


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JAMES M. MANDERSON
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AF Historical Research Agency

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27 June 1971

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

1. This interview is closed until 1 April 1982.
2. 3825th Historical Research Division internal access is granted only to the Chief, 3825th Special Acquisitions Branch (3825/HOS).
3. For further information, contact the Chief, 3825th Special Acquisitions Branch.

Richard B. Clement
RICHARD B. CLEMENT, Major, USAF
Chief, Special Collections Section
Research Support Branch

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After Khe Sanh that same team moved up to the Panhandle, as I understand it. And you had, after Tet, for the first time, in my judgment, first-class tactical bombing. In fact, I think we were really getting a noose around their necks in the Panhandle, then in Laos, in that period, from Tet down to October 31st. And if I would commend anything to the people studying this operation, it would be the work done and the changes made in the planning of targets at Khe Sanh and then the transfer of those very intelligent techniques based on a study of the logistical routes in the Panhandle in Laos. I assume that those techniques are still used in Laos. It's a very tough job. No one has to tell me how tough it is to use bombers against that kind of route with those very low tonnages. Nevertheless, I think that's a model of how it should have been done. It should have been done much earlier. One of the reasons that I proposed early in

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'67 that we maybe just occasionally touch them up around Hanoi/Haiphong to keep the engineers up there and the anti aircraft but concentrate on the Panhandle, was that I felt we were doing a sloppy job; and that the lessons of tactical bombing in the Second World War and Korea had somehow been forgotten in the Air Force; and that we were repeating the biggest built-in tendency in the use of airpower, which is diffuseness. What you have to do in a situation like this is to analyze with great sophistication the logistical routes, study them until you find the minimum number of places which if held out will bugger those routes, and then just keep them out 24 hours a day and not go running all over the place like a chicken with your head off. The reason this is so tough for air forces is because the operational commanders (with weather and all sorts of things, and flak sometimes) want to have maximum flexibility. They'll say, you know,

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go up and down the roads and shoot anything that moves. The whole history of airpower is the struggle between those who want tactical flexibility and those who want to do a rational job. I saw this with the RAF; I saw it with us in bombers in the Second World War; I saw it in Korea; and I saw it here. It used to drive me absolutely mad, and I'd share my anxieties with Bob Ginsburgh [Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh], but I couldn't get hold of it. But somehow the Air Force got hold of it, or somebody got hold of it, at Khe Sanh, and it was transferred up to the Panhandle. There's a fellow who -- I forget what his name was, but I'd certainly find out who it was, because he was in charge of that. A brilliant -- I think he was only a Colonel [Brigadier General George J. Keegan, Jr.]. Built into Air Force history is a great debate of this kind before D-Day between those who just wanted to clobber marshalling yards, run up and down the railway

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lines, and those who wanted to take out, systematically, the bridges that would control access to the Cherbourg Peninsula. In fact, we had three sets of bridges that we wanted to concentrate on. We didn't want to go and clobber railway yards. We said the bridges can be taken out. And the British - well, Tedder [Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder] and Zuckerman [Professor Solly Zuckerman] - said, "Oh, no, no, you can't ever take out a bridge; let's just hit the marshalling yards." (Which is a big, diffuse effect; you could always put a line through a marshalling yard in no time). And there is a fantastic story of how we finally got the bridges in, part of the Air Force lore. Pre Cabell [General Pre Cabell] knows it; General Smith [Brigadier General Frederic H. Smith, Jr.], if he's still alive, knows it. At one meeting we said well, over Germany it's kind of cloudy; let's just try an experiment today to see if we can take

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out bridges. We knew we were taking out bridges with 70 sorties, or something, in Italy. Zuckerman said it took 600 sorties to take out a bridge. Let's have a test. We were going to mount the test by taking the whole 8th Air Force and the 9th [Laughter]; in fact, take out one of our whole rings of bridges that day as a test, because we had plenty of planes and there was bad weather in Germany, good weather in France. Zuckerman found out about this, and he had the test knocked off down to a very small number, I think 48 Thunderbolt [P-47] fighter-bombers. He was scared we would pull it off. And the Good Lord was with us. These 48 fighter-bombers took on six bridges. They dropped two of them into the Seine. They damaged two others, and they nicked the other two. You know, statistically, it was the hand of the Lord; no one could count on that [sort of success]. But the pictures were so lovely of these two bridges, as I say, lying on the

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bottom, that we got in one ring of bridges.

But the battle to get rationality in tactical air is an endless battle, and we didn't have it (and it's a shame we didn't have it) until, in my judgment, after Khe Sanh.

Riddlebarger: Would you say, Sir, that you suspect maybe the rationality wasn't there? Or would you put a lot of this on lack of coordination/integration between intelligence and operations?

Rostow: Well, you have to build a special staff of intelligence for this kind of thing. You have to have a group of first-class intelligence officers but who are operationally geared to know the capabilities of aircraft. It's a curious kind of intelligence planning operation that you need for this, and very rarely do you get that marriage. The structure of our commands is such as to put planners here and intelligence here. In fact, it's just got to be one thing. By a series

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of accidents, we had that for the 8th and 15th [Army Air Forces] in the European theater: a true marriage of planning and intelligence. But, in any case, it was the failure to produce that, early, and to concentrate on that rather than the more glamorous thing of chewing away a little at Hanoi/Haiphong. Unless the President was willing to tear the place down or to take risks of knocking the ships out from the harbor, you just weren't going to get -- You were doing something great up there, mind you; you were pinning down about a half a million people and anti-aircraft engineers. But that could be done very economically. It was right to use Walleye to take out the electric power. It was great. It was beautifully done. But the big job was, of course, this tactical thing. So you pin down, cheaply, four or five hundred thousand fellows there at Hanoi/Haiphong as cheaply as you could, but then concentrate your mind on

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how to use your airpower rationally and purposefully on these extraordinarily difficult and complex supply routes. That didn't come [until] late, and that's a shame. And I think the Air Force should analyze why it didn't come [until] late. That's my biggest single recommendation. I regard myself as an Air Force man, so this is a pal [speaking] and not an external critic. But that's my advice, and never again lose the lesson of concentration. In every damned war the Air Force has to learn it over again.

Okay, next. On this question, "Did you believe that Washington officials were receiving all the information needed to accurately assess the results of U.S. military actions in South Vietnam?" "Policy of the government." [Reference Project CORONA HARVEST question, "From reviewing reports emanating from SVN during the 1960-1964 time period,

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there appears to be a lack of understanding of just what the FARMGATE unit was doing, i.e., combat versus training. Did you believe that Washington officials were receiving all the information needed to accurately assess the results of U.S. military action in South Vietnam? What was the policy of the Government regarding the prerogatives of U.S. military personnel and U.S. units in South Vietnam during the 1961-1964 period? Do you believe that the U.S. military actions were always within the confines of that policy?"⁷ Well, I wasn't in the Government -- I wasn't in the heart of the Vietnam operation from the end of '61 down to '66. "Lack of understanding just what FARMGATE was about": I don't know anything about that. "Prerogatives of U.S. military personnel": I don't know that. "U.S. military actions always in the confines of that policy": I don't know that. "Did you believe that the Washington officials were

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receiving all the information needed to accurately assess the results of the U.S. military actions in South Vietnam?" No, I do not think they were, but that's not because anyone was holding anything back. This is an extraordinarily hard war to report. I heard former President Eisenhower say to President Johnson once, I guess in their last (not the last time, maybe, but the last time they had a substantive exchange, because the next time they met Ike was already ill) -- He [Eisenhower] said, "Westmoreland's job was much tougher than mine in Europe; mine was a job of bigger scale but nowhere as near as complex as Westmoreland's or as difficult." And I believe Ike was exactly right. And how you report this kind of three-level war, where you don't have a fixed front, is really a searching problem. I think that's one of the reasons why the country was so -- The newspaper men, of course, had even greater

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trouble reporting it. The military had trouble reporting it. The newspaper men had trouble reporting it and they were easily then, therefore, prey to all kinds of images and things built up at the Caravelle [the Caravelle Hotel in Saigon]. As an example, look how long it took for us to get a truly reliable way of assessing what was happening province by province, village by village, hamlet by hamlet. I think we've got it pretty well now, but it was an extraordinary effort that we all had to make to mount that HES [Hamlet Evaluation System] system with its modifications. I think it's a pretty good system. It really tells you something in that kind of a war. The casualty figures are always hard to come by, the attrition rates. I know I worked out my own way of following the war, and I was pretty satisfied with my way of doing it, because it told me not only when things got better but when things got worse. And

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I won't try to describe that to you unless you particularly want it. But, in any case, I think that it was an awfully hard war to report, and it took us time to get good at it. I think we have gotten pretty good at it now.

Riddlebarger: This, of course, ties in with the intelligence community: do you think possibly the Air Force was a little too concerned with BDA [bomb damage assessment], nuts and bolts reporting up the line, rather than impact on the enemy and this sort of thing, tied in with what you've just been saying?

Rostow: Well, I don't know. You see, I didn't follow Air Force intelligence. I just had everything I could lay my hands on and built up my own system for trying to follow it from all-source intelligence, and I don't really have a particular impression of Air Force reporting. It's impossible, if you're using tactical bombing or B-52's, to measure what

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you're doing. You don't know whether you hit supplies, or you knocked down a lot of trees, or you hit a unit assembling, or killed a general. An awful lot of it is blind. When you got up there in the North and really analyzed the thing (after Tet, in the Panhandle) and said, all right, these 25 cuts [road cuts], if held out day and night, will throttle it, you can then report the state of every one of those cuts everyday. And they were trying to repair them, and there was a slide here, and the trucks were backed up here, and you shot them up where they were trying to open a new route there, and you got them there. You could do that. And, for awhile, we had some rational reporting of that kind of interdiction, because you've reduced the problem to something that was lucid and measurable. But inevitably, in trying to chew up units assembling and all of that kind of thing, it's very hard to get a neat way of reporting.

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You can't report it except in the context, as you know: here we've been hitting in this area; or, here are the forces we think are there; here is what they have been able to do against our side; and we think a mixture of this and that, including the bombing, has produced this result. It's awful hard. But, in any case, I can't be helpful to you on this, because I did not spend an awful lot of time on, as it were, Air Force as opposed to the general military flow. And I didn't have a very lucid impression of what Air Force intelligence consisted in, independent of everybody else's.

Swenston: You said you had to use what you could get your hands on?

Rostow: Yes.

Swenston: I get the feeling maybe there was some omission here, that maybe something in the

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intelligence area needs to be solidified or regulated.

Rostow: No, no. I'll give you very briefly (I don't want to take your time) the way I viewed it. Without a fixed front, the way I tried to follow the war was to collect as many statistical indicators as I could that bore on the course of the war - statistical indicators that were collected from independent sources: U.S. casualties; South Vietnamese casualties; estimates of enemy casualties; numbers of weapons captured, numbers of weapons lost; casualty ratios, as they changed; estimates of population control; number of battalion-size attacks by the enemy, [and those] initiated by us; number of enemy defectors; number of AWOL's from ARVN; just any damned thing that bore on the war that was independently collected. My view being that no one of these was a satisfactory index by itself; all of them

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were flawed in one way or another, except maybe U.S. casualties, in terms of statistical exactness. And I studied these to assure myself that they went down when we damned well knew things went badly and went up when we knew things were going pretty well, in broad terms. In other words, they had some kind of a capacity to show you the direction of movement - not the scale, but the direction, of movement. Once I was sure that they were sensitive to direction of movement, I was prepared to use them along with everything else. Some joked about Rostow and his statistics, but I was doing exactly what I've done as an economic historian in, let's say, the late 18th Century in Britain, or early 19th Century, when you didn't have accurate measurements of gross national product or all these things, but you had things which gave you a feel. And, in my work on that period, I think I built up a better feel for that period from

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1790 to 1850 than anyone has done for any subsequent period of British history, by using everything and checking it against the other things that were independently collected until you finally got a mosaic. Then [referring back to South Vietnam] I would take all the qualitative material (reports from provinces and general reports) and see if the way these quantitative data were trending, up or down, checked out with the feel of good province advisers or sensitive observers from CIA or whatever. And by the time I was finished, I really felt that I had a pretty good feel for that war. I followed it rather closely, and I never misled my President one bit. For example, one of my prides is that long before anybody else I got the smell of this Winter-Spring Offensive. I saw that when they [clues] began to come in, in the autumn, all the indicators damped (they had begun fast in 67). The President's mind was not only

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wholly made up but it was he who went to McNamara and said, "I want every damned maneuver battalion I promised Westy by June '68 there before Christmas." And he got them there before Christmas, except four.

Riddlebarger: Christmas of '67, you mean?

Rostow: Sixty-seven. "I know what's coming [the President said], " and he flew them out there. McNamara didn't like the expense, and Johnny Johnson [Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson] wouldn't let four go. He [the President] wanted those four to go, but they wouldn't be ready until April or May. And he [the President] said, "Couldn't we put them out there and train them there? In case something big blows, I want them there." No, the Army got its way. So there were only 102 of the 106 [maneuver battalions] there by Christmas. But he knew this was coming, and he briefed the Australian Cabinet out there before Christmas '67, saying, "We're

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going to see kamikaze tactics. It's going to be a tough winter. They're hungering for a tactical victory. Then, after they fail, maybe we can start some movement towards peace." But the point is -- One of the reasons that there were so many damned wobbly knees in the Government U.S. Government⁷ in Tet was that people weren't following this thing closely enough.

Riddlebarger: What did you base your "calling the shot" on? The things you've been talking about?

Rostow: Well, what I saw was, first, there was piles of evidence on the Winter-Spring Offensive: they were coming in; they were going to have a great uprising; they were going to do this and that and the other thing. There was nothing secret about the Winter-Spring Offensive. And then I saw the units moving down. Bob Ginsburgh and I, I think, were the first to call that these two divisions were going to go for Khe Sanh, long before

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other people did. We also, incidentally, were the first fellows to spot that they were moving out. They began to move out earlier than people realized, about mid-February. The picture that Bob and I love is -- One night we found this crazy evidence. We said we weren't sure about it, [but we] called up the President and said, "If you've got nothing else to do, we've got something down here you might like." And he came downstairs. We had a sand-table mock-up of Khe Sanh in the "Sit Room" [the White House "Situation Room"]. We told him about these units that had been all clustered, and that these units were pulling back into Laos as near as we could make out. It looked very crazy. February 15th, this was; early as that. The President's photographer was there, and he took this picture of Bob and me showing the President this thing one night, saying, "Don't hang your hat on it; the intelligence units may say we're all wet tomorrow." But

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I think we were right.

Riddlebarger: Well, as an individual who was sitting in Plans at 7th Air Force at that time, I'm sure glad those battalions got over there.

Rostow: It was pretty hairy. But the point is -- When you don't have a fixed front, the question is, How do you follow a war? It's an attritional war by definition. Most wars are attrition wars, but how do you measure the pace and the scale and so on. The only way I could figure out was to use everything, statistical and nonstatistical, and use it just exactly the way I would try to reconstruct the story of the British economy from 1790, at a time when there weren't good statistical indicators and measurements and national income data and unemployment data. Use both quantitative and qualitative data, and just see. Check it out, and you get a feel, a damned good feel. We weren't misled. And that's why I think the President and I

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were really much cooler than practically everybody else after Tet. You can look at his press conference on February 3rd. Everyone was wringing their hands: but the President said here's the way it is; this is what happened; and these factors are going to decide what's going to happen. But I don't think the military ever built up a systematic way to follow this thing, and that's why the press couldn't follow it. They'd give these raw data (it was called the "MACV Follies," or the "Five O'Clock Follies"). Referring to the daily briefings for the press conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon. So maybe an effort ought to be made now to see, with retrospect, couldn't you have followed this war and explained it a lot better than the military did?

Riddlebarger: That's a question we have, Sir. Do you think the military, let's say the Air Force,

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were really much cooler than practically everybody else after Tet. You can look at his press conference on February 3rd. Everyone was wringing their hands: [but the President said] here's the way it is; this is what happened; and these [factors] are going to decide what's going to happen. But I don't think the military ever built up a systematic way to follow this thing, and that's why the press couldn't follow it. They'd give these raw data (it was called the "MACV Follies," or the "Five O'Clock Follies"). [Referring to the daily briefings for the press conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon.] So maybe an effort ought to be made now to see, with retrospect, couldn't you have followed this war and explained it a lot better than the military did?

Riddlebarger: That's a question we have, Sir. Do you think the military, let's say the Air Force,

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in this case, told its story inside the Government parameters adequately, expressed itself?

Rostow:

No, but I don't think -- My point is, you can't just tell it as an Air Force story. The Air Force was just part of the total attritional process we were applying. So the Air Force can't do it. What you need is a JCS team. I would go back and reconstruct that war, now, with all the data you have in hindsight, and get a special team, all Services, at the JCS staff level, to see in retrospect what an optimum way of following the war would look like and an optimum way of explaining it. GOD willing, we'll never have another war like this. And it could be, because, as I said in the beginning, this was a unique case because of the depth of the Mao Stage One base they built in Japanese and French times. But you could have a war without a fixed front to

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fight again. And we ought to learn how it
could have been done better, now, with
hindsight.

Swenston: Are you distinguishing between the intelligence
collection and the subsequent stages of
putting it together and all?

Rostow: No, you can't separate those. In science
and in policy and in academic life it's the
question you ask which determines what you
get out. In other words, you've got to pose
the question very sharply. If you pose the
question very sharply, What's happening in
the villages in terms of security, politics,
economics? and then break that down, then
you'll get back answers. If you just pose
it roughly in terms of who controls what
area, you get back a much cruder answer. So
there's no such thing as that kind of a
separation between the question you're asking
and intelligence. Intelligence only answers
what you ask it. And what it answered were

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rather crude, obvious kinds of questions.

It answered the best it could, but it didn't answer, sensitively, how this kind of a very curious, three-dimensional war was going.

Swenston: There was the lack of some agency, some coordination, asking these questions, though. The information came in, but what was done with it?

Rostow: No, it doesn't work quite that way. You've got to have some first-rate minds posing the questions for the intelligence. The facts you could collect are always determined by some question. The facts you normally collect are the facts that result from your habits built up out of other wars. No one really sat down (until we got the HES system) and said, What kind of questions must we ask to follow this war with all its peculiarities? and imposed that on intelligence so that the facts came back. The story of how we built up the HES system is well worth looking into,

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because there some minds did go to work and say, What's happening in the rural areas is damned important, and it's not being answered by what we've got; now, these are the questions. We finally built it up and we got the answers. And you never get back anything that you didn't ask for. You've got to go out and get intelligence geared to that, and I don't think anyone really got on to that. That's my point on that one.

Riddlebarger: Could we go on to page three there, Sir?
[Reference the list of questions posed by Project CORONA HARVEST.] I'm particularly concerned with that second question. [How do you view the impact of the Southeast Asia conflict on the image of the military in the eyes of the U.S. public? What will be the result of that image on future military plans, programs, force levels, equipment, and operations?"] How do you view the impact of this conflict on the image of the military

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and the impact it's going to have on plans
and programs?

Rostow:

I honestly don't know, and I don't think you
should -- I mean, in the eyes of the U.S.
public, I think that you're going through a
phase here now in which people are kind of
quasi-isolationists, and we're trying to
draw down the military budget. We're going
through a version of what historically has
happened between wars. It's a kind of hard
time for the military, but the military
should say, It's a lot less than what we had
between the First and Second World Wars,
what we've had historically; let's not belly-
ache; we have an abiding duty to the country -
our job is to serve the country; our job is
to make plans as we see the world. I think
you should assume that this nation will
continue to do what it's done in this century
(which is, no matter what the speeches made,
react very strongly if anyone tries to upset

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the balance of power in Europe or Asia, or
tried to emplace south of us the power of a
major extra-continental power) and just go
about your business. [You should] handle
this riptide with poise and without self-
pity. I think that the behavior in the
Middle East of the Russians has kind of
sobered folks up. I don't think this is a
"bug-out" country now. I don't think the
majority believe in that. I don't know
whether Vietnamization is going to work. I
mean how well. I can't even try to make a
guess as to whether it's going too fast or
whether we're going to produce a crisis there
or not. I'm prepared to wish all our succes-
sors well, and I just hope they don't do it
too fast, because I think one of the reasons
the war is still going on is that they're
waiting to see how far we draw down and whether
they still have a military capability to take
advantage of it when we hit bottom or something.
I'm not too pessimistic about that, because

[REDACTED]

my fundamental feeling about the North Vietnamese is that they're a broken-back military force. They broke their backs in Tet and in May 1968 and they have never recovered. I'm not sure they ever will recover. That's my gut feeling, from a distance. But they could try again when the American force is at minimum, and I don't know what we'll do then. President Nixon said he's not going to give up Southeast Asia. I believe that! I know enough about the imperatives of the President of the United States to believe that that's exactly what he means. When he says that if they try to take advantage of our withdrawal that he's prepared to act militarily, I believe that, too, because that's a corollary to the first position - that you're not going to give up Southeast Asia. I said before I left the Government that no matter who was elected President -- Even if Gene McCarthy had been elected President, he wasn't, in

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fact, as President, going to give up Southeast Asia. I think I understand enough about the imperatives that go with the Presidency to understand why that's so. So, I think I'd be calm. Use your resources intelligently, and don't panic. Make your plans for the world as you see it in the future, and fight for your budgets rationally. Don't fight for silly things. Keep the security of this country in reasonable order within your budgetary limitations. And, above all, think ahead. Think ahead to what you might have to do if President Nixon is called on what he says, mainly that you might have to lean on these fellows pretty hard if they try to take advantage of our withdrawal militarily. Think ahead to other situations. We have a lot of hardware, and we have a priceless asset which the Russians envy profoundly: namely, we have a military establishment that has fought. I can tell you, from very solid sources, that the

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Soviet military are very worried that our whole military establishment is battle-worthy. It has proved it, and they haven't had a chance to do that. They know that. They try -- I can't go into some of the evidence. But, in any case, you shouldn't panic. I don't know what the -- The public swings, you know. The people said after the Korean War, Never again! This nation, I think, will fight for what it judges to be its vital interest, and I think its vital interest will remain that no single power take over Europe or Asia or the Middle East or emplace itself south of us. I'd just go about my business on the assumption that America will stay steady on those propositions. You read my piece, "The Tocqueville Oscillation," didn't you? ¹"Domestic Determinants of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Tocqueville Oscillation," Armed Forces Journal, 27 June 1970.⁷

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[REDACTED]
Riddlebarger: Yes, Sir. [REDACTED]

Rostow: So we can expect -- It's built into us that we oscillate some, and your job is to minimize the lack of preparedness that has sometimes gone with that oscillation. Count yourselves -- Don't feel sorry for yourselves just because you're taking a bit of a shellacking in the Congress now. No decent, democratic country, no mass of people, likes war. They're right in not liking wars. Wars are terrible and just as bad as people say. They're hell, and that people should get sick of it and want it over is just right. On the other hand, it's still a world that can make a lot of trouble, and your job is to protect the country. Get on with it, and don't feel sorry for yourselves.

Riddlebarger: Sir, you mentioned Vietnamization. Could I ask a question about the pacification programs? Do you think this was a function

[REDACTED]

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Riddlebarger: Sir, you mentioned Vietnamization. Could I ask a question about the pacification programs? Do you think this was a function

[REDACTED]

that should have been under military control?

Rostow:

I think the reasons that we did it the way we did it were sound reasons. We made the decision at Guam. Because you couldn't get behind this effort (which is, after all, basically a Vietnamese effort, with U.S. advisers, and had civilian components) - also knowing that we couldn't get the logistics, we couldn't get the priority - unless the military were with it. And I think the solution that we came to of making Bob Komer [Robert W. Komer] Westy's Deputy [for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, CORDS] and weaving it into the military was a brilliant solution. And I think it worked. What happened to Bob was that he no sooner began to get it going than we had Tet. He kept his cool, and helped clean up the mess in Saigon. Then he got the accelerated pacification going. President Johnson gave the flattest order I

[REDACTED]

ever saw to Abrams: just go, go, go, from
October on. In October he gave this order.
I don't know whether you've ever seen the
order. It just said, Get every cook and
bottle-washer and just, right down to the
end of my Administration, throw everything
including the kitchen sink at them; move
this thing! And we recovered about pre-Tet
levels by September. We had accelerated
pacification. By the time we left the
Johnson Administration ended we had over 80
percent of the population secure, and it's
gone up to 90 percent. I guess it's kind of
stalled up there now. It was a good method.
But the basic reason for military participa-
tion was that you just couldn't -- The
capacity of the civilian agencies to mobilize
(men, jeeps, food, everything) was not enough.
And in Westy and Komer, we found two men who
understood each other and worked together.
I think it was fine. The civilian contribu-
tion was not swallowed up, distorted. And

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some of the most sensitive people that worked on it were military men. So, I can't tell you how it worked out in '69 and '70, but I'm glad we did it at Guam. It was a good decision.

Riddlebarger: Sir, you've telescoped ahead and got most of these [questions]. [Again, referring to the list of questions posed by Project CORONA HARVEST.] I only have three left, if I may?

Rostow: All right; fine.

Riddlebarger: One is the next-to-last question on page two: that is, did we anticipate the staying power, the resolve [of the enemy], however you want to phrase that question, in the early '60's, and to what extent possible Chinese Communist intervention had on this? I realize that's a rather broad question. [Referring to Project CORONA HARVEST question, "During the early 1960's were we able to foresee the extent, resolve, and nature of

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the VC/NVA threat? Did the threat of Chinese Communist or Russian intervention significantly impact on the strategy determined in January 1965?"⁷

Rostow:

All of the evidence I have (because I wasn't in the President's councils at that time) is that there was no cheap optimism in '65 when they moved the troops in. There was nobody who promised a quick fix. It was a most somber decision. The war was almost lost, clearly. We had waited until we were really at the very bottom and there was no option except give up, before we introduced U.S. forces. By that time the enemy was fully committed to bringing the North Vietnamese in. So, it was, Do you accept defeat, or do you go, starting at the bottom? There was no cheap optimism, and no one said the job is doable; it was just that, as compared to the alternative, it had to be tried. And I would say that we tried a lot of sort of peace

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moves, but President Johnson certainly never believed that -- [He] was never optimistic about their accepting until they really had no realistic alternative but to accept them. He wanted to try it after they failed at Tet, but even then he thought it would be a long, slow negotiation. He wasn't terribly -- He didn't really think that it would happen in his time, but he wanted to play that card. And I must say that Abrams and Bunker thought they were in bad enough shape [after Tet] to move towards negotiations. No I don't think there was any cheap optimism in this.

[Pause in discussion to change tapes.]

Riddlebarger: We were talking about the recognition of the long-term resolve of the enemy in Southeast Asia.

Rostow: Yes. I think that the fact that we waited so long before showing that we would put up our ground forces, and that they [the enemy]

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were deeply committed and fairly close to victory by spring and early summer of '65 [contributed to enemy resolve]. Having taken the step of introducing major North Vietnamese forces, I think that they were going to see how it came out. I think, second, they had won North Vietnam out of the struggle with the French, out of the mixture of politics in Paris and limited tactical success in the field. And they were imprinted with the possibility that perhaps they could be handed victory out of the politics of the United States, and that kept them in the war. And, third, they're fellows whose whole mature lives have been devoted to this obsessive dream that they could take over, had the right to take over, and would take over, the French colonial empire in Asia. They took their poor little country of seventeen million and put them through, what? six or seven hundred thousand dead? I don't know what their

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casualties are, but they're enormous. They made it [their nation] for ten or twelve years into a funnel in which there was no economic and social development. Men who do that kind of thing must try to get something out of it. It's the most horrible decision you can imagine men to take - to say, Well, the end of all this is that we're just going back to North Vietnam and start economic and social development, and we could have done that in 1954; if we'd gone on with it in '58 and not revived the war in '58, we could have been so much ahead and all these people [our casualties] with us. This is the most terrible human thing that they face in accepting the fact that they're not going to get South Vietnam, they're not going to get Cambodia, they're not going to get Laos. If you have any sense of the history of these people, you've got to say that once they got started and made this commitment (especially the commitment of North Vietnamese regulars,

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which they made in '64) that it was just going to be hell to make them give up. And I think they're hanging in there now on marginal hopes. One, that we will draw our forces down so far that they might be able to do something militarily significant. I think President Nixon and the American people have convinced them that the "doves" are not going to turn it over to them, in the United States, politically. (Although, they're going to see how the elections come out this year.) And, third, they may hope for a rise of some "dove" sentiment in the cities of South Vietnam, where there's inflation and a lot of problems. So there's enough kind of marginal hope here to keep throwing in bodies - at a much lower rate than in '68 and '69, but still doing it. But, in other words, I can't tell you, except from documents, what the view was in '65. And the view, as I see it from the documents, is that there was no cheap optimism about the length

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of the war. In my time in the White House there was no cheap optimism about the length of the war or what it would take to make these guys go home. As I told you when we were changing tapes, the only prediction that was ever given was Westy's, which he made to the National Press Club: that within two years from, let's say November '67, we might be in a position to withdraw some American forces - a prediction that you correctly pointed out turned out to be accurate. What the military told President Johnson was that the job was doable on the long term if we stuck with it. I believe their assessment was correct. What we were gambling on was the basic thing that President Kennedy gambled on in '61, which was his major concern in '61: that there was an authentic South Vietnamese nationalism on which to build. That was his most basic assessment. And there was. That was tested at Tet, and it yielded the mobilization. And,

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in my judgment, that will be, historically, the turning point of the war. But a guerrilla war, a war like this when attrition rates are under control of the other side (they can keep their name in the papers at relatively low levels of casualties), is a very long run affair unless you're prepared to put them in a "go/no go" position.

Riddlebarger: Yes, Sir. I only have one more area here I'd like to finish on. I'd like to possibly wind up and give you some more time if you'd like.

Rostow: No, I've got to get back to work; that's right.

Riddlebarger: Yes, Sir. We get into the problem of measuring Air Force effectiveness versus Air Force efficiency. There are lots of measurements of efficiency, such as the dropping of bombs on the enemy, and all that. How do you see our problem of measuring that effectiveness?

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How would you measure it? Is there any way other than in generalities?

Rostow:

No, I think the answer is that you can only measure it when you define your objectives much more sharply than they were defined. What were you trying to do at Hanoi/Haiphong within the limits set by the President? You were trying, one, to cut down their industrial production; two, to harass to a certain extent the movement of supplies through the area; and, three, to pin down a large proportion of their best manpower in air defense. One, two, three. Now, how well did you do the job and at what cost. My judgment is that the job was done pretty well but at excessive cost. And, as I say, you could have done that job with fewer sorties in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. There was a wastage in terms of those objectives. The other thing is, What proportion of the supplies and men headed for South Vietnam through the Panhandle

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in Laos did you prevent from getting there?
That's the other measure. And how much
manpower and resources did you divert to
protect against the bombing we did in the
Panhandle in Laos? How much weight did you
lift from South Vietnam (that would other-
wise have been expended there) by your bomb-
ing? I think that the debates that sometimes
went on in the CIA and parts of the Secretary
of Defense's Office were arguing against the
use of airpower and saying it was inefficient
and so on. I often felt that the Air Force
evaluations, military evaluations as a whole,
were nearer right but done with much less
sophistication and analytic ability. You'd
be losing debates on points that you didn't
have to lose.

