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ROLL No. A, 4021
DATE FILMED 5-29-74
OPERATOR E. L.
LOCATION Maxwell AFB, Ala.
REDUCTION 26:1

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Billie H. Hix

BILLIE H. HIX
Chief, Technical Systems Branch
The Albert F. Simpson Historical
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Exhibit # 8
TO THE AIR
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DETAIL COVERAGE --
B-36 ACCIDENT

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Operations and Training

On 15 September 1949, B-36[illegible] aircraft number [redacted] of the [illegible] Bombardment Squadron was scheduled for a routine training mission. Take off was attempted at 1935 central, only to end tragically with the crash into Lake Worth. Of the thirteen crew members aboard, five were fatalities and the other eight suffered minor injuries.

A very thorough investigation of the accident has taken place. Numerous difficulties were encountered due to the partially disintegrated condition of the aircraft due both to the crash and to dismantling necessary in order to recover the wreckage from the water. The Accident Board has made available its findings and recommendations both for historical and informational purposes.

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Description of the Accident (From Report of Major Accident Form)

The aircraft was given a normal pre-flight check on the ramp and taxied out for take-off on runway 35 R. Nothing in this check indicated that anything was wrong and a check of the propellers in reverse was made at this time. Taxiing was accomplished by alternately using the inboards and outboards in reverse. All indications during the pre-take-off check were that all engines were developing normal power. This check was performed on the taxi strip just off the end of the runway. The aircraft was lined up in take-off position on the runway and a physical check was made of the propellers by the engineer. The parking brakes were set and power was increased to 35" manifold pressure; the engineer reported all instruments normal and that the RPM was around 2100 across the board. Power was increased to 62" with the parking brakes released and holding the aircraft by use of the foot brakes. On application of full power the brakes were released and the take-off run commenced. The pilot reported the nose came off normally at approximately 80 mph and shortly later the aircraft left the runway for a few seconds. Up until this time everything appeared to be normal but when the aircraft settled back to the runway the pilot checked checked his flap setting and shortly after called for emergency power. The engineer increased the RPM from 7 to 10 and the manifold pressure went to 72 or 73 inches. The TBS was backed off to 9 or 9½ and manifold pressure dropped to 70 inches.

No increase in power or surge was felt at this time and the aircraft remained on the runway in a nose high attitude. The tail skid was in contact with the runway for the last 1600 feet. On seeing that a crash landing was inevitable the pilot attempted to use brakes and reverse all props and held the nose high for ditching. The pilot is not sure whether any braking action was accomplished or whether he managed to reverse any or all of the props. No tire marks were found on the runway and the wheels were still rolling when the aircraft crossed a small knoll just off the end of the runway. The aircraft came to rest in the water approximately 200 yards off shore. The water at this point is around 25 feet deep.

Eight (8) of the crew members received minor injuries and five (5) were injured fatally. Of the five fatalities, four (4) were riding in the nose section of the aircraft. The other was the radio operator who was seated at the radio operator's position.

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AMSC (POC)
Subject: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving B-36B No. 41-27670 Occuring 15 September 1948 (30 Sep 48)

AC 3d Ind MHS/lwm

HQ 7th Bomb Wing (L), Carswell AFB, Ft Worth, Texas

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Ft Worth, Texas

1. This headquarters recommends that immediate steps be taken to authorize procurement of high powered lamps in the amount of three (3) per aircraft assigned. Two (2) lamps would be located in the aft pressurized compartment to aid the members in visual checks of propellers and engines; and one (1) lamp, in the pilots compartment.

2. Indications are that a tell-tale light system is to be installed on all B-36 aircraft beginning with 41-27636. It is recommended that this installation be considered a latent defect and that all earlier models be modified accordingly.

3. Eighth (8) reflector signs approximately three (3) feet square will be installed at 1000-ft intervals along runway 32L-14R, to be completed and installed by 31 Oct 48. These signs will be numbered 1 thru 8 to inform pilots of usable runway remaining.

4. Recommend AVC engineering research to be started to determine by visual means when propellers are in reverse position while in flight.

5. A constant study will be continued by qualified personnel of this station to make further recommendations to prevent a recurrence of this type accident.

1 Incl
None

BRYAN B. HARPER
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

[signature]
[illegible] A. CAMPBELL
1/Lt, USAF
Asst. Officer

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WAR DEPARTMENT
AAF Form No. 14
(Rev. 1 Oct. '44)

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ARMY AIR FORCES
REPORT OF MAJOR ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AAF Reg. 62-14 and "Aircraft Accident Investigator's Handbook" issued by Office of Flying Safety, Headquarters, AAF.

Fill in all spaces except where otherwise indicated.

If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

FIELD OFFICES—DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	ACTION	DATE
	Preliminary Report Received	
	Form 14 Received	
	Evaluated by	
	Verified by	
	Checked by	
	Coded by	

Type, Model and Series

Accident No.

No. Aircraft Involved

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Place of Accident—State, County, Nearest Town, Distance and Direction from Same.		Nearest Army Airfield, Distance and Direction from Same.	
Texas Tarrant Fort Worth 3½ Mi NW		Carswell AFB, Fort Worth, Tex	
2. Was Collision With Other Aircraft? ☐ Yes ☒ No	AF Nos. of Aircraft Involved (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft) 41-02019	Date 16Sep 42	Hour and Time Zone 1035 GCT ☐ Day ☒ Night

Section B—AIRCRAFT

1. Aircraft No.	2. Type	Model	Series	3. Home Station
A 2019	B	17	E	Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

4. Air Force or Command	Subcommand	Wing	Group No. and Type	Squadron
SAC	8th Air Force	7th Bomb Wing	7th Bomb Group (H)	9th B.S.

5. Date of Manufacture	Total Hours	Date Last Overhaul	Overhauling Depot or Sub-depot	Hours Since Overhaul
Unk	30:35	None	None	None

6. Attach detailed statement of tech orders having direct bearing on this accident which have not been complied with. Describe orders and give reasons for noncompliance

Section C—OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)

1. Last Name	First Name	Middle Initial	Grade	Branch	ASN	Sex	Age
HUSBAND	TOY	B.	Major	USAAF	A0728072	M	32

2. Attached Station	AF or Command	Subcommand	Wing	Group No. and Type	Squadron
See three below	SAC	8th Air Force	7th BW	7th Bomb Group	9th BS

3. Assigned Station	AF or Command	Subcommand	Wing	Group No. and Type	Squadron
Carswell Air Force Base	SAC	8th Air Force	7th BW	7th Bomb Group	9th BS

4. Aeronautical Rating? ☒ Yes ☐ No	Present Rating	Date Received	5. Normal Duty Status
	Pilot	27 Aug 42	Airplane Commander

Section D—OPERATOR'S FLYING EXPERIENCE (including civilian)

Flying Time	1st Pilot or Solo Student	Other Pilot or Other Student
1. Total Hours	1049	421
2. Hours This Type	1026	0
3. Hours This Model	200	14
4. Hours Last 90 Days	101:35	0
5. Hours Last 30 Days	38:20	0
6. Hours Last 24 Hours	0	0
7. Actual Combat Hours	100	100

Fill in items 8 and 9 only if operator was student in training or rated pilot in CIS, OTU, etc.

8. Trainee Class No. and School, OTU, CCTS, Etc.

9. Phase and Hours in This Phase

Phase	Dual or Copilot	Solo or 1st Pilot

10. AAF Schools Previously Attended and Dates

USAF Pilot School Grad
27 Aug 1942

USAF Inst. Pilot School
Bryan, Tex Oct 1944

11. Instrument Rating

Type	Date
Green	10 Dec 40
Last Check Station	Date
CAFB	10 Dec 40

12. Was operator on instruments at time of accident or immediately before? ☐ Yes ☒ No

If answer to number 12 is Yes, or if accident occurred at night or under instrument or unknown conditions, fill in items 13 through 17.

Hours	1st Pilot	Other
13. Total—Instrument	211:00	
14. Instrument Last 6 Mos.	13:00	
15. Instrument Last 30 Days	2:30	
16. Night, Last 6 Mos.	19:00	
17. Night, Last 30 Days	7:00	

Section E—PERSONNEL INVOLVED (Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty (P, CP, CT, VO, PE, RO, G)	Name (Last Name First) (2)	Type of Aero. Rating (Symbols) (3)	Serial No. (4)	Grade and Branch of Service (5)	Pers. Class. Symbol (AAF Reg. 15-1) (6)	Org. Assignment—Air Force or Command Group Number and Type Station (7)	Fatal Major Minor None Missing Unknown (8)	Parachutes Used Yes (9)	Parachutes Used No (10)	Parachutes Successful Yes (11)	Parachutes Successful No (12)
P	Husband, Toy B.	P	A0728072	Maj, USAAF		SAC, 8th Air Force, 7th Bomb Wing, 7th Bomb Group (H), 9th Bomb Sqdn	Minor	X			
CP	Keene, John M.	P	0818A	Maj, USAF			"	X			
CT	Kornoffe, Harold L.	P	A0702044	Capt, USAFR			Fatal	X			
VO	Tomaine, Joseph L.	O	0857A	Maj, USAF			"	X			
VO	Styles, Herman G., Jr.	O	A0697030	1/Lt, USAFR			"	X			
PE	Stanko, John S.	CE	AF13011147	M/Sgt, USAF			"	X			
PE	English, Richard L.	E	A0801944	T/Sgt, USAFR			Minor	X			
RO	Holloway, Harry Jr.	RO	AF6950014	T/Sgt, USAF			"	X			
RO	Dufour, William G.	RO	AF6984178	T/Sgt, USAF			Fatal	X			
G	Lattimore, James H.	G	AF6970570	Sgt, USAF			Minor	X			
G	Freed, Quentin B.	G	AF13032401	S/Sgt, USAF			Minor	X			
G	Shonts, James R.	G	AF6985729	T/Sgt, USAF			"	X			
G	Allen, Jack D.	G	AF6950586	S/Sgt, USAF			Minor	X			

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Section F—DAMAGE

Describe briefly the extent of the damage which occurred. (If no damage, write "None." If aircraft is missing, write "Missing." If aircraft was totally wrecked, so state)

1. To Aircraft

Totally Wrecked

2. To Engine	1	2	3	4
3. To Propeller	1	2	3	4

4. To Private Property (Explain on Attachments)

None

Section G—POWER PLANT FAILURE

(Use this section of the form if power plant failure was a contributing cause factor in the accident. This must be signed by engineering officer)

1. Duration of Flight Since Last Take-off — Hours / Minutes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
2. Engine Model				
3. Engine No.				
4. Engine-Hours Since Last Major Overhaul				
5. Depot or Sub-depot Performing Overhaul				
6. Total Engine-Hours				
7. Propeller Model				
8. Propeller-Hours Since Major Overhaul				

9. Statement of Operator, if Available, on Behavior of Power Plant and Manipulation of Controls Immediately Before Failure

See Pilot's Testimony

10. Statement of Engineering Officer, Mechanics, and Others as to What Failed and Probable Reasons Why

See findings of the Aircraft Accident Investigating Board

11. Octane Rating of Fuel: 115/145

Engineering Officer (Name, Grade, and Station): MARVIN M. HAMMACK, Lt. Colonel, Carswell AF Base

Section H—AIRFRAME, LANDING GEAR, OR OTHER MATERIEL

(Use this section if matériel failure was a contributing cause factor in the accident. This must be signed by engineering officer)

1. Describe the Matériel Failure, Including Statement of Kind of Flight at the Time of Failure and All Factors Which Might Have Contributed Toward the Failure

See findings o Not a Factor

See findings of the Aircraft Accident Investigating Board

Engineering Officer (Name, Grade, and Station) → MARVIN M. HAMMACK, Lt. Colonel, USAF, Carswell AF BASE

Section I—SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

(Use this section if special equipment—parachutes, radio, dinghies, oxygen equipment, fire extinguishers, etc.—was a contributing cause factor in the accident for any reason including failure, misuse, or by reason of not being in the plane)

1. Describe How the Special Equipment Contributed to the Accident or to Its Results

Not a Factor.

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Section J—AIRPORT AND FACILITIES AND AIRWAYS

(Use this section if the airport or its facilities or airways facilities were a contributing factor in the accident, either because of inadequacy, condition, or poor maintenance)

1. EXPLAIN

None

Section K—WEATHER (This must be signed by weather officer of the reporting station)

1. WHAT WAS THE WEATHER AT THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT? Estimated 1500 ft ceiling broken, 3000 ft overcast visibility nine miles temp 68 dew point 62 wind calm, altimeter 998.

2. IF WEATHER WAS A FACTOR IN THE ACCIDENT, STATE HOW AND ATTACH COPY OF WEATHER REPORTS

Weather was not a factor.

WEATHER OFFICER (Name, Grade, and Station) → Elwyn A. Moseley, Major, USAF, Carswell AF Base, Fort Worth, Tex

Section L—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. IF ERROR ON THE PART OF SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE OPERATOR WAS A FACTOR, STATE HOW

2. WHAT WAS THE MISSION?

Radar Bomb Scoring

3. DID FIRE OCCUR UPON CRASHING? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. WERE THERE ANY VIOLATIONS OF ORDERS OR REGULATIONS? (Explain)

None

5. DISCIPLINARY ACTION TAKEN OR CONTEMPLATED

None

6. KIND OF CLEARANCE (Attach Form 23)	FROM	TO	OR LOCAL	STATION OF LAST DEPARTURE
Local IFR	Carswell	Carswell		Carswell AFB

7. IF UR FORM 34 HAS BEEN SUBMITTED ON ANY FEATURE INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT, GIVE UR NO. AND DATE	NO.	DATE

EXPLAIN FULLY AND ATTACH COPY

None Submitted

8. ARE COPIES OF AAF FORMS 1, 1A, ATTACHED HERETO AS REQUIRED BY AAF REGULATION 62-14? ☐ YES ☒ NO

9. ARE PHOTOS ATTACHED? ☒ YES ☐ NO

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Section M—DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT

1. TELL IN NARRATIVE FORM, IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS NECESSARY, EVERYTHING THAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE ACCIDENT. BE SURE TO COVER EVERYTHING THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TOWARD THE ACCIDENT. INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION TO PREVENT SIMILAR ACCIDENTS, AND ACTION TAKEN.

The aircraft was given a normal pre-flight check on the ramp and taxied out for take-off on runway 35L. Nothing in this check indicated that anything was wrong and a check of the propellers in reverse was made at this time. Taxiing was accomplished by alternately using the inboards and the outboards in reverse. All indications during the pre-takeoff check were that all engines were developing normal power. This check was performed on the taxi strip just off the end of the runway. The aircraft was made of the propellers by the engineer. The parking brakes were set and power was increased to 35" manifold pressure: the engineer reported all instruments normal and that the RPM was around 2100 across the board. Power was increased to 62" with the parking brakes released and holding the aircraft by use of the foot brakes. On application of full power the brakes were released and the take-off run commenced. The pilot reported the nose came off normally at approximately 80 mph and shortly later the aircraft left the runway for a few seconds. Up until this time everything appeared to be normal but when the aircraft settled back to the runway the pilot checked his flap setting and shortly after called for emergency power. The engineer increased the TSO from 7 to 10 and the manifold pressure went to 72 or 73 inches. The TSO was backed off to 9 or 9½ and manifold pressure dropped to 70 inches.

No increase in power or surge was felt at this time and the aircraft remained on the runway in a nose high attitude. The tail skid was in contact with the runway for the last 1000 feet. On seeing that a crash landing was inevitable the pilot attempted to use brakes and reverse all props and hold the nose high for ditching. The pilot is not sure whether any braking action was accomplished or whether managed to reverse any or all of the props. No tire marks were found on the runway and the wheels were still rolling when the aircraft crossed a small knoll just off the end of the runway. The aircraft came to rest in the water approximately 200 yards off shore. The water at this point is around 25 feet deep.

Eight (8) of the crew members received minor injuries and five (5) were injured fatally. Of the five fatalities, four were riding in the nose section of the aircraft. The other was the radio operator who was seated at the radio operator position.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS

See Attachment I

3. ACTION TAKEN

Reclamation and salvage of the aircraft is continuing in an effort to further determine cause of the accident

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATING BOARD FROM REPORTING STATION. EACH MEMBER MUST SIGN. → STATION: Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

NAME—PRESIDENT		NAME—MEMBER		NAME—INTELLIGENCE OFFICER	
William R. Smith		Marvin W. Hemmack		Thomas W. Gunn	
GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION
Lt Col	Hq & Hq Sq 7th BW	Lt Col	Hq & Hq Sq 7th BW	Captain	Hq & Hq Sq 7th BW
NAME—MEMBER		NAME—MEDICAL OFFICER		NAME—RECORDER	
		William A Dorries		Ralph Wallace, Jr	
GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	GRADE	ORGANIZATION
		Major	Hq Sq 7th Bomb Gp	Captain	Hq & Hq Sq 7th Avn

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[illegible] OF THE AIRCRAFT [illegible]

1. [illegible], did not absolutely conclusive in all details, are felt to be sufficient to [illegible] by the testimony will be at the present time. Efforts will continue to [illegible] available evidence, and it is hoped that a more definite conclusion can be reached at a later date.

2. The following facts make it appear probable that two propellers were in reverse from the start of the take-off run. [illegible] as to whether this was due to improper operation of the propeller controls or to a malfunctioning.

DISCUSSION

The following discussion considers the probable events during the take-off with particular reference to the results of the [illegible] and records subsequent to the accident. It will be noted that certain of the statements are in conflict with some of the testimony of the crew members, but it is believed that the evidence supports the statements given below.

1. The airplane accelerated very slowly from [illegible] throughout most if not all of the take-off run.

2. The airplane became airborne for a very short time (a fraction of a second to a few seconds), following which it settled back on the runway.

3. All indications before the flight check and during take-off were that the power plant was developing proper power. [illegible] of all engines were checked after the accident and showed no evidence of engine failure.

4. After the airplane had settled back on the runway, the application of the manifold pressure did not increase airspeed. The airplane continued in a nose high attitude, the tail skid digging for approximately 1500 ft.

5. The decision that the airplane would not take off was not made until the end of the runway was nearly reached, too late to stop. Brakes were not applied at all and there is a question as to whether the propellers were actually reversed for braking, although an attempt was made to reverse them.

6. The slow acceleration, the inability to reach flying speed until the [illegible]th of the take-off run can be explained by two propellers having been reversed during all or the latter part of the take-off run. See Appendix C for stopping distances.

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a. Tests conducted by CVAC on 22 September 1949 on B-36B at plane #43 showed that acceleration to 80mph with any symmetrical pair of propellers reversed and the other four normal takes approximately 28 seconds and 2650 ft run with 60" MP and 2700 RPM. This compares to 15 seconds and 1000 ft with all six propellers normal. (Tests could not be carried out to much higher airspeed with two propellers reversed due to runway length limitations. See Appendix 1.

b. The above test is in agreement with calculations which show that initial acceleration with two propellers reversed on four normal is about half that of six normal at the start of the take-off run but that at 100 to 110mph the reverse thrust of two propellers would have increased sufficiently so that there would be no net accelerating thrust remaining. See Appendix 2.

c. The calculations also show that an increase in power from 60 to 70 inches manifold pressure would not result in an increase in net thrust at approximately 100 mph.

d. The calculations also show that with one propeller reversed the airplane could become airborne at the particular gross weight (241,000 lbs.); however, with three propellers reversed the airplane would have accelerated so very slowly that take-off would not have been attempted.

7. Reversal of two propellers could have occurred due to either:

a. Improper operation or use of the controls prior to the start of the take-off ; or

b. Malfunctioning of the propeller or the propeller control or airplane wiring system so that the propellers went to reverse accidentally after the pre-take-off check had been completed.

Evidence to support one or the other of the above possibilities is as follows:

a. The flight crew stated that engine and propeller checks on the runway and mid of the runway were normal. Crew members state that normal operation was experienced during taxi and take-off.

b. Two or more pairs of propellers were used in reverse during the taxi to the end of the runway.

c. The pilot and flight engineer stated that the propellers were placed in forward pitch, which was verified by having the pilot flight engineer get out of the airplane and observe the propellers. Also, the flight engineer stated that he performed a "ramming feather" check to observe the trip in RP, which is an indication that the propellers are in normal and not reverse pitch.

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c. There is no sign of damage to any of the blades, which would indicate that one of the propellers might have failed first and thereby damaged adjacent propellers.

d. No propeller hub or engine propeller shaft or case section parts were found on or adjacent to the runway as would have been expected had a propeller failed where the four blades were found. There were no marks to indicate that any of these parts struck the runway.

e. Static tests by CWAC to determine the amount of overspeeding which would occur with propeller reversal at take-off power and airspeed show that the RPM surge probably would not exceed 400 to 500 RPM, which is insufficient by a large margin to cause propeller failure. See Appendix B.

RECOMMENDATION

1. Improve operating procedures to eliminate any possibility of take-off with the propellers reversed due to improper use or operation of the controls.

2. Install an indicator system to show when each propeller is in reverse pitch. This can be accomplished in several ways, the most promising of which are as follows:

a. Install a telltale indicator system on the pilot's panel.

b. Install a mechanical slipstream deflection indicator forward of each propeller visible to the scanners. This system will be effective only when the airplane is static and must be designed so that it is effective for any wind velocity likely to be encountered.

c. A test could be made to determine the feasibility of a visual check for reversal before the take-off run. This check to be made by running up each pair of symmetrical engines to full take-off power and momentarily releasing brakes to check thrust direction.

3. Data as to stopping distance with propellers reversed should be made available to flight crews. Training in abortive take-offs should be given all crews.

4. Use water injection for all take-offs regardless of gross weight. This is to avoid detonation when extra power is required in emergencies such as this.

5. Use the interphone system for reading the take-off and landing configurations.

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4. Recover the pilot's pedestal, the junction box containing the reverse pitch relays and at least three propeller hubs, one from each pair of propellers (inboard, center and outboard) to assist in checking the possibility that malfunctioning occurred in the propeller or propeller control system.

7. Acquire improved training aids (of the airplane flight simulator type) to permit familiarization of flight crews with the behavior of the airplane under abnormal and emergency operating conditions which are hazardous to perform in routine flight training.

8. That all crew members refrain from filling in the space on take-offs or landings.

9. That all seats in the front of the aircraft, other than pilot's and co-pilot's, be strengthened to withstand the same pressure as the safety belts.

10. That final check of propellers for correct position be made in take-off position on the runway just prior to take-off.

11. That seats be moved to determine if landing lights should be re-located or re-aligned to prevent blinding of the pilot in bad.

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NAM XBSF2 R-36M #43

PREFACE

In an attempt to further show what caused the crash of R-36M #79 a series of simulated take-off runs by #43 airplane were executed.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The two outboard propellers reversed during the take-off ground run allowed the nose to come off normally and produce a right wing down effect.

2. During the take-off runs with any symmetrical pair of propellers reversed the flight engineer's panel looked normal - however, at the 56" M.P static check point the propellers in reverse showed a higher engine speed by 300 to 400 rpm.

3. Ground check, at 1700 rpm, with Handheld, does not adequately show propellers in reverse pitch.

4. The difference in acceleration between the normal take-off with six propellers forward and the condition of two reversed was very noticeable to the entire crew. Acceleration to 80 mph took only 25 seconds under normal thrust whereas with two reversed it took 38 seconds.

DISCUSSION

1. Propellers 3 & 4 Reversed - Others at normal: At 50" M.P propellers with forward thrust had 2100 rpm and reversed props had 2500 rpm. At 62" M.P forward props had 2650 rpm and reversed props 2700 rpm. Work was approximately 425 psi (-7 mod. curve.). All prop came up to 2700 and held after some forward speed was attained. The flight engineer's panel looked normal during the take-off roll. This configuration gave the pilot considerable trouble steering. He had to use brakes and nose wheel to hold center of the runway early in run. The nose wheel was light at 60 mph but would not come off with normal pull. The landing gear fairing pulled open and was quite obvious to observers.

2. Propellers 2 & 5 Reversed: At 62" M.P and 2700 rpm during run steering was much improved but nose wheel still would not come off at 80 mph with normal pull on elevator control.

3. Propellers 1 & 6 Reversed: With 62" M.P and 2700 rpm during run there was a right wing down tendency early in the run, however, this was easily corrected. The nose came up o.k.

4. Propellers normal for take-off: Same power as above took 15 sec. to accelerate to 80 mph. Length of runway to stop from 105 mph including transition was approximately 2500 ft. (full power was not used).

5. Ground reversal of propellers: Observers in a 5 mile wind could

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not tell that propellers were reversed except by the sound of the pitch change, as the indicator would be changed.

c. Inadvertent reversing over:

Reversing from 2,140 RPM & 41° gave 2730 RPM & 43°.

Reversing from 2530 RPM & 51.5° gave 2705 RPM & 55 1/2°.

Reversing from 2550 RPM & 55° gave 2710 RPM & 60°, and 2900 RPM gave to 69°.

Reversing from 2630 RPM & 62° gave 2830 RPM & 67°.

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Encl 4 (G)

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Airworthiness History of A/C No. 44-92079

1. Aircraft number 44-92079 was received on 28 August 1949.

2. Total time on the aircraft was 20:35.

3. Last Inspection of the aircraft was the Daily Inspection on 19 September 1949.

4. Propeller changes: 3 September 1949, changed #1 (401,414)

6 September 1949, changed #3 (three bladed)

14 September, 1949, changed #4 (three bladed)

14 September 1949, changed #5 (three bladed)

15 September 1949, changed #5 (#4 return (rev. reverse)

19 September 1949, changed #4 (three bladed)

5. Had diagonal cracks before flight on 19 September 1949:

No 07-1-1 not complied with. (Painting and Marking of Aircraft)

Nose light not installed.

Oil rack not installed.

Oil cabin electric heater inoperative.

Cabin pressurization leaks.

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Incl 2 (d)

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Stopping distances at 241,000 A.U.W.

From 110 miles per hour with 50 degrees wing flap:

1. Full brakes applied, takes 1350 feet.
2. Full brakes applied, plus full reverse props, takes 1060 feet at 62" MAP and 2700 RPM.
3. Full brakes and full reverse props at 70", takes 1040 feet.

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

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B-36 B AIRPLANE
TAKE-OFF GROUND ROLL AND TIME VS. SPEED

68" HG M.A.P., 4 PROPELLERS FWD, 2 REV.
FLAPS 20°, G.W. = 241,000 LBS., NACA DAY

TEST POINTS - TIME ONLY
⊡ Pprops 3 & 4 reversed
⊙ " 2 & 5 " "
+ " 1 & 6 "



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B-36 B AIRPLANE
TAKE-OFF THRUST AND DRAG

FLAPS 20°, G.W. = 241,000 LBS., NACA DAY



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

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TACTICAL
WEIGHT and BALANCE CLEARANCE

FORM F

DATE 15 Sept 49 AIRPLANE B-36B FROM Local
MISSION SCR - 584 SERIAL NO. 44-92079 TO

*** REMARKS ***

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COMPUTER PLATE NO. (If Used)

This weight and index or moment must be within limits for landing. If this is impossible, pertinent instructions to the pilot for shifting load and crew should be noted above. Particular care must be taken when paratroops are evacuated.

REF.	ITEM	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOMENT/1000
1	BASIC AIRPLANE (from chart C)	141 162	111 38
2	(780) Gallons	5853	111 98
3	DISTRIBUTION OF LOAD		

COMPT.	CREW NO.	CREW WEIGHT	BAGGAGE	CARGO AND MISC.	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOMENT/1000
A	1	200			200	12
B	4	800			800	81
C	3	600			600	87
D	2	400			400	80
E						
F				2267	2267	918
G				100	100	55
H				208	208	152
I				769	769	654
J						
K	1	800			800	928
L						
M						
N						

CORRECTIONS (Ref. 9)

COMPT.	ITEM	CHANGES (+ or −) WEIGHT	CHANGES (+ or −) INDEX OR MOMENT/1000
	A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY		
	RALPH WALLACE, Jr. Captain, USAF		
	TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED	−	−
	TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED	+	+
	NET DIFFERENCE (Ref. 9)		

4	MINIMUM LDG. GR. WT.	153157	118730
5	( ) Rds. ( ) Cal. AMMUNITION (By Compartment)		
6	BOMBS: FORWARD		
	AFT		
	EXTERNAL		
7	FUEL: BUILT IN (4000) Gal. A	23400	16221
	BOMB BAY (6900) Gal. C	40365	29126
	EXTERNAL (4240) Gal. D	24805	18086
8	TAKE-OFF CONDITION (Uncorrected)	211627	163455
9	CORRECTIONS (If required)		
10	TAKE-OFF CONDITION (Corrected)		

TAKE-OFF CG IN % M.A.C. 31

LIMITS

Recommended Max. Take-off Gr. Wt. 278000 LB.
Recommended Max. Landing Gr. Wt. 268000 LB.
Permissible CG Limits 23.5 % to 40 % M.A.C.

COMPUTED BY /s/ John G Stanko M/Sgt
WEIGHT & BAL. OFFICER
PILOT /S/ TOT B. HUSBAND Major USAF

(FOR TRANSPORT AND CARGO MISSIONS, USE OTHER SIDE)

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

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PERFORMANCE DATA

B-50A (MR)

WICHITA MODIFIED AIRPLANE

SAC TECHNICAL PAMPHLET 60-5

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APRIL 1949

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Apr 1949

PERFORMANCE DATA

WICHITA MODIFIED B-50A AIRPLANE "MR"

29 APRIL 1949

PREPARED BY:

Operational Engineering Section
Eighth Air Force

APPROVED:

J. B. MONTGOMERY
Brigadier General, USAF

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B-50A WICHITA MODIFIED PERFORMANCE PRELIMINARY

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XII. TEST AIRCRAFT PHOTOGRAPHS

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FOREWORD

Top level planning requires performance data which represents the maximum capabilities of any particular aircraft when it reaches the field, in operational status and modified for combat.

The recent extensive modification program on combat aircraft has changed the performance characteristics of the basic aircraft. B-50A, AF 46-020, Gem Modified, was flight tested by the 8th Air Force Operational Engineering Section to determine the changes in performance characteristics caused by the change in configuration of this type aircraft. It was found that the range of the aircraft was decreased considerably, due to the drag of the multi-antennae installations and fuel flows which proved to be higher than Pratt & Whitney Spec. 7051E predicted. The results of this test indicate that similar flight test programs on aircraft of the Strategic Air Command will develop precise operational data for the operations planning sections and staff flight engineers. Realistic tactical flight plans, utilizing range, speed, altitude, and bomb load capabilities of combat aircraft can then be designed for maximum effectiveness.

The 10,000 ft and 20,000 ft curves, together with the range and time summary charts contained herein, were used in the flight planning phases of the "Round-the-World" flight. This data, designed for application on one type of aircraft with a given configuration, enabled the staff engineers to make the accurate predictions that were borne out by the above flight.

This document should be used for the B-50A Wichita Modified airplane, until superseded by an Air Materiel Command publication. It will be of great value when properly employed by combat crews flying this type aircraft.

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II. SUMMARY

In order to obtain complete operational and cruise control data on the Wichita modified B-50A airplane, a flight test program and performance study was instigated on AF 46-020 by the 8th Air Force Operational Engineering Section at Walker Air Force Base. One of the primary objectives of the study was to furnish long range cruise data needed in planning and conducting the non-stop globe circling mission recently carried out by the Eighth Air Force.

Approximately eighteen (18) hours of actual flight time was involved in the determination of speed-power relationships. The results of the speed-power runs may be seen in the form of a plot of P_{iw} versus V_{iw} in Figure 27. This data shows graphically the effect of the Wichita modification on the performance of the B-50A. The external drag items, i.e., radio and radar antenna, chaff chute, etc., cost six (6) to eight (8) miles per hour, depending upon the operating conditions.

Checks were run, both on the ground and in the air, to determine the variation between the Direct Pressure and the Magnesyn torquemeters. It was found that the Magnesyn type instruments read approximately four (4) to eight (8) PSI high. A curve showing the readings of Magnesyn versus Direct Pressure torque is plotted in Figure 20. It should be noted that if the Magnesyn torquemeters are used in determining a power condition, the resulting power will be less than desired, due to this error. Figure 20 is believed representative of the torquemeter error for all Magnesyn installations.

In addition, data was obtained on fuel consumption which proved extremely valuable. The fuel consumption is shown in Figure 25 for both auto rich and auto lean mixtures. The fuel consumption was checked with the Flight Data Branch at Air Materiel Command, and agreed very favorably with information obtained at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The revised fuel flow was used in the cruise control data presented herein. It was further learned that the vapor return line could pass as much as two hundred (200) pounds per hour per engine, if not operating properly. This is important in that the flowmeters would read high by this amount, if such a condition existed.

A test will be conducted with solenoid shut-off valves installed in all vapor return lines to measure the induced error. As a matter of clarification the Boeing B-50A Wichita Modified Receiver will be referred to as B-50A "MR".

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III. REFERENCES

1. A. M. C. pamphlet, "Preliminary Cruise Control Data for the B-50A"
2. Boeing Report, D-8316
3. Boeing Report, D-8025
4. S. A. C. Technical Pamphlet 60-4, "B-50A Performance Preliminary"
5. Boeing Report, D-8403-40

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B-50 EXTERNAL CONFIGURATION
AIRCRAFT NO. 46-020
IV.

EXTERNAL	NOMENCLATURE
4-Gun Streamlined Upper Forward Turret	
2-Gun Lower Forward Turret	
2-Gun Upper Rear Turret	
2-Gun Lower Rear Turret	
2-Gun Tail Turret	
Top Sighting Blister	
Astrodome	
2 Side Sighting Blisters	
Receiver Coupling	
Radome (60 inch dish)	AN/APQ-23
Static Dischargers	AN/ASA-3
ANTENNAE	
ILS	AN/ARN-5
Interrogator - Responsor	AN/APN-2
RCM Antennae - 6	
Liaison	AN/ARC-8
Loran	AN/APN-9
IFF	SCR-695
Streamlined Trailing Anteana	AN/ARC-8
VHF	AN - 104B
Radio Altimeter (Receiver and Transmitter)	SCR - 718
Fan Antenna	AN/ARQ-8
Low Frequency Recur. Antenna	AN/ARQ-8
Whip antenna Mast	AN/APN-9
Compass Loop	AN/ARN-7
Compass Sense	AN/APN-10A

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V. POWERPLANT

Pratt & Whitney R-4360-35 Engines
Eclipse MP regulators
Model PR-100B3 Stromberg Injection Carburetor
Type AC-181 Spark Plugs
Type CH-7 G.E. Turbo Superchargers
Model G-11 G.E. Turbo Regulators
Curtiss Electric Reversible Pitch Propellers
Blade Dwg. No. 1052-7C4-30
Blade Settings: Low pitch 15.7° plus or minus .2°
High pitch 55.7° plus or minus .1°
Reverse pitch 21.3° plus or minus 1°
Feathered 83.9° plus or minus .5°
Propeller deicer boots installed
Fuel 100/130 Spec AN-F-28

VI. INSTRUMENTATION.

Direct pressure type torquemeter system with gages vented to cabin pressure.

Calibrated flight engineer's instruments.

Pilot, and flight engineer's airspeed indicators calibrated.

VII. AIRPLANE WEIGHT RECORD.

Airplane AF 46-020 was weighed 20 January 1949 at Walker Air Force Base, P-3 Hangar, on platform scales. The following is the breakdown to the basic weight:

	Net Weight	Arm	Moment
Total as weighed	86,492	434.6	37,591,343
Oil in Airplane: InBd-150 Gal	1,125	373	419,625
OutBd-150 Gal	1,125	391	439,875
Basic airplane (For flight test only)	84,242	436.0	36,731,843

Basic Index - 78.0

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VIII. AIRPLANE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

1. Airspeed Calibrations.

The airspeed calibration data for the static hole location at Station 180 was obtained from Boeing Airplane Company Document D-8403-40. The airplane configuration is with gear and flaps up.

The data for the static hole locations at Station 211 and 214 was obtained from a Boeing Airplane Company curve of $\frac{CAS}{V_I}$ vs V_{iw}

2. Nautical Miles Per Pound Curves.

The nautical miles per pound curves were calculated from the BHP_{iw} vs V_{iw} test data. These curves differ from those usually presented for flight engineers in the following items:

a. The power schedule is now given with the BHP in even numbers, and the RPM in resulting values for 150 BMEP and Prop Load (115/145 fuel) or Prop Load minus 10 BMEP (100/130 fuel.) The reason for this change is to make the interpolation problem much less burdensome for the flight engineer.

b. Nautical Miles Per Pound is presented versus True Indicated Airspeed. The different airspeed corrections we are concerned with are as follows:

(1) Instrument Error - ΔV_{Inst}

(2) Pitot Position Error - ΔV_{Pos}

(3) Compressibility Error - ΔV_{Comp}

$$\text{True Indicated Airspeed} = \text{Instrument Reading} + \Delta V_{Inst} + \Delta V_{Pos} + \Delta V_{Comp}$$

3. Power Schedules.

Curves of BHP vs RPM and BHP vs Torque Pressure for 115/145 and 100/130 fuel are plotted on the Power Schedule curve. As the Magnesyn Torquemeter reads 5-10 PSI higher than the Direct Pressure Torquemeter a curve of BHP versus Magnesyn Torque Pressure for 100/130 and 115/145 fuel is also plotted to aid in setting powers with the Magnesyn Torquemeter. M-1 Tables for 100/130 and 115/145 fuel are presented on Pages 27 and 28. The RPM-BHP Curves can be used in conjunction with the M-1 table for determining manifold pressures and RPM as follows:

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After the BHP/ENG has been determined for the altitude concerned, go into the RPM vs BHP curve on Page 26. From this graph, both RPM and Torque Pressure can be read. The correct manifold pressure can then be obtained from the M-1 Table (Pages 27 and 28) by interpolation in the RPM column.

A curve of Test Points showing the variation between the Magnesyn and Direct Pressure Torquemeter installations is shown on Page 29.

4. Range Data

Range versus Gross Weight curves for 115/145 and 100/130 fuel are presented here. These curves are based on Long Range Cruise speeds.

5. Operational Curves

The climb curve presented on Page 32 was obtained by correcting the climb data for the Standard B-50 to conform with the Wichita Modified version. The Standard Take-off Distance curve was also revised to fit the Wichita Modified configuration.

6. Fuel Consumption Curves

The Fuel Flow curve on Page 34 was obtained by correlating Air Materiel Command data, Pratt and Whitney data and data obtained by this section during the Flight Test Program. The Brake Specific Fuel Consumption curves on Page 35 show the relationship between the data obtained from these sources. Auto-lean fuel flow averaged out approximately 4% above the Pratt and Whitney specification values. The fuel flow at powers above 2000 BHP is considerably richer than as indicated by the specification, but this has relatively small effect on the range of the B-50A.

7. Power Required Curves

Speed-power data was taken at 10,000, 12,000, 15,000 and 20,000 feet. These data were obtained between 21 January 1949 and 17 February 1949, in the vicinity of Walker Air Force Base, Roswell, New Mexico.

These data were recorded with the airplane in the following configuration: Cowl flaps and intercooler flaps 5°, oil cooler flaps closed, wing flaps and gear up.

The airplane as tested had the airspeed static source located at Station 180. The airspeed calibration to be used with this location is on Page 10. Since the static source is being moved aft to Station 211 on the later models (Boeing M.C.R. 225) the airspeed calibration for the new static source location is included on Page 11. The new location shows a considerably smaller pitot position error, and it is therefore very important that Page 11 be used when the airplanes have the new static source location.

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The data were all taken manually with the airspeed and altitude carefully stabilized for each power setting. The weight during the test was calculated by taking fuel flow readings for each power and noting the time at which the power was changed.

The drag data were plotted up for a standard weight and altitude by using the BHP_{iw} system where

$$BHP_{iw} = \frac{\text{Total BHP}}{(W/W_s)^{3/2} \times \frac{1}{\sqrt{\sigma}}}$$

$$V_{iw} = \frac{V_i}{(W/W_s)^{\frac{1}{2}}}$$

W = Airplane gross weight at any given time

W_s = Standard gross weight, 100,000 lbs

σ = Density Ratio

The BHP_{iw} vs V_{iw} curve shown on Page 36 represents a 100,000 lb airplane flying at sea level on an NACA Standard Day.

8. Cooling Data

The pressure drop requirements for cooling to prescribed cylinder head temperatures are shown on Page 39. These requirements are based on fuel flows as shown on Page 34. The pressure drop available for various cowl flap angles are shown on Page 38. These cooling requirements will appear pessimistic if the CHT readings are taken on Cylinder B-7. It is recommended that all airplanes be equipped with two thermocouples per engine, one on Cylinder A-4 and one on Cylinder B-1. (See Ref 4). CHT limit with thermocouple on Cylinder B-7 is 210°C.

9. Instrument Calibration

The Engineer's and Pilot's airspeed indicators were calibrated with a master manometer. The engineer's airspeed indicator calibration is shown on Page 40. The Direct Pressure Torquemeter installation was calibrated with a Dead Weight Tester and is shown on Page 42. The Tachometer calibration shown on Page 43 used a master tachometer for the calibration.

The manifold pressure gage calibration on Page 44 was made against a master manometer. The fuel flowmeters were calibrated with a dual master rotometer.

10. Flight Test Logs

Pages 46 through 54 are Flight Test Logs of all the data obtained on the Test Flights.

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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. All airplanes should be equipped with two thermocouples per engine, one on Cylinder A-4 and one on Cylinder B-1.

2. All airplanes should have dampeners installed in the Magnesyn Torquemeter System. The dampeners tested by the 8th Air Force Operational Engineering Section eliminated the objectionable oscillation encountered with the Magnesyn installation, and makes possible the establishment of correct powers by use of torquemeters.

3. That flight tests be conducted for performance data on all airplanes where modification changes affect the external configuration.

4. That each Air Force base utilizing bombardment type aircraft be authorized sufficient equipment for proper instrument calibration.

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AIRSPEED CALIBRATIONS

FIGURES 1 & 2

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

Fig. 1

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

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8th AF Operational Engineering Section

FIG. 2

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NAUTICAL MILES PER POUND CURVES

FIGURES 3 THRU 16

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

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

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Fig. 4

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

B-50A "KB"

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Fig. 5

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

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Fig. 6

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

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

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Fig. 8

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

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

O-0629 19 Fig. 10

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

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

O-0629 21 Fig. 12

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

Fig. 13
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

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

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Fig. 15
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

Fig. 16

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POWER SCHEDULES

FIGURES 17 THRU 20

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

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TIPS MI TABLE
P-47D4 SCHEDULE - R-4360-35 Engines CH-7 Turbo Use Auto Rich Above 1675 BHP
Grade 100/130 Fuel
250C CAT

APPROXIMATE MP REQUIRED WITH ALTITUDE

RPM	BHP	BMEP	S.L.	5000'	10000'	15000'	20000'	25000'	30000'	35000'	CTL. MP. LIMITS
2700	3000	TO/2ST	55.5	53.8	53.7	53.7	53.9	54.2	- -	- -	246
2550	2500	RP/AP	48.0	45.8	45.5	45.4	45.3	45.4	45.7	- -	248
2500	2360	171	43.6	43.0	42.6	42.5	42.3	42.9	43.4	44.2	249
2450	2225	165	41.6	41.1	40.8	40.9	40.7	41.0	41.5	42.5	246
2400	2080	157	39.3	38.8	38.5	38.3	38.2	38.1	38.6	39.6	249
2350	1950	151	37.8	37.3	37.1	36.9	36.7	36.8	37.3	38.1	246
2300	1900	150	37.5	37.1	36.8	36.7	36.5	36.4	36.7	37.8	246
2250	1860	150	36.5	36.1	35.8	35.7	35.5	35.4	35.7	36.8	249
2200	1815	150	36.1	35.7	35.5	35.3	35.1	35.0	35.5	36.6	246
2150	1775	150	35.8	35.4	35.2	35.0	34.8	34.8	35.3	36.3	246
2100	1735	150	35.3	34.9	34.6	34.5	34.3	34.3	34.8	35.8	246
2050	1695	150	35.2	34.9	34.6	34.5	34.3	34.4	34.8	35.9	249
2000	1650	150	37.7	37.4	37.2	37.0	36.8	36.9	37.2	38.5	232
1950	1610	150	37.5	37.2	36.9	36.8	36.6	36.8	37.1	38.3	232
1900	1570	150	37.3	37.3	38.0	38.6	39.1	39.6	40.3	41.4	232
1850	1530	150	37.1	37.8	37.8	38.3	38.8	39.3	40.0	1950 36.7	232
1800	1485	150	36.9	36.8	37.5	38.1	38.5	39.0	39.7	1900 38.2	232
1750	1445	150	38.7	36.5	37.4	37.9	38.3	38.8	1800 38.3	1900 37.3	232
1700	1405	150	36.6	36.3	37.2	37.7	38.1	38.6	1800 37.0	1900 36.2	232
1650	1365	150	36.5	36.2	37.1	37.6	38.0	1700 37.0	1800 36.0	1900 35.1	232
1600	1320	150	36.2	36.0	37.0	37.6	37.8	1700 36.1	1800 35.1	1900 34.4	232
1550	1280	150	36.1	36.0	37.0	37.7	1800 36.8	1700 35.2	1800 34.2	1850 34.2	232
1500	1240	150	36.0	36.0	36.9	38.0	1550 36.0	1650 34.0	1750 34.0	1850 33.2	232
1450	1200	150	35.9	36.1	36.9	36.9	1500 36.0	1650 34.0	1750 33.0	1850 32.0	232
1400	1155	150	36.0	36.3	36.8	1450 36.0	1500 34.0	1650 33.0	1750 31.8	1850 31.0	232
1350	1115	150	36.1	36.6	36.4	1450 35.2	1500 34.2	1650 32.2	1750 31.0	1850 29.3	232
1300	1075	150	36.5	37.1	1350 36.2	1450 34.0	1450 34.5	1600 32.0	1750 30.0	1850 29.8	232
1250	1035	150	37.1	37.7	1350 35.0	1400 33.5	1450 33.2	1600 30.5	1750 29.5	1800 29.0	232
1200	990	150	38.4	38.4	1300 35.3	1400 33.0	1450 32.0	1600 29.5	1700 28.5	1800 28.5	232
1200	934	140	36.3	36.3	1250 35.0	1350 32.8	1400 31.0	1450 28.8	1650 27.6	1750 27.0	232
1200	880	130	34.2	34.1	1250 33.3	1350 30.0	1400 29.3	1450 27.3	1650 26.2	1750 25.5	232
1200	795	120	32.0	31.9	32.1	1350 29.5	1350 28.2	1450 25.8	1600 25.5	1750 24.0	232
1200	730	110	30.0	29.9	29.9	1300 27.2	1350 26.0	1400 25.0	1450 24.5	1700 23.2	232
1200	665	100	27.9	27.8	27.7	1250 25.0	1300 25.0	1400 25.0	1400 23.2	1650 23.5	232
1200	595	90	25.8	25.8	25.5	25.4	1250 25.0	1350 23.5	1400 23.0	1600 21.2	232

NOTES: The RPM & MP Settings Within The Bracket are To Be Used To Obtain The Recommended Power Where Normal Power Settings Will Be Limited By Closed Waste Gate or Surge.

Correct MP .1" for Each 3° Variation In CAT.

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9th AF Operational Engineering Section
Fig. 18

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TYPE XI TABLE

Power Schedule - R-1360-35 Engine CH-7 Turbo
Grade 115/145 Fuel
25°C CAT MP REQUIRED WITH ALTITUDE

RPM	BHP	BM&P	S.L.	5000'	10000'	15000'	20000'	25000'	30000'	35000'	CYL. HD. LIMITS
2700	3500	T.O. Wet	60	58.7	58.8	58.8	58.8	60.4	——	——	219°C
2700	3250	T.O. DRY	60	58.3	58.2	58.2	58.4	58.8	——	——	249
2550	2650	R.P. A.R.	50.5	48.3	48.0	47.9	47.8	47.9	48.4	——	249
2550	2650	R.P. A.R.	49.0	46.9	46.7	46.6	46.5	46.6	47.2	——	249
2500	2500	161	44.3	43.7	43.3	43.2	43.0	43.6	44.1	44.9	249
2450	2350	173	42.6	42.1	41.8	41.7	42.5	41.8	42.3	43.3	249
2400	2210	167	41.6	41.1	40.8	40.6	40.5	40.6	41.1	42.1	232
2350	2070	161	40.8	40.3	40.1	39.9	39.7	39.8	40.3	41.1	232
2300	1900	150	40.1	39.7	39.4	39.3	39.1	39.0	39.3	40.4	232
2250	1860	150	39.6	39.2	38.9	38.8	38.6	38.5	38.8	39.9	232
2200	1815	150	39.1	38.7	38.5	38.3	38.1	38.0	38.5	39.6	232
2150	1775	150	38.7	38.3	38.1	37.9	37.7	37.7	38.2	39.2	232
2100	1735	150	38.4	38.0	37.7	37.6	37.4	37.4	37.9	38.9	232
2050	1695	150	38.0	37.7	37.4	37.3	37.1	37.2	37.6	38.7	232
2000	1650	150	37.7	37.4	37.2	37.0	36.8	36.9	37.2	38.5	232
1950	1610	150	37.5	37.2	36.9	36.8	36.6	36.8	37.1	38.3	232
1900	1570	150	37.3	37.3	38.0	36.6	39.1	37.6	40.3	41.1	232
1850	1530	150	37.1	37.8	37.8	36.3	38.8	39.3	40.0	1950 36.7	232
1800	1485	150	36.9	36.8	37.5	36.1	36.5	39.0	39.7	1900 36.2	232
1750	1445	150	36.7	36.5	37.4	37.9	36.3	38.8	1800 38.3	1900 37.3	232
1700	1405	150	36.6	36.3	37.2	37.7	38.1	38.6	1800 37.0	1900 36.2	232
1650	1365	150	36.5	36.2	37.1	37.6	38.0	1700 37.8	1800 36.0	1900 35.1	232
1600	1320	150	36.2	36.0	37.0	37.6	37.8	1700 36.1	1800 35.1	1900 34.1	232
1550	1280	150	36.1	36.0	37.0	37.7	1600 36.8	1700 35.2	1800 34.2	1850 34.2	232
1500	1240	150	36.0	36.0	36.9	38.0	1550 36.0	1650 35.0	1750 34.0	1850 33.2	232
1450	1200	150	35.9	36.1	36.9	36.9	1500 36.0	1650 34.0	1750 33.0	1850 32.0	232
1400	1155	150	36.0	36.3	36.8	1150 36.0	1500 35.0	1650 33.0	1750 31.8	1850 31.0	232
1350	1115	150	36.1	36.6	36.4	1150 35.2	1500 34.2	1650 32.2	1750 31.0	1850 29.3	232
1300	1075	150	36.5	37.1	1350 36.2	1150 36.0	1150 34.3	1600 36.0	1750 30.0	1850 29.6	232
1250	1035	150	37.1	37.7	1350 35.0	1100 33.5	1150 33.2	1600 30.5	1750 29.3	1800 29.0	232
1200	990	150	38.1	38.4	1300 33.3	1100 33.0	1150 32.0	1600 29.5	1700 28.9	1800 28.5	232
1200	950	140	36.3	36.3	1250 32.0	1350 32.2	1100 31.0	1550 28.8	1650 27.6	1750 27.0	232
1200	860	130	34.2	34.1	1250 31.3	1350 30.0	1100 29.3	1350 27.3	1650 26.2	1750 25.5	232
1200	795	120	32.0	31.9	32.1	1300 29.5	1350 28.2	1350 25.6	1600 25.5	1750 24.0	232
1200	730	110	30.0	29.9	29.9	1300 27.5	1350 26.5	1300 25.0	1350 24.5	1700 23.8	232
1200	665	100	27.9	27.8	27.7	1250 26.8	1300 26.0	1100 25.0	1300 23.2	1650 22.5	232
1200	595	90	25.8	25.6	25.5	25.4	1250 25.0	1150 25.0	1100 23.0	1600 21.8	232

NOTES: The RPM & MP Settings Within The Brackets Are To Be Used To Obtain The Recommended Power Where Normal Power Settings Will Be Limited By Closed Waste Gate Or Surge.

Correct MP .1" For Each 3°Variation In CAT.

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8TH AF Operational Engineering Section
Fig. 19

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

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RANGE DATA

FIGURES 21 & 22

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

Fig. 21

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

Fig. 22

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OPERATIONAL CURVES

FIGURES 23 & 24

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

Fig. 23
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

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FUEL CONSUMPTION CURVES

FIGURES 25 & 26

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

Fig. 2c Section 3c
B-50A "MB" Operational Engineering Data

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

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POWER REQUIRED CURVES

FIGURES 27 & 28

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

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

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COOLING DATA

FIGURES 29 THRU 31

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

Fig. 29

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

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Fig. 30

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

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

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INSTRUMENT CALIBRATIONS

FIGURES 32 THRU 36

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

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

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

O-0629 42 Fig. 33

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

Fig. 34

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

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

Fig. 36

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FLIGHT TEST LOGS

PAGES 46 THRU 54

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FLIGHT ENGINEERS LOG SHEET

DATE 21 JAN 91 A/C SER NO. 86-0032 SHEET NO. 1

FROM KAFB, Albuquerque, N. Mex. MODEL B-1B (Lancer Multi-role)

TO KAFB START ENGINES 1031 TEST NO. 2

COND	TIME SET	TIME TOTAL	PRESS ALT	OAT °C INST	OAT °C CORR	IAS	TAS MPH	TAS KNOTS	COMP RELEP AND	CYL HEAD TEMP			WATER CLR AND	OAT	DIV DUTY	M A I N	NAP	RPM INST	RPM CORR	TORQUE PSI INST	TORQUE PSI CORR	BHP	FUEL FLOW INST	FUEL FLOW CORR	SPD	FUEL USED IN LBS	FUEL REMAINING FLOWMR	FUEL REMAINING GABE	GROSS WT	DIST K MI
Taxi	1054		1548	34.5												A	1		2700										181186	
Run up	1057															A	2									500			180686	
Taxi	1103		1562	34.6												A	5													
TAKEOFF	1103															A	4									824			179862	
BOW "A"	1107	121	1,200±	32.7	+5.7	278.9	324.7	282.1	97	224			99	81.8	75	B	1	86	7697	4567	4577	3378	4331	1745	1756	1,005	2395		1158	177467	
									97	224			99	82.9	77.5	B	2	84.8	7680	3913	3928	2513	2349	1504	1506	1,276			1265		
Cable Areas Diff = "B"									97	222			99	83.0	78	B	3	84.9	7702	3733	3736	2424	2418	1555	1560	1,275			1217		
Run	1120								97	220			99	83.3	78	B	4	85.3	7743	3764	3778	2513	2478	1756	1739	1,268			1156		
TAKEOFF	1130	132														A	1		2056								1345			116680	
																A	2													
																A	3													
																A	4													
BOW "A"	1147	148	1,040±	+5.8	+22.3	278.9	324.5	282.0	97	228			99	92.9		B	1	91.9	8486	5073	5067	3747	4794	2090	2070	.758	1078			115096	
									97	231			99	93.4		B	2	91.3	8348	4968	4965	3683	4668	2020	2043	.803					
Cable Areas Diff = "B"									97	228			99	93.5		B	3	91.3	8501	5088	5084	3783	4801	2045	2041	.720					
Run	1213								97	225			99	93.6		B	4	91.8	8490	5113	5108	3803	4808	2055	2082	.758					
BOW "A"	1229	164	1,040±	+5.8	+22.3	278.9	324.5	282.0	97	243			99	96.4		B	1	96.4	8617	5252	5254	3906	4784	2178	2180	.726	1062			114179	
									97	243			99	96.9		B	2	94.9	8518	5109	5114	3798	4662	2082	2073	.720					
Cable Areas Diff = "B"									97	239			99	97.0		B	3	95.7	8593	5201	5206	3870	4709	2120	2121	.674					
Run	1239								97	240			99	97.1		B	4	96.2	8642	5240	5245	3899	4765	2138	2139	.729					
LANDING	1247																1												114721	
																	2													
																	3													
																	4													
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B-1B "A"

Flt AF Operational Engineering Section

FORM 6020

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FLIGHT ENGINEERS LOG SHEET

DATE [illegible] A/C SER NO [illegible] SHEET NO 1

FROM [illegible] MODEL [illegible]

TO [illegible] START ENGINES [illegible]

COND	TIME SET	TIME TOTAL	PRESS ALT	OAT °C INST	OAT °C CORR	IAS	TAS	TAS MPH	TAS KNOTS	CYL HEAD TEMP °C FLAP AND	CYL HEAD TEMP °C	CYL HEAD TEMP °C	INTER CLR AND	CAT	DIG DUTY	M & S	MAP	RPM INST	RPM CORR	TORQUE PSI INST	TORQUE PSI CORR	BHP	FUEL FLOW INST	FUEL FLOW CORR	SFC	FUEL USED IN LBS	FUEL REMAINING FLOWMTR	FUEL REMAINING GAGE	GROSS WT	DIST K MI
ST BD	[illegible]															1														
TAKE	[illegible]															2														
CLIMB	[illegible]															3														
CRUISE	[illegible]															4														
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]														1														
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FLIGHT ENGINEERS LOG SHEET

DATE [illegible] A/C SER NO. [illegible] SHEET NO. 1

FROM Wright Patterson AFB MODEL [illegible] (Flight modified)

TO [illegible] START ENGINES [illegible]

CONFIG	TIME SET	TIME TOTAL	PRESS ALT	OAT °C INST	OAT °C CORR	IAS	TIAS	TAS MPH	TAS KNOTS	DOOR FLAP AND	CYL HEAD TEMP		INTER CLR AND	OAT	CYL QUTY	M I S T	ENG	MAP	RPM INST	RPM CORR	TORQUE PSI INST	TORQUE PSI CORR	BHP	FUEL FLOW INST	FUEL FLOW CORR	SFC	FUEL USED IN LBS	FUEL REMAINING FLOWMTR	FUEL REMAINING GAGE	GROSS WT	DIST K MI.
[illegible]																A	1														
																A	2														
																A	3														
																A	4														
																A	1														
[illegible]																A	2														
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																A	4														
																A	1	17.5													
																A	2	15.4													
																A	3	14.0													
																A	4	14.4													
																A	1	16.6													
																A	2	15.0													
																A	3	13.9													
																A	4	14.0													
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																A	2	15.4													
																A	3	15.4													
																A	4	15.6													
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																A	4	14.0													
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FLIGHT ENGINEERS LOG SHEET

DATE
FROM
TO
A/C SER NO.
MODEL
START ENGINES

SHEET NO. 2

GMD	TIME SET	TIME TOTAL	PRESS ALT	CAT °C INST	CAT °C CORR	IAS	TIAS	TAS MPH	TAS KNOTS	PROP RPM ANG	CYL HEAD TEMP		INTER CLR ANG	OIL CAT	OIL DUTY	MIX	ENG	MAP	RPM INST	RPM CORR	TORQUE PSI INST	TORQUE PSI CORR	BHP	FUEL FLOW INST	FUEL FLOW CORR	SFC	FUEL USED IN LBS	FUEL REMAINING FLOWMTR	FUEL REMAINING GAGE	GROSS WT	DIST K MI

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FLIGHT ENGINEERS LOG SHEET

DATE [illegible] A/C SER NO. [illegible] SHEET NO. 3

FROM Kelly, Brooks, & Fox MODEL [illegible] TAIL NO. 3

TO [illegible] START ENGINES [illegible]

CORD	TIME SET	TIME TOTAL	PRESS ALT	OAT °C INST	OAT °C CORR	IAS	TAS	TAS MPH	TAS KNOTS	COWL FLAP ANG	CYL HEAD TEMP			INTER CLR ANG	OAT	OIL QUTY	R E C T	MAP	RPM INST	RPM CORR	TORQUE PSI INST	TORQUE PSI CORR	BHP	FUEL FLOW INST	FUEL FLOW CORR	SFC	FUEL USED IN LBS	FUEL REMAINING FLOW/MR	FUEL REMAINING GAGE	GROSS WT.	DIST K MI.
RON *1*	1113	:12	10000	7.7	-.6	277.0	273.8	320.5	278.7	4.0	232			0	25		R 1	54.0	2030	2160	744.0	794.5	2565	1540	1551	.721	4366			111611	
										3.0	232			3.8	28		R 2	54.0	2050	2217	756.0	817.5	2705	2065	2084	.757					
										4.2	232			2.2	24		R 3	49.3	1990	2089	743.5	794.0	2573	1535	1545	.747					
	Oil Cooler =		0							3.3	232			4.4	25		R 4	48.0	2030	2171	743.5	836.0	2709	1660	1799	.747					
RON *2*	1204	:07	10400	7.8	-.5	283.8	276.5	327.5	275.7	4	228			5	8		R 1	48.3	2050	2160	772.5	794.0	2626	1620	1643	.695	854			112654	
										5	228			5	21		R 2	47.8	2030	2203	764	836.5	2736	2026	2054	.758					
										5	227			5	23		R 3	47.2	2030	2089	743	794.5	2578	1580	1673	.674					
										5	232			5	19		R 4	46.7	2060	2171	743.5	836.0	2787	1695	1833	.738					
RON *3*	1248	:44															1							1807	1905		1374			114154	
																	2							2026	2023						
	Delta Diff. =	1.2															3							1824	1814						
																	4							1906	1888						
RON *4*	1293	:07	10930	-7.5	-17.5	276.5	256.2	295.6	256.8	4	232			-.2	27		R 1	45	2030	2160	740.5	842.5	2665	1512	1554	.729	675			117772	
										4.3	232			1.9	28		R 2	50.5	2050	2163	764.5	838.5	2824	2078							
	Delta Diff. =	3.8								6	230			0.7	22		R 3	48.0	2030	2088	743.5	842.5	2855	1545	1551	.726					
										5.3	232			2.9	28		R 4	47.7	2060	2171	743.5	836.5	2830	1570	1558	.743					
RON *5*	1330	:21	20000	-9	-17.7	230.3	219.2	264.9	229.8	7.1	232			0	29		R 1	54.4	2300	2329	1206.0	1234.4	3321	1691	1636	.491	748			107457	
										8.1	232			1	31		R 2	54.0	2300	2364	1212.0	1286.6	3547	2089	2073	.582					
	Delta Diff. =	6.7								7.3	232			1	34		R 3	54.3	2186	2237	1183.5	1285.4	3393	1092	1083	.320					
										6.6	232			1	29		R 4	53.7	2300	2330	1187.5	1284.1	3460	884	870	.255					
RON *6*	1345	:10	20000	-16.8	-17.7	274.3	232.9	264.9	230.0	8.7	232			-.1	27		R 1	54.3	2100	2168	1255.7	1246.1	3680	885	873	.520	881			108371	
										8.2	232			1.1	29		R 2	53.9	2080	2095	1233	1286.8	3853	875	867	.521					
	Delta Diff. =	6.8								7.2	232			.2	26		R 3	54.3	2065	2027	1210	1246.8	3549	890	831	.504					
										5.0	232			.7	32		R 4	54.0	2075	2027	1197	1284.9	3720	930	854	.494					
RON *7*	1413	:10	20000	-11.7	-17.9	276.7	249.1	286.4	248.8	7.4	232			1.7	29		R 1	51.2	1800	1793	1195.9	1246.9	3424	1205	1211	.463	625			110732	
										7.3	232			1.0	31		R 2	54.4	1800	1793	1214	1285.9	3661	1260	1241	.468					
	Delta Diff. =	6.7								5.0	232			3.2	28		R 3	54.4	1810	1804	1215.5	1255.3	3524	1187	1105	.439					
										5.5	232			1.7	27		R 4	51.5	1770	1817	1150	1247.0	3464	1070	1056	.448					
RON *8*	1508	:10	19950	-10.1	-17.4	275.5	275.8	317.4	273.5	8	232			2	32		R 1	50.1	1805	1810	1170	1276.4	3598	1144	1140	.418	411			105835	
										8	232			2.6	30		R 2	50.4	1780	1808	1183	1282.5	3700	1200	1185	.463					
	Delta Diff. =	6.7								7.3	232			1.2	34		R 3	49.7	1761	1767	1184.6	1284.7	3690	1200	1195	.484					
										7	230			1.0	33		R 4	51.1	1800	1809	1181.0	1282.9	3700	1090	1085	.430			105827	

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FLIGHT ENGINEERS LOG SHEET

DATE 18 Feb 53
FROM Hqtr, Everett, Wash.
TO Hqtr
A/C SER NO 52-1025
MODEL B-47B (Wichita Modified)
START ENGINES 1105
Test No. 4
SHEET NO 2

COND	TIME SET	TIME TOTAL	PRESS ALT	OAT °C INST	OAT °C CORR	IAS	TIAS	TAS MPH	TAS KNOTS	COWL FLAP ANG	OIL HEAD TEMP			INTER CLR ANG	OAT	OIL QUTY	M A T	E G	MAP	RPM INST	RPM CORR	TORQUE PSI INST	TORQUE PSI CORR	BHP	FUEL FLOW INST	FUEL FLOW CORR	SFC	FUEL USED IN LBS	FUEL REMAINING GAGE	FUEL REMAINING FLOWMTR	GROSS WT	DIST K MI
																	1	1														
																	2	2														
																	3	3														
																	4	4														
																	1	1														
																	2	2														
																	3	3														
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5th AF Operational Engineering Section

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FLIGHT ENGINEERS LOG SHEET

DATE _____ A/C SER NO. _____ SHEET NO. 1

FROM _____ MODEL _____

TO _____ START ENGINES _____

COND	TIME SET	TIME TOTAL	PRESS ALT	OAT °C INST	OAT °C CORR	IAS	TAS	TAS MPH	TAS KNOTS	COMP BLEED AMS	OIL TEMP °C	CYL HEAD TEMP °C	INTER CLR AND	CAT °C	OIL QUTY	MIX	PROP	MAP	RPM INST	RPM CORR	TORQUE PSI INST	TORQUE PSI CORR	BHP	FUEL FLOW INST	FUEL FLOW CORR	SFC	FUEL USED IN LBS	FUEL REMAINING FLOWMTR	FUEL REMAINING GAGE	GROSS WT.	DIST K MI
																														INITIAL	
															75	R	1														
															70	R	2														
															70	R	3														
															72	R	4														
																R	1														
																R	2														
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FLIGHT ENGINEERS LOG SHEET

DATE 21 February 1956 — A/C SER NO. 56-502 — SHEET NO. 1

FROM Kelly Hickam, T. Hawaii — MODEL B-52A

TO Local — START ENGINES 1515 — TEST NO. 6

COND	TIME SET	TIME TOTAL	PRESS ALT	OAT °C INST	OAT °C CORR	IAS (mph)	TAS	TGS MPH	TGS KNOTS	COWL FLAP ANG	CYL HEAD TEMP			INTER CLR ANG	CAT	OIL QUTY	ENG	MAP	RPM INST	RPM CORR	TORQUE PSI INST	TORQUE PSI CORR	B.H.P.	FUEL FLOW INST	FUEL FLOW CORR	SFC	FUEL USED IN LBS	FUEL REMAINING FLOMETER	FUEL REMAINING GAGE	GROSS WT.	DIST K. MI.
TAXI	1549																1														
T.O.	1603																2														
																	3														
																	4														
NEW A	1618		10,000	10.5		256	272.5			5	230			5	18		1	50.3	2540		243		2665	1955							
										5	233			5	16		2	46.1	2535		240		2569	2145							
										5	231			5	19		3	45.5	2540		242		2612	1905							
										5	200			5	17		4	25.7	2555		233		2532	1950					94758		
NEW B	1629		10,000	10.4		273.5	290.3			5	226			5	14		1	44.7	2485		219		2360	1520							
										5	224			5	22		2	42.9	2490		220		2325	1730							
										5	225			5	25		3	40.3	2500		218		2315	1510							
										5	200			5	20		4		2505		213		2317	1690					93370		
NEW C	1636		10,000	9.7		263.5	280.3			5	220			5	11		1	40.1	2395		202		2080	1215							
										5	217			5	15		2	38.4	2395		202		2054	1360							
										5	226			5	23		3	36.8	2410		204		2050	1220							
										5	208			5	17		4		2405		201		2054	1325					92770		
ROD	1649		10,000	8.5		255.5	270.3			5	217			5	9		1	36.9	2350		192		1928	1075							
										5	213			5	13		2	35.9	2340		190.5		1882	1165							
										5	207			5	23		3	34.1	2370		196.5		1920	1055							
										5	208			5	16		4		2370		192		1940	1230					92180		
NEW A	1650		10,000	9.5		260.5	275.7			5	226			5	13		1	42.7	2440		212		2230	1390							
										5	220			5	22		2	41.7	2435		212		2175	1560							
										5	220			5	25		3	38.9	2455		211.5		2202	1390							
										5	204			5	17		4		2460		210.5		2175	1505					91951		
TAXI BACK	1655																1														
LAND	1716																2														
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B-52A Test

6th AF Operational Engineering Section

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FLIGHT ENGINEERS LOG SHEET

DATE 25 February 1954 A/C SER NO 40-980 SHEET NO 1

FROM Kelly Roswell, N Mex MODEL B-50A TEST NO. 7

TO Local START ENGINES 1015

COND	TIME SET	TIME TOTAL	PRESS ALT	OAT °C INST	OAT °C CORR	IAS MACH	TIAS	TAS MPH	TAS KNOTS	OVR FLD AMB	CYL HEAD TEMP			INTER CLR AMB	CAT	OIL DILUTN	ENG	MAP	RPM INST	RPM CORR	TORQUE PSI INST	TORQUE PSI CORR	BHP	FUEL FLOW INST	FUEL FLOW CORR	SFC	FUEL USED IN LBS	FUEL REMAINING FLOWMTR	FUEL REMAINING GAGE	GROSS WT	DIST K MI
																														Initial	
TO	1105																1													97472	
																	2														
																	3													WL 43 AGL AT TO	
																	4													96472	
CLIMB	1111																1						1960								
																	2						2187								
																	3						1996	5241 FF							
																	4						2038	8051						95758	
RDR 4	1116		10,000	5.6		287.1				5	222			5	13			1	51.0	2545		287			1885						
MAP	1119									5	219			5	25			2	51.0	2550		286.5			2235						
										5	228			5	24			3	45.9	2565		294.5			1935						
										5	201			5	22			4	0	2570		294.5			2080	8195				95252	
RDR 3	1120		10,000	6.8		286.5				5	215			5	9			1	46.1	2445		216.5			1485						
MAP	1124									5	211			5	18			2	46.6	2435		214.5			1915						
										5	230			5	21			3	38.4	2460		211.0			1335						
										5	201			5	17			4	0	2465		210			1990	5795				94668	
RDR 2	1129		9,975	8.5		287.7				5	217			5	8			1	38.6	2400		200			1215						
MAP	1133									5	212			5	18			2	37.7	2385		198.5			1525						
										5	225			5	21			3	35.8	2420		199.5			1185						
										5	203			5	15			4	0	2415		202			1950	5675				94018	
RDR 1	1134		10,000	8.8		274.5				5	219			5	10			1	44.6	2405		220			1520						
MAP	1139									5	214			5	20			2	44.0	2490		218.5			1755						
										5	234			5	21			3	40.1	2505		218.5			1510						
										5	200			5	18			4	0	2500		219.5			1880	6425				93017	
RDR 5	1141		9,930	7.6		282.8				5	212			5	22			1	35.7	2295		168			1010						
FIRE										5	211			5	17			2	35.3	2290		199			1135						
FIRE										5	227			5	21			3	33.8	2305		192			1005						
MAP	1148									5	208			5	19			4	0	2300		198.5			1085	7815				92716	
RDR 7	1149		9,980	7.9		285.3				5	208			5	25			1	34.8	2220		187			965						
F F										5	212			5	16			2	33.0	2220		182			1010						
MAP	1153									5	217			5	18			3	30.7	2230		173.5			885						
										5	197			5	18			4	0	2285		179			970	5810				92505	

B-50A "BW"

5th AF Operational Engineering Section

FORM 6020

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TEST AIRCRAFT PHOTOGRAPHS

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

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

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

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

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

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

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FOREWORD

SAC Communication Instructions is the basic Communications plan for operation within SAC organizations and is effective upon receipt unless otherwise indicated. This publication supersedes SAC CI dated 1 November 1946 and all changes thereto.

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INDEX
NO 1-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
15 August 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

TITLE OF ITEM	CI NO.	DATE OF CURRENT ISSUE
Index to CI	1-1	21 July 1947
Distribution	2-1	21 July 1947
General Instructions	3-1	21 July 1947
Index to Regulations and Orders on Communications	4-1	21 July 1947
Frequency Assignments	8-1	21 July 1947
MF & HF Universal and Common Frequencies	8-2	21 July 1947
MF & HF Frequency Assignments	8-3	21 July 1947
MF Frequency Assignment for Air-to-Air Homing	8-4	21 July 1947
Criminal Investigation Frequencies and Call Signs	8-5	21 July 1947
VHF Universal and Common Frequencies	10-1	21 July 1947
VHF Frequency Assignments	10-2	21 July 1947
VHF Channel Assignments	10-3	21 July 1947
GCA Frequency Assignments	10-4	21 July 1947
VHF Point-to-Point Frequency Assignments	10-5	21 July 1947
Numerical Index of Operating and Fundamental Crystal Frequencies (VHF)	10-6	21 July 1947

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TITLE OF ITEM	CI NO.	DATE OF CURRENT ISSUE
263rd Radar Bomb Scoring Detachment Radio Net	11-1	21 July 1947
Tactical Radio Call Signs	12-1	21 July 1947
Aircraft Radio Call Signs	12-2	21 July 1947
Ground Station VHF/DF Call Signs	12-3	21 July 1947
Radio-Telephone Call Words	14-1	15 Aug 1947
Direction Finding (D/F) Procedures	16-1	21 July 1947
Emergency Communications Procedures	18-1	21 July 1947
Time Equivalents	20-1	21 July 1947
Air Rescue Service	22-1	21 July 1947
Commercial Teletype Facilities	26-1	21 July 1947
Tactical Teletypewriter Call Signs	28-1	21 July 1947
Army Teletypewriter Exchange	30-1	21 July 1947
Special Message Handling Procedure	32-1	21 July 1947
VLR Communications With Strategic Air Command Aircraft	34-1	21 July 1947
Long Range Communications Facilities	36-1	21 July 1947
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Radio Log For Fox Type Broadcast	40-1A	13 Aug 1947

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

For P. M. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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CI 2-1
2 Pages
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS
DISTRIBUTION
NO. 2-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

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ORGANIZATION	COMPLETE SERIES CI NUMBER OF COPIES
CG Army Air Forces	2
CG Army Air Forces Training Command	2
CG Air Defense Command	2
CG Strategic Air Command	2
CG Tactical Air Command	1
CG Air Materiel Command	2
CG Air University	2
CG Fifteenth Air Force	5
CG Eighth Air Force	5
Communications Officer Strategic Air Command	20
CG Andrews Field	5
CG MacDill Field	5
CG 311th Rcn Wg	5
CG Air Transport Command	2
CG Airways and Air Communications Service	2
CO 30th Comm Sq	2
CO 263rd AAF Base Unit RBS	15
CO Senior Staff Communications Officers School	2

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NOTE: Any changes desired in the distribution list above should be made known to this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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R E S T R I C T E D

COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTIONS CI 3-1

1 Page
Page 1

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
NO. 3-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. Communication Instructions will be classified and safeguarded in accordance with AR 380-5 and other AAF and WD publications pertinent to the safeguarding of classified documents. Complete Communication Instructions, when bound as a single document, will bear the highest classification of items contained therein.

2. Revisions and additions to this CI will be made as required. Items superseded by revisions will be destroyed by burning not earlier than five days after the effective date of supersession. A report is not required of the destruction of CI's published by this Headquarters.

3. a. Subordinate headquarters of SAC listed in CI 2-1 are hereby directed to publish and maintain current CI's for the benefit of organizations under the jurisdiction of their command. Two copies each of these CI's will be forwarded to this Headquarters.

b. Only such extracts of CI's as may be required for immediate tactical, simulated tactical or training operations will be carried by aircraft.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Tate

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

INDEX TO REGULATIONS AND ORDERS ON COMMUNICATIONS

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

This Section, the index to Regulations and Orders on communications will be revised semi-annually by this headquarters and subordinate commands will be responsible for the changes and revisions during the interim periods.

ARMY AIR FORCES REGULATIONS

NUMBER	DATE	TITLE
100-1	29 Apr 47	Communications Publications Files
100-2	20 Nov 43	Army Airways Communications System
100-2A	30 Nov 43	Army Airways Communications System
100-2B	3 Apr 44	Army Airways Communications System
100-6	7 Sep 43	Contacts by AAF Pilots with CAA Radio Range Stations in Continental United States
100-8	26 Feb 45	Message Identification
100-9	21 Feb 45	Radio Call Signs for Aircraft
100-10	4 Jul 45	Transmission of Aircraft Movement Messages
100-10A	26 Nov 45	Transmission of Aircraft Movement Messages
100-11	7 Apr 47	Monitoring of Communications Instructions
100-13	13 Jul 44	AAF Teletypewriter Private Lines Net Control
100-15	15 Aug 46	Fixed Communications Systems and Facilities
100-15A	9 Jan 47	Fixed Communications Systems and Facilities

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STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND REGULATIONS

NUMBER	DATE	TITLE
50-8	19 Jun 47	Training Program for Fiscal Year 1948
100-1	7 Feb 47	Use of Very High Frequencies by VHF Aircraft
100-2	27 Dec 46	Fixed Communications Systems and Facilities
100-4	18 Jan 46	Commercial Communications Facilities
100-5	26 Dec 46	Distribution of Signal Operation Procedures Communications
100-7	6 Nov 46	Radio Notes

AAF LETTERS

NUMBER	DATE	TITLE
100-3	30 Sep 46	Radio Frequencies, High Frequency Band
100-4	1 Sep 44	VHF Airport Control Radio Communications
100-5	26 Mar 47	Joint Communication Instructions
100-6	15 Aug 46	Priority for Urgent Telephone Calls Essential to the War Effort or Public Safety
100-7	20 Aug 46	Standard Ground Control Approach Frequency Assignments
100-8	14 Dec 44	Insecure Use of Converter M-209 ( )
100-10	22 Apr 46	Instructions for Avoiding Stereotypes in Classified Messages
100-11	30 Dec 44	Airways VHF Radio Facilities
100-12	2 Jan 45	Composite Standing Operating Procedure for Radio Sets SCR-602-A, AN/TPS-1, AN/TPS-1A and AN/TPS-3
100-13	18 Jan 45	Clarification of Radar Terminologies

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AAF LETTERS (cont'd)

NUMBER	DATE	TITLE
100-14	9 Sep 46	Distribution of Cryptographic Material
100-15	7 Apr 47	Procedures and Responsibilities for Operation of AAF Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) System
100-16	30 Oct 46	Use of Electrical Means of Communications
100-17	23 Feb 45	Intra-AAF Direction Finding (D/F) Procedure
100-18	20 Feb 45	Simultaneous Operation of Control Tower Radio Facilities on VHF and LF
100-21	1 Oct 45	Minimum Requirements of Air Crew Personnel in Use of International Morse Code
100-23	18 Jun 46	Installation of Weather Teletype and CAA Flight Control Facilities
100-24	25 Apr 45	Teletypewriter Exchange Service
100-25	19 Jul 46	Designation of Net Control Stations
100-26	5 Apr 44	Functions of a Radar Calibration Detachment
100-27	5 Apr 44	Functions of a Radar Calibration Detachment
100-32	4 Jan 46	I A U S C
100-34	12 Jul 45	R O C S
100-34A	11 Feb 46	
100-35	22 Mar 46	P F T E O I I. III T I A
100-[illegible]	18 Dec 44	Employment of Radio Set SCR-584 in Combined Air-Ground Operations
100-37	11 Jan 45	MEW Control Center
100-38	14 Feb 45	R S A W T A

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AAF LETTERS (cont'd)

NUMBER	DATE	TITLE
100-39	16 Feb 45	R T S
100-39A	28 May 45	
100-43	6 Apr 45	P C T O C M I A
100-44	11 Apr 45	P C T U O C C
100-45	23 Jan 46	Air-Sea Rescue Communications Plan
100-46	30 Apr 45	P G A O C E
100-48	7 Jul 45	P C D A D O C D O C M
100-51	15 May 45	Standardized Method of Addressing and Drafting Messages
100-52	15 May 45	Loss or Suspected Compromise of Cryptograph Material Issued for Use in Aircraft
100-53	14 Jul 45	Radio Interference Owing to Incorrect Adjustment of Airborne Radio Equipment
100-54	30 May 45	Chart Showing Assignment of Primary Communications Responsibilities within the AAF
100-56	10 Jul 45	A O I E
100-[illegible]	12 Jul 45	Summaries of Insecure Cryptographic Procedure
100-58A	7 Jan 46	
100-59	19 Jul 45	Procedure for Processing Requests for Airways Communications Facilities and Radio Navigational Aids
100-59A	12 Dec 45	
100-60	31 Jul 45	P F M L R A E I O E R S
100-61	2 Aug 45	Endings in Air-Ground Communications

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AAF LETTERS (cont'd)

NUMBER	DATE	TITLE
100-64	10 Sep 45	C C M
100-65	17 Sep 45	Handling and Transmission of Literal Plain-Text Copies of Messages
100-66	20 Sep 45	U O C M E
100-67	20 Sep 45	D O C C M I E O L S A I T A
100-68	25 Sep 45	Release of Information Concerning Cryptanalytic Activities
100-69	9 Oct 45	Comparisons of Quality of Radio Transmissions with Forecasts AFAAC of Radio Propagation
100-71	18 Oct 45	Declassified Radio Wave Propagation Data
100-73	16 Nov 45	Payments under Revocable Licenses for Pay Station Telephones
100-74	8 May 46	AAF Military Flight Service Communications System - Continental United States (Plan 62)
100-76	12 Dec 45	Classified Message Traffic
100-79	7 Jan 46	Radio Facility Charts
100-80 100-80A	19 Jul 46 24 Jan 47	Radio Frequency Allocations - 100-156 mcs
100-81	26 Jan 46	Reduction of Teletype and Telephone Messages
100-82	15 Apr 46	Transmission of Warnings of Ionospheric Disturbances from WWV
100-83	1 Apr 46	Establishment of Amateur Radio Stations at AAF Installations
100-84	2 Apr 46	Combined Teletypewriter Procedure
100-85	22 May 46	Reduction of Private Branch Exchange Telephone Plants
100-86	27 May 46	Radio Interference Reduction

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AAF LETTERS (cont'd)

NUMBER	DATE	TITLE
100-87	3 Jul 46	C I P
100-88	9 Jul 46	Army-Navy Electronic and Electrical Standards Agency
100-89	26 Aug 46	Standard VHF Crystallization
100-90	26 Aug 46	P O M O C E

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. Hutchison

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS
NO. 8-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. Universal and Common frequencies allocated for use with other forces or services are listed in CI 8-2 and CI 10-1.

2. MF and HF, frequency assignments are listed in CI 8-3.

3. VHF frequency assignments are listed in CI 10-2.

a. Assignments to subordinate organizations will be made on a basis to avoid intolerable interference and to insure maximum use of each frequency. Consideration will be given to wave propagation characteristics as well as to other users of the same or adjacent channels.

b. Power will be limited to the minimum required to provide reliable communications and will not, except in an emergency, exceed the maximum authorized.

c. Training in establishing nets may be conducted on a secondary basis provided that power is limited to 10 watts on practice point-to-point nets and to 25 watts on practice air-ground nets. Training in changing frequencies and tuning transmitters will be conducted using dummy antennas. Radio circuits will not be established merely to provide code practice.

d. Crash trucks and ambulances are assigned Army Airways Frequencies for emergency operations by airfields. Other ground-air training frequencies assigned to an airfield may be used for emergency communications in the crash net.

e. Local bombing and gunnery ranges will use the common bombing and gunnery range frequencies listed in CI 8-3 and CI 10-2 and/or the command frequency of the organizations using the range.

4. Requests for additional frequencies or revisions in frequency assignments will be made to this headquarters, ATTN: Communications & Electronics Section. Should include the following information:

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a. Means other than radio available.
b. Possibility of curtailing other services.
c. Evidence of inadequacy of current frequencies.
d. Frequency range and maximum power output of transmitter.
e. Minimum power and emission required.
f. Geographical location of antenna or, if airborne, the flight range.
g. Type of traffic to be handled.

5. A frequency in the VHF Spectrum has been set aside by Army Air Forces for flight line maintenance use. Request for the use of this frequency will follow the procedure of a normal frequency request.

6. Only Standard radio equipment or commercial equipment approved by Hq, Army Air Forces will be used. Assignments listed in CI 10-2 will be reassigned to subordinate units by means of CI's in accordance with the following conditio:

a. Maximum power output will not exceed 50 watts. A1, A2, A3, or F30 emission will be used.

b. In using frequencies in the 20 to 200 mc band, the following factors should also be taken into consideration:

(1) Frequencies in the 20 to 200 mc band are allocated to the Wa and Navy Departments and to other important non-government activities such as police, forest protection and special emergency services. It is the responsibility of the SAC organizations making use of these frequencies under the conditions of this authorization to avoid interference to the prior uses of these channels. This will be accomplished through local FCC coordination before using any frequency and operations will be terminated immediately upon notification of interference.

7. Interference to Communications should be accepted as a normal factor and should be tolerated unless of a disruptive character and extended in duration. Interference problems which cannot be resolved locally should be submitted directly in urgent cases and must contain the following information:

a. Frequencies involved.
b. Date and time interference existed.
c. Calls, operation agencies and locations of stations involved.
d. Type of emission used by each station.
e. Nature of radiation causing interference is fundamental, key clicks, etc.

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f. Type of traffic being handled by all stations involved.
g. Any other pertinent information.

8. Interference problems outside the United States will be handled in accordance with the policies of theater and similar commanders involved. Problem requiring coordination of higher headquarters will be forwarded through command channels to this headquarters, ATTN: Communications and Electronics Section.

9. Transmitters will be kept within the frequency tolerances of the assigned frequency. The standard frequencies broadcast by the Bureau of Standards radio station WWV will be used to calibrate frequency meters. Frequency tolerances considered permissible are as follows:

Class of Station	Below 30 mc Per Cent	30 mc and up Per Cent
Fixed	.01	.02
Land	.01	.02
Aeronautical Special	.01	.02
Hydrological & Meterological	.01	.02
Marine Broadcast	.01	.02
Marine Beacon	.01	.02
Portable	.02	.03
Mobile	.02	.03
Portable & Mobile, 1 watt or less	.02	.10
Standard Frequency	.00001	.00001
Aerological sounding	- - -	.30
Experimental	.04	.05

10. Units directly under SAC control are authorized to raise the classification of frequency assignments for use in manuevers or other special operations.

11. Nomenclature of frequencies are as follows:

Below 30 kcs - Very Low Frequencies (VLF)
30-300 kcs - Low Frequencies (LF)
300-3000 kcs - Medium Frequencies (MF)
3-30 mcs - High Frequencies (HF)
30-300 mcs - Very High Frequencies (VHF)
300-3000 mcs - Decimetre Waves (DCW) (1 to 0.1 Metre)
3000-30,000 - Centimetre Waves (0.1 to 0.01 Metre)

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

MF & HF UNIVERSAL AND COMMON FREQUENCIES

NO. 8-2

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

FREQ.	EMISSION	WATTS	UNIVERSAL AND COMMON ASSIGNMENT	APPLICATION AND REMARKS
333			All Government Agencies.	International general calling in connection with Transatlantic flt.
500			Normally used at sea.	International distress and calling universal.
536	A1,A2,A3	75	Used with SCR-287 or similar equipment and radio compass SCR-269.	Emergency homing where other navigational aids are lacking. Training in homing procedure on secondary non-interference basis.
1742	A1,A2,A3	75	Same as 536.	Same as 536.
1850	Special		Army and Navy.	Navigational aid, Loran system.
1950	Special		Army and Navy.	Navigational aid, Loran system.
2670	A3		Coast Guard, AAF Emergency liaison with Coast Guard.	For one Emergency use by authorized rescue boats.
2716	A3		All Naval Districts, AAF emergency liaison to Navy stations.	For Emergency use by authorized boats.
2738	A3		All Government agencies.	For working non-government coastal, harbor & ship phone stations.

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FREQ.	EMISSION	WATTS	UNIVERSAL & COMMON ASSIGNMENT	APPLICATION & REMARKS
2862	A3	1000	East Zone and West Zone Air/Ground stations of AAF Mil. Flt. Serv. Comm. System.	Local training missions. SEE AAF Manual 100-63-1.
2936	A3	1000	Central Zone Air/Ground Stations of Mil. Flt. Serv. Comm. System.	Local Training Mission. SEE AAF Man. 100-63-1.
3000	A3		Combined"Scene of Action" contact or coordinating frequency. Also available to all aircraft, surface craft & shore stations for intercomm. during search & rescue operations for distressed aircraft, surface craft and survivors thereof in the North American Sea Frontiers & contiguous Army Areas.	To be used in tactical action as last resort when no coordinated communications plan exists.
3105	A3		All aircraft for operations in Western Hemisphere.	For calling and working control towers restricted to protection of life and property.
3475	A3		GCA Search Control	
3995	A3	5	Joint War, Navy and USMC	For glider intercommunications.
4220	A3		Army aircraft, AACS stations and mobile installations.	For calling and working airway stations.
4495	A3		Primary Control Tower Frequency.	To be used for primary control tower operations.
4595	A1		Common CW frequency for Air/Ground stations belonging to AAF Military Flt. Serv. Comm. System.	Common CW frequency.
4630	A3	1000	Central Zone Air/Ground Stations of Mil. Flt. Serv. Comm. System.	Local training missions. SEE AAF Manual 100-63-1.
4697.5	A3	1000	West Zone Air/Ground Stations of Mil. Flt. Serv. Comm. System.	Local training missions. SEE AAF Manual 100-63-1.

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FREQ.	EMISSION	WATTS	UNIVERSAL AND COMMON ASSIGNMENT	APPLICATION AND REMARKS
4765	A3		Common voice frequency for Air/Ground Stations belonging to AAF Military Flt. Serv. Comm. System.	Common HF frequency.
4845	A3	1000	East Zone Air/Ground Stations of Military Flt. Serv. Comm. System.	Local training missions, SEE AAF Man. 100-63-1.
4890	A3		GCA Final Approach Control.	Primary.
6210	A3		World wide by all a/c.	For calling and working airways stations.
6640	A3		GCA Final Approach Control.	Secondary.
7165	A3	25	U. S. Bomb and Gun Survey.	For domestic Air Forces and Commands.
8200	A1		Common CW frequency for Air/Ground Stations belonging to AAF Military Flt.	Common CW frequency.
8280	A1		U. S. Emergency & Safety frequency.	
11445	A1		Same as 8200.	Same as 8200.
75000	A2		Aeronautical marker.	Used on legs of ranges.

NOTE: For details on the frequencies for the Continental U. S. Army Airways, see AAF Reg. 100-4 and 100-4A.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. M. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTION

MF AND HF FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS

NO. 8-3

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. The following HF frequencies are assigned to organizations indicated for operation of point-to-point radio circuits within this command. All frequencies listed are in kilocycles.

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Frequency	Emission	Power Output
*4280	A-1, A-2, & A-3	50W
6900	A-1	400W
9040	A-1, A-2, & A-3	400W
11975	A-1	400W (SAC Training)

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

2000	A-1	25W
2890	A-1	400W
*4280	A-1, A-2, & A-3	50W
*4907.5	A-1	400W
5020	A-1	400W
5897.5	A-1	400W
6635	A-1	1000W
*7680	A-1, A-2, & A-3	50W
10047.5	A-1	400W
11975	A-1	400W (SAC Training)
13065	A-1	1000W (Radio Teletyp
15805	A-1	400W
15515	A-1	1000W (Radio Teletyp

311th RECONNAISSANCE WING

*3027.5	A-1, A-2, & A-3	400W
9040	A-1, A-2, & A-3	400W
18190	A-1	3000W

MACDILL FIELD

2670	A-3	50W

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MACDILL FIELD (cont'd)

Frequency	Emission	Power Output
4280	A-3	50W
4835	A-1, A-2, & A-3	400W
7680	A-3	50W
11975	A-1	400W (SAC Trainin

*Also authorized for air-ground use.

2. The following HF frequencies are assigned to Hq SAC for operation of a point-to-point radio circuit between this headquarters and organizations listed below. All frequencies are listed in kilocycles.

Organization	Frequency	Emission	Power Output
SAC	11975	A-1	400W (Training Net)
15th AF	15515	A-1	1000W (Radio Teletype)
15th AF	13065	A-1	1000W (Radio Teletype)
BW-8	18190	A-1	400W (Training Net)

3. The following HF frequencies are assigned for general aeronautical use by organizations listed below. All frequencies are listed in kilocycles.

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Frequency	Emission	Power Output
4275	A-1	400W
4327.5	A-1	400W
4560	A-1	400W
8520	A-1	400W
9290	A-1	400W
10150	A-1	400W
11000	A-1	400W

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

3052.5	A-1	400W
4185	A-1, A-2, & A-3	400W
4280	A-1, A-2, & A-3	50W
4342.5	A-1	400W
4357.5	A-1	400W
4457.5	A-1	400W
4507.5	A-1	400W
4855	A-1, A-2, & A-3	400W

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FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE (cont'd)

Frequency	Emission	Power Output
5462.5	A-1	400W
5735	A-1	400W
5752.5	A-1, A-2, & A-3	400W
6610	A-1	400W
6910	A-1	400W
7680	A-1, A-2, & A-3	50W
10280	A-1	400W
11610	A-1	400W
12560	A-1	400W
*14650	A-1	400W
*15805	A-1	400W

MACDILL FIELD

4760	A-1, A-2, & A-3	100W
4897.5	A-1, A-2, & A-3	400W
6910	A-1	400W
10150	A-1	400W
12560	A-1	400W

311th RECONNAISSANCE WING

None at present.

*May also be used for Point-to-Point.

4. The following HF frequencies are assigned to Hq SAC for use in conjunction with the SAC ground/air tactical CW net: All frequencies are listed in Kilocycles.

17490
12755
9320
4772.5

5. All presently allocated unassigned frequencies within the numbered air forces and separate commands of SAC are hereby withdrawn and will be retained in this headquarters for future assignments to subordinate organizations of this command. Requests for additional frequencies or revisions in current assignments will be made in accordance with CI 8-1, this Headquarters, dated 21 July 1947. In the event previously allocated unassigned frequencies within your command have recently been assigned, authorization is granted to continue the use of such frequencies on a temporary basis until official authorization has been granted by this Headquarters.

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3.

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R E S T R I C T E D

CI 8-4
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Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTION

MF FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT

FOR AIR TO AIR HOMING
NO. 8-4

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. The following MF frequencies are assigned to organizations indicated for air to air homing on six (6) months temporary non-interference basis. All frequencies listed are in kilocycles.

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Frequency	Emission	Power Output
528	A1	10 W

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

536	A1	10 W

MACDILL FIELD

343	A1	10 W

2. The following MF frequency will be used for air-to-air homing on all global training and combat missions or any other type of mission involving joint operations between all SAC numbered air forces and/or separate commands:

Frequency	Emission	Power Output
429	A1	10 W

3. The following air-to-air homing frequency is assigned to Strategic Air Command and will be held by this headquarters for future assignments as required.

Frequency	Emission	Power Output
225	A1	10 W

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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CI 8-5
1 Page
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION FREQUENCIES AND CALL SIGNS
NO. 8-5

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

The following frequencies, call signs, and emissions are authorized for use in the Criminal Investigation Division at Stations indicated:

Station	Call Signs	Type Stations	Freq	Emission	Power Output
Andrews Field Camp Springs, Md.	WZGA	Central Fixed Sta	36500 Kc	F-30	50W
	WZGA 2-6 Incl	Mobile Units	36500 Kc	F-30	25W
Fort Worth AAFld, Fort Worth, Tex.	WYWD	Central Fixed Sta	36500 Kc	F-30	50W
	WYWD 2-7 Incl	Mobile Units	36500 Kc	F-30	25W
Peterson Field Colorado Spgs, Colo.	WXDL	Central Fixed Sta	36500 Kc	F-30	50W
	WXDL 2-6 Incl	Mobile Units	36500 Kc	F-30	25W
Rapid City AAFld, S.D.	WXER	Central Fixed Sta	36860 Kc	F-30	50W
Rapid City AAFld, S.D.	WXER	Mobile Units	36860 Kc	F-30	25W

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

VHF UNIVERSAL AND COMMON FREQUENCIES
NO. 10-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

FREQUENCY (MCS)	EMISSION	UNIVERSAL AND COMMON ASSIGNMENT
116.10	A-3	CAA Airways *ACS Airways (Plan 62)
126.18	A-3	U.S. Army Common Control Tower
132.84	A-3	Bomb A/C Common, Radar Bomb Scoring
133.20	A-3	Joint U.S. Army - Navy Ops.
134.10	A-3	GCA Final Approach Control
136.80	A-3	Joint U.S. Army - Navy Ops.
137.70	A-3	GCA Search Control
137.88	A-3	AACS Airways *Alt. Control Towers *GCA Search Control
138.42	A-3	D/F, Homing & Fixing Training
139.32	A-3	D/F Homing and Fixing Primary Restricted to Fighters.
140.58	A-3	Military Emergency *GCA Final Approach Control
142.02	A-3	Joint U.S. Army - Navy Ops.
149.58	A-3	U.S. Bomb and Gunnery Range
151.74	A-3	U.S. Bomb and Gunnery Range.

*Available for Service indicated on a secondary basis.

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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R E S T R I C T E D

CI 10-2
1 Page
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS
VHF FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS
NO. 10-2

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. The following VHF frequencies are assigned to all SAC numbered air forces and major sub-commands. These frequencies may be assigned to subordinate units at the discretion of the respective Commanders, consideration being given to wave propagation characteristics and users of the same or adjacent channels to avoid interference.

133.56 Mcs
134.82 Mcs
142.20 Mcs
143.10 Mcs
148.86 Mcs

2. The VHF frequencies listed below will be used for air-to-air command communications on all global training and combat missions or any other type mission involving joint operations between all SAC numbered air forces and/or separate commands. These frequencies will be set up for use on the aircraft VHF radio sets SCR-522 and AN/ARC-3 as follows:

Frequency	Button	Radio Set
143.10 Mcs	E	AN/ARC-3
	C	SCR-522

3. Maximum power output of the above SAC frequencies will not exceed 50 watts using A-3 emission.

4. All using organizations will requisition the appropriate transmitting and receiving VHF crystals required to operate on the above frequencies using AAF letter 100-80 and 100-30A as a basis.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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VHF CHANNEL ASSIGNMENTS
NO. 10-3

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. Channel assignments for SAC transport or administrative aircraft equipped with SCR-522 will be:

BUTTON	FREQUENCY	SERVICE
A	116.10 mcs	CAA AIRWAYS (RANGE STATIONS) (a) AACS Airways (Plan 62)
B	126.18 mcs	CONTROL TOWERS
C	137.88 mcs	AACS AIRWAYS (Plan 62) (a) Alt. Control Towers (a) GCA Search Control
D	140.58 mcs	MILITARY EMERGENCY (a) GCA Final Approach Control

2. Channel assignments for SAC tactical aircraft equipped with SCR-522 will be:

BUTTON		FREQUENCY	SERVICE
A		116.10 mcs	CAA AIRWAYS (RANGE STATIONS) (a) AACS Airways (Plan 62)
B		126.18 mcs	CONTROL TOWERS
C	(b)	137.88 mcs	AACS AIRWAYS (Plan 62) (a) Alt. Control Towers (a) GCA Search Control
D	(b)	140.58 mcs	MILITARY EMERGENCY (a) GCA Final Approach Control

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3. Channel assignments for Strategic Air Command transport or administrative aircraft equipped with AN/ARC-3 will be:

BUTTON	FREQUENCY	SERVICE
A	116.10 mcs	CAA AIRWAYS (RANGE STATIONS) (a) AACS Airways (Plan 62)
B	126.18 mcs	CONTROL TOWERS
C	137.88 mcs	AACS AIRWAYS (Plan 62) (a) Alt. Control Towers
D	140.58 mcs	MILITARY EMERGENCY
E	( )	(As Required)
F	( )	(").
G	137.70 mcs	GCA SEARCH CONTROL
H	134.10 mcs	GCA FINAL APPROACH CONTROL

4. Channel assignments for SAC tactical aircraft equipped with AN/ARC-3 will be:

BUTTON		FREQUENCY	SERVICE
A		116.10 mcs	CAA AIRWAYS (RANGE STATIONS) (a) AACS Airways (Plan 62)
B		126.18 mcs	CONTROL TOWERS
C		137.88 mcs	AACS AIRWAYS (Plan 62) (a) Alt. Control Towers
D	(b)	140.58 mcs	MILITARY EMERGENCY
E	(b)	((c)) mcs	Tactical see below
F	(b)	((c)) mcs	Tactical see below
G	(b)	137.70 mcs	GCA SEARCH CONTROL
H	(b)	134.10 mcs	GCA FINAL APPROACH CONTROL

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(a) Available for service indicated on a secondary basis.

(b) Tactical frequencies selected from AAF Letter 100-80 or tactical COI's may be inserted or substituted.

(c) Tactical aircraft engaged on Radar Bomb Scoring Missions utilizing Detachments of the 263rd AAFBU (RBS) will carry radar bomb scoring primary (132.84mcs) or secondary (139.32mcs) on one of these channels.

NOTE: "Tactical Aircraft" - includes aircraft of all types which are subject to participation in regular tactical and training missions. Experimental and test aircraft are included in this category.

"Transport and Administrative Aircraft" - including aircraft of all types which are not subject to participation in regular tactical, training, or experimental missions.

5. On local training flights of more than one aircraft where an interflight control channel is necessary, aircraft equipped with the SCR-522 may substitute in Channel "C" a tactical frequency listed in SAC CI 10-2.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
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R E S T R I C T E D

CI 10-4
2 Pages
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS
GCA FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS
NO. 10-4

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. HF COMMUNICATIONS

a. GCA stations will transmit to aircraft as follows:

PURPOSE	FREQUENCY (Kcs)
Search Control	3475
Final Approach Control	4890 (Primary)
Final Approach Control	6640 (Secondary)

b. Aircraft will transmit to the GCA station on the same frequency used to transmit to the control tower throughout the landing operation.

c. GCA stations will be prepared to receive 4495 Kc and 6210 Kc and will be prepared to transmit on 6640 Kc, 4890 Kc, and 3475 Kc continuously throughout the hours of operation of the GCA station. Normally 4890 Kc will be used for final approach; however, 6640 kc may be used, upon concurrence of the pilot, when required for reasons of interference or equipment limitations.

d. The HF, ground-to-air frequencies have been assigned jointly to the Army and Navy for the purpose indicated, consequently service on these frequencies may be expected from either A.F or naval GCA Stations.

2. VHF COMMUNICATIONS

a. GCA Station Operating Frequencies:

PURPOSE	FREQUENCY (MC)	FOUR BUTTON EQUIPPED A/C
Search Control	137.88	C
Final Approach Control	140.58	D
PURPOSE	**FREQUENCY (MC)**	**EIGHT BUTTON EQUIPPED A/C**
Search Control	137.70	G
Final Approach Control	134.10	H

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b. To provide a means whereby AAF aircraft may receive assistance from Naval GCA stations and vice versa, the following agreement will govern:

(1) AAF GCA stations will operate on 140.58 mc for Naval aircraft final approach control.

(2) Naval GCA stations will operate on 140.58 mc for AAF aircraft final approach control.

(3) It will be the responsibility of the pilot concerned to establish communication with the respective AAF or Navy control tower for preliminary approach instructions. This applies regardless of whether HF or VHF is contemplated for let-down communications.

3. VHF is considered the primary means of communications and HF the secondary. It is to be understood that GCA service, when installed, is available to all AAF aircraft (subject to local operational instructions). Commanders, therefore, who anticipate use of GCA service by aircraft of their commands, will insure that such aircraft are equipped to communicate with GCA stations in accordance with the provisions of this CI.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
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CI 10-5
1 Page
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

VHF POINT-TO-POINT FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS
NO. 10-5

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

The following VHF Point-to-Point Radio Frequencies are assigned to Hq SAC for operation of a link circuit between Hq SAC and the WD Signal Center:

Frequency	Emission	Power Output
235.00 Mcs	A-1, A-3	50 Watts
235.60 Mcs	A-1, A-3	50 Watts

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS
NUMERICAL INDEX OF OPERATING AND
FUNDAMENTAL CRYSTAL FREQUENCIES (VHF)
NO. 10-6

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

Following is a list of operating frequencies with respective fundamental transmitting and receiving crystal frequencies authorized for use by units of this command:

OPERATING FREQ. (MCS)	TRANSMITTING CRYSTAL FREQ. (KCS)	RECEIVING CRYSTAL FREQ. (KCS)
116.10	6450.0	8007.69
126.18	7010.0	8155.71
132.84	7380.0	8056.00
133.56	7420.0	8104.00
133.20	7400.0	8080.00
134.10	7450.0	8140.00
136.80	7600.0	8320.00
134.82	7490.0	8188.00
137.70	7650.0	8380.00
137.88	7660.0	8392.00
138.42	7690.0	8428.00
139.32	7740.0	8488.00
140.58	7810.0	8036.25
142.02	7890.0	8126.25
142.20	7900.0	8137.50
143.10	7950.0	8193.75
148.86	8270.0	8050.59
149.58	8310.0	8092.94
151.74	8430.0	8220.00

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

CI 11-1
2 Pages
Page 1

COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

263d RADAR BOMB SCORING DETACHMENTS RADIO NET

NO. 11-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. For training purposes, Detachments of the 263d AAF BU (RBS) are authorized admission into SAC radio circuits as indicated:

RBS Detachment	Station to Work in Order of Preference	Frequency Order of Pref.	Power Output
Kansas City, Kansas	Hqs 15AF Colo Spgs Smoky Hill AAB	10047.5	50 Watts
Ft. Worth, Texas	Hqs 8AF (Ft. Worth)	(Use present SAC Radio Net)	
Salton Sea	San Diego, Calif.	9040 - 6900	50 Watts
San Diego, Calif.	Hqs 8AF (Ft Worth) Hqs 15AF	9040 - 6900 10047.5	400 Watts
Tampa, Fla	MacDill Field	(Use Present SAC Radio Net)	
McClelland AAFld, Sacramento, Calif.	Hqs 15AF Hqs 8AF	10047.5 9040 - 6900	400 Watts
Ft George Wright, Spokane, Wash.	Spokane Hqs 15AF	10047.5	400 Watts
Ogden, Utah	Wendover AAFld Hqs 15AF	10047.5 10047.5	50 Watts

2. Fifteen copies of numbered air forces and separate commands' CI's will be sent to Hqs 263d AAF BU (RBS), Andrews Field, Washington 20, D. C. without delay.

3. In the event of sudden frequency and/or call sign changes, 263d RBS Detachments operating in the respective command Pt to Pt radio nets will be notified directly of such changes.

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4. Only traffic of an urgent nature or traffic regarding use of scoring ranges will be transmitted over this net.

5. Relay of above traffic over numbered air force nets and SAC net is authorized.

6. A-1 (CW) Transmission will be utilized in the net.

7. RBS Stations will stand by from 0900 to 1000 and 1400 to 1500 local time.

8. RBS Detachments at Ft. Worth, Texas and Tampa, Florida will coordinate locally by telephone, etc., with presently established radio [redacted] nets and handle their traffic.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

CI 12-1
2 Pages
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

TACTICAL RADIO CALL SIGNS
NO. 12-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE ØØØ1, 20 August 1947.

1. Basic tactical call signs will be used in accordance with the instructions contained in FM 11-5, FM 24-5, and FM 24-10.

2. The call signs contained in JANP 110 and allocated hereby may be used as three character call signs or may be expanded indefinitely by the addition of a suffix consisting of any desired letter or numeral or combination thereof, including the numeral Ø.

3. The following tactical CW call signs from Page 1, JANP 110, dated December 1945 are hereby assigned:

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

Line 17, 1-10 inclusive
Line 18, 1-10 inclusive
Line 19, 1-10 inclusive
Line 20, 1-10 inclusive
Line 21, 1-10 inclusive
Line 22, 1-10 inclusive

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Line 23, 1-10 inclusive
Line 24, 1-5 inclusive

311th RECONNAISSANCE WING

Line 24, 6-10 inclusive
Line 25, 1-10 inclusive

94th COMBAT BOMB. WG. (PROV)

Line 26, 1-10 inclusive
Line 27, 1-5 inclusive

3rd COMBAT FIGHTER WING (PROV)

Line 27, 6-10 inclusive

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30th COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON

Line 28, 1-3 inclusive

263rd AAF BASE UNIT (RBS)

Line 28, 4 and 5 inclusive

4. The 30th Communications Squadron's tactical CW call signs are assigned as follows:

GK8	SAC Headquarters	Air/Ground Tactical
4JA	SAC Headquarters	SAC Training
1RJ	SAC Headquarters	Radio Teletype circuit
9CV	SAC Headquarters	Radio Station (to BW 8)

5. For training purposes tactical call signs allocated to various commands issuing Communications Instructions will be periodically reassigned so as to insure that no station holds the same tactical call sign for a period greater than two months.

6. The following tactical (CW) call signs are assigned to the Commanding General and Deputy Commanding General, Headquarters Strategic Air Command:

Commanding General	PY1
Deputy Commanding General	PY1A

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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R E S T R I C T E D

CI 12-2
1 Page
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

AIRCRAFT RADIO CALL SIGNS
NO. 12-2

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE ØØØ1, 20 August 1947.

1. For tactical operations, tactical radio-telegraph and radio-telephone call signs as promulgated in CI 12-1 and CI 14-1 will be used.

2. For non-tactical operations, call signs will be used as follows:

a. Single aircraft will use the last four (4) digits of the aircraft serial number except when requested by ground stations to use the complete serial number.

b. Operations involving more than one aircraft may use a flight number to designate the entire flight for reports of orders affecting the flight as a whole. The flight number will be assigned to the flight leader by the Air Force originating the flight. The flight number will consist of a combination of three (3) digits followed by a letter. Single aircraft of such flights will use the last four (4) digits of the aircraft serial number when independent communications is required.

3. Aircraft Radio Call Signs will be used in accordance with AAF Regulation 100-9. Radio-Telephone Call Words for Fighter Aircraft will be used in accordance with FM 1-46.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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R E S T R I C T E D

CI 12-3
1 Page
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

GROUND STATION VHF/DF CALL SIGNS
NO. 12-3

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. The Radio Call Sign used by VHF/DF Stations is composed of the name of the station plus the suffix "HOMER".

Example: An aircraft desiring navigational assistance from Grand-Island calls "Grand-Island Homer", Grand-Island VHF/DF station answers, "This is Grand-Island Homer".

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTION

RADIO-TELEPHONE CALL WORDS
NO. 14-1

HQ STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D.C.
15 August 1947

(This CI supersedes CI 14-1, this headquarters, dated 21 July 1947.)

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. Strategic Air Command tactical radio telephone call word allocations are made to this command in accordance with JANP-119, Section 2c, pages 2-13 to 2-18 inclusive. The call words listed below may be expanded by suffixing ABLE to ZEBRA or by the addition of numeral(s).

2. Your particular attention is invited to the fact that the words ABANDON and ANDREWS listed as word one (1) and eighteen (18) respectively on pages 2-13, Section 2c, JANP-119, will not be used under any circumstances.

3. The following specific assignments are made as indicated:

Gen. Kenney, CG, SAC — WELCOME
Gen. McMullen, Deputy CG, SAC — WELFARE

COMMAND	ASSIGNMENTS
Eighth Air Force	Pages 2-13, words ABLAZE to BUTTERFLY incl. (except for ABANDON and ANDREWS)
Fifteenth Air Force	Pages 2-14, words CONFEDERATE to GUITAR incl.
3d Ftr Wg VLR (PROV)	Pages 2-15, words ICECUBE to IVY incl.
94th Combat Wg (PROV)	Pages 2-15, words LAMENTATIONS to LUXURY incl.
311th Rcn Wg	Pages 2-16, words OBJECTIVE to OVERTURE incl.

4. The following radio telephone voice call words are specifically assigned as indicated for use with ship-to-shore radio telephone service:

ASSIGNMENT	HQ.	A/C NO.	CALL WORD
Gen. Kenney	CG, SAC	B-17 - 477	PARAMOUNT

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ASSIGNMENT	HQ	A/C NO.	CALL WORD
Gen. McMullen	Deputy CG, SAC	B-17 - 494	QUARTERBACK
Gen. Ramey	CG, Eighth AF	- - - - -	VANDERBILT
Gen. Johnson	CG, Fifteenth AF	- - - - -	SEMINOLE
Gen. Hutchison	CG, AC/S, A-3, SAC	- - - - -	REVELATION
Gen. Hutchinson	CG, MacDill Fld	- - - - -	RELIABLE
Gen. Taylor	CG, Andrews Fld	- - - - -	TYLER
Gen. Staff	SAC	- - - - -	VOLUNTEER

5. The following procedure for the assignment of tactical radio telephone voice call signs is hereby established and will be employed as outlined below:

a. One call word will be chosen for the use of a particular organization and will be expanded by the addition of letters and/or numerals to meet existing requirements. EXAMPLE:

509TH BOMB GROUP CALL WORD - - - - - - - - - ARROW

COMMANDERS' CALL WORDS

ARROW LEADER - - - - - Group mission commander
ARROW ZEBRA - - - - - 1st squadron commander
ARROW YOKE - - - - - 2d squadron commander
ARROW XRAY - - - - - 3d squadron commander
ARROW WILLIAM - - - - etc.

COLLECTIVE CALL WORDS

ALL ARROWS - - - - - - Group collective call
ALL ARROW ZEBRAS - - - 1st squadron collective call
ALL ARROW YOKES - - - 2d squadron collective call
ALL ARROW XRAYS - - - 3d squadron collective call
ALL ARROW WILLIAMS - - etc.

INDIVIDUAL CALL WORDS

ARROW ZEBRA ONE - - - - 1st squadron leader
ARROW ZEBRA TWO - - - - 1st squadron deputy leader
ARROW ZEBRA THREE - - - 1st squadron a/c
ARROW ZEBRA FOUR, FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, ETC.

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6. Radio telephone voice call words are hereby assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Command and are to be used on all missions involving joint operations between numbered air forces and/or major subordinate commands of Strategic Air Command.

Collective call - - - - - - - - UMBRELLA
SAC mission commander - - - - - REGULATE

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

J. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

DIRECTION FINDING (D/F) PROCEDURES
NO. 16-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

Direction Finding Procedure will be in accordance with AAF Letter 100-17, "Intra-AAF Direction Finding (D/F) Procedure", 23 February 1945, JANP 13X0 "Joint Direction Finding Procedure" and Radio Operator's Information File.

NOTE: VHF/DF will be available on 139.32 Mcs and 126.18 Mcs at all Strategic Air Command airfields having VHF/DF facilities.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE
NO. 18-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. Emergency communications procedure will be in accordance with "JOINT EMERGENCY RESCUE COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE" (JANP 107) and Section 8 of ("Radio Operators Information File)" (ROIF), " JOINT EMERGENCY RESCUE COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE."

2. Emergency VHF/DF is available on 139.32 Mcs and 126.18 Mcs at all Strategic Air Command airfields having VHF/DF facilities.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

TIME EQUIVALENTS
NO. 20-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

Paragraphs 1001 through 1008 of FM 101-10, Staff Officers Field Manual Organization, Technical and Logistical Data, dated 1 August 1945, contain information and tables concerning the hours of daylight and darkness, sunrise and sunset, from which sunrise-sunset tables for any locality within the area of the Strategic Air Command may be calculated.

G.C.T. 24-hr clock	G.C.T.	P.S.T.	M.S.T.	C.S.T.	E.S.T.	G.C.T. 24-hr clock
2400Z						2400Z
0000Z	12:00M	4:00P	5:00P	6:00P	7:00P	0000Z
0100Z	1:00A	5:00P	6:00P	7:00P	8:00P	0100Z
0200Z	2:00A	6:00P	7:00P	8:00P	9:00P	0200Z
0300Z	3:00A	7:00P	8:00P	9:00P	10:00P	0300Z
0400Z	4:00A	8:00P	9:00P	10:00P	11:00P	0400Z
0500Z	5:00A	9:00P	10:00P	11:00P	12:00M	0500Z
0600Z	6:00A	10:00P	11:00P	12:00M	1:00A	0600Z
0700Z	7:00A	11:00A	12:00M	1:00A	2:00A	0700Z
0800Z	8:00A	12:00M	1:00A	2:00A	3:00A	0800Z
0900Z	9:00A	1:00A	2:00A	3:00A	4:00A	0900Z
1000Z	10:00A	2:00A	3:00A	4:00A	5:00A	1000Z
1100Z	11:00A	3:00A	4:00A	5:00A	6:00A	1100Z
1200Z	12:00N	4:00A	5:00A	6:00A	7:00A	1200Z
1300Z	1:00P	5:00A	6:00A	7:00A	8:00A	1300Z
1400Z	2:00P	6:00A	7:00A	8:00A	9:00A	1400Z
1500Z	3:00P	7:00A	8:00A	9:00A	10:00A	1500Z
1600Z	4:00P	8:00A	9:00A	10:00A	11:00A	1600Z
1700Z	5:00P	9:00A	10:00A	11:00A	12:00N	1700Z
1800Z	6:00P	10:00A	11:00A	12:00N	1:00P	1800Z
1900Z	7:00P	11:00A	12:00N	1:00P	2:00P	1900Z
2000Z	8:00P	12:00N	1:00P	2:00P	3:00P	2000Z
2100Z	9:00P	1:00P	2:00P	3:00P	4:00P	2100Z
2200Z	10:00P	2:00P	3:00P	4:00P	5:00P	2200Z
2300Z	11:00P	3:00P	4:00P	5:00P	6:00P	2300Z

G.C.T. - Greenwich Civil Time P.S.T. - Pacific Standard Time
M.S.T. - Mountain Standard Time C.S.T. - Central Standard Time
E.S.T. - Eastern Standard Time.

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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AIR RESCUE SERVICE
NO. 22-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. The Commanding General, Air Transport Command, through the Chief, Air Rescue Service, is responsible for providing rescue service within the continental United States.

2. The Commanding General, Air Transport Command, through the appropriate Air Transport Command division commander is responsible for providing rescue service along air transport routes, or portions of such routes, as are not covered by theater or department resuce units.

3. Air Rescue data is outlined in AAF Regulation 20-54, "Organization Emergency Rescue", 24 April 1946, AAF Regulation 20-54A, "Organization, Air Rescue Service," 25 June 1946, and AR 95-125.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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R E S T R I C T E D

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Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

COMMERCIAL TELETYPE FACILITIES
NO. 26-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. When exchanging traffic over commercial teletype facilities (such as Western Union), the procedures followed will be these arranged locally by the commercial agency and the Officer in Charge of the Communications Center.

2. The procedures adopted will be incorporated in the Communications Procedures of the Communications Center.

3. Officers in Charge will be alert to adopt and incorporate changes as they become necessary.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. Hutchison

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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R E S T R I C T E D

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1 Page
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

TACTICAL TELETYPEWRITER CALL SIGNS
NO. 28-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

The numbered air forces and/or major subordinate commands of Strategic Air Command will assign basic tactical teletypewriter call signs from JANP-110 in accordance with tactical C.W. call sign allocations contained in Strategic Air Command CI 12-1, dated 2[illegible] July 1947. One call sign will be selected and expanded to meet the requirements of the respective commands.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. Hutchison

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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R E S T R I C T E D

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

ARMY TELETYPEWRITER EXCHANGE
NO. 30-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT:

1. When exchanging traffic over Army Teletypewriter Exchange (TWX) facilities the procedures prescribed in Traffic Circular Letter Number 2, "Procedures and Practices for Terminal Tributary Stations and Manual Room Channel Operating Positions" (SIG-470-2), Army Service Forces, Office of the Signal Officer, Washington 25, D.C., 15 August 1945 will be followed.

2. All personnel engaged in the operation of the Exchange will become thoroughly familiar with approved practices and procedures.

3. Supervisors will see that operating personnel will follow the prescribed practices and procedures.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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SPECIAL MESSAGE HANDLING PROCEDURE

NO. 32-1

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. PURPOSE. To outline procedure for minimizing delay in the handling of messages originated personally by the Commanding General or the Deputy Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, and intended for the immediate personal attention of the Commanders of the Eighth Air Force, the Fifteenth Air Force, MacDill Field, and Andrews Field, and vice versa.

2. USE. The use of the ARROW designation will be restricted to the commanders indicated in paragraph 1 above for the interchange of high priority messages. All such messages will either be prepared personally by these commanders or will be approved personally by them. ARROW type messages will not be used below the echelons of command indicated above.

3. IDENTIFICATION. In lieu of the normal message reference number such commander's messages will use and be identified by "ARROW" (No.)."

4. PREPARATION. With the exception mentioned in paragraph 3, existing regulations govern the preparation of commander's messages.

5. HANDLING. With the exceptions mentioned below, existing regulations govern the handling of commanders messages.

a. Outgoing Messages.

(1) As soon as the message has been signed by the originator, the message will be sent directly to the Communications Center where the Communications Center Officer, or in his absence, the Communications Center Chief, will sign for it and take personal charge of the message to insure its being handled with a minimum of delay.

(2) The message reference number will be supplied by the Communications Center.

(3) After the message has been transmitted, necessary data will be logged and file copies of the message will be forwarded to the Adjutant General.

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b. Incoming Messages.

(1) The message will be brought to the immediate attention of the Communications Center Officer, or in his absence, the Communications Center Chief, who will personally deliver same to the Deputy Commanding General or his aide de camp and obtain a hand receipt.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Deputy Commander

OFFICIAL:

D. W. Hutchison

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, United States Army
AC/S, A-3

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Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

VLR COMMUNICATIONS WITH SAC AIRCRAFT

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT.

1. Headquarters Airways and Air Communications System has designated certain AACS radio stations to be prepared to transmit and receive on certain frequencies for the purpose of providing communications between Headquarters Strategic Air Command and aircraft of this command participating in long range training flights.

2. This command will submit flight plans on all such flights to Headquarters Airways and Air Communications System at least twenty-four hours prior to departure from the Zone of Interior.

3. Use of these facilities will in no way preclude the requirement for certain other radio contacts with AACS and ICAO stations as may be designated in other instructions. The sole purpose of using these facilities is to provide units of this command with a means of passing to or receiving from this headquarters information essential to the maintenance of control of the aircraft involved.

4. All flights of Strategic Air Command units outside the Zone of Interior will, through the use of these facilities, send a position report every thirty (30) minutes and any other traffic as may be deemed necessary by the flight commander.

5. Facilities available:

a.

STATION	LOCATION
WZN	MacDill Field
WZA	Albrook Field
WYTD	Atkinson Field
WZQ	Borinquin Field
WYXN	Stephenville, Newfoundland
AFKF	Rhien Main, Frankfurt, Germany
AHO5	Dhahran, Arabia

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WZY	Ladd Field
WZX	Elmendorf Field
WYUQ	Adak, Aleutian Islands
WUQM	Manila, P. I.
NPN5	Guam, Marianas
WZJ	Hickam Field

b. Frequencies

All above listed stations are prepared to transmit and receive on the following frequencies:

(1) 11445 KC
(2) 8200 KC
(3) 4595 KC

(Note) All above listed stations are planning to guard and transmit on 17490 KC. When the AACS are set to operate on this frequency interested units will be notified.

6. Aircraft radio operators will use the example given below as a guide for preparation of messages to be relayed to Headquarters Strategic Air Command:

WUQT V A/C CALL MSG NO._____
OP T WAR A A/C CALL 300530Z
HKIM GR4 BT POSITION COURSE
SPEED ALTITUDE BT K

7. Messages to aircraft in flight will be addressed in a similar manner except that the station which relays the message to the aircraft will be determined by the planned position of the aircraft concerned. An aircraft between Guam and Hawaii but nearest Guam would receive a message similar to the following example:

WAR V HKIM MSG NO._____ OP T
NPN5 A HKIM 300550Z A/C CALL
GR4 BT PKVIM INRDZ LFOQC JAPLS BT K OR AR

(Note) HKIM is the delivery group of Headquarters Strategic Air Command as given in JANP-116.

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8. Messages to or from the aircraft will be put on high speed relay circuits to the particular AACS station the aircraft is working for relay to the aircraft, or on similar circuits terminating in WAR for relay to Headquarters Strategic Air Command.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

DWH

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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2 Pages
Page 1

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTION

LONG RANGE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. The War Department has made available the following facilities for use by this command for the long range control of aircraft:

a. Four 1 to 10 KW transmitters using Parisitic Rotary Array antennae on the two higher frequencies and doublet antennae on the lower frequencies.

b. Four highly selective crystal controlled receivers located in a noise free area using Rhombic receiving antenna covering 360° with directivity of ± 5°.

c. The frequencies to be used with these facilities are as follows:

(1) 17490 KC

(2) 12755 KC

(3) 9320 KC

(4) 4772.5 KC

2. The equipment mentioned in paragraph 1a and b above is remotely controlled from the Headquarters Strategic Air Command radio station at Andrews Field.

3. Call Sign QSV will be used until ØØØ1 20 August at which time the call sign will change to GKS.

4. It is highly desirable to make the utmost use of this ground-air station, but the primary purpose is for long range communications with flights outside the Zone of Interior. All flights outside the Zone of Interior will work the above station and any other flights may use them by coordinating their actions with the Communications and Electronics Section of this headquarters prior to the flight.

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5. Since crystal controlled receivers are used in the ground stations, it is very important that the frequency of the airborne transmitters be frequently and carefully checked for accuracy. The type of antennae being used on the higher frequencies is very directional and accurate position reports, including course and ground speed, are very important to the efficient operation of these facilities.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS MCMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Deputy Commander

OFFICIAL:

D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, United States Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

EMERGENCY POWER
NO. 38-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
21 July 1947

EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

1. The following will govern the use of Emergency Power in Communications Centers of this Command:

a. During electrical storms and under certain other conditions which might cause failure in Commercial Power Lines, the emergency power unit will be started.

2. To avoid placing an un-due load or strain on the Emergency Power unit, the following will be strictly observed:

a. Power will not be supplied to illuminating equipment which is unessential to the operation of the Communications Center.

b. Power will not be supplied for "conveniences" such as electric fan, privately-owned radios, hot-plates, etc.

c. Adjacent sections of a headquarters will not be permitted to "borrow" power from the unit which is providing power for the operation of communications facilities.

3. One qualified man from the Communications Center will be detailed to supervise the operation of the Emergency Power Unit during the time that it is being used. His duties will be incorporated in an SOP for the operation of Emergency Power Units.

a. Preventive maintenance and routine checks on the Emergency Power Unit will be performed by personnel of the Communications Center.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. W. Hutchison
D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

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COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

FOX TYPE BROADCASTS

NO. 40-1

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
13 August 1947

EFFECTIVE ØØØ1Z 25 August 1947.

1. General. This headquarters is establishing a "FOX" (Do Not Answer) type broadcast schedule for experimental purposes to be conducted over a period of six (6) months. The purpose of this test is to permit the evaluation and effectiveness of the "FOX" type broadcast and to determine whether or not the adoption of this system would be of value or enhance the efficiency of the Air Forces communication networks.

2. Plan. Beginning at 17ØØZ 25 August 1947, this headquarters will broadcast two (2) "FOX" type transmissions per radio day; one at 17ØØZ and one at 22ØØZ. These broadcasts will be made on the SAC Tactical CW ground-to-air net (Ref SAC CI 36-1) and keyed simultaneously on all four frequencies. The broadcasts will also be made on the SAC point-to-point training net at the same times specified above. All ground radio stations as well as all aircraft radio operators in flight under the jurisdiction of SAC will monitor and copy the "FOX" type broadcasts.

a. The numbered Air Forces and major subordinate commands will intercept the "FOX" broadcast from this headquarters and rebroadcast the traffic on the appropriate Air Force or major subordinate command point-to-point and ground-to-air radio nets. The procedure outlined herein will require all aircraft in flight as well as the radio stations at base level to monitor four (4) "FOX" type transmissions per radio day; one at 17ØØZ and 22ØØZ from this headquarters and one at 173ØZ and 223ØZ from the Air Force or major subordinate command concerned.

b. Call sign 4JA9 will be used as the SAC collective call on the SAC point-to-point CW net. Call sign GK89 will be used as the SAC collective call sign on the tactical ground-to-air CW net. Point-to-point and ground-to-air tactical call signs will be changed from time to time for security training purposes in which case the new station basic call supplemented by the numeral nine (9) will be used as the collective call.

c. All "FOX" type broadcasts will be numbered serially for the entire six (6) month experimental period. For identification purposes, the message number will be preceded by *ALSAC, i.e., ALSAC1 - ALSAC103 - AISAC972, etc.

d. Your particular attention is invited to the fact that all SAC ground and aerial radio stations are authorized and encouraged

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to monitor both the SAC ground-to-air and point-to-point CW radio net to determine which of the frequencies may be received the maximum percentage of the time in a given area.

e. Submission Data. A weekly report (Example - SAC CI 40-1A) will be prepared by all SAC radio stations as of 17ØØ local time on Friday covering the period of Monday through Friday. The stations at base level will submit the special report to the numbered Air Forces and major subordinate command headquarters who will assemble the logs and after necessary study has been completed will forward the reports to this headquarters without delay. Reports will be marked Attn: Communications and Electronics Section.

3. Type of Traffic. The type of traffic to be broadcast in general, will be traffic which is considered to be of interest to all stations down to and including the base level. This activity will be closely coordinated with all "A" staffs and other staff sections within this headquarters for the purpose of obtaining the desired message material.

4. The "FOX" type broadcast will be considered unofficial traffic and in no event will official action be taken as a result of information received by the "FOX" method unless otherwise specified. In the event that official action is desired, the word ACTION will be included as the first word of the text of the "FOX" message.

5. The numbered Air Forces and major subordinate commands are authorized to establish their own "FOX" type broadcast schedule if desired. However, in the event that such broadcasts are established, the necessary steps will be taken to insure that a numbering system entirely different from that used by Hq SAC will be used.

6. CI 40-1 and 40-1A will be effective until 25 February 1948, unless otherwise specified, at which time it will be removed from the CI files and destroyed in accordance with Par 2, SAC CI 3-1, dated 21 July 1947.

7. The Reports Control Symbol for the form (Special Reporting Form, example SAC CI 40-1A) will be SAC-CE-T6. These forms will be reproduced locally.

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KENNEY:

CLEMENTS McMULLEN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

APPROVED:

for Clarence D. Wheeler
D. W. HUTCHISON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
AC/S, A-3

*ALSAC - All Strategic Air Command Radio Stations both airborne and ground.

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EXAMPLE

R E S T R I C T E D

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RADIO LOG FOR FOX BROADCAST

NO. 40-1A

HQ Strategic Air Command
Andrews Field
Washington 20, D. C.
13 August 1947

Station: Andrews Field Organization: Hq. Strategic Air Command Date 13 Aug 47

Time (GCT) From ØØØ1Z to Ø43ØZ Freq 11975 KC Radio Operator S/Sgt Doe

Aircraft Info: Position; _____ Course; _____ Speed;_____ Alt; ____

FROM	TO	MSG NO	SIGNAL STRENGTH	READ-ABILITY	% OF MSG REC	REMARKS
4JA	4JA9	1	5	5	100	Reception Excellent
4JA	4JA9	2	3	4	100	Reception Good
4JA	4JA9	3	1-3	1-2	20	Signal fading - Atmospheric interference (See back of log)
4JA	4JA9	4	4	1	15	Station interfering on adjacent channel (See back of log for comment).
4JA	4JA9	5	0	0	0	Unable to intercept broadcast - reason unknown.

Radio Officer's Signature /s/John J. Smith
/t/JOHN J. SMITH
1st Lt., AC
Radio Officer

EXAMPLE

EXAMPLE

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COMMENTS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS

1. With reference to "FOX" message number 3, the signal strength varied from 1 to 3. Readability varied from 1 to 2. Local storms were the cause of atmospheric interference.

2. With reference to "FOX" message number 4, station _____ (or unknown) blocking frequency 11975 KC about 50% of the time.

Note (Furnish any other comments and/or recommendations which will aid in evaluating the effectiveness of "FOX" type broadcasts).

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GM-1042-NC
SAC FORM NO. 66-19

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM NO. 66-19

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM 66-19

ORGANIZATION _____
Group Squadron Address

AIRCRAFT TYPE _____ NO _____ RADAR TYPE _____

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE _____db. RING TIME (in miles or feet) _____

Date	Time	Type of Inspection	Troubles Corrected	Components Replaced	Overall Performance miles or ft	db	Radar Mechanic

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM 66-19

ORGANIZATION _____
Group Squadron Address

AIRCRAFT TYPE _____ NO _____ RADAR TYPE _____

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE _____db. RING TIME (in miles or feet) _____

Date	Time	Type of Inspection	Troubles Corrected	Components Replaced	Overall Performance miles db or ft		Radar Mechanic

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM 66-19

ORGANIZATION _____
Group Squadron Address

AIRCRAFT TYPE _____ NO _____ RADAR TYPE _____

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE _____db. RING TIME (in miles or feet) _____

Date	Time	Type of Inspection	Troubles Corrected	Components Replaced	Overall Performance miles db or ft		Radar Mechanic

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM 66-19

ORGANIZATION _____
Group Squadron Address

AIRCRAFT TYPE _____ NO _____ RADAR TYPE _____

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE _____db. RING TIME (in miles or feet) _____

Date	Time	Type of Inspection	Troubles Corrected	Components Replaced	Overall Performance miles or ft	db	Radar Mechanic

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM 66-19

ORGANIZATION _____
Group Squadron Address

AIRCRAFT TYPE _____ NO _____ RADAR TYPE _____

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE _____db. RING TIME (in miles or feet) _____

Date	Time	Type of Inspection	Troubles Corrected	Components Replaced	Overall Performance miles or ft	Overall Performance db	Radar Mechanic

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM 66-19

ORGANIZATION _____
Group Squadron Address

AIRCRAFT TYPE _____ NO _____ RADAR TYPE _____

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE _____db. RING TIME (in miles or feet) _____

Date	Time	Type of Inspection	Troubles Corrected	Components Replaced	Overall Performance miles or ft	db	Radar Mechanic

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM 66-19

ORGANIZATION _____
Group Squadron Address

AIRCRAFT TYPE _____ NO _____ RADAR TYPE _____

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE _____db. RING TIME (in miles or feet) _____

Date	Time	Type of Inspection	Troubles Corrected	Components Replaced	Overall Performance miles or ft	db	Radar Mechanic

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM 66-19

ORGANIZATION _____
Group Squadron Address

AIRCRAFT TYPE _____ NO _____ RADAR TYPE _____

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE _____db. RING TIME (in miles or feet) _____

Date	Time	Type of Inspection	Troubles Corrected	Components Replaced	Overall Performance miles db or ft		Radar Mechanic

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RADAR MAINTENANCE LOG

SAC FORM 66-19

ORGANIZATION _____
Group Squadron Address

AIRCRAFT TYPE _____ NO _____ RADAR TYPE _____

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE _____db. RING TIME (in miles or feet) _____

Date	Time	Type of Inspection	Troubles Corrected	Components Replaced	Overall Performance miles db or ft		Radar Mechanic

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GM-1041-NC
SAC. FORM No. 66-20

UNCLASSIFIED

RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM NO. 66-20

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM NO. 66-20

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

INSTRUCTIONS: Form to be completed in duplicate using carbon paper. One copy to remain in aircraft until pad is used, and the other to be given to Squadron Radar Observer

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

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2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
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4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
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AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

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1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
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4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

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4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
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4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
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MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
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4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with trilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

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2. on long search pulse? _____
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4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

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3. on beacon? _____
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AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

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5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
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3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
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5. Remarks.

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1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
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AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

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MISCELLANEOUS
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2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
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Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

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Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

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4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min___
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
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5. Other difficulties encountered.

INSTRUCTIONS: Form to be completed in duplicate using carbon paper. One copy to remain in aircraft until pad is used, and the other to be given to Squadron Radar Observer

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

INSTRUCTIONS: Form to be completed in duplicate using carbon paper. One copy to remain in aircraft until pad is used, and the other to be given to Squadron Radar Observer

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min___
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with trilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max____Min___
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min___
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with trilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 V, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max____Min___
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENTS
1. What was the initial [illegible] with inverter voltage at [illegible] v. and with [illegible] short search pulse?
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. [illegible] long search pulse? _____
3. [illegible]
4. Did these readings [illegible] or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ FLAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search range? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

INSTRUCTIONS: Form to be completed in duplicate using carbon paper. One copy to remain in aircraft until pad is used, and the other to be given to Squadron Radar Observer

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min___
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
3. Did azimuth stabilization work? _____
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

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AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
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REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
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RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
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TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db..
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

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	Time	Ringtime
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
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AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
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AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

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FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

Time	Ringtime
1.	
2.	
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
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REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
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LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
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Time	Occurrence

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4. Was receiver gain sufficient to obtain solid noise on indicator with brilliance set so that trace is barely visible when gain is zero? _____
5. Other difficulties encountered.

INSTRUCTIONS: Form to be completed in duplicate using carbon paper. One copy to remain in aircraft until pad is used, and the other to be given to Squadron Radar Observer

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

QUESTIONNAIRE ON OPERATION OF RADAR:

INVERTER
1. Was adjustment of inverter voltage necessary to obtain 117 v? _____
2. Was further adjustment necessary during flight? _____
3. Was spoking observed? _____ If so, what was angle between spokes? _____
4. What was DC voltage reading on Engineer's panel during flight? _____
5. Remarks.

CRYSTAL CURRENT
1. Did Xtal I peak at maximum return setting of RCVR TUNE? _____
2. Did maximum crystal current change during flight? _____
3. If so, to what limits did it vary? Max_____Min_____
4. Remarks.

TRANSMITTER CURRENT
1. What was the initial reading of XMTR I with inverter voltage at 117 v, and with transmitter on short search pulse? _____
2. on long search pulse? _____
3. on beacon? _____
4. Did these readings jump or vary during flight? Give details in remarks.
5. Remarks.

AUTOMATIC FREQUENCY CONTROL
1. Did AFC lock in without adjustment of screwdriver controls? _____
2. If not, how much change in AFC voltage reading was required? _____
3. Did AFC remain locked in during flight? _____
4. Was reduction of range apparent as set was switched from maximum tune on AFC-OFF to AFC-ON? _____
5. Remarks.

CALIBRATION
1. What calibrations did not check out properly? Explain in remarks.
2. Remarks.

MISCELLANEOUS
1. Was scope definition as sharp as on the best set of this type you have operated? _____
2. If the radar set currently uses different models of components, give model letter of RF Head_____ Modulator_____ Synchronizer_____.
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REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

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Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

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	Time	Ringtime
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

ORGANIZATION_____ DATE_____
AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

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	Time	Ringtime
1.		
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

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AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
RINGTIME_____miles or feet.

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Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

Time	Occurrence

IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

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TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
FIGURE_____db.
REQUIRED OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
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LOG OF MALFUNCTIONS:
Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

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IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE CHECKS:

	Time	Ringtime
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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

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RADAR OPERATOR'S REPORT

SAC FORM 66-20

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AIRCRAFT TYPE_____ SERIAL NUMBER_____ RADAR TYPE_____
TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
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Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

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	Time	Ringtime
1.		
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TYPE OF MISSION_____ TAKE OFF TIME_____ LANDING TIME_____
RADAR TIME: RADAR ON_____ RADAR OFF_____ ELAPSED TIME_____
LAST PERFORMANCE CHECK: DATE_____ TIME_____ PERFORMANCE FIGURE_____db.
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Give running commentary of events and indications leading up to malfunction(s).

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	Time	Ringtime
1.		
2.		
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DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES OF GCA OPERATORS ,15 OCT 46

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HEADQUARTERS, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE SURGEON
AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY DIVISION

15 October 1946

RESEARCH REPORT NO. SAC-46-1

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES OF GCA OPERATORS IN THE ARMY AIR FORCES

Prepared by:

Richard H. Henneman
Philip H. Mitchell
Howard J. Hausman
Joseph T. Begley
Gabriel D. Ofiesh, Captain, A.C.

Approved:

Richard H. Henneman
RICHARD H. HENNEMAN
Chief, Aviation
Psychology Division

Approved:

EHRLING L. BERGQUIST
Colonel, M. C.
Surgeon

[redacted]

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DESCRIPTION OF DUTI . OF GCA OPERATORS

INTRODUCTION

The Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) System is the combined radar and radio device recently developed by the Army Air Forces to assist pilots in the blind landing of aircraft under conditions approaching zero visibility. It is essentially a mobile ground radar installation which provides facilities for directing the flight of aircraft over a predetermined glide-path on a safe approach to a given runway. The actual "touch-down" upon the runway must be made by the pilot after breaking into the clear at least 50 feet above the ground. The essential purpose of GCA is to bring the airplane over the runway on the proper approach to a point where the pilot is able to "take over" by visual contact with the ground. The men operating the radar equipment inside the GCA trailer are able to pick up and accurately track an approaching airplane (within a 30-mile radius and under a 4000-foot altitude). Information relative to range, course, and elevation is secured from the radar equipment and the proper approach instructions are transmitted to the pilot by normal radio channels. The GCA operators may thus be said to "talk the pilot down" the correct approach to the runway until he breaks into the clear to make a contact landing.

The present report is intended to present a brief comprehensive picture of GCA operation, with primary emphasis on the duties of the operating team. Based upon this description of duties, a psychological analysis of crew activities has been made. Results of this analysis have been interpreted in the light of research results accomplished during the war on the selection of airborne radar operators. The report concludes with suggestions relative to aptitude testing for the selection of GCA personnel. Included as appendices to the report are: (1) a typical GCA approach radio-telephone conversation, and (2) a tentative performance check for GCA operators using the AN/MPN-1 system. It is believed that these two appendices will supplement the overall picture of GCA duties.

The following sources of information have been drawn upon in the development of the present report:

1. A visit to Boca Raton Army Air Field, Boca Raton, Florida where GCA operator training was discussed and observed.

2. Several visits to Andrews Field, Camp Springs, Maryland, where the operation of a GCA unit was observed.

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POSITION OF GCA INSTALLATION WITH RESPECT TO RUNWAY



FIGURE 1

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DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES OF GCA OPERATORS

INTRODUCTION

The Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) System is the combined radar and radio device recently developed by the Army Air Forces to assist pilots in the blind landing of aircraft under conditions approaching zero visibility. It is essentially a mobile ground radar installation which provides facilities for directing the flight of aircraft over a predetermined glide-path on a safe approach to a given runway. The actual "touch-down" upon the runway must be made by the pilot after breaking into the clear at least 50 feet above the ground. The essential purpose of GCA is to bring the airplane over the runway on the proper approach to a point where the pilot is able to "take over" by visual contact with the ground. The men operating the radar equipment inside the GCA trailer are able to pick up and accurately track an approaching airplane (within a 30-mile radius and under a 4000-foot altitude). Information relative to range, course, and elevation is secured from the radar equipment and the proper approach instructions are transmitted to the pilot by normal radio channels. The GCA operators may thus be said to "talk the pilot down" the correct approach to the runway until he breaks into the clear to make a contact landing.

The present report is intended to present a brief comprehensive picture of GCA operation, with primary emphasis on the duties of the operating team. Based upon this description of duties, a psychological analysis of crew activities has been made. Results of this analysis have been interpreted in the light of research results accomplished during the war on the selection of airborne radar operators. The report concludes with suggestions relative to aptitude testing for the selection of GCA personnel. Included as appendices to the report are: (1) a typical GCA approach radio-telephone conversation, and (2) a tentative performance check for GCA operators using the AN/MPN-1 system. It is believed that these two appendices will supplement the overall picture of GCA duties.

The following sources of information have been drawn upon in the development of the present report:

1. A visit to Boca Raton Army Air Field, Boca Raton, Florida where GCA operator training was discussed and observed.

2. Several visits to Andrews Field, Camp Springs, Maryland, where the operation of a GCA unit was observed.

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3. Observations of GCA operator performance at Westover Field, Massachusetts; Clinton County Army Air Field, Ohio; Mitchel Field, New York; and Langley Field, Virginia.

4. Conferences with GCA officials of the Air Communications Service at Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., and Headquarters, Air Communications Service, Langley Field, Virginia.

5. The film "GCA" produced by the AAF Motion Picture Unit (TF-1-3442).

6. War Department Technical Manual 11-1343, Radio Set, AN/MPN-1, Technical Operation.

7. War Department Technical Manual 11-1443, Radio Set, AN/MPN-1, Preventive Maintenance Manual.

8. Tentative Standard Operating Procedure, Ground Controlled Approach (compiled at GCA School, Columbia Army Air Field, Columbia, South Carolina).

THE GCA EQUIPMENT AND TEAM OF OPERATORS

The GCA equipment (AN/MPN-1 installation) is composed of three principal systems: a radar search system, a precision radar system, and a radio communications system. The equipment is housed in a mobile trailer attached to a truck (See Figure 24). The latter contains the generators for the high-voltage power supply and an air conditioning unit. For proper function of the equipment, the truck and trailer must first be accurately placed at a predetermined location with respect to the runway in use. This position is to the left of the runway (from the approaching pilot) and 250 feet from its center. It is approximately 3000 feet from the approach end of the runway (See Figure 1). The proper alignment of the truck and trailer is an intricate process, involving the use of special reflectors set up along the runway and entailing the efforts of all members of the GCA team. However, once the proper locations of the truck and trailer have been determined with respect to each runway, permanent sites are marked so that in future operation alignment becomes a relatively simple and rapid, though precise, procedure.

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POSITION OF GCA INSTALLATION WITH RESPECT TO RUNWAY



FIGURE 1

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

Fig. 24. Radio Set AN/MPN-1 during operation.

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

Fig. 17: Indicator Rack MT-118/MPN-1

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

Fig. 8: Approach indicator display.

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The search radar system includes two identical radar sets for providing information relative to the location in range and azimuth of all aircraft in the vicinity (i.e., within a range of 30 miles and under a 4000 foot altitude). The cathode ray tubes of these two sets have screens known as PPI (plane position indicator) scopes. These tubes are equipped with adjustable navigation heads, compass roses, variable lights, superimposed maps, clocks, and various other aids to the operator to make it possible to transmit the proper instructions to the pilot. Both PPI scopes have range adjustments providing for expansion of the normal 30-mile range into a 15-mile range for guiding the airplane through the traffic pattern. Duplication of the search radar sets provides for splitting the "search" duties between two operators (the Plane Selector and the Traffic Director) when air traffic is heavy, each operator specializing in certain functions.

The precision radar system scans the area in which the final approach is made, including a space 10 miles in radius, 20 degrees in azimuth, and seven degrees in elevation. It includes two radar units, the azimuth tracking unit and the elevation tracking unit, each of which comprises two radar sets with 10-mile and two-mile ranges respectively. The cathode ray tubes of these four sets have screens which are known as EPI (expanded position indicator) scopes. This expansion provides much greater accuracy of range, azimuth, and elevation data to the operators. One operator (the Azimuth Tracker) observes the two scopes of the azimuth unit, while a second operator (the Elevation Tracker) observes the two scopes of the elevation unit. Each of these operators, by means of a tracking mechanism with which he follows the "pip" across the scope, actuates the mechanism of the errormeter. The four radar sets can be adjusted for "rapid scan" in order to provide more distinct "pips". This adjustment aids accurate tracking on the expanded scopes, on which speed of movement of the "pip" has been greatly increased. Furthermore, the rapid detection of deviations from the glidepath becomes progressively more important as the airplane nears the runway.

An important auxiliary unit in the precision system is the errormeter (See Figure 8). It consists of two meters, calibrated in feet, one to indicate deviations to the right or left of the predetermined glidepath, and the other to indicate deviations above or below the glidepath. This device is observed by the fifth member of the GCA team known as the Final Director.

Some GCA installations make use of an aural signal unit, another auxiliary device of the precision system. The function of the aural signal unit is to provide the pilot of the approaching aircraft with a supplementary aid, in addition to the Final

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Director's voice, for maintaining the proper heading on the final approach. The signal mechanism is activated by the tracking devices in much the same manner as the errormeter (See Below), the sound (a warning buzz) being conveyed to the pilot over the Final Director's communication channel.

The communications system includes three sets of HF transmitters, three sets of HF receivers, and three sets of VHF "transceivers" for contact with approaching aircraft. For contact with the tower, a low frequency power receiver and an emergency field telephone are provided. For communication among GCA operators within the trailer, an intercommunication system is provided.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the complete GCA equipment (AN/MPN-1) requires for its normal operation a team of five persons. These are:

1. The Plane Selector, or First PPI Operator, who employs the distance search set to pick up and identify the aircraft which is to be brought in for a landing. He also brings the aircraft over the field and into the traffic pattern.

2. The Traffic Director, or Second PPI Operator, who operates the 15-mile search set and directs the pilot through the traffic pattern to the final approach.

3. The Azimuth Tracker who operates the azimuth tracking unit of the precision system.

4. The Elevation Tracker who performs similar duties with the elevation tracking unit.

5. The Final Director (sometimes referred to as the Final Controller) who observes the errormeter and directs the pilot down the glidepath on his final approach until he breaks into the clear over the runway.

Both equipment and procedures used in GCA operations at the present time are in an experimental stage. The system described in this report (AN/MPN-1) is that currently in use at several air bases in the continental United States, but research on simplified systems requiring fewer operators (e.g., the AN/CPN-4) is now in progress. Even with the equipment described above, different procedures are currently being tried

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out at various stations. For example, at least one GCA unit (that at Langley Field, Virginia) is operating without use of the errormeter. In this case, instead of the Final Director, the Azimuth and Elevation Trackers, reading course and altitude deviations directly from their EPI scopes, inform the pilot at once of necessary corrections. Another procedure calls for a combination of the duties of these two operators and those of the Final Director into the activities of a single operator, who reports directly to the pilot from his observation of azimuth and elevation EPI scopes. It is to be expected, therefore, that in the months to come there will be considerable modification of GCA equipment and procedures and that much of the contents of this report will have to be revised. On the other hand, it can be anticipated with some confidence that ground radar devices will continue in use to guide pilots in making the correct final approach when visibility is restricted and that such devices will require one or more operators to interpret radar scopes and to "talk the pilot down". The psychological requirements of such operators should remain substantially the same. It is, however, with full recognition of the tentative character of the present description of equipment and procedures, that this report is prepared.

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

The following description of personnel activities involved in GCA operations begins with a brief account of setting up procedures, then progresses to the essential duties of each of the five operators in the process of directing an airplane in for a safe low-ceiling landing.

Setting up procedures include principally the proper location of the truck and trailer adjacent to the runway in use, and tuning the set before the start of actual operations. Although all members of the GCA team participate in these detailed procedures, the Truck Driver (not included in the team members listed above) has a leading part in location, since skill in placing the truck precisely, materially reduces the time consumed in "setting up". Similarly, the Radar Mechanic (who also usually functions as one of the Trackers) has an important role in tune-up procedures, which include properly aligning the search and precision radar sets and tune-up of the radio sets. The Final Director normally shares with the Radar Mechanic supervision of the details of tune-up and alignment. These procedures include specific details which must be performed in a definite sequence. The efficiency of the above procedures is measured in terms of clear scope

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returns and normal radio-telephone communication. A GCA team is ordinarily expected to get its equipment installed and in operation within a 40-minute period. In theory each team member has his own specific functions to perform in "set-up" operations, but in practice it has been found that individuals vary widely from day to day in the activities which they perform.

Normal operations include the various steps from the time communication is established with the aircraft until direction of the airplane is turned back to the pilot to complete his landing visually. The most important of these steps include: (1) identification of the aircraft; (2) traffic control operations ("stacking") when necessary; (3) transmission to the pilot of necessary landing information (altitude setting, landing runway, weather conditions, etc.); (4) directing the pilot to the airdrome; (5) directing the pilot through the traffic pattern; and (6) directing the pilot down the proper glidepath on his final approach to the point where he can complete his landing visually. Normally the individual members of the GCA team have regularly assigned duties during the above operations so the following description of duties has been broken down by operator. It must be pointed out once more, however, that no established GCA procedures appear to be in effect at the present time which would insure standard operations from one base to another and from one GCA installation to another.

The Plane Selector (First PPI Operator) first establishes radio contact with the aircraft requesting GCA and obtains and records necessary identifying data (e.g. airplane type, present heading, altitude, etc.). He must then pick up this airplane on the scope of the distance search set. Since there may be several aircraft flying within a 30-mile range of the airdrome, the Plane Selector must identify the airplane with which he is in communication. Identification procedure usually consists of a succession of directions to the pilot to fly specific headings these instructions being continued until the corresponding "pip" on the PPI scope has been positively distinguished from all others. The Plane Selector may be assisted in locating and identifying the correct "pip" by the Second PPI Operator or Traffic Director. During and after identification procedure, the Plane Selector must also observe carefully the "echoes" of other aircraft in the vicinity to safeguard against air collisions. Where necessary, he instructs the pilots of other aircraft to maintain specific headings and altitudes until such time as GCA can bring them in. This traffic control procedure,

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known as "stacking" may be shared with, or assumed by, the Control Tower Operator at the airdrome.*

After identification has been made, the Plane Selector provides the pilot with necessary weather data (including ceiling, visibility, wind direction and velocity, runway in use, etc.). He then gives the pilot the necessary instructions to bring the aircraft over the field and into the traffic pattern for a landing. When the airplane is on the downwind leg, the Plane Selector (after instructing the pilot to retune to a new radio frequency and await a call by the Traffic Director) turns direction of the pilot over to the Traffic Director. The Plane Selector, however, continues to follow carefully the progress of the GCA operation and subsequently may contact the control tower at the proper time to obtain clearance for a landing. This clearance is actually relayed to the pilot by the Traffic Director.

The Traffic Director (Second PPI Operator), following closely the previous operations of the Plane Selector, switches on the 15-mile range adjustment of his search set as soon as the airplane is within that range. He normally assumes direction of the pilot from the Plane Selector on the downwind leg.** After establishing radio communication with the pilot, the Traffic Director warns the latter to make his cockpit check preparatory to landing. He ascertains from the pilot the latter's intended air speed on the base leg and on the final approach, and records these figures in a log, to be handed on to the Final Director. After turning the pilot on to the base leg, a position report is made to him, and a preliminary tower clearance to land (previously obtained from the control tower by the Plane Selector) is relayed to the pilot.

Next comes the most important job of the Traffic Director namely, instructions to the pilot regarding the turn into the

* In GCA operations in oversea theaters, GCA operators were normally responsible for "stacking". At continental U.S. air bases, however, this function is usually taken over by the Control Tower Operator or by the C.A.A. radio range adjacent to the airdrome.

** At the present time at U.S. bases on bad weather approaches when traffic is light, the normal traffic pattern may be simplified in the interests of landing the airplane more quickly. Furthermore, when there is only a single airplane to be brought in, one operator may combine the duties of both Plane Selector and Traffic Director.

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final approach. He may follow either the "speed lines" or "angle timing" method of determining the correct position to begin the turn. Both methods call for skillful scope interpretation. The importance of an accurate final turn springs from the fact that the Final Director is limited in the extent of error on the final approach which he can hope to correct in the very limited time at his disposal. An excessively faulty turn into the final approach (i.e., too soon or too late) may result in the necessity for a last-minute "pull-up" by the pilot and a new approach.

After the pilot has been turned into his final approach and is within at least 10 miles of the runway, the Traffic Director makes a check to see if the two Trackers and Final Director are ready to assume direction of the approach. He then turns direction of the pilot over to the Final Director for instruction down the final glidepath.

The Azimuth and Elevation Trackers. The principal tasks of these two operators are the correct use of the two precision sets with consequent "feeding" into the errormeter of accurate azimuth and elevation data during the final approach. These men do not normally communicate with the pilot. Their duties are essentially similar since one of them tracks the approaching aircraft as to deviations in azimuth from the predetermined glide path, while the other tracks the aircraft in elevation during its progress down the glidepath to the runway. Each operator must closely observe the EPI scopes of the precision sets; each has a tracking task (by means of manual controls); and each must operate a pedal mechanism with the feet. The two trackers must closely follow earlier operations and directions to the pilot as given by the two PPI operators in order to pick up the approaching aircraft on their EPI scopes as soon as it comes within range.

The two pedal mechanisms regulate the direction of the antenna sweeps of the two precision sets and serve to keep these properly lined up with the approaching airplane so that the "pip" is not lost from the scopes. The alignment regulator for the elevation set antenna is under control of the Azimuth Tracker, while the scan of the azimuth set antenna is regulated by the Elevation Tracker. Thus each operator is able to detect in his own scope whether or not the other operator is tracking properly with his pedal mechanism. Where necessary either operator can warn the other by turning on a red light or by speaking directly.

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In addition to operation of the pedal mechanism (to maintain proper alignment of the two set antennae), the two Trackers must manually track the "pip" of the approaching airplane on their scopes in order to determine azimuth and elevation deviations from the fixed glidepath. Adjustment of the manual controls of these tracking cursors regulates the voltages in the errormeter mechanism directly so that the needles of the azimuth error and elevation error dials indicate deviations proportional to those manifested on the EPI scopes by the "pips". Accurate manual tracking is thus absolutely necessary if the Final Director is to direct the pilot with the precision necessary for an instrument landing. The tracking cursors by which this operation is accomplished are relatively simple visual pursuit devices.

The Trackers transfer their attention from their 10-mile scopes to their two-mile scopes when the incoming airplane is within the more restricted range. Also for the last phase of the approach the "rapid scan" adjustment is switched on for the two precision sets to obtain greater sensitivity on the EPI scopes and to aid tracking precision, thus leading to more accurate errormeter indications. A displacement of one inch on the two-mile scope represents a deviation of only 50 feet by the approaching airplane.

The Azimuth Tracker also provides the Final Director with range information (e.g., "Now half-mile from end of runway!"; Now over the end of the runway!"), which in turn the latter relays to the pilot.

The Final Director. The Final Director serves throughout the entire GCA operation as the director of the team, generally supervising all activities from the first radio contact with the pilot by the Plane Selector to final communication with the pilot after the latter is taxiing along the runway. He is responsible for the maintenance of the equipment, its proper alignment before the start of operations, and for the success of the whole process of "bringing the pilot down." During normal operations he follows closely all the activities of the two PPI Operators and is ready to take over the direction of the pilot after the latter is on the final approach and within range of the precision sets of the two Trackers. From this point on he observes carefully the azimuth and elevation dials of the errormeter, noting the direction and amount of deviation of the airplane from the predetermined glidepath, and informing the pilot by radio of the necessary corrections. He also glances directly at the scopes of the two Trackers from

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time to time to check on the accuracy of their pedal and manual tracking and to verify or anticipate the readings of the errormeter dials.*

At the proper point the Final Director instructs the pilot to start his glide. Since the progress of the airplane down the glidepath on the final approach to the runway is the most critical phase of the entire approach operation, the Final Director carries a heavy responsibility for quick and accurate interpretation of the devices he uses and for clear and precise instructions to the pilot. During this period the Final Director must keep up an almost continuous flow of talk to the pilot, even when there are no corrections to be given, in order to establish and maintain the pilot's confidence in the approach. He repeatedly informs the pilot of his progress toward the runway --- of his distance from the end of the runway, of his holding proper heading and maintaining just the proper rate of glide to bring him over the runway for a safe landing. He cautions the pilot to check his landing gear and flaps, assures him of his good progress, and finally, turns the direction of the airplane back to the pilot when the latter is in a position to complete the landing visually. If the approach, at the last minute, is obviously unsatisfactory (i.e., the airplane is too far off the correct glidepath), the Final Director must instruct the pilot to pull up and go around for another approach. If the landing is safely accomplished, the Final Director turns the pilot over to the control tower for taxi instructions and requests the pilot's comments on the approach.

Shut-down Procedure. Care, speed, and specialization of duties are less important in "shutting-down" the GCA equipment than in setting it up. Several checks have to be made, however, such as ascertaining from the control tower that there is no need for further operation and insuring that all equipment is in good operating condition for future action. The Radar Mechanic, under the general supervision of the Final Director, superintends shutting-down operations.

General Comments Relative to Team Duties. It is clear from the above that the GCA crew must work as a team, cooperating closely with one another in the various steps of setting up the equipment and bringing the aircraft in.

* In some cases where the older GCA procedure has been modified to exclude use of the errormeter, the two Trackers read azimuth and elevation deviations directly from their scopes and jointly direct the pilot down the final glidepath by radio, thus replacing the Final Director.

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Each man must follow carefully every detail of the progress of the approach. It is common for the members of a successful team to exercise a sort of friendly supervision over one another and to give such warnings or suggestions informally as may be helpful. Complete familiarity with the equipment is obviously necessary for efficient functioning of a GCA team. Finally, all operators, but especially the Plane Selector, Traffic Director, and the Final Director, must be familiar with, and proficient in the use of, standard radio-telephone procedures. Clearness, precision, and confidence in the directions to the pilot are quite as much an essential feature of successful GCA operation as is efficient radar operation.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF DUTIES

The necessity for a mutual knowledge of one another's duties among GCA operators has already been pointed out. This necessity arises from the degree of close teamwork involved in successful GCA procedure. Furthermore, it is common practice for the two PPI Operators to trade places from one day to another, and for the two Trackers to do likewise. It is, therefore, apparent that the requisite psychological qualifications for proficient GCA operators are the same for the two PPI Operators and again for the two Trackers. The Final Director should possess the same qualifications as the PPI Operators plus sound judgment in emergencies, the ability to plan and supervise the activities of others, and good division of attention.

The duties of GCA operators fall logically into two principal divisions, radar operation and radio-telephone communication. Two major aspects of radar operation may be distinguished, namely set operation and scope interpretation. In the following psychological analysis of GCA operator's duties the essentials of set operation, scope interpretation, and radio-telephone procedure will be matched in turn with related psychological qualifications. In this analysis a distinction is made between skills and qualifications. The former are considered to be the product of long and careful practice or training, while the latter are defined as desirable characteristics of potential operators before the start of formal training.

By set operation is meant those details of procedure in the adjustment of the devices used which are necessary for efficient operation of the equipment. Smooth and efficient handling of the set is fundamental in all types of radar operation and such skill implies in addition detailed knowledge of the various controls and sequence of activities involved in the operation of the several units of the GCA equipment. Proficiency

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in set operation is largely the product of long and careful practice under expert supervision. The operator must have practiced his procedures to the point where his reactions have become automatic and no longer need to be "thought out" in advance. A valuable supplement to adequate practice in producing an efficient GCA operator is a thorough comprehension of the rationale for the various operating procedures. Adequate understanding of the technical functioning of radar sets will assist the student operator to acquire the requisite skills more quickly and to remember them more effectively. Such technical comprehension should be an end-product of a process of careful instruction of trainees who were highly selected to begin with on the bases of general intelligence and mechanical comprehension.

Aside from the above two qualifications of candidates for GCA training, several other psychological attributes are desirable for efficient set operation. The proper manipulation of the switches and control knobs, and the various small adjustments on the several units calls for psychomotor coordination. The simultaneous operation of manual wheels and pedals by the two Trackers presents another instance of the desirability for this qualification. In planning and executing set operational procedures, it is necessary to organize the various steps in such a way as to provide for maximum time for each detailed operation in sequence. Such procedure calls for thorough and systematic work-habits. The desirable psychological quality is here tentatively designated "systematic diligence". It is possible that the foundations for such requisite habits of performance may be identified in advance of training in many of the individual's work-tendencies and from his hobbies

Radar operators are sometimes accused of "finger trouble" during set operation. This label is given to the bad habit of excessive manipulation of controls. It is quite probably a manifestation of nervous tension springing from lack of confidence. This deficiency in turn may be merely an indication of insufficient practice or it may indicate a basic lack of emotional stability on the part of the operator, i.e., "nervousness."

Scope interpretation is the fundamental skill in GCA procedure, as in any type of radar operation. The "pips" corresponding to aircraft "echoes" must be distinguished from other types of "echoes" on the scopes which may result from mountains, tall buildings, trees, and certain types of clouds. Where there are several "pips" resulting from a number of aircraft flying in the vicinity, the airplane requesting GCA has to be positively and quickly identified. The positions and

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movements of the various "pips" must be observed accurately and from these observations must be judged the actual position and course of the aircraft with which radio contact has been established. The scopes of the radar sets used in GCA operation are marked with range circles, corresponding to different distances from the GCA installation. The actual range of a particular airplane is determined by the relation of its "pip" to the range markers on a PPI or EPI scope. Direction of flight of an airplane is calculated by the angular position and movement of a "pip" with respect to a fixed compass direction.

Adequate visual acuity and brightness discrimination are necessary for the accurate location and identification of "pips", particularly since near-threshold changes in size, movement, and brightness are often involved. In general, perceptual speed and accuracy are called for in the scope interpretation activities of the two PPI Operators (Plane Selector and Traffic Director). Identification of an individual airplane from the progress of its "pip" across the scope calls for visual memory. This qualification is also involved in giving traffic control directions to other aircraft (i.e., in "stacking" to avoid congestion and collisions). The important ability of "seeing" the actual position of the airplane under direction as the pilot executes the instructions given him from the GCA set involves a high degree of visualization of spatial relations. The more readily and completely a GCA operator can identify himself with the pilot and follow each change in heading and altitude of the incoming airplane, the more successfully will he be able to direct the pilot through the traffic pattern and down the correct glidepath. Scope interpretation and the transmission to the pilot of the correct approach instructions are also facilitated by the possession of certain navigator qualifications. The operator may frequently have to make approximate calculations mentally, and to anticipate the future position of the airplane. Two of the most important psychological qualifications for such activities are numerical facility and arithmetic reasoning.

Radio-telephone procedure calls primarily for knowledge of the principles of, and skill in the use of, the multi-channeled radio communications system. Such skill and knowledge are primarily products of practice. However, certain psychological qualifications are important for personnel who must make as much use of radio communication as is called for in GCA operation. Most important of these are speech and voice characteristics. Spoken verbal fluency, i.e., ability to speak smoothly and spontaneously, and to make quick verbal responses to rapidly changing situations without hesitation and "blocking", is of paramount importance. In

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addition, quality of voice (clearness of expression, precise enunciation, and good carrying quality) is a pertinent factor. Enunciation and articulation must be good enough so that each word is perfectly understood by the pilot. It is furthermore necessary that those GCA operators in communication with the pilot, but especially the Final Director be able to convey confidence. This quality is dependent upon both the content of the message and the manner of speech. Its importance is universally stressed by those familiar with GCA operation. Since operators who habitually follow full and detailed "SOP" in radio-telephone communication are more intelligible to the pilot, the qualification of systematic diligence, mentioned above, is probably of importance here also. Good auditory acuity for voices coming in over a radio communications system is a prerequisite for GCA operators. Finally, an emotionally stable temperament is an essential characteristic, if the GCA operator is to bring the pilot down successfully under emergency conditions. This trait is most important for the Final Director.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A SELECTION TEST BATTERY

From the foregoing psychological analysis of the duties of GCA operators, the following qualifications are suggested as being important for the selection of personnel to be trained for duty with GCA equipment.

MOST IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL GCA OPERATORS

Psychological Qualification	Related Activity
1. Mechanical comprehension	Set maintenance; set operation
2. Visualization of spatial relations	Scope interpretation
3. Arithmetic reasoning	Precision of instructions (Two PPI Operators and Final Director)
4. Emotional stability	R-T procedures, especially approach instructions (2 PPI Operators and Final Director)

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Psychological Qualification	Related Activity
5. Verbal Fluency (spoken)	R-T procedures (Two PPI operators and Final Director)
6. Perceptual speed and accuracy	Scope interpretation
7. Visual memory	Scope interpretation
8. Visual acuity and brightness discrimination	Scope interpretation
9. "Systematic diligence"	Overall operation; especially tracking
10. General intelligence	Overall operation
11. Quality of voice	R-T communication
12. Confidence of voice	R-T communication
13. Auditory acuity	R-T communication
14. Psychomotor coordination	Set operation
15. Numerical facility	Precision of instructions (Two PPI Operators and Final Director)

Some of the qualifications listed above are basically physiological and candidates for GCA training could be screened by existent standard tests of these characteristics. The physiological attributes are the following: visual acuity; brightness discrimination; auditory acuity; and certain speech characteristics (pitch, range, timbre, articulation, enunciation).

The measurement of spoken verbal fluency and confidence of voice will probably require a special research at the operating bases. The habit-complex, designated above as "systematic diligence," may be investigated through a study of biographical data or by some related means. A number of standard tests are available for the measurement of emotional stability. For an estimation of general intelligence level, AGCT scores would be available. It is suggested that GCA student operators be restricted to Class I on AGCT scores.

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For the measurement of the remaining psychological qualifications there are available a wide variety of tests and supplementary information from the results of previous research studies. During the recent war, considerable experimental work was done on the development and validation of tests designed to measure the qualifications suggested above as important for GCA operators.* In the Aircrew Classification Batteries developed by the AAF Aviation Psychology Program were tests covering mechanical comprehension, visualization of spatial relations, arithmetic reasoning, numerical facility, and psychomotor coordination. NDRC psychologists developed tests for radar operators which, according to a factor analysis discussed in the terminal report of PRP (Radar), sample factors of perceptual speed, visual memory, and spatial relations. (This last is defined similarly to the qualification termed "visualization of spatial relations" above). Research on the problem of selecting navigators for training to operate airborne radar equipment was conducted in the European theater by Aircrew Evaluation and Research Detachment #1. Since an attempt was made to validate the tests used, even though the number of trainees was small, the findings have some bearing on the present problem. Research personnel in AERD #1 concluded

* The sources of information used in the discussion regarding suggestions for a selection test battery were the following:

1. Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology Research Reports, Report #12 - Psychological Research on Radar Observer Training.
2. Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology Research Reports, Report #17 - Psychological Research in the Theaters of War.
3. Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology Research Reports, Report #2 - The Classification Program.
4. Memoranda Nos. 2 and 3, Instruction Manual for Oscilloscope Operator Tests, Experimental Editions NDRC Project SC-70, NS-146, Camp Murphy, Florida.

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concluded that the following six tests held the greatest promise in the field of airborne radar personnel selection:

Coordinate Reading (NDRC)

Oscilloscope Interpretation (NDRC)

Pattern Orientation

Spatial Orientation I (Aircrew battery)

SAM Complex Coordination (Aircrew battery)

SAM Two Hand Coordination (Aircrew battery)

Of the above tests, Pattern Orientation was developed specifically for the airborne navigator selection project. Psychologists from PRP (Radar) recommend from the results of factor analyses that Instrument Comprehension (from the Aircrew Classification Battery) be used to sample the factor of spatial relations.

In summarizing the above discussion, the following battery of existing psychological tests is suggested for the selection of students for training as GCA operators:

QUALIFICATION	TEST	SOURCE
Mechanical comprehension	Mechanical Principles (CI-905B)	Aircrew Classification Battery
Visualization of spatial relations	Instrument Comprehension (CI-616C)	Aircrew Classification Battery
Arithmetic reasoning	Arithmetic Reasoning (CI-206C)	Aircrew Classification Battery
Perceptual speed and accuracy	Spatial Orientation I (CP-[illegible]B)	Aircrew Classification Battery
	Oscilloscope Interpretation (CP-817A)	NDRC

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QUALIFICATION	TEST	SOURCE
Visual memory	Coordinate Reading (CP-224B)	NDRC
Psychomotor coordination	SAM Complex Coordination (CM-[illegible]1E)	Aircrew Classification Battery
Numerical facility	Numerical Operations (CI-702B)	Aircrew Classification Battery
Emotional stability	To be selected from available standardized instruments in this area.	

The respective weightings of the above tests will have to be experimentally determined.

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APPENDIX I

SAMPLE GCA APPROACH RADIO-TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Pilot:	"Hello Andrews Tower, Hello Andrews Tower, This is Army 1234. We are 15 miles north of field. Request GCA. Over."
Tower:	"Roger, Army 1234. This is Andrews Tower -- altitude setting 29.55. Contact GCA on 3475 frequency. Over."
Pilot:	"Thank you Andrews Tower. Will call GCA on frequency 3475. Out."
	"Andrews GCA this is Army 1234. Request Ground Controlled Approach. Over."
Plane Selector:	"Army 1234 - This is Andrews GCA, how do you hear me? Over."
Pilot:	"GCA, I hear you strong and clear. Over."
Plane Selector:	"Army 1234 - what is your aircraft type, present heading, and altitude? Over."
Pilot:	"GCA from Army 1234 -- Flying C-54; present heading 010; altitude 3000 feet. Over."
Plane Selector:	"Understand C-54; present heading 010; altitude 3000. Over."
Pilot:	"That is correct, GCA."
Plane Selector:	"Army 1234 - if during any three-minute interval you receive no communication from me, fly the reciprocal of the heading you are steering at that time. Over."
Pilot:	"Roger, GCA."

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Plane Selector: "Army 1234 - read back all headings and altitudes as given. Over."

Pilot: "Will read back all headings and altitudes as given. Over."

Plane Selector: "Army 1234 - all turns will be standard rate, three degrees per second. Over."

Pilot: "Understand all turns will be standard rate, three degrees per second. Over."

Plane Selector: (Weather Report). "Army 1234 - present weather at this station, ceiling 300 feet, visibility one-half mile, light rain, wind from southwest 14 miles per hour. Over."

Pilot: "Understand present weather, ceiling 300 feet, visibility one-half mile; light rain, wind southwest 14 miles per hour. Over."

Plane Selector: "Army 1234 - steer left to heading 225, descend to 2000 feet. Over."

Pilot: "Steering left to heading 225; descending to 2000 feet. Over."

Plane Selector: (Position Report). "Army 1234 - you are on your crosswind leg, five miles north of field. Over."

Pilot: "Understand now on crosswind leg, five miles north of field. Over."

(Plane Selector provides pilot with any essential additional information not previously given).

Plane Selector: "Army 1234 - steer left to heading 135, descend to 1500 feet. Over."

Pilot: "Steering left to 135; descending to 1500 feet. Over."

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Plane Selector:	(Position Report) "Army 1234 - you are on your downwind leg eight miles northwest of field. Over."
Pilot:	"Understand present position, eight miles northwest of field on downwind leg. Over."
Plane Selector:	"Army 1234 - stand by for simulated frequency change. Over!" OR "Army 1234 - retune your receiver to 4890 and stand by. If you receive no communication in 30 seconds, retune to present frequency. Over."
Pilot:	"Roger, GCA."
Traffic Director:	"Army 1234 - this is Andrews GCA, how do you read? Over."
Pilot:	"Coming in strong and clear. Over."
Traffic Director:	"Army 1234 - Perform initial cockpit check at this time. Over."
Pilot:	"Making cockpit check. Over."
Traffic Director:	"Army 1234 - What will be your speed on base and final? Over."
Pilot:	"Speed on base leg 120; speed on final 110. Over."
Traffic Director:	"Army 1234 - understand your speed on base, 120, speed on final, 110. Over."
Pilot:	"That is correct, GCA."
Traffic Director:	"Army 1234 - steer left to heading 045, descend to 1200 feet. Over."
Pilot:	"Now steering left to heading 045; descending to 1200 feet. Over."
Traffic Director:	(Position Report) "Army 1234 - you are on your base leg 10 miles south of field. Over."
Pilot:	"Understand now on base leg, 10 miles south of field. Over."

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Traffic Director:	(Tower Clearance) "Army 1234 - Andrews Tower clears you to three miles on final for this low approach. Over."
Pilot:	"Roger, GCA, thank you."
Traffic Director:	"Army 1234 - Check your gyro compass heading at this time. Over."
Pilot:	"Now checking gyro compass heading. Over."
Traffic Director:	"Army 1234 - Check your gear down and locked. Over."
Pilot:	"Gear down and locked."
Traffic Director:	"Army 1234 - Stand by for turn on to final approach. Over."
Pilot:	"Standing by for turn on to final."
Traffic Director:	"Army 1234 - Steer left to heading 315, maintain 1200 feet. Over."
Pilot:	"Steering left to heading 315; holding altitude of 1200. Over."
Final Director:	"Army 1234 - This is your Final Director. You are now on your final approach. Do not acknowledge further instructions unless unable to comply. If radio contact with GCA is interrupted, climb immediately to 1500 feet. Is this understood. Over."
Pilot:	"Understand instructions. Roger, GCA."
Final Director:	"Six miles from touchdown. Complete your final landing check."
	"Approaching glidepath, begin descent at 500 feet per minute. Now five miles from touchdown."

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Final Director: "Elevation good."

"Present heading good."

"Fifty feet above glidepath; increase rate of descent. Four miles from touchdown."

"Forty-five feet above glidepath --- twenty feet above --- decrease rate of descent --- on glidepath --- that is good --- decrease rate of descent slightly --- that is good --- rate of descent very good --- on glidepath."

"Steer two degrees left heading 313 degrees."

"On course --- hold present heading."

"Three miles from touchdown. Use flaps at own discretion."

"Heading and elevation good."

"Holding glidepath nicely."

"Two miles from touchdown --- you are drifting slightly to the right, steer left three degrees --- correcting nicely ---steer right two degrees."

"Now one mile from touchdown. Heading and elevation both good."

"One-half mile from touchdown --- on glidepath --- on course --- you are doing very good job ---runway should be visible --- clear to land.

"Runway center 50 feet to your right --- over runway --- take over."

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Final Director: "Army 1234 --- Tune to frequency 2875 for taxi instructions from tower."

Final Director's alternate directions: (if pilot misses approach --- i.e., not aligned at one-half mile from runway, runway not clear, or any emergency):

"Pull up! Climb to 1500 feet, heading _____ --- acknowledge --- Over."

To avoid collision at any time:

GCA Operator: "Army 1234 - left turn, heading ___ --- unidentified aircraft crossing your course two miles ahead --- acknowledge --- Over."

If at any time turns are not made promptly:

Traffic Director: "Army 1234 - begin your turns immediately on command to turn and acknowledge while in turn. Over."

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APPENDIX II

TENTATIVE PERFORMANCE CHECK FOR GCA OPERATORS

The following check list of specific activities performed by the GCA team has been prepared as a possible basis for the objective measurement of personnel proficiency. While the contents of the check list have been extensively discussed with officers in charge of GCA units, the list has not been tried out in actual GCA operation. It therefore follows that the various items are purely suggestive, and it is to be expected that considerable revision, in the way of both additions and deletions, will have to be made prior to any actual use of the check list as a device for the measurement of on-the-job proficiency.

The items in the present check list apply more particularly to the operational procedure of the GCA Unit at Andrews Field (which uses the AN/MPN-1 set) than to GCA installations at other bases. Procedures are known to vary widely at the present time. The items below have been grouped according to a chronological order of procedure. The attempt to break down the activities entirely by individual team members has not been made because specific individual assignments are not rigidly adhered to. It is believed, however, that an evaluation of individual GCA operators is possible by means of some type of objective check list, provided operating procedures become standardized. It seems likely that the most successful proficiency checks ultimately will emphasize end results, rather than technique, and the path of the airplane, rather than the activities of specific individuals in the GCA trailer.

In the purely tentative form of the check list presented below, no attempt has been made to designate tolerance limits for those items which do not specify all-or-none performance. The requisite standards of accuracy for such activities should be experimentally determined by field research conducted at several GCA installations.

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SETTING UP PROCEDURE

(1-5) Was prime mover (truck) checked to determine that it was properly serviced? This includes checking:

1. Motor oil.
2. Radiator water.
3. Supply of gasoline.
4. Proper inflation of tires.
5. Lights.

(6-8) Were power generator engines checked to determine that they were properly serviced? This includes checking:

6. Motor oil.
7. Radiator water.
8. Gasoline.

(9-10) Were cables between prime mover and GCA trailer unit properly connected? This includes:

9. Proper connection of #1 and #2 cables between prime mover and GCA trailer unit.
10. Secure locking of the cables by locknuts.

(11-24) Were power engines in prime mover properly started? This includes the following sequence:

11. Make sure ignition switch is in OFF position.
12. Check to see that circuit breakers are off.
13. Check to see that field rheostats are in AUTO position.

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14. Turn regulator voltage switch to ON position.

15. Turn ignition switch to ON position.

16. Push starter button until engine fires.

17. Throw in circuit breaker after engine has started.

18. Check oil gauge to see that it is at least 15 pounds.

19. Check ammeter to see that it reads 14 to 16 amperes at start; this will drop to two and one-half amperes as battery nears full charge.

20. Check operation of radiator and fan. (Water temperature should remain below 196 degrees Fahrenheit).

21. Check to see that voltmeter on panel reads 117 volts. (Proper voltage can be obtained by rheostat on voltage regulator cover).

22. Check to see that frequency meters register between 60 and 62 cycles.

23. Connect the two air duct vents between blower unit and GCA trailer unit.

24. Push start button for air conditioning located at side of air conditioning unit.

TURN-ON PROCEDURE

(25-34) Were the following activities performed?

25. Make certain that #15 switch is on.

26. Throw on main power switch.

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27. Turn on preheat channel precision switches, preheat switch for proper channel, ceiling light switch, and communication switch.

28. Call tower for instructions on procedure to proper position adjacent to runway.

29. Call tower for permission to cross runway or runways. (Prime mover now pulls GCA trailer unit to operating site).

(After a lapse of 30 minutes from the time the preheat, ceiling light, and communication switches are thrown, the following switches are turned on):

30. Throw in transmit switch.

31. Throw in 4KV switch.

32. (Prime mover pulls GCA trailer unit to correct line site). Check to see that trailer unit is lined up on 84 degree line (tolerance of one-half to two inches).

33. Lower jacks and obtain proper leveling. (Proper leveling is obtained when plumb is directly over center of circle at rear of unit).

34. Turn up variac on proper channel until search meter reads 16 milliamperes and precision meter reads 10.4 milliamperes.

TUNE-UP PROCEDURE

(35-46) Were the following activities relating to the search set performed?

35. Turn on synchroscope for proper channel.

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36. Set Input Trig to proper system (A or B).

37. Set selector switch for search on proper channel (A or B).

38. Set sweep speed switch to four.

39. Adjust intensity focus and centering controls.

40. Turn CRT input to amplifier.

41. Set Video attenuator to 10:1 or 1:1.

42. Tune echo box to maximum current reading.

43. Turn ON-OFF receiver switch for proper channel to ON position.

44. Turn remote switch to LOCAL for tune-up.

45. After tune-up, switch back to REMOTE and leave on REMOTE until unit is shut-down.

46. Turn AFC potentiometers until maximum width appears on synchroscope.

(47-53) Were the following activities relating to the precision set performed?

47. Turn selector switch to X for proper channel.

48. Turn sweep speed switch to three. (Other controls remain in the same position as for search operations).

49. Open door by elevation antenna and turn off scan switch.

50. Set azimuth antenna at ground level.

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51. Turn RF switch blades until azimuth blade is open; then turn in azimuth range to provide strong signal.

52. Adjust AF controls for maximum amplitude on scope.

53. Turn on scan switch.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

(54-66) Activities of the Plane Selector (First PPI Operator)

54. Was initial contact established with plane requesting GCA?

55. Was plane number, type, contact frequency, present heading, and altitude obtained and recorded?

56. Was pilot instructed to fly a reciprocal heading after any three-minute interval during which contact was lost?

57. Was pilot directed to read back all headings and altitudes?

58. Was pilot advised that all turns would be standard rate, three feet per second?

59. Was pilot given latest weather, ceiling visibility, wind direction and velocity, and altimeter setting?

60. Was pilot given landing priority in case of a disabled plane, wounded personnel, etc.?

61. Was pilot given occasional position report to establish his confidence in GCA?

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62. In case radio frequency was changed, was pilot advised to what frequency he should retune?

63. Was pilot turned from crosswind to downwind leg?

64. Was pilot given position report following turn into downwind leg?

65. Was pilot directed to stand by for simulated frequency change and await call from Traffic Director?

66. Was pilot instructed to return to present frequency if he had received no communication within 30 seconds?

(67-77) Activities of the Traffic Director (Second PPI Operator)

67. Was contact established with pilot by Traffic Director on new frequency immediately after aircraft was released by Plane Selector?

68. Was pilot advised to make final cockpit check?

69. Was pilot asked for his speed on base leg and final approach?

70. Was above speed information verified by repeating back to pilot?

71. Was pilot advised to turn to new heading and altitude for base leg?

72. Was position report given to pilot following turn into base leg?

73. Was pilot informed of initial tower clearance?

74. Was pilot instructed to check his gyro compass?

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75. Was pilot instructed to check gear down and locked?

76. Was pilot advised to stand by for turn into final approach?

77. Was pilot advised to turn to new heading for final approach and to maintain present altitude?

(78-99) Activities of the Final Director

78. Was contact established with pilot?

79. Was pilot given correct heading if necessary?

80. Was pilot informed not to acknowledge further instructions unless he was unable to comply?

81. Was pilot informed to climb to new altitude if radio contact was interrupted?

82. Did Final Director make sure that pilot understood instructions?

83. Was pilot informed when he was six miles (variable distance) from touchdown?

84. Was pilot informed of rate of descent as he approached glidepath?

85. Was pilot instructed to begin his descent?

86. Was pilot informed at five miles from touchdown?

87. Was pilot informed that he was on glidepath, or where necessary, were elevation corrections given?

88. Were course corrections given as necessary?

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89. Was pilot informed at four-mile range from touchdown?

90. Was pilot informed of final tower clearance?

91. Was pilot informed at three miles from touchdown?

92. Was pilot directed to use flaps at his own discretion?

93. Was pilot informed at two-mile range from touchdown?

94. Did Final Director maintain steady flow of information regarding heading and elevation (specifying corrections when necessary)?

95. Was pilot informed when he was one mile from touchdown?

96. At distance of one-half mile from touchdown (in clear weather) was pilot instructed to take over after breaking through ceiling?

97. Was pilot informed to contact tower for taxiing instructions?

(Procedures in special cases where necessary)

98. If approach to runway was obviously unsatisfactory, was pilot instructed to pull up, climb to new altitude, and take new heading?

99. If there was danger of collision with another aircraft, was pilot instructed to alter course?

(100-108) Activities of the Azimuth Tracker

100. Were azimuth scopes checked for proper alignment?

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101. Was radar mechanic notified whenever radio frequency system needed tuning?

102. As plane appeared on scope, was the DATA GOOD switch turned on?

103. Was servo cursor kept on plane at all times?

104. Was DATA GOOD switch left on so that plane could be accurately tracked?

105. If at any time plane was not accurately tracked, was DATA GOOD switch turned off so that Final Director would not give false information to pilot?

106. Was fast scan switch turned on when plane was between four and two miles out?

107. Was Final Director notified when plane approached the runway?

108. Was Final Director notified when plane was over the runway?

(109-116) Activities of the Elevation Tracker

109. Were elevation tubes checked for proper alignment?

110. Was radar mechanic notified whenever the radio frequency system required tuning?

111. As plane appeared on scope, was the DATA GOOD switch turned on?

112. Was servo cursor kept on plane at all times?

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113. Was care taken so as not to "servo" so low as to pick up excessive round clutter as plane approached touchdown?

114. Was range of plane in miles from end of runway called off at frequent intervals?

115. Was tracking cursor kept on plane when it was in position to be tracked?

116. If for any reason the target disappeared, was DaTa GOOD switch turned off until the target reappeared?

SHUT-DOWN PROCEDURE

(117-127) Were the following activities performed?

117. Turn down variac to its extreme counter clockwise position.

118. Turn off 4KV switch.

119. Turn off transmit switch.

120. Turn off all main panel switches except #13 switch (communications), #15 switch (blower motors), and #16 switch (ceiling lights).

121. Lock antennas.

122. Take up ground stakes.

123. Pull up leveling jacks.

124. Call tower for instructions and permission to cross runway or runways.

(Prime mover now pulls GCA unit to parking space).

125. Throw off main power switch.

126. Shut down power units by throwing off ignition switch.

127. Place intercommunication extension in prime mover.

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HISTORY
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SECRET

TO

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ELWOOD R. QUESADA

SECRET

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27 September 1948

P R E F A C E

The history of the Tactical Air Command for the period March 1946 - December 1946 is the history of the command in its formative period. Here one may read of the command's activation, of the factors and forces which went into the shaping of its structure and edifice, of the problems which early beset its staff, and of the command's successes and frustrations. Owing to a dearth of documentary data relating to the period, there are, regrettably, certain gaps in the narrative. In December 1947, when the collection of material for the history was seriously commenced, much of the data pertaining to the period March 1946 - December 1946 had already disappeared.

The actual compilation of the history has been chiefly the work of the undersigned. However, it is desired to emphasize, this volume of text and the accompanying volumes of supporting documents represent, in a very real sense, a headquarters enterprise. For without the contributions, direct and indirect, large and small, of many individuals and sections, the sucessful completion of this history within the allotted time would clearly have been impossible. To these individuals go our sincere and special thanks.

In particular we wish to thank Colonel Rox H. Donaldson, Director of Intelligence, for his invaluable ambassadorial services on all matters requiring liaison with the Tactical Air Command staff, for his staunch support, and for his constant guidance and inspiring direction; Colonel William Momyer, Director of Plans, for his helpful and constructive

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Above all, we wish to express our deepest thanks to Lieutenant General Elwood R. Quesada, Commanding General of the Tactical Air Command, whose strong personal support of the Historical Program, manifested in many ways, has, in the final analysis, made these volumes possible. To him the undersigned respectfully dedicate this history.

J. J. Lichman
J. J. LICHMAN

F. A. Alling
F. A. ALLING

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BIOGRAPHIES

Major General Elwood R. Quesada

Brigadier General Robert M. Lee

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Brigadier General Glenn O. Barcus

Brigadier General Warren R. Carter

Colonel Rox H. Donaldson

Colonel Gilbert L. Meyers

Colonel William W. Momyer

Colonel Allen W. Reed

Colonel Edgar M. Scattergood

Colonel Robert M. Stillman

Colonel Roger V. Williams

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SECTION ONE

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

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"Organization is a dry topic . . . . It is likely, for that reason, that it will receive less attention than it merits. Actually, organization . . . is the most important of all the military functions." -- H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker 1/

THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

March 1946 - December 1946

When the War Department in March 1946 proceeded to activate the Tactical Air Command and the Strategic Air Command,[2] it was, in effect, doing two things: (1) it was perpetuating the wartime distinction between tactical and strategic air power represented in the European Theatre of Operations by the Ninth and the Eighth Air Forces; (2) it was, in the instance of both commands, effecting the merger into a single command of two wartime concepts: tactical -- using the word in its broadest sense -- and operational training.[3]

1/ H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare (New York, 1941), p. 104

2/ Ltr, WD, file AG 322 (21 Mar 46), Subject: Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air Commands; Redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces, etc., To: CG's, AAF and CAF, 21 March 1946

3/ In a sense, the new organization can be regarded as being a return to prewar concepts in which the Air Forces were charged with the responsibility for operations, administration, and training.

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Thus, each command was to be at once an air arm and an operational training agency, a distinct contrast to wartime practice which had seen operational training as the general responsibility of the four air forces in the Zone of the Interior.[4]

Underlying the activation of the new Tactical Air Command was the desire to preserve within the Air Force an organization trained, organized, and equipped to cooperate with the surface forces in the conduct of a surface campaign, and more specifically to work in conjunction with an Army Group. This basic motive was early established in the interim mission of the command, promulgated by General Spaatz on 12 March 1946.[5]

Essentially, the Tactical Air Command which came into being in March 1946 was a new organization in name only. Seldom perhaps has one single organization owed so much to so many. From the wartime Ninth Air Force and its component Tactical Air Command, the new Tactical Air Command inherited an ideal and a tradition, a philosophy of combat, a wealth of operational experience, and tactics and techniques developed and refined under actual fire. The continuity between the

---

4/ In some instances, it seems, inadequate pre-combat training of crews and individual replacements necessitated establishment of training programs by the combat air forces. See p. 13 and p. 92, RESTRICTED Staff Study, "Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of Operations," published by Hq AAF, March 1946.

5/ Ltr, CG, AAF, no file number, Subject: Interim Mission, To: CG, TAC, 12 March 1946

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two organizations came to be symbolized in the person of General Quesada himself and Brigadier General Robert M. Lee, key personnel in both organizations.[6] From the old Third Air Force, whose headquarters had been in Tampa, Florida, the Tactical Air Command inherited an organizational structure, operational training concepts and policies, and a host of installations.[7] And, finally, from the Ninth (the old First) Troop Carrier Command came a third contributory influence. By virtue of having troop carrier activities under its fold, the Tactical Air Command acquired the Ninth Troop Carrier Command's installations, standard operating procedures and policies, special troop carrier projects and missions.[8] In the face of such diversity and heterogeneity of origins, influences, foundations, etc., homogeneity and a sense of command individuality were not easily to be achieved. But even more interesting perhaps is the extent to which

6/ 1. G. O. #1, Hq TAC, 26 March 1946
2. G. O. #5, Hq TAC, 1 April 1946
3. P. 22, RESTRICTED Staff Study, "Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of Operations," published by Hq AAF, March 1946
4. Ibid., p. 32

7/ Sec II, G. O. #56, Hq 3AF, 21 March 1946

8/ 1. P. iii, IX Troop Carrier Command History, 5 November 1945 - 31 March 1946
2. Station List, 7 March 1946, contained as Appendix 12 to IX Troop Carrier Command History, 5 November 1945 - 31 March 1946
3. Pp. 1 - 6, Third Air Force Troop Carrier History, 1 April 1946 - 31 October 1946
4. P. 22, IX Troop Carrier Command History, 5 November 1945 - 31 March 1946

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the edifice and entire history of the Tactical Air Command during 1946 came to be shaped by the command's having been constructed upon such an agglomeration of antecedents and pre-existing structures.

Unquestionably the precursor for which the Tactical Air Command had the greatest affinity was the wartime Ninth Air Force. It was an affinity which the command sought consciously and constantly to underline, and understandably so, in view of the Ninth's brilliant combat achievements and unparallelled success in tactical air operations. There is but little doubt that General Quesada fully intended in the early days of the command that the structural organization of the Tactical Air Command should be patterned upon the organization of the Ninth and upon its subordinate Tactical Air Command. On 12 April 1946, scarcely three weeks after the new command had been activated, General Quesada, in a letter to Major General Earle E. Partridge, Assistant Chief of Air Staff - 3, set forth the "general features" of the proposed organization for the Tactical Air Command, saying:

> "The key-note of the organization of this Command will be mobility and flexibility, two essential characteristics of tactical air units which are expected to perform their mission. The Tactical Air Command Headquarters will be organized somewhat similar to the Ninth Air Force Headquarters in the ETO, with Headquarters at Langley Field, Virginia, and will be prepared to operate and cooperate with the Army Group which will be located at Fort Monroe, Virginia." 9/ (Italics ours)

9/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (12 April 46), Subject: Organizational Plan of the Tactical Air Command, To: CG, AAF, 12 April 1946

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The mobile character and operational flexibility of the headquarters seemed to be implicit in the organizations desired as satellites to the main headquarters: a Communications Squadron, a Radio Squadron, Mobile, an Engineer Topographical Company, and an Aviation Engineer Battalion.[10] That these units were, in the main, never acquired by the Tactical Air Command does not alter the fundamental desire expressed in this plan to establish a headquarters designed to be similar to the Ninth, highly mobile and self-contained.

The all-pervasive influence of the wartime Ninth Air Force made itself felt in other ways in the new Tactical Air Command. For example, the ability of the Ninth to design its tactical and service units so that their mobility would approximate that of the ground units with which they were associated found a conscious reflection in a staff study undertaken in the A-4 Section in Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, in April 1946, the purpose of which, we are told, was "to give TAC units the necessary mobility to properly accomplish its mission of tactical air support to Ground Forces operations".[11] Although the actual results achieved as a result of this study were negligible,[12]

10/ Ibid.

11/ 1. Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-5 and Chief of Staff, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947.
2. P. 8, RESTRICTED Staff Study, "Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of Operations," published by Hq AAF, March 1946
3. Ibid., p. 3

12/ Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-5 and Chief of Staff, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947 (See s. d. #11)

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the fact that such a study was undertaken is again a clue to a deep-seated desire on the part of the command to model itself and its units on its counterparts in the wartime Ninth Air Force.

However deep may have been the wish to approximate the Ninth Air Force in the new Tactical Air Command, the conclusion would seem inescapable that the wartime Ninth Air Force, as an influence affecting the organization and development of the new command, came to be pushed more and more into the background. The reason is that however similar the two organizations were in general objectives and underlying purposes, actually, for the moment, there was little similarity between the missions and operating locale of the two commands. The Ninth Air Force had been designed to meet a given operational and tactical situation. In the instance of the Tactical Air Command during 1946, not only was a tactical situation non-existent but the real tactical mission of the command was obscured by its preoccupation with recruitment and demobilization and the custody of stations in an inactive or standby status. Mobility and flexibility were hardly necessary requisites in an headquarters whose prime interests lay at the moment in directions other than in tactical operations, although to be sure the overtones of those concepts persisted insofar as Tactical Air Command units were concerned.[13/] Secondly, the Tactical Air Command in these first few months of its existence was not prepared effectively to operate as a tactical command. Its resources were

13/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 8 July 1946

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being frittered away in air demonstrations, in the ferrying of aircraft, and in the conducting of piecemeal military demonstrations for ground forces' schools.[14] And, before the command could operate as a tactical command, extensive training was considered necessary. As General Quesada noted late in June 1946: "We must train and we must train a great deal. We are in a horrible state; to put it bluntly, we are in a hell of a shape . . . ."[15] Finally, the relative degree of stability which had permitted the Ninth Air Force to operate with such striking effectiveness was completely lacking in the Tactical Air Command during 1946. Rather, instability was the keynote. A case in point is that offered by the Tactical Air Command's 47th Bombardment Group which noted in its history for July - September 1946:

> "Unit and Crew /training/ directives . . . had been practically completed when a sudden avalanche of TWX's, ordering . . . transfers fell upon the Group. Consequently, the Air Crew personnel was reduced to an all time low, leaving the Group with only one alternative. Make-shift crews were formed but since the training had not been homogeneous, . . . some phases of training had to be repeated or practically started from the initial phase, thereby seriously crippling the ability of the Group to perform its mission . . . . In short, 'the bottom

14/ Address by Brigadier General Robert M. Lee, presented at the Air-Ground Conference, Hq TAC, Langley Field, Virginia, 25-26 June 1946

15/ Opening Remarks of General Quesada at the Air-Ground Conference, Hq TAC, Langley Field, Virginia, 25-26 June 1946.

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fell out', and as a consequence the Group is now practically on its last legs struggling for survival." 16/ (Italics ours)

Perhaps more direct and more tangible than the Ninth Air Force in its influence on the organization and subsequent development of the Tactical Air Command in 1946 was the old Third Air Force, whose headquarters had been at Tampa, Florida. From this one of its forerunners the Tactical Air Command acquired a headquarters, a headquarters organization and staff,[17] the bulk of its command personnel, a host of units and stations.[18] Third Air Force directives, were in toto, redesignated Tactical Air Command directives and thus the basic law of the new command was entirely Third Air Force in origin.[19] Through the absorption of Third Air Force directives, the continuity between the two commands came to have a solid foundation in fabric as well as in fact, in policies as well as in procedures and precedents. The entire sum total of experience accumulated by the Third

16/ P. 5, History of 47th Bombardment Group (L) for July - September 1946

17/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 3 April 1946
2. G. O. #5, Hq TAC, 1 April 1946
3. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 27 March 1946

18/ 1. Sec II, G. O. #56, Hq 3AF, 21 March 1946 (See s. d. #7)
2. Table, "Status of Tactical Air Command Units," prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, August 1947

19/ See, for example, notations concerning rescissions on TAC Staff Memorandum 80-2, 27 November 1946, TAC Ltr 65-12, 14 May 1946, TAC Ltr 65-6, 9 May 1946

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Air Force in four years of operational training was inherited by the Tactical Air Command.

Perhaps more than any other single command, the old Third Air Force helped shape the immediate future of the Tactical Air Command by bequeathing to that command virtually intact its entire constellation of inactive and surplus stations, thereby compelling the Tactical Air Command in turn to invest no few of its personnel and no little of its funds in the custody and disposal of these stations.[20] The anomaly of a command with a tactical mission being engaged as custodian for a number of stations for which it had no immediate or foreseeable need was discernible to all and was made the occasion for various appeals to higher headquarters pointed towards relieving the command of its custodial duties.[21] Ultimately relief came in two ways: (1) the declaration, with Army Air Forces' and War Department concurrence, of certain stations as surplus and their eventual transfer to the District Engineers following the completion of supply demobilization processes at those stations; (2) the transfer of stations to other commands.[22] But even long after some of these stations had been transferred from Tactical Air Command jurisdiction, the command still continued to be plagued by problems which arose in connection

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20/ TWX, Hq TAC, A4A 1692, To: CG, AAF, 23 October 1946

21/ Ibid.

22/ For a fuller discussion of this topic, see the following chapter, "The Acquisition and Loss of Bases."

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with the validation and payment of claims for services incurred while those installations were under the old Third Air Force, the Troop Carrier Command, or under early Tactical Air Command jurisdiction.[23]

Next to the wartime Ninth Air Force and the old Third Air Force, the Ninth -- or the former First -- Troop Carrier Command was the third major organization to exert an influence upon the molding of the new Tactical Air Command. The Ninth Troop Carrier Command, it will be recalled, had been redesignated the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier),[24] a subordinate air force of the Tactical Air Command, and its inactive and surplus station load came to swell that which the Tactical Air Command was already saddled with by virtue of being the legatee of the stations belonging to the old Third Air Force. The Ninth Troop Carrier Command's personnel, its staff, its projects and missions, its directives as set forth in Ninth Troop Carrier Regulations,

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23/ 1. Ltr, Hq Middletown Air Materiel Area, no file number, Subject: Delinquent Telephone Bill, To: CG, AMC, 21 March 1947, with 3 indorsements and 1 inclosure thereto
2. Ltr, Hq Brooks Field, file R121.2, Subject: Retained Accounts of Camp Polk, La., To: Finance Officer, U.S. Army, New Orleans, La., 15 April 1947, with 3 indorsements and 12 inclosures thereto
3. Ltr, Hq Tuskegee AAFld, no file number, Subject: Transmittal of Outstanding Account, To: CG, 9AF, 7 June 1947, with 1 indorsement thereto
4. Ltr, Southern Bell Tel and Tel Co., To: Hq TAC, 12 June 1947

24/ P. iii, IX Troop Carrier Command History, 5 November 1945 - 31 March 1946 (See s. d. #81)

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were in turn absorbed into the Tactical Air Command.[25] Thus, oddly enough, one of the Tactical Air Command's major subordinate commands commenced operating on directives which were of First Troop Carrier Command in origin, while the Tactical Air Command itself was operating on the old Third Air Force directives. And, when one stops to consider that certain stations acquired by the Tactical Air Command from the First and Fourth Air Forces, the Training Command, the Air Transport Command, brought with them certain peculiarities of administration and operation peculiar to those commands,[26] it becomes increasingly clear that the Tactical Air Command faced no little problem in erasing the many variations and local differences which existed within its domain and standardizing the whole into a unified, homogeneous organization. Some of the Tactical Air Command's stations, for example, were operating on the three directorate system; others on the general staff plan.[27] Some of the stations were operating on

25/ 1. G. O. #2, Hq TAC, 26 March 1946
2. P. ii, IX Troop Carrier Command History, 5 November 1945 - 31 March 1946
3. Pp.1 - 6, Third Air Force Troop Carrier History, 1 April 1946 - 31 October 1946 (See s. d. #83)
4. Pp. 6 - 8, IX Troop Carrier Command History, 5 November 1945 - 31 March 1946

26/ 1st Ind., Hq Shaw Field, no file number, 3 April 1946, to ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Shaw Field, Sumter, S. C., 28 March 1946.

27/ 1. P. 3, History of Lawson Field, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1 July 1946 - 30 September 1946
2. P. 5, History of March Field, California, 1 March 1946 - 30 June 1946

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a unit personnel system; others on a squadron set-up.[28] Some stations had one system of maintenance; other stations, specifically those in the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), had another.[29] Divergencies in administration, in organization, in policies and procedures, all stemming chiefly from the fact that the Tactical Air Command had been built upon the pre-existing structures of the old Third Air Force and the Ninth Troop Carrier Command, had to be ironed out before a unified command organization could result. Initial efforts to standardize base organization throughout the command came to a head in June 1946.[30]

27/ 3. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 320.4 (11 Apr 46), Subject: Exact Manning Table for Fighter Station, To: CG, 12th Air Force, 11 April 1946
4. Pp. 2 - 4, History of Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, 1 July 1946 - 31 December 1946.
5. P. 5, History of Bergstrom Field, Austin, Texas, 2 September 1945 - 30 June 1946
6. P. 2, History of Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, 1 April 1946 - 30 June 1946
7. Minutes of Personnel Management Committee Meeting, Sedalia AAFld, Warrensburg, Missouri, 2 July 1946, contained as inclosure to ltr, Hq Sedalia AAFld, Subject: Letter of Transmittal, To: CG, TAC, 8 July 1948

28/ 1. Ltr, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, A-1, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Report of Board Appointed to Study Unit Personnel Sections of Bases and Organizations Within the Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 21 October 1946
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 201.62 (22 Oct 46), Subject: Recommendations for Standardized System of Personnel Accounting and Reporting at Base Level, To: CG, 12AF, 22 October 1946

29/ Ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 300.6 (6 Aug 46), Subject:Directive for Aircraft Maintenance, To: CG, TAC, 6 August 1946, with one indorsement thereto

30/ 1. TAC Regulation 20-2, "Base Organization", 12 June 1946
2. See also Functional Base Organization Charts, attached as inclosure to TAC Regulation 20-1, "Tactical Air Command", 12 July 1946

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And in August, the system of maintenance throughout the field was standardized.[31] In August, too, came a rescission of all Headquarters, Continental Air Forces, directives which were still on the law books of the Command.[32] Command homogeneity was thus clearly in the making.

31/ Ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 300.6 (6 Aug 46), Subject: Directive for Aircraft Maintenance, To: CG, TAC, 6 August 1946, with one indorsement thereto (See s. d. #29)

32/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 461 (26 Aug 46), Subject: Rescission of CAF Publications, To: CG, 3AF, et al, 26 August 1946

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Command Structure

In contradistinction to the Strategic Air Command which, during the greater part of 1946, had but one single air force -- the Fifteenth -- under its control, the Tactical Air Command had three air forces within its command structure, the Third (Troop Carrier), the Ninth, and the Twelfth. In addition, the Tactical Air Command retained under its own direct control a number of active stations as well as a varying number of inactive and surplus stations, principally acquired from the old Third Air Force.[33/]

Initial plans for the general organization of the Tactical Air Command had been formulated early in April and forwarded to Washington for the consideration of the Air Staff.[34/] In these plans General Quesada proposed that three numbered air forces be established -- the Ninth and the Twelfth as "tactical" air forces and the Third as a Troop Carrier Air Force. That the two tactical air forces might cooperate more effectively with the Ground Forces, one -- the Ninth -- was to be located on the East Coast, and the other -- the Twelfth --

33/ This was in accord with the early policy of General Quesada who stated on 27 September 1946, that he did not want to "burden" the Air Forces with "non-productive" activities. "Let the Air Forces contain no parasites," he said at a staff conference on that date. See Tactical Air Command Staff Conference Notes, 27 September 1946

34/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (12 April 46), Subject: Organizational Plan of the Tactical Air Command, To: CG, AAF, 12 April 1946. (See s. d. #7)

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located on the West Coast. The present location of the Ninth Air Force at Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, being considered generally unsatisfactory, General Quesada proposed that the headquarters be moved to Tyndall Field, Florida.[35] Stations destined for assignment to the Ninth Air Force under the new scheme of things were to be Shaw Field, Dover Army Air Field, Brooks Field, Lockbourne Army Air Field and Smyrna Army Air Field.[36] Tactical Air Command's western outpost, the Twelfth Air Force, was to be activated on 1 May 1946, with three stations -- Biggs Field, McChord Field,[37] and March Field -- to be directly assigned to the air force upon its activation, plus the eventual assignment of two others, thus, giving each tactical air force an equal station load of five stations.

General Quesada's original plan of 12 April apparently failed to win complete acceptance in Washington. Long-coveted Tyndall Field

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35/ While still Commanding General of the Third Air Force, General Quesada had proposed the exodus of the XIX Tactical Air Command -- destined to be the parent organization of the reactivated Ninth Air Force -- and its units from Biggs Field to Tyndall Field, Panama City, Florida. See ltr, Hq 3AF, file 322, Subject: Movement of the XIX Tactical Air Command, To: CG, AAF, 15 March 1946

36/ The location of these stations is as follows: Shaw Field, Fort Sumter, South Carolina; Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware; Brooks Field, San Antonio, Texas; Lockbourne Army Air Field, Columbus, Ohio; Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee.

37/ McChord Field, Tacoma, Washington.

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had to be handed over to the Air University in May,[38] and Ninth Air Force Headquarters, was thereby compelled to remain at Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas. This in turn prevented the assignment of Biggs Field to the Twelfth Air Force, which had been activated in May at March Field, California,[39] and which was left thus in the extraordinary position of having one single, solitary installation -- its own home station -- under its control during the greater part of 1946, and, indeed, never having more than two subordinate stations at one time. Nor for that matter did projected plans for the Ninth Air Force fare much better. The stations which ultimately came to comprise the Ninth's domain were Biggs Field, Brooks Field, Marshall Field, and Lake Charles Army Air Field, or, in other words, the identical domain of the XIX Tactical Air Command, a subordinate command of the old Third Air Force.

Of the Tactical Air Command's numbered air forces, probably the most active during 1946 was the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), so redesignated from the IX Troop Carrier Command, which had in February moved from Stout Field, Indianapolis, Indiana, to Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina.[40] Greenville had been chosen,

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38/ 1. Telephone conversation, General Lee and General Doyle, 13 May 1946
2. G. O. #26, Hq TAC, 20 May 1946

39/ G. O. #25, Hq TAC, 17 May 1946

40/ P. 21, IX Troop Carrier Command History, 5 November 1945 - 31 March 1946

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we are told, because of its facilities, its proximity to Airborne and Parachute schools, and its relative proximity to Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Langley Field had been the first choice for the location of the Troop Carrier Command's headquarters, but had been declared "not available."[41/]

In April, General Quesada submitted to the Air Staff for its consideration a plan for the organization and operation of the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier).[42/] Although the document containing this plan is no longer extant, its content may be gleaned in part from the Air Staff's reply to this document on 6 August 1946.[43/] In this communication, written over the signature of Brigadier General Reuben C. Hood, Deputy Chief of Air Staff, it was stated that current AAF plans envisaged the assignment of only 10 squadrons, plus affiliated service units, for Troop Carrier functions during the interim period, a number of squadrons which Headquarters, Army Air Forces, considered incapable of supporting two Troop Carrier Wings, recommended for retention

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41/ Ibid.

42/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (7 May 46), Subject: Proposed Plan for Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), To: CG, AAF, 7 May 1946, with one indorsement thereto.

43/ 1st Ind., Hq AAF, no file number, 6 August 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (7 May 46), Subject: Proposed Plan for Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), To: CG, AAF, 7 May 1946 (See s. d. #42)

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by the Third Air Force(TC).[44] Stated Headquarters, Army Air Forces: "If it is desired within the present bulk allotment of the Tactical Air Command to authorize to the Third Air Force Troop Carrier Wings, this headquarters will authorize these units at zero strength to be manned without increase in overall bulk allotment allotted to the Tactical Air Command."[45]

Doubts concerning the wisdom of retaining the Wings had apparently begun to assail the Tactical Air Command even before receipt of General Hood's letter. Late in July, on receipt of an Army Air Forces Unit Forecast, steps had been taken to inactivate one of the Wings.[46] Retention of the other in an active status was now contingent upon a plan being weighed in Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, whereby only two Air Forces would be retained within the structure of the Tactical Air Command, each of which would be "tactical."[47]

44/ Retention of the Wings was espoused by Major General Paul L. Williams, Commanding General of the Third Air Force(TC). See SECRET Minutes of Meeting of Major General Paul Williams (CG, 3AF) and general and special staff members; and Major General E. R. Quesada (CG, TAC) and general and special staff members, held on 2 April 1946, at Hq TAC, Tampa, Florida.

45/ RESTRICTED 1st Ind., Hq AAF, no file number, 6 August 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (7 May 46), Subject: Proposed Plan for Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), To: CG, AAF, 7 May 1946 (See s. d. #42)

46/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Deputy CG, AAF, 31 July 1946

47/ Ibid.

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The disadvantage of this plan, in the opinion of General Quesada, lay in its elimination of an Air Force which had Troop Carrier activities as its prime concern. Were this plan to be approved, General Quesada felt that some justification might then exist for the retention of the second Wing on the ground that it would provide in part "a stimulant to troop carrier activities which would be lost in eliminating a troop carrier air force".[48] Although the reply to this communication is again not a source available to the historian, we may assume that the decision to abandon the second Troop Carrier Wing was also carried through, since we find that the 52nd Wing at Bergstrom was scheduled for inactivation 29 August 1946.[49]

It seems interesting to note that plans for a reduction in the number of air forces, from three to two, was considered as early as July, for such a reduction did actually take place a few months later. The primary motivation at that time stemmed from an economy move, the impetus for which had its origins in the War Department itself.[50] Certain reductions "of varying magnitude" were directed to be made within the military establishment in order to effect economies.[51]

48/ Ibid.

49/ G. O. #67, Hq TAC, 14 August 1946

50/ Ltr, Office of the Chief of Staff, WD, no file number, Subject: Enforcement of Economies, To: Directors, WD General Staff Divs, et al, 22 August 1946

51/ Ibid.

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In the Tactical Air Command, implementation of this directive received the fullest support of General Quesada who stated at a Staff Conference on 30 August 1946:[52]

> "We must not be influenced by our desire to keep our little empire intact. We must make a conscientious effort to contribute to the economy forced upon us. By doing that, we'll be contributing something to the overall plans of the AAF."

