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THE CONTINENTAL AIR COMM'D
and the
KOREAN WAR
June to December 1950

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THE CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND AND THE KOREAN WAR

June 1950 -- December 1950

Directorate of Historical Services
Office of the Air Adjutant General
Continental Air Command
December 1950

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The Continental Air Command and the Korean War

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CHAPTER ONE

THE CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND AND THE KOREAN WAR: AN OVERALL VIEW

In the grim days of May 1940, as the formidable German Army overran the Netherlands and hammered the Belgian, French, and British Armies into a series of none too orderly "withdrawals," the New York Times, in commenting editorially on the Allied reverses, expressed the observation that the Dutch had prepared for war in the eighteenth century, the French had prepared for World War I, and the British had not prepared at all. Implicit in this perceptive observation was a criticism not only of military unpreparedness per se but of a blind adherence to decadent philosophies and doctrines of waging war. In an age of rapid technological advances, of mechanization, of three-dimensional warfare, it was almost virtually a prerequisite to military success that military planning, tactics, and broad considerations of strategy should always be progressive and forward-looking, rather than static, in concept as well as in execution.

With the end of World War II and the advent of the so-called Atomic Age, a Brave New World seemed to be on the verge of a new era in the science of war-making. While there was no universal agreement among the various services as to which concepts of warfare would be valid in the event of another war or as to which im-

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operations of war would be most effective in the event of conflict, the opinion was widely prevalent that the infantry would, in all probability, not be employed in the strength, size, and composition of past operations.^{2/} Amphibious operations were regarded as a thing of the past.^{3/} In the realm of war-making implements, the demise of conventional type aircraft (among others) seemed to be implicit in the introduction of jet-propelled aircraft.^{4/}

Existing concepts of war envisaged a strategic striking force, fully modernized and equipped for immediate and sustained combat operations, as being the initiating agent of an air atomic offensive.^{5/} Units designed for employment in support of surface forces would, it was believed, not see action unless the atomic offensive failed and the war degenerated into a conventional air-surface action, a contingency which was not expected to occur until two years after the onset of hostilities.^{6/} Considerations of national security

1/ In this connection, see "The National Defense Program - Unification and Strategy," Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949.

2/ SECRET Study, "An Evaluation of the Exchange of the 51st Fighter Group for the 82nd Fighter Group," prepared by the Director of Plans, Hq TAC, 10 August 1948. A copy of this study will be found in the History of the Tactical Air Command for 1948.

3/ Hanson W. Baldwin noted in his column in the New York Times on 4 November 1950 that amphibious operations had "just a short time" been characterized by "some of our most prominent leaders in Washington" as "obsolescent."

4/ SECRET Study, "An Evaluation of the Exchange of the 51st Fighter Group" prepared by the Director of Plans, Hq TAC, 10 August 1948

5/ Ibid.

6/ Ibid.

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therefore dictated that the Group composition of the United States Air Force be such as to reflect the proportionate importance attached to the strategic, air defense, and tactical missions of the Air Force, and that first-line aircraft be modernized as expeditiously as possible in order to assure the attainment and maintenance of air superiority, a fundamental tenet of air power.^{7/} The retirement of conventional type aircraft seemed therefore to be a prime desideratum. As one study, written in the summer of 1948, phrased it: "To retain a P-51 Group In the United States Air Force is to perpetuate a decadent philosophy of Air War as exemplified in the last conflict. The continuance of such a philosophy can seriously challenge the attainment of national security."^{8/}

2

It is undeniable that the Korean War, which broke out on 25 June 1950, differed radically from the pattern for post-World War II warfare envisaged by American military thinkers and strategists. In certain aspects of its operations, it was a "throw-back" to mid-World War II days, with the ground forces of the opposing sides being cast in principal roles,^{9/} resulting thereby in an urgent requirement for tactical air support. The major tactical triumph of

7/ Ibid.

8/ Ibid.

9/ "...The ground forces are the predominant factor. Our tactical air support is noteworthy as a supporting factor, but can only be regarded as an auxiliary and not a decisive influence..." -- General Douglas MacArthur, in reply to a series of questions posed by various reporters in Tokyo, 2 December 1950. See The New York Times, 3 December 1950.

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the war -- the amphibious landing at Inchon -- was an operation conceived and executed in the manner of island operations peculiar to the Pacific Theatre in World War II.

By its very nature, the Korean War created an urgent requirement for tactical units^{10/} and for conventional types of support aircraft at a time when the modernization program had largely effected the retirement of such aircraft from active United States Air Force inventories^{11/} and at a time when tactical aviation had, in consonance with prevailing air concepts and of a necessity born of strict budgetary limitations and the 48-Group Program, been subordinated in the United States Air Force to the Air Force's strategic and air defense missions.^{12/}

^{10/} "The air aspects of the Korean conflict are now and will continue to be until such time as the USSR enters the war purely a tactical air war." From SECRET Notes on Tactical Air Operations in the Japan-Korea Area, 2 July-6 July 1950, prepared by Major General C.P. Weyland, contained as inclosure to SECRET Ltr, General Weyland to General Whitehead, 11 July 1950.

^{11/} 1. This necessitated the recall of one hundred and fifty (150) P-51's from the Air National Guard on 1 July 1950 for shipment via carrier to the Far East. See SECRET Memorandum, sub: "Summary of DO Actions Resulting from Korean Situation," 3 July 1950.
2. An "insufficient" number of P-51 Mustangs, "many of which had been put into mothballs by the Air Force," was cited by TIME magazine in its issue of 14 August 1950 as being one of a "number" of reasons explaining the inability of the part of the United States to use its air power "to full effectiveness."

^{12/} There is evidence to suggest that tactical aviation had been subordinated in the Far East to the missions of Occupation and Air Defense. See SECRET Observer Report of the Korean War, 14 July-15 August 1950, prepared by Major Rex T. Barber, August 1950. See also Hanson W. Baldwin's column in the New York Times of 2 November 1950 in which he remarks: "Both the Army and the Air Force in the Far East theatre had to improvise hastily when the Korean War started. The Air Force had suggested joint air-ground training in Japan prior to the War, but the Army was not much interested. There were no tactical air control parties, no tactical air direction center, no joint operations center, no proper communications net and few personnel skilled or trained in the difficult techniques of close air support."

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The deemphasis of tactical aviation had been implicit in the Groups selected for deactivation in the cutback from 55 Groups to 48 Groups.^{15/} It was apparent in the loss by the Tactical Air Command on 30 November 1948 of its major command status and its incorporation into the newly-formed Continental Air Command.^{14/} It was suggested by the deactivation in 1949 and in early 1950 of units and organizations designed specifically for employment in concert with land and/or amphibious forces.^{15/} Indeed the dearth of tactical units had reached the point where on 15 June 1950, scarcely ten days before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Continental Air Command was in process of bringing to the attention of Headquarters, United States Air Force, its inability to meet Department of the Army training requirements for troop carrier and tactical support aviation.^{16/} In order effectively to fulfill the Army's requests, the Continental Air Command advised higher headquarters that it would require the equivalent of two additional troop carrier groups. In order to meet the Army's requirements for fighter bombers, the Continental Air Command found

^{15/} See Chapter One, Volume I, History of the Continental Air Command for 1 December 1948-31 December 1949.

^{14/} Ibid.

^{15/} RESTRICTED Table, "Organizational Changes in Continental Air Command Units, 1 December 1948-31 December 1949," prepared by the Unit Control Branch, Directorate of Programming and Organization, November 1950.

^{16/} End Ind, Hq ComAC, 15 June 1950 to ltr, CCAPP, sub: "Army Field Forces Minimum Requirements for Tactical Air Support Aircraft During Fiscal Year 1951," 27 April 1950.

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itself compelled to solicit the use in a tactical role of two of the Strategic Air Command's Fighter-Bombardment Groups.^{17/}

As one of the United States Air Force's two major "combat" commands in the Zone of the Interior, it was inevitable that the Continental Air Command should be called upon to play a prominent role in supporting United States Air Force operations in the Far East upon the outbreak of the Korean War. As the instrumentality of the United States Air Force charged with the provision for Air Force cooperation with land and/or amphibious forces in the United States and for operational training therefor, the Continental Air Command possessed within its domain all available United States Air Force tactical and troop carrier resources within the continental limits of the United States. It had within its establishment the bulk of tactical and troop carrier experience and "know-how" in the Air Force and thus the wherewithal to establish and to operate schools for the operational training of crews and units destined for action in the Far East. As the agency charged with the mission of discharging the field responsibilities of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, with respect to the Reserve Forces (with particular emphasis upon the mobilization thereof), the Continental Air Command was the Command required to evolve and set into motion the machinery for the Recall of individual Reservists and Reserve units. Finally, from its armada of aircraft the Continental Air Command

^{17/} Ibid.

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could be counted upon to transfer such combat aircraft as it had available to meet the peculiar aircraft requirements of the Korean War. Obviously both the amount and the nature of the Command's assistance were shaped in some measure by the broad external doctrinal considerations and the modernization program to which reference has already been made above.

Internally, a complicating factor to the Command's "assistance" program arose from the fact that at the outbreak of the Korean War, the Continental Air Command was engaged in the process of overhauling its command structure through a reorganization intended to regroup the Command's six numbered air forces into four, and to "convert" the operational commands, (i.e., the Tactical Air Command and the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces) into headquarters possessing full command jurisdiction over units assigned to their respective commands.^{18/} Under the reorganization, the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force was slated to be discontinued on 1 July 1950, and the headquarters of the Ninth Air Force, located at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, was destined to undergo a similar "fate" on 1 August 1950. The area responsibilities (including the maintenance of Reservist records and the recall of Reservists) formerly assumed by the Twelfth and Ninth Air Forces were to be "absorbed" respectively, by the Fourteenth and First Air Forces. Thus, it so happened that

^{18/} For a more detailed description of this reorganization, see Chapter One, Volume I, History of the Continental Air Command for January-June 1950.

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upon the outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950, records pertaining to Reservists in the geographical areas formerly administered by the Twelfth and the Ninth Air Forces were either en route, or in process of being readied for shipment, to the headquarters of the Fourteenth or the First Air Forces.^{19/} That the Command's Recall Program was hampered goes without saying. It is perhaps worthy of special note that the Continental Air Command succeeded in carrying through a major internal reorganization of its command structure at the very time that it was exerting every effort to support United States Air Force operations in the Korean War. This in itself was an achievement of no small stature.

I

Word of the invasion of the Republic of Korea by North Korean Communist forces and the subsequent announcement on 27 June 1950 by President Truman that in response to the United Nations Security Council's plea to member nations for "every assistance" in repelling the invaders he had ordered the United States Navy and Air Force to give cover and support to the Republic of Korea's troops^{20/} were accompanied and followed by a tremendous outburst of activity in Headquarters, Continental Air Command, and among its subordinate echelons.

^{19/} Records Disposition Instructions, contained as an inclosure to the Historical Report of the Directorate of Administration for June 1950

^{20/} The decision to use American Ground Troops in Korea was made a day or two later. See Arthur Krock's column in the New York Times, 30 November 1950

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This activity was of a diversified kind. A considerable portion of it consisted of measures taken in direct support of United States Air Force operations in the Far East, (i.e., the transfer of units, personnel, and aircraft, the despatch of advisors and observers, etc.). A not inconsiderable amount of activity was generated by measures instituted in indirect support of United States Air Force operations in Korea (i.e., the Recall Program, the establishment of Combat Crew Training Schools, the build-up program). Finally, a third kind of activity originated as a reaction to the Korean War: a general acceleration of the squadron deployment program and the strengthening of the air defense system of the United States.^{21/} Principally because of the workload occasioned by these various activities, the headquarters of the Command found itself compelled to operate on a seven day basis, with other echelons of the Command required to operate on a six day work week.^{22/} Command administrative agencies found their facilities taxed to the utmost by the extraordinary amount of "paper" work entailed as a result of the Korean Crisis.^{23/}

One of the initial steps taken by the Continental Air Command following the outbreak of war in Korea was the issuance of Operations Order 16-50, directing the operation of Aircraft Control and Warning

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- 21/ 1. SECRET Memorandum, sub: "Summary of DC's Action as a Result of Korean Situation," 20 July 1950
 2. Historical Report of the Air Defense Division, Directorate of Operations and Training, July 1950
- 22/ ComAC Diary for 14, 15, 16 July 1950
- 23/ Historical Report of the Directorate of Administration for July 1950

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facilities on a twenty-four hour basis and ordering a moderate re-
 deployment of fighter-interceptor aircraft^{24/}. The Eastern and West-
 ern Air Defense Forces were directed to assume operational control
 of all combat-ready fighter-interceptor aircraft. The interception
 and identification of all unidentified aircraft entering the United
 States from certain specified areas were made mandatory^{25/}.

In one instance, the "alerting" of Aircraft Control and Warning
 Units had an unintended consequence: the corollary "alert" of an
 Air National Guard fighter unit by a member of a Regular Aircraft
 Control and Warning Unit. The "alerting" of the Air National Guard
 unit was made, of course, without official sanction and was sub-
 sequently cancelled by the same means by which it had been ordered --
 by means of a telephone call. This prompted the Inspector General
 of the United States Air Force to observe, in correspondence ad-
 dressed to the Continental Air Command, that the telephone call was
 not an acceptable medium for the transmittal of alert instructions,
 since telephone calls were made "in the clear" and were susceptible
 to interception by enemy agents. This entire incident was cited by
 the Inspector General as an illustration of the manner in which air
 defense resources might be diverted by enemy agents as the result of
 the lack, or failure to adhere to, standard procedures for the alert

^{24/} SECRET Operations Order 16-60, Hq ComAC, 25 June 1960

^{25/} 1. Ibid.

2. SECRET Memorandum, sub: "Summary of DO Actions Resulting
 from Korean Situation," 3 July 1960

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of units.

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A by-product of the Korean situation was the intensive scrutiny given the matter of effective security of bases and installations under the jurisdiction of the Continental Air Command. On visits to key installations of the Command it was discovered that additional wiring, better lighting, and additional guard personnel were required to insure adequate protection against espionage and sabotage at those installations. A force of one hundred and fifty guards was recommended for assignment to Hamilton Air Force Base, California, and McChord Air Force Base, Washington.

In Headquarters, Continental Air Command, two new staff agencies -- the Directorate of Personnel Mobilization Control and a Central Control Agency for Emergency Air Staff Actions -- came into being as a result of activities stemming from the Korean situation. The Direct-

26/ Historical Report of the Office of the Air Inspector for July 1950

27/ Historical Report of the Office of the Air Provost Marshal for July 1950

28/ Ibid.

- 29/
1. Historical Report of the Directorate of Personnel Mobilization Control for July 1950
 2. Historical Report of the Operations Center, Office of the Deputy for Operations, August 1950
 3. RESTRICTED Staff Memorandum 11-20, sub: "Administrative Practices, Organization and Responsibilities of the Continental Air Command Central Control Agency for Emergency Air Staff Actions" 21 August 1950
 4. RESTRICTED Staff Memorandum 11-21, sub: "Administrative Practices, Procedure for Processing Emergency Air Staff Actions," 24 August 1950

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orate of Personnel Mobilization Control, which began operations on 28 July 1960, absorbed the functions of the former Directorate of Military Personnel Procurement, the former Call, Recall and Assignment Divisions of the Directorate of Military Personnel, and, in addition, took over the responsibility of the Command's Processing Stations. Establishment of a Central Control Agency within the Office of the Deputy for Operations was an underlying expression of the intent to insure a state of complete combat readiness in the event of hostilities.

Some mention should be made of the attempts on the part of the Command to maintain a separate cost system for operations and support activities undertaken in connection with the Korean imbroglio. The attempts were doomed to failure. On 2 September 1960 the costing program was abandoned as a result of the difficulties encountered in endeavoring to segregate costs attributable to Korean support operations. Part of the difficulties arose from the fact that the United States Air Force Cost System was a "cost reporting" rather than a "cost accounting" system. In order accurately to determine support costs for the Korean War, the Continental Air Command would have required a detailed cost accounting system.^{30/}

^{30/} Information conveyed by the Directorate of Programs and Costs to the Director of Historical Services, 16 November 1960

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II

Had an inventory been taken of the tactical, tactical reconnaissance, and troop carrier resources of the Continental Air Command on 25 June 1950, the day of the outbreak of the Korean War, it would have looked like this:

Headquarters, Tactical Air Force (Provisional)	314th Troop Carrier Wing
	316th Troop Carrier Group
	62nd Troop Carrier Group
20th Fighter-Bomber Group	1st Tow Target Squadron
31st Fighter-Bomber Group	1st Shore Recon Unit
	2nd Radio Relay Squadron
502nd Tactical Control Group	5th Radar Calibration Unit
84th Bombardment Squadron (L) Jet	934th Signal Battalion, Sep, Tactical
85th Bombardment Squadron (L) Jet	30th Motor Transport Squadron (Aviation)
Hq, 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Group	1st Liaison Flight
162nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Night Photo)	2nd Liaison Flight
161st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Photo Jet)	3rd Liaison Flight
363rd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron	4th Liaison Flight
	5th Helicopter Flight

The inventory was undoubtedly much more impressive on paper than it was in actuality. The Tactical Air Force (Provisional) had been created principally to serve as the field operating agency of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out maneuvers, exercises, and demonstrations conceived in that headquarters, and it is extremely doubtful whether it would have been capable of operating in a combat theatre of operations had the need for a tactical air force headquarters arisen. The 20th Fighter-Bomber Group was being

^{SI/} This organization is not to be confused with the Ninth Air Force (Tactical) which came into being on 1 August 1950. Headquarters, Tactical Air Force (Provisional), was discontinued on that date. See RESTRICTED General Orders #48, Hq ComAC, 12 July 1950

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readied for a temporary tour of duty in the United Kingdom and ^{32/} preparations for its departure were already in an advanced stage. The 51st Fighter-Bomber Group was slated to be transferred to the Strategic Air Command on 1 July 1950, barely a week ^{33/} away. Thus, no Fighter-Bomber Groups were available within the Continental Air Command for transfer to the Far East. The 502nd Tactical Control Group's combat capabilities had been impaired by losses of its trained personnel to air defense units. The 62nd Troop Carrier Group was committed to the support of Military Air Transport Service operations in the event of emergency (and was, in fact, transferred ^{34/} to the control of the Military Air Transport Service on 17 July 1950). In the field of tactical reconnaissance, the Command's entire resources consisted of three squadrons and one Group headquarters. The Command's assets in the realm of Light Bombardment consisted of two jet squadrons. At best, the unit resources of the Continental Air Command which could be made available for operation in the Korean War might be described as "limited".

^{32/} SECRET Memorandum, sub: "Summary of DO's Actions as a Result of Korean Situation", 9 July 1950

^{33/} See Chapter One, Volume I, History of the Continental Air Command for January-June 1950

^{34/} 1. RESTRICTED General Order #49, Hq ComAC, 17 July 1950
2. According to Colonel Albert P. Clark, Jr., Assistant Deputy for Operations, Hq ComAC, the transfer of the 62nd Group was made on a contingency basis, with the Group destined for employment in the Korean airlift. The Continental Air Command was required to earmark another Troop Carrier Group for the emergency support of MATS operations. Thus, the Command was practically insolvent in troop carrier resources.

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The complete story of the transfer to the Far East of units under the control of the Continental Air Command is told elsewhere in this monograph. The loss of these units was compensated in some measure, however, by the activation of new Regular units, by the recall to active duty of four Reserve Wings, and by the ultimate federalization of certain Air National Guard units. One immediate effect of the loss of Continental Air Command's Regular tactical units was to leave the Tactical Air Command -- which under the reorganization of May-August 1950 acquired, on 1 September 1950, full command control over units assigned to its jurisdiction -- without any substantial number of subordinate units.

III

No specialized monograph of this nature can ever hope adequately to portray the entire gamut and scope, the mass and magnitude, of the personnel actions undertaken by the Continental Air Command in direct or indirect support of United States Air Force operations in the Far East during the period June-October 1950. (1) The evolving, establishment, and operation of the machinery for the recall and processing of reservists and the formulation of policies required in connection therewith were, per se, personnel activities of the first order and posed a complex of problems for Command personnel agencies. (2) Frequent and substantial levies of military personnel for assignment to the Far East Air Forces and to other commands had to be met. (3) Certain units destined for service

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in Korea had to be brought up to strength prior to shipment overseas. (4) The Base Complements of installations scheduled to house Reserve Wings being called to active duty and Air National Guard units being federalized had to be manned. (5) A sizeable number of airmen were required to be in place to operate the Combat Crew Training School being established at Langley Air Force Base to train replacement crews for assignment to Korea. (6) Continental Air Command headquarters and the headquarters of its major subordinate commands had to be augmented in order to meet excessive workloads occasioned by the impact of Korean situation. (7) Units activated to replace those being sent overseas had to be manned. And, finally, the headquarters of the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces, the Tactical Air Command, and the Ninth Air Force (Tactical) had to be built up in personnel strength in order to be able to fulfill the responsibilities inherent in the respective missions of those headquarters under the reorganization of May-August 1950. The massive proportions of the Command effort required to bring to completion the personnel actions entailed by the foregoing activities can scarcely begin to be comprehended, much less reduced to terms susceptible of coherent presentation in a narrative of this scope.

