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
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
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
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
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




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


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


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
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CHAPTER I

In July 1949, with the Johnson Economy Program in full motion, the communications facilities of the several Services were subject to searching scrutiny by the office of Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the program of integration of communications between the several Services, in accordance with the "Principle of Joint Communications" was reviewed and revised by General J. T. McNarney, Chairman, Management Committee, CSD. As a result, a number of communications facilities were placed on a standby status and directives issued curtailing the transmission of messages by electrical means.

During this period, Major General F. L. Ankenbrandt, the Director of Communications, functioned as a member of the Joint Communications—Electronics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to which Major General H. M. McClelland was later added and designated as Director of Communications, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as Chairman of the Joint Communications—Electronics Committee. This Committee, working in conjunction with the British Joint Communications—Electronics Committee (Washington), managed to resolve many of the joint and combined communications problems, primarily procedural and doctrinal in nature and essential to successful joint and combined operations of the two nations.

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CHAPTER II

The Plans and Policies Division, under Colonel J. K. DeArmond, maintained close coordination with both the Directorate of Plans and the Directorate of Operations to insure that communications planning was kept continually abreast of the rapidly changing Air Force requirements, brought about by the increased tempo of the "Cold War."

In August 1949, Standards Branch completed a study of communications and electronics officer MOS's and SSN's then existing, to determine their operational applicability to the communications—electronics family. This study indicated that the majority of communications—electronics MOS's and SSN's could be converted intefour (4) MOS's:

Electronics Officer, Ground
Electronics Officer, Air
Communications and Electronics Officer
Radar Observer, ECM

Based on this study, action was then initiated to process job descriptions for the Electronics Officer, Ground, Electronics Officer, Air, and the Communications and Electronics Officer. No change was made at that time in the job description for the Eadar Observer, ECM.

Substantially, the conversion consisted of:

Rewrite of SSN OllO as Electronics Officer, Ground, and rescission of SSN Ollo, Radar Officer.

Rewrite of SSN OL41 as Electronics Officer, Air, and rescission of SSN Ol30, Aircraft Marning Officer, Airborne Equipment and SSN Ol45, Radar Maintenance and Repair Officer.

Rewrite of SSN 0200 as Communications and Electronics Officer, and rescission of SSN 0210, Signal Officer, SSN 0224, Message Center Officer, Cryptographic, SSN 0220, Message Center Officer, SSN 0400, Telephone and Telegraph Officer, SSN 0410, Telephone and Telegraph Officer, Inside Plant, SSN 0430, Telephone and Telegraph Officer, Outside Plant, SSN 0500, Radio Officer, SSN 0503, Radio Officer, VHF, SSN 2680, Communications Inspector, SSN 4402, Maintenance and Repair Officer, Airborne Signal Equipment, SSN 4415, Signal Equipment Maintenance and Repair Officer, and SSN 9610, Security Officer, Cryptographic.

Rewrite of SSN 1014, Controller, Fighter Interception and rescission of SSN 0160, Radar Filter Officer.

Rescission of SSN 0102, Aircraft Warning Plotter Officer, SSN 0115, Aircraft Warning Ground Observer Officer, and SSN 0120, Aircraft Warning Officer, Gunlaying and Searchlight Equipment, since the need for these positions no longer existed.

Detailed implementation instructions relative to the new SSN's and conversion of existing SSN's were promulgated by change B to AFL 35-701 distributed in February 1950.<sup>2</sup>

Shortly after promulgation of AFL 35-7015, it became evident that there existed the need for an additional SSN in the communications-electronics field which could be used to identify individuals possessed of a lesser degree of experience than that expected of SSN 0200. This brought into the communications-electronics family SSN 0205, Communications Officer, and raised the communications-electronics spectrum to five basic specialties.

In June 1950, after more than a year of consideration and rewriting,

T/OSE 1-2234, Communications Construction Organization, went to the printer. The function of this T/OSE is to provide the necessary Communications Construction support for the Air Force Communications which such a unit might be assigned or attached.

This organization is cellular which permits the utilization of any combination of the teams as squadrons, separate flights, or detachments (individual teams) to fulfill effectively the communications construction requirements of the command to which it is assigned or attached.

Well advanced at this time was the T/ORE for the Communications Operations Organization which is also to be cellular in structure because of the great flexibility necessary for such an organization. It is being designed to replace T/ORE 1-1037 and the communications operations elements of tables for Sig Bn Sep, TAC. 5

On 23 January 1950, Standards Branch reviewed J.L.F.C. 454/1 regarding the assignment of functions and responsibilities in the signal communications field and in general made the following recommendations:

SCARWAF units be transferred to USAF.

All spaces and ratings supplied SCARMAF by USAF, remain with USAF.

All Reserve and National Guard Aviation Signal Units be placed in Air Reserve or National Guard.

All recruiting, training, budgetary and fiscal matters relevant to aviation signal units go to USAF.

This matter was reviewed by the Secretary of Defense in June 1950 and the entire matter was set aside pending a decision by the Congress developing the fields of responsibility of the several services.

In August 1949, Mr. L. S. F. Meaker, a member of Liaison Branch and the Department of the Air Force representative to the Provisional Frequency Board (FFB), returned to Washington. The FFB had been in continuous session in Geneva, Switzerland since January 1948, attempting to formulate, on an engineering basis, international assignment lists for radio frequencies between 10 - 150 kilocycles and 4000 - 27500 kilocycles conforming to the Atlantic City (1947) Allocation Table. The PFB recessed in February 1950: During its active life, the Department of the Air Force participated continuously in the work of the Mashington FFB Liaison Committee, to insure a rapid and thorough exchange of information with the Delegation in Geneva. The results of the FFB, particularly the assignment plans for fixed station radio circuits, were largely unacceptable to the United States particularly to the Air Force. Accordingly, in the Spring 1950, it was decided to convene an Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (EARC) at the hague, Netherlands in September 1950, to give further study to the work of the PFB and the problems involved in implementing the new Allocation Table. The Department of the Air Force participated in an intensive series of meetings to prepare a United States position for the EARC. The work was complicated in no small degree by the fact that the extent and manner of Air Force Prequency usage had changed considerably since submission of original requirements to the PFB in 1947 and 1948.

Senate Resolution 60, approved 11 April 1949, directed the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce "to make a full and complete study and investigation" among other things "of such problems as it may deem proper relating to all matters relating to radio,

this Senate Resolution, the three (3) military services were required to prepare statistical summaries of radio frequency utilization, listing the use of frequencies functionally as well as yearly. This study was prepared by the Liaison Branch reflecting the Air Force utilization as a portion of a project prepared under the auspices of the JCBS. Similarly, a dual requirement was imposed upon the Branch by the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee by the necessity of a duplication of the same material in a slightly different form. Due to the illness of Benator MacFarland, Chairman of the Senate Committee, action on the material presented has been held in abeyance.

Captain Robert H. Service of the Lizison Branch was the Department of Defense's Representative at the Second Session of the International Administrative Aeronautical Radio Conference (IAARC) which convened I August 1949, thus continuing the work of the First Session which had adjourned 25 September 1948. In general, this conference was convened to determine the specific frequencies and frequency sharing pattern to be employed internationally by the aeronautical service in order to develop a frequency allotment plan in conformity with the allocations listed in the Atlantic City Radio Regulations. This Second Session dealt primarily with the requirements for the route service, civil requirements, since the First Session had been able to secure international agreement with the Off-Route Service (military requirements). This conference was successful in that international acceptance of the frequency sharing pattern was secured in spite of general derogatory attacks from the USSR and her satellites. The conference officially

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terminated 10 October 1949. (Restricted)

On 1 September 1949, the frequency 140.58 Mc/s replaced frequency 116.10 Mc/s as the communications channel between military aircraft and CAA airways stations. The replacement was considered advisable because frequency 116.10 Mc/s does not fall within the portion of the radio spectrum which is allocated to the military services, but falls within that portion of the radio spectrum which, in the United States, is used for the operation of Very High Frequency comi-ranges, and is administered by the CAA. Simultaneously, frequency 121.50 Mc/s which had been internationally agreed upon by signatories to the Atlantic City Convention, as an international emergency frequency, military and civilian alike, replaced frequency 140.58 Mc/s which hitherto had been used as a military emergency frequency.

On 9 December 1949 and 7 April 1950, by letter from the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, subject: "Joint Army and Air Force Call Sign Reassignments," the Air Force implemented the use of non-tactical "A" calls in accordance with Atlantic City, 1947. The breakdown of allocations is as follows:

U. S. AFA - AFZ
Pacific AGA - AGI
Caribbean AHA - AHI
FEAF AJA - AJI
USAFE AJA - AJI
Alaska AKA - AKI
N. E. Atlantic AKX - AKZ

The assignments to the Air Force bases are reflected in the current

JANAP 113(E). On 29 June 1950, the Air Force was designated the printing agency for JANAP 116. On 29 June 1950, the Air Force member was elected as the Chairman of J/CS. (Restricted)

On 27 January 1950, the Department of the Army introduced, into the Frequency Allocation Panel of the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee, a plan to provide for low frequency requirements in Alaska in the band 14 - 200 kg/s. Inamuch as the Department of the Air Force was at that time planning an extensive system for reporting aircraft movements, weather information, etc., the proposed plan of reallocation suggested by the Department of the Army was welcomed by the Air Force. After considerable study, an acceptable low frequency plan for all military services was devised and coordinated through the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee for trial use for the period of one (1) year. This plan was forwarded to the Alaskan Command on 27 April 1950 for implementation on a trial basis. Through this plan, the Air Force was able to provide necessary low frequencies for use of AACS and the Alaskan Air Command aircraft control and warning systems. (Confidential)

Captain Robert H. Service represented the Department of the Air Force in Ottawa, Canada at a series of meetings commencing 22 March 1950 for the purpose of discussing by what means the IRAC plan might be made more acceptable to the Canadian Administration. The results of this meeting made it possible for the Canadian Civil Off-Route frequency requirements to be accommodated within the Route bands, thereby releasing all Off-Route frequencies for use of the ROAF. In effect, this placed both the USAF and ROAF on a common source frequency basis within the IAARC bands thereby increasing the possibility of

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intra-service cooperation in the assignment of frequencies to Joint Military Aeronautical Problems. It is anticipated that future discussions between the HUAF and USAF will delineate methods for the sharing of specific frequencies.

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In August 1949, the Plans Branch started preparation of communications plans in support of the emergency war plans and mobilization requirements. This is a continuing process based on changes in mission


During September 1949, as a result of establishing a Director of Communications-Electronics, the Chief of the Plans Branch was designated as the Air Force Member of the Coordinating Committee responsible to handle all Joint Communications-Electronics Committee papers for the Air Force Member. The Plans Branch continued to furnish principal membership on the Joint Strategic Communications Plans Panel and the Joint Tactical Communications Plans Panel.

With regard to representation on the Telecommunications Coordinating Committee, the Plans Branch was given the responsibility to prepare the Air Force position and furnish working group members on all Telecommunications Coordinating Committee matters.

On 1 February 1950, the Flans Branch was assigned the responsibility to monitor and advise Joint American Military Advisory Groups and Military Assistant Advisory Groups in preparation of communications-electronics portions of the MDAP relative to standardization and suitability of items of equipment consistent with requirements of NATO countries and U. S. Air Force long range plans.

On 21 February 1950, the Plans Branch assumed the responsibility for providing representation of the U. S. Air Force on the Communications Subcommittee of the Technical Division of the Air Coordinating Committee.

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CHAPTER III

During the summer of 1949, Communications Systems Division received and reviewed studies prepared by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and the Western Union Company relative to modernization of the Air Force domestic teletype network. While these studies were predicated on increased efficiency and economy of operation, a careful review showed that both studies actually would result in a considerably higher cost to the Air Force. First Lieutenant R. H. Almes, under direction of Colonel G. A. Westphal, Chief of the Communications Systems Division, made a detailed study, using the basic semi-automatic switching equipment of the Western Union System, which greatly simplified existing circuit complexity and reduced the required number of relay centers. This study, designated as Plan 51, was approved by General Ankenbrandt on 17 March 1950, who directed that it be placed into existence at the earliest possible date. Flan 51 contemplated its existence around five major switching centers at Washington, Wright-Patterson, Maxwell, Carswell and MacClellan Air Force Bases.

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CHAPTER IV

The Electronic Systems Division, under the direction of Colonel G. H. Sparhawk, was concerned primarily with the study and implementation of the "Radar Fence" progress and the coordination of the various phases of development of the so-called "Common System of Air Navigation and Traffic Control." The "Radar Fence" progress did not proceed very rapidly due to conflicting requirements and uncertainty as to exact staff responsibilities. Congress appropriated limited funds for the construction for permanent sites. In the interim, however, limited ACAN coverage in the ZI was established by the assembly of a radar system known as Lashup III which utilized mainly World War II type equipment.


During this period, extensive work was accomplished in the field of IPP Mark X equipment and operations, and in January 1950, the first effort was made to use IFF Mark X as a beacon system for all-weather traffic control for the jet bombers of SAC. (Confidential)

On 1 April 1950, after thorough investigation and evaluation of the results obtained on the Sutte Arctic LF Loran chain, this system was inactivated. The decision was reached at the combined LF Loran Committee meeting held in Ottawa, in February 1950.

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CHAPTER V

In summary, the rapidly increasing tempo of operations toward the end of the Fiscal Year, as well as the revision of plans increasing the size and scope of Air Force operations indicated that World War II concepts of communications would require drastic revisions . It became increasingly apparent that the modern aircraft possessed greater flexibility of action than existing communications systems could accomodate. In a large measure, the command prerogative whereby each commander controlled and operated his own separate communications system was fundamentally the reason why world war II types of communications tended to restrict the freedom of action of the modern strategic aircraft. For example, the great range and high mobility of the modern bomber and the strategic concept which requires movement through various command areas indicated that the future would necessitate a single communications organization capable of providing a communications system possessing the speed and flexibility necessary to equal that of the aircraft.



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GLOSSARY

AACS Airways and Air Communications Service

AFL Air Force Letter

Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference

ECH Electronics Countermeasures

LAARC International Administrative Aeronautical Radio Conference

IFF Identification, Friend or Foe

JAMAP Joint Army-Havy-Air Force Publication

JCEC Joint Communications-Rectronics Committee

J/CP Joint Call Signs Panel, JCAC

IF Low Frequency

LORAN Long Range Havigation

MCS Wilitary Occupational Specialist

PFB Provisional Frequency Board


RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force

SCARWAF Special Category Army with Air Force


SSN Specification Serial Number

T/OAE Table of Organization and Equipment

VHF Very High Frequency



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The Directorate of Manpower and Organization was established on 23 November 1949 as a staff agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations by directive from the Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters USAF. Some personnel were assigned to the Directorate on 30 November 1949,2 and the remainder on 31 December 1949.3 Brigadier General Edmond C. Lynch was appointed Director and Brigadier General Aubry L. Moore, Deputy Director. This action combined staff agencies formerly known as the Organization Division, Office of the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O and the Manpower Group, a separate staff agency of the Chief of Staff's Office. The Directorate was made responsible for the development and maintenance of an integrated USAF manpower and organization program in order to promote effective and economical manpower utilization. To properly discharge this responsibility, the Directorate was organized in three (3) Divisions, namely, the Organization Division, the Manpower Allocations Division and the Manpower Analysis Division.

The Organization Division was formed from the Organizational Planning Branch which had been an element of the Organization Division as it was formerly constituted under the Office of the Assistant for Programming, . DCS/O. Colonel Archibald J. Hanna was appointed Division Chief. The

2. Office of the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, Personnel Assignment Memo No. 7, dated 30 November 1950. Department of Air Force Special Orders No. 247, Paragraph 20, dated

Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, dated 23 November 1949, subject, "Establishment - Directorate of Manpower and Organization" signed William F. McKee for the Vice Chief of Staff.

<sup>21</sup> December 1949.

Division was made responsible for the development of modern organizational tional concepts in the USAF, the development of uniform organizational terminology and the development and maintenance of the USAF organizational structure.

The Manpower Allocations Division was formed by combining the Troop Basis Branch and the T/O&E Branch of the Organization Division as formerly constituted. Colonel Allen R. Springer was appointed Division Chief. The Division was made responsible for the preparation and maintenance of the USAF Troop Program, the preparation of orders for the establishment, assignment, or discontinuance of USAF activities, and the final review and approval of all USAF Tables of Organization and Equipment, changes thereto, and Equipment Modification Lists to insure that they satisfy established requirements and that the final drafts have been prepared in accordance with established policies. 5

The Manpower Analysis Division was formed from the Manpower Group which formerly functioned as a staff agency of the Chief of Staff's Office. Colonel Stephen C. Lombard was appointed Division Chief. The Division was made responsible for the development of work measurement factors and guides used for measuring manpower requirements and the analysis of Air Force activities and programs with respect to mission, workload, and utilization of manpower resources.

<sup>6.</sup> Headquarters U. S. Air Force Organization and Functions Chart Book



Headquarters USAir Force Organization and Functions Chart Book No. 7 Al.

<sup>5.</sup> Headquarters U.S. Air Force Organization and Functions Chart Book No. 7 A3.

HISTORY of the DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION 1 July 1949 - 30 June 1950 Prepared for the Air University Historical Liaison Office By Major Sheldon W. Farnham (Acting Historical Officer) 10 November 1950 Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Headquarters USAF

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
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Headquarters U. S. Air Force Organization and Functions Chart Book No. 7 Al.


No. 7 al.

5. Headquarters U.S. Air Force Organization and Functions Chart Book


Headquarters U. S. Air Force Organization and Functions Chart Book No. 7 A2.



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


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AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS AND PUBLISHED TROOP PROGRAMS. PART II. The Air Force entered the Fiscal Year with a directed reduction in progress. The Authorized Strength 1 July 1949 was: Female Warrant Medical Corps Airmen Total Civilian Officer Officer 398116 168 341401 159365 \*55545 1002 54 Groups were authorized at this time and consisted of: 3 Heavy Bomb Groups 12 Medium Bomb Groups 2 Light Bomb Groups 20 Fighter 3 Fighter All-Weather 3 Strategic Reconnaissance Medium 2 Tactical Reconnaissance 2 Reconnaissance Weather, Very Long Range 7 Troop Carrier, Heavy 54 Total Separate squadrons authorized at this time included: 2 Strategic Support 2 Liaison 8 Air Rescue 1 Tow Target
13 Total Reduction of Groups during the Fiscal Year included: 1 Bomb Group Light 3 Fighter 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Troop Carrier, Heavy





PART III. AIR FORCE REORGANIZATION FISCAL YEAR 1950.

Implementing directives for the following major Air Force reorganizations were issued during this period -

- a. Western and Western Air Defense Forces were established and assigned to Continental Air Command in September 1949.
- b. The Air Force Division, Joint Long Range Proving Ground was redesignated as the Long Range Proving Ground Division and established as a special operating agency in September 1949.
- c. The Special Weapons Command was established as a major Air Command in November 1949.
- d. The Air Engineering Development Division was established as a Special Operating Agency in December 1949.
- e. The Research and Development Command (Later redesignated as the Air Research and Development Command) was established as a major Air Command in February 1950.



PART IV. SPECIAL PROJECTS PARTICIPATED IN BY THE MANPOWER
ALLOCATIONS DIVISION.

a. Tables of Distribution analysis and the officer reduction: Table of Distribution analysis was initiated as a part of the Air Force management program and during this period a complete analysis was made of Military Air Transport Service transport function; the Military Air Transport Service Weather and Airways and Air Communication Service functions, and of the Air Training Command, in addition to separate studies of troop space requests by all commands. Staffed with two (2) officers and one (1) civilian, the program produced excellent results although meeting with considerable opposition within the Air Staff. Savings in the initial analysis of eight (8) Military Air Transport Services transport squadrons alone totaled fifty-eight (58) officer spaces and two hundred ninety-four (294) other spaces.

As a result of the level program imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 1951, a complete re-analysis of the Air Force in the officer categories was required; a deficiency of 3707 officers forced immediate study of the problem and concurrently all major commands were queried as to (a) the effects of a 10% officer cut and (b) as to where they recommended the reductions be made. This information was consolidated and preparations made to effect reductions in a number of functional areas most of which were in the administrative and support fields. A Chief of Staff conference with major commanders followed and resulted in some modifications; however, at the end of the year the Korean crisis caused suspension of this project and restoration in most cases of reductions made.



b. Strategic Air Command Readiness Plan: Strategic Air Command
Tables of Organization and Equipment were converted to readiness
strength to provide for Strategic Air Command mobility and to effect
economies in troop space allocation; basically the plan involved a reduction from war strength to a point computed to permit a thirty (30) day
suctained operation without replacements by a unit so organized. This
plan, proposed by Derategic Air Command was implemented during Fiscal
Year 1950 and reduced six (6) Medium Wings from War to Readiness
Strength while augmenting four (4) Medium Wings from Peace to Readiness.
At the end of the Fiscal Year the mobility plan was completely implemented
with only two (2) areas of adjustment still to be made.

- (1) Additional Communications and Administrative officers requested have been referred to Strategic Air Command for adjustment within total spaces authorized.
- (2) Request for Specification Serial Number 684 on the basis of one (1) per engine is being investigated, however, no change is anticipated at this time.

While the conversion to Readiness Strengths failed to effect the economies in troop spaces initially planned, it has provided the Air Force with a much larger combat ready force and as such has effected a real economy.

c. United States Air Force Reserve Program: A conference was held in the office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces on 19 April 1950 to discuss the United States Air Force Reserve manning and promotion prospects for Reserve Officers. Prior to that time a grade structure for the United States Air Force Reserve as a whole had not been established. The Organized Air Reserve portion, including the Air National Guard, had grades in accordance with the



Tables of Organization or Tables of Distribution. The promotion of officers assigned to the Volunteer Air Reserve was made without reference to grade structure or vacancies except that the ratio of officers in grades above captain to those below that grade would not exceed the ratio of authorized allocations and positions above the grade of captain in the Organized Air Reserve to those below that grade in the Organized Air Reserve. This was in accordance with Air Force Regulation 45-5, dated 16 March 1949. Furthermore, Air Force Regulation 45-5, states: "The grade structure in Air Force Reserve units will be as established by appropriate Tables of Organization and Equipment and Tables of Organization. For Air Force Reserve officers not assigned to units, the grade structure will be as established by the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force". —

The M / 12 position in mobilization plan . Air Force Mobilization Plan 51-1 was selected as a basis for the United States Air Force Reserve Mobilization requirements. Although it was an outmoded plan it was believed more realistic in establishing a grade structure rather than a ratio as indicated above.

The following grades were allocated for Mobilization Assignees,
Mobilization Designees and officers assigned to Volunteer Reserve
Training Units:

Colonel Lt Colonel Major Captain Lieutenant Total
605 2,297 8,108 20,664 42,105 73,779

General officer grades will be allocated as determined jointly by Director of Manpower and Organization and Director of Military Personnel.



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On 7 June 1950, Personnel Allotment Vouchers were sent to each major command allocating grade authorizations for mobilization assignees and designees. Vouchers were being drafted listing grades and Specification Serial Numbers in the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units (VARTU); the projected date of publication being the First Quarter in Fiscal Year 1951.


d. Vittles Phase-out: "Operations Vittles" in Fiscal Year 1950 As of 1 July 1949 the organizational structure of "Operation Vittles"
had reached its zenith. Five Heavy (C-54) Troop Carrier Wings and a myriad
of supporting units operated wore than 200 C-54 aircraft under the
guidance of Headquarters 1st Air Lift Task Force.

The blockade of Berlin was gradually lifted in July 1949 and "D Day" was officially proclaimed as the first day of August. The succeeding five months saw the orderly disintegration of the Air Lift Task Force from a July peak strength of 2778 officers, 15124 airmen and 6319 civilians.

The additional troop space authorizations, over and above United States
Air Force programmed units, charged to Operation Vittles in July 1949 were
expended by the following major air commands:

Command	Officer	Airsen	Aggregate	Civilian
United States Air Force in Europe	1884	7692	9576	205
Third Air Division	78	1949	2027	740
Military Air Transport Services	187	1397	2084	58
Air Training Command	135	1060	1195	509
Air Materiel Command				4807
TOTAL	2284	12598	14882	6319

The balance of 494 officer and 2526 airmen spaces were diverted to the airlift from activities aiready programmed at that time, i.e., the 60th



1 0 0



and 61st Troop Carrier Wings in the United States Air Force in Europe and the 59th Air Depot Wing in Third Air Division. As the Vittles requirement disinished, these units resumed normal activities.

During the Operation of Vittles, the major air commands performed as follows:

United States Air Force in Europe Third Air Division Military Air Transport Service

Air Training Command
Air Materiel Command

Flight Operations

200 hour depot maintenance

Airways & Air Communications Service

& Weather & Replacement Training Units

Trained technical Support Personnel

1000 hour depot overhaul

The military and civilian space allocateds to Military Air Transport Service and Air Training Command were withdrawn from those commands during August 1949 by appropriate Voucher action. The civilian allocations to Air Materiel Command were not withdrawn until October and November 1949 to permit that command to schedule the rehabilitation of all C-54 aircraft through cycle reconditioning depots.

In Third Air Division the Production Line Maintenance system, with parallel docks and three eight hour shifts, lent itself admirably to shrinking activities. The midnight shift was discontinued in August 1949 and maintenance docks were pregressively closed down as United States Air Force in Europe returned aircraft to the Zone of Interior rather than press 200 hour inspections at Burtonwood. The Depot authorizations were reduced as follows:

		Officer	Airmen	Aggregate	Civilian
August	1949	4	295	299	72
Sept		4	363	367	106

			11	
	0001 Mar	A compared		
		men Aggregat	106	
	October 1949 4 43  November 1949 66 85		456	
(	The depletion of the Vittles Task Force			
	two factors:			
	The rehabilitation capability of the C-5	4 cycle recondi	tioning depots	
	in the Zone of Interior, and			
	The diminishing scale of airlift operati	ons into Berlin		
	The maximum acceptance of C-54 aircraft for c	ycle recondition	ning was	
	50 per month - this rate scheduled all aircr	aft requiring r	econditioning	
	to be processed by 30 November 1949. The air	craft that rema	ined in	
	Germany continued to move supplies to Berlin	to provide a st	ockpile. Dur-	
	ing August and the succeeding months, the ope	ration was redu	ced to	
	approximateJy 75 percent of July performance.			
	The following units were inactivated by			
	in Europe during the month indicated, and Per			
	were issued monthly to reduce the Non Tables	of Organization	and Equipment	
	support:	icer Airmen	Civilian	
	August 1949 Off 317 Troop Carrier Wing 21			
	Non Table of Organization Support 29	-	100	
	September 1949 313 Troop Carrier Group 12	1 433		
4	20	3 765		
4	Headquarter & Group)			
	Non Table of Organization Support 44	,0 1232	35	

1			1.2
October 1949	Officer	Airmen	Civilian
513 Troop Carrier Wing Headquarter & Group	157	568	
Non Table of Organization Support	118	560	
November 1949			
7169 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron	19	96	
Mon Table of Organization for	210	1610	30
60 & 61st Troop Carrier			
20 Communication Squadron	8	111	
2nd Communications Maintenance Organization	8	44	
Headquarters 1st Air Lift Task Force	80	68	40
Crew Augmentation	28	9	
32 Statistical Service Unit Augmentation	16	30	

In December 1949 no "Vittles" authorizations were extant; the 60th and 61st Troop Carrier Wings in Europe had resumed operations; and, the last of C-54 aircraft were being reconditioned for return to the commands from which they had been withdrawn the previous year.

e. Depot Wing Program: The Department of Air Force Troop Program (48 Groups Revised), dated 1 August 1942 reflected four (4) Air Depot Wings in Air Materiel Command, the 25th, 29th, 30th and 80th. The 25th and 90th were deployed to Hill Air Force Bas, the 29th and 30th to Norton Air Force Base. The 25th and 29th were phased from the 1st Quarter 1950 through 4th Quarter 1951; the 30th and 80th were phased from 3rd Quarter 1950 through 4th Quarter 1951.

In the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1950, the United States Air Force had certain requir ments associated with Strategic Air Command and security



100



activities that were considered of highest priority, and it was necessary to delete the 30th and 80th Air Depot Wings from the Troop Program. Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel approved of this action and only two Air Depot Wings remained in the Program at the end of the Piscal Year.

f. Aircraft Control and Warning Program: This consideration of the evolvement of the Zone of Interior Aircraft Control and Warning System has been limited primarily to the organizational actions concerned for the period 1 July 1949 through 31 December 1950. Only on broad or over-all effect has the considerable number of Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States Air Force actions pertaining to funding appropriations, construction, real estate procurement and rights of entry (for Aircraft Control and Warning site locations), research and development of radar equipment been considered. Necessarily, the above actions have had a direct effect on personnel requirements and at such points where these effects have caused major changes in the personnel Programs of the Aircraft Control and Warning System development, they are mentioned.

Background data (a) in November 1947, the Chief of Staff, United States
Air Force approved a 5-year plan for the establishment of an adequate
Aircraft Control and Warning Program which called for the expenditure of
\$388,000,000. This plan was given the code name Plan "Supremacy" and the Air
Staff was directed to take the necessary implementing action. However, before
enabling legislation could be enacted, the 80th Congress adjourned and the
implementing legislation was killed; (b) in light of the legislation delay
incurred with Plan "Supremacy" and Fiscal Year 1949 and Fiscal Year 1950
budgetary limitations the United States Air Force position was taken that an



interim air defense (Aircraft Control and Warning) plan should be implemented at once. To this end, a presentation was made to The Secretary of Defense on 9 September 1948 by Major General Saville. The presentation called for a modified Program designed to constitute the initial phase of "Supremacy" or similar plan. The scope of this interim plan was limited to installation, deployment and inter-communication of basic radar equipment on hand or under (at that time) current procurement from funds already appropriated. This was done to avoid objection on grounds of magnitude, cost or possible interference with research and development of better equipment. The interia plan, as presented by Major General Saville and based on estimates of delivery achedules for radar equipment, provided for sixty-one (61) radar stations and ten (10) control centers during Fiscal Year 1949 and fifteen (15) additional stations in Fiscal Year 1950, making seventy-six (76) total. This plan was subsequently presented to Congress and approved effective 30 March 1949 as Public Law Ho. 30, 81st Congress; (c) at the time of Major General Saville's presentation and in the months preceding the start of Fiscal Year 1950, the in-place "radar screen" included only five (5) radar stations and two (2) control centers. These radar stations and control centers were operated by the 503r and 505th Aircraft Control and Warning Groups. The total personnel authorized these groups and their assigned squadrons in May 1949 was as follows:

<u>Orr</u>	icer	Airnen	Appregate
503d Aircraft Control & Warning Group	147	1514	1661
505th Aircraft Control & Marning Group	108	1215	1323




The Fiscal Year 1950, Aircraft Control and Warning Troop Program
was prepared providing organizations and personnel authorizations for
that portion of the radar not to be completed in the Fiscal Year.

Preparation and subsequent revisions of the Fiscal Year 1950 Aircraft
Control and Warning Troop Program were made incorporating Air Staff
advice and the recommendations of the Continental Air Command as to
personnel composition and phasing of new Aircraft Control and Warning
Units. Due to the extremely reduced manning capabilities of the
United States Air Force under the Fiscal Year 1950 budget limitations,
the principal deficiencies of the Aircraft Control and Warning Frogram, organization-wise were:

a. The imposing of an 80 percent and in the case of two-thirds of the units a 40 percent of full Tables of Organization and Equipment Authorization level for manning;

b. The Aircraft Control and Warning Organization Tables of
Organization and Equipment 1-600 had been considered inadequate for
some time. Development of a new Tables of Organization and Equipment
could not be completed and all organizational actions were necessarily
authorized under Tables of Organization and Equipment 1-600 during
Fiscal Year 1950. After refinement and revisions the some of Interior Aircraft
Control and Marning Program settled as follows:



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g. Other Projects: In February 1950 a Troop Program was prepared in support of a joint report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Logistic and Strategic plans committee in connection with "Guidance for long range facilities planning for the Alakka - Pacific Far East Areas (Joint Strategic Plans Committee 193/41).

In July 1949 a troop basis was computed on force tabs of "OFFTACKLE" for inclusion in the Air Force Emergency War Flan. (Top Secret)


An officer of this branch was appointed a member of an Ad Hoc Committee by Joint Logistic Plans Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Logistic Plans Committee 416/40/0, 29 July 1949) for the purpose of reviewing certain logistic aspects of "DEOPSHOT", (Long Hange War Plan Outline); to prepare the war reserve and application base report required by subject plan. An estimated troop strength by type combat units and certain type support units was made for four (4) positions of the plan. (Top Secret)


Prepared and submitted to the Chief of Staff, for approval and transmission to the Munitions Board, the military troop requirements for Fiscal Year 1951.

Assisted in defense of United States Air Force programs before Air Force Budget Advisory Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Budget Bureau and the Armed Services Committee of Congress.


h. Division Participation on Boards and Committees: Members of the Manpower Allocations Division participated on major Boards Committees, etc., during Fiscal Year 1950 as follows:

- 1. Equipment Review Board.
- Ad Hoc Committee for Reviewing certain logistic aspects of "DESPARCE" (Long Hange War Plan Outline) appointed by Joint Logistic Plane Committee.





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#### CHAPTER I

Organization of Aeronautical Chart Service

Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation, 6 October 1948, the Aeronautical Chart Service, responsible for providing adequate aeronautical charts covering the world, had been assigned to the Strategic Air Command. Approximately 1 July 1949, Strategic Air Command, in a letter to this Headquarters, requested that due to the Air Force-wide mission of the Aeronautical Chart Service, consideration be given to the transfer of the Service from Strategic Air Command to some other organizational unit of the United States Air Force.

The mission of the Aeronautical Chart Service in providing photographic services to the USAF is very closely related to the responsibilities of the Director of Intelligence, DCS/O, in providing Air Objective folders for the strategic warfare plans of the USAF. As a result of this relationship, the Director of Intelligence recommended that the Aeronautical Chart Service be established organizationally in a position which would provide the most direct and expeditious channels of communication between that office and the Service.

<sup>1.</sup> R&R, Comment #2, 9 Sep 49, from Director of Intelligence to Organization Division, Assistant for Programming, subject:

"Photographic Services" for a full discussion of the mission and functions of the ACS as it relates to that of Director of Intelligence, Hqtrs., USAF.





Colonel C. C. Wasem of the Organization Division prepared a staff study of the entire problem of the Aeronautical Chart Service, recommending that the Service be immediately assigned to Headquarters Command, Bolling Air Force Base, and that the Director of Intelligence retain the primary responsibility for the supervisory control and monitoring of the Service.<sup>2</sup>

A conference was held on 27 November 1949 with representatives of this office, other interested staff agencies, the Air Materiel Command, Headquarters Command and the Commander of the Aeronautical Chart Service. The result of this conference was the reaching of the same decision previously arrived at by Colonel Wasem's study - namely, that the Aeronautical Chart Service should be assigned to Headquarters Command at Bolling and that representatives of the Aeronautical Chart Service and Headquarters Command immediately proceed to work out the final details and collaborate with this Headquarters in the preparation of the appropriate order to accomplish the transfer.

Subsequently, the Director of Intelligence, in an R&R to this office, suggested that the Air Materiel Command should be considered as a possible site for the Aeronautical Chart Service:

"The Headquarters Command, USAF, is organized solely for the purpose of servicing the housekeeping needs of Headquarters USAF.

Memo for General Lynch, from Organization Division, dated 23 Nov 1949, subject: "Reassignment of the Aeronautical Chart Service" and accompanying staff study.



"Air Materiel Command, in carrying out its mission of service, remains a more logical solution to the reassignment problem of Aeronautical Chart Service. Further, it is possible that duplication of effort and expenditure as well as overlapping of functions would result were Aeronautical Chart Service located other than in the AMC organizational structure."3

The Director of Intelligence, therefore, recommended that the reassignment of the Aeronautical Chart Service be delayed until such time as the Air Materiel Command had an opportunity to comment on this problem.

In January of 1950, as the result of a telephone conversation between the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, General McKee, the Deputy Commanding General of Air Materiel Command, General Street, and General Moore of this Directorate, the decision was reached that the Aeronautical Chart Service be reassigned to the Air Materiel Command. With this determination, the details pertaining to the final transfer of the Service were quickly arranged.

The reassignment was directed effective 1 March 1950 and an Air Adjutant Letter to that effect was issued 7 February 1950.4

<sup>3.</sup> R&R #1, dated 21 December 1949, from Director of Intelligence to Assistant for Programming, subject: "Reassignment of Aeronautical Chart Service."

<sup>4.</sup> AAG Letter, subject: "Reassignment of the ACS", ref. no. AFOMA 498f.



#### CHAPTER II

#### The Air Force Wing

In July of 1949 the Organization Division undertook a project to effect a uniform Air Force base level organization to cover all elements of the base with the exception of the primary mission group and its direct aircraft organizational maintenance effort. This group and its maintenance support required variation in organizational structure due to the differences in mission; i.e., fighter, technical training, medium and heavy bombardment, etc. However, it was believed that the wing headquarters, field maintenance, motor vehicle and base supply functions of the Maintenance & Supply Group, the entire Air Force Group, and the Medical Group for all Air Force bases could be identical in organizational structure and uniform in placement of functions.

It was not believed possible to effect complete uniformity immediately. Each major command has certain staff and organizational concepts which are too well accepted through custom and constant usage to enable an identical organization structure in all areas to be installed simultaneously. However, by concentrating on "selling" one command at a time, it was felt that ultimately all commands may be led to the desired uniform organization. Organization Division, therefore, adopted this "selling" plan of approach. As of the end of Fiscal Year 1950, all combat wings had been standardized through AFR 20-15. A 20-15 type of Regulation (AFR 24-2) for the Air Training Command has also been published. Proposed AFR 24-3, "Air Depot Wings" is approaching final form.



Because of the new concept of combat group operations, i.e., fixed base concept versus a requirment for rotation and mobility in SAC organization and a real requirement for Air Defense and Tactical Units to deploy by separate squadrons, Air Force Regulation 24-4 is being prepared and will supersede AFR 20-15 for combat wings. AFR 24-5 will cover the base level organization for Air Transport and Troop Carrier Wings. It is anticipated that after all major commands in the Air Force have operated under the wing concept for a period of from six to twelve months, it will no longer be necessary to publish detailed informative regulations. At that time, a staff manual or regulation will be published setting forth broad principles in operating procedures for Air Force base level organizations and individual commands will be delegated the authority of publishing their own regulations comparable to the 24 Series mentioned above.

The basic objective of this project is to increase effectiveness and efficiency in the Air Force. Uniform organizational structure and assignment of functions facilitates equitable distribution of resources. Furthermore, uniform organization will enable the Air Force to develop the necessary staff and command concepts, doctrines and procedures so vital to smooth, decisive actions which presently do not exist.

There have been no tests, other than garrison-type operations, which would serve to demenstrate the combat effectiveness or efficiency of the Air Force Wing. While it is true that the wing base organization is designed with the flexibility to permit, through augmentation, the structure and manning to undertake this task, the primary interest is in




the determination of the combat potential, under actual conditions, of our fighting elements organized under this concept. In August of 1949, the Inspector General, Major General Knerr, said: "The time appears to be appropriate to extend operational readiness tests to include the Wing Organization." The Organization Division concurred in this.<sup>2</sup> This Division has accepted several proposals to field test the wing base organization under simulated combat or field conditions.

The Organization Division feels that Air Force Regulation 20-15 provides the Air Force with the best basic organizational structure we have to date.

<sup>1.</sup> Memo to DCS/O from General Knerr dated 24 Aug 49.

<sup>2.</sup> R&R to Inspector General from Organization Division dated 31 Aug 49.



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# FOREWARD: I. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS II. THE MISSION AND ITS INFLEMENTATION Over-all Mission III. ACT IVITIES Surveys Actions on Air Force Directives Considered Unduly Restrictive Participation in Management Improvement Program Special Studies MAJOR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED Inability to Accomplish Surveys Air Force Wide Selling the Major Commands on the Program EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM Needs set forth as essential to VI. APPENDIX Memorandum for Chief of Staff, 11 January 1949, Subject: "Manpower Economy" 2. Organization Charts of USAF Manpower Group 3. Charts: Directorate of Manpower & Organisation as of 9 Feb 50 Extracts of Mq. USAF Orders List of Surveys FI 1950 5. List of Management Improvement Projects FY 1950



FOREWORD


In order to understand the activities of the Manpower Analysis
Division it is believed desirable to briefly review the Manpower Group
as the forerunner of the Analysis Division. The Manpower Group was
established on 10 November 1948. The Group, as established, was
under the command of Major General Eugene L. Eubank as Chief. Personnel
from the inactivated Manpower Economy Branch, DCS/Operations became
the nucleus of the Manpower Group. The Group as a separate activity
reported directly to the Chief of Staff, USAF, and was on a staff
level equivalent to that of the Inspector General or the Special
Assistant for Reserve Forces.

The mission of the Manpower Group was primarily to survey and analyze Air Force activities with respect to the mission, workload, personnel requirements, and effectiveness in the utilization of personnel resources and over-all operational economy. Field Surveys were used to a great degree in effecting the Manpower Group mission.

During the entire period of the Manpower Group, the Air Force was undergoing a severe reduction in strength, funds, and procurement. This situation did not aid the Manpower Group in accomplishing its mission, due to the fact that personnel authorizations, funds, etc. having been determined by higher authority, it became the main responsibility of the Manpower Group to obtain the most effective utilization of Air Force resources so authorized.

The Manpower Group established a program which has been entirely incorporated into the Manpower Analysis Division. It is of interest to note in this connection a Memorandum (1) for the Chief





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#### SECTION I

#### ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Manpower Analysis Division was established 23 November 1949 by Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Subject:

"Establishment of the Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O".

This directive (1) by the Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, reduced the USAF

Manpower Group from a top level agency of the Chief of Staff to that

of Division level within the new Directorate. Personnel of the USAF

Manpower Group were transferred to the Directorate of Manpower &

Organization by Paragraph 20, SO 247, dated 21 December 1949, Mq.

USAF(2) and the new designation of Manpower Analysis Division was
thus implemented.

The Division (Office Symbol AFONG) was given the following manning authorization (3), effective 1 February 1950 as follows:

General Officers 1
Colonels 5
Lt. Colonels 14
Majors 5
Civilians 7

Total 32

Two (2) Branches and the Office of the Division were set up concurrent with establishment of the Division and were designated:
Manpower Analysis Branch; Manpower Standards Branch; and Office of the Division Chief. (Appendix 3)





-2-

Establishment of the Manpower Analysis Division brought little change in the personnel authorization or duties assigned to the personnel. Just prior to discontinuance of the Manpower Group, Major General Eugene L. Eubank, the Group Chief, was reassigned as Deputy Inspector General, USAF with station at 1003rd IG Unit, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas and was succeeded by Brigadier Ceneral Aubry L. Moore as Chief. Colonel Stephen C. Lombard (4) became first Chief of the Manpower Analysis Division. Colonel Philip D. Coates became Chief of the Manpower Standards Branch and Colonel LeRoy Mudson the Chief of the Manpower Analysis Branch. Colonel Charles M. Seebach was assigned 18 March 1950.

<sup>23</sup> January 1950. See Appendix 4A



Memorandum for DCS/O fm Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, 23 Nov. 1949. Division Files SO 247, Mq. USAF, 21 December 1949, Extract, See Appendix 4 Manning Authorization, D/M&O, DCS/O, 1 February 1950, Division Files Extract Personnel Assignment Memorandum No. 1, D/M&O, dated



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# SECTION II THE MISSION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

The mission for the Manpower Analysis Division as prescribed by the Director, Manpower & Organization differed in small detail from that of the former Manpower Group. Actually there occurred only a restatement of mission and functions previously existing.

The Mission: (1)

"The analysis, survey and study of current and proposed

Air Force activities and programs with respect to the mission,

workload and personnel requirements in order to insure the

most effective and economical use of manpower resources."

The Major Functions outlined for the Manpower Analysis Division

likewise conformed very closely to those of the former Manpower

Group. Major Functions:

(1)

- "a. Study and analyze current and proposed Air Force activities and programs with respect to mission, workload, procedures, methods and utilization of manpower resources.
- b. Analyze functional area and activities to determine and recommend relative position and priority in the economical accomplishment of the Air Force mission.
- c. Provide staff supervision over, evaluate performance of and provide consultant service to Command Manpower Groups.
- d. Conduct manpower surveys of selected areas as directed or required.





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- e. Develop, analyze, and test work measurement factors and standards for estimating and substantiating manpower requirements.
- f. Develop and review guides, methods, and procedures to be used in the determination of manpower requirements.
- g. Conduct field studies to establish standards for selected activities.
- $\underline{h}_{ullet}$ . Develop and disseminate a USAF Work Simplification Program.

The Manpower Analysis Division was given numerous and varied tasks to perform during the period. Such diversity precludes emmeration, however, the services of the Division were much in demand in matters which dealt with manning problems, the Career Development Program, monitoring Air Force Directives, and Major Organizational matters.

It should be clarified here that neither the Manpower Analysis Division nor its predecessor the Manpower Group were ever charged with the responsibility or function of limiting, reducing, or in any manner effecting the over-all Air Force strength authorization. The Air Force strength requirements having been determined at higher staff level, it then became the Division's principal job to get the most out of what was on hand.

1. USAF Organization and Functions Chart Book, December 1949



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
# SECTION III

The activities of the Manpower Analysis Division, as previously stated, were varied and diversified, however, certain activities require mention and individual evaluation.

Air Force Manual 150-1, revised 1 January 1950. MANPOWER GUIDE was published and given Distribution "C" less subordinate Air Commands. The manual, prepared by the Manpower Standards Branch of the Division, was a time consuming activity, required a high degree of skill in preparation, much planning and coordination with various staff agencies and Major Commands. The manual as originally compiled was intended to serve as a guide for the use of staffs of all echelons of Command within the USAF in matters pertaining to personnel requirements.

The "Yardsticks" so developed were based on workloads and other factors considered valid. This Air Force Manual or guide is considered of prime importance as it provides unit commanders with an efficient tool in arriving at manpower requirements for certain functions.

Field Surveys (1) FIELD SURVEYS were a continuation of the old
Manpower Group function, however, it was found that the Manpower
Analysis Division could not possibly conduct adequate field surveys
Air Force wide. Accordingly, instructions were issued by letter(2)
to all Major Commands on 12 December 1949 implementing Paragraph 4 of
Air Force Regulation 150-3 dated 20 July 1949. This letter by
Major General William F. McKee placed responsibility on Major Commands





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for conducting surveys, rendering reports and recommendations to Mq.
USAF on manpower matters. The Manpower Analysis Division, USAF was
left restricted survey functions and was charged with rendering
assistance to the Commands in making their surveys. The Division was
henceforth to perform only such supervisory and special surveys as
directed.

Placing survey responsibility on the Major Commands immediately raised the problem of personnel with sufficient background and training to conduct the surveys. This Division was able to furnish the necessary supervision as well as manuals and survey criteria and guides. Generally, it can be stated that the Commands carried out the survey function capably and energetically, however, some resistance was encountered, possibly due to failure on the Commander's part, to realize the great importance of efficient manpower utilization and the demand for economy of our national resources.

As stated previously, it was not the aim of the Manpower Analysis Division to "cut" the strength of the Air Force, but to get the personnel where most needed and best utilized. Following are results of surveys taken at random and which were undertaken during the period FX-1950. These surveys (3) were Personnel Requirements Surveys, strengths shown are totals for that unit.