On 10 September the Tactical Air Command forwarded to Washington its proposals for reductions in its command and unit structures. Essentially these proposals fell into three categories: (1) reduction from three air forces to two, each to contain troop carrier activities; (2) refrainal from activating service units, and the 50th and 52nd Troop Carrier Wing headquarters, not considered "absolutely necessary;" (3) inactivation of Lake Charles Army Air Field, Bergstrom Field, Dover Army Air Field, Sedalia Army Air Field, Smyrna Army Air Field, and Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, and the resultant moving of activities from those installations to the command's remaining active stations, thereby effecting a consolidation of activities.[53] This program, it was added in closing, "provides for maximum economy with greatest efficiency and falls within the limits of recent cut."[54]

52/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 30 August 1946

53/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 30 August 1946
2. TWX, Hq TAC, TACCG 520, To: CG, AAF, 10 September 1946

54/ TWX, Hq TAC, TACCG 520, To: CG, AAF, 10 September 1946 (See s. d. #53)

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The War Department, in its reply three days later, approved the actions proposed in items 1 and 2 above, and gave only its partial approval to actions proposed in item 3.[55] These reductions, it was stated, were keyed to impending drastic reductions in civilian personnel authorizations, and thus further reprogramming, the War Department warned, might still be necessary.[56]

With (1) the merger of the Ninth Air Force and the Third Air Force (TC) on 1 November, and the resultant redesignation of the two as the Ninth Air Force, with its headquarters at Greenville, South Carolina,[57] and (2) with the long overdue transfer of Biggs Field to the Twelfth Air Force, thus strengthening that command and relieving it from the rather embarrassing position of being an Air Force sitting atop one single station, and (3) with the lopping off of certain inactive stations for which the Command had no need, the outlines of a streamlined command structure came finally to take shape. Oddly enough, just at the moment when the Tactical Air Command was reducing its internal command structure to two air forces, the Strategic Air Command was taking steps to increase the number of its subordinate

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55/ CONFIDENTIAL TWX, WD, WAR 80280, To: CG, TAC, 13 September 1946

56/ Ibid.

57/ 1. G. O. #88, Hq TAC, 25 October 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 30 October 1946
3. Pp. 139-140, Third Air Force Troop Carrier History, 1 April 1946 - 31 October 1946

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air forces to two. Thus, the internal command structures of the two organizations came to be identical in the fall of 1946.

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Delineation of Air Forces' Jurisdictive Controls

Inevitably one of the problems which had to be solved in the formative period of the Tactical Air Command, March 1946 - December 1946, was the precise delineation and definition of the command functions of its numbered air forces. The question was, would the air forces be "strong" commands, with complete and unlimited control over all activities within their geographical bounds, permitting no deviation from strictest channelization of all correspondence through their own headquarters? Or, were the Air Force headquarters to be shorn of considerable of their command prerogatives over their field activities and reduced virtually to a supervisory status? Or, were they to be permitted to retain full control in some spheres of operations and administration and to be by-passed in other matters?

Certain factors operating during 1946 indirectly contributed to a resolving of this problem. In the field of courts-martial jurisdiction, for example, the Tactical Air Command continued to exercise jurisdiction over Ninth Air Force stations long after the Ninth had been activated, simply because the Ninth Air Force had no legal section.[58] Secondly, neither the newly activated Twelfth Air Force nor the new Ninth Air Force had behind it any strong tradition of a "strong" air

58/ Memorandum for A-1, Hq TAC, by Colonel Guy M. Kinman, Subject: Need for Legal Officers (JA's), 10 May 1946

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force with full command powers, and displayed therefore no marked reluctance in surrendering certain powers to the direct control of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command. Only the Third Air Force(TC), which prior to its redesignation had been a major subordinate command, on a level with the four continental air forces and the I Staging Command under Headquarters, Continental Air Forces, displayed any resistance to the Tactical Air Command's invasion of what is regarded as its command prerogatives. In this connection, the utterances of Major General Paul L. Williams, Commanding General of the Third Air Force(TC) at a Tactical Air Command staff conference on 30 October 1946 are revealing. With particular reference to the proposed removal by the Tactical Air Command of air force controls over Budget and Fiscal matters, he stated: "I don't like the plan that is set up at all. I think as much business as possible should be given to the subordinate units."[59]

Generally speaking, the policy of the Tactical Air Command during 1946 was to allow to its numbered air forces exercise of the widest possible controls in the matters of personnel, maintenance, training and operations. The first notable exception to this general policy came in the matter of civilian personnel administration. In a move designed to "bring about a greater uniformity of operations of civilian personnel administration," Headquarters, Tactical Air

59/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 30 October 1946

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Command, in May 1946, solicited the opinion of the Third Air Force(TC) concerning the withdrawal into Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, of all matters pertaining to the administration of command civilian personnel other than civilian personnel ceilings. Communications with all stations on civilian personnel matters would thus be direct. "This action is deemed necessary because of the shortage of qualified staff civilian personnel officers and qualified civilian personnel technicians to staff civilian personnel divisions at the command level," the Tactical Air Command stated.[60/]

The Third Air Force's reply to this communication constituted a polite non-concurrence in the Tactical Air Command's proposal. The recommendation of that headquarters was that it retain "complete jurisdiction" over the administration of all civilian personnel with the exception of payroll audit functions, and the conduct of formal inspections. These and other recommendations, the Third Air Force added, were made with the view towards preserving the "administrative integrity" of the command.[61/]

Apparently undismayed by the adverse reaction of the Third Air Force(TC) to its proposal, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command,

60/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 230 (3 May 46), Subject: Responsibility for Civilian Administration, To: CG, 3AF, 3 May 1946, with one indorsement thereto.

61/ 1st Ind., Hq 3AF, file AF3AF230 (8 May 46), 8 May 1946, to ltr Hq TAC, file TAC 230 (3 May 46), Subject: Responsibility for Civilian Administration, To: CG, 3AF, 3 May 1946 (See s. d. #60)

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proceeded in June to sound out the Ninth Air Force concerning its projected plan to deprive the numbered air forces of control over civilian personnel administration.[62] Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, fell readily in with the Tactical Air Command's plan, saying that "in the interest of economy and due to shortage of qualified staff civilian personnel" it considered the establishment of a civilian personnel branch at its level of command to be "a duplication of effort."[63]

With the Ninth Air Force thus arrayed in favor of the change, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, proceeded in July to assume complete responsibility for the review, inspection, and administration of civilian personnel employed at bases under its command. Numbered air forces were directed to eliminate civilian personnel divisions in their respective headquarters with the exception of one qualified civilian personnel officer who was to act in a liaison capacity.[64] The Third Air Force(TC) apparently still felt constrained

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62/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 230 (7 June 46), Subject: Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration, To: CG, 9AF, 7 June 1946, with one indorsement thereto

63/ 1st Ind., Hq 9AF, file 9Al 230 (7 June 46), undated, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 230 (7 June 46), Subject: Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration, To: CG, 9AF, 7 June 1946 (See s. d. #62)

64/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 230 (16 Jul 46), Subject: Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration, To: CG, 12AF, 16 July 1946, with one indorsement thereto

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to protest this decision. In September the Tactical Air Command was, in the form of answers to a questionnaire submitted by the Third Air Force, still justifying its action on the grounds that it was impelled by the "drastic reduction in civilian personnel and budgetary allowances," which in turn necessitated the elimination of duplicate functions. From a reading of this document, it is apparent that the Third Air Force(TC) was capitulating only with extremest reluctance. It pointed out that civilian personnel represented 28.6% of the total strength of its command, and for that reason, control over these personnel was considered "desirable." To which the Tactical Air Command's enigmatic reply was: "Commanding General is responsible and does have control over all personnel assigned to Third Air Force."[65]

Deprival of control over matters of civilian personnel administration was the first big blow to the proponents of a "strong" Air Force. The second was the withdrawal into Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, of all supervision over matters pertaining to Budget and Fiscal activities in the command. This move now found both the Third and the Twelfth Air Forces aligned against the Tactical Air Command's proposal to eliminate staff Budget and Fiscal officers from the headquarters of the numbered Air Forces.[66] The Third Air Force(TC) stated

65/ Questionnaire, found as attachment to 2d Ind., Hq TAC, file TAC 230, (21 Aug 46) /September 1946/, to ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Civilian Personnel Administration, 21 August 1946

66/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (11 Oct 46), Subject: Establishment of Command Budget and Fiscal Offices, To: CG, 3AF(TC), 11 October 1946, with one indorsement thereto

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in October that with its existing budget and fiscal staff it could handle fiscal activities for the twelve bases projected for assignment to the combined Third and Ninth Air Forces.[67] Moreover, the Third Air Force(TC) saw no substantial saving to be achieved under the new setup since the Tactical Air Command would be required to handle 12 station allotments, 12 reports on status of allotment, 12 requests for funds, etc., instead of one of each if these requests were consolidated on the air force level. "Thus," said the Third Air Force(TC), "the work in actual practice would not be eliminated . . . but merely moved to higher headquarters with only a small savings."[68] The Third Air Force(TC) summed up its case by listing the various advantages which would accrue from the retention of a staff Budget and Fiscal office in its headquarters, adding: "The small savings obtained in the elimination of the Budget and Fiscal office, at air force level, is not felt to compensate for the attendant losses in efficiency, economy, and flexibility of operation that would be incurred."[69]

The Twelfth Air Force, over the signature of its Commanding

67/ 1st Ind., Hq 3AF(TC) file AF 3AF 322 (11 Oct 46), 21 October 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (11 Oct 46), Subject: Establishment of Command Budget and Fiscal Offices, To: CG, 3AF(TC), 11 October 1946 (See s. d. #66)

68/ Ibid.

69/ Ibid.

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General, Major General William D. Old, protested the proposed elimination of the Budget and Fiscal Section in its headquarters, saying that such an action would deprive it of "the essential authority and personnel necessary to adequately meet the assigned command responsibilities."[70] General Old went on to recommend that if the Air Forces were to be deprived of control over Budget and Fiscal activities within their domain, or that control in any way curtailed, the assigned responsibilities of each Air Force should be correspondingly "modified."[71] Protest of both headquarters were unavailing, and in mid-November all stations were directed to report directly to Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, on Budget and Fiscal matters.[72]

The third sphere in which the air forces found themselves required to relinquish command control was in the field of repairs and utilities. In this instance the Tactical Air Command did not seek to ascertain what were the desires of the air forces in the matter. In the regulation effecting the change, however, the command struck a conciliatory note, saying:

70/ 2nd Ind., Hq 12AF, file 210.3, 5 November 1946, to ltr, Hq 12AF, no file number, Subject: Appointment of B & F Officers, 16 September 1946

71/ Ibid.

72/ 3d Ind., Hq TAC, file TAC 210.3 (16 Sep 46), 14 November 1946, to ltr, Hq 12AF, no file number, Subject: Appointment of B & F Officer, 16 September 1946

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> "The fundamental basis of policy in assigning functions and responsibilities pertaining to construction and repairs and utilities activities derives from necessity for conserving manpower and not from the desire to limit the functions and responsibilities of the air forces." 73/

The regulation authorized direct communication between Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, and its installations on the following matters: (1) repairs and utilities functions; (2) supplies and equipment pertaining to repairs and utilities; (3) fiscal activities relating to repairs and utilities; (4) the assignment and reassignment of officer personnel to air installation duties.[74] The air forces could still derive some consolation from the fact that correspondence pertaining to master planning and to new construction was still to be routed through their headquarters.[75]

Thus, as the year 1946 ended, the numbered air forces had been required to surrender to Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, their command jurisdiction in three phases of activity; civilian personnel, budget and fiscal, and air installations. It will be interesting to see whether any further impairment of their command functions would occur in the following year.

73/ TAC Regulation 85-4, "Delineation of Functions and Responsibilities Pertaining to New Construction and Repairs and Utilities Activities," 29 October 1946

74/ Ibid.

75/ Ibid.

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The Move of Headquarters to Langley Field

Location of a tactical air command headquarters adjacent to the headquarters of the army with which it collaborated was considered a prerequisite to successful air-ground operations[76] and such a consideration no doubt played a major role in the decision to award Langley Field to the Tactical Air Command for its headquarters,[77] Langley Field being adjacent to Fort Monroe, projected site for Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. Apparently at one time the idea was even entertained that both Tactical Air Command and Army Ground Forces headquarters would be located at the same station, in a single building, with adjoining offices for the corresponding sections of the two headquarters.[78]

The move of headquarters from Tampa, Florida, to Langley Field, Virginia, was accomplished during the latter part of May 1946. Tactical Air Command headquarters was officially opened at Langley Field on 27 May 1946.[79] Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, did not

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76/ 1. P. 57, RESTRICTED Staff Study, "Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force of the European Theater of Operations", published by Hq AAF, March 1946
2. Ibid., p. 91

77/ 1. Telephone conversation, General J.P. Doyle and Colonel Davasher, 1 March 1946
2. Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Transfer of Langley Field, Virginia, to the Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 4 April 1946

78/ Draft of Chapter XXIII, "The Preliminaries", prepared by Mr. L. A. Otterness, Historian for the Tactical Air Command, August 1946-August 1947

79/ G. O. #28, Hq TAC, 21 May 1946

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open its headquarters at Fort Monroe until 1 October 1946.[80]

Certain difficulties encountered in effecting the move from Tampa to Langley Field and in effecting the acquisition of that installation have been described in detail in a draft of a chapter prepared by Mr. L. A. Otterness, former Historian for the Tactical Air Command. The chapter may be found among the exhibits to this history.[81]

80/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 23 September 1946

81/ Draft of Chapter XXIII, "The Preliminaries," prepared by Mr. L. A. Otterness, Historian for the Tactical Air Command, August 1946 - August 1947 (See s. d. #78)

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II

ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF BASES

In the reshuffling of bases which accompanied the major Army Air Force reorganizational changes in March 1946, the Tactical Air Command found itself in possession of forty-four stations,[82] whose geographical location represented twenty-one states stretching from Washington and California to Florida. The two chief bequests were twenty stations from the old Third Air Force and fourteen from the Ninth Troop Carrier Command.[83] Plus these were five stations formerly under the First Air Force and two from the Fourth Air Force.[84] The Training Command had contributed two stations[85] and the Air Transport Command, one.[86] Such a numerous and heterogeneous grouping was far in excess of the needs of the new peacetime command.

In fact, to begin with, over half of these forty-four bases

82/ G. O. #2, Hq TAC, 28 March 1946

83/ Ltr, Hq IX Troop Carrier Command, file TCC 322 (1 Mar 46), Subject: Assignment of Missions, To: CO's, AFTCC Wings et al, 1 March 1946

84/ Report of Meeting, Hq Dover Army Air Field, Subject: Transfer of the Following AAF Army Air Bases from Jurisdiction of First Air Force to the Tactical Air Command, 28 March 1946

85/ 1. G. O. #4, Hq TAC, 29 March 1946
2. G. O. #9, Hq TAC, 15 April 1946

86/ 1. Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Transfer of Langley Field, Virginia, to the Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 4 April 1946
2. G. O. #10, Hq TAC, 19 April 1946

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were already on a standby status or surplus and in process of being readied for transfer to the appropriate District Engineers.[87] This situation was the result of the fact that contraction of the air forces Zone of Interior installations, set in motion by the cessation of hostilities on V-J Day, was still in progress.[88] The Tactical Air Command was thus at the very outset forced into custodial duties incompatible with its main tactical and training aims.

In addition to this standby station load, there were twenty-one so-called "active" bases from which the Tactical Air Command was to build its permanent structure. Among the factors no doubt affecting their selection had been such considerations as their proximity to Army Ground Forces and Navy installations,[89] and the fact that active units were presently located on them. The rather extensive fluidity that characterized the use of these bases during the course of the year is indicative that planning had not completely crystallized. In retrospect certain factors may be noted that colored and influenced the development of the base structure from the beginning in March to the more or less stable set-up that emerged at the end of the year.

In the first place, possession of the bases which the

87/ G. O. #2, Hq TAC, 26 March 1946 (See s. d.#82)

88/ See pages 44 - 78, History of Third Air Force, September 1945 - March 1946, for an account of the early stages of this contraction within the Third Air Force

89/ Pp. 2 - 3, History of Lawson Field, for September 1945 - July 1946

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Tactical Air Command had already acquired in its initial allocation of stations in March and April 1946 was by no means firm and secure.[90] Again with only a limited number of top-notch bases in the Zone of the Interior, it is not strange that there would be pressures on the part of the various commands to obtain the most desirable of the lot. For example, as late as 30 April 1946, we note that Tactical Air Command's possession of March Field, Riverside California, seems still to have been in doubt.[91] Brigadier General Y. H. Taylor, Commanding General of March Field, speaking at a station staff conference on that date remarked that "There's still some argument about March Field. Lots of people would like March Field." The "lots of people" which General Taylor had in mind, one may presume, were the Strategic Air Command which would have desired to annex March Field for its own 58th Bombardment Wing located at that station,[92] and the Air Defense Command which was casting covetous eyes upon the 412th Fighter Group also stationed at March.[93] Similarly controversial was the acquisition

90/ 1. Record and Routing Sheet, A4C to A-4, Subject: Repairs to Streets and Parking Areas, Sedalia Army Air Field, 21 May 1946
2. March Field Staff Meeting, 30 April 1946

91/ 1. March Field Staff Meeting, 30 April 1946 (See s. d. #90[2])
2. Telephone conversation General Quesada and General Doyle, 11 April 1946

92/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 6 May 1946

93/ Lieutenant General E. Stratemeyer, CG, ADC, writing to CG, AAF on 19 April 1946, on the subject of the air-defense of the United States stated: ". . . it is again urgently recommended that fighter units best suited for air defense, principally P-80

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of Langley Field, finally acquired on 30 April from the Air Transport Command.[94]

Secondly, no doubt, the Tactical Air Command would have preferred a situation in which the number of stations held should bear a close relationship to the number of active units under its command. Nevertheless throughout 1946 Tactical Air Command had more active bases than units. Influencing this was the fact that planning had to be projected on the 70-group program. At the same time allowance had to be made for the retention of bases and sub bases whose utilization rested primarily on their proximity to active ground force installations and where there was a demand on the part of Army Ground Forces for liaison services.

Thirdly, not all fields presently held were desirable in that they lacked some of the requirements which the Tactical Air Command would have for them in pursuance of its tactical and training mission. McChord Field, Tacoma, Washington, due to its fog and generally bad flying weather, would reduce the efficiency of flying training.[95]

93/ organizations, to be returned to command jurisdiction of Air Defense Command.
"This Headquarters is cognizant of its responsibility for air defense but does not yet have combat units under its control which can be allocated for this task. Recently Headquarters, Air Defense Command, urged the assignment of the P-80 Group at March Field to be made to the Air Defense Command as it is primarily an intercepter type of air weapon." See SECRET ltr, CG, ADC to CG, AAF, Subject: Air Defense, Pacific Coastal Frontier, 19 April 1946

94/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 19 April 1946

95/ Major Activities Accomplished by the Twelfth Air Force from 17 May 1946 to 31 December 1946

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Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, located in the mountains, did not present conditions conducive to good radar operations.[96]

Fourthly, once accepted, bases had to be maintained as they were with little possibility for improvement of facilities. Only very limited construction could be expected for present needs although there was some hope in the Master Planning of those bases designated Interim stations.[97] Housing facilities would have a high priority during this year of extreme housing scarcity.

Geographical location, too, would be a factor in the selection of permanent holdings as it was the right of enlistees to choose their station of initial assignment. Biggs Field, for example, was not as popular as some other stations. Some locations such as Langley Field on Virginia's Lower Peninsula had a larger available reserve of civilian workers on which to draw than the less populous Tampa area.

At the other end of the scale, uncertainty as to which bases would become interim stations and which would be placed in an excess category left a question mark on the planning for usage of

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96/ Ltr, Hq 3AF, file 3AF 322 (1 Mar 46), Subject: Movement of the XIX Tactical Air Command, To: CG, AAF, 15 March 1946

97/ 1. Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Construction Planning Program, To: CG, TAC, 15 April 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL)
2. Ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 686 (24 May 46) Subject: Post-War Planning, To: CG, TAC, 24 May 1946, with two indorsements thereto
3. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq Fort Bragg, N.C., file 370.01, Subject: Post-War Planning, To: CG, Seventh Army, 14 June 1946
4. Diary, Engineer Division, Hq TAC, 8 July 1946

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some bases.[98] A prime example of this is the case of Lake Charles Army Air Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana, which had been set for inactivation in February 1946 and Smyrna Army Air Base, Smyrna, Tennessee, which had been assigned to the Tactical Air Command to house the units then at Lake Charles.[99] A change of plans reactivated Lake Charles, which retained its units, leaving Smyrna without a use. Towards the end of the year a final change resulted in Lake Charles' being definitely declared surplus.[100] In the summer of 1946 Headquarters, Army Air Forces, had Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina, earmarked for inactivation, apparently counter to the Tactical Air Command's interests, as we note in the Staff Conference Notes that an attempt was being made to have this reconsidered as Tactical Air Command needed this base as a headquarters station.[101] The future existence of Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, was in doubt a good part of the year. This large installation, located near Washington, D.C.

98/ 1. P. 34, History of Shaw Field, for 1 April 1946 - 30 June 1946
2. 5th Ind., Hq TAC, file TAC 121.6 (15 Apr 46), 12 July 1945, to ltr, Smyrna AAFld, no file number, Subject: Individual Project Estimate-Repairs and Utilities, Post Request No. SAAF-15-46, Resurface of Low Type Bituminous Roadways, 15 April 1946

99/ 1. TWX, Lake Charles AAFld, LCS 034 Pub Rel, To: CG, TAC, 4 January 1947
2. 3AF Staff Conference Notes, 18 March 1946
3. Diary, Engineer Division, Hq TAC, 9 May 1946

100/ TWX, Lake Charles AAFld, LCS 034 Pub Rel, To: CG, TAC, 4 January 1947 (See s. d. #99[1])

101/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 20 May 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 30 October 1946

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had once been considered as a defense of the capitol city.[102] The Tactical Air Command retained it as an inactive station after 1 September 1946.

In addition to the above considerations there was some sentiment throughout the Tactical Air Command that bases, which from the Tactical Air Command's point of view, were more the responsibility of other commands should be turned over to the custody of these commands. In this category were Marfa, Army Air Field, Marfa, Texas, Blytheville Army Air Field, Arkansas, and Baer Field, Ft. Wayne, Indiana, which the Tactical Air Command was holding in a temporary inactive status for possible future use in the Air Defense Command's Reserve program, and which the Tactical Air Command felt should be the responsibility of the latter Command -- a proposal looked upon unfavorably due to the already heavy load of the Air Defense Command.[103] On the grounds that the Air Materiel Command had its Rocket Testing unit at Dover Army Air Field, a matter which was delaying the inactivation of Dover Army Air Field, the Tactical Air Command suggested that the Air Materiel Command take over the custody of that station.[104] As the servicing activities at Sherman Army Air Field, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, revolved

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102/ Article - "Only 40 Planes Remain at $9,000,000 Dover Army Air Base," contained in Wilmington Sunday Star, 9 June 1946

103/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 602.3 (20 Jun 46), Subject: Transfer of Third Air Force Installations to Air Defense Command, To: CG, TAC, 20 June 1946

104/ Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Movement of 4146th Base Unit, To: CG, AMC, [September 1946]

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principally around the personnel of the Air University assigned to the Command and General Staff School, the Tactical Air Command felt that the Air University should assume the custody of Sherman Field.[105/]

There was also a tendency on the part of the Tactical Air Command to endeavor to dispose of installations whose sole utilization consisted of the servicing of ground forces posts.[106/] Requests were made to discontinue such fields as Atterbury, Indiana, Camp Mackall, North Carolina and Camp Campbell, Kentucky, whose retention was felt to be detrimental to the limited capabilities of the command.

105/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686 (14 Nov 46), Subject: Request for Transfer of Sherman Field, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, To: CG, AAF, 14 November 1946

106/ 1. Ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 686 (10 May 46), Subject: Jurisdiction of Camp Mackall, To: CG, TAC, 10 May 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686 (23 Aug 46), Subject: Temporary Inactivation of Campbell Army Air Field, Hopkinsville, Kentucky, 23 August 1946, with one indorsement thereto
3. 1st Ind., Smyrna AAFld, file 333.1, 1 October 1946, to ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Report of Annual General Inspection, Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee, To: CG, TAC, 24 September 1946

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Disposal of Inactive and Surplus Bases

While the inactivation of stations and the disposition of those in a surplus category proceeded without major difficulties, both processes did present no few problems for the command, and were to be an activity considerable in size. In the early days of the command at a conference held between the Staffs of the Tactical Air Command and the Third Air Force(Troop Carrier), the A-4's for both organizations were in agreement that this problem was the biggest from their point of view.[107] It is worthy of mention that Tactical Air Command headquarters itself assumed a major portion of the responsibility for disposal of stations with the remainder being assumed by the Third Air Force.[108]

That this problem was solved is indicated by the fact that by the end of the year all but two of the stations originally acquired in an inactive status had been eliminated.[109] Except for Stout Field, which had been turned over to the Air Defense Command,[110] these had all

107/ SECRET Minutes of Meeting of Major General Paul Williams (CG, 3AF) and general and special staff members; and Major General E.R. Quesada (CG,TAC) and general and special staff members, held on 2 April 1946, at Hq TAC, Tampa, Florida

108/ Pp. 6 - 7; 18 - 22, History of Third Air Force(TC), for 21 March 1946 - 1 November 1946

109/ List of TAC Stations Transferred to District Engineers During March December 1946, prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, May 1948, from data contained in TAC General Orders, 1946

110/ G. O. #42, Hq TAC, 25 June 1946

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been transferred to the District Engineers. The two survivors, Chatham Army Air Field, Savannah, Georgia, and Baer Field, Ft. Wayne, Indiana, remained for ultimate transfer.

During 1946, four of the stations on the command's original list of active stations were placed on an inactive status. These included Lake Charles Army Air Field and Tuskegee Army Air Field, which were preparing for transfer in January to the District Engineers, and Dover Army Air Field[111] and Sedalia Army Air Field[112] which were waiting for final decision as to their destiny.

The solution of this task of inactivation was aided by the fact that the problems inherent in the deactivation of bases had been gradually defined in the period after V-J Day and during the initial period of the Tactical Air Command. Essentially these problems fell roughly into five groups: (1) actual disposal of the property in accordance with instructions received, including the transfer of the surplus property account, (2) the termination of accounts and the completion of final audits, (3) the transfer of the field to the appropriate District Engineer, (4) the closing of the base unit and outshipment of records, and (5) the maintenance of strict control over the

111/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686 (6 Aug 46), Subject: Disposition of Dover Army Air Field, Delaware, To: CG, AAF, 6 August 1946, with one indorsement thereto.
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (7 Aug 46), Subject: Change of Status, Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, To: CO, Dover AAFld, 7 August 1946

112/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686 (6 Aug 46), Subject: Disposition of Sedalia Army Air Field, Missouri, To: CG, AAF, 6 August 1946, with one indorsement thereto

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political aspects of inactivation.[113]

Nevertheless it could not be said that the work was greatly simplified as actual work was still delayed somewhat by conflicting instructions issued by Headquarters, Army Air Forces, and Headquarters, Army Service Forces, on policy matters and by lack of instructions and inability to get disposition orders.[114] The freezing of shipments on installations not yet declared surplus hampered inactivation on these installations until such time as Headquarters, Army Air Forces, could make a firm decision.[115] The personnel problem was that which was endemic to the Air Forces during this period, the lack of experienced supply personnel and the distribution of those that it had.[116] Numerous changes in command and in key personnel brought about in great part

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113/ Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-5, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947

114/ 1. Diary, Engineer Division, Hq TAC, 5 August 1946
2. Ltr, Hq Dover AAFld, no file number, Subject: Major Activities During 1946, Dover AAFld, Dover, Del., To: CG, TAC, 3 January 1947
3. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 400.22 (11 June 46), Subject: Disposal of Property Transferred to War Assets Administration, To: CG, AAF, 11 June 1946

115/ Ltr, Hq SAC, file SAC 400 (27 Mar 46), Subject: Supply demobilization of temporarily inactive bases for week ending 9 March 1946, 27 March 1946

116/ 1. Ltr, Hq CAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Headquarters IX Troop Carrier Command, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S.C., To: CG, CAF, 29 March 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 5 June 1946
3. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 14 June 1946

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no doubt by demobilization, added to the difficulties of inactivation.[117]

Two special problems in supply inactivation which complicated the rapid disposal of surplus stations are deserving of mention. Both of these problems revolved around the responsibility of the command for property remaining on these stations. Immediately upon the declaration of surplus of a station by the War Department, rights of entry were granted to the adjacent cities and municipalities which might be desirous of obtaining the airports and the airport operating equipment. In the negotiations between the cities and the Division Engineer the latter would lease the property to the cities, notwithstanding the fact that Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces property under consideration had not yet been declared surplus and therefore was not subject to the Surplus Property Act. The Tactical Air Command was thus placed in the difficult position of refusing to allow the use of the equipment, thereby risking a deluge of political inquiries, or of loaning the property on Memorandum Receipt until such time as the Chiefs of Technical Services had made a firm determination as to which items were true surplus and which were still needed by the Army Air Forces and the Army. Although the equipment was loaned on Memorandum Receipt, it was inevitable that the municipalities would exact every effort to prevent a future withdrawal of items determined to be in short supply. This situation was finally cleared up in May 1947 when the War Department decided that equipment that had been placed on

117/ 1st Ind., Hq Dover AAFld, no file number, 10 September 1946 to ltr, Hq TAC, Subject: Report of Inspection, 30 August 1946

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such temporary use permits during 1946 would not be removed but would be offered for disposal as surplus in connection with the real property.[118/]

The second problem lay in the fact that even after a base had been declared surplus and turned over to the District Engineer, the Tactical Air Command was still required to keep civilian and military personnel on the base until the last item of surplus property had been disposed of. This resulted in the waste of Army Air Forces manpower and funds all out of proportion to the value of the property involved. The situation was resolved for the Tactical Air Command in July 1946 when it was decided that Army Commanders would assume accountability for declared surplus property at surplus Army Air Forces installations.[119/]

118/ 1. TWX, Hq 3AF, A4 236, To: CG, CAF, 24 February 1946
2. Ltr, Hq 3AF, file 3AF 400.7 (15 Mar 46), Subject: Disposition of Supplies at Surplus Installations, To: CG, Air Technical Service Comd, 15 March 1946
3. 2nd Ind., Hq 3AF, file 3AF 400 (7 Mar 46), 21 March 1946, to ltr, Hq 3AF, file 400 (7 Mar 46) Misc, Subject: Equipment required for operation of an active civilian airport, 7 March 1946

119/ 1. Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to Chief of Staff, Subject: Effect of WD Cir 138 on Inactivation, 18 June 1946
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Transfer of Property Accountability and Reassignment of Personnel, To: CO, Hunter Field, 9 July 1946
3. TWX, Hq TAC, A4 899, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 11 July 1946
4. Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Property Disposal at Coffeyville Army Air Field, To: CG, AMC, 16 October 1946

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Utilization of Bases

At the same time that the Tactical Air Command was pushing its efforts to free itself of the burden of its excess of stations, it was also confronted with the problem of the distribution and stabilization of its active-base structure. The choice of bases for permanent utilization by tactical units and the assignment of these bases to the air forces underwent considerable change during the course of the year before a distribution was reached that could be called firm. A blueprint of the original setup, as worked out in early April,[120] envisioned a distribution of stations in which Langley Field, Virginia, would become the headquarters for the Tactical Air Command itself. Tyndall Field, located at Panama City, Florida was scheduled to replace ~~the~~ unsatisfactory Biggs Field at El Paso, Texas, as headquarters for the Ninth Air Force. Under the Ninth Air Force and housing its tactical units, were to be five stations:

1. Shaw Field, Sumter, S.C. (Light Bomb Group)[121]
2. Dover Army Air Base, Dover Del. (Fighter Group)
3. Brooks Field, San Antonio, Tex. (Tactical Recn Group)
4. Lockbourne Army Air Base, Columbus, O. (Light Bomb Group)
5. Smyrna Army Air Base, Smyrna, Tenn. (Light Bomb Group)

120/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (12 Apr 46), Subject: Organization Plan of the Tactical Air Command, To: CG, AAF, 12 April 1946, with inclosures thereto

121/ At the same time an alternate plan for Shaw Field was in use by Third Air Force for Troop Carrier Activities. See TAC Staff Conference Notes, 5 April 1946

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March Field, California, was to become the headquarters station of the Twelfth Air Force when that organization was activated, and the other stations assigned to it were to be: Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas and McChord Field, Tacoma, Washington, each with a Fighter Bomber Group and two stations as yet unassigned for a Reconnaissance and a Light Bombardment Group. The Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) which had been received by the Tactical Air Command operationally intact, along with its group of stations, was to follow temporarily a somewhat autonomous existence as far as its base structure was concerned, with its headquarters at Greenville Army Air Base, South Carolina.[122] Although the course of events of this period did not permit this plan to be implemented in any great detail, certain features of it did emerge in the various base adjustments that took place.[123]

The move of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, from Tampa, Florida, to Langley Field, Virginia, was accomplished as planned in May following the transfer of Langley Field from the Air Transport

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122/ SECRET Minutes of Meeting of Major General Paul Williams (CG, 3AF) and general and special staff members; and Major General E. R. Quesada (CG, TAC) and general and special staff members, held on 2 April 1946 at Hq TAC, Tampa, Florida (See s. d. #107)

123/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Total Personnel Authorizations, Bulk and T/O, for Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 11 June 1946, with two inclosures
2. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Total Personnel Authorizations, Bulk and T/O, for Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 12 July 1946, with two inclosures

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Command on 30 April.[124]

Not as fortunate was the plan to move Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, to Tyndall Field. Late in April a decision was made by Headquarters, Army Air Forces, to award Tyndall to the Air University, a serious loss to the Tactical Air Command which was then unable to move the Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, from Biggs to the east coast until the end of the year.

Decision again of Army Air Forces to retain Lake Charles as an active station for the 47th Bombardment Group resulted in Smyrna Army Air Field's not being utilized[125] as a home station for the group and the Tactical Air Command's being saddled with another unneeded station.[126] Lake Charles was assigned to the Ninth Air Force on 29 May.[127]

A somewhat different problem existed in the case of Lockbourne Army Air Base, Columbus, Ohio. Tuskegee Army Air Field, Tuskegee, Alabama, was assigned to the Tactical Air Command on the 15 April so that the screening of colored rated personnel could be more equitably

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124/ 1. Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Transfer of Langley Field, Virginia, to the Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 4 April 1946.
2. G. O. #10, Hq TAC, 19 April 1946 (See s. d. #86[2])

125/ 1. P. 7, History of 47th Bombardment Group (L), Lake Charles Army Air Field, For April 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 3 April 1946

126/ TWX, Hq TAC, TACCG 520, To: CG, AAF, 10 September 1946

127/ G. O. #32, Hq TAC, 29 May 1946

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accomplished under one command.[126] This screening process was not completed until the end of the year, therefore Lockbourne's incorporation was delayed until January 1947.[129]

March Field, California, became the location for the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force on 17 May and that headquarters' only station, although McChord Field, Tacoma, Washington, was briefly assigned to the Twelfth Air Force during July 1946 pending its transfer to the Air Defense Command in August.[130]

A strong impetus to the consolidation of the base structure and moreover an opportunity for the command to rid itself of excess stations was given by the President's budget announcement in August and the necessary retrenchment in the armed forces that followed this

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128/ 1. Ltr, Hq AAF, file AFDIN-2B/2, Subject: Transfer of Command Jurisdiction of Tuskegee Army Air Field, Alabama, to Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 1 April 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Transfer of Tuskegee Army Air Field, To: CG, TAC, 3 April 1946
3. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 5 April 1946

129/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (3 Jul 46), Subject: Change of Status, Tuskegee Army Air Field, Tuskegee, Alabama, To: CO, Tuskegee AAFld, 3 July 1946
2. Ltr, Hq Tuskegee AAFld, file 319.1, Subject: Activities of Tuskegee Army Air Field from 15 April 1946 to 31 December 1946, To: CG, TAC, 3 January 1947
3. Pp. 1 - 2, History of Tuskegee Army Air Field, for 1 January 1946 - 31 October 1946
4. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 16 August 1946

130/ 1. G. O. #39, Hq TAC, 20 June 1946
2. G. O. #66, Hq TAC, 13 August 1946

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drastic cut in available funds.[131] To absorb its share of the cut, the Tactical Air Command reduced its organization to two air forces, thus necessitating some reshuffling of bases and tactical units within the command and the reduction in number of the bases for active use.[132] These changes wrought an extensive change in the tactical distribution of the command's stations. Greenville Army Air Base, South Carolina, became the headquarters of the combined Third and Ninth Air Forces,[133] thus fulfilling at long last the plan for a headquarters on the east coast, while the transfer of Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, to the Twelfth Air Force gave that organization, until then an Air Force with but a single station, a second permanent base. While Brooks Field and Lake Charles Army Air Field were eliminated as active stations and were soon to leave the jurisdiction of the command,[134] Shaw Field, until

131/ 1. Ltr, Office of the Chief of Staff, WD, no file number, Subject: Enforcement of Economies, 22 August 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Reduction in Civilian Personnel, To: CG, TAC, 6 September 1946
3. SECRET ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Current AAF Plans and Programs, To: CG, TAC, 24 October 1946, with Tabs thereto.

132/ 1. TWX, Hq TAC, TACCG 520, To: CG, AAF, 10 September 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL TWX, WAR, WAR 80280, To: CG, TAC, 13 September 1946
3. Notes on Briefing of theSubordinate Air Forces Commanders on the West Coast Amphibious Maneuvers, 30 September, held at Langley Field, Virginia

133/ 1. G. O. #88, Hq TAC, 25 October 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 30 October 1946

134/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686.2 (26 Nov 46), Subject: Transfer of Brooks Field, To: CG, AAF, 26 November 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686 (6 Nov 46), Subject: Future Disposition, Lake Charles Army Air Field, Louisiana, To: CG, 9AF, 6 November 1946

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then used only for Night Fighter squadrons, became a Fighter Group station and Langley Field became a Reconnaissance station as well as a headquarters station.

Troop Carrier bases remained for the most part firm during 1946, although the Third Air Force lost its identity as a separate troop carrier air force and although the number of troop carrier units was reduced from four to two groups. The only exceptions were that Sedalia Army Air Field, Missouri, was declared inactive in September 1946 [135/] and that Greenville Army Air Base, South Carolina, was shared with other tactical groups after the reorganization of 1 November 1946. Now with Troop Carrier functions incorporated in the tactical air forces, a new need had been created for a Troop Carrier station for the Twelfth Air Force on the west coast. [136/]

While the general trend was still in the direction of reduction of the number of tactical bases to be retained, the acquisition of new bases for specific reasons or use was also under consideration throughout the year.

One base that was acquired was Stewart Field, Newburgh, New York, important to the command in that it was adjacent to the United

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135/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (7 Aug 46), Subject: Change of Status Sedalia Army Air Field, Warrensburg, Missouri, To: CO, Sedalia AAFld, 7 August 1946

136/ P. 58, History of the Twelfth Air Force, 17 May 1946 to 31 December 1946

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States Military Academy at West Point.[137] Stewart Field would be tactically used as a northern station if a proposed Light Bombardment Group could be activated there in 1947.[138]

However, the greatest acquisition activity was in the search for good installations on the west coast. This search continued throughout the year, beginning with the bid for Camp Pinedale, Sacramento, California, in April 1946, which came to naught when Headquarters, Army Air Forces, decided to declare this installation excess.[139] During the summer, investigation of the possibilities of such bases as Las Vegas Army Air Base, New Mexico, Casper Army Air Base, Wyoming, Portland Army Air Base, Oregon, and Midland Army Air Base, Texas, was made, but these bases were found unsuitable.[140] For a time it was hoped to obtain

137/ 1. G. O. #93, Hq TAC, 12 November 1946
2. Ltr, US Military Academy, Stewart Field, no file number, Subject: Transfer of Technical Control of Facilities at Stewart Field, Newburgh, New York, from Air Training Command to Tactical Air Command, 15 October 1946, contained in History of Stewart Field, 1 Oct 1946 - 31 December 1946
3. Ltr, US Military Academy, Stewart Field no file number, Subject: Administration and Technical Control of Stewart Field, To: CG, TAC, 25 October 1946, with one inclosure thereto
4. Ltr, Hq AAF, file AFDIN-2B/1, Subject: Transfer of Jurisdiction - Stewart Field, Newburgh, New York, To: CG, TAC, 30 September 1946, with three inclosures thereto

138/ 1. SECRET Table, "Activation, Deployment, and A/C Authorizations of AAF Units", found as inclosure to ltr, CG, AAF, Subject: AAF Plans and Programs, 24 October 1946
2. RESTRICTED Table, "AAF List 1 Stations," found as inclosure to ltr, CG, AAF, Subject: AAF Plans and Programs, 24 October 1946

139/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 5 April 1946
2. Memorandum for the Record, from Hq AAF, Subject: "Disposition of AAF Communications Unit Training Center, Camp Pinedale, California, Activity

140/ 1. TWX, Hq TAC, A3D-2 2196, To: CG, 12AF, 21 June 1946

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Walla Walla Army Air Base, Walla Walla, Washington, as a troop carrier reconnaissance base.[141] Mather Field, Sacramento, California, was actually assigned to the Tactical Air Command in November from the Training Command, but after protracted negotiations was relinquished.[142] Better flying weather at Mather Field would have made this base a desirable replacement for McChord Field. With the failure to obtain Mather Field or Walla Walla Field, further action was left to 1947.

To sum up, the Tactical Air Command had by the end of the year succeeded in attaining a firm and workable -- if not ideal -- base distribution from which it could perform its tactical and training mission. The unproductive drain of the inactive and surplus

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140/ 2. TWX, CG, 12AF, 12AF A2230PD, To: CG, TAC, 30 June 1946
3. Also surveyed were four stations located in Georgia - Thomas Field, Moody Field, Turner Field and Cochran Field. See TAC Staff Conference Notes, 17 July 1946.

141/ 1. TWX, Hq TAC, A-3 0060, To: CG, AAF, 1 October 1946
2. Notes on Briefing of the Subordinate Air Forces Commanders on the West Coast Amphibious Maneuvers, 30 September 1946, held at Hq TAC, Langley Field, Virginia
3. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 21 October 1946

142/ 1. SECRET ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Transfer of Jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California, to Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 18 November 1946
2. SECRET ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686.2 (22 Nov 46), Subject: Transfer of Jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California to Tactical Air Command from Air Training Command, To: CG, Air Training Command, 22 November 1946, with two indorsements thereto
3. TWX, Hq TAC, AlE 314, To: CG, 12AF, 6 December 1946
4. Ltr, Hq 12AF, file 686, Subject: Mather Field -- Transfer to Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 16 December 1946

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station load had been reduced to relatively negligible proportions -- to three surplus stations, Chatham Field, Savannah, Georgia, Baer Field, Ft. Wayne, Indiana, and Tuskegee Field, Tuskegee, Alabama -- and to two inactive stations, Dover Army Air Field and Sedalia Army Air Base. Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, had turned over to its air forces all but Sherman Field, Smyrna Army Air Field, and Stewart Field.[143/]

143/ 1. TAC Weekly Bulletin, 11 November 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 11 September 1946
3. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 9 December 1946
4. TAC Station List, 10 January 1947
5. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686.2 (12 Dec 46), Subject: Disposition of Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee and Dover Army Air Field, Dover Delaware, To: CG, AAF, 12 December 1946

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ACTIVE STATIONS IN THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND 1946*

10 April 1946	10 June 1946	10 August 1946	10 Nov 1946	10 Jan 1947
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, Stations directly under:				
Dover	Dover	Dover	Dover	Sherman
Godman	Godman	Langley	Langley	Smyrna
Lake Charles	Langley	Lockbourne	Lockbourne	Stewart
Lockbourne	Lockbourne	Myrtle Beach	Sherman	
March	McChord	Shaw	Smyrna	
McChord	Myrtle Beach	Sherman	Stewart	
Myrtle Beach	Shaw	Smyrna		
Shaw	Sherman			
Sherman	Smyrna			
Smyrna	Tuskegee			
Tyndall				
THIRD AIR FORCE, Stations under:				
Bergstrom	Bergstrom	Bergstrom	Inactivated GO #68, Hq TAC, 25 Oct 46, effective date 1 Nov 46	
Greenville	Greenville	Greenville		
Lawson	Lawson	Lawson		
Pope	Pope	Pope		
Sedalia	Sedalia	Sedalia		
NINTH AIR FORCE, Stations under:				
Biggs	Biggs	Biggs	Bergstrom	Bergstrom
Brooks	Brooks	Brooks	Brooks	Brooks
Marshall	Lake Charles	Lake Charles	Greenville	Greenville
	Marshall	Marshall	Lawson	Langley
			Lake Charles	Lawson
			Marshall	Lake Charles
			Myrtle Beach	Lockbourne
			Pope	Marshall
			Shaw	Myrtle Beach
				Pope
				Shaw
TWELFTH AIR FORCE, Stations under				
	March	March	Biggs	Biggs
			March	March

* Station Lists, Hq TAC, as of 10 Apr, 10 Jun, 10 Aug, 10 Nov, 1946 and 10 Jan 1947

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III

THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND: GOALS VERSUS ACCOMPLISHMENTS

March 1946 - December 1946

In March 1946, in a letter written over the signature of General Carl Spaatz, the interim mission of the Tactical Air Command was promulgated as follows:

> "The Tactical Air Command will be prepared to participate in joint operations with ground and/or sea forces; to cooperate with the Air Defense Command in the air defense mission; to operate independently in offensive operations; to train units and personnel for the maintenance of the tactical forces in all parts of the world; to cooperate with Army Ground Forces in training of airborne troops; to perform such special missions as the Commanding General, Army Air Forces may direct." 144/

This mission, as its name implies, was interim or temporary, apparently to serve only until such time as the duties and sphere of activity of the command could more clearly and concretely crystallize.[145/]

Another statement of this same mission, contained in the War

144/ Ltr, CG, AAF, no file number, Subject: Interim Mission, To: CG, TAC, 12 March 1946 (See s. d. #4, Chapter on Personnel)

145/ 1. Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Hq AAF, Orlando, Florida, no file number, Subject: Report of Inspection of Headquarters TAC, Langley Field, Virginia, To: CG, AAF, 25 June 1946
2. Article - "The Future of the Army Air Forces," by General Carl Spaatz (See s. d. #13, Chapter on Acquisition and Loss of Stations)

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Department Circular #138 which appeared on 17 May 1946, was even more general in phraseology than that published by General Spaatz.[146] At the same time, however, were added two new specific missions, namely (1) the control and training of anti-aircraft units and (2) such UMT unit training as might be directed by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. In point of fact, these missions did not involve the accretion of any additional obligations on the part of the command. Neither the final assignment of anti-aircraft artillery responsibility to the Army Air Forces[147] nor the passage of the Universal Military Training law was at that time assured.

The vagueness of the phraseology of this interim mission of the Tactical Air Command (and, we may presume, the same was true of the missions of the other major commands) left it in a rather fluid state which could not help but be conducive to ambiguities and controversies, the outcome of which would serve in some measure to determine the shape and size of the command.

An early source of difficulty arose as a result of the omission in the statements of the mission of mention of the responsibility for the testing and development of research projects.[148] In May 1946

146/ WD Cir 138, Subject: "War Department Reorganization," 14 May 1946

147/ SECRET 1st Ind., Hq TAC, file TAC 381 (24 Jun 46), 13 August 1946, to ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Responsibilities for Air Defense, 24 June 1946

148/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Hq AAF, 24 May 1946 (See s. d. #3, Chapter on Personnel)

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it was learned that the Air University was taking steps to set up a Testing and Development Force or Demonstration Force,[149] consisting of four tactical groups and the necessary supporting units. General Quesada, in a letter to General Ira C. Eaker, strongly protested this move on the grounds that (1) such a force could not be created in the 400,000 man troop basis without resultant reduction elsewhere in the Army Air Forces program, and that (2) such testing of projects and demonstrations were within the province of the commands (strategic or tactical) in which the primary interest lay. The responsibility for such missions seems to have been decided in favor of the Tactical Air Command as the mission of tests and demonstrations is included in the Tactical Air Command's mission of October 1946.[150]

A further problem that had its origin in the ambiguity of the major command's missions was that of the mission of the air defense of the United States. While air defense was primarily the mission of the Air Defense Command, it was also the responsibility of the Tactical Air Command to cooperate in the carrying out of this mission. Debatable, it seems, were the questions of representation of the AAF

149/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 3 May 1946

150/ 1. AAF Regulation 20-19, "The Tactical Air Command," 10 October 1946

2. As a matter of interest, it may be noted that the above responsibilities had been considered a part of the mission of the tactical agencies under the old Third Air Force, and so such a decision was in reality a return to an older concept. See CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Mission for Tactical Air Units, To: CG, CAF, 21 July 1945

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in contact with external military agencies on the matter of air defense, and the relationship of the Tactical Air Command to the Air Defense Command when, and if, hostilities began, there being involved here a question of timing as to when air defense responsibilities would be transferred from the Air Defense Command to the Tactical Air Command or to a Task Force Commander. Differences of concept were amicably debated by General Quesada and General Stratemeyer, Commanding General of the Air Defense Command, with the matter referred to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, for decision.[151] No evidence available to the historian indicates that a definite solution was reached in 1946.

The functions of Troop Carrier aviation which had come under the control of the Tactical Air Command in the reorganization of the Army Air Forces, in March 1946, came to be examined in the light of Troop Carrier activities which pertained to the Air Transport Command.

[151] 1. SECRET ltr, Hq ADC, no file number, Subject: Air Defense, Pacific Coastal Frontier, To: CG, AAF, 19 April 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Investment of Command Responsibilities of the Land, Sea and Air Forces in Event of an Air Invasion, To: CG, ADC, 10 June 1946
3. SECRET ltr, Colonel R. E. Beebe, Hq ADC, To: Major General E.R. Quesada, CG, TAC, 13 June 1946
4. SECRET ltr, Hq 12AF, file 381, Subject: Air Defense Plans for Emergency Defense of Vital Installations, To: CG, TAC, 22 July 1946, with two indorsements thereto
5. SECRET ltr, Major General Charles B. Stone, III, Hq, ADC, To: Major General E.R. Quesada, CG, TAC, 23 August 1946, with one inclosure thereto
6. SECRET ltr, Hq ADC, file 322, Subject: Responsibility of the Air Defense Command, To: CG, AAF, 13 September 1946, with one inclosure thereto
7. SECRET ltr, Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, CG, ADC, To: Major General E.R. Quesada, CG, TAC, 14 October 1946

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Brigadier General Reuben C. Hood, Jr., Deputy Chief of Air Staff-3, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, speaking in May of Tactical Air Command's proposed plan for Third Air Force(Troop Carrier) emphasized the fact that Troop Carrier mission should not encroach upon the functions and missions of the Air Transport Command, which was responsible for all air transport service except within the overseas theatres. In line with this thinking the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) was relieved of such responsibilities as those of operating aircraft for regional hospitals.[152/]

Two special missions, which the Tactical Air Command was to assume during 1946, are worthy of mention as indicating some possible overlapping of command functions. The first of these was the training of glider pilots by the Third Air Force(Troop Carrier), a duty, in the minds of some, belonging more properly to the Training Command as it was considered a clear case of individual training.[153/] The second involved non-tactical testing in the assigning of the 608th Malaria

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152/ 1. P. 3, Special Projects, IX TCC and AF 3AF(TC), 5 November 1945 - 30 September 1946
2. P. 9, Third Air Force Troop Carrier History, 1 April 1946 - 31 October 1946
3. RESTRICTED 1st Ind., Hq AAF, no file number, 6 August 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Proposed Plan for Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), 7 May 1946

153/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 5 June 1946
2. Ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 322 (10 Jul 46), Subject: Necessity and Justification for Retention of Certain T/O & E Organizations Presently Assigned to Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), To: CG, TAC, 10 July 1946

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Survey Detachment, and the AAF Committee on Aerial Disposal of Insecticide to the Tactical Air Command from the Air Proving Ground Command, where it no doubt belonged since such testing could be considered more properly within the province of the latter command rather than in a tactical command.[154] While these two missions were assigned due to the inability of the above commands to assume the responsibilities in question, they represented a potential danger in that duties of this sort could materially detract from the primary objective of a tactical air arm.

Although some problems in the concept and scope of the mission remained, the situation had so far crystallized by October 1946 that Headquarters, Army Air Forces, was able to issue the postwar missions of the major commands. The statement of Tactical Air Command's mission appeared in AAF Regulation No. 20-19[155] which superseded the Interim Mission Directive of 12 March 1946. The rather general and abstract language of March 1946 was supplanted by a more detailed and concrete terminology -- rather legalistic in form. The mission of 12 March which said that the Tactical Air Command was to be prepared to participate in joint operations with ground and/or sea forces, was now amplified to

154/ Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Assignment of 608th Malaria Survey Detachment and AAF Committee on Aerial Dispersal of Insecticide, To: CG, TAC, 17 September 1946, with one indorsement thereto

155/ AAF Regulation 20-19, "Tactical Air Command," 10 October 1946 (See s. d. #150[1], this Chapter)

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include the responsibility that the Tactical Air Command was to:

(a) "Organize, administer, train, and maintain combat service, and supporting units necessary for joint operations with ground and naval forces.

(b) "Prepare either independently or in cooperation with land and sea forces, plans for air operations or exercises as directed by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces."

In these items, as in the others of this fifteen item statement, there was besides the element of specific detail, a sort of blueprint as to how the functions were to be implemented. We find predominate in the documents such terms as "plan, test, develop and improve" in such fields as air ground cooperation techniques, airborne and airlift aviation, troop carrier, liaison and helicopter type aviation. This research was to be conducted both independently and in conjunction with other Army Air Forces commands and agencies. Also stressed was the educational role that the Tactical Air Command was to play for the indoctrination of members of other commands and services. To foster a true conception of tactical air power the Tactical Air Command was to "conduct instruction and exercises demonstrating tactical techniques and doctrines for service schools, colleges and other training installations." Other missions included in this listing were cooperation with the Air Defense Command in the air defense mission, operation of tow-target aviation for ground-to-air firing of Army Ground Force units, universal military training and the all-inclusive "special missions", which the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, might direct.

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Such then was the postwar mission as Headquarters, Army Air Forces, set it up for the Tactical Air Command. However, from the very start the command found itself confronted with responsibilities and obligations that arose from the transition from the wartime to the peacetime organization. Special missions, some temporary in nature, some of longer duration, were assigned to the command.[156] These missions revolved around the demobilization of supply, stations, and personnel, recruiting, and Civil Air Patrol demonstrations.

The effect of the assignment of these missions on the command, during the period under consideration here, was to dissipate a disproportionately large percentage of the capabilities and potential of the command in these duties which were not related to its primary aim, that of creating and establishing a combat air arm.[157]

The demobilization and recruiting programs enjoyed a priority over all other activities during 1946, much the same as they had in the period between V-J Day and the activation of the command.[158] Demobilization, by its very nature was a deterrent to the any activities

156/ The extent of these missions and the diverse activities they entailed are well illustrated by the detailed lists that appear in the Weekly Bulletin put out by Tactical Air Command during 1946

157/ TWX, Hq TAC, Al 0275, To: CG, 9AF, et al., 2 May 1946

158/ 1. Article -- "The Tactical Air Command", by Lieutenant Hal Basham, contained in AAF Review, August 1946
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Mission of March Field, To: CO, March Field, California, 12 April 1946

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undertaken by the command owing to the loss of skills and the continual loss of personnel that it represented.[159] To fulfill high priority missions, a considerable juggling of available strength was necessary in a process of robbing Peter to Pay Paul. The efforts to carry out such missions as the Chinese Crew training program and the West Coast Amphibious maneuvers of November 1946, are examples of activities that necessitated this juggling. Loss of personnel on overseas shipments and in filling mandatory quotas for schools further complicated the loss sustained as a result of demobilization.

To replace the personnel in the needed categories that had been lost in demobilization and to the personnel requisitions from higher headquarters,[160] recruiting more and more held the spotlight during 1946 and even in December of the year we find the Tactical Air Command writing to its subordinate commands that:

> "It must be realized by all of this command that the outlook for obtaining personnel through recruiting is now and will remain critical; therefore, a continuing direct and aggressive action must be taken to secure enlistments, reenlistments, and extension of enlistment of desirable and qualified personnel." [161]

159/ Pp. 5 - 6, History of 47th Bombardment Group (L) Night Attack, Lake Charles Army Air Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana, for July - September 1946

160/ See pp.147-151,infra. Part II, Personnel

161/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 327 (24 Dec 46), Subject: Review of Recruiting Program, To: CG, 9AF, et al., 24 December 1946

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Thus recruiting was to retain its priority as a mission of the Tactical Air Command into the following year.

To get results in the recruiting campaign required aggressive and time consuming activity on the part of the command, both by direct and indirect methods. Mobile recruiting caravans had to be sent throughout the country.[162] All activities that brought the Army Air Forces before the public, such as the numerous demonstrations and CAP shows, although their primary purpose was to sell a 70 Group Air Force program to the public and through it to Congress, did act as publicity to interest likely recruits.[163]

The task of publicizing the Army Air Forces especially through the medium of these recruiting shows was considered vital to the Army Air Forces.[164] Brigadier General William A. Matheny, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff-3 at Headquarters, Army Air Forces, expressed the importance of this mission in a letter to the Tactical Air Command in July, saying:

162/ 1. Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Recruiting Publicity, To: CG, TAC, 16 April 1946, with one indorsement and one inclosure thereto
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 327 (7 Jun 46), Subject: Enlistment and reenlistment in the Regular Army, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 7 June 1946
3. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 327 (10 Oct 46), Subject: Mobile Recruiting Caravans, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 10 October 1946

163/ SECRET ltr, CG, AAF, no file number, Subject: Current AAF Plans and Programs, To: CG, TAC, 24 October 1946

164/ 1. Conference relative to formation and control of CAP Demonstration Teams, Washington, D.C., 10 July 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 31 May 1946

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> "The Army Air Forces is now engaged in the all important task of selling the importance of air power to national defense to the American people. On how well this job is done depends, in large measure, the entire post war mission of the AAF, its progress, size, development, and future. One of the best media of AAF contact with the American people in this campaign is the successful staging of air demonstrations . . . ." 165/

Just how important this job was considered is indicated by the fact that at the close of the year 1946, the Tactical Air Command had participated in 159 aerial demonstrations, utilizing a total of 1465 aircraft and gliders for the various civilian agencies.166/ These demonstrations ranged from the use of three aircraft in small town flyovers to the participation of a hundred aircraft in the Cleveland Air Races.167/ An inspection in July 1946 of the activities of the 47th Bombardment Group at Lake Charles Army Air Base, Lake Charles, Louisiana, revealed that roughly fifty percent of the group effort was devoted to civilian air shows.168/ Heavy demands too were placed on the 1st Fighter Group whose jet planes held great interest to the public. During the

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165/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Air Exhibition Teams, To: CG, TAC, 22 July 1946, contained in Special Projects IX TCC and AF 3AF (TC) for 5 November 1945 - 30 September 1946

166/ Summary, Tactical Air Command Activities During 1946, prepared by A-3 Section, Hq TAC

167/ Ibid.

168/ Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Report of Supervisory Staff Visit, To: Chief of Staff, TAC, 17 July 1946

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summer of 1946 a group of jet P-80's organized as Operation Comet, was sent around the country to give demonstrations.[169]

The very number and diversity of these shows taxed the Tactical Air Command's capabilities during the spring and early summer of the year to such an extent that the Tactical Air Command sought relief from Headquarters, Army Air Forces, from this burden.[170] At one time the Tactical Air Command, according to General Quesada, had more missions than it had flyable planes.[171] To afford relief, a conference at Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 17 July 1946, resulted in the forming of Air Exhibition Teams of which the Tactical Air Command was responsible for one.[172] This concentrated the duties of this sort into one squadron (Squadron "Z" located at Langley Field, Virginia) thus relieving other units of this type of activity from drain of aircraft for this purpose.[173] Due to the curtailment of funds in the autumn of 1946, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, was forced to suspend the policy

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169/ Pp. 92 - 93, History of the Twelfth Air Force, 17 May to 31 December 1946

170/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 8 May 1946

171/ Ibid.

172/ Sec I, G. O. #66, Hq TAC, 13 August 1946

173/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 373 (3 Aug 46), Subject: Air Demonstration Teams, To: CG, 3AF, 3 August 1946

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the policy of air shows after 24 November.[174]

In addition to these public shows, the Tactical Air Command was called upon to perform many other special missions. Among these were such duties as those entailed in the numerous servicing missions of ferrying aircraft, furnishing tow target facilities for the Army Ground Forces, Air Reserve,[175] etc. The command too was called upon for the implementation of various insect aerial spraying projects.[176] The emergency created by such industrial disturbances as the railroad strike of 1946, involved the use by the Third Air Force of 150 C-46 aircraft in 79 missions.[177]

In addition to demobilization, recruiting and the special missions there were the continuing activities evolving from the disposition of supply and the closing of stations, a host of custodial

174/ 1. Telephone conversation, Major Grummitt, AAF Flight Services, and lieutenant Colonel K. C. Dempster, TAC Operations, 30 August 1946
2. G. O. #96, Hq TAC, 10 December 1946

175/ "The Expenditure of Effort Involved in Servicing Activities Unrelated to the Primary Mission of the Tactical Air Command," Study prepared by A-5, Hq TAC, February 1947

176/ 1. G. O. #62, Hq 3AF(TC), 22 April 1946
2. TWX, Hq TAC, A3A-2 841, To: CG, 9AF, 10 July 1946

177/ 1. TWX, Hq TAC, A3A 1315, To: CG, 9AF, et al., 22 November 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL TWX, WAR 87217, To: CG, TAC, 7 December 1946
3. For an account of the part played by Third Air Force(TC) in this mission see "Operation Casey Jones", contained in Special Projects IX TCC and AF 3AF, 5 November 1945 - 30 September 1946, pp. 1 - 6

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and housekeeping duties that could add nothing to the development of the command. "Every individual devoted to deactivation", noted Brigadier General Robert M. Lee in a letter to the Commanding General of the Third Air Force in May 1946, "constitutes manpower lost to constructive organizational activity."[178] Throughout 1946 this unproductive expenditure of the command's potential was to remain a major consideration.

Not only was the command confronted with these extraneous missions but it also found itself in a situation that required considerable reexamination and revision of the concepts involved in shaping the direction of its cooperative and training missions.[179]

At first this cooperation, except for a small amount of joint training of troop carrier units with the 82nd Airborne Division, consisted mainly of small demonstrations for the various ground force schools. This frittering away of its energies was very disturbing to the command as it was felt a true picture of tactical air power was not being conveyed. General Quesada explained in a letter to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, in July that while the command was engaged in far too numerous small scale and misleading demonstrations with Ground Force Units, the only justification for this action was its

178/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (14 May 46), Subject: Deactivation Activities, To: CG, 3AF, 14 May 1946

179/ Remarks by Major General E. R. Quesada to the Air-Ground Liaison Officers, Hq TAC, 24 June 1946

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inability, due to temporary limited means, to do otherwise.[180] To put a stop to the numerous small demands the Tactical Air Command called a conference of Army Ground Forces agencies in June 1946 in which plans were made for the concentration of these demonstrations in an Indoctrination Course in which could be concentrated a complete showing of tactical air power, thereby eliminating many of the individual requests. The first of these Indoctrination courses was planned for early 1947.[181]

In addition to these demonstrations, for the schools, etc., the command was able to participate in some joint training and maneuvers with the surface forces. Foremost of these was the participation in the joint Army-Navy and Air Forces amphibious exercise held at Camp Pendleton, California, during November 1946.[182] To provide complete tactical air participation in the maneuver, six tactical groups of the command were utilized during the actual maneuver period. For the first time the jet-propelled P-80 type aircraft were used as fighter bombers in close support of friendly ground forces.

180/ 1. Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, 24 May 1946 (See s. d. #3, Chapter on Personnel)

2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 373 (21 May 46), Subject: Air Demonstrations, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 21 May 1946

181/ Article -- "The Tactical Air Command", by Lieutenant Hal Basham, contained in AAF Review, August 1946

182/ CONFIDENTIAL 9AF Special Study "Operation Mountain Goat," West Coast Amphibious Maneuver, November 1946

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Additional joint missions which merit comment were the several large fire power demonstrations,[183] using all types of aircraft and armament and a resupply mission which was performed for the Mountain Warfare school at Camp Carson, Colorado. The latter necessitated dropping highly essential supplies near the top of Pike's Peak with the drop zone being just above the top of a solid overcast.[184]

Accomplishments, too, in the training mission of the command were greatly affected by the personnel situation existing during the period in question.[185] One of the problems of the year was that of training and retraining of individuals. Although the major role of the command was stated as "the training and employment of tactical units,"[186] the effect of demobilization and the collapse of the Army Air Forces organization that resulted made this aim to a large extent impossible. "After the bulk of demobilization", said General Quesada, in an article

183/ ~~Report on~~ Commentary Fire Power Demonstration, Ft. Bliss, 17 May 1946

184/ Summary, "Tactical Air Command Activities During 1946", prepared by A-3 Section, Hq TAC (See s. d. #166, this Chapter)

185/ 1. Article -- "The Tactical Air Command Today" by Major General E. R. Quesada, contained in Military Review, September 1947 (See s. d. #68, Chapter on Personnel)
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 9 December 1946
3. Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Withdrawal of Personnel for Overseas Shipment, To: CG, TAC, 3 June 1946

186/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (15 Apr 46), Subject: Assignment of Units and Bases, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 15 April 1946

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in the Military Review for September 1947,[187] "we were engaged in finding men to man our tactical units and, throughout 1946, we were largely preoccupied with training individuals to perform their jobs."

Due to the non-existence in the Training Command of provisions for glider pilot training, the Tactical Air Command established a school during the year to effectuate this type of training.[188] Similarly a second school was established at Lawson Field, Georgia, in the autumn, the Pathfinder School, to train navigators and other personnel in the operation and employment of radar equipment partly or wholly peculiar to the Third Air Force(Troop Carrier).[189]

The largest training project undertaken by the command in 1946, however, was that of training of 104 crews of the Chinese Air Forces in the operation of the C-46 transport type aircraft during the period between 15 March and 31 July.[190] This project, entirely a special or extra mission, occupied most of the Third Air Force's

187/ Article - "The Tactical Air Command Today" by Major General E. R. Quesada, contained in Military Review, September 1947 (See s. d. #68, Section on Personnel)

188/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 5 June 1946

189/ SECRET ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 322 (27 Aug 46), Subject: Radar Training for Troop Carrier Navigators, To: CG, TAC, 27 August 1946, with two indorsements thereto

190/ See Section on Chinese Training contained in Special Projects IX TCC and AF 3AF (TC), 5 November 1945 - 30 September 1946

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capabilities during this period.[191]

Another type of activity that was undertaken by the Tactical Air Command at this time was that relative to the various phases of research and testing. In line with the avowed policy that the Army Air Forces must maintain a position of preeminent leadership in research and development,[192] the Tactical Air Command undertook certain research projects that related to its sphere of the Army Air Forces mission and that would aid it in its primary function of operations with the ground forces. The priority and choice of these projects evolved from the needs brought to the fore by the war.

Deficiencies that had become evident in the rapidly changing wartime scene, but whose solution could not then be attained, were to receive close scrutiny. One of the most glaring of these deficiencies was the inability of the combat air forces during the war to conduct night operations.[193] "We were able," remarked General Quesada, "to stop the Germans cold in the daytime, but at night we were a flop".[194]

191/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 1 April 1946
2. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq IX TC Command, no file number, Subject: Operational Capabilities of the IX Troop Carrier Command, To: CG, CAF, 7 February 1946, with six indorsements thereto

192/ SECRET Tab to ltr, CG, AAF, no file number, Subject: Current AAF Plans and Programs, To: CG, TAC, 24 October 1946

193/ Article -- "The Tactical Air Command Today" by Major General Quesada, contained in Military Review, September 1947

194/ Ibid.

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There might be added to this the dependence on good flying weather at all times and the inadequacies of radar precision and jet-propulsion operations, both new elements, the full possibilities of which had not yet been realized.[195]

Direction of the various projects that were created was entrusted to the Army Air Forces Board at Orlando, Florida, which called upon the Tactical Air Command for the operational implementation of the tests which it planned. The inactivation of the Army Air Forces Board on 18 June 1946 resulted in the planning function being transferred to the Research Section, Academic Staff Division of the Air University.[196] The same forces that influenced the accomplishment of the other missions of the Tactical Air Command, came to play in the various scientific projects attempted in 1946. Four major research projects were undertaken during 1946. There were: (1) Project Q4876 -- "Development of Doctrine and Technique for a Tactical Night Striking Unit employing Light Bombardment Aircraft."[197] This project was assigned

195/ AAF ltr 20-98, "Establishment of Experimental All Weather Flying Program", 18 March 1946

196/ Ltr, Hq Air University, no file number, Subject: Activation of the Research Section, Academic Staff Division, Air University, To: CG, TAC, 16 July 1946

197/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Radar Equipment for the 47th Bombardment Group (L) (Night Attack), To: CG, CAF, 5 March 1946, with one indorsement thereto
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, AAF Board, no file number, Subject: Development of Doctrine and Technique for a Tactical Night Striking Unit Employing Light Bombardment Aircraft, To: CG, TAC, 3 May 1946

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to the 47th Bombardment Group (Light) of the Ninth Air Force, which was equipped with A-26 type aircraft. Although the Tactical Air Command expressed itself as vitally interested in these tactical tests and desirous of putting forth all available facilities, to complete the tests as quickly as possible, the command was by no means certain that the project could be immediately accomplished due to the many Civil Air Patrol, recruiting, and other demonstrations now being assigned the 47th Bombardment Group. In spite of these difficulties -- and, in addition, in spite of the fact that the 47th Bombardment Group experienced a large turnover of pilots with comparable losses in technicians and navigators, and had great difficulty in obtaining equipment such as target ships [198] -- the Group was able to log 8961 flying hours on this project completing approximately 60% of the test by the end of the year.

(2) Project Q4841: Tactical test of the capabilities of the P-80 type aircraft in all phases of tactical operations, with the exception

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197/ 3. SECRET ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 461 (17 May 46), Subject: Army Air Force Board Projects Q4841 and Q4876, To: President AAF Board, 17 May 1946
4. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 461 (16 May 46), Subject: Army Air Force Board Project Q4876, To: CO, 47th Bomb Gp, 16 May 1946
5. Record and Routing Sheet, A3A Night Fighter, to A-3, Subject: AAF Board Project, 14 May 1946

198/ Ltr, Hq Air University, file 330.14, Subject: Air University Research Project Priorities, To: CG, AAF, 19 September 1946

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of photo reconnaissance.[199] The 412th Fighter Group (redesignated 1st Fighter Group) at March Field under the Twelfth Air Force was given Tactical Air Command's share of this test. Of similar importance to the A-26 testing, this project was also undertaken in spite of the difficulties encountered due to shipment of pilots overseas and to the great demand for Jet type planes for demonstrations, and was 75% complete by the end of the year.[200] This test helped to establish the acceptance of the practicability of the P-80 type aircraft as a dive bombing fighter.

(3) Project H4856 (C): Selection of Radar and Communication Equipment for the Air Warning and Control System of a Tactical Air Force.[201] Operations in combat had emphasized the need for a combination of radar sets for air warning and aircraft control that were highly mobile, that

199/ 1. SECRET ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 461 (17 May 46), Subject: Army Air Force Board Projects Q4841 and Q4876, To: The President, AAF Board, 17 May 1946
2. SECRET ltr, AAF Board, no file number, Subject: Tactical Test of the P-80 Aircraft, To: CO, 412th Ftr Gp, 10 May 1946
3. SECRET ltr, Hq 1st Ftr Gp, no file number, Subject: Progress Report of P-80 Project Q4841 for Period ending 15 July 1946, 19 August 1946, 19 August 1946

200/ Summary, "Tactical Air Command Activities During 1946", prepared by A-3 Section, Hq TAC (See s. d. #166, this Section)

201/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Selection of Radar Equipment for Tactical Air Command, To: CG, AAF Center, Orlando, Florida, 7 February 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, TAC 319.1 (22 Mar 46), Subject: AAF Board Project, H4856, "Selection of Radar and Communications Equipment for the Air Warning and Control System of a Tactical Air Force", To: CG, 9AF, 14 May 1946

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would assure reliable and continuous operation and would possess sufficient traffic handling capacity. The handling of this project was entrusted to the 502d Tactical Control Group at Biggs Field but had to be cancelled[202] due to the lack of personnel in the special categories required for this testing both in the 502d Group and in the Air University. This project, incidently, caught as it was in the mesh of the acute personnel problem of the time, points up the general difficulty of combined efforts involving more than one command when neither command had available personnel.[203]

(4) Project H4804 (C): Test and evaluation of Navigational Systems for Airborne Operations.[204] This project, along with Project 4695 (R), Operations Test of AN/UPN-4 Radar Beacon for front line demarcation

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202/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq Air University, no file number, Subject: Air University Projects H4856, "Selection of Radar and Communications Equipment for the Air Warning and Control System of a Tactical Air Force," To: CG, AAF, 21 October 1946, with one inclosure thereto

203/ CONFIDENTIAL Record and Routing Sheet, Communications Officer to A-3 and A-5, Subject: Air University Project No. H4856, 25 October 1946

204/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, AAF Board, no file number, Subject: Test and Evaluation of Navigational Systems for Airborne Operations, AAF Board Project No. H4804, To: CG, AAF, 30 January 1946
2. RESTRICTED ltr, AAF Board, no file number, Subject: AAF Board Project H4695, "Operational Test of AN/UPN-4 Radar Beacons for Front-Line Demarcation and Troop Carrier Operations," To: CG, IX TC Division, 3 April 1946
3. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, AAF Board, no file number, Subject: Test and Evaluation of Navigational Systems for Troop Carrier Operations, AAF Board Project No. H4804, To: CG, 3AF(TC), 4 June 1946

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and Troop Carrier operations, the responsibility of the Third Air Force (TC), was hindered by the lack of technical officers and the transfer to other commands of those familiar with this field of operation.[205]

To get around this bottleneck, the Third Air Force set up a Pathfinder School at Lawson Field, Georgia, for training navigators and other personnel in the operation and employment of radar equipment.[206] The instructors at this school, it was hoped, would be able to work on the various projects peculiar to troop carrier aviation of which the Tactical Air Command was the field agency. Little, however, was accomplished during 1946 due to the heavy Troop Carrier commitments of the command and to the fact that the various reductions in civilian personnel came to limit the modifications of aircraft to those changes necessary to place them in simple flying status.

Important in the planning stages, but not implemented by definite projects or activity on the part of the Tactical Air Command were the arctic training and research that, along with the night fighting

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205/ 1. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq Air Proving Ground Comd, file 400.112, Subject: AAF Board Project H4695, "Operational Test of AN/UPN-4 Radar Beacon for Front Line Demarcation and Troop Carrier Operations," To: CG, 3AF(TC), 13 September 1946, with one indorsement thereto

2. Ltr, Hq Air University, file 330.14, Subject: Air University Research Project Priorities, To: CG, AAF, 19 September 1946

206/ SECRET ltr, Hq 3AF(TC) file AF3AF 322 (27 Aug 46), Subject: Radar Training for Troop Carrier Navigators, To: CG, TAC, 27 August 1946, with two indorsements thereto (See s. d. #189, this Section)

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and radar precision operation, held a high priority at Headquarters, Army Air Forces.[207] Much of this research in its early stages lay outside the province of the Tactical Air Command, especially that part concerned with equipment (Air Materiel Command), and communications (Air Transport Command) and establishment of advance bases (Strategic Air Command). In the evaluation of the air force mission that accompanied the necessary reductions due to economy, this arctic study was considered a must by the Army Air Forces.

> "The Army Air Forces has become cognizant of the growing importance of the Arctic Frontier. It is planned that ultimately we will have the greater part of our units and personnel trained in Arctic Operations."

A letter from the Tactical Air Command to the Air Materiel Command, dated 20 October 1946, noted that the Tactical Air Command has currently engaged in planning for the operations of tactical groups and units in regions of severe cold.[208] The various problems thus being worked out would result in active projects in this field by the Tactical Air Command during the following year.

207/ 1. SECRET ltr, General Carl Spaatz, CG, AAF, To: Major General Elwood R. Quesada, CG, TAC, 3 May 1946
2. SECRET ltr, CG, AAF, no file number, Subject: Current AAF Plans and Programs, To: CG, TAC, 24 October 1946

208/ 1. SECRET Memorandum prepared by Arnold C. McLean, Operations Analysis Sec, Hq TAC, Subject: Recommendations for Arctic Operations, 22 July 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, TAC 320.3 (2 Oct 46), Subject: Sub-Arctic Equipment Requirements, To: CG, AMC, 2 October 1946

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IV

HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL

Headquarters Organization

The organizational structure of the Headquarters of the Tactical Air Command as set up in March 1946 was essentially the same as that of its predecessor the headquarters of the old Third Air Force.[209] That structure was based on the A-Staff system which had finally displaced the tri-directorate system in the Third Air Force in early March, just prior to the reorganization of the Air Forces which created the Tactical Air Command.[210] Headquarters Staff Memoranda of the Third Air Force as well as the directives, etc. by which the headquarters administered its lower echelons, were redesignated Tactical Air Command memoranda etc., and were effective until such time as they could be revised or rescinded. The sections of the Headquarters of the Tactical Air Command were manned by the personnel that had manned those of the Third Air Force. The Commanding General of the Third Air Force, Major General Elwood R. Quesada, became the Commanding General of the new command.[211]

209/ 1. 3AF Regulation 20-1, "Third Air Force", 1 March 1946
2. TAC Regulation 20-1, "Tactical Air Command", 11 June 1946

210/ 1. 3AF Staff Conference Notes, 4 March 1946
2. 3AF Staff Conference Notes, 11 March 1946

211/ 1. TWX, Hq AAF, AFPSU 2212, To: CG, 3AF, 22 March 1946
2. TAC Special Orders No. 1, 25 March 1946

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The new organizational structure, established on 1 March 1946,[212] placed under the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Secretary to the General Staff. Directly beneath were the A-Staffs as follows:

A-1	A-2
Recruiting	Security
Military Personnel	Combat Intelligence
Personnel Control	Counter Intelligence
Individual Services	Historical
Civilian Personnel	
WAC Personnel	

A-3	A-4
Requirements	Supply
Operations	Maintenance
Training	Installations (Eng)
	Traffic
	Purchasing and Contracting

The following were in the category of special staff sections:

Adjutant General	Surgeon
Air Inspector	Judge Advocate General
Chaplain	Communications
Finance	Budget and Fiscal
Public Relations	Acft Accident Prevention
Statistical Control	Hq Commandant

While these sections were set up, in many cases the activities subordinate to these sections were not, as will be noted below, completely and definitely fixed.[213]

212/ 3AF Regulation 20-1, "Third Air Force, 1 March 1946 (See s. d. #209)

213/ Remarks of Brigadier General Y. H. Taylor at Staff Meeting, March Field, California, 30 April 1946

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In April, a position of Deputy Commanding General, to which was assigned Brigadier General Warren R. Carter, was inserted in the chain of command.

It was not until July 1946 that an A-5 Section was set up in the headquarters.[214] The functions pertaining to this section had originally been set up as Plans Control, a special staff section headed by Brigadier General Robert M. Lee,[215] but on the latter's appointment as Chief of Staff the position was no longer listed until it emerged as the A-5 Section with Colonel William W. Momeyer in charge.[216]

In contradistinction to the more recent type of organization under the General Staff plan, no A-6 Section was established. Instead Communications was placed on the special staff level.

Public Relations had emerged as a special staff section due to the increased emphasis placed on the program by topside.[217]

The new demands of the postwar period and the special conditions prevailing during 1946 influenced the responsibilities of other

214/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 19 July 1946

215/ 3AF Regulation 20-1, "Third Air Force", 1 March 1946 (See s. d. #209)

216/ G. O. #51, Hq TAC, 11 July 1946

217/ Indicative of this emphasis are the following letters:
1. Ltr, General Carl Spaatz, CG, AAF, To: Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, 4 May 1946
2. Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: General Carl A. Spaatz, CG, AAF, 7 June 1946

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sections. The war department reorganization, announced in War Department Circular No. 138 in May[218] and to go into effect on 10 June,[219] for example, increased the Command's responsibilities in that it had to take over functions formerly performed by the various service commands which had now been eliminated.[220] The work loads of Budget and Fiscal, Finance, and the Engineering Division of A-4 were greatly increased. An increase of bulk allotment of 107 civilians was granted by Headquarters, Army Air Forces, to aid the Headquarters in the taking over these added responsibilities.[221] The transfer of complete Repairs and Utilities responsibilities to the Tactical Air Command Engineering Division increased the size of this section from twenty to 137 persons[222] and eventually raised the section to a Special Staff level in November.[223] Full audit responsibilities were turned over to Budget and Fiscal in August, although the section was unable to establish the audit teams

218/ WD Cir No. 138, Subject: "War Department Reorganization", 14 May 1946

219/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 10 June 1946

220/ Ibid.

221/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 5 June 1946

222/ Memorandum for A-5, Hq TAC, by Lieutenant Colonel Walter A. Faiks, Subject: Historical Record, Air Installations Section, Hq Tactical Air Command, 3 January 1947

223/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 13 November 1946

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necessary to perform audits of appropriated and nonappropriated fund accounts during the remainder of the year, due to personnel difficulties.[224]

In addition to the responsibilities permanently added by the War Department reorganization and the elimination of the service commands, temporary duties, resulting from the reduction in size of the wartime armed forces, caused the expansion of certain headquarters sections, and in particular the A-4 Division. These duties evolved from the responsibility of the command for the disposal of inactive and surplus stations and supplies.[225] The assigning of many installations, both active and inactive, directly under Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, by increasing the workload, further complicated the activities of A-4 and the Air Inspector[226] because they had to perform responsibilities that might normally be discharged by the numbered air forces. These operational activities had decreased by the end of the year with the disposal of stations and the assignment of others to the Air Forces.[227]

Certain headquarters sections reflected an increase in power

224/ 1. TAC Ltr 33-3, Subject: Transfer of Audit Responsibilities, 7 August 1946
2. Budget and Fiscal Activities Report for 1946

225/ 1. Narrative History of A-4 Activities for 1946
2. Narrative History of Air Inspector Activities for 1946

226/ Ibid.

227/ Ibid.

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owing to the fact that certain responsibilities were removed from the Air Forces and concentrated in the headquarters of the command. One of these was the Civilian Personnel section which in June 1946 assumed direct control for the administration of all civilian personnel matters other than civilian personnel ceilings.[228] Budget and Fiscal functions were likewise concentrated in the command headquarters, but this change-over was not affected until early 1947.[229] No similar action seems to have been taken in other fields considered, such as Engineer, Legal, Chaplain, Finance,[230] etc.

Some administrative changes within the headquarters itself were made during the year by the shifting of sections between staffs and by the elevation of some to special staff status. One of the first of these changes was the transferring in April of the Organization and Manpower Division from A-1 to A-3.[231] In June the Security and Intelligence Division under the A-2 Section was broken up and the Provost Marshal transferred to the A-1 Section, with the Counter

228/ 1. Narrative History of the Civilian Personnel Division, A-1, for 1946
2. Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

229/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (4 Nov 46), Subject: Command Budget and Fiscal Office at Ninth Air Force, To: CG, 9AF, 4 November 1946

230/ Record and Routing Sheet, Personnel Division, to A-1, Subject: Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration, 30 April 1946

231/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 15 April 1946

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Intelligence Division remaining under A-2.[232] This solution did not appear to be satisfactory as in September the Provost Marshal was removed from the A-1 Section and made a Special Staff Section.[233]

Another section whose assignment was somewhat doubtful in 1946 was the Aircraft Accident Prevention Division. This Division had started out in April as Special Staff but had subsequently been placed under the A-3 Section. In August it was returned to Special Staff status and renamed Flying Safety.[234]

An inspection by the Field Air Inspector of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, in September resulted in the Coordination and Compliance Office being transferred from the Air Inspection Section to a position directly under the Chief of Staff.[235] This same inspection questioned the placing of Food Services as part of the A-4 Section instead of the A-1 Section.[236] The Tactical Air Command stated that,

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232/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 12 June 1946

233/ 1. TAC Regulation 20-1 C2, "Tactical Air Command", 6 November 1946
2. Note 2, Routing and Record Sheet, Historical Division to Staff Provost Marshal, Subject: Request for Historical Data, 8 January 1948
3. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 25 September 1946

234/ TAC Regulation 20-1 C1, "Tactical Air Command", 12 August 1946

235/ Ltr, Office of Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Inspection of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia, To: CG, AAF, 13 September 1946, with 1st Indorsement thereto

236/ Ibid.

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in its opinion, Food Services should function under the Staff Quartermaster or his equivalent, which, in this case was the Supply Division of A-4. Food Services did, in fact, remain in A-4 throughout the year.[237/]

In late October, an Operations Analysis Section was set up directly under the Chief of Staff.[238/]

The last major organizational change in 1946 was the elevation of the Engineer Division from its position in A-4 to the Special Staff as the Air Installations Section.[239/]

The most important organizational tendency in 1946 in the headquarters of the command, aside from the adjustments required by a new organization and by the weight of extra duties in getting settled, was the increase in the number of the special staff sections having direct access to the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General.[240/] This tendency could well result in an unwieldy organization. The aggravation of this situation, if we may look forward to the future, was to a great degree responsible for the return to a directorate system of organization in 1947.

237/ Ibid.

238/ TAC Staff Memorandum 200-4, "Operations Analysis Section", 31 October 1946

239/ TAC Regulation 20-1 C2, "Tactical Air Command, 6 November 1946

240/ 1. Organizational Chart, Hq TAC, 5 November 1946
2. Record and Routing Sheet, Ordnance Section to Chief of Supply, no subject, 3 June 1946

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An organizational feature of the Tactical Air Command that seems to have been peculiar to it was reflected in the placing of Liaison Officers on a staff level with the A-Staffs. The organizational charts of the autumn months list Liaison Officers to eight Army Ground Force Schools as well as to the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the Navy Amphibious Training Center at Coronado, Colorado, as being on this staff level.241/

241/ 1. Organizational Chart, Hq TAC, 18 September 1946
2. Organizational Chart, Hq TAC, 5 November 1946

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Key Personnel

Major General Elwood R. Quesada, the Commanding General of the Third Air Force, assumed command of the Tactical Air Command on 26 March 1946 and remained in that position throughout the year.[242]

Brigadier General Warren R. Carter was assigned to the Command on 25 March 1946 as Deputy Commanding General and assumed his duties upon return from temporary duty with the Regular Army Screening Board.[243]

Brigadier General Robert M. Lee was Chief of Staff until the end of August when he was succeeded by Brigadier General Glenn O. Barcus.[244]

Colonel Edgar M. Scattergood, Jr., was Deputy Chief of Staff until the autumn of the year when Colonel Robert W. Stillman took over that position.[245]

The A-Staff sections all experienced some changes in their

242/ 1. TWX, Hq AAF, AFPSU 2212, To: CG, 3AF, 22 March 1946 (See s. d. #211, this Section)
2. G. O. #1, Hq TAC, 26 March 1946

243/ 1. G. O. #5, Hq TAC, 1 April 1946
2. Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Assignment and Reassignment of General Officers, To: CG, TAC, 3 April 1946

244/ 1. G. O. #5, Hq TAC, 1 April 1946 (See s. d. #243[1], this Section)
2. G. O. #75, Hq TAC, 31 August 1946

245/ Organizational Chart, Hq TAC, 18 September 1946

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top positions. In the A-1 Section, Colonel Roger V. Williams, took the place of Colonel Terrell E. Phillips, the original holder of the position, from 24 May to 7 August,[246] when the position reverted to Colonel Phillips. The position of A-5 was set up in July with Colonel W. W. Momeyer in charge.[247] Colonel Rox H. Donaldson assumed the A-2 position in August, taking over from Lieutenant Colonel Linden E. Johnson.[248] Colonel George B. Greene, Jr., resumed the position of Assistant Chief of Staff A-3 in July succeeding Colonel Gilbert L. Meyers.[249] In September Colonel Allen W. Reed, became Assistant Chief of Staff, A-4 vice Colonel Basil L. Riggs.[250] This completed the changes that took place in 1946, a relatively light turnover in a period of great changes in personnel.

246/ G. O. #31, Hq TAC, 24 May 1946

247/ TAC Regulation 20-1, "Tactical Air Command", 12 July 1946

248/ 1. G. O. #64, Hq TAC, 7 August 1946
2. G. O. #69, Hq TAC, 16 August 1946

249/ 1. G. O. #3, Hq TAC, 26 March 1946
2. G. O. #61, Hq TAC, 31 July 1946

250/ G. O. #76, Hq TAC, 4 September 1946

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SECTION TWO

PERSONNEL

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"I am keenly conscious of the disturbance which the changing personnel picture has caused and of the future disruptions which we must face. You have my personal assurance that my staff will give you all possible cooperation during this transitional period." -- General Quesada to General Williams, 26 July 1946 1/

I

PERSONNEL IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD: AN OVERALL VIEW

To be properly understood and appraised, the period March 1946 - December 1946 -- the so-called formative period of the Tactical Air Command -- must be viewed as an integral part of the broad, shifting, kaleidoscopic period of demobilization which followed the formal end of World War II on 2 September 1945. At the same time one must keep in mind that these same formative months were a part of the period of transition of the Army Air Forces from a wartime to a peacetime footing, a period of the building of an interim and postwar air force which represented a many fold increase over its prewar size. 2/

1/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Major General Paul L. Williams, CG, 3AF, 26 July 1946.

2/ Ltr, Hq AAF, file AFPMP-11, Subject: Availability of Field Grade Officers, To: CG, TAC, 22 August 1946.

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Basically, then, during this period, three separate and somewhat diverse processes were going on simultaneously: a tearing down (i.e. demobilization), a building up, and a moving towards a new order of things. In a sense, the workings of these three processes represent the key to an understanding of this entire period. For, if one is to add to the jarrings and confusion which would normally accrue from an organization being torn down and built up simultaneously, the vicissitudes and uncertainties which were the inevitable corollaries of the transition from the old order to the new -- the matter of selection of permanent installations in the zone of the interior, the searching for a stable peacetime organizational pattern, the defining of "spheres of influence" of the various commands [3/] and the crystallization of major command missions, [4/] the establishment of the officer personnel structure of the Air Force [5/] and

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3/ The interim missions of the major commands were apparently so loosely phrased that the Air University, for example, seemed, in May, well on the road towards encroaching upon what the Tactical Air Command regarded as its own private mission. This action on the part of the Air University brought forth a vigorous letter of protest from General Quesada. See Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, 24 May 1946.

4/ 1. Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Interim Mission, To: CG, TAC, 12 March 1946.
2. AAF Regulation 20-19, "Organization, Tactical Air Command", 10 October 1946.

5/ Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Army Air Forces Special Committee, 26 August 1946, with one inclosure thereto.

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the establishment of personnel skill requirements and needs, the formulation of peacetime Tables of Organization and manning tables,[6] etc. -- if one, then, is to add all these together, one may more easily begin to comprehend how and why, through the interplay of these various forces and factors, the formative months of the Tactical Air Command at times may have seemed to lack all semblance of goals or direction. General Quesada, writing late in May to General Baker, Deputy Commander of the Army Air Forces, noted his preoccupation since the activation of the Tactical Air Command with the establishment of an "objective".[7] To be sure, the Tactical Air Command's "objective" may be said to have been set forth in the interim mission promulgated by General Spaatz,[8] but no doubt, in many instances, during the early months of the Command, it was probably difficult to translate these paper goals into reality. Moreover, the Tactical Air Command itself, by stating to its subordinate units and stations that, in the accomplishment of their missions, priority would be given to recruiting and demobilization[9]

6/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 200.3 (24 Jun 46), Subject: Bulk authorization, To: CG, AAF, 24 June 1946, with one indorsement thereto.

7/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, 24 May 1946. (See s. d. #3)

8/ Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Interim Mission, To: CG, TAC, 12 March 1946. (See s. d. #4)

9/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (22 May 46), Subject: Mission of Ninth Air Force, To: CG, 9AF, 22 May 1946.

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proceeded, in effect, to nullify or play down much of its tactical and operational training mission.

All in all, the psychological climate during the months which witnessed the activation and the early development of the Tactical Air Command was not such either effectively to facilitate that development or to be conducive to highest standards of performance on the part of individuals assigned or employed in the command. For one thing, demobilization periods are traditionally periods of let down and relaxation which normally follow the end of wartime tensions and restrictions. For another thing, accompanied as they are by much uncertainty, maladjustments, instability and insecurity, they are difficult periods for individuals who are participants in them.[10] That the entire problem was keenly appreciated on topside is evident in the aforementioned correspondence of General Quesada with General Baker in

9/ 2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (23 May 46), Subject: Mission of the Twelfth Air Force, To: CG, 12AF, 23 May 1946.
3. Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Report of Quarterly Inspection, 304th AAF Base Unit, Langley Field, Virginia, To: CG, TAC, 18 December 1946.

10/ The times were no less difficult for civilian employees than for military personnel. The Civilian Personnel Officer at Lawson Field, for example, noted in May that "the constantly changing authorization for civilian personnel at that base was having a bad effect on the morale of civilian employees due to the uncertainty of their job from month to month." See Minutes of Meeting of Personnel Management Practices Committee, 24 May 1946, found as inclosure to ltr, Hq 319th AAF Base Unit, Lawson Field, file LFBP, Subject: Appointment of Personnel Management Committee, To: CG, 3AF (TC), 27 May 1946, with one indorsement thereto.

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which the former had noted his preoccupation not only with an attempt to establish an objective but to establish three other factors; (1) mental tranquillity, (2) confidence, (3) stability.[11]

It is doubtful, however, whether the elevation in mental tone and clime for which General Quesada strove were ever fully attained during the months under consideration (March 1946 - December 1946) except possibly during its very final weeks. As late as 28 October 1946, we find Colonel T. E. Phillips, Assistant Chief of Staff, A-1, for the Tactical Air Command noting the prevalence throughout the Command of a state of mind which was far from salutary. He explained this condition as follows:

> "I do believe . . . that the rapidity with which demobilization has been conducted, the everchanging criteria and instructions (sometimes two or three times . . . in one day), the lack of security felt by personnel because of unpredictable attitude of War Department as pertains to demobilization have gotten personnel to an almost defeated state of mind. No matter what they do today, they will have to do it again or amend it the next day." [12]

He went on trenchantly to point out the impact which the force-out programs had exercised, and were exercising, upon existing morale, saying:

11/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, 24 May 1946. (See s. d. #3)

12/ Record and Routing Sheet, A-1 to Chief of Staff, Subject: Report of Board of Officers, 28 October 1946.

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> "At first it was to get the people home who wanted to go home, now it is to send those home who do not want to go. That affects morale of those who remain because they can't help but feel that maybe tomorrow he will be sent too, so why should he burn himself out today, especially since this is peacetime." 13/

As other contributory factors, Colonel Phillips mentioned the prevalence of world-wide civilian unrest, which was invariably bound to creep into the military, the break-down in military administration, common, thought Colonel Phillips, to all postwar periods, and, finally, the fact that lower commanders had not exercised the leadership expected of them. "They are skilled in war leadership but not administrative leadership", wrote Colonel Phillips.14/

As with "mental tranquillity" and "confidence", the "stability" which General Quesada mentioned he was seeking to attain15/ was probably more of an ideal than an actuality during the formative period of the Tactical Air Command. It could hardly have been otherwise. The turnover in personnel, estimated to be approximately 125% for officers and 118% for enlisted men over a six months period,16/ and

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13/ Ibid.

14/ Ibid.

15/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Hq AAF, 24 May 1946. (See s. d. #3)

16/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 330.3 (31 Oct 46), Subject: Data Reference Army Air Force Commands, To: The Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, 31 October 1946.

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originating in a multiplicity of causes -- the closing of stations, transfers overseas, mandatory school quotas, force-out programs, separations, etc.,[17] -- vitiated any effort, however sincere, to achieve a degree of stabilization which would have permitted sound and long-range personnel planning, judicious assignment and utilization of personnel, necessary continuity in administration, and in general, successful fulfillment of training missions. Periodically from the provinces of the command came tidings of the disruptions caused by a lack of stabilization.[18] Typical is the report of a meeting of the Personnel Management Committee at Bergstrom Field, Austin, Texas, in which it was stated that "until overall reductions in both military

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17/ 1. Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946.
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 5 August 1946.
3. Record and Routing Sheet, AlC to Military Personnel, Subject: Schools Activities for the Year 1946, 3 January 1947.
4. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 7 June 1946.

18/ 1. 1st Ind., Myrtle Beach AAFld, file 451, 12 August 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case-Report, AAF Special - Lack of Inspections on Motor Vehicles, 22 July 1946.
2. Pp. 12 - 13, History of the 321st AAF Base Unit, March Field, for 1 March to 30 June 1946.
3. Ltr, Hq 9AF, file AF9AF 333.1, Subject: Report of Quarterly Inspection of the 342nd AAF Base Unit, Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee, To: CG, TAC, 22 November 1946.
4. Ltr, Hq Marshall Field, file MF 334, Subject: Minutes of Personnel Management Committee Meeting, To: CG, TAC, 11 December 1946, with one indorsement and one inclosure thereto.
5. Ltr, Hq Myrtle Beach AAFld, file 334, Subject: Minutes of Personnel Management Committee, To: CO, Myrtle Beach AAFld, 6 December 1946, with 2 indorsements thereto.

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and civilian authorizations are effected and some semblance of personnel stabilization is again attained, it seems futile to train individuals whose services may ultimately be lost to the installation.[19] The effect of a lack of stabilization on morale was similarly damaging. The A-1 Section of the Tactical Air Command, in its Summary Report for 1946, noted that the "unsettled" state of personnel affairs had contributed to a general lowering of morale.[20]

That the number of officers in the Command was, until December, far out of proportion to the enlisted strength was a factor not calculated to aid in a simplification or a solution of outstanding personnel problems. While demobilization had cut a wide swath through the enlisted brackets and specialties, it had left throughout the entire Army Air Forces a huge surplus of officers,[21] particularly rated officers, whose utilization and assignment -- key factors affecting morale -- posed no little problem for the Tactical Air Command

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19/ Ltr, Hq Bergstrom Field, no file number, Subject: Monthly Meeting Personnel Management Committee, To: CO, Bergstrom Field, 24 October 1946, with two indorsements thereto.

20/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946.

21/ 1. 3AF Ltr 122-1, Subject: Assignment and Release of Officer Personnel, 19 December 1945.
2. Ltr, Office of the Field Air Inspector, HQ AAF, Subject: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Shaw Field, Sumter, S. C. To: CG, AAF, 28 March 1946.
3. Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946.

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and its subordinate units.[22] The extent of this surplus may be gauged from the fact that at the end of March, for example, there was one officer for approximately every two enlisted men in the Command.[23] (By the end of December the ratio had improved so that there was one officer for approximately every nine enlisted men)[24] At some stations, it is likely that the number of officers on hand exceeded the enlisted strength. For example, it was reported that in May, Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, had a strength of 315 officers as compared with 168 enlisted men.[25]

Unquestionably, the principal problem in connection with

22/ 1. 1st Ind., Hq Smyrna AAFld, file 319.1, 25 July 1946, to ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case-Report, AAF Special-Military Courtesy and Dress, To: CG, TAC, 3 July 1946.
2. Report of Supervisory Visit, Lake Charles AAFld, 8-9 May 1946, by Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Batten, Chief, Bombardment Branch, Hq TAC, 13 May 1946.
3. Ltr, Brigadier General Y. H. Taylor, CG, 12AF, To: Brigadier General W. R. Carter, Deputy Commander, TAC, 3 May 1946.
4. Ltr, Office of Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Inspection of Headquarters, 12th Air Force, March Field, California, To: CG, AAF, 4 October 1946, with one indorsement thereto.
5. Ltr, Hq Dover AAFld, no file number, Subject: Appointment of Personnel Management Committee, To: CG, TAC, 6 June 1946, with one inclosure thereto.

23/ Table, "Personnel Assigned to the Tactical Air Command, March 1946 - December 1946", prepared by the Historical Division from data furnished by Directorate of Statistical Control, May 1948.

24/ Ibid.

25/ Ltr, Office of the Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Supervisory Inspection of the Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, To: CG, AAF, 14 May 1946.

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the existence of an excess of officers was one of utilization, since it is axiomatic that idleness tends to breed discontent. The old Third Air Force, one of the forerunners of the Tactical Air Command, had handled the matter of surplus officers by utilizing them in duties unrelated to flying, in administration, and "occasionally" in duties formerly assigned enlisted personnel.[26] The Tactical Air Command, it may be presumed, continued the same policy, permitting widest possible discretion in the matter to its subordinate echelons. The utilization of officers in enlisted positions was looked upon with equanimity, and even with favor, at some stations. For example, the Personnel Management Committee at Pope Field, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, recommended in June that a station-wide survey be conducted, designed to effect the replacement of enlisted men and civilians by officers.[27] At Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, inspectors found in May that over 50% of aircraft maintenance accomplished at that station was being done by officer personnel.[28] However, utilization of officers in enlisted

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26/ Ltr, Hq 3AF, file 3AF 353 (27 Feb 46) Misc, Subject: Maximum utilization of office personnel, To: CG, XIX TAC, et al, 27 February 1946.

27/ Ltr, Applied Personnel Management Committee, Pope Field, no file number, Subject: Minutes of the Meeting of the Applied Personnel Management Committee, To: CO, Pope Field, 10 June 1946.

28/ Ltr, Office of the Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Supervisory Inspection of the Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, To: CG, AAF, 14 May 1946, with two indorsements thereto.

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men's position, although sanctioned by no less a personage than General Eisenhower himself,[29] did, it seems, have some unfavorable repercussions on stations to which newly inducted enlisted personnel were assigned. The Assistant Air Inspector for Headquarters Tactical Air Command, noted in April that "an entirely distorted view of officer-enlisted men relationships" resulted at such stations when officers were assigned to "menial" tasks.[30] But by December, no doubt, the maladjustments arising from an excess of officers had largely corrected themselves. The Tactical Air Command, in its last big force-out of officers in November 1946, reduced its existing officer strength by some 60%.[31] The command now had fewer officers than it actually required.[32]

A low state of discipline and military courtesy during the period under consideration could be directly attributed to demobilization, although, historically, the decline in discipline could be

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29/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 333 (23 Apr 46) Misc, Subject: General Eisenhower's visits and inspections, To: CG, 9AF, et al, 23 April 1946.

30/ Routing and Record Sheet, Air Inspector to A-1, Subject: Maximum Utilization of Officer Personnel, 16 April 1946.

31/ RESTRICTED Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.8 (19 Oct 46), Subject: Relief from Active Duty of AAF Officers and Warrant Officers, To: CG, 3AF, et al, 19 October 1946.

32/ Ibid.

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directly traced back to the early summer of 1945, when returnees and redeployees began pouring into the states from the European Theater of Operations.[33] In the Third Air Force during the interim between V-J Day and the Army Air Forces reorganization of March 1946, headquarters staff officers were requested to observe and report on the quality of military courtesy and discipline while conducting inspections or staff supervisory visits.[34] That the unsatisfactory state of discipline and military courtesy seems to have continued without noticeable improvement through 1946 is evident in several extant documents.[35] Unquestionably, the entire situation had its roots in several diverse factors: (1) the influx into the Service of many teen-age soldiers who displayed but scant respect for and pride in the military service;[36] (2) idleness or inefficient utilization of

33/ On 14 June 1945, Headquarters, Continental Air Forces, had noted among returnees "low morale displayed by lack of enthusiasm to go to war in another theatre", and "bad discipline, especially as to saluting, deportment, dress and AWOL." Quoted on p. 70, History of the Second Air Force for 1945. See also pp. 89 - 90, Contraction and Decline: The History of the Second Air Force, 2 September 1945 - 30 March 1946.

34/ Monthly Report of Supervisory Visits and Inspections, Hq 3AF, March 1946.

35/ 1. Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case-Report, AAF Special - Military Courtesy and Dress, To: CG, TAC, 3 July 1946, with one indorsement thereto.
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 23 August 1946.
3. TAC Ltr 35-21, Subject: Conduct and Appearance of Military Personnel, 15 November 1946.
4. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 250 (27 Nov 46), Subject: Standards of Discipline, To: CG, 9AF, et al, 27 November 1946.

36/ Report of a Board of Officers Convened at Headquarters Scott Field, Illinois, 24 to 31 August 1946, 31 August 1946.

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surplus officers and enlisted men waiting reassignment or transfer;[37] (3) personnel whose separation was imminent and who felt that on that account that they might, with impunity, be remiss in the observance of the customs and regulations of the Service and of the local stations to which they were assigned;[38] (4) finally, the situation may have been aggravated by the "poor control" which General Quesada said in June extended down to the lowest corporal,[39] and by also existing types of squadron organization which had become too unwieldy in size to permit effective control over assigned personnel.[40]

Whatever the causes for the laxness in discipline and military courtesy, the fact remains that both the Tactical Air Command and its subordinate echelons bore down heavily in an aggressive effort to correct the situation. The Tactical Air Command prescribed frequent inspections,[41] stressed correct conduct and appearance of military

37/ 1st Ind., Hq Smyrna AAFld, file 319.1, 25 July 1946, to ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case-Report, AAF Special - Military Courtesy and Dress, To: CG, TAC, 3 July 1946.

38/ P. 11, History of 308th Army Air Forces Base Unit, Tyndall Field, Florida, 1 April 1946 - 15 May 1946.

39/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 14 June 1946.

40/ Ltr, Hq 300th AAF Base Unit, file TAC 301.62, Subject: Recommendations for Standardized System of Personnel Accounting and Reporting at Base Level, To: CG, TAC, 2 December 1946.

41/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 14 June 1946.

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personnel,[42] decreed that orientation and indoctrination talks be given recruits,[43] warned Base Commanders that "weakness of command" would not be tolerated.[44] Despite these measures, sentiment in Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, seems to have been of the opinion that hope of effecting a real improvement in military courtesy and discipline lay in the force-out programs of surplus officers and inapt enlisted men, the theory apparently being that the "selectest" would survive the reductions. "With the separation of approximately 50% of the officers of this Command and the separation of inapt EM," it was noted in November, " . . . it is to be expected that all remaining personnel will be of such quality so as to attain the standards demanded by the CG, AAF."[45]

We have thus far seen how demobilization and the travails of the transition period brought in their wake no few problems and difficulties for the command. No few problems also, it seems, were to emanate from the workings of War Department and Army Air Forces'

42/ TAC Ltr 35-21, Subject: Conduct and Appearance of Military Personnel, 15 November 1946. (See s. d. #35)

43/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 250 (27 Nov 46), Subject: Curtailment of Delinquency Among Young Soldiers, To: CG, 9AF, 20 December 1946.

44/ Ibid.

45/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 250 (27 Nov 46), Subject: Standards of Discipline, To: CG, 9AF, et al, 27 November 1946. (See s. d. #35[4])

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policies of enlistment and reenlistment -- the chief media through which the Air Force hoped to populate its holdings and replenish its thinning ranks.

By way of preface, we may note that in the fall of 1945, the armed forces embarked upon an aggressive and intensive recruiting campaign designed to offset the tremendous losses of personnel incurred and envisioned as a result of accelerated demobilization. By design, the accent early in this campaign was upon numbers of personnel rather than upon quality.[46/] According to Major General Gilbert, speaking at a recruiting conference in Washington in November 1945, "the need for men, any kind of men, was so great for the immediate future" that none of the major forces -- Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, or Army Service Forces -- would subscribe to policies which would have permitted the operation of any extensive degree of selectivity in recruiting.[47/] Selectivity, according to General Gilbert, was something which would be exercised once the boys were in khaki and well within the pale. In his words: " . . . This whole program evolves on these two phases. Get a big Army now for this immediate period of the future to meet our immediate needs, and weed it out,

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46/ 1. Minutes of the AAF Regular Army Recruiting Program Conference, Washington, D. C. 29-30 November 1945.
2. TAC Weekly Bulletin, 25 November 1946.

47/ Minutes of the AAF Regular Army Recruiting Program Conference, Washington, D. C., 29-30 November 1945. (See s. d. #46[1])

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and cull it out, and boil it down to what we hope it will be hereafter as the opportunity permits."[48]

Thus with all bars and barriers down, the inevitable result was an influx of individuals possessing neither demonstrated nor latent aptitudes for military service, men who were neither actual nor potential technicians,[49] and men whose utilization in any capacity was at best questionable. In the Tactical Air Command the presence of individuals of this calibre caused no little concern. "They are of little value to this command, or to the Army Air Forces", observed the TAC A-1 Section with particular reference to a shipment of eliminees received from the Training Command, "and cause a distorted picture of the efficiency of a unit."[50] At Marshall Field, Kansas, receipt of a shipment of non-profitable personnel caused the Personnel Management Committee at that station to remark that "apparently many recruiting officers have no scruples and will enlist any type of personnel in order to fill a quota."[51] And, as topside was shortly to discover, once these personnel were in uniform, it was no easy task to weed them

48/ Ibid.

49/ AAF Recruiting Bulletin, 13 May 1946.

50/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946.

51/ Ltr, Hq Marshall Field, file MF 334, Subject: Minutes of Personnel Management Committee Meeting, To: CG, TAC, 16 December 1946, with one indorsement and one inclosure thereto.

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out and cull them out as General Gilbert had envisaged in the fall of 1945. In January 1947, the Tactical Air Command found itself compelled to take its subordinate echelons to task for not displaying sufficient zeal and ardor in eliminating inapt, unsuitable and non-productive personnel from their organizations. "The high priority of this force-out program has been repeatedly brought to your attention," stated Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, adding that not only would the program continue to be given "highest priority" but would be given the personal attention of all commanders in order to insure "absolute compliance" with its provisions.[52]

The workings of War Department and Army Air Forces' recruiting policies during late 1945 and 1946 had consequences disturbing for the Tactical Air Command other than facilitating the admittal of scores of misfits. For one thing, the policy of enlisting ex-officers in the grade of Master Sergeant helped considerably to swell the excess of first graders in the command during the formative period from March 1946 - December 1946.[53] March Field, for example, authorized 25 Master Sergeants for its Base Unit, found itself in June with 304 Master Sergeants on its rolls,[54] a number admittedly way out of

52/ TAC Ltr 122-1, Subject: Separation of Inapt Enlistment Personnel, 14 January 1947.

53/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946.

54/ Record and Routing Sheet, Air Inspector to A-1, Subject: Report of Inspection by Major General Jones, 11 June 1946.

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proportion in a Base Unit population of 1366 enlisted men and women.[55] There was thus more truth than jest in the March Field Deputy Commander's remark that "We have a pretty fair army of officers and master sergeants."[56]

Perhaps even more far-reaching in its ramifications was the policy of permitting recruits to enlist for a specific station in the zone of interior. This had, for one thing, the effect of freezing personnel at a station for an indeterminate period, regardless of whether or not a vacancy existed for them or whether their particular skill or specialty could be utilized at that station. In turn, flexibility of control of personnel and ability to adjust shortages and overages between stations in the command were impaired. The manning of tactical and their affiliated service units was similarly impaired,[57] the Tactical Air Command, early in 1946, being compelled to ask for volunteers to man its groups.[58] Finally, the policy of permitting three year enlistees a choice of station assignment resulted in an overcrowding

55/ P. 8, History of the 321st AAF Base Unit, March Field, for 1 March to 30 June 1946.

56/ Notes of Staff Meeting, March Field, California, 30 April 1946.

57/ 1. TWX, Hq TAC, AlS 2333, To: CG, AAF, 28 March 1946.
2. Ltr, Hq 9AF, file AlA 200.3, Subject: Personnel Requirements of 502d Tactical Control Group, To: CG, TAC, 28 March 1946.

58/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (19 Apr 46), Subject: Manning 362nd Fighter and 471st Air Service Group, 19 April 1946.

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of certain stations, since personnel tended invariably to gravitate towards the better stations in the zone of the interior, all the while steering clear of installations which were regarded generally as being less favorably located or situated.[59] Eventually, however, a modification of War Department policy whereby enlisted personnel would remain at a station of their choice for six months only,[60] afforded some measure of relief since it held out promise to the command of a gradual restoration of complete and uninhibited freedom of transfer and the ability to make adjustments of personnel between stations, powers which were, after all, requisites to effective personnel control.

In a way, some of the Tactical Air Command's personnel problems during the period under survey were derivative in nature, having their origin in the fact that the Tactical Air Command and its agencies had been built upon the pre-existing structures of the old Third Air Force and the IX Troop Carrier Command and had thus inherited not only their excess officer personnel, separables, prisoners, courts-martial cases,[61] but also certain responsibilities in connection with the

59/ Thus in May, the Base Unit at March Field, California, was approximately 125 officers and 800 enlisted men over authorized strength. See p. 9, History of 321st AAF Base Unit, 1 March to 30 June 1946. (See s. d. #55)

60/ Ltr, Hq Sherman Field, file 334, Subject: Personnel Management Meeting, To: CG, TAC, 20 June 1946, with one inclosure thereto.

61/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file 333.3 (23 Apr 46), Subject: Criminal Investigation Activities Report, To: CG, AAF, 23 April 1946, with one inclosure thereto.

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custody of inactive and standby stations.[62] In view of its rather meager enlisted resources, it was irking to the command to be required to invest no few personnel in the maintenance of stations for which it had no immediate or foreseeable need, and time and again the command strove to rid itself of its "holding company" responsibilities. Brigadier General W. R. Carter, Deputy Commanding General for the Tactical Air Command, summed up the situation in October 1946 when he wrote in connection with five excess stations: "Performing custody of the installations . . . constitutes the most significant outlay of personnel and money being utilized by TAC in activities which do not relate directly to the command's primary functions and missions . . ."[63] Eventually the necessity for strictest economy, resulting from the stringent budgetary limitations imposed on the War Department in the summer of 1946, had at least the beneficial effect of strengthening TAC's hand in its appeals for relief from its custodial duties and permitted no doubt a more extensive lopping-off of installations than would probably otherwise have been possible.

The accent upon economy in the early fall of 1946 may be said to have had another beneficial effect. It caused units on all

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62/ Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-5 and Chief of Staff, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947.

63/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686.2 (25 Oct 46) Jurisdiction, Subject: Excess Installations, To: CG, AAF, 25 October 1946, with one indorsement thereto.

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echelons to reexamine their existing organizational structures with a view towards combining functions and eliminating duplication and non-essential work.[64] One significant manifestation of the increasing emphasis upon costs was the increasing attention which the command gave to the overhead cost of civilian personnel administration.[65]

However, in other respects, the economy wave of 1946 may be said to have exerted effects other than beneficial. It brought cuts in officer strength which brought the command below authorization;[66] it hampered the manning of tactical units; it effected a drastic reduction in the civilian personnel allotment of the command;[67] and it forced the command into a two rather than a three air force

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64/ 1. Minutes of Personnel Management Committee Meeting, Smyrna Army Air Field, 14 October 1946.
2. TWX, Hq TAC, TACCG 520, To: CG, AAF, 10 September 1946.
3. TAC Ltr 37-1, Subject: Reduction in Personnel Authorizations, 18 September 1946.

65/ 1. History of Civilian Personnel Division, Hq TAC, for 1946.
2. Table, "Civilian Personnel Office Strength, McChord Field, Washington" and Table, "Civilian Personnel Office Strength Bergstrom Field, TAC 3AF", found as inclosure to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 230 (16 July 1946), Subject: Review and Examination of Civilian Personnel Program, To: CO, Bergstrom Field, 16 July 1946, with two indorsements thereto.

66/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 14 October 1946.

67/ 1. TAC Ltr 37-1, Subject: Reduction in Personnel Authorizations, 18 September 1946. (See s. d. #64)
2. Table, "Personnel Assigned to the Tactical Air Command, March 1946 - December 1946, prepared by the Historical Division from data furnished by Statistical Control, May 1948. (See s. d. #23)

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organization, which General Quesada described as "not ideal" since it was his desire to concentrate all troop carrier elements in one air force.[68] Thus, in short, economy brought in its wake certain disadvantages as well as advantages.

Generally speaking, the policy in the Tactical Air Command during the months March 1946 - December 1946 was to permit maximum latitude to the numbered air forces in the control, assignment, transfer, and reclassification of personnel within their respective domains.[69] Two notable exceptions to this general policy were (1) the responsibility for the administration of civilian personnel, which Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, withdrew from the numbered air forces in the summer of 1946,[70] over the objections of the Third Air Force,[71] and (2) the powers to assign and transfer certain specialists like Budget and Fiscal Officers, controls which were specifically vested in the Commanding

68/ Article - "The Tactical Air Command Today" by Major General Quesada, contained in Military Review, September 1947.

69/ 1. TAC Regulation 35-41, "Personnel, Military, Permanent Change of Station", 2 October 1946.
2. TAC Ltr 35-13, Subject: Delegation of Reclassification Jurisdiction, 11 October 1946.

70/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, file 230 (16 Jul 46), Subject: Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration, To: CG, 12AF, 16 July 1946, with one indorsement thereto.
2. History of Civilian Personnel Division, Hq TAC, for 1946. (See s. d. #65[1])

71/ 1st Ind., Hq 3AF (TC), file AF3AF230 (8 May 46), 8 May 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 230 (3 May 46), Subject: Responsibility for Civilian Administration, To: CG, 3AF, 3 May 1946.

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General, Tactical Air Command.[72] The occasional practice on the part of the Tactical Air Command to ignore air force geographical boundaries and to deal directly with stations on matters of transfers elicited a rather sharp protest from the Third Air Force in September 1946.[73]

To sum up: If the period March 1946 - December 1946 was in some respects a period of frustration, owing to the impact upon the command of the workings of external forces and factors beyond the powers of the command to control, it was, in other respects, a period of notable progress and solid achievement. The Tactical Air Command of December 1946 was a far more streamlined, a far more unified and cohesive organization than the diffuse organization which had come into being in March 1946. The handicaps of the command's diverse origins had been overcome. Gone from its domain were some thirty-odd inactive and surplus stations,[74] whose custody and disposal has absorbed no little of the energies and no few of the personnel of a command which ostensibly had a tactical and training mission. Gone, too, through separation, was much of the deadwood -- non-productive, inapt personnel -- which the command had bequeathed and had been unable

72/ TAC Ltr 30-5, Subject: Budget and Fiscal Officers, 8 August 1946.

73/ Ltr, Hq 3AF (TC), file AF3AF 220.3 (6 Sep 46), Subject: Transfer of Enlisted Personnel by Headquarters, TAC, To: CG, TAC, 6 September 1946.

74/ Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-5 and Chief of Staff, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947. (See s. d. #62)

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to assimilate or utilize effectively. Force-out programs and reductions in force had been accomplished with a maximum of speed and a minimum of complaints. Manning tables and personnel yardsticks for various Tactical Air Command activities had been constructed. Personnel reporting procedures, though still far from perfect, had demonstrated a steady improvement throughout the year.[75/] And perhaps most important of all, a semblance of stability had finally been achieved, in part through the increasing influx of Regular Army officers and enlisted men.[76/] Clearly the fulfillment of the true tactical and training mission of the command and of General Quesada's concept of tactical air power in being were infinitely closer to realization in December 1946 than ever before.

75/ Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Headquarters Officers Classifications Index File (AAF-SC-P7A), To: CG, TAC, 12 November 1946, with one indorsement thereto.

76/ 1. P. 13, History of 77th Fighter Squadron, Shaw Field, October 1946 - December 1946.
2. Pp. 46 - 48, History of Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, 1 July - 31 December 1946.
3. Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946.

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SUPPLY OF PERSONNEL

"As long as officers get married and have babies, I shall have exasperating personnel problems," humorously remarked one Tactical Air Command Staff officer in June 1947.[77]

Of infinitely greater variety in scope and far more exasperating in effect, we may be certain, were the command's personnel problems during the entire previous year, especially those relating to the supply of personnel. Here the great central fact which emerges is that there was not so much a shortage of personnel during 1946 as a shortage of personnel in the right categories, in the necessary military occupational specialties, and possessing the required skills. Indeed, it is worthy of note that some of the command's most acute personnel problems during this period arose not from shortages at all but from an almost embarrassing excess of personnel, notably officer personnel and colored enlisted personnel. For example, against an authorized strength of 3300 officers in April, the Tactical Air Command had an actual assigned strength of some 8100 officers.[78] And at one time during the year, colored personnel constituted almost one-third of the command's total enlisted strength.[79]

77/ Record and Routing Sheet, AIS to A-1, Subject: Assignment of Officers, 12 June 1947

78/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

79/ Ibid.

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In considering therefore the topic of supply of personnel in the Tactical Air Command during 1946, we come face to face at the very outset with the existence within that supply of a decidedly unbalanced, almost lop-sided, situation. Put down in most elementary terms, the command simply had an excess of personnel within certain broad, inflexible, and normally non-interchangeable, categories. It had, as we have just noted, too many officer personnel. In turn, within this broad category, it had too many rated officers, a problem aggravated by the fact that some of these officers were rated in MOS's not usable by the command[80] and hence creating what was considered in the opinion of the commanding general of one of TAC's numbered air forces, an "unsatisfactory" morale problem.[81] It had, moreover, too many colored personnel for the relatively few positions for which experience had demonstrated these personnel could advantageously and

80/ 1. 3d Ind., Hq TAC, file TAC 333 (29 Mar 46), 22 April 1946, to ltr, Hq CAF, Eastern Field Division, no file number, Subject: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Hq IX Troop Carrier Command, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S. C., To: CG, CAF, 29 March 1946
2. Ltr, Office of the Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Shaw Field, Sumter, S. C., To: CG, AAF, 28 March 1946
3. Ltr, Hq CAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Headquarters IX Troop Carrier Command, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S. C., To: CG, CAF, 29 March 1946

81/ 1st Ind., Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 333.1 (29 Mar 46), 3 April 1946, to ltr, Hq CAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Headquarters IX Troop Carrier Command, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S. C., To: CG, CAF, 29 March 1946

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judiciously be utilized.[82] Finally, among its enlisted white brackets, the command had an excess of master sergeants.[83] Given any military system, with its frank acknowledgement of the existence of a hierarchy of grades and of distinctions between officers and enlisted men, it is clear that no extraordinary amount of interchangeability (that is, utilizing officers in enlisted positions, using senior officers in positions normally filled by junior officers, using Master Sergeants as basic soldiers, etc.) could long occur without doing irreparable damage both to the structure and basic philosophy of the military system. That the shortage of enlisted white personnel did at times make necessary the utilization of junior officers in positions normally filled by enlisted men[84] attests to the unhealthy personnel situation existing in the command almost to the very end of 1946, when a more equitable proportion of officer strength to enlisted strength was brought about by a "force-out" of officers.

In studying the command's personnel strength figures for

82/ 1. 1st Ind., Hq 304th AAF Base Unit, file 333, 24 September 1946, to ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case-Report, No. 2, Inspection of the 304th AAF Base Unit, 3-6 September 1946, Conditions affecting Morale of Squadron F, To: CG, TAC, 13 September 1946
2. SECRET Study, "Training of Negroes Within Third Air Force", prepared by the Operations and Training Section, Hq 3AF, 25 July 1945

83/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

84/ Ibid.

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April 1946 -- 8100 officers, 17,000 enlisted personnel, 10,000 civilians[85] -- the casual observer might find it difficult to comprehend why, with a total of some 35,000 bodies, the Tactical Air Command should experience any difficulty in establishing its training structure, manning its units and active bases, and meeting its various operational commitments. In this instance the military strength figures are not only deceiving, but misleading. For, as we have just noted, although the command may have had a substantial enough supply of bodies to perform its mission, actually certain restrictions implicit in the military system itself made it impossible fully to utilize these personnel. At the same time, enlisted strength figures, swelled by a tremendous overage of colored personnel, had to be treated with circumspection. Certain limitations inherent in the capabilities of colored personnel (plus perhaps certain innate local prejudices which existed and which no amount of War Department pressure could overcome) precluded their extensive utilization in white enlisted positions nor permitted their use in the command's tactical units.[86]

The restrictions on utilization of individuals, inherent in their rank, grade, or race, were augmented by the fact that during this period the command did not possess full freedom of transfer and

85/ Table, "Personnel Assigned to the Tactical Air Command, March 1946 - December 1946", prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, from data provided by the Directorate of Statistical Control (See s. d. #23)

86/ Routing and Record Sheet, A-1 to Chief of Staff, Subject: Utilization of Negro Personnel, 13 March 1946

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assignment. Under current enlistment policies, personnel were entitled to initial choice of station assignment and could remain at the station of their choice even though their particular skill or specialty could not be effectively utilized at that station. They were thus, to all intents and purposes, "frozen" at stations for indeterminate periods[87] and the command was faced with the problem of an accumulation of overages at certain active stations with no power to transfer these personnel as the needs of the command dictated.[88] Brigadier General Y. H. Taylor, arriving late in April to take command of March Field, whose base unit at the time had an excess of some several hundred enlisted men, saw the "untangling" of a lot of personnel as one of his missions.[89]

There were other factors which served to limit the full utilization of the command's available supply of personnel towards fulfilling what could be regarded as the command's primary mission. One of these was the necessity for investing personnel into the custody of inactive stations and/or stations in process of deactivation. As

87/ Minutes of Personnel Management Committee Meeting, Sherman Field, 19 June 1946, found as inclosure to ltr, Hq Sherman Field, file 334, Subject: Personnel Management Meeting, To: CG, TAC, 20 June 1946

88/ The effecting of transfers of specialists "in the interest of the military service" was similarly impaired. See ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 220.3 (23 May 46), Subject: Transfer of PQ Target Type Aircraft Specialists, To: CO, McChord Field, 23 May 1946

89/ Notes of Staff Meeting, March Field, California, 30 April 1946, at 0900

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General Lee, Chief of Staff, pithily observed in May: "Every individual devoted to deactivation constitutes manpower lost to constructive organizational activity"[90]. General Carter, Deputy Commanding General, echoed these sentiments several months later, noting, in a request for a declaration of excess of five stations, that the custody of these stations was compelling the diversion of personnel into what could be regarded as non-productive activities[91].

In internal composition the Tactical Air Command's supply of personnel during the period under consideration was a factor making for instability and impermanence, consisting as it did in part of AUS enlisted personnel and non-volunteer officers. In July, General Quesada expressed himself as being in favor of the elimination from tactical units of all personnel other than Regular Army or Category I or II. "Our future program for maneuvers and demonstrations requires that we give the major training effort to those who will continue in the service," he said[92]. Still, there is no question but that the loss of the AUS personnel worked a hardship on the command since in many cases their

90/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (14 May 46), Subject: Deactivation Activities, To: CG, 3AF, 14 May 1946

91/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 686.2 (25 Oct 46), Jurisdiction, Subject: Excess Installations, To: CG, AAF, 25 October 1946, with one indorsement thereto (See sup doc #63)

92/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Major General Paul L. Williams, CG, 3AF, 26 July 1946

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loss meant a loss of needed skills and specialties. Dover Army Air Field, in its history for April - June 1946, reported that flying activities had sunk to a new low, not because of what it described as the "absolute" loss of personnel, but rather because of the loss of a relatively few specialists in certain "vital" specialties.[93/]

In the pages which follow an attempt has been made to treat individually the question of the supply of personnel within the three main categories of personnel -- officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians -- together with a discussion of certain factors which operated powerfully to affect that supply during the months under consideration.

93/ P. 26, History of Dover Army Air Field for 1 April 1946 - 30 June 1946

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Supply of Officers

As we have already had occasion to note above, the Tactical Air Command found itself in the early days of its activation with an officer strength of approximately 8100 officers against an authorized strength of 3330. So vast a gulf between actual strength and authorized strength could not help but be disquieting to the command in view of the utilization and morale problems involved in such an excess of officers. The problem of utilization was partially solved by using junior officers in what some inspectors described as "positions of responsibility formerly held by enlisted men".[94] But no matter how much one essayed to dignify the use of officers in enlisted positions, such utilization clearly violated a basic tenet of utilization of military personnel. On the other hand, where there was a manpower pinch in enlisted categories, it clearly would have seemed injudicious to insist on a hard-and-fast distinction between officers and enlisted men and to sanction idleness on the part of a sizeable portion of the command's population. The dilemma, it was clear, could only be solved by correcting the balance between officer and enlisted strength and by obtaining additional enlisted personnel.

As early as 2 April 1946, scarcely two weeks after the

94/ Ltr, Hq CAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Headquarters IX Troop Carrier Command, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S.C., To: CG, CAF 29 March 1946 (See sup doc #803)

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Tactical Air Command had been activated, portents of an impending reduction in officer strength were announced. At a conference on that date between the Tactical Air Command staff and the staff of the Third Air Force(TC) in Tampa, Florida, General Quesada hinted that measures were then being planned in Headquarters, Army Air Forces, designed to institute a force-out program of officers.[95] General Quesada expressed the opinion that the separation of these officers could not help but redound to the benefit of the command.[96] General Quesada's views found an echo a few weeks later in a letter received from General Baker in which he noted that while "full satisfaction" had been expressed by General Eisenhower with the temporary employment of officers in enlisted positions, it was still AAF policy to relieve the burden of excess officers by encouraging their early return to civilian life.[97]

The first broad category of officers destined to feel the impact of the force-out program were flight officers. Their relief from active duty was made mandatory except for those who possessed the qualifications necessary for appointment as commissioned officers.[98]

95/ SECRET Minutes of Meeting of Major General Paul Williams (CG, 3AF) and general and special staff members, and Major General E. R. Quesada (CG, TAC) and general and special staff members, held on 2 April 1946, at Headquarters, TAC, Tampa, Florida

96/ Ibid.

97/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 333 (23 Apr 46) Misc, Subject: General Eisenhower's visits and inspections, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 23 April 1946

98/ TAC Separation Bulletin, 5 April 1946

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Officers over-age in grade were also directed to be separated unless sufficient reasons for retention existed.[99]

In mid-April came the first of the big force-out programs, with the Tactical Air Command being allotted a total of 897 non-regular officers and warrant officers to be recommended for relief from active duty by their immediate commanders.[100] This quota provided for the "force-out" of field grade officers with an efficiency index equal to or less than 35, of company grade officers with an efficiency index of 30 or less, and all service and glider pilots. After these "force-outs" were separated, the remainder of the quota was to be applicable to officers with efficiency indices of 44 or less for field grades, and 40 or less for company grades, this group to be known as "select-outs." The ratio of rated and non-rated officers recommended for relief was to be in proportion with those categories in existing strength. A minimum of 5% of all officers recommended for relief under the above provisions was to be in field grades.[101]

The reaction of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, to the above directive was two-fold: (1) it appealed the forced exit of all glider pilots, requesting the retention of 48 glider pilots whose

99/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 10 April 1946

100/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Relief of Volunteer Officers and Warrant Officers from Active Duty, To: CG, TAC, 18 April 1946

101/ Ibid.

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separation would tend seriously to interfere with the Third Air Force glider training and testing program;[102] (2) it expressed its dissatisfaction with the inadequate quota of 897 separatees which it had been allotted, saying that after the so-called "force-outs" had been relieved, 639 in number (462 of whom were service or glider pilots, and 177 of whom had below minimum efficiency indices), the quota remaining applicable to be "selected" out was only 258, a number which in its opinion was entirely too few for the assigned officer strength of 7663 against projected requirements of 4824 officers.[103] The Tactical Air Command therefore requested an additional quota of 1200 officers which would allow a reduction in colored officer strength from 611 to 510 -- the interim AAF requirement for negro officers -- as well as permit the separation of a substantial portion of the white officer overage.[104]

Headquarters, Army Air Forces, concurred in the retention by the Tactical Air Command of 48 glider pilots[105] and acceded only in part in its request for an additional quota of 1200 officers. The additional

102/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Retention of Glider Pilots, To: CG, AAF, 26 April 1946, with one indorsement thereto

103/ SECRET ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.456 (6 May 46), Subject: Relief of Volunteer Officers and Warrant Officers from Active Duty, To: CG, AAF, 6 May 1946, with one indorsement and two inclosures thereto

104/ Ibid.

105/ 1st Ind., Hq AAF, file AFPMP-13, 10 May 1946, to RESTRICTED ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Retention of Glider Pilots, To: CG, AAF, 26 April 1946 (See sup doc. #102)

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quota granted by AAF was for 863 officers, making a total of 1760 officers to be separated. Headquarters, Army Air Forces' reluctance to grant the full quota was based on the fact that the quota would effect too large a reduction in the command's officer strength to permit subsequent withdrawals of individuals for overseas; (2) it was felt that too many officers in TAC with a "reasonably high" efficiency index, as compared to those possessed by officers in other commands, would have to be separated in order to meet the requested quota.[106]

Next to the force-out programs, overseas shipments tended appreciably to bring about a decrease in TAC officer strength during 1946. On 7 June it was noted at a staff conference that Headquarters, Army Air Forces, was requiring Tactical Air Command to send approximately 1750 officers overseas.[107] Actually, only 1436 officers were sent by Tactical Air Command during the entire year, but this loss, coupled with that occasioned by force-out programs, brought the discovery that there was impending an overall shortage of rated officers to man units scheduled to be activated.[108] As a result, arrangements were made with the Air Transport Command for the transfer to TAC of 500 surplus rated

106/ 1st Ind., Hq AAF, file AFPMP-13, 10 May 1946, to SECRET ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.456 (6 May 46), Subject: Relief of Volunteer Officers and Warrant Officers from Active Duty, To: CG, AAF, 6 May 1946 (See sup. doc. #103)

107/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 7 June 1946

108/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

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officers.[109] These officers began arriving at designated TAC stations late in September and early in October.[110]

By acquiring Lockbourne as one of its permanent possessions and by acquiring Tuskegee Army Air Field, which was in the process of inactivation, The Tactical Air Command came to be confronted in 1946 with a special personnel problem arising from an excess of colored officers. So that Lockbourne would not be burdened with an unusable surplus, it was discovered that it would be necessary to reassign 225 officers outside the command. But where? Arrangements had been made for Headquarters, Army Air Forces, to reassign these personnel but that headquarters expressed a reluctance to accept other than non-rated personnel, which did not aid towards the solution of the problem since the overage in colored officers existed among rated personnel.[111] By August, however, the decision was reached in Headquarters, Army Air Forces, to separate those surplus rated officers at Tuskegee who could not be absorbed at Lockbourne. Surplus non-rated colored officers who could not be absorbed within the Tactical Air Command were to be reported surplus to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, for reassignment to

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109/ 1. Ibid.
2. The Air Transport Command was authorized to transfer to the Tactical Air Command any number of single engine, twin engine, and four engine pilots up to 1200. See ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Transfer of Surplus Officer Personnel, To: CG, Air Transport Command, 15 August 1946

110/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

111/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 1 July 1946

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other commands.[112]

New emphasis on the mandatory relief of inefficient or unsuitable officers appeared in the summer of 1946. On 1 July there appeared AAF Letter 35-40 in which it was noted that during the period of "demobilization and readjustment," laxness had been displayed in eliminating or demoting incompetent officers.[113] The Letter went on to say:

> "It is essential that our postwar air force be composed of officers only of the highest caliber. The AAF is undergoing a tremendous reduction in personnel and commanders will be called upon to do many tasks with few personnel. Of necessity, these few must possess the highest qualifications. There will be no room for border-line officers who cannot be depended upon to carry their share of the responsibilities." [114]

No extant data exists which would indicate the extent to which the Tactical Air Command acted to rid itself of unsuitable officers under force of this directive. Impetus to bring about the forced exodus of officers from the command came suddenly from a new source: a cut in funds. On 30 August 1946 General Quesada remarked at a staff conference that the War and Navy Departments had been forced into a program of economy far beyond anything that had been anticipated

112/ Resume of Telephone Conversation between Colonel Hunter Harris and General Lee, 8 August 1946

113/ AAF Ltr 35-40, "Demotion or Disposition of Inefficient or Unsuitable Officers", 1 July 1946

114/ Ibid.

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occurring at that time.[115] To meet the reduction in bulk allotment of personnel -- estimated to be in the vicinity of 42% -- consolidation of certain activities and elimination of others would be necessitated.[116] At the same time an impetus to effect a reduction in the size of the headquarters occurred as the result of an inspection of the headquarters by inspectors who felt that the headquarters was overstaffed.[117]

Despite impending cuts in officer strength, officers in Categories II - VII, inclusive, were given an opportunity in September to change their category statements either to Category I (unlimited period of service) or to Category VIII (two year period of service). Simultaneously all volunteer officers were permitted to request immediate release from active duty, regardless of category, provided that they met the requirements of current separation criteria.[118]

Apparently a far greater number of officers than was anticipated took advantage of the opportunity to change their category statements. Early in October the field was notified that personnel surveys had indicated that changes in category statements would cause the command to be far overstrength and decidedly surplus in rated officers for whom neither present nor future assignment existed. All requests

115/ Staff Conference Notes, 30 August 1946

116/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 11 September 1946

117/ Staff Conference Notes, 13 September 1946

118/ TWX, Hq TAC, AlF 1213, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 20 September 1946

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for change in category statements were now to be limited to those officers performing duty in one of the "critical" military occupational specialties. Warning of the shape of things to come was given in unmistakeable terms: "Commanders will make proper plans and preparations for the impending drastic reduction in officer personnel."[119/]

The term "drastic reduction" was not an understatement for what was to follow. On 19 October, in a letter ominously entitled, "Relief from Active Duty of AAF Officers and Warrant Officers," the Tactical Air Command directed a reduction of 60% (later modified to 55%) of all officers assigned to the command. The importance attached by the command to the effective completion of this reduction was underscored in the very opening sentence: "The accomplishment of this directive is the most critical assignment all commanders have had during the demobilization period".[120/] The reduction, when completed, would bring the assigned strength of the command to approximately 70% of its present overall officer authorization. The ratio of rated and non-rated officers to be relieved was to be in the ratio of one for one, or 50% rated and 50% non-rated. Criteria to be considered in selection of returnees were category statement, age, efficiency, ratings,

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119/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.8 (2 Oct 46), Subject: Reduction in Officer Strength, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 2 October 1946

120/ 1. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.8 (19 Oct 46), Subject: Relief from Active Duty of AAF Officers and Warrant Officers, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 19 October 1946
2. TWX, Hq TAC, AI 1431, 20 October 1946

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versatility, retrainability, social, educational and professional qualifications, potentialities, and future value to the service. Special consideration was to be given to the retention of officers whose records had demonstrated capabilities of performing many "diversified" duties. Constantly stressed was the necessity for the retention of the most capable and the most qualified officers. Said the command:

> "It is desired to . . . reemphasize the necessity for the elimination of weak, mediocre officers in this reduction program. None of the requirements stated herein with regard to grades, rated or non-rated categories, or other restrictive measures, will operate to prevent this being accomplished. Commanders on all echelons will pay particular attention to this phase of the program." 121/

A reduction on so vast a scale and destined to be carried out in so relatively short a period -- "The time it has to be done in is the worst thing about it," said the TAC A-1 122/ -- could not help but make for difficulties. The work load involved in separations was further increased by having to relieve many of the officers who had recently been assigned to the command from the Air Transport Command. 123/

The reduction had far-reaching consequences. (1) It aggravated existing shortage in certain tactical units in combat crew specialties and brought certain units far below authorized strength.

121/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.8 (19 Oct 46), Subject: Relief from Active Duty of AAF Officers and Warrant Officers, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 19 October 1946 (See sup. doc. 120[1])

122/ Staff Conference Notes, 21 October 1946

123/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

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The 502nd Tactical Control Group was left with 30 officers against an authorized strength of 137 officers.[124] (2) It made more difficult the meeting of mandatory school quotas; (3) it meant that officer strength of the command would be composed entirely of volunteers, thus assuring a greater degree of permanence in officer assignments; (4) it could possibly pave the way for a reopening of promotions; (5) it effected a drastic reduction among junior officers, the S-1 for March Field noting in October that "we will have no first lieutenants, about 3 captains, and 4 or 5 majors left";[125] (6) it served to dampen the morale of the units affected;[126] (7) it achieved, finally, a more equitable proportion of officers to enlisted personnel, effecting an approximate ratio of one to nine.[127]

124/ 1. Staff Conference Notes, 18 October 1946
2. Staff Conference Notes, 23 October 1946

125/ Notes of Staff Meeting, March Field, California, 29 October 1946

126/ 1. History of 162nd Reconnaissance Squadron (NP) for 1 October 1946 - 31 October 1946
2. Routing and Record Sheet, A-1 to Chief of Staff, Subject: Report of Board of Officers, 28 October 1946

127/ Table, "Personnel Assigned to the Tactical Air Command, March 1946 - December 1946", prepared from data furnished the Historical Division by the Directorate of Statistical Control, May 1948 (See sup. doc. #23)

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Supply of Enlisted Personnel

"Procurement of enlisted personnel", wrote General Spaatz in October 1946, "continues to be the most sericus personnel problem of the AAF."[128/] In its application to the Tactical Air Command, this statement might perhaps have been modified to say "procurement of skilled enlisted personnel." For what the command lacked in 1946 was not so much personnel as skilled personnel. Revealing in this connection is the statement made by the A-1 Section of Tactical Air Command in December in which it was noted that the command had an excess of 4500 enlisted personnel over its authorization. "Although the number assigned is greater than authorized," it was said, "we are not qualified to operate efficiently due to lack of many skilled specialists."[129/]

The lack of specialists was by no means unique to the Tactical Air Command. Rather, it was AAF wide. The output of the technical training pipeline was during 1946 being channeled into overseas theaters and hence this source could not be of material aid to the Zone of Interior Commands in their manning problems. In June 1946, Headquarters, Army Air Forces estimated that by mid-summer the "average" Zone of Interior Command could expect that but 55% of its bulk authorization

128/ SECRET ltr, General Carl Spaatz, CG, AAF, To: Major General Elwood R. Quesada, CG, TAC, 9 October 1946

129/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

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for skilled personnel would be filled by personnel actually so trained.[130]

Lack of specialists was but one factor which made it necessary to treat 1946 enlisted strength figures with caution. Another was the huge excess of colored troops. Of the 17,000 enlisted personnel in the command in April, approximately 2400 were negroes.[131] War Department planning had anticipated a 10% negro strength but the Tactical Air Command was already above that figure.[132] Indeed the percentage was to show a perceptible rise within the next two months when five thousand of the command's total enlisted strength of 18,000, were negroes.[133]

The reasons underlying the great influx of negro troops into the military establishment were probably related to the fact that the military offered a refuge from social and economic pressures on the outside. In part however this influx was directly sanctioned by the War Department itself which in February 1946 noted that the "present critical need" for manpower in the Army would necessitate a greater reliance on the utilization of negro troops.[134] It envisaged a negro

130/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Withdrawal of Personnel for Overseas Shipment, To: CG, TAC, 3 June 1946

131/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

132/ Ibid.

133/ Ibid.

134/ SECRET ltr, AGO, file AG 291.2 (31 Jan 46) OB-S-A-M, Subject: Utilization of Negro Personnel, To: CG's, AAF, et al., 4 February 1946, contained as inclosure to AAF Ltr 35-100, "Utilization of Negro Personnel", 1 March 1946

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strength of 15% on 1 July, with overseas commanders being required to utilize that percentage of negroes within their troop allotment. Continental commands were required to utilize all negro troops who would not be shipped overseas.[135]

Although the War Department experienced a marked change of heart concerning negro enlistments before too many months had elapsed[136] one has to recall that the presence within the Tactical Air Command of two bases -- Lockbourne and Tuskegee -- consisting almost entirely of colored troops and officers, as well as the existence of overages of colored personnel at its other stations, presented the Tactical Air Command with a not insignificant problem. To reduce its colored population, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, directed Tuskegee to separate as expeditiously as possible personnel whose services could not be utilized at Lockbourne.[137] At the same time it took advantage of the administrative machinery set up by the War Department to eliminate inapt enlisted personnel and those with an AGCT of 70 or less.[138] It also undertook to rid

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135/ Ibid.

136/ In the summer of 1946 the War Department suspended negro recruiting except in 48 scarce categories of specialists. See Press Release, WD Public Relations Division, 16 July 1946

137/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 220.3 (19 Sep 46), Subject: Reduction of Personnel Strength, To: CO, Tuskegee Army Air Field, 19 September 1946
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 220.3 (19 Sep 46), Subject: Reduction of Personnel Strength, To: CO, Tuskegee Army Air Field, [October 1946]

138/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Elimination of Inapt Enlisted Personnel, To: CG, TAC, 13 September 1946

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the command of illiterate personnel[139], which indirectly must have operated to reduce the command's colored strength, inspectors visiting Lockbourne having noted the existence of illiteracy among troops at that station.[140] Despite these various measures, the supply of colored enlisted personnel was by the end of the year still above command needs.[141]

An overage of master sergeants within the Tactical Air Command during 1946 was another factor which impels circumspection in treating enlisted strength figures for 1946, for again certain problems of utilization were inherent in this overage.[142] Many of the Master Sergeants

138/ 2. It is interesting to note that under this program the Ninth Air Force in November reported 55 negro personnel available for discharge as opposed to 9 white enlisted men. See 1st Ind., (C) Hq 9AF, file AF9AF 220.801 (1 Oct 46), 8 November 1946, to CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Elimination of Inapt Enlisted Personnel, To: CG, 3AF, 1 October 1946

139/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 201.62 (15 Oct 46), Subject: Disposition of Illiterate and Non-English Speaking Personnel, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 15 October 1946

140/ Ltr, Office of Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Supervisory Inspection of the Lockbourne Army Air Field, (318th AAF BU), Columbus 17, Ohio, To: CG, AAF, May 1946

141/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (29 Dec 46), Subject: Transmittal of Organization Charts and Strength Report, To: CG, AAF, 30 December 1946

142/ 1. Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

2. The overage of Master Sergeants was AAF-wide. On 31 July 1946, it was noted that the AAF had 19,992 Master Sergeants assigned as against 8,186 authorized by the War Department. See TAB to SECRET ltr, Hq AAF, Subject: AAF Plans and Programs, 24 October 1946

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were former officers who had but scant knowledge of the military attributes and administrative and technical procedures required of these key non-commissioned officer personnel. The problem was aired briefly at a TAC Staff Conference on 23 September 1946. At this meeting the A-4 for the Tactical Air Command noted that "a lot of our stations are cluttered up with former officers who have reenlisted as Master Sergeants."[143] The A-4 favored establishment of a "mandatory policy" which would require that Master Sergeants be qualified in a certain MOS.[144]

The presence during 1946 within the command's supply of enlisted personnel of a varying number of AUS personnel made for an element of impermanence. Upon the activation of the command, TAC had a total of approximately 17,000 enlisted personnel of whom only 7500 were Regular Army.[145] By the end of the year, however, the number of AUS personnel had undergone a marked decrease of an approximate enlisted strength of 22,000 in December, only 1788 of whom were Army of the United States, and of this number in turn, 289 were WACs.[146]

143/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 23 September 1946

144/ Ibid.

145/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

146/ Ibid.

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Supply of Civilian Personnel

During the months March through July 1946, the civilian strength of the command remained fairly constant at 10,000, varying slightly as bases were acquired or dropped.[147] Beginning in July, reductions in authorizations began to be received, to be effective at the end of the succeeding month.[148] The figures given below serve to dramatize the tremendous losses sustained as a result of these reductions:[149]

August	900
September	700
October	1,000
November	3,300
	5,900

Thus by the end of the year the civilian strength of the command had been cut from 10,000 to approximately 4000 civilians.[150]

The reductions in force, particularly that occurring in

147/ Table, "Personnel Assigned to the Tactical Air Command, March 1946 - December 1946", prepared from data furnished the Historical Division by the Directorate of Statistical Control, May 1948 (See sup. doc #23)

148/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

149/ Ibid.

150/ Table, "Personnel Assigned to the Tactical Air Command, March 1946 - December 1946", prepared from data furnished the Historical Division by the Directorate of Statistical Control, May 1948 (See sup doc #23)

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November, effected a change in the internal composition of the civilian complement of the command. A cut in the number of graded employees was absorbed by the elimination of all fire fighter positions (except a chief and assistant chief at each base for both aircrash and structural departments) and by the assumption of fire fighting duties by military personnel.[151] The month of November was utilized to conduct a prescribed training program for military replacements.[152] Through the separation of approximately 750 civilian fire fighters, the retention of many skilled aircraft mechanics in ungraded positions was made possible.[153]

Changes in internal composition, other than in a decrease in graded employees, which resulted from the November reduction in force are reflected below:[154]

Before:

Men	70%	Graded	56%	Veterans	30%
Women	30%	Ungraded	44%	Non-Veterans	70%

After:

Men	67%	Graded	54%	Veterans	43%
Women	33%	Ungraded	46%	Non-Veterans	57%

151/ 1. Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 230 (12 Dec 46), Subject: Tours of Duty for Civilian Fire Chiefs and Assistant Fire Chiefs - Both Crash and Structural, To: CG, 9AF, et al., 12 December 1946

152/ Difficulty in conducting this instruction was experienced at Langley Field where qualified military personnel were not immediately available to replace the civilian fire fighters who were being released. See ltr, Hq Langley Field, no file number, Subject: Request for Authority to Retain Civilian Firefighters for Additional Two Week Period, To: CG, TAC, 2 December 1946, with one indorsement thereto

153/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

154/ Statistical Strength Chart, Civilian Personnel Strength, Hq TAC, prepared by the Civilian Personnel Division

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Certain categories of personnel were more severely affected by the reduction than were others in view of the fact that cuts were greater in certain categories of funds than others. Particularly hard hit were personnel services projects, librarians, hostesses, quartermaster services, repairs and utilities activities.[155] The loss was perhaps most keenly felt among air installations sections since by WD Circular 138 (14 May 1946) all phases of Repairs and Utilities responsibility for Class III installations had been placed with the Army Air Forces and its major commands effective 11 June 1946.[156] The TAC Air Installations section found itself reduced from 137 personnel to 90.[157]

The cut in funds made necessary the adoption in the fall of 1946 of a new procedure for the sub-allotment of civilians to the various stations in the command. Hitherto, organization and manpower civilian ceilings had governed, with a station receiving a manpower ceiling and being assured of being allotted sufficient funds to meet that ceiling. Now in the fall of 1946, the procedure was adopted whereby the number of civilian employees was governed either by the authorized personnel ceiling or by the amount of money available for the

155/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 21 October 1946
2. Pp. 26-27, History of the 321st AAF Base Unit, 1 October 1946 to 31 December 1946

156/ Memorandum for A-5, Hq TAC, by Lieutenant Colonel Walter A. Faiks, Subject: Historical Record, Air Installations Section, 3 January 1947

157/ Ibid.

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pay of civilian employees, whichever was the smaller. If personnel ceilings given a station could not be met with the funds available, personnel ceilings had to be adjusted to meet the funds available.[158]

The reduction in civilian employees which the Tactical Air Command sustained during 1946 had far-reaching ramifications and consequences: (1) it offset to some extent the gain in enlisted personnel which the command had made throughout the year and necessitated the diversion of these enlisted personnel into positions formerly occupied by civilians;[159] (2) the reduction necessitated, together with the corresponding reduction among officers, a curtailment and consolidation of the command's activities;[160] (3) it was a delaying factor in the closing out of certain stations and thus affected the carrying out of the supply demobilization program;[161] (4) it handicapped the operation of

158/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 23 September 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 16 October 1946

159/ 1. P. 29, History of Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) for 1 April 1946 - 31 October 1946
2. Pp. 5-6, History of Marshall Field, 356 AAF BU (Base Services) for 1 October 1946 - 31 December 1946
3. At Langley Field approximately 600 civilians had to be replaced by enlisted men (See sup doc #152)

160/ 1. 1st Ind., Hq TAC, file 230 (6 Sep 46), 2 October 1946, to CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Reduction in Civilian Personnel, To: CG, TAC, 6 September 1946
2. CONFIDENTIAL TWX, WAR, WAR 80280, To: CG, TAC, 13 September 1946

161/ Report of Lieutenant Colonel Allison C. Brooks, Subject: Informal Report on the Inactivation Status of Tuskegee Army Air Field, To: CG, TAC, 28 October 1946

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post commissaries, owing to the lack of qualified military replacements[162]; (5) it made necessary the establishment of accelerated training programs, particularly in the field of fire-fighters[163]; finally, the dislocations and the "bumping" of employees occasioned by the workings of the machinery of the reductions in force caused a morale problem of no inconsiderable proportions among civilian employees of the command and in some instances affected their efficiency.[164]

162/ 1. 1st Ind., Hq 9AF, file AF9AF 331.3 (7 Nov 46), 26 November 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 331.3 (7 Nov 46), Subject: Commissary Operation, To: CG, 9AF, 7 November 1946
2. 1st Ind., Hq Lockbourne Army Air Base, file 331.3, 14 November 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 331.3 (7 Nov 46), Subject: Commissary Operation, To: CO, Lockbourne AAB, 7 November 1946

163/ Report of Activities at Lawson Field during the year 1946, 4 January 1946

164/ 1. Report of Air Installation Office Activities at Sedalia Army Air Field for year 1946, 2 January 1947
2. "Upon receipt of information that civilian personnel, paid under Project #441, were to be released immediately, the first reaction among the civilian personnel affected was one of marked decline of efficiency". See 1st Ind., Hq Langley Field, file 331.3, 19 November 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 331.3 (7 Nov 46), Subject: Commissary Operation, To: CO, Langley Field, 7 November 1946

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Gains in Personnel

The chief means through which the Tactical Air Command undertook in 1946 to augment its supply of enlisted personnel and to offset losses sustained as a result of separations was through a forceful recruiting program. Two recruiting caravans and ten individual mobile units were placed on the road to give exhibits and shows at state and local fairs, carnivals and in local communities. Short-term enlistees and all AUS enlisted personnel in the command were interviewed by base recruiting officers and acquainted with all advantages of being in the Regular Army. Aerial demonstrations were conducted.[165] In the Third Air Force(TC) a novel practice of encouraging enlistments was the establishment of a rookie airline on which new AAF volunteers were given their first plane ride shortly after signing up. This was an added incentive for the prospective enlistee since it eliminated a tedious trip to processing stations.[166]

Oddly enough, enlistments were noted as being "much higher" during the period of operation of Selective Service. The draft holidays which commenced in July brought about a decided decrease in enlistments during July and August. There was a rise in enlistments in September 1946 owing to the fact that some of the benefits offered

165/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities

166/ P. 25, History of Third Air Force(Troop Carrier), 1 April 1946 - 31 October 1946

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short term enlistees were eliminated in October 1946, apparently in an effort to persuade more men to sign up for a three year period.[167]

The suspension by the War Department in July of provisions for the enlistment of negroes except in 48 scarce specialties[168] caused the Tactical Air Command to request that consideration be given to permittal of enlistment of negroes possessing aircraft maintenance specialties for assignment to units at Lockbourne.[169] "The comparatively small numbers of such personnel available for reenlistment", wrote the Tactical Air Command, "will not materially affect the numerical status of the negro complement of the Army Air Forces or upset the ratios as planned by the War Department."[170] The request for authority to enlist maintenance technicians was looked upon favorably by Army Air Forces, although that headquarters did not concur in the simultaneous

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167/ Narrative History of Tactical Air Command Recruiting Division, 21 March - 31 December 1946

168/ 1. Press Release, "Response to Enlistment Drive Causes Suspension of General Negro Recruiting", prepared for release by War Department
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 327 (10 Oct 46) Nat'l Army, Subject: Negro Enlistment and Reenlistments, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 10 October 1946

169/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 327 (19 Jul 46) Nat'l Army, Subject: Enlistment and Reenlistment of Negro Personnel, To: CG, AAF, 19 July 1946, with one indorsement thereto

170/ Ibid.

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request of Tactical Air Command for authority to recruit for colored bandsmen.[171]

Budgetary considerations affected recruiting activities as they did so many other phases of Tactical Air Command operations during 1946. In July, the Third Air Force(Troop Carrier) complained that its allotment of funds for per diem was not adequate to meet the needs both for recruiting and for the various flying missions undertaken by the commands. It requested that action be taken either to obtain additional funds for per diem for recruiting or that the responsibility for the Third Air Force recruiting caravans be transferred to the appropriate Army Area Headquarters.[172] Although the Tactical Air Command in its reply held out hope for obtainal of supplemental funds,[173] actually by October it was necessary to notify the field that owing to the curtailment of per diem funds, it was necessary to curtail the operations of Army Air Forces mobile recruiting caravans.[174] Small local mobile

171/ 1st Ind., Hq AAF, file AFPMP-2, 20 August 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 327 (19 Jul 46) Nat'l Army, Subject: Enlistment and Reenlistment of Negro Personnel, To: CG, AAF, 19 July 1946

172/ Ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 123 (18 Jul 46), Subject: Adjustment of Funds for Per Diem Payments Activities, To: CG, TAC, 18 July 1946, with one indorsement thereto

173/ 1st Ind., Hq TAC, file TAC 327 (18 Jul 46) Nat'l Army, 31 July 1946, to ltr, Hq 3AF(TC) file AF3AF 123 (18 Jul 46), Subject: Adjustment of Funds for Per Diem Payments Activities, To: CG, TAC, 18 July 1946

174/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 327 (10 Oct 46) Nat'l Army, Subject: Mobile Recruiting Caravans, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 10 October 1946

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recruiting units were authorized and encouraged to continue operations, provided no per diem funds were expended.[175]

Late in December, the command noted in a "review" of the recruiting program, that on its rolls it had 2,432 short-term enlistees whose enlistments were due to expire within the next year. In addition, the command had a total of approximately 1500 AUS enlisted men, which gave the command a total of almost 4000 possible enlistees throughout the command. The reenlistment of at least 50% of these men for three years was a desideratum for the next year.[176] The command, however, could point with pride to the fact that under its auspices and those of the old Third Air Force, 7,855 men had been enlisted since the beginning of the recruiting program in October 1945.[177]

175/ Ibid.

176/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 327 (24 Dec 46), Subject: Review of Recruiting Program, To: CG, 9AF, et al., 24 December 1946

177/ Narrative History of A-1 Recruiting Division, 21 March - 31 December 1946 (See sup. doc. #167)

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Losses of Personnel

School Quotas

Throughout 1946 the Tactical Air Command was compelled to honor what seemed to be a never-ending stream of requisitions for personnel to fill school quotas. Many of these requisitions had their origin in the overall requirements of the entire Army Air Forces, rather than in needs unique to the Tactical Air Command. To train many of the specialties required in the peacetime Air Force, a sizeable technical training structure had been set up within the Air Training Command and the production of this school system was expected to contribute immeasurably to the molding of the new Air Force in being. While a portion of the students necessary to fill the training pipeline would come from trainable enlistees in the Army Air Forces who had no prior service, it was apparent that this source alone would not fill the needs of the Training Command and it was necessary therefore to call upon the major commands for students. For October 1946, for example, inputs were less than 30% of estimated requirements.[178]

Under the provisions of AAF Letter 50-62, 23 August 1946,[179] Headquarters, Army Air Forces, established a system of mandatory quotas

178/ Ltr, Hq AAF, File AFPMP-11, Subject: Supply of Enlisted Students for Technical Training Courses, To: CG, TAC, 17 September 1946

179/ AAF Ltr 50-62, Subject: "Establishment of Mandatory Quotas for Technical Training", 23 August 1946

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to insure that the Air Training Command received sufficient officer and enlisted student personnel to maintain all technical training courses at the desired capacity. Except for personnel trained in specialties not peculiar to the command of their origin, all personnel upon completion of training were to be returned to their former command.[180]

Within the Tactical Air Command it was often difficult for unit commanders to reconcile themselves to the loss of personnel to schools, especially at a time when these personnel were needed to carry on current unit missions. Since qualification standards were high it was often necessary for commanders to send their best personnel.[181] At the same time, AAF Letter 50-62 caused unit commanders to hesitate to request training quotas owing to the fact that they felt they would thus cut down on the personnel needed to fill mandatory quotas.[182]

The singular lack of enthusiasm in the field for mandatory quotas made it necessary for Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, constantly to underscore the importance of proper filling of these quotas. The command stressed that a continuous flow of trained replacements was necessary to maintain overseas establishments and that this training load had to be borne in part by Zone of Interior Commands, often making

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180/ Ibid.

181/ Narrative History of A-1 Activities for 1946

182/ Ibid.

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it necessary to allot training quotas to stations which they themselves did not require. In November, the subject of mandatory quotas was discussed at a TAC Staff Conference at which General Quesada observed that "every effort" should be made to meet the quotas of personnel being sent to schools. "The situation should straighten itself out", said General Quesada, "when these people begin graduating from the schools."[183/]

Despite attempts on the part of the command to enforce compliance with mandatory quotas, the field resorted to two circumventing devices: (1) it filled the quotas with students who did not possess the desired aptitudes or prerequisites,[184/] a practice which apparently was Air Force wide, and which caused Headquarters, Army Air Forces, to assert that on that account elimination rates in the schools had undergone a considerable increase;[185/] (2) it resorted to the time-honored expedient of "short-shipments". This latter practice on the part of Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, elicited a sharp reprimand from the Tactical Air Command in December, which noted that of a mandatory school quota of 88 officers allotted that air force in the preceding

183/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 6 November 1946

184/ Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Improper Selection of Students, To: CG, 9AF, 21 January 1947, with one inclosure thereto

185/ Ltr, Hq AAF, file AFPMP-11, Subject: Selection of Enlisted Students for Technical Schools, To: CG, TAC, 27 November 1946, with one indorsement and one inclosure thereto

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five week period the Ninth Air Force had supplied only 45 officers.[186] "It is imperative" wrote TAC, "that the training program of the Army Air Forces be supported in order that the personnel within it become trained in the various skills required by the AAF in the performance of its assigned mission."[187]

Almost simultaneously, the Tactical Air Command was protesting to topside the allotment of a mandatory quota of 55 officers for the Air Tactical School.[188] This quota, plus others, it was stated, "greatly increases the difficulty with which this command performs its mission." It was noted that at the time the command was approximately 20% below its authorized officer strength.[189]

Although we have no specific evidence concerning the precise extent to which TAC lost personnel to schools during 1946, some clue is afforded by a study undertaken by the A-5 Section and designed to show the extent of activities unrelated to the primary mission of the

186/ Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Non-Compliance with AAF Letter 50-62 Dated 23 August 1946, To: CG, SAF, 4 December 1946, with one inclosure thereto

187/ Ibid.

188/ 1. Ltr, Hq AAF, file AFPMP-1-E, Subject: Selection of Students to Attend the Air Tactical School, To: CG, TAC, 15 November 1946
2. TWX, Hq TAC, AlC -- , To: CG, AAF, 20 December 1946

189/ TWX, Hq TAC, AlC -- , To: CG, AAF, 20 December 1946 (See sup doc #188[2])

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Tactical Air Command.[190] This study revealed that on 31 January 1947, 248 officers and 771 enlisted men assigned to the command were absent from their home station attending schools. This, said the A-5 study, "means that 9% of the total officer and 4% of total enlisted strength were contributing nothing at the moment toward the operation of their units." The study noted further that "whereas vast improvement in capabilities might be expected in the foreseeable future, the question of the extent to which current activities are crippled must also be considered." "The basic problem", it was stated, "is to balance current with long term requirements".[191]

Medical Losses

As in years past, one source of "loss" of personnel manhours during 1946 (and thus indirectly at least tending to affect the command's supply of personnel) was the incurrence of venereal diseases by personnel assigned to the command.

The venereal disease rate for the Tactical Air Command for 1946 was admittedly high when compared to the rate of 40 per 1000 for 1941 and even 69 per 1000 per annum for 1945.[192] The rates for 1946 are given below:[193]

190/ Study, "The Expenditure of Effort Involved in Servicing Activities Unrelated to the Primary Mission of the Tactical Air Command", prepared by the A-5 Section, Hq TAC, February 1947

191/ Ibid.

192/ Medical History of the Tactical Air Command for 1946

193/ Ibid.

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Month	VD Total	White Rate Per Thousand	Negro Rate Per Thousand
April	103	39	457
May	86	44	303
June	114	49	357
July	101	39	340
August	97	39	310
September	115	44	375
October	115	46	344
November	90	46	270
December	90	50	295
Average	101	44	339

That the Tactical Air Command had such a high venereal disease rate per 1000 per annum could in the main be attributed to the large proportion of negro troops within the command. Evidence of the effect of colored troops on the VD rate may be found in histories written during and for the period under consideration. Bergstrom noted in April that its rate had risen to the high rate of 126 per thousand per annum, owing in part to a six hundred percent increase in colored strength during the month.[194] Stewart Field observed in its history for the final quarter of 1946:

> "The high rate at the outset of the last quarter can be attributed to Squadron F. Their rate was approximately 300 while the white rate was about five".[195]

At Langley Field the rate for August for Squadron "A" was 55 per 1000 per annum; for Squadron "F" for the same month, 518.[196] For the month

194/ P. 46, History of Aviation Medicine in the Tactical Air Command, 1 January to 30 June 1946

195/ P. 30, History of Stewart Field for 1 October 1946 - 31 December 1946

196/ Monthly Venereal Disease Statistical Report for 304th AAF BU, contained as inclosure to ltr, Station Hospital, TAC, Langley Field, no file number, Subject: Monthly Venereal Disease Report, To: CO, Hq 304th AAF BU (TAC), 4 September 1946

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of June, Sedalia Army Air Field, Missouri, reported a rate of 162 per 1000, with the white rate 29, while the colored rate was 710 per 1000.[197]

Some of the factors contributing to the rise of the venereal disease rates in the postwar period were considered to be the following: the increased amount of free time; increased carelessness among all troops owing to the prevalence of the belief that cures could speedily be accomplished via use of sulfa drugs and penicillin; the loss of fear of physical and administrative consequences. Venereal disease was considered to have been incurred in line of duty, with no loss of pay and no necessity to make up time lost under Article of War 107.[198] Furthermore, in the opinion of the Surgeon's Office, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, the 1946 rate could be considered a "transitory reflection of the confusion and disorganization" incident to the rapid demobilization of the wartime army and the integration of a new volunteer Army. "It is the result of unsuitable living conditions, not only in the Army, but also of civilian population" said the Surgeon.[199]

197/ P. 46, History of Aviation Medicine in the Tactical Air Command, 1 January to 30 June 1946 (See sup. doc. #194)

198/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 726 (7 Aug 46), Subject: Venereal Disease Control, To: CG, AAF, 7 August 1946
2. Medical History of the Tactical Air Command for 1946 (See sup. doc. #192)

199/ Medical History of the Tactical Air Command for 1946 (See sup. doc. #192)

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It was the considered opinion of the Tactical Air Command Surgeon that Venereal Diseases should not be made the subject of special reports but should be handled the same as nasopharyngitis, athletes foot, and other diseases. When the rates had to be reported to higher headquarters, the commanding officer and the medical officer were always reprimanded if the rate was high. As a result, said the TAC Surgeon, there was a tendency to conceal the true rates since each organization desired to make a good showing. "One reason that the rates are so high today is because there has been very little discussion of VD in the last year and the officers are making a true report of conditions as they are found. This will not be true if another drive is made to lower the VD rate, for it will be lowered by the stroke of a pencil. Allow the doctors to treat the disease, and get the patients well."[200/]

Courts-Martial

A source of loss of man days in the command during 1946 occurred not only from courts-martial proceedings but from delays incurred in bringing the accused to trial.[201/] The actual time required for processing a case to completion ranged from 94 days at Lake Charles

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200/ Ibid.

201/ 1. Draft of chapter, "Military Justice", prepared by Lt. Ruth Boehner in cooperation with Colonel Guy M. Kinman, TAC Staff Judge Advocate, June 1947
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 253 (14 Oct 46), Subject: Excessive Confinement Without Trial, To: CG, 9AF, 14 October 1946, with three indorsements and two inclosures thereto

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in the early days of the command to an average of 23 days at Dover Army Air Field in August of that year. The average delay per month in the entire command for processing general courts-martial cases was reduced from 72 days in April to 38.75 days in November.[202]

The record with reference to bringing special courts-martial cases to completion was similarly none too bright. Here the monthly average number of days delay from the date the accused became available for trial to the date of receipt of trail records in Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, was 38.00 days in December as opposed to 29.93 days in April. The total average delay in number of days was 28.51. The year's high was 58 days for the complete processing of a case at March Field in June, while the low of 7.67 days was recorded at Smyrna Army Air Field in October.[203]

The average delays in completing courts-martial cases for all Tactical Air Command installations from April through December 1946 were as follows:

Type of Courts-Martial	Average No. of days Required to Process Case to Completion
General	44.14
Special	28.51
Summary	19.42 [204]

202/ Table, "Average Delays in General Courts-Martial Cases in the Tactical Air Command", April 1946 - December 1946, prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, August 1947, from data furnished that Division by the office of the Staff Judge Advocate

203/ Table, "Average Delays in Special Courts-Martial Cases in the Tactical Air Command, April 1946 - December 1946, prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, August 1947, from data furnished that Division by the office of the Staff Judge Advocate

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Many factors were responsible for delays consumed between the bringing of the charges and the completion of the trial. The major factor involved was the loss of trained personnel through separations. Inexperienced replacements, faced with a new field of endeavor, made many errors. Charge and specification sheets and allied papers had to be returned for correction. Investigations contained meager and insufficient information and had to be returned for reinvestigation. Such delays could be directly traced to the lack of inexperienced personnel.[205]

To help reduce the amount of time consumed in processing courts-martial cases, the Judge Advocate's Section in Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, established a training school at which instruction was given on various phases of courts and board and courts-martial procedures. Each of the air forces was required to send two officers for a thirty day course of instruction. By the end of the year, twenty-eight officers had been graduated from the staff judge advocate's school.[206]

204/ Table, "Average Delays in Summary Courts-Martial Cases in the Tactical Air Command", April 1946 - December 1946, prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, August 1947, from data furnished that Division by the office of the Staff Judge Advocate

205/ Draft of chapter, "Military Justice", prepared by Lt. Ruth Boehner in cooperation with Colonel Guy M. Kinman, TAC Staff Judge Advocate, June 1947 (See sup. doc. #201)

206/ 1. Ibid.
2. Record and Routing Sheet, Air Inspector to Judge Advocate, Subject: Inspection Report of this Headquarters, 20 September 1946

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Particularly interesting data concerning the types of courts-martial offenses, as well as the age groupings of the offenders may be gleaned from a statistical study prepared by the office of the Command Judge Advocate, a copy of which is attached among the supporting documents.[207] The study reveals, for example, that approximately two-thirds of the offenses tried under Tactical Air Command courts-martial jurisdiction during 1946 were committed by personnel within the age groups of seventeen to twenty-four. The age group, 17-20, was responsible for 41% of the total offenses tried, underlining the juvenile aspects of delinquencies in the command. Absence without leave constituted the most common military offense. Again, almost one-half of the offenders in this category fell into the 17-20 age group.[208]

A comparison made of the types of offenses committed during 1946 with those occurring during the period of hostilities brings some interesting facts to light. During the war era intoxicating liquor entered the picture in approximately 80 percent of the cases. In the Tactical Air Command, in 1948, intoxicating liquor was connected with less than 20 percent of the cases. Sex offenses and those to which some sort of violence was attached amounted from 15 percent to 20 per cent of the cases arising during the war, whereas in the Tactical Air

207/ Study, "Analysis of Offenses Tried by General, Special, and Summary Courts-Martial During the Calendar Year 1946", prepared by the Office of the Command Judge Advocate, Hq TAC, August 1948

208/ Ibid.

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Command during 1946 they figured in but one or two percent of the cases.[209]

Of the cases tried in the Tactical Air Command during 1946, roughly 16 percent had officers as accused, ranking from Warrant Officer through Colonel; roughly 84 percent were enlisted personnel (including WAC's), ranking from private through sergeant.[210] Of the offenders, from 20 to 25 percent were colored, 75 to 80 percent white.[211]

Accidents

Accidents -- both ground and flying -- contributed to a loss of manhours in the command during 1946 and served thus in effect to constrict the command's available supply of personnel. Flying accidents will be discussed in relation to the Flying Safety program in connection with the section on Training. In this chapter we shall confine ourselves solely to ground accident statistics during 1946.

Of a total of 6,918, 483 man days of exposure of military personnel in the command during the period, 1 April - 20 December 1946, the actual time lost as a result of disabling injuries consisted of 8266 man days. The accident rate for military personnel during 1946 was 8.02 per 100,000 man days exposure.[212] For civilian personnel,

209/ Draft of chapter, "Military Justice", prepared by Lt. Ruth Boehner in cooperation with Colonel Guy M. Kinman, TAC Staff Judge Advocate, June 1947 (See sup. doc. #201)

210/ Ibid.

211/ Ibid.

212/ RESTRICTED Table, "Disabling Injury of Subcommands and Stations Assigned Directly to Hq TAC (1) Military Personnel -- Cumulative Rate 1 April to 20 December 1946", prepared by the Directorate of Ground Safety, Hq TAC, December 1947

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the frequency rate was 6.80.[213]

Shortages and Overages

If one accepts the postulate that shortages and overages are a perennial problem in any military organization, then it should evoke no undue concern to discover that such a problem did exist in the Tactical Air Command during its formative period. The question is therefore not so much the presence of shortages and overages as their control and character. In the period under consideration, we shall find, certain factors -- notably the ravages of demobilization and the fact that most of the newly assigned personnel in the command consisted of ex-servicemen who already possessed an established military skill -- altered to some extent the wartime picture of shortages and overages.[214]

Medical officers and medical personnel, in general, afford an illustration of shortages occurring during this period which had

213/ 1. RESTRICTED Table, "Disabling Injury of Subcommands and Stations assigned Directly to Hq TAC (1) Military Personnel -- Cumulative Rate 1 April to 20 December 1946, prepared by the Directorate of Ground Safety, Hq TAC, December 1947 (See sup. doc. #212)

2. For civilian personnel, the frequency rate is determined on the basis of the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{No. Disabling Injuries} \times 1{,}000{,}000 \text{ Man Hours}}{\text{Exposure (Man Hours Worked)}}$$

214/ Pp. 12-13, History of the 321st AAF Base Unit, March Field, for 1 April 1947 - 30 June 1947

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not existed in the pre-VJ Day era. The loss of experienced medical personnel through separations was keenly felt, and exercised, not unnaturally, an appreciable effect on the calibre of medical services rendered in the command.[215] As the Surgeon for the Third Air Force(TC) noted in April 1946;

> "This problem of loss of experienced Medical Department personnel is allied with the problem of transition of hospital and dispensaries staffed with experienced Medical Department personnel operating on a war time basis rendering efficient and skilled ethical and complete professional care to that of hospitals and dispensaries with reduced staffs of new and inexperienced personnel, both from professional and administrative ability; and yet render the same efficient and skilled ethical and complete professional care to the sick and wounded, aid in health conservation measures for the entire command and train personnel".[216]

On 20 May the Command Surgeon noted at a staff conference that of the 91 doctors assigned to the command at that time, only 40 would be left by 1 July 1946. And of the 54 dentists in the command, only 14 would remain as of 1 July 1946.[217] To alleviate the shortages incurred as a result of the separation of medical officers, the Tactical Air Command requested the assignment of doctors fresh out of school, but under American Medical Association regulations, all doctors had to serve at least 90 days in a hospital before going to a tactical unit

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215/ Medical History of the Third Air Force(TC) for April 1946

216/ Ibid.

217/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 20 May 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 1 July 1946

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or dispensary. Because of the shortage of medical officers, it was expected that it would be impossible to assign flight surgeons to groups.[218]

In December, Lieutenant Colonel J. F. McDonough, Assistant Surgeon for the Tactical Air Command, noted that while the number of medical officers assigned the command was by then "adequate", very few of the officers were qualified specialists. Although the command would request medical officers by specific MOS's in the various specialties, most of the medical officers received possessed an MOS of 3100 (Medical Officer, General Duty). "Almost every highly qualified specialist was AUS", said Colonel McDonough, "and has been lost through separation since December 1945". Dental officers were also in a "critically short" category, noted Colonel McDonough. As with medical officers, most of the dental officers then assigned were Army Specialized Training Program graduates who had little or no formal post-graduate training. The situation with reference to enlisted medical personnel was scarcely more encouraging. Colonel McDonough observed that a "large number" of enlisted personnel working in hospitals and dispensaries had had little or no formal training and that many of them were not capable of receiving formal training by reason of their low AGCT scores.[219] Convalescent training was especially handicapped by lack

218/ Ibid.

219/ Routing and Record Sheet, Asst. Surgeon to Deputy Chief of Staff, 13 December 1946, attached to ltr, Office of Inspector General, Hq 9AF, file IG 333.1-General, Subject: Action-letter, IGD, Erroneous Information Contained in Current Recruiting Bulletins, To: CG, 9AF, 4 December 1946

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of trained and experienced supervisory personnel.[220]

A dearth of Chaplains was another shortage peculiar to the postwar period. Inspectors visiting Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, in May 1946, discovered no chaplain present for duty at that station. In its forwarding indorsement to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, the Tactical Air Command observed that the shortage of chaplains was command wide and held out but scant hope for the immediate assignment of a chaplain to Myrtle Beach.[221]

The shortage of legal officers and judge advocates was as alarming in its implications for the legal needs of the command as was the shortage of physicians for the medical. Early in May, in reply to a request for a legal officer for assignment to March Field, Colonel Guy Kinman, Judge Advocate for the Tactical Air Command, replied that not only did he not have an officer to send to March Field but that he had no officers to send anywhere. Moreover, said Colonel Kinman, the lack of legal personnel in Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, was necessitating the handling by Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, of courts-martial cases that actually belonged to the Ninth.[222] Eventually,

220/ History of Aviation Medicine in the Tactical Air Command 1 January to 30 June 1946 (See sup. doc. #194)

221/ 2nd Ind., Hq TAC, file TAC 333 (14 May 46) Myrtle Beach, 21 June 1946, to ltr, Office of Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, Subject: Report of Special Combined Inspection of Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, Myrtle Beach, S. C. and Command Channels, To: CG, AAF, 14 May 1946

222/ Memorandum for A-1, Hq TAC, by Colonel Guy M. Kinman, Subject: Need for Legal Officers (JA's), 10 May 1946

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at Colonel Kinman's suggestion, a letter was written to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, setting forth the "critical need" which existed within the command for six Judge Advocates and six to eight legal officers for assignment to bases of the command.[223] It is extremely doubtful whether this plea ever produced any concrete results, and the command was compelled in June 1946 to institute a school at the headquarters for the training of officers in court and board proceedings.[224]

Shortages of other personnel in professional categories -- post engineers, budget and fiscal officers -- brought about either the adoption or the continuation of policies whereby the assignment and transfer of these specialists were controlled by Headquarters Tactical Air Command.[225]

In technical specialties shortages were no less keenly felt than in the professional categories. As a result of demobilization, many of the radar personnel necessary for airborne radar operation and maintenance were lost to the command.[226] According to the Communications

223/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.3 (15 May 46), Subject: Judge Advocates and Legal Officers, To: CG, AAF, 15 May 1946

224/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 353 (26 Jun 46), Subject: Training of Officers in Courts-Martial Procedure, To: CG, 12AF, 26 June 1946

225/ 1. Routing and Record Sheet, A-4 to Chief of Staff, Subject: Policy of the Assignment of Post Engineers, 13 May 1946
2. TAC Ltr 30-5, Subject: Budget and Fiscal Officers, 8 August 1946

226/ Routing and Record Sheet, Communications to A-5, Subject: Narrative Report of Communications Activities, 6 January 1947

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Section in Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, the Air Training Command had been unable to furnish a single qualified ground radar specialist. The 502nd Tactical Control Group was especially handicapped by the lack of radar and radio mechanics during the maneuvers on the West Coast in the fall of 1946. Even though many of these specialists were borrowed for the exercise,[227] the training and background of the men obtained and assigned were not sufficient to cope with many of the problems which arose.[228] The shortage of communications specialists was again one which was AAF-wide and Headquarters, Army Air Forces directed that special care be taken to avoid mal-assignment in this category of specialists.[229]

Within the broad range of combat crew specialties both overages and shortages existed. The overages existed chiefly within pilot categories; the shortages in navigator-bombardiers and radar observers. In July, inspectors conducting an inspection of the 47th Bombardment Group (L) at Lake Charles Army Air Field discovered crew member shortages consisting of 20 navigator-bombardiers and 21 radar observers.[230] As a

227/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 23 August 1946
2. Routing and Record Sheet, Communications to A-5, Subject: Narrative Report of Communications Activities, 6 January 1947

228/ Routing and Record Sheet, Communications to A-5, Subject: Narrative Report of Communications Activities, 6 January 1947 (See sup. doc. #226)

229/ Ltr, Hq AAF, file AFPMP-11, Subject: Proper Utilization of Enlisted Personnel in the Communications Field, To: CG, TAC, 29 July 1946

230/ Ltr, Office of Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Inspection of 47th Bombardment Group (L) Night Attack, Lake Charles AAF, Lake Charles, La., To: CG, AAF, 16 July 1946

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result of losses to overseas shipments, these shortages in the 47th Group became even more pronounced.[231] Navigator-bombardier replacements were finally obtained from the Air Transport Command but the command had no luck in obtaining Radar Observers Bombardment (SSN 0142).[232] Significant of the shortages in this category are statistics which show that in December the high priority 47th Bomb Group had only 16 radar observers of a complement of 48. In a report to Army Air Forces on 30 December it was noted that officers were still unavailable to fill existing shortages such as Radar Observer Bombardiers, Bombardier-Navigator and Electronics officers in tactical and other T/O&E units.[233]

Among enlisted specialists there were ever-present shortages of clerk-typists, aircraft maintenance technicians, statistical control personnel, finance clerks, mess personnel, photo technicians, Link trainer instructors, control tower operators. The shortage of maintenance personnel, as we shall have occasion to note in the next section, was particularly acute throughout 1946.

231/ 1. Report of Supervisory Staff Visit by Lieutenant Colonel K. C. Dempster, To: Chief of Staff, 17 July 1946
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.3 (3 Feb 47), Subject: Personnel Urgently Required for 1C Priority Mission, To: CG, AAF, 26 July 1946

232/ 3d Ind., Hq AAF no file number, To CG, TAC, 30 September 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.3 (3 Feb 47), Subject: Personnel Urgently Required for 1C Priority Mission, To: CG, AAF, 26 July 1946 (See sup. doc. #231[2])

233/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (29 Dec 46), Subject: Transmittal of Organization Charts and Strength Report, To: CG, AAF, 30 December 1946

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To a certain extent, shortages of specialists were overcome by the use of Training Command Schools, by training officers in additional skills,[234] by the awarding of non-rated MOS's to rated officers,[235] and by a very extensive use of on-the-job training.

234/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 352 (24 Dec 46), Subject: Diversified Training of Officers, To: CG, 9AF, et al., 24 December 1946

235/ Routing and Record Sheet, Military Personnel to A-1, Subject: MOSs for Rated Officers, September 1946

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

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OF THE
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1. Quesada, Elwood Richard, 1904–
2. Lee, Robert Merrill, 1904–
3. Barous, Glenn Oscar, 1903–
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5. Moyer, William Wallace, 1916–

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SECTION THREE

MAINTENANCE

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I

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

An inquiry into the state of aircraft maintenance in the Tactical Air Command during the first several months of the command's existence must first of all take into account the broad underlying aspects of the entire period under consideration. This was for the Army Air Forces a period of transition from the old order to the new, and it was inevitable that the uncertainties, the strains and the stresses which invariably accompany such periods of change, should tend to affect all echelons and all phases of operations, including maintenance. It was a period, moreover, in which the Army Air Forces and its subordinate commands faced the necessity of painful rebuilding from the shattered remains left as a result of rapid demobilization, which, in the instance of maintenance, had thinned out maintenance specialists and dissipated maintenance "know-how" to such an extent that in the Second Air Force, the Army Air Forces' main wartime training agency for Very Heavy Bombardment Groups and crews, the number of B-29 hours flown in March 1946 had fallen to a scant 237.[1/] It was a period finally characterized by excessive instability, and by an enormous turnover of personnel.[2/] Perhaps it was precisely such handicaps which General Quesada had in mind when he stated at a conference

1/ P. 95, Contraction and Decline: The History of the Second Air Force, 2 September 1945 - 30 March 1946

2/ 1. Narrative History of A-1 Activities during 1946

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held in August 1946, "We have all done very, very well under the handicaps we have worked."[3]

Because of the interplay of factors both external as well as internal in nature, Tactical Air Command Maintenance found itself hard pressed to meet its various commitments during the year. It was called upon to provide aircraft for numerous air demonstrations, for air cooperative missions, troop carrier airborne demonstrations, CAP shows and air exhibition teams, for Air Reserve training, for special training of Chinese crews and other foreign nationals[4], and for the amphibious maneuvers on the West Coast. In addition, Maintenance was required to provide aircraft so that rated personnel could obtain their minimum proficiency flying time, a chore of no little magnitude when one considers the heavy load of rated personnel which Tactical Air Command

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[2] 2. Ltr, Hq Marshall Field, file MF 319.1, Subject: Objective Activity Report for Marshall Field, Kansas, for 1946, To: CG, TAC, 2 January 1947

3. 1st Ind., Hq Dover Army Air Field, no file number, 10 September 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Report of Inspection, 30 August 1946

4. Ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 353 (10 Sept 46), Subject: Glider Pilot Training, To: CG, TAC, 10 September 1946, with one indorsement thereto

[3] Minutes of Airborne Troop Carrier Conference, Hq TAC, 22 August 1946

[4] 6th Ind., Hq AAF, file AFCOP-T, 5 April 1946, to ltr, Hq IX TC Comd, file TCCAP, Subject: Operational Capabilities of the IX Troop Carrier Command, To: CG, CAF 7 February 1946

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stations were carrying during these months.[5] The very extent and diversity of these various demands, many of which carried an immediate and high priority, served to preclude full attention from being given to the command's training program during 1946.

Unlike the Strategic Air Command, where very heavy bombers (B-29's) and fighters formed the nucleus of aircraft to be maintained, the Tactical Air Command found itself during 1946 with an entire miscellany of types and models of aircraft to keep in flyable condition. These included C-45's, C-46's, C-47's, C-54's, gliders, and helicopters, AT-6's, P-47's, P-51's, P-61's, A-26's, L-5's, B-17's and B-25's used for administrative flights, the P-80 and the C-82, the latter two of which presented special problems in maintenance. Interchange of models and basic types of unit aircraft often made for difficulties, since it involved "transition" training for mechanics in the maintenance and servicing of new aircraft, a time-consuming process.[6] At Bergstrom Field, for example, the exchange of C-46's for C-54's as the basic aircraft for the 7th Troop Carrier Squadron evoked the following comment from Lt. Colonel Joseph A. Kelly, Deputy Air Inspector, and Colonel J. J. Brogger, Chief of the Maintenance Division for the Tactical Air Command:

5/ Dover Army Air Field, for example, had over 300 pilots assigned during the period April - June 1946. See p. 6, History of Dover Army Air Field for April 1946 - June 1946

6/ 1. P. 57, History of 50th Troop Carrier Wing for 2 September - 30 June 1946
2. Third Air Force Troop Carrier History for 1 April 1946 - 31 October 1946

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> "The specific mission of the 7th Squadron for the employment of C-54's could not be determined. If this employment has as its ultimate objective the development of Troop Carrier techniques for the C-54 then it may be a well worthwhile project. If, on the other hand, the use of C-54's is to train pilots and maintenance personnel of this type equipment it would be an improvident move. The AAF already has the know-how to operate this type aircraft and to train operating personnel in large quantities on relatively short notice." 7/

Twin factors, personnel and parts, were basically at the root of maintenance's "headaches" during 1946. The first of these centered chiefly around a shortage of trained maintenance technicians. In order to project more strikingly the dimensions of this shortage and the devastation which it exercised upon Maintenance and Training, we have constructed below a montage of brief excerpts from inspection reports, unit histories, correspondence, and other data pertaining to Tactical Air Command units and stations during the months March 1946 - December 1946:

> "The number of aircraft maintenance personnel at this Base is inadequate. At the time of the inspection there were forty-four (44) officers and forty-three (43) enlisted men assigned to the maintenance section. Because of the shortage of enlisted men assigned to maintenance, it has been necessary to assign officers to accomplish work in many of the

7/ Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Investigation of Technical Order Compliance at Bergstrom Army Air Field, Austin, Texas, To: CG, TAC, 16 December 1946

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sections. It is estimated that in excess of 50% of the maintenance is being accomplished by officer personnel." -- Report of inspection of Dover AAFld, May 1946 8/

"There were insufficient personnel available to perform maintenance on assigned aircraft by the Production Line Maintenance System." -- Report of inspection of Pope Field, May 1946 9/

"Night flying requirements are not being complied with due to the extreme shortage of maintenance personnel." -- Report of inspection of Dover AAFld, May 1946 10/

"Radar maintenance personnel are extremely short in the 47th Group and the 544th Service Group and urgent request for allotment to schools is requested." -- Report of Supervisory Visit to Lake Charles AAFld, May 1946 11/

8/ Ltr, Office of the Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Supervisory Inspection of Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, To: CG, AAF

9/ Ltr, Office of the Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Special Combined Inspection of Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, To: CG, AAF, 13 May 1946, with four indorsements and one inclosure thereto

10/ Ltr, Office of the Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Supervisory Inspection of the Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, To: CG, AAF, 14 May 1946

11/ Report on Supervisory Visit, Lake Charles Army Air Field, 8-9 May 1946, by Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. Batten, Hq TAC, 13 May 1946

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"The situation insofar as radar maintenance enlisted men is concerned is more than critical. . . . The radio maintenance personnel are likewise a critical shortage and must also be trained." -- Record and Routing Sheet, Military Personnel to A-1, 23 May 1946 12/

"Flying proficiency requirements can be met only if additional qualified mechanics are assigned to this base, or the number of rated pilots assigned greatly reduced. Approximately one hundred ten (110) rated officers are presently assigned whereas current activities require approximately one-third (1/3) this number." -- Report of inspection of Myrtle Beach AAFld, May 1946 13/

"Request for quota of one (1) enlisted man (SSN, 747) in the Weather Observer Course, cannot be favorably considered due to the critical shortage of personnel in the airplane maintenance field." -- Ltr, AAF to TAC, 4 June 1946 14/

12/ Routing and Record Sheet, Military Personnel to A-1, no subject, 23 May 1946

13/ 1st Ind., Hq Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, file 333.1, 29 May 1946, to ltr, Office of the Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Special Combined Inspection of Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, Myrtle Beach, S. C., To: CG, AAF, 14 May 1946

14/ 1st Ind., Hq AAF, file TAC 353 (9 May 46), no date, to ltr, Hq TAC, file 353 (9 May 46), Subject: Training of Assigned Personnel, to CG, AAF, 9 May 1946

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"It is felt that any further work load imposed upon the Maintenance Section in its present under-staffed condition would be at the sacrifice of Maintenance quality and a direct hazard to flying safety . . . Request that a waiver of Non-Compliance with AAF Regulation 50-2 be granted to Rated Flying Personnel assigned to this station for the period of April, May and June 1946." Ltr, Dover AAFld to TAC, 4 June 1946 15/

"It has been difficult to secure personnel with an adequate background and ability to acquire . . . /maintenance/ instruction set forth. In some instances personnel dropped out voluntarily upon realizing that the subject was beyond their comprehension. Rejects amount to approximately seventy-five percent." -- History of Pope Field for July - September 1946 16/

"Tactical unit training is at present at a standstill for lack of qualified glider pilots and especially qualified enlisted men in MOS 559" -- Ltr, 3AF to TAC, August 1946 17/

15/ Ltr, Hq Dover Army Air Field, no file number, Subject: Compliance with AAF Regulation 50-2, To: CG, TAC, 4 June 1946

16/ P. 32, History of Pope Field for 1 July 1946 - 30 September 1946

17/ 1st Ind., Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 353 (15 Aug 46), 21 August 1946 to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 452.1 (15 Aug 46) Misc., Subject: Glider Program, To: CG, 3AF, 15 August 1946

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"As of 31 August 1946, the 99th Fighter Squadron had assigned 6 skilled 747's and 4 skilled 750's, of an authorized 56, for a percentage of 17.9" -- Ind., Lockbourne AAB, October 1946 18/

"A shortage of trained personnel was found to exist in almost every section on the base. 'On the job' training personnel are assigned as crew chiefs in many cases." -- Report of inspection of Lockbourne AAB, August 1946 19/

". . . Only 50% of assigned aircraft were inspected during the month of August which, in the interest of flying safety, is not consistent with the high standards of AAF aircraft maintenance." -- Report of inspection of Smyrna AAFld, September 1946 20/

"The shortage of qualified enlisted maintenance personnel during the period was acute, and consequently, the number of aircraft kept in commission was at a low figure." -- History of 27th TT Squadron, October - December 1946 21/

18/ 3rd Ind., 99th Ftr Sq (SE) 477th Composite Group, 15 October 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 201.62 (1 Oct 46), Subject: Personnel Section, Unit Operational Effectiveness Index, To: CO, Lockbourne AAB, 1 October 1946

19/ Incl #4 of ltr, Hq TAC, Office of the Air Inspector, Subject: Report of Minor Irregularities and Deficiencies Pertaining to Quarterly Inspection of Lockbourne AAB, Columbus, Ohio, To: CO, Lockbourne AAB, 17 August 1946

20/ Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Report of Annual General Inspection, Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee, To: CG, TAC, 24 September 1946

21/ P. 19, History of 27th Tow Target Squadron for October - December 1946

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"There have been sufficient pilots and aircraft assigned to meet the schedule, but there has not been sufficient maintenance personnel assigned to maintain the airplanes. As a result, maintenance personnel have been spread so thin along assigned airplanes, that maintenance efficiency has been very low." -- Ind., Lawson Field, November 1946 22/

"Assigned strength of maintenance personnel, both civilian and military, was found to be inadequate to perform necessary maintenance on the presently assigned 105 aircraft." -- Report of inspection of Bergstrom Field, December 1946 23/

In an attempt to relieve the burden on maintenance resulting from a shortage of maintenance specialists, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, sought in the fall of 1946 to equate the number of aircraft to the number of personnel available to keep them in flyable condition. 24/ Earlier in July, in a letter written over the signature of General Quesada, a request had been made to General Baker to revise the

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22/ 3d Ind., Hq 319th AAF Base Unit, file LFBCO, 18 November 1946, to ltr, Hq AAF, Office of the Field Air Inspector, Gunter Field, no file number, Subject: Report of Inspection of 319th AAFBU, including 75th Troop Carrier Squadron, Lawson Field, Georgia, 16 October 1946

23/ Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Investigation of Technical Order Compliance at Bergstrom Army Air Field, Austin, Texas, To: CG, TAC, 16 December 1946

24/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 8 November 1946
2. Routing and Record Sheet, C&C to A-4, Subject: Report of Inspection of 319th AAFBU including 75th Troop Carrier Squadron, Lawson Field, Georgia, 26 November 1946

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existing system of aircraft distribution by which an organization was initially allocated its T/E aircraft plus an additional number of aircraft called "advance attrition". The additional attrition aircraft assigned the command, it was argued, tended to overburden the command's meager peacetime maintenance personnel and facilities. Secondly, since it was not economical to pickle the additional aircraft, they were flown by the unit and thus deteriorated at the same rate as the T/E aircraft.[25]

Maintenance problems in the Tactical Air Command during 1946 were aggravated by difficulties uncommon in scope in obtaining parts and adequate stock levels for P-80, C-82, C-46, A-26, and P-51 type of aircraft.[26] (Obtainal of parts for P-80 jet aircraft presented a special problem and is discussed below in connection with P-80 maintenance). In reviewing the correspondence with the Air Materiel Commsnd during the year, it seems as though one letter seemed to follow hard on the heels of another with reference to the matters of inadequate supply levels and spare parts. On 10 April, a letter was despatched to the

25/ Ltr, Major General Elwood R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, DCG, AAF, 29 July 1946

26/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 4 November 1946
2. P. 29, History of Pope Field, for 1 July 1946 - 30 September 1946
3. Ltr, Hq 9AF, file 9A4A 452.11, Subject: Supply of Aircraft Parts, To: CG, TAC, 11 September 1946, with two indorsements thereto
4. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 452.11 (6 Aug 46), Subject: Supplies for A-26 Aircraft, To: CG, AAC, 6 August 1946, with two indorsements thereto

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Ninth Air Force requesting that a survey be made of the total number of P-51 type aircraft grounded for parts with a view towards requesting the Air Materiel Command to reestablish contracts for airframe and engine parts considered essential for uninterrupted operation of P-51's.[27] Six days later a letter was sent to the Air Materiel Command in which mention was made of "extreme difficulties" being experienced in maintaining aircraft in flyable status owing to delay of deliveries of aircraft parts and the impossibility of maintaining suitable stock levels. This, it said, was particularly true in the instance of AT-6, B-25, P-51, and P-61 type of aircraft.[28] Inclosed was a copy of an Unsatisfactory Report from McChord Field, Tacoma, Washington, which stated that owing to the unduly great length of time required to procure parts, it had been necessary to "cannibalize" 4 AT-6's to maintain 8 AT-6's, 3 P-51H's to maintain one P-51H, 3 P-61's to maintain 8 P-61's. The effect of this state of affairs on maintenance was noted with the remark that cannibalizing was causing "untold hidden manhours to remove and reinstall parts from one aircraft to another."[29] Difficulties encountered in the

27/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 452.11 (10 Apr 46), Subject: Maintenance Parts, Type P-51 Aircraft, To: CG, 9AF, 10 April 1946

28/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 452.11 (16 Apr 46), Subject: Aircraft Maintenance parts, To: CG, AMC, 16 Apr 1946, with one inclosure thereto

29/ Unsatisfactory Report, McChord Field, found as inclosure to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 452.11 (16 Apr 46), Subject: Aircraft Maintenance Parts, To: CG, AMC, 16 Apr 1946

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same month in obtaining parts for P-51H aircraft was one of the reasons which impelled the retention of the type of P-51D model by two Groups of the Ninth Air Force,[30] although General Sanders, Commanding General of that Air Force, had personally protested to General Quesada the retention of the P-51D on the grounds that the model was structurally unsound.[31]

In May, the parts situation was again the subject of correspondence with Air Materiel Command. At this time particular reference was made to 91 P-51 aircraft in the Ninth Air Force which were grounded for an average of 12.8 days during the period 8 January - 24 April 1946. Because of this, it was stated, those aircraft in commission required more maintenance in view of the unequal distribution of flying hours among assigned aircraft.[32]

Possibly at the root of some of the supply difficulties of the period lay the perennial problem of maldistribution and the unfamiliarity of new personnel both on the bases and in the depots with proper supply procedures. Certainly something seemed amiss somewhere when

30/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 17 April 1946
2. Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Brigadier General Homer L. Sanders, CG, 9AF, 3 May 1946

31/ Ltr, Brigadier General Homer L. Sanders, CG, 9AF, To: Major General Elwood R. Quesada, CG, TAC, 10 April 1946

32/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 452.11 (16 May 46), Subject: Maintenance Parts, P-51 Aircraft, To: CG, AMC, 16 May 1946, with two indorsements thereto

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Tactical Air Command P-51 aircraft were being grounded for 12.8 days, and difficulty was being encountered in obtaining A-26 spares, all the while the Air Materiel Command asserted that it had a supply in excess of 39 months requirements for P-51 type of aircraft and that, in general, the current A-26 spares inventories were in a "satisfactory status."[33/] Undoubtedly, however, other factors entered into the situation. As the A-4 for the Twelfth Air Force remarked: "Airplanes are either so new or so old that the parts section faces a critical shortage from the contractors."[34/] Procurement was thus one major source of difficulty. Inventory problems encountered by the Air Materiel Command were another.[35/] And still another factor which aggravated existing difficulties was the high percentage of replacement parts necessary when aircraft were placed in service from a storage status. Finally, procurement of parts for certain aircraft - notably the C-46 and the A-26 - had been curtailed at the end of the war and difficulties were anticipated in obtaining replacement parts for certain classes of items.[36/] The supply of AT-6 parts

33/ 1. 1st Ind., Hq AMC, no file number, [undated], to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 452.11 (16 May 46), Subject: Maintenance Parts, P-51 Aircraft, To: CG, AMC, 16 May 1946
2. Ltr, Hq Lake Charles AAFld, file 452, Subject: Supply Status of A-26 B&C (Pathfinder), To: CG, 9AF, 26 June 1946, with four indorsements thereto

34/ Pp. 51-52, History of the Twelfth Air Force for 17 May - 31 December 1946

35/ Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-5 and Chief of Staff, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947

36/ Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Spare Parts for A-26 and C-46 Type Aircraft, To: CG, TAC, 19 December 1946, with Record and Routing Sheet attached

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became so critical that flying in that type of aircraft had to be curtailed until spare parts could be retrieved from the War Assets Administration and from various AAF agencies.[37]

The lamentable state of Technical Order compliance was indeed a cause for concern to the command during 1946. In part this could be attributed to lack of kits, but chiefly it could be attributed to inexperienced personnel and to the failure on the part of maintenance supervisors to brief their subordinates on the Technical Orders applicable to the aircraft which they were maintaining. In July, Technical Order compliance was made a "special subject" for Air Inspectors throughout the command.[38] In September a TAC Regulation was published prescribing construction of charts designed to show the status of compliance with Technical Orders and familiarization by maintenance personnel with pertinent Technical Orders.[39] A month later the command issued a mimeographed letter, saying that in view of the "low experience level, quality of maintenance and the lack of technical knowledge of maintenance personnel

37/ Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Critical Shortage of AT-6 Spare Parts, To: CG, 12AF, 30 December 1946

38/ TAC Ltr 121-7, Subject: "Failure to Comply with Technical Orders", 18 July 1946

39/ TAC Regulation 65-17, "Technical Order, Parts, Procurement, Compliance, and Familiarization Charts", 11 October 1946

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throughout the command", certain Technical Orders listed in the letter were to be "required reading" for maintenance officers, supervisors and technicians.[40/]

Despite constant hammering by the command on Technical Order compliance, the results could scarcely be described as being eminently satisfactory. A survey made in November revealed that for the 653 aircraft assigned to the command, there was a total Technical Order backlog of 46,928 manhours, or an average backlog per aircraft of 47.55 manhours. To this total backlog, Bergstrom Field, alone, with 23,978 manhours, contributed approximately half. At that station the average backlog per aircraft assigned was 342.54 mahours.[41/] Indeed, as the Tactical Air Command Air Inspector remarked at a staff conference in December, Bergstrom Field could not possibly comply with all required Technical Orders in a month's time even if, as he said, "they stopped everything else and worked [solely] on that." As he explained, Bergstrom Field had gotten "in the hole" on its maintenance during the Chinese training program when there were many heavy demands made on Maintenance in order to meet training commitments.[42/]

40/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 400.312 (22 Oct 46), Subject: Technical Order Familiarization, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 22 October 1946

41/ Table, "Technical Order Compliance of 9th Air Force Stations," contained as inclosure to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 400.312 (21 Dec 46), Subject: Compliance with Technical Orders, To: CG, 9AF, 20 December 1946

42/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 9 December 1946

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In a letter to the Ninth Air Force in December 1946, the Tactical Air Command noted that stations assigned to that command were "outstanding" in their non-compliance with Technical Orders. The average backlog in manhours per aircraft in the Ninth Air Force, it was stated, was over nine times that of the rest of the command. Nor could lack of parts be blamed for this deplorable condition, since surveys had indicated that in the majority of instances, kits were available to comply with Technical Orders. The command directed that a "vigorous campaign" be instituted for the accomplishment of outstanding Technical Orders.[43] From the period of 6 January - 18 January 1947, emphasis was to be placed on Technical Order compliance and maintenance improvement in general, and with first priority over flying training.[44]

A clue to the extent to which Maintenance was performing its mission during 1946 is to be found in flying time statistics for the year. In April, Tactical Air Command stations and units flew 32,489 hours. In the following month the total rose to 34,521 hours, a rate exceeded only by the Flying Training Command which flew 44,067 hours.[45] Probably because of the Chinese training program, the TAC rate ascended to 39,835 hours in June, the high point for the year. In July the number

43/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 400.312 (21 Dec 46), Subject: Compliance with Technical Orders, To: CG, 9AF, 20 December 1946

44/ TWX, Hq TAC, A4B 839, To: CO, 300th AAF Base Unit, 17 December 1946

45/ TAC Aircraft Accident Prevention Data bulletin, 9 September 1946

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of hours dropped to 30,994 and in August to 27,528.[46] In September there was still a further drop to 25,293 hours.[47] Already increasing concern was being manifested in Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, over the drop in flying hours, especially since the accident rate was increasing while the number of hours flown was decreasing. In August, for example, Tactical Air Command pilots flew an average of 10.8 hours, while the average TAC aircraft was flown only .86 hours per day. Both of these figures were considered too low, and General Quesada indicated that he would not be satisfied with less than twenty hours flying per pilot each month.[48] Lockbourne, Smyrna, Tuskegee, Bergstrom, Lake Charles, were way below this desired minimum, and in addition, were low in the number of hours flown per aircraft per day.[49] Observed the editors of Tactical Air Command's Aircraft Accident Prevention Data bulletin in September: "There are two obvious ways of bettering the poor records as shown above. One is better maintenance. For August, aircraft in commission throughout Tactical Air Command averaged only 50%. The other way is better scheduling of aircraft so as to increase the utilization of

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46/ Flying time statistics are contained in a Table, "Accident Rate Per 1000 Flying Hours", contained in Aircraft Accident Prevention Data Bulletin, 16 September 1946

47/ TAC Aircraft Accident Prevention Data bulletin, 14 October 1946

48/ 1. Ltr, CG, TAC, file TAC 210.49 (18 Sept 46), Subject: Inadequate Flying Training, To: CG, 9AF, 18 September 1946
2. TAC Aircraft Accident Prevention Data bulletin, 23 September 1946

49/ TAC Aircraft Accident Prevention Data bulletin, 23 September 1946 (See sup. doc. #48[2])

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available aircraft hours and to derive more profitable individual and unit training from these hours flown."[50]

Possibly as a result of the increased emphasis upon a greater number of flying hours, the field responded with 29,513 hours during October, a not insignificant accomplishment in view of the fact that several Groups and an air force headquarters - the Ninth - were involved in moves, and the number of pilots assigned to the command suffered a reduction in the force-out program then being instituted.[51] In November, however, the flying time for the command dropped over 5000 hours below that of the previous month, in part because of restrictions on flying owing to the coal crisis, and in part because of the drop in assigned pilot strength. The total flying time reported for November was 23,862 hours.[52]

Possibly a factor contributing to low in-commission rates and to a decreasing number of flying hours was the absence during peacetime of the incentive and will to work which normally are corollaries to wartime operations. At a staff conference in December 1946, in Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, General Carter, Deputy Commanding General, made several observations which might seem to confirm this hypothesis. He stated that during the war, in New Guinea, C-47's had

50/ Ibid.

51/ TAC Aircraft Accident Prevention Data bulletin, 25 November 1946

52/ TAC Aircraft Accident Prevention Data bulletin, 23 December 1946

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been operated "from 150 hours on "per month, with the necessary maintenance being done in the open and with 88% in commission being achieved. "We didn't have Service Groups either," said General Carter. "Most of the maintenance was done by personnel assigned in tactical units." He concluded: "It just goes to show what can be done when you have a reason. Back here if there is no other reason, the CO has to make a reason."[53] All of which, most commanding officers would probably agree, was easier said than done. Scarcely a month or two earlier, Colonel Phillips, A-1 for the Tactical Air Command, had been noting the prevalence throughout the command of an apathetic attitude which could be considered peculiar to the era of peacetime military operations and which found articulate expression in the phrase that there was no need to "burn oneself out."[54]

The P-80 and the C-82, aircraft new to Tactical Air Command flight lines during 1946, posed special problems for maintenance during the year. The problems relating to the P-80 maintenance are deemed to be of such significance that a special section has been devoted to them below. With the C-82, maintenance problems centered chiefly around abortions, equipment failures, necessary modifications, and the need to

53/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 9 December 1946

54/ Vid supra p. 96

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indoctrinate personnel in maintenance procedures peculiar to that type of aircraft.[55] "The main difficulty" observed the 316th Troop Carrier Group, is "the lack of experienced engineering personnel." To overcome this difficulty, the unit established a ground maintenance school. On 1 May, the 316th Group considered itself sufficiently advanced in C-82 operations to accept command missions, and shortly thereafter the first mission, participation in the supply of P-89's in Project Comet, followed.[56] In September the disadvantages of the C-82 from an operational and engineering standpoint were summarized in a special report prepared by the 316th Troop Carrier Group.[57] In brief, maintenance of the C-82 was considered "difficult" by the Engineering Section of the 316th Group, for the following reasons:

1. There was a continual breakdown of a great variety of untested vital parts, and there was a lack of replacement parts.

55/ 1. Pp. 10, History of 316th Troop Carrier Group for 1 July 1946 - 31 December 1946
2. Pp. 3-4, C-82 Phase of Operation Comet, a chapter contained in History of Troop Carrier Air Force, November 1945 - September 1946
3. Study, "Comments and Recommendations on C-82 Aircraft", compiled from information furnished by A-3 and Aircraft Engineering Sections, Hq 3AF(TC), 1 July 1946
4. History of 62nd Troop Carrier Group for 1 July 1946 - 31 December 1946 (pp. 32-33)

56/ P. 15, History of 316th Troop Carrier Group for 2 September 1946 - 30 June 1946

57/ Ltr, Hq 316th Troop Carrier Group, file 16GPOPN 452, Subject: C-82 Disadvantages, To: CG, 3AF(TC), 23 September 1946, with three indorsements and one inclosure

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2. Inasmuch as the C-82 was larger than other cargo and troop carrier aircraft, and utilized larger type engines, maintenance requirements were correspondingly increased. The electrical system materially increased the work load and required highly trained specialists. Inspections were required more frequently. Items normally inspected every 100 or 300 hours on a C-47 or C-46 aircraft had to be inspected every 25 or 50 hours on the C-82.

3. Experience had demonstrated a need for 48 manhours, after a normal cross country flight of about eight hours, to return aircraft to flyable status, when only minor maintenance was necessary.

4. Upon returning from a twelve ship flight of about eight hours duration, but four aircraft were flyable on the following day. Maintenance difficulties ranged from oil leaks to landing gear failures. On almost every flight, eight (80) percent of the aircraft developed oil leaks of some description. This condition alone tended to make heavy demands upon the Engineering Section. 58/

In order to improve maintenance throughout the command, the Tactical Air Command, in conjunction with the Air Materiel Command, instituted an Engine Conditioning Program, which was scheduled to be published in the form of a Technical Order. A logical system of engine adjustment was planned, commencing with carburetor idle adjustment, magneto timing, and spark plug installation. A scientific method of "trouble shooting" was included, using the dead cylinder indicator (magic wand) and checking each contributing system in turn. 59/

A further measure instituted by the command to raise the calibre of maintenance was the organization in the fall of 1946 of a team of maintenance and supply specialists to assist each air force in

58/ Ibid.

59/ Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-5 and Chief of Staff, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947 (See sup. doc. #35)

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instituting a maintenance improvement program for its bases. The subjects to be given "special consideration" by the team ranged over the broad fields of Maintenance and AAF Supply. The numbered air forces were directed to establish maintenance and supply teams, to be available to accompany the TAC team upon its arrival at Lake Charles Army Air Field and to aid in the evolving of a standard program.[60]

60/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file 400.4 (28 Sept 46), Subject: Supply and Maintenance Improvement Program, To: CG, 9AF, 28 September 1946

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P-80 Maintenance

Unquestionably the most challenging problem with which Tactical Air Command Maintenance was confronted during 1946 was in the field of jet maintenance. The "maladies" alone peculiar to P-80 aircraft were such as constantly to preoccupy not only some of the best maintenance minds in the Twelfth Air Force and the Tactical Air Command but in the Air Materiel Command and the Lockheed factory as well.

According to the A-4 Section in Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, practically every P-80 in operation during 1946 developed loose rivets in trailing edges of flaps, trim tabs, and over the aircraft in general,[61] necessitating on new production aircraft alone some two to three hundred manhours of sheet metal rework.[62] In some cases, airduct vanes were pulling loose and were being blown into the engine section.[63] Another source of trouble was the aileron boost unit.

