2) The 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group, 867th AAA AW Bn (Mob), and 625th ACEN Sq provide air defense for the Fort Richardson-Elmendorf AFB area.

2. MISSION:

- a. The Base Defense Force will prepare to execute Operations Order 1-50.
- b. Boundaries and limiting points are as prescribed in Operations Order 1-50.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- X (1) All Forces will continue their normal training, supply or service mission on the base subject to the restrictions in Par 4.
 - (2) All Forces will make final preparations for execution of Operations Order 1-30 short of actual deployment to field positions.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:

a. ADMINISTRATIVE:

- All personnel living on the base will remain on the base.
 Personnel living off the base must maintain contact with their unit and be capable of immediate return to the base.
- (2) All personnel will wear the prescribed battle dress except that the wool uniform (with jacket or shirt) may be worn in lieu of the fatigue uniform.
- (3) No new leaves or passes will be granted. Personnel already on leave or pass will not be recalled.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

OPERATION ORDER 6-50

27 June 1950

(4) Weapons will be carried, except where specific exception is granted for short periods by major Force Commanders.

b. LOGISTICAL

- (1) Small arms ammunition will be issued to individuals, but weapons will not be loaded.
- (2) Supply action will be expedited on all levels to provide the special supplies and equipment authorized by Operations Order 1-50.
- (3) Arrangements will be finalized for prompt opening of Sector Supply Points, dumps, and aid stations upon announcement of Condition No. 1.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL MATTERS:

- a. See COI. Passwords and countersigns will not be used until announcement of Condition $\#1_{\bullet}$
- b. A duty officer and communications watch (wire and radio) will be posted in major Force Command Posts. Communications checks will be made hourly.
- c. Command Posts: As per Operations Order 1-50 except for General Reserve Force which will be located in Bldg T-6.

t/ HNTCHINSON Commanding General

OFFICIAL:

s/ Heffner t/ HEFFNER

Dir Opns & Tng

Captain, SAF

1464

SECRET

44

HEADQUARTERS
5001ST COMPOSITE WING, LADD AIR FORCE BASE
APO 731, c/o Postmaster, Seattle, Washington
25 April 1950

SPECIAL ORDER NUMBER 80

EXTRACT

25. The following named airmen highth Fighter (AW) Sq, this sta, are placed on TDY for approximately sixty (60) days to 57th Fighter Interceptor Wing, Ft Richardson, Als, for the purpose of gaining maintenance experience on jet aircraft. WP o/a 1 May 50 by mil acft. Upon compl of TDY airmen will ret to proper sta by mil acft. Arctic clothing as prescribed in Joint USARAL and AAC Reg 67-16-4 will be worn while tvlg by mil acft. Auth: TNY AAOTN-10-20297 Hq AAC, dtd 24 February 1950.

S/Sgt John R. Jacobus, AF 12 204 239 T/Sgt Carl E. Carlson, AF 36 318 091 S/Sgt Carl G. Tennille, AF 6 973 086 Sgt James W. Sorrells, AF 15 410 139

BY ORDER OF COLONEL BAKER:

OFFICIAL:

CARL FEE CAPT, USAF Adjutant

s/t/ WALTER E. JOHNSON 1ST LT., USAF Asst Adjutant

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

ORLEAN W. T. Captain, USAF

Ass't Adjutant, Hq, 57th Ftr-Intop Wg

RESTRICTED

(Document No.

45). 57TH FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR WING Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska 13 June 1950

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FLIGHT ORDER NO: 4-50

CHARTS OR MAPS:

Flight Chart Number 6

World Aeronautical Charts No. 118, 117, 77 and 78

TASK ORGANIZATIONS:

57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing

- 1. GENERAL SITUATION:
 - a. (1) Intelligence Annex: Omitted.
- 2. MISSION: This command moves acft of 57th Ftr-Intep Group to Ladd AFB for training personnel 449th Ftr Sq in operation and maintenance of F-80C type aircraft.
 - a. ROUTE OUT: Elmendorf AFB Ladd AFB via airways.
 - b. ROUTE BACK: Ladd AFB Elmendorf AFB via airways.
- 3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:
 - a. 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group: Move 16 F-80C acft and 1 T-33 acft to Ladd AFB for 30 days Detached Service.
 - (1) Force "A" Necessary personnel and equipment to move 0800, 13 June 1950 to receive tactical acft.
 - (2) Force "B" Move personnel and equipment for 30 days sustained operation.
 - b. 54th Troop Carrier Squadron provide necessary airlift to support 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group move.
 - 3. Y. (1) Flights will be attached to Wh9th Fighter Sqdn for administration, operational control and logistic support to include housing and messing.

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Flight Order No. 4-50, contd:

- (2) Tactical acft will be loaded as follows:
 - (a) 900 rounds cal .50 ammunition per each acft.
 - (b) 744 gals JP-3 fuel per each acft.
- (3) F-80 Flight Commander will assist Commanding Officer, 449th Fighter Squadron in establishment of procedures for F-80 checkouts, gunnery, formation and all tactical training and will provide such maintenance supervision as required.
- (b) Individual tool kits authorized to airmen by TO&E 1-1233 will be carried by airmen.
- (5) Necessary flyaway kit spares will be provided by Commanding Officer, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group to support this mission.
- (6) Flight Commander will coordinate all matters pertinent to air movement with Commanding Officer, 54th Troop . Carrier Squadron
- (7) Detailed mission report will be submitted to this Headquarters with original and 4 copies in booklet form upon completion of D/S movement.
- 4. ADMINISTRATIVE: Omitted
- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS:
 - a. In accordance with current COI, 57th Fighter-Interceptor Wing.
 - b. COMMAND POST
 - (1) CO 149th Fighter Squadron
 - (2) CO 57th Fighter-Interceptor Group.