On 30 June 1950, the Continental Air Command had an assigned strength of 89,218 permanent party and pipeline personnel,^{35/} a

^{35/} Continental Air Command Monthly Report of Personnel Strength, 30 June 1950, compiled by the Directorate of Statistical Services, Hq ComAC

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reservoir of personnel against which Headquarters, United States Air Force, lost no time in making levies of officers and airmen for assignment to the Far East Air Forces. On 27 June 1950, the day on which President Truman announced that he was ordering the Navy and the Air Force to give cover and support to the forces of the Republic of Korea, the Continental Air Command was requested to supply three hundred and six (306) Radar Operators and sixty-nine (69) Radar Repairmen for immediate assignment to the Far East. Subsequently, additional requisitions were received for radar repairmen, a category of personnel in which the Continental Air Command itself was in critically short supply. To compensate for the loss of these latter personnel, the Continental Air Command requested and received approval to employ 400 Philco and RCA technical representatives, and proceeded to assign them to units employed in the Air Defense system from which the specialists had been withdrawn.

The deleterious effect exercised upon the Continental Air Command's air defense, tactical, and Reserve Forces missions by the alarming withdrawals of personnel from the Command was noted in a special memorandum prepared by General Whitehead for General Edwards, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, for Headquarters, United States Air Force, on 5 July 1950. The Continental Air

36/ Historical Report of the Communications and Electronics Division, Directorate of Maintenance, Supply, and Services, for July 1950

37/ SECRET Memorandum of Lieutenant Generalennis C. Whitehead to Lieutenant General Ioval H. Edwards, Sub: Immediately Available Sources for Critical SH's, 5 July 1950

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Command, said General Whitehead, was filling the United States Air Force's entire requisition for 2718 airmen, provided that the Command had the airmen in the specialties required with six months of service remaining. A requisition for an additional 9300 airmen was noted with some concern by General Whitehead. After withdrawals required to fill the initial major requisition had been completed, the Continental Air Command would, he declared, be less than 45% manned in jet aircraft crew chiefs (SSN 750-d). Communications specialties would be equally hard hit. In order therefore to readjust personnel strengths remaining in Continental Air Command units, blanket authority was requested by General Whitehead to make intra-command transfers regardless of existing restrictions on such transfers contained in pertinent Air Force Regulations. In addition, General Whitehead proposed that each Zone of the Interior Command be permitted to call to duty such corollary Units as it required to bring its Regular units up to strength and that ten or twelve Reserve T/O&E Wings be called into active service in order to meet ^{39/} filler personnel requirements.

^{38/} According to information conveyed orally to the Historian by the Director of Military Personnel, Hq ComAC, the authority to make intra-Command transfers freely was granted by Headquarters, United States Air Force.

^{39/} SECRET Memorandum of Lieutenant General Dennis C. Whitehead to Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards, Sub: Immediately Available Sources for Critical SSN's, 5 July 1950 (Vid. sup. doc. #77)

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A survey of officer personnel losses from the Command to the Far East Air Forces revealed that the whole range of officer skills was involved, with losses equally divided between pilot and non-rated officer personnel. A total of 186 officers was requisitioned during the month of August alone.^{40/} The requests for common administrative specialties and for P-50 pilots were met without difficulty.^{41/} However, requirements in the critically scarce categories -- Armament, Intelligence, Communications, Aerial Photography and Photo Interpreter, Food Service, Petroleum Products Supply, and Fire Aircraft Crash Rescue -- resulted in the depletion of officer resources possessing these skills in order to meet urgent Far East Air Forces requirements.

The depletion of officer resources possessing Aerial Photo and Photo Intelligence skills was particularly acute.^{42/} The heavy withdrawals from these fields eventuated in a letter to Headquarters, United States Air Force, in which a special point was made of the fact that assigned strength figures were not an accurate reflection of the number of personnel in the Command

^{40/} Historical Report of the Officers Assignment Branch, Directorate of Military Personnel, for August 1950

^{41/} 1. Ibid.
2. CONFIDENTIAL IRS, Deputy for Personnel to Vice Commander, Hq ComAC, Sub: Summary of Requirements for P-50 and P-51 pilots, 28 September 1950

^{42/} SECRET ltr, ComAC to Director of Military Personnel, USAF, Sub: Assignment of Officers, 1 September 1950

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owing to the fact that officers assigned to Continental Air Command units serving overseas were being carried in the assigned strength ^{43/} columns of Continental Air Command personnel strength reports.

A requisition in August for 37 officers qualified in C-46 and C-47 aircraft was met with considerable difficulty. Headquarters, United States Air Force, indicated that the officers selected for the assignment had to be extremely well qualified in Troop Carrier operations. The urgent nature of the requisition complicated matters considerably. Personnel had to be screened, selected, and "shipped" with the utmost speed. In order to meet this particular requisition, personnel from so-called Category "R" and from the Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps program had to be ^{43/} utilized.

Use of Category "R" personnel was apparently the exception rather than the rule, for such personnel were ordinarily exempt from overseas quotas. This prompted one Headquarters, Continental Air Command staff officer to remark: "Due to the present emergency, I can see no reason why Category "R" personnel should not be in the same class as any other officers and subject to the same ^{44/} assignments." In the opinion of this same officer, the "overall" picture in officer personnel in the Command was, by no means

^{43/} Historical Report of the Officers Assignment Branch, Directorate of Military Personnel, for August 1950

^{44/} SECRET IHS, Major W. W. Woods to Chief, Officers Division, Directorate of Military Personnel, 12 September 1950

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"a bright one". School quotas had placed a "tremendous" burden on the Command. Many Reserve Officers were being called to active duty who did not possess the experience essential for the positions they were being called upon to fill. Moreover, many of them had been deferred for thirty to forty days and it was believed that a period of similar duration would be required in order to train them for the positions which they were slated to occupy. Although the Command had an assigned strength of 6882 officers on 31 July 1950, the number remaining by mid-September to meet United States Air Force quotas was exceedingly limited for reasons apparent in the following breakdown:

Category "R" Officers	344 (Could not be moved)
Shipped Overseas	660 (Approximate total since 25 June 1950)
ROTC	598
National Guard	162
Hq ComAC	512
Average in School	175 (Sep., Oct., Nov. 1950)
Lost to 20th Ftr Bomber Group	91
Lost to 502nd Tac Control Group	139
Lost to 162nd Tac Recon Sq	64
Lost to 363rd Tac Recon Sq	25
Lost to 314th Troop Carrier Gp	190
Lost to 62nd Troop Carrier Gp	142
	<u>2900</u>

In addition, 1278 officer personnel assigned to the Command's Fighter-Interceptor Groups and to its Aircraft Control and Warning Groups could not be used to meet "ordinary" commitments. Subtracting these 4178 officers from the total assigned to the Command on 31 July 1950, there remained a total of 2704 officers to meet overseas commitments, transfers within the Zone of the Interior, school quotas, and various other commitments that the

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Command was called upon to meet from day to day. To be sure, approximately 1100 reserve officers had been recalled to active duty. However, approximately fifty percent of these were assigned to the 452nd Bombardment Wing (L) and to the 437th Troop Carrier Wing. Two solutions were therefore offered: (1) to unfreeze Category "R" personnel, and (2) to request Headquarters, United States Air Force, to relieve the Command of some of its school quotas.^{45/}

A survey of the Command's jet pilot resources on 6 July 1950 disclosed that of 621 assigned jet pilots, only 392 were considered combat ready, with 95 new pilots requiring complete phase-training. In order to initiate a seven day week training program for pilots considered "combat ready", Headquarters, Continental Air Command, declared it "most urgent" that aircraft flying hour limitations on jet fighters, F-5E, F-6, and F4U aircraft be removed. This, it was believed, would further expedite the flow of F-80 crew replacements to the Far East since pilots trained in F-80's and F-84's could transition speedily into F-80's at Williams Air Force Base or at Las Vegas.^{46/}

A moderate number of crews were placed in training at a Combat Crew Training Station established at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, with a view towards qualifying them for service

^{45/} Ibid.

^{46/} SECRET Memorandum, Sub: Summary of DD's Action in Connection with the Korean Situation, 6 July 1950

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^{47/} in Korea. In July the input of crews for B-26 bombardment and attack crews was set at ten crews per month. Beginning on 11 August, twelve crews were entered in monthly increments. Of the twelve crews, five (5) were three-man medium altitude bombardment crews and seven were two-man strafing crews. Nine two-man B-26 crews graduated on 8 August 1950 in Class 50A, and were ordered ^{48/} overseas.

Although authority was given on 26 July to call two Reserve Wings to active duty in order to relieve some of the "pressure" on Regular United States Air Force personnel, it turned out, paradoxically, that action had to be taken to fill airmen shortages in one of these Wings from the Regular Establishment owing to unexpectedly large numbers of deferments granted Reservists assigned to the Wing. In all, a total of 661 Regular Air Force airmen, in various SSN's had to be transferred to the Wing's units from sources within the Continental Air Command. ^{49/}

In endeavoring to carry out its responsibilities with respect to the Recall Program, the Continental Air Command was confronted with what its Vice Commander, Major General Charles T. Myers, described as three "problems" of an "exceptional nature". ^{50/}

^{47/} SECRET Memorandum, Sub: Summary of DO's Action as a Result of Korean Situation, 4 July 1950

^{48/} SECRET ComAC Diary, 10 August 1950

^{49/} Historical Report of the Airmen's Division, Directorate of Military Personnel, for August 1950

^{50/} SECRET Memorandum of General Myers for General Twining, Sub: Permanent Party Personnel Requirements to meet Involuntary Recall Loads, 20 July 1950

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The first of these "problems" emanated from the burden imposed upon the numbered Air Forces as the result of their Recall activities, a burden which, in General Myers' opinion, necessitated an increased authorization of 10 officers and 100 airmen in each numbered Air Force headquarters. ("Failing this support," said General Myers, "we invite the danger of stagnating pools, poor controls and delays.") The second "problem" stemmed from the requirement to operate processing squadrons, an activity requiring eleven officers and 68 airmen per thousand processes each month, or a total of 220 officers and 1660 airmen to handle a monthly flow of 20,000 personnel. The third "problem" originated in the additional workload imposed on Headquarters, Continental Air Command, as a result of the Korean situation, necessitating a personnel augmentation of 25 officers, 60 airmen and 20 civilians. The total "conservative" requirements of the Command were listed as being 265 officers, 2120 airmen and 20 civilians.^{51/} Approval was shortly forthcoming from Headquarters, United States Air Force for an additional 163 officer, 617 airmen and 511 civilian spaces. In addition, authority was given to recall approximately one thousand administrative airmen over and above the requirements previously furnished.^{52/}

^{51/} Ibid.

^{52/} SECRET LTR, USAF to Major General Charles T. Myers, Sub: Permanent Party Personnel Requirements to meet Involuntary Recall Loads, 14 August 1950

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To overcome the losses of personnel sustained by the Command and in order to meet the requirements for personnel entailed as a result of the build-up program, the Continental Air Command came to rely increasingly after 20 July 1950 (as did other major air commands) on recalls. The story of the problems posed in the procurement of these personnel has been related in another chapter in this monograph. For our purposes, let it merely be noted here that in spite of the fact that thinking on the matter of the recall of the Reservists dated back to early 1947^{53/}, the inauguration and actual operation of the Recall Program by the Continental Air Command in the summer of 1950 was attended by more than a score of difficulties. General Myers' prophetic utterance of 10 January 1950 to the effect that "The mobilization of our personnel resource is not going to be a matter to be attended to with ease and leisure in the event of another mobilization^{54/}" was, it seems, destined to be more than amply fulfilled.

^{53/} Among pertinent documentation on this point, see especially the following:

1. SECRET Study, Hq ADC, Sub: ADC Mobilization Plan 1947 (Preliminary Draft), 23 January 1947
2. SECRET Study, Hq ADC, Sub: Air Defense Command Mobilization Plan 1947, 30 January 1947
3. SECRET Study, Hq ADC, Sub: AAF Mobilization Plan, 29 April 1947
4. Ltr, ADC to USAF, Sub: Air Force Reserve Administration, 26 January 1948
5. Ltr, ADC to USAF, Sub: Air Force Reserve Administration, 6 August 1948
6. Historical Reports of the Directorate of Personnel Planning and Management for January-October 1950, inclusive

^{54/} SECRET Ltr, ComAC to Chief of Staff, USAF, Sub: Personnel Requirements Upon Mobilization, 10 January 1950

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Undoubtedly some of the adversities encountered by the Command in the operation of its controlled recall program could be charged off to the initial overriding speed in implementing the recall program, the uncertainty regarding the ultimate extent of Air Force expansion, and the limited facilities available to processing stations. ^{55/} By late October, when a greater degree of facility in the operation of the Recall Program had been attained, involuntary recall of Reserve Forces airmen was discontinued at the direction of the Department of Defense and extended active duty of officers was placed on a volunteer basis, except for those officers possessing critical skills not available from voluntary procurement or training sources. ^{56/}

IV

In its direct and indirect ramifications, the Korean War, posing, as it did, an urgent need for certain tactical and troop carrier units under the jurisdiction of the Continental Air Command, distinctly weakened the capabilities of the Command to support Department of the Army training in the ~~██████████~~ ^{57/} Zone of the Interior. At the same time as a result of the

^{55/} Ltr, USAF to ComAC, Sub: Recall of Reserve Officers and Airmen, 13 September 1950

^{56/} Historical Report of the Directorate of Personnel Mobilization Control for October 1950

^{57/} 1. Historical Reports of the Tactical Operations Branch, Operations Division, for July-September 1950, inclusive
2. SECRET Memorandum, Sub: Summary of DO's Actions as a Result of Korean Situation, 19 July 1950

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impetus which it gave to tactical aviation,^{58/} the Korean War was undoubtedly a factor contributing to the restoration of major command status to the Tactical Air Command on 1 December 1950.^{59/}

By underscoring the importance of effective Mobilization in the time of national crisis and by bringing to light certain deficiencies in the Air Force Reserve through the workings of the Recall Program, it is more than likely that the Korean War was a significant factor in hastening the reorganization of the Continental Air Command under which the Reserve Forces and Command area functions were to be divorced from the Command's combat missions.^{60/}

By bringing into sharp focus the complex of legal obstructions which inhibited the immediate and effective employment by the United States Air Force of Air National Guard units, the Korean War was undoubtedly an animating force in bringing about a critical reevaluation of the entire relationship of the Air Force vis-à-vis the Air National Guard,^{61/} and resulted, for one thing, in a move on the part of the Air Force to seek

^{58/} General Omar Bradley was quoted as saying that the No. 1 lesson of Korea was the need for tying aviation closer to ground troops. See TIME Magazine, 20 November 1950

^{59/} The New York Times, 10 November 1950

^{60/} Ibid.

^{61/} For an interesting commentary on the relationships of the Air Force vis-à-vis Air National Guard units, see SECRET Memorandum for General Myers, Sub: Weaknesses of ComAC Plan 1-50 as Pertains to the Air National Guard, prepared by the Directorate of Plans, Organization and Requirements, 27 April 1950

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Congressional legislation designed to erase from the lawbooks the archaic statutes which governed the employment and control of Air National Guard units.^{62/}

Finally, the outbreak of the Korean War was unquestionably responsible for the tremendous impetus accorded to the Command's air defense program, eventuating in the re-siting of Aircraft Control and Warning facilities, the deployment of Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons and the assignment of personnel in numbers sufficient to permit the continuous operation of aircraft control and warning systems.^{63/}

^{62/} Information orally conveyed to the Historian by Colonel Albert P. Clark, Jr., Assistant Deputy for Operations, Hq ConAC, December 1950

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1. Historical Report of the Air Defense Operations Division, Directorate of Operations and Training, for July 1950
 2. Historical Report of the Communications and Electronics Division, Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services, for August 1950
 3. Article bearing the by-line of C. P. Russell in the New York Times, 9 August 1950

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CHAPTER TWO

RECALL OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE

It is the traditional policy of the United States to rely for its national security largely upon the readiness and willingness of its citizens to mobilize rapidly as armed forces in the event of national emergency. 1/

I. Introduction

One of the Far East Air Forces' first needs upon the outbreak of war in Korea was for additional personnel. This requirement was met initially by the reassignment of Regular Air Force officers and airmen to Japan from the Zone of the Interior Commands, Continental Air Command included. To fill the gaps created in the domestic commands by the withdrawal of these persons and to bolster its resources to meet further Far East Air Forces demands, the United States Air Force turned to its Reserve Forces.

For almost a month after American troops went into Korea, the Air Force strived to meet its personnel requirements by volunteer recall of members of the United States Air Force Reserve. Continental Air Command's numbered air forces screened applications from Reserve officers and airmen requesting recall to active duty and if individual Reservists met the requirements for recall and qualified

1/ TWX, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 7 August 1950 [vid. sup. doc. #487

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to fill a vacancy in a Regular Air Force unit they were called or recalled to service. Had there been sufficient volunteers to meet requirements at this time there would have been no need to take further individual recall action. However, too few Reserve officers volunteered their services, especially those skilled in such fields as medicine, electronics and radio; as far as airmen volunteers were concerned, the number was scarcely worth mentioning. Consequently, more drastic measures had to be taken.

At the behest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, the President of the United States issued orders for what was termed "Involuntary Recall of the Reserve Forces." This meant that those individual Reservists whom the Armed Forces had need for on active duty were to be ordered to join the Regular establishment or "show cause" for their deferment. The Continental Air Command actively entered the picture when Headquarters, United States Air Force designated it sole agency for recall of those Reservists whom the Air Force required to fill out its ranks to combat strength. In general, these were the actions Continental Air Command was to take: (1) Recall voluntarily and involuntarily individual Reservists to meet specific quotas established by Headquarters, United States Air Force, and effect this recall without disrupting the Reserve Troop Carrier and Light Bomb Wings (for the "integrity" of these units had to be maintained in the event circumstances dictated their recall as entities); (2) Establish sufficient stations and procedures for in-processing of recalled Reservists; and (3) Establish

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Deferment Boards to consider applications of Reservists for release from their commitments for reasons of hardship and to make certain the Air Force had less need for a Reservist than had the Government for him in his civilian employment.

In due course, a more detailed account of the workings of the controlled recall system will be presented. Suffice it to say here in the introduction that while Continental Air Command was the logical command to handle this program for the parent headquarters its resources for conducting this activity were inadequate. Reserve records had been in the possession of the Continental Air Command for only about a year prior to the outbreak of the Korean war. And personnel shortages and fund limitations during this period had seriously curtailed the amount of effort Continental Air Command could devote to the administration of these records and other Reserve matters. Consequently, individual files, in many cases, did not reflect the current capabilities of the Reservist. Now, of a sudden, the Continental Air Command was ordered to recall thousands of Reservists according to specific skill requirements. How was Continental Air Command to accomplish this feat in the face of inaccurate or incomplete records and shortages of administrative personnel?

Continental Air Command did not have time to ponder the above question for long, however, nor to lament the lack of precedent to guide its efforts with the controlled recall program. The "overnight" requirement for additional personnel, the inadequacy of existing processing machinery to handle the sudden influx of Reservists,

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the indecision as to whether to recall Organized Reserve units intact or to break them up and recall only those individuals in them with critically needed specialties, the necessity for granting deferments to Reservists in vital positions or for hardship reasons and at the same time meet quota allotments -- these and other initial considerations decreed that Continental Air Command plunge immediately into its assignment. Mistakes were made and it took time to find solutions to them. As the ensuing narrative and supporting documents reveal, much of the "unraveling" took place on a trial-error-correction basis. But one single fact stands out in the midst of all the seeming confusion which enveloped the recall program at times: Despite the lack of precedent and despite the lack of concrete instructions, a steady flow of "selected" Reservists poured forth from the processing units to take up duty stations in the United States Air Force in its hour of need.

II. A Brief Review of the Air Force Reserve Program^{2/}

As peacetime custodian of the Reserve Forces -- the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps -- Continental Air Command has been responsible for so monitoring the progress and development of these organizations

^{2/} Data contained in this account was obtained for the most part from the transcription of an address delivered by Lieutenant Colonel Yudin before the National Convention of the Air Reserve Association at Fort Worth, Texas on 29 September 1950. For detailed information on the establishment and development of the Air Force Reserve Program see the Histories of ConAC from 1 December 1948 - 30 June 1950.

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that they would be capable of augmenting, with little additional training, limited Regular Air Force resources in the event of a national emergency. At least, that was the theory upon which the Reserve Forces programs (or Civilian Components as they are sometimes called) were established and maintained.

From the colleges and universities supporting Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps detachments have graduated many promising young Air Force officers. While a selected few of them, for exemplary achievement during their scholastic careers, have earned direct Regular commissions in the Air Force, the majority of them have been enrolled in the Air Force Reserve. The AFROTC program, therefore, supplies the Air Force Reserve with "new blood" and enhances the capabilities of the latter program to maintain "on call" a supply of trained individuals. The Air National Guard program, on the other hand, is an entity in itself, entirely separate from the Air Force Reserve program. Under State jurisdiction, the Air National Guard looks to the Air Force for equipment and training assistance only. By law, Air Guardsmen were exempted from individual recall. Further discussion of these programs, insofar as the purpose of this paper is concerned, is unnecessary.

To understand the functioning of the recall program, however, the reader must be familiar with the basic essentials of the Air Force Reserve program, for it was this program which provided primarily the personnel required to strengthen the Air Force for its task in Korea and for building-up Air Force capabilities for coping with possible

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similar outbreaks of aggression elsewhere.

Immediately following World War II, Congress authorized the establishment of a United States Air Force Reserve program. Fund limitations and the lack of airmen volunteers early inhibited the progress of this program, but in spite of many set-backs the Air Force Reserve struggled along until June of 1949 when a reorganization took place within its ranks. Out of that reorganization emerged a new program, entitled the United States Air Force Reserve Program of Fiscal Year 1950. At that juncture, the Air Force believed that it had realized at last the possession of a Reserve force which, ultimately, could be developed and equipped into a strong bulwark of defense in time of emergency.