61/ 1. Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-[illegible] and Chief of Staff, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947
2. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 412th Ftr Gp (P-80 Jet), file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF 21 June 1946

62/ Memorandum Report on Unsatisfactory Reports on P-80 Airplanes, prepared by the Aircraft Section, Procurement Division, Hq AMC, 20 November 1946, contained as inclosure to ltr, Office of Tactical Air Command Liaison Officer, Wright Field, Subject: Unsatisfactory Reports on P-80 Aircraft, To: CG, TAC, 16 December 1946

63/ 1. Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-5 and C/S, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947 (See sup. doc. #61[1])
2. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 1st Ftr Gp, file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 9 August 1946, with one indorsement and one inclosure thereto

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The hydraulic pump was activated by an electric motor so that electrical failure immediately caused the aileron boost unit to become inoperative.[64]

The J-33-11 power unit was at times a source of grief. The inner lines of the combustion chambers had to be changed frequently and the buckets of the turbine wheel slipped back and forth after a few hours of flight, making engine changes frequent and causing a number of accidents.[65]

Through constant experimentation by the Air Materiel Command and the Lockheed factory, and subsequent change of the manufacturing processes, the life of the inner lines of the combustion chambers was extended to equal the life of the engine. The turbine wheel also underwent improvement but remained in some instances a source of difficulty in the turbo jet engines.[66]

In May, Project Comet brought to light certain "maladies" encountered in the operation of P-80 aircraft. Considerable trouble was encountered during this flight with landing gear failures. Frequent replacements of main landing gear wheels were necessary. The

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64/ Record and Routing Sheet, A-4 to A-5 and Chief of Staff, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947 (See sup. doc. #61[1])

65/ 1. Ibid.
2. Maintenance Journal, Hq TAC, for 24 June 1946

66/ Record and Routing Sheet, A-2 to A-5 and Chief of Staff, Subject: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, 3 January 1947 (See sup. doc. #61[1])

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design of wing fuel filler wells, it was also reported, left "much to be desired" since water accumulating during inclement weather could not drain out and had to be blown out with air hoses. It was felt also that "adequate and proper" modification should be made on the air duct vane anchorage on P-80 aircraft. This particular item, it was said, "has been a maintenance headache since receipt of P-80 aircraft and will continue to require expenditure of manhours to repair until air ducts are redesigned instead of temporary stop-gap fixes that are authorized at present."[67]

In June, the Air Materiel Command was requested by the Tactical Air Command to give a number one priority to all Unsatisfactory Reports involving P-80 aircraft and equipment during the "present critical stage" of P-80 operations. It requested also that a Liaison Officer be stationed at March Field to evaluate the Unsatisfactory Reports and to monitor the recommendations made concerning them.[68]

It is in part symptomatic of the extent of "maladies" encountered in the P-80 that in August 1946 the P-80 accident rate rose

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67/ 1. RESTRICTED Resume of Project "Comet" from Maintenance Standpoint, contained as inclosure to ltr, Hq 412th Ftr Gp (P-80 Jet), no file number, Subject: Resume of Project "Comet" From Maintenance Standpoint, To: CG, 12AF, 21 June 1946
2. RESTRICTED ltr, 412th Ftr Gp (P-80 Jet), file 452.1 (P-80 Jet), Subject: Weekly Reporr of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 7 June 1946

68/ 1. Maintenance Journal, Hq TAC, for 5 June 1946
2. Record and Routing Sheet, A43 Maintenance to A-3, Subject: Liaison Officer from AMC to March Field, 5 June 1946

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to the astronomical figure of 1055 which meant a major accident for each 95 hours flown. From this time on, however, the accident rate began to fall, averaging less than 300 during the last quarters of 1946.[69]

Jet maintenance required a specialized "know how" which few mechanics in the Tactical Air Command possessed during the early months of the jet program. Moreover, the enlisted personnel situation was in such a state of flux, what with the separation of numerous AUS personnel and the increasing acquisition of Regular Army personnel, that little headway could be made with operational flying or P-80 maintenance during the spring of 1946. Because many of the mechanics received by the 412th Fighter Group (later redesignated the 1st Fighter Group) were not basically fighter mechanics, and few, if any, had ever worked or had received instruction on P-80 maintenance, Training Command quotas had to be requested for P-80 maintenance officers and airplane and engine mechanic specialists.[70]

Effective P-80 maintenance in the 1st Fighter Group was often circumscribed by an inadequate Table of Organization for the Group Engineering section. Late in May, Colonel Bruce K. Holloway, Commanding

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69/ Record and Routing Sheet, Historical to Flying Safety, Subject: Request for Historical Data, 17 December 1947

70/ 1. P. 43, History of the 1st Fighter Group for 1 April 1946 - 30 September 1946
2. Record and Routing Sheet, Military Personnel to A-1, Subject: P-80 Courses /no date/

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Officer of the Group (then the 412th), petitioned for a change in the T/O which would allow for additional inspection personnel. In justification for his request, Colonel Holloway pointed to the frequency of required inspections and engine unit replacement interval (50 hours) and the "highly unstabilized" modification status of the P-80. Colonel Holloway further requested that three additional enlisted men qualified as painters (MOS 144) be assigned to the Group. He observed that reliable Lockheed estimates had it that the P-80 was from 30 to 40 miles per hour faster with paint then without it. Remarked Colonel Holloway: "It is conceivable that possibly 25 to 40% of this gain in performance would be lost if the paint finish were not maintained."[71/]

Probably the most serious deficiency of the existing Table of Organization for the 1st Fighter Group seemed to be in its inadequate allotment of sheet metal workers. Colonel Holloway requested that two additional sheet metal workers (MOS 555) be assigned to accomplish sheet metal work on the Group's P-80's, work, which he noted, was in excess of that required on conventional type of fighter aircraft.[72/] Whether the T/O was not modified or whether there were no 555's to be had at all we do not know, but we find the Group again pressing for the assignment of additional sheet metal workers in July, and requesting

71/ Ltr, Hq 412th Ftr Gp (P-80 Jet), no file number, Subject: Equipment and Personnel Required for Jet Organization in Addition to Standard Tables of Organization and Equipment, To: CG, AAF, 29 May 1946

72/ Ibid.

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that the Twelfth Air Force bring to the attention of the Tactical Air Command the "critical shortage" of sheet metal specialists in P-80 operating activities. In October, inspectors from the office of the Field Air Inspector, endeavoring to explain the low in-commission status of P-80 aircraft in the 1st Fighter Group, pointed a finger at the inadequacies of the existing Table of Organization with reference to sheet metal workers. Noted the inspectors: " . . . The T/O & E's for the Fighter Group and Air Engineering Squadron do not provide sufficient sheet metal workers nor are they presently assigned."[73/]

The in-commission statistics for P-80's assigned to the 1st Fighter Group are revealing of the state of jet maintenance during 1946. For the week ending 1 July, 34% of the aircraft were in commission. For the week ending 30 August, 53% of the P-80's were in commission.[74/] Two weeks later the in-commission rate dropped to 17% of the aircraft assigned.[75/] Inspectors visiting March Field in October expressed concern over the in-commission status of P-80 type aircraft assigned to the

73/ Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Gunter Field, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Inspection of March Field, Including 1st Fighter Group and 361st Air Service Group, To: CO, March Field, 4 October 1946

74/ Ltr, Hq 1st Ftr Gp, file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Reportof P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 30 August 1946

75/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 1st Ftr Gp, file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 13 September 1946, with one inclosure thereto

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1st Fighter Group, noting that not only had the rate been low but that it was going downward. For 60 days prior to 25 September, stated the inspectors, an average of 37% of the P-80 aircraft had been in commission. For the week ending 21 September, the in-commission rate had fallen to 22% and for the week ending 26 September to 17 percent. The inspectors attributed this decline to three "primary" factors: the excessive amount of sheet metal work, design weaknesses in the P-80 aircraft delivered from the factory, and the spare parts situation.[76]

In October the aircraft in-commission rates showed no perceptible improvement over those in September.[77] In November, however, there was a marked upsurge in the rates, owing to the participation of the 1st Fighter Group in the west coast amphibious maneuvers. Headquarters Twelfth Air Force reported that 61% of the aircraft were in commission during the exercises. Four hundred and seven sorties were flown, with but 14 abortive missions.[78]

The parts situation for P-80 aircraft was a major source of concern to the Tactical Air Command during 1946 and was the subject of

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76/ Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Gunter Field, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Inspection of March Field, Including 1st Fighter Group and 361st Air Service Group, To: CO, March Field, 4 October 1946 (See sup. doc. #73)

77/ Weekly Reports of P-80 Activities prepared by Headquarters First Fighter Group, dated 11 October 1946, 17 October 1946, 23 October 1946, and 30 October 1946

78/ 1st Ind., Hq 12AF, file 452.1, 6 December 1946, to ltr, 1st Ftr Group, file 452.1, Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 29 November 1946

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no inconsiderable amount of correspondence with the Air Materiel Command, some of which was conducted on top level between General Quesada and General Twining.[79] In April, the Tactical Air Command stated that the 412th Fighter Group was experiencing "extreme" difficulties in obtaining aircraft storage batteries in an amount consistent with its operational requirements. For lack of these batteries, the Tactical Air Command continued, aircraft of the 412th had been out of commission since February 1946.[80] The Air Material Command, in its reply, attributed the shortage to "production difficulties" and the "extremely high rate" of the batteries. Relief from the existing supply shortage, the Air Materiel Command stated, might be expected within 60-75 days.[81]

Over and over again the 1st Fighter Group complained concerning

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79/ 1. Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General N. F. Twining, Hq AMC, 8 July 1946
2. Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General N. F. Twining, Hq AMC, 17 July 1946

80/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 452.11 (24 Apr 46), Subject: Storage Batteries, Class 03-J, To: CG, AMC, 24 April 1946, with two indorsements thereto

81/ 1. 1st Ind., Hq AMC, Wright Field, file 452.1, 1 May 1946, to ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 452.11 (24 Apr 46), Subject: Storage Batteries, Class 03-J, To: CG, AMC, 24 April 1946 (See sup. doc. #80)
2. The expectation of "relief" within 60-75 days turned out to be a rather rosy estimate. On 25 November, the A-4 Section was noting that batteries for P-80 aircraft were still a "critical item". This, is explained, was due to "labor troubles" in the manufacturing plants. The Air Materiel Command had issued contracts for 5000 batteries but was unable to get delivery. See Record and Routing Sheet A3A to Chief of Staff, A-3 and A-4, Subject: FP-80 Activity Report, 18 November 1946

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the supply situation, as it pertained to P-80 type aircraft. Typical comments are the following:

"Lack of P-80 parts still stands as the major factor for the number of AOCP's and the outstanding reason for the low percentage of aircraft in commission at this time." -- Weekly Report, 31 May 1946[82]

"It is inconceivable to understand why Headquarters AAC, stated in their 1st Indorsement to the letter from Hq. TAC /that/ sufficient parts are available. . . . (while) local supply agencies are not able to obtain the necessary parts" -- Weekly Report, 7 June 1946[83]

"The supply situation as regards to P-80 replacement parts is steadily growing worse instead of getting better as has been promised by all higher echelons of supply." -- Weekly Report, 21 June 1946[84]

82/ RESTRICTED ltr, 412th Ftr Gp (P-80 Jet), file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 31 May 1946

83/ RESTRICTED ltr, 412th Ftr Gp (P-80 Jet), file 452.1 (P-80 Jet), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 7 June 1946 (See sup. doc. #67[2])

84/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 412th Ftr Gp (P-80 Jet), file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 21 June 1946 (See sup. doc. #61[2])

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In July, the P-80 parts situation was made the subject of a letter from General Quesada to General Twining, Commanding General of the Air Materiel Command, General Quesada stated that of the 81 P-80's assigned to the 1st Fighter Group, 39 were out of commission for parts. General Quesada further observed that while approximately 30% of the P-80's assigned had been out of commission over the past four month period, the rate was now approaching 50%. He suggested that representatives of both Commands be sent to March Field to investigate the supply difficulties existing there with reference to P-80 parts.[85] In a subsequent letter to General Twining, General Quesada attributed some of the P-80 supply difficulties to "lack of supervision" on the part of supply personnel at March Field itself.[86] Be that as it may, the parts situation by November was again somewhat gloomy, with Major General George L. Hicks, Assistant Air Inspector for the Tactical Air Command, commenting thus:

> "It is realized that numerous conferences and investigations have been held on the subject of AOCP for P-80 aircraft, but outward appearances indicate that verbal promises and follow-ups have bogged down at some higher echelon. The fact remains that conditions at the using level have not improved since July 1946 and in many cases have shown a backward trend." [87]

85/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General N. F. Twining, Hq AMC, 8 July 1946 (See sup. doc. #791)

86/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, CG, TAC, To: Lieutenant General N. F. Twining, Hq AMC, 17 July 1946 (See sup. doc. #792)

87/ Ltr, Office of Air Inspector, Hq TAC, Subject: AOCP of P-80 Type Aircraft, To: Inspector General, Hq TAC, 15 November 1946

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On the basis of Major Hicks' report, the inadequacy of AOCP parts procurement for P-80 type aircraft was made the subject of an AAF Special Case Report in December.[88] In his first indorsement to the report, Colonel Gilbert Myers, Commanding Officer of the 1st Fighter Group, pointed out that items on the AOCP list for April 1946, were still to be found on the AOCP list for September and October 1946. This, said Colonel Myers, could be accepted as an indication of the fact that the AMC procurement and supply system as it pertained to P-80 aircraft at March Field was "inadequate and inefficient."[89] The Twelfth Air Force's indorsement to this communication was lukewarm in tone and expressed the view that as the result of personal visits by members of the Twelfth Air Force staff to Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, a satisfactory solution to the parts problem would shortly be attained.[90]

88/ Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case Report, AAF Special - Inadequacy of AOCP Parts Procurement for P-80 Type Aircraft, To: CG, TAC, 4 December 1946, with three indorsements thereto

89/ 1st Ind., Hq 1st Ftr Gp, no file number, 16 December 1946, to ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case Report, AAF Special - Inadequacy of AOCP Parts Procurement for P-80 Type Aircraft, To: CG, TAC, 4 December 1946 (See sup. doc. #88)

90/ 3rd Ind., Hq 12AF, file 452.11, 15 January 1947, to ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case Report, AAF Special - Inadequacy of AOCP Parts Procurement for P-80 Type Aircraft, To: CG, TAC, 4 December 1946 (See sup. doc. #88)

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Next to spare parts, the matter of Depot Inspection and Repair for P-80 aircraft assigned to the 1st Fighter Group was a subject for protracted negotiation with the Air Materiel Command. In August, Depot Inspection and Repair processes were recommended for P-80 aircraft after approximately 100 hours of operational time. The 1st Fighter Group, in its Weekly Report for 30 August 1946, held out the sanguine hope that once this project was authorized and in operation, the percentage of aircraft in commission would undergo an increase and that the condition of the aircraft would be better.[91] Although the project was approved, actual accomplishment of the Depot Inspection and Repair procedures had by November not been achieved. At the San Bernardino Air Materiel Area where the DIR work was scheduled to be completed, the necessary major parts and assemblies were not on hand nor on procurement. A representative of the Lockheed factory stated that he did not know how San Bernardino could ever process one aircraft through Depot Inspection and Repair, in view of the existing state of supplies, and the low priority (2-8) given the project.[92] With 21 of the 59 P-80's assigned to the 1st Fighter Group then ready for DIR, and with the outlook for the return of aircraft from DIR resting

91/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 1st Ftr Gp, file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF 30 August 1946 (See sup. doc. #74)

92/ Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: AOCP of P-80 Type Aircraft, To: Inspector General, Hq TAC, 15 November 1946 (See sup. doc. #87)

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at "zero", the conclusion seemed inescapable that the 1st Fighter Group would be grounded within three months unless new aircraft were assigned.[93]

Early in December, the state of the 1st Fighter Group's DIR program was, like the spare parts situation, made the subject of an AAF Special Case Report. In the basic communication, it was noted that with 38 of the Group's 59 P-80 aircraft ready for DIR, and with the remainder to be ready on the conclusion of the amphibious maneuvers, there could be no doubt but that the tactical efficiency of the 1st Fighter Group would be "seriously impaired" by a lack of aircraft to fly.[94] To this, Colonel Myers, Commanding Officer of the Group, added the following comment:

> "The importance of DIR procedure as regards operating efficiency of P-80 tactical units cannot be overemphasized. It is inevitable that if no ships were lost due to transfer or crashes that the maintenance overload would be so great, somewhere in the vicinity of the 150 to 200 hour bracket (airplane time) that operations would be drastically curtailed." [95]

93/ Ibid.

94/ Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case Report, AAF Special - Depot Inspection and Repair Program, To: CG, TAC, 4 December 1946, with two indorsements and one inclosure thereto

95/ 1st Ind., Hq 1st Ftr Gp, no file number, 16 December 1946, to ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case Report, AAF Special - Depot Inspection and Repair Program, To: CG, TAC, 4 December 1946 (See sup. doc. #94)

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The Twelfth Air Force, however, in its indorsement, stated, in effect, that the matter in question had already been negotiated by a personal visit on the part of certain members of its staff to Headquarters, Air Material Command, and that no further action was deemed necessary.[96]

96/ 3rd Ind., Hq 12AF, file 452.11, 15 January 1946, to ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case Report, AAF Special - Depot Inspection and Repair Program, To: CG, TAC, 4 December 1946 (See sup. doc. #94)

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Maintenance Organization

Prior to August 1946, there was no standard system of aircraft maintenance in the Tactical Air Command. In what was the domain of the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) the system of maintenance prevailing among stations of that command was that prescribed by an old Troop Carrier Command directive, which was described as being "impractical" for peacetime operations.[97] Within the remainder of the Tactical Air Command, Production Line Maintenance seemed to be favored, although in some units, the Squadron Maintenance system was in vogue. For example, on a supervisory visit to Lake Charles Army Air Field late in February 1946, members of the A-4 Section in Headquarters, Third Air Force, found that maintenance in the 47th Bombardment Group was organized along lines similar to the old pre-war Group.[98] That is, maintenance responsibility was equally divided among the four squadrons, with each squadron organized to maintain those aircraft assigned to their unit. No standardization of maintenance systems existed within the Group, each squadron using somewhat of a different system. It could be generally stated, however, said the visiting officers, that with minor variations, the old "crew chief" system with assigned crews was the most predominate system used. Some squadrons used

97/ Ltr, Hq 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 300.6, Subject: Directive for Aircraft Maintenance, To: CG, TAC, 6 August 1946 with one indorsement thereto

98/ Record and Routing Sheet, Chief of Maintenance to Director of Supply and Maintenance, Hq 3AF, Subject: Report of Supervisory Visit - Lake Charles AAF, 26 February 1946

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specialized periodic inspection crews for the 50-, 100-, hour and subsequent inspections. All other maintenance however, was accomplished by regularly assigned crews.[99]

Apparently, the existence of a Squadron System of Maintenance in the 47th Group was looked upon with disfavor in Tampa, for in the next extant reference to the 47th Group, in a report of a supervisory visit conducted at Lake Charles in May, we find that the Group had been operating under a Production line Maintenance system over a period of three months.[100] In part because of this system, and in part because 2nd echelon maintenance had been assigned to the Service Group, aircraft-in-commission percentages at Lake Charles had dropped, although there had been no actual loss of mechanics.[101] As a result, Production Line Maintenance was temporarily discontinued, and responsibility for the inspection of all aircraft assigned to the 47th Group was accepted by that Group under the Squadron Maintenance system.[102] A report made by the 47th

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99/ Ibid

100/ Report on Supervisory Visit, Lake Charles Army Air Field, 8-9 May 1946, prepared on 13 May 1946 by Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. Batten, A-3 Section, Hq TAC

101/ Ibid

102/ Ltr, Hq 47th Bombardment Group, Subject: Squadron System Maintenance, To: CG, TAC, 9 July 1946

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Group in July indicated overwhelming sentiment for retention of the Squadron System of maintenance.[103]

In August, the Tactical Air Command published its Regulation 65-1 which became the basis for the maintenance organization for the command. Briefly, under the provisions of this regulation, the base unit was to furnish first, second, and third echelon maintenance for base and transient aircraft, and, when necessary, was required to assist the Service Group in fulfilling its functions. The Air Service Group, through its engineering squadron, was to provide third echelon maintenance for associated tactical units. The tactical Group was to be responsible for first and second echelons of maintenance. Actual maintenance was to be accomplished by each individual squadron of the Group under the supervision of the Group S-4. Periodic inspections of aircraft were scheduled to be conducted by the Squadron maintenance section.[104]

103/ Ibid

104/ TAC Regulation 65-1, "Supply and Maintenance of TAC Units", 7 August 1946

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SECTION FOUR

TRAINING

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I

FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROGRESS OF TRAINING

The establishment of a training program to fit the specific mission of a peacetime command charged with cooperative training and with the support of the surface forces was to prove a difficult problem to the Tactical Air Command during its formative months. In the division of training responsibilities, the Tactical Air Command, like the Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command, was charged with the molding of individuals into units prepared for combat operations. Individual training was essentially the province of the Training Command.[1/]

In the building of a program to enable it to fulfill its postwar mission, the new command was faced with the still continuing disintegrating pressure resulting from the demobilization of the armed forces. It was further handicapped by the uncertainties stemming from the interim nature of the mission of the command.

In discussing the general situation of the formative period and its effect on the command, General Quesada, in an article in the

1/ 1. Article, "The Future of the Army Air Forces," by General Carl Spaatz (See sup. doc. #13, Chapter, "Acquisition and Loss of Bases")
2. Memorandum for CG, TAC, by Colonel W. W. Momyer, Subject: Comments on Chapter I of the History of the Tactical Air Command for the Year 1946, 11 August 1948

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September 1947 Military Review, remarks that, "after the bulk of the demobilization following the defeat of Japan was completed, the command was engaged in finding men to man its tactical units and throughout 1946 was largely preoccupied with training individuals to perform their jobs."[2/]

Although the command was thus largely preoccupied with the necessity for conducting individual training, it was also setting up and developing a unit training program. Special emphasis was given to the training of the 362nd Fighter Group, the 47th Bombardment Group, and the 1st Fighter Group, whose manning and equipment requirements had been given top priority.[3/]

Before progress could be made, however, in establishing the content and direction of a long range program, the training mission of the command had to be clarified since the interim promulgation of its mission seems to have lacked much in concreteness. In an inspection of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, by one of the Field Air Inspectors, in June 1946, the following observation was made:[4/]

2/ Article, "The Tactical Air Command Today", by Major General E. R. Quesada, contained in Military Review, September 1947

3/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (19 Apr 46), Subject: Manning 362nd Fighter Group and 471st Air Service Group, 19 April 1946

4/ Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Inspection of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia, To: CG, AAF, 25 June 1946, with one indorsement thereto

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> "Considerable delay in the development of a program and plan for the training of personnel and units in the functions of a tactical air force were noted. In a discussion with senior staff personnel, the apparent slow development of a program was attributed to a lack of subsequent clarification or expansion of the Tactical Air Command's mission as outlined in . . . [the 'Interim Mission']"

It was further added "there was immediate need for a command training program supplemental to existing AAF directives in order that subordinate units would be properly trained for the specific mission of the Command." In order to initiate such a program, the inspectors recommended that "expeditious effort" be made to clarify the mission. In October, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, did issue a restatement of the mission of the Tactical Air Command that stated more fully the broad details of the command's training duties.[5]

The Tactical Air Command maintained close liaison with various ground forces agencies during the year[6] and initiated several conferences with these organizations in order to aid in setting up mutual training programs and to so allocate commitments that adequate time could be afforded the necessary training of the tactical units.[7]

5/ AAF Regulation 20-19, "Tactical Air Command", 10 October 1946

6/ Remarks by Major General E. R. Quesada to the Air-Ground Liaison Officers, Hq TAC, 24 June 1946

7/ 1. Minutes of Airborne Troop Carrier Conference, Langley Field, Virginia, 22 August 1946
2. Minutes of Air-Ground Conference, Hq TAC, 25, 26 June 1946

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Greatly detrimental to the fulfilling of the training mission was the fact that during the greater part of 1946, the unit training requirement was subordinated to other missions.[8] The situation that existed then was such that unit training per se was to a great extent at the mercy of higher priority considerations. The demands of demobilization, recruiting, and the various Civil Air Patrol shows, for example, took precedence over any tactical training programs that might be established.[9] The 47th Bombardment Group estimated that at least 50% of its capabilities were consumed by Civil Air Patrol demonstrations during the summer.[10] A similar requirement in the 1st Fighter Group contributed to a situation in which that group was able to accomplish but very little training throughout the year. An inspection

8/ 1. Ltr, Field Office of Air Inspector, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Inspection of 47th Bombardment Group (L) Night Attack, Lake Charles AAF, Lake Charles, La., To: CG, AAF, 16 July 1946
2. P. 26, History of Shaw Field, for 1 July 1946 - 30 September 1946

9/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Mission of March Field, To: CO, March Field, 12 April 1946
2. Ltr, Office of the Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Case Report AAF No. 1, 47th Bombardment Group (L) Night Attack, Lake Charles Army Air Field, Lake Charles, La.: Flying Status for Enlisted Men Participating in Air Demonstrations, To: CG, AAF, 16 July 1946
3. P. 13, History of the 1st Fighter Group, for 1 April 1946 - 30 September 1946

10/ Report of Supervisory Staff Visit at Lake Charles Army Air Field, by Lieutenant Colonel K. C. Dempster, Hq TAC, 17 July 1946

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of this Group in October revealed the following:

> "Training in the 1st Fighter Group has consisted for the most part of pilot transition and CAP demonstrations. Other than this type of flying, there has been very little training accomplished to qualify this Group as a tactical organization. A very low percentage of aircraft in commission and the participation in the CAP demonstrations have greatly affected training, as have lack of essential facilities, such as gunnery ranges." 11/

The assignment to crews of the Tactical Air Command of the mission of ferrying aircraft for other commands interrupted and often disrupted the training programs.[12] A study in February 1947 by the A-5 Section of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, brought out the fact that some of the command's units had been "completely immobilized" for periods during 1946 when ferrying commitments were unusually heavy.[13] The expenditure of effort involved in these activities, which were unrelated to the primary mission of the Tactical Air

11/ 1. Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Inspection of March Field, Including 1st Fighter Group and 361st Air Service Group, To: CO, March Field, 4 October 1946
2. Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Report of Quarterly Inspection, Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force, March Field, Riverside, California, To: CG, TAC, 26 November 1946

12/ 1. Report of Major Activities Accomplished by the Twelfth Air Force from 17 May 1946 to 31 December 1946
2. Telephone conversation, General Old and General Barcus, 31 October 1946

13/ Study, "The Expenditure of Effort Involved in Servicing Activities Unrelated to the Primary Mission of the Tactical Air Command", prepared by A-5, Hq TAC, February 1947

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Command, assumed importance, it should be noted, only because they could adversely affect the command's already limited capabilities.

Another type of special activity and one which was particularly detrimental to the training of its own units by the Third Air Force's oen units was the commitment involving the training of foreign nationals. This included the training of Chinese crews in C-46 aircraft, Peruvian pilots in C-47's, and Mexican pilots in Troop Carrier aircraft. Such training inevitably imposed a heavy burden upon the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier).[14/] The tactical training of the 349th Troop Carrier Group at Bergstrom Field, Austin, Texas, was non-existent from April through July 1946, chiefly because of the Chinese training commitments.[15/]

Strenuous counter efforts were made by the command to alleviate at least in part, the situation which permitted the training program to be disrupted constantly by outside factors. All Army Ground Forces demonstrations were cancelled during July and August 1946 in order to give some training time to the various units involved.[16/] An air demonstration team was set up in the autumn of the year so that individual

14/ Ltr, CG, 3AF(TC), file AF3AF 322 (10 Jul 46), Subject: Necessity and Justification for Retention of Certain T/O&E Organizations Presently Assigned to Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), To: CG, TAC, 10 July 1946

15/ Ibid.

16/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Cancellation of Scheduled Air Demonstrations, To: Commandant, The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, May 1946
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 29 May 1946
3. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 24 April 1946

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pilots and crews would not be pulled from training.[17] The Airborne Troop Carrier Conference of August 1946, and the Air-Ground Conference of June sought to regularize the demands of the Army Ground Forces for demonstrations, etc., so that definitely allotted times could be allowed for unit training.[18] The Air Indoctrination Course was designed to concentrate the command's demonstration activities for the Ground Forces schools into one or two complete demonstrations during the year, thus eliminating the disrupting influence of small scale demonstrations.[19]

During 1946, in addition to the demands of special missions, the command was further burdened with activities relating to the responsibilities for the custody and disposal of a large number of installations. These activities which included station deactivation and supply demobilization, represented a loss of manpower to what was described as "constructive organizational activity".[20] As a result of

17/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 373 (3 Aug 46), Subject: Air Demonstration Teams, To: CG, 3AF, 3 August 1946 (See sup. doc. #173, Organization Section)
2. Study, "The Expenditure of Effort Involved in Servicing Activities Unrelated to the Primary Mission of the Tactical Air Command", prepared by A-5, Hq TAC, February 1947 (See sup. doc. #13)

18/ Minutes of Air-Ground Conference, Hq TAC, 25-26 June 1946 (See sup. doc. #72)

19/ Ibid.

20/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (14 May 46), Subject: Deactivation Activities, To: CG, 3AF, 14 May 1946 (See sup. doc. #90, chapter on Supply of Personnel)

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the assumption of these activities by the command, the available manpower was correspondingly reduced, making the filling of the tactical units more difficult. This in turn retarded the unit training program.[21/]

An equally important deterrent to the effective and efficient creation of a training program lay also in the instability of the personnel situation throughout the year. The effect of the personnel problem on the command's training program was cumulative in the various factors involved rather than in any individual factor.[22/] A shortage of skilled personnel, one phase of the problem, was the result of an arbitrary release of personnel through demobilization. General Quesada in a letter on 18 September 1946 to the Commanding General, Third Air Force, notes that one of the effects of the rapid demobilization following V-J Day, was that of "upsetting the balanced team play necessary for efficient flying operations."[23/]

The shortage of technical specialists owing to the rapid release of personnel was particularly acute in aircraft and communications. Practically every base and unit in the command was adversely influenced

21/ 1. See chapter on Personnel in the Formative Period: An Overall View
2. TAC Ltr 122-8, Subject: Manning of Tactical Units, 4 June 1946

22/ 1. P. 26, History of Dover Army Air Field, for 1 April 1946 - 30 June 1946
2. Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Case Report AAF No. 1, Report of Supervisory Inspection, Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware - Duplication of Reports, To: CG, AAF, 15 May 1946, with one indorsement thereto

23/ Ltr, CG, TAC, file TAC 210.49 (16 Sept 46), Subject: Inadequate Flying Training, To: CG, 3AF, 18 September 1946

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by this lack.[24] This affected not only unit training but also recurrent basic flying and instrument time as well. Dover Army Air Field, for instance, reported in May that its flying was restricted to day flying, thus eliminating night flying entirely, because there were insufficient maintenance personnel to keep its planes flyable.[25] Stations with a large number of link trainers could neither operate them nor keep them in operational condition due to the absence of link trainer maintenance personnel.[26] A Teletype message in June temporarily relaxed the requirements for proficiency flying time because of the safety factor which existed owing to faulty and incomplete maintenance.[27] In an inspection

24/ 1. Ltr, Brigadier General Y. H. Taylor, To: Brigadier General W. R. Carter. 3 May 1946
2. Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Inspection of 319th AAF Base Unit, including 75th Troop Carrier Squadron, Lawson Field, Georgia, To: CG, AAF, 16 October 1946, with 3d indorsement thereto
3. Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Investigation of Technical Order Compliance at Bergstrom Army Air Field, Austin, Texas, To: CG, TAC, 16 December 1946
4. Ltr, Hq Marshall Field, file MF 319.1, Subject: Objective Activity Report for Marshall Field, Kansas for 1946, 2 January 1947

25/ Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Supervisory Inspection of the Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, To: CG, AAF, 14 May 1946

26/ 1. Report of Supervisory Staff Visit, Lake Charles Army Air Field, by Captain James B. Carten, Hq TAC, 15 April 1946
2. Ltr, Hq Dover Army Air Field, file 452.31, Subject: Training of Officers for Link Trainer Operators and Mechanics, To: CG, TAC, 12 June 1946
3. Record and Routing Sheet, Inspector to Colonel Wallace, no subject: 21 May 1946

27/ 1. TWX, Hq TAC, A3B 2020, To: CO, Langley Field, 20 June 1946
2. Ltr, CG, TAC, file TAC 210.49 (18 Sep 46), Subject: Inadequate Flying Training, To: CG, 12AF, 18 September 1946

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of Shaw Field in September, it was reported that the two night fighter squadrons there (the 414th and 415th) were unable effectively to commence their training program until sufficient numbers of maintenance personnel could be assigned.[28] Radar and radio mechanics represented a category of personnel of which there was an extremely acute shortage not only in the Tactical Air Command but throughout the entire Army Air Forces.[29]

The instance of the 502nd Tactical Control Group is the extreme example of the effects of personnel shortages.[30] This Group with a Table of Organization of 137 officers and 1517 enlisted men, was able only to obtain 35 officers and 70 enlisted men by August with no expectations of reaching full strength until 1947. Part of the difficulty lay in the fact that this Group had a lower manning priority than certain

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28/ 1. Record and Routing Sheet, Inspector to A-3, Subject: Quarterly Inspection, Shaw Field, S. C., 29 August 1946
2. Record and Routing Sheet, Inspector to C&C, Subject: Inspection Reports, 7 February 1946

29/ 1. SECRET ltr, General Carl Spaatz, CG, AAF, to Major General Elwood R. Quesada, CG, TAC, 3 May 1946
2. Ltr, Hq AAF, file AFPMP-11, Subject: Proper Utilization of Enlisted Personnel in the Communications Field, To: CG, TAC, 29 July 1946
3. Record and Routing Sheet, Communications to A-5, Subject: Narrative Report of Communications Activities, 6 January 1947

30/ 1. Record and Routing Sheet, Military Personnel to A-1, no subject, 23 May 1946
2. Tab "A" to CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq Air University, no file number Subject: Air University Projects H4856, "Selection of Radar and Communications Equipment for the Air Warning and Control System of a Tactical Air Force", To: CG, AAF, 21 October 1946

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other groups.[31] The effect of the failure fully to man the 502nd Tactical Control Group unquestionably exercised a prejudicial effect on the successful fulfillment of the Group's mission, particularly in the projected November Amphibious Maneuvers.[32]

Second only to the shortages in specialized categories in its effect on the tactical training program was the loss of personnel already trained, or in process of training, either to overseas shipments or to school quotas.[33] The operation of the 47th Bombardment Group, which had been functioning as an operational training unit until July, was suddenly disrupted by what it describes as "a sudden avalanche" of TWX's ordering transfers.[34] These transfers in a short time resulted in a turnover of 80 to 88% of its combat crew personnel.

31/ Record and Routing Sheet, Military Personnel Section to A-1, Subject: Training of Radar Personnel for the 47th Bombardment Group, /undated/

32/ Memorandum for CG, AAF, by Lieutenant Colonel Leo F. Paul, Subject: Field Trip to Air University, Army Air Forces Proving Ground Command and the Tactical Air Command, 1 July 1946, to ltr, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, to Major General E. R. Quesada, 9 July 1946

33/ P. 41, History of the 1st Fighter Group, for 1 April 1946 - 30 September 1946

34/ 1. Pp. 5-6, History of the 47th Bombardment Group (L) Night Attack, Lake Charles Army Air Field, for July 1946 - September 1946

2. Ltr, Hq Air University, file 330.14, Subject: Air University Research Project Priorities, To: CG, AAF, 19 September 1946

3. Report of Supervisory Staff Visit, 47th Bombardment Group (L), Lake Charles Army Air Field, by Lieutenant Colonel K. C. Dempster, Hq TAC, 17 July 1946

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The effect of this was entirely disruptive; make-shift crews had to be formed, some phases of the training had to be repeated or practically started from the initial phase, thereby seriously crippling the ability of the Group to perform its mission. The combat efficiency rating of the Group which had been 75% in May was approximately 50% in October.[35/]

The necessity of filling school quotas, another cause of temporary personnel shortages, seems to have had its greatest effect in the closing months of the year when economy and, with it, personnel reductions both military and civilian, hit the command most sharply.[36/] In a staff conference discussion of the difficulties of filling school quotas on November 1946, it was recognized that the quotas were "crippling" the Tactical Air Command's units to some extent. Nevertheless it was felt that the situation would correct itself when the graduates began to return.[37/]

35/ 1. "AAF Units Available", found as inclosure No. 2, to SECRET ltr, Hq Air Defense Command, file Y381, Subject: Air Defense of the Continental United States, To: CG's, 1st Air Force, et al, 2 May 1946
2. SECRET Memorandum for the Director of Organization and Training, Subject: Strength and Training Status of Freeboot Units as of 31 October, contained as inclosure to SECRET ltr, Hq 9AF, no file number, Subject: Strength and Training Status of Freeboot Units, as of 31 October 1946, To CG,TAC, 14 November 1946

36/ 1. See pp. 174-150, Chapter, "Supply of Personnel"
2. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 5 August 1946

37/ TAC Staff Conference Notes, 6 November 1946

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To counteract the effect of these personnel problems, the command of necessity, embarked on a vigorous on-the-job training program and an extensive base schools program.[38] This training reached down through all the ranks and grades and applied to all specialties. The Twelfth Air Force noted in its Activities Report for 1946 that its training program was largely centered in on-the-job training.[39] The various station and unit histories attest to the fact that the on-the-job training program was the main source through which their organizations were kept operative.[40] In October 1946, Headquarters, Army Air Forces stated: "The chief solution to the problem of obtaining officer specialists must continue to be local on-the-job training and maximum use by the major AAF commands of school training available to their officer personnel on an assigned status."[41] The temporary failure of the

38/ 1. Record and Routing Sheet, Military Personnel to A-1, Subject: Maximum utilization of officer personnel, 23 April 1946
2. Ltr, Hq 62nd Troop Carrier Group, Bergstrom Field, no file number, Subject: Recommendations for Standardized System of Personnel Accounting and Reporting at Base Level, To: CG, 9AF, 27 November 1946

39/ Report of Major Activities Accomplished by the Twelfth Air Force from 17 May 1946 - 31 December 1946

40/ Activities Report of Lockbourne Army Air Base, for 1946, 4 January 1947

41/ 1. Tab to ltr, CG, AAF, no file number, Subject: AAF Plans and Programs, 24 October 1946
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 353 (24 Dec 46), Subject: Diversified Training of Officers, To: CG, 9AF, 24 December 1946

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Training Command to establish certain schools for individual training made it necessary for the Tactical Air Command to set up special schools within the command. The glider transition school and the pathfinder school for radar instruction established in the Third Air Force were the largest of these special schools.[42] Smaller on-the-job training schools, such as the one for 150 linemen (SSN 238) assigned to the 934th Signal Battalion, had to be established.[43] In December, on-the-job training was given an impetus due to the economy program which necessitated the transfer of many civilian positions to military. At Langley Field alone, over 600 civilians had to be replaced by military personnel[44] owing to the reduction in civilian allotments.

This same economy reduction emphasized another factor in the personnel problem, namely the instability even of on-the-job training. A letter of October 24 by the Personnel Management Committee at Bergstrom Field sums up this fact in the following observations:

> "In view of the low mission priority assigned to specialized and recurring training in the Third Air Force, it is recommended that all such training

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42/ Pp. 52-63, 74-85, Third Air Force Troop Carrier History for 1 April 1946 - 31 October 1946

43/ Ltr, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Training of the 934th Signal Battalion, Separate, Tactical Air Command, To: CG, TAC, 23 October 1946

44/ Ltr, CO, Langley Field, no file number, Subject: Request for Authority to Retain Civilian Firefighters for Additional Two Week Period, To: CG, TAC, 2 December 1946

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be temporarily suspended wherein the operating efficiency of the base is not adversely affected. It is agreed that this recommendation is a short-sighted remedy; however, until overall reductions in both military and civilian authorizations are effected and some semblance of personnel stabilization is again attained, it seems futile to train individuals whose service may ultimately be lost to the installation." 45/

A concrete example of personnel instability was noted in the history of Stewart Field for October - December 1946 which stated: "In spite of a training program which converted a group of 'unskilled' enlisted men, representing 25% of total strength to 'skilled', separation to the extent of 40% left the unit barely sufficient personnel to operate". 46/

Still another factor, exercising a deterrent effect upon the training program was the lack of adequate equipment, parts and facilities. 47/ The inability to obtain suitable range facilities throughout the command was an especially harrassing problem in the effort to

45/ Ltr, Hq Bergstrom Field no file number, Subject: Monthly Meeting Personnel Management Committee, To: CO, Bergstrom Field, 24 October 1946

46/ P. 29, History of Stewart Field, for 1 October 1946 - 31 December 1946

47/ 1. Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: AOCP of P-80 Type Aircraft, To: Inspector General, Hq TAC, 15 November 1946 contained as inclosure to ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, no file number, Subject: Case Report, AAF Special - Depot Inspection and Repair Program, To: CG, TAC, 4 December 1946
2. Ltr, Office of the Air Inspector, Hq TAC, no file number, Subject: Case Report, AAF Special - Depot Inspection and Repair Program, To: CG, TAC, 4 December 1946, with two indorsements and one inclosure thereto

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obtain proper gunnery and bombing training for the various tactical units. While Myrtle Beach and its ranges were available on the East Coast, the Twelfth Air Force on the West Coast experienced great difficulty in obtaining range facilities for the 1st Fighter Group.[48] Over water flights in training the 47th Bombardment Group, had to be curtailed due to the lack of emergency aid and sea rescue facilities.[49] A third facility lack that deserves mention was the absence of weather reporting service at altitudes where jet aircraft were forced to fly and the lack of certain radio navigational aids, factors which, in the cause of flying safety, restricted jet aircraft training.[50]

Of greatest importance, however, was the difficulty experienced by the command in having available sufficient flyable aircraft for its

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47/ 3. TWX, CO, Lake Charles Army Air Field, LCXH 0523, To: CG, TAC, 30 July 1946
4. Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Hq AAF, file 333.1, Subject: Report of Inspection of March Field, Including 1st Fighter Group and 361st Air Service Group, To: CO, March Field, 4 October 1946

48/ 1. Record and Routing Sheet, A3A-2 to AIS, no subject, 6 December 1946
2. Ltr, Hq Air University, file 330.14, Subject: Air University Research Project Priorities, To: CG, AAF, 19 September 1946

49/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file 373 (3 May 46), Subject: Over Water Flight Requirements Army Air Forces Training Standard 20-5, To: CG, AAF, 3 May 1946

50/ Ltr, Hq 1st Fighter Group, no file number, Subject: Safety of Flying, To: CO, March Field, 6 August 1946, with one indorsement thereto

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training.[51] In part this could be attributed to a lack of maintenance technicians; in part, it could be attributed to the fact that the Tactical Air Command was undertaking a part of its training in new and untried type aircraft. The 1st Fighter Group was equipped with the P-80 type jet propelled aircraft, and the troop carrier units were converted to the C-82, neither of which planes had been tested fully before. New planes inevitably result in many "bugs" and in the necessity of modification to overcome them, during which the planes are grounded.

The transition to the jet P-80 type aircraft, was further complicated by a serious supply problem throughout the entire year. In June a Weekly Report of P-80 Activities made by the 1st Fighter Group notes the seriousness of the parts problem warning that "if this unsatisfactory supply condition is not corrected immediately, this group cannot accomplish its presently assigned mission of normal transition training, not to mention participation in the forthcoming training maneuvers in the near future."[52] The percentage of aircraft in commission ranged from 20% to a maximum of 60%. This situation showed very little

51/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, TAC 452.1 (5 Apr 46), Subject: Extension of loan of AT-6 aircraft from AAFTC, To: CG, AAF, 5 April 1946
2. RESTRICTED ltr, Standardization Board, Dover AAFld, no file number, Subject: Base History, To: Operation and Training Office, Dover Army Air Field, /undated/
3. Activities Report of Lawson Field during Year 1946

52/ RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 412th Fighter Group, file 452.1 (P-80 Jet) Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 7 June 1946

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improvement by December of the year in spite of the great efforts made by all agencies concerned.[53]

The C-82, the other major "new" plane during the year, presented a great number of technical difficulties.[54] These were set forth in a report prepared by the Third Air Force(Troop Carrier) on the disadvantages of the C-82 aircraft as a tactical troop carrier plane. This report is appended among the supporting documents. An

53/ 1. Ibid.
2. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 412th Ftr Gp, file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 21 June 1946
3. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 1st Ftr Gp, file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 22 August 1946
4. RESTRICTED ltr, 12th Rcn Sq Photo (Jet), no file number, Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CO, March Field 28 August 1946
5. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 1st Ftr Gp, file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 30 August 1946
6. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 1st Ftr Gp, file 452.1 (P-80), Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 6 September 1946
7. RESTRICTED ltr, 12th Rcn Sq Photo (Jet), no file number, Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CO, March Field, 11 September 1946
8. 1st Ind., Hq 12AF, file 452.1, 6 December 1946, to ltr, Hq 1st Ftr Gp, Subject: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities, To: CG, 12AF, 29 November 1946

54/ 1. Comments and Recommendations on C-82 Aircraft, prepared by A-3 and the Aircraft Engineering Sections, Hq 3AF(TC), 1 July 1946, contained as inclosure to ltr, Hq 3AF, file AF3AF 452.1 (2 July 46), Subject: Comments and Recommendations on C-82 Aircraft, To: CG, TAC, 2 July 1946, with one indorsement thereto
2. Ltr, Hq 316th T.C. Group, file 16GPOPN 452, Subject: C-82 Disadvantages, To: CG, 3AF(T.C.), 23 September 1946, with three indorsements thereto
3. Record and Routing Sheet, A4B to Assistant Chief of Staff, Subject: C-82 Disadvantages, 14 October 1946

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early difficulty lay in the inadequacy of this aircraft to adapt itself to glider tow operations, an important feature of troop carrier tactics.

The shortage of parts, it must be noted, was not restricted to the newer type aircraft but extended to the A-26 type. The parts situation affected the participation of the 47th Bombardment Group, which was equipped with A-26 type aircraft, in the November Amphibious Maneuvers. At a staff conference on 4 November, the A-3 was quoted as saying: "Twelfth Air Force will be in a position to put a maximum of 200 aircraft in the air during the exercises. If the parts situation goes haywire, it is doubtful they will be able to put 50% of that number in the air".[55/]

In reviewing the various factors that influenced the establishment and successful implementation of an operational training program, the resultant picture is one of a variety of difficulties, the total of which made the year 1946 a trying one for the command. In contradistinction to its position in the wartime Zone of the Interior air forces, Training as such had lost its primary position during the transition period owing to the necessity of using the very limited capabilities of the commands to perform necessary administrative duties and to meet the requirements of special missions of Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Responsibilities such as those involved in recruiting and the numerous Civil Air Patrol demonstrations, missions such as those

55/ 1. TAC Staff Conference Notes, 4 November 1946
2. TWX, Hq TAC, A3-1 255, To: CG, AMC, 6 November 1946

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involved in training of personnel other than those assigned to the command, all took precedence over the actual training of the Tactical Air Command's own units. In setting up a unit training program within the command, difficulties arose first from certain ambiguities as to the specific mission in the early months of the command's existence and in the exact type of program to be set up.[56] Secondly, various physical difficulties assumed important proportions. Personnel changes and transfers well above the normal attrition to be expected prevailed throughout the year and with the increasing pressure of economy, this personnel problem became one of a threatened shortage in numbers of officers. The general industrial letdown and confusion of the first postwar year, resulted in parts shortages for aircraft and a scarcity of needed facilities. The general result of the situation was that the command had to concentrate its energies on individual and on-the-job training and to perform only a minimum of unit training.[57]

56/ Ltr, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Hq AAF, no file number, Subject: Report of Inspection of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia, To: CG, AAF, 25 June 1946, with one indorsement thereto (See sup. doc. #4)

57/ Article, "The Tactical Air Command Today" by Major General E. R. Quesada, contained in Military Review, September 1947 (See sup. doc. #2)

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Flying Safety

Flying safety assumed considerable importance during 1946 owing to the unusually high accident rate which prevailed during the year. Major accidents increased to nearly 100 per 100,000 flying hours early in 1946. This rate gradually decreased until the last quarter averaged just over 60 -- a rate still excessive but a great improvement over the earlier one.[58] The chief reasons advanced for the high rates, originating in the general atmosphere of a postwar letdown and disintegration, were the lack of adequate numbers of maintenance personnel, plus the lessening of discipline among pilots. To these reasons should be added the fact that two new type aircraft were introduced, the jet P-80 type fighter and the Cargo C-82 both of which planes were hardly out of the experimental stage and, as with all new planes, had their quota of "bugs".[59]

To counteract this high accident rate, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, raised the Flying Safety Section (formerly called the Aircraft Accident Prevention Section) to a special staff level from

58/ Record and Routing Sheet, Historical to Flying Safety, Subject: Request for Historical Data, 17 December 1947

59/ 1. Ltr, CG, 12AF, file 452.1, Subject: Safety of Flying - P-80 Aircraft, To: CG, TAC, 23 September 1946
2. Pp. 45-47, 79, History of the Twelfth Air Force, 17 May - 31 December 1946
3. Pp. 112-113, Third Air Force Troop Carrier History, 1 April 1946 - 31 October 1946

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its position as a subordinate activity of A-3 and directed that at base level a flying safety officer be appointed to whom no other duties would be assigned and who would have direct access to the Commanding Officer.[60]

Compliance with regulations regarding flying and checks on aircraft was stressed.[61] Efforts were made to increase the number of flying hours per month. In General Quesada's opinion a minimum of 20 hours per month was necessary to keep pilot efficiency at its highest level, since experience had consistently shown that the fewer the number of hours a pilot flies the more likely he was to have an accident.[62] Disciplinary policy for personnel violating flying regulations was made more uniform by TAC Letter 62-4 published 11 September 1946.[63]

60/ 1. TAC Regulation 62-1, "Flying Safety Program", 15 August 1946
2. TAC Regulation 62-1, C1, "Flying Safety Program", 10 December 1946
3. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 360.331 (1 Oct 46), Subject: Flying Safety Sections at Headquarters Third Air Force and Lawson Field, To: CG, 3AF, 1 October 1946, with one indorsement thereto

61/ 1. TAC Regulation 62-1, "Flying Safety Program", 15 August 1946 (See sup. doc. #60[1])
2. TAC Regulation 62-6, "Night Flying", 25 September 1946
3. TAC Regulation 62-2, "Airplane Crew Member's Final Reminder", 8 October 1946
4. TAC Ltr 35-20, Subject: Serious, Wilful Violations of Flying Regulations, 14 November 1946

62/ 1. TWX, Hq TAC, A3B 2020, To: CO, Langley Field, 20 June 1946 (See sup. doc. #27[1])
2. Ltr, CG, TAC, file TAC 210.49 (18 Sep 46), Subject: Inadequate Flying Training, To: CG, 12AF, 18 September 1946 (See sup. doc. #27[2])

63/ TAC Ltr 62-4, Subject: Flying Safety - Disciplinary Policy, 11 September 1946

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The Flying Safety Section, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, on 15 August 1946, began publishing a bulletin, "Aircraft Accident Prevention Data", in which were narrated the causes of various accidents and "boners" by pilots, and preventive information obtained from various sources passed on to all pilots. These publications, selected copies of which are to be found in the supporting documents give a good account of the trends in accidents occurring in the command during the last half of the year.[64/]

64/ TAC Aircraft Accident Prevention Data Bulletins, issues of 15 August, 16 September, 23 September, 30 September, 7 October, 14 October, 21 October, 25 November, 9 December, 16 December and 23 December 1946

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SURVEY OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM

The training structure of the Tactical Air Command during 1946 might briefly be described as follows: At the summit of the structure was the command headquarters with location at Langley Field, Virginia. Directly beneath and responsible for the direction of the training program were the three numbered Air Forces, the Third, Ninth, and Twelfth. The Third Air Force with headquarters at Greenville Army Air Base, South Carolina, was the agency for the carrying out of the troop carrier activities in the command. The Ninth Air Force at Biggs Field, Texas, and the Twelfth Air Force at March Field, California, were designated as "tactical" Air Forces and had under their control, the various fighter, light bomber, reconnaissance, and tactical control Groups assigned to the command.[65]

A unique feature of the training structure in the Tactical Air Command for the period under consideration was the retention by command headquarters of the direct control of the training of certain tactical and base units.[66] This policy relieved the numbered Air Forces

65/ 1. Ltr, CG, TAC, file TAC 322 (12 Apr 46), Subject: Organizational Plan of the Tactical Air Command, To: CG, AAF, 12 April 1946
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (22 May 46), Subject: Mission of Ninth Air Force, To: CG, 9AF, 22 May 1946
3. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (22 May 46), Subject: Mission of Twelfth Air Force, To: CG, 12AF, 22 May 1946

66/ G. O. #2, Hq TAC, 26 March 1946

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of the burden of responsibility for the administration of these units. It may have been motivated by the fact that the permanent status of some bases was not stable nor was the permanent location of some units firm. The location of the headquarters of the Ninth Air Force at Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, was geographically unsatisfactory if the tactical air forces were to be located on both coasts. The tactical units held directly for varying lengths of time by the command headquarters were the 47th Bombardment Group, the 414th and 415th Night Fighter Squadrons and the 477th Composite Group.[67] In addition there were the base units at Shaw Field, Dover Army Air Base, Sherman Field, Tuskegee Army Air Field, Langley Field, Stewart Field, Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, etc., whose training remained a responsibility of the command headquarters.[68]

A major revision of the training structure took place on 1 November when the three Air Forces under Tactical Air Command were reduced to two, and the Third Air Force(Troop Carrier) ceased to exist as a separate organization. The tactical air forces were destined by this reorganization to include in each, elements of troop carrier aviation.

67/ TAC Station Lists, 12 April 1946, 30 April 1946, 10 June 1946, 10 August 1946, 10 November 1946 and 10 January 1947

68/1. Ibid.

2. The 47th Bombardment Group was assigned to the Ninth Air Force on 29 May and reassigned to Twelfth Air Force on 1 November when it moved from Lake Charles Army Air Base to Biggs Field. The 414th and 415th Night Fighter Squadrons which were earmarked for transfer overseas in 1947 were assigned to Third Air Force on 1 October and to Ninth Air Force on 1 November. The 477th Composite Group was assigned to the Ninth Air Force on 1 January 1947.

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In actual practice, however, the Ninth Air Force absorbed all troop carrier elements, and it was not until much later that troop carrier Groups could be added to the Twelfth Air Force.[69]

The training structure in the lower echelons underwent considerable change during the year. In the beginning, TAC General Order #2[70] assigned both bases and units to the numbered Air Forces. A letter dated 15 April from Headquarters, Tactical Air Command sought to explain and clarify the provisions of this General Order.[71] This letter stated that:

> "The major role of this command has been changed from that of training combat crews to the training and employment of tactical units. In the past, bases have been assigned directly to the commands and the commands have held the station commanders directly responsible for the training conducted by units on their station. The objective of this general order is that where appropriate, both bases and units will be assigned directly to the numbered air forces. The commanding generals of the air forces normally will not further assign tactical units to their respective stations. The unit commanders

69/ 1. G. O. #68, Hq TAC, 25 October 1946
2. G. O. #91, Hq TAC, 4 November 1946
3. TWX, Hq TAC, TACCG 520, To: CG, AAF, 10 September 1946 (See sup. doc. #132[1], Chapter, "Acquisition and Loss of Bases)
4. CONFIDENTIAL TWX, War Dept., WAR 80280, To: CG, TAC, 13 September 1946 (See sup. doc. #132[2], Chapter, "Acquisition and Loss of Bases)

70/ G. O. #2, Hq TAC, 26 March 1946 (See sup. doc. #66)

71/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (15 Apr 46), Subject: Assignment of units and bases, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 15 April 1946

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of the tactical units stationed on a base will be directly responsible to the command to which they are assigned. The base commander will have no authority or jurisdiction over the tactical training and operations of tactical units other than to provide the necessary training aids and ground equipment used in the unit's ground training program. The base commander is, however, responsible for the immediate processing of supply requisitions from the units, for obtaining necessary supplies, and for assisting in every way possible the tactical units in the accomplishment of their mission."

That the command was somewhat uncertain as to how this system would work out is revealed in this same letter which directs that each base and unit commander on the Tactical Air Command stations keep a comprehensive diary setting forth the difficulties encountered while operating under this system to aid in making recommendations as to where the responsibilities should lie for the operating and training of the tactical units.

On 11 July, a base commanders conference was held at Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, in order to discuss some of the problems that had arisen in connection with the training structure and to work out necessary changes in the responsibilities for operation and the training of the tactical units. It had been found by experience that divided command had reduced the efficiency of the operation of units and that this problem was most acute at the bases where more than one group was stationed. There also had become evident a duplication of effort in the service Groups which were not being fully utilized in view of the critical shortage in maintenance and other categories.[72/]

72/ Minutes of Base Commanders Conference held at Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia, 11-12 July 1946

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The result of this conference was a change in the command relationship. This change was outlined in TAC Letter 18 July 1946,[73] which stated that henceforth all units now assigned to air forces were to be further assigned to the bases on which they were permanently stationed. The responsibilities of the base commanders were defined and the following policies established:

1. The primary mission of the base was to foster and implement . . . the training of all units, particularly the tactical units assigned to the base.

2. The mobility of tactical units was to be maintained.

3. The integrity of all units was to be maintained

4. The base be prepared to continue operations subsequent to the withdrawal of tactical units.

5. Execution of operation and training directives for tactical units from higher headquarters was to be the responsibility of the tactical unit commander and compliance with these directives the responsibility of the base commander.

The Third Air Force(Trcop Carrier) retained a somewhat different organizational pattern during the early months of the command

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73/ 1. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (18 Jul 46), Subject: Assignment of Units and Bases, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 18 July 1946
2. G. O. #18, Hq 9AF, 24 July 1946
3. Ltr, Hq 9AF, file 9CG 322.011, Subject: Letter of Instruction to Base Commanders Relative to General Order 18, this Headquarters, dated 24 July 1946, To: CC's 9AF bases and units, 30 July 1946

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in that a supervisory wing structure was interposed in the chain of command. This structure, which had been inherited from the IX Troop Carrier Command, had been retained chiefly because of the heavy commitments of the new Third Air Force(Troop Carrier)[74]. With the reduction in the size of troop carrier from four to two groups, it was felt that the retention of the wing structure was "extravagant and unnecessary"[75], so the 50th Troop Carrier Wing[76] was inactivated on the first of August and the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing[77] on the 29th of August after the completion of the Chinese Training commitment that had been handled by this latter wing.

The great bulk of the training activities accomplished by the command in 1946 centered around individual training, of fitting personnel for their various jobs. The rapid turnover of personnel through demobilization, and quotas for overseas and for the schools, plus the great number of demands for air demonstrations made the implementation to any great degree of unit training impossible. Unit

74/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 322 (19 Apr 46), Subject: Prepared Inactivation of certain Army Air Force Units, To: CG, AAF, 3 May 1946

75/ Ltr, Major General E. R. Quesada, To: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, 29 July 1946

76/ G. O. #56, Hq TAC, 1 August 1946

77/ G. O. #67, Hq TAC, 29 August 1946

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training, which was considered the long range primary mission of the command during 1946 was relegated to a secondary priority after the missions of demobilization, recruitment, and air shows.[78]

A great number of miscellaneous training programs were undertaken during the year in order to fill both administrative and technical positions and to increase the general efficiency of command personnel.

The Tactical Air Command embarked during 1946 upon a program of military education to counteract the low discipline and morale that resulted from the disintegration of the armed forces after V-J Day.[79] A formal Saturday morning program was instituted in July 1946. The program consisted of inspection of troops in ranks, drill and parade (first Saturday) showdown inspection of clothing and equipment, inspection of barracks, dayrooms and mess (Second Saturday), one hour lecture period and atheletics (third Saturday), and inspection of flight line and aircraft maintenance.[80]

Supplemental to this program were the minimum basic, continuous, and special training requirements for permanent party personnel. These consisted in part of one hour of troop information and three hours of physical training. This training, however, was not to be permitted to

78/ Vid. supra pp. 63-72

79/ Vid. supra pp. 91-114

80/ TAC Regulation 50-13, "Military Training", 26 July 1946

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interfere with the duty assignments of personnel.[81]

An officers professional training program was established in July. The guide to this program was contained in the booklet "Air Forces Professional Training Program" compiled by headquarters Tactical Air Command. The purpose of this program was to train officers who, though highly trained in their specialties, lacked the general skills of the army profession. Professional training was to be established at Tactical Air Command bases in Operations, Administration, Technical Training, Supply and Maintenance, and Communications.[82]

Comparable to the professional training of officers, in its intent, was the program of supervisor training of enlisted personnel. All enlisted men, in grade four or higher, who possessed SSN's a requisite of which was ability to supervise or to train others, were to take the course outlined in a Tactical Air Command Regulation, published in September 1946. The course was a condensation of the approved "AAF Supervisor Training Program."[83]

81/ 1. TAC Regulation 50-58, "Military Training of Permanent Party Personnel", 17 April 1946
2. TAC Regulation 50-58, "Military Training of Male Personnel", 15 August 1946
3. TAC Regulation 50-3, "Physical Training and Athletics," 14 November 1946

82/ TAC Regulation 50-47, "AAF Officer's Professional Training Program", 23 July 1946

83/ TAC Regulation 50-40, "Supervisor Training of Enlisted Personnel," 18 September 1946

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A course in Personnel Management was set up in August at all bases whereby a series of ten two hour conferences were to be held in which officers were to be indoctrinated in the principals of personnel management.[84]

Another phase of the training was the training of officers and of enlisted men for specific positions wherein critical shortages existed, or were likely to exist due to the discharges and the impossibility of obtaining replacements from sources available to the command. Owing to the critical shortage within the command of officers with legal experience, and in order to meet the need of officers trained in courts-martial work, the Staff Judge Advocate instituted a school at headquarters to which each air force would send two men on TDY for thirty days training in courts-martial procedure, each month beginning in July.[85]

Officers were assigned to Tactical Air Command installations for Finance training duties, and to assist Finance Officers there. The trainees were given on-the-job training plus courses of study on the various regulations, bulletins, and circulars pertaining to Finance.[86]

84/ TAC Regulation 37-1, "Personnel Management Indoctrination for for Officers", 8 August 1946

85/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 353 (26 Jun 1946) Training, Subject: Training of Officers in Courts-Martial Procedure, To: CG, 12AF, 26 June 1946

86/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file 353 (2 Jul 46), Subject: Finance Trainees, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 2 July 1946

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In an attempt to further guard against losses of key personnel, a system of rotation of jobs was established so that in an emergency, officers could fill several positions.[87] To bolster the efficiency and stability of this important section, Tactical Air Command established in October a uniform course of Finance Technical Training throughout the command in the form of an Instructors Guide. The course to be offered was to be for two hours daily for the period of a month and was to be attended by all Finance personnel, who were during the period to be freed of all formations.[88]

Similar activities were set up in other sections. A program, supplementary to on-the-job training, was to be given to Military Police personnel, to Food Service Personnel, etc.[89]

The on-the-job training method was by far the most widespread system for training personnel and preparing them for positions within the Tactical Air Command. The Twelfth Air Force records in its history for the year 1946 that "the training program /of the Twelfth Air Force/

87/ TAC Ltr 33-6, Subject: Guide for Technical Training of Personnel on Finance Duty", 21 August 1946

88/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 353 (22 Oct 46), Subject: Finance Technical Training, To: CG, 9AF, et al., 22 October 1946

89/ 1. TAC Regulation 50-14, "Military Police", 6 August 1946
2. Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 353 (13 Nov 46), Subject: Survey of Food Service Personnel, To: CG, 9AF, et al., 13 November 1946

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was largely centered in on-the-job training".[90] This training served in many ways to alleviate personnel problems. At some stations surplus officers and enlisted men were assigned as understudies to key personnel.[91] Diversified training of pilots as crew members was undertaken. Rotation of personnel in sections helped to deaden the shock of sudden transfers and discharges. To provide a uniform on-the-job specialist training program for military personnel within the command, the command directed in October that an on-the-job training branch be established under the supervision of the S-3 Section.[92] This same regulation stated that on-the-job training was to be conducted by all units and organizations within the command to meet individual organizational requirements in MOS shortages and to qualify individuals more fully for the various job positions.

Throughout the year every attempt was made to comply with the requirements of AAF Regulation 50-2 which set the yearly minimum flying

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90/ P. 97, History of the Twelfth Air Force for 17 May to 31 December 1946

91/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 333 (23 Apr 46)Misc., Subject: General Eisenhower's visits and inspections, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 23 April 1946

92/ 1. TAC Regulation 50-44, "On-the-Job Specialist Training", 7 October 1946
2. RESTRICTED ltr, Hq 316th Troop Carrier Group, file 16GPCO 353, Subject: Mission of the Ground Training Section of the S-3 Office, To: Group S-3, 316th T.C. Gp, 18 November 1946

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hours as 100 per year for all rated personnel, with 35 hours of this to be flown in any six-month period and twenty hours on instruments and fifteen hours in night flying.

At some stations, where the number of pilots exceeded the maintenance capabilities, difficulty was found in fulfilling this minimum requirement.[93] However, the many air demonstrations and ferrying missions accomplished during the year afforded rated personnel the opportunity to log long hours of flying time.

The Tactical Air Command dictum that at least ten hours of flying time should be obtained monthly, was changed in the autumn to establish the minimum as twenty hours monthly.[94] This order, however, soon ran into the snag of the coal strike emergency in November which greatly lowered the amount of aviation fuel available for flying.[95]

93/ 1. Ltr, Hq Dover Army Air Field, no file number, Subject: Compliance with AAF Regulation 50-2, To: CG, TAC, 4 June 1946
2. P. 20, History of Smyrna Army Air Field for June 1946
3. P. 62, History of Pope Field for 3 September 1945 - 30 June 1946
4. P. 22, History of Shaw Field, for April 1946 - June 1946

94/ Ltr, Hq TAC, file TAC 210.49 (18 Sept 46), Subject: Inadequate Flying Training, To: CG, 3AF, et al., 18 September 1946 (See sup. do. #23)

95/ TWX, Hq TAC, A3A 1315, To: CG, 9AF, et al., 22 November 1946

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BIOGRAPHIES

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MAJOR GENERAL E.R.QUESADA

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Elwood R. (Pete) Quesada
Major General, USAF

Commanding General
Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Virginia

General Quesada was born in Washington, D. C. on April 13, 1904. He was a student at Wyoming Seminary at Wilkes Barre, Pa.; University of Maryland, and Georgetown University.

PROMOTIONS

Commissioned second lieutenant in the Regular Army, January 23, 1927; promoted to first lieutenant on November 1, 1932; temporary captain, April 20, 1935; permanent captain, January 23, 1937; temporary major, December 30, 1940; permanent major, January 23, 1944; temporary lieutenant colonel, January 5, 1942; temporary colonel, March 1, 1942; brigadier general, temporary, December 11, 1942; permanent brigadier general, 12 December 1942, ~~and temporary lieutenant general, 1 October 1943.~~ and temporary major general 28 April 1944.

SERVICE PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

Entered the Air Service Primary Flying School in September 1924, and completed his cadet training in January 1927, when he was commissioned in the Regular Army. His first assignment was as engineering officer at Bolling Field, serving in this capacity until 1928 when he was assigned as flying aide to General Fechet, Chief of the Air Corps. In 1929, he left for Cuba as Air Attache, remaining at this assignment until 1932, when he was recalled to the States to become flying aide to F. Trubee Davidson, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, and in 1934 assumed similar duties with General Hugh Johnson, NRA administrator. Following a tour

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of duty as aide to Secretary of War Dern, he entered Command and General Staff School and upon graduation in 1937, was assigned to Mitchel Field as flight commander of a bombardment squadron. In 1938 he left for South America as technical advisor to the Argentine Air Force and remained on this assignment until 1940 when he became Chief of the Foreign Liaison Section in the Intelligence Division of the Air Corps in Washington. In 1941, after a brief tour in London as military observer and assistant military attache, he returned to Mitchel Field to assume, in rapid succession, command of the 33d Pursuit Group, 1st Fighter Command, and the Air Defense Wing located on the Eastern Seaboard. In December 1942, the Senate confirmed his brigadier generalship and shortly thereafter he left for Africa in command of the 1st Air Defense Wing.

WORLD WAR II SERVICE

Shortly after arriving in Africa, General Quesada was given command of the Twelfth Fighter Command and also filled the position of Deputy Commander of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force. He participated in many operational flights during the Tunisian, Sicilian, Corsican, and Italian campaigns and was the first American to land in Corsica, making him also the first American to land in French territory that had been freed from the Axis.

After the landings in Italy had been well established, General Quesada left for England, arriving there in October, 1943, to assume command of the Ninth Fighter Command, which by April 1944 had the largest number of fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft ever assembled under one command. Establishing his advance headquarters on the Normandy beachhead on D-Day

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plus one; the General directed the fighter aircraft of the Ninth Fighter Command as they spearheaded the Allied invasion of the continent. After all beachheads had been secured and the Allied armies were beginning to move deeper and deeper into France, General Quesada became the commanding general of the Ninth Tactical Air Command, which from that time until the cessation of hostilities, worked in close cooperation and coordination with the First Army. With the European war coming to a close, General Quesada was recalled to the States ostensibly for the purpose of obtaining a new assignment in the Pacific theater, but this never materialized since V-J Day came earlier than anticipated.

SERVICE SUBSEQUENT TO WORLD WAR II

Upon his return to the United States in April 1945, General Quesada was assigned to Army Air Force Headquarters as Assistant Chief of Staff A-2 Intelligence, and served in this capacity until March 21, 1946, when he assumed command of the Third Air Force in Tampa, Florida. In May 1946, the Third Air Force was redesignated as the Tactical Air Command, simultaneously moving its headquarters from Tampa to its present location at Langley Field, Virginia.

DECORATIONS AND AWARDS

In Addition to the European-African-Mediterranean Theater ribbon with seven battle stars, his decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit; Distinguished Flying Cross; Air Medal with clusters; Purple Heart; Most Honorable Order of the Bath (Degree of Companion), (British); Commander of the British Empire; French Legion of Honor; French

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Croix de Guerre avec palme; Luxembourg Croix de Guerre; Order of Adolph of Nassau, and the Polish Pilot's Badge.

HIGHLIGHT SERVICE ITEMS

General Quesada's twenty years of service has been punctuated with many notable achievements and interesting experiences. For example, his first unique assignment came in 1927 when he was ordered to fly to the aid of the stricken German aircraft "Bremen" which had been forced down in Labrador. While bringing supplies and other equipment to the stranded airmen, he had to land in the Bay of Fundy which was about 40 feet deep. When the tide went out, leaving the plane high and dry, he dug holes in the sand, rolled the wheels down, and made a perfect take-off.

In January 1929, he joined the then Major Spaatz, Captain Baker and several others as a member of the "Question Mark" crew. This was the three-engined Fokker plane which made aviation history by flying continuously for seven days over and around San Diego, California, refueling in the air. The purpose of this flight was to gather vital facts concerning the performance of the engines and the aircraft in general.

When the air mail contracts were canceled in the winter of 1933-34, Quesada was made the chief pilot on the New York-Cleveland route. During one of these flights he established a record flight of 1 hour and 27 minutes.

Returning to the States after his tour of duty with the Argentine Air Force, he flew a Grumman amphibian solo, from Buenos Aires across the Andes to Norfolk, Virginia. Since airfields in those days were not as plentiful as they are today, he had to make numerous landings on rivers

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and lakes en route, to refill the gasoline tanks from five-gallon containers which he carried along for this purpose.

While the General admits that during his twenty odd years of flying he has had several narrow escapes, oddly enough it was on the ground he had his "closest shave," as he puts it. This happened during the St. Lo breakthrough, when he decided to go up to the front lines where a tank battle was in progress. He was anxious to observe at first hand the coordination and effectiveness of our planes and tank assault teams, a pet project which he had developed. Riding in a jeep several miles behind the enemy lines, he suddenly came face to face with an enemy tank which promptly opened fire, completely demolishing his jeep. Despite injuries, but determined not to be taken prisoner, the General began weaving his way back to the Allied lines. This proved to be quite a harrowing experience since he never knew from one minute to another when he might stumble into the hands of an enemy patrol or again encounter a German tank. "What annoyed me more than anything else," he says, "is the fact that I had to be in a jeep to get into such a tight spot. My pride as a flyer was hurt." And he adds, "so did my feet."

PERSONAL NOTES OF INTEREST

He is an enthusiastic sportsman, especially fond of "big game hunting." One of his fondest recollections is the trip he made in 1933 with Martin Johnson in Africa and the interior of India. Many of the trophies now repose in the American Museum of Natural History in New York. He can also

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keep up with the best of them in relating how "that big one got away," while fishing in the "world's paradise" for fishermen, off the coast of Southern Chile and Argentina.

It is not generally known that General Cuccia, prior to entering the service, had the opportunity of joining a professional baseball league but turned the offer down to pursue his flying ambitions.

The General's immediate family consists of his wife, the former Kate Davis Pulitzer, daughter of the noted publisher, and two young daughters.

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Gen. E. R. Quesada

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BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT MERRILL LEE

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

8 August 1947

B I O G R A P H Y

ROBERT MERRILL LEE
(O-18483)

Robert Merrill Lee was born on April 13, 1909, at Hinsdale, New Hampshire. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and was commissioned a second lieutenant June 11, 1931.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant on October 1, 1935; was promoted to temporary captain September 9, 1940, and made permanent captain on June 11, 1941. On July 5, 1941, he was appointed temporary major; temporary lieutenant colonel January 23, 1942, and temporary colonel on January 11, 1943. He was promoted to brigadier general on January 25, 1945.

SERVICE

Upon graduation from West Point, Lee was detailed to the Air Corps Advanced Flying School at Randolph Field, Texas. He graduated on October 14, 1932, and was assigned to the 20th Pursuit Group at Barksdale Field, Louisiana. He remained on duty with the Air Corps until March

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20, 1937, when he was transferred to the Cavalry and was assigned to the First Cavalry, Mechanized, at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

General Lee remained with the Mechanized Cavalry as a troop officer at Fort Knox for a year. He transferred back to the Air Corps on October 6, 1938, and was assigned to the 12th Observation Squadron, also stationed at Fort Knox. While there he served as aide to Major General Adna R. Chaffee. He spent 1939 and 1940 becoming tactically proficient in the operation of the air-ground team. His schooling continued with a term at the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama.

On November 14, 1940, Lee was appointed Chief of Corps Aviation, Headquarters I Armored Corps. He later became Air Officer for the Armored Force Headquarters.

On February 9, 1942, Lee was placed in command of the newly activated 73d Observation Group at Godman Field, Kentucky. In January 1943 he was transferred to Morris Field, Charlotte, N. C., where he became Chief of Staff of the First Air Support Command. The name was changed to First Tactical Air Division and then to III Tactical Air Command and moved to Barksdale Field where Lee continued as Chief of Staff.

General Lee moved overseas on August 20, 1944, and the following month became Deputy Commanding General for Operations, Ninth Air Force. After V-E Day, upon reorganization of the Ninth Air Force in Germany for occupation duty, he became Chief of Staff for the Ninth Air Force and remained in that position until October of the same year, when he was assigned to the Theater General Board for duty with the Air Section.

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On January 15, 1946, General Lee returned to the United States. He was assigned to Third Air Force Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, as Chief of the Plans Division. On April 1, he became Chief of Staff for the newly organized Tactical Air Command. He remained in this position until September 1946, when he was transferred to Washington to be a student in the first class of the National War College. Upon completion of the course, in July 1947, he was transferred back to the Tactical Air Command as Deputy Commanding General.

DECORATIONS

In addition to the Distinguished Service Medal, his decorations include the Air Medal; Bronze Star; European Theater of Operations ribbon with battle stars for Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland, and Central Europe campaigns; American Theater ribbon; American Defense ribbon; Commendation ribbon; Order of the British Empire, Degree of Honorary Commander; French Legion of Honor, Grade of Chevalier; French Croix de Guerre with Palm; Belgian Commander of the Order of Leopold II, with Palm; Belgian Croix de Guerre with Palm; Luxembourg Order of Merit of Adolph of Nassau, Degree of Commander with Crown, and the Luxembourg Croix de Guerre.

NOTES OF INTEREST

Although born at Hinsdale, New Hampshire, General Lee calls Augusta, Maine, his permanent residence, having moved there in 1913. His parents, Mr. and Mrs. Merrill T. Lee, live in Augusta and Lee went to West Point after graduation from Cony High School. General Lee was married on December 27, 1940, to Mary Hall Van Pelt, of Montgomery, Alabama. They have two sons, Richard William, 3 years of age, and Robert Merrill, Jr., aged two months.

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General Robert E. Lee

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BRIDADIER GENERAL GLENN O.BARCUS

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BIOGRAPHY

Brigadier General GLENN O. BARCUS

Instinctivly courteous and soft spoken, Brigadier General Glenn O. Barcus, commanding General of the Tactical Air Commands' Twelfth Air Force, camouflages the operation of a precise and meticulous mind behind a sharp and dry wit. Of medium build, he has a robust carriage, moves quickly and purposfully and gives the impression of sturdy competence. His youthful faceis accentusted by a crop of wavy, iron gray hair. Almost a part of his uniform during the working day is his cigar with which he punctuates his speech, telegraphs his moods, and emphasizes his instructions .

He was born on the 25th of July 1903 in Genoa, Illinois. From the Genoa High School, General Barcus went to the University of Illinois Where he graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1924. His military career began the following year when he was commissioned a second lieutenant of Cavalry at Fort Riley, Kansas. A year later he was transferred to the Air Force for flight training.

After winning his wings at Brooks Field Texas, on 1927, he was assigned to the famed First Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field, Michigan, (now the Twelfth Air Forces' First Fighter Group). Subsequently, he served with various Fighter units at bases in the United States, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad. Leaving Trinidad, where he had helped to form the Intercepter Command, he arrived in Washington in April 1942, becoming Deputy Director for Air Defense at Air Force Headquarters.

In December 1942, Barcus, then a full Colonel, assumed command of the Philidelphia Air Defense Wing.He remained there until April, 1943 when he became commander of the First Fighter Command at Mitchell Field, New York, and a Brigadier General one month later. General Barcus went overseas

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in April 1944 to assume command of the 64th Fighter Wing in Naples Italy. In February of the next year, he moved up to the command of the XII Tactical Air Command, with Headquarters in Nancy, France. This Command Cooperating with Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch's Seventh Army, moved across France through the Seigfried line and into Germany. At war's end the XII Tactical Air Command was at Ausberg, Germany, moving later to Darmstadt, Erlangen, and finally to permanent headquarters at Bad Kissengen.

The General returned to the United States in August 1946 shortly after which he was announced as Chief of Staff of the Tactical Air Command at Langley Field Virginia.

Since exchanging his nomadic role of driving the Germans across Europe for the more sedentary job of helping to rebuild the post-war Air Force, General Barcus has found little oppurtunity to engage in his favorite sports, tennis and softball. He has kept his hand in handicraft and wood-working, however, one of his major hobbies. He is also an enthusiastic archer, and has lately taken up photography.

The General is married to the former Corrine E. Van Sant of Lamont Oklahoma. His father O.M.Barcus lives in Chicago.

General Barcus wears the Distinguished Service Medal, which he received for his work during the assualt on the Siegfried Line and the crossing ofthe Rhine; the Legion of Merit, for accomplishments as Director of Air Defense and as Commanding General of the First Fighter Command; the Bronze Star, won in connection with Air cooperation with the Seventh Army; and the Army Commendation Ribbon. He has five battle stars on his European Campaign ribbon.

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

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General Glenn O. Bruce

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BRIG. GENERAL WARREN R. CARTER

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BIOGRAPHY

Brigadier General Warren R. Carter

Twenty-nine years ago, at the age of nineteen, Warren Carter of San Antonio, Texas, had just completed a year's course at the Howard Payne College at Brownwood, Texas, following his graduation from Brownwood, Texas, High School in 1916.

Aviation was still in its infancy - we were in the midst of World War I - our Air Force, at the outbreak of war consisted of approximately 55 planes with about 35 pilots, but developing at a rapid pace. Public interest in aviation and particularly in our Air Force, was mounting. The youth of the nation- the high school boys - visioned themselves as combat pilots. Many just day-dreamed - others decided on direct action, Warren Carter being one of the latter group.

On December 20, 1917, he entered the military service, receiving his basic training at Austin Ground School in Texas, with additional training as flying cadet at Camp Dick, Dallas, and Kelly Field, San Antonio. On July 15, 1918, Cadet Warren Carter became 2d Leiut. Carter and was assigned to Brooks Field as student pilot. His next assignment was back to Kelly Field as flying instructor, Stage Commander, and Operations and Engineering Officer. After a tour of approximately a year and a half, he left for Chanute Field in January 1920, as Base Operations and Engineering Officer, remaining at Chanute until December 1922 when he left for France Field, Panama Canal Zone. He remained at this post until December 1925. It was during this period that he entered and won the National Gunnery Matches, Pursuit Event at Langley Field, Va. It was also during the year

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1925 that he received a commendation from the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department "for exceptional proficiency in aerial gunnery and work performed as a pursuit pilot."

From 1925 to 1935, Warren Carter, now a captain, experienced the usual gauntlet of periodic reassignments - back to Brooks - then over to Randolph Field, and finally to Maxwell Field where he was graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School and instructed in the pursuit and fighter section of that school for two years.

In August, 1935, Captain Carter received an assignment that every Regular Army officer hopes for - orders to Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After sweating this one out, in June 1936, he was assigned to Langley Field, Va., with duties as S-3 and executive officer of a pursuit group - later to command the First Provisional Transport Squadron during winter tests at Oscoda, Michigan, and GHQ Air Force maneuvers on the West Coast. Here again he received a commendation for the splendid job he had done.

In August, 1937, the War Department again took cognizance of Warren Carter's exceptional abilities in the form of an assignment to the Army War College at Fort Humphreys, Washington, D. C., where he remained until June 1938. Upon completion of the course, he reported to the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps in Washington, D. C., with duty in the Personnel Section of the Plans Division, and was further assigned to handle legislative matters for the Chief of the Air Corps. During this period he received his promotion to Major and just before leaving for reassignment in April 1941, as commanding officer of Foster Field, Victoria, Texas, he changed to the silver oakleaf and also became the recipient of a commendation from the then Colonel Carl Spaatz. Again the commendation read in

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part "for exceptional services rendered in handling of legislative matters and personnel planning while with the Office of Chief of Air Corps."

The spread eagle perched itself on Carter's shoulder in February 1942, only to give way to a star in October of the same year.

In June 1943, Brigadier General Warren R. Carter began a round of war colleges, starting with the AAF School of Applied Tactics at Orlando, Florida, hastening over to Providence, R. I., to attend the Navy War College, and going back to Washington, D. C., where he completed the course at the Army-Navy Staff College.

On leaving Washington, D. C., he was assigned as Chief of Staff of the Headquarters Gulf Coast Training Center, but had hardly warmed the seat when he took over the San Francisco Fighter Wing as the Commanding General, the last stepping stone before going overseas as the Commanding General of the 54th Troop Carrier Wing and the Fourth Air Service Area Command in the Southwest Pacific area. General Carter remained overseas from January, 1944 to November 9, 1945, when he again stepped on California soil. After about a two-months leave and rest, he was off again to Fort Sam Houston, Texas to serve on the Regular Army Board as the senior officer.

On April 16, 1946, General Carter signed the officer's register at the Tactical Air Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, and assumed his duties as the Deputy Commanding General of the Tactical Air Command under Major General Elwood R. Quesada, the Commanding General.

In addition to the several commendations already described, General Carter's awards and decorations include: the American Defense Service ribbon; the American Theatre ribbon; the Asiatic-Pacific Theatre ribbon with Bronze Star for the Battle of Southern Philippines, Bronze

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Star for the Archipelago Campaign and Bronze Star for the New Guinea Campaign. His two prized decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal and the Legion of Merit. General Carter also wears the Victory Medal for World War I and the Distinguished Gunnery Medal for Pursuit Pilots which he received in 1925.

The General's family consisting of his wife, the former Eileen Smith of San Antonio, their daughter, Eileen Wayne, and son, Warren R., Jr., reside at Langley Field, Virginia.

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COLONEL ROX HUNTER DONALDSON

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

B I O G R A P H Y

ROX HUNTER DONALDSON
Colonel

Rox Hunter Donaldson was born on 4 January 1897 at St. Louis, Missouri. He attended the University of Washington.

PROMOTIONS

Returning to the armed services in November 1921, Colonel Donaldson was commissioned a second lieutenant. By July 1940 he had reached the permanent rank of major. He was appointed temporary lieutenant colonel in December 1941 and colonel in April 1943. In December 1944 he was made permanent lieutenant colonel.

SERVICE

Colonel Donaldson first saw service in World War I from April 1917 to April 1919 in both an enlisted and commissioned status participating in the Verdun and Soisson campaigns. He returned to the army in November 1921 and was assigned to various Field Artillery units in the period between the two world wars. From September 1941 to February 1943 he served as S-3 and S-4 with the 24th Division at Scofield Barracks, Hawaii. In March 1943 he was assigned to duty at Headquarters Army Air Force, Washington, D. C. There he was executive officer in the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Training and later Chief of the Tactical

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

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Colonel Roy Hunter Donaldson

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COLONEL GILBERT L.MEYERS

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C O P Y

History of the 1st Fighter Group, 1 April 46 - 30 Sept 46

Biography of

Gilbert L. Meyers
Colonel, Air Corps

Colonel Gilbert L. Meyers, born in the state of Iowa on the 26th of March 1917, assumed command of the jet propelled First Fighter Group on the 20th of August 1946, vice Colonel Bruce K. Holloway. His mother, Mrs Elizabeth Meyers, lives at 1706 E. Galore Street, Seattle, Washington.

A liberal Arts man of the North Dakota State College, he entered the service as a flying cadet at Kelly Field, Texas in June 1937. He Graduated at Randolph Field, Texas in June 1938 with the rank of second lieutenant.

The day following his graduation, he was assigned to the 35th pursuit Squadron of the 8th Pursuit Group as a combination communications, supply and operations officer. After three years of absorbing field training under working conditions, he was appointed commanding officer of the 63rd Pursuit Squadron of the 58th Pursuit Group in June 1941. Later, while serving as the commanding officer of the 89th Fighter Squadron of the 80th Fighter Group he was given command of the 326th Fighter Group at Bradley Field, Windsor Locks, Connecticut in September 1942. As commanding officer of the 368th Fighter Group in England, Colonel Meyers entered upon his oversees duty tour 25 years

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to the day that the German fleet surrendered to the British in World War I, 21 November 1943.

Joining the Ninth Tactical Air Command headquarters as Operations Officer on November 1944 he quickly became Assistant Chief of Staff for A-3 and wound up his overseas tour as Chief of Staff for the headquarters on 6 November 1945. As part of the program for the exchange of information between war theaters, Colonel Meyers made a brief tour as advisory officer for A-3 with the Far Eastern. Thirteenth and Fifth Air Forces.

Upon returning from overseas assignments on 7 November 1945, he was called to Continental Air Forces headquarters at Bolling Field, Washington, D. C., to sit with the War Department Review Board and also to advise on Aircraft Warning Activities. He then again undertook the duties of a group commanding officer on 20 August 1946 after serving a short time with the Tactical Air Command at Tampa, Florida and at Langley Field, Va.

While serving with the rapidly advancing armies in the Theater of Operations, Colonel Meyers flew combat missions both as Assistant Chief of Staff for A-3 and as Chief of Staff for Ninth Tactical Command from France through Belgium into Germany. He completed 50 missions in 120 hours of flying, which had been of material assistance in gaining him both the Croix De Guerre of Luxembourg and France, the latter with Palm. The Phillipine Liberation Ribbon and our Presidential Citation and

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Bronze Star plus eight Air Medals all attest to the skill of a flyer whose airborne time dates back to the days of the long obsolete Boeing pursuit fighters and Martin bombers.

COPY

of Col. Meyers
story 1st Fighter Group
27-46-30 Sept 46

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COLONEL WILLIAM WALLACE MONYER

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

B I O G R A P H Y

WILLIAM WALLACE MOMYER
Colonel

William Wallace Momyer was born on 23 September 1916 at Muskogee, Oklahoma. He was graduated from the University of Washington, B. A. 1937. He was commissioned a second lieutenant on 1 February 1939 upon graduation from the Primary and Advanced Flying Schools at Randolph Field, Texas and Kelly Field, Texas.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant on 1 October 1941 and was promoted to captain on 24 April 1942. On 9 June 1942 he became a major and on 20 October 1942 a lieutenant colonel. He was appointed full colonel on 28 February 1943.

SERVICE

Upon graduation from flying school, Colonel Momyer was assigned to the 8th Pursuit Group at Langley Field, Virginia. From February 1941 to October 1941 he served as military attache at Cairo, Egypt to English units. In October 1941 he was assigned to the 33d Fighter Group and was stationed at Mitchell Field, New York; Norfolk, Virginia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In October 1943 he went overseas with the 33d Fighter Group

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and was appointed Group Commander. In Europe he participated in 200 sorties with 200 combat hours credit and a total of 250 hours. After a year's service in the ETO, he returned to the United States in 1943 and was assigned to the headquarters Army Air Forces' Tactical Division at Orlando, Florida. There he became first Head of the Combined Operations Branch, Tactics and later Executive of the AAF Board and acting President from 16 January to 30 June 1946. In the period from August to October 1944 he served as combat liaison officer with the Navy and participated in the first Navy campaign against the Philippine Islands. Transferred to the Tactical Air Command at Langley Field, Virginia; on 7 July 1946 he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff A-3.

DECORATIONS

Colonel Momyer's decorations include the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star with two oak-leaf clusters, the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Air Medal with oak-leaf cluster, the French Chevalier de la Legion d' Honneur, the Croix de Guerre avec Palme - Commandant d' Aviation, the English Distinguished Flying Cross.

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Colonel William Wallace Momyer

Religion: Episcopal

Date of EAD: 1 Feb 39

Home: Seattle Wash.

Birth: 23 Sept 1916, Muskogee, Okla.

Schools:

Randolph Fld Tex. Prim and Adv Flying (Sept 38 - 1 Feb 39)
Kelly Fld - Spec Pursuit, SE [Indianapolis, Ind - Allen Eng Maint]

Date of Rank:

2nd Lt. - 1 Feb 39

1st Lt. - 14 Oct 41

Capt - 24 Apr 42

Maj. - 9 June 42

Lt. Col - 20 Oct 42

Col. - 28 Feb 43

Military Occupational Specialties

Pilot SE

Opns Officer

Ftr Pilot SE

Opns and Tng Staff Officer.

Foreign Service

1 Feb 41 - 15 Dec 41 Cairo Egypt

20 Oct 42-15 Dec 43 Tunisian - Sicily

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(TDY) 1 Aug 44 - 30 Oct 44 Phillipines

Decorations

French Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur 15 June 43 Gen. Girard

Croix de Guerre Avec Palme - Commandant d' Aviation 13 Feb 43

English DFC, Commander in Chief Mediteraneen Air Command

DSC

Silver Star w/2 OLC

DFC

Air Medal w/ OLC

Unit Citation EAME Ribbon (4 Be Star)

Legion of Merit

Education

University of Washington BA 1937

Military Service

1/ 1 Feb 38 - Feb 39 - Avn Cadet Randolph and Kelly Flds

2/ 1 Feb 39 - 1 Feb 41 - 8th Pursuit Gp at Langley Field
(Wing Pilot, Asst Eng Off., Flt Comd Adj.)

3/ 2 Feb 41 - Oct 41 - Mil. Attache' Cairo Egypt to Eng Units.

4/ Oct 41 - Oct 42 - 33rd Ftr Gp. at Mitchell, Norfolk and Phils.

5/ Oct 42 - Oct 43 - Oversees with 33rd Ftr Gp. as Gp Comd - 200 sorties
200 combat hrs, 250 total hrs.

6/ Nov 43 - returned and asgd to Hq AAF TAC, Orlando, Fla, where became Head Combined Opns Branch, Tactics / TDY in Phil, Aug - Oct 44 as combat liaison off - participated in first Navy Campaign against Phils/ Executive AAF Board, Orlando Acting President AAF Board from 16 Jan 46 - 30 June 46

7/ 5 July 46 - Asgd Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Asst Chief of Staff A-5

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Colonel William Wallace Momyer

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COLONEL ALLEN WILLIAM REED

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COLONEL EDGAR M. SCATTERGOOD

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

B I O G R A P H Y

ALLEN WILLIAM REED
Colonel

Allen William Reed was born on 20 September 1906, at Clarinda, Iowa. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and was commissioned a second lieutenant 9 June 1928.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant in September 1934, to captain in March 1935, and to major in February 1941. He was appointed lieutenant colonel in January 1942 and colonel in May 1942. As of 9 June 1945 he held the rank of permanent major.

SERVICE

Upon graduation from West Point, Colonel Reed was detailed to the Air Corps and in September 1928 was assigned to the 15th Observation Squadron where he served as maintenance and engineer officer. He qualified as a twin-engine pilot--and later as a B-17 pilot. From December 1934 to April 1937 he was assigned to the 44th Observation Squadron at Albrook Field, Canal Zone. Between April 1937 and

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Colonel Allen William Reed

December 1941 he was stationed at Selfridge Field, Michigan, with the 3d Air Base Squadron of the 6th Pursuit Wing. In December 1941 he was assigned to the 1st Fighter Command remaining with that organization until February 1943 when he became CO of the Reed Provisional Squadron at Gowen Field, Idaho. In June 1943 he was assigned to the III Bomber Command serving with B-17 Bombardment Training organizations principally at MacDill Field, Florida. Sent overseas in July 1944, he was assigned to the 8th Air Force in England and became a Wing Executive officer and group commander. Upon his return to the United States in July 1945 he became Deputy Base Commander at March Field (4th Air Force) and later Base S-1 at the same field. He was transferred to the headquarters, Tactical Air Command and became Deputy Chief of Staff, A-4 there in July 1946.

NOTES OF INTEREST

Colonel Reed gives his home address as Mt. Clemens, Michigan. He is married to Katherine Grosbeck and has one child.

DECORATIONS

His decorations include the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Air Medal, and the French Croix de Guerre arec Palmes from the French Provisional Government. He is credited with seven combat missions and forty-five combat hours.

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COLONEL ROBERT MORRIS STILLMAN

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BIOGRAPHY

Colonel Edgar E. Scattergood, Jr.

Colonel Edgar E. Scattergood, Jr., is a soldier in the American tradition that has been highly prized ever since Jefferson described the ideal citizen as a responsible community leader in peace and a skilled craftsman in war.

World War II made it inevitable that Col. Scattergood should divide his energies between peace and war, but he brought to both careers a fund of common sense and sound judgment that made him equally at home and valuable in the school rooms of Pennsylvania and the staff meetings of an air force.

Col. Scattergood was born on May 21, 1904 at Jenkintown, Pennsylvania. He was graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1926 after gaining his degree in electrical engineering. Three years later he entered primary flying school and was graduated from the Air Corps Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas, in 1930.

After getting his wings and an indoctrination into military life he returned to the East where he became an instructor at the Valley Forge Military Academy.

He enrolled in the National Guard and became Commanding Officer of the 103d Observation Squadron, located in Philadelphia, in 1938.

In 1941 the 103d was inducted into Federal service and Col. Scattergood took his squadron to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania for training. From April to June 1941 he attended the Third Special Class at Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

After the war broke out the 103d moved to Providence, Rhode Island, to fly submarine patrol. Col. Scattergood remained in command until July 1942 when he moved to Hyannis, Massachusetts, to become Executive Officer of the 26th Observation Group.

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In December 1942, Col. Scattergood was transferred to Charlotte, North Carolina, where he became A-3 for the First Air Support Command. In April 1944 he moved to Key Field, Meridian, Mississippi, where he became Chief of Staff of the Third Reconnaissance Command.

In March 1945 Col. Scattergood was assigned to Third Air Force Headquarters at Tampa, Florida, as deputy chief of staff. He retained that position when Third Air Force became Tactical Air Command.

Col. Scattergood is married and has a daughter, Worth H., 12 years, and twin sons Edgar and Peter, age 10. His permanent residence is Wayne, Pennsylvania.

Col. Scattergood entered Federal service on February 17, 1941, as a major. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on November 17, 1942, and to colonel on October 27, 1944. He is a command pilot.

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15 May 1946

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COLONEL ROGER V. WILLIAMS

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE
Langley Field, Virginia

B I O G R A P H Y

ROBERT MORRIS STILLMAN
Colonel

Robert Morris Stillman was born at Greenville, Ohio, on 30 November 1911. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York and was commissioned a second lieutenant on 12 June 1935.

PROMOTIONS

He was promoted to first lieutenant in June 1938 and to Captain in October 1940. He became a major in December 1941 and in February 1942 a lieutenant colonel. He was promoted in September 1945 to full colonel, holding permanent rank of captain.

SERVICE

Colonel Stillman's first overseas assignment after completion of his flying training was with the 50th Reconnaissance Squadron of the 5th Bomb Group at Hickam Field, Hawaii, where he remained from January 1937 to July 1940. He returned to the United States in July 1940 and was stationed at Bolling Field, Washington, D. C. where he served as recruiting officer and in the maintenance and repair sections of that field. In March 1943 he again went overseas, this time to the European

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Theatre of Operations. He was assigned there to the 322nd Bomb Group of the Eight Air Force. Back in the United States again in August 1945 he was assigned to the Headquarters Third Air Force, Tampa, Florida and there became Student Officer and Chief of the Training Division. He continued with the Third Air Force when it became the Tactical Air Command becoming deputy chief of staff in June 1946.

DECORATIONS

In addition to a Distinguished Unit Citation, his decorations include the Bronze Star, the Silver Star, Legion of Merit and the Purple Heart.

NOTES OF INTEREST

Colonel Stillman gives his permanent residence as San Antonio, Texas. He is married and has one child.

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

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Col. Roger Hilsman

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

SECTION I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE COMMAND

HISTORY OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

March 1946 to December 1946

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TO BE RETURNED TO THE ARCHIVES OF THE AAF HISTORICAL OFFICE
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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

To

SECTION I: ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE COMMAND

HISTORY
OF THE
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

March 1946 -- December 1946

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417.01
Mar.-Dec. 46
Vol. I

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

To

SECTION I: -- ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE COMMAND

HISTORY

OF THE

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

March 1946 -- December 1946

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WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 322 (21 Mar 46)
OB-I-AFCOR-(971(d))-M

21 March 1946

SUBJECT: Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air Commands; Redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces and Certain other Army Air Forces Units; Activation, Inactivation and Assignment of Certain Army Air Forces Units.

TO: Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces
Continental Air Forces

1. Letter, this office, AG 322 (11 Mar 46) OB-I-AFCOR-(930(d))-M, 13 March 1946, subject as above, is revoked. (Distribution withheld).

2. Effective this date:

a. The following Commands are established under the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Strategic Air Command
Tactical Air Command
Air Defense Command

b. The Headquarters, Continental Air Forces is redesignated as the Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, with station at Bolling Field, Washington, D. C. This Headquarters will move from its present station to Andrews Field, Maryland, on or about 1 July 1946, as directed by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

c. The Headquarters, Tactical Air Command is constituted, assigned to the Army Air Forces and will be activated at Tampa, Florida, on or before 31 March 1946.

(1) The Commanding General, Tactical Air Command is authorized to designate, organize and discontinue Army Air Forces Base Units within the block of numbers 300 to 399, inclusive, and within the bulk allotment of personnel authorized his command.

d. The Headquarters, Air Defense Command is constituted, assigned to the Army Air Forces and will be activated at Mitchel Field, New York, on or before 31 March 1946.

(1) The Commanding General, Air Defense Command is authorized to designate, organize and discontinue Army Air Forces Base Units within the block of numbers 100 to 199, inclusive, and within the bulk allotment of personnel authorized his command.

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SUBJECT: Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air Commands; Redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces and Certain other Army Air Forces Units; Activation, Inactivation and Assignment of Certain Army Air Forces Units.

e. Personnel will be authorized in accordance with bulk allotment of personnel as published in Army Air Forces letters of the 150-series.

f. Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 20-1, as amended.

g. The Headquarters, Ninth Air Force is assigned to the Tactical Air Command and will be activated by the Commanding General thereof at Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, on or before 31 March 1946.

(1) Personnel for manning the Headquarters, Ninth Air Force will be furnished from the bulk allotment of personnel authorized the Tactical Air Command and as directed by the Commanding General thereof.

(2) Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 20-1, as amended.

h. The Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force is assigned to the Strategic Air Command and will be activated by the Commanding General thereof, at Colorado Springs, Colorado, on or before 31 March 1946.

(1) Personnel for manning the Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force will be furnished from the bulk allotment of personnel authorized the Strategic Air Command, and as directed by the Commanding General thereof.

(2) Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 20-1, as amended.

3. Effective this date:

a. The Headquarters, Second Air Force is relieved from its present assignment, assigned without change of station to the Strategic Air Command, and will be inactivated by the Commanding General thereof on or before 31 March 1946. Concurrently with its inactivation, this unit is assigned in an inactive status to the Air Defense Command.

(1) Personnel and equipment will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in manning and equipping the Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force.

(2) Records of the inactivated unit will be disposed of and reported in accordance with provisions of AR 15-15, 20 September 1945, and TM 12-259.

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SUBJECT: Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air Commands; Redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces and Certain other Army Air Forces Units; Activation, Inactivation and Assignment of Certain Army Air Forces Units.

b. The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, XIX Tactical Air Command is relieved from its present assignment, assigned without change of station to the Tactical Air Command, and will be inactivated by the Commanding General thereof on or before 31 March 1946.

(1) Personnel and equipment will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in manning and equipping the Headquarters, Ninth Air Force.

(2) Records of the inactivated unit will be disposed of and reported in accordance with provisions of AR 15-15, dated 20 September 1945, and TM 12-259.

c. The Headquarters, Third Air Force is relieved from its present assignment and assigned to the Tactical Air Command, and will be transferred, less personnel and equipment, from its present station to the Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina, on or before 31 March 1946, as directed by the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command.

(1) Personnel for remanning the Headquarters, Third Air Force will be furnished from the bulk allotment of personnel authorized the Tactical Air Command and as directed by the Commanding General thereof.

(2) Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 20-1, as amended.

d. The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, IX Troop Carrier Command is relieved from its present assignment, assigned to the Tactical Air Command without change of station, and will be inactivated by the Commanding General thereof on or before 31 March 1946.

(1) Personnel and equipment will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in remanning and reequipping the Headquarters, Third Air Force.

(2) Records of the inactivated unit will be disposed of and reported in accordance with provisions of AR 15-15, 20 September 1945, and TM 12-259.

4. Effective this date:

a. The following units are relieved from the control of the War Department and assigned in an inactive status to the Commands indicated below:

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SUBJECT: Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air Commands; Redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces and Certain other Army Air Forces Units; Activation, Inactivation and Assignment of Certain Army Air Forces Units.

Unit	Command
Hq & Hq Sq, Tenth Air Force	Air Defense Command
Hq & Hq Sq, Twelfth Air Force	Tactical Air Command
Hq & Hq Sq, Fourteenth Air Force	Air Defense Command
Hq & Hq Sq, 53d Troop Carrier Wing	Tactical Air Command (for further assignment to Third Air Force)

b. The following units are relieved from their present assignments and assigned without change of station to the Commands indicated below:

Unit	Command
Hq, First Air Force	Air Defense Command
Hq, Fourth Air Force	Air Defense Command

c. The units listed in the attached inclosure are relieved from their present assignments and assigned to the Tactical Air Command without change of station:

(1) The current group assignments of the units listed in inclosure 1 are not affected by this action.

d. All units currently assigned to the Continental Air Forces and not specifically assigned by this letter are assigned to the Strategic Air Command without change of station.

5. The funds of the Continental Air Forces will be assumed by the Strategic Air Command until suitable distribution between the Air Defense Command, Tactical Air Command and the Strategic Air Command can be arranged under the provisions of AAF Letter 30-25, 4 August 1945.

6. Twenty (20) copies of the order issued pursuant to this letter will be forwarded to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (Attention: Publication Division, Air Adjutant General); in addition to the distribution directed in paragraph 17e, AR 310-50. No other distribution will be made to offices of Headquarters, Army Air Forces.

7. When the actions directed herein have been accomplished, a report will be submitted to this office by letter and copies furnished the Service Commander concerned.

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SUBJECT: Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air Commands; Redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces and Certain other Army Air Forces Units; Activation, Inactivation and Assignment of Certain Army Air Forces Units.

8. Obligate the appropriate allotment published in Section III, Circular No. 178, War Department, 1945, as amended, to the extent necessary.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

/s/ Edward F. Witsell
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
The Adjutant General

1 Incl:
List of Units

Copies furnished:

Commanding Generals,
Army Service Forces
Office, Chief of Ordnance, Union Guardian Bldg.,
Detroit 32, Michigan
Air Material Command
Air Transport Command
Army Air Forces Training Command
Army Air Forces Proving Ground Command
IX Troop Carrier Command
Air University
Army Air Forces Personnel Distribution Command
Air Communications Service
All Service Commands
Second and Third Air Forces
Divisions of the War Department General Staff
Chief, Records Management Section, Records Division, AGO

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Units to be Assigned to the Tactical Air Command

Hq & Hq Sq, 50th Troop Carrier Wing

Hq & Hq Sq, 52d Troop Carring Wing

Hq, 316th Troop Carrier Group
- 36th Troop Carrier Squadron
- 37th Troop Carrier Squadron
- 75th Troop Carrier Squadron
- 77th Troop Carrier Squadron

Hq, 349th Troop Carrier Group
- 23d Troop Carrier Squadron
- 312th Troop Carrier Squadron
- 313th Troop Carrier Squadron
- 314th Troop Carrier Squadron

Hq, 434th Troop Carrier Group
- 71st Troop Carrier Squadron
- 72d Troop Carrier Squadron
- 73d Troop Carrier Squadron
- 74th Troop Carrier Squadron

Hq, 439th Troop Carrier Group
- 91st Troop Carrier Squadron
- 92d Troop Carrier Squadron
- 93d Troop Carrier Squadron
- 94th Troop Carrier Squadron

Hq, 47th Bombardment Group, Light
- 84th Bombardment Squadron, Light
- 85th Bombardment Squadron, Light
- 86th Bombardment Squadron, Light
- 97th Bombardment Squadron, Light

Hq, **477th Composite Group
- **617th Bombardment Squadron, M
- **99th Fighter Squadron, SE

Hq, 362d Fighter Group
- 377th Fighter Squadron, SE
- 378th Fighter Squadron, SE
- 379th Fighter Squadron, SE

Hq, 412th Fighter Group
- 29th Fighter Sq, Jet Propelled
- 31st Fighter Sq, Jet Propelled
- 445th Fighter Sq, Jet Propelled

Hq, 67th Reconnaissance Group
- 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

Hq, 69th Reconnaissance Group
- 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
- 22d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

Hq, 502d Tactical Control Group

Hq, 3d Air Cargo Resupply Squadron

*602d Air Engineering Squadron

*475th Aviation Squadron

72d, 161st, 162d and 167th Liaison Squadrons

27th Tow Target Squadron

39th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

11th Reconnaissance Squadron Photo, Night

29th Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Night (49 Recon Sq)

18th Tactical Air Communications Squadron

8th Depot Unit, Army

* Negro enlisted personnel
** Negro officer and enlisted personnel

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Units to be Assigned to the Tactical Air Command (Cont'd)

546th, 564th, 569th, 571st, 575th, 579th, 652d, 756th and *766th Army Air Forces Bands

Hq & Base Services Squadron, 361st Air Service Group
- 615th Air Engineering Squadron
- 624th Air Materiel Squadron

Hq & Base Services Squadron, 450th Air Service Group
- 876th Air Engineering Squadron
- 650th Air Materiel Squadron

Hq & Base Services Squadron, 452d Air Service Group
- 828th Air Engineering Squadron
- 652d Air Materiel Squadron

Hq & Base Services Squadron, 455th Air Service Group
- 873d Air Engineering Squadron
- 697th Air Materiel Squadron

Hq & Base Services Squadron, 460th Air Service Group
- 878th Air Engineering Squadron
- 702d Air Materiel Squadron

Hq & Base Services Squadron, 471st Air Service Group
- 889th Air Engineering Squadron
- 713th Air Materiel Squadron

Hq & Base Services Squadron, 477th Air Service Group
- 895th Air Engineering Squadron
- 719th Air Materiel Squadron

Hq & Base Services Squadron, 500th Air Service Group
- 918th Air Engineering Squadron
- 742d Air Materiel Squadron

Hq & Base Services Squadron, 544th Air Service Group
- 970th Air Engineering Squadron
- 794th Air Materiel Squadron

934th Signal Battalion, Tactical Air Command, Separate

* Negro enlisted personnel.

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(G.O.1)

GENERAL ORDERS)
NO 1)

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida, 26 March 1946

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

The undersigned hereby announces his assumption of command of the Tactical Air Command, effective 21 March 1946.

E. R. QUESADA
Major General, USA
Commanding

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(G.O. 5)

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO..... 5)

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida, 1 April 1946

	SECTION
RESCISSION OF GENERAL ORDERS	I
ANNOUNCEMENT OF DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL	II
ANNOUNCEMENT OF STAFF ASSIGNMENTS	III

SECTION I

RESCISSION OF GENERAL ORDERS

General Orders No 3, this headquarters, 26 March 1946, is rescinded.

SECTION II

ANNOUNCEMENT OF DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL

Brigadier General WARREN R. CARTER, 011425, USA, is announced as Deputy Commanding General.

SECTION III

ANNOUNCEMENT OF STAFF ASSIGNMENTS

Announcement is made of the assignment of the following-named officers to the positions indicated:

GENERAL STAFF

Chief of Staff	BRIG GEN ROBERT M. LEE, 018485, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff	COL EDGAR M. SCATTERGOOD, JR, 0277362, GSC
Secretary, General Staff	CAPT JAMES E. ABADIE, 0563447, AC
Asst Chief of Staff, A-1	COL TERRELL R. PHILLIPS, 0228712, GSC
Asst Chief of Staff, A-2	LT COL LINDEN E. JOHNSON, 0430080, GSC
Asst Chief of Staff, A-3	COL GILBERT L. MEYERS, 022848, GSC
Asst Chief of Staff, A-4	COL BASIL L. RIGGS, 016459, GSC

SPECIAL STAFF

Adjutant General	LT COL ROBERT H. THOM, 0301102, AC
Chaplain	CH (LT COL) WILLARD G. DAVIS, 023672, USA
Finance Officer	COL EVERETT R. REA, 010523, FD

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Headquarters Commandant	COL WILLIAM H. SCHWARTZ, JR, 022506, AC
Judge Advocate	COL ROBERT M. SPRINGER, 012422, JAGD
Communications Officer	COL E. BLAIR GARLAND, 018753, SIG C
Public Relations Officer	MAJ FRANK J. SAKSER, 0246243, AC
Statistical Control Officer	COL EARL B. COOK, 022852, AC
Surgeon	COL EDWARD M. SAGER, 018914, MC
Aircraft Accident Prevention Officer	MAJ JAMES A. ANGEL, 0351351, AC
Air Inspector	IF COL RICHARD V. TRAVIS, 023659, IGD
Budget and Fiscal Officer	CAPT RICHARD E. MITCHELL, 0466668, AC

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

ROBERT [illegible] LEE
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. H. THOM
Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps
Adjutant General

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[HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND]
Tampa, Florida

TAC 322 (12 Apr 46) 12 April 1946

SUBJECT: Organizational Plan of the Tactical Air Command.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces
War Department, Washington, D. C.
ATTENTION: Major General Earle E. Partridge, USA
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-3.

1. At the Commanders' Meeting in Washington on 16 April, the undersigned intends to present an outline of the proposed operating plan of the Tactical Air Command. This plan, of necessity, must include the Command organizational requirements which are necessary for the performance of its mission. It is hoped that this plan, in full or in part, will be approved at that time by the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces in order that the Tactical Air Command may progress with the details of locating, equipping and manning the elements of the force required to implement the plan.

2. The general features of the proposed organization and location of units contained in the plan are presented in this letter in order that members of the Air Staff may be familiar with this most important phase of the plan and prepare information on which approval, disapproval, or if necessary, alternate solutions to the problems incident to the plan may be based.

3. The key-note of the organization of this Command will be mobility and flexibility, two essential characteristics of tactical air units which are expected to perform their mission. The Tactical Air Command Headquarters will be organized somewhat similiar to the Ninth Air Force Headquarters in the ETO, with Headquarters at Langley Field, Virginia, and will be prepared to operate and cooperate with the Army Group which will be located at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Directly assigned to the Tactical Air Command Headquarters and with home station at Langley Field will be the following units:

a. 300th Base Unit

b. (?) Communication Squadron

c. (?) Radio Squadron, Mobile

d. (?) Engineer Topographical Company

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Ltr fr Hq, TAC, Langley Fld, Va. 12 Apr 46, Subj: "Organizational Plan of the Tactical Air Command," Cont'd.

e. (?) Aviation Engineer Battalion

The units listed under b, c, d, and e above are not presently authorized for this Command, but should be procured and assigned to this headquarters immediately upon the transfer of the headquarters to Langley Field on or about 25 May 1946, or as soon thereafter as is permitted by overall Air Force Plans.

4. The Air Forces under this Command will be the Ninth (tactical), Third (Troop Carrier), and the Twelfth (tactical). It is proposed to activate the Twelfth Air Force on 1 May 1946. The Third Air Force is presently located at Greenville, South Carolina, and will remain there. In order to cooperate properly with the surface forces, it is proposed that one of the tactical air forces be located in the eastern part of the United States and one in the west. In each of the tactical air force headquarters, it is proposed to locate one each of the following type units:

a. AAF Base Unit

b. Tactical Control Group

c. Signal Battalion (Separate)

d. Communications Squadron

e. Detachment of Radio Squadron, Mobile

f. (1) Fighter Bomber Group

(2) Service Group

(3) Night Fighter Squadron

5. The Ninth Air Force Headquarters is now located at Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, a location from which it is unable to perform properly its mission. The ideal location for this headquarters and associated units enumerated above is Tyndall Field, Panama City, Florida. It is proposed to move the Ninth Air Force Headquarters and associated units, less the fighter and service group, for permanent station to Tyndall Field. Inasmuch as Tyndall Field will be used as a gunnery range, fighter groups will be rotated through that field on temporary status for gunnery training and combined training (tactical) with the elements of the Air Force Headquarters, the tactical control group group and night fighter squadron. Other units to be assigned to the Ninth Air Force as they become available and proposed locations for the units are as follows:

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a. (1) Fighter Bomber Group (Shaw Field)

(2) Service Group

b. (1) Fighter Bomber Group (Dover Field)

(2) Service Group

c. (1) Tactical Reconnaissance Group (Brooks Field)

(2) Service Group

d. (1) Light Bomber Group (Lockbourne Field)

(2) Service Group

e. (1) Light Bomber Group (Smyrna Field)

(2) Service Group

6. The Twelfth Air Force, its base unit, and reduced elements of its control group, signal battalion (separate), communications squadron, and its detachment of radio squadron, mobile, as well as a fighter group, service group, and night fighter squadron will be located at March Field, California. The 412th Fighter Group, its associated service group and a night fighter squadron are presently located at March Field and will be assigned to the Twelfth Air Force upon activation of the latter. Additional units to be assigned to the Twelfth Air Force as they become available and locations are as follows:

a. (1) Fighter Bomber Group (Biggs Field)

(2) Service Group

b. (1) Fighter Bomber Group (McChord Field)

(2) Service Group

(3) Night Fighter Squadron (separate)

c. (1) Tactical Reconnaissance Group (none available)

(2) Service Group

d. (1) Light Bomber Group (none available)

(2) Service Group

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Ltr fm Hq, TAC, Langley Fld, Va. 12 Apr 46, Subj: "Organizational Plan of the Tactical Air Command," Cont'd.

7. a. It will be noted from paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above that the following units, necessary to the two tactical air forces, for them to perform their missions, are not presently authorized and should be procured and assigned to this command at the earliest practicable date.

(1) Detachment Radio Squadron, mobile (for the Ninth Air Force) (from Radio Squadron, mobile, noted in paragraph 3 above)

(2) Same for Twelfth Air Force

(3) Tactical Control Group (reduced) (for Twelfth Air Force)

(4) Signal Battalion, separate (reduced)(for the Twelfth Air Force)

(5) Communications Squadron (for Twelfth Air Force)

b. Authorization for activation of the Twelfth Air Force on or about 1 May 1946 is required.

c. There are only two (2) fields assigned to this command west of El Paso. Two (2) additional fields in the west are required for the Tactical Reconnaissance Group and the Light Bomb Group to be assigned to the Twelfth Air Force.

8. This plan is bases on the best information available, flow charts and organizational charts prepared for planning purposes and which were obtained from Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Justification for the above outlined organizational and station requirements will be presented at the Commanders' Meeting on 16 April 1946.

E. R. QUESADA
Maj Gen U.S. Army
Commanding General

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THE AIR-GROUND CONFERENCE
HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia
25 - 26 June 1946

Welcome Address by General Quesada

No doubt some of you don't know who I am; I am "Pete" Quesada, Commanding General, Tactical Air Command. I take this moment to welcome you to Langley Field and to tell you how glad we are that you could attend our meeting. We are going to try to keep it from developing into a long and drawn out affair. I hope you will think about the points that are brought up and come up with some of the solutions. You have had experience with tactical air power in conjunction with ground force action. Before the second war started there was no such thing as employing air power with ground armies or ground masses. We did not know how to do it or how it could be done. You can all look with some chagrin at how bad we were at employing tactical air power before the invasion of Africa. We are all aware of the accomplishments in the Pacific. I will review briefly the events in Europe and it is to be remembered the same operations were performed in the Pacific. We look with pride to the accomplishments that resulted; a better understanding on the part of the ground soldier, the capabilities of the air men and vice versa, and the fact that both had the desire to accomplish the proper employment of both arms. Unless we have the desire to facilitate the efforts of each, there is no hope of success. I assure you we have the desire here.

We desire to present to you at this meeting a logical plan which we feel is both beneficial to you and to ourselves. We want to bring out some of the difficulties under which we have operated in the past and I say without qualification that we do not intend to employ these tactics in the future. There is just so much air available in the United States to play the role of cooperating with the ground forces which has to be used to the best advantage of all. In the past two years there have been very few ground force units in the United States; they have been in the Pacific and in Europe. Hence, there was little air power cooperation with Divisions; most of it was with schools in conjunction with school activities. Those conditions have changed. The ground forces have six armies and each, it is assumed, have some units of a striking force. The ground forces have a fair sized striking force in the United States with which we must cooperate. I am particularly interested in seeing that the advancements made in Europe will not be lost and that we can and will continue to work with the striking forces. In the past two years such has not been the case. We have not had the striking forces with which to work.

The general purpose of this conference is to bring out some of the difficulties which arise in what we are trying to accomplish. This meeting

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is confined solely to the necessity of recognizing that there are other requirements than those of the schools system. We have ours. We must train and we must train a great deal. We are in a horrible state; to put it bluntly, we are in a hell of a shape and I assume the same is true of you. We want to present to you a plan that we intend to follow. In presenting the plan it must be recognized that the time has arrived when we must start preparing for the future. We can't go on in the future having two planes here, and four planes there and six or eight somewhere else, each of which is misappropriated and misguided. We must assume a realistic attitude toward combined air power and land armies to accomplish one end and the same is true of sea power. Sea, land, and air power must be combined. We are all for participating in the activities of the air, ground, and sea forces but we must do it differently from the practices employed in the past. In showing you our plan we hope we will reach a final approval. We don't expect you to commit yourselves definitely. Take our ideas, accept them as they are presented, take them back to the various commanders and talk them over. We think the plan is constructive and has an aim or objective and that is to give the junior officer the proper concepts of air power so we won't have to go through the same difficulties again that we had in this war when the senior officers were not familiar with air power. Now the senior officers of the air and the senior officers of the ground think alike and are in complete accord. We recognize that the junior officers of today are to be the senior officers of tomorrow and we don't want to be participants in their improper education.

General Lee is going to carry the meeting along and try to guide it. He is anxious for comments on the subject being discussed at the time. Everyone is free to comment if they will. He will attempt to adhere to the schedule and bring the subject back to the topic under discussion at the time. He has had a heck of a lot of experience on this subject and I am sure he will give due consideration and welcome any comment you wish to make or if you wish to express the views of the people you represent.

Address by General Lee

General Officers and Gentlemen:

We are honored this morning with the presence of Major General C. R. Huebner, G-3, Army Ground Forces and Major General W. G. Wyman, G-2, Army Ground Forces.

I am going to take a few minutes to explain how this conference is to be conducted and what we expect to get out of it. First, so that you will know who the Tactical Air Command representatives in this conference are and their duties, I will point out those officers we have attending this meeting:

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General Carter - Deputy Commanding General

Colonel Moyer - A-3, Tactical Air Command

Colonel Riggs - A-4, Tactical Air Command

Colonel Garland- Communications Officer

Colonel Perego - Chief, Fighter Branch, Operations Section A-3

Lt. Col. Taylor- Chief Air Liaison Officer, A-3

Representatives of the Three Air Forces of Tactical Air Command:

Brigadier General Taylor - Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force

Colonel Moore - Chief of Staff, Ninth Air Force

Colonel F. X. Krobs - A-3, Headquarters Third Air Force

The purpose of this conference is not only to meet each other and promote a better understanding of our mutual problems, but also to create a basis upon which we can plan our future air participation with your school activities. In the past, requirements from the service schools for air participation with your courses have come into the air force agency responsible for the conduct of the operations, in a piece-meal manner. These requests have come in without reference to the air operations requirements for other air and ground force agencies or even other service schools. This has caused schedules for demonstrations and air-ground exercises to be made hastily, almost never as complete as all parties concerned should like, and without sufficient attention to efficient utilization of the air units available or to the maximum benefit for the ground forces and the air forces involved. Such scheduling of air operations has resulted in frittering away the small force available into many small parcels of air detachments. Such detachments are unable to demonstrate employment of tactical aviation in accordance with War Department doctrine, directives, and latest schools of thought. Rather than demonstrating proper technique and principles, they have most often taught wrong lessons. Since the detachments, whether they be small flights, squadrons, or groups have to be on the road a great part of the time for participation in many short, small exercises, they have been unable to assemble and spend sufficient time on individual and unit training. Consequently, our potential force is retrogressing rather than progressing either as a fighting unit or as a training unit.

It is our desire to execute demonstrations and air-ground exercises with the maximum air power available and in accordance with the latest tactics and techniques which have been developed. Certain tactics and techniques developed during the past war have proven very successful although they will change with improvement in equipment. The experience which we are mutually seeking can best be obtained by participation in, or the study

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of, simulated combat situations which approach the realistic. The Staffs of the Headquarters Army Ground Forces and Headquarters Tactical Air Command are to work in close harmony in the furtherance of our mutual goal. In this conference we hope to discuss the future requirements of the service schools as well as the capabilities of the Tactical Air Command. If these subjects are fully developed in the discussion, both the Air Forces and the Service Schools should be enabled to efficiently plan those activities which require participation of the Tactical Air Command and the service school bodies. We hope that this conference will form a basis for the actual completion of sound and definite schedules for future air-ground exercises in the shortest possible time. We hope that the air operations conducted will be of the type which will more efficiently assist you in the training of students and which will present a clear picture of Tactical Air Operations.

An explanation of the conference schedule was made by General Lee.

We are now ready to hear the air requirements as presented by the representatives of each service school. As I mentioned before, these requirements for air units for instructional purposes in your courses may be stated in general terms, but if possible you should give the following information:

Type of exercise desired.
The approximate date or period desired.
Purpose of the desired exercise and approximate number of students in attendance.

As the presentation for air requirements are being made, Colonel Taylor will fill in this chart with the indicated requirements. As you will notice, there is a calendar which includes the next school year, with a line available for indicating requirements of each service school. When the presentations are completed and all requirements have been entered on the chart, we should have a fair consolidation of total requirements. It is not contemplated that there will be any general discussion during this portion of the conference. As each representative takes the floor he should present as fully as possible the requirements of his school through June 1947. The object of this portion of the conference is to acquaint everyone present and to get down graphically the air requirements of the service schools.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Lt. Col. Singles

The Infantry School is at this time unable to give an accurate schedule of what problems we'd like to have because several of the proposed courses are not as yet scheduled. I have here a list of what we have scheduled for the next year.

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4 September - - That is the air power demonstration order by AGF and will be a very large show. I don't know what is contemplated; it's for graduates of West Point. There will be 1650 students attending, which is a tentative figure.

11 September - - That is our problem. It involves an attack by an Infantry Battalion supported by an Artillery Battalion and will require 12 to 16 fighters. It's a four hour show and will be attended by about 1200 students.

18 September - - That is our best problem - battalion in the defense involving 12 to 16 fighter-bombers to break up a counter-attack. Most of the classes in attendance at the school will witness the problem.

12 October - - Battalion in the attack again with 16 fighters.

16 October - - Battalion in the attack of a fortified position. 12 to 16 fighters.

5 or 6 January - - Showing of the air power demonstration.

1 March - - Rifle company in attack on a large scale. 1200 in attendance.

10 May - - Air power show with three showings of the air power demonstration.

There will be approximately 10 additional problems but how many of these will need air demonstrations I don't know, as the problems have not yet been written. They will be at regimental level in the advanced course to qualify commanders of battalion and regimental combat teams and to give them a smattering of air inasmuch as all other arms and services are included. Two or three of these will have air written into the course. I believe April and July will be the approximate time for these demonstrations. We possibly can work in some of these with the other shows going on.

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

Lt. Col. Abrams

At the Armored School we try to achieve air-ground instruction in the basic and advanced courses. We are anxious to teach the Company and Battalion Commanders how air support applies to them at their level. It will be a rare instance in which a platoon, company, or battalion commander would see medium bombers in action or a group of airplanes. At his level he observes or works with small numbers. It is important, however, for him to understand the communications and workings with the forward control officer. As his education progresses he goes into the broader picture of air and ground and naval units and at this stage of the game we want to teach him the things he will be concerned with at that level. We want to take him

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through at least the grades of high school before we send him out to college. We feel it is necessary for him to have a clear understanding of air as to the ways it would apply to him.

During March - - Four demonstrations, one each week.
Approximately 150 students in attendance. These problems are based upon the re-inforced battalion in penetration, exploitation, delaying action, and night attack. As far as the air participation is concerned, it is a column cover type mission. Four close support type planes required.

First week in April - - This is a five day field exercise with 50 students in attendance. Each of four days 12 close support type aircraft required.

First week in June - - Same problem with the same requirements and approximately the same number in attendance.

THE CAVALRY SCHOOL

In the absence of a representative from the Cavalry School, their requirements were presented by Lt. Col. Lowe of the Intelligence School.

Four fighter-bomber missions of squadron strength with close support type aircraft. Two between the period September and January and two between the period January and June. We would also like to have any demonstrations of air power that the Tactical Air Command can put on between the same periods. Approximate attendance of students - - 400.

INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

Lt. Col. Lowe

We will require photographic coverage in the vicinity of Kansas City and Fort Riley sometime before September. There are about eight sites to be photographed; scale 1-10,000.

One air power demonstration between the period September - January and one between the period January - June.

The 162nd Liaison Squadron is up there and we are working with them and do not expect any difficulties. Their strength is adequate for the requirements outlined.

AIRBORNE SCHOOL

Lt. Col. Schorr

I would like to mention our normal Troop Carrier requirements for

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this school. Starting in September we need the following type Troop Carrier aircraft:

25 C-46
2 or more C-82
45 CG-15A gliders
A number of C-47 aircraft equipped for pickup

This is for the full year. These aircraft will be used in operational flight daily in the basic airborne course. In addition we would like to have your assistance in securing mock-ups of the following aircraft:

12 C-46
4 C-82
1 C-54 with cargo door
15 CG-15A gliders
If possible, C-47's and C-97's.

As regards aircraft for special dates in the course we have six in mind. Our use of Troop Carrier and glider aircraft is aimed especially at what we call the advanced airborne course. At that course we teach especially selected staff officers their duties as regards airborne operations. We do not teach ground tactics. The six demonstrations would come in the following weeks:

Week of September 30; November 11; January 6; and February 17; week of March 31 and May 12. These are airborne and close support type demonstrations: The requirements:

12 C-46	1 CG-15A
1 C-47	12 P-51
1 C-82	4 A-26

Attendance - - 100 officers.

It is contemplated to conduct these on Saturdays for two purposes: (1) to use our normal allotment of Troop Carrier aircraft, and, (2) to enable the attendance of all students in the school. In that case it would run 2000 men and officers. We would like to stage these at Fort Benning when possible but if it can be done satisfactorily we do not object to combining our demonstrations with those of some of the other schools.

Commencing this fall we have been directed to conduct a course in air transport. It is desired that in this course to have the mock-ups requested and we would also like to have some aircraft of the C-47 and C-97 type. That is only a three week course and we would like the use of these planes once a week for three weeks. This course runs throughout the year.

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FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Major Miller

We have no requirements for air force participation prior to September 1st, except the Ground Branch Basic Course. Exact dates are unknown because starting dates not scheduled as yet. Our estimated requirements for the next school year are as follows:

Air fire power demonstration. This demonstration should show the observers the maximum possible number of types of aircraft and types of munitions used in close and deep support of surface forces, and the flexibility, power, weight, accuracy, and effect of such attacks. This we would like to have sometime after September 1st.

Airborne demonstration. This should, if practicable, be combined with the air fire power demonstration into one tactical exercise. It should show parachute and glider infantry and supporting troops in landing, reorganization, consolidation of position, and subsequent ground action. It should also include air re-supply and evacuation, and display of equipment.

A demonstration of the air-ground liaison system in action to include processing of requests for air strike from front line units to the air unit, handling of the planes responding to the call to include functioning of the forward air controller, and exchange of information.

Prearranged missions of bombing and strafing, both simulated and with live ammunition, artillery reconnaissance, tactical reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance to be integrated into normal field exercises.

The demonstrations described above should be given on Saturdays to permit maximum attendance with minimum disruption of normal schedules. They would be given twice a year to permit all classes except RMS&T, NG Instr, and POI, to witness them. Assuming that the Associate Basic and Advanced Courses will begin in September and March, they should be given in demonstrations, in addition to Field Artillery School personnel.

It is estimated that the missions described above will require an average of one flight of three planes each two weeks beginning about 15 October 1946. Most of this air action will be witnessed by small groups of students, troops, and instructors engaged in the exercises.

In view of present impossibility of fixing exact dates for air participation, it is requested that air units be designated to furnish the above-mentioned missions, and that authority be granted for direct correspondence between the FAS and such units.

It is estimated that the concrete runway at Post Field will be ready for use by January 1, 1947.

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The first three demonstrations should be given twice a year about November and May. 1500 students in addition to FAS personnel attending.

For the smaller missions: one flight of three planes each two weeks beginning with the 15th of October 1946. Witnessed by small groups of students and the instructors. I don't know the number or type of aircraft required for the larger demonstrations. They would be similar to the demonstration put on in March.

COAST ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Major Irwin

The location of the Coast Artillery School has been established at Fort Winfield Scott. We have four types of classes to conduct. We have requirements for three missions.

One for spotting.
One for anti-aircraft machine gun target practice.
One for radar.

For the spotting we need a plane slow in speed, that can give us two way communication with the shore batteries and can take photographs of the shooting. We'd like to get the splash of the water. A helicopter would be excellent.

In July we would like to have spotting for a battery we are training to send to Alaska. One plane would be plenty. The largest calibre ammunition will be 50 calibre.

In October we will have a sea coast artillery practice for about 12 hours and also a sea coast artillery practice which will require a plane for four days. We would like a full day of radar tracking in October.

In November we'd like a spotting mission for a seacoast practice which will be done by the school troops and a tow-target for maching gun firing. This is about a 10 hour mission.

On the tracking, any kind of airplane will do; range is the most important thing. We'd like to go out 75 to 80 thousand yards from shore.

In December we have another school shoot for which we would like some sort of spotting. That will be a three day show.

In April and May one shoot each month.

Sometime in May we'll have a combine operation with the Navy; the scope of which has not been layed down yet. For that we'll need a long range reconnaissance mission from the Air Force capable of going about 300 miles

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out to sea. The type of the planes to be involved in that mission will be more up to the Air Forces than to us. It is a search problem. Also, there is a three day air demonstration which the Air Corps puts on for the Coast Artillery School in which you pick up the students and take them to one of the Air Corps establishments. We'd like for you to put that demonstration on sometime in October. We would also like for you to come out and show us how you would attack a harbor defense. That's for the purpose of revising our tactics if we find out that we are out of date.

THE MOUNTAIN AND WINTER WARFARE SCHOOL

Colonel Calhoun

We were just established the first of this month, and at present we are rather unstable. Most of the summer training is done around Colorado Springs and the winter training at Camp Hale. The work we are engaged in is highly specialized but on a small scale and we cannot use air power in the way other schools can. We won't require so much.

We want a demonstration between August 19th and 23rd which will include wire laying. We would like the very latest methods if you have anything better than the L-5. It will include air supply, both free drop and parachute. This is a one day problem. We have about 250 students to observe this from the hillside. The supply is to a marooned battalion and some of every type drop you know should be done. We don't anticipate any fire assistance. We would like a similar demonstration between the 2nd and 15th of March. This will be at 10,000 feet and below zero weather.

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

Colonel Webster

Our basic purpose is to give each Cadet a basic overall picture of the Air Force history to help him in his choice of branch when he graduates. The post war curricula calls for one month work at Stewart Field, which is being conducted by the personnel and equipment available at Stewart Field. As far as is now known the requirements for next summer will be as follows:

For the three week trip during June, about the 5th, we'd like to have air transport for 300 cadets of the first class to the Fort Benning area and to Biggs Field. The following summer there will be 600 students. During the trip we'd like to have at Benning or at some airbase nearby if possible, a combined air arms demonstration. This will include the air and ground. We'd also like to conduct the airborne training for the cadets at Benning and give them a ride in a glider if possible. We'd also like to show the cadets a display of the latest aircraft and equipment. We'd also like a demonstration similar to the one conducted at West Point on the 7th of this month. We will have no regular flying training at the USMA in the future. The cadets will get 10

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hours of pilot training during basic but will not solo.

June 8 through August 8 we will want continuous use of Troop Carrier aviation and indoctrination rides periodically. For the three weeks trip there will be 300 students, 50 pounds equipment, and about 150 pounds baggage each.

THE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH

Colonel Browne

We have a course 42 weeks in duration, broken up into three periods. The first three weeks consists of common instruction for all students irrespective of branch. At the end of that period they get 10 weeks in specialist school, intelligence, school of combined arms and school of logistics. Then, at the end of that period they come back for two weeks more of common instruction in which they plan an amphibious invasion. The school of combined arms is the only one that has put in a request for air demonstrations. The curricula drawn up by the four schools has not been approved by the War Department.

The Combined Arms School plans to visit Fort Benning April 14, 15, and 16 and then to the Airborne Center on the 17th and 18th. Then May 12th to Camp Hood; June 4th, 5th, and 6th at San Diego, California.

The first 30 weeks will consist of teaching division commanders and staff officers. We will call on Tactical Air Command for the transportation for all these visits. There will be approximately 250 students. All the dates given are contigent upon approval by the War Department of our curricula.

In addition to these air requirements are those of the Intelligence School. I believe they should look further into the matter of tactical reconnaissance. I am not sure that they fully exploit the possibility of a reconnaissance group and understand the capabilities and limitations.

THE AIR UNIVERSITY

Colonel Grover

In presenting the requirements for the Air University I cannot give a complete picture. We believe we will need only one demonstration; October 29, 30, 31. The purpose of that demonstration is to give the student a complete explanation of a tactical air operation. The students will be broken down into groups and take part in the demonstration. There will be approximately 250 students of group commander, wing commander, and air force staff level. The place, at your selection. We'll deliver the students to you and will pick them up. We want one complete tactical control group in operation; we do not want a fire power demonstration.

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THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT SCHOOL

Lt. Col. Lontz

We need two demonstrations this year; the 18th of October and the 14th of February. They will be purely fire power demonstrations using all types of combat aircraft; P-51's, B-29's, and A-26's.

During the presentation of requirements period each mission request was entered on the TAC Demonstration Requirements Chart. This chart was then complete and presented an overall picture of the air requests for the coming school year. A reproduction of the chart is included as Figure 1.

General Lee: That completes the presentation of requirements by the schools represented here today. We will now recess for lunch.

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TACTICAL A

DEMONSTRATIO



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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
DEMONSTRATION REQUIREMENTS

FIGURE I



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General Lee: Give me your attention please gentlemen. Col. Meyers, A-3 Tactical Air Command, will now present a description of the Tactical Air Command, touching upon its organization, composition, past and current operations and future capabilities. It is requested that you not interrupt for questions during the next two presentations. Jot down your thoughts for future reference. As I mentioned this morning, General Huebner will be given a special opportunity to express his views tomorrow morning after which each representative will get a chance to voice his reactions. It is felt that we will get more accomplished quicker if you first hear these next two presentations out and have the benefit of any clarification that may be brought out in the general discussion that follows. Colonel Meyers - -

Before presenting the main subject matter I believe it is advisable to briefly review the organization of the Tactical Air Command.

Directly under this headquarters there are three Air Forces as shown on this chart; namely, Third, Ninth, and Twelfth Air Forces. The Third Air Force is located at Greenville, South Carolina, and is made up entirely of Troop Carrier Units which at the present time consist of four groups with C-46, C-47, and C-82 type aircraft. Units of the 434th Troop Carrier Group are scheduled to be deactivated on 1 July 1955 and re-activated on 1 December of this year. This will then give the Third Air Force a total of four Troop Carrier Groups consisting of ten squadrons which we expect to be fully operational about the first of next year.

The Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces are designated as tactical air forces and will function similar to the Tactical Air Command as it was known in Europe. At the present time the Ninth Air Force, with headquarters at Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, has assigned three tactical units: 47th Bomb Group (Light) (Night Attack) equipped with A-26's; 362nd Fighter Group equipped with P-51's; and the 69th Reconnaissance Group, which has one squadron of P-51's for tactical reconnaissance, and one squadron of A-26's for night photography. I might say at this point, that is is our plan to move the Ninth Air Force to a location on the eastern seaboard, where for geographic reasons it will be in a more favorable position to carry out such missions as may be assigned. This move is considered a "must," which we expect to accomplish at an early date. When this move is made the 477th Composite Group at Columbus, Ohio, consisting of one squadron of P-47's and one squadron of B-25's will be relieved from assignment to the Tactical Air Command and assigned to the Ninth Air Force.

The recently activated Twelfth Air Force, with headquarters at March Field, California, is presently assigned one tactical unit - - the 1st Fighter Group which consists of four squadrons of P-80 aircraft. One squadron of this group (39th) is to be equipped with FP-80 aircraft the latter part of this year. The FP-80 is almost identical to the P-80 but is equipped with cameras for use in high altitude photographic airplane. In addition to the Jet unit which I have just discussed, the Twelfth Air Force is scheduled to activate a reconnaissance group in October of this year. Also, recent information received from AAF indicates that two Light Bomb Groups are

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to be activated, one in November and one group in December. These two units will be assigned to the Twelfth Air Force, but as they are presently scheduled for overseas shipment approximately six months after activation the majority of their time will be spent on organization and training.

Keeping in mind those units which we have already available and those forecast for the future it can be readily seen that our resources are limited and only proper utilization of the available effort will enable us to meet the minimum requests for demonstrations that we are presently receiving. A thorough review of how the aircraft of the Tactical Air Command have been utilized in the past three months indicates a piece-meal operation with small flights of aircraft, which not only seriously interferes with training but also presents an erroneous and false impression of the tactical air operation. The available strength in this command has been dissipated on small but extremely numerous missions to such an extent that during the first week of June it was necessary to cancel all Ground Force requests so as to permit completion of minimum training requirements. Training of our units is very important and must be maintained to a degree of proficiency which permits us to develop new tactics and technique, which is of great importance to the Ground Forces as well as ourselves. If this training is neglected in a very short period of time we will be unable to perform a demonstration of any value.

It must be remembered that the successful operation of air units on tactical missions requires a very intricate and complicated radar and communications system which requires knowledge and teamwork by the people operating the equipment on the ground and those flying the airplanes in the air. This knowledge and teamwork can only be achieved by units working together so that they will have a mutual understanding of the respective problems. This close relationship can not exist if units and flights are assigned to ground force schools throughout the country for short or indefinite periods of time. Sufficient equipment is not available, nor is it physically possible to move and set up this equipment at the various places to permit operation of this type.

Complete training of Tactical Air Force units can then be resolved to this: in addition to flying training, our air units must be thoroughly indoctrinated in controlled procedures. To accomplish this, they must be located near and work with the tactical control group. Likewise, training of a tactical control group requires aircraft for control purposes and located near a flying unit.

One might argue that such flying time can be obtained in performance of demonstration missions, that we should be able to meet these requirements in cooperation with the various ground units during exercises being conducted at the various schools. This is an erroneous assumption as these demonstrations include only one phase of the training required which consists of Instrument Flying, Night Flying, Bombing, Gunnery, Navigation, Sheran Flights, Formation Flying and Unit Procedures. This training can not be kept at a desired state of efficiency with the aircraft continuously parcelled out all over the United States. On the basis of the T/O&E the flying units have assigned a greater number of pilots than aircraft. Experience has proven that only 50%

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of those airplanes can be maintained in serviceable condition at any one time. This then leaves approximately three pilots for each airplane in commission. When airplanes are away from their bases for a period of three to four days to take part in demonstrations which take about three or four hours the pilots remaining at the home station have no means of continuing their training. I am sure that this very inefficient operation is apparent to all and needs no further explanation.

In closing, I wish to show you a chart that contains the units assigned to this command with the number of aircraft days needed to meet their minimum requirements of flying training. This chart is based on directives which we have received from higher headquarters requiring a minimum of eight and a half hours of flying training per pilot per month. These figures will show in some cases where units have not been able to meet even this minimum requirement due to the numerous demonstrations and inefficient operation which results from these demonstrations. In those cases where the minimum requirements were met, a diversified training (which is essential for all phases of tactical air operations) has not been received.

With this in mind we are faced with only one conclusion. Until the high priority air demonstrations are reduced to the point that training can be completed and experienced maintenance personnel trained, an obstacle remains in the path of greater Air-Ground Cooperation Training and Demonstrations.

Explanation of attached chart (Figure 2) was made to the conference.

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A	B	C			D			E			No acft days per mo. (30 day Mo)			(Tng Time Lost) Acft Days		
Organization and Type Acft Flown	Monthly Tng Rqmts Acft Days	Air Demonstrations Rqmts Acft Days Apr	May	Jun	Total = B + C Apr	May	Jun	(Av acft in comm per day for mo Jun assumed same May) Apr	May	Jun	Apr	May	Jun	Apr	May	Jun
316th TC Gp	145	All aircraft			All acft committed for Airborne & Chinese Tng			14	42	42	420	1260	1260	145	145	145
349th TC Gp	171	All aircraft						28	55	55	840	1650	1650	171	171	171
434th TC Gp (C-46, C-47 C-62)	142	222	355	73	364	497	215	18	24	24	540	720	720	0	0	0
477th Comp Gp (P-47, B-25)	79	48	30	184	127	109	263	8	8	8	240	240	240	0	0	23
362d Ftr Gp 138 69 Recn Gp 12 (P-51)	350	71	278	617	421	628	967	26	26	26	710	780	780	0	0	187
47th BG (1) (A-26)	80	17	178	437	97	258	517	35	37	37	1050	1110	1110	0	0	0
412th Ftr Gp	116	0	354	44	116	470	160	10	13	13	300	390	390	0	80	

362nd Ftr Gp and 69th Recn Gp considered as one for simplification. Both have P-51 and commitments are based on availability of acft.

Figure 2

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PRESENTATION OF THE TACTICAL AIR INDOCTRINATION COURSE

Colonel Porogo

Col. Meyers has presented a picture of the highly undesirable situation in regard to the availability of tactical aircraft and the requirements of this command for the use of these aircraft. In addition, it is of utmost importance that the doctrine of tactical air power be presented in a clear cut, understandable manner.

World War II marked the inception of the air-ground team, a highly specialized, highly integrated swift striking force which completely outmaneuvered, out-thought, and out-fought one of the greatest armies history has known. The organization and development of the Air-Ground team demanded the best efforts of the top leaders of the Ground and Air Forces. In the combat theater, Fighter-Bombers appeared for close cooperation with a tank column or an Infantry Division at the right place and the right time only because an elaborate but sound system had been utilized in the planning, directing, and controlling of the mission. This planning, directing and controlling of missions has become tactical air doctrine and must be studied by all personnel participating, not only in the light of final results; that is, airplanes over a target, but also as a highly specialized whole.

This can be done only by establishing a tactical air indoctrination course which will encompass all phases of Air-Ground operations and present a complete picture to the student, from the joint planning phase to the successful completion of the "operational phase". This has been done and I would like to present to you in brief resume the Tactical Air Indoctrination course, as planned by this headquarters.

The plan calls for the establishment of facilities at an air field with physical characteristics which are suitable and with favorable geographic location. Each exercise can accomodate a maximum of 250 officers. Those attending will be picked up at their stations by airlift provided by this headquarters and flown to the Tactical Indoctrination Center. Transportation, billeting, messing facilities and entertainment will be provided at the field where the exercise is conducted. The exercise will extend over a two and half day period beginning the morning after the class arrives, with the attending personnel leaving for their home stations by air lift provided by this headquarters, the afternoon of the third day. On this basis it will be possible to run two exercises a week totalling 500 people. It is anticipated that two periods of one and a half months each during the year will be sufficient to handle all the personnel to attend the Indoctrination course. However, this is not to be construed as the final basis on which to build the scheduling plan. This is merely a point of departure representing a maximum number of personnel who could be expected to attend the indoctrination course. This course can also be modified to fulfill specific requirements of individual schools.

At this point I would like to present to you in outline form the scope of the curriculum for the Tactical Air Indoctrination course.

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FIRST DAY

From:
0900-0840 There will be an Indoctrination Lecture

This lecture will review the complete organization of the Army Air Forces, breaking it down into the eight major commands and giving an explanation of their particular missions. Organization charts and diagrams will be used. Special emphasis will be given to the organization and development of the Tactical Air Command and its close association with the Army Ground Forces. This lecture will also include a description of the aircraft of this command, their capabilities, armament and tactical employment.

From:
0850-0940 A training film entitled "Air Power and Armies" will be shown which gives a detailed theoretical explanation and need for tactical air operations. The three operational phases are explained showing the principals and employment in diagrammtic detail.

From:
0950-1050 There will be Air-Ground Operations at Army-Air Force Level Lecture

a. This lecture will bring out forcefully the mutual responsibility of the Air and Ground commanders for proper cooperation of effort in joint operations. The lecture will also emphasize the primary purpose of the Air Ground operations system; namely, to provide each commander with facilities for rapid and continuous exchange of current battle information such as: location of forward elements and bomb lines; intelligence gained from all sources; plans for impending operations and requests for and reports on air missions. The organization of the system including personnel required and their duties will be fully covered at all levels of command utilizing charts showing the appropriate channels and responsibilities. Further discussion of the Air-Ground system will emphasize that this is the means by which the Army Ground Commander presents his requirements to the Tactical Air Force Commander.

b. To complete the picture of efficient teamwork with the Ground Forces in respect to proper application of air power, the lecture turns to a comprehensive explanation of the combat operations section. It is pointed out that the Tactical Air Force Commander controls the means of translating Ground Force air requirements into cooperation missions through the Combat Operations Section. The organization of this section is broken down to show how the responsibility for the detailed planning and supervision of the execution of all Tactical Air operations is carried out. The location, equipment, personnel and the functions of this section are all covered in detail with the aid of charts and diagrams.

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AT
1100-1200 A training film entitled "Thunderbolt" will be shown. This is a technicolor story of the operations of a Thunderbolt Fighter Group in the Italian Theater illustrating the combat execution of different types of cooperation missions.

From:
1300-1500 There will be a lecture on the Tactical Air Control System

This lecture will present to the attending personnel active physical control of tactical air power in joint operations generally executed at the Tactical Air Force-Army level by means of a Tactical Air Control system with which the Air-Ground operations system is closely coordinated. While the combat operations section will have been covered in a previous lecture, this lecture will show how it completes in conjunction with the Air-Ground Liaison section in the Combined Operations Center, the coordination between the Tactical Air Control System and the Air-Ground operations system.

With the aid of appropriate charts and diagrams this lecture will explain in detailed theory the organization and functions of the Tactical Air Control system including the Tactical Air Control group, the Tactical Air Control Center, the Tactical Air Direction Center, the Tactical Air Control Party and the Air Liaison Officers.

From:
1500-1600 There will be a lecture on troop carrier aviation and airborne forces showing the organization and development of each and describing, in general, the possible future development. This lecture will stress the fact that troop carrier operations, in conjunction with the ground forces, must be planned well in advance of their execution and will include reasons for this.

From:
1600-1700 There will be a Mission Planning Lecture

This lecture will discuss in detail the various types of missions such as Call missions, pre-planned missions, Armed Reconnaissance missions, attacking targets of opportunity, and Tactical and Photo Reconnaissance missions all of which are flown by units of the Tactical Air Force. This will include a description of each type of mission, when and how used, and thetypes of targets attacked, together with the various types of armament used to accomplish those missions. This will explain to the attending personnel information given to pilots prior to take-off for each type of mission.

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SECOND DAY

From:
0800-0830 There will be a briefing for all personnel to describe the simulated Air-Ground situation on an Air Force Army front.

A map of the area brought up to date by Combat Intelligence will be utilized to depict the situation. G-2 Air will describe the enemy deployment and G-3 Air will give the friendly situation and plans for proposed operations. A-2 will describe the enemy air disposition and A-3 will give friendly forces available and future commitments.

A second map showing a portion of a Divisional front, containing the area where an offensive is to be launched, will be displayed and the problems to be dealt with in the planning conferences to follow will be outlined. If an airborne operation is to be utilized, it will be included in these plans.

From:
0840-1200 Following the briefing of the situation a series of three conferences to represent the Army Air Force Commanders meeting, the Combat Operations drafting of Field Orders for the following days operations, and the Pilot briefing in one of the Fighter Bomber Groups committed for the cooperative missions, will be enacted in detail. All personnel normally at these conferences will be represented in their respective roles.

In the afternoon the Tactical Air Control Group and its functions will be discussed and illustrated.

From:
1300-1330 An introduction with charts and diagrams will outline the organization of the Tactical Air Control group and its mission.

AT
1335-1400 A Training Film will furnish a basic background in radar and its uses.

From:
1400-1450 There will be a demonstration of radar equipment

The equipment and its disposition in the field will be illustrated by use of models. A standard field set-up of all teams and units can thus be demonstrated in prospective.

Models will also be utilized to show the communication channels employed in the Tactical Air Control system.

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From:
1450-1550 The above listed theory will be demonstrated in operations by enacting an offensive and a defensive problem as supervised and directed from a Tactical Air Control Center in operation.

Fighter Bombers will be vectored to a target located by a Forward Tactical Air Control party and an attack made upon this target.

An enemy raid will be picked up by radar and friendly fighters will be airborne and vectored for an interception by the controller.

From:
1600-1730 To complete the instruction the personnel will be divided into sections and shown a display of the specialized equipment employed by a Tactical Air Control Group to make Tactical Air cooperation function inits complex but effecient manner which provides the third dementional phase to modern, fast moving air-land warfare.

During the evening of the second day of instruction an A-26 Fire Power demonstration will be given. This demonstration will include location of a target by means of airborne radar and illumination of the target area by parachute flares. The target will be further identified by red target marked bombs and then attacked by low altitude incendiary bombing, rocket firing and strafing with tracer ammunition.

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THIRD DAY

From:
0800-1000 There will be a demonstration of combat loading.

The Field Order having been received and the Group Operations order issue, the personnel will be divided into sections and will observe the complete loading and arming of a group of Fighter-Bomber aircraft.

Through a running commentary the problems in bombing up, fusing and preparing the aircraft for a tactical mission are shown to be both technical and time killing. This will show that detailed planning and knowledge of proposed targets is essential for maximum results by forces committed, and demands the minimum of last minute changes in missions.

From:
1000-1200 The students will be transported to the demonstration range where the Fire Power demonstration of the missions previously planned is to be accomplished.

A combat team representing forces to be deployed on that sector of a divisional front from which the attack on the designated strong point is to be launched may be deployed by an air drop or by forward movement from an air lift in the immediate rear and may be either actual or simulated.

Reconnaissance aircraft will photograph the proposed combat area, furnish area reconnaissance and target selection during the combat phase and photograph results at the completion of missions.

Very Heavy Bombers will be utilized in a tactical role to neutralize reserve area in the rear of the days objective.

Light Bombardment aircraft will bomb, fire rockets and strafe ahead of the launching of the ground attack to neutralize strong points as exemplified by a small heavily fortified village.

Fighter Bombers will attack selected call mission targets to knock out suitable heavily fortified targets which are holding up the ground attack. Targets appropriate for one and two flight strikes as well as squadron attacks will be designated to demonstrate flexibility of this highly adaptable striking force.

During the afternoon of the third day the Personnel will be returned to their stations by aircraft provided by this headquarters.

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This, in essence, is the Tactical Air Indoctrination Course.

It can be readily seen that, throughout this course of instruction, special emphasis will be placed upon the planning, directing and controlling of missions rather than upon the execution. It is the firm belief of this command that this is the type of instruction which must be disseminated in order to correctly present the Tactical Air Doctrine as it exists today. In this we are commited to a presentation of the complete picture, making use of the latest approved methods of cooperation.

This can be carried further to include the presentation of the latest developments in armament and communications as they are released. At the present time we are only on the threshold of the great new field of electronics, which will undoubtedly contribute many new methods to our use.

In addition, this command is actively concerned with the development of jet aviation, and its application to tactical methods. Although it is still too early to accurately foretell the adaptations of controlled speed in excess of 500 miles per hour, we can predict vast changes in our present operations. In this respect we have every reason to believe, that after proper adjustments to mechanical and material difficulties have been effected, we will be able to attain new heights in Air-Ground procedures.

We must be prepared to disseminate these new methods translated into new operational procedures. This will insure the future development of joint Air-Ground operations.

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General Lee: During the discussion that follows it is our desire not to get involved in any lengthy arguments over some controversial questions; but rather to clarify certain points pertaining to the two presentations which have just been made. This is an honest endeavor to give you a clear understanding of our problems and plans; that each of you may make a better presentation of your reaction to such a plan tomorrow morning and as a result we will all get further along toward the solution of our mutual problem by the end of the Conference.

It is believed that we will all benefit by any amplification of the Tactical Air Command solution which General Quesada may wish to make at this time.

General Quesada: In approaching the problem and discussing it I hope that each of you will remember that the problems discussed in this room pertain only to solving some of the overall requirements as related to the service schools. I am afraid that many of you are going to interpret this program only in the light which it affects you. I hope you all will be able to modify your judgment and recognize that there are other requirements than those discussed here. Some will say "damn the other requirements" but we don't. Now one of the other requirements is our own. These units must be trained. When units are activated you don't just write out a paper and say they are activated. They must be trained. The training problem that is ours is great and can't be avoided. If we avoid it we will not be able to do anything. In addition to that requirement, which is great and which has to have first priority, there is another requirement. You must remember that there are six armies and those armies have subordinate units. We must train the Ground Forces striking forces. That must be second priority. Eventually we must take the field with the armies. The time will come when we will take the field with Headquarters Army Ground Forces. Take into consideration that the subjects under discussion today are less than one-third of the total.

I will not continue to try to do the things outlined on the Demonstration Requirements Chart because they are wrong. Many phases of that are wrong. They do not accomplish the overall desire. In my opinion, in some cases, the result is misleading. We, on this level, are just as concerned with perpetuating the "know how" as anything else. It's intangible, it's hard to get at, but that is what we want to perpetuate. We went into Normandy with a desire but very little "know how". At the end of the war we had quite a bit of "know how" but not all. We must look forward to the betterment of our operations with the ground and naval forces.

I hope you will recognize that this two and one-half day course is flexible. When the West Point people send their students there they may wish to emphasize certain phases of the indoctrination course. And the same may be true with the other schools.

In contrast to what we are trying to do now, I will present my experience for two years running; 1927 and 28. I participated in indoctrinating the West Point Cadets in air. I was a Lieutenant then and was told to go down to Mitchell Field and spend two weeks. I was to give them an

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indoctrination course. I got into my little D-H and went to Mitchell. When I got there my water jacket was leaking and I had to get it fixed. The next morning four boys walked out and asked if I was the instructor and I replied yes. The first boy put his helmet on backwards and I had to show him how to wear it and how to get into a parachute and so forth. Finally I got him in the rear seat and then I asked him if he lived around there. He said, "No sir, I live in Alabama." I asked if he had a girl and he said yes. I said, "Where does she live?" He told me she lived in Westchester. I said, "Do you think you can find it?" He said, "Yes." So we went over there and looked around and finally he found the house that his girl lived in and we proceeded to buzz the hell out of it. The boy became very sick, all over the side of the plane, so we rushed back and when we landed he felt awful but he ran off to the nearest telephone to call his girl. That was the indoctrination course. I thought it fun at the time but now that I'm older and see things differently, I want to avoid that. Now the same thing is true to a lesser degree regarding the demonstrations we have put on in the past. They have been amusing to some to see the guns shoot and amusing to some to see the bombs go off and amusing to others to see the boys bail out, but that is not what we are trying to preserve. We are trying to put out something constructive in order to improve the young officer's mind and give him a clear impression as to how air can be used. It's a part of his education. I am also particularly anxious for the Air Force officer to be indoctrinated to the needs of the Ground Forces.

When we gave you an example of one exercise, that exercise could have been an airborne exercise. We hope to bring out all the ramifications of our airborne demonstration which are difficult. There are a thousand and one angles to a problem of this sort. A battalion commander may think the Air Force is not cooperating because he asked for an air drop and did not get it. We must start early in teaching the young officer that the airdrop is a decision which rests in the hands of a higher commander.

We do not mean to suggest to anybody that we will not participate in the joint air-ground exercises at the schools. But, by the same token we want you to recognize that the schools in writing up their curricula can't just say, "let's put some air here and some there." We must make you realize that you don't get air participation by simply writing it in. It is not there. We must have some other means in employing it. When there is no possibility of getting the idea across to the students without air participation, we will do it. We will not send planes just so the students can see them. In those cases you can simulate planes. If air is requested for no other purpose than letting the students see the planes, we will not be there.

Remember the requirement of training our units and the requirement of training with the other ground forces. They are great and we have suggested a plan that will honestly meet a large requirement that we would not otherwise meet. I hope you all see that.

General Huebner spoke along these lines:

We of the ground forces are interested in getting across to our

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students that the power and capabilities of aircraft have nothing to do with the flying.

We developed a fairly good technique during the war in air-ground cooperation but only the surface was scratched.

This Air Indoctrination Course is a step in the right direction.

The Course would have to be modified to meet the needs of officers being taught on different levels.

Getting the students to the Course might be a stumbling block but it might be possible to put the course on in two different places such as Fort Benning and Fort Knox.

The lack of personnel and aircraft prevents the Tactical Air Command from continuing to put on these small demonstrations all over the country and the Ground Forces recognize the difficulty involved.

I think the fire power demonstrations are worthwhile in certain instances because they present a realistic view of air power.

General Lyman:

I think the matter has been covered very well. Obviously the difficulty in solving the situation is the way the schools have been twisting it up. The absence of reference to reconnaissance is somewhat startling to me. We, of intelligence, are very interested in it. I think we are off in the right direction.

Lt Colonel Singles of The Infantry School stated that due to the large number of students attending this school that some difficulty might be encountered in transporting the students to the course. Also, inasmuch as the classes started at all different times throughout the year there might be another difficulty. He suggested that some thought be given to setting the course along the style of a mobile traveling university.

General Lee stated that due to the type of equipment that would be employed in the exercise that the mobile university would not be feasible, that a more permanent set-up was desirable. However, after the other representatives expressed their views it might be necessary to modify that particular part to meet the existing needs.

General Carter stated that transporting the students might be a minor problem compared to getting the place for the demonstration and getting it set up.

Lt. Col. Singles of the Infantry School stated that it would be desirable to have all officers attending the Infantry School get the indoctrination course and to understand its operation and the planning involved

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but that as far as the non-coms attending the Infantry School were concerned, just seeing the demonstrations given in the course would be sufficient for familiarization purposes.

Lt. Col. Abrams of the Armored School inquired as to whether or not the couse at the Air Indoctrination Demonstration would be different for the basic and advanced Armored School courses. Also, what classes of students would attend.

General Huebner stated that for the next four years this Air Indoctrination should be aimed at the advanced courses. He also stated he could not visualize lieutenants and non-coms getting anything out of the course except for the fire power demonstrations.

General Lee pointed out the flexibility of the course and suggested that each school be contacted before the students arrived at the Air Indoctrination Course to be sure that the things emphasized at the course would fit in with the curriculum of the students. He pointed out that due to new developments in both equipment and air tactics very little repetition would be encountered as the years passed.

Lt. Col. Lowe of the Intelligence School stated that they were vitally interested in reconnaissance.

General Lee explained that in conducting the course, planning as well as execution of the missions would come up, therefore, reconnaissance activity as it is actually performed in the field could be emphasized for the Intelligence School.

Lt. Col. Schorr of the Airborne School stated that three classes were conducted at his school. Two of these he would recommend seeing the course. He would not recommend the Advanced Course attend the school because after they left the Airborne School the officers would attend their respective branch school and receive this type training which would result in duplication. He would like to see the course modified to meet the needs of the airborne officer before making any definite recommendations. He also stated that the Airborne School gets a wealth of training from the Troop Carrier aircraft stationed there. In the eight week course designed to teach the students to jump, a field problem is put on in which the advanced course students do all the planning.

General Lee: With reference to the Indoctrination Course I gather that none of the classes which you conduct at the Airborne School would materially benefit from the course?

Lt. Col. Schorr: My answer to that is yes. They would get the same training when they attend their respective branch schools.

Major Miller of the Field Artillery School stated that out of the four requirements presented in the morning three of them could be taken care of by having the students attend the course. The fourth would not. The class

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would have to attend the course twice a year to be fully accommodated. The course would have to be adjusted to meet the needs outlined in the fourth requirement because of shooting.

Colonel Webster of the USMA stated that he thought the course could be modified to meet the needs of the Cadets and that they could possibly attend the course during the period of their three weeks trip. He thought that demonstrations of equipment were very worthwhile because of the impression left in the mind of the student.

Major Irwin of the Coast Artillery School stated he was sure the Air Indoctrination Course would meet the needs of his school. He would not be interested in radar because the engineering section at the school conducts a course in radar which is very extensive in scope.

Colonel Calhoun of the Mountain and Winter Warfare College and Training Center stated he did not think the course would be applicable to his school in view of the fact the students eventually went to their respective branch schools and would receive the training there. Their classes are small and they are particularly interested in specialized training.

Major Milloy of the Replacement and School Command stated he was present solely for the purpose of informing his commander of the difficulties involved between the TAC and the schools.

General Wyman stated his department was particularly interested in the intelligence side of the training and was also interested in giving the intelligence officers practical training during peacetime in the problems that would confront them during wartime. He was also interested in the ground problems of air bases; they were similar and in some instances identical with the problems concerning him. Reconnaissance is gone into very thoroughly in the Intelligence School. Reconnaissance participation in air-ground exercises at the Intelligence School will increase as time goes on.

Lt. Col. Rosa, of the G-3 Air Section, Hq AGF stated that the Indoctrination Course had merit. He would like to see all the lieutenants and captains thoroughly indoctrinated in the air-ground system. He would like to show them how the combat operations work and to show the lieutenant who is leading the platoon out front and receiving enemy fire how to request air support through channels and let him see the process of the aircraft hitting the target. He would like to see the first demonstration put on by experienced personnel and then let the students act as the S-1, S-2, battalion commander, the G-2 and G-3 air at division and corps headquarters and actually have them act as the air and ground commanders. I feel the Air Indoctrination Course should be the climax of the officer's schooling as far as air-ground cooperation work is concerned. When they go out as commanders or are on the ground force staff they will understand the difficult process through which their request for air-ground strike must go before it can be accomplished. They must be made to realize that all the requests cannot receive the same amount of air support. I would like for them to see that

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the decision for an air strike is the function of a higher commander.

General Lee: From what you have heard of the course do you feel it could be adapted to such a type of officer?

Lt. Col. Rosa: Yes, I do.

Lt. Col. Harper, of the G-2 Air Section, Hq AGF, stated that he would go along with the statement made by Lt. Col. Rosa. He would like to show the lower units how they can work to get air reconnaissance and photographic coverage. These people will later hold down jobs on the different staffs and they should know the way to get their photo coverage in maneuvers or in actual operations. If the skeleton is set up in the demonstration which shows the chance of their request being turned down as it goes up the line to the tactical air commander they will have a clearer conception of what is happening. Another point, the officers at lower levels might not be able to absorb all that is put out in this course. All of them should know the basic principles of air power.

Lt. Col. Hillman of the Ninth Air Force Air Indoctrination stated he thought the Course was an improvement over the present system of furnishing air demonstrations. He would like to see the students participate actively in the course because they would learn more. From the way the schools are set up the people finish the advance course by the time they are captains. It is important for the people down below to get the instruction.

General Taylor, Colonel Moore, and Colonel Krebs, representing the major subordinate commands of the TAC, the 12th, 9th and 3rd Air Forces respectively, indicated their approval of the Air Indoctrination Course plan. Colonel Moore stated that he had every confidence in the success of the plan as it would allow tactical air power to be presented in a clear-cut and comprehensive manner, thereby being of mutual benefit to both ground and air.

Recess until tomorrow morning.

0900, 26 June 1946

General Lee:

Gentlemen: Yesterday participants in this conference presented and compiled the desired total requirements of the service schools for joint air-ground exercises and demonstrations during the coming year. Sufficient mention was made of training requirements of the air force units themselves and the present and expected requirements of military agencies other than service schools (such as army maneuvers, special exercises and tests ordered by Headquarters Army Air Forces, etc.) to indicate the tremendous workload that will be imposed on the air units authorized in the United States by the

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War Department. All present were appraised of the current and projected future resources of the Tactical Air Command with which to fulfill these requirements.

It must be evident to all present that enough air units just don't exist to satisfy everyone's wants or to continue operations as we have in the past if we are to derive maximum effectiveness and comply with the priorities for training and joint exercises prescribed by higher authority.

This condition presented to the conference the following primary problem:

"How are the air requirements of the service schools to be presented in a manner which will be of greatest mutual benefit to the air and ground forces involved?"

The Commanding General of the Tactical Air Command has presented a, I repeat, a solution. The Tactical Air Command solution contemplates a comprehensive, but flexible in scope, air-ground indoctrination exercise of $2\frac{1}{2}$ - 5 days duration, a series of which may be conducted over a $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 month period twice a year. Student bodies of the various service schools will attend these exercises.

It was emphasized that the air-ground indoctrination exercise as presented by Colonel Perego yesterday, is only one example of the type of exercise that might be conducted. It is a sample. It is constructed on a solid foundation of sound principles, but its scope is extremely flexible. The possibilities of moulding this coverage of the field of air-ground joint participation is unlimited.

For the coming year, we should be able to conduct the first indoctrination exercise on 15 January 1947.

The discussion yesterday afternoon brought out that such an indoctrination exercise would be feasible for certain classes of students in the service schools. Others would benefit more by witnessing a fire power demonstration. The Tactical Air Command can perform the latter if they are not too numerous and if they are properly scheduled and spaced.

There will be other joint exercises involving the service schools and Tactical Air Command units. These may be directed from time to time by higher authority and we both will be required to take them on if some higher priority commitment is not consuming all of our resources. These may be considered extra curricular activities and need not be considered now. They will be dealt with as they come up.

Special exercises which, as General Quesada says, "Seem to cry for Air" and missions for specialized schools such as Mountain and Winter Warfare Training, Field Artillery shoots, Coast Artillery Spotting, Anti-Aircraft Artillery tracking and towing, Airborne Training and Intelligence Reconnaissance, we will attempt to schedule.

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We have presented a solution to the main problem facing the conference members. In the case of the Command and Staff College, The Air University and the United States Military Academy, it is believed that we can work out the details directly with the commanding generals or their representatives.

With respect to the other service schools represented here, it is felt that is has been established that the solution of the major problem involving principle or decision will have to be arrived at by the Headquarters Army Ground Forces and Headquarters Tactical Air Command. We will now hear from General Huebner.

General Huebner:

Gentlemen: This conference is one of the greatest steps we have taken towards solving the air-ground liaison problems. I think if you will bear with me a few minutes, some of the things that don't ordinarily show up in air-ground liaison should be reviewed. I think we are familiar with the air-ground set-up in the control and method of getting missions but there is a close liaison between the air and ground only brought out by constant practice, by the planes functioning in front of the troops. This is important in the Armored Division because the VHF set is located out in front. After it has once been made available, either by air cover over the column or special liaison and directives from the Tactical Air Command, there is a lot to be done that must be done by practice. After the controller gets hold of the plane he vectors it to the target. This is a problem that we are going to lose our "know how" on. I don't think for a minute we will on the larger patterns.

We have got to build up again. As the speed of the planes increase and new methods of communications are developed, we'll have to change our methods from time to time. Attacking targets with different type airplanes and equipment proposes a problem. We've got to be careful not to los that end of the thinking. The whole communications system of an infantry division is set up to get the aircraft and people where we want them. That is our problem, one of them. In our special service schools and in the maneuvers we hope to have in the years to come, we can improvise a lot with pictures and training aids and with liaison type aircraft, but, some place in the picture we must have actual participation of the high performance aircraft to meet the problem. That is most valuable to the armored division.

As far as the infantry division is concerned we can handle that. Again that is mostly a command set-up with infantry communications involved in the matter. We can improvise by the use of an L-5, etc., to get the people ready to work with the Air Corps. Somewhere we must come together for practice.

With regard to the proposed set-up at Tyndall Field, I believe we can make it work. I believe we are on the right track but we must have ground force participation. The infantry communications and the observers are strictly ground units. They are not air at all, but I am sure we can work that out

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and it can be accomplished.

I am also very sure these demonstrations have got to be pointed towards some objective. But the very nature of the fighting is so difficult that to show it to the infantryman without ground participation would leave the problem vacant in many respects.

We are coming into a new war technique with guided missiles and rockets. Spotting will be more important than ever. The liaison type aircraft will not be able to observe the fire. A high performance aircraft will be required. A demonstration along this line at Tyndall Field will help a lot.

Most of the work and problems before us now has to be dealt with on a high level. That is why the Ground Forces are coming to Fort Monroe; to solve these problems by living next to one another. It is a mutual education on the part of both. We made tremendous progress from D-Day to the end of the war. If we lose that we have lost something we can't get back.

General Lee: Thank you General Huebner. A review of the activities of the conference yesterday indicated that any proposal of dates by the Tactical Air Command before hearing the talk by General Huebner and the views of the representatives from the service schools would be premature. Colonel Taylor is prepared to accept any proposed tentative dates from any representative, while he has the floor, who may wish to offer them in light of the revelations brought out in the conference thus far. We realize that before any definite schedule can be arranged it will be necessary for each school to study our proposal and determine how and at what date they can fit it into their curriculums. After this has been done there should be another meeting involving the TAC and representatives of Hq AGF.

The Infantry School
Lt. Col. Singles

The Infantry School understands Tactical Air Command's problems in meeting the requirements. We would feel unfortunate if we did not get some air participation. The air power demonstration that has been talked about should be given at Fort Benning at least three times during the year to cover the students of the various courses. That should be given in spite of the fact that the Air Indoctrination Course may be held at Tyndall Field. I am now trying to get a little air to come to Benning instead of sending the students to Tyndall Field. The dates I mentioned yesterday are the ones necessary to properly cover the students at the school.

The Armored School
Lt. Col. Abrams

The proposed instruction for the Air Indoctrination Course we feel has many advantages. However, we feel it is particularly adapted to the advanced course and not so much to the balance of the classes. We feel that it is perfectly feasible that the advance class attend this unit of instruction. We do feel there is a definite need for 12 close support type aircraft

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to participate in field exercises for two days during the first week of April and the first week of June. There is a definite requirement in addition to that for our students to either see at the school or be transported to the Airborne School and see glider and transport equipment for the transport of units in airborne operations. This should occur once during the year, about March 13th. The students involved would not exceed 100. Although desirable it is not essential that they be given a demonstration of airborne units in the assault. It is important for them to see the equipment, and the methods of loading the gliders.

The Airborne School
Lt. Col. Schorr

Because of the technical and specialize nature of instruction at the Airborne School and the comparative brevity of the courses, the fact that duplication of instruction will be eventually received, obviates the attendance of the officers at the exercises. The continuous requirements listed yesterday are the same.

The Field Artillery School
Major Miller

As pertains to the air-ground liaison system, I think at my school we can show them technically how it's done by using liaison type aircraft. All the students at the school will not be able to attend your course. I feel, if possible, we should have fire power demonstration twice a year during the months of November and May. That will give everyone in the school a chance to see it.

The Coast Artillery School
Major Irwin

We requested the air demonstration in October or November. That is for our branch specialists school. However, there may be a need for another to include the 37 weeks course. This is a fire power demonstration.

Mountain and Winter Warfare College
Colonel Calhoun

Our needs have been taken care of; one demonstration in August and one in March requiring air photography, evacuation, supply, and wire laying.

Intelligence School
Lt. Col. Lowe

The needs of the Intelligence School have been expressed and I feel we have been adequately covered by the assurance we would receive the photo coverage in the Kansas area.

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USMA
Colonel Webster

I believe that as stated yesterday, the proposed exercises modified to meet the needs of the Cadets is proper for their first class summer combined arms trip. It will fit in well. The second class summer cannot be discussed yet. We have a year to do it in and we do plan to ask for help from A-3.

Command and Staff College
Colonel Browne

The Command and Staff College is happy over the outcome of the demonstration if given at Tyndall Field with ground force participation. We want to see the ground work with the air. The demonstration of the control of tactical air power could be given in April or May. I refer to the time we visit Benning and Bragg and the Tyndall Field exercises.

Air Command and Staff School
Colonel McGuire

From our views we feel the air exercises are excellent. There is some duplication. The first day of the demonstration is entirely duplicated in the Air University where the lectures are covered more in detail. The needs of the Air University would be best met if the first day was excluded from the exercises and the last day expanded. The best time as far as the Air University is concerned will be the last week in October. However, that may be impossible to achieve therefore we'd like to attend the first of your exercises, I believe in the last part of January.

General Quesada: I want to bring out more forcefully the fact that the exercises to be set up are exercises to be performed to give you something to shoot at and to describe what we are seeking. It is not in any way the exercises that would be put on. We had to have something to present to you to show you what our goal is. We recognize it's only a means of presenting to you the idea. When you show it to your commanders I hope you will explain very thoroughly that it's an organ to show our goal, to bring out to you what we are trying to accomplish. We will mould the demonstration to lean in the direction of the group of people we have there and conform to the type of instruction they have in their school. We will bring out the points they want.

General Lee: Gentlemen, I believe many enlightening things have been brought out in this conference. I think we have accomplished a great deal and the essential purpose of the meeting has been accomplished. It is believed the representatives will want to go back to their schools and present the ideas before final schedules can be arrived at. Also, the Army Ground Forces may want to review these also and make some decisions on some of the proposals of each school under their jurisdiction. As that is done members of this headquarters are ready to meet with Headquarters Army Ground Forces and arrange final details for these exercises not decided upon in this conference.

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A few closing remarks now from General Quesada.

General Quesada:

I can't add much other than what I have already said. In my opinion the purpose of the meeting has in fact been accomplished. We wanted you to see the futility of scrambling like hell from day to day and trying to keep everybody happy and meeting needs as they arose. I am very gratified that General Huebner sees that we must have a plan of 18 months in range to meet the needs that arise from day to day. I hope there is no impression of the part of those present that we are trying to get out of anything. We're trying to do what we're supposed to do in a better manner and it is with that in mind that we have had this meeting. We feel that by such a meeting we have had the opportunity of expressing our views and we have witnessed an expression of your views. I am positive a lot of good has come out of this conference. I am sure that when the Army Ground Forces get down here there will be more constructive thinking. I want to say I was most gratified at the very fine impression made by General Huebner when he grasped the idea of an air power demonstration. I think most of you think of it as just shooting machine guns. It's on a higher level and represents a four or five thousand ton bomb drop in a few minutes. It is our hope we'll progress on the side of 4,000 tons in a matter of minutes. We feel the responsibility is on our part to interject that thinking in the mind of the officer during the early part of his education. We have accomplished our end; we have brought to your attention the difficulties that are ours and given you the opportunity to criticize our plan. We hoped you would express your desires and views. There is one solution to the problem better than all others and we hope to reach it. It amounts to the best solution between the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces that will take in the needs and requirements of all.

In my opinion this meeting has accomplished more than I thought it would. It has been objective in nature and your views have been most encouraging. I hope you recognize that we are having our problems and they are terrific. The next year will require a great deal of patience. We hope you will be patient and we'll just "bust a gut" to do everything we can. As I said before, we have the desire.

I am glad you came and I am glad to see we finished before time which shows there was a meeting of the minds.

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STATUS OF TACTICAL AIR COMMAND UNITS

SECTION I - TACTICAL AIR COMMAND AAF BASE UNITS ASSIGNED UNDER TAC GENERAL ORDER NO. 2, 26 March 1946
(All General Orders originated TAC and dated 1946 unless otherwise stated)

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
300th AAF BU (Hq TAC)	Hq TAC, Tampa, Fla.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Moved to Langley Fld, Va. 26 May, GO #28	Active
303d AAF BU (Hq 3AF)	Hq 3AF, Greenville AAB, S. C.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Active	Discontinued eff 1 Nov, GO #93	Discontinued
309th AAF BU (Hq 9AF)	Hq, 9AF, Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	28 Mar	Active	Designated Hq 9AF, Greenville AAB, eff 1 Nov, GO #91; PCS to Greenville AAB (MO 5 Oct 46)	Active
301st AAF BU (Standby)	Drew Fld, Fla.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 2 Dec, GO #95	Discontinued
302d AAF BU	Hunter Fld, Ga.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 15 Dec, GO #3 8 Jan 47	Discontinued
305th AAF BU (Tactical)	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 305th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Reasgd 12AF, eff 1 Nov, GO #91	Active
306th AAF BU (Tactical)	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 306th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Reasgd ADC & trfd, eff 15 Jan 47 GO #6, 31 Jan 47	Transferred

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section I) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
307th AAF BU (Tactical)	Lake Charles AAF, La.	TAC	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 307th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Asgd 9AF, eff 29 Mar GO #32	Active
308th AAF BU (Tactical)	Tyndall Fld, Fla.	TAC	28 Mar	Active	Reasgd Air University, Maxwell Fld, Ala., eff 15 May GO #26	Transferred
310th AAF BU (Tactical)	Pope Fld, Ft. Bragg, N.C. (Inf Sch)	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 310th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
311th AAF BU (Tactical)	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 311th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
313th AAF BU (Tactical)	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 313th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
314th AAF BU (Tactical)	McChord Fld, Wash.	TAC	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 314th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Trfd ADC, eff 1 Aug GO #71	Transferred
315th AAF BU (Tactical)	Godman Fld, Ky.	TAC	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 315th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Trfd ADC, eff 15 Jul GO #68	Transferred

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Status of Tactical Air Command (Section I) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
316th AAF BU (Tactical)	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 316th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Reasgd 3AF 1 Oct GO #86; Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
317th AAF BU (Tactical)	Myrtle Beach AAF, S.C.	TAC	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 317th AAF BU (B&GR) GO #24; Reasgd 3AF 1 Oct GO #86; Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
318th AAF BU** (Tactical)	Lockbourne AAB, O.	TAC	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 318th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Jan 47 GO #99	Active
319th AAF BU (Tactical)	Lawson Fld, Ga.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 319th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
320th AAF BU (Tactical)	Dover AAF, Del.	TAC	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 320th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24	Active
321st AAF BU (Tactical)	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 321st AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Reasgd 12AF, eff 17 May GO #25	Active
322d AAF BU (Tactical)	Sedalia AAF, Mo	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 322d AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24; Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88; Standby Status Sta List 10 Nov	Standby

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section I) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
324th AAF BU (Standby)	Chatham AAF, Ga.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby		Standby
328th AAF BU (Standby)	Gulfport AAF, Miss.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 28 Nov GO #95	Discontinued
329th AAF BU (Standby)	Alexandria AAF, La.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 23 Sep GO #85	Discontinued
330th AAF BU (Standby)	Dyersburg AAF, Tenn.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby		Standby
331st AAF BU (Standby)	Stout Fld, Ind.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Standby	Trfd ADC 15 Jan GO #50	Transferred
332d AAF BU (Standby)	Alliance Fld, Nebr.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 8 June Jan GO #47	Discontinued
333d AAF BU (Standby)	Baer Fld, Ind.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Standby	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Standby
334th AAF BU (Standby)	Blytheville AAF, Ark.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Standby	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88; Discontinued 25 Nov GO #95	Discontinued
335th AAF BU (Standby)	Dale Mabry Fld, Fla.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Reld asgmt Dale Mabry Fld, without change of station, asgd directly under TAC redesignated 335th AAF BU (Supply) 31 Mar GO #6; Discontinued 1 Jul GO #45	Discontinued

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section I) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
336th AAF BU (Standby)	Sarasota AAF, Fla.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 25 May GO #23	Discontinued
337th AAF BU (Standby)	Venice AAF, Fla.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 20 Jun GO #39	Discontinued
338th AAF BU (Standby)	George Fld, Ill.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 1 Jul GO #52; Amended to read 15 Jul GO #60	Discontinued
339th AAF BU (Standby)	Kellogg Fld, Mich.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 1 Jul GO #52; Amended to read 15 Jul GO #63	Discontinued
341st AAF BU (Standby)	Laurinburg-Maxton AAB, N. C.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 8 Jul GO #52 Amended (correction) GO #54	Discontinued
344th AAF BU (Standby)	Marfa AAF, Tex.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Standby	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88; (Disc, eff 31 Jan 47.GO #10 17 Feb 47)	Standby
345th AAF BU (Standby)	Malden AAF, Mo.	TAC 3AF	28 Mar	Standby	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88; (Disc, eff 17 Feb 47,GO #13 6 Mar 47)	Standby
348th AAF BU (Standby)	Will Rogers Fld, Okla.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 17 Jun GO #38	Discontinued
349th AAF BU (Standby)	Muskogee AAF, Okla.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 28 Oct GO #90	Discontinued

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section I) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
353d AAF BU (Standby)	Esler Fld, La.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 2 Aug GO #65	Discontinued
355th AAF BU (C&GSS Sch)	Sherman Fld, Kans.	TAC	28 Mar	Active		Active
356th AAF BU (Cav Sch)	Marshall Fld, Kans.	TAC 9AF	28 Mar	Active	Redesignated 356th AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24	Active
379th AAF BU (Standby)	Coffeyville AAF, Kans.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	(Discontinued 9 Jan 47, GO #5, 21 Jan 47)	Standby
383d AAF BU (Standby)	Stuttgart AAF, Ark.	TAC	28 Mar	Standby	Discontinued 17 Nov GO #95	Discontinued
340th AAF BU (Supply)	Bartow AAF, Fla.	TAC	28 Mar	Supply	Discontinued 6 May GO #17	Discontinued
347th AAF BU (Supply)	Key Fld, Miss.	TAC	28 Mar	Supply	Discontinued 6 May GO #17	Discontinued

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Cont'd)

SECTION II - ASSIGNMENTS OF OTHER UNITS TO TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, TAC GENERAL ORDER NO. 2, 26 March 1946
(All General Orders originated TAC and dated 1946 unless otherwise stated)

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq & Hq Sq, XIX TAC	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Inacti-vating	To be inactivated on or before 31 Mar 46	Inactivated
Hq & Hq Sq, IX TAC	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Inacti-vating	To be inactivated on or before 31 Mar 46	Inactivated
Hq & Hq Sq, 12AF	(Not Asgd)	TAC	21 Mar	Inactive		Inactive
Hq & Hq Sq, 53d TC Wing	(Not Asgd)	TAC	21 Mar	Inactive		Inactive
Hq, 47th Bomb Gp Light	Lake Charles AAF, La.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Added to designation of Hq 47th Bomb Gp, Light (Night Attack), amendment to GO #12, per par. 1 a (1) GO #17, 6 May; Reasgd 9AF 29 May GO #32; PCS to Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46); Reasgd 12AF w/ Biggs Fld, 1 Nov GO #91	Active
84th Bomb Gp, Light	Lake Charles AAF, La.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by GO, 47th Bomb Gp, Light, eff 1 May as 84th Bomb Gp, Light (Night Attack) GO #12: Reasgd 9AF 29 May GO #32; PCS to Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46); Reasgd 12AF w/ Biggs Fld, 1 Nov GO #91	Active

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Contd)

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq, 47th Bomb Gp, L, (Night Attack) Cont'd						
85th Bomb Sq, L.	Lake Charles AAF, La.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CO, 47th Bomb Gp, L, eff 1 May as 85th Bomb Sq, L, (Night Attack) GO #12; Reasgd 9AF, 29 May GO #32; PCS to Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46); Reasgd 12AF w/ Biggs Fld, 1 Nov GO #91	Active
86th Bomb Sq, L.	Lake Charles AAF, La.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CO, 47th Bomb Gp, L, eff 1 May as 86th Bomb Sq, L. (Night Attack) GO #12; Reasgd 9AF, 29 May GO #32; PCS to Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46); Reasgd 12AF w/ Biggs Fld 1 Nov GO #91	Active
97th Bomb Sq, L.	Lake Charles AAF, La.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated, eff 31 Mar.GO #16	Inactivated
Hq, 477th Comp Gp **	Lockbourne AAB, O.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Jan 47, GO #99	Active
617th Bomb Sq**	Lockbourne AAB, O.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Jan 47, GO #99	Active
99th Ftr Sq SE **	Lockbourne AAB, O.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Jan 47, GO #99	Active

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq 412th Ftr Gp (15th Ftr Gp)	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd March Fld 1 May GO #14; Reasgd 12AF 17 May GO #25; Inactivated 10 Jul GO #43	Inactivated
29th Ftr Sq (JP)	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd March Fld 1 May GO #14; Reasgd 12AF, 17 May GO #25; Inactivated 10 Jul GO #43	Inactivated
31st Ftr Sq (JP)	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd March Fld 1 May GO #14; Reasgd 12AF 17 May GO #25; Inactivated 10 Jul GO #43	Inactivated
445th Ftr Sq (JP)	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd March Fld 1 May GO #14 Reasgd 12AF 17 May GO #25; Inactivated 10 Jul GO #43	Inactivated
Hq 67th Rcn Gp	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated, eff 31 Mar, GO #16	Inactivated
15th Tac Rcn Sq	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated, eff 31 Mar, GO #16	Inactivated
602d Air Engr Sq**	Lockbourne AAB, O.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Atchd 477th Comp Gp, 8 May GO #20; Reorganized 5 Sep & asgd to 580th Air Sv Gp GO #72 (22 Aug 46); Asgd 9AF, 1 Jan 47 GO #99	Active
11th Rcn Sq, Photo, Night	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated, eff 31 Mar GO #16	Inactivated

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
39th Tac Rcn Sq	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd March Fld 1 May GO #14; Reasgd 12AF 17 May GO #25; Inactivated 29 Jul GO #58	Inactivated
Hq & Base Sv Sq, 361st Air Sv Gp	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd March Fld 1 May GO #14 Reasgd 12AF, 17 May GO #25	Active
615th Air Engr Sq	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd March Fld 1 May GO #14 Reasgd 12AF, 17 May GO #25	Active
624th Air Mat Sq	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd March Fld, 1 May GO #14 Reasgd 12AF, 17 May GO #25	Active
575th AAF Band	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd Shaw Fld 29 Mar GO #4; Inactivated 31 May GO #29, and trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
579th AAF Band	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd March Fld 29 Mar GO #4; Reasgd 12AF, 17 May GO #25	Active
766th AAF Band**	Lockbourne AAB, O.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Asgd Lockbourne AAB 29 Mar GO #4; Reasgd 9AF, 1 Jan 47, GO #99	Active
564th AAF Band	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	PCS to Langley Fld, Va. approx 1 Jun (MO 7 Jun 46); Asgd TAC and atchd 300th AAF BU, 1 Jan 47 GO #99	Active

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq & Base Sv Sq, 500th Air Sv Gp	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated, eff 31 Mar GO #16	Inactivated
918th Air Engr Sq	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated, eff 31 Mar GO #16	Inactivated
742d Air Mat Sq	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated, eff 31 Mar GO #16	Inactivated
Hq & Base Sv Sq 544th Air Sv Gp	Lake Charles AAF, La.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CO, 544th Air Sv Gp 28 Apr GO #13; Reasgd 9AF 29 May GO #32; PCS to Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46); Reasgd 12AF w/ Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov GO #91	Active
970th Air Engr Sq	Lake Charles AAF, La.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CO, 544th Air Sv Gp 28 Apr GO #13; Reasgd 9AF 29 May GO #32; PCS to Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46); Reasgd 12AF w/ Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov GO #91	Active
794th Air Mat Sq	Lake Charles AAF, La.	TAC	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CO, 544th Air Sv Gp 28 Apr GO #13; Reasgd 9AF 29 May GO #32; PCS to Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46); Reasgd 12AF w/ Biggs Fld, eff 1 Nov GO #91	Active

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq 362d Ftr Gp	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #57 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
377th Ftr Sq SE	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #57 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
378th Ftr Sq SE	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #57 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
379th Ftr Sq SE	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #67 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
Hq, 69th Rcn Gp	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 29 Jul GO #58 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
10th Tac Rcn Sq	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated AG Ltr 322 (25 Apr 46), dtd 29 Apr 46	Inactivated
22d Tac Rcn Sq	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 31 Aug GO #58 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
29th Rcn Sq, Night Photo	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 29 Jul GO #58 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
72d Liaison Sq	Marshall Fld, Kans.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated (WD Ltr 322, 25 Apr 46) eff, 31 Mar GO #8, Hq 9AF Biggs Fld, dtd 10 May 46	Inactivated

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
161st Liaison Sq	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Trfd to Caribbean Defense Comd 9 Sep GO #32 Hq 9AF Biggs Fld, dtd 3 Oct 46	Transferred
162d Liaison Sq	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated, eff 3 Oct GO #31, Hq 9AF Biggs Fld, dtd 3 Oct 46	Inactivated
167th Liaison Sq	Marshall Fld, Kans	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated, eff 3 Oct GO #31, Hq 9AF Biggs Fld, dtd 3 Oct 46	Inactivated
27th Tow Target Sq	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized 17 Jun GO #35; Amended to read "28 June" GO #49; Reasgd to 12AF, eff 1 Nov GO #91	Active
18th Tac Air Comm Sq	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 12 Aug GO #62 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
8th Depot Unit, Army	Marshall Fld, Kans.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized, eff 26 Dec GO #45 Hq 9AF Greenville AAB dtd 24 Dec 46 & trfd to Post Fld, Ft. Sill, Okla.	Active
569th AAF Band	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 30 Jun GO #41 & trfd to contl of WD (Pers reasgd 564th AAF Band, Langley Fld.	Inactivated

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq, 502d Tac Contl Gp	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	PCS fr Biggs Fld to Greenville AAB, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)*	Active
605th Tac Contl Sq	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	PCS fr Biggs Fld to Greenville AAB, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)*	Active
606th Acft Contl & Warning Sq	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	PCS fr Biggs Fld to Greenville AAF, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)*	Active
607th Acft Contl & Warning Sq	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	PCS fr Biggs Fld to Greenville AAF, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)*	Active
608th Acft Contl & Warning Sq	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	PCS fr Biggs Fld to Greenville AAF, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)*	Active
Hq & Base Sv Sq, 450th Air Sv Gp	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CG, 9AF, 1 Jul GO #40; PCS to Langley Fld, eff 20 Dec (MO 6 Dec 46)	Active
826th Air Engr Sq	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CG, 9AF, 1 Jul, GO #40; PCS to Langley Fld, eff 20 Dec (MO 6 Dec 46)	Active

* Occurred o/a 5 Jan 47
TAC MO, 3 Jan 47 (Delay
due to West Coast Maneuvers).

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Status of Tactical Air Command (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
450th Air Sv Gp (Cont'd)						
650th Air Mat Sq	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CG, 9AF, 1 Jul GO #40; PCS to Langley Fld eff 20 Dec (MO 6 Dec 46)	Active
Hq & Base Sv Sq, 471st Air Sv Gp	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CG, 9AF, 1 Jul GO #40; Amended GO #44; PCS to Shaw Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)	Active
889th Air Engr Sq	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CG, 9AF 1 Jul GO #40; Amended GO #44; PCS to Shaw Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)	Active
713th Air Mat Sq	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	Reorganized by CG, 9AF, 1 Jul GO #40; Amended GO #44; PCS to Shaw Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)	Active
934th Sig Bn, TAC Separate	Bigge Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	21 Mar	Active	PCS to Greenville AAB, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)	Active
Hq & Hq Sq, 50th TC Wing	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #56 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
Hq & Hq Sq, 52d TC Wing	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 29 Aug GO #67	Inactivated

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq, 316th TC Gp	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
36th TC Sq	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
37th TC Sq	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	DS Greenville AAB approx 1 Aug thru 31 Dec ('46 Sta Lists); Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
75th TC Sq	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	DS Lawson Fld approx 1 Jun thru 31 Dec ('46 Sta Lists); Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
77th TC Sq	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 10 Jun GO #33 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
Hq, 349th TC Gp	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 8 Sep GO #74	Inactivated
23d TC Sq	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 8 Sep GO #74	Inactivated
312th TC Sq	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 8 Sep GO #74	Inactivated
313th TC Sq	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 8 Sep GO #74	Inactivated

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq, 349th TC Gp (Cont'd)						
314th TC Sq	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #56 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
Hq, 434th TC Gp	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #59 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
71st TC Sq	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #59 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
72d TC Sq	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #59 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
73d TC Sq	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #59 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
74th TC Sq	Greenville AAB, S. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #59 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
Hq, 3d Air Cargo Resupply Sq	Lawson Fld, Ga.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 31 Mar GO #4	Inactivated
475th Avn Sq**	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	PCS fr TAC to SAC (Davis-Monthan Fld, Tucson, Ariz) eff 25 Jul (MO 1 Aug 46)	Transferred
571st AAF Band	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 30 Apr GO #6 Hq 3AF Greenville AAB	Inactivated

** Negro Personnel

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
652d AAF Band	Greenville AAB, S. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 31 Mar GO #18 Hq IX TCC Greenville AAB	Inactivated
Hq, 439th TC Gp	Sedalia AAF, Mo.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 10 Jun GO #33 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
91st TC Sq	Sedalia AAF, Mo.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 10 Jun GO #33 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
92d TC Sq	Sedalia AAF, Mo.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 10 Jun GO #33 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
93d TC Sq	Sedalia AAF, Mo.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 10 Jun GO #33 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
94th TC Sq	Sedalia AAF, Mo.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated ~~10 Jun~~ 1 Aug GO #56 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
Hq & Base Sv Sq, 452d Air Sv Gp	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #59 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
828th Air Engr Sq	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #59 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
652d Air Mat Sq	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 1 Aug GO #59 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section II) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq & Base Sv Sq, 455th Air Sv Gp	Sedalia AAF, Mo.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 10 Jun GO #33 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
873d Air Engr Sq	Sedalia AAF, Mo.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 10 Jun GO #33 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
697th Air Mat Sq	Sedalia AAF, Mo.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Inactivated 10 Jun GO #33 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
Hq & Base Sv Sq 460th Air Sv Gp	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
878th Air Engr Sq	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
702d Air Mat Sq	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
Hq & Base Sv Sq, 477th Air Sv Gp	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
895th Air Engr Sq	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
719th Air Mat Sq	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	21 Mar	Active	Asgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Cont'd)

SECTION III - ALL OTHER UNITS ASSIGNED TACTICAL AIR COMMAND DURING 1946
(All General Orders originated TAC and dated 1946 unless otherwise stated)

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
342d AAF BU (Standby)	Smyrna AAF, Tenn.	TAC	29 Mar	Standby	Trfd fr AAFTC GO #4; redesignated 342d AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #24	Active
756th AAF Band	Pope Fld, N. C.	TAC 3AF	29 Mar	Active	Added GO #4 amending GO #2; Inactivated 31 May GO #29 & trfd to contl of WD	Inactivated
385th AAF BU	Tuskegee AAF, Ala.	TAC	14 Apr	Active	Trfd fr AAFFTC GO #9; redesignated 385th AAF BU (Pilot Tng); Standby status 27 Sep (Ltr TAC 322, 27 Sep 46); Reasgd Hq 9AF GO #4 (10 Jan 47)	Standby
304th AAF BU (Base Svs)	Langley Fld, Va.	TAC	30 Apr	Active	Trfd fr ATC GO #10; reasgd 9AF eff 1 Jan 47 GO #99	Active
862d Chemical Co, Air Opns	March Fld, Calif.	TAC	25 Apr	Active	Asgd March Fld 25 Apr GO #17; Reasgd 12AF GO #25; PCS to Shaw Fld, 9AF (MO 29 Jan 47)	Active
557th AAF Band	McChord Fld, Wash.	TAC	8 May	Active	Asgd 8 May GO #19; Inactivated 30 Jun GO #41 & trfd to contl to WD (Pers reasgd 564th AAF Band, Langley Fld	Inactivated

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section III) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
15th Tac Air Comm Sq	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	14 May	Activated	Activated, eff 14 May GO #64 Hq 3AF Greenville AAB; Inactivated GO #1 Hq 9AF Greenville AAB (3 Jan 47)	Inactivated
312th AAF BU (Hq 12AF)	March Fld, Calif.	TAC 12AF	17 May	Active	Asgd 12AF 17 May GO #25	Active
Boat Rescue Sec	Langley Fld, Va.	TAC	20 May	Active	304th AAF BU (Base Svs) auth special section Sq A composed all boat & rescue pers GO #27, 20 May 46	Active
613th AAF Band**	Tuskegee AAF, Ala.	TAC	12 Jun	Active	Asgd 12 Jun GO #36; Reasgd 9AF GO #4 (10 Jan 47)	Active
Hq, 1st Ftr Gp	March Fld, Calif.	TAC 12AF	10 Jul	Activated	Asgd 12AF 10 Jul GO #43	Active
27th Ftr Sq, JP	March Fld, Calif.	TAC 12AF	10 Jul	Activated	Asgd 12AF 10 Jul GO #43	Active
71st Ftr Sq, JP	March Fld, Calif.	TAC 12AF	10 Jul	Activated	Asgd 12AF 10 Jul GO #43	Active

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section III) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
1st Ftr Gp (cont'd)						
94th Ftr Sq, JP	March Fld, Calif.	TAC 12AF	10 Jul	Activated	Asgd 12AF 10 Jul GO #43	Active
4th Photographic Techn Sq	Langley Fld, Va.	TAC	19 Jun	Active	Asgd Langley Fld fr MacDill Fld Fla, to be reorganized by CO, 304th AAF BU GO #48; reld asgmt Langley Fld, reasgd directly TAC & atchd 300th AAF BU 1 Jan 47 GO #98	Active
Hq, 20th Ftr Gp	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	1 Aug	Activated	Asgd 9AF 1 Aug GO #57; PCS to Shaw Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)	Active
55th Ftr Sq SE	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	1 Aug	Activated	Asgd 9AF 1 Aug GO #57; PCS to Shaw Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)	Active
77th Ftr Sq SE	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	1 Aug	Activated	Asgd 9AF 1 Aug GO #57; PCS to Shaw Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)	Active
79th Ftr Sq SE	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	1 Aug	Activated	Asgd 9AF 1 Aug GO #57; PCS to Shaw Fld, eff 1 Nov (MO 5 Oct 46)	Active

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section III) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq, 363d Rcn Gp*	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	29 Jul	Activated	Asgd 9AF 29 Jul GO #58; PCS to Langley Fld, eff 20 Dec (MO 6 Dec 46)	Active
12th Rcn Sq, Photo, JP*	March Fld, Calif.	TAC 9AF	31 Aug	Activated	Asgd 9AF 31 Aug GO #58; Redesignated fr 12th Tac Rcn Sq, reld present asgmt & reasgd 363d Rcn Gp (pers fr 39th Tac Rcn Sq), atchd 12AF for opns, adm, supply, & maintenance GO #58; PCS to Greenville AAB, eff 15 Nov (MO. 23 Oct 46)	Active
161st Rcn Sq,* Photo, JP	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	31 Aug	Activated	Asgd 9AF 31 Aug GO #58; Redesignated fr 161st Tac Rcn Sq, reld present Gp asgmt & reasgd 363d Rcn Gp (pers fr 69th Rcn Gp) GO #58; PCS to Langley Fld, 1 Nov (MO 9 Oct)	Active
162d Rcn Sq,* Night Photo	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	31 Aug	Activated	Asgd 9AF 31 Aug GO #58; Redesignated fr 162d Tac Rcn Sq reld present asgmt Gp & reasgd 363d Rcn Gp (pers fr 69th Rcn Gp) GO #58; PCS to Langley Fld, eff 20 Dec (MO 6 Dec 46)	Active

* Above Gp & Sqdns designated Regular Army units GO #65, dtd 12 Aug 1946.

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section III) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Sq Z (Air Exhibit Team)	Langley Fld, Va.	TAC	13 Aug	Authorized Special Sq	300th AAF BU (Hq TAC) auth special Sq - Air Exhibit Team (See Chapt) GO #66; Disc, eff 5 Dec GO #96	Discontinued
62d TC Sq	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	25 Jul	Active	Asgd TAC & 3AF 25 Jul, GO #67; Inactivated 29 Aug GO #67	Inactivated
Hq, 314th TC Gp	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	25 Jul	Active	Asgd 3AF 25 Jul GO #70	Active
Hq & Base Svs Sq, 580th Air Sv Gp **	Lockbourne AAB, O.	TAC	5 Sep	Activated	Asgd 3AF 5 Sep & atchd to 477th Comp Gp GO #72; reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Jan 47, GO #99	Active
1062d Air Mat Sq**	Lockbourne AAB, O.	TAC	5 Sep	Activated	Asgd 3AF 5 Sep, further asgd to 580th Air Sv Gp & atchd w/580th Air Sv Gp to 477th Comp Gp GO #72; reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Jan 47, GO #99	Active
29th Comm Sq, Air Force	Langley Fld, Va.	TAC	23 Aug	Activated	Asgd TAC 23 Aug & atched 300th AAF BU (Hq TAC) for rat & qtrs GO #73	Active

** Negro personnel

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section III) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
Hq, 62d TC Gp	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	8 Sep	Activated	Asgd TAC & 3AF to be activated 8 Sep GO #74; reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
4th TC Sq	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	8 Sep	Activated	Asgd TAC & 3AF to be activated 8 Sep GO #74; Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
7th TC Sq	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	8 Sep	Activated	Asgd TAC & 3AF to be activated 8 Sep GO #74; Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
8th TC Sq	Bergstrom Fld, Tex.	TAC 3AF	8 Sep	Activated	Asgd TAC & 3AF to be activated 8 Sep GO #74; Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
904th Chem Co,** Air Opns	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	19 Sep	Activated	Asgd TAC & 9AF to be activated 19 Sep GO #79; reasgd 12AF, eff 1 Nov GO #91	Active
42d Stat Contl Unit	Langley Fld, Va.	TAC	10 Oct	Activated	Asgd TAC to be activated 10 Oct, atchd 300th AAF BU (Hq TAC) GO #25 Hq Langley Fld; reorganized eff 6 Nov GO #26, Hq Langley Fld, (Trfd TAC to AAF, 15 Feb 47 MO 5 Feb 47)	Active

** Negro Personnel

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section III) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
2002d AAF BU (AFS-BA)	Stewart Fld, N.Y.	TAC	30 Sep	Active	Trfd fr ATC 30 Sep GO #93; Redesignated 2002d AAF BU (Base Svs) GO #97	Active
1st Shoran Beacon Unit	Biggs Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	28 Oct	Activated	Asgd 9AF to be activated 28 Oct GO #37 Hq 9AF Biggs Fld; GO #94 amends GO #91 to add this unit; trfd 12AF GO #94	Active
414th Night Ftr Sq	March Fld, Calif	TAC	31 Jul (EDCMR)	Active	Reld asgmt ADC & asgd TAC (MO 9 Jul 46); PCS to Shaw Fld GO #53 (13 Jul 46) Reasgd 3AF, eff 1 Oct GO #86; Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88 (To be trfd to Canal Zone approx 17 Mar 47)	Active
415th Night Ftr Sq	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC	21 Aug	Active	PCS to Shaw Fld fr ADC 21 Aug; Reasgd 3AF eff 1 Oct GO #86; Reasgd 9AF eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
72d Liaison Sq	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	3 Oct	Activated	Asgd 9AF to be activated at Brooks Fld 3 Oct GO #31 Hq 9AF Brooks Fld; PCS to Langley Fld, eff 20 Dec (MO 6 Dec)	Active

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section III) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
163d Liaison Sq	Marshall Fld, Kans.	TAC 9AF	3 Oct	Activated	Asgd 9AF to be activated at Marshall Fld 3 Oct GO #31 Hq 9AF Brooks Fld	Active
722d AAF Band	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	25 Oct	Active	PCS fr Tinker Fld (Okla) GO #58 Hq Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area (17 Oct); Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
256th Med Disp Avn Unit	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	6 Oct	Activated	GO #90, Hq 3AF Greenville AAB (10 Oct); Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
1st Vet Det, Avn Unit	Greenville AAB, S.C.	TAC 3AF	6 Oct	Activated	GO #90, Hq 3AF Greenville AAB (10 Oct); Reasgd 9AF, eff 1 Nov GO #88	Active
12th Photo Tech Unit	Brooks Fld, Tex.	TAC 9AF	6 Oct	Activated	Activated 6 Oct at Brooks Fld, GO #33 Hq 9AF Biggs Fld; PCS to Greenville AAB 15 Nov SO #224 Hq Brooks Fld (MO 23 Oct)	Active

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Status of Tactical Air Command Units (Section III) Cont'd

NAME OF UNIT	STATION	ASGMT	DATE ASGD TAC	STATUS WHEN ASGD	CHANGES	STATUS 31 Dec 1946
30th Motor Trans-port Sq Avn **	Shaw Fld, S. C.	TAC 9AF	11 Nov	Activated	Asgd 9AF to be activated at Shaw Fld 11 Nov GO #40 Hq 9AF Greenville AAB (To be trfd to Lawson Fld for Air Indoctrination Course May 47	Active
31st Motor Trans-port Sq Avn **	March Fld, Calif.	TAC 12AF	18 Nov	Activated	Asgd 12AF to be activated at March Fld 18 Nov GO #35 Hq 12AF March Fld	Active
817th Engr Avn Bn	March Fld, Calif.	TAC 12AF	Dec	Active	PCS fr Gieger Fld, Wash (ATC) approx Dec (Ltr AFCOP-T Move Directive dtd 24 Oct 46)	Active
1st Depot Unit, Army	Greenville AAB, S.C. Camp Hood, Tex.	TAC 9AF	26 Dec	Activated	Asgd 9AF to be activated at Camp Hood, eff 26 Dec GO #45, Hq 9AF Greenville AAB	Active
3d Depot Unit, Army	Smyrna AAF, Tenn. Camp Campbell, Ky.	TAC	26 Dec	Activated	Asgd TAC & Smyrna AAF to be activated at Camp Campbell eff 26 Dec GO #14, Hq Smyrna AAF	Active
4th Depot Unit, Army	March Fld, Calif. Ft. Lewis, Wash.	TAC 12AF	26 Dec	Activated	Asgd 12AF to be activated at Ft. Lewis eff 26 Dec GO #39 Hq 12AF March Fld.	Active
5th Depot Unit, Army	Greenville AAB,S.C. Pope Fld, N.C.	TAC 9AF	26 Dec	Activated	Asgd 9AF to be activated at Pope Fld eff 26 Dec GO #45 Hq 9AF Greenville AAB	Active

** Negro Personnel

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia 23 Oct 1946

UNCLASS

COMMANDING GENERAL
ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D C

PRIORITY

A4A 1692 PD ATTN AC/AS-4 AIR INSTALLATIONS DIVISION PD
CONFIRMING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION COL REED CAM THIS HQ CMA
WITH COL FISHER CMA REQUEST ACTION BE EXPEDITED TOWARD
COMPLETION OF ACTION TO OBTAIN SURPLUS DECLARATION FOR
FOLLOWING INSTALLATIONS EXCESS TO NEEDS THIS COMMAND COLON

ATTERBURY AAF CMA INDIANA
BAER FIELD CMA INDIANA
CHATHAM AAF CMA GEORGIA
NORTH AAF CMA SOUTH CAROLINA
SANTA MARIA AAF CMA CALIFORNIA
CAMP CAMPBELL CMA TENNESSEE
CAMP MACKALL CMA NORTH CAROLINA

THIS IS INITIAL REQUEST WITH RESPECT TO CAMP CAMPBELL AND CAMP
MACKALL PD RECENT CURTAILMENT IN MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS TO THIS

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C O P Y

HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND LANGLEY FIELD VIRGINIA UNCLASS

23 Oct 46
PRIORITY

(CONTINUED)

COMMAND AND CURRENT SHORTAGES IN BUDGETARY ALLOTMENTS MAKE IT IMPERATIVE THIS HQ UNBURDEN ITSELF OF UNESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES PD CUSTODY OF CITED INSTALLATIONS CONSTITUTES THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OUTLAY OF PERSONNEL AND FUNDS BEING EXPENDED IN UNPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES THIS COMMAND PD EXPEDITIONS COMPLETION OF WAR DEPARTMENT ACTION DECLARING ABOVE INSTALLATIONS SURPLUS IS URGENTLY NEEDED

WILLIAMS HQ TACAIRCOMD

Stamped PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

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Basic: Hq, AAF, Washington DC 28 Mar 46.
Subj: "Report of Rehabilitation Inspection of Shaw Field, Sumter, S.C.

1st Ind AC/AS

HEADQUARTERS, Shaw Field, Sumter, South Carolina 3 April 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida.

******

1. Organization

a. This base has recently been transferred from the First Air Force to the Tactical Air Command and the base is now in the process of reorganizing in compliance with the policies and directives of the Tactical Air Command. New organization and functional charts will be prepared in accordance with the proper directives. Organization of the former Maintenance and Supply Directorate was in accordance with First Air Force Circular 20-11 dated 8 June 1945, which authorized a Supervisor of Motor Transportation separate from the Supervisor of Maintenance.

d. The main reason for not consolidating the Chinese area with the main area of the Post was because the Officer in Charge of the Chinese did not desire to move his personnel in view of the fact that the detachment had been alerted for movement to another station. Instructions have been received from the Tactical Air Command that the Chinese will move within approximately 48 hours of this date. The area now used by the Chinese will be closed and the American enlisted Personnel will be utilized on other duties.

******

2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, Tampa, Florida

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
(ATTN: The Air Inspector).

******

6. Reference paragraph 6a, basic communication. Headquarters Tactical Air Command has authorized Shaw Field a bulk allotment of personnel, dated 21 March 1946. This consists of 95 officers, 3 warrant officers, 811 enlisted men, and 100 civilians.

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Basic: Hq, AAF, Washington, DC 28 Mar 46.
Subj: "Report of Demobilization Inspection of Shaw Field, Sumter, S.C.

2nd Ind (Cont'd)

8. Reference paragraph 6g, basic report, The Plans Division, A-3, this Headquarters, is making a thorough study of the most propitious utilization of officer personnel within this Command with the view of being prepared to act on forced reductions in the future.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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TAC 320.4 (11 Apr 46) 11 Apr 46

SUBJECT: Exact Manning Table for Fighter Station.

TO: Commanding General, 15th Air Force, Colorado Springs, Col.

1. In accordance with request contained in message ASM 496, your headquarters, dated 4 April 1946, attached for your information is a voided copy of an Exact Manning Table pertaining to a typical Fighter Combat Crew Training Station.

2. This manning table is indicative of requirements considered essential for operating former fighter stations of this command in operation approximately eight months ago.

3. It will be noted that organizational structure of this table is based upon the Tri-Directorate System and not under the General Staff Plan which has been recently installed throughout the command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CLARENCE H KREEN
Maj, AC
Asst Adj Gen

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21 October 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Board Appointed to Study Unit Personnel Sections of Bases and Organizations Within the Tactical Air Command

TO : Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

AUTHORITY

The board was appointed pursuant to Special Order 154, paragraph 8, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, dated 30 September 1946. Members of the board were as follows:

Lt. Col. Joe W. Compton	O-33777	AC
Captain Earl W. Quillman	O-728236	AC
Captain Kendall D. Wheaton	O-1003348	AC
Captain John B. McClellan	O-34943	AC

MATTERS STUDIED

The board conducted a study of Unit Personnel Sections located at Langley Field, Lake Charles Army Air Base, Biggs Field, and March Field. The study was made to secure information and make recommendations with regard to the following:

1. Organization and operation and the more efficient utilization of personnel in unit personnel sections.

2. The echelon at which the personnel section should best be located, i.e., at squadron, base unit, or base level or a combination thereof.

3. Major causes for the errors in reporting and personnel accounting prevalent at the present time.

FACTS

1. The experience level of personnel engaged in personnel accounting, personnel record-keeping and statistical control is in general inadequate. This condition is gradually remedying itself inasmuch as the overall stabilization of the Army is allowing experience levels to increase.

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2. The study revealed that personnel procedures of many different varieties are being used in different organizations. Certain phases of one particular procedure might be considered efficient, while other phases are organized poorly and operate inefficiently. For example, see Inclosure 1 showing in chart form the wide divergence in the flow of information relative to classification actions at four different units.

3. Poor supervision on the part of officer personnel was observed in several personnel sections, which in some instances, resulted in the adoption of a lakadaisical attitude by the enlisted personnel.

4. Some specific deficiencies observed which contribute to poor reporting and accounting were:

a. Forms 20 and 24 not filed in close proximity in order to insure simultaneous entrees of pertinent data.

b. Personnel Memoranda not being utilized in many instances.

c. Informational Roster not being maintained in many instances as required by AAF Manual 35-0-1.

d. Foreign special orders arriving at receiving station several days subsequent to the EDCMR established in the special order.

e. Agencies throughout the Air Forces are obviously not complying with the provisions of AAF Regulation 35-59, dated 16 May 1946, as pertains to data to be contained in special orders and AR 345-60, dated 16 April 1946 as pertains to EDCMR.

f. It is believed that Statistical Control Officers have not been giving critical attention to the effect of poor record maintenance on outgoing reports.

g. Specific responsibilities are not being affixed to individuals in many cases. This is in conflict with good management principles and tends to promote dissatisfaction and lack of interest leading to inefficiency.

h. Little, if any, continuous on-the-job training was observed.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

1. The Unit Personnel System should be retained, based on the following reasons:

a. Provides centralized control, uniformity and standardization of personnel records. For example:

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(1) When sizeable transfers are made, the control of documents is centered under one administrative head who can accomplish the movement including the processing of records and drafting of special orders.

(2) Personnel reporting for each squadron is supervised by one person instead of three or four as in the case when reporting is done at squadron level.

(3) Entries on such forms as Form 20 and 24 would reflect uniformity inasmuch as a single agency is charged with maintenance of all records. At squadron level, entries would likely vary in structure subject to the interpretations of the various numbers of squadrons in operation.