Riddlebarger: The approach was bad?

Rostow: You didn't put enough good brains on this
problem. The tendency in an air force, or
anything in a war, is to put your good brains

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on operations, guys who are flying and out in the field. I have no doubt that there are men of first-rate intellectual, analytic quality in the Air Force. And if you didn't have them, you could have gotten civilians. I never felt that Rand was put properly to work, incidentally, on Vietnam and on this problem (I said that to the Rand people) - the problem of analyzing the use of airpower in this kind of a war. But in any case, I think you can't measure unless you define your mission very sharply; then you have to go out and see how well you are doing your mission. I don't think the -- The mission was defined a little fuzzily. It was quite different around Hanoi/Haiphong than it was in the Panhandle or Laos or in tactical support of ground units. And I didn't think enough first-class brains were put on this problem of defining the mission, and then, when you defined it clearly, measuring results and challenging some of the sophisticated

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(but, in my judgment, wrong) assessments that were made in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or CIA. That's just blunt.

Riddlebarger: We appreciate your candid response. Let me finish by this, unless you have some other points. Are there any other lessons learned or advice you'd give the Air Force in their current endeavor here [Project CORONA HARVEST's assessment of the effectiveness of airpower in Southeast Asia] or some way of possibly summarizing the Air Force's role in that war? As to what we should do in the future? Any [more comments or advice] that you'd have? You've given us some fine comments. We want to be sure you have the opportunity to add any others that you have, or a summary.

Rostow: No, I think I've said, in the course of this, the very limited things that I have to contribute. If there's anything in general, it is that in this kind of a war or any kind

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of a war that I can think of (except the one I don't want to contemplate, maybe: an all-out nuclear war) the use of airpower is woven with extreme complexity into all the other dimensions of the war. That requires, therefore, Air Force planning and Air Force intelligence of an extremely high order, because you're trying to apply one instrument to a very complex field in which ground forces and all kinds of things are involved. It means, also, therefore, that it pays to invest the very best brains you've got, very best imagination that you've got, in planning and intelligence. I don't know how you stumbled on getting that Khe Sanh thing set up; I had a feeling you did stumble on it. Maybe people just got so damned scared that they put some good fellows onto it. But I think the scandal of this period is you didn't have that kind of operation from the beginning, that quality. I didn't have the sense that the Air Force, as an institution,

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had made a command decision that, This is a mighty complicated piece of business, and we're going to assemble the best brains we have and bring in the best civilian brains so that all the conceptual work on this, all the planning, all the intelligence, will be the best we can produce from this country and the Air Force. I lived through this curious experience, as a kid, of being pulled over to London and of joining the targeting for the 7th and the 15th Army Air Forces in WW II. It arose because we found ourselves putting a lot of planes over there. We built the B-24 and the B-17 and then flew them around in Texas with a Norden bomb sight; that kind of weather and no flak. Then suddenly we were in Europe. And the weather was bad. And we were up against a damned good fighter force and heavy flak. And we had no experience in target selection. We built the planes. We made the national commitment of about 40 percent of our total war effort to

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these big damned bombers and had never given a bit of serious thought as to target selection or planning. We were operating off British intelligence. The British were committed to area bombing and kind of half wanted us to fail and go over to just tearing down cities. And our planes weren't built to take that much tonnage. So Spaatz [General (then Major General) Carl Spaatz] and Fred Anderson and this marvelous character Dick Hughes asked us in OSS [Office of Strategic Services] and BEW [Bureau of Economic Warfare] to send a few fellows over so they could have an independent judgment about British intelligence and planning. There were hundreds of people in the United States as smart or smarter than we were, but we just happened to be the kids (because we were kids) that were pulled into this. And only a handful of us. It was very rare. Usually [in instances of] the Americans dealing with British, you've got a vast American establishment

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and a few smart Britishers who can draft.

It was just the reverse. Britain had the Air Ministry full of people, Lansdowne House full of people, and we were about five or six fellows who operated like the Globe-Trotters [Harlem Globe-Trotters] basketball team. But the point is that at least there was some thought about the fundamentals, about what this was about, what the instrument was about, what you had to do: (a) to maximize the role of these bombers, pre-D-Day, and then (b) how to maximize their tactical effectiveness. We built a doctrine and we related it to the individual targets. We weren't just abstract. I did the aiming point reports. I took apart these factories and found where the key point [was], [where] you ought to have your aiming point for precision bombing. I knew these plants building by building; I knew the weather; I knew all the routes and where the planes could fly. So it was a mixture of intelligence

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and operational and strategic planning. We weren't the greatest guys in the world, but we did do a job. We got air supremacy over Germany, and nobody thought that could be done in daylight. Then we took out their oil, immobilized their ground forces and their air force, and made irrelevant all the planes and hardware that Speer built in his dispersed factories. And when D-Day came the big debate I was involved in was would there be 2,000 or 200 [enemy] sorties? I think there were 12 or something like that. That's about what flew against us on D-Day. And we did take out the bridges; I saw 60,000 German trucks that never could cross the Seine. The trucks they got just dribbled into Normandy. These were hard military achievements. It takes a tremendous effort to discipline the inherent tendency of airpower to diffuse. Look what the British did with their RAF; it was a trivial result, because just by hitting cities you get a very diffuse military effect.

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It's very hard to get a serious military effect with airplanes, very hard. You're dropping bombs and things go up in nice explosions; [there is] a lot of physical damage; but, in terms of a war, you're just amazed how little effect it can have unless you've really disciplined it to something that matters. I was just delighted to see these fellows, after Khe Sanh, finding a little road that ran along the side of a hill. It didn't look like anything. But they would go there everyday and they would just keep that thing slid out. They had analyzed it enough to know that mattered. Sure, the Air Force would rather have gone out and found a truck or something physical to knock down, than just dig a hole in the side of a hill everyday; nobody around. But that's the kind of work you need to make our airpower useful. And I just think that partly because the operation of planes is such a challenging piece of physical business; partly because the flying

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of planes in [redacted] requires such extraordinary discipline and courage, qualities of character, and all the rest of it; that the Air Force underinvests in planning and intelligence. That's always been its problem. I had the privilege in the Second World War of helping compensate for it a little. But I think that was its problem in Vietnam, and I hope -- If I have anything to contribute, it's the hope that it will never do it again.

Riddlebarger: Thank you, Sir.

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were flawed in one way or another, except maybe U.S. casualties, in terms of statistical exactness. And I studied these to assure myself that they went down when we damned well knew things went badly and went up when we knew things were going pretty well, in broad terms. In other words, they had some kind of a capacity to show you the direction of movement - not the scale, but the direction, of movement. Once I was sure that they were sensitive to direction of movement, I was prepared to use them along with everything else. Some joked about Rostow and his statistics, but I was doing exactly what I've done as an economic historian in, let's say, the late 18th Century in Britain, or early 19th Century, when you didn't have accurate measurements of gross national product or all these things, but you had things which gave you a feel. And, in my work on that period, I think I built up a better feel for that period from

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1790 to 1850 than anyone has done for any subsequent period of British history, by using everything and checking it against the other things that were independently collected until you finally got a mosaic. Then referring back to South Vietnam I would take all the qualitative material (reports from provinces and general reports) and see if the way these quantitative data were trending, up or down, checked out with the feel of good province advisers or sensitive observers from CIA or whatever. And by the time I was finished, I really felt that I had a pretty good feel for that war. I followed it rather closely, and I never misled my President one bit. For example, one of my prides is that long before anybody else I got the smell of this Winter-Spring Offensive. I saw that when they clues began to come in, in the autumn, all the indicators damped (they had begun fast in 67). The President's mind was not only

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wholly made up but it was he who went to
McNamara and said, "I want every damned
maneuver battalion I promised Westy by
June '68 there before Christmas." And he got
them there before Christmas, except four.

Riddlebarger: Christmas of '67, you mean?

Rostow: Sixty-seven. "I know what's coming [the
President said]," and he flew them out there.
McNamara didn't like the expense, and
Johnny Johnson [Army Chief of Staff
Harold K. Johnson] wouldn't let four go.
He [the President] wanted those four to go,
but they wouldn't be ready until April or
May. And he [the President] said, "Couldn't
we put them out there and train them there?
In case something big blows, I want them
there." No, the Army got its way. So there
were only 102 of the 106 [maneuver battalions]
there by Christmas. But he knew this was
coming, and he briefed the Australian Cabinet
out there before Christmas '67, saying, "We're

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going to see kamikaze tactics. It's going to be a tough winter. They're hungering for a tactical victory. Then, after they fail, maybe we can start some movement towards peace." But the point is -- One of the reasons that there were so many damned wobbly knees in the Government U.S. Government⁷ in Tet was that people weren't following this thing closely enough.

Riddlebarger: What did you base your "calling the shot" on? The things you've been talking about?

Rostow: Well, what I saw was, first, there was piles of evidence on the Winter-Spring Offensive: they were coming in; they were going to have a great uprising; they were going to do this and that and the other thing. There was nothing secret about the Winter-Spring Offensive. And then I saw the units moving down. Bob Ginsburgh and I, I think, were the first to call that these two divisions were going to go for Khe Sanh, long before

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other people did. We also, incidentally, were the first fellows to spot that they were moving out. They began to move out earlier than people realized, about mid-February. The picture that Bob and I love is -- One night we found this crazy evidence. We said we weren't sure about it, [but we] called up the President and said, "If you've got nothing else to do, we've got something down here you might like." And he came downstairs. We had a sand-table mock-up of Khe Sanh in the "Sit Room" [the White House "Situation Room"]. We told him about these units that had been all clustered, and that these units were pulling back into Laos as near as we could make out. It looked very crazy. February 15th, this was; early as that. The President's photographer was there, and he took this picture of Bob and me showing the President this thing one night, saying, "Don't hang your hat on it; the intelligence units may say we're all wet tomorrow." But

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I think we were right. AIR FORCE EYES ONLY

Riddlebarger: Well, as an individual who was sitting in Plans at 7th Air Force at that time, I'm sure glad those battalions got over there.

Rostow: It was pretty hairy. But the point is -- When you don't have a fixed front, the question is, How do you follow a war? It's an attritional war by definition. Most wars are attrition wars, but how do you measure the pace and the scale and so on. The only way I could figure out was to use everything, statistical and nonstatistical, and use it just exactly the way I would try to reconstruct the story of the British economy from 1790, at a time when there weren't good statistical indicators and measurements and national income data and unemployment data. Use both quantitative and qualitative data, and just see. Check it out, and you get a feel, a damned good feel. We weren't misled. And that's why I think the President and I

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were really much cooler than practically everybody else after Tet. You can look at his press conference on February 3rd. Everyone was wringing their hands: [but the President said] here's the way it is; this is what happened; and these [factors] are going to decide what's going to happen. But I don't think the military ever built up a systematic way to follow this thing, and that's why the press couldn't follow it. They'd give these raw data (it was called the "MACV Follies," or the "Five O'Clock Follies"). [Referring to the daily briefings for the press conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon.] So maybe an effort ought to be made now to see, with retrospect, couldn't you have followed this war and explained it a lot better than the military did?

Riddlebarger: That's a question we have, Sir. Do you think the military, let's say the Air Force,

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in this case, told its story inside the Government parameters adequately, expressed itself?

Rostow:

No, but I don't think -- My point is, you can't just tell it as an Air Force story. The Air Force was just part of the total attritional process we were applying. So the Air Force can't do it. What you need is a JCS team. I would go back and reconstruct that war, now, with all the data you have in-hindsight, and get a special team, all Services, at the JCS staff level, to see in retrospect what an optimum way of following the war would look like and an optimum way of explaining it. GOD willing, we'll never have another war like this. And it could be, because, as I said in the beginning, this was a unique case because of the depth of the Mao Stage One base they built in Japanese and French times. But you could have a war without a fixed front to

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fight again. And we ought to learn how it
could have been done better, now, with
hindsight.

Swenston: Are you distinguishing between the intelligence
collection and the subsequent stages of
putting it together and all?

Rostow: No, you can't separate those. In science
and in policy and in academic life it's the
question you ask which determines what you
get out. In other words, you've got to pose
the question very sharply. If you pose the
question very sharply, What's happening in
the villages in terms of security, politics,
economics? and then break that down, then
you'll get back answers. If you just pose
it roughly in terms of who controls what
area, you get back a much cruder answer. So
there's no such thing as that kind of a
separation between the question you're asking
and intelligence. Intelligence only answers
what you ask it. And what it answered were

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rather crude, obvious kinds of questions.

It answered the best it could, but it didn't answer, sensitively, how this kind of a very curious, three-dimensional war was going.

Swenston: There was the lack of some agency, some coordination, asking these questions, though. The information came in, but what was done with it?

Rostow: No, it doesn't work quite that way. You've got to have some first-rate minds posing the questions for the intelligence. The facts you could collect are always determined by some question. The facts you normally collect are the facts that result from your habits built up out of other wars. No one really sat down (until we got the HES system) and said, What kind of questions must we ask to follow this war with all its peculiarities? and imposed that on intelligence so that the facts came back. The story of how we built up the HES system is well worth looking into,

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because there some minds did go to work and say, What's happening in the rural areas is damned important, and it's not being answered by what we've got; now, these are the questions. We finally built it up and we got the answers. And you never get back anything that you didn't ask for. You've got to go out and get intelligence geared to that, and I don't think anyone really got on to that. That's my point on that one.

Riddlebarger: Could we go on to page three there, Sir?
[Reference the list of questions posed by Project CORONA HARVEST.] I'm particularly concerned with that second question. [How do you view the impact of the Southeast Asia conflict on the image of the military in the eyes of the U.S. public? What will be the result of that image on future military plans, programs, force levels, equipment, and operations?"] How do you view the impact of this conflict on the image of the military

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and the impact it's going to have on plans
and programs?

Rostow:

I honestly don't know, and I don't think you should -- I mean, in the eyes of the U.S. public, I think that you're going through a phase here now in which people are kind of quasi-isolationists, and we're trying to draw down the military budget. We're going through a version of what historically has happened between wars. It's a kind of hard time for the military, but the military should say, It's a lot less than what we had between the First and Second World Wars, what we've had historically; let's not belly-ache; we have an abiding duty to the country - our job is to serve the country; our job is to make plans as we see the world. I think you should assume that this nation will continue to do what it's done in this century (which is, no matter what the speeches made, react very strongly if anyone tries to upset

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the balance of power in Europe or Asia, or tried to emplace south of us the power of a major extra-continental power) and just go about your business. You should handle this riptide with poise and without self-pity. I think that the behavior in the Middle East of the Russians has kind of sobered folks up. I don't think this is a "bug-out" country now. I don't think the majority believe in that. I don't know whether Vietnamization is going to work. I mean how well. I can't even try to make a guess as to whether it's going too fast or whether we're going to produce a crisis there or not. I'm prepared to wish all our successors well, and I just hope they don't do it too fast, because I think one of the reasons the war is still going on is that they're waiting to see how far we draw down and whether they still have a military capability to take advantage of it when we hit bottom or something. I'm not too pessimistic about that, because

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my fundamental feeling about the North

Vietnamese is that they're a broken-back military force. They broke their backs in Tet and in May 1968 and they have never recovered. I'm not sure they ever will recover. That's my gut feeling, from a distance. But they could try again when the American force is at minimum, and I don't know what we'll do then. President Nixon said he's not going to give up Southeast Asia. I believe that! I know enough about the imperatives of the President of the United States to believe that that's exactly what he means. When he says that if they try to take advantage of our withdrawal that he's prepared to act militarily, I believe that, too, because that's a corollary to the first position - that you're not going to give up Southeast Asia. I said before I left the Government that no matter who was elected President -- Even if Gene McCarthy had been elected President, he wasn't, in

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fact, as President, going to give up Southeast Asia. I think I understand enough about the imperatives that go with the Presidency to understand why that's so. So, I think I'd be calm. Use your resources intelligently, and don't panic. Make your plans for the world as you see it in the future, and fight for your budgets rationally. Don't fight for silly things. Keep the security of this country in reasonable order within your budgetary limitations. And, above all, think ahead. Think ahead to what you might have to do if President Nixon is called on what he says, mainly that you might have to lean on these fellows pretty hard if they try to take advantage of our withdrawal militarily. Think ahead to other situations. We have a lot of hardware, and we have a priceless asset which the Russians envy profoundly: namely, we have a military establishment that has fought. I can tell you, from very solid sources, that the

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Soviet military are very worried that our whole military establishment is battle-worthy. It has proved it, and they haven't had a chance to do that. They know that. They try -- I can't go into some of the evidence. But, in any case, you shouldn't panic. I don't know what the -- The public swings, you know. The people said after the Korean War, Never again! This nation, I think, will fight for what it judges to be its vital interest, and I think its vital interest will remain that no single power take over Europe or Asia or the Middle East or emplace itself south of us. I'd just go about my business on the assumption that America will stay steady on those propositions. You read my piece, "The Tocqueville Oscillation," didn't you? ¹Domestic Determinants of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Tocqueville Oscillation, "Armed Forces Journal, 27 June 1970.⁷

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Riddlebarger: Yes, Sir. AIR FORCE EYES ONLY

Rostow: So we can expect -- It's built into us that we oscillate some, and your job is to minimize the lack of preparedness that has sometimes gone with that oscillation. Count yourselves -- Don't feel sorry for yourselves just because you're taking a bit of a shellacking in the Congress now. No decent, democratic country, no mass of people, likes war. They're right in not liking wars. Wars are terrible and just as bad as people say. They're hell, and that people should get sick of it and want it over is just right. On the other hand, it's still a world that can make a lot of trouble, and your job is to protect the country. Get on with it, and don't feel sorry for yourselves.

Riddlebarger: Sir, you mentioned Vietnamization. Could I ask a question about the pacification programs? Do you think this was a function

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Riddlebarger: Sir, you mentioned Vietnamization. Could I ask a question about the pacification programs? Do you think this was a function

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that should have been under military control?

Rostow:

I think the reasons that we did it the way we did it were sound reasons. We made the decision at Guam. Because you couldn't get behind this effort (which is, after all, basically a Vietnamese effort, with U.S. advisers, and had civilian components) - also knowing that we couldn't get the logistics, we couldn't get the priority - unless the military were with it. And I think the solution that we came to of making Bob Komer [Robert W. Komer] Westy's Deputy [for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, CORDS] and weaving it into the military was a brilliant solution. And I think it worked. What happened to Bob was that he no sooner began to get it going than we had Tet. He kept his cool, and helped clean up the mess in Saigon. Then he got the accelerated pacification going. President Johnson gave the flattest order I

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ever saw to Abrams: just go, go, go, from
October on. In October he gave this order.
I don't know whether you've ever seen the
order. It just said, Get every cook and
bottle-washer and just, right down to the
end of my Administration, throw everything
including the kitchen sink at them; move
this thing! And we recovered about pre-Tet
levels by September. We had accelerated
pacification. By the time we left the
Johnson Administration ended we had over 80
percent of the population secure, and it's
gone up to 90 percent. I guess it's kind of
stalled up there now. It was a good method.
But the basic reason for military participa-
tion was that you just couldn't -- The
capacity of the civilian agencies to mobilize
(men, jeeps, food, everything) was not enough.
And in Westy and Komer, we found two men who
understood each other and worked together.
I think it was fine. The civilian contribu-
tion was not swallowed up, distorted. And

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some of the most sensitive people that worked on it were military men. So, I can't tell you how it worked out in '69 and '70, but I'm glad we did it at Guam. It was a good decision.

Riddlebarger: Sir, you've telescoped ahead and got most of these questions. Again, referring to the list of questions posed by Project CORONA HARVEST, I only have three left, if I may?

Rostow: All right; fine.

Riddlebarger: One is the next-to-last question on page two: that is, did we anticipate the staying power, the resolve of the enemy, however you want to phrase that question, in the early '60's, and to what extent possible Chinese Communist intervention had on this? I realize that's a rather broad question. Referring to Project CORONA HARVEST question, "During the early 1960's were we able to foresee the extent, resolve, and nature of

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the VC/NVA threat? Did the threat of Chinese Communist or Russian intervention significantly impact on the strategy determined in January 1965?"

Rostow:

All of the evidence I have (because I wasn't in the President's councils at that time) is that there was no cheap optimism in '65 when they moved the troops in. There was nobody who promised a quick fix. It was a most somber decision. The war was almost lost, clearly. We had waited until we were really at the very bottom and there was no option except give up, before we introduced U.S. forces. By that time the enemy was fully committed to bringing the North Vietnamese in. So, it was, Do you accept defeat, or do you go, starting at the bottom? There was no cheap optimism, and no one said the job is doable; it was just that, as compared to the alternative, it had to be tried. And I would say that we tried a lot of sort of peace

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moves, but President Johnson certainly never believed that -- He was never optimistic about their accepting until they really had no realistic alternative but to accept them. He wanted to try it after they failed at Tet, but even then he thought it would be a long, slow negotiation. He wasn't terribly -- He didn't really think that it would happen in his time, but he wanted to play that card. And I must say that Abrams and Bunker thought they were in bad enough shape after Tet to move towards negotiations. No I don't think there was any cheap optimism in this.

Pause in discussion to change tapes.

Riddlebarger: We were talking about the recognition of the long-term resolve of the enemy in Southeast Asia.

Rostow: Yes. I think that the fact that we waited so long before showing that we would put up our ground forces, and that they the enemy

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were deeply committed and fairly close to victory by spring and early summer of '65 [contributed to enemy resolve]. Having taken the step of introducing major North Vietnamese forces, I think that they were going to see how it came out. I think, second, they had won North Vietnam out of the struggle with the French, out of the mixture of politics in Paris and limited tactical success in the field. And they were imprinted with the possibility that perhaps they could be handed victory out of the politics of the United States, and that kept them in the war. And, third, they're fellows whose whole mature lives have been devoted to this obsessive dream that they could take over, had the right to take over, and would take over, the French colonial empire in Asia. They took their poor little country of seventeen million and put them through, what? six or seven hundred thousand dead? I don't know what their

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casualties are, but they're enormous. They made it [their nation] for ten or twelve years into a funnel in which there was no economic and social development. Men who do that kind of thing must try to get something out of it. It's the most horrible decision you can imagine men to take - to say, Well, the end of all this is that we're just going back to North Vietnam and start economic and social development, and we could have done that in 1954; if we'd gone on with it in '58 and not revived the war in '58, we could have been so much ahead and all these people [our casualties] with us. This is the most terrible human thing that they face in accepting the fact that they're not going to get South Vietnam, they're not going to get Cambodia, they're not going to get Laos. If you have any sense of the history of these people, you've got to say that once they got started and made this commitment (especially the commitment of North Vietnamese regulars,

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which they made in '64) that it was just going to be hell to make them give up. And I think they're hanging in there now on marginal hopes. One, that we will draw our forces down so far that they might be able to do something militarily significant. I think President Nixon and the American people have convinced them that the "doves" are not going to turn it over to them, in the United States, politically. (Although, they're going to see how the elections come out this year.) And, third, they may hope for a rise of some "dove" sentiment in the cities of South Vietnam, where there's inflation and a lot of problems. So there's enough kind of marginal hope here to keep throwing in bodies - at a much lower rate than in '68 and '69, but still doing it. But, in other words, I can't tell you, except from documents, what the view was in '65. And the view, as I see it from the documents, is that there was no cheap optimism about the length

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of the war. In my time in the White House there was no cheap optimism about the length of the war or what it would take to make these guys go home. As I told you when we were changing tapes, the only prediction that was ever given was Westy's, which he made to the National Press Club: that within two years from, let's say November '67, we might be in a position to withdraw some American forces - a prediction that you correctly pointed out turned out to be accurate. What the military told President Johnson was that the job was doable on the long term if we stuck with it. I believe their assessment was correct. What we were gambling on was the basic thing that President Kennedy gambled on in '61, which was his major concern in '61: that there was an authentic South Vietnamese nationalism on which to build. That was his most basic assessment. And there was. That was tested at Tet, and it yielded the mobilization. And,

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in my judgment, that will be, historically,
the turning point of the war. But a guerrilla
war, a war like this when attrition rates are
under control of the other side (they can
keep their name in the papers at relatively
low levels of casualties), is a very long run
affair unless you're prepared to put them in
a "go/no go" position.

Riddlebarger: Yes, Sir. I only have one more area here
I'd like to finish on. I'd like to possibly
wind up and give you some more time if you'd
like.

Rostow: No, I've got to get back to work; that's
right.

Riddlebarger: Yes, Sir. We get into the problem of measur-
ing Air Force effectiveness versus Air Force
efficiency. There are lots of measurements
of efficiency, such as the dropping of bombs
on the enemy, and all that. How do you see
our problem of measuring that effectiveness?

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How would you measure it? Is there any way other than in generalities?

Rostow:

No, I think the answer is that you can only measure it when you define your objectives much more sharply than they were defined. What were you trying to do at Hanoi/Haiphong within the limits set by the President? You were trying, one, to cut down their industrial production; two, to harass to a certain extent the movement of supplies through the area; and, three, to pin down a large proportion of their best manpower in air defense. One, two, three. Now, how well did you do the job and at what cost. My judgment is that the job was done pretty well but at excessive cost. And, as I say, you could have done that job with fewer sorties in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. There was a wastage in terms of those objectives. The other thing is, what proportion of the supplies and men headed for South Vietnam through the Panhandle

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in Laos did you prevent from getting there?

That's the other measure. And how much manpower and resources did you divert to protect against the bombing we did in the Panhandle in Laos? How much weight did you lift from South Vietnam (that would otherwise have been expended there) by your bombing? I think that the debates that sometimes went on in the CIA and parts of the Secretary of Defense's Office were arguing against the use of airpower and saying it was inefficient and so on. I often felt that the Air Force evaluations, military evaluations as a whole, were nearer right but done with much less sophistication and analytic ability. You'd be losing debates on points that you didn't have to lose.

Riddlebarger: The approach was bad?

Rostow: You didn't put enough good brains on this problem. The tendency in an air force, or anything in a war, is to put your good brains

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on operations, guys who are flying and out
in the field. I have no doubt that there
are men of first-rate intellectual, analytic
quality in the Air Force. And if you didn't
have them, you could have gotten civilians.
I never felt that Rand was put properly to
work, incidentally, on Vietnam and on this
problem (I said that to the Rand people) -
the problem of analyzing the use of airpower
in this kind of a war. But in any case, I
think you can't measure unless you define
your mission very sharply; then you have to
go out and see how well you are doing your
mission. I don't think the -- The mission
was defined a little fuzzily. It was quite
different [around] Hanoi/Haiphong than it
was in the Panhandle or Laos or in tactical
support of ground units. And I didn't think
enough first-class brains were put on this
problem of defining the mission, and then,
when you defined it clearly, measuring results
and challenging some of the sophisticated

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(but, in my judgment, wrong) assessments
that were made in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense or CIA. That's just
blunt.

Riddlebarger: We appreciate your candid response. Let me
finish by this, unless you have some other
points. Are there any other lessons learned
or advice you'd give the Air Force in their
current endeavor here [Project CORONA HARVEST's
assessment of the effectiveness of airpower
in Southeast Asia] or some way of possibly
summarizing the Air Force's role in that
war? As to what we should do in the future?
Any [more comments or advice] that you'd
have? You've given us some fine comments.
We want to be sure you have the opportunity
to add any others that you have, or a summary.

Rostow: No, I think I've said, in the course of this,
the very limited things that I have to
contribute. If there's anything in general,
it is that in this kind of a war or any kind

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of a war that I can think of (except the one
I don't want to contemplate, maybe: an all-
out nuclear war) the use of airpower is woven
with extreme complexity into all the other
dimensions of the war. That requires,
therefore, Air Force planning and Air Force
intelligence of an extremely high order,
because you're trying to apply one instrument
to a very complex field in which ground forces
and all kinds of things are involved. It
means, also, therefore, that it pays to
invest the very best brains you've got, very
best imagination that you've got, in planning
and intelligence. I don't know how you
stumbled on getting that Khe Sanh thing set
up; I had a feeling you did stumble on it.
Maybe people just got so damned scared that
they put some good fellows onto it. But I
think the scandal of this period is you
didn't have that kind of operation from the
beginning, that quality. I didn't have the
sense that the Air Force, as an institution,

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had made a command decision that, This is a
mighty complicated piece of business, and
we're going to assemble the best brains we
have and bring in the best civilian brains
so that all the conceptual work on this, all
the planning, all the intelligence, will be
the best we can produce from this country
and the Air Force. I lived through this
curious experience, as a kid, of being pulled
over to London and of joining the targeting
for the 7th and the 15th Army Air Forces in
WW II. It arose because we found ourselves
putting a lot of planes over there. We built
the B-24 and the B-17 and then flew them
around in Texas with a Norden bomb sight;
that kind of weather and no flak. Then
suddenly we were in Europe. And the weather
was bad. And we were up against a damned good
fighter force and heavy flak. And we had no
experience in target selection. We built the
planes. We made the national commitment of
about 40 percent of our total war effort to

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these big damned bombers and had never given
a bit of serious thought as to target
selection or planning. We were operating off
British intelligence. The British were
committed to area bombing and kind of half .
wanted us to fail and go over to just tearing
down cities. And our planes weren't built
to take that much tonnage. So Spaatz [General
(then Major General) Carl Spaatz] and
Fred Anderson and this marvelous character
Dick Hughes asked us in OSS [Office of
Strategic Services] and BEW [Bureau of Economic
Warfare] to send a few fellows over so they
could have an independent judgment about
British intelligence and planning. There were
hundreds of people in the United States as
smart or smarter than we were, but we just
happened to be the kids (because we were kids)
that were pulled into this. And only a
handful of us. It was very rare. Usually
[in instances of] the Americans dealing with
British, you've got a vast American establishment

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and a few smart Britishers who can draft.

It was just the reverse. Britain had the Air Ministry full of people, Lansdowne House full of people, and we were about five or six fellows who operated like the Globe-Trotters [Harlem Globe-Trotters] basketball team. But the point is that at least there was some thought about the fundamentals, about what this was about, what the instrument was about, what you had to do: (a) to maximize the role of these bombers, pre-D-Day, and then (b) how to maximize their tactical effectiveness. We built a doctrine and we related it to the individual targets. We weren't just abstract. I did the aiming point reports. I took apart these factories and found where the key point [was], [where] you ought to have your aiming point for precision bombing. I knew these plants building by building; I knew the weather; I knew all the routes and where the planes could fly. So it was a mixture of intelligence

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and operational and strategic planning. We weren't the greatest guys in the world, but we did do a job. We got air supremacy over Germany, and nobody thought that could be done in daylight. Then we took out their oil, immobilized their ground forces and their air force, and made irrelevant all the planes and hardware that Speer built in his dispersed factories. And when D-Day came the big debate I was involved in was would there be 2,000 or 200 [enemy] sorties? I think there were 12 or something like that. That's about what flew against us on D-Day. And we did take out the bridges; I saw 60,000 German trucks that never could cross the Seine. The trucks they got just dribbled into Normandy. These were hard military achievements. It takes a tremendous effort to discipline the inherent tendency of airpower to diffuse. Look what the British did with their RAF; it was a trivial result, because just by hitting cities you get a very diffuse military effect.