The Air Force Reserve Program of June 1949 was the one in existence at the commencement of the Korean crisis. It was divided into two major segments: the Organized Air Reserve and the Volunteer Air Reserve. By far the greater proportion of the Reserve population belonged to the latter group. In the early days of the Air Force Reserve Program, training of the Volunteer Air Reserve had been of an unspecific, sporadic nature. To correct this was the purpose for the establishment of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Unit (VARTU) system. Specific personnel quotas were allocated this program, in conjunction with anticipated requirements of the Air Force in the event of an emergency. Training schedules, while naturally much less adequate than those afforded the Organized Reserve, were established and at frequent intervals members of VART units met to

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discuss the latest developments in military aviation, to listen to lectures on pertinent Air Force topics and to engage in limited training in individual specialties when training aids and literature were available. In return for their participation in this program, Reservists were permitted to retain their Reserve commissions, to accrue points for promotion and to qualify for retirement benefits. Naturally, this program was not expected to produce trim and fully prepared fighting men at a moment's notice, but it was to serve to keep up the interest of former military persons in the Air Force and to aid the Air Force to maintain its records of persons who would prove better material than raw draftees for fighting a war. Ultimately, the VARTU Program was to include 100 Groups, 500 Squadrons and a variable number of flights, the latter dependent upon the number of Reservists in any given area. With the cooperation of the Air University, Continental Air Command was just getting this aspect of the Reserve program in order when the Korean action broke out.

The Organized Reserve was a more "down-to-business" proposition. Reservists in this program were given the same advantages granted to members of the Volunteer Air Reserve. Additionally, they were called to two weeks active duty training each year and throughout the remainder of the year they participated in regularly scheduled inactive duty training. For the time they devoted to the program, these Reservists were paid.

The Organized Reserve was divided into three parts: The first of these, the Mobilization Designee and Mobilization Assignee Program,

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was, perhaps, the best source of personnel the Air Force had from which to meet sudden M-Day requirements. The principal value of this program was that a man was extended a specific assignment in a Regular Air Force unit during peacetime, was trained in that assignment, and stepped into that assignment on M-Day or during a comparable period of emergency. In June 1949, the exact number of mobilization assignees permitted each major Air Force command was established. The availability of funds and anticipated requirements of the Air Force in case of war were the criteria for the establishing of mobilization designee positions, alike in every respect to the mobilization assignee program with the exception that the designees were, for budgetary reasons, not paid. Reward for serving as a designee was high priority for a mobilization assignee spot and for recall to active duty at any time the Air Force expanded its troop strength.

The second type of Air Force Reserve program in the Organized Reserve was the Corollary Unit -- Reserve T/ONE units organized and trained by and with like Regular Air Force units. These units used the equipment and other facilities of the Regular Air Force unit to which they were affiliated. Personnel of the Regular Air Force unit were employed to assist in the instruction and training of these Reservists.

The third type of active Reserve program was the Air Force Reserve Training Center (AFRTC) Program. Continental Air Command had full responsibility for manning and operating the twenty-three Regular Air Force training centers on which this program was conducted ✓

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and for the organization and training of the twenty Reserve Troop Carrier and five Reserve Light Bomb Wings contained in this program. Aircraft and equipment were allocated to these Wings to permit effective training of ground personnel and to allow each Reserve pilot a total of eighty hours proficiency flying annually.

The officers and airmen in the Organized Air Force Reserve Program were to be the first called in the event of mobilization. Upon these resources Continental Air Command had geared its plans for mobilization. For those positions which did not require prompt or immediate filling there was the Volunteer Air Reserve, members of which could be mobilized and given intensive refresher training before they were committed to combat. The plan ultimately was to provide for the training of some 56,000 officers and about 40,000 airmen through the Volunteer Air Reserve program.

III. Voluntary Recall of Individuals

It was several days after the outbreak of "war" in Korea before Continental Air Command received first official intimation that recall of individual Reservists to active duty would provide the major solution to the problem of how to build up the strength of the Air Force. On 30 June, higher headquarters authorized Headquarters, Continental Air Command to recall to active duty as many electronic specialists as its Fiscal Year 1951 first quarter personnel authorization called for. Recall action in this case was to be

^{3/} Ltr, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, Sub: Recall of Reserve Officers and Airmen Personnel, 30 June 1950

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governed by the provisions of Air Force Regulation 45-4 in the case of officers,^{4/} and Air Force Letter 45-5 in the case of airmen.^{5/} These recalls, of course, were to be made on a voluntary basis and the duration of service for men called to duty under these terms was to be for a minimum period of six months and a maximum period of three years for officers and twenty-one months for airmen. Shortly thereafter, Headquarters, Continental Air Command requested and received authority to recall other specialists critically needed by both Continental Air Command and the Air Force as a whole.^{6/}

In selecting Reservists for active duty to augment its Regular establishment, Continental Air Command added the following additional criteria to those enumerated in Air Force directives: First choice of acceptance for active duty was to be given to Reservists who had kept current in their military skills, either through active participation in the Air Force Reserve program or through their civilian employment. Reservists with the greatest amount of military technical experience or training were to be given second consideration. In reference to officers alone, recent Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps graduates were to be given first opportunity for recall providing they were qualified to fill position requirements; for

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- ^{4/} AFR 45-4, Sub: Reserve Forces: Voluntary Call of Officers to Extended Active Duty, 30 November 1949
 - ^{5/} AFL 45-5, Sub: Reserve Forces: Male Enlisted Reservists Voluntary Call to 21 Months Active Duty, 13 July 1949
 - ^{6/} Ltr, Hq ConAC to Director of Military Personnel, Hq USAF, Sub: Recall to Active Duty of USAF Reserve Personnel, 6 July 1950 and 1st Ind, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 16 July 1950

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airmen, those most recently separated from the service were to be selected over other applicants. Continental Air Command's four numbered air forces were directed to solicit voluntary applications for recall to active duty of officers and airmen meeting the above criteria. No authority in these initial instructions was provided nor any quotas established for actual recall; rather, the numbered air forces were informed that they would be furnished periodic quotas for recall of officers by grade and specialty number according to the number of such applications they reported on hand. Station assignments, also, would be provided at that time and, whenever practicable, applicants would be assigned to duty at a Continental Air Command installation in the area of the numbered air force to which they had applied.^{7/}

At the time that it informed Headquarters, United States Air Force of the additional provisions which it had established for recall, Headquarters, Continental Air Command requested that it be permitted to add the stipulation that second priority for officer recall would be extended those officers recently separated for budgetary reasons.^{8/} Higher headquarters, however, refused to sanction this request, stating that it felt no priority for call or recall of officers should be extended "beyond that predicated on the capability, experience, and availability of all officers in the Reserve

^{7/} 1st Ind, Hq ComAC to CG 4th AF, 6 July 1950, To: Ltr, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, Sub: Recall of Reserve Officer and Airmen Personnel, 30 June 1950 [Vid. sup. doc. #5]

^{8/} RESTRICTED TX, Hq ComAC to DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, 4 July 1950

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9/ Headquarters, United States Air Force explained that it was reluctant to commit itself to any specific priority system for recall at that time. In the matter of airmen recall, Headquarters, Continental Air Command requested higher headquarters to confirm the additional provision that, if necessary, airmen could be recalled in grades as much as two steps higher than the grade normally currently authorized for their specialty if they possessed skills particularly sought by the Air Force. This request Headquarters, United States Air Force granted, pointing out, however, that the Air Force was already exceeding its overall budgeted grade ceiling and that overgrading as proposed would further aggravate the situation. 11/

By 6 July, Headquarters, United States Air Force had estimated the additional personnel reinforcements it needed to provide support to the Far East Air Forces and, at the same time, to "maintain the integrity" of the remaining major commands. The list of these requirements was forwarded to Continental Air Command along with instructions to fill them as best as possible through voluntary recall action. This was the first of four so-called "packages" to arrive at Headquarters, Continental Air Command to be filled from the Reserve "pool". It called for the recall of 2,909 officers and 19,980 airmen. There was little hope, of course, that Continental Air Command could effect this many recalls on a voluntary basis; however, as higher headquarters

9/ RESTRICTED TXL, Hq USAF to CG ComAC

10/ RESTRICTED TXL, Hq ComAC to DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, 4 July 1960

11/ RESTRICTED TXL, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, 6 July 1960

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pointed out, the Air Force would be called upon to demonstrate its procurement capability on a voluntary basis before consideration would be given to mobilizing Reserve units.^{12/}

If Continental Air Command Headquarters was unable to procure these officers and airmen by voluntary recall action, it was to inform higher headquarters of the fact and give its opinion on how it thought the Air Force could best utilize the Reserve "pool" to effect expansion of the Regular establishment.^{13/} Thus it appeared that Headquarters, United States Air Force was not yet decided as to how it would "mobilize" once authority was extended to put involuntary recall machinery into motion. At this time it was well enough aware of the fact that it required additional personnel, and it knew that the best place to obtain these persons was from the Reserve Forces. But how it was going to recall its Reserve Forces, whether by unit or individual action, it had not yet quite decided.

On 14 July, Continental Air Command informed the parent headquarters of the results it had had with volunteer methods of recalling Reservists to active duty as of that date. With the exception of volunteers for pilot, bombardier, and navigator positions, Continental Air Command had not had much success with the volunteer recall of officers. The fields of medicine, electronics, and radio,

^{12/} SECRET ltr, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, Sub: Recall of Reserve Officer and Airmen Personnel, 6 July 1950. Attached to this document was a list of Reserve officers and airmen, by number and by specialty, for recall. This "package" was labeled FEAF #1.

^{13/} Ibid.

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it pointed out, were the most difficult to fill. Airmen recall by volunteer methods was, putting it bluntly, a "dismal failure." Of the 19,980 airmen called for in the first "package", only 100 had been recalled.^{14/}

Continental Air Command issued a consolidated set of instructions to its numbered air forces for voluntary recall of individual Reservists on 19 July. A review of the provisions of this document provides a short summary of the voluntary recall program.^{15/} Under the provisions of these instructions, Continental Air Command numbered air forces were authorized to initiate a program to recall officers and airmen of the Air Force Reserve to extended active duty on a voluntary basis. The numbered air forces were to secure applications for active duty from Reservists in their areas to meet the requirements for personnel established by higher headquarters in "package" #1, previously mentioned, and to meet their personnel needs but who were eligible to fill an Air Force assignment elsewhere were to be called to active duty and retained at the base where they were recalled until assignment instructions were forwarded by Headquarters, Continental Air Command.

Minimum criteria which Reservists had to meet to qualify for recall were enumerated in this consolidation set of instructions.

^{14/} Ibid., SECRET 1st Ind, Hq ComAC to DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, 14 July 1950 [Vid. sup. doc. #12]

^{15/} Ltr, PPM-R 210.455, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Subj: Voluntary Recall of Officer and Airmen Personnel, 19 July 1950

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Priorities for recall of pilots were also established. In addition, more selective criteria were enumerated. Those officers and airmen who had remained proficient in their skills, either by participation in the Air Force Reserve or through their civilian jobs and those with the greatest amount of military technical experience or training were to be recalled over other Reservists. For officers, Air Force Reserve Training Corps graduates, if qualified in their specialties, were to be given first choice, and those officers recently separated from the service for budgetary reasons were to be given next priority. For the most part, grade vacancies were to be adhered to, with the exception that vacancies calling for lieutenants could be filled by either first or second lieutenants.^{16/} The officer Reservist willing, he could be recalled at two grades lower than the grade he held in the Reserves. Mobilization assignees could be recalled by the numbered air forces to fill positions within their units. If a mobilization assignee was requested to come onto active duty and refused to do so, he was to be relieved from his mobilization assignment and assigned to the Volunteer Air Reserve. Preference to airmen Reservists volunteering for active duty was given to those most recently separated from the service. Over grading, it was stated, was not to bar the recall of an airman who possessed a skill currently in great demand.^{17/}

^{16/} Ibid. The numbered air forces were authorized to recall Reservists in grades up to major on their own initiative. Recall authority for recall of officers in field grade, however, had to be obtained from Hq ComAC.

^{17/} Ibid.

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Shortly after the above list of instructions was issued, a revised quota of personnel, officer and airmen, required by Headquarters, United States Air Force for immediate recall was forwarded. The new "package" set up the requirement for 2,000 pilots, 1,200 specialized observers (officers), and 4,236 non-rated officers. Requirements for airmen from the Reserve "pool" not totaled 41,535.^{18/}

Illustrative of the rapidity with which instructions for recall were amended, Continental Air Command forwarded to its numbered air forces a number of changes to the 19 July consolidated directory less than a week later. Outstanding among these changes were: Authority was granted to recall volunteer WAF personnel to help meet Air Force personnel requirements. Since there was no program for recall of Reserve Chaplains, applications for active duty from these Reservists were to be governed by the provisions of the second part of paragraph eight of Air Force Regulation 45-4.^{19/} Also, authority was granted to recall medical and dental officers in the current Reserve grade up to and including lieutenant colonel without reference to Headquarters, Continental Air Command. Formerly, applications from these officers were received and processed by the numbered air forces but they had to be forwarded then to higher headquarters for final approval.^{20/} A final alteration was that the numbered air forces were

^{18/} RESTRICTED ltr, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, Sub: Recall of Reserve Officer and Airmen Personnel, 20 July 1960

^{19/} RESTRICTED ltr, Hq ConAC to CGs All Major Commands, Sub: Voluntary Recall Instructions of Continental Air Command, 24 July 1960

^{20/} 1. Ibid.
2. FWX, Hq ConAC to CGs ConAC APs, 20 July 1960

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authorized to recall their mobilization assignees up to and including the grade of captain. For recall of mobilization assignees in grades over that, approval had to be obtained from Headquarters, Continental Air Command.

IV. Involuntary Recall of Reservists

The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, early in July, requested authority to initiate involuntary recall of Reservists. Anticipating the granting of this request, Headquarters, United States Air Force, on 18 July, informed Continental Air Command of its plans for implementing this action once it was placed in effect. In this initial correspondence pertaining to involuntary recall, higher headquarters informed that Reservists recalled under the provisions of this policy would be in numbers and skills which the Air Force required. Since there was no intention of halting voluntary recall once involuntary recall went into effect, all officer recalls henceforth would be made in the Reservist's Reserve rank. In other words, the policy of permitting volunteers for active duty to be recalled in grades lower than their Reserve grades would, after the commencement of involuntary recall procedures, be eliminated.^{21/}

The equitable adjustment of rank between active duty officers and recalled officers was a difficult task for the Air Force. During the post-war years, the Air Force, as well as the other branches of the Armed Services, had operated under budgetary restrictions which

^{21/} SECRET ltr, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, Sub: Recalls to Active Duty, 18 July 1950

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had not permitted the promotion of many capable and promising active duty officers to grades consistent with the levels of responsibility which they had been performing. For this reason, Reservists accepted to fill voluntary recall quotas were not recalled in their terminal leave grades, unless subsequent to such promotions they had demonstrated their ability to discharge the responsibilities of such grades. This procedure, in the opinion of the Air Force, established a minimum of parity between the ranks of officers who had served for a long time on active duty without promotion and the ranks of Reservists recalled voluntarily to active duty. Thus, until the establishment of involuntary recall policies there were no great difficulties encountered in maintaining an equitable distribution of grade between active duty officers and recalled officers.^{22/}

However, when involuntary procedures went into effect this happy medium was destroyed. The law provided that when Reserve officers were involuntarily recalled they were to come onto active duty in their Reserve rank. Consequently, if officers involuntarily recalled were to be permitted this privilege, officers volunteering for duty during the same period could not be penalized by being recalled in their pre-terminal leave rank. In short, all Reserve officers, in all fairness to volunteers, had to be recalled in their Reserve grade. But how was this to affect the promotion of active duty officers? Were they to lose out on what, for many of them, was their first chance at promotion since the end of the war? Higher

^{22/} Ibid.

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headquarters proposed to deal with the problem in the following manner: Until the occasion for greater expansion of the Air Force, individual involuntary recall of Reservists would not be made in grade higher than captain. This, of course, would not apply to senior Reserve officers in units recalled to active duty.^{23/} Nor would it apply always to the recall of doctors, dentists, and certain key specialists. If demand dictated, these persons would be recalled in grades higher than those normal to overall recall requirements.^{24/} Other than the above cited exceptions, however, recall was to be restricted to company grade officers.

Necessity for this policy was quite evident. United States Air Force Headquarters estimated that it had about 14,000 officers serving on active duty in grades below their Reserve grades as well as other officers equally deserving of promotion. In all fairness to them, general recalls had to be held to the lowest commissioned grades until deserving active duty promotions were accomplished.^{25/}

On 19 July, involuntary recall was authorized by President Truman.^{26/} The following day, Headquarters, United States Air Force

^{23/} Ibid. At this time, the program for recall of units had not been firmly established. Until it was, the integrity of the Reserve units was to be maintained by meeting the greatest practicable portion of individual recall requirements from the Volunteer Air Reserve "pool" and from Reservists assigned to units which were unlikely to be recalled into active Federal service.

^{24/} 1. Ibid.
2. FWX, Hq USAF to CG ComAC

^{25/} Ibid.

^{26/} Personnel News Letter, Department of the Air Force, Vol III, No. 9, 1 September 1950

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informed its Zone of the Interior Commands that it planned to commence involuntary recall of Reserve officers and airmen to replace skills withdrawn as a result of the Korean situation. All procurement action, it was stated, would be implemented by Continental Air Command. Command allocations of skills would be determined by Headquarters, United States Air Force and would be forwarded to Continental Air Command for procurement action. At the same time, each major command would be notified of its allocation. This was the program, in its basic essentials, that was to continue throughout the period of involuntary recall.

To expedite station assignment of personnel within each command, all major commands were instructed to place an officer on temporary duty at Headquarters, Continental Air Command to represent their personnel interests. Upon receipt from United States Air Force of the numbers, by specialty, of personnel authorized for recall, each Command was to determine station assignment for those persons and forward that information to its personnel liaison officer.

Shortly after this information was forwarded, Continental Air Command published the first consolidated set of instructions to its numbered air forces for effecting involuntary recall. The principal provisions established in this document were: (1) Personnel from the Volunteer Air Reserve were to be recalled for assignment to commands other than Continental Air Command. (2) Continental Air Com-

27/ TWX, Hq USAF to All Major Commands, 20 July 1950

28/ Ibid.

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mand's corollary unit members, with the exception of those in the 302nd and 309th Troop Carrier Wings, and mobilization assignees and designees were to be recalled to fill Continental Air Command station vacancies; and (3) Members of the Volunteer Air Reserve were to be recalled to fill vacancies in Continental Air Command units when corollary unit personnel or mobilization assignees or designees were not available.^{29/} Members of the Reserve Troop Carrier and Light Bomb Wings in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program were excluded from recall action at this time. Still no definite policy had been established as to whether or not any Reserve units would be recalled; until such information was forthcoming, the integrity of these units had to be maintained. Duration of duty of Reservists involuntarily recalled, both officers and airmen, was for a minimum period of one year.

Effective with the publication of this document, recall quotas set forth in the 19 July document pertaining to voluntary recall were cancelled; however, voluntary recalls were to continue under provisions established in this directive. The new method of procedure required the numbered air force headquarters to accomplish call or recall to active duty only as specifically directed by Headquarters, Continental Air Command. The latter headquarters was to forward the numbers (by specialty by station assignment) of Reservists to be recalled. Individuals were then to be selected

^{29/} RESTRICTED ltr, PPM-R 210.455, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Subj: Involuntary Recall of USAF Reserve Personnel, 24 July 1950

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by name and be actually recalled by the numbered air forces. For the most part, criteria for establishing eligibility of Reservists for recall were the same as for voluntary recall.^{30/}

On 26 July an amended quota of airmen United States Air Force desired to have recalled from the Reserve "pool" was forwarded to Continental Air Command. This was the so-called "FRAP #1 and #2 Revised" quota.^{31/} Partial deduction was made in this quota of requirements imposed on Continental Air Command for the recall to active duty of two Reserve Wings.^{32/} As soon as Continental Air Command was certain how many additional persons it would need to man these units, Headquarters, United States Air Force stated, further adjustments would be made in recall quotas. Total airmen to be recalled at this time numbered 39,412. On 31 July 1950, the final "package" was forwarded to Continental Air Command establishing recall requirements for airmen at 41,526.^{33/}

A new set of consolidated instructions for involuntary recall was released by Continental Air Command on August 4th. At this time, Continental Air Command Headquarters pointed out to its air forces that the basic concept of the involuntary program was: "no one, officer or airmen, [were to] be recalled until a specific individual quota

^{30/} Ibid.

^{31/} RESTRICTED ltr, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, Sub: Amended Quota Allocation of Reserve Airmen, 26 July 1950

^{32/} See below: Recall of Reserve Units to Active Duty, pp.