		. 7
		- 7-
	a. 7th Bomb Wing, SAC, Carswell AFB, Texas, 31 August 19	949
	Auth. Asgd. Recomme	
	Off AM Civ Total Off AM Civ Total Off AM	Civ Total
	156 1880 344 2380 197 2389 325 2911 152 2041	298 2491
	b. 97th Bomb Wing, SAC, Biggs AFB, Texas, 10 March 1950	
	Auth. Ased. Recomm	ended
	Off AM Civ Total Off AM Civ Total Off AM	Civ Total
	586 3310 328 4224 533 2648 301 3472 539 3163	
	c. 3310th Tec. Tng. Wing, AFTRC, Scott AFB, Illinois, 2	
	Auth. Aggd. Recomm	
	Off AM Civ Total Off AM Civ Total Off AM	Civ Total
	418 3206 1204 4828 Not available 382 3760	982 5124
	d. 57th Ftr. Intercept Wing, AAC, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska (See comment below on result of Alaskan Air Command	
	Auth. Ased. Recomm	
	Off AM Civ Total Off AM Civ Total Off AM	Civ Total
	200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100	1060 5157
	e. 1701st AT Wing, CMTLD MATS, Great Falls AFB, Mont.,	25 Apr 50.
	Auth. Asrd. Recomm	ended
	Off AM Civ Total Off AM Civ Total Off AM	CIV Total
	175 1271 268 1714 Not available 175 1537	268 1980
16		
	Statement and the statement of the state	



In regard to the survey of the Alaskan Air Command conducted by the Manpower Group of that Command, a memorandum (4) for the Chief of Staff, USAF, 10 November 1949, is of interest. Although the 57th Fighter Intercept Wing had not been fully surveyed at the time, the AAC Manpower Group reported space savings as follows were indicated:

96 Officers; 647 Airmen; 204 Civilians - Total: 947 Spaces. Troop authorizations were reported reduced as follows:

68 Officers; 457 Airmen; 326 Civilians - Total: 851 Spaces.

ACTIONS ON AIR POFCE DIRECTIVES. Monitoring Air Force directives (AFR, AFL, APM's) was a carry-over function from the discontinued Manpower Group, USAF, however it was not fully implemented until 6 February 1950 when the late General Muir S. Fairchild directed by Memorandum (5) to Director, Manpower and Organization, DCS/O, the setting up a Committee known as the Committee on Festrictive Air Force Directives. The Committee (CHD) was placed on TDY at Bolling Air Force Base, Colonel LeRoy Hudson as Chairman. An intensive study was made of Air Force directives to determine those that were unduly restrictive and appeared to handicap rather than assist the unit commander. At the same time the CRD was functioning, the Manpower Analysis Division was continuing along the same lines, therefore the results may be reported as a total and still give due credit to all participants. After the Committee was dissolved, Review and monitoring of Air Force directives became this Division's responsibility. During the same period Major Air Commanders were invited to forward their own studies and comments on Air Force directives along the lines of being unduly restrictive,





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obsolete, or containing impractical requirements. Lt. General Ennis

C. Whitehead, Commanding General, Continental Air Command, under date
of 5 June 1950 submitted some thirty-one (31) comments (6) on reduction
of the mass of regulations, improvement in practices, policies,
miscellaneous directives.

A total of approximately 2000 Air Force directives were reviewed.

The main result of this review was to bring the Air Force directives to a more current status by rescissions, revisions, and amendments.

The USAF Committee on Restrictive Air Force Directives rendered a report covering one hundred (100) items of major importance in which recommendations were made for simplification of procedures, elimination of non-essential, and other reasure regarded as improvements.

This project resulted in a great improvement in the condition of Air Force directives, particularly those in effect before establishment of the Department of the Air Force. The review is a continuing function and will require constant application since there are being added monthly to the list of Air Force directives as many as 100 per month. (7)

PARTICIPATION IN THE MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM. The Management Improvement Program was continued by this Division although its inception began in November 1948 in so far as the USAF Manpower Group was concerned. This Division was not charged with responsibility for the Program but rather charged with "Participation in" the program. This question of responsibility was raised by Colonel Stephen C. Lombard under date of 26 May 1950 in a Memorandum (8) to Director of Manpower and Organization, pertinent portions quoted herewith:





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".... Is or is not the manpower function intended to include management? For best operations it is felt that management must be one of the principal approaches to the overall manpower problem...."

Although entrance to the Management Improvement Program might be through the "back door" of manpower economy, considerable constructive work was done on many activities. A partial list of these activities will be found in Appendix 6. In general, it may be stated that this Division was responsible for either stimulating or instituting mamerous management improvement activities, the value of which cannot easily be estimated. Some of the activities will be considered below in order to show the extent of Participation:

a. Study (9) on Costs of Shipping Mousehold Goods OS:

This study was undertaken with the view of saving manpower and funds involved in shipment of household goods to overseas stations. It was proposed that furnished quarters for all Air Force officers and first three grades Airmen (married) be provided in order to eliminate cost of packing and crating, and cost of transportation. It was estimated by the Director of Installations that \$22,369,905 a year would be saved for Overseas requirements, however, the cost of such furnishings and the fact that adequate housing could not be provided OS caused the idea to be dropped.

b. Study on Superimposing Certain Numbered Air Force Headquarters on an existing air base or installation was begun in May 1949 and continued into FY-50, submitted to the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USAF. The study may have had far reaching results inasmuch as the 10th Air Force was moved from Ft. Benjamin Harrison. The 1st Air Force





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from Ft. Slocum to Mitchel Air Force Base; and 15th Air Force from Colorado Springs, Colorado to March Air Force Base.

- c. Survey of Field Installations in the Washington Area to determine essentiality of activities and personnel in the Area: This survey was undertaken on instructions of Vice Chief of Staff, dated 16 May 1950, subject: "Field Installations in the Washington Area". Reports of progress were submitted periodically, however, as of 30 June 1950 the project was only 40% completed.
- d. Reduction of Pipeline Time for OS Replacements and Returnees: The USAF system of reporting for reassignment was studied and analyzed to determine its sufficiency. A survey team visited each ORD and PAE studying the systems used. A report was rendered to DCS/Personnel with findings and recommendations. Results obtained or planned for immediate future:
  - (1) Elimination of Assembly Stations
  - (2) Consolidation of facilities at Hamilton AFB, Camp Mason, Camp Stoneman, California.
  - (3) The establishment of a reporting period in advance of reassignment which would provide for "Straight line transfers between units of ZI and OS Commands.
- e. Study on the Administration and Apprehension of Air Force Prisoners: At a briefing (10), 27 February 1950, in the Office of the DCS/Personnel the question of establishing a Retraining Center for Air Force Prisoners was reemphasized. This Division did not feel that such was feasible in view of additional manning requirements and other considerations. The Apprehension program was further





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studied to determine the justification for the maintenance of 12 officers, 288 airmen, and 104 vehicles as a special absentee-apprehension team in ConAC. As the study progressed it was found to duplicate a special sub-committee within the OSD Management Committee, consequently the study was dropped but contact with OSD on the subject maintained. The latest development was to the effect that ConAC had been directed to transfer the responsibility for apprehension of absentees to OSI not later than 1 July 1950.

The time and effort contributed by the Manpower Analysis Division during the period on Special Studies, Problems, Coordination with other Staff Agencies of Mq. USAF, indicated rather deep participation in the Management Improvement Program. It was not a planned program on the part of the Division, but a result of the close association of manpower economy with good management practices.

- List of Surveys conducted or begun in FY 50, Appendix 5
- Ltr, Assist. VC/S, USAF, subj: "Manpower Groups", 12 Dec 49, signed by Maj. Gen. William F. McKee, Division Files.
   Manpower Surveys, FY-50, Division Files.
- 4. Memo of Brig. Gen. Aubry L. Moore to C/S, USAF, subj: "Item for
- Daily Staff Digest", 10 Nov. 49, Division Files.

  5. Memo of Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, VC/S, USAF to Dir of MeO, subj:
  "Command and Economy of Operations", 6 Feb 50, Division Files.

  6. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, CG, ConMC, 5 June 50, w/attached
- comments, Division Files.
- 7. From Project File by Lt. Col. J. T. Mercereau, 1 Aug. 50, Div Files.
  8. Memo of Col. S. C. Lombard, Chief, Manpower Analysis Division,
  26 May 50 to D/M&O, subj: "Air University Management Program", Division Files.
- 9. Study on feasibility and dollar savings in furnishing household
- equipment in OE Sta., 22 July 1949, Division Files.

  10. From notes in Project File, Manpower Analysis Division, 1 Mar. 50.



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#### SECTION IV

### MAJOR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

The Manpower Analysis Division organized under the Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/Operations with a total authorization of thirty-two (32) military and civilian personnel could not begin to survey the Air Force world-wide. Its mission was therefore adjusted to perform limited surveys and supervision. This survey responsibility suddenly thrust on the Major Commands disclosed the shortage of personnel equipped by training and experience in conducting this new responsibility. The plan of development as set up by the Manpower Standards Branch of the Division, was to hold initial indoctrination conferences with the Command Manpower Groups, explain the use of Manpower Guides, Workload Questionnaires, Survey Sheets, and other tools. As early as 15 February 1950<sup>(1)</sup> some eleven (11) Commands had been given this initial indoctrination. The quality of Surveys conducted prior to this indictrination indicated the magnitude of the problem confronting the Commands.

Another problem of great importance arose during the periodYardsticks. (2) AFM 150-1 dated 1 January 1950 and later revised,
contained the basic yardsticks covering activities organized in
accordance with the principles of AFR 20-15, dated 13 December 1948.

For the Manual to be of assistance to those commands not organized
or only partially organized under AFR 20-15, more yardsticks would have
to be devised. The Standards Branch of the Division found itself
incapable of producing the quantity of yardsticks required to cover
the new requirement. Solution of the problem remained for a later date.






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A feeling appeared to exist among the various Commands visited or surveyed that the main purpose of such visits or surveys was to perpetuate the activities of the War Department Manpower Board in existence during World War II, that is reduce personnel authorizations unless a strong justification was put up. This feeling, or one might say dubious attitude had to be dispelled by the Division before cooperation could be obtained. Sensing this attitude early, the Division was able to gradually overcome the preconceived notions of most of the Commanders concerned.


The volume of special and miscellaneous studies channeled to this Division began to impose greater demands on its own manpower resources that was originally anticipated. Much of this type activity could only be remotely connected with the Division's primary mission, and therefore it was realized that a restatement of mission and function was necessary. This followed at a later date. In fact it appeared for a while that the Division would become bogged down in minutia rather in the performance of its mission.

Dropping from a top echelon of the USAF staff to a Division within a Directorate required some readjustment in thinking on the part of the personnel involved. During the USAF Manpower Group days channels were downward, as a Division, channels were upward. Supervision was formerly immediate and direct. As a Division this type of supervision was not so apparent at first, however as the various Divisions of the Directorate of Manpower & Organization became more integrated the required and essential supervision was forthcoming.





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#### SECTION V

#### EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM

Possibly the greatest contribution of the period was accomplished in making all echelons both military and civilian, manpower conscious. The approach to determining the manning requirements became more and more based on workloads, factors, and other systems. A beginning had been made to more intelligently determine adequate personnel authorizations.


A better understanding with a higher degree of cooperation was beginning to be manifest as Commanders came to realize the need for the best utilization possible of all resources afforded the Nation under the 48 Group Program.

In general it can be said that any "savings" in personnel spaces simply meant that these spaces were needed or could be more fully utilized elsewhere. "Luts" in the over-all Air Force authorization, both civilian and military during the so-called Economy period were directed by higher echelon on factors best known to those echelons.


As the manpower program of better utilization began to reap some results the Korean situation burst upon the International scene. The manpower program was paralyzed for the time being. A rapid build-up was critically necessary that the once vital matter of economy went overboard. The need for utmost and efficient manpower utilization became more important than ever - and so remains.

The Korean situation and other considerations pointed out the need for stronger manpower controls. These indicated some changes were needed, if the Manpower Analysis Division was to be anything more than






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Company of Street

A cerebul review be sade of all the directives requiring the appointment of boards, committees, etc., and that those that infringe in any may upon the discharge of the responsibilities of commenders by resided. In general, standing boards should be limited to those boards that was account to collect, record and evaluate evidence.

more representations - Date D and E.

5. Improver behoof Barail for Officers. Since the establishment of the six University, there have been a himser of instances where officers were detailed to commes when their rank, experience and provious duties deeped to indicate that they were qualified for a higher level of training. In the past two years, more than 100 full exhausts have been essigned as students at the Command and Staff Edwals. In most cases this was their first attendance at a formal military research and the officers were extremely anxious to get a school for their record, but a review of their records indicates the large majority of these officers but already performed high staff and second functions most creditly and were either qualified for the Air Tar Seilege, or could have so qualified by calified by reliefed for the Air Tar Seilege, or could have so qualified by calified by the been could be been could be serious of these highly qualified officers are not available where they were savely messed, and two, younger officers where withelly in need of this advention have not received it.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

That a firm oligibility list be established for our higher schools and that an officer on these lists be described to sources on a lower level.


6. Personnel Tursover - Picekips. The personnel in transit due to change of station is, and mill continue to be, one of our heavy manpower losses. Since this cannot be eliminated entirely, it behoves us by careful planning and continuous supervision, to been it at the lowest possible level. Throughout the Air Force, the rate of turnover of officers is very high. In this headquarters alone, over 1600 officers have moved in and over 600 officers have moved out in the past 12 months. Station commenders, in conference with our Wanpower Survey Turns, cite numerous instances of personnel who have had a number of changes of station within a relatively short period of time, despite the provisions of a normal 18 menth tour of duty by AFR 35-39. Done of our overcous tasses, because of climate, isolation, or lack of facilities, lave very short tours of duty which results in a very high percentage of versums time being lost in pipelines.

#### THE OWN STRATTORS

a. A general tiphtening up on permanent charge of design


orders.

b. Survey of all overseas stations with short tours of duty to determine shather or not it is absolutely necessary to maintain those stations and if so, the minimum number of troops required.




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
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
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


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
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


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
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


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
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
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
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER & ORGANIZATION DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS

EXTRACT


PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT NEMO No. 1 23 January 1950

3. The following officers, having been assigned to Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O, in accordance with para 20, Special Orders No. 247, Department of the Air Force, dated 21 December 1949, are further assigned to the Manpower Analysis Division and branches of the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O, with duty assignment as indicated below, effective 28 December 1949.


	MANPONER ANALYSIS	DIVISION	DESIG-	DUTY
RANK	NAME	S.N.	NATION	SSN
COLONEL	LONGARD, STEPHEN C.	2174	Chief	2162
IT COLONEL	MALONY, ROBERT E.	2151A	Executive	2162
Manpower Analysis Er COLONEL	NUDSON, LEROY	204A	Chief	2162
COLONEL	NOCETO, WALTON E.	A0366391	Asst.Chief	6320
LT. COLONEL	BOWER, WILLIAM M.	4548A		2162
LT. COLONEL	EGGE, GEORGE V.	2831A		2162
LT. COLONEL	HOOVER, EDWARD F. Jr.	6322A		2162
IT. COLONEL	KELLY, CHARLES A.	A0888477		4010
IN . COLONEL	MERCEREAU, JAMES T.	A0195682		7010
IT . COLONEL	REYNOLDS, ALDEN C.	2886A		6320
LT. COLONEL	WILSON, CHARLES E.	A0221128		2260
MAJOR	DETTRE REXFORD H. Jr.	9768A		4010
MAJOR	HUBLER, GEORGE O.	4559A		4823
MAJOR	RECTOR, MALTER S.	6830A		4823
MAJOR	STERN, IRVING R.	A0100147	0	2260



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APPENDIX NO. 6

MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS INITIATED AND DEVELOPED BY THE MANPOWER ANALYSIS DIVISION - FY 1950

### Major Project

Supervisory and Indoctrination Manpower Surveys

Reorganization of Air Force

Study of Functional Assignment of Officers in T/OME Units

Study of System of Computation of USAF Training Requirements

Diversion of Manhours from Primary Mission

Survey of Activities in Washington area

Study of Administration and Apprehension of Air Force Prisoners

The Evaluation and Review of Approximately 2000 Air Force Directives

### Objective of the Study

The conducting of Manpower Surveys of approximately 26 ZI and 8 overseas Air Force installations for the purpose of effecting greater economy of operation and better utilization of manpower.

Prescribing the uniform placement of function at Air Force Bases under mobile and/or fixed operating conditions, and establishing a packaged requirement for Base and Wing programming.

Study to determine possible deletion and/ or consolidation of officer positions in T/CEE units.

An analysis of the current system of computing USAT Training Requirements and recommendations for the improvement thereof.

An experience table, covering approximately 100,000 military personnel and 30,000 civilians, which will guide the commander in estimating productive and non-productive manhours.

To determine the possibility of reducing Air Farce activities within the Washington, D. C. area.

An evaluation of the justification for the maintenance of a special absentesapprehension team, and subsequent recommendation for the dissolution of the team.

Insuring the compatibility, essentiality, and currency of Air Force publications, and that only the minimum necessary restrictions are incorporated therein. Action has been taken to recommend the revision of some 200 directives.

### Major Project

The Development and Publication of AFM 150-1

Development of a Manpower-Survey Procedures Manual

The Initiation and Drafting of Air Force Regulation 24-1

The Conversion of SSN's to AFSC's in AFM 150-1

Cost Budget Integration

A Study of the Performence of non-Air Force Mission Services

The Base Level Personnel Management Program

USAF Morning Report (AFR 31-6)

Revision of the Procedure for the Operation of Motor Pools

Personnel Requirements for the Proposed Air Force Academy

#### Objective of the Study

The development of manpower yardsticks for the use of staffs of all echelons of command which will provide guidance in effective manpower control.

To provide an operating guide for personnel engaged in conducting organization and mannower surveys.

To prescribe the basic principles governing the administration of Air Force bases.

The conversion of the personnel requirements in terms of AFSC's in the Manpower Guide (AFM 150-1) so as to be comparable with Wilitary Career Program titles.

Integration to the maxisum extent practicable of the two divergent systems of accounting currently being maintained in the Air Force.

A survey to determine the extent to which the Air Force is committed to perform services normally assumed to be the primary responsibility of other governmental departments. (Postal, Civil Service, etc.)


An analysis of the current Base Level Personnel Management Program and recommendations for the improvement thereof.

A comprehensive study of the requirements for, and frequency of, the reporting and accounting of USAP personnel.


A study of Motor Pool Operations to determine if it is possible to eliminate trip tickets and the conducting of formal investigations for accidents of \$25 or less.

The analysis and development of T/D's and initiation of a plan for phased acquisition schedules for the establishment of an Air Force Academy.


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PART 1. MAHPO SER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION - 1 July 1950 - 31 December 1950.

a. Organization and Personnel.

On 1 July 1950 the Manpower Allocations Division was composed of a Division Chief office and two Branches with Gol Allen K. Springer as Division Chief, and Col L. O. Ryan and Col Frank Graves, Franch Chiefs (See Incl 1). In August 1950, Colonel Ryan was transferred and was replaced by Col John F. Wadman. On 20 November 1950 the Manpower Allocations Division was reorganized to its present organization (See Incl 2). Basically, this reorganization transferred the Table of Organization and Equipment Branch with all its functions to the Manyower Requirements Division, Director of Mannower and Organization, and divided the old Troop Basis Branch into four new Branches with Colonel Jadman advancing to the position of Deputy Division Chief. The four new branches being the Military Allocations Branch, Civillan Allocations Branch, Programs Branch and the Activations and Unit Control Branch with functions as described in the Headquarters, United States Air Force Chart Book, Page 7A3, dated 19 December 1950. Ho further organizational or functional change was made during this reporting period. However, due to increased emphasis on management of Civillan Allocation and the new fiscal budget project structure, it was necessary to increase Personnel Authorization to the Civilian Allocations Branch from 2 officers and 2 civilians to 4 officers and 4 civilians during this period.

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Authorized Strength of the Air Force. PART II. As of 1 July 1950 the Air Force had allocated to major commands the troop spaces and civilian positions in totals as follows: W/O Airmon Total Civillans FMC Officers 387,754 154,150 1271 251 331,645 954,587 By 1 January 1951 these authorizations had been increased to: Airmen Total Civilians FEC Officers 215,197 1459 197 471,831 543055 -69,568 Thile only a part of this increase was authorized to Far East Air Forces, most of the increases could be attributed to the Korean cituation as Training, Maintenance or Supply Support. (For the Far East Air Forces buildup see Part V of this report). Increased operations were reflected in the combat buildup from 43 Tables of Organization and Equipment Wings on 1 July 1950 to 62 Tables of Organization and Equipment Wings authorized on 1 January 1951 with composition as follows: 3 Tactical Reconnaissance Bomb Group Reavy 3 Troop Carrier, Heavy 17 Bomb Group Medium 6 Troop Carrier, Medium 2 Bomb Group, Light Fighter Boober Fighter Interceptor Fighter Escort Strategic Reconnaissance, Heavy Strategic Reconnaissance, Medium "These figures exclude pipeline

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Separate Tables of Organization and Equipment Squadrons were increased from 13 to 22 during this same period with the following

- 3 Strategic Support
- 2 Liaison
- 9 Air Rescue
- 2 Tow Target
- 6 Strategic Reconsissance Medium Weather 22


PART III. The following listed Troop Programs were published:

- United States Air Force Troop Program, dated July 1950.
- United States Air Force Program, Organization and Personnel Worldwide, dated July 1950.
- 3. United States Air Force Troop Program, dated 1 October, 1950.
- 4. United States Air Force Program, Organization and Personnel,

PART IV. Major reorganizations within the Air Force, included
Activation or Inactivations as follows:

- 1. Directives were issued in November 1950 reorganizing the Continental Air Command into Continental Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Air Defense Command.
- Directives were prepared to implement the reorganization of Military Air Transport Services to Air Transport Command; however, this plan was not implemented due to Air Staff decisions.






- 4. Directive issued in December 1950 establishing the Air Force Pinance Division as a special operating agency.
  - 5. Various Air National Guard units were returned to Active Duty.

PART V. Korean Buildup in Far East Air Forces.

for implementation in January 1951.

Total Authorization	Officer	Airmen	Aggregate
Pre-Kores	3,858	33,529	37,387
1 January 1951	8,502	59,726	68,228

a total authorization of 3,858 officers, 33,529 airmen for a total of 37,387 troop spaces. In order to suggest Far East Air Forces to a wartime strength and augment other support activities, the Air Force estimated that an additional 4,468 officers and 20,709 airmen would be required. However, to provide these spaces from within the Air Force Program would seriously compromise the missions of other major air commands, the Air Force requested authority to exceed the Fiscal Year 1951 budget strength. Additional authorizations were granted by the Secretary of Defense in two increments of approximately 25,000 each; Package I (25,177), Package II (25,412). Allocations of troop spaces for functions directly attributable to the Korean situation were authorized as requests were received from the various commands chargeable to this special authorization called "SAFE" (Special Augmentation Far East). Such authorizations were to be withdrawn



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Total authorisations:

	Officers	Airmon	Aggregate
As of 31 July	5,024	40,316	45,340
As of 16 August	5,310	40,884	46,194

As of 18 September Far East Air Forces had been sugmented by 10,623 spaces since the crisis in the Far East. This increased 1,582 officers and 9,041 airmen. In addition, an increase of 66 civilians was authorized for the Far East Air Forces Headquarters. On 1 October, the total Special Augmentation Far East (SAFF) to Far East Air Force reached the following totals: 1839 officers, 11751 airmen, 13590 aggregate for total Far East Air Forces authorization of 5714 officers, 44863 airmen, 50,577 aggregate.

By 3 November 1950 Far East Air Force was requested to reconsider their request of 19 Deptember for 700 officers and 5000 airmen in light of the overall troop space increases incorporated in the revised United States Air Force Fiscal Year 1951 Troop Program of 1 November. The revised program included the transfer of certain units on temporary duty from Continental Air Command accounting in a large measure for the large Tables of Organization and Equipment increases. 714 Signal Battalion Separate, 2nd Radio Relay Squadron, 162 Tactical Reconnaissance, 1st Shoran Beacon Unit, 363 Reconnaissance Tactical Squadron, 437 Trainer Carrier Wing (Nedium) 452 Bomb Wing (Light) brought the total authorized in Far East Air Forces to 7062 officers, 50,307 airmen, 57,369 aggregate.

Beginning with the Third Quarter Personnel Allotment Vouchers,
Fiscal Year 1951, 700 Finite Control Comp SAFE (Special Augmentation
Far East) authorizations were no longer specifically indicated on



Personnel Allotment Vouchers; however, "SAFE" (Special Augmentation Far East) authorizations previously granted and not programmed for other functions upon cessation of hostilities in the Far East are subject to withdrawal.


Entering the 7th month of sustained combat in the Korean Mar, combat and supporting units were in most cases, instead of being organized at war strengths, sugmented with additional combat crews and limited maintenance and armament personnel. On 29 December Far East Air Forces requested reorganization under the war column. This reorganization resulted in an increase of 1,584 officers, 6,762 minument, with a return of 788 officers, 2,098 minument non-Tables of Organization and Equipment spaces. In addition the 4th Interceptor Wing and the 27th Fighter Escort Wing on temporary duty from Continental Mir Command were also reorganized under the war column. For East Air Forces total authorization as of 31 December 1950 was:

 Officers
 Airmen
 Aggregate

 8502
 59,726
 68,228


PART VI. Aircraft Control and Warning Program.


1. The organizations enumerated in paragraph 3 of Fiscal Year 1950 Report, were in the process of maining, training and equipping at the end of Piscal Year 1950. Owing to the international situation at this time, an increased emphasis was ismediately placed on the Air Defense of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff a proved plan (Public Law 30) for the Zone of Interior Aircraft Control and Marning System providing for



75 permanent radar stations by 30 June 1952 and was subsequently revised to make 30 June 1951 the completion date. The lash-up stations were to phase out of the picture as permanent stations became operational. By direction of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, every effort was to be made to effect occupancy of the first 24 permanent Aircraft Control and Warning sites by 31 December 1950, which date was subsequently changed to 31 March 1951 due to construction and squipping difficulties. Under the guidance of the Operations Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Hq, United States Air Force, several conferences with Continental Air Command Staff officers resulted in a firm personnel requirement figure for Fiscal Year 1951. The new Table of Organization and Equipment 1-2129T, Aircraft Control and Warning Organization (Fixed) had now been completed and was utilized for composition of the below or anizations. In addition, Hq, United States Air Force approved the Continental Air Command proposal that each Aircraft Control and Warning site be provided a squadron type of organization. Heretofore, the concept of operations provided for detachments only at certain locations.

The phased requirements for the first two quarters of Fiscal Year 1951 are shown below and include organizations for manning of Lash-up stations and the 2nd quarter figures provide for the first 24 permanent sites, all of which have been authorized by appropriate Department of the Air Force Letters:





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As a result of the publishing of the new Tables of Organization and Equipment, 121307, Aircraft Control and Tarning Organization (Fixed) and increased personnel ceilings for Fixeal Year 1951, the principal deficiencies of the Fiscal Year 1950 program were overcome. The Aircraft Control and Marning organizations enumerated above are suthorized sufficient personnel to smintain complete 24-hour radar coverage on a 56-hour work week basis. In peacetime, certain duplicate operating positions can be left unmanned in order to work only 40-hours weekly.

For information purposes, an organizational chart is attached (Incl 3) which depicts the typical structure of the Air Defense Force in Fiscal Year 1951.

PART VII. Air Depot Wing Program.

With the advent of the Morean action, it was determined that certain SAPE (Special Augmentation Far East) authorizations could not be used by Far East Air Forces; therefore, it was proposed to activate the 30th and 80th Air Depot Wings on a reduced scale. However, before this action was completed the United States Air Force was authorized an increased troop ceiling and subsequent Troop Programs restored the 30th and 80th Air Depot Wings at full strength.

Air Depot Wings in Fiscal Year 1951 and two more in Fiscal Year 1952.

Therefore, by the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1952, Air Materiel Command will have trained a total of seven Air Depot Wings; of which, five will be deployed to overseas installations.



PART VIII. Enlisted Flying Pay Policy.

Allocations and control of enlisted flight positions were assumed by the Doputy Chief of Staff, Operations from Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel as a result of a directive issued by General Eckee and was assigned to the Man ower Allocations Division, Directorate of Manpower and Organization. Study of the problem and participation on an Ad Hoc Committee resulted in a new Air Force policy regarding enlisted flight status for pay as expressed in Air Force Regulation 39-47 ( ublished 26 January 1951).

PART IX. Recall of Reserve and National Guard Units.


During this period, due to partial mobilization, the Air Force recalled into service the following numbers and types of National Guard and Reserve units. Necessary details and implementing directives were issued to State Governors and units concerned to recall:

- 4 Pighter Wings
- 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
- 1 Aircraft Control & Marning Tactical Group
- 1 Bomb Wing (Light)
- 3 Troop Carrier Wings (Hedium)

These units upon Federalization became a part of the degular Air Force establishment and are included in the units listed in Part II where applicable.




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


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
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18 I. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT MISSION II. III. ACTIVITIES a. Field Surveys b. Monitoring AF Directives c. Management Improvement d. Special Studies e. Yardstick Development IV. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW DEVICES FOR DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS a. Ratio Factors b. Evaluation Procedures V. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN T/ORE BRANCH MAJOR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED VI. a. Preparation of Yardsticks by Major Commands b. AF Build-up and Surveys VII. EVALUATION OF THE MANPOWER PROGRAM VIII. APPENDIX 1. Hanpower Requirements Division Organization Charts, 20 Nov. 1950 2. Field Surveys, a partial listing.



#### SECTION I

#### ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Manpower Requirements Division resulted from a reorganization within the Directorate of Manpower & Organization under authority of Personnel Assignment Memo No. 19, (1)D/M&O, dated 20 November 1950. The reorganization continued the functions previously performed and added new functions designed to meet the deficiences recognized in the previous organizational set-up of the Manpower Analysis Division. The T/O&E Division was incorporated as the T/O&E Branch of the Manpower Requirements Division.

Changes are shown as follows:

Manpower Analysis Division

Standards Branch

Analysis Branch

Manpower Requirements Division

Standards Branch

Ratio Factors Section

Yardstick Section

Utilization Branch

Survey Section

Performance Evaluation

Section

Program Review Section

T/OAE Branch

T/D Section

T/D Section

Equipment Section

Pers. Auth. 91

Pers. Auth. 32





Chiefs of Division Branch & Section:

Col. LeRoy Hudson, Division

Col. Charles M. Seebach, Utilization Branch

Col. Joseph Halversen, Survey Section

Lt. Col. Edward F. Hoover, Evaluation Section

Col. Philip D. Coates, Standards Branch

Lt. Col. Harold A. Pruitt, Ratio Factors Section

Lt. Col. Edward M. Lightfoot, Yardstick Section

Col. Frank N. Graves, T/O&E Branch

Lt. Col. Carl J. Lust, T/O Section

(2) Lt. Col. Alden C. Reynolds, T/D Section


Lt. Col. R. M. Grek, Equipment Section

The Division thus set up (3) was believed more capable of performing the Manpower Function imposed upon the Director than had been true in the past.


Measures were located in a single Division capable of analysing and evaluating manpower requirements, develop new tools for determining adequate manning, measure the degree of utilization, and then by appropriate T/O's or T/D's establish more intelligent manpower manning documents.

The Division lost one of its most respected and beloved officers in the death of Col. Robert E. Maloney, 2151A, 3 December 1950. Col. Maloney had held position as Division Executive in the Manpower Analysis Division, and was scheduled for the same position in the new Manpower Requirements Division





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The Mission of the Manpower Requirements Division changed very little from that under the Manpower Analysis Division. The additional function of the T/O&E Branch was the difference. The mission (1) under which the reorganized Division was to function:

"The analysis survey and study of current and proposed AF activities and programs with respect to the mission, workload and personnel requirements, provide final review and approval of all AF manning and equipping documents——in order to insure the most effective and economical use of manpower resources."

Implementing that part of the mission pertaining to the added T/CAB Branch imposed no new requirement on that Branch as this had been the main function prior to reorganization.

1. USAF Organization and Functions Chart Book 1 December 1950.





SECTION III

The activities of the Division continued along previous lines with some new functions added. Organization into branches with sections thereto provided a greater degree in specialization, such as the Ratio, Factors discussed below. Heretofore limitation as to personnel prevented much desirable research into new devices capable of being used in accurate, or even approximate manning requirements, but with addition of several civilian employees as analysts and statisticians, progress along these lines because more likely of attainment.

AF Manual 150-1, Hovember 1950 was revised, amended, and additional yardsticks provided, thus superseding the manual published 1 January 1950.

Field Surveys, (1) for the period continued in accordance with provisions of AFR 150-3, dated 20 July 1949. The volume of surveys received was considerably decreased due to the impact of the Korean situation. In order to stimulate the Commands, especially ZI Commands, supervisory visits were made by personnel of the Survey Section as follows:

July 1950 ConaC, AU, Scott AFB, Lackland AFB, ANC.

Aug 1950 USAFE, ANC (3 trips), AFTRC.

Sep 1950 Hq MATS, AU, Carswell AFB, ANC.

Oct 1950 AFTRC (3 trips), AMC (3 trips), ConaC.

Nov 1950 McChord AFB, AMC

Dec 1950 ConaC





Monitoring AF Directives continued on a decreased basis, in general confined to review of proposed changes or drafts of proposed new regulations. Under date of 18 December 1950 the Chief of the Utilization Branch issued a memo to personnel of his branch to the effect that the program would be renewed 1 January 1951, completion of review to be accomplished by 31 March 1951.

Management Improvement Program. Participation in the program continued throughout the period in which numerous special studies were made. Some of the more significant studies are taken up below.

Special Studies in connection with Management Participation:

- a. Survey of Washington Area Personnel was begun in the preceding period but as stated nothing accomplished except the preliminary ground work. This study was conducted in conformance with a memorandum (2) of the Director, M&O, Brig. Gen. Edmund C. Lynch, dated 11 May 1950. The study was based upon the supposition that the AF was frequently under criticism for the number of people in the Washington Area-one particular area being the Washington Mational Airport. General Lynch set forth these criteria:
  - 1. "Does it have to be done in Washington?
  - 2. Is it properly organized for effective and economical operation?
  - 3. Are the functions performed and the mannower required consistent with the general AF Mission\*.

The above instructions were followed by additional instructions

16 May 1950 from the office of the Vice-Chief of Staff and the survey

immediately started. The scope of the survey was all Washington Area units,





MATS and Hq. Command being the principals. Reports were rendered by phases. Several recommendations were made, but in general, it may be said that little was accomplished within the period. The survey originally intended to do something about conditions at the Washington National Airport, apparently brought forth no solution acceptable to agencies involved. The survey clearly indicated that too much was undertaken at one time and under the heading of one study. Should this project be reopened at some future date, it would appear feasible to begin all over again and not attempt to use data now obsolete.

manhours was completed during the period. This study began by obtaining extensive data from the field by the I.G. The data was used in determining the number of hours which the Commander could consider as productive time, that is, the manhours available and utilized in accomplishing a primary duty assignment. This determination had long been considered desirable and essential in working out Manpower Requirements. After appropriate coordination with the Deputy Chiefs of Staff a proposed AF directive was drawn up, publication is pending. This study developed standards for the workweek to be used as a guide by commanders in obtaining the greatest manpower utilization possible. The standard arrived at:

M/hrs per month which the


Commander can reasonably anticipate

for allottment to Primary Duty: 140 144 155 162 172 178





- c. A study (3) to determine the most efficient and economical organizational structure for the performance of the Air Installations Mission
  was undertaken by this Division. The study indicated certain deficiencies
  with suggested improvements. The plan considered as offering greatest
  improvement consisted of establishing a territorial organization to provide
  engineering services on an area basis which would be most effective in
  providing close technical supervision at installation level. This study
  was being given consideration by the Director of Installations at the close
  of the period. If the plan were placed in effect, apparently it would have
  far reaching effects, promoting a great saving in travel, time and other
  possible economics.
- d. Other special studies (4) or projects are listed herewith. No evaluation of the following and is a partial list only.
  - 1. Incorporation of Equipment authorized by Army Documents to the AF system.
    - 2. Implementation of the Equipment Peview Board Directives
  - 3. Implementation of the Airman Career Plan in personnel and Equipment.
    - 4. Grade revisions for SAC Combat Crews.
  - 5. Revision of T/OAE's to convert equipment sections to provide columns for Unit Essential Equipment, Field Support, and Base Support where applicable.
    - 6. Conversion of all SAC T/CAR's to Readiness Strongth.
    - 7. Revision of the System of Tables of Allowances.
    - 8. Mechanization of Equipment Authorizations for T/OAE units.





- 9. Revision of AF Directives pertaining to the manpower program.
- 10. Support required for a Major Command Headquarters when in tenant and when in non-tenant status.

YARDSTICK DEVELOPMENT: Under date of 3 July 1950 a letter (5) was directed to the major commands, inviting their comments regarding "the style of presentation, format, contents, efficacy of, or requirement for AFM 150-1, Manpower Guide." The general concensus of opinion was that the manual met desired standards, however, only those organizations set up on the Wing Base plan (AFR 20-15) were adequately covered by Yardsticks. The Manual was revised to incorporate suggestions deemed appropriate. This was the Movember 1950 revision.

The Division, realising that it could not possibly work up Yardsticks to cover all functions differing so greatly from Command to Command, decided on a course of operation which raised considerable controversy. The decision arrived at was to require the Major Commands to work up these yardsticks and submit to this Division for review and publication. This requirement was sent out to the commands between 10 November and 27 November 1950 by letter, (6) subject: Development of Manpower Yardsticks.

In furtherance of this program a Manpover Yardstick Conference was held at the Pentagon on 12, 13, 14th December 1950. Representatives from the Commands were present. The conference was opened by Director, MAO, Brig. Gen. E. C. Lynch, talks and presentations of subjects on manpower followed. The conference served to implement the program of developing yardsticks by the commands. Some feeling was expressed by the command



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representatives that development of yardsticks was not necessarily their responsibility nor considered essential to their operations. This was borne out after the conference as indicated by a letter (7) from Major General Charles T. Myers, Vice-Commander ConaC. General Myers in his lengthy letter, strongly disagreed with the proposed program. The ground work had only been laid by the close of the period, and thus any evaluation of the yardstick program must be left to a later period.

1. See appendix 2 for partial list of Field Surveys.

3. A Staff Study on Air Installations USAF, Div. Files.

Special Studies and Projects from Div. Files. Ltr. from Chief Manpower Requirements Division, Subj: Air Force Manual 150-1, Manpower Guide, dated 3 July 1250, Div. Files.
Ltr. from Chief, Manpower Requirements Division, Subj: Development of Manpower Yardsticks, 10-27 November 1950, Div. Files.

Ltr. Maj. Gen. Charles T. Myers, Vice-C.G. ConAC Subj: Development of Manpower Yardsticks, 27 December 1950, Div. Files.



Memo of B. G. Edmund C. Lynch 11 May 50 to Col. Stephen C. Lombard Div. Files.



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SECTION IN

DEVELOPMENT OF ERW DEVICES FOR DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS

Reeds have existed over a long period of time for determining manpower requirements on some basis other than guess or estimate. Generally, requests for increase in personnel authorizations had been refered to this Division as a matter of routine. There was no rule of thumb or objective measurement available for use in any speedy determination of such requirements. Requests by some major commands were supported by justifications which were so voluminous as to be measured in pounds rather than by pages. An easier method or system of intelligently acting on these requests was and still is the goal. Programming for the AF had become so involved and of such magnitude that in order for this Division to be of any assistance, something had to be done in the way of development of typical manning tables, perhaps better called Manpower Planning Tables. Whether or not the program undertaken by this Division brings forth a solution remains to be seen. The Ratio Factors Section, Standards Branch and the Performance Evaluation Section of the Utilization Branch were set up to explore all possibilities.

RATIO FACTORS: This Section was charged with developing ratio-factors for broad overall planning of manpower requirements pertaining to functional areas within the various AF command programs. Ratio-factors were created to provide specialized supplements to T/O&E's, Yardsticks, and other process, that is to provide a basis for estimation in those problems which do not



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lend themselves to a reduction to T/OAE's, yardsticks, or basic planning tables. The problem was to reflect relationships within fundamental elements involved in a mannover problem in order to facilitate broad estimates or to heighten specific comparison. Examples of this would be the ratio of support personnel to aircraft, or overhead training personnel to student load.

The Ratio-Factors Section was immediately called on to assist in the Programming activity by:

- a. Working out Basic Planning tables for those non-T/O&E units which possessed homogeneity.
- b. Subject the remainder of the non-T/OAE strength of the USAF to analysis and to determine the extent to which interpretation was possible for programming purposes by such standard instruments as Manpower Planning Factors.

The section had effected its organization, laid out its program, and done some research by the close of the period.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: This section was charged with:

- a. Monitoring the manpower utilization program AF wide.
- b. Evaluate the performance of and provide consultant services to Command manpower groups.
- c. Analyze command manpower evaluation surveys and make recommendations thereon.
- d. Conduct manpower surveys of selected areas as directed.
- e. Conduct a manpower statistical analysis and research program





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This section was primarily engaged in the study and analysis of requests for increased manpower authorizations from the various commands. It worked at full capacity during the period, there being many such requests immediately following the Korean situation with the resultant build-up. Two typical samples of the sections major function is furnished below in order to afford a clear picture of the importance of monitoring the AF manpower utilization program:

Example No. 1. Under date of 9 November 1950 SAC made a request (1) for an additional Non-T/OAE allottment for Crash Fire and Structure Fire Protection personnel. This request was for 643 Airsen troop spaces for Fire Fighters.

An analysis based on very liberal interpretations of the factors furnished by SAC, could only justify 375 added spaces. The Section made its recommendations accordingly.


Example No. 2. Under date of 6 November 1950 the Northeast Air Command,
Pepperrell AFB made request (2) for additional personnel authorizations based
on increased aircraft maintenance responsibilities.


The request was analyzed and it was found that the latest troop programming indicated the Air Depot Wing would be phased into Pepperrell AFB the first quarter of 1952. It was recommended that no increase be authorized for depot maintenance personnel at the present time.

It might be said that this section was doing a good service within the limitations imposed, to obtain better utilization in manpower authorizations.

One development of the section appeared to offer possibilities in future requirements determination. An approximately linear relationship was found to exist between the number of headquarters personnel and command strength







The T/ORE Branch was formerly a Branch within the Directorate of allocations Div.

Manpower & Organizations. Incorporation into the Manpower Requirements

Division did not imply that its importance or its responsibilities were decreased. The Branch was charged with:

\*Establishing, developing, and maintaining ground rules and policies pertaining to personnel and equipment authorization documents-T/O's, T/D's, T/A's, and MEAL's (Master Equipment Authorization Lists)\*.

No attempt will be made to outline or evaluate the accomplishments of the 7/06% Branch inasmuch as it had been a part of the Division for less than a month of the period concerned. There was one development of major scope which began to take shape at this time. It is descussed here in some detail:

#### Mechanization of Equipment Authorizations for T/ORE Units.

The system of authorizing personnel through T/OAT & T/D documents has always been recognized as being unsatisfactory in some respects due to (1) difficulty and slowness in effecting changes; (2) insufficient controls in the T/D system; (3) general undersirability from the organizational ratio of the AF. To correct the cumbersome and undesirable personnel and equipment authorizations procedure, it was proposed:

a. That equipment authorizations be removed from the T/CAN and prepare Master Equipment Authorization Lists (MEAL's)



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- b. Make T/O adaptable to machine preparation by revising format.
- c. Instruct major commands to prepare IRM punch cards for their T/D organizations and subsit to Hq. USAF, Personnel Authorizations to be prepared from the machine listings.


This now system appeared to offer many advantages and few, if any, disadvantages:

- a. MMAL would always be up-to-date.
- b. T/O could be prepared in matter of hours and changes make by changing the applicable IBM punch cards and re-running complete T/O rather than issuing numerical changes as has been the case in the past.
- c. With all T/D authorizations on punch cards, analyses could be run which will compare utilization of authorizations in like fields.
- d. With all T/C's & T/D's on IBM punch cards, complete listings in all specialities could be made very rapidly.

As of 30 November 1950 mechanization of equipment authorizations for T/O&Z units was reported (1) as 80% completed.

1. Project file, mech. of Equip. Auth 30 Nov 1950, Div. Files.





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MAJOR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

Outside of occassional "flaps"(1) into which the Division was thrown, the only major difficulties met with continued in surveys and submission of yardsticks by the commands. The decrease in number of surveys conducted by the commands as well as submission of yardsticks can correctly be charged to the rapid build-up of the Air Force. The commands had about all they sould do in adjusting to the new conditions. Since some indications (2) existed in the commands that the program of devising yardsticks was not rightfully their responsibility not essential to their operations, it became necessary later for the Director, General Lynch, to reemphasize the importance of the program to those commands which were dubious as to the value of the program.

<sup>2.</sup> See footnote No. 7 to Section III



 <sup>&</sup>quot;Flap" defined: A condition occassioned among AF personnel when a higher echelon calls for immediate submission of data not at hand or available.



SECTION VII

EVALUATION OF THE MANPOWER PROGRAM

The set-back (1) in progress toward implementation of the Manpower Utilization program within the major commands resulting from the Korean crisis indicated the following trends:

a. Four of the seventeen Major Commands have shown improvement during August and September 1950: The 3rd Air Division, USAFE, Alaskan Air Command, and Long Range Proving Ground.

b. Five of the seventeen Major Commands have shown a continuance of the progress made previously: AMC, Hq. Command, AU, RAD Command, Caribbean Command.

c. Eight of the seventeen Major Commands have decelerated the implementation of the mannover program: FEAF, ATRC, SAC, ConAC, MATS, APG, SWC, and USAF Security Service.

The above statement or evaluation of progress dealt chiefly with the conduct of command manpower surveys. These commands affected least by the Korean situation appeared more active in the survey function.

During the period Standards and other devices were being developed, or were in the planning stage, whereby manpower could be allocated more intellegantly against the functions required to perform the AF mission.

Manpower utilization continued as a subject for inspection and review.

While not yet perfected, the machinery was functioning to keep the AF manpower utilization in balance with the job to be done.






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
A perorandum (2) for Mr. Eugene Zuckert, Assistant Secretary of the AF
was prepared by this Division (date of about 26 December 1950) quoted
herewith excellently summarises the status of the manpower program at the close
of 1950:

"OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE:


At present many of our AF units and organizations are overstrength. The person el are there to obtain training and to get accustomed
to military life. As new units are activated, the source of personnel will be
existing units. All 'surplus' will be drawn off to man new units or serve
as replacements. As this source becomes less and less, it is then that the
procedures, plans, and devices now at hand will be of greatest aid to the
unit commanders. The controls and measures now at hand will serve to prevent
conditions of large groups of personnel being improperly utilized. The management program, analysis of cost reports, and emphasis at all echelons on
proper utilization will certainly aid the AF in its problem of obtaining a
full return from its manpower. The work being done by the AF in manpower
allottment, control, and utilization is intensive, continuous, and planned in
great detail.

Project Files, Col. P.D. Coates, Standards Br. 1 Oct 1950, Div. Files.
 Memo for Mr. Zukert, Subj: The AF Manpower Utilization Program, December 1950 (date of preparation) Div. Files.







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
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#### ORGANIZATION

The Organization Division was divided into two Branches, Organizational Flanning and Organizational Research. Colonel & J. Manna was Division Chief, Colonel C. C. Masea was Chief of the Organizational Planning Branch, and Colonel M. S. Ecklund was Chief of the Organizational Research Branch. On 24 July 1950, Colonel R. T. Michols, Jr. replaced Colonel Ecklund as Chief of the Organizational Research Branch upon Colonel Ecklund's assignment to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

During this period the Organizational Research Branch was working on the development of the USAF Management Improvement Program and related activities without a specific organizational directive giving it the authority and responsibility for such actions. To correct this situation, the Division was reorganized on 27 November 1950, inactivating the Organizational Research Branch and establishing the Management Improvement Branch. The personnel of the Organizational Research Branch were assigned to the new Branch and Colonel Nichols was made Chief.

The functions of the Management Improvement Branch, in line with its new responsibilities for management improvement and management engineering became:

- 1. Making reviews of staff agencies concerned with management in the various components of the USAF.
- 2. Waking "periodic reviews as directed or deemed advisable to determine the effectiveness of methods, procedures, system, performance standards and control measures utilized by components of the United States Air Force and making recommendations thereon."





3. The preparation of the annual USAF Management Improvement Report.  $^{1}$ 

The duties of the Organizational Planning Branch remained substantially the same; they remained responsible for:

- 1. Maintenance of a logical, balanced organization for the USAF.
- 2. Development of long-range organizational objectives for the USIF.
- 3. Review and analyses of all current and proposed mission directives and organizations to determine proper assignment of functions, responsibilities, etc.



For full details of these functions, see Chapter II below, "The USAF Management Improvement Program."



#### THE USAF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Under the provisions of Executive Order 10072, Public Law 429, Slat Congress and their amplification by Bureau of the Budget Circular 4-8, each Federal Agency was required to "make systematic reviews of the operations of each of its activities, functions, or organization units, on a continuing basis...The purposes of such reviews shall include, ...determining the degree of efficiency and economy in the operation of the department's activities, functions or organization units..."

The Organizational Research Branch was informally assigned the duties and responsibilities required under this act. In a memorandum to the Vice Chief of Staff, dated 22 June 1950, Colonel Manha recognized the requirement for a single office officially responsible for all phases of this program:

"Reports on management activities have been called for from time to time in the past and have usually been made on a crash basis. The task of assembling this material...emphasized the lack of co-relation in this field. Different organizational elements of the Air Force have established means of reviewing their separate programs... Tublic Law now requires that a centralized program be established...

"... The new objectives can be accomplished... by:

- Satablishing clear responsibility for staff supervision of the Management Improvement Program within the Air Staff.
- b. Delineating the responsibilities of the various agencies of the Air Staff...and establishing an operating procedure to make this plan effective.

3



c. Establishing an office within the Directorate of Manpower and Organization to serve as a focal point for the Management Improvement Plan..."