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It's very hard to get a serious military effect with airplanes, very hard. You're dropping bombs and things go up in nice explosions; [there is] a lot of physical damage; but, in terms of a war, you're just amazed how little effect it can have unless you've really disciplined it to something that matters. I was just delighted to see these fellows, after Khe Sanh, finding a little road that ran along the side of a hill. It didn't look like anything. But they would go there everyday and they would just keep that thing slid out. They had analyzed it enough to know that mattered. Sure, the Air Force would rather have gone out and found a truck or something physical to knock down, than just dig a hole in the side of a hill everyday; nobody around. But that's the kind of work you need to make our airpower useful. And I just think that partly because the operation of planes is such a challenging piece of physical business; partly because the flying

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of planes in combat requires such extra-
ordinary discipline and courage, qualities
of character, and all the rest of it; that
the Air Force underinvests in planning and
intelligence. That's always been its
problem. I had the privilege in the Second
World War of helping compensate for it a
little. But I think that was its problem
in Vietnam, and I hope -- If I have anything
to contribute, it's the hope that it will
never do it again.

Riddlebarger: Thank you, Sir.

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[REDACTED]

27 June 1971

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

1. This interview is closed until 1 April 1982.
2. 3825th Historical Research Division internal access is granted only to the Chief, 3825th Special Acquisitions Branch (3825/HOS).
3. For further information, contact the Chief, 3825th Special Acquisitions Branch.

Richard B. Clement
RICHARD B. CLEMENT, Major, USAF
Chief, Special Collections Section
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
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THE PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEFING IS TO PRESENT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PUEBLO INCIDENT FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

THE PRESENTATION WILL COVER THE *NINE* PARTS SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE:

- I. HISTORY, ORIGIN AND CONCEPT EVALUATION.
- II. MISSION AND ORDERS.
- III. COMMAND AND CONTROL.
- IV. DESCRIPTION OF SHIP.
- V. SEIZURE CHRONOLOGY.
- VI. REACTIONS OF HIGHER COMMANDS.
- VII. EVALUATION OF COMPROMISE.
- VIII. TREATMENT OF CREW DURING CAPTIVITY.
- IX. POST CAPTIVITY EVENTS--PROCESSING AND BOARD OF INQUIRY.

FIRST, I WILL DISCUSS THE ORIGIN AND LEVEL OF APPROVAL OBTAINED IN DEVELOPING THE CAPABILITY FOR PUEBLO-TYPE OPERATIONS.

PRIOR TO 1962, U.S. EFFORTS AT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AT SEA WERE CONDUCTED BY COMBATANT SHIPS.

EVEN TODAY, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE SOVIET MID-PACIFIC MISSILE IMPACT AREAS ARE ACCOMPLISHED BY SPECIALLY CONFIGURED DESTROYERS.

AS EXPERIENCE WAS GAINED, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN INHERENT DISADVANTAGES IN THE USE OF COMBATANTS AS SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE.

THEY ARE COMPELLING REASONS FOR SHIFTING TO NON-COMBATANT SHIPS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HERE THAT THE FIRST NON-COMBATANT DEDICATED INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHIP WAS COMMISSIONED IN 1961 THROUGH THE CONFIGURATION OF A WW II LIBERTY-TYPE HULL.

THIS WAS THE USS OXFORD WHICH IS STILL IN COMMISSION AND OPERATING IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA THEATER TODAY.

THERE WAS A TOTAL OF SEVEN OF THESE LARGER SHIPS SPECIALLY CONFIGURED AND PUT INTO USE OVER THE YEARS--TWO ARE MSTs, THE MULLER AND VALDEZ WITH CIVILIAN CREWS, THE OTHERS ARE COMMISSIONED SHIPS OF THE NAVY.

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- I. HISTORY, ORIGIN AND CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
- II. MISDEEDS AND CASES
- III. CONDUCT AND CONTROL
- IV. REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
- V. GENERAL SYNOPSIS
- VI. REACTION OF OTHER COMMANDS
- VII. EVALUATION OF CB PROGRAM
- VIII. TREATMENT OF CREW AND THEIR CONDUCT DURING CAPTIVITY
- IX. POST CAPTIVITY EVENTS - PROCESSING AND BOARD OF INQUIRY

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DISADVANTAGES OF COMBATANTS

THE MISSILE PUTS BEHIND WARSHIP OF NORMAL SENIOR AND ARMY
LONG DISTANCE.

IT IS A SECONDARY CONSIDERATION AND OTHER SPACE RESTRICTIONS, IRRADIANCE
CONSIDERATIONS ARE CONSIDERABLY LESS EVIDENT. NOT COST EFFECTIVE.

WARSHIPS ARE HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE TO THE WORLD AT LARGE AND THEREFORE
RESTRICTED BY CONVENTIONS.

WARSHIPS ARE BOUND BY VARIOUS TERRITORY TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

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THE PRINCIPAL DISADVANTAGES OF THESE SHIPS ARE IN THEIR SIZE AND EXPENSE OF OPERATION, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE IS LIMITED.

THESE LARGER SHIPS CAN IN MANY RESPECTS BE EQUATED TO A SMALL SHORE STATION IN TERMS OF CAPABILITY.

SLIDE 3

IN 1965, FOR THESE REASONS: AS AN OUTGROWTH OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION EXPERIENCE WITH THE LARGER SHIPS, CONSOLIDATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL PROGRAMMING CONCEPT IN WHICH OSD VERY CLOSELY CONTROLS THE EXPENDITURES INVOLVED IN THE NATION'S SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS, AND EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET SHIPBORNE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM; A GROWING FEELING BEGAN TO PREVAIL IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT THE U. S. SHOULD EMBARK UPON A SEABORNE SURFACE COLLECTION PROGRAM SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO THAT USED SO EFFECTIVELY BY THE RUSSIANS.

IN APRIL 1965, DR. FUBINI, WHO WAS THEN ASD(DDR&D), MET WITH THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, THEN ADMIRAL MC DONALD, WHERE THEY EXCHANGED THEIR VIEWS ON AN ALL-OUT, ALL-INCLUSIVE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM PLAN.

SLIDE 4 PAUSE

BALANCE WAS TO BE THE KEY: THAT IS, WERE WE EQUIPPING TOO MANY SSN'S FOR COVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND ARE LARGE OXFORD-TYPE SHIPS TOO EXPENSIVE FOR THE MODE OF SURVEILLANCE/INTELLIGENCE GENERALLY REQUIRED? WOULD TRAWLERS BE BEST?

CNO REQUESTED CINCPACFLT TO PROPOSE A TRIAL OPERATION.

IN SHORT ORDER, THE OTHER NAVY CINC'S EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT AND DESIRES FOR SUCH A PROGRAM.

IT WASN'T DIFFICULT TO GENERATE A SET OF 25 INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES FOR SUCH A PLATFORM. AS A RESULT OF THESE OBJECTIVES, IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A PLATFORM SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF COLLECTING:

SLIDE 5

ACOUSTIC, PHOTOGRAPHIC, RADAR, INFRA-RED, AND SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NAVY DIVERTED AN AKL HULL AND RE-PROGRAMMED EQUIPMENT TO OUTFIT HER.

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REASONS FOR CONSIDERING SMALL SHIPS

EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM EMPLOYING LARGER COLLECTION SHIPS

NATION'S SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS CONSOLIDATED UNDER FUNCTIONAL
PROGRAMMING CONCEPT UNDER OSD

EVALUATION OF SOVIET SHIPBORNE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM

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BALANCE FACTORS

WERE WE EQUIPPING TOO MANY SSNs FOR COVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION?

ARE LARGE OXFORD-TYPE SHIPS TOO EXPENSIVE FOR THE MODE OF SURVEILLANCE/
INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED?

WOULD TRAWLERS BE BEST?

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INTELLIGENCE AREAS

ACOUSTIC

PHOTOGRAPHIC

RADAR

INFRA-RED (IR)

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT)

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SOME EQUIPMENT WAS ALSO BORROWED FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. OBVIOUSLY, IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO GO FOR A SMALL, HIGHLY FLEXIBLE NONCOMBATANT, POSSESSING GRADUATED CAPABILITIES TO MEET NATIONAL/NAVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS.

SLIDE 6

THIS CONCEPT WAS SET FORTH IN THREE PHASES AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE FIRST PHASE TO DETERMINE OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY AND UTILITY OF SMALL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHIP OPERATIONS.

THE FIRST PHASE ENTAILED DEPLOYING ONE SHIP TO ONE AREA KNOWN TO HAVE INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL.

(IN THIS CONNECTION, HISTORY SHOWS THAT BANNER MADE HER FIRST MISSION COMMENCING IN NOVEMBER 1965.

SHE CONDUCTED 16 OF THESE PATROLS AND THERE WERE INDEED SOME INTERESTING REACTIONS FROM THE SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET.

IN 1966 SHE WAS SIDESWIPE BY A SIMILARLY SIZED SOVIET SHIP.

ON THIS OCCASION, BANNER WAS OPERATING APPROXIMATELY 48 MILES OFF VLADIVOSTOK WHEN THE SOVIET FLEET TUG "ANEMOMETER" SCRAPED HER PORT BOW.

ON A SUBSEQUENT MISSION OFF THE CHINA COAST, SHE WAS COMPLETELY SURROUNDED BY AN ESTIMATED 800 CHINESE MOTOR AND SAIL FISHING BOATS. BANNER CLEARED THE AREA TO SEAWARD AND NO "INCIDENT" RESULTED.

B. PHASE II ENTAILED THE ADDITION OF TWO SHIPS TO COMPLEMENT BANNER IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SHIPBORNE COVERAGE IN ONE SEA AREA OF THE WORLD.

AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, THESE TWO SHIPS WERE PUEBLO AND PALM BEACH.

NOW LET US LOOK INTO THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPT, THE REASONS FOR DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT ARE SHOWN ON THIS VIEW GRAPH.

SLIDE 7 PAUSE

SECRET

AGER

DEVELOPMENT PHASES

PHASE I

DETERMINE OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY AND UTILITY OF USING SMALL TRAWLER-TYPE SHIP AS NAVY SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLATFORM.

PHASE II

BASED ON SUCCESS OF PHASE I OPERATIONS INCREASE SHIPBORNE COLLECTION COVERAGE BY EXPANSION TO THREE-SHIP OPERATIONS.

PHASE III

FOLLOW-ON EXPANSION OF AGER PROGRAM, INCREASING TOTAL PLATFORMS TO 15 AND EXTENDING OPERATING AREAS.

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THE FLEET COMMANDERS WANTED LARGE NUMBERS OF THESE UNITS.

THE CONCEPT OF THE MODE OPERATION AS SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE WAS CONCEIVED AND COORDINATED BETWEEN NAVY AND NSA REPRESENTATIVES. ACCORDINGLY, NSA ORIGINATED A LETTER TO DNI ON 10 NOV 1965 SETTING FORTH AGREEMENT ON THE USE OF MODES AS SHOWN.

PAUSE

NOW, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE LEVEL OF APPROVAL OF THESE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. FIRST, CAME THE MATTER OF WHAT TYPE HULLS TO USE. AS HAS BEEN MENTIONED ALL AGERS AT THE MOMENT WERE CONVERTED AKLS. THE DECISION TO USE THE AKL HULL WAS MADE BY CNO PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY WERE AVAILABLE. EQUALLY COMPULSIVE WAS THE TIME FACTOR AND THE URGENCY OF PHASE I AND II TO MEET NATIONAL AND FLEET NEEDS. THIS PROHIBITED UNDERTAKING ANY NEW CONSTRUCTION OR EXTENSIVE CONVERSION PROGRAM. AS TO THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, IT WAS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED BY CNO AND HIS NAVY CINCS IN THE MAY/JUNE 1965 TIME FRAME AND BY NSA AS IT PERTAINED TO SIGINT COLLECTION IN JULY OF 1965.

A SECNAV MEMO TO SECDEF ON 7 OCTOBER 1965 RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF AN ADDITIONAL TWO SHIPS FOR PHASE II.

THE DEPUTY SECDEF APPROVED THESE TWO SHIPS IN NOVEMBER 1965 THUS CONCLUDING THE APPROVAL OF PHASE II CONCEPT.

THIS HAS ALL SUBSEQUENTLY BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF FLEET FORCE LEVELS AND THE CONSOLIDATED CRYPTOLOGIC PROGRAM WHICH IS REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY SECDEF FINITELY ON AN ANNUAL BASIS.

THE PHASE III PROGRAM IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF FORMULATION WITHIN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

INDIVIDUAL DEPLOYMENTS, OF COURSE, HAVE ALWAYS BEEN APPROVED AT THE JCS LEVEL.

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AGER MODES

- MODE 1 OPERATION IN ONE AREA BY ONE SHIP AT A TIME FOR OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION OF ALL SENSORS. NAVY SHIP OPERATIONAL CONTROL. TASKING: (1) DIRECT SUPPORT PRIMARY, (2) NATIONAL, SECONDARY.
- MODE 2 UTILIZATION OF ANY AVAILABLE ON STATION TIME NOT REQUIRED FOR MODE 1, BY RESPONSE TO NSA FOR DEPLOYMENT TO SOME OTHER AREA FOR OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION. TASKING: (1) NATIONAL PRIMARY; (2) DIRECT SUPPORT, SECONDARY, UNLESS SHIP IS IN POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION AND SAFETY OF SHIP IS PARAMOUNT.
- MODE 3 UTILIZATION AS A PRIMARY SIGINT COLLECTOR TO EVALUATE SUCH CAPABILITIES FULLY FOR CERTAIN DEPLOYMENTS. CONTROL AS IN MODE 2.
- MODE 4 OPERATION IN AREAS OTHER THAN THAT DESIGNATED FOR MODE 1. CONTROL AS IN MODE 1.
- MODE 5 DIVERSION FROM ANY MODE TO PERFORM HIGH PRIORITY MISSIONS AS AGREED TO OR DETERMINED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY. NON-SIGINT MISSION TASKING: (1) NAVY SHIP OPERATIONAL CONTROL WITH SIGINT RESOURCES DEDICATED TO DIRECT SUPPORT. SIGINT MISSION: NAVY SHIP OPERATIONAL CONTROL WITH SIGINT RESOURCES DEDICATED TO (1) NATIONAL, PRIMARY; (2) DIRECT SUPPORT SECONDARY.

SECRET

USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

MISSION AND ORDERS

1. MISSION

A. THE PRIMARY MISSION OF EACH AGER IS TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF AND COLLECT INTELLIGENCE AGAINST NAVAL FORCES AND COASTAL INSTALLATIONS IN SUPPORT OF NAVAL AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.

THESE MULTI-SENSOR PLATFORMS ARE TASKED WITH THE GATHERING OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (WHICH INCLUDES BOTH ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE) PLUS VISUAL (PHOTOGRAPHIC), ACOUSTIC AND OCEANOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE DATA BASED ON COLLECTION PRIORITIES SET FORTH BY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

B. THE SPECIFIC PRIMARY OBJECTIVES FOR CONDUCT OF THE 11 JAN - 4 FEB PUEBLO MISSION WERE:

SLIDE 9

- (1) DETERMINE EXTENT AND NATURE OF NAVAL ACTIVITY IN VICINITY OF NORTH KOREAN PORTS OF CHONGJIN, SONJIN, MAYANG, DO, AND WONSAN.
- (2) SAMPLE ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT OF EASTERN COAST NORTH KOREA, EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED ON INTERCEPT AND FIXING OF COASTAL RADARS.
- (3) INTERCEPT AND CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN VICINITY OF TSUSHIMA STRAIT TO DETERMINE REASON FOR THEIR PRESENCE IN THAT AREA SINCE FEBRUARY 1966.
- (4) DETERMINE COMMUNIST REACTION TO AN OVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLATFORM OPERATING NEAR THE PERIPHERY OF NORTH KOREA AND THE SOVIET UNION AND CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF THEIR NAVAL UNITS.

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(5) REPORT DEPLOYMENT OF NORTH KOREAN/SOVIET UNITS WHICH MIGHT INDICATE A CHANGE IN THE WESTPAC THREAT LEVEL.

(6) CONTINUE EVALUATION OF AGER EFFECTIVENESS AS A NAVAL SURVEILLANCE SHIP.

(SLIDE OFF)

OPERATING AREAS WERE PROPOSED WHICH PROVIDED FOR A CPA OF NOT LESS THAN 13 NMI.

CINCPAC MESSAGE, DTG 230230Z DECEMBER 1967, TO JCS, RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF CINCPACFLT VOYAGE PROPOSAL AND REITERATED A CPA OF 13 NMI.

THE RISK TO PUEBLO WAS ESTIMATED TO BE MINIMAL SINCE THE OPERATION WOULD BE CONDUCTED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

ORDERS

THE PRINCIPAL ORDER UNDER WHICH USS PUEBLO OPERATED WAS COMMANDER TASK FORCE 96 OPERATION ORDER 301-68.

THIS OP ORDER PROVIDED BASIC GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION TO USS PUEBLO AND BANNER FOR THE EXECUTION OF THEIR ASSIGNED MISSIONS, THEIR REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS, AND THEIR OPERATING AND COMMUNICATIONS PLANS.

FOR THIS PARTICULAR OPERATION, PUEBLO WAS ALSO PROVIDED ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE BY CTF 96 THROUGH HIS SAILING ORDER ISSUED 5 JAN 1968. THESE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS WERE:

SLIDE 10

- (1) DEPART SASEBO JAPAN WHEN RFS ABOUT 10 JAN 68, CHECK OUT OF MOVREP SYSTEM AND PROCEED VIA TSUSHIMA STRAITS TO ARRIVE OPAREA MARS ABOUT 12 JAN.
- (2) ATTEMPT TO AVOID DETECTION BY SOVIET NAVAL UNITS WHILE PROCEEDING TO OPAREA MARS.
- (3) UPON ARRIVAL MARS, CONDUCT OPERATIONS IAW CTF 96 OPORD 301-68.
- (4) OPERATE OPAREAS MARS, VENUS, AND PLUTO, CONCENTRATING EFFORTS IN AREA(S) WHICH APPEAR MOST LUCRATIVE.

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- (5) DEPART OPAREAS 27 JAN AND IF NOT UNDER SURVEILLANCE MAINTAIN STRICT EMCON CONDITION. PROCEED SOUTH ALONG KOREAN COAST TO VICINITY TSUSHIMA STRAITS.
- (6) INTERCEPT AND CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET NAVAL UNITS OPERATING TSUSHIMA STRAITS.
- (7) TERMINATE SURVEILLANCE TO ARRIVE SASEBO 4 FEB 68. EARLIER DEPARTURE AUTHORIZED TO ENSURE TEN PERCENT ON-BOARD FUEL UPON ARRIVAL SASEBO.
- (8) THE ORDER DEFINED, BY GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES, THE OPAREAS MARS, VENUS, AND PLUTO.

SLIDE 11

IT ALSO PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- (1) COLLECT ELINT IAW PROVISIONS OF PACOM ELINT CENTER SPECIAL COLLECTION GUIDANCE (PEC 210734Z DEC 67) ON NOT TO INTERFERE BASIS WITH BASIC MISSION.
- (2) CPS TO KORCOM/SOVIET LAND MASS/OFF-SHORE ISLANDS WILL BE THIRTEEN Nm.
- (3) UPON ESTABLISHING FIRM CONTACT WITH SOVIET NAVAL UNITS, BREAK EMCON AND TRANSMIT DAILY SITREP.
- (4) OPERATE AT LEAST FIVE HUNDRED YDS FROM SOVIET UNITS EXCEPT TO CLOSE BRIEFLY TO TWO HUNDRED YDS AS NECESSARY FOR VISUAL/PHOTO COVERAGE.
- (5) DO NOT INTERFERE WITH SOVIET EXERCISES BUT MAINTAIN A POSITION ON THE PERIPHERY FOR OBSERVATION PURPOSES.
- (6) (ON THE HOMEWARD LEG) IF UNABLE TO ESTABLISH OR MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH SOVIET UNITS WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS ARRIVAL TSUSHIMA STRAITS AREA, ADVISE ORIG, IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

(7) PROVISIONS CINCPACFLT (SEC) INST 003120.24 APPLY REGARDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

CINCPACFLT (CONF) INST 03100.3D APPLIES REGARDING CONDUCT IN EVENT OF HARASSMENT OR INTIMIDATION BY FOREIGN UNITS.

(8) INSTALLED DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT SHOULD BE STOWED OR COVERED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO NOT ELICIT UNUSUAL INTEREST FROM SURVEYING/SURVEYED UNIT(S). EMPLOY ONLY IN CASES WHERE THREAT TO SURVIVAL IS OBVIOUS.

THIS THEN WAS THE MISSION AND ORDERS UNDER WHICH PUEBLO OPERATED DURING PERIOD 10 JAN 68 UNTIL HER CAPTURE BY THE N. K. ON 23 JAN 68.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

IN THE EVENT OF AIR OR SEA ATTACKS AGAINST UNITED STATES FORCES OPERATING IN THE PACOM, THE FOLLOWING APPLY:

IN EVENT OF UNPROVOKED COMMUNIST ARMED ATTACK AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIRCRAFT, SHIPS OR OTHER SURFACE CRAFT OUTSIDE COMMUNIST TERRITORY, UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE AREA WILL TAKE IMMEDIATE AND AGGRESSIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURES.

WHEN NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE, IMMEDIATE PURSUIT IS AUTHORIZED, BUT WILL NOT PENETRATE TERRITORIAL SEA/AIRSPACE OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

SEE SUB-PARAGRAPHS 4G AND 4H ABOVE FOR DESCRIPTION. COMMANDERS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO DELIBERATELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANIZE A PURSUING FORCE.

CINCPACFLTINST 003120.24A

RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST TARGETS ON THE CHINESE MAINLAND OR IN MANCHURIA, OR IN USSR SHALL BE TAKEN ONLY WITH APPROVAL OF CINCPACFLT.

FACTS CONCERNING ENEMY ATTACKS AND RETALIATORY ACTION, IF ANY, SHALL BE REPORTED BY COMMANDERS CONCERNED TO CINCPAC, INFORMATION TO CINCPACFLT AND OTHER COMMANDERS IN THE INTERVENING CHAIN OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND, AND TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OP AREAS

OPAREAS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. EAST/WEST BOUNDARIES ALL AREAS ARE CONTIGUOUS TO KORCOM COAST EXTENDING FROM THIRTEEN NM CPA TO LAND MASS/OFF-SHORE ISLANDS SEAWARD TO SIXTY NM.
- B. NORTH/SOUTH BOUNDARIES AREA:
 - MARS, 40-00N4 TO 39-00Ns;
 - VENUS, 41-00N5 TO 40-00N4;
 - PLUTO, 42-00N6 TO 41-00N5.
- C. HARASSMENT MAY BE EXPECTED FROM ALL TYPES OF SHIPS SUCH AS AGI'S, MERCHANT SHIPS, WARSHIPS AND FISHING TRAWLERS.
- D. COMMANDING OFFICERS SHOULD NOT COMPROMISE OUR ESTABLISHED SUPPORT OF FREEDOM OF THE SEAS BY TOLERATING ILLEGAL ACTS. THE RULES OF THE ROAD MUST BE RESOLUTELY ADHERED TO. FIRMNESS IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED FREE USE OF THE SEAS BY ALL SHIPS.

POLICY:

UNITS OF THE PACIFIC FLEET WILL NEITHER BE INTIMATED BY NOR TOLERATE ILLEGAL ACTS BY FOREIGN SHIPS.

WHILE IN THE PROXIMITY OF SUCH SHIPS, SPECIAL VIGILANCE IS REQUIRED.

WHEN FACED WITH HARASSING ACTIONS OR MANEUVERS IN VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS COMMANDING OFFICERS SHALL:

- A. RIGIDLY ADHERE TO THE INTERNATIONAL RULES OF THE ROAD.

THIS INCLUDES MAINTAINING COURSE AND SPEED AS PRIVILEGED SHIP, MANEUVERING ONLY IN EXTREMIS TO BEST AID TO AVERT COLLISION.

THIS ACTION REQUIRES THE FINEST SENSE OF SEAMANSHIP AND JUDGEMENT.

THE CNO AND CINCPACFLT FULLY REALIZE THE POSSIBLE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH ACTION, AND WILL FULLY SUPPORT ANY COMMANDING OFFICER WHOSE ADHERENCE TO THE RULES RESULTS IN COLLISION.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS DESIRES TO RESERVE TO HIMSELF THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT ANY DISCIPLINARY ACTION IS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ACTIONS OF THE OFFICERS INVOLVED.

THEREFORE, ANY NAVAL COMMANDER AUTHORIZED TO INSTITUTE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS SHALL NOT DO SO WITHOUT PRIOR SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

THE FACTS IN EACH CASE SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE CNO WHO WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY DETERMINATION OF SUBSEQUENT ACTION, IF ANY.

B. RIGIDLY ADHERE TO THE POLICY OF FREEDOM OF THE SEAS SHOULD FOREIGN FORCES ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A RESTRICTION UPON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF U. S. NAVY SHIPS.

WHEN OPERATING BEYOND LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, DO NOT COMPLY WITH OR INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH ORDERS OF FOREIGN AUTHORITY.

TOP SECRET

page of pages

TOP SECRET

COMMAND AND CONTROL. AGERS ARE FLEET RESOURCES. THEREFORE, THE FLEET COMMANDER PROPOSES OPERATING AREAS, BASED UPON PRECOORDINATED NAVY AND NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AS APPROPRIATE.

THIS PROPOSAL IS FORWARDED TO THE AREA COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WHO IN TURN APPROVES/DISAPPROVES THE OPERATION AND SUBMITS IT TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ASSIGN ACTION TO THE JOINT RECONNAISSANCE CENTER.

THAT CENTER COMPARES RISK WITH DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THEN COORDINATES WITH STATE DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE (CIA, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND SERVICES).

WHEN A NEW MISSION OR AREA IS PROPOSED, AS WAS THE CASE WITH PUEBLO, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THROUGH THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR RECCE THEN MUST GET SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND PRESUMABLY PRESIDENTIAL BOARD APPROVAL.

AFTER THE FOREGOING COORDINATION, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PREPARE AN APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL MESSAGE AND COORDINATE THIS THROUGH THE SERVICES.

THIS MESSAGE IS ADDRESSED TO THE AREA COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WHO IN TURN ADDRESSES THE CHAIN OF COMMAND.

TASKING. CINCPACFLT LEVIES INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS UPON THE AGER.

IN THE CASE OF SIGINT TASKING, CINCPACFLT REQUESTS DIRNSA TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON TECHNICAL DETAILS IN THE MISSION AREA.

DIRNSA IN TURN PROVIDES THIS COLLECTION GUIDANCE TO THE AGER VIA DIRNAVSECGRU AND DIRNAVSECGRUPAC.

SIGINT TASKING IS PRIMARILY TO SATISFY NAVAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS, BUT THE SHIPS ALSO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ACCEPT NATIONAL SIGINT TASKING FROM NSA THROUGH JOINT SOBE PROCESSING CENTER.


IN REVIEWING PAST BANNER MISSIONS, BOTH TASKING REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH RELATIVE EASE.

HOWEVER, THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NAVAL SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENTS AFLOAT IS DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND THIS TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER OTHER TASKING REQUIREMENTS.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET LIMDIS

AGER COMMAND AND CONTROL



7. IS REVERSE STEP BACK THROUGH CHAIN AUTHORIZING MISSION.

TOP SECRET LIMDIS

SECRET

MODE 2 SIGINT COLLECTION TASKING
(CHICOM)



HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

MODE I SIGINT COLLECTION GUIDANCE
(SOVIET/CHICOM)



HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY SECRET

SECRET LIMDIS

PACOM ELINT CENTER SPECIAL COLLECTION GUIDANCE.



SECRET LIMDIS

TOP SECRET

THIS BRIEFING ADDRESSES PUEBLO - THE SHIP - ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

FIRST, A RESUME' OF THE SHIP'S HISTORY;

SECOND, A TABULATION OF THE SHIP'S CHARACTERISTICS; AND THIS, A REVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF THE SHIP'S LAYOUT.

A RESUME' OF THE SHIP'S HISTORY IS TABULATED ON THIS SLIDE.

SLIDE 17

ON 10 JANUARY 1966 THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY MADE THE SHIP AVAILABLE TO THE NAVY.

LATER IN 1966, THE NAVY NAMED THE SHIP PUEBLO AND DESIGNATED THE HULL AKL-44.

THE SHIP WAS TOWED TO THE PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD FOR ACTIVATION AND RECONFIGURATION AS AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR.

IN MAY 1967 THE SHIP WAS DESIGNATED AGER-2 AND PLACED "IN COMMISSION".

SHIPYARD WORK WAS COMPLETED ON 11 SEPTEMBER 1967.

SLIDE 18

PUEBLO IS 176'6" IN LENGTH AND HAS A DRAFT OF 9'3" AT A FULL LOAD DISPLACEMENT OF 848 TONS.

THE SHIP'S PROPULSION PLANT CONSISTS OF TWO 500 HP DIESEL ENGINES AND TWO PROPELLERS WHICH PROVIDE A MAXIMUM SPEED OF APPROXIMATELY 12 KNOTS.


THE SHIP'S FUEL CAPACITY OF 46,690 GALLONS PROVIDES AN ENDURANCE OF 20 DAYS AT 12 KNOTS OR 40 DAYS AT 8 KNOTS.

ON 14 JULY 1965, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS REQUESTED COST AND FEASIBILITY STUDIES ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHIPS WHOSE CHARACTERISTICS WOULD EXCLUDE ARMAMENT EXCEPT SMALL ARMS.

AS THE PROGRAM FOR THESE SHIPS MOVED FROM PLANNING STAGES TO EXECUTION STAGES, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS - IN THE NORMAL EXECUTION OF HIS RESPONSIBILITY - APPROVED THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SHIP WITH NO ARMAMENT EXCEPT SMALL ARMS.

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ON 24 JULY 1967, AFTER THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY, THE VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS DIRECTED THAT 20MM GUNS BE INSTALLED ON THOSE COMMISSIONED SHIPS WHOSE ARMAMENT WAS LESS THAN 20MM GUNS.