(4) The system also enables a check to be made of such forms as the Morning Report from the various squadrons to insure that no duplications have been made on such items as gains and losses.

b. The system is more economical of personnel.

c. The system affords a wider range of training in personnel administration than could be secured at squadron level.

2. The most efficient organization and also the most economical of personnel would be one in which a Unit Personnel System is operated within the Service Group Headquarters charged with the responsibility of maintaining all personnel records of all personnel assigned to the station regardless of unit assignment. (This will include all personnel assigned to TO & E organizations and the personnel comprising the station complement.) Obviously, the authorization of a Service Group would not be sufficient to administer these units. Enlisted personnel from the Station Complement should be attached to the Unit Personnel Section to work on the records of station complement personnel and the personnel authorized in the Fighter or Bomb Group should be attached to the Unit Personnel Section to work on the records of personnel of their Group. Contrary to popular opinion, this would not cut down the mobility of either the Service Group or Fighter Group, because in an organization such as above proposed, if a move came about, it would only be necessary to pick up the records and leave. This would leave the station complement records intact and the duties of Personnel Officer could be taken over by the Adjutant or Assistant Adjutant of the station complement. An organization such as the above would result in a considerable saving in manpower by reducing the overhead now required in maintaining two and sometimes three unit personnel sections on a station.

3. Specific instructions and information should be issued at this headquarters regarding the integration of tactical groups, service units, and base units. The proposed plan at most stations with regard to integration is to augment the base units with personnel of the Service Group instead of augmenting the Service Group with personnel of the base unit as outlined in TAC Letter 322, dated 18 September 1946, Subject: "Reorganization and Reduction of Base Unit Structure."

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4. A standard manual guide for personnel sections is needed at the present time to encompass, in addition to the procedures outlined in AR 345-5 and other pertinent directives, the following practices found to be advisable:

a. Forms 20 and 24 should be filed in close proximity (in the same room if not adjacent).

b. A flow chart be maintained and understood by all personnel in Unit Personnel Sections, this chart to indicate the flow of information from one subsection to another to insure entries on all records.

c. The publication of Personnel Memoranda be required, such memoranda to reflect pertinent changes in status of enlisted personnel such as reclassification, duty assignment, qualification in arms, and other prescribed training.

d. Specific responsibilities affixed to specific individuals in line with good management practice.

e. Enlisted men selected for personnel work should be only those who profess an interest in this type of work.

f. Personnel Officers and supervisory NCO's should be trained in Personnel Management principles, procedures, and practices.

g. Personnel records pertaining to a particular squadron be maintained principally by personnel assigned to those squadrons in order to promote organizational pride to facilitate mobility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Unit Personnel System be retained. Further, that there be only one Unit Personnel Section on each station, this section to be operated by the Service Group.

2. A standard manual guide for personnel sections be written.

3. A vigorous on-the-job and up grade training program be prosecuted in each Unit Personnel Section.

4. The organization and operation of Unit Personnel Systems be made a Special Subject for Air Inspectors for approximately six months.

Kendall D. Wheaton

KENDALL D. WHEATON,
Captain, Air Corps
Recorder

JOE W. COMPTON,
Lt. Col. Air Corps
Chairman

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A. LANGLEY FIELD (304th AAF Base Unit)

System in operation: Unit Personnel.

Board called upon Adjutant and Executive Officer and explained purpose of visit. The Executive Officer referred the members to the S-1 officer. Discussed purpose of the visit with S-1 and other personnel in this section. The S-1 is definitely of the opinion that higher echelons (Hq TAC) are requiring reports for information which could be supplied by the statistical Control Section in this headquarters. The S-1 advocates the Unit Personnel System and gave as his reason that such a system provided for better records and was more economical of personnel. The Unit Personnel Officer appeared fairly well qualified to perform assigned duties, but an apparent lack of a regulated flow of information through the office was noticeable. An interview was held with the NCO in charge of Service Records. The soldier queried has had 29 years Army service many of which were spent in personnel work. This NCO advocated personnel system at squadron level provided trained personnel are available and if not, the Unit Personnel System. Although supervisory personnel, both officers and enlisted are seemingly well qualified, the balance of the personnel are undergoing on-the-job training and definitely are not to be considered expert in their particular jobs. The NCO stated that more accurate work would likely be produced were it not for such as the following:

(1) Apparent disinterest and "floating" (here today and gone tomorrow) attitudes.
(2) If men concerned were required to perform and accept responsibilities commensurate to their grade.

The NCO interrogated further expressed opinion that the condition today (deficiencies in reporting and general laxity of personnel involved in preparation of same) was existent also at the close of World War I, but that this condition is considerably worse after World War II, due principally to the surplus of officer personnel existing today. This NCO's recommendation for alleviation of the general breakdown in our reporting system were:

(1) Select EM who are interested in and prefer personnel work for this type of duty.
(2) Affix definite responsibilities commensurate to grades held and reduce if not achieved.
(3) Intensify training for all personnel engaged in personnel duties.

Some specific findings as to method of operation were:

(a) Morning report. Prepared in the squadron, goes to Statistical Control to Unit Personnel to Morning Report section to Payroll section to the files. It was noticed, however, that the Morning Reports did not include data pertaining to reclassification. (See also remark under "Personnel Memoranda" below).

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(b) WD AGO Forms 20. Not filed in close proximity to WD AGO Form 24. No periodic comparison of Forms 20 and [illegible] insure that entries agree.

(c) WD AGO Forms 24. EM in section do not have a fixed responsibility for a given number of records. 1369 records are being maintained by four EM and one NCO. No colored or hospital squadron personnel are utilized to maintain the records pertaining to their own squadrons. All EM maintain all records.

(d) Personnel Memoranda. No personnel memoranda being published for purpose of listing official reclassifications, etc, which information is vital to all sections in Unit Personnel. Such information should be simultaneously transcribed on all pertinent records.

Personnel Sergeant Major, when queried, expressed favor for the Unit Personnel System. He stated that in his opinion the placement of all personnel records at squadron level would result in several different interpretations of applicable personnel directives by various commanding officers and would result in non-conformity of records pertaining to all personnel.
The Classification Officer, when interviewed, stated that the training of men in his section was poor and that very close supervision was required.

B. LAKE CHARLES ARMY AIR BASE
(307th AAF Base Unit)

Reported to Adjutant upon arrival. Adjutant referred members to Base S-1 and requested that the board report findings to him upon completion of visit. The principal remark obtained by the Base S-1 relative to the reporting problem was that personnel are arriving at the station with EDCMR's often specified in the Special Orders on or about the last day of the month. He recommended that a directive be promulgated which would require that EDCMR's on all Special Orders be made not later than three days before the end of a month so that all personnel assigned the station could readily be accounted for on the month end AAF 127 report. He expressed the opinion that the EDCMR was devised for record keeping purposes only, arrived at arbitrarily, and had no bearing on actualities. The Unit Personnel Officer reported that when men come into the base and are to be assigned to some other unit on the field, that they are picked up and assigned to the Base Unit and later transferred on Special Orders issued by the base to the Unit concerned. Such practice might possibly result in one EM being picked up by two separate organizations and is considered unnecessary. The Unit Personnel Officer had available for use by any and all concerned a policy file, outlining all adopted procedures pertaining to personnel action. Each individual in the office, it was noted, had clearly defined responsibilities. Written duty descriptions were in the hands of each individual. A roll call is held for base unit personnel each morning at 0745. It was noted that the Personal Affairs Office was also located with the Unit Personnel Office, which feature gives the Personal Affairs Officer immediate access to Service Records and other pertinent records required. Service Records were filed in alphabetical order and Pay

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Data cards were used in making up payrolls. The 1st Sergeants of Squadrons A and F are well trained and are actively engaged in the preparation of the Morning Report. The Unit Personnel and Classification Sections were established as separate activities inasmuch as neither officer was familiar with the responsibilities of both. The classification officer is being separated from the service within the near future and an on-the-job trainee officer is presently assigned although he has recently graduated from the AG school, no practical experience has been had by the understudy. With reference to the transfer of personnel, it was noted that the Classification Officer was preparing a draft of the Special Order instead of giving the names to the Special Order Section and letting them make the draft. Classification Officer reported that because of the present work load in his section, he is forced to work approximately 16 hours per day and on Saturdays and Sundays in order to accomplish assigned duties. The Classification Officer remarked that the command channels are so cumbersome that he has too little time for proper consideration and action on the new and special reports required of him. He further advised that although he has several recent graduates of Classification School, they are not well qualified in the performance of assigned duties. It was also noted that this station is receiving from Headquarters 9th Air Force for information and compliance certain teletypes originating at Headquarters 4th Army. These teletypes are all in reference to separation matters, and the base is confused as to whether to comply or not. The concensus of opinion within the Base S-1 was that the Unit Personnel System was definitely the most desirable.

C. LAKE CHARLES ARMY AIR BASE
(544th Service Group)

Reported in to the Group Executive and explained the mission of the board, and were then shown the Unit Personnel Office to observe the functioning of the unit. The Personnel Staff Officer was seemingly well qualified and had his organization set up and operating quite efficiently. This particular group advocates the maintenance of personnel records at squadron level for the following reasons:

(1) Easier access to the personnel records by squadron Commanding Officers.
(2) Preservation of unit integrity.
(3) Time saving factor. Personnel report to squadron headquarters rather than making a trip to the Unit Personnel Office.
(4) Organization pride would be enhanced.

It was noted that personnel records of the group were at one time maintained at squadron level but were moved to group headquarters due to an inspection by AAF inspection personnel. The records at group headquarters are maintained by personnel of the different squadrons, each individual working on

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records pertaining to his own squadron. Personnel engaged in maintenance of records at this headquarters appear to be exceptionally well qualified. In this connection it was also observed that the morale in this unit was superior to any other base or unit accountered, due principally, it is felt, to the definite affixation of responsibilities to individuals and not to a collective group of personnel. With the exception of one squadron, all morning reports are personally prepared by squadron 1st Sergeants. The Squadron Commander of Headquarters Squadron was strongly in favor of having the personnel records maintained within his squadron, but was aware of the fact that a change to the applicable TO&E would first have to be effected.

D. LAKE CHARLES ARMY AIR BASE
(47th Bomb Group (L)

Reported in to the Adjutant and were later referred to the Executive and Personnel Officers. At this group it was observed that a Unit Personnel Office was in operation and the personnel were very much in favor of this system. This opinion was based on the fact the 98 EM in each of the four squadrons amounts to such a few personnel, comparatively speaking, that the records administration could easily be undertaken at group level. This system was also believed to result in the more efficient utilization of manpower and economy of personnel. It was noted at this group, that, in spite of no authorization for a Personnel Officer, a 1st Lieutenant had been appointed. The Personal Affairs function pertaining to group personnel was also being performed in the group headquarters. The Forms 20 and 24 were filed in close proximity (same room). With reference to the EDCMR question which was brought up considerably at all bases, it was observed that the adjutant of this unit had met the problem of end of the month EDCMR's by requesting the base not to assign any personnel to the group on the last few days of the month, thereby throwing a heavier reporting responsibility on the base unit. Organization structure within this unit appeared to be exceptionally good and the experience level of the enlisted personnel superior. The EM in the Unit Personnel Section have been working together for approximately one year.

E. BIGGS FIELD (305th AAF Base Unit)

Reported in to the Base Commander and the Executive Officer and explained the purpose of the visit. Both officers were seemingly in favor of the Unit Personnel System. The principal problem at the moment at this station was the directive of this headquarters TAC 322, dated 18 September 1946, Subject: Reorganization and Reduction of Base Unit Structure, requiring integration and transfer of base unit personnel to Tactical organizations at the station. Inasmuch as this problem is so closely associated with the operation of a unit personnel system, it was quite widely discussed. The plans in preparation at this station, insofar as the above indicated directives was concerned, was to augment the base staff with personnel from the Service Group, rather than augmentation of the Service Group with base unit personnel as is the spirit of the letter. This plan, when implemented, called for a base unit strength of 416 Civilian, 238 EM, and 38 officers. Their reasoning for this amount of personnel, seemingly ex-

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cessive, was to retain sufficient number of personnel at the station upon loss of the Service and Tactical organizations presently assigned. It was stated by the Base Commander that the biggest problem encountered in attempting compliance with the integration directive was contained within S-4. He further indicated that if some of the present supply functions chargeable to the base could be withdrawn, a considerable less number of personnel would be required to man the station complement. This station was apprently confused as to what degree of integration was desired, assuming that too complete an integration would jeopardize the required mobility of the tactical units. Upon completion of the discussion, the board was referred to the Unit Personnel Officer. The organization of this unit was discussed with the officer and various other people within the office. It was observed that no specific EM were assigned a particular number of records for maintenance and, in general, organization of this office was not considered to be in conformance with good management practices. The Morning Report section was placed in a separate part of the building in the same office as the Statistical Control Section. Although the Morning Reports were well prepared and checked, it is believed that operation of this section in closer proximity to the Unit Personnel would lend for greater efficiency. A casual observation revealed that discrepancies between Forms 20 and 24 were existent and apparently no periodic check of the two records was scheduled to alleviate such a condition. No personnel memoranda are being published by the office for the purpose of announcing reclassifications and other important changes which would affect all personnel records, instead, Special Orders were used. During course of the discussion with the Unit Personnel Officer it was observed that an enlisted man called at the Unit Personnel Office to determine information relative to obtaining an emergency leave. The officer exhibited a belligerent attitude towards the soldier and apparently was not familiar enough with his required duties to answer intelligently the questions earnestly advanced by the soldier. Such a demonstration more or less indicated to the board that possibly the best type of officer for this type of work had not been assigned to the office. The Forms 20 and 24 are not filed in the same room but in separate offices, which in the opinion of the board, is not consistent with good record keeping practices, particularly so at this station inasmuch as no instrument is published itemizing the various entries which would be required simultaneously on both records. This station also expressed disfavor of Special Orders being received from other stations and commands with the EDCMR being set on or about the last day of the month. Some stations have the erroneous conception that EDCMR is synonymus with the reporting date thereby not allowing sufficient time for receipt of Special Orders prior to EDCMR. The Pay Data Card System is in operation at this station. The Unit Personnel officer expressed the wish that AAF Form 127 would provide for some indication of EM and Officer duty status in order that personnel on DS and TDY could be shown as such rather than being shown opposite their authorization. All Morning Reports submitted by all units at this station are checked by the Morning Report section to insure that not more than one organization has picked up a particular individual.

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F. BIGGS FIELD (309th AAF Base Unit Hq 9th Air Force)

A Unit Personnel System is in operation at this unit for the purpose of maintaining records of personnel assigned to Headquarters 9th Air Force only. While the section is headed by a seemingly competent officer, no efficient operating organization was noticeable. The Unit Personnel Officer when queried, favored a Unit Personnel System in preference to record maintenance at squadron level. Records were maintained by this office for 273 EM and 207 Officers. The number of personnel assigned to this office appeared quite excessive in view of the comparatively small number of records being maintained. It was observed that personnel employed were not being fully utilized. Several personnel appeared to be doing little or nothing during the course of the visit. Inquiries were made as to what might possibly be causing errors in reports submitted to higher headquarters. One reason advanced was that several officers assigned to the unit had been placed on DS for more than 30 days and records had accompanied them. Inasmuch as no duplicate records nor information cards containing pertinent data had been retained in the Unit Personnel Office, incomplete reporting data resulted. A recent directive makes it mandatory that a file card be maintained in the personnel office when personnel are placeden DS for more than thirty days. Personnel Memoranda covering reclassifications and other important changes of status are not being published by this unit. Another reason advanced by the officer for reporting errors was that Special Orders being received at the unit contained insufficient information which all accounted for incomplete reporting data. The officer was strongly in favor of combining Forms 20 and Forms 24 into one instrument. His reason for this was to decrease margin for errors and eliminate duplication of certain information contained on both records. The officer also expressed the opinion that responsibilities should definitely be assigned to personnel commensurate to their grades and that if the desired efficiency and work output was not achieved, reduction of personnel concerned should be made without delay.

G. BIGGS FIELD (471st Service Group)

This organization is attached for operation and administration to the 20th Fighter Group on orders issued by Headquarters 9th Air Force citing a TWX form Headquarters TAC (TWX A3D 1665, dated 18 July 1946). This would imply that the Fighter Group is charged with administering the personnel records of the personnel assigned the service group and which, in the opinion of the board, is contrary to the missions of these units. The Unit Personnel Officer stated that Forms 24 and payrolls were maintained at squadron level and that Forms 20 were maintained at the Unit Personnel Office. The officer was very much in favor of the squadron system of record maintenance. The board was quite surprised to find a squadron system of record maintenance in operation particularly since such a system is in conflict with the Provisions of AR 345-5. This was explained however, by the personnel officer, who stated that such a system was sanctioned by a meeting at Headquarters TAC on 10 July 1946, at which time verbal approval of General

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Quesada was allegedly given for operation of such a system. A Master Sergeant was the only person qualified to act on reclassifications and was, in fact, the only person to act favorably or otherwise on the awarding of additional MOS's or reclassifications. This Sergeant entered pertinent data on Forms 20 immediately upon completion of action without waiting for the promulgation of any instrument authenticating the action. This group was undergoing or in the process of a change of station and the board was consequently unable to examine in detail the workings of the personnel office or the personnel system in operation at squadron level. It was noticed that very few trained personnel are assigned to this organization for administration of personnel records. It is logical to assume that from such an organization errors are likely to occur.

H. BIGGS FIELD (20th Fighter Group)

The Unit Personnel Officer from the 471st Service Group accompanied the board to the above organization (in the same building) and introduced the board to the Personnel Officer. Here it was observed that a similar system was in operation and that records of this group were also being maintained at squadron level, with the exception, as in the case of the service group, of the Forms 20. Here also a state of confusion was encountered. All records were in the process of being packed for shipment and a general disorganization was found. This personnel officer was in favor of a Unit Personnel Office within the Service Group with the Service Group administering all records both of the Service Group and the Fighter Group personnel. In a conversation with the Sergeant Major, he expressed dissatisfaction with his assignment which might possibly be indicative that a harmonious personnel system had not been established. This soldier had also initiated several letters requesting his transfer. These two groups, in the opinion of the board, can be singled out as being the poorest examples of an efficiently operating personnel system of any encountered.

I. MARCH FIELD (Headquarters 12th Air Force)

Reported to the Adjutant General and then were directed to the A-1 who accompanied the board to the office of the Commanding General. The purpose of the visit was explained to the Commanding General who asked whether the mission of the board was not tied in with the integration of units. He was advised that the primary mission was not in reference to integration but that it was so closely tied in that it could not be ignored. The Commanding General requested that a report of the findings of the board be made known to him before departure. Returned to the office of the A-1 and discussed with the officers of that section the proposed plan that had been prepared in that office relative to the integration of units. The written plan was not seen by the board inasmuch as it was not in final prepared status, but the general idea behind the plan was that the fighter group operate independently of the Service Group with the Service Group maintaining records of personnel of their group and also personnel of the base unit or station complement.

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Upon completion of visits to all units on March Field and upon completion of discussion with the A-1, the board returned to the office of the Commanding General as requested, to report findings. Due to the absence of the Commanding General, the board was referred to the Deputy Commanding General who discussed various problems, both as pertains to personnel systems and to plans for integration. The conference with the Deputy Commanding General lasted approximately two hours. He had some specific ideas relative to the personnel system and highly favored the maintenance of records at the squadron level. He reasoned that the peace time mission of the Army was principally the training of officers and enlisted personnel and emphasized that the placement of all records in the squadron would contribute greatly toward that training. He further pointed out that all administration in our peace time Army, in his estimation, should be continually downward to the lowest echelon.

J. MARCH FIELD (321st AAF Base Unit)

Reported to the Base Executive and explained the purpose of the visit, and were referred to S-1 office. The Base S-1 was at the time sick in quarters and board discussed purpose of visit with the deputy. The deputy encountered was a civilian (an unusual situation) but apparently was a very well qualified personnel officer having a seemingly excellent knowledge of the workings of a personnel office. He expressed a preference for the Unit Personnel System. After a general discussion, the board was referred to the Unit Personnel Office for actual observation of the operation of this office. Here was encountered, in the opinion of the board, the most efficiently operating personnel office of any visited. This was largely due to the capabilities and experience of the officer in charge, who was an officer of some 27 years Army experience, most of which had been spent in personnel work. This officer expressed definite favor of the Unit Personnel System and also indicated that a Service Group could quite easily maintain the records of all personnel, both base unit and tactical, assigned to the station without impairing in the slightest the desired mobility of the Tactical units assigned. The organizational structure of this office was believed to be exceptionally good. All responsibilities were specifically assigned to individuals with each member of the office having written defined duties clearly outlined. This officer had read the directive issued by this headquarters relative to integration, and was confident that such an integration could readily be accomplished. He had worked with the Manpower Section in devising a plan whereby the desired centralized personnel office could be established. This officer undoubtedly had the most intelligent approach to the referred to directive than any other officers queried. The Classification Office was placed in a separate building from the Unit Personnel Office. The officer in charge, however, stated that he had attempted to get the two offices placed together and he felt they should be placed together in the interests of efficient operation. As an argument in favor of this placement, he pointed out that on a large shipment

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of personnel, one agency only would be required to out-process the personnel. This would be equally true in the case of incoming personnel, and for filling school quotas. He also pointed out that under a unit system including classification, a single interpretation of directives would be obtained. The Classification Officer expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that records pertaining to incoming personnel are frequently mailed rather than entrusted to the ranking NCO or to the individual. In the Classification office two card files are maintained, one file utilized for locator purposes and the other for use in the preparation of AAF Form 127 Report and the Classification and Audit List. The latter file is operated on a punched card system which speeds up screening and sorting and is considered to be very helpful in personnel accounting.

K. MARCH FIELD (361st Service Group)

Reported to the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer, explained the purpose of the visit and were referred to the Unit Personnel Officer. This was the only Service Group visited which was maintaining the personnel records of the parent Fighter Group. The Group Executive was very much in favor of a personnel system such as was employed in England during the war in which the Service Group kept all records of all personnel assigned to a station. This officer also outlined the proposed plan of operation in compliance with letter directive relative to integration. The proposed plan was that the Service Group would be integrated with personnel of the base headquarters, and the fighter group so organized as to maintain their own records. An interesting observation made at this headquarters was that approximately 90 personnel (principally mechanics) had been detailed from the Service Group to the Fighter Group. This was done for the purpose of permitting the Fighter Group to perform their own second echelon maintenance. This system was believed by the Commanding Officer of the Fighter Group to be more advantageous, due to the fact that the coming maneuvers did not include use of the Service Group. This move raises a question, however, as to whether such an action is correct, i.e., assignment of personnel from an authorized Service Group to a Fighter Group in an attached unassigned status.

L. MARCH FIELD (1st Fighter Group)

Reported to the Group Commander and explained the purpose of the visit. This officer was highly in favor of all records being kept at squadron level for the following reasons:

1. Preserves the unit integrity.
2. Promotes esprit de corps.
3. Provides for training of squadron commanders and other personnel in personnel work at squadron level.
4. Provides closer association of the squadron commander to the enlisted men assigned to this squadron.
5. All administration should be performed at the lowest possible echelon.

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The views of this officer were that all personnel engaged in administrative work should be trained and rotated for the purpose of training them in all phases of squadron administration and ultimately qualifying them for filling duties with greater responsibilities. The group commander was firmly of the opinion that the peace time mission of the Army as a whole was training, and that such training should be emphasized and accomplished even if it meant a certain sacrifice in economy. With reference to the directive on integration, the group commander stated that its present form did not exact strict compliance insofar as organizing a station complement was concerned. He suggested that the present base structure could be made to assimilate a station complement only if the directive were supplemented with a specific set of instructions as to relationship of units, designation of base commanders, responsibilities of all units, etc.

M. MARCH FIELD (312th AAF Base Unit)

This unit was organized along the lines of a headquarters squadron. Two men were engaged in maintaining the Service Records and Payrolls of the headquarters enlisted men. All Forms 20 were on file and maintained in the A-1 section of Headquarters 12th Air Force. Not more than a total of eight personnel were employed in the office in contrast to much greater numbers employed in the base unit of Headquarters 9th Air Force. No daily roll call is held for this unit but a roster was posted in the Orderly Room and was signed daily by all enlisted personnel assigned to the headquarters. This office was visibly operating on a minimum number of personnel and apparently operating quite efficiently.

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C O P Y

/HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE/ AE
(Troop Carrier)

AF3AF 300.6 (6 Aug 46) 6 August 1946

SUBJECT: Directive for Aircraft Maintenance

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. At the present time there is in effect in the Third Air Force a Maintenance Directive AFTCC Memorandum 65-72 which is considered impractical for peace-time operation, therefore, must either be rewritten or rescinded.

2. Information is requested as to whether Headquarters Tactical Air Command proposes to publish maintenance instructions for the entire Command, or whether the publishing of such instructions will be delegated to subordinate commands. (reference paragraph 3 AAF Regulation 65-73)

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/t/ W. L. BAXTER
Major, AGD
Asst. Adjutant General

TAC 461 (6 Aug 46) Hq 3AF 1st Ind. A4B

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia 13 Aug 46

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina.

TAC Reg 65-1 entitled "Supply & Maintenance of TAC Units" was published 7 August 1946 for your information and compliance.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ WINSTON M. HAYES
1st. Lt. Air Corps
Asst Adj. Gen.

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C O P Y

38

13 May 46 General Doyle
1415 General Lee

1. General Doyle reported that instructions on the activation of the Twelfth Air Force were leaving Headquarters, AAF, today, directing the activation of the Twelfth Air Force within twenty (20) days of date of the letter. The letter is dated 10 May.

2. General Doyle reported that he learned that a decision had been made that no tactical units were to be assigned to the Air University. I asked General Doyle when this decision had been made and he stated that General Quesada was in Washington yesterday on that very subject. He stated that he did not learn of it until today and it was his impression that the decision was made today. I asked him if he heard of any decision on the assignment of Tyndall Field. He stated that he had no information on a decision, but he understood that Tyndall would go to Tactical Air Command. I asked him to see if he could find out anything definite on this as we have just completed drawing up an agreement on the transfer of the field to the Air University which should be effective 15 May. Furthermore, we have a squadron doing gunnery training at Tyndall and our present directive from the Commanding General is to stop gunnery and return them to Brooks Field in the 15th if no change is made in the reassignment of the field. General Doyle stated that he would see what he could find out and call me back this afternoon.

3. I asked General Doyle if he had seen General Quesada. He said that he had not although he had been in his office all morning. I told him we had the information on the amphibious excercise on the west coast brought back by Colonel Taylor. I asked him if he would be prepared to go out there within the next few days and pick up a couple of officers from March Field who, I am sure, would be qualified, and contact Stillwell's Headquarters with a view to planning Tactical Air Forces operations in this exercise. He stated that he would. I told him that General Quesada intended to make the initial contact with Stillwell's Headquarters on his present trip, and we would notify him when then he is to proceed out there. General Doyle

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Conv between Gen Doyle and Gen Lee, 13 May (1415) cont'd

stated that he would like to have an A-26 to make the trip in. He would like to have it sent up to Bolling Field with a crew, and he will use the trip for check out. I told him I would do this. General Doyle made a request for Nichols and Lyle when and if he is transferred to the Twelfth Air Forces.

4.

General Doyle called back in about five (5) minutes and stated that this command would not get Tyndall Field. He said that the Ground Forces were very anxious that the GLO School function even though we do not have a control group operating and the students do not get practical training with a control group. They are extremely short of GLO's and would like to have some training going on even though it is theoretical and the practical training consists only of visits to fighter and light bomb groups. He requested that I look into this and let him know what I can do.

R. M. L.
C/S

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C O P Y

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(G.O. 26)

GENERAL ORDERS)
NO 26)

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida, 20 May 1946

TRANSFER OF STATION

1. Transfer of command jurisdiction Tyndall Field, Panama City, Florida, with attendant facilities to Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama, is hereby announced effective 2359, 15 May 1946.

2. Authority: AAF letter, dated 3 May 1946, subject: "Transfer of Tyndall Field, Florida to Air University."

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ ROBERT M. LEE
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Henry W. Spiller
/t/ HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant General

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(G.O. 25)

GENERAL ORDERS)
NO 25)

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida, 17 May 1946

SECTION
ACTICATION OF UNIT---------- I
DESIGNATION OF AAF BASE UNIT---------- II
REASSIGNMENT OF UNITS----- ----------III
REASSIGNMENT OF STATIONS ---------- IV

SECTION I

ACTIVATION OF UNIT

1. Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, having been assigned to this command, is activated with station at March Field, California, effective date of this general order.

2. Personnel will be furnished from bulk allotment of personnel of the 312th AAF Base Unit (Headquarters Twelfth Air Force).

3. Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 20-1, as amended.

4. Authority: Letter AG 322 (1 May 46) AO-I-AFCOR-(33(o))-M, dated 10 May 1946, subject: "Activation of the Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force."

SECTION II

DESIGNATION OF AAF BASE UNIT

1. The 312th AAF Base Unit (Headquarters Twelfth Air Force) is designated effective date of this general order with station at March Field, California, and is assigned to the Twelfth Air Force.

2. Squadrons, sections, and flights will be authorized by the Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force in accordance with TAC Regulation 20-5.

3. Authority: AAF Regulation 20-52.

SECTION III

REASSIGNMENT OF UNITS

The following units are relieved from assignment to March Field and are reassigned to Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, March Field, Riverside, California, effective date of this general order, without change of station:

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UNITS

321st AAF Base Unit (Base Sv)
Hq 412th Fighter Group
  29th Fighter Sq, Jet Propelled
  31st Fighter Sq, Jet Propelled
  445th Fighter Sq, Jet Propelled
39th Tactical Reconnaissance Sq
579th Army Air Forces Band
Hq & Base Services Squadron, 361st Air Service Group
  615th Air Engr Sq
  624th Air Mat Sq
862d Chemical Company, AO

SECTION IV

REASSIGNMENT OF STATIONS

The following station and auxiliaries are further assigned to Headquarters Twelfth Air Force effective date of this general order:

March Field, Riverside, California
Blythe Army Air Field (Auxiliary of March)
Santa Maria Army Air Field (Auxiliary of March)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ ROBERT M. LEE
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Henry W. Spiller
HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General

A3B

Tampa, Florida

TAC 322 (7 May 46)

7 May 1946

SUBJECT: Proposed Plan for Third Air Force (Troop Carrier).

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Major R. V. Whitlow, Operations Division,
Office Assistant Chief of Air Staff-3.

1. Forwarded herewith is a proposed plan for Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) under title "A Brief Synopsis of Third Air Force."

2. On 16 April 1946 Major General Quesada visited your Headquarters to submit the general plan for Tactical Air Command. It was intended that the inclosed document be left in your office along with other parts of the general plan, but it was inadvertently returned to this Headquarters. The other parts of the plan were studied by your staff and returned with comments indicating approval or disapproval and changes necessary to comply with Army Air Force policies. The comments of your Headquarters are greatly appreciated and serve to guide this command during this period of organization. It is requested that the plan for Third Air Force be reviewed for the same reasons.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Stamped C. A. STANFIEL
Major, AGD
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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BASIC: Ltr. frm. TAC, Subj: Proposed Plan for Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) dated 7 May 1946.

1st Ind. AFCOP-T

Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C. 6 August 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.
Attention: Col. Stillman, Office of A-3.

1. The proposed plan for the Third Air Force has been carefully reviewed by the concerned agencies of the Air Staff and the following comments are offered:

a. The mission of the Third Air Force should be confined to two (2) sub-divisions.

(1) In a tactical role, Troop Carrier units must be prepared to deliver assault forces and equipment (airborne forces) by parachite, glider assault transport or any other means available.

(2) In a strategic role, Troop Carrier units must be prepared to deliver troops and combat equipment by tactical troop carrier aircraft in air landing operations.

b. No portion of the Troop Carrier mission should encoach upon the functions and mission of the Air Transport Command. The mission of the Air Transport Command includes the provision for air transport services between the United States and the overseas commands, and between the overseas theaters. The Air Transport Command is directly responsible for all air transport service except within the theaters; intra-theater air lift is accomplished by direction of the theater commander. At present, in all theaters, this function has been selegated to to Troop Carrier forces.

c. Existing civilian air transport resources cannot be concerted to tactical use in was time except upon very limited scale. The modified DC-3 was used as a step-gap aircraft by the Troop Carrier during the war but not as satisfactory airplane because if its limited load, difficulty in loading and inability to transport many combat weapons and vehicles necessary in operations.

d. No attempt has been made to evalute all the cited stand-by fields

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with respect to operational suitability. If it is intended that these fields are used to other light, single-engined aircraft, it is desired that a thorough field survey of all these installations be made by qualified AAF Engineer personnel of Tactical Air Command. The light type of construction used for strips or the total lack on any of the auxiliary fields of Blytheville Army Air Field or Maulden Army Air Field and its listed auxiliaries would be extremely dangerous for operations of C-46 or heavier aircraft.

e. It is planned to organize the Troop Carrier functions under the integrated T/O&E's. Specifically, four (4) Troop Carrier Group Headquarters will be organized under T/O&E 1-312R (reduced) at a strength of twenty (20) Officers, one (1) Warrant Officer and thirty-nine (39) Enlisted men for an aggregate strength of sixty (60). Six (6) of the Troop Carrier squadrons will be organized under T/O&E 1-317R (reduced), including glider echelons, at a strength of seventy-six (76) Officers, one hundred forty-seven (147) Enlisted men for an aggregate strength of two hundred twenty-three (223). The remaining four (4) squadrons will be organized under T/O&E 1-317R (reduced). with no glider echelons, at a strength of forty-four (44) Officers, one hundred nineteen (119) Enlisted men for an aggregate strength of one hundred sixty-three (163). The Headquarters Air Service Group and Base Service squadrons accompanying the above Troop Carrier forces will be organized under T/O&E 1-452R (column 5 reduced) at a strength of twenty-five (25) Officers, one (1) Warrant Officer and two hundred ten (210) Enlisted men for an aggregate strength of two hundred thirty-six (236) the Air Engineering squadrons will be organized under T/O&E 1-457R (column 11 reduced at a strength of fourteen (14) Officers, one (1) Warrant Officer and three hundred twenty -five (325) Enlisted men for an aggregate strength of three hundred forty (340); the Air Material squadrons will be organized under T/O&E 1-458R (column 10 reduced) at a strength of seven (7) Officers one (1) Warrant Officer and one hundred twenty-seven (127) Enlisted men for an aggregate strength of one hundred thirty-five (135). All of the above tables have been reduced approximately 20%. No Air Cargo Re-supply squadrons or Aviation squadrons are contemplated in the December 31, 1946 or the June 30, 1947 Troop Basis for the Third Air Force.

f. The present contracts with Boeing Aircraft Corporation calls for only thirteen (13) C-97 aircraft. Four (4) of these will be assigned to the Air Materiel Command; two (2) will be assigned to the First Transport Flight (formerly the 320th Troop Carrier Squadron) which is assigned to the 58th Wing of the Strategic Air Command; the Air Transport Command will receive the remainder. No information is presently available on future contracts for C-97 aircraft; however, the possibility of assignment of these aircraft to the Third Air Force in the immediate future is slight.

2. It is desired that the proposed plan for the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) be reviewed and re-submitted, incorporating the information contained in Para 1 above. In addition, it is desires to emphasize taht it is not possible for the Troop Carrier units now overseas to be returned to the United States for training; and since these units are using the Troop Basis spaces alloted for

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Troop Carrier functions, additional personnel cannot be allocated to the Third Air Force within the Continental United States for training. The small size of the Third Air Force during the Interim period (only 10 Squadrons) cannot support the recommendations that two (2) Wing Headquarters be authorized. If it is desired within the present bulk allotment of the Tactical Air Command to authorize to the Third Air Force Troop Carrier Wings, this headquarters will authorize these units at zero strength to be manned without increase in over-all bulk allotment allotted to the Tactical Air Command.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ REUBEN C. HOOD, JR.
Stamped REUBEN C. HOOD, JR.
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

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31 July 1946

TAC 322 (31 Jul 46)

Lt. General Ira C. Eaker
Deputy Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Eaker:

I have carefully considered the staff study inclosed with your letter, subject: "Troop Carrier Wings", 21 July 1946. In fact I and my staff have studied the merits of retaining wings in the Third Air Force since that command came to us in March.

I would like to point out that the 30 June forecast for command structures of troop carrier functions within the continental United States was established before the present Third Air Force became a part of this command. Also the proposed 31 December 1946 command structure of the Third Air Force was made without reference to this headquarters. The latest information available here (3 July 1946 Forecast of Interim Air Force Units) indicates that there will be only one (1) Troop Carrier Wing on 31 December 1946, rather than two (2) indicated in Paragraph 2b of the inclosure. Orders have been issued for the inactivation on 1 August 1946 of one of two wing headquarters which now exists.

I agree thoroughly with the suggestion that one troop carrier wing is extravagant and unnecessary, assuming that the present structure of Tactical Air Command and the Third Air Force in particular, is to remain unchanged. There would be no objection on our part to the inactivation of the one wing that will remain with us after 1 August. However, before doing so I would like for you to give consideration to a plan that we are to present along with the briefing that is now being prepared. This plan provides for further reduction and the retention of only two Air Forces within the structure of the Tactical Air Command, each of which would be "tactical" and would have the disadvantage of eliminating an Air Force confining itself solely to troop carrier activities. I consider this to be a great disadvantage. The subject is so involved and has created so much doubt in my mind, in respect to advantages and disadvantages, to form no definite opinion. The savings attained may not justify the certain loss of interest and impetus to the essential troop carrier program.

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Should you look with favor on the suggestion that we are going to make which embodies reduction of this Command from three Air Forces to two Air Forces, there may be some wisdom in retaining a troop carrier wing which would in part provide a stimulant to troop carrier activities which would be lost in eliminating a troop carrier Air Force. Our conviction on this point are equally unfirm.

Considerable of our effort of late has been directed towards economy and you can be sure we support your own efforts in that direction. However, in this particular case I suggest that you wait until we have given our presentation to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, before the final decision is made to inactivate the one remaining wing.

Sincerely yours,

E. E. QUESADA
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Incl:
Memo for CAS fr
AC/AS-3 dtd 11 Jul 46

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(GO 67)

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 67

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia, 14 August 1946

SECTION
ASSIGNMENT OF UNIT ---------- I
INACTIVATION OF UNITS ---------- II

SECTION I

ASSIGNMENT OF UNIT

1. The assignment of the 62d Troop Carrier Squadron to Tactical Air Command, effective 25 July 1946, is announced.

2. Concurrently with this assignment, subject unit is further assigned to Headquarters Third Air Force, Greenville, South Caroline. Authority: Letter, AG 322 (22 Jul 46) AC-I-AFCOR (176(e)-M, dated 25 July 1946, subject: "Assignment of Headquarters, 314th Troop Carrier Group, and certain other Army Air Forces Units."

SECTION II

INACTIVATION OF UNITS

1. The following units will be inactivated by the Commanding General Third Air Force, not later than 29 August 1946:

Hq & Hq Sqdn, 52d Troop Carrier Wing
62nd Troop Carrier Squadron

Authority: Letter, AG 322 (6 Aug 46) AO-I-AFCOR (205)-M, dated 9 August 1946, subject: "Inactivation of the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 52d Troop Carrier Wing and 62d Troop Carrier Squadron."

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ EDGAR M. SCATTERGOOD, JR.
Colonel, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Philip Doddridge
/t/ PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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TWX 10 Sept 46

HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND LANGLEY FIELD VA UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

COMMANDING GENERAL
ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON DC

ATTN: MAJOR GENERAL FRED L. ANDERSON

TACOG 520 PD IN COMPLIANCE WITH LTR HQ AAF 21 AUG 1946 THIS HQ RECOMMENDS THE FOLLOWING COLON

ONE PD REDUCING FROM THREE AIR FORCES TO TWO CMA EACH AIR FORCE CONTAINING TROOP CARRIER ACTIVITIES PD

TWO PD REFRAIN FROM ACTIVATING THE THREE NINETY FIRST SERVICE GROUP WHICH IS PROVIDED TO SERVICE LIAISON SQUADRONS AND IS CONSIDERED BY THIS HQ TO BE UNNECESSARY AS ALL LIAISON SQUADRONS WILL BE SO LOCATED AS TO OBTAIN NECESSARY SERVICE FROM OTHER SERVICE GROUPS PD

THREE PD REFRAIN FROM ACTIVATING FOUR SEVENTY SECOND SERVICE GROUP WHICH IS ORGANIZED TO PROVIDE SERVICE FOR TOW TARGET SQUADRONS PD

FOUR PD THE INACTIVATION OF FIFTEENTH COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CMA COMMAND CMA WHICH IS CONSIDERED NONESSENTIAL IN THE AVENT WE ESTABLISH TWO AIR FORCES IN PLACE OF THREE PD

FIVE PD REFRAIN FROM ACTIVATING THE FIFTY SECOND AND FIFTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING HQS AS THEY ARE NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDERED ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY PD

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WE FURTHER PROPOSE THE INACTIVATION OF THE FOLLOWING BASES OCION

LAKE CHARLES	SKIALIA
BERGSTROM	SMYRNA
DOVER	MYRTLE BEACH

ACTIVITIES NOW AT BERGSTROM WILL BE MOVED TO LAWSON FIELD GWA ACTIVITIES AT LAKE CHARLES WILL BE MOVED TO BIGGS FIELD GWA ACTIVITIES AT BIGGS FLD WILL MOVE TO SHAW FIELD AND GREENVILLE FD THIS PLAN PROVIDES TURNING BROOKS FLD OVER TO AUG AND MOVING ACTIVITIES THERE TO LANGLEY FIELD ASSUMING THAT ACS WILL MOVE FROM LANGLEY FLD AT ONCE FD THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES FOR MAXIMUM ECONOMY WITH GREATEST EFFICIENCY AND FALLS WITHIN LIMITS OF RECENT CUT FD

QUESADA HQ TACAIRCOM

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General

Tampa Florida

10 May, 1946

Memorandum for A-1.

Subject: Need for Legal Officers (JA's).

1. With reference to your note concerning the need for a legal officer at March Field, my answer is that at the present time I have no officer to send to them.

2. This request for a legal officer brings to a head the question of the increasing need for new legal officers and replacements for those going out of the service. I have need for eight to ten judge advocates either now or before the summer is over. Because of the great distance and the consequent delay in the handling of courts-martial matters this headquarters should cease to handle cases that properly belong to the Ninth Air Force. We are handling them now because there are no lawyers available to the Ninth from whom they could form a Judge Advocate Division. I have taken this matter up with the Air Judge Advocate who, apparently, is unable to supply us with the personnel. However, the Ninth Air Force, which has general court martial jurisdiction, should be exercising it instead of our having to handle the cases here at this headquarters. The Ninth will need three legal officers or Judge Advocates.

3. The Third Air Force needs one lawyer now to take the place of Maj. Alyea, being discharged; another to take the place of Lt. Anderson, too old for his grade and so being discharged soon; and another for Lt. Col. Porter if he does not receive a Regular Army commission and so is discharged.

4. When the Twelfth Air Force is activated it will need at least two officers for the Judge Advocate Division.

5. I need two more lawyers in this division here at headquarters. At the present time I am using a captain and a first lieutenant (McPhie and Sheehan, respectively) who have had absolutely no legal training, but whom I keep busy doing non-legal matters as they endeavor to become proficient in the handling of AW 104 cases and inferior court-martial cases.

6. In addition to the above I am getting a call every day or so,---two to-day, March Field and Dover Air Field--- for a legal officer for some post or Air Field. They are simply not available.

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7. It is suggested and requested that this problem be taken up directly with A-1 of the Air Forces and that (1) no more officers in the Air Forces who are lawyers be discharged until their services as lawyers are no longer needed at any station in the Air Forces; (2) effort be made to call back to active duty lawyers who have been discharged, but who are willing (and I feel sure that we could get hundreds of them if we so desired) to come back to active duty for a year. (Note: I have heard of a number of lawyers who have found it hard to get adjusted under present conditions is civil life, who now regret their having been discharged.)

8. I feel sure that if the urgency of this matter were presented to the Army Air Forces some such action as suggested above would be taken.

/s/ GUY M. KINNAN,
/t/ GUY M. KINNAN,
Colonel, JAGD.
Staff Judge Advocate.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General

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TAC 230 (3May 46)

Tampa Florida

3 May 1946

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Civilian Administration

TO: Commanding General
Third Air Force
Greenville Army Air Base
Greenville, S. C.

1. Due to the recent reorganization of the Army Air Forces and the assumption of responsibility for the overall civilian personnel program by this Command as outlined in AAF Regulation 40-12, dated 14 August 1945, and Letter Headquarters Army Air Forces, subject: "Command Responsibility for Examination and Audit of Field Civilian Personnel Administration", dated 15 April 1946, copy attached, it is the opinion of this headquarters that in order to bring about greater uniformity in the administration of civilian personnel, all matters pertaining to subject administration other than civilian personnel ceiling should be handled direct with the station. This action is deemed necessary because of the shortage of qualified staff civilian personnel officers and qualified civilian personnel technicians to staff civilian personnel divisions at the command level.

2. In accordance with provisions of AAF Regulation 40-12, dated 14 August 1945, this headquarters will maintain a complete staff of technicians for the purpose of making official semi-annual surveys of civilian personnel administration and to render technical assistance to all station in the Command upon request.

3. Your comment on the above proposed policy will be furnished this headquarters at the earliest practicable date.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ ROBERT M. LEE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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Basic Ltr, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida, 3 May 46, Files TAC 230 (3 May 46) to CG, Third Air Force, Greenville, S. C.

AF3AF230 (8 May 46) 1st Ind. AF3AFAP

HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE (Troop Carrier), Greenville, South Carolina, 8 May 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida.

1. In compliance with Paragraph 3 of basic communication concerning the responsibility of civilian personnel administration, it is recommended that this headquarters retain complete jurisdiction over administration of all civilian personnel alloted to this command as outlined in Paragraph 6, AAF Regulation 40-12 with the exception of payroll audit functions, conduction of formal inspection and that the staff of civilian personnel technicians presently employed at this headquarters be retained. There are available in this command qualified civilian personnel technicians, both eligible for separation.

2. It is further recommended that representative of the Civilian Personnel Division of this headquarters make peridic routine inspections of all installations under the jurisdiction of this headquarters. Although formal inspection reports would not be submitted to higher headquarters, it is believed that the importance of these routine examinations should not be minimized as they would assume this headquarters that delegated responsibility is being adequately executed. It is also recommended that this headquarters be advised of each informal inspection conducted by your headquarters and that a representative of the Civilian Personnel Division, this headquarters be present during each inspection to assist in the work and to obtain a detailed picture of the condition of operations at the installation being examined and that copies of formal inspections and audit reports with recommended corrective action be furnished this headquarters.

3. These recommendations are made with a view toward preserving the administrative integrity of this command. If this headquarters is relieved of the jurisdiction of personnel administration, it would be an added effort on the part of the stations to always keep this command informed of all reports, policies and changes of their status with respect to civilians, retaining jurisdiction in this headquarters would be in accordance with the normal channels of all other phases of administration.

4. Lastly, it is requested that some overall policy be announced as follows:

a. Wheras any regulation, letter, circular, etc. that requires

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Basic Ltr, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida, 3 May 1946, File: TAC 230 (3May 46) to CG, Third Air Force, Greenville, S.C.

AF3AF 23- (3May 46) 1st Ind (Cont'd) AF3AFAP

no report from the individual bases, the channels be directed from your command to bases with this headquarters being always furnished on information copy.

b. That any directive requiring a report to be made by individual bases always be submitted through this headquarters except when specifically designated as an emergency on-time report.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/t/ WILLIAM M. CROSS
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

7 June 1946

IN REPLY REFER TO:

T C 230 (7 June 46)

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration.

TO: Commanding General
Ninth Air Force
Biggs Field
El Paso, Texas

1. Due to the recent reorganization of the Army Air Forces and the assumption of responsibility for the overall civilian personnel program by this Command as outlined in AAF Regulation 40-12, dated 14 August 1945, and a Letter Headquarters Army Air Forces, subject: "Command Responsibility for Examination and Audit of Field Civilian Personnel Administration", dated 15 April 1946, it is the opinion of this headquarters that in order to bring about greater uniformity in the administration of civilian personnel, all matters pertaining to subject administration other than civilian personnel ceiling should be handled direct with the stations. This action is necessary because of the shortage of qualified staff civilian personnel officers and qualified civilian personnel technicians to staff civilian personnel divisions at the command level.

2. In accordance with provisions of AAF Regulation 40-12, dated 14 August 1945, this headquarters will maintain a complete staff of technicians for the purpose of making a complete semi-annual survey of civilian personnel administration and to render technical assistance to all stations in the Command upon request.

3. Direct your comment on policy outlined above.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

Stamped ROY MARSHALL
Capt., Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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9Al 230 (7 June 46) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Biggs Field Texas.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

This Headquarters concurs with the substance of subject letter as it is felt that, in the interest of economy and due to the cited shortage of qualified staff civilian personnel, the establishment of a Civilian Personnel Branch at this level for the purpose of handling the cited adminstrative duties would be a duplication of effort.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND AIN

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:
TAC 230 (16 Jul 46) 16 July 1946

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration.

TO: Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field
Riverside, California

1. After careful deliberation, because of the lack of competently qualified staff personnel and in the interest of economy and uniformity this headquarters has decided to assume complete responsibility for the administration of the civilian personnel program in this Command. Tactical Air Command Regulation 10-1 has been revised to include direct communication with this headquarters by all bases, this Command, on all routine matters pertaining to civilian personnel administration except personnel allotment which will continue to be handled by your headquarters. It will be noted that an option has been placed in the revised Regulation to the effect that a copy of all civilian personnel matters may be forwarded to your headquarters if you so desire. It is directed that you take immediate action to eliminate the Civilian Personnel Division in your headquarters, with the exception of one qualified Civilian Personnel Officer to act in a liaison capacity.

2. This headquarters will continue to furnish copies of important changes in policy and administration of civilian personnel so that your headquarters will be currently informed on the civilian personnel program.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

Stamped PAUL R. CERF
Capt, AGD
Asst, Adjutant General

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BASIC: Ltr, TAC, Langley Fld, Va, dtd 16 Jul 46, Subj: "Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration"

230 1st Ind 12AF-E-1

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE, March Field, California 25 July 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. Activities under the jurisdiction of this command have been advised of provisions of basic letter and directed to address all routine correspondence pertaining to civilian personnel administration, except personnel allotments, direct to Commanding General, Tactical Air Command. Information copies of all such correspondence will be forwarded to this headquarters marked for the attention of the Civilian Personnel Liaison Officer.

2. In order that this headquarters may be kept currently and completly informed on civilian personnel matters, it is requested that an information copy of all correspondence from your headquarters to civilian personnel activities under our jurisdiction be forwarded to this headquarters marked for the attention of the Civilian Personnel Liaison Officer.

3. Pending a decision from your headquarters relative to responsibility for personnel administration, this headquarters did not staff a civilian personnel division and it will not be necessary, therefore, to dissolve such a unit. In this connection no officer qualified to serve as a Civilian Personnel Liaison Officer has yet been found but it is hoped that one soon will be.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Stamped W. B. PUFFUS
Major, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

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1. Q. Clarify responsibility for civilian personnel administration in accordance with TAC letter, 16 July 1946. (AAF Regulation 40-12 requires Air Force Headquarters to maintain civilian personnel staff.)

A. This command has assumed the responsibility for the review, inspection and examination of civilian personnel administration of all bases under this command. AAF Regulation 40-12 was published and dated 14 August 1944 under war conditions and was applicable under those conditions. At the current date your command has only three active bases, namely, Greenville Army Air Base, Pope Field and Bergstrom Field, with a small detachment at Lawson Field. This command has information that AAF Regulation 40-12 is being revised. Also, it is imperative that with the drastic reduction in civilian personnel and budgetary allowances, that steps be taken to eliminate duplicate functions. Therefore, it did not appear that your command would warrant a staff office under these and impending limitations for so few bases.

2. Q. What station will be responsible for administration of civilian personnel, (under provisions of AAF Letter 40-35), at Baer Field, Fort Wayne, Indiana?

A. This command coordinated through Strategic Air Command for the transfer of administration of civilian personnel at Baer Field to Selfridge Field, Michigan, effective 25 August 1946.

3. Q. Have stations received any advice as to proper channels for submitting reports other than TAC Regulation 10-1? What instructions should be furnished by Hq. Third Air Force?

A. No other information other than normal distribution of TAC Regulation 10-1, July 1946, has been made to the bases. Your headquarters may further elabrate on that notice if it is deemed necessary.

4. a. Q. What will be duties and responsibilities of Liaison Officer, Hq. Third Air Force?

A. The duties and responsibilities of Liaison Officer would rightly include - coordination of civilian personnel matters between your headquarters and the bases, assisting the Commanding General by furnishing technical advice on civilian personnel administration, and after an inspection by Civilian Personnel Division, this headquarters, the bases are required to reply by indorsement within thirty (30) days. The Liaison Officer could advantageously make a 30 day follow-up on these inspection reports.

b. Q. Will this position be under A-1 or A-5?

A. Definate placement of this position in the organization of Third Air Force is for the decision of the Commanding General, your

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command. It is believed that it would properly be placed under A-1.

5. a. Q. Will Liaison Officer have authority to make recommendations to bases under the command jurisdiction of Third Air Force?

A. The Liaison Officer will have authority to make recommendations to bases under your command.

b. Q. Will he have authority to furnish technical advice to bases?

A. He will also have authority to furnish technical advice on civilian personnel procedure and regulations.

6. Q. Will transfer of civilian personnel from Third Air Force Bases to other TAC Bases be coordinated with Hq. Third Air Force prior to requests for such personnel.

A. Coordination on transfer of all civilian personnel between bases would involve an unnecessary volume of correspondence. However, requests for key personnel will be coordinated with your headquarters.

7. Q. Due to the fact that civilian personnel represent 28.6% of the total strength of the command, control over such personnel is considered desirable.

	Officers	Enlisted	Civilian	Total All Personnel	Civilian % of Total
Greenville	564	1412	587	2563	23%
Pope Field	320	1380	374	2074	18%
Bergstrom Field	464	1019	515	1998	26%
Sedalia AAFld	157	272	387	816	47%
Lawson Field	147	473	254	874	29%
Esler Field	11	4	127	142	89%
Blytheville AAFld	4	0	76	80	95%
Marfa AAFld	8	0	86	94	91%
Walden AAFld	7	0	99	106	93%
	1682	4560	2505	8747	28.6%

A. Commanding General is responsible and does have control over all personnel assigned to Third Air Force.

8. AAF Regulation 40-5 and 40-12 place civilian personnel administration under the jurisdiction of the Commanding Officer of the installation. When a base headquarters and command headquarters are located at same installtion, should the administration of civilian personnel be under the higher echelon?

A. Administration of civilian personnel should be under the Base Civilian Personnel Office.

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9. Q. How frequent will audits of payroll administration and inspection of the personnel program be accomplished? Only one inspection has been accomplished in Third Air Force during calender year to date, as a result of the organization. Copy of report of this inspection has not been received.

A. Inspection of payroll administration and civilian personnel procedures are planned for twice yearly. A copy of the inspection report of Bergstrom Field was furnished your headquarters 23 August 1946.

10. Q. What disposition will be made of the following civilian personnel files in the staff office in command headquarters on all currently operating stations, on deactivated stations, and on stations where administration has been transferred under the provisions of AAF Letter 40-35? 1. Payroll Audit and Survey. 2. Wage Administration, Classification (including Internal Alignment and Position Descriptions). 3. AAF Suggestion Program (number of cases are pending advice from higher headquarters). 4. Grievance Procedures. 5. Placement. 6. Training.

A. All files in your headquarters on all phases of civilian personnel administration of a current status should be retained in accordance with TM 12-259.

a. Q. What disposition will be made of current training memorandums (Third Air Force Memorandums 40-11, and 40-12, etc)?

A. Retain until inspection by this command.

b. Q. What echelon will be responsible for the preparation of maintenance course outlines and various other training material previously prepared and disseminated by Hq Third Air Force? (Bases are not equipped and staffed with sufficient personnel to prepare airplane maintenance course outlines).

A. Aircraft maintenance course outlines should be prepared by On-the-Job Training Officers and coordinated with Training Division, this headquarters.

c. Q. If TAC is going to assume this responsibility, how soon will outlines be available on the following:

(1) Supervisor Training:

A. Revised Supervisor Training Course Outlines approved by AAF, were forwarded to all bases 10 September 1946.

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(2) On-The-Job and Up-Grade Training:

A. No on-the-job training outlines have been prepared by this headquarters. War Department C.F.F. 23 A & B are latest publication received by this headquarters.

(3) Apprenticeship Training Program:

A. Apprenticeship training program, in accordance with AAF Letter 40-88, 7 December 1945, must be submitted through channels to Headquarters AAF for approval prior to initiating such a program.

(4) How will Apprenticeship Training Program be conducted?

A. Any apprenticeship training program must be conducted as approved by Headquarters AAF.

d. Q. Is Mr. Gunnoe still available for transfer to Greenville?

A. This headquarters informed Captain Price about 10 June that Mr. Gunnoe was available for transfer to Greenville AAB from Tyndall Field, Panama City Florida.

e. Q. Are any other qualified training coordinators available?

A. No training coordinator is presently available in this command for transfer to Greenville AAB.

11. Q. Clarify policy concerning use of civilians in MOS 2202 at stations employing less than 1000 employees. Hq Third Air Force recommends retention of qualified military 2202's at following stations: 1. Bergstrom Field. 2. Greenville AAB. 3. Cedalia Army Air Field.

A. The policy in this command in the use of civilians in MOS 2202 is in confirmity with AAF letter 37-25, 9 January 1946. The recommendation for the continued use of a military officer at any base may be made to this headquarters. However, it must be borne in mind that these officers are subject to transfer and overseas assignments. Therefore this will preclude any continuity in the position of civilian personnel officer.

12. Q. Is it the policy of TAC to reassign military personnel holding MOS 2202 who have signed Category 1 or made application for RA at stations employing less than 1000 employees? If so, how soon should reassignment be accomplished.

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A. Yes, it is the policy of this command to reassign officers holding MOS 7202. This should be accomplished as soon as qualified civilian is assigned the duties of civilian personnel officer.

13. Q. What is the policy concerning use of women who appear to be qualified for these positions?

A. All applications of qualified personnel will be considered by this command and recommendations made to the Base Commanders.

14. Q. What instructions were given to Bergstrom Field concerning transfer of Miss Mary McClung, Civilian Personnel Administrative Assistant at George Field?

A. On inspection visit to Bergstrom Field, representatives of this headquarters realigned the organization and duties of employees in the civilian Personnel Office and found no available position to utilize the service of Miss Mary McClung.

15. Q. TAC Letter 322 (26 Jun 46), subject: "Activation of Air Reserve Program", transmitting letter 322 (8Jun 46), from Air Defense Command, subject: "Activities of Air Reserve Program", designates the following Third Air Force bases as parent bases to furnish certain services including civilian personnel administration as follows:

Air Reserve Sta	Parent Base	Apvd Hq AAF	Proposed ADC	Off	EM	Civ	Total
Columbia AAB, SC	Greenville AAB, SC	12	8	5	16	24	43
Morris Fld, NC	Greenville,AAB, SC	15	9	4	22	31	57
Des Moines Mun, Io	Sedalia AAB, Mo	20	25	6	28	41	75
Sioux City AAB, Io	Sedalia AAB, Mo	15	10	4	22	31	57
Orchard Plsce Aprt, Ill	Baer Field, Ind	100	90	39	131	207	377

A. At this date, Morris Field, N. C., being serviced by Greenville AAB, is the only Air Service Base being serviced by a Third Air Force installation.

16. Q. The Civilian Personnel Office, Baer Field, Fort Wayne, Ind., will close effective 27 July 1946. What station can the Civilian Personnel Director be transferred to:

A. If Civilian Personnel Director at Baer Field, Ind., has proven qualified, it is suggested that he be considered for a base under your command.

17. Q. Clarify the following Payroll matters:

a. Responsibility for reconciling old accounts of Greenville Municipal Airport and Florence AAB.

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A. Reconcilement of old accounts for Greenville Municipal Airport and Florence AAB will be effective by this headquarters.

b. Use of Payroll Control Card, 40-1.

A. No objection interposed in use of Payroll Control Card 40-1. However, this form will become obsolete upon installation of site audit procedures.

c. Time and attendence Report, 40-3.

A. No objection interposed to use of this form providing it is the same as covered by AF3AF Memorandum 40-3, 11 July 1946.

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C O P Y

Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va., subject: "Civilian Personnel Administration". 21 Aug 46, cont'd.

TAC 230 (21 Aug 46) 2nd Ind AIN

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force, Greenville AAB, Greenville, SC

Captain Arthur Eva, Jr., Chief, Civilian Personnel Division, this headquarters, will visit your headquarters o/a 25 September 1946 to discuss list of questions left here by Civilian Personnel Officer, your headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

Stamped PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND BF

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

11 Oct 1946

IN REPLY REFER TO:

TAC 322 (11 Oct 46)

SUBJECT: Establishment of Command Budget and Fiscal Offices

TO: Commanding General
Third Air Force
(Troop Carrier)
Greenville Army Air Base
Greenville, South Carolina

1. In accordance with the policy promulgated by the War Department and Headquarters Army Air Forces, the following recommendations have been made to the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command in order to effectuate economy in the operation of Budget and Fiscal activities of this command:

a. Eliminate from the organization of numbered air forces the Budget and Fiscal Office as an operating agency.

(1) This change would eliminate the necessity of the following:

(a) The establishment of a detailed set of books and a complete Budget and Fiscal Office including trained Budget and Fiscal personnel, both military and civilian, in the maintenance of the following records:

1. General Ledger consisting of the following accounts: "Funds Received, Sub-allotments Issued, and Undistributed Funds", broken down by projects under each appropriation.

2. Summary Control Ledger by projects under each appropriation.

3. Monthly reports to be submitted by projects and appropriation.

4. Monthly Reconciliation of Expenditures by projects and appropriation.

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5. Responsibility of submission of monthly cost reports.

6. Submission of yearly and quarterly budget estimates from each field directly under the command of the numbered air force concerned.

7. The establishment of an audit team for the auditing of non-appropriated funds and the audit of appropriated funds issued.

8. Alleviate the present shortage of qualified Budget and Fiscal Officers.

b. It is further recommended that the following procedures be substituted for a Budget and Fiscal operating agency in your command:

(1) Stations where numbered Air Forces Headquarters are located, a well-qualified Budget and Fiscal Officer (field grade if possible) be assigned the following functions:

(a) Budget and Fiscal Officer of the station.

(b) Member of the Commanding General's Special Staff for Budget and Fiscal.

(2) Budget and Fiscal Officer, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, sub-allot money direct to each station under the numbered Air Forces. Stations will report status of funds direct to Tactical Air Command Headquarters.

2. Your comments and recommendations on the suggested program are requested.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/s/ Winston M. Hayes
WINSTON M. HAYES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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Basic ltr fr Hqs TAC, Langley Field, Va., dtd 11 Oct 46, subj: Establishment of Command Budget and Fiscal Officers"

AF 3AF 322 (11 Oct 46) 1st Ind BF

HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE (Troop Carrier), Greenville, South Carolina
21 October 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. In reference to letter TAC 322 (11 Oct 46) subject: "Establishment of Command Budget and Fiscal Offices", it is agreed that some savings will result. However, this savings will not be as large as first thought and would probably result in the savings of only two civilians and one officer. Under the present set up, the budget and fiscal office, this headquarters, could handle without increase of personnel the twelve bases projected for the Ninth Air Force. Under such a set up, TAC would have only one consolidated set of figures to handle on reports, accounting of funds, request for funds, etc. If the budget and fiscal office is eliminated in this command, TAC would have:

a. 12 Allotments to handle instead of 1.

b. 12 Reports on Status of Allotments instead of 1.

c. 12 Request for funds to handle instead of 1.

d. 12 Reconciliation of Expenditures, now done at this headquarters.

e. The posting of Station Ledger from 12 sets of reports instead of 1.

Thus the work in actual practice would not be eliminated as suggested in subject letter, but merely moved to higher headquarters with only a small savings. In addition, for the Third Air Force Budget and Fiscal Officer to serve in his function, as a member of the staff, certain files would have to be maintained at this headquarters and personnel available to maintain files and write correspondence. This would present no savings. It is not believed practical for the Budget and Fiscal Officer to serve in the dual function as set out in paragraph 1b (1) (a) (b) of subject letter.

2. The definite advantages of having a budget and fiscal office at this headquarters, as listed below, from a standpoint of efficient and economical operations would be lost:

a. The Commanding General has ready access to all fiscal information and records pertaining to past and present operations of bases under his command.

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b. A more flexible and economic use of funds is provided by the coordination possible between the budget and fiscal office and other sections of this command. It is believed that Tactical operations would be seriously impaired by this the lack of fund control which would not provide for necessary shifting of funds according to changes of missions or projects on a day to day basis. Orders and funds could not be sent simultaneously, nor would this headquarters have knowledge if funds were available at the bases. A direct savings of time and communication cost, plus a more efficient operation, results from this knowledge.

c. A close control of funds is possible due to the fact that the majority of orders are issued from this headquarters and relative costs of execution of similar projects by bases may be made.

d. Past knowledge of bases is a large aid in the closing or inactivation of Third Air Force bases. This knowledge would be lost.

e. Past experience shows most efficient operation is obtained by having ten to twelve bases under one Budget and Fiscal Office. This allows for economy in administration of funds, but retains personal contact and knowledge of each base with flexibility of action possible because of such knowledge.

3. The small savings obtained in the elimination of the Budget and Fiscal Office, at Air Force level, is not felt to compensate for the attendant losses in efficiency, economy, and flexibility of operation that would be incurred.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ William M. Gross
WILLIAM M. GROSS
Colonel, GSC
Chief of Staff

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SATISFACTORY

BASIC: Ltr Hqtrs Twelfth AF, March Fld, Calif., subj: "Appointment of D & F Officers," dtd 16 Sept 46.

210.3 2nd Ind 12 AF-A

HEADQUARTERS, TWELFTH AIR FORCE, March Field, California. 5 Nov 46

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

[illegible]

5. The recommendations contained in paragraph 3, 1st indorsement, are not concurred in for the following reasons:

a. Twelfth Air Force Headquarters would be deprived of the essential authority and personnel necessary to adequately meet the assigned command responsibilities.

b. Those responsibilities are clearly defined in the Mission of this Air Force and are:

(1) Preparation of detailed plans for technical, tactical, supply and administrative functions connected with constituted and activated units and provisional organizations assigned to this command.

(2) To assume direct responsibility for all stations and units assigned to this command.

c. If the Air Force Headquarters is deprived of control over Budget and Fiscal activities or that control restricted, it is recommended that the assigned responsibilities be modified.

WILLIAM D. OLD
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Contemplated AF Move to Langley and Fort Monroe, Misc.

1 March 1515 — Gen J. P. Doyle, Air Corps Liaison Officer, Army Ground Forces. Col Davasher, C/S Headquarters Third Air Force.

Gen Doyle called and stated that Gen Devers had approved the plan for air-ground headquarters at Fort Monroe and tactical headquarters at Langley Field. The plan is to be presented to Gen. Eisenhower for his approval. Gen. Eisenhower's reaction will be phoned to us as soon as is determined.

He brought up four other points in connection with the move to Langley Field-:

1. The taking over of the Base Headquarters Building for use of the Tactical Air Corps (I think this will bear some study on the ground as I think that the acquisition of the two (?) buildings now occupied by the AACS and Weather Service, we will have adequate space).

2. He also stated that Flying Safety was now moving into Langley Field but that he had been assured by the Front Office of AAF that they would move out prior to the time we would move to Langley.

3. He recommended strongly that before a combat unit was moved to Langley that the officer housing situation be surveyed very minutely as it is critical (you will recall that I reported to you when I returned from Langley Field that officer housing will be short but that enlisted housing is adequate).

4. The Army Ground Forces is very strong for a Central Housing Agency to assist in locating houses and in establishing basic rentals. The A.G.F. have secured approval of the War Dept. for a policy of immediately transferring to some desirable station any officer or EM found guilty of paying more than the established rentals. Gen. Doyle suggests that you contact Headquarters AAF and secure a similer commitment from them.

G. L. D.

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington

4 April 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Langley Field, Virginia, to the Tactical Air Command

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida

1. It is desired that your command assume jurisdiction of Langley Field, Virginia, from the Air Transport Command on 30 April 1946. Your headquarters will move to that station as soon as practicable after 30 April 1946.

2. Your command is authorized to communicate directly with the Air Transport Command relative to the details of this transfer.

3. Accomplishment of this assignment will be reported to this headquarters in the Daily Organization Status Change Report.

4. The Air Communications Service, Weather Service and Flying Safety Service will remain at Langley Field until such time as a permanent location is determined for these activities.

5. The units enumerated in paragraph 4 will be on domiciliary status while at Langley Field. They will remain under the command of ATC, except for such administration as is required to conform to Post Regulations. While at Langley Field, these units will be provided with their proportionate share of quarters, hangers, office space, enlisted housing and other common facilities.

6. This headquarters will initiate action to amend War Department assignment list and will also notify the Interdepartment Air Traffic Control Board accordingly.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Ira C. Eaker
IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces

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GENERAL ORDERS)
NO 28)

(G.O. 28)
HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida, 21 May 1946

CLOSING HEADQUARTERS, TAMPA, FLORIDA, OPENING LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

1. Headquarters Tactical Air Command will close at Tampa, Florida, at 2400, 26 May 1946, and open at Langley Field, Virginia, 0001, 27 May 1946.

2. Authority: Letter, Headquarters Army Air Forces, file AFCOP-T, subject: "Movement Directive, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command," dated 19 April 1946.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ ROBERT W. LEE
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Henry W. Spiller
/t/ HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant General

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Central File

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GENERAL ORDERS)
NO 2)

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida, 26 March 1946

	SECTION
ACTIVATION, INACTIVATION, TRANSFER, AND REASSIGNMENT OF UNITS -----	I
ASSIGNMENT OF STATIONS -----	II
REDESIGNATION, ASSIGNMENT, AND DESIGNATION OF AAF BASE UNITS ------	III
ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS -----	IV

SECTION I

ACTIVATION, INACTIVATION, TRANSFER, AND REASSIGNMENT OF UNITS

1. The Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, having been constituted and assigned to the Army Air Forces, is activated at Tampa, Florida, effective 21 March 1946.

a. Personnel is authorized in accordance with bulk allotment of personnel as published in AAF letters of the 150-series.

b. Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 20-1, as amended.

2. The Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, having been assigned on 21 March 1946 to the Tactical Air Command, will be activated at Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, effective 28 March 1946.

a. Personnel will be furnished from bulk allotment of personnel as authorized in separate communication from this headquarters.

b. Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 20-1, as amended.

3. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, XIX Tactical Air Command, is relieved from present assignment and is assigned without change of station to the Tactical Air Command, effective 21 March 1946. Upon activation of the Ninth Air Force, the XIX Tactical Air Command is further assigned to the Ninth Air Force and will be inactivated by the Commanding General thereof on or before 31 March 1946.

a. Personnel and equipment of the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, XIX Tactical Air Command, will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in manning and equipping the Headquarters, Ninth Air Force.

4. The Headquarters, Third Air Force, is relieved from present assignment, assigned to the Tactical Air Command, and transferred, less personnel and equipment, from Tampa, Florida, to Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina, effective 21 March 1946.

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a. This unit will be remanned from bulk allotment of personnel authorized by separate communication from this headquarters.

b. Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 20-1, as amended.

5. Headquarters and headquarters Squadron, IX Troop Carrier Command having been assigned to the Tactical Air Command, is further assigned to the Third Air Force without change of station, effective 21 March 1946, and will be inactivated by the Commanding General thereof on or before 31 March 1946.

a. Personnel and equipment of the IX Troop Carrier Command will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in remanning and re-equipping the Headquarters, Third Air Force.

6. The assignment of the following units to the Tactical Air Command in an inactive status effective 21 March 1946 is announced:

Hq & hq Sq, Twelfth Air Force
Hq & hq Sq, 53d Troop Carrier Wing

7. Records of the inactivated units will be disposed of and reported in accordance with the provisions of AR 15-15, 20 September 1945, and TM 12-259.

8. The funds of the Continental Air Forces will be assumed by the Strategic Air Command until suitable distribution between the Air Defense Command, Tactical Air Command, and the Strategic Air Command can be arranged under the provisions of AAF Letter 30-25, 4 August 1945.

9. Twenty copies of the orders issued pursuant to this directive will be forwarded to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, attention: Publications Division, Air Adjutant General, in addition to the distribution directed in paragraph 17e, AR 310-50.

10. When the actions directed herein have been accomplished, a report will be submitted to The Adjutant General by letter and copies furnished the service commander concerned and this headquarters.

11. Obligate the appropriate allotment published in section III, Circular 178, WD, 1945, as amended, to the extent necessary.

12. Authority: Letter AG 322 (21 Mar 46) OB-I-AFCOR-(971(d))-M, 21 March 1946, subject: "Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air Commands; redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces and certain other Army Air Forces units; activation, inactivation, and assignment of certain Army Air Forces units."

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SECTION II

ASSIGNMENT OF STATIONS

1. The assignment of the following stations to the Tactical Air Command effective as of 2359, 21 March 1946, or as soon thereafter as mutually agreed upon between the losing command and the Tactical Air Command, is announced. This transfer will include all auxiliary facilities and associated facilities now assigned to the listed stations. Stations are further assigned to air forces as indicated:

Station	assigned further	Effective date
Alexandria AAFld, Alexandria, La	Tactical Air Command	as stated above
Chatham AAFld, Savannah, Ga	Tactical Air Command	as stated above
Coffeyville AAFld, Coffeyville, Kans	Tactical Air Command	as stated above
Dale Mabry Field, Tallahassee, Fla	Tactical Air Command	as stated above
Dover AAFld, Del	Tactical Air Command	as stated above
Drew Field, Tampa, Fla	Tactical Air Command	as stated above
Dyersburg AAFld, Dyersburg, Tenn	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Esler Field, Alexandria, La	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Godman Field, Ft Knox, Ky	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Gulfport AAFld, Gulfport, Miss	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Hunter Field, Savannah, Ga	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Lake Charles AAFld, Lake Charles, La	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Lockbourne AAB, Columbus, Ohio	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
March Field, Riverside, Calif	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
McChord Field, Tacoma, Wash	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Muskogee AAFld, Muskogee, Okla	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Myrtle Beach AAFld, Myrtle Beach, SC	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Sarasota AAFld, Sarasota, Fla	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Shaw Field, Sumter, SC	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Sherman Field, Ft Leavenworth, Kans	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Stuttgart AAFld, Stuttgart, Ark	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Tyndall Field, Panama City, Fla	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Venice AAFld, Venice, Fla	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Will Rogers Field, Oklahoma City, Okla	Tactical Air Command	As stated above
Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas	Ninth Air Force	28 March 1946
Brooks Field, San Antonio, Tex	Ninth Air Force	28 March 1946
Marshall Field, Ft Riley, Kans	Ninth Air Force	28 March 1946
Alliance AAFld, Alliance, Nebr	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Baer Field, Ft Wayne, Ind	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Bergstrom Field, Austin, Tex	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Blytheville AAFld, Ark	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
George Field, Lawrenceville, Ill	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Greenville AAB, Greenville, SC	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Kellogg Field, Battle Creek, Mich	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Laurinburg-Maxton AAB, NC	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Lawson Field, Ft Benning, Ga	Third Air Force	28 March 1946

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Station	Assigned further	Effective date
Malden AAFld, Malden, Mo	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Marfa AAFld, Marfa, Tex	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Pope Field, Ft Bragg, NC	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Sedalia AAFld, Sedalia, Mo	Third Air Force	28 March 1946
Stout Field, Indianapolis, Ind	Third Air Force	28 March 1946

2. Authority: Letter Headquarters AAF, AFDIN-2A/6, 11 March 1946, subject: "Reassignment of airfields, installations, auxiliaries, and associated facilities."

SECTION III

REDESIGNATION, ASSIGNMENT, AND DESIGNATION OF AAF BASE UNITS

1. The 300th AAF Base Unit (Hq Third AF) is redesignated as the 300th AAF Base Unit (Hq TAC) and reassigned to the Headquarters Tactical Air Command, without change of station, effective 21 March 1946.

2. The following AAF base units are designated, assigned to the Headquarters as indicated, and will be organized by the commanding generals thereof, effective 28 March 1946, in accordance with AAF Regulation 20-52.

Unit	Assigned
303d AAF Base Unit (Hq Third AF) Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, SC	Hq, Third Air Force
309th AAF Base Unit (Hq Ninth AF) Biggs Field, El Paso, Tex	Hq, Ninth Air Force

3. The following AAF base units are designated, assigned to stations indicated, and will be organized by the commanding officers thereof, effective 28 March 1946, or concurrently with transfer of jurisdiction of station to Tactical Air Command, in accordance with AAF Regulation 20-52. Personnel strengths and squadrons will be as authorized by separate instructions to be issued by this headquarters:

Unit	Station
301st AAF Base Unit (Standby)	Drew Field, Tampa, Fla
302d AAF Base Unit (Standby)	Hunter Field, Savannah, Ga
305th AAF Base Unit (Tactical)	Biggs Field, El Paso, Tex
306th AAF Base Unit (Tactical)	Brooks Field, San Antonio, Tex
307th AAF Base Unit (Tactical)	Lake Charles AAFld, Lake Charles, La
308th AAF Base Unit (Tactical)	Tyndall Field, Panama City, Fla
310th AAF Base Unit (Tactical)	Pope Field, Ft Bragg, NC

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Unit	Station
311th aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	Bergstrom Field, Austin, Tex
313th aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	Greenville AAB, Greenville, SC
314th aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	McChord Field, Tacoma, Wash
315th aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	Godman Field, Ft Knox, Ky
316th aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	Shaw Field, Sumter, SC
317th aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	Myrtle Beach AAFld, Myrtle Beach, SC
318th aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	Lockbourne AAB, Columbus, Ohio
319th aaf Base Unit (Inf Sch)	Lawson Field, Ft Benning, Ga
320th aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	Dover AAFld, Dover, Delaware
321st aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	March Field, Riverside, Calif
322d aaf Base Unit (Tactical)	Sedalia AAFld, Sedalia, Mo
324th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Chatham AAFld, Savannah, Ga
328th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Gulfport AAFld, Gulfport, Miss
329th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Alexandria AAFld, Alexandria, La
330th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Dyersburg AAFld, Dyersburg, Tenn
331st aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Stout Field, Indianapolis, Ind
332d aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Alliance AAFld, Nebr
333rd aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Baer Field, Ft Wayne, Ind
334th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Blytheville AAFld, Ark
335th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Dale Mabry Field, Tallahassee, Fla
336th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Sarasota AAFld, Sarasota, Fla
337th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Venice AAFld, Venice, Fla
338th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	George Field, Lawrenceville, Ill
339th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Kellogg Field, Battle Creek, Mich
341st aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Laurinburg-Maxton AAB, NC
344th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Marfa AAFld, Marfa, Tex
345th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Malden AAFld, Malden, Mo
348th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Will Rogers Field, Oklahoma City, Okla
349th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Muskogee AAFld, Muskogee, Okla
353d aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Esler Field, Alexandria, La
355th aaf Base Unit (C&GSS)	Sherman Field, Ft Leavenworth, Kans
356th aaf Base Unit (Cav Sch)	Marshall Field, Ft Riley, Kans
379th aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Coffeyville AAFld, Coffeyville, Kans
383d aaf Base Unit (Standby)	Stuttgart AAFld, Stuttgart, Ark

4. The following aaf base units are designated at stations as indicated and will remain assigned directly to this headquarters.

Unit	assigned
340th aaf Base Unit (Supply)	Bartow army air field, Bartow, Fla
347th aaf Base Unit (Supply)	Key Field, Meridian, Miss

5. Authority: aaf Regulation 20-52.

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SECTION IV

ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS

1. The assignment of the following units to the Tactical Air Command, effective 2359, 21 March 1946, is announced:

Unit

Hq, 47th Bombardment Group, Light
84th Bombardment Sq, Light
85th Bombardment Sq, Light
86th Bombardment Sq, Light
97th Bombardment Sq, Light

Hq, **477th Composite Group
**617th Bombardment Squadron, L
**99th Fighter Squadron, SE

Hq, 412th Fighter Group
29th Fighter Sq, Jet Propelled
31st Fighter Sq, Jet Propelled
445th Fighter Sq, Jet Propelled

Hq, 67th Reconnaissance Group
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

*602d Air Engineering Squadron

39th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Night
575th AAF Band
579th AAF Band
*766th AAF Band
361st Air Service Group
Hq & Base Service Sq
615th Air Engr Sq
624th Air Mat Sq
500th Air Service Group
Hq & Base Service Sq
918th Air Engr Sq
742d Air Mat Sq

544th Air Service Group
Hq & Base Sv Sq
970th Air Engr Sq
794th Air Mat Sq

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2. The following units, having been assigned to the Tactical Air Command on 21 March 1946, are further assigned, effective 28 March 1946, as indicated.

Unit	Assigned further
Hq, 362d Fighter Group	Ninth Air Force
377th Fighter Sq, SE	
378th Fighter Sq, SE	
379th Fighter Sq, SE	
Hq, 69th Reconnaissance Group	Ninth Air Force
10th Tac Ren Sq	
22d Tac Ren Sq	
29th Ren Sq, Night Photo	
Hq, 502d Tactical Control Gp	Ninth Air Force
605th Tac Contl Sq	
606th Acft Contl & Warning Sq	
607th Acft Contl & Warning Sq	
608th Acft Contl & Warning Sq	
72d Liaison Sq	Ninth Air Force
161st Liaison Sq	Ninth Air Force
162d Liaison Sq	Ninth Air Force
167th Liaison Sq	Ninth Air Force
27th Tow Target Squadron	Ninth Air Force
18th Tac Air Comm Sq	Ninth Air Force
8th Depot Unit, Army	Ninth Air Force
564th AAF Band	Ninth Air Force
569th AAF Band	Ninth Air Force
450th Air Service Gp	Ninth Air Force
Hq & Base Sv Sq	
826th Air Engr Sq	
650th Air Mat Sq	
471st Air Service Gp	Ninth Air Force
Hq & Base Sv Sq	
889th Air Engr Sq	
713th Air Mat Sq	
934th Signal Bn, TAC, Sep	Ninth Air Force
Hq & Hq Sq, 50th Troop Carrier Wing	Third Air Force
Hq & Hq Sq, 52d Troop Carrier Wing	Third Air Force

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Unit	Assigned further
Hq, 316th Troop Carrier Group	Third air force
36th Troop Carrier Sq	
37th Troop Carrier Sq	
75th Troop Carrier Sq	
77th Troop Carrier Sq	
Hq, 349th Troop Carrier Gp	Third air force
23d Troop Carrier Sq	
312th Troop Carrier Sq	
313th Troop Carrier Sq	
314th Troop Carrier Sq	
Hq, 434th Troop Carrier Gp	Third air force
71st Troop Carrier Sq	
72d Troop Carrier Sq	
73d Troop Carrier Sq	
74th Troop Carrier Sq	
Hq, 439th Troop Carrier Gp	Third air force
91st Troop Carrier Sq	
92d Troop Carrier Sq	
93d Troop Carrier Sq	
94th Troop Carrier Sq	
Hq, 3d Air Cargo Resupply Sq	Third air force
*475th Aviation Sq	Third air force
571 AAF Band	Third air force
652 AAF Band	Third air force
452d Air Service Gp	Third air force
Hq & Base Sv Sq	
828th Air Engr Sq	
652d Air Mat Sq	
455th Air Service Gp	Third air force
Hq & Base Sv Sq	
873d Air Engr Sq	
697th Air Mat Sq	
460th Air Service Gp	Third air force
Hq & Base Sv Sq	
878th Air Engr Sq	
702d Air Mat Sq	

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Unit	assigned further
477th Air Service Gp	Third Air Force
Hq & Base Sv Sq	
895th Air Engr Sq	
719th Air Mat Sq	

3. Authority: Letter AG 322 (21 Mar 46) OB-1-AFCOR-(971(d))-M, 21 March 1946, subject: "Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air Commands; redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces and certain other Army Air Forces units; activation, inactivation and assignment of certain Army Air Forces units."

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

EDGAR E. SCATTERGOOD, JR
Colonel, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

/s/ R. H. Thom

R. H. THOM
Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps
Acting Adjutant General

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* Negro enlisted personnel
** Negro officer & enlisted personnel

A TRUE COPY:

Ballard D. Zuehl
BALLARD D. ZUEHL
Lt Col, Air Corps

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GENERAL ORDERS)
NO 4)

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida, 29 March 1946

	SECTION
DESIGNATION OF AAF BASE UNIT	I
ASSIGNMENT OF STATIONS	II
ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS	III
ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS	IV
INACTIVATION OF UNIT	V

SECTION I

DESIGNATION OF AAF BASE UNIT

1. The 342d AAF Base Unit (Standby) is designated with station at Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee, assigned to that station, and will be organized by the commanding officer thereof, effective concurrently with the transfer of the station from AAF Training Command to the Tactical Air Command. This unit is authorized Squadron A. Personnel strength will be as authorized by separate communication from this headquarters.

2. This unit will absorb personnel and equipment transferred to Tactical Air Command from AAF Training Command with the transfer of this station.

3. Authority: AAF Regulation 20-52.

SECTION II

ASSIGNMENT OF STATIONS

Section II, General Orders No 2, this headquarters, 26 March 1946, is amended to change the effective date and the authority and to add Smyrna Army Air Field. Specific amendments are as follows:

a. So much of paragraph 1 as reads "effective 2359, 21 March 1946" is amended to read "effective as of 2359, 22 March 1946."

b. Add following to tabulation in paragraph 1:

Station	Assigned further	Effective date
Smyrna Army Air Field, Tenn	Tactical Air Command	As stated above

c. Paragraph 2 is amended to read as follows:

"2. Authority: Letter Headquarters AAF, AFDIN-2A/2, 21 March 1946, subject: 'Reassignment of airfields, installations, auxiliaries, and associated facilities'."

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SECTION III

ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS

Paragraph 2, section IV, General Orders No 2, this headquarters, 26 March 1946, is amended by adding the following:

Unit	Assigned further
756th AAF Band	Third Air Force

SECTION IV

ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS

The following units now assigned to the Tactical Air Command are assigned further to stations as indicated:

Unit	Assigned to
575th AAF Band	Shaw Field, Sumter, SC
579th AAF Band	March Field, Riverside, Calif
*766th AAF Band	Lockbourne AAB, Columbus, Ohio

*Negro officer & enlisted personnel.

SECTION V

INACTIVATION OF UNIT

1. The inactivation of the 3d Air Cargo Resupply Squadron, Lawson Field, Fort Benning, Georgia, effective 31 March 1946, is announced.

2. Authority: Letter AG 322 (12 Mar 46) OB-I-AFCOR-(942(D))-M WD AGO, 15 March 1946, subject: "Inactivation of the Headquarters, 317th Wing and Certain other Army Air Forces Units"; 1st Indorsement, Headquarters CAF, 21 March 1946, to Commanding General, IX Troop Carrier Command; and General Orders No 19, Headquarters IX Troop Carrier Command.

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BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

EDGAR M. SCATTERGOOD, JR
Colonel, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. H. THOM
Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

COPY

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Repairs to Streets and Parking Areas, Sedalia Army Air Field
1	(A4C) F. P. W Engineer 21 May 45	A-4	COVER SHEET - NOT TO BE REMOVED UNTIL CORRESPONDENCE REACHES THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF 1. In accordance with paragraph 6i of AAF Reg 85-5, the attached correspondence requires the personal signature of the Commanding General or, in his absence, the Deputy Commanding General. 2. The project is one of abnormal maintenance of roads and parking areas at Sedalia Army Air Field and is estimated to cost $16,549.00 if accomplished by contract. 3. While the present plans for the future use of Sedalia Army Air Field by Tactical Air Command are not too firm, it is considered advisable to process this request, since the station has been designated as an Army Air Forces Interim installation and the work proposed is necessary for preservation and protection of existing Government facilities. COPY

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General

A3

In reply Refer To:
3AF 322 (1 Mar 46)

Tampa Florida

15 March 1946

SUBJECT: Movement of the XlX Tactical Air Command.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to Inclosure 1, which is a request to move the XlX Tactical Air Command and units presently stationed at Biggs Field, El Paso Texas, to Tyndall Field, Panama City, Florida.

2. Inclosure 2 is the answer received from Continental Air Forces, stating that request for change of station is being held for consideration pending an investigation as to the possibility of Zone of Interior units being stationed at temporary bases such as Tyndall Field.

3. In view of the pending reorganization of Army Air Forces, which is about to be consummated except for the receipt of orders, I desire to bring this to your attention and request favorable consideration as the time length is a considerable factor in this case.

4. As noted in Inclosure 1, my reasons for desiring this move are: (1) To shorten the lines of communication between this headquarters and Headquarters XlX Tactical Air Command and also between the headquarters of the XlX Tactical Air Command and the various ground forces schools and insure closer cooperation and a more positive and efficient supervision and control of tactical units performing demonstrations for these schools. (2) To locate units more strategically to the general area of Army Ground Forces units. (3) To utilize better housing; and (4) to utilize existing and better range facilities at Tyndall and surrounding vicinities.

5. I would like to augment the above reasons by another which will have a profound effect on the manning of the units under consideration for movement. It is a known fact that very few enlistments are being made at Biggs Field and that very few men enlisting at other stations are selecting Biggs as a station for duty; whereas, if these units were at Tyndall, enlistments for subject units wouls increase to a great extent. However, at present the recruitment program of the 362d Fighter Group is practically nil.

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Subj: Movement of the XlX Tactical
Air Command. (cont'd)

6. The training of a tactical air command is dependent upon the mobility and efficiency of its tactical control group. For a tactical control group to be mobile and to function in an efficient manner requires terrain conditions conducive to radar operation. Biggs Field and vicinity does not offer these facilities or advantages. In fact the terrain in and around this base prohibits the efficient use of radar. I wish to point this out as my main objection for the XlX Tactical Air Command to remain at Biggs Field. On the other hand, Tyndall Field offers every advantage conducive to the efficient training of a tactical air command and all units assigned thereto.

/s/ E. R. QUESADA
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding.

(15 Mar 46) 1st Ind

Hq Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C. 25 April 1946

To: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida

At a conference in General Spaatz's office this date, he decided that Tyndall Field will be transferred to the Air University.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

C. C. CHAUNCEY
Major General, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief of Air Staff

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

15 April 1946

SUBJECT: Construction Planning Program.

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Tampa, Florida.

1. This headquarters has been directed to provide certain data in connection with a long range construction planning program for the Army. This program will be used in consonance with authorization for the 1948 budget as well as estimates to be submitted for future fiscal years, based upon construction items necessary for a long range peacetime military establishment.

2. It is therefore desired that your Command compile a list of items proposed for new construction by installation. These items will be based upon master plan studies, if available, and will contain a numerical priority for each item of work desired at each particular installation. In addition to the numerical priority of all items pertinent to a particular installation, it is desired that the relative priority of the installation within your Command be indicated. The cost estimates will be considered only as preliminary cost estimates. These preliminary unit and total cost figures will be obtained from the Engineer representative on Post Planning Boards.

3. For planning purposes in compiling this construction planning program, the following assumptions should be used:

a. It must be assumed that the installations now under your Command will remain under your Command throughout the entire long range construction program. It should also be assumed that all operating combat installations should be capable of supporting at least one (1) installations such as control depots, schools, etc., should be planned based upon their present contemplated interim and postwar use.

b. In establishing priorities of installations within your Command, primary consideration should be given to installations which will unquestionably be retained regardless of the peacetime size of the Army Air Forces.

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SUBJECT: Construction Planning Program.

c. The construction cycle will cover a ten (10) year period. By the end of this cycle all mobilization and theater of operations type construction will have been replaced in accordance with the requirements of the master for the installation.

d. No detailed justification need be submitted with these items at this time. Include only a sufficient description of the project to enable this headquarters to properly identify the type of work desired. A sample form indicating the information desired is attached. The column for reamrks should be filled in where pertinent data will aid in planning the construction program.

e. If a certain facility is desired to be constructed by increments rather than providing the ultimate requirements under one project, it should be shown as separate projects. The ultimate requirement of family housing, for instance, is 1,000 units and it is desired to construct these units in four (4) projects of 250 units each. They should therefore appear in the tabulation as four (4) separate projects and priority numbers assigned in the order in which these units will be required.

f. In planning for housing construction it should be assumed that family quarters will be required for 70% of the officers and 70% of the noncommissioned officers of the top three (3) grades. Provision will be made for housing the balance of the officers and noncommissioned officers in bachelor officers quarters and barracks.

4. It is desired to have this information for use in compiling the preliminary 1948 budget, a call for which will be made by the Bureau of the budget in August 1946. It is therefore necessary that this information be compiled as outlined above, and submitted in sufficient time to reach this headquarters not later than 15 June 1946. No extention of time for submission of this report will be granted.

5. The magnitude of this task is well known to this headquarters and it is fully understood that estimates submitted will be of the most preliminary type, all subject to change. Your headquarters will also be given an opportunity to review any items included in future budgets before formal presentation and revisions occasioned by a change of condition or mission of the base may be made.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

LEO J. ERLER, Col., A. C.
Deputy Chief, Air Installations Division
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-4

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE
(Troop Carrier)
Greenville, South Carolina

AF3AF 686 (24 May 46) 24 May 1946

SUBJECT: Post-War Planning

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. This headquarters has received various instructions from Headquarters, TAC, regarding Post-War Planning for Pope Field, Fort Bragg, N. C., Sedalia AAFld, Warrensburg, Mo., and Bergstrom Field, Austin, Texas. However, no provisions have as yet been made for Post-War Planning at Lawson Field, Fort Benning, Ga., a Class III Installation currently assigned to this command.

2. Lawson Field, Fort Benning, Ga., is operationally important and essential to the mission of this command. The air field occupied a position in this command very similar to the position of Pope Field, identical to the relationship of Pope Field to Fort Bragg, N. C., another Ground Force Installation.

3. In view of probable future requirements for use of Lawson Field in the Post-War Air Force, it is recommended that action be taken towards performance of Post-War Planning thereat, in step with planning presently being accomplished at the above named Post-War Interim Air Fields of this command. Such planning might proceed, pending final determination of the status of Lawson Field, to the end that valuable time would not be lost in securing required facilities, should Headquarters, AAF, determine it expedient to include the Installation on the AAF Interim Air Field List.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Stamped O. G. VAN HOESEN
Lt. Col., A. G. D.
Adjutant General

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Subjects: Post-War Planning, Lawson Field, Ft. Benning, Georgia.

TAC 686 (24 May 46) 1st Ind 12 June 1946
HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, Langley Field, Virginia.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C. Atten: AC/AS. Materiel and Services, Air Installations Division.

1. Request this headquarters be advised whether or not any revision is being made in the list of installations designated as interim air fields. Also, request this headquarters be advised whether Lawson Field, Ft. Benning, Georgia, or any other installations presently assigned to this command is to be added to the interim air field list and designated for master planning. Attention is called to the correlation between the mission of Lawson Field and of that of the Ground Force at Fort Benning, Georgia.

2. Attached is a copy of a letter to Third Air Force, indicating the action taken by this headquarters in connection with the basic communication.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Stamped CLARENCE N. KEEN
Maj., Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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SUBJECT: Post-War Planning

AFDIN-2A/6 2nd Ind 28 June 1946

Hq, AAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. Reference is made to paragraph 1 of 1st Indorsement.

2. There are no completed changes on the list of interim Army Air Forces stations. In view of the fact that Lawson Field, Fort Benning, Georgia, will remain under the jurisdiction of the Army Air Forces as long as a requirement exists for Fort Benning, Georgia, it is recommended that a planning board be established at Lawson Field.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

ROBERT KAUCh, BRIG. GEN., USA
Chief, Air Installations Division
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-4

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HEADQUARTERS
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

370.01 14 June 1946

SUBJECT: Post War Planning

TO: Commanding General
Seventh Army
Atlanta 3, Georgia
(Attn: Regional Planning Board)

1. This headquarters has been advised by the Commanding Officer, Pope Field, Fort Bragg, N. C. by letter dated 17 May 1946 (copy enclosed) that the construction planning program of the Army Air Forces contemplates extention of existing runways at Pope Field from 5,000 feet to 8,000 feet with reduction of glide angle from 1 on 40 to 1 on 50.

2. It is strongly recommended that this project be not favorably considered for the following reasons:

a. The construction contemplated is completely incompatible with the use of the Division Area for the housing of a division, either now in the existing mobilization type buildings or in the future in permanent type construction.

b. The present Division Area is the most suitable on the Post for the housing of a division from the standpoint of convenient location near training facilities, as well as being the largest nearly level area on the Post.

c. Take-offs and landings on the present runways at glide angles now established bring planes very close to the buildings of the Main Post. The proposed new glide angles will bring planes over these buildings at an even lower altitude, which, with increasing traffic, will be definitely dangerous.

d. Additional clear zones required to the North and northeast will require the purchase of additional land in these areas, part of which has been developed by the construction of dwellings, etc. It is estimated that the land to be acquired will cost not less than $100,000.

e. The completion of this project will necessitate the removal of the present known distance rifle ranges west of Pope Field, consisting of over 400 targets, built at a cost of approximately $300,000. It is estimated that replacement of this training facility in a new location would

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now cost in excess of $750,000. In addition to the cost of rebuilding the ranges there will be the continuing and expensive disadvantage of having the ranges at a greater distance from the troops than at present. This involves wear and tear on vehicles and loss of training time for the troops.

3. In view of the above it is urgently recommended that this matter be brought to the attention of higher headquarters in order that the proposed construction can be considered in connection with AGF requirements for the post to the end that the best interests of the Army as a whole will be served.

PEARSON MENOHER
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Deputy Post Commander

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AJSVD 370.01 Ft Bragg (14 Jun 46) 7th Ind.

HQ SEVENTH ARMY, Atlanta 3, Georgia. 5 August 1946

TO: Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Report of Commanding General, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, reference conflict between Construction Planning Program at Fort Bragg and Pope Field is attached.

2. It is evident from the attached marked map that the proposed lengthening of runways at Pope Field will effect existing housing and training facilities at Fort Bragg to such an extent as to cause complete revision of utilization and construction at that post.

3. Utilization and training at Fort Bragg, together with a carefully planned program of training facilities, are so well-established that such a conflict of construction is untenable from the standpoint of effective and continuing training of Army Ground Force units.

4. Recommend that this situation be relieved as soon as possible in order that orderly planning may be resumed at Fort Bragg.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CHARLES D. PALMER
Brigadier General, GSC
Chief of Staff

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Ltr fr Ft. Bragg, N. C., dtd 14 June 1946, subj: "Post War Planning"

AFDIN 5B/1 9th Ind 21 Nov 1946

Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

To: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

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3. It is evident from the preceding correspondence that the authorities at Fort Bragg have not only a misunderstanding with regard to the planning factors established for the master planning at AAF installations but also with regard to the long range construction planning program which was prepared by Pope Field at the request of this headquarters. Both of these requirements were predicated upon the maximum foreseeable expansion which might be anticipated over a long period of time, and were expected to produce not only a master plan upon which future construction would be based, but also would, to the greatest possible extent, disclose the expansion possibilities and the limitations of the installations concerned. In the present instance, it appears that a point in planning has been reached whereby a determination must be made as to the feasibility of expanding Pope Field in accordance with the established planning factors. Particular reference is made to AR 210-20, 11 June 1946, "Master Planning of Installations" a portion of which is quoted below:

"5. Duties of Board - The duties of planning boards will include, but will not necessarily be limited to, the following:

d. To cooperate and coordinate with adjacent and adjoining military and naval installations and activities for the purpose of insuring that plans and progress developed are in harmony with the best interests and requirements of the military interests."

****

5. It must also be realized that the requirements for master planning were predicated on the VHB Group since it has the largest aircraft used in a combat and also the largest number of personnel. This does not mean, however, that a VHB Group may ever be assigned to any individual station as Pope Field. One of the major purposes of the planning program will be to indicate the extent to which an AAF installation can be logically and economically expanded.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

LEO J. ERIER, Col., A. C.
Asst, Chief, Air Installations Division
Asst, Chief of Air Staff-4

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Subject: Individual Project Estimate-Repairs and Utilities, Post Request No. SAAF-15-46, Resurface of Low Type Bituminous Roadways.

TAC 121.6 (15 Apr 46) 5th Ind (A4C)
HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, Langley Field, Virginia, 12 Jul 1946

TO: Commanding Officer, Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee

1. Inclosed project, covering resurfacing of low type bituminous roadways at your station at an estimated cost of $5,800.00 has been reconsidered at this headquarters based on the fact that Smyrna Army Air Field has not been designated as an AAF List No. 1 Interim station and on this basis it is considered advisable to defer work as requested at this time. Project is therefore returned without further action to be held in abeyance and resubmitted only in the event that Smyrna Army Air Field is designated as a List No. 1 AAF Interim station.

2. Pending change of status of the station, it is desired that only minimum day to day maintenance be accomplished on the road system with due consideration being given to higher type maintenance on specific areas receiving heavy traffic.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

WINSTON M. HAYES
1st Lt Air Corps
Actg Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE
(Troop Carrier)

Greenville, South Carolina

AF3AF 602.3 (20 Jun 46) 20 June 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Third Air Force Installations to Air Defense Command

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. It is recommended that immediate action be taken through Headquarters, Army Air Forces, to effect transfer of the following Third Air Force Installations from jurisdiction of this command to jurisdiction of the Air Defense Command.

STATION	LOCATION	CATEGORY**
Baer Field	Fort Wayne, Ind	I A*
Blytheville AAFld (and 4 auxiliaries)	Blytheville, Ark.	II B
Marfa AAFld	Marfa, Tex.	II B

** Category as indicated in WD Program of Installations, Volume I, 30 Apr 46

2. The above action is strongly recommended for the following reasons:

a. Each Installation listed above is indicated in the WD Program of Installations as being desired for Post-War retention for reserve and transient training or for National Guard or ORC Summer training. This type utilization does not fall within the future planning of this command, but rather is a vital part of the projected planning for the Air Defense Command.

b. Since future usage of the above stations is contemplated, it will be to the advantage of the Army Air Forces, and particularly of the Air Defense Command, to obtain jurisdiction at the earliest possible date in order to:

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Ltr fr CG Hq 3AF (TC) Greenville, SC, AF3AF 602.3, 20 Jun 46 to CG, TAC subj: Transfer of Third Air Force Installations to Air Defense Command.

(1) Ascertain the status of equipment, supplies, materiel.

(2) Prohibit the disposal of equipment, supplies and materiel, which will be required for operation of the stations.

(3) Determine what additional or new equipment, supplies or materiel will be required sufficiently prior to time of intended usage to permit acquisition thereof.

c. Utilization of funds and manpower available to this command, to effect complete inactivation in accordance with current policies, represents an abominable wastage both to the Army Air Forces, the Air Defense Command and this command, particularly when it is known in advance that subject installation will be utilized in the future.

2. It is strongly urged that the above recommendation be presented to higher Air Force headquarters, in order that transfer of jurisdiction may be effected at the earliest feasible date.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

ROBERTS P. JOHNSON, Jr.
Lieut. Colone, AGD
Asst, Adjutant General

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

TAC 686 (14 Nov 46) 14 November 1946

SUBJECT: Request for Transfer of Sherman Field, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Sherman Field, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, is excess to the needs of this Command. Future planning does not include the assignment of a tactical unit to this base.

2. The mission of this base is to provide flight facilities to The Command and General Staff School, rated permanent party personnel, student officers on flying status attending the Command and General Staff School, and rated AAF Command and General Staff School instructors. All rated personnel maintaining flying proficiency at Sherman Field, except fifteen (15) base personnel are assigned to the Air University or are on duty at the Command Staff School.

3. It is requested that Sherman Field, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, be transferred from this Command to the Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama. The work load is being carried by twenty-one (21) officers, and one hundred and eighty-five (185) enlisted men of the 355th AAF Base Unit, and is a service to the Air Unversity and The Command and General Staff School.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

GLENN C. BARCUS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE
(Troop Carrier)
Greenville, South Carolina

AF3AF 686 (10 May 46) 10 May 1946

SUBJECT: Jurisdiction of Camp Mackall

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Tampa, Florida

1. The Army Air Forces Installations Directory for the Continental United States dated 1 February 1946 indicates that Camp Mackall Airfield at Hoffman, North Carolina is under the jurisdiction of the Army Ground Forces with an operational permit to this Headquarters for use of the field as an auxiliary to Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base.

2. Laurinburg-Maxton was declared surplus to the War Department 26 February 1946 and this auxiliary field is therefor no longer required.

3. The above is furnished for information and any action deemed necessary.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Stamped ROBERT P. JOHNSON, Jr.
Lieut, Colonel, AGD
Asst. Adjutant General

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Subject: Jurisdiction of Camp Mackall Air Field.

TAC 686.2 (10 May 46) Juris 1st Ind (AAC)
HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, Langley Field, Virginia.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C. Atten: AC/AS, Materiel and Service, Air Installations Division.

1. Forwarded for appropriate action to relieve this headquarters of all responsibility for Camp Mackall Field. No requirements known to this headquarters exist for this installation, and it is recommended that it be declared excess.

2. Request this headquarters be notified of action taken as a result of this communication.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Stamped C. A. STANFIEL
Major, AGD
Asst, Adj, Gen.

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SUBJECT: Jurisdiction of Camp Mackall Airfield

AFDIN-2A/6 2nd Ind 6 July 1946

Hq, AAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. The Army Air Force Installations Directory for Continental United States, dated 1 February 1946, indicating that Camp Mackall Army Air Field is under jurisdiction of the Army Ground Forces is in error in this respect.

2. This airfield is and will remain under the jurisdiction of the Army Air Forces as long as a requirement exists for the Army Ground Forces installation at subject location. Therefore, until such time as Camp Mackall is declared surplus, it is desired that this installation remain under your jurisdiction and be assigned to an active installation of your command for administrative and repairs and utilities responsibilities.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

ROBERT KAUCh, Brig. Gen., USA
Chief, Air Installations Division
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-4

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA A4C

IN REPLY REFER TO:

TAC 686 (23 Aug 46) 23 August 1946

SUBJECT: Temporary Inactivation of Campbell Army Air Field, Hopkinsville, Kentucky.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: AC/AS-4, Air Installations Division.

1. In accordance with AAF Regulations 85-2 and TT WHQ V WAR NRD15 WD dated 3 August 1946, authority is requested to place Campbell Army Air Field, Hopkinsville, Kentucky an auxiliary of Smyrna Army Air Field, on a temporary inactive status, effective 1 September 1946.

2. This request to place subject field on a temporary inactive status is made in view of the fact that there is no planned mission or requirement for the field by this headquarters.

3. If the request for temporary inactive status for Campbell Army Air Field is not favorably considered by your headquarters it is then requested that subject field be reassigned to the 35th AAF Base Unit.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CLARENCE N. KEEN
Maj., Air Corps
Actg, Asst, Adj, Gen.

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SUBJECT: Temporary Inactivation of Campbell Army Air Field, Hopkinsville, Kentucky

AFDIN-2A/7 1st Ind 10 September 1946

Hq, AAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. This headquarters does not favorably consider placing Campbell Army Air Field, Hopkinsville, Kentucky on a temporary inactive status.

2. Camp Campbell is presently an active Ground Forces installation and as long as a requirement exist for the afor-mentioned installation, it is desired that Campbell Army Air Field remain active.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Leo J. Erler
LEO J. ERLER, Col., A. C.
Deputy Chief, Air Installations Div.
Asst. Chief of Air Staff-4

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Hq, TAC, Langley Fld, Va. 24 Sept 46, subj: Report of Annual General Insp, SAAFld, Smyrna, Tenn. To: CG, TAC, Langley Field, Virginia

333.1 1st Ind R/rmm

HEADQUARTERS, SMYRNA ARMY AIR FIELD, Smyrna, Tennessee, 1 October 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

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3. Section III - General:

a. Reference paragraph 7, a Coordination and Compliance Officer was appointed on orders during the period of the subject inspection. He has been directed to take positive action with reference to recurrent minor discrepancies and to spot check all inspection reports.

b. Reference paragraph 8, the situation concerning the relationship between this field and the detachment at Campbell Army Air Field has been taken up with A-3 and A-4 at Tactical Air Command headquarters. With the maintaining of Campbell Army Air Field by this base, there is, in effect, the necessity of keeping two complete command, operational and maintenance (including servicing) activities. Drastic reduction, directed by higher headquarters, in personnel, commissioned, enlisted and civilian, at this base, has made it extremely difficulty, in some instances almost physically impossible, to handle either the Smyrna Army Air Field itself or its auxiliary, Campbell Army Air Field, in a satisfactory or desirable manner. The recommendation made to A-3 in regard to Campbell Army Air Field was that a specific allotment of personnel and funds be made for that activity and that consideration of the existence of this activity be given when reductions or transfers are considered.

c. Reference paragraph 9, the Air Inspection section is now in the process of arranging its activities so that all airplanes on active flying status will be inspected during each current month.

****

s/ Ira P. Koenig
t/ IRA P. KOENIG
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

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TAC STATIONS TRANSFERRED TO DISTRICT ENGINEER DURING
March - December 1946

STATION	DATE OF TRANSFER	AUTHORITY
Dale Mabry Field, Tallahassee, Fla.	31 Mar	GO #6
Sarasota Army Air Field, Sarasota, Fla.	20 Apr	GO #15
Venice Army Air Field, Venice, Fla.	20 Apr	GO #15
Will Rogers Field, Oklahoma City, Okla.	20 May	GO #37
*George Field, Lawrenceville, Ill.	1 Jan	GO #52
Gulfport Army Air Field, Gulfport, Mississippi.	1 Jan	GO #37
*Alliance Army Air Field, Alliance, Nebraska.	8 Jan	GO #42
Esler Field, Alexandria, La.	1 July	GO #54
*Kellogg Field, Battle Creek, Mich.	1 July	GO #54
*Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base, North Carolina.	13 July	GO #52
Hunter Field, Savannah, Ga.	17 Aug	GO #73
Coffeyville Army Air Field, Coffeyville, Kansas.	25 Aug	GO #78
Dyersburg Army Air Field Dyersburg, Tennessee.	26 Aug	GO #78
Malden Army Air Field, Malden, Missouri.	1 Sep	Weekly Bulletin 23 Sep 46

* Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) stations

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TAC STATIONS TRANSFERRED TO DISTRICT ENGINEER DURING
March - December 1946

(Continued)

STATION	DATE TRANSFER	AUTHORITY
Drew Field, Tampa, Fla.	7 Sep	Weekly Bulletin
Alexandria Army Air Field, Alexandria, La.	20 Sep	Staff Conference Notes
Muskogee Army Air Field, Muskogee, Okla.	30 Sep	TWX to AAF
Stuttgart Army Air Field, Stuttgart, Ark.	25 Oct	28 Oct Weekly Bulletin
*Blytheville Army Air Field Ark.	15 Nov	
*Marfa Army Air Field, Marfa, Tex.	28 Dec	

Prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, May 1948, from data contained in TAC General Orders for 1946, etc.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA A4C

IN REPLY REFER TO:

TAC 686 (6 Aug 46) 6 August 1946

SUBJECT: Disposition of Dover Army Air Field, Delewsre.

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: AC/AS, Materiel and Services
Air Installations Division

1. It is requested that action be taken to relieve this headquarters of all responsibility for Dover Army Air Field, Delewsre. No requirements known to this headqusrters exist for this facility.

2. It is urgently requested that early action be taken on this request, in order to relieve this command of the burden of maintaining an inactive installation which is excess to its requirements.

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FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ Henry W. Spiller
HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, A. G. D.
Asst. Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Disposition of Dover Army Air Field, Delaware

AFDIN-2A/6 1st Ind 20 August 1946

Hq, AAF Washington 25, D, C,

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

While no apparent need exists for Dover Army Air Field, Delaware, at the present time, this installation will remain an interim air forces station. Consequently, it is desired that this field remain in temporarily inactive status under your command pending further instructions from this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Robert Kauch
ROBERT KAUCH, Brig, Gen., USA
Chief, Air Installations Division
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-4

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/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/
/Langley Field, Va/

7 August 1946

TAC 322 (7 Aug 46)

SUBJECT: Change of Status, Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware.

TO : Commanding Officer, Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware.

1. Effective 1 September 1946, Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware is placed in a temporary inactive status. All facilities under your jurisdiction will likewise become temporarily inactive on this date. Inactivation is the primary mission of your station Orderly and aggressive action will be initiated at once to the end that procedures for temporary inactivation will be completed by the deadline date of 1 October 1946.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND A4C

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

6 August 1946

IN REPLY REFER TO:

TAC 686 (6 Aug 46)

SUBJECT: Disposition of Sedalia Army Air Field, Missouri.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: AC/AS-4, Air Installations Division.

1. It is requested that action be taken to relieve this headquarters of all responsibility for Sedalia Army Air Field, Missouri. No requirements known to this headquarters exist for this facility.

2. It is urgently requested that early action be taken on this request, in order to relieve this command of the burden of maintaining an inactive installation which is excess to its requirements.

3. h. Auxiliary Facilities. Sturgis Army Air Field, Kentucky is on an inactive status and being retained pending future requirements of Army Air Forces, but it is excess to the needs of this command.

****

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ Henry W. Spiller
Stamped HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, A. G. D.
Asst, Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Disposition of Sedalia Army Air Field, Missouri.

AFDIN-2A/6 1st Ind 20 August 1946

Hq, AAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

While no apparent need exists for Sedalia Army Air Field, Missouri, at the present time, this installation will remain an interim air forces station. Consequently, it is desired that this field remain in temporarily inactive status under your command pending further instructions from this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Robert Kauch
Stamped ROBERT KAUCH
Chief, Air Installations Division
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-4

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General

A4
AcB/7

TAC 400.22 (11 June 46)

Langley Field, Virginia

11 Jun 1946

SUBJECT: Disposal of Property Transferred to War Assets Administration

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Assistant Chief of Air Staff - A-4

1. A recent inspection of inactive and surplus bases has revealed a problem of increasing magnitude in respect to Surplus Property disposal. In many instances, shipping instructions from the War Assets Administration to these bases are of a volume and frequency greater than the bases are able to comply with. Prior to V-J Day, when the agreement between the War Department and War Assets Administration for shipment of Surplus Property was made, bases were on a full-war-time status and such shipments would have been in no way unusual. However, since current strength at inactive and surplus bases is generally 1-2 officers, no enlisted men, and 10-15 civilian employees, a severe strain is being imposed. Since more Surplus Property finds its way into consumer channels daily, the problem is increasing in volume. Long delay in complying with War Assets Administration shipping instructions is occurring frequently because the greatly reduced personnel strength at inactive bases cannot efficiently and expeditiously cope with the problem. A serious implication evolves from the fact that purchasers of Surplus Property from the War Assets Administarion have already paid their money to the War Assets Administration and are not receiving their property. This results in political repercussion to the War Assets Administration, which in turn shows that delay in shipment is caused, not in their office, but at the installation where the property to be shipped is located.

2. To cope with the problem, this Headquarters has pursued an aggressive, energetic policy of assisting bases which are surplus to dispose of their property, zero out their accounts, transfer the installation to the District Engineer, and close out the base unit. An inactivation project team has been formed and will shortly be put in operation. This team consists of approximately thirty (30) men and one (1) officer. Included are supply specialists, carpenters, duty soldiers, etc., who are familiar with inactivation at base level. This team is "loaned" to the base commander at a particular installation and works under his command until the base is ready to be closed. The team is then moved to another base and the same process is repeated.

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Subject: Disposal of Property Transferred to War Assets Administration
TAC 400.22 (11 June 46)

3. It is requested that the agreement by which the Army Air Forces is obligated to comply with War Assets Administration shipping orders on Surplus Property be reviewed in an effort to obtain, relief for the Army Air Forces from compliance wit these shipments. The assumption of responsibility for shipping Surplus Property at station level by the War Assets Administration would be the ideal solution.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/Clarence N. Keen
/t/CLARENCE N. KEEN
Maj., Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
BOLLING FIELD 20, D. C.

A 4D

SAC 400 (27 Mar 46) 27 March 1946

SUBJECT: Supply demobilization of temporarily inactive bases for week ending 9 March 1946.

TO : See distribution

1. Submitted for information is an analysis of the statistics reported by installations concerned with temporary inactivation (report control symbol CAF-SM-E2).

2. For the week ending 9 March 1946 a total of 53 installations were concerned with demobilization of equipment and supplies. This represents a difference is accounted for by the fact that ASF has recently released CAF of jurisdiction over 3 installations, whereas there was a gain of one installation in the inactivation category.

The installations released to ASF include:

Bradley Fld. AF1AF
Key Fld. AF3AF
Bartow AAFld. AF3AF

* * * * * * * *

AVERAGE PERCENTAGES SUPPLY DEMOBILIZATION
Week Ending 9 March 1946
(Includes only installations under CAF jurisdiction)

Command	No of Reports	Dispos Instruc Requested		Dispos Instruc Received		Processing & Packing		Ship and/or Storage	
Phase		I		II		III		IV	
Equipment		AAF	ASF	AAF	ASF	AAF	ASF	AAF	ASF
AF1AF	3	100.	90.3	100.	88.7	82.3	81.3	80.7	81.0
AF2AF*	13	94.7	96.5	78.7	82.7	74.4	74.5	63.7	65.8
AF3AF	15	100.	100.	85.5	96.5	78.3	88.6	76.2	86.6

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Subj: Supply demobilization for temporarily inactive bases for week ending 9 March 1946.

Command	No of Reports	Dispos Instruc Requested		Dispos Instruc Received		Processing & Packing		Ship and/or Storage	
Phase		I		II		III		IV	
Equip ment		AAF	ASF	AAF	ASF	AAF	ASF	AAF	ASF
AF4AF	13	99.8	99.9	95.4	97.2	93.5	94.0	91.7	92.6
AFTCC	9	83.0	78.1	71.3	73.1	56.7	64.8	51.8	58.3
Total CAF 53									
CAF Average		95.5	93.0	86.2	87.2	77.0	80.6	72.8	76.9
Prev Wk									
Total CAF 55									
Prev Wk Av		96.1	94.0	87.3	88.2	78.5	82.2	74.3	78.2

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

3. Freezing of shipments on all installations not surplus to the War Department, together with lack of experienced personnel, continue to be the major delaying factors in supply demobilization activities. In some cases delay of receipt of disposition instructions (phase 2) is retarding progress in phases 3 and 4.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

5. The table below gives a breakdown of the inactivation classification of installations within each command:

Command	Total Instls	Instls TIS	Instls SWD	Instls 100% Inactivated*
AF1AF	3	2	-	1
AF2AF	13	12	-	1
AF3AF	15	6	7	2
AF4AF	13	6	5	2
AFTCC	9	5	3	1
CAF Total	53	31	15	7

*Remaining under CAF Jurisdiction.

6. Base which reflect an overall average of between 90% and less than 100% for the four (4) phases under consideration are given below showing the percentage levels reached within each phase:

Instl Equip	Comd	Date	SWD	* * *	* * *	*
* * *	* * *	* * *	* * *	* * *	* * *	*
Chatham	AF3AF	-				
Dale Mabry	AF3AF	17 Dec				
Dyersberg	AF3AF	-				
Muskogee	AF3AF	-				
Sarasota	AF3AF	29 Jan				
Venice	AF3AF	15 Nov				
Kellog	AFTCC	-				

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Subj: Supply demobilization of temporarily inactive bases for week ending 9 March 1946.

A summary of the above information is presented below.

Command	Total Bases being Inactivated	Bases overall average over 90% and less than 100% Bases with Aver 90% & Over	# SWD	# TIS	% of total bases with 90% & over
AF1AF	2	1	-	1	50
AF2AF	12	2	-	2	16.7
AF3AF	13	6	3	3	46.1
AF4AF	11	9	5	4	81.8
AFTCC	8	1	-	1	12.5
CAF Total	46	19	8	11	41.3

7. Installation listed below showed little or no progress (less than 2 % change) for the week under consideration.

Installations	Command	Date SWD
		SURPLUS TO WAR DEPARTMENT
Dale Mabry	AF3AF	17 Dec 45
Gulfport	AF3AF	6 Feb 46
Sarasota	AF3AF	29 Jan 46
Venice	AF3AF	15 Nov 45
Will Rogers	AF3AF	25 Feb 46
* * *	* * *	* * *
		NOT SURPLUS TO WAR DEPARTMENT
* * *	* * *	* * *
Alexandria	AF3AF	-
Chatham	AF3AF	-
Coffeyville	AF3AF	-
Myersberg	AF3AF	-
Esler	AF3AF	-
Muskogee	AF3AF	-
* * *	* * *	* * *
Baer	AFTCC	-
Blytheville	AFTCC	-
Kellogg	AFTCC	-
Malden	AFTCC	-
Marfa	AFTCC	-

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Subj: Supply demobilization of temporarily inactive bases for week ending 9 March 1946.

8. In relation to the date of their inactivation orders and/or the date declared surplus to the War Department the installtions listed below appear to be lagging in the process of reaching 100% inactivation. All installations which have been declared surplus to the War Department do not have to conform to the freeze order in Hq CAF A4FI-5041. It is also apparent that complete inactivation of many installations has been retarded by delay in the processing and packing (Phase III) and shippins and storage (Phase IV) functions.

Installation	Comd	Date Inact Orders	Date SWD
SURPLUS TO WAR DEPARTMENT			
Venice	AF3AF	15 Oct	15 Nov
Dale Mabry	AF3AF	30 Nov	17 Dec
Drew	AF3AF	31 Dec	30 Jan
Sarasota	AF3AF		29 Jan
Gulfport	AF3AF		6 Feb
Will Rogers	AF3AF	31 Jan	25 Jan
George	AFTCC		28 Feb
NOT SURPLUS TO WAR DEPARTMENT			
Esler	AF3AF	30 Sep	
Coffeyville	AF3AF	-	
Muskogee	AF3AF	-	
Dyersburg	AF3AF	15 Oct	
Maldin	AFTCC	-	
Kellogg	AFTCC	31 Oct	

Installation	Comd	Date Inact Orders	Date SWD
NOT SURPLUS TO WAR DEPARTMENT			
Alexandria	AF3AF	-	
Blytheville	AFTCC	-	
Marfa	AFTCC	-	
Chatham	AF3AF	-	
Baer	AFTCC	-	
Hunter	AF3AF	-	
Maxton	AFTCC	-	

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Harris F. Scherer
HARRIS F. SCHERER
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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Basis: Ltr, Hqs TAC, subj: "Report of Inspection," dtd 30 August 46.

1st Ind. HQTS-ES

HEADQUARTERS, Dover Army Air Field and 320th AAF Base Unit (Base Services), Dover, Delaware, 10 September 1946.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

1. There has been considerable confusion and lowered efficiency, due to changes in command at this base. Since 1 July 1946, command has changed five times, involving five different officers. The undersigned assumed command 3 September 1946 and has orders to deport this station on or about 16 September 1946.

2. Basis report contains considerable criticism, based on the fact that this base had not accomplished more toward inactivation at time of inspection, 26 to 29 August 1946. Attention is invited to the fact that the base continued operations through 31 August 1946, that all activities and facilities were required to be maintained, and that in addition, base services were furnished the 320th AAF Base Unit through 31 August 1946. Not withstanding the fact that inactivation was the primary mission of the base from about 10 August 1946. In view of normal operating requirements, new annel shortage and personnel changes taking place daily at the direction of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, it was difficult to progress further along the lines of inactivation.

3. It is true that personnel was available in numbers sufficient to accomplish more than was accomplished in the month of August. However, a considerable loss in efficiency and accomplishment was suffered due to disorganization inherent to above-mentioned causes, and the loss of personnel best fitted to carry out inactivation procedures.

******

s/ Emil I. Sluga
s/ EMIL I. SLUGA
1st Lt, AC
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE (A4) C-19

TAMPA, FLORIDA

24 Feb 1946

COMMANDING GENERAL
CONTINENTAL AIR FORCES
BOLLING FIELD,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A4 236 PD REFERENCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH COLONEL BRIGGS YOUR HQ AND COLONEL WELLER THIS HQ PD IN ORDER TO AVOID COMPLICATIONS INCIDENT TO RIGHT OF ENTRY GRANTED BY DIVISION ENGINEERS TO DREW FIELD WHICH INCLUDED USR OF AIRPORT CMA AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES FOR WHICH THE MILITARY AUTHORITY IS STILL ACCOUNTABLE CMA THIS HQ IS ARRANGING LOAN OF AAF AND ASF ITEMS DESIRED BY THE CITY BUT NOT YET DETERMINED AS SURPLUS ON MEMO RECEIPT SUBJECT TO BEING WITHDRAWN TO SUPPLY CHANNELS PD THIS ACTION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS BUT IS BELIEVED TO BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF SERVICE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES PD ACTION BY DIVISION ENGINEERS IN THIS CASE IS PREMATURE PD IT IS APPARENT HE IS UNDER IMPRESSION ALL PROPERTY ON SURPLUS BASES HAS BEEN DECLARED SURPLUS AND IS SUBJECT TO ACT ON UNDER SURPLUS RULES AND REGULATIONS PD YOUR APPROVAL IS DESIRED PD THIS SITUATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BUT WILL PREVENT IMMEDIATE REPERCUSSSIONS PD ONLY QUICK DETERMINATION OF SURPLUS BEFORE CITY OFFICIALS PLANS ARE FIRMLY ROOTED CAN AVOID DIFFICULT CONSEQUENCES.

QUESADA HQ THIRD AF

/t/ OTIS C. TURNER
WOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen.

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[HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE]
[Tempe, Florida]

A4-C-7

3AF 400.7 (15 Mar 46) 15 March 1946

SUBJECT: Disposition of Supplies at Surplus Installations.

TO: Commanding General, Air Technical Service Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio.

1. The advance copy of Army Air Forces material and services directive No. 67-28, dated 6 March 46, advance copy, has been received and is considered a satisfactory instrument for implementing a rapid clearing out of supplies at surplus installations provided prompt action is forthcoming when property has been reported.

2. The long delay already experienced has rendered the situation critical. In most instances Army Air Forces property has been reported to depots and has been in the hands of the depots for decision for some time, yet disposition instructions have been withheld, to too great an extnet, in too many cases.

3. The lists of airports operating equipment previously submitted will be re-submitted immediately in accordance with 67-28. However, this equipment in some cases represents only a small portion of the overall Army Air Forces property already reported, and for which disposition instructions have not yet been received.

4. It will be appreciated that where surplus installations are concerned the War Department has not delayed granting rights of entry to civilian enterprise. Since the Army Air Forces has been made practically no surplus declarations, action by the District Engineer to function under WD Circular 28 legally embodies only the buildings, grounds, and such items already declared surplus, usually ASF property.

5. In these instances the civilian element is desirous of maintaining in operation, an airport, and this headquarters is placed in the difficult position of either obstructing by refusing to part with required Army Air Forces items or loaning them. To avoid political repercussion we have loaned certain items indicated by representatives as contemplated in Circular 28 on a memorandum receipt basis. This situation is not desirable as the civilian element is certain to protest if Army Air Forces attempts to withdraw items under consideration for short supply.

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6. The only proper solution is for Army Air Forces to determine its surplus prior to the time the War Department makes the station surplus or within a very short time thereafter.

7. With regard to Circular 34 the question in this headquarters arose as to whether we could not declare surplus under the provisions of paragraph 9.b., however, it is clear that this cannot be done at the station level until some assurance is had that the items under consideration are not in short supply. This is the crux of the whole matter.

8. Anything which your headquarters can do to expedite this matter will greatly enhance the possibilities of complete deactivations without further complication, which, at this time, appear to have serious consequence.

9. It is requested that this letter be brought to the personnel attention of General Gordon and Mr. Stemple of your headquarters, who, it is believed, have an intimate knowledge of this problem and who have been directly in communication with General Lee of this headquarters on recent occasion.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/t/ CLARENCE N. KEEN
Maj. Air Corps
Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen.

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Subject: Equipment required for operation of an active civilian airport.

3AF 400 (7 Mar 46) 2nd Ind A4-C-7
HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE, Tampa, Florida,
21 Mar 1946

To: Asst. Engineer Consultant Radar and AAF Equip., ASF OCSIGO Storage & Issue Agency, 128 North Broad St., Philidelphia, Pennsylvania.
THROUGH: Hq. Army Air Force, Washington, D. C.

1. This correspondence is routed through your office as it is understood that Mr. Hayans office of the addresse will meet with you on Wednesday, March 20th, for the purpose of clarifying existing instructions on the subject, and because it is particularly applicable to AAF supply.

2. The situation is apparently not understood by all agencies concerned, and as a result has reached a critical stage which may have serious consequences.

3. The problem is essentially this: this headquarters has property both AAF and ASF on bases which have been declared surplus to the needs of the War Department. In too many instances the ASF and the AAF have not:

a. Declared it surplus so that it may be handled in accordance with the surplus property act.

b. Given disposition instructions for shipment to military supply channels because it is in short supply.

4. Unless one or the other is done the supplies referred to will never be disposed of under existing regulations including WD Circular 34, AAF materiel and services 67-28 and WD Circular 28.

5. a. The question has arisen that airport operating equipment will not be otherwise disposed of without first having been offered for sale or lease to the state, political sub-division or municipality etc. (See WD Circular 34 and AAF M&S Directive 67-28.)

b. Your attention is invited to the fact that 5a. above is a surplus property act and applicable to surplus property only. It is not a WD directive. There is nothing in any WD,AAF, ASF, or other military publication which states that airport operating equipment or any other equipment will not be disposed of without having been effered for sale or lease to anybody.

6. This headquarters takes the firm stand that the proper procedure for disposing of all military property is for the chief of the branch concerned to:

a. Order all property needed by the Army back into Army Depots.

b. Declare the balance surplus.

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required
Subj: Equipment/for operation of an active civilian airport. 21 Mar 1946

7. To date this has not been done by the AAF, and it has been done only to a limited extent by the AAF. The attached basic correspondence with 1st Ind. is an example applicable to ASF.

8. a. As a result of the failure of the military establishment to act on its existing regulations and provide organization in the field with dispositoin instructions, the following difficulty situation has arisen in this Air Force.

b. The War Department has declared many stations surplus. This declaration applied only to the buildings and grounds. Rights of entry were immediately granted. Cities and municipalities desiring to obtain airports and airport operating equipment immediately regotiated with the Division Engineer, who, under WD Circular 28 and the Surplus Property Act, attempted to lease the property to the cities, notwithstanding the fact that the ASF and theAAF property under consideration was not yet declared surplus and not subject to Circular 28 and Surplus Property Act. This headquarters was placed in the difficult position of refusing to allow the use of such property, thereby ricking a deluge of political inquires at AAF Headquarters or loaning the equipment until the AAF and the ASF could make its determinations as to what was surplus and what is needed by the ARMY. The property was loaned on memorandum receipt with the understanding that it might be withdrawn. Despite this understanding it may be expected that the municipalities will bend every effort to prevent the future withdrawal. The situation therefor acts against the best interest of the service.

9. It is imperative that the chiefs of the supply brahches proceed with all possible haste in making its surplus declarative in order that short supply can be withdrawn before rights of entry are granted creating further confusion. This headquarters has written numberous correspondence on the subject to CAF, the Materiel and Services Command, and ASF Depots, to date no progress has been made toward a universal understanding of the problem between all branches concerned. It is urgently requested that every effort be made to clarify this problem before further difficulties arise.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

9 Incls. n/c

/t/CLARENCE N. KEEN
Maj. Air Corps
Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Effect of WD Cir 138 on Inactivation
1	A. C. B. A-4 18 Jun 46	A-4 C/S	The effect of War Department Circular no 138, 1946, on the inactivation of bases raises the following issues: a. Higher headquarters must give an unambiguous interpretation of Circular 138 as it applies to War Department Circular No 34. The specific answer desired is whether or not Circular 138 is meant to supersede or rescind Circular 34. Circular 138 does not indicate this is to be so, but the ex-Seventh Service Command has already issued instructions to its lower echelons to accept no property accounts, i, e., Surplus Property specifically at Class III installations after 11 June 1946. This means that instead of moving off the base after transfer of the field to the District Engineer, the Air Force must keep military and civilian personnel on the base until the last item of Surplus Property has been disposed. In this manner, the Air Force could be concerned with Surplus Property on surplus bases for many months. The decision as to whether this will be an Air Force obligation or whether it will be a Ground Force obligation should be clarified. If the Air Force is to be so obligated, then plans can be formulated accordingly. b. It is the opinion of those concerned with inactivation that in any event no change should be made in the policy of pointing toward an early transfer of each surplus station to the respective District Engineer. If property still remains at the time of transfer, accountability can be transferred to an active base, and the personnel concerned can be assigned to an active base and put back on Detached Service at the surplus station until the property is removed. The most important single factor supporting this procedure is that the right of entry, which causes most of the problems of a political nature, has originated in the Division Engineer's Office, and the engineer, therefore, is the logical party to assume jurisdictional control of the field and handle such problems directly.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Effect of WD Cir 138 on Inactivation (Cont'd)
1	a. c. b. A-4 18 Jun 46	A-4 C/S	c. Property disposal, except Surplus Property, will be generally unaffected. If the Air Force is to continue to hold Surplus Property accountability until ultimate physical disposal from the station, then this should be clearly determined and all concerned so informed.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia (AlF)

9 Jul 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Property Accountability and Reassignment of Personnel.

TO: Commanding Officer
Hunter Field
Savannah, Georgia

1. As of the date Hunter Field is turned over to the District Engineer, property accountability will be transferred to Chatham Field. This transfer of property accountability will be "on paper" only, in order that the 302nd AAF Base Unit may be discontinued as soon as possible after the date of transfer.

2. Concurrently with the transfer of property accountability all personnel assigned to the 302nd AAF Base Unit will be reassigned to the 324th AAF Base Unit, Chatham Field. This personnel will remain on Temporary Duty at Hunter Field, officers will not be paid Per Diem and enlisted men will be entitled to only monstary allowances in lieu of subsistance when applicable, to complete the remaoval of all property which remains at Hunter Field after the transfer. When personnel currently at Hunter Field become surplus, they will be reported as surplus on Chatham Field's P-18 report in order that new assignments may be determined.

BY COMMANDOF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

Info cpy to:
CO Chatham AAFld

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

A4
22125

BOOK MESSAGE ROUTINE

11 Jul 1946
W.F.G.

COMMANDING GENERAL
THIRD AIR FORCE
GREENVILLE ARMY AIR BASE
GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA

COMMANDING GENERAL
NINTH AIR FORCE
BIGGS FIELD
EL PASO, TEXAS

COMMANDING GENERAL
TWELFTH AIR FORCE
MARCH FIELD
RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA

A4 899 PD FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM HQ AAF DATED ONE ZERO JUL FOUR SIX IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION QUOTE AF DBS DASH FOUR DASH C EIGHT ONE FIVE PD THE FOLLOWING LTR DTD TWO SIX JUNE FOUR SIX FR THE ADJUTANT GENERALS OFFICE SUBJ DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS SERVICEABLE MILITARY PROPERTY AT SURPLUS CLASS III INSTLS WHICH ADDRESSED TO CG AAF AND CGS OF ALL ARMIES ZI IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION ARMY COMMANDERS WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY INCLUDING PROVISION FOR ACCOUNTABILITY FOR DECLARED SURPLUS SERVICEABLE MILITARY PROPERTY AT SURPLUS CLASS III INSTLS WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS OF THE ARMY AREA ON THE DATE WHEN SUCH INSTLS ARE DECLARED SURPLUS BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN SECTION II WD CIR THREE FOUR ONE NINE FOUR SIX ARE APPLICABLE AN AAF LTR ON THIS SUBJ IS NOW IN PROCESS OF PUBLICATION AND WILL BE RECEIVED ON REGULAR DISTRIBUTION UNQUOTE

QUESADA HQS TACAIRCOMD

/t/PAUL R. CERF
Capt., AGD
Asst. Adj Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia A4

SUBJECT: Property Disposal at Coffeyville Army Air Field
16 Oct 1946

TO: Commanding General
Air Materiel Command
Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio
ATTENTION: Chief, Property Disposal Section

1. Reference is made to the disposaition of supply at Coffeyville Army Air Field, Coffeyville, Kansas. A recent visit by the Tactical Air Command's Inactivation Inspector reveals the following situation:

a. Fifteen percent (15%) of the total disposition instructions previously given were withdrawn, presumably to allow Air Materiel Command to remonitor certain classes of equipment. The date, allbut three per cent (3%) of the dispositon instructions outstanding have been returned to Coffeyville for action by the accountable officer. This situation has presently delayed closing of that station by approximately thirty-five (35) days and will cause further delay if the remaining three per cent (3%) of disposition instructions is not received by Coffeyville by 25 October 1946.

b. The Tactical Air Command Inspector was informed by a telephone conversation with Air Materiel Command Disposition Officers that most of the supply, still in question, is to be donated to various institutions. During the inspection, a representative of Kansas State University arrived in Coffeyville to look over the Class 16 items and select those desired by the University. If each list of property on which disposition instructions remain outstanding is to be donated in this manner, complete dispositoin instructions on remaining property in question could be delayed several more weeks. Because of the current civilian personnel and budget reduction, Tactical Air Command is most desirous of completing the withdrawal of the AAF Base Unit from Coffeyville by 25 November 1946.

2. To accomplish the above, the Coffeyville Accountable Officer must receive complete disposition instructions by 25 October 1946. If this is not feasible, it is suggested that the Independence Army Air Field be directed to receive that supply and equipment, amounting

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Ltr Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va TO: CG AMC Wright Fld, Dayton, O, Subj: "Property Disposal at Coffeyville Army Air Field" 16 Oct 1946

materially to approximately twelve (12) 2-1/2 ton truck loads, which is still in question. This would allow the accountable officer at Coffeyville to complete the disposition of supply, on which he now has dispositoin instructions, by the middle of November 1946. Any delay past 25 October 1946 in receiving those disposition instructions still outstanding will delay complete closing og the station by the amount of time the instructions are received past that date.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/t/ GLENN O BARCUS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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C O P Y

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

TAC 322 (12 Apr 46) 12 April 1946

SUBJECT: Organization Plan of the Tactical Air Command.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces
War Department, Washington, D. C.
ATTENTION: Major General Earle E. Partridge, USA
Assistant Chief of Air Staff 3.

1. At the Commanders' Meeting in Washington on 16 April, the undersigned intends to present an outline of the proposed operating plan of the Tactical Air Command. This plan, of necessity, must include the Command organizational requirements which are necessary for the performance of its mission. It is hoped that this plan, in full or in part, will be approved at that time by the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces in order that the Tactical Air Command may progress with the details of locating, equipping and manning the elements of the force required to implement the plan.

2. The general features of the proposed organization and location of units contained in the plan are presented in this letter in order that members of the Air Staff may be familiar with this most important phase of the plan and prepare information on which approval, disapproval, or if necessary, alternate solutions to the problems incident to the plan may be based.

3. The key-note of the organization of this Command will be mobility and flexibility, two essential characteristics of tactical air units which are expected to perform their mission. The Tactical Air Command Headquarters will be organized somewhat similar to the Ninth Air Force Headquarters in the ETO, with Headquarters at Langley Field, Virginia, and will be prepared to operate and cooperate with the Army Group which will be located at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Directly assigned to the Tactical Air Command Headquarters and with home station at Langley Field will be the following units:

a. 300th Base Unit

b. (?) Communication Squadron

c. (?) Radio Squadron, Mobile

d. (?) Engineer Topographical Company

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Ltr Subj, "Organizational Plan of the Tactical Air Command," contd.

e. (?) Aviation Engineer Battalion

The units listed under b, c, d, and e above are not presently authorized for this Command, but should be procured and assigned to this headquarters immediately upon transfer of the headquarters to Langley Field on or about 25 May 1946, or as soon thereafter as is permitted by overall Air Force plans.

4. The Air Forces under this command will be the Ninth (tactical), Third (troop carrier), and the Twelfth (tactical). It is proposed to activate the Twelfth Air Force on 1 May 1946. The Third Air Force is presently located at Greenville, South Carolina, and will remain there. In order to cooperate properly with the surface forces, it is proposed that one of the tactical air forces be located in the eastern part of the United States and one in the west. In each of the tactical air force headquarters, it is proposed to locate one each of the following type units:

a. AAF Unit

b. Tactical Control Group

c. Signal Battalion (Separate)

d. Communications Squadron

e. Detachment of Radio Squadron, Mobile

f. (1) Fighter Bomber Group

(2) Service Group

(3) Night Fighter Squadron

5. The Ninth Air Force Headquarters is now located at Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, a location from which it is unable to perform properly its mission. The ideal location for this headquarters and associated units enumerated above is Tyndall Field, Panama City, Florida. It is proposed to move the Ninth Air Force Headquarters and associated units, less the fighter and service group, for permanent station to Tyndall Field. Inasmuch as Tyndall Field will be used as a gunnery range, fighter groups will be rotated through that field on temporary status for gunnery training and combined tactical training with elements of the Air Force Headquarters, the tactical control group and night fighter squadrons. Other units to be assigned to the Ninth Air Force as they become available and proposed locations for the units are as follows:

a. (1) Fighter Bomber Group (Shaw Field)

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(2) Service Group

b. (1) Fighter Bomber Group (Dover Field)

(2) Service Group

c. (1) Tactical Reconnaissance Group (Brooks Field)

(2) Service Group

d. (1) Light Bomber Group (Lockbourne Field)

(2) Service Group

e. (1) Light Bomber Group (Smyrna Field)

(2) Service Group

6. The Twelfth Air Force, its base unit, and reduced elements of its control group, signal battalion (seperate), communications squadron, and its detachment of radio squadron, mobile, as well as a fighter group, service group, and night fighter squadron will be located at March Field, California. The 412th Fighter Group, its associated service group and a night fighter squadron are presently located at March Field and will be assigned to the Twelfth Air Force upon activation of the letter. Additional units to be assigned to the Twelfth Air Force as they become available and locations are as follows:

a. (1) Fighter Bomber Group (Biggs Field)

(2) Service Group

b. (1) Fighter Bomber Group (McChord Field)

(2) Service Group

(3) Night Fighter Squadron (seperate)

c. (1) Tactical Reconnaissance Group (none available)

(2) Service Group

d. (1) Light Bomber Group (none available)

(2) Service Group

7. a. It will be noted from paragraph 4, 5, and 6 above that the following units, necessary to the tactical air forces, for them

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Ltr subj, "Organization Plan of the Tactical Air Command," contd.

to perform their missions, are not presently authorized and should be procured and assigned to this command at the earliest practicable date.

(1) Detachment Radio Squadron, mobile (for the Ninth Air Force)(from Radio Squadron, mobile, noted in paragraph 3 above)

(2) Same for Twelfth Air Force

(3) Tactical Control Group (reduced)(for Twelfth Air Force)

(4) Signal Battallion, seperate (reduced)(for the Twelfth Air Force

(5) Communications Squadron (for Twelfth Air Force)

b. Authorization for activation of the Twelfth Air Force on or about 1 May 1946 is required.

c. There are only two (2) fields assigned to this command west of El Paso. Two (2) additional fields in the west are required for the Tactical Reconnaissance Group and the Light Bomb Group to be assigned to the Twelfth Air Force.

8. This plan is based on the best information available, flew charts and organization charts prepared for planning purposes and which were obtained from Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Justification for the above outlined organizational and station requirements will be presented at the Commanders' Meeting on 16 April 1946.

E. R. QUESADA
Maj Gen U.S. Army
Commanding General

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington, D.C.

12 July 1946

SUBJECT: Total Personnel Authorizations, Bulk and T/O, for Tactical Air Command

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

Attention: General Quesada

1. This is the second issue of the Army Air Forces Command letter which is designed to acquaint you with workloads and station utilization assumed in preparing manpower authorizations for your command.

2. The bulk personnel authorization to your command for reporting 31 July and the projected bulk personnel authorizations for 31 August and 30 September 1946 are shown on Tab A attached hereto. Tab B explains the workloads and station utilization that has been assumed in the preparation of the bulk authorizations. The Zone of Interior T/O authorizations for your command, as of 25 June 1946, are reflected on Tab C.

3. With reference to the names of stations and workloads assumed (Tab B) in figuring permanent party personnel requirements for your command, the AAF troop basis and reduction in funds for civilian personnel have made it necessary to project the discontinuance of certain equivalent installations or activities to bring the Zone of Interior requirements within the totals to be available to the AAF. While the numbers of active installations as scheduled for your command in Tab B are to be considered firm, your command may desire to transfer missions or substitute stations for certain of those shown by name in Tab B. In the event that certain shifts in mission or substitution of station names are considered more practicable, it is requested that your recommended changes be submitted to this headquarters by 20 July 1946.

4. The following considerations are worthy of your attention in evaluating the Hq AAF authorization of T/O & E units for your command:

a. This headquarters has immediate access to all WD, AG letters reflecting WD authorized changes to the AAF Troop Basis. Changes in the troop basis are made here upon receipt of an AG letter or cable directing activation, inactivation, disbandment or reorganization unless the letter or cable establishes a specific date for such action.

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SUBJECT: Total Personnel Authorizations Bulk and T/O, for Tactical Air Command (12 July 1946)

In addition, changes in a command's authorized strength are made here at the time a directive is issued reassigning a unit from one command to another, the varied time lag before you receive this same information and the fact that your headquarters may make the prescribed change in your records at such time as directed action has actually been accomplished, is valid basis for a variance between the figures contained herein and those reflected in the records of your headquarters for the same "as of date".

b. Changes in the assignment of T/O & E units between continental commands may be made with little or no advance notice. Consequently, the possibility of a quick change in your commands T/O & E picture will exist until the complete organization of each continental command has crystallized.

5. This headquarters plans to issue in August 1946 a letter containing data indicating the predicted flow, at least by quarters and perhaps by months, of trained personnel to continental commands.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Leon W. Johnson

LEON W. JOHNSON
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy AC/AS-1

3 Incls:
1. Tab A - Bulk Pers Auth yr Cmd for rptng 31 July, & Proj Bulk Pers Auth's for 31 July & 30 Sept 46.
2. Tab B - Stations and activities assumed in projecting perm party pers.
3. Tab C - T/O unit auth's yr Cmd as of 25 June 46.

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BULK AUTHORIZATIONS FOR TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

	Authorized 31 July 1946	Projected 31 August 1946	Projected 30 September 1946
Officers	1,652	1,652	1,514
W/O	69	69	69
ANC	54	54	54
HD	4	4	4
PTA	2	2	2
Enlisted	6,567	6,567	5,967
Total Civilians	10,645	10,645	8,446
Civilians Subj BED (Included in above totals)	6,615	6,615	5,442

TAB "A"

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Stations and Activities Assumed in Projecting
Permanent Party Personnel Requirements

Station or Activity	31 July '46	31 August '46	30 September '46
Headquarters			
TAC	x	x	x
3AF	x	x	x
9AF	x	x	x
12AF	x	x	x
Medium Bomb			
Lockbourne	x	x	x
Light Bomb			
Lake Charles	x	x	x
Fighter			
March Field	x	x	x
Biggs Field	x	x	x
McChord	x	x	x
Troop Carrier			
Pope	x	x	x
Sedalia	x	x	x
Lawson	x	x	x
Reconnaissance			
Brooks Field	x	x	x
Miscellaneous			
Marshall	x	x	x
Sherman	x	x	x
C & GSS Faculty	x	x	x
Myrtle Beach	x	x	x
Langley	x	x	x
Processing for Standby			
Dover	PFTI	PFTI	TI
Bergstrom	PFTI	PFTI	TI
Greenville	PFTI	PFTI	TI
Shaw	PFTI	PFTI	TI
Smyrna	PFTI	PFTI	TI
Tuskegee	PFTI	PFTI	TI
Standby Stations	24	24	16

PFTI - Preparation for Temporary Inactivation
TI - Temporarily Inactive

TAB B

AFAPM-1
2 Jul '46

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington

11 June 1946

SUBJECT: Total Personnel Authorizations, Bulk and T/O, for Tactical Air Command

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

ATTENTION: General Quesada

1. The purpose of this letter is to acquaint you with current personnel allocations planning, as it applies to your Command, in order that you may have a basis for local planning. It must be borne in mind that some modification of the figures furnished herewith may be necessitated by changing conditions. However, you will be notified promptly as any major change occurs.

2. From present indications, the authorized Troop Basis for the AAF on 1 July 1946 will stabilize at 400,000 military personnel Air Force-wide, and 200,000 civilian personnel for Z. I. only. Current planning contemplates a breakdown of the 400,000 military personnel as follows:

Officers & F/O	61,395
Nurses, HD's & PTA's	1,071
Warrant Officers	1,403
Enlisted	336,131
	400,000

In making allocation of the above stated Troop Basis, each major continental and overseas Air Command has been allotted its proportionate share based on its assigned mission. No personnel is being reserved; hence any increase in the Troop Basis of one command must result in a corresponding decrease in that of another.

3. The bulk personnel authorization to your Command for reporting 30 June 1946 and projected bulk personnel authorizations for 31 July 1946 and 31 August 1946 are shown on Tab A, attached hereto. Likewise, T/O unit authorizations for your Command, as of 25 May 1946,

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are reflected on Tab B. Tab C reflects the stations and activities assumed by this Headquarters in projecting permanent party personnel requirements for your Command. In connection with the T/O authorization, the following should be noted:

a. This Headquarters has immediate access to all WD AG Letters reflecting WD authorized changes to the AAF Troop Basis. Changes in the Troop Basis are made here upon receipt of an AG Letter or cable directing activation, inactivation, disbandment or reorganization - unless the letter or cable establishes a specific date for such action. In addition, changes in a command's authorized strength are made here at the time a directive is issued reassigning a unit from one command to another. The varied time lag before you receive this same information and the fact that your Headquarters may make the prescribed change in your records at such time as directed action has actually been accomplished, is valid basis for a variance between the figures contained herein and those reflected in the records of your Headquarters for the same "as of date".

b. Changes in the assignment of T/O units between continental commands may be made with little or no advanced notice. Consequently, the possibility of a quick change in your Command's T/O picture will exist until the complete organization of each continental command has crystallized.

4. In most cases the total personnel assigned will be approximately equal to the authorization for your Command. The AAF-wide shortage of skilled technicians will, however, be reflected in your Command. It is estimated that by mid-summer the average Z. I. command may expect that approximately 55% of its bulk authorizations for skilled personnel will be filled by individuals properly trained. The output of the technical training pipeline through the ensuing months will be largely channelled into overseas theaters, and this source may not be anticipated as a material aid to the manning problems of the Z. I. commands. Z. I. commands may expect their position on technically trained personnel to be improved only by the following factors:

a. Accrual of long-term enlistees.

b. On-the-job training of assigned personnel.

c. Technical school training for their personnel on an assigned status.

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Basic Ltr, Hq AAF, subj: Total Personnel Authorizations, Bulk and T/O for Tactical Air Command (11 Jun 46)

The aid to be obtained from continuation of enlistments is contingent upon many factors presently indeterminate, including possible Congressional action concerning draft legislation, rate of improvement of conditions in civilian industries, and possible added legislative inducements to enlistees. Aid to be gained by on-the-job training and by school training on an assigned status is largely a matter for determination by your Command. Vigorous action ot obtain maximum relief through these two measures is strongly recommended.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Leon W. Johnson

LEON W. JOHNSON
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Deputy, AC/AS-1

3 Incls
1. Tab A - Bulk Pers Auth yr Comd for Rptng 30 June, & Proj Bulk Pers Auth's for 31 Jul & 31 Aug 46.
2. Tab B - T/O Unit Auth's yr Comd as of 25 May 46.
3. Tab C - Stations and activities assumed by this Hq in projecting permanent party reqmts.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND BULK AUTHORIZATIONS

	Actual 30 June 1946	Projected 31 July 1946	Projected 31 August 1946
Officers	1,773	1,773	1,773
W/O	78	78	78
Nurses	64	64	64
HD	4	4	4
PTA	2	2	2
Enlisted	7,273	7,273	7,273
Total Civilians	10,698	10,698	10,698
Civilians Subj BSD (Included in above total	6,454	6,454	6,454

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Stations and Activities Assumed in Projecting
Permanent Party Personnel Requirements

Station or Activity	Mission	30 June	31 July	31 August
TAC Headquarters		1	1	1
Air Forces Headquarters		3	3	3
Lockbourne AAF	Comp. Gp. Sta.	1	1	1
Lake Charles AAF	L. B. Sta.	1	1	1
March Fld.	Fighter Station & Misc. Activities	1	1	1
Biggs Fld.	Fighter Station & Misc. Activities	1	1	1
Dover AAF	No mission	1	1	1
McChord Fld.	No mission	1	1	1
Greenville AAB	TC Hdq. Sta.	1	1	1
Bergstrom AAF	TC Sta.	1	1	1
	Chinese Tng	138 crews	0	0
Pope Fld.	TC Sta.	1	1	1
Sedalia AAF	TC Sta., (No Gp.)	1	1	1
Lawson Fld.	Paratroop Tng	1	1	1
Brooks Fld.	Recn. Sta; and Misc. Activities	1	1	1
Shaw Fld.	Recn. Sta; (No Gp.)	1	1	1
Marshall Fld.	Ln. Sq. Sta.	1	1	1
Sherman Fld.	Adm. & Faculty for C&GSS	1	1	1
Smyrna AAF	Proficiency Flying	1	1	1

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Stations and Activities Assumed in Projecting
Permanent Party Personnel Requirements

Station or Activity	Mission	30 June	31 July	31 August
Tuskegee AAF	Proficiency Flying	1	1	PPTI
	Pilot Tng. Colored	40	40	0
Langley Fld.	Adm. Services	1	1	1
Myrtle Beach	Range & Spray Team	1	1	1
Inactive Stations		29	29	25

PPTI - Preparation for Temporary Inactive Status.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters Army Air Forces
Washington

AFDIN-2B/2

1 April 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Command Jurisdiction of Tuskegee Army Air Field, Alabama, to Tactical Air Command.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida

1. It is desired that your command assume command jurisdiction of Tuskegee Army Air Field on or about 1 April 1946 and at 2359 hours on the date mutually agreed upon.

2. It is requested that your command contact the AAF Training Command directly relative to the effective date and other details of this transfer.

3. Your command and the AAF Training Command jointly will determine the strength, military and civilian, to be transferred because of the change in jurisdiction. A request to adjust the personnel allotment of your command based on the new work load resulting from the assumption of jurisdiction of this station will be transmitted to this headquarters.

4. Accomplishment of this assignment will be reported to this headquarters in the Daily Organization Status Change Report.

5. This headquarters will initiate action to amend War Department assignment list and will also notify the Interdepartmental Air Traffic Control Board accordingly.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

LEO J. ERLER, Col., A. C.
Deputy Chief, Air Installations Div
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-4

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington

3 Apr 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Tuskegee Army Air Field

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
MacDill Field
Tampa, Florida

1. The 477th Composite Group and the attached service unit are to be manned with the most efficient individuals selected from the personnel now assigned to the organization and from personnel at Tuskegee Army Air Field.

2. It is highly desirable to have the above screening accomplished by one agency. Such an arrangement would facilitate a more uniform selection standard, be fairer to the individuals being screened and would insure the best qualified individuals being included in the post-war 477th Composite Group. To attain this objective a directive is being prepared in this Headquarters transferring Tuskegee Army Air Field from the AAF Training Command to your command approximately 15 April 1946.

3. Presently there are twenty-four (24 pilot training students at Tuskegee Army Air Field. Interruption of this training by transfer of the students to another flying school in the AAF Training Command would result in a delay of graduation dates. Therefore, it is the desire of this Headquarters that pilot training at Tuskegee be continued under your command. The AAF Training Command has been notified of the above plan and has been directed to cooperate with your command so that the completion of pilot training at Tuskegee Army Air Field may be accomplished as expeditiously as possible.

4. Personnel in excess of the needs of the 477th Composite Group will be dealt with in accordance with directive from this Headquarters relative to the separation of excess personnel.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ C. C. Chauncey
C. C. CHAUNCEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Chief of Air Staff

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13 September 1946
131/ c/s

FROM WAR 1319072

RO CG TACTICAL AIR COMMAND LANGLEY FIELD VIR

WAR EIGHT ZERO TWO EIGHT ZERO REFERENCE YOUR TARE WILLIAM XRAY DASH XRAY TARE ABLE CHARLIE CHARLIE GEORGE FIVE TWO ZERO REGARDING LETTER HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FOCES TWO ONE AUGUST ONE NINE FOUR SIX PD PAR FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS CMA THE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED ARE APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED AS INDICATED BELOW PD SPECIFIC AUTHORITY NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT ANY OF THESE ACTIONS WILL BE MADE THE SUBJECT OF ABLE SEPARATE COMMUNICATION BY YOUR COMMAND AS REQUIRED PD NO RPT NO PUBLICITY CMA PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO BASES CMA WILL BE GIVEN SUCH ACTION PENDING RECEIPT BY YOU OF SUCH SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS PD. PAR PROPOSED ACTIONS COLON REDUCE TO TWO AIR FORCES DASH APPROVED PD DELAY ACTIVATION OF THREE NINE ONE AND FOUR SEVEN TWO AIR SERVICE GROUPS DASH APPROVED PD INACTIVATION OF ONE FIVE AIR COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CMA COMMAND DASH APPROVED PD DELAY ACTIVATION OF FIVE ZERO AND FIVE TWO TARE CHARLIE WING HEADQUARTERS DASH APPROVED PD INACTIVATE LAKE CHARLES DASH APPROVED PD CONTINUANCE OF TEMPORARY INACTIVE STATUS PD SEDALIA AND DOVER DASH APPROVED SMYRNA WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO TRAINING COMMAND PD INACTIVATE BERGSTROM DASH DISAPPROVED PD. INACTIVATE MYRTLE BEACH DASH RETAIN AS ACTIVE RANGE PD ACTIVITIES FROM LAKE CHARLES TO BIGGS DASH APPROVED AND ORDERS WILL ISSUE FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS PD.

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ACTIVITIES FROM BERGSTROM TO LAWSON DASH DISAPPROVED PD
ACTIVITIES AT BIGGS TO SHAW AND GREENVILLE DASH APPROVED
AND ORDERS WILL ISSUE UPON YOUR APPLICATION CONTAINING
DETAILS PD TACTICAL AIR COMMAND ROGER GROUP AND LIAISON
SQUADRON FROM BROOKS TO LANGLEY DASH APPROVED BUT WITHHOLD
ALL ACTION PENDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS PD
TRANSFER OF BROOKS TO AIR DEFENSE COMMAND WILL FOLLOW PD
ALL PUBLICITY FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS PD PAR CIVILIAN
PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS TO ZEBRA ITEM COMMANDS AHS
SCHEDULED TO BRING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE
ARMY AIR FORCES VK LINE WITH ESTIMATE OF THE FUNDS TO
BE AVAILABLE DURING THE FISCAL YEAR FOR THEIR PAYMENT
AND THEREFORE IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT COMMANDERS
MAKE REDUCTIONS IN FORCE AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE PD.
ANY DELAY IN MAKING REQUIRED REDUCTIONS IN FORCE WILL
ONLY NECESSITATE FURTHER CUTS LATER IN THE FISCAL YEAR PD
IN THE EVENT THE WAR DEPARTMENT FURTHER REDUCES CIVILIAN
PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE ARMY AIR FORCES CMA
FURTHER REPROGRAMMING AND CHANGES IN AUTHORIZATIONS
TO THE VARIOUS COMMANDS FROM THOSE PRESENTLY SCHEDULED
FOR THREE ONE DECEMBER ONE NINE FOUR SIX WILL BECOME
NECESSARY PD

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PAR IN ORDER THAT THIS HEADQUARTERS MAY HAVE COMPARABLE
DATA WITH THAT USED BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES
CMA IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE SCHEDULED WORK LOAD AND
PERSONNEL ALLOTMENT PLANNED FOR EACH STATION OR ACTIVITY
FOR EACH THREE ONE OCTOBER CMA THREE ZERO NOVEMBER AND
THREE ONE DECEMBER ONE NINE FOUR SIX BE SUBMITTED TO
THIS HEADQUARTERS CMA ATTENTION COLON MANPOWER AND
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT DIVISION ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF
DASH ONE ON FORM FIVE DASH ONE TWO TWO THREE CMA ARMY
AIR FORCES PAREN REVISED ONE SIX APRIL ONE NINE FOUR
FIVE PAREN AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE BUT NOT RPT NOT LATER
THAN ONE ZERO OCTOBER ONE NINE FOUR SIX PD SUCH REPORT IS
EXEMP FROM REPORTS CONTROL PROCEDURE UNDER PROVISIONS
OF PARAGRAPH FOUR DOG PAREN SEVEN PAREN ARMY REGULATION
THREE ZERO FIVE DASH ONE FIVE CMA JUNE ONE NINE
FOUR SIX PD

FROM COMGENAIR

13 SEPTEMBER 1946

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

26 November 1946

TAC 686.2 (26 Nov 46)

SUBJECT: Transfer of Brooks Field

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

1. It is the understanding of this headquarters that Brooks Field, San Antonio, Texas, will be transferred from Tactical Air Command to the Air Defence Command upon completion of the move of tactical units from Brooks Field to Langley Field.

2. This headquarters plans to complete the transfer of tactical units from Brooks Field to Langley Field on or about 20 December 1946.

3. It is requested that appropriate orders be issued directing the transfer of Brooks Field to the Air Defence Command, effective on or about 20 December 1946.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

GLENN O. BARCUS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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CONFIDENTIAL

(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

A4C

TAC 686 (6 Nov 46)

6 November 1946

SUBJECT: Future Disposition, Lake Charles Army Air Field, Louisiana.

TO: Commanding General
Ninth Air Force
Greenville Army Air Base
Greenville, South Carolina

1. Your attention is invited to:

a. Letter this headquarters, TAC 686, subject: "Disposition of Lake Charles Army Air Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana", dated 4 October 1946, classified "Confidential".

b. Letter this headquarters, TAC 686, subject: "Temporary Inactivation of Lake Charles Army Air Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana, dated 4 October 1946, classified "Confidential".

c. Letter, Headquarters Army Air Forces, subject: "Airways Detachment at Lake Charles Army Air Field, Louisiana" dated 28 October 1946, copy of which is inclosed (Incl #1).

d. Copy of draft of letter, this headquarters: "Transfer of Lake Charles Army Air Field", (Incl #2) which will be sent to your headquarters upon notification of the surplus declaration of the War Department.

2. Informal information from Army Air Forces indicates that Lake Charles Army Air Field will not be placed on a temporarily inactive status but will go directly on an excess status, which, it is understood, is to provide for "full preparation of all activities of the installation for formal transfer to the District Engineer, pending the surplus declaration by the War Department." Placing of Lake Charles Army Air Field on an excess status must wait in determination of Air Materiel Command requirements at Lake Charles Army Air Field.

3. This headquarters has initiated action to the Mobile Materiel Command Air Depot, Brookley Field, Alabama, to establish the requirements at Lake Charles Army Air Field in order that disposal and inactivation action will not be taken on facilities and items required by the Air Material Command. A meeting between representatives of the Air Materiel Command and this headquarters has been arranged for 1300 hours, 6 November 1946, at Lake Charles Army Air Field.

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Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va., subj: "Future Disposition, Lake Charles AAFld, Louisiana"

4. Pending receipt of instructions from Army Air Forces to place Lake Charles Army Air Field on the excess status referred to in paragraph 2 above, it is directed that immediate action be taken to comply with the provisions of:

a. AAF Manual 80-2D-2, "Inactivation Manual". June 1945.

b. WD Technical Bulletin Eng-86, "Maintenance of Inactive and Surplus Installations", dated May 1945.

c. Draft of letter forwarded herewith (Incl #2).

Except that disposal action and inactivation action will not be taken on any items of facilities that may be requested by Air Materiel Command as a result of the survey to made in compliance with the provisions of AFDIN-2A/1 letter forwarded herewith (Incl #1), and except that no arrangements can be made at this time with the District Engineer, Galveston, Texas, for arriving at a date (tentative) of transfer of Lake Charles Army Air Fields.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

GLENN O. BARCUS
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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EXTRACT COPY

/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/
/LANGLEY FIELD, VA./

7 August 1946

TAC 322 (7 Aug 46)

SUBJECT: Change of Status, Sedalia Army Air Field, Warrensburg, Missouri.

THROUGH: Commanding General, Third Air Force, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina.

TO : Commanding Officer, Sedalia Army Air Field, Warrensburg, Mo.

1. Effective 1 September 1946, Sedalia Army Air Field, Warrensburg, Missouri, is placed in a temporary inactive status. All facilities under your jurisdiction will likewise become temporarily inactive on this date. Inactivation is the primary mission of your station. Orderly and aggressive action will be initiated at once to the end that procedures for temporary inactivation will be completed by the deadline date of 1 October 1946.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
Army Air Forces Basic-Advanced Flying School
United States Military Academy

RAM:gml
Stewart Field, Newburgh, N.Y.

25 October 1946

Subject: Administration and Technical Control of Stewart Field

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. Forwarded herewith for informational purposes is copy of Letter, AGO, subject: "Administrative and Technical Control of Stewart Field, West Point, N. Y.", dated 20 November 1944, and copy of General Orders No. 36, Headquarters USMA, West Point, N. Y., dated 9 December 1944.

2. These directives are forwarded in an effort to clarify the responsibilities for administrative control and technical control of this station. It should be noted that the assignment and relief from assignment, except for disciplinary reasons, of all personnel to Stewart Field proper, other than the Commanding Officer, was formerly the responsibility of the Commanding General, Air Training Command and should now be assumed by the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command.

/s/ Benjamin J. Webster
BENJAMIN J. WEBSTER
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

2 Incls
1 - Ltr, AGO
2 - GO No. 36, USMA

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WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D.C.

686/267 S.F. RSM/lw

In Reply AG 352 (10 Nov 44)
Refer To OB-I-WDGAP

20 November 1944

Subject: Administrative and Technical Control of Stewart Field, West Point, New York

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces
Commanding General, Army Air Forces Training Command, Fort Worth, Texas
Superintendent, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, New York

1. Letter, this office, AG 352 (16 Feb 43) OB-I-AFACT, 26 April 1943, subject as above, is rescinded.

2. The administrative control of the Army Air Forces Basic-Advanced Flying School, United States Military Academy, Stewart Field, West Point, New York as prescribed by letter, this office, AG 352 (20 May 42) MT-AF, 22 May 1942, subject: "Establishment of an Air Forces Basic Advanced Flying School," as exercised by the Superintendent, United States Military Academy, shall include all personnel, both Army Air Forces and Arms and Services. The assignment and relief from assignment, except for disciplinary reasons, of all personnel to Stewart Field, proper, other than the Commandant, is the responsibility of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces Training Command. Post and Squadron organization shall be as approved by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The construction and maintenance and the procurement of all supplies other than Army Air Forces property shall be through the Superintendent, United States Military Academy.

3. The technical control as exercised by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces Training Command, or as delegated by him shall consist of:

a. Providing training directives.
b. Furnishing all controlled items of equipment required for training purposes at Stewart Field, such as airplanes and synthetic training devices, etc.
c. Inspections to see that training directives are carried out.
d. Issuance of all necessary training memoranda and data.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ EDWARD F. WITSELL
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General

Incl 1

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Mr. Ceconi/amw/4444
Wrtn: 25 Sept 1946

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AFDIN-3B/1

30 Sept 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Jurisdiction - Stewart Field, Newburgh, New York and Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee.

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. It is desired that you assume technical control of Stewart Field, Newburgh, New York, from Air Training Command, effective 30 September 1946. Stewart Field is a Class II installation, under the administrative control and responsibility of the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy.

2. It is also desired that you transfer command jurisdiction of Smyrna Army Air Field to Air Training Command, effective 30 September 1946.

3. Air Training Command will contact your command concerning details of these transfers.

4. Your command and Air Training Command will determine the strength, military and civilian, to be transferred because of the changes in jurisdiction. A request to adjust the personnel allotment of your command based on the revised work load resulting from the release and transfer of jurisdiction of these installations will be submitted to this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ FORREST KAUCH, Brig. Gen., USA
Chief, Air Installations Div.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-4

MEMO FOR RECORD: 1. These transfers are in accordance with telephone conversation between Gen. Chauncey and Col. Erler on 23 Sept 1946. Telephone coordination was made with Col. Richardson, AC/AS-1 on Sept 24, 1946.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

UNIT	AUTH. STRENGTH O	WO	EM	AGG	STATION	AUTH AIRCRAFT	REMARKS
47th L/B Gp	239	1	397	637	Biggs Fld, Tex.	53 A-26	Nite Attack Gp.
17th L/B Gp	119	1	397	517	Great Falls AAFld, Mont.	53 A-26	To be activated in May '47 & manned by 30 Jun
12th L/B Gp	119	1	397	517	Stewart Fld, N.Y.	53 A-26	
*477th Comp Gp	161	1	642	804	Lockbourne AAFld Ohio	18 B-25 28 P-47	*Negro Personnel, not in 70 Gp Program.
1st Ftr. Gp	112	0	336	448	March Fld, Cal.	83 P-80	
20th Ftr. Gp	112	0	336	448	Shaw Fld, S.C.	83 P-51	
363d Tac Recn Gp	170	0	724	894	Brooks Fld, Tex. (To be moved to Langley Fld, Va.	20 FA-26 20 FP-80 20 F-6	To be moved to Langley Fld, Va. by 31 Oct 46. 20 F-6 A/C will be replaced by 20 FP-80.
67th Tac Recn Gp	128	0	503	633	Pocatello AAF, Idaho	20 FA-26 20 F-6	
316th Trp Carr Gp	174	2	543	755	Pope Fld. N.C.	53 C-47 (Re-equip with 53 C-82	Paratroop Trng Unit - Delivery of A/C initiated Nov '46; Delivery of A/C completed Jan '47. C-82 in Dec '46
62d Trp Carr Gp	249	0	480	729	Bergstrom Fld. Tex.	53 C-46 (Re-equip with 53 C-82	Trng Chinese Crews. - Delivery of A/C initiated Dec '46; C-82 in Jan '47.
64th Trp Carr Gp	249	0	480	729	Greenville AAB	53 C-82	To be activated in Jul '47 & manned by 31 Aug '47.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

UNIT	AUTH. STRENGTH O	WO	EM	AGG	STATION	AUTH AIRCRAFT	REMARKS
315th Trp Carr. Gp	249	0	480	729	Sedalia, Mo.	53 C-82	To be activated in Aug '47 & manned by 30 Sep '47.
163d Helicopter	11	0	78	89	Marshall Fld. Kansas	6 R-5/6	Date unit will be completely equipped with A/C unknown due to shortage of Helicopters.
160th Liaison Sq	11	0	78	89	Shaw Fld. S.C.	18 L-13	To be activated in May '47 & manned by 30 Jun '47.
72d Liaison Sq	11	0	78	89	Langley Fld, Va.	18 L-13	None
6th Liaison Sq	11	0	78	89	Marshall Fld. Kansas	18 L-13	To be activated in Apr '47 & manned by 31 May '47.
167th Liaison Sq	11	0	78	89	Pope Fld, N.C.	18 L-13	To be activated in Jun '47 & manned by 31 Jul '47.
159th Liaison Sq	11	0	78	89	Biggs Fld, Tex.	18 L-13	To be activated in Jul '47 & manned by 31 Aug '47.
1st Tow Target Sq	25	0	162	187	Biggs Fld, Tex.	18 A-26	None
2d Tow Target Sq	25	0	162	187	Shaw Fld, S.C.	18 A-26	To be activated in Jun '47 & manned by 31 Jul '47.
5th All Wx Ftr Sq	38	1	210	249	Shaw Fld, S.C. (Alaska)	13 P-61	To be deployed to Alaska on PCS in Feb '47. Sta not yet designated by Com Gen Alaska.
319th All Wx Ftr Sq	31	1	210	249	Shaw Fld, S.C. (CDC)	13 P-61	To be deployed to CDC on PCS in Feb '47. Sta not yet designated by CG, CDC.

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

21 June 1946

COMMANDING GENERAL TWELFTH AIR
FORCE
MARCH FIELD RIVERSIDE CALIFORNIA ROUTINE X

A3D-2 2196 PD DIRECT A SURVEY BE MADE OF LAS VEGAS ARMY AIR FIELD LAS VEGAS NEV TO DETERMINE SUITABILITY OF THIS BASE FOR UTILIZATION BY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING TYPE UNITS CIN ONE FTR GP CMA ONE RCN GP OR ONE LIGHT BOMB GP PAREN A DASH TWO SIX AIRCRAFT PAREN PD FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE SUBMITTED THIS HQ EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE PD

QUESADA HQ TAC AIR COMD

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

WA 137
V
RB167
IP229
WHQ V UIRSD NR34 WD
FROM TAYLOR CG 12 AF MARCHFIELD CALIF 2817242
TO CG HQ TAC LANGLEY FIELD VA

28 June 1946

GRNC
12AF A223GPD ATTENTION A DASH THREE PD/ RE YOUR TWX A THREE D DASH TWO TWO ONE NINE SIX PD LAS VEGAS AIR BASE NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDERED SUITABLE FOR OUR USE DUE TO SHORTAGE OF HOUSING IN THAT VICINITY ALSO FACT THAT CITY RESERVES RIGHT TI USE BASE FOR COMERICIAL AIR TRANSPORT PRESENTLY OPERATING APPROXIMATELY TWENTY FLIGHTS PER DAY PD COMPLETE WRITTEN REPORT FORWARDED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS THIS DATE
PD RECOMMEND THIS AIR FORCE BE GRANTED AUTHORITY TO SELECT A MORE SUITABLE LOCATION FROM AMONG OTHER BASES THAT MAY BE AVAILABLE PD END
1809Z

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
LANGLEY FIELD VIRGINIA

COMMANDING GENERAL TWELFTH AIR FORCE
MARCH FIELD RIVERSIDE CALIFORNIA

8 July 1946

ROUTINE

A3A 483 PD RE YOUR RPT ON LAS VEGAS AIR BASE PD

IT IS DIRECTED YOU SURVEY FOLLOWING AIR BASES CLN CASPER CWA WYOMING

SEMICOLON PORTLAND CWA OREGAN SEMICOLON WALLA WALLA CWA WASHINGTON

SEMICOLON MIDLAND CWA TEXAS PD SUBMIT TT RPT TO THIS HQ PD HOUSING

CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE PD ALSO REGARDING COMMERCIAL

AIR LINES OPNS CWA OTHER ARRANGEMENTS CAN USUALLY BE MADE

QUESADA HQ TAC AIR COMD

Stamped WINSTON W. HAYES
1st Lt. Air Corps
Actg.Asst.Adj. Gen.

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C O P Y

TWX

1 October 1946

from TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, LANGLEY FIELD VIRGINIA

UNCLASS

ROUTINE

COMMANDING GENERAL
ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25 DC

A-3 0060 PD CITE YOUR TWX AFCOP-T NINE TWO THREE PD IN THE PROJECTED PLAN OF THIS COMMAND ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF STATIONS AND THE DISPOSITION OF UNITS THEREON CMA WALLA WALLA ARMY AIR FIELD HAS BEEN SELECTED AS THE STATION OF ACTIVATION FOR SIX SEVEN FCN GP CMA FIVE ZERO ZERO AIR SERVICE GP CMA THREE ONE FIVE TR CARR GP AND FOUR FIVE FIVE AIR SERVICE GP PD IN VIEW OF ABOVE CMA REQUEST THE ASSIGNMENT OF WALLA WALLA ARMY AIR FLD TO THIS COMMAND AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE PD IN ADDITION REQUEST ACTIVATION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE OF SIX SEVEN FCN GP CMA ONE ZERO FCN SQ CMA ONE ONE FCN SQ AND FIVE ZERO ZERO AIR SERVICE GROUP CMA NINE ONE EIGHT AIR ENGINEER SQ CMA SEVEN FOUR TWO AIR MATERIEL SQ WITH STATION AT WALLA WALLA PD

QUESADA HQ TACAIRCOM

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A-3 1 Oct 46

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HEADQUARTERS
ARMY AIR FORCES, WASHINGTON

AFDIN2B/1 18 November 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California, to Tactical Air Command

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. Your command will assume jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California, effective on date mutually agreed upon between your command and Air Training Command. This headquarters will be notified of the effective date.

2. Your command will contact the Air Training Command concerning the effective date and other details of this transfer.

3. This directive is not authority to reassign any Army Air Forces base units currently stationed at this installation. Procedure for reassignment of Army Air Forces base units is contained in paragraph 7 g of AAF Regulation 20-52, dated 21 May 1946.

4. Your command and Air Training Command will agree on the personnel authorizations to be transferred as a result of this change in jurisdiction and will forward a copy of such agreement together with a request for adjustment of the respective total personnel authorizations to this headquarters, attention: Manpower Division, AC/AS-1, promptly. Likewise, an agreement will be reached on actual personnel to be transferred.

5. Four copies of complete transferagreement will be transmitted to this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

LEO J ERLER, col., sc
Asst Chief, Air Install Div
Asst Chief of Air Staff-4

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Subject: Transfer of Jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California, to Tactical Air Command from Air Training Command.

AFDIN-2B/1 3rd Ind 14 January 1946

Hq AAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. With reference to letter from this headquarters, dated 18 November 1946, subject: "Transfer of Jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California, to Tactical Air Command", the directive contained therein transferring jurisdiction of Mather Field to your command is rescinded. This installation will remain under the jurisdiction of the Air Training Command.

2. In view of the above, the request in the preceding 2nd Indorsement is returned without action.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Leo J. Erler
LEO J. ERLER
Asst Chief, Air Install, Div.
Asst Chief of Air Staff-4

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

AFPMP-2

FJD:fab 71371

19 November 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California to Tactical Air Command

TO: Commanding General
Air Training Command
Barksdale Field, La.

1. It is directed that Permanent Party at Mather Field, Sacramento, California be frozen, effective immediately, pending transfer of the aforementioned field to the Tactical Air Command.

2. Personnel will be disposed of in accordance with agreement between the two (2) commands. Upon disposition, freeze is removed.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIS

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:
TAC 686.2 (22 Nov 46)

22 November 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California to Tactical Air Command from Air Training Command

TO: Commanding General
Air Training Command
Barksdale Field, La.

* * * * * *

3. It is contemplated that the Twelfth Air Force will be designated to represent Tactical Air Command in effecting the transfer of Mather Field. Certain staff officers of this headquarters may be selected to assist the Twelfth Air Force in effecting the transfer.

4. It is the informal understanding of this headquarters that the Air Training Command will not be ready to effect the transfer of Mather Field prior to 1 March 1947.

5. It is requested that, prior to 9 December 1946, the Air Training Command furnish this headquarters with:

a. A proposed date for the transfer of Mather Field

b. The number of officers, enlisted men, and civilians in the permanent party being held at Mather Field in compliance with the provisions of letter referred to in paragraph 1b above, which directs that permanent party be frozen immediately.

c. The amount of funds, by projects and appropriations, to be transferred to this command in accordance with the provisions of correspondence referred to in paragraph 2 above.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ Glenn O. Barcus
/t/ GLENN O. BARCUS
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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680.2 1st Ind

Headquarters, Air Training Command, Barksdale Field, La.,
25 November 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

1. Reference is made to letter, this Headquarters, dated 21 November 1946, Subject: "Transfer of Jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California, to Tactical Air Command." The effective date for the transfer is to be determined between your representatives and the representative of the Commanding General, Flying Division, Air Training Command. The move from Mather Field is to be completed prior to 1 March 1946, as training will start at the new location of the school on that date.

2. It is desired to point out that this Command is not reducing a station, but only moving the school now located at Mather Field to a currently inactive station, Las Vegas Army Air Field; therefore, this Command will not reflect any reduction in authorized personnel or allotted funds. Neither personnel nor funds can be made available for transfer to your Command from this Command incident to the transfer of the Mather Field Installation.

3. Reference Inclosure #2, this Headquarters has taken action to effect revocation of the instructions contained therein since a progressive move of personnel from Mather Field to Las Vegas is now being effected.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ A. C. Kincaid
A. C. KINCAID
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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TAC 686.2 (22 Nov 46) 2nd Ind 12 December 1946 AlS

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

1. It is planned to station the 17th Light Bombardment Group at Mather Field, Sacramento, California. According to information available to this headquarters, the 17th Light Bombardment Group should have been activated during December 1946, but will probably not be activated until after May 1947.

2. It appears that the Air Training Command will not be prepared to transfer Mather Field to the Tactical Air Command until sometime in January or February 1947.

3. In view of the fact that several months will elapse between the time that the Air Training Command will be prepared to transfer Mather Field and the time that this headquarters will have a unit to station thereat, and in view of the Air Training Command's intention of removing the entire permanent party from Mather Field along with funds for operation of the field, as indicated in the preceding indorsement, it appears advisable that the Air Training Command be directed to place Mather Field in a temporarily inactive status before transfer of the field to the Tactical Air Command is effected.

4. It is estimated by this headquarters that 6 officers, 43 enlisted men, and 54 civilians would be required to maintain Mather Field on a temporary inactive status, and that 38 officers, 305 enlisted men, and 208 civilians would be required to operate the station in an active status in support of the operation of the 17th Light Bombardment Group.

5. The present Annual Fund Program of the Tactical Air Command cannot absorb the added cost of Mather Field either in a temporarily inactive or active status without seriously impairing the operation of other installations under this command.

* * * * * *

6. It is recommended that:

a. The Air Training Command be directed to place Mather Field in a temporarily inactive status.

b. The transfer of Mather Field to the Tactical Air Command be accomplished after the field has been placed in a temporarily inactive status.

c. The transfer to the Tactical Air Command of Mather Field, in a temporarily inactive status, be accompanied by the following increase in bulk personnel allotment to the Tactical Air Command:

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TAC 686.2 (22 Nov 46) Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va Subj: "Transfer of Jurisdiction of Mather Field, Sacramento, California, to Tactical Air Command from Air Training Command" 22 Nov 46

6 Officers
43 Enlisted Men
54 Civilians

d. The transfer of Mather Field, in a temporarily inactive status, be accompanied by a quarterly increase in funds in the amounts and by appropriations and projects as shown in paragraph 5 above under "Funds Required - Temporarily Inactive Status," with the understanding that the increase in funds will, upon re-activation of Mather Field, be augmented to that shown in paragraph 5 above under "Funds Required - Active Status."

/s/ Glenn C. Barcus
GLENN C. BARCUS
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

6 December 1947

HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, LANGLEY FID, VA UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

COMMANDING GENERAL
TWELFTH AIR FORCE
MARCH FIELD,
RIVERSIDE CALIFORNIA

12AFB 2062

AIE 314 PD REUTEL 12AFE 2062 AND RECURLTR SUBJ CLN TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION OF MATHER FLD CALIF TO TACTICAL AIR COMD DTD 22 NOVEMBER 1946 PD THIS HQ IS IN RECEIPT OF FOL INFO FROM HQ AIR TNG COMD CLN QUOTE THE EFFECTIVE DATE FOR THE TRANSFER IS TO BE DETERMINED BETWEEN YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CG CMA FLYING DIV CMA AIR TNG COMD PD THE MOVE MATHER FLD IS TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO ONE MARCH ONE NINE FOUR SEVEN CMA AS TRAINING WILL START AT THE NEW LOCATION OF THE SCHOOL ON THAT DATE PD IT IS DESIRED TO POINT OUT THAT THIS COMMAND IS NOT REDUCING A STATION AMC BU T ONLY MOVING THE SCHOOL NOW LOCATED AT MATHER FID TO A CURRENTLY INACTIVE STATION CMA LAS VEGAS AAFLD SEMI CLN THEREFOR CMA THIS COMMAND WILL NOT REFLECT ANY REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL OR ALLOTED FUNDS PD NEITHER PERSONNEL NOR FUNDS CAN BE MADE FOR TRANSFER TO YOUR COMMAND FROM THIS COMMAND INCIDENT TO THE TRANSFER OF THE MATHER FLD INSTALLATIONS PD UNQUOTE AIR TNG COMMAND HAS TAKEN ACTION TO EFFECT REVOCATION OF PERSONNEL G FREEZE DIRECT.

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HQ TAC LANGLEY FLD, VA. , UNCLASSIFIED

COMMANDING GENERAL
TWELFTH AIR FORCE
MARCH FIELD
RIVERSIDE CALIFORNIA

ROUTINE

12 AFB 2062

(CONTINUED)

RD IN HQ AAF LTR SUBJ CLN QUOTE TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION OF MATHER FLD CMA CALIF TO TACTICAL AIR COMD UNQUOTE DTD 19 NOVEMBER 1946 PD REMOVAL OF FREEZE BECAME EFFECTIVE ON 29 NOVEMBER 1946 PD UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR REPLY TO OUR MSG TAC 62 DTD 3 DECEMBER 1946 THIS HQ PROPOSE TO TAKE UP WITH HQ AAF QUESTION OF PERSONNEL AND FUND ALLOCATIONS FOR MATHER FLD END

QUESADA TACAIRCOMD

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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General
MARCH FIELD, CALIFORNIA

12AF-J

686.

16 December 1946

SUBJECT: Mather Field--Transfer to Tactical Command

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. Two visits were made by staff personnel of this Headquarters to Mather Field during the month of December. The first on 5 December 1946 was made to assist in gathering information relating to funds and personnel requested by your message TWX, TAC, 62, dated 2 December 1946. Message from this Headquarters TWX, 6A-M6135, dated 7 December 1946 contained the information requested relating to funds and personnel for permanent party, to operate Mather Field on a temporarily inactive basis, as well as for a Group Station. Summarized in paragraph 2 are factors relating to funds, personnel and other items for your consideration. The second visit to Mather Field was made by staff personnel from this Headquarters on 10-11 December 1946, to confer with staff personnel of Flying Division, Air Flying Training Command, on matters of personnel and funds transfer to the Tactical Air Command, and preliminery negotiations for the official transfer of the station. Paragraph 3 of this letter will summarize the results of this letter visit.

2. Factors of importance and interest relating to Mather Field determined on first visit are:

a. The personnel and funds required to operate Mather Field, as reported in detail in our message noted above, are:

	On temporary Inactive Status	As Base for Reconnaissance Group but no Service Group
Officers	25	80
Enlisted Men	47	350
Civilian	110	300
Funds per Quarter	$98,665	$319,535

The above figures do not include the Weather Detachment, AACS Detachment, Air Defense Command Detachment, nor does it include the non-appropriated funds.

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Ltr, Hq 12AF, file 686, subj: "Mather Field--Transfer to Tactical Air Command." 16 Dec 46

b. Mather Field now in use by the Flying Division, Air Flying Training Command for training of Navigator-Bombardiers appears to be in good to excellent condition. The base population capacity is:

Officers family quarters	50	(Converted Barracks
NCO family quarters	50	(Housing project outside Main Gate)
Civilian family quarters	50	(Housing project outside Main Gate)
B.O.Q.	600	
Barracks	4000	

All construction is Mobilization Type.

c. A project for converting additional Mobilization type buildings into fifty (50) apartments (single family units) has been approved and funds are available. The Commandant of Mather Field has indicated that he is proceeding with the conversion of twenty-four (24) additional family sets for officers, and twenty-six (26) family sets for enlisted men.

d. The Commissary, Post Exchange, and Clubs appear to be in excellent condition financially and physically. Various buildings such as house the operations office, Headquarters, Commissary, Post Exchange, Air Installation, B.O.Q. and officers quarters were checked for condition. They are in good condition but some painting and floor repairs are considered necessary and should be accomplished. It is estimated that the painting of fifty (50) duplex units (just outside Main gate which now are an eye-sore) would cost $25,000. Floor repairs to fifty (50) buildings would cost $15,000. These estimates were not included in the funds estimates given in paragraph 1, above.

3. During the second visit to Mather Field on 10-11 December 1946 the principle items considered were as follows:

* * * * * *

b. During the conference various questions such as the accountability for property, the various funds, and the probable date of actual transfer of the field under agreement to be prepared tentatively o/a 1 February 1947, were considered. In this connection the members attending the conference have agreed to prepare by 15 January 1947, suggested agreements for the actual transfer of Mather Field between Commands, and to submit these agreements by the date noted in order that each Headquarters may evaluate thaem and suggest any modification in them in order that not later than 15 February 1947 a final agreement between Commands may be signed loofing toward the official transfer of Mather Field from Fd, AFTRC, to Tactical Air Command.

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Ltr, Hq 12AF, file 686, subj: "Mather Field-- Transfer to Tactical Air Command." 16 Dec 46

c. The civilian personnel problem will be more easily resolved with an early understanding by the Twelfth Air Force of the requirements of Station operation during the fourth quarter of the current fiscal year. The Commandant of Mather Field will prepare a list of civilian jobs to be terminated during February and March, as well as a current list of positions filled.

d. The staff personnel representing the Flying Division, Air Flying Training Command were appraised of message received from Tactical Air Command relating to the regulations regarding the handling of Central Post Fund, Headquarters Fund, Unit Fund, WEM Fund, NCO Club, Officers Club and library property, and their non-removal.

4. The impression gained by the officers visiting Mather Field on 10-11 December is that, while the Training Command will begin training at Las Vegas on 1 March 1946, they will not have completed their move of personnel and equipment by that date. This impression was obtained from a discussion between the Commandant and Brigadier General C. T. Myers.

5. In order that this Headquarters may develope sound and economical plans, and a program for the period of reduced operation and strength at Mather Field it is desirable to have information at an eadrly date relating to the availability of funds to operate during March, and for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. It will materially assist this command to obtain early advices regarding the extent of the period of temporary inactivity. This will be invaluable in determining the disposition of items such as the Commissary, Post Exchange, various messes and the service to be rendered by and to the various detachments at Mather Field which includes the Reserve Training program already servicing some 500 reserve officers with the estimated 650 by late Spring. It also appears that the Chinese Processing Detachment for officers and enlisted men (approximately 300-450) now at Mather Field will continue during the transition period. Housing, mess and other services are now being supplied.

/s/ William D. Old
WILLIAM D. OLD
Major General, USA
Commanding

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[HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND]
[Langley Field, Virginia]

TAC 686.2 (12 Dec 46) 12 December 1946

SUBJECT: Disposition of Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee and Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

Request that necessary action be taken to relieve this headquarters of responsibility for Smyrna Army Air Field and Dover Army Air Field. These air fields are not required for present ot future needs of this command. Recent reduction in personnel and budget and fiscal authorizations and additional transfers of other stations to this command, without loss of stations already assigned, make a burden of maintaining installations which are excess to the requirements of this command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

GLENN O. BARCUS
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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FIELD OFFICE OF THE AIR INSPECTOR
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
ORLANDO, FLORIDA

25 June 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: The Air Inspector, THRU: Commanding General Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

I. INSPECTION

* * * *

3. The mission of the activity inspected is to participate in joint operations with ground and/or sea forces; to cooperate with the Air Defense Command in the air defense mission; to operate independently in offensive operations; to train units and personnel for the maintenance of the tactical forces in all parts of the world; to cooperate with the Army Ground Forces in training of airborne troops; to perform such special missions as the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, may direct. Mission quoted above was taken from Headquarters AAF Letter dated 12 March 1946, subject: "Interim Mission", to Commanding General, Tactical Air Command. The mission of the Tactical Air Command is also set forth in WD Circular 138, dated 14 May 1946.

II. OBSERVATIONS

4. General. Considerable delay in the development of a program and plan for the training of personnel and units in the functions of a tactical air force were noted. In a discussion with senior staff personnel the apparent slow development of a program was attributed to the lack of subsequent clarification or expansion of the Tactical Air Command's mission as outlined in paragraph 3, Section I, of this report.

* * * *

A. R. MAC MILLAN
Colonel, Air Corps
The Field Air Inspector

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/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/
/Langley Field, Virginia/

TAC 333 (25 Jun 46) Hq TAC 1st Ind 17 July 1946 IN

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The following action has been taken to correct the deficiencies noted in basic communications:

a. Reference paragraph 4. Information was presented to General Jones during his visit to this headquarters in order that he might prepare a letter to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, requesting further clarification of Tactical Air Command mission.

*****

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/t/ Philip Doddridge
Colonel, A. D. G.
Adjutant General

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Ltr Hq AAF, Wash, D. C., Subj: "Responsibilities for Air Defense," dtd 24 Jun 46 (Cont'd)

TAC 381 (24 Jun 46) 1st Ind CS

Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia Aug 13 46

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 26, D. C.
ATTENTION: ACAS-3.

1. The attached memorandum from General Devers to General Spaatz with inclosed study has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. It is believed that although many principles of the air defense doctrine were not fully proven in action by the United States Air Forces and Army in the recent war, the basic principle of air defense, namely that all the means of air defense must be under a single command, was not proven unsound. It appears that in the preparation of the attached study, proper consideration has not been given to the fact that regardless of whether or not fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery defend in the same area, friendly aircraft are required to fly through or in the vicinity of areas defended by friendly A.A.A. The only proven method of insuring effective simultaneous operation of fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery and air warning in a single area is to have them all under a single command. This principle applies equally well to the operation of guided or controlled missiles and rockets.

3. A large number of different expedients of organization, command, control and responsibility were tried during the recent war in attempts to discover a satisfactory solution to the problem of air defense as now defined. The lack of a prescribed organization and operational procedure resulted in different procedures being adopted in the several commands and at various periods, depending upon the intensity and current objectives of hostile fighter aviation and guided missiles.

4. Because of the fact that our war experience has not resulted in complete agreement on organization, command, control, and responsibility for air defense, it is suggested that a reexamination of the current concepts of air defense be made at an early date by representatives of the air and ground forces. This with a view to applying our war experience to a solution to the problem which will be entirely satisfactory to the air and ground forces and preparing appropriate recommendations for submission to the War Department.

5. It is recommended that:

a. A joint air-ground committee be designated to reexamine our

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current concepts of air defense.

b. No action be taken on the recommendations contained in the inclosed study until the committee report is prepared and approved by both air and ground force commanders.

6. Detailed comments of this headquarters on the study are attached as Inclosure No. 2.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

ROBERT M. LEE
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

Incls:
1 n/c
2 TAC comments to study "Security from Enemy Air Action"

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND STAFF CONFERENCE NOTES

VOLUME I NUMBER 17 3 May 1946

CHIEF OF STAFF'S REPORT:

1. The Chief of Staff discussed his visit at the Air University. He learned that the commanding officer and staff are preparing plans for an organization substantially as follows: There will be a commanding general and 2 deputy commanders (1 for education, for supervision of all the schools under Air University, and 1 for administration and commanding officer of troops).

Deputy of Education:
- Air War College
- Air Command and Staff School
- Air Tactical School
- School of Aviation Medicine
- Special Staff School
- Liaison with the Air Institute of Technology

Deputy of Administration and Commander of Troops:
- Maxwell Field
- Gunter Field
- Craigg Field
- Tyndall Field

2. Also under Deputy of Administration comes a Test and Development Force. This force will consist of a fighter and service group (at Tyndall Field) and will use P-80's and P-84's; bomber (B-29's) and service group at Maxwell, guided missle and service group at Eglin Field, tactical control group and antiaircraft artillery group at Tyndall Field are among their installations.

3. Individual projects will be tested at the AAF Proving Ground. Command unit tests will be made in the Test and Development Force. Close liaison should be maintained between the TAC and the Air University in order that the students will be taught the latest tactics and techniques developed in the TAC, and in order that tactical units may have the benefit of methods taught in the Air University.

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A-1 REPORT:

Transfer of personnel at Tyndall Field is frozen. The Commanding General directed that arrangements be made to meet with representatives of the Air University to negotiate the terms of the turn-over of the field.

A-3 REPORT:

1. Representatives of the A-3 Section are in Washington at the present time to secure administrative airplane requirements with a view toward changing allocations between the 3 major commands.

2. A request has been received in this headquarters for TAC's participation in air demonstration at the New Orleans Airport. There are to be 100 visiting aircraft and it was requested that this headquarters furnish the latest type of aircraft, particularly Jet-powered aircraft. The Commanding General directed that a letter be written to New Orleans Airport stating that due to the high priority of the P-80 aircraft they would not be available, but other type aircraft can be furnished if so desired.

3. The P-80 flight (Operations Comet) will arrive in Washington on Sunday, 19 May 1946, instead of 20 May 1946. General George has been informed of the change.

A-4 REPORT:

1. A letter was sent to the Commanding General, March Field, outlining the things that have been accomplished in Operations Comet. No arrangements for the housing of personnel for this trip have been made.

2. The furniture from Atterbury Army air Field was sent to Lockbourne Army Air Base.

3. An AAF letter was received in this headquarters directing that all excess aircraft be turned in by 30 June 1946. Most of TAC's stations have disposed of excess aircraft; however, some of the new stations (i.e., Smyrna Army Air Field has 52 B-17's but only 15 are needed to maintain pilot proficiency, and Shaw Field, South Carolina, has 40 B-25's that should be declared excess). Requirements of these stations have been turned in to Air Materiel Command and disposition instructions of excess aircraft are desired.

4. In compliance with a technical order from Headquarters AAF directing that fuselage tanks are to be blocked off in P-51's, a teletype was sent to Ninth Air Force directing that fuselage tanks in P-51D's remain installed but nonoperational. For long trips, wing tanks can be used.

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COMMUNICATIONS REPORT:

Colonel Lyle, Communications Division, reported on the DF arrangements that were made by AACS (Colonel German) for Operations Comet. SCR-634 (Homer) has been delivered to each of the fields concerned in this P-80 flight. (This type radar set offers no direct communication -- doesn't offer 2 channels.) SCR-624 (VHF radar receiver and transmitter) has been requested in addition to the SCR-634. There is a shortage of DF operating personnel. The Commanding General directed that action be initiated to obtain SCR-575's installed at all TAC bases.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

OTIS C. TURNER
WOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Col Donaldson/dc/73077

AFCTC-6

21 Jul 1945

SUBJECT: Mission for Tactical Air Units

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Forces, Bolling Field, D.C.

1. The following missions, appropriate to be carried out by utilizing a tactical air command or commands, are assigned to your command:

a. Provide Army Air Force units for participation in joint air-ground training and field exercise with the Army Ground Forces and the Navy.

b. Provide Army Air Force Units for demonstrations of air attacks and joint exercises at service schools and other training installations.

c. Develop and improve the methods, procedures and means of joint air-ground operations.

d. In conjunction with the Army Air Forces Board, develop, test and improve:

(1) The organization equipment, tactics, technique and doctrine of Tactical Air Commands

(2) The tactical employment of visual and electronic equipment particularly with respect to control of aircraft and location of targets for ground attacks.

(3) The equipment, organization, tactics, technique and employment of liaison aviation.

(4) The organization and operation of the Tactical Control Group and the standard air-ground liaison system.

2. The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, is being notified that your Headquarters is assigned the missions of conducting joint air-ground training and that direct correspondence reference requirements for air participation in the training program of ground force units is authorized.

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3. This Headquarters will be notified when in your opinion the air units available for joint training exercises and directed tactical training and development are insufficient to provide the personnel and the proper amounts and types of aircraft to enable you to carry out your assigned missions.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL ARNOLD:

/s/WILLIAM F. McKEE
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Acting Asst. Chief of Air Staff
Operations, Commitments and Requirements.

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HEADQUARTERS, AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
MITCHEL FIELD
NEW YORK

19 April 1946

SUBJECT: Air Defense, Pacific Coastal Frontier

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces

1. The following secret urgent radio was received this date from Commanding General, Fourth Air Forces:

"Pursuant to request of Gen Joseph W Stillwell CG Sixth Army, this Hq is participating in preparation of interimjoint plant for defence of Pacific Coastal Frontier (C 29). Representatives of Army, Navy, and Air Force meet weekly for discussion and formulation of plan. AA 65 A. Principal consideration is being given to defence against following types of attack:

a. Air bombardment

b. Airborne landings

c. Submarine attacks against coastal installations.

The area under consideration corresponds approximately to Fourth Air Force area with first priority to Pacific Northwest. The plan has progressed to point where it is necessary to know what forces of all types are available for emergency and the procedure to be used in committing these forces to action. Fourth Air Force although charges with defence of the Pacific Coastal area has no control over any air combat organizations. It is therefore essential that arrangements be made with Tactical Air Command to provide the forces necessary to meet emergency conditions outlined above.

"Some of the problems requiring an immediate solution are:

a. What forces can be made available and how soon to meet the various situations?

b. What procedure should be used to obtain these forces?

C. Which Hq exercises operational control over air forces involved in direct defence of coastal area?

Request all possible information relative to above questions be furnished this Hq prior to 24 April, date of next joint planning board meeting.

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It is suggested that a representative of your command be present at next meet in order to obtain a complete picture concerning the problem of rpt problems of air defence of this area. In connection with above discussion it is again urgently recommended that fighter units best suited for air defence principally P-80 organizations be returned to command jurisdiction of Air Defence Command."

2. This Headquarters is cognizant of its responsibility for air defence but does not yet have combat units under its control which can be allocated for this task. Recently Headquarters, Air Defence Command, urged the assignment of the P-80 group at March Field to be made to the Air Defence Command as it is primarily an interceptor type of air weapon.

3. Pending definate decision of this matter, it is recommended that action be taken to specify those combat air units in the United States which may be utilized for air defence in the event of an emergency. It is further suggested that the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, and Strategic Air Command be advised of those units which may be placed under operational control of the Commanding General, Air Defence Command, in the event of an emergency, and that he is including those units in plans for air defence with authority for direct dealing with the two commanders in formulating these plans. It is obvious also that the question of operational control of anticraft units must be determined for proper integration of all active defence measures.

4. It is requested that necessary information be made available to this Headquarters as a matter of urgency in order that reply may be made to the Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, who is working with the Commanding General, Sixth Army in the preparation of plans for the defence of the Pacific Coastal frontier.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Air Forces
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

10 June 1946

SUBJECT: Investment of Command responsibilities of the land, Sea and Air Forces in Event of an Air Invasion.

TO : Commanding General, Headquarters, Air Defense Command, Mitchel Field, New York.

1. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, is responsible for the air defence of the continental United States. He has delegated this responsibility to the Commanding General, Air Defence Command. This investiture of command responsibility is authority for the Commanding General, Air Defence Command to take immediate and independent action in the event of air attack against the continental United States.

2. The Commanding General, Air Defence Command has, in addition, the responsibility for coordinating within the continental United States the means available from other services for air defence, such as naval or marine fighter units temporarily shore-based, antiaircraft artillery presently assigned to the Army Ground Forces and antiaircraft fire of warships in harbors. It is the opinion of this Headquarters that effective coordination can only be achieved through the assignment of operational control of such units of other services to the Commanding General, Air Defence Command, during periods of emergency. There is apparent agreement among the services on this matter at the present time.

3. The exercise of "command" over land and sea forces (except those participating in the Air Defence mission in the event of air attack) is not believed essential to the discharge of the responsibility for air defence. It is therefore unlikely that the Commanding General, Air Defence Command, would be invested with actual command control over land and sea forces, since his task is purely one of air defence.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the event of a sustained attack against this country and under existing command and operational procedures, would most probably assess the situation, declare a theater of operations, appoint a theater commander, assign him a mission and allocate suitable forces. It is not likely, under present joint procedures, that the Air Defence Commander would be appointed to function as a theater commander and, as such, be held responsible for the conduct of theater operations concurrently with the conduct of all air defence measures in protection of the continental United States.

5. This Headquarters is presently conducting a study to determine the desirability of issuing a detailed directive which will indicate your command responsibilities, extent of control, and forces to be made

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available as they apply solely within the Air Forces in the event of an air attack launched against the continental United States with little or no warning. When the results of this study are available, you will be furnished with further instructions to guide you in the implementation of the air defence system.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Ira C. Eaker
Lt. General USA
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Mitchel Field, New York

13 June 1946

Major General E. R. Quesada,
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia.

Dear General Quesada:

In response to your request, I am forwarding a copy of the presentation made by this section to General Spaatz on 4 June 1946.

We are proceeding rather slowly in accomplishing practical plans for air defense. I know you have talked to General Stratemeyer about the exchange of forces between your Commands for testing and implementing defense and tactical plans. It would be of great help to us to arrive at a policy on this exchange of units, both for training and for combat. I believe, it is generally agreed, that we have no part in areas of operations in which you would support ground forces. However, it is my understanding that you will have a defense command type of unit which will do the defense work for the combat area. So far we have approached the problem on the assumption of purely defensive action. Should we advance to new areas, the requirement exists for providing defense in these new areas. It is a part of our mission to train units for this purpose. It would seem advisable that some basic SOP's be prepared on this subject.

If you will let me know when you have an A-5 Section we would be delighted to confer with them and see what arrangements can be perfected.

Thank you very much for your interest the other day. I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you soon.

Sincerely,

s/
R. E. BEEBE
Colonel, G.S.C.
AC/S A-5

1 Incl:
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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding
General
March Field, California

22 July 1946

381

SUBJECT: Air Defense Plans for Emergency Defense of Vital Installations

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. On a recent visit to Headquarters, 6th Army, Presidio, San Francisco, Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3 of this command was informed of a proposed plan for the emergency defense of vital installations on the Pacific coast. This plan particularly applies to the "Manhattan Project" in the state of Washington.

2. In subsequent discussions it was learned that Fourth Air Force, in compliance with instructions from Commanding General AFADC, had drawn a similar plan for emergency air defense of vital installations. Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3 then contacted the A-3 Section of Fourth Air Force and was given an outline of the plan. (Incl. #1) The Plan, as outlined, places the tactical units of Tactical Air Command under operational control of Fourth Air Force in event of emergencies which threaten the West Coast of the United States.

3. It is felt by this headquarters that the plan, as proposed, is feasible and that it is logical that our units participate in emergency defense under operational control of Air Defense Command. Request that any additional information, directives, or comments on this subject available at your headquarters be forwarded to this command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ Y. H. Taylor
t/ Y. H. TAYLOR
Brigadier General
Chief of Staff

1 Incl:
MESSAGE NR AFADCY (Secret)

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12 AF 381 (22 July 46), Hq Twelfth Air Force, March Fld, Calif, Subj: "Air Defense Plans for Emergency Defense of Vital Installations".

TAC 381 (22 Jul 46) 1st Ind. A3D-3

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Air Defense Command, Mitchel Field, New York.

1. This headquarters has received general plans for the National Defense to include letter, your headquarters, subject: "Air Defense of the Continental United States", dated 2 May 1946, and "Plan to Accomplish ADC Mission", dated 3 June 1946, but has received no specific plans for the defense of vital areas on the Pacific Coast.

2. Request any further information available on this subject be forwarded to this headquarters to be used for planning purposes.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ John K. Brock
t/ JOHN K. BROCK
Capt., Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl - n/c

Y381 2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Mitchel Field, New York.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

1. Joint defense plans are being developed in all air force areas as well as the one being developed by the Fourth Air Force, Sixth Army, and the Western Sea Frontier which is mentioned by the Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force. Plans have not as yet progressed beyond the discussion stage in any area. This planning is based on a directive from this headquarters, subject: "Air Defense of the Continental United States", recently issued, a copy of which is attached.

2. You and your subordinate commanders will be invited to participate in the preparation of all Air Defense Command defense plans which specifically involve your command. Additionally, any plans which may

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affect your command will be furnished your headquarters for information when approved, as well as all other pertinent informative material.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ R. C. Candee
t/ R. C. CANDEE
Colonel, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff

2 Incls:
1 - n/c
2 - Added, ltr Hq ADC 12 Aug 46
subj: "Air Defense of
Continental U. S."

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Mitchel
Field, N. Y.

23 August 1946

Major General E. R. Quesada,
Commanding General,
Tactical Air Command,
Langley Field, Virginia.

Dear Pete:

Inclosed is my interpretation of what we agreed on in your office Thursday. Please let me know if my understanding is correct.

Sincerely yours,

s/ Chuck Stone
t/ CHARLES B. STONE, III
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

1 Incl.

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1. In the event of hostilities or threatened hostilities, it is expected that a theatre or theatres within the United States will be established. Delineation of the theatre and the assignment of a Theatre Commander is a responsibility of the War Department or even Joint Chiefs of Staff. Internal organization of the theatre is a function of the Theatre Commander but presumably will include an overall Air Commander who will have under him a Tactical Air Commander, an Air Defense Commander and Strategic Air Commander. Forces will be allocated to the theatre by the War Department and may include those previously assigned to the Tactical Air Command and Air Defense Command. When the Theatre Commander is appointed, neither the present Tactical Air Command or Air Defense Command as such have further responsibility for combat operations in the theatre.

2. Pending the establishment of a theatre, the defense against air attack responsibilities of the Air Defense Command and the Tactical Air Command are:

a. The Air Defense Command is responsible for the establishment of the defense of the United States against air attack. In time of threatened hostilities or actual hostilities, forces will be allocated to the Air Defense Command by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (and the forces to be allocated may be agreed to prior to that time by Air Defense Command and Tactical Air Command). These forces may include the bulk of the forces assigned to the Tactical Air Command. In any area threatened by air attack, the command of all combat air forces will be assumed initially by the Air Defense Command Air Force Commander.

b. The Tactical Air Command is responsible for providing air defense required specifically because of the presence of ground combat forces. This includes an actual battle area, or potential battle areas where either:

(1) There is no static air defense system provided by the Air Defense Command; or

(2) Operation of the ground forces are or are expected to be paramount (the Air Battle has been won or our own Air Forces have been decisively beaten).

These areas will be specifically designated by higher authority or agreement between the Tactical Air Command and the Air Defense Command. Until the areas are specifically designated, Air Defense Command is responsible for the provision of air defense as part of its general mission. For use in any designated area, necessary forces will be allocated to Tactical Air Command by the Army Air Forces or Theatre Commander and may include all Air Defense Command combat units or installations in the area and additional mobile forces of the Air Defense Command.

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Mitchel Field, New York

322

13 September 1946

SUBJECT: Responsibility of the Air Defense Command

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

1. At a conference held at the Headquarters of the Tactical Air Command on 10 August 1946 it became apparent that the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, and myself differ in our understanding of my responsibilities for the provision of the air defense of the continental United States. You have indicated that a theater commander is expected to be appointed in any area of the United States which is attacked or threatened with attack. My concern is for the period between the time hostile action occurs or is first expected to occur, and the time a theater commander has actually been appointed and assumes responsibility in the area. During this period I believe a unified air command in any one area is essential.

2. My headquarters is now engaged in the preparation of air defense plans for the United States. However in view of the difference of opinion between the Tactical Air Command and this command, it appears necessary that a firm decision be made in the immediate future as to my responsibilities insofar as they affect other military commands so that I may have a sound basis for further planning for air defense.

3. My concept of my responsibilities (insofar as they affect other military commands) is attached. This concept involves the issuance by you of directives to other AAF commands, and action by your headquarters to secure approval or agreement by the War Department and other government agencies. This concept is obtainable within the present organizational framework of the armed forces and appears to be the most feasible way of providing the unified air command which is essential to the security of the continental United States.

4. It is requested that:

a. The attached concept of my responsibilities be approved.

b. The necessary directives be issued to other major AAF commands to inform them of your approval.

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Ltr, Hq ADC, Mitchel Fld, N.Y. subj: "Responsibility of the Air Defense Command, 13 Sep 46 (cont'd)

c. The necessary arrangements with other branches of the armed forces and the government be made to effectuate this concept.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding

1 Incl.
"Methods to Achieve Unified Air Command"

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Mitchel Field, NY

14 October 1946

Major General E. R. Quesada
Commanding General, Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

Dear Pete:

From your letter of 7 October I believe there are only two differences in our views.

The first of these concerns the job General Eaker gave me of being the AAF contact man with external agencies. This assignment was made verbally, was not sought by me and came as a total surprise. I have been the unwilling target of several very specific but completely contradictory directives on this and, as a result, I do not know what AAF intends. For your information I attach a letter I sent General Chauncey on this matter on 1 October.

The other difference appears to be the relationship of the Tactical Air Command and the Air Defense Command when and if hostilities begin or are anticipated in the continental United States, and that difference is merely a question of timing as to when air defense responsibilities will be transferred from ADC to TAC or to an Air Task Force Commander. I have no doubt that given adequate warning a theater or similar command will be established to take care of the situation. My concern is solely that until that Theater Commander is appointed suitable conditions are created to permit me to fulfill my responsibility. By these "conditions" I mean that some central air authority is established so that the chaos and confusion of hundreds of airplanes independently operating in one area and independently competing for bases and other resources is prevented. That central air authority most likely will be either a TAC agency or an ADC agency, and the situation on the ground will determine which.

I do not believe there will ever be a time when everybody will admit that the sole threat to the United States is from the air. The Ground Forces and the Navy will have a mission and will have forces and will conduct operations (at least of reconnaissance, patrol and assuming a position of readiness) and will unquestionably ascribe to the enemy capabilities which will call for actual naval and ground force operations. As an example, during the last war the Fourth Army very busily deployed forces all over the Gulf coast, manned its guns, and otherwise prepared to fight. They required air support to do this and asked for great

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quantities of combat type airplanes to be set aside to provide air support and actually got some air support. The only real threat however was from the air and the III Fighter Command (as an Air Defense Command) was in fact the only appreciable air force involved. The determination by the Fourth Army that ground operations were involved was not along sufficient to give tactical air operations priority over air defense operations. In other words I do not see how the responsibility for air defense can be transferred from the Air Defense Command to the Tactical Air Command solely because the Ground Forces or the Navy decide to do something or decide that a threat from the Ground or the sea exists. I believe that the question as to the threat involved (and therefore as to whether air defense over a specific area is your responsibility or mine) must hinge on an affirmative determination, not that ground or naval forces will have something to do, but that the primary threat is from the air or otherwise.

I am looking forward to your visit and will be very glad to talk to you about this at that time. I am sure that we can arrive at a meeting of the minds.

Thanks for your letter of 7 October 1946.