HUTCHINSON Commanding General

OFFICIAL:


GERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

HEFFNER
Dir. Operations & Training

Captain, USAF Historical Officer

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Hqs 57th Ftr-Intep Group

M/Sgt Schmidt, Lawrence M

AF-6 899 741

64th Ftr-Intep Squadron

Captain LOVE, THOMAS M Captain SMITH, JAMES B 1st It GRAY, WILLIAM W 1st It JARVIS, JAMES E 1st Lt MILLER, VIRGIL O 2nd Lt SCHLUETER, EUGENE E	101 29A 137 147A 175 89A A0-1 903 011 A0-2 086 691 A0-1 908 1447
2nd Lt SCHLUETER, EUGENE E	AU-1 900 1141

T/Sgt Stewert, Calvin I	AF-6 581 621 AF-16 035 683
S/Sgt Gorskey, Martin P	AF-6 559 14?
S/Sgt Rankin, Ervin H	AF-16 230 047
Sgt Myelle, Kenneth E Sgt O'Pool, Audrey G	AF-15 199 046
Cpl Gwinn, Tommy A	AF-19 323 111
Sgt Coonts, Donald R	AF-18 279 926

65th Ftr-Intep Squadron

Captain FELTS, MARION C Captain WAGNER, ROBERT M 1st Lt BASTIEN, ROBERT E 1st Lt JACKSON, WILLIAM O 1st Lt ERICSON, DONALD E	161 77A 124 78A AO-589 950 142 85A AO-820 732
M/Sgt Moore, Glenn E	AF-18 045 900 AF-19 076 56

M/Sgt Moore, Glenn E M/Sgt Laremore, Mile T M/Sgt Peterson, Elmer F M/Sgt Magness, Edgar K Mgt Baker, Richard F Michael F	AF-18 045 902 AF-19 076 568 AF-31 302 910 AF-19 276 679 AF-16 283 457 AF-13 268 048
Sgt Brown, Charles E	AE-13 266 046

66th Ftr-Intep Squadron

Captain DECKMAN, ROBERT Captain FAISON, EDWARD L 1st Lt BERNHARD, THOMAS D 1st Lt O'CONNELL, JOSEPH Jr 1st Lt KELLER, WILLIAM K	124 64A 140 76A A0-2 098 020 A0-2 074 493 A0-935 200		
S/Sgt Lee, Clay W Sgt Jones, Robert A Sgt Moore, Ronald E Gpl Fritz, Allen E Cpl Ilovichny, Edward Cpl Venditto, Richard R	AF-19 282 106 AF-19 321 168 AF-17 083 799 AF-16 285 179 AF-12 301 095 AF-19 309 538		



(F-80C)

64th Fighter Interceptor Squadron


Serial Number 7570 Serial Number 7593 Serial Number 7530 Serial Number 7561 Serial Number 7578 Serial Number 7597 Serial Number 7907 (T-33)

65th Fighter Interceptor Squadron

Serial Number 7534 Serial Number 7564 Serial Number 7568 Serial Number 7533 Serial Number 7582

66th Fighter Interceptor Squadron

Serial Number 7551 Serial Number 7552 Serial Number 7541 Serial Number 7546 Serial Number 7543



64th Ftr-Intep Sqdn

Captain R. 4. Barnes, Jr. Captain C. E. Van Bibber 1st Lt Paul B. Ellison 2nd Lt E. F. Schlueter 1st It Edward J. Wnjk 2nd Lt J. P. Finch	16423A AO 667 978 AO 686 728 AO 1 908 447 AO 2 101 919 AO 1 908 417
S Sgt Gorskey, Martin P. Sgt Plank, Ervin J. Sgt Sakaye, Arthur R. Sgt Trollinger, James E. Cpl Wocelka, James D.	AF16 035 603 AF16 274 769 AF19 315 403 AF14 249 368 AF16 230 067

65th Ftr-Intep Sqdn

Captain Will N. Blair	13886A
Captain John T. F. Hart Jr	AO 661 755
1st Lt Richard E. Moore	AO 532 661
	14 285A
1st Lt William C. Jackson	AO 1 908 407
1st Lt Richard L. Coombe	80 1 900 401
M Sgt Moore, Glenn E.	AF 18 045 902
M Set Amos. William J.	AF 6 882 373
	AF 19 076 568
T Sgt Laremore, Milo T.	AF 31 302 910
T Sgt Peterson, Elmer F.	
S Sgt Magness, Edgar K.	AF 19 276 679
Sgt Baker, Richard T.	AF 16 283 457
Sgt Brown, Charles E.	AF 13 268 0148

66th Ftr-Intep Sqdn

Captain Marion M. Davis 1st Lt Raphael H. Barto 1st Lt Robert H. Luedeka 1st Lt Nolan R. Dotz 1st Lt William R. Fullerton	AO 9 AO 2 AO 1	43 h3 34 88 08081 903 903	33 47 006
S Sgt Lee, Clay W. Sgt Hoore, Ronald E. Cpl Fritz, Allen E. Col Mergele, David J.	AF17 AF16	262 083 285 239	799 179

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Activities Activities