HOSPITAL SHIPS AND SUBMARINES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THIS REQUIREMENT, BUT AGERS WERE AMONG THE SHIPS INCLUDED IN THIS REQUIREMENT FOR 20MM MACHINE GUN INSTALLATIONS.

PLANNING COMMENCED FOR INSTALLING TWO TWIN 20MM MACHINE GUNS ON AGERS; HOWEVER, THESE GUNS HAD NOT YET BEEN INSTALLED ON 14 DECEMBER 1967 WHEN THE USS BANNER WAS SURROUNDED BY CHINESE MOTOR AND FISHING BOATS - ONE OF WHICH CLOSED THE BANNER TO 5 YARDS.

AS A RESULT, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS DIRECTED THAT PRIOR TO THEIR NEXT DEPLOYMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS, AGERS WOULD BE FITTED WITH AN INTERIM ARMAMENT SUIT CONSISTING OF A MINIMUM OF TWO SINGLE 50 CAL. MACHINE GUNS USING ANY SUITABLE MOUNTS TO BEST ACHIEVE 360 DEGREE COVERAGE.

THE DIRECTIVE ALSO STATED THAT THE SHIPS WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH STANDARD 50 CALIBER AMMUNITION LOADS AND THAT THE SHIPS WOULD CONDUCT TEST FIRING AND GUN CREW TRAINING TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS.

IN PUEBLO, TWO GUN MOUNTS WERE INSTALLED ON THE FOC'SLE DECK AT FRAME #10 - ONE PORT AND THE OTHER STB'D.

ANOTHER GUN MOUNT WAS INSTALLED AT FRAME #81, CENTERLINE AT THE AFTER END OF THE BOAT DECK.

THE SHIP WAS ISSUED TWO 50 CAL. MACHINE GUNS AND APPROXIMATELY 10,000 ROUNDS OF 50 CAL. AMMUNITION.

STOWAGE FOR THE SHIP'S SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, CONSISTING OF 6,700 ROUNDS OF 45 CAL. AND 300 ROUNDS OF 30 CAL., WAS LOCATED ON THE BOAT DECK PORT SIDE AT FRAME #79.


ON THE PORT SIDE OF THE BOAT DECK - ABEAM OF THE STACK - WAS THE STOWAGE FOR 50 OFFENSIVE HAND GRENADES WHICH ARE SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS PERCUSSION GRENADES TO DIFFERENTIATE THEM FROM FRAGMENTATION GRENADES.

SLIDE 19

THE NEXT SLIDE SHOWS A PORTION OF THE MAIN DECK PLAN.

TOP SECRET


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USS PUEBLO AGER-2

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AT FRAME #55, IN THE PASSAGEWAY ON THE STB'D SIDE, IS THE STOWAGE FOR THE SHIP'S SMALL ARMS WHICH CONSISTED OF TEN 45 CAL. SUBMACHINE GUNS, SEVEN 45 CAL. PISTOLS AND ONE 30 CAL. CARBINE.

NOTE, IN THE MIDSHIP DECKHOUSE THERE IS 1 PORTHOLE ON THE PORT SIDE AND 4 PORTHOLES ON THE STB'D SIDE.

SLIDE 20

THE SHIP'S FREEBOARD - WHICH IS THE DISTANCE FROM THE MAIN DECK TO THE WATER IS APPROXIMATELY 6'6" IN THE FORWARD BREAK BETWEEN FRAMES #20 AND #30, AND 8'0" AFT AT FRAME #80.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

THE FOLLOWING IS A CHRONOLOGY OF THE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS WHICH WERE REPORTED BY THE USS PUEBLO FROM THE TIME OF HER DEPARTURE FROM SASEBO UNTIL HER SEIZURE BY NORTH KOREAN ARMED SHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS ON 23 JANUARY 1968.

SLIDE

THE DARK LINE ON THE CHART FOLLOWING THE COASTLINE IS THE 12 MILE LIMIT FROM THE NORTH KOREAN MAINLAND AND OFF-SHORE ISLANDS.

ALL TIMES ARE KOREAN TIME.

PUEBLO DEPARTED SASEBO, JAPAN AT 0600 ON 11 JANUARY 1968.

SINCE SHE WAS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN RADIO SILENCE UNTIL CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH TARGET SHIPS, HER FIRST TRANSMISSION WAS HER MESSAGE DTG 220915Z.

IN THIS TRANSMISSION PUEBLO REPORTED SEVERAL EVENTS.

FIRST, SHE REPORTED HAVING ENTERED HER OPERATING AREA AT 2330, 12 JANUARY; SECOND, THAT AT 1750 ON THE 20TH OF JANUARY, WHILE SHE WAS DEAD IN THE WATER AT POSITION ALFA, A MODIFIED SO-1 CLASS SHIP PASSED HER AT A RANGE OF ABOUT 2 MILES.

PUEBLO REPORTED THAT DUE TO DARKNESS SHE WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THIS CRAFT WHICH APPEARED TO BE HEADING FOR WONSAN.

PUEBLO ALSO REPORTED HAVING SPENT EQUAL TIME OFF EACH OF THE FOUR INTEREST PORTS EXCEPT WONSAN WHERE SHE ARRIVED ON 22 JANUARY.

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THE FIRST SITUATION REPORT ALSO STATED THAT AT 1225 ON THE 22ND OF JANUARY, WHILE PUEBLO WAS AT POSITION BRAVO, SHE SIGHTED TWO NORTH KOREAN CRAFT AT A RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 5 MILES TRAVELLING TOWARDS PUEBLO AT AN ESTIMATED SPEED OF 8 KNOTS.

WHEN THE CRAFT CAME TO ABOUT 1500 YARDS, ONE CHANGED COURSE AND PASSED CLOSE ABOARD TO STARBOARD AT A RANGE OF ABOUT 100 YARDS.

PUEBLO REPORTED THAT THESE SHIPS THEN RETIRED TO ABOUT 9,000 YARDS AND LAY TO, CLOSE TOGETHER.

THESE CRAFT APPEARED TO PUEBLO AS BEING NATIONAL FISHING SHIPS, BOTH APPEARED TO BE HEAVILY LADEN AND EACH HAD FISHING NETS STOWED NEATLY FORWARD.

AT ABOUT 1500 THE SAME SHIPS BEGAN ANOTHER APPROACH, CLOSED TO ABOUT 30 YARDS AND CIRCLED PUEBLO WHICH REMAINED DEAD IN THE WATER.

PUEBLO REPORTED THAT ALL HANDS ON THE TWO SHIPS OBSERVED HER, BUT THAT THERE WAS NO EXCHANGE BETWEEN HER AND THE CRAFT.

BOTH SHIPS RETIRED ON COURSE 340° TO THE NORTHWEST AND BY 1600 THEY HAD DISAPPEARED.

DURING THE ENTIRE INCIDENT PUEBLO REPORTS SHE WAS SHOWING INTERNATIONAL SIGNALS SIGNIFYING SHE WAS ENGAGED IN HYDROGRAPHIC OPERATIONS.

WHILE THE SHIP WAS DEAD IN THE WATER SHE WAS CONDUCTING A NANSEN CAST. THIS IS A HYDROGRAPHIC OPERATION TO OBTAIN SIMULTANEOUSLY WATER TEMPERATURE AND SAMPLES AT VARIOUS PRE-DETERMINED DEPTHS.

IT REQUIRES ABOUT 40 MINUTES IN 50 FATHOMS OF WATER.

PUEBLO REPORTED THAT THESE WERE THE FIRST CRAFT TO SHOW ANY INTEREST OF THE 19 THAT WERE SIGHTED BY HER SINCE HER DEPARTURE FROM THE TSUSHIMA STRAITS.

FINALLY IN HER FIRST REPORT SHE STATED HER INTENTION TO REMAIN IN HER PRESENT OPERATING AREA.

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IN HER NEXT TRANSMISSION DTG 230352Z JANUARY, PUEBLO REPORTED ENCOUNTERING, AT 1200 ON THE 23RD, ONE SO-1 CLASS NORTH KOREAN PATROL CRAFT, THE P/N 35, A SUBMARINE CHASER.

AT THIS TIME PUEBLO WAS DEAD IN THE WATER AT POINT CHARLIE.

HER INTERNATIONAL SIGNALS AGAIN INDICATED SHE WAS ENGAGED IN HYDROGRAPHIC OPERATIONS.

THE P/N 35 CIRCLED HER ONCE AND ON THE SECOND TRIP AROUND SHE REQUESTED NATIONALITY.

PUEBLO RAISED THE ENSIGN.

ON A THIRD SWING THE SHIP SIGNALLED "HEAVE TO OR I WILL OPEN FIRE ON YOU."

PUEBLO REPLIED " I AM IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS."

IN HER NEXT TRANSMISSION PUEBLO INDICATED HER INTENTION TO REMAIN IN THE AREA IF CONSIDERED FEASIBLE, OTHERWISE TO WITHDRAW SLOWLY TO THE NORTHEAST.

NOW THE NEXT REPORT IS A KEY REPORT BECAUSE IT IS THE FIRST INDICATION THAT THE SITUATION WAS MORE SERIOUS THAN HARASSMENT.

IN THIS REPORT, SENT AT 1315, PUEBLO REPORTED THAT AT 0400, THE P/N 35 WAS JOINED BY THREE P-4 PATROL CRAFT.

THESE ARE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS.

ONE OF THE CRAFT SENT A CODE SIGNAL "FOLLOW IN MY WAKE, I HAVE A PILOT ABOARD."

THE P/N 35 AND ONE MTB WERE 300 YARDS ON THE STARBOARD BOW; ONE MTB WAS JUST FORWARD OF THE STARBOARD BEAM AND THE THIRD MTB WAS ON THE STARBOARD QUARTER.

IN HER 1315 TRANSMISSION, PUEBLO ALSO REPORTED SIGHTING TWO MIG'S ABOVE HER STARBOARD BOW AND THAT ONE OF THE PATROL CRAFT WAS BACKING TOWARDS PUEBLO WITH FENDERS RIGGED WITH AN ARMED LANDING PARTY "ATTEMPTING TO BOARD."

TOP SECRET

FINALLY, IN THIS TRANSMISSION, PUEBLO REPORTED: "PUEBLO
ALL AHEAD ONE THIRD, RIGHT FULL RUDDER AND DEPARTING AREA
UNDER ESCORT.

INTENTIONS: DEPART AREA."

AT 1328 PUEBLO REPORTED THAT SHE WAS BEING BOARDED AND THAT SHE
WAS CONDUCTING EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION.

AT THIS TIME SHE SENT AN SOS.

THEREAFTER AT ABOUT 1345 SHE TRANSMITTED "WE ARE BEING ESCORTED
INTO PROB WONSAN."

AT ABOUT 1405 A SUBSEQUENT PUEBLO MESSAGE REPORTED, "HAVE O KEY
LIST AND THIS ONLY ONE HAVE.

HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO FOLLOW INTO WONSAN.

HAVE THREE WOUNDED AND ONE MAN WITH LEG BLOWN OFF.

HAVE NOT USED ANY WEAPONS NOR UNCOVERED .50 CAL MG.

DESTROYING ALL KEY LISTED AND AS MUCH ELEC EQUIP AS POSSIBLE.

HOW ABOUT SOME HELP?

THESE GUYS MEAN BUSINESS.

HAVE SUSTAINED SMALL WOUND IN RECTUM.

DO NOT INTEND TO OFFER ANY RESISTANCE.

DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP UP CIRCUIT AND
DO NOT KNOW IF COMM SPACES WILL BE ENTERED."

AT 1432 PUEBLO REPORTED THAT SHE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO COME TO
ALL STOP; THAT DESTRUCTION WAS INCOMPLETE AND THAT
SEVERAL PUBLICATIONS WOULD BE COMPROMISED.

THE FINAL TRANSMISSION FROM PUEBLO WHICH FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY
STATED: "FOUR MEN INJURED AND ONE CRITICALLY. GOING
OFF AIR NOW. DESTROYING THIS GEAR NOW."

TOP SECRET

THE CIRCLED AREA TO THE RIGHT OF POINT CHARLIE DENOTES THE AREA OF THE INCIDENT FROM THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER THROUGH THE ESTIMATED TIME OF BOARDING AS INDICATED FROM INTERCEPTED NORTH KOREAN RADIO TRANSMISSIONS.

THIS CONCLUDES THE PUEBLO PATROL CHRONOLOGY.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

REACTION OF HIGH COMMANDS

BASED ON EXAMINATION OF MESSAGES, I WILL PICK UP THE SEQUENCE OF HIGH COMMAND ACTIONS WITH THOSE WHICH STARTED IN THE OPERATION CENTER OF COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES JAPAN.

COMNAVFORJAPAN:

AT 1322 COMNAVFORJAPAN RECEIVED PUEBLO'S MSG 230415Z REPORTING THE NORTH KOREAN INTENT TO BOARD.

THIS MESSAGE WAS ALSO DELIVERED TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, COMNAVFORJAPAN WHO NOW DECLARED THE SITUATION A HOSTILE INCIDENT, AND ORDERED THE N-2 DUTY OFFICER TO "RELAY THE INFORMATION TO THE FIFTH AIR FORCE.

DURING THE NEXT 15 MINUTES, HEADQUARTERS COMNAVFORJAPAN RECEIVED COMMUNICATIONS FROM KANJISEYA WHICH REPORTED A STEADILY DETERIORATING SITUATION.

AT 230520Z (1420 INDIA), COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES JAPAN NOTIFIED CINCPACFLT HEADQUARTERS BY TELEPHONE THAT PUEBLO WAS BEING HARASSED/BOARDED.

BY 230545Z (1445 INDIA), WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT NO AIRCRAFT WERE AVAILABLE AND THAT PUEBLO WAS "OFF THE AIR" (AT 1432 INDIA AND ASSUMED BOARDED), NO ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COMMANDS WAS REQUESTED.

COMFIFTH AIR FORCE

UPON RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION OF PUEBLO'S DISTRESS, COMMANDER FIFTH AIR FORCE CALLED CINCPACAF AND WHILE WAITING FOR CINCPACAF, IN PERSON, TO COME TO THE PHONE, HE DIRECTED THE 18TH TFW TO PREPARE FOR DEPLOYMENT.

AT THE DIRECTION OF CINCPACAF, COMMANDER FIFTH AIR FORCE THEN DIRECTED THE 18TH TFW TO DEPLOY THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF F-105S TO OSAN.

TOP SECRET

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COMMANDER FIFTH AIR FORCE DIRECTED A "DOWNLOAD" OF THE SIG F-4S IN KOREA AND A RECONFIGURATION TO CONVENTIONAL ORDNANCE.

COMMANDER FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVISED CINCPACAF THAT HE HAD NO GUNPODS, MERS, PYLONS, OR RAILS WITH WHICH TO ARM THE F-4S AND THAT OTHER SUPPORT AIRCRAFT COULD NOT REACH THE SCENE BEFORE DARK.

CINCPACAF AGAIN CONTACTED COMMANDER FIFTH AIR FORCE AND WAS ADVISED THAT 6 F-105S FROM KADENA WERE AIRBORNE, BUT HAD TO STOP AT OSAN FOR FUELING BEFORE THEY COULD BE OF USE.

DURING A STILL LATER PHONE CONVERSATION CINCPACAF ADVISED COMMANDER FIFTH AIR FORCE NOT TO SEND F-4S ALOFT WITHOUT AN "ANTI-MIG CAPABILITY."

WHEREUPON, COMMANDER FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVISED CINCPACAF THAT PUEBLO'S ESTIMATED POSITION WAS WITHIN THE NORTH KOREAN 3-MILE LIMIT AND THAT HE WOULD NOT TAKE FURTHER ACTION THAT NIGHT.

EARLY THE NEXT MORNING, CINCPACAF STOPPED DEPLOYMENT OF ALL AIRCRAFT DUE TO A RELAYED MESSAGE FROM NMCC.

CINCPAC. THE COMMANDER WAS IN WESTPAC EN ROUTE TO CTF-77S FLAGSHIP (KITTY HAWK) AT THE TIME OF THE SEIZURE.

CINCPAC HEADQUARTERS RECEIVED ITS FIRST INDICATION OF THE INCIDENT THROUGH A TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE NMCC. (THE LATTER WAS NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY THROUGH THE CRITICOM NET).

IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH COMNAVFORJAPAN HEADQUARTERS, IT WAS INDICATED TO CINCPAC HEADQUARTERS THAT THE FIFTH AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS HAD BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE PUEBLO DISTRESS.

NO ACTION COULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT CAPTURE OF PUEBLO SINCE CINCPAC HEADQUARTERS WAS NOTIFIED AFTER THE FACT OF CAPTURE AND THERE WERE NO PACOM FORCES THAT COULD HAVE REACTED IN TIME.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

CINCPACFLT. CINCPACFLT COMMAND CENTER AND INTELLIGENCE CENTER WERE ALERTED TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT BY SIMULTANEOUS PHONE CALLS FROM COMNAVFORJAPAN AND CINCPAC.

THE REPORT ALSO INCLUDED THE FACT THAT FIFTH AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS HAD BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE SITUATION.

CINCPACFLT RECEIVED PUEBLO'S MESSAGE AT 230525Z WHICH CONFIRMED THE ATTEMPTED BOARDING.

CINCPACFLT NEXT ESTABLISHED LIAISON BY TELEPHONE WITH CINCPAC, COMNAVFORJAPAN, FLEET ACTIVITIES YOKOSUKA, FLEET ACTIVITIES SASEBO, AND FIFTH AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS TO DETERMINE THE AVAILABILITY OF ASSISTANCE FORCES.

HE ORDERED A DESTROYER TO A POSITION OFF WONSAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND PROVIDED FOR APPROPRIATE AIR COVER.

THE DESTROYER WAS TO BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN OPERATIONS WHICH COULD INCLUDE TOWING OF PUEBLO OR RETRIEVAL OF THE CREW.

COMSEVENTHFLEET. COMSEVENTHFLEET RECEIVED INFORMATION OF PUEBLO'S PLIGHT AT ABOUT 230510Z (1410 INDIA), FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY RECEIPT OF PUEBLO'S KEY MESSAGE AT 1426.

AT 230606Z (1506 INDIA), HE DIRECTED CTG 77.5, EMBARKED IN ENTERPRISE AND WITH TRUXTUN IN COMPANY (LOCATED 600 MILES SOUTH OF WONSAN), TO PROCEED AT BEST SPEED TO 32-30N; 127-30E, OR A POSITION 120 N, WEST OF NAGASAKI.

HE ALSO ORDERED COLLETT (120 MILES SOUTH OF YOKOSUKA) AND O'BANNON (AT SASEBO) AND HIGBEE TO JOIN ENTERPRISE.

HE REPORTED TO CINCPACFLT THAT CTG 70.6 (FORMERLY CTG 77.5) WAS READY TO EXECUTE AIR STRIKES WHEN DIRECTED.

CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA (COMUSKOREA MESSAGE 282300Z JAN 68. UNC/USFK FORCES WERE ALREADY IN A HIGH STATE OF ALERT DUE TO THE INCREASED ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE NORTH KOREANS AND THE "BLUE HOUSE" RAID.

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CINCPACFLT. CINCPACFLT COMMAND CENTER AND INTELLIGENCE CENTER WERE ALERTED TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT BY SIMULTANEOUS PHONE CALLS FROM COMNAVFORJAPAN AND CINCPAC.

THE REPORT ALSO INCLUDED THE FACT THAT FIFTH AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS HAD BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE SITUATION.

CINCPACFLT RECEIVED PUEBLO'S MESSAGE AT 230525Z WHICH CONFIRMED THE ATTEMPTED BOARDING.

CINCPACFLT NEXT ESTABLISHED LIAISON BY TELEPHONE WITH CINCPAC, COMNAVFORJAPAN, FLEET ACTIVITIES YOKOSUKA, FLEET ACTIVITIES SASEBO, AND FIFTH AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS TO DETERMINE THE AVAILABILITY OF ASSISTANCE FORCES.

HE ORDERED A DESTROYER TO A POSITION OFF WONSAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND PROVIDED FOR APPROPRIATE AIR COVER.

THE DESTROYER WAS TO BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN OPERATIONS WHICH COULD INCLUDE TOWING OF PUEBLO OR RETRIEVAL OF THE CREW.

COMSEVENTHFLEET. COMSEVENTHFLEET RECEIVED INFORMATION OF PUEBLO'S FLIGHT AT ABOUT 230510Z (1410 INDIA), FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY RECEIPT OF PUEBLO'S KEY MESSAGE AT 1426.

AT 230606Z (1506 INDIA), HE DIRECTED CTG 77.5, EMBARKED IN ENTERPRISE AND WITH TRUXTUN IN COMPANY (LOCATED 600 MILES SOUTH OF WONSAN), TO PROCEED AT BEST SPEED TO 32-30N; 127-30E, OR A POSITION 120 N, WEST OF NAGASAKI.

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UPON RECEIPT OF PUEBLO'S 230415Z WHICH HE RECEIVED AT 230537Z (1437 INDIA),
ALL COMMAND CENTERS WERE PLACED ON A 24-HOUR OPERATIONAL BASIS.

COMMANDERS WERE TO BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO THE NEAREST CENTER.

HIS MESSAGE PROVIDES NO FURTHER CLUE AS TO OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN.

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COMPROMISE EVALUATION

MY PURPOSE NOW IS TO PROVIDE YOU WITH AN APPRAISAL OF WHAT DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT MAY HAVE TAKEN PLACE ABOARD PUEBLO AFTER IT FIRST BECAME APPARENT THAT THE NORTH KOREANS INTENDED TO TAKE HER INTO CUSTODY AND TO FURTHER COMMENT ON THE EXTENT OF COMPROMISE RESULTING THEREFROM.

THERE ARE SEVERAL ASPECTS. FIRST, CRYPTOLOGIC--IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IT HAS BEEN U.S. POLICY THAT SECURITY OF U.S. COMMUNICATIONS WILL NOT DEPEND SOLELY ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF THE EQUIPMENT USED TO ENCIPHER OR DECIPHER MESSAGES.

AS A WORST CASE, CAPTURE PERMITS THE NORTH KOREANS AND RUSSIANS TO BECOME AWARE OF CRYPTOLOGIC EQUIPMENT TECHNOLOGY WHICH IT IS ESTIMATED WOULD TAKE THEM 5 TO 14 YEARS (RUSSIANS 3 TO 8 YEARS) TO DEVELOP NORMAL PROCESSES.

THE GREATEST SINGLE COMPROMISE TO CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT WOULD HAVE ACCRUED FROM THE TECHNICAL MANUALS AND THE TRAINING MANUALS WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO CAPTURE.

THESE HAVE GREATLY TO THE CLOSING OF THAT 5 TO 15-YEAR GAP PREVIOUSLY ALLUDED TO.

THEREFORE, THE VERY REAL COMPROMISE THAT CONCERNS US IS THAT WHICH WOULD LEAD TO CHANGES IN THE COMSEC EQUIPMENT AND PRACTICES OF THE TARGET COUNTRIES.

THIS IN TURN WOULD IMPACT ON OUR SIGINT EFFORT.

THE NEXT ASPECT IS THE ELCTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND VARIOUS OTHER PIECES OF GEAR.

ALL OF THE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT WAS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT ONE RECEIVER WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED SOME YEARS AGO AS CONFIDENTIAL BUT IS NOW CONSIDERED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED BECUASE IT HAS NOW BECOME AVAILABLE IN MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC OR COMPROMISED IN VIETNAM.

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HOWEVER, THE CAPTURE OF PUEBLO INTACT, AND AGAIN WE DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH EQUIPMENT WAS DESTROYED OR JETTISONED, WOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE CAPTORS WITH AN INSIGHT INTO: THE ELECTRONIC DEVELOPMENT STATE OF THE ART OF A SIGINT SUIT OF EQUIPMENT, OUR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES, AND BY ANALYSIS, A GOOD EDUCATED GUESS AS TO OUR MISSION, THE METHODOLOGY USED BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE SHIPS, SPECIFIC AREAS OF INTEREST WITHIN THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM, AND INSIGHT INTO THE LIMITATIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES OF OUR AGERS.

OUR NEXT MAJOR ITEM FOR DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL COMPROMISE OF THE COMTAC PUBLICATIONS WHICH COVER A WIDE RANGE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; THE MOST SENSITIVE INCLUDE: EXPERIMENTAL SURFACE AND AIR TACTICS, SURFACE MANEUVERING INSTRUCTIONS AND SIGNALS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, TACTICAL DECEPTION PROCEDURES, RIVERLINE WARFARE, ANTI-AIR WARFARE, AND ESCAPE AND EVASION, FREQUENCY DESIGNATIONS, BREVITY CODES, CODED TERMS USED IN TACTICAL REPORTING.

THEY WOULD PROVIDE A CLEAR INSIGHT INTO THE MANNER IN WHICH U. S. NAVAL OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED.

IT WILL BE A HORRENDOUS JOB TO NEGATE THE FULL IMPACT OF THIS COMPROMISE.

HOWEVER, THE JOB HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR A YEAR.

THE NEXT LARGE GROUP OF POTENTIALLY COMPROMISED PUBLICATIONS ARE THOSE CONCERNING TRAINING AND DOCTRINE WITHIN THE SIGINT COMMUNITY.

THESE PUBLICATIONS ARE ANALYTIC AIDS AND, IF CAPTURED, WOULD PROVIDE PRECISE KNOWLEDGE ON THE EXTENT OF U. S. KNOWLEDGE OF NORTH KOREAN COMMUNICATIONS, USAGE, AND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF RADAR EQUIPMENTS.

THEY WOULD ALSO HAVE DIVULGED OUT KNOWLEDGE ON THE SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICES IN THE SOVIET MARITIME PROVINCE AREA.

LASTLY, AND IN OUR OPINION MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, COMES THE CATEGORY OF PERSONNEL CAPTURED.

THE CAPTURE AND HOLDING OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE NAVAL SECURITY GROUP OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME GREATLY INCREASES THE POSSIBILITY OF THE GLEANING OF INFORMATION FROM INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

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MANY OF THESE PEOPLE HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF SENSITIVE COLLECTION AND ANALYTIC EFFORTS.

POSSESSION OF THESE PEOPLE CLEARLY MEANS THAT THERE COULD BE COMPROMISE OF SEVERAL HIGHLY CLASSIFIED PROJECTS WITH SERIOUS COUNTER ACTIONS ON THE PART OF TARGET NATIONS.

ANALYSIS OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEF OF THE CREW WILL ASSIST IN THIS EVALUATION.

EVEN THEN, OUR KNOWLEDGE MAY NEVER BE COMPLETE BECAUSE OF THE FRAILITY OF HUMAN MEMORY AND BECAUSE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER WHICH THE MEN COULD HAVE BEEN PREVAILED UPON TO PROVIDE INFORMATION.

LASTLY, WE MUST COMMENT THAT WE KNOW THAT SOME SENSITIVE MATERIAL WAS DESTROYED. THERE WAS ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF TIME PERIOD TO DO SO.

THE DEBRIEF OF THE CREW MEMBERS IS THE KEY. IT IS THE KNOWLEDGE THEY CAN GAIN FROM THE MINDS OF OUR PEOPLE WHICH IS A MUCH GREATER THREAT THAN THAT WHICH COULD GLEAN FROM MATERIAL THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CAPTURED.

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MALTEMENT BULKING

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One facet of the PUEBLO incident which we felt would be of interest to you is the question of the treatment the crew received during confinement.

On 28 December I was directed by CNO to inquire into the treatment imposed on the crew of USS PUEBLO while in custody of the North Koreans. I was instructed to submit my report on 3 January - a total of 6 days. It was completed and delivered to the Secretary of Defense on that date. The report is now being prepared by the State Department for presentation at Panmunjom in an effort to indict the North Koreans. This information may be subsequently presented in other public forums such as the UN.

My instructions were to obtain voluntary sworn statements from the crew regarding this treatment. I was not to inquire into anything else, such as the acts that led to maltreatment, the consequences of any abuse, documents signed, statements made under duress or incriminating admissions. A deliberate effort was made to insure that statements did not include any such material. I took two other officers with me to San Diego and spend four days soliciting the crew's cooperation in this effort. It was carefully explained to the crew that we were interested only in determining the facts regarding their treatment and, if it was so indicated, in gathering evidence which could be used to expose North Korea. Due to the press of time the men were not interrogated. Although we talked with 81 crewmen and in some instances assisted them with the writing

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of statements. I did not see Commander Eucher because he was under intensive medical care and not accessible except to his immediate family.

Fifty-seven crewmen chose to make statements. Twenty-four persons elected not to make statements. None of them was asked for his reason. However, many volunteered explanations which varied with the individual. No attempt was made to persuade these persons to change their minds. It should be emphasized that a report of this limited scope is in no sense definitive. However, the crew statements graphically illuminate the character of subject treatment and indicate that distinct patterns of treatment were employed by the North Koreans.

Now as to the substance of the report. We found widespread evidence of abuse. Everyday living was punctuated with a level of violence which would certainly shock the average American or at least would be difficult for him to comprehend. There were constant random kicks, punches, slaps, threats and verbal abuse meted out by the guards and even officers. Most crew members were hit or kicked in some manner at least once a day. In particular the men were abused as a matter of course during trips to the head. This was often very uncomfortable for men suffering for diarrhea. They were forced to make frequent trips to the head and yet they knew they were risking physical mistreatment with each trip. The men's statements are replete with references to constant fear, mental torture, severe anxiety, psychological stress, etc. Even during the relatively relaxed

routine periods there were occasional severe beatings.

An individual would be isolated from his comrades and beaten with sticks, fists, sandals, belts and any one of a number of implements. The most severe of these beatings was administered in late August or early September. The individual was interrogated for about 2 hours. During this session he was struck repeatedly with sticks, fists and a rubber-soled shoe. Often falling from his chair. Eventually he could no longer find his chair. Several shipmates attested that his face was disfigured, severely discolored, swollen, and he had the sole prints of the shoe on his face for several weeks.

It is appropriate here to mention medical treatment. To say the least the wounded were neglected. Some 10 men were wounded during the seizure. They were given the same treatment as the rest of the crew on the way to detention. One case was not able to walk. He was carried by the arms and legs, bumped on the ground, kicked when he moaned, and laid on the floor of a bus where he was often stepped on. His wounds were not looked at for 3 days. When they were tended, they had become infected. This necessitated a painful operation which was performed without anesthesia. Another individual had shrapnel in his leg. This was not removed for three weeks. In fact he underwent interrogation and beatings with the shrapnel in his leg and the wound draining. The ship's pharmacist gathered together some medical supplies to take with him into detention. A Korean officer on learning what they were threw them against a wall

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and he was not allowed to take any of them ashore. In turn, he was not allowed to treat any of his shipmates, although he was eventually allowed to assist a North Korean doctor with superficial tasks on two occasions.