Sincerely,

s/ Strat
t/ GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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[HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES]
[Washington]

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17 September 1946

SUBJECT: Assignment of 608th Malaria Survey Detachment and AAF Committee on Aerial Dispersal of Insecticide.

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. It is contemplated transferring the 608th Malaria Survey Detachment and the AAF Committee on Aerial Dispersal of Insecticide from the Air Proving Ground Command to the Tactical Air Command without change of station.

2. These two (2) units are presently stationed at Orlando Army Air Base where they work closely with the United States Department of Agriculture. Currently, they are attempting to develop a disinfectant for aircraft which will be effective in elimination of harmful pests that are being flown into the United States by air. For these reasons and the magnitude of the mosquito problem in Florida, the Air Surgeon highly recommends that the units remain in the Orlando area. Furthermore, they act as an advisory board on aerial dispersal of insecticide and furnish information to Squadron D, 303rd Base Unit, Greenville, South Carolina on airplane spraying.

3. Inasmuch as Squadron D, 303rd Base Unit is the operational agent for airplane spraying, it is believed that these units should be reassigned to your command. Request your comments on this proposed change at the earliest possible date.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

A. Q. Mustoe
Col, AC
Chief, Operations Division
Office Asst. Chief of Air
Staff-3

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Hq AAF, Washington, D. C., Subj "Assignment of 608th Malaria Survey Detachment and AAF Committee on Aerial Dispersal of Insecticide" dtd 17 Sept 46, Cont'd

TAC 322 (17 Sept 46) 1st ind A-5

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
ATTN: Chief, Operations Division, Office Asst. Chief of Air Staff - 3

1. This headquarters does not concur in the proposed transfer of the AAF Committee on Aerial Dispersal of Insecticide from the Air Proving Ground to the Tactical Air Command.

2. This committee was organized for the purpose of testing equipment and the development of methods and techniques for the dispersal of insecticide. The mission of the Air Proving Ground Command is the service test of AAF equipment and the development of techniques for the utilization of that equipment. Its purpose is to serve the entire AAF. Therefore, the committee should constitute a section in the Proof Division of the Air Proving Ground Command. It should be concerned with the tests of equipment and developments of techniques relative to the dispersal of insecticide.

3. It was the practice during the war to creat a committee for ev ry special device and different problem confronting the AAF. This practice might be justified as an expedient during the war. Since the problems now confronting the air forces can be solved by existing agencies within the AAF structure, it might well be desirable to re-examine the necessity for the many varied and diversified committees. As an example, the Committee on Aerial Dispersal of Insecticide should be dissolved and the functions assigned to the Proving Ground Command. The testing of insecticides proposes no greater problem than the testing of new chemicals, munitions, bombs and other methods of warfare utilized by the AAF. The fact that this committee works in close coordination with the United States Department of Agriculture is irrelevant to the continued existance of the committee in that the Proving Ground Command could very competently carry on this necessary liaison activity.

4. It is recommended that the AAF Committee on Aerial Dispersal of Insecticide be dissolved and that the functions of this committee be reconstituted in the Proving Ground Command. It is further recommended that this command continue the tactical testing of insecticide but that the Proving Ground Command be the primary agency for the

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Hq AAF, Washington, D. C., Subj "Assignment of 608th Malaria Survey Detachment and AAF Committee on Aerial Dispersal of Insecticide" dtd 17 Sept 46, Cont'd

testing of equipment and the determination of the chemical composition of the insecticide to be issued to the field organizations.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

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HQ TAC AIR COMD
TAMPA FLA

2 May 1946

BOOK MESSAGE

ROUTINE X

A1 0275 PD IN THE FORMULATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERIM AND POST WAR AF THE MISSION OF THIS COMD IS PRIMARY THAT OF ORGANIZING CMA TRAINING AND OPERATING TACTICAL UNITS PD IN FURTHERANCE OF THIS MISSION IT IS THE POLICY OF THIS HQ TO GIVE FIRST AND HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE MANNING OF TACTICAL AND AIR SERVICE UNITS WITH THE BEST PERS AVAIL PD BASE UNITS ARE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT THE TACTICAL UNITS PD COMMANDERS OF BASE UNITS ARE THEREFOR INSTRUCTED TO GIVE ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CMA SUPPLY CMA MAINTENANCE AND SERVICE REQUIREMENTS OF TACTICAL AND AIR SERVICE UNITS PD TO FURNISH THE ABOVE POLICY BASE UNIT COMMANDERS ARE DIRECTED TO SCREEN THE EFFICIENCY INDEXES AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ALL PERS ASGND OR TO BE ASGND TO BASE UNITS AND MAKE THE BEST PERS AVAIL FOR TRF TO TACTICAL AND AIR SERVICE UNITS PD ACTION TO ACCOMPLISH THIS POLICY WILL BE INITIATED WITHOUT DELAY AND ON A CONTINUING BASIS PD THE CONTENTS OF THIS MSG WILL BE MADE THE SUBJ OF A COMMAND LETTER IN THE NEAR FUTURE

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A1A HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC 327 (24 Dec 46) 24 December 1946

SUBJECT: Review of Recruiting Program

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters

1. With the completion of more than 1,056,000 volunteer enlistments in the Regular Army by the end of November 1946, it appears probable now that 1,070,000 enlistments in the Regular Army will be obtained by 1 January 1947, which is the desired figure for the coming year. This is an outstanding and unprecedented achievement which has been made by the recruiting personnel. It does not mean however taht there will be 1,070,000 volunteers in the Regular Army at that time. Normal attrition has depleted this figure, and the fact that less than 52% of these total enlistments were for periods of 3 years, service to darken the results; which at first glance appear to be bright. It must be realized by all of this command that the outlook for obtaining personnel through recruiting is now and will remain critical; therefore, a continuing direct and aggressive action must be taken to secure enlistment, reenlistment, and extentions of enlistment of desirable and qualified personnel.

2. In October 1946, 175,925 one-year enlistments started to expire. In April 1947, 93,907 18-month enlistments will also start to expire. A total of 269,832 short-term enlistments will expire by 31 July 1947. The men who fall within these figures of short-term enlistments and are soon eligible for discharge are prospects for reenlistment. If these men, therefore, have entered the Army as volunteers and can be won over to reenlistment or extending their enlistment, the problem we face in building a 100 per cent volumteer Army will be relieved greatly.

3. In TAC alone, we have 2,432 short-term enlistees. Of this total, 107 are 2-year, 1,056 are 18-month, and 1,269 are 1-year enlistees. In addition to this we have 1,499 AUS personnel which gives a total of 3,931 possible enlistees throughout this command. It is expected that at least 50% of these men are undecided as to their future careers. If this 50% can be effectively won over to 3-year enlistments our recruiting totals will definitely be on the upward swing and we can rise from the recruiting slump we have had for the month of November and early part of December 1946.

(Effective until 24 June 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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4. Each shortpterm enlistees will be given a personal and private interview by the base recruiting officer, at least one month prior to discharge.

5. All commanders will critically review their present recruiting program with the idea in mind of preventing any greater drop in the number of enlistments, which has taken place during the month of November and early part of December 1946.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/s/ PHILIP DODDRIDGE
PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's
Department
Adjutant General

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AIA HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

7 June 1946

IN REPLY REFER TO:

TAC 327 (7 Jun 46)

SUBJECT: Enlistment and reenlistment in the Regular Army.

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters.

(This letter supersedes letter, this headquarters, file TAC 327 (12 Feb 46) (published as 3AF 327 (12 Feb 46). dated 12 February 1946, subject as above.)

1. In view of recent changes in recruiting policy and the shift in emphsis from on-the base recruiting of enlisted men to off-the base recruiting of civilians and veterans, it is desired to point out the highlights of existing policies.

2. All bases are authorized to construct small mobile recruiting units and recruiting displays for the purpose of contacting potential enlistees in nearby civilian communities. In this connection, attention is directed to AAF Letter 47-31, dated 22 April 1946, which provides an excellent opportunity for contacting young men in civilian communities. All bases are urged to construct immediately a small mobile unit, if such has not been accomplished.

3. High school graduating classes in civilian communities are the biggest and one of the most desirable sources of potential enlistees. These young men should be contacted, speeches in schools arranged, and every possible means utilized to present to them the many advantages of a career in the Regular Army. It is desired to emphasize the need for close cooperation and coordination with nearby service command recruiting agencies on all off-the-base recruiting.

4. Telegrams, this headquarters, AIE 0609, dated 7 May 1946 to Commanding Generals, Third and Ninth Air Forces, and AIE 0613, dated 7 May 1946, to all air bases and units assigned directly to this headquarters, authorize 3-year enlistees with prior service who have been discharges since 12 May 1945 and select the AAF to be retained at base of enlistment without transfer to a reception center for processing. This does not apply to men who reenlist in US Army recruiting stations (Army

(Effictive until 7 December 1946, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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Ltr fr Hq TAC 7 June 1946, Subj: Enlistment and reenlistment in the Regular Army. Cont'd.

Service Forces). This should be a great inducement to many veterans who desire to reenlist at a particular AAF station as they are not required to be processed through a reception center like a new recruit. It is directed, therefore, that this fact be given the maximum publicity in order that all veterans may be cognizant of this added incentive.

5. A pamphlet, "Think This Over," will be ready for distribution to all bases in the near future. This pamphlet is designed to be mailed to former service men and points out the provisions of WD Pamphlet 12-16, as well as current recruiting regulations which separated men may not be familair with.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ OTIS C. TURNER
aOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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AIA

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

10 October 1946

IN REPLY REFER TO:

TAC 327 (10 Oct 46)

SUBJECT: Mobile Recruiting Caravans

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters

1. Due to the curtailment of per diem funds it has been necessary to restrict the operations of AAF mobile recruiting caravans. The purpose of this letter is to outline instructions relative to the future activity and disposition of these caravans.

2. Small local mobile recruiting units which were constructed in accordance with paragraph 4d, AAF letter 35-33, are authorized and encouraged to continue operations, provided no per diem funds are expended.

3. The decision as to the practicable of continued operation, storage, or disposition of the caravans is delegated to air force or base commanders concerned in accordance with the following:

a. If practicable, these caravans or selected portions thereof, will be retained for possible future use by storing them or by distributing the units to various bases of the command for continued use in local activities.

b. Where continued activity is considered worthwhile, these active units will tour locations within heavily populated areas. This will permit the units to obtain maximum coverage without requiring extensive travel.

c. Caravans, or parts of caravans, which are considered of no further value for recruiting purposes may be dismantled and property accountability settled. Vehicles that are determined as excess to station needs will be reported to this headquarters requesting disposition instructions. A completed inspection report, AD AGO Form 461-6, for each vehicle will accompany subject letter.

(Effective until 10 April 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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C O P Y

Hq TAC, Langley Field, Va., Subj: Mobile Recruiting Caravans 10 Oct 46, Cont'd.

4. This headquarters will be notified of the disposition of all caravans.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ PHILIP HODGRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

C O P Y

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EXTRACT
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LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CALL

FILE NO._____ FILE NO._____

Subject: Reference CAP Show at Waterloo, Ohio

Date: 30 Aug 46 TO: Lt. Col. K. C. Dempster, Tac Opns.

Time: 1150 FROM: Major Grummitt, AAF Flight Services

Major Grummitt: It might be of interest to you to know that there will be no further air shows of any nature after 24 November 1946, also after the 15th of September 1946, only two of the seven air demonstration teams will be retained - which two has not been decided as yet but of those, five will be disbanded. Personnel will be returned to their original organization.

K. C. DEMPSTER
Tac Opns.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND A3A-2

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

10 July 1946

COMMANDING GENERAL NINTH AIR FORCE
BIGGS FIELD EL PASO TEXAS

Operational

PRIORITY

A3A-2 841 PD YOU WILL FURNISH ONE A DASH TWO SIX TYPE ACFT WIRED FOR W DASH ONE ZERO SPRAY TANK AT LAKE CHARLES LOUISIANA ON ONE FIVE JULY FOR PURPOSE OF SPRAYING RICE FIELDS IN THE VICINITY OF BEAUMONT TEXAS PD THREE PERSONNEL ACCOMPANIED BY A DOCTOR MINARIK AND TWO THOUSAND POUNDS OF SPRAY EQUIPMENT WILL ARRIVE LAKE CHARLES FROM EDGEWOOD ARSENAL ON ONE FIVE JULY PD DOCTOR MINARIK HAS ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE AREA TO BE SPRAYED

QUESADA HQ TAC AIR ACMD

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C O P Y

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

HQ TAC LANGLEY FLD VA 22 November 1946

UNCLASSIFIED

BOOK MESSAGE

PRIORITY

A3A 1315 PD DUE TO EMERGENCY CREATED BY THE THREATENED COAL STRIKE THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTION ON FLYING WILL APPLY UNTIL CANCELLED BY THIS HQ PD ALL UNNECESSARY FLYING WILL BE ELIMINATED PD FLYING NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY TO BE CONSTRUED AS TEN REPEAT TEN HOURS PD THOSE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE WEST COAST AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES ARE EXEMPTED FROM THIS RESTRICTION DURING THE MANEUVER PERIOD PD ALL UNIT AND BASE COS ARE DIRECTED TO HAVE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF GROUND VEHICLES AVAILABLE IN COMMISSION WITH DRIVERS ASSIGNED DURING THE EMERGENCY PERIOD

QUESADA HQ TACAIRCOMD

C O P Y

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7 December 46

PRIORITY

FROM WAR AFACC 072000Z

TO CG TAC AIR COMD LANGLEY FIELD VA

WAR EIGHT SEVEN TWO ONE SEVEN

CITE OURAD WAR EIGHT SIX ZERO TWO NINE THIS MESSAGE IS ABLE WARNING ORDER FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY PD EXECUTION ORDER WILL BE FURNISHED IF AND WHEN NECESSARY PD YOU ARE HEREBY CHARGED WITH THE TRANSPORT OF COMBAT TROOPS WITHIN ZONE OF INTERIOR IN EMERGENCIES ARRIZING FROM PRESENT COAL STRIKES PD YOU WILL BE PREPARED CMA UTILIZING AVAILABLE FORCES AND EQUIPMENT UNDER YOUR JURISDICTION CMA TO EXECUTE SUCH REQUESTS FOR THE AERIAL TRANSPORT OF TROOPS AND THERI EQUIPMENT AS ARE MADE TO YOU THROUGH THE PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL CMA WHO WILL DEAL WITH YOU DIRECTLY PD. WAR EIGHT SIX ZERO TWO NINE DATED TWO ONE NOVEMBER FOUR SIX IS RESCINDED PD OTHER PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES THIS SUBJECT ARE AMENDED TO CONFORM WITH ABOVE

SIGNED SPAATZ

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C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC 322(14 May 46) 14 May 1946

SUBJECT: Deactivation Activities.

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force, Greenville Army Air Field, Greenville, South Carolina.

1. A review of the deactivation activities of stations under the jurisdiction of the Third Air Force indicates that action toward final disposition of supply and closing of the stations has been seriously impeded.

2. The shortage of personnel, difficulties in correcting records, bringing posting up to date and failure to receive disposition instructions promptly are understood, but it is imperative that these difficulties be viewed as necessities for extraordinary action which must be taken if additional delays and difficulties are to be avoided.

3. Increases in skilled personnel cannot be expected. Every individual devoted to deactivation constitutes manpower lost to constructive organizational activity. As rights of entry are granted prior to complete disposition of supplies at surplus stations; the time required to clear the stationis increased owing to the additional problems arising out of temporary negotiations with the civilian communities in the utilization of equipment tentatively earmarked as surplus but which experience shows, frequently becomes a recoverable item of supply.

4. Prerequisites for unobstructed deactivation procedures call for completed postings, currently maintained inventories and preparation of records for submission to Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces depots for disposition. If the above is accomplished the only burden remaining at the station consists of outshipments and surplus property processing.

5. It appears that the greatest deficiency experienced by your stations is failure to report all supplies to depots for disposition. Outstanding examples are as follows:

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Subject: Deactivation Activities TAC 322 (14 May 46(

Marfa Army Air Field, Property not reported	100%
Malden Army Air Field property not reported	75%
Maxton Army Air Field property not reported	88%
Baer Army Air Field property not reported	99%
Kellogg Army Air Field property not reported	100%

6. Higher authority cannot act until they are advised as to what supply is on hand. In a number of instances supplies have not yet been reported to depots for disposition. The success of your program depends upon this being done without delay.

7. It is desired that the Commanding General give this matter his personal attention as it is felt that personnel, both civilian and military are being seriously dessipated and unless steps are taken to overcome the difficulties now being encountered, they will be magnified and further delays experienced as the situation becomes drawn out.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ROBERT M, LEE
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief of Staff

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C O P Y

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COMMENTARY FIRE POWER DEMONSTRATION, FT. BLISS, 17 MAY 1946

GENTLEMEN, THE DEMONSTRATION WHICH YOU WILL WITNESS THIS AFTERNOON WILL BE PERFORMED BY THE NINTH AIR FORCE AND WILL, NOT ONLY ILLUSTRATE THE CAPABILITIES, LIMITATIONS, AND FIRE POWER OF TACTICAL AVIATION, BUT WILL DEFINITELY REVEAL THE ROLE TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS PLAYS IN THE FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD PHASE OF THE AIR BATTLE; NAMELY, GAIN AND MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY, ISOLATION OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA, AND AIR COOPERATION MISSIONS WITH THE GROUND FORCES.

TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS CAN BE BROADLY DEFINED AS THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER IN COOPERATION WITH GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES. THESE AIR OPERATIONS ARE CLASSIFIED INTO THREE BASIC TASKS; NAMELY, OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, AND RECONNAISSANCE. OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS ARE THOSE AIR OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST ENEMY OBJECTIVES, THE DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALIZATION OF WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE MOST TO THE SUCCESS OF THE TASK FORCE AS A WHOLE. OFFENSIVE TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO THREE PHASES DIRECTED TOWARD THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE THREE BASIC TASKS IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER OF PRIORITY: FIRST PHASE:- GAIN AND MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY IN LOCALIZED SECTORS TO THE DEGREE THAT GROUND AND AIR FORCES CAN OPERATE FREELY WITHOUT EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION FROM THE ENEMY'S AIR POWER.

SECOND PHASE:- ISOLATION OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA. BY PREVENTING MOVEMENT OF ENEMY FORCES INTO AND WITHIN THE OBJECTIVE AREA AND SEEKING OUT AND DESTROYING THESE FORCES AND THEIR SUPPORTING INSTALLATIONS. THE ISOLATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD BU AIR ATTACK IS SECOND IN IMPORTANCE ONLY TO THE GAINING AND MAINTAINING OF AIR SUPERIORITY.

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C O P Y

THE DISRUPTION OF ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF ROADS AND SUPPLIES DEPRIVES THE ENEMY THE MEANS HE REQUIRES TO CONTINUE MILITARY OPERATION.

THESE AIR OPERATIONS CONSTITUTE ATTACK IN DEPTH WITH THE RESULT THAT ONCE THE ENEMY IS DISLOGED FROM HIS POSITION AND REARWARD MOVEMENT BEGUN, HE MUST BACK GREAT DISTANCES BEFORE HE HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RE-ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FRONT.

THIRD PHASE:- TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COORDINATED EFFORT OF THE AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN THE BATTLE AREA. TO GAIN OBJECTIVES ON THE IMMEDIATE FRONT OF THE GROUND FORCES. AIR OPERATIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE BATTLE AREA ARE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE MOVEMENT OF ENEMY FORCES ANS SUPPLIES. THESE ENEMY FORCES AND SUPPLIES, CONCENTRATED IN THE BATTLE AREA WILL BE GENERALLY SUITABLE FOR AIR ATTACK. THESE TARGETS INCLUDE TROOPS, VEHICLES, FUEL, AMMUNITION AND SUPPLY DUMPS. MOTOR PARKS AND COMMAND POSTS. THE PURPOSE OF ATTACKING THESE OBJECTIVES IS TO DISORGANIZE AND DESTROY ACCUMULATED RESERVES AND TO PREVENT THE ENEMY FROM USING TROOPS ANS SUPPLIES WHICH HE HAS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE AGAINST GROUND FORCES.

IN ADDITION TO THE THIRD PHASE THERE HAS DEVELOPED A HIGHLY TECHNICAL PHASE -- CLOSE AIR COOPERATION -- THIS PRESENTS THE MOST DIFFICULT PHASE IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. IT CAN BE BROADLY DEFINED AS ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT ON HOSTILE GROUND TARGETS WHICH ARE SO CLOSE TO FRIENDLY FRONT LINES AS TO REQUIRE DETAILED INTEGRATION OF EACH AIR MISSION WITH THE FIRE AND MOVEMENT OF THE GROUND FORCES.

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THIS PHASE IS DESIGNED LITERALLY TO DROP BOMBS. FIRE ROCKETS, OR STRAFE CLOSE IN FRONT OF THE GROUND FORCES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUSLY MADE PLANS AND ON THE REQUEST OF GROUND COMMANDERS. IT IS DIFFICULT PHASE TO ACCOMPLISH SINCE TARGETS ARE SMALL, WELL DISPERSED AND HARD TO LOCATE. BOMB LINES MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO AVOID BOMBING OUR OWN TROOPS, AND TO BE EFFECTIVE, IMMEDIATE RESPONSE MUST BE GIVEN TO THE APPROVED REQUEST OF GROUND COMMANDERS. THIS PHASE DEPENDS FOR SUCCESS UPON TEAMWORK AND CLOSE COOPERATION. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, COMMUNICATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED WITH THE GROUND FORCES TO KEEP THE GROUND COMMANDERS INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF THE AIR EFFORT, TO EXCHANGE INTELLIGENCE, TO ADVISE THE GROUND COMMANDERS ON THE CAPABILITIES OF AIRCRAFT, AND TO RELAY REQUESTS FOR STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS.

THE LIAISON BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR TODAY IS ESTABLISHED BY A GROUND CONTROL RADIO JEEP LOCATED JUST TO THE REAR OF OUR FRONT LINES AND WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH OUR AIRCRAFT THROUGHOUT THIS DEMONSTRATION.

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C O P Y

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A3 HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida

TAC 322 (15 Apr 46) 15 April 1946

SUBJECT: Assignment of units and bases.
(No reports control symbol required; cite Par 4f, Cir 303, WD, 1945)

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases, Wings, Groups, Battalions, and Separate Units, Tactical Air Command.

1. Reference is made to General Orders No. 2, this headquarters, dated 26 March 1946. It is the desire of the Commanding General that this order be amplified in order that the desired results may be obtained in a harmonious and well-coordinated manner.

2. The major role of this command has been changed from one of training combat crews to the training and employment of tactical units. In the past, bases have been assigned directly to the commands and the commands have held the station commanders directly responsible for the training conducted by units on their station. The objective of this general order is that where appropriate, both bases and units will be assigned directly to the numbered air forces. The commanding generals of the air forces normally will not further assign tactical units to their respective stations. The unit commanders of the tactical units stationed on a base will be directly responsible to the command to which they are assigned. The base commander will have no authority or jurisdiction over the tactical training and operations of tactical units other than to provide the necessary training aids and ground equipment used in the unit's ground training program. The base commander is, however, responsible for the immediate processing of supply requisitions from the units, for obtaining necessary supplies, and for assisting in every way possible the tactical units in the accomplishment of their mission.

3. It is directed that each base and unit commander on TAC stations keep a comprehensive diary setting forth difficulties encountered or difficulties overcome while operating under this system, such as inapplicable reports and functions, duplications of effort, etc. Included should be recommendations as to where the responsibility should lie for reports and functions in question in order that the tactical unit can best be trained and operated.

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Hq TAC, Tampa, Fla., subj: Assignment of units and bases, 15 Apr 1946

4. Each base and tactical unit commander will submit a detailed report by mail to reach this headquarters on or before 1 June 1946. This headquarters will appoint a board to review these reports upon receipt and to arrive at conclusions which will be published in the form of a directive. It is directed that your conscientious and whole-hearted attention be given this matter and that your reports include every detail pertaining to base and tactical unit relations.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

OTIS C. TURNER
WOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

(Effective until 15 October 1946, unless sooner superseded or rescinded)

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Tab to letter fr CG AAF
dated 24 Oct 1946 subj:
AAF Plans and Programs

SECRET
By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Forces

FUTURE OPERATIONAL PLANS OF THE AAF

The Army Air Forces has become cognizant of the growing importance of the Arctic Frontier. It is planned that ultimately we will have the greater part of our units and personnel trained in Arctic Operations. As the first step in this direction the 28th VHB Group and one squadron of the 56th Fighter Group will be deployed to Alaska this fall on TDY for Arctic Training. These first units will establish training periods, standards, and doctrines for the AAF rotational plan for Arctic Training.

The Army Air Forces is presently in the process of a world-wide reorganization and re-equipping of our Night Fighter Squadrons into all Weather Fighter Groups. These units will be capable of conducting their primary mission during either daylight or darkness and under all types of weather conditions. The P-82 type aircraft has been decided upon as the interim type for this mission until a suitable aircraft, designed primarily for all weather operations, can be designed and produced.

The Army Air Forces jet program is presently underway with the jet types now represented in the Zone of Interior, the European Theater and the Pacific Theater. One group, the 1st Fighter Group, of Tactical Air Command is engaged in developing jet tactics for Air-Ground cooperations. It is planned to have the 14th Fighter Group of Air Defense Command equipped with the P-84 by January 1947 in order that intercept tactics for jet types may be perfected.

The B-36, next step in the development of the strategic air weapons of the Army Air Forces, will be in evidence next year. By December 1947 the 40th VHB Group should be equipped with this type aircraft.

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HEADQUARTERS AIR UNIVERSITY

Maxwell Field, Alabama

16 July 1946

SUBJECT: Activation of the Research Section, Academic Staff Division, Air University.

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. The Research Section, Academic Staff Division of the Air University was activated, effective 18 June 1946, for the purpose of accomplishing the following mission:

a. Maintains continuing research into the strategic, tactical, and defensive concepts of air power, both manned and unmanned aircraft, and guided missiles.

******

c. Maintains close liaison with the Headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, the Tactical Air Command and the Air Defense Command with regard to matters of policy and doctrine.

******

i. Develops basic doctrines and concepts for the employment of air power.

j. Plans and supervises the development and testing of new and improved methods and techniques of aerial warfare, reviews and evaluates such tests and makes recommendations thereon in collaboration with appropriate tactical commands.

******

2. Prior to this date, it has been the responsibility of the Army Air Forces Board, Orlando, Florida, to activate projects of a technical and tactical nature upon direction from Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C. Further, the Army Air Forces Board was charged with the preparation of and/or revision of Field Manuals as directed by Headquarters, Army Air Forces. All projects which were

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Ltr to CG, Tactical Air Command, subj: "Activation of the Research Section, Academic Staff Division, Air University". (Cont'd)

currently active at the time the Army Air Forces Board was deactivated have been transferred to the Research Section of the Air University and are in the process of being reactivated as Air University Research Projects.

******

s/ Dalton G. Peagler
t/ DALTON G. PEAGLER
WOJG, USA
Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

5 March 1946

SUBJECT: Radar Equipment for the 47th Bombardment Group (L) (Night Attack)

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Forces
Bolling Field, D.C.

1. Contemplated low level night radar operations by A-26 type aircraft against mobile naval target vessels indicate the need for installing suitable radar equipment in several A-26 type aircraft.

2. Inasmuch as the 47th Bombardment Group (L) (Night Attack) is the only group properly equipped to undertake such an operation, it is proposed to install six (6) AN/APQ-58 in six (6) aircraft of this group. Necessary action is being taken to obtain and deliverthe six (6) sets to the 47th Group.

3. It is desired that tactics be perfected for destroying mobile naval target vessels of the destroyer size by night low level radar bombardment. There are no naval vessels available at this time for practice use. It will be necessary, therefore, to employ all available means of improving or simulating mobile waterborne practice targets.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

REUBEN C. HOOD JR
Brigadier General U.S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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3AF 413.44 (5 Mar 46) 2nd Ind A3C
HEADQUARTERS, THIRD AIR FORCE, Tampa, Florida 21 Mar 1946

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Forces, Bolling Field, Washington 20, D.C.

1. The 47th Bombardment Group (L) is operating under TO&Es 1-112R and 1-137R, dated 5 May 1945, as amended and are authorized no radar mechanics to install AN/APQ-5B indicator equipment.

2. The 544th Air Service Group (for the 47th Bombardment Group) is operating presently under TO&Es 1-452T, 1-457T, and 1-458T, as amended, dated 5 May 1945. There are five radar mechanics (SSN 955) authorized for this unit and only one assigned. Second indorsement your headquarters, file CAF 322 (25 Feb 46), dated 14 March 1946, to letter Headquarters Lake Charles Army Air Forces, subject: "Reorganization of the 455th Air Service Group", dated 25 February 1946, indicates a reorganization of the 544th Air Service Group to include additional personnel. It is not known the number of radar maintenance personnel this unit will contain. Until additional personnel are made available the installation if the AN/APQ-5B indicators cannot be made at any installation of this air force.

3. In view of the above this air Force is requesting immediate quotas to schools for training regular army enlisted personnel of the 47th Bombardment Group and 544th Air Service Group on Radar. Personnel for this training are presently available in these units.

4. It is recommended that the AN/APQ-5B installation be made at some Air Materiel Command Depot where personnel are available. If the installation is made at a depot it will be necessary for a factory representative to be sent to Lake Charles Army Air Field to check off Radar Observers of the 47th Bombardment Group on the operation of the equipment.

5. It is requested that the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, be informed of this project in order that it may be included in AAF Training Standard 20-5, dated 25 February 1946.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ Clarence N. Keen
Major, Air Corps
Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Office of the Commanding General

Tampa, Florida

In reply refer to:
TAC 461 (17 May 46)

SUBJECT: Army Air Force Board Projects Q4841 and Q4876.

TO: The President, Army Air Forces Board, Orlando, Florida
ATTENTION: Tactics Division

1. This command is very desirous of conducting the proposed projects: "Tactical Test of the P-80 Aircraft" dated 10 May 1946, and "Development of Doctrine on Technique for a Tactical Night Striking Unit Employing Light Bombardment Aircraft," dated 3 May 1946. Project Q4841 has been forwarded to the Commanding Officer of 412th Fighter Group, March Field, California, and Project Q4876 has been assigned to the 47th Bombardment Group, Lake Charles Army Air Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana. These two Groups have been authorized direct communications with your headquarters on all matters pertaining to these projects.

2. In order to expedite these projects it is requested that project officers from your headquarters be sent to the 412th Fighter Group, March Field, California, and to the 47th Bombardment Group, Lake Charles, Army Air Field, Louisiana, to assist them in organizing and conducting the projects.

3. Tactical Air Command is vitally interested in such tactical tests and will use all available facilities to complete the tests as quickly as possible. Request that an information copy of all communications from your headquarters be sent to this headquarters for purpose of monitoring and coordination of the project.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ Henry W. Spiller
HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, A.G.D.
Asst. Adjutant General

C O P Y

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MJA/mc-Q

3 May 1946

SUBJECT: Development of Doctrine and Technique for a Tactical Night Striking Unit Employing Light Bombardment Aircraft. Tactics Division

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Tampa, Florida

1. The Army Air Forces Board has activated project Q4876 "Development of Doctrine and Technique for a Tactical Night Striking Unit Employing Light Bombardment Aircraft."

2. This project is assigned a 1C priority and is classified confidential.

* * * * *

4. The object of this project is to determine the organization and equipment and to develop the tactical doctrine and technique for operating a light bombardment unit at night under favorable weather conditions in the execution of the mission of a Tactical Air Force. When possible under these tests, it is desired to establish factors which limit operations, to ascertain minimum weather conditions for efficient operations, and to indicate any factors that might lead to the solution of problems confronting all-weather tactical operations.

5. A basic requirement of future units of the Army Air Forces is the ability to operate under all weather conditions. Inasmuch as this requirement cannot be immediately accomplished, it is imperative that the Air Forces develop the tactics and technique for night operations during favorable weather conditions with its present equipment. It is believed that a satisfactory completion of this project will result in conclusions and recommendations which will be applicable to the ultimate aim and progress of tactical air operations under all weather conditions.

* * * * *

FOR THE ARMY AIR FORCES BOARD:

E. L. EUBANK
Brigadier General, U. A. Army
President

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

A3A

TAC 461 (16 May 46) 16 May 1946

SUBJECT: Army Air Force Board Project Q4876.

TO: Commanding Officer, 47th Bombardment Group, Lake Charles Army Air Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana.

1. Inclosed is a copy of AAF Board Project Q4876, "Development of Doctrine and Technique for a Tactical Night Striking Unit Employing Light Bombardment Aircraft". The project is assigned to the 47th Bombardment Group for accomplishment.

2. Lieutenant Colonel O. B. Johnson and an Operations Analyst of this headquarters will be available to advise and assist you in any way possible on the establishment of procedure in the conduct of test and collection of data.

3. Lieutenant Colonel M. J. Akers is AAF Board Project Officer and direct communication between your headquarters and the AAF Board is authorized.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR QUESADA:

Stamped HOWARD J. GEPHART
Captain, Air Corps
Asst, Adj, Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

ILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: AAF Board Project
1	OBJ Nt. Ftr. A3A 14 May 46	A-3	This project will be highly appropriate for obtaining data of the type that will be invaluable for conduct of future operations by this command. The tentative outline as submitted by the AAF Board is quite general, and in my opinion completly covers the scope of a night attack Unit as we now know it. It will, however, be necessary to conduct extensive discussion and planning of details on tactics and techniques. It is recommended that an operations analyst and myself be assigned to this project to advise the 47th Group and the AAF Board Project officer.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

ILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: AAF Board Project
1	A3A OBJ Night Ftr 13 May 46	CofS	Attached is AAF Board Project Q4876 "Development of Doctrines and Techniques for a tactical night striking unit employing Light Bombardment aircraft" as per conference with Colonel Tipton and yourself. Lt. Col. M. J. Akers from AAF Board, Col. Meyers and myself discussed project 13 May 46. The project was accepted by Col. Meyers and is being studied by A-3 section. It will be assigned to 47th Bomb Group and will be accomplished as soon as possible though it will be slow due to the many CAP recruiting and other demonstrations now being assigned the group. Request project be returned to me after being reviewed by yourself.
2	C/S M. L. May 46	A-3	Night Ftr. - Noted and approved. This project should be given a high priority. I feel that the Board Project officer should spend a good bit of time with the 47th Gp. R. L.

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C O P Y

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR UNIVERSITY
Maxwell Field, Alabama

U/mc/R

330.14

19 September 1946

SUBJECT: Air University Research Project Priorities.

TO : Commanding General
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

ATTN: Lt. Col. J.I. Vanderhood
Policy and Review Section,
Requirements Division,
AC/AS-3

1. Apparent discrepancies concerning the effect of Air University Research Project priorities have occurred recently. In that the majority of these projects are directed by Headquarters, Army Air Forces, and all subject priorities either originate with or are concurred in by your headquarters, it is indicated that this information will be of interest.

2. Working priorities assigned to projects do not secure comparable priorities for the procurement of personnel and equipment to sustain prosecution of the project by the testing agency. The following are examples concerning projects which carry a 1-C priority:

a. AU Project Q-4841 - "Tactical Test of the P-80 Aircraft." Testing Agency: 1st Fighter Group, March Field, California.

(1) Several experienced personnel have been lost from the 1st Fighter Group to overseas and to a demonstration unit.

(2) Difficulty has been experienced in obtaining an adequate gunnery range which is needed for the project.

b. AU Project B-4856 - "Selection of Radar and Communications Equipment for the Air Warning and Control System of a Tactical Air Force". Testing agency: 502nd Tactical Control Group, Biggs Field, Texas.

(1) The 502nd Tactical Control Group has been unable to obtain personnel. As of the first of this month,

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only five men assigned could be classified as technicians and these were inexperienced. In fact, this group has never had enough personnel for normal administrative and housekeeping duties.

(2) Request for equipment to be used in the testing has not met with appreciable success. This is relatively unimportant in that the lack of adequate personnel precludes operating same.

c. AU Project Q-4876 - "Development of Doctrine and Techniques for a Tactical Night Striking Unit Employing Light Bombardment Aircraft". Testing agency: 47th Bombardment Group (L), Lake Charles, Louisiana.

(1) The 47th Bomb Group has had over 100% turnover in pilot personnel within the past three months. At the present time there is a surplus of pilots in the group which is due to the replacement of transferred personnel. The new pilots are inexperienced in night operation and will require extensive training.

(2) Key personnel other than pilots are being transferred. Of these proficient Bombardier-Navigators and Radar Operators are significant. The group has only 16 0142s (radar observers) of a TO compliment of 48.

(3) Some types of equipment and facilities such as a target comparable to night attack of shipping in the Gulf of Mexico has been difficult to arrange.

3. Concurrently, other projects have not had comparable personnel and material difficulties, although the pertinent priority is often lower. An example is AU Project 4601, "Test Firing Against B-17 Drone", priority 2-A.

4. The proper execution of an Air University Project depends directly upon the successful application of the priority together with the efficient cooperation of all concerned. Although AAF Regulation 20-21 is specific in its reference to responsibility, it is often difficult for project officers to clarify authorities and procedures. Such an obstacle is magnified when priorities of projects fail to product intended results.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ F. E. Lankston
F. E. LANKSTON
Maj, AGD, Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Office of the Commanding General

In Reply Refer To:
TAC 461 (17 May 46)

Tampa, Florida

SUBJECT: Army Air Force Board Projects Q4841 and Q4876

TO: The President, Army Air Forces Board, Orlando, Florida
ATTENTION: Tactics Division

1. This command is very desirous of conducting the proposed projects: "Tactical Test of the P-80 Aircraft" dated 10 May 1946, and "Development of Doctrine on Technique for a Tactical Night Striking Unit Employing Light Bombardment Aircraft", dated 3 May 1946. Project Q4841 has been forwarded to the Commanding Officer of 412th Fighter Group, March Field, California, and Project Q4876 has been assigned to the 47th Bombardment Group, Lake Charles Army AirField, Lake Charles, Louisiana. These two Groups have been authorized direct communications with your headquarters on all matters pertaining to these projects.

2. In order to expedite these projects it is requested that project officers from your headquarters be sent to the 412th Fighter Group, March Field, California, and to the 47th Bombardment Group, Lake Charles Army Air Field, Louisiana, to assist them in organizing and conducting the projects.

3. Tactical Air Command is vitally interested in such tactical tests and will use all available facilities to complete the tests as quickly as possible. Request that an information copy of all communications from your headquarters be sent to this headquarters for purpose of monitoring and coordination of the project.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ Henry W. Spiller
t/ HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, AGD
Asst Adj. Gen.

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(AAF Board)

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10 May 1946
Tactics Division

Tactical Test of the P-80 Aircraft.

TO: Commanding Officer
412th Fighter Group
March Field, California

THRU: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Tampa, Florida

1. An urgent requirement exists for the completion of the "Tactical Test of the P-80 Aircraft" at the earliest practical date. A study of the test requirements of this project suggests that the pilot proficiency and operational efficiency of the 412th Fighter Group if utilized for the project would materially accelerate its completion. By dividing the test to be completed between Eglin Field, Pinecastle Army Air Base and the 412th Fighter Group, a more comprehensive and expeditious program can be accomplished. It is therefore requested that the 412th Fighter Group, March Field, California, participate in the testing necessary to complete the subject project.

******

5. The object of this project is to test the tactical capabilities of the P-80 aircraft in all phases of tactical operations with the exception of photo reconnaissance. The test will include dive and glide bombing, ground strafing, interception, escort, aerial combat, tactical reconnaissance, instrument flying, night operations, formation and ground handling.

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HEADQUARTERS
First Fighter Group
March Field, Riverside, California

19 August 1946

SUBJECT: Progress Report of P-80 Project CA641 for Period ending 15 July 1946.

1. In accordance with letter, Hq. Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama, Subject: Liaison Between P-80 Units, dtd 1 July 1946, the following information is submitted.

2. During the recent testing of the P-80A-1-LO type aircraft to determine its capabilities as a dive bomber as compared to contemporary fighters, missions were accomplished using various angles of dive from 35 degrees to the vertical and from altitudes of 20,000 feet to 5,000 feet, using all types of overheads from the straight pushover up to 270 degree overhead passes, with the following results.

Altitude at Initial Point
Angle of Dive
Altitude at the Point of Release
Speed at Point of Release
Aiming
Results
Dive Flaps
Best Dive Bombing Technique
Cautions To Be Taken
Miscellaneous
Remarks.

a. The general consensus of opinion from all pilots participating in these tests is that the P-80 is the most accurate dive bombing fighter they have ever flown.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ James C. Brown
t/ JAMES C. BROWN
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

7 February 1946

AFCTG-6

SUBJECT: Selection of Radar Equipment for Tactical Air Commands

TO: Commanding General, AAF Center, Orlando, Florida
ATTENTION: AAF Board

1. Operations in combat emphasized the need for combination of radar sets in the Tactical Air Commands, for air warning and aircraft control, that are highly mobile, assure reliable and continuous operation and possess sufficient traffic handling capacity.

2. Developments during the war resulted in construction of radars that did not receive sufficient tests in combat to determine their suitability for meeting the requirements of a Tactical Air Command. The CPS-1, together with the necessary CPS-4's, the combination extensively used, results in a total weight and equipment outlay that might be materially lessened by the use of other combinations of available radars, without loss in useful performance.

* * * * *

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL ARNOLD:

/s/ Kenneth P. Bergquist
KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Colonel, Air Corps
Executive
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-3

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

COPY

TAC 319.1 (22 Mar 46) 14 May 1946

SUBJECT: AAF Board Project, H4856, "Selection of Radar and Communications Equipment for the Air Warning and Control System of a Tactical Air Force."

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Biggs Field, El Paso, Tex.

1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters, file 319.1 (22 Mar 46), dated 22 March 1946. Subject, AAF Board Project H4856, "The Selection of Radar Equipment for Tactical Air Commands." Subject project has been revised and changed to, "Selection of Radar and Communications Equipment for the Air Warning and Control System of a Tactical Air Force." The 502d Tactical Control Group is designated as the testing agency to accomplish this Board project.

2. This project has been expanded to include the selection of equipment required to provide adequate communications for the Tactical Control system. Since the communications equipment in the control system is so closely associated with the radar equipment, and the amount and type of traffic at each location, the required communications equipment will be considered as an integral part of the radar sets being tested.

******

This headquarters is taking further action to increase the TO&E authorization by nine (9) VHF teams (Ch) to allow sufficient VHF channels and is requesting assignment of a Radar-Calibration Detachment as per letter request 502d Tactical Control Group, dated 26 March 1946, Subject, "Assignment of Radar Calibration Detachment", and 1st Indorsement your headquarters, file Ninth Air Force-319.1 (26 Mar 46) dated 28 Mar 1946.

******

5. All units of this command may be called upon to assist in the conducting of the test. Units not under the command of the Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, will be requested for availability through this headquarters. Authority is granted to make visits to prospective locations for the purpose of selecting suitable areas for conducting the tests. It is recommended that areas adjacent to stations of this command be given first priority. If areas adjacent to stations of other commands are considered, a request to visit such areas will be forwarded to this headquarters . For the purpose of conducting the test, the 502d Tactical Control Group will be authorized to suitable locations within the United States. When such moves are desired, a request for movement orders will be forwarded to this headquarters.

6. The General Test Program has been amended and is inclosed as

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

ILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NC	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Air University Project No. H4856
1	H.E.R. Comm O 25 Oct 46	A-3 A-5	For your information 1 Attach
2	J.D.S. Act A-3	A-5	Noted
3	R.B.W. A-5 Sec	A-1	It is becoming evident that the Air University thinks that the Tactical Air Command has no other duties than that of completing or furnishing personnel to complete projects that their Research Division attempts but are not capable of completing. If the Tactical Air Command must accomplish the work of the Research Division of the Air University, it is recommended that the Air University discontinue their Research section and have the personnel transfered to the jurisdiction of the T.A.C. where their duties can be plainly outlined.
4	J.W.P. A-1	A-3	Concur with #3. Don't think this requires A-1 attention.
5	J.D.S. Actg A-3	Comm	Concur in note #3. We have no personnel available to help in such a study.

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inclosure #1. Prior to conducting any test on actual equipment, a detailed test program will be written and forwarded for concurrence by the A&F Board. This detailed test program will include:

a. A plan for conducting the tests.
b. Combinations of radar equipments to be tested. This will be substantiated by a staff study on equipments ommitted from general test program.
c. Types of missions to be flown.
d. Probable locations of areas within the continential limits of the United States where the tests may be conducted.

****

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

s/ Howard J. Gephart
t/ HOWARD J. GEPHART
Captain, AC
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl.
Gen. Test Program

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THE ARMY AIR FORCES BOARD
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Orlando, Florida

30 January 46

SUBJECT: Test and Evaluation of Navigational Systems for Airborne Operations, AAF Board Project No. H4804 M&E Div, Elec Br.

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

ATTENTION: AAF Center Liaison Office

* * * *

2 a. (1)(c) In most situations it would be desirable for Troop Carrier aircraft to use the existing Tactical Air Command ground radar net, which is normally employed for tactical air operations, rather than to establish an independent ground control system for the exclusive use of airborne operations, which would be a very costly undertaking, out of proportion to the use which would be derived from it by airborne operations alone. However, this sharing of the ground control system with Tactical Air Command would further restrict the volume of Troop Carrier traffic that would be accommodated.

* * * *

6. Conclusions. From the foregoing preliminary survey of navigation systems that could be used for all-weather Troop Carrier operations, it is concluded that:

a. The most promising are: (1) Extended Range Shoran, which is completely independent of any aids other than those in friendly terriroty or in relay aircraft and is also independent of terrain, but which has limited range and limited traffic handling capacity; and (2) an airborne radar device which has unlimited range and traffic handling capacity, but is somewhat restricted in accuracy by the type of terrain over which operations must be conducted.

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Basic: The AAF Board, Of of the President, Orlando, Fla, subj: Test and Evaluation of Navigational Systems for Airborne Operations, AAF Board Project No. H4804.

b. Tests should be conducted to determine the accuracy and general suitability of both of these types of equipments under Troop Carrier operating conditions.

c. On the basis of these tests and further study of the requirements for a navigation system for Airborne Operations, Troop Carrier Command and the associated agencies to whom airborne operations are a matter of primary interest should make a decision in regard to future developments as to whether: (1) work should be directed toward a further extension in the maximum range of a Shoran type system, (2) effort should be directed toward an improved airborne radar device and associated beacons, or (3) Troop Carrier Command can profitably use both of these types of equipments to meet the changing demands of world-wide warfare. This decision should be elaborated in a revised statement of Military Requirements. The generalized military requirements that resulted from the 7 November meeting in Washington (inclosure 1) are of practically no value to development, testing, and planning agencies.

7. The AAF Board will take necessary action to include in the Extended Range Shoran tests, soon to be made at Eglin Field, specific tests to determine the maximum range, accuracy and general suitability of this system for Troop Carrier use.

* * * *

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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3 April 1946

SUBJECT: AAF Board Project H4695, "Operational Test of AN/UPN-4 Radar Beacons for Front-Line Demarcation and Troop Carrier Operations." Elec Br, M&E Div

TO: Commanding General
IX Troop Carrier Division
Greenville, South Carolina

ATTENTION: A-6

THRU: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida

1. On 14 June 1945, the AAF Board initiated Project No. H4695 of a 2-C priority for the purpose of operationally testing and developing organizational details for the employment of the AN/UPN-3, - 4 radar beacons for front-line demarcation. It is requested that the IX Troop Carrier Division, with the cooperation of Army Ground Forces Board No. 1, conduct such tests as to accomplish the objectives outlined below.

* * * * *

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Wm W. MOMYER
Colonel, Air Corps
Executive

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EXTRACT COPY 204[3]

THE ARMY AIR FORCES BOARD
Army Air Forces Proving Ground Command
Orlando, Florida

4 June 1946

SUBJECT: Test and Evaluation of Navigational Systems for Troop Carrier Operations, AAF Board Project No. H4804

TO: Commanding General
Third Air Force (Troop Carrier)
Greenville, South Carolina
ATTENTION: A-6 Section, Maj. Cloyd H. Derey

THRU: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. On 23 October 1945, the AAF Board initiated Project No. H4804 of a 2-A priority to test and to evaluate navigational systems for troop carrier operations. It is requested that the Third Air Force accomplish the objectives outlined below:

a. Determine the requirements for a navigational system for troop carrier operations.

b. Evaluate existing navigational systems applicable to troop carrier use and test those systems deemed practicable employing presently available equipment including the Eicher system with AN/APS-10 airborne search radar using a 30-inch antenna.

c. Prepare recommendations for those systems upon which further development should be concentrated insofar as troop carrier operations are concerned.

2. In general, the requirement is for a navigational system which will enable the dropping of large groups of airborne troops immediately in a predetermined drop zone without first dropping pathfinder teams to establish beacons in the designated zones. Such an operation requires an accurate system of navigation which does not depend on the use of beacons in the immediate vicinity of the drop zones. The basic requirements are that the system must be operable for a flight altitude of five hundred (500) feet above terrain, a range of twenty-five (25) miles (minimum) to forty (40) miles (desirable) from any ground beacon stations which may be necessary, and for any

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Basic: The AAF Board, AAF Proving Grnd Comd, Orlando, Fla, subj: Test and Evaluation of Navigational Systems for Troop Carrier Operations, AAF Board Project No. H4804, 4 Jun 46

direction of approach. It has been indicated that a dropping accuracy of four hundred (400) yards or an instrumental accuracy of one hundred (100) yards is desired. It must also be borne in mind that the system must simultaneously serve a number of drop zones.

3. To fulfill the above requirements there have been a number of navigational systems proposed, such as Shorne, SCR-584 control, or a ground position indicator attached to a search radar. It would appear that the use of a ground position indicator attached to a search radar, whereby well-definited terrain check points and beacons in friendly territory can be used to nitially orient the GPI information and thence furnish automatic tracking information to the desired zones, may be one answer to the problem.

4. One (1) C-47 with the AN/APS-10 and Eicher Computer combination installed will be made available to the Third Air Force by Air Materiel Command about 1 July 1946. Mr. Eicher and one (1) radar technician will also be made available to assist on this project.

* * * *

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Wm. W. MOMYER
Colonel, Air Corps
Executive

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HEADQUARTERS
Air Proving Ground Command

141/GFW/be

400.112

13 September 1946

SUBJECT: AAF Board Project H4695, "Operational Test of AN/UPN-4 Radar Beacon for Front Line Demarcation and Troop Carrier Operations."

THRU: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), Greenville, South Carolina. ATTENTION: A-6.

* * * * *

4. Since reorganizations and personnel shortages have precluded proper liaison while this test was in progress, it is requested that an officer, or officers, most familiar with the testing procedures and writeup of the results of the test as conducted by Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) be placed on temporary duty with this command for a period of 15 days to aid in preparation of the Final Report.

5. This command wishes to express its appreciation to the Third Air Force for their aid in conducting this project.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

M. P. PARSONS
Captain, Air Corps
Asst Air Secretary

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Basic fr Hq Air Proving Grnd Comd, dtd 13 Sep 46, subj: "AAF Board Project H4695, "Operational Test of AN/UPN-4 Radar Beacon for Front Line Demarcation and Troop Carrier Operations."

* * * * *

AF9AF 475 (13 Sep 46 2nd Ind. CM

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Greenville, South Carolina, 13 November 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. Only four (4) officers of this Air Force were familiar with Project H4695. Two (2) of these officers were transferred to other commands during August and September. Prior commitments have precluded the assignment of either of the remaining officers to the APGC to supervise the rewriting of the project report.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

ERLATH W. ZUEHL
Lt. Col., Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

* * * * *

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205[2]

HEADQUATERS
AIR UNIVERSITY
330.14 MAXWELL FIELD, ALABAMA U/mc/R

19 September 1946

SUBJECT: Air University Research Project Priorities.

TO: Commanding General
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
Whashington 25, DC ATTN: Lt Col J. I. Vanderhoof
Policy and Review Section
Requirements Div, AC/AS-3

1. Apparent discrepancies concering the effect of Air University Research Project priorities have occurred recently. In that the majority of these projects are directed by Headquarters, Army Air Forces, and all subject priorities either originate with or are concurred in by your headquarters, it is indicated that this information will be of interest.

2. Working priorities assigned to projects do not secure comparable priorities for the procurement of personnel and equipment to sustain prosecution of the project by the testing agency. The following are examples concerning projects which carry a 1-C priority:

a. AU Project Q-4841 - "Tactical Test of the P-80 Aircraft". Testing agency: 1st Fighter Group, March Field, California.

(1) Several experienced personnel have been lost from the 1st Fighter Group to overseas and to a demonstration unit.

(2) Difficulty has been experienced in obtaining an adequate gunnery range which is needed for the project.

b. AU Project E-4856 - "Selection of Radar and Communications Equipment for the Air Warning and Control System of a Tactical Air Force". Testing agency: 502nd Tactical Control Group, Biggs Field, Texas.

(1) The 502nd Tactical Control Group has been unable to obtain personnel. As of the first of this month, only five men assigned could be classified as technicians and these were inexperienced. In fact, this group has never had enough personnel for normal administrative and housekeeping duties.

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Ltr to CG, Hq, AAF, Washington, DC Frm CG, Air Univ, Maxwell Field, Ala. Subj: Air University Research Project Priorities (cont'd)

(2) Request for equipment to be used in the testing has not met with appreciable success. This is relatively unimportant in that the lack of adequate personnel precludes operating same.

c. AU Project Q-4876- "Development of Doctrine and Techniques for a Tactical Night Striking Unit Employing Light Bombardment Aircrafr". Testing agency: 47th Bombardment Group (L). Lake Charles, Louisiana.

(1) The 47th Bomb Group has had over 100% turnover in pilot personnel within the past three months. At the present time there is a surplus of pilots in the group which is due to the replacement of transferred personnel. The new pilots are inexperienced in night operation and will require extensive training.

(2) Key personnel other than pilots are being transferred. Of these, proficient Bombardier-Navigators and Radar Operators are significant. The group has only 16 0142s (radar observers) of a TO compliment of 48.

(3) Some types of equipment and facilities such as a target comparable to might attack of shipping in the Gulf of Mexico has been difficult to arrange.

3. Concurrently, other projects have not had comparable personnel and material difficulties, although the pertinent priority is often lower. An example is AU Project 4601, "Test Firing Against B-17 Drone", priority 2-A.

4. The proper execution of an Air University Project depends directly upon the successful application of the priorty together with the efficient cooperation of all concerned. Although AAF Regulation 20-21 is specific in its reference to responsibility, it is often difficult for project officers to clarify authorities and procedures. Such aman obstacle is magnified when priorities of projects fail to produce intended results.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ F. E. Lankston
F. E. LANKSTON
Major, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Operations Analysis Section
Langley Field, Virginia

22 July 1946

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Recommendations for Arctic Operations

1. Referring to conversation between CAS and Colonel Luehman, A-5 of Strategic Air Command on 16 July concerning plans to establish an operating base for VHBs on the North Polar Ice Cap, the following considerations are advanced:

a. Surveys by Low Flying Aircraft

* * * * *

b. Establishment of Operating Base

* * * * *

2. The further remote possibility of conducting underwater exploration by specially equipped submarine is not here considered. There are too many unknown conditions attendant on such a technique.

ARNOLD C. McLEAN
Operations Analyst

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/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/
Langley Field, Va.

TAC 320.3 (2 Oct 46) 2 October 1946

SUBJECT: Sub-Arctic Equipment Requirements

TO: Commanding General
Air Materiel Command
Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio
ATTENTION: Lt Colonel Wilmott, Engineering Standards Division, TSEST, Building 16, Post C-63

1. Reference is made to conference on 26 September 1946 between members of your command and this command. The following letter has been forwarded to the six technical chiefs; Chief of Chemical Corps, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, Quartermaster General, and Surgeon General:

"1. Tactical Air Command is currently engaged in planning for the operation of tactical groups and units in regions of severe cold. The present authorized Tables of Organization and Equipment, Tables of Allowances, and Individual Equipment Lists are not sufficient in themselves to provide for adequate equipment and supply for sub-Arctic operations. Up to the present time, no authorized arctic lists have been published. This headquarters is desirous of obtaining the recommendations for additions to or deletions from the authorized Tables of Organization and Equipment for (work applicable to technical service) equipment and supply for the types of units concerned (see Inclosure No. 1). In effect, this will constitute an Arctic supplement to the Tables of Organization and Equipment now authorized.

"2. Any assistance which can be given this headquarters in securing a list of additional (word applicable to each technical service) equipment and supply necessary for sub-Arctic operations will be of immense value."

2. This command is most appreciative of the information rendered by your command during the recent conference. It is believed that the receipt of information from each of the technical services concerned, plus the receipt of information from Air Materiel Command will enable Tactical Air Command to plan sub-Arctic operations with reasonable assurance that supply and equipment requirements will be adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

J. K. BROCK
Capt. A.C.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl
List of Orgns

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*Reg 20-1
1-2

REGULATIONS)
NO 20-1)

HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE
Tampa, Florida, 1 March 1946

ORGANIZATION

Third Air Force

*(This regulation supersedes Third Air Force Regulation 20-1, 5 September 1945, including C1, dated 15 November 1945.)

		Paragraphs
Section I	Mission	1-2
Section II	Headquarters Third Air Force staff	3-11
Section III	Third Air Force commands	12-13
Section IV	Stations and exempted activities	14

SECTION I

MISSION

	Paragraphs
Commanding General	1
Mission	2

1. COMMANDING GENERAL. The Commanding General, Third Air Force, is responsible for the fulfillment of the mission of the Third Air Force.

2. MISSION. The mission of the Third Air Force is:

a. Demobilization and recruitment of military personnel in accordance with directives received from higher headquarters.

b. To man, train, and equip for movement to overseas theaters such units, combat crews, and individuals as may be designated by higher headquarters.

c. To receive, man, train, and equip for overseas movement, or for tactical operations, all units which may be assigned for redeployment or strategic reserve by higher headquarters.

d. To cooperate with Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces within the continental limits of the United States as prescribed by higher headquarters.

e. Preparation of detailed plans for the active support of the Eastern Defense Command and the Sixth Air Force.

(Effective until 1 March 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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f. To cooperate with the AAF Board in developing doctrines for tactical air operations by improving organizations, testing equipment, and developing new techniques for use of equipment.

g. To operate search and rescue service within the area assigned by AAF Regulation 20-34.

h. The reception, classification, assignment or reassignment of combat crews, individuals, and miscellaneous personnel.

SECTION II

HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE STAFF

	Paragraph
Deputy Commanding General	3
Chief of Staff	4
Deputy Chief of Staff	5
Secretary of General Staff	6
Assistant Chief of Staff, A-1 Personnel	7
Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2 Intelligence	8
Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3 Operations and Training	9
Assistant Chief of Staff, A-4 Supply and Maintenance	10
Special Staff	11

3. DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL. Assists the Commanding General and acts for him during his absence.

4. CHIEF OF STAFF. See paragraph 11, Field Manual 101-5.

5. DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF. See paragraph 12, Field Manual 101-5.

6. SECRETARY OF GENERAL STAFF. See paragraph 13, Field Manual 101-5.

7. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, A-1 PERSONNEL. The Assistant Chief of Staff, A-1 Personnel, will supervise and is charged with the performance of the activities enumerated in paragraph 14, Field Manual 101-5, including the following:

a. Ground safety (AAF Regulation 38-1).

b. Personnel control (AAF Regulation 37-1).

c. Special services (AAF Regulation 20-55 and AAF Regulation 20-30.)

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Reg 20-1, Third Air Force, Tampa, Fla., 1 March 46. Cont'd.

8. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, A-2 INTELLIGENCE. The Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2 Intelligence, will supervise and is charged with the performance of the activities enumerated in paragraph 15, Field Manual 101-5, excluding public relations activities and including the following:

a. Historical.

b. Security.

9. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, A-3 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING. The Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3 Operations and Training, will supervise and is charged with the performance of the activities enumerated in paragraph 16, Field Manual 101-5.

10. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, A-4 SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE. The Assistant Chief of Staff, A-4 Supply and Maintenance, will supervise and is charged with the performance of the activities enumerated in paragraph 17, Field Manual 101-5, including:

a. Chemical, quartermaster, engineer, and ordnance functions.

11. THE SPECIAL STAFF. The Special Staff will act for and upon direction of the Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, and will advise and make recommendation to them and the General Staff. The Special Staff is charged with the activities enumerated in section III, Field Manual 101-5, and pertinent AAF directives to include the following:

a. Plans Control.

b. Adjutant General.

c. Air Inspector (AAF Regulation 120-1).

d. Chaplain.

e. Finance.

f. Public Relations (AAF Ltr 47-24).

g. Statistical Control.

h. Surgeon.

i. Judge Advocate General.

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j. Communications.

k. Budget and Fiscal.

l. Aircraft Accident Prevention.

m. Headquarters Commandant.

NOTE: Pending revision of Third Air Force regulations wherein directors or directorates are mentioned, the titles Director of Personnel and Administration, Director of Operations and Training, and Director of Supply and Maintenance will be considered synonymous with the designations A-1, A-3, and A-4 used in this regulation.

Reference to staff functions formerly assigned to directorates will be construed to refer to the appropriate A-staff and special staff organization indicated on the attached chart.

* * * *

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ G. L. DAVASHER
Colonel, GSC
Chief of Staff

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PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE



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SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 1) EXTRACT HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida, 25 Mar 1946

3. VOCG 21 Mar 46 relieving fol pers (w) from Third AF 300 AAF Base Unit Hq Third AF and assigning them to TAC 300 AAF Base Unit Hq Tactical Air Comd without C in sta or dy asgmt are confirmed. EDCMR 21 Mar 46

MAJ GEN 0002 EDWOOD R QUESADA 016731 USA
BRIG GEN 0002 JOSEPH H ATKINSON 017055 USA
BRIG GEN 0002 WARREN R CARTER 011425 USA
BRIG GEN 0002 ROBERT M LEE 018483 USA
COL 1013 RAPHAEL BAEZ JR 010567 AC
COL 1013 DONALD J M BLAKESLEE 0885264 AC
COL 1055 DALE D BRANNON 022228 AC
COL 8103 CHARLES S BRICE 07906 JAGD
COL 2162 EARL D COOK 022852 AC
COL 3221 CHARLES M COWHERD 09529 VC
COL 2120 GLENN L DAVASHER 016011 GSC
COL 0210 E BLAIR GARLAND 016753 SigC
COL 2162 GEORGE B GREENE 022344 GSC
COL 1013 HORACE A HANES 023480 AC
COL 1061 GEORGE W PECK 0401451 AC
COL 0001 FRANK S PEREGO 0426422 AC
COL 2260 TERRELL E PHILLIPS 0228712 GSC
COL 6200 EVERETT F REA 010523 FD
COL 4010 BASIL L RIGGS 016459 AC
COL 3139 EDWARD M SAGER 016914 MC
COL 2120 EDGAR M SCATTERGOOD JR 0277362 GSC
COL 8103 ROBERT M SPRINGER 012422 JAGD
COL 2160 ROBERT M STILLMAN 019760 GSC
COL 7314 HOWARD G WALLIS 0297044 CWS
COL 2120 RICHARD C WELLER 019995 GSC
COL 2162 WILLIAM H WISE 019527 AC
LT COL 2162 DONALD H AINSWORTH 0427574 AC
LT COL 2161 EARL E BATTEN 0379389 AC
LT COL 2166 FRED D BRADSHAW 0440094 AC
LT COL 9310 FRANCIS C CARTAGLIA 0297697 IGD
LT COL 2162 EDWARD R CASEY 022436 AC
LT COL 2166 JOE W COMPTON 0386408 AC
LT COL 1055 PAUL F DOUGLAS JR 0432187 AC
LT COL 2166 MURRAY G FANT 0417691 AC
LT COL 1013 ROBERT W FISH 0395147 AC
LT COL 8502 JOHN R GEE 0253607 AC
LT COL 2120 SAMUEL D GIBSON 0200156 AC
LT COL 0612 CLEMENCE E GOSSETT 0480214 AC
LT COL 4015 JAMES F GREENE 010858 QMC
LT COL 2162 JOHN F GROOM 0464517 AC
LT COL 2162 DEXTER L HODGE 0389555 AC
LT COL 5000 LEROY C HINCHCLIFFE 0902462 AC
LT COL 1092 ARTHUR P HURR 025790 AC
LT COL 1029 LINDEN E JOHNSON 0430080 AC
LT COL 1058 CRIS B JOHNSON 0421751 AC
CH (LT COL) 5310 WILLARD G DAVIS 023672 USA

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3. Cont'd.

LT COL 9310 JOSEPH A KELLY 022519 IGD
LT COL 4010 JOHN J KENNEDY 0347028 GSC
LT COL 2161 WILLIAM D KYLE 025780 AC
LT COL 4010 GEORGE T LAWVER 0382835 AC
LT COL 4010 LAWRENCE L LEWIS 0306504 AC
LT COL 2162 WILLIS F LEWIS 023013 AC
LT COL 0210 WILLIAM H LYLE 0358591 SigC
LT COL 2120 CHARLES H MASON 0316966 AC
LT COL 2166 LOUIS B MCCORD 0421267 AC
LT COL 2120 JOHN C MCCURNIN 0299162 AC
LT COL 2162 WILLIAM H MUWHORTER 0385342 AC
LT COL 4010 HENRY S MONROE 0349294 AC
LT COL 2162 RICHARD L ORR 0406280 AC
LT COL 1093 ROBERT H ORR 0420633 AC
LT COL 1062 H E PARSONS 0659171 AC
LT COL 4015 FRANKLIN B OSGOOD 0305623 QMC
LT COL 1051 KENT J PRIM 0398585 AC
LT COL 2120 CHARLES E REESER JR 0283631 AC
LT COL 4010 ESTON E SELVEY 0483841 AC
LT COL 2162 RICHARD TAYLOR 0385016 AC
LT COL 2110 ROBERT H THOM 0301102 AC
LT COL 8103 IRA M TIPPS 0253432 JAGD
LT COL 6402 ALLEN M TRASTER 0915465 AC
LT COL 9310 RICHARD V TRAVIS 023859 IGD
LT COL 2260 WHITNEY L TURLEY 0327371 AC
LT COL 1013 JOHN B WALLACE 0388897 AC
LT COL 4823 GEORGE R WALTER 0432438 AC
LT COL 2120 HAROLD B WHITE 03050200 AC
LT COL 2120 DONALD A WOLFE 0300114 AC
LT COL 1093 GEORGE W R ZETHREN 021970 AC
LT COL 7010 FRANK P WHITE 0314416 CE
LT COL 2120 ROBERT T WILHITE 0469563 AC
LT COL 9310 THOMAS D WOOD 0333409 IGD
MAJ 2162 JOHN T ALLAN 0659038 AC
MAJ 2162 JAMES A ANGEL 0351351 AC
MAJ 5000 RALPH F BAUER 0913884 AC
MAJ 4512 JOHN A BELL 0358793 AC
MAJ 2120 BRUCE C BIRDSONG 0357941 AC
MAJ 8103 PAUL BOUCHER 02051804 JAGD
MAJ 0820 ROYAL F BREWTON 0914004 AC
MAJ 4902 VICTOR BROWNING 0463138 AC
MAJ 2110 FRANK E BRUNNER 0504465 MAC
MAJ 2166 WILLIAM E BRYAN JR 0736974 AC
MAJ 0612 WILLIAM E BURTON 0372079 AC
MAJ 2210 HAROLD C CAMPBELL 0905201 AC
MAJ 1065 RICHARD T CARTER 0726626 AC
MAJ 2161 H J CHISHOLM 0417192 AC
MAJ 5000 DONALD F CONWAY 0559685 AC

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3. Cont'd.

MAJ 2162 JOSEPH H CORBIN 0959726 AC
MAJ 7526 WILBUR O CUNNINGHAM 0157454 AC
MAJ 7010 BENJAMIN H CUTTINO 0248994 AC
MAJ 8502 DAVID R EASTBURN JR 0432680 AC
MAJ 2162 JAMES J ENGLAND 0662903 AC
MAJ 2260 EDMUND E ERICKSON 0749040 AC
MAJ 1055 FRED W GLOVER 02045172 AC
MAJ 4010 WILLIAM F GOLDEN 0563120 AC
MAJ 8103 MILTON GOLDINGER 0311220 AC
MAJ 1337 ROBERT T GREIGG 01105475 CE
MAJ 7888 JOHN A GUYTON 0407764 AC
MAJ 7536 RONALD F HALL 0406125 AC
MAJ 4823 RAYMOND J HANSEN 0484508 AC
MAJ 2120 JAMES H HAYDEN 0561236 AC
MAJ 4823 ROGER L HICKS JR 0725726 AC
MAJ 0210 CLAUD H HOOKS 0313109 AC
MAJ 5754 GEORGE O HOPKINS 0287914 AC
MAJ 2162 MCDANIEL B JACKSON 0415328 AC
MAJ 2260 ROY T JOYCE 0235279 AC
MAJ 2110 CLARENCE M EDEN 0365873 AC
MAJ 7536 JOHN W KERR 0530497 AC
MAJ 7130 EDWARD K KIMPTON 0118167 CE
MAJ 1073 JACK D KOGER 0404024 AC
MAJ 2162 ROBERT M LAWSON 0417168 AC
MAJ 2162 CLAUDE V LEFFINGWELL 0434004 AC
MAJ 7130 GUY B LYNES 0229120 CE
MAJ 2162 RALPH G MARTIN 0424979 AC
MAJ 2161 BENJAMIN B MATHIS 0412178 AC
MAJ 2260 MARGARET V MCCAULEY L700005 AC (WAC)
CH (MAJ) 5310 DWAYNE H MENGEL 0484312 USA
MAJ 6402 LEROY L MILLER 01000423 AC
MAJ 9301 WARREN J MORGAN 0399374 AC
MAJ 2162 SQUIRE T OCONNOR 0661543 AC
MAJ 2554 MILES R PALMER 0434935 AC
MAJ 2202 ROLAND R PETERS 0569743 AC
MAJ 6201 STEPHEN RAPAY 01260122 FD
MAJ 2120 STANFORD RANDALL 0478110 AC
MAJ 2110 JOHN F RASH 0561869 AC
MAJ 0210 HAROLD E REYNOLDS 01635250 SigC
MAJ 2162 WADE H ROBERT JR 0421318 AC
MAJ 2162 DANIEL T ROGERS 0426429 AC
MAJ 9307 FRANK J SAKSER 0246243 AC
MAJ 2520 JOSEPH L SCAVOTTO 0323229 AC
MAJ 1091 TALMA A SCOTT JR 0426801 AC
MAJ 0210 ROBERT J SHAFER 0433318 SigC
MAJ 2260 LESTER H SHOVERS 0475368 AC
MAJ 3149 NAOMI B SILVERMAN N702915 ANC
CH (MAJ) ALPHONSE B SLIVINSKI 0439435 USA (5310)

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3. Cont'd.

MAJ 2260 FORREST W SHEINWALD 0297896 AC
MAJ 2110 HENRY W SPILLER 0519042 AC
MAJ 0200 KENNETH E TROUT 01635421 AC
MAJ 1091 MARVIN M WAIDROUP 0438086 AC
MAJ 9301 DONALD G WILLIAMS 0383652 AC
CAPT 9301 ED C ALLEN 02040678 AC
CAPT 3175 MARLOWE L ANDERSON 0520306 DC
CAPT 4823 MICHAEL H ALLISON 0575192 AC
CAPT 8503 CLARENCE A ANDERSON 0559539 AC
CAPT 2120 WILLARD C BLACKWELL 0560643 AC
CAPT 1083 LEE R BOYD 0726318 AC
CAPT 0210 PAUL H BRIGHT 0477144 SigC
CAPT 8503 ELVA D BROWN 0567478 AC
CAPT 1055 HARLEY L BROWN 0710650 AC
CAPT 1035 ROBERT F BRUBAKER 0660325 AC
CAPT 1024 JAMES B CARTER 0730659 AC
CAPT 4010 PATRICK F CLARK 01298358 AC
CAPT 4010 TOMMY E CORRELL 0559694 AC
CAPT 6201 WILLIAM B COOK JR 01280709 FD
CAPT 2136 LESLIE S CRUTHIRDS 02044842 AC
CAPT 0820 FRANK W DAWSON 0181715 AC
CAPT 1034 THOMAS C DAY 0433136 AC
CAPT 1055 MELVIN N DICKEY 0667670 AC
CAPT 7970 FRANCIS C DOOLEY 0111580 CE
CAPT 4902 JOHN E DOYLE 0462159 AC
CAPT 9260 PAUL W ECKLEY JR 0430574 AC
CAPT 2202 ARTHUR EVE JR 01587955 AC
CAPT 1093 HAYWOOD R FAISON 0402693 AC
CAPT 7960 JOHN J FERRY 0530934 SnC
CAPT 5521 CHESTER K FRIEDLAND 0565381 AC
CAPT 1035 BENJAMIN W FILIPSKI 0432317 AC
CAPT 6201 OLLIE T FRITH 01281535 AC
CAPT 4823 GORDON R FULTON 0617075 AC
CAPT 2200 ALDO GARCIA 0581706 AC
CAPT 6402 MILTON H GAYNOR 0650296 AC
CAPT 9301 HENRY L GIRE 0383335 AC
CAPT 2120 LEE V GOSSICK 0659695 AC
CAPT 9310 DENVER D GRAY 0379413 IGD
CAPT 2110 ELEANOR G HARRELL 1400050 AC (WAC)
CAPT 6402 CHARLES L HAYDEN 0650100 AC
CAPT 2161 FLOYD H HAYWOOD JR 0668579 AC
CAPT 2200 DOUGLAS R HEFFERNAN 0577873 AC
CAPT 2520 JAMES E HILGENBERG 0568615 AC
CAPT 2159 RICHARD S HOSMAN 0408113 AC
CAPT 1034 WILLIAM H HOOVER 0418958 AC
CAPT 2520 JAMES E JACKSON 0565743 AC
CAPT 9231 WILSON H KAYKO 0322057 AC
CAPT 7536 OSCAR H KEGLEY 0503929 AC
CAPT 2110 BENJAMIN KIABANOFF 0381247 AC

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CAPT 2120 GEORGE G LUCAS 0372415 AC
CAPT 1055 THEODORE T LUTREY 025743 AC
CAPT 1091 CHARLES V MARGINEAN 0561523 AC
CAPT 2260 ROY MARSHALL 0509539 AC
CAPT 4902 THOMAS J MASTERSON 0563797 AC
CAPT 1081 JOHN B MCCLELLAN 0422328 AC
CAPT 1092 JOHN M MCCORMICK 0681449 AC
CAPT 9301 CHARLES MCGLONE 0566081 AC
CAPT 1055 JAMES P MCGUIRE 0798330 AC
CAPT 1035 JOSEPH M MCPHIE 0776849 AC
CAPT 6302 RICHARD E MITCHELL 0466668 AC
CAPT 6302 JOHN J ODONNELL 0578758 AC
CAPT 1034 JOE D PETTIGREW 0719455 AC
CAPT 0210 DONALD G POLLARD 01642475 SigC
CAPT 9260 JACK E PUCKETT 0690247 AC
CAPT 1034 EARL W QUILLIAN 0728236 AC
CAPT 2554 WALTER F QUINN 0854580 AC
CAPT 2120 EDWIN J POPLAWSKI 01583318 QMC
CAPT 9301 WARREN E REID 0737548 AC
CAPT 2166 RICHARD E ROBINSON 0791148 AC
CAPT 7536 THOMAS C RAMPEY 0533841 AC
CAPT 2159 CECIL RIDDIE 0433989 AC
CAPT 3100 SEABORN A RODDENBERY 0438375 MC
CAPT 1091 MICHAEL F ROBINSON 0668532 AC
CAPT 2120 JOHN H ROGERS 0569979 AC
CAPT 2421 NEWTON O SAPPINGTON 0922876 AC
CAPT 0141 CHARLES Y SHULTZ JR 0861250 AC
CAPT 9301 HOWARD F SMART 0372648 AC
CAPT 3170 MYRON H SHANER 0533147 DC
CAPT 4512 EARL L SMITH JR 0423275 Ord Dept
CAPT 1055 THOMAS STARMONT 0442300 AC
CAPT 4821 JOSEPH H STEIN 0476314 AC
CAPT 7536 HAROLD L STOTZ 0349226 AC
CAPT 5000 HERBERT G STRIBLING 0903272 AC
CAPT 4015 JAMES A TAYLOR 01583753 AC
CAPT 5000 GEORGE R TEBBETTS 0576465 AC
CAPT 1055 BARTHOLOMEW G TENORE 0886204 AC
CAPT 4010 EVERETT J THORNTON 0579465 AC
CAPT 1051 PORTER M WALSSUM 01691829 AC
CAPT 2200 JAMES Y WATSON 01995714 AC
CAPT 4110 WALLACE C WATSON 0286854 AC
CAPT 0200 LESLIE H WELLS 01646102 AC
CAPT 2260 KENDALL D WHEATON 01003348 AC
CAPT 2162 HARRISON G WHITE 0424595 AC
CAPT 1051 WALLACE WICKHAM 0736441 AC
CAPT 2520 HAROLD A WICKLUND 0789115 AC
CAPT 0200 JOHN C WILLIAMS 0567099 AC
CAPT 3139 JOHN A WILSON 0531485 MC

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CAPT 5754 HENRY T WINGATE 0228720 AC
CAPT 1055 WALTER W WYATT 0821583 AC
CAPT 4823 HARRY H YOUNG JR 0854589 AC
CAPT 4532 FRANKLIN L YOUNG 01551555 AC
1ST LT 1035 JAMES C ADCOX 0676528 AC
1ST LT 1051 GLEN J AIDEN 0803960 AC
1ST LT 1093 LEO H ARNOLD 0568040 AC
1ST LT 1055 RICHARD H ARNOLD 0797766 AC
1ST LT 1091 JOHN V BARCZAK 01581505 AC
1ST LT 1055 GEORGE A BENNETT 0799753 AC
1ST LT 4823 DARWIN H BINGHAM 0868489 AC
1ST LT 1034 MILTON P BLANCHETT 0725939 AC
1ST LT 2161 JOHN BLEACH 0792207 AC
1ST LT 4823 WILLIAM O BRANCH 0574011 AC
1ST LT 1081 CHESTER H BOWERS 0725252 AC
1ST LT 2200 HAROLD V BREEN 0567444 AC
1ST LT 4822 JOHN H BROTHBACK JR 0679037 AC
1ST LT 0224 WALTER B BRUCE 0583086 AC
1ST LT 1024 REX H CARPENTIER 0818337 AC
1ST LT 0220 STANLEY O CHRIST 01657185 AC
1ST LT 2161 R H CHARLES 0736991 AC
1ST LT 1035 JOSEPH B COMBS 0660969 AC
1ST LT 1035 JOHN M COOPER JR 0671289 AC
1ST LT 4320 FREDERICK M COUGHLIN 0651147 AC
1ST LT 6402 ALLEN J DANCY 0702384 AC
1ST LT 1058 OWEN H DAVID 0747763 AC
1ST LT 1092 CHARLES E DEATON 0834395 AC
1ST LT 1091 JOSEPH DUKES 0828980 AC
1ST LT 1055 C E ELLISON 0799150 AC
1ST LT 1091 EUGENE EMOND 0818652 AC
1ST LT 6402 JOHN R FARMER 0587740 AC
1ST LT 1082 GORDON S FAUTS 02056166 AC
1ST LT 4823 CHARLES E FILER 02002187 AC
1ST LT 6201 ROBERT E GARDNER 0587768 AC
1ST LT 1091 ADAM I GETTE 0563090 AC
1ST LT 1055 H F GARLINGTON 0812075 AC
1ST LT 1035 JOHN R GIBSON 01103652 AC
1ST LT 1091 HENRY F GLASS 0802848 AC
1ST LT 1093 EVIN N GUINN 0803975 AC
1ST LT 2161 BENJAMIN HALLOCK JR 0803377 AC
1ST LT 1055 WILLIAM G HETLAND 0829860 AC
1ST LT 1035 HOWARD A HANDRAN 0688528 AC
1ST LT 1055 ARCHIBALD M HARRISON 0736194 AC
1ST LT 4110 ELIZABETH T HICKSON L401370 AC (WAC)
1ST LT 1035 EARL L HOLCOMB 02061382 AC
1ST LT 9301 NORVAL D JENNINGS 0425280 AC
1ST LT 0200 MORRIS KASANOF 0923303 AC
1ST LT 7422 JOHN H KENNEDY JR 0587880 AC
1ST LT 1091 DEWITT T KELLER 0748673 AC

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1ST LT 2136 ELIZABETH I KERWICK L202964 AC (WAC)
1ST LT 1035 KENNETH E KLEINE 0699559 AC
1ST LT 1035 EARL C LONG 0741200 AC
1ST LT 1034 WILLIAM S LAWING 0405857 AC
1ST LT 4822 BILL T MACAULEY 0867723 AC
1ST LT 1091 ROBERT MACOMBS 0759703 AC
1ST LT 4823 JOSEPH R LOVE 0826742 AC
1ST LT 1022 RAYMOND R MANLEY 0662468 AC
1ST LT 1055 WILLIAM H MANKE 0792851 AC
1ST LT 1055 MAURICE D MARK 0810696 AC
1ST LT 1081 CECIL D MAY 0793423 AC
1ST LT 1093 ALVIN L MILLER 0825231 AC
1ST LT 6402 STANLEY C MILLER 0578607 AC
1ST LT 1091 ERIC G MILLINGTON 0759490 AC
1ST LT 1055 JAMES L KENDALL 0807575 AC
1ST LT 1055 JAMES L MOTLEY 0706432 AC
1ST LT 1034 LOUIS A MONTALVO 02073191 AC
1ST LT 1055 CHARLES L MOORE 0810552 AC
1ST LT 1055 GEORGE G MURPHY 0826734 AC
1ST LT 1930 WALTER H MURPHY 01287220 AC
1ST LT 9100 MADISON L MUMBAUER 0370497 AC
1ST LT 1091 WILLIAM N PARMAN 01169280 AC
1ST LT 1055 WALTER K PENDERGRASS 0813218 AC
1ST LT 0220 FLAY R PATRICK 01644651 AC
1ST LT 1024 HOWARD L PEPER 0809866 AC
1ST LT 5401 ARTHUR R PETERSON 0480409 AC
1ST LT 1055 JOHN R PHILLIPS 0798164 AC
1ST LT 1055 RICHARD A PLUMLEY 0799245 AC
1ST LT 1024 NORMAN A PROCTOR 0815264 AC
1ST LT 2136 GABRIEL P PYTEL 0575979 AC
1ST LT 1091 ROBERT D QUIGGLE 0818219 AC
1ST LT 1034 JAMES A RAY 0789268 AC
1ST LT 1055 JULIUS H REID JR 0742016 AC
1ST LT 1034 CECIL R ROBBINS JR 02065679 AC
1ST LT 1091 JUNIOR ROBINSON 0784961 AC
1ST LT 1091 CHARLES A ROSS 0863496 AC
1ST LT 1024 MAYRON H ROWE 0700986 AC
1ST LT 2161 WILLIAM L RYBURN 0789349 AC
1ST LT 1035 MARION T SEBASTIAN 0689169 AC
1ST LT 6302 ALBERT W SAHM 0585222 AC
1ST LT 1028 JOE SCHIEBOUT 0870171 AC
1ST LT 1034 DOUGLAS M SHEEHAN 0694612 AC
1ST LT 5004 ROBERT T SEIFERT 0566681 AC
1ST LT 1081 PAUL SIMS 0730976 AC
1ST LT 4210 CHARLES A SMITH 0564318 AC
1ST LT 1091 HENRY R SMITH 0813797 AC
1ST LT 1091 HOLMES A SOUTHER JR 0818232 AC
1ST LT 1035 PATRICK W STANISTREET 0761478 AC
1ST LT 4821 WILLIAM G JONES 0665417 AC

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

3. Cont'd.

1ST LT 3100 BERNARD STERNHILL 0534950 MC
1ST LT 4823 GEORGE R SHUMWAY 0868835 AC
1ST LT 3159 JOHN H STAPLETON 0749701 AC
1ST LT 1055 LAURINE S SUGGS 0799675 AC
1ST LT 4821 WILLIAM SWEDERSKES 0818454 AC
1ST LT 7010 HUBERT F TRUDEAU 0502299 CE
1ST LT 1091 ROBERT VONLUEHRTE 0757344 AC
1ST LT 4113 RAY J WALKER 0512030 AC
1ST LT 1092 CHARLES G WARDEN 0822149 AC
1ST LT 1034 SAMUEL H WARE 0752540 AC
1ST LT 1093 FRANK H WARREN 0758864 AC
1ST LT 1093 MARVIN S WATKINS 0801224 AC
1ST LT 1091 WILLIAM C WEIXEL 0817310 AC
1ST LT 1055 ROBERT D WELDEN 0744672 AC
1ST LT 1035 ROBERT J WHEELER 0741297 AC
1ST LT 1092 MILTON D WILKES 0548807 AC
1ST LT 1091 WILLIAM F WILKINSON 0802506 AC
1ST LT 1093 LON E WILLIS 0804087 AC
1ST LT 1091 ARYL D WINEINGER 0818790 AC
1ST LT 1091 WOODROW W YOUNG 0684596 AC
2D LT 6302 BYRON B BOWER III 0589053 AC
2D LT 1092 CLARENCE G BRISSE 0720431 AC
2D LT 2210 OTHA M CALHOUN 0589688 AC
2D LT 1051 JOSEPH W COLEMAN 0933817 AC
2D LT 4823 HARRY N FOSTER 02030587 AC
2D LT 2161 JAMES L FOSTER 01702946 AC
2D LT 1092 JOHN W GEMMEL 0837685 AC
2D LT 1051 WILLIAM T GENTRY 0787494 AC
2D LT 6402 MAURICE J GRIFFIN 0589700 AC
2D LT 1034 MAURICE P GUICHET 02077147 AC
2D LT 1024 WILLIAM Q HAYS 02080282 AC
2D LT 1034 PETER R LAGREGOR JR 0934388 AC
2D LT 1030 ROBERT H NELSON 0786969 AC
2D LT 1035 JOHN F PACHECO 0927216 AC
2D LT 1055 WILLIAM F SHAUB 02039307 AC
2D LT 1091 ARMOND L STEWART 0786360 AC
2D LT 1028 CHARLES W TENBROECK 0843022 AC
2D LT 1092 ROBERT J VIAU 0719807 AC
2D LT 1035 LEONARD L VONARX 0933552 AC
2D LT 5401 JAMES S WEAR 0589404 AC
CWO 0820 VINCENT A BURNS W2121567 USA
CWO 2121 JOHN B DIMERS W2112803 USA
CWO 0823 WILLARD DERALTER W2118857 USA
CWO 0820 GEORGE D DOUGLASS W2139853 USA
CWO 2120 GREEN R FIEST W2118681 USA
CWO 2120 JACK R GERMAINE W2113244 USA
CWO 7536 ROBERT GRAY W2112875 USA
CWO 0200 FRED T HORN W2114110 USA
CWO 2120 LESLIE S HUBBARD W2110976 USA

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

3. Cont'd.

CWO 2200 WOODROW W KIRK W2121521 USA
CWO 0823 LAFAYETTE L LANG W2118845 USA
CWO 2260 DAVID MCKEE W2114062 USA
CWO 0820 RICHARD F MEYER W2121477 USA
CWO 4902 CHARLES E MILLER W2104787 USA
CWO 2120 CESCO W SHEPARD W2118866 USA
CWO 0820 JOHN J SPENCE W2116670 USA
WOJG 0820 CHARLES L BAILEY W2130581 USA
WOJG 0820 ARCHIE H BELL W2121489 USA
WOJG 0820 FLOY V BULLOCK W2118777 USA
WOJG 0823 IRA P CARLTON W2121494 USA
WOJG 0820 LEONARD F CAHOON W2118850 USA
WOJG 0500 ELBERT J CREMER W2118820 USA
WOJG 0823 CHARLES R DERR W2133409 USA
WOJG CLAUDE H DRAKE W2130354 USA
WOJG JOHN FENDER W2118853 USA
WOJG 0820 RODGER H HAYENS W2133374 USA
WOJG 0820 CLIFTON M HELLNER W2121488 USA
WOJG 0823 RICHARD L HAZELGROVE W2121506 USA
WOJG 0820 HARTWELL F HILDERBRAND JR W2125720 USA
WOJG 0820 WINFRED E JONES W2121586 USA
WOJG 0820 HARRY C KINGSLAND W2121502 USA
WOJG 0823 JAMES D KIRKLAND W2121648 USA
WOJG 0823 ALFRED KUECK W2121507 USA
WOJG 0820 ROY C LOVELAND W2121508 USA
WOJG 0820 CHARLES MONTGOMERY W2121475 USA
WOJG 0820 JOHN R MONTSERRAT W2133363 USA
WOJG 0823 KIMBROUGH W O'HAVER W2118842 USA
WOJG 0820 CECIL O PRITCHARD W2121474 USA
WOJG 0823 ARTHUR R PROUTY W2118860 USA
WOJG 4902 ROBERT G RAY W2107422 USA
WOJG 0200 ROBERT W SHOWERS W2107179 USA
WOJG 0820 SPENCER V SNOW W2121490 USA
WOJG 2110 OTIS C TURNER W2134303 USA
WOJG 0823 LEONARD J VANDEPSYS W2130589 USA
WOJG 0823 WILLIAM VAN STEENWYK W2121600 USA
WOJG 0820 ROBERT O SYLVIA W2133371 USA
WOJG 0823 ALLEN J THOMPSON W2116631 USA
WOJG 0820 RICHARD L THORPE W2133369 USA
FLT O 0916 GLENN E DISBRO T66401 USA
FLT O 1091 HOWARD B EDWARDS T5831 USA
FLT O 1091 EDWIN L ELLIOTT T7756 USA
FLT O 1091 ROBERT L MAYLOR T4716 USA
FLT O 1054 JACK R PETTIT T61711 USA
FLT O 1091 WILLIAM C PARRISH T7908 USA

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 Cont'd

3. Cont'd

1st Sgt 502 Charles H Dean RA-14033867 AC
1st Sgt 502 William C Dempsey RA-20423484 AC
1st Sgt 502 Troy L Ingram RA-14031975 AC
1st Sgt 502 John H Wintrode RA-99860 AC
1st Sgt 502 Norman F Woehle RA-20759197 AC
M Sgt 2750 Robert H Anderson RA-6817060 AC
M Sgt 821 Mitchell J Aycock RA-6967902 AC
M Sgt 750 Frans J Baker RA-39082631 AC
M Sgt 826 Richard R Blue RA-7000841 AC
M Sgt 965 Christopher R Bradley RA-6971045 AC
M Sgt 1014 Hugh C Brooks RA-14128290 AC
M Sgt 750 Thomas A Brown RA-6973353 AC
M Sgt 750 Ora E Burnett RA-6965912 AC
M Sgt 502 Wilfred T Buswell RA-14031617 AC
M Sgt 502 Herman L Byer RA-6897413 AC
M Sgt 750 Clarence A Carr RA-6767602 AC
M Sgt 014 Ray D Cheatham RA-1290460 AC
M Sgt 502 Earle L Collier RA-6389235 AC
M Sgt 502 Charles M Combs Jr RA-6359890 AC
M Sgt 542 Garland Crabtree RA-6973059 AC
M Sgt 502 Lynn I Davis RA-6969910 AC
M Sgt 750 Gilbert O Dean RA-6219500 AC
M Sgt 750 Harold Dease RA-6266880 AC
M Sgt 502 Thomas L Dixon Sr RA-14040090 AC
M Sgt 940 Edward F Donahay RA-6814924 AC
M Sgt 502 Hughes F Fisher RA-14028163 AC
M Sgt 118 Eugene G Foster RA-6923694 AC
M Sgt 750 James H Gardner RA-13014064 AC
M Sgt 750 Lloyd W Garner RA-14033283 AC
M Sgt 502 Wesley W Gifford RA-6141080 AC
M Sgt 502 Arnold L Grantham RA-6399175 AC
M Sgt 502 Otha L Hawkes RA-6287315 AC
M Sgt 502 Alfred G Jessee RA-6398907 AC
M Sgt 502 Thomas C Joyner RA-38092035 AC
M Sgt 750 William H Marsh RA-6711336 AC
M Sgt 502 James H McCoy Jr RA-6385435 AC
M Sgt 502 Charles L Mo RA-7000407 AC
M Sgt 118 Marvin M O'Haver RA-14211404 AC
M Sgt 542 Fred W Park RA-20755226 AC
M Sgt 502 Lonnie O Ratley Jr RA-14044107 AC
M Sgt 772 Joseph Reburn RA-6837782 AC
M Sgt 080 James H Roach RA-6259306 AC
M Sgt 750 Beverly C Robinson RA-6948381 AC
M Sgt 502 Paul E Schleyer RA-6645531 AC
M Sgt 750 Watson Smith RA-6776599 AC
M Sgt 965 William C Strum RA-6928377 AC
M Sgt 821 James F Stuart RA-6751000 AC
M Sgt 750 Charles E Towers 6911345 AC

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

3. Cont'd

M Sgt 502 Ellis F Villiard RA-16021945 AC
M Sgt 750 Donald C Williams RA-6274913 AC
M Sgt 750 Lewis G Williams RA-33119714 AC
M Sgt 502 William R Williams RA-6996412 AC
M Sgt 502 Jack B Wilson RA-38094195 AC
M Sgt 014 Ruel R Windham RA-6389461 AC
M Sgt 261 William O Wood RA-6277411 AC
M Sgt 502 Oliver S Woodward RA-6925613 AC
T Sgt 750 Francis M Adair RA-18005211 AC
T Sgt 505 William L Adams RA-14044174 AC
T Sgt 502 Frank R Antonucci RA-7022595 AC
T Sgt 2750 Delbert L Baker RA-37076972 AC
T Sgt 612 William A Barrow RA-6972650 AC
T Sgt 750 William Berry RA-7001084 AC
T Sgt 748 Wesley V Blackwell RA-14044278 AC
T Sgt 2750 Wendell L Burton RA-18038825 AC
T Sgt 502 William H Callingham RA-32482846 AC
T Sgt 750 Myers A Cason RA-14069256 AC
T Sgt 622 Robert Christy RA-32326294 AC
T Sgt 2756 Chester Davis RA-6833710 AC
T Sgt 065 Jack E Davis RA-16040235 AC
T Sgt 2750 Howard G Ellis RA-14033731 AC
T Sgt 502 Franklin W Fones RA-14033722 AC
T Sgt 2750 Henry R Goode Jr RA-14078284
T Sgt 587 Frederick K Hall RA-6970903 AC
T Sgt 750 Edward G Haynes RA-6972134 AC
T Sgt 542 Oliver N Heath Sr RA-6973415 AC
T Sgt 502 Edward Heinich RA-6908518 AC
T Sgt 824 Ernest W Hluchan RA-6229806 AC
T Sgt 502 Benedict F Holden RA-31191053 AC
T Sgt 118 Russell H Hurley RA-6248142 AC
T Sgt 502 Jack S Isenberg RA-35395305 AC
T Sgt 748 William A Jeffords Jr RA-6968535 AC
T Sgt 757 Nelson H Karrer RA-32954103 AC
T Sgt 757 George M Kendall 14121823 AC
T Sgt 750 Joseph R Kirchner RA-37300038 AC
T Sgt 750 Stephen Koser RA-6999695 AC
T Sgt 748 Ralph Long RA-18004227 AC
T Sgt 118 James McCrorey RA-14003822 AC
T Sgt 853 Leonard S Medlin RA-6927969 AC
T Sgt 911 Ray A Mercer RA-6971523 AC
T Sgt 2750 Onyx S Nichols RA-20421273 AC
T Sgt 750 Oscar B Pehl RA-6200890 AC
T Sgt 911 Oscie C Powell RA-6374663 AC
T Sgt 2756 Velpo Rainwater RA-14031673 AC
T Sgt 748 James W Reckner RA-6994811 AC
T Sgt 301 Robert J Sheeran 34782659 AC
T Sgt 118 William D Sheppard RA-14067315 AC

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 Cont'd

3. Cont'd

T Sgt 050 John B Spells RA-6283234 AC
T Sgt 2750 Maurice A Tatlow RA-31181788 AC
T Sgt 757 Robert L Turner RA-32371621 AC
T Sgt 750 William H Vande Hey RA-6919730 AC
T Sgt 555 James M Walker RA-6913873 AC
T Sgt 070 Warren G Williams RA-17035662 AC
T Sgt 065 Preston R Woodring RA-14044280 AC
S Sgt 657 Ivan H Adkins RA-14025521 Med
S Sgt 118 Clarence H Andress RA-20420386 AC
S Sgt 791 Raymond Belknap Jr 39325543 AC
S Sgt 757 Sidney Botbyl RA-32770666 AC
S Sgt 748 James L Bragg RA-34195961 AC
S Sgt 405 Earl C Bryant RA-35585640 AC
S Sgt 622 Donald I Buckley 32975984 AC
S Sgt 612 Richard F Carr RA-19142794 AC
S Sgt 2750 Manuel E Casias RA-38167297 AC
S Sgt 1685 Ladon C Cotner 39721340 AC
S Sgt 911 Charles K Demar 31115575 AC
S Sgt 118 Eugene L Demary RA-10008722 AC
S Sgt 750 Russell J Dunkle 13037430 AC
S Sgt 118 Warren W Eberhardt RA-36237881 AC
S Sgt 080 John N Fraunhoffer RA-39828685 AC
S Sgt 118 Guy L Gammon RA-14051293 AC
S Sgt 757 Morley B Glick 13187845 AC
S Sgt 502 John W Gould RA-6927391 AC
S Sgt 502 Anna L Hagar A713633 AC (WAC)
S Sgt 612 George J Hall RA-13025029 AC
S Sgt 2750 Jimmie L Hines RA-34057465 AC
S Sgt 502 John E H[illegible]le 33709458 AC
S Sgt 502 Alson N Johnson 14102515 AC
S Sgt 612 Ellwood S Johnson 39145699 AC
S Sgt 772 Denzil Caler 19149377 AC
S Sgt 757 Marvin W Kalina 36897602 AC
S Sgt 748 Richard F Kauffman RA-13092605 AC
S Sgt 502 Wilbur D Kuebler RA-36553680 AC
S Sgt 867 Vernon G LaFollette 15375624 AC
S Sgt 542 Raymond G Mashburn RA-37150209 AC
S Sgt 502 William C Morrison 42032507 AC
S Sgt 118 Otis J Petty RA-34539250 AC
S Sgt 757 Walter A Proft 38510486 AC
S Sgt 2756 Joseph J Ramuta 16174853 AC
S Sgt 502 Ruth Rice A521816 AC (WAC)
S Sgt 747 Wade N Shank Jr 33210135 AC
S Sgt 748 Joe S Shellenberger 39565048 AC
S Sgt 502 Charles B Skredenis RA-36347511 AC
S Sgt 2750 George W Smith RA-6809092 AC
S Sgt 757 James F Swabb 33612248 AC
S Sgt 659 Robert S Swoap RA-38153723 AC

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GO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 Cont'd

3. Cont'd

S Sgt 750 John A Taylor RA-17014452 AC
S Sgt 772 Henry J Thomas 38515519 AC
S Sgt 502 Francis E Urtz 32947659 AC
S Sgt 065 Charlie Vikejan RA-33122589 AC
S Sgt 678 Harry R Wallace RA-15058823 AC
S Sgt 502 Filson C Williams 33282538 AC
Sgt 274 Miriam A Abele A709675 AC (WAC)
Sgt 747 Thomas D Adams 38444662 AC
Sgt 060 Champ N Agee 68882448 AC
Sgt 766 Kenneth L Albert 31352285 AC
Sgt 2756 Carlton E W Anderson 36352285 AC
Sgt 2750 Delbert A Arthur RA-18193407 AC
Sgt 118 Guy B Bailey RA-34179207 AC
Sgt 1685 Robert D Balch 14115091 AC
Sgt 502 Lilla C Bannister A713550 AC (WAC)
Sgt 237 James L Barnhart 37490133 AC
Sgt 757 Carlton F Barston 13170278 AC
Sgt 070 Nishan Bichakjian 11091407 AC
Sgt 012 James A Blakley 14148476 AC
Sgt 080 Henry C Boerner RA-12127640 AC
Sgt 272 Leland D Boone 37729233 AC
Sgt 405 Arthur B Borland RA-32355779 AC
Sgt 667 Thomas J Brennan 36947603 AC
Sgt 566 Robert B Byer RA-6886657 AC
Sgt 1685 William M Callan 32996531 AC
Sgt 611 Irving L Caton 31469193 AC
Sgt 080 Talmadge H Cox RA-34248026 AC
Sgt 405 Kathryn M Cremans A912737 AC (WAC)
Sgt 118 Francis Crimbring RA-32836358 AC
Sgt 405 Virginia A DePace A120951 AC (WAC)
Sgt 272 William J Doerner 31407021 AC
Sgt 065 Charles J Dohrman RA-34247727 AC
Sgt 060 Regis Dube RA-52236 AC
Sgt 065 Leo E Fayard RA-31085037 AC
Sgt 405 Richard T Foulkes 35843459 AC
Sgt 274 Frizelle Gable A708857 AC (WAC)
Sgt 055 Ben Garber 35842951 AC
Sgt 055 Maxine A Gatton A712055 AC (WAC)
Sgt 1685 Joseph S Golab 31440242 AC
Sgt 405 Elmer A Goodlin 33704645 AC
Sgt 405 Fay W Gove A613203 AC (WAC)
Sgt 691 L D Graham 34895538 AC
Sgt 932 Henry C Guyer RA-38212641 AC
Sgt 612 Carl R Harmel 35918802 AC
Sgt 274 Ralph E Heidbrink 17118925 AC
Sgt 835 James W Hendrix RA-6393874 AC
Sgt 301 Sidney J Hess Jr 36956970 AC
Sgt 611 Dennis K Hetrick 13146554 AC

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

3. Cont'd.

Sgt 055 Ethel D Hillier A609257 AC (WAC)
Sgt 405 Willard P Huffman 35295211 AC
Sgt 065 Lorne F Hurley RA-14003814 AC
Sgt 405 Kellis L Jackson 35295390 AC
Sgt 612 Elwood R Jacquemin 35087134 AC
Sgt 667 Julia Jedinak A613098 AC (WAC)
Sgt 2274 Mary L Jefferds A905767 AC (WAC)
Sgt 612 James H Jones 34923942 AC
Sgt 213 Mary H Kent A710934 AC (WAC)
Sgt 055 James E La Brot 37627227 AC
Sgt 055 Margrette F Lawson A526878 AC (WAC)
Sgt 405 Gladys D Lehman A926482 AC (WAC)
Sgt 502 James C Leindecker 36780683 AC
Sgt 400 Beatrice H Lidell A218105 AC (WAC)
Sgt 055 Foster D Lilly 39469122 AC
Sgt 757 David Lipman 42061940 AC
Sgt 070 Yoshi N Lorincz A711473 AC (WAC)
Sgt 060 John A Lott RA-34444968 AC
Sgt 580 Maurice N Marchal 13188228 AC
Sgt 824 Samuel L Martin 14033631 AC
Sgt 580 Eldridge R Maulsby 42182246 AC
Sgt 580 George R Mayer 13188373 AC
Sgt 747 Cecil L McDaniel 38107189 AC
Sgt 060 James H McRoberts RA-16017310 AC
Sgt 580 Flavell B Melvin 33910039 AC
Sgt 080 Jack A Mierzen 32718179 AC
Sgt 2750 Curtis M Monsebroten 37580601 AC
Sgt 055 Robert M Morgan RA-34050038 AC
Sgt 055 Carl U Mustico RA-32839536 AC
Sgt 747 Aurelio A Muzaurieta 32814603 AC
Sgt 611 James G Nye Jr 37588882 AC
Sgt 055 Mary P Orrison A515573 AC (WAC)
Sgt 118 John L Palmer 34868524 AC
Sgt 611 Marion E Parker 33888606 AC
Sgt 2750 James H Patterson 42080416 AC
Sgt 055 Earl L T Payne 34985557 AC
Sgt 757 Gordon O Pelishak 36827044 AC
Sgt 070 Charles W Piat RA-42054187 AC
Sgt 750 William K Potter RA-16117725 AC
Sgt 400 Fletcher B Reed 38566836 AC
Sgt 611 Cleo I Reiter 18195574 AC
Sgt 2756 Robert N Rentschler 36468112 AC
Sgt 757 Robert J Resau 33730744 AC
Sgt 757 Orlo K Rieder 33684252 AC
Sgt 757 Malcolm P Ringo 17134614 AC
Sgt 2756 Joseph E Roback 12240070 AC
Sgt 612 Joseph A Robards 15364488 AC
Sgt 2756 Morley Robinson 37709472 AC

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. SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

3. Cont'd.

Sgt 748 Kenneth E Rogers RA-37535163 AC
Sgt 400 Gertrude P Rosenbrook A613148 AC (WAC)
Sgt 275 Donald T Rothgaber 33872699 AC
Sgt 757 Albert J Rusatsky 33836412 AC
Sgt 555 John T Ryan RA-11094320 AC
Sgt 425 Laslie W Satterwhite 38562495 AC
Sgt 835 Howard C Schwach 16106885 AC
Sgt 502 Marion F Shambaugh 35923105 AC
Sgt 405 William L Shockley Jr 13180768 AC
Sgt 055 Irving A Sigler RA-32386601 AC
Sgt 167 William R Smith 17148574 AC
Sgt 055 Karen D Smuland A710902 AC (WAC)
Sgt 580 Donald J Solomon 19210121 AC
Sgt 853 Henry G Sopjes 16139627 AC
Sgt 055 Frances Stein A209397 AC (WAC)
Sgt 611 Alfred E Sternberg 39930422 AC
Sgt 405 Mildred P Tabet A410396 AC (WAC)
Sgt 747 William A Tiemann RA-37611126 AC
Sgt 400 Cecil R Trainum 33544348 AC
Sgt 748 Marion C Tunstall Jr 38502321 AC
Sgt 623 Frances R Turlo A615080 AC (WAC)
Sgt 612 William E Waldman Jr 33848709 AC
Sgt 425 Charles T Watkins 33875286 AC
Sgt 065 Thomas J Watson 39929177 AC
Sgt 757 Edwin F Werwas 42049426 AC
Sgt 059 Harry L Whidden RA-14064656 AC
Sgt 405 Vernon L Whittle RA-37498132 AC
Sgt 118 Gerald W Winker RA-12089007 AC
Sgt 405 Dorothy M Winders A905923 AC (WAC)
Sgt 612 Joseph F Yates 31411231 AC
Sgt 118 Madison H Young RA-6289147 AC
Cpl 648 Homer P Anderson RA-14157772 AC
Cpl 118 George L Appleby RA-31207684 AC
Cpl 684 Paul W Baker 33542486 AC
Cpl 080 William Ballard 36894998 AC
Cpl 055 Edward Beckner 42130292 AC
Cpl 1685 Donald C Becker 19142777 AC
Cpl 055 Harry F Bentz 33707759 AC
Cpl 747 Theodore A Berndt 36922147 AC
Cpl 405 Mary M Biddle A514550 AC (WAC)
Cpl 345 Gilbert E Blevins 34221990 AC
Cpl 405 Audrey R Bolyard A916110 AC (WAC)
Cpl 405 Sybil M Bower A714588 AC (WAC)
Cpl 055 Frances E Bowlin A415073 AC (WAC)
Cpl 754 Lewis T Boyd RA-6965131 AC
Cpl 055 Clair G Brady A226075 AC (WAC)
Cpl 502 James J Brady RA-32066857 AC

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

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Cpl 400 Frank B Broderick 39963062 AC
Cpl 650 Mary Bruce A819597 AC (WAC)
Cpl 611 Denver E Campbell RA-38669677 AC
Cpl 511 Sam C Cartwright RA-6556537 AC
Cpl 400 Mae Chilette A616312 AC (WAC)
Cpl 747 Gerald W Ohristensen RA-19165067 AC
Cpl 405 Irene M Clauson A715524 AC (WAC)
Cpl 345 Warren H Clemenz 35920186 AC
Cpl 070 Manny Cole 42127391 AC
Cpl 055 Robert E Cole Jr 44058424 AC
Cpl 055 Primo A Colla 39420502 AC
Cpl 405 Mae E Cox A412436 AC (WAC)
Cpl 272 Betty A Currie A612624 AC (WAC)
Cpl 405 Olga S Dabrowski A618320 AC (WAC)
Cpl 400 Otto DelFavero 31406707 AC
Cpl 345 Florian C Denny 38547887 AC
Cpl 055 Reesanne D Dwyer A130855 AC (WAC)
Cpl 650 Joan E Egan A219658 AC (WAC)
Cpl 757 Eugene W Fairbanks 17118689 AC
Cpl 667 Jerome H Feinstein 42069995 AC
Cpl 014 Joe M Fernandez 34799312 AC
Cpl 405 George A Figlestahler 33814236 AC
Cpl 683 Robert J Fink 15344546 AC
Cpl 400 James C Fowler 39926457 AC
Cpl 747 Loren J Fox 15174712 AC
Cpl 405 Thomas B Freeman 34904013 AC
Cpl 747 Calvin T Gunnon 34729103 AC
Cpl 835 Bernice W Garrick A222809 AC (WAC)
Cpl 560 David D Geer 19041084 AC
Cpl 853 James G Gerl 36842380 AC
Cpl 055 Donald H Gilbreath 39216586 AC
Cpl 684 Virgil L Goecker 37750479 AC
Cpl 405 Mary T Gonsales A313104 AC (WAC)
Cpl 282 Robert H Greenough 33613642 AC
Cpl 747 Millard J Griffis 36781530 AC
Cpl 835 Mafalda C Hanlon A527300 AC (WAC)
Cpl 237 Clovie B Harrington 36974600 AC
Cpl 590 Oscar Harrison 34986733 AC
Cpl 2750 Sammy W Harrison RA-18168444 AC
Cpl 070 Charles S Hawkins 36473261 AC
Cpl 528 John L Heck RA-39204822 AC
Cpl 055 William I Hepler 34893593 AC
Cpl 080 George N Hill RA-6579637 AC
Cpl 400 Verena L Hoerth A613022 AC (WAC)
Cpl 405 Mamie B Hollomon A910982 AC (WAC)
Cpl 275 Robert J Hunt 12226501 AC
Cpl 970 Bruce J Idell 13112394 AC
Cpl 060 Nobuo Imura RA-39931132 AC

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Cpl 237 Victor C Ingram 18094286 AC
Cpl 552 Ralph M Irvin 19090995 AC
Cpl 345 George E Jackson RA-34684846 AC
Cpl 070 Elliott L Jacobson 17083049 AC
Cpl 747 William T Johnson Jr 38568499 AC
Cpl 1274 William Kanowitz 12235236 AC
Cpl 756 Joseph J Kelcher 37305380 AC
Cpl 080 James P Kindred 37629061 AC
Cpl 747 Richard M Knowles 39589965 AC
Cpl 345 William C Koehn 37586662 AC
Cpl 400 Mercislaus J Kucinski 35918953 AC
Cpl 612 Richard J Kvasnicka 36699761 AC
Cpl 754 Bernard Land 14174160 AC
Cpl 237 William L Lane 36946660 AC
Cpl 683 Carl W Larson Jr 42118798 AC
Cpl 237 Jessie M Lee A921516 AC (WAC)
Cpl 055 Marian R Liepport A218956 AC (WAC)
Cpl 657 Luis L Llana 44050003 Med
Cpl 345 Richard J Lockard 37694593 AC
Cpl 065 Henry C Lockwood 37706040 AC
Cpl 848 Charles B Lohr Jr 38535849 AC
Cpl 055 Alice R Lomen A713742 AC (WAC)
Cpl 055 Karl F Mader 33837942 AC
Cpl 275 James F Mauk Jr 33767291 AC
Cpl 835 Karl J Moehl 35242892 AC
Cpl 118 Robert D Morrison 37582290 AC
Cpl 835 Howard J Morrow 38608783 AC
Cpl 055 Charles H Murphy 34358214 AC
Cpl 055 Cecile F Nadeau A110265 AC (WAC)
Cpl 400 Charles Nesta 12241608 AC
Cpl 118 Lawrence G Otera RA-14064573 AC
Cpl 2756 Paul C Palmer 19106817 AC
Cpl 852 Alvin F Peters 33843595 AC
Cpl 405 Kenneth F Prince 37487967 AC
Cpl 055 Evelyn S Pudas A618179 AC (WAC)
Cpl 405 Coletta R Rauschert A509331 AC (WAC)
Cpl 611 James T Reiff 17134338 AC
Cpl 080 William H Robinson 33802820 AC
Cpl 055 Paul A Rocheleau 31455863 AC
Cpl 400 Marvin R Rom 13188193 AC
Cpl 055 Harold Roney 34978635 AC
Cpl 400 Airine A Roth A608997 AC (WAC)
Cpl 055 Joseph F Runo 42005760 AC
Cpl 055 Stephanie T Sagan A209866 AC (WAC)
Cpl 522 Frederick S Salerno RA-42133114 AC
Cpl 967 Arthur H Samet 42135752 AC
Cpl 747 Robert H Scheider RA-34026980 AC
Cpl 750 Richard H Schlagel 11108431 AC

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd).

3. Cont'd.

Cpl 070 Elmer J Schwegel 35884440 AC
Cpl 747 Wayne L Shinn 38678934 AC
Cpl 835 Wilma B Simmons A118592 AC (WAC)
Cpl 667 James F Simpson RA-31386476 AC
Cpl 747 Donald P Snyder 42116968 AC
Cpl 964 Kenneth G Spencer 37586347 AC
Cpl 070 Leland E Stanton 12239347 AC
Cpl 060 Otis L Summerlin 34823405 AC
Cpl 237 Eugene R Talcott 35899582 AC
Cpl 405 Eileen V Tatum A709590 AC (WAC)
Cpl 055 Luther C Tinsley 34798603 AC
Cpl 590 Reginold E Treadwell 36696627 AC
Cpl 055 Dietta B Tribble A819932 AC (WAC)
Cpl 805 Thomas R Uecker 19195698 AC
Cpl 522 Artie O Vandergriff RA-35502453 AC
Cpl 400 Faye Vincent A609048 AC (WAC)
Cpl 852 Robert Volenec 36904288 AC
Cpl 757 Bill J Waller 18233265 AC
Cpl 650 Elizabeth D Weidman A615267 AC (WAC)
Cpl 747 William R Winters 31242783 AC
Cpl 400 Frank H Wolf 42072382 AC
Cpl 750 Vern G Woodward 17175331 AC
Cpl 055 Dorothy B Worthley A911150 AC (WAC)
Pfc 065 James B Agee 42190768 AC
Pfc 405 Marie J Antolik A508630 AC (WAC)
Pfc 623 John A Baldasare 42158128 AC
Pfc 400 Vincent Barry 16200593 AC
Pfc 747 John Barto 35778227 AC
Pfc 055 Robert C Bass RA-44114880 AC
Pfc 405 Bertha B Billings A135677 AC (WAC)
Pfc 065 David L Boston 34914213 AC
Pfc 747 Robert R Brass 17124623 AC
Pfc 521 Landis A Brewington RA-44005801 AC
Pfc 747 James F Bunch 33908012 AC
Pfc 017 Lucien M Carrier 31400707 AC
Pfc 060 Clayton T Clements RA-14053476 AC
Pfc 590 Joseph C Cook RA-R285734 AC
Pfc 400 Betty A Cummings A513033 AC (WAC)
Pfc 747 Joseph Dragan 36832646 AC
Pfc 747 Arthur E Elkins 44109544 AC
Pfc 521 Alvie J W Evans 38725199 AC
Pfc 405 Frances Franda A222841 AC (WAC)
Pfc 345 Manuel Fernandez 42131774 AC
Pfc 747 Gerald J Forwerda 16192145 AC
Pfc 080 Stewart V Folger 39725082 AC
Pfc 590 Carl M Fowler 34829598 AC
Pfc 065 Pricilla J Fuller A119303 AC (WAC)
Pfc 400 Virginia M Gifford A819758 AC (WAC)

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Pfc 590 Vernon E Graves RA-37656444 AC
Pfc 055 Donald L Greeman 35555166 AC
Pfc 650 Arlette B Gribbons A715553 AC (WAC)
Pfc 758 William G Grimsley 34808209 AC
Pfc 065 William E Harris 33734430 AC
Pfc 747 David G Henderson Jr 14177031 AC
Pfc 345 Edward J Henderson 44109375 AC
Pfc 590 Fred Henderson 38697024 AC
Pfc 400 Emmett L Herrmann 16196637 AC
Pfc 747 Edwin G Hill 16192336 AC
Pfc 650 Evelyn Hirst A509072 AC (WAC)
Pfc 766 Robert C Hopp 36886317 AC
Pfc 055 Mary P Hughes A235090 AC (WAC)
Pfc 080 Edward G Hummell 42110513 AC
Pfc 400 Catherine M Jackson A209730 AC (WAC)
Pfc 521 Joseph A Janiszewski RA-16178609 AC
Pfc 521 John D Johnson RA-15202602 AC
Pfc 590 Constantine Katchis 42162377 AC
Pfc 747 John F Korker Jr 38564670 AC
Pfc 521 George H Kraus 14084095 AC
Pfc 650 Jean M Kuhse A713594 AC (WAC)
Pfc 345 James J Maio 31310624 AC
Pfc 747 Bernard C Manning 12239745 AC
Pfc 065 Lloyd D Marshall 33886923 AC
Pfc 590 John B Mathis RA-34999589 AC
Pfc 590 James E McDougal 34986519 AC
Pfc 345 William J McGlaughlin RA-33176057 AC
Pfc 237 Roenah H Messer A927023 AC (WAC)
Pfc 590 Fred Michaelyan 14107255 AC
Pfc 590 Matsuichi Miyahira 30109645 AC
Pfc 650 Robert L Mullen 39445089 AC
Pfc 080 James H Myhand 14029303 AC
Pfc 521 Myles T Nealon RA-42155073 AC
Pfc 747 Donald C Nelson 17124788 AC
Pfc 237 Audrey M Nyiri A927285 AC (WAC)
Pfc 400 Thomas E O'Bryan 33362992 AC
Pfc 400 Nina F Patti A219467 AC (WAC)
Pfc 667 Alda L Paul A320627 AC (WAC)
Pfc 747 Ransom E Peterson 18195430 AC
Pfc 741 Joseph T Piotrowski 42096722 AC
Pfc 650 Alexander P Pistoia 32639304 AC
Pfc 747 Fred P Plyler 14148623 AC
Pfc 647 Russell M Poff 19202034 AC
Pfc 522 Johnie E Pruitt 34915835 AC
Pfc 747 William Pudleiner 13190476 AC
Pfc 747 John C Reese 14154567 AC
Pfc 400 John R Ronsel 13172679 AC
Pfc 060 Joseph J Romanowski 46052751 AC

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

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Pfc 747 Virgil L Rossow 37681779 AC
Pfc 747 Donald L Russell 13190090 AC
Pfc 590 Michael S Russell 38619455 AC
Pfc 070 Dorothy P Shafer A230216 AC (WAC)
Pfc 521 Jack Smedley 36942402 AC
Pfc 522 Raymond J Solek 35920833 AC
Pfc 014 Henry Stephenson RA-6927457 AC
Pfc 345 Emmett G Sterling 35844572 AC
Pfc 078 Lamar J Terry RA-34934117 AC
Pfc 1685 William S Toth 35929373 AC
Pfc 521 Perry T Turner 38580747 AC
Pfc 055 William G Villiard RA-36998919 AC
Pfc 400 Rossey L Weeks A411421 AC (WAC)
Pfc 747 Glenn H Weichel 37489648 AC
Pfc 118 Richard D Whiteside Jr 44008293 AC
Pfc 010 John S Wightman 39344632 AC
Pfc 590 William C Wolf RA-33303967 AC
Pfc 747 Marvin L Yocum 36776760 AC
Pfc 521 Alvert Zinsavage 33998977 AC
Pvt 521 Elmer O Allison 44127178 AC
Pvt 521 Robert C Ashley 45041335 AC
Pvt 521 Willis L Bauman 37809341 AC
Pvt 521 Buddy L Berkey 38785880 AC
Pvt 521 Richard E Bicker 43038802 AC
Pvt 065 Stanley D Bjornstad 39489643 AC
Pvt 521 Warren R Booth 37809415 AC
Pvt 521 Keith F Bozarth 37809307 AC
Pvt 521 Sanford D Briskell 14037030 AC
Pvt 521 Elwood B Buzzell Jr 31514395 AC
Pvt 521 Douglas J Byers 46045597 AC
Pvt 080 Joseph J Chigosh 33974109 AC
Pvt 521 Glen E Collier 37809389 AC
Pvt 521 Stuart W Cook 37821437 AC
Pvt 903 Lee D Cowan 38596542 AC
Pvt 521 Verlin Crook 37810038 AC
Pvt 080 Charlie G Curci 44009575 AC
Pvt 521 John D Czerwinski 46052277 AC
Pvt 013 James A Dainard 39440454 AC
Pvt 521 Francis E Deveny 37821411 AC
Pvt 521 Franklin P Dixon 18233891 AC
Pvt 521 Edward H Eastin 46062354 AC
Pvt 521 Norbert Effenberger 46045597 AC
Pvt 521 Daniel Fanella Jr 46045577 AC
Pvt 521 Donald L Francisco 43038889 AC
Pvt 967 Thomas R Garland 14020466 AC
Pvt 521 Gilbert W Goodger 37821461 AC
Pvt 590 Sam Goodman 36903574 AC
Pvt 521 Donald J Goudreau 46062387 AC

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80 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

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Pvt 521 Roland P Hancock 44136346 AC
Pvt 521 Clarence B Harrell RA-20402566 AC
Pvt 521 James W Hart 38593247 AC
Pvt 080 Roman N Haslag 37690647 AC
Pvt 521 Carl E Hinshaw 37821395 AC
Pvt 521 John D Hix 44136806 AC
Pvt 521 Charles E Hoffman 37809409 AC
Pvt 118 Charles Holdworth RA-44115270 AC
Pvt 065 Ralph E Howard RA-42238439 AC
Pvt 521 Marvin L Huisman 17198460 AC
Pvt 521 Jerome J Huslig 37821422 AC
Pvt 521 Jimmie L Hutchinson 38786115 AC
Pvt 257 Erwin T Ivey 37257336 AC
Pvt 677 Alfred J Jaeger 17135191 AC
Pvt 521 David C Jenkins RA-45032288 AC
Pvt 405 Agnes S Johnson A618173 AC (WAC)
Pvt 345 Aubrey E Kimble 39933943 AC
Pvt 677 Curtis M Ladner 14169018 AC
Pvt 521 George C LaTour 37809156 AC
Pvt 521 Joseph A Malakaua 30116140 AC
Pvt 521 Harry Marderosian 31506054 AC
Pvt 747 Eugene J McDevitt Jr 17118662 AC
Pvt 747 William H McDonough 11141796 AC
Pvt 821 Joseph E McInroe RA-6134789 AC
Pvt 747 Hayden L Miller 39702391 AC
Pvt 521 Leroy D Miller 46017691 AC
Pvt 521 Gilbert L Moose 44165422 AC
Pvt 065 Budy W Morales RA-14211406 AC
Pvt 521 Robert C Morrison 44165370 AC
Pvt 521 Joseph Musselman 33870284 AC
Pvt 521 Walter Niedrich 46045744 AC
Pvt 590 Alton P Oakes 31495958 AC
Pvt 521 Harry L O'Brien 38770676 AC
Pvt 055 Richard H Paule 36952111 AC
Pvt 521 Ernest H Paulus 37809386 AC
Pvt 835 John D Philman 44112330 AC
Pvt 521 Richard A Potter 37809261 AC
Pvt 065 William Powell RA-6837591 AC
Pvt 821 Donald K Ray 37821105 AC
Pvt 521 Robert J Redmond 46062343 AC
Pvt 065 Rosendo F Rendon 38697679 AC
Pvt 521 Joseph H Reynolds 38726096 AC
Pvt 080 Walter S Rohm 33971577 AC
Pvt 521 J H Ross 38779698 AC
Pvt 521 Melvin M Samuels RA-42239646 AC
Pvt 521 Ivan C Shafer 35970685 AC
Pvt 521 Edward Shorman, Jr 46045774 AC
Pvt 945 Charles W Short 33870438 AC

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SO 1 Hq Tactical Air Comd 25 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

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Pvt 080 James T Spangler 44086401 AC
Pvt 521 John H Spence 38345960 AC
Pvt 521 Lum D Spillers Jr 37821099 AC
Pvt 014 Carlton [illegible] Stewart RA-44132844 AC
Pvt 677 Bert St Ivany Jr 14135197 AC
Pvt 521 Karl Summers 18051785 AC
Pvt 521 William R Thompson 37821058 AC
Pvt 965 John Tomlinson 42147266 AC
Pvt 521 Harley J. Vandenburgh 6904004 AC
Pvt 521 Wayne C Warner 39967293 AC
Pvt 590 Lynn W Watkins 37783732 AC
Pvt 080 Woodard Webb 35992902 AC
Pvt 521 Gerald D West 37882174 AC
Pvt 521 James M Whatley 44111416 AC
Pvt 521 James P Willingham 44136275 AC
Pvt 521 A J Wilson 38786007 AC
Pvt 521 Hurley G Winter 37821010 AC
Pvt 747 Thomas F Woodle 34841408 AC
Pvt 065 Reinhold A Zindler 36751165 AC

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

EDGAR M. SCATTERGOOD, JR
Colonel, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

Roy E Marshall

ROY MARSHALL
Capt Air Corps
Actg Asst Adj Gen

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33-3

FD HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC Ltr 33-3 7 August 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Audit Responsibilities.

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force.
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force.
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force.
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters.
ATTENTION: Property Auditors.

1. In compliance with Circular 138, WD, 1946 all auditing responsibilities will be assumed by this command after 1 August 1946, and will no longer be under supervision of the service command.

2. All correspondence pertaining to auditing will be submitted to this headquarters through normal channels.

3. Technical matters may be communicated directly to this headquarters. Reference paragraph 7, TM 14-1010, dated 1 January 1945.

4. Technical Manual 14-1010 will apply until such time as appropriate changes or revisions are made. The words "Service Command" will be amended to read "Headquarters TAC", and the words "Fiscal Director" will be amended to read "Finance Officer," where applicable.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

OTIS C. TURNER
TAGO, USA
Asst Adj Gen

(Effective until 7 May 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded)

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C O P Y

/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/
Langley Field, Va.

4 November 1946

TAC 322 (4 Nov 46)

SUBJECT: Command Budget and Fiscal Office at Ninth Air Force

TO: Commanding General
Ninth Air Force
Greenville Army Air Base
Greenville, South Carolina

1. Due to drastic reductions in both civilian and officer personnel it is necessary to terminate the functions of the Command Budget and Fiscal Office, Third Air Force and/or Ninth Air Force. These functions will be taken over by the Budget and Fiscal Office at this headquarters.

2. Since funds have been sub-allotted for the quarter ending 31 December 1946, it is deemed advisable that the Command Budget and Fiscal Office, Third Air Force continue to operate until 31 December 1946. This will be accomplished by transferring the office to the Ninth Air Force, necessitating no change of personnel or records, but simply of headquarters name.

3. No Budget and Fiscal functions of additional stations will be assumed by the Budget and Fiscal Office, Third Air Force when it becomes Budget and Fiscal Office, Ninth Air Force. The Budget and Fiscal Office, this headquarters will continue to administrate and fund the stations other than those formerly under Third Air Force.

4. Fiscal records in the 661 allotment series issued by Continental Air Force, and 676 allotment series sub-allocated by headquarters Tactical Air Command, will be closed as of the close of business 25 December 1946.

a. Unliquidated obligations and reconciliations will be completed as far as possible prior to transfer date.

b. Reports on 661 series funds for the month of December will be submitted directly to headquarters Strategic Air Command.

c. Reports on 676 series funds for the month of December will be submitted direct to headquarters Tactical Air Command.

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d. Fiscal records in the 661 series and 676 series should be properly boxed, marked, and shipped to this headquarters by military aircraft at the earliest possible date, but not later than 15 January 1947.

5. Fiscal records in the 702 allotment series sub-allotted by this headquarters will be closed as of the close of business 31 December 1946.

a. Reports on 702 series funds for the month of December will be submitted direct to this headquarters on or before 6 January 1947.

b. Fiscal records in the 702 series should be properly boxed, marked, and shipped to this headquarters by military aircraft to arrive at the earliest possible date, but not later than 15 January 1947.

6. Quarterly estimates of fund requirements of installations presently funded by your command will not be consolidated by your headquarters for the third quarter, Fiscal Year 1947. These estimates will be forwarded by each station direct to this headquarters per TAC Regulation 30-1 dated 29 July 1946.

7. All stations will report direct to headquarters Tactical Air Command on Budget and Fiscal functions, such as Status of Funds, Cost of Operations report, with a copy, if you desire it, to your headquarters.

8. Installations under your command affected by this change will be notified by your headquarters in order that requirements as stated above may be complied with.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUASADA:

WINSTON M. HAYES
1st. Lt., Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Responsibility for Civ. Pers. Administration
1.	R.R.F. Chief Pers Div 30 Apr 46 AIN	A-1	1. In order to bring about a greater uniformity of operations of civilian personnel administration, it is recommended that the present staff civilian personnel division of Hq. Third Air Force, Greenville AAB, Greenville, S. C., be relieved of its responsibility, the section abolished, and all matters relating to civilian personnel other than civilian personnel ceiling be carried on directly with the stations as stated in attached letter. 2. It will be noted that such a policy was a complete success at the time Third Air Force was a major command and that civilian personnel functions were carried on directly with stations in accordance with TAC (formely 3AF) Regulation 10-1, dated 20 November 1945, paragraph 2a(6).
	JR	C/S	CAF had assumed this position when they were Third Air Force.
	EA 3 May 46	C/S A-1	NOTE: Believe this same idea might apply to the Engineer, Legal, B&F, Chaplain, Finance (Comment), A-4 Purchase and Contract, Traffic (WAC Styt) COPY

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TAC-2

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

SECTION TWO: PERSONNEL

Chapter I -- Personnel in the Formative Period

Chapter II -- Supply of Personnel

HISTORY OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

March 1946 to December 1946

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[redacted]

TO BE RETAINED 20 YEARS ARCHIVES OF THE AAF

411.01 Dec 46

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

To

SECTION TWO: PERSONNEL

Chapter I -- Personnel in the Formative Period

Chapter II -- Supply of Personnel

HISTORY
OF THE
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

March 1946 - December 1946

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EO 11652

417.01
Mar.-Dec. 46
Vol I

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

To

SECTION TWO: PERSONNEL

Chapter I -- Personnel in the Formative Period

Chapter II -- Supply of Personnel

HISTORY

OF THE

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

March 1946 - December 1946

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[HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND]
[Langley Field, Virginia]

TAC 327 (26 Jul 46) Nat'l Army 26 July 1946

Major General Paul L. Williams,
Commanding General, Third Air Force,
Greenville Army Air Base,
Greenville, South Carolina

Dear "P. L.":

Recently I have been reviewing information on probable future AAF policies for Reserve and AUS officer personnel. There are several considerations which strike me as important and I bring them to your attention for planning and immediate action.

The War Department (TWX MABX 92245, 23 June 46) has pointed out that every effort should be made to encourage temporary officers to remain on active duty. Revision of category statements to permit earlier separation is not authorized at this time but statements may be revised to extend the period of service. Headquarters AAF has not revised its policy (AAF Letter 35-308) in connection with re-signing categsory statements but there may be some relaxation from present restrictive procedures.

There has been uncertainty, with attendent lowering of morale, among officers who applied for RA but failed appointment in the first increment. We are all aware that many highly qualified officers were passed over. It should be brought to their attention that Congress may approve an additional authorization; the legislation has already passed the House. It is understood The Adjutant General will have shortly notified each applicant that he falls in one of four categories:

1) selected; 2) on the eligible list and has a chance of being selected if an additional increment is authorized; 3) on the eligible list but too low to warrant hope for future selection; or 4) rejected and not eligible for further consideration.

I am advised that AAF will probably initiate a survey (at least within certain commands) to ascertain the numbers of personnel who would change their category statements (to extend or reduce the length of service) if given an opportunity. When completed it may provide the basis for new policies; we shall watch the results closely.

We are faced with the prospect of ultimately losing officers who have not signed Category I. The most recent data which reveals the over-all situation within TAC disclosed that we will have lost upwards of twenty

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percent of our rated officers (Categories III, IV and V) and thirty percent of non-rated officers by this year-end.

It appears that TAC will be faced in the very near future with having substantially less officer personnel than we should have to operate. Overseas shipments, alone, will bring us down below our authorizations. We shall be confronted with a constant turnover, involving temporary loss of officers' services, to meet school quotas. We will have to give up Category III personnel by the end of the year.

All of this adds up to a problem which requires immediate and continuing attention. Of first priority in the solution is the necessity for training personnel to take over key jobs now held by officers in Categories III, IV and V who are unwilling to continue on a volunteer basis by signing Category I if and when the opportunity is afforded. Simultaneously, to play it safe, plans and provision must be made for replacing officers in Categories I and II who desire to separate should the opportunity be afforded them. This requires close personal attention on the part of Unit Commanders and action must be taken only after consideration is given to individual attitudes and intentions.

It is my opinion that on-the job training should be initiated at once to provide the replacements from regular army and temporary personnel who will continue on a volunteer basis. Emphasis should be given to the need for careful selection of the replacement trainees, keeping in mind overseas commitments, school quotas, present intentions of officers regardless of current category statements and the relative position of the selected officers on the overseas roster.

In this same connection, I think we should pay especial attention to the elimination from tactical units of all personnel other than regular army or Category I or II. Our future program for manuevers and demonstrations requires that we give the major training effort to those who will continue in the service.

I am keenly conscious of the disturbance which the changing personnel picture has caused and of the future disruptions which we must face. You have my personnel assurance that my staff will give you all possible cooperation during this transitional period.

Note: Simular Letter sent to:
CG, Ninth Air Force.
CG, Twelfth Air Force.

Sincerely,

E. R. QUESADA
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington

AFPMP-11

SUBJECT: Availability of Field Grade Officers 22 Aug 40

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. The planned size of the interim and post war Air Force, greatly diminished though it is from war time strength, represents a many-fold increase over its pre-war size. The number of positions of responsibility to be filled has increased proportionately. Regular Army and Category I Officers in the field grades, particularly the grade of colonel, are the only long range resource available to fill these responsible positions. Analysis of latest statistics reveals that this resource falls short of the corresponding requirement.

2. In the best interests of the AAF, the desire for current operating efficiency must be tempered by the need to improve individual officer proficiency through attendance at schools. Definite quotas for attendance at selected professional schools, both within and without the AAF, have therefore been set up. In addition, the AAF must participate in external functions; consequently, certain minimum requirements must be met in the assignment of experienced officers to the War Department General Staff, to Reserve, National Guard and ROTC activities, and to other special details such as attache posts and military missions.

3. When the foregoing commitments have been met, the residual Regular Army and Category I field grade officers must be spread equitably through the bulk allotment and T/O portions of the internal AAF structure. The attached chart reveals the extent to which these resources fail to meet the requirements. It may be noted that after completion of appropriate action to level experienced personnel, each command may anticipate approximately 82% of its required strength in colonels and 86% of its requirement in total field grades. The requirements shown are based on a analysis of jobs only. They are not related to current grade authorizations within bulk allotments, which are presently curtailed by percentage ceilings under War Department directive. Action has been taken by this Headquarters to attempt to have these percentage ceilings lifted to a figure commensurate with true requirements. The conclusions in the succeeding paragraph are applicable whether current grade authorizations or true grade requirements are used as a basis for comparison.

4. The conclusions to be drawn from this analysis are readily

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apparent. They may be summarized thus:

a. Asubtantial shortage of field grade officers will be experienced by each command.

b. These projected field grade officer shortages will not be realized until Category III and II officers have been separated due to expiration of their contracted tours. The planned distribution of retainables shown in the attached chart is that which would result from an even spreading of the availables; priority which may be given the mission of certain commands may influence this distribution so as to give certain command a higher percentage of retainable key officers at the expense of others.

c. The projected shortages may be somewhat alleviated by action of this headquarters and by the major commands. Action by this headquarters will be the recall to active duty of volunteer officer specialists and their assignment in proportion to requirements. Major commands may aid themselves by encouraging selected key personnel not now classed as retainable to change their category statements, under provisions of current and subsequent directives, to place them in the retainable group.

d. Assignment of less experienced, company grade officers into field grade position vacancies will be necessary in order to maintain operations.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Leon W. Johnson,
LEON W. JOHNSON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Deputy, AC/AS-1

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/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/
/Langley Field, Virginia/

24 May 1946

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker
Headquarters Army Air Forces
Washington, D. C.

My Dear General Eaker:

During the past months we have been formulating plans with a view of establishing:

1. An objective
2. Stability
3. Mental tranquillity
4. Confidence

The preparation of our plan was influenced by:

1. Utilization of bases and facilities assigned to us by published orders.
2. Flow-charts prepared by Headquarters Army Air Forces for planning purposes.
3. Location of Army Ground Forces and Naval Installations.
4. A genuine desire to cooperate effectively with Army Ground Force and Naval Forces.
5. A desire to establish Tactical Air Power IN BEING and in conformance with air force ambitions.

Although our plan has been submitted to Headquarters Army Air Forces for approval, or for such modifications as deemed advisable, it is our firm conviction that we would be derelict if we failed to proceed to implement so much of our plan as is supported by existing orders and common practice.

In the course of proceeding, I have become aware of an apparent duplication that if permitted to proceed will result in inefficient utilization of limited personnel available and may develop into unhealthy competition and rivalry between air force activities that should be devoting their energies to a common end. In addition, there are indications that practices are to be affected that are in direct opposition to many fundamental principles that the Air Forces have for so long supported and so seldom obtained and could, in the end, nullify our best efforts.

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It appears, from relisble information, that the Air University is planning and is proceeding to establish activities that consume approximately 25,000 men that can not be provided in our 400,000 man troop basis without reduction elsewhere in the Air Force program. In this connection, it is my understanding that our 400,000 man Air Force will not fulfill our ambition of 70 groups because of necessary and unpredicted requirements which came to light after the requirements for the 70 group program had been determined. It is evident that any additional requirement will make further reductions in our 70 group program and is therefore a direct attack on our optinum ambitions of possessing "Air Power in Being."

The duplication which I refer to is that the Air University intends to establish a "Test and Development Force" or "Demonstration Force" consisting of the following:

1. One Fighter Group
2. One Service Group (Fighter)
3. One VHB Group
4. One Service Group (VHB)
5. One Guided Missile Group
6. One Service Group (Guided Missile)
7. One Tactical Control Group

In addition to utilizing an excessive amount of personnel and equipment for which no provision has been made, I feel that activities of the nature indicated are far removed from the natural and normal function of an Air University. Specifically I feel that we should continue, in this particular case, to pursue past and proven practices which charged the Air Materiel Command and the Proving Ground Command with the responsibility of testing individual aircraft and associated equipment. When the time arrives to employ in large numbers or "unit test" any new devices or equipment (as example, a group of jet propelled VHBs), the responsibility should rest with the Command of primary interest which is the organization best prepared to accomplish the particular job.

The development of tactics and methods should certainly rest with the various Commands which, by their very existence could not avoid such activities and interests. As for example, the Strategic Air Command should and will develop tactics and devise methods of engaging in the mission that is natural to it -- namely strategic bombing.

The Air University's ambition to possess a test and development or demonstration activity is diametrically opposed to air force interest that I have so energetically pursued in my association with the Army Ground

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Forces. At the present time, I am engaged in far too numerous small scale and misleading demonstrations with Ground Force Units. The only justification for my action is my inability, due to temporary limited means, to do otherwise. My intention to discontinue these improper procedure has been expressed to General Devers and his various Commanders, and I have indicated that our future aims are the realistic presentation of "Tactical Air Power in Being and in its entirety. It is only recently that I have been successful in withdrawing the many small detachments that were permanently dispersed over the country and which were providing the various Ground Force Schools and Units with misleading indoctrination and at the same time depriving this Command of an opportunity of engaging in unit training.

The opinion has been expressed and supported to the effect that each Ground Force Service School should have an air demonstration unit following the principle that the Air Forces School possess them. It is my firm conviction that demonstrations of Air Power should be conducted by those commands possessing it. That is, demonstrations involving strategic air power should be the responsibility of the Strategic Air Command, the same principle applying to all types of air operations.

In reviewing the problems with which we are confronted during these difficult days, I am fully aware of and heartily concur in the essential purpose of the Air University. My own experience in service schools does not support the contention that our schools should be charged with the conduct of tests, the development of tactics or the responsibility of demonstrating air power in any of its phases. Most of our current difficulties, in my opinion, can be traced to the inability of our officers to think. It should be recognized that the Air Forces of the future will be manned by personnel who were deprived of educational opportunities because of the late War and it should be presumed that our problems of today will be prolonged and even increased unless we are able to improve the mental processes of our officers. I am firm in my belief that the Air University has a most lucrative opportunity in the field of education and, if fulfilled, will bring great credit and relief to the Air Forces. This belief is supported by the many difficulties with which the Air Forces are now confronted, many of which are non-military in their nature and can be attributed to the inability of our officer personnel th think clearly and logically. I do not mean to suggest that the Air University should confine itself to non-military subjects.

If my views are supported, it would seem proper for the Air University to avoid "stick and rudder" activities and strive to better the intellectual and mental capabilities of our officers in order that they may better cope with the problems with which they are to be confronted and which are becom-

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ing more and more complex. The complex problems are not confined to officers of high rank. The necessity for junior officers to think clearly and to possess the ability of exercising proper judgement is becoming greater. We will never be able to prepare the solution for each and every problem that will from time to time be presented. It therefore follows that it is better to spend more of our efforts in guiding the mental processes of our potential leaders and directing our efforts to teaching them to think.

I have thought of this subject for a considerable time. I have talked to the other Commanders and many of the principal members of your Staff, and I have yet to get an expression of opposition to my views. I am aware that this letter has consumed what may appear to be a disproportionate part of your time, but I feel that the subject is worthy of any attention you can give to it. My experiences in my present position support my contention.

I would like to suggest that you direct a review of the original plan establishing the Air University in order that it may be modified in the light of realities of today as compared to the permitted extravagance that prevailed during the recent War and when the plan in question was promulgated. I would also like to suggest that a review be made of the mission that is to be assigned to the various Commands, including the Air University, and which I understand is now being prepared. This subject might be given to the Air Board, headed by General Kneer. The consequences of an improper procedure at this time could be great. The result is of great interest to all the Commanders and to any air force officer with ambitions of a career.

In closing, I would like to tell you honestly that what appears to me to be an improper concept of an Air University is causing considerable difficulty and confusion in the minds of many of your staff officers as well as Commanders. It is hoped that you will accept these expressions in the light in which they are meant.

/t/ E. R. QUESADA
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

26 August 1946

SUBJECT: Army Air Forces Special Committee

TO: Personnel Concerned

1. The following named officers are designated as members of an AAF Committee to make a study and prepare a complete plan for building the officer personnel structure of the Air Force to its ultimate objective of approximately 27,500 officers:

Brig. General Edwin B. Lyon	O-3811	USA
Brig. General John E. Upston	O-10595	USA
Brig. General Lyman P. Whitten	O-14850	USA
Brig. General William A. Matheny	O-17460	USA
Brig. General Frank F. Everest	O-17145	USA

2. Duty on this Committee will be on first priority and its report will be expedited.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

LEON W. JOHNSON
Brig. General, U. S. Army
Deputy AC/AS-1

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MEMORANDUN FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER 26 August 1946

SUBJECT: A plan for the Regular Army Officer Personnel Structure of the Army Air Force Within the Ceiling Authorized by the 79th Congress

1. There is attached hereto a Special Committee Report on the above subject. I have approved the conclusions and recommendations contained therein.

2. Briefly these conclusions and recommendations are:

a. An Army Air Force Officer Corps of approximately 27,500 as established by you.

b. A ratio of Line (rated) to Support (non-rated Air Corps and ASWAAF) of 70 to 30 and this ratio to be maintained in all grades and in reasonably narrow age groups within each grade.

c. The Support to be broken down as follows: Non-Rated Air Corps, 15.4%; ASWAAF, 14.6%.

d. The initial allocation of grades be: Generals .75%, colonels 5.95%, Lieutenant colonels 10%, majors 18.3%, captains 25%, first and second lieutenants 40%.

e. The Air Corps to have a separate promotion list divided into two categories of Line and Support. It will be necessary in the Support to fill to a great extent the grade of general, colonel, and lieutenant colonel by transfer from other arms or services; and this necessity will hold true to a lesser extent in majors and senior captains.

f. Promotions to fill vacancies be made as follows:

(1) In general, to fill vacancies in both Line and Support by promotion of officers arranged in the order of longest Federal active commissioned service with the additional proviso that no officer intergrated under Public Law 281 and 670 shall thereby be placed in a grade lower than that held under the provisions of Public Law 281, and specifically:

(2) To fill initially not to exceed 65% of the existing vacancies in each grade by permanent promotion of officers with the restrictions that no officer will be advanced initially more than two grades above his adjusted grade eligibility as determined by his active Federal commissioned service; the balance of vacancies to be filled initially by temporary Air Corps promotion employing length of active Federal commissioned service and ability demonstrated while occupying temporary appoint-

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ment in the prospective grade or higher as equal determining factors.

3. I request that the conclusions of the study be approved for planning purpose and as a controlling guide in presenting and defending pending personnel legislation effecting the Army Air Forces.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND AGD-1

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

24 June 1946

IN REPLY REFER TO:
TAC 200.3 (24 Jun 46)

SUBJECT: Bulk authorization.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Lt Col Richardson, Organization and Manpower Division.

In reference to the recent conference between Lt Colonel Richardson, Headquarters AAF, and Lt Ware, this headquarters, the following information is requested for purpose of future planning by this headquarters:

a. Listings or copies of yardsticks and any other data that is used by you in establishing the peace time bulk allotment authorization for a Fighter, light Bomb, Troop Carrier, and Reconnaissance station.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ HENRY. W. SPILLER
Stamped HENRY. W. SPILLER
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant General

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Bulk Authorization

1st Ind
Hq, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C. 10 July 1946

To: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. Data requested is not available at this time as this Headquarters is in the process of developing new typicals for peacetime operation.

2. In general, computation of the bulk authorization for those stations housing Combat and Service Groups is based on the assumption that station activities will be integrated where possible, that Service Groups will provide the major portion of station operating personnel as indicated by the SSN's of the T/O's, and that units will be self-sufficient in training, requiring no training or instructor personnel from bulk allotment.

3. It is desired that your Command make use of field experience in peacetime station organization and operation to develop appropriate data for requirements of bulk allotment personnel. Such data can then be compared with that developed by this Headquarters and proper reconciliation made.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ RUFUS B. HOLLOWAY Lt. Col A.C.
For FELIX L. VIDAL
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Manpower & Personnel
Management Division
Personnel Policy & Management
AC/AS-1

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

TAC 322 (22May 46) 22 May 1946

SUBJECT: Mission of Ninth Air Force.

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas.

1. The Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, is responsible for the fulfillment of the mission of the Ninth Air Force in accordance with directives received from this and higher headquarters. The mission of the Ninth Air Force is:

a. Demobilization and recruitment of military personnel.

b. To cooperate with Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces within the continental limits of the United States.

c. To cooperate with the AAF Board in developing doctrines for tactical air operations by improving organizations, testing equipment, and developing new techniques for use of equipment.

d. To train assigned units and air crews in accordance with proficiency standards prescribed.

e. To prepare units and air crews designated by this headquarters for overseas movement.

f. To provide units for active support of other commands for defense missions.

g. To prepare detailed plans for technical, tactical, supply and administrative functions connected with constituted and activated units and provisional organizations assigned to your command.

h. To assume direct responsibility for all stations and units assigned to your command.

i. To continuously train officers and enlisted men by an actual on-the-job training program that will broaden military experience and permit training in administration and technical duties that will qualify personnel for their peace-time responsibilities.

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Subj: Mission of 9th AF (Cont'd) 22 May 46

2. Although the larger part of your mission outlined above is in relation to training and equipping units and individuals, priority will be given to that part which relates to the current War Department demobilization program and the War Department recruiting program.

3. Each individual assigned to your station, civilian personnel as well as military, should be thoroughly acquainted with your assigned mission and indoctrinated in such a manner that each person concerned feels that his portion of the task is a definate contribution to the accomplishment of the mission.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

Stamped C. A. STANFIEL
C. A. STANFIEL
Major, AGD
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

TAC 322 (23 May 46) 23 May 1946

SUBJECT: Mission of the Twelfth Air Force.

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, March Field, California.

1. The Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, is responsible for the fulfillment of the mission of the Twelfth Air Force in accordance with directives received from this and higher headquarters. The mission of the Twelfth Air Force is:

a. Demobilization and recruitment of military personnel.

b. To cooperate with Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces, within the continental limits of the United States.

c. To cooperate with the Navy in joint maneuvers to develope and perfect tactics and technique for use in assault landings.

d. To cooperate with the AAF Board in developing doctrines for tactical air operations by improving organizations, testing equipment, developing new techniques for use of equipment.

e. To train assigned units and air crews in accordance with proficiency standards prescribed.

f. To prepare units and air crews designated by this headquarters for overseas movement.

g. To provide units for active support of other commands for defense missions.

h. To prepare detailed plans for technical, tactical, supply, and administrative functions connected with constituted and activated units and provisional organizations assigned to your command.

i. To assume direct responsibility for all stations and units assigned to your command.

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j. To continuously train officers and enlisted men by an actual on-the-job training program that will broaden military experience and permit training in administrative and technical duties that will qualify personnel for their peace-time responsibilities.

2. Although the larger part of your mission outlined above is in relation to training and equipping units and individuals, priority will be given to that part which relates to the current War Department demobilization program and the War Department recruiting program.

3. Each individual assigned to your station, civilian personnel as well as military, should be thoroughly acquainted with your assigned mission and indoctrinated in such manner that each person concerned feels that his portion of the task is a definate contribution to the accomplishment of the mission.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

ROBERT M. LEE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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EXTRACT
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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Air Inspector

Langley Field, Virginia
18 December 1947

SUBJECT: Report of Quarterly Inspection, 304th AAF Base Unit, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding Officer
Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

I. AUTHORITY AND COMMAND INSPECTED

1. In compliance with your instructions the quarterly inspection of Langley Field, Virginia, was conducted during the period 16-21 December 1946, under the provisions of AAF Regulation 120-1, 2 January 1946.

2. The inspection was conducted by Major George I. Hicks, Assistant Air Inspector, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia, assisted by 6 officers and 4 enlisted men.

3. The over-all rating of this base is: Satisfactory

4. The rating for the Command Staff Sections are:

S-1	Satisfactory
S-2	Excellent
S-3	Excellent
S-4	Unsatisfactory

5. The activity inspected is under the jurisdiction of Tactical Air Command.

II. MISSION OF ACTIVITY

7. Although the larger part of your mission outlined above is in relation to training and equipping units and individuals, priority will be given to that part which relates to the current War Department demobilization program and the War Department recruiting program.

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Ltr Report of Quarterly Inspection, 304th AAF Base Unit, Langley Field, Va. dtd 18 Dec 47

II. MISSION OF ACTIVITY (Cont'd)

8. Each individual assigned to your station, civilian personnel as well as military, should be thoroughly acquainted with your assigned mission and indoctrinated in such manner that each person concerned feels that his portion of the task is a definite contribution to the accomplishment of the mission.

******

VII. S-4

12. The supply section is operating under extreme difficulties due to loss of technically qualified personnel. This section should receive supervision and assistance from higher headquarters before the supply situation at this station becomes more critical and hopelessly behind schedule. Major discrepancies concerning supply are brought out in Case Reports #1, #2, #3, and #4. Aircraft maintenance has improved and only one major discrepancy was noted in Case Report #11. Major discrepancies covering other maintenance activities are listed in Case Reports #5 - #10.

19. The increasing load on this station coupled with the loss of trained personnel has created a problem that will necessitate a high degree of effort and efficiency on the part of all base functions. It is recommended that the morale and working conditions of all concerned be closely analyzed so that a defeatist attitude will not develope in view of the apparent insurmountable odds with which some sections feel that they are faced.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Report of Board of Officers
	A-1 EBP 28 Oct 46	C/S	1. Attached is report of the Board of Officers who investigated and made recommendations concerning the location, organization, operation and efficiency of the Unit Personnel Sections at several stations. 2. I concur generally in their findings. I do believe, however, that the rapidity with which demobilization has been, conducted, the everchanging criteria and instructions (sometimes 2 or 3 times (messages) in one day) the lack of security felt by personnel because of unpredictable attitude of War Department as pertains to demobilization (many changes in category, discharge criteria, etc, all in favor of W. D. and none definite as far as personnel is concerned) have gotten personnel to an almost defeated state of mind. No matter what they do today they will have to do it again or amend it the next day. This is felt by regular officers and enlisted men too, in other words they feel if higher authority (everything stems from W. D.) doesn't know what they want why should it make much difference to them at their level. All decisions at W. D. and implementation by intervening headquarters are easy as compared to the poor fellow at the bottom who actually has to do the job. I realize this should not be true and do not mention it as an excuse or in defense but as a compelling reason for the apparent breakdown in the syatem. At first it was to get the people home who wanted to go home, now it is to send those home who do not want to go. That affects morale of those who remain because they can't help but feel that maybe tomorrow he will be sent too, so why should be burn himself out today, especially since this is peacetime. The papers are full of civilian unrest world wide and some of it is bound to creep into the military which effects the quality of the work.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT:
			(Continued)

3. On the hand the newspapers are featuring stories that W. D. wants officers to come back on active duty (specialists of course, but the news items don't saythat), we are putting them out against their wishes. We are enlisting to the best of our ability and discharging to the best of our ability. Of course this action is necessary in the big picture are and we know why but the people in lowest echelons (where this breakdown has occurred) don't get the big picture and can't understand it. If they could they probably would not be where they are.

4. I have talked with some officers and old noncoms from the last war and they tell me a similar breakdown occurred in administration then when the red tape, procedures, etc., was not so complicated as now. I suppose it must go with war because it is general in all commands; no one has an option on it and not many are worse than others (Ground Forces, Air Forces and Navy have it) the Navy is nearer stabilization than the other two forces). I do not believe lower commanders have exercised the leadership expected of them either. They are skilled in war leadership but not administrative leadership.

5. AAFArecognizes the need for review of our syatems and has directed a study of the personnel part of the problem, (Supply and other agencies have had the same breakdown, personnel just gets more attention because it concerns humans) as indicated by attached letter. This letter has been indorsed to appropriate units as directed in paragraph 2 thereof and the and field's recommendation and that of the attached board will constitute material from which a study and draft manual on personnel accounting and reporting will be prepared. (It is unfortunate that it occurs during a period when the people most concerned. have more than they can do in complying with presint priority directives and reports).

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT:
			(Continued) 6. In view of the above and the report required by the AAF letter, recommend that no action be taken on the attached Board Report but that it be considered in complying with Par. 4 of the attached AAF letter. TEP A-1 2 Incls. 1. Bd Rpt 2. Cpy AAF Ltr

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

31 October 1946

TAC 330.3 (31 Oct 46)

SUBJECT: Data Reference Army Air Force Commands.

TO: The Field Air Inspector
Headquarters Army Air Forces
Gunter Field
Montgomery, Alabama

1. Reference letter Headquarters Army Air Forces, The Air Inspector, dated 11 October 1946, subject as above, to your Headquarters, the following information is furnished:

a. Strength of Headquarters Tactical Air Command as of 30 September 1946 is:

	Authorized	Assigned
Officer	280	373
Enlisted	785	725
Civilian	308	287

b. Overall Strength of Tactical Air Command as of 30 September 1946 is:

	Authorized	Assigned
Officer	3920	4818
Enlisted	18265	18467
Civilian	8895	8325

c. There are three intermediate commands and the strength of each headq uarters as of 30 September 1946 is as follows:

(1) Third Air Force Headquarters, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina:

	Authorized	Assigned
Officer	131	172
Enlisted	221	163
Civilian	117	112

(2) Ninth Air Force Headquarters, Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas:

	Authorized	Assigned
Officer	145	202
Enlisted	237	282
Civilian	56	45

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TAC 330.3 (31 Oct 46) Subj: "Date Reference Army Air Force Commands" (Cont'd)

(3) Twelfth Air Force Headquarters, March Field, Riverside, California:

	Authorized	Assigned
Officer	106	108
Enlisted	185	209
Civilian	41	29

d. The overall strength of each intermediate command as of 30 September 1946 is as follows:

(1) Third Air Force Overall Strength:

	Authorized	Assigned
Officer	1065	1471
Enlisted	4383	4590
Civilian	2175	2456

(2) Ninth Air Force overall strength:

	Authorized	Assigned
Officer	1469	1299
Enlisted	7133	4753
Civilian	1481	1398

(3) Twelfth Air Force overall strength:

	Authorized	Assigned
Officer	443	519
Enlisted	2336	2682
Civilian	1173	1023

e. The number of Bases by intermediate commands as of 30 September 1946, classified as active and inactive, is as follows:

	Active	Inactive
Hq, Tactical Air Command	5	6
Third Air Force	6	4
Ninth Air Force	4	
Twelfth Air Force	1	

f. (1) The average rate of turnover of personnel throughout the command (as determined by adding total number of personnel transferred out of the command, divided by the average strength figures for the command) is as follows:

Last 30 days	Officer	19.8%
	Enlisted	15.3%
Last 6 months:	Officer	124.6%
	Enlisted	118. %

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TAC 330.3 (31 Oct 46) Subj: "date Reference Army Air Force Commands" (Cont'd)

(2) The average rate of turnover of bases throughout the command (as determined by additing total number of bases gained by the command and bases transferred out of the command, divided by the average number of bases assigned the command) is as follows:

Last 30 days: 18.1%
Last 6 months: 66. %

g. The average number of pieces of correspondence handled through Tactical Air Command Headquarters and through Headquarters of intermediate commands is as follows:

Tactical Air Command Hq	2800	per	wk	for	past four mos.
Third Air Force Hq	7944	"	mo	"	" three "
Ninth Air Force Hq	5798	"	"	"	" six "
Twelfth Air Force Hq	1500	"	"	"	" five "

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

ROGER W. HOLTON
Major, AC
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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FINAL DRAFT

Narrative History of A-1 Activities since
Activation of Tactical Air Command

1. Since the activation of Tactical Air Command on 21 March 1946, the personnel aspect has been very unsettled and many problems have been encountered. Planning towards personnel utilization, retention, and qualifications has been to little avail. Constantly changing discharge criteria for enlisted men, reduction in force for civilian employees and involuntary separation of officers has kept all personnel in a very poor state of mind concerning their future with the Tactical Air Command and Army Air Forces. Morale has suffered as a result of these factors and consequently the general operating efficiency has fallen down. Briefly the A-1 picture is as follows:

a. Officers:

Upon the activation of Tactical Air Command, we had an assigned officer strength of approximately 8150 against an authorization of 3307. In order to keep this many surplus officers busy and to compensate for the acute shortage of trained enlisted men at this time, many officers were assigned to duties normally performed by enlisted men, such as, administrative clerks, airplane mechanics, gate guards, clerk typists, etc. Many other were assigned to on-the-job training to understudy officers performing administrative and technical duties. Adequate assignments existed for the majority of the non-rated officers, therefore rated officers comprised the majority of the surplus for the jobs available, and as a result, were utilized as mentioned above. This training proved very valuable, both from a morale standpoint and also to give

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them an idea of what the people "behind the line" did, since the majority of them had never performed duties other than as crew members.

During this period, readjustment regulations and other separation criteria allowed many experienced medical and dental officers and resulting in numerous reassignments to redistribute those medical and dental officers remaining. The experience level reached a new low. Very few specialists remained and the type of service formerly given was no longer available. Treatment of dependent personnel was, of necessity, curtailed, thereby causing military personnel to seek civilian medical and dental specialists at their own expense which, through no fault of anyone, did not give these benefits promised by the recruiting people.

In May and June a program was directed by Hq Army Air Forces to reduce the officer strength of the command approximately 1800. Generally, this reduction tended toward greater operating efficiency in that officers relieved from active duty were more or less "dead-wood." This is borne out by the fact that during the nine months period of this report ten cases of reclassification and resignation of officers were handled compared to 120 cases in the preceding nine months. Some officers in critical MOSs and key jobs were necessarily relieved, however, causing a temporary shortage of certain specialists.

With the closing of certain stations, movement of units, relocation of personnel by specialty and transfers to separation facilities, the average rate of turnover of officer personnel has been approximately 20% per month or 180% for the period 21 March 1946 to 31 December 1946. With such a rapid turnover of personnel, it is no wonder that administration, supply and maintenance dropped to low levels. The many training

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problems created by this turnover are obvious.

While the first separation program tended to rid the command of many undesirable individuals, overseas shipments required many trained officers in critical specialties, the loss of which was definitely felt throughout the command. During the period we have shipped 1436 officers overseas with a peak shipment of 491 in the month of July.

With the loss of the officers in the first separation program mentioned above and the loss of 1436 officers to overseas shipments, a personnel inventory (considering those Category II and III officers who would be soon lost) indicated that there would be an overall TAC shortage of rated officers to man units scheduled on the flow chart to be activated. As a result, arrangements were made with the Air Transport Command for the transfer of 500 surplus rated officers to the Tactical Air Command. This action was concurred in by Military Personnel Division, Hq Army Air Forces, and these officers began reporting to the designated TAC stations in late September and early October.

In October, TAC was directed to again reduce its officer strength, this time to a ceiling figure which was set at approximately 2350. At the time of receipt of this directive, we had approximately 4800 officers assigned, many of whom were the rated officers from Air Transport Command that had been recently transferred in. The method of reducing strength to accomplish this was directed by budgetary limitations rather than requirements or authorizations and the authorized ceiling actually was approximately 25% less than our authorized strength. The method of relieving these officers was left to the discretion of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command. Decision was made that the field commanders be allowed to choose

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their least desirable officers and recommend them for separation. They were to give particular emphasis, however, to the relief of officers with low efficiency indices. Each commander was required to recommend 60% of his assigned officers for relief from active duty and these recommendations were reviewed by a board of officers at this headquarters. From the recommendations received, those to be relieved were selected. The board at this headquarters selected certain officers for retention on active duty and their papers were returned to the stations concerned without action. In this way, the best officers who had been recommended were retained and a desirable ratio of rated to non-rated officers was controlled by this headquarters. Under this program approximately2200 officers were separated between 19 October 1946 and 15 November 1946. The rapidity with which Hq AAF required that this program be carried out prevented this headquarters from making adequate plans and prohibited the field commanders from making a thorough screening of personnel to be relieved. The work load in accomplishing this separation program was further increased by having to relieve many of the officers who were received from Air Transport Command in September and October.

Since the WD Personnel Centers were already overloaded, TAC was directed by Hq AAF to set up officer separation points at five TAC stations to accomplish the separation of the officers to be relieved from active duty. These separation points were also to separate AAF officers from other AAF installations near-by that were not equipped to accomplish complete separation proceedings. Setting up these separation points was accomplished with a minimum of trouble and the separations were accomplished rapidly and efficiently. The effort expended in setting

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up these separation points is considered justifiable and in the interest of economy.

It is to be noted that in this separation program, medical officers (doctors) could not be relieved. In August and September a large number of medical officers were assigned, but they were young doctors, graduates of the ASTP schools with no professional experience other than a short internship, therefore a surplus of medical officers occurred during, and upon completion of, this program. The critical shortage of dental officers was somewhat alleviated by assignment of 8 Naval Dental Officers, but changing separation criteria gradually consummed this gain.

Upon the completion of the separation program, certain units were re-located and the problem is now to reassign officers by specialty to units where they are now required.

b. ENLISTED PERSONNEL:

Upon the activation of TAC, this command had a total of approximately 17,000 EM of whom 7500 were Regular Army. Of the 17,000, however, 2371 were negroes. War Dept planning had indicated a 10% negro strength and we were already considerably above this figure. Within 60 days our total enlisted strength had risen to 18,000, 5000 of whom were negro, with 10,500 Regular Army. On 3 July 1946, discharge criteria became effective allowing non-volunteer fathers, regardless of service, to be separated. All other who 18 months service as of 30 November 1946 were eligible for separation. At this time 5000 of our assigned strength was comprised of AUS personnel, therefore we realized a considerable loss under the provisions of this discharge criteria. The result was that by 31 July 1946 our strength of RA personnel had increased to nearly 12,000, our total assigned had dropped to

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approximately 17,000, of which 5000 were colored personnel. On 30 September 1946, as a result of an influx following the continuation of Selective Service, the strength of the command increased to 20,000 of whom 12,000 were Regular Army. By 30 October 1946, the RA strength had increased to 14,000 and by 30 November 1946 to 16,000 with a total enlisted strength as of 30 November 1946 of 22,000 of which 4300 were colored. This loss of colored personnel may be contributed to attrition and the virtual cessation of colored enlistments brought about by War Dept enlistment criteria and a later directive limiting colored enlistments to certain critical MOSs.

A semblance of stability seemed to have been reached at this time (30 November 46). Inapt and undesirable personnel were being eliminated under the provisions of WD Circular 241. Loss of these undesirables did not involve large numbers of people but did rid us of the liability of keeping them. Action under this circular has not been as aggressive as desired but is being followed up and additional separations are anticipated.

Throughout the period, various discharge criteria for AUS personnel had gradually reduced the AUS strength to a point where the desirable goal of authorized strength in RA personnel could be seen.

During the period of the rapid recruiting, there developed an undesirable situation of an excessively high percentage of RA EM holding permanent grades far in excess to the command authorization. Recently, however, we have transferred approximately 700 first two graders to overseas assignments. While this is materially improved, our distribution of grades has not yet reached the desirable proportion. Some adjustment of grades has also been realized from the assignment of several thousand EM

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from the Training Command. Approximately one-third of this personnel has been semi-skilled, following completion of technical training courses. The remainder, however, are mainly inductee privates who are technical school eliminees. They are of little value to this command or to the Army Air Forces as a whole and cause a distorted picture of the potential efficiency of a unit. These people must be carried for a while to determine their fitness and after serving three months some will be separated as inapt under the provisions of WD Circular 241, if such is the case.

Boiling the enlisted personnel situation down, our present authorization is approximately 18,000 compared to 22,500 assigned. Although the number assigned is greater than authorized, we are not qualified to operate efficiently due to the lack of many skilled specialists. The most critical shortage lies in communications personnel, however, acute shortages exists in many other specialties. The reduction in civilian authorizations has further aggrevated the operating efficiency in that many civilians were qualified for and were utilized in jobs for which military personnel could have been used were they available. The cut in civilian personnel has resulted in the sudden realization that commanders depended too much on civilian help and did not give sufficient on-the-job training to military personnel in order that they could step into the positions vacated by civilians. Accelerated school training, emphasis on on-the-job training, decrease in work load and a general stablilization of activities will gradually overcome this problem, however.

c. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL:

The Civilian Personnel Administration of the entire command was assumed by this headquarters during the period. The subordinate air

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forces do not delve in civilian personnel administration and all bases within the command are dealt with directly in matters of civilian personnel administration. This action reduces administrative overhead and insures uniform administration.

During the inactivation of stations and resulting reduction in force of civilian personnel, several Congressional Investigations have been received. The carrying out of such investigations has generally required that old records be requisitioned from AG Records Depots in order that a complete investigation could be carried out. Requisitioning and analyzing these old records has been time consuming and contrary to desirable efficiency. In all cases the actions of the stations have been found to have been proper, but all of the facts had to be included in the Reports of Investigation in order that the recipient of the investigation would be satisfied.

Of 14 stations having a civilian strength below 1000, 9 now have a civilian as civilian Personnel Administrator, thereby relieving an officer from this duty. Utilization of civilians in this position has been found generally satisfactory since the civilians are not subject to miscellaneous additional duties and frequent changes of station as in the case of military personnel.

During the period March through July, the civilian strength of the command remained fairly constant at 10,000. Reductions in authorizations begin to be received in July to be effective at the end of succeeding months. The reductions in round figures by months were, August 900, September 700, October 1000, November 3300. This total reduction of 5900 reduced the civilian strength of the command to approximately 4200, roughly 43% of which are veterans, 54% graded, and 46% ungraded.

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d. RECRUITING:

It is felt that TAC has carried out a very forceful recruiting program during the period. Two Recruiting caravans and 10 individual mobile units were placed on the road to give exhibits and shows at state and local fairs, carnivals and in local communities. Each short term enlistee and non-Regular Army EM in the command was given a personal and private interview by his base recruiting officer and thoroughly acquainted with all the advantages of being a Regular Army soldier. Many false recruiting promises were made by both our recruiting personnel as well as those from the Service Commands. These false promises reached their peak during August. Immediate and positive action was taken to check improper dissemination of information and false promises by our recruiting personnel. Many of the mistakes made by recruiting personnel are directly attributable to inexperience and lack of training caused by the great turnover in officer personnel and in discharge, transfer and overseas assignment of enlisted personnel. In addition to false promises, several benefits to which military personnel were normally entitled were not available, such as specialized medical and dental treatment for dependents, post schools, etc. This further aggrevated the morale problem created by false promises made to new enlistees.

It has been interesting to note that enlistments are much higher during the period of the operation of Selective Service. The draft holidays commencing in July brought about a decided decrease in enlistments during July and August which raised during September before a few of the advantages of enlistments terminated on 5 October 1946. The pay increase effective 1 July 1946 was a new selling point and gave renewed vigor to recruiting personnel. At the end of 1946, TAC had a total of 2432 short term enlistees, 107 of whom were 2 year, 1056 were 18 months and 1269 were 1 year enlistees. In addition

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to this number, we had 1499 AUS personnel which gives a total of 3931 possible enlistees in the command on whom the recruiting personnel can work to secure additional long term enlistments.

e. SCHOOLS:

In detailing personnel to schools particular emphasis is placed on training of personnel to fill vacancies in critical specialties. Qualification standards in most of these courses, however, are high and make it difficult to obtain sufficient students. Numerous officers have been detailed to civilian colleges and universities for post graduate training or to continue schooling toward a degree. Seventy-two officers have been detailed to the various courses offered under the Air University and a quota of 90 has already been received for 1947. The assignment of quotas for indefinite periods with weekly entrance intervals have tied up many officers in schools. The majority of the enlisted personnel detailed to Training Command schools are receiving training in aircraft maintenance, radar, communications and as clerk typists. AAF Letter 50-62 has caused commanders of units to hesitate to request additional training needed due to the movement of personnel involved in filling mandatory quotas allotted by the Training Command under above cited letter. This situation should be somewhat relieved in the near future when the graduates of these schools begin to return to their units. Many of our enlisted men are ineligible for Training Command schools because of recent failure of technical courses in the Training Command. It is pointed out that these people were assigned to us from the Training Command after having been eliminated.

Much schooling was lost during this period by detailing officers and EM to schools and then separating them under new discharge criteria and involuntary separation in the case of officers.

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f. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT:

At the time TAC was activated, the only available school for the indoctrination of personnel in the principles, functions and procedures of management was the course in Applied Personnel Management at the AAF Special Staff School. This course was only available to staff officers in key positions and could only accomodate 1500 students per year for the AAF. This headquarters made plans which were approved by AAF to hold an institute to train civilian training coordinators in the command, who in turn would teach this course to supervisory personnel. Eighteen civilian training coordinators were trained and upon completion returned to their respective bases. A directive was issued requiring officers, EM, and civilian personnel to attend conferences in personnel management. Personnel Management committees were organized at each base to discuss, recommend and place in effect operating procedures based on sound management principles. Of the 18 civilian training coordinators who were originally trained, only 8 are still employed within the command, this loss may be attributed to reductions in force and resignations to accept better positions with other agencies. The evaluation of the program thus far is difficult and can be based only on the opinions of personnel who attended the courses. Without exception these opinions have been very enthusiastic in favor of the training.

g. GROUND SAFETY:

Personnel have been sent to school and trained as Safety Officers and Safety Technicians to insure an aggressive safety program within the command. Stations have been required to appoint a board of officers to meet at least once each month to discuss safety hazards or potential hazards and how they could best be eliminated. A ground Safety Accident Experience

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Report is published and distributed from this headquarters to further emphasize and create a spirit of competition between commands and stations.

h. WAC:

When TAC was activated there were seven WAC squadrons with a total of 693 enlisted women and 31 WAC officers. Discharge criteria effective 30 June 1946 and 1 September 1946 as well as other discharge criteria effecting WAC personnel have gradually decreased the WAC enlisted strength to 173 white enlisted women and 115 colored enlisted women. Discharges, reassignments and termination of category statements have gradually reduced the WAC officer strength to 10, two of whom are colored and eight white.

With the decrease in WAC strength, certain WAC squadrons have been eliminated and others consolidated to where we now have 3 WAC squadrons; one at Langley Field, one at Greenville and one at Lockbourne.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND STAFF CONFERENCE NOTES

VOLUME I NUMBER 26 7 June 1946

CHIEF OF STAFF'S REPORT:

The Chief of Staff stated that he and Colonel Richardson of the Manpower Board in Washington had discussed reduction of allotments of personnel. AAF has reduced the rest of the major commands, SAC, ATC, so it is an even cut for all commands. This reduction, it is planned, will be made gradually. The Chief of Staff directed that the manpower section of this headquarters be prepared to make reports on allotments and where reductions can be made.

A-1 REPORT:

1. The Air Defense Command has requested TAC to furnish a commanding officer and officer cadres for various Air Reserve units of their command.

2. AAF requirements require TAC to send 1757 officers overseas. Approximately 300 have been shipped and the rest will be selected from those who haven't been overseas. Most of the requests have been for MOS's that this command does not have assigned.

3. Papers have been received on 425 officers to be separated. A-1 will discuss this matter with the Chief of Staff this afternoon.

A-3 REPORT:

1. A-3 has requested Headquarters AAF to move Brooks Field band to Langley Field. The Commanding General directed that the band should be assigned to the Base Headquarters and that they should be informed of its pending arrival.

2. After our call to Headquarters AAF, the 477th Service Group at Pope Field, belonging to 316th Troop Carrier, will not be inactivated.

A-4 REPORT:

1. Eglin Field is making tests on a new bomb with reinforced fins for P-80's. The bomb should be available in about 6 weeks.

2. The project regarding refinishing of the permanent buildings at Langley Field has been approved in the amount of $115,000. Projects instituted at March Field were approved by Headquarters AAF but disapproved by

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the War Department because they did not have a review taken by the service command. With the reorganization of the War Department and Army on 11 June 1946, this headquarters will have reviewing authority. These projects will be reviewed and returned to the War Department on that date.

3. The Chief of Staff directed A-4 to bring Lockbourne AAB project papers for him to review.

COMMUNICATIONS REPORT:

TAC is now in possession of a telephone van consisting of dial equipment, switchboard, battery charger, and assorted instruments. The Commanding General directed that the request to have it exhibited in Philadelphia on 4 July 1946 be granted.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

OTIS C. TURNER
WOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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BASIC LTR: Hdqs TAC, subject: "Case-Report, AAF Special - Lack of Inspections on Motor Vehicles," dated 22 July 1946.

AAJ 1st Ind AA/GCM/meb

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER, Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, Myrtle Beach, S. C. 12 August 1946.

To: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

1. Due to transfer of personnel from this base, the Motor Transportation Section has had six (6) different officers in charge during the past six (6) weeks. The resultant confusion caused by the varying policies of succeeding officers will be alleviated by the application of standard operating procedures to control the activities of both drivers and supervisory personnel. These procedures will be followed regardless of any change of officer personnel in this department.

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s/ Glenn C. Nye
+/ GLENN C. NYE
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

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C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE
Greenville, South Carolina

AFOAF 333.1 22 November 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Quarterly Inspection of the 342nd AAF Base Unit, Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee.

TURU: Command Channels

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

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III. COMMANDING OFFICER AND SPECIAL STAFF.

8. The Commanding Officer of the unit is capable commander who is fully aware of his functions and responsibilities and is carrying out his duties in a manner equal to the standards of the Army Air Forces.

9. The Special Staff almost entirely consists of officers who are newly assigned to their specific jobs and therefore have not received adequate training in the particular job assigned to them. This is the result of the recent reduction in officer strength of this base at the direction of higher headquarters. Exceptions to this statement are the Surgeon and Finance Officers who are properly qualified.

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V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS, OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

20. At the time of the inspection, this station was undergoing a drastic reduction of officer personnel and it was noted that the officers remaining at the station were being given from 2 to 8 jobs as additional duty. In most cases, personnel questioned were found to be unfamiliar with the responsibilities involved. It was noted that 6 months ago, the station had 739 enlisted men, 200 civilians and 333 officers with which to man approximately 73 jobs. At the present time the station has been reduced to approximately 400 enlisted men, 170 civilians and 27 officers, which includes 6 medical corps officers. The number of jobs assigned remains the same; approximately 73. It is recommended that the organizational chart for this size operation be drastically reduced so that no attempt will be made to continue any job or office that could well be done away with. It is believed that if the present practice of assigned numerous jobs to one officer who is unable to give full attention to this job including the making of numerous reports, that these reports will be meaningless and of no value to higher headquarters.

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W. E. PATTERSON, Lt Col, IGD
Asst. Air Inspector

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28 March 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Shaw Field, Sumter, S. C.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: The Air Inspector (Thru Appropriate Command Channels)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Inspection of subject activity in accordance with AAF Letter 120-10,21 January 1946, was conducted by Winfred O. Craft, Lt. Col., AC, assisted by three (3) officers of Headquarters Army Air Forces during the period 25-28 March 1946. This is a spot check inspection following the second regular inspection conducted under provisions of AAF Letter 120-10.

II. QUESTIONNAIRE

2. Command

Commanding Officer at the time of this inspection is Colonel C. E. Hughes, A. C., in command since 15 January 1946. She is at present on temporary duty with a Regular Army Screening Board.

Colonel C. T. Edwinson is at present acting Base Commander.

3. Mission

There is no written directive setting forth the present mission of this base other than the War Department Letter, which established the primary mission for the Army (Demobilization and Separating). However, Letter 352, Hdq. 1st Bomber Command, 27 November 1945, charged this base with the responsibility for Ground Control Approach and Special Weapons training for the First Air Force. The Ground Control Approach training has been completed or the crews have been transferred. The major portion of the training equipment is packed for shipment, and both equipment and personnel are awaiting disposition by First Air Force. The Special Weapons training personnel and equipment have been transferred to Proving Ground Command.

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Ltr 28 March 1946, subj: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Shaw Field, Sumter, S. C.

2. Mission (Cont'd)

A further responsibility of this base is Chinese Combat Crew Training which, although there are no written directives at this headquarters establishing this as a mission, has been in operation since 1 November 1945. The present complement of Chinese personnel, consisting of one hundred and forty eight (148) officers, and one hundred and seven (107) enlisted men, have completed the required training program prescribed for them at this base, and are awaiting disposition by higher headquarters.

4. Organization

a. No functional chart for this Base has been prepared for present or past missions. The organizational chart on which a functional chart would be based is not at present in a usable form and does not follow the policies outlined in AAF Regulation 65-77, dtd, 6 February 1946 or AAF Letter 20-26, dtd, 7 March 1946.

c. There are twenty-two (22) aircraft in Class "B" storage at the extreme north eastern edge of the field. This storage necessitates the use of a large area including a hanger and several small buildings which at present are being used for temporary storage of aircraft or equipment. The transfer of these aircraft, which are in fact surplus to the needs of this Base, would permit this area to be closed and would release two (2) officers and fourteen (14) enlisted men for reassignment to other maintenance activities. In addition, it is believed that greater utilization and control of available maintenance personnel could be achieved thru further consolidation of 1st and 2nd Echelon maintenance activities. The current dispersal of such activities requires additional overhead and tends to decrease the effectiveness of supervision.

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6. Personnel

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a. There are approximately 170 pilots available for flying at this base out of the 265 rated personnel assigned. One hundred and twenty-four (124) of these pilots are overage in strength from that authorized. Fifty-five (55) rated officers are in fact surplus to any need of this Base and twenty-seven (27) of these have no present assignment other than maintaining flying proficiency except the

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Ltr 28 March 1946, subj: Report of Demobilization Inspection of Shaw Field, Sumter, S. C.

6. Personnel (Cont'd)

attendance of a Garrison of a School which is being conducted on the Base for the purpose of increasing their administrative and technical knowledge. The balance of the surplus rated personnel are being used as understudies for administrative positions.

The number of aircraft maintained in an operational status has been kept within the capabilities of the maintenance section. However, this number of aircraft, if fully utilized, is more than sufficient to carry out the current flying mission of the Base, namely the maintenance of flying proficiency of assigned rated personnel, even with the large number of surplus rated personnel.

b. The Manpower Control Board of this Base consists of the Director of Personnel and Administration, the Director of Operations and Training, the Director of Supply and Maintenance, the Air Inspector, the Civilian Personnel Officer, the Classification Officer, and the Personnel Officer. This board has done much for the efficient utilization of personnel and facilities, but there is evidence of further consolidation which can be effected.

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FOR THE FIRST AIR INSPECTOR, HQ AAF:

WINFRED O. CRAFT
Lt Col, AC
Acting Inspector General

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C O P Y

F/T Hq, TAC, Off of the Air Insp, Langley Fld., Va. 3 Jul 46, subj: Case-Rpt, AAF Special-Military Courtesy and Dress. To: CG, TAC, Langley Fld, Va.

319.1 1st Ind. A/mmm

HEADQUARTERS, SMYRNA ARMY AIR FIELD, Smyrna, Tennessee, 25 July 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. While the condition indicated may have existed at this base at the time of the inspection, it has since been corrected to a marked degree. This has been done by a routine continuing program of education and supervision through the unit commander.

2. In reviewing the causes of the subject deficiencies, it appears that there were a large number of flying personnel assigned this base who had no definitely stated mission and no aircraft available for flying. A large percentage of personnel, commissioned and enlisted, were awaiting reassignment or separation which caused considerable dissatisfaction and confusion.

3. The deficiencies stated in paragraph two have since been corrected.

H. BART, JR.
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Commanding General

3 May 1946

Brigadier General W. R. Carter
Deputy Commander
Headquarters, Tactical Air Command

Dear Nick:

I took over in command here last Monday, and General Jones and his party of inspectors arrived on Tuesday. They spent all day Wednesday giving us a going-over, but apparently found very little wrong with the place - except an excess of personnel which will soon be cleared up. They gave us a rating of Excellent on aircraft maintenance, which I attribute to the fact that a good many of the old non-coms have returned to March Field.

Since one hundred and sixty-five men from the Fighter Group are on temporary duty with the Crossroads project, and have been promised that they will be assigned to any organization of their choosing upon their return, I plan to replace them in the Group and bring it up to full strength, including the Service Group, so that the Fighter Group can function properly and not depend on men who are absent, possibly never to return. One of the principal difficulties they have been having has been the shortage of maintenance personnel in the Service Group to perform third echelon maintenance on the P-80s. Of course, the cause for the large number of aircraft out of commission is mainly shortage of batteries and brakes.

Please tell your A-1 section that I do not believe we should move many men out of March Field because we have two hundred and sixty-five (265) separations coming up, and by proper distribution of those we have, together with the possibility of an early activation of the Twelfth, the men will all be used to a good advantage. We are still way over in officers, and the only place I can see a need for them would be a setting up the Twelfth Air Force Headquarters.

I have two old timers here: Colonel Harper and Colonel Koontz. Koontz has been away, and I don't know what job I will give him. Colonel Harper has only fifteen months to go before retiring; consequently, I can see no use in sending him to any sort of school or moving him from March Field at this time. I am using him as Deputy Commander with the idea in view that if the Twelfth is activated and I take it over, we may possibly want him to return to the job of Base Commander.

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Brig. Gen. W. R. Carter 3 May 1946

If A-1 can scare up a good legal officer, we can use him to good advantage because the one we have is leaving soon.

Colonel Holloway told me yesterday morning that the Lockheed Company, and the company which manufactures rockets to assist aircraft in takeoff, have made a considerable number of tests on assisted takeoffs and have offered to equip the P-80 airplane in the Group, furnishing the necessary rockets, to allow it to participate in the flight to Washington and return. All expenses, etc, would be born by the two companies concerned. Within a day or two they will demonstrate on a C-47 airplane here at March Field the rocket assisted takeoff. If things work out right, we will probably send you some sort of a message asking for you to secure permission to equip an airplane on the Washington flight, since we feel it would add to the demonstration at each point along the route.

Also, we have worked up the idea of taking along a cutdown engine which, at the present time, is being used here in school work, as an added exhibit along the route.

The Air Depot has gone to work on modification of wing tanks, and we expect good results from them. However, they have been able to find only ten (10) sets of batteries up to the present time. With what we have, though, that will be sufficient in case no others are forthcoming.

Please notify your staff officers that since the Fighter Group and the Service Group have been assigned to me, all communications should be routed through the Commanding General, March Field.

The last of our sub-bases, Van Nuys, is being transferred to a different command today.

We expect the bomber people to all be out of here within the next two or three days.

I will send sufficient copies of this letter so you can pass them on to General Quesada or any other staff officer you desire.

With best wishes I am

Sincerly

Y. H. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., USA
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

FSH/AFT/b

Field Office Of The
Air Inspector, Hq AAF
Gunter Field, Ala.

333.1

4 October 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of Headquarters, 12th Air Force, March Field, California

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.
Attn: The Air Inspector
THRU: Commanding General, Headquarters, 12th Air Force
March Field, California

* * * *

II. OBSERVATIONS

6. Administrative

* * * * *

d. It was observed that there is a considerable excess of field grade officers, over and above the manning table. This was particularly evident in the grade of Colonel. It is recommended that action be taken to make as equitable a distribution of this personnel as possible.

* * * * * *

FRANKLIN S. HENLEY
Colonel, Air Corps
The Field Air Inspector

333.1 1st Ind 12AF

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE, March Field, California 15 Jan 1947

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

* * * *

6. d. Field Grade Officers are being equitably distributed

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Basic: Ltr fr Hq AAF, Washington, D.C. dtd 4 Oct 46, file 333.1, subj: "Report of Inspection of Hq, Twelfth Air Force, March Field, Calif."

1st Ind (contd)

among the units of this command. Two officers in the grade of Colonel are being assigned to Biggs Field and one to March Field to further equalize the distribution of high ranking field grade officers.

* * * *

WILLIAM D. OLD
Major General, USA
Commanding

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PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

March 1946 - December 1946

MONTH	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
MARCH	8115	17459	10063	35637
APRIL	8076	18692	10322	37090
MAY	7723	18940	10659	37322
JUNE	7531	19562	10322	37425
JULY	5265	19128	10010	34403
AUGUST	4693	18114	9128	31935
SEPTEMBER	4817	18460	8409	31686
OCTOBER	4511	21631	7440	33582
NOVEMBER	2874	22116	4164	29044
DECEMBER	2736	21023	3993	27752

(From data furnished the)
(Historical Division by)
(the Directorate of Stat-)
(istical Control, May 1948)

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington 25, D. C.

333.1

Olmsted Field
Middletown, Pa.
14 May 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Supervisory Inspection of the Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware

TO: Commanding Officer, Dover Army Air Field and Command Channels

CO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Attention: The Air Inspector, Washington 25, D. C.

******

0. General

a. Observation

(1) Listed below is a comparison of the authorized strength of the assigned units and the actual strength:

	Authorized		Assigned	
	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted
320th AAF FU	68	340	315	168

(2) In addition to the above, 195 civilians are employed at this station at present, the number of authorized being 200.

(3) Listed below is a compilation of men reported 20 April 1946 as available for overseas duty:

Officers	Enlisted
197	93

(4) This activity is performing its mission. Personnel are assigned to further the recruiting program and pre-separation activities. On-the-job training is being given to untrained personnel to as great an extent as practicable under existing circumstances.

b. AAF Special Subjects are being followed up in a satisfactory manner.

c. A report of minor irregularities and deficiencies, not a part of this report, was left with activity commander.

* * * *

/s/ JAJ
/t/ JOHN A. JORDAN
Lt. Col., IGD
Field Air Inspector, HQ AAF

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CGA HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida

TAC333 (23 Apr 46) Misc 23 April 1946

SUBJECT: General Eisenhower's visits and inspections.

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force.
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force.
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases, Wings, Groups, Battalions, and Separate Units assigned directly to this headquarters.

1. The following letter from Lieutenant General Ira C. Baker, Deputy Commander, AAF is quoted:

"1. General Spaatz desired that information be communicated to you that General Eisenhower expressed very favorable comment on the work being done by surplus officers at several Air Force stations he visited. He pointed out that at these stations, large numbers of officers who had no airplanes to fly due to shortage of mechanics had on their coveralls and were being given thorough courses on airplane and engine maintenance and other subjects. He thought this was most forward-looking and his conversations with the officers taking these courses and doing this special work indicated that the officers themselves were enthusiastic about the idea.

"2. It is still the policy of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to relieve the burden on the Army Air Forces as much as possible by returning to civil life at the earliest practicable date officers surplus to our peacetime requirements. It is obviously to the best interest of these officers that they do return to civil life and take up their civil occupations as soon as possible. Until, however, they are released from military service, it is believed both the Air Force and the individual profit by these technical efficiency courses which can be conducted at stations."

2. It is directed that the contents of this letter be brought to the attention of all subordinate commanders.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/s/ WARREN R. CARTER
WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

(Effective until 23 October 1946, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____ (Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Maximum Utilization of Officer Personnel
3	F D R Asst A I 16 Apr 46	A-1	1. Results of "Maximum Utilization of Officer Personnel" as viewed by inspectors of this section, though still incomplete, nevertheless, reveals certain advantages of this policy in actual operation. It is believed that the advantages far out-weigh the few disadvantages which have been seen by inspectors from this section. The main disvantge revolves around the lack of any or insdequate screening of officers to determine their capabilities before assigning them administrative or technical duties. This alone has been found to be the deciding factor in the assurance of the success of such officer utilization. 2. Of importance, but less urgent, is the disadvantage of officers performing menial tasks about a base where newly inducted enlisted personnel are stationed. These enlisted men take an entirely distorted view of officer-enlisted men relationship when seeing such officers assigned to menial tasks. This, however, has not been observed where enlisted men of considerable war service have been stationed. 3. This section would point to the example of Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware, in keeping with the letter and spirit of the directive, and thus acquiring an extremely high percentage of efficiency throuhg proper officer utilization. At Dover, Delaware, officers are made to realize that without their services in the jobs assigned, the base would cease to function. As a result of knowing why their services are needed through this intelligent approach to the problem, a high state of morale is evident though officers are performing such tasks as guard duty, hangar policing, bus driving, mess hall cashiers, and other similar menial tasks. 4. As an over-all policy the utilization of officer personnel is considered excellent throughout the bases of this command, with the exception of the discrepancies noted which reflect on its application at base level and not on the policy itself.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____ (Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Maximum Utilization Officer Personnel, Contd
			5. It is recommended that all base commanders under this command are made to realize the importance of proper screening of the officers available to determine their capabilities before assigning them duties in either administrative or technical functions.
4	JUP 16 Apr 46	A-3	Request comments and/or recommendations. It appears very poor judgment was used in selections of officers and duties.
5	MBG Rep A-3 [illegible]	A-1	1. Ref note 3 # 2 - this is very auribiguous; however, recommend letter be sent to bases directing them to exercise more care in the screening of officers for jobs.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Air Inspector

Langley Field, Virginia
2 July 1946

SUBJECT: Case-Report, AAF Special - Military Courtesy and Dress.

TO: Commanding Officer, Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

I. IRREGULARITY.

1. In analyzing the irregularities and deficiencies existing at Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee, as recorded in the Coordination and Compliance records, this headquarters, it is noted that military courtesy and dress of the officer and enlisted personnel was unsatisfactory.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. It is recommended that the provisions of AR 600-10, and TAC Ltr 322-6, subject: "Military Behavior, Dress, and Discipline", dated 8 January 1946, be strictly adhered to and a program be initiated to bring Smyrna Army Air Field up to the high standards required by the Army Air Forces.

III. INSTRUCTIONS.

3. This Case-Report, AAF Special, will be reviewed by all commanders listed above who will state, in indorsements, corrective action taken. This report and all indorsements and inclosures thereto will be prepared so as to reach Headquarters Tactical Air Command in original and one carbon copy.

JOSEPH A KELLY
Lt Col, TAC
Acting Air Inspector

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
STAFF CONFERENCE NOTES

VOLUME I NUMBER 49 23 August 1946

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL'S REPORT:

General Carter stated that a meeting of all base unit commanders at Langley Field was called for the purpose of initiating a program of more strict compliance with regulations pertaining to military courtesy and discipline. General Carter further stated that the results of this program will be in direct proportion to the cooperation of commanders and their staffs.

A-3 REPORT:

1. The 161st Liaison Squadron, Biggs Field, Texas, and the 314th Troop Carrier Group, Greenville Army Air Base, South Carolina, will be transferred overseas, less personnel and equipment.

2. Air Materiel Command has been directed by Headquarters AAF to transfer the 4146th AAF Base Unit (rocket test firing) from Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware.

A-4 REPORT:

1. The 7-day and 30-day supply lists for the various types of aircraft of the demonstration unit have been received by this headquarters.

2. Sturgis Army Air Field, and auxiliary of Sedalia Army Air Field, has been declared surplus, effective 13 August 1946. Blytheville Army Air Field has been declared surplus, effective 15 August 1946.

3. The Engineers have assumed jurisdiction of Hunter Field, 17 August 1946.

4. Information received from the Air Installations Division revealed that the estimate for 1948 construction submitted by this headquarters would be approved with the exception of construction of permanent barracks. Emphasis is being placed on family housing in the early years of the 10-year plan.

A-5 REPORT:

1. The West Coast maneuvers are still scheduled for the early part of November. The Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, has been directed to

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employ as many TAC units as possible.

2. This headquarters has obtained permission from the Air University to inspect Tyndall Field, Florida, for the purpose of considering its utilization for the TAC Air Indoctrination course which will be held during the early part of next year.

AIR INSPECTOR'S REPORT:

The question regarding maintenance of transient aircraft at TAC bases over week ends and holidays was mentioned by the Air Inspector. Instructions are being prepared directing all bases to assure that the supply of parts is made available to transient aircraft at all times.

COMMUNICATIONS REPORT:

1. A telegram received from Headquarters AAF restricts the use of VHF/DF frequencies (138.42 and 139.38) to emergencies only during the period of 30 August to 1 September, inclusive. The P-80's entering the Bendix Race will be exempted from this restriction.

2. Due to the lack of trained radar personnel, this command is requesting that Headquarters AAF endeavor to secure technicians from the Watson Laboratory to assist us in preparing a CPS-5 for use in the West Coast Maneuvers

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

OTIS C. TURNER
WOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS
CONVENED AT HEADQUARTERS
SCOTT FIELD, ILLINOIS
24 to 31 August 1946

31 August 1946

I. PURPOSE

The board was constituted and instructed by the commanding Officer to study the problem of the young soldier at Scott Field today; to identify the factors which produce or contribute to the high incidents of delinquency in the military service; and to determine proper methods of dealing with the teen-age soldier.

* * * * *

IV. FINDINGS

1. That the Recruiting Service is recruiting solely for numbers without regard to the effect of their false statements and practices, resulting in the following:

a. Assignment to duty other than that promised.
b. Erroneous anticipation of furloughs.
c. Assurance of attending the school of his choice without regard to military necessity or personal qualifications.
d. Inadequate personal counsel of the recruit to ascertain his desires or qualifications.
e. No apparent investigation of civilian criminal record.

2. That the basic training which the soldier arriving at Scott Field has undergone is grossly inadequate as evidenced by the following:

a. Qualifications as a soldier:

(1) Disregard for constituted authority.
(2) Ignorance of good housekeeping practices within his squadron area.
(3) Improper wearing of the uniform.
(4) Lack of respect for and pride in the military service.

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HEADQUARTERS 300TH AAF BASE UNIT
Headquarters Tactical Air
Command
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC 301.62 2 December 1946

SUBJECT: Recommendations for Standardized System of Personnel Accounting and Reporting at Base Level

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. The recommendations and comments which are contained herein are submitted in compliance with letter, Ho TAC, dated 22 October 1946, above subject anf file number.

2. Existing difficulties relating directly to personnel procedures are incidental to the entire administrative body being unhealthy. For this reason, any remedy applied to the sickness in personnel procedures cannot be wholly or permanently effective until the administrative body as a whole is revitalized and made healthy.

3. A "Squadron", as defined in par 1 g (3), Army Regulations 245-5 dated 2 June 1942, is the basic administrative unit. "The commanding officer of a squadron is in general responsible for the administration, instruction, tactical efficiency, and preparedness for war service of his organization. If this doctrine can be accepted as sound, then a working basis for the solution of basic administrative problems is established.

4. The first step then is to create squadrons to replace existing masses of loosely organized units with various designations and poorly defined lines of authority and responsibility.

5. A squadron should be the organization designated to carry on with continuity, to make history, and to have the means of making a happy home for the soldier. Two or more squadrons should be tied together in tactical, service, or base groups, depending upon requirements. The squadron should be the organization where all basic administrative work is performed.

6. To carry out its basic administrative function as outlined in AR 245-5, the squadron must be organized properly. Each squadron must have its administrative, mess and supply sections, with other sections to carry out its assigned mission. Squadron strength should range between 100 and 250 military personnel, with more than 250 the rare exception.

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7. In the field of personnel accounting the morning report, which is the basic administrative report, should originate in the squadron. The squadron being an organization of such size that it can prepare a morning report accurately and expeditiously, can submit its morning report to the next higher echelon of command by 0900 hours daily. Figures may be consolidated at group level beginning at 0900 hours and dispatched to the Air Force not later than 1200 hours. Thus the Air Force can have complete and accurate figures (if teletype is used) by 1400 hours daily.

8. Why can't it be done now? It is easy to understand that a C-47 aircraft can not get off the ground with a 10 ton load. It appears difficult to understand that a morning report "can not get off the ground" with a 10 ton load, i.e., if the morning report organization is loaded down with 500 or more persons with unrelated duty assignments and who are scattered all over a field.

9. Many good arguments, sound in principal, can be advanced in favor of much larger squadrons. Squadrons of 500 or more men have been administered effectively in days gone by. In those days effective assistance by noncommissioned officers was the rule, in these days such assistance is the exception and will remain so until the overall standards of training and discipline are raised. The raising of these standards can be expedited by adopting squadron organization.

10. It follows that any system or organization requires management (command) to make it work. No organization is a cure-all within itself, however, the average officer can command and control a squadron effectively if it is of such shape and size as to be within his reach, whereas, few officers have the ability to exercise effective control over an organization which is clumsy, top-heavy, and widespread.

11. As we go into a peace time organization we must be conscious that the next test of our product will not occur until our next war. It has been proven in all our wars that the officer who was well grounded in company or squadron administration was most capable of assuming command and staff assignments in air forces, divisions, and higher commands. There is no other assignment in which a young officer can get the experience and training to equal and/or even approach that which is incidental to service with a squadron which conducts its own administrative, supply, mess and service or tactical functions.

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

20 December 1946

TAC 250 (27 Nov 46)

SUBJECT: Curtailment of Delinquency Among Young Soldiers

TO: Commanding General
Ninth Air Force
Greenville, S. C.

1. Attached as Inclosure 1 is a letter from General Carl Spaatz which is of primary importance in its presentation of a grave condition which is present in this command, and also in its connection with letter, this headquarters, file TAC 250 (27 Nov 46), dated 27 November 1946, subject: "Standards of Discipline."

2. The following steps will be initiated immediately to combat this condition:

a. All recruits received at any base in this command will be interviewed by a senior officer, preferably the base commander, within 4 days after his arrival, who will perform the following:

(1) Explain the oath of allegiance and what it means and entails.

(2) Explain the Articles of War, what they are, and the authority behind them, and will especially point out the pertinent ones, such as the 58th, 61st, 63d, 64th, 65th, 83d, and 84th.

(3) Explain the proper relationship between the recruit and other soldiers, noncommissioned officers and officers.

(4) Give the soldier assurance of genuine interest in the soldier and his success in the military service.

b. Have the recruit reported to the chaplain who will give the recruit one or more orientation talks not on sex morality and one sex morality talk.

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c. Have the recruit reported to the individual service officer for orientation as to the AAF relief, etc.

d. The Red Cross field director should also explain the place of the ARC at this time. Care must be taken not to give the soldier the "cry baby" malinger attitude. The emphasis must be "You are a man" with all a man's responsibilities.

e. The recruit will be given special drill periods over an 8-week period under competent drill masters with emphasis on marching, saluting, dress, and posture. This must be snappy, alert, and subject to frequent checking by senior officers. Emphasis must be placed on snap, precision, and keeness.

f. The recruit will be given real moral education by the surgeon, the chaplain, and a line officer who has something genuine to say. Honesty, loyalty, dependability, faithfulness, and personal cleanliness are topics for discussion.

g. The command policy with regard to discipline, military bearing, courtesy, and dress must be made more effective. To accomplish this, troop schools will be established in each base in accordance with supplemental instructions from this headquarters. Subjects to be considered will be courts-martial, Army Morale, Army Organization, and Customs and Courtesies of the Service.

h. Staff officers and section heads will be impressed with their duty to cooperate with, and back up to the limit, the efforts of unit commanders in matters of drill, discipline, courtesy, neatness, and military bearing. Too often staff officers and section heads are lax or even a hinderance in this respect. This is not to be tolerated.

i. Courts must be impressed with the fact that clemency is the prerogative of command. Inadequate sentences are as destructive of discipline as unjust sentences. The manual for Courts-Martial must be carefully studied by all officers.

j. Commanding officers will take every legitimate step to arouse the adjacent communities to their responsibility to see to it that conditions in their cities are at a high moral level. Commanding officers should call upon the majors of these towns and cities and talk over problems, seeking to work out an amicable solution to all difficulties. The provost marshal should contact the local sheriffs and police in the effort to improve conditions and establish a cordial working relationship. The post chaplain should visit the local clergy individually or in a body at ministerial gathering and present the problem and secure their assistance. The individual services officer should contact the

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welfare and social agencies of the surrounding town and cities and secure their assistance in working out the mutual problems involved in inter-community cooperation. The luncheon clubs and fraternal orders should be by the properly accredited members of the command their sympathetic support secured.

k. A series of special talks will be given by base commanders and specially selected officers to the officer personnel on their responsibility in matters of conduct, discipline, and example for the enlisted men. This must be concrete and definate. Too many officers of this command apparently are unaware of their responsibility in this respect. Officers must appreciate the fact that they are officers.

l. On each base a council will be formed, composed of the post executive, surgeon, chaplain, provost marshal, and individual service officer. This council will examine thoriughly the facts in every case of venreal disease and juvenile delinquency, finding out the personal questioning of the offender all the facts involved, securing every bit of information available despite the offenders embarrassment at the intimate questions necessary to safeguard other members of the command and without any threat of punishment or reprizal. This council shall advise the commanding officer on all matters of policy concerning this entire field of juvenile delinquency (venereal disease and allied problems.)

m. This headquarters cannot look lightly upon the failure of base commanders to exercise command properly. Weakness of command, as shown by a high venereal disease rate, exessive AWOL's, desertions, will not be tolerated.

3. Attached Inclosure 2 is material provided as thought-provokers, model talks, and suggested methods of approach to the topics indicated. They are not required material, and part of parts may be used, but better results will be obtained if original material or the reworking of the sample material into the individual's mode of delivery is utilized.

4. Flying is of utmost importance, but discipline must be first. It makes flying safer, it keeps down the accident rate, and it saves money and lives. Good discipline is essential to the success of the mission of the Tactical Air Command.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA: C O P Y

/t/ GLENN O. BARCUS
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief of Staff

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MINUTES OF THE
AAF REGULAR ARMY RECRUITING PROGRAM CONFERENCE
NOVEMBER 29-30, 1945

* * * * *

Speech by Major General Gilbert: Army Wide Recruiting Program

* * * * *

Our present goal of 1,600,000 men of course, is several times that big. So the fundamental theme which has been adopted for this campaign revolves upon two basic points. First, we must overcome in the public's mind the aversion, the apprehension or the disdain which many civilians sometimes have in regard to the Regular Army soldier. In other words, we must enhance the position of the Regular Army soldier. We have got to raise his level so that the public will respect his job equally with that of any job available to the average young man anywhere. The second fundamental is to emphasize the value of the Regular Army soldier's job. Those are two basic things. We are eliminating any of the so called hoopla or flag-waving. We are trying to keep this campaign on a straight business proposition with straightforward figues and straightforward statements. We can prove to you that this Regular Army soldier's job is actually better in every respect than the job available to the average young man in business or industry. Bear these two points in mind, gentlemen, in whatever you do hereafter: Enhance the value of the soldier's position in the public's mind and emphasize the value of his job as compared to others. We have under way at this time a very comprehensive program. It is always difficult to have everyone understand just what is going on behind the scenes everywhere.

* * * * * *

Now the law provides another critical date that requires no interpretation: Namely, that every man now in the Army has the opportunity to be discharged and reenlisted and retain the grade he now holds, provided he does it before the first of February 1946. So I estimate that between this date and the end of January 1946, there will be an over-increasing number of men reenlisting because it behooves them to make their present temporary grade permanent by reenlisting before that date. Of this 158,094 men as of 14 November, about 24%, (24.38) have chosen the Air Corps. You can make your own estimate. If the Air Corps is to comprise, let us say, for example, 40% of the Army, then the Air Corps ought to be getting at least 40% of the recruits. As it stands to day, you have obtained 24.38 percent, or a total number of men 38,550 directly for the Army Air Forces. Ofcourse you have your proportionate share in the unassigned group of some 60,~~66~~ men, so that I estimate that all told the number of men now going into

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Speech by Major General Gilbert: Cont'd

the Air Corps, or the Air Forces, will approximate 32% of the total. I am confident that you can greatly increase the amount of men that you can enlist in your own command right on the post where you are located today. You cannot do it with part-time recruiting officers.

* * * * * *

The sky is the limit. There is no limit on how many we can recruit. Likewise there is no limit on this T/O grade business on men reenlisting for their present grade. Don't worry about having too many men of this or that, so long as they come within the law and are reenlisted prior to February 1st, grades go right out of the window. And please remember, you are your own best salesman; you have the best tools available to you right in the outfit. If you can't sell that man in your outfit, where he knows the details, he knows how you are handling things, he knows what you can do for him, he knows you are sincere in your promises, if you can't do it there, nobody else can do it for you somewhere else.

* * * * * *

Any other questions:

Q: What is the emphasis on character and ability in this recruiting campaign? Where do we draw the line? The mere number indicated, in my opinion, is not what we are seeking. Your plan, which is absolutely right, to build up the prestige of the American soldier, make him a member of the community, respected, and enhancing his position in society, but that to me, is directly opposed th the idea od numbers. Where do you draw the line?

A: Our thought and our recommendation on that subject are embodied in this statement, I believe. We have contended that the concept that most all of us have had of the Regular Army in the past is a thing of the past. This new peace-time Regular Army must be a completely new concept of an Army of men whose standards in every respect must be higher because of the technical advancements that have been made. Our Army of the future must be mainly an Army of technicians. Men who have it on the ball. Men who have the mental ability to absorb the high type and high degree of technical training which we will evolve and the other major forces will envolve for their needs. We have had the oral concurrence with the general proposition that our new Army must have a complete new concept in this regard so that we will be oblidged to eliminate the "Rslooks" and the undesirable man.

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Speech by Major General Gilbert: Cont'd

One thought that is now under consideration, I believe, involves this: That we would accept a man on a tentative basis for six months. If he made good within six months and he was the kind of man you wanted to retain in your outfit, at the end of six months he would autometically be jumped to a much higher base pay and be retained. If he did not meet your specifications, he would be ousted. That is one of the things actually under consideration now, I belive. But your overall story for the immediate future, no plan has yet been handed down which will permit this highly selected process at this moment. The reason for it, of course, was that none of the major forces were ready for it, and secondly, that the need for men, any kind of men, was so great for the immediate future that they did not want to subscribe it. In other words, this whole program evolves on these two phases. Get a big Army now for this immediate period of the future to meet our immediate needs and seed it out, and cull it out, and boil it down to what we hope it will be hereafter as the opportunity permits.

* * * * * *

Speech by General Upston: Conference Plans.

And so, what some of the training which we have given to the millions of people in the Air Forces now, who are carrying the load and have been carrying it so successfully during the war period. We must try to keep those peoplewith us so that we may avail ourselves of their skills on which we have spent millions of dollars and a great deal of effort to procure. We have no hold on these people. They came into the Army because they were required to join the Army at least for the emergency. That emergency, at least so far as they are concerned, is now over. They are free agents, or soon will be. Those who are free now are clamoring to get out because of the general trend--the war being over, let's get back to our normal pursuits. So what we must do is to sell those people the idea and the fact, and it is a fact, that they have a career open to them in the Air force which is as good or perhaps better than the career which they may hope to find in civil life. If they, in their judgment determine it is not true, that they can do better in civil life, we can do nothing about it, but if we fail to bring to their attention the advantages which are now offered them under the more recent laws pertaining to enlistments, and we do not bring to their attention what they are leaving to take on something unknown, then we have failed in our mission. As General Gilbert pointed out, this is a sales campaign. It requires salesmanship. We have something to sell which has merit. There are strong and convincing, logical, reasonable sales arguments.

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Speech by Colonel T. H. Belshe, Chief, Enl Br- "Our Enlisted Personnel Status"

* * * * * *

The green line represents our present assigned strength. Starting at September it was 1,700,000. It drops down very fast because of General Born's good efforts in putting the pressure on separations. In March it comes below 400,000. It gradually drops below the authorized strength and here you can see what is going to happen to us. These are world-wide figures, not continental and foreign separate. You can very easily visualize how short of personnel you are going to be at this point. Just how the personnel will be distributed here, overseas and continental, will depend a great deal upon what we have qualified for overseas assignments. If we have them qualified for overseas assignment then the cintinental establishments will take all the lag because the occupation forces will be maintained as near authorized strength as possible. After June 1946 the authorized strength under the joint Chief of Staff plan levels off for the rest of the year and stays about level for the remainder of 1946. In June the assigned strength catches up with the authorized and goes just a little above but drops down again if we start separating on two years' service. All of these figures are based on present plans. War Department directives and policies on the separation of personnel might change this line here, by slowing down separations. We have nothing to indicate that it will change, but of they should slow down separations that does not help you a great deal because we end up in the same position as in June 1946. All you have is a group of dissatisfied people who want to get out and will get out anyway in another few months. The short red line represents the present number of Regular Army personnel, the number that we have enlisted in the Air Forces through 31 October. It has not been charted for the first two weeks of November. This line would come up sharply to 60,000 if we include enlistments for the first two weeks in November. This blue line represents an estimated enlistment rate of 20,000 per month in the Air Forces. If we enlisted 20,000 per month this is the rate at which our Regular Army enlisted strength would climb compared to troop basis and we would still be short all the way across through the entire year of 1946 unless we can enlist more than 20,000 a month through June. We are going to have a very serious personnel situation unless we can bring this red line up faster to meet our authorized strength. We know we can bring it up faster if we really ger down to work on the recruiting.

* * * * * *

A: (General Upston). We are telling the soldier, and this is clear--if he is now in the military service and enlists within twenty days from the date of his separation, he will enlist in the grade which he now has and he is also told about what pay he will get, his retirement privileges, his allotment privileges, his insurance privileges. All the things that we can promise him are in Circular 310.

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Speech by Colonel T. W. Belshe, Chief, Enl Br- "Our Enlisted Personnel Status" Cont'd

* * * * * *

Q: (General Born). It will help recruiting a great deal if we could recruit personnel for definite tactical unit. Then you can assure the man of a vacancy within that outfit. Most men want to belong to an outfit. They dont want to be thrown in a pool. If you can authorize a bunch of good units, units with a good history behind them, it will be a help.

* * * * * *

A: (General Upston). They will continue to do that and we can't hope to hold a man if the other fellow offers him more than we can. We should find out where we are deficient and what must we do to be able to compete in the labor market for these people becsuse that is what we are doing. We are hiring people. We are not selling them in the Army on a patriotic motive because the war is over. The question they ask is "What is in it for me?" And if we cannot show him a more attractive offer we are not going to get him.

* * * * * *

Colonel Belshe: It may never be necessary to reduce non-coms at all as we need some 16,000 Master Sergeants in the present troop basis and until we get 16,000 Master Sergeants, we will run over on Master Sergeants. When you fill'up on one SSN and we have more men in the high grades than their grades are justified by their SSN, then we can retrain them and do something with them. This plan would stop that as we would not be enlisting them in the high grade. We would enlist only the SSN that we need.

Q: Right now in the First Air Force, we are over in every grade from Corporal. We have a lot of 747's who are working in the grade of Pfc and when February 1 comes around, he will have worked in his job for eighteen months. You plan to enlist sombidy who has worked in a job eighteen months, say two years ago, and you will give him the grade of a Staff Sergeant. What are you going to do on the morning of February 2 when you start reenlisting these people and you have thousands of people already in the army?

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Colonel Watson

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Another poor choice of judgment was in assignment of personnel who had enlisted for stations of their choice.
It concerned two types of personnel. One instance was that they enlisted for Air Corps stations and for service in the Air Corps Regular Army but upon assignment, they were sent to an Army Service Force station. There are in the mail today, five such cases at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Another error in judgment was in the assignment of Negro troops. There had been many cases where Negro troops had been assigned to stations of their choice even though those stations are not equipped for colored troops. I mention slightly the fact that an enlistment was refused. I have been asked to attempt to clarify that point in that there is no way, if the man is otherwise eligible for enlistment, that we can refuse to enlist him. There was another case we felt where there was a missuse of influence. In a chart compiled by CAF, they had taken a case of an officer who held a pilot rating and in figuring his benefits, they continued to figure the pay he would have gotten because he had a pilot rating. That is not true - that the man could continue to hold his pilot rating in his enlisted status. Colonel Stalder who was at the head of this trip, tried his best to fire up the personnel we talked to. We thought they lacked a tremendous amount of fire and pressure. One thing was brought up this morning - to see a little quality injected into the Regular Army. Our standards have probably dropped slightly and I would like to see it brought up to the point where the men will be proud to belong to it.