^{33/} RESTRICTED ltr, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, Sub: Amended Quota Allocation of Reserve Airmen, 31 July 1950

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(including SSN and station assignment) [had] been established and furnished [the numbered air force] headquarters." Recall provisions for recall of Continental Air Command's mobilization assignees and designees remained unchanged; the numbered air forces were to continue to recall these Reservists to fill Continental Air Command station requirements. However, the additional proviso was included in these instructions that mobilization assignees and designees assigned other major commands were to be recalled, at the direction of Headquarters, Continental Air Command, to fill vacancies within those commands. A change was made also in the provisions regulating recall of Continental Air Command's corollary unit members. Whereas station assignment of these individuals had been restricted to Continental Air Command units, in the past, they could now be assigned to fill any station vacancy within the Air Force. As formerly, members of the Volunteer Air Reserve were to be recalled when mobilization assignees, mobilization designees or corollary unit personnel were not available to fill quota allotments. Reservists in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program were still to be exempted from recall action.^{34/}

Final instructions pertinent to involuntary recall were issued on 19 August. For the most part, there was little change wrought by this document in the procedures the numbered air forces were applying to involuntary recall. The reader has but to compare this document

^{34/} RESTRICTED ltr, PFM-R 210.458, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Subj: Individual Recall of USAFR Personnel, 4 August 1960

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with the 24 July document to see the long way Continental Air Command had come in formulating and establishing rules of procedure for involuntary recall. Had such a document as this been in existence at the outset of the recall program, it is likely that little difficulty, or at least much less difficulty, would have been encountered.^{35/}

Because members of the Volunteer Air Reserve were so "rusty" that they required too much refresher training before they could commence combat crew training or unit transition training,^{36/} and because Continental Air Command felt the fullest advantage of the Organized Reserve "pool" was not being taken to meet rated personnel requirements, the 19 August consolidation of recall instructions stated that each major command, other than Continental Air Command, was to list its assignees and designees and corollary members according to the following breakdown: (1) Those who were considered essential for ultimate assignment to their command; (2) Those whose recall was not recommended because of their lack of proficiency in their specialties or because they were unqualified for duty in their current grade, or for other reasons; and (3) Those who were left over after the above had been categorized. Once this list was submitted to Continental Air Command, it was planned, action would be taken to recall and assign to the major command, as soon as station assignments

^{35/} RESTRICTED ltr, PPM-R 210.455, Hq ConAC to CGs ConAC AFs, Sub: Individual Recall of USAFR Personnel, 19 August 1950

^{36/} 1. Memorandum, CG ConAC to Deputy for Personnel, Hq ConAC, Sub: Recall of Rated Officer Personnel of USAF Reserve, 19 August 1950
2. TRX, Hq ConAC to CGs ConAC AFs, 19 August 1950

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and recall quotas were established, those Reservists the command reported as essential to its purposes. Those reported as undesirable would be checked and reassigned either to the Volunteer Air Reserve or have their Reserve commissions revoked. Finally, those in the remaining category would be recalled by the numbered air forces to fill any station allocation^{37/}. By this action, Continental Air Command hoped to open up the large "pool" of Organized Reserve resources which had hitherto not been tapped overly hard for recall. To recall those corollary unit members who were not essential to the functioning of the other major commands would not destroy the training investment the other major commands had placed in their corollary Reservist programs nor would it interfere with the preservation of Reserve unit strength. On the other hand, by utilizing corollary unit members the other major commands had no use for, the Air Force would secure better trained individuals than the Volunteer Air Reserve had to offer.

The above action was but one more attempt on the part of Continental Air Command to "dip into" the zealously hoarded corollary unit resources of the other major commands to meet air crew quota requirements. At the outset of the recall program there were no procedures in existence for recall of corollary unit personnel assigned the other major commands. Of the opinion that rated personnel of the corollary units would require much less pre-combat

^{37/} RESTRICTED ltr, PFM-R 210.455, 19 August 1950 [vid. sup. doc. #34]

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training that would rated personnel in the Volunteer Air Reserve, Continental Air Command early proposed that each major command be authorized to recall its own corollary unit members to fill the quotas allotted them by higher headquarters. Headquarters, United States Air Force, however, anxious to "maintain the integrity" of as many of its Reserve units as possible, refused this petition and gave to Continental Air Command sole authority to recall the corollary unit members of other major commands but only upon the request of the latter and only to meet the latter's needs. This, of course, decreed that the majority of the quota allocations would be filled from the Volunteer Air Reserve.^{38/}

Additionally, however, higher headquarters authorized Continental Air Command to recall members of all corollary units "where the skill [was] in critically short supply and the individual [was] needed to meet a world-wide Air Force requirement of higher priority that [existed] within the major air command."^{39/} On the surface, this action would seem to have satisfied Continental Air Command's desire to recall rated personnel from any corollary unit to meet any requirement. However, there was one drawback which prevented Continental Air Command from implementing this action; it had no way of ascertaining whether it would be robbing Peter to pay Paul when it selected corollary unit members of one major command to assign to another. In other words, Continental Air Command had no basis for determining

^{38/} TWX, Hq USAF to All Domestic and Overseas Commands, 29 July 1960

^{39/} Ibid.

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whether one recall requirement had a higher priority than another. To enable it to make this decision was the reason Continental Air Command requested each major command to list its corollary units according to those it required for its own purposes, those which it recommended to be relieved of their corollary unit assignments, and those which were free for Continental Air Command to recall to fill any requirement.

But if Continental Air Command thought the above action would solve its problems, it was mistaken: the major commands, when the lists were in, considered practically all their corollary unit members essential for retention. There was nothing to do but carry the case back to United States Air Force for settlement. As explained by Continental Air Command, something had to be done to enable Continental Air Command to meet its recall requirements for air crew personnel. In the past, when air crew requirements provided for attendance at Air Training Command refresher courses, it was practical to recall Volunteer Air Reserve personnel to fill the quota; however, when no refresher training was provided such recall requirements had been met from Continental Air Command Organized Reserve resources. As a consequence, Continental Air Command corollary units had been "stripped" of air crew personnel to meet Air Force-wide requirements and, even some air crew personnel had been called from the AFRC Reserve Wings, a dangerous practice that had to stop if the integrity of these units was to be preserved. In view of this, Continental Air Command asked permission of higher headquarters to

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recall the corollary unit members of other major commands regardless of the latter's preferences in the matter.^{40/}

In response to Continental Air Command's request for authority to recall corollary unit members of any major command to meet any requirement, Headquarters, United States Air Force established the following policy in mid-November: Upon submission of a request from a corollary unit member for active duty, the major air commander would indicate whether or not he had use for the Reservist in his command. If so, the Reservist would be assigned to that command; if not, Continental Air Command could assign the Reservist to any existing Air Force vacancy. At the same time, Continental Air Command was authorized to recall through involuntary means any corollary unit Reservists "for world-wide assignment when they possessed^{41/} skills not available from voluntary procurement or training sources."

V. Deferments

Immediately upon the commencement of involuntary recall, Continental Air Command discovered that a large number of Reservists would not be available for immediate return to active duty. Many held key civilian positions in organizations whose continued efficient operation was directly contributive to the "war" effort. Others had personal troubles of such a nature that their recall at the time they received their orders would work a hardship on themselves or their dependents. Consequently, there was no alternative

^{40/} RESTRICTED TXL, Hq ComAC to Director of Military Personnel, Hq USAF, 13 October 1960

^{41/} TXL, Hq USAF to Major Domestic Commands, 17 November 1960

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but to excuse these persons temporarily from recall. To grant these deferments and still meet United States Air Force manpower quotas was not an easy task for Continental Air Command. To establish adequate procedures and criteria for granting deferments and to prevent abuse of these provisions by Reservists whose only reason for requesting deferment was an intense reluctance to return to active duty was a major assignment.

There was no necessity, naturally, for granting deferments during the voluntary period of recall. If an officer or airman requested to come onto active duty, and if he met the physical standards, was qualified in his specialty, and satisfied other recall criteria, his application was accepted. However, even during this period, if a Reservist was employed in an important position with the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) or held a key position in an industry whose product was essential to the "war" effort, his application for active duty was discouraged. It was up to the commander of the numbered air force to which the Reservist submitted his application to decide whether or not his position with one of the above organizations was important enough to warrant his remaining on his civilian ^{42/}job.

When the inevitable time arrived for the institution of involuntary recall, first instructions to the numbered air forces were more concerned with whom to recall than with whom not to recall.

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- ^{42/} 1. 1st Ind, Hq ComAC to CG 4th AF, 8 July 1950, To: Ltr, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, Sub: Recall of Reserve Officers and Airman Personnel, 30 June 1950 ^{42/} Vid. sup. doc. #3/
2. RESTRICTED TRK, Hq ComAC to DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, 4 July 1950 ^{42/} Vid. sup. doc. #9/

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There were stipulations in these instructions which disqualified certain Reservists for active duty. Those who were found physically unfit for general service with waiver were disqualified immediately for recall. Also, those who were considered poor security risks and those drawing a pension, disability allowance or disability compensation from the United States Government and who did not relinquish this compensation if found qualified for duty were not recalled. Finally, those provisions enumerated above concerning key employment with certain civilian industries remained applicable. Other than these stipulations, however, no additional provisions for deferment were included in the initial, consolidated listing of instructions forwarded to the numbered air forces by Headquarters, Continental Air Command for effecting involuntary recall.^{43/}

By 4 August, date of the release of Continental Air Command's second consolidated directory of instructions for involuntary recall, certain definite policies had been established for granting deferments to Reservists recalled to active duty. Because as of that date the Department of Defense had not released an official deferment policy, Continental Air Command's instructions to its air forces on the subject were, as it called them, "interim" policies. All Air Force Reservists had an obligation to serve in the Regular Air Force to meet that establishment's personnel requirements, Continental Air Command stated, but national interest might take precedence over this requirement and demand the deferment of certain Reservists for a period of

^{43/} RESTRICTED ltr, PFM-R 210.455, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: Involuntary Recall of USAF Reserve Personnel, 24 July 1950
[Vid. sup. doc. #29]

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time. The various types of civilian occupations which required the services of the Reservist more than did the Air Force were then listed. However, mere employment in the industries or organizations on this list was not considered sufficient evidence to defer a Reservist. Rather, each case was to be decided individually by a deferment board on the basis of a written statement from the Reservist's employer. In addition to deferment for reasons of critical employment, deferments were to be granted Reservists enrolled in medical, dental, and veterinary schools.^{44/} Members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,^{45/} Civil Aeronautics Authority, and the Atomic Energy Commission, and those Reservists whose recall would critically affect community health or welfare were also exempted at this time.^{46/} Finally, Reservists were granted deferment for a period of not more than two months if they could produce sufficient evidence that their recall would work undue hardship on either their dependents or themselves. If the case was such that this temporary hardship would not

^{44/} RESTRICTED ltr, PFM-R 210.455, Hq ConAC to CGs ConAC AFs, Subj: Recall of USAFR Personnel, 4 August 1950 [Vid. sup. doc. #36/]. Reservists enrolled in other courses in a university or college were deferred until they had completed their current semester. If they were taking post graduate instruction or were pursuing scientific studies for which the Air Force had a critical requirement (e.g., nuclear physics, electronics) they could be deferred until they had completed their current course of instruction.

^{45/} Ibid. Reservists employed by these organizations were not to be recalled until an availability study underway in USAF Hq was completed. Each air force forwarded a list of Reservists who were employees of these organizations to Hq ConAC.

^{46/} Ibid. Conclusive evidence had to be submitted to prove that the recall of these Reservists would have their affect on their communities.

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be alleviated by the end of the two month period, the Reservist was to be transferred to the Inactive Air Reserve. If the Reservist was a medical or dental officer, however, and the request for deferment on these grounds was over the sixty day period, his case was to be forwarded to Headquarters, United States Air Force for final disposition.

As pointed out by Continental Air Command, the above deferment of Reservists was only temporary to avoid disruption of essential industry or service. Deferment was not to exceed six months. At the end of that time, each case was to be reviewed on its individual merits. The intention of Continental Air Command was to eliminate from the active Reserve program those Reservist who appeared to be subject to a continuing ^{47/}deferment.

On 7 August, Headquarters, United States Air Force released its policy on deferments. For the most part, the provisions of this policy were in agreement with deferment procedures already placed into effect by Continental Air Command. "Delays in calling to active duty members of the civilian shall not be considered as a means of exempting individuals indefinitely from military service," higher headquarters stated, "and such delays may be terminated at any time due to overriding military considerations." All such delays were to be granted on an individual basis only, it was directed. Delays would be for a maximum period of six months. No blanket delays in recall to active duty were to be made. If, after strict interpreta-

^{47/} Ibid.

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tion of the provisions of Air Force Regulation 39-13, 3 November 1949 had been applied to the individual case, a delay beyond this maximum period had to be granted, the Reservist was to be transferred to the inactive Reserve.^{48/}

The actual machinery for deferment, as established in the final consolidated directory of instructions published by Continental Air Command concerning recall procedures was as follows: Each numbered air force established one or more deferment boards, composed of officer members of the Judge Advocate General's Department Reserve or officers with comparable qualifications, in its area. All Reservists upon reporting to a processing squadron who desired deferment were permitted to present their cases to the deferment board of that station. When the case fell clearly within one of the criteria for deferment, the board had the authority to issue appropriate orders in the name of the air force commander for deferring the individual. When deferment was not granted by the board, the Reservist was directed to proceed to the station to which he was assigned.^{49/} In those cases where the individual appealed this board's decision, the appeal was forwarded direct to the Continental Air Command's Air Judge Advocate and, if the Board of Appeals established at Headquarters, Continental Air Command granted the appeal, appropriate deferment orders were issued from that headquarters.^{50/}

^{48/} TWX, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 7 August 1950

^{49/} RESTRICTED ltr, PFM-R 210.455, Hq ConAC to CGs ConAC A/Fs, Subj: Individual Recall of USAFR Personnel, 19 August 1950 [vid. sup. doc. #357]

^{50/} Hq ConAC Special Orders #163, 22 August 1950

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The policy adopted by Continental Air Command of sending a Reservist whose application for deferment had been rejected by a processing center deferment board to his station assignment pending ultimate decision on his appeal was considered necessary for the fact that once Reservists being involuntarily recalled know that they could "stall" by requesting deferments Continental Air Command might conceivably never meet its recall commitments. And, really, there was little logical reason for delay. As Continental Air Command stated, it selected good men to act as deferment boards at the processing centers and there would be few instances of overrulings of their decision by the Command Board.^{51/}

On 8 September, President Truman signed the Dependency Assistance Act of 1950 which provided basic allowance to airmen with dependents.^{52/} Thereafter, airmen in the lower grades were no longer granted dependency deferments. Passage of this bill terminated the hard struggle Continental Air Command had had with recalling skilled airmen below the rank of staff sergeant with dependents.

Immediately preceding the Korean "war", airmen Reservists in grade four and below with dependents had been ineligible for recall.^{53/} Since there were no provisions for providing airmen in the four lower grades allowances for dependents, it would have been almost impossible

^{51/} CONFIDENTIAL ltr, General Whitehead to General Twining, 11 August 1950

^{52/} TWX, Hq ComAC to All Major Commands, 8 September 1950

^{53/} Air Force Letter 45-5, 13 July 1949, paragraph 3a [Vid. sup. doc. #5]

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for these men to support their families on their salaries. During the period of increased voluntary recall action following the outbreak of the "war" in Korea, however, Continental Air Command's numbered air force commanders were authorized to waive the stipulation preventing return to active duty of airmen in the lower grades. If they wished to struggle along on their salaries, that was their business. Once involuntary recall commenced, however, the old restriction went back into effect. Until dependency legislation for airmen in the lower grades was passed, Headquarters, United States Air Force directed, these Reserve airmen would be "deferred" from recall action.

Headquarters, Continental Air Command soon realized the difficulty it would have in meeting its airmen quotas for recall so long as it could not recall this category of airmen. The truth of the matter was, Continental Air Command did "not have the capability of meeting ^{54/} [its] requirements" if it could not recall airmen in the lower grades with dependents. But United States Air Force Headquarters could do little else but "press" for early legislation to provide this benefit.^{55/}

Headquarters, Continental Air Command late in July uncovered an old policy which authorized airmen in the fourth grade (sergeant) with dependents who had seven years or over in the Air Force to

^{54/} Ltr, General Whitehead to General Nugent, DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, Sub: Personnel Specialty Deficiencies in the USAF Reserve, 27 July 1950

^{55/} Ibid., 1st Ind, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, 14 August 1950

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receive dependency allotments. Time spent in the Reserve could be counted toward this time requirement. As the Deputy for Personnel stated, this helped considerably to alleviate the problem.^{56/} However, passage of the Dependency Assistance Act was the only satisfactory solution to the problem.^{57/}

VI. Reporting and Processing

To accommodate the influx of Reservists from the inactive Reserve individually recalled to active duty, Headquarters, Continental Air Command and Air Training Command activated nine processing stations in early August.^{58/} Establishment of adequate procedures for rapid, thorough processing of these individuals soon occupied much of Continental Air Command's attention. Actual recall of these Reservists, as stated previously, was performed by Continental Air Command's numbered air forces. Reservists were notified by night

^{56/} IBS, Director of Personnel Planning and Management to Deputy for Personnel, Hq ConAC, 28 July 1960 /Authority: Department of the Army and Air Force Bulletin No. 30, 21 October 1949 (Sections 202a(2); 301 and 302/

^{57/} The urgency for recall of Reserve airmen in the lower grades with dependents and the frustration felt by both Hq USAF and Hq ConAC in not being able to "tap" this large resource of airmen is well illustrated in the following documents:
 1. TFX, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 1 August 1960
 2. TFX, Hq ConAC to DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, 11 August 1960

^{58/} Ltr, PRC-O 319.26, Hq ConAC to CGs ConAC AFBs, Sub: Correct Mailing Addresses of Air Force Processing Squadrons, 24 August 1960. In October, the 3300th Personnel Processing Squadron at Keesler AFB was inactivated and a new squadron (the 3890th) was activated at Maxwell AFB in Alabama. By this action, Air University joined ConAC and ATRC in the processing of Reservists. /Historical Report of the Personnel Mobilization Control Branch for October 1960/

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letter to report to the United States Air Force processing station nearest their homes. At the same time, Special Orders were issued by the numbered air force headquarters confirming the directions contained in the night letter and specifying the ultimate duty station of the individual. Duplicate copies of these orders were then sent to the proper processing station to arrive as soon after dispatch of the night letter as possible. The night letter constituted the authority for the Reservists to obtain Transportation Requests and meal tickets from the nearest Air Force Base or Recruiting Service Station.^{59/}

As stipulated in recall instructions, the mission of each processing station was to receive, process, house, mess and report the flow of Reserve personnel directed to it. During August, processing of each Reservist took approximately forty-eight hours. Receiving consisted of checking the incoming Reservist's orders and records. At this time, the Reservist was queried as to his present employment to determine whether he was eligible for deferment because of critical employment. Since complete medical processing facilities were not available at this time, the medical "examination" consisted of filling out Standard Form 89 (Medical History) and certain portions of the "Report of Medical Examination." A Physical inspection was

^{59/} RESTRICTED ltr, PFM-R 210.456, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: Involuntary Recall of USAF Reserve Personnel, 24 July 1960
 [Vid. sup. doc. #257]. Members of corollary units and mobilization assignees and designees recalled were not sent to processing stations. They were processed into active duty at the location of the units to which they were assigned. Members of Reserve units in the APFTC program, when their unit was recalled, were to be processed at the APFTC to which the unit was assigned.

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made for the detection of communicable diseases and "gross" physical defects. ^{60/} Various other routine activities were performed, such as administration of the oath of service, filling out of Emergency Data Cards, and applying for National Service Life Insurance and Allotments, ^{61/} etc.