I should perhaps mention that the crew adjusted rapidly to this type of treatment. To illustrate the normal pattern of their life I would like to read briefly from one of the more articulate statements:

"A swift kick in the shins or a rabbit punch became as natural to this crew as breakfast and the morning paper are to most Americans."

Over and above the normal pattern of abuse there were three periods which stand out. The period of interrogation--the first few weeks until about the middle of February, the "purge"--a name coined by the crew--ran from the latter part of March until early April, and "hell week" from 11-18 December. All three of these periods of time were characterized by a high level of violence and maltreatment.

During interrogation sessions four distinct techniques were used. (1) The most popular--the individual would be forced to kneel with his arms above his head or in front of him. If he collapsed, he would be kicked until he resumed the position. One variation of this technique was to force the crewman to hold a chair with his arms outstretched. (2) A number of individuals were forced to remove their trousers and then walk on their knees in a circle of about 10 feet in diameter. This was done on a rough wooden floor with cracks and splinters. When they collapsed

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they would be kicked and struck until they resumed. (3) A third rather diabolical scheme was to place a wooden 2x4 behind the knees of a kneeling prisoner and force him to rock back on the board and to balance on the balls of his feet. If he lost his balance or fell from pain he would be abused until he resumed. (4) A variety of threats were used. The most common was the threat of death. These were made with the threatener pointing a gun at the captive and cycling ammunition in and out of the chamber and on some occasions pulling the trigger when the gun was empty.

This type of maltreatment was often administered by North Korean officers and always in their presence. The Statements describe a number of sadistic beatings during interrogation. One man was beaten severely although wounded with shrapnel in his leg and his wounds draining. Another was beaten off and on for a period of about six hours. He estimated he was beaten from head to foot in various ways. On five occasions he was picked up and his head bounced on the floor. Later, he was propped in a seated position against a wall and an officer and a guard stamped on his crotch and groin. He was then karate chopped until his neck was paralyzed for several minutes and one eye closed. One officer underwent a similar beating during which he lost consciousness some six times. On each occasion he was slapped back to consciousness.

The purge which took place from late March to early April was of a different character. This was merely an intensification of the normal level of abuse. The kicking and hitting stepped up

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dramatically. A number of petty rules were initiated and any violations were punished with beatings. As far as I could determine all the mistreatment during this period was meted out by enlisted guards. Abuse was applied with greater frequency, more vehemence, and as a result of apparent design.

Blows were delivered to all parts of the body, but kicks to the legs and punches and slaps to the head were emphasized in the statements. Threats with guns were commonplace. This usually took the form of placing a sub-machine gun between the eyes or against the temple, cycling live ammunition in the weapon, and threatening to shoot the captive.

Probably the most vivid description of the type of violence offered during the purge can be found in this excerpt from a crew statement:

"One evening my roommate looked behind him before closing the door. For this, he was kicked and beaten with fists. The next night, I, myself was last man in line, and, because of my friend's experience, did not look back. Consequently, I closed the door just before the guard reached it. For this I was choked, bent backwards over the end of a bed until my feet left the deck, kicked on the right leg, shin, hit in the jaw, pulled forward by my hair until I was bent looking at the floor, and then karate chopped on the back of the neck. I went onto a bed kitty-corner from the first one, and lost my right slipper. I stood back up at attention and tried to regain the slipper. I caught a full arm swing with a fist behind the right ear. I again tried to regain my slipper and came to attention. The treatment was repeated. This time I said 'to hell with the slipper' (to myself) and came to attention. A haymaker caught me in the jaw and I once again landed on the bed-deck. My friend tried to catch me as he was standing between the two beds where I landed. For this the guard called him forward and kicked and hit him with fists."

The last distinctive period was "hell week" from 11 to 18 December. Again the level of violence increased dramatically.

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With little or no provocation, guards would administer beatings including a series of punches or kicks or both to various parts of the head and body, clubbing with sticks or belts. It was also required that prisoners assume rigid and uncomfortable positions for periods as long as 16 hours. The crew members were forced to keep their heads bowed motionless on their chests, feet in front flat on the deck, and hands motionless on their knees. If they moved even slightly they were set upon by the guards and beaten. This was often exacerbated by forcing the prisoners to keep their windows open, permitting freezing wind to blow through the room--in one instance with crew members naked.

The statements abound with detailed references to the intensive and systematic abuse which was applied during this period. Again these punishments were often applied by officers. In fact the prison commandant informed the crew that they were going to be punished during this period for their conduct.

The medical evidence which was still evident on repatriation is not as great as might be expected. The entire crew was suffering from malnutrition. One man had a broken jaw, another a broken rib, and 29 men showed some evidence of mistreatment. Numerous crew members complained of tenderness and soreness and even numbness. It is difficult to separate their complaints from the effects of malnutrition. Three were diagnosed as "depressed."

In summarizing, the evidence is overwhelming that North Korean officers condoned the maltreatment of the crew and in numerous occasions participated. It is also clear that the abuse was systematic

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and organized. At the same time the crew adjusted to and tolerated well a level of violence which they were certainly not accustomed to. It is significant no deaths occurred, no maimings, no bizarre tortures, although the North Koreans had the power and evidently the will to carry out their worst threats. This would support the conclusion that the levels of violence were consciously and carefully controlled and explain the apparent lack of lasting medical evidence of physical mistreatment.

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PUEBLO INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEF AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BRIEF SECRET

FOLLOWING INITIAL MEDICAL SCREENING AND TREATMENT IN KOREA, THE CREW OF THE PUEBLO WAS FLOWN TO SAN DIEGO FOR INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEFING.

THE PURPOSE OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEF WAS TO OBTAIN WITHIN A LIMITED TIME FRAME A MAXIMUM OF INFORMATION FROM PUEBLO RETURNEES FOR SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS IN DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE TO NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH THE COMPROMISE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC/CRYPTOLOGIC, AND SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PROGRAMS AND MATERIALS AS A RESULT OF THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO BY THE NORTH KOREANS.

THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES WERE ADHERED TO IN THE INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEF:

1. THE DEBRIEF WAS NOT CONCERNED WITH ASPECTS OF CULPABILITY. ALL INFORMATION WAS PRIVILEGED. EACH RETURNEE WAS ADVISED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY OF THIS, AND THAT THE QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE DEBRIEFING PROCESS WERE FOR THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING NEEDED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
2. ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED DURING THIS DEBRIEFING PROCESS IS BEING CAREFULLY SAFEGUARDED AND HELD EXCLUSIVELY AS PRIVILEGED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, AND THAT IT WILL NOT IN ANY WAY, DIRECTLY, OR INDIRECTLY BE USED AGAINST THE PERSON WHO PROVIDED IT, OR AGAINST ANY OTHER RETURNEE IN ANY JUDICIAL OR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEF, EACH RETURNEE WAS ADVISED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEF WAS CONCLUDED, AND THAT ANY INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RETURNEE HEREAFTER MAY BE USABLE AGAINST THE RETURNEE IN A COURT OF LAW, COURT-MARTIAL OR OTHER DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING; HE WAS TOLD THAT NONE OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RETURNEE DURING THE INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEF PROCESS HAS BEEN OR WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PERSONS WHO MAY SUBSEQUENTLY TALK WITH, QUESTION, OR INTERROGATE THE RETURNEE CONCERNING HIS CONDUCT FOR OTHER THAN INTELLIGENCE SECRET

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PURPOSES. ALSO, THAT IF THE RETURNEE DESIRES TO WITHHOLD FROM LATER DISCLOSURES ANY OF THE INFORMATION WHICH HE HAD PROVIDED DURING THE DEBRIEFING PROCESS, HE MAY FEEL COMPLETELY SECURE IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT HIS PRIOR STATEMENTS WILL NOT BE DISCLOSED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THE METHODOLOGY USED IN THE DEBRIEF WAS ENTIRELY DEPENDENT UPON THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OF THE RETURNEES. ALL HUMANITARIAN MEASURES WERE AFFORDED THEM. NO PERSON WAS INTERVIEWED UNTIL RELEASED BY MEDICAL AUTHORITIES. THE DEBRIEF TEAM CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY 300 INTERVIEWERS, TECHNICAL, CLERICAL, AND ADMIN PERSONNEL.

EACH CREWMEMBER WAS INTERVIEWED BY ONE DEBRIEFER USING A PRE-ESTABLISHED QUESTION FORMAT. NOTES WERE TAKEN AND THE INTERVIEW WAS OVERTLY TAPE RECORDED.

THE INTERVIEW PORTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEF LAST TWO WEEKS AND WAS COMPLETED ON 11 JANUARY 1969. A TOTAL OF 1293 INTERVIEW TAPES RESULTED, FOR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 270 MILES OF TAPE. THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THESE TAPES ARE STORED IN 11 FIVE-DRAWER FILE CABINETS, CONSISTING OF APPROXIMATELY 100 CUBIC FEET.

THE INTELLIGENCE DEBRIEF TAKE WAS FLOWN TO WASHINGTON WHERE AN INTENSIVE EFFORT IS NOW UNDERWAY TO ANALYZE AND COLLATE THIS MATERIAL FOR DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PURPOSES. MR. HELMS, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, HAS ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASSESSING THE OVERALL DAMAGE TO THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESULTING FROM THE LOSS OF PUEBLO. A SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT GROUP HAS BEEN CREATED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF ^{#510} SUB COMPRISED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF CIA, STATE, NSA, DIA, AND THE NAVY, ARMY AND AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. THIS GROUP IS CHAIRED BY A NAVY FLAG OFFICER REPRESENTING THE DIRECTOR OF DIA, AND HAS

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BEEN DIRECTED TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO USIB.

SINCE THE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT HAS YET TO BE COMPLETED, I CANNOT INDICATE AT THIS TIME THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHICH RESULTED FROM CAPTURE OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS ON PUEBLO.

I CAN, HOWEVER, GIVE YOU SOME FEELING FOR THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK, BY INDICATING AREAS WHERE COMPROMISE IS KNOWN TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE. THESE INCLUDE:

SIGINT PROCEDURES, METHODS, EQUIPMENT AND KNOWLEDGE.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC/CRYPTOLOGIC PROCEDURES, METHODS, EQUIPMENT AND KNOWLEDGE.

US COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES, METHODS, EQUIPMENT AND KNOWLEDGE.

US INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OPERATIONS.

US COMMAND AND CONTROL.

NAVY OPERATING PROCEDURES, COMMAND AND CONTROL.

US KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING SOVIET, NORTH VIETNAM, CHINESE AND NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITIES AND STATE OF THE ART IN ELINT, SIGINT, COMMS, RADAR ORDER OF BATTLE, TACTICS, METHODS, PROCEDURES, ETC.

THE REPORT ASSESSING THE DAMAGE WILL HAVE TWO ASPECTS - SI AND NON-SI. NSA WILL PREPARE THE SI REPORT FOR USIB, AND ACNO (INTEL) WILL PREPARE THE NON-SI REPORT. USIB WILL THEN STUDY THE REPORTS, AND FORWARD THEM TO MR. HELMS FOR AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE DAMAGE TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAUSED BY THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO.

FROM THIS ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE, RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CORRECTIVE MEASURES TO NEGATE THE DAMAGE SHALL BE MADE.

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USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

23 JAN 1968 - 30 JUN 1968



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PUEBLO INCIDENT

This notebook contains reference material pertinent to the assessment of the United States Fifth Air Force responsibilities and actions in response to the Pueblo incident. It focuses upon Fifth Air Force responsibilities in respect to support for the USS Pueblo mission, and includes the posture and deployments of Fifth Air Force units prior to, during and after world attention centered on the event. The information has been cross-checked with various chronologies and historical reports, the CHECO Report on Northeast Asia, the NMCC Data Books, and previous testimony given by the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. Entries are cross referenced to source documents and messages contained in the backup book or brief case file.

Complete files have been prepared for the Vice Chief of Staff, and Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. Additional books have been prepared for SAFOS, SAFOI, SAFLL, AFCCS, and AFXDC.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations
Lt Col Roderick D. Thompson, AFXOXOC
Lt Col Robert A. Carter, AFXPPEP

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
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TALKING PAPERS

1. The Pueblo Incident
2. Korean Status

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TALKING PAPER

on

PUEBLO INCIDENT

MAIN THURST OF PAPER:

To answer questions raised which tend to impute a lack of responsiveness or failure of Fifth Air Force to discharge responsibilities.

DISCUSSION:

- The capture of the USS Pueblo in international waters off the North Korean coast
 - has raised some questions concerning Air Force responsiveness
 - and Air Force responsibilities for protection of the Pueblo and other Navy ships on similar missions
- The central questions emanating from the Pueblo incident have been
 - Why was air cover not provided
 - and/or why was air support not immediately available
- Although Fifth Air Force was an information addressee on the Pueblo planning and execution messages
 - Fifth Air Force had no responsibility and did not participate in the risk assessment assigned this mission
 - Nor were we involved in the determination of the need for air support

- To be specific -- no Fifth Air Force support was requested for the Pueblo
- Hence -- no air support was in position nor configured
 - To provide an immediate response
- On two previous occasions -- CLICKBEETLE IX (11 Nov-8 Dec 66) and CLICKBEETLE XV (22 Aug-16 Sep 67)
 - Neither of which were near North Korea
 - Air Force support was requested by the Navy and strip alert was provided
- At the time of the Pueblo incident, Fifth Air Force was in the middle of a long-planned conversion program
 - Replacing F-100 and F-105 aircraft in Japan with F-4Cs
 - And had only one Tactical Fighter Unit - Okinawa based F-105s -- operationally ready
- Had the Navy requested implementation of the Fifth Air Force readiness plan
 - Such as had been employed in connection with the Banner operations off the China and Soviet coasts
 - We would have been ready with some kind of "quick reaction" capability
- Even if we had provided a "quick reaction" capability for the Pueblo
 - Or for similar missions in the future
 - Doesn't insure that we can prevent a determined enemy from capturing these vessels.

- The close proximity of research type vessels to territorial waters means
- That an enemy can close with the vessel very rapidly -- operating at a time of his choosing, within his defensive perimeter
- And with his military posture aligned for the particular operation
- Our "quick reaction" capability is, therefore, limited
- To probe the intentions of the enemy force -- to cause it to pause or withdraw
- On failing in that effort -- to respond to any hostile act
- Gentlemen -- this concludes my remarks
- I would be happy to respond to any questions
- That you may have at this time

TALKING PAPER

ON

KOREAN STATUS

MAIN THRUST OF PAPER

Air Force actions to improve Korean posture since the Pueblo incident.

DISCUSSION

- At the time of the Pueblo incident, Fifth Air Force was in the middle of a long-planned conversion program
 - Replacing F-100 and F-105 aircraft in Japan with F-4Cs
 - And had only one Tactical Fighter Unit - Okinawa based F-105s operationally ready.
 - During conversion training to F-4Cs - emphasis was placed on nuclear qualification
 - To maintain the SIOP posture
 - Aircrews, maintenance and armament personnel were in training status
 - Logistics guidance authorized 90 days pre-position War Reserve Material (WRM)
 - On hand stocks were about 20% of the 90 day authorized
- There were no SUU 16/23 gunpods - or AIM-7 missiles available within 5AF
- To provide F-4s with an air-to-air capability.

TALKING PAPER

OR

KOREAN STATUS

MAIN THRUST OF PAPER

Air Force actions to improve Korean posture since the Pueblo incident.

DISCUSSION

- At the time of the Pueblo incident, Fifth Air Force was in the middle of a long-planned conversion program
- Replacing F-100 and F-105 aircraft in Japan with F-4Cs
- And had only one Tactical Fighter Unit - Okinawa based F-105s operationally ready.
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- To maintain the SIOP posture
- Aircrews, maintenance and armament personnel were in training status
- Logistics guidance authorized 90 days pre-position War Reserve Material (WRM)
- On hand stocks were about 20% of the 90 day authorized
- There were no SUU 16/23 gunpods - or AIM-7 missiles available within 5AF
- To provide F-4s with an air-to-air capability.

- A limited number of AIM-9 (Sidewinder) missiles were available but can only be carried on external launcher rails - with special adapter cables (NOTE: Nuclear alert aircraft are not armed with air-to-air weapons)
- Overall conversion training for aircrews
 - Was about 25% complete
- The foregoing notwithstanding
 - Had the Navy requested implementation of the 5AF readiness plan to protect the Pueblo
 - We would have used Okinawa based F-105s
 - To provide a "quick reaction" capability
- Unfortunately, our aircraft were configured for training
 - Or nuclear alert and loadout times for weapons and fuel tanks and distance from the Pueblo prevented our responding to the scene
 - Before the ship was captured.
- F-4 nonnuclear loadout times
 - are as follows:

<u>Config</u>	<u>WPNS</u> <u>SYSTEM</u> <u>CHECK-</u> <u>OUT</u>	<u>PYLON</u> <u>INST</u>	<u>INSTALL</u> <u>REFUEL</u> <u>TANK</u>	<u>LOAD</u> <u>MUNI-</u> <u>TIONS</u>	<u>START</u> <u>TAXI</u> <u>T.O.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>TIME</u>	<u>LOAD</u>
Non-							
Nuclear	0:30	1:30	0:45	1:10	0:15	4:10	6 CP Bombs or 6 LAU2A or 4 Fire bombs or 6 CSU 24/29

CONFIG	WPNS SYSTEM CHECK- OUT	PYLON INST	INSTALL REFUEL TANK	LOAD MUNI- TIONS	START TAXI T.O.	TOTAL TIME	LOAD
Air Defense or Escort	0:35	1:00	0:45	1:00	0:15	3:35	4 ATM 9

NOTE: This data represents the average loadout time required using qualified load teams and weapon release crews with operational ready aircraft in position for loading with two 370 gallon fuel tanks installed. It assumes the munitions are already built up with bomb fins, boosters installed and rockets assembled in the launchers. Loadout times will increase for any decreased capability. If munitions are in dead storage add the following generation times: GP bombs (20) - 3:12; LAU-3A Rocket Launchers (18) - 6:05; BLU Firebombs (8) - 4:17; AIM-9 Missiles (12) - 4:29. If nuclear weapons are loaded add :20 to download weapons.


SOURCE: USAFEM 3-1, 15 March 1968. (Times are based on USAF F-4 wing averages).

F-105 nonnuclear loadout times

CONFIG	INSTALL REFUEL TANK	CHECK/ LOAD CL	CHECK/ LOAD PYLONS	LOAD M-61 AMMO	START TAXI T.O.	TOTAL TIME	LOAD
Non Nuclear		2:00		:20	:15	2:35	6-GP bombs 500/ 750#
	:45		1:30	:20	:15	2:50	2 LAU- 3A
Air Defense or Escort	:45		1:10		:15	1:25	4 AIM- 9

NOTE: This assumes the aircraft are already loaded with two full 450 gallon fuel tanks. See note under F-4 loadout times for additional facts.

SOURCE: TACM 136-1 plus TAC (DMAS) load standardization team.



FORCE BUILDUP

DATE/TIME
EVENT

Zulu 23/0500

23/1400I

At the hour of the Pueblo seizure, the forces immediately available to 5AF were deployed as follows: *

KOREA

OKINAWA

JAPAN

Osan	3 F-4C (2 SIOP, 1 Spare)	Kadena	24 F-105 (4 SIOP)	Yokota	20 F-4C* 6 F-105**
Kunsan	4 F-4C (2 SIOP, 1 Spare, Naha 1 Tng)		14 RF-4C 25 F-102 (8 Alert)	Misawa	12 F-4C *1 Tng flt fm Misawa **2 Add. a/c TDY SEAsia

ZULU 23/1500

23/2400I

By midnight (Korea) of the 23rd, 11 F-105s (Kadena) and 1 F-4C (from Japan) had augmented the Korean force. (The twelfth Kadena F-105 arrived at 24/0055I and 3 RF-4Cs from Kadena arrived at about the same time). At 23/1830Z (24/0330I), PACAF suspended all movement of 5AF fighters UFN.

ZULU 27/1500

27/2400I

On the 27th, additional F-4Cs were deployed from Japan to Kunsan to support special recon operations, and all F-4s in Korea were consolidated at Kunsan. This completed unilateral deployments by 5AF and provided this status:

KOREA

OKINAWA

JAPAN

Osan	12 F-105 3 RF-4C		12 F-105 11 RF-4C		8 F-105 19 RF-4C
Kunsan	20 F-4C		25 F-102		

Jan 27/2400 - Feb 11/2400 Korea

The following forces were added to PACAF resources through "COMBAT FOX" and other deployments from CORUS.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>TMS</u>	<u>To</u>
4 TFS	Seymour Johnson	72 F-4D	Kunsan
4537	Nellis	6 F-105 (WW)	Osan
19 TFW	Shaw	6 EB-66	Osan
355 TFW	Myrtle Beach	18 F-100	Phu Cat SVN
91 BW	Glasgow	15 B-52	Kadena
318 FIS	McCord	18 F-106	Naha

Additional deployment of units within PACAF was as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>TMS</u>	<u>To</u>
12 TFS	Kadena	12 F-105	Osan
80 TFS	Yokota	4 F-105	Osan
15 TRS	Kadena	11 RF-4C	Osan
64 FIS	Clark	13 F-102	Kimpo
82 FIS	Naha	25 F-102	Suwon
558 TFS	Cam Ranh Bay	18 F-4C	Kunsan

Status upon completion of deployments was:

<u>Korea</u>		<u>Okinawa</u>		<u>Japan</u>	
Osan	34 F-105 *5 EB-66 14 RF-4C	Kadena	15 B-52 6 F-105 2 RF-4C	Yokota	22 F-4C
Kunsan	18 F-4C 72 F-4D	Naha	1 F-102 18 F-106**	Misawa	17 F-4C
Kimpo	13 F-102				
Suwon	25 F-102				
	181		42		39

*1 AOCF Anderson

**Redeployed to Osan on 18 Feb

a. ALERT POSTURE IN KOREA: As aircraft arrived in Korea, the following alert posture was established:

BASE	TYPE	SIOP	5 Min	15 Min	30 Min	1 hr
Osan	F-105	*2		12 AG		13 AG
Kunsan	F-4D			8 AA	47 AA/ AG	
	F-4C	*2			14 AA	
Suwon	F-102		4	8	11	
Kimpo	F-102		4	5		

NOTE: * SIOP alert posture re-established at Osan by 18 TFW at 31 2300Z Jan 68. SIOP alert posture re-established at Kunsan by 475 TFW at same time. SIOP alert posture (4 a/c) at Kadena was degraded at approximately 0400Z, 28 Jan 68 and has not been re-established.

b. REVISED POSTURE IN KOREA:

(1) On 22 April 1968, the JCS forwarded to SECDEF (JCS 2339/273-2) a memorandum which contained a proposed USAF posture for Korea. This posture provided for 151 fighter/interceptor aircraft in Korea and tactical recon and tactical electronic warfare support (TEWS) aircraft in Japan in support of the Korea posture.

(2) On 22 May 1968 the Dep SECDEF, in a memorandum for the Chairman of the JCS, approved the revised US Air Force air posture in Korea. The conversion to reach this posture continued through July 1968 and was accomplished as shown below:

<u>REVISED USAF FORCES IN KOREA</u>			
	Feb 68	Jul 68	Present
F-4D (TDY-CONUS)	-----72 UE-----	(CONUS)	
F-4C (TDY-SVN)	-----18 UE-----	(PCS-JAPAN)	
F-105 (TDY-WESTPAC)	-----24 UE-----	(WESTPAC)	
EF-105F (TDY- CONUS)	----- 6 UE-----		
F-106 (TDY-CONUS)	-----18 UE-----		
F-102 (TDY-WESTPAC)	-----13 UE-----		
F-100C (PCS-CONUS)		-----50 UE-----	
F-4C/F-105 (TDY-WESTPAC)		-----64 UE-----	
TOTAL AIRCRAFT		151	

c. Actual Beddown of TAC Ftr/Recon/Interceptor Aircraft in Korea/Japan/Okinawa - 30 June 68: (As of this date the reposturing actions were still ongoing)

KOREA

<u>Kunsan</u>	<u>Kwangju</u>	<u>Osan</u>	<u>Suwon</u>	<u>Taegu</u>
F-4C 7	F-4D 18	F-4C 17	F-102 13	F-4C 16
F-4D 46		F-105 6		
F-100 25		F-106 17		
TOTAL 78	TOTAL 18	TOTAL 40	TOTAL 13	TOTAL 16

JAPAN/OKINAWA

<u>Yokota</u>	<u>Misawa</u>	<u>Itazuke</u>	<u>Kadena</u>	<u>Naha</u>
F-4C 28	F-4C 28	EB-66 4	F-105 19	F-102 17
		RF-4C 14	RF-4C 4	F-106 1
TOTAL 28	TOTAL 28	TOTAL 18*	TOTAL 23	TOTAL 18

NOTE: * These aircraft in support of Korean buildup and were initially deployed to Korea. RF-4Cs subsequently replaced by ANG RF-101s on Rote from CONUS.

d. Alert Posture In Korea/Okinawa - 30 June 68:

<u>BASE</u>	<u>TMS</u>	<u>SIOP</u>	<u>5 MIN</u>	<u>15 MIN</u>	<u>30 MIN</u>	<u>1 HR</u>
Osan	F-4C	8				
Kunsan	F-4C	5				
	F-4D			4		
	F-100C			2		
Kwang-ju	F-4D			4		
Taegu	F-4C			4		
Naha	F-102		2		6	7
Suwon	F-102		4		9	
Osan	F-106		4		11	

- Logistic Buildup
- Munitions buildup directed by JCS
 - To provide 45 day (app 15K tons) level
 - Level established for original 182 acft COMBAT FOX Force
 - Level attained and remained static since June 68
 - Level for adjusted 151 acft equates to 60 day support level
- AF Munitions Status (Korea)

ITEM	Requirement	On Hand (15 Jan 68)	On Hand (15 Jul 68)	Due In
<u>General Purpose Bombs</u>				
MK 82, 500#	19,449	1,019	17,096	-
MK 84	126	-	126	-
M 117, 750#	16,330	4,804	15,693	-
<u>Special Purpose Bombs</u>				
CBU-1/7	461	1,646	461	-
CBU-2	272	-	272	-
CBU-3	51	-	192	-
CBU-12	45	-	48	-
CBU-24/29	1,594	-	1,449	-
CBU-28	750	-	-	-
CBU-33	336	-	-	-
CBU-34	689	-	-	-
BLU-31(Bomb)	2,514	-	-	-
BLU-31(Mine)	455	-	-	-
<u>Fire Bombs</u>				
BLU-1/27	1,683	2,213	2,759	-
<u>Missiles</u>				
AIM-4A, Falcon	141	-	121	-
AIM-4D, Falcon	141	-	105	-
AIM-4F (F-102)	103	-	99	-
AIM-4G	108	-	102	-
AIM-7E, Sparrow	710	-	344	366
AIM-9B, Sidewinder	660	49	417	-
AGM-12C, Bullpup	240	-	334	-

AGM-45, Shrike	130	-	184	-
AGM-62, Walleye	330	-	-	-

Flares

MK-24	25,000	1,028	40,369	-
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Rocket Motors

2.75" Rocket	43,740	12,442	44,902	-
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Aircraft Gun Ammo

20mm (M-61 Gun)	1,740,000	1,371,000	1,305,000	-
20MM (M-39 Gun)	586,000	978,000	1,014,000	-

Miscellaneous

MK 75 Kit	700	-	-	700
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- Shortages primarily air-to-air (AIM) munitions
- Stock levels adequate for force listed above
- Munitions being replaced to maintain 16K ton (app) level

Status of USAF Forces
As of 26 Feb 1969

KOREA

<u>Location</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>TDY/PCS</u>	<u>WDR/Type</u>	<u>C-Rating</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>
Kunsan	127 TFS	PCS	21/F-100	C-2	Equipment
	166 TFS	PCS	21/F-100	C-2	Equipment
	356 TFS	TDY	5/F-4C	C-4	Equip/Supp
	391 TFS	TDY	2/F-4C	C-3	Trng
Osan	71 F15	TDY	14/F106	C-1	
	35 TFS	TDY	4/F-4C	C-4	Equip
	36 TFS	TDY	10/F-4C	C-3	Equip
	80 TFS	TDY	7/F-4C	C-2	Equip
Suwon	82 F15	TDY	12/F-102	C-2	Pers
Taegu	67 TFS	TDY	4/F-4C	C-3	Equip
	356 TFS	TDY	1/F-4C	C-4	Equip/Supp
	391 TFS	TDY	10/F-4C	C-3	Trng
Kwangju	12 TFS	TDY	11/F-105	C-4	Trng
96 Pers	26 Inteps				

OKINAWA

Naha	71 F15	TDY	3/F-106	C-1	
	82 F15	PCS	17/F-102	C-2	Pers
	21 TAS	PCS	10/C-130	C-2	Trng
	35 TAS	PCS	9/C-130	C-2	Equip
	41 TAS	PCS	7/C-130	C-2	Equip
	817 TAS	PCS	9/C-130	C-2	Equip
Nadena	12 TFS	PCS	11/F-105	C-4	Trng
	15 TFS	PCS	15/RF-4	C-3	Pers
	4133 PERW	TDY	21/B-52	C-1	
	4252 STRW	TDY	35/RC-135	C-1	
	343 SRS	TDY	1/RC135	C-1	
	22 SRS	PCS	6/RC-135	C-1	
	99/1 SRS	TDY	3/SA-71	C-1	
	349 SRS	TDY	1/U-2	C-1	
	815 TAS	TDY	1/C-130	C-3	Trng
	11 Per, 26 Recce, 25 Inteps, 36 airlift				

Status of USAF Forces
As of 26 Feb 1969

KOREA

<u>Location</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>TDY/PCS</u>	<u>NR/Type</u>	<u>C-Rating</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>
Kunsan	127 TFS	PCS	21/F-100	C-2	Equipment
	166 TFS	PCS	21/F-100	C-2	Equipment
	356 TFS	TDY	5/F-4C	C-4	Equip/Supp
	391 TFS	TDY	2/F-4C	C-3	Trng
Osan	71 F15	TDY	14/F106	C-1	
	35 TFS	TDY	4/F-4C	C-4	Equip
	36 TFS	TDY	10/F-4C	C-3	Equip
	80 TFS	TDY	7/F-4C	C-2	Equip
Suwon	62 F15	TDY	12/F-102	C-2	Pers
Taegu	67 TFS	TDY	4/F-4C	C-3	Equip
	356 TFS	TDY	1/F-4C	C-4	Equip/Supp
	391 TFS	TDY	10/F-4C	C-3	Trng
Kwangju	12 TFS	TDY	11/F-105	C-4	Trng
96 Pers	26 Intcps				

OKINAWA

Naha	71 F15	TDY	6/F-106	C-1	
	82 F15	PCS	17/F-102	C-2	Pers
	21 TAS	PCS	10/C-130	C-2	Trng
	35 TAS	PCS	9/C-130	C-2	Equip
	41 TAS	PCS	7/C-130	C-2	Equip
	617 TAS	PCS	9/C-130	C-2	Equip
Futenma	12 TFS	PCS	11/F-105	C-4	Trng
	15 TRS	PCS	15/RF-4	C-3	Pers
	4155 PERW	TDY	21/B-52	C-1	
	4252 STRW	TDY	35/RC-135	C-1	
	343 SRS	TDY	1/RC135	C-1	
	32 SRS	PCS	6/RC-135	C-1	
	99/1 SRS	TDY	3/SA-71	C-1	
	349 SRS	TDY	1/U-2	C-1	
	815 TAS	TDY	1/C-130	C-3	Trng
	11 Per, 26 Recce, 25 Intcps, 36 airlift				

JAPAN

Tachikawa	22 MARS	TDY	14/C-124	C-1	
	815 TAS	PCS	10/C-130	C-3	Trng
	346 TAS	TDY	10/C-130	C-1	
Itazuke	19 TMS	PCS	4/LB66	C-2	Equip
	165 TRS	TDY	19/RF-101	C-1	
Yokota	556 RCSR	PCS	3/EB57	C-1	
	35 TFS	PCS	8/F-4	C-4	Equip
	36 TFS	PCS	5/F-4	C-3	Equip
	80 TFS	PCS	8/F-4	C-2	Equip
Misawa	67 TFS	PCS	9/F-4	C-3	Equip
	356 TFS	PCS	2/F-4	C-4	Equip/Supp
	391 TFS	PCS	4/F-4	C-3	Trng

36 Ftr, 34 Airlift, 19 Recce, 7 EB

Grand total

Tac Ftrs	143
Interceptors	51
Tac Recon	45
Airlift	70

- Alert Posture in Korea/Okinawa - 27 February 1969:

Base	Type	SIOP	5 Min	15 Min	30 Min	1 Hr
Osan	F-4C	6				
	F-4C				1*	
	F-106		4AA		6AA	*
Kunsan	F-4C	8				
	F-100C			4AG**	4 AG **	
Suwon	F-102		4AA		4AA	
Taegu	F-4C				1*	
Naha	F-102		2AA		2AA	4AA

* Night Flare Alert

**Day Alert Only

- Aircraft have missile capability as follows:

	F-4C	F-105	F-100	F-102	F-106
AIM-4				X(A+D)	X(F+G)
AIM-7	X				
AIM-9	X	X	X		

NOTE: Normal AG/AA Loads

	AG	AA
F-105	1000rd 20mm HEI 6XMK-117 (750#)	
F-4	2XAIM-9 8XMK-117	4XAIM-9 4XAIM-7
F-102		5XAIM-4 (A+D)
F-106		4XAIM-4 (F+G)

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USAF POINT PAPER ON THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

Provided Secretary of Defense in response
to Navy Briefing which contained certain
irregularities regarding Air Force actions.