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AAF RECRUITING BULLETIN
Hq AAF Washington,D.C.

NUMBER 7 13 May 1946

THE AAF WANTS QUALITY

The Army Air Forces are overstrength in personnel who are not mentally qualified for technical training and are far understrength in technicians or potential technicians. Recent reports indicate that many recruiting offices are not properly applying the P-1 Test prior to enlistment of civilians or are not requiring a minimum AGCT of 70 for reenlistment. These criteria must be applied to all applicants. The Army Air Forces wishes to exclude as many undesirable and unqualified men as possible. The exclusion of these men is a direct responsibility of all AAF commands.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Report of inspection by Major General Jones
1	Mil Pers A-1 11 Jun 46		Extracted below are major items noted in Tactical Air Command activities during an inspection made by Major General Julius Jones, The Air Inspector, AAF: March Field Base unit greatly overstrength in both officers and EM, due primarily to influx of RA enlistees who have chosen this installation for initial assignment. 25 M/Sgt's authorized; 304 assigned -- example of excess of high non-commissioned grades. Approximately 250 B-29 specialist EM assigned to base unit. Action was taken by A-1 to effect transfer of such personnel to 58th Bomb Wing before the wing moved to Ft. Worth. How did this come out? Personnel accounting system in base unit SNAFU. Record of on-the-job training not thorough. Ready information as to MOS utilization of personnel is not available. M. G. F. INSP

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND) 283
(Langley Field, Virginia)

AIE

HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

TAMPA FLORIDA 28 March 1946

COMMANDING GENERAL
ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25 D C DEFERRED X

AIE 2333 PD WITH REFERENCE TO LTR YR HQ AF ACC SUBJ OPERATIONAL GPS PERTAINING TO MANNING OF 362ND FTR GP AND 471ST AIR SERVICE GP PD MANNING REQUIREMENT FOR THE ABOVE UNITS IS 1013 EM PD THE TOTAL TRANSFERABLE NON RA ASSIGNED THIS AF IS 369 NOT INCLUDING MACDILL FLD AND RAPID CITY AAF PD REASGMT OF ALL QUAL PERS TO THESE ORGNS WOULD BRING THE STRENGTH TO ONLY 35% OF THE REQUIRED NO PD PERS ORDERED INTO THE ABOVE UNITS SINCE 28 FEB 46 BRINGS THE TOTAL ASGND TO 19% STRENGTH PD REMAINING 10% WHO QUAL FOR TRF ARE PRESENTLY ASGND IN VITAL WORK INVOLVING INACTIVATION AND OTHER PHASES ESSENTIAL TO THE BASE TO WHICH ASGND OR POSSESS SSNS OR UNUSABLE TO SUBJ GPS PD IN ORDER TO MAN THESE ORGNS IT WILL BE NEC EITHER TO RECEIVE PERS FROM AN OUTSIDE SOURCE OR THAT YR HQ DIRECT THE TRF OF RA EM WHO HAVE CHOSEN FOR THEIR INITIAL STA ASGMT ORGNS OTHER THAN THE FTR AND AIR SERVICE GPS PD IF AUTH IS GRANTED TO THE TRF RA PERS AND ALL POSSIBLE TRFS ARE EFFECTED THE ABOVE ORGNS CAN BE MANNED TO 69% TOTAL STRENGTH PD SUCH ACTION WOULD DENUDE OF PERS AND WORK EXTREME HARDSHIPS ON SOME ACTIVITIES THIS AF PD SPECIAL AUTH MUST BE GRANTED TO EFFECT SUCH TRFS IN VIEW OF LTR HQ CAF FILE 220 POINT 3 PAREN 18 FEB 46 SUBJ REASGMT OF 3 YEAR ENLISTEES

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A1E 2333 PD (CONTINUED) 28 March 1946

IN RA PD IF THE DECISION AT YR HQ IS THAT PERS BE ASGND INTO THIS AF FOR REASGMT TO THESE GPS A COMPLETE SHORTAGE RPT WILL BE FURNISHED UPON REQUEST

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE
Biggs Field, Texas

AIA 200.3 28 March 1946

SUBJECT: Personnel Requirements of 502d Tactical Control Group.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, National Guard Armory, Tampa Florida.

1. It is requested that immediate consideration be given to making available to this Command sufficient personnel, as specified in Inclosures 1 and 2, to permit assignment of such personnel to the 502d Tactical Control Group. The figures in Inclosures 1 and 2 represent approximately twenty-five percent (25%) of the authorized strength of this Group, and is considered the absolute minimum required to establish a training cadre to conduct On-The-Job-Training for the remainder of the Group personnel as they are assigned. On-The-Job-Training cannot be successfully conducted by the group at this time.

2. The shortage of personnel in this group has reached such a critical situation that it is extremely difficult to conduct the barest administrative functions.

3. Of a total authorized strength of fourteen hundred and twenty-five (1425) enlisted men there are presently assigned fourteen (14), eight (8) of whom are eligible for discharge within the next three (3) weeks.

4. Of a total authorization of one hundred fifty-one (151) officers, there are presently assigned eighty-eight (88), of which there are thirty (30) whose services can be properly utilized in Tactical Control work. The remaining fifty-eight (58) are excess pilots from flying organizations, whose value (actual or potential) to this group, is questionable, as only four (4) rated officers are authorized.

5. It is felt that the assignment of this requested personnel is absolutely essential to the reasonably efficient performance of this group's mission, and to provide the minimum required technical personnel to conduct successful On-The-Job-Training for untrained or semi-trained personnel when available to complete the manning of the group.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Stamped KEITH A. [illegible]
Lt. Col. AC
Actg Asst Adj Gen

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A1 HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida

TAC 322 (19 Apr 46) 19 April 1946

SUBJECT: Manning 362nd Fighter Group and 471st Air Service Group.

TO: See distribution below.

1. The 362d Fighter Group and the 471st Air Service Group currently assigned Biggs Field, Texas, will be manned immediately to full strength.

2. These organizations are committed for the post-war air force and will be among the first groups so manned within the AAF.

3. To accomplish this manning, it may be necessary to transfer a considerable number of Regular Army enlisted men. Since the present policy on Regular Army 3-year enlistees is to allow them to remain at stations of their choice where practicable, it is directed that you canvass your command for Regular Army enlisted men who will volunteer for these highly desirable assignments. It should be emphasized to those Regular Army enlisted men in SSN's which are overages in your command that it would be to their advantage to select this assignment. A report of volunteers SSN will be submitted to this headquarters citing Project A1E1 not later than 10 May 1946. Negative reports are required where applicable. Opportunities offered in this letter also should be presented to all other personnel as an encouragement for reenlistments for these units.

4. The required SSN's are:

014	114	275	542	650	791	870
024	144	283	548	657	803	901
037	164	301	550	667	805	903
050	188	345	555	673	809	911
055	196	348	573	677	815	915
059	201	359	581	681	821	925
060	237	383	590	685	822	932
063	238	405	620	687	824	941
070	239	409	622	727	826	945
076	242	502	623	747	835	955

(Effective until 19 October 1946, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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Hq TAC, Tampa, Fla. 19 Apr 46, Subj: Manning 362nd Fighter Group and 471st Air Service Group. Cont'd.

081	256	505	631	750	850	956
095	264	522	647	766	861	965
097	274	528				

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ OTIS C. [illegible]
ROAG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

25 Oct 1946

TAC 686.2 (25 Oct 46) Jurisdiction

SUBJECT: Excess Installations

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
Attention: Chief of Staff

1. The inclosed correspondence indicates, as far as known by this headquarters, the current status of the following installations which are excess to the needs of the Tactical Air Command:

Atterbury Army Air Field, Indiana
Baer Field, Indiana
Chatham Army Air Field, Georgia
North Army Air Field, South Carolina
Santa Maria Army Air Field, California.

2. Recent curtailment in manpower allocations to this headquarters and current shortages in budgetary allotments to this headquarters render it essential that Tactical Air Command take effective action to unburden itself of unessential activities.

3. Performing custody of the installations listed in paragraph 1, above, constitutes the most significant outlay of personnel and money being utilized by Tactical Air Command in activities which do not relate directly to the command's primary functions and missions as set forth in paragraph 2a, Circular 138, WD, 14 May 1946.

4. In order that this command may make the best use of its authorized personnel, it is requested that the above installations be transferred to the headquarters having a need for their facilities.

s/ Warren R. Carter
t/ WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, U S Army
Deputy Commanding General

5 Incl
1. cy ltr (Atterbury) 27 Sep 46
2. cy ltr (Baer Fld) 24 Sep 46
3. cy ltr (Chatham) 19 Sep 46
4. Cy ltr (North) 26 Sep 46
w/1st ind dtd 16 Oct 46
5. cy ltr (Santa Maria) 30 Sep 46

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SUBJECT: Excess Installations [redacted]

AFIIN-2A/7 1st Ind 2 Dec 46

Hq, AAF, Washington, 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Va.

1. This headquarters is cognizant of the fact that the recent reduction in funds and personnel is handicapping the activities of your command. This situation is apparent throughout the Army Air Forces.

2. While Air Defense Command will eventually have a requirement for Baer Field, Indiana and Chatham Army Air Field, Georgia, it is not believed in the best interest of the Army Air Forces to overburden one command with installations for which there is no immediate need. As soon as the Air Reserve program at these installations is activated, your headquarters will be relieved of command jurisdiction of subject fields.

3. Although your headquarters does not have a requirement for Atterbury Army Air Field at the present time, this headquarters is committed to keep jurisdiction of this installation in order to service the Ground Forces activities at Camp Atterbury.

4. Santa Maria Army Air Field, California, having been declared surplus, effective 23 October 1946, may be transferred to appropriate District Engineer as soon as arrangement can be made between your headquarters and the District Engineer.

5. Although there is no requirement for North Army Air Field, South Carolina, at the present time, this installation is being retained for possible use during the interim period.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

s/ Leo J. Disler
t/ Leo J. Disler, Col, AC
Assistant Chief, Air Installations Div.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-4

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HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND LANGLEY FIELD VA

UNCLASSIFIED
10 September 1946

COMMANDING GENERAL
ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON DC

PRIORITY

ATTN: MAJOR GENERAL FRED L ANDERSON

TACCG 520 PD IN COMPLIANCE WITH LTR HQ AAF 21 AUG 1946 THIS HQ RECOMMENDS THE FOLLOWING COLON

ONE PD REDUCING FROM THREE AIR FORCES TO TWO CMA EACH AIR FORCE CONTAINING TROOP CARRIER ACTIVITIES PD

TWO PD REFRAIN FROM ACTIVATING THE THREE NINETY FIRST SERVICE GROUP WHICH IS PROVIDED TO SERVICE LIAISON SQUADRONS AND IS CONSIDERED BY THIS HQ TO BE UNNECESSARY AS ALL LIAISON SQUADRONS WILL BE SO LOCATED AS TO OBTAIN NECESSARY SERVICE FROM OTHER SERVICE GROUPS PD

THREE PD REFRAIN FROM ACTIVATING FOUR SEVENTY SECOND SERVICE GROUP WHICH IS ORGANIZED TO PROVIDE SERVICE FOR TOW TARGET SQUADRONS PD ALL TOW TARGET SQUADRONS WILL BE SO LOCATED PERMITTING SERVICE FROM OTHER SERVICE GROUPS PD FOUR PD THE INACTIVATION OF FIFTEENTH COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CMA COMMAND CMA WHICH IS CONSIDERED NONESSENTIAL IN THE EVENT WE ESTABLISH TWO AIR FORCES IN PLACE OF THREE PD

FIVE PD REFRAIN FROM ACTIVATING THE FIFTY SECOND AND FIFTIETH TROOP CARRIER WING HQS AS THEY ARE NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDERED ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY PD

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Hq TAC Langley Fld, Va TWX 10 Sept 46 Cont'd.

WE FURTHER PROPOSE THE INACTIVATION OF THE FOLLOWING BASES COLON

LAKE CHARLES	SEDALIA
BERGSTROM	SMYRNA
DOVER	MYRTLE BEACH

ACTIVITIES NOW AT BERGSTROM WILL BE MOVED TO LAWSON CMA ACTIVITIES AT LAKE CHARLES WILL BE MOVED TO BIGGS FIELD CMA ACTIVITIES AT BIGGS FLD WILL MOVE TO SHAW FIELD AND GREENVILLE PD THIS PLAN PROVIDES TURNING BROOKS FLD OVER TO ADC AND MOVING ACTIVITIES THREE TO LANGLEY FIELD ASSUMING THAT ACS WILL MOVE FROM LANGLEY FLD AT ONCE PD THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES FOR MAXIMUM ECONOMY WITH GREATEST EFFICIENCY AND FALLS WITHIN LIMITS OF RECENT CUT PD

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC Ltr 37-1

18 September 1946

SUBJECT: Reduction in Personnel Authorizations.

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force.
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force.
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force.
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters.

1. The War Department has directed that the recent pay increase granted civilian employees by Public Law 390 be absorbed within the funds previously appropriated to the A.A.F for payment of civilians. In order to comply with this directive and other economy measures it is necessary that the present number of civilian employees of this command be reduced about 40% by 31 December 1946, and limited to that number for the remaining months of the fiscal year 1947. This reduction plus an approximate 27.5% reduction of current military bulk allotment authorization will demand the highest type leadership and concerted action must be initiated by all commanders to project plans for reorganizations of divisions and sections of each headquarters and base segments to accomplish their mission.

2. It is imperative that in planning for and carrying on operations with such reduced force, emphasis must be placed on combining related functions as much as possible and the eliminating of all duplications. The following principles will be adhered to:

a. Only absolutely essential work will be performed and only the number of personnel actually required for the normal work load will be retained.

b. Sound organizational patterns will be developed. Consideration must be given definitely to combining duties and the utilization of the most competently qualified personnel in clerical pools and an elimination of duplicate work in any two sections. A survey on skills of all personnel should be made to assure where practicable the retention of only those personnel who have more than one skill. A clerical employee qualified as a Clerk-Stenographer is much more valuable for full time utilization in a steno-typist pool than an employee who is only a typist. A truck driver qualified to do second echelon maintenance is a more essential employee for full utilization. A typist in stock records section may be able to accomplish typing and stock record posting.

(Effective until 18 June 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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c. Duties and responsibilities of all personnel will be clearly defined and assigned; expected standards of performance will be established and personnel will be informed of them.

d. All personnel will be trained in their duties to increase their efficiency. Supervisory personnel at all levels will be trained in the principles of management, especially in techniques of effecting personnel economies through use of work simplification and control devices, and will be held responsible for utilizing their training.

e. The work of all employees will be kept under continued review; inefficient new employees will be reassigned or separated prior to the end of their trial periods in accordance with CFRs 55 and 60. The provisions of CPP 12 will be used where appropriate.

f. Reductions in force will be conducted efficiently and justly, in accordance with War Department and US Civil Service Commission regulations and directives. In these reductions it is essential that only efficient employees be retained (AAF Letter 40-18).

3. Personnel Management Committees must be utilized to the fullest extent in making these reductions. The committee members are required to assure themselves that every person, both military and civilian, is being utilized fully in his highest skill. T&C Letter 200.3, dated 26 July 1946, Subject: "Personnel Management," will be used as a guide by the committee members and supervisory personnel in determining that personnel are being utilized fully and for effecting further economies in personnel.

4. The Efficiency Rating of civilian employees prescribed in CFRs 95 and 96 is the periodic evaluation of the employees performance of his assigned duties and responsibilities. These Efficiency Ratings also reveal inefficient employees. As the next official Efficiency Rating is scheduled for all ungraded employees for the six month period ending 30 September 1946, rating and reviewing officials will be fully trained in their duties prior to this rating period. This training will be based upon CRP 96 and CPP 24. The ratings must be administered objectively and fairly so that they will gain the confidence of management and of employees. In justice to the service and to those individuals who are performing their work efficiently, those employees revealed by the ratings to be inefficient and unsatisfactory will be separated.

5. It is directed that all commanders give their personal attention to this critical situation and initiate, without delay, action indicated in this letter. It is desired to re-emphasize the fact that it is the prerogative of all commanders to reorganize their commands in any manner to

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eliminate duplications and enable them to most efficiently and economically accomplish their missions, and that full use should be made of this prerogative in this period of drastically reduced budgets. The keynote should be the elimination of all duplications and non-essential work.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
A-1, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DIVISION

In July the consolidation and analysis of the Semi-Annual Report on Civilian Personnel Office Manpower Utilization revealed significant information on costs of civilian personnel administration in the command. At that time there were 20 TAC bases maintaining a Civilain Personnel Office. These 20 offices rendered personnel services at an additional 15 bases too small to warrant a separate office. Total salaries of the 277 persons engaged in civilian personnel administration was at an annual rate of $645,861, making an average cost per employee serviced of $61.10 for the 10,570 civilians on the rolls. This cost ratio varied from $44.82 at a large station to $88.86 at one of the smaller bases. Payroll administration alone required 84 persons at salaries totaling $182,291, for a cost ratio of $17.25 per employee paid. Acconsolidated report was submitted to Hq, AAF in compliance with AAF Letter 40-86.

This office considers the cost ratio for civilian personnel administration as an important factor in determining the general acceptability of each station's program. The Federal Employees Pay Act of 1946 making an average increase of 14% for all graded civilian employees, has necessitated an increase in the acceptable cost ratio figure. For stations servicing less than 300 employees a cost ratio of $75 is considered acceptable, for the larger stations the goal is $60 - $70. A cost ratio of $15 for pay roll administration alone is desired at all stations.

The chief problem regarding attainment of satisfactory standards of economy in civilian personnel administration is that the work load of the

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(cont'd)
office does not decrease in proportion to the decrease in civilian strength of the station. Some phases of the program require almost as much time for administration for a small group of employees as for a larger group. In addition, under present reduction in force, procedure employees being dropped are allowed to exhaust annual leave on a pay period basis prior to an RIF furlough; this results in many cases i in carrying them on the rolls several months after their last day of active duty.

Cost figures for the period July - December 1946, will not be available until 20 January 1947. They will be analyzed carefully upon receipt and used as a guide for attainment of maximum economy consistent with maintenance of a satisfactory program.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
STAFF CONFERENCE NOTES

VOLUME I NUMBER 62 14 October 1946

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL'S REPORT:

The CAP show at Richmond, Virginia, on Sunday, 13 October 1946, went off very nicely. Our demonstration unit was functioning efficiently and they put on a very good performance.

A-1 REPORT:

1. The freeze on personnel at Smyrna AAFld has been removed.

2. Each of the base units assigned directly to this headquarters has been authorized a Squadron "X" to which will be attached in an attached unassigned status the personnel being separated. This will eliminate the possibility of personnel on terminal leave being included in our strength reports. The air forces have been directed to authorize Squadron "X's" for base units under their command actually separating personnel.

3. This command has been directed by Headquarters AAF to reduce its officer strength approximately 50% by the 15th of November 1946. This will put us well below our authorized strength, but the move was necessitated by the cut in appropriations.

A-3 REPORT:

1. Neither the 161st nor the 162d Reconnaissance Squadron will participate in the West Coast maneuver. A minimum number of F-6's from the 161st Reconnaissance Squadron will be dispatched to the West Coast for inclusion in the maneuver. The participation of the squadron as a whole has been deleted due to the impending move to Langley Field. Deletion of the 162d Reconnaissance Squadron was due to the fact they are unable to take photographs with their present aircraft.

2. Authority has been granted by Headquarters AAF for the retention of the 502d Tactical Reconnaissance Group at Biggs Field until completion of the West Coast maneuver. Third and Ninth Air Forces have been notified of this decision.

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R E S T R I C T E D

FLYING SAFETY REPORT:

Two accidents involving aircraft of this command were reported over the weekend; one involving a P-80 and the other an AT-6. This brings our total to 3 accidents for the month.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAMS:

OTIS C. TURNER
WOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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*Reg 35-41
-1-3

TAC REGULATIONS)
NO 35-41)

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia, 2 October 1946

PERSONNEL, MILITARY

Permanent Change of Station

*(This regulation supersedes TAC Regulation 35-41 (published as Third Air Force Regulation 35-41), dated 16 November 1945.)

	Paragraph
Purpose	1
Authority	2
Exceptions	3
References	4

1. PURPOSE. To announce the delegation of authority to effect permanent change of station.

2. AUTHORITY. a. Pursuant to the provisions of AAF Regulation 35-59, authority is delegated commanding generals of numbered air forces assigned to TAC to issue orders requiring permanent change of station of officer and enlisted personnel under their jurisdiction, and to units and stations under their control wherever located.

b. The authority granted in paragraph 2a above may not be redelegated.

c. Elements assigned to the numbered air forces may actually publish such orders on behalf of the air force after being directed by the respective air force headquarters to effect specific transfer of personnel.

d. Commanders of other elements assigned directly to this headquarters may not issue orders requiring permanent change of station of personnel under their control except as directed by this headquarters.

3. EXCEPTIONS. a. Delegation of authority to issue orders requiring permanent change of station does not apply to officers of the categories listed in paragraph 8g, AR 605-110, or those listed in TAC Letter 30-5.

b. The assignment and reassignment of ASW AAF officers will be accomplished by Headquarters AAF. Requests for assignment or reassignment of such officers will be forwarded through this headquarters. Officers affected are those officers whose basic branch is one of the following: Corps of Engineers, Ordnance, Chemical Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Transportation Corps, Signal Corps, Medical Corps, Chaplain Corps, Judge Advocate General's Department, Finance Department, Adjutant General's Department, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, Infantry, Cavalry, Corps of Military Police. The above also applies to any officer whose basic branch or service is one of those cited but who is detailed to duty in the Air Corps under the provisions of

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*Reg 35-41
3-4

AAF Regulations 35-57 and AR 605-145. A detailed search will be made of each officer's records before any transfer is effected to determine that his basic branch of service is not one of those cited above. Reassignment of officers whose basic branch is one of those cited will be on orders issued by Headquarters AAF only.

c. Commanders concerned will request authority from this headquarters prior to issuing orders not specifically provided for in this regulation or in current directives of higher headquarters.

4. REFERENCES. AR'S 35-4810, 35-4820, 35-4850, 35-4880, 35-4890, 310-50, 605-145, 615-200, 600-115.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

GLENN O. BARCUS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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AIF

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC Ltr 35-13

11 October 1946

SUBJECT: Delegation of Reclassification Jurisdiction

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force

1. Under the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, AAF Letter 35-40, the following commanders are delegated reclassification jurisdiction, effective as of the date of this letter:

Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force

2. Reclassification cases will be processed expeditiously in accordance with attachment to AIF Letter 35-40.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

(Effective until 11 July 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND AIN

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:

TAC 230 (16 Jul 46) 16 July 1946

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration

TO: Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field
Riverside, California

1. After careful deliberation, because of the lack of competently qualified staff personnel and in the interest of economy and uniformity, this headquarters has decided to assume complete responsibility for the administration of the civilian personnel program in this Command. Tactical Air Command Regulation 10-1 has been revised to include direct communication with this headquarters by all bases, this Command, on all routine matters pertaining to civilian personnel administration except personnel allotment which will continue to be handled by your headquarters. It will be noted that an option has been placed in the revised Regulation to the effect that a copy of all civilian personnel matters may be forwarded to your headquarters if you so desire. It is directed that you take immediate action to eliminate the Civilian Personnel Division in your headquarters, with the exception of one qualified Civilian Personnel Officer to act in a liaison capacity.

2. This headquarters will continue to furnish copies of important changes in policy and administration of civilian personnel so that your headquarters will be currently informed on the civilian personnel program.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/s/ PAUL B. CERF
Stamped PAUL B. CERF
Capt., AGD
Asst. Adjutant General

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BASIC: Ltr, TAC, Langley Field, Va, dtd 16 Jul 46, Subj: "Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration"

230 1st Ind 12AF-E-1

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE, March Field, California 25 July 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. Activities under the jurisdiction of this command have been advised of provisions of basic letter and directed to address all routine correspondence pertaining to civilian personnel administration, except personnel allotments, direct to Commanding General, Tactical Air Command. Information copies of all such correspondence will be forwarded to this headquarters marked for the attention of the Civilian Personnel Liaison Officer.

2. In order that this headquarters may be kept currently and completely informed on civilian personnel matters, it is requested that an information copy of all correspondence from your headquarters to civilian personnel activities under our jurisdiction be forwarded to this headquarters marked for the attention of the Civilian Personnel Liaison Officer.

3. Pending a decision from your headquarters relative to responsibility for personnel administration, this headquarters did not staff a civilian personnel division and it will not be necessary, therefore, to dissolve such a unit. In this connection no officer qualified to serve as a Civilian Personnel Liaison Officer has yet been found but it is hoped that one soon will be.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ W. R. PURPUS
Stamped W. E. PURPUS
Major, A. G. D.

C O P Y

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[illegible] TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General

TAC 230 (3 May 46)

Tampa Florida

3 May 1946

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Civilian Administration

TO: Commanding General
Third Air Force
Greenville Army Air Base
Greenville, S. C.

1. Due to the recent reorganization of the Army Air Forces and the assumption of responsibility for the overall civilian personnel program by this Command as outlined in AAF Regulation 40-12, dated 14 August 1945, and Letter Headquarters Army Air Forces, subject: "Command Responsibility for Examination and Audit of Field Civilian Personnel Administration", dated 18 April 1946, copy attached, it is the opinion of this headquarters that in order to bring about greater uniformity in the administration of civilian personnel, all matters pertaining to subject administration other than civilian personnel ceiling should be handled direct with the station. This action is deemed necessary because of the shortage of qualified staff civilian personnel officers and qualified civilian personnel technicians to staff civilian personnel divisions at the command level.

2. In accordance with provisions of AAF Regulation 40-12, dated 14 August 1945, this headquarters will maintain a complete staff of technicians for the purpose of making official semi-annual surveys of civilian personnel administration and to render technical assistance to all station in the Command upon request.

3. Your comment on the above proposed policy will be furnished this headquarters at the earliest practicable date.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL [illegible]:

[illegible], Jr.
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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Basic Ltr: Tactical Air Command, Tampa Florida, 3 May 1946, Files TAC 230 (3 May 46) to CG, Third Air Force, Greenville, S. C.

AF3AP230 (6 May 46) 1st Ind. AF3AFAP

HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE (Troop Carrier), Greenville, South Carolina, 8 May 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida.

1. In compliance with Paragraph 3 of basic communication concerning the responsibility of civilian personnel administration, it is recommended that this headquarters retain complete jurisdiction over adminstration of all civilain personnel alloted to this command as outlined in Paragraph 6, AAF Regulation 40-12 with the exception of payroll audit functions, conduction of formal inspections and that the staff of civilian personnel technicians presently employed at this headquarters be retained. There are available in this command qualified civilian personnel technicians, both eligible for separation.

2. It is further recommended that representative of the Civilian Personnel Division of this headquarters make periidic routine inspections of all installations under the jurisdiction of this headquarters. Although formal inspection reports would not be submitted to higher headquarters, it is believed that the importance of these routine examinations should not be minimized as they would assume this headquarters that delegated responsibility is being adequately executed. It is also recommended that this headquarters be advised in advance of each informal inspection conducted by your headquarters and that a representative of the Covilian Personnel Division, this headquarters be present during each inspection to assist in the work and to obtain a detailed picture of the condition of operations at the installation being examined and that copies of formal inspections and audit reports with recommended corrective action be furnished this headquarters.

3. These recommendations are made with a view toward preserving the administrative integrity of this command. If this headquarters is relieved of the jurisdiction of personnel administration, it would be an added effort on the part of the stations to always keep this command informed of all reports, policies and changes of their status with respect to civilians, retaining jurisdiction in this headquarters would be in accord with the normal channels of all other phases of administration.

4. Lastly, it is requested that some overall policy be announced as follows:

a. Whereas any regulation, letter, circular, etc that requires

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Basic Ltr: Tactical Air Command, Tampa Florida, 3 May 1946, File: TAC 230 (3 May 46) to CG, Third Air Force, Greenville, S.C.

AF3AF 230 (3 May 46) 1st Ind (Cont'd) AF3AFAP

no report from the individual bases, the channel be directed from your command to bases with this headquarters being always furnished an information copy.

b. That any directive requiring a report to be made by individual bases always be submitted through this headquarters except when specifically designated as an emergency on-time report.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

WILLIAM M. CROSS
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

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C O P Y

/HEADQUARTERS, THIRD AIR FORCE (TC)/

A-1

AF3AF 220.3 (6 Sep 46) /September 6, 1946/

SUBJECT: Transfer of Enlisted Personnel by Headquarters, TAC

TO: Commanding General, TAC, Langley Field, Virginia

1. Desire to bring to your attention again the fact that your headquarters is still directing transfers of personnel from bases, under this Air Force, withour contacting this headquarters. Such procedure is causing confusion and delays at this headquarters, and at the units in the field.

2. The latest situation occured when Headquarters TAC sent a TWX, direct to Bergstrom Field, directing a report be submitted to that headquarters regerding EM with SSN 528 for transfer to Chanute Field. Bergstrom Field compiled as directed; submitting the name of one (1) EM. A TWX was then received by this headquarters, referring to Bergstrom's report, and directed that subject enlisted man be transferred. This was the first indication that this headquarters had that such a transfer was contemplated. This headquarters directed Bergstrom Field to accomplish the transfer and provide us with a complete report covering this situation.

3. Near the end of the month of July, a similar situation arose in that TAC directed Pope Field to transfer three (3) colored EM SSN 060, to Geiger Field, Washington, for shipment overseas. At the same time, this headquarters received a quota for the same shipment. This quota included EM with SSN 060, and Pope Field was directed to supply their share of this SSN. They reported that they were being required to furnish such personnel in accordance with TWX direct from TAC and wondered whether our quota was in addition there to or covered the same personnel. Accordingly, this headquarters had to recontract TAC in order to get the true picture. In view of the fact that a deadline for reporting to Geiger Field had to be met, the delay in ordering out this personnel resulted in a reduction in the number of days which could be granted the enlisted menas prior-overseas-shipment furlough.

4. A similar situation occured about the middle of June when personnel was ordered transferred from Sedalia AAFld by TWX direct from TAC. Clarification had to be obtained, at that

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time by this headquarters and, within our TWX, we requested that TAC discontinue the practice of directing transfers without first contacting this headquarters. TAC's reply, at that time, read in part as follows: "Messages are not transmitted direct to stations under your jurisdiction except under most unusual and urgent con-titions." Considering the confusion and that arises and the resultant delay, it appears that the time TAC expects to gain is more than lost. In the case of the most recent situations, referred to in Paragraph 2, the TWX, requesting the report, was sent from TAC on 19 August 1946 and the report was not required until August, a period of seven (7) days. This would have been more than sufficient time to work through this headquarters.

5. It is requested that consideration be given by your headquarters to discontinue the practive as outlined above, The number of transfers which are taking place at the present time, and those proposed in the future information is out of date almost immediately after preparation. It is highly possible that personnel directed transferred by your headquarters may have previously been transferred by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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12 November 1946

SUBJECT: Headquarters Officers Classification Index File (AAF-SC-F7A)

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia
Attn: Chief, Statistical Control Section

1. The inclosed audit sheet reflects in detail the completeness of information in the subject file as of 31 September 1946.

2. A comparison of strength totals and grade totals of the 127 report and the subject file beginning with April 1946 is shown.

April

	Gen	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2nd Lt	CWO	WO	FLO	Other	Total
127	7	156	387	828	1944	3030	1268	142	118	196	14	8090
901	8 x1	158 x2	386 x 1	844 x 16	2012 x 68	3123 x 93	1265 -3	144 -2	122 x4	205 x9	1 -13	8270 x180

May

127	7	161	381	785	1818	2968	1293	129	144	90	22	7745
901	7	157 -4	389 - 2	787 x 2	1794 - 21	2927 - 41	1138 -155	128 - 1	117 -27	96 x6	0 -22	7480 -265

June

127	7	144	332	706	1695	2858	995	127	94	80	0	7008
901	7	146 x2	330 -2	701 -5	1693 -2	2853 -5	949 x4	113 -14	108 x11	80	0	6987 -11

July

127	8	132	289	619	1401	2042	749	108	93	18	0	5269
901	7 -1	134 x 2	295 + 4	606 -14	1401	2056 x 14	850 x1	105 - 3	96 x3	17 -1	0	5866 -3

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Ltr to TAC, Subject: Headquarters Officers Classification Index File (AAF-3C-P7A)

August

	Gen	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2nd Lt	CWO	JWO	PLO	Other	Total
127	7	117	269	870	1287	1860	394	101	80	9	0	4694
901	7	116 -1	268 -1	869 -1	1288 x1	1860	397 x 3	95 - 6	86 x6	8 -1	0	4694

September

127	8	104	246	841	1347	2019	371	99	75	8	0	4818
901	8	104	248	841	1347	2014 -5	374 x 3	95 -4	80 x5	7 -1	0	4816 -2

x is plus.

3. It is requested that this Headquarters be informed by indorsement of the reason for the continuing discrepancies between the 127 and the subject file in strength and grade and the remedial steps taken. This request is not intended as a gig, but as a means of revealing difficulties both to your Headquarters and to this Headquarters. Through the pooling of information problems common to all commands may be solved.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ O. E. Turner, Major, AC
for L. E. FLETCHER
Colonel, Air Corps
Acting Chief, Statistical Control
Div., Office of Air Comptroller

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Hq, AAF, Washington, DC, Subj:"Hq Off Class Index File (AAF-SC-P7A)", 12 Nov 46

TAC 210.01 (12 Nov 46) 1st Ind 22 Nov 46 SC

Hq, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C., Attn: Chief, Office of Statistical Control

1. It is regarded an impossibility to balance the SS-901 Headquarters Officer's Classification Index File, in all respects, to the tabulation indicated by 127 report as ong as reporting agencies continue to make errors in reporting. The errors made by field installations can be charged up to inexperienced personnel, a few to oversight, a few purely to incorrect mathematical addition and subtraction and the remainder to plain carelessness.

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6. The extremely high rate of turn-over of personnel during the last year has been a major cause of the difficulties encountered in maintaining accurate records on personnel of this command. It is hoped that the recent reduction of officers strength and the expected future stability of individuals as regards length of assignment at a given station will enable this Command to keep more accurate records in the future.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CLEVE O. BARCUS
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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C O P Y HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Assignment of Officers
1	AIS 12 Jun 1947	A-1 Attn: Col Martindale	1. As long as officers get married and have babies, I shall have exasperating personnel problems. 2. Do this for me: a. Send attached TWX No. 1 to AAF requesting that our TWX re sending Lt Col Thompson to Twelfth Air Force be disregarded. b. Send attached TWX No. 2 to the Twelfth Air Force telling the Twelfth Air Force that Col. Thompson will not be available, but some other Lt. Colonel will be available at March on or before 1 August as replacement for Col. Hiatt or Lt. Col. Kabrich. Lt. Col. Mercereau can serve as Col. Hiatt's replacement until 1 August. /s/ A. C. Welling /t/ A. C. WELLING Colonel, Corps of Engineers Air Installations Officer C O P Y

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Basic: Hq, Continental Air Forces, Washington 20, D.C. Eastern Fld Div, "Rpt of Demobilization Inspection of Hq IX Troop Carrier Command, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S.C.", dtd 29 March 1946

TAC 333 (29 Mar 46) Greenville 3d Ind IN

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, Tampa, Florida 22 April 1946

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
(ATTN: The Air Inspector)

* * * *

4. Reference paragraph 12, 1st Indorsement. Many Tactical Air Command stations have surplus of rated officers. For example, Smyrna Army Air Field, Tennessee, has 350 - 4 engine pilots. This headquarters does not need them. The rated personnel referred to above were reported to Army Air Forces, 11 March 1946, for transfer to the Strategic Air Command. The Tactical Air Command wishes to insure they are screened by a command who can utilize their services, rather than separate this personnel as surplus officers. Action is being taken to place rated officers in proper assignments, if possible. In the interim period, maximum utilization of the services of officer personnel has been emphasized throughout this Command.

* * * *

/t/ WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Deputy Commanding General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Air Inspector

Langley Field, Virginia
13 September 1946

SUBJECT: Case-Report, No. 2, Inspection of the 304th AAF Base Unit, 3-6 September 1946, Conditions affecting Morale of Squadron F.

TO: Commanding Officer
Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

I. IRREGULARITY OR DEFICIENCY.

1. During the Annual General Inspection of the 304th AAF Base Unit, Langley Field, Virginia, by Headquarters Tactical Air Command during the period 3-6 September 1946, the following conditions were found to exist which were affecting the morale and efficient operation of Squadron F.

a. Punishment under the 104th Article of War was not being administered by the squadron commander, but was delegated by him to the squadron adjutant in violation of instructions contained in AAF Letter 35-58, dated 18 April 1946.

b. Forty-four enlisted men were being detailed to serve as mess attendants in messes other than those assigned to Squadron F. (This includes 12 enlisted men assigned to service in the TAC mess hall.)

c. Personnel possessing an AGCTS of 100 or better (records showed 12) were not being utilized to perform duties higher than those assigned personnel possessing an MOS of 500. This is in violation of Circular 124, WD, 1946, on the proper "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy."

II. RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. The above conditions as enumerated are creating an "unhealthy" condition in this squadron, which in turn is being reflected in the loss of morale and operating efficiency. It is recommended:

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Consolidated, No. 2, Item of 304th AAF BU, 2-6 Sept 46, Conditions Affecting Morale of Squadron F, 12 Sept 46. (Cont'd)

a. That punishment under the 104th Article of War, now being administered by the squadron adjutant, be henceforth administered by the squadron commander.

b. That personnel now assigned to messes other than Squadron F, be relieved from that assignment.

c. That all Negro CO be screened and personnel possessing qualifications be placed in on-the-job training for assignment to a higher MOS in accordance with Circular 124, WD, 1946.

s/ ROBERT G. CAPTAGITA
s/ ROBERT G. CAPTAGITA
1st Col, TAC
Asst AIG Inspector

333 1st Ind F-KWH/efg

HEADQUARTERS, 304th AAF Base Unit, Langley Field, Va. 24 Sep 46

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Va.

1. In compliance with paragraph 5, AAF Regulation 100-11, dated 24 October 1944; the following report of corrective action taken is submitted:

a. Company punishment is now being administered by the squadron commander as prescribed by paragraph 104, WD, 1928.

b. Enlisted men currently performing KP duty in the NAC mess will be relieved; enlisted men assigned other messes will be relieved therefrom unless they volunteer, in writing, for permanent mess attendant duty as a definite career as set forth in paragraph 24, AAF Letter 40-2, dated 20 March 1946.

c. Every effort is being made to assign negro personnel within their MOS so far as is possible. However, the greater proportion of negroes working out of their MOS are those holding MOS which are not available to this station nor are there related positions in the same family group to which this personnel may be assigned. As of 2400, 18 September 1946, negro personnel comprised

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Consolidated No. 2, Incl of 304th AAF BU, 5-6 Sept 46, Conditions Affecting Morale of Squadron B, 13 Sept 46. (Contd)

36.3% of the enlisted strength of the 304th AAF Base Unit which is far in excess of the 1-10 ratio as set forth in paragraph 1, Cir 124, WD, 1946. In the opinion of the undersigned this creates a local problem in which the maximum latitude is authorized by par 10, Cir 124, WD, 1946. All Negro personnel who cannot be utilized at this station will be furnished your headquarters with a view to reassignment to a station where their skills can be used.

s/ Robert W. C. Strobl
s/ ROBERT W. C. STROBL
Colonel, AC
Commanding

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R & R frm A-1 to C/S 13 Mar 46

1 1. As of 28 Feb we had 9348 white personnel and 1258 colored personnel or about 12% of our total strength was colored.

2. On that date we had 3226 RA white EM and 210 Regular Army colored enlisted men or only a little over 6% of our strength.

3. We expect and no doubt will receive an increasing number of colored personnel.

T.E.P.

(After coordination with A-3)

2 To A-1 frm Plans 14 Mar 46

1. It is desired that you make a study of the possibility of utilizing colored personnel in our table of organization white units.

2. There is a school of thought that colored personnel could be effectively utilized in certain MOS's in many of our units. If this could be done, we could then show that colored personnel were being used in tactical units. This would probably avoid the necessity of forming additional colored tactical units.

3. Jobs to be set up for colored personnel could include those positions such as mess attendants, cooks, carpenters, vehicle drivers, messengers, personnel required for general police and utility duty, certain carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and so forth.

4. Your study should indicate approximately how many colored personnel could be absorbed in each type of unit together with proposed grade and MOS. It should also include any advantages and disadvantages to the adoption of such a system of utilizing colored personnel.

R. M. L.

---

3 to A-1 frm A-3

1. This study is being made on the basis of:

a. T/O strength in these particular MOSs of Fighter, Bomber, Service, and Tactical Reconnaissance Groups.

b. Assumption that negro personnel can go as high in grade as MOS is authorized.

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Utilization of Negro Personnel (Cont'd)

2. It is believed that the following problems would be created by assigning colored personnel in all listed MOSs with the white personnel:

a. Quarters and messing. Absolute refusal of some men to use communal toilet, sleeping and messing accomodations with colored personnel.

b. Rank among NCOs. The idea of white men being supervised by negro NCOs would cause great resentment.

c. Social activities. Organizational dances and mixed parties would be impossible with the mixed races.

d. Morale. Organizational morale would be completely destroyed by the preceding three factors. Maintenance of high morale in tactical organizations is imperative.

e. The recruiting of white personnel would greatly fall off. Re-enlistment of career soldiers would be greatly jeopardized with a mixed army.

3. Assuming that negro troops must be used in T/O organizations, it is recommended that the following MOS numbers be utilized exclusively by colored personnel:

060	Cook
345	Driver
590	Duty soldier
037	Meat cutter
196	Sanitary Technician

4. It is recommended that colored personnel assigned any additional MOSs as listed in Inclosure No. 1 will be in the capacity of an assistant and under supervision of white personnel.

1 Incl. G.B.G.

Conclusion: Colored personnel should be used in the base units performing housekeeping duties--not in T/O Units.

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Utilization of Negro Personnel (Cont'd)

4 to Plans Control frm A-1 22 Mar 46

1. Concur in pars 1 and 2 note 3

2. Do not concur in pars 3 and 4, note 3, in that it is not felt that the idea is at all practicable for the reasons advanced in par 2, note 3, and on general principles.

3. Concur in conclusion, note 3.

4. Some suggestions for thoughtful considerations are:

(a) Organize an Engineer Bn (Avn) for each Air Force. This unit can have its companies dispersed at Air Bases and maintain runways and fields. This may cause some work, now done by civilians and civilian contract, to be done by military personnel.

(b) Continue Squadron C, enlarged if necessary, to provide additional military personnel which could be used to maintain and service the Air Bases by performing a great deal of the duties now done by the Post Engineer with civilians such as, electrical, plumbing, carpentry, general utility, fire fighting, beautification, mosquito control, maintenance of roads, walks, grounds, etc.

(c) Organize a unit I've heard proposed, but know nothing of, called Mess Squadron which could operate all fixed messes on a base and possibly to include mess personnel for officers clubs and PX restaurants, etc.

(d) Adopt the policy of all drivers, messengers, a great deal of the guard personnel, and innumerable service jobs, performed by those personnel being placed in Squadron C's manning table.

5. These recommendations, it is believed, would adequately care for the percentage of colored personnel ever to be assigned to us and would release some white personnel which could be trained for higher skilled jobs and reduce the requirement of civilians actually on the payroll and direct cost to contract now performed by civilian contractors.

6. It is suggested that before any final decision is made and manning tables changed, responsible representatives of several bases be invited to this headquarters and their views obtained. After all they are the people who will have the problem of using them and their thoughts should be had.

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UTILIZATION OF NEGRO PERSONNEL

MOS	TITLE	GRADE
014	Auto Equipment Mechanic	Sgt-Cpl
050	Carpenter	Sgt-Cpl
060	Cook	Sgt-Cpl
144	Painter	Cpl-Pvt
345	Driver	Cpl
522	Guard Patrolmen	Pfc-Pvt
555	Ap Sheet Metal Wkr	S/Sgt-Sgt-Cpl
566	Duty NCO	Depends on duty-TOP GRADE S/Sgt
590	Duty Soldier	Pvt
826	AAF Supply Techn	S/Sgt
835	Supply Clerk	Sgt-Cpl
059	Construction Tech.	Depends on duty-Responsibility S/Sgt
550	Ap Woodworker	Sgt-Cpl
037	Meat Cutter	Cpl
024	Blacksmith	Sgt-Cpl
078	Electrician	Sgt-Cpl
114	Machinist	S/Sgt-Sgt
164	Plumber	Sgt-Cpl
188	Construction Wkr	Pvt
196	Sanitary Tech.	Cpl-Pfc
238	Tel Lineman	Sgt-Cpl
242	Toolroom Keeper	Cpl
256	Welder	S/Sgt-Sgt
261	Wire Tech	Depends on duty-TOP GRADE M/Sgt
348	Auto Parts Clerk	Sgt-Cpl
359	Const. Mach. Opr.	Cpl
383	Fire Fighter	Cpl-Pfc
505	Amm Supply Tech	Depends on duty-TOP GRADE-T/Sgt
511	Armorer	Cpl
581	Comm Supply Tech	Depends on duty-TOP GRADE-S/Sgt
657	Medical Corpsman	Cpl-Pfc
727	Water Supply Tech.	Sgt-Cpl
786	Toxic Gas Handler	Cpl-Pfc
809	Decontam. Opr.	Sgt-Cpl
815	Ordnance Supply Tech.	Depends on duty-TOP GRADE-T/Sgt
901	Munitions Worker	Cpl-Pfc
931	Heavy Auto Opr	Cpl

Incl #1

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CGA HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Tampa, Florida

TAC 333 (23 Apr 46) Misc 23 April 1946

SUBJECT: General Eisenhower's visits and inspections.

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force.
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force.
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases, Wings, Groups, Battalions, and Separate Units assigned directly to this headquarters.

1. The following letter from Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander, AAF is quoted:

"1. General Spaatz desires that information be communicated to you that General Eisenhower expressed very favorable comment on the work being done by surplus officers at several Air Force stations he visited. He pointed out that at these stations, large numbers of officers who had no airplanes to fly due to shortage of mechanics had on their coveralls and were being given thorough courses on airplane and engine maintenance and other subjects. He thought this was most forward-looking and his conversations with the officers taking these courses and doing this special work indicated that the officers themselves were enthusiastic about the idea.

"2. It is still the policy of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to relieve the burden on the Army Air Forces as much as possible by returning to civil life at the earliest practicable date officers surplus to our peacetime requirements. It is obviously to the best interest of these officers that they do return to civil life and take up their civil occupations as soon as possible. Until, however, they are released from military service, it is believed both the Air Force and the individual profit by these technical efficiency courses which can be conducted at stations."

2. It is directed that the contents of this letter be brought to the attention of all subordinate commanders.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/s/ WARREN R. CARTER
WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

(Effective until 23 October 1946, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General

ASF

Tampa Florida
26 Apr 1946

SUBJECT: Retention of Glider Pilots.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

1. It is requested that the provisions of paragraph 2 b (1), letter your headquarters dated 18 April 1946, subject: "Relief of volunteer officers and warrant officers from active duty", be amended to authorize the retention of forty-eight officer glider pilots for a period of six months under the following conditions:

a. Officers to be chosen by Commanding General, Third Air Force, Greenville Army Air Field, Greenville, South Carolina.

b. Individuals to be highly qualified officers in addition to being experienced glider pilots in Category I who have made application for commission in the regular army.

c. Officers to be highly qualified in accordance with existing regulations to enter pilot training.

d. Officers to be placed on sufficiently high priority for pilot training to insure their entering such training prior to the termination of the six months retention.

2. The seperation of all glider pilots at this time will seriously interfere with Third Air Force glider operations at a time when study and experimentation are underway which offer promising results. If this action is approved it will enable Third Air Force to continue the following projects:

a. Test of rigid tow bar devices which will permit glider operations under instrument flying conditions.

b. Test of the C-82 aircraft as a glider tug using glider tow installation in the booms and an experimental installation in the fuselage floor.

c. Test of deceleration devices including parachute and rockets.

d. Test of powered gliders to evaluate assisted take-offs, pick-up operations, and prolong time aloft.

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Subj: Retention of Glider Pilots.

e. Development and test of metal assault gliders XCG-18 and XCG-19.

f. The development of aircraft of sufficient power and suitable design to permit pick-up operations of gliders up to and including the CG-10 class.

g. Incorporation of radar and electronic equipment in gliders

h. Development of special flying equipment to permit glider operations in extreme cold weather.

i. The training of rated power pilots as glider pilots.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ ROBERT M. LEE
/t/ ROBERT M. LEE
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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Basic Ltr fr Hq TAC, Tampa Fla, Subj: Retention of Glider Pilots, dated 18 April 1946

AFPM-13 1st Ind 10 May 1946

Hq Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa Florida

1. The request to retain forty-eight (48) glider pilots until 30 November 1946 as an exception to paragraph 2b (1) of letter, this headquarters, Subject: Relief of Volunteer Officers and Warrant Officers from Active Duty, dated 18 April 1946, is approved provided that these officers meet all the requirements set forth on paragraph 1a, b, c and d of basic letter.

2. It is unstood that officers who are retained under the above quota meet all the requirements of paragraph 2, AAF Letter 50-161, for pilot training in grade. Therefor, any additional requests of glider pilots for waiver of the requirements of the above cited AAF letter in order to enter pilot training will be submitted individually to this headquarters and will bear no reference to the above quota approved for retention.

3. Subsequent instructions will be issued from this headquarters concerning the initiation of an intensive training program whereby a sufficient number of rated military pilot officers will be trained as glider pilots to fill both overseas and D/I requirements. As a result, all officers whose primary MOS is now glider pilot will be replaced by rated pilots officers who have graduated successfully from a course in glider training.

4. All overseas requisitions for glider pilots will be filled by military pilots who have been trained as glider pilots either prior to or during the above mentioned program.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ F. I. ANDERSON
Major General, USA
AC/AS-1

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General
(Al)
Tampa, Florida

TAC 210.456 (6May 46) 6 May 1946

SUBJECT: Relief of Volunteer Officers and Warrant Officers from Active Duty.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Assistant Chief of Air Staff-1, Readjustment Branch.

1. Reference is made to letter, your headquarters, subject as above, dated 18 April 1946, which allotted this command the quota of 897 non-regular army volunteer officers to be relieved from active duty.

2. This quota provided for release of field grade officers with efficiency indices less than 35, company grade officers less than 30 and all service pilots and glider pilots, which are hereafter termed "force-outs". After these "force-outs" are relieved, 639 in number (462 of whom are service and glider pilots and 177 have below minimum efficiency indices) the quota remaining applicable to officers with efficiency indices of 44 or less for field grades and 40 or less for company grades, hereafter referred to as "select-outs", is only 258, which, in the opinion of this headquarters, is entirely too few for the assigned officer strength of 7663 as indicated in Inclosure 1 and projected requirements of 4824 for this command as indicated in Inclosure 2.

3. Policies expressed by your headquarters, Inclosures 3 and 4, are being used in the separation of colores personnel. Results of the application of these policies will be observed on Inclosures 5 and 6. Quota now allotted is sufficient to reduce the colored strength to the desired figure of 510, indicated in Inclosure 3, by equal allocation of quotas regardless of race. After separation of the initial quota of 897 the remaining 611 colored officers 8% of the remaining officer total of 7663. For your information Colonel Davis, Commanding Officer of Lockbourne Army Air Field and the 477th Composite Group, feels that some colored non-rated personnel should be selected out. This headquarters concurs. As will be observed from Inclosure 6, no colored non-rated personnel were "selected-out". There are some

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non-rated colored officers who would undoubtedly be considered undesirable as long term retention yet have an efficiency index above 30.

4. Comparison of Inclosure 1 (present strength and strength after separation of current quota of 897) and Inclosure 2 (projected requirements) indicates an excess of 2839 officers over the projected requirements of this command after application of the present 897 separation quota. Inclosure 7 indicates 5166 officers still eligible for "selection-out" after application of the present quota. Of this number 522, or approximately 10%, are colored.

5. Colonels Musgrave and Stalder of your headquarters visited this headquarters last week and are familar with the officer reduction problem of this command at this time.

6. In view of the above, it is requested that this headquarters be allotted an additional quota of 1200 officers which will not only permit the separation of sufficient additional colored officers (approximately 101) to reach the desired requirements of 510 but also permit the separation of a goodly portion of the substantial white officer overage remaining after separation of 897 (white and colored) now authorized, at the ratio of 8% colored and 92% white, the ratio that the 611 remaining colored bears to the total remaining of 7663. If large overseas drafts are to be made of this command in the near future, consideration should be given thereto in final action on the requested quota.

7. As time is of essence in this operation and while the machinery is geared to handle the details thereof, it is requested that early approval of this additional quota be made by TWX in order that the separation program may be accomplished as one project rather than being broken down at a later date into additional projects.

Stamped Warren R. Carter
/t/ WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

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AFPMP-13 1st Ind

Hq Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C. 10 May 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida

1. The request for an additional quota of 1260 officers to be released by your command is not favorably considered for the following reasons:

a. At the time the initial quota was allotted to your command, it was not intended to reduce your officer personnel down to authorized strength primarily by relieving surplus officers from active duty.

b. The above quota which has been requested, together with your initial quota, would constitute too large a reduction of your officer strength to permit subsequent withdrawals of individuals who are eligible for overseas service.

c. It is felt that too many officers in your command with a reasonably high efficiency index, as compared to other commands, would have to be separated in order to meet your requested quota.

2. An additional quota, however, of 863 officers has been authorized your command making a total of 1760. It is believed that this figure will be sufficient to separate all white and colored officers that you are required to recommend for relief. It was not the original intent of this headquarters that your white and colored officer personnel be relieved from active duty in the ratio of 92% to 8% as referred to in paragraph 6 of basic letter. Consequently, it is desired that you utilize the necessary portion of the quota which you are now allotted to bring the strength of colored officers in your units down to that which is authorized without reference to the percentage now assigned.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ Hunter Harris, Jr.
HUNTER HARRIS, JR.
Colonel, G. S. C.
Deputy Chief, Mil. Pers. Div.
Office of AC/AS-1

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Analysis of Officer Strength as of 31 March and After Application of 897 Quota for Separation

WHITE

Asgnd Strength 31 Mar 46	Less "Force-Outs"	Less "Select-Outs"	Total Releases	Remaining after Separation of Quota of 897
Rated 5512	532 (X)	157	689	4823
Non-Rated 2329	18	82	100	2229
Total White 7841	550	239	789	7052

COLORED

Rated 439	69	19	88	351
Non-rated 280	20	None	20	260
Total colored 719	89	19	108	611 (a)
Aggregate Total 8560	639	258	897	7663

(X) Includes 8 Service Pilots, 454 Glider Pilots

(a) Approximately 8% of total officers (7663) remaining assigned

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
STAFF CONFERENCE NOTES

VOLUME I NUMBER 34 1 July 1946

COMMANDING GENERAL'S REPORT:

We must take the initiative on getting projects started under the 1947 allocations. Permanent buildings are badly in need of paint and many of the temporary structures are beginning to fall down. The bases should initiate the requests for these repairs without delay and we must expedite action on them to get them approved and contracts awarded this summer. Many of the temporary structures on our bases should be torn down. The base commanders must initiate these projects, stating that these buildings are unsuitable for conversion to family quarters and are not needed for storage buildings. We are unable to determine from here, for example, which buildings at March Field should be torn down, so the initiative in this matter must rest with the base commander.

CHIEF OF STAFF'S REPORT:

1. I would like to bring up the subject of some of our administrative practices. In the first place our correspondence is getting careless. I am having a short memorandum prepared for distribution to everyone in headquarters, pointing out typical errors that have been made. It will make reference to staff memorandums covering these particular items.

2. It has been noted in some cases that officers are directing correspondence to corresponding sections in lower headquarters. It is the policy of this headquarters that everything will be addressed to the commanding general or commanding officer of all units. This, of course, does not apply to certain technical channels which have been authorized.

3. When record coordination is desired, it is best to carry the correspondence by hand so that the sections concerned can get together and settle it. Sending arguments back and forth on paper is not satisfactory.

4. I am going to leave it up to the section heads to see that officers and civilian employees charged with the handling and routing of correspondence are thoroughly instructed. If the caliber of our correspondence is not definitely improved, we will be forced to establish a school on correspondence with required attendance for everyone.

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A-3 REPORT:

1. Headquarters AAF has informed us that they are planning to send some of the mechanics of the 477th Composite Group to factory training schools.

2. The first draft of the Air Ground Conference Notes will be completed today and a complete report of the conference should be ready for distribution immediately after 4 July 1946.

A-4 REPORT:

1. Air Materiel Command is starting modifications on C-82's at Fairchild Factory to eliminate the condition which has had them grounded. They will take 6 a week and it will probably take 8 weeks to complete the project. They also have begun modification of the P-80 engines at San Bernardino.

2. The project for the painting of quarters and permanent buildings at March Field has been disapproved and returned because of insufficient data, so we were unable to let a contract on this during the fiscal year 1946. Washington has informed us, however, that there will be sufficient funds in 1947 for all necessary repair and rehabilitation. Our Engineering Section is under-staffed for handling the increased work load that has been thrust upon us by the reorganization under Circular 138, WD, 1946. We are endeavoring to secure additional personnel from the engineering sections of the old service commands to enable us to promptly perform technical reviews, etc.

3. A master planning conference is to be held for all interim stations on 16 and 17 July at Brooks Field, Texas, and at this time we will be able to get many of the ideas on projects started under 1947 allocations across to our base commanders.

PUBLIC RELATIONS REPORT:

1. Headquarters AAF is planning to produce a 13 week radio show to be produced by the AAF commands. There will be 8 50,000 watt stations employed. Each command will have 2 minutes space on the program for any message about or from the command.

2. Headquarters AAF plans on having open house at all stations in the USA AAF Day, 1 August 1946.

SURGEON'S REPORT:

The Surgeon's Report of IAC Staff Conference Notes No 22, dated 20 May 1946, was misleading in its statement, "The flight surgeons will have to be

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SURGEON'S REPORT CONT'D:

eliminated." This should have read "Due to a shortage of flight surgeons, it will be impossible to assign flight surgeons to groups."

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

OTIS C. TURNER
WOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

AAF LETTER 35-40

1 July 1946

SUBJECT: Demotion or Disposition of Inefficient or Unsuitable Officers

TO: Commanding Generals, Major AAF Commands
Commanding Generals and Commanding Officers, Independent AAF Activities
Commanding Generals and Commanding Officers, Subordinate AAF Commands and AAF Divisions, Wings and Districts
Commanding Officers, AAF Base Units (not included above) in continental United States

(This Letter supersedes AAF Letters 35-40, 2 November 1944; 35-40A, 2 February 1945; 35-48, 31 January 1944; 35-69, 24 March 1944; and 35-132, 25 August 1944.)

1. Reclassification jurisdiction is hereby withdrawn from all air forces and commands and redelegated, under the provisions of Letter, AG, 201.6 (31 December 1943) PO-M-A, dated January 1944, subject: "Revision of AR 605-230," and par 8, AR 605-230, 6 September 1945, to the following commanders, effective as of the date of this Letter:

Commanding General, Air University
Commanding General, Strategic Air Command
Commanding General, Tactical Air Command
Commanding General, Air Defense Command
Commanding General, Air Materiel Command
Commanding General, Air Transport Command
Commanding General, Air Training Command
Commanding General, Air Proving Ground Command

2. Each commander granted reclassification jurisdiction under the preceding paragraph may delegate reclassification jurisdiction to such of his subordinate numbered air forces or equivalent commands as he may deem appropriate, but not below the level of either numbered air force or equivalent command. Ten (10) copies of any orders issued pursuant to the authority contained herein will be forwarded without delay to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C., ATTN: Separations Section, Officers' Branch, Military Personnel Division, AC/AS-1.

3. A commander granted reclassification jurisdiction will establish a reclassification center within the geographical limits of his command in accordance with paragraph 9, AR 605-230, and will convene a permanent reclassification board in the reclassification center under his control in accordance with paragraph 11, AR 605-230. Each reclassification board will function directly under the authority by which convened. The appointing order will state that the board is convened under the provisions of AR 605-230.

4. The following activities which have been assigned to the Air Transport Command will henceforth refer all reclassification matters through that command:

Air Weather Service
Air Communications Service
Flying Safety Service
Aeronautical Chart Service
Air Rescue Service
Flight Services

5. It is desired that all subordinate commanders forward reclassification cases and resignations in lieu thereof and in lieu of trial by court-martial through proper military channels. All such cases forwarded to The Adjutant General for appropriate action under the provisions of AR 605-230 and AR 605-275, will be forwarded through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C., ATTENTION: Separations Section, Officers' Branch, Military Personnel Division, AC/AS-1.

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6. During this period of demobilization and readjustment, it has been noted that there has been a general laxness toward taking prompt, objective, and vigorous action to eliminate or demote incompetent officers. It has become evident that the standards by which an officer is deemed unsatisfactory are too lenient. There can be no leniency in applying strict standards either in time of war or in time of peace. It is essential that our postwar air force be composed of officers only of the highest caliber. The AAF is undergoing a tremendous reduction in personnel, and commanders will be called upon to do many tasks with few personnel. Of necessity, these few must possess the highest qualifications. There will be no room for border-line officers who cannot be depended upon to carry their share of the responsibilities. The retention in the AAF of officers who render merely mediocre service or who fail to demonstrate a satisfactory capacity for the performance of their military duties through lack of innate ability, or failure to absorb instruction, or the possession of habits or traits of character detrimental to military discipline, cannot be tolerated. Their retention is a serious detriment to and deprives more valuable officers of assignment and training opportunities. Many such type officers have not applied for Regular Army commissions or were not recommended for such commissions by their immediate commanders, but have signed category statements stating their desire for retention. Regardless of the retention category of such individuals, deficiency in any of the AAF standards should result in prompt initiation of reclassification procedures. The records of all officers whose efficiency indices, computed as of 31 December 1945, in accordance with appendix II, RR 1-1, 25 January 1946, are equal to or less than 35 for field grades or 30 or less for company grades will be carefully scrutinized to determine whether their manner of performance of duties indicates a degree of inefficiency or unsuitability warranting action under AR 605-230. If it is determined that reclassification action is warranted, such proceedings will be initiated immediately and such officers will in no event be recommended for release under either Readjustment Regulations or the provisions of Cir 290, WD, 1945.

7. Many key personnel thoroughly familiar with the technical aspects incident to the disposition of inefficient or unsuitable officers have been lost to the AAF during this period also and have been replaced by operational personnel new to such problems and procedures. To the end that such personnel may have readily available a practical operating guide, the attached standing operating procedure is furnished for their guidance and use. Personnel who handle any of the type cases referred to therein will thoroughly familiarize themselves with the provisions of this Letter and manual.

8. Reclassification and resignation proceedings have been streamlined and no longer involve cumbersome and difficult procedures. Simplified methods which evolved during the war have now been incorporated into the new AR 605-230, dated 6 September 1945, and provide commanders with the means by which they can promptly, and with minimum effort, rid themselves of unsatisfactory officers. The attached standard operating guide implements and further simplifies the provisions of this Regulation. This standing operating procedure will be put into effect immediately, and the disposition of all officers who fail to perform with satisfactory proficiency will be accomplished in the manner prescribed therein without further delay.

9. Personnel upon whom reclassification, court-martial, or resignations in lieu thereof are pending will under no circumstances be relieved from active duty under current Readjustment Regulations or declared surplus until final action has been taken upon their cases by the War Department.

10. Reclassification proceedings and resignations in lieu thereof or in lieu of court-martial will be processed and forwarded to the next higher headquarters over the personal signatures of commanders within 48 hours of their receipt.

11. Upon receipt of instructions from The Adjutant General directing issuance of orders transferring an officer to a separation center for discharge, it will be the responsibility of each commander issuing transfer orders to ensure that such orders include full instructions relative to authority, type of discharge, separation form to be used; to state whether certificate of service, mileage allowance, and accrued leave are authorized; and to inform the subject officer that he is completely subject to military law, regulation, and custom until finally discharged.

12. Upon receipt of letter directive from The Adjutant General, which does not include instructions to provide subject officer with WD, AGO forms 53-97, or 53-98 (Certificate of Service)

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(See AR 345-500), each commander will ensure the appropriate disposition of all military identification papers by including the following information in transfer orders:

"Prior to departure from the separation center, (officer's name) will surrender the following military identification papers to the AAF liaison officer thereat:

"a. WD, AGO Form 65 (Identification Card)

"b. Rated Officers' (Pilots) Identification Card (if issued under former AAF Reg 35-10), both parts.

"c. WD, AGO Form 77 (Officers' Pay Data Card).

"d. All other passes or identification cards issued by his command or subordinate echelons of the command."

13. AAF liaison officers at separation centers will ensure that these identification papers are disposed of in the following manner:

a. WD, AGO Form 65 will be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of sec 1, Cir 336, WD, 1945.

b. Rated Officers' (Pilots) Identification Card (if issued under former AAF Reg 35-10), both parts, will be obtained and destroyed.

c. WD, AGO Form 77 (Officers' Pay Data Card). Liaison officers will determine whether or not officer has turned in his pay data card to the disbursing officer. If not, liaison officers will obtain same and transmit it to the disbursing officer for appropriate disposition.

d. All other passes or identification cards issued by his command or subordinate echelons of the command will be obtained and destroyed.

14. AAF liaison officers will also advise such officers that following discharge the wearing of the uniform or any part thereof is prohibited by the provisions of section 125, National Defense Act, as amended by act 4 June 1920, and act of 30 June 1921, and violations are liable to fine and imprisonment (par 26, AR 600-40, 31 March 1944).

15. Local reproduction of required forms is authorized.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
OFFICIAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces

OFFICIAL:

H. G. CULTON
Colonel, Air Corps
Air Adjutant General

1 Attachment
SOP for the Demotion or Disposition of Inefficient or Unsuitable Officers

DISTRIBUTION:
Air Forces and AAF Commands Overseas

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ARMY AIR FORCES

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

FOR THE

DEMOTION OR DISPOSITION OF INEFFICIENT OR UNSUITABLE OFFICERS

Attachment to AAF Ltr 35-40

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PERTINENT DIRECTIVES TO BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MANUAL

AR 600-185 -- Personnel, Efficiency Reports
AR 605-230 -- Commissioned Officers, Reclassification
AR 605-275 -- Commissioned Officers, Resignation
AR 610-5 -- Warrant Officers, General Provisions
AR 610-15 -- Warrant Officers, Temporary Appointment in the Army of the U.S.
AR 610-50 -- Flight Officers, General Provisions
AR 605-10 -- Commissioned Officers, Officers Appointed in the AUS
AAF Ltr 35-226, 7 Dec 44, "Lack of Incentive for Flying & Unwillingness to Meet Military Stresses," which received limited distribution.
AAF Ltr 35-300, 13 Dec 45, "Fear of Flying," which received limited distribution.
AAF Reg 35-16, 20 Oct 44, "Military Personnel, Flying Status."
AAF Manual 35-0-1 Revised through 1 July 1945, "Military Personnel Classification & Duty Assignment."
AG 210.45 (24 Mar 44) PO-M-A, 12 May 44, "Application of Public Law 190--77th Congress," which received limited distribution.
Sec III, Cir 81, WD, 1945--Personnel, Administrative & medical disposition of noneffective personnel.
Sec II, Cir 301, WD, 1945--Discharge.
Sec I, Cir 385, WD, 1945, as amended by sec I, Cir 85, WD, 1946--Homosexuals.

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SECTION I - POLICY

1. The Commanding General, AAF, directs that prompt, objective, and vigorous action will be taken to eliminate or demote incompetent officers. Deficiency in any of the following standards should result in prompt initiation of reclassification, resignation, or demotion procedures:

a. Inability to accomplishment assigned duties commensurate with grade and training promptly and efficiently without close supervision;

b. A record of bad judgment;

c. A record of mistakes of commission or omission;

d. Possessing weak traits of character, lack of integrity, or habits that either affect efficient performance, reflect upon the service, or result in lack of respect from his subordinates;

e. Lack of aggressiveness or marked indolence;

f. Inadequate training or up-to-date military skill commensurate with grade;

g. Unawareness of or failure to correct inefficient performance, bad judgment, or mistakes on the part of his subordinates;

h. Any other type of malperformance that adversely affects the AAF mission.

2. With regard to demotion, many officers have shown by inferior performance that previous promotions were unwarranted. The Secretary of War has directed that recommendation for demotion originating within the continental United States (oversea personnel under the command jurisdiction of the Air Transport Command, fall within this category) will be forwarded by the Commanding General, AAF, to The Adjutant General for issuance of necessary orders to accomplish the demotion. Thus, demotion recommendations approved by the Commanding General, AAF, are final.

3. It is the responsibility of AAF commanders at all echelons to initiate appropriate action with regard to officers who fail to meet the AAF standards of efficiency. All officers recommended for reclassification will be offered the privilege of tendering a voluntary resignation, or a request for demotion, if appropriate. The resignation or request for demotion in lieu of reclassification need be supported only by the report of interview. (See 6d(2), AR 605-230, 6 September 1945.)

4. Normally, but not necessarily, an officer's services should be rated unsatisfactory before reclassification proceedings are initiated. In any event, extreme care will be taken in preparing efficiency reports. (See AR 600-185.)

5. Expeditious handling of reclassification cases is essential. Papers will not be returned for correction except when the rights of the officer concerned have been prejudiced or the evidence or information presented is insufficient as a basis for sound decision. Inclosures to cases will not be withdrawn without detailed explanation.

6. The War Department has directed that when the Secretary of War's Personnel Board deems it necessary for any reason to return a reclassification case, the reasons necessitating the return will be stated.

SECTION II - HOW TO USE THIS SOP

7. This SOP has been designed for practical field use. This section is the key to effective use of the SOP. Before initiating any specific action, determine what actions are available and which one is appropriate. Use the indicated references for procedures and paper work. In addition, at the beginning of each major paragraph, the basic principles for the actions are cited. These principles should be studied prior to determining the action.

8. All actions shown herein except pure transfer and/or reassignment without reclassification, recommendation for demotion by a general officer, and discharge under paragraph 19, AR

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605-10, 26 May 1944, as amended by changes, must be based on a decision to recommend reclassification. Under paragraph 13, AR 605-230, "an officer who has been recommended for reclassification" may submit his resignation voluntarily or may request demotion. The term "recommended for reclassification" has been determined to mean that proper authority has reached a decision to reclassify. The subject officer may be informed of that decision verbally without any papers having been initiated. Through this method the subject officer can take advantage of the provisions of paragraph 13, AR 605-230, authorizing voluntary resignation or request for demotion, thus eliminating the necessity for more lengthy formal reclassification board hearings.

9. In each headquarters commanded by a general officer a qualified officer of field grade and appropriate experience who will be a member of the officers' qualification committee, will be appointed to expedite the disposition of inefficient and unnecessary officers, indoctrinate the command in policy and procedure, and coordinate the activity of the officer qualification committee. In each subordinate unit an officer will be appointed who will be responsible to know policy and procedure and to guide in paper work on cases initiated locally.

SECTION III - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RECLASSIFICATION

(References for this and all following sections include: AR 605-230; AR 605-275, and changes thereto; AR 600-185, and changes thereto; and AR 605-10, and changes thereto.)

10. When Authorized. Whenever it is considered that an officer is:

a. Assigned to duties for which he is not fitted. (A malassigned, but otherwise efficient officer should be reassigned and/or transferred without recourse to reclassification procedure.)

b. Inefficient or otherwise unsuitable in his current assignment because he:

(1) Holds commission in a grade (permanent or temporary) higher than that for which he is professionally fitted; or

(2) Possesses habits or traits of character which, either actually or potentially, affect his efficiency as an officer; or

(3) Is not qualified, professionally or otherwise, to hold any commission.

11. Who May Initiate. The immediate or any higher commander may initiate reclassification proceedings on any officer permanently or temporarily assigned or attached to a command.

12. To Whom Applicable. This is applicable to officers of all components of the Army of the United States except flight and warrant officers. The same standards for identifying inefficient or unsuitable flight or warrant officers apply. However, such officers will not be reclassified under the provisions of AR 605-230, but will have their appointments terminated under the provisions of AR 610-50 and AR 610-5, respectively. Such officers may either meet formal boards or resign in lieu thereof (or in lieu of court-martial for the good of the service); and their appointments will be terminated only after review by, and at the direction of, Headquarters, AAF.

13. Time Limit. An officer may be ordered to appear before a reclassification board at any time without regard to the length of time he has served on active duty.

14. Determination of Proper Action. Careful consideration will be given to determination of proper action. Reclassification procedure is not disciplinary, but administrative, and is not to be used in lieu of action by court-martial or punishment under the provisions of Article of War 104. However, offenses committed by an officer which may be punishable by court-martial may also cause the officer to perform his duties inefficiently or evidence his unsuitability for continued commissioned status. In such cases, reclassification proceedings may be initiated irrespective of whether or not specific offenses have resulted in court-martial or other disciplinary action. A statement of the disciplinary action taken, if any, will be included in the reclassification papers.

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SECTION IV - PROCEDURE IN INITIATING ACTION

15. Definition of "Initiating Commander":

a. At any headquarters commanded by a general officer the initiating commander will be the chief of staff, assistant chief of staff, deputy, or director under whose jurisdiction the subject officer is assigned to duty.

b. In all other cases the initiating commander will be the commander immediately subordinate to the headquarters of a general officer.

c. Under the authority contained in paragraph 6d(4), AR 605-230, in AAF activities or organizations operating under other than Tables of Organization and Equipment, reclassification cases will be initiated by the base commander or by the commander of any activity or organization reporting directly to a headquarters commanded by a general officer. Commanders or section heads subordinate to those cited in the preceding sentence are responsible for continuously identifying incompetent, inefficient, or unnecessary officers through noncertification on the Officers Duty Roster Certification Form or through immediate recommendations to superior commanders.

d. In AAF organizations or activities operating under Tables of Organization and Equipment, reclassification cases will be initiated by group, depot, or other commanders who report directly to a headquarters commanded by a general officer. Commanders subordinate to those cited in the preceding sentence are responsible in the same manner as described for subordinate commanders in c above.

16. Function of Initiating Commanders. When through his own knowledge of facts, recommendations from subordinates, or the noncertification of an officer on the Officer Duty Roster Certification Form, an initiating commander decides that action should be initiated under AR 605-230, he will report to the responsible commanding general, who, upon agreement, will designate his authorized representative (member of the officer qualification committee) to visit the initiating commander's headquarters and conduct the prescribed interview. Prior to the arrival of the representative of the general officer, initiating commanders will obtain affidavits or statements from all available witnesses or persons having knowledge of the alleged inefficiencies or charges against the subject officer and will advise the officer in question to obtain any affidavits or statements he may desire to submit in his own behalf before the arrival of the interviewing officer. The interviewing officer will consider these affidavits, examine the affiants, if necessary, and obtain such additional evidence as may be reasonably available before making his decision and recommendation. At the beginning of this interview the subject officer will be informed by the initiating commander of the latter's decision to recommend reclassification. The subject officer will also be informed by the initiating commander of his rights under AR 605-230, including his right to submit a voluntary resignation, request demotion when appropriate, or submit to a reclassification board hearing. In addition, the officer concerned will be informed of the type of discharge for which he will be recommended and the meaning of such discharge. Upon completion of the interview, the initiating commander will accomplish the action determined upon during the interview and will make entry of such action under item 34, on the WD, AGO Form 66-2 or 66-3. This entry should include date reclassification action was initiated and whether or not final action has been taken.

17. Function of Authorized Representative. The personal interview, by the "next higher commander" of the officer recommended for reclassification as prescribed in paragraph 6d(1), AR 605-230, will always be carried out by a member of an officer qualification committee who has been designated as the representative of a general officer. The officer designated by a general officer as his authorized representative under paragraph 6d(3), AR 605-230, will require the initiating commander and the subject officer both to be present during the formal interview, but may talk with either individually before, during, or following the formal interview. When desired the subject officer's immediate commander may also be present and participate in the formal interview. The authorized representative will make every effort to determine the facts relevant to the case during the interview; and to accomplish this purpose may require others immediately available without expense to the Government who have knowledge of the facts to participate in the interview. He will obtain specific facts, including names, dates, and places wherever possible. At no time will the officer concerned be presented with a previously prepared resignation and requested to sign the resignation. He will be advised fully of his rights in this respect

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and his resignation will be accepted only if voluntarily tendered. An officer will not be forced to make an immediate decision as to his desires, but may be granted twenty-four hours in which to decide whether he desires to resign or meet a reclassification board. When the officer expresses a desire voluntarily to resign, the resignation may then be prepared and submitted to him for signature. Upon completion of the interview the authorized representative may recommend or direct (see paragraph 6d(1)(g), AR 605-230) the action to be taken and will prepare a report of the interview in accordance with exhibit L (Form C) and will attach thereto as an inclosure a verbatim transcript thereof. The authorized representative will not be of a grade lower than the subject officer and will not be a subordinate of the initiating command. (See also paragraph 713 through 714.6 of AAF Manual 35-0-1, revised through 1 July 1945.)

18. Ordering Officers to Reclassification Centers. Upon decision by the authorized representative conducting the interview that reclassification action is warranted, the subject officer will be ordered immediately to the appropriate reclassification center upon receipt of his resignation by the initiating commander or upon the receipt of the reclassification case from the subject officer by the initiating commander.

19. Exceptional Circumstances. When necessary in isolated activities or units where the next higher commander is not reasonably available to conduct the required interview because of distance or reasons of military necessity, the commander of the activity or unit may authorize his chief of staff, executive officer, or other officer occupying a similar position to initiate reclassification proceedings. In such cases, the commander of the activity or unit may act as the interviewing officer.

20. Reclassification Channels for Headquarters, AAF Offices and Other Units Not Subordinate to a Reclassification Jurisdiction:

Each continental station, organization, unit, or separate detachment (hereafter called "units") under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, AAF, and not under a command having reclassification jurisdiction will forward resignations or demotion actions not involving formal reclassification through normal channels; formal reclassification cases requiring board action will be forwarded directly by such units to the headquarters having reclassification jurisdiction which has its reclassification center located geographically nearest the station from which the case originated and where the subject officer is on duty.

SECTION V - ACTIONS AVAILABLE

21. Definition. Actions available to "initiating commanders" are those available to any commander originating the actions contained herein. (See paragraph 15, section IV, for description of "initiating commander" and procedure.)

22. Actions Available to Initiating Commanders. Upon determining that action is desirable regarding an officer, the initiating commander may take whatever action outlined below is deemed appropriate:

a. Reassign and/or transfer within the organization to a more suitable duty or recommend that this be accomplished by higher authority. (See paragraph 25.)

b. Inform subject officer of right to submit voluntary resignation. (See paragraph 29.)

c. Inform subject officer of right to request demotion voluntarily. (See paragraph 26.)

d. Recommend to general officer that demotion without initiating reclassification be instituted. (See paragraph 26d(3).)

e. Initiate recommendation for discharge of officers appointed AUS if information is revealed which would have made them originally ineligible for commission. (See paragraph 28.)

f. Initiate formal reclassification proceedings. (See section VII.)

23. Actions Available to Intermediate Higher Commanders Prior to Initiation of Formal Reclassification Proceedings. Upon determining that action is desirable regarding an officer, any

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intermediate commander between the initiating commander and the commander having reclassification jurisdiction may take whichever action outlined below is deemed appropriate based on his own knowledge of the facts, or on recommendations from the officer qualification committee, or from a subordinate organization commander:

a. Reassign and/or transfer within the command to a more suitable duty or recommend that this be accomplished by higher authority. (See paragraph 25.)

b. Recommend to a general officer that he initiate demotion under paragraph 7, AR 605-230, without initiating reclassification proceedings. (See paragraph 26d(1)(b).)

c. Upon receipt of recommendation or request for demotion, forward to a general officer. (See paragraphs 26d(2)(c).)

d. Initiate action outlined in paragraph 22e, reference discharge of AUS officers. (See paragraph 28.)

e. Upon determining the proper reclassification action to be taken (demotion or discharge), require the "initiating commander" to initiate such action.

f. If subject officer, under e above, does not take voluntary action, request Special Efficiency Report from organization commander and initiate formal reclassification proceedings. (see section VII.)

g. Actions in Addition to above Authorized to General Officers:

(1) Initiate demotion (thus obviating need for reclassification board action) without initiating reclassification proceedings. (See paragraph 26d(3).)

(2) Upon receipt of recommendation from subordinate commander, recommend demotion (thus obviating need for reclassification proceedings). (See paragraph 26d(3).)

(3) Upon receipt of request for demotion. (See paragraph 26d(3)(d).)

(4) Regarding recommendations or request for demotion initiated or approved by a general officer under the provisions of paragraphs 7 and 13, AR 605-230, if a superior commander to the initiating general officer concurs, see paragraph 26d(4)(a), or if he nonconcurs, see paragraph 26d(4)(b).

24. Actions Available to Intermediate Higher Commanders upon Receipt of Reclassification Papers. Based upon a study of the facts in the case and/or recommendations of the officer qualification committee, any intermediate higher commander between the "initiating commander" and the commander having reclassification jurisdiction may take whichever action outlined below is deemed appropriate:

a. Concur with written recommended action and forward papers through channels to reclassification board. (See paragraphs 26e(1) and 35.)

b. Reassign and/or transfer within the command to a more suitable duty, terminating reclassification proceedings as provided. (See paragraph 25b(1).)

c. If the commander is a general officer, recommend demotion (thus obviating need for Reclassification Board action), when deemed appropriate regardless of the recommendation the reclassification case contains. (See paragraph 35d and then paragraph 26e(2).)

d. If nonconcurs with initiating officer's recommendation and does not desire to reassign and/or transfer or, if a general officer, does not desire to recommend demotion as per c above, add any such recommendation he may desire to make by indorsement and forwards. (See paragraph 35e.)

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SECTION VI - ACTION PROCEDURES

25. Reassignment and/or Transfer:

a. A malassigned but otherwise efficient officer should not be subjected to reclassification, but should be utilized where his qualifications can be of greatest value to the AAF. Simple reassignment and/or transfer should be accomplished in the normal manner within command channels.

b. Any commander in the chain of command may direct reassignment and/or transfer within his command jurisdiction upon receipt of a recommendation for such action, a request or recommendation for demotion without reclassification, a voluntary resignation in lieu of reclassification, or a formal reclassification case.

(1) Upon receipt of a formal reclassification case from subordinate authority, may terminate the proceedings and reassign the officer. When this action is taken by any commander in the chain of command, the following actions are required:

(a) Enter statement that the proceedings are terminated because of reassignment and retain the complete record in the reassigning headquarters to be made part of any further proceedings to determine the ultimate disposition of the officer.

(b) Advise new unit commander of the officer concerned of the reason for reassignment and instruct the commander to submit to the reassigning commander a Special Efficiency Report on the officer by a specified date, said date being one considered appropriate to allow for additional training or to permit demonstration of ability to perform satisfactorily the duties for which recommended.

(c) If the Special Efficiency Report is favorable, it will be placed with the complete record, including a copy of order reassigning the officer in the reassigning headquarters and forwarded through the Headquarters, AAF (ATTENTION: Separations Section, Officers' Branch, Military Personnel Division, AC/AS-1), to The Adjutant General for file. If the Special Efficiency Report is unfavorable, attach it to the complete record, including a copy of the order reassigning the officer and forward through channels to the reclassification jurisdiction, together with a recommendation, for action.

26. Demotion (Reference is made to paragraph 2 of this attachment):

a. Actions under the provisions of this paragraph will be limited to those cases in which the officer is obviously unfitted for the temporary grade he holds, but is acceptable in a lower grade in the recommending general officer's command. Reassignment following demotion will, in the usual case, be accomplished locally, but will not be made to the same base unit, group, or comparable or lower unit in which the officer was serving at the time of demotion, nor to the same group or comparable lower unit in which he was serving when any reclassification proceedings were instituted. Whenever reassignment to a different jurisdiction or locality is considered essential, the recommendation will contain a full justification therefor and a statement of the type of assignment and duty for which the officer is best qualified.

b. Permanent Grade:

(1) Recommendation for demotion of an officer who holds a permanent appointment in the National Guard of the United States or the Officers Reserve Corps and does not hold a higher temporary grade in the Army of the United States may be made by any commander in the chain of command, but must be sustained by action of a reclassification board. In such a case, officer must be relieved from active duty under his permanent appointment, thereby reverting to an inactive status. He may then be appointed in a lower grade in the Army of the United States and upon acceptance of said commission be immediately ordered to active duty in the lower grade.

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(2) However, an officer holding only a permanent appointment as described in (1) above, who has been recommended for reclassification may voluntarily request that he be relieved from active duty and, without affecting his grade in the inactive status, be appointed to a lower grade in the Army of the United States and upon acceptance of said commission be immediately ordered to active duty in said lower grade. (For procedure and actions follow d below.)

(3) An officer holding a permanent grade in the Regular Army may not be demoted from that permanent grade to a lower permanent grade in the Regular Army.

c. Temporary Grades:

(1) Action of this nature is applicable only to temporary grades held in the Army of the United States and in the Air Corps under the Act of 16 June 1936, or the Act of 16 February 1942 (Public Law 455).

(a) An officer who holds a permanent appointment in the Regular Army, National Guard of the United States, or the Officers Reserve Corps, and a higher temporary grade in the Army of the United States or in the Air Corps under the Act of 16 June 1936, or the Act of 16 February 1942 (Public Law 455), may be demoted by a termination of the temporary appointment. Such an officer may be demoted to any intermediate grade by termination of the higher temporary grade followed by appointment to and acceptance of a temporary grade between the permanent grade and the grade in which commission has been terminated. Such an officer may also be demoted to his permanent grade by termination of all temporary commissions held by him in higher grades.

(b) An officer in the Army of the United States who does not hold a permanent appointment in the Regular Army, National Guard of the United States, or the Officers Reserve Corps, may be demoted only by termination of his commission in the Army of the United States followed by appointment to and acceptance of commission in a lower grade. This involves complete separation of the officer from the service and his reappointment in an appropriate lower grade.

d. Actions Available Prior to Initiating Formal Reclassification Proceedings:

(1) Organization commander, when a decision has been reached to recommend an officer for reclassification, for the purpose of demotion will:

(a) Inform officer of right to voluntarily request demotion or submit resignation. (For resignation see paragraph 29.) Requests for demotion will be limited to those cases in which reclassification recommendations are based on deficiencies resulting from factors over which the officer has no control. Requests for demotion in cases in which reclassification recommendations are based on deficiencies resulting from factors over which the officer does have control will not be forwarded; however, recommendation for demotion in such cases may be initiated as shown in (b) below. If officer decides to voluntarily request demotion (par 13b, AR 605-230), organization commander will:

1. Ensure that such request, in quintuplicate (subject officer retains one copy), clearly sets forth the reasons therefor (regarding requests involving officer holding temporary grade only, see exhibit B; officer holding permanent grade only, see exhibit C; officer holding permanent grade and higher temporary grade, see exhibit D) and attach to the forwarding indorsement the original and 3 copies of the report of interview. No other supporting papers are required.

(b) If, after informing officer of right voluntarily to request demotion, officer decides against that action, it will be the responsibility of the initiating commander or the unit commander to recommend to a general officer that the latter institute demotion without initiating formal reclassification proceedings. In this case, the commander will forward recommendation to a

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general officer stating clearly and fully the broad reasons, supported by specific facts why demotion should be recommended by the latter under his authority provided in par 7b, AR 605-230; include with statement to general officer a Special Efficiency Report in quintuplicate, which must have been referred to subject officer for remark.

(2) Intermediate Commanders Who Are Not General Officers:

(a) When a decision has been reached at this echelon to recommend an officer for reclassification for the purpose of demotion, the intermediate commander will instruct organization commander of this decision and to take action outlined in d(1)(a) above.

(b) If subject officer decides against action outlined in d(1)(a) above, this intermediate commander will forward a recommendation to a general officer as outlined in d(1)(d) above.

(c) Upon receipt of a recommendation to a general officer or a voluntary request for demotion, commanders at this echelon will indorse to a general officer, indicating concurrence or nonconcurrence and reasons therefor.

(3) General Officers. In accordance with par 7b(1), AR 605-230, when, in the opinion of a general officer, an officer under his command is unsatisfactory in the temporary grade he holds because of lack of ability or for other reasons, but is acceptable in his command in a lower grade, appropriate demotion may be recommended without resorting to the initiation of reclassification proceedings. Therefore, a general officer may recommend demotion as follows:

(a) Initiate appropriate demotion recommendation based on his own opinion that an officer of his command is unsatisfactory in the temporary grade he holds; or

(b) Receive recommendations, prior to the initiation of reclassification proceedings, from subordinate commanders or an officer qualification committee that the general officer initiate recommendation for demotion under authority granted in par 7b(1), AR 605-230.

(c) Having determined that demotion is appropriate and that the officer is acceptable in his command in a specific lower grade, the general officer will:

1. Request Special Efficiency Report in quintuplicate from organization commander, if one has not already been furnished.

2. When Special Efficiency Report is received, prepare in quintuplicate recommendation for demotion to a specific grade and a statement on which the recommendation is based outlining clearly and fully the specific reasons, including statement "Subject officer is acceptable in my command in the grade of (to which being demoted)."

3. Forward two copies of Special Efficiency Report and the recommendation to the officer concerned for such remarks or explanation as he may desire to make and return. Subject officer retains one copy and makes his indorsement in quintuplicate forwarding four copies. In forwarding these papers to officer, instruct organization commander to inform the officer of his right (as per par 7b(2), AR 605-230) to:

a. Voluntarily request demotion.

b. Tender his resignation.

c. Request hearing before reclassification board.

d. Request trial by court-martial.

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4. If officer voluntarily requests demotion, procedure outlined in d(1)(a) above, will be followed, but in this case no interview is required by an authorized representative.

5. If officer submits his resignation, procedure outlined under paragraph 29e(1)(a) will be followed.

6. If trial by court-martial or hearing before a reclassification board is requested by the officer, such request may be granted by the initiating commander or by any higher commander at his discretion; or the request may be denied by these commanders and the case forwarded to the Commanding General, AAF, for final decision, together with the reasons why the request should not be granted.

7. If officer does not desire to request that any of the above actions be granted, the general officer will, upon receipt of four copies of returned papers, forward three copies of all such papers through channels to the Commanding General, AAF.

(d) Upon receipt of a voluntary request for demotion which has been based on a commander's decision to reclassify, may approve and forward three copies of all papers through channels to the Commanding General, AAF.

1. If the general officer disapproves such voluntary request for demotion, the case will be returned to the initial command with instructions.

2. If the general officer approves and forwards such voluntary request for demotion, further action on the preparation of formal reclassification proceedings will be suspended pending final action on the request.

(4) Commanders Higher than the General Officer Initiating Demotion Recommendation:

(a) Each higher commander through whose headquarters either a voluntary request for demotion or a recommendation for demotion passes will indicate his approval on all three copies, giving any additional reasons known to him for such action.

(b) Any commander who disapproves a recommendation for demotion will return the recommendation to the headquarters of origin with instructions as to the action which will be taken. A disapproved recommendation will not be forwarded.

e. Actions Available Following Initiation of Formal Reclassification Procedures. In all cases commanders will first ensure that the subject officer has been properly informed of his rights to request appropriate voluntary action.

(1) All higher commanders will consider the reclassification papers and reassign the officer to other duty or forward the papers in quadruplicate to the next higher commander; in which latter case, the forwarding indorsement will include a statement, "Consideration has been given to reassignment of subject officer within this command." If the officer is reassigned, the procedure in paragraph 25b(1) will be followed.

(2) If a general officer in the normal channel of command receives a reclassification case, regardless of the recommendation it contains, and in his opinion demotion from a temporary grade to the permanent or a lower temporary grade is appropriate, he may recommend demotion in a manner that eliminates the necessity for a formal reclassification hearing. In this case he will:

(a) Submit by indorsement on the Form A his recommendation for demotion and reasons therefor, together with one copy of all other papers in the case to the officer concerned for his remarks in connection therewith and return; in forwarding the case to the officer, a copy of the recommendation of

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general officer will be provided for subject officer. In such cases, instruct organization commander to inform the officer of his rights and follow the applicable procedures as outlined in d(3)(c)3 through 6 above.

(b) If officer voluntarily requests demotion or submits resignation, suspend further preparation or processing of reclassification papers pending final action on the request.

(c) If officer does not desire that any of the actions described be granted, the general officer will act under the authority of par 7c, AR 605-230, and procedure will follow d(3)(c)7 above. In addition, in these cases the original qualification record (WD, AGO Form 66-2 or 66-3) will be withdrawn from the reclassification recommendation by the headquarters of the general officer concerned and a copy substituted therefor. The original qualification record will be held in this Headquarters pending action on the case by the Commanding General, AAF, after which it will be forwarded to the appropriate commander unless the case is otherwise disposed of in accordance with instructions received from some intermediate superior headquarters.

(3) If the higher commander nonconcurs with prior recommendations, he may so state giving reasons therefor in his forwarding indorsement.

27. Types of Discharge:

a. Except in cases of dismissal from the service or separation resulting from physical disability, an officer is separated by either of two classes of discharge, "honorable discharge" or "discharge without specification as to the character thereof."

(1) "Honorable discharge" - An officer may be recommended for honorable discharge or may tender a resignation in expectation of an honorable discharge when he has displayed traits of character and devotion to duty which characterize his service as honest and faithful and is subject to reclassification board action solely because of deficiencies resulting from factors over which he has no control, such as inability to learn or military inaptitude. He is entitled to a Certificate of Service (AR 345-500) and will be granted accrued leave. He must report to his local Draft Board within 10 days after discharge.

(2) "Discharge without specification as to the character thereof" - An officer should be recommended for, or will tender a resignation for, discharge without specification as to the character thereof when the deficiency for which he is being reclassified is a result of factors over which he does have control, such as laziness or drunkenness. An officer so discharged is not entitled to a Certificate of Service, or mustering-out pay and will not be granted accrued leave. As in (1) above, he must report to his local Draft Board.

b. Resignations "for the good of the service" will be submitted only in lieu of court-martial under the provisions of AR 605-275 and will so state. (See exhibit G.) The immediate commanding officer of an officer who tenders his resignation in lieu of trial by court-martial will prepare a complete summary of all facts which relate to the conduct upon which the resignation is predicated. This summary will carry as inclosures charge sheets; statements of the substance of the testimony of any witness who has been examined; any statement, document, or other matter considered by him in arriving at his conclusions and making his recommendation. (See exhibit I for additional statements, which must be included in commander's forwarding indorsement.) An officer so discharged is not entitled to a Certificate of Service or mustering-out pay and will not be granted accrued leave. He will also be barred from all rights, based upon the period of service from which he will be separated by acceptance of this type resignation, under any laws administered by the Veterans Administration, except that this provision does not apply to any war risk, Government (converted), or National service life insurance policy. Resignations tendered by reason of Cir 385, WD, 1945, will also be submitted in lieu of trial by court-martial "for the good of the service" under the provisions of AR 605-275. (See exhibit G.)

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c. Officers separated from the service under conditions other than honorable, i.e., separated because of deficiencies resulting from a course of conduct or other factors over which they have control, will be separated at a War Department separation center nearest their station.

28. Discharge, AUS. Discharge under par 19, AR 605-10, 26 May 1944, is applicable only to officers appointed in the Army of the United States. Thus Reserve officers, National Guard officers, or officers of the Regular Army may not be affected. The principles are as follows:

Any officer appointed in the Army of the United States may have his appointment terminated by the War Department by discharge at any time when information is revealed which, if known at the time of his appointment, would have made him ineligible for such appointment. Any misstatement of fact or any material omission in the original application or attendant papers, or in the case of chaplains withdrawal of ecclesiastical indorsement, is a basis for discharge at any time.

29. Voluntary Resignation:

a. An officer who has been recommended for reclassification or who has been recommended for demotion by a general officer may submit his resignation as an officer of the Army. Such resignation must conform strictly with either exhibits E or F, as appropriate.

b. The type of discharge granted when a resignation is accepted is governed by the principles in paragraph 27. Resignations will conform to the provisions of AR 605-275. Any resignation tendered in lieu of reclassification or court-martial will expressly so state and may not be withdrawn without the consent of the War Department, and normally such consent will not be granted.

c. A resignation must be forwarded by commanding officers and higher echelons of command, through channels, to the War Department for final action thereon. If intermediate commanders determine that the type of resignation submitted is not warranted by the facts, they may make such recommendation as they may deem to be appropriate when forwarding the resignation, but in no event will the resignation be stopped or returned to the officer for submission of a new type resignation, either more or less severe in character. Further, no resignation will be stopped or filed in order to take any other action such as reassignment and/or release from active duty. If such action is deemed appropriate, recommendation to that effect will be made. If it is determined by the War Department that the tendered resignation is inappropriate, the officer may then be advised to tender another type of resignation, unless other action is directed. Should he decline, then reclassification or court-martial proceedings will be continued. The foregoing will not act to prevent the return of a resignation for correction in form or for additional supporting evidence. Whenever such measures are necessary, expeditious action will be taken to ensure the prompt handling of the correspondence in order that no undue delay may result therefrom.

d. An entry will be made under item 34, on the WD, AGO Form 66-2 or 66-3, of all AAF officers who resign in lieu of reclassification or court-martial. This entry should include date resignation was tendered and whether or not final action has been taken.

e. Prior to Initiation of Formal Reclassification Proceedings:

(1) Initiating commander, when a decision has been reached to recommend an officer for reclassification, for the purpose of discharge, will:

(a) Inform officer of right voluntarily to submit resignation, to request demotion, or to request a hearing before reclassification board. If hearing before a reclassification board is requested by the officer, such request will be granted if the commander's recommendation is for discharge. If the officer decides to submit voluntary resignation (par 13a, AR 605-230), organization commander will:

1. Ensure that such resignation, prepared in quintuplicate (subject officer retains one copy), conforms with either exhibit E or F as is appropriate.

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2. Indorse completely as shown in exhibit H, forwarding original and three copies (for notification of disbursing officer see AR 210-10), and attach to the indorsement the original and three copies of the report of interview and four copies of AAF Officers' Qualification Record (WD, AGO Form 66-2 or 66-3). In cases based upon an officer's professional qualifications for the performance of further flying duty, four copies of the final type physical examination for flying WD, AGO Form 64, will be attached as well as copies of the Flying Evaluation Board proceedings if the officer concerned has met such board. (In cases involving fear of flying, lack of incentive for flying, or refusal to fly, the provisions of AAF Letter 35-300, which received limited distribution, will be complied with.)

3. If, after informing officer of right to submit voluntary resignation, officer decides against that action, organization commander will initiate formal reclassification proceedings. (See section VII.)

4. If a voluntary resignation is returned not favorably considered by the War Department, formal reclassification proceedings will be initiated unless otherwise instructed.

(2) Intermediate Commanders Who Are Not General Officers. Upon receipt of a voluntary resignation, commanders at this echelon will indorse, in quadruplicate, indicating concurrence or nonconcurrence and reasons therefor.

(3) General Officers:

(a) When a decision has been reached by a general officer (based on his own knowledge of the facts, recommendations from a subordinate commander, or recommendations from an officer qualification committee), to recommend an officer for reclassification for the purpose of separation, he will instruct the organization commander to inform the subject officer of this decision, of his rights, and then to take the action outlined in (1) above.

(b) Upon receipt of a voluntary resignation from an officer who is being considered for reclassification, the general officer will approve or disapprove, make such other remarks as deemed appropriate, and forward the resignation.

(c) When a commanding officer approves or disapproves a voluntary resignation, any further action on any formal reclassification paper initiated will be suspended pending final action on the resignation.

30. Hospitalization. When an officer on whom reclassification proceedings have been initiated is admitted to a hospital prior to formal hearing before a reclassification board, his immediate commanding officer through the commander exercising reclassification jurisdiction on this latter commander will advise the commanding officer of the hospital of the officer's status. This information will be incorporated in the officer's medical record and entered on his Officers' Qualification Record (WD, AGO Form 66-2 or 66-3). Pending outcome of hospitalization, reclassification proceedings will be suspended. In the event of the appearance of the officer before a disposition board or an Army retiring board, a copy of the board's report will be forwarded to the officer exercising reclassification jurisdiction. The communication forwarding the original report to the War Department will indicate the officer's status with respect to reclassification action.

a. If the findings of the disposition board or the Army retiring board indicate the officer is physically qualified for return to a duty status, further action will be taken in accordance with paragraphs 36b and 37c(7). Upon completion of this action the officer exercising reclassification jurisdiction will transmit the complete record to the War Department, through Headquarters, AAF, by an appropriate indorsement which will include a reference to the attached copy of disposition board or retiring board proceedings.

b. If the findings of the Army retiring board indicate that the officer is physically incapacitated for active service as a result of disability, either incident to the service or not incident to the service, a determination will be made by the

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officer exercising reclassification jurisdiction as to whether the circumstances warrant continuance of the reclassification proceedings. The officer will not be relieved from active duty or placed on terminal leave pending such determination by the officer exercising reclassification jurisdiction. The commanding officer of the hospital will be informed of the above decision. If the decision is to drop the reclassification proceedings, the officer may be relieved from active duty. If the decision is to continue with the reclassification proceedings, the officer will not be relieved from active duty until directed by the War Department.

(1) If it is determined that continuance might result in the recommendation for discharge without specification as to the character thereof, reclassification proceedings will be continued. Upon completion all papers, including a copy of the retiring board proceedings, will be forwarded to the War Department through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C., ATTENTION: Separations Section, Officers' Branch, Military Personnel Division, AC/AS-1, with appropriate recommendations as to whether the officer should be relieved from active duty, or should be discharged without specification as to the character thereof, or with recommendations as to other action deemed advisable in the case under consideration.

(2) In the event the determination under b above, is that the reclassification proceedings should not be continued, the record of the reclassification proceedings will be forwarded to the War Department, through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C., ATTENTION: Separations Section, Officers' Branch, Military Personnel Division, AC/AS-1, by appropriate indorsement recommending relief from active duty and inclosing a copy of disposition board or retiring board proceedings.

SECTION VII - FORMAL RECLASSIFICATION PROCEEDINGS

31. Initiation. When all other prior actions have been given consideration and it is determined that formal reclassification is necessary, the initiating commander or a higher commander, when necessary, will initiate such proceedings.

32. Supporting Papers:

a. The supporting papers required are as follows and will be prepared in quintuplicate, one for subject officer's retention, others forwarded:

(1) Recommendation for reclassification board action on Form A.

(2) Full Efficiency Report for the period involved, which, if it contains any unfavorable entries, must have been referred to the officer concerned for his remark, as required by AR 600-185.

(3) WD, AGO Form 66-2 or 66-3 (AAF Officers' Qualification Record) completed up to date.

(4) Supporting sworn statements, to the extent applicable, from available individuals having knowledge of the inefficiency or undesirable habits or traits of character of the individual concerned. The scope and detail of these statements, when considered with the Special Efficiency Report and other data, must substantiate the recommendation for reclassification. It is recognized that cases arise in which official records or other data rendered the submission of supporting sworn statements inapplicable.

(5) Sworn statements of available individuals submitted in their own behalf by the officer concerned.

(6) Signed receipt of the officer concerned for all documents furnished him.

(7) Certificate of the officer concerned that:

(a) He has been afforded full opportunity to submit sworn statements from available witnesses.

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(b) He has read AR 605-230 and fully understands his rights thereunder, including his right to counsel; opportunity to submit his resignation or to request demotion where applicable; and that he understands that he may be discharged as an officer of the Army as a result of reclassification procedures.

(8) The report of interview required by paragraph 6d(2), AR 605-230, will be included with the supporting papers forwarded.

(9) In cases based upon an officer's professional qualifications for the performance of further flying duty, copies of the Flying Evaluation Board proceedings will also be attached. In cases based upon physical disqualification for flying duties, copies of the physical examination for flying, WD, AGO Form 64, will be attached as well as copies of the Flying Evaluation Board proceedings if the officer concerned has met such board. (In cases involving fear of flying, lack of incentive for flying, or refusal to fly, the provisions of AAF Letter 35-300, which received limited distribution, will be complied with.)

33. Duties of the Initiating Commander:

a. Notify the officer concerned that proceeding has been instituted; deliver to him the original and one copy each of Form A, the Special Effeciency Report, and each sworn statement from the individuals having knowledge of the basis for reclassification and relied upon to support Form A; advise subject officer that the copy of each paper is for his own file and that the original is to be returned by his indorsement as outlined below.

b. Inform the officer concerned that he will obtain and submit all sworn statements in his own behalf in quintuplicate (retaining one copy of each) that he expects to introduce in his own defense before a reclassification board. Render necessary assistance to expedite this action.

34. Expeditious Action. Reclassification cases or resignations in lieu of reclassfication or court-martial, will be processed and forwarded to next higher headquarters over personal signature of commander within forty-eight hours of receipt. If a case is held more than forty-eight hours, explanation of reasons therefor will be given in forwarding indorsement. This practice will be reduced to a minimum.

35. Duties of Intermediate Commanders, upon Receipt of Reclassification Papers:

a. Cause the record to be carefully checked to see that all of the requirements of paragraphs 32 and 33 have been met.

b. Determine whether recommendation in Form A is appropriate to the case.

c. Forward all copies of papers in the case in triplicate to next higher commander within forty-eight (48) hours of receipt, stating that "consideration has been given to reassignment of the officer within this command."

d. If this commander is a general officer and he determines that demotion is appropriate regardless of the recommendation the reclassification case contains, he may follow the procedure in paragraphs 26d(3)(c)3 through 6.

e. If nonconcurs with recommendation on Form A, add own recommendation by indorsement and forwards.

SECTION VIII - RECLASSIFICATION BOARDS

36. Duties of Commanders Having Reclassification Jurisdiction:

a. Each commander having reclassification jurisdiction will establish a reclassification center within the geographical limits of his command. A reclassification center consists of a reclassification board, a board room, and the necessary

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clerical personnel, office space, and equipment to enable preparation of the board proceedings and to conduct the administration incident thereto.

b. Upon receipt of a reclassification case, or upon notification by the authorized representative (see paragraph 17) the commander having reclassification jurisdiction will promptly order the officer to the reclassification center without assigned duty and upon receipt refer the case to a reclassification board or take other authorized action.

c. In those cases referred to reclassification boards, the authority having reclassification jurisdiction will transmit the documents prescribed in paragraph 32 in quadruplicate to the president of the reclassification board.

37. Reclassification Boards:

a. Each commander having reclassification jurisdiction will convene a permanent reclassification board in the reclassification center under his control. Each board will function directly under the authority by which convened. The appointing orders will state that the board is convened under the provisions of AR 605-230. (Officers of the National Guard of the United States will only be ordered before an efficiency board - see paragraph 39b).

b. Composition. Except as indicated in paragraph 39b, reclassification boards will be composed of not less than five commissioned officers of the Army of the United States, and in addition, one or more recorders without vote and one or more defense counsels. At least one member of each board will be an officer commissioned in the line of the Army, and one will be an officer of the Medical Corps. On boards reclassifying rated Air Corps personnel at least two of the above officers will be rated Air Corps officers on full flying status in addition to the officer of the Medical Corps, who will be a flight surgeon. Each board (except the recorders and defense counsels) so far as practicable will be composed of officers senior in permanent and temporary grades to the officer appearing before the board.

c. Procedure:

(1) Prior to a formal hearing, the board will meet informally, review the officer's record, and call the officer for an informal interview with a view to determining whether or not it should proceed with a formal hearing. Where it appears to be to the best interest of the Government that the officer be reassigned within the jurisdiction of the convening authority, this fact will promptly be brought to the attention of the convening authority with appropriate recommendations as to the disposition of the case. Pending action by the convening authority, proceedings will be held in abeyance. If the convening authority approves the recommendations, action in paragraph 25b will be followed.

(2) If the convening authority disapproves the informal recommendations of the board concerning reassignment or if during the informal interview it becomes apparent that the final recommendation is likely to involve action other than reassignment within the jurisdiction of the convening authority, the board will proceed with a formal hearing.

(3) Except as otherwise prescribed herein, reclassification boards will be governed by the applicable provisions of AR 420-5. The members of the board will be subject to challenge and the board will be sworn.

(4) An officer appearing before a reclassification board will be permitted counsel of his own selection, provided such counsel is reasonably available and attends the hearings of the board without expense to the Government.

(5) A reclassification board is authorized to obtain such evidence bearing upon any case as is deemed necessary, provided the officer concerned is afforded an opportunity to meet any new facts thus adduced. The board may direct that the officer be examined physically when the evidence indicates that his physical condition may have contributed to military inefficiency.

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(6) Testimony (except Efficiency Reports and WD, AGO Form 66-2 or 66-3, "AAF Officers' Qualification Record," 63, "Report of Physical Examination," and 64, "Physical Examination for Flying,") for and against the officer concerned will normally be presented in the form of sworn statements. Witnesses who happen to be present at the station of the board may be heard, but no official travel and no detached service will be authorized by any commander for the appearance of witnesses before reclassification boards.

(7) The primary duty of a reclassification board is to determine the grade for which an officer is fully qualified and type of duty which he may be expected to perform with the required standard of efficiency. If the board determines that an officer's qualifications and ability are such that his retention in the service is justified, it will recommend reassignment, indicating the type of duty and appropriate grade, which it considers within the officer's capabilities. If the board determines that an officer cannot render efficient service in a position appropriate to his grade, or a lower grade, or that his retention is not in the best interests of the service, it will recommend separation from active service, or relief from active duty in cases contemplated by d(4) below.

(8) The recommendations of a reclassification board are not limited in any way, but will in general conform to those enumerated in d below.

(9) The reclassification board proceedings will be recorded on Form B. (See exhibit K.)

(10) On completion of any case, a reclassification board (or an efficiency board) will forward its proceedings in triplicate, together with all pertinent records, to the convening authority, except that the original WD, AGO Form 66-2 or 66-3 will be withdrawn and a duplicate copy substituted. (See TM 12-245.)

d. Recommendations. Reclassification boards will consider the following actions in submitting recommendations:

(1) Reassignment:

(a) To any activity under the jurisdiction of the convening authority.

(b) By Headquarters, AAF, or the War Department where the officer concerned is recommended for suitable duty outside of the jurisdiction of the convening authority.

(c) When reassignment under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, is recommended, character of duty must be specified by Military Occupational Specialty.

(2) Demotion. (See paragraphs 26b and c.)

(3) Demotion and Reassignment. Combination of (1) and (2) above.

(4) Relief from Active Duty. This action will be recommended only in the case of an officer of the National Guard of the United States or Reserve Officer who is over 44 years of age and has held commission for more than 15 years and who is reclassified primarily for reasons other than misconduct or habits or traits of character affecting his efficiency and whose relief from active duty and return to an inactive status is considered to be in the best interests of the service.

(5) Removal from Active List of Regular Army. Removal from the active list of Regular Army under the provisions of the Act of 29 July 1941 (55 Stat. 606) in the case of an officer of the Regular Army. See paragraph 22 and Letter, AG, 210.45 (24 March 1944) PO-M-A, dated 12 May 1944, subject: "Application of P. L. 190-77th Congress," which received limited distribution.

(6) Discharge. Recommendations under this provision will include:

(a) Statement that the individual should be separated from the service not as a result of physical disability.

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(b) Statement that the officer should be honorably discharged or discharged without specification as to the character thereof. (See paragraph 27a(1) and (2).)

(7) Observation and Treatment in Army Hospital. When it is recommended that the officer be placed in an Army hospital for observation and treatment, the reclassification board will forward the papers in triplicate to the convening authority with a recommendation to that effect. Pending outcome of hospitalization and receipt of report of the hospital disposition board or retiring board, proceedings will be suspended. Upon completion of hospitalization the officer and the papers in his case, including a copy of the report of the disposition board or retiring board, will be returned to the reclassification board. Further action will then be taken as follows:

(a) If the findings of the disposition board or the Army retiring board indicate that the officer may be returned to a duty status, reclassification proceedings will be continued. Upon completion of the reclassification proceedings the officer exercising reclassification jurisdiction will transmit the complete record of the reclassification proceedings to the War Department, through Headquarters, AAF, with an appropriate reference to the attached copy of disposition board or retiring board proceedings.

(b) If the findings of the Army retiring board indicate that the officer is physically incapacitated for further service (active) as a result of disability, further action will be taken in accordance with paragraph 30b.

(8) Return of the officer to former command for trial by court-martial.

(9) Other suitable action.

(10) An officer who is found to be inefficient or unsatisfactory and who has previously been found by a reclassification board to be inefficient or unsatisfactory in a different assignment, will be recommended for appropriate discharge.

e. Cases received by reclassification boards will be disposed of and returned to the convening authority within ten days of their receipt. When action has not been completed within this period, the letter of transmittal returning the case to the convening authority will explain the reasons therefor.

38. Action by Convening and Higher Authorities:

a. If, at the conclusion of a formal or informal hearing, and upon receipt of any recommendation of the reclassification board, the convening authority desires reassignment within his jurisdiction, he will take action under paragraph 25b.

b. An officer recommended for reassignment by a reclassification board will not be assigned to duty in a unit or installation under the commander who initially recommends his reclassification; and the type of assignment will adhere as far as practicable to that recommended by the reclassification board.

c. The following actions may be taken:

(1) In the convening authority approves a recommendation that the officer be reassigned to a command or activity under his jurisdiction, he will reassign the officer and comply with the provisions of paragraph 25b,(1).

(2) If the convening authority approves a recommendation that the officer be hospitalized as provided in paragraph 37d(7), he will transfer the officer and the records in triplicate in the case to the appropriate hospital.

(3) If the convening authority approves a recommendation of a reclassification board that the officer be returned to his former command for trial by court-martial, he will forward all records in the case to the officer exercising

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general court-martial jurisdiction for instructions. Pending receipt of these instructions, the officer concerned will remain under the jurisdiction of the convening authority approving the recommendation.

(4) Except as provided in e below, in cases in which the convening authority approves any recommendation of a reclassification board not mentioned in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) above, he will forward the completed records to The Adjutant General through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C., ATTENTION: Separations Section, Officers' Branch, Military Personnel Division, AC/AS-1, (records will be forwarded in triplicate) who will issue the necessary instructions, pending receipt of which the officer concerned will be retained under the jurisdiction of the convening authority. However, in an appropriate case and in order to expedite action, the convening authority may, with the written concurrence of the commander of any convenient command or installation not under the jurisdiction of the convening authority, reassign the officer to such command or installation without prior reference to The Adjutant General, in which case the completed records, together with a report of the action taken and the written concurrence of the commander concerned, will be forwarded through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C., ATTENTION: Separations Section, Officers' Branch, Military Personnel Division, AC/AS-1, to The Adjutant General.

d. It is the prerogative of the convening authority to make such recommendation as he deems appropriate, regardless of the recommendation of the reclassification board. Such authority has the right to approve or disapprove all or any part of the findings and recommendations of the board. The findings of such boards are in no manner binding on the convening or higher authority.

e. In all cases in which discharge of an officer of the National Guard of the United States or the removal from the active list of a Regular Army officer is recommended, the convening authority will take the action prescribed in paragraph 39, prior to forwarding the complete records to the War Department.

39. Other Actions in Certain Cases of Regular Army or National Guard Officers:

a. Discharge or Retirement of Regular Army Officers. When a reclassification board recommends the discharge or retirement of an officer of the Regular Army for reasons other than physical disability and the convening authority concurs in the recommendation, or when other action is recommended by the reclassification board and the convening authority is of the opinion that discharge or retirement is warranted for reasons other than physical:

(1) The officer recommended for discharge or retirement will be afforded the opportunity to indicate whether he desires to appear in person before a board convened under the provisions of Public Law 190, the Act of 29 July 1941 (55 Stat. 606) and, if eligible, to apply for voluntary retirement under provisions of AR 605-245, 17 June 1941.

(2) Upon receipt of statement from the officer concerned in compliance with (1) above, the complete record will be forwarded through the Commanding General, AAF, to The Adjutant General by the commander having reclassification jurisdiction.

(3) When the record is returned and if so directed, then upon receipt of directions, the convening authority will immediately convene a board of officers under the provisions of the cited act and order the officer concerned to appear before such board. The order appointing the board will clearly indicate that the board is convened "by order of the Secretary of War," under the provisions of the act cited, for the purpose of determining the suitability for retention on the active list of the Army of officers of the Regular Army appearing before it. This board will be composed of not less than five general officers of the Army of the United States, whose permanent commis-

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sions are in the Regular Army and whose Regular Army rank is senior to the officer appearing before them, and one or more recorders (of any grade and component) without vote.

b. Discharge of Officer of National Guard of the United States. Federally recognized officers of the National Guard of the United States will be ordered before a board of officers (efficiency board) convened under the provisions of section 76, National Defense Act, as amended. The order appointing the board will clearly indicate that it constitutes an "efficiency board" under the provisions of section 76, National Defense Act, as amended, and is convened "by order of the Secretary of War." This board will be composed of not less than five officers of the Regular Army or National Guard of the United States, or both, who are senior in rank (permanent and temporary) to the officer under investigation, one or more recorders without vote, and one or more defense counsels (of any grade and component). The membership of the board should be composed of at least fifty percent of officers of the National Guard of the United States, if available. When not available, an explanation to that effect will be included in the forwarding indorsement.

(1) Procedure of boards convened under b above, will conform in general with that prescribed in paragraph 37c.

(2) In addition to the consideration required by the provisions of section 76, National Defense Act, as amended, boards convened under b above, will include such recommendations under paragraph 37d, as are appropriate.

c. Procedure When Officers Are Not Available for Boards Mentioned in a and b above. When suitable officers are not available within the jurisdiction of the convening authority for the above-required boards, effort will be made to obtain the services of suitable officers by mutual arrangement with other commanders within the territorial limits of the service command or other reclassification jurisdiction. When suitable officers cannot be made available for such boards by mutual arrangement, the facts will be reported by air mail to The Adjutant General who will issue the instructions necessary to an expeditious conclusion of the case. In oversea theaters and other oversea commands where reclassification jurisdiction has been delegated to a subordinate, the superior commander will take appropriate action before reporting the facts to The Adjutant General.

d. Procedure of Boards Mentioned in a and b above. Procedure of boards mentioned in a and b above, will conform, in general, to that prescribed in paragraph 37c. Evidence introduced before them will include that introduced before the original reclassification board and any other available evidence desired by the board or the officer concerned, subject to the provisions of paragraph 37c(6). The findings and recommendations of the original reclassification board and the action of the convening authority thereon will be excluded. Recommendations of boards appointed under a and b above, are not limited in any way but will, in general, conform to those enumerated in paragraph 37d.

e. Action by Convening and Higher Authority in Case of Officers of Regular Army and National Guard of the United States. Action by convening and higher authorities upon proceedings of boards of officers convened in accordance with a and b above, will conform to that outlined in paragraph 38, except that the convening authority will not disapprove the proceedings of such boards when the findings are favorable to the officer concerned, but may make such comment or recommendation as he may desire concerning demotion to permanent grade and to retention on active duty.

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EXHIBIT A

CERTIFICATION OF OFFICERS' QUALIFICATIONS

Unit _____
Location _____
Date _____

Execute this form in DUPLICATE
ORIGINAL to officer qualification committee member
DUPLICATE retained by unit commander
(See separate instructions.)

66(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		(9)	(10)
					CO'S CERTIFICATE					
Officer's Name	Grade	Age	Exact Current duty assignment & applicable SSN	Primary MOS fr WD, AGO Form 66-2 (or 66-3)	Not over graded	Not unqual for current duty	Not unqual affecting performance	No habits or traits	Action recommended	Remarks

OFFICER QUALIFICATION COMMITTEE MEMBER'S NAME AND GRADE:

_____

SIGNED: _____
(signature of certifying commander)

_____
(printed name, grade, and command position of certifying commander)

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INSTRUCTIONS

Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are to be filled out completely by the officer having custody of the WD, AGO Form 66-2.

Column 1 - Place last name first, followed by first name and middle initial.

Column 2 - Use grade currently held by officer.

Column 3 - Show officer's age by last birthday.

Column 4 - Use principal duty currently assigned the officer, not the title of the authorized vacancy being filled.

Column 5 - Enter MOS number of most important MOS assigned to the officer on his WD, AGO Form 66-2.

Columns 6, 7, and 8 are to be filled in by the immediate superior of the officers whose names appear on the form. This will be the officer who is charged with the rendering of Efficiency Reports or the rendering of Manner of Performance ratings on the officers whose names appear on the form.

Column 6 - Refers to whether or not the officer is overgrade for his ability as an officer. If he is not considered overgrade, place a check (v) in the space. If he is considered overgrade, mark x.

Column 7 - Refers to whether or not the officer is qualified for his present duty assignment. If he is considered qualified, place a check (v) in the space. If he is not considered qualified, mark x.

Column 8 - Refers to whether or not the officer has habits and/or traits of character which actually or potentially affect his efficiency adversely. If it is considered that he does not possess such traits, place a check (v) in the space. If he does, mark x.

Columns 9 and 10 are to be filled in by the qualification committee.

Column 9 - Enter committee's recommended action.

Column 10 - Self explanatory.

GENERAL:

1. The entries appearing in columns 6, 7, and 8 will be certified to by the IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR of the officers listed on the form by signing the form in the space provided.

2. Only officers under the command of the same immediate superior will be listed on the form certified by him.

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DEMOTION FORMS

*(Request for demotion will be limited to those cases in which reclassification recommendations are based on deficiencies resulting from factors over which the officer has no control. Requests for demotion in cases in which reclassification recommendations are based on deficiencies resulting from factors over which the officer does have control will not be forwarded. However, in the latter case recommendations for demotion may be initiated and forwarded as provided in par 7b, AR 605-230.)

EXHIBIT B

VOLUNTARY REQUEST FOR DEMOTION (OFFICER ORIGINALLY APPOINTED AUS)

(When holding only a temporary appointment in the Army of the United States.)

SUBJECT: Voluntary Request* for Demotion

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces
(THRU: Channels)

1. I, John Doe, Major, AUS, 0-000000, have been informed by my commanding officer, pursuant to the provisions of AR 605-230, that I have been recommended for reclassification.

2. Therefore, under paragraph 13b, AR 605-230, I hereby request termination of my commission in the Army of the United States in my present grade and appointment to the grade of _____ in the Army of the United States. I agree to accept such lower grade and immediately be ordered to active duty in that status.

EXHIBIT C

VOLUNTARY REQUEST FOR DEMOTION (PERMANENT GRADES ONLY)

(When holding only a permanent appointment in the Officers' Reserve Corps or National Guard of the United States and not holding a higher temporary grade in the Army of the United States.)

SUBJECT: Voluntary Request* for Demotion

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces
(THRU: Channels)

1. I, John Doe, Major, Inf, ORC, 0-000000, have been informed by my commanding officer, pursuant to the provisions of AR 605-230, that I have been recommended for reclassification.

2. Therefore, under paragraph 13b, AR 605-230, I hereby voluntarily request relief from active duty in my present permanent grade in the (Officers' Reserve Corps or National Guard of the United States), without affecting that grade in the inactive status and appointment to the grade of _____ in the Army of the United States. I agree to accept such lower grade and immediately be ordered to active duty in that status.

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EXHIBIT D

VOLUNTARY REQUEST FOR DEMOTION (TEMPORARY GRADES)

(When holding a permanent appointment in the Regular Army Officers' Reserve Corps or National Guard of the United States and a higher temporary grade in the Army of the United States or in the Air Corps under the Act of 16 June 1936, or under Act of 16 February 1942 (Public Law 455).)

SUBJECT: Voluntary Request* for Demotion

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces
(THRU: Channels)

1. I, John Doe, Major, AUS (or AUS (AC)), 0-000000, have been informed by my commanding officer, pursuant to the provisions of AR 605-230, that I have been recommended for reclassification.

2. Therefore, under paragraph 13b, AR 605-230, I hereby request termination of my present temporary grade together with all other temporary grades between by present grade and the grade of _____(AUS, ORC, NG, or Regular Army as appropriate). I agree to accept immediately such appointment in lower grade and assume the duties thereof.

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EXHIBIT E

RESIGNATIONS SUBMITTED IN LIEU OF RECLASSIFICATION (HONORABLE)

SUBJECT: Tender of Resignation

TO: The Adjutant General (through channels)

1. I, John Doe, Major, AUS, 0000000, have been informed by my commanding officer pursuant to provisions of AR 605-230 that I have been recommended for reclassification.

2. Therefore, under the provisions of AR 605-275, I hereby voluntarily tender my resignation from the Army in lieu of reclassification.

3. I understand that this resignation, if accepted, will be accepted under honorable conditions, and I will be furnished a certificate of service.

4. I am entitled to _____ days accrued leave as of _____ (last day of preceding month).

*(Where the deficiency for which the officer is being recommended for reclassification results from factors over which he has no control, such as inability to learn or military inaptitude, the resignation should contain the statement in paragraph 3 above, and the indorsing commander may properly recommend discharge under honorable conditions.)

(See exhibit H for form of 1st indorsement.)

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EXHIBIT F

RESIGNATION IN LIEU OF RECLASSIFICATION (DISCHARGE WITHOUT SPECIFICATION AS TO THE CHARACTER THEREOF)

SUBJECT: Tender of Resignation

TO: The Adjutant General (through channels)

1. I, John Doe, Major, AUS, 0000000, have been informed by my commanding officer pursuant to provisions of AR 605-230 that I have been recommended for reclassification.

2. Therefore, under the provisions of AR 605-275, I hereby voluntarily tender my resignation from the Army in lieu of reclassification.

3. I understand that this resignation, if accepted, will be accepted without specification as to the character thereof and that this implies neither honorable nor dishonorable conditions.

4. I understand that I am not entitled to a certificate of service or mustering-out pay and will not be granted accrued leave.

*(When the deficiency for which the officer is being recommended for reclassification results from factors over which he has control, such as laziness or drunkenness, the resignation should contain the statement in paragraph 3 above, and the indorsing commander must recommend "discharge without specification as to the character thereof." When the term is used, the individual will not receive a certificate of service or mustering-out pay and will not be granted accrued leave. The term is not synonymous with "for the convenience of the Government" or "for the good of the service."

(See exhibit H for form of 1st indorsement.)

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EXHIBIT G

RESIGNATION IN LIEU OF TRIAL BY COURT-MARTIAL
(for the good of the service)*

SUBJECT: Tender of Resignation

TO: The Adjutant General (through channels)

1. Under the provisions of AR 605-275, I hereby voluntarily tender my resignation from the Army for the good of the service in lieu of trial by court-martial.

2. I understand that this resignation, if accepted, will be accepted for the good of the service, and my separation from the Army will be considered as under other than honorable conditions.

3. I understand that I will not be entitled to a certificate of service or mustering-out pay and will not be granted accrued leave.

4. I understand that I will be barred from all rights, based upon the period of service from which I will be separated by acceptance of this resignation, under any laws administered by the Veterans Administration, except that this provision does not apply to any war risk, Government (converted), or National service life insurance policy.

*(A resignation for the good of the service ordinarily will not be accepted where the offense or offenses with which the officer is, or may be, charged would warrant imposition by a general court-martial of punishment more severe than dismissal from the service.)

(See exhibit I for form of 1st indorsement.)

NOTE

Resignations tendered while under suspended sentence of dismissal will so state and will be tendered under Form D, AR 605-275.

Resignations tendered by reason of Cir 385, WD, 1945, will be submitted in lieu of trial by court-martial "for the good of the service" under the provisions of AR 605-275. (See exhibit G above.)

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EXHIBIT H

COMMANDER'S INDORSEMENT TO VOLUNTARY RESIGNATIONS IN LIEU OF RECLASSIFICATION

1. Officer is not (or "is") in the category covered by par 6a(1), AR 605-275. (If officer is in this category, state circumstances in full.)

2. There has not (or "has") been report of any recent misconduct, not shown herein on the part of this officer. (If there has been, report will accompany resignation or if discovered subsequently will be reported to War Department by wire with information copies to all intermediate commanders.)

3. Officer is not (or "is") accountable or responsible for public property or funds. (If he is, the requirements of par 5c(2) and (3), AR 605-275, must be met.)

4. Officer is to be separated from the service not as a result of physical disability.

5. A decision to reclassify subject officer has been reached for the following reasons (or state as follows when formal reclassification has been initiated: "Reclassification proceedings have been instituted for the following reasons, but are now suspended per par 13c, AR 605-230"):

(For example only)

a. Undesirable habits or traits of character as evidenced by:

(1) Three (3) occasions of absence without leave in past two (2) months.

(2) Chronic alcoholism.

b. Lack of proficiency as a commissioned officer as evidenced by:

(1) Lack of leadership.

(2) Inability to learn.

6. A report of interview required by par 6d(2), AR 605-230, is attached.

7. It is recommended that the resignation be accepted and subject officer be discharged under honorable conditions (or "discharged without specification as to the character thereof"). (If the term "discharged without specification as to the character thereof" is used, state that officer has been informed that such separation is because he has exhibited misconduct or undesirable habits or traits of character, which do not properly allow recommendation for an honorable discharge; and that he is not entitled to a Certificate of Service or mustering-out pay and will not be granted accrued leave.)

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EXHIBIT I

COMMANDER'S INDORSEMENT TO VOLUNTARY RESIGNATIONS SUBMITTED IN LIEU OF TRIAL BY COURT-MARTIAL "FOR THE GOOD OF THE SERVICE"

1. Officer is not (or "is") in the category covered by par 6a(1), AR 605-275. (If officer is in this category, state circumstances in full.)

2. There has not (or "has") been report of any recent misconduct, not shown herein on the part of this officer. (If there has been, report will accompany resignation or if discovered subsequently will be reported to War Department by wire with information copies to all intermediate commanders.)

3. Officer is not (or "is") accountable or responsible for public property or funds. (If he is, the requirements of par 5c(2) and (3), AR 605-275, must be met.)

4. Officer is to be separated from the service not as a result of physical disability.

5. Court-martial proceedings have been instituted for the following reasons, but are now suspended per par 4, AR 605-275:

(For example only)

a. Violation of 95th Article of War.

(1) Being grossly drunk and conspiciously disorderly in a public place.

b. Attached herewith as inclosures are charge sheets, statements of the substance of the testimony of witnesses who have been examined, statement of investigating officer, and other documentary evidence in this case. (In the case of officers resigning by reason of Cir 385, WD, 1945, the report and recommendation of the examining psychiatrist will also be included.)

6. There is no reasonable ground for the belief that the accused is, or was, at the time of his misconduct, mentally defective, deranged, or abnormal.

7. It is recommended that the resignation be accepted and subject officer be discharged "for the good of the service." This officer has been informed that such separation is because he has committed an offense (or offenses) punishable by court-martial, which does not properly allow recommendation for an honorable discharge; that he is not entitled to Certificate of Service or mustering-out pay and will not be granted accrued leave; and that he will be barred from all rights, based upon the period of service from which he will be separated by acceptance of this resignation, under any laws administered by the Veterans Administration, except that this provision does not apply to any war risk, Government (converted), or National service life insurance policy.

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EXHIBIT I

FORM A

RECOMMENDATION FOR RECLASSIFICATION BOARD ACTION

TO: (Commanding officer of next higher echelon of command)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Reclassification Board Action

Doe	John	Henry	0-111112
(Last Name)	(First)	(Middle)	(Serial Number)

1st Lieutenant	Air Corps
(Grade)	(Arm or Service)

1061st Base Hq & Air Base Sqdn	White	10 August 1906
(Organization)	(Race)	(Date of Birth)

1. Date of recommendation: (This date must agree with closing date of duty period on Form 66-2 (66-3) and Efficiency Report.)

2. Explanation in detail of reasons for the recommendation: (for example)

   a. This officer possesses habits and traits of character which make his retention in the service undesirable as shown by his conduct in the city of Blank, Wisconsin, on the evening of 25 September 1946, which is described in sworn statements attached hereto as inclosures 1, 2, and 3.

   b. This officer is unreliable and inattentive to duty as indicated by his action on the dates of 10 April 1946, 21 May 1946, and 10 June 1946, as described in detail in sworn statements attached hereto as inclosures 4, 5, and 6.

   c. This officer lacks leadership as indicated by occurrences on 13 August 1946, and 22 August 1946, described in detail in sworn statements attached hereto as inclosures 7 and 8.

(Note: The above are examples. Note that specific allegations must be made and each allegation must be supported by sworn statements of witnesses describing occurrences in detail. Where opinion evidence is relied upon and is based upon inspection reports and reports of subordinates, copies of reports will be inclosed. Where the officer has been notified of his deficiencies and has failed to show improvement thereafter, the facts will be noted and amplified in the accompanying sworn statements.

3. Inclosed are sworn statements of the following witnesses who have knowledge of the facts: (List by name, grade, serial number, organization, station, and duty assignment for each witness.)

4. Duty, if any, for which suited:
(State "none" or give a specific duty recommendation.)

5. Remarks and recommendations:
(List here any opinions or facts not covered above which would be of assistance in aiding higher commanders or the reclassification board in reaching a decision. These statements need not be supported by evidence. A specific recommendation with reference to reassignment and/or demotion or discharge, etc., will be made with reasons therefor. In any event, a statement that reassignment of the officer

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has been fully considered and deemed impossible for the reasons given under paragraph 2 of Form A, will be included.)

RICHARD ROE
Major, Air Corps
Commanding Officer
1061st Base Hq & Air Base Sqdn

Inclosures:
1-Special Efficiency Report (Quadruplicate)
2-WD, AGO Form 66-2 (66-3) (Original)
3-Sworn statement of Capt James Blank (Quadruplicate)
4-Etc. (List each sworn statement separately, including any sworn statements which the officer may desire to submit in his own behelf.) (Quadruplicate)

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EXHIBIT K

FORM B

PROCEEDINGS FOR RECLASSIFICATION* BOARDS

Record of a reclassification* board in the case of _____

INDEX

Testimony

Name of Witness	Direct, page	Cross, page	Redirect, page	Examination by board, page	Recalled, page

Exhibits

	No.	Page where introduced
Orders appointing board		
Deposition of		
Affidavit of		
Letter from		
Form A		
Report of interview		
Efficiency report		
WD, AGO Form 63 or 64 (Report of Physical Examination) (if directed)		
WD, AGO Form 66-2 or 66-3 (Officers' Qualification Record)		

Proceedings of a reclassification* board which convened at _____ pursuant to the following order(s). (See exhibit(s).)

(Place)

(date)

The board met pursuant to the foregoing order(s) at _____
(Time)

Present: (Name those present.)
Absent: (Name those absent and authority for absence.)
The board proceeded with the case of _____
(Name and grade of officer concerned)

who, appearing before the board, introduced _____ as

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counsel (or who stated, upon being asked by the recorded, that he did not desire counsel).

_____ was sworn as reporter.

The order appointing the board (and order or orders modifying the detail, if any) was (were) read to _____ and he was asked if he objected to any member present named therein sitting as a member of the board in this case. The officer concerned stated that he did not desire to object to any member present named in the order (or made objection as follows):

(If objection is made, the record will show the answer of the member objected to, and that the member objected to, the recorder, the reporter, the officer concerned and his counsel, if any, withdrew, and that the board was closed. Upon reopening the board, the president will announce the decision of the board, and decision will be made of record. After all objections have been made and met, the record will continue.)

The members of the board and the recorder were then sworn. (For form of oath, see AW 100, substituting the word "board" for "court."

The recorder then read to the board Form A (Recommendation for Reclassification Board Action). The officer concerned was then informed that he was afforded an opportunity to introduce evidence pertinent to the case; that he could take the stand in his own behalf or submit a sworn or unsworn statement.

(Here record a summary of all testimony and attach all documents. Care will be exercised that all pertinent testimony and only pertinent testimony is included in this summary. Any witness will be sworn, and the record will so indicate. (See AW 101 and par 3, AW 19.) In case the officer concerned does not desire to call any available witnesses, submit any evidence in the nature of documents, take the stand, or submit a statement, the record will so show.)

The officer having stated that he had no further evidence to offer, the board was then closed, and after mature consideration submits the following:

a. Findings of Fact: (To include specific finding as to whether or not the officer was unsatisfactory or inefficient in the assignment forming the basis for initiation of reclassification.):

_____

b. Discussion: _____

c. Conclusions: _____

d. Recommendation: In view of the above, the board recommends _____

_____

This case was received by the board on _____ (Date), a hearing was held on _____ (Date), and the findings and recommendations were made on _____ (Date).

The board then at _____ (Time), _____ (Date) proceeded to other business. (Or, adjourned until _____ (Time), _____ (Date)) (or adjourned to meet at the call of of the president.)

_____
President

_____
Recorder

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EXHIBIT L

FORM C

SUBJECT: Personal Interview of Officer Recommended for Reclassification under AR 600-230

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C. (Through command channels)

1. Report of interview.
   a. By-

_____ _____ _____ _____
(Name of interviewer) (Grade) (Arm or service) (Serial No.)

_____ _____
(Present assignment) (Command relationship to respondent)

   b. Of-

_____ _____ _____ _____
(Name of respondent) (Grade) (Arm or service) (Serial No.)

_____
(Present assignment)

   c. Who has been recommended for reclassification by-

_____ _____ _____ _____
(Name) (Grade) (Arm or service) (Serial No.)

_____ _____
(Present assignment) (Command relationship to respondent)

2. Date of interview: _____
3. Respondent was advised of his privilege to tender his resignation under the provisions of AR 605-275, or, if appropriate, to request demotion.
4. Statements of the initiating officer.-a. Detailed summary of reasons for recommending reclassification: _____
   b. Respondent should be-(Indicate "yes" or "no" in each case.)
      (1) Separated from the service _____
      (2) Reassigned _____
   c. If answer to b (2) above, is "yes" recommend an appropriate position and include a definite statement as to the positions respondent is capable of filling and his qualifications therefor: _____
5. Statements of respondent.-a. With reference to 3: _____
   b. With reference to 4a: _____
   c. With reference to 4b: _____
   d. With reference to 4c: _____
6. Statements of interviewing officer.-a. General summary of principal points in question: _____
   b. Recommendation of action to be taken: _____
   c. Recommendation of appropriate assignment for respondent: _____
7. Signature of recommending officer: _____
8. Signature of respondent: _____
9. Signature of interviewer: _____

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counsel (or who stated, upon being asked by the recorded, that he did not desire counsel).

_____ was sworn as reporter.

The order appointing the board (and order or orders modifying the detail, if any) was (were) read to _____ and he was asked if he objected to any member present named therein sitting as a member of the board in this case. The officer concerned stated that he did not desire to object to any member present named in the order (or made objection as follows):

(If objection is made, the record will show the answer of the member objected to, and that the member objected to, the recorder, the reporter, the officer concerned and his counsel, if any, withdrew, and that the board was closed. Upon reopening the board, the president will announce the decision of the board, and decision will be made of record. After all objections have been made and met, the record will continue.)

The members of the board and the recorder were then sworn. (For form of oath, see AW 100, substituting the word "board" for "court."

The recorder then read to the board Form A (Recommendation for Reclassification Board Action). The officer concerned was then informed that he was afforded an opportunity to introduce evidence pertinent to the case; that he could take the stand in his own behalf or submit a sworn or unsworn statement.

(Here record a summary of all testimony and attach all documents. Care will be exercised that all pertinent testimony and only pertinent testimony is included in this summary. Any witness will be sworn, and the record will so indicate. (See AW 101 and par 3, AW 19.) In case the officer concerned does not desire to call any available witnesses, submit any evidence in the nature of documents, take the stand, or submit a statement, the record will so show.)

The officer having stated that he had no further evidence to offer, the board was then closed, and after mature consideration submits the following:

a. Findings of Fact: (To include specific finding as to whether or not the officer was unsatisfactory or inefficient in the assignment forming the basis for initiation of reclassification.):

_____

b. Discussion: _____

c. Conclusions: _____

d. Recommendation: In view of the above, the board recommends _____

_____

This case was received by the board on _____ (Date), a hearing was held on _____ (Date), and the findings and recommendations were made on _____ (Date).

The board then at _____ (Time), _____ (Date) proceeded to other business. (Or, adjourned until _____ (Time), _____ (Date)) (or adjourned to meet at the call of of the president.)

_____
President

_____
Recorder

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*The words, "reclassification board" will be deleted, and the words "efficiency board" will be substituted in appropriate cases. (See par 11b(2), AR 605-230.)

INSTRUCTIONS

Findings of facts should be clear and concise. The discussion should be confined to the evidence presented in the hearing. The board will include under "Discussion" a statement setting forth its impression of the officer as to demeanor, attitude, intelligence, alertness, and sincerity. The conclusions should flow logically from the evidence. The recommendation should be definite and in accord with the conclusions.

The officer may be furnished a copy of the proceedings, exclusive of the findings of fact, discussion, conclusions, and recommendations of the board or higher authority.

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EXHIBIT L

FORM C

SUBJECT: Personal Interview of Officer Recommended for Reclassification under AR 600-230

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C. (Through command channels)

1. Report of interview.
   a. By-

_____ _____ _____ _____
(Name of interviewer) (Grade) (Arm or service) (Serial No.)

_____ _____
(Present assignment) (Command relationship to respondent)

   b. Of-

_____ _____ _____ _____
(Name of respondent) (Grade) (Arm or service) (Serial No.)

_____
(Present assignment)

   c. Who has been recommended for reclassification by-

_____ _____ _____ _____
(Name) (Grade) (Arm or service) (Serial No.)

_____ _____
(Present assignment) (Command relationship to respondent)

2. Date of interview: _____
3. Respondent was advised of his privilege to tender his resignation under the provisions of AR 605-275, or, if appropriate, to request demotion.
4. Statements of the initiating officer.-a. Detailed summary of reasons for recommending reclassification: _____
   b. Respondent should be-(Indicate "yes" or "no" in each case.)
      (1) Separated from the service _____
      (2) Reassigned _____
   c. If answer to b (2) above, is "yes" recommend an appropriate position and include a definite statement as to the positions respondent is capable of filling and his qualifications therefor: _____
5. Statements of respondent.-a. With reference to 3: _____
   b. With reference to 4a: _____
   c. With reference to 4b: _____
   d. With reference to 4c: _____
6. Statements of interviewing officer.-a. General summary of principal points in question: _____
   b. Recommendation of action to be taken: _____
   c. Recommendation of appropriate assignment for respondent: _____
7. Signature of recommending officer: _____
8. Signature of respondent: _____
9. Signature of interviewer: _____

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
STAFF CONFERENCE NOTES

VOLUME I NUMBER 31 30 August 1946

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF'S REPORT:

Expenditures for temporary duty travel has been totalling $80,000 a week. This included personnel going to school, paying per diem while at school, various demonstrations, inspections, etc. The command spent $480,000 the first 7 weeks of this quarter. There is $18,000 remaining in the temporary duty fund of this command which will have to cover all expenditures through next month.

A-1 REPORT:

The Armed Forces School at Norfolk, Virginia, is scheduled to open 1 February 1947. Nominations for attendance will be received through 1 October 1946.

A-3 REPORT:

The Airborne - Troop Carrier Conference held here last week with representatives of the 82d Airborne Division and Army Ground Forces enabled us to work out a program for the calendar year 1947. Joint Staff exercises are being planned with the Airborne Division. A board was informally set up consisting of a representative from each of the following: Headquarters Army Ground Forces, 82d Airborne Division, Headquarters TAC, and Third Air Force. This board will function as a recommending and inspection agency on joint Airborne - Troop Carrier matters.

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AIF

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

T.C 210.8 (2 Oct 46)

2 October 1946

SUBJECT: Reduction in Officer Strength

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters

1. Air mail message, this headquarters, AIF 1213, 20 September 1946, amended by message, this headquarters, AIF 1800, 30 September 1946, and supplemented by message, this headquarters, AIF 1873, 26 September 1946, establishes the policy and outlines the procedure by which officer personnel may request permission to change their category statement. Message, this headquarters, AIG 1538, 25 September 1946, as amended by message, this headquarters, AIG 1797, 25 September 46 and supplemented by message, this headquarters AIG 1789, 28 September 1946, outlines the procedure whereby all volunteer officers may request immediate release from active duty, regardless of category, provided they meet the requirements of separation criteria outlined therein.

2. Recent personnel surveys indicate that approximately 50 per cent of category II, III, IV, V, VI and VII officers will request change to category I or VIII under provisions of message this headquarters, AIF 1213, and that this number will far exceed those officers in category I and VIII who will request immediate relief from active duty under provisions of message this headquarters AIG 1538. This situation will cause the command to be overstrength under projected authorizations and decidedly surplus in officers, especially rated, for whom neither present nor future assignments exist. Limitations in budgetary expenditures make it imperative that each commander eliminate all surplus personnel and restrict officer personnel to the minimum requirement necessary to accomplish their assigned missions.

3. All requests for change of category will be reviewed by a board of officers at this headquarters. Approval of these requests will be limited to only those officers who are presently performing duty in one of the critical specialities listed below. These critical specialities are as follows

0110	0430	4470	6110	7888	8103	9511
0130	0500	4532	6200	7914	8120	9600
0140	0602	4512	6201	7915	8125	9605
0141	0600	4514	6302	7916	8205	9610
0145	0612	4541	6402	7917	8218	
0160	1014	4805	7050	7960	8219	
0200	1337	4960	7010	7970	9300	
0400	4402	4880	7130	8101	9301	
0410	4415	5310	7314		9307	

(Effective until 2 April 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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medical officers, linguists and officers listed in Circular 321, WD, 1945, as amended by Circular 48, WD, 1946. Requests for change of category submitted by general service nonrated company grade officers holding any of the following MOS's must be submitted by this headquarters to Headquarters AAF for final decision if disapproved:

0142	0222	0501	2200	4010	7100	7303	7720	7790	7864
0210	0224	0502	2201	4400	7105	7539	7723	7800	7870
0213	0260	2110	2210	4410	7110	7700	7724	7820	0225
0211	0420	2120	2520	4808	7120	7701	7730	7830	7770
0220	0424	2150	2622	7004	7140	7702	7740	7860	
0121	0425	2162	2680	7020	7242	7710	7760	7862	

4. Upon completion of the above change in category program it is expected that there will still be a surplus of officers. It is therefore believed that another separation of surplus officers program, similar to that initiated in May 1946, may be inaugurated in late October or early November.

5. Commanders will make proper plans and preparations for the impending drastic reduction in officer personnel.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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IMMEDIATE ACTION
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A1

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC 210.8 (19 Oct 46)

19 October 1946

SUBJECT: Relief from Active Duty of AAF Officers and Warrant Officers

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases, Groups, Base Units, and Separate Squadrons assigned TAC (including those assigned numbered air forces)

1. The accomplishment of this directive is the most critical assignment all commanders have had during the demobilization period. The following procedure does not reflect command requirements or authorizations, but are dictated by stringent budgetary limitations which require immediate drastic action. This communication will be brought to the personal attention of each commander immediately upon its receipt.

2. You will take immediate action to recommend for relief from active duty, under provisions of section II, Circular 290, WD, 1945, 60% of all officers assigned your command as of receipt of this letter. Warrant officers are to be included in this total and are hereinafter referred to as officers. Regular Army and Medical Department personnel will not be recommended for relief from active duty under this directive except as indicated in paragraph 6b below for medical officers. Officers presently assigned your station who are currently awaiting separation for any reason, including those who have departed but are still carried on the morning report awaiting EDCMR, are to be considered in the total strength from which the 60% is selected and will be considered a part of the 60%. For example, 100 officers are assigned as of date of receipt of this letter, 10 of whom are awaiting separation; separation quota would be 60 officers but since 10 are currently awaiting separation only 50 must actually be recommended for relief from active duty at this time. While the number of officers so recommended will be in excess to those actually to be relieved, it is necessary that this headquarters require you to recommend a small overage in order to allow adequate screening of all of the qualifications of all officers within the TAC who are considered for relief in comparison with all others assigned. A system of pointing out those who should receive most careful consideration is provided in paragraph 6d.

3. The above action will result in reducing the assigned strength of TAC to approximately 70% of its present overall officer authorization. It is realized that this reduction will place certain units in a personnel status that will render their effectiveness far below that which is desired. Such

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action, however, is absolutely necessary and must be accomplished without exception. Personnel adjustments will be made upon completion of the program. This action will produce one gratifying result, however; that of allowing commanders to select the officers retained which should assure the retention of the outstanding officers of the air forces.

4. To effect a fair cross-sectional elimination of all officers within this command, it will be necessary to recommend officers for relief from active duty at all stations and units and not confine recommendations to installations where current surpluses exist. Careful attention must be given by both the immediate commander and each higher headquarters in order to select officers in all grades for separation so that the net result will leave substantially the same proportion of field grade officers in comparison to company grade officers. The ratio of rated and nonrated officers relieved from active duty will be in the ratio of one for one, or 50% rated and 50% nonrated. Officers undergoing formal school training should be carefully screened under the same criteria as other officers. They will not be considered surplus solely because they are presently in a student status. Your selection of officers to be relieved should receive careful and deliberate consideration of each individual officer's category, age, efficiency ratings, versatility, retrainability, social, educational, professional qualifications, potentialities, and future value to the service. Substandard or marginal producers must be eliminated and only the very best officers retained. Outstanding individuals whose records indicate that they are capable of performing many diversified duties capably should be retained. Commanders should not be influenced by marital, financial or personal consideration and retain officers who would otherwise be selected for release. Action will be taken to relieve all category II officers who have elected to remain on active duty until the termination of their contract inasmuch as these officers are already potential losses. Over-age in grade and limited service officers should only be retained in exceptional cases.

5. Directives recently issued from this headquarters have accelerated the separation of:

a. All nonregular Army officers (except Medical Department personnel) who previously signed category I, II, VI, VII, or VIII statements and who submitted a written request for relief prior to 10 October 1946, provided they meet service requirements of the readjustment regulations.

b. All nonregular Army officers who previously signed category III, IV, or V statements, and who either desire immediate release or whose present desire to remain on active duty through changing their category is not approved. For planning purposes, pending receipt of final action on applications (which is being expedited) it should be assumed that only those cases involving critical primary MOS's listed in letter, this headquarters, file TAC 210.8 (2 Oct 46), dated 2 October 1946, subject: "Reduction of Officer Strength," will be approved.

6. The following instructions will be used as a guide in the preparation

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of recommendations and approval of release of officers from active duty:

a. This headquarters has final approving authority in the separation of officers recommended for relief from active duty under the provisions of this letter with the exception of nonrated officers possessing certain scarce primary MOS's listed in Inclosure 1.

b. In order to accelerate action hereunder and reduce administrative effort, base commanders are hereby authorized to reassign any nonregular Army officer, except medical officers, regarless of category or MOS whose efficiency index computed under AAF Letter 35-309 is below 35.00 for company grade or below 40.00 for field grade to an appropriate separation facility for relief from active duty under the provisions of RR 1-1. This action may be taken without resort to the administrative processing required by paragraph 6c below. Any medical officer whom you desired to release under this provision will be reported to this headquarters for final decision. All releases of this nature will be accomplished in sufficient time so that officers affected will be on orders for reassignment to separation facilities prior to 31 October 1946, even though effective date of reassignment may fall at later date. Orders will be issued on such officers assigning them to appropriate separation facilities with EDCMR prior to 31 October 1946. Such officers will depart for separation facility in sufficient time to arrive on the accomodation date furnished by the separation facility commander. Officers released under the provisions of this paragraph will be credited as part of the required reduction of your command. Copies of orders reassigning such personnel to separation facilities will be forwarded to this headquarters in the manner prescribed in paragraph 6d below.

c. Company grade officers with efficiency indices above 35.00 and field grade officers with efficiency indices above 40.00 to be recommended for relief from active duty will be notified in accordance with model letter attached as Inclosure 2 and who will reply by 1st Indorsement as indicated on Inclosure 2, with the exception that those nonrated officers possessing primary MOS's as listed in Inclosure 1 will receive a letter similar to model letter attached as Inclosure 3, and who will reply by 1st Indorsement as indicated on Inclosure 3. The 1st Indorsement to Inclosure 3 will include the statement that he does, or does not, desire service with the other arms and services of the Army, and if he does desire such services, he will list his desired branches in the order of preference. Model of the immediate commander's letter of recommendation is attached as Inclosure 4 and will be accomplished in all cases, even though the actual forwarding is by letter of transmittal required by paragraph 6d below. Succeeding indorsements to this headquarters on the letter of transmittal will indicate each commander's recommendation for approval, or, in the event of disapproval, reasons therefor will be indicated.

d. Each base commander will consolidate all recommendations hereunder and transmit them by letter of transmittal through command channels to this headquarters. The letter of transmittal will list all officers recommended for relief in order of the desired priority of release, the first name on the list being the officer the commanders least desire for retention. Concurrence of

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group and separate unit commanders assigned to the station will be indicated by their signatures on letter of transmittal. Attached to this letter of transmittal and listed in a separate paragraph will be copies of orders reassigning officers present on the station awaiting separation to appropriate separation facilities. (These officers will be credited in the percentage indicated in paragraph 2 above.) In this manner all separations being, and to be, accomplished at the base will be covered by one letter of transmittal and the total recommendations transmitted plus copies of orders enclosed will equal the required reduction.

7. Immediate, forceful, and continuous action on this letter will be initiated in order that recommendations for relief from active duty of all officers contemplated will be received at this headquarters not later than midnight, 6 November 1946. In order to assure prompt delivery of recommendations as required, commanders are authorized to dispatch their letters of transmittal to appropriate headquarters by military aircraft where necessary.

8. Due to the extreme shortage of time and close deadline dates established by Headquarters AAF for this program, this directive is addressed direct to commanders of all bases, groups, base units, and separate squadrons within the TAC. Subordinate air force commanders may implement this program as deemed necessary; however, it is directed that action hereunder receive highest priority in all echelons and that established deadline dates be met without exceptio

9. It is desired to forcefully reemphasize the necessity for the elimination of weak, mediocre officers in this reduction program. None of the requirements stated herein with regard to grades, rated or nonrated categories, or other restrictive measures, will operate to prevent this being accomplished. Commanders in all echelons will pay particular attention to this phase of the program.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAMS:

4 Incls
Exhibits A, B, C, and D

WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

INFO COPIES TO ALL UNITS NOT ADDRESSEES

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EXHIBIT A

AAF AND WAR DEPARTMENT LIST OF CRITICAL NONRATED OFFICER PRIMARY MOS's

Part A

General Provisions and Instructions for Use of Subsequent Lists of Critical nonrated Officer Primary MOS's in Part B and Part C

1. The list of officer primary MOS's in Part B and Part C below will be used by your command in screening recommendations into three groups as follows:

a. Recommendations on which Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, has final approval authority. (This includes all officers who do not have primary MOS's listed in Part B or Part C.)

b. Recommendations which must be forwarded to the CG, AAF for either final decision or additional referral by the AAF to the War Department.

2. These lists will be used by immediate commanders in both interviewing and notifying nonrated officers recommended for relief from active duty who are eligible for reassignment to either the AAF or other Arms and Services of the War Department so that they may state whatever desires for reassignment they have in order of preference.

3. Nonrated officers who possess primary MOS's critical only to the AAF will be notified that any request for reassignment and retention on active duty with other Arms or Services will not be favorably considered.

4. Nonrated officers who, in accordance with these lists, are eligible for reassignment either within the AAF or to other Arms or Services will be informed that they may request reassignment either in the AAF alone or to any other Arm or Service of the War Department.

Part B

Nonrated Officer Primary MOS's Critical to the AAF

(Recommendations for relief from active duty of nonrated officers qualified to perform duty in the following primary MOS's must be forwarded to Hq AAF for final decision.)

0110	0503	4541	7010	8103
0130	0600	4805	7130	8120
0140	0612	4880	7314	8125
0141	1014	4960	7888	8205
0145	1337	5310	7914	8218
0160	4402	6110	7915	8219
0200	4415	6200	7916	9300
0400	4470	6201	7917	9301
0410	4512	6302	7960	9307
0430	4514	6402	7970	9511
0500	4532	7050	8101	9600
				9605
				9610

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Part C

Nonrated Officer Primary MOS's Critical to the WD

(Recommendations for relief from active duty of nonrated officers qualified to perform duty in the following MOS's must be forwarded to the AAF for referral to the War Department.)

1. Nonrated Officers in all Grades:

Linguists
2401
2402

---- Nonrated officers and warrant officers who have experience or training in statutory renegotiation activities.

---- Nonrated officers and warrant officers who have experience or training in contract termination and property disposal activities.

---- Civil Affairs or Military Government nonrated officers who are assigned in occupied territories or who are in training for such assignment (excludes CA officer, Internal Security, SSN 9246)

2. General Service Nonrated Officers in Company Grades Only:(Primary MOS)

0140	0260	2120	4470	7140	7760
0141	0300	2150	4514	7242	7770
0142	0420	2102	4805	7303	7790
0145	0410	2200	4808	7539	7800
0200	0430	2201	4880	7700	7820
0210	0434	2210	7004	7701	7830
0213	0435	2520	7010	7702	7860
0214	0500	2622	7020	7710	7862
0220	0501	2680	7100	7720	7864
0221	0502	4010	7105	7723	7870
0222	0503	4400	7110	7724	7888
0224	1337	4410	7120	7730	7914
0225	2110	4415	7130	7740	7915
					7916
					7917

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EXHIBIT B

NOTIFICATION OF RECOMMENDATION FOR RELIEF FROM ACTIVE DUTY

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Relief from Active Duty

TO: (Officer Concerned)

1. Reference is made to Section II, Circular 290, WD, 1945, as amended by Section III, Circular 44, WD 1946.

2. After careful consideration, it has been decided to recommend that you be relieved from active duty under the provisions of Section II of the above cited Circular. This recommendation is based on a reduction in organizational strength of officers of this command due to stringent limitations which have been placed on budgetary allowances alloted to the AAF. Therefore, it is suggested that you make necessary arrangements which will be required for your return to inactive status. This action has not been taken on the basis of military performance you have rendered but because of required reduction in the current officer strength of this command.

3. It is regretted that this action is mandatory and I wish to express the appreciation of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces for the honorable and faithful service you have rendered during your tour of active duty.

4. Provided you are placed on an inactive status you may apply to The Adjutant General for recall to active duty at a later date, should a need exist for additional officers in the Armed Forces. Widest publicity will be given through appropriate press releases when vacancies occur. Therefore, it is suggested that you apply for a commission in the Officers Reserve Corps and utilize existing means to retain your military proficiency should you desire to make your services available in a military capacity at a future time.

5. It is desired that this letter be acknowledged by indorsement within one (1) day of its receipt together with any remarks that you wish to make. This letter and your indorsement thereto will then be forwarded to the appropriate Headquarters for final decision.

_____
(Signature of immediate commander.)

_____
(Name, Rank, ASN and Organization.)

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1st Ind.

(From officer concerned)

TO: (Immediate Commander)

1. Receipt acknowledged.

2. (This paragraph may be used by officer for any remarks he desires to make.)

_____
(Signature of officer)

_____
(Name, Rank, NSN and Organization)

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EXHIBIT C

NOTIFICATION OF RECOMMENDATION FOR RELIEF FROM ACTIVE DUTY

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Relief from Active Duty

TO: (Officer Concerned)

1. Reference is made to Section II, Circular 290, WD, 1945 as amended by Section III, Circular 44, WD, 1946.

2. After careful consideration, it has been decided to recommend that you be relieved from active duty under the provisions of Section II of the above cited Circular. This recommendation is based on a reduction in organizational strength of officers of this command due to stringent limitations which have been placed on budgetary allowances allotted to the AAF. You are advised that this action is not final, since there are existing requirements in (the AAF) (other Branches of the Service outside the AAF) (both the AAF and other Branches of the Service)* for officers of your grade and qualifications. Therefore, should you desire to remain on active duty, it is requested that you state your assignment preference, together with your qualifications, in order of preference when you return this letter to me by first indorsement.

3. It is desired that this letter be acknowledged by indorsement within one (1) day of its receipt together with any remarks that you wish to make, in addition to your assignment preferences and a list of your qualifications. This letter and your indorsement thereto will then be forwarded to the headquarters authorized to make final decision on such recommendations.

_____
(Signature of immediate commander)

_____
(Name, Rank, ASN and Organization)

1st Ind.

(From officer concerned)

TO: Immediate Commander

1. Receipt acknowledged.

2. Provided that I am found surplus to the needs of the AAF, it is requested that I be considered for assignment to the following Arm(s) or Service(s) in the order of preference stated and in the MOS's which I have listed.

3. (This paragraph may be used by officer for any additional remarks he desires to make.)

(Signature of officer)
(Name, Rank, ASN, and Organization)

*Use only applicable phrase.

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EXHIBIT D

RECOMMENDATION FOR RELIEASE OF A SURPLUS OFFICER DESIRING RETENTION

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Relief from Active Duty of a Surplus Officer

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

THROUGH: Channels

1. It is recommended that (name, rank, serial number, and arm or service) be relieved from active duty under the provisions of Section II, Cir 290, WD, 1945.

2. The following information is furnished on the above named officer:

a. Date the officer reported on extended active duty, his age, adjusted service rating score as of 2 September 1945, and his duty assignments for which he is qualified by training and experience and by civilian occupational background are contained in appropriate items on a complete and up-to-date copy of his qualification record (WD, AGO Form 66-2) and his indorsement of reply to notification, which are attached to this letter.

b. The desire of this officer is indicated in his indorsement to attached letter of notification with reference to continuation of active duty. (See inclosure 2.)

c. A surplus exists in this command of officers of his particular grade or any higher grade who are qualified to fill the aforementioned duty assignments. With no reflection on the officer, he is deemed to be nonessential to any future needs of this command, as based on the present tentative troop basis.

d. He is entitled to separation under honorable conditions.

e. No disciplinary action or reclassification proceedings under AR 605-230 are pending or appropriate.

f. No hospital disposition board or Army retirement board proceedings are pending or believed to be appropriate.

2 Incls.
1. WD AGO Fm 66-2
2. Ltr notification of officer concerned & indorsement

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Incl #4

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20 OCT 4

HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND LANGLEY FLD, VA UNCLASSIFIED

BOOK MESSAGE PRIORITY

A1 1431 PD PRIORITY ATTN COMMANDING OFFICER PD FOR INFO OF NUMBERED AIR FORCE COMMANDERS THIS MSG HAS BEEN DISSEMINATED TO ALL STATIONS YR COMMAND PD ALL BASE COMMANDERS WILL FURNISH COPIES THIS MSG TO ALL UNIT COMMANDERS PRESENT ON THEIR STATIONS PD MESSAGE BEGINS PD LETTER THIS HQ FILE TAC 210.8 DTD 19 OCT 1946 SUBJ RPAD OF AAF OFFICER AND WARRANT OFFICERS IS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS CLN PAR ABLE SO MUCH OF PAR TWO AS READS SIXTY PERCENT IS CHANGED TO READ FIVE FIVE PERCENT REPEAT FIVE FIVE PERCENT PD PAR BAKER DELETE THIRD SENTENCE PAR FOUR AND INSERT QUOTE THE PERCENTAGE OF THOSE RATED AND NON RATED OFFICERS TO BE RELIEVED AND RECOMMENDED FOR RELIEF FROM ACTIVE DUTY WILL BE IN SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME PROPORTION AS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED RATED AND NON RATED OFFICER STRENGTHS BEAR TO THE PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TOTAL OFFICER STRENGTH UNQUOTE PAR CHARLIE FIRST SENTENCE OF PAR SIX CHARLIE IS AMENDED TO READ QUOTE COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS WITH EFFICIENCY INDICES OF THREE FIVE POINT ZERO ZERO AND ABOVE AND FIELD GRADE OFFICERS WITH EFFICIENCY INDICES OF FOUR ZERO POINT ZERO ZERO AND ABOVE ETCETERA UNQUOTE

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HENRY W. SPILLER
MAJOR, AIR CORPS

1 MIL PERS 201900Z ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL 1 1

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
STAFF CONFERENCE NOTES

VOLUME I NUMBER 65 21 October 1946

A-1 REPORT:

1. The cut in 403 funds necessitates a reduction in hostesses and librarians. Headquarters AAF suggests, and we concur, that the librarians be retained and dispense with the employment of hostesses.

2. The flow of officer students to the service schools from 21 October to 21 November totals 141.

3. The letter on separations to reduce our officer personnel to 2,426 by 15 November was dispatched from this headquarters by courier plane on 19 October.

4. Another change in War Department policy on separations authorizes station commanders to report direct to separation facilities company grade officers possessing an efficiency index of less than 35.00 and field grade officers possessing an efficiency index of less than 40.00.

5. Nonregular Army enlisted men who were inducted in 1945 may be and should be reported for separation immediately.

6. Nonregular Army enlisted men falling in the inapt category may be reported direct to separation centers without the board proceedings heretofore required, provided they have completed a minimum of 6 months' service. Regular Army enlisted men falling in this category continue to require processing by the boards.

7. No officer or enlisted man eligible for separation under the present separation criteria, or who will become eligible for separation under the present separation criteria prior to 30 June 1947, will be sent overseas.

A-3 REPORT:

A letter from Headquarters AAF has been received stating that our request for Walla Walla AAFld was not favorably considered. The request for activation of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group and the 500th Air Service Group was not favorably considered. Likewise, it is not expected that we will receive favorable consideration on our request to activate the 64th Troop Carrier Group.

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A-4 REPORT:

The Air Material Command has requested that someone familiar with all the aspects of the Amphibious Maneuver visit them and bring them up-to-date on the maneuver. Twelfth Air Force has been directed to send such a representative.

A-5 REPORT:

A conference has been scheduled at Stewart Field on 23 October concerning the indoctrination course for the West Point cadets. The Training Command has been requested to send a representative and a representative from this headquarters will attend. This conference has been scheduled for the purpose of deciding on the dates on which the cadets will be transported to the various groups for training which replaces the flight training formerly held at Stewart Field.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S REPORT:

1. A telegram from Headquarters AAF has been received stating that 15 complete sets of AAF letters have been mailed out to the Twelfth Air Force.

2. A representative of this headquarters has been dispatched to Wright Field to pick up separation forms. It is anticipated that he will obtain a sufficient number of forms for all our bases.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAMS:

OTIS C. TURNER
WOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
STAFF CONFERENCE NOTES

VOLUME I NUMBER 64 18 October 1946

A-1 REPORT:

1. Promotions to technical and master sergeant have been suspended indefinitely. The subject of promotions for enlisted personnel is under study by the War Department.

2. All Wacs are supposed to have signed up to remain in the service until 30 June 1947 or for an indefinite length of time. Any Wacs becoming surplus will not be discharged but will be reported to the War Department for reassignment.

3. Personnel management classes for company grade officers will begin on Monday, 21 October 1946.

A-3 REPORT:

According to information from Washington, the 2 troop carrier units scheduled to be activated this year will not be activated. We are instituting a study to show how the reduction of officer personnel and the non-activation of these units will effect our commitments.

COMMUNICATIONS REPORT:

Our request to Headquarters AAF for the establishment of 17 VHF/DF stations across the country has been approved and ACS has been instructed to install them. Six of these stations will be located on our bases.

FLYING SAFETY REPORT:

Total aircraft accidents for this month is 4.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAMS:

OTIS C. TURNER
WAC, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCE
Washington

1 March 1946

AAF LETTER 35-100

SUBJECT: Utilization of Negro Personnel

TO: Commanding Generals, Major AAF Commands
Commanding Generals and Commanding Officers, Independent AAF Activities
Commanding Generals and Command Officers, Subordinate AAF Commands and AAF Divisions, Wings and Districts
Commanding Officers, AAF Base Units (not included above) in continental United States

Attached is Ltr, AG 291.2 (31 Jan 46) OB-S-A-M, 4 February 1946, subject as above, which establishes the policy for utilization of negro personnel. This Headquarters will allocate negro personnel to the continental air forces and commands on a percentage basis of total enlisted strength in implementing paragraph 4d of the attached letter.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces

OFFICIAL:

H.G. CUITON
Colonel, Air Corps
Air Adjutant General

1 Attachment
AG 291.2 (31 Jan 46) OB-S-A-M, 4 Feb 46

DISTRIBUTION:
Office of the Air Inspector
Field Offices of the Air Inspector
Enlisted Br, Military Personnel Div, AC/AS-1
Policy Planning, AC/AS-1
Troop Basis Br, Organization Div, AC/AS-3 (3 copies)

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The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 291.2 (31 Jan 46) OB-S-A-M

SUBJECT: Utilization of Negro Personnel 4 February 1946

TO: The Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces
Army Ground Forces
Army Service Forces
Commander-in-Chief,
Army Forces, Pacific
The Commanding Generals,
Eastern and Western Defense Commands
Alaskan Department
U.S. Forces, European Theater
U.S. Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations
U.S. Army Forces, Africa-Middle East Theater
U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific
U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater
U.S. Forces, China Theater

1. Enlistments of negroes in the Regular Army now exceeding 10% of the total enlistments. Due to the present ciritical need for manpower in the Army it is necessary that voluntary enlistment of negroes be continued and that this personnel be effectively utilized.

2. It is anticipated that on 1 July 1946 the Army (Regular and AUS) will contain approximately 15% negroes. Inasmuch as present planning on the part of all echelons has been based on utilization of 10% negroes, it is necessary that plans be revised in order to provide for the effective utilization of 15% negroes.

3. The War Department is thoroughly cognizant of the difficulties that will be encountered in organization, training and supplying of replacements incident to the implementation of this policy. However, the need for manpower at this time is so pressing that no action is immediately contemplated that will limit the intake of negroes to 10% of total Army strength.

4. Accordingly the following War Department policy is announced for the information and guidance of all Commanders concerned:

a. Induction of negroes will continue in the ratio of 10% of the total.

b. Enlistments of negroes in the Regular Army will be accepted without restriction as to numbers.

Attachment to AAF Ltr 35-100

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c. Overseas commanders will be required to utilize 15% negroes in their troop bases.

d. Continental commands will be required to utilize all negro troops who are not shipped overseas.

By order of the Secretary of War:

s/ Edward P. Witsell
EDWARD P. WITSELL
Major General
The Adjutant General

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Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command (For Information only)
Divisions of the War Department General Staff
Divisions of the War Department Special Staff

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Public Relations Division
PRESS SECTION
Tel. - RE 6700
Brs. 3425 and 4860

July 16, 1946

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

RESPONSE TO ENLISTMENT DRIVE CAUSES SUSPENSION OF GENERAL NEGRO RECRUITING

Overwhelming response of Negroes to the Regular Army recruiting campaign has resulted in suspension of provisions of the enlistment of Negroes except in forty-eight scarce categories of specialists, the War Department announced today.

Negro veterans and new enlistees responded to Army enlistment calls to such an extent that the Regular Army quota for Negroes was greatly oversubscribed and the Army found itself unable to continue uncontrolled enlistment.

It was emphasized by the War Department that the decision was merely to suspend and not to cut off entirely general enlistment of Negroes. It was made in line with the recently-announced War Department policy on utilization of Negro manpower that the ratio of Negroes to total Army strength should bear approximately the same relationship as Negro population to the total civilian population. It is expected that as a result of expiration of enlistments, Negro Army strength will be reduced to an extent where enlistments can profitably be resumed.

The skills in the forty-eight categories to which Negro enlistments will be limited for the present are listed below. Enlistment criteria call for at least six months prior service in the occupational specialty listed and sufficient skill to attain the Army standard of competence. The categories are:

Specialty No. 243, Geodetic Computer; 070, draftsman; 107, photolithographer; 004, aerial photographer; 076, topographic draftsman; 230, topographic surveyor; 304, electric motor repairman; 622, 623 and 624, advance finance; 409, medical technician; 067, dental technician.

Specialty 855, dental laboratory technician; 858, medical laboratory technician; 409, advanced medical technician; 149 and 859, pharmacy

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War Dept, Public Relations Div, subj: "Response to Enlistment Drive Causes Suspension of General Negro Recruiting", dtd 16 Jul 46

technician; 861, surgical technician; 120, meat and dairy inspector; 250, veterinary inspector; 264, X-ray technician; 114, machinest.

Also 229, medical equipment maintenance technician; 629, medical department physical therapist; 965, wheeled vehicle automotive mechanic; 919, heavy antiaircraft remote control system repairman; 348 and 848, Ordnance parts clerk; 039, telephone and telegraph cable splicer; 042, camera repairman; 095, central office repairman; 097, instrument repairman, telephone and telegraph; 166, powerman; 648, radio repairman.

And 187, repeaterman; 239, teletype mechanic; 649, fixed station radio repairman; 766, high speed manual radio operator; 805, cryptographic technician; 792, single channel radio repairman; 646, telegraph and telephone equipment repairman; 261, telegraph and telephone wire chief; 739, intercept operator (Japanese language); 738, intercept operator (German language); 952, gun laying equipment radio repairman; 208, motion picture sound recorder; 152, photographer; and 945, photo laboratory technician.

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

13 September 1946

SUBJECT: Elimination of Inapt Enlisted Personel

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Fld. ,Va.

1. Reference is made to Section III, Cir 241, WD, 1946 series and AR 615-369, concerning the separation of enlisted personnel who, after six (6) months current active service, are found inapt to be trained economically. The War Department has indentified this type of enlisted men as such personnel who normally lack the mental qualifications necessary to become suitable soldiers (generally personnel whose AGCT score is below 70) or those who, because of repeated commision of minor offenses requiring disciplinary action, cannot be economically utilized. The War Department has also stated that personnel of this type should be separated from the service and denied the opportunity of re-entering it.

2. During the recent war, manpower shortages required the Army to reduce its mental and physical standards. With our approach to a peacetime level, these standards should be raised again and our requirements focused now on both the procurement and retention of higher caliber personnel. The large percentage of highly trained specialists required by the AAF must be obtained from enlisted personnel of normal or higher mental caliber. Our peacetime organizations should consist entirely of personnel whom we either retain or procure and train as skilled specialists and who, in case of any future emergency, will become the nucleus of an efficient striking force. Regular Army enlisted men must be ready to furnish the necessary leadership, instruction, and skilled technical ability required in any furure mobilization. The replacement of enlisted men of low mental caliber who are presently assigned to basic duties with individuals whos AGCT score is slightly higher than seventy (70) will tend to reduce your requirement for supervisory personnel and thereby result in saving of overhead manpower.

3. The present personnel procurment program of the AAF is now based primarily on quality rather than quantity of individuals obtained. Thus, the inapt individual is no longer authorized to voluntarily enlist in the AAF. Prior to this time, however, we have allowed thoudsands of these individuals to enter the service through voluntary enlistement and have also received a considerable portion of them through selective service.

4. In order to reduce our current overstrength and improve the quality of our enlisted personnel, it is desired that you utilize the provisions of Circular 241 immediately, through appropriate Board Proceedings, to

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eliminate all Regular Army and inductee personnel in your command who have had a minimum of six (6) months' service and who, in your estimation and judgement, meet the requirements for discharge under these directives. This does not preculde your retention of any skilled technician whom you deem as an exception to this policy or any duty soldier who must be retained to meet your current requirements when such individuals cannot be obtained from the personnel on hand who are not eligible for discharge in accordance with the above criteria. It is further disired that this action be accomplished by 31 October 1946 with regard to the personnel you have presently assigned and continued indefinitely beyond that date to affect individua ls who become eligible for discharge in the furure in accordance with the above policy.

5. In order to secure immediate available data with regard to the number of enlisted personnel separated in accordance with paragraph 4 above, it is requested your headquarters submit a report of action taken to AC/AS-1, Attention: Plans are Analysis Group. This report will include the number of separations as of midnight 31 October 1946 and should be submitted so as to arrive at this Headquarters not later than 15 November 1946. Reports Control Symbol AAF-AP-SP269 is assigned to this report.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/
F. L. ANDERSON
Major General, USA
AC/AS-1

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (A1)

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

1 October 1946

IN REPLY REFER TO:

SUBJECT: Elimination of Inapt Enlisted Personnel

TO: Commanding General,
Third Air Force,
Greenville Army Air Base
Greenville, South Carolina

1. Reference is made to Circular 241, WD, 1946. With the approach of peace-time conditions within the Army, it is imperative that commanders turn their immediate attention to the quality of personnel desired in the Army Air Forces.

2. It is the policy of the War Department to attain the high standards of proficiency and mental capability necessary to man our highly technical Air Force of today. In keeping with this policy it is directed that commanders very carefully screen their respective organizations for individuals who, in their estimation and judgment, lack normal learning ability and receptiveness to military training, thereby failing to meet the high standards desired. This type of personnel has been identified generally by the War Department as the enlisted personnel who possess an AGCT score of less than 70, and such other personnel who have proved themselves to be a detriment and expense to the service through repeated commission of minor offences requiring disciplinary action. It is further directed that such individuals who are considered to fall into the above category be eliminated immediately through the use if Circular 241, WD, 1946, AR 615-369, and appropriate board proceedings. This action will not be construed to prohibit the retention of skilled specialists with a low AGCT score.

3. It is directed that action indicated in Circular 241, WD, 1946, and in this directive be accomplished by 31 October 1946 on personnel presently assigned, and be continued indefinitely with individuals who become eligible for discharge under this policy in the future. Numbered air forces, this command, will exercise final approving authority of board proceedings for stations under their command. Stations directly assigned this headquarters will forward board proceedings to this headquarters for final action.

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Ltr, Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va, subject: "Elimination of Inapt Enlisted Personnel," 1 Oct 46 contd

4. A report will be submitted as of midnight, 31 October 1946, to indicate the number of separations by grade, SSN, and race under the provisions of this directive, and will be forwarded to arrive this headquarters not later than 12 November 1946. Reports Control Symbol AAF-AP-SP269 is assigned this report.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/s/ WARREN R. CARTER
WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

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Basic: Confidential letter from Hdqs, TAC, Langley Field, Va., 1 Oct 46, Subject: "Elimination of Inept Enlisted Personnel"

AF9AF 220.801 (1 Oct 46) 1st Ind A1

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Greenville, South Carolina, 8 November 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. Cite Reports Control Symbol AAF-AP-SP269.

2. In compliance with paragraph 4, basic letter, and letter, your Headquarters, file TAC 220.8, same subject, 22 October 1946, the following report of personnel is submitted for units of the Third Air Force as of 31 October 1946:

PART I

Type of Personnel	Aggregate	White	Colored
Total all Personnel	66	11	55
(1) RA, 3 Yr Enlistees	46	9	37
(2) RA, Other Than 3 Yr	16	0	16
(3) Volunteers	0	0	0
(4) Inductees	4	2	2

Part II

SSN	Grade	White	Colored
017	Pvt		1
050	Pvt		1
055	Pvt	1	1
060	Pfc		1
	Pvt		2
345	Pfc		1
	Pvt	1	4
521	Pfc		5
	Pvt	1	11
522	Pvt		1
590	Pfc	2	2
	Pvt	5	24
657	Pfc		1
677	Pfc	1	
	Total	11	55

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AF9AF 220.801 (1 Oct 46), 1st Ind, Hdqs Ninth Air Force, Greenville, SC, 8 Nov 46, to CG, TAC, Langley Field, Virginia (cont'd)

3. The following additional report is submitted covering cases which have been processed for separation subsequent to 31 October 1946:

PART I

Type of Personnel	Aggregate	White	Colored
Total all Personnel	7	6	1
(1) RA, 3 Yr Enlistees	5	5	
(2) RA, Other Than 3 Yr	2	1	1

PART II

SSN	Grade	White	Colored
345	Pfc	1	
	Pvt	2	
521	Pvt	1	
590	Pfc	1	
	Pvt	1	1
	Total	6	1

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ W. L. BAXTER
Stamped W. L. BAXTER
Major, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

139

TAC 201.62 (15 Oct 46)

15 October 1946

SUBJECT: Disposition of Illiterate and Non-English Speaking Personnel (Reports Control Symbol AAF-AP-SP261)

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters

1. A survey will be conducted within your command to identify illiterate and non-English speaking personnel. Those awarded medals for valor are excepted. Such personnel will be reported to this headquarters not later than 28 October 1946 with the following information:

a. Name, rank, and Army serial number.

b. Enlistment or reenlistment (with term) or induction, with effective date of same.

c. Army area or AAF station of enlistment or induction.

d. WD induction station or reception center through which processed and dates of processing.

e. AAF commands to which assigned, with dates, before assignment to TAC.

2. These illiterate and non-English speaking enlisted men will be considered under the provisions of section III, Circular 241, WD, 1946, and AR 615-369. If the provisions of these directives are deemed applicable by the commander they will be applied to accomplish separation from the service. Personnel affected by this paragraph will not be included in the above report.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAMS:

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

(Effective until 15 April 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 1946

WSR/elc

333.1 ("Supervisory" - Lockbourne Army Air Field, (318th AAF BU) Columbus 17, Ohio - May 1946)

SUBJECT: Report of Supervisory Inspection of the Lockbourne Army Air Field, (318th AAF BU), Columbus 17, Ohio)

THRU: Commanding Officer, Lockbourne Army Air Base and Command Channels.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: The Air Inspector.

I. INSPECTION

1. This inspection was conducted by John A. Jordan, Lt. Colonel, IGD, assisted by eight officers, Office of The Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, Olmsted Field, Middletown, Pennsylvania, during the period 6 - 7 May 1946, under authority of paragraph 8 AAF Regulation 20-1, 15 September 1945.

2. The Commanding Officer at the time of inspection was B. O. Davis, Jr., Colonel, AC, who has been in command since 15 March 1946. The followi g organizations are assigned to this activity:

a. 477th Composite Group (Colored)

b. 318th AAF BU (Colored)

3. The Air Inspector of this activity was A. J. Knox, Major, AC, who has served in this capacity since 15 March 1946.

4. This activity is under the commanding jurisdiction of the Tactical Air Command.

5. The mission of Lockbourne Army Air Base as stated by letter from Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, dated 12 April 1946, is:

"a. Demobilization and recruitment of military personnel.

"b. To perform base functions pertaining to operations, training, administration, supply, and maintenance.

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Basic: 333.1, Hq AAF, FAI, 14 May 1946, subj: Rpt of Insp of Lockbourne Army Air Base, Columbus 17, Ohio (cont'd)

"c. To cooperate and offer assistance in every way possible to the commanding officers of tactical units when located at your station.

"d. To assist units of this or other commands at your base for the purpose of active defense missions.

"e. To continuously train officers and enlisted men assigned your station by an actual on-the-job training program that will broaden military experience and permit training in administration and technical duties that will qualify personnel for their peace-time responsibilities.

II. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6. Administration and Services

a. Military Personnel

* * * * *

(2) A high percentage of illiteracy exists among the personnel which hampers an adequate training program. The Information and Education Officer does not have sufficient qualified personnel to carry out a program broad enough in scope to adequately keep all base personnel informed as to the advantages to be gained in an I & E Program.

RECOMMENDATION: That all possible steps be taken to find persons qualified to institute an adequate overall training program.

(3) Many discrepancies exist in the service records and payrolls as a result of incomplete records being received on incoming personnel, and due to inefficient clerical personnel and a lack of responsibility on their part, resulting in but partial compliance with AAF Letter 37 - 26.

RECOMMENDATION: That responsible personnel be transferred into the Unit Personnel Section and that a greater degree of supervision be exercised.

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Basic: 333.1, Hq AAF, FAI, 14 May 1946, subj: Rpt of Insp of Lockbourne Army Air Base, Columbus 17, Ohio (Cont'd)

6. a. (4) During the course of the inspection it was observed that the lack of housing facilities for dependents of colored military personnel, both enlisted and commissioned, has resulted in a definite lowering of the morale factor of the base personnel. Quarters are not available on the Base nor in the area immediately adjacent thereto, resulting in necessitating dependents of military personnel to live in Columbus, Ohio, approximately 15 miles from the installation. There are at present approximately 42 buildings at the installation that are surplus to the needs of the activity and could be converted into living quarters for the military personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: That a survey of the potential housing on Lockbourne Army Air Field be made and forwarded with appropriate recommendations to higher authorities for consideration and appropriate action.

* * * * *

7. Operations and Training

b. The Ground Training Section is not functioning properly due to the lack of trained personnel. This activity has 24 Link Trainers, It is believed that four Link Trainers would be adequate. At the time of this inspection there was one qualified Link Trainer Operator and no qualified maintenance personnel assigned.

RECOMMENDATION: That a survey be made to ascertain the number of Link Trainers needed and the number of personnel required for operations and maintenance, and that the Base CO secure from headquarters a quota for sending personnel to Link Maintenance and Operation School.

8. Supply and Maintenance

a. Maintenance

(4) Motor Vehicle Maintenance

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Basic: 333.1, Hq AAF, FAI, 14 May 1946, subj: Rpt of Insp of Lockbourne Army Air Base, Columbus 1?, Ohio (Cont'd)

(a) Motor vehicle maintenance on this Base is inadequate. The officer in charge has just been assigned and steps were being taken to correct existing deficiencies. Deficiencies noted were: 1st echelon maintenance not being accomplished, no system in effect for scheduling vehicles through 2d and 3d echelon maintenance, no records being maintained on weekly, monthly and semi-annual inspections. Of the 171 vehicles assigned, 33 had been on deadline approximately a month, due to lack of parts and trained maintenance personnel. It is to be noted also that no survey had been conducted to determine the actual number of vehicles needed by various base activities.

RECOMMENDATION: That (1) the vehicle section be organized properly in accordance with pertinent directives and the vehicles be scheduled for maintenance at proper intervals. (AAF Reg 75-4, 4 Dec 45, TM 37-2810, March 1945). (2) Records be maintained in vehicle inspections in accordance with TM 37-2810, March 1945. (3) A survey be conducted to determine the actual number of vehicles needed on the base and a report submitted to higher headquarters on vehicles surplus to the needs of the activity. (4) A training program be initiated in order to familiarize personnel with vehicle maintenance and pertinent directives thereto.

* * * * *

9. General

a. Observations

(1) Listed below is a comparison of the authorized strength of the assigned uni s and the actual strength:

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Basic: 333.1, Hq AAF, FAI, 14 May 1946, subj: Rpt of Insp of Lockbourne Army Air Base, Columbus 17, Ohio (Cont'd)

	Authorized		Assigned	
	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted
477th Comp. Gp	163	714	157	648
318th AAF BU	86	966	155	1251
TOTALS	249	1680	312	1899

In addition to the above, the number of civilians authorized and employed at this station at present is 399.

* * * * *

9. a. (2) Listed below is a compilation of men reported 30 April 1946 as available for overseas duty:

	Officers	Enlisted
477th Comp. Gp	163	451
318th AAF BU	106	720
TOTALS	263	1171

(3) This activity is performing its mission. Personnel are assigned to further the recruiting program and pre-separation activities. On-the-job training is being given to untrained personnel to as great an extent as practicable under existing circumstances.

* * * * *

III. CONCLUSION

10. The overall rating of this activity is SATISFACTORY.

* * * * *

FOR THE FIELD AIR INSPECTOR, HQ AAF:

JOHN A. JORDAN
Lt Colonel, IGD
Field Air Inspector

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

30 December 1946

TAC 322 (29 Dec 46)

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Organization Charts and Strength Report

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.
Attn: Mr. c. d. Cline, Management Associates

1. In accordance with request made by Mr. C. D. Cline on his recent visit to this headquarters, attached are ten (10) copies of the organization chart of this headquarters and a recapitulation of the authorized and assigned strength of this command by units. All figures are as of 30 November 1946.

2. In preparing the strength report the following criteria was used:

a. Staff - All officers, enlisted men and civilians assigned to the 300th, 309th and 312th Base Units. These three base units comprise this headquarters and the headquarters of the two Air Forces. The personnel in these base units are the staff and the personnel required to assist the staff in the performance of their duties.

b. Housekeeping - All personnel assigned to base units other than the three above, Service Groups and units not considered tactical.

c. Tactical - All officers and enlisted men assigned to Tactical Groups.

d. Others - All personnel assigned to units not falling under any of the above.

3. This compilation shows the bulk of the assigned personnel under housekeeping activities. It is believed, however, that the base units are the only true housekeeping units. The other units shown under housekeeping such as Service Groups, are supporting units for the Tactical Groups whose function is to enable the Tactical Groups to operate. These supporting units number 278 officers and 5937 enlisted personnel.

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It is the policy of this command to have in the base units only the minimum number of personnel required to perform functions which cannot be accomplished by a fully implemented service group. A copy of a letter, subject, "Reorganization and Reduction of Base Unit Structure," is attached. This letter was mailed on 18 September 1946 to Air Force commanders and commanding officers of bases assigned directly to this headquarters.

4. It is also desired to point out that approximately 12% of the personnel shown under staff are not physically present for duty. Those not present for duty are enroute to join, awaiting assignment, and personnel on temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States. The personnel shown as assigned to the 300th Base Unit include 26 officers and 64 enlisted men assigned to the Air Demonstration Unit. this unit has now been distanded and the personnel reassigned throughout the command.

5. The following organizations are shown under Brooks Field, however, they are in the process of moving to Langley Field and a large number of personnel have been assigned to the 304th Base Unit earmarked for assignment to these units when they arrive at Langley Field.

363rd Reconnaissance Group
161st Reconnaissance Squadron
162nd Reconnaissance Squadron
72nd Liaison Squadron
450th Air Service Group
826th Air Engineering Squadron
650th Air Material Squadron

6. The large overage of personnel assigned to the 313th Base Unit, Greenville, South Carolina, is caused by the 37th Troop Carrier Squadron being assigned to this base with no supporting Air Service Group. Consequently, in addition to the normal function of the base unit, the 313th Base Unit is required to service this Troop Carrier Squadron, which itself is considerably over strength in airplanes.

7. The oversge of personnel shown under the 561st Air Service Group is due to personnel being retained at March Field in anticipation of assignment to West Coast bases this command expects to acquire in the near future and activation of the following units:

10th Reconnaissance Squadron
506th Tactical Control Group
Photo Technical Squadron

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8. The overage of officers assigned to base units as against the shortage of officers assigned to tactical units and other T/O&E units (housekeeping support) has been caused by the following:

a. The recent program of separation of officers has left the base units with an overage of officers and sufficient time has not elapsed since termination of the separation program to reassign the officer to tactical and other T/O&E units.

b. The surplus officers in base units do not possess qualifications required to fill existing shortages in the tactical and other T/O&E units such as Radar Observer Bombardier, Bombardier - Navigator and Electronics officers.

9. The overage of enlisted personnel assigned to base units is caused primarily by the large number of Negro troops assigned to this command. Another contributing factor to this overage is the large number of recently assigned basic soldiers who do not possess qualifications required to fill existing shortage in the tactical and other T/O&E units.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

GLENN O. BARCUS

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TAB to Letter from Commanding General, AAF dated 24 October 1946,
Subject: "AAF Plans and Programs"

PERSONNEL

* * * *

(b) Enlisted

1. On 31 July 1946, the AAF had assigned 19,092 Master Sergeants as against 8,186 authorized by the War Department. If the present regulations governing enlistment and reenlistment remain in effect, it is estimated that the assigned figure may reach 27,500 by 31 December 1946, thus exceeding our authorization in the first grade by over 200%

2. The AAF from the beginning of the reconversion program has made every effort to combat the increasing percentage of personnel in the first grade. This effort has been met with little success.

3. On 4 May 1946 a TWX was sent to all commands directing discontinuance of promotions to the first two grades. The directive, still in effect, applies to all enlisted personnel in the Zone of Interior.

4. Any realization in this promotion freeze can only come about as a result of a demotion and grade readjustment program. Such a program is now under study in the War Department, but no decision has yet been reached as to how, when or where it may be put into effect.

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U-AHB/as
2 December 1946

SUBJECT: Request for Authority to Retain Civilian Firefighters for Additional Two Week Period.

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. Confirming the verbal action taken 30 November 1946 on the subject matter, it is hereby requested that authority be granted to retain ten (10) civilian structural fire fighters for a period of two (2) weeks after 30 November 1946.

2. This request is necessary to assure an effective structural fire fighting department until the enlisted personnel assigned to replace the civilians are sufficiently trained to perform the fire fighting mission.

3. Failure to develop a military structural fire fighting department by 30 November 1946 has resulted from the fact that this Base Unit could not assign qualified military personnel to replace the civilians, and sufficient time was not available to train the unqualified personnel who were assigned. Instructions to replace the civilian firefighters by military personnel arrived after action had been initiated to replace approximately six hundred (600) civilians by military personnel in other departments. Qualified personnel were not available in sufficient numbers to make the replacements in the other departments, much less the structural fire fighting department.

4. The only personnel immediately available were basic privates. These were assigned without delay and appropriate training was initiated. Screening of assignments of non-commissioned officers had to be accomplished to determine which non-commissioned officers could be pulled from other departments. Since considerable time was required for this, non-commissioned officers were not assigned to the structural fire fighting department until the third week in November. Meanwhile many of the basic privates failed to assimulate the training as rapidly as was required to make them proficient in the short period of time available. For example, of twenty privates sent to the Base Drivers' School as potential fire truck drivers, only four (4) passed. Yet driving a truck is a

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minor portion of the requirement for a fire truck driver, considering the knowledge he must posses of the auxiliary engines, pumps, valves and gauges which are all part of a fire truck. In this connection it is desired to point out that a minimum of six months were required to train the military T/O and E fire fighting detachments employed during the War.

ROBERT W. O. WINGATT
Colonel, AC
Commanding

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Hq Langley Fld, Va, Subj: "Request for Authority to Retain Civ Fireftrs or Add'l Two Wk Period", dtd 2 Dec 46

TAC 230.38 (2 Dec 46) 1st Ind A3E

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia,

TO: Commanding Officer, Langley Field, Virginia.

1. Requested authority to retain ten civilian structural fire fighters for a period of two weeks after 30 November 1946 is not favorably considered and it is directed that immediate action be taken to remove them from the civilian personnel rolls of the 304th AAF Base Unit.

2. Message AIN 1939, this headquarters, dated 28 October 1946, gave definite instructions as to the methods and maximum time allowed for the converting of structural and crash fire fighters from civilian to military personnel. Failure to comply with this directive has resulted in the 304th AAF Base Unit reporting an overage of approximately 15 civilian positions over and above the authorized strength on the 30 November 1946 AAF Form 134 Report. Due to the shortage of funds available to this command for the payment of civilian personnel, and due to the very low civilian authorization allotted to this command by Headquarters Army Air Forces, a discrepancy of this nature can not be tolerated.

3. Reference paragraph 3 and 4 of the basic communication which states that sufficient time and personnel were not available to carry out the above mentioned directive by 30 November 1946, it is pointed out that the instructions left this headquarters by scheduled messenger on 28 October 1946 which allowed approximately 30 days to accomplish the converting of civilian fire fighters to military personnel; and it is also pointed out that records of this headquarters as of 31 October 1946 show an assigned figure of 1086 white retainable enlisted personnel for the 304th AAF BU against an authorized figure of 850 which trends to show that sufficient personnel, although untrained, were available for immediate training and assignment to the Fire Department.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
STAFF CONFERENCE NOTES

VOLUME I NUMBER 63 16 October 1946

A-5 REPORT:

1. The 722d AAF Band is being moved from Tinker Field to Greenville AAB.

2. By 30 November 1946 the number of civilian employees in this headquarters must be reduced by 90. It is requested that at the time personnel of the Manpower Section contact the staff sections to effect this reduction, the fullest cooperation be extended this group by the section heads. It is asked that the sections not be too selfish in saying they have to have the people. It is to be borne in mind that other headquarters are taking similar drastic cuts.

BUDGET AND FISCAL REPORTS:

1. Budget and Fiscal has received their second-quarter allotments together with an annual budget covering nearly all projects under each appropriation. The projects and appropriations for which no annual budget has been received has been promised sometime during October. The second-quarter allotments were based on the annual budget taking into consideration the amount of money the Bureau of the Budget authorized to be granted during the first 6 months of the fiscal year. In many projects, however, we have already spent approximately 50% of our annual budgetary figure.

2. In the past, organization and manpower civilian ceilings governed. In other words, a station received a manpower ceiling and was assured of receiving sufficient funds to meet that ceiling. Now the number of civilian employees is governed by the authorized personnel ceiling or the amount of money available for the pay of civilian employees whichever is smaller. If personnel ceilings issued to a station cannot be met with funds available, the personnel ceilings will be adjusted to meet the funds available. Civilian employees, therefore, will not be maintained on the rolls which would require funds in excess of those received by this command or suballotted to stations under any particular personnel project.

3. Headquarters AAF indicated the following points, which are considered most important:

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a. Obligations will not be incurred in excess of funds in an allotted status at any time.

b. No reserves are being held by Headquarters AAF and no source of additional funds is available for the year's operation.

c. This command will finance satellite activities based on our installations for administration in a fair manner consistent with funds available and in compliance with directives issued by Headquarters AAF. Note: When it appears necessary to eliminate an essential requirement or it is impossible to comply with directives issued, a list in detail indicating the requirements of the command in the particular project will be forwarded to Headquarters AAF and that headquarters will recommend the priority of activites or functions for elimination.

d. Civilian personnel for any particular activity will be reduced in order to stay within the funds herewith provided on an annual basis and their functions generally assumed by military personnel as an additional duty.

e. Although this command received an annual budget for most of the appropriations, we suballotted the money to stations on a quarterly basis in order to maintain flexibility within the command. This was necessary in order to have immediate transfer ability of funds from one installation to another in the event the primary functions of one field were discontinued or transferred to another field. The funds, however, were suballotted to the stations on a fair and equitable basis by this headquarters.

4. This command was greatly reduced in all personal services projects; however, quartermaster projects 441 and 403 is the worst hit. After discussing this command shortage over the telephone with AAF officials, we were informed it may be necessary to go to the Bureau of the Budget for authorization to use the entire fiscal year allotment of funds in order to pay terminal leave and salaries now due these employees. We have requested the field to furnish us exact figures so this may be accomplished if necessary.

FLYING SAFETY REPORT:

A P-80 accident at March Field makes a total of four accidents for the month.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAMS:

OTIS C. TURNER
WOJG, USA
Asst Adj Gen

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6 September 1946

SUBJECT: Reduction in Civilian Personnel

TO: Commanding General, Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. In view of the drastic reductions in both budgetary and personnel allotments by recent Congressional and Budget Bureau action, this Headquarters has been forced to reduce both funds and manpower ceilings to your command. With this in mind, it is my purpose in this letter to bring to your attention several pertinent factors that have direct bearing upon our current situation with respect to required economies.

2. As your are aware, it is the prerogation of your individual commanders to reorganize their commands in any manner which will enable them to most efficiently and economically accomplish their missions. Full use should be made, therefore, of this prerogative in this period of drastically reduced budgets.

3. In this connection it is frequently found feasible to combine the duties and responsibilities of certain individaul civilian positions, or to abolish a given number of positions and redistribute their duties and responsibilities among a smaller number of new positions. To the extent that this is done wherever possible, the desired goal of maximum utilagation of personnel will be achieved. As an example of this, the following recent case which came to the attention of this Headquarters is cited for your information: An installation found it possible to abolish all positions of "Fire Sprinkler System Inspector" by distributing the duties of these positions among the various fire inspectors at the installation, after it was determined that the new duties could easily be assumed inaddition to their regular duties. In some cases it may be found that by consolidating two or more individual positions the newly created position will warrant a higher classification grade than either of the abolished positions. Promotions may be made in the new positions subject to normal promotion procedure. Selection of personnel to occupy thenew positions is at the option of the operating official in accordance with normal civil service appointment procedure.

FOR THE AND IN THE ABSENCE OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

C. C. CHAUNCEY
Major General, U, S. Army
Deputy Chief of Air Staff

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C O P Y

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TAC 230 (6 Sept 46) 1st Ind October 2, 1946 Al

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Major General Chauncey

1. The required drastic reductions in funds and manpower ceinlings for this command will be met through consolidations, eliminations, realigments, sound personnel management practices and retention of only the most qualified personnel.

2. For information on steps takem to date to meet the situation, inclosed are copies of recent directives issued pertaining to the subject. Staff officers of this headquarters have been briefed on their contents and on each supervising visit to subordinate units are directed to closely observe progress being made and render assistance where Indicated.

3. Through wholehearted cooperation and diligent application in all echelons, it is believed this command will be able to perform its mission under thescheduled reduction.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

5 Incls
1. Ltr TAC 334 (8 May 46), Apmt of Pers Management Committee, 8 May 46
2. Ltr TAC 200.3, Pers Management, 26 Jul 46
3. TAC Ltr 40-2, Reduction in Force-Civ Emp, 11 Sep 46
4. TAC Ltr 37-1, Reduction in Pers Auth, 18 Sep 46
5. Ltr TAC 322, Reorg and Reduction of Base Unit Structure, 18 Sep 46

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND AIE

LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA

19 July 1946

IN REPLY REFER TO:

TAC 327 (19 Jul 46) Nat'l Army

SUBJECT: Enlistment and Reenlistment of Negro Personnel

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to teletype AFPRE-2 1946. This command has, presently assigned, the 477th Composite Group, the 602d Air Engineer Squadron and the 318th AAF Base Unit urgently requiring the services of negro enlisted maintenance personnel. Attention is further invited to the discrepancies in the release by the War Department Public Relations Division, Press Section, of 16 July 1946, which listed 48 SSN's as eligible for reenlistment as compared with the 31 listed in first cited teletype. It is believed that above discrepancy will result in inquiries from stations under the jurisdiction of this command.

2. Informal information received this headquarters indicated the strong probility of approval by your headquarters of an additional air service group for assignment to Lockbourne Army Air Base. It is believed that consideration should be given to the inclusion of such enlisted specialties in the list of those eligible for enlistment or reenlistment. The comparatively small numbers of such personnel available for reenlistment will not materially effect the numerical status of the negro complement of the Army Air Forces or upset the ratios as planned by the War Department.

3. The critical shortage of aircraft specialists, particularly SSN's 685, 686, 747 and 750 in the above organizations has brought about an intensive recruiting program at Lockbourne for negro enlisted men with the above qualifications. The commanding officer of that station is thoroughly aware of sources and of individuals who are highly qualified potential Regular Army personnel.

4. Difficulty has been encountered in the lack of availability of quotas to training Commands schools. The limited source of negro personnel meeting qualifications for training further emphasizes the problem. The use of personnel already skilled would not only result in a saving of manpower as they are capable of duty at this time, but would result in a considerable monetary saving and materially reduce the work load of the Training Command.

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ltr, TAC Langley Fld, Va., Subj: Enl and Reenl of Negro Pers 19 Jul 46.
Cont'd.

5. In addition to the above, a procurement program has been initiated in an attempt to man the 766th AAF Band. Attempts to secure qualified negro bandsmen from outside sources as well as from within the command have been largely ineffective. It is requested that authority be granted for this command, or if it is desired to limit such authorization, for Lockbourne Army Air Base to recruit personnel in the following specialties until such time as the units may be brought to operative strength:

432	528
433	648
434	685
435	686
436	687
437	747
438	750
439	754
440	
441	

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/t/ ROGER M. HERRICK
Major Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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AFPMP-2 1st Ind ERL/mib

Hq, AAF, Washington 25, D. C. , 20 August 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Va.

1. The request contained in basic communication is not favorably considered.

2. Records of this Headquarters indicate that sufficient bandsmen are assigned to the Army Air Forces to adequately man the authorized band in your command. Action is being taken to assign all negro bandsmen in the zone of interior to your command.

3. To meet requirements for trained negro specialists, quotas should be requested under the provisions of AAF Letter 150-2. In this connection, attention is invited to AAF Letter 50-3, dated 25 July 1946. If sufficient qualified trainees are not available in your command, they will be furnished from other commands upon request to this Headquarters.

4. Two hundred seventeen (217) negro Air Corps unassigned personnel will complete airplane maintenance training in the Air Training Command during the last quarter of this year. It is anticipated that practically all of this personnel will be assigned to your command.

5. The SSN list of negro personnel eligible for enlistment is being revised to include maintenance specialists. This revision will be published by the War Department in the near future.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/s/ T. W. BELSHE
T. W. BELSHE
Military Personnel Division
Office, AC/AS -1

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE
(Troop Carrier)
Greenville, South Carolina

A1

AF3AF 123 (18 July 46) 18 July 1946

SUBJECT: Adjustment of Funds for Per Diem Payments Activities.

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. This headquarters was directed to secure and equip mobile units to be used for the purpose of recruiting publicity per letter Continental Air Forces dated 26 February 1946, subject: Mobile Recruiting Units. The first of these units was completed on 24 April 1946 and the first two itineraries were coordinated with the Headquarters Fourth Service Command but were used primarily for recruiting activities of this command. On or about 20 May 1946 Headquarters Fourth Service Command directed these units on a tour of cities in the State of Tennessee and since that date they have been on a continous tour as directed by Headquarters Seventh Army (formerly Headquarters Fourth Service Command) and will in the future be working primarily for recruiting activities of Headquarters Seventh Army. Similar units were constructed at the Army Air Base, Pope Field, North Carolina, Army Air Base, Sedalia, Missouri and the Army Air Base, Bergstrom Field, Texas.

2. The unit being operated out if Headquarters Third Air Force consists of 7 vehicles manned by 5 officers and 11 enlisted men. The unit being operated out of Pope Field consists of 3 vehicles and manned by 2 officers and 6 enlisted men. The units located at Sedalia Army Air Field and Bergstrom Army Air Field are approximately the size of the unit at Pope Field. It is considered that the minimum number of personnel is now being used in order that a sufficient number of drivers may be available in case of sickness, emergency furlough, etc. and the proper explanations of the exhibits to the general public. The amount of money now being expended monthly for per diem payments by the Headquarters Third Air Force unit and the Pope Field unit is approximately $5,000 per month and the amount expended by the units at Sedalia Army Air Field and Bergstrom Army Air Base will total approximately $3,000 per month. This Air Force has lost a considerable number of enlisted men due to the rapid demobilization and the personnel shortage is still acute. However, this headquarters concurs in the importance of the recruiting program and will gladly cooperate in any way possible in order to stimulate the enlistment and reenlistments in the Regular Army, but due to the economy program now being exercised on the payments from appropriated funds, it is felt that some assistance should be given in the payment of per diem to the recruiting personnel.

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Basic Ltr, 18 July 46, subj: Adjustment of Funds for Per Diem Payments Recruiting Activities

3. Heretofore all per diem payments of approximately $8,000 monthly have been made from funds allotted to this command. Since 1 July 1946 this command has been allotted only a limited amount of money that can be used for per diem payments, which will not nearly cover the per diem needed for the different flying activities directed by this and higher headquarters. Inasmuch as the recruiting caravans are working for the U. S. Army as a whole rather than just this command, it is requested that necessary action be taken to secure additional funds to cover the per diem needed for the officers and enlisted men accompanying these mobile recruiting units and such finds be sub-allotted to Army Headquarters under whose jurisdiction the units are operating and payments of per diem for recruiting activities be charged against these allotments.

4. If for recruiting, a separate appropriation or an increase in the Third Air Force allotment cannot be obtained, it is recommended that the responsibility for the Third Air Force recruiting caravans be transferred to the appropriate Army Area Headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

WILLIAM M. GROSS
Colonel, GSC
Chief of Staff

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B/L fr Third Air Force, Subj: Adjustment of Funds for Per Diem Payments Recruiting Activities.

TAC 327 (18 Jul 46) Nat'l Army 1st Ind. 31 July 1946

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force, (Troop Carrier), Greenville Army Air Forces, Greenville, South Carlinia.

1. Information has reached this Headquarters from Army Air Forces that we amy expect a stimulated recruiting program to be established within Army Air Forces in the immediate future.

2. A supplemental request for funds to be utilized in connection with temporary duty travel necessitated by operation of the recruiting program has been submitted to Headquarters Army Air Forces. This Headquarters has been informed that negotiations have been initiated to effect an equitable adjustment between the travel fund of the Army Ground Forces etc and Army Air Forces with respect to temporary duty costs resulting from recruiting programs.

3. As soon as additional funds have been received by this Headquarters, supplemental funds will be made available to your headquarters. In the event that temporary duty travel funds presently allotted your command become exhausted prior to the receipt of subject funds, a WD AAF Form 316 will be properly executed by your Budget and Fiscal Officer and forwarded to this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

Stamped PAUL R. CERF
PAUL R. CERF
Capt., AGD
Asst. Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC 327 (10 Oct 46) Nat'l Army

10 October 1946

SUBJECT: Mobile Recruiting Caravans

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units
assigned directly to this headquarters

1. Due to the curtailment of per diem funds it has been necessary to restrict the operations of AAF mobile recruiting caravans. The purpose of this letter is to outline instructions relative to the future activity and disposition of these caravans.

2. Small local mobile recruiting units which were constructed in accordance with paragraph 4d, AAF Letter 35-33, are authorized and encouraged to continue operations, provided no per diem funds are expended.

3. The decision as to the practicability of continued operation, storage, or disposition of the caravans is delegated to air force or base commanders concerned in accordance with the following:

a. If practical, these caravans or selected portions thereof, will be retained for possible future use either by storing them or by distributing the units to various bases of the command for continued use in local activities.

b. Where continued activity is considered worthwhile, these active units will tour locations within heavily populated areas. This will permit the units to obtain maximum coverage without requiring extensive travel.

c. Caravans, or parts of caravans, which are considered of no further value for recruiting purposes may be dismantled and property accountability settled. Vehicles that are determined as excess to station needs will be reported to this headquarters requesting disposition instructions. A completed inspection report, WD AGO Form 461-5, for each vehicle will accompany subject letter.

(Effective until 10 April 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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4. This headquarters will be notified of the disposition of all caravans.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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(A)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington

AFPMP-11

17 Sep 1946

SUBJECT: Supply of Enlisted Students for Technical Training Courses

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. The Interim Air Force must be built upon a foundation of skilled technicians. Many of the specialties required in the balanced force planned must be school trained. A sizable technical training structure has been set up within the Air Training Command and the production of this school system will contribute in large measure to the moulding of a new Air Force in being. Eventual realization of the benefits of this technical school capacity is, of course, contingent upon maintaining a continuous flow of trainees therein. A part of the students necessary to fill the training pipeline will continue to come from trainable enlistees in the AAF who have no prior service. Every effort is being made to maintain procurement of these individuals at a high rate. It has long been apparent, however, that this source will not meet all needs for students.

2. Through a vigorous recruiting campaign admirably supported by all echelons, the AAF has procured a large number of three-year enlistees. These men possess various skills which do not, in totals, match the specialty pattern needed in the Air Force toward which we are building. There are too many in some specialties, far too few in others. It is from this large group, which is now spread amongst all AAF Commands, that the additional technical school trainees needed must come.

3. AAF Letter 50-62 points up this problem and indicates the direction its solution must take. Three steps are open to the AAF Commands and to this Headquarters in obtaining trainees:

a. Selection of qualified volunteers applying under the provisions of AAF Letter 50-58.

b. Requests from the AAF Commands for assigned training quotas under provisions of AAF Letter 150-2.

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c. Finally, the imposition of mandatory quotas by this Headquarters in order to fill the remaining gaps.

4. It is apparent that the first two steps listed above are far more desirable than the third and that the interest of the AAF can be better served through their employment to the maximum extent. To date, however, responses from the field under AAF Letters 50-58 and 150-2 have been extremely meager. Availabilities from these sources for October inputs, for example, are less than thirty percent (30%) of the estimated requirements. Applications under AAF Letter 50-58 total only six hundred (600); yet there are thousands of enlistees who were former officers whose application for school training is made mandatory by referenced letter. It must therefore be concluded that considerably more publicity and emphasis should be given to AAF Letter 50-58 in order to achieve the results intended.

5. All echelons within the AAF share an interest in the solution of this problem, for only through full implementation of the technical training program may all echelons hope to gain the personnel stability and quality which is the ultimate goal. It is requested that every effort be made to:

a. Insure dissemination of the contents of AAF Letter 50-58 to all enlisted men concerned and to assure full implementation of its provisions by all echelons.

b. Examine the needs of your command for school training and to take full advantage of the opportunity provided in AAF Letter 150-2 to request quotas for such training.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

/t/ F. L. ANDERSON
Major General, USA
AC/AS-1

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/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/
/Langley Field, Virginia/

TAC 726 (7 Aug 46) 7 August 1946

SUBJECT: Venereal Disease Control

TO : Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: The Air Surgeon

In compliance with AFTAS-15, subject "Venereal Disease Control", 17 July 1946 and attached letter AGO AGA-MPM 726.1 (5 July 1946) the following comments and recommendation are submitted.

1. Factors influencing the low venereal disease rates of 1943 and 1944 were the following:

a. The all out training effort with very little free time for the troops, lessening opportunity for exposure.

b. The novelty of the newly insugrated intensive venereal disease prevention drive in all its phases; educational, religious, and administrative.

c. This intensive venereal disease control program and the consequent emphasis upon command responsibility for increase in rate resulted in the tendency to minimize true rates by reporting the cases as nasopharyngitis only or some other intercurrent desease and by condoning superficial laboratory procedure which resulted in a large number of missed diagnoses.

d. Forced issue of prophylactics.

e. Increased availability and use of the newly introduced sulpha drugs for prophylaxis.

f. Practice of restricting organization to the station if the organization venereal disease rate increased, with resultant lowered exposure opportunities.

2. Factors fovoring present high rate.

a. Increased amount of free time for troops as opposed to full time pressure of training activities and combat during previous years.

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Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va., 7 Aug 46, subj: "Venereal Disease Control" Cont'd.

b. Constant repetition of an outworn venereal disease control program with resultant boredom and the adoption by the troops of the idea that venereal disease was just a bogy.

c. Loss of effectiveness of sulfa drugs as prophylactics due to increase in sulpha-resistant strains of gonococci.

d. Increase in case diagnoses due to widespread practice of the culture method in the laboratory.

e. Increased carelessness in personal prophylaxis due to comparative ease and speed of treatment with the sulpha drugs and pencillin.

f. Loss of fear of the physical consequences of venereal disease due to ease, speed and results of treatment with the new drugs. No longer were the administrative consequences of venereal disease to be feared with line of duty, yes; no loss of pay, and no making up lost time.