At the beginning of the involuntary recall program, Reservists were permitted ten days between receipt of notification of recall to active duty and the date they were to report to the processing center to wind up their civilian affairs. ^{62/} This was in contrast to the Army and Navy system of granting twenty-one days. From the outset, Continental Air Command had difficulty with this time interval; the numbered airforces were swamped with "several hundred requests daily ... for additional time to settle business and personal affairs." ^{63/}

^{60/} RESTRICTED ltr, PPM-R 210,456, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: Individual Recall of USAFR Personnel, 4 August 1960 Vid. sup. doc. #34

^{61/} During August the nine processing stations processed 2,017 officers and 14,980 airmen for recall to active duty. Of this number, 74 officers and 811 airmen were rejected for physical reasons. Deferments during the same month totalled 4,309 of which 226 were officers and 4,143 were airmen. As of 30 August, 1,442 officers and 8,084 airmen were sent to duty. On 31 August, 275 officers and 1,942 airmen were being processed. Historical Report of the Directorate of Personnel Mobilization Control, 1 - 31 August 1960

^{62/} RESTRICTED ltr, PPM-R 210,456, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: Individual Recall of USAFR Personnel, 4 August 1960 Vid. sup. doc. #34

^{63/} TWX, CG 10th AF to CG ComAC, 7 August 1960

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Not only did this require an exorbitant amount of additional administrative labor, it interfered with the controlled flow of Reservists to processing and duty stations. Subsequently, Headquarters, Continental Air Command received permission to increase the time interval to twenty-one days.^{64/}

By mid-August the details of processing had been fairly well ironed out. Orders directing Reservists to report for processing were issued as sufficiently in advance of the date of entry onto active duty as possible. Usually, this time interval was twenty-one days plus travel time. In the event the individual requested additional time, the time limit could be extended for any period up to a maximum of thirty days^{65/} by the numbered air force commanders at the processing stations. Reservists now received more complete physical examinations, including blood typing, physically disqualified officers were transferred to the Honorary Air Force Reserve; airmen found physically disqualified were discharged from the Air Force Reserve. Those Reservists not eligible for deferment on other

^{64/} Members of Reserve units recalled to active duty were given thirty days notice. ConAC Headquarters questioned this practice. Considering the fact that members of units were supposedly to have a much higher state of readiness than individual Reservists there appeared to be little justification to grant this latter category of Reservists less time than the former to clear up their civilian affairs prior to reporting for duty. [TRX, CG ConAC to DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, 27 September 1950]

^{65/} Later this extension of nine days was ceased and requests from Reservists for more than twenty-one days between notification of recall and reporting date had to be treated as deferments. [TRX, CG ConAC to All ConAC APs, 27 September 1950]

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grounds were then processed through to their duty stations.^{66/}

The number of Reservists processed through these stations in September was considerably less than in August.^{67/} This reduction was directly attributable to the fact that, commencing 1 September, the time Reservists spent in the processing station was increased from forty-eight hours to six days. From that time forward, a complete physical examination and clothing issue was made at the processing station rather than at the duty station as had formerly been the practice.^{68/}

VII. Unit Recall

As late as 18 July no program for recall of Reserve units had been firmly established. During this interim period, the principal effort of Continental Air Command was to attempt to maintain Reserve

^{66/} RESTRICTED ltr, PPM-R 210.455, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: Individual Recall of USAFR Personnel, 19 August 1950 [Vid. sup. doc. #34]

^{67/} 1,215 officers and 8,853 airmen went through the nine processing stations during September. Of this number, 52 officers and 1,080 airmen were rejected for physical reasons and 152 officers and 1,184 airmen were deferred. A total of 992 officers and 7,747 airmen were sent to their duty stations. Undergoing processing, as of 30 September, were 104 officers and 1,323 airmen. [Historical Report of the Directorate of Personnel Mobilization Control for September 1950]

^{68/} 1. Ibid.
2. Of the 1,025 officers and airmen who reported to processing stations during October, 38 officers and 1,050 airmen were physically disqualified; 53 officers and 1,032 airmen were deferred; and 916 officers and 7,286 airmen were sent to duty stations. [Historical Report of the Directorate of Personnel Mobilization Control for October 1950]

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and National Guard unit integrity through meeting the greatest practicable portion of individual recall requirements from Reserve personnel not assigned to units and from personnel in units unlikely to be recalled into active service.^{69/}

In the corollary and APRTC Reserve units there was a substantial supply of trained Reserve personnel skilled in their specialties. During the period of indecision as to whether to recall individual Reservists or Reserve units to meet Air Force personnel requirements, General Whitehead suggested that the latter action be taken. His feeling on this subject was that members of the Organized Reserve were more prepared for duty than were members of the Volunteer Air Reserve. In spite of the fact that mobilization of Reserve units would bring in many specialties surplus to the needs of the Air Force, there was no reason, in General Whitehead's opinion, why certain Reserve units could not be mobilized for filler personnel and those "surplus" individuals placed in the Volunteer Air Reserve until there was a requirement for them. In other words, Continental Air Command was early in favor of recalling certain units to meet personnel quotas levied by United States Air Force Headquarters to assure filling them with trained personnel.^{70/}

Specifically, General Whitehead suggested that the following

^{69/} SECRET ltr, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, Subj: Recalls to Active Duty, 18 July 1950 [Vid. sup. doc. #21]

^{70/} SECRET 1st Ind, Hq ConAC to Hq USAF, 14 July 1950, To: Ltr, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, Subj: Recall of Reserve Officer and Airmen Personnel, 6 July 1950 [Vid. sup. doc. #12]

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action be taken: (1) Mobilize one light bomb wing to provide personnel and equipment for a B-26 Combat Crew Training Station at Langley Air Force Base. Surplus personnel from this unit could be used for combat crew training station trainees and filler purposes; (2) Mobilize as many Reserve light bomb wings as were required to meet operational commitments; these units, until required, could be held on inactive status and be allocated additional spaces for both officers and airmen to bring their organizational structure up to full T/O&E strength. This would include augmentation of Medical Groups, and the organization of Food Service, Air Police, Motor Vehicle, and Air Installations Squadrons; (3) Mobilize up to ten of the twenty Reserve troop carrier wings in the Air Force Reserve Training Centers to provide filler personnel. Wings with the least airmen capability would be the logical ones to provide this service since such wings were the least capable of entering into Operational Training Unit trainings; (4) Hold the ten best manned Reserve troop carrier wings in reserve and mobilize them when operational requirements decreed; as additional Reserve spaces became available they could be allocated to these units to permit the manning of Food Service, Air Police, Motor Vehicle and Air Installations Squadrons prior to their mobilization. C-46 and C-47 aircraft freed by the "roll-up" of wings used for filler purposes could be transferred to the remaining Reserve troop carrier units to give each fifty percent of its unit equipment aircraft; (5) Finally, mobilize Continental Air Command's corollary units to provide filler personnel and to form

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additional squadrons in selected regular tactical wings.^{71/}

By following the proposed program, the unit integrity of the four remaining light bomb wings would be protected for mobilization as combat units. The 1,000 B-26s in the overall United States Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard inventories as of 1 April 1950 would support three to four light bomb wings in addition to the Third Light Bomb Wing then in combat. Likewise, the mobilization potential of the ten remaining medium troop carrier wings and one Reserve light bomb wing an average of twenty officers and 225 airmen and seventy-five civilians of AFRC permanent party personnel would be required to provide the remaining Reserve troop carrier wings with the necessary additional personnel to support their thirty-two assigned aircraft.^{72/}

That Headquarters, United States Air Force did not adopt this proposed plan for recall has been indicated in the preceding pages. Rather, recall was made during the first month and one-half after the Korean "war" on an individual basis. With respect to the recall program in general, United States Air Force's first attitude on the matter was that as many of the Reserve units as possible were to be maintained intact. In other words, no units were to be called up to provide "filler" personnel to meet individual recall quotas.^{73/}

^{71/} Ibid.

^{72/} Ibid.

^{73/} Ibid., SECRET 2nd Ind, Rq USAF to Cc ConAC, 9 August 1950

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Eventually, four Reserve units, were recalled to active duty as entities. These were the 437th Troop Carrier Wing at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, the 452nd Light Bomb Wing in Hamilton Air Force Base, California, the 433rd Troop Carrier Wing at Cleveland, and the 375th Troop Carrier Wing at Pittsburg. The first two of these units were recalled in August; the latter two in October.^{74/} Lessons learned during recall of the first two units considerably facilitated recall of the latter.

As pointed out by Continental Air Command's Deputy for Operations, General Thatcher, the 437th Troop Carrier Wing, upon the completion of recall action, bore slight resemblance to the Reserve Wings which had existed at Chicago.^{75/} Not only were there changes among key personnel, the number of changes among airman numbered in the hundreds. The 431st Troop Carrier Wing, also stationed at O'Hare, was "cannibalized" to provide "filler" personnel to build up the 437th. And members of the 512th, in addition to those assigned to the 452nd Light Bomb Wing to bring that unit up to strength, were shipped to Chicago to increase the strength of the 437th. For the most part, the haste in which these persons were assembled permitted little time for evaluating their abilities to perform the skills called for in their specialties. Also, there

^{74/} See Chapter Three, Continental Air Command Units: A Source of Direct and Indirect Support.

^{75/} SECRET IRS, Deputy for Operations, Hq COMAC to Vice Commander and other major staff sections, Sub: Visits to 437th Troop Carrier Wing (M) and 452nd Light Bomb Wing, 1 September 1960

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was a tremendous smarl in administrative procedures and a lengthy period during which many persons newly assigned to the 437th Troop Carrier Wing did not know what to do. While recall of the 452nd Light Bomb Wing proceeded more smoothly, these same general difficulties were encountered.^{76/} Since there were no Standard Operating Procedures covering unit recall in existence at that time, this was a rather natural result.^{77/}

The following major lessons Continental Air Command learned from experience gained during recall of the above Reserve units: If a recalled unit was to be given thirty days prior to activation, supervisory personnel and a skeleton cadre group should be recalled within fourteen days and sent to their new station to provide for the recall of their fellow members. These persons should plan a definite processing program, based upon the number of individuals to be recalled. This would eliminate large groups of people standing around waiting to be told what to do. It was particularly important that Supply training sections, Air Police, Air Installations

76/ Ibid.

77/ Prior to the recall of these two units, Personnel Planning Officers in Hq ComAC literally "sat down and thought up" the initial instructions to the numbered air forces for unit recall. No previously conceived plans existed to direct such an action. [Interview, Lieutenant Colonel Yudkin, 4 December 1960]

1. TWX 18968, CG ComAC to CG 4th AF, 30 July 1950 and TWX 19006, recall of 452nd Light Bomb Wing
2. TWX, Hq ComAC to CGs 1st and 10th AFs, 30 July 1950 and TWX 19033, Hq ComAC to CGs 1st and 10th AFs, 30 July 1950 instruct these commands in procedures to be followed in recall of 437th Troop Carrier Wing.

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and other jobs which were not readily apparent and not directly associated with aircraft be made operative as quickly as possible. The efficient functioning of these units was essential; they would provide a stability which otherwise could not be obtained for a long period of time. In short, there had to be ready to receive a unit recalled to active duty a well-organized staff to conduct processing activities. As General Thatcher pointed out, the personnel in the two Reserve units recalled to duty in August were eager, were not anxious for deferments, and appeared to be willing to get started on a job. However, for lack of guidance, they wandered around aimlessly waiting for directions. Consequently, a cadre had to be on hand for future Reserve unit recalls to give necessary guidance and to afford continuity of action.^{78/}

By 19 September, unit recall procedures, based in good part on experience gained in the recall of the above units, had been consolidated and forwarded to the numbered air forces for guidance in the future recall of Air Force Reserve units. The concept of these direc-

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- ^{78/} 1. SECRET IRS, Deputy for Operations, Hq ComAC to Vice Commander, 1 September 1950 [Vid. sup. doc. #75]
2. For detailed information concerning the recall to active duty of the 437th Troop Carrier Wing and the 452nd Light Bomb Wing see the following:
- a. Ltr, Colonel C. E. Duncan, Deputy for Operations, Hq 4th AF to Colonel Kyle, Deputy for Personnel, Hq ComAC, Sub: Report on Processing of 452nd Bomb Wing (L) Recalled to Active Military Service, 1 September 1950
 - b. Ltr, Hq 4th AF to CG ComAC, Sub: Recall of Organized Reserve into Military Service
 - c. IRS, Inspector General to Deputy for Personnel, Hq ComAC [Report of visit to 437th Troop Carrier Wing], 11 September 1950
 - d. Ltr, Deputy for Personnel and Administration, Hq ComAC to CG, 437th Troop Carrier Wing, Sub: Critique on Call to MAD and Subsequent Move to Shaw AFB, South Carolina, 28 August 1950

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tions was that units would be recalled at their present locations at specifically established strengths. Criteria for selection of officers and airmen for manning Reserve units called to active duty, would, except in certain instances, be the same as for individual recall. The principal difference between unit and individual recall, as it affected the individual, was, perhaps, the fact that personnel called to active duty with their units, were to be recalled in grades up to and including those authorized by unit manning tables. General officers were the only exceptions to this policy,^{79/} these officers to be recalled only on orders issued by Headquarters, United States Air Force.

To fill shortages in future units recalled, individual members of corollary units, T/O&E or T/D Reserve units and Volunteer Air Reserve personnel were, upon the direction of Headquarters, Continental Air Command, to be recalled to fill specific vacancies. Personnel from other AMTC units were to be recalled as filler personnel only at the specific instruction of Headquarters, Continental Air Command. All vacancies remaining which could not be filled from these sources were to be listed and the list forwarded to Headquarters, Continental Air Command within ten days after the unit was recalled to active duty. Unlisted women (WAP) of Reserve units, if facilities were not available to accommodate them were not to be recalled with their unit of assignment but were to be relieved from their Reserve assignment and trans-

^{79/} RESTRICTED ltr, PFM-R 326, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Subs
Recall of Air Reserve Units, 19 September 1950

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ferred to the Volunteer Air Reserve.^{80/}

Treatment of Category "R" personnel, those individuals called to active duty for three years to serve at one Air Force Reserve Training Center both as a member of the AFRTC and the Reserve Wing stationed there, posed a problem for a while. As finally resolved, these persons, if qualified, were to have their Category "R" status terminated, be relieved from active duty, and be recalled to duty in their Reserve grade with their unit of Reserve assignment if their Reserve grade was higher than the grade in which they had been serving. Those Category "R" personnel considered by the numbered air force commander to be unqualified for duty with their Reserve unit of assignment in their Reserve grade were to have their Category "R" status terminated and were to continue on extended active duty in their Air Force grade at whatever station the numbered air force commander directed.^{81/}

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- ^{80/} 1. Ibid.
2. SECRET ltr, General Myers to DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, Sub: Authorization for Recall of Filler Personnel, 6 September 1960 explains the general action ComAC proposed to take to build up to combat strength future Reserve units recalled to active duty.

- ^{81/} 1. Ibid.
2. Hq ComAC Memo, Sub: Category "R" Personnel [September 1960]
3. General Whitehead had the following to say concerning the Category "R" Program: "The Category "R" Program ... has not been a success. In great part this is the result of administrative error which came about because of lack of appreciation of the problem and proper follow-up by ComAC. Even with good administration, this program is still not sound. Military personnel should not enjoy indefinite exemption from overseas service. Military Personnel should not be granted what amounts to indefinite tenure at one location. The benefits and privileges of the uniform can be granted only when all obligations are equally shared. There is no question

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Personnel surplus to the authorization of a unit were not to be recalled but were to be transferred to the Volunteer Air Reserve. Surplus personnel were those individuals excess to the unit's T/O&E authorizations in both their primary and secondary SSNs and who could not be utilized effectively in an allied specialty that was critical. These persons were to be reported immediately to the appropriate air force headquarters for transfer to the Volunteer Air Reserve. ^{82/}

Policies for determining deferments of Reservists called to active duty with their units was much the same as for those Reservists recalled as individuals. Upon notification of the recall of a Reserve unit, the appropriate numbered air force headquarters was to establish a deferment board at the Air Force Reserve Training Center at which the Reserve unit was recalled. Members of the Reserve unit not previously screened for deferment at the time they reported and who requested deferment in writing or for whom deferment had been previously requested by their employers, were to present their case to the deferment board. When the case fell clearly

^{81/} (cont'd) but what a permanent force of Reserve Wing members is required. Some sort of stability needs be guaranteed. In view of these facts we should abandon the Category "R" and institute in its place a program of civilian employees along the lines of the system now in use by the Air National Guard. This type program will meet every requirement of the current situation and does not perpetuate the undesirable features of the Category "R" Program." SECRET ltr, General Whitehead to Chief of Staff, USAF, Sub: The USAF Reserve Forces [Vid. sup. doc. #101]

^{82/} RESTRICTED ltr, PFM-R 326, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: Recall of Air Reserve Units, 19 September 1960 [Vid. sup. doc. #79]

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within the policy for deferment the board was authorized to issue deferment orders. If the board refused to pass on deferment, the Reservist was to take his duty station when he had completed his processing. An effort was made to facilitate unit recall action by including the stipulation in these directions that insofar as possible deferment action would be taken during the twenty-one day period the Reservist was granted prior to his reporting date for processing.^{83/}

VIII. Conclusion

On 26 October, Headquarters, United States Air Force instructed Continental Air Command to discontinue involuntary recall of airmen and to limit involuntary recall of Reserve officers to critically needed specialists not obtainable from the voluntary lists.^{84/} In

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- ^{83/} 1. Ibid.
2. On 15 November, A ComAC publication appeared which outlined the action to be taken when units of the Organized Reserve or Air National Guard were called to active Federal Service. Presumably, much of the contents of this document were based on experience encountered with recall of the 437th Troop Carrier Wing and 452nd Light Bomb Wing. See: ComAC Staff Memo 45-1, Sub: Reserve Forces Unit Call-up of Organized Reserve or Air National Guard.
3. See ComAC ltr PPM-R 210x220, to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: Air National Guard Personnel Ordered to Active Federal Service, 6 October 1950
- ^{84/} 1. Department of Defense Press Release, 26 October 1950
2. TWX, Hq USAF to CGs Major Commands /26 October 1950/
3. TWX, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, also CGs Air University and Air Training Command, 26 October 1950
4. See ltr CNPMC-O 210,455, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: Individual Recall of USAFR Personnel, 9 November 1950 -- the final consolidated list of instructions to the numbered air forces for effecting individual recall.

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short, while involuntary recall did not cease entirely, such action was considerably restricted from that date forward. Continental Air Command could now catch its breath and commence to study the results of the recall activity which had absorbed so much of its attention and energies during the past two and one-half months.^{85/}

Though it accomplished its mission, in that it met United States Air Force requirements for additional manpower, Continental Air Command was not fully satisfied with the manner in which the recall program progressed. During the period 19 July - 26 October some 5,987 Reserve officers and 25,796 Reserve airmen were processed from civilian life into the Regular Air Force.^{86/} This was no mean accomplishment. However, compared to the demands total mobilization would have made, the controlled recall action was a relatively small-scale operation. Consequently, if Continental Air Command was to profit from its experiences and prepare for future mobilization activities, it had to ask itself the following questions: In the event of a further demand for increased Air Force strength, would plans evolved during this "practice session" provide sufficient guidance to permit rapid integration of the Air Force Reserve into the Regular Air Force or were there inadequacies still in existence which would again clog up the machinery? Perhaps the best way to answer the question would be to: (1) review the major difficulties Continental Air Command encountered with the recall program and the degree of success it had

^{85/} Ltr, Hq ComAC, Sub: "Investigation of Recall Program," 6 November 1950

^{86/} Recall statistics as of 27 October 1950 (obtained from Historical Report of the Directorate of Personnel Mobilization Control, October 1950)

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in solving them; and (2) consider the tentative conclusions arrived at by Continental Air Command concerning possible elimination of those deficiencies in its own "family" and in that of the United States Air Force Reserve which prevented maximum efficiency in carrying out the recall assignment.

At the commencement of the controlled recall program, Continental Air Command's numbered air forces, custodians of the Reserve Records, were caught in the midst of a reorganization.^{87/} The Twelfth and Ninth Air Forces had recently been inactivated and their Reserve Records, if not still enroute to new destinations, were in disordered condition in the headquarters of the numbered air force that had received them. Also, Reserve Records were in poor condition so far as evidencing an up-to-date account of the qualifications of members of the inactive Reserve. These records had been in the possession of the numbered air forces for only about a year prior to the Korean action. Perfection of the records was well underway but there had been little time to ascertain the current validity of the data pertinent to members of the Volunteer Air Reserve. Consequently, the four numbered air forces faced the considerable initial burden of issuing orders for recall on the basis of the contents of incomplete records. As Major General Harry A. Johnson, Commander of Continental Air Command's Tenth Air Force explained: "the current recall program ... brought to light many deficiencies in the administration of the

^{87/} See Above: Chapter One, The Continental Air Command in The Korean War: An Overall View.

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Reserve. Most of these ~~were~~ directly attributable to the absence of adequate regulations covering Reserve administration and to the rigid limitations imposed on the capabilities of the Air Force by inadequacies of personnel, equipment and facilities^{88/}.

The shortcomings of Reserve administration were compensated for in the numbered air force headquarters by long, hard hours of work during the initial phase of involuntary recall. Eventually, also, an increase in administrative personnel strength was obtained for these units to assist them to get their records into condition^{89/}. By these actions, the most serious of the Reserve administrative "snarls" were untangled. By mid-September, the perfection of Reserve officers records had been completed; perfection of airmen records was "well under way." In short, while considerable progress was made in the way of completing the screening of Reserve Records during the period to insure that their contents were basically correct, there still remained considerable work ahead to get these records in such condition that they would give an accurate, up-to-date picture of the capabilities of each member of the Air Force Reserve

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- ^{88/} 1. 1st Ind, Hq 10th AF to CG ComAC, 24 August 1950, To: Ltr, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: USAF Reserve Administration, 19 August 1950
2. 1st Ind, Hq 14th AF to CG ComAC, 25 August 1950, to: Ltr, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, Sub: USAF Reserve Administration, 19 August 1950
- ^{89/} SECRET Memo, General Myers to General Twining, Sub: Permanent Party Personnel Requirements to Meet Involuntary Recall Loads, 20 July 1950

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program.

Problems encountered by Continental Air Command as a result of deferment policies may not be any easier to solve in the event of future controlled recall action than they were during this period. While full mobilization action would have permitted few deferments, controlled recall activity, by its very nature, had to provide lenient deferment provisions. This interfered with the effort to fill quota requirements and the maintaining of a steady flow of Reservists through the processing stations into uniform.

One matter in connection with deferments which disturbed Continental Air Command was: what would happen if, during some future period of controlled recall activity, the Air Force found itself with a large number of deferred Reservists whom it was committed to recall but for whom it had no vacancies? During this period, assignments for individual Reservists deferred for sixty days or less had been kept open until these same Reservists returned for active duty and filled them. However, original assignments for individual Reservists deferred for more than sixty days had to be filled from other sources for the obvious reason that to permit these requirements to remain unfilled for a long period would have hampered operations. By the same token, original assignments for

90/ 1st Ind, CG ComAC to Hq USAF, 25 September 1950, To: Ltr, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, Sub: Recall of Reserve Officers and Airmen, 13 September 1950 [Vid. sup. doc. #94]

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deferred members of Reserve units recalled to active duty had to be filled immediately in order not to incapacitate the unit when it commenced training. Consequently, new assignments had to be found for these two categories of deferred Reservists when they became available for active duty. As resolved during this period, these Reservists were utilized to fill any station assignment established by Headquarters, United States Air Force; when no such assignment existed, they were assigned within Continental Air Command regardless of station allocations furnished by higher headquarters.^{91/}

As Continental Air Command stated, such a situation could "assume serious proportions" if the number of deferred Reservists became greater than the number of vacancies available within the Air Force for placing these men when their periods of deferment were up. It was a matter for higher headquarters to take into consideration in the event the controlled recall program continued for a much longer period.^{92/}

Another problem encountered concerned discharge of Reservists at processing stations after they had been recalled to duty, for physical reasons. On this score the Air Force was severely criticized by various members of the American Press.^{93/} True, if a Reservist fully

^{91/} CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq ComAC to DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, 17 August 1960, Sub: Recall of Deferred Personnel

^{92/} Ibid.