An Air Staff Summary Sheet was prepared on 8 September 1950 recommending that the responsibility for the Air Force Management Improvement Plan be assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations with the Director of Manpower & Organization as the operating agency within the Air Staff. The reason for this organizational location was given by Delonel Manna in his 22 June memorandum:

"The Air Force concept has always been that Banagement Improvement is a function of command and that the two are synonymous...(This concept) has placed the responsibility for employing every effort to accomplish his mission, with maximum economy and efficiency on the commander...

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations is responsible for assigning the mission to the subordinate Air Force Commands and for allocating personnel, aircraft and flying hours necessary to accomplish it. This office also establishes the organizational framework which controls the relationship of these factors. The fundamental management task is the co-relation of those factors in the most effective manner and it is apparent...that responsibility for improvement should remain in the same staff agency. The development of a Management Improvement Plan, naturally, falls under his jurisdiction and the introduction and installation of such a plan must be a part of a total program for improving the structure and operations of the Air Force.

The principles and concepts delineated in this memorandum were understood and accepted by the Air Staff and on 11 September, after receiving the coordination of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, the Vice Chief of Staff, General McKee, approved the establishment of the Management Improvement Stanch as the Air Staff focal point for management improvement activities.



On 5 October 1950, the Secretary of Defense, Nr. Marshall, established a Management Division in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). After delineating the functions included in the phrase "management engineering," Mr. Marshall recommended that "to the extent not already accomplished, the Secretary of each Military Department is requested to designate an official to provide for and coordinate departmental management engineering services." The Air Porce, recognizing the relationship between the Management Improvement Program and management engineering services, placed the responsibility for management engineering with the same office responsible for management improvement.

"...The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations is hereby charged with the responsibility for the staff direction and control of this (management engineering) function. The Director of Nanpower and Organization ... is specificially responsible as the action agency in this Headquarters for this function.

"Ver your information, this function is considered to be of an integral nature with the Air Force Management Laprovesent Program."

Bureau of the Endget Circular No. A-8 required the submission of a report from each agency describing the operation of the agency's management improvement program, the advantages and disadvantages, and an analysis of management improvement in the agency. Also to be submitted was a listing of management improvement projects which had been accomplished during the past Fiscal Year, and those planned for the current and coming Fiscal Years.

<sup>1.</sup> Memo for Secretary of the Air Force from Secretary of Defense dated 5 October 1950.

Memo for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, from the AVC/S, General McKee, dated 7 Movember 1950.




Instructions to the field resulted in individual command reports which, when finally assembled in this Headquarters, resulted in a three-volume report totalling approximately 2,500 pages. Upon request from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each of the Departments was asked to summarize its report. Mr. George Martin of this Division summarized the Air Porce report into a 65-page document which was finally submitted to the Bureau of the Budget by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Management Improvement Branch immediately began work on developing management improvement policies and determining how their operation could be of the greatest assistance to the rest of the Air Force in the accomplishment of its mission. As of the end of the calendar year 1950, many details of the program still remained to be resolved. The basic philosophy of the program is this: Management improvement is not the sole responsibility of any one office at any echelon, but is rather the continuing, day-to-day responsibility of every commander and supervisor; management improvement, therefore, will be accomplished primarily through the commanders and only secondarily through special staff offices.

This philosophy guided the work on management improvement through management engineering. Drafts of an as yet unpublished regulation on management engineering require that management engineering aid will not be given by higher echelon management engineering agencies until the requesting agency has shown that they have made a genuine attempt to solve the problem with their own personnel.







## THE MAINTENANCE PROBLEM IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AIR PORCE COMBAT VINGS

As far back as August of 1949, the Organization Division has been considering the problem of the organization of Air Porce Combat Wings and the proper placement of the organizational saintenance responsibility for combat aircraft. In a 1 August 1949 memorandum to General McNaughton, then Director of Training and Requirements, Captain J. G. Wilson explained the problem:

"The primary requirement of a combat squadron is 'to maintain a state of readiness to execute assigned missions...' To attain effectiveness requires a constantly increased emphasis on tactics; the attainment of this effectiveness can be accomplished only through continuing and continual activity on the part of the Squadron Commander in the development of such tactics.

"The advance in technology has made correspondingly more difficult the problem of organizational maintenance. In view of the extremely advanced technical stage of development of present operating units... organizational maintenance has attained a migh degree of complexity necessitating a high degree of specialization; what is now considered 'organizational maintenance' on present equipment is comparable, perhaps, to Mield maintenance ' on the equipment used in the last war...

"It is submitted that the span of control of the squadron commander is exceeded numberswise and functionalwise. The former by having the command responsibility for assigned individuals. The latter by having ultimate responsibility for both tactics and saintenance, fields which today require the full time attention of one man."

The Organization Division worked on this problem continually, receiving and evaluating comments from the field, and observing installations at which proposed solutions to this problem were in operation.

During March of 1950, the Air Command and Staff School, with the coopera-



tion of this Division, presented this problem for classroom solution.

Of the thirty-two Seminar "teams" working on this problem, twenty-two
of them agreed, either entirely or in part, with the concept of placing
all maintenance in the Maintenance and Supply Group.

In order to accurately evaluate the desirability of the proposed reorganization, this Headquarters authorized the Strategic Air Command to reorganize, within its heavy and medium bombardment, fighter and strategic recommaissance wings, the organizational maintenance personnel assigned to the combat squadrons of the wing. The establishment of T/D organizational maintenance squadrons (less Fre and Post-Flight) with the personnel to be drawn from the current authorization of the wing, was authorized.<sup>2</sup>

A conference with representatives of this Meadquarters and the Strategic Air Command, held subsequent to the publication of referenced letter, evaluated the results of these tests. The determination was made that the Combat Squadron Commander's responsibilities in the wing were too great to be properly handled, and a realignment of functions was accomplished. All periodic aircraft Maintenance specialists and equipment were reassigned from the Combat Squadron and Group to the Maintenance and Supply Group.

The responsibility for performing organizational maintenance (less French Fost-Flight Inspection) was reassigned to the MAS Group. A Maintenance Control Section was established in the Ming Materiel Section to effect the


Dept of AF Itr, subj: "Service Test of Organizational and Field Waintenance Squadrons," to CG SAC, File No. 322(AFCMA 574f) dtd 27 Apr \*50






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Study "Proposed Reassignment of Aircraft Maintenance Functions Within All Combat Wings of the UBAF," Air Command & Staff School, SM 4225,10 Mar 150.



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
## THE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE TO UTILIZE THE CAA

Around the middle of August, 1950, the proposition of the utilization of Civil Aeronautics Administration facilities and personnel in the event of a National Emergency was considered by the CAA. The Folicy Division, Director of Flans and Operations, in collaboration with the Civil Aeronautics Administration, prepared a proposed bill "to provide for the more effective utilization of the Civil Aeronautics Administration in the interest of National Security and public welfare, and for other purposes."

The Organization Division was asked to submit a proposed organization by which the CAA could be integrated into the Department of Defense as a part of the Air Force. The Division was to determine; (a) the functions and responsibilities of the CAA required by the Air Force in times of emergency, (b) the personnel strengths required to adequately perform functions desired, and (c) the location of the CAA functions within military command channels and the degree of supervisory control and responsibility that must be exercised by the Air Force.

An RAR requesting Air Staff comments on this subject was sent to various Air Staff agencies on 18 August. On 22 and 23 August letters were sent to Continental Air Command and Military Air Transport Service requesting their comments on this problem. ConAC's emphasis was relative to (a) present operation of AAGS and Flight Service in relation to the CAA, and (b) the integration of the present operation of AAGS and Flight Service and the CAA with the Air Defense plans. MATS emphasis was relative to

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


A meeting was held on 28 August in t is Headquarters with representatives of ConAC, MATS, the CAA and the Bursau of the Budget. ConAC indicated that although they were then operating on a B-Day status with the satisfactory cooperation of the CAA, nevertheless a requirement existed for the absolute operational control of Federal Airways and Gateways to insure an adequate Air Defense net in the United States. The method of effecting the required control was not determined.


The draft legislation contained a proposal to militarize the CAA and form a Civil Aero Corps in time of emergency. The Bureau of the Budget questioned this point.

On 15 September another meeting was held with the Eureau of the Budget at which the Organization Division outlined its current thinking on the problem, presenting an unofficial proposed organization. This organization was based on the conception that the only organization within the Air Force that parallels the required facilities of the CAA is AACS. The only portions of CAA that would be necessary would be the Federal Airways portion of the Administrator's Office and the Airways Pacilities Division of the regional office.

phase of this problem. The project was then continued by the Director of Communications, DCS/Operations.



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## CONTENTS Page Subject The First Quarter Prequency Allosation and Assignment Training Officer Attrition Training SSN 7888 Retitled International and Regional Telecommunications Conferences Frequency Requirements of Joint Task Force THRME Condensation of Air Communications Electronics Staff Officer Course Procurement and Installation Program II The Second Quarter Aleskan Frequencies Plan 51 Primary GCI Frequency Cossumications Construction Organisation Agreement on Duplex Communications Frequency Allocation Plan GLOBECOME Frequencies JANAP 193(A) War Listings of Frequencies Propagation Activities

#### CHAPTER I

In the past no training facility existed within the Air Force to train officers in frequency allocations and assignment type of work. To alleviate the situation facilities were set up within the Directorate of Communications to train two officers, one Major and one Captain, specifically in the field of frequency allocations and assignments within the Air Force. Two officers were assigned in July 1950 from the 3310the Technical Training Wing, Scott AFB, Belleville, Illinois, for one year of intensive frequency training. It was planned that the training, while mostly "on-the-job" in nature, would consist of courses in Radio Propagation and other problems encountered in the selection and assignment of radio frequencies. Instruction on the organization and functions of other government agencies such as the Department of State, Federal Communications Commission, Department of Commerce, Department of Interior, Department of Justice, Department of the Army, and the Department of the Navy, was also incorporated in an attempt to point out the interdependency of all government agencies upon one another in telecommunications matters on both a national and international basis.

In July, it became apparent that the requirement for communicationselectronics types of officers was rapidly approaching attrition. Steps were taken to realign the communications-electronics picture to the view of encouraging officers not fully qualified for such duties to apply for training in one of the several communications-electronics training courses. During July, the job description of SSM 7888, Radar Observer, RCM, was reviewed and retitled "Electronics Counter Measures Officer."

By the end of July 1950, events in Korea made it apparent that it would be highly impracticable, if not impossible, for the United States to embark upon any extensive program of revising the structure of its radio frequency assignments. It had earlier been contemplated that, at the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (EARC) scheduled for The Hague, Netherlands in September 1950, steps would be initiated to bring world frequency assignments into conformity with the Atlantic City (1947) Allocation Table. At the suggestion of the United States, the EARC was postponed until August 1951. The Directorate of Communications furnished representation on committees preparing the United States position on a variety of technical and policy questions. Preparatory work, of a similar nature, had already been carried forward for those radio frequency problems of primary interest to the countries of North, Central and South America.

The United States Air Force as the Executive Agent for Joint Task Force THREE had the responsibility of procuring radio high frequencies to fulfill operational requirements. In July 1950, Colonel Wesley Calkins, USAF, Joint Task Force THREE communications staff, presented the Directorate of Communications with a consolidated list for all Task Groups. In April 1950, the U.S. Army had established an ACAN circuit from the testing ground to Zone of Interior. This, plus existing AAGS and Army services, provided inter-theater fixed communications. Intra-theater circuits were assigned frequencies to carry

the load of additional operations and administrative traffic.

Frequencies were also allocated for weather collection and dissemination, air-ground-air, facsimile, scientific groups and numerous mobile uses. (Restricted)

On 8 August 1950, the Standards Branch recommended that the
Air Communications-Electronics Staff Officers course be reduced in
length and merged with the Air Command and Staff School. Each student
thereafter would receive a course of instruction approximately 50%
purely communications-electronics and 50% Air Command and Staff
instruction. Field grade officers recalled to active duty would
then be entered into this school as early as possible after recall.

On 9 August 1950, the Military Services, CAA and the FCC reached an agreement on a common frequency for direct Center to Pilot communications.

During the summer, accelerated procurement and installation action was taken through meetings with the various manufacturing concerns. These actions included increased emphasis on development of SII during July and August 1950. Particular action was taken to ship AN/UPN-4 beacons to Morea for front line demarkation purposes. (Secret)

#### CHAPTER II

In the early Fall, the function of operating as Executive Agent for the Alaskan Command was transferred from the Office of the Chief Signal Officer to the Directorate of Communications. In the capacity of Executive Agent, the Directorate assumed responsibility for all frequency coordination and assignment messages for the FAFUSJCEC for Alaska regardless of the service requirement. This was an administrative task devised to minimise inter and intra-theater interference. (Restricted)

In October 1950, steps were taken to organize and man units which were to carry out the mission of the new Air Force Plan 51 system.<sup>2</sup>

It was decided that the system needed centralized operational control and that such control should be vested in the Directorate of Communications. It was proposed, therefore, to establish a separate group, assigned to Headquarters Command, USAF, with headquarters located physically at the Pentagon. This group would be parent unit for the five field detachments located at the Pentagon, and Maxwell, Wright-Patterson, Carswell and McClellan Air Force Bases. The Washington Plan 51 Center would include the functions of the Air Force Communications Center and would be organized around the 1908th AACS Squadron as a nucleus. Activation of the units was planned early in January 1951 with implementing of the system scheduled for 10 February 1951.

On 9 October 1950, agreement was reached with RGAF to adopt the USAF Primary Ground Control Intercept Frequency as a combined USAF-RGAF Air Defense Frequency. The frequency had been implemented in all USAF GGI stations and USAF aircraft committed to Air Defense. The RGAF was

to been the sensency entire to early all MDS greens makes largesept stations and all MDS operational figures already with familities for operation on the frequency. [Austrianstell.]

is homeober 1992, AV was estimated to estimate the let demonstrate bettimes forestruction beganisms, under 1/362 1-2752. This was the first of several units to be approved for estimation under this 1/362 during \$1 1992.

In 30 Seminer 1930, agreement was reacted with the List to provide deploy communications in the airways stations for encountrations with DEAT element in order to reduce air/air interference. Implementation date for the interpretation of deploy communications between DEAT airereft and the DEA within the continental United States was fired at 1 North 1951. Overseas communicate were urred to follow suit.

During November 1950, Standards Branch of the Directorate of Communications reviewed and accepted with minor modifications the Airman Communications Operations Career Field.

On 5 December 1950, the FUEC approved the Frequency Allocation
Flan for the 225 - 400 Mc/s band. In general, the plan is based on
an interspersed assignment of channels 200 kc/s in width, with 212
channels each allotted for primary use of the Air Force and Navy, 42
channels allotted for primary use of the Army and 210 channels allotted
for joint usage. The assignment of channels for use in connection with
radio relay which are 364.2 to 378.6 Mc/s and 38.5 to 400 Mc/s is
delayed pending service tests of AM/TRG-24 equipment by the U.S. Army.
About 44 frequencies have been assigned for field tests and evaluation
with the new UHF equipments. No firm assignments will be made until
the equipments are tested on all frequencies. (Confidential)


Since GLOBECOMM requirements became more or less firm during the summer, efforts were made to clear and assign frequencies to the various proposed circuits. Phase I which consisted of existing and new circuits was put into being without too much trouble. Phase II which was primarly the single side band belt around the Globe presented quite a dilemma regarding frequencies. In Phase II the circuit from Washing to Casablanca appeared to be the common denominator. Once frequencies could be cleared and assigned to it, the others could be processed with comparative ease. However, after four months, the frequencies for this path were still in a nebulous stage. Four men have at various times gone through the frequency spectrum, spending an average of six man hours a day on the project. However, only six frequencies on the upper side of the HF band passed IRAC, although over two-hundred had been proposed for comment in order to provide the necessary high frequencies above 12 megacycles. Requirements from 6 to 11 megacycles would be difficult to fulfill. Other circuits designated for implementation in Phase II have had frequencies assigned; however, these were not final and in some cases had to be shifted to insure less outage. (Rostricted)

On 22 December 1950, the Air Defense Command was authorised to discontinue the standard very high frequency used by mirraft for communications with the Military Airways System in order that tactical frequencies required for the support of Air Defense activities might be substituted. (Restricted)

The preparation of JANAP 193(A), United States Air Force Frequency Plan, a publication intended for the use of Air Gommands and Joint Planning Staffs commenced in July 1950, and the final manuscript was delivered to the Operations Division late in December. This document was intended to show all frequencies utilized for major communications activities, cross-referenced by numerical order of frequency and operating circuits. The most important function of the publication was the decentralization of vital USAF radio frequency information previously obtainable only at this headquarters. (Confidential)

Among problems occasioned by the separation of functions from
the Signal Corps was the necessity of establishing for the Department
of the Air Force a separate register of frequencies in the Presidential
Executive Order. This separated register of frequencies was obtained
by interpreting the old War Department Executive Order listing as
"Army" or "Air Force" according to the existing usage of the frequencies.
Work has progressed to about the one-half point. Completely separate
Executive Order listings and assignments in the IRAC Station Lists
have been established for both Army and Air Force up to about 10 Mo/s.


A considerable increase in the volume of radio propagation data furnished to Air Force commands is an indication of growing appreciation and application of this information. Principle Air Force users are Airways and Air Communications Service and the Strategic Air Command. The data furnished consists of basic propagation predictions, prepared by the Central Radio Propagation Laboratory of the National Bureau of Standards, and predicted optimum frequencies for specific point-to-point and ir-ground circuits on a world-wide basis.



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# GLOSSARY Frequency Allocation Panel, Joint Communications-1. FAPUSJCEC Electronics Committee Ground Controlled Interception GCI Joint Communications-Electronics Committee JCEC International Radio Advisory Committee IRAG Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Publication JARAP Short Interval Identification SII

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3. Case Study of Directorate Reorganization
4. HOI 150-12 5. USAF Civilian Requirements
6. USAF Personnel Functional Utilization - Pie Chart
7. Listing of Directives Published
8. Extract From "A Report To The Secretary of the Air Force"

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION

#### I. Organizational Developments

- 1. Personnel authorizations for the Directorate of Manpower and Organization as of 1 January 1951 and contrasting personnel authorizations as of 30 June 1951 are indicated as Inclosure #1. A roster of key personnel is attached as Inclosure #2.
- 2. There is much discussion throughout the history with regard to reorganization. Inclosure #3 provides the motivation, reasoning and other factors bearing on the case on an all inclusive Directorate basis. It further provides the Historian with a reference in tying in the comments of the division Chiefs on the subject of reorganization.
- a. The Secretary of the Air Staff in fulfilling part of his Management Improvement responsibilities as outlined in paragraph (3)b 4, Headquarters Office Instruction 150-12 (Incl #4) had published and distributed the case study developed by the directorate to all major Air Staff activities.

#### II. Mission and Implementation

- Mission of the Directorate is clearly defined under Tab A, Inclosure #3.
- 2. In justifying USAF personnel allotments before the Bureau of the Budget, Major General E. C. Lynch provided and used a pictorial functional distribution of personnel utilization. The pie chart primarily serves to indicate the ratio of support forces to operating forces with replacement forces for support and operations in training. These charts are attached as inclosures 5 and 6 and further compliment the manpower summaries of the Military Allocations Division and Manpower Requirements Division.
- 3. Implementation of the Manpower and Organization programs are covered in the appropriate 20, 24 and 150 series of Air Force Regulations, Air Force Letters, Air Force Manuals and Headquarters Office Instructions. A history of directives published during this semi-annual period is attached as Inclosure #7.
- a. As a matter of record, 2mThe Annual Management Improvement Report", compiled by this directorate, reflects improvement activities throughout the Air Force in consolidated form.

The Case Study was prepared by Colonel Robert W. Bowles, Assistant Executive, Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O.


<sup>2</sup>The Annual Management Improvement Report, Department of the Air Force, 30 June 1951, prepared by Directorate of Manpower and Organization.

#### III. Miscellaneous

An extract from 3"A Report To The Secretary of the Air Force" is attached as Inclosure #8. This extract has a direct bearing on the Directorate and provides an outside summarization of its organization, composition and functions. There has been no directed action as a result of the survey at the close of this period.

(2)

<sup>3</sup>A Report To The Secretary of the Air Force by The Committee on Personnel Utilization and Training, June 1951.



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ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

NAME

RANK

TITLE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Maj Gen

Brig Gen

Civilian Colonel

Colonel

LYNCH, Edmund C. MOORE, Aubry L. ELLIS, Weldon T., Jr. DAVENPORT, Robert B. BOWLES, Robert W.

Director Deputy Director Civilian Deputy Director Executive Assistant Executive

ACTIVATION AND RECORDS SECTION

FISHER, William R.

Colonel

Chief, Activation and Records

ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

SEEBACH, Charles M. NUZUM, James R.

Colonel Colonel Chief Deputy Chief

ORGANIZATION PLANNING BRANCH

WASEM, Clinton V.

Colonel

Chief

MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT BRANCH

NICHOLS, Roscoe T., Jr.

Colonel

MANPOWER MANNING STANDARDS BRANCH

MOODY, Charles O.

Colonel

Chief

MANNING AND EQUIPPING DOCUMENTS BRANCH

GRAVES, Frank N.

Colonel

Chief

MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION

WADMAN, John F. McCHRISTY, Albert J.

Colonel Colonel Chief Deputy Chief

MANPOWER PROGRAMS BRANCH

CARMACK, Beverly E. KOWALSKI, Andrew

Lt Col


Colonel

Chief

Chief Plans and Mobilization Section

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTIES, ASSISTANTS TO THE DEPUTIES, DIRECTORS, AND CHIEFS OF COMPARABLE OFFICES

SUBJECT: Management Improvement Through Better Organization

The Directorate of Manpower and Organization was reorganized on 1 May 1951 for the purpose of providing a way to meet increasing workloads without hiring more people. When this reorganization was in the proposal stage, it was presented to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, for approval.

Since the procedures followed and the results achieved were considered to be of such general interest to the Air Staff, a brief of the method used was prepared in the form of a case study for circulation to Air Staff Agencies.

Incl Case Study WAYNE E. THURMAN Colonel, USAF Secretary of the Air Staff

ayne E. Thurman

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Incl# 3

#### MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT THROUGH BETTER ORGANIZATION

(A Case Study for Air Staff Use)

#### I. INTRODUCTION

- 1. At one time or another, every Staff Agency in Headquarters is faced with the problem of handling increasing workloads. If additional qualified personnel can be hired, solution of this problem from the standpoint of getting the work done in some manner, is easy. It is common knowledge, however, that this simple solution is prohibited by:
  - a. Office space and personnel authorization limitationsb. Critical shortages of personnel

- c. Fund limitations
- As a matter of policy, the solution of Air Force management problems with numbers alone is not adequate. By-passing of more scientific routes is incompatible with over-all Air Force management objectives. The shortage of personnel at this time simply accentuates our need for re-evaluation of internal management processes. Quality and quantity of production for each individual have to be raised. The statement of this objective is simple, but achieving it is not easy. It requires a lot of hard work and the application of common sense on the part of everyone. There are no hard and fast rules which prescribe how this work should be done. A rather superficial approach to the job is through a statement: "Conduct a comprehensive organization and management survey of your agency, use the latest survey techniques and tools available, and apply sound principles of organization and management."
- 3. Although there is nothing fundamentally wrong with this approach, there is a need for a concrete illustration of how results can be obtained by applying sound organization and management practices. Since one Directorate recently completed a reorganization which produced some good results, a brief description of the steps followed in this process is being made available to other Staff Agencies for whatever assistance it may provide. While this was a solution to its problem, it may not necessarily be applicable to the needs of other agencies.

#### II. PROBLEM OF THE DIRECTORATE

From June 1950 to April 1951, personnel authorizations were increased substantially. The continuously increasing workload and overtime would have required an additional authorization of twenty-eight (28) people. In view of office space and personnel limitations, a critical examination of organization and procedures was made to see if the increased work could be handled without additional employees.

#### III. BACKGROUND

- 1. In November 1950, the organizational structure and functional assignments reflected in Tab A were developed to provide for the following:
- a. There was a need for orientating the organization to the expanded Air Force and for providing for the possibility of mobilization.
  - b. The OSD Management Committee stated, in August 1950, that emphasis

on economy in dollars would be shifted to the fields of organization, manpower and logistics. The objective behind this change was to remove obstacles to achievement of basic missions.

- c. In September 1950, responsibility for the Management Improvement Plan as specified in Bureau of the Budget Circular A-6, was placed in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, and the Directorate of Manpower and Organization was designated as the operating agency in the Air Staff for carrying out this responsibility.
- d. In November 1950, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations was made responsible for Management Engineering functions in the Air Force. Since these functions were considered to be of an integral nature with the Air Force Management Improvement Program, they were assigned to the Directorate of Manpower and Organization. When the organization of November 1950 was established several of the changes reflected in the current organization were considered. They were delayed, however, for the purpose of providing for gradual phasing, in order to minimize the effects of re-assigning personnel and the general loss of effectiveness that immediately follows major reorganizations.
- 2. In April 1951, an analysis of the statistics collected during March, led to the conclusion that an organizational change should not be delayed longer for the following reasons:
- a. Civilian and military personnel worked a total of 1,443 hours of overtime during the month of March.
- b. The number of action papers had risen to fifty-two (52) per person, per month, as compared with seventeen (17) per person during the month of June 1950.

#### IV. STEPS FOLLOWED IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM

- 1. In November 1949, the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O came into being by combining the Organization Division which was then under the Assistant for Programming and the Manpower Group, Office of the Chief of Staff. At that time, only those major organizational changes required to eliminate overlapping of responsibility and duplication of effort were made. Detailed changes were delayed to provide for evolution and evaluation of operations. It was subsequently revealed that the basic objectives were not clearly defined, were not generally understood, and were not being achieved satisfactorily. Therefore, long and careful consideration was given to the spelling out of the basic objectives and defining the principal goal of the agency. This step was taken to assure maximum direction of effort toward achieving the basic purpose for which the agency exists. The process of definition and evolution of the organizational structure are illustrated in Tab A, which shows initial, intermediate, and present structure and functional statements.
- 2. The principal objectives were subdivided into logical, coherent segments and the basic organizational structure was almost automatically determined. In breaking down the objectives, particular attention was directed toward preventing excessive layering in the supervisory structure, over-division to the point of unnecessary duplication, and compartmentalization to the point of obstructing desired integration and coordination. (See Tab B)

- 3. All Air Force Regulations and Letters which applied to the Directorate and which outlined basic programs and general procedures for accomplishing them were reviewed. Programs were redefined for the purpose of stating more clearly what their contents should be and for the purpose of facilitating the integration of program results toward the accomplishment of basic objectives. Procedures were revised with the idea in mind of making them as simple as possible without interfering with the achievement of the best results. A listing of current Air Force Regulations and Letters pertaining to the Directorate appears on Tab C.
- 4. Delegation of authority and supervision in the Directorate were examined for the following reasons:
- a. To determine whether each individual was given enough authority to carry out his assignments.
- b. To find out whether the delegations of authority were providing for the kind of coordination and cooperation desired.
  - c. To make sure that no unnecessary layers of supervision existed.
- d. To determine whether the ideas of junior and low echelon officers were flowing in their original form to the top of the organization.
  - 5. It was concluded that:
- a. Much of the work of the Directorate is of such a nature that frequent coordination with various agencies of the Air Staff is imperative.
- b. A large part of the work is divided into projects which are completed primarily by a single individual.
- c. Progress on projects was being retarded by adhering too closely to the structural chain of command in clearing and coordinating with outside Agencies. The change in policy on delegation of authority and supervision that resulted was primarily one of degree rather than kind.
- 6. With respect to individual project officers, it was emphasized that each officer should feel free to make as many contacts with officers of other staff agencies as he believes to be desirable. He is expected to exhaust every possible avenue in attempting to obtain coordination and concerted effort before submitting a seemingly insolvable problem to his supervisor to be taken up through channels. In order to maintain unity of command and coordination within each organizational segment, each project officer is required to provide his supervisor with periodic verbal or written reports on progress being made. Within the Directorate itself, a corollary practice was instituted. It provides that a project officer can be given an assignment through his immediate supervisor by a supervisor at a higher echelon. Once the assignment is made, the project officer works directly for the higher echelon supervisor and merely keeps his immediate supervisor informed as to what he is doing. The advantages derived from this kind of delegation of authority are as follows:

- a. Project officers are provided with the freedom they need to accomplish assignments.
- b. The flow of ideas from the bottom to the top of the agency is increased.
- c. The possibilities of obtaining coordinated staff work are enhanced.
- d. Paper work is reduced and the number of people who have to be informed of most of the details is decreased.
- e. Supervisors are enabled to direct the efforts of more people or are free to work on projects themselves.
- f. The flexibility in making assignments which is permitted, facilitates the handling of unusual workloads in certain functional areas.
- 7. The best organization planning is weak and non-productive unless it is integrated with a sound personnel management program. In order to provide for this integration and for motivation and stimulation of the will of individuals to work, the following actions were taken:
- a. The qualifications of all individuals were reviewed in relation to the jobs to which they were assigned. Particular attention was directed to the ability of individuals to perform assignments under the delegation of authority referred to in 4 above. Changes in assignments were made for the purpose of achieving maximum utilization of employee skills and abilities. In some cases, employees who were definitely unsuited for work in the Directorate were encouraged to find jobs in other agencies. This last step was relatively easy during this period of build-up, and it was an action which frequently resulted in a service to the employees concerned. (See Tab D).
- b. Job descriptions of civilian employees and assignments of officers were reviewed to determine whether confusion or jurisdictional conflicts could result from vague assignments. The classification Branch, Secretary of the Air Staff, on request from the Directorate, conducted a complete survey of all civilian positions. In order to encourage the exercise of initiative and individual development, promotion ladders were established for both military and civilian employees.
- 8. Workload and overtime records were kept as indicated in Tab E. These records provided a basis for determining just how much business was increasing, where it was increasing, total personnel needs, and needs by organizational segments. If it had been feasible to develop and use individual performance standards, the accuracy of estimating personnel needs would have been improved.


### V. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

- 1. Objectives, programs and procedures were clarified or revised.
- 2. Unnecessary divisions of activities were eliminated; activities of a similar nature were consolidated.

- 3. A smoother flow of work was provided.
- 4. Greater operating flexibility was obtained, particularly at the lower levels.
- Re-adjustment of personnel authorizations to meet the increased workload was made possible.
  - 6. Effectiveness in the use of personnel was increased.
- 7. A combination of the changes resulted in a need for twenty-eight (28) less people than would have been required under the old organization.
- 8. The importance of reviewing operations constantly was demonstrated. Currently, a training course is being conducted for key personnel in the field so that greater decentralization of operations may be accomplished in the near future.

### VI. APPLICATION OF RESULTS

- 1. In applying this approach or one similar to it, the following points should be considered:
- a. This type of survey will be productive only if there is a will and determination to develop new ideas and improve operations.
- b. After changes are made it should not be assumed that they are permanent. Every work situation is dynamic; only by a constant review of operations is it possible to maintain a high level of operating efficiency.
- c. If major changes in organization are contemplated and many people are affected, the changes should not be made all at once. Unless such a problem is handled with the utmost care, low morale, excessive loss in effectiveness and actual loss of employees will result.
- d. Frequently, excuses given for overstaffing are rate of personnel turnover and lack of trained personnel.
- e. Before surveying an organization, a review of overall operations should be made. If such a review discloses a few glaring problem areas, concentration on them may produce significant results with the expenditure of much less time and effort than is required for a complete survey. Furthermore, the solution of one problem at a time, whenever that is possible, enables an organization to effect improvements which ultimately lead into desirable major changes.



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# **BEFORE** 7A DC/S OPERATIONS DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION INITIAL STAGE Represents the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, in all matters pertein-ing to the development and maintenance of sound USAF organization and the adminis-tration of the USAF responser program. Page 1 of 4 Pages Establishes policy on matters pertaining to the constitution, activation, in-activation, reorganisation or dishandment of UNAF units, in accordance with the Department of the Air Force Troop Program: Develops criteria for evaluating manpower requirements and recommending improve-ments in methods and procedures in order to insure the most effective and economical use of manpower resources. Prepares and defends before the Air Force Budget Advisory Coemittee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Bureau of the Budget and the Congress of the sempower requirements of the USAF program. Develops a Management Improvement Program for the UCAF and provides functional guidance and management engineering services for the implementation thereof. Periodically appraises the effectiveness of the USAF management program and reviews the results with ranagement concerned. ORGANIZATION DIVISION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DIVISION MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION Chart 7AI Chart 7A2 Chart 7A3 I December 1950

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DCS/OPERATIONS
DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION
ORGANIZATION DIVISION

Page 2 of 4 Pages

#### ORGANIZATION DIVISION

Provides for the development and maintenance of the organizational structure of the UNAF by conducting organizational studies, developing modern organizational concepts for the UNAF, recommending the assignment of responsibility, suthority, and functions to major organizational elements of the UNAF, and defining the relationship among the mejor organizational elements.

Serves in a limison capacity by working with other Directorates within the Eq UDAF and with the commands in isolating problem areas wherein improvements in Air Force organization and management can be effected.

Organizes special working groups for study at all echelons of various

#### ORGANIZATIONAL PLANNING BRANCH

Responsible for developing plans to the end that each organizational component of the United States Air Force is a logical, separable, integral part of the whole organization, having commensurate responsibility, authority and accountability for results within clearly defined limits.

Responsible for development of organization objectives for the United States Air Force and formulation of policies pertaining thereto which will be given Air Force-wide application.

Perponsible for review and analysis of current and proposed mission directives to determine proper; assignment of functions, responsibilities, and limits of authority and clarify relationship with other segments of the organisation.

Responsible for developing organization charts: Format and terminology for Air Force presentations.

DON BED OF

#### MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT BRANCH

Responsible for making periodic reviews and appraisals on a planned and programmed basis of the accompliabrent, performance, and effectiveness of staff agencies concerned with remangement in the various components of the United States Air Force.

Responsible for periodic reviews as directed or decemed striable to determine the effectiveness of methods, procedures, systems, performance standards and control sessures utilized by components of the United States Air Force and making recommendations thereon.

Responsible for preparation and presentation of the Management Improvement Reports of the USAF recutred by the Bureau of the Budget.

1 December 1950

7A2 DC/S OPERATIONS DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DIVISION Page 3 of 4 Pages MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DIVISION Develops staffing standards to cover all Air Force functional areas. Provides final review and approval of all Air Force manning and equipping documents. Monitors the manpower utilization program and provides staff guidance to command Manpower Groups. Conducts special manpower surveys as directed. Develops ratio factors to indicate in tabular form and for planning purposes the requirements for a stated progress. UTILIZATION BRANCH STANDARDS BRANCH T/O & E AND T/D BRANCH Develops staffing standards to cover all functional areas within the Air Force for the use of staffs of all schelons of command in providing essential information to assist in facilitating and standardising effective manpower control. Studies and analyzes current and proposed Air Force activities and progress, including functional areas, with respect to mission, workload, and personnel requirements in order to determine the effectiveness of the utilization of manpower resources. Using current staffing standards as a guide, exercises final review and approval on all USAT Tables of Organization and Fquipment, Tables of Allowances, Technical Orders of the CO-30 series and charges or modifications thereto. Conducts a continual refinement of all published manpower standards in order that requirements, consistent with the current mission of the Air Force, are reflected. Using current staffing standards as a guide, exercises final USAF review and approval on USAF & DA Tables of Organization and Squipment designed for the performance of interservice functions. Conducts a continuing analysis and review of Tables of Distribution and makes recommendations re-garding the structure and skill composition thereon in order to assure effective manpower control. Monitors the restrictive directive program to insure the compatibility, essentiality, and currency of Air Force publications, and to see that only the minimum necessary restrictions are incorporated therein. Conducts field studies to establish standards for selected scrivities. Repository for typical tables developed to Indicate the manpower requirements for units. I December 1950

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**7A3** 

DC/S OPERATIONS DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION MANPOWER ALLOCATION DIVISION

Page 4 of 4 Pages

### MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION

Secures overall information mecessary for preparation of current, projected and mobilization manpower programs.

Propers the mapower portion of the Department of the U. T. Air Force Troop Progres which sets forth pleaned utilization of silitary and civilian personnel for the accomplishment of all Air Force activities permissible within applicable ceilings or limitations. Letersines policies and procedures to be used by all operating agencies of the USAF in the determination of troop space requirements within established ceilings.

Freperes budget progress for presentation of AFRAC, JCF, OST, Bureau of the Fudget and Congress as planned personnel utilizations. These progress are prepared to support a prescribed set of rissions and are developed within limitations of personnel awailability, dollar cellings and such other restrictions as re; be imposed in the

Tevelops place, jolicles and procedures on matters pertaining to the elicitect end subalicitent of rilitery grades in the USE and exercises Air Ctoff supervision over these ratters. Tetermines rilitary grade account for the USE Troop Fregram. Intermines For JOSE grades subjoired in Personnel Allotrent Vouchers [FV].

Frequency coded work streets reflecting T/ORF and hon-T/ORF enthorizations by grade and STW and APPC in a UDAF Troop heals or UPAF Troop Frequency for use by the steff executes for remning, training and cquipment requirements

HOLLE BOIT

#### MILITARY ALLOCATIONS BRANCH

Allocates military spaces to major commands within the USAF program and readjusts spaces to conform with approved changes in requirements.

Pevelope procedures governing the distribution of Yo (/OFE suthorization to be used by all operating agencies of the USAF.

Prepares the military Non-T/OSF Personnel Allotment Nouchers for the major commands each fiscal quarter and supplemental wouthers as required.

Prepares, when supropriate, requests to Activations and nit Control Branch for the establishment, assignment or iscontinuance of major USAF activities and units.

### CIVILIAN ALLOCATIONS BRANCH

Estimates Air Force-wide civilian personnel require-ments for current and projected progress tased on analysis of command requests in accordance with approved staffing standards.

Prepares detailed justifications and estimated civilian employment by appropriation and fund project to be used for preparetion and defense of Air Force civilian employment by appropriation and fund project to be used for preparetion and defense of Air Force civilian personal requirements before the Budget Advisory Committee.

Furnishes estimated employment levels for subsequent quarters of the fincel year to be used by GED. Prepares request for manpower ceilings from OSD sufficient to cover Air Force employment.

### ACTIVATION AND UNIT CONTROL BRANCH

Prepares Department of Air Force letter directives for the constitution, activation, reorganization, redesignation, assignment, resemplement, inscrivation or disbandment of TCAF units in secondance will the Lepartment of the Air Force Troop Program.

Prepares letters of authorization for the establishment, assignment or discontinuance of major Air Force ectivities and organization of T/D units above Air Divi-sion level.

I December 1950

# 7A **AFTER** DC/S OPERATIONS DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION INTERMEDIATE STAGE DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING PERSONNEL PROGRAMMING MANPOWER UTILIZATION ORGANIZATION MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DIVISION ORGANIZATION DIVISION Produces current and projected Air Force man-Originates or evaluates proposals concerning the USAF organizational structure. Recommends assignment of responsibilities to major USAF organizational elements. Develops and directs the USAF management improvement program. Exercises final manpower approval of all manpower programs. Allocates military and civilian spaces to major ning and equipping documents. Develops and directs the Air Force manpower USAF organizational elements. Prepares directives activating or disbanding organizations in accordance with approved Air Force programs. utilization program. Develops staffing standards. BRANCHES BRANCHES BRANCHES Programs Military Allocations Civilian Allocations Activation & Unit Control Standards Organizational Planning TO&E and TD Management Improvement Utilization 1 April 1951

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D. C.

27 April 1951

MEMORANDUM TO ALL PERSONNEL, DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION SUBJECT: Organizational Change

- 1. Since June 1950, personnel authorizations for this Directorate have increased 66% as a result of increased workload. The work is still increasing. Present limitations on personnel authorizations and office space for Headquarters, as well as a limited ability to hire qualified people, have required looking into other means for solving the problem. The attached memorandum of the Vice Chief of Staff explains the problem.
- 2. When we adopted the present three division organization in November 1950, we also had under consideration an alternate proposal for two divisions. Three divisions were retained then because that plan involved the least change and it was believed that some evolution would be helpful.
- 3. Due to the limitations described above, we have re-examined the two division proposal and have decided to place it into effect with minor revisions because:
  - a. It provides a smoother flow of work.
  - b. It further consolidates activities of a similar nature.
  - c. It provides more operating flexibility, particularly at the lower levels.
  - d. It permits re-adjusting present personnel authorizations to meet the increased workload.

Edmund C. Lynch

4. The attached chart shows the major shift of functions as a result of the change.

2 Incls. 1-ltr 17 Apr 51 2-chart EDMUND C. LYNCH Major General, U. S. Air Force Director of Mampower and Organization

### RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.


17 April 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTIES, DIRECTORS, DIVISION CHIEFS, AND COMPARABLE OFFICES, HEADQUARTERS USAF

- 1. I had intended to present the following thoughts to the semimonthly Directors' meeting on Friday, 13 April 1951; however, I believe it important that all echelons of the Air Staff receive this information first-hand. Pertinent facts concerning the growth of this Headquarters, personnel situation and status of office space in Headquarters USAF follow:
  - a. I think you will all be interested in the fact that we have increased our authorized strength in Headquarters USAF by 2,090 since 1 June 1950: this represents an increase of 844 military personnel and 1,246 civilian personnel. I consider this a sizeable increase.
  - b. It seems to me that we must slow down this quantitative trend and concentrate on qualitative improvements. Obviously, the Air Staff cannot continue to grow at the present rate. Manpower and space limitations make it impossible. This leaves only one course of action: better staff work; better supervision; and a determination to do the job with what we have.
  - c. The office space situation in the Pentagon and in Washington in general, is very critical. We know that the Directorates are below 30 square feet per person. Our people are making every effort together with the appropriate officials in OSD to acquire more office space to alleviate this situation. Our office space needs have been presented to the proper authorities in OSD, and we have been assured that as space is acquired it will be allocated to the Air Force on an equitable basis. In the meantime, we will have to live with this crowded condition.
  - d. We know that there is a serious shortage of stenographers and typists in the Washington area. Our people are working very hard on this problem and exploring every avenue to bring qualified people in the stenographic and typist fields to duty with the Air Force. In this connection, each Director should look into the utilization of the stenographers and typists he now has in his Directorate to make sure that stenos are doing stenographic work and not just straight typist or clerical work, and that those

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
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
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Listing of pertinent directives and regulations: 1. AFL No. 150-1 2. AFR No. 150-1 3. AFR No. 150-2 4. AFR No. 150-3 5. AFL No. 150-3 6. AFL No. 150-12 7. HOI No. 150-12


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HOI 150-12

HQ OFFICE INSTRUCTION ) NO. 150-12 HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, 17 MAY 1951

### PROGRAM AND MANPOWER

Development and Implementation of an Air Force Management Improvement Program

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Purpose					*	*: *		. A					 		*	*						*	*		*	*							1		
Policy																																	2		
Objective			*	4.					*	*	*		an > 1			٠	*)	*	*	*			*	*	*	*	*	*	À.	*			4		
Responsibilit	tes					5 1		-10			*	e	*		9			*	*		* :		*	*	*	*	٠		٠				7		
Relationship	625							- 2	-	12	-	2	 	 - 4					*	*						*	-	*		*			2		

- 1. Purpose. This Instruction describes the assigned responsibilities and clarifies the working relationships within the Air Staff for the development and implementation of an Air Force-wide Management Improvement Program.
  - 2. Policy. The Air Force will accomplish its mission in the most effective and efficient manner.
- Objective. Command and management are synonymous. The improvement of management will strengthen command and expedite the accomplishment of the mission.

#### 4. Responsibilities:

a. General. Every element of the Air Staff is responsible for ascertaining that there is continuing improvement in the carrying out of each of its functions. This responsibility includes guidance within each functional area outlined below, as well as periodic appraisal of the activities involved and covers all organizations and all levels, consistent with normal command prerogatives.

#### b. Primary:

- The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, is responsible for giving general direction to the Air Force-wide Program.
- (2) The Director of Manpower and Organization is the operating official in the Air Staff for the development and implementation of the Air Force-wide Program.
- (3) The Secretary of the Air Staff is responsible for that portion of the Management Improvement Program that pertains to the Headquarters USAF and its field extensions.

#### c. Functional:

- (1) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, is responsible for conducting and for obtaining maximum improvement in the comptroller system, including: budgeting, accounting, progress and statistical reporting, internal auditing, and the administrative organizational structure and managerial procedures relating thereto.
- (2) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the fields of research and development, and with determining qualitative requirements.
- (3) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the field of logistics, including: procurement, production engineering, industrial resources, maintenance engineering, supply, transportation, real estate, installations planning, and construction.

Incl # 4.

HOI 150-12 4-5

- (4) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in all phases of management, including: plans, programs, organization, allocations, manpower utilization, management engineering, operations, unit training, communications, and intelligence.
- (5) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in all phases of personnel management, including: recruitment, individual training, career monitoring, selection, effective personnel utilization, elimination of the unfit, and standardization of personnel administration procedures.
- (6) The Air Adjutant General is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the field of administrative procedures, including: the administration of records, printing and publications, mail and postal services, and still photographic services.
- (7) The Inspector General is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the fields of inspection, investigation, internal security, counterintelligence, and flight safety. In evaluating the over-all state of the Air Force, through inspections, he will aid in identifying areas needing improvement.
- (8) The Surgeon General, USAF, is resonsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the fields of dental, medical, and veterinary services; operation of medical facilities, procurement and distribution of medical supplies and equipment, and administration of medical records.

#### 5. Relationships:

- a. Sound management is impossible without coordinated staff work. Coordination cannot be accomplished without teamwork. The principle of coordinated staff work through teamwork will govern the development and implementation of the Air Force Management Improvement Program.
- b. The Directorate of Manpower and Organization is the Air Staff office charged with seeing that a formalized Air Force-wide Management Improvement Program is developed and implemented. In discharging this responsibility the Directorate will work with and through representatives of those Air Staff offices charged with management improvement responsibility in the various functional fields and with the major air commands. Those Air Staff offices and major air commands are responsible for furnishing such technical or specialized advice and assistance as may be needed in the development and implementation of the program.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

NATHAN F. TWINING General, United States Air Force Vice Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL


K. E. THIEBAUD Colonel, USAF Air Adjutant General

51-6017, AF


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C. C.	SECRE	T			
CIVILIAN	RE	QUIR	EMEN		
BUDGET PROGRAM	SYMBOL	30 June 150	STRENGTHS 30 Dec 150	30 Jun '51	30 Jun 152
ACFT. & RELATED PROCUREM'T	100	4,265	5,692	13,115	16,183
ACQUISITION & CONSTRUC- TION OF REAL PROPERTY	300	7	90	65	0
MAINTENANCE & OPERATIONS	400	140,882	170,689	276,459	375,176
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT	430	(71,726)	(88,787)	(144,809)	(208,609)
TRAINING SUPPORT	440	(16,388)	(19,180)	(31,442)	(40,924)
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT	450	(32,463)	(38,528)	(56,790)	(71,435)
RESEARCH & TEST SUPPORT	460	(5,329)	(6,521)	(11,932)	(13,360)
MEDICAL SUPPORT	470	(2,972)	(3,409)	(6,719)	(8,766)
SERVICE-WIDE SUPPORT	480	(12,004)	(14,264)	(24,767)	(32,082)
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT	600	7,015	7,025	11,212	12,622
AIR NATIONAL GUARD		1,393	1,453	1,558	4,181 M/Y
GRAND TOTAL		153,562	184,949	302,409	408,162
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# LIST OF DIRECTIVES PUBLISHED DURING THIS SEMI-ANNUAL PERIOD SUBJECT DIRECTIVE NO. Manpower and Organization AFR 150-1 Manpower Utilization Program AFR 150-2 Operation of the Manpower Program AFR 150-3 Manpower Utilization Program AFL 150-1 AFL 150-3 Manpower Measurement Allotment of Man Hours - Commander's Guide AFL 150-12 Personnel Allotments in Headquarters USAF HOI 150-3 Wartime Planning Factors Manual HOI 170-3 AFM 150-1 Manpower Guide Incl #7

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A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

by

The Committee on Personnel Utilization and Training

Chapter VI

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIRECTORATE

#### Organization

Inquiry by the Committee has brought forth a wide range of commendations on the manpower utilization work of the Air Force and the activities of the manpower and organization directorate in particular. As of this date, the opinions which we have sampled outside of the Air Force have agreed that the Air Force is ahead of both the Army and the Navy in its comprehension of the problems involved in manpower utilization and in what it is doing to put its house in order. Commanding officers in the field had words of praise for this directorate. The specific suggestions which the Committee has to make are directed not toward the correction of an unsatisfactory situation, but of the more effective implementation of a well-planned program.