3. Other considerations.

a. Due to publication of more or less accurate statistics, higher authority and outside quasi-official agencies have been falsely impressed with the apparent wide prevalence of venereal disease in the Army as opposed to the same age group in civilian life, wholly disregarding the lack of publicity and the non-existence of comparable figure for the civilian group.

b. The importance of venereal disease as a cause of non-effectives is handed down from the days, ten, twenty and thirty years ago when it had a much worse effect upon the fighting strength of the Army than it now exerts, as result of new medicines and treatment methods. It now has no greater influence upon the man days lost figures than many of the common reportable diseases.

c. Many suggestions have been offered for reducing emphasis on venereal disease such as elimination of the venereal disease report, section VI Form 8-122, elimination of carding for record only in all non-hospitalized cases and reporting only all hospitalized cases, and elimination of monthly venereal disease lectures.

d. There is only a small percentage of individuals in a command who contact venereal disease and only a small number of these who are the "repeaters". The latter can be considered prone to acquire venereal disease and there is now no deterrent to prevent the venereal disease prone individuals in a command from becoming infected.

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Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va., 7 Aug 46, subj: "Venereal Disease Control" Cont'd.

4. Recommendations.

a. Revamp the venereal disease control program, repeating formal lecture and movies every six months and then only those who have not attended a previous formal lecture and/or movies. Maintain the special venereal disease control exhibits at each station and make them available to all new recruits.

b. Classify all medical reports giving venereal disease figures as restricted and prevent publication in the press of matters relating to venereal disease in the Army.

c. Try by court-martial all individual who acquire venereal disease and fail to report for treatment.

d. Make contraction of venereal disease as not in line of duty, except when proven otherwise.

e. Establish forfeitures of pay in cases of time lost due to venereal disease acquired through neglect.

f. Try by court-martial and dishonorably discharge those individuals who contact venereal disease three times not in line of duty during a htree year period.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Paul R. Cerf
Capt., AGO
Assistant Adjutant General

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AVERAGE DELAYS IN GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL CASES
in the
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
April 1946 - December 1946

Average Delay in Days		GCM with Least Delay		GCM with Greatest Delay	
April	72.00	58.00	Lockbourne AAB	94.00	Lake Charles AAFld
May	61.48	38.00	Dover AAFld	81.00	Shaw Fld
June	43.50	27.50	Dover AAFld	77.00	Tuskegee AAFld
July	40.28	24.00	Lockbourne AAB	74.00	March Fld
August	52.69	23.00	Dover AAFld	79.25	March Fld
September	47.88	24.00	Dover AAFld	72.34	Langley Fld
October	43.67	29.00	Dover AAFld	44.40	Langley Fld
November	35.75	32.67	Langley Fld	45.00	Dover AAFld
	44.14	Total Average Delay in Days			

Prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, August 1947, from data furnished that Division by the office of the Staff Judge Advocate

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AVERAGE DELAYS IN SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL CASES
in the
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
April 1946 - December 1946

	Average Delay in Days	GCM with Least Delay	GCM with Greatest Delay
April	29.93	11.00 Hunter Fld	44.33 MacDill Fld
May	36.49	13.00 Dover AAFld	55.50 Smyrna AAFld
June	43.98	23.00 Hunter Fld	58.00 March Fld
July	17.87	11.67 Lockbourne AAB	23.67 Smrna AAFld
August	23.92	14.22 Lockbourne AAB	30.00 Shaw, Sherman, Smyrna
September	23.52	20.00 Smyrna AAFld	30.00 Sherman Fld
October	11.99	7.67 Smyrna AAFld	16.00 Myrtle Beach AAFld
November	30.91	17.00 Smyrna AAFld	41.00 Tuskegee AAFld
December	38.00	26.00 Docer AAFld	40.15 Langley Fld
	28.51	Total Average Delay in Days	

Prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, August 1947, from data furnished that Division by the office of the Staff Judge Advocate

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AVERAGE DELAYS IN SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL CASES
in the
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
April 1946 - December 1946

Average Delay in Days		SCM with Least Delay		SCM with Greatest Delay	
April	22.19	5.00	Hunter Fld	33.75	Smyrna AAFld
May	18.72	3.00	Sarasota AAFld	61.00	McChoed Fld
June	22.15	9.00	Smyrna AAFld	37.14	March Fld
July	15.71	4.00	Sherman Fld	17.00	Langley Fld
August	11.68	3.00	Dover AAFld	12.80	Langley Fld
September	18.85	9.00	Shaw Fld	36.67	Smyrna AAFld
October	31.27	16.00	Tuskegee AAFld	50.00	Lockbourne AAB
November	13.37	9.00	Smyrna AAFld	18.85	Lockbourne AAB
December	20.86	16.00	Langley Fld	30.41	Lockbourne AAB
	19.42	Total Average Delay in Days			

Prepared by the Historical Division, Hq TAC, August 1947, from data furnished that Division by the office of the Staff Judge Advocate

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND) (AAF)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

TAC 210.3 (15 May 46) 25 May 1946

SUBJECT: Judge Advocates and Legal Officers.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

1. There is a critical need within this command for 6 Judge Advocates (8103) (1 for this headquarters, 2 for 3rd Air Force, 2 for 9th Air Force and 1 for 12th Air Force, when activated). There is also an immediate requirement of 6 to 8 legal officers (8101) for assignment to Bases of this command.

2. It is understood that such personnel are not available for reassignment to this command. If such is the case, it is suggested that properly qualified officers be ordered back to active duty. The Judge Advocate of this headquarters states that he is informed quite a few lawyers are finding it hard to get adjusted under present conditions in civilian life and regret having been seperated. He further states it is generally understood many such officers would welcome active duty at this time.

3. Request appropriate action be taken to furnish the personnel requested in paragraph 1. Suitable qualified officers are not available within this command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Stamped HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, A.G.D.
Asst, Adjutant General

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[HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND]
[Langley Field, Virginia]

TAC 353 (26 Jun 46) 26 June 1946

SUBJECT: Training of Officers in Courts-Martial Procedure.

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, March Field, Riverside, California.

1. There is a critical shortage in this command of officers with legal experience. To meet the need for officers trained in courts-martial work the Staff Judge Advocate is instituting at this headquarters a school for selected officers from the various air forces. The commanding general of each air force will select and place on special duty at this headquarters 2 officers monthly, each officer to remain on such special duty for a period of 30 days. Officers selected should be of all ranks. It is realized that competent Judge Advocates of legal advisors cannot be trained in a 30 day period. It is believed, however, that training in the duties of Investigating officer, law member of a general court, member, Trial Judge Advocate and Defence Counsel of special and general courts-martial, and the routine duties of a Judge Advocate Office, including the examination of charges and reference for trial, and the review of the record of trial, will be of inestimable value to all officers who take this training. The proposed course will serve as a means of acquainting officers with the work of the legal department, and the duties and responsibilities of all officers in connection with court-martial matters.

2. It is believed that if all of the air forces follows the above procedure the command will eventually have a substantial leaven of experienced officers capable of handling courts-martial in an expeditious and uniform manner.

3. It is directed that the officers for such training report to this headquarters on the tenth day of each month.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/s/ HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Policy of the Assignment of Post Engineers
1.	B. L. R. A-4 13 May 1946	Chief of Staff	1. It has been the past policy of this Headquarters to control the assignment and the appointment of Post Engineers. The present critical shortage of personnel qualified as Post Engineers emphasizes the need for the continuance of this policy. a. The advantages to be gained are: (1) This Headquarters is more familiar with the personnel qualifications of engineer personnel. (2) The major engineer activities are centralized at this Headquarters. Present Air Forces do not have qualified Engineer Sections. (3) Several engineer officers have been lost in the past because base commanders declared them surplus. b. The chief disadvantage of this policy is that it usurps the command prerogative of base commanders. 2. It is strongly recommended that until such time as the shortage of engineer personnel is relieved that the policy of assignemtn and appointment of Post Engineers be retained by this Headquarters. Request command approval.

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington

AFPMT-11 29 July 1946

SUBJECT: Proper Utilization Enlisted Personnel in the Communications Field

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. Reference AAF letter 121-1C (12 June 1946). The shortage of Communications Specialists endangers the AAF program during the demobilization period.

2. It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that personnel in the Communications field are being mal-assigned in the face of a critical AAF shortage of this type of specialist.

3. Reference Para 1203 and 1204, and pages 579, 579, and 580, AAF Manual 35-C-1. It is requested that all personnel audit teams make a special study of the utilization of communications and radar technicians during the months of July and August and include their findings in their reports to the Headquarters of major commands. Particular attention should be given to the utilization of personnel possessing as primary or as secondary any of the following MOS's:

2756 Radio Operator-Mechanic, AAF
754 Radio Mechanic, AAF
756 Radio Operator, AAF
757 Radio Operator-Mechanic-Gunner

4. It is felt that the specialists possessing MOS's noted in Par 3 above, can, if properly assigned and utilized, provide a valuable source for the alleviation of the present critical shortages of communications technicians. As possessors of the basic radio skills, they can most profitably absorb on-the-job training for vitally needed AAF trained personnel requirements

5. It is particularly requested that personnel audit teams review the proceedings of base classification boards and note the instances in which personnel with communications MOS's have been reclassified to another critically needed skill, when additional training might save their communications skill for AAF use.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL SPAATZ:

Stamped LEON W. JOHNSON
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy AC/AS-1

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233

[HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND]
[Langley Field, Virginia]

30 December 1946

TAC 322 (29 Dec 46)

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Organizatien Charts and Strength Report

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.
Attn: Mr. c. d. Cline, Management Associates

* * * * * *

2. In preparing the strength report the following criteria was used:

* * * * * *

3. This compilation shows the bulk of the assigned personnel under housekeeping activities. It is believed, however, that the base units are the only true housekeeping units. The other units shown under housekeeping such as Service Groups, are supporting units for the Tactical Groups whose functions is to enable the Tactical Groups to operate. These supporting units number 278 officers and 5937 enlisted personnel. It is the policy of this command to have in the base units only the minimum number of personnel required to perform functions which cannot be accomplished by a fully implemented service group. A copy of a letter, subject, "Reorganization and Reduction of Base Unit Structure," is attached. This letter was mailed 18 September 1946 to Air Force commanders and commanding officers of bases assigned directly to this headquarters.

****

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

GLENN O. BARCUS

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC 352(24 Dec 46)

24 December 1946

SUBJECT: Diversified Training of Officers

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters

1. During the recent war, training of commissioned personnel was necessarily channelized to insure the availability of highly skilled officers in numbers required during the emergency period. The requirements of war necessitated mass training in some specialities while other skills were needed in comparatively small numbers. The termination of hostilities left the AAF with a large surplus of personnel in certain fields of skill such as pilots, navigators, bombardiers, etc. This, coupled with the accelerated reduction of officer strength within the AAF since the cessation of hostilities, has resulted in the AAF being critically short in some fields of skill and surplus in others. It is obvious also that, due to this reduction program, the commissioned personnel remaining in the AAF will be required to assume additional and broader responsibilities.

2. An intensive training program has been initiated to alleviate this situation. The Air Training Command has been charged with the responsibility of providing the facilities necessary for the retraining of this personnel in the fields of skill which are now critical. The various AAF publications providing for this training on a voluntary basis have received a very poor response. It has become necessary for quotas to be allotted on a mandatory basis under the provisions of AAF Letter 50-62 to secure students. AAF Letter 50-2 consolidates these publications, listing names of courses and qualifications, and establishes a system whereby an officer may pursue training of his choice.

3. It is imperative that officers be trained in additional skills. AAF Letter 50-2 will be brought to the attention of each officer below the rank of colonel. He will be informed of the courses for which he is qualified and encouraged to make formal application for such training. Officers not desiring to apply for training will be required to select three fields of training for which they are qualified. This list will be completed not later than 30 January 1947 and will be maintained within each organization and used to facilitate the selection of students for mandatory quotas allotted under AAF Letter 50-62. The application of those officers applying for training will be forwarded through channels to this headquarters for approval. A file of approved applications will be maintained within the officer's organization and this headquarters advised of any change in officer's status making him unavailable.

(Effective until 24 June 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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4. Courses for food service personnel are not listed in AAF Letter 50-2; however, officers qualified under the provisions of letter, this headquarters, file TAC 353 (13 Nov 46), dated 13 November 1946, subject: "Survey of Food Service Personnel," may apply for this training. This headquarters will request quotas from food service schools within the Army area concerned or from AAF schools to be established.

5. Before attending any service school each prospective student will be briefed on the advantages the training will afford him and his increased value to the AAF. He will be prevailed upon to exert his utmost effort to complete the course successfully and to obtain the maximum benefits of the training.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

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FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____ (Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: MOSs for Rated Officers
1	Mil Pers JBW Sep '46	A-1	1. Att'n invited to attached copy of AAF Ltr 35-17 which encourages the awarding of MOS of highest skill and greatest value to the service to rated Officers. Compliance will have the following effects: a. Overages and shortages in primary MOSs will tend to leval out as rated officers are given MOSs that are now considered critical. b. While overages of rated primary MOSs will tend to level out, it is believed that an overall shortage of certain rated MOSs will occur. c. Many rated officers will strongly object to being awarded non-rated primary MOSs since they will not want to be earmarked for the particular type of duty the rest of their career. d. Rated personnel will be awarded primary MOSs when they are not sufficiently qualified for that particular non-rated MOS. Present policy only requires 30 days duty on a particular duty to get a Secondary MOS but no policy is announced as to how long it takes for a Primary MOS. It is up to the 30's and classification people to determine what an Officers greatest skill is and then award him that primary MOS. With the present shortage of skilled Classification personnel a large number of rated people are bound to get non-rated MOSs as Primary MOSs when they should not. 2. It is recommended that the other Staff Chiefs in this Hq express their views on this subject and that this Hq issue a numbered letter on this subject. 3. It is recommended that control of changes of primary MOSs from rated to non-rated be retained at Air Force level to insure that such changes are made only when warranted.
2.		A-3 A-4 Air Inspectr	AAF Manual 35-0-1 governs classification. Do you have suggestions. JCH

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

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FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: MOS System
3	A3-1 J.D.S. Dep A-3 10 Sep 46	A-4	1. The MOS system as it now stands is unsatisfactory. Every pilot in a squadron who has served as an operations officer or assistant operations officer, has an MOS of 7162, along with the trained staff officer in a high command. At the same time there is nothing to show his rated MOS., i. e. whether he is a single-engine or four-engine pilot. A revision of the entire system is underway in Headquarters AAF but in the meantime believe the following steps will tend to help the situation: a. Retain MOS classification on Air Force level. b. While encouraging rated officers to obtain non-rated primary MOS, the entire system will mean nothing if too liberal a policy of awarding these MOS's is adopted. Air Force classification officers should be thoroughly briefed on a definite policy so as not to so endanger the system. c. If possible, a campaign should be instituted to acquaint rated personnel with the desirability of obtaining non-rated MOS, stressing the point that achievement of such a primary MOS is difficult. d. On rated officers, list both their primary non-rated MOS and rated MOS in all correspondence requiring listing of an MOS. Although cumbersome, this will acquaint the inquiring authority with necessary information.

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TO BE RETURNED
TO THE ARCHIVES
OF THE AAF
HISTORICAL GROUP

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

SECTION THREE -- MAINTENANCE

SECTION FOUR -- TRAINING

HISTORY
OF THE
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
March 1946 - December 1946

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417.01
Mar. – Dec. 46
Vol III

SEC III

HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE
(Troop Carrier)
Greenville, South Carolina

A3

AF3AF 353 (10 Sept 46) 10 September 1946

SUBJECT: Glider Pilot Training

TO; Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. Authority is requested to extend the period of training associated with the training of power pilots as glider pilots, as directed in paragraph 1, AAF Letter, subject: Glider Pilot Training, AFCTC-2, dated 6 June 1946, from 15 December 1946 to 15 Febuary 1947.

2. It is proposed to reduce the number of students per class from sixty (60) to thirty (30), effective 1 October 1946. This action is deemed necessary in view of the inactivation of the 434th Troop Carrier Group.

3. Although this Headquarters originally stated in AF3AF Letter 352, subject: Glider Training for Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) Pilots, dated 28 May 1946, that one (1) Troop Carrier Squadron was considered adequate to accomplish the original outlined training, the present workload is proving to be beyond the capability of the 37th Troop Carrier Squadron.

4. Training of sixty (60) students per month requires a minimum of 1200 hours flying time, plus 200 additional hours for incidental flying. This flying time when broken down perassigned aircraft for twenty (20) flying days per month (ten (10) days a month subtracted for weekends and bad weather) gives a daily total of 4.375 hours required of each aircraft on squadron assigned T.O. basis. This number of hours is felt to be excessive considering the maintenance capability of one (1) Troop Carrier Squadron and the rapid turnover of personnel.

5. By 30 September 1946 a total of 186 students will have been trained leaving a balance of 120 required to meet the commitment.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Stamped C. C. VAN NORSEN
It. Col., A. G. D.
Adjutant General

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Hq 3d AF, (Trp Carrier) Greenville, S. C., subj: " Glider Pilot Trg." 10 Sept 1946

AG-4

TAC 352 (10 Sept 46) 1st Ind 10 September 1946

Hq. Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force, Greenville Army Air Field, Greenville, South Carolina

1. Authorization has been received from Headquarters Army Air Forces, to extend the glider pilot training to 15 January 1947.

2. It is directed that you extend your period of training until 15 January 1947, at which time all the pilot scheduled for glider training will be trained.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR QUESADA:

Stamped CLINTON D. HAYES
1st Lt. Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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AAFFACT
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14 May 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Special Combined Inspection of Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, Myrtle Beach, S. C.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: The Air Inspector, Thru: Commanding Officer, Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, Myrtle Beach, S. C. and Command Channels.

I. INSPECTION

1. This inspection was conducted by Lt Col Conrad E. Carns, IGD, and six (6) officers of the Office of the Field Air Inspector, Hq AAF, Orlando, Florida, assisted by the quarterly inspection team of the Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida, during the period 6-9 May 1946, under authority of current instructions from the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

2. Commanding Officer at the time of inspection was Colonel Glenn C. Nye, who has been in command since 26 February 1946.

3. The Air Inspector at the time of inspection was Major E. Miller, who has served in this capacity since 26 March 1946.

4. Activity inspected is under jurisdiction of Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida.

5. The mission of the activity inspected consists of normal base functions plus the furnishing of accommodations to tactical units for bombing, gunnery and rocket training.

II. OBSERVATIONS

A. Administration and Services.

a. Administration and Services of this activity is rated SATISFACTORY.

b. Administration and Services inspection of this activity is rated SATISFACTORY.

c. Inspection System.

(1) There is, at present, no full time Administrative

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5rt Insp Genl Insp of Myrtle Beach AFB, Myrtle Beach, S. C.

a. Inspection System. (Cont'd)

Inspector for this activity, and full coverage is not being obtained.

(2) Files of records and directives are not current.

(3) Clerical personnel is not sufficient to record and thereby assure adequate follow-up of inspection reports.

(4) Special subjects are not filed and administered as required by current directives. Command subjects were not filed, nor is there any indication of inspection to assure compliance.

(5) A study of the few administrative inspection reports revealed that none could be considered of sufficient scope to keep the Commander informed of conditions in the activity inspected.

d. There is, at present, no on-the-job training program operating in the Civilian Personnel Section.

e. This station does not have a Chaplain. Chaplain transportation is provided on Sundays for personnel desiring to attend services at nearby Myrtle Beach. It is not believed such action satisfactorily solves the problem. There are approximately 240 colored personnel on duty at the base, and facilities for worship in their race are extremely limited, and in some denominational categories, non-existent.

f. Inspection action has been taken at this base to readjust and re-organize the administrative functions of the base in accordance with the reduction of personnel and mission requirements.

h. There is only one Surgeon assigned to this base. This Surgeon holds the rank of captain and is not a Flight Surgeon, therefore he cannot perform the duties required of a Flight Surgeon. He is required to be on a 24-hour call status, which is considered an excessive responsibility. An eight bed dispensary has been established, which is being operated and maintained in a superior manner.

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HEADQUARTERS DOVER ARMY AIR FIELD
DOVER, DELAWARE

4 June 1946

SUBJECT: Compliance with AAF Regulation 50-2

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. Reference AAF Regulation 50-2, subject: "Flying Proficiency and Minimum Annual Flying Requirements", dated 7 March 1946, due to the acute shortage of qualified Maintenance Personnel, this base finds it impossible to comply with the requirements of the above Regulation. Rated Officer Personnel are performing full time duties on the Line to relieve the strain imposed upon the few qualified Enlisted Men assigned to the Maintenance Section. However, this alleviates the condition only enough so that rated Flying Personnel are barely able to accomplish the minimum requirements of four (4) hours per month.

2. During the month of May, there was a total of twenty-one (21) enlisted men and eight (8) officers assigned to the Maintenance Section, with an average of eighteen (18) enlisted men and five (5) officers present for duty. With a total of twenty-two (22) working-flying days in May, a total of 792 hours were flown by pilots assigned to this base for a total of 3,170 maintenance man hours expended by Maintenance personnel. As a basis for computation of man-hours expended on routine Maintenance inspections, the Engineering Officer determined the following:

a. A 100 hour inspection requires 75 man-hours.

b. A 50 hour inspection requires 65 man-hours.

c. A 25 hour inspection requires 6 man-hours.

For a total of 792 flying hours accomplished in May, there were 30-25 hour, 16-50 hour and 8-100 hour Maintenance inspections performed, or a total of 1,832 man-hours expended on routine inspections alone, representing approximately 57 per cent of the total man hours expended. The remaining 43 per cent was expended by pre-flight and daily inspections, hangar equipment, and normal trouble shooting and repair maintenance. The Engineering Officer certifies that all assigned Maintenance personnel were utilized to the utmost of their efficiency and the maximum of their work capacity.

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Ltr, Subject: "Compliance with AAF Regulation 50-2, " dtd 4 June 1946
(Cont'd)

3. The following computations are presented to show the ration of Maintenance man hours available and man hours required to meet the requirements of AAF Regulation 50-2 for a thirty-day period. There are 171 rated officers assigned to this base, with an average of 150 present for duty. As a basis for a thirty-day period, eight (8) hours twenty (20) minutes would be the minimum time required per pilot, or a total of 1250 flying hours would have to be accomplished per thirty-day period. To accomplish 1250 flying hours, fifty 25-hour, twenty-five 50-hour and thirteen 100-hour inspections would have to be performed, involving a total of 2900 maintenance man hours expended on necessary inspections, hangar equipment, and normal trouble shooting and repair maintenance, a total of 5,303 man hours would have to be available. With twenty-three (23) men present for duty, seven (7) hours actually on the job, per day, twenty-two (22) working per thirty (30) day period, only 3,542 maintenance man hours would be available, or approximately only 70 per cent of the required amount. It is felt that any further work load imposed upon the Maintenance Section in its present under-staffed condition would be at the sacrifice of Maintenance quality and a direct hazard to flying safety.

4. In view of the above conditions, request that a waiver of Non-Compliance with AAF Regulation 50-2 be granted to Rated Flying Personnel assigned to this station for the period of April, May and June 1946.

/s/ KENNETH R. POWELL
/t/ KENNETH R. POWELL
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Air Inspector

Langley Field, Virginia
24 September 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Annual General Inspection, Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee

TO: Commanding Officer
Smyrna Army Air Field
Smyrna, Tennessee

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

******

IV. S-1

10. The S-1 Section showed an appreciable improvement in the processing of military records. Although there is a general feeling of uncertainty of the future status of personnel, a high state of morale is being maintained and S-1 is well prepared for either inactivation or the acceptance of a definite mission.

******

VI. S-3

12. This section was observed to be operating in a commendable manner along with steady decreases in personnel. In inverse proportion to the personnel decrease, the work load of the base operations Section had been materially increased with the closing of nearby Berry Field. In the interest of flying safety, it is suggested that additional qualified operations dispatchers and engineering maintenance personnel be assigned to Smyrna as a refueling station, and the overall heavy transient aircraft traffic which is caused by the fact that Smyrna is the only air field in this section used for refueling on flights between east and west sections of the country.

******

RICHARD I. COE
Lt Col, IGD
Asst Inspector General

1 Incl
Act Ext TAC, No. 1

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Air Inspector

Langley Field, Virginia
24 September 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Annual General Inspection, Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee

TO: Commanding Officer
Smyrna Army Air Field
Smyrna, Tennessee

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

******

8. The relationship between the detachment at Camp Campbell and Smyrna Army Air Field is unsatisfactory. Personnel have not been assigned in sufficient numbers, nor with necessary qualification to accomplish this mission in accordance with the high standards of AAF achievement. In dealing, as they are, with important personages of the Army Ground Forces, this condition cannot help but reflect discredit on the AAF as a whole.

9. The Air Inspection Section was operating in an unsatisfactory manner. Lack of complete Inspector coverage of all base activities caused this maximum rating, i.e., only 50% of assigned aircraft were inspected during the month of August which, in the interest of flying safety, is not consistent with the high standards of AAF aircraft maintenance.

******

RICHARD L [illegible]
Lt Col, TAC
Assistant Inspector General

1 Incl
Act Dpt TAC, No. 1

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

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FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____ (Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of 319th AAFBU including 75th Troop Carrier Squadron, Lawson Field, Ga.
1.	C&C 26 Nov 46	A-4	Attached inspection Report is for your information and any comments you may wish to include in the indorsement to AAF. M.C.F. MURRAY G. FANT Lt Colonel, AC Coordination and Compliance
2	A-4 29 Nov 46	C&C	A-4 and A-3 are now taking action to reduce number of aircraft at all stations. This will result in better maintenance of aircraft and a reduced load upon the shops and supply.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field Virginia

29 July 1946

Lieutenant General Ira C Eaker
Deputy Commanding General
Army Air Forces
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Eaker,

It is my firm conviction that our present system of aircraft distribution is basically wrong and that corrective measures should be adopted immediately.

Under the present procedure, an organization is initially allocated its T/E aircraft plus an additional number called advance attrition. When losses reduce the units' aircraft below authorized strength, replacements are made by requisition on Air Materiel Command, who establishes a project for the necessary number of aircraft. The faults of such a system areapparent. Firstly, the additional attrition aircraft over burden our meager peace time maintenance personnel and facilities. Secondly, since it is not economical to pickle the additional aircraft, they are flown by the unit and thus deteriorate at the same rate as the T/E aircraft. Finally, the replacement system is cumbersome, time consuming, and uncertain.

I contend that an organization should receive initially its T/E aircraft and thereafter replacements necessary to maintain authorized strength should be automatic. This simple system, used in the European Theatre of Operations throughout the war, was most effective and since it would be used again in a future war, I strongly recommend its adoption as a peace time procedure.

Very truly yours,

ELWOOD R. QUESADA
Major General, USA
Commanding

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(AAA)

(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

6 Aug 1946

TAC 452.11 (6 Aug 46)

SUBJECT: Supplies for A26 Aircraft

TO: Commanding General
Air Material Command
Wright Field, Ohio
Attn: TSDSP

1. During visit to your headquarters on 2 August 1946 by representatives of this headquarters, Col. Denniston of Supply Division was informed of the critical supply situation existing at Lake Charles Army Air Base, Louisiana as pertains to parts for A26C (Pathfinder) aircraft.

2. Inclosures 1 and 2 are correspondence related to efforts to start flow of materiels into Lake Charles AAS prior to the time of issuance of CEL's, based on T/O & E's modified to fit the 47th night Attack Group and 544th Air Service Group.

3. It is believed that these inclosures should have made MOAMA aware of the need for establishing supply levels to meet the needs of these organizations.

4. It is requested that this headquarters be informed of the approximate date the project being set up by your headquarters to furnish Lake Charles AAB a forty-five (45) day level of supplies will reach that station, and action being taken to establish sixty (60) day level of supplies at MOAMA.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

2 Incls
1. Cy ltr fr Hq AMC 29 Apr 46 w/2 Inds
2. Cy ltr fr Hq TAC 16 Apr 46

Stamped PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

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C O P Y

Basic ltr dtd 6 Aug 46 fr Hq. TAC, subj: "Supplies for A-26 Aircraft".

1st Ind. TSSC05F/CIF/dw

Hqs. AAC, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio Aug 20 1946

TO: Commanding General, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Va.

1. Following receipt of information from NOAMA regarding the type, model and series numbers of aircraft assigned to Lake Charles AAB, this Command has taken action to initiate a Special Project (No.16731-HO) covering Table II equipment for A-26 aircraft. Shipment will be made direct from the various specialized depots to Lake Charles. Initial shipments may be expected within the next two weeks.

2. Tables of Equipment 452R, 457R, 457R, and 112R are being mailed from this Headquarters to Lake Charles this date.

3. Action has already been taken by NOAMA to establish a sixty (60) day level of A-26 supplies to meet requirements of Lake Charles AAB.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/t/ A.W.MARTENSTEIN
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Supply Division

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C O P Y

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General

(AAA)
Tampa Florida

In reply refer to:

TAC 452.11 (17 May 46)

17 May 1946

SUBJECT: Parts for C-82 Aircraft

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina.

1. Personnel of Maintenance Division, this headquarters, reported after a recent visit to Pope Field, North Carolina, that difficulties were being experienced by that station in securing parts for C-82 aircraft.

2. It is directed that this headquarters be advised without delay of action by Pope Field to secure stock lists for this aircraft and if AAF M&S Directive 67-29, dated 5 October 1945, has been complied with in endeavoring to establish initial stock of spare parts for C-82 type aircraft.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/s/ ROY MARSHALL

Stamped ROY MARSHALL
Capt., Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen

C O P Y

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND) AAA
(Langley Field, Virginia)

TAC 452.11 (16 Apr 46) 16 Apr 1946

SUBJECT: Aircraft Maintenance parts.

TO: Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Ohio.

1. This command is experiencing extreme difficulties in maintaining aircraft in flyable status due to delay of deliveries of aircraft parts and impossibility of maintaining suitable stock levels. This is particularly true in types AT-6, B-25, P51 and P-61 aircraft.

2. Inclosed is copy of Unsatisfactory Report which exemplifies supply problems throughout this entire command.

3. While it is realized that this general condition exists as a result of many types of presently assigned aircraft falling within limited and Restricted Procurement Lists as outlined in AAF Materiel and Services Directive Number 65-8, dated 30 March 1945, it is felt that some action need be taken to expedite the movement of necessary maintenance parts, thereby allowing this command to better perform its assigned mission.

4. Information is requested as to measures taken, or proposed, to alleviate the present parts supply problem.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl
Unsatisfactory report
#46-10, McChord Field, Wash.
1 April 46

Stamped CLARENCE N. KLEIN
Maj., Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
AAF Form No. 54
(Revised 2-15-44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY AIR FORCES
UNSATISFACTORY REPORT

(See AAF Reg. 15-54 for Information on Proper Use of this Form)

TO BE FILLED IN BY STATION	
STATION SERIAL No.	DATE SUBMITTED
WCF 46-10	4-1-46

LEAVE BLANK		
A. S. C. SERIAL No.	REFER TO	CLASS

STATION	ORGANIZATION
McChord Field, Washington	464th Base Unit

SUBJECT OF REPORT	Property Class—Name	Manufacturer	AAF Order or Shipping No.
	Procurement of Parts		

AIRCRAFT—Model & AAF Serial No.	ENGINE—Model & AAF Serial No.	UNIT OR ACCESSORY—Type, Model and Serial No.

AIRCRAFT REPORTS ONLY	LAST D. I. R.—Depot	Date	Flying Time Since	Total Flying Time

ENGINE REPORTS ONLY	LAST OVERHAUL—Depot	Hours Since	Depots and Hours At Each Previous Overhaul

PART	Name	Part Drawing, Serial and Specification No.

Time in Use	Quantity on Hand	Quantity Known Defective	No. Previous Failures	Manufacturer	Inspector's No. or Identification

Indicate by "X" Disposition of Exhibit	Photographed and Prints Enclosed	Held for Instructions	Sent Under Separate Cover	Sent in Attached Package	Repaired and Returned to Service	Disposed of (Explain Below.)	To Overhaul Facility (INITIALS)

GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS, PROBABLE CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW:
(Use Only Applicable Spaces Above—Avoid Unnecessary Repetition)

EXPEDITE

1. Due to length of time required to procure aircraft parts that are not in stock at this base, it has been necessary to cannabalize on four AT-6's to maintain eight AT-6's in flying status; three P-51H's to maintain one P-51H; three P-61's to maintain eight P-61's. This causes untold hidden man hours to remove and reinstall from one aircraft to another.

2. It is suggested that at this time that stock level control be reviewed and if a Base has certain type aircraft to maintain it be allowed to retain necessary replacement parts in the area irregardless whether there has been a consumption or not in the past 45 or 60 days. Source of supply should be maintained in area of operation of aircraft as long as aircraft are to be flown. As presently set up, Base Supply stock levels amount to a mail order house and length of time to extract to a specialized depot seriously hampers efficient operation and maintaining a maximum percentage of aircraft in flyable status.

3. The following are a few examples of time lost in awaiting items:

   1. One each Piston Assy 0232-890555 - ordered 28 Feb - Not received to this date.

   2. One each Wing Assy - 0108-82785-29 - Ordered AOCF 12 March - No notice of shipment received this date.

   3. One each Carburetor - 4305-PL-392057-1 - Ordered 8 Jan - Not received to date - Required for A-20 aircraft for which movement orders was received 14 December 1945.

   4. One each Tank Assy - 0107-519609-502 - Ordered AOCF 21 Feb - Not received to date.

ROUTING SEND ORIGINAL AND TWO COPIES DIRECT TO COMMANDING GENERAL, HQ. AIR SERVICE COMMAND, PATTERSON FIELD, FAIRFIELD, OHIO.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
AAF Form No. 54
(Revised 2-18-43)

WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY AIR FORCES
UNSATISFACTORY REPORT

(See AAF Reg. 15-54 for Information on Proper Use of this Form)

TO BE FILLED IN BY STATION	
STATION SERIAL No.	DATE SUBMITTED
MCF 46-10	4-1-46

LEAVE BLANK		
A. S. C. SERIAL No.	REFER TO	CLASS

STATION: Mc Chord Field, Washington		ORGANIZATION: 464th Base Unit		
SUBJECT OF REPORT	Property Class—Name: Procurement of Parts	Manufacturer		AAF Order or Shipping No.
AIRCRAFT—Model & AAF Serial No.	ENGINE—Model & AAF Serial No.	UNIT OR ACCESSORY—Type, Model and Serial No.		
AIRCRAFT REPORTS ONLY	LAST D. I. R.—Depot	Date	Flying Time Since	Total Flying Time
ENGINE REPORTS ONLY	LAST OVERHAUL—Depot	Hours Since	Depots and Hours At Each Previous Overhaul	
PART	Name		Part Drawing, Serial and Specification No.	
	Time in Use	Quantity on Hand	Quantity Known Defective	No. Previous Failures	Manufacturer	Inspector's No. or Identification

Indicate by "X" Disposition of Exhibit ➔ ☐ Photographed and Prints Enclosed ☐ Held for Instructions ☐ Sent Under Separate Cover ☐ Sent in Attached Package ☐ Repaired and Returned to Service ☐ Disposed of (Explain Below.) ☐ To Overhaul Facility (INITIALS)

GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS, PROBABLE CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW:
(Use Only Applicable Spaces Above—Avoid Unnecessary Repetition)

EXPEDITE

5. Two each Couplings - 0107-421102 - Ordered 21 Feb - Not received to date.

6. Two each Auto Booster - 4400-1509-2A - Ordered 7 March - Not received to date.

7. Four each Door Assys - 0107-412583 - Ordered 28 Jan - Not received to date.

5. With reference to the above items the Base Maintenance has made a thorough inspection and investigation in the Base Supply to ascertain when items were requisitioned, the procedure, and when tracers were submitted. The Base Supply has rendered every possible effort in order to expedite the shipment of the items above, therefore, it is felt that the depots are not making necessary follow-ups and tracers on these items which they have extracted to other depots. It is the opinion of this department that the Maintenance Section and the Base Supply on this base have done their part in this matter.

5. Recommendation: That if Depots do have priorities existing at other bases which are more urgent than those of this Base, that in all cases this Station be informed what action is being taken on those specific items which are requisitioned, which will afford this Station an opportunity to make the necessary improvisions to carry on.

F. P. BOSTON
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General

Biggs Field, Texas
10 April 1946

Major General Elwood R. Quesada
Headquarters Tactical Air Command
Tampa, Florida

Dear General Quesada:

Yesterday at about 1600 hours the first fatal accident of this Command occurred since my arrival here. I am bringing it to your immediate attention because preliminary investigations lead to the conclusion that it was strictly a structural failure, and without any good reason.

The accident occurred at the Salt Flats Target Range during practice dive bombing training. The left wing failed on a P-51H assigned to the 362d Fighter Group at the pull-out of the dive, and First Lieutenant Samuel S. Durfee, the Pilot, was unable to clear the airplane in time to prevent his death. According to another pilot flying on Lieutenant Durfee's wing to gain experience in dive bombing practice, the wing failed at about the gun position. The dive was made from approximately 6000' above the ground, and the speed of pull-out was about 350 at the time of failure. The dive was at approximately 45° and, according to the other Pilot who saw the failure, it would seem to him that not over four or five G's were put onto the airplane.

There have been repeated wing failures in P-51D type airplanes and various theories have been advanced as to causes. Most of the overseas failures were accounted for by the fact that the fuselage tank had gasoline in it which caused a shift in the center of gravity, resulting in excessive stresses being placed on the airplane when the stick was pulled back. In this case there was no gasoline in the fuselage tank, and stresses did not appear to have been excessive. An investigation has been made to determine if the airplane had been abused on previous flights, with negative results. The airplane had been on two previous flights the same day, once on a formation flight and once on an instrument flight. In neither case had any excessive strain been placed upon the airplane.

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It is my opinion that the original design of the P-51 was highly efficient and I have always been a great exponent of this particular airplane. However, since putting in the heavier engine and adding other weight in later models, the safety factor has been reduced to a point where the P-51D is not a suitable airplane for the performance of the missions of a Tactical Air Force. It is recommended that the P-51D's now assigned to the organizations of this Air Force be replaced by P-51H's or, in the event this is not feasible, that the Fighter Group be equipped with the P-47 type airplane until a more modern airplane is furnished.

To the best of my knowledge, the P-51H has not yet been equipped for reconaissance, and if it is decided to replace P-51D's in the 69th Reconnaissance Group with P-51H's it will be necessary to do some experimental work on them to make them suitable as a reconnaissance airplane. The need for a change in model is not so urgent in the 69th Reconnaissance Group as it is in the 362d Fighter Group due to the fact that maneuvers incident to the operation of the Fighter Group place more strain upon the airplane than the maneuvers of the Reconnaissance Group.

Sincerely yours,

HOMER L. SANDERS
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/ (A4A)

16 May 1946

TAC 452.11 (16 May 46)

SUBJECT: Maintenance Parts, P-51 Aircraft.

TO: Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Ohio.

1. Considerable difficulty has been experienced by units of the Ninth Air Force, assigned this command, in securing parts for P-51 aircraft resulting in these aircraft being grounded for a considerable length of time.

2. Analysis of inclosures 1, 2, 3, and 4, attached, indicates that ninety-one (91) aircraft were grounded for an average of 12.8 days for the period 8 January to 24 April 1946. Considerable man hours are consumed in making necessary follow-through tracing supply action which could be devoted to other work had those parts been readily procurable. Those aircraft in commission required more maintenance because of unequal distribution of flying hours among assigned aircraft.

3. Under the provisions of paragraph 2, AAF M & S Directive 65-8, dated 30 March 1945, it is believed parts may be procured to fill requirements for aircraft grounded for parts by renewal of manufacturers contract.

4. Request this headquarters be advised of any contemplated action by your headquarters to alleviate this condition. It is further believed that conditions of a similar nature exist within other commands.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, A.G.D.
Asst, Adjutant General

4 Incls.
1. Report from 362nd Fighter Group
2. Report from 309th AAF Base Unit
3. Report from 27th Tow Target Sq.
4. Report from 69th Recon Group

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Basic Ltr frm Hq TAC dtd 16 May 46, Subj: Maintenance Parts, P-51 Acft

1st Ind. TSSAOIR/JWR/thj

Hq AMC Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, National Guard Armory, Tampa, Florida.

1. All items on the maintenance parts list for grounded P-51 airplane have been screened by the various property classes and all items listed except two (2) show material on hand in excess of 30 months requirements.

2. Item One, Signal Assy. S/N 4202-3246, Class 03-C, cannot be identified. Item Two, Cover Assy. S/N C110-99-54161, Class 01-M, is recommended for local manufacture by Maintenance.

3. None of the various property classes have any record of any extraction to Headquarters, Air Material Command, covering these items.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

A.W. MARTENSTEIN
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Supply Division

Incl:
w/d

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Basic Ltr fm Hq TAC dtd 16 May '46, file TAC 452.11 (16 May 46), subject; Maintenance Parts, P-51 Aircraft. (Continued)

TAC 452.11 (16 May 46) 2nd Ind. 10 June 1946

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, Langley Field, Virginia.

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas.

1. For your information and guidance.

2. As indicated by 1st indorsement, Air Materiel Command has sufficient supply of parts to operate this type aircraft for a considerable time. The two items referred to in paragraph 1 will be requisitioned and locally manufactured, as the case may be, if not already secured.

3. A study of the supply procedures will be made to insure that adequate follow-up is made on requisitions for those aircraft grounded for parts as it is believed that supplies can be secured. If after this study it is determined that proper action is not taken by the depots concerned, this headquarters will be informed giving full particulars.

4. Reports referred to as inclosures 1, 2, 3 and 4 were submitted to this headquarters in compliance with letter TAC 452.11, subject: "Maintenance Parts, Type P-51 Aircraft", dated 10 April 1946.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

stamped O.A. STANFIEL
Major, AGD
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS
LAKE CHARLES ARMY AIR FIELD
Office of the Commanding Officer

ICFA

Lake Charles, Louisiana
26 June 1946

452

SUBJECT: Supply Status of A-26 B&C (Pathfinder)

TO : Commanding General, 9th Air Force, Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas.

1. Information has been received from Mobile Air Technical Service Command that the following listed parts for A-26 Type Airplanes are no longer being procured for AAF Stock, and that the provisions of AAF M&S Directive 65-8 will govern:

0105-3277036	Door Assy., Camera R.H.
0105-5153147-12	Panel Assy., Windshield Glass, R.H.
0105-2126686-5	Bearing Assy., R. H. and L.H.
0105-277050	Seal, Camera, R.H.
0105-5277008	Door Assy., Gunners Escape

2. Mobile Air Technical Service Command has been contacted on the manufacture of Door Assy., Camera R.H. and Door Assy., Gunners Escape, but cannot assure manufacture, and if possible to manufacture, cannot set delivery date to priority projects now on hand. Items cannot be manufactured at Base Level.

3. The increasing shortage and unavailability of A-26 Aircraft parts is seriously hampering base function of supply and the A-26 training schedule as directed by AAF Training Standard 20-5 and special projects assigned to the 47th Bomb Group.

4. Compliance with Paragraph 5d, AAF M&S Directive 65-8 dated 30 March 1945, will not suffice as the majority of parts required are recurrent. The A-26 Type Airplane affected have been modified to Hight Attack (Pathfinder), and most parts required are for specialized airplanes and are not standard items on other type A-26 aircraft. Information furnished by MOATSC indicate that no future procurement for this type aircraft is being made for AAF Stock.

5. Request information if compliance with Paragraph 5d, AAF M&S Directive 65-8 is desired and if all A-26 Aircraft should be declared surplus. If A-26 Aircraft are to be maintained, it is requested that some suitable method be made available to procure the necessary parts for these aircraft.

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Basis: Ltr. fr Hqs, LAAAF, Lake Charles, La., 25 June 46, 452, sub: "Supply Status of A-26 B&C (Pathfinder)"

6. The subject matter above has been coordinated with the 47th Bomb Group and 544th Air Service Group.

THOMAS R. FORD
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding

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Ltr fr Hq, Lake Charles AAB, Lake Charles, La., 452, Subject: Supply Status of A-26 B&C (Pathfinder) dtd 26 June 1946.

TAC 452,11 (26 Jun 46) 2d Ind A4A

Hq, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia 17 July 1946

TO: Commanding General, Air Materiel Command Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio.

1. Request that parts for these aircraft be procured under the provisions of paragraph 2e, AAF M&S Directive 65-8, dated 30 March 1945, or that the procedure outlined in paragraph 1, first Indorsement be followed.

2. Further request this headquarters be informed of any contenplated change which replace this type aircraft with a type of later design.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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Ltr., Hqs., Lake Charles AAB, Lake Charles, La., 452, Subj: Supply Status of A-26 B&C (Pathfinder) dtd 26 June 1946.

9AAB 452 1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Biggs Field, Texas.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

1. Request that Air Materiel Command be requested to procure the necessary drawings from the modification center and forward them to Mobile Technical Service Command directing that MOATSC manufacture necessary parts for the A-26 aircraft based at Lake Charles Army Air Field, Louisiana.

2. If the policy as outlined in paragraph 5d AAF M&S Directive 65-8 is followed then in the very near future all A-26B-C type aircraft modified to Night Attack (Pathfinder will be declared excess and the type of replacement aircraft is not known to this headquarters.

3. In the event that MOATSC cannot manufacture the necessary parts, it is requested that Air Materiel Command procure the necessary parts as outlined in paragraph 2e of AAF M&S Directive 65-8.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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Ltr fr, Hq, Lake Charles AAB, Lake Charles, La., 452, Subj: Supply Status of A-26 B&C (Pathfinder) dtd 26 June 1946.

3rd Ind. TSSAC3R-1/FEK/erg

Hq AMC Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. 14 August 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

1. The A-26 spare parts refered to in paragraph 1 and 2 of the basic letter have been analyzed from records available at this Headquarters and the following data is furnished for your information:

PART NUMBER	DATA
3277036	No issue. No levels 1 each in stock No requirements.
5153147-12	4 each in stock No requirements.
2126686-5	No stock No requirements.
5277008	2 each in stock supplied 6 each on procurement (1Reqn.) Shipment to Lake Charles.
2277055	20 each in stock - 822nd SPD.

This data also referred to the Mobile Air Materiel Area for comment on the information furnished to your Headquarters relative to local manufacture and unavailability for supply. Mobile Air Materiel Area is cognizant of the fact that drawings for the preceding part numbers are available for supply. AMC regulation Number 5-10 provides a method for Mobile to acquire these drawings in the event they are not available within the Area Command Records.

2. This Headquarters has not been informed of any present or anticipated plan whereby A-26 type airplanes will be replaced by another model. Current utilization programs prepared by Headquarters AAF indicate continued usage of the A-26 airplane.

3. AAF M&S Directive 65-8 is now in the process of revision for publication in the near future. The revised directive will permit procurement, when properly substantiated, of spare parts for all aircraft in the current and future utilization program.

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Ltr fr Hq, Lake Charles AAB, Lake Charles, La., 452, Subject: Supply Status of A-26 B&C (Pathfinder) dtd 26 June 1946. 3rd Ind. Con'd.

4. The status of A-26 spares reflected by the proceeding correspondence has been reviewed by this Headquarters. The 5 items listed in the basic letter cannot be considered representative of the overall A-26 spare parts inventory. This Headquarters procured ample initial quantities of A-26 spares at the time the airplanes were being produced and replenishment procurements based upon reported issues are initiated upon the completion of each requirements computation which is now being performed each 90-day period. These replenishment procurements are determined by computing reported issues by activities with the future aircraft utilization program. In general, the current A-26 spares inventories are in a satisfactory status.

5. A complete copy of this correspondence is being forwarded to the Mobile Air Materiel Area for comment direct to your Headquarters and to Headquarters, Air Materiel Command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

A. W. MARTENSTEIN
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Supply Division

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Hq, Lake Charles AAB, Louisiana, subj, "Supply Status of A-26 R&C (Pathfinder) 26 June 1946.

TAC 452.11 (26 Jun 46) 4th Ind 21 Aug 1946 A4A

Hq, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas.

1. Attention is directed to paragraph 4 of Third Indorsement, Headquarters Air Materiel Command in preparing forty-five (45) day level of supply for these aircraft for shipment direct to Lake Charles. Your headquarters will be advised when further information on this project is received from Air Materiel Command.

2. These aircraft will not be declared excess because of non-availability of supplies.

3. Continued close liaison with Mobile Air Materiel Area will be maintained. Further difficulties beyond your control will be brought to the attention of this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
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NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946
1.	A-4 3 Jan 47	A-5 C/S	1. With the activation of the Tactical Air Command, 17 bases were on an inactive status, 9 bases were on a surplus status, and 11 bases had been transferred to the District Engineer. The problems inherent in the inactivation of bases had been gradually defined during the period subsequent to V-J Day, and during the initial period of Tactical Air Command's operation these problems fell into five broad groups. These were: (1) Actual disposal of the property in accordance with instructions received, including the transfer of the Surplus Property Account. (2) The termination of accounts and the completion of final audits. (3) The transfer of the field to the appropriate District Engineer. (4) The closing of the base unit and outshipment of records, and (5) The maintenance of strict control over the political aspects of inactivation. During this time, the inactivation supervisory team was visiting one or more bases weekly. The placing of bases on an inactive and a surplus status was a continuing process, and by the middle of the summer 18 bases had been closed or transferred, 9 bases were on an inactive status, and 9 bases were on a surplus status. Upon receipt of Cir. 138, WD, 1946, new policies, especially in regard to R & U property and audits, had to be developed to conform to the current regulations. The political aspects of the Surplus Property Accounts became increasingly clear at this time, and a letter was drafted for submission to higher headquarters outlining the basic problems and suggesting remedial action. 2. By early Fall, 26 bases had been closed, 7 bases were on an inactive status, and 9 bases were on a surplus status. No unusual or new problems were encountered and inactivation proceeded on an efficient, planned basis. 3. At the end of the calendar year 34 bases and 22 auxiliary bases had been closed, 4 bases were on an inactive status, and 4 bases were on a surplus status. Of the surplus bases, 2 are expected to close within 60 days. Currently, reduced personnel ceilings have slowed down work at inactive bases to a certain extent, but all bases presently surplus should be closed by mid-summer of 1947. 4. During the initial period of Tactical Air Command's operation, no specific logistical problems were under consideration.

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Routine data was furnished upon request of the A-3 and A-5 Section to supplement plans formulated during this period. ~~In addition, work was undertaken on the study of additional transport needed to obtain added mobility for Tactical Air Command units. This work was completed in July and submitted to higher headquarters for approval.~~ Concurrently, the plan for "Operation Mohawk" was developed and the logistical information was supplied as an annex to the plan. In September, cost estimates were developed for the West Coast maneuvers, and cost estimates for the Camp McCoy Cold Weather maneuvers were compiled the following month. Concurrently, costs were computed for the 1947 Louisiana maneuvers. Work was begun on "Operation Icicle" at this time. In addition to a logistics annex to this plan, a comprehensive cost estimate was developed and submitted to A-5. The work on this project was completed in November. At this time, a distinct logistics section was set up in A-4 for the purpose of coordinating and assembling all logistical information. In December, an officer from this section accompanied the officers from A-3 and A-5 to Fairbanks and Anchorage, Alaska. The purpose of this trip was to study the logistics problems inherent in the proposed Air Transport of 5000 Ground troops to the Alaskan Area in the winter of 1948. Information was also obtained relative to "Operation Icicle".

5. The principal activity of the Supply Division during the initial phase of Tactical Air Command's operations was the monitoring of the disposal of all classes of excess and surplus property and salvage at stations declared surplus or placed on a temporarily inactive status. Principal difficulties encountered during this period were occasioned by conflicting directives from all agencies concerned with inactivation or disposal, as well as the inability of supply agencies (principally AMC) to forward disposition instructions to stations within a reasonable time.

6. In order to capitalize on experiences gained in combat during World War II, a staff study was initiated in April 1946 to give TAC units the necessary mobility to properly accomplish its mission of tactical air support to Ground Forces operations. After repeated attempts to obtain approval of this plan by AAF, a partial solution was reached in August 1946, in the form of an authorization by AAF for the activation of two (2) Motor Transport Squadrons (Avn) and the preparation of an Equipment Modification List to serve as

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the basis for obtaining the additional vehicles desired for one of each type TAC unit, to be service tested at some future date. Very few, if any, of these vehicles have been delivered to TAC units, inasmuch as the supplying agencies froze all vehicle issues for an indefinite period, pending the completion of nationwide inventories.

7. In April 1946 it was proposed to conduct the first mass transcontinental P-80 flight, during May. This headquarters made all arrangements for the supplying of necessary fuel, refueling units, equipment and spares at the designated stops along their itinerary. Inasmuch as top priority was granted this project by AAF, no major difficulties were encountered and cooperation by all other AAF commands was excellent.

8. In June projects were established with AMC to improve the unsatisfactory parts situation for P-80, A-26, and P-51 aircraft, with limited success. TAC will continue to have difficulty with the supply of all aircraft parts, in view of the procurement and inventory problems now being encountered by AMC.

9. Throughout the year, Stock Control and Salvage teams from this headquarters visited all stations and subordinate headquarters of the command, concentrating principally on the establishment of new procedures laid down in TM 38-410, "AAF Base Supply Procedure". Because of recent reductions in force, this activity has been incorporated in the TAC Supply and Maintenance Improvement Program initiated in October 1946.

10. An accurate reporting system for the supply of ammunition and vehicles was established, and has permitted this headquarters to properly control the distribution and replenishment of these items for training, demonstrations and maneuvers. Concurrently, recognized ammunition storage, safety, and surveillance practices were established at all TAC bases, by means of directives and technical inspections by a qualified civilian ammunition inspector. To reduce accidents incurred in the destruction of unserviceable or dud ammunition, a 30-day Demolition School was conducted at Langley Field during August 1946 for selected ammunition personnel from all TAC units.

11. Throughout the year, as T/O &E's of TAC units became stabilized, concentrated effort has been put forth, in conjunction

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with AMC to process OEL's for all TAC units, and to monitor the delivery of this equipment to the proper station and unit. Steady progress has been made along these lines, some units, due to low manning status or lack of sufficient storage facilities, do not show a reasonable percentage of this equipment on hand.

12. In view of the emphasis being placed on it by the War Department and Army Air Forces, the Food Service Supervision Program has been established in the command, and is progressing in a satisfactory manner. TAC personnell are now attending specialist schools, and policy and technical directives and literature has been distributed throughout all echelons.

13. After considerable correspondence, telephone conversations, and conferences with AAF and ADC, the responsibilities of TAC for the supply of Air Reserve and Air National Guard units on or in the vicinity of TAC stations have been delineated, and duly disseminated to all concerned. The Air Reserve Program has definitely placed an additional load of some 200 aircraft on our already over-burdened and undermanned supply activities.

14. The closing periods of the year were directed toward the supervision over and assistance in obtaining the necessary supplies for the support of the TAC Air Exhibition Team and the 12th Air Force participation in the November West Coast Amphibious Maneuvers, and [redacted] coordination of the establishment of appropriate depot and station supply levels to accomodate the reorganization of the 9th and 12th Air Forces and the troop movements incident thereto. Principal difficulty encountered in all of the above was the lack of funds for movement of supplies within the command. Exceptionally close staff coordination on this, and lower levels will be required to overcome this difficulty. Requirements for supplies for routine operation, training, demonstrations, and maneuvers, both as to quantity and point of consumption, must be carefully considered prior to actual movement by depots to TAC stations, inasmuch as subsequent movements must be charged to TAC funds.

15. At the activation of the Tactical Air Command, P-80 activities at March Field, California presented a number of problems. Practically every P-80 in operation developed numerous loose rivets in trailing edges of flaps, trim tabs and over the aircraft in

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general. The wing fillets were found to be warped and rivets pulled loose after a few hours of flying time. In many cases the air duct vanes were pulling loose and being blown into the engine section. The paint and putty filler that comprised the finish of aircraft made replacement of the rivets and sheet metal a job, in every case, requiring far more man hours than required on conventional aircraft.

16. The aileron boost unit was also a source of trouble. The hydraulic pump was activated by an electric motor so that electrical failure would immediately cause the aileron boost unit to become inoperative. Hydraulic pressure drop to 250 pounds also caused failure of the boost unit. Failure of the boost unit automatically causes manual operation of the ailerons; but this is difficult, since the boost unit supplies 15/16 of the pressure necessary to move the ailerons in flight.

17. The J-33-11 power unit was also a source of trouble. The inner liners of the combustion chambers had to be changed frequently and the buckets of the turbine wheel were slipping back and forth after a few hours of flight, making engine changes frequent and causing a number of accidents.

18. Numerous Unsatisfactory Reports were submitted by the operating units, and representatives of the Maintenance Division, Tactical Air Command Headquarters, made several visits to Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, as well as visits to March Field. With the occurence of each major unsatisfactory condition, AMC was contacted by teletype, letter or by personal visit and corrective action was undertaken immediately by Hq, AMC and the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

19. A Depot Inspection and Repair program at San Bernardino Air Materiel Area has been initiated by Hq, AMC. This program, to be conducted on a production line basis, provides for rework of all sheet metal defects on each aircraft as well as removal of the finish from the entire aircraft. The P-80 aircraft at March Field will be accepted for DIR at the completion of the first 100 hours of flying time.

20. At the present time a new method of securing the air duct vanes is being service tested at March Field.

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21. Through constant experimentation by AMC and the Lockheed factory, and subsequent change of manufacturing process, the life of the inner liners of the combustion chambers has been extended to equal the life of the engine. The turbine wheel has also been improved but is still a large source of difficulty in the turbo jet engines. The J-33-17 power unit incorporating an engine driven hydraulic pump as well as improved staking methods of the turbine wheel buckets should eliminate much of the trouble with the power unit employed in the P-80 aircraft. This improved engine is in production and available to using activities in the Continental United States in limited numbers.

22. It was noted that percentage of aircraft in commission (maintenance efficiency) was consistently low at stations in Tactical Air Command. Upon investigation, it was found that this situation could be attributed to a lack of spare parts and to difficulties in maintaining the engines, especially the radial type. Difficulties were reflected in frequent spark plug change, carburetor change, magneto replacement and engine change before the time expiration. In conjunction with Hq, AMC, an Engine Conditioning program was initiated, to be published at a later date, in the form of a Technical Order. A logical system of engine adjustment was planned, commencing with carburetor idle adjustment, magneto timing and spark plug installation. A scientific method of "trouble shooting" was included, using the dead cylinder indicator (magic wand) and checking each contributing system in turn.

23. Supervisory visits were made to the Air Force Headquarters as well as a number of the stations in order to indoctrinate personnel at Air Force and base level with the details of the methods to be employed. It was found that maintenance personnel were completely unaware of the advantages to be gained by the methods discussed, in spite of the fact that all methods used had been covered in earlier Technical Orders. A letter was initiated from ~~Hq, [illegible]~~ THIS HEADQUARTERS to Hq, Army Air Forces recommending that films be produced depicting in detail the methods to be employed in Engine Conditioning. This recommendation was favorably considered and subject films will be forthcoming. It was found that maintenance personnel were not familiar with the Technical Orders that are applicable to the particular type aircraft which they were maintaining, especially the informative and procedure Technical Orders. To remedy this, a

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regulation was published directing that a maintenance officer at each station screen every Technical Order upon receipt and be responsible for personnel understanding these Technical Orders.

24. A TAC Letter was then published which included a Technical Order reading list for all maintenance personnel in the command, to have accomplished ninety (90) days after receipt.

25. With the emphasis on Technical Order compliance, a letter was forwarded to the Air Forces and bases assigned directly to Tactical Air Command, directing submission of forms showing the Technical Order compliance status of each assigned aircraft. Upon receipt of subject forms, a chart was prepared showing the outstanding Technical Orders on each aircraft in the command. Figures were compiled showing the number of man hours required at each station for complete Technical Order Compliance. A number of TAC stations are faced with a very large back-log in man hours. During the period from 6 January to 18 January 1947 inclusive, Technical Order Compliance has been given priority over flying training in the command, and at the end of that time, a new report will be submitted, again showing Technical Order Compliance status on all aircraft in TAC. Considerable improvement is expected. A program of aggressive follow up action is planned for the items mentioned above.

26. A project, to install radio compasses in all fighter type aircraft, was started soon after the activation of Tactical Air Command. The 99th Fighter Squadron is now installing compasses in the P-47 type aircraft assigned them. This program is being held up on P-51 type aircraft because this installation seriously affected the C.G. and causes restriction of gasoline in the fuselage tank, thus reducing the range of the P-51's. AMC has agreed to install radio compasses in all P-80 type aircraft now in service. This will be done by an Air Materiel Area on a production line basis and will save operating units considerable work. Hq, AAF has granted authority for the removal of radar equipment from C-47 type aircraft used only for administrative and cargo purposes. Bases and units having these C-47's assigned are now removing this radar equipment and returning it to depots. It is felt that the removal of this radar will lessen the work on bases and units, since radar maintenance personnel are very limited in numbers.

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27. The AN/APS-10 radar installed in production C-82 type aircraft was located in the nose section and thus the scan was limited. AMC was requested to relocate the spinner in the cargo compartment, thus allowing 360° scan. This has been done on production models.

28. A project has been started to install marker beam receiving equipment in all A-26 type aircraft. The 47th Bomb Group is now making the initial installation and preparing drawings and data. When this is completed, marker beacon receiving equipment will be installed in all A-26 type aircraft.

29. The 1st Fighter Group is now installing homing adapter AN/ARA-8 in one P-30 type aircraft. When the installation is completed, service tests will be conducted with a view toward making the installation in all P-80 type aircraft.

30. A primary project confronting the armament section has been action concerning P-80 nose guns and bomb racks. The gun blast tubes and nose skin has presented an unsatisfactory condition since the aircraft has been in service. Numerous Unsatisfactory Reports have been submitted and a number of temporary fixes have been tried. Blast tubes have been splitting open and rivets in the nose skin have become loose and pulled out from the shock of continued firing of the six (6) 50 cal. guns. When the guns were not loaded, it has been necessary to carry ballast in the ammunition boxes. The ballast has broken loose and also damaged the nose section. A new Technical Order will be published in the near future providing for complete rework of the nose section.

31. Hq, AMC has restricted the P-80 from carrying anything on the wing tip bomb shackles except external fuel tanks. 100 lb. practice bombs were formerly carried, but this was found to be unsatisfactory since damage resulted either to the aircraft wing tip or to the bomb fins in numerous cases. At present AMC is carrying on tests to determine the feasibility of using the Mark 47 Navy bomb rack with the M38A2, 100 lb. practice bomb.

32. The main project of the automotive maintenance section has been the accomplishment of plans to make TAC Headquarters a mobile unit, capable of operating its main office sections in the field in conjunction with any Tactical Air Force unit or ground unit.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, Cont'd.

Shortly after Hq, TAC moved to Langley Field, 26 office trailers and 26 prime movers were received from Hq, AMC for this purpose. Performance of considerable routine maintenance on this equipment was necessary to place them in first class condition since they had been in storage for a considerable time. The interior of the trailers was then redesigned and outfitted to accomodate the required office. This project has been completed.

34. In conjunction with the Ordnance Supply Section, requirements were drawn up for new type bomb handling vehicles. These vehicles are to be used in bomb servicing of all types of tactical aircraft in the field.

34. Control of the standards of automotive maintenance at TAC stations has necessitated close supervision from command level, supervisory visits to the Air Forces and stations have been made at intervals, and the standards of maintenance have shown considerable improvement.

35. Since the inception of Tactical Air Command, the Purchasing and Contracting Division has experienced numerous major changes in its modes of operation caused by the transition in the national economy from a war to a peace-time footing. The changing price structure affected by both O.P.A. and law of supply and demand has decreased the ease with which goods can be procured by informal means. As an aid to Procurement Officers, this headquarters discussed this situation at some length in its P&C Information Letters. Less difficulty was experienced in formal lump sum supply contracts. However, here too the contractors were making claims for price increases authorized by the O.P.A.

36 An entirely new activity has been created by the inactivation and abandonment of bases. All open accounts which remain unpaid after a subordinate base has closed are referred to this headquarters for final liquidation. Some of these claims, such as emergency purchase of aircraft gasoline at civilian airports, are as much as five years old and often require voluminous correspondence to trace to a satisfactory conclusion. Claims for demurrage, utility bills, packing and crating household goods, missing drums, cylinders and various other containers which were to have been returned by the using agency, etc., must be traced to determine justification for payment by this

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

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(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, Cont'd

command. Since these claims reach this headquarters after the station has been abandoned and usually after the accountable officers who have knowledge of the transaction have separated from the service, it is necessary to contact vendors, contractors, records administrators, finance officers, fiscal officers, district engineers and lateral command headquarters to assemble the necessary evidence before such a claim can be approved or disapproved by this command.

37. The loss through separation of many qualified Procurement Officers has placed a greater burden on this headquarters. We have been forced to issue more detailed instructions and conduct an informal training program through the medium of Purchasing and Contracting Information letters and personal letters and visits. The Purchasing and Contracting Information Letters discuss new directives and clarify and amplify those which are subject to possible misinterpretation.

38. The end of the war found several types of locomotive equipment in use at AAF installations in the United States. Much of this equipment was in a deadline status due to lack of parts and trained maintenance personnel. To alleviate this situation, this headquarters has established a program to standardize all locomotive equipment at installations of this command by replacing with Diesel engine locomotives all steam, gasoline, and electric engines formerly in use. It has been found that Diesel engines can be operated more efficiently and economically than other types. This alleviated many maintenance and supply problems heretofore encountered with many types and models in use.

39. To assure a high standard of efficient and economical operation of Class A bus transportation at installations of this command, a general survey was conducted to determine any excess number of units in relation to the work load. Inspections of both Army owned units as well as those units leased to commercial carriers were carried out to insure a high standard of maintenance. Through this survey, savings were the cancellation and adjustment of several contracts and operations.

40. Supervisory visits by representatives of this headquarters revealed the necessity for a standardized program of Drivers Training and Selection. A uniform program was inaugurated in the summer of 1946, and at this time the program is functioning throughout the command.

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RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

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(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: A-4 Narrative Report for 1946, Cont'd

41. In the fall of 1946, Transportation activities were seriously affected by reduction in force of both military and civilian personnel.. This headquarters has reassigned several officers and civilians, in order to attain optimum utilization of personnel and personnel skills. Close liaison work with installations and agencies of the command has been maintained by supervisory visits in order to improve the effectiveness of both commercial and motor transportation personnel.

W.F.G.
A-4 Exec.

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

30 December 1946

SUBJECT: Critical Shortage of AT-6 Spare Parts

TO: Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field
Riverside, California

1. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, has informed this headquarters that every effort must be made to prevent the curtailment of essential flying of AT-6 aircraft due to the shortage of maintenance parts and that the following steps have been taken to alleviate this critical shortage:

a. Action is in progress to effect the return to stock of aircraft spare parts from excess, surplus and salvage in the hands of the War Assets Administration or the Army Air Forces. Action was also initiated to cannibalize a large number of AT-6 and P-25 aircraft for the purpose of reclaiming such critical component parts as are needed.

b. Instructions have been issued to all AMC installations requiring the immediate repair of all AT-6 critical reparable items.

c. Emergency procurements of spare parts will be given first priority as soon as production of AT-6 spares gets under way. Lack of approximately forty-five (45%) percent of the tooling required and shortages of raw materials has delayed delivery in most cases until July 1947.

2. In an effort to sustain operation of type AT-6 aircraft within this command until such time as maintenance parts become available from sources mentioned above, it is directed that station and unit supply personnel maintain close supervision over existing stocks of these items and that all reparable items are shipped to AMC repair installations in the most expeditious manner. It is further directed that all stations

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Ltr fr Hq, TAC to CG, 12th AF, March Fld, Calif, subj: "Critical Shortage of AT-6 Spare Parts" 30 Dec 46 Cont'd

where stock levels become excess, due to transfer of aircraft from those stations, that the excesses be immediately reported to appropriate AMC activities.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

Stamped J.K. BROCK
Capt. A.C.
Asst. Adj. Gen

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*Reg 65-17
1-3

TAC REGULATIONS)
NO 65-17)

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia, 11 October 1946

SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE

Technical Order, Parts Procurement, Compliance, and Familiarization Charts

*(This regulation supersedes TAC Regulation 65-17, dated 22 April 1946, including change 1, dated 14 May 1946.)

	Paragraph
Purpose	1
Responsibility	2
Procedures	3
Records	4

1. PURPOSE. To provide maintenance, inspection, and supply personnel with ready reference of the technical order compliance status of all aircraft assigned and to insure their familiarization with all directives and technical orders which pertain to the maintenance, supply, inspection, and operation of assigned aircraft and allied equipment.

2. RESPONSIBILITY. Air force and station commanders directly under this headquarters are responsible for the following:

a. The procurement of class 15 kits and materiels necessary for compliance with technical orders affecting assigned aircraft.

b. The compliance of all technical orders affecting assigned aircraft.

c. The familiarization of all maintenance, inspection, and supply personnel with all directives and technical orders applicable to the aircraft assigned.

3. PROCEDURES. a. Procurement of materiel. Action for procurement of materiel necessary for compliance with technical orders will be initiated immediately, and in no case later than 48 hours after receipt of the technical order. In this connection, attention is directed to TO 00-35A-15 and TO 00-35A-15A.

b. Technical Order Compliance Chart.

(1) The aircraft maintenance officer of each TAC base unit and/or tactical group having assigned aircraft will maintain

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a Technical Order Compliance Chart (Inclosure 1) and will ascertain by daily inspection that it is accurate and up-to-date.

(2) The following information will be entered on the Technical Order Compliance Chart in lines and columns as indicated.

(a) Column 1. Number and date of technical order applicable to aircraft or equipment assigned.

(b) Column 2. Date of receipt of technical order.

(c) Column 3. Date entered on applicable forms. If no entry is required on any form, a black vertical line will be entered.

(d) Column 4. If technical order requires "Immediate ..ction," the initials "IA" will be entered. If technical order states "Soon as possible," enter the symbol "SAP," etc.

(e) Column 5. If technical order kit is required, enter the word "Yes."

(f) Column 6. Enter date kit was requisitioned in upper half of square, and date received in lower half.

(g) Other columns. Enter airplane model and serial number at head of the column, and date technical order complied with on the appropriate line. The chart may be extended to include as many columns as are needed or desired.

4. RECORDS. a. Technical order files will be maintained by TAC base units, tactical groups, service groups, and all separate squadrons operating aircraft. The attention of all maintenance officers is directed to the provisions of TO 00-5-2. The provisions of this technical order will be complied with to adequately provide technical publications for all maintenance personnel. Technical order reading files and familiarization charts will be maintained as prescribed in section IV, TO 00-5-2.

b. Due to the many technical publications now being distributed to organizations, it is considered impracticable to require all personnel to read and familiarize themselves with technical publications that do not pertain to the equipment or branch to which they may be assigned; i.e., airplane mechanics should not be required to read technical publications pertaining to communication equipment, nor should communication personnel be required to read technical publications pertaining to the landing gear

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of an airplane, etc. Maintenance officers responsible for the maintenance of technical publications files and familiarization charts, therefore,, will personally scan and determine the data that will be read to, and by the personnel of, the various branches under the control of the maintenance division. It will be the responsibility of every maintenance officer assigned to a branch or unit of the maintenance division to personally read and explain the contents of any technical publication affecting the functions of that branch or unit to all assigned personnel. This duty will not be delegated to a noncomissioned officer or civilian employee. The S-4 or equivalent will be responsible that all key officer personnel under his control are made thoroughly familiar with the contents of all publications pertaining to their section.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

GLENN O. BARCUS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

1 Incl
TO Compliance Chart

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TECHNICAL ORDER COMPLIANCE CHART

TECHNICAL ORDER NO. AND DATE (1)	DATE TO RECEIVED (2)	DATE ENTERED ON FORMS 60A, 60B, 61 or 41B (3)	WHEN TO WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED (4)	TO KIT REQUIRED (5)	DATE TO KIT REQUISITIONED & DATE RECEIVED (6)	A-26C 42-5060 (7)	A-26C 42-11092 (8)	A-26C 42-31096 (9)	A-26C 42-10037 (10)
SIZE OF CHART AND WIDTH OF COLUMNS WILL BE AS DESIRED BY USING ACTIVITY.									

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC 400.312 (22 Oct 46)

22 October 1946

SUBJECT: Technical Order Familiarization

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters

1. In view of the low experience level, quality of maintenance, and lack of technical knowledge of maintenance personnel within this command, the following will be accomplished within 90 days after receipt of this letter. The provisions of paragraph 4b, TAC Regulation 65-17, may be waived for compliance with this directive if so desired by the commander concerned.

a. The following technical orders will be entered on familiarization charts and read to, or by, all personnel assigned the maintenance division:

00-5
00-5B
00-5-1
00-20A
00-20A-2
00-25-1
00-25-8
00-25-20
00-35A-39
00-35D-54
00-35D-263C
01-1-1
01-1-1A
01-1-10
01-1-14
01-1-18
01-1-23
01-1-26
01-1-50
01-1-50A
02-1-38
02-1-38A
02-1-42
02-1-55
02-1-70
01-1-52
01-1-109
01-1-117
01-1-117A
01-1-122
01-1-212
01-1-213
01-1-282
01-1-285
02-1-1
02-1A-1
02-1-7
02-1-8
02-1-14
02-1-15
02-1-22
02-1-28
02-1-29
02-1-35
03-5B-3
03-5CA-9
03-5B-1
03-10-3
03-20-1

(Effective until 22 April 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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03-1-1
03-1-1B
03-1-2
03-1-2A
03-1-27
03-1-32 Sec I to V inclusive
03-5-39
03-5-41
03-5-46
03-5-49
03-5-50
03-5-56
03-5B-1
03-25-6
03-25B-1
04-20-2
04-20A-1
05-1-1
06-1-2
06-5-1
06-10-1
06-10-4
07-1-11
19-1-105
19-1-107 Sec II only
29-1-1

b. All supervisory personnel and section chiefs will read the following technical orders:

00-5-2
00-5-2A
00-5-3
00-25-21
00-25-45
00-25-48
00-25-53
00-25-53A
00-25-54
00-25-56
00-25-59
00-35A-6
00-35A-8
00-35A-9
00-35A-15
01-1-24
01-1-81
01-1-81A
01-1-160
01-1-240
03-5-69
18-1-39
30 Series, as pertains to the department concerned

c. The maintenance officer will be held responsible for thoroughly explaining the use and purpose of the following technical orders to all maintenance personnel.

00-3-1
00-3-2
00-3-3
00-3-4
00-4-
00-4A
00-4B
00-45-1
00-45-1B
00-45B-1
00-45B-2
00-45C-1
00-45GB-1
00-45GB-2
00-45GE-1
00-45GV-1
00-45S-1
00-45T-1
00-55-2
00-60-5
00-65 Series
02-5-4
03-1-5

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Ltr Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va, file 400.312, dated 22 Oct 46, subj: "Technical Order Familiarization," contd

d. The communications officer will be responsible that all assigned communications personnel read and thoroughly understand the contents of the following technical orders:

00-1	01-190
00-1C	01-1-152
00-4	C008-1-5
00-4A	16-1-8
00-4B	16-1-9
00-5	16-1-10
00-5B	16-1-21
00-15-1	16-1-25
00-20A	16-1-29
00-20A-2	16-1-39
00-25-1	16-1-41
00-30 & 00-30A	16-1-45
pertaining to	16-1-46
radio & radar	16-1-47
00-35A-1	16-1-48
00-35A-6	16-1-53
00-35A-8	16-1-54
00-35A-9	16-1-59
00-35A-12	16-50 Series
00-35A-15	16-55 Series
00-35D-54	30-20F-2
00-65	30-20FC-2
01-1-52	Stock Lists

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAMS:

PHILIP DODDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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17 Dec 1946

HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND LANGLEY FLD VA
BOOK MESSAGE

UNCLASS

PRIORITY

1. COMMANDING GENERAL
NINTH AIR FORCE
GREENVILLE ARMY AIR BASE

2. COMMANDING GENERAL
TWELFTH AIR FORCE
MARCH FIELD
RIVERSIDE CALIFORNIA

3. COMMANDING OFFICER
DOVER ARMY AIR FIELD
DOVER DELAWARE

4. COMMANDING OFFICER
LOCKBOURNE ARMY AIR BASE
COLUMBUS OHIO

5. COMMANDING OFFICER
SHERMAN FIELD
FT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS

6. COMMANDING OFFICER
SMYRNA ARMY AIR FIELD
SMYRNA TENNESSEE

7. COMMANDING OFFICER
STEWART FIELD
NEWBURGH NEW YORK

A43 838 PD DURING PERIOD FROM SIX JAN TO ONE EIGHT JAN FOUR SEVEN INCLUSIVE EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON TECHNICAL ORDER COMPLIANCE AND MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENT PD THIS WILL HAVE PRIORITY OVER FLYING TRAINING PD AT THE END OF ABOVE PERIOD CMA REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF A LETTER TO FOLLOW USING REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL TARE ABLE CHARLIE DASH ABLE FOUR BAKER DASH SUGAR PETER TWO PD AGGRESSIVE FOLLOWUP ACTION WILL BE TAKEN WITH AMC DEPOTS ON ALL REQUEST THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED AND THOSE TO BE SUBMITTED FOR ALL ITEMS REQUIRED TO EFFECT COMPLETE TECH ORDER COMPLIANCE ON YOUR ACFT PD ACFT TYPE AND NUMBER WILL BE INCLUDED IN SUBSTANTIATION REMARK OF AAF FORM ONE ZERO FOUR BAKER AND IN ALL FOLLOWUP ACTION PD

QUESADA HQ TACAIRCOMD

DWIGHT T. ROBINSON
Major, A.C.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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C O P Y

HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND LANGLEY FIELD VA 17 DEC 1946

UNCLASS

COMMANDING OFFICER
300th AAF BASE UNIT
LANGLEY FIELD VIRGINIA

SPECIAL

A4B 839 PD DURING PERIOD FROM SIX JAN TO ONE EIGHT COMPLIANCE AND MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENT PD THIS WILL HAVE PRIORITY OVER FIYING TRAINING PD AT THE END OF ABOVE PERIOD CMA REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDING WITH PROVISIONS OF A LETTER TO FOLLOW USING REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL TARE ABLE CHARLIE DASH ABLE FOUR BAKER DASH SUGAR PETER TWO PD AGRESSIVE FOLLOWUP ACTION WILL BE TAKEN WITH AMC DEPOTS ON ALL REQUEST THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED AND THOSE TO BE SUBMITTED FOR ALL ITEMS REQUIRED TO EFFECT COMPLETE TECH ORDER COMPLIANCE ON YOUR ACFT PD ACFT TYPE AND NUMBER WILL BE INCLUDED IN SUBSTANTIATION REMARK OF AAF FORM ONE ZERO FOUR BAKER AND IN ALL FOLLOWUP ACTION

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TAC file 452.1 Cargo
1 January 1946 thru _____ T-46

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HEADQUARTERS
316TH TROOP CARRIER GROUP, AAF
Pope Field, Fort Bragg, N. C.

316GPOPE 452 23 September 1946

SUBJECT: C-82 Disadvantages

THRU: Commanding Officer
AAB, Pope Field
Fort Bragg, N. C.

TO: Commanding General
Third Air Force (Troop Carrier)
Greenville, South Carolina

1. The information contained in this report is compiled for the purpose of re-emphasizing or bringing to light disadvantages of the C-82 type of aircraft for Troop Carrier use.

2. From an operations point of view, the subject has been divided into four (4) phases: (1) Airplane General, (2) Flying General, (3) Tactical Operation, (4) Engineering.

3. Airplane General.

a. The windshield wipers are inadequate and the double glass windshields "fog" or collect moisture between, causing poor visibility and creating a hazardous condition. In rain the windshields and entire cockpit leak excessively causing deterioration of communication and electrical equipment. Rust and corrosion have been noted on radio equipment. The possibility of damage to vulnerable electrical circuits make this condition hazardous.

b. The electrical gasoline selector valves are not dependable, resulting in aborts or emergency procedures. Such difficulty has been experienced by this Headquarters. There is no manual method of tank selection and no "in flight" corrective measures. Being electrical and incorporating a number of micro-switches, moisture or condensation may cause the system to become inoperative. Knowledge of such condition would not be apparent ot the pilot until such time as a tank change was necessary.

c. The landing gear, though modified, is not completely dependable. The retraction mechanism fails to operate on occasion necessitating return for landing.

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d. The only usable exit for the crew is located in rear of the cargo compartment making escape questionable.

e. The ventilation system is seriously inadequate, especially in the cargo compartment, making long flights uncomfortable to the point of nausea for the passengers.

f. Even though the aircraft has two (2) separate braking systems, only one (1) hydraulic pump is used. No auxiliary pump is included. An electrical failure would render both systems inoperative.

g. Metal fatigue and failure of the skin has been experienced in flight.

h. The "L" shaped filler neck installation precludes the use of a measuring stick in determining the amount of gasoline in the tanks. Undue delay is experienced in servicing because of the "L" shaped filler neck and air being trapped in the gas tanks due to inadequate vents.

4. Flying General.

a. Take off attitude of the aircraft is such that it gives limited forward visibility. This condition is extremely hazardous if difficulties are encountered during take off.

b. All flight instruments cannot be observed in flight due to the control column and wheel obstructing the pilot's view.

c. Night flying is hazardous and fatiguing due to inadequate and improper placement of cockpit lighting facilities. The material for marking instrument faces is not entirely satisfactory.

d. The inaccurate indications registered by gasoline gauges preclude the use of these gauges in determining actual fuel consumption or reserve during flight, and may result in aborts or emergency action.

e. The throttle linkage has excessive slack which causes surge and non-positive power adjustment.

f. The present vertical alignment of rudder and brake pedals causes undue muscular fatigue during taxiing operation. This strain is caused by the unnatural position of the foot in placing the toe of the foot on the brake pedal while maintaining the heel of the foot on the rudder pedal.

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g. Electrically operated flight instruments are not considered as dependable, by the pilots, as the suction type.

5. Tactical Application.

a. Because of the non-positive throttle application, width of the cockpit, and heaviness of controls, the present Troop Carrier tactical formation is impossible to fly. When flying number three position in a "V" formation, it is necessary for the co-pilot to handle the controls. This situation makes it mandatory that two (2) first pilots be assigned to the aircraft flying in this position. The attitude of the aircraft at jump speeds make it hazardous even with the co-pilot at the controls. Although large formations have not been flown as yet with the C-82, it is reasonable to assume that ships in the rearward flights would tend to stall out or collide with the forward flights when air speeds of 110 MPH are flown by the lead ship. With a nine (9) ship "V" of "V"s the inside element would also tend to stall on an abrupt turn away from or out of a DZ.

b. The bomb-bay is inadequate in size and location for the following reasons:

(1) Full loads of paratroopers cannot be dropped because the bomb-bay divides the cargo compartment when para-bundles of equipment are to be dropped from the bomb-bay simultaneously.

(2) Because of the varied size and shape of the bundles, adequate short drop interval cannot be attained.

c. Since glider operations are an integral part of Troop Carrier, it is essential that glider tow and communication facilities be incorporated. The present facilities are not adequate. Booms are not sufficiently stressed for tow of even the present light weight gliders.

d. The flight attitude of the aircraft at jump airspeed (110 MPH) is such that the pilot cannot see the drop zone from a point 25 to 30 seconds away. This tends to further rule out present Troop Carrier formations and the jump signal, of necessity, is the decision of the co-pilot, with actual operation of the jump signal switch by a third member of the crew. This condition prhibits any degree of success in small field jumps and is unsatisfactory for any operation.

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16GP OPN 452, Subj: "C-82 Disadvantages", dtd 23 Sep 46, fm 316th TC Gp to CG 3AF (TC) thru CO, Pope Fld (Cont'd)

e. The combat durability of the aircraft is questionable inasmuch as heavy flak penetrations of the cargo compartment would very likely cause collapse of the fuselage, aborting the flight or, at best, prevent further use of the aircraft for a long period of time. (The "in flight" loss of the forward door caused such fuselage damage to an aircraft assigned this organization).

f. The paratropp jump doors are unfinished, therefore, require taping of the entire perimeter and building up of the floor area to the level of the jump door. Sharp edges cause hand lacerations and cutting of the static lines occur during paratroop operations.

g. The cargo compartment is much too large for any practical application of Troop Carrier and Airborne operations. This type of cargo compartment can only be utilized for secondary resupply, air landed on an airdrome. Attention is directed to the fact that the cubic dimension incorporated are necessary for only a limited variety of equipment. It is recognized that the heavy equipment to be transported is necessary to wage war but possibly the consolidation of two (2) different type of mission efforts into one (1) aircraft is detrimental to the accomplishment of both. For Troop Carrier and Airborne combat operations, it is visualized that a fast flying aircraft with a detachable cargo or troop compartment could be utilized. The compartment could have an independent airfoil making glider type landing permissible or dropped with parachutes. Inasmuch as 90 per cent of the battle damage suffered by Troop Carrier is from small arms ground fire, a fast flying aircraft would reduce that damage considerably. If delivery of troops into combat can be made by container rather than by individual jumps the efficiency of both Troop Carrier and the Airborne will be increased. (Major General Gavin of the 82nd Airborne Division concurred with the last sentence).

h. Concrete or prepared runways seem to be indicated where the C-82 is used. The bottom part of the fuselage is low to the ground making muddy field operations questionable. The aircraft weight would limit its use under all conditions. Whether or not the nose wheel will enter into the picture under such conditions is debatable.

6. A great many of the disadvatages listed above are correctable with midifications but the necessary changes normally will add weight to the aircraft further reducing its efficiency. Having not been tested under simulated combat conditions, a number of question marks have not been erased. Using the conditions of World War II as a yaadtick, many requirements have not been met by the airplane.

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16GP OPN 452, Subj: "C-82 Disadvantages," dtd 23 Sep 46, fm 316th TC Gp to CG 3AF (TC) thru CO, Pope F$_1$d (Cont'd)

It is felt that in the age of atomic power and jet propulsion, the aircraft was obsolete before delivery. If ground troops are to become airborne, Troop Carrier aircraft should be designd so as to fit their needs. Air landings are only one (1) phase of operations.

7. Engineering.

a. Maintenance of the C-82 is considered difficult by the Engineering Section of this Headquarters.

(1) Most of the difficulties encountered are the result of continued break-down of a great variety of untested vital parts and the lack of replacement parts.

(2) Inasmuch as the aircraft is larger, and utilizes larger type engines, maintenance requirements are increased in proportion. The electrical systems materially increase the work load and require highly trained specialists. Inspections are required more frequently. Items normally inspected every 100 or 300 hours on a C-47 or C-46 aircraft must be inspectad every 25 or 50 hours on the C-82.

b. Experience has shown a need of forty-eight (48) man hours after a normal cross country flight of about eight (8) hours to return the aircraft to flyable status when only minor maintenance is necessary.

c. On aircraft received by this organization many part failures have been experienced. The generator condenser brackets are cracked or broken off of 90 per cent of the C-82's. Taht condition, although not grounding the aircraft, causes static on the radio equipment. The pressure transmitters installed are the same type installed on the C-47 aircraft which proved of no value. The lines must be bled after each long flight to get a correct instrument reading. The R-2800 engine installed on the C-82 is equipped with Helacoil inserts instead of the bronze aluminum bushings to hold the spark plugs in the cylinder. These inserts reduce the difficulties endountered in the old type but reconditioned spark plugs, that are presently being used, cross thread and bind. To correct this condition ten (10) to twenty (20) man hours are necessary to replace the inserts. In some cases inserts become brittle and break. The intake manifold has to be removed to "fish" them out of the cylinder.

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16GP OPN, Subj: "C-82 Disadvantages", dtd 23 Sep 46, fm 316th TC Gp to CG 3AF(TC) thru CO, Pope Fld (Cont'd)

d. Upon returning from a 12 ship flight of about eight (8) hours duration, four aircraft were flyable the following day. Maintenance requirements ranged from oil leaks to landing gear failure. On almost every flight eighty (80) per cent of the aircraft develop oil leaks of some description. This condition alone makes heavy demands upon the Engineering Section.

e. The vent line of the hydraulic system is not long enough causing overflows to spill onto the floor of the cargo compartment.

f. The oil transfer system functions only after priming the pump for each transfer.

g. The switches utilized in the electrical system are used in three (3) different applications.

(1) Limit switch applications.

(a) Landing gear limits, flap and cowl flaps limit, etc.

(2) Control applications.

(a) Lights, fire cut-off and throttle warning horn switches, etc.

(3) Miscellaneous applications.

(a) Door and bomb-bay door interlocks, fire fighting equipment, etc.

(4) There are thirty-three (33) switches for the landing gear, four (4) for each fuel cell, twenty-six (26) for the heating system, and four (4) incorporated with the fuel and oil shut off valves. Aileron droop mechanism has four (4) per aircraft and two (2) are installed in the paratainer doors. The systems mentioned above have a total of eighty-five (85) switches likely to give trouble, i.e., control switches, limit switches, etc. Any oil moisture or other fluids will cause failure of the switches.

(5) The two junction boxes habe 342 terminals to which are attached two (2) and three (3) wire each. There are 16 relays, 40 circuit breakers and the cockpit has 40 toggle switches.

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16GP OPN, Subj: "C-82 Disadvantages," 23 September 1946

(6) Although the C-82's assigned this organization have less than 100 hours on the aircraft and engines, the status for August was only 58.5 per cent "in". Breaking down the man hour requirements, in order to fly sixteen (16) C-82's 50 hours each per month for a two (2) month period, fifteen (15) man hours are required for each hour flown.

(7) The personnel requirement for the engineering section is eighty (80) full time mechanics (747's and 2750's) to maintain a standard of 80 to 85 per cent in flyable status. When the service group engineering squadron is fully trained some relief can be expected.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ Frank Ritz
FRANK RITZ
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant

POPAD 1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR BASE, Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 27 September 1946

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force (Troop Carrier), Greenville, South Carolina

Noted and forwarded for your information.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ Leonard H. Mathe
LEONARD H. MATHE
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant

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Basic ltr, subj: "C-82 Disadvantages" fr Hdqs, 316th TC Group, AAF, Pope Fld, Fort Bragg, N. C., dtd 23 Sept 46

AF3AF 452.1 (23 Sept 46) 2nd Ind. A3

HEADQUARTERS, THIRD AIR FORCE (Troop Carrier), Greenville, South Carolina, 9 October 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

1. This Headquarters compiled a report outlining many of the disadvantages and criticisms encountered with the C-82 airplane during transition training since its assignment to the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier). Reference is made to AF3AF 452.1 letter, subject: "Comments and Recommendations on C-82 Aircraft," dated 2 July 1946. Basic letter re-emphasizes several items noted in the abovementioned report and introduces the operational and maintenance difficulties experienced by a tactical organization. This correspondence is forwarded for your evaluation as a supplemental report to the abovementioned letter.

2. Several outstanding matters are reiterated in view of their particular importance Troop Carrier activities.

a. The C-82 aircraft presently assigned as well as future aircraft, possibly up to the 108th Article, are restricted from glider tow operations. In this matter attention is invited to AF3AF 452.031 1c letter, Subject: "Glider Tow Kits for C-82 Airplane," dated 25 September 1946. As is generally known, Troop Carrier tactics as well as present commitments necessitate the employment of glider tow operations. Obviously this requirement cannot be achieved since, in a short while, this Headquarters will be saturated with C-82 aircraft unable to function as an all-around Troop Carrier airplane.

b. Forward, sideward and downward visibility during Airborne paratroop operations is obstructed to such an extent that accuracy is prohibited upon approach to the drop zone since the flight attitude at minimum airspeed and altitude is such that the DZ cannot be seen from a point a mile or more away. Since accuracy is all important in this phase of Airborne-Troop Carrier operations, the capabilities of Troop Carrier aviation are again adversely affected.

c. Formation flying with the C-82 is also considered another problem. It has been observed that to maintain an assigned position in tactical formations tremendous pressure is required on flight controls which results in extreme pilot fatigue. This is primarily due to heaviness of controls, an unwieldy control column and the sluggish reaction of control surfaces when altitude corrections are attempted. Another important factor is the width of the cockpit coupled with the pilots seating arrangement which prevents adequate scope of vision while flying formation in other than straight and level flight.

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Basic ltr, subj: "C-82 Disadvantages" fr Hdqs, 316th TC Group, AAF,
Pope Field, Fort Bragg, N.C., dtd 23 Sept 46, 2nd Ind Cont'd

3. In view of the various comments submitted in this correspondence and the report reffered to in Paragraph 1 above, it is believed that the C-82 airplane does not completely meet all the requirements for universal Troop Carrier operation.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

O. C. VAN HOESEN
Lt. Col., AGD
Adjutant General

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316th TC Group, AAF, Pope Fld, Ft Bragg, N.C. Subj: "C-82 Disadvantages" 23 Sept 46

TAC 452.1 (23 Sept 46) Cargo 3d Ind 21 Oct 46 A4B

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter your headquarters, subject: "Operational Suitability Test of the C-82 Aircraft" dated 11 October 1946.

2. The basic communication is forwarded as a preliminary report pending accomplishment of the tests as requested in above referenced letter.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

ROGER M. HENRICK
Major, Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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28 September 1946

TAC 400.4 (28 Sept 46)

SUBJECT: Supply and Maintenance Improvement Program

TO: Commanding General
Ninth Air Force
Biggs Field
El Paso, Texas

1. In order to raise the standard of supply and maintenance and to prevent any further lowering of the present standard which may result from further reduction of personnel, this headquarters has established a Maintenance Improvement Program, the purpose of which is to institute and maintain a system by which special subjects adversely affecting the performance of maintenance will be given immediate attention in the field.

2. To inaugurate a definite Supply and Maintenance Improvement Program with subordinate air forces and stations of this command, a team of maintenance and supply specialists has been organized in this headquarters to assist each air force in instituting a program for its bases.

3. The team of this headquarters headed by Colonel Maxwell of Supply Division and Colonel Brogger of Maintenance Division, and approximately twelve additional officers and enlisted men will arrive at Lake Charles on or about 7 October 1946, and remain a sufficient length of time to initiate the above program in units stationed at Lake Charles. Visits to other stations of your command by this team will be made as a follow-up of the program placed in effect by the team from your headquarters.

4. General subjects which will be given special consideration by this team are as follows:

a. Maintenance.

(1) Oil clarification.

(2) Engine tune-up.

(3) Tools and equipment.

(4) Technical Order compliance.

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(5) Organization and procedure.

(6) Coordination among Operations, Supply, and Maintenance.

(7) Vehicles and equipment.

(8) Airborne Communications.

b. AAF Supply.

(1) Coordination of Supply and Maintenance at using level.

(2) ACCP procedure.

(3) Organization equipment lists.

(4) Tables of Allowances.

(5) Adequate supply levels.

(6) Flow of requisition and supplies.

(7) Compliance with T.M. 38-410.

(8) Requisitioning of spare parts for newly acquired aircraft.

(9) Base AAF and Unit Supply Records.

(10) Care and supervision of equipment.

(11) Relations with Control Depot,

5. It is directed that your headquarters designate a team composed of Supply and Maintenance personnel most qualified in the above subjects. This team will be formed as soon as possible, and will be available to accompany the TAC team upon arrival. Thus a standard program can be evolved which will closely correspond to the program which has been outlined by the TAC team. Specific supply and maintenance problems wherein TAC representatives can render aid or take positive corrective action will be presented at this time, with the complete information, correspondence, TWX's, vouchers, or other supporting evidence.

6. It is imperative that this program be given the strongest support.

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Hq TAC, Langley Field, Va, Subj: "Supply and Maintenance Improvement Program"

It is directed, therefore, that your headquarters lend all assistance and cooperation necessary for successful operation.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

GLENN O. BARCUS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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AA-44

EXTRACT
COPY

Request for Historical Data

3 FS Hist
5 Jan 48

1. The following information is submitted:

a. During 1946 the disintegration which followed victory was slowly arrested and we began to rebuild. The lack of adequate numbers of maintenance personnel due to rapid demobilization plus the lessening of discipline among pilots caused the number of major accidents to increase to nearly 100 per 100,000 flying hours early in 1946. This rate gradually decreased until the last quarter averaged just over 60. This rate was still excessive but was a great improvement.

b. August 1946 saw the P-80 rate rise to the astronomical figure of 1055, which means a major accident for each 95 hours flown. Gradually the bugs were worked out of the P-80 and the 1st Group settled from a show outfit to a tactical organization. The rate began to fall, averaging less than 300 the last quarter of '46 and in '47 it became lower than that for any other major fighter.

c. The C-82 did much the same on a smaller scale with a major rate of 582 for Sept '46 and rapidly decreasing its rate as bugs were ironed out. A big difference was however that none of the C-82 accidents was fatal.

2. Most of the FS problems are an integral part of the A-1, 3 & 4 story. If any other facts and figures are desired, however, they can be furnished.

Richard V. Travis
Lt Col, USAF
D/FS

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H E A D Q U A R T E R S AS/dcf
412th Fighter Group, (P-80 Jet)
March Field, Riverside, California

29 May 1946

SUBJECT: Equipment and Personnel Required for Jet Organization in Addition to Standard Tables of Organization and Equipment.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, DC

* * * *

a. SECTION I, "Organization" of T/O & E 1-12.

(1) Recommend that two (2) additional enlisted personnel qualified as 750, be assigned to the Materiel Section, Air Echelon in the grade of Master and Technical Sergeant. Personnel required to facilitate maintenance coverage and administration in Materiel Section. It is physically impossible at present for the Group Engineering Officer to make personal coverage of all squadron engineering activities frequently enough and keep up administrative duties in the Materiel Section. Due to the frequency of inspections and engine unit replacement interval (50 hours, and the highly unstablized modification status of the P-80, it is imperative that two (2) additional inspectors be assigned this section to insure a high standard of maintenance efficiency within Squadrons of the Group, and to obtain adequate administrative, Attention is further invited to the fact that the enlisted personnel qualified as 752, previously assigned the Materiel Section have been assigned to the Air Inspection, SSN changed to 750, in accordance with change No. 2, 23 Nov. 1944, and are no longer available to the Group Engineering Officer for Duty.

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Hq 412th Ftr Gp, (P-80 Jet) March Fld, Calif. 29 May 46, Subj: Equip and Pers Add to Standard Tables of Org and Equip. Cont'd.

* * * *

c. Section 1, "Organization" of T/O & E 1-27, "Fighter Squadron".

(1) Three (3) additional enlisted personnel, qualified as painter (MOS 144) be assigned jet type organizations. Personnel required to maintain the finished specifications required for optimum performance of the aircraft involved. Present available estimates from lockheed engineering personnel, indicate that P-80 is from 30 to 40 mph faster with paint than without it. It is conceivable that possibly 25 to 40% of this gain in performance would be lost if the paint finish were not maintained. From actual operational experience, it is known that the requested number of additional MOS 144 personnel, plus the one (1) already alloted in 1-27, can maintain finish specifications if properly supervised. Attention is cited to the fact that the finish will have to be maintained, and adequate personnel are not authorized at present in T/O & E 1-27. Paint deterioration in flight, on subject aircraft, occurs mainly in flex areas at wing butts, stablizer, fin fillets and in areas on the nose section. Without proper maintenance on the finish, it is possible that the compressibility burble may be accentuated at or around these areas, induced by uneven air foil surfaces, which are merely chippedand flaked areas. This fact would tend to lower the mach number of the aircraft and possibly lead to accidents involving the loss of aircraft and human lives. Grade recommended as two (2) Sergeants and one (1) Corporal.

(2) Two (2) additional personnel, qualified as Sheet Metal Workers, (MOS 555), should be assigned to accomplish sheet metal work, which is in excess of that required on present fighter type aircraft. Operational experience with P-80 aircraft definately indicates the necessity for this increase. Considerable rivet replacements are required during daily inspections on this type of aircraft, main points of rivet loosening are: landing gear doors, elevator inner rear butt adjucent to the rudder, ailrons and flaps. This aircraft uses countersunk riveting throughout.

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

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

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Hq 412th Ftr Gp, (P-80 Jet) March Fld, Calif. 29 May 46, Subj: Equip and Pers Add to Standard Tables of Org and Equip. Cont'd.

* * * *

(4) One (1) Hydraulic Specialist, qualified as 528, should be assigned jet type organization because present T/O & E does not provide this type of specialist. Specialist required because of complexity of hydraulic equipment involved on jet type aircraft.

* * * *

/t/ B. K. HOLLOWAY
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

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M-446

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R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS 1ST FIGHTER GROUP
March Field, Riverside, California

452.1 (P-80) 30 August 1946

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities

TO : Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field, Riverside, California

1. In accordance with verbal request of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, the following information is submitted for the week ending 27 August 1946.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

a. 56 aircraft are assigned this Group. Of these; fifteen (15) are at the Cleveland Air Races, one (1) on DS to 321st A F Base Unit for repairs, two (2) to El Paso for repairs, one (1) DS to San Berdue for school, eight (8) at 361st Air Service Group for repairs, one (1) at Keesler Field for repairs.

b. Type of flying training; Demonstration, Navigation, Dive bombing, Transition, Formation, and Cruise Control. Several Engineering Test Flights were also flown.

c. Pilot Status: 84 pilots assigned to Group. 80 pilots are checked out in P-80 type aircraft.

d. Four (4) pilots remain to be checked out.

e. 101 hours and 35 minutes were flown during this period.

f. One fatal accident occurred during the period. On August 26, 1946 while flying at a slow air speed with a P-51 and a B-25 on a mission involving air-to-air photography, a P-80 type aircraft developed engine trouble. The pilot elected to attempt a crash landing on an abandoned light plane flight strip at Banning, Calif. The terrain was very rough and the resulting crash was fatal to the pilot.

g. Summary of interesting problems of operations.

(1) One instance occurred of hydraulic pressure failure immediately after take-off. Pilot stated after landing that system pressure had fluctuated slightly prior to dropping to zero. Ground check disclosed that system circuit breaker had opened, thus rendering system inoperative until circuit breaker was reset.

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BASIC: Hqs 1st Ftr Gp Subj: Wkly Rpt of P-80 Activities dtd 30 Aug 46

6. (1) Cont'd. This circuit breaker is in the plenum chamber proper and not accessible to the pilot during flight. It is assumed that cause of opening of circuit breaker was a momentary airlock in the hydraulic system.

(2) One high altitude tracking mission performed in coordination with the Los Angeles Controller. The mission was of two hours duration and very satisfactory to both the pilot and ground controller.

(3) Lack of adequate high altitude weather data has continued to handicap this organization on long range navigational flights. Unlimited C. F. R. conditions and extremely cautious flight planning continue to be a "must" in this type aircraft.

(4) The need for the radio compass as a navigational aid still exists in this type of aircraft.

(5) During this period a vertical search light beam was used as a navigational aid. This light was utilized as a visible homing device while night flying was being conducted and has proven very satisfactory.

SECTION II-MAINTENANCE

a. 53% of aircraft in commission for the period.

(1) 3 aircraft NOCP for parts (See incl #1)

b. Summary of interesting problems of maintenance:

(1) Two anti-aircraft searchlight instructors from Fort MacArthur, California have been placed on temporary duty with this group for the purpose of orienting operators in the operation, care and maintenance of the searchlight equipment allocated for use in homing and landing P-80 aircraft in emergencies. A school is being conducted for a period of five days.

(2) This paragraph is in reference to airspeed calibration trouble in last report. A small amount of trouble has been encountered with airspeed indications on P-80 aircraft due to leakage at the quick disconnect in the pressure line from the pilot head. The quick disconnect facilitates removal of the aft section. A permanent fix for this condition is replacement of the

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disconnect assembly with a Standard AN ¼" flexible hose. This installation is being made as failures occur. Installation of the hose assembly adds approximately five minutes to disassembly and assembly time of aft section to mid section.

(3) Considerable trouble has been encountered with cracks in the ring assembly (burners) on J-33 series. The majority of the cracks occur adjacent to the front turbine flange. In some instances engines removed because of this type of failure and sent to SBAMC for DIR have been received marked serviceable without the cracks being welded or ring assembly replacement. In some instances it is difficult to ascertain or differentiate between a circumferential crack, weld bead or flux mark, particularly when the area under inspection is beneath the flange ring. In general all longitudnal cracks and circumferential cracks over 1/8" in length are just cause for removal of the engine. Where any doubt exists as to the validity of a crack, it is inspected after every five hours of operation.

Two additional air duct vane failures on P-80 aircraft Serials 44-85094 and 85090 similiar to failures reported for the week ending 13 August 1946 have occured. These failures are being submitted on AAF Form 54 to the Commanding General, AMC. The last two previous occurances were reported as Station Serial No. 46-668 and 46-669. Attached photos with this report are garphic illustrations of what actually occurs. This type of failure has been reported repeatedly without any permanent remedy or fix resulting. It is believed that proper modification requires removal of the air duct assembly to accomplish and should be done at an area AMC depot on all P-80 aircraft now assigned to service activities.

(5) Inspection of engine Serial No. A-071302 from airplane Serial No. 44-85040 which crashed 26 August 1946, discloses no definite reason for power failure. This is due to the fact that impact damage to engine was so severe, with all components of fuel system broken off the accessory housing with the exception of the throttle assembly that accurate or definite analysis is

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BASIC: Hqs 1st Ftr Gp Subj: Wkly Rpt of P-80 Activities dtd 30 August 1946.

impossible. Turbine wheel and shafe were intact and shaft bearings were O.K. aft of the accessory section, which was badly smashed.

(6) In compliance with March Field TWX MRHM-FS-3-1-0392 dated 26 August 1946, two aircraft are now grounded for shakedown inspection prior to being flown to Patterson Field for a period of fifteen days for the purpose of undergoing inspection by AMC engineers to determine whether P-80 type aircraft will require DIR at 100 hours.

Depot inspection and repair for P-80 aircraft after approximately 100 hours operational time was originally proposed by this activity and was the subject of a communication forwarded to higher headquarters on 7 August 1946. The necessity for this proposal has become increasingly apparent throughout the last four months. An itemized inspection list was incorporated in the basic communication and is also being forwarded with the two aircraft concerned to Patterson Field.

The AMC Liaison Officer at this base has made a thorough study of the need for this DIR and recommended concurrence with basic proposal to the Commanding General AMC at Wright Field, Dayton Ohio.

It is anticipated that when this project is authorized and operating that the percentage in commission of aircraft assigned will be considerable higher and that condition of aircraft will be better. It is recommended that aircraft be routed to the depot for DIR in increments of five or six until such time as inspection has been accomplished on all aircraft assigned. It is believed considerable value to AMC activities will accrue from this proposal inasmuch as fourth echelon experience is practically non-existant to date.

Major problem of initial inspections will be removal of paint. This is a more difficult job than removal of camouflage paint on conventional aircraft has been. P-80 series aircraft now being produced by Lockheed do not have painted exterior surfaces.

(7) On a replacement P-80, Serial No. 44-85335, from Lockheed 19 August 1946, numerous screws were loose, rivets pulled, paint chipped, and buckles

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in skin above air ducts. Said aircraft had a total accumulated time of five hours and forty minutes at time of delivery to this squadron. Every indication is that excessive "G's" were pulled prior to delivery or that acceptance inspection at manufacturers plant was faulty. An Unsatisfactory Report is being submitted on above defects and irregularities.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

James C. Brown

JAMES C. BROWN,
Major, Air Corps,
Adjutant.

Incl:
AOCP List.

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3 Aircraft AOCP for parts

TYPE & SER NO	AMT	CLASS	PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE
P-80A 44-85063	1	01-L	0112-30-174800	Nose assy.
	12	08-A	8800-914900	Tubing
	2	03-I	4846-121	Valve assy.
	2	03-I	4846-12A	Nipple
	1	01-L	0112-10-176890	Channel
	1	01-L	0112-175523-7	Mast assy.
	1	01-L	0112-176330-R	Fitting main LG
	1	01-L	0112-177901	Lever assy.
	1	01-L	0112-177735	Plug throttle
	1	01-L	0112-177802	Spacer
	1	01-L	0112-177712	Support
P-80A 44-85066	1	01-L	0112-10-176262-3R	Fillet
P-80A 44-85139	1	03-C	4248-430	Signal assy.
	2	01-L	0112-LS-1907-2	Panel
	1	05-C	6000-218560-6	Indicator

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P-80 Activities Rpt Distribution

5 - CG 12th Air Force
5 - CO Williams Field
Chandler Arizona
ATTN: Director of Flying Training
P-80 Transition School
1 - Col Austin
AC/AS-3 Maintenance Division
Req Branch Aircraft Section
Pentagon Bldg Room 4D 1069
Washington DC
1 - Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama
1 - Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama
ATTN: Lt Col M. A. McKenzie
1 - AAFPGC
Proof Division
Eglin Field, Florida
ATTN: Col Viccillio
1 - AFPG
Pinecastle Field, Florida
1 - CG AMC
Wright Field, Dayton Ohio
ATTN: Aircraft Division
1 - CG AMC
Muroc Army Air Field
Muroc, California
1 - Commanding Officer
1st Fighter Group
5 - S-2
5 - S-4
2 - S-3
1 - S-1
1 - AI
1 - Stat Control

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[HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND]
[Langley Field, Virginia]

TAC 452.11

8 July 1946

Lieutenant General N. F. Twining
Headquarters Air Materiel Command
Wright Field,
Dayton, Ohio

Dear Nate:

We are experiencing extreme difficulties in carrying out our P-80 (Jet) training program due to shortage of supply, and delays in obtaining the necessary maintenance parts for this type aircraft. Continued efforts of the First Fighter Group and all higher echelons of the command have, in some cases, eased the problem, but in general the situation is growing worse. At present out of 81 aircraft assigned there are 39 aircraft out of commission for parts. While we have had an average, of 30% out of commission for parts during the past four months, the figure is now approaching 50%.

In answer to a letter from this Headquarters dated 26 April 1946 which outlined existing supply deficiencies, the Supply Division of your command stated that the production of spare parts for P-80 (Jet) aircraft was ahead of schedule and sufficient spare parts were available in appropriate specialized depots. This reply was forwarded to General Taylor, Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, March Field. He in turn acquainted representatives of San Bernardino ATSC with the contents thereof, inasmuch as SBATSC was able to supply only 33% of requested items at that time. These representatives did not concur in some instances and stated that a large percentage of their requisition had been returned unfilled from specialized depots because requested items were not procurable.

I would like to suggest that we both send a qualified representative of our respective Supply Division to March Field for such period as is necessary to get to the bottom of the supply problem as regards requirements and availability of maintenance parts and find out just where the deficiency lies. I think this action would offer a solution to many of the difficulties.

In approaching this problem, my only desire is to discover the source of difficulty in order that corrective action may be taken.

We have requested Headquarters Army Air Forces to authorize the establishment of a high priority to meet our needs in this manner, but as yet that established for project "Comet" is warranted.

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C O P Y

Ltr fm TAC, 452.11 Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va., 8 Jul 46, Cont'd

The First Fighter Group is the only P-80 (Jet) Group in the Continental United States and is still in the infant stage. As this Group will be activating Cadres for other Groups in the near future, I feel it is our duty to assist them in every possible way in carrying out their program to training P-80 pilots.

Very sincerly yours,

E. R. QUESADA
Major General, U S Army
Commanding

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND) (AAA)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

TAC 452.11 (19 Jul 46) 17 July 1947
Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining
Commanding General
Air Materiel Command
Wright Field
Dayton, Ohio

Dear Nate,

Subsequent to the date of my last letter to you, members of my A-4 Section have returned from a supervisory visit to the Twelfth Air Force Headquarters and March Field. From their report now in my hands, it is apparent that there has been a lack of supervision on supply matters on the part of my people out there at March. I have written a letter to General Doyle who recently took command of the Twelfth Air Force apprising him of the conditions that exist, and I feel sure they will be remedied.

My people also visited your depots at San Bernardino and Maywood, California, where they joined members of your staff in investigating the supply problem. On their return trip, they stopped over at Patterson and contacted Colonel Martenstein. Based upon their conversation with him, and checking the records pertaining to a list of critical items, they estimate that approximately 65% of the parts are available in your depots.

Included in this report, mentioned above, is a list of recommendations. Those that pertain to your organization I am passing on to you for what they are worth.

/t/ E. R. QUESADA
Major General, USA
Commanding

1 Incl.
List of Recommendations

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. An extensive supply research section be established at SPATSC to enable that activity to determine suitable substitutes and eliminate supply levels.

2. In order to implement the 1-C priority recently granted this project by AAF, airlift be used on all AOCF, and in establishing a partial stock level, the reminder to be transported by other means.

3. Requisitions for items not previously required, or for which no stock level exists, be processed expeditiously, and prompt action be taken to procure such items and establish ample stock levels.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (A4A)
Office of the Commanding General

In reply refer to:
TAC 452.11 (24 Apr 46)

Tampa Florida
24 Apr 1946

SUBJECT: Storage Batteries, Class 03-J

TO: Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Ohio.

1. The 412th Fighter Group (P-80 Jet), March Field, California, is experiencing extreme difficulties in obtaining aircraft storage batteries in the amounts required and commensurate to meet the operational requirements of the organization.

2. A recent visit to the 412th Fighter Group by representatives of this headquarters revealed that battery shortages had reached such proportions that broken batteries were being used in Battery Booster Carts for engine starting. Aircraft of the organization have been AOCP since 24 February 1946 and the numbers are constantly increasing due to shortage of this item. AAF-64-SO, March Field, received shipping notices for batteries 6 April 1946 but had not received same as of 18 April 1946.

3. To aleviate the existing battery shortage it is recommended that action be taken to supply this organization, through AAF-64-SO, March Field, direct from the manufacturer, 24 each Class 03-J, stock numbers 4900-043500 Batteries - aircraft, high rate starting - electric storage.

4. If above recommendation is not considered practical or justifiable, it is requested this headquarters be advised of other action being taken by your command to relieve the present supply shortage of subject item.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ CLARENCE N. KEEN
Stamped CLARENCE N. KEEN
Maj., Air Corps
Asst, Adj, Gen.

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Basic: Ltr fr Hq. Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida dated 24 April 1946 to Class 03J, Hq. AMC, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. Subject: Storage Batteries.

452.1 1st Ind. TSSAC502/6T/meh

Hq., AMC, Wright Field, Dayton Ohio, 1 May 1946.

To: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida, Attention: TAC 452.10 (24 Apr 46)

1. Records of this office indicate all requests which originated at March Field for stock number 4900-043500 Battery, for P-80 Aircraft have, as of this date, been shipped from the Contractors plant. Shipment of twenty-five (25) was made 26 April 1946 on B/L WX-8347743. Twenty-four (24) each were marked for AOCP's 230-2-27 thru 242-2-27, 254-2-27 thru 245-2-27 and one (1) each was marked AOCF 23-3-5.

2. In regard to Paragraph three (3) of basic letter, in view of the above, no action will be taken to supply twenty-four (24) each additional Batteries.

3. The present shortage of stock number 4900-043500 Battery, is due chiefly to production difficulties and extremely high mortality rate; however, corrective action has been accomplished by utilizing a new type improved Case which will facilitate increased production and lower the mortality rate.

4. Relief from the present supply shortage should be forth coming within the next sixty (60) to seventy-five (75) days.

By Command of Lieutenant General TWINING:

/s/ F. J. MATHEWS,
For BEN H. ROBERTS
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief Aircraft Section
Supply Division

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Basic: Ltr fr Hq. Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida dated 24 April 1946 to Class 03J, Hq. AMC, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. Subject: Storage Batteries.

452.1 1st Ind. TSSAC5G2/GT/meh

Hq., AMC, Wright Field, Dayton Ohio, 1 May 1946.

To: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Tampa, Florida, Attention: TAC 452.10 (24 Apr 46)

1. Records of this office indicate all requests which originated at March Field for stock number 4900-043500 Battery, for P-80 Aircraft have, as of this date, been shipped from the Contractors plant. Shipment of twenty-five (25) was made 26 April 1946 on B/L WX-8347743. Twenty-four (24) each were marked for AOCP's 230-2-27 thru 242-2-27, 254-2-27 thru 245-2-27 and one (1) each was marked AOCP 23-3-5.

2. In regard to Paragraph three (3) of basic letter, in view of the above, no action will be taken to supply twenty-four (24) each additional Batteries.

3. The present shortage of stock number 4900-043500 Battery, is due chiefly to production difficulties and extremely high mortality rate; however, corrective action has been accomplished by utilizing a new type improved Case which will facilitate increased production and lower the mortality rate.

4. Relief from the present supply shortage should be forth coming within the next sixty (60) to seventy-five (75) days.

By Command of Lieutenant General TWINING:

/s/ F. J. MATHEWS,
For BEN H. ROBERTS
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief Aircraft Section
Supply Division

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (A4A)
Office of the Commanding General

In reply refer to:
TAC 452.11 (24 Apr 46)

Tampa Florida
24 Apr 1946

SUBJECT: Storage Batteries, Class 03-J

TO: Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Ohio.

1. The 412th Fighter Group (P-80 Jet), March Field, California, is experiencing extreme difficulties in obtaining aircraft storage batteries in the amounts required and commensurate to meet the operational requirements of the organization.

2. A recent visit to the 412th Fighter Group by representatives of this headquarters revealed that battery shortages had reached such proportions that broken batteries were being used in Battery Booster Carts for engine starting. Aircraft of the organization have been AOCP since 24 Febuary 1946 and the numbers are constantly increasing due to shortage of this item. AAF-64-80, March Field, received shipping notices for batteries 6 April 1946 but had not received same as of 18 April 1946.

3. To alleviate the existing battery shortage it is recommended that action be taken to supply this organization, through AAF-64-80, March Field, direct from the manufacturer, 24 each Class 03-J, stock numbers 4900-043500 Batteries - aircraft, high rate starting - electric storage.

4. If above recommendation is not considered practical or justifiable, it is requested this headquarters be advised of other action being taken by your command to relieve the present supply shortage of subject item.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ CLARENCE N. KEEN
Stamped CLARENCE N. KEEN
Maj., Air Corps
Asst, Adj, Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NC	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: FP-80 Activity Report
1	A3A-1 18 Nov 46	C/S A-3 A-4	1. No interesting happenings this report. 2. Twelfth Squadron has far better flying and in commission record than any other P-80 squadron. 3. Twelfth Squadron is not shackled with TO&E 1-17R and a service group which decentralizes the maintenance personnel and authority to such an extent that unified action is very difficult. /t/ R T B Tac Opns
	J.D. S. A-3		
2	18 Nov 46 C/S	A-4	Noted. /t/ Glenn O. Barcus C/S
3	25 Nov 46		Batteries for P-80 acft are still a critical item. This condition is due to labor troubles in manufacturing plants. AMC has contracts for 5,000 but cannot get delivery. /t/ B C BIRDSONG Major, AC A-4 Tech Supply
	W.R.M. C/Sup A-4		
4		AC M&R	AG & File

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HEADQUARTERS
412th Fighter Group (P-80 Jet)
March Field, Riverside, California

AT/er

452.1 (P-80)

31 May 1946

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities

TO: Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field, Riverside, California

1. In accordance with verbal request of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, the following information is submitted for the week ending 28 March 1946.

****

(1) Pilots report that the back-pack parachute is uncomfortable when worn in the P-80 cockpit. This type of parachute places the pilot too far forward and constitutes a hazard in the event a forced landing is made. The seat-pack parachute is satisfactory from standpoint of comfort and position of the pilot in the cockpit. It has, however, a tendency to creep forward past the edge of the bucket seat and interfere with the control stick during landing. This is not a dangerous condition since the pilot can shift the parachute while flying the airplane. A suggestion that this condition can be prevented by incorporating a deeper and more steeply inclined front lip in the bucket seat will be included in an U.R.

(2) The aerial gunnery program has been given top priority at present and is progressing satisfactory. Tests are being conducted to determine the best method of utilizing the K-14 gunsight in the P-80. After consolidating the results of these tests, the method producing the desired optimum results will be made SOP for the group. Highest single score to date is 67 hits, fired on an AGA target at 20,000 feet altitude. It has been found that two P-80 airplanes constitute the best firing formation due to the high overtaking speed of this airplane.

(4) The chief maintenance difficulties encountered during project "Comet" were due to shortage of parts and lack of adequate aerial transportation for ground

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Basic: Ltr Hq 412th Ftr Gp, Subj: Mthly Rpt of P-80 Activities A52.1 (P-80). 31 May 1946.

crew personnel. Basic difficulty encountered with cargo ships was the wide variation in cruising speed as compared to the type (P-80A) which were being serviced. Parts shortages in question were not available at March Field Prior to departure from this station. Appreciable quantities of tires and brake linings were procured from Wright Field, direct during performances of the project. One engine was replaced in addition to normal maintenance that was performed plus 2 each engine change demonstrations.

1. Recommendations for corrective action.

(1) Lack of P-80 parts still stands as the major factor for the number of ADCI's and the outstanding reason for the low percentage of aircraft in commission at this time.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ JOHN S. GARRETT

/t/ JOHN S. GARRETT
1st Lt., Air Corps
Asst Adjutant

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C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Air Inspector

Langley Field, Virginia
15 November 1946

SUBJECT: AOCP of P-80 Type Aircraft

TO: Inspector General
Headquarters Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. During the quarterly inspection of Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, 12 through 17 November 1946, the problems effecting procurement and distribution of supplies (AOCP) for the P-80 type aircraft were discussed at a meeting attended by the A-4 Section of the Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, representatives of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation included Mr. Lah (Supply), Mr. Zillhover (Maintenance), Mr. Hamphill (Inspection), and three representatives of the Inspector General's Department, Tactical Air Command. Most of the discussion was devoted to the DIR (Depot Inspection and Repair) program which has been set up at San Bernardino Air Material Area and will service P-80's of the Twelfth Air Force. Mr. Lah pointed out that a large percentage of the major parts and assemblies necessary to complete a DIR are not on procurement. Mr. Lah further stated that he did not see how SBAMA could process even one aircraft through DIR with the present supplies available and low priority (2-8) allotted the project.

2. The 1st Fighter Group sent one P-80 to DIR on or about 27 Sep 46. Reports indicate that little or no progress has been made on this aircraft, and the nine additional aircraft sent to DIR are reportedly in storage. In the 1st Fighter Group alone twenty-one of the fifty-nine P-80 type aircraft assigned are now ready for DIR and it is estimated that upon completion of the current maneuvers on or about 1 Dec 46 that the remaining thirty-eight aircraft will be nearing the 100-hour mark set as the approximate number of hours when a P-80 should go to DIR. With the current and near-future outlook for return of aircraft from DIR resting at Zero, the theoretical conclusion is that the 1st Fighter Group will be grounded within the next three months unless new aircraft are assigned. Take the TO & E for a P-80 Group as an example, with eighty-one pilots and seventy-five aircraft assigned, the following may be assumed: Eighty-one pilots flying twenty hours a month accumulate 1620 hours of flying time which would send 16.2 P-80 aircraft to DIR every month, assuming that they were processed at the 100-hour mark.

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C O P Y

Ltr, Hq TAC, Office of the AI, Langley Fld, Va., subj: AOCP of P-80 Type Aircraft, dtd 15 Nov 46

SBAMA estimates that twelve to thirteen P-80's could be processed through DIR per month. In other words SBAMA could not process enough P-80's through DIR to meet the needs of one Fighter Group. However, SBAMA handles the procurement and distribution of P-80 parts for the Continental United States as well as the Philippine Islands and the European Theater. It is obvious that additional plans must be made if the future P-80 program is to function in an efficient manner.

3. The AOCP problem at March Field has not been alleviated and sixteen P-80's were AOCP as of 12 Nov 46. Items such as batteries and tires on which stock level data could be easily obtained are still a major factor in AOCP aircraft, and the lack of these and similar items can be traced directly to procurement. The weakness in the functions of basic procurement and distribution prevents March Field from maintaining adequate stock levels even though the Specialized Depots for the P-80's are in the local area. A large number of parts for the P-80 are being requisitioned on first-time requisitions, and this station has been informed that no procurement for them has been made by the Air Materiel Command. When it becomes necessary to procure parts for which the need was not or could not be anticipated, the contractor has to halt production on current items, re-set his tools and dies, and produce the requested number of items.

4. It is realized that numerous conferences and investigations have been held on the subject of AOCP for P-80 aircraft, but outward appearances indicate that verbal promises and follow-ups have bogged down at some higher echelon. The fact remains that conditions at the using level have not materially improved, since July 1946, and in many cases have shown a backward trend. The problem of procurement does not seem to improve and the procedures seem contrary to and not in keeping with the present financial savings policy currently in effect in the AAF. For example, thirty-four wing fillets have already been used out of the forty-six placed on procurement to support 559 aircraft. It is believed that present procurement is inadequate to take care of the flying time requirements now in effect for the P-80 type aircraft.

5. It was believed by all present at the discussion that the proper approach to the solution of the AOCP problem for the P-80 type aircraft lay in an Investigating Board consisting of P-80 procurement and maintenance men from Wright Field, representatives of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and representatives from the using level of the P-80 aircraft. On previous occasions procurement and maintenance men (some of them not familiar with the P-80 procurement problem) from AMC have visited March Field separately and apparently

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Ltr, Hq TAC, Office of the AI, Langley Fld, Va., subj: AOCP of P-80 Type Aircraft, dtd 15 Nov 46.

did not concur on the problems found at the time of the visit. It is felt that this Investigating Board should visit March Field as a team in view of the fact that maintenance ties in so closely with present supply problems as well as production, procurement and distribution of P-80 parts. It is further recommended that the time requirements for items coming up on first time requisition for which no procurement has been made by AMC be also investigated. It is further recommended that a formal written report be made and distributed to all echelons concerned.

6. This instrument does not purport to be a solution to the AOCP problem of the P-80 type aircraft. It is drawn up with the intention of bringing facts into the open which indicate the extreme necessity of positive and definite action on the part of all echelons concerned with the production, distribution, maintenance, and supply of parts for the P-80 aircraft.

7. Supporting evidence covering this instrument is attached as follows:

Exhibit A - Six Unsatisfactory Reports

Exhibit B - Two AOCP Reports from SBAMA

Exhibit C - AMC procurement data

Exhibit D - Minutes of two meetings

/s/ George L. Hicks
GEORGE L. HICKS
Major, AC
Asst Air Inspector

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Air Inspector

Langley Field, Virginia
4 December 1946

SUBJECT: Case Report, AAF Special - Inadequacy of AOCP Parts Procurement for P-80 Type Aircraft

THRU: Commanding Officer, 1st Fighter Group, March Field, Riverside, California
Commanding Officer, March Field, Riverside, California
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, March Field, Riverside, California

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

I. IRREGULARITY AND DEFICIENCY.

1. In analyzing the irregularities and deficiencies existing in the 1st Fighter Group, March Field, Riverside, California, as recorded in a letter to the Inspector General, this headquarters, subject: "AOCP of P-80 Type Aircraft," dated 15 November 1946, it was noted that P-80 type aircraft parts procurement of the 1st Fighter Group under AOCP was unsatisfactory. Major factors substantiating this conclusion are as follows:

a. Sixteen P-80s of the 1st Fighter Group were AOCP as of 12 November 1946.

b. Weaknesses in the functions of basic procurement and distribution of P-80 type aircraft parts prevents March Field from maintaining adequate parts stock levels for P-80 type aircraft including such items as batteries and tires.

c. Certain first time part requisitions for P-80 type aircraft are not procurable.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. It is recommended that an appropriate investigation be conducted into all phases of P-80 parts procurement, with a view towards

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Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va, subj: "Case Rpt, AAF Spec - Inadequacy of ACCP Parts Procurement for P-80 Type Aircraft," 4 Dec 46

locating and correcting the factors responsible for the excessive number of P-80 type aircraft in the 1st Fighter Group out of commission awaiting parts.

III. INSTRUCTIONS.

3. This case report, AAF Special, will be reviewed by all commanders through whom it passes, and action taken. Recommendations, or other comments, will be stated by indorsement, each of which will be prepared in sufficient copies to insure that the original and 2 copies, including inclosures, will reach Headquarters Tactical Air Command.

/s/ Joseph A. Kelly
JOSEPH A KELLY
Lt Col, IGD
Deputy Air Inspector

1 Incl
Ltr to IG, TAC, dtd
15 Nov 46

1st Ind AS/dcj

HEADQUARTERS 1st Ftr Gp March Field, Calif 16 Dec 1946.

TO: Commanding Officer, March Field, Riverside, California.

1. This activity concurs in deficiencies and recommendations as outlined in Section I and II of basic communication without any reservations.

2. Inclosures one (1), two (2), and three (3) to this indorsement substantiate irregularity and deficiencies as basically outlined.

3. Attention is cited to the fact that items on ACCP list for April 1946 (Inclosure 1) are prevalent on ACCP lists for September and October 1946 (Inclosures 2 and 3). These facts indicate that the AMC procurement and supply system as pertains to P-80 aircraft at this base is inadequate and inefficient.

/s/ Gilbert L. Meyers
GILBERT L. MEYERS
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding.

3 Incl added:
ACCP list Apr 1946
ACCP list Sep 1946
ACCP list Oct 1946

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Basic: Ltr Hq TAC. To: CO MF, dtd 4 Dec 1946. Subj: Case Report AAF Special - Inadequacy of AOCP Parts Procurement for P-80 Type Aircraft.

452.11 2d Ind. MFS4-1

HEADQUARTERS, March Field, Riverside, California 2 Jan 1947

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, March Field, California

1. This station is aware of the findings incorporated in Section I, basic communication. However, this is obviously due to many P-80 parts being in short supply or not scheduled for procurement, which is the case of most first time part requisitions.

2. Every effort is being spent by this station to alleviate the situation by establishing a critical AOCP list and a list of all recurring items which might be considered reparable. This list will be checked by maintenance this station, to insure that wherever possible these items are repaired by the most expeditious means.

3. This matter is being coordinated with Aircraft Reclamation this station in view of cannibalization of aircraft in Reclamation to recover any items that may be used.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ J. R. Mamerow
J. R. MAMEROW
Lt Col., Air Corps
Adjutant

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C O P Y

Basic: Ltr Hq TAC to CO, MF, dtd 4 Dec 46, Subj: "Case Report AAF Special - Inadequacy of AOCP Parts Procurement for P-80 Type Aircraft"

452.11 3rd Ind 12AF-H

HEADQUARTERS, TWELFTH AIR FORCE, March Field, Calif. 15 Jan 1947

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Fld, Va.

1. Representatives of this headquarters visited Headquarters, Air Materiel Command from 17 December to 21 December 1946, with the express purpose of presenting to them the critical situation existing in the procurement of P-80 supplies and equipment, and to obtain first hand information as to what AMC is doing to alleviate this condition.

2. As a result of discussions and information brought out during this visit, AMC has designated a team of representatives to visit March Field, during the month of January, 1947, to personally view each existing condition, recommend changes and to aid in any way possible. Also during this visit they will review the existing inadequate ground handling equipment, in order to obtain pertinent information, as to type and quantities of equipment that should be authorized a P-80 unit for proper operation.

3. In view of the statements contained in Par. 2 above, it is the opinion of this Hdqrs that the action recommended in the basic communication has already been arranged. Numerous conferences between AMC personnel (both from Wright Field and San Bernardino) and TAC personnel have been held in efforts to overcome not only supply difficulties referred to in the basic report but many others as well. Brig. General Arthur Thomas from Supply Division, Hdqrs AMC, accompanied by members of his staff, recently visited March Field and SBAMA. During this visit General Thomas evidenced particular interest in "first time" requisitions, time lag in deliveries, matters bearing on the functions of procurement and distribution in general, suitable and unsatisfactory substitute supplies, repairables and their expeditious repair and return to stock, local purchase and many other matters.

4. It is realized that the improvement in supply functions in the lowest echelons can and does contribute materially to the over all improvement in supply efficiency in general. In the light of this axiom, this Hdqrs and all subordinate units within the Command have expended and will continue to expend every effort to find and

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Basic: Ltr Hq TAC to CO, MF, dtd 4 Dec 46, Subj: "Case Report AAF Special - Inadequacy of AOCP Parts Procurement for P-80 Type Aircraft"

correct weaknesses in the supply system. The Air Materiel Command has and continues to show vital and sincere interest and is doing all in its power to improve its services. It is therefore the belief of this Hdqrs that the AMC has, is, and will continue to perform the actions indicated in the recommendation of the basic communication.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ W. R. Purpus
W. R. PURPUS
Major, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

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452.11 3rd Ind 12AF-H

HEADQUARTERS, TWELFTH AIR FORCE, March Field, Calif. 15 Jan 1947

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Fld, Va.

1. Representatives of this headquarters visited Headquarters Air Materiel Command from 17 December to 21 December 1946, with the express purpose of presenting to them the critical situation existing in the procurement of P-80 supplies and equipment, and to obtain first hand information as to what AMC is doing to alleviate this condition.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Air Inspector

Langley Field, Virginia
4 December 1946

SUBJECT: Case Report, AAF Special - Depot Inspection and Repair Program

THRU: Commanding Officer, 1st Fighter Group, March Field, Riverside, California
Commanding Officer, March Field, Riverside, California
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, March Field, Riverside, California

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

I. IRREGULARITY AND DEFICIENCY.

1. In analyzing the irregularities and deficiencies existing in the 1st Fighter Group, March Field, Riverside, California, as recorded in a letter to the Inspector General, this headquarters, subject: "AOCP of P-80 Type Aircraft," dated 15 November 1946, it was noted that the Depot Inspection and Repair Program for P-80 type aircraft, as it affects the 1st Fighter Group, was unsatisfactory. Major factors substantiating this conclusion are as follows:

a. Present inadequate supplies, and the low priority allotted this project, has retarded the Depot Inspection and Repair Program as it applies to P-80 type aircraft of the 1st Fighter Group.

b. With 38 of the 59 P-80 type aircraft of the 1st Fighter Group at present ready for a Depot Inspection and Repair job, and with the anticipation of the remaining 21 P-80 aircraft ready for a Depot Inspection and Repair job at the completion of the current maneuvers on or about 1 December 1946, it is concluded that tactical efficiency of the 1st Fighter Group will be seriously impaired by a lack of aircraft to fly.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. It is recommended that an appropriate investigation be conducted in the San Bernardino Air Materiel Area with a view towards

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Hq TAC, Langley Fld, Va, subj: "Case Rpt, AAF Spec - Depot Insp and Repair Program," 3 Dec 46

locating and correcting the factors responsible for the break-down in Depot Inspection and Repair Program for P-80 type aircraft of the 1st Fighter Group.

III. INSTRUCTIONS.

3. This case report, AAF Special, will be reviewed by all commanders through whom it passes, and action taken. Recommendations, or other comments, will be stated by indorsement, each of which will be prepared in sufficient copies to insure that the original and 2 copies, including inclosures, will reach Headquarters Tactical Air Command.

/s/ Joseph A. Kelly
JOSEPH A. KELLY
Lt Col, IGD
Deputy Air Inspector

1 Incl
Ltr to IG, TAC, dtd
15 Nov 46

1st Ind AS/doj

HEADQUARTERS 1st Ftr Gp March Field Calif, 16 Dec 1946

TO: Commanding Officer, March Field, Riverside, California

1. This activity fully concurs in deductions as outlined in Section I of basic communication.

2. As of 13 Dec 1946, thirty nine (39) P-80 aircraft on hand at this base are eligible for D.I.R. These aircraft all have had 100 or more flying hours. One P-80 aircraft has a total of 217:00 hours.

3. The importance of D.I.R. procedure as regards operating efficiency of P-80 tactical units cannot be over emphasized. It is inevitable that if no ships were lost due to transfer or crashes that the maintenance overload would be so great somewhere in the vicinity of the 150 to 200 hour bracket (airplane time) that operations would be drastically curtailed.

/s/ Gilbert L. Meyers
GILBERT L. MEYERS
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

1 Incl
n/c

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Air Inspector

Langley Field, Virginia
15 November 1946

SUBJECT: AOCP of P-80 Type Aircraft

TO: Inspector General
Headquarters Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. During the quarterly inspection of Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, 12 through 17 November 1946, the problems effecting procurement and distribution of supplies (AOCP) for the P-80 type aircraft were discussed at a meeting attended by the A-4 Section of the Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, representatives of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation included Mr. Lah (Supply), Mr. Zillhover (Maintenance), Mr. Hemphill (Inspection), and three representatives of the Inspector General's Department, Tactical Air Command. Most of the discussion was devoted to the DIR (Depot Inspection and Repair) program which has been set up at San Bernardino Air Materiel Area and will service P-80's of the Twelfth Air Force. Mr. Lah pointed out that a large percentage of the major parts and assemblies necessary to complete a DIR are not on procurement. Mr. Lah further stated that he did not see how SBAMA could process even one aircraft through DIR with the present supplies available and low priority (2-B) allotted the project.

2. The 1st Fighter Group sent one P-80 to DIR on or about 27 Sep 46. Reports indicate that little or no progress has been made on this aircraft, and the nine additional aircraft sent to DIR are reportedly in storage. In the 1st Fighter Group alone twenty-one of the fifty-nine P-80 type aircraft assigned are now ready for DIR and it is estimated that upon completion of the current maneuvers on or about 1 Dec 46 that the remaining thirty-eight aircraft will be nearing the 100-hour mark set as the approximate number of hours when a P-80 should go to DIR. With the current and near-future outlook for return of aircraft from DIR resting at Zero, the theoretical conclusion is that the 1st Fighter Group will be grounded within the next three months unless new aircraft are assigned. Take the TO & E for a P-80 Group as an example, with eighty-one pilots and seventy-five aircraft assigned, the following may be assumed: Eighty-one pilots flying twenty hours a month accumulate 1620 hours of flying time which would send 16.2 P-80 aircraft to DIR every month, assuming that they were processed at the

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100-hour mark. SBAMA estimates that twelve to thirteen P-80's could be processed through DIR per month. In other words SBAMA could not process enough P-80's through DIR to meet the needs of one Fighter Group. However, SBAMA handles the procurement and distribution of P-80 parts for the Continental United States as well as the Philippine Islands and the European Theater. It is obvious that additional plans must be made if the future P-80 program is to function in an efficient manner.

3. The AOCP problem at March Field has not been alleviated and sixteen P-80's were AOCP as of 12 Nov 46. Items such as batteries and tires on which stock level data could be easily obtained are still a major factor in AOCP aircraft, and the lack of these and similar items can be traced directly to procurement. The weakness in the functions of basic procurement and distribution prevents March Field from maintaining adequate stock levels even though the Specialized Depots for the P-80's are in the local area. A large number of parts for the P-80 are being requisitioned on first-time requisitions, and this station has been informed that no procurement for them has been made by the Air Materiel Command. When it becomes necessary to procure parts for which the need was not or could not be anticipated, and the contractor has to halt production on current items, re-set his tools and dies, and produce the requested number of items.

4. It is realized that numerous conferences and investigations have been held on the subject of AOCP for P-80 aircraft, but outward appearances indicate that verbal promises and follow-ups have bogged down at some higher echelon. The fact remains that conditions at the using level have not materially improved, since July 1946, and in many cases have shown a backward trend. The problem of procurement does not seem to improve and the procedures seem contrary to and not in keeping with the present financial savings policy currently in effect in the AAF. For example, thirty-four wing fillets have already been used out of the forty-six placed on procurement to support 559 aircraft. It is believed that present procurement is inadequate to take care of the flying time requirements now in effect for the P-80 type aircraft.

5. It was believed by all present at the discussion that the proper approach to the solution of the AOCP problem for the P-80 type aircraft lay in an Investigating Board consisting of P-80 procurement and maintenance men from Wright Field, representatives of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and representatives from the using level of the P-80 aircraft. On previous occasions procurement and maintenance men (some of them not familiar with the P-80 procurement problem) from AMC have visited March Field separately and apparently did not concur on the problems found at the time of the visit. It is felt that this Investigating Board should visit March Field as a team in view of the fact that

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maintenance ties in so closely with present supply problems as well as production, procurement and distribution of P-80 parts. It is further recommended that the time requirements for items coming up on first time requisition for which no procurement has been made by AMC be also investigated. It is further recommended that a formal written report be made and distributed to all echelons concerned.

6. This instrument does not purport to be a solution to the AOCP problem of the P-80 type aircraft. It is drawn up with the intention of bringing facts into the open which indicate the extreme necessity of positive and definite action on the part of all echelons concerned with the production, distribution, maintenance, and supply of parts for the P-80 aircraft.

7. Supporting evidence covering this instrument is attached as follows:

Exhibit A - Six Unsatisfactory Reports

Exhibit B - Two AOCP Reports from SEAMA

Exhibit C - AMC procurement data

Exhibit D - Minutes of two meetings

/s/ George L Hicks
GEORGE L HICKS
Major, AC
Asst Air Inspector

A TRUE COPY

/s/ Richard L. Orr
RICHARD L. ORR
Lt Col, IGD

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HEADQUARTERS, TWELFTH AIR FORCE, March Field, Calif. 15 Jan 1947

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Fld, Va.

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2. As a result of discussions and information brought out during this visit, AMC has designated a team of representatives to visit March Field, during the month of January, 1947, to personally view each existing condition, recommend changes and to aid in any way possible. Also during this visit they will review the existing inadequate ground handling equipment, in order to obtain pertinent information, as to type and quantities of equipment that should be authorized a P-80 unit for proper operation.

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FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

W. R. PURTUS
Major, A.C.D.
Adjutant General

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D. The Air Defence Command furnish all personnel needed to administer and instruct The Air R.O.T.C. and Air Scout summer encampments. Such physical facilities as are available at Tactical Air Command bases be used for these activities.

E. Aerial demonstrations be confined to that type which will provide training for Tactical Air Command units and is compatible with current Tactical Air Command doctrine.

F. The number of Tactical Air Command personnel in technical schools and colleges be limited to that number compatible with current work loads and long run efficiency.

G. When Tactical Air Command is asked to supervise or implement special programs cognizance be taken of the extra demands for personnel and equipment.

lV. CONCLUSIONS:

It is concluded that:

A. The servicing of Air Reserve Units based on Tactical Air Command installations has not decreased the efficiency of The Tactical Air Command unit to an appreciable degree.

B. Due to the inactivity of National Guard Units, their servicing by Tactical Air Command bases is not an important factor at this time.

C. The expenditure of over 600 man days per month on ferrying aircraft for other commands has definitely decreased the efficiency of Tactical Air Command operational units.

D. The bulk of tow target activity within Tactical Air Command has been directed toward towing aerial targets for the Army Ground Forces.

E. The programming and administering of summer encampments for Air R.O.T.C. and Air Scout groups will call for facilities and personnel in quantities large enough to be of serious concern to Tactical Air Command bases.

F. Aerial demonstrations are not a particular problem at the present time since activity in this regard is practically nil.

G. Over 1000 man days are taken up daily by Tactical Air Command personnel attending schools and colleges.

H. About 5% of the total man days available within Tactical Air Command were spent in activities unrelated to the primary mission. Of this 5% of total effort, about 90% was lost to personnel in school.

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THE EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT INVOLVED IN SERVICING ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

(TAC A-5 STUDY)

V. DISCUSSION:

A. Air Reserve Commitments

Under the Air Reserve Training Program as outlined by the War Department, Air Reserve Base Units were to be established at various Army Air Force installations throughout the United States. These base units were to be capable of their own internal administration and 1st and 2nd echelon aircraft and automotive maintenance but would have to rely on the Army Air Force Base Unit for supply, mess, finance, housing, medical service, and 3rd echelon aircraft and automotive maintenance.

Originally Air Reserve Units were to be bases on eleven (11) Tactical Air Command bases. As of 15 February 1947, active Reserve base units were established on eight (8) Tactical Air Command Airfields. The normal base services of housing, messing, finance, etc., were provided as well as 3rd echelon maintenance being made available. The status of the three units not yet activated is understood.

Four of the eight (8) bases within Tactical Air Command having Air Reserve Units were visited in order to determine the extent of the extra base load caused by the Reserve units. All units were found to be at near their authorized strength of officers and enlisted men. The average strength of the units was seven (7) officers and thirty-one (31) enlisted men, which was 105% of authorized strength. Normal services of housing, messing, but one where the Reserve Unit was a satellite field. Base Commanders and members of their staffs who were contacted indicated that the extra service involved was not particularly important to their operations, since it amounted to but a small percentage of the total effort. Housing in most cases was not a problem, except for married personnel.

It was originally assumed that the problem of accomplishing 3rd echelon maintenance for aircraft and ordnance equipment would work the greatest hardship on Tactical Air Command base units because of the already critical situation of service units as to personnel, experience, and work loads. The average Reserve Unit visited was authorized sixteen (16) aircraft, mostly trainer types, while an average of twelve (12) were actually on hand. Thus the influence of only 75% of the potential aircraft of the Reserve unit is shown in this study. Estimates by Base Commanders, Maintenance personnel, and Air Reserve Unit Commanders indicated that approximately seventy-five (75) man hours had been expended per base accomplishing 3rd echelon maintenance for Reserve aircraft during the month of January. In addition, about twenty-five (25) hours were spent per month

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by base technicians conferring, consulting, and instructing Reserve unit maintenance personnel. This relatively small expenditure of effort by the base service units did not appear to seriously hamper the accomplishment in this regard, however. Since the plane level is only 75% of that authorized, it is logical to assume that higher maintenance requirements may result as more planes are assigned. In addition, it is well to note that the Reserve Training program is just getting organized and for this reason relatively little flying has been done. At the bases visited planes were flown an average of about 30 hours per month. As the program expands and more flying is done per plane more 3rd echelon maintenance will be required. Many of the planes in use have only recently been released from depots, which will mean added 3rd echelon maintenance as time on the aircraft and engines builds up. The low aircraft accident rate in the units visited is largely responsible for the low requirement for 3rd echelon maintenance. In the long run, however, it is logical to assume that the accident rate would equal or exceed the current rate for equivalent type aircraft, especially since Reserve pilots will not have the opportunity to maintain their proficiency as will flying personnel on active duty. Salvage and major repair work incident to accidents would put a major drain on 3rd echelon shops.

As this study draws to a close, information has been received that seven (7) of the eight (8) active Air Reserve Units on Tactical Air Command bases are being deactivated. This action will release Tactical Air Command bases from nearly all of their present commitments relative to the Air Reserve program. Any future commitments will revolve around undisclosed plans for the Air Reserve.

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THE EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT INVOLVED IN SERVICING ACTIVITIES

UNRELATED TO THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

(TAC A-5 STUDY)
February 1947

B. Air National Guard Commitments

Under the Air National Guard program as outlined by the War Department, a certain amount of interconnection with established Army Air Force installations was to be effected. Regulations provide that Air National Guard Bases will be attached to or satellited on the nearest Army Air Force base or depot capable of furnishing Army Air Forces supply and maintenance services. These bases would also assist the Air National Guard units in the performance of 3rd echelon maintenance when facilities and equipment are inadequate at the National Guard base. This means that even though National Guard units are not based on Army Air Force bases it might well be a big responsibility to service such units.

Three Tactical Air Command bases were originally concerned with servicing National Guard activities. Recently however, March Field, which was assigned to service the National Guard Unit at Van Nuys Metropolitan Airport, has been relieved of that responsibility. Currently only two Tactical Air Command bases, Langley Field and Lockbourne Army Air Base, are charged with servicing National Guard units. Langley Field, assigned to service the unit at Richmond Army Air Base has not been called upon to furnish any service as yet due to the inactive status of that National Guard Unit. Information is not available at this time as to the service supplied by Lockbourne Army Air Base to the four Guard Units for which it is responsible. Subsequent study should be initiated when the National Guard units reach a more active state of operations in order to determine the work load of servicing them.

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(TAC A-5 STUDY)
February 1947

C. Aircraft Ferrying Activities

During recent months the Tactical Air Command has been called upon to furnish crews to ferry aircraft for other Command in the Army Air Forces. Since this is an unscheduled activity insofar as the Tactical Air Command is concerned and since it has frequently placed a heavy demand on available pilots and crews, the activity has in some cases made it impossible for Tactical Air Command units to fulfill their primary missions.

During the months from September 1946 up through 15 February 1947, Tactical Air Command Ferried 291 aircraft which would ordinarily have been the responsibility of other commands. This number included 69 planes for the Air Defence Command, 198 for the Air Materiel Command, and 24 for the Air Transport Command. The bulk of these aircraft were destined for units and activities outside the Tactical Air Command although 95 were ferried to Tactical Air Command bases. This latter group was composed principally of new aircraft being delivered from the factory or depot. Of the others, the majority were either P-80's being delivered to the east coast from California or aircraft delivered for National Guard units.

Pilots and crews are often absent from their home stations for unusually long periods of time to circumstances beyond their control. In some cases pilots have reported that planes to be ferried were not ready for flight upon arrival of pilot. Others were in such a state of maintenance that pilots hesitated or refused to fly them. Unfavorable flying weather often caused delays in delivery. The biggest factor, however, appeared to be the delays involved in traveling by Military Air Transport. In many cases schedules are slow or difficult to meet; in others surface transportation had to be used in conjunction with air, thus causing delay. Information received from the units furnishing ferry vrews indicates that the average ferry mission takes about a week to complete. Considering seven (7) days to be an average length of time for a ferry trip and considering the need for two pilots, engineers and radio operators in some aircraft, computations show that 2455 pilot man-days and 868 other crew man-days have been used by Tactical Air Command personnel in the delivery of aircraft during the period September 1946 to 15 February 1947. This total of 3323 man-days lost to Tactical Air Command while engaged in ferrying aircraft, an average of 604 man-days per month, clearly indicates the extra load caused by this activity. In fact, some units have been completely immobilized for periods when ferrying commitments were unusually heavy because qualified pilots are in short supply and have administrative duties as well. Since continuation of the current ferrying program will continue to adversely affect the capabilities of Tactical Air Command, ferrying responsibilities should be reallocated by Army Air Forces.

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D. Tow Target Commitments

The Tow Target Unit of Tactical Air Command is charged with the primary responsibility of providing tow target service for all units of Tactical Air Command. Considering the current gunnery range facilities in use and the number of active units assigned to Tactical Air Command it is felt that two flights of four (4) aircraft each can readily furnish the necessary service required at the present time. With the activation of additional tactical groups, however, it would probably become necessary to augument the unit with additional flights of tow target aircraft. For the past several months the tow target squadron has been committed by Headquarters Army Air Forces to furnish aerial target for the Army Ground Forces. This work is in conjunction with the testing of new anti-aircraft weapons and has accounted for the major efforts of the TacticalAir Command tow facilities during this period. Because of this added commitment the strength of the tow target squadron was augmented to twenty-three (23) A-26's, and one (1) B-29. These added aircraft made it possible to carry commitments for both the Ground Forces and Tactical Air Command, although the service required by the latter was slight because of the inability of the groups to concentrate on aerial gunnery. Since no more than eight (8) aircraft could have satisfactorily serviced the Tactical Air Command, it can be assumed that the increase in required aircraft was made necessary to fill all commitments for the Ground Force Project. This indicates that sixteen (16) aircraft were utilized in this regard, Specific attention should be paid to the organization and administration of Tactical Air Command tow target units so as to insure the most efficient utilization of personnel and equipment. Planning should be accomplished in advance so as to coordinate the requirements of the Ground Forces and Tactical Air Command units for tow target service. Effective consideration should enable a more permanent level of strength in tow target units. In any event a positive process should be established for rapid and efficient changes in bulk allotments of personnel and equipment whenever the situation so dictates.

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February 1947

E. Air R.O.T.C. and Air Scout Activities

The Army Air Forces has initiated a Reserve Officers Training Corps Program at seventy-eight (78) colleges and universities throughout the United States. The Air Defence Command is charges with all responsibilities in connection with the Air R.O.T.C. program. As a part of the training course, advance R.O.T.C. students are expected to participate in a six to eight week summer camp at an Army Air Force Base, where they will receive military training and on-the-job training in specific Air Force specialities. Eventually ten (10) hours of orientation flying is to be accomplished during this summer camp.

The Air Defence Command has contacted the Tactical Air Command regarding the use of Tactical Air Command bases for R.O.T.C. summer encampments. Present plans call for four (4) camps to be located at the following Tactical Air Command bases: Stewart Field, Lockbourne Army Air Base, Langley Field, and March Field. As yet however, planning is in the initial stages and little is known of the actual requirements on each base. In general though the following requirements are anticipated:

a. Personnel:

1. Medical Personnel

2. Personnel to perform duties related to messing

3. Physical training personnel

4. Public relations and photographic coverage. It is expected that Air Defence Command personnel will supervise the camps and conduct the training.

b. Facilities and equipment:

1. Barracks

2. Mess Hall

3. Medical dispensary and hospital

4. Class rooms and activity areas

5. Chapel and recreation hall

6. Training aids, mock-ups and instructional equipment. (Includes Link Trainers).

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E. Air R.O.T.C. and Air Scout Activities Contd--

7. Athletic equipment.

8. Bunks and bedding

9. Post Exchange facilities

10. Transportation for numerous occasions.

11. Post Theater facilities

In addition Air Defence Command desires an air show of any dimensions at the conclusion of the camps.

Although plans for the camps are not yet complete it is obvious that any bases used in this regard would bear an extra burden of no mean consequence. Facilities and personnel would necessarily be needed to the extent that normal Tactical Air Command functioning would be impaired. These summer encampments should be confined to Air Defense Command bases charged with the responsibility or augmentations in personnel should be made if Tactical Air Command bases are used.

The Air Scouts, an activity composed of teen age boys interested in aviation, also plan summer encampments of one week duration at Army Air Forces bases. These encampments would require personnel services and facilities similar to those needed by R.O.T. C. encampments. In addition, it is likely that base personnel would be called upon to conduct the program and administer the camps.

Information available at the present time is too limited to make an approximation of the cost of these encampments to Tactical Air Command in personnel and base services.

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THE EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT INVOLVED IN SERVICING ACTIVITIES

UNRELATED TO THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

(TAC A-5 STUDY)
February 1947

F. Aerial Demonstrations

Since the organizing of the Tactical Air Command there have been many requests for aerial demonstrations and air shows of one kind or another. Some have been of a nature ordinarily expected of Tactical Air Power and as such proved valuable insofar as training was concerned. However, it was often necessary to make up the demonstration teams with so few aircraft that the force was ineffective. The lack of power often conveyed erroneous concepts of Tactical Air Power.

In an effort to consolidate current capabilities of men and equipment the demonstration team has been deactivated and scattered aerial demonstrations are no longer looked upon with favor. At the present time three shows are scheduled, one for the Armored School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and P-80 demonstrations over San Francisco and Newport News. These latter two may be accomplished as a part of normal missions while the former will be a training exercise. Special demonstrations and shows may be scheduled from time to time but never to the extent where their accomplishment will cripple the primary Tactical Air Command mission.

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G. Tactical Air Command Personnel on TDY at schools and Colleges

It is normally wise for any command or unit to raise the overall intelligence and technical level of its personnel by continuously keeping part of such personnel in schools of various types. Only in this far sighted manner can personnel be kept abreast of current developments and a high degree of efficiency attained. However, such personnel are lost to any command during their absence at school and as such hinder the parent organization in its efforts to fulfill its current mission. Obviously current efficiency cannot be sacrificed to long run efficiency for any prolonged period of time.

From this point of view it is interesting to note the extent to which Tactical Air Command personnel are attending schools. As of 31 January 1947, 248 Officers and 771 enlisted men assigned to Tactical Air Command were absent from their home station attending school. This means that 9% of the total officers and 4% of total enlisted strength were contributing nothing at the moment toward the operation of their units. Whereas vast improvement in capabilities might be expected in the foreseeable future the question of the extent by which current activities are crippled must also be considered. The extent to which various schools should be patronized by the personnel of any command is ofcourse flexible but should be considered in connection with the existing workload, personnel on TDY for other purposes, personnel on leave and furloughs, etc. The basic problem is to balance current with long term requirements.

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H. Miscellaneous Activity

At the present time the Tactical Air Command is committed to cooperate with the Strategic Air Command in the initial establishment of a weather station in Greenland. This commitment will involve the use of two (2) C-47's, one (1) C-82, two (2) gliders, and 24 officers and enlisted men for a period of approximately 60 days. These personnel and equipment will be supplied by the Troop Carrier Units of Tactical Air Command. This project is a special one and is peculiar inasmuch as it involves cold weather flying in northern latitudes. Because of past experience in cold weather, personnel of Tactical Air Command are apparently better suited to carry out the mission than other personnel available. In addition, Strategic Air Command is not in a position to furnish the entire complement at this time. The 24 personnel furnished by Tactical Air Command for 60 days will add up to 1440 man days. contributed toward this project. Whereas it may not appear that this commitment is unduly large in itself, recurring projects of similar nature continually call for manpower and equipment commitments.

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Tab. I

Status as of Dec 11, 1946 of Air Reserve Units on Tactical Air Command Bases

Location	ADC Air Res HU	Reserve Unit Aircraft								Personnel		
		AT-6		AT-7		AT-11		P-51				
		Auth	Recd	Auth	Recd	Auth	Recd	Auth	Recd	Off	EM	Civ
# Bergstrom Field, Austin Texas	179	5	8	0	0	2	1	1	1	5	21	11
#* Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas	181	6	3	1	0	2	0	2	0	5	11	3
#* Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S.C. (Services Morris Fld, Charlotte, N. C.)	471	5	6	1	0	2	2	1	1	10	25	40
#* Langley Field, Hampton Virginia	441	17	21	2	0	7	1	4	2	8	48	23
#* Lawson Field, Fort Benning, Ga.												
# Lockbourne Army Air Base, Columbus, O.	447	20	0	2	0	8	2	5	0	5	26	0
#* March Field, Riverside, California	409	8	7	1	0	3	2	2	0	10	25	28
(March also serves Long Beach, Calif	416	18	20	2	0	7	8	5	5	12	59	46
# Shaw Field, Sumter, So. Carolina (Services Columbia AAB, Columbia, S.C.	103	5	6	0	0	2	2	1	1	7	34	29
** Sherman Field, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.												
** Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna Tenn.		6	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	-	-	-
Stewart Field, Newburgh, N.Y.	115	35	10	4	0	12	5	9	0	11	52	51

* Bases and Units Visited, 8 - 14 Feb 46
** Units not operational as of 11 Dec 46
# Units deactivated 24 Feb 47

The Expenditure of effort Involved in Services Activities Unrealated to the Primary Mission of the Tactical Air Command
(TAC A-5 STUDY)
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Tab II

TABULATION OF INFORMATIN OBTAINED FROM PERSONAL VISITS TO TAC BASES

15 Feb 1947	409th Res. BU March Field		441st Res. BU Langley Field		181st Res. BU Biggs Field		471st Res. BU Greenville AAB		Average
	OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM	
Number of Personnel Authorized	10	25	8	48	5	14	10	25	
Number of A.D.C. Personnel Assigned	10	42	7	23	5	26	7	32	
Number of TAC Personnel Assigned	0		0		0		0		0
Number of Aircraft Authorized	14		30		11		9		16
Number of Aircraft Operated	12		19		8		9		12
Number of Flying Hours in January	750		200		350		300		425
Man Hours expended by Base Service Unit on 1st & 2nd echelon maint.	0		0		0		0		0
Man Hours expended by Base Service Unit on 3rd echelon Maintenance.	100		30		100		50		70
Man Hours expended by Base Service Unit on duties other than Maint. (Consultation, Instruction, Advice)	25		50		20		None		24
Percentage pf Base Service Unit potential being used servicing Air Reserve Unit.	Practically Negligible		Practically Negligible		Practically Negligible		Practically Negligible		--
Does Servicing of Air Reserve Unit Interfere with full Accomplishment of Base mission?	To a small degree		to a small degree		To a small degree		To a small degree		--
Number of accidents to aircraft Involving Major 3rd Echelon Maint.	0		0		0		0		0
Are Housing and other Services performed by TAC base a problem	No		No		No		No		

THE EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT INVOLVED IN SERVICING ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE TACTICAL AIR (TAC A-5 STUDY) Feb 1947

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Number Aircraft Ferried by TAC Personnel

Tab III

	Air Defense Command			Air Materiel Command						Air Transport Command			
	Dec '46	Jan '47	1 Feb to 15 Feb 47	Sep '46	Oct '46	Nov '46	Dec '46	Jan '47	1 Feb to 15 Feb 47	Sep '46	Oct '46	Nov '46	TOT
C-47	10	8				4							22
P-51	3	12	18		2								35
P-61					1								1
B-80						58	25	14	3	6	14		120
A-26		12	5		1	1							19
B-25								2					2
B-17												1	1
C-46			1					2	2				5
C-47					1	7		2				1	11
C-82				1	18	5	7	9	3				43
L-5				1			1	5					7
AT-6										1			1
R-5										1			1
PW-14				8	4				11				23
	13	32	24	10	27	75	33	34	19	8	14	2	291

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THE EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT INVOLVED IN SERVICES ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

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Tab. IV Man Days Spent in Ferrying Aircraft

	Monthly Totals						
	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	1 Feb to 15 Feb	Totals
Planes Ferried	18	41	77	46	66	43	291
Pilot Days expended (7 days per trip)	108	420	637	371	567	357	2455
Engineer & Radio Op. days. (7 days per trip)	14	266	196	98	196	98	868

Tab V. Number Aircraft Ferried - 1 Sept 46 to 15 Feb 47.

by Air Forces

Number Aircraft			
9th AF		12th AF	
Tot	To TAC Bases	Total	To TAC Bases
149	55	142	40

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THE EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT INVOLVED IN SERVICING ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE PRIMARY MISSIONS OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

(TAC A-5 STUDY)
Feb 1947

Tab. VI TAC PERSONNEL ATTENDING SCHOOLS - 30 JANUARY 1947

	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total or Average
*Technical Schools	235	771	1006
**Colleges (Undergraduate Training)	13	0	13
Authorized Command Strength	3137	18,225	21,362
Assigned Command Strength	2747	18,884	21,631
Percent Authorized Strength Assigned	88	103	101
Percent Assigned Strength in Schools	9.03	4.1	4.7

* Personell on Temporary duty who will return to former station.

** Personnel who have been transferred PCS to Air University
Does not include Officers taking Graduate Training.

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THE EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT INVOLVED IN SERVICING ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

(TAC A-5 STUDY)
Feb 1947

TAB. VII MAN DAYS OF EXPENDITURE ON UNRELATED PROJECTS

Type of Activity	Man Days per Day	Percentage of Total
Air Reserve	4	0.3
Ferrying Aircraft	20	1.7
Target Towing For Ground Sch.	48	4.4
Personnel in School	1019	91.0
Miscellaneous Activities	30	2.6
Total Man Days	1121	100.0
Total Man Days Available	21,631	--
Percent of Available Man Days Used	--	5.2

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE
(Troop Carrier)
Greenville, South Carolina

10 July 1946

AFBAF 322 (10 Jul 46)

SUBJECT: Necessity and Justification for Retention of Certain T/O & E Organizations Presently Assigned to Third Air Force (Troop Carrier)

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. The past several months have witnessed considerable controversial discussion regarding the necessity for retaining certain T/O & E organizations presently assigned to the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier).

******

3. This Headquarters is heartily in accord with the above expressed viewpoint and considers its initiation and fulfillment a necessary expedient to sound and efficient operation and in conformity with this policy has experienced the inactivation of the 439th Troop Carrier Group, formerly stationed at Sedalia Army Air Field. In addition, the deactivation of one (1) operational squadron of the 316th Troop Carrier Group has also been accomplished. This has reduced this Group to a "3 Squadron organization" in accordance with the present post-war plan. Inactivation of the above named units has not imposed an operational hardship upon this Headquarters, but has increased the workload of the remaining units to a degree where further loss of any one organization would necessitate an immediate curtailment of present Troop Carrier activities. Since deactivation is supposedly predicted on the inability of an organization to retain 50% of its T/O & E manpower the subsequent information is submitted in an attempt to prevent any further inactivation orders. This summation, of course, should only be considered in the event that the foregoing rule of thumb is still considered as a criterion.

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5. Upon close examination of the Third Air Force manpower chart showing civilian and enlisted strength it may be noted that the Army Air Force Base and Air Service Group units show consolidated personnel

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Ltr to CG, TAC, subj: "Necessity and Justification for Retention of Certain T/O & E Organizations Presently Assigned to Third Air Force (Troop Carrier) (Cont'd)

entries and that in each case their strength exceeds the minimum 50% requirement. In fact their percentages may be considered exceedingly high in view of the 68% at Greenville, 83% at Pope, 58% at Bergstrom, and 89% at Lawson Field. The Base and Service Groups are shown in a consolidated form since their integration into a single operating unit employing one Headquarters was effected some time ago. This action resulted in a saving of personnel which was considered a necessary adjunct to economical operation.

******

11. This indicated helath is also the result of recent impetus experienced in recruiting. The following number of enlistments and reenlistments were accomplished by the Third Air Force and have been retained and integrated with the personnel of this Command:

April	68
May	149
1 June - 21 June	174

Judging from the rate of enlistments, it is felt that the completion of June will witness enlistments and reenlistments in excess of 300. This estimation is offered since actual returns involving the last portion of June have not been received. With the advent of enlisted men's pay raises, enlistments should accelerate tremendously and the mentioned figure is actually considered a conservative one in view of the increased interest displayed by many former enlistees.

******

15. In the event that deactivation of additional units becomes a reality it is desired to point out an attempt to give operational support to the same missions without a reduction in personnel, requiring only the deletion of a T/O & E Group organization which could result in the fulfillment of all assigned missions on a Squadron scale instead of a Group level, would impose a penalty upon enlisted men. Subject enlisted men's promotions and flight pay could not be supported or justified if their employment were protracted to a Squadron level, since their overgrade in T/O strength would strangulate the meager T/O authorizations of a Squadron.

******

PAUL L WILLIAMS
Major General, USA
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General

Tampa, Florida

May 1946

SUBJECT: Cancellation of Scheduled Air Demonstrations.

TO: Commandant, The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

1. The Tactical Air Command is currently being called upon by the various Service Schools to provide aircraft for demonstration purposes in connection with the curriculum of these schools. These requests, usually calling for small numbers of aircraft, have become so numerous and so widely scattered that the entire available strength of the Tactical Air Command is being dissipated in their accomplishment.

2. To perform these demonstrations the Tactical Air Command has at present one fighter group and one light bombardment group, each but partially manned. Both of these units are in the process of regrouping and retraining. To acquire the degree of proficiency necessary to properly perform future demonstrations a certain amount of constructive training as a unit is imperative.

3. The present work load imposed upon these two available groups does not permit any of the aforementioned necessary training or regrouping. Therefore, it is considered mandatory to temporarily cancel the committments of the Tactical Air Command during the period 1 June to 15 August. The following mission requests will be affected by this cancellation:

A cooperation between air and ground in the attack scheduled for 17 June 1946, 22 July 1946, and involving two P-51, two P-47, two P-40, and one B-25 aircraft.

4. The understanding and cooperation of The Armored School in this temporary curtailment is requested. As the staff work and planning for missions for your school will continue, it is believed a more complete and accurate presentation of the proper employment of Air Power will be possible upon resumption of demonstrations in the near future.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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A1 HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND 122-8
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC ltr 122-8 4 June 1946

SUBJECT: Manning of tactical units.

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force.
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force.
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force.
Commanding Officers, All Air Bases and Units assigned directly to this headquarters.

1. The instructions contained in this letter are for the purpose of supplementing those issued by telegram, this headquarters, A1 0275, dated 2 May 1946.

2. The mission of the TAC requires that tactical and service units be maintained at the highest possible level of efficiency. For this reason it is necessary that these units be given first consideration in the assignment of personnel. It is directed, therefore, that base unit commanders, after determining their minimum requirements, transfer immediately to combat and service units all qualified officers and enlisted specialists, over and above their absolute requirements, having MOS's and SSN's required to fill T/O & E shortages. Where personnel with proper MOS's and SSN's are not available, alert and adaptable personnel who are capable of being trained for required MOS's and SSN's in on-the- job training will be made available to meet the T/O & E requirements. At Stations where there are no tactical or service units assigned, this headquarters will take action to transfer personnel who appear to have qualifications for up-grading by a school or on-the- ob training to meet the requirements of tactical and service units.

3. This headquarters is aware fully of the mission and problems of base commanders and their need for personnel, including certain highly qualified specialists. Until such time as personnel are available to meet all of the requirements of this command, however, it will be necessary for base units to operate with the minimum of personnel.

4. In connection with this subject reference is made to paragraphs 6 and 7, letter this headquarters, file TAC 201.36 (13 Apr 46), dated 13 April 1946, subject: "Personnel accounting and personnel records," as the basis for accurately selecting the personnel to be transferred to tactical and service units.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

/t/ WARREN R. CARTER
Brigadier General USA C O P Y
Deputy Commanding General

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Case Report AGF No. 1, Hqt of Observatory Insp, TAAF, Del. - Invitation

1st Ind. 1/Capt-rbn

233.3 (Observatory - Lower AFld, Lewes, Del.)

HQ AF (MAINSC), TOVCS ARMY AIR FORCES and 320th AAF Base Unit (Central), Lower Army Air Field, Lewes, Delaware.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Va.

SO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
Attn: The Air Inspector

A survey of the application in these reports has been made at this station and the recommendation of the Field Air Inspector is concurred in.

ROBERT W. HOWIT
Col, AC
Commanding

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III. Lower Army Air Field

A. Purpose:

1. The visit to Lower Army Air Field was aimed at determining what programs of training were existent and the problems encountered in complying with TAC Regulations governing:

a. AAF Officer's Professional Training Program
b. Supervisory Training for Enlisted Personnel of the Unit
c. On-the-Job-Training
d. Chemical Warfare
e. Instrument Training
f. Physical Training
g. Training Aids

B. Findings:

1. No planned training programs in existence for the accomplishment of requirements as set forth in TAC Regulations. Specific findings were:

a. The base has a total of one hundred and thirty-five (135) enlisted personnel available for duty and three hundred and twelve (312) officers. The overage of officer personnel was being utilized in filling positions normally held by enlisted personnel.

b. No Officers Professional Training Program in existence due to the fact that all officers were needed for full time duty in positions through the base.

c. No on the job training was not being accomplished due to the shortage of enlisted personnel. Available enlisted personnel being utilized in various positions and being reclassified and given proper MOS when the section head feels individual is qualified in carrying out duties as set forth by AAF Manual 35-0-1. Note on the job training was not a set or established program aimed at relieving shortages.

d. A Mr. Bell has recently been assigned to the Civilian Training Section as conference leader and instructor of supervisory training. His duties and responsibilities will include training of civilian personnel before embarking on a program of training enlisted personnel in the supervisory work.

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/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/ (FS)
/Langley Field, Virginia/

TAC 210.49 (18 Sept 46) 18 September 1946

SUBJECT: Inadequate Flying Training.

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force
Greenville Army Air Base
Greenville, South Carolina

1. The rapid demobilization of the AAF following the cessation of hostilities with Japan so upset the balanced team play necessary for efficient flying operations that at one time it become difficult for every pilot to fly as much as four hours a month. This was due chiefly to the rapid release of numbers of maintenance specialists, necessitating vigorous action throughout the AAF to train new personnel. During recent months we have again approached the desirable balance among pilots, maintenance personnel, and available equipment, but as yet we have failed to remain efficient utilization of these basic components to realize the maximum possible training value.

2. While the present maintenance record leaves much to be desired, I am convinced that by proper scheduling of available hours that aircraft are in commission a large increase in flying time of the individual pilot can be accomplished. During the past month the total pilot hours flown by your command continued to decrease, and the average number of hours flown per pilot was only 10. For the same period, the average daily time flown per aircraft was only slightly more than one hour.

3. Experience has shown consistently that the fewer number of hours a pilot flies the more likely he is to have an accident. I consider that a minimum of 20 hours per month should be flown by each pilot to keep his proficiency at its highest level. The only one of your units to achieve this during August is the 97th Troop Carrier Squadron whose record as to hours flown per aircraft is also better than that of any other unit. The records of the 303d and the 313th Base Units are particularly poor.

4. In spite of this your accident rate has remained commendably low. You must lend every effort to keep it low and to eliminate entirely pilot error accidents.

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ltr, TAC 16 Sept 26 (FS), to CG, 3AF; subj: "Inadequate Flying Training". Cont'd.

5. I wish to impress upon you that in no way must you sacrifice the quality of either maintenance or training in order to log a greater number of flying hours. On the contrary, by improving the quality of maintenance and the efficiency of your planning and scheduling you can increase your flying time and, at the same time, increase the individual and unit value derived therefrom.

6. I shall expect you to take action without delay to accomplish throughout your command a revitalization of the training program in effect to achieve the results discussed above.

/t/ H. R. HARMON
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

FSH/WPT/d

Field Office of The
Air Inspector, Hq AAF
Gunter Field, Ala.

333.1

16 October 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of 319th AAF Base Unit, including 75th Troop Carrier Squadron, Lawson Field, Georgia.

TO: Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: The Air Inspector
THRU: Commanding Officer, Lawson Field, Georgia and Command Channels.

I. INSPECTION

1. This inspection was conducted by William P. Thorington, Lt. Colonel, AC, assisted by five (5) officers, Field Office of the Air Inspector, Hq AAF, Gunter Field, Montgomery, Alabama, during the period 7 - 11 October, 1946, under authority of AAF Regulation 20-1.

* * * * *

4. Activity inspected is under the jurisdiction of Third Air Force.

5. The mission of the activity inspected is, as quoted from extract Letter, Headquarters, Third Air Force, dated 30 August 1946, subject: "Assignment of Missions":

"2. The primary mission of all Third AirForce (Troop Carrier) Bases and units will be as follows:

a. Demobilization and Recruitment.

b. The Air Defense of the Continental United States, as may be specified by WD Directives.

c. To utilize units stationed in the United States as a means of training individuals of assigned duties in anticipation of fairly rapid turnover.

d. To participate in joint air-ground training and field exercises with the Army Ground Forces and the Navy.

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Subj: "Rpt of Inspection of 319th AAFBU, including 75th Troop Carrier Sq, Lawson Fld, Ga." dtd 16 Oct 46 (contd)

e. The activation, training and development of various experimental units as may be directed by higher headquarters.

f. Maintaining the capability of rapid expansion and of training combat crews in time of national emergency.

3. The secondary mission of each active base is assigned as follows:

* * * * * *

d. Lawson Field

(1) Station of the 319th AAF Base Unit and the 75th Troop Carrier Squadron of the 316th Troop Carrier Group. Secondary mission will be joint training with the Airborne School and Airborne Center Board, transition to C-82 type aircraft, and the pathfinder school.

(2) Commanding Officer, Lawson Field, will maintain and control the 75th Troop Carrier Squadron of the 316th Troop Carrier Group attached thereat and furnish aircraft and crews for joint training with the Airborne School and accomplishment of the Pathfinder School as directed by this headquarters."

* * * * * *

7. d. The above conditions are caused primarily by the following:

(1) Inexperience of supervisory and maintenance personnel.

(2) Lack of an overall production control for all echelons of aircraft maintenance performed. Base S-4 does not control 1st and 2nd Echelon maintenance or technical order compliance in the 75th Troop Carrier Squadron nor has close liaison on the scheduling of work been effected.

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Subj: "Rpt of Inspection of 319th AAFBU, including 75th Troop Carrier Sq, Lawson Fld, Ga." dtd 16 Oct 46 cont'd

(3) Shortages of qualified aircraft maintenance specialists, particularly Aircraft Sheet Metal Workers.

(4) The number of aircraft (including gliders) on hand is in excess of that required to perform the assigned mission. This condition reduces maintenance efficiency.

* * * * * * *

7. e. Recommendations:

(1) It is recommended that an aggressive scheduled and supervised on-the-job training program for supervisory and maintenance personnel be initiated. Training should include maintenance of AAF Forms 41B, 60A, 60B and 263.

-(2) It is recommended that all echelons of aircraft maintenance be controlled and scheduled by a central agency. This could be effected by placing responsibility for all maintenance with the Base S-4, or by establishing a maintenance liaison section consisting of Base and 75th Troop Carrier Squadron maintenance personnel to coordinate and schedule activities.

(3) It is recommended that additional effort be made to obtain sufficient qualified aircraft maintenance specialists to properly maintain assigned aircraft and to reduce the back-log of maintenance to a reasonable level.

(4) It is recommended that the number of aircraft assigned be reduced to the minimum required for the performance of the assigned mission.

* * * * *

FOR THE FIELD AIR INSPECTOR, HQ AAF:

/s/ William P. Thorington
WILLIAM P. THORINGTON
Lt Colonel, Air Corps
Field Air Inspector

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Basic: Ltr Hq AAF, Fld Off of TAI, Gunter Fld, Ala. dtd 16 Oct 46, subj: Rpt of Insp of 319th AAFBU, incl 75th TC Sq, Lawson Fld, Ga.

LFBCO 3d Ind GTC/HLC/jl

HEADQUARTERS, 319th AAF Base Unit (Base Services), Lawson Field, Ft. Benning, Georgia, 18 November 1946

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina

* * * * *

1. b. Paragraph 8d (3)

The schedule as prepared by The Airborne School, has not always been met by the 75th Troop Carrier Squadron, but adjustments have been made so that The Airborne School has always graduated scheduled classes on time except when weather prevented it. There have been sufficient pilots and aircraft assigned to meet the schedule, but there has not been sufficient maintenance personnel assigned to maintain the airplanes. As a result, maintenance personnel have been spread so thin among assigned airplanes, that maintenance efficiency has been very low. In order to correct this, an analysis of requirements of The Airborne School, necessary flying to maintain proficiency of rated personnel, airplanes required, and maintenance personnel required, has been made and recommendations have been submitted to the Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, to bring the above requirements into proper relationship with each other. It is believed that if these recommendations are accepted, the 75th Troop Carrier Squadron will be able to accomplish the mission assigned.

*

/s/ Gilbert T. Collar
GILBERT T. COLLAR
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

16 December 1946

SUBJECT: Investigation of Technical Order Compliance at Bergstrom Army Air Field, Austin, Texas

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. In accordance with Letter Orders 20576, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, dated 2 December 1946, an informal investigation was conducted at Bergstrom Army Air Field, Austin, Texas, during the period 5-6 December 1946 by Colonel J J Broggan, Lt Col J A Kelly, Captain H I Hiota, Captain J. E. McGill, Lt F A Scott, and M/Sgt [illegible] K Olsen to determine the status of Technical Order compliance on the aircraft assigned to the 311th AAF Base Unit and the 65th Troop Carrier Group.

2. The allegation that a large percentage of the Technical Orders had not been complied with, as indicated by the Statistical Control Report, subject: "Technical Order Compliance," with Reports Control Symbol SAC AAF-SR-1, was true.

3. The investigation covers the period 1 June 1946 to the present time. A cross section of that period will give a fair indication of the present capabilities of the station from a maintenance and supply standpoint, and show any weaknesses of organization and/or individuals in the correctable past. It is felt that the period of demobilization and reorganization of September 1946 through May 1946 should not be considered due to the instability of the AAF during that period.

4. The supply of Technical Order Compliance Kits was considered satisfactory as it was not the limiting factor in the non-compliance. However, instances were found where a long delay in requisiting them had occurred. The system used in building up Technical Order Kits from stock was considered inefficient.

5. The following information was gathered by the officers representing the Personnel Section, this headquarters:

a. Maintenance personnel present for duty at Bergstrom Army Air Field were estimated to be 56% qualified in their MOS.

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3. Assigned strength of maintenance personnel, both civilian and military, was found to be inadequate to perform necessary maintenance on the presently assigned 105 aircraft.

a. A distribution in AGCT grades of enlisted men assigned was normal, and the capacity of the personnel to be trained was good.

4. Assignment of personnel as a whole was good and the utilization of personnel was satisfactory.

5. The Flying Safety Record at Bergstrom Army Air Field for the period 1 June - 1 December 1946 was good. Three accidents occurred, two of which were major and one was minor. The flying accomplished during this interval was about 18,500 hours.

7. The mission being carried out by the 60d Troop Carrier Group appeared to be top heavy with flights transporting supplies and personnel. These for the most part were individual flights.

8. The number of aircraft assigned to Bergstrom Army Air Field was inordinately high being 105 at the time of the investigation. The lowest number assigned was 72 aircraft during the month of August.

9. The Engineering and Supply Sections of all squadrons of the 60d Troop Carrier Group and the Base Administrative Flight Section at Bergstrom Army Air Field were checked to determine if non-receipt of kits and items of supply were interfering with the compliance with Technical Orders.

10. All Technical Orders requiring complete kits and several Technical Orders requiring component parts to be assembled at the station were thoroughly checked to ascertain if proper supply action had been taken at squadron level. The results of this investigation are as follows:

a. Files of Forms 81B were not properly maintained, i.e., the Engineering Technical Order Compliance Crew and the Squadron Technical Supply were both maintaining files of these forms which caused much confusion and made checking difficult. In many cases, action copies from Base Supply were not on hand. Further, in some cases neither Engineering nor Supply could produce copies of requests for kits or component parts.

b. The Technical Order Kit Storage Room of each unit was checked to determine the quantity of kits on hand as against the number

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of aircraft assigned. In many instances complete kits were on hand, although the report to this headquarters had indicated that they had not been received. The quantity of kits on hand if installed on aircraft would have materially reduced the number of Technical Orders awaiting compliance.

c. In checking to determine if sufficient parts had been ordered to assemble kits at squadron level for all aircraft assigned it was found, in many instances, that the quantity ordered was not enough to comply with the Technical Orders on all aircraft assigned even if the parts had all been received from supply.

d. Requisitions were not being filled promptly by SAF supply because of lack of parts.

11. Records and data obtained from the squadrons and Base Flight were taken to the Base Supply for comparison with the Stock Record Card to determine if items requisitioned by units had been ordered from the spot. This check revealed that:

a. Many items had been issued to units but these units failed to correct their paper work accordingly.

b. Approximately 80% of all items ordered had been requisitioned in quantities sufficient to meet needs of the units.

c. In some instances quantities of parts were on hand to meet the needs of the units.

12. The status of Technical Order compliance at Bergstrom Army Air Field is unsatisfactory. In view of TAC letter 171-7, subject: "Failure to Comply with Technical Orders," dated 19 July 1946, very little action was taken. It is estimated that Technical Order compliance requiring 33,063 man hours would be necessary to complete the work. The breakdown of man hours required by type of aircraft is as follows:

a. C-46 aircraft 4,230.5 man hours required

b. C-47 " 19,633.5 " " "

c. C-82 " 174 " " "

d. C-47 " 30 " " "

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During the period January, 630 Technical Orders have been complied with averaging 6.56 man hours. The inception of the C-141 type aircraft to USAF would lighten the load considerably at Forestry Army Air Field. Being an obsolete airplane, such cops on it would be to no avail. However, a check of the Technical Order compliance situation at Forestry Army Air Field against other similarly equipped stations of this Command indicates that this is an average condition.

13. Two squadrons, 4th and 8th, of the Group are now partially equipped with C-47 aircraft. The 4th Squadron has 17 of this type, while the 8th Squadron has 20. These aircraft are being allotted at the rate of 6 per month. The remaining of the aircraft to make up the 40 authorized for squadron are C-46 type and 1 C-47. With the change in type, the maintenance sections would learn the new type aircraft more readily as they were relieved of all C-46 and C-47 type aircraft.

14. The Ninth Air Force verbally instructed Forestry Army Air Field that the 74th Troop Carrier Squadron would be equipped with C-82 type aircraft. This squadron is now being equipped with a C-47 Mobile Training Unit. These aircraft could be given to C-82 squadron if they were relieved of all but 8 C-47s which would be one-half of Table of Organization strength.

15. The operating mission of the 74th Squadron for the equipment of C-82s could not be determined. In this regard it has an ultimate objective the development of Troop Carrier techniques for the C-82 that it may be a well rounded project. If, on the other hand, the use of C-82s is to train pilots and maintenance personnel on this type equipment it would be an inconsistent move. The AAF already has the know how to operate this type aircraft and to train operating personnel in large quantities on relatively short notice.

16. Considering the reductions in the number of assigned aircraft mentioned above, the capabilities of the Group would be lessened in the immediate future. In the long range view the Group would reach good proficiency in a shorter period of time with the new equipment.

17. The Base Commander, Group Commander, and the group engineering officer await that they have been low in complying with Technical Orders. It was their opinion that actual operation established the precedent that they were to accomplish maximum effort in flying consistent with safe operation.

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18. It is the opinion of the investigating officer that this precedent was perpetuated during the Chinese Training Program there during May, June, and July, 1946. Bergstrom Army Air Field wrote a syllabus in which they proposed to train 52 Chinese air crews in 3 months. A second course was to begin at the completion of the first course with the training of an additional 52 Chinese air crews. The final result was that 104 Chinese air crews were trained in one 3 month period. Bergstrom Army Air Field reported that they were required to double their program by the 52d Troop Carrier Wing then stationed at that field. During the month of June, 5084 hours were flown. While it is not definitely established that this amount of flying broke down maintenance, it is conclusive evidence that operations' requirements has had a tendency to over-ride maintenance requirements in the past. Hence, it is the opinion of the investigating officer that there is justification for the attitude of the commander at Bergstrom Army Air Field. It is pointed out that the Flying Safety Record vindicates their judgment.

19. A study was made of the maintenance personnel to determine the quality and quantity of men available. The AGCT Score of the 298 maintenance personnel assigned was tabulated as follows:

a. 130 enlisted men, 43% of total assigned, Grade I & II

b. 77 " " , 22% " " " " III

c. 60 " " 20% " " " " IV & below

d. 31 " " 10% " " " " Unknown

In quality, the enlisted men at Bergstrom are above average. It is further pointed out that the majority of Grade I and II personnel were high ranking NCOs. This provides good key men upon which to build an organization. The majority of the Grade IV men recently joined the organization from the Training Command and were eliminees from school training. The quantity of maintenance personnel assigned to Bergstrom Army Air Field does not compare favorably with the task at hand. A break-down of maintenance personnel, is as follows:

a. Enlisted personnel authorized - 375

b. " " assigned - 298

c. " " present for duty - 208

d. Civilian maintenance personnel - 47

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It is pointed out that these figures are based on 48 aircraft. The consolidated figures show that the field is at 79% of authorized maintenance strength.

20. Since July 1946, the relation of aircraft to enlisted maintenance personnel present for duty is as follows:

a.	July	- 227	enlisted men	-	77	aircraft assigned
b.	August	- 183	" "	-	73	" "
c.	September	- 191	" "	-	84	" "
d.	October	- 266	" "	-	86	" "
e.	November	- 213	" "	-	99	" "
f.	December	- 208	" "	-	105	" "

These figures were taken from the Morning Report at a random day during each month. Aerial engineers on TDY with their aircraft are not shown here. However, this shows a representative number of men available for work at their home station.

21. At present the total number of enlisted personnel assigned is 1073, while the authorization is 2522.

22. An observation of 50% of the maintenance personnel basic records revealed that, on the whole, assignment was good and the utilization of personnel satisfactory.

23. A delay in declaring aircraft excess has been responsible for the large number of aircraft assigned to Bergstrom Army Air Field. Nineteen aircraft were declared excess to their needs in a letter dated 27 September 1946. This letter was indorsed to Tactical Air Command by Ninth Air Force with a date line of 24 November 1946. The indorsement contained several aircraft subsequently declared excess by Bergstrom Army Air Field.

24. It is the understanding of the investigating officer that the reason for Ninth Air Force holding up the correspondence was in anticipation of activating a new Troop Carrier Group. It was planned to hold the aircraft in storage at Bergstrom Army Air Field. While this planning may be justified, it cannot be implemented without working an undue hardship on the storing organization thus impairing its efficiency.

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25. In the opinion of the investigating officers, the ultimate objective of the investigation was to determine the over-all efficiency of the 62d Troop Carrier Group with the view of reestablishing it as an efficient operating organization with a balance between Supply, Maintenance, and Operations in order that it can best accomplish its mission.

26. As a result, instructions were issued on the spot to that end. These instructions consisted of a revision in the system of building Technical Order Compliance Kits from stock by the Air Corps Supply Officer rather than in the individual squadrons. Instructions were issued that no Technical Order compliances would be accomplished on C46D type aircraft until final disposition is determined for this type aircraft. This is an obsolete type aircraft. If it is decided to declare this type surplus to the needs of the Army Air Forces, a large number of man hours would be wasted by completing the Technical Order compliances now unaccomplished.

27. It is concluded that:

a. The Technical Order compliance status at Bergstrom Army Air Field was unsatisfactory.

b. The procurement of Technical Order Kits was satisfactory.

c. The quality of maintenance personnel was satisfactory.

d. The assignment of maintenance personnel was satisfactory.

e. The number of maintenance personnel was inadequate to properly maintain the number of aircraft assigned.

f. The number of aircraft assigned was excessive.

28. It is recommended that:

a. The number of aircraft assigned to the 62d Troop Carrier Group be held to a maximum of 16 per squadron as authorized by the Table of Organization.

b. The 8th Troop Carrier Squadron be relieved of all C-46 and C-47 type aircraft.

c. The 4th Troop Carrier Squadron be relieved of all C-46 and C-47 type aircraft.

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d. The specific mission of the 7th Troop Carrier Squadron be studies by the staff members of this headquarters to determine its employment.

e. This headquarters publish a policy letter stating the relationship to exist between Operations, Supply, and Maintenance in this command.

f. Bergstron Army Air Field be visited in 3 months to determine the progress made in Technical Order compliance.

g. The operational committments be restudies and reestablished to conform with the re-equipped group.

h. More stress be placed on the unit tactical training of the group.

i. The 311th AAF Base Unit be equipped with 5 AT6 type aircraft and 3 C-47s, the latter to be equipped with glider pick-up gear.

j. All C-46D type aircraft at Bergstrom Army Air Field be declared excess to the needs of this command.

k. No technical Order compliances be accomplished on C-46D type aircraft at Bergstrom Army Air Field pending final disposition.

l. No disciplinary action be taken.

s/ Joseph A. Kelly
t/ JOSEPH A KELLY
Lt Col, IGD
Deputy Air Inspector

s/ Jacob J. Brogger
t/ JACOB J BROGGER
Col, AC
Chief, Maintenance
Division
A-4 Section

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington 25, D. C.

333.1

Olpated Field
Middletown, Pa.
31 May 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Supervisory Inspection of the Tower Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware

TO: Commanding Officer, Tower Army Air Field and Command Channels

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Attention: The Air Inspector, Washington 25, D. C.

******

7. Operations and Training.

a. (1) Due to the shortage of aircraft in commission at this base, it is impossible to comply with AAF Regulation 50-2 until such time as more aircraft can be maintained in flyable condition.

(2) Night flying requirements are not being complied with due to the extreme shortage of maintenance personnel. Any night flying attempted would be at a large sacrifice to day flying. It is anticipated that due to the greatly decreased number of pilots in the future, it will be possible to comply with AAF Regulation 50-2.

b. Ground School training program is being pursued at this time to the extent of supervisory training.

c. Requests have been made for link maintenance personnel and link operators. Efforts will be made to secure a quota for sending personnel to link maintenance and link operators schools.

8. Supply and Maintenance.

a. Maintenance.

(1) Adequacy of Aircraft Maintenance Personnel.

(a) The number of maintenance personnel at this base has decreased since the subject inspection. However, approximately the same number of aircraft are still being maintained in service.

(b) The following changes have been made in aircraft assigned this field: Three (3) AT-6D aircraft have been transferred; five (5) UC-78 aircraft have been declared excess to military

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Rpt of Supervisory Insp of the Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware (Cont'd)

requirements and are awaiting disposition; and ten (10) B-17G aircraft have been scheduled for transfer and are now being prepared for transfer. Request for instructions on storage of aircraft not in service was made to Tactical Air Command on 15 May 1946 and reply was received 23 May 1946 stating that all aircraft remaining after scheduled transfers are believed to be required to secure minimum flying requirements.

(c) All Technical Order compliances are being made as soon as possible with available personnel.

(d) One (1) officer is assigned as Maintenance Control Officer to maintain a skeleton office to facilitate reorganization of this office if sufficient personnel are assigned to reactivate this section.

(2) Crash Crew and Fire Fighting.

(a) Insufficient funds are available to the Post Engineer at the present time to construct roadway recommended.

b. Supply.

(1) Salvage Section.

(a) (1) Personnel will be assigned to the Salvage Section as soon as additional personnel are available at this station.

(2) Vehicle transportation has been made available from the base Motor Pool on the call of the Salvage Officer.

(3) Authority to ship aluminum scrap to the Defense Plant Corporation, Greenwich Point, Philadelphia, Pa., was received from Reconstruction Finance Corporation on 21 May 1946. Five (5) carloads were shipped; then equipment broke down causing a stoppage of the shipments. Since that time personnel shortage has prevented loading of this scrap aluminum at the salvage yard on this base as well as unloading the material at the rail head. Invitation to Bid on 300,000 lbs. scrap aircraft aluminum is being sent out by the Purchasing and Contracting Officer of this base on 29 May 1946.

(2) AGCP Section.

(a) AGCP status board is now being maintained

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Rpt of Supervisory Inspection of the Lower Army Air Field, Lover, Pol. (Contd)

and coordination has been established with the maintenance division. Filing of the records of the ACCP section has been corrected.

(3) Surplus Property Section.

(a) Surplus property on hand is being turned over to the Surplus Property Officer for disposition as fast as it is possible to do so with the limited amount of personnel available. All excesses will be shipped to the proper area supply depots when necessary personnel to pack and crate the material is available.

(4) Aircraft Power Plant Storage Section.

(a) A maintenance inspector is now inspecting aircraft engines in storage regularly and is insuring compliance with the provisions of TO 02-1-1.

(5) Stock Record Section.

(a) Stock Record Cards are being posted as rapidly as inventories are completed and proper stock levels are being established.

KENNETH P. POWELL
Col, AC
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS DOVER ARMY AIR FIELD
AND
320TH AAF BU (BASE SERVICES)
DOVER, DELAWARE

452.31 12 June 1946

SUBJECT: Training of Officers for Link Trainer Operators and Mechanics

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Va.

1. In view of the fact that there are no qualified Link Trainer Operators or Maintenance personnel at this base, and previous correspondence with your command on this subject indicates that none are available for assignment to this station, request that a quota of four (4) Officers to attend courses of instruction on Link Trainer Operation and Maintenance be assigned to this station: two (2) Officers to attend the Maintenance Course, and two (2) Officers to attend the Operators Course at the earliest possible date.

2. Link Trainers are being operated without the proper Maintenance in order to comply with Flying Proficiency Regulations, and at the present time, only one (1) out of three (3) trainers are in a satisfactory condition, due to the complete absence of qualified personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Stamped LYMAN R. BLAKE
Captain, Air Corps
Adjutant

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T.W.X. To Col Wallace from HQ? 21 May /6

No. 1

1. TAC has presently assigned 2 TF, ESM 960, Link Trainer Maintenance. Of this number, the following stations have 1 each:

Biggs Fld
Tyndall Fld
Foreatron Fld
Mathard Fld
Stout Fld

2 are assigned to March Field.

2. A requisition for this type personnel sent to Hither by wire a similar situation arose at Lake Charles was returned without action as personnel are presently unavailable in AF.

3. Quotas have been requested for Link Trainer Maintenance School, however, as the course is 17 weeks in length, immediate relief cannot be anticipated from that source.

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(HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)
(Langley Field, Virginia)

20 June 1946

COMMANDING OFFICER
LANGLEY FIELD VIRGINIA

PRIORITY

Scheduled Message

A3B 2020 PD FOLLOWING TWX IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO COLON QUOTE THIS HEADQUARTERS IS APRECIATIVE OF THE TREMENDOUS EFFORTS MADE BY YOU TO HAVE FLYING PERSONNEL OF YOUR COMMAND COMPLY WITH THE FLYING PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED BY AAF REGULATION NUMBER FIFTY DASH TWO PD HOWEVER CWA INFORMATION AVAILABLE INDICATES THAT BY REASON OF THIS TREMENDOUS EFFORT FLYING SAFETY WILL BE JEOPARDIZED DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND FLYING EQUIPMENT TO INSURE ALL RATED PILOTS COMPLYING WITH FIFTY DASH TWO PROVISIONS PD IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CWA FULL COMPLIANCE WITH FIFTY DASH TWO FOR THE FISCAL YEAR OR PORTION THEREOF FOR ONE NINE FOUR SIX IS NOT REPEAT NOT MANDATORY PD ALL RATED PERSONNEL CWA HOWEVER CWA SHOULD CONTINUE CWA WHERE PRACTICABLE AND CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY CWA THEIR PROFICIENCY FLYING FOR PROFESSIONAL REASONS PD MANDATORY COMPLIANCE WITH AAF REGULATION FIFTY DASH TWO WILL BE DURING THE PERIOD FISCAL YEAR ONE NINE FOUR SEVEN PD IT IS DESIRED THAT THE ABOVE BE DISSEMINATED TO ALL YOUR ECHELONS WITHOUT DELAY PD NO PUBLICITY WILL BE GIVEN TO THIS MESSAGE PD UNQUOTE

QUESADA HQ TAC AIR COMD

Stamped WINSTON M. HAYES
1st Lt. Air Corps
Actg Asst Adj Gen

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/HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND/ (FS)
Langley Field, Virginia

TAC 210.49 (18 Sept 46)

SUBJECT: Inadequate Flying Training.

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force
March Field
Riverside, California

* * * * *

3. Experience has shown consistently that the fewer number of hours a pilot flies the more likely he is to have an accident. I consider that a minimum of 20 hours per month should be flown by each pilot to keep his proficiency at its highest level. Although the 12th Reconnaissance Squadron achieved this in August, your other units, tactical and base, fell far short. The August record of hours flown per pilot by the 312th Base Unit was particularly poor, and the 1st Fighter Group averaged scarcely more than half an hour flying time per aircraft per day.

4. I am fully cognizant of the unique difficulties that you face with P-80 type aircraft, and I am aware that participation in air shows has not only cut into your flying time, but has increased markedly the number of major accidents to your aircraft. I am gratified that the frequency of these air shows is rapidly diminishing. This resulting decrease in ordered cross-country flights will enable you to concentrate upon securing for your pilots additional valuable flying training with a view towards increased individual proficiency and elimination of pilot error accidents.

* * * * *

E. R. QUESADA
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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P & R No. 1, to A-3 from INSP 29 August 46, Subj: Quarterly Inspection, Shaw Fld, S. C.

A Quarterly Inspection of Shaw Fld, S.C., will be conducted by this office 9 September 1946. Request any items you desire to be checked be noted below and this correspondence returned to this division not later than 6 September 1946.

******

No. 2, to A-3 from INSP, 17 Sept 46, Subj: Quarterly Inspection, Shaw Fld, S. C.

1. Information requested in Note 2 is submitted:

a. The two night fighter squadrons (41/th and 415th) are doing a very limited amount of training and will not be able to do much training until maintenance, clerical, and flying personnel are assigned. Squadrons have orderly rooms, operations sections, etc., set up and have charts, plans, etc., to begin training as soon as TO/s are filled.

S. H. C.

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F & R

No. 1 from Insp, 7 Feb, to C & C Subj: Inspection Reports

Attached are copies of inspection reports of the 316th AAF Base Unit and 471st Air Service Group, 414th Night Fighter Squadron, and 415th Night Fighter Squadron conducted by Ninth Air Force Air Inspector.

D. A. EYTH
Maj, AC
Asst Air Insp

No. 5 from A-2, 12 Feb 45, to A-4

1. The question of instrument training and sufficient qualified supervisory personnel for training program at Shaw Field has already been taken up with 9th AF Hq. A reply to the letter is forthcoming.

2. On night fighter squadrons, commanders estimate of effectiveness is believed to be quite high due to shortage of trained personnel. This shortage cannot be filled from sources within the command and has been made known to Hq AAF.

J. T. STEVENSON, Col AC
Dept A-2

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT:
1	J.P.T. 11 Pers 23 May 45	A-1	1. Numerous queries with regard to enlisted radar personnel have been received in this section perting to the manning of the 502nd Tactical Control Group and the transfer of personnel to the 47th Tomb Group. The situation insofar as radar maintenance enlisted men is concerned is more than critical. The total personnel assigned is not sufficient to man the organization utilizing such skills to any satisfactory degree. Requisitions to higher headquarters have failed to elicit favorable replies as this shortage is prevelant throughout the AAF. Of the total of approximately 1500 enlisted men authorized in the 502nd Tactical Control Group, only 33 are assigned. Insufficient numbers of properly trained men are assigned to effect an on-the-job training program. 2. It is recommended that attempts be made to recruit civilians skilled in radar maintenance. If this can be accomplished enlisted men in less critical specs but with AGCT's high enough to make them potentially highly skilled personnel will be transferred in limited numbers to the 502nd as students in an extensive on-the-job training program. 3. The training of such enlisted men in technical training schools is the only way in which a proper solution can be reached to this problem. The major difficulty encountered here is that to train personnel in these super specialty skills requires enlisted men with a background in radio maintenance. The radio maintenance personnel are likewise a critical shortage and must also be trained. The total training period involved in both phases of work varies between 6 and 9 months. For future planning it is advisable that action be taken to send as many well qualified basic specialties to school as possible, however, the results of such a program will not be seen for the period mentioned above.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT:
			4. For your information the total white retainable assigned in the following specs is offered:

RIGHT	SSN	EM	ASSIGNMENT
Radar Mech (Maw) 593	6	1-Ledalia OA 100-Not pr Gp PAFT*	
		1-Pope 695 Engr Sq-PAFT	
		2-March-PAFT	
		2-Bergstrom-Not pr Gp TDA	
Radar Mech (Ftr) 607	3	1-209 Biggs	
		1-47 Ftr Gp Lake Charles Ordered In	
		1-544th ASG, Lake Charles	
Radar Tech (Ftg) 053	2	1-47th Gp Cmf (avail for trf)	
		1-36 Ord Ftr Gp, Biggs, TAN	
Radar Tech (Ftr) 055	2	1-March-PAFT	

*Regular Army Non-Transferable

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT:
1	C.A.C. [illegible] 14 May 46	A-1	1. The current status of the 502nd Tactical Control Group from manning standpoint is very unfavorable 44th AF assigned and 1517 authorized. This organization is superseded in priority by the 362nd and 412th Groups. The transfer of enlisted personnel into the 502nd at this time cannot be accomplished in any appreciable number. 2. Of the 47 MOSs authorized in the 502nd, 31 are useable in the 362nd Fighter Group. As a result enlisted men becoming available in these MOSs are transferred to the 362nd because of its high priority. The remaining specialties in the 502nd are radar and other communications specialists who are not present in TAC. Previous requisitions from higher headquarters for this type personnel have failed to produce desirable results. 3. On completion of the manning of the 362nd and 412th, it will be possible to transfer enlisted men in MOSs currently unuseable in the 502nd into that organization for on-the-job training or for use in training schools. However, in view of the highly technical aspect of a tactical control group, training would, in most cases, require attendance at technical schools.

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C O P Y

34[2]

HEADQUARTERS
AIR UNIVERSITY
Maxwell Field, Alabama U/mc/R

330.14 19 September 1946

SUBJECT: Air University Research Project Priorities.

TO : Commanding General
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C. ATTN: Lt. Col J. I. Vanderhoof,
Policy and Review Section,
Requirements Division,
AC/AS-3

1. Apparent discrepancies concerning the effect of Air University Research Project priorities have occurred recently. In that the majority of these projects are directed by Headqusrters, Army Air Forces, and all subject priorities either originate with or are concurred in by your headquarters, it is indicated that this information will be of interest.

2. Working priorities assigned to projects do not secure comparable priorities for the procurement of personnel and equipment to sustain prosecution of the project by the testing agency. The following are examples concerning projects which carry a 1-C priority:

a. AU Project Q-4841 - "Tactical Test of the P-80 Aircraft". Testing agency: 1st Fighter Group, March Field, California.

(1) Several experienced personnel have been lost from the 1st Fighter Group to overseas and to a demonstration unit.

(2) Difficulty has been experienced in obtaining an adequate gunnery range which is needed for thr project.

b. AU Project E-4856 - "Selection of Radar and Communications Equipment for the Air Warning and Control System of a Tactical Air Force". Testing agency: 502nd Tactical Control Group, Biggs Field, Texas.

(1) The 502nd Tactical Control Group has been unable to obtain personnel. As of the first of this month, only five men assigned could be classified as technicians and these were inexperienced. In fact, this group has never had enough personnel for normal administrative and housekeeping duties.

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(2) Request for equipment to be used in the testing has not met with appreciable success. This is relatively unimportant in that the lack of adequate personnel precludes operating same.

c. AU Project Q-4876 - "Development of Doctrine and Techniques for a Tactical Night Striking Unit Employing Light Bombardment Aircraft". Testing agency: 47th Bombardment Group (L), Lake Charles, Lousiana.

(1) The 47th Bomb Group has had over 100% turnover in pilot personnel within the past three months. At the present time there is a surplus of pilots in the group which is due to the replacement of transferred personnel The new pilots are inexperienced in night operation and will require extensive training.

(2) Key personnel other than pilots are being transferred. Of these, proficient Bombardier-Navigators and Radar Operators are significant. The group has only 16 0142s (radarobservers) of a compliment of 48.

(3) Some types of equipment and facilities such as a target comparable to night attack of shipping in the Gulf of Mexico has been difficult to arrange.

3. Concurrently, show projects have not had comparable personnel and material difficulties, although the pertinent priority is often lower. An example is AU Project 4601, "Test Firing Against B-17 Drone", priority 2-A.

4. The proper execution if an Air University Project depends directly upon the successful application of the priority together with the efficient cooperation of all concerned. Although AAF Regulation 20-21 is specific in its reference to responsibility, it is often difficult for project officers to clarify authorities and procedures. Such an obstacle is magnified when priorities of project fail to produce intended results.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ F. E. Lankston
F. E. LANKSTON
Major., A.G.D.
Assistant Adjutant General

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Basic: Ltr, Hq AAF, Office of Field Air Inspector, file 333.1, Subj: Rpt of Inspection of March Fld, Including 1st Ftr Gp and 361st Air Svs Gp, To: CO, March Fld, 4 October 1946

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S-4 (cont'd)

3. Supervisor of Maintenance

a. General

(1) Considerable difficulty is being encountered in obtaining sufficient aircraft parts to properly maintain type aircraft assigned. A survey of requisitions for aircraft parts during March and April reveal the following:

Class	Airplane	Items Requested	Items Filled	Items B.O.	% Items B. O.
OID	C-47	79	47	32	40%
OIM	B-25,AT-6	185	79	106	52%
03	Airplane Accessories	47	19	28	60%
OIM	C-45	78	51	27	34%

(2) Personnel stated that they did not receive pertinent TAC publications within a reasonable period of time through normal base distribution.

b. Base Flight

(1) A spot check of three (3) aircraft and records revealed the following:

(a) B-25J 44-30020

1 Inspection date column on the form 41B was not currently maintained listing hours when routine inspections are due.

2 Red diagonals were being carried on Form 1A for the following:

a. T.O. 01-60G-10B and 01-1282 N.C.W.

b. Heater in-operative.

c. Compass not swung.

d. Blind flying hood missing.

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S-4 (contd)

3 The pilots check list was out of date.

4 Right Engine

a Push rod housing hose connections leaking.

b Bolt loose in bell crank to throttle control at carburetor.

c Kinked hose on oil line from oil tank to propeller feathering pump.

5 No deficiencies were noticed on the left engine.

(b) C 47D 43-16134

1 Red diagonals were being carried on Form 1A for the following:

a Oxygen not serviced.

b T.O.'s 01-40N-69 and 01-40MG-93 N.C.W.

c Pilots check list dated 5 February 1945 and 10 May 1945 were out dated.

d T.O. 01-40NC-1 was missing from Pilots Instruction File.

2 Numerous hose clamps were loose on the hose connections of both engines. (T.O. 04-1-17)

(c) P-51H 44-64397

1 Red diagonal was being carried on Form 1A for the following:

a. Clock missing

b Compass swing overdue

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S-4 (cont'd)

c T.O. 01-60J-59 and 02-55A-20 N.C.W.

d T.O. 01-60JF-1 missing from Pilots Information File.

e "C" file was incomplete (T.O. 01-1-10)

2 Aircraft General

a Seal broken on first aid kit. (T.O. 01-1-117)

b Cover deteriorated on landing gear up indicator switch.

c Actuating cylinder for right wheel well door was leaking hydraulic fluid.

(d) Local Supply Issue: Several aircraft accessory parts in shelfs not tagged. (AAF Regulation 15-60)

c. Maintenance Property Section

(1) This section has 34 M/R accounts to the various technical activities. No physical check or inventory of this equipment has ever been completed. Officer in charge stated he was continually picking up surplus property around the various sections. The following items were picked up.

(a) Five (5) each, Plant Power C-10 electric portable stock number 6200-72900.

(b) Two (2) each Compressors, air portable, 2 stage 5 CFM, motor AC 110J.

(2) It is recommended that a complete physical inventory be completed on all equipment in the maintenance sections.

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S-4 Contd

d. Inspection Section:

(1) Inspection reports on file show that references and recommendations are not being used on listed deficiencies and irregularities.

e. Battery Room:

(1) No "No Smoking" signs were posted. (Section II, par B (20) AAF Manual 38-0-1)

(2) No vapor proof lights or switches were installed. (Section IX, par 11, AAF Manual 38-0-1)

(3) Charging dynamotors are openly installed and operating in battery shop. (Section IX, par 11 AAF Manual 38-0-1)

f. Electrical Shop

(1) Hydraulic spark plug test stand is being used for spark plug testing, but high pressure indicator is malfunctioning, resulting in an inaccurate reading for proper check.

g. Steam Cleaning Section

(1) Steam pressure gauges were inoperative on both Kerrick cleaners. There were requisitioned several times, but replacements have not been received.

h. Hangar #2

(1) One aircraft was on jacks and personnel working on this aircraft. No cribbing or other supports were placed under aircraft. Both doors of hangar were open. (Section 7, par c (15) AAF Manual 38-0-1).

i. Cylinders, Compressed Gas Sections

(1) General conditions of this section was untidy.

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S-4 (contd)

(2) Approximately 30 excess CO^2 life raft bottles and several A-17 fire extinguishers were stored in this section with reparable tags dated in April 1946.

(3) Cylinders were not painted in accordance with instructions in T.O. 08-20-2.

j. Propeller Shop

(1) Four (4) propellers for P-38 type aircraft were stored in Building 433 without being cleaned or being stored properly. (T.O. 01-1-7)

(2) There was no protective covering on two (2) propeller hub assemblies stored outside on propeller dollys. (T.O. 01-1-7)

k. Crash Equipment

(1) Fire truck radio receiver was inoperative on control tower frequency.

l. Flight Motor Pool

(1) The authorized allowance of truck drivers, heavy (MOS 932) is not adequate for the amount of heavy vehicles being operated by this activity.

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST FIGHTER GROUP
March Field, Riverside, California

CO/cvg

6 August 1946

SUBJECT: Safety of Flying.

TO : Commanding Officer
March Field
Riverside, California

1. It is considered that the P-80 aircraft is, in its present condition, unsafe for normal cross country flying under peacetime standards of safety. This conclusion has been reached after careful and prolonged analysis of flying conditions and problems encountered during the series of air shows in which this group has participated in the past few months.

2. Inadequacy of weather reporting service at altitudes where jet aircraft are forced to fly, and lack of radio navigation aids are the primary reasons for this belief. Jet aircraft in their present state of development present a new and considerable more complex problem in aerial navigation over any type of terrain or water than has ever been encountered in the past. Both the speed and altitude operating limits of the P-80 are very inflexible if effective cruising range is to be realized. The problems involved may be enumerated in logical sequence as follows:

a. High fuel consumption at low altitudes forces operation at higher altitudes in order to have sufficient range to cruise from one suitable field to another.

b. At 30,000 to 40,000 feet, most economical cruising altitude for P-80 type aircraft, it is most difficult to navigate by pilotage and mapped terrain if the visibility is less than 25 miles.

c. Weather forecasting on thunderstorm and frontal activity above 20,000 feet is extremely inaccurate and optimistic, and wind data above 20,000 feet is practically non-existent. Such conditions make dead-reckoning largely a matter of guesswork in as much as wind velocities and directions habitually change to a great degree at higher altitudes.

d. There are no suitable radio aids in the P-80. The RC-120G beam receiver is weak and low-powered, and frequently will not function at all. It is particularly susceptable to all electrical disturbances, and in bad weather will not function at all. It always picks up considerable generator noise at high altitudes. On the other hand the VHF radio set in the P-80 is probably the best aircraft radio installation yet made, but it is useless, for navigation without homing or VHF beam installations on the ground.