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USAF POINTY PAPER ON THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

Issue: Air Force Support for the Pueblo

1. Assessment of risk assigned Pueblo mission
2. Air Force response to support Pueblo mission
3. Time of notification to Fifth Air Force of Pueblo attack
4. Status of Air Force units in Korea and Japan
5. Responsiveness of Air Force Okinawa units to Navy request for assistance

AF Comments:

Air Force representatives had not engaged in joint planning with Navy personnel concerning protection for the Pueblo. No Fifth Air Force support was requested for this mission; hence, no air support was in position to provide a quick reaction response. Responsible Air Force authorities were not notified of the Pueblo emergency in sufficient time to effect on-the-scene action prior to darkness and while the captured ship was still beyond the three-mile limit. Shortly after the Commander, Fifth Air Force had been notified, the enemy was escorting the ship to Wonsan. Okinawa-based F-105 aircraft, the only Operationally Ready Tactical Fighter Unit in Fifth Air Force, were diverted from non-alert training status and launched in minimum time to Korea. They were ordered to go to the aid of the Pueblo if they could do so prior to darkness and prior to the time the ship entered the three-mile limit, or to provide for any further contingency that might develop.

1. In the initial request by CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC requesting approval to conduct the Pueblo mission, CINCPACFLT estimated the risk as "minimal". Subsequently, CINCPAC submitted the request to the JCS for mission approval without altering the risk assessment. On 2 Jan 68, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the proposed operation was approved for execution and appropriate Navy Hq were so informed. On 5 Jan 68, CTG 96 (COMNAVFORJAPAN) issued the sail order. Although Fifth Air Force was an information addressee on these planning and execution messages, Fifth Air Force had no responsibility and did not participate in the risk assessment assigned this mission.

2. Of some 16 such prior missions known to have been conducted by the Banner (CLICKBEEBLE), the Navy requested Fifth Air Force support on two of them. Neither of these missions was near North Korea. For CLICKBEEBLE IX, scheduled 11 Nov - 8 Dec 66, CINCPACFLT requested and CINCPACFLT approved in using F-102 alert aircraft and F-105s on 15-day alert. Authority to

launch these aircraft was initially retained by CINCPAC but subsequently delegated to Commander, Fifth Air Force. For OJCKBETLE XV, scheduled 22 Aug - 16 Sep 67, COMNAVFORJAPAN requested Fifth Air Force plan for contingency air support on an on-call basis vice continuous strip alert. Subordinate units were alerted and advised by Fifth Air Force of Banner's intended operation. Additional aircraft were placed on alert with increased armament. COMNAVFORJAPAN was informed that Commander, Fifth Air Force would direct launch; however, no request for air support was made. As far as the Pueblo incident is concerned, no air support was requested of Fifth Air Force. Had the Navy requested implementation of the Fifth Air Force readiness plan, such as had been employed in connection with the Banner operations off the China and Soviet coasts, the Air Force would have been prepared with quick reaction capability to assist them. Sufficient information was available within the Fifth Air Force staff (i.e., CTC 96 OPOD, Fifth Air Force OPOD 307-67) to plan for air support of the Pueblo. Cognizant personnel within the Fifth Air Force staff had discussed the Sail Order message with the Seventh Fleet Liaison Officer to Fifth Air Force. Since it did not request any action of Fifth Air Force, the message was not brought to the attention of DCS/Ops or the Command Section.


3. Although a difference exists regarding when Fifth Air Force was notified of the Pueblo distress, it is not considered significant in light of the fact that between 0418 - 0440Z (1318-1340I), the Pueblo was boxed in and was being escorted toward Wonsan by NKN patrol craft. At 0532Z (1432I) the Pueblo sent its last message and was boarded. The boarding had taken place about 17 minutes after the Commander, Fifth Air Force had been notified. Reconstruction of the incident reveals that his staff had been working the problem (plotting position, determining forces available, etc.) for approximately 20 minutes before he was notified.

4. Of the seven Air Force F-4C aircraft in Korea at the time of the incident, four of these were nuclear configured in support of the SIOP posture, and two were being used as spare backup. Additionally, one aircraft from Japan was in Korea on a training flight. The time for reconfiguration from nuclear to non-nuclear armament and the fact that the F-4Cs had no guns or missile air-to-air capability precluded their use in a known MIG environment.


In Japan, Fifth Air Force tactical fighter units were in the middle of a conversion program from F-105s and F-100s to F-4Es. Consequently no units were operationally ready on the day the intelligence ship was seized, the most serious limiting factor being combat ready aircrews. Of the 32 formed aircrews available, only three were combat ready. Further, the tactical aircraft in Japan were not used because generation time to reconfigure training aircraft and enroute flying time would have required more than three hours, and no assistance could reach the scene prior to darkness or while the ship was beyond the three-mile limit.

5. Upon notification of the Pueblo's ordeal, the Commander, Fifth Air Force alerted the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing on Okinawa to deploy as many F-105s as possible to Osan AB, Korea. This unit was the only operationally ready tactical fighter unit available. To save time, the first six aircraft were ordered to take off with loaded guns only (the gun being internally mounted did not require any reconfiguration and the guns were already loaded with training ammo). At approximately 0711Z, some one hour and twenty-three minutes after the "go" was given, aircraft had been diverted from non-alert training, crews briefed, and the first two F-105s were airborne. Again the scene of action was at such distance -- over 1,000 miles with recovery in Korea -- that staging through Korea was required. The last of the twelve F-105s to deploy reached their destination shortly after midnight, Korean time.

1 Atch
Fifth Air Force Posture Map (S)



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FIFTH AIR FORCE POSTURE CHANGES -
30 Jun 64 thru 23 Jan 68

REFERENCES

Fifth Air Force Working
Paper - Posture Changes

CHECO Report

5AF STATREP

BACKUP TAB

A

File 1

H

3. FIFTH AIR FORCE POSTURE CHANGES - 30 Jun 64 thro 23 Jan 68

<u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Aircraft/Missiles</u>
8 Tactical Fighter	200 F-100/F-105
4 Fighter Interceptor	86 F-102
2 Tactical Recon	32 RF-101
3 Bomb (Tactical)	48 B-57
1 Aerial Refueling	20 KB 50
1 Recon	17 B-57/C-130/C-97
*(1 Tactical Missile)	(32 TM-76)
TOTALS: 19 Aircraft Squadrons	403 Aircraft

* 1 TMG maintained continuously - not reported in subsequent recaps.

Changes due to Operation CLEAR WATER resulted in this status on 30 June 1965:

<u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
6 Tactical Fighter	150 F-105
2 Tactical Recon	32 RF-101
1 Recon	17 B-57/C-130
ASG TOTALS: 9 Squadrons	199 Aircraft

Augmentation by TAC Rotational Squadrons was

4 Tactical Fighter	72 F-105/F-100
1 Fighter Interceptor	18 F-4C
TOTALS: 14 Squadrons*	289 Aircraft

* 2 to 3 sqs continuously TDY to SEAsia throughout 1965.

a. SEAsia drawdown through PCS of units and replacement for SEAsia attrition.

- | | | |
|-----|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| (1) | 3 Squadrons PCS to SEAsia | 54 Acft (38 F-100/36 F-105) |
| (2) | Replacements for SEAsia losses | 88 Acft (72 F-105/16 RF-101) |
| (3) | Resulted in this status, 31 Dec 67: | |

<u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
4 Tactical Fighter	72 (36 F-105/36 F-4C)
1 Ftr Interceptor	26 F-102
1 TAC Recon	14 RF-4C
1 Recon	2 RB-57/11 C-130
TOTALS: 7 Squadrons	125 Aircraft

b. F-4D Conversion Program. Original planning documents reflected 5AF units beginning conversion training to F-4Cs in FY 68 with three 24 UE squadrons at Yokota Air Base. In late 1966, 5AF was requested to submit recommendations on force structure in response to queries posed by Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown. 5AF proposed the following equipment and basing to provide an effective all-weather Tactical/Air Defense capability in Korea:

- 1 24 UE F-4D Sq at Osan
- 1 24 UE F-4D Sq at Kunsan
- 1 24 UE F-4D Sq at Taegu

The Secretary indicated the aircraft total could be reduced and a dual-basing concept used more widely. In early November 1966, 5AF was advised by CSAF message that PD 68-4 would reflect four 18 UE F-4D squadrons at Yokota and one 18 UE F-4D squadron at Misawa. After several additional changes, it was proposed to base three 18 UE squadrons at Yokota AB and two 18 UE squadrons at Misawa AB.

(1) The original arrival date for the first F-4s was changed from the planned date in July 1967, to October 1967; and F-4Ds were again changed to F-4Cs. The F-4Cs were to be obtained from SEAsia assets as the SEAsia units converted to F-4Ds.

This revision slipped the conversion program for the last 5AF unit to begin receiving aircraft from November 1967 to March 1968.

ORIGINAL F-4D CONVERSION PROGRAM

	July 67	Aug 67	Sep 67	Oct 67	Nov 67
35 TFS	9	9			
36 TFS	9	9			
356 TFS		18			
80 TFS			18		
XXX TFS (67 TFS)				8	10

REVISED F-4C CONVERSION PROGRAM

	Oct 67	Nov 67	Dec 67	Jan 68	Feb 68	Mar 68
356 TFS	18					
35 TFS		18				
36 TFS				18		
80 TFS					18	
67 TFS						18


After the conversion program began 5AF was left with only one complete, fully operational squadron -- the 12th TFS at Kadena, equipped with 24 F-105s.

NOTE: The first F-4C assigned in the revised program arrived at Yokota on 2 Sept 67, and was transferred to Misawa on 19 Sept 67.

c. By 23 January 1968, assignment and deployment of Fighter, Interceptor, and Tactical Recon Aircraft in 5AF was as follows:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Possessed</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
<u>Tactical Fighters</u>			
12 TFS Kadena	26 F-105	24	2 Base Mod Maint
35 TFS Yokota	18 F-4C	17	1 Tainan Mod Maint
36 TFS Yokota	9 F-4C	5	4 Accept Check
67 TFS Misawa	Unequipped		
80 TFS Yokota	8 F-105	8*	2 TDY SEAsia
356 TFS Misawa	20 F-4C	17	3 Tainan Mod Maint
TOTAL	81	71	(69 on hand, *2 TDY)
<u>Tactical Recon</u>			
15 TRS Kadena	14 RF-4C	14	
<u>Interceptor</u>			
82 FIS Naha	29 F-102	25	2 IRAN 2 13AF
TOTALS	124	110	

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COMMAND & CONTROL

REFERENCES

CINCPAC MSG
5AF MSG - ADVON

BACKUP TAB

B
C

COMMAND & CONTROL

REFERENCES

CINCPAC MSG

5AF MSG - ADVON

BACKUP TAB

B

C


4. COMMAND & CONTROL

a. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM: Commander In Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) is the commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his mission. CINCPAC exercises operational command of all forces assigned or attached through the component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). There are five subordinate unified commands in the PACOM area.

b. SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES: Designated representatives coordinate activities of U.S. forces in each particular country or area on all matters of joint concern and represent CINCPAC in U.S. joint matters. Representatives in Japan and Korea are designated COMUSJAPAN and COMUSKOREA.

COMUSJAPAN is two-hatted in that he also serves as Commander 5AF Force. COMUSJAPAN has no operational units assigned nor does he have operational command authority. As indicated above, COMUSJAPAN coordinates activities of U.S. forces in Japan only.

COMUSKOREA is the senior designated Army officer in Korea. As the senior military representative, he has the same responsibilities in Korea as COMUSJAPAN has in Japan. However, COMUSKOREA as a subordinate unified command under CINCPAC, commands assigned units. Units are assigned upon the outbreak of hostilities or when directed by CINCPAC or the JCS. In a pre-hostility situation, COMUSKOREA does not normally have US forces assigned and exercises only a coordination authority over all US forces in Korea.




-----OP COMMAND
 -----PLANNING AND COORDINATION

c. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN KOREA: Command relationships which apply in Korea at any time depend upon the particular conditions at the time; such as pre-hostilities with actions derived from US objectives or UN objectives, or hostilities with CINCPAC Op'lan 27 executed either under UN command or not under UN.

(1) PRE-PUEELO

COMUSKOREA is a subordinate unified command under operational command of CINCPAC. CGEUSA is under command of CINCUSARPAC. COMNAVFORKOREA is under command CINCACFLT. COMAFKOREA/COM 314th ADiv is under command of Com 5AF to CINCPACAF.




(2) CURRENT ARRANGEMENT:

Under the current situation, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCACFLT exercise command and operational control of assigned forces. CINCPACAF with approval of CINCPAC established 5AF ADVON at Osan which exercises operational control of all PACAF forces deployed to Korea, and will support CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA as appropriate. Establishment of the 5AF ADVON puts a senior Air Force Commander in place to conduct an air war, if it occurs, or if the war is an Air/Ground battle, provides a senior Air Force Commander as COMAFKOREA and 5AF Command and Control forward. The current arrangement of a 5AF ADVON provides flexibility for either situation.

c. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN KOREA: Command relationships which apply in Korea at any time depend upon the particular conditions at the time; such as pre-hostilities with actions derived from US objectives or UN objectives, or hostilities with CINCPAC OPlan 27 executed either under UN command or not under UN.

(1) PRE-PUEBLO


COMUSKOREA is a subordinate unified command under operational command of CINCPAC. CGEUSA is under command of CINCUSARPAC. COMNAVFORKOREA is under command CINCPACFLT. COMAFKOREA/COM 314th ADiv is under command of Com 5AF to CINCPACAF.



(2) CURRENT ARRANGEMENT:

Under the current situation, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT exercise command and operational control of assigned forces. CINCPACAF with approval of CINCPAC established 5AF ADVON at Osan which exercises operational control of all PACAF forces deployed to Korea, and will support CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA as appropriate. Establishment of the 5AF ADVON puts a senior Air Force Commander in place to conduct an air war, if it occurs, or if the war is an Air/Ground battle, provides a senior Air Force Commander as COMAFKOREA and 5AF Command and Control forward. The current arrangement of a 5AF ADVON provides flexibility for either situation.

Collocated with the 5AF ADVON, the COM 314th ADiv continues his mission as Commander, Korea Air Defense sector under Commander 5AF, and provides administrative/logistical support of USAF units and coordinates AF activities with COMUSKOREA and other service components in Korea.



----- OPERATIONAL COMMAND
 - - - - - COORDINATION

As a result of the North Korean actions against the Pueblo and the territory and officials of the Republic of Korea, related operational actions and planning have taken place. However, CINCPAC OPlan 27 has not been implemented, and for the present actions taken are bilateral US- ROK rather than UNC actions.

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FIFTH AIR FORCE/COMNAVFORJAPAN PLANNING

REFERENCES

BACKUP TAB

Msg - McKee - Brown	D
Msgs - CLICKBEETLE IX, XIII, XV (Rules of Engagement)	D
5AF OPORD 307-67	E
CTF 96 OPORD 301-68	File 6
Precis Banner/Pueblo	F
Approval Cycle	G
JCS 2308/378/7 Policy & Procedures	File 5
USAF Response - Research Vessels	File 4

5. FIFTH AIR FORCE/COMNAVFORJAPAN PLANNING

a. Planning Coordination for BANNER/PUBLIC Operations:
The National Security Agency (NSA) promulgates recommendations for utilization of Technical Research Ships such as the Banner and the Pueblo. Furthermore, NSA field representation provides assistance to appropriate unified commanders to facilitate preliminary planning. Responsibility for planning and operational control is vested with the concerned unified commander. Normally, ship schedules are coordinated 60 days in advance. Final approval is on a monthly basis and is required at the JCS level and by other high national authorities (JCS 2308/378-7).

(1) COMMANDER TASK FORCE (CTF) 96 OPOD 301-68. The Navy developed a plan to use small auxiliary type vessels, suitably equipped to conduct naval surveillance and intelligence collection efforts. These efforts were to be directed against naval operating forces and shore establishments of countries whose actions and policies pose a threat to the National Security of the U.S. CTF 96 (COMNAVFORJAPAN) promulgated OPOD 301-68 on 3 Jan 68 which detailed operations and procedures. A broad operational concept was outlined with implementation in three phases:

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| PHASE ONE | Test operational feasibility and political implications of using a small trawler-type ship as a naval surveillance unit (USS Banner completed Phase One prior to effective period of this OPOD. Assigned Code Word "CLICKBEETLE"). |
| PHASE TWO | Provide continuous shipboard collection coverage in one operating area by using several ships. (Assigned Code Word "ICHTHYIC"). |
| PHASE THREE | Expand effort to provide coverage of areas in which collection deficiencies exist and provide a capability for surveillance of expanding Soviet naval operations. |

(2) 5AF OPORD 307-67. This OPORD developed in conjunction with COMNAVFORJAPAN and was to be effective when fraged by 5AF. 5AF OPORD 307-67 established detailed procedures and operating instructions for 5AF units in support of USS Banner operations. Selected Air Force units assigned to 5AF would provide tactical air support for the Navy at various times along the CHICOM, KOROCCOM and Soviet coasts. Concept envisions tactical forces on ground alert for air-to-air and air-to-surface defensive support of Navy intelligence collection activities, as required. Authority to commit 5AF aircraft in support of this operation was retained by Commander 5AF.

FRIENDLY FORCES:

6 Tac Ftrs (Rockets and Ammo)

2 Interceptors (Rockets and Missiles)

Other, i.e., Air Rescue, Tankers, etc)

*(CM-3163-68, 29 Mar 68: Although 5AF OPORD 307-67 cited the USS Banner by name, this OPORD was prepared for Banner's deployments and others similar in nature).

(3) Resume of Banner Missions/5AF Support. Of some 16 such missions known by 5AF to have been conducted (not all in the same area), Air Force support was requested by the Navy for four of them. Due to mission cancellations and support cancellations, only two missions were supported by 5AF units with aircraft and aircrews on strip alert. These missions were CLICKBEETLE IX, 11 Nov-8 Dec 66, and CLICKBEETLE XV, 22 Aug-16 Sep 67. On one other occasion when a mission was to be conducted in the East China Sea (CLICKBEETLE XVII, 1 Dec 67-16 Dec 67), 5AF notified subordinate units to the possible need for support.

CLICKBEETLE IX CINCPACFLT requested and CINCPACAF concurred in utilization of F-102 alert aircraft and F-105s on 15 minute alert. Aircraft to be utilized when directed and as considered appropriate by CINCPAC or higher authority. Later authority to launch delegated to Cndr 5AF. 5AF directed 313 ADiv at Kadena to configure 2 F-105s with RX+20 MM; add RXs to standard air defense load on 10 F-102s on normal air defense alert.

CLICKBEETLE X CTF 96 (COMNAVFORJAPAN) informed 5AF of planned operation. No air support requested. No action taken by 5AF to put a/c on alert. However, 5AF anticipated a possible request for support and notified subordinate units to insure sufficient air munitions were available at forward operating locations in Korea to upload aircraft, if required.

CLICKBEETLE XI No air support requested. No action taken by 5AF to put a/c on alert.

CLICKBEETLE XII No air support requested. No action taken by 5AF to put a/c on alert.

CLICKBEETLE XIII CINCPACFLT requested air support. CINCPACAF directed 5AF to plan air support similar to that planned for CLICKBEETLE IX. After two delays, this operation was cnx.

CLICKBEETLE XIV CINCPACFLT requested air support. CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF to be prepared to provide air support. 5AF initiated preparation. However, CINCPAC later cnx air support request because USS Banner would not penetrate the Russian coastal area as far north as anticipated.

CLICKBEETLE XV COMNAVFORJAPAN requested 5AF (info cy CINCPACAF) plan for contingency air support of Banner to be on an on-call basis vice continuous strip alert. Subordinate units were alerted and advised by Fifth Air Force of Banner's intended operation, and additional aircraft were placed on alert with increased armament. COMNAVFORJAPAN was informed that Cmdr, 5AF would direct launch; however, no requirement to launch alert forces developed.

CLICKBEETLE XVI No air support requested. No action taken by 5AF to put a/c on alert.

CLICKBEETLE XVII CINCPACFLT requested air support forces be notified of area and time frame. CINCPACAF did not direct 5AF to place a/c on alert. 5AF advised units of possible requirement. However, no 5AF a/c actually committed to alert.

(4) Pueblo Deployment. The USS Pueblo was ordered on an intelligence mission, beginning 8 Jan 68 from Sasebo, Japan, in the international waters off the coast of North Korea.

(a) Planning: 5AF had been an info addressee on COMNAVFORJAPAN, CINCPACFLT and CINCPAC messages in Dec 67. A "minimal risk" evaluation was assigned by Navy planners, and this evaluation remained unaltered in the approval cycle.

(b) Execution: On 5 Jan 68, CTF 96 (COMNAVFORJAPAN) dispatched the sail order message for the USS Pueblo (ICHTHYIC ONE). The Address Indicator Group (AIG) used on the sailord message included 5AF as an info addressee. The 7th Fleet Liaison Officer and the 5AF Cognizant Officer were informed by the sailord message of the Pueblo operation and had discussed it. Because no action had been requested of 5AF and the planning messages had estimated risk to be "minimal," the sailord message was not brought to the attention of anyone in the Command Section of 5AF, and no further action was indicated.

NOTE: 5AF received an average of 1534 messages per day and sent an average of 798. It is apparent that decisions on those that required no action of 5AF would be made at levels below the Commander.

	Monthly - 1968
Send	24,275
Rec	46,781


Source: AFOCC

b. Air Force Responsibility: A Report by the J-3 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Policies and Procedures on the control and scheduling of Technical Research Ships (JCS 2308/378-7) 17 October 1967, establishes the authority and responsibility for the operation of research vessels.

Operational control is executed by the cognizant unified commander through the naval component commander. Operational control includes planning, control of the ships, and coordination with other assigned forces as necessary to accomplish the mission. This includes coordination for emergency defense.

This document lists the required addressees for all planning/scheduling messages, but in no case does it list an air component commander. Since the air commander clearly is not in the risk assessment or approval cycle, it is apparent that he must be tasked by the cognizant CINC, or coordination for support must be initiated by the Naval component commander.

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FIFTH AIR FORCE OPERATIONAL READINESS STATUS AT
0500Z (1400I) 23 Jan 68

REFERENCES

BACKUP TAB

SAF STATREP

H

SAF MSGS - Aircrew Capability

I

PACAF MSG - Status, 23 Jan

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6. 5AF OPERATIONAL READINESS STATUS AT 0500Z (1400I) 23 Jan 68

a. At the hour of the Pueblo seizure, the status of Ftr/
Recco/ Interceptor aircraft and aircrews by country was as
follows:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TMS</u>	<u>ACFT</u> <u>AVAIL</u>	<u>ACFT</u> <u>OR</u>	<u>AVAIL</u> <u>PRIMARY</u> <u>AIRCREWS</u> <u>AVAIL</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Korea	F-4C	7	7	5	4 SIOP Alert 2 Spares 1 Tng Flt
Japan	F-4C F-105	38	16	32	2 A/C and CR TDY 2 CR LV/DNIF
Okinawa	F-105	24	18	20	8 CR TDY SEAsia
Attack Total:		69	41	57	2 acft and 10 CR TDY 2 CR LV DNIF
Okinawa	F-102 RF-4C	25 14	23 10	29 19	
TOTALS:		108	74	105	

3. The following is a more detailed unit status which reflects unit's assets at home and dispersed operating locations:

Unit	Location	TMS	C-Ratings	Acft Pos.	OR	Crews Formed	OR	Remarks
12 TFS	Kadena	F-105	C-1	24	18	28	28	8 Crews TD
35 TFS	Yokota	F-4C	C-4	14	3	17	0	
	Oson			3	3	2	0	2 SIOP 1 Spare
36 TFS	Yokota	F-4C	C-4	5	1	4	0	Unequipped
67 TFS	Misawa							
80 TFS	Yokota	F-105	C-4	6	5	4	4	1 DNIF, 1 leave
	TDY SEAsia			2	2	2	2	
356 TFS	Misawa	F-4C	C-4	12	6	12	1	
	Kunsan			4	4	3	0	2 SIOP, 1 Spare, 1 Tng Flt
	Yokota			1	1	1	0	1 Tng Flt
Attack aircraft and primary crews possessed.				71	43	69	35	
Available				69*	41	57	23	*2Acft TDY SEAsi. Total includes a/c in Korea & on tng flts.
82 FIS	Naha	F-102	C-1	25	23	29	29	
15 TRS	Kadena	RF-4C	C-2	14	10	19	18	
TOTAL AVAILABLE				108	74	105	70	

c. C-Ratings Defined: The rating is based on the availability of equipment, personnel, supporting resources, status of training and an overall personnel evaluation by the major air commander.

AIRCRAFT CRITERIA

C-1, Fully Combat Ready

1. At least 90% of authorized personnel are assigned.
2. At least 85% of authorized aircraft are possessed.
3. At least 71% of authorized aircraft are combat ready.
4. At least 85% of authorized aircrews are combat ready.

C-2, Combat Ready

1. At least 80% of authorized personnel are assigned.
2. At least 75% of authorized aircraft are possessed.
3. At least 51% of authorized aircraft are combat ready.
4. At least 70% of authorized aircrews are combat ready.

C-3, Marginally Combat Ready

1. At least 70% of authorized personnel are assigned.
2. At least 55% of authorized aircraft are possessed.
3. At least 40% of authorized aircraft are combat ready.
4. At least 55% of authorized aircrews are combat ready.

C-4, Not Combat Ready - A very low degree of effectiveness. The unit is incapable of performing its primary mission. Extreme deficiencies exist in personnel, facilities, equipment, training, etc. Aircraft and aircrew percentages are lower than those prescribed for C-3. Rating may be used to describe units in the process of activation, inactivation, and major aircraft conversion.

d. Cause of C-4 Ratings:

- 35 TFS - Personnel and training - Short Combat Ready Crews
35% of training completed.
- 36 TFS - All measured areas - Personnel, Equipment, Training
8% of training completed
- 67 TFS - Unequipped
0% of training completed

80 TFS - All measured areas - Personnel, Equipment, Training
Conversion training not begun

356 TFS- Personnel & Training - Short Combat Ready Crews
83% of training completed

e. SIOP Combat Capable Crews - not included in OR column:

35/36 TFS	6	.	.
356 TFS	12		

During conversion training, emphasis was placed upon nuclear qualification for aircrews, aircraft maintenance and armament personnel. All personnel were in training status. Although commanders had authority to declare non-OR crews Combat Capable in an emergency, 5AF did not believe they had enough F-4 capable crews for employment in an air-to-air environment.

Available totals do not include supervisors and attached pilots

f. War Reserve Material Status (WRM) - 23 Jan 68:

Logistics Guidance authorizes 90 day pre-positioned WRM. Actual air-munitions stocks on hand by country were as follows:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>ON HAND (Tons)</u>	<u>90 DAY WRM (Tons)</u>
Korea	5,167	25,592
Japan	580	32,766
Okinawa	5,681	20,010


g. 5AF Air Munitions Status (KOREA):

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>REQUIREMENT</u>	<u>ON HAND</u> (15 Jan 68)
<u>General Purpose Bombs</u>		
MK 82, 500#	19,449	1,019
MK 84, 2000#	126	
M 117, 750#	16,330	4,904
<u>Special Purpose Bombs</u>		
CBU-1/7	461	1,646
CBU-2	272	
CBU-3	51	
CBU-12	45	
CBU-24/29	1,594	
CBU-28	750	
CBU-33	336	
CBU-34	689	
BLU-31(Bomb)	2,514	
BLU-31(Mine)	455	
<u>Fire Bombs</u>		
BLU-1/27	1,683	2,213
<u>Missiles</u>		
AIM-4A, Falcon	141	
AIM-4D, Falcon (F-102)	141	
AIM-4D1, Falcon (F-4)	(365)	
AIM-4F	108	

AIM-4G	108	
AIM-7E, Sparrow	708	
*AIM-9B, Sidewinder	(365)/295	49
AGM-12C, Bullpup	240	
AGM-45, Shrike	130	
<u>Flares</u>		
MK-24	25,000	1,028
<u>Rocket Motors</u>		
2.75" Rocket	43,740	12,442
<u>Aircraft Gun Ammo</u>		
20MM (M-61 Gun)	1,740,000	1,371,000
20MM (M-39 Gun)	0	978,000
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
MK 75 Kit	700	
POL		73% = 21.3 days

*NOTE: Launchers and adapter cables for the AIM-9 were not available at SIOP Forward Operating Locations (FOL). They are part of aircraft 781 equipment maintained at Main Support Bases (MSB) in Japan. There were no SUU-16/23 gun pods or AIM-7 missiles available within 5AF.