Despite the casual treatment which this function received in the Air Force immediately following World War II, the wartime accumulation of knowledge and technique was not entirely dissipated. Recent efforts to strengthen this directorate have resulted in placing under it the functions of determining requirements, making allocations, revising assignments, and monitoring utilization. We feel this combination of functions will make possible the achievement of the assigned objectives.

The Committee discussed at some length the issue as to where this directorate should be located within the headquarters organization. It considered whether it should remain in operations, be transferred to personnel, or the Comptroller, or whether it should report to or be made a part of the Office of the Chief of Staff. It was concluded that the organizational location of this directorate is not so important today as are effective top-level understanding and support by both the Chief of the Air Staff and the Office of the Secretary, and an experienced and able staff to perform the assigned functions of the directorate. The Committee did not wish to raise possible organization questions until these other two elements have been established. If an organization change becomes necessary or desirable at a later date, we feel this change will become apparent to the top command of the Air Force as they continue to give this activity the necessary support and attention.

The Committee would like to emphasize one continuing organization requirement which the directorate must always keep in mind—the close and effective coordination with all of the headquarters directorates. Successful manpower utilization cannot be made the function of any one office. It is inevitably an activity which permeates in great detail many of the day-to day activities of operations, personnel, and the Comptroller.

Incl #8

#### HEADQUARTERS LEADERSHIP

In its visits to the various field commands, the Committee has observed an almost complete lack of uniformity in the manner in which the commands have organized their staffs in relation to manpower utilization. The Committee suspects a similarly wide variation in the effective utilization of manpower among and within the various commands. This observation indicates that headquarters must take an active leadership in working with the various commands to improve their operations.

Specifically, the Committee believes that the manpower and organization directorate should make an intensive survey of manpower utilization throughout the headquarters USAF, and that the personnel making the headquarters study should then be assigned to make a similar study of each headquarters command. Commands in turn should direct similar surveys of their stations.

These surveys cannot be left to the sole responsibility of the various commanding officers under a philosophy of decentralized authority and responsibility. Each commander must be given the authority and responsibility to use his staff as he sees best. But no commander given a mission to perform can be relied upon to be wholly objective as to his own requirements and use of personnel. Independent evaluation and guidance must be given by the headquarters.

The preceding suggestion can be effectively executed only if the manpower and organization directorate has a trained, experienced staff and the full backing and support of both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary. This support must be extended in such a way as to be apparent to all commanding officers in the field. Again, the Committee has in mind as an example the outstanding achievements of the Air Force in creating and developing the Comptroller function during the past 4 years.

### STAFFING

An immediate area requiring top-side support is the staffing of this directorate. None of the military personnel at the division of branch level in this directorate has had significant prior training or experience in the field of manpower utilization. The director, if he is to carry out successfully his mission, must have a small corps of trained, experienced personnel to support him.

Since such experience seems to be lacking in the Air Force at present, we recommend the direct commissioning from civil life of a highly trained, thoroughly experienced individual as a brigadier general to act as deputy director.

The Committee would suggest that the commission be made for a period of from 2 to 3 years and that the individual selected, in addition to having had a broad civilian experience, should also have had sufficient military experience to be able to adapt himself readily to such a military assignment. We believe that an officer so commissioned will be able to select from the Air Force reserves, or from civilian life, four to six experienced personnel who

can be brought in to form a nucleus to plan, train, and carry out the day-to-day assignments. It has been the observation of the Committee that the director of manpower and organization has had so many Air Force and outside demands upon his time that he cannot also effectively direct day-to-day operations.

#### PROGRAMMING REVIEW

Adequacy of the staff and its procedures do not constitute the only elements of top-side support for this directorate. Periodically, it must have decisive top-level guidance for programming purposes.


The Committee recognized that top management in the Air Force itself often must await guidance on which to base firm decisions. However, in the absence of such guidance, Air Force programming cannot come to a stop. Someone must make the decisions. As a result, the major operating decisions that direct the Air Force are sometimes made by the lower echelons in default of top support. For example, the numbers and skills required to operate the Air Force are determined by the size, composition, deployment and level of activity of the major operational elements; strategic, tactical, defensive, and transport. This is sound—provided the necessary decisions as to the size, composition, deployment and level of activity are made by those charged with this responsibility. But if the assistant for programming cannot give the director of manpower and organization the necessary program guidance, either the director must make his own estimates or the director of training must make the programming decisions in order to avoid bottlenecks at the induction centers awaiting instructions as to how many of what type should be trained "in accordance with the Air Force program." The director of training cannot await "top-level guidance"; he must act on the best information available to him.

Similarly, it has been reported to the Committee that because of congressional delay, budgetary and manpower allocations have been as late as 6 months in going out to the Commands. In such cases, the Commands are forced to assume the responsibility avoided by top management and make the program decisions. These decisions are undoubtedly made with the best of intent, but without central guidance they are of necessity uncoordinated.


The top management of the Air Force must accept the programming responsibility when direction is not forthcoming at the prescribed time through normal legislative executive channels. Programming is an area where close review by the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force should be exercised.

#### YARDSTICKS OR STANDARDS

The Committee recognizes the critical importance which standards or yardsticks play in arriving at planned requirements for the Air Force; however, it did not explore the work being done on these standards in much detail nor did it explore the problems of flexibility and adaptation to program changes required in the application of T/O & E's and T/D's. Coincident with the appointment of this Committee, the Air Force retained a firm of management



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26 June 1951

Number of Wings & Sep Sqs Authorized

HISTORY OF ACTIVATIONS AND UNIT CONTROL, D/M&O, from 1 Jan 51 to 30 June 51

	Off	FMC	Authoriza WO	ed Strength Airmen	Total	Civilian
1 January 1951	69568	1459	197	471831	543055	215197
30 June 1951	100376	2809	F50	698155	801760	274157

1 Jan 51

The above figures do not include pipeline.

	62 Wings	87 Wings
Bombardment, Heavy	2	3
Bombardment, Medium	17	18
Bombardment, Light	2	14
Fighter-All Weather	3	
Fighter-Bomber	10	15
Fighter-Interceptor	9	20
Fighter-Escort	3	3 -
Strat Recon, Hv	2	3
Strat Recon, M	2	2
Tact Ren	3	14
Troop Carrier, Hv	3	3
Troop Carrier, M	_6	12
Total	62	87

Separate Squadrons
Strategic Support
Lizison
Air Rescue
Tow Target
Strat Rcn, M, Weather
Total

ZED	

	11	
	6	
-	26	
	20	

### MAJOR REORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED

Action	Effective Date
Air Defense Command re-established as a major air comman	d 1 January 1951
Air Force Finance Division established as separate operating agency	1 January 1951

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# SEGRET

h. "	Action	Effective Date
C	3d Air Division status as major air command terminated and assigned to USAFE, along with HHS thereof and all units assigned	21 January 1951
	12th Air Force designated and organized as a T/D unit, assigned to USAFE	21 January 1951
	2d Air Division discontinued	7 May 1951
	Aeronautical Chart Service redesignated as USAF Aeronautical Chart and Information Service	1 February 1951
	Central Air Defense Force assigned to ADC and HHS, CADF designated and organized as a T/D Unit	1 March 1951
	Eighteenth AF assigned to TAC and HHS thereof designated and organized as T/D Unit	28 March 1951
	AMC authorized to designate and organize as T/D units the HHS, Northeastern, Eastern, Central, Mid-Central, Southern and Western Air Procurement Districts	1 March 1951
	Air Pictorial Service established as separate operating agency	1 April 1951
	Air Research and Development Command relieved from assignment to Air Materiel Command	2 April 1951
	Air Development Force assigned to Air Materiel Command and Hq, ADF designated and organized as T/D Unit	1 April 1951
	Air Development Force reassigned to ARDC	2 April 1951
	Hq, Flying Training Air Force designated and organized as T/D unit and assigned to Air Training Command	1 Way 1951
	European Air Materiel Force assigned to UNAFE and Hq, European Air Materiel Force designated and organized as T/D Unit.	1 May 1951
	Air Engineering Development Division and HHS thereof assigned to ARDC. AEDD status as a separate operating agency terminated	1 May 1951
1	hird Air Force assigned USAFE and Hq, Third AF designated and organized as a T/D unit.	1 May 1951

# SEGRET

#### Action

Hq and Hq Squadron, 3d Air Division discontinued

LRPGD assigned to Air Research and Development Command. Long Range Proving Ground Division status as separate operating agency terminated.

Air Technical Intelligence Center designated

Air Development Force redesignated the Wright Air Development Center

### Effective Date

1 May 1951

1h May 1951

21 May 1951

8 June 1951

SEGRET

MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION - 1 Jan 1951 - 30 June 51. I. DIVISION REORGANIZATION II. CIVILIAN ALLOCATIONS III. MILITARY ALLOCATIONS IV. PROGRAMS

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MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION - 1 January 1951 - 30 June 1951

#### I. Division Reorganization.

The Manpower Allocations Division reorganization on 27 April 1951 added the Program Analysis Branch to the three Branches previously assigned. The new Branch provides for systematic analysis of the USAF Troop Program and assembly in one office of related functions including preparation and development of machine run programs. The principal difficulties encountered in commencing operation have been lack of office space. Full operation is expected at such time as adequate space is available.

#### II. Civilian Allocations.

Continuation of the Korean Police action and the general Air Force buildup resulted in revision from the FI-51 opening strength of 154,000 to an approved strength of 278,400 for end FI-51, and 319,400 for FI-52. This position was modified by the 28 April 51 decision of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to place a 260,000 ceiling of the Air Force. Labor shortages resulted in a reduced hiring capability which made this ceiling adequate for an end year position. Increases to the 260,000 ceiling may be obtained by presentation of adequate justification to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Civilian Allocations Branch participated in the preparation of detailed and general statements, charts, answers to anticipated questions and general backup to be used in defense of civilian personnel strengths before the Budget Advisory Committee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Bureau of Budget and Congress.

III. Military Allocations.

Normal allocations activity continued during this period with emphasis on security, Air Defense and the general Air Force buildup. During January Luke Air Force Base was activated and a Fighter Combat Crew Training unit assigned; 45 officers and 1300 airmen were authorized Continental Air Command for additional security requirements, and 18,300 additional military personnel were authorized for an expanded AC&W program. Continental Air Command Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Squadrons were activated and/or reorganized to accommodate the first 24 permanent AC&W sites. CONAC authorizations were divided to provide spaces for Air Defense Command (ADC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC).

In February San Marcos Air Force Base was established as a USAF Liaison/Helicopter School. All Zone of Interior engineer Scarwaf units were assigned to CONAC and the Headquarters Aviation Engineer Force authorized CONAC for activation in April. The transfer increased Air Force installations requirements and 3 bases (Beale, Orlando and Walters) were activated to accommodate the units. Further emphasis was placed on tactical air operation and Tactical Air Command expanded the Air Ground Operation School at Langley Air Force Base.

In March Gila Bend Gunnery Range was opened for use by Luke AFB and Amarillo Air Force Base was activated as the 7th Tech Training Base (Aircraft Maintenance). Sixty-two (62) additional ROTC units were approved for FY-52 and 1 Troop Carrier Wing, Medium was ordered to active duty and assigned to the Tactical Air Command. Two (2)

additional Troop Carrier Wings were assigned in April and three (3) in May with the necessary TDA for support. Increases in Fighter Forces and Aircraft Control & Warning (AC&W) units resulted in an Air Defense Command reorganization which provided the Central Air Defense force as an additional subordinate Headquarters to the Air Defense Command. To provide coverage for radar gaps, low altitude or radar, the Ground Observer plan was implemented and two (2) additional Air National Guard AC&W Groups were ordered to Federal Service.

In April one (1) Tactical Reconnaissance Wings and two (2)
Fighter Bomb Wings were federalized for duty with Tactical Air Command.
The Newark Transportation Control Depot was established with a
Materiel Control Group M.D.A.P. The Air Force assumed responsibility
for operation of Aerial Ports in FEAF at a cost of 116 officer and
10,006 airmen. Operation of hospitals at Johnston, Nagoya and
Tachikawa in FEAF was also assumed during this period.

In May Spence Field, Georgia, and Bartow Field, Florida were established as contract flying schools and assigned to the Air Training Command. Additional Department of Army requirements for Tow Target Squadrons resulted in the activation of the 2d and 3rd Tow Target Squadrons.

In June Wichita Municipal Airport was activated as a B-47 Combat Crew Training Station. Hondo, Texas was activated as the 5th Contract Flying School and Bryan Air Force Base was established as an Advanced Single Engine Jet School.

During the six months period the USAF Security Service was expanded by four (4) Radio Squadrons, Mobile; TO&E Crash Rescue Detachments were organized Air Force wide and Communications Construction

Units were organized in each Air Materiel Area of Air Materiel

Command. Project Greenhouse was dissolved and two additional Tactical

Air Command Control Groups authorized (one for deployment). The

Air Defense Command activated or reorganized AC&W Groups and Squadrons
to provide for 75 permanent AC&W sites and the interceptor program

was accelerated by ordering to Federal Service 9 Fighter Groups and
21 Fighter Squadrons. Korean support resulted in considerable augmentation
of the Air Materiel Command purchasing program and several specialized
depots were activated.

#### IV. Programs.

Troop Programs developed during this period were

- a. 87 Wings 971,000 Military Personnel, FI-51.
- b. 87 Wings 850,000 Military Personnel, FI-51.
- c. 95 Wings 1,061,000 Military Personnel, FI-52 (two editions prepared).

SSN and AFSC officer and airmen identities were prepared on each of the above programs, except for the end FI-51 position. Pilot seat requirements were determined for the end FY-52 position. Military Personnel Forms based on the above listed Troop Programs were prepared reflecting

- a. Military grades requirements
- b. Rated and non-rated crew requirements
- c. Deployment of Military personnel by location
- d. Deployment of Military personnel by identity officer airman male - female,

for use in budget hearings.


Special project type data for use in support of Military Troop programs before OSD, BOB and Congress reflecting

- a. Functional identification of component parts of Wilitary personnel requirements.
- Utilization of programmed pilots Peace and in the event of Mobilization or War.


Other Special Projects included

- a. Pilot requirement based on JCS outline war plan. (Unclassified)
- b. Personnel requirements for NATO Air Forces. (Unclassified)
- c. Preparation of Troop Basis for Air Force Mobilization Plan (AFMOP 2-51) (Unclassified)
- d. Preparation of overseas Troop Basis for Air Force Emergency War Plan. (Unclassified)
- e. Preparation of new Air Force Regulation pertaining to Flying Status of Airmen. (Unclassified)
- f. Study of RAF emthods of administering manpower allocations and utilization. (Unclassified)
- g. "Order of Magnitude" study of ground defense requirements for USAF bases. (Unclassified)
- h. USAF Reserve Forces Program. (Unclassified)
- Transfer of Engineer Aviation Units from Army to Air Force. (Unclassified)
- j. Determination of manpower requirements for forces proposed for the Air Force by JCS documents. (Unclassified)
- k. Determination of personnel requirements of new air bases for use in negotiating air base rights in foreign countries. (Unclassified)

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


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Is Since Jame 1950, parsonnel arthorizations for this Directorate have increased 66% as a result of increased we know. The work is still increasing. Present timitations on personnel authorizations and office space for Headquarters, as well as a listed shallty to hire qualified people, have required looking into other means for solving the problem. The attached approximate of the Vice Chief of Staff explains 2. When we adopted the present three division organization in lovember 1950, we also had under consideration as alternate proposal for the divisions. Three divisions were retained then because that plan involved the less change and is was believed that some evolution would be helpful. 3. Due to the ligitations described above, we have re-examined the two civision proposal and have decided to place it into effect d. It permits re-adjustin; pro ent percental authorizations in the attached enict move the autor shift of functions as a bjor Ceneral, U. S. Air Force




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people with typing skills are not being masted on purely clerical jobs in their own offices. Further, each Director should make sure that typists and stenographers are working at these skills for accious percentage of their time. All cherical toks not re uiring dictation and typing should be segregated and assigned to clerks. Our reople on hire intelligent and competent personnel to perform clerical work not requiring typing and dictation. The utilization of the highest skills available is becoming increasingly important to us as the labor market centimues to shrink.


2. Directors, Division and Branch Chiefs ment evaluate the above factors as they relate to their orn individual effice and take action accordingly.

N. P. T INING General, United States ir Force Vice Chief of Staff

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ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT II. MISSION III. BRANCH ACTIVITIES A. Organizational Planning Branch B. Management Improvement Branch C. Manpower Manning Standards Branch D. Manning & Equipping Documents Branch IV. APPENDIX

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#### SECTION I

#### ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The period covered by this history begins with the birth of a new Division — the Organization Management Division. The Organization Management Division is one of the two Divisions that evolved from a reorganization of the Directorate of Manpower & Organization on 1 May 1951.

For record purposes, a roster of personnel of the Directorate which includes all personnel assigned to the Division is attached as Appendix No. 2.

In the reorganization of the Directorate, the functions formerly performed by three Divisions were reassigned to two Divisions. Many of the functions of the Manpower Requirements Division are now the laresponsibility of the Organization Management Division.

<sup>1.</sup> See Appendix No. 1.


SECTION II

MISSION


The mission of the Organization Management Division is as follows:

- Originates or evaluates proposals concerning the USAF organizational structures.
- 2. Assigns functions to USAF organizational elements.
- 3. Develops and directs the USAF Management Improvement Program
- 4. Develops and directs the Air Force Manpower Performance
  Evaluation Program.
- 5. Develops Manpower Standards
- Exercises final approval of all Manning & Equipping
  Documents.

The missions of the Branches of the Organization Management Division may be found on a chart of the Directorate of Manpower & Organization dated 1 May 1951 in Appendix 6.



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# SECTION I ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

The reorganization of the Directorate of Manpower and Organization as of 1 May 1951, placed the Organization (formerly Organizational)

Planning Branch as one of the two Branches of the Organization Management Division.

The Branch was not organized into Sections, but as one cooperating group. In order, however, to insure expert knowledge of all that pertained to the organizations of the various commands, certain officers or groups of officers were assigned commands as their special, but not exclusive function. Because a large number of projects not directly related to organization planning were being handled by officers assigned to the Branch, those officers were designated as special project personnel.

The function of the Branch was not materially changed. It was set forth as follows:

- 1. Determines the organizational structure that will most effectively accomplish the mission and reduce to a minimum the qualitative and quantitative requirements for manpower by:
  - a. The application of sound principles of organizational management.
  - b. Developing plans to the end that each organizational component is a logical, separable, integral part of the

1. See Appendix 3

whole organization, having commensurate responsibility, authority and accountability.

c. Developing organizational objectives and formulating

- d. Reviewing and analyzing mission directives and determines proper assignment of functions to major organizational elements.
- Determines the qualitative manning requirements, physical and mental, generated by the mission and by the organizational structure.

policies pertaining thereto.

In order to fulfill the various aspects of the function, a statement of implementation was prepared. This was to be used as a guide by Branch personnel, and to provide information to others.<sup>2</sup>

At the time of the reorganization, Col. C. C. Wasem, Chief of the Organization Planning Branch was in Korea. Col. W. C. W. Cletanoff, Deputy, acted as Chief. It soon became apparent that many of the other personnel assigned would not be available for Branch work. It was necessary, therefore, for all available to work on whatever came along.

See Appendix 4 for detailed statement.

# SECTION II ACTIVITIES

Branch dealt continuously with organizational problems of varying importance and magnitude. In each case it viewed the problems in accordance with well-established principles of organization. It attempted also to insure flexibility and mobility of organization and also to insure strong central control by the maximum possible decentralization of responsibility and authority.

Examples of types of projects of some significance are given below:

A. Organization and Manpower Requirements of Intermediate Commands

(A Continuing Project - Project Officer-W/C Burgess)

This project originated from the knowledge that major commands are planning to organize intermediate headquarters below the Major Air Command and Air Force. The problem is to determine the proper organization of these intermediate echelons.

To do this, information must be obtained as to the proposed function of these echelons and the projected manpower requirements.

To date, the number of intermediate echelons of command between Major Commands and Wings and their proposed strength have been tabulated by command as programmed through 31 July 1951. The next step is to determine the proposed utilization and function of these various head-quarters. To do this, it is proposed to visit the commands concerned and obtained this information.

Considerable material has been collected and following staff visits to the appropriate command headquarters a detailed study will be compiled. This should lead to recommendations concerning the organization and function required in the intermediate command echelons.

B. Reorganization of ZI Air Weather Service (Mr. A. E. Pierce)

The Air Weather Service under the Military Air Transport Service has been organized geographically in the ZI. A squadron in a given geographical area fractions through its detachments, Air Weather Service to the several major command installations in that area. This service has failed to meet the peculiar and special need of those commands.

Furthermore, staff weather officers have been assigned by AWS to commands as needed. They have been in AWS command channels, but not connected with the AWS detachments and with no authority over them.

To improve the situation the ZI Air Weather Service is to be so organized that:

- An AWS Group will be adjacent to Command Headquarters of each SAC, TAC, ADC, ATRC, AMC. Other commands will be handled by one group.
- A squadron of the groups located at a command will be adjacent to each of the Command s Air Forces.
- A detachment of that squadron will be at each of the Air Force's bases.
- 4. The Commander of the AWS units at each level will be the staff weather officer for that level.

Through this reorganization it is hoped that:


- 1. AWS can better meet the special needs of a given command;
- 2. provide better staff service, and
- 3. be somewhat more closely integrated into Air Force activities.

The proposed reorganization was discussed with the pertinent Air Staff Agencies. The Organization Planning Branch, the Organization and Management Division and other offices of AFOMO approved the idea. Other agencies also concurred.


A letter approving the reorganization was prepared. This was signed by the Assistant Vice-Chief of Staff and sent to MATS on 3 July 1951.

- C. The special projects function of the Organization Flanning
  Branch (Lt. Col. Coleman and Others) is to determine the qualitative
  manning requirements, physical and mental, generated by the organizational
  structure. It is changed with the survey of manpower requirements and
  utilization in specific areas and the preparation of reports pertaining
  thereto within the command areas Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the
  Air Force, HQ USAF, and Directorate of Manpower and Organization.
- D. A special report: "Methods and Procedure for Determining
  Manpower Requirements, Maximum Utilization of Air Force Manpower Resources" was prepared 12 May 1951 for the Assistant Secretary of
  Defense (Manpower & Personnel) subsequent reports were prepared on this
  same subject on 21 May 1951 and 15 June 1951 in more detail the
  latter, a presentation for the Congress.

<sup>3.</sup> See Appendix 5



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#### THE PHYSICAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT PROCEDURE

On 18 January 1951, a meeting was held in the office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Progress Management during which the Bureau of the
Budget presented the results of a survey they had made. This survey showed
that the time involved in the administrative procedures incident to physical disability retirement was excessive. In a memorandum on 19 January
1951 to the Organization Division, General Lynch said:

"This is a worthy project for Management Improvement. I suggest as an initial step a procedural study or flow chart showing how these cases are handled in Hq. USAF, that is the routing through the various offices and the action taken by each one. From that, we can derive general ideas as to improvement.

"After we have a general idea of what should be done, I would suggest getting the principle staff heads together in Mr. Sweeney's office to get a full understanding of the problem, a general agreement as to the solution and their full backing on working out changes designed to improve the system."

With this as a charter, the Management Improvement Branch formed a team with the Secretary of the Air Staff to survey the Headquarters portion of the procedure. The emphasis throughout the entire survey was placed on the savings of hospital beds through an improvement in the administrative procedures; that is, no attention was paid to the medical aspects of the problem.

The survey team examined the procedures of the Air Adjutant General, the Directorate of Military Personnel and the Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council. One 26 March 1951 the results of this survey were presented to all interested staff officers at a special briefing. Mr.

Sweeney, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Management wrote the following:

"I was very much impressed by the briefing this morning on the disability retirement procedures.


"I was even more impressed by the fact that after the meeting, Mr. Palmer of the Bureau of the Budget advised me that the Bureau was proposing to discuss with Mr. Zuckert the possibility of a 5% reduction in hospital facilities, as a result of their work in the field.

"I think it behooves us to continue this study in the lifield and to cut down the time required as much as possible."

The field portion of this study was initiated by a memorandum to General Lynch proposing a series of hospitals to be visited and the time schedule of survey. Two representatives of this Division visited Brooke Army Hospital, San Antonio, Texas, and Westover Air Force Hospital, Massachusetts, and charted the procedures in use at these installations. All aspects of the problem were discussed with appropriate officials both in the field and in Headquarters, USAF and suggestions and recommendations were made as the survey progressed.

With the presentation of these suggestions to the appropriate offices in the Air Staff, in informal sessions, the work of this Division on this project was ended. The responsibility for adoption or non-adoption of all suggestions were left to the appropriate staff offices.

<sup>1.</sup> Memorandum for General Lynch, 26 March 1951 from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Management.



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In late 1949 the Manpower Group, which staff function during its existence reported to the Chief of Staff, was authorized to begin the development of Standards (Yardsticks) on all functional activities within the Air Force. The Wing Base organization was selected as that area on which the initial development was begun. These standards were developed by a team of officers within the Headquarters USAF Manpower Group utilizing manpower surveys as the basic data on which the requirements were determined. On 1 January 1950, these Standards, a total of 51, were published and distributed world-wide in AF Manual 150-1, Manpower Guide.

In order to continue the plan of development into other functional areas and in an accelerated manner, it was decided to delegate to the Major Air Commands the development of Standards on activities peculiar to each command. This delegation was accomplished by letter on 12 November 1950. In passing a portion of the program to each Major Commander, a schedule of units on which Standards were desired, together with a schedule of submission dates for these Standards was forwarded. The program in the field began in early January 1951 after an extensive three-day Standards indoctrination conference was held in this Headquarters in December 1950 with manpower representatives from the Major Commands world-wide.

The current program, which is in its sixth month, covers development of Standards on all units authorized as of 1 September 1950 by either Tables of Distribution or Tables of Organization and Equipment.

This is referred to as Phase 1 of the Program, which will be concluded on or about 31 December 1951. Phase 2 will be established in the latter part of this year with implementation in 1952. At that time revision of many of the Standards will be necessary due to changes in mission.

The following data summarizes the program as of 1 July 1951.

79 Standards published and contained in AFM 150-1


20 Standards at the Public Printer

54 Standards in final copy processing which will be submitted to the public printer in about 60 days.

The degree to which this program has progressed is in large measure due to the energetic efforts of the major air command Manpower Groups in submitting Standards based on a realistic measurement. It is evident to the Directorate of Manpower & Organization that this undertaking is receiving the full and personal support of the major air commanders.

The purpose of Standards.

- A. Serve as a method of evaluating the degree of efficiency of manpower utilization.
- B. Serve as a pattern for the equitable distribution of manpower in accordance with workloads.
- C. Serve as the basis upon which all manning documents are constructed.



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#### SECTION I, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Effective 1 May 1951 with the reorganization of the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, the title of this Branch was changed from T/O&E Branch to Manning and Equipping Documents Branch. Concurrently, an additional responsibility of the operation of the Planning Tables Section was assigned.

The Branch is organized in four sections, entitled: Tables of Organization Section, Tables of Equipment Section, Tables of Distribution Section and Planning Tables Section. Functions of the Branch, assigned respectively to the Sections, are as follows:

- Develops Tables of Organization for units, largely combat in nature, that are designed with a predetermined capability of performance in combat.
- 2. Develops equipment documents for Air Force units, and stations.
- 3. Reviews and recommends improvements in Tables of Distribution, which indicate personnel by job title, specialty code, and grade, authorized for each function of an activity manned with personnel under bulk allotment.
- 4. Develops manpower planning tables, ratios and factors designed for gross programming and budget needs of USAF.

#### SECTION II, ACTIVITIES

The major activity in process in this Branch is the mechanization of personnel and equipment authorization documents. This program was

first initiated on 21 November 1949 and has been under development since that date. It had been determined that a need existed to find a more expeditious way of compiling, coordinating and publishing authorization documents. Authorization documents are defined, for this writing, as Tables of Organization and Equipment and Tables of Distribution. To mechanize these authorization documents, completion of the following three basic requirements was necessary and is in process.

Separation of personnel and equipment in the T/O&E to make possible machine preparation.

Development of statistical procedures to convert T/O's and T/D's from their present form to an IBM machine document.

Development of a Master Equipment Muthorization List to provide a single document that would encompass equipment requirements of all Tables of Organization.

The status of this program for the reporting period 1 May to 30 June 1951, indicating the continued action taken since the submission of the history for the period 1 January 1951 to 31 March 1951, is as follows:

"T/0's are 100% converted to the Mechanization Worksheets.

From these worksheets, cards are being key punched to list all T/0's by
IBM tabulating machines. This program is in the early stages of implementation.

"Concurrently, interim instructions for the conversion of T/D's will be transmitted to the Major Air Commands on or about 1 August 1951.

Punch cards on all T/D's Air Force-Wide will reach Headquarters, USAF, on or about 15 October.

"Completion date for the Master Equipment Authorization List

(MEAL) will be 1 September 1951. Immediate Air Force-wide implementation of this program will follow and will be completed six months thereafter."

Additional action taken during the period of this history was the beginning of briefings, on mechanization of authorization documents, of all major commands in order to obtain their recommendations and alert them for the implementation period.


The major commands receiving briefings are indicated:

- 24 April 1951 (not included in previous history) Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York
- 25 April 1951 (not included in previous history) Tactical Air Command, Lengley Air Force Base, Virginia
- 21 May 1951 Air Materiel Command, World-Wide Supply Conference, San Antonio, Texas
- 21 May 1951 Security Service, Brooks Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas
- 25 May 1951 Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska
- 25 May 1951 Air Defense Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado
- 27 May 1951 Finance Center, Denver, Colorado
- 29 June 1951 Military Air Transport Service; Air Research and Development Command; Air Training Command; Head-quarters Command, Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C.

<sup>1</sup> Mechanization of Personnel and Equipment Authorization Documents", prepared by Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O, Headquarters, USAF Apprendix #7.

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appendix
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Brigadian General Anary L. Moore - Deputy Director
Br. Meldon S. Bills - Civilian Deputy Director
Delevel Robert B. Devemport - Fractains
Colonel Robert W. Booles - Andstant Executive
Calcael Robert W. Borles - Aerdstant Executive
Captein Willia A. Bynes - Special Project and Supply Officer
in Horse I. Therp - Administrative Officer
Fine Hery E. Lymb - Secretary to Director and Deputy Director
Fine Hery E. Lymb - Secretary to Director and Deputy Director
Fine Horsenery A. Three-Hearton - Administrative Assistant
Vacant - Special Assistant and Top Secret Class
Mine Helen Furdulis - Secretary to Civilian Deputy Director
Vacant - Secretary to Assistant Executive
Mine Joan Fernand - Secretary to Administrative Officer
Her Hey M. Limbol - Chief, Office Heil Feellity
Mine June Goodnin - Mail Clark
He. Hereli Holses - Cable Clerk
Mr. Worepa W. Velga - Supply Clark
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
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# Colonel Frank N. Graves - Chief Lt Colonel Robert M. Crek - Deputy Chief Mr. Glenn W. Harkins - Special Assistant Miss Rosa Grubich - Secretary Major Donald Andre - Executive Vacant - Clerk-Typist TABLES OF ORGANIZATION SECTION Lt Coloral Carl J. Lust - Chief Vacant - Deputy Chief Vacant - Clerk-Stenographer POWBAT WINE TABLES UNIT Captain Charles W. Hodgson - Chief Captain Thomas J. Lynn - T/O Specialist Mr. Dorald Bongardner - T/O Specialist Miss Elizabeth Koury - T/O Specialist Vacant - T/O Specialist Mrs Armie Sandagger . Editorial Clerk Vesent - Captain - T/O Specialist Mas Polly Porrectall - T/O Specialist Mrs Beulah Schoults- T/O Specialist Mrs Audrey Hall - Clark-Typist Major Joses L. Jósemia - Chief Mios Bora Pita-Geral I - 7/0 Specialist Mr. Leotard Brown - 7/0 Specialist Mios Ethyline Collons - 7/0 Specialist Diss Lois Foulty - Glark-Typia. Er. Frank Fradley - Special Assistant Vacant - Sectionical Assistant Vecant - Chief Vecant - T/D Specialist Hr. Willard Oriffing - T/D Specialist Vaccat - 1/D Specialist Vacant - 1/D Specialart Br. Marold Leigh - 1/D Specialist Vacant - 1/D Specialist

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
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### LAND St ALLOCATIONS DIVISION - total 66 - Officers - 40 Airmon -Colonel Allen R. Springer - Chief Colonel John F. Wadman - Assistant Chief Colonel Albert J. McChristy . Deputy Chief Lt Colonel Robert H. Allyn - Executive Lt Colonel Frank P. Gallo - Executive Miss Emma Rand - Secretary 'Miss Sara Field - Clerk-Stenographer MANPOWER PROGRAMS BRANCH Colonel Beverly Carnack - Chie? Lt Colonel John W. Shinners - Deputy Chief Mr. Willard Studey - Special Assistant Variant - Chief Programs and Budget Section Major Jesse Peasles - Assistant Programs and Budget Section Major Edward Smith - Assistant Programs and Budget Section Lt Colonel Andrew Kowalcki - Chief, Plans and Mobilization Section Major Stevens Keller - Chief, Air Force Specialty Section Captain Kendell Wheaton - Chief, Military Grade Section S/Sgt Howard Donaldson \* Air Force Specialty Section //Sgt Alexander Grandscka - Air Force Specialty Section (Grades) Mins Almyra Compbell - Air Force Specialty Section (AFC) ir, James Rouse - Clerk-Stenographer Miss Evelya Willer - Clerk-Typist MILATARY AUGOCATIONS PRANCH Colored Charles Optel - Chief Lt Colonel Arthur Hadwin - Command Allocations (Cffeer Major Bill R. Alans . Cormand Allocations Officer Major John S. Bownn - Command Allocations Office ajor Kenneth Davey - Command Allocations Officer Major Edwin Enswiller - Command Allocations Officer Major Vincent Evers + Command Allocations Of Moor Cajor Stanley Salisbury - Commend Allocation Officer Major Lawrence Alexander - Communi Allocation Officer Major Othmer Kemper - Commend Allocation Officer Major George C. Northeutt - Command-Allocation Officer Major John Roberts - Command Allocation Officer Vacant - Command Allocation Officer Captain Harry A. Hillar - Command Allocation Officer Captain Robert Surrie p Cormand Allocation Officer Major Thomas A. Wodin - Cormani Allocation Officer M/Sgt Edward J. Plant - Assistant to Cormand Allocation Officer () Vacant - M/Sgt - Assistant to Command Allocation Officer Mina Ruth Ho - Clerk-Stanographer Mrs Katherina Agin - Clerk-Stenographer Ura Elsia Davis - Clerk-Typist GIVILLAND ALLOCATIONS BRANCH Lt Colonel William Boiley - Chic? Capt James R. Howell - Deputy Chief Miss Lucy Healerson - Special Assistant Major Joseph Vollensch - Chief, Programing Section Captain Robert Borg - Programming Officer Captain Modern Sorg - Programming Officer Captain William Hipton - Programming Officer Captain Walker - Civilian Requirements Officer Captain Denver Wood - Chief, Civilian Allocations and Sudget States Tra Carelyn HeCowdek - Statistician Tra Lucille Mithens - Statistician Tra Joseph Turner - Statistician Tra Joseph Turner - Statistician Tra Joseph Turner - Dirichtonographer Mas Slais Nott - Clerk-lypist

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# HASPOTER E-OVAL A GLASTS BLANCH Lt Colonel Aldridge Beattie - Chief Mr. Albert Yanak - Special Assistant Major Fred Petri - Program Analysis Officer Captain Ned Renick - Program Analysis Officer Vacant - Program Analysis Officer Lt Colonel Charlie Fallotte, Chief - Program Preparation & Audit Section Vacant - Survey Statistician Mrs F. Lasette Irvin - Administrative Assistant Mrs Helen Aldmon - Statistical Clerk Urs Sigman - Statistical Clerk Mrs Colleen McHorrow - Clerk (Typing) TOTAL AUTHORIZED SPACES Officers Airmon Civiliana Total Office of the Director 18 29 Organization Management Division 48 77 Manpower Allocations Division \_40\_ 22... 66 TOTAL 98 220 Director of Manpower & Organization, DOS/O.

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#### ORGANIZATION PIANNING BRANCH

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#### FUNCTIONS

1. Determines the organizational structure that will most effectively accomplish the mission and reduce to a minimum the qualitative and quantitative requirements for memperor by:

a. The application of sound principles of organizational management.

#### Implementation

- (1) Establish, through policies, sound organizational concepts for all USAF activities:
  - (a) Stabilization of Air Porce structure
  - (b) Standardization of schelons and nomenclature
  - (c) Standardization of staff structures
- (2) Assure that the USAF is organized along functional lines.
- (3) Prohibit the establishment of "Corps" type structures.
- (4) Provide flexibility in the USAF Organizational structure.
- (5) Stress maximum decontralization of responsibility and delogation of authority.
- (6) In the interest of economical manpower utilization to use the lowest possible Air Force organizational schelon that can effectively do the job.
- (7) Hold to a minimum the number of headquarters between operating units and major air commands.
- (8) Maintaining an appropriate balance between combat and supporting elements.

b. Developing plans to the emi that each organizational component is a logical, separable, integral part of the whole organization, having commensurate responsibility, authority and accountability.

#### Implementation

- (1) Study and continually review the organizational structure of all major USAF commands.
- (2) Study organizational structures of Army, Navy, Marino, industrial organizations and Foreign Military Services for the purpose of sceling and applying improvements to the USAF organization.
- (3) Examine the charter or missions of all types of USAF units to determine their essentiality, adoquacy and functional alignment.
- (4) Reporting USAF organizational changes to the GSA for periodic publication in the Federal Register and annual publication in the U.S. Government Organization Manual.
- (5) Preparing Organizational Charts showing Air Force organiza-
- (6) Preparation of speeches relative to Air Force organization for members of the Air Staff.

c. Deteloping organizational objectives and formulating policies partaining thereto.


#### Implementation

- (1) Preparation of an organizational objective folder cutlining the long range organizational objectives for the USAF.
- (2) Preparation of an Air Force organizational manual embodying current Air Force organization concepts, policies and criticria.
- (3) Working in close coordination with other staff sections to assure that operational commitments, personnel plans and material needs are adequately reflected in current organization.
- (4) Review and revision of designated chapters of the Eartime Flanning Factors Manual (EDI 170-3).

d. Redewing and analyzing mission directives and determining proper assignment of fractions to major organizational elements.

#### Implementation

(1) Review and analyze the mission directives of all major air commands to insure against duplication, everlapping or malassignment of functions and that the missions are accurately and clearly stated.



Opr. 5 METHODS AND PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS CONTROLLING MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION INSURING MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER RESOURCES PREPARED THE DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE DATE 12 MAY 1951

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#### INTRODUCTION

We are currently aware that one of the most vital problems to the nation and the Services is the effective utilization of our manpower resources. Since the out-set of the Korean situation we have been faced with the additional need for re-alingment of our program and its vitalization down through the first line supervisory level. We have directed our efforts toward these ends and believe we now stand at the threshold of realization of improved manpower utilization and control, both military and civilian throughout the Air Force in its global deployment.

The Directorate of Manpower and Organization is aided by participation of other air staff agencies in this program. They actively engage in supporting and participating in the formulation of the program cycle to its completion. The role of these agencies will be introduced prior to more detailed treatment of the functions of the Directorate of Manpower and Organization in its mission.

## PLANNING AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE:

The fundamental agency for the providing of program guidance is the Joint Chiefs of Staff who must initially indicat the Armed Services direction in our national objectives and agrees to the particular part that each of the three services will play. The part that the Air Force plays in the Joint Program then becomes the Air Force Objective. Based on the War Plans outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Directorate of Plans,

DCS/Operations assumes the responsibility for preparation of intermediate and long-range Air Force War Plans to meet the outlined objectives. These War Plans together with Mobilization War plans are themused as a guide by the Air Staff in establishing an Air Force structure capable of performing the mission objectives.

The basic composition of the United States Air Force in combat units only is established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These and the installations on which they will be located are the foundation on which the USAF Troop Program is developed. The combat units and the stations determine the various supporting elements and activities necessary to form balanced combat groupings. The training rates for the crew members and technicians needed to fill and main tain these units determine the number and size of the various training establishments, together with their auxiliary support. The operating rate for aircraft determines the size of our maintenance and supply establishment. The radar net and other facilities required in Air Defense require their share of personnel. Provision must be made to continue research and development. The Air Force Troop Program is the sum total of Personnel, enlisted, officer and civilian, necessary to op rate all of these separate activities.

## THE TROOP PROGRAM:

The composition of an integrated Troop Program is a coordinated progressive procedure in which all elements of the Air Staff play a part. Such reflections are apparent not only in the sound evaluation of their personnel requirements, but are also inherent in the operation of their mission programs. However, the organizational elements of the Air Staff most directly involved in the development, evaluation, control of personnel programs, and budget justification are as follows:

## a. Assistant for Programming, DCS/0:

Exercises direction over the development and preparation of Air Force programs and the analy is incident thereto to insure continued correlation of all related phases f om their initial planning bases to the resource distribution necessary to final implementation. Fixes responsibility for each phase of programming, and establishes or approves procedures for the correlation of Air Force programs. Authenticates all changes in Air Force programs and superintends the operations of a program change system. Upon completion of this phase the Directorate of Manpower and Organization determines the personnel requirement. This operation will be developed later in the report.

# b. The Directorates of Personnel Planning, Military Personnel and Training, DCS/P:

Analyzes estimates of personnel requirements, which have been developed as to total numbers, in terms of procurement, training and facility capabilities. Producing programmed personnel strength by category, by grade for mid-year and end-year positions, projected monthly gains and looses by category, man year requirements for rated versus non-rated personnel by grade, overseas total strength by area and category, and man year averages of airmen overseas by grade. The above basic data is used as a basis for preparing their operating program which consists of the Personnel Procurement Program, the Training Program, the Promotion Program, and the Morale and Welfare Program.

# c. Directorate of Civilian Personnel, DCS/P:

The operation of the civilian personnel system as an integral

part of the Air Force military-civilian team has been delegated to the local Air Force Hase Command rs, who in accordance with legal, policy and regulartory standards:

- 1. Allocate positions to appropriate grades so that employees are compensated equitably.
- 2. Appoint, assign, promote, demote and separate civilian employees.
  - 3. Operate programs which will insure:
- (a) Sound management of civilian personnel. Some of the management programs, directive or regulatory in nature, which provide for a more effective civilian work force are: Planned Assistance to Supervisors, The Fromotion Program, the Placement of Physically Handicapped Personnel, Civilian Personnel Measurement, Performance Requirements and Employment of Women.
- (b) That employees are assigned to essential jobs for which they are fitted best by aptitude and experience.
- (c) That employees are trained and supervised effectively so that an efficient work force is developed, and one is maintained in which a high degree of morale and productivity is ever present.
  - (d) The maintenance of essential employee services.
- (e) That the recognized Employee Incentive Programs, (suggestion awards, efficiency awards, superior accomplishment awards, and meritorious service awards) are familiar to all employees and carried out in the best interests of employees and management.
- (f) That the current Employee Grievance and Fair Employment Programs are familiar to all employees, so that each

employee knows what his rights and privileges are in these respects.

## d. Directorate of Budget, DCS/C

The presentation of budget estimates is a joint effort of the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, the Directorate of Personnel Planning and the Directorate of Budget. The "Call for Esti mates", issued by the Directorate of the Budget, recites the basic policies to be used in arriving at such requirements, and the required data to be included in the narrative justification in support of the estimates. The Directorate of Budget reviews the estimates prepared by the operating agencies, in the light of previous operating experience, as it relates to the proposed military and civilian personnel programs, as well as its relationship to other proposed programs, such as, the Base Utilization Program, the Construction Program, the Aircraft Procurement and Utilization Programs and the Aircraft Flying Hours Program. After collaboration with interested staff agencies, the final military and civilian personnel programs are defended before the Air Force Budget Advisory Committee, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Congress. After the enactment of appropriations, the final budget and fund projects are interpreted into, and become part of, the Troop Program.

# e. Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/0:

1. The organization basically responsible for the control and determination of personnel requirements, and for the utilization and management of personnel resources in the Department of the Air Force, is the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations.

- The Directorate organization and functions are as shown. The Organization Management Division, in general terms, is responsible for development of methods to determine the numbers of people by type and skill required for a program and to review the utilization of manpower resources. The Allocations Division, again in general terms, applies this information in terms of numbers, grade, skill and function to meet approved programmed manning requirements.
- 3. The methods of determining military and civilian manpower requirements include the use of the following management engineering tools:
  - (a) On the spot manpower management surveys.
- (b) Six types of work measurement units addressed at specific areas.

These are some of the types of work measurement used at Headquarters USAF. They are samples only, and in no way do they represent the various types used in the different functional areas and the numerous echelons. Work measurement techniques as applied in the Air Force are not a separate program, but are an integral part of each program in any local installation or functional area.

- (c) Performance Evaluation Tables to appraise the uti-
- (d) Reports Analysis -- use of statistical, cost, and inspection reports as a basis for comparison of actual operating elements.
- 4. Techniques used in promoting a more effective utiliza-

- (a) The operation of a sound Management Improvement Program utilizing the techniques of management engineering, to include the education and indoctrination of all supervisory personnel in the use of management tools.
- (b) The Employee Incentive, Employee Suggestion and Management Improvement Award Programs.
- (c) The review of current and proposed programs and directives, for manpower implications, and to assure conformance to policy and doctrine.
- (d) Comparative studies of the performance of like operations under various types of organizations.
- (e) The review of manpower utilization and management practices in other governmental agencies and private industry.
- 5. The major implementing documents to assure the best utilization and overall control of Air Force Personnel world wide are many.

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- 6. It is a directive procedure that when it is necessary to balance fluctuations in work loads, Commanders at each echelon will make adjustments within their existing personnel space allotments before requesting additional allotments from higher echelons. Low priority work loads will be eliminated or reduced and back logs will be allowed to accumulate to the greatest degree possible.
- 7. With this brief introduction, of the long and short range plan of the USAF, the organizational structures and echelons for its implementation, the clarification of objectives and broad policies as laid out in the inclosed regulations, the remaining discussion will expand in more detail, the functions of the

Directorate of Manpower and Organization, which is directly responsible for manpower management, organization, allocations, utilization and control.

Combat units, on standard Tables of Organization and Equipment, are built on a detailed analysis of the personnel required to perform a pre-determined work load imposed by the mission of the unit. The Directorate of Manpower and Organization, Headquarters USAF, controls the preparation and approves those tables after detailed analysis, to assure balance of personnel against work load, based upon our standard yardsticks. Standard yardsticks, used as a measuring device, are continually evaluated and refined to reflect advanced changes in equipment, additional mechanization, and other factors which influence the work load. For example, in a recent study the overall effectiveness of a World War II B-29 Bomb Group with all its supporting services was compared to our present B-50 Group and showed that our present group has greater combat potential with proportionately fewer personnel to operate it.

Further, the planned proportion of combat versus other functional areas is a matter of continuing study. Constant effort is exerted toward maintaining an appropriate balance between combat and supporting elements.

As you may know, our Tables of Organization and Equipment include both peace and war authorizations. The essential difference between these authorizations is that the peace column provides for what might be termed, "one shift operation", whereas the war authorization permits "around the clock and sustained operation". Our present troop program is based on an interme-

Strategic Air Command units and Air Defense units are in a readiness status which calls for an authorization approximately half way between that for peace and that for war, whereas other non-tactical and support units have to be more clearly geared to the total Defense Program and our civilian economy.

The Training, Support and Administrative establishments are allocated personnel in bulk according to the USAF Troop Program, based upon overall estimates of the work load. The Major Command, in turn, distributes this personnel authorization to its subordinate activities in accordance with their requirements, after approving the Tables of Distribution. Tables of Distribution are the same as the personnel section of a Table of Organization and Equipment. The difference lies in the procedure required to obtain their approval. After Tables of Distribution are approved by the Major Command, copies are forwarded to Hq USAF where they are reviewed and analyzed to see that they conform to established work load standards. Tables of Distribution are designed to meet the conditions imposed by balancing personnel against changing work load as the mission of an activity changes. We use the same measures of work load to build and analyze Tables of Distribution as we use for Tables of Organization, and are continually attempting to obtain greater standardization in our tables to simplify the analysis and comparison of personnel required to perform similar functions in different activities.

Headquarters, USAF, retains the power of veto on Tables of Distribution and, if necessary, adjustments are made in subsequent

personnel authorizations of the Major Comand to reflect the result of the analysis made in this Headquarters. It is emphasized that control in the allocation of manpower within the Air Force is exercised initially through personnel allocations to the Major Command and again when the distribution within the command is submitted for review.