^{93/} The Boston Traveler had this to say on the matter in its 29 August editions:
 "If the Air Force is really interested in de-lousing some of the loused-up aspects of the Reserve situation, why not institute some pre-call physical examinations? An Air Force Reservist

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expected to go back into uniform, sold his home or business and took other action to clear up his civilian interests prior to reporting for duty, and then learned that he was not physically qualified for duty, he sometimes was caught in a serious financial predicament. Could anything be done to prevent this, short of the unfeasible ordering of Reservists to take their physicals prior to reporting for processing?

After the initial flurry was over to build the Air Force up to required strength, but only then, the Air Force was able to devote some time to straightening this matter out. United States Air Force Headquarters proposed, in mid-September, that Reservists be called to short periods of active duty for the primary purpose of accurate classification, determination of physical qualification and establishment of need for deferment or delay in reporting for duty prior to actual recall. Each Reservist would then be returned to his home under orders which either transferred him to inactive status or instructed him to report to a duty station after the necessary period of delay to put his personal affairs in order. This, in higher

95/ (cont'd) now gets a call to report for active duty. He arranges his personal affairs, this including relinquishing his job in civilian life. Maybe he sells his house. Maybe he gives up his flat and sends Mrs. Reservist back to her Mother. Later on he reports, has a physical, and discovers he isn't going to be accepted. Why couldn't he have had the physical in the first place, establishing his disqualification before his civilian affairs were completely disrupted.

"It wouldn't be too difficult to set up physical examination centers at such points as the Bedford Airport and the Army Base where Reservists could be called in for sessions with the flight surgeon to determine whether it is practicable to call a man for service or not." [Historical Report of FIO for September]

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headquarters' opinion, was the only solution to the problem. The attitude of Headquarters, Continental Air Command on the matter was requested, however, prior to putting this policy into practice.^{94/}

Continental Air Command Headquarters did not feel United States Air Force's proposal for pre-recall screening was the best possible answer to settling the problems of classification, rejections for physical reasons, and deferments. Actually, such a program would impose an unjustified amount of labor if it were to be established merely to eliminate the possibility of Reservists being recalled to duty and then being sent home again because they failed to pass their physicals. And it would have little affect on reducing the number of deferments because any number of hardships might arise between the time of screening and reporting date that would cause the Reservist to be forced to request deferment. Consequently, the only real value such a pre-recall screening might have would be to enable the reclassification of members of the Volunteer Air Reserve, most of whom, unlike members of the Organized Reserve had not had their records checked since the end of the war. But even considering this desirable aspect, could not classification checks be made in an easier manner than on a mass pre-recall screening basis?^{95/}

Continental Air Command thought an easier method of checking

^{94/} Ltr, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, Sub: Recall of Reserve Officers and Airmen, 13 September 1950

^{95/} Ibid., 1st Ind, Hq ComAC to DC/S Personnel, Hq USAF, 25 September 1950

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the present skills of Volunteer Air Reserve members against their World War II records would be to continue and to expand a questionnaire method Continental Air Command had initiated in June 1950. By this system, forms would be sent to all Reservists not in the Organized Reserve asking sufficient information to permit the Reservist's records to be brought up-to-date. If each such Reservist took the effort to fill out the form, such a procedure would be fully as efficacious as a personnel interview. However, the success of such a system did hinge on the Reservist's complying with the request to submit the form. For this reason, Continental Air Command asked permission to order those Reservists who failed to submit such a form to present themselves for a personnel interview at a processing station. This was Continental Air Command's proposed solution to correcting in the future, the problem existent throughout the controlled recall period of failure of the records of Volunteer Air Reserve members to reflect an up-to-date picture of the Reservist's capabilities.^{96/}

In addition to instituting a formal investigation of the recall program, Continental Air Command commenced what might be termed an informal or tentative exploration of the Air Force Reserve Program. Was the Air Force Reserve organized in the best possible manner to provide maximum support to the Regular Air Force in time of emergency? In pursuit of the answer to this most important question, Continental Air Command uncovered "both good and bad features in both [the]

^{96/} Ibid.

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Organized and Volunteer Air Reserve.^{97/}

In the opinion of Continental Air Command Headquarters, too much emphasis in the Air Force Reserve Program had been placed on procurement and training of Reserve officers and not enough attention had been paid to the build-up of a strong Reserve airmen "pool". To support this view, Continental Air Command directed attention to the fact that no provision existed for mobilization assignee spaces for airmen. There should be at least four airmen to every officer enrolled in this portion of the Air Force Reserve Program, Continental Air Command believed.

Another deficiency in the Air Force Reserve was that there were too many mobilization assignees in field grade and not enough in company grade. Mobilization assignments, Continental Air Command averred, should be established in grades comparable to the grade structure of the Regular Air Force or to a similar structure in the Air Force Reserve. Then, once mobilization commenced, each major command would be allocated so many spaces and all mobilization assignees would be recalled immediately.^{98/}

Concerning the corollary program, Continental Air Command stated that members of these units should be fully aware that they would be

^{97/} This information was derived from a draft copy of a ComAC letter prepared by General Whitehead to be sent to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel at Headquarters USAF. While this document was never forwarded to higher headquarters, it served the purpose of providing the basic guide to the preparation of a more comprehensive treatment of inadequacies in the Air Force Reserve Program. See below.

^{98/} Ibid.

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recalled in either an individual or unit capacity as operational requirements decreed. Also, they would be recalled early, since once the parent Regular Air Force unit departed, no resources remained for continuance of corollary unit training.^{99/}

Continental Air Command had high praise for certain aspects of the AFRTC program; concerning other aspects, it was less enthusiastic. Flying personnel in these units were qualified to enter directly into combat crew training without undergoing a lengthy period of refresher training. Consequently, while a full mobilization potential was not in existence within the wings of this organization, a firm partial mobilization potential was in evidence. Deficiencies observed in the program were: (1) officer manning was not based on either the peace or war authorization in certain units; (2) certain squadrons of the Air Base Groups were not authorized; (3) recruitment of members had not taken into consideration possibilities of deferment; (4) too few service units, such as engineer aviation battalions and communications squadrons were included in the program. The Volunteer Air Reserve Program, Continental Air Command felt, served a valuable purpose in that it retained the interest of thousands of ex-Air Force members in the Air Force Reserve who could not take part in the Organized Reserve. Serious weaknesses of this program however, were: there were too many officers and not enough air men in the organization, and too few instructors were available to conduct interesting lecture training periods.

^{99/} Ibid.

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These then, were the major actions Continental Air Command proposed be taken to eliminate some of the weaknesses in the Air Force Reserve and to further develop its assets: (1) man the Reserve Wings to war strength; (2) man units with persons who would not request deferment when the time arrived for them to be recalled to active duty; (3) authorize airmen mobilization assignments and reorganize the Volunteer Air Reserve on the basis of four airmen to one officer; (4) accept only ex-Air Force airmen in the Reserve program unless an individual without this experience possessed a critically needed skill and could fill a space in a Reserve unit within a six month training period; and (5) activate and man the necessary Air Base Groups and service functions necessary to support the Reserve Wings. In addition to these recommendations, Continental Air Command suggested that Reservists be made fully aware that in time of crisis they could be recalled either as individuals or with their units, dependent upon operational requirements.^{100/}

By mid-December, Headquarters, Continental Air Command had prepared a more detailed document incorporating its thinking on various aspects of the United States Air Force Reserve Forces. As General Whitehead stated, he wished to put his thoughts on paper "so that the results of [his] experience of the past eighteen months would be recorded for the benefit of the Air Staff and [his] successor as Commanding General, Continental Air Command."^{101/} The quotation of the third paragraph of this valuable and comprehensive document would afford,

^{100/} Ibid.

^{101/} SECRET ltr, General Whitehead to Chief of Staff, USAF, Subj: The USAF Reserve Forces.

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perhaps, the best summary of the contents of this paper:

Basically, the weaknesses of our Reserve Forces programs stem from a planning deficiency which has still not been corrected. We do not have a proper Reserve Forces Troop Basis. We do not have a USAF Mobilization Plan. Until the Troop Basis and the Mobilization Plan are prepared, we are working in the dark. We do not know our requirements; we cannot with assurance define our procedures of training and administration. This deficiency is, in my best judgement, the one factor which has contributed most to the creation of Reserve Forces problems and difficulties. All other problem areas are complementary or subsidiary to this basic one.

II. Epilogue

It is perhaps fitting to bring the foregoing account of the Recall Program to a close with a brief resumé of the findings and recommendations of the Board which had been constituted on 6 November 1950 for the express purpose of conducting an impartial investigation and evaluation of the operation of the Recall Program, with particular emphasis upon the adequacy, suitability, and effectiveness of the recall system.^{102/} Through a localization and identification of inadequacies and ineffective procedures as well as of those systems and policies which had proved to be sound, it was hoped to provide a basis for formulating a more effective recall system in the future.^{103/}

In the course of its investigation, the Mitchell Board (so called because it was headed by Brigadier General Clyde H. Mitchell)

^{102/} Ltr, Hq ComAC, Sub: Investigation of Recall Program, 6 November 1950

^{103/} Memorandum of Major General Charles T. Myers for the Deputy for Personnel, Hq ComAC, 18 December 1950

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visited the four numbered air forces of the Command, the headquarters of the Military Air Transport Service, the Tactical Air Command, the Strategic Air Command, the Air Materiel Command, and the Air Training Command, four Personnel Processing Squadrons, and one Air Force Reserve Training Center. Briefly, the findings, recommendations, and/or conclusions of the Board may be summarized as follows:

1. The greatest universal deterrent to a "satisfactory and orderly" recall had been the "inadequacy" of Reservist records. The standardization of records administration of both officers and airmen in the numbered air force headquarters and the maintenance of those records on a current basis were strongly recommended.
2. The lack of well-planned recall procedures at the commencement of the recall program had resulted in an "excessive" number of procedural changes subsequent to the issuance of the first recall instructions, a factor which had caused "extensive confusion" in the field and had raised a question as to the proper procedure to be followed.
3. Restrictions which had limited the recall of officers to those of company grade had made it "difficult" to provide technical specialists required by the major air commands and to provide qualified crew members required by the Strategic Air Command and the Military Air Transport Service. It was recommended that restrictions on the recall of field grade officers be "relaxed".
4. The restrictions which had originally been imposed on the recall of members of Organized Reserve units had made it "exceedingly difficult" to recall those personnel for whom the most accurate records were available and to procure those individuals who had maintained a high degree of proficiency in their military skills. This had operated to effect the

104/ Report of Proceedings of a Committee Appointed to Investigate the Recall Program, Hq ConAC, 14 December 1950

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recall of many members of the Volunteer Air Reserve and had permitted a comparative immunity from recall of individuals who were members of organized units.

5. The restrictions on the use of mobilization assignees, mobilization designees, as well as of members of corollary units had "handicapped" the Continental Air Command in providing qualified personnel to fill established quotas. It was therefore concluded that "depending on the degree of mobilization existing at any time, maximum flexibility in the use of all Reserve resources must be provided in order to obtain the best available personnel for current demands."
6. The continuance of the system whereby Headquarters, United States Air Force, provided the Continental Air Command with personnel requirements by specific quantity and by specific SSN requirements was recommended.
7. The classification phase of the recall program had been "hampered" because dependence upon listed inventories of skills had caused the recall of incorrectly classified personnel to duty in fifteen to twenty-five per cent of "all cases". It was urged that through the use of questionnaires and through the employment of all available media, each Reservist be made acutely conscious of the need to keep his Reserve records in a current status.
8. The present recall system was "limited" in its adequacy to provide personnel to fill established quotas, owing in part to imperfections in Reserve records as well as to shortcomings in current recall procedures. It was recommended that all future individual recalls be based on the principle that travel should not be started until a preliminary review of the recallee's status had been determined by means of a questionnaire.
9. Among the major air commands, it was discovered that the lack of "firm" information concerning the reporting dates of reservists recalled against approved requisitions had been "uniformly troublesome", the failure of recall actions to meet specific reporting dates had been "extremely detrimental" to the orderly development of planned expansion programs, and the fulfillment of these requests had frequently been delayed "for long periods" owing to the inability of the Continental

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Air Command numbered air forces to locate the necessary records. The institution of improved quota control and reporting procedures was recommended. It was also recommended that recall actions to meet personnel requirements involving specific reporting dates be held to a minimum.

10. Assignment, utilization and morale problems were discovered in connection with procedures and policies for the recall of units, and appropriate corrective measures were recommended.

In transmitting copies of the Mitchell Board report, together with papers related thereto, to Headquarters, United States Air Force, and in commenting on the lack of preparation for the conduct of the recall program which the report had disclosed, Major General Willis H. Hale, Commanding General of the Continental Air Command, stressed the strong binding inter-relationship of Recall actions, the Reserve Program, and of War and Mobilization Planning. "Without realism in one", he stated, "effective performance in the other is most unlikely."^{108/}

In commenting further on the Board's report, General Hale observed that the policy of limiting the recall of officers to those of company grade was not "above criticism" and that it would have been more advisable had a policy been instituted whereby the recall of selected officers of field grade had been effectuated on a percentage basis in accordance with the actual grade spread within the Reserve.

Sharp exception was taken by General Hale to existing procedures for the administration and utilization of Reservists assigned to other major commands. Said General Hale in this

^{108/} SECRET Ltr, ComAC to Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Hq USAF, Sub: Recall of USAF Reserve Gross Personnel, 20 December 1950

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connection: "The situation cannot continue wherein ConAC has half a hand in the administration and control of such Reservists. Since the Air Force must have one control and one repository of information, ConAC must control the administration of all Reservists, regardless of inactive duty assignment."

"All of our recall actions will be evaluated further and in greater detail", promised General Hale in closing. "Improvements will continue within the limitations of available resources."^{106/}

106/ Ibid.

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CHAPTER THREE

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND UNITS:
A SOURCE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT SUPPORT

I

When the Korean crisis disclosed an urgent requirement for tactical air support of ground troops, it was inevitable that the Continental Air Command should be called upon to provide such units, since it was the agency in the Zone of the Interior charged with Air Force cooperation with land and/or amphibious forces.

The first call from the Far East Air Forces was for six tactical control parties, which were drawn from the 502d Tactical Control Group. The Continental Air Command had anticipated this requirement and previously requested the Fourteenth Air Force to screen personnel with appropriate qualifications. As a result of the Command's foresight, the six tactical teams were able to depart on the day after they received telephone orders to move^{1/}, leaving by air on 7 July. Each of these forward tactical control teams consisted of one Controller Fighter Interceptor Officer, and three radio specialist airmen (SSN's 648, 776, and 789).

The first three complete units which the Continental Air Command contributed to the Korean effort were the 363rd Reconnaissance Tech-

^{1/} Telephone message, Hq USAF to Hq ConAC, 6 July 1950

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nical Squadron,^{2/} the 162d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Night Photo,^{3/} and the 1st Shore Beacon Unit.^{4/} The 363rd Squadron was to assist the 162d Night Photo Squadron and photographic units which were already employed by the Far East Air Forces. The units moved in current training status and at current strength. Preparation for Overseas Movement inspections revealed that the 363rd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron was greatly under strength, especially in technical personnel,^{5/} the 162d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Night Photo, was critically short of navigator-bombardier-radar observers (SSN 1037), and of radar mechanics (SSN 853), and slightly short of reconnaissance trained pilots, while the 1st Shore Beacon Unit was found short of radar mechanics and of a topographic surveyor (SSN 230).

In increments of four crews a day, the flight echelon left Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, beginning 26 July, for the refitting of their planes at the Ogden Air Materiel Area. The ground echelon of the three units departed from Langley Air Force Base two days later. The ground echelons of the 363rd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron and the 162d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron left port by

^{2/} SECRET TWX, APOOP-Z 159430, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 20 July 1960

^{3/} SECRET TWX, APOOP-C 58592, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 7 July 1960, amended by SECRET TWX, APOOP-C 58636, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 8 July 1960

^{4/} SECRET TWX, APOOP-Z 159430, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 20 July 1960 (This was the same TWX mentioned in Footnote #2)

^{5/} SECRET Historical Report of the Air Inspector's Office for August 1960; Table G: Summary of FOI Inspection Reports for July 1960

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water on 6 August. The 1st Shore Base Unit began its move by air on 5 August. The Military Air Transport Service furnished a B-29 to accompany the 162d's B-26 aircraft as a guide.^{6/}

The next unit the Command furnished the embattled Far East Air Force was the remainder of the 502d Tactical Control Group. The Group (which included a skeletoned Group headquarters, the 605th Tactical Control Squadron, the 606th and 607th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons) was accompanied by the 934th Signal Battalion, Separate, Tactical, and the 2d Radio Relay Squadron.^{7/} Personnel of these units began to leave their home station at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, on 16 August. The air echelons of the 502d Group and of the 934th Battalion departed on that date; their ground echelons left on 26 August. The 2d Radio Relay Squadron, which was transported by water, left Pope Air Force Base on 27 August.^{8/} These units went directly to Pusan, Korea to meet the critical need for direct air-to-ground control support units.^{9/}

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- ^{6/} SECRET Historical Report of the Organization Division, Office of the Deputy for Operations, for July 1950. Further information obtained from documents on file in the Office of Unit Control, Hq ConAC.
- ^{7/} Original warning: SECRET TWX, AFOOP-ZI 59681, Hq USAF to CG ConAC. Movement directive: SECRET TWX AFOOP-ZI 50854, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 7 August 1950
- ^{8/} Information supplied by Unit Control Branch, Directorate of Programming and Organization, November 1950
- ^{9/} The Continental Air Command was seeking forward air controllers so assiduously for attachment to the Army that it requested permission of SAC to screen the units of the 31st Fighter-Escort Group, which had recently been transferred from ConAC to SAC. (SECRET Historical Report of the Tactical Operations Branch for August 1950)

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The 502d Tactical Control Group and 934th Signal Battalion, Separate, Tactical, and the 2d Radio Relay Squadron departed for Pusan in a status of current training and at current strength.^{10/} The 502d Group was far below authorized strength, because of the transfer of technical personnel to the Far East Air Forces and because of the previous transfer of personnel to Air Defense units in the Zone of the Interior.^{11/} The Group was moved at twenty-three per cent below peacetime strength. Personnel shortages were to be filled by the Far East Air Forces. The manpower shortages of the 934th Signal Battalion, Separate, Tactical, and of the 2d Radio Relay Squadron were also to be met from personnel within the Far East Air Forces. Those personnel of the 934th Battalion who were assigned were well-trained and had participated in joint maneuvers, but only ten per cent of the 2d Radio Relay Squadron had such training.

The 314th Troop Carrier Wing (M) was originally alerted on 13 July 1950 for an overseas movement which ultimately eventuated in the air drop of parachutists in North Korea in September.^{12/} After

^{10/} The POM Report, dated 14 August, two days before the departure of the air echelon of the movement, indicated that the Group had sixteen tactically qualified major operating teams, with some small supporting teams. (Submitted with SECRET Historical Report of the Air Inspector's Office for August 1950)

^{11/} Volume III, "The Development of an Air Defense System In-Being," History of the Continental Air Command for January-June 1950

^{12/} SECRET TWX AFOOP-21-58995, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, 13 July 1950
 SECRET TWX AFOOP-21-59291, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, 17 July 1950 rescinded the warning order of 13 July and placed the wing on a 72-hour alert

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several delays and amendments of orders, the 314th Wing began its move late in August, moving not only with the 50th, 61st and 62d Squadrons of the 314th Group, but also with the 37th Troop Carrier Squadron of the 316th Troop Carrier Group.^{13/} Glider echelons of the 314th Wing did not accompany the move. Orders specifying the size of the move doubled its magnitude from that of 17 July which specified forty-eight aircraft to that of 18 August, which directed ninety-six aircraft.^{14/} The C-119's of the Wing carried ten men to each aircraft, with one navigator assigned to each four crews.

On 20 August, Headquarters, Continental Air Command was requested to alert a detachment of three of its B-46 aircraft with crews from the 84th Bombardment Squadron (L), Jet.^{15/} The movement was set up at first as a water move because of the short jet range; however, the order was amended on 14 September to require movement by air. Of the three aircraft which departed from Barksdale Air Force Base,

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- ^{13/} SECRET TWX APOOP-ZI-51304, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 11 August 1950 added the 37th Squadron and changed the operations order into a movement order
- ^{14/} SECRET TWX APOOP-ZI-51746, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 18 August 1950. An intermediate order, on 11 August, had set the readiness date at 6 September for sixty-four aircraft. One of the unit's C-119 aircraft exploded on take-off; thus, ninety-five of the ninety-six aircraft ordered actually left the home station; of these ninety-five planes, one crashed on Guam.
- ^{15/} SECRET TWX APOOP-ZI-51876, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 20 August 1950 set the readiness date as 1 September and the move by water. SECRET TWX APOOP-ZI-53043, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 8 September 1950 changed the readiness date to 20 September; the move was still to be made by water. SECRET TWX APOOP-OO-53487, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 14 September 1950 amended the move to flight.

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Louisiana on 18 September 1960 a fire at Midway damaged one beyond repair; the other two aircraft reached their destination on 28 September. A C-54 of the Military Air Transport Service accompanied the flight, carrying maintenance personnel, three civilian technical representatives, and some equipment. The long leg from Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base, California to Hickam Field, Hawaii was flown in slightly over five hours. Crew composition for the flight was pilot, co-pilot and navigator.^{16/}

A special problem was posed for the Command as a result of the temporary movement of units to the Far East. Until the 29th of September, units that had moved out of the Continental Air Command for service in the Far East were ordered there for "temporary duty in excess of 90 days."^{17/} The Command was thus charged with the assignment of the units although it actually had no control over their personnel. As a result of the temporary nature of the movement orders no Government compensation was authorized to individuals shipped overseas for movement of household goods or dependents. This in turn entailed the movement of dependents at the individual's own expense. Members of houses were thus occupied by dependents of military personnel no longer on duty at Continental Air Command bases. It also entailed a heavy responsibility on the part of unit commanders to assist the dependents of personnel who might be casualties in Korea.