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NAVY/MARINE CORPS - AIR POSTURE - 23 Jan 68

REFERENCE

BACKUP TAB

Chairman's Memorandum (CM-2948-68) T

AFCHO Historical Study File 2

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7. NAVY/MARINE CORPS - AIR POSTURE - 23 JAN 1968


a. Land Based:

Iwakuni MCAS
17 F-4B/C
20 A-4E


b. At Sea:

CVAN Enterprise
24 F-4B
23 A-4F
12 A-6A

(1) The exact distance from the Enterprise to the incident cannot be established. When queried for the Enterprise position by Mr. Walt Rostov, Special Assistant to the President, CINCPAC Headquarters responded --- "that it was too far away to assist." Various CINCPAC messages have placed the Enterprise 400 to 600 miles south of Wonsan. Capt Everett, COMNAVFORJAPAN N-3, in recent testimony before the Pueblo Board of Inquiry, stated that the Enterprise sailed the morning of the 23rd from Sasebo, Japan, and was approximately 100 mi south of Sasebo at the time of the incident. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum for the President (CM-2948-68) placed it 470 N.M. from the Pueblo. This distance was also used in material prepared by DOD General Counsel for use by the Secretary of Defense in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee. It is concluded then, that 470 NM is the most probable distance, and equates to approximately 1:00 hour flying time for Enterprise aircraft.



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REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCES (ROKAF)
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - 23 JAN 1968

Source: AFNIE

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
8. REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCES (ROKAF)
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - 23 JAN 1968

<u>SQUADRONS</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT</u>
2 Fighter Interceptor	F-86D	31 *
*5 Tactical Fighter	F-86F	114
**3 Tactical Fighter	F-5	34
1 Tactical Recce	RF-86F	10
Total		189

NOTE: * 1 F-86F Squadron assigned mission is
advanced flying Training

** 1 F-5 Squadron not Combat Ready

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NORTH KOREAN AIR ORDER OF BATTLE

Source: AFNIE

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9. NORTH KOREAN AIR ORDER OF BATTLE

a. The North Korean AOB consists of about 555 combat aircraft:

<u>TYPE</u> <u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>NO</u> <u>AIRCRAFT</u>
IL-28 Bombers	80
MIG 15/17	407
MIG 19	7
MIG 21	27
MIG 19/21	34
Total	555


NOTE: Aircraft beddown by base is as shown on following page.

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13 Mar 68

NORTH KOREAN AIR ORDER OF BATTLE
(REVISED)

AS OF 12 MAR 68




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Source: AFNIN, 12 Mar 68

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NEA 11


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FIFTH AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT LOCATIONS/DISTANCE/TIME
STRIKE CAPABILITY/COMBAT RADIUS/AIRCRAFT LOADOUT
TIMES

Source: Pilots Handbook
USAFEM 3-1



a. Distance from strike aircraft location to scene of the incident with recovery at Osan:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>A/C TYPE</u>	<u>DISTANCE TO PUEBLO REC OSAN</u>	<u>TIME TO PUEBLO</u>	<u>DIRECT STRIKE CAPABILITY</u>
Osan	3 USAF F-4C (SIOP)	214/428	:28	Yes
Kunsan	4 USAF F-4C (SIOP)	266/480	:34	Yes
Iwakuni	37 USMC F-4/A-4	382/596	:47/:58	Yes
USS Entpr	59 USN F-4/A-4/A-6	470/684	1:00/1:11 /1:10	Yes
Yokota	26 USAF F-4/F-105	587/801	1:12/1:09	Yes*
Misawa	12 USAF F-4	623/837	1:15	Yes*
Okinawa	24 USAF F-105	806/1020	1:45	Yes*
	25 USAF F-102	806/1020	1:45	No

* Additional fuel tank would be required.

b. Combat Radius:

<u>ACFT</u>	<u>FUEL</u>	<u>MUNITIONS</u>	<u>COMBAT RADIUS</u>
F-4	2X370's	6 MK 82	340 NM
F-4	2X370's + C	6 MK 82	520 NM
F-105	2X450's	6 MK+ M-61	400 NM
F-105	2X450's + C	M-61	700 NM
F-102	Internal only	6 AIM 4/26 + 12 RX	350 NM

<u>ACFT</u>	<u>FUEL</u>	<u>MUNITIONS</u>	<u>COMBAT RADIUS</u>
F-102	2X230's	6 AIM 4/26 +12 RX	450 NM
A-4E	2X300's	6 MK 82 + 2 Cannons	600 NM
A-6A	2X300's	3 MK 84.	900 NM

c. Attack Capability:

By recovering at Osan, the Okinawa based training configured F-105 aircraft (2X450 tanks) could not have accomplished a direct strike carrying only the M-61 gun and training ammunition. By uploading a centerline fuel tank, F-105 aircraft could have accomplished a direct strike recovering at Osan. If combat ready crews had been available a direct strike and Osan recovery could have been accomplished by F-4 aircraft from Yokota; however uploading additional centerline fuel tanks would have been required.

USN and USMC F-4, A-4 and A-6 aircraft from the USS Enterprise and/or Iwakuni could accomplish a direct strike and Osan recovery.

d. F-4 Loadout Time Requirements:

USAF strike aircraft could not be loaded with weapons and additional fuel tanks, and respond to the scene of the incident before the Pueblo would be within the three mile limit or darkness would occur. (Sunset 0841Z (1741I); twilight 12"; last light 0853Z (1753I)) The following chart indicates the normal time to load the F-4 aircraft with non-nuclear weapons.

F-4 NON-NUCLEAR LOADOUT TIMES

<u>CONFIG</u>	<u>WPNS SYSTEM CHECK-OUT</u>	<u>PYLON INST</u>	<u>INSTALL REFUEL TANK</u>	<u>LOAD MUNI-TIONS</u>	<u>START TAXI T.O.</u>	<u>TOTAL TIME</u>	<u>LOAD</u>
Non-Nuclear	0:30	1:30	0:45	1:10	0:15	4:10	6 GP Bombs or 6 LAU 30 or 4 Fire bombs or 6 CBU 24/29

CONFIG	WPNS	PYLON	INSTALL	LOAD	START	TOTAL	LOAD
	SYSTEM		REFUEL	MUNIO	TAXI		
	CHECK-	INST	TANK	TIONS	T.O.	TIME	
	OUT						
Air	0:35	1+00	0:45	1:00	0:15	3:35	4-AIM-9
Defense							
or							
Escort							

SOURCE: USAFEM 3-1, 15 March 1968. (Times are based on USAF F-4 wing averages).

NOTE: This data represents the average loadout time required using qualified load teams and weapon release crews with operational ready aircraft in position for loading with two 370 gallon fuel tanks installed. It assumes the munitions are already built up with bomb fins, boosters installed and rockets assembled in the launchers. Load out times will increase for any decreased capability. If munitions are in dead storage add the following generation times: GP bombs (20) - 3:12; LAU-3A Rocket Launchers (18) - 6:05; BLU Firebombs (8) - 4:17; AIM-9 missiles (12) - 4:29. If nuclear weapons are loaded, add :20 to download weapon.


e. F-105 Loadout Time Requirements:

CONFIG	INSTALL	CHECK/	CHECK/	LOAD	START	TOTAL	LOAD
	REFUEL	LOAD	LOAD	M-61	TAXI		
	TANK	CL	PYLONS	AMMO	T.O.	TIME	
Non				:20	:15	2:35	6-GP bombs
Nuclear		2:00					500/ 750#
	:45		1:30	:20	:15	2:50	2 LAU-3A
Air					:15	1:25	4 AIM-9
Defense	:45		1:10				
or							
Escort							

Source: TACM 136-1 plus TAC (DMAS) load standardization team.

NOTE: This assumes the aircraft are already loaded with two full 450 gallon fuel tanks. See note under F-4 loadout times for additional facts.

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CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS

REFERENCES

BACKUP TAB

CNFJ Msgs - Time/Events	K
NFLO/5AF Statements	L
5AF Msg - SITREP	M
Msg McKee to Ryan	Mc
Pueblo Msg Sequence	Mc
Msg - Ryan/McConnell	N
NMCC Data Base Books	AFSSO
Resume of 5AF Msg Traffic	File 3
AFCHO - Historical Study	File 2
Navy Report to Pike Committee - Notification Times	W

NAVY REPORT TO PIKE COMMITTEE

On 27 Feb 69, Navy was directed to provide the Pike Committee with a report of communications handling of the Pueblo OPREP Pinnacle #1 (230352Z) and #2 (230415Z). In this report they identified first notification of incident to 5AF as 0435Z (1335I) by phone call from CNFJ. They identified message receipt time at 5AF as 0600Z for Pinnacle #1 (by DCS common user net), and 0600Z for Pinnacle #2. Actual receipt time at 5AF was 0515Z for Pinnacle #1 and 0523Z for Pinnacle #2.

Navy agreed to caveat phone notification with a footnote to read, "Call to 5AF initiated approximately 0435Z and completed approximately 0450Z."

Subsequently agreed to correct message receipt times to show 0515Z and 0523Z.

(See BACKUP W)

11. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS

ZULU 23/0435

23/1335I

A difference of approximately twenty minutes exists between CNFJ construction of the initial telephone notification time, and 5AF construction of that time. In response to a request from COMUSJAPAN to reconcile the difference, CNFJ supported his original timing construction by relating the time of the first call to the time of subsequent calls to the 7th Fleet Liaison Officer (NFLO) at 5AF. The NFLO does not corroborate the time sequence construction of CNFJ, and in a formal statement of exception to the Commander 5AF, he denies receiving any call from N-3 as alleged by CNFJ, and confirms 5AF construction of the notification time.

The difference is not significant in terms of aid to the Pueblo. The maximum distance of the ship from the NK coast was never over 20-25 miles (Breeches Bouy - SITREP #9), and he had been following the sub-chaser toward Wonsan for over an hour (from 0428Z until 0532Z (1432I) when he sent his last message and was boarded. At the time the Commander 5AF notified CINCPACAF (0546-1446I) that he had alerted fighter units to prepare for deployment, a NK pilot was at the helm of the Pueblo and they were proceeding at flank speed (12½ knots) toward Wonsan.

Detailed reconstruction of the CNFJ notification to 5AF is presented for background use as required.

CNFJ POSITION

5AF POSITION

0430Z (1330I)

1350I (Approx)

Talk Quick log entry - call to 5AF by Duty Officer (LCdr Wilson) requesting immediate assistance. CNFJ Chief of Staff notified of Pueblo distress while receiving a (10 minute) call at 1330I. CoS directed N-3 (Capt Everett) to notify 5AF and "Push the Button for contingency action N-3 advised call already initiated.

Not so. Call had no precedence; stated no urgency. No message relayed to command center except a request for Lt Col Dugan. Dugan's office was notified. Time was not recorded due to nature of call. Dugan was not on station - call accepted by Maj Priest. Call stated ICHTYHIC operations under attack and requesting assistance.

11. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS

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Estimates call completed
at 1335I and no later than
1340I.

(Note: Previous ops supported
by 5AF sailed under the code-
word CLICKBEETLE. Planning for
Pueblo ops was under codeword
PINKROOT. SAILORD for Pueblo
specified ICHTHYIC). Maj Priest
was not knowledgeable of the
codeword and consulted the NFLO.
Maj Priest estimated the time
of call at 1400I plus or minus
15 minutes. NFLO estimates call
completed between 1345I and
1355I

0450Z (1350I)

N-3 made unclassified call
to 5AF NFLO to obtain
information on action being
taken by 5AF. Call not
logged.

1410I

NFLO denies any call from N-3
at any time, but in conjunc-
tion with Major McQuade, estab-
lishes this call at about 1410I
- Major McQuade received the
call from N-3. He established
the time at 1413I because he had
N-3 standby while he checked for
NFLO and relayed the information
to the Command Section. The
Command Section duty officer (Lt
Col Pix) was called into Gen
McKee's office while McQuade was
relaying the N-3 message. NFLO
supports the time of the call
at 1410-1413 because he was in
Gen McKee's office at that time
to relay the first telephone
message received by Maj Priest.
Maj McQuade went back to phone
and told N-3 that NFLO was in Gen
McKee's office.

23/0457Z (1357I)

1357I

5AF received garbled copy of
DIRNSA relay of CNFJ's 0436Z
(1336I) first critic flash.

0507 (1407I)

1407I

Received DIRNSA relay of CNFJ's second critic. DTG 23/0445Z (1345I). This was message handed to Gen McKee by NFLO and others at 1415I. It had been passed to them in hallway (1409-1411I) just as they were entering Gen McKee's office.

0508Z (1408I)

1408I

Duty Officer (LCdr Wilson) made his second call to Major Priest to inquire of action taken. Call turned over to NFLO who confirmed 1350I telecon with N-3 and suggested CNFJ confirm the telecon by message.

NFLO confirmed call at 1408I (just before entering Gen McKee's office) with CNFJ Duty Officer. He denies confirming (1350) telecon with N-3 but did confirm knowledge of call to Major Priest at 1350I.

0515Z (1415I)

1415I

Commander 5AF advised of Pueblo problem based on CNFJ telephone call and DIRNSA relay of CNFJ's second CRITIC message.

0520Z (1420I)

1420I

Commander 5AF called PACAF and asked for the CINC on a secure line.

0525Z (1425I)

1425I

Commander 5AF while awaiting CINCPACAF to reach secure telephone called 18 TFW at Kadana and directed they prepare for deployment to Osan.

0530Z (1430I)

5AF advised CNFJ by phone -
no aircraft on strip alert -
estimated 2-3 hours delay in
launching aircraft.

1420I - 1425I

NFLO called CNFJ N-3 at about
1420-1425I to advise him of
efforts being made by 5AF. He
advised that no action on scene
could be effected in less than
about three hours. CNFJ N-3 asked
about 5AF's response from alert
posture. NFLO informed him that
there was no alert posture at
5AF for Pueblo's operation because
CNFJ had not asked for any kind
of alert posture whatsoever.
N-3's response appeared to NFLO
to be one of surprise at this
statement.

In summary, the most probable sequence of the notification
process was this:

1330 - 1355I

First telecon initiated and completed between
CNFJ Duty Officer and Maj Priest. (It cannot
be positively determined when the call was
initiated; but strong evidence exists that it
was not completed before 1350-1355I).

1357I

5AF received CNFJ's 1st critic.

1407I

5AF received CNFJ's 2nd critic.

1408I

CNFJ Duty Officer called 5AF NFLO (2nd telecon)

1410 - 1413I

CNFJ N-3 called for NFLO but talked with
Major McQuade (3rd telecon)

1415I

Commander 5AF notified.

1420I

Call initiated to CINCPACAF

1425I

18TFW alerted for deployment

1425 - 1430I

NFLO notified CNFJ no aircraft on strip alert-
and no action on the scene could be effected
in less than about three hours (4th telecon).

KEY CHRONOLOGY (Continued)

ZULU 23/0532 23/1432I

Pueblo boarded and NK pilot put at helm. Pueblo sent last message.

ZULU 23/0546 23/1446I

Commander 5AF and CINCPACAF (KY-3) discussed attack on Pueblo. Commander 5AF advised 18 TFW alerted for deployment to Osan. CINCPACAF approved. 5AF estimated that 10-12 aircraft would be in place within 4-6 hours.

ZULU 23/0548 23/1448I

Commander 5AF directed 18TFW to deploy max number F-105s to Osan and Kunsan.

ZULU 23/0600 23/1500I

PACAF advised CINCPAC that 18TFW is deploying all available F-105s from Okinawa to Osan and Kunsan.

ZULU 23/0606 23/1506I

Commander 7th Fleet directed diversion of Enterprise and support ships.

ZULU 23/0620 23/1520I

PACAF called Commander 5AF and confirmed that 5AF had received Navy request for assistance. Commander 5AF stated that he had no gun pods but only air-to-surface rockets in Korea with which to arm F-4s. He advised he was deploying a full squadron of F-105s from Kadena to Osan ASAP. However, they could not get to the scene before dark. He advised that the ship was being towed (sic) into port and estimated arrival at Wonson at 1700I (0800Z). He advised he could download 5 F-4s (nuclear alert) in Korea and send them out as show of force. However, a cover of MIG aircraft was over the ships and the F-4s had no air-to air capability. Also, the F-105s at Yokota could not

get there before darkness: Flight time 1 plus 45, darkness in 1 plus 30, ship arrival in Wonsan 1 plus 45. PACAF asked if he could download the F-4s and get them on scene in time. Commander 5AF advised it was the only chance, however, he had no MERS, Pylons, Rails or Gun Pods, but had 48 ATM 9's. PACAF instructed Commander 5AF to check availability of rails and if he had them, to download the F-4s, load them with ATM 9's and send them into the area, but not to send them unarmed. PACOM informed that CINCPACAF had given authority to attack escorting ships up to a point 3nm off the coast if necessary to prevent the Pueblo from being forced into Port. Authority would be confirmed with CINCPAC and unless notified otherwise, they had authority to attack. Cmdr 5AF began generation of 347 and 475 TFW at MOB.

ZULU 23/0630

23/1530I

PACAF advised CINCPAC that authority to attack NKN PT boats had been delegated to 5AF.

ZULU 23/0711

23/1611I

Twelve tactical fighters deployed from Okinawa in increments of two. The first two F-105s launched at 23/0711Z and arrived Osan at 23/0835Z (23/1735 Korean time). Departures continued through 1425Z. Six aircraft were in place at Osan at 0943Z, and the final increment at 1555Z. NOTE: The 18TFW launched its first aircraft 1 hour and 46 minutes after being alerted (1 hour and 23 minutes after the execution order). This involved diverting aircraft and crews from trng status, servicing aircraft, and briefing aircrews. Seven aircraft were recalled from flight; six were taxiing or otherwise preparing for a training mission.

ZULU 23/0722

23/1622I

PACAF queried 5AF on deployment and downloading status. Was advised that 6 F-105s were airborne. Also advised F-4s could be launched in 30 minutes, but Commander 5AF recommended no launch because of present MIG screen and potential force of 100 MIGs available elsewhere in N. Korea. PACAF concurred. Commander 5AF advised he was alerting all aircraft in Japan

for deployment if needed. He also advised he had instructed Commander 18TFW to commandeer C-130s in Okinawa to support fighter deployment. PACAF approved.

ZULU 23/0730 23/1630I

5AF directed launch of one C-130 ACRP with instructions to hold south of Wonsan area.

ZULU 23/0745 23/1645I

CINCPAC queried PACAF regarding preparation of Korea based F-4s on nuclear alert. PACAF advised that A/C could be airborne within 25 minutes, but without air-to-air capability. Because of the strong MIG activity in the Wonsan area, PACAF had withheld launch. CINCPAC replotted position of Pueblo and estimated ship in harbor at this time.

ZULU 23/0757 23/1657I

5AF estimated Pueblo was within 3 mile limit; no further action intended that night. Advised PACAF that 12 F-105s at Osan would be ready for launch at dawn. Plans underway to move F-4s to Itzuke and be armed for next day. NOTE: Sunset at Wonsan was 1741 local (0841Z) twilight is 12 minutes. Last target time (last light) 1753 local (0853Z).

ZULU 23/0812 23/1712I

PACAF directed 13AF to ship 38 SPARROW Missiles (AIM-7) from Clark to Itzuke.

ZULU 23/1029 23/1929I

CINCPAC message directed CINCPACAF to immediately position RF-4C aircraft in Korea prepared to recce Wonsan area when directed. At 23/1125Z 5AF directed to position 3 RF-4Cs and most qualified crews at Osan.

ZULU 23/1340

23/2240I

AFCP passed request from SECDEF as to number of USAF aircraft that could have responded to Pueblo at 1 + 45 and 3 + 00. Answer given: 1 + 45 - Zero aircraft; 3 + 00 - 4 F-4s with no air-to-air capability.

ZULU 23/1354

23/2254I

CINCPAC suspended movement of F-4s to Itazuke.

ZULU 23/1400

23/2300I

3 RF-4Cs departed Kadena ETA Osan 23/1530Z.

ZULU 23/1500

24/0000I

By the end of the day, 5AF had 11 F-105s and 3 F-4Cs at Osan and 5 F-4Cs at Kunsan. The fifth F-4C at Kunsan was a training flight out of Misawa/Yokota. (The 12th F-105 arrived 23/1555Z).

ZULU 23/1645

24/0145I

CINCPAC reported NMCC advised no show of force desired and no surface or air vessels to enter Pueblo incident area for recce or other reasons until so instructed. This confirmed by CINCPAC message at 23/0035Z.

ZULU 23/1830

24/0330I

PACAF suspended all movement of 5AF fighters UFN.

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PLANS FOR RECOVERY OR DESTRUCT - PUEBLO/CREW

REFERENCE

BACKUP TAB

Courses of Action (JCS 1776/768-2)
(JCSM-50-69)

O

JCS Msg - Operating Instructions

P

12. PLANS FOR RECOVERY OR DESTRUCT - PUEBLO/CREW

a. JCS Actions: After seizure of the Pueblo, though the "range of actions possible" to recover the Pueblo and crew was not great," the JCS examined many courses of action such as mining -- possibly in conjunction with air strikes -- the waters of Wonsan harbor. Shortly after the seizure, however, diplomatic actions were in progress and higher authority did not desire to hamper these efforts by facing the North Koreans and Soviets with an ultimatum or with military actions which could be construed as a prelude to an ultimatum.

(1) One JCS paper pertaining to alternative courses of action regarding the Korean situation was noted only (JCS 1776/768-2). When it is determined that diplomatic actions will not gain the return of the crew, the paper concluded:

- That military actions against NK may be required to demonstrate US resolve and intent to protect its national interests and to reaffirm the necessity for all nations to abide by the international laws which govern the use of the high seas.
- That before commencing military actions against NK, the US must take actions to strengthen the US/ROK posture in the Korean area.

Subsequently, the US would take an increasingly demanding position leading to and including an ultimatum to NK. If NK had not returned the crew by the end of three weeks from the issuance of the ultimatum, a North Korean submarine would be destroyed by a US submarine. Additionally, the US would be prepared to destroy additional North Korean ships or other military actions as required.

(2) Since the return of the Pueblo crew to U.S. custody on 23 December 1968, a second JCS paper on Courses

of Action concerning the Pueblo has been worked (JCSM-50-69). With the return of the crew the consideration for personnel safety has been removed. The continued retention of a commissioned ship of the U.S. Navy severely damages the prestige of the U.S. Accordingly, the U.S. should consider courses of action to cause North Korea to release the Pueblo. The following actions, in sequence, appear to provide, initially, the most practicable approach for securing the release of the ship:

- Demand return privately at Panmunjom. Emphasize that NK territorial waters were not violated and present evidence of maltreatment of prisoners.
- If private demands fail, release publicly.
- Present U.S. position before a UN forum, requesting diplomatic support.
- Initiate action in an appropriate international adjudicatory body.
- Imply that NK can expect her shared use of the high seas to be far more limited.

If, after a reasonable time, the U.S. has exhausted all peaceful means, further action should be taken: i.e. seizure of a North Korean ship; destroy the Pueblo; and destruction or seizure of a major North Korean naval unit or attack of other appropriate targets.

b. CINCPAC/Service Component Plans:

(1) After seizure of the Pueblo, the Enterprise which had just departed Sasebo, Japan, enroute to SEAsia was ordered to change course for the Sea of Japan.

(2) Some 15 hours after the Pueblo was seized, CINCPACFLT directed that a destroyer be positioned beyond the 12-mile limit off Wonsan, be provided air cover, "as appropriate and feasible" and be prepared to engage in operations which may include towing the Pueblo and/or retrieval of Pueblo crew. (In view of a JCS directive to

to all commanders on 23 Jan --"to initiate no show of force along the Korean DMZ, or elsewhere adjacent to North Korea," -- the plan to station a destroyer off Wonsan was abandoned).

(3) On 26 Jan 68, CINCPAC recommended employment of the USS Banner with surface escort in the area where the Pueblo was seized. During daylight hours, combat air and anti-PT boat patrols would be conducted. CINCPACAF directed publication of a plan which would provide 12 F-105s on 15-minute ground alert and backed up by F-4s. (This plan was not implemented for same reason as above.)

(4) On 28 Jan 68, CINCPAC warned that contemplated Banner operations could be considered by NK as threatening and provocative and urged adding a second large aircraft carrier to the naval task group in Sea of Japan. The Ranger was subsequently added.

(5) CINCPAC proposed an immediate air mobility exercise involving a brigade of the 82 ABN Div, or a large reconnaissance party to Korea. This exercise was considered by the JCS, but decided against at that time.


(6) On 29 Jan 68, CINCPAC issued a plan designated "OPERATION FORMATION STAR." This plan formally established Task Gp 70.6 which included the carrier Enterprise and 5 escorts. The Gp was tasked to (1) Be prepared to assume custody of and to tow the Pueblo from NK waters; (2) Assume custody of the Pueblo crew; (3) Conduct aerial recce of Wonsan harbor, and take such offensive action as directed. Offensive action envisaged was "Quick Reaction" non-nuclear strike against key military targets in North, i.e., Wonsan AF, Munpyong-ni Naval Base, and Myang-do Submarine Base. Carrier-based Navy planes or AF Tactical fighters or a combination of both would be used.

(7) On 29 Jan 68, CINCPAC requested his component commanders to prepare a joint plan for coordinated strikes employing non-nuclear munitions against all North Korean airfields with the objective of destroying the NK AOB. The plan, "FRESH STORM," as modified contains 5 options, i.e.,

U.S. Tactical Forces only and combinations of U.S. forces assisted by B-52s and ROKAF.

(8) CINCPAC OPLAN "FREEDOM DROP" provides pre-coordinated options for selective use of nuclear weapons against NK short of implementation of CINCPAC OPLAN 27. Plan can be implemented in lieu of or subsequent to "FRESH STORM." "FREEDOM DROP" envisages 3 separate applications of nuclear intensity ranging from punitive actions to actions designed to diminish greatly the overall North Korean offensive capability. Forces include TAC fighters, carrier-based fighters, Sargeant missiles and Honest John rockets.

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FORCE BUILDUP

REFERENCES

BACKUP TAB

PACAF Deployment Summary

Q

PACAF Msg - Pueblo Incident

R

JCS Msg - Position on Force
Drawdown

S

13. FORCE BUILDUP

DATE/TIME
EVENT

Zulu 23/0500

23/1400I

At the hour of the Pueblo seizure, the forces immediately available to 5AF were deployed as follows: *

<u>KOREA</u>	<u>OKINAWA</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>
Osan 3 F-4C (2 SIOP, 1 Spare)	Kadena 24 F-105 (4 SIOP)	Yokota 20 F-4C* 6 F-105**
Kunsan 4 F-4C (2 SIOP, 1 Spare, 1 Tng)	Naha 14 RF-4C 25 F-102 (8 Alert)	Misawa 12 F-4C *1 Tng flt fm Misawa **2 Add. a/c TDY SEAsia

ZULU 23/1500

23/2400I

By midnight (Korea) of the 23rd, 11 F-105s (Kadena) and 1 F-4C (from Japan) had augmented the Korean force. (The twelfth Kadena F-105 arrived at 24/0055I and 3 RF-4Cs from Kadena arrived at about the same time). At 23/1830Z (24/0330I), PACAF suspended all movement of 5AF fighters UFN.

ZULU 27/1500

27/2400I

On the 27th, additional F-4Cs were deployed from Japan to Kunsan to support special recon operations, and all F-4s in Korea were consolidated at Kunsan. This completed unilateral deployments by 5AF and provided this status:

<u>KOREA</u>	<u>OKINAWA</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>
Osan 12 F-105 3 RF-4C	12 F-105 11 RF-4C	8 F-105 19 RF-4C
Kunsan 20 F-4C	25 F-102	

Jan 27/2400 - Feb 11/2400 Korea

The following forces were added to PACAF resources through "COMBAT FOX" and other deployments from CONUS.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>TMS</u>	<u>To</u>
4 TFS	Seymour Johnson	72 F-4D	Kunsan
4537	Nellis	6 F-105 (WW)	Osan
19 TEW	Shaw	6 EB-66	Osan
355 TFW	Myrtle Beach	18 F-100	Phu Cat SVN
91 BW	Glasgow	15 B-52	Kadena
318 FIS	McCord	18 F-106	Naha

Additional deployment of units within PACAF was as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>TMS</u>	<u>To</u>
12 TFS	Kadena	12 F-105	Osan
80 TFS	Yokota	4 F-105	Osan
15 TRS	Kadena	11 RF-4C	Osan
64 FIS	Clark	13 F-102	Kimpo
82 FIS	Naha	25 F-102	Suwon
558 TFS	Cam Ranh Bay	18 F-4C	Kunsan

Status upon completion of deployments was:

<u>Korea</u>	<u>Okinawa</u>	<u>Japan</u>
Osan 34 F-105	Kadena 15 B-52	Yokota 22 F-4C
*5 EB-66	6 F-105	
14 RF-4C	2 RF-4C	
Kunsan 18 F-4C	Naha 1 F-102	Misawa 17 F-4C
72 F-4D	18 F-106**	
Kimpo 13 F-102		
Suwon 25 F-102		
181	42	39

*1 AOCPC Anderson

**Redeployed to Osan on 18 Feb

a. ALERT POSTURE IN KOREA: As aircraft arrived in Korea, the following alert posture was established:

BASE	TMS	SIOP	5 Min	15 Min	30 Min	1 Hr
Osan	F-105	*2		12 AG		13 AG
Kunsan	F-4D			8 AA	47 AA/ AG	
	F-4C	*2			14 AA	
Suwon	F-102		4	8	11	
Kimpo	F-102		4	5		

NOTE: * SIOP alert posture re-established at Osan by 18 TFW at 31 2300Z Jan 68. SIOP alert posture re-established at Kunsan by 475 TFW at same time. SIOP alert posture (4 a/c) at Kadena was degraded at approximately 0400Z, 28 Jan 68 and has not been re-established.

b. REVISED POSTURE IN KOREA:

(1) On 22 April 1968, the JCS forwarded to SECDEF (JCS 2339/273-2) a memorandum which contained a proposed USAF posture for Korea. This posture provided for 151 fighter/interceptor aircraft in Korea and tactical recon and tactical electronic warfare support (TEWS) aircraft in Japan in support of the Korea posture.