Yardsticks and manpower standards have been mentioned as the basis on which we build our standard tables and allocate personnel. These yardsticks are based upon work measurement studies and an analysis of practical experience in the field to determine the number of people it takes to do a given task. Our original set of yardsticks were inherited from the War Department Manpower Board established during the latter stages of World War II. They have been further developed by the Air Force and modified as necessary to meet changing equipment and conditions, and are now published in the form of an Air Force Manual. We have a continuing program for their revision and expansion to assure that all functional areas are covered.

Control of manpower by Headquarters USAF does not cease with the process of allocation jusydescribed. A continuous follow-up is made on its utilization. In Headquarters USAF, this is done by analyzing various reports, the two most important of which are the Reports of Manpower Surveys made in the field, and the Cost Control Reports. The Manpower Survey Reports are analyses made of the utilization of personnel by function by the Major Commands and submitted to this Headquarters for review. The Cost Control Reports include numbers of people in addition to details of the cost of operating an activity by function. The comparison of

the number of people or cost of a particular function within the total expenditure for the activity permits an evaluation as to whether that function is in balance with the mission of the activity. In addition to the Director of Manpower and Organization, who is directly responsible for monitoring the utilization of personnel, the Inspector General includes the general subject of manpower utilization in his regular inspections and makes special studies as required.

In the Major Commands, Command Manpower Groups are established for the primary purpose of assisting the Commander in assuring himself that his manpower is properly distributed against the functions which he has to perform to get his job done. These groups are responsible for developing such special yardsticks as the command may need and for conducting a manpower survey of each activity at least once a year.

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The Air Force position with respect to the utilization of limited service personnel in uniform is that, at a time like the present, this utilization be confined to those now in service or to those who may pass into this category in the future, whose limited physical condition was incurred in the service. The extent of such utilization is dependent upon provisions of retirement rules, regulations and policies. Such people are of value to the Air Force because of their experience and acquired skills. Limited service personnel without prior service must be trained and motivated. They currently represent a problem in our Troop Program, and become more significantly an operating liability in a period of mobilization build up because of the inflexibility of utilization.

The present plan for the use of uniformed women is to have


about 40,000 by 30 June 1952. The present strength of 6000 will be expanded as rapidly as accessions can be made from voluntary enlistment.

Civilian women employed by the Air Force are considered a part of any local labor market. The proportion of their employment is dictated by the "tightness" or "looseness" of that market. As a rule civilians are employed to meet a job requirement regardless of sex. The policy of the Air Force is to encourage the employment of women whenever practical.


### SUMMARY:

In summary, the major features of the U. S. Air Force program for manpower control are:

- a. The responsibility for the control of manpower, both military and civilian is incorporated in one office.
- b. Standards are available which permit manpower to be allocated accurately a ainst the functions required to perform the Air Force task. These standards are the result of continuing studies, and are kept current as functions and work loads change.
- c. In addition to the control of manpower through the allocation process, the utilization of manpower is subject to continuing inspection and review.
- and revitalized our program toward its new problems. In this new program we are at the threshold of implementation. Our main task is to alert all personnel to the gravity of the manpower situation. As the need for emphasis shifts between the various functions which must be per o med to accomplish the Air Force mission, we




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


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
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
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
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	10 Apr 50	AMC, Middleton AFB, Pa	Lt. Col. Reynolds
C.	17 Apr 50	AMC	Lt. Col. Kelly Major Salisburg
C	21 Apr 50	ConAC	Col. Coates Col. Noceto Lt. Col. Kelly Major Rector
	15 Mar 50	Sandia and Kirtland AFB	Col. Hudson
	16 May 50	Hamilton AFB	Major Dettre
	16 May 50	ConAC	Col. Noceto Lt. Col. Kelly Major Rector
	21 Jun 50	USAFE	Col. Noceto Major Rector Lt. Col. Egge Lt. Col. Kelly
	21 Jun 50	Scott AFB	Lt. Col. Lightfoot Col. Coates Major Stern
	21 Jun 50	AMC	Mr. Coffey
C	5 Jul 50	ConAC & AU	Col. Coates Lt. Col. Reynolds
1	18 Jul 50	Scott & Lackland	Lt. Col. Lightfoot Mr. Coffey
100	31 Jul 50	AMC	Lt. Col. Coleman Major Dettre
1	8 Aug 50	USAFE	Lt. Col. Lightfoot
*	16 Aug 50	AMC	Lt. Col. Reynolds
	16 Aug 50	AMC, ATRC	Mr. Coffey
	28 Aug 50	AMC	Lt. Col. Coleman Lt. Col. Reynolds Mr. Mantell
0			
0			

### MANPOWER MANAGEMENT SURVEYS - Period Jan 50-Jan 51 TEAM HQ VISITED DATE Col. Noceto Great Falls, Montana 16 Jan 50 Lt. Col. Bower Kelly AFB, Texas Lt. Col. Hoover Col. Noceto APG, Eglin AFB, Florida Lt. Col. Kelly 6 Feb 50 Major Rector Col Hudson Andrews AFB 13 FEB 50 Col Malony Lt Col Bower Col. Coates AMC Lt. Col. Reynolds 26 Feb 50 Mr. Currier Mr. Coffey Col Coates ConAC 1 Mar 50 Col. Noceto Major Rector Col. Noceto Carswell AFB, 2 Mar 50 Major Rector Bergstrom AFB Lt. Col. Kelly Davis-Monthan AFB Kirtland AFB Lt. Col. Beebe FEAF Lt. Col. Lightfoot 5 Mar 50 Major Waugh Major Lamek Major Nickles Major Stern Scott AFB 9 Mar 50 Lt. Col. Egge Ogden Utah and 12 Mar 50 San Antonio, Texas Lt. Col. Mercereau Kirtland AFB, New Mexico 14 Mar 50 Mr. Currier Scott AFB 27 Mar 50 Lackland AFB Barksdale AFB Mr. Coffey AMC 10 Apr 50

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	U	ITS OF MEASUREMENT USED IN DE	TERMINING MANPORT	R REQUIRED	
			ECHELON OR ECHELONS		RESPONSIBILITY FUN DEVELOPMENT
TAME OR TYPE OF MEASUREMENT	DESCRIPTION	PURHORE FOR WHICH USED	OF PRIMARY USE	MEANS OF DEVELOPING  Major Commands and subordinate elements propose  Major Commands and subordinate elements proposes	DERECTORATE OF MANDOWER AND ORGANIZATION
YARDSTICK	A basic manpower standard which establishes the relationship between the work load of a specific task or function, and the personnel (quantitative and qualitative) required to accomplish it.	To provide a standard for the equitable distribu- tion or mangover resources for hardroinal activ- ties and as a beater management tool for use in checking the utilisation of personnel.	MAJOR COMMAND AND SUBORDINATE UNITS	Majur Commands and subordinate elements propose initial yardistics solited by Major Commands stall said towarded to He USAF. Sandard Strack. edited and validated. Yardeticks are currently saidstated. Spot checks are made at lief installations to validate date workloads and to reflex gardeticks. Arrange in a formal and published in Masqueer Cuide. AFM 150-1.	DCR/O, Bq. USAF
MANPOWER PLANNING TABLES		To provide a factual means for projecting and pro- gramming management requirements and as a guide to allocations. Provides a basis-for rapid compu- tation of realistic factors for use in ministration planning in Pt (50). Provides a unit for use in badget justification. I sade of the competing of	MAJOR COMMANDS Hq. USAF	A detailed program is inasqurated for each Major Command. Major Commands propose initial tables which we for eva-de to Standards Branch 16, USAF Edited by Standards Branch compared with pardatakes survey recommendations—experience data—set—Published and recorded in machine records. Spot surveys are made at field installations to variables the manufact figures.	DERECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DCS: O. Re. URAF
		the USAF mangemen requirements under varying conditions, and in the detail necessary for der va- tive acheeules such as personnel procurement, assignment, training schedules, vic		at less searconstantly refined for change in workloads	
TABLE OF ORCARIZATION	A table showing mission, organizational structure and operational capability of a standardised Air Force unit. It pre- acribes numbers, grades, specially codes and dottes of all personnel within the organization.	The T/O is the basic document for manning units designated to operate on a T/O basis. The units are largely constat in nature and are designed with a preferenteed capability of performance in combat.	MAJOR COMMANDS AND SUBCRIDINATE UNITS	Detailed analytical studies of workloads, etilization of the manpower standards contained in yardsirks and facture, conferences with find activities, and staff offices Hq. USAF, coordination with Standards Branch.	DESECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DOS/O. Ng. USAF
TABLE OF DESTRIBUTION	A table ladicating the assignment of personnel, by number, job title, specially code and grade, for each func- tion of an activity manned with jersom- nel authorised by bulk allotment.	To distribute one T/O personnel authorizations within a unit run-measurate with the workload generated by the minaton of the unit.	HQ, USAF MAJOR COMMANIS AND SURORDINATE UNITS	An analytical field study of workloads. Utilization of mangover standards, i. e., pardsticks and a comparison of mangover utilization in like units.	DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DCS/O. Sq. USAF
RATIO	The relationship which the workload of a functional or organization segment bears to a total workload	The establishment of ratios is the initial step on the development of planning tables and factors. These ratios provide a means for each ring staffing patterns of activities, areas bases, commands, functional segments and so on.	STANDARDS BRANCH, Hq. USAF	An analytical study of the manning of broad func- tional areas in relation to the volume of the work- load in specific tasks and functions.	DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DCE/O. Rq. UBAF
PACTOR	A bulk mannewer standard which trans- lates the workload of a particular segment into manpower requirements.	To facilitate the accutate complitation of man- power requirements for all Air Force programs and or motions.	HQ USAF MAJOR COMMANDS	Detailed analysis of workloads and personnel per- formance provides the prime basis for the develop- ment of factors	DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DCS: O, Hq. USAF
MAJOR SECURENTS USED IN PRESENTING MANPOWER REQUIREMENT	GT-			Manpiveer Planning Tables and Factors are the basis	DIRECTORATE OF
Functions! Segment	Any of the live broad functional areas of the Air Force Airway of the Air Force Research and Development Transling Logistics Operations	To provide the means for the quick and according computation of the many-level requirements for each broad faultinitial area.	MAJOR COMMANDS	Manpirer Planning Tables and ractive acre use means upon which functional ageneric are lased.	MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DCS O, Hq. UBAF
Dudget Regovesi	A budget calegory expressed in terms of appropriations and budget projects	To serve as a means of olicoand entimates and of jumdising personnic command in incores estimates	He USAF	The Manpower Planning Tables and Factors are the foundation upon which budget segments are based.	DESCYCRATE OF MANFORCE AND GENERATION DCS/O, Fig. USAF
Command Segment	As expression used to identify a major Air Force command, below the Headquar ters USAY terel, when it is being con- sidered as a segment of the Air Force.	To facilitate the computation of total multipoxies	No CSAF No USAF MAJOR COMMANDS	The Manpurer: Planning Tables and Factors serve as the basis for developing the Command and Wing augments.	DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DCE/O, Hq. UBAF
Wag Segreral	As exit, comprising a combat wing plus all necessary support.	To provide the means for the rapid calculation of manpower requirements for combat wings and to relate the change in the number of wings to the change in the overall also of the Air Force	Nq. USAF	See alore	DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DCE/O, Nq. USAF



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## LIST OF DIRECTIVES PERTINENT TO MANPOWER

#### DIRECTIVE NO.

AFR 20-15 AFR 20-52 AFR 20-53

AFR 20-62 AFR 20-66 AFR 24-1 AFR 35-44 AFR 35-60

AFR 150-1 AFR 150-2 AFR 150-3 AFR 150-5 AFR 171-8 AFL 121-28 AFL 150-1 AFL 150-3 AFL 150-10 AFL 150-10

AFL 160-33 HDI 11-10 HDI 14-2

AFL 150-15

HOI 150-3 HOI 150-7 HOI 150-8 HOI 150-10


HOI 150-11

HOI 170-3 AFM 150-1


### SUBJECT

Organization of Air Force Combat Wings Table of Distribution Units Standardization and Stabilization of Air Force Organization


Assignment of Department of the Air Force Units Civilian Manpower Coordination Groups Principles of Air Force Base Administration Assignment and Administration of WAF Personnel Instructions concerning the preparation of Tables of Personnel Authorization Manpower and Organization Manpower Utilization Program Operation of the Manpower Program Non-T/O&E Personnel Allotment Voucher Report of PAV Permanent Party Authorizations Status of Mission for T/O and T/D Units Manpower Utilization Program Manpower Measurement Peacetime Planning Factors Allotment of Man Hours - Commander's Guide USAF Program - Organizations, Personnel, Aircraft, Flying Hours, and Installations Air Force Medical Service Manning Guides Directives Affecting Air Force Troop Basis and/or Manpower Boards and Committees Personnel Allotments in Headquarters USAF Field Extensions of Headquarters USAF Peacetime Planning Factors USAF Program - Organizations, Personnel, Aircraft, Flying hours, and Installations Procedures and Responsibilities for Costing of Proposed Major Changes in Program Wartime Planning Factors Manual Manpower Guide



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
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#### IN RODUCTION

This report responds to assorandum for The Secretary of the
Air Force, subject: "DOD Marriers and Personnel Controls," deted
28 May 1951, from the Assistant Secretary of Defense and complements
a previous document subsitted by this Directorate on 12 May 1951,
covering the same general subject.

The major portion of the Air Force Program showing Manpower and Personnel Controls was reported on 12 May 1951. Programs presented in that document were being implemented at that time. This presentation will be a brief of the rajor additional programs and tools for mempower and personnel willication and control, plus a number that will relate the two reports to the execution of the specific points covered in paragraphs as, 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Chapter III.

- I. ADDITIONAL PROGRAM FRECUSION SINCE 12 MAY 1951.
  - 1. Additional Implementation of Management Improvement frogram.
- a. Publication of NO. NO. 150-12, 17 May 1951, which describes the assigned responsibilities and clarifies the working relationships within the Air Staff for the development and implementation of an Air Force-wide Mausgement Improvement Program. See
- b. Letter to major commanders, 23 May 1951, on the Development of Air Force-wide Vanagement Improvement Program. Tab B is an example.



Air Perce Manyour Management Training School

On A June 1991, 160 Field grade officers entered the first class of an Air Force Mappen. Tanagement Course at Caurge Technique. University, initiated by the Directorate of Manpower and Organization. Scople from this Directorate have worked jointly with masters of the University staff in both the design of the corricular and in class instruction. The course will can for a weeks. Two subsquart classes of 150 students each will follow consecutively.

Students are selected from the fields of exquery and organization, personnel estagement, conservate engineering and consequent

The addition of this welling to the program should result in greatly increased personnel tilisation and control as these people will assist in setting to adequate campower management programs in the major Air Force communic.


Mechanization of Paragood and Equipment Authorization Documents.

The Air Force has edge ed, and is now implementing, a plan to standardize and to expedite the publication of personnel and equipment authorization documents. This new method uses electrical accounting machines which improve our ability to evaluate utilization of manpower and material through a more rapid and detailed analysis of the tables. It circumvents previous time-consuming dalays in personnel and equipment actions without sacrificing any of the accuracy and control inherent in the old system. Further details are in Tab E.

These tables proving node marring stendards for solivites not organized under Tables of eigenization. They are designed for typical Air Force tables and some as a culck and sociate seems for estimating requirements, both cultitary and sivilian. At organit, part of the Air Training Section Function has been published. The tables for this common will be completed during July 1951 and should amount to approximately 15 in number. This program will proceed to other commands as first as possible. They tables also have been designed for electrical accounting machines. See Tab F for an example and more detail.

a. In item not providedly reported is the reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. A concretable from the Secretary to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management) the responsibility for civilian economies. This economidates, at the Departmental level, the responsibility for all Air Force personnel matters, civilian and military. It these together the management utilization and management proves as well as the overall Air Force personnel progress.

b. Responsibility for satisfies pertaining to civilian components has been fully integrated with corresponding Air Force-wide functions in the Air Staff. This was implemented by a letter from the Vice Chief of Staff on 13 Euroh 1951. This action is designed



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- d. The Air Forts has developed a plan to identify and felly utilize professional, scientific, and technical personnel now entering the service at indestrination centers. Based on existing requirements personnel with special skill in any field will be fully utilized in a wide range of programs essential to the realization of the Air Force mission.
- e. In connection with the Eunagement Improvement Program, it is planned to establish and prosots a policy of greater emphanis on improved personnel utilization. It is intended that this will apply to all personnel military and civilian, make and female, limited service personnel and others.
  - 8. Manpower Controls.

The Chart (Tab 0) summarizes hir Force manposer controls and gives a brist statement repending their operation in the Air Force

## II. SUMPARY OF EXECUTION

These remarks will respons directly to paragraphs in Chapter III of DOD Attachment A. References will be in the form of cross index for the purpose of bravity and colek reference from the text of both Air Force reports.

In some cases, numerous cross references can be made to existing tools, techniques, progress, etc. Only the major items will be indicated in this summary

a. (Chapter III, par. 40 1). Centralized responsibility for manpower control both military and civilian is directed through Air

Further evidence of centralized responsibility and control is categorically outlined in a chart "Manpower Controls," Tab G of 15 June report.

b. (Chapter III, per. Le 2). Standards for determining the mi is a number of people, military and civilian, needs for the forces to fight under strategic plans are estegorically outlined in a chart entitled "Units of Measurement Used in Determining Manyomer Requireds listed on Tab F in 12 May report.

o. (Chapter III, per. 4-3). A continuing procedure for beeping the use of manprear in belance with changes in plan is directed in Air Force Regulations 150-1-2-3 and Air Force Letter 150-1 listed as Tabe J. K. L. and P. respectively in 12 May report. Further currentness is assured in the Vanagement Improvement Program and its many facets, part of which is reported in this 15 June report.

d. (Chapter III, par. 40 %). A procedure for stimulating programmive improvement in the placement and use of individual skills. Some of the main features of this program are introduced in this 15 June report in Section I, par. 1a, b, c and d, par. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7. The civilian part of this program is treated in par. c, pages 3 and 4 of the 12 May report. Further procedures are inherent in the overall management displayed in the presentation made by the two reports.

HOI 150-12

HQ OFFICE INSTRUCTION ) NO. 150-12 HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, 17 MAY 1951

### PROGRAM AND MANPOWER

Development and Implementation of an Air Force Management Improvement Program

- 1. Purpose. This Instruction describes the assigned responsibilities and clarifies the working relationships within the Air Staff for the development and implementation of an Air Force-wide Management Improvement Program.
  - 2. Policy. The Air Force will accomplish its mission in the most effective and efficient manner.
- Objective. Command and management are synonymous. The improvement of management will strengthen command and expedite the accomplishment of the mission.

#### 4. Responsibilities:

a. General. Every element of the Air Staff is responsible for ascertaining that there is continuing improvement in the carrying out of each of its functions. This responsibility includes guidance within each functional area outlined below, as well as periodic appraisal of the activities involved and covers all organizations and all levels, consistent with normal command prerogatives.

#### b. Primary:

- (1) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, is responsible for giving general direction to the Air Force-wide Program.
- (2) The Director of Manpower and Organization is the operating official in the Air Staff for the development and implementation of the Air Force-wide Program.
- (3) The Secretary of the Air Staff is responsible for that portion of the Management Improvement Program that pertains to the Headquarters USAF and its field extensions.

#### c. Functional:

- (1) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, is responsible for conducting and for obtaining maximum improvement in the comptroller system, including: budgeting, accounting, progress and statistical reporting, internal auditing, and the administrative organizational structure and managerial procedures relating thereto.
- (2) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the fields of research and development, and with determining qualitative requirements.
- (3) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the field of logistics, including: procurement, production engineering, industrial resources, maintenance engineering, supply, transportation, real estate, installations planning, and construction.

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# HOI 150-12

- (4) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in all phases of management, including: plans, programs, organization, allocations, manpower utilization, management engineering, operations, unit training, communications, and intelligence.
- (5) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in all phases of personnel management, including: recruitment, individual training, career monitoring, selection, effective personnel utilization, elimination of the unfit, and standardization of personnel administration procedures.
- (6) The Air Adjutant General is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the field of administrative procedures, including: the administration of records, printing and publications, mail and postal services, and still photographic services.
- (7) The Inspector General is responsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the fields of inspection, investigation, internal security, counterintelligence, and flight safety. In evaluating the over-all state of the Air Force, through inspections, he will aid in identifying areas needing improvement.
- (8) The Surgeon General, USAF, is resonsible for obtaining maximum improvement in the fields of dental, medical, and veterinary services; operation of medical facilities, procurement and distribution of medical supplies and equipment, and administration of medical records.

#### 5. Relationships:

- a. Sound management is impossible without coordinated staff work. Coordination cannot be accomplished without teamwork. The principle of coordinated staff work through teamwork will govern the development and implementation of the Air Force Management Improvement Program.
- b. The Directorate of Mampower and Organization is the Air Staff office charged with seeing that a formalized Air Force-wide Management Improvement Program is developed and implemented. In discharging this responsibility the Directorate will work with and through representatives of those Air Staff offices charged with management improvement responsibility in the various functional fields and with the major air commands. Those Air Staff offices and major air commands are responsible for furnishing such technical or specialized advice and assistance as may be needed in the development and implementation of the program.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

NATHAN F. TWINING General, United States Air Force Vice Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

K. E. THIEBAUD Colonel, USAF Air Adjutant General

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
COLX

23 May 1951

SUBJECT: Development of Air Force-Wide Management Improvement Program


TO: Commanding General
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base, Colorado

- 1. In response to Congressional and Presidential action, the Air Force is developing a formalized Management Improvement Program. The attached copies of the law and directives on this subject are reasonably self-explanatory.
- 2. In the Air Force, Command and Management are considered as synonymous. For that reason, any improvement that a commander makes in management automatically strengthens his hand.
- 3.—The present status of management in the Air Force can be likened to that of aircraft flying in 1942. To quote the introduction to AFM 51-38, "Aircraft progressively became larger and more complex until the large bombers and transports could no longer be flown by 'feel' or by the 'seat of the pants', even in the clearest weather."
- 4. Managing the Air Force is like piloting an aircraft or any portion of it. When the job becomes as large as it is today, "managing by feel or by the seat of the pants" isn't good enough, even in the clearest weather. We must design a complete system for providing facts for the commander, just as the full-panel attitude system provides necessary facts about a plane for the pilot. Similarly, a means must be devised to assist the commander in understanding and using the system in managing his operation.
- 5. The report required by Section V of the attached directive from the Secretary of Defense, subject: "The Department of Defense Management Improvement Program", dated 20 April 1951, will be prepared from information made available to this Headquarters by existing reports. This Headquarters will not require any



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# Catagories of Haragement Indicate int The primary mission of the Villed States Air Forms as designed by the Congress and the the milest quatains these dist. Proplings To defend the United Series gainst air stinct. To gain and may air a rebrecasy. To defeat energy the for the To control dital att a cus To sonduct stra gis a s warfare. These wital functions, referred to simplest tarms of the or present as follows "To I a roy the energy's ability to wate with through aerial warfe we the the basic responsibility of the and Force to accomplish there and frictions in the most offentive mannor possible In order to gain and south in the grantest offentive sees in the primary mission the Air Formantes be extensively offerlive in the was of all of the resource required in its supporting operations It is a basto tene of the suscensed improvement propose policy statement that all support or operations musts be kept in balance be reduced to a minimum under in the specifically to the primary mission; free resources to the recomplishment of the rest Ale Porce functions Those and Punctions are the implantably operations". Every ass systation and action run be scaleated as to its contribution to he accomplishment of the priving mission The management improvement program is designed to all every indi-

signed to improve his skill in using effective and economic methods and procedures. The progress is designed to increase his skills in his management jobs whether it be in the substantive, or the support operations.

- 5. There are two categories of operations in which management improvement can be made. They are identified as follows:
  - a. The Substantive Cotegory which includes all of the resources used directly in combat operations.
  - nance, supply, training, transportation, installations, commundcations, weather phytographic and photomapping and food service. The support category includes such activities as personnel, comptroller, administration, medical, logal, safety, security, public relations and manpower management services.
- II. Existing Flements for Management Improvement in the Air Parce
  - 1. As businesses and military establishments grow in size and complexity, management operations increase in complexity. In the simple organization, the "boss" is management. However, in a complex organization such as the Air Force, the Commander needs assistance. The management program assures him of that assistance. It provides for increasing effectiveness in all his operations.
  - 2. Five existing emjor elements for management improvement will be the basis for improved effectiveness. These five major elements within the Air Force are listed in order of their patential for increased economy as follows:

- manders, and military and civilian supervisors. They are supervisors of units, sections, branches and divisions in both line and staff operations. They serve the commanders by improving economy of operation in the offices, shops and ware houses.
- b. The Staff includes the deputy chiefs of staff and directors of special technical and professional organisational segments. The staff serves the commander and the command chain by developing operations and procedures, cost control and snalysis systems, budget and fiscal systems, personnel and career programs, supply and maintenance techniques and procedures, administrative procedures and medical programs
- time management specialists in organizational segments such as management central groups in supply, production control groups in supply, production control groups in maintenance, notheds and procedure groups in administration, organization and methods groups in comptroller, policy planning and programming groups in personnel and management groups in transportation. They serve the commander and the command line by applying management principles and techniques within their functional areas. They are management engineering technicians who operate management improvement program. They participate in its development.
- d. The Staff Management Engineers concerned with the development and

direction of the overall management program. They integrate the various management activities of the Air Force into the program as a whole. They serve the commander and the command line by developing policies, programs, standardized surveys and audits. They develop management tools and techniques.

Management Consultant Services include management technicians from private consultant Services include management technical services serve the commander, the command line and the staff by bringles objectivity and technical knowledge to bear on major problems of management. They work on problems which are considered beyond the capabilities of the management familities of the Air Force.

The Management Committee: Commanding officers often find
that a management committee serves extensively in solving sz
integrating management problems. The management committee's
value is recognized even though it has not been listed as one
of the five major elements for management improvement.

### III. Hanagement Program Scope and Limitations

A management program can be considered in such a broad scope that it includes every development in the Air Force. Considered from another point of view, the program might be made up of dozene of asparate managements. They might be records management, fiscal management, personnel management, building management, management, office management and many others. The program might be considered as a series of systems; ocet control systems, career systems, work measurement systems and manpower systems.

The effective utilization of all resources, personnel, meterial pleaning, organizing, directing, controlling and coordinating The application of the injor management principles; principles of organization, principles of motion aconomy, principles of training and communication and foundations of amployee re-The wide use of process admigrant techniques and procedures The evaluation and integration of systems and techniques developed for Air Force use by staff and operational unite in relation to the belanced functions concept The effective utilization of existing facilities, supplies and equipment, including new developments and the use of jigo fixtures and adjustments to existing familities The scope of the Management Improvement Program will not include Development of new airclance, instruments and other squip-

- b. Construction of bases and buildings.
- c. Research and development projects and activities.
- d. Hethods and procedures relating to the application of skills of a technical or professional nature such as operations in the medical service, treatment of disease, tactical methods, flying formations, intelligence procedures, bond handling procedures and demolition techniques.
- 5. The Management Improvement Program will become operational through management engineering services to the commander, the command line and the staff. Management engineering services are defined as follows:

Management engineering is the application of scientific management principles and techniques at all schelons of command. It includes systematic appraisal and improvement of organisational structures; functional delineations, administrative, staff and operational procedures, work flow, scheduling and the use of time and space. It is concerned with mission performance and effectiveness, planning and programming effectiveness, and the progress and evaluation of specific programs and projects. Management engineering includes review and analysis of manpower utilization, material utilization, reporting, records and filing systems, management control devices, staff coordination, communications and employee morals.

6. As a supplement to defining and limiting the scope of the management program, the following quotations have been extracted from

Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Havy, Air Force, Subject: "Management Engineering Functions and Organization", 5 October 1950, signed by the Secretary of Defense.

"It is recognised that improvement in management is an integral responsibility of command. However, commanders can be
assisted materially in this respect by staff management engineers
"MANAGEMENT ENGLATING MERCIAL PROTECTIONS

- Fa. Planning programs to include named anent.
- "b. Coordinating such progress in order to assure the use of the best procedures epocapriate to local situations and consistent with general college.
- functions; coordinating proposed changes in organization to prevent distortion, overlap of responsibility, or conflict or gap in authority; reviewing organization plans for adherence to established nonenclature, forms and precentation processes; advising and assisting the working staffs at comment levels in implementation.
- "d. Developing guides on makers of organization, procedures and methods.
- materials, and facilities (i.e., work simplification, work measurement, etc.) including the development of criteria and techniques of procedure for measuring workload, determining personnel and sinffing requirement, and appraising performance.

- Assuring that areas are available and utilized to combut analyses to identify areas of exceptionally good management, ment, as well as areas where management improvement is indicated.
- to determine whether adequate management controls are in initiating staff action when existing controls are in adequate; devicing sethods and systems of adequate management controls; and analysing the reports developed through controls for presentation periodically to top camagement on the status of management projects or programs.
- Tetablishing task forces or coordinating management surroys where need it to analyze specific management problems and to recommend concrete action to correct management deficiencies.
- "i. Performing other functions related to assagement impratement as may be required."
- Resid statements of policy with explanations for the Air Force
  Penagement Improvement Program follow in the next section of this
  document. They are designed to
  - a. Place increasing employees on the development of management knowledges and skills in all management personnel. The result will show to improved effectiveness in accomplishing the primary mission of the Air Force and in all of the supporting functions to the primary mission.
  - b. Be used as a basic frame of reference in developing the details of the Management Improvement Program.

## - STATIMENT OF AIR FORCE HAMAGINENT IMPROVEMENT POLICY:

- .1. Management Improvement Will be Mased on the Concept of Balanced Functions.
- Management Improvement is a Frimery Responsibility of the Commander and the Command Line.
- Management Improvement is a Easic Responsibility of the Staff of the Commander.
- Management Improvement is a Major Support Responsibility of Functional and Staff Management Technicians.
- 5. The Management Improvement Program Will Incorporate Technical and Scientific Advancements into Air Force Operations.

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### STATISHING OF PAUCHHEIT INFRINDER! FOLIOT

### WITH COMMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS

Management improvement will be based on the concept of balanced functions

### COMMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS

- e. Inherent in this policy is the need to belance cost in resources for programs, systems, and procedures in terms of the demands for those same resources for other operations.
- b. It is possible to over-commit resources for support and services; resources which are required for primary operations and missions. By accepting a pareer program, a proficiency testing program, a cost control system an additional statistical report, a series of new forms ON A ONE AT A TIME BASIS, it is possible to impose resources demand on the basis operations that are much such more than the traffic will stand. Without control by a balanced functions policy, it is possible to load the Air Force with labyrinth procedures and masses of experts which divert resources basic to the primary mission. What does it cost? Bow much does it contribute? On what other operations does it make demands for resources?
- ing to do the infinitesical when resources for accomplishments of regulated are required in princry operations. This

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personnel have, to exaggerate the value of their service or system; to promote their program to the extent that the balance of functions is upset, in order to maintain the relative value of one operation in the Air Force as compared with another function.

2 Hanagement Improvement is a Primary Responsibility of the Commander and the Command Line

### COMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS:

- a. This policy supports the concept that "management is something that a commander does, not what is done to him". The policy supports the concept that management is not a program superimposed on the command line, but is accomplished primarily by command personnel. The command line, in assence, is management in the Air Force. Command and management are synonymous
- b. This policy requires, since the responsibility and greatest potential for management lies in the command line; that a management program will be designed to enhance the management skills and capabilities of command line personnel
- management exist in the personnel of the command line. It implies that management duties and tasks are major elements of each supervisor's job description.
- d. This policy implies that the Air Force will provide to a comparable degree the effort, the energy and the facilities

to develop enongerest and leadership skills and knowledges in the command line; such as it new provides for the development of technical skills in its personnel.

- e. This policy implies that as skills, knowledges and attitudes are developed to the command line, systems, reports techniques and controls with their administrative openhexities and resources requirements will be reduced to a minimum.
- f. This policy implies the the "grass roots" approach to permuency in effective esnagement is dependent on efficiency in the thousands of offices, shops and warehouses. It is these millions of little inefficiencies that constitute the greatest irain on Air Force resources.
- Management Improvement is a Samic Responsibility of the Staff of the Jammander.

### COMMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS.

- a. The import of this policy is that as the complexity of an organization increases, it becomes more and more necessary for the commands and the command line to be assisted by the staff. The staff serves the commander by providing guides, policies, systems and providing guides, policies, systems and providing guides.
- to avoid administrative complexities and reporting monstresities.

  This policy implies that the staff will not propose static systems with mandatory requirements for use in dynamic, changing situations. Systems, controls and reports, which because of

their impact on manpower and resources available to the command line, often cannibalize the economies they are designed to effect.

- o. This policy implies a responsibility through the management program to enhance the abilities of the staff to apply the principles and techniques of management.
- d. This policy implies that staff agencies have, within their own organisational unite, a direct line responsibility for economy of operation.
- This policy implies a requirement for integration and coordination of the programs and systems through the management program into a balanced management system.
- 4 Hanagement Improvement is a Major Support Responsibility of Functional and Staff Management Engineering Technicians COMMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS:
  - a. Functional management engineering technicians are both physically and technically close to the command line and to the shops, offices and warehouses. They have "inside knowledge" so that management technique can be custom-built to the conditions and situations under which work is done. They know the peculiarities of the local situation such as variations in weather, the quality of the personnel, the building space available, the condition of the buildings, the condition of the buildings, the condition of the buildings. They have the advantage of technical knowledge in the areas of their

work. These functional management engineering technicians

Staff nanagement suglessed as the nanagement improvement program
Staff nanagement suglessed to technicians are concerned with
developing the policies, programs and nanagement tools for
the by the semment line and the functional management technicians. They are concerned with evaluation and reporting
of management improvement outsivities.

This policy of functional and staff management engineering services as a unjor support responsibility:

- (1) implies that amagement improvement surveys and suffits
  will be done extensively by functional management techminima. It implies that an extensive portion of the
  manpower requirement to affect improvements is in the
  functional staff. This policy minimizes dual responsibility and resistance the commander's prerogative.
- (2) Implies a responsibility through the management program to enhance the careement engineering skills and abilities of the functional specialists.
- (3) Implies a limitation to the numbers of staff management technicisms which can be superimposed on and operate externally to the command line.

This policy would not exclude expert aid and staff sirios on canagement engineering techniques and procedures from staff nanagement technicians or from contractual management engineering firms. This expert aid and staff advice will give objectivity

to and insure the inclusion of the most recent developments in the science of management engineering into Air Force operations

- This policy of functional and staff management engineering werees as a major support responsibility:
- (1) Implies staff immagement engineering technicians will develop policies, programs, management tools and techniques.
- will provide integration and synchronization of Air Force management improvement activities into a coordinated program. This is in contrast to centering responsibility for management in a single hierarchy of organizational units. This concept implies that the policy, authority, program, the tools, the coordination and the integration will be provided, but the responsibility for the operation of the program will rest in the command line and the functional management technicians.
- 3) Implies that the management improvement progres will be designed to calance the management engineering skills of the staff management technicians.
- 5. The Panagement Improvement Frogram will Integrate Technical and Scientific Advancements Into Air Force Operations.

### CONCLETS AND EXPLANATIONS:-

- This policy implies a limited but purposeful use of contractual

management consultant services. Air Force management surveys, audits and research projects. All of these will be closely coordinated. This is in contrast to a series of unrelated or uncoordinated inspections, audits, contractual consultant projects and their resultant impact on Air Force resources and normic

This policy prohibits the establishment of a large pool of canagement technicians external to the sommand line. Its basis is the team concept. The policy provides for the pershalling of needed personnel in numbers and combinations of skills required for a specific well-defined and planned management program. These technicians would come from aviation engineering, comptroller, operations, personnel and other appropriate organisational and staff units. This policy will insure that major management recommendations resulting from curreys and studies will be made in terms of "inside" knowledge of the Air Force; a thorough knowledge of its organizational structure, its mission, its customs and traditions. Each management project would consider the inter-relation and spect of each management proposal on other Air Force units This policy will permit coreful planning, careful analysis and survey techniques, thorough weighing and determining of lines of action. Above all this policy will permit the "phasing in" of recommended and approved management adjust-

direct contrast to the "crash type" management projects that are necessary with outside management engineering projects.

Projects which require, because of dollar and time limits, rush planning, rush survey, rush analysis, rush decision and rush action or implementation.

It is understood that refinements to the policies, and the concepts and explanations of them will be a continuous process.

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# THE AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM AIMS FOR IN EFFECTIVENESS ON ALL FRONTS

EXISTING ELEMENTS FOR MANAGEMENT

-THE COMMAND LINE-

-THE STAFF-

OPERATIONS
PERSONNEL
MATERIAL
COMPTROLLER
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
INSPECTOR
MEDICAL-LEGAL
ADJUTANT

HQS. COMMAND BASE AND WING LEVEL

LEVELS

ALL LEVELS

-FUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT-- ENGINEERING SERVICES-

CONCERNED WITH MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT IN FUNCTION FIELDS SUPPLY MAINTENANCE, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS, MEDICAL, ETC.

COMMAND AND BASE LEVEL

IT IS THROUGH POSITIVE ACTION THE APPROACHES AND ACTIONS ON EACH EXISTING ELEMENT FOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT THAT INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS IS GAINED IN EACH AREA.

IT IS THE LOSS THROUGH THESE MILLIONS OF LITTLE INEFFICIENCIES THAT CONSTITUTE THE GREATEST DRAIN ON THE RESOURCES OF THE AIR FORCE.

ECONOMIES WHICH RESULT FROM STANDARDIZED OPERATING PRO-CEDURES, BUDGET AND MANPOWER STANDARDS, PERSONNEL MANAGE-MENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES, INSPECTIONS, COST CONTROL SYSTEMS, AND CAREER SYSTEMS,

EFFICIENCIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM CLARIFICATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN UNITS, SECTIONS AND DIVISIONS. EFFICIENCIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM WORK FLOW PROCESSES AND FACILITY LAYOUT TECHNIQUES, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS WILL BE LOWERED BY IMPROVED METHODS AND WORK STANDARDS,

IT IS THROUGH THE STAFF MANAGEMENT TECHNICIANS, SERVICE TO THE COMMAND LINE AND STAFF THAT HUNDREDS OF MAJOR ECONOMIES WILL BE EFFECTED IN THE AIR FORCE,

EFFICIENCIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, ECONOMIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM STANDARDIZED WORK MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES, UNIFORM AUDIT AND SURVEY SYSTEMS,

-ENGINEERING SERVICES-

CONCERNED WITH THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

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CONTRACTUAL MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT SERVICES  ANY LEVEL WHERE PROBLEM EXISTS  WILL BE EFFECTED,  PROBLEMS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF THE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO AIR FORCE MODERN MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO AIR FORCE  -NOT JUST A COMPOSITE BUT AN ADVANCEMENT—						-
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# ORCE MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM AIMS FOR INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS ON ALL **FRONTS**

-AREAS OF EFFECTIVENESS

IT IS THROUGH POSITIVE ACTION THE APPROACHES AND ACTIONS ON EACH EXISTING ELEMENT FOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT THAT INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS IS GAINED IN EACH AREA.

IT IS THE LOSS THROUGH THESE MILLIONS OF LITTLE INEFFICIENCIES THAT CONSTITUTE THE GREATEST DRAIN ON THE RESOURCES OF THE AIR FORCE,

IT IS THROUGH THE STAFF SERVICE TO THE COMMANDER THAT BASIC ECONOMIES IN RESOURCES WILL BE REALIZED BY THE AIR FORCES.

ECONOMIES WHICH RESULT FROM STANDARDIZED OPERATING PRO-CEDURES, BUDGET AND MANPOWER STANDARDS, PERSONNEL MANAGE-MENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES, INSPECTIONS, COST CONTROL SYSTEMS, AND CAREER SYSTEMS,

IT IS THROUGH THE FUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TECHNICIANS' SERVICE TO THE COMMAND LINE AND STAFF THAT THOUSANDS OF IMPORTANT ECONOMIES WILL BE REALIZED BY THE AIR FORCE,

EFFICIENCIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM CLARIFICATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN UNITS, SECTIONS AND DIVISIONS, EFFICIENCIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM WORK FLOW PROCESSES AND FACILITY LAYOUT TECHNIQUES, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS WILL BE LOWERED BY IMPROVED METHODS AND WORK STANDARDS,

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EFFICIENCIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, ECONOMIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM STANDARDIZED WORK MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES, UNIFORM AUDIT AND SURVEY

\* APPROACHES AND ACTION ITEMS

- SYSTEMATIC INDOCTRINATION OF ALL ECHELONS OF MANAGEMENT. PROVIDE MANPOWER MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTION IN AIR WAR COLLEGE, COMMAND AND STAFF SCHOOL TECHNICAL COURSE FOR OFFICERS, ROTC AND RESERVE OFFICER
- 3. ESTABLISH A MILITARY MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR COMMAND LINE OFFICERS AT THE

- AR UNIVERSITY.

  4. EXTEND THE SUPPORT FOR AND CONDUCT OF THE BASIC AND PRIMARY MANAGEMENT COURSE AT BASE LEVEL.

  5. PROGRAM FOR QUALIFYING BASE LEVEL MANAGEMENT COURSE INSTRUCTORS.

  6. PROVIDE FOR EXTENSIVE APPLICATION OF MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES IN DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS.

1. INTEGRATE STAFF TECHNIQUES AND SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED INTO THE OVERALL

INTEGRATE STAFF TECHNIQUES AND SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED INTO THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.
 RELATE ALL DEVELOPMENT OF STAFF INTO THE CONCEPT OF BALANCED FUNCTIONS INDOCTRINATE STAFF OFFICERS IN THE POLICY, PROGRAM AND SYSTEMS RELATED TO THE MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.
 PROVIDE FOR ADJUSTMENT OF EXISTING STAFF REPORTS TO PROVIDE DATA TRANSLATEABLE TO MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRESS AND REPORTS.
 ASSIST IN FORMULATING EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES WITHIN THE STAFF UNIT OPERATIONS.

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF MANPOWER MANAGEMENT OFFICER MOS. (APPLICABLE TO BOTH FUNCTIONAL AND STAFF MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TECHNICIANS.)
2. ACTIVATE TRAINING AT LOWRY AFB FOR QUALIFYING AIRMEN WITHIN THE FOLLOWING AFSCS—80100, 80270, 80130, AND 80230,
3. PROVIDE FOR ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS TRAINED IN CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS IN MANAGEMENT COURSES TO OPERATIONAL TECHNICIANS GROUPS.
4. INCREASE BOTH TECHNICIAL AND MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING SKILLS OF PERSONNEL IN THESE GROUPS—6 TO 8 HUNDRED IN SPECIAL STAFF SCHOOL IN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT.

MANAGEMENT,
THREE CONFERENCES OF COMMAND-WIDE REPRESENTATIVE GROUPS—1951 TO
JUNE 1952.
PROVIDE THESE GROUPS WITH BASIC MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT POLICY, PROGRAMS
AND SPECIFIC ION ALL FRONTS) PROJECTS.
FURNISH PRACTICAL AUDIT AND SURVEY TECHNIQUES—WORK MEASUREMENT
SYSTEMS, ETC., PROM COMMAND LEVEL.

- 1. DEVELOP MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAM.
  2. DEVELOP MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES AND SYSTEMS: MANPOWER UTILIZATION AND MANAGEMENT AUDITS, SURVEYS, AND EVALUATIONSSTATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT AND MANAPOWER TENDS.
  3. ANALYZE AND EVALUATE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF ANALYZE AND CONDUCT CIVILIAN UNIVERSITY COURSE TO TRAIN 4 TO 8 HUNDRED MANAGEMENT ENGINEERS.
  5. CONDUCT 3 AIR FORCE-WIDE CONFERENCES FOR STAFF MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TECHNICIANS—1951 TO JUNE 1952.
  6. ISOCATE AND ESTABLISH SERIES OF SHORT AND LONG-RANGE PROJECTS WITH PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT, ACCOMPLISHMENT AND EVALUATION,
  7. DEVELOP DIRECTIVES, MANUALS AND GUIDES FOR USE IN MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES.

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TRAINING, ESTABLISH A MILITARY MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR COMMAND LINE OFFICERS AT THE AIR UNIVERSITY,
AIR UNIVERSITY,
EXTEND THE SUPPORT FOR AND CONDUCT OF THE BASIC AND PRIMARY MANAGEMENT
COURSE AT BASE LEVEL.
PROGRAM FOR GUALIFYING BASE LEVEL MANAGEMENT COURSE INSTRUCTORS,
PROVIDE FOR EXTENSIVE APPLICATION OF MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES
IN DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS, LEVELS INTEGRATE STAFF TECHNIQUES AND SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED INTO THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.

2. RELATE ALL DEVELOPMENT OF STAFF INTO THE CONCEPT OF BALANCED FUNCTIONS.

3. INDOCTRINATE STAFF OFFICERS IN THE POLICY, PROGRAM AND SYSTEMS RELATED TO THE MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.

4. PROVIDE FOR ADJUSTMENT OF EXISTING STAFF REPORTS TO PROVIDE DATA TRANSLATEABLE TO MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRESS AND REPORTS.

5. ASSIST IN FORMULATING EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES WITHIN THE STAFF LAND. SE AND WING LEVEL 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF MANPOWER MANAGEMENT OFFICER MOS. (APPLICABLE TO BOTH FUNCTIONAL AND STAFF MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TECHNICIANS.)
2. ACTIVATE TRAINING AT LOWRY AFB FOR QUALIFYING AIRMEN WITHIN THE FOLLOWING AFS 65—8010. 8020, 80176, 80276, 80130, AND 80230.
3. PROVIDE FOR ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS TRAINED IN CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS IN MANAGEMENT COURSES TO OPERATIONAL TECHNICIANS GROUPS.
4. INCREASE BOTH TECHNICIAL AND MANGEMENT ENGINEERING SKILLS OF PERSONNEL IN THESE GROUPS—TO 8 HUNGHED IN SPECIAL STAFF SCHOOL IN MANNOWER MANAGEMENT.
5. THREE CONFERENCES OF COMMAND—WIDE REPRESENTATIVE GROUPS—1951 TO JUNE 1952.
6. PROVIDE THESE GROUPS WITH BASIC MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT POLICY, PROGRAMS AND SPECIFIC ON ALL FRONTS) PROJECTS.
6. FURNISH PRACTICAL AUDIT AND SURVEY TECHNIQUES—WORK MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS, ETC., FROM COMMAND LEVEL. BASE LEVEL EFFICIENCIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM CLARIFICATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN UNITS, SECTIONS AND DIVISIONS, EFFICIENCIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM WORK FLOW PROCESSES AND FACILITY LAYOUT TECHNIQUES, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS WILL BE LOWERED BY IMPROVED METHODS AND WORK STANDARDS, 1. DEVELOP MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAM.
2. DEVELOP MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES AND SYSTEMS: MANPOWER UTILIZATION AND MANAGEMENT AUDITS, SURVEYS, AND EVALUATIONSSTATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT AND MANPOWER TRENDS.
3. ANALYZE AND EVALUATE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS
4. ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT CIVILIAN UNIVERSITY COURSE TO TRAIN 4 TO 6 HUNDRED MANPOWER MANAGEMENT ENGINEERS,
5. CONDUCT 3 AIR FORCE—MIDE CONFERENCES FOR STAFF MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TECHNICIANS—1931 TO JUNE 1952.
6. ISOLATE AND ESTABLISH SERIES OF SHORT AND LONG—RANGE PROJECTS WITH PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT, ACCOMPLISHMENT AND EVALUATION,
7. DEVELOP DIRECTIVES, MANUALS AND GUIDES FOR USE IN MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES. IT IS THROUGH THE STAFF MANAGEMENT TECHNICIANS, SERVICE TO THE COMMAND LINE AND STAFF THAT HUNDREDS OF MAJOR ECONOMIES WILL BE EFFECTED IN THE AIR FORCE, AND LEVEL EFFICIENCIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, ECONOMIES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM STANDARDIZED WORK MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES, UNIFORM AUDIT AND SURVEY PROBLEM EXISTS PROBLEMS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF THE MANAGEMENT RESOURCES WITHIN THE AIR FORCE. MODERN MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO AIR FORCE OPERATIONS. -NOT JUST A COMPOSITE BUT AN ADVANCEMENT-

EL O III

#### MECHANIZATION OF

### PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENTS

The Air Force has adopted, and is now implementing, a plan to expedite the publication of personnel and equipment authorization documents. The purpose of this brief is to place informal advance information regarding that plan in the hands of those who will be most concerned with its application in the field.

The basic problem was to determine a more expeditious way of compiling, coordinating, and publishing Tables of Organization and Equipment without sacrificing any phase of the planning, research, and analysis upon which we depend for accurate and appropriate authorizations. It was found that some of the time-consuming details could be shortened, or even eliminated, by revising methods used for many years by Headquarters, USAF.