^{16/} SECRET Historical Report of the Tactical Operations Branch, Directorate of Operations and Training for September 1960

^{17/} SECRET TEX APOOP-))-54446, Hq USAF to CG COMAC, 28 September 1960

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For these and for other reasons, Headquarters, United States Air Force abandoned its policy of ordering units overseas on temporary duty and made these movements a permanent change of station.

The 452nd Bombardment Wing (L) was one of the first two Reserve Wings to be ordered to active ^{18/}duty. The necessary authority was given by Headquarters, United States Air Force, on 26 July 1960. Wing personnel were ordered to active service effective 10 August, although a small number of key personnel were in place by 30 July. Use of the Wing overseas was specified.

The Wing's readiness date was set for 15 September 1960. Actually only a single detachment of four aircrews of the 452nd Wing's 731st Bombardment Squadron (L), Night Attack departed from their training station at George Air Force Base, California, on that ^{19/}day.

The advanced detachment of four aircrews of the 731st Bombardment Squadron (L), Night Attack, consisted of a flight echelon of four pilots, four co-pilots, and four engineers who ferried four dual control B-26 aircraft and an air echelon of four bombardiers and four radar-bombardiers (MOS 1037). (In combat, each crew of the detachment was to consist of one pilot, one bombardier, and one

^{18/} The other Reserve Wing recalled simultaneously was the 437th Troop Carrier Wing (M) ~~discussed below~~. Both wings were alerted by SECRET TX AFOP-21-51530, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, 25 July 1960. The movement order was directed in SECRET TX AFOP-21-52616, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, 26 July 1960.

^{19/} SECRET TX AFOP-OP-51841, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, 18 August 1960

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radar bombardier). For the ferry flight Strategic Air Command provided a B-29, which carried the only navigator in the flight.^{20/}

Movement of the first detachment of the 731st Squadron's night intruders overseas was smoothly prepared. Nevertheless, the temporary misunderstanding caused by the minor matter of a misplaced comma in the quick interchange of messages that sped the preparation for the movement is worthy of consideration in view of the role that such a misunderstanding could play with far larger numbers of personnel and aircraft involved in a quick emergency operation. The case in point developed this way: The Continental Air Command requested Headquarters, United States Air Force, that each crew of the detachments' four B-29s consist of a pilot, a co-pilot and a bombardier-radar observer, "all with experience in shoran and APO-15 if possible. Bombardiers will be qualified navigator-bombardiers." When the Tactical Air Command received an informational warning copy of the message, the words "if possible" were cut off the first sentence and prefixed to the second. The message was thus read at its headquarters as a flat, definite request for a crew whose members were to be "all with experience in shoran and APO-15". (The "if possible" was placed thus: "If possible, bombardiers will be qualified navigator-bombardiers"). The Tactical Air Command quickly replied that a firm mandatory request for crew mem-

^{20/} SECRET Historical Report of the Organization Division, Directorate of Programming and Organization, for September 1950

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bers trained in shoran and ANQ-13 radar would require 45 days of extra days training. At this point, Headquarters, United States Air Force, rescinded the order. A quick comprehension of the situation at the right spot in the Headquarters, Continental Air Command led to an immediate telephone conversation with the proper office in the Pentagon building; thereupon the order was reinstated. This incident is worth mentioning here not only because the importance such a misunderstanding could attain if large numbers of men and aircraft were involved, but also because of the possibility that such a misunderstanding could interfere with the quick implementation of a command decision in an emergency, in some part of the world where a mischance of war or bad weather had caused a major interruption in normal modern communications.^{21/}

The 452nd Bombardment Wing (L) had recruited a great many talented technicians from the aviation industry of Southern California. The fact that personnel of two Reserve Wings were assigned at Long Beach also made it an easy matter to add many of the personnel of the other wing (the 449th Bombardment Wing (L)) to help assignment of the 452nd to war strength.^{22/} The Wing was moved for training to George Air Force Base, where a number of Regular personnel were as-

^{21/} Information furnished orally by Captain Charles H. Stewart, Unit Control Branch, Directorate of Programming and Organization, November 1950

^{22/} RESTRICTED History of the 452nd Bombardment Wing (L) for July-September 1950

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^{23/} signed. The 452nd Bombardment Wing (L) was assigned to the Tactical Air Command, but the Fourth Air Force retained responsibility for its processing until unit accountability and morning reports could be set up. The Fourth Air Force ordered clerical personnel from the 2347th Air Force Reserve Training Center to assist the Wing personnel with their administrative detail. ^{24/} The readying of the 452nd Wing for overseas was hampered by the fact that facilities at George Air Force Base were not fully in operating condition. ^{25/}

When Brigadier General Herbert B. Datcher, Deputy for Operations for Headquarters, Continental Air Command, made a staff visit to the 452nd Bombardment Wing (L) late in August, three weeks after the Wing's recall, he found a great deal of technical talent among its

^{25/} Quotas of airmen were requisitioned from ComC forces in the following numbers:

First Air Force	69	Fourth Air Force	305
Tenth Air Force	60	Fourteenth Air Force	45
Western Air Def Force	69	Eastern Air Def Force	67
Tactical Air Command	37	28th Comm Squadron	2

Hq USAF directed the Air Training Command to supply 175 basic airmen to fill authorized vacancies for Food Service workers, construction men, ammunition handlers, and duty soldiers. The Air Training Command actually sent 183 basic airmen from Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Overages in certain SSM's were met by transfer of the excess airmen to other units at George Air Force Base. (These figures were obtained from RESTRICTED History of the 452nd Bombardment Wing (L) for July-September 1950 and from the RESTRICTED History of the 452nd Air Base Group for August-October 1950).

^{24/} Ibid.

^{25/} George Air Force Base, California, had been only very recently occupied by the 1st Fighter-Interceptor Wing, after its transfer from the Strategic Air Command.

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Reserve personnel, but discovered it handicapped by tool and equipment shortages, and by a lack of organization. General Thatcher observed the following difficulties with respect to combat training: an exaggerated trust in formation flying, without emphasis enough on combat tactics, firing, bombing, and rocketry. He foresaw that its current status of training would make the readiness date hard to meet. (Actually, with the readiness twice postponed meanwhile, the Wing began its departure about 25 October, 40 days after the readiness date originally set).

General Thatcher suggested revision of current procedures, whereby the following would occur:

- (a) If a unit was to be given 30 days' advance notice prior to recall, the key supervisory personnel should be given only 14 days instead and immediately sent to their new stations;
- (b) The key personnel should plan a realistic program based on the flow of individuals into the unit and thus eliminate a good deal of wasted time and effort on the part of incoming personnel;
- (c) Use of a Regular cadre. This was essential in that it offered stability that was impossible to obtain without long periods of time and continuous on-the-job training, properly supervised and formalized.

It was General Thatcher's observation that supply procedures should be explained in detail in the Reserve program.^{26/}

The movement of the 482nd Bombardment Wing (L) was begun late in October and completed by the middle of November.^{27/}

^{26/} SECRET IBS, Deputy for Operations to Vice Commander, ComAC, 1 September 1960 /vid. sup. doc. #75, Chapter Two, Recall of Air Reserve/

^{27/} G.O. #61, Hq ComAC, 27 November 1960 - Assigning the Bomb Wing and its constituent units to Far East Air Forces, effective 16 November 1960

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The orders calling the 437th Troop Carrier Wing (M) to active duty differed from those recalling the 462nd Bombardment Wing (L). The 437th Wing was ordered into active service at peace strength rather than at war strength. Like the 462nd Wing, the 437th Troop Carrier Wing was assigned to the Tactical Air Command on arrival at its training station.

The initial strength of the 437th Troop Carrier Wing (M) was half that of the 462nd Wing^{28/}. In order to build up the 437th Wing to peace strength personnel from other Reserve Troop Carrier Wings were utilized^{29/}.

A POM inspection of the 437th Troop Carrier Wing (M) conducted on 23 September 1960, shortly after the delivery of the first two of the C-46s of the 48 aircraft scheduled to equip it for combat operations, revealed approximately 400 personnel not considered qualified for their positions^{30/}.

It was found by POM inspectors that only 30% of the personnel had participated in field training with the units; only the aircrews

^{28/} Monthly Report of Personnel Strength in USAF Reserve Units of ComAC, as of 25 June 1960

^{29/} These Wings were the 441st Troop Carrier Wing (M) whose home station was also the O'Hare International Airport at Chicago, Illinois; and the 512th Troop Carrier Wing (M), whose home location was the Newcastle County Airport at Wilmington, Delaware. Information supplied by Office of Unit Control, HQ ComAC

^{30/} POM Inspection Report of 437th Troop Carrier Wing (M), 23 September 1960, inclosed with the SECRET Historical Report of the Air Inspector's Office for September 1960

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had taken part in joint maneuvers. Although training in "para-dropping" of supplies and troops had not been accomplished since the recall of the Wing on 10 August, such training had occurred in summer encampment. Although only seven pilots had dropped live paratroops and supplies, all "first" pilots were considered capable of performing such drops satisfactorily. The 437th Troop Carrier Wing (M) began to move from its training station a month after the preparation for overseas movement inspection, reaching its destination by 8 November^{31/}.

II

The transfer of units to the Far East left a void in the Continental Air Command which was filled by the activation of new units. These units were:

- the 807th Tactical Control Group to replace the 802nd Group;
- the 2nd Shoran Beacon Unit to replace the 1st Shoran Beacon Unit;
- the 3rd Radio Relay Squadron to replace the 2nd Radio Relay Squadron;
- the 933rd Signal Battalion, Separate, Tactical, to replace the 934th Signal Battalion;
- the 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron to replace the 363rd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron;
- the 160th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Night Photo to replace the 162nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Night Photo. ^{32/}

The Continental Air Command was directed on 15 September to

^{31/} Information supplied by Office of Unit Control, Hq ConAC

^{32/} Information obtained from documents on file in the Unit Control Branch, Hq ConAC

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recall the 375th Troop Carrier Wing (M) to active service for 21 months effective 15 October 1950. This Wing's inactive training station had been the Greater Pittsburgh Airport, Pennsylvania. The same directive initiated the recall to active military service of the 433rd Troop Carrier Wing (M), from the Schlegel Air Force Plant, Cleveland, Ohio; its tour of duty and date of entry thereon were identical with those of the 375th Wing. Both these wings were moved for training to Greenville Air Force Base, South Caro-
^{33/}
 11th.

On the 8th of September 1950, the Continental Air Command was informed that 74 Air National Guard Units were being ordered into active military service, which began on 10 October 1950.^{34/} The Fourteenth Air Force bore the brunt of the burden in this recall, as the Air National Guard Units in its area flew most of the fighter aircraft which were not earmarked for Air Defense in the Zone of the Interior. The totals of the units recalled for the four numbered air forces was as follows:

First Air Force	14 units
Fourth Air Force	4 "
Tenth Air Force	4 "
Fourteenth Air Force	52 "

^{33/} SECRET Historical Report of the Organization Division, Directorate of Programming and Organization, for September 1950; See also: RESTRICTED TWX APOPM 53008, Hq USAF to CG ComAC, 8 September 1950

^{34/} Ibid. See also: RESTRICTED ltr, Department of the Army AGAO-I 322, sub: "Ordering of National Guard or Organized Reserve Units into Active Service," 31 August 1950; and RESTRICTED ltr, Hq ComAC to CGs ComAC AFs, sub: "Order Into Active Military Service of Air National Guard and Reserve Units," 12 September 1950

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CHAPTER FOUR

COMBAT CREW TRAINING SCHOOLS

Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 23-1, the Continental Air Command was charged with the responsibility for the organization, equipping, and training for combat of such units and combat crews of the Air Force as might be assigned or attached to its Command. It is therefore not surprising that upon the outbreak of the Korean War the Continental Air Command was called upon to establish and operate Combat Crew Training Schools for the operational training of B-26 and RF-80 crews.

The B-26 school (the 2215th Combat Crew Training School) was established in mid-July at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. The Continental Air Command was directed to establish a monthly minimum output of B-26 crews as follows:^{1/}

1. Eight B-26 crews each month, of which one-third would be three-man crews and the remainder would be two-man crews.
2. Two B-26 crews each month qualified in night attack operations, including Shoran. (The Continental Air Command proposed that two such crews would enter training monthly, beginning 11 September 1950.)

^{1/} SECRET Historical Report of the Flying Training Branch, Directorate of Operations and Training, for July 1950

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3. Twenty-four RB-26 crews, additionally qualified in medium altitude bombing and Shoran, to be trained as soon as practicable. Thereafter, two RB-26 crews would be similarly trained each month.

The Continental Air Command proposed that nine RB-26 crews would enter training on 11 September 1950, nine crews on 16 October 1950, and nine crews on 13 November 1950. Thereafter, two crews would be entered each month. Composition of the crews listed above was to be:

B-26 - two-man crews	1 SSN 1061 (Pilot, Two Engine) 1 SSN 748 (Flight Maintenance Gunner)
B-26 - three-man crews	1 SSN 1061 1 SSN 748 1 SSN 1036 or 1038 (respectively, Bombardier or Navigator-Bombardier)
B-26 - night attack	2 SSN 1061 1 SSN 1036 1 SSN 0142 (Bombardier-Radar Obser- ver Officer)
RB-26 - crews	1 SSN 1061 (Tactical Reconnaissance Pilot) 1 SSN 1036 1 SSN 0142

Late in September 1950, Headquarters, United States Air Force, made nineteen RB-26 Shoran-equipped aircraft temporarily available for training purposes. As soon as a sufficient number of reconnaissance crews had been trained, they were to be ferried to the Far East.

In July, the Continental Air Command issued B-26 training standards and programs for strafing and medium, low, and night bombardment.^{2/}

^{2/} SECRET Historical Report of the Programs and Analysis Branch, Directorate of Programming and Organization, for July 1950

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The first class of the B-26 Combat Crew Training School was graduated on 8 August 1950. It consisted of nine two-man B-26 crews. In that same month, Headquarters, United States Air Force increased the RB-26 classes to nine crews per class, for a total of four classes, instead of the three originally planned. Each class thereafter was to produce two qualified RB-26 crews monthly.^{3/}

Realistic training in questions peculiar to the Korean theater was provided at the Combat Crew Training School through the assignment thereto of Far East Air Forces personnel experienced in Korean operations.^{4/}

The number of B-26 crews of different categories graduated from the 2215th Combat Crew Training School from the time of its inception in mid-July to late November 1950 is contained in the periodic training reports of the School which are included among the supporting documents. By autumn, the 2215th Combat Crew Training School had virtually exhausted the supply of Reservists who had kept up their flying since the end of World War II. The Command was then compelled to recall to active service personnel of Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units who had not maintained their flying proficiency. This in turn necessitated the lengthening of the training course from eight and one-half weeks to ten weeks.

The Continental Air Command established its RF-80 Combat Crew

^{3/} SECRET Historical Report of the Flying Training Branch, Directorate of Operations and Training for August 1950

^{4/} SECRET Historical Report of the Flying Training Branch, Directorate of Operations and Training for October 1950

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Training School in the latter part of August. It was operated by the 161st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet, at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. Training began on 1 September 1950, with each class extending ninety days. The length of the training was determined in part by the facts that recent overseas shipments of RF-80 personnel had greatly reduced the 161st Squadron's training capability and that classes for RF-80 training had possessed little or no previous experience in tactical reconnaissance.

Under the pressure of immediate deployment of RF-80 graduates to the Far East during the Fall months, the RF-80 Combat Crew Training School -- which could accommodate a maximum student load of fifteen pilots -- graduated a class of thirteen on 18 November 1950. Month-end graduations on 2 December 1950 and 2 January 1951 were to revert to two pilots each. The Command arranged an input of ten pilots on 16 November 1950, which was to be followed by the entry of five pilots on the first of each month thereafter. This input was calculated to make it possible for the 161st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet, to attain its authorized crew strength of eighteen tactical pilots by February 1951, in addition to graduating classes of five pilots a month and four pilots a month in alternate succeeding months.^{5/}

The operation of both the B-26 and RF-80 Combat Crew Training

^{5/} SECRET Historical Report of the Flying Training Branch, Directorate of Operations and Training for September 1950. Statements made in this Chapter which are otherwise undocumented are based on information supplied by Major Edward H. MacNeill, Flight Training Branch, Directorate of Operations and Training, 7 December 1950.

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Schools was monitored by the Tactical Air Command. When that command resumed its status as a major air command on 1 December 1950, it assumed full responsibility for the operation of both schools.

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CHAPTER FIVE

AIRCRAFT AND MATERIEL

I. Introduction

All wars, for those other than the aggressors, are untimely. For the Continental Air Command, the Korean hostilities were most inopportune. The events of 25 June caught Continental Air Command in the commendable act of girding itself for combat. This is always a wise precaution for those anticipating trouble, but it may be quite embarrassing for one caught in the complicated act of donning a suit of armor. Continental Air Command, unfortunately, found itself in this latter category.

When war broke out in Korea, Continental Air Command was engaged in a great effort to build, man, train and operate the country's first air defense system.^{1/} This, in itself, was a logistical task of the first magnitude. In addition, however, Continental Air Command was busily engaged in dispersing its fighter aircraft and the supplies needed to maintain them among 23 fighter bases. As if this were not enough, in June and July a reorganization of the entire command was taking place whose primary purpose was to make

^{1/} For the nature of this effort see Volume III, SECRET History of the Continental Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1960, "The Establishment of an Air Defense System in Being."

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these Continental Air Command organizations concerned with air defense self sufficient logistically, administratively and operationally.^{2/} Little wonder, therefore, that the events of 25 June had the effect of a bomb burst on Continental Air Command's logistical activities.

Because of the many missions entrusted to Continental Air Command, the events in Korea had repercussions upon its activities which transcended the local Korean war in their significance. As a combat command, the first concern of Continental Air Command was to prepare to meet a hostile attack against the continental United States. This meant immediately placing the air defense system on a 24 - hour alert. Logistically this was translated into frantic efforts to cut down both radar and aircraft "Out of Commission for Parts and Radio" (AOCF and AOR) rates.^{3/} This was initially performed by a drastic screening of all supply resources available to the Continental Air Command. This activity was abnormally complicated by the evolution of the 23 squadron deployment plan and its consequent dislocation of the wing-base supply functions. Simultaneously, doubled efforts were made to speed up the construction of the Permanent Aircraft Control and Warning System, and to put the finishing

^{2/} For the reorganization plans see Volume I, SECRET History of the Continental Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1950, "Organization and Mission."

^{3/} SECRET Historical Report of the Aircraft Maintenance and Supply Branch, Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services for July 1950.

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touched to the Interim or "Lashup" system. As the command responsible, through its four Air Forces, for the mobilization of Air Force personnel, Continental Air Command made immediate preparations to recall and equip thousands of individuals and an indefinite number of units into active duty from the Air Force Reserve. Similarly, plans were made to provide installations and facilities for the inevitable Federalization of key Air National Guard units. These preparations preaged logistical efforts of huge dimensions.

The preoccupations mentioned above, however, were secondary to the immediate problem of providing Far East Air Force with the combat requirements the latter needed for survival. The prospect that Continental Air Command's jealously hoarded air defense capabilities might be drained was also a serious concern.

As the days following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea rolled by, the pattern of Continental Air Command's materiel support of Far East Air Forces began to appear. As full-scale Russian air support of the North Koreans did not come to pass, Far East Air Forces' materiel demands upon the Zone of the Interior commands crystallized into the shape of ground support fighter-bombers, tactical control equipment and troop carrier aircraft, as well as units utilizing such materiel. Initial activity in support of Far East Air Forces, in consequence, was to prepare the designated aircraft and materiel for transfer and to make plans for the equipping of both Regular and Reserve units destined for transfer overseas.

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In addition to these activities, Continental Air Command by virtue of its possession of numerous air installation facilities throughout the United States, was in a position to offer its support to aircraft of sister commands engaged in heightened activity in behalf of Far East Air Forces. This was especially true in the case of the Military Air Transport Service which made frequent use of Continental Air Command's air bases and materiel services. The Military Air Transport Service, in addition, was demanding in another way. An entire troop carrier wing, the 62d, was transferred in toto from Continental Air Command to Military Air Transport Service, and some of Continental Air Command's troop carrier procurement was deflected to that command.

It early became obvious that a smooth-working relationship between Continental Air Command and the Air Materiel Command was of paramount importance. The urgency of Continental Air Command's demands upon the Air Materiel Command, without discrimination in terms of relative urgency, might well produce the same unfavorable results as "flogging a dead horse." It was happily decided to classify Continental Air Command's urgent demands upon the Air Materiel Command in order of priority as follows: those demands of vital necessity for Far East Air Forces were labeled as Project "Holdoff," carrying an overriding S-1 supply priority; and those demands concerned with the air defense of the United States were categorized as Project "Speed," inferior in priority only to Project "Holdoff."

In the narrative which follows, it is proposed to deal solely

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with those aspects of Continental Air Command materiel activity in direct support of Far East Air Forces, leaving the many other aspects of materiel activity occasioned by the Korean war for treatment in the Continental Air Command history for June-December 1950.