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3. A flight of eight P-80 Aircraft to Scott Field, Ill. and return for an Air Forces Day demonstration exemplifies the facts brought out above. Subject flight, a part of the 27th Fighter Squadron, was under the command of Captain Gaston W. Hensley, a very capable flight leader.

a. Capt. Hensley reports that on his initial hop from March Field to Ft. Worth, Texas the weather was good and no navigational troubles were encountered. One aircraft was left at Tucson, Ariz. account minor maintenance trouble, and of the seven remaining, only one radio beam set would pick up stations at a sufficient distance to be of any value.

b. From Ft. Worth to Scott Field, Ill., Weather Service reported light cumulus clouds with visibility over ten miles. The visibility at Scott Field upon arrival in that vicinity was estimated as five miles, and Capt. Hensley had trouble finding the field. Upon reaching the Mississippi River, he split his flight up and sent one section north and one south to make radio strength tests. The flight proceeding north was reported by St. Louis radio as giving radio signals of increasing strength, so both flights proceeded north and reached Scott Field without further incident.

c. At Scott Field, Capt. Hensley's flight was split up for demonstration tours by order of the Demonstration Commander, Col. A.L. Harvey. He objected to several plans on the grounds of insufficient fuel, and finally agreed to send one flight on a tour to Detroit, and another to Dayton, Ohio. These tours were not a part of his original instructions before leaving March Field, so Capt. Hensley requested these orders in writing. Copies are attached.

d. Flights to Dayton and Detroit were uneventful.

e. On return trip to March Field, Lt. John Hancock, leader of the Dayton Flight of two aircraft encountered considerable weather difficulty between Topeka, Kansas and Denver, Colorado. He was alone on this trip, having left his wingman at Lattersom Field for Airplane Sheet Metal work. The Weather Service forecast conditions above CFR minimums with light, scattered thunderstorms in the vicinity of Denver. After passing Goodland, Kansas, Lt. Hancock encountered a solid line of thunderstorms with tops between 40,000 and 50,000 feet. His nearest suitable field was Denver, so he elected to go through the thunderstorms just above the roll cloud at about 10,000 feet. He had no radio range contacts, and weather was so rough he dropped his tip tanks.

f. Lt Hancock cleared Denver for March Field on a CFR flight plan with a weather forecast of broken altocumulus cloud conditions. No wind data was available anywhere on this route at altitudes above 14,000 feet. For the first 400 miles of this hop, the weather was as predicted,

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and Lt. Hancock kept careful check of his speed and compass headings for further dead reckoning. Approximately 400 miles out of Denver, he again encountered a solid mass of thunderstorms, but this time was able to pick out saddlebacks to go through. He remained on top of solid cloud layers and thunderstorms for about an hour, during which time the canopy was completely frosted over. After two hours and fifteen minutes of flight he descended from 35,000 to 25,000 feet and was then able to get some of the canopy ice off. At this point he was contact, but lost. He could contact no radio stations, so proceeded west. Visibility was excellent, and he hoped to pick up the Pacific Ocean. In approximately fifteen more minutes he saw Mono Lake, and simultaneously contacted McClelland Field for a VHF homing and proceeded contact toward Stockton. McClelland Radio reported it would endeavor to get a homing and advised Lt. Hancock to stand by for fifteen minutes while so doing. Lt. Hancock proceeded via Stockton to McClelland Field and landed, and about the time he reached the traffic pattern was contacted by Fairfield Radio and advised that they were unable to help him with a homing, further advising that he contact Los Angeles for same. This flight demonstrates very graphically what can happen in uncharted winds without radio or visual contact; Mono Lake is approximately 250 miles off the direct course from Denver to March Field, and Lt. Hancock held the same compass heading that had kept him on course for the first 400 miles of contact flight.

4. It is recommended that:

a. Our Weather Service be revised to include accurate forecasting and radiosonde wind observations to altitudes of 40,000 feet at all principal weather reporting and forecasting stations in the continental United States.

b. That a comprehensive weather interpretation and instrument Flying School be established at March Field for all pilots.

c. That radio navigational aids be installed on all P-80 Aircraft retroactively. Order of preference for these aids is as follows:

(1) VHF homing equipment in the airplane for use with VHF ground stations. The AN/ARA-8 adapter to the normal VHF communications set is quite satisfactory, and the airborne eqipment weighs less than twenty five pounds.

(2) Ground controlled VHF homing equipment at all principal AAF fields.

(3) MF Automatic radio compass.

A continuous effort has been made by this Group to obtain some type of radio navigational equipment, and approximately two months ago notification was recieved from Wright Field that installations of

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radio compasses would be made to include retroactive installations on present aircraft. This has been done to date only in the P-80 types being received by the 12th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron.

d. That until suitable radio navigational aids are effected, P-80 flying in the 1st Fighter Group be restricted to within 500 miles of March Field.

/s/ P. K. HOLLOWAY
P. K. HOLLOWAY
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

1 Incl.
412th Opns Pr #8
(Flt Orders)

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BASIC: Ltr, Hq 1st Fighter Group, March Field, 6 August 46, subject: "Safety of Flying".

1st Ind. MFCO-2

HEADQUARTERS, March Field, Riverside, California, 14 August 1946.

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, March Field, California.

1. Concur in paragraphs 4 a, 4 b, and 4c (2), basic letter.

2. The employment of this transitional type aircraft has not presented any new operational problem. It has, however, accentuated the old ones. Due to the inherent design of fighter aircraft, fighter pilots have been, and will be, faced with the inexorable requirements of accurate navigation. This fundamental requirement should not be compromised by the installation of heavy navigational equipment. Installation of additional technical equipment of dubious combat value must be carefully reviewed in view of the additional maintenance personnel required and consequent reduction in mobility.

3. It is recommended that:

a. Navigational training with minimum aids for subject pilots be emphasized and that cross-country flights be stringently supervised until desired standards are met.

b. Immediate action be taken to implement our continental VHF radio system. It is essential that the existing VHF installation in P-80 aircraft be complemented by its proper VHF ground system.

/s/ L.I. KOONTZ
L.I.KOONTZ
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

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C O P Y

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General

AGA

Tampa, Florida
5 April 1946

TAC 452.1 (5 Apr 46)

SUBJECT: Extension of loan of AT-6 aircraft from AAFTC.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to mutual agreement by t is headquarters with Army Air Forces Training Command on the transfer of the jurisdiction of Tyndall Field, Panama City, Florida, copy attached.

2. In the above mentioned agreement, thirteen (13) AT-6 aircraft were loaned this command for sixty-day period which will expire 30 April 1946. It is requested that this loan be extended until such time as the number of 202 pilots presently assigned the pilot depot at Tyndall Field is reduced appreciably, but not to exceed sixty days.

3. This extension is urgently needed for the following reasons:

a. Most of the pilots in this depot have had little, if any, training in combat type aircraft since recently graduating from advanced flying school. Thus, AT-6 types aircraft are deemed most suited to meeting minimum flying time requirements.

b. The bulk of AT-6 aircraft assigned to this command are being utilized for instrument training in the Ninth Air Force, and it is planned to assign any additional AT-6 aircraft that become available in the future, to that command.

c. The 13 AT-6 aircraft presently assigned to Tyndall Field from this command will not be sufficient for meeting minimum flying requirements when and if the Training Command aircraft are no longer available.

4. In view of the above, it is requested that the extension of time be given favorable consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ Clarence N. Keen
CLARENCE N. KEEN
Maj., Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS 47/ej
412th Fighter Group (J-80 Jet)
March Field, Riverside, California

452.1 (J-80 Jet) 7 June 1946

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities

TO: Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field, Riverside, California

1. In accordance with verbal request of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, the following information is submitted for the week ending 4 June 1946.

****

a. Summary of interesting problems of operations and maintenance.

(1) 28 of the 30 airplanes of Project "Comet" completed the trip on schedule. A wing from a salvage airplane is being flown to Scott Field as a replacement wing for the 30th P-80 that was forced down by weather at Cape Girardeau.

a. Considerable benfits have been derived from maintenance problems encountered during project "Comet". Air hoses are being utilized to dry out fuel filler wells during and after inclement weather prior to servicing fuel to preclude the possibility of water in the fuel system. A TR has been submitted on this problem with a sound recommendation to eliminate troubles encountered. Three engines have been replaced to date because of fuel nozzle collapse due to water in the fuel system.

****

c. Two of the chief maintenance difficulties encountered on project "Comet" were: (1) inadequate aerial transportation for ground crews and (2) the lack of enough spare parts. Parts in question were not available prior to take-off at March Field.

d. The basic difficulty with the C-82 type ships lies in wide margin between the cruising speeds of the C-82 and the P-80 being served. It is to be emphasized that the ideal situation is to have the fastest transportation available for the maintenance personnel and supplies in order that there be a minimum of lost time. The primary accomplishment and efficiency

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Basic: Ltr Hq 422d Ftr Gp, subj: Mthly Rpt of A-80 Activities 452.1 (A-80), dtd 4 June 1946.

of maintenance dictates that the crew be available as soon as possible after the P-80 has completed its mission and landed. From experience gained on project "Comet", it was proved that it is absolutly necessary for the success of the mission that the maintenance section be in two teams, one team to go ahead and prepare the maintenance facilities and the second team to pick up all equipment such as wheel chocks, etc., and leave immediately after the P-80's have taken off. With slow transports and a fast moving schedule for P-80's, the number of man hours available for maintenance is greatly hampered and becomes critical in cases of major trouble. This is considered a major problem to overcome, and as a result of study of this and other problems encountered, the following is submitted: (Recommendations are based on the requirements of 25 P-80 aircraft).

(1) Two C-82 type transports for personnel and supply.

(2) One C-47 for standby emergency and to act as a pick-up for any major maintenance that would require an airplane to drop behind.

e. The advantage of the C-82 type transport are outstanding when considered in the light of the difficulties encountered on project "Comet". First, it has a high cruising speed. This one point alone would save a large number of man hours as can be calculated against the slower types of cargo ships. This advantage can be converted by fewer personnel required for maintenance and another big factor is morale and comfort gained by less hours of tiring travel.

f. There would be fewer aircraft required for transport with a saving in maintenance and no advantage is to be gained by smaller transports, as a C-82 can get into and take-off on any field that a P-80 type aircraft can land and take-off on under normal conditions. Another advantage would be that with the capacity of a C-82, it is possible to have the Tech Supply on the same ship as the crew chief. This gives the advantage of parts being more quickly available to the crew and adds to the efficiency of maintenance. The C-82 has internal load ramp. This alone is a very important factor as the loading and unloading of heavy equipment, particularly engines, proved to be a big problem and consumed a large number of man hours on the project "Comet".

g. A high speed transport would cut down the span of time between the advanced team and the take-off of the P-80's and also

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Basic: Ltr Hq 412th Ftr Gp, Subj: Wkly Rpt of P-80 Activities 452.1 (P-80), dtd 7 June 1946.

cut the time between the arrival of the P-80's and the crew chiefs of the second team. As can be easily seen, this loss of time, becomes serious when the schedule between stops for the P-80's is close and requires the maximum effort of every one concerned to overcome. On project "Comet" this was only accomplished by working night and day.

(2) A meeting was called by General Taylor on 20 May 1946. Due to the results of a letter written by this headquarters on the unsatisfactory supply problems concerning P-80 aircraft. Representatives from San Bernardino AMC, Base Supply personnel, and 412th Fighter Group Supply personnel were present at this meeting. Considerable confusion seems to exist between San Bernardino and Base Supply as to just what supplies are available for P-80 aircraft in the various specialized depots. 1st Indorsement dated 9 May 1946 from AMC, Wright Field, to Ltr from TAC dtd 26 April 1946, states that production of spare parts for the P-80 is ahead of schedule and that sufficient spare parts are available in specialized depots. This statement was read at the meeting from above mentioned letters and subsequent indorsement. Supply personnel from San Bernardino seem to indicate that the above is not altogether true inasmuch as their requisitions have been returned in many cases stating items not procurable. It is believed that further investigation should be made concerning the procurement of P-80 spare parts, especially checking the latest revised Supply Table 11, determining if sufficient parts have been procured to fill the revised Table 11. This headquarters feels that further and more detailed study should be conducted on the supply problems. It is inconcievable to understand why Headquarters AMC states in their 1st Indorsement to ltr from Hq, TAC sufficient parts are available and the local supply agencies are not able to obtain the necessary parts. If this unsatisfactory supply condition is not corrected immediately, this group cannot accomplish its presently assigned mission of normal transition training, not to mention participation in the forthcoming training maneuvers scheduled in the near future.

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HEADQUARTERS
412th Fighter Group (P-80 JET)
March Field, Riverside, California

AT/er

452.1 (P-80)

21 June 1946

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities

TO: Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field, Riverside, California

1. In accordance with verbal request of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, the following information is submitted for the week ending 17 June 1946.

****

h. Summary of interesting problems of operations and maintenance.

(1) One pilot while on a cross-country flight lowered his flaps for landing and immediately noticed a tendency for the aircraft to roll. By using full opposite ailron trim this condition was sufficiently corrected to allow the pilot to make a normal landing. It was discovered after landing that the left flap actuating rod was broken and therefore only the right flap had extended. The pilot states that the aircraft is perfectly manageable in this condition.

(2) The ground and aerial gunnery program is progressing quite well in spite of the difficulty being encountered by using a relatively low mussel velocity .50 cal. machine gun in a relatively high speed aircraft.

(a) Too much controversary exists over the proper type of patterns, speeds, angles, and techniques to be used for aerial and ground gunnery, skip and dive bombing to include any of this information in this report. However, pilots of this organization all agree that the P-80 is an excellent gun platform and everything possible is being done to develope techniques that will employ the present inadequate armament in the most advantageous manner.

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Basic Ltr: Hqs AAFSAT Wtr Gp, Subj: Wkly Rpt [illegible] Activities, dtd 21 Jun 46.

(6) The supply situation as regard to P-80 replacement parts is steadily growing worse instead of getting better as has been promised by all higher echelons of supply. The AOG list has increased from thirty-one (31) as of last weeks report to thirty-nine (39) for this weeks report. AMC's representative promised special air shipment to get up stock levels but if this has been organized as promised, this organization has not realized any benefit as is indicated by the growing AOG list. This organization cannot begin to realize the accomplishment of its assigned mission with the present supply status and in view of information reaching this Headquarters, that the production of spare parts is ahead of schedule and that sufficient spare parts are available at specialized depots. (Reference TAC letter 452.1 dated 26 April, 1946, subject: Supply and Maintenance P-80 Jet Airplane and 1st Ind, AMC, dated 9 1946). No plausible reason exists for the AOG condition suffered by this organization.

(7) With many of our P-80 aircraft approaching the 100 hour flying time mark considerably more sheet metal repair is becoming apparent. Screws holding lower leading edge wing fillets are pulling through the skin and evidence of distortion and sheared rivets is apparent at fuselage station 163.6. As an example of stresses imposed on aircraft during flight missions, on 10 June 1946 a pilot while on a transition flight encountered extreme turbulent air while descending from high altitude at approximately 450 MPH indicated air speed and aircraft was subjected to extreme buffeting and stress. Investigation disclosed that approximately ten (10) rivets were pulled at fuselage station 163.6, both sides with extreme distortion and pulled rivets at station 190.5 both sides. Leading edge wing fillets, both upper and lower, on each wing were distorted and torn with approximately eight (8) rivets pulled through the skin on lower wing fillet each side. Left horizontal stabilizer on elevator were buckled and warped requiring replacement.

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Basic Ltr: Hqs 174th Ftr Gp, Subj: Wkly Rpt P-80 Activities,

(c) The majority of engine changes encountered recently have been due to cracks in the ring (burners) assembly. Some of the failures occur in existing weld while the minority occur on the burners where no weld exists. These failures are probably accelerated by high atmospheric temperatures with high attendant tail pipe temperatures.

4. Recommendations for corrective action.

None.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ JOHN S. GARRITT

/t/ JOHN S. GARRITT
1st Lt., Air Corps
Asst Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST FIGHTER GROUP
March Field, Riverside, California

AT/aj

452.1 (P-80)

22 August 1946

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities

TO : Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field, Riverside, California

1. In accordance with verbal request of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, the following information is submitted for the week ending 20 August 1946.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

* * * * * * * * * * * *

SECTION II - MAINTENANCE

a. 30% of aircraft in commission for the period.

(1) 11 aircraft AOCP for parts (See Incl #1)

b. Summary of interesting problems of maintenance:

(1) A telegraphic Unsatisfactory Report was sent 16 August 1946 to the Commanding General, Air Material Command on the continued receipt of improper screws from the supply agency. Variation in the head diameters and truncation prevents use in the repair of P-80 aircraft in accordance with Technical Order 01-75FJA-2. A continuation of the supply problem will necessitate the grounding of P-80 aircraft.

(2) A teletype directing the grounding of all aircraft equipped with J-33-17 engines until governors are reworked effected only one engine in the three tactical squadrons of this group.

(3) A teletype directing inspection for fuel leaks at air adapter fuel intake elbows on engines in P-80 aircraft has been complied with and a negative report submitted as required.

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Basic: Hqs 1st Ftr Gp Subj: Wkly P-80 Activities Rpt dtd 20 Aug 46.

(4) In accordance with information received from Hq TAC, aircraft losses will be immediately replaced. Loss of seven aircraft in the 71st Fighter Squadron is in the process of repletion by the receipt of new aircraft.

(5) Difficulty is being experienced with the cocking lever of the S-1 bomb rack. Cocking levers bend and twist after a few cocking procedures and this necessitates a bomb rack change. Two UR's have been submitted on this condition.

(6) Two new P-80 aircraft were received from the contractor's plant this week, AAF Serial Numbers 44-85334 and 85336. Time on the aircraft was six hours and three hours respectively upon landing at March Field. Numerous discrepancies were noted on each aircraft including faulty riveting, wrinkles in skin over air ducts, etc. This can only be attributed to sub-standard workmanship and lax inspections at the contractor's plant. UR Forms No. 54 are being submitted by the 27th and 71st Fighter Squadron on these aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

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OFFICE OF THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
12TH RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON PHOTO (VLR)
March Field, California

28 August 1946

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities.

TO : Commanding Officer, March Field, California.

1. In compliance with VOCG TAC the following information in connection with P-80 activities of this squadron is submitted:

a. Twenty-six (26) P-80 type aircraft on hand.

b. Percentage of aircraft in commission is 30%.
(1) AOCF - Engine - No Aircraft.
(2) AOCP - Parts - Three aircraft.

c. Transition and Navigation.

d. Twenty-four (24) pilots checked out.

e. None.

f. Twenty-one (21) Hours.

g. None.

h. This organization is now partially equipped with aerial cameras and has been endeavering to fulfill its primary mission. This is greatly hampered, and often becomes impossible, due to severe and total canopy icing encountered at high altitudes--30,000 feet and above.

It is possible to maintain clear vision through the windshield and the right and left windshield side panels by using the pressurization system. But in flying mapping or mosaic missions it is absolutely necessary to maintain at least a 180 degree area of unrestricted vision forward and to the sides of the canopy.

It is felt that a possible solution of this difficulty would be the installation of two flexible hoses, at least two inches in diameter, mounted above and to the rear of the pilot's seat, directing a blast of air upward and forward against the inside canopy surface. This source of air could be derived from the compressor section of the unit and would also due to the increased volume of air, greatly aid in levels; in addition to its primary purpose of deicing the canopy.

i. Excessive icing inside of canopy at 35,000 feet was encountered in P-80 44-85383 even though cabin pressurization lever was in

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open position. This icing prevented pilot from properly flying a photographic mission where all around visibility is imperative.

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST FIGHTER GROUP
March Field, Riverside, California

452.1 (P-80) 30 August 1946

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities.

TO: Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field, Riverside, California

1. In accordance with verbal request of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, the following information is submitted for the week ending 27 August 1946.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

SECTION II - MAINTENANCE

a. 33⅓ of aircraft in commission for the period.

(1) 3 aircraft AOCP for parts (See Incl #1)

b. Summary of interesting problems of maintenance:

(1) Two anti-aircraft searchlight instructors from Fort Macarthur, California have been placed on temporary duty with this group for the purpose of orienting operators in the operation, care and for use in homing and landing P-80 aircraft in emergencies. A school is being conducted for a period of five days.

(2) This paragraph is in reference to airspeed calibration troulbe has been encountered with airspeed indications on P-80 aircraft due to leakage at the quick disconnect in the pressure line from the pilot head. The quick disconnect facilitates removal of the aft section. A permanent fix for this condition is replacement of the disconnect assembly with a Standard AN$_{4}$" flexible hose. This installation is being made as failures occure. Installation of the hose assembly adds approximately five minutes to disassembly and assembly time of aft section to mid section.

(3) Considerable trouble has been encountered with cracks in the ring assembly (burners) on J-33 series. The majority of the cracks occur adjacent to the front turbin flange. In some instances engines removed because of this type of failure and sent to SEAMC for .TH have been received marked serviceable without the cracks being welded or ring assembly replacement. In some instances it is difficult

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BASIC: Hqs 1st Ftr Gp Subj: Wkly Rpt of P-80 Activities dtd 30 Aug 46

to ascertain or differentiate between a circumferential crack, weld bead or flux mark, particularly when the area under inspection is beneath the flange ring. In general all longitudnal cracks and circumferential cracks over 1/8" in length are just cause for removal of the engine. Where any doubt exists as to the validity of a crack, it is inspected after every five hours of operation.

(4) Two additional air duct vane failures on P-80 aircraft Serials 44-85094 and 85090 similiar to failures reported for the week ending 13 August 1946 have occured. These failures are being submitted on AAF Form 54 to the Commanding General, AMC. The last two previous occurances were reported as Station Serial No. 46-868 and 46-869. Attached photos with this report are garphic illustrations of what actually occurs. This type of failure has been reported repeatedly without any permanent remedy or fix resulting. It is believed that proper modification requires removal of the air duct assembly to accomplish and should be done at an area AMC depot on all P-80 aircraft now assigned to service activities.

(5) Inspection of engine Serial No. A-071302 from airplane Serial No. 44-85040 which crashed 26 August 1946, discloses no definite reason for power failure. This is due to the fact that impact damage to engine was so severe, will all components of fuel system broken off the accessory housing with the exception of the throttle assembly that accurate or difinite analysis is impossible. Turbine wheel and shafe were intact and shaft bearings were O.K. aft of the accessory section, which was badly smashed.

(6) In compliance with March Field TWX MAFMFS-3-1-0392 dated 26 August 1946, two aircraft are now grounded for shakedown inspection prior to being flown to Patterson Field for period of fifteen days for the purpose of undergoing inspection by AMC engineers to determine whether P-80 type aircraft will require DIR at 100 hours.

Depot inspection and repair for P-80 aircraft after approximately 100 hours operational time was originally proposed by this activity and was the subject of a communication forwarded to higher headquarters on 7 August 1946. The necessity for this proposal has become increasingly apparent throughout the last four months. An itemized inspection list was incorporated in the basic communication and is also being forwarded with the two aircraft concerned to Patterson Field.

The AMC Liaison Officer at this base has made a thorough study of the need for this DIR and recommended concurrence with basic proposal to the Commanding General AMC at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio.

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BASIC: Hqs 1st Ftr Gp Subj: Wkly Rpt of P-80 Activities dtd 30 Aug 46.

It is anticipated that when this project is authorized and operating that the percentage in commission of aircraft assigned will be considerable higher and that condition of aircraft will be better. It is recommended that aircraft be routed to the depot for DIM in increments of five or six until such time as inspection has been accomplished on all aircraft assigned. It is believed considerable value to AAC activities will accrue from this proposal inasmuch as fourth echelon experience is practically non-existant to date.

Major problem of initial inspection will be removal of paint. This is a more difficult job than removal of camouflage paint on conventional aircraft has been. P-80 series aircraft now being produced by Lockheed do not have painted exterior surfaces.

* *

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ James C. Brown
JAMES C. BROWN
Major, Air Corps,
Adjutant.

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST FIGHTER GROUP
March Field, Riverside, California

452.1 (P-80) 6 September 1946

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities

TO: Commanding General
Twelfth Air Force
March Field, Riverside, California

1. In accordance with verbal request of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, the following information is submitted for the week ending 3 September 1946.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

* * * *

SECTION II - MAINTENANCE

a. 53% of aircraft in commission for the period.

(1) Circumstances surrounding aircraft out of commission for other than normal maintenance problems, i. e., grounding for modification changes as of 2 September 1946.

(a) 1 airplane AOCP for parts (see Incl #1.)

b. Summary of interesting problems of maintenance:

(1) Action on Technical Order 01-75FJA-12 was instigated immediately after receipt on 3 September 1946. P-80 aircraft assigned with the new type combination relief and unloading valve on the emergency fuel system were immediately grounded for compliance. This activity has three (3) aircraft assigned necessitating compliance. No trouble has been encountered with installation of Technical Order compliance kit.

(2) Eight P-80 aircraft assigned to this activity are at other stations as the results of accidents or materiel failures. In some instances, aircraft have been static with no attempt made on the part of Base Commanders to repair and return to service or disposal for salvage. From the standpoint of this activity, the undesirable feature is that accountability for the aircraft concerned rests here. Result is, that these aircraft, although assigned, are of no materiel benefit to the organization. Aside from the fact that those airplanes destined for salvage could furnish sorely needed spare parts, this situation, in some instances is a direct violation of AAF Regulation 65-22.

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Basic: Hq 1st Ftr Gp 6 Sept 46, Subj: Wkly Rpt of P-80 Activities

(s) It is strongly recommended that higher headquarters take immediate action to alleviate this situation. It is believed that this subject pertains to other types of aircraft also. It is further recommended that this matter be made a special subject for Air Inspectors. * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ James C. Brown
/t/ JAMES C. BROWN
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant

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12TH RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON PHOTO (JET)
March Field, California

11 September 1946

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of P-80 Activities.

TO: Commanding Officer, March Field, California.

1. In compliance with VOCG TAC the following information in connection with P-80 activities of this squadron is submitted:

a. Thirty-five (35) P-80 type aircraft on hand.

b. Percentage of aircraft in commission is 20%.
(1) AOCP - Engine - No Aircraft.
(2) AOCP - Parts - Nine Aircraft.

* *

h. Maintenance of aircraft, lack of Phillips type screwdriver is severly hampering maintenance on P-80 aircraft. Crew chief kit and other maintenance kits contain Truncated or Reed and Prince type screwdrivers. T. O. 01-75FJA-2 states that only Phillips head screws and screwdrivers will be used on P-80 aircraft. An unsatisfactory report form #54 has been submitted.

i. No Comment.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ F. E. Kelly
F. E. KELLY
1st Lt., Air Corps
Adjutant

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C O P Y 538

BASIC: Weekly Rpt of P-80 Activities, dtd 29 November 46.

452.1 1st Ind 12AF-G

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE, March Field, California. 6 December 1946

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

1. During the period of this report the First Fighter Group was on maneuvers stationed at El Centro. It is interesting to note that even though extensive flying was done, the Group kept 61% of its aircraft in commission. 407 sorties were flown (718:57 total time) with only fourteen aborts.

2. Reference Section 1, par. b., basic communication. The operational problems peculiar to the P-80 type aircraft referred to in the last sentence of the paragraph mentioned above are as follows:

a. Fuel, altitude, time and distance relationship had to be carefully computed in order to accomplish the missions assigned the First Fighter Group during the maneuver period.

b. Ground handling of the P-80's warranted special planning to take care of two main problems. The first problem was that of parking with the primary consideration being the hot blast of air from the tail pipe. The second problem consisted of getting the planes airborne as quickly as possible after they were started in order to conserve fuel. (El Centro Field has two parallel runways and this helped immeasureably)

c. In planning the P-80 flights special attention had to be given the landing traffic problem to see that large groups of planes did not bunch up and all land at the same time. (The two parallel runways at El Centro helped this condition.)

d. The problem of refueling necessitated much planning and coordination inasmuch as the P-80 consumes large quantities of fuel and is very slow to fuel.

3. Reference Section 11, par 2.d., basic communication. Unsatisfactory Reports have been submitted on all engine failures to date. Chief of Maintenance, SBAMA was requested to investigate oil leakage and bearing failures of the J-33 engines, now undergoing overhaul at SBAMA. Service activities will be notified as soon as the cause of the failures have been determined by SBAMA personnel.

4. Reference "Armament" Section par 2, basic communication. A letter is being prepared at this headquarters with four (4) UR inclosures describing the present installation of Armament Equipment

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BASIC: Weekly Rpt of P-80 Activities, dtd 29 Nov 46.

with recommendations that an enlarged ballast box be installed 35" forward from reference datum point. The maximum capacity of this box to be 250 lbs. The Armament Officer and the Officer for weights and balances concurred that the installation of a ballast box as described above would obtain desired center of gravity.

5. Reference "Armament" Section, par 3, basic communication. The NCO appointed is in addition to the squadron Weights and Balance Officer and as such does not relieve the Weights and Balance Officer of his duties and responsibilities, but merely assists him in carrying out his work.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ W. F. Uhlman, lll
/t/ W. F. UHLMAN, lll
Captain, Air Corps
Actg Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD AIR FORCE
Greenville, South Carolina

CC

2 July 1946

AF3AF 452.1 (2 July 46)

SUBJECT: Comments and Recommendations on C-82 Aircraft.

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. After five (5) months of operation of the C-82, most of them being used for transition purposes, there are submitted herewith compilation of comments and recommendations furnished by A-3 and Aircraft Engineering Sections of this Headquarters.

2. It is recommended that this report, after being evaluated by your Headquarters, be forwarded through Army Air Forces for the Materiel Command, to be used in the future improvement and development program now contemplated for C-82 aircraft.

/s/ Paul L. Williams
PAUL L. WILLIAMS
Major General, U. S. A.
Commanding

TAC 452.1 (2 July 47) Cargo 1st Ind. 22 July 46 (A4B)

1q Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia

TMMO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio

Noted and forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

HENRY W. SPILLER
Major, Air Corps
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: C-82 Disadvantages
1	A4E 14 Oct46 J.J.E. Chief A-4 Maint	AC/S A-4	1. In view of t e many disadvantages enumerated in basic letter, it is recommended that a meeting be called as soon as possible by Army Air Forces of A-4 and A-3 personnel representing Army Air Forces, Air Materiel Command, Tactical Air Command, and Third Air Force to discuss and make recommendations for improvement of the C-82. 2. It is expected that this airplane will remain in the Army Air Forces for a cinsiderable length of time. Therefore if it is possible to correct these difficulties, it should be done now while the airplane is still in production. 3. The Third Air Force maintenance section is instituting a program of maintenance improvement that should alleviate some of the trobles mentioned in Par 7, basic letter, such as oil leaks and difficulties with spark plugs.
2	A-4 A.W.L.	A-3 C/S	For your comment.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: C-82
3	A3A-4 15 Oct 46	Col Greene	1. Reference Colonel Brogger's recommendation to hold a conference of interested Headquarters personnel to discuss the C-82, the following is submitted; a. Third Air Force was asked on approximately 1 October 46, by this section, to begin a complete study of this aircraft to determine its troop carrier suitability and to outline all of its disadvantages. b. On 14 October 1946 a letter from Headquarters AAF was received, instruction TAC to initiate comprehensive tests to determine the suitability of the C-82 for troop carrier operations; a detailed report is to be submitted to AAF upon completion of these tests. 2. It is recommended that Third Air Force be instructed to begin a series of test covering the points outlined by AAF and prepare the required detailed report. The contents or report will enlighten AAF on the many disadvantages of present C-82 and will set forth proposed midifications to be incorporated into future production models. 3. It is felt that the changes that will be recommended are urgently needed if Troop Carrier is to accomplish its assigned mission. 4. Irrespective of changes and modifications which may be proposed it is believed that unless the basic design of the C-82 is changed it will never be completely suitabel for over-all troop carrier operation. 5. It is further recommended that the basic letter be forwarded to Hq AAF, stating that the tests they requested, in their letter of 11 Oct 46, "Operational Suitability of C-82 Aircraft", will begin as soon as possible, and that the basic letter is forwarded to them for their information.
	R.W.G. Tr Carr		

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
RECORD AND ROUTING SHEET

FILE _____ SUSPENSE _____
(Date and initials)

NO	FROM/DATE	TO	SUBJECT: C-82
4	(A4B)	A-3	Recommend the following or similar indorsement be attached to basic communication and forwarded to Army Air Forces: 1. Reference is made to letter your Hq. subject: "Operational Suitability Test of the C-82 Aircraft" dated 11 October 1946. 2. The basic communication is forwarded as a preliminary report pending accomplishment of the tests as requested in above referenced letter. O.M.W. 22123
	R.I.S. Asst. A-4 Maint. 18 Oct46		

* Do not write in this space

TAC-2

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MESSAGEFORM

MESSAGE CENTER No.	TRANSMITTING MEANS	CRYPTOGRAPH OR CLEAR TEXT

CALLS	STA. SER. No.	PRECEDENCE	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS	ORIGINATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP
V	NR				

ACTION	INFORMATION	EXEMPT	OPERATING SIGNALS	GROUP COUNT
				GR

SPACE ABOVE FOR SIGNAL CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)
HQ TAC LANGLEY FLD VA

ACTION TO:
. COMMANDING GENERAL
AIR MATERIEL COMMAND
. WRIGHT FIELD
DAYTON, OHIO
.

INFORMATION TO:

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PRECEDENCE FOR

ACTION	INFORMATION
PRIORITY	

☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE

REFERS TO ANOTHER MESSAGE

IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

6 NOV 1946

AS-1 [illegible] FD PERSONAL ATTN GEN SMITH FD RE YOUR MESSAGE TSTEX11-S STATING ANC DID NOT DESIRE TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO WEST COAST AMPHIBIOUS TAC EXERCISES CNA YOUR ATTEN IS INVITED TO THE FACT THAT ANC HAS A VITAL INTEREST IN THESE EXERCISES SECOND ONLY TO THAT OF TAC FD THE EXERCISES ARE NOT EXPECTED TO BE PERFECT AND MANY VALUABLE LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED BY BOTH COMMANDS FD THE SUCCESS OF THE AIR FORCES PARTICIPATION DEPENDS LARGELY UPON PROMPT SUPPLY OF NECESSARY PARTS FD REQUEST YOU RECONSIDER AND NOTIFY THIS HQ OF ANY ACTION TAKEN FD

QUESADA HQ TACAIRCOM

/s/ J.E.S.
J. E. SMOCK
Asst. Adj. Gen.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — AUTHORIZATION

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SIGNATURE

ORIGINATING AGENCY

SYMBOL	DATE-TIME GROUP	OFFICIAL TITLE	PAGE 1 OF 1
AS-1	6 Nov 46		

WD AGO FORM 11-168 15 JUN 1945 — This form supersedes WD AGO Form 11-168, 23 Aug 44, and WD AGO Form 801, 12 Mar 43, which are obsolete.

16—45601-1 ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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COPY

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General
March Field, California

12AF-G

452.1

23 Sep 1946

SUBJECT: Safety of Flying - P-80 Aircraft

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. Due to the lack of radio navigational equipment of the proper type, both in the P-80 and on the ground, and due to the inadequacy of weather reporting service at altitudes where jet aircraft are forced to fly, it is felt that the P-80 aircraft is unsafe for normal cross-country flying under peacetime standards of safety. This conclusion has been reached after careful and prolonged analysis of flying conditions and problems encountered by the pilots of the First Fighter Group on numerous cross-country flights.

2. Jet aircraft in their present state of development present a new and considerably more complex problem in aerial navigation over any type of terrain or water than has ever been encountered in the past. Both the speed and altitude operating limits of the P-80 are very inflexible if effective cruising range is to be realized. The problem involved may enumerated as follows:

a. High fuel consumption at low altitudes forces operation at higher altitudes in order to have sufficient range to cruise from one suitable field to another.

b. At 30,000 to 40,000 feet, most economical cruising altitude for P-80 type aircraft, it is most difficult to navigate by pilotage and mapped terrain if the visibility is less than twenty-five (25) miles.

c. Weather forecasting on thunderstorm and frontal activity above 20,000 feet is extremely inaccurate and optimistic, and wind data above 30,000 feet is practically non-existent. Such conditions make dead-reckoning largely a matter of guess work, inasmuch as wind velocities encountered at such altitudes are usually quite high.

3. There are no suitable radio aids in the P-80's. The SC-1206 beam receiver is weak and low-powered. It is particularly susceptible to all electrical disturbances, and in bad weather will not function at all. The VHF radio sets in the P-80 is probably the best

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Basic: Ltr Hqs 12th AF to CG Tac, 300.31 dtd Sept 46, Subj: "Flying Safety of P-80 Aircraft".

aircraft installation yet made, but it is useless for navigation without homing or VHF installations on the ground. Lack of proper radio equipment leaves the P-80 pilot, in time of reduced visibility or when over an overcast, with no means of point-to-point check.

e. Once a pilot lets down from altitude after traveling cross-country he has definitely committed himself to land and must find a field immediately, as fuel consumption at low altitudes is too high to permit much looking around, and the amount of fuel expended to get back to altitude is prohibitive. Therfore, it is important that the pilot be able to positively identify his position at the terminal of a cross- country flight. Present navigational aids are not adequate for this purpose.

3. A continous, extensive program centering around Flying Safety has been conducted by all echelons of command from Twelfth Air Force down through the tactical squadrons. Pilots of the P-80 aircraft are thoroughly indoctrinated with all aspects of the Flying Safety program and are extremely safety-conscious. In spite of these elabrate precautions by the supervisory personnel, and in spite of the fact that the pilots flying the P80's on cross-country are specially picked and briefed, there continues to be abnormally high rate of accidents and an even higher rate of close calls or near accidents. It is therefore evident that being a skilled, conscientious pilot is not enough to solve the problem. Some positive steps must be taken to further aid the pilot on his cross-country flights. It is suggested that certain steps, enumered below, be taken immediately and that others, enumerated below, be held in mind for long range planning.

a. Immediate steps to be taken:

(1) Weather Service.

(a) Weather service should be revised to include accurate forecasting and radiosonde wind observations to altitudes of 40,000 feet at all principal weather reporting and forecasting stations in the continental United States.

(b) All weather personnel should be given a comprehensive course in the problem encountered in planning flights for jet-type so that they may more clearly recognize their responsibilities.

(2) Homing.

(a) Ground controlled VHF homing equipment should be in operation at all principal AAF Fields.

(b) VHF homing equipment should be installed in the P-80

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Basic: Ltr Hqs 12th AF to CG TAC, 260.21 dtd Sept 46, subj: "Flying Safety of P-80 Aircraft".

aircraft for use with VHF ground stations. The AN/APA-8 adaption to the normal VHF communications set is suggested. The total weight of installation is less than twenty-five (25) pounds.

(3) VHF Radio Range Stations.

(a) All radio range stations on the main airways should be equipped with VHF voice, and the major radio ranges should be equipped with VHF beams.

(4) H F Automatic Radio Compass.

(a) Radio compasses should be installed in all P-80 aircraft including not only those to come out in the future, but also the present operational P-80(s.

b. Long Range Planning.

(1) It would be extremely desirable if all major airways in the continental United States were criss-crossed with radar so that the exact position of any plane could be determined at any time. This would greatly facilitate navigation and would be of invaluable aid in planning let downs at the terminal of a cross-country.

4. It is earnestly felt that the recommendations under "Immediate steps to be taken", paragraph 3a should be given serious thought and action should be initiated to accomplish same. Until such time as these recommended steps become reality, it is thought most desirable that cross-country flights in P-80 type aircraft be held to an absolute minimum.

/s/ JOHN P. DOYLE

/t/ JOHN P. DOYLE
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

15 August 1946

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INFORMATION OF **ALL** PILOTS

PREPARED BY OFFICE OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I. INITIAL ISSUE -

This is the initial issue of a weekly publication, the purpose of which is to help prevent avoidable aircraft accidents. To do that, this publication will summarize TAC accidents, discuss causes of accidents and boners by pilots, and pass on to all pilots preventive information sent in from the bases and obtained from other sources..

Most of our information will come from reports prepared by base aircraft accident prevention officers and, therefore, will be only as accurate as are these reports. Since subsequent investigation often discloses information which changes data sent on preliminary and summary reports, what we publish here cannot be taken as official statement of fact. Do not read this with the idea of hunting for errors in the material, but with the intention of profiting by the lessons to be learned from the information printed herein.

This information is not published to die in someone's file!
To be effective it must reach all pilots -- that is the job for you prevention officers on the **base.** Use this material in your weekly pilot meetings. See that all unit prevention officers receive copies. Make it available to pilot lounges and ready rooms. In conjunction with this, follow the same policy concerning the Weekly Summaries published by AAF Flying Safety Service here at Langley Field. Safe pilots are enlightened pilots! It is unfortunate that every man will not dig for himself to find what is good for him, even when it means a longer life. We must, therefore, force it to the attention of those indifferent pilots who will not seek it.

It is always disheartening to see what a high percentage of accidents were avoidable. Let's get in front of this thing instead of trailing along behind it! Any of you who have suggestions or ideas that may make flying safer give them to your prevention officer. He will send them to us and we will pass them on to all other pilots.

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II. JULY RATE -

The July accident rate for all of TAC was .71 with 30994 hours flown and 22 major accidents. This rate is double that of the preceding month when 39,835 hours were flown with 14 major accidents. Past experience has shown that when flying time drops the accident rate increases; however, for it to double is out of reason.

WE MUST PREVENT AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS!!

Records available now show that pilot error was the primary cause of 10 accidents; materiel failure of 10; while 2 were classed as "other".

March Field is charged with 10 of the accidents, nearly half. Six of these were P-80's, 3 were AT-6's, and one a P-59. March is charged with 7 of the 14 accidents so far reported in August.

III. SAFETY REGULATIONS -

The reason for the change published last week in TAC Regulation 15-25 was to assure this headquarters a copy of preliminary and supplementary reports. As the regulation read before, it could have been interpreted as requiring a copy for the numbered air forces but not this headquarters.

The new Flying Safety regulation, 62-1, should reach you about the same time as this issue of Prevention Data. Most prevention offices are already set up as this regulation requires; however, note particularly that the nomenclature is now Flying Safety Section instead of Aircraft Accident Prevention, and that this section is directly under the commander. The reason for changing back to Flying Safety is this: CAF changed the nomenclature to AAP when this headquarters was 3AF and under CAF. Other organizations, including AAF, have retained the title Flying Safety.

In a future issue we will publish a minimum list of regulations that should be in the files of every flying safety officer. This list will be brought up to date periodically to make certain that safety officers are familiar with all pertinent directives.

IV. SUMMARY OF ALL MAJOR ACCIDENTS FOR JULY 1946 -

ACCIDENT: - 1 July 46 Tuskegee 1459 CST AT-6D

Ground-loop. Aircraft was landed on Runway 22 with the wind from S to SW at 15 miles per hour, gusty. After a three point landing, the right wing went down and the aircraft started a turn to the left. The pilot applied right rudder and brake but failed to straighten the aircraft. Full throttle was then applied in an attempt to "go-around." With application of power the aircraft veered out of control on the left wing tip, turning approximately 15 degrees to the left and then 180 degrees to the right as the right wing dragged.

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RESULTS: The right landing gear and right wing were buckled, left wing tip scraped, and left landing gear bent. No injuries to personnel.

CAUSE: Pilot error in misjudging torque on attempted "go-around" after partial loss of control during landing roll.

ACTION: Pilot to be given a check flight to determine his proficiency in AT-6 type aircraft.

ACCIDENT: 1 July 1946 March Field 1503 PST P-80A

Coming in for a normal landing, the pilot dropped the gear and flaps while experiencing difficulty in maintaining lateral control of the aircraft due to lack of aileron boost. Flaps failed to extend. Radio appeared inoperative. Noticing an aircraft on the landing runway, 30R, the pilot tightened his turn to land on Runway 30L as he turned on final approach. Dive flaps were extended, attempting to slow down aircraft. When contact was made with the ground, the nose section and right wing dropped to the runway and the aircraft slid to a stop with a fire in the right tip tank.

RESULTS: Pilot suffered no injuries. Extent of damage unknown at this time.

CAUSE: Pilot assumed that wheels were down during a hurried and incomplete check. The operator should have realized that gear might not be fully extended when flaps failed to extend properly, as both gear and flaps are dependent on generator and battery. The loss of the radio is another indication of electrical or generator failure.

ACTION: New P-80's have hydraulic pumps driven directly by the engine. Aircraft now on hand are being so modified.

ACCIDENT: 4 July 46 March Field 16 PST P-80A

Performing a demonstration at a County Fair, the pilot and his wingman were executing a special landing pattern when the accident occurred. Both pilot and wingman had completed a loop made down-wind to the landing strip in formation and then started a "split-S" from approximately 1500 feet back to the strip. The lead aircraft failed to execute the "split-S" with sufficient altitude although the wingman broke formation and pulled out at an altitude of approximately 400 feet.

RESULTS: Fatal to the pilot of the lead aircraft. Aircraft was a total wreck.

CAUSE: This manouver had successfully been accomplished many times by the two pilots involved in this accident, both in practice and in demonstration. The

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wingman stated that the pilot technique of the leader, the day of the accident, was not up to his usual ler.

ACTION: Regulations governing minimum altitude demonstrations have been revised, placing minimum altitude for completion of all maneuvers at 1,000 feet. This particular maneuver has been excluded from demonstration flights.

ACCIDENT: 7 July 46 March Field 1812 MST P-80

Before takeoff pilot omitted full cockpit check, dropped 70 degrees of flaps, turned 1-16 emergency fuel pump on and ran unit to 100% RPM. Gear was retracted when airborne and the aircraft accelerated to 150 mph. At this time RPM's dropped off. Check was made of fuel switches and stop-cock. The pilot then turned off the 1-16 emergency fuel pump to see if he would get the normal 3% increase in RPM. However, they still dropped so he turned 1-16 on again. Tower was informed that an emergency landing was being made at a nearby airfield. Flaps were lowered, battery and generator were turned off, stop-cock closed, 1-16 off, and crash landing was made with gear up and tip tanks on. Tanks were not jettisoned because the approach was high and fast and the pilot thought the added weight and increased stalling speed would keep him from overshooting.

RESULTS: Minor injuries to pilot. Major damage to the underside of the fuselage, to the flaps, wing-tips and drop tanks. Fire damage to engine compartment.

CAUSE: The barometric control would not hold pressure over 25 lbs. A serviceable barometric unit was checked in comparison and held pressure to 350 lbs. The opinion of the investigating board is that failure of the barometric unit on takeoff resulted in the drop in RPM's. Thus, the fuel pressure supplied by the main fuel pump would be by-passed at the barometric and fuel could only be supplied by the 1-16 pump. Since the 1-16 pressure at the altitude of the airfield (4,000 ft) that takeoff was accomplished from is approximately 180 - 190 lbs, the engine RPM would drop and could only be maintained at around 80% due to error of the tachometer. When the pilot shut off the 1-16 momentarily he caused a complete loss of fuel and the result was an engine flame-out and complete loss of power.

ACTION: All P-80 pilots were informed of the cause and results of this accident. UR was submitted on failure of subject part.

ACCIDENT: 9 July 46 March Field 0918 PST AT-6A

Aircraft groundlooped on landing.

RESULTS: Major damage to the aircraft. Right gear sprung, center wing flap damaged, wing center section damaged slightly, left landing gear strut snapped completely, left gear door bent, left wing damaged beyond repair. No injuries to personnel.

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CAUSE: Unknown at this time.

ACTION: Procurement of kits necessary for compliance with T.O. 01-60F-57 be expedited to provide positive manual tail wheel lock.

ACCIDENT: 9 July 46 Myrtle Beach 1145 EST C-45F

One landing had previously been made successfully. Pilot taxied back to position and tookoff a second time. A smooth wheel landing was made, and, slowing down, pilot unlocked tailwheel after lowering to the ground in preparation for turn to the left off the runway. During the turn (25 degrees) the tail gear collapsed.

RESULTS: Major damage to both vertical fins and rudders, horizontal stabilizer, slide assembly to tail wheel, and cable assembly to tail wheel. No injuries to personnel.

CAUSE: The AN bolt connecting the tail wheel retracting cable to the retracting slide failed. Subject bolt was never recovered.

ACTION: UR has been submitted on part that failed.

ACCIDENT: 9 July 46 Brooks Field 1900 CST A-26B

During the normal landing and while on landing roll, the nosewheel started heavy and severe vibration causing buckling of the fuselage at the wing roots and in the bomb-bay.

RESULTS: Major damage to the aircraft and no injuries to personnel.

CAUSE: Cap to nosewheel dampener pin evidently not replaced after routine inspection.

ACTION: Pilots and crew chiefs briefed on importance of thorough preflight checks.

ACCIDENT: 9 July 46 Greenville 0945 EST C-46F

Taxi accident. Aircraft was being taxied by maintenance personnel when operator lost control of the aircraft and ran into a parked C-46.

RESULTS: Major damage to moving aircraft. Minor damage to parked aircraft. No injuries to personnel.

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CAUSE: Believed brake failure but full facts are not obtainable at this time as the enlisted man responsible for the accident is AWOL.

ACTION: None, pending apprehension of operator.

ACCIDENT: 10 July 1946 Lawson Field 0500 EST C-46F

On an early morning drop mission, aircraft involved in accident was second to takeoff in formation from an auxiliery air strip. On takeoff run and as the aircraft became airborne, the left propellor struck a horse causing engine failure. Pilot tried to stop the roll of the aircraft with brakes and later by retracting the gear but was unsuccessful until the aircraft had rolled past the end of the runway and into a gully.

RESULTS: Major damage to the aircraft.Minor injury to two occupants of the aircraft.

CAUSE: One each horse on airstrip.

ACTION: Airstrip no longer to be used during the hours of darkness.

ACCIDENT: 10 July 46 Biggs Field 1004 MST P-51D

During normal landing aircraft was seen to ground-loop to the right, dragging the left wing, nosing up and cart-wheeling onto the right wing and coming to a stop 50 feet off the runway.

RESULTS: No injuries to pilot. Major damage to the aircraft.

CAUSE: Aircraft was landed with the right brake locked. Evidence discloses that excessive use of the brakes during ground operations was the cause of the accident.

ACTION: Pilots briefed on proper taxiing and take off technique in regard to proper use of the brakes.

ACCIDENT: 10 July 1946 March Field 1000 PST P-80

Aircraft was witnessed in a shallow glide coming out of the overcast at 3000 feet. Tip tanks were jettisoned and found five miles from the scene of the crash. The canopy was found one mile from the crash. It was the belief of the investigating board that the pilot was endeavoring to make a crash landing and lost control of the aircraft. Witness statements tell of hearing attempts by

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the pilot to start the unit. These were likened unto thunder. It was deemed likely that engine failure was the reason for the attempted crash landing.

RESULTS: Fatal to the pilot. Aircraft was a complete wreck.

CAUSE: Believed engine failure.

ACTION: Unknown at this time.

ACCIDENT: 12 July 46 Langley Field 1930 EST AT-6

Pilot obtained IFR clearance via airways over a mountainous route. Fifteen minutes out and at assigned altitude of 6000 feet, weather was encountered as predicted. A short time later pilot checked his radio but found it useless because of the static. Flight was continued on instruments and on original heading until ETA had elapsed in the vicinity of a radio check point. Reasonably sure he was clear of the mountains, pilot let-down to 4000 ft. and encountered contact conditions. Believing position to be north of the radio check point, a south heading was held for fifteen or twenty minutes. At this time, realizing his situation to be very critical because of dwindling fuel supply, plus unfavorable terrain below, he reciprocated his course for fifteen or twenty more minutes. Finding a small, level field and, after dragging it once, a wheels down landing was made during which, at the end of the roll, the aircraft hit a ditch.

RESULTS: Minor injuries to the pilot as shoulder harness was not used though available. Major damage to the aircraft as landing roll ended in a ditch, shearing the gear and causing sudden stoppage to the engine.

CAUSE: Poor flight planning and faulty navigation. Investigation discloses that an IFR flight plan was filed by the pilot when he did not possess a valid instrument card. (Violation of par. 6c, AAF Regulation 60-22). An impossible flight plan was filed. A computation figuring fuel on board, power settings, existing winds at 6000 ft, indicates that pilot would have been very fortunate to have reached his alternate at all. Flight was not conducted on airways as initial heading indicates flight started and was held on a direct heading. No listening watch was maintained on airways as required nor was an attempt made to check radio before encountering weather. After the pilot did attempt the flight under false certification of an instrument rating, he showed almost complete ignorance of CAA and Army Regulations governing instrument airways clearances, and of his aircraft, its range, and its equipment and limitations.

ACTION: Strict enforcement made of AAF Regulation 60-22, which requires holder of white instrument card to present same for inspection before being cleared for any instrument flight. Pilot will receive disciplinary action suitable to the magnitude of the offenses. The complete action taken against the pilot is unknown at this time.

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ACCIDENT: 12 July 1946 March Field AT-6

Aircraft caught fire prior to takeoff.

RESULT: No injuries to personnel. Major damage to the aircraft.

CAUSE: Materiel failure. Probable fuel line failure due to strain.

ACTION: Unknown at this time.

ACCIDENT: 15 July 46 Biggs Field 1604 MST P-51

Tail wheel tire blew out on landing roll. Pilot lost control of aircraft and ground-looped to the left.

RESULTS: Major damage to the right landing gear, rudder, right elevator, right flap, right aileron, right wing proper. No injuries to the pilot.

CAUSE: When tire blew, shear pin jammed tail wheel strut at 45 degree angle to the left.

ACTION: UR has been submitted. Request made to strengthen tail wheel tires.

ACCIDENT: 16 July 1946 Lockbourne AF 1430 EST AT-6D

Pilot had just previously been checked out in the type aircraft with a flight of thirty minutes and five landings. During previous three months, six hours and thirty minutes dual time had been logged. The pilot made two solo landings, but on the third he noticed that the left wing was extremely low and aircraft started to veer to the left. Starting "go-around", the aircraft rose suddenly veering to the left, stalling out, and crashing violently out of control. A small fire broke out but was quickly extinguished.

RESULTS: Minor injuries were suffered by both the pilot and a passenger that was aboard. The engine was wrecked and torn from its mounts. The fuselage was buckled, right wing buckled, left wing tip scraped, right and left gear sheared off, tail wheel and strut torn off, fire wall and the under side of the pilot's nacelle burned.

CAUSE: Pilot proficiency.

ACTION: Checkout requirements changed locally.

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ACCIDENT: 20 July 1946 March Field 1127 MST P-51H

Engine failure was experienced at 4000 feet above terrain. Pilot cut all switches and crash landed.

RESULTS: Minor injuries to the pilot. Aircraft was a complete wreck.

CAUSE: Materiel failure. Possibly broken oil line.

ACTION: Unknown at this time.

ACCIDENT: 22 July 1946 March Field 0843 PST AT-6

Aircraft groundlooped to the right during landing roll.

RESULTS: No injuries to pilot. Major damage to the aircraft. Left outer wing panel buckled, left strut broken, right strut bent, left aileron damaged, flaps damaged, left wheel broken, prop bent, minor damage to wing fairings, engine sudden stoppage.

CAUSE: Pilot proficiency.

ACTION: Pilots advised to make wheels first landings in this type aircraft unless tail wheel locks are installed.

ACCIDENT: 22 July 46 March Field 1056 MST P-80A

Engine failure at 11,000 feet. Pilot experienced loss of aileron boost and hydraulic system. Landed gear up on an air field.

RESULTS: No injuries to the pilot. Major damage to the aircraft. Tail section bulkheads broken, underside of fuselage scraped, dive flaps damaged, radio antenna damaged, main and nose gear doors major damage.

CAUSE: Engine and hydraulic failure. Details unknown at this time.

ACTION: Unknown at this time.

ACCIDENT: 23 July 46 March Field 1700 MST P-59A

Pilot became lost and crash landed because of lack of fuel. Aircraft was not equipped with belly tanks and had but 45 minutes fuel aboard.

RESULTS: No injuries to pilot or co-pilot. Major damage to the aircraft in landing.

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CAUSE: Fuel exhaustion.

ACTION: P-59 type aircraft not to be ferried without belly tanks.

ACCIDENT: 29 July 46 March Field 0915 PST P-80A

During the landing roll aircraft travelled off the end of the runway.

RESULTS: No injuries to the pilot. Nose gear strut bent at fork, right strut possibly sprung, tail pipe damaged, tail cone section damaged.

CAUSE: Aircraft landed long with full tip-tanks.

ACTION: Pilots instructed to fly 25 minutes to allow tip-tanks to run dry before attempting landing. P-80's not to be landed with full tip-tanks.

ACCIDENT: 30 July 46 Bergstrom Field 1125 C&T L-5G

During transition training aircraft experienced a secondary stall after recovery from a spin and struck the ground. Gear and prop hit first, causing the aircraft to cartwheel.

RESULTS: No injuries to personnel. Aircraft wrecked.

CAUSE: Possible acrobatics below minimum altitude. Details unknown at this time.

ACTION: Unknown at this time.

ACCIDENT: 30 July 46 Brooks Field AT-7

Aircraft involved in taxi accident.

RESULTS: Wheel and axle assembly broken out of strut.

CAUSE: Materiel failure. Aircraft being taxied when landing gear strut broke where wheel is fastened to strut.

ACTION: Unknown at this time.

3 Incls
1. Accdt Rate Chart
2. Comparison of Acft Chart
3. Comparison of Acft Accdt by Types

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

NO. ACCIDENTS	6	10	7	24	25	14	22
NO. FATAL ACC.	2	3	1	4	2	2	2
FLYING HOURS	11435	10098	10981	32489	34843	39835	30994
NO. FATALITIES	2	5	1	7	8	6	2

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COMPARISION OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATES BY AIR FORCE AND BASE
RATES PER 1000 FLYING HOURS



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COMPARISION OF ACCIDENTS BY TYPES



COMPARISION OF ACCIDENTS
BY PRIMARY CAUSE



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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

Number 5
15 September 1948

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INFORMATION OF **ALL** PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I. THIS WEEK.....

Five accidents were reported. Three involved P-80 type aircraft from March Field, one was a C-45 stationed at Biggs and the other a TF-6D from Brooks. This indicates an increase of one accident over the preceding week.

The P-80 accidents occurred when the aircraft were enroute to California after completion of the Cleveland Air Races. Takeoff of a flight of five was accomplished on a CVR clearance, Cleveland to Topeka. The aircraft became lost and scattered due to weather. Faced with fuel exhaustion, they tried to set down. Two landed on instruments at Fairfax with major damage resulting to one when the pilot bounced, stalled, and sheared the nose gear. One aircraft made a belly landing near Waverley, Missouri, with major damages and the others landed without incident.

The same day, another P-80 departed from Topeka for Albuquerque. Shortly after takeoff the bucket wheel went out shearing off the tail assembly of the aircraft. The pilot hit the silk successfully.

The TF-6D accident was caused by a hard landing which resulted in minor injury to the pilot and complete wreck of the aircraft, as it nosed over onto it's back.

The C-45 was also involved in a rough landing, which in this case buckled the gear to such an extent that it could be locked neither fully up nor fully down. Loss of power from the left engine caused the pilot to belly-in on the runway with major damage to the aircraft.

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II. AUGUST RATE.....

The August rate for all of TAC was .91, with 27,528 hours flown and 25 major accidents. This is an increase of .20 and 3 accidents over the preceding month. The total flying time dropped over 3,000 hours.

A check over the total accidents reveals that 16½ were credited to pilot error, with 8½ caused by materiel failure. The previous month recorded 10 pilot error and 10 material failure.

Of the bases, March Field is far in advance of the others in total accidents for the month. They suffered 11 major accidents. Lockbourne and Biggs had 4 each. Lake Charles totaled 2, and Langley, Shaw, Greenville, and Tuskegee each had one. March had 5 of their 11 accidents occur on one flight of P-80's on 1 August. These five accidents were discussed in the 26 August issue of this Bulletin.

This excessively high rate, .91, must be lowered. The fact that 16½ accidents were credited to pilot error cannot be tolerated. It indicates that operations and flying safety personnel are failing in their job. Flying is not being properly supervised, nor are the pilots indoctrinated in the proper technique, care, and caution essential to safe flight in the type aircraft flown. Pilot error accidents can be avoided.

III. STATISTICS TO DATE

	August Accidents	September Accidents to Date
3AF	1	0
9AF	6	2
12AF	11	3
Bases under TAC	7	2
Total	25	7

IV. ALL COMMANDERS NOTE.....

During August 1945 Sherman Field had three major accidents, giving a rate of 1.43. In September 45 this base had two major acidents; in October, one and in November, one. Since then, November 1945, Sherman Field has had only one major aircraft accident and has flown more than 9,000 hours.

This record is more impressive when we look at the aircraft assigned to the station: AT-6's, P-51's, C-47's, B-25's, L-5's, C-45's, AT-7's, and AT-11's. Then look at the primary mission of Sherman Field--to furnish flying time to the amorphous group of pilots who are students at the CGS School -- and their record for safe flying is remarkable.

Colonel Kenneth R. (Sleeper) Martin assumed command of Sherman Field on 29 August 45. With Lt. Nolan as his Flying Safety officer, he attacked the

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source of accidents -- poor maintenance and inadequate control of pilots and their flying. In his favor was the relatively small size of the base so that it was easier to give his personal attention to all of its functions. Against him, however, was the relative irresponsibility of pilots away from their home station and the desire of these pilots (often high-ranking officers) to check out in new type aircraft.

In spite of personnel shortages and of odd hours that the students do the bulk of their flying, the percentage of aircraft in commission--and in good commission-- has remained so consistently high that it keeps Sherman Field at or near the top of T.C stations on maintenance.

Wherever possible, the students at the school are restricted to the type aircraft with which they are familiar, as it would over-tax the facilities at Sherman Field to check out properly all of those who wished to do so. The base has a requirement that all pilots must have 25 hours dual time (where applicable) before being allowed to take an aircraft out without a base pilot.

All of the base pilots are required to meet the minimums prescribed in AAF Regulation 50-2. Five pilots, whose primary duty is flying, make the bulk of administrative flights, using less experienced pilots as co-pilots. Pilots, assigned to the base, average 50 hours per month flying time.

Lt. Cochrane is continuing the excellent work of Lt. Nolan, who was transferred several months ago. However, the safety program at Sherman Field re-emphasizes the fact that no one individual can accomplish a flying safety program. In his recommendation of the Commendation Ribbon for Major M. G. Long, the Director of Operations and Training, Col. Martin, stated: "During a six months' period, starting 1 December 1945 and ending 31 May 1946, pilots were cleared and aircraft dispatched on over 4,000 local flights and over 969 cross-country flights. The total hours flown during this period was 7527. During all this flying activity there was only one major aircraft accident."

Colonel Martin commends his Director of Supply and Maintenance, Major B. H. Garrison, in a like manner, pointing out the excellent safety record of base and transient aircrafts at Sherman Field.

There you have your ideal flying safety program: Run by the Flying Safety Officer, backed by the Commander, made possible and aided by maintenance and operations personnel and flown by the pilots.

V. LOCKBOURNE B-25 LOST.....

Manned by a pilot, co-pilot, and engineer, this aircraft took-off from Shaw Field, Sumter, South Carolina, at 1510 EST on an IFR clearance to Lockbourne AAB, Columbus, Ohio. Flight was to be conducted at 12,000 ft. It was known before take-off that this aircraft did not have a command set installed and that the liaison set was inoperative.

Arriving in the vicinity of Columbus at approximately 1710, the pilot endeavored to raise Columbus radio. Contact was not made but Lockbourne tower relayed instructions to hold on the North-East leg of Columbus Range at assigned altitude. A few minutes later the pilot was instructed to hold off the North-East leg. They were then cleared to let down to 1500 ft. on the South leg of

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the range and into Lockbourne. These instructions were given at 1756 EST. Nothing more was heard until 1830 when the pilot reported in over Mt. Vernon, Ohio, at 1500 ft. This is 47 miles northeast of Lockbourne.

The pilot states that he was making a quadrant let-down, flying North and South headings, when the radio compass became inoperative. They broke out of the overcast, heading South at approximately 500 ft. above the terrain. Estimating their position to be south of Columbus, a 180 degree turn was made but they were unable to find either Columbus or Lockbourne.

At this point a rectangular search was begun and finally a town was identified as Mt. Vernon, Ohio. A transmission was made giving this town as their location. This message was relayed to Lockbourne by another aircraft. The proper heading of 211 degrees to reach Lockbourne from Mt. Vernon was transmitted and heading was allegedly flown, but once again Columbus and Lockbourne were by-passed (as were 9 airfields in the immediate vicinity).

At 1903 a last contact was made, and pilot estimated his position as 10 miles north of Columbus. One hour later, as darkness approached and with but one hour's fuel aboard, a suitable field for crash landing was found and wheel-up landing was accomplished without injury but with major damage to the aircraft. This occurred at 2000 EST at Piketon, Ohio, 53 miles south of Columbus.

The sequence of events as reported by the Accident Investigating Board indicates that confusion reigned supreme from the time the let-down started until two hours later when they crash-landed. It also indicates, concerning radio equipment on IFR flights, not a violation of regulations but a good thorough bending of them. With only radio compass and VHF operating, take-off was accomplished with a 6-800 foot overcast at their destination. That is not smart planning. The conditions under which the takeoff was made were known to the Lockbourne Operations Officer as he was the pilot that ferried the B-25 crew to Shaw Field. From the action indicated in the AAF Form 14 and Letter of Transmittal, Lockbourne apparently failed to recognize the advisability of a thorough check of this officer's qualifications and ability to hold such a responsible office.

Computing elapsed times from known positions is imperative on IFR flights even though the radio is operating. Failure to do this without a properly functioning radio is asking for trouble.

The pilot, as a result of this accident, has had his instrument card revoked and is to receive intensive instrument training. His flying proficiency is also being checked.

VI. ATTN: FLYING SAFETY OFFICERS.....

Discrepancies are still noted in the receipt of preliminary reports at this headquarters. Main faults are the delay that is evident before transmittal and in certain cases no preliminary report is received at all. The latter case usually involves an accident being reported by another station. The Flying

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Safety Officer at the base credited with the accident should insure that the reporting agency has informed the proper headquarters, etc. If there is some doubt as to proper notification, sending a report duplication will not be criticized.

Form 14's should be prepared for distribution as follows:

1 (original) Flying Safety Service, Langley Field, Va.

1 cy Air Force having jurisdiction over the operator.

1 cy TAC Headquarters (Through appropriate Air Force Hqs).

1 cy File at reporting station.

2 cys Home station of the operator.

1 cy Home station of the aircraft (if different than the operator).

1 cy CG, AMC, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, (if materiel failure involved).

VII. P-6D LANDS WITH GEAR PARTIALLY EXTENDED.....

A group commander flew his P-6D from Brooks to Biggs Field. He made several unsuccessful attempts to contact the tower at Biggs and then flew down the landing runway at approximately 800 feet in an attempt to get a light signal from the tower. Receiving no light, he turned off, slowed to 170 MPH, and put his gear handle in a down position. He later stated that he saw the red warning light go off, but did not recall whether the red or green light came on. In other words, he did not check to see whether his gear was down. He continued his pattern and landed, with his gear partially extended, on the first part of the runway.

Tower operators stated that they did not receive a call from this P-6D, but that another P-51 had called in at approximately this same time and verified receipt of landing information. These operators then saw the P-6D pass by the tower at traffic altitude and assumed that it was the P-51 to which they had given landing instructions. As the P-6D came in on final approach, the tower saw that the gear was not properly extended and made three calls: "P-51 on final, pull up and go around." The red light on the right side of the tower was being repaired and the left light gun was not available in time to flash a warning. After the accident the red warning light on the P-6D was tested and found to function properly. A series of retraction tests showed that the entire landing gear mechanism functioned normally. The generator was checked "OK". The switches were in the "on" position. Radio checked loud and clear. The battery however, was found to be in poor condition, weak and dry and showing evidence of having boiled over. This is a clear indication of faulty maintenance.

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In aircraft equipped with radio, pilot can never consider that he is cleared to land unless he receives radio instructions or a green signal light. This pilot received neither. Further, this pilot did not check his gear to see that it was in a down position. Since gear operation checked out on the ground, it can be assumed that this accident would have been avoided had he checked his gear in the air. This pilot has lived through quite a number of hours of flying, which include an excellent combat record. If he had been this careless in combat, he would not have been here to have this accident. If he is this careless from now on, he won't be here for many more accidents.

VIII. NEW TRAINING REGULATION.....

A new TAC Regulation has been published that establishes an Instrument Flying Training Program. Numbered TAC Reg 50-15 and dated 4 September 1946, it should be included with the regulations in each Flying Safety Officer's file.

The purpose of this training program is to qualify all pilots for an AAF Form 8A (green) instrument rating. It comprises both flight and ground training. The flight training covers basic instruments, radio range, radio direction finding, blind approach, and weather flying. The ground training has emphasis placed on weather analysis, flight planning, and alternate procedures.

Four-hour-a-month CFR pilots are going to have to buckle down to comply with this.

IX. CHARTS AND GRAPHS.....

(Attached)

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND



NO. ACCIDENTS	6	10	7	24	25	14	23	25				
NO. FATAL ACC.	2	3	1	4	2	2	2	4				
FLYING HOURS	11435	10098	10981	32489	34843	39835	30994	27528				
NO. FATALITIES	2	5	1	7	8	6	2	10				

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COMPARISION OF ACCIDENTS BY TYPES



COMPARISION OF ACCIDENTS
BY PRIMARY CAUSE

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COMPARISION OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATES BY AIR FORCE AND BASE
RATES PER 1000 FLYING HOURS



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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

Number C
23 September 1946

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INFORMATION OF **ALL** PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I. THIS WEEK.....

Four accidents were reported. One was a C-47 from Biggs, another a P- 4 from March, one a P-47N stationed at Lockbourne, and the fourth was a A-26 from Myrtle Beach.

The four accidents this week are a decrease from the previous week's total of six. The sum total for the month, now half gone, is eleven major aircraft accidents.

The C-47 accident from Biggs occurred when the tail wheel strut socket broke while taxiing and caused major damage.

The SP-80A departed Van Nuys for March and made a wheels-up crash landing in a field. The cause is unknown at this time.

The P-47N was flying locally when the pilot reported engine failure. In attempting a forced landing the aircraft crashed through trees and burned. Pilot suffered minor injuries. The aircraft was wrecked.

The A-26B was on final approach when fire was observed by tower and transient aircraft in right wheel well. Cause unknown at this time.

II ACCIDENT STATISTICS.....

	August Accidents	September Accidents to Date
3AF	1	0
9AF	6	3
12AF	11	4
Bases under TAC	7	4
TOTAL	25	11

RESTRICTED

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III. LOW FLYING TIME.....

During the past three months the flying time for all of TAC has decreased from 39,835 hours to the August figure of 27,408 hours; while for the same period the accident rate has increased from .58 to .71. Experience has shown many times that when the flying time per pilot decreases the accident rate increases.

For August, TAC pilots flew an average of 10.8 hours, while the average TAC aircraft were flown only .86 hours per day. Both of these figures are too low. The Commanding General has indicated that he will not be satisfied with less than 20 hours per pilot per month. Below is a comparison by air forces and bases directly under TAC:

	Hours Flown per Aircraft per Day- August	Hours Flown Per Pilot- August	Accident Rate- August
Directly Under TAC - -	.73	8.7	1.04
3rd Air Force - -	1.11	10.1	.12
9th Air Force - -	.86	15.0	.62
12th Air Force - -	.69	10.8	3.86

The 37th Troop Carrier Squadron established the best all-around figure with 26.2 hours per pilot and 1.98 hours flown per aircraft per day. Sherman Field - 27th Tow Target, 47th Bomb Group, and the 12th Reconnaissance Squadron all exceeded 20 hours per pilot per month. However, with the exception of the 47th Bomb Group, the above named units did not fly their aircraft an impressive number of hours. The 318th Base Unit, Lockbourne; the 347th Base Unit, Smyrna; 385th Base Unit, Tuskegee; 303rd Base Unit, Headquarters Third Air Force; 311th Base Unit, Bergstrom; 309th Base Unit, Headquarters Ninth Air Force; the 307th Base Unit, Lake Charles; the 356th Base Unit, Marshall; and the 312th Base Unit, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, were all very low in both hours flown per pilot and hours flown per aircraft per day.

Figures are not complete for the liaison squadrons.

There are two obvious ways of bettering the poor records shown above. One is better maintenance. For August, aircraft in commission throughout TAC averaged only 50%. The other way is better scheduling of aircraft so as to increase the utilization of available aircraft hours and to derive more profitable individual and unit training from these hours flown. We have come considerable distance from the time in the not too distant past

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when the average pilot was sweating out four hours a month. We now have the means of giving all pilots many times four hours a month. It must be impressed upon all in authority that it is of the greatest importance for pilots to secure flying time while the aircraft and other facilities are available. It is quite possible that in the future the allotment of aircraft, gasoline, etc., will be cut to the point where flying is again extremely limited. In the meantime, it is a vital necessity that all facilities now available be used to the maximum and in such a manner as to result in the maximum benefit for units as a whole and to individual pilots.

I. C-47 TAXI ACCIDENT.....

A C-47 was being prepared to fly on a cross country flight from March Field, California. Normal pre-flight was made but upon attempting to start the left engine, the starter would not energize. The flight engineer, after checking voltage and amperes, attempted to remedy the situation by checking the fuses.

The crew chief, after removing the landing gear safety pins, movable surface control locks, and wheel chocks, proceeded to secure an external power unit, believing the batteries to be at fault. He returned a short time later with a C-16 Power Unit mounted on the bed of a weapons carrier. The vehicle was parked directly in front of the aircraft. He started the unit and plugged it into the electrical system of the aircraft. The flight engineer had since found the burnt out fuse and replaced it. Pilot was informed that all was "OK" and the crew chief was told to stand clear. The A.P.U. was not disconnected as the crew chief was not certain that the batteries would work.

Both engines were started, radio check made with the tower and taxi information received. Both sides of the aircraft were checked for clearance and the co-pilot unlocked the tail wheel.

After the engines had been started, the crew chief removed the C-16 unit leads from the aircraft and placed them in the back of the truck. He then climbed onto the seat of the vehicle to drive it away. At this time the aircraft rolled ahead about 12 feet and struck the weapons carrier. The crew chief escaped serious injury.

It was the opinion of the Board that the pilot and the crew chief were responsible for the accident. The pilot proceeded to taxi the aircraft without first receiving a taxi signal from the crew chief and the crew chief failed to comply with AAF Reg 60-10 in that the landing gear safety pins and wheel chocks were removed before the engines were started.

It has been recommended that the crew chief be brought before a Non-Commissioned Officer Reduction Board and the pilot to be punished under the 104th Article of War.

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V COMPARISON OF COMMAND RATES.....

It was interesting to note in the recent Flying Safety Service "Flying Accident Bulletin", covering June accidents, that a TAC station was at the top of the list. Lake Charles flew 4,802 hours and suffered no accidents for that month. On the other side of the ledger (in the red) was Laredo Field, at the bottom of the list, with only 985 hours flown but with one major and three minor accidents.

The TAC accident rate for June, .38, was the second lowest rate ever achieved by this command. In May 1945 TAC, then Third Air Force, had a rate of .38.

The June rate was unequalled by any other continental command. This low rate is very gratifying; but, whether we better the rate of other commands or not, we should strive always to keep the TAC accident rate this low. Since June it has more than doubled.....

VI P-51 CRASH LANDS...LOSS OF MANIFOLD PRESSURE IN FLIGHT.....

The pilot was cleared on a CFR flight plan from Hensley Field, Dallas, Texas to Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas. At approximately 15,000 feet southwest of Trent, Texas, manifold pressure fell off to about 15 inches and the aircraft began to lose altitude. The pilot applied carburetor heat, switched tanks, and changed mixture control from auto-rich to full-rich. By use of the primer, the engine would pick-up, but not enough to maintain altitude. All instruments were normal with the exception of the manifold pressure gauge.

Wing tanks were jettisoned at 6000 feet and a suitable field was selected for a wheels-up forced landing. Full flaps were used and the landing was made with no injury to the pilot but with major damage to the aircraft.

Investigation disclosed that the nut holding the throttle linkage together came off causing the carburetor to close to idling speed.

This type of accident is inexcusable. Proper daily inspection of the aircraft evidently had not been accomplished. Gross negligence of maintenance personnel such as in this case, cannot and will not be tolerated. Flight personnel's lives depend on the alertness of ground crewmen and the thoroughness with which they do their job.

VII VIOLATIONS OF FLYING REGULATIONS.....

Few violations of Flying Regulations have been reported in the past few days. A flying violation does not necessarily result in an accident, but safety regulations are printed for the purpose of saving lives, property, and preventing needless expense to the government. A pilot that discloses utter disregard for regulations will not live long.

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One of the most flagrant violations is the engaging in instrument flight while on a CFR flight plan. Other violations concern unauthorized landings at airports other than ...F or failure to close or file a flight plan.

Some reports make very interesting reading --- for example:

Recently a Major took three unauthorized civilians for a flight without prior approval. The major stated that he knew that it was a violation of regulations when he escorted them onto the field and then to the parked C-47. They were witnessed by numerous individuals entering the aircraft that later tookoff for a flight. Upon landing they were met by the O.D. with a staff car and an M.P. escort. The pilot had approximately 15 hours pilot time in a C-47 and flew on this flight with a crew chief as a co-pilot. The tower had asked if there were any additions to the loading list as they had witnessed the aircraft taxiing out with the unauthorized passengers. The pilot answered that he had none other than what was listed on the clearance. (This contained the name of the pilot and the engineer only.)

The action taken on this case is unknown at this time.

Regulations are not to be trifled with. Action is being initiated each day on many pilots who fail to adhere to the printed words.

Always make sure:

That you have the proper authority for the flight.

That you close your flight plan by turning in the yellow sheet.

That you adhere to Instrument Flight Rules when on IFR and that you maintain your given altitude.

That tower and range operators transmit information to you that will prove you contacted them. (Towers and ranges record transmissions only)

ALWAYS CHECK NOTAMS....

VIII L-5 CRASHES ON TAKEOFF...OCCUPANTS WALK AWAY (15 miles).....

The L-5 in this accident was piloted by an Operations Officer whose aircraft and pilots were employed in observation, reconnaissance, and ground cooperation work in conjunction with the Guided Missiles Project at White Sands Proving Grounds, New Mexico. The day of the accident and while ascertaining that all aircraft were homeward bound after the V-2 rocket firing, the pilot noticed an L-5 on an auxiliary strip. Deciding to investigate, he prepared to land.

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When nearing the field, he noticed the L-5 takeoff but spotting a jeep approaching the strip, decided to land anyhow and check on radio two-way communications between the ground and the L-5's. An occupant of the jeep was a civilian employee of the Project who desired to return to the launching site as the rocket had not reacted as expected. He boarded the L-5.

The aircraft was fired-up and mags checked with 50-75 rpm drop on each. Takeoff was normal until the aircraft was about 15 feet in the air just over the end of the runway. At this point the engine cut-out. As the aircraft touched down straight ahead the engine caught and fired normally. The pilot dropped flaps and as he became airbourne again, the engine quit. Switches were cut and an emergency landing made with the aircraft bouncing to a stop over and through the sand dunes. No injuries to the occupants but major damage to the aircraft resulted.

The driver of the jeep had since started back to the launching site and the pilot and passenger of the aircraft, expecting his return momentarily since they had not taken off, waited a few minutes. It became apparent then that the driver was not coming back so they started walking south. (White Sands Launching Site was 85 miles south.) After walking 15 miles they were luckily picked up by a jeep and returned to the base.

No reason for the engine failure was found after tests showed that the engine operated normally after the accident. Both tanks were sufficiently full for safe operation of the aircraft so that possibility was ruled out. All that remained was the chance that a foreign body became lodged in the fuel line and had worked itself through or that water was in the fuel.

L. FLYING SAFETY OFFICERS.....

It has not been brought out before, but this publication should be seen by Base S-4 as well as S-3. If you wish additional copies to come regularly, send a request to Flying Safety Officer, Hqs, Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginia.

And while you are about it, how about a few suggestions on safety or on improving this publication.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

Number 7
30 September 1946

PUBLISHED FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

Five accidents were reported. Of this total, three were fatal accidents. A P-51 from March Field was fatal to one, an A-26, also from March Field, resulted in five fatalities, and a P-51 from Biggs Field was fatal to the pilot. The other two accidents concerned a P-80 from Langley Field and a P-61 from Shaw Field.

The five accidents this week is an increase of one over last week's total. Two of the three fatal accidents occurred to aircraft on instrument flight plans.

The March Field P-51 fatal accident report states that the pilot was lost and attempted to get beneath the overcase when he collided with the ground.

The March Field A-26 cleared IFR from Godman Field, Kentucky, lost an engine on take-off and crashed causing fatal injuries to all five aboard.

The Biggs Field P-51 accident was fatal to the pilot when he collided with a ground gunnery target at Myrtle Beach and, shearing off his left wing, crashed into the ocean.

The Langley Field P-80 crash occurred when the aircraft experienced engine failure and crash-landed with minor injuries to the pilot.

Shaw Field recorded a P-61 accident that occurred when a main wheel tire blew on take-off roll and caused extensive damage to the aircraft before it could be brought to a stop.

II. CURRENT STATISTICS.....

	August Accidents	September Accidents to Date
3AF	1	0
9AF	6	4
12AF	11	5 *
Bases under TAC	7	6

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TOTAL	25	15

*Total does not include March Field P-80 accident, 4 September 1946, which has been reclassified as a minor accident.

III. FLYING SAFETY OFFICERS NOTE.....

Lawson Field (Third Air Force base) was visited recently by personnel of this headquarters and the following information was revealed:

Weekly Flying Safety meetings are held each Thursday when all safety problems are discussed and pilots are urged to make suggestions. The contents of this publication are used as material for these meetings. A chart on attendance is kept as well as records of the material covered. Each pilot is warned that disciplinary action will be more severe if he has failed to attend a meeting and becomes involved in an accident that was of the nature of those discussed in the meeting he failed to attend. Lawson Field Grade Officers note, for the attendance chart made them conspicuous by their absence.

Lt Doyen has been Flying Safety Officer at Lawson Field for several months and has shown considerable initiative in getting the job done.

On one occasion, when changing the markings of the parking areas and taxi strips, he could get the paint but no manual labor was available from the Post Engineers. (The shortage of personnel at Lawson Field is very critical.) Lt Doyen and a friend accomplished the painting on their own.

On another occasion, when orders were received from Third Air Force Headquarters to land all L-5 type aircraft on the grass, the area was laid off. Considerable difficulty arose in the procurement of lime but upon obtaining it, once again there was no help available. After a great deal of effort on his part, a small lime disposer was made and Lt Doyen marked off the area himself.

This officer should be highly commended for the initiative shown in the completion of his and other personnel's duties. This type of action, in the interest of Flying Safety, will surely pay dividends to the pilots.

IV. HOWEVER.....

The work of Lt Doyen is of no avail when the engineering officer - or any other officer - orders an enlisted man to break safety regulations.

This engineering officer ordered a T/Sgt to taxi a C-47 out of the parking area to a new position to be a control ship. This was at night and this T/Sgt was the only enlisted man on duty, a fact that must have been known to the engineering officer. He must also have known that to carry out this order the T/Sgt must break at least two regulations: one, taxiing an aircraft in the parking area without a wing walker or man directing the aircraft, and two, either starting the engines without chocks

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or getting out after starting to remove the chocks and leaving no one in the cockpit. Further, this aircraft had a history of hydraulic leaks.

The T/Sgt started an engine, examined the gauges with a flashlight, and, as he gave his attention to the other engine he realized that the aircraft was moving forward. He hit the brake pedals but there was no response and as he cut the engine the aircraft rolled forward and into a parked C-46.

In the letter transmitting the 14a, the commanding officer stated that in the future safety regulations would be complied with even if it meant curtailment of operations. This headquarters was very much surprised to learn that any other policy was in effect at one of its bases.

V. P-80 CRASHED ON "GO-AROUND".....

Two P-80's were completing a flight from March Field, California, to Hill Field, Ogden, Utah. Both aircraft were cleared for a tactical peel-off for landing. As they started this maneuver, an AT-7 which had been shooting touch-and-go landings and had radio contact for these landings moved onto final approach ahead of the lead P-80. The tower called to the AT-7 to "go-around". No answer was received and both P-80's and the AT-7 drove on down on final approach. Tower then shot a red light to the AT-7, but it's pilot continued to land. After he touched down, the tower instructed "ground loop to the right and clear the runway", but he continued his landing roll.

The pilot of the first P-80 meanwhile, when spotting the AT-7 on final approach ahead of him, requested the tower to send him around. This, the tower operator stated was being attempted but that they had no radio contact. The P-80 was then advised to "go-around" and the pilot attempted this when the aircraft was but 20 feet in the air. The right wing dropped, as power was applied, and hit the runway tearing off the right tip tank. The pilot jettisoned the other tank as the engine failed and a straight ahead wheels-up landing was made. A fire was burning in the aft section of the fuselage as the aircraft came to a stop off the runway. The second P-80 had landed to the right of the AT-7 on the runway without incident.

Investigation disclosed no apparent reason for the P-80 engine failure. It also revealed that the AT-7 and tower radios were functioning properly when checked after the accident, however, the AT-7 pilot denied having heard any of the above quoted instructions from the tower.

The importance of AAF Letter 55-62, dated 21 November 1945, cannot be stressed enough. Pilots, and particularly co-pilots, in left hand traffic should be especially alert on base leg to spot any faster aircraft which may be making a long final approach.

The instructions by the tower to "ground-loop" the AT-7 shown inexperience or instability under stress on the part of the tower operator in that ground-

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looping an AT-7 would most likely cause more material damage than belly-landing a P-80 and would most certainly subject a greater number of personnel to possible injury.

The obvious discrepancies between the tower operator's statement and statements of the pilot and co-pilot of the AT-7 has caused a separate and more complete investigation to be made and forwarded as a supplemental report. The co-pilot was specifically instructed by the pilot to keep his eyes on the tower for a light signal. According to his statement, no light signal was given. The tower operator states that a red light signal was given.

No action is being taken until this supplemental information is received.

VI. P-47 NOSES UP ON LANDING.....

A flight of four P-47 aircraft, led by a Major with 1139 hours in fighter aircraft, had cleared from Lockbourne AAB and was landing at Scott Field at St Louis. Landing instructions were received for a tactical peel-off. Final approach speed was 145 mph so the pilot states. The aircraft was landed in a tail-high attitude and the friction caused by the tires coming in contact with the concrete of the runway overbalanced the tail and caused the propeller to strike the runway bending all four blades. The landing was completed without incident.

It was the opinion of the Investigating Board that improper landing technique on the part of the pilot was the direct cause of the accident. Possible cause factors were:

a. High landing speed caused excessive friction and threw nose down.

b. Pilot may possibly have been unconsciously riding the brakes.

Accidents of this type are inexcusable. It does not pay to become careless for an instant. That instant may mean your life. Because you have a lot of pilot time is no reason for you to throw caution to the winds and say, "It can't happen to me". These are famous last words.

VII. THIS ONE'S FOR YOU MAINTENANCE PEOPLE.....

For some reason using wheel chocks when starting up engines seems to be about as unpopular as standing reveille. Regulations require it but that makes no difference to a lot of mechanics, engineering officers, pilots, and the men who are always responsible for everything - the base commanders.

Among the worst offenders are transient aircraft, and that means you when you are on a cross-country. The pilot doesn't want to wait for the alert crew and the engineer wants to be in the cockpit when the engines are started, so he pulls the chocks and gets in first.

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When at home it is so much easier to get the chocks out before starting the engines and before forward pressure is exerted against them. Besides the mech doesn't like to get his hair blown.

A recent accident (discussed in last week's issue) occurred at March Field when the pilot released brakes and rolled forward into a weapons carrier. The chocks had been pulled and placed in the rear of the C-47 before the engines were started.

A minor accident occurred last month at Lawson Field when a crew chief fired-up a C-47, at night, and alone. Chocks had been removed and the right engine started when he noticed the aircraft was moving. He applied brakes but a loss of hydraulic pressure resulted in no braking action and the aircraft rolled into a parked C-46 causing minor damage. (Reported in full in paragraph IV this issue.)

An accident to one of TAC's aircraft was narrowly avoided at Memphis recently. Sub-Depot personnel had started the engines of a B-25 with fighter type chocks in front of the main wheels. The right engine was being run up with the brakes off and the right wheel had climbed the chock when the operator in the cockpit noticed the frantic signals of a crew member on the ground outside. He cut power just in time to prevent the aircraft from jumping the chocks and probably running into a row of aircraft parked in front.

It was because of instances such as these that TAC Regulation 65-10 was written. Therein is described the proper type chocks to be used at all TAC bases. They are of a type construction that propellor blasts cannot blow away and also a type that cannot be "jumped".

The war's over! Each of us has from one to thirty years to go in this man's army before we quit "work" and go to hunting and fishing. Let's spend a few minutes of that time wrestling with wheel chocks and we'll probably save the government our next ten years' pay.

VIII. B-25 CRASHES AFTER TAKE-OFF.....

A one hour and 30-minute transition flight had been completed at Lockbourne Army Air Base. Aircraft prepared for another take-off. On previous flight, pilot noticed that the carburetor heat rise tended to creep open in flight as the ship took off. On this take-off he held carburetor heat controls forward in the "off" (cold) position. When airborne, the gear was retracted and heat controls brought back to neutral. The aircraft had gained approximately 200 feet of altitude when the left engine lost power and burst into flames. Co-pilot noticed the carburetor air temperature for the left engine was approximately 70°C. At the same time, pilot in checking the left engine saw the shutter for the carburetor heat on the left engine was open. He pushed the heat controls to the "closed" position but the shutter did not close. In the meantime, the co-pilot pulled the fire extinguisher for the left engine. The aircraft was losing altitude and the pilot lined up with a corn field. He began to feather the left engine

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and then changed his mind when he saw they were about to crash. The escape hatch was released before contact with the ground, and a crash landing was made with only minor injury to the engineer. The use of the fire extinguisher was effective, and the aircraft did not burn upon crashing.

Investigation of the left engine revealed the #1 exhaust stack had burned completely in two and that the controls to the carburetor heat shutter were also burned through. The force of the slip stream then forced the shutter fully open, causing practically complete loss of power in the left engine. An Unsatisfactory Report was submitted, recommending that all #1 exhaust stacks be replaced at every 25-hour inspection. The reporting station has had twenty previous failures.

No explanation is offered as to why the pilot could not maintain altitude on one engine.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

NUMBER 8
7 October 1946

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INFORMATION OF **ALL** PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I. THIS WEEK.....

Five accidents were reported. Three involved C-82 aircraft, two from Pope Field and the third from Greenville AAB. Of the other accidents, one was an A-26 from Lake Charles AAB that was fatal to five and the other involved a P-80 from March Field.

These five accidents equals the total number for last week. The fatal accidents, however, were reduced from three to one.

The Greenville C-82 was involved in a taxi accident while being operated by a crew chief. A collision occurred with a parked glider when the brakes failed.

One Pope Field C-82 accident occurred when complete electrical failure was experienced on a night flight out of Miami. Returning to the airport, the pilot landed but the main gear collapsed on landing roll. The other Pope Field C-82 was involved in an accident caused by a fire in the generator electrical system.

The P-80 crashed short of a March Field runway when the pilot, after the fire warning light came on in the cockpit, turned off the unit on pull-up and tried a dead-stick landing. With no power, he undershot.

The Lake Charles A-26 apparently flew into the ground in a heavy rain storm with fatal injuries resulting to all five aboard.

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II. CURRENT STATISTICS.....	August Accidents	September Accidents to date
3AF	1	3
9AF	6	5
12AF	11	6
Bases Under TAC	7	6
TOTAL:	25	20

III. P-47 NOSES-UP DURING FORMATION LANDING.....

On a formation flight of eight P-47's enroute from Lockbourne to Olmsted Field, Pennsylvania, peel-off was made for landing. When the leader reached an intersection after landing on the left side of the runway, the tower operator instructed him to turn off to the left as it appeared that the second aircraft was getting dangerously close during the landing roll. The leader executed the turn as requested.

At this time the pilot who landed second and on the right side of the runway, tried to accomplish this turn also but noticed that the number three aircraft was closing rapidly and he would have to cross in front if he were to complete the turn off the runway. Number two, after starting his turn, straightened out and continued on straight ahead down the runway. Number three pilot hit his brakes just after crossing the intersection and went up on his nose.

The pilot makes no mention of being dangerously close to the number two man, but blames the nose-up on the brakes locking, first the right brake and then the left one. The attitude of the aircraft and the tire marks on the runway show that both wheels were braked evenly. After the accident, a check of the brakes revealed no maintenance or material failure.

It was the opinion of the board that the tower contributed confusion to the situation by giving unnecessary instructions to the flight for a situation that should have been handled by flight training and discipline, however, pilot error in use of brakes was considered the chief cause of the accident.

IV. NEW COMPUTATION OF RATE.....

AAF Flying Safety Service computes accident rates on the basis of 100,000 flying hours rather than 1000 hours. For the sake of uniformity this headquarters will adopt this new system. Air Forces and bases should do likewise.

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V. P-80 FATAL FORCED LANDING.....

The mission was to obtain publicity photographs of a P-51 and a P-80 in flight. A B-25 was the accompanying aircraft from which the pictures were to be taken.

At 10,000 feet, the B-25 and the P-51 were in formation when the P-80 appeared. The jet made a series of wide S turns after he had overrun the other aircraft and was approaching from behind with dive flaps extended in an effort to slow the aircraft down. According to the pilot of the P-51, the P-80 manuevered to a position approximately one mile behind the B-25 at about 8,000 feet and was attempting to move into position when the pilot stated, "I may have to go in - I may have to get out". He further stated that his jet had gone out.

The P-80 then made a 90 degree turn to the right and started descending. The P-51 pilot advised him of his location and the nearest emergency field but received no answer from the jet.

A normal let-down was witnessed by the 51 driver and a wheels-up landing was attempted in a small dirt field used by light civilian aircraft. It appeared to witnesses that the pilot was having difficulty in keeping his wings level.

An investigation of the accident disclosed that as the flare-out was made, the right wing-tip grazed the soft dirt. The right wing touched the ground twice more, each time with increasing force, until finally the aircraft cart-wheeled and struck with a shattering force on it's nose and right wing, causing the aircraft to disintegrate. The pilot was killed instantly.

It was the opinion of the board that the accident was the result of power failure due to causes unknown. The pilots radio transmission to the effect that he had lost his jet led the board to assume that flame-out occurred due possibly as a result of sudden retraction of the throttle in joining formation. Whether or not flame-out actually did occur, cannot be determined.

A UR has been submitted on the present ignition system recommending that a switch be incorporated in the burner fuel line that will cause firing of the spark plugs when fuel pressure drops below a safe minimum. This will reduce danger of complete flame-out, particularily at high altitudes and when throttle is retarded at high speeds. This pressure switch would be coupled in series with a landing gear position switch that would make this system operative only in flight.

It has been further recommended that an emergency hydraulic switch, similar to the emergency hydraulic switch located in the right side of the fuselage next to the external power connection, be installed also in the cockpit. This is to enable the pilot to have aileron boost even after the generator has ceased to operate. This switch would be connected directly to the battery. The battery undoubtedly would not operate the hydraulic pump for extended periods but even 60 seconds would be sufficient time to enable the pilot to have full aileron control during the landing.

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VI. FLYING SAFETY OFFICERS NOTE.....

Army Air Forces, Flying Safety Service, Langley Field, Virginia, has started publishing a new poster series. They are designed for posting in locations where they will attract the widest possible interest. Organization bulletin boards, briefing rooms, operations offices, clubs, and other places where pilots gather, are recommended.

The first of this series came out last week. The accident summary related thereon concerned an accident that occurred to one of our aircraft from Godman Field, Kentucky.

If you are not receiving this poster series entitled, "Crash and Consequences", let Flying Safety Service, Langley Field, Virginia, know about it.

VII. COMMANDERS NOTE.....

AAF Letter 62-5, dated 18 September 1946, requires an education program for pilots to be achieved by weekly meetings at which accident summaries and prevention data will be discussed.

In all probability, you have this school already established. We have noticed, however, that at many bases the attendance figures show that field grade officers are frequently absent.

While a pilot naturally feels that the more hours that he has compiled the safer he flies, many staff pilots who are flying six or eight hours a month, fail to realize that their low current average number of hours flown is making them unsafe fliers. And yet they will not attend these meetings and receive valuable accident prevention tips.

As mentioned in last week's issue, at Lawson Field, the pilots are warned that if they are involved in a pilot error accident similar to one discussed at a Flying Safety meeting that they failed to attend, resulting disciplinary action will be more severe.

The operation and adequacy of this program will be a subject for special observation on supervisory visits from this headquarters.

VIII. AN A-26 ENDS A PILOTS' LONG, SUCCESSFUL CAREER.....

Some of you were flying balsawood model airplanes when Forrest O'Brine and Dale Jackson broke the world's record for endurance flying. They kept their crate in the air 647 hours 28 minutes and 30 seconds. Mr and Mrs St. Louis raped when they saw O'Brine's hovering plane being nurtured by it's flying gas station. This record smashed the previous one held by Major Carl Spaatz and Capt Ira Baker. The Major is now Commanding General of the AAF and Capt Baker is a Lieutenant General, the Deputy Commander of the Army Air Forces - But Forrest O'Brine....

Forrest O'Brine became a Captain in the Army Air Forces and was assigned to the Ferrying Division. He lost his life at El Paso, Texas, when an A-26 he was flying crashed and burned. We will tell you about that one mistake this pilot made, a minor one, but his last.

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O'Brine had flown many planes, good and bad, flown in the days when each ETA he flew out was a good break, flown by the seat of his pants, and managed to keep one jump ahead of the temperamental jobs they called airplanes. He was a good pilot - he had to be to clock 7000 air hours under those condition yet, one CAVU day O'Brine was taking an A-26 off at El Paso. As he became airborne both motors were smoking. He lost his left engine but he had enough speed and with his good engine he was able to climb to traffic altitude. The airplane headed west when the good engine began cutting out. Both were smoking heavily. Now the bad engine came in but they both were cutting in and out and the plane was bobbing up and down.

He managed to gain an altitude of 500 feet. Had he won the first round? Would he trim the ship and go straight in for a belly landing? No! the 'turn and return' gremlin had him. He started a turn and headed back for the airport in a steep bank. O'Brines luck ran out, both engines conked. The plane, momentarily suspended, fell off slightly to the right and crashed on it's belly.

It struck with a sickening thud, then bounced and slued along throwing up a curtain of dust. As the dust cleared, flames were seen licking the fuselage. The siren of the rescue truck that came too late, sounded the requiem for an experienced, capable, pilot.

We have hinted about the mistake that O'Brine made - we don't know and do not sit in judgment but the Accident Investigating Committee findings point to the supposition that he put the mixture control of the right engine in emergency rich position. The excellent single engine procedure of the A-26 would probably have made a safe landing possible after the loss of the left engine if this rich mixture had not been used, resulting in loss of power in the good engine. The altitude at El Paso is 4000 feet and the A-26 'loads up' fast in the full rich position, especially at high altitude. A thorough ground check prior to takeoff or proper use of mixture control may have prevented this tragic end of a long, successful career.

(Credit Air Transport Command Flying Safety Journal)

IX. FLYING SAFETY FILE CORRECTION.....

The 26 August issue of this data sheet contained an error in paragraph V, entitled Flying Safety File. The heading reading "Air Force Regulations" should read, ARMY AIR FORCE REGULATIONS.

X. CREW CHIEFS NOTE.....

At Langley Field a P-51 landed after a local flight and was serviced for the next hop. The pilot climbed in and started the engine but quickly cut it again when he noticed that the oil pressure needle did not rise off zero.

Disconnecting the inlet oil line the crew chief found a metal disc, about the size of a half a dollar, bearing the inscription, "Good for $1.00 trade at Pure Place, Dayton, Ohio." The rim of the disc was well battered showing evidence of having been used to loosen and fasten cowling. Nuff said.....

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

Number 9
14 October 1946

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INFORMATION OF **ALL** PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I. THIS WEEK .....

One accident was reported.

A nearly perfect week was marred when a C-47 took off at Lawson Field and climbed abruptly for about fifty feet. The pilot then cut the throttles, and crash-landed straight ahead.

This is the first week since this publication was started that the number of accidents reported has been as low as one. We sincerely hope that this is a continuation of the downward accident trend that started during September. We know that there will be a few accidents, but it is our aim and our duty to cut these to a minimum. It behooves all of us, therefore, to redouble our efforts for safe flying because, having gone for a period of more than a week with only one accident, there are bound to be other accidents about to occur. Every Flying Safety officer and every pilot should consider that statement well. Knowing there is going to be an accident within the command, each pilot should take every possible precaution to make certain that he is not involved in it.

II. ACCIDENT STATISTICS.....September Accidents.....October Accidents to date.

3AF	3	1
9AF	5	0
12AF	6	0
Bases under TAC	5	0
TOTAL	19	1

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III. SEPTEMBER RATES.....

(The accident rates referred to hereafter in this publication will be based on 100,000 flying hours.)

The Tactical Air Command major accident rate for the month of September 1946 was 75 accidents per 100,000 flying hours. This is a reduction of 16 over the rate for the previous month. A total of 25,283 flying hours was recorded with 19 accidents. Flying time dropped 2,113 hours and the total accidents were lowered by six.

What was noticed in the statistics.....

The standing of the bases as to total accidents is as follows:

March Field.....6	Langley Field.....1
Biggs Field.....3	Greenville AAF.....1
Myrtle Beach....2	Brooks Field.....1
Lockbourne.....2	Lake Charles AAF....1
Pope Field.....2	

Myrtle Beach has the highest rate among the bases as they had two accidents and recorded but 418 hours giving them a rate of 478. Lockbourne was next with 158 and Pope Field was pushing with 155. This information is included in the chart labeled Incl #2.

The rates recorded by organizations are as follows:

312 Base Unit, March Field.....2 acc...391 hours.....Rate 512

317 Base Unit, Myrtle Beach.....2 acc...418 hours.....Rate 478

313 Base Unit, Greenville.....1 acc...282 hours.....Rate 355

316 Trp Carr Group, Pope Field....2 acc...648 hours.....Rate 309

1st Ftr Group, March Field.....3 acc..1109 hours.....Rate 271

477 Composite Gp., Lockbourne.....2 acc...862 hours.....Rate 232

12 Rcn Sqdn., March Field.....1 acc...571 hours.....Rate 175

309 Base Unit, Biggs Field.....1 acc...697 hours.....Rate 143

20th Ftr Group, Biggs Field.....2 acc..1796 hours.....Rate 111

300 Base Unit, Langley Field.....1 acc..1486 hours.....Rate 67

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363 Rcn Group, Brooks Field.....1 acc...1543 hours.....Rate 65

47 Bomb Group, Lake Charles.....1 acc...1974 hours.....Rate 51

(All statistics recorded in this Bulletin were compiled from the monthly 110 report transmitted to this headquarters by base statistical control units. Inaccuracy and garbling was evident so the figures used arent times approximate.)

The greatest improvement was shown by the 1st Fighter Group. This unit decreased its accidents from eight to three and its rate from 784 to 271. This reduction is reflected in the over-all 12th Air Force reduction. Of the three accidents that the 1st Fighter Group reported, two probably would not have occurred had this unit not been required to participate in air shows. It is expected that the frequency of this required participation will decrease; however, it is improbable that it will be eliminated altogether. The public wants to see P-80's, and it is the policy of the AAF that P-80's will participate in air demonstrations. To date, the 1st Fighter Group has been the main source of aircraft and personnel for these demonstrations. The problem of participating and returning to home station safely still exists, and it is one that must be solved by 12th Air Force personnel.

The policy established recently by the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, that every attempt be made by each pilot to fly a minimum of 20 hours a month is expected to be a major factor in the continued reduction of the accident rate for all stations. Experience is of primary importance in safe flying, and Flying Safety officers must exert themselves to see that all pilots assigned to the station attempt to reach this 20-hours-a-month figure. While it is true that the Flying Safety officer cannot require staff officers to fly more frequently, he should prepare a report for his commander giving the names of all persons on the station who do not meet the 20 hour minimum.

IV. A-26 WHEEL-WELL FIRE ON FINAL APPROACH.....

The aircraft, with a pilot and engineer aboard, had cleared from it's home base, Myrtle Beach, to Pope Field on a CFR flight plan. Upon arrival at Pope, the tower was called for landing information and the gear was lowered. As the aircraft passed over the end of the runway on final approach, the pilot of a transient aircraft parked there called on VHF that the right nacelle of the landing aircraft was on fire. The pilot of the A-26 touched down and brakes were applied. An attempt was made to blow-out the fire by running up the right engine but that was unsuccessful. The pilot then put the mixture control in idle-cut-off and cut all the switches. About this time the aft part of the nacelle fell to the runway after burning off. Brakes were again applied but the fire had burned through the hydraulic system, rendering them useless. Emergency brake pressure was used and failed also as the fire by then had burned away all hoses and connections at the right wheel nacelle.

The speed of the aircraft carried it off the end of the runway, down a slight incline, across the perimeter track and a drainage ditch. Before reaching the ditch, the engineer "bailed-out" over the left wing and fell

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to the ground with no injuries even though the aircraft was still moving quite rapidly. The pilot remained with the aircraft as it rolled to a stop 250 feet off the end of the runway and beyond the ditch. The aircraft was further damaged when one of the blades of the left propellor dug into the ground bending the blade.

As the aircraft completed its roll, the crash trucks were on hand and the fire was quickly extinguished due mainly to their quick response to the crash alarm.

The origin of the fire was undetermined due to the damage caused, but the board recommended that an investigation of all A-26 aircraft be made to determine if there is a possible fire hazard evident in the wheel nacelles with attention being directed to possibilities of accumulation of fuel or fumes in the nacelle, the clearance and action of the landing gear in respect to possible contact with hydraulic and electrical systems causing fire. Commanders of units flying A-26's should also give consideration to the advisability of recommending that the nacelles be vented.

V. FORWARDING THE FORM 14.....

When a base, other than the home base of aircraft and pilot, conducts the accident investigation, the completed Form 14 and inclosures should be forwarded direct to the home station of the pilot. The Commanding Officer of this station will then forward it to the tactical unit commander who will indicate his action and send it through channels to this Headquarters. If the aircraft involved is a base unit aircraft, the base commander will indicate his action and forward it through channels to this Headquarters.

On a recent accident at Godman Field, involving a March Field pilot and aircraft, Godman sent the Form 14 to this Headquarters instead of to the Commanding Officer, March Field. A similar mistake was made by Pope Field in sending the accident report on a Myrtle Beach aircraft to this Headquarters instead of to the Commanding Officer, Myrtle Beach.

Flying Safety officers should make certain the adjutant is properly briefed on what to do with accident reports. (AAF Regulation 62-14)

VI. FAULTY PILOT TECHNIQUE CAUSES NOSE-OVER OF P-6D.....

Twelve P-6D aircraft departed Barksdale Field enroute Brooks, their home station, on a CFR flight plan. While landing at Brooks Field, one aircraft bounced, veered to the left, went off the runway and nosed-over in soft earth only 60 yards from the parking ramp. The pilot suffered minor injuries.

The aircraft was in number two position in the third flight of the twelve aircraft formation. Landing information was given by the control tower to be right hand traffic. Routine "peel-off" was executed and the aircraft suffering the accident fell in behind the flight leader in a normal right hand pattern. On final approach, the pilot encountered severe prop-wash and made a "go-around". The pilot later stated that he noticed a cross-wind from the right

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so he attempted to make a wheel landing. Upon contact with the runway, he bounced or ballooned into the air. As he tried to correct with throttle, the aircraft veered to the left and the left wing dropped, dragging on the runway. At this point the pilot partially regained control but was headed directly for the parking ramp at excessive speed. Realizing that the aircraft must be stopped, the pilot applied full braking power and being on soft ground, the wheels dug in and the aircraft nosed-over on it's back.

Upon questioning other members of the flight, it was learned that each of them experienced a noticeable cross-wind from the right. However, since the other eleven pilots of the flight landed safely and without experiencing too much difficulty in so doing, the Accident Board assumed that the cross-wind was a minor contributing factor in the initial loss of control suffered by the pilot when the aircraft ballooned. The Board feels that proper pilot technique would have corrected this first loss of control.

The pilot has been directed to be placed under observation for a period of thirty days to determine his flying efficiency and if found deficient, to be re-evaluated.

VII. FLYING SAFETY OFFICERS NOTE.....

It is the intention of this headquarters to distribute once each month, copies of photographs of a recent accident, the narrative of which should prove interesting to all flying and maintenance personnel. The photographs will be 20 x 24 inches in size and approximately five will be distributed to each base with a narrative of the accident they depict. To obtain the negative of appropriate photographs it will be necessary for this headquarters to wire the reporting base to send them immediately. They will be returned as soon as prints have been made.

In this manner certain accidents can be publicized even greater than by it's being reported in this Bulletin.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

——— ACCIDENT RATE PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS

---------- FATAL ACCIDENT RATE PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS



NO. ACCIDENTS	6	10	7	24	25	15	23	25	19
NO. FATAL ACC.	2	3	1	4	2	2	2	4	4
FLYING HOURS	11435	10098	10981	32489	32813	39835	30094	27406	25293
NO. FATALITIES	2	5	1	7	8	6	2	10	12
ACCIDENT RATE	52	99	64	74	76	38	76	91	75

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COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATES BY AIR FORCE AND BASE
RATES PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS



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COMPARISON OF ACCIDENTS BY TYPES



COMPARISON OF ACCIDENTS BY PRIMARY CAUSE



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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

Number 10
21 October 1946

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INFORMATION OF **ALL** PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I. THIS WEEK.....

Three accidents were reported.

Two of these accidents concerned P-80 type aircraft from March Field. The other accident involved an AT-6 from Langley Field.

One of the P-80 accidents occurred when the aircraft experienced a hard landing and blew the nose-wheel tire. The shock caused damage to the nose-wheel and strut.

The other P-80 apparently lost aileron control while in formation and proceeded to perform barrel rolls on it's own. The pilot parachuted with minor injuries from 2000 feet.

The AT-6 was enroute from Pittsburg to Richmond, when the pilot became lost. As darkness approached, a wheels-up landing was made, resulting in major damage to the aircraft and causing minor injuries to the pilot. (Shoulder harness was not used.)

II. CURRENT TACTICS.....September Accidents.....October Accidents to date

3AF	3	1
9AF	5	0
12AF	6	2
Bases under TAC	5	1
TOTALS	19	4

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III. C-82 TAXI ACCIDENT.....

A crew chief was taxiing a C-82 type aircraft assigned to Greenville Army Air Base. The operator was fully qualified to taxi this type aircraft.

Moving slowly, the crew chief had first indication of trouble when the brakes refused to operate. The engines were cut immediately, but the aircraft continued rolling ahead. The crew chief called to nearby personnel to put chocks under the wheels but, before this could be accomplished, the aircraft had turned slowly to the right off the taxi strip and started down a hill toward a row of parked gliders. The C-82 suffered major damage to the nose section in the resulting collision with one of the gliders.

The board investigation revealed that the hydraulic electric pressure switch failed to make contact when the hydraulic pressure dropped to or below the automatic switch cut-in point. It was believed that the small metering valve in the Starbird Pressure Switch became obstructed by dirt and prevented hydraulic oil from free flow from the switch when there was a sudden drop in hydraulic system flow. The manual testing switch for the electric hydraulic pump is located in the nose section of this type aircraft and is inaccessible to the operating crew.

It has been recomended that this switch be re-located to the overhead control panel in the cockpit. This location would make the switch readily accessible to the crew operating the aircraft in case of failure of the automatic pressure switch. The board further recommended that the metering valve be inspected and cleaned at each 50 hour inspection.

IV. AAF ACCIDENT REVIEW.....

Army Air Forces, Flying Safety Service, Langley Field, Virginia, is publishing a weekly periodical entitled: "AAF Accident Review". The first issue has been received in this headquarters and covers the week ending 27 September 1946.

This publication is another aid that you Flying Safety officers can utilize in your pilots' meetings.

V. P-47 ENGINE FAILURE AT 1500 FEET.....

A flight of five P-47's departed from Lockbourne on a round-robin navigation flight. The pilot involved in the accident was flying in number four (4) position. He states that when about 100 miles out on course the engine began running rough and a slight amount of oil was being thrown on the windscreen. About fifteen minutes later, when on course at an altitude of 1500 feet above the terrain, the engine gave a surge of power and cut out completely. Fuel tanks had been changed some time earlier, but the pilot immediately switched tanks again and turned on the emergency fuel boost pump. The engine did not respond.

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The aircraft began losing altitude rapidly and the pilot, deciding he was too low to abandon the aircraft, looked for a clearing in which to crash-land. In making the dead-stick landing, the pilot undershot and came dangerously close to a farm house. To avoid hitting the house, he altered his approach slightly and one wing grazed the roof of a barn. The remainder of the flight watched the aircraft, landing in rough terrain and clipping trees, come to a stop in a wooded gully and begin to burn.

The pilot survived with only minor injuries. The aircraft was a complete wreck. The operator do s not know what happened from the time he was leveling the aircraft and stalling out until he found himself walking up a hill near the scene of the accident. He was evidently thrown clear as the aircraft cart-wheeled through the trees.

Witnesses both on the ground and in the air stated that the aircraft was tailing smoke before it crashed. The aircraft was a complete wreck and the cause of the engine failure could not be ascertained.

The board recommended that, even though the flight was conducted at an altitude in accordance with CFR flight, future flights be conducted at a higher altitude unless the mission is specified as a low-altitude cross-country flight.

VI. WEEKLY FLYING SAFETY SUGGESTIONS.....

Dated 4 October 1946, the first of a new series of "Weekly Flying Safety Suggestions for Base Comm nders" published by Flying Safety Service, was received last week. These suggestion sheets were suspended shortly after V-J Day, but now that post-war operations have been standardized somewhat, it became apparent that there was a continuing need for the dissemination of flying safety hints and reminders.

This first issue deals with Flying Regulation Violations. Copies are distributed to base commanders at all active stations in the Continental United States.

VII. C-82 GEAR RETRACTS ON LANDING.....

A C-82 assigned to Pope Field departed Miami, Florida, at 0100 for a night flight to it's home station. Fifteen minutes later the cockpit lights went out as well as the radio and electric flight instruments, indicating an electrical failure. Attempt was made to start the auxiliary power unit, but this could not be done due to the low condition of the batteries. Circuit breakers were checked along with all electrical equipment but the source of the trouble could not be found.

Returning to their point of departure, preparations were made to land. The gear was lowered by emergency freefall procedure, the green light showing that the gear was down and locked. The aircraft touched down within the first third of the runway, without lights, after attempts to attract tower personnel for a green light to land had failed. As the pilot started to lower

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the nose wheel to the runway, the left gear began to retract. Switches were cut and the aircraft came to a stop off the runway with no injuries to personnel.

At the present time, it is believed that the cause of the accident was probable malfunction of either of the down and lock micro-switches on the left gear, causing a false reading on the "green" light indicator. The reason for the electrical failure has not been determined.

VIII. CHANGE IN ACCIDENT RATE.....

The accident rate of 75 accidents per 100,000 flying hours stated in last week's issue is in error. This office received erroneous information regarding total flying time. The official 110 report from T.C Statistical Control Unit gives T.C a flying time total of 24,773 hours for September, instead of 25,293 as previously stated. This raises the TAC over-all rate from 75 to 77 accidents per 100,000 flying hours.

The following change in base accident rates was noted: March Field had second highest rate with 170.

The standings listed as rates recorded by organizations remains the same but with the following corrections:

1st Fighter Group, March Field	-	250 rate
12th Recon. Sqdn., March Field	-	146 "
309th Base Unit, Biggs Field	-	142 "
300th Base Unit, Langley Field	-	70 "

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

Number 15
25 November 1946

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INFORMATION OF **ALL** PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I. THIS WEEK.....

Three accidents were reported. A 54-day stretch with no fatal accidents in TAC was broken when the pilot of a P-80 from March Field lost aileron control at 4000 feet as he was preparing to land at El Centro Naval Station. He dropped his tip tanks, but spun in.

To Twelfth Air Force also goes credit for a Lockbourne P-47 accident since the 477th Composite Group is under the operational control of the Twelfth Air Force while on TDY at Blythe for participation in the maneuvers. This P-47 had a main gear collapse after the pilot landed with his red warning light on. He had previously checked with the tower and received their report that it appeared down and locked.

The third accident involved a Greenville C-47 which skidded off the runway and nosed up as it was landing at Lowry Field.

II. CURRENT STATISTICS.....October Accidents.....November Accidents to date

3AF	1	Inactivated
9AF	1	2
12AF	2	3
Bases Under TAC	3	1
TOTAL	7	6

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III. L-5 GROUND LOOPS - PILOT HADN'T CHECKED OUT.....

As aircraft accidents go, this one wasn't very expensive - it only cost the Government the price of a new Buick. It has a good lesson though.

Dover was closing down, and there was no formal training program in existence. When a friend wants to fly it's hard to turn him down. Besides, any pilot can fly an L-5 if the crew chief shows him how to start it.

So this commanding officer told the pilot to go ahead and fly without a check out, and he went ahead and flew and ran off the runway and ground-looped.

When all the reporting and corresponding was over the commanding officer said that he had verbally reprimanded the pilot and that in the future his pilots were going to check out before soloing. Maybe the pilot deserved a reprimand at that - he is supposed to know the regulations too.

The commander received a written administrative admonition.

P. S.

Paragraph 4, Section K, of the Form 14 asks, "Were there any violations of orders or regulations?" The Dover accident board said, "None."

Could it be that they still haven't heard of AAF Regulation 50-16!

IV. OCTOBER RATE.....

The seven major accidents that occurred in TAC in October brought a new low rate of 24 accidents per 100,000 pilot hours. It is particularly gratifying that none of these October accidents resulted in a fatality. December, 1945, is the only other month during the past four years (the major part of which time TAC was the old 3AF) during which there were no fatal accidents.

> This October record rate was established when TAC pilots flew 29,513 hours with only 7 major accidents. That is the overall picture, however, further breakdown brings out many interesting points.

One of the chief aims of the flying safety program has been to increase the hours flown per pilot, thereby increasing pilot proficiency. October brought an increase of nearly 5000 hours (20%) over September, even though several groups and an air force headquarters were involved in moves, and even though the number of pilots assigned dropped off. This is a credit to both operations and maintenance personnel.

To old Ninth Air Force (Biggs Field) goes the bouquet of the month. On October 28, their record of 35 days without a major accident was broken

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when an L-5 stationed at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, hit a goose and broke the prop while flying low over the Potomac. It was necessary for the pilot to ditch. It is unfortunate, however, that their safety streak should be broken by an accident of this type, for preliminary investigation indicated that the pilot was probably duck hunting, and further indicates that this and other detachments from the liaison squadrons are under practically no control from their parent organization or higher headquarters.

For the second successive month, Twelfth Air Force obtained a large decrease in their accident rate - from 170 in September to 49 in October. Both of the Twelfth Air Force accidents involved P-80's, one resulting from pilot error and the other from probable material failure, exact nature undetermined.

With two accidents, the L-5 managed to nose the P-80 out of top honors for the worst monthly accident record - this because both L-5 accidents resulted from pilot error. At Dover a pilot ground-looped after his first flight in an L-5, which flight was made without his being checked out. The other L-5 accident, which resulted in a fatality to one each goose, Canadian, and to one each L-5, Government issue, (death by drowning), was mentioned above.

The C-82, professional trouble maker among the air lift ships, kept a clean slate in October, but is back again in November.

After a month on the side lines the AT-6 is back in the game, but to no discredit to itself. You can't blame cockpit fog on the aircraft and it was really zero-zero in this cockpit when the pilot got lost and made a belly landing at night!

The accident rate by aircraft is as follows:

P-80	120
L-5	118
AT-6	31
C-47	23
A-26	22

The B-25, B-29, P-51 and P-6, P-47, P-61, C-45, C-46, C-82, Gliders, and miscellaneous type aircraft kept clean records.

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V. WHAT IT COST IN OCTOBER.....

The figures below are for cost of parts for replacement only and do not include the cost of man-hours spent in repair. Of necessity, they are approximate.

Type	What Happened	Cost
A-26	Nose gear collapse	$ 1,327.00
P-80	Nose gear collapse	2,000.00
P-80	Bail out--crash	113,471.00
C-47	Take-off stall, bellied in	50,000.00
L-5	Ditched	10,106.00
L-5	Ground looped	1,116.00
AT-6	Lost--bellied in	9,112.00
7	TOTAL	$187,132.00

VI. FLYING SAFETY OFFICERS NOTE.....

The 25 October 1946 edition of the AAF Accident Review is particularly valuable. The accident reading file, suggested on page 2, is considered excellent.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND



NO. ACCIDENTS	6	10	7	24	25	15	23	25	19			
NO. FATAL ACC.	2	3	1	4	2	2	2	4	4			
FLYING HOURS	11435	10098	10981	32489	32843	39835	30094	27406	25293			
NO. FATALITIES	2	5	1	7	8	6	2	10	12			
ACCIDENT RATE	52	99	64	74	76	38	76	91	75			

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COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATES BY AIR FORCE AND BASE
RATES PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS



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COMPARISON OF ACCIDENTS BY TYPES



COMPARISON OF ACCIDENTS
BY PRIMARY CAUSE



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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

Number 17
9 December 1946

PUBLISHED FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I. THIS WEEK.....

Three accidents were reported.

All of these accidents occurred to P-80 aircraft.

The second fatal accident of the month was reported when a P-80 from Langley crashed near Jacksonville, Florida. Cause has not definitely been established however witnesses state that the aircraft exploded in flight shortly after takeoff.

The other two P-80 accidents for the week involved March Field pilots. One had a nose gear collapse on landing and the other pilot experienced unit failure at 11,000 ft. Attempting a dead-stick landing, he undershot by 300 yards, stalling out as he tried to avoid a parked automobile. Striking at 15 degree angle the aircraft was a complete wreck and the pilot required hospitalization suffering from shock.

To date no accidents have been reported for December.

II. CURRENT STATISTICS.....October Accidents.....November Accidents

3AF	1	Inactivated
9AF	1	5
12AF	2	* 7
Bases under TAC	3	4
TOTAL	7	16

* Accident previously credited to 12AF in error has been picked up by TAC instead. Reference paragraph VII this issue.

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



III. C-82 PUSHES AROUND .. C-46 IN TAXI ACCIDENT.....

Two crew chiefs climbed aboard a C-82 at Bergstrom and prepared to taxi the aircraft from a maintenance hangar at one end of the ramp to the squadron parking area at the other end. Starting the engines they checked instruments and noted normal readings. The auxiliary power unit was left on for the taxi operation. The brakes worked normally as the aircraft moved slowly down the ramp. It was necessary to use them frequently as they had a 22 mph tail wind and the aircraft wanted to roll. All went well until a 90 degree turn to the left was attempted at the far end of the ramp. Feeling no reaction on application of pressure on the left brake pedal, the operator noticed that the hydraulic pressure gauge indicated only 200 lbs pressure. He then applied both brakes in an attempt to stop the aircraft and instructed the other crew chief to go down the ladder and turn on the manual pressure switch. At this time the operator saw that his aircraft would strike a parked C-46 before any further action could be taken so he placed the mixture controls in idle cut-off positions and retarded the throttles. Before he could turn off the battery switch, the C-82 struck the C-46 head-on and the force of the impact knocked the right mixture control into auto-rich, starting the engine and driving both aircraft approximately 25 feet off the apron before the engine could be stopped. Switches

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were then cut and the enlisted men left the aircraft with no injuries but both aircraft were very badly damaged.

The board believes that when the hydraulic pressure dropped below 600 PSI, the Hydraulic Electrical pressure switch (P/N 4268 - 1505) failed to function. All C-82 aircraft are being modified by relocation of the panel assembly electric system. This involves placing the manual pressure switch for the hydraulic system in the cockpit so that it is instantly available.

IV. FLYING ACCIDENT BULLETIN.....

Flying Safety Service monthly publication entitled "Flying Accident Bulletin" for September 1946 has been received in this headquarters. Of interest was the fact that the P-80 steals the show for the highest accident rate for the period, January to September 1946.

The high and low accident rates among aircraft flown in excess of 5,000 hours for that period are listed below:

	Highest Rate		Lowest Rate	
Major Accidents	P-80	385	C-54	12
Fatal Accidents	P-80	39	(C-54, AT-11 and L-4)	0
Fatalities	B-29	63	(C-54, AT-11 and L-4)	0
Aircraft Wrecked	P-80	154	C-47	1
Minor Accidents	PT-13	85	B-25	7

V. AT-6 GROUND-LOOP WITH TAIL WHEEL UNLOCKED.....

An AT-6 from March Field, piloted by a Captain, was making a normal full flap landing. As the gear touched the runway the aircraft veered sharply to the right. Left brake and rudder were applied along with partial power but these measures were not effective and the aircraft completed a 360 degree ground-loop. Both wing tips were damaged, the right wing was buckled, right landing gear bent, and the left landing strut damaged beyond repair. The tail wheel and the tail wheel lock were not damaged.

The opinion of the Accident Investigation Board as to the cause of the accident is that the tail wheel was not locked for landing. The pilot states that the lock was engaged prior to takeoff and left in the locked position for the duration of the flight. Examination of the tail wheel and the runway indicate that the tail wheel received no excessive wear. Inspection of the locking mechanism shows no malfunction. It is the belief of the board that the tail wheel was not locked by the pilot as he claimed.

T.O. 01-60F-57 dated 4 June 1946 prescribes the installation of a tail wheel lock on all AT-6C, D, and F type aircraft. Since that date Tactical Air Command has had a total of seven accidents caused by AT-6 groundloops, however, six of the seven accidents occurred to aircraft on which the T.O. had not been complied with. The only accident that has occurred to an AT-6 equipped with a tail wheel lock is the accident described above. In that

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case the tail wheel lock was evidently not used.

This headquarters feels that there is no excuse for failure to use the tail wheel lock in an AT-6. Commanders have been directed that in the future any instances of ground-loop of an AT-6, wherein the Investigation Board finds that the pilot did not use the tail wheel lock, will be investigated by the commander concerned with a view to taking or recommending disciplinary action under the 104th Article of War.

VI. ICING.....

Flying Safety Officers should place special emphasis during their weekly meetings on icing now that we're flying in cold weather.

Most non-tactical aircraft are without anti-icing and de-icing equipment. Clearing authorities should be especially particular on all IFR clearance to be assured that the aircraft are properly equipped for the type flight to be attempted.

Pilots, before takeoff, should check all anti-icing and de-icing equipment including checking of pitot heat.

References listed below are recommended for coverage in weekly pilot meetings:

"Weekly Flying Safety Suggestions For Base Commanders," Flying Safety Service

Vol III, Number 4, dated 25 October 1946, "Icing."

Vol III, Number 5, dated 1 November 1946, "Cold Weather Operations."

Film

Navy Aviation Training Film, MN-119a, "Aerology - Ice Formation on Aircraft." This film can be obtained from film libraries with an instructors guide sheet that contains a test on items covered in the film.

VII. BASE COMMANDERS AND FLYING SAFETY OFFICERS NOTE.....

A teletype has been received from Headquarters AAF stating: "Aircraft accident responsibility is charged..... to the home station and command of the operator of the aircraft. This policy will..... include cases of aircraft being ferried wherein the pilot and the aircraft are assigned to different commands."

A P-47 accident earlier this month was originally credited to Twelfth Air Force. Since the accident responsibility is charged to the operator's home station, Lockbourne picked up this accident.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

Number 18
16 December 1946

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INFORMATION OF **ALL** PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I. THIS WEEK.....

Three accidents were reported.

A Brooks Field L-5, flying out of Belvoir, received major damage when carburetor ice caused engine stoppage and a forced landing.

A P-80 from March Field had a nose wheel collapse when the pilot made a rough landing at Greater Pittsburg Airport. This is the second such accident credited to this same pilot.

The third accident was a fatal, and like most fatal accidents, it was entirely unnecessary. The airdrome officer at Scott Field walked into the spinning prop of a Lockbourne B-25. Apparently he was trying to enter the aircraft.

II. CURRENT STATISTICS.....November Accidents.....December Accidents to date

9AF	5	1
12AF	8	0
Bases under TAC	4	1
	17	2

III. P-80 MATERIEL FAILURE ACCIDENT.....

The pilot involved in this accident was leading a two-ship local formation in CAVU weather. Both aircraft were taxied to the end of the runway where engine run-up and checks were completed. The pilot of the lead aircraft

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ran up his unit to 97% with the I-16 on and started takeoff roll. Tail pipe temperature was normal and never exceeded normal operating maximum. The fire warning light did not come on.

As soon as he was airborne, he raised the gear and as it started up, he heard a loud explosion followed by a whirring noise and immediate loss of power. The aircraft had about 20 feet altitude when this occurred and the pilot made a 30 degree turn to get into the only suitable field to be seen. A dead-stick belly landing was made with tip tanks on.

When the aircraft came to a stop, the pilot opened the canopy and made a hasty exit as he noticed flames spurting from the plenum doors. He received no injuries. The aircraft, however, was classed as a wreck even though the fire was quickly extinguished.

Investigation reveals that the bearing on the impeller shaft at the accessory section failed, letting the impeller move forward against the compressor case, causing it to disintegrate and freeze the unit. The exact cause of the bearing failure will be determined when the unit is disassembled at the overhaul depot.

IV. TOTAL ACCIDENTS FOR NOVEMBER 1946.....

The month of November 1946 saw an alarming increase of total accidents over the previous month. October 1946 recorded seven accidents. This past month we recorded 17 major aircraft accidents. More than doubled!

Eight accidents occurred to P-80 aircraft; two each to AT-6, C-82, and CG-15's; one each to C-47, P-47, and B-25.

March Field led the parade again with a total of eight accidents. Langley Field was next with two and Bergstrom, Pope, Stewart, Greenville, Lockbourne, Shaw, and Lawson each had one.

The three fatal accidents involved personnel from March, Langley and Lawson. The March and Langley accidents involved P-80 aircraft and the Lawson Field fatality occurred in a CG-15 crash.

V. POOR FLIGHT PLANNING.....

A lot has been said, more has been written about the importance of proper flight planning. We believe the following accident narrative, explained with cold facts, can best describe the foolhardiness of attempting a flight without first giving the undertaking an ounce of thought.

AT-7 #42-2493

A Lieutenant Colonel, senior pilot, filed an AAF Form 23 for a night CFR flight from Andrews Field, Washington, D. C., to Berry Field, Nashville, Tennessee. Estimated time enroute was three hours and forty minutes at 170 mph.

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Five hours of fuel was entered on the clearance as being aboard the AT-7. The L.C. signed the 23 as clearing officer and departed for the aircraft.

In the pilot's seat for the takeoff was a First Lieutenant. The co-pilot's seat was occupied by a Major. The Lieutenant Colonel, another Major and a First Lieutenant were seated in the rear as passengers.

Takeoff was uneventful and level-off was made at 8,000 feet with power reduced to 27 inches and 1800 rpm. Mixture was lean.

After a normal flight of three hours had been accomplished, the lieutenant pilot noticed that fuel was running low. He believed, however, that they had enough to reach their destination. He advised the co-pilot of this, reduced rpm to 1700, and switched tanks, using all available fuel and finally switched to the tank indicating the most fuel.

Upon checking a map and determining their location, they found that an auxiliary field was nearby to the right of course. The Lt. Col. was informed and a decision was made to land at this field as they agreed that they could make it.

The pilot states that, after the engines quit due to fuel starvation at approximately 7,000 feet, the passengers, who were sleeping, were awakened and instructed to put on their parachutes. However, by the time everyone was ready to bail out, the aircraft was too low.

Undoubtedly there was some confusion in putting on parachutes in time and in the decision of whether or not to bail out, but the final choice was definitely to remain with the aircraft and try to reach the auxiliary airport.

The pilot was gliding the aircraft at 90 mph indicated with flaps and gear up. He states that he advised the others to brace themselves as best they could for a crash landing. Landing lights were turned on shortly before they brushed the tops of some trees. The aircraft struck the ground further on and came to a stop against a line of trees just three hundred yards short of the auxiliary field they had intended to land on. This field is 24 miles NNE of their original point of first intended landing, Berry Field, Nashville, Tennessee.

The crash was fatal to the Major seated in the middle of three seats in the cabin of the AT-7. The Lieutenant Colonel suffered major injuries sitting in the forward seat and the Lieutenant in the rear seat received minor injuries as did the pilot and co-pilot. The aircraft was wrecked.

Investigation reveals that none of the passengers had their safety belts fastened at the time of the crash even though the pilot and co-pilot were strapped in. The pilot and co-pilot suffered minor cuts and abrasions and they were in the part of the aircraft which was most heavily damaged. The passengers were more seriously injured although they were occupying that part of the aircraft which was not so badly damaged. The pilot and co-pilot were the only ones conscious after the crash.

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Upon checking all four tanks of the aircraft, they were found to be empty. No nose tank was installed. The altimeter setting was 30.25. (The correct altimeter setting for the Nashville area at the time of the accident was 30.43).

Investigation reveals that fuel consumption on the last four flights as checked by the AAF Form 1A averaged 42½ gals. per hour. On the flight described above, fuel consumption would have to be 55 gals. per hour if they had 206 gals. when they departed Andrews. The flight crew did not check this until it was too late. The only fuel check made prior to takeoff was what they read off the dial.

Undertaking a flight of this length in an AT-7 aircraft should have been cause for concern and reason to believe that the operators would be "sweating out" the petrol. At least they should have noticed consumption long before they ran dry. The Form 23 indicates that the flight was to be conducted at 170 mph with five hours of fuel aboard. It further indicates a wind of 260 degrees at 45 mph. The maximum range at 170 mph is four hours. This precludes the possibility of reaching their destination with any margin of safety.

It is indeed disheartening to arrive at the conclusion that happens so many times. Trying to go too far, too fast, on too little. In this case it was fatal.

Don't go into Operations, grab a 23, sneak a peek at a sequence or two, get that signature on the bottom and get the hell out of there. Take your time, look things over thoroughly, plan it through and then act with a little common sense.

VI. ACCIDENT OF THE MONTH.....

Accident of the Month photos and narrative were mailed out this week. This concerns a fatal A-26 accident and is the second of a series of Accident of the Month photographs.

VII. SPECIAL ACCIDENT STUDIES.....

The following Special Accident Studies published by AAF Flying Safety Service have been distributed to all bases. Additional copies are available upon request.

P-80.....	24 August 1945	A-26.....	18 December 1944
	30 April 1946		7 July 1945
	27 June 1946		26 August 1946
	28 October 1946		
		B-25.....	20 June 1945
P-51.....	30 October 1944		7 July 1945
	30 October 1945		19 October 1945
	6 November 1945		15 February 1946

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C-46.....	6 April 1945	AT-6.....	November 1944
	18 October 1945		28 February 1945
			22 May 1945
C-47.....	23 May 1945		19 June 1946

These studies cover a sufficient number of accidents to arrive at well-considered and very valuable conclusions. If not already accomplished, all safety officers should immediately cover, at the weekly meetings, those listed above that are pertinent to their units.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION DATA

Number 19
23 December 1946

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INFORMATION OF **ALL** PILOTS

PREPARED BY FLYING SAFETY SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, TAC

I THIS WEEK .....

Four accidents were reported.

The unit access doors of a P-80 blew off in flight causing major damage to the aircraft which was from March Field. The pilot landed safely.

A P-51 from Shaw Field nosed up on landing the cause of which indicates poor braking technique as the pilot landed with the right brake locked.

Two passengers aboard a C-82 from Bergstrom were injured when turbulence jostled the aircraft. The pilot had instructed all passengers to fasten their safety belts and leave them fastened until further notice. Several passengers unfastened them as soon as they were airborne.

Another C-82 accident occurred when the aircraft became airborne, lost power, and settled back on the runway. The pilot was unable to stop the aircraft before it left the end of the runway and major damage resulted. The aircraft was from Pope Field.

An AT-6 is still missing on a round robin cross-country from Myrtle Beach to Pope to Jacksonville, North Carolina. To date aircraft from Pope and Myrtle Beach have not located the missing six. No position report was received from this aircraft after it departed Myrtle Beach.

II CURRENT STATISTICS..... November Accidents....December Accidents to date

9AF	5	4
12AF	8	1
Bases under TAC	4	2
	17	7

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

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III TRYING TO PUT A ROUND PEG IN A SQUARE HOLE .....

This is a report of a minor accident, but minor or major, the gross negligence involved bears reproduction here so all can read and heed.

One afternoon recently, a C-46 from Shaw Field, Sumter, South Carolina, and an AT-6 from Berg strom Field, Austin, Texas were involved in a taxi accident at Greenville AAB. It seems that the C-46 with a 108 foot wing span attempted to taxi through a 105 foot space between an AT-6 and a C-47. It didn't make it and and a minor accident was the result.

Here are the facts:

The pilot of the taxiing C-46 was attempting to enter the transient parking ramp. He was directed to proceed between a parked AT-6 on his right and a parked C-47 on his left by his co-pilot, the alert crew and the pilot of the AT-6. All personnel concerned thought that the wing of the C-46 would clear, but "forgot the antenna on the AT-6". The right aileron of the C-46 was damaged and also the antenna of the AT-6.

Neither the AF Form 14 nor the indorsements attached thereto gave any reason for the absence of wing-walkers in a congested area. One indorsement did state however, that "proper taxi procedure, using wing-walkers, will

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continue to be emphasized at this station". (Borgstrom)

The personnel involved in this accident no doubt will, at least in the future, comply with the provisions of paragraph 7a, AAF Regulation 60-16. It is our desire that all who read this do likewise. Don't be too proud to get out and take a look or at least have a man on each wing tip when taxiing in a congested area.

Summary: A C-46 with a 108 ft wing span just will not fit in a 105 ft space without something being bent or broken.

IV NOVEMBER RATE.....

The flying time for November 1946 dropped over 5,000 hours below that of the month previous while at the same time the accidents soared from seven to seventeen. This gives Tactical Air Command a rate of 71 accidents per 100,000 flying hours. The total flying time reported was 23,862 hours.

Of the seventeen accidents the P-80 accounted for eight, almost half of the total. Two of these were fatal accidents. Three were accidents that occurred when the nose gear collapsed on landing roll.

A glance at the tables attached to this issue shows that most of the accidents occurred during landing. Also, a majority were caused by pilot error.

Among the bases, March Field was high with a rate of 211 accidents per 100,000 hours. Lawson Field was next with 180 and Stewart Field followed with a 169 rate.

Biggs Field had the best safety record of the month, flying more than 3,000 hours without a major accident. Brooks Field was not far behind.

V DISTRIBUTION OF AAF FORMS 14 AND 14A.....

AAF Flying Safety Service has been receiving blurred carbon copies of AAF Forms 14 and 14A in violation of AAF Regulation 62-14 as amended by 62-14C. Paragraph 48a of cited regulation states that the original will be submitted directly to AAF Flying Safety Service. The reason for this is that forms are photostated for filing, and carbons will not show up clearly.

VI OPERATIONS OFFICERS NOTE.....

With the coal crisis over, the restriction to ten hours per month per pilot has been lifted and the TAC Commanding General's policy of twenty (20) hours a month minimum where at all practicable is again in effect. This includes all staff pilots as well as those in the lower tactical units.

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VII FLYING SAFETY OFFICERS NOTE.....

Is it a major or is it a minor? How many times have you asked yourself that question? About as many times as you have said, "But it wasn't sudden stoppage", we'll bet. Well here is the answer to your questions.

Accident Investigating Officers in the field have been giving a wide variety of interpretations to T.O. 02-1-15. This pertains to the phrase, "Abruptly stopped or slowed down", contained in paragraph 2a (1) of above cited regulation.

AAF Flying Safety Service requested clarification of this phrase from AMC citing the following example.

A P-51, with engine turning up approximately 3000 rmp, nosed forward. The prop struck the runway curling up 1 1/2 inches of each prop tip, the aircraft settled back in a three point position and the engine was stopped in the normal manner. The accident report stated that the engine was not reduced in speed enough to require an overhaul. AMC's reply is quoted below:

"It is the opinion of this headquarters that strict compliance with Technical Order 02-1-15 would have necessitated the removal and overhaul of the engine involved in the accident to the P-51 aircraft.

"The proper interpretation of the phrase, 'abruptly stopped or slowed down', if the propeller comes in contact with a fixed object, that object will slow down the rotation of the propeller within the meaning of paragraph 2a (1) of Technical Order 02-1-15.

"It is also the opinion of this headquarters that damage to the engine can in no way be judged from the damage suffered by the propeller."

Flying Safety Service has no desire to reclassify minor accidents, nor to see engines changed unnecessarily by maintenance personnel. However, it is felt that in the interest of safety, no engine that has suffered possible internal damage should be allowed to remain on an aircraft and unnecessarily jeopardize the safety of future flights.

VIII ACTION ON VIOLATIONS OF FLYING REGULATIONS.....

AAF Flying Safety Service "Violation Report", dated September 1946, lists on page 9 a table showing the number of actions taken on violations by commands for the months of July, August and September 1946.

Tactical Air Command had 16 of these in July, 14 in August and 8 in September. In comparison with the other commands TAC had the most in July, was second in August and fourth in September with the number of actions taken on violations.

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IX CHRISTMAS GREETINGS.....

The editors and staff of this publication wish to each of you a happy holiday season and may each of you enjoy successful flights during the coming year.

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TACTICAL AIR COMMAND



NO. ACCIDENTS	6	10	7	24	25	15	23	25	19	7	17	
NO. FATAL ACC.	2	3	1	4	2	2	2	4	4	0	3	
FLYING HOURS	11435	10098	10981	32489	32843	39835	30094	27406	25293	29513	23862	
NO. FATALITIES	2	5	1	7	8	6	2	10	12	0	3	
ACCIDENT RATE	52	99	64	74	76	38	76	91	75	24	71	

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C[illegible]ON OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATES BY AIR FORCE AND BASE
RATES PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS



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COMPARISON OF ACCIDENTS BY TYPES



COMPARISON OF ACCIDENTS BY PRIMARY CAUSE

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0-46

BASE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

Held at

HEADQUARTERS, TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia

0900 to 1030

11 July 1946

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C O P Y

It is my pleasure to welcome you to our headquarters and I hope your visit will be pleasant and profitable. I am sure it will be to us. We have been trying to have this conference for sometime and we all welcome this opportunity to have you with us.

The purpose of the conference is to discuss and determine the policies of the relationship and responsibilities of the Base Unit, Tactical Group, and the Service Group at base level. Admittedly our present organizations are not suited, however, we have the present organizations to work with as tools and it will take some time to effect any changes in our authorized T/O, so in the present discussion we will confine our remarks to our organization. If we end this conference in sufficient time, then we will have an opportunity to discuss what we think for the ideal organizations and I am sure everybody has some ideas. Some of the factors we must consider are the inherent characteristics of tactical units and the mission assigned to this command. These two factors demand mobility and tactical integrity of the tactical group and service group, and that demands that the base must function whether it is a tactical group or not. Our manpower shortage will also be a factor as everybody is pinched for manpower and the indication is there will be further pinch. Another factor is the differance in the operations of the Third, Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces. It might be that we can consider a different type of organization for the Third, Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces. WD Cir. 178 just recently published states that the base commander is the commanding officer of the base unit assigned to operate the base. He will exercise duties and responsibilities of post commander outlined in AR 210-10. These responsibilities and functions

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are divided into two classes: Those which can be delegated and those which cannot be delegated. Those which cannot be delegated are those imposed by law, articles of war, etc. Those which can be delegated concern facilities, welfare of personnel, discipline and conduct and appearance of personnel, preservation and proper use of government property, enforcement of law and court martial jurisdiction, enforcement of rigid expenditure of public funds in the public interest, etc. We must consider in our discussion the present trend of AAF towards integration that is outlines in AR 65-73, however, we must not consider that integration is to be the expression of tactical efficiency. General Order No. 2 made the assignment of bases and units to the Air Forces or to this command direct. It is amplified by letter of 15 April "Assignment of Units and Bases" (read letter).

* * * * * * * *

Commanding General:

You all know that over the past 15 or 20 years, we have been confronted with a problem of the relationship which is exercised between the groups and bases. I have been the recipient of the unsatisfactory situation myself. In my own mind I have ideas on how it should be solved, which I have never been able to put into effect. It may have been that there was no unity of personalities, or conflicting regulations which kept us fromreaching a solution . Over the past six months we have been operating under a condition which is not the best system. I hope that as a result of the difficulties we have had ever the past six months that we can make a much better solution than before.

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Commanding General:

In reaching that solution there are a few prinicples that I am insistant upon. Any solution to which you come must embody the principles I am going to announce or I won't approve. You are free to make any expression you see fit to make. I want everybody to feel perfectly at ease, if you fail todo that your are not really a participant inthis discussion. The principles I am interested in are: 1. Integrity of units - I do not want the units to become confused. For example, The group commander must have command over the group. The service group commander must be commander over the service group as long as we have one. He must have all preogative of a commander. The base Commander must have the prorogative of a base commander. By formulating such a policy there are several things we gain. 1. Experience. 2. We are taking a step towards clearer cut responsibilities. 3. Most important, by adopting such a system, we create a condition that is condusive to the mobility that is inherent to our job. We must be able to move these units around. We establish a system of the movement of each unit and its ability to operate then and there. If it is possible, I would like to have been able to establish a system that unifies a command. A command that is in the hands of any one man. I personally favor base commander being in command of all units on the field. If you all come up with that agreement I will accept it provided it has all of the features I advised. I want to repeat what A-4 said to the effect that we should not confuse the purpose of this conference to get away from "R" tables or our desire to establish another principle either to service group or tactical group. Our object must be for integrity of units and their ability to operate independently and alone.

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Chief of Staff:

I would like to discuss the system of command as arrival at by the staff after reviewing the recommedations and comments of the various commanders of the field. We outlined some sort of a basis to start the discussion. In reviewing all the recommendations and concurrences and objections of the staff and myself, it appears and is concurred in by the staff that the only way to maintain and have a proper command system is to have what we term a single command, on a base. That is in line with what General Quesada would like to have done. In order to solve many of the problems which come up, the various responsibilities and functions which have to be implemented from the high command, it appears there should be a single commander on the base. How are we going to arrive and adher to requlations and still maintain the freedom of the units which the Commanding General desires. There are several ways of doing this: Take the base commander and assign the various units on the baseto the base, then we would have a channel of command from the Air Force or command, depending on the next highest echelon to the base commander who then was responsible to the base complement and to the t tactical group and service group. The question then arises that in order for the higher commander to implement his policies in a free manner with a tactical group in his relations for training and operations, it might be desirable tohave this base ~~base~~ commander responsible for all functions with the exception of training and operations and have the tactical and service group commanders responsible to the Air Force commander for these responsibilities. Suppose we would have the tactical group commander as commanding officer of the base. There have developed many difficulties in such arrangements, the principle one is it is felt that the tactical group commander would be so involved in the administrative matters that he would neglect the very thing you want to

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Chief of Staff (Contd)

maintain in giving him wide latitude to train and operate his group. His organization is such that he could not use his own staff here for all necessary inpections of the base activity in maintaining these various functions which could not be delegated as base commander and still properly train and operate this group and still pick up his group and leave the base in any condition which would be accepted by higher headquarters. We might even go so far as to designate the tactical group commander as base commander if he had a bonafide executive officer who could continue the operations and training of the group. He would then be in command of the base but using base facilities for the actual execution of the base responsibility. That brings up one of the few questions - is that base commander the one who has majority responsibility. For the present then do we want an individual who is more throughly versed in administrative matters; experience and ability or who's experience is almost entirely tactical. Which would we get now. It is the feeling of the staff that with the present situation as far as operations and training, the responsibility and the emphasis of higher headquarters on th proper operation of the base, the political complications and things like that, it would be better at this time have an individual in charge of the base who is well versed and experienced in handling administrative matters and with tactical group command we feel group commander would benefit considerably as his administrative training which may have been a little bit overlooked, in his experience at this time. A good sole base commander would be able to lend considerable assistance to this group commander in the administrative conduct of his group and service group. After considering all these factors, we might mention one other. The Third Air Force came up with a plan. (Explained Chart).

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Cont'd Chief Of Staff

The T/O and the authorization for base complement are utilized here in its present form. The one thing have done is in order to arrive at a single command and to facilitate supply and maintenance as well, if you lack efficient utilization of personnel, they have selected an individual as commander of base and called him Tactical Group and Station Commander. theStaff of Tactical and service froups have been integrated. Base complement is one of several units under tactical group, but run by the tactical group and service group staffs. There are several combinations. The tactical group commander or deputy commander could be in charge of base complement, depending on seniority.

The service gropp commander wo ld be S-4. The various staffs are integrated in order to make use of any of the facilities, several of service groups personnel work under base sections. Many of base personnel go into service group and work. It appears like a very simple organization. Present drawback in that type of organization is that it would take some time for tactical and service group to extricate from the base and leave it in a manner so it can function. The staff, however, after weighing these things feels that by having a single command that the base commandef should be so designated so that tactical and service groups would be assigned to base and without any exceptions that all responsibility and flew from air force to base commander to base units be assigned to base. Proper thing for certain commands. We will have all the various staff sections follow so we do not get into too much discussion on the responsibilities of various staff sections, I would like to confine the discussion to that of command responsibilities in such an organization. After this particular discussion, each of vario s staff sections will take up effect of its functions under such a system and recommend responsibility of base commander, there will be an open discussion of responsibilities on his staff.

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Deputy Commanding General:

I would like to offer one more pos ible solution. As I see the regulation now, most allof uscontemplate tactical and administrative form of command. In my recent visits and discussions with base and tactical group commanders, I wonder if the difficulty may be the interpretation of the existing regulation. Maybe we all read and interpret the existing regulation wrong. There is a question in my mind whether the present regulations may be could not be followed if we all interpret them in the same way in which they were intended. They contemplated administrative chain of command and tactical chain of command.

Chief of Staff:

You have to specify what administrative responsibilities are as commander in chain of command as the responsibilities would be divided. The tactical group commander with responsibility of running the base is too much of a lead imposed upon and individual. Further, base functions are very important and many will take him from giving too much thought to tactical training and efficiency and his tendency may be to impose upon the individual who is going to be responsible for the training and tactical efficiency of the group, maybe too much. As I see the regulations they are so drawn as to have two channels of command now as everybody has understood.

* * * * * * * *

CG: Wonder if Army Air Forces have any views.

AAF-representative: We are trying to. I am reluctant to admit that they are not quite ready. AGP is trying to revise that regulation 210-10 with respect to base commander. They are trying to reword the regulation so that command is delegated to senior man. We thought if they were going to revise it we would like to add a few paragraphs and are working on that.

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AAF - representative: Cont'd

It might solve most of our difficulties.

* * * * * * * *

CG, Third AF:

The approach to this problem has been that everyone says we will try to make tactical group, base, or service group commander boss on this base. In my mind, I think everyone agrees that a single command is necessary. That is the job we have to do. Forget individuals and personalities, set up the job and responsibilities and then pick a man for the job. Everyone wants to set up the job and put the manin it at the same time. Command necessarily includes command of supply and I don't see how you can have an efficient organization by having two channels. One person should be responsible for the whole works. Every now and then I hear that the base commander on tactical group commander with both jobs would be too much. The proper stagg is all that is needed. Lets set up the job and worry who is going to do it.

Commanding General:

Several things you said are very pertinent. The only fault which I offer constructively is this: Take Tex Sanders - no personality in involved. He is commander of a group. Give him responsibility of the entire base. I am afraid he is vitally concerned with the operations of the group and he will loan to that group. One point very well taken by me is that job of base commander is not beyond capabilities by him or anyone we may designate as base commander, whichever he might be/. I would like to add to that that my experience has been that if I were given a job as base commander my job would be eased by virtue of authority. If I were a group commander I would run my group easier and more efficiently if I had the authority over all base activities.

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CG-9th AF:

In Europe we did that but the situation was different when you moved out you abandoned the station and there were no politics to worry about.

Chief of Staff:

I would like to bring out in arriving at one thing that everybody agreed on that you shouldhave a single commander on base. There are several ways of accomplishing that. After a thorough discussion by members of the staff it was decided that divided responsibility is not very good whether it is more or less.

A-4:

We desire to get the views of various conferees on those particular things. Whether a single command is better.

CG, Third AF:

We must keep in mind what we are trying for. If we put this into effect and we move out, is the base commander going to stay? No, but you break up your chain of command. By the time you should have the system wor worked out. I do not believe putting a base commander in direct chain of command would work.

Page 11 A-4: What is your proposal?

CG, Third Air Force:

My proposal involves change of T/O. Divide the service group into two squadrons in the tactical group. Thwy must be able to move in six hours in order to do that they have to be set up to go but the base will only serve as 3d echelon base. My sistem which takes 2d echelon out of hands of tactical squadron is wrong.

A-4:

The change of organization is one thing I don't think we are prepared to discuss.

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CON'TD Page 11

Commanding General:

The operational chain of command will go direct from the group to Air Force.

Chief Of Staff:

Would you assign service group to tactical group?

Deputy Commanding General:

Two channels of command, administrative and tactical, of people who don't agree with duties. Maybe if all regulations were rewritten maybe we would not feel we have this divided responsibility and authority. Maybe we don't know what the authoriteás of base commander and tactical group commander are - maybe because they are two complicated for people to digest.

Page 12

Representative from Third Air Force:

One thing I think we all agree on is principles. We want to be prepared for thought of war for the tactical group. What is the mission of this tactical group? How is it later to separate and function of the base is going to take care of a differant mission, we have to give greater thought to the tactical situation. I think as far as you all know that group would be a protective force and to suggest it for that group commander when he determines the necessity for dispach. If he has to go through three headquartersto get supplies, that affects his work and tears down what's been build up. The mission has to be determined. Once it is, we will perform longer fighter operations. A strategic location would aid and protect quite an area. The group should be given every priority and consideration.

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Con'td Page 12

Commanding General:

Do you want the base commander to have fulljurisdiction over everything on the base?

Representative from Third Air Force:

No, sir, if the mission was to provide a fighting force.

Commanding General:

Suppose he is the group and base commander, would you agree?

Page 13

Representative from Third Air Force:

Yes, sir, if you want that group supported to its fullest extent.

SAC Representative:

It has not been used yet. We think we are having trouble. The main trouble is say we have a plan for SAC operations in order to meet it put our groups out overseas, general approval indicated whereby we would rotate groups to primitive bases for part of training area presented the problem wherby we will have to maintain bases. I would like to restate that this plan is in channels and not approved in our headquarters. I mentioned already the problem of maintaining primitive bases. We are in the long range business and with type of equipment we have, we have to operate from a fairly permanent base. Our plan is that we would have a permanent base in the United States for every unit that we have, overseas we would also have a certain number of bases. The base organization that would maintain those bases would be on permanent status. WE would rotate our units out and that provides a home for dependents for people in groups.

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Sac Representative:

That, of course, does provide more bases than units. On base requirements there, we anti cipate that some base will not have all their units on them some of the time. We expect to use that for replenishing supplies and bringing maintenance of base up to a higher standard. Our organization would be one whereby we would set up a combat group, three tactical squadrons, engineering and material squadrons. But under a combat group commander the base can perform 2d and 3d echelon maintenance.

Page 15

Commanding General:

Let's clarify that point. You are opposed to the idea of having bomb groups and service groups. You would like to have one bomb group with five squadrons. Initially there should be one commander on the base who must have full command by reducing those things carrying the personnel at basses. We know with the combat group all elements of equipping and supplying necessary to function. We keep them to insure a proper working organization. The people in engineering and supply publish no requirements for working on them withit one organization and one purpose.

A-4:

Would be combat group commander to be Base commander. Establish base unit as additional unit under his commadn. Difficulty comes when there is more than one group on each base. There is a personnel problem of getting individuals with combat experiences and administrative experience. There are certain people who are qualified. Getting back to the problem on base organization was then in its concept and we had the base commander read the combat group commander. This Senior Officer knows the administrative side of the command combat group as well as base establishment.

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72 0-46

BASE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

1030 to 1230

11 July 1946

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O-46

C O P Y

BASE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
1330 to 1530
11 July 1946

Colonel Gaines:

In the beginning of the discussion this morining, General Quesada laid down some basic principles; so far as recommending, base commander, I would stick to this. Integrity of units is what we want and I think we should work with what we have now and then by working with what we have we can plan for the future for a new organization. As I understand, this conference is to determine the best solution with what we now have. Units can be mobile through integrity to man a new base quickly. The principle thing we have to deal with so far as I can see is integrity, mobility and manning of new bases. I would like to remark on what has already been said so far as how tactical units operate depends on the situation. So far as providing six wings' staffs as the Stretegic Command brought, it strikes me that Senior officers and experienced officers are more plentiful than staffs. We could provide in the case of the 9th Air Force, Three senior officers but one wing staff. At Brooks Field we have a lot of spare parts floating which lack supervision, inspection, facilities, aircraft accident prevention, which base is adequately equipped to to furnish. This situation is caused by not being under one central command. The solution to the problem in my estimation is to provide a unified command on the base. Then we should forget about the base tactical and service group commander. Set up the job and find a man to fit it, who is not biassed for any one of the three. Find a commander and put under him these three outfits; I would prefer to call them (the groups) tactical, service, and base.

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Cont'd

I agree 100% with Colonel Hobson's 58th wing idea but if we do we will get away from principle of integrity. Due to a shortage of personnel, we will have to stick to our present organization. We have only about 50 men in the service group and we simply cannot do it. The 450th has not been manned yet. So the plan that I have in mind is for central commander and have him over these three groups. If we work towards integrity. Set up the service group on the base as separate from the base group and then carry out an echelon of maintenance. Echelons of maintenance as apply to Brooks Field are three - 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. The 4th is carried on at Kelly Field. The training command here where they had an integrated base become integrated in every respect with exception of two which become Squadron D mainenance squadron and 1st echelon maintenance squadron which they took away from the operating squadron commander, who should certainly have 1st echelon maintenance.

The breakdown of Brooks Field is:

Operating Squadron	- 1
Service Group	-2
Base Shops	- 3
Kelly Field	-4

The training command had a central commander on post and everybody worked on the plans which he laid out. I think we can achieve that same efficiency by having the one commander and the same time we can keep the units integrated. Have the 2nd echelon maintenance performed by service group. The tactical commander would control final report of airplane servicing, etc. My recommendation is to have ONE commander for post; he is neither tactical, base nor service commander and we work towards integrity but in the meantime adopt coordinated system of that submitted by 3rd Air Force.

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Colonel Koontz:

From my experience in our operation we have been conducting at March Field during the last few months we have had few actual difficulties and we all get along out ther reasonably well and the fact that we do get along is not necessarily an indication that the present system is the best. We just insist on getting along with each other. I for a long time have felt that the service group has over-constituted serving the units like we have in TAC and is an unnecessary overhead - we feel that the headquarters could be eliminated and the essential units that the tactical group needs co ld readily be provided by furnishing them with maintenance and supply that they need. It is not necessary for our essential operation and is a waste of manpower. I am convinced that command should be conducted in all respects from higher headquarters right on down to all commands. There should be no division or separttion of command. From our experience in the past, I feel that everything indicates that unity of command is essential and it is never going to work to give aman responsibility and no authority to accomplish that mission. And it is just as bad or worse to give a man a mission and responsibility to accomplish that mission and not give him the money. It makes no difference who it is or how much authority on missions to perform unless the chain of command of supplies is direct. He can't perform his mission. The individual who controls supply and operation relays our chain of command. I spent considerable time in the Pacific with Admiral_____ devoting my time to logistical problems. They were assigned missions by the Air Forces, etc. They had no commander over their supplies. The man who controlled those missions was Admiral Hoover. I am a base commander at March Field and can assign a tactical group commander to go and perform a mission and if I can see fit I can make each mission look like a total less if I want to.

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Colonel Koontz Cont'd

The point is that you should never gi ve a man a job without giving him the tools to perform the mission. I am in favor of somebody being in command of the entire works. It certainly can be solved. In discussing a possibility of recommeded changes, I agreed with Colonel Hobson. I think we need a complete new slate and I recommend that whatever we do that those orgainizations provide for a supply system and the personnel to accomplish that mission and is located in the proper channels to see that supply is moved from higher headquarters to lower units. About unification of command, as Commanding Officer of March Field, I do not know what its mission is. I have been told that it is to furnish service to units assigned. I find I have so many other responsibilities and duties that there is a question as to which is primarily_____comes up. We are furnishing service of some thing or other to (named stations outside of his command). Purchase and Contract for these units requires 60 man hours a day or 20% of my alloted personnel. Laudry - 75 man hours a day. Transportation: Maintenance at present is doin maintenance work on motor vehicles. (Named units to which maintenance is furnished). When we go into these things the base commander wonders what is mission is. In addition to that we have 5 radar stations - there are 75 to 100 civilians belonging to the 4th Air Force but who are charged as though they were part of civilian employees of March Field. Nearly all our Bases are involved with the same problem. Therefore, whoever assumes the responsibility of commanding officer of a base under AR 210-10 has got to consider those responsibilities unless somebody can have the Air Force bases relieved of those responsibilities.

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Commanding General:

We have a lot of sympathy and that supports to a large degree the contention I have that although there are advantages of roup commander assuming command there are disadvantages. I am sure many of those missions would be a bother to any group commander. Also there are advantages in a group commander being a base commander. We must all recognize that we must temper our opinions to some degree. We are not ready to establish another headquarters on each of our bases because we have no personnel. I want to say that everybody here realizes complications of running a large base like March Field are far greater than Brooks Field. I have in mind what I consider to be a solution to the problem but I do not want to express it right now. I want this meeting to develop. It might change my own views. I am not prepared to suggest that we establish another headquarters at each of our bases.

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C O P Y

)HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND(A3B
(Langley Field, Virginia)

TAC 322 (19 Apr 46) 3 May 1946

SUBJECT: Prepared Inactivation of certain Army Air Force Units.

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Chief, Operations Division, Office Assistant Chief of Air Staff-3.

1. Reference telephone conversation between Colonel T. L. Mosley, Headquarters Army Air Forces, and Colonel G. L. Meyers, A-3, this Headquarters, 1 May 1946, pertaining to proposed inactivation of certain Army Air Force Units, as outlined in: letter, subject: "Inactivation of Certain Air Force Units, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.", 19 April 1946, to: Commanding General Tactical Air Command, and, the Army Air Force Interim Air Force Forecast, Unit Designation - World Wide, Third Edition, prepared by Operations Divisions, AC/AS-3, Headquarters Army Air Forces, 11 April 1946, the following action is recommended by this Headquarters.

2. Since the unit forecast indicates that the four Troop Carrier Groups and the four Air Service Groups of the Third Air Force are to be active by December 1946, it is recommended that no actioh be taken to activated these units in the meantime. It is desired that the problem of personnel shortage be met by placing selected units on a non-operational basis rather than be inactivated. This action:

a. Solves the personnel problem effectively.
b. Permits flexibility to meet operational requirements.
c. Reduces the administrative problem imposed by inactivation and re-activation.
d. Permits a continuing authority for retention of officers which will be required when all units are active.
e. Permits continuing authority for retantion of aircraft required when units are again active.

3. Selection of the 316th Troop Carrier Group and 477th Air Service Group located at Pope Field will seriously interfere with th e very important mission of supporting the Airborne Center, the Parachute and Glider School, and the 82nd Airborne Division. To move another unit into Pope Field would impose a large administrative work lead on Third Air Force, thereby increasing the problem of personnel shortage. The 439th Troop Carrier Group and 455th Air Service Group are already on a non-operational basis to alleviate personnel shortage (units stationed at Sedalia Army Air Field, Missouri)/

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Subj: Proposed Inactivation of Certain Army Air Force Units.

4. Recommend that the 50th and 52nd Troop Carrier Wings not be inactivated at this time. No enlisted personnel are assigned to either Wing Headquarters. The 50th Troop Carrier Wing is supervising Troop Carrier activities in conjunction with the Airborne Center and the 82nd Airborne Division in the North Carolina area. The 52nd Troop Carrier Wing is supervising the Chinese Training Program being conducted at Bergstrom Army Air Field. At this time these Headquarters perform an important mission and provide a useful asignment for senior officers.

5. If the plan of avtion proposed in paragraph 2 and 4 above is approved, this Headquarters will reduce selected units to a strength of one officer and one eliisted man to meet the shortage of enlisted personnel. If the selection of units to be made non-operational is delegated to this Headquarters, it will permit the flexibility required for maximum operational efficiency.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

ROBERT M. LEE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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C O P Y

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AE

AF3AF 300.6 (6 Aug 46)

SUBJECT: Directive for Aircraft Maintenance

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. At the present time there is in effect in the Third Air Force a Maintenance Directive AFTCC Memorandum 65-72 which is considered impractical for peace-time operation, therefore, must either be rewritten or rescinded.

2. Information is requested as to whether Headquarters Tactical Air Command proposes to publish maintenance instructions for the entire Command, or whether the publishing of such instructions will be delegated to subordinate commands. (Reference paragraph 3 AAF Regulation 65-73)

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

W. L. BAXTER
Major, AGD
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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C O P Y

Hq Third Air Force, Greenville, S. Car., 6 Aug 46. Subj: "Directive for Aircraft Maintenance."

TAC 461 (6 Aug 46) Hq 3AF 1st Ind. 13 August 1946 A4B

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Field, Virginis

TO: Commanding General, Third Air Force, Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S. Car.,

TAC Reg 65-1 entitled "Supply & Maintenance of TAC Units" was published 7 August 1946 for your information and compliance.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

WINSTON W. HAYES
1st. Lt. Air Corps
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS
47TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (L) NIGHT ATTACK
LAKE CHARLES ARMY AIR FIELD
Lake Charles, Louisiana

WWA/go

LCZA 9 July 1946

SUBJECT: Squadron System Maintenance

THRU : Commanding General
Ninth Air Force
Biggs Field, Texas

TO : Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Virginia

1. In compliance with verbal directive from General Lee, Tactical Air Command Headquarters, the following report is submitted.

2. Production Line Maintenance under the supervision of the 544th Air Service Group was discontinued 13 May 1946, and responsibility for inspection of all aircraft assigned to the 47th Bombardment Group was accepted by the 47th Group under the Squadron Maintenance System. Approximately 38 enlisted men from 544th Air Service Group were placed on special duty with the 47th Group to assist in the performance of first and second echelon maintenance.

3. The following table is a comparison of the average efficiency of the Squadron System of Maintenance as compared to Production Line Maintenance for period indicated.

PRODUCTION LINE MAINTENANCE

Squadron	Percentage of A/C Cut for Inspection
84th	30%
85th	38%
86th	33%

SQUADRON SYSTEM OF MAINTENANCE

Squadron	Percentage of A/C Cut for Inspection
84th	17%
85th	20%
86th	23%

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Basic: Ltr fr 47th Bombardment Group (L) Night Attack, LCAAF, subj: Squadron System Maintenance, dtd 9 July 46, CONTD

4. Difficulties encountered under the Squadron System of Maintenance were largely psychological and to some extent administrative.

a. Psychological factors involved consisted mainly of those normally arising when men from one organization are placed on special duty with another organization.

b. Administrative difficulties, while not particularly critical, arise when men must perform their primary duties with one organization and comply with additional directives and duties from the organization to which they are assigned for housekeeping and administration.

5. It is recommended that T. O & E 1-137 R be amended to include the technical specialists, (propeller, electrical, hydraulic and instrument mechanics) in order that the tactical squadron will be self-sufficient in performing first and second echelon maintenance on assigned aircraft. Specialists added to the tactical Group may be deleted from the T. O. & E of the Engineering Squadron of the Service Group, causing no increase in the overall strength of the two organizations.

/s/ Robert J. Hughey
ROBERT J. HUGHEY
Commanding, 47th Bomb Group

/s/ Wilbur W. Aring
WILBUR W. ARING
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding, 544th Air Service Group

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TAC REGULATIONS)
TO 65-1)

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Field, Virginia, 7 August 1946

SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE

Supply and Maintenance of TAC Units

		Paragraphs
Section I	General	1-2
Section II	Organization, TAC, Air Force, Wing and Other Commands	3
Section III	Organization - Base Unit	4-6
Section IV	Organization - Air Service Group	7-9
Section V	Organization - Tactical Group	10

NOTE: As of the date this regulation is published, Headquarters AAF has not yet prescribed the regulations for maintenance and supply organization of AAF commands within the continental limits and certain territories of the United States. This regulation is therefore subject to the provisions of AAF regulations which may be published subsequently.

SECTION I

GENERAL

	Paragraph
Purpose	1
Principles	2

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this regulation is to prescribe the basic organization, procedure, and policy to be followed in the maintenance and supply of TAC units.

2. PRINCIPLES. The basic principle upon which this regulation is promulgated is to provide organization, procedures, and policies for the maintenance and supply of TAC units which will permit their immediate transition from operation in garrison to operation in the field with the least possible loss of time and efficiency. Each unit, from the highest echelon to the aircraft and its crew, having maintenance and supply functions will be capable of fulfilling those functions independently insofar as the capability of its organization, mission, and equipment will permit.

SECTION II

Organization, TAC, Air Force, Wing, and Other Commands

	Paragraph
TAC, Air Force, Wing and Other Commands	3

3. TAC, AIR FORCE, WING, AND OTHER COMMANDS. The maintenance and supply organization of the TAC, air forces, wings and other commands will be basically the same. Their functions will be the direction, planning, provision and supervision of all maintenance and supply activities of the command.

(Effective until 7 August 1947, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.)

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SECTION III

ORGANIZATION - BASE UNIT

	Paragraph
General	4
Organization for maintenance	5
Organization for supply	6

4. GENERAL. The base unit is provided to man the facilities of the base, which exists for the primary purpose of serving any operational units which may occupy it. To facilitate the efficient withdrawal of tactical and service units, it will operate all those activities which are peculiar to the particular base and require the installation of a considerable quantity of equipment of a permanent or semipermanent nature, or the handling of quantities and types of supplies in excess of those which might be normally expected to accompany tactical and service units into the field. In addition, it must be recognized that each base will have a quantity of post, camp, and station equipment which is equal to, if not in excess of, that assigned to the operational units. This property, as well as the real property involved, comprises one of the greatest responsibilities of the base commander, who by regulations, is responsible for the guarding of the public interest in every respect. Nothing in this regulation will be interpreted or construed as authorizing or encouraging, in the interests of tactical efficiency, any requirement of the base commander which is inimical to the responsibilities imposed upon him by regulations (See AR 210-10).

5. ORGANIZATION FOR MAINTENANCE. The base unit will furnish first, second, and third echelon maintenance for base and transient aircraft and when necessary, assist the service group when its facilities are overloaded. It will furnish third echelon maintenance for vehicles and motorized equipment assigned to the base. In order to efficiently carry out the above duties, it will establish the following organization:

a. Line service section. To service and perform periodic inspections and such other first and second echelon maintenance as may be required for base and transient aircraft.

b. Third echelon maintenance section. To perform all major maintenance repair, reconditioning, rebuilding, renovating, replacement, modification, manufacture and servicing beyond the scope and capabilities of the line service section. In addition, it will perform any third echelon maintenance which is beyond the capacity and capabilities of the service group. These include engine, cylinder, and turbo changes; fabrication and repair of parts and assemblies; repair of aircraft structures; removal and replacement of large or complicated assemblies; and repairs and replacements requiring special equipment or weight and bulk. Specialists, when required, will be assigned to the line service section by the maintenance and production control unit. The third echelon maintenance officer will organize the various units and shops in the manner which the mission of his organization and the physical layout of his activities dictate. Under normal circumstances, the organization here shown will be used:

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(1) Maintenance and production control unit. Organized for the operation of all shops within the base maintenance organization, maintenance of records, technical files, record of jobs being performed, etc. Operation will be in accordance with T.C Regulation 65-7, and will provide drafting service and maintain all drawing files for base maintenance facilities. A supply coordinator will be established to expedite the flow of parts, supplies, and equipment required by the base maintenance activities.

(2) Aero repair unit. Used for detailed repair of aircraft assemblies and accessories, consists of the following 3 shops:

(a) Armament shop. Responsible for first, second, and third echelons of maintenance, repair, and reclamation of aircraft armament, including CFC equipment.

(b) Electrical shop. Responsible for maintenance and repair of all types of electric and electronic accessories and circuits in aircraft.

(c) Communication shop. Responsible for second and third echelon maintenance of all communications, radar, and radio equipment; second and third echelon maintenance of ground communications equipment.

(d) Instrument shop. Responsible for inspections, tests, and minor adjustments of aircraft instruments as prescribed by pertinent technical directives.

(e) Propeller shop. Responsible for second and third echelon maintenance of propellers and propeller controls.

(3) Fabrication unit. For authorized manufacture of parts and assemblies which can be produced locally. Consists of the following 3 shops:

(a) Paint and dope shop. Responsible for repair and renovation of fabric-covered surfaces of aircraft and for all painting required by the base maintenance activities.

(b) Fabric, parachute, and personal equipment shop. Responsible for periodic inspection, repairing, drying, packing, and testing of parachutes, life rafts, vests, etc, and the authorized manufacture and repair of required fabric items, exclusive of aircraft surface coverings.

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(c) Machine shop. Responsible for repair and manufacture of parts, special tools and equipment needed by other shops.

(d) Woodworking shop. Responsible for the repair and manufacture of aircraft wooden parts, plywood surfaces, etc, and for the manufacture of wooden patterns for the sheet metal shop.

(e) Sheet metal shop. Responsible for the sheet metal manufacture and repair of aircraft, repair of self-sealing tanks, and replacement and repair of plastics.

(f) Welding shop. Responsible for all welding, heat treating, soldering, etc, required by the base maintenance activities.

(4) Reclamation unit. Responsible for acceptance of damaged equipment, tools, materials, and supplies and for their processing. Resulting scrap is turned over to salvage for disposition.

(5) Office repair unit. Responsible for the repair, adjustment, and rebuilding of all teletypewriters, typewriters, adding machines, and other mechanical office equipment.

c. Aircraft crash recovery and crash fire fighting section. Responsible for the organization, equipping and training of aircraft crash rescue and aircraft crash fire fighting activities as outlined in AAF Regulation 20-60 and established as a part of the maintenance organization. This section will be equipped and manned in accordance with AAF Regulation 150-2 on the basis of the number and types of base and transient aircraft served. When operational units occupy the base the aircraft crash rescue and crash fire fighting section of the airdrome group will augment this section.

d. Automotive section. To provide for third echelon maintenance, inspection, and reclamation of all automotive and powered ground equipment (exclusive of that installed in aircraft) assigned to the base unit with the following responsibilities:

(1) Operation of third echelon repair shop.

(2) Reclamation of automotive and other powered ground equipment.

(3) Performance of technical inspections, limited technical inspections, spot checks, etc.

(4) Maintenance of pertinent records and reports, such as WD AGO Form 478 (Modification Work Order and Major Unit Assembly Replacement Records), WD AGO Form 747 (Vehicle Status Report), and data required for maintenance control.

(5) Continuous training of mechanics in third echelon maintenance.

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(6) Evacuation of vehicles beyond the capabilities of base facilities.

(7) Over-all supervision of the maintenance of powered ground equipment. Direct responsibility for maintenance of powered ground equipment will lie with the officers in charge of the activities to which subject equipment is assigned. Personnel of these activities will perform first echelon maintenance and such second echelon maintenance as is within their capabilities. First and second echelon maintenance will be performed under the supervision of the Base Motor Pool Officer.

6. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPLY. The base unit will provide all echelons of supply for the base itself and operational units assigned thereat. In order to efficiently carry out this function, it will set up the following organization in accordance with the provisions of TM 38-410.

a. Requirements section. To requisition initial stock and replenishment of supplies from the appropriate depots in accordance with pertinent directives, for the base, sub-bases and units assigned and attached thereto.

b. Stock record section. To maintain stock record cards for each item of stock for which formal accountability is required. Each item of stock for which accounting is required will be accounted for on 1 stock record card in each section of the consolidated account for which the item was requisitioned. Stock record cards of all sections will normally be centralized.

c. Stock control section. To effect stock control. (Stock control is defined as having adequate quantities of supplies at the proper place and at the proper time, without overstocking the supply point.) A stock control level is a requisitioning objective and is determined to be the maximum quantity of supplies permitted to be on hand and on order at any 1 time. The base supply is normally authorized a 45-day stock level of AAF supplies and a 60-day stock level of technical services supplies.

d. Voucher Section. To maintain a master voucher control index for the consolidated stock record account under the supervision of the base accountable officer. Comprehensive blocks of voucher numbers will be assigned for each section of the consolidated account. It will be the responsibility of the base accountable officer to ascertain by frequent inspections that voucher numbers are properly assigned and voucher register properly maintained.

e. Distributing section. To provide and operate the facilities necessary for the rapid issue of supplies to agencies and activities requiring same. Issue of authorized T/O&E equipment to organizations will be made on an approved shipping document and formal accounting will be terminated upon issue. Signature of the receiving officer will be obtained on the shipping document in each instance. A company property book will be maintained by the commanding officer of each squadron or similar unit

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which will reflect at all times the authorized allowance of each item of equipment prescribed for the unit, except items of individual clothing and equipment which will be carried on the prescribed form. Quantities on hand in excess of authorized allowances, with authority therefor, will also be reflected in the total on hand. Issue of expendable and nonexpendable items will be on Property Issue Slips, Form 81B. Nonexpendable and expendable recoverable items will normally be issued on an exchange basis, however, the turn-in and issue of the replacement item will be a separate and distinct transaction.

f. Reparable section. Will receive, process and dispose of reparable items. The processing of reparable property is a joint function of the base supply and maintenance. The supply will be responsible for identification and classification of items, maintaining necessary property records, operation of the reparable warehouse, including the receiving, storing, issuing and inventorying of reparable property. The base maintenance will be responsible for effecting final condition status, i.e., serviceable, reparable, or condemned; direct and control the flow of reparable property from the reparable storage warehouse to maintenance repair shops; return to the serviceable warehouse all items received for repair or in lieu thereof, furnish the supply with a valid credit voucher to the stock record account, prepare all forms required to process reparable items between the reparable warehouse and maintenance activities. Make prompt tear-down inspections and advise the supply of items to be transferred to a higher echelon of repair. The number of reparable warehouses will be kept to an absolute minimum and where local facilities permit, only one reparable warehouse will be operated.

g. Memorandum receipt section. Will maintain records for property on loan to organizations and individuals. The MR account represents the total quantities of property issue to responsible officers for which the accountable officer maintains accountability. All transactions in connection with memorandum receipts will be posted to the stock record cards by use of the prescribed property Issue and Turn-in Slips, Forms 81B and 82B. The squadron or similar unit Commander will be responsible for all property issued on MR for use by members of his unit. He may, however, designate a representative to sign for such property. The base supply officer will maintain records as prescribed by TM 38-410, which will reflect the amount of property issued each unit.

h. Inventory section. Will reconcile stocks on hand with those shown on stock record account. Inventory may be taken by the "Closed Warehouse Method" or by the "Open Warehouse Method." While the former is the preferred method, it is not always practical. Therefore, the method selected for each inventory may be determined by the base commander. In either instance, however, an inventory deadline date will be set and all vouchers will be posted up-to-date. Adjustments of errors in posting to the stock record account will be made by use of the Inventory Adjustment Report Form.

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i. Receiving, classification, and shipping section. Will provide a receiving, classification, and shipping point. When practical, and facilities permit, a central receiving, classification, and shipping section will be operated at each base. This section will be responsible for receiving, classifying, and shipping supplies between all echelons of supply, receiving shipments directly from vendors and miscellaneous sources.

SECTION IV

ORGANIZATION - AIR SERVICE GROUP

	Paragraph
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Organization for maintenance	8
Organization for supply	9

7. GENERAL. The air service group mission is to provide a functioning maintenance and supply organization which can accompany tactical units into the field. Therefore, its operations in garrison will be on a semi or complete mobile basis and dependent upon base unit facilities only for assistance in handling overloads placed upon it.

8. ORGANIZATION FOR MAINTENANCE. The air service group, through its air engineering squadron, will provide third echelon maintenance for associated tactical units. To efficiently carry out the required duties it will establish the following organization:

a. Third Echelon Maintenance Section. To perform all major maintenance repair, reconditioning, rebuilding, renovating, replacement, modification, manufacture, and servicing beyond the scope and capabilities of the tactical units. These include fabrication and repair of parts and assemblies, repair of aircraft structures, removal and replacement of large or complicated assemblies and repairs and replacements requiring special equipment of weight and bulk. Specialists, when required, will be detached to the tactical units by the maintenance and production control unit. The third echelon maintenance officer will organize the various units and shops in the manner which the mission of this organization and the physical layout of these activities dictate. Under normal circumstances, the organization here shown will be used:

(1) Maintenance and production control unit. Will act as the management center of all maintenance activities within the service group and act as coordinator with maintenance activities of the base unit and the tactical units. Section will be staffed with personnel thoroughly familiar with all phases of maintenance and related matters of supply, since it is the planning agency which coordinates work with first, second, and third echelon maintenance activities, avoiding overlapping confusing of effort, and, upon investigation, recommends solutions to various maintenance and management problems. It is responsible for accomplishing the following:

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(a) Maintains complete library of technical orders and other pertinent maintenance directives.

(b) Monitors all unsatisfactory reports originating in the service group or the tactical units for the purpose of accuracy, clarity, and necessary detail.

(c) Maintains usable statistics to assist in measuring trends, requirements, work progress, etc.

(d) Maintains liaison with unit S-1 for the control of maintenance personnel.

(e) Inspects third echelon maintenance performed by the engineering squadron and approves all major repairs made to equipment and aircraft by the engineering squadron.

(f) Insures that test flights are made on aircraft after completion of major repairs and prior to return to flying status.

(g) Coordinates flow of parts, supplies, and equipment required by air service group maintenance activities.

(h) Dispatches specialists from the various shops to the tactical units, as required, to assist in the accomplishment of periodic inspections, or to assist tactical squadron maintenance personnel in performance of second echelon maintenance when specialists are required.

(2) Aero repair unit. For detailed repair of aircraft assemblies and accessories. Consists of the following five shops:

(a) Armament and photo shop. Responsible for third echelon maintenance, repair, and reclamation of aircraft armament, CFC and photographic equipment.

(b) Electrical shop. Responsible for third echelon maintenance and repair of all types of electric and electronic accessories and circuits in aircraft.

(c) Communications shop. Responsible for third echelon maintenance of all communications, radar, and radio equipment; responsible for second and third echelon maintenance of ground communications equipment.

(d) Instrument shop. Responsible for inspections, tests, and minor adjustments of aircraft instruments as prescribed by pertinent technical directives.

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(c) Propeller shop. Responsible for third echelon maintenance of propellers and propeller controls.

(3) Fabrication unit. Utilizes for authorized manufacture of parts and assemblies which can be produced locally. Consists of the following six shops:

(a) Paint and dope shop. Responsible for repair and renovation of fabric covered surfaces of aircraft and for all painting required by the air engineering squadron maintenance activities.

(b) Fabric, parachute, and personal equipment shop. Responsible for periodical inspection, repairing, drying, packing, and testing of parachutes, life rafts, vests, etc., and the authorized manufacture and repair of required fabric items, exclusive of aircraft surface coverings.

(c) Machine shop. Responsible for authorized repair and manufacture of parts, special tools and equipment used by other shops and sections.

(d) Woodworking shop. Responsible for the repair and manufacture of aircraft wooden parts, rigging, cradles, etc., and for the manufacture of wooden patterns for the sheet metal shop.

(e) Sheet metal shop. Responsible for authorized sheet metal manufacture and repair of aircraft, repair of self-sealing tanks, and replacement, fabrication, and care of plastic.

(f) Welding shop. Responsible for all welding, heat treating, soldering, etc., required by the air engineering squadron maintenance activities.

(4) Reclamation unit. Responsible for acceptance of damaged equipment, tools, materials, and supplies and their processing. Remaining scrap is turned over to salvage for disposition.

(5) Office repair unit. Responsible for the repair, adjustment, and maintenance of all teletypewriters, typewriters, adding machines, and other mechanical office equipment.

b. Aircraft crash rescue and crash fire fighting section. Will be responsible for the organization, equipment, and training of aircraft crash rescue, and aircraft crash fire fighting activities as defined in AAF Regulation 20-80 and established as a part of the maintenance organization.

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This section will be equipped and manned in accordance with appropriate T/O&E's. When the air service group occupies a base having a base unit, personnel and equipment of this section will be integrated with that of the base unit but will be so employed that this section will be capable of operating separately should the need arise.

c. Automotive section. To provide for third echelon maintenance, inspection, and reclamation of all automotive and powered ground equipment (exclusive of that installed in aircraft) assigned to the air service group and its associated tactical units, with the following responsibilities:

(1) Operation of third echelon repair shop.

(2) Reclamation of automotive and other powered ground equipment.

(3) Performance of inspections, technical inspections, limited technical inspections, spot checks, etc.

(4) Maintenance of pertinent records and reports, such as WD AGO Form 478 (Modification Work Order and Major Unit Assembly Replacement Records), WD AGO Form 577 (Vehicle Status Report), and data required for maintenance control.

(5) Continuous training of mechanics in third echelon maintenance.

(6) Evacuation of vehicles beyond the capabilities of air service group facilities.

(7) Over-all supervision of the maintenance of powered ground equipment. Direct responsibility for maintenance of powered ground equipment will lie with the officers in charge of the activities to which subject equipment is assigned. Personnel of these activities will perform first echelon maintenance and such second echelon maintenance as is within their capabilities. First and second echelon maintenance of organic vehicles will be performed under the supervision of the officer in charge of the Joint Tactical Group-Service Group Motor Pool.

9. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPLY. The Air Service Group will provide the necessary supplies required for the maintenance of aircraft, vehicles, and equipment of the tactical group. The materiel squadron of the air service group will be so organized that it can accompany the tactical unit into the field with a functioning supply system in operation. A "Service Stock" will be established in accordance with TM 38-410. All requisitions for the supply of items, which for any reason (e.g. lack of adequate facilities) cannot be carried in this stock, will be consolidated by the Materiel Squadron for processing by the base unit, who will issue in bulk for detail breakdown and re-issue by the materiel squadron.

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a. Service stock. Service stock will consist of predetermined quantities of specified items conveniently located and made available for issue to maintenance personnel.

b. Service stock level. Service stock level is the maximum quantity of items contained in the service stock which would normally be consumed in connection with maintenance work during a designated period of time. Normally, the service stock level will be a 15-day supply.

c. Service stock officer. The service stock officer is the officer designated to be responsible for the operation of the service stock and who supervises the receipt, storage, and issue of the items contained in service stock. An officer designated as a sub-base supply officer may come within this category when handling supplies from a parent base on a service stock basis.

d. Jacket file. The jacket file maintained by a service stock will contain copies of issue and turn-in slips and authorization for establishment and changes of stock level.

e. Method of establishment. The initial list of items including nonexpendable items, when established to efficiency, will be prepared by coordination between the service stock officer and an authorized representative of the activity to be served and will be approved by the supervisor of supply. The initial list on which approval will be obtained will be a property issue slip. The original copy will be filed in the jacket file of the service stock officer and the duplicate will be retained by the accountable officer. Authorization for increases and decreases of stock levels will be accomplished in the same manner.

f. Method of replenishment. Requests will be submitted weekly or as often as is necessary to prevent the reduction of any item below the reorder point. Replenishment of nonexpendable and recoverable items will normally be made on an exchange basis by use of property issue and turn-in slip. Each, however, will be a separate and distinct transaction.

g. Records maintained by service stock officer. The service stock officer will maintain a jacket file containing initial authorizarion, authorized changes in levels, together with copies of subsequent replenishment and turn-in slips. Records of the items stocked will be maintained as an informal property record on WD AAF Form 105-F-5. This card will show location, stock number, nomenclature, unit of issue, service stock level, reorder point, and a record of receipts, issues, and inventories.

h. Issues from service stock.

(1) Expendable items. Maintenance personnel will be authorized to draw supplies from service stock to apply against a work order or authorized requirement. Each issue will be recorded on a daily recapitulation sheet. These forms will be numbered serially and posted daily to the property record card.

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(2) Nonexpendable items. Nonexpendable items will be issued on property issue slip and will be signed for by an authorized stock tracer. Issue will be made on an exchange basis, i.e., serviceable items will be exchanged for like repairable or condemned items.

SECTION V

ORGANIZATION - TACTICAL GROUP

Paragraph
Tactical Group---------- 10

10. TACTICAL GROUP. The tactical group will be responsible for first and second echelons of maintenance and supply. Actual maintenance and supply will be effected by the squadron of the tactical group under the supervision of the group S-4, who will coordinate higher echelons of maintenance with the service group and keep the tactical group commander informed as to the maintenance status of the group.

a. Technical inspection. The tactical group inspection section will make frequent inspections of the maintenance and supply activities of the tactical units. Records of inspections will be maintained.

b. Tactical squadron. The squadron commander will organize the maintenance and supply system as follows:

(1) Maintenance.

(a) Line maintenance section. Will provide all first echelon maintenance for aircraft. This section will consist of line chiefs, flight chiefs, crew chiefs, and authorized specialists.

(b) Periodic aircraft maintenance section. Will perform periodic inspections, including 25-hour, 50-hour, and 100-hour inspections, and to accomplish those minor repairs, replacements, modifications, and adjustments which can be completed during the time normally allotted for inspection. The squadron maintenance officer will schedule the priority and accomplishment of as many technical orders as possible during inspections, as consistent with first and second echelons of maintenance.

(c) Armament and photo section. Will perform all first and second echelon maintenance on squadron armament and photographic equipment.

(d) Communications section. Will perform all first and second echelons of maintenance on squadron communications and radar equipment.

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(e) Tools and equipment section. Will maintain all squadron special equipment, such as crew chief stands, special tools, lights, battery carts, oil clarifiers, etc. This section may be consolidated with the technical supply section.

(f) Personal equipment section. Will provide all first and second echelons of maintenance of parachutes, life rafts, preservers, etc. Section will function in accordance with pertinent directives.

(g) Automotive section (Squadron Transportation Section). Will provide first and second echelon maintenance and inspection for all organic automotive equipment. Second echelon maintenance will be accomplished in the second echelon shop, operated and supervised by the officer in charge of the joint Tactical Group-Service Group Motor Pool.

(2) Supply.

(a) Squadron commanders will organize supply sections for the receipt and issue of all authorized classes of property. Property will be received, stored, issued, and appropriate records will be maintained in accordance with existing regulations. AAF property necessary for the maintenance of aircraft will be segregated from other classes and will be under the supervision of the squadron aircraft maintenance officer. It will be located adjacent to the aircraft maintenance facility. All property authorized will be secured through the service group assigned to administer services and supply.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL QUESADA:

ROBERT M. LEE
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

EDGAR T. ADDRIDGE
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
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THE MINUTES OF TROOP CARRIER AIRBORNE CONFERENCE

22 August 1946

Headquarters, Tactical Air Command
Langley Field, Va.

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AIRBORNE TROOP CARRIER CONFERENCE

Welcome Address By

Major General H. P. Quesada

I thought in order to start this off I might give you some idea of what we are driving at and what we hope to accomplish. I think everyone appreciates the fact there is a problem that has to be solved. It has to do with the calendar year 1947 in which we want to establish and efficient method to accomplish the Airborne-Troop Carrier activities. We are trying to avoid the catch-as-catch-can procedure that has been so prevalent in the past year and establish something for the best of all concerned, something that has credit to it. We are trying to reach the problem as objectively as we can and we hope each activity involved will give recognition to the requirements of the others.

It is absolutely essential that we get a well-rounded, well-thought out program with the Airborne Division. We are anxious to engage in a program which provides air lift to the ground units that are not airborne. Secretary of War Patterson has directed the Chief of Staff to take steps along that line.

For the Troop Carrier activities to intelligently and properly in an organized way to engage in these activities, they must undergo a period of training as aviators the same as the Airborne units must undergo training as soldiers. Now we want to establish that training on a well-thought out basis so that when they can and have an opportunity to engage in the activities with Airborne and Infantry units, they can do it as airmen. We hope we can bring out some of the problems we consider mutual. No problem is yours that is not ours and no problem is ours that is not yours.

We hope that the expressions will be free and objective. We hope we can, in here today, establish a better method and program for the coming year that we have had in the past. We have had our failures in the past; we cannot lay the fault at anyone's door. We have all done very, very well under the handicaps we have worked. I assure you that if we can adopt an intelligent program for 1947, we will approach 1948 and the succeeding years in the same manner. I assure you we are approaching this with the hope of mutual advantages. At this time I'd like to have Colonel Edris develop the principles I have tried to establish.

Colonel G. L. Edris

My remarks are intended to furnish the background to the Airborne Troop Carrier Conference. To begin with, Tactical Air Command, as the Air Force Agency responsible for direct support of the Army Ground Forces, has been authorized direct liaison and communication with Headquarters Army Ground Forces.

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Correspondence between Army Ground Forces and this Headquarters resulted in the adoption of a standing procedure for coordination of Airborne - Troop Carrier training. Briefly, this standing procedure provides:

a. For a conference, such as this one, when it has been decided that an Army Ground Forces unit will receive Airborne training. The conference will determine the scope and scale of the Airborne training; the period of time aircraft will be required to accomplish the training, and the dates between which aircraft will be furnished.

b. Subsequent to the conference, direct communication between participating units will be authorized to accomplish prescribed airborne training.

c. A Joint Inspection Team will inspect training activities at regular periods.

d. At the conclusion of the prescribed airborne training, a critique will be prepared and furnished participating commands.

Because of the importance of this standing procedure for coordination of Airborne - Troop Carrier training, its provisions have been described in the agenda furnished each member attending this conference.

Because of the limited Troop Carrier resources available and increased requirements for Troop Carrier aircraft, it is necessary that the allocation of Troop Carrier units be coordinated between Army Ground Forces and Tactical Air Command.

Concerning the increased requirements for Troop Carrier aviation, it is desired to point out the following:

a. The interest in Army Ground Forces to provide Airborne training for not only airborne units but to all other elements as well.

b. The requirements for Troop Carrier to support the Air Indoctrination Course.

c. The Troop Carrier requirements of the Airborne School and the 82d Airborne Division.

d. Troop Carrier support of Air Force missions. Troop Carrier is required, from time to time, to move Air Force units from their home stations to gunnery stations, maneuver areas, or to other stations in the event of emergency. Also, Troop Carrier is responsible for the movement of military police and other troops to vital points in the event of national emergencies. These and many other similar missions must be met whenever required.

Concerning the limited Troop Carrier resources, it is desired to point out:

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a. That at the present time the Troop Carrier organization is composed of Third Air Force Headquarters, two Troop Carrier Group Headquarters, and six Troop Carrier Squadrons, and, in addition, the supporting service units.

b. Present plans of the Army Air Forces provide for the following Troop Carrier organization as of January 1, 1947: Third Air Force Headquarters; four Troop Carrier Group Headquarters; and ten Troop Carrier Squadrons. Six of the Squadrons will possess Glider echelons, the other four will not have Glider echelons. The Tables of Organization and Equipment, under which these units will organize, provide for a reduction in strength of approximately twenty per cent from that normally authorized in the past.

To further complete the picture concerning Troop Carrier resources, I will cover the proposed location of Troop Carrier units. The Third Air Force Headquarters will be located at Greenville, South Caroline. Also at Greenville will be the 64th Troop Carrier Group and 2 Squadrons. The 316th Troop Carrier Group with 3 Squadrons will be located at Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 62d Troop Carrier Group with three Squadrons will be located at Bergstrom Field, Austin, Texas. The 315th Troop Carrier Group with two Squadrons will be located at Walla Walla, Washington. It is anticipated that one or two Squadrons, as may be decided at this conference, will be rotated for duty at Lawson Field.

Before we proceed to discuss the allocation of Troop Carrier on the several projects, it is desired to point out that the success of Troop Carrier support will depend upon the efficiency of Troop Carrier units and that a sound unit training program is, therefore, essential. The unit training requirement is considered the first priority mission to be accomplished by Troop Carrier units. The conduct of support operations which follow, must be in accordance with established doctrine in order to preserve the unit training, and, in fact, enhance it.

The agenda for this conference lists the following subjects:

a. Combined Troop Carrier - Airborne Staff exercises.

b. Combined Troop Carrier - Airborne unit training exercises.

c. Joint Inspection Tour.

d. Allocation of Troop Carrier units to the Parachute and Glider School.

e. Allocation of Troop Carrier units for routine training of the 82d Airborne Division.

f. New projects requiring Troop Carrier aircraft.

There may be additional subjects to be presented by the representative of the Army Ground Forces.

Before the conference proceeds with these separate subjects, I would like to explain the charts:

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These two charts here are maps representing the present and 1947 organization of the Third Air Force. You see that we have Third Air Force Headquarters at Greenville; the 316th Troop Carrier at Pope Field; one Squadron at Lawson Field; and the 440th Troop Carrier Group at Sampson Field. We do not anticipate any major changes in this set-up during the next year with the exception of putting a group at Walla Walla.

General Quesada: By way of explanation for putting a Troop Carrier Group at Walla Walla. From the War Department point of view, a great deal of emphasis has been placed upon operations being directed against us over the polar regions. We find we are well oriented over the Southeast instead of the Northwest. That is why we want to put a Troop Carrier unit at Walla Walla. We have in mind we should take more advantage of the available facilities offered by Troop Carrier in transporting units and taking care of emergencies. We feel the War Department over-all plan would be facilitated if we try to get some Troop Carrier in the Northwest. The Second Division is located at Seattle and they are placed there in accordance with the War Department over-all plan.

Colonel Edris: This chart is prepared to represent ten Troop Carrier Squadrons for the fifty-two weeks of the year. We consider unit training as first priority and the brown indicates the twelve weeks we have allotted to accomplish it in. To go back a moment, each square represents a Troop Carrier Squadron for one week. This first square represents unit training. The next blocks, indicated in yellow, represents the Air Indoctrination Course which will last for sixteen weeks. It commences in January and it is anticipated seven Squadrons will be required to support it. The red represents the Squadron at the Parachute and Glider School which is a continuing mission running the complete fifty-two weeks. The green represents the Air Force missions which this command is required to participate in. The blue represents the routine training of the 82d Airborne Division which also is a continuing mission of one year's duration. This chart was set up in this manner in order to show that we have an additional 132 weeks which this conference can discuss. This does not mean we have this entire block of uninterrupted time, but the chart was set up in this manner to illustrate the principles.

The top chart indicates: one Squadron at the Parachute and Glider School; one Squadron performing the missions assigned by this Headquarters; one Squadron supporting the 82d Airborne Division; and seven Squadrons supporting the Air Indoctrination Course for sixteen weeks. The brown represents twelve weeks of unit training for each of the ten Squadrons. We don't know whether the Third Air Force will choose to rotate the Squadron supporting the Parachute and Glider School or not. If they should, this chart provides for the squadron being rotated. As the conference proceeds, we can change the quantity of support to the 82d Airborne Division and the Parachute and Glider School, if desired. The unit training, the support of the Air Force missions, and the support of the Air Indoctrination Course cannot be changed. After we allocate these 132 weeks which remain, then Third Air Force will be in a position to prepare a year's schedule. Are there any questions on the charts?

General Quesada: There are two points I'd like to bring out. It has been my experience over the past twenty to twenty-two years, that if there are extra

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curricula activities, and there always are, they will increase if we don't have a full program to oppose it with. There will be less tendency to use the Third Air Force if it has specific missions, a well-rounded program to conform to. I am anxious to have a full program to use as a defense against these extra curricula activities. I am anxious to devote as much time and effort to the things we must do as we possibly can. Another thing, the bottom chart indicates everything by volume. It does not mean that for twelve weeks everything has to be devoted to just that. It only shows volume. The top chart indicates the way we can allocate units to certain activities. It is not necessarily the best method of doing it and not necessarily the one we indorse, but, it is a means of getting to you what we hope to accomplish at this conference. We might not be able to devise a definite schedule now, but by an expression from all individuals concerned, General Williams can go back and drew up a definite program in cooperation with the other agencies. We must get something across on which we can progress.

General Gavin: What is this Air Indoctrination Course?

General Quesada: The Ground Forces, I should say the associated service schools, such as Fort Riley, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Sill, Fort Knox, United States Military Academy, the National War College, have, by putting in piecemeal demands, consumed our efforts. We were flying missions at these various schools just so they could hear an airplane. We were using two planes here and there to simulate attacks and strafing missions. We were getting nowhere and in most instances we were misleading the people. Now the result of that was two-fold. It made our Tactical Air Forces impotent; absolutely no good. We were having a flight at Benning, a flight at Knox, a flight at Sill, and nothing was being done at El Paso where the Group was supposed to be training. So, we stopped that. However, by stopping that we failed to meet our obligations. Also, the system was preventing us from working with the Airborne Division, the Second Division, the Armored Division, and the main things. We were becoming a show team for the schools. We realized something had to be done so we thought up the idea of taking a whole tactical air force and bringing it together and injecting into the curriculum of the schools a period of indoctrination to show them how a tactical group works. We have coordinated with the Army Ground Forces a system whereby we take an air force and move it to Tyndall Field and somewhere in the curriculum of the service schools they will allot a week to go to Tyndall Field where we can show them tactical air power as it is meant to be. As you well know, every Regimental Commander wants a drop in front of his Regiment. We must overcome that and the great disadvantages we have suffered over the past year. Many of the senior officers, when the war started, thought of the Air Forces as an easy means of transportation. They did not realize the potentiality of air power because they had never seen it. We hope to gain benefits ten years from now by instilling into the minds of the junior officers today, some knowledge of the potentialities of air power. We hope in this program to build up a situation where an Army Group or Division asks for an air drop and show them why it can't be accomplished because the over-all plan provides for a strategic effort at another place. We hope to show them all the intricate planning required for an airborne operation and the fact that it is not brought about by somebody deciding, we are going to drop on hill 120. We hope to show them all the things

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that go with it and to affect the thinking of the junior officers in the rest of the Army career. The Ground Forces are in full support of our contention.

General Gavin: To what extent do you propose to conduct this course?

General Quesada: We figure it will take sixteen weeks. There is a question, however, as to whether we can run it consecutively for sixteen weeks or conduct it in two periods of eight weeks each.

General Gavin: Will the Airborne Division participate in the course?

General Quesada: I am all for it. Now the Ground Forces are doing this: They hope to have a contingent of artillery present so when it becomes necessary to lay smoke they will be called upon to do it and it will be done in a realistic manner. We hope to have a skeleton of Division, Regimental, Corps, and Headquarters present so we can perpetuate the system developed during the last conflict. However, the participation of Ground Force elements has not been crystalized in our plans as yet. We want, and hope to get, an airborne contingent in the demonstration.

General Gavin: I would also like to have that.

Colonel Dwyer: I think I can say to you there definitely will be airborne participation in the course.

General Gavin: How will that affect the Troop Carrier Squadron supporting the 82d Airborne Division?

General Quesada: The Squadron at Pope Field will not be affected.

Colonel Ferris: I'd like at this time to have the representative from the Army Ground Forces present his requirements.

Colonel S. A. Cheppuis: During May 1948, it is contemplated holding Corps maneuvers at Polk. It will be necessary for Troop Carrier to provide air lift for one Regimental Combat Team of the 82d Airborne Division. Tactical air support for the maneuver will consist of one Light Bomb Group, one Fighter Group, one Reconnaissance Group, and one Tactical Control Group. Also, there is the Amphibious exercise on the West Coast in the fall of 1947. For this maneuver, Army Ground Forces will request the same tactical support. For the period November 1947 - March 1948, the Airborne Cold Weather exercise will be held at Camp McCoy. Troop Carrier will be requested to furnish two squadrons for the five-month period.

General Quesada: Ground Forces are way off base. We don't think it's for Ground Forces to ask for units by strength. We know what a round team is better than Ground Forces. That procedure is wrong; we should take part in the planning.

General Carter: All these things shoul be worked out together. The first exercise you mentioned will take everything we have and then some.

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General Quesada: There is no hope of getting things done in a systematic manner unless we are a party to the planning.

Colonel Chappuis: The training by Army Ground Forces has not progressed beyond what I have mentioned. However, along the lines of air transportability what has been done is this. The Airborne School starting this year is beginning a three-week course in air transportability to instruct nonairborne officers in moving troops and supplies by air. After we have some of these officers in the Infantry Division and the units become capable of moving by air, we will request Troop Carrier to bring in planes to support that.

General Gavin presented a copy of his training program for this year and 1947. A brief discussion was had concerning this subject.

General Williams brought up the subject of the redesignation of units within the Third Air Force, stating he could see no logical reason for doing this. Colonel Ederle explained the new designations were taken from the flow chart published by Headquarters Army Air Forces. Also, Headquarters Army Air Forces did not indicate which squadrons would have glider echelons. General Williams stated he did not visualize any great need for gliders in the next three years.

General Gavin stated that his training program envisioned a gradual build-up from the eighteen flying aircraft presently to sixty at the time of the regimental lift which is envisioned in April.

General Williams stated that he could not meet these requirements in April and support the Air Indoctrination Course. He suggested that General Gavin arrange to have the Regimental drop at the conclusion of the Air Indoctrination Course and that during the course he could work on the Battalion drop. This General Gavin agreed to do.

General Gavin stated he desired to "beef up" his program this Fall in order to be prepared to participate in the Air Indoctrination Course. He stated he could adjust his training program in order to conform. He would like to know definitely just what he would have to work with in order to be prepared to participate in the course and so he could modify his training program.

Colonel Ederle: Could we proceed from the point of view that the Troop Carrier units will be employed in the Course until April First, and plan on the Regimental drop after that?

General Williams: I'd like to say we have had some very excellent airborne exercises as you know. An Airborne - Troop Carrier demonstration should be on a Battalion level. It should be a demonstration in which General Gavin can give these people some valuable and instructive information. I can't see where our participation will amount to anything unless a well-rounded airborne team participates. I think we should have at least a Battalion drop.

General Carter: In the discussion with Army Ground Forces, they indicated the course would vary with the different schools attending. We are going to

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build up a course which will be modified to fit the requirements of the school attending at the time.

Colonel Mowyer: I tell you what we can do as a planning factor; we'll shoot for a Battalion landing in our exercises and draw our plans along those lines. We'll shoot for that strength landing.

General Carter: I think Army Ground Forces will go along with that; I think we should settle on that.

General Gavin: Good. Then I'll need sixty airplanes when the course is over. We'll figure on getting the planes approximately April first for the Regimental drop.

General Williams: In order to be ready for the Regimental exercise, we'll need a month to give all the Troop Carrier units unit training. General Gavin agreed that the Airborne - Troop Carrier exercises should be postponed until Troop Carrier units had completed unit training.

Colonel Edriss: April then, will be devoted to unit training and on May first the Airborne - Troop Carrier exercises will commence. To furnish the sixty airplanes, how many units will be utilized?

Colonel Krebs: All of the remaining seven.

Colonel Edris: I think we should now take up the allocation of Troop Carrier units to the Parachute and Glider School.

Colonel Williams stated he needed twenty-five airplanes at the School. General Gavin stated he did not agree with those figures, that the School used to graduate more students with less aircraft than they now do. General Williams stated he could not afford to put more planes at the School. Colonel Edris stated we would hold one squadron at Lawson Field and Army Ground Forces would have to justify any increase.

Allocation of Troop Carrier units for routine training at the 82d Airborne Division.

General Gavin wants to step up his training program starting the last week in November in order to be ready for participation in the Air Indoctrination Course. General Williams stated that it might be well to send the squadron of Troop Carrier that trained with the Airborne Division to the Air Indoctrination Course. If that is done, he will substitute aircraft to take care of the routine training of the 82d Airborne Division while this other squadron is at Tyndall Field. In 1947, there will be one Troop Carrier Squadron available for routine training of the 82d Airborne Division for fifty-two weeks.

It was agreed that following the Amphibious exercises on the West Coast this Fall, that an additional squadron would be furnished the 82d Airborne Division to provide the build-up in training desired by General Gavin. Thus,

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beginning about December seventh, there will be two squadrons supporting the 82d Airborne Division until the Air Indoctrination Course commences about January fifteenth.

Colonel Edris: While the Generals are here, I think we should discuss the Joint Inspection Team and the Combined Airborne - Troop Carrier Staff exercises. Also, the Army Ground Forces want to get up a Joint Airborne - Troop Carrier Committee. This would be a recommending committee which would also disseminate information on Airborne - Troop Carrier activities. Third Air Force, 82d Airborne Division, Tactical Air Command, and Army Ground Forces would be represented on this committee. Standing Operating Procedures for joint operations would be drawn up by the committee.

General Gavin: The Army Ground Forces had something in mind like a committee existing in Army Ground Force Headquarters which would be a source of information to Army Ground Forces on all Troop Carrier capabilities. The committee would be charged with working up staff exercises and anything of that nature. They need very badly in Army Ground Forces some Troop Carrier- Airborne "know how." That is what they are thinking about and that is what they want.

General Williams: I would like to see that in the form of a Board where representatives of each command would have a definite meeting time, say at least once a month.

General Carter: If this was done, Army Ground Forces probably would want the assistance of that Board from time to time.

General Gavin: They could refer their problems to that Board. What do you think about that Colonel Chesnutt?

Colonel Chesnutt: I think it would be a good idea. When you're in Headquarters the tendency is to get out of touch with everyone.

It was agreed that the Board would be established. Members of the Board will remain assigned to each of the several headquarters.

Colonel Edris asked General Gavin to outline his thoughts concerning the combined Airborne - Troop Carrier Staff exercises.

General Gavin: I raised the matter last March. The reason was that we, I felt the Airborne Division, were losing a great deal of the Staff "know how". It seemed as if we had arrived at the point of having nothing but green staff officers and unit commanders. I wrote a letter to Army Ground Forces suggesting they work up some plans for exercises involving larger airborne units. From my own viewpoint, I am happy to get together with General Williams and work up some staff planning; the same thing we did in the last war. Beyond that, I would recommend and go on record as favoring a large staff plan. We should give some thought about what we would do if we had to fly six or eight Divisions a long way; just how we would go about doing it if called upon on short notice.

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General Williams: This year we should look into the 82d Airborne Division and Third Air Force requirements and after this year we should go into the staff planning with the Tactical Air Command and Army Ground Forces on a larger scale.

General Carter: I think this a very good idea.

Following further discussion of the Joint Staff exercise, it was decided that the responsibility for planning and conducting the exercise would rest jointly with General Williams and General Gavin.

General Williams and General Gavin went on record as favoring the Joint Inspection Team and recommended that it be set up to function this fall.

General Carter: In the absence of General Lemnitzer, I wish to thank you people for coming up here and helping us out today. I think we got a lot of good out of it.

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CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

1. That during 1947 one squadron will continuously support the Parachute and Glider School.

2. During 1947 one squadron will continuously support routine training of the 82d Airborne Division.

3. During 1947 the equivalent capability of one squadron will support Air Force missions assigned by this Headquarters.

4. That all Troop Carrier units will receive at least twelve weeks of intensive unit training during 1947.

5. That an effort will be made to provide for one Airborne Battalion to participate in the Airborne - Troop Carrier presentation of the Air Indoctrination Course.

6. That one additional squadron will be allocated to the 82d Airborne Division during the period between the Amphibious exercises this Fall and the beginning of the Air Indoctrination Course next January.

7. Following the Air Indoctrination Course, there will be four weeks devoted to unit training in preparation for joint Troop Carrier - Airborne exercises to be conducted on a regimental scale.

8. That the joint Airborne - Troop Carrier exercises will last for a period of eight weeks commencing 1 May. Seven Troop Carrier Squadrons will participate.

9. That an Airborne - Troop Carrier Board composed of representatives from the following Headquarters would function as a recommending and inspection agency on joint Airborne - Troop Carrier matters. The Board will meet at Headquarters 82d Airborne Division in October 1946. The date and program will be issued by Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division.

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington

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Field Office of The Air
Inspector, Hq AAF
Gunter Field, Ala

383.1

4 October 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of March Field, Including 1st Fighter Group and 361st Air Service Group

TO: Commanding Officer
March Field
Riverside, California
THRU: Commanding General, Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force
March Field, California

* * * *

8. Tactical

a. The Tactical rating is SATISFACTORY.

b. The Tactical inspection is rated EXCELLENT.

c. It was observed that thirty-eight (38) out of one-hundred and thirty-six (136) base pilots do not possess valid instrument cards.

d. In the 1st Fighter Group twenty (20) pilots out of ninety-six (96) do not possess valid instrument cards.

e. All officers authorized to sign clearances (AAF Form 23) at Base Operations do not possess valid instrument cards, in accordance with AAF Regulation 60-22. In one case an officer assigned to Base Operations was not rated but is signing clearances.

f. At present there are no suitable gunnery ranges for the 1st Fighter Group, to utilize in accomplishing their air to air gunnery, air to ground gunnery, and dive bombing requirements, Recommend immediate action be taken to make available ranges for the required training of this group.

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Ltr Subj: "Rpt of Insp of March Fld, Incl 1st Fighter Group and 361st Air Service Group" dtd 4 Oct 46 (contd)

g. It was noted that A-26's are being utilized as tow target ships at 20,000 feet and at 200 MPH. Realizing that A-26's possibly are the best aircraft available at this time for tow target gunnery, it is recommended that every effort be expended to obtain a 300 MPH target at 30,000 feet.

h. Training in the 1st Fighter Group has consisted for the most part of pilot transition and participation in CAP demonstrations. Other than this type of flying there has been very little training accomplished to qualify this group as a tactical organization. A very low percentage of aircraft in commission and the participation in the CAP demonstrations have greatly affected training, as have the lack of essential facilities, such as gunnery ranges noted above.

i. It is recommended that a detailed study be made of the problems confronting P-80 Jet tactical training and that every effort be expended to increase the training of this group, as outlined in their mission.

* * * *

FRANKLIN S. HENLEY
Colonel, Air Corps
The Field Air Inspector

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THE EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT INVOLVED IN SERVICING ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

(TAC A-5 STUDY)
February 1947

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C O P Y

THE EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT INVOLVED IN SERVICING ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

(TAC A-5 STUDY)
February 1947

1. PURPOSE:

To determine the effect of servicing miscellaneous activities on the efficiency of the Tactical Air Command.

11. FACTS:

The Tactical Air Command has been delegated certain responsibilities in connection with the following unrelated activities:

A. To furnish certain supply and maintenance services for Air National Guard and Air Reserve Units.

B. To make available such pilots and crews as are necessary to ferry aircraft for other commands within Army Air Forces.

C. To make available Aerial Target Towing facilities for the Army Ground Forces.

D. To furnish certain facilities and personnel in support of summer encampments for Air R.O.T.C. and Air Scouts.

E. To execute such aerial demonstrations and exhibits as the Army Air Forces may direct.

F. To support such special projects as the Army Air Forces may direct.

111. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that:

A. The effort involved in servicing National Guard Units be studied at a future date when the Units are more active.

B. Aircraft Ferrying responsibilities be reallocated by Army Air Forces, considering the capabilities of other commands and National Guard Units.

C. Tow Target activities be studied closely to insure coordination and efficient utilization of this service by Tactical Air Command and Army Ground Forces.

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192	416.906-1	1949			"	U	
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310	416.908-1	Oct/46			Strategic Air Command.	U	
355	417.01	Mar-Dec/46	1		Tactical Air Command.	U	
547	"	Mar-Dec/46	2		"	U	
688	"	Mar-Dec/46	3		"	U	
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