The study and solution of the problem evolved into four inter-related projects, which will be discussed separately.

### PART I - MECHANIZATION OF TABLES OF ORGANIZATION

Because of the widely separated channels through which personnel and equipment requirements are determined, the Table of Organization and Equipment will be divided and the T/O will be published as a separate entity. When the organization, composition, and personnel requirements for a standard unit are determined, coordinated, and approved, the data will be coded for transfer to IBM punched cards. With newly-procured statistical machines, it is now possible to reproduce the entire document, including Section I - General, and the Organizational Chart (except boxes and command lines) from a dack of punched cards.

The Director of Manpower and Organization has the responsibility of determining requirements for changes, revisions, or new Tables of Organization. He will forward necessary coded information to the Director of Statistical Services, who will insure that appropriate cards are punched and substituted in the deck to keep each document up-to-date at all times. Changes to a T/O, therefore, will reach the affected organization, not as a separate document that must be stripped or pencilled into the basic document, but as a completely revised T/O to be substituted for the old. The superseded document will be discarded and, although the T/O number on the new one will be the same, it may be identified by the new date. Reference to AFR 5-2 will reveal the current date of any T/O.

The format of the tables will be essentially that used for T/O&E's recently published. Vertical columns will divide the various grades of officers and airmen for rapid computation, obviating the former method of providing a separate line for each grade within an SSN or AFSC. Because of space limitations, the remarks column will contain only a code, and the referenced remarks will be fully written at the end of the table.

For simplicity's sake, and to preclude frequent publication of documents in response to changes in war plans, except when units are organized at war strength, the peace and war versions of each Table of Organization will be published as separate documents. It is well-known that the war tables will change more rapidly and more often than the relatively static peace authorizations of personnel. Each table will carry the same number, with appropriate suffix, as T/O 1-1234P and T/O 1-1234W.

When emergencies arise that require the immediate activation or reorganization of a unit under a newly-revised or changed Table of Organization, it

will be possible to send out a carbon copy of the statistical machine listing for organization and reporting purposes. It is doubtful, however, that such unorthodox procedure will often apply, since the printing will be accomplished by the photo-offset method, using the same machine listing as the master copy. Thus, printing of an average-sized document, if given highest priority, will require about 48 hours after determination of the requirement.

In lieu of Persennel Modification Lists, a unit may receive a completely revised persennel listing, incorporating the desired modifications. There will be no need to add or delete persennel indicated in the basic T/O, because the new listing will be, in effect, a new T/O with a limited application to a specific unit. Tables of Organization so modified will be identified by an alphabetical suffix to the table number, progressing as additional modifications are made. Example: T/O 1-1234P-A, T/O 1-1234P-B, T/O 1-1234P-C.

### PART II - MECHANIZATION OF TABLES OF DISTRIBUTION

The present manual method of preparing T/D's and T/D-A's will also be mechanized. Procedures outlining the conversion from the manual to machine method are now being prepared, and will be distributed to the Commands in the near future.

The format for  $T/D^2s$  will be identical to that of the T/O, except that one additional column will be added for the civilian authorizations.

The same functions and codes used in preparing the T/O will be utilized in preparation of the T/D's and T/D-A's. A listing of these codes will be distributed to the Commands.

Using a conversion worksheet similar to that used for T/O's, the present T/D's and T/D-A's will be rapidly converted to IBM key punch cards, which will

be assembled in decks that reflect the authorized strength and composition of the non-T/O organizations. One deck of cards will be forwarded to Hq USAF, and a duplicate deck will remain at the Command. From the deck retained by the Command, authorization tables will be produced on a standard format by Statistical Services. Cards forwarded to Hq USAF will be used for detailed analysis of organization strength and composition, and, when distribution cannot be more economically accomplished by the Commands, for the preparation of tables for use in Hq USAF offices. This method eliminates the necessity of typing T/D's and T/D-A's in the using activities of major Commands.

Changes to T/D's and T/D-A's can be accomplished rapidly under this system.

New tables will be prepared when changes occur. However, the effort involved to accomplish revision will be minimized, inasmuch as the cards for unchanged lines of the original table will be automatically reused. It will be necessary only for the agency initiating the change to advise the appropriate Command Statistical Services of the line items which are to be changed. Cards will then be substituted in the master decks and new tables produced by Statistical Services.

Benefits of the mechanization program include:

- A more rapid and accurate method of preparing personnel authorization documents for utilization by the field commanders.
- Rapid analyses of personnel authorizations and skills, by function, in units of the numbered Air Forces and major Commands.
- Establishment of more accurate individual training quotas, to guarantee a source of skilled manpower to meet programmed requirements.
- 4. Better distribution of skills and personnel resources available within major Commands.
- Greater stability of organizations.
- 6. More accurate programming data to support budget estimates.
- 7. Information for by-product statistical reports.

PART III - ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MASTER EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZATION LIST

As a result of the above-referenced division of the Table of Organization and Equipment, the equipment portion will no longer be published simultaneously. Instead, equipment authorizations for all units organized in accordance with T/O's will be consolidated in one document, entitled: "The Master Equipment Authorization List". It will include organizational, individual, and contingent items of equipment, with appropriate bases of issue to organizations, AFSO's, individuals, and items, etc., as applicable.

One of the primary purposes of the establishment of the Master Equipment Authorization List method of equipment authorization is to relieve unit supply officers and base supply officers of the requirement for maintaining a large library from which T/O&E equipment authorizations can be determined. Another purpose is the reduction in the cost of publication of T/O&E's and the elimination of duplication of equipment listings in the T/O&E and Unit Property Record and Equipment List (UPREL). Salient features of the new equipment authorization method, insofar as using agencies are concerned, are outlined below:

Equipment Component Lists: In order to permit the inclusion of Equipment Component Lists (ECL's), formerly 00-30 Series Technical Orders (T.O.'s), in the authorization system, it has been necessary to remove them from the Maintenance Controlled Technical Order System. This has resulted in the change of the title to Equipment Component Lists. The purpose of these documents is the same as the old 00-30 Series T.O.'s. Of interest is the recent decision to include USAF non-recoverable and Dept of the Army expendable items in the ECL's for pre-packing and reference purposes. No reference will be made therein

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to quantities of mon-recoverable items authorized, and no requirement for the inclusion of the recommended items in kits and sets is established. These listings will be used as guides in the preparation of complete kits and sets for everseas shipment with units or individuals and in the pre-packing of kits or sats for issue. ECL's will, in the near future, be set up on This punch cards. Printed copies of ECL's for Air Force-wide reference and T/A use distribution will be provided from IBM-run master copies. Applicable ECL's will be included in the Unit Property Record and Equipment Authorization List (UPREAL) of each unit, itemized directly from the IBM punch card dacks. This method will permit the immediate correction of the master decks and the subsequent inclusion of the corrected items in all ECL's appended to UPREAL's, as recurring publication of the UPREAL's takes place. This will eliminate the 00-30-1A Series, "Kits and Sets of Equipment, Quarterly Summary of Changes in the 00-30 Series Technical Orders." In conjunction with the establishment of the ECL system, is a provision for the annual revision of all ECL's on each anniversary of the publication date. Units in the field and major Commands will be primarily responsible for the maintenance within the USAF system of accurate and up-to-date ECL's. Further information on the entire ECL field will be provided the major Commands and using agencies in the immediate future through the publication of ECL 00-20-1, "General Previsions of the Equipment Component Lists System," and the publication of a 5-Series Regulation by Headquarters, USAF, covering the entire area of authorization documents.

2. Unit Property Record and Equipment Authorization List: As indicated, this is simply a change in designation of the current Unit Property
Record and Equipment List, to add the function of equipment authorization.
This additional function is in lieu of the equipment authorization heretofers

made by the T/O&E. The UPREAL will be prepared by Statistical Barvices Divisies, Hq AMC, from a Master Equipment Authorization List provided to them by Hq USAF. At the outset, and effective 1 July 1951, the Master Equipment Authorization List will reflect virtually unchanged equipment authorizations as conceined in current USAF T/ORE's. The initial transition should do me more than correct equipment authorizations, when such corrections have previously been approved by Hq USAF, and make sinor changes in the placement, within Technical Service, of certain items of equipment currently being transferred from Dept of the army to USAF stock lists. Future plans for the MEAL include review of equipment authorizations to eliminate duplications of issues; authorizations of little-used or luxury-type equipment; and to trans for from UEE, Base Support and/or Field Support columns, equipment which currently is erreneously classified in these three categories. Of particular importance to units in the field is the method of effecting changes to the UFREAL's. Upon determination of a requirement for a particular piece of equipment, which is not currently authorized in the UPREAL, the fellowing steps will be taken:

a. Using USAF Form 25, the unit will initiate to Headquarters USAF through Command channels to include AMC, a request for the addition of the required equipment with a complete and therough justification therefor.

b. As the request progresses through Command channels, each Gommand is expected to make a thorough investigation of the requirement and to appead thereto a sincere and straight-forward recommendation concerning the addition of the equipment to the UPREAL, and to indicate overall requirement for the equipment in like units within the Command. Where progressive review of the stated requirement indicates a doubt as to the actual requirement, any

echelon in the approval channel may return the recommendation, except Hq. AMC. Upon receipt in Hq AMC, the change request will go directly to the Statistical Services Division, where a thorough review will be made to determine whether or not the non-authorization of the equipment was due to an error on the part of the Statistical Services Division in interpreting from the Master Equipment Authorization List to the UPREAL. If such an error is found to be the cause for non-authorization, Statistical Services Division AMC, will reply directly to the unit and instruct them to make a "hand" addi tion to the UPREAL, pending its formal correction upon republication at the next recurrent publication date. If, however, it is determined that the nonauthorization is due to lack of proper authorization in the MEAL, Statistical Services Division will transfer the USAF Form 25 to the Equipment Allowance Office at AMC. Recommendations concerning the requirement will be made, and the request will be forwarded to Hq USAF. Upon receipt in Hq USAF, the paper will again be further reviewed for requirements as justified by the Form 25 and subsequent comments, and if it is determined that a valid requirement exists, the MEAL will be corrected to reflect the appropriate authorizations Periodically, corrected pages to the MEAL will be forwarded to Statistical Services Division, AMC, with indication of changes made. Upon receipt of such change, Statistical Services Division, AMC, will completely re-run the UPREAL, where changes are of great magnitude, or will, by letter, instruct the requesting unit to make necessary "hand" changes to their UPREAL. Pro cedures outlined above will be thoroughly covered in the Hq USAF 5-Series Regulation referenced under the ECL explanation, above.

3. Implementation: Effective 1 July 1951, the equipment authorization changes outlined above will be implemented. No action will be required by units in the field until such time as they receive a UPREAL which indicates that it is also an equipment authorization. Upon receipt of the UPREAL, reference will be made to a T/O, rather than a T/O&E, and ECL's will be referenced in lieu of the 00~30 series T.O.'s. It is anticipated that all USAF units will be under the new system by 1 January 1952. Further and more detailed information on the implementation of the above outlined program will be provided using agencies by a Dept of the Air Force letter to be published in the immediate future.

made in Part I to Personnel Modification Lists, it is pointed out that the Master Equipment Authorization List method will eliminate the requirement for published equipment modifications. Upon the publication of a T/O identified by an alphabetical suffix to the table number, all equipment authorizations referenced in the MEAL to the basic T/O number will continue to be applicable. Changes in organizational equipment items, brought about by the additional or changed capability which resulted in the personnel modification, will be included in the MEAL and referenced to the T/O number with appropriate alphabetical suffix. In the preparation of the UPREAL for a unit having a T/O including a personnel modification, AMC will be in a position to authorize equipment commensurate with personnel authorizations.

PART IV - PROPOSED TABLES OF ALLOWANCE CHANGE

Headquarters USAF realizes the many inadequacies of the present T/A system, and for some time has been striving to develop a new system which will:

 Permit adequate and easily interpreted bases of issue to indicate to the using agency exact authorizations as intended, and  Permit firm computation of requirements for procurement based on any given program of expansion or contraction.

An embryonic solution to the present T/A problems has been presented to saveral levels at Hq USAF, and has, so far, been given hearty accord. The plan, briefly, is as follows:

- 1. Based on the Plant account or some other method of arriving at an accurate inventory of equipment on hand at any given base or installation, develop authorization tables which will authorize all memorandum receipt equipment on hand or on order, and for which a firm requirement can be established.
- 2. Consider changes to the authorization document for each base on an individual requirement for that particular base or installation, without regard to the USAF as a whole.
- 3. Develop, from the individual base authorization tables, a set of minimum typical tables for each type installation, based on, for instance, the type of aircraft and mission, or some other determinable factor. Develop augmentation tables, based on other determinable factors, such as geographis location, to the minimum typical tables. (These minimum typical tables would then be used for planning purposes and upon programmed activation of new bases, procurement and automatic supply action could be initiated many months before actual occupancy.)

Other details in connection with this plan would entail the establishment of equipping "yardsticks" against measurable factors; authority to base commanders to vary "individual" items commensurate with strength fluctuations (this would include ECL's and all items authorized on an individual basis); police of authorizations, in light of actual requirement by on-the-spot checks by a full-time equipment review group from Hq USAF and/or major Commani, and

would parmit the placing of a firm "price tag" on the equipment required for the operation of any given base or installation within the USAF, or on the activation of a new base of any type. This method would also permit, for the first time, measure of equipment authorization against manning authorization for any given base or selected types of bases.

#### SUMMARY

It is well-realized that changes outlined above are of great magnitude and represent the first effort ever made by the USAF to deviate from equipment and personnel authorizations inherited from the Dept of the Army. These proposals regarding the Table of Organization and the Master Equipment Authorization List have been thoroughly discussed, reviewed, and analyzed. It is the consensus of the many who have been consulted that this system will work to the best advantage of all echelons of the USAF. Those to whom the Table of Allow ance concept has been presented have enthusiastically accepted it and feel the best interests of appropriate and economical equipment authorizations will be achieved. The purpose of this outline is to acquaint using agencies, briefly with the purpose and aims of the method in an effort to eliminate, at least to a dagree, some of the inherent opposition which manifests itself with any proposed change of a broad nature. Your cooperation is not only invited, but is necessary. As ideas for improvement of the system come to your mind, it is requested that such improvements be conveyed to Hq USAF in order to prevent our authorization system from becoming as ineffective and as antiquated as it had become under our former system. Correspondence on this subject should be directed to the Director of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O, Hq USAF, Washing ton 25 D.C.

July 1951

AFM 150-Table No. G-25

Advanced Multi-Engine Pilot Training (Refer to Manpower Planning Table G-25)

### PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

Flanning-data provided in this Table has been computed on the basis of the following assumptions:

- Course Length 23 to 25 weeks
   Flying Phase 23 weeks
- Flying hours par student 130 hours (70 T6/T28, 65 B25)
- Mission Aircraft T/6, T/28 070, B25 065 Minimum Individual Training Aircraft 5 Multi-Engine
- Involves full-base utilization to include only the normal tenant units such
  - so AACS, Weather detachment, etc.

### GENERAL PLANNING FACTORS

The following relationships are applicable when estimating total permanent party personnel and the principal components of that total:

- 7. Total PP = 935 x No. of bases 4 (3.9698 x No. of Students) 8. Officers = 136 x No. of bases 4 (.4198 x No. of Students)
- 507 x No. of bases (2.6261 x No. of Students)
- 9. Airmen \* 507 x No. of bases \* (2.6261 x No. of Students)
  10. Civilians \* 292 x No. of bases # (.9239 x No. of Students)
  11. Graded Civilians \* 136 x No. of bases # (.3307 x No. of Students)

The following relationships are applicable to the estimate of total civilian personnel computed according to line 10 above:

- 12. No. funded from P443 = 4 x No. of bases 4 (.0067 x No. of Students)
  13. No. funded from P448 = 276 x No. of bases 3 (.8739 x No. of Students)
- 12 x No. of bases 4 (.0433 x No. of Students) No. funded from P478 = 14.

### SPECIAL PERSONNEL CATEGORIES

In computing personnel requirements for a single base the following relationships exist between permanent party categories and students:


	Officer/Civilian	Initial P/P Increment for S/D of Zero	Rate of P/P Increase Per Student Added
15.	Field Grade Officers Company Grade Officers Filots (total) Pilots (primary duty) Rated (Other than Pilots) Instructors Modical Officers Dental Officers FMSO Chaplains	46	.0032
16.		98	.4375
17.		29	.3337
18.		12	.3305
19.		7	.0000
20.		0	.3122
21.		9	.8099
22.		4	.0126
23.		2	.0146

			THE PERSON NAMED IN
			Barrier Sacra
	Special Personnel Categories (Contd)		n n/n Transcen
	Airmen/Civilian	Initial P/P Increment for S/L of Zero	Rate of P/P Increase Per Student Added
	Positions		.0427
0	26. Combat Support 27. Electronic Engineering	25 9	.1603
1	28. Mainte mance Engineering	79	1.4672
**	29. Maintenance Crafts and Trades 30. Logistics	125 189	.9022
	31. Person sel and Administration	183 26	.2507 .0316
	32. Comptrell r 33. Special Services	1155	,3851
0	REMARKS: Hanning information included devanced Multi-Engine Pilot Training Command. For more detailed informatifunction, and/or organizational elementary Table G-25 on file with Direction to the intended nature of this Table ment is engassized. Personnel required justed to compensate for non-representations.	as it is conducted within ion regarding requirement. ent reference should be me ectorate of Manpower & Or le as a planning and/or pr rements computed from thi	s by skill, grade, ade to Manpower ganization, DCS/O.
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		MANPOWER CONTROLS		
TYPE OF CONTROL	RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXERCISE OF CONTROL	AREA CONTROLLED	OPERATION OF CONTROL	
		PROGRAM		
Policy Guidance	The President, The Congress, The Rational Security Council and The Secretary of Defense	The United States Air Force	The translation into action all of the Policies and the Programs as promulgated by the "ecutive and the Legislative Branch and the Secretary of Defense.	
Strategic Guidance	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Combat Units	Determination of Air Force objectives in terms of Combat Units.	
General Direction and Control	Secretary of the Air Force	All Air Force Activities	Exercise of final approval and control of Air Force Programs.	
Scheduling	Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations	All Air Force Programs	Insures a time phased and correlated Air Force Program.	
Manpower	Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations	All Air Force Programs	Determines an effective organizational structure that will accomplish the Air For Mission with minimum qualitative and quantitative manpower requirements.	
Budgetary	Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller	All Air Force Programs	Provides a budget program which includes a comprehensive analysis of personne	
Personnel	Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel	Personnel Programs	Piracts personnel constitute along to the land to the December 1	
			Directs personnel operating plans to include, the Personnel Procurement Pro- gram, the Training Program, the Promotion Program and the Morale and Wel- fare Program for both military and civilian personnel.	
Logistic	Deputy Chief of Staff, Material	Logistic Support Programs	Complements Manpower controls by providing a program which assesses logistic capabilities as a factor in determining personnel requirements.	
Research & Development	Deguty Chief of Staff, Development	Research & Development Programs	Exercises direction and control of all programs relating to basic and applied re- search and development including the field of Human Engineering.	
		PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS.		
Basic Manning Standards (Yardsticks)	Directorate of Manpower and Organization DCS/O, Hq USAP	All Air Force activities	Yardsticks directly relate manpower to workload and provides the basic manning standard upon which all Air Force manning documents are based.	
Planning Tables and Factors	Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	All Air Force activities	Provides the means for programming Air Force manpower resources in direct relationship to the various mission workloads.	
Tables.of Organization	Directorate of Manpower & Organization DCS/O Hq. USAF	All Air Force units standardized under Tables of Organization.	T/O's, comprised exclusively of military personnel, and designed for use of units normally combat in nature with a predetermined capability of performance, are used in packaged projection of tactical requirements.	
ALLOCATION				
Bulk	Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	All Air Force units not organized under Tables of Organization.	In accordance with Budget, as legislated by The Congress, controls the bulk allocations of all Air Force Manpower resources (less T/O units) specifies the exact number and grades of personnel allocated.	
Tables of Organization	Directorate of Manpower & Organization,	All Air Force units standardized under Table of Organization	Controls the exact numbers, the grades, specialty codes and duties of all per- sonnel within standardized Air Force Units.	
Tables of Distribution	DCS/O, Hq. USAF  Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq USAF	Air Force units organized under Tables of Distribution contain military and civilian personnel.	Tables of Distribution are designed to meet the conditions imposed by balancing personnel against changing workload as the mission of an activity changes	
		ASSIGNMENT	activity changes	
Military	Directorate of Military Personnel DCS/P, HQ, USAF	All military personnel	Reviews military manpower plans for their feasibility. Plans the procurement a training program to meet the troop program. Prepares mid year and end year e-timates military personnel strengths, projects military gains and losses, the requirement for specific skills to meet program requirements.	

Research & Development	Deputy Chief of Staff, Development	Research & Development Programs	Exercises direction and control of all programs relating to basic and applied re- search and development including the field of Human Engineering.				
		PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS.					
Basic Manning Standards (Yardsticks)	Directorate of Manpower and Organization DCS/O, Hq USAF	All Air Force activities	Yardsticks directly relate manpower to workload and provides the basic manning standard upon which all Air Force manning documents are based.				
Planning Tables and Factors	Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	All Air Force activities	Provides the means for programming Air Force manpower resources in direct relationship to the various mission workloads.				
Tables of Organization	Directorate of Manpower & Organization DCS/O Hq. USAF	All Air Force units standardized under Tables of Organization.	T/O's, comprised exclusively of military personnel, and designed for use of units normally combat in nature with a predetermined capability of performance, are used in packaged projection of tactical requirements.				
ALLOCATION							
Bulk	Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	All Air Force units not organized under Tables of Organization.	In accordance with Budget, as legislated by The Congress, controls the bulk allocations of all Air Force Manpower resources (less T/O units) specifies the exact number and grades of personnel allocated.				
Tables of Organization	Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	All Air Force units standardized under Table of Organization	Controls the exact numbers, the grades, specialty codes and duties of all personnel within standardized Air Force Units.				
Tables of Distribution	Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq USAF	Air Force units organized under Tables of Distribution contain military and civilian personnel.	Tables of Distribution are designed to meet the conditions imposed by balancing personnel against changing workload as the mission of an activity changes				
		ASSIGNMENT					
Military	Directorate of Military Personnel DCS/P, HQ, USAF	All military personnel	Reviews military manpower plans for their feasibility Plans the procurement an training program to meet the troop program. Prepares mid year and end year estimates military personnel strengths, projects military gains and losses, the requirement for specific skills to meet program requirements.				
Civilian	Directorate of Civilian Personnel DCS/P, HQ, USAF	All civitina personnel	Establishes Air Force policies and programs for civilian employee placement, employee executive, work measurement and utilization of physically handicapped personnel. Commanding officers of Air Force Bases are charged with the responsibility of assigning civilian personnel to essential and appropriate jobs and the utilization of defined management techniques in order to obtain maximum operation of the command of the comman				
		UTILIZATION					
Manpower Utilization Program	Directorate of Manpower & Organization,	All Air Force activities	Air Force Regulation No. 150-1 consolidates and vitalizes the Air Force Program for the effective allocation and economical use of Air Force manpower resources.				
	DCS/O, Hq. USAF		Air Force Regulation No. 150-2 outlines a positive program for effective man- power utilization.				
			Air Force Regulation No. 150-3 establishes the Air Force Manpower Program, and prescribes operational and administrative policies and procedures. It also directs the Major Commands to conduct Manpower Utilization Surveys, of all activities within the command in order to uncover any deficiencies that may exist, and to initiate corrective action.				
Program Evaluation	Directorate of Manpower & Organization DCS/O, Hq. USAF	All Air Force activities	Reviews and makes statistical analyses of manpower allotments and requirements in order to compare and evaluate the operating efficiency of functional activities. Reports those areas in need of survey and/or corrective action.				
Management Improvement	Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	All Air Force activities	Develops Management Improvements policies, plans, programs and survey techniques designed to increase the degree of proficiency of supervisory personne				
Civilian Manpower Coordination Groups	All Air Force Installations	All Civilian employees of the Air Force	Air Force Regulation No. 20-66 directs the appointment of Civilian Manpower Co- ordination Groups to review the positions and grades of civilian personnel in rela- tion to their justification, in terms of program requirements, work requirement and sound concepts of organization and management.				
Cost Control	Directorate of Program Standards and Cost Control, DCS/C, HQ USAF	All Air Force activities	Supplies the basic data for evaluating the operating efficiency of all echelons.				
Organization of Combat Wings	Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	Air Force Wings	Air Force Regulation 20-15 directs a standard organizational pattern for Air Force Bases, and a uniform placement of all functions.				
Tables of Organization	Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	All Air Force Units standardized under Tables of Organization	Directs the organizational structure and placement of functions for all standardized Air Force units.				
Tables of Distribution	Major Commands subject to the veto of the Directorate of Manpower & Organization, DCS/O, Hq. USAF	All Air Force units not organized under Tables of Organization	Air Force Regulation 20-52 prescribes the methods and procedures for designating, re-designating, organizating, re-organizing, discontinuing, re-assigning, and moving of T/D Units.				



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# MECHANIZATION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENTS

The Air Force has adopted, and is now implementing, a plan to expedite the publication of personnel and equipment authorisation documents. The purpose of this brief is to place informal advance information regarding that plan in the hands of those who will be most concerned with its application in the field.

The basic problem was to determine a more expeditious way of compiling, coordinating, and publishing Tables of Organization and Equipment without sacrificing any phase of the planning, research, and analysis upon which we depend for accurate and apprepriate authorisations. It was found that some of the time-consuming details could be shortened, or even eliminated, by revising methods used for many years by Headquarters, USAF.

The study and solution of the problem evolved into four inter-related projects, which will be discussed separately.

### PART I - MECHANIZATION OF TABLES OF ORGANIZATION

Because of the widely separated channels through which persennel and equipment requirements are determined, the Table of Organization and Equipment will be divided and the T/O will be published as a separate entity. When the organization, composition, and persennel requirements for a standard unit are determined, coordinated, and approved, the data will be coded for transfer to IBM punched cards. With newly-procured statistical machines, it is now possible to reproduce the entire document, including Section I - General, and the Organizational Chart (except boxes and command lines) from a deck of punched cards.

The Director of Manpower and Organization has the responsibility of determining requirements for changes, revisions, or new Tables of Organization. He will forward necessary ceded information to the Director of Statistical Services, who will insure that apprepriate cards are punched and substituted in the deck to keep each document up-to-date at all times. Changes to a T/O, therefore, will reach the affected organization, not as a separate document that must be stripped or pencilled into the basic document, but as a completely revised T/O to be substituted for the old. The superseded document will be discarded and, although the T/O number on the new one will be the same, it may be identified by the new date. Reference to AFR 5-2 will reveal the current date of any T/O.

The format of the tables will be essentially that used for T/O&E's recently published. Vertical columns will divide the various grades of officers and airmen for rapid computation, obviating the former method of providing a separate line for each grade within an SSN or AFSC. Because of space limitations, the remarks column will contain only a code, and the referenced remarks will be fully written at the end of the table.

For simplicity's sake, and to preclude frequent publication of documents in response to changes in war plans, except when units are organized at war strength, the peace and war versions of each Table of Organization will be published as separate documents. It is well-known that the war tables will change more rapidly and more often than the relatively static peace authorizations of persennel. Each table will carry the same number, with appropriate suffix, as T/O 1-1234P and T/O 1-1234W.

When emergencies arise that require the immediate activation or reorganization of a unit under a newly-revised or changed Table of Organization, it

will be possible to send out a carbon cepy of the statistical machine listing for organization and reporting purposes. It is doubtful, however, that such unorthodox procedure will often apply, since the printing will be accomplished by the phote-offset method, using the same machine listing as the master cepy. Thus, printing of an average-sized document, if given highest priority, will require about /8 hours after determination of the requirement.

In lieu of Persennel Modification Lists, a unit may receive a completely revised persennel listing, incorporating the desired modifications. There will be no need to add or delete persennel indicated in the basic T/O, because the new listing will be, in effect, a new T/O with a limited application to a specific unit. Tables of Organization so modified will be identified by an alphabetical suffix to the table number, progressing as additional modifications are made. Examples T/O 1-1234P-A, T/O 1-1234P-B, T/O 1-1234P-C.

### PART II - MECHANIZATION OF TABLES OF DISTRIBUTION

The present manual method of preparing T/D's and T/D-A's will else be mechanized. Procedures outlining the conversion from the manual to machine method are now being prepared, and will be distributed to the Commanis in the near future.

The fermat for T/D's will be identical to that of the T/Q, except that one additional column will be added for the civilian authorizations.

The same functions and codes used in preparing the T/O will be utilized in preparation of the T/D's and T/D-E's. A listing of these codes will be distributed to the Commands.

Using a conversion worksheet similar to that used for T/O's, the present T/D's and T/D-&'s will be rapidly converted to IEM key punch cards, which will

be assembled in decks that reflect the authorized strength and composition of the non-T/O organizations. One deck of cards will be forwarded to Hq USAF, and a duplicate deck will remain at the Command. From the deck retained by the Command, authorization tables will be produced on a standard format by Statistical Services. Cards forwarded to Ho USAF will be used for detailed analysis of organization strength and composition, and, when distribution cannot be more economically accomplished by the Commands, for the preparation of tables for use in Hq USAF offices. This method eliminates the necessity of typing T/D's and T/D-A's in the using activities of major Commands.

Changes to T/D's and T/D-A's can be accomplished rapidly under this system. New tables will be prepared when changes occur. However, the effort involved to accomplish revision will be minimized, inasmuch as the cards for unchanged lines of the original table will be automatically reused. It will be necessary only for the agency initiating the change to advise the appropriate Command Statistical Services of the line items which are to be changed. Cards will then be substituted in the master decks and new tables produced by Statistical Services.

Benefits of the mechanization program includes

- 1. A more rapid and accurate method of preparing personnel authorization documents for utilization by the field commanders.
- Rapid analyses of personnel authorizations and skills, by function, im units of the numbered Air Forces and major Commands.
- 3. Establishment of more accurate individual training quotas, to guarantee a source of skilled manpower to meet programmed requirements.
- 4. Better distribution of skills and personnel resources available within major Commands .
- 5. Greater stability of organizations.
- 6. More accurate programming date to support budget estimates.
  7. Information for by product statistical reports.

### PART III - ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MASTER EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZATION LIST

As a result of the above-referenced division of the Table of Organization and Equipment, the equipment portion will me longer be published simultaneously. Instead, equipment authorizations for all units organized in accordance with T/O's will be consolidated in one decument, entitled: "The Master Equipment Authorization List". It will include organizational, individual, and contingent items of equipment, with appropriate bases of iscue to organizations, AFSC's, individuals, and items, etc., as applicable.

One of the primary purposes of the establishment of the Master Equipment Authorization List method of equipment authorization is to relieve unit supply officers and base supply efficers of the requirement for maintaining a large library from which T/O&E equipment authorizations can be determined. Another purpose is the reduction in the cost of publication of T/O&E's and the climination of duplication of equipment listings in the T/O&E and Unit Property Record and Equipment List (UPREL). Salient features of the new equipment authorization method, insefer as using agencies are concerned, are outlined below:

Equipment Component Lists: In order to permit the inclusion of Equipment Component Lists (ECL's), formerly 00-30 Series Technical Orders (T.O.'s), in the authorization system, it has been necessary to remove them from the Maintenance Controlled Technical Order System. This has resulted in the change of the title to Equipment Component Lists. The purpose of these documents is the same as the old 00-30 Series T.O.'s. Of interest is the recent decision to include USAF non-recoverable and Dept of the Army expendable items in the ECL's for pre-packing and reference purposes. No reference will be made therein

to quantities of ass-recoverable item authorized and no requirement for the indication of the vecommented theme to rite and mate to established. These listings will be used as guides in the properties of nempiets hits am sale everage enimes; with units or individuals and in the pre-marker at kits sets for home. BOL's will in the most future be set up so IBC pusch peris Printer series of ECL's for Air Peros-wide reference and T/A use dis principle will be previded from IB-rus master deplet. Applicable Edi w wil be included in the Unit Preparty Record and Equipment Authorization List (UPREAL) of each unit, itemised directly from the IBs pusch eard decks. This method will permit the immediate serrection of the mester deaks and the sub sequent inclusion of the serverted items in all ECL's appended to UPRRAL's as recurring publication of the Urical's takes place. This will eliminate the 00-30-12 Series, "Kite and Bots of Boulpment, Quarter Summer of Changes in the 00-30 Series Technical Orders. In conjunction with the establishment of the BOL system, is a provision for the annual revision of all BOL's on each anxiversary of the publication date. Daits in the field and major Decmends will be primarily responsible for the maintenance within the USAT system of accurate and up-to-date ECL to Further information on the entire BOL field will be provided the major Communic and using agazone in the immediate fulling through the publication of BOL 00-20-1, "General Provisions of the Equipment Component Lists System," and the publication of a 5-Series Regulation by Rest quarters. WAF, severing the entire area of authorization decuments

2. Unit Property Record and Southment Authorization List: As in dicated, this is simply a charge in designation of the current Unit Property Record and Equipment List, to add the function of equipment authorization.

This additional function is in list of the equipment authorization heretefans

made by the T/O&E. The UPREAL will be prepared by Statistical Services Div siez, Hq AMC, from a Master Equipment authorization List provided to them by Hq USAF. At the outset, and effective 1 July 1951, the Master Equipment Authorization List will reflect virtually unchanged equipment authorizations as contained in current War T/OCE's. The initial transition should do no mere than correct equipment authorizations, when such corrections have previously been approved by Eq USAF, and make miner changes in the placement, within Technical Service, of certain items of equipment currently being transferred from Dept of the army to USAF stock lists. Future plans for the MEAL include review of equipment authorizations to eliminate duplications of issues; authorizations of little-used or luxury-type equipment; and to transfor from UKE, Base Support and/or Field Support columns, equipment which currently is erremeously classified in these three categories. Of particular importance to units in the field is the method of effecting changes to the UPREAL's. Upon determination of a requirement for a particular piece of equipment, which is not surrently sutherized in the UPREAL, the fellowing steps will be taken?

b. As the request pregresses through Command channels, each Command is expected to make a thorough investigation of the requirement and to append thereto a sincere and straight-forward recommendation concerning the addition of the equipment to the UPREAL, and to indicate overall requirement for the equipment in like units within the Command. Where progressive review of the stated requirement indicates a doubt as to the actual requirement, any

through Command channels to include AMC, a request for the addition of the required equipment with a complete and therough justification therefor.

a. Using USAF Ferm 25, the unit will initiate to Headquarters USAF.

echelon in the approval channel may return the recommendation, except Hq. AMO. Upon receipt in Hq AMC, the change request will go directly to the Statistical Services Division, where a thorough review will be made to determine whether or not the non-authorization of the equipment was due to an error on the part of the Statistical Services Division in interpreting from the Master Equipment Authorization List to the UPREAL. If such an error is found to be the cause for non-authorization, Statistical Services Division AMC, will reply directly to the unit and instruct them to make a "hand" addition to the UPREAL, pending its formal correction upon republication at the next recurrent publication date. If, however, it is determined that the nonauthorization is due to lack of proper authorization in the MEAL, Statistical Services Division will transfer the USAF Form 25 to the Equipment Allowance Office at AMC. Recommendations concerning the requirement will be made, and the request will be forwarded to Hq USAF. Upon receipt in Hq USAF, the paper will again be further reviewed for requirements as justified by the Form 25 and subsequent comments, and if it is determined that a valid requirement exists, the MEAL will be corrected to reflect the appropriate authorizations. Periodically, corrected pages to the MEAL will be forwarded to Statistical Services Division, AMC, with indication of changes made. Upon receipt of such change, Statistical Services Division, AMC, will completely re-run the UPREAL, where changes are of great magnitude, or will, by letter, instruct the requesting unit to make necessary "hand" changes to their UPREAL. Procedures outlined above will be thoroughly covered in the Hq USAF 5-Series Regulation referenced under the ECL explanation, above.

- 3. Responsibilities of the Field: It is necessary for every echelon, from the using agency to Hq USAF, to exercise prudence and honesty in recommendations forwarded to Hq USAF. It is mot our desire or intent to deny a using agency equipment necessary to perform its mission, nor is it our desire to burden it with equipment having infrequent use. It becomes necessary, then, to place the responsibility for recommending the deletion or addition of equipment upon units, based upon the recommendations of the people who actually use the equipment. Our primary job is to assure that policies delineated by Hq USAF are adhered to. As an example, it is pointed out that among the policies referenced above are those which delineate the three echelons of maintenance and the capabilities of the various echelons, both personnel- and equipment-wise, built into each T/O unit. Unless an extremely good justification for re-establishment of policy is given in the request for the authorization of field maintenance type equipment to an organization charged with only the organizational echelon, such policy change cannot be made. It therefore behooves the requesting agency to completely and honestly justify every request, and to point out its inability to accomplish its mission if existing policies are adhered to.
- 4. Implementation: Effective 1 July 1951, the equipment authorization changes outlined above will be implemented. No action will be required by units in the field until such time as they receive a UPREAL which indicates that it is also an equipment authorization. Upon receipt of the UPREAL, reference will be made to a T/O, rather than a T/O&E, and ECL's will be referenced in lieu of 00-30 series T.O.'s. It is anticipated that all USAF units

will be under the new system by 1 January 1952. Further and more detailed information on the implementation of the above outlined program will be provided using agencies by a Dept of the Air Force letter to be published in the immediate future.

made in Part I to Personnel Modification Lists; it is pointed out that the Master Equipment Authorization List method will eliminate the requirement for published equipment modifications. Upon the publication of a T/O identified by, an alphabetical suffix to the table number, all equipment authorizations referenced in the MEAL to the basic T/O number will continue to be applicable. Changes in organizational equipment items, brought about by the additional or changed capability which resulted in the personnel modification, will be included in the MEAL and referenced to the T/O number with appropriate alphabetical suffix. In the preparation of the UPREAL for a unit having a T/O including a personnel modification, AMC will be in a position to authorize equipment commensurate with personnel authorizations.

### PART IV - PROPOSED TABLES OF ALLOWANCE CHANGE

Headquarters USAF realizes the many inadequacies of the present T/A system, and for some time has been striving to develop a new system which wills

- Permit adequate and easily interpreted bases of issue to indicate to the using agency exact authorizations as intended, and
- Permit firm computation of requirements for procurement based on any given program of expansion or contractiom.

An embryonic solution to the present T/A problems has been presented to several levels at Hq USAF, and has, so far, been given hearty accord. The plan, briefly, is as follows:


- 1. Based on the Plant Account or some other method of arriving at an accurate inventory of equipment on hand at any given base or installation, develop authorization tables which will authorize all memorandum receipt equipment on hand or on order, and for which a firm requirement can be established.
- Consider changes to the authorization document for each base as an individual requirement for that particular base or installation, without regard to the USAF as a whole.
- 3. Develop, from the individual base authorization tables, a set of minimum typical tables for each type installation, based on, for instance, the type of aircraft and mission, or some other determinable factor. Develop augmentation tables, based on other determinable factors, such as geographic location, to the minimum typical tables. (These minimum typical tables would then be used for planning purposes and upon programmed activation of new bases, procedurement and automatic supply action could be initiated many months before actual occupancy.)

Other details in connection with this plan would entail the establishment of equipping "yardsticks" against measurable factors; authority to base commanders to vary "individual" items commensurate with strength fluctuations (this would include ECL's and all items authorized on an individual basis); police of authorizations, in light of actual requirement by on-the-spot checks by a full-time equipment review group from Hq USAF and/or major Command, and would permit the placing of a firm "price tag" on the equipment required for the operation of any given base or installation within the USAF, or on the

activation of a new base of any type. This method would also permit, for the first time, measure of equipment authorization against manning authorization for any given base or selected types of bases.

#### SIMMARY

It is well-realized that changes outlined above are of great magnitude, and represent the first effort ever made by the USAF to deviate from equipment and personnel authorizations inherited from the Dept of the Army. These proposals regarding the Table of Organization and the Master Equipment Authorization List have been thoroughly discussed, reviewed, and analyzed. It is the consensus of the many who have been consulted that this system will work to the best advantage of all echelons of the USAF. Those to whom the Table of Allowance concept has been presented have enthusiastically accepted it and feel the best interests of appropriate and economical equipment authorizations will be achieved. The purpose of this outline is to acquaint using agencies, briefly, with the purpose and aims of the method in an effort to eliminate, at least to a degree, some of the inherent opposition which manifests itself with any proposed change of a broad nature. Your cooperation is not only invited, but is necessary. As ideas for improvement of the system come to your mind, it is requested that such improvements be conveyed to Hq USAF in order to prevent our authorization system from becoming as imeffective and as antiquated as it had become under our former system. Correspondence on this subject should be directed to the Director of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O, Hq USAF, Wasnington 25, D.C.



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I. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT II. MISSION III. BRNACH ACTIVITIES a. Utilization b. Standards c. T/0 & E IV. DIVISION ACTIVITIES (General) V. MAJOR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED VI. EVALUATION FOR THE PERIOD VII. APPENDIX

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#### SECTION I

### GEGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Manpower Requirements Division experienced little change during its brief history. During the period, effort was placed on development of activities to the fullest extent possible. Reorganization of the Directorate of Manpower & Organization was suddenly announced 27 April 1951 to be effective 30 April 1951. This reorganization (1) terminated the Marporer Requirements Division and its functions incorporated in a new division known as the "Organization Management Divisions. For record purposes a roster of personnel of the Equirements Division is attached as Appendix (2) no. 1. The Division personnel authorizations was:

42 Officers, 1 Airman, 56 Civilians - Total 99

The organizational set-up appeared to be good from the viewpoint of the Division. No noticeable inadequacies appeared, in fact the structure was beginning to appear firm and well founded.

#### SECTION II

#### MISSION

The Division mission remained unchanged from the previous period, (3)

Memo, subj: Organizational Change, 27 Apr 1951, D/NBO files
 Roster of Personnel, 23 April 1951
 See Section II Historical Report period: 1 July 50 - 31 Dec. 50

# SECTION III BRANCH ACTIVITIES

a. Utilization Branch: Activities continued along projected lines for the various Sections of the Branch.

- 1. Program Review Section continued various analysis and studies, including review of uneconomical and unduly restrictive AF directives. The Major Commands were requested to submit suggestions for improvement in AF Directives. AMC in particular was very cooperative, submitting recommendations on some 89 AFR's, and 4 AFM's. Major General McKee, Asst. VC/S expressed to Lt. General B. W. Chidlaw, CG AMC, his appreciation for AMC's contributions.
- 2. Performance Evaluation Section made evaluation studies or analysis of requests for increased personnel spaces submitted by various commands. In this connection this request for increased spaces by SWC was of interest.

  This is more fully discussed in Section IV. General Lynch, 30 Mar 51, submitted a memo (2) to the three Divisions of the Directorate reporting results of a man Resultance, and the Capua, or conference with three (3) major elements of the personnel problem:
  - (a) Detailed requirements and their justification.
  - (b) Utilization
  - (c) Standards.

Mrs. Rosenberg made the observation that, (quoting Memo)

"We spend so much time justifying our personnel requirements that we become convinced that our argument is

sound, whether it really is or not. She thinks that we
should examine our requirements to see what we can do

without". This memo introduced a new aspect in the current
thinking of this Division.

2. Surveys from commands continued to come in but rather slowly and intermittently. The Air Proving Ground Command submitted under date of 5 Warch 1951 a survey(3) considered of interest which is attached as Appendix No 5. Surveys of this type reveal what may be accomplished when conscientious effort is applied to the problem.

A survey(4) which began in June 1950 of Field Installations in the Washington area, was reopened in January 1951. Major General McKee issued instructions for the transfer of the housekeeping functions performed by 1254th AT Squadron, WATS, to Headquarters Command. This survey in summary form is attached as Appendix No 6.

The Division sent a survey team to NEAC on 20 March 1951 for the purpose of indoctrinating the NEAC Manpower Team. NEAC, with its Hqs located at Pepperrell AFB, Hewfoundland and only recently activated, had not begun their Command Surveys. The Hq USAF Team was only able to give the NEAC team some of the fundamental approaches to a manpower survey due to the frief period and weather conditions affecting travel. Since the purpose of this visit was indoctrination of NEAC Manpower Team, no official survey report was submitted by the Hq USAF Manpower

team, however, much information on the seasonal and peak morkloads was obtained by the team which will be of use in analysis of requests for manning of the NEAC Command.

b. Standards Branch: The Branch continued with routine activities.

Matters pertaining to the Ratio Factor. Section is discussed in more detail
in Section IV below. Status of Planning Tables prepared by the Ratio Factors
Section Ida this period.

- 1. Total 1st Priority Tables 14
  - Completed for distribution (2)
  - In machines at Stat Control (5)
  - Completed & forwarded by ATRC (7)
- 2. Total 2d Priority Tables 8
  - (All under preparation by ATRC)
- 3. Total 3rd Friority Tables
  - (All under preparation by ATRE)

The Yardstick Section reported 96 Yardsticks received from the Major Commands, representing 29 functional areas. The Major Commands appeared to be more cooperative during the period than had at first seemed probable as reported in Section III, (page 10) of the history for period 1 July to 31 December 1950. The Section reported the following status as of 30 March 1951:

- Proposed I/S due 71
- Proposed Y/S received 86
- Units being processed 9
- Units in clerical backlog 17
- Units awaiting publication 3
- Units being published 0
- Units distributed C

c. T/O & E Branch: Under date of 19 February 1951, the Division sent a letter to each Major Command, Subject: Mechanization of T/O's,

T/D's, and T/D-A's in which the program was outlined. Comments on the proposal for mechanization were requested. Replies indicated full cooperation and interest on the mechanization plan. On 8 March 1951 a briefing was held in the Signal Grops Auditorium, the Pentagon, to acquaint all Hq USAF Directors on the new plan. Colonel Frank N. Graves, T/O & E Branch Chief, and personnel from his Branch conducted the briefing which appeared to adequately outline the mechanization plan for manning and equipment documents.

During the three-month, period covered by this report, finalization action, including establishment of a firm date of implementation, has been taken on the establishment within the USAF of the Master Equipment Authorization List plan of equipping T/OME units. Finalization action was concluded 22 March 1951.

Work in the T/OME and T/D Branch during the period has resulted in the establishment of a proposed method of eliminating certain areas of unsatisfactory performance within the USAF Tables of Allowances system. The proposal, which would entail the establishment of "tailor-made" authorisations for each USAF installation, based on the Plant Account, was presented to the USAF Equipment Review Board and was approved by that Board. To provide sufficiently firm equipment programming information, it was found necessary that the T/OME and T/D Branch have access to "typical" or "minimum" tables for each type of installation, and augmentation "packages" for climatic conditions and other variable factors for which yardsticks can be developed.

Majority of the action required to implement the Equipment Component
List system, in lieu of 00-30 series Technical Orders, was accomplished by
this Headquarters and AMC during the period. AF Form 91B, to provide
necessary distribution of the ECL's, has been submitted and will be published
within the next thirty days. General Provisions and Index of the Equipment
Component List system have been approved and are being published by AMC.
No particular gains have been made toward the ultimate goal which entails
the establishment of IBM punch cards for the preparation of master copies
of ECL's and the by-product permitting the attachment of applicable ECL's
to Unit Property Record and Equipment Authorization Lists (UFREAL's).
Delay in this area has been due primarily to the inability of Statistical
Services Division at Air Materiel Command to obtain personnel qualified in
this type of work.

Tables of Organization & Equipment covering organizations of the Air Depot Wing have been developed and submitted to the printers for publication. Estimated date of completion of printing is 1 May 1951.

All SAC readiness tables have been published and reorganization of units thereunder has been effected.

Air Resupply and Communication Wing Tables of Organization have been developed and published. Tables of Equipment required are in the process of final preparation.

The plan to mechanize T/O's, T/D's, and T/D-A's not only involved "selling" but an enormous amount of preparation on the part of the T/O & E Branch. It appears that some previous effort had been expended along these lines, however, as in the case of many studies and research made, the T/O & E Branch was unaware of such efforts. A letter from Colonel Eugene C. Light along these lines is quoted herewith:

" HEADQUARTERS

AIR PROVING GROUND

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

1 Warch 1951

Colonel LeRoy Hudson Chief, Manpower Requirements Division Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O Headquarters, United States Air Force Washington 25, D. C.

My Dear Colonel:


I received your letter on mechanization of T/D's with great interest. While I was Chief of the Organizational Planning and Manning Division of A-3, Second Air Force in 1945, my office developed the procedures, directed and monitored machine run Manning Tables under the old Base Unit System. I had a manual published at the time, which I believe was very comprehensive. It was titled "Second Air Force Manual 20-10", and was revised in February of 1946.

I am taking the liberty of passing this information on to you because I am well aware of some of the difficulties with machine runs, and limitations inherent in the machines themselves.