II. Regular Air Force Units

To a great extent, the nature of the aircraft and tactical equipment desired by Far East Air Forces dictated the source from which Continental Air Command was to draw these resources. Far East Air Forces' requirement for ground support aircraft, tactical control units, and troop carrier aircraft made it inevitable that the brunt of this requisition would fall upon Continental Air Command's subordinate Tactical Air Command. The status of the Tactical Air Command in terms of assigned strength in personnel and materiel had been lowered considerably since the major Air Force reorganization of December, 1948, which saw the birth of Continental Air Command. This is not the place wherein to enlarge upon the motives which prompted the relegation of the Tactical Air Command to a status inferior to that it possessed prior to 1949. Suffice it to say at this point that this command was practically decimated by the deluge of requisitions made upon it after 25 June. Two of its major units, the 314th Troop Carrier Group, and the 502nd Tactical

^{4/} See Volume I, SECRET History of the Continental Air Command, 1 December 1948 to 31 December 1949, "Organization and Mission."

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cal Control Group, were almost immediately earmarked for transfer to Far East Air Forces, the primary reason being that these two units were among the few Regular units in the United States Air Force engaged in the desired activities.

The C-119 troop carrier aircraft utilized by the 314th Troop Carrier Group were a relatively new acquisition, that unit having been converted to this aircraft in November 1949. The seven months experience of the 314th with the C-119s was not entirely a happy one. Almost immediately upon the arrival of these aircraft it was discovered that there existed a chronic propeller malfunction, and the AOCF rate was consequently quite high throughout the period.^{5/} To make matters even more troublesome, parts for the propeller assemblies were critical.

The designation of the 314th for assignment to the combat zone brought the technical deficiencies and parts shortages of this aircraft to the fore. The awarding of a "Holdoff" priority to this supply project succeeded in bringing the propeller supply problem under control so that the AOCF rate dropped from 12% in July to only 4% at the end of August, 1950.^{6/} The intrinsic deficiencies of the propeller units were corrected by arrangement with the Hamilton Standard Company, manufacturers of the propellers, who dispatched

^{5/} Historical Report of the Aircraft Supply Division, Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services for July 1950.

^{6/} SECRET Historical Report of the Aircraft Supply Division, Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services for August 1950.

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modification kits and technicians toewart Air Force Base in August for the necessary alterations^{7/}. Aircraft with more than 50 hours of flying time were returned to the Hamilton Standard factory for replacements of the propeller control units. In consequence the troublesome problem of propeller deficiencies and parts shortages were resolved in time for the unit transfer.

The prospective flight of the C-119's across the Pacific posed problems which had been non-existent before. The installation of long range fuel tanks, was, of course, indispensable for the flight, and this meant that all the aircraft had to undergo modification to permit such installation. Arrangements were made with the Fairchild Aircraft Corporation to receive the aircraft in installments for this work, and this was subsequently accomplished. Cruise control tests were run with the new tanks, proving that they would perform their mission adequately for the long^{8/} trip.

While the 314th was preparing itself in this fashion, its mission of training with the Army continued without interruption. This work assumed increased significance at this time, for the group was thrown into strenuous soritnage practice with the 11th Airborne Division in rehearsal for the later mass "drops" in Korea.

Since the C-119's were destined to go immediately into combat, it was urgent that they be outfitted with "Identification, Friend or Foe" (IFF) equipment to preclude the destruction of the aircraft

^{7/} TRX, Hq 314th TCG to Hq ConAC [August] 1950

^{8/} SECRET, Historical Report of the Tactical Air Operation Branch, Directorate of Operations and Training, for August 1950

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and their precious cargo by our own defenses. This posed a problem which proved insurmountable in the period under consideration. The standard Mark III IFF sets readily available in the United States, were however, useless for this purpose in view of the fact that this equipment had been compromised by the transfer of some thousands of these sets on Lend-Lease to the USSR during World War II. Conversion to the newer Mark X IFF had been underway in the aircraft of the United States Air Force for some time, but as yet, the troop carriers had not been affected by the change-over. To further aggravate the situation, insufficient Mark X IFF sets were available numerically to permit installation of IFF equipment in the United States, necessitating the decision that the proper modifications be performed in the Far East some time after the arrival of the aircraft.^{9/}

The overwater flight posed additional problems. Life vests and rubber rafts were almost impossible to obtain. Whatever such equipment existed in Air Materiel Command depots had been earmarked for Far East Air Forces. Perplexed, Continental Air Command requested that sufficient vests and rafts be diverted from Far East Air Forces to outfit the Far East Air Force-bound 314th. Fortunately, Strategic Air Command produced the required equipment from its own resources before any drastic action was taken.^{10/}

^{9/} SECRET Historical Report of the Director of Maintenance and Supply and Services for August 1960

^{10/} SECRET Historical Report of the Aircraft Supply Division, Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services for August 1960

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The provision of "Flyaway" kits for the 314th posed another problem. Each such kit was planned to contain a prepacked 30-day level of spare parts for 16 C-119 aircraft, but the temptation to "rob" this emergency equipment in order to keep the ACP rate down had been too much for the 314th. Consequently after "scrourging" from base-level supply stocks and priority requisitions from Air Materiel Command, three complete kits were assembled, coupled with awe-inspiring admissions from Continental Air Command against any further "robbing."^{11/} Similar problems were encountered in providing the group with the "Enroute" kits for spare parts sufficient to see them through the long trip to destination.^{12/}

Four C-119's were shipped to Far East Air Forces almost immediately after 25 June. The remaining 96 planes of the 314th began to arrive at the Port of Air Embarkation at Castle Air Force Base from Sewart on 27 August 1960, and the entire movement to Far East Air Forces was successfully accomplished during September. The itinerary across the Pacific was determined as follows: the aircraft were to be flown from Castle Air Force Base to Hickam Field, Hawaii, thence to Johnston Island, Wake Island, Guam and Japan. Since the "point of no return" was midway between Castle and Hickam, the Chief of Naval Operations was asked to spot a vessel between these

^{11/} SECRET, Historical Report of the Aircraft Supply Branch, Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services for July 1960

^{12/} SECRET, Historical Report of the Aircraft Supply Division, Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services for August 1960

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two points for possible emergencies. Because the C-119's were loaded to capacity for the long trip by the necessary fuel-supply, the carrying of additional spare engines was thereby precluded. This problem was solved by the stationing of three spare engines at Hickham Field for emergency use ^{13/} en route.

The loss of the 514th left Continental Air Command with only four C-119's remaining in its possession. These were located in the 36th Troop Carrier Squadron remaining at Sewart Air Force Base. Only 16 Regular troop carriers in addition to these C-119's remained in Continental Air Command. These C-52's were owned by the 2601st Squadron at Smyrna, Tennessee. A new procurement of C-119's was anticipated, however, these being scheduled for the newly recalled 433d Troop Carrier Group of the Air Reserve ^{14/}.

The necessity for tactical control of ground support operations prompted the choice of the 502d Tactical Control Group for transfer to Far East Air Forces. For Continental Air Command, the loss of this organization, composed of the 606th Tactical Control Squadron, the 606th and 607th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons, and the 664th Signal Battalion, and the 2nd Radio Relay Squadron, which were also designated for transfer, posed a more serious problem than the loss of the 514th Troop Carrier Group.

^{13/} SECRET, Historical Report of the Tactical Air Operations Branch, Directorate of Operations and Training for August 1960

^{14/} SECRET, Historical Report of the Tactical Air Operations Branch, Directorate of Operations and Training for September 1960

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Not only did these units include skilled radar and electronics personnel, always chronically short in the Continental Air Command, but their transfer on a war footing meant the withdrawal of additional equipment from the air defense system. The supply activity for the 502d was matched in intensity by urgent efforts to activate and equip the 507th Tactical Control Group to fill the gap in air defense.

In order to equip the 502d for transfer Continental Air Command was called upon to furnish AN/TRC-3 and AN/TRC-4 Radio Sets which were not available in Air Materiel Command stocks. First Air Force and Western Air Defense Force were directed to withdraw the necessary supplies from their units and to airlift them to the 502d. In addition Air Materiel Command supplemented Continental Air Command's efforts by "Holdoff" priority orders to its depots. Completeness of the Air Materiel Command shipments was monitored by the Fourteenth Air Force.^{15/}

With the 502d went also ten sets of modernization kits for AN/TRC-13 radars. Since Continental Air Command was originally allocated only twenty sets of which six were for the 502d, this action left the Command short four sets.^{16/}

In September Continental Air Command's supply activity went into high gear in behalf of the newly activated 507th Tactical Control

^{15/} SECRET Historical Report of the Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services for August 1960

^{16/} Ibid.

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Group at Pope Air Force Base. In this matter Continental Air Command took immediate steps to fill the needs of the 507th from its own resources. Headquarters shipped an AN/CPS-5 from Otis Air Force Base to Pope Air Force Base for overhaul and mobilization. In addition Air Materiel Command was asked to schedule the following Continental Air Command sets into a depot for overhaul and issue to the 507th: one AN/CPS-1 and two AN/TPS-10s. The Command further requested that another serviceable AN/CPS-1 be mobilized immediately into an AN/APS-6. The new unit was also furnished with three serviceable AN/TPS-13 radar sets, two of which came from Mitchel Air Force Base, New York and one from Hamilton Air Force Base, California. From Hamilton, also, was shipped a serviceable AN/APS-6.^{17/}

The first concrete demands upon Continental Air Command's aircraft resources were for B-26, B-45 and F-80 type aircraft to be used for ground support. Initially, the request for B-26's was for 22 such aircraft and crews. On 10 July 1950 Continental Air Command's resources in B-26 aircraft numbered only 28 planes assigned to its Regular units, and 88 assigned to the Air Force Reserve. The parts supply shortages for this type aircraft reduced the number of B-26's in an operational status considerably, and the eligible list was further curtailed by the necessity that aircraft with very low fly-

^{17/} Historical Report of the Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services for October 1950

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ing times be selected. The possibility that additional demands upon Continental Air Command's B-26 crew resources would be required, prompted Continental Air Command to make plans for the establishment of a Combat Crew Training Station at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. To this effect it was contemplated routing its best B-26's to Langley for final selection of the Far East Air Forces quota, and utilization of the remainder by the Combat Crew Training Station. However, Headquarters, United States Air Force rejected the scheme of assembling the aircraft at Langley and directed the aircraft to be flown to Ogden Air Materiel Area for final combat conditioning and modification. Ultimately the B-26's were selected for shipment and crews from the 162d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron chosen to accompany the aircraft.

The B-26's were to be escorted in the overwater flight by a C-54 aircraft carrying a navigator and maintenance personnel and spare parts. The transfer was accomplished successfully.

Far East Air Forces reconnaissance operations also prompted the request for three B-45 fighter-bombers. After selection from the resources of the 94th Bombardment Squadron (Light) the three B-45s were provided with a 90-day level of spare parts and left Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base via Hawaii, Midway, Wake and Guam. A C-54 escorted the planes overseas with maintenance personnel and spare parts for the trip. At Midway, one of the B-45's was destroyed by fire and only two reached final destination.

On 18 July orders arrived at Headquarters, Continental Air Com-

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mand to transfer 12 F-80 jet fighters from the 161st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Shaw Air Force Base to McClellan Air Force Base, California, for overhaul by Air Materiel Command and transfer to Far East Air Forces. These aircraft were speedily processed and the transfer to Far East Air Forces was accomplished by aircraft carrier without undue delay.

A Far East Air Force requirement for F-51's did not occasion Continental Air Command any direct logistical problems since the National Guard Bureau assumed responsibility for the transfer of 217 of these aircraft to Sacramento Air Materiel Area for overhaul and shipment by carrier to destination.

However, the loss of so many fighters made a serious depression in Continental Air Command's air defense capabilities, in which the Air National Guard figured heavily. Action was begun to Federalize five additional Air National Guard wings to fill this shortage and also to provide for future contingencies.

III. The Air Reserve

The recall to active duty of the 437th Troop Carrier Wing and the 542d Light Bombardment Wing also posed considerable materiel difficulties. To a great extent the calling of these particular units was motivated by the nature of their training and the type of aircraft utilized -- the 437th employing C-46D aircraft and the 542d using B-26's.

In the case of both these organizations, the burden of monitor-

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ing their logistical preparation fell upon both the Western Air Defense Force and the Fourth Air Force.

Originally, the 437th, stationed at O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, was destined to move to Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio for training, but this destination was altered to Shaw Air Force Base, Sumter, South Carolina. The move to Shaw was made at mobilization strength (60%) including the 36 C-46A's assigned to the wing at the time. The full T/O&S equipment of the wing, less Minimum Essential Equipment (MEE) necessary to support the "B unit" remaining at O'Hare, accompanied the wing to Shaw. Orders were issued by Continental Air Command to establish stock levels to support 32 C-46A's for 30 days and 48 C-46D's for 60 days thereafter. Commencing on 1 September the 437th was scheduled to convert to combat ready C-46D's on a one-to-one basis until the unit was brought to the peacetime strength of 48 combat-equipped C-46D's.^{18/}

An unforeseen problem arose involving ramp assemblies for each of the unit's C-46D's. Air Materiel Command depots were called upon to supply this equipment but were unable to do so. Since the deadline date of 15 December 1950 was closing in Continental Air Command took the drastic step of requiring Air Materiel Command to take action to manufacture the equipment locally.^{19/}

Orders to assemble three "Enroute" kits were issued to the 437th

^{18/} TIX, Hq ComAC to Hq TAC, 30 July 1950

^{19/} TIX, Hq ComAC to CG, AMC, 12 September 1950

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with the usual admonition to prevent "robbing," even though the AOCF status of the aircraft might be affected. The Tenth Air Force at Selfridge Air Force Base was ordered to prepare the assembling of the C-46D's for delivery to the 437th on a combat-ready status. Wherever Continental Air Command resources were inadequate to supply the many essential combat requirements, a "Holdoff" priority was designated to the Air Materiel Command.

The establishment of the 437th at Shaw Air Force Base was only the very beginning of its supply and materiel problems. The Air Force Reserve Training Center at Chicago merely collected the unit equipment in one conglomerate heap for transfer to Shaw Air Force Base. The assembly of hundreds of hastily "selected" persons at Shaw from several Air Force Reserve units whose personnel was "cannibalized" to bring the 437th to strength meant that supply procedures and experience had to begin from "scratch." In the words of Brigadier General Herbert B. Thatcher, Deputy for Operations, Continental Air Command, "Were it not for the fact that they are based at Shaw, which does have adequate facilities and is a well operated base, they could not even eat at the present time...Supply is the hardest item for these people to learn rapidly. We must take aggressive action now in the reserve program to explain all the ramifications to Air Force Manual 07-1. In this respect the reserve program has failed."

20/ SECRET IHS, Brigadier General Herbert B. Thatcher to Vice Commander, Continental Air Command, 1 September 1950

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The 452d Light Bombardment Wing, stationed at Long Beach Municipal Airport, was "tapped" for transfer to Far East Air Forces because of the requirement for B-26s in Korea. This unit was transferred to George Air Force Base, California, in September 1950.

The most pressing problem affecting the 452d was the difficulty of obtaining suitable aircraft because of differences in B-26 accessories and nose sections. One squadron of the 452d was chosen to be equipped as a night intruder squadron with 12 aircraft being dual controlled and four being equipped with single controls. Sixteen aircraft were designated to be equipped with glass noses for day operations and the balance of the units 64 B-26's were of the "hard nose" variety. This lack of homogeneity in materiel demands did not aid in the task of rushing the modifications and equipment projects to an earlier completion.^{21/}

Delivery estimates for the B-26 aircraft from Air Materiel Command sources were determined as follows: 16 glass nosed, Shoran equipped aircraft, by 25 August, and 48 "hard noses" by 25 September. Air Materiel Command's B-26's were to replace the heterogeneous B-26's assigned the wing in due time. The B-26's assigned the 452d were by no means operationally adequate even for training purposes, 16 of them located at George Air Force Base being out of commission because

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- 21/ 1. Hq ComAC IRS, MatP to Hist, 19 September 1950
 2. TUX, Hq ComAC to CG, TAC, ~~August~~ 1950
 3. TUX, Hq ComAC to CG, AHC, 10 August 1950

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of parts shortages when the 452d arrived at that base.^{22/} The general inadequacy of the B-26 situation may be attributed partly to the fact that immediately following the outbreak of war in Korea Far East Air Force had requested 22 B-26's, which were supplied by Continental Air Command from the very best aircraft it could muster from its meager store.

The provision of clothing for the 452d followed a pattern similar to that of the 457th. "Blues" earmarked for Regular units were diverted to the recalled units and additional requisitions were made upon Air Materiel Command. The supply of flying clothing for combat crews proved to be troublesome and recourse was had to outside purchases by individual crewmen to fill this requirement.^{23/}

The supply of parachutes was another perplexing problem. Air Materiel Command indicated that none were available in its stores and suggested Continental Air Command redistribute the requirement of the 452d from its own supplies. In this matter, unnecessary packing was noted in several instances. For example, Headquarters, Western Air Defense Force sent parachutes to the 452d in cans for overseas shipment, when actually the parachutes were to be worn by crew members who would ferry the units' aircraft overseas.^{24/}

^{22/} TXX, Hq ComAC to CGs, WADF, 4AF, 7 September 1950

^{23/} SECRET Hq ComAC, Air Inspector, "P.O.M. 452d Bomb Wing (148th)," September 1950

^{24/} Hq ComAC Memorandum, sub: "Summary of Activities Report, Lt. Col. J.W. Green, in assisting 452d Bomb Wing in its Preparations for Overseas Movement," September 1950

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T/O&E equipment for the 452d was handled by the Sacramento Air Materiel Area and packed there for shipment. However, it was found that M&E was also being packed for overseas shipment. This materiel should have been sent to George Air Force Base since it was to accompany the unit on the trip. Steps were taken to insure greater coordination in this respect between Continental Air Command and Air Materiel Command and in addition Continental Air Command ordered a supply officer and several airmen of the 452d to remain at Sacramento Air Materiel Area depot to follow up on delivery of M&E and T/O&E equipment.^{25/}

To aid the 452d in its training at George Air Force Base the newly activated 3d Shoran Beacon unit had to be equipped simultaneously. It was discovered that improper supply procedures were holding up this unit's requisitions. For example, requisitions for Signal Corps and Air Force communications equipment were being placed on the same requisition and units of issue did not agree (e.g. reels of wire were requisitioned when the actual basis of issue was in feet).^{26/}

IV. Supporting Services

The logistical activities of Continental Air Command, as seen above, were not confined solely to contributions of materiel for Far

25/ Ibid.

26/ Ibid.

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East Air Forces. The national emergency necessitated far-reaching preparations to keep the stream of men and supplies flowing rapidly to Korea. In this effort Continental Air Command's ownership of air installations throughout the country was significant. At Hord Chord Air Force Base, for example, the increased activities of the Military Air Transport Service necessitated the extension of housing, maintenance and operational facilities at a total cost in excess of \$1,000,000.^{27/} Continental Air Command was also advised to render all services necessary for foreign aircraft engaged in support of Far East Air Forces.

The necessity of recalling thousands of Reservists under the involuntary recall program dictated the activation of processing facilities by Continental Air Command at four locations. New processing stations at Langley, Hamilton, Portland and Brooks Air Force Bases supplemented five Air Forces' stations located at Fort Dix, New Jersey, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois, Fort Francis, Wyoming, and Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.^{28/} Besides records processing functions these centers were also concerned with the initial issue of one uniform for each Reservist pending the arrival of the Reservist at his active duty station.

The sudden expansion of the Air Force jeopardized existing Continental Air Command clothing stocks. Reduction of clothing allow-

^{27/} Information supplied by Directorate of Installations, Hq. COMAC.

^{28/} Ibid.

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ances was only partly successful in paring down drains on clothing stocks. To make matters worse, the Korean episode came at a time when a change-over to the new Air Force "blues" was in progress. Basic stocks of such clothing were cut deeply by the influx of new Reservists and by the Federalization of five new Air National Guard wings. The results of this unexpected drain on clothing supplies was that the minimum requirements of the processing stations were met only by half, and even after the arrival of the personnel at the Overseas Replacement Group depots, shortages remained in clothing ^{29/} issues. The clothing of personnel proceeding to Far East Air Forces in August was 50% of requirements. By the end of September less than 10% of the Airmen reporting to the depots were minus items of mandatory clothing allowances. ^{30/}

Continental Air Command's activities in behalf of units newly Federalized or recalled occasioned additional supply problems. A major logistical barrier was the activation of a number of new installations as active duty stations for Guard units. ^{31/} On 10 October, Alexandria Air Force Base, Louisiana, was reopened for utilization by the 157th Fighter-Bomber Wing, Air National Guard, Standiford Field, Kentucky, was activated on the same date for use by the 2230th Air Force Reserve Training Center, which had been transferred from Godman Air Force Base, Kentucky to make room for the 233d Fighter-Bomber

^{29/} Historical Report of the General Supply Branch, Directorate of Maintenance, Supply and Services for September 1950

^{30/} Ibid.

^{31/} Information supplied by Directorate of Installations, Hq ComAC.

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Wing of the Guard. On 16 September, Greenville Air Force Base, South Carolina, was activated to house two new Reserve troop carrier wings -- the 375th, to be equipped with C-82s, and the 433d, to utilize C-119s.

At five installations existing facilities were enlarged, or major alterations were made thereto, as a result of the Korean situation. At Godman, housing was extended to provide for personnel increases due to the Federalization of the 123d Fighter-Bomber Wing. At Lawson Air Force Base, automotive and aircraft maintenance shops were expanded due to the Federalization of the 117th Fighter-Bomber Wing. At New Castle Air Force Base, acquisition of new space was necessitated by the transfer to that base of the 4th Fighter Wing from Langley in order to make room at that base for the newly activated 303d Tactical Reconnaissance ^{32/}Wing.

32/ Ibid.

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