(2) On 22 May 1968 the Dep SECDEF, in a memorandum for the Chairman of the JCS, approved the revised US Air Force air posture in Korea. The conversion to reach this posture continued through July 1968 and was accomplished as shown below:

	REVISED USAF FORCES IN KOREA		Present
	Feb 68	Jul 68	
F-4D (TDY-CONUS)	-----72 UE-----	(CONUS)	
F-4C (TDY-SVN)	-----18 UE-----	(PCS-JAPAN)	
F-105 (TDY-WESTPAC)	-----24 UE-----	(WESTPAC)	
EF-105F (TDY- CONUS)	----- 6 UE-----		
F-106 (TDY-CONUS)	-----18 UE-----		
F-102 (TDY-WESTPAC)	-----13 UE-----		
F-105C (PCS-CONUS)		-----30 UE-----	
F-4C/F-105 (TDY-WESTPAC)		-----64 UE-----	
TOTAL AIRCRAFT		151	

c. Actual Beddown of TAC Ftr/Recon/Interceptor Aircraft in Korea/Japan/Okinawa - 30 June 68: (As of this date the reposturing actions were still ongoing)

KOREA

<u>Kunsan</u>	<u>Kwangju</u>	<u>Osan</u>	<u>Suwon</u>	<u>Taegu</u>
F-4C 7	F-4D 18	F-4C 17	F-102 13	F-4C 16
F-4D 46		F-105 6		
F-100 25		F-106 17		
TOTAL 78	TOTAL 18	TOTAL 40	TOTAL 13	TOTAL 16

JAPAN/OKINAWA

<u>Yokota</u>	<u>Misawa</u>	<u>Itazuke</u>	<u>Kadena</u>	<u>Naha</u>
F-4C 28	F-4C 28	EB-66 4	F-105 19	F-102 17
		RF-4C 14	RF-4C 4	F-106 1
TOTAL 28	TOTAL 28	TOTAL 18*	TOTAL 23	TOTAL 18

NOTE: * These aircraft in support of Korean buildup and were initially deployed to Korea. RF-4Cs subsequently replaced by ANG RF-101s on Rote from CONUS.

d. Alert Posture In Korea/Okinawa - 30 June 68:

<u>BASE</u>	<u>TMS</u>	<u>SIOP</u>	<u>5 MIN</u>	<u>15 MIN</u>	<u>30 MIN</u>	<u>1 HR</u>
Osan	F-4C	8				
Kunsan	F-4C	5				
	F-4D			4 AG		
	F-100C			2 AG		
Kwang-ju	F-4D			4 AG		
Taegu	F-4C			4 AG		
Naha	F-102		2 AA		6 AA	7 AA
Suwon	F-102		4 AA		9 AA	
Osan	F-106		4 AA		11 AA	

NOTE: See next page for normal AG/AA loads.

Normal AG/AA Loads

	<u>AG</u>	<u>AA</u>
F-105	1000Rd 20mm HEI 6XMK-117 (750#)	
F-4	2XAIM-9 8XMK-117	4XAIM-9 4XAIM-7
F-102		5XAIM-4 (A+D)
F-106		4XAIM-4 (F+C)

c. Status of USAF Forces
As of 26 Feb 1969

KOREA

<u>Location</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>FW/PCS</u>	<u>MR/Type</u>	<u>C-Rating</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>
Kumoh	127 TFS	PCS	21/F-100	C-2	Equipment
	186 TFS	PCS	21/F-100	C-2	Equipment
	306 TFS	TDY	5/F-4C	C-4	Equip/Supp
	391 TFS	TDY	2/F-4C	C-3	Trng
Osan	71 TFS	TDY	14/F-100	C-1	
	35 TFS	TDY	4/F-4C	C-4	Equip
	38 TFS	TDY	10/F-4C	C-3	Equip
	80 TFS	TDY	7/F-4C	C-2	Equip
Sturon	82 FIS	TDY	12/F-102	C-2	Pers
Taegu	67 TFS	TDY	4/F-4C	C-3	Equip
	356 TFS	TDY	1/F-4C	C-4	Equip/Supp
	391 TFS	TDY	10/F-4C	C-3	Trng
Wonsu	12 TFS	TDY	11/F-105	C-4	Trng
90 Pers	26 Intcps				

OKINAWA

Naha	71 FIS	TDY	8/F-100	C-1	
	82 FIS	PCS	17/F-102	C-2	Pers
	21 TFS	PCS	10/C-130	C-2	Trng
	35 TFS	PCS	9/C-130	C-2	Equip
	41 TFS	PCS	7/C-130	C-2	Equip
	817 TFS	PCS	9/C-130	C-2	Equip
Kadena	12 TFS	PCS	11/F-105	C-4	Trng
	15 TRS	PCS	15/RF-4	C-3	Pers
	4133 BSMW	TDY	21/B-52	C-1	
	4152 STRW	TDY	35/KC-135	C-1	
	343 SRS	TDY	1/AC135	C-1	
	82 SRS	PCS	6/AC-135	C-1	
	99/1 SRS	TDY	3/SR-71	C-1	
	349 SRS	TDY	1/U-2	C-1	
	815 TAS	TDY	1/C-130	C-3	Trng
11 Pers, 26 Recce, 25 Intcps, 36 airlift					

<u>JAPAN</u>						
Tachikawa	22 FALS	TDY	14/C-124	C-1		
	815 TAs	PCS	10/C-130	C-3	Trng	
	346 TAs	TDY	10/C-130	C-1		
Itazuke	19 TEWS	PCS	4/EB66	C-2	Equip	
	165 TRS	TDY	19/RF-101	C-1		
Yokota	556 RCSR	PCS	3/EB57	C-1		
	35 TFS	PCS	8/F-4	C-4	Equip	
	36 TFS	PCS	5/F-4	C-3	Equip	
	80 TFS	PCS	8/F-4	C-2	Equip	
Misawa	67 TFS	PCS	9/F-4	C-3	Equip	
	356 TFS	PCS	2/F-4	C-4	Equip/Supp	
	391 TFS	PCS	4/F-4	C-3	Trng	
36 Ftr, 34 Airlift, 19 Recce, 7 EB						

Grand total

Tac Ftrs	143
Interceptors	51
Tac Recon	45
Airlift	70

f. Alert Posture in Korea/Okinawa - 27 February 1969:

Base	TMS	STOP	5 Min	15 Min	30 Min	1 Hr
Osan	F-4C	6				
	F-4C				1*	
	F-106		4AA		6AA	
Kunsan	F-4C	8				
	F-100C			4AG**	4 AG **	
Suwon	F-102		4AA		4AA	
Taegu	F-4C				1*	
Naha	F-102		2AA		2AA	4AA

* Night Flare Alert

**Day Alert Only

- Aircraft have missile capability as follows:

	F-4C	F-105	F-100	F-102	F-106
AIM-4				X(A+D)	X(F+G)
AIM-7	X				
AIM-9	X	X	X		

NOTE: Normal AG/AA Loads

	AG	AA
F-105	1000rd 20mm HEI 6XMK-117 (750#)	
F-4	2XAIM-9 8XMK-117	4XAIM-9 4XAIM-7
F-102		5XAIM-4 (A+D)
F-106		4XAIM-4 (F+G)

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

REFERENCES

BACKUP TAB

CM-2948-68 to President

T

CM-3163-68 to SECDEF

U

CSAF Testimony

V

CNO Testimony

W

Senate Committee Visit to 5AF

XYZ

14. QUESTIONS/ANSWERS

The following questions/answers have been extracted from various documents, reports, committee hearings, etc, and provide a basis for further response as may be required.

a. In a chairman's memorandum for the President on 30 Jan 1968, the following answers were provided (CM-2948-68, 30 Jan 68).

Q-1. "What aircraft were available to provide help to the Pueblo?"

<u>Answer:</u> Osan	3 F-4C	Enterprise	24 F-4B
Kunsan	*3 F-4C		23 A-4F
Okinawa	+25 F-105		12 A-6A
Yokota	20 F-4C	Iwakuni	17 F-4B/C
	# 8 F-105		20 A-4E
Misawa	12 F-4C		

* Cmdr 5AF confirmed 1 additional F-4C at Kunsan

+ Cmdr 5AF confirmed 1 less F-105 at Okinawa

Later info revealed that 2 F-105s were TDY to SEAsia

Q-2. "Why was help not provided?"

Answer: Aircraft were not sent to help the Pueblo for the following reasons:

(1) The 6 US aircraft in Korea were on alert, armed with nuclear weapons, and could not have been downloaded and reloaded with non-nuclear armament in the time available to reach the Pueblo prior to darkness or her being towed into North Korean coastal waters. The aircraft, F-4Cs, had no armament with which to defend against MIG attack.

(2) The United States aircraft in Japan and Okinawa were not used because the scene of action was at such distance that they could only have responded by staging through Korea. Movement to Korea and arming there would not have permitted them to reach the scene of action in time. Twelve F-105 aircraft were sent to Korea but were not sent to help the Pueblo because they would have been too late.

(3) The situation at the scene of action was unfavorable to employment of aircraft. The weather was poor, 6000 ft broken, occasional overcast with lower scattered clouds at 3000 ft, with occasional snow showers and visibility 7 miles. MIG aircraft were reported to be above the Pueblo. The surface action occurred only 25 miles from a major North Korean airfield on

which were based 75 MIG aircraft. Lastly, the action occurred well within the North Korean air defense control net, so that their radar coverage and ground control of fighters would have been very effective even at low altitude.

(4) Were aircraft to have been used in such a situation, they would be required in numerical strength. Aircraft would be needed to "cap" the MIG base at Wonsan to "pin down" the MIGs. Additional fighter aircraft would be needed to protect the attack aircraft aiding the Pueblo from MIGs which might be airborne.

(5) From the time (1345 Korean time) the Pueblo requested assistance and while being towed one or more of the Korean boats was always near the Pueblo and Koreans were aboard the Pueblo. If friendly aircraft had been sent, and if they could have found the Pueblo, there is reasonable doubt that they would have been able to drive off the North Korean boats without sinking one or more with serious risk of sinking the Pueblo in the process.

(6) It is unlikely the mere presence of aircraft in support of the Pueblo would have caused the North Korean boats to have freed the Pueblo, since it must be assumed that the MIG aircraft would have been active in repelling the US aircraft.

b. In a chairman's memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on 29 March 1968, the following answers were prepared by a task group chaired by Brigadier General deSaussure (CM-3163-68, 29 Mar 68)

Q-1. "Regarding DIRNSA's message ADP 541, dated December 29, 1967, outlining DIRNSA's evaluation of the risk involved in the deployment of the Pueblo, what specific action was taken by the JCS and by CINCPAC to weigh DIRNSA's evaluation against the "minimal risk" evaluation in CINCPAC's request for permission to deploy the Pueblo? What were the factors that led to CINCPAC's "minimal risk" evaluation? What ship protective measures, if any, were developed as a result of the DIRNSA evaluation? Was the DIRNSA message passed to CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, Commander 5th AF, COMUSFK, COMNAVFORKOREA, or COMNAVFORJAPAN? If so, to whom and what action was taken?"

Answer: There was long precedent for the type of operation scheduled for the Pueblo. The USSR pioneered this type of operation using unescorted trawlers to collect intelligence in locations thousands of miles from any Soviet supporting forces. The operation is in accord with international law as

long as the ship remains in international waters. The ships are non-combatants and therefore less provocative. In 1967 the Banner, a sister ship of the Pueblo, performed a similar mission involving passage through the same waters off North Korea without a serious incident. Hijacking of a US naval vessel last occurred during the Civil War. The capability of the US to retaliate would tend to deter anyone from deliberately attacking a U.S. ship. Considering these factors a "minimal risk" evaluation was made. The DIRNSA message was reviewed in the JRC and passed to CINCPAC where, at staff level, it was determined that all the information in the message had already been considered and therefore no further action was taken.

Q-2. "I note that the Fifth Air Force OPLAN 307-67 was developed to provide protective air support for CLICKBEETLE operations, but it cited only the USS Banner by name. Did CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, COMUSFK, COMNAVFORJAPAN and the Commander, Fifth Air Force, believe that 307-67 was only applicable to USS Banner deployments, or did they consider the plan applicable for the protection of other CLICKBEETLE surface intelligence collection ships?"

Answer: The Fifth Air Force OORDER 307-67 was prepared for Banner's deployments and others which were similar in nature. The order was to be implemented only when specifically directed in response to a request for pre-planned support of a particular mission. No such request was made in the case of the Pueblo's deployment.

Q-3. "Since the Commander, Fifth Air Force was an information addressee on Pueblo deployment and mission messages, did he personally have knowledge of the Pueblo's operation? What did he or his staff feel was required in support of the Pueblo? Did he or his staff have enough information to plan for air support of the Pueblo? Did the Commander, Fifth Air Force, or his staff inquire as to whether Air Force support was required? Did the Commander, Fifth Air Force, or his staff believe that such support should be requested by the Navy? What were CINCPAC's specific orders or instructions to his component commanders, and other subordinate commanders, on providing protective arrangements for operations like the Pueblo's?"

Answer: CINCPAC had not issued specific instructions to his subordinate commanders concerning protective arrangements for operations like the Pueblo's. The practice had been

that these ships operated independently, with preplanned protection being provided on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the estimated risk. Since a "minimal risk" determination was made for this mission, it was not brought to the personal attention of the Commander, Fifth Air Force, and his staff did not address the question of whether air support should be provided. If air support had been requested, the information available to Fifth Air Force would have been adequate for air support plans.

Q-4. "Since COMNAVFORJAPAN was an action addressee on Pueblo deployment and mission messages, why did he or his superiors in the chain of command, such as CINCPACFLT and CINCPAC, not provide for ship protective measures as a contingency? Why did he or his superiors not check with Fifth Air Force or PACAF to see if the Air Force could provide protective air support?"

Answer. Ship protective measures and air support normally were not provided for operations like the Pueblo's and were considered unnecessary in this instance.

Q-5. "I am also concerned about a different aspect of the signal intercept missions conducted by the Navy. Under the current mode of operations the naval vessels conducting these missions are without integral self-protection to any significant degree. Further, they do not have an automatic or semi-automatic destruct capability of sensitive intelligence equipment, since apparently the view has been that the principle of freedom of the seas would provide sufficient security. On the other hand, the mission of the ships is such as to invite certain foreign powers to take some action against them because active intercept operations are being conducted. I would like your views as to whether such ships should be permitted to operate in the future, as they have in the past, as U.S. Naval vessels? If so, should they be provided a full measure of internal self-protection or external support? Alternatively, should their modus operandi be changed to provide non-military cover for their operations?"

Answer: I believe that such ships should be permitted to operate in the future as US Naval vessels as part of our intelligence collection effort. In the final analysis, intelligence gathering activities of this type cannot be masked sufficiently to preclude discovery of the true purpose regardless of whether the ship is a fishing trawler or a naval vessel

and regardless of whether there is non-military cover for the operations. As to internal protection for these ships, I believe that extensive arming would increase the likelihood of hostile action by an enemy. On the other hand, appropriate external support will have to be provided for future operations in high risk areas. However, I agree with the Secretary of Defense's testimony to the Congress that we cannot provide a "full measure" of support which will preclude all possibility of recurrence of an incident like the seizure of the Pueblo.

Q-6. "I would also appreciate your comments and recommendations as to what further specific improvements could be made to lessen the possibility of incidents similar to the Pueblo occurring in the future."

Answer: These missions should be continued and appropriate protection should be provided for operations in high risk areas. I agree with the words of the Secretary of Defense in his testimony to the Congress emphasizing the need for these missions as follows:

"Now, the last category (electronic collection platforms and equipment) I would say on the whole is the most important of the three, and from it we obtain an immense amount of information as to the military capabilities of our opponents, their possible strategy, their tactics, their operational tactics, and also their intentions. I cannot over-emphasize therefore, the importance of this third category, communications intelligence collection."

c. Before a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on 6 May 1968 during FY 69 appropriations hearings, the CSAF responded as follows to questions concerning the Pueblo.

Q-1. Senator Russell. "I didn't think the Air Force added a great deal of luster to its record in the Korean incident. How did you increase the range of our choices or accomplish anything at all in the Pueblo incidents?"

Answer: Mr Chairman, we sent 150 airplanes out there, 182 aircraft in five days to South Korea. As far as the Pueblo incident is concerned, the Air Force was not notified of the incident in sufficient time to take any action. There had

been no previous plans for the Air Force to be prepared to take any action. The ship was run up there under what was called minimal danger. In other words, they didn't think anything was going to happen to it. On a previous occasion when the Banner had been run up in North Korea on the west side of North Korea, the Air Force was asked to and did prepare aircraft on the alert to assist in relieving the Banner if it got into any trouble.

Q-2. Senator Russell. "I did not get your last sentence, preceding, into trouble"

Answer: I said if it ran into any trouble. We had aircraft on the alert to assist in relieving it if it did run into any trouble. The Banner did not run into any trouble. When this other ship was sent up to the east coast the Air Force was not asked to be prepared to do anything. We were not required to have aircraft on the alert. We were not even notified except informally that the Pueblo was going to be up there at that time. So we weren't prepared to do anything about it because we were not asked to. At the same time we were notified that it was up there, the enemy already had it, they had *boarded it and taken it in.

*By further assessment, it is now known that between 0418Z-0440Z (1318-1340I) the Pueblo was boxed in and brought under control and escorted toward Wonsan by NKN patrol craft. At 0532Z (1432I) the Pueblo sent its last message and was boarded. The Commander 5AF was notified at 0515Z (1415I).

Q-3. Senator Russell. "What is the truth about all this wide range of conflicting statements about the strength of the North Korean Air Force, and what is available on the field right near this port where the Pueblo was carried after it was surrendered?"

Answer: There were anywhere between 50 to 75 fighter MIG type aircraft and some TU-26 bombers.

Q-4. Senator Russell. "Does the Air Force have any plans on that, or has the Joint Chiefs worked on that any, General?"

Answer: Yes, sir, we have done considerable work on that. We have come up with several plans, Mr Chairman, not any of them that will get the people back. We have come up with plans

which could have been put into effect, still could be put into effect but it would not do any good about getting the people back. I am sure the people would be dead about the time the plan got implemented.

Q-5. Senator Russell. "I guess you would have to sink the ship too. You have no program to seize the ship or get it out of there?"

Answer: No, sir. It is being dismantled, probably.

Q-6. Senator Young. "What kind of read out equipment do they have and what do we have to encounteract in North Korea?"

Answer: They have the same type that they have in North Vietnam, actually. It is all Russian built radar. It is not nearly as thick as it is in North Vietnam. We successfully jammed the radars up there. So, I think we could jam the radars in North Korea. We jam them with pods that are put on every aircraft plus other aircraft that are specifically designed as jamming aircraft, the B-66s, which fly them along with the mission. We have been very successful in jamming the anti-aircraft radar controlled antiaircraft guns and their SAMs.

Q-7. Senator Young. "At the time the Pueblo was seized, though, you were not in a position to jam them at that time?"

Answer: We didn't have any equipment in South Korea at that time. We had four aircraft and they were loaded with nuclear weapons.

Q-8. Senator Thurmond. "If we were starting from scratch to send out a ship like the Pueblo and it was desired to give it protection what steps would you take to insure that a catastrophe would not happen to such a ship in the future?"

Answer: I don't think you can ever be sure that such a catastrophe will not happen.

Q-9. Senator Thurmond. "If they were attacked what could we do to prevent capture of the ship?"

Answer: In some places we escort the ship with destroyers. In other places we have aircraft on the alert available to come to their assistance, or when they are in distress. In some

places we can't have aircraft on the alert and some places we do not escort them, depending on what intelligence considers to be the right involved. Operating next to another country's shoreline where he has all of his power right there behind him and where you don't necessarily have very much power, normally not any to amount to anything, I don't know of any way that you could keep those catastrophes from occurring, certainly such a catastrophe could happen again, although we can arm the ship and we can make them faster, so that they can get out of the way. But they still could not stand up against air attack.

Q-10. Senator Thurmond. "Did we have ships within reasonable distance, either Navy, Marine or Air Force, that could have gone to the defense of the Pueblo and destroyed the ships that captured the Pueblo, if necessary?"

Answer: We had aircraft which we did dispatch as soon as we found out they were in trouble. We didn't know in the Air Force that they were in any trouble until after the ship had already been captured. That is when we got the message. We didn't have any aircraft in position to protect that ship because we had not been asked to do so. Normally, when a ship is operating in areas like that the Air Force is asked on some occasions to be prepared to protect the ship. On other occasions it is not. It is up to the theater commander.

Q-11. Senator Thurmond. "If the Air Force had had authority to protect that ship and had gotten the word to protect it sooner could we have saved the ship?"

Answer: I don't know whether we could have saved the ship or not, Senator. We could have sunk the ships that were attacking it, that is for sure. But they had about 70 aircraft at Wonsan on the airfield there. If we had gone out to attack the ships they undoubtedly would have put those aircraft in the air and they would have attacked our aircraft and they might have sunk the Pueblo. I don't know, they could have. I can't say we could have saved it. We could have knocked off the ships that were attacking.

Q-12. Senator Thurmond. "I don't see how a great nation like this can allow ships to be captured the way this one was captured. I am just wondering how some of the military people feel about this and if they feel that we can't protect our ships when we send them out."

Answer: You can protect them but it is at a terrific cost. You are going to have to have a task force with every one of them. I talked to Admiral Moore about that. He said if he were going to protect the number of those ships we have out doing that kind of business he would need a Navy about twice as big as the one he has.

Q-13. Senator Allott. "So assuming that they had 70 fighter aircraft on Wonsan Airport or the airport near Wonsan, if you were going to have an effective protection against possibilities you would have had to have at least 70 of the F-4s at a reasonably adjacent spot at the time, and perhaps more in order to protect the Pueblo and perhaps to destroy the torpedo boats. Would that be a fair statement?"

Answer: When we are going to get into a fight I like to have an even break at it. In the first place, I don't think they could have launched all of the Wonsan aircraft to get there.

d. Following questions, of which were an interest to the Air Force, were extracted from a book prepared for OSD. Answers were prepared by Pueblo Ad Hoc Committee, coordinated with SAFLL, and approved by AFXOPD.

Q-1. Were there any plans to protect Pueblo or any similar ships?

Answer: 5AF Operations Order (OPORD) 307-67 was developed in conjunction with COMNAVFORJAPAN and was to be effective when the fragmentary order committing units and forces was issued by 5AF. This OPOED established detailed procedures and operating instructions for 5AF subordinate units in support of *USS Banner operations. Selected Air Force units assigned to 5AF would provide tactical air support for Navy intelligence collection activities at various times along the CHICOM, KORCOM and Soviet coasts. Under the concept of operations, tactical forces would be placed on ground alert to provide air-to-air and air-to-surface defensive support if required. On two previous occasions, Code name CLICKBEETLE IX (11 Nov-8 Dec 66) and CLICKBEETLE XV (22 Aug-16 Sep 67), which were USS Banner missions, Air Force support was requested through CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF, and strip alert was provided by 5AF.

NOTE: *Although 5AFORD 307-67 cited the USS Banner by name, if air support had been requested, the information available to 5AF would have been adequate for air support plans.

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NOTE: *Although SAFORD 307-67 cited the USS Banner by name, if air support had been requested, the information available to 5AF would have been adequate for air support plans.

Q-2. Were orders ever given to execute plans to protect the Pueblo if such plans existed and were orders rescinded if they were given?

Answer: The 5AF plan which provided air support for intelligence collection operations (5AF Operations Order 307-67) was to be implemented only when specifically directed in response to a request for pre-planned support of a particular mission. Fifth Air Force was an addressee for information only on Pueblo planning and execution messages, however, no request was made for Air Force support and no orders were issued to execute plans.

Q-3. Was there any help available to the Pueblo in the time frame involved on the first threat to the boarding?

Answer: No U.S. air support was available. At 23/0415Z (1315I) the Pueblo sent the first message reporting an attempted boarding at 23/0400Z (1300I). The first S.O.S. and request for help was sent at 23/0428Z (1328I) while the ship was under forced escort. At 23/0532Z (1432I), the Pueblo sent its last message, and was boarded shortly after. A North Korean pilot was placed at the helm, and the ship proceeded at flank speed (12½ knots) toward Wonsan. Thus, the time frame from the first threat until the actual boarding was about one hour and a half. The nearest U.S. aircraft that provided a potential source of help were the USAF F-4s on nuclear alert at Osan and Kunsan, South Korea. They were about 30 minutes flying time from the scene of the incident. Had the requirement for support been known at the moment of the attempted boarding, the time required to download the nuclear weapons and to reconfigure to conventional ordnance, and reach the scene, would have considerably exceeded the time required for the ship to reach port. The next nearest potential source was in the U.S. Marine Corps aircraft at Iwakuni, Japan, and the Navy aircraft aboard the carrier Enterprise. (Navy comments required).

USAF F-4Cs in Japan were about 1:15 away, based on direct flight and maximum speed, however, all were in a training configuration, and the distance to the scene of the incident and to the nearest recovery base in South Korea, was over 800 miles. Aircraft had to be configured with additional fuel tanks, as well as air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Loadout time requirements plus flying time would have exceeded the time required for the ship to reach port. USAF F-105 aircraft

on Okinawa were armed, guns only, with training ammunition. Flying time to the scene was 1:45, and the distance was such (over 1000 miles) that these aircraft could not go directly to the scene and recover in South Korea, without reconfiguring with additional fuel tanks, or by staging through South Korea. Therefore, no U.S. air support was available within the time frame involved from the first threat to the boarding.

Q-4. Why couldn't forces from Japan reach the scene in time to at least make a show of force?

Answer: Air Force tactical fighter units in Japan were in the middle of a conversion program from F-105s and F-100s to F-4Cs. Consequently, all were configured for training except those on nuclear alert at forward operating locations. Further, the distance to the scene from Air Force Bases in Japan, with recovery in South Korea, was over 800 miles. Generation time to reconfigure training aircraft, with additional fuel tanks and ordnance, and enroute flying time would have precluded reaching the scene prior to darkness or before the ship entered the three-mile limit.

Q-5. If a plan did exist and the forces were not available to react, then it appears to me that the overtures I've heard over the past few years about our being able to stay in Vietnam with no degradation of the level of commitments worldwide must be untrue. Is this so? Are we over committed militarily?

Answer: The plan that involved use of Air Force resources (5AF OPOD 307-67), was not implemented because no request had been made to Air Force units to provide support for this mission. Had a request been made, such as the case of the Banner operations off the China and Soviet coasts, Okinawa based F-105s were available and would have been placed on alert in Korea to provide a quick reaction capability.

Q-6 Were any actual published orders violated by commanders who might have been able to provide help. Had anyone been directed to have planes armed and available?

Answer: The Air Force had not been requested or directed to support this mission in any way. The Navy planning message submitted to higher authorities for approval assessed the risk as minimal, and did not contain any instructions regarding

coordination with Air Force units, or any reference to Air Force support. There was no precedence or requirement for Air Force units to provide on call alert aircraft without a specific request. Information copies of planning messages and sailing orders received at 5AF did not make reference to Air Force coordination or support, and were handled by officers at the appropriate staff level and were not brought to the attention of the Deputy for Operations or the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

NOTE: An average of 1534 messages per day are received at 5AF. It is apparent the Commander does not see all of them.

Q-7. Why did Secretary McNamara's testimony and that of Rear Admiral Johnson and Rear Admiral Cassel differ on who had the authority to order assistance to Pueblo? McNamara said the responsibility lay with Commander Naval Forces, Japan, and Fifth Air Force. The two admirals said Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet would have to authorize the sending of assistance. Who is right.

Answer: Technically speaking, neither is right. The authority, initially, is with the theater Commander - CINCPAC. In the past, when a ship had been operating in similar areas, the Air Force had been asked on several occasions to provide defensive support for the ship. For instance, on CLICKBEETLE IX (11 Nov-8 Dec 66), Air Force provided strip alert as requested. Aircraft were to be used when directed by CINCPAC or higher authority. Later, however, "authority to launch" was delegated to Cmdr 5AF. On one additional occasion, CLICKBEETLE XV (22 Aug-16 Sep 67) the same authority prevailed with Cmdr 5AF authorized to direct launch, if necessary. It is assumed, that had Air Force support been requested for the Pueblo, the same arrangement for launch authority as before could have existed. Had launch been directed in response to a hostile attack, and in the absence of specific restrictions to the contrary, the U.S. forces committed would have authority to take aggressive protective measures until the immediate threat to the security of the ship was countered.

Q-8. Who actually made the decision to deny assistance to Pueblo?

Answer: Fifth Air Force Okinawa based aircraft responding to the event were authorized to defend the vessel only while outside the three-mile territorial waters of North Korea. The distance from the scene required staging thru South Korea, and these aircraft could not reach the scene prior to the ship entering the port, or before darkness. Subsequent action was suspended by higher authority.

Q-9. Why weren't aircraft sent to assist Pueblo? Could they have reached Pueblo prior to entering Wonsan?

Answer: Aircraft from Air Force units were not sent because none could have been armed and launched in time to arrive at the scene prior to darkness, or the ship entering Wonsan harbor. Reconstruction of the event shows that before sending the first message requesting help, the Pueblo was under capture and forced escort toward Wonsan. Just over an hour later 23/1432I, a N.K. pilot was at the helm and the ship was proceeding at flank speed toward Wonsan. Aircraft would have had to arrive at the scene prior to 23/1432 to be effective in relieving the Pueblo. USAF aircraft had not been requested to provide support for this mission, and the only aircraft in Korea were on nuclear alert. They could not be downloaded and reconfigured with conventional ordnance before the ship arrived in Wonsan. The aircraft in Japan and on Okinawa could not be configured and arrive on the scene prior to darkness. (See Q-3 for detailed reaction timing).

Q-10. Was there no adequate Naval or Air Force support for the Pueblo because of heavy drawdown from Vietnam -- or did we have all our eggs in one Vietnam basket?

Answer: USAF units in Japan were in the middle of a conversion program from F-105s and F-100s to F-4Cs. All were engaged in training operations and were not rated operationally ready. However, had Navy requested implementation of the 5AF readiness plan, such as had been employed in the case of the Banner operations off the China and Soviet coast, there were adequate combat ready aircraft and crews available from Okinawa based F-105 units to provide a quick reaction force in Korea to support the Pueblo mission.

Q-11. Why is the court not calling Admirals Sharp, Hyland and Bringle or General McKee, and other senior officers who had certain responsibilities in connection with the capture of the Pueblo.

Answer: It would be inappropriate for the Air Force to comment on the manner in which the Navy Court of Inquiry is being conducted. It should be noted that while Fifth Air Force was an information addressee on the planning and execution messages, Fifth Air Force had no responsibility and did not participate in the risk assessment assigned this mission, nor in the determination of the need for quick reaction support. Since no Air Force action or support was requested, the Fifth Air Force staff did not bring the Pueblo mission to the attention of Gen McKee.

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