I do not have a copy of the old manual, however, there is a former Captain, now living in Arlington, who worked out the details and might possibly have one. His name is H. S. B. White. I believe that I gave his name to Lt. Col. Kelly when he was down here a couple of weeks ago. I am sure that White would be glad to render his services if you feel that you could be benefited by his experiences.

Sincerely,

EUGENE C. LIGHT Colonel, USAF "



# SECTION IV

Certain general activities, or rather those not handled at Branch level, presented a full program for the Division Chief. The usual routine activities became of such volume, that the Chief, Colonel LeRoy Hudson, brought in Colonel Philip D. Coats as Division Deputy. Colonel Coates previously held position as Chief of the Standards Branch, this Division. Some of the more important activities are considered below.

- a. Manpower Utilization: At the instigation of this Division a letter(1) was sent to the Major ZI and overseas Commands in which the need for greater sampower utilization was emphasized. The Commands were asked to review their whole program and furnish the Division information as to their current programs. This letter brought forth sufficient information to enable the Director of Manpower and Organization to report(2) to Mr. Zuckert in detail on the Manpower Utilization and Management Engineering Program within ten Field Commands. Eriefly summarized:
  - Some 1509 fulltime and 100 part time personnel were devoting their time to management engineering, Manpower projects, and missions.
  - One hundred thirty manpower surveys were conducted by the Commands during calendar year 1950.
  - All commands were cooperating with Headquarters USAF in the development of yardsticks.
  - 4. Haragement engineering projects were being conducted on many subjects.

- 5. Training programs in work simplification and various management programs were being conducted.
- Some progress was made in review of directives to determine essentiality or unduly restrictive content.

b. Development of the Typical Station (Manning) Tables: The
need for some effective determination of manpower requirements, including
skills and specialities, for use in programing and mobilization planning
has long been in evidence. Methods in existence for such determinations
are cumbersome and time consuming. Two requests were forwarded to the
Director, Manpower and Organization along these lines, one by Brigadier
(3)
General F. J. Dau . Director Program Standards and Cost Control, DCS/C,
and smother by Major General W. B. Todd . Assistant for Programing.
General Dau and General Todd expressed their needs in view of frequent rapid
"blitz" troop program calculations.

The Manpover Requirements Division placed priority on this project and assigned it to the Ratio Factors Section of the Standards Branch.

The Section Chief, Colonel Harold. A. Pruitt, took the position that such typical tables should worked out in such detail as to secure a high degree of accuracy. The Division Chief took the position that this degree of accuracy was secondary to the need to get the program launched, that accuracy and refinement would come later when experience factors were available.

Under date of 8 January 1951, Brigadier General E. C. Lynch, Director of Manpower and Organization took the same position as Colonel Hudson and his memo to Colonel Hudson is quoted herewith:

\*Memorandum for: Manpover Esquirements Division 8 Jenuary 1951 Subject: Typical Station Tables

1. It seems to me that it would be a simple solution to this

problem (and probably just as accurate) to pick one of our existing stations in each Major Command as a standard for that Command.

- 2. These could be used as the starting point and refined as experience indicates.
- 3. There are a number of World War II typical tables developed under the "Anderson Plan". These are in the Allocations Division files and have been reviewed by Colonel IsWasche and his group not very long ago.
- 4. Since we may need this type of material right away, it seems to me we should start with what we have on hand and refine it as we go along, rather than to start from scratch.

E.C.L." (Brigedier General E.C. Lynch)

The foregoing project is well underway and to date sufficient

Planning Tables have been compiled to begin testing their value. Colonel

Budson reported to Seneral Lynch, D/M20, on 21 March 1951 that Air
(5)

Materiel Command has expressed a "distinct enthusiasm" for these

Planning Tables for use in their Mobilization Planning Section. This

expression of support on the part of Air Materiel (Seneral Hopkins, Hq

Air Materiel Command) occurred as result of a visit by Colonel Budson to

Air Materiel Command.


c. Status of Mission for T/O & T/D Units: A study began in 1950 (6) in regard to missions of Air Force Units. AFL 121-28 , dated 15 August 1950, Special Subjects for Inspectors General, was designed to discover any units with manning inconsistent with the mission, or units which no longer had an adequate mission. The Inspector General found relatively little in the way of deficiencies or discrepancies. His report

up the results of 1.0. inspections, dated 26 March 1951, indicated satisfactory conditions throughout the Air Force with the exception of ANC which reported an excess of Airmen at practically all Air Materiel Command stations. If this report represents the actual condition and not just the viewpoint of Inspectors at levels incapable of seeing the over-all Air Force Mission, then the condition as reported is indeed gratifying.


- d. Consultant Service to USAF Manpower Program: On 26 March 1951
  Mr. Charles W. Ufford, vice-president of Barrington Associates, New York
  City, presented to the Division Chiaf, the program of consultant service
  which his Company expected to provide the Air Force. The service planned
  is Air Force Wide and not merely an aid to this Division.
- e. Special Weapons Command: SNC under went a change in mission during the period. This change in mission was attended by a request for additional spaces. A conference was held 5 March 1951 at which the new mission was approved, however, the resultant increase in personnel was presented to the Director Manpower and Organization for review. Due to insufficient written justification, the issue became controversial.

  (8) In order to resolve this controversy, General Lynch wrote a letter to Brigadier General John S. Mills to the effect that a Survey Group consisting of Officers from DCS/O and DCS/D, which acting jointly, would render such assistance as possible in an on-the-spot study of the complicated problem. The Survey Group was detailed to visit the SWC and establish justification for the personnel spaces required. This was accomplished during the latter part of March 1951, however, the actual allocation of the additional spaces had not been confirmed at the close of the period.

f. Efforts at Manpower Control prior to December 1948: Attached



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#### SECTION V

#### MANPOWER PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

Argument was presented, especially by some members of the group sent out to survey the Special Meapons Command (see Section IV above), to the effect that many areas of Mesearch and Development were so intangible as to afford no measurable workload basis. Since the very basis for the existence of the Manpower Requirements Division hinges on the belief that every function within the Air Force can be measured in terms of workloads, the Division Chief felt it necessary to reaffirm this concept to General Lynch in a memorandum dated 21 March 1951 which is quoted below:

"This is an expression of our concept of Manpower Guides (Yardsticks) and Manpower Planning Tables and Planning Factors. This is based on the assumption that all workloads are capable of being measured and can therefore be matched by a given number of people of certain skills who can accomplish the work in an acceptable manner.

The fact that certain functions are more difficult than others to translated into workload, or that some functions require a set number of personnel through a wide range of mork or responsibility (such as each installation requiring a commander irrespective of size) does not invalidate the above concept. We are planning to continue our field visits and contacts. In these we will constantly be faced with the reaction from the field installations that our assumption is all right for others but that their

function is so unusual that no standard can be evolved, and that they should be excused from participation in the Manpower Guide Program.

must be changed. In the few contacts that Colonel Moody and I have had, this has not been too difficult. I would like your comments on this."

Selling this concept, not only to Hq USAF personnel but to the Commands as well, presents a problem of considerable magnitude to this Division.

The second major problem encountered during the period was that of coordination. The Division Chief took cognizance of this lack in a memorandum(1) to the Director about 1 March 51, (date memo compiled). It was pointed out that evidence existed that some offices of this Headquarters, notwithstanding the provisions of HOI 11-1-, had grown negligent about fully coordinating messages and plans which have current or potential manpower and equipment implications. This has been particularly noticeable in instances where major items of equipment, including airplanes, have been allocated to units without regard to T/O&E authorizations and without providing the additional personnel required to operate and maintain such equipment. In the case of allocating additional aircraft above the T/O&E authorization, additional requirements for pilots, inspectors, mechanics, and in turn clothing and equipment for them, is generated. There is no end to the circle: Build up aircraft, build up personnel, build up supplies for each. Hanning and Equipment documents are designed to preclude this condition, however, commitments have been made that result in just such a situation.

-17-

This lack of coordination was forcefully illustrated by the Lackland Air Force Base incident in which Training Requirements and Housing facilities were the subject of considerable publicity. Secretary of Air Force, Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, in a confidential memorandum(2) to General Twining, Vice Chief of Staff (cc to General Lynch), dated 29 January 1951, pointed one that other similar situations might possible arise.

A problem indirectly affecting the Manpo er Requirements Division is explaining or rather defending the Air Force against the charge of "too much overhead". While this Division has no responsibility or voice in determining the overall Manpower Requirements for the Air Force, it does have responsibility in allotting those spaces made available and seeing to it that personnel are well utilized. When this charge of "too much overhead" is made it becomes desirable to offer an analysis, not a justification of this matter. A study made by Lt. Col. Charles W. Coleman, this Division, is attached as Appendix No. 7 (3) and is offered as having concretely expressed some of the causes of so called "too much overhead".

Memorandum to D/MMO from Division Chief, Subject: Utilization of T/O&E Division Files

Confidential memorandum to General Twining from Secretary of Air Force Mr. Finletter, 29 January 1951, Division Files
(3) Appendix No. 7, Study by Lt. Col. Charles W. Coleman

### SECTION VI

#### EVALUATION FOR THE PERIOD

The Manpower Requirements Division ceased to exist 30 April 1951. As has been the case with so many starf agencies and activities of the Air Force, the Division had scarcely settled down to performing its functions before a reorganization hit. The Directorate of Manpower & Organization was reorganized into only two Divisions. No prior notice was given to the Division Chief in regard to the reorganization. On 27 April 1961 the Colonels of the Directorate were called together and notified of the new organization.

A great portion of the program of the Division was naturally incomplete at the time the reorganization axe fell. It is difficult to evaluate the accomplishments except to say that a well planned program was going on. Undoubtedly a greater portion of the program will continue under the new organization. It is felt that the following are definitely indicated as accomplishments:

a. The Utilization Branch with Colonel C. H. Seebach as Chief, had made progress in analyzing and determining the appropriatiness of requests for personnel increases. This was undertaken at a time when very little background was available on which to make such determinations. The Allocations Division was beginning to rely on the Branch for advice more and more when allocations of personnel were concerned.

The Command Surveys were kept alive and functioning through the efforts of Colonel Seebach and in particular Colonel Joseph Halversen, the Chief of the Performance Evaluation Section.

b. The Standards Branch, with Colonel Charles O. Moody
as Chief, had moved ahead in development of some of the fundamental
tools so escential in determining manning requirements. Lt. Col. Edward M.
Lightfoot had the Yardstick development program so well in hand, that it
was only a ratter of continuation and follow-up. Lt. Col. Lightfoot
was with Yardstick development practically throughout the program, and
in fact he can be regarded as the father of the yardstick program.

The Fatio factors section proved the supposition that

Standard Planning Tables could be developed to meet the great need for
more accurate planning factors for use in programming the manpower
requirements of the Air Force. Colonel Harold A. Pruitt as Chief of this
Section, started practically from "scratch", there being little available
to him as reference or background material.

c. The T/OSE Branch with Colonel Frank N. Graves as
Chief, had laid plans to mechanize various manning documents and equipments lists. This was a radical development and offered the greatest advance yet in such manning documents as T/O's, T/D's and Equipment Lists.

In the past it has been a slow and cumbersome process to change or improve these documents. The plan of mechanization will materially improve this situation.

The program initiated by the Manpower Requirements Division pioneered the way for improved Manpower Utilization, entered upon development of elemental tools so essential to determining manpower requirements, and in various ways contributed to better management of our Manpower Resources. The Chief, Colonel LeRoy Hudson expressed his satisfaction to the Division for a job well done.

END

# Appendix Nol DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORC W. ELLIS, Weldon T., Jr. DAVLUPCRT, Robert B. BOLLES, Robert W. 600 29th Rd S, Arl. Va. 07 1973 2633 N Nottinghem St, 141, Va. M2 36758 2800 Quebec St N M, Walh, DC W0 4038 269 N Nayme St, Apt S, Arl. Va. M 25705 5280 Seventh Rd, Apt S, Columbia Hgta, Arl. Va. 117 Leesburg Pike, Falls Ch, Va. 1332 31st St N W, Mach, DC AD 2057 2613 S 8th St, Arl. Va. 08 4027 2601 16th St N W, Mach, DC AD 1000 2621 S Meade St, Arl. Va. 07 8676 1332 35th St N W, Apt 505, Washington, DC M0 4533 ELROD, Mary E. BYNUM, Willis A. SH.PHEAD, Milton D. 501014 TILRP, Norman R., YANAK, Albert LYNCH, Mary M. THROCK DUTON, Resembly KUHNLE, Robert E. RAYLOND, Jean NIMROD, Kay M. 50978 HANNA, Archibald J. NUZUM, James R. ROBICHAUD, Oliver V. HOPPER, Anne H. 75676 139 E Westmereland Rd, Falls CLATABOFF, Walton G. A. HOLSEY, Seton T. ASI2 N 7th St. Arlington, Va 221 Lawrence Dr. Fills Ch. V 2836 S Duchanan, seiington, Gluscumor epta 7255 Audrey KOLSTAD, Robert F. ... REICHERT, Earl T. THOMAS, Dorothy

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PRUITT, Harold A. EMINO, Donald B. HUBLER, George O. CAMERON, John MYSZA, John E. STERN, Irving R. HASTY, Willis HICKS, Waldo C., Jr. GRAFFIUS, Ruth B.	Colonel Major It Col It Col Major Major Civ Civ	401083 401083 401083 401083 401083 401083 401083	524.65 521.88 524.65	702 Chalfonte Dr. Alexandria, Va 2401 S Joycett, Arlington, Va. 5108 7th Ed S. Arl. Va. 125 S Irving St. Arl. Va. Vol. Bolling AFB, Mash. D. 122 Firmit Dr. Fairs Ca. Va. 3475 S Wakefield St., Arl. Va. 1-1123 S Thomas St. Arl. Va. 1668 S Edison St., Arl. Va.	JO 29000 FA 1523 ZE A398 GL 4400
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LIGHTFOOT, Edward M.	It Col	401083	55061	2835 M Van Buren St, Palls Ch,	
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EDYONIS, James L.    Major   58993   72369   817 La Bella walk, Falls Ch, Va. JE 38188
EDYONIS, James L.    Major   58993   72369   817 La Bella walk, Falls Ch, Va. JE 38188
COARK, Howard M.   Capt   SE990   S4731   S509 8th St S, Arlington, Va.   DOCSON, Charles   LYNN, Thomas J.   Capt   SE993   S4427   S41 Argylo Dr., Falls Ch., Va.   JE 39510
NYN, Thomas J.   Capt   SE993   Sul27   G720   Luke St, Falla Ch, Va.   JE 39510
BRO.N.   Leconard C.   Civ   58993   72369   322 Fairhaven Ave, Alex, Va.   Corresponding S.   Civ   58993   54731   5224   8th Rd S. Arlington, Va.   ON 6776   FITZ-GERALD, Mona F.   Civ   58993   72369   4125   N Henderson Rd, Arl, Va.   OX 0969   SCHOULTZ, Beulah E.   Civ   58993   54427   22104   Milson Blvd, Arl, Va.   OX 0969   SCHOULTZ, Beulah E.   Civ   58993   54427   224   Condon Terrace S. E., tach   OX 23687   KOURY, Elizabeth F.   Civ   58993   72369   52702   Sth St.   Arlington, Va.   GI   5283   COLLOME, Ethyline   Civ   58993   72369   5801   15th Pl.   Hyatboville, Md.   AP 2776   GOLLOME, Ethyline   Civ   58993   72369   5801   15th Pl.   Hyatboville, Md.   AP 2776   FERDERER, Helen F.   Civ   58993   54731   875   Lebanon St.   N.   Arl.   Va.   FA 0935   STROBEL, Sara S.   Civ   58985   54427   442   Argyle Br., Falls Ch., Va.   FA 6109    T/D REVIEW SECTION  GREK, R. M.   Lt Col   58985   55598   526   Monticello Dr., Falls Ch., Va.   FA 6109    T/D REVIEW SECTION  GREK, Mary M.   Civ   58985   55598   5905   Kris St. S.   Mash, DC   AV 5011    LEICH, Harold   Civ   58985   55598   5905   St.   Row   Alexandria, Va.   Al. 7362    TABUE, Mary M.   Civ   58985   55598   702   St.   Row   Alexandria, Va.   Al. 7362    HOFFMAN, John M.   Lt Col   58989   55992   801 S Florida St.   Al.   Columbia   Higts, Arlington, Va.   Al. 7362    ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   76323   123 Williagton, Va.   Al. 4748    ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   76323   123 Williagton, Va.   Al. 4748    ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   76323   123 Williagton, Va.   Al. 4748    ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   76323   124 Williagton, Va.   Al. 4748    ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   76323   124 Williagton, Va.   Al. 4748    ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   76323   124 Williagton, Va.   Al. 4748    ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   76323   124 Williagton, Va.   Al. 4748    ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   76323   124 Williagton, Va.   Al. 4748    ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   76323   124 Williagton, Va.
PORRESTAIL, Pauline B. Civ 5E993 54731 5224 8th Rd S. Arlington, Va. 0W 6776 FITZ-GRAID, Mona F. Civ 5E993 72369 4125 N Henderson Rd, Arl, Va. JA 20528 BCTGARDNER, Donald H. Civ 5E993 54427 104 Wilson Bivd, Arl, Va. 0X 0769 SCHOULTZ, Beulah E. Civ 5E993 54427 424 Condon Terrace S. Lash JC 23687 KOURY, Elizabeth F. Civ 5E993 55588 605 N Bucharan St, Arl, Va. JA 23852 GGLLOME, Ethyline Civ 5E993 72369 702 8 9th St, Arlington, Va. GL 5433 RUDDY, Lois P. Civ 5E993 72369 702 8 9th St, Arlington, Va. GL 5433 RUDDY, Lois P. Civ 5E993 72369 5801 19th Pl, Hyathoville, Md. AP 2776 RUDDY, Lois P. Civ 5E993 54731 875 Lebanon St N, Arl, Va. FA 0935 STROBEL, Sara S. Civ 5E993 54721 448 Argyle Dr, Falls Ch, Va. JE 3936 GREK, R. M. Lt Col 5E985 55598 729 Echnicallo Dr, Falls Ch, Va. JE 39367 GRIFFILO, Millard Civ 5E985 55598 2905 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 2905 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 9055 055 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 705 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 705 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 705 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 705 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 705 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 705 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 705 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5012 LEICH, Harold Civ 5E989 7052 kris St S E, Mash, DC AK 5012 HOFFLAN, John M. Lt Col 5E989 75392 201 S Florida St, #L, Columbia Hgts, Arlington, Va. JA 80693 VILLIANS, Enrys P. Civ 5E989 76323 12 W Windsor Ava, Alax, Va. UK 6999 PATTERSON, Douglacs E. Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St H W, Wash, DC MI 8928 LEONARD, Thelman H. Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St H W, Wash, DC MI 8928 LEONARD, Thelman H. Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St H W, Wash, DC MI 2000 WAURER, Ida M. Civ 5E989 76323 2330 N Ilkh St, Arlington, Va. Civ 5E989 76323 23340 N Ilkh St, Arlington, Va. Civ 5E989 76323 2340 N Ilkh St, Arlington, Va. Civ 5E989 76323 2
### PITZ-GERALD, Mona F. Clv   58993   72369   4125 N Henderson Ha, Arl, Va. DA 2028   BOYGARDHER, Donald H. Clv   58993   54427   204 Walson Blvd, Arl, Va. DC 2069   SCHOULTZ, Beulah E. Clv   58993   54427   424 Condon Terrace S. S., Lach   JC 23587   MCOURY, Elizabeth F. Clv   58993   72369   5598   605 N Bucharan St., Arl, Va. DA 22852   GOLLOME, Ethyline   Clv   58993   72369   5801 15th Pl, Hyattoville, Md. AP 2076   RUDDY, Lois P. Clv   58993   72369   5801 15th Pl, Hyattoville, Md. AP 2076   FERDERGER, Helen F. Clv   58993   54731   375 Lebanon St. N., Arl, Va. FA 6355   STROBEL, Sara S. Clv   58985   54427   442 Argyle Dr., Falls Ch., Va., JE 33867   54427   442 Argyle Dr., Falls Ch., Va., FA 6109    ###################################
SCHOULT, Boulah E. Civ 5E933 5LA27 L24 Condon Terrace S E, Lash JC 23627 KOURY, Elizabeth F. Civ 5E933 5598 605 N Fucharian St, Arl, Va. JA 22852 GOLOME, Ethyline Civ 5E933 72369 2702 S 9th St, Arlington, Va. GL 5593 RUDDY, Lois P. Civ 5E933 72369 5801 15th Pl, Hyutboville, Md. AP 2976 FERDERER, Helen F. Civ 5E933 5L731 875 Lebanon St N, Arl, Va. FA 6335 STROBEL, Sara S. Civ 5E985 5L427 448 Argyle Br, Falls Ch, Va. JA 6109 T/D REVIE. SECTION  GREM, R. M. Lt Col 5E935 55598 729 Nenticello Dr, Falls Ch, Va. JE 39367 GRIPFING, Sillard Civ 5E935 55598 526 Monticello Dr, Falls Ch, Va. JE 39367 GRIPFING, Sillard Civ 5E935 55598 5958 826 Monticello Dr, Falls Ch, Va. JE 39367 GRIPFING, Sillard Civ 5E935 55598 9054 St. New Alexandria, Va. AL 7362 TABOR, Mary M. Civ 5E935 55598 1712 17th St N W, Wash, DC NO 5932 TABOR, Mildred R. Civ 5E935 55598 63002 Queens Chapal Rd, Nyacts MA 8745 AUUPMENT SECTION  HOFFMAN, John W. Lt Col 5E989 76323 12 W Windsor Ave, Alex, Va. Ov 6999 PATTERSON, Bouglass E. Civ 5E989 76323 12 W Windsor Ave, Alex, Va. Ov 6999 PATTERSON, Bouglass E. Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St H W, Washington, DC ST 5784, MOCRE, Edward C. Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St H W, Washington, DC ST 5784, MAUCK, Emma C. Civ 5E989 76323 2340 N N Lt Raington, Va. UN 2742 NAME CIV 5E989 76323 2340 N N Lt Raington, Va. ON 2742 NAME CIV 5E989 76323 2340 N N Lt Raington, Va. ON 2742 NAME CIV 5E989 76323 2340 N N Lt Raington, Va. ON 2742 NAME CIV 5E989 76323 2340 N N Lth St, Arlington, Va. ON 2742 NAME CIV 5E989 76323 2340 N N N St, N St, DC DI 2000 NAMER, Norma W. Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 5E989 76323 1211 S Homas St, Arlington, Va. CIV
ROURY, Elizabeth F.   Civ   5E993   55598   605 N Bucharan St., Arl., Va.   JA 22852
GOLLOME, Ethyline RDDY, Lois P. Civ 5E993 72369 5801 15th Pl, Nyattoville, Md, AP 2776 FERDEEER, Helen F. Civ 5E993 92731 875 Lebanon St N, Arl, Ve. FA 0935 STROBEL, Sara S. Civ 5E985 54427 448 Argyle Dr, Falls Ch, Va. FA 6109  T/D REVIEW SECTION  GREW, R. E. BRAULEY, Frank W. Civ 5E985 55598 729 Monticello Dr, Falls Ch, Va. JE 39896 CRIFTING, Millard Civ 5E985 55598 2905 Eric St S E, Mash, DC AY 5011 LEIGH, Harold TABOR, Mary M. Civ 5E985 55598 1712 17th St N, Wash, DC MO 5932 THORGAN, Mildred R.  Civ 5E985 55598 6302 Queens Chapel Rd, Myatts WA 8745 AULIPMENT SECTION  HOFFLAN, John M. Lt Col 5E989 55992 801 S Florida St, #1, Columbia Hgts, Arilington, Va. AL 7862 WILLIAMS, Emrys P. Civ 5E989 75992 807 Green St, Alexandria, Va. RI 89539 PATTERSON, Douglace E. Civ 5E989 76323 12 W Windson, Va. ALLEN, Wendell C. WEAVER, Ida M. Civ 5E989 75236 2826 Loreum Lane, Arl, Va. A 80693 MOORE, Edward C. WEAVER, Ida M. Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St M., Washington, DC ST 5784 MACK, Emma C. Civ 5E989 76323 2340 N 11th St, Arlington, Va. Civ 5E989 76323 2340 N 11th St, Arlington, Va. Civ 7938 SMITH, Marguerite P. Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 7938 SMITH, Marguerite P. Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 7938 SMITH, Marguerite P. Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 7938 SMITH, Marguerite P. Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 7938 SMITH, Marguerite P. Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 7938 SMITH, Marguerite P. Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 7938 SMITH, Marguerite P. Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. CIV 7934
FERDERER, Helen F. Civ 58993 54731 875 Lebanon St N, Arl, Va. FA 60935 STROBEL, Sara S. Civ 58985 54427 443 Argric Dr., Falls Ch., Va., FA 6109  T/D REVIEW SECTION  GRAN, R. E. Lt Col 58985 55598 729 Monticello Dr., Falls Ch., Va., JE 33507 GRIFFING, Millard Cav 58985 55598 2905 Mrte St S E, Mash, DC AX 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 58985 55598 2905 Mrte St S E, Mash, DC AX 5011 LEICH, Harold Civ 58985 55598 9052 G St., Now Alexandria, Va. At 7862 TABOR, Mary M. Civ 58985 55598 1712 17th St M W, Rash, DC MO 5932 DUGGAN, Mildred R. Civ 58985 55598 6302 queens Chapel Rd., Nach, DC MO 5932 AQUIPMENT SECTION  HOFFMAN, John M. Lt Col 58989 55992 801 S Florida St, Fl., Columbia Hgts, Arlington, Va. AL 89539 WILLIAMS, Enrys P. Civ 58989 75323 12 W Windsor Ave, Alex, Va. OV 6999 PATTERSON, Douglace E. Civ 58989 71605 6315 Suitland Rd., Vas., DC HI 8928 LEONARD, Thelma H. Civ 58989 75236 2826 Loreum Lane, Arl, Va. JA 80693 MOORE, Edward C. Civ 58989 76323 2030 F St H W, Washington, DC ST 5784 MAUCK, Roma C. Civ 58989 76323 2030 F St H W, Washington, DC ST 5784 MAUCK, Roma C. Civ 58989 76323 2340 H 11th St, Arlington, Va. ON 2002 MAUCKER, Araine C. Civ 58989 75323 400 S Admas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 2340 H 11th St, Arlington, Va. ON 2002 SANDAGGER, Araine K. Civ 58989 55598 550 S 18th St, Mt Rainler, Md. WA 3742 SMITH, Marguerite P. Civ 58989 55598 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 76323 1211 S Thomas St. Arlington, Va. Civ 58989 7
### STROBEL, Sara S.   Clv   58985   54427   448 Armyle Br, Falls Ch, Va.   FA 5109    ### T/D REVIEW SECTION    GREEK, R. L.   Lt Col   58985   55598   729 Menticello Dr, Falls Ch, Va. JE 39396    ### BRADLEY, Frank w.   Civ   58985   55598   526 Menticello Dr, Falls Ch, Va. JE 39507    GRIFFING, willard   Civ   58985   55598   2505 Eric St S E, Mash, DC   AX 5011    LEICH, Harold   Civ   58985   55598   3052 GS. Now Alexandria, Va. AL 7862    #### TABOR, Mary M.   Civ   58985   55598   1712 17th St N W, Wash, DC   NO 5932    #### TUGGAN, Mildred R.   Civ   58989   55598   5502 Queens Chapel Rd, Wetts   WA 8745    #### ALLEN, Wendell G.   Civ   58989   55992   S01 S Florida St, #1, Columbia    #### Hgts, Arlington, Va.   Lt 89539    #### WILLIAMS, Enrys P.   Civ   58989   76323   12 W Windsor Ava, Alex, Va.   OV 6999    #### PATTERSON, Douglass E.   Civ   58989   76323   12 W Windsor Ava, Alex, Va.   OV 6999    #### MOORE, Edward C.   Civ   58989   76323   23030 F St M. Washington, DC ST 5784    ### MOORE, Edward C.   Civ   58989   76323   2300 F St M. Washington, DC ST 5784    ### MAUCK, Enma C.   Civ   58989   76323   2340 N 11th St, Arlington, Va.   CIV 79438    ### SMITH, Marguerite P.   Civ   58989   55236   4003 S Adams St, Arlington, Va.   CL 7344    SMITH, Marguerite P.   Civ   58989   55236   4003 S Adams St, Arlington, Va.   CL 7344    CARVELAS, Jane W.   Civ   58989   76323   1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va.   CL 7334    CARVELAS, Jane W.   Civ   58989   76323   1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va.   CL 7334    CARVELAS, Jane W.   Civ   58989   76323   1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va.   CL 7334    CARVELAS, Jane W.   Civ   58989   76323   1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va.   CL 4000    #### CARVELAS, Jane W.   Civ   58989   76323   1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va.   CL 4000    #### CARVELAS, Jane W.   Civ   58989   76323   1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va.   CL 4000    #### CARVELAS, Jane W.   Civ   58989   76323   1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va.   CL 4000    #### CARVELAS, Jane W.   Civ   58989   76323
GRAK, R. M.  BRADLEY, Frank  Civ 5E985 55598 526 Monticello Dr., Falls Ch., Va. JE 39396  GRIFFING, Millard Civ 5E985 55598 526 Monticello Dr., Falls Ch., Va. JE 38507  GRIFFING, Millard Civ 5E985 55598 2905 Emte St S E, Mash, DC AZ 5011  LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 9052 OS St., New Alexandria, Va. AL 7862  TABOR, Mary M.  Civ 5E985 55598 1712 17th St N W., Mash, DC NO 5932  TABOR, Mildred R.  Civ 5E985 55598 6302 Queena Chapal Rd., Nyauts WA 8745  EQUIPMENT SECTION  HOFFIAN, John M.  Lt Col 5E989 55992 801 S Florida St., #1., Columbia  Higto, Arlington, Va.  ALLEN, Wendell G.  Civ 5E989 55992 807 Green St., Alexandria, Va., KI 89539  WILLIAMS, Enrys P.  Civ 5E989 76323 12 W Windsor Ave., Alax, Va., OV 6999  PATTERSON, Douglaes E. Civ 5E989 76323 12 W Windsor Ave., Alax, Va., OV 6999  PATTERSON, Douglaes E. Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St N N, Washington, DC ST 5784,  MOORE, Edward C.  Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St N N, Washington, DC ST 5784,  MAUCK, Emma C.  MAURER, Norma W.  Civ 5E989 76323 2340 N Nith Rainier, Md. WA 3742  MAUCK, Emma C.  MAURER, Norma W.  Civ 5E989 75236 A106 28th St., Mt Rainier, Md. WA 3742  MAURER, Norma W.  Civ 5E989 755236 A00 S Adman St., Arlington, Va., CI 9038  SMITH, Marguerite P.  Civ 5E989 55236 A00 S Adman St., Arlington, Va., CL 7334,  SMITH, Marguerite P.  Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St., Arlington, Va., CL 7334  CARVELAS, Jane W.  Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St., Arlington, Va., CL 7334
BRADLET, Prank w. Civ 5E985 55598 526 Monticello Dr. Falls Ch. Va.JE 335C7  GRIPFING, Millard Civ 5E985 55598 2905 Ente St S E. Mash. DC AZ 5011  LEICH, Harold Civ 5E985 55598 9051 C St. New Alexandria, Va. AL 7862  TABOR, Mary M. Civ 5E985 55598 1712 17th St N W. Mach. DC NO 5932  DUGGAN, Mildred R. Civ 5E989 55598 6302 Queena Chapel Rd. Nyatts WA 8745  AULIEN, Wendell G. Civ 5E989 55992 801 S Florida St. #1. Columbia  Hgto, Arlington, Va. JA 41748  ALLEN, Wendell G. Civ 5E989 76323 12 W Windsor Ava. Alexandria, Va. KI 89539  WILLIAMS, Enrys P. Civ 5E989 76323 12 W Windsor Ava. Alex. Va. OV 6999  PATTERSON, Douglass E. Civ 5E989 71605 6215 Suttland Rd. Vash. DC HI 8728  LEONARD, Thelma H. Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St N N. Waskington, DC ST 5784  WEAVER, Ida M. Civ 5E989 76323 2030 F St N N. Waskington, DC ST 5784  WEAVER, Ida M. Civ 5E989 76323 2340 N 11th St, Arlington, Va. OW 2002  MAURER, Armie K. Civ 5E989 55236 400 S Adams St, Arlington, Va. GL 4300  CANVELAS, Jane W. Civ 5E989 76323 1211 S Thomas St, Arlington, Va. GL 4400
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DEPART: FHIT OF THE AIR FORCE HEAD WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Appendix No 2

16 Feb 1951

AFOLIO

SUBJECT: Manpower Utilization

TO: all Maj. Comeds

- 1. The President has promulgated a very firm policy in the fields of Mannower Utilization and Management Engineering, and has delegated responsibilities for conformance to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of Defense. These two departments, together with various congressional committees are applying and will continue to apply, considerable pressure for information relative to the methods we employ in the utilization of our manpower resources and the extent to which management engineering functions are being performed.
- 2. This Headquarters is taking action to realign responsibilities in the fields of Management Engineering and Manapower Utilization in accordance with directives from higher echelons, and it becomes imperative that we re-emphasize and revitalize these programs. Advance copies of Air Force Regulations 150-1, 150-2, and 150-3, currently in the process of being published, are inclosed for your information and guidance.
- 3. A recent inquiry received by this Headquarters indicates a necessity for a complete inventory of Lanpower Program and Lanagement Engineering efforts of the last calendar year. In order to furnish an accurate report, it is requested that you furnish this Headquarters, by 1 March 1950, the following information:
- a. All directives issued by your Headquarters relating to manpower and management engineering, and the means you employ to exercise control.
- b. The number of personnel and organizational level of activities devoting full or part time attention to manpower and management engineering problems. For the purpose of this report management engineering functions will include:
  - (1) Organizational planning and review.
  - (2) Developing guides on matters of organization, methods and procedures.

- (3) Devising programs to improve utilization of facilities, materials and equipment (work measurement, work simplification, etc.)
- (4) Performing surveys to determine existence of adequate management deficiencies.
- c. Current projects underway designed to improve management.
- d. A list of surveys being conducted either by USAF personnel or civilian firms concerning functions listed in paragraph 3, b, (4).
- e. A list of the names of bases and units on which "on the spot" Manpomer Surveys have been performed, to include the following:
  - (1) Action taken on survey report recommendations by reviewing authority.
  - (2) A list of the number of survey reports forwarded to Headquarters USAF.
- f. The status of the Directive Screening Program (as cutlined by Letter of Assistant Vice Chief of Staff) to include:
  - (1) Command comments on USAF Directives.
  - (2) Results of screening of Command Directives.
- g. Copies of yardsticks, typical tables, or other workload measures which have been developed and used to determine the number of people required to perform the workload.
- h. The number of staff visits to subordinate echelons in connection with management engineering problems.
- i. Any other actions taken to provide for management improvement and better utilization of personnel.

> BY CCMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

3 Incls

1. Proposed AFR 150-1 2. Proposed AFR 150-2

3. Proposed AFR 150-3

Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force Director of Manpower and Organization

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

appendix ho 3

AFL 121-28

AUR FORCE LETTER) NO. 121-28 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, 15 AUGUST 1950

SPECIAL SUBJECTS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL

Status of Mission for T/O and T/D Units

(Effective until 31 December 1950 unless sooner rescinded or superseded)

- 1. <u>Deficiency</u>. The extensive activities of the Air Force require large numbers of T/O and T/D units with varying missions, objectives, and functions, many of which are relatively temporary or frequently subject to changes.
- a. Subsequent to activation of a unit many factors and conditions arise which indicate that the need for the unit or its mission should be reviewed, with attendant revision of its T/O or T/D.
- b. Readquarters USAF has noted instances where the manning and equipment of units was inconsistent with the mission; or where the mission was nearing completion, without any plan or action to deactivate the unit or to give it a currently required mission. In other instances the mission had changed without appropriate changes in T/Os or T/Ds; or the mission was not of sufficient importance to the over-all Air Force mission to justify continuance of the unit.
- c. The above deficiencies indicate a waste of panpower which reflects adversely on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Air Force.

#### 2. Action Required:

- a. Commanders will require inspections to be made to determine the status of the mission of T/O and T/D units, with special regard to determining that:
  - The mission of the unit is clear and definite, is required in support of the parent command's mission, and could not be more economically performed as an additional function of another unit.
  - (2) The actual activities of the unit are consistent with its assigned mission and that actions are taken to adjust T/Os or T/Ds when the mission of the unit has been, or should be, changed.
  - (3) The manning of the unit is not in excess of T/O or T/D or other approved document, or is not inappropriate to economical performance of the mission.
  - b. Reports will be rendered as directed by AFR 120-25.

AFL 121-28 3. Expiration Date. This will be a Special Subject for all inspectors general until 31 December 1950 at which time this Letter will be rescinded and removed from the active file of Special Subjects. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE: HOYT S. VANIENEERO Chief, of Staff, United States Air Ford OFFICIAL: L.L.JUCCE Colonel, USAF Air Adjutant General DISTRIBUTION: E:F

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

AFOMO-G

MEMORANDUM FOR: GIMER L LYNCH SUBJECT: Manpower Utilization 23 may 1951

- 1. Attached hereto are comments pertinent to obtaining historical data on the subject of manpower utilization and control function within the Air Force.
- 2. In view of Comment #2 wherein the Air University Liaison Office advised that they were not in a position to undertake a historical study of this nature, this Division made a check of the availability of material within the Air Force Library in both this Headquarters and Records Center at Alexandria, Va. As a result of this check it was determined that in order to compile a complete history of this activity within the Air Force supported by substantiating documents, considerable research would be necessary. No histories of the activities within Aq AAF or Hq USAF were compiled during the war and for 5 years subsequent thereto. It was only recently that such a program was initiated. The documents at the Records Center in Alexandria dealing with this subject, although consolidated into several file cabinets, have neither been inventoried nor catalogued.
- 3. A review of the more readily available information indicates that the Manpower Division came into being upon publication of General Order #1 dated March 28, 1943. This General Order abolished the Directorate of Management Control and placed this function in the Office of the Chief of Air Staff and was titled Office of Management and Control. The Manpower Division was set up as a part of this office. The functions of the Division were outlined as follows:
- a. Effectuates establishing policies of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces with respect to the efficient utilization of personnel in the Army Air Forces; formulates and recommends new and revised policies as required.
- b. Studies organizational structure, procedures, practices and activities involving the use of manpower in all elements of commands and air forces and recommends improvements to effect economies.
- c. Monitors studies designed to economize in the use of personnel in combat and service units.
- d. Directs action necessary to alleviate personnel burdens created by over-emphasized regulations and restrictions.

- e. Collaborates with War Department Manpower Board.
- 4. The functions of this Division remained the same until January 1, 1945 and on that date they were considerably broadened and set up as follows:
- a. Effectuates established policies of the Commanding General, AAF with respect to manpower utilization in the AAF; formulates and recommends new and revised policies as required.
- b. Determines permanent party personnel requirements, both military and civilian, on the basis of approved programs, for all activities under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, AAF, operating under bulk authorization of personnel.
- c. As AAF Liaison Agency with the War Department Manpower Board, submits Zone of Interior requirements to the Deputy Chief of Staff (War Department Manpower Board) for approval.
- d. Sub-authorizes military and civilian allotments to Zone of Interior air forces and commands from the totals approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff.
- e. On the basis of changes in programs, redistributes the total Zone of Interior allotments as required.
- f. Reports to AC/AS, OC&R, Troop Basis Division for inclusion in the overall AAF Troop Basis, Zone of Interior military manpower requirements approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff, and to the Budget and Fiscal Officer, for inclusion in budgetary presentations, the approved civilian requirements.
- g. Initiates studies and surveys and establishes standards respecting efficient utilization of manpower, and develops forms and procedures for the control and reporting of manpower authorization.
- h. Assists the Air Porces and commands in surveys initiated by the field and in projecting permanent party requirements.
- 5. On July 1, 1945 the Manpower Division was transferred from the Office of Management Control to AC/AS Personnel operating under the Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Personnel and Policy Management. The Office of Management Control was completely dissolved on August 25, 1945.
- 6. The functions of the Deputy Assistant Chief/AS for Personnel and Policy Management were outlined as follows:

Will advise and assist the Chief of Air Staff-l in the formulation

of broad policies in the field of personnel; establish permanent party requirements, both military and civilian, for all activities under the jurisdication of the Commanding General AAF which operate under bulk authorizations; conduct and supervise such studies and surveys as are necessary to obtain the most efficient utilization of manpower in the AAF; conduct the personnel management program of the AAF and establish operating standards in the field of personnel as requested or directed.

On January 10, 1947 the function was transferred to the Organization Division AC/AS-3 and was identified as the Manpower Survey Branch. Since no functional charts were kept during this period the exact functions of this branch were not determined however in March 1948 when these charts were resumed, the functions of the Manpower Survey Branch were listed as follows:

- a. Conducts actual field manpower field surveys of USAF installations; in conjunction with representatives of the major command concerned to determine the total manpower requirement incident to the accomplishment of the current total mission of an air base or activity.
- b. Advises T/O&E and Troop Basis Branches of its survey findings and makes appropriate recommendations as to desirable changes or adjustments to personnel authorizations.
- c. Deter ines the adequacy of personnel requirement guides or measures and makes recommendations as to desirable changes thereto.
- d. Identifies directives in force which are expensive or wasteful in the use of manpower and takes appropriate steps to have such directives modified or rescinded.
- e. Advises interested staff agencies of field deficiencies in the employment of personnel when such uneconomical employment results from methods and/or procedures directed by such agencies as their counterparts in lower echelons.
- 7. On July 1, 1948 the name of this branch was changed to the Manpower Economy Branch with functions essentially the same as before.
- 8. During the months of March 1948 a manpower economy board was established in Headquarters USAF and at each major command. These boards were to initiate continuing action to attain the most effective utilization of personnel consistent with assigned missions. Recommendations were to be made to Headquarters USAF providing for the correction of practices, methods and procedures leading to improper personnel utilization. Surveys were to be conducted and reports and recommendations submitted in accordance with instructions issued by Hq USAF.

h. In December of 1948 a Manpower Group was set up in the Office Chief of Staff which replaced the Manpower Economy Branch in Organization Division, AC/AS-3. The functions for this group were outlined as follows:

- (1) Appraises the necessity and manpower cost of specific functions and their relationship to the overall AF program.
- (2) Reviews established Air Force policies and effectiveness of utilization of personnel resources and the overall economy of operations, and recommends new policies and changes in existing policies where necessary or desirable.
- (3) Surveys personnel utilization, reviews military and civilian personnel allocations and recommends revisions when appropriate.
- (4) Develops and maintains current guides, methods and procedures for use in the determination of manpower requirements.
- (5) Represents the Chief of Staff, USAF on such interdepartmental manpower boards as may be established.

LeROY HUDSON

9. Since the abolishment of the Manpower Group in November 1949 and the transfer of its activities to the Manpower and Organization Division, DGS/O a detailed activity history is being kept and is on file in the Director's office.

#### References:

Colonel, USAF

General Order #1 Chief, Manpower Requirements Division

March 28, 1943

AAF Regulation 20-1,
1 December 1943

AAF Regulation 20-1, 28 May 1944

HOI 20-95, 25 June 1945

HOI 20-107, 25 August 1945

HOI 20-12, 9 January 1947

AF Regulation 20-32, 22 March 1948

Runctional Charts

1 Incl Comments 1 & 2, subj: Historical Data -Manpower Utilization

SESTION #1

- 1. Upon the publication of General Order #1, 28 March 1943, the functions normally associated with Troop Basis were placed in the Allocations and Program Division, AC/AS Operations, Commitment and Requirements. It was not until 1 February 1944 that this activity was broken out as the Troop Basis Division operating under the AC/AS Operation, C&R. The functions for the Division at that time were outlined as follows:
- a. Formulates the AAF program (troop basis) and changes thereto, constituting the official schedule of units required by each Air Force and Command and recommends to the AC/AS Operation, Commitments and Requirements for approval; and acts as the point of contact between Army Air Forces and G-3, ND General Staff on matters affecting the AAF program.
- b. Determines quantitative requirements of personnel and units; and initiates directives to other AC/AS's defining the requirements for which they are responsible in implementing the program.
- c. Authorized or disapproves personnel authorisations of all types and directs for the AAF the activation, deactivation, constitution or reorganisation of units, obtaining decisions as to policy on questionable cases from the AC/AS, OCAR for the resolution of conflicting requirements.
- d. Translates for approval of the AC/AS, OGAR in collaboration with AC/AS, Plans and Requirements Division of AC/AS, OGAR, the objective and policies determined by higher authority into basic ground rules, ratios and standards to be employed by all offices concerned in programming and scheduling and promulgates such ground rules, ratios and standards.
- e. Performs programming and scheduling procedure required for the preparation and maintenance of the AAF program.
- f. Recommends to the AC/AS Operations, CAR, action necessary to bring the program into balance with requirements and availability.
- g. Mintains a record check on all activated units; periodically monitors the recommendation of the requirements therefor and initiates the inactivation of units not required.

- h. Reviews, in collaboration with the %C/85, Personnel, training output, schedules and other personnel resources available for adequacy in providing program requirements.
- 2. The functional exarts of 1 June 1945 show the functions of Troop Basis Division being essentially the same as those enumerated above. During this period the Assistant for Personnel and Organization was charged with the responsibility for making recommendations to the Troop Basis Division the basis of allotment of AAF units (the ratio of given types of units to other units) and the quantitative requirements (except for Zone of Interior) for personnel for which no established basis of allotment existed. ZI requirements for permanent party personnel were determined by the Manpower Division, Management and Control and upon their recommendation to Troop Basis such requirements were included in the overall AAF Troop Basis.
- 3. In the reorganization of Eq. AAF upon the cessation of hostilities HOI 20-1 dated 15 September 1945 shows Troop Basis as a branch under the Organization Division, AC/AS-3 along with the T/ORE Branch.
- 4. In November of 1947 a reorganisation of Hq. USAF was effected and HoI 20-12 dated 4 Movember shows the Troop Hasis function in the Organization Division, Directorate of Training & Requirements, DCS/O.
- 5. The functional chart of September 1948 shows the Troop Basis Branch as still being in a part of the Organization Division along with the T/CAE Branch, Manpower Secondary Branch and the Organizational Branch. The functions at this time were outlined as follows:
- a. Momitors, resolves, records, advises and acts as Air Staff focal point in allocations affecting the USAF Troop program.
- b. Maintains an accurate day to day record of the USAF Troop Program with all approved changes reflected therein.
- e. Maintains a current record of unfilled requirements and possible sources of Troop Program spaces for new requirements.
- d. Provides troop program information to other Air Staff agencies as requested.
- e. Maintains a day to day accounting of all phases of the current USAF Troop Program which indicates the number of units by type, strength, assignment and deployment which are currently authorised and as the number which are planned to be authorised during a specified period as by a specified time.

- f. Interprets and integrates from available sources allocations to be reflected in a projected USAF Troop Program and proposes for quarterly publication the USAF Troop Program by type and units.
- g. Frepares and processes for publication, orders for the establishment, assignment or discontinuance of USAF activities.
- h. Determines projected military and civilian requirements for the annual budget estimates and for interim changes thereto. Prepares all estimates in the Organization Division for budgetary purposes.
- i. Develops, plans, policies and procedures on matters pertaining to the allotment and sub-allotment of military grades in the USAF and exercises Air Staff supervision over these matters, and conducts continuing studies to determine trends in military grades requirements in the USAF.
- j. Prepares SSW runs on current and projected programs as needed. Prepares, analysis studies of personnel utilisation and prepares typical personnel requirements for designed type stations, wartime and peacetime.

Troop Basic remained a function of the Director of Organization, DCS/O and upon the establishment of the Directorate of Manpower and Organization in December of 1949, the function was absorbed by that Directorate.

Recap of Offices charged with the Troop Basis functions:

Allocations & Programs Div. AC/AS OCER Organisation Div. AC/AS-3 Organisation Div. Dir. Trng & Req. DCS/O Allocations Div. Dir. Man. & Org. DCS/O 28 March 1943 15 September 1945 4 November 1947 1 December 1949

CHESTION /2

- 1. After establishing the Management and Control function in the Office of the Chief of Air Staff in March of 1943, a system for allotting permanent party personnel (military and civilian) was drawn up by the Manpower Division of that office. The plan was approved and put into effect as follows:
- a. Manpower Division made bulk allotments to Commands by requesting Troop Basis AC/AS-3 to issue ACO Letter to Commands. At a later date the letter was issued direct to Commands by the Manpower Division.
  - Wilitary Personnel issued grades within above totals.
     Budget allotted funds.
- b. Manpower Division defended bulk requirements before War Department Manpower Board.
- c. Manpower Division defended bulk requirements as related to civilian personnel funds before War Department Budget Officer.
- 2. In July 1945 the Manpower Division was transferred to AC/AS-1 with no change in the method of operation.
- 3. In January of 1947 when the Manpower functions were transferred to the Organization Division, AC/AS-3 the grade allocation function was also transferred to that Division from another office of the AC/AS-1. These transfers brought together for the first time the functions associated with manpower and those associated with Troop Basis and Allocations.
- 4. Upon the establishment of the Manpower Group in the Office of the Chief of Staff in December 1948, the total manpower function again became separated and it was not until the Directorate of Manpower and Organisation was established in December of 1949 that centralisation was again effected in one staff agency.

appendix 405

AIR PROVING GROUND MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT DURING FY 50 9 Mar 1951

An organizational and manpower utilization and requirements survey of the Comptroller's organization, Hq APG was conducted by the APG Manpower Survey Team during FY 50, with the following results:

a. Reorganisation from four Divisions to three, as follows:

#### Previous Divisions

Program Standards & Cost Control Budget & Fiscal Statistical Services Finance

#### Recommended Divisions

Accounting & Disbursing Management Analysis Reporting

- b. Reorganization streamlined operations of this activity by:
  (1) Grouping homogeneous functions together under separate Division
  Chiefs and, within each Division, grouping related duties and responsibilities under the same organizational component; (2) Shifting personnel spaces not needed in one Division to other Divisions where realistic requirements existed; and (3) Eliminating nonessential functions, weeding out duplications, correcting canditions where overlapping duties and responsibilities existed, and combining like duties and responsibilities under individual employees.
- c. International Business Machine equipment surplus to the needs of the Air Proving Ground was returned to corporation from which rented.
- d. Amber of personnel authorizations required was reduced from 120 to 113.
- e. Procedures involving processing of statistical reports, fiscal vouchers, cost reports, etc. were simplified and reduced to only the essential steps, thereby accelerating each process considerably.
- f. A yardstick was developed, for future manning purposes, which established a ratio between personnel requirements and workload.
  - g. Savings effected were:
    - Six officer personnel and one civilian with total annual salaries of \$42,250.
    - (2) International Business Machine equipment rental costs: \$1920 annually.
    - (3) 10% increase in effectiveness of organization.

Wrtn 16 Jan 51/Lt Col Bower/wd/75554 - AFOAD-G

APPENDIX NO. 6

SUBJECT: Transfer of Housekeeping Responsibilities at Washington National Airport to Headquarters Command

AFOMO-G

3rd Ind

17 Jan 1951

Department of the Air Force, Hq, USAF, Washington 25, D. G.

THEU: Commanding General, Headquarters Command, USAF, Bolling Air Force Base, Mashington 25, D. C.

TO: Commander, Military Air Transport Service, Andrews Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C.

- 1. Headquarters Command will assume responsibility for the base at Washington National Airport and will provide logistic and administrative support to the 1254th AT Squadron, MATS. The 1254th AT Squadron will retain only those functions directly related to the operational mission assigned them including internal administration.
- 2. MATS and Headquarters Command will arrange the details of personnel troop space and property adjustment and submit these requests for adjustment to this Headquarters.
  - 3. The transfer will be effected as expeditiously as possible.

    BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Signed

4 Incls

WILLIAM F. MCKEE Major General, U. S. Air Force Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

Wrtn 16 Jan 51 Lt Col Bower/rg/75554

APPENDIX NO. 6

DCS/Operations 1 Vice Chief of Staff 2

Approval Signature Manpower Requirements Div. D/180, DCS/0

Lt. Col. Bower/rg

75554

Transfer of Housekeeping Responsibilities at Machington National Airport to Headquarters Command

- 1. Under the provisions of AFR 23-7 Headquarters Command is charged with the administration and logistic support of all units and personnel in the Mashington area except those whose inherent structure provides for self sufficiency.
- 2. The 1254th AT Squadron of WATS is responsible for operating the SAW and attendant terminal facilities. This squadron has been augmented sufficiently to perform the functions of operating an air base.
- 3. Headquarters Command has the organizational and functional ability to provide the support at Washington National Airport. MATS can operate the SAM function with a greatly reduced personnel strength if the support is furnished.
- 4. A reply has been prepared to the basic letter from MATS directing that Headquarters Command assume base responsibility at Mashington National Airport and provide administrative and logistic support for the 1254th AT Squadron. MATS and Headquarters Command will make the necessary adjustments of personnel spaces and property accountability submitting their request for change to this Headquarters. (See TAB "A").

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1. Recommend that Headquarters Command assume the support of the 1254th AT Squadron. (Tab "A")
  - 2. Recommend signature and dispatch of the reply to the MATS letter.

1 Inel
Tab "A" - 3rd Ind to MATS
thru Hq. Cond,
subj as above

AURRY L. MOORE Brigadier General, USAF Deputy Director of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O

#### AREA EXAMINED

Aeronautical Chart Service Washington Hq & Plant St. Louis Plant & Stores

#### STATEMENT OF FUNCTION

- Provides and maintains adequate aeronautical charts, air target materials and related publications covering the world.
- 2. Assigned to Air Materiel Command.

1254th Air Transport Squadron Washington National Airport

Responsible for operating and maintaining in the highest standards of service:

- Passenger and cargo traffic terminal for military aircraft.
- 2. Port of Aerial Embarkation.
- 3. Air Force Foreign Clearing Station.
- 4. Training, both unit and reserve.
- 5. Assigned MATS.

4203rd Photo Technical Squadron Tenant-Bolling AFB

- Assist in preparation of Target Folders by Director of Intelligence and by Air Adjutant General.
- Assist Air Adjutant General in screening capture photography.
- 3. Assigned Strategic Air Command.

USAF Band and School Tenant - Bolling aFB

- Participate in and provide music for military formations and other appropriate ceremonies.
- Provide concert music and other instrumental combinations for entertainment.
- Assist in the promotion of Air Force objectives and prestige of the Air Force and of the United States.
- 4. Operate the Bandsman School in support of all USAF Bands.
- Provide a centrally directed investigative service to all USAF activities.
- Field Extension, Inspector General, Hq USAF.

Military Air Transport Service (MATS) Tenant-Bolling AFB

1005th Inspector General Unit

gations)

0.5.I. School 12 & Constitution

Tenant-Bolling AFB

(Office of Special Investi-

1. Transportation by air of mesonnel (including the

#### SUMMARY OF SURVEYS IN THE WASHINGTON AREA

#### CONCLUSIONS REACHED

- The organization has mushroomed without enough regard to good principals of command and organiaction
- 2. Duplications exist between the Washington and St. Louis offices.
- Technical research and liaison requirements are located in Washington.
- 4. The Headquarters elements can operate out of Washington.
- Administrative and housekeeping overhead requirements can be reduced by the assumption of those functions by Headquarters Command in keeping with the intent of AFR 23-7, "Headquarters Command" relative to the housing of airmen in the Washington area.
- The housing conditions at WNA are deplorable, requiring undue flunds and efforts in maintenance to permit, at best, sub-standard utilization.
- Activities performed are more properly office functions of the Director of Intelligence and of the Air Adjutant General.
- Considerable overhead can be eliminated by transferring the functions as indicated in 1 above. (From over 600 spaces to 126 required).
- Korean situation created an immediate tactical deployment of a squadron of this type for which SAC was charged.
- A band is needed in Washington for official ceremonial purposes.
- A band school is needed somewhere.
   A saving in manpower and facilities can be made by combining the USAF Band and the school in Washington.
- Central direction requires close proximity to the Director, OSI.
- The association and dependency on other Federal Agencies are so close and necessary, the location of the Headquarters OSI (1005 I.G. Unit) in the immediate vicinity of those agencies is required.
- The location of Hq, MATS and of the Hq AACS, ARS and FS in the Washington area is desirable and expedient in effecting required

#### RECOMMENDATION

- 1. That Air Materiel Command reorganize the Aeronautical Chart
- 2. That the Headquarters, ACS move to St. Louis, Mo., including:
  - a. C.O. and staff
  - Comptroller, Personnel and Administration, PIO, Inspector and Supply Division
  - c. Photogrammetry Section
- That a Washington Division, ACS, be established to care for the required research and liaison function (approximately 100 spaces).
- That Headquarters Command assume responsibility for the base at WNA, providing logistic and administrative support to the 1254th AT Squadron.
- That the 1254th AT Squadron retain only the functions directly related to the operational mission.
- That steps be taken to provide decent and adequate housing.
- That the authorizations of the Directorate of Intelligence be increased to assume these functions (total - 126).
- That the 4203rd Photo Tech. Sqdn be dissolved and a similar unit be assigned to DAC at a location to be announced.

That there be no change.

No change.

Due to the cost, both in dollars and interruption of activities, that no moves be made at this time.

	2. Port of Aerial Emparkation. 3. Air Force Foreign Clearing Station. 4. Training, both unit and reserve. 5. Assigned MATS.	relative to the housing of airmen in the Washington area.  2. The housing conditions at WNA are deplorable, requiring undue funds and efforts in maintenance to permit, at best, sub-standard utilization.	to the operational mission.  3. That steps be taken to provide decent and adequate housing.
4203rd Photo Technical Squadron Tenant-Bolling AFB	<ol> <li>Assist in preparation of Target Folders by Director of Intelligence and by Air Adjutant General.</li> <li>Assist Air Adjutant General in screening capture photography.</li> <li>Assigned Strategic Air Command.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Activities performed are more properly office functions of the Director of Intelligence and of the Air Adjutant General.</li> <li>Considerable overhead can be eliminated by transferring the functions as indicated in l above. (From over 600 spaces to 126 required).</li> <li>Korean situation created an immediate tactical deployment of a squadron of this type for which SAC was charged.</li> </ol>	1. That the authorizations of the Directorate of Intelligence be increased to assume these functions (total - 126).  2. That the 4203rd Photo Tech. Sqdn be dissolved and a similar unit be assigned to SAC at a location to be announced.
USAF Eard and School Tenant - Bolling AFE	<ol> <li>Participate in and provide music for military formations and other appropriate ceremonies.</li> <li>Provide concert music and other instrumental combinations for entertainment.</li> <li>Assist in the promotion of Air Force objectives and prestige of the Air Force and of the United States.</li> <li>Operate the bandsman School in support of all USAF Bands.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>A band is needed in Washington for official ceremonial purposes.</li> <li>A band school is needed somewhere.</li> <li>A saving in manpower and facilities can be made by combining the USAF Band and the school in Washington.</li> </ol>	5
1005th Inspector General Unit (Office of Special Investi-	Provide a centrally directed investigative service to all	<ol> <li>Central direction requires close proximity to the Director, OSI.</li> <li>The association and dependency on</li> </ol>	No change.
gations) Tenant-Bolling AFB 0.5.I. School 12 & Constitution	USAF activities.  2. Field Extension, Inspector General, Hq USAF.	other Federal Agencies are so clos and necessary, the location of the Headquarters OSI (1005 I.G. Unit) in the immediate vicinity of those agencies is required.	
Military Air Transport Service (MATS) Tenant-Bolling AFB  (Services assigned MATS which provide similar services for all commants and which are located at Andrews AFB, Barton Hall, and other smaller locations in the Washington Area).  Air Weather Services (AWS) Airways & Air Communications System (AACS) Air Rescue Service (ARS) Flight Service (FS)	MATS  1. Transportation by air of personnel (including the evacuation of sick and wounded) materiel, mail, strategic materials and other cargoes for all agencies of the Military Establishment, and as authorized for other agencies of the United States.  AWS  Provide weather service in conformity with AFR 20-58 for the Army and Air Force.	<ol> <li>The location of Hq, MATS and of the Hq AACS, ARS and FS in the Washington area is desirable and expedient in effecting required liaison in the accomplishment of the assigned missions but it is not essential.</li> <li>Any movement will be expensive* and cause some interruption of activities which is not desirable at this time.</li> <li>Hq AWS and the functions of that service presently here must remain in the Washington area to carry</li> </ol>	and interruption of activities, that no moves be made at this time.
	Provide and operate a system of airways communications and ground electronics aids to air operations.  ARS Provide Air Rescue Service to the Army and Air Force.	out required liaison with other Federal agencies.  4. If an urgent requirement arose, al of these activities, except the AWS, its activities, and certain AACS detachments can be moved and operated from another location.	1
	FS Direct and operate Flight Service Centers.	*Cost - Tariff, Freight, Packing New Base or Office Bldg - annual rental or Hq Bldg Tenant on base	- \$ 200,000 - \$35,000,000 - \$ 1,500,000 - \$ 5,625,000

AREA

#### RECOMMENDATION

- That Air Materiel Command reorganize the Aeronautical Chart Service.
- That the Headquarters, ACS move to St. Louis, Mo., including:
  - a. C.O. and staff
  - Comptroller, Personnel and Administration, PIO, Inspector and Supply Division
  - c. Photogrammetry Section
- That a Washington Division, ACS, be established to care for the required research and liaison function (approximately 100 spaces).
- That Headquarters Command assume responsibility for the base at WNA, providing logistic and administrative support to the 1254th AT Squadron.
- That the 1254th AT Squadron retain only the functions directly related to the operational mission.
- That steps be taken to provide decent and adequate housing.
- That the authorizations of the Directorate of Intelligence be increased to assume these functions (total - 126).
- 2. That the 4203rd Photo Tech. Sqdn be dissolved and a similar unit be assigned to SAC at a location to be announced.

That there be no change.

No change.

Due to the cost, both in dollars and interruption of activities, that no moves be made at this time. ACTION

 AMC completed detailed manpower survey, Dec. 1950 with a decision to reorganize ACS upon the consolidation in St. Louis, Mo.

2. The elements recommended to move will move when facilities in St. Louis, presently occupied by Army, are turned over by that Service to the Air Force (probably by 1 July '51). (Involves approximately 500 spaces).

- Recommendations #1 and #2 were accomplished in February, 1951.
- 2. Recommendation #3 is in process of accomplishment at WNA.

Recommendations carried out in July, 1950. The 544th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (formerly 4203rd Photo Tech Sqdr.) is still at Bolling AFB and will be moved to Offutt AFB as soon as space is available there. This is expected in the Fall of '51.

None.

None.

None.

#### AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS FUNCTIONS LOCATED DUT OF WARHINGTON, D.C.

BURE

OTHER OF MOTO				PERSONN	ments.
STAFF AGENCY	FUNCTION	LOCATION	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	CIVILIANS
Air Adjutant General	Records Administration Unit Maintains liaison and coordination with Dept. of Army on non-current records.	Kansas City, Mo.	0	0	2
	Postal Service Unit Performs courier service in conjunction with Army.	Courier Transfer Stations	15	8	
Directorate of Civilian Personnel	Area Survey Teams Continual review of all field installations Civilian Personnel Programs	Kelly AFB, Texas (San Antonio)	0	0	32
	Civilian Personnel Research, Placement, Training, Coordination, and School for Civilian Personnel Administration	Kelly AFB, Texas (San Antonio)	0	0	37
Directorate of Military Personnel	Special Services Branch Procurement, distribution, etc. Special Services Supplies Information & Education Division	Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Chio	12	0	4
	Provides press service, shortwave radio outlets, correspondence courses, educational facilities.	New York City, California, Wisconsin,	32	0	0
	Awards Branch Handles correspondence relative awards with WW II Veterans.	Kansas City, Mo.	0	0	10
	Various Personnel relationships with Army & Navy This does not include 2680 in Military Recruiting Service	Different Headquarters of Army and Navy in ZI	45	0	0
Directorate of Finance	Air Force Finance Division Extension of the Office of Dir/Finance for the purpose of exercising and supervising finance functions which require centralized control.	Denver, Colorado	63		1918
Directorate of Communications	1060th USAF Communications Group Operates the Hq USAF communications network throught the U.S.	Maxwell, Carswell, Wright- Patterson, Sacramento	24	72	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel	1132nd Special Activities Squadron Joint activities with Army - (1) Food Container Institute, Rations, petroleum, etc.	Sundry - 2I	12	0	0
	1151st Field Activities Squadron Joint Activities with Army at POE's	Sundry Ports	33	0	0
Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller	Auditor General Punction Receives and processes accounting documents pertaining to disbursements and collections made, etc.	Philadelphia, Pa.	12	150	0
Surgeon General	1152nd Field Activities Squadron Conducts Air Force Expert Consultant Service	Sundry - ZI	0	0	20
Inspector General	1002th Inspector General Unit Promotion and supervision of Flying Safety and performance of	Norton AFB, California	166	142	120
	Technical Inspections 1003rd Inspector General Unit Ferforms general inspections of all Air Force installations.	Kelly AFB, Texas	83	50	60
			-		

#### QUESTION B-9 (5)

We frequently hear the complaint that we have "too much overhead." Or, to put it mother way, the question is asked "Why doesn't every man see combat?" We are told that the Russions get many more divisions per 100,000 men than we do; that they get more airplane crews; sail more ships; that we are soft and require too many fancy supporting units.

What is the Department of Defense's view on this very vital question-since manpower is one of our most serious problems and we can't afford to weste a single man.

#### AIR FORCE COMMENT

- 1. Of the Air Force strength which is not of a combat type or in immediate support of combat operations (such as radar control and warning nets, etc.) the bulk is involved in two functions; namely, training and material activities. The remaining overhead activities require such a small percentage of personnel as to be relatively unimportant in an evaluation of manpower utilization. The total distribution of personnel by all functions is shown in Table A, Inclosure No. 1.
- 2. The total number of personnel required in the entire Air Force for each combat group obtained provides a simple means of measuring the total amount of overhead involved, most of which is in the training and material functions as outlined above, and this varies considerably with the nature of the situation confronting the Air Force. Table, B, Inclosure No 1, presents the changes which have taken place in these requirements before, durning and after World War II. During a period in which the United States is preparing for a possible all-out war (or even after such a war has started) and this country lacks the total air power required for minning such a war, a great deal of effort must be expended on the training establishment to produce the final combat groups required. This condition prevailed during 1942 and 1943 and exists today. As the number of combat groups approaches the number required for winning a war this percentage of effort devoted to the training establishment can be reduced. In postwar years when large reductions are mde in the size of the total Air Force a surplus of trained personnel exists temporarily and this requirement for a training program is reduced accordingly. This variation in training requirement is portrayed by the table of percentages of personnel involved in training activities either as students or supporting personnel during and after World War II, contained in Table C, Inclosure No 1. It should be noted that during theearly war years the percentage of effort devoted to training was so large that the majority of the tactical groups were not utilized for combat purposes at that time. This was due to the fact that these groups, although representing some combat potential, were either engaged in training other units or were receiving additional training themselves.
- 3. The major factor influencing the material and maintenance support required for a given number of tectical groups is the complexity of the equipment contained in such groups and the related equipment required for their operation. The anticipated nature of any future war in terms of type of operations required and opposition expected has dictated the development of aircraft and supporting equipment of much greater complexity than that used in World War II. This development has given us bombers which are capable of carrying greatly increased bomb loads much longer

#### Appendix No 7

distances, fighters with greater speed, altitude, weather and fire power capabilities and larger transports with greater range, This increase in equipment complexity has increased the length of time required to train personnel for its operation (and hence the number of people involved in training) and the number required for maintenance, supply and other logistics functions. The simplest common demominator which may be used to indicate this change is the cost to produce the various types of aircraft. Although the cost of comparable products has increased in recent years, the change due to this general price rise is small in comparison to increases directly related to changes in equipment. Table D, Inclosure No 1, presents an indication of the magnitude of this change for various typical types.

4. The above analysis clearly indicates that the personnel required for the legistical support of each tactical Group is considerably greater today than for any comparable period in the past. In addition the Air Force is confronted with a situation similar to that of the early years of World War II in that it must be prepared for a large expansion. Therefore the ratio of personnel to tactical groups should be greater now than during World War II in order to previde a satisfactory base for expansion. Instead, this ratio is less and rather than having too much effort involved in "overhead" activities this supporting force has been reduced below that required in an effort to give a maximum immediate striking capability should war occur in the near future. This situation is even more critical than the figures indicate due to the fact that the present tactical groups are devoted to maintaining a high operational readiness and will be instantly employed upon the outbreak of war whereas the tactical groups of pre- and early World War II days were used primarily in training other groups to develop the large force which was ultimately required to defeat Germany and Japan.

#### SUPPORTING DATA

See Inclosure No 1.

#### PRIME DESIGNEE

Due to the great variation in the type of operations, equipment utilized, training requirements, etc., for the three services, it is recommended that no single service be designated to support the position of the other services on this matter.

#### TABLE A

### DISTRIBUTION OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL BY ACTIVITY

25.3 per cent of all personnel are in combat wings or separate squadrons—fighting units. (Not all combat crews and pilots, includes maintenance, medical, steff and housekeeping personnel.

5.7% are assigned to air defense systems and radar control and warning nets (Ground units).

8.5% are assigned to air transport activities. This includes MATS units.

10.4% are assigned to aviation engineer, dommunication and TAC control support units.

4.0% are assigned to air depots and material activities.

6.6% are assigned to station maintenance and base services.

2.9% are assigned to headquarters administrative and joint activity projects.

1.8% are assigned to Research and Development activities.


12.7% are engaged in training activities (Air Training Command, Air Univ., etc.)

13.2% are assigned to various student bodies at training schools.

3.2% are in the category of being patients or "in transit."

			Appendix No 7	
	TABLE B			
			TOTAL PERSONNEL	
DATE GI	TICAL COUPS	TOTAL PERSONNEL	AIR FORCE WIDE PER GROUP	
December *41	64	354,161	5,554	
June 142 December 142	136	764,415 1,597,049	7,568 11,743	
June 143	185	2,197,114 2,373,682	11,876	
	234 242	2,372,292 2,359,456	10,136	
June 145	243	2,282,259 888,769	9,392 8,154	
June   146 December   146	54 52	465,515	8,435 6,366	
June *47 December *47	63 70	305,827 339,246	4,854 4,846	
June '48 December '48	70 60	387,730 412,312	5,539 6,872	
June *49 December *49	56 47	418,037	7,465 8,858	
June #50 October #50	46 56 .	408,844 481,319	8,888 7,470	

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HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION DIVISION 1 January 1951 - 30 April 1951 Prepared for the Air University Historical Liaison Office by Mr. Daniel R. Schimmel (Historical Officer) 17 July 1951 Directorate of Manpower and Organization Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations HEADQUARTERS USAF

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#### CHAPTER I

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION

During the period covered by this History, the organization of this Division remained stable; the Division was functionally divided into two Branches, Organizational Flanning and Management Improvement, with Colonel A. J. Hanna as Division Chief and Colonels C. C. Wasem and R. T. Nichols as Chiefs of the Organizational Planning and Management Improvement Branches respectively.

The duties and responsibilities of the Organizational Flanning Branch remained as follows:

- 1. The maintenance of a logical, balanced organization for the
- 2. The development of long-range organizational objectives for the USAF.
- 3. The review and analysis of all current and proposed mission directives and organizations of the USAF to determine the proper assignment of functions and responsibilities, remove overlapping authority, establish clean-cut command channels, etc.

It was determined by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management), in coordination with the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, that the Air Staff agency responsible for management improvement and management engineering should also be responsible for an analysis of all requests for management engineering surveys emenating from subordinate echelons. Accordingly, the Director of Manpower and Organization, Major General Lynch, was given this additional responsibility. The Management Improvement Branch became the action agency within the Directorate on all such requests.

Consequently, the duties of the Management Improvement Branch became:

- The review of staff agencies concerned with management in the various components of the USAF.
- The making of periodic reviews to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the methods and procedures utilized by components of the USAF.
- The preparation of the annual USAF Management Improvement Report.
- 4. The review and analysis of all requests for management engineering surveys and the making of recommendations to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force as to the desired action.

During this period, several personnel changes of importance occurred. Colonel Walter G. W. Clatanoff, Deputy Chief of the Management Improvement Branch, transferred to the Organizational Planning Branch as Deputy Chief of that Branch and Lt Colonel E. J. Beth of the Organizational Planning Branch transferred to the Management Improvement Branch as Deputy Chief of that Branch.

The personnel strengths of both branches were increased during this period, the Organizational Planning Branch due to the increased workload incident to an expanding Air Force and the Management Improvement Branch due to a continued expansion of its field of interest and scope of activity.

There had, for some time, been a definite trend toward increasing personnel authorizations within Headquarters, USAF. On 17 April 1951 the Vice Chief of Staff, General Twining, issued a memorandum to the Air Staff recommending that efforts be made to halt this trend:

"I think you will all be interested in the fact that we have increased our authorized strength in Readquarters USAF by 2,090 since 1 June 1950...

"It seems to me that we must slow down this quantitative trend and concentrate on qualitative improvements. Obviously, the Air Staff cannot continue to grow at the present rate...

"Directors, Division and Branch Chiefs must evaluate the above factors as they relate to their own individual offices and take action accordingly."

In order to take action as recommended by General Twining,
General Lynch, on 27 April 1951, directed an organizational change
effective 30 April in an attempt to streamline the operations of
the Directorate. As a result of this reorganization, the Organization Division, as such, ceased to exist and its duties were taken over
by the newly established Organization Management Division. Both the
Organizational Flanning and Management Improvement Branches retained
their identities under the new organization, the titles, functions
and personnel transferring, in toto, to the newly established Division.

Memorandum dated 17 April 1951 from General Twining, Vice Chief of Staff to Deputies, Directors, Division Chiefs and comparable offices, Headquarters, USAF.

Memorandum dated 27 April 1951 from Major General Lynch to all Personnel, Directorate of Manpower & Organization, subject: "Organizational Change."

#### CHAPTER 11

#### MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING SERVICES

In the past it has been the policy of the Air Force to hire civilian management engineering firms to assist in the solving of problems which were beyond the capabilities of Air Force personnel. The determination as to the need for such surveys had been left largely to the discretion of the requesting office; that is, Hq USAF was not prepared to adequately evaluate requests for management engineering contracts and make a determination as to the desirability of hiring civilian consultants to solve the problem.

With the establishment of the Air Force Management Improvement Program, considerable interest focused on the use of civilian consultant services. The fear was expressed (and has been borne out by subsequent events) that Congress would examine this area with the attitude that perhaps the Air Force (as well as other Dovernmental agencies) was using its contractual authority as a means of by-passing its manpower ceilings. It was therefore determined that a strict control on all management engineering consultant contracts would be exercised by the Air Staff and by the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.

The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management) designated his Doparty for Organization and Program Management, Mr. William R. Sweeney, as the official responsible for making the final decisions on all management engineering consultant contracts:

"There is hereby delegated to you the responsibilities in connection with consulting engineering firms...

"You will take such action as may be required to assure that present procedures call for expeditious handling, full coordination, and that they are consonant with Air Force procurement policies and practices."

The responsibility for Air Staff action was placed with this 2
Directorate:

"Final approvals for such (management engineering) contracts are to be rendered by this office. Final approvals will be based upon recommendations made by you."

With this responsibility firmly established within the Air Staff and the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, this office undertook action to publish appropriate instructions to the field.

The following policies were firmly established as the basis for management engineering surveys:

- 1. Any office requesting such a survey must prove to the satisfaction of this office that it has made an effort to solve its problem with its own resources.
- Requests for such surveys will be thoroughly investigated by this office which will attempt to conduct the survey itself with the assistance of appropriate technical personnel from within the Air Staff.
- Memorandum dated 1 March 1951 from the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Eugene M. Zuckert, to the Deputy for Organization.
- Memorandum dated 1 March from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Organization & Program Management, to General Lynch, subject: "Contracts for Management Industrial Engineering Services."

3. Only if there are no Air Force resources available which are capable of solving the problem will a contract be let to a civilian management engineering consultant firm.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the fact that the responsibilities and procedures for processing requests for management engineering surveys has only recently been formalized, this office has processed nine requests for such surveys from Air Force commands since 1 January 1951. Of these nine, one was withdrawn by the requesting command and one was disapproved. Due to the newness of this office, it was not possible for it to undertake the remaining surveys; these were, therefore, approved for contracting to private management engineering firms at a total estimated cost of \$3,192,000.

For full details on this procedure, refer to Air Force Regulation 150-6 entitled "Management Engineering Services."

### CHAPTER III

# THE ORGANIZATION OF DENTAL UNITS IN THE USAF

In compliance with the requirement that all Army Regulations be replaced by appropriate Air Force publications by 1 July 1951, the Surgeon General, in March of 1951, submitted the draft of an Air Force Regulation to replace Army Regulation 40-15. AR 40-15, 27 September 1948, entitled "Dental Corps-General Provisions" defines the duties and responsibilities of Army Dental Officers and establishes their organizational location throughout the Army.

Based on the premise that "dental attendance is provided by a distinct and separate profession in the health services area" and patterning his draft on the Army model, the Surgeon General prepared a draft Air Force Regulation establishing the USAF dental service as "an operationally independent service." The proposed regulation provided that the commanding officer at each installation must "avail himself of direct access to, and must in turn be directly accessible to, the senior dental officer whenever either shall consider it advisable."

This provided, in effect, for a second medical group reporting directly to the base commanding officer.

In May of 1950, this Division discussed the entire problem of specialized services within the Air Force, paying particular attention to the dental service. The Organization Division said:

Air Staff Summary Sheet from AFCSG dtd 29 March 1951, subject: "Air Force Regulation Replacing AR 40-15."

"It is an established AF organizational policy and principle to minimize the number of specialized agencies reporting directly to the commander through the homogeneous grouping of closely related activities under a single head. It is most important that each agency be established on a status suited to its major purpose. It has been noted entirely too frequently that it has been the tendency of various special activities such as the dental service to agitate for a greater emphasis of its special function and status with an inherent requirement for separate organizational structure, usually of a 'Corps type'."


The Division recommended non-concurrence in the proposed regulation. In a memorandum for General Lynch, the Division stated that the approval of a separate dental service will establish a precedent justifying separate status for other branches of the service, violating a basic organizational policy of the Air Force and resulting in an excessive use of manpower:

"If the Dental Service is permitted to become separated from the Medical Service, a precedent will have been established, justifying the Veterinary Service, the Physical Therapy Service and Optometry Service to become a separate service. The basic idea of a separate Dental Service is contrary to the concept that the Air Force is a completely integrated unit...

"It is an established Air Force policy and principle to minimize the number of specialized agencies reporting directly to the commander by grouping closely related activities under a single head. The proposed regulation violates this policy."

Memorandum for General Lynch from Organization Division, dated 12 May 1950, subject: "Dental Service of the United States Air Force."

Memorandum for General Lunch from Organization Division, dated 17 April 1951, subject: "Air Force Regulation Replacing AR 40-15 (Dental Service)."



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#### CHAPTER IV

#### STANDARDIZATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL NOMENCLATURE

For some time the Air Force has been faced with a multiplicity of titles for its units. We have had as many as thirty different organizational titles in use at one time to designate our units; this has resulted in a situation in which two units at the same organizational level would carry different titles, or, what is even more confusing, the same title would be used in two different places to designate organizational units at two entirely different levels. In an attempt to remove this confusion, this Division drafted an Air Force Regulation which proposed to standardize the nomenclature of Air Force organizational units into seven prescribed words. The initial draft of this recommendation prescribed the use of the following nomenclature:

- 1. Air Command
- 2. Air Force
- 3. Air Division
- 4. Wing
- 5. Groun
- 6. Squadron
- 7. Flight

A draft of this proposed regulation was submitted to the Air Staff and major commands and their comments were largely favorable. The entire Air Staff coordinated but several of the commands raised objections on the grounds that the nature of their missions was such as to make it undesirable for them to comply with the recommended nomenclature.

After revision the draft was ready for final Air Staff coordination. As finally submitted, the regulation provided for the use of the word "Command" for the next subordinate echelon to Headquarters USAF, "Force" for the next subordinate echelon to "Command," with "Division," "Wing," "Group," "Squadron" and "Flight" completing the desired seven levels.


The word "Air" was to be used with "Command," "Force" and "Division." Combat commands would be known as "Air Commands"; Service commands would be known as "Air Service Commands." This would serve to draw a distinction between combat and noncombat organizational units. The same terminology would apply to forces and divisions.

In the Air Staff Summary Sheet which accompanied the proposed Regulation, the Organization Division gave this reason for presenting this proposal:

"There is currently no policy limiting the number of echelons or prescribing any system of uniform terminology for organizational titles. As of 1 Sep 1950, there were in use 43 different organizational titles, representing the various USAF echelons and over 384 different designations were required to account for all of the types of USAF units. The lack of a uniform system of terminology causes confusion at all staff levels and in the field and imposes an unneccessary administrative load on all who process reports, records, or are involved in any organizational problems. A policy is definitely required as a guide for future unit designations at all levels and to reduce to a minimum the ever increasing variances in organizational structure and nomenclature."

This Summary Sheet received the coordination of all the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. However, at a regular Air Staff meeting of the

Air Staff Summary Sheet from Organization Division, dated 18 Dec. '50, subject: "Proposed Regulation Standard Echelons and Nomenclature for USAF Organizational Structure."



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#### CHAPTER V

### ORGANIZATION OF THE AIR FORCE WING

The Air Force Combat Wing organization was designed to have in one mobile package all the elements of a balanced combat force. Original plans called for applying this organization Air Force-wide and numerous changes have been made in the major commands to fit the general concept of the wing plan to their wing mission. In 1948 Air Force Regulation 20-15 was revised to apply the wing base plan to combat wings only; other Air Force units were to be organized, utilizing principles of the wing base plan insofar as practicable. The Wing Base Organization has been under continuing study and comments and criticisms have been received from all echelons of the Air Force. These have been analyzed with the aim of removing as many as possible of the flaws which have been demonstrated by actual field conditions.

There have been three primary criticisms of the wing base organization: (1) the overhead is too high, (2) lines of control within the structure are not clearly enough defined, and (3) the wing commander is too deeply involved in the minor details of commanding the base.

There are explanations and justifications for these criticisms; however, this office did develop a modification of the wing organization which meets, rather than explains, the main objections to the present organization.


The new organization is based upon the concept of dividing wing functions into two main groups; the primary mission functions and those associated with station support. The wing headquarters will now

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become an operating headquarters whose functions will be primarily to control the operations required by the primary mission group and secondarily to settle any difficulty between the combat and supporting elements. The newly established base support group will assume all the functions of the former Air Base Group plus those of the supply, field maintenance and motor vehicle squadrons of the former maintenance group. The medical group has become a squadron and is also assigned to the air base group. The air base group commander will become, in effect, the deputy wing commander for administration, utilizing his staff to operate the base in support of the primary mission group. The combat group commander will be handling the detail involved in operational matters and will become, in effect, the deputy wing commander for operations.

This solution to the organizational problem of base organization is very similar to the World War II organization of one combat group paired with one service group and associated supporting elements. There is one important difference: this organization provides a means for settling local differences on the scene, with the emphasis placed on the combat group side. In addition, consolidation of functions provides clearer channels of control.

On 5 January 1951, the Strategic Air Command was authorized to reorganize their wings under this new concept, with some changes. Under the SAC plan, the Air Base Group Commander is the base commander, thus removing the administrative load of operating the base from the Wing Commander. The Combat Group Headquarters has become the wing headquarters, making the combat group commander the wing commander. When



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#### CHAPTER VI

### THE MANPOWER MANAGEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM

The establishment of the Air Force Management Improvement Program brought to the fore the fact that the Air Force suffered from a shortage of management-trained personnel. Air Force officers had been trained in management courses, but these courses had all been designed primarily for command and staff operations personnel. The requirement now existed for personnel trained in manpower and management improvement who would be located organizationally where they could continually apply their specialized skills to the solving of Air Force problems. The Air Staff Summary Sheet which requested Air Staff approval for this training program stated:

"The manpower and economy of operation problems inherent in the world situation have resulted in great concern being shown by the public, the Congress, the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force. Analysis of techniques and approaches within the Air Force to insure effective utilization of manpower and improved economy of operations shows that there are in existence programs and activities authorized by appropriate Air Force Regulations that are both effective and practical. The analysis showed, however, that officer personnel both in quantity and quality are required to supplement the staffs of present manpower utilization and management engineering activities in the Air Force."

It was decided to initially train 400 people, both military and civilian in this field. Because of the high level of experience required, students were limited to field grade officers or GS-11 and up

Air Staff Summary Sheet from Organization Division dated 26 Mar '51, subject: "Training Requirements for Officer Personnel with Manpower Maragement Skills."

civilians. Quotas were sent to all commands, with the understanding that the students: (1) would be sent on TDY from their parent station, (2) would be currently working in the manpower management field or would be assigned to that activity upon completion of the course, and (3) would be retained in the manpower management field for at least two years after completion of the course.

It was further decided that because of the close relationship between the training course and the Air Force Manpower Management Program, it would be desirable to conduct the program at a civilian university in the Washington, D. C. area. Upon approval of the program by the Air Staff on 16 April, George Washington University was selected as the training site and personnel of this office, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and George Washington University collaborated on the preparation of a course outline and the collection of course material.

On 4 June 1951, the first Manpower Management Training course, 6 weeks in length, started at George Washington University attended by 93 officers and civilians.

#### CHAPTER VII

# DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC MANAGEMENT IMPHOVEMENT POLICIES AND CONCEPTS

The establishment of the management improvement program developed a requirement for a formalized policy statement which could be used by the entire Management Improvement Branch as a basic reference and guide for all major decisions and as a means of indoctrinating and orienting staff personnel.

The initial draft of this policy presented two thoughts which have been continued down to the present policy statement which has been developed:

"Management Improvement is primarily a responsibility of commanders and secondarily a responsibility of staff and special service agencies.

"Management Improvement is not a program superimposed on an organization, but is to be accomplished in the main through existing potential sources and programs."

The greatest potential source of management improvement in the Air Force is the supervisory personnel under the direction of the commander; that is, the people who are actually doing the job are in the best position to make improvements. The next most fruitful source is from the staff of the commander; there exist, in this staff, offices whose responsibility lies in the development of new and improved methods and procedures to effect maximum efficiency within their respective areas of interest. There is also in existence at both Headquarters USAF and command levels a number of organizations which, while having the responsibility for effective management within their own areas, also have

"across-the-board" responsibilities to the commander; for example, manpower, comptroller or personnel offices. A further source of management improvement is the use of contractual or per diem consultants on a "crash" basis.

This initial policy statement recommended that the main emphasis for obtaining management improvement action should be placed on the operations of the front line supervisor and the immediate staff of the commander as being the greatest potential sources of improvement action. It further recommended that management engineering technicians be recruited and trained for assignment to existing activities within the command line rather than to specialized management improvement offices.

The refinement of these thoughts led to a declaration of the following policies as a development of those described previously:

- That management improvement will primarily be accomplished through the command chain and only secondarily through staff or special service groups.
- That management improvement projects will be sponsored and accomplished almost entirely by the staff agency primarily concerned with the functional field concerned.
- 3. That management will be based on the use of the balance of functions concept; that is, the amount invested in an activity must be in direct relationship to its importance to the overall Air Force mission.
- 4. That if the management improvement program is to succeed, there must be a high degree of management skills in the command chain.

The most recent development of this basic policy, entitled
"Management Improvement Program - Policy Statements (Tentative)"

dated May, 1951, continue to present the same basic concepts. The
major elements for management improvement within the Air Force, listed
in the order of their potential for increased economy are as follows:

- 1. The command line, including all commanders and supervisors.
- The staff, including all special technical and professional groups. The staff improves management through the development of programs, procedures and systems in its own functional field.
- 3. Functional management engineering technicians, operating full-time on the solution of management problems within their respective fields. Examples of this are production control groups in maintenance, methods and procedures groups in administration, etc.
- 4. Staff management engineering technicians, concerned full time with the development of the overall management program, the integration of various management activities of the Air Force into a unified program, and the development of management tools and techniques.
- 5. Management consultant services including management technicians from private consultant firms. These work on problems which are considered to be beyond the capabilities of the management facilities of the Air Force.

The scope of the Air Force Management Program is concerned with:

- The effective utilization of all resources, personnel, materiel, space and time.
- 2. The effectiveness of the five major functions of management, planning, organizing, commanding, controlling and coordinating.
- 3. The wide use of precise management techniques and procedures in day-to-day operations.

It is clear that the developments still to occur in the management policy of the Air Force will not result in any major policy changes.

The basic policies have been determined and the development will consist primarily of amplification or development of the basic ideas.

#### CHAPTER VIII

#### THE USAF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT REPORT


An annual Management Improvement Report is required of all Governmental agencies which come under the provisions of Public Law 429, 81st Congress. The Bureau of the Budget directed the submission of such a report in its Circular A-8, "Instructions for Agency Management Improvement Plans":

"Each agency shall submit an annual report on the operation of its Management Improvement Plan to the Bureau of the Budget...The report shall contain...a summary evaluation of the Management Improvement Plan...(and) a summary of the major opportunities for improvement which have been identified, the actions taken and benefits realized..."

Specific requirements as to the format and content of the reports to be submitted by the three military departments were directed by the Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett, in a directive dated 20 April 1951, subject: "The Department of Defense Management Improvement Program." This directive established a 31 July deadline on the submission of the report from the military departments.

In developing the procedure and format of the Air Force report, it was determined that the primary source of information for such a report must be the Air Staff, Based on this determination, it was decided that no special report would be required from the field, the

<sup>1.</sup> Bureau of the Budget Circular #A-8, 31 January 1950.



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#### CHAPTER IX

# DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND FIELDS PATTERN FOR THE MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Early in February, the question arose of establishing a pattern for the USAF Management Improvement Program to prevent the program from becoming an unintegrated "fire-fighting" proposition rather than a systematic, comprehensive program.

In the development of the pattern to be followed by the program, consideration was given to three possibilities:

- 1. Major Air Force Organizations
- 2. Constant and Variable Factors
- 3. Functional Areas and Fields

The "Major Air Force Organizations" pattern would make the basic unit of the program an Air Force command. A management technician or team of technicians would be responsible for the management activities of one command, covering all problems within that command. This pattern would cause the least amount of confusion at command or base level since it would limit the number of people contacting any one command. Its disadvantages lie in the fact that it would force the management technician to work in a large number of fields, many in which he would have no technical knowledge. In addition, it would make more difficult the integration of activities in the same field in different commands.


The "Constant and Variable Factors" pattern would have management technicians specializing in such phases of management as planning, organization, control, coordination, methods, personnel utilization, etc. It would permit the development of a high degree of technical competence

on the part of management technicians in their particular area of specialization. However, such a pattern would increase the number of people contacting any office at subordinate levels, make more difficult the problem of integrating all activities within the same functional area and force the management technician to work in a functional area in which he lacks technical knowledge and skills.

The "Functional Areas and Fields" pattern divides all Air Force activities into functional areas such as personnel, materiel, operations, etc., and requires the management technician to have technical knowledge as well as management engineering skills and knowledge. This pattern automatically provides for coordinated actions within a functional area and provides for specialization on the part of the management technician which will increase his knowledge of his primary area.


Consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the three proposed patterns led to the selection of the "Functional Areas and Fields" pattern as the one which would provide the best approach for the Management Improvement Program and this was the pattern presented to the informal Air Staff management committee for their comments in June of 1951.

Mention must be made at this point of the informal Air Staff
Management Committee. This group, which held its first meeting on
3 April 1951, consists of representatives of each of the Deputy Chiefs
of Staff and the Surgeon, Inspector and Air Adjutant Generals. It was
formed for the purpose of securing Air Staff comments on all management
improvement issuances and assisting in the development of management
improvement policies, programs and objectives.




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HISTORY OF

ASSISTANT FOR PHOGRAMMING

1 January 1951 - 30 June 1951

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
PART VII - FLYING HOURS

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### CHAPTER I - ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Part I - Functions. The functions of the Assistant for Programming, unchanged from the previous period, are:

- Program Control. The complete USAF Programming cycle is subject to the control of the Assist at for Programming.
   Besides monitoring the entire cycle, this office contributes the following:
  - a. Provides guidance and assumptions to the Air Staff for program procedures.
  - b. Establishes program procedures.
  - c. Analyzes USAF major programs for balance, phasing and consistency with Air Force objectives.
- 2. Aircraft and Flying Time Allocation. In addition to the responsibilities for over-all program control, the Assistant for Programming produces the programs allocating aircraft and flying time.



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CHAPTER II - MA JOR ACTIVITIES

Part I - Program Analysis. In the course of this years program planning activities a major accomplishment is in process. It is that of tying more closely together the establishment of program objectives to war planning designed in part to serve as a basis for programming and budgeting. Various discussions and informal proposals in which this office participated, had resulted in the prior November (1950) in publishing a memorandum to the Air Staff which dealt with basic planning policy. (1A) The memorandum discussed the necessity for three basic time-division plans, a current emergency plan, an intermediate range plan and a long range plan. Of these three the intermediate range plan is designed to provide a basis for establishing program objectives for the planning-budgeting programs on which budgets are based. Changes in strategy as reflected in war planning can thereby be reflected in the programs which guide the building and management of the Air Force. The period reported was one of increasingly effective teamwork of programmers, planners and other associated Air Staff agencies.

Part II - Development of Program Guidance

At the start of the period, the need arose for the development of policy guidance, ground rules and assumptions needed by the Air Staff to begin preparation of new program objectives and detailed cost estimates for the third supplemental request for FY 1951 and for FY 1952. The Secretary of the Air Force requested authority from the Secretary of Defense to base this development on the assumptions that the Air Force could: (1B)

- 1. Expand to 95 wings and 971,000 military personnel as soon as practicable.
- 2. Obligate funds as necessary to attain the new program objectives in anticipation of a deficiency appropriation.

This request was deferred pending approval of build-up schedules.

The Secretary of Defense, meanwhile, requested data on planned strength phasings and major military units. (2B) The data developed on forces and personnel requirements for FY 1951 and FY 1952 were agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (3B) and were submitted to OSD for examination preliminary to OSD's appropriations requests. Forces and personnel requirements agreed upon were:

<u>Air Force</u> <u>FY 1951</u> <u>FY 1952</u> Wings

Personnel 971,000 \*1,061,000

\*The 90,000 increase over FY 1951 was required to phase out the National Guard and Air Reserve from the active establishment within twenty-one (21) months. These military strengths were approved by a

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
Memorandum dated 13 January 1951 from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) McNeil. (LB)

The Assistant for Programming also participated in the development of the 3rd USAF supplemental appropriation request for the build-up to 87 wings in FT 1951 and 95 wings in 1952. This request resulted in a supplemental appropriation of \$1,886,700 for the Air Force. (5B)

The last part of Fiscal Year 1951 saw the preparation, revision and review of the 3rd Supplemental FY 1951 and the FY 1952 materiel program requirements. While this program contained errors and inconsistencies, it did provide a uniform base for the computation of material requirements by the Air Staff and the Major Commands. Review of the program and the resultant material requirements high-lighted the need for more detailed program guidance for the determination of material reserves. To facilitate this process, material reserves were divided into two (2) categories:

- 1. D-Day readiness reserves. This is defined as the quantity of any item required to be stocked in addition to the peacetime force requirement in order to support completely the forces inbeing on D-Day at war time activity rates until production deliveries are sufficient to support war time requirements.
- 2. Mobilization reserve material requirements. This is defined as the quantity of any item to be stocked in addition to the D-Day readiness reserve material requirements in order to equip and support completely the forces to be mobilized subsequent to D-Day at war time activity rates until production deliveries are sufficient to support the requirement.

The determination of these materiel reserves and the pre-positioning of these items resulted in a requirement for a firm policy on the



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
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Part III - Air Mational Guard and Air Force Reserve

Program guidance was also developed as a basis for a plan to reconstitute the Air National Guard following federal service. On 1 January 1951 there were twenty-two (22) wings in the Air National Guard. (1C) All but five (5) were ordered into the active establishment under the 95 wing program. (2C) Later the induction program was expanded to include all of the remaining AC&W Groups of the Air National Guard plus three (3) of the Communications Squadrons and five (5) of the Signal Construction Companies. (3C) Simultaneously, the unexpected events of partial mobilization forced radical reprogramming and major revisions in the ground rules on which to base the Air National Guard budget estimates for FY 1952, due for submission in the fall.

All units of the organized Air Reserve were ordered into active duty status by the end of the fiscal year. In addition, most individual Air Reserves and over 60,000 volunteer Air Reserves were ordered to active service. (40)

In March 1951 the Secretary of the Air Force established a board under the Chairmanship of Major General Earl 5. Hoag to develop a plan for the Air Reserve Forces in consonance with the proposed Armed Forces Reserve Act. (50) The working committee of this board was chairmanned by a representative of the Assistant for Programming. (60) The original plan developed by the board provided for a total of 1,600,000 Reserves. The Council of Deputies considered this figure excessive and caused its downward revision. (70) Assistant Secretary Zuckert realizing that the board had had insufficient time to develop a sound long range plan,



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#### Part IV - Aircraft Programming

During the reporting period, the aircraft inventory contained an average of about 20,000 aircraft. (1D) This represents a decrease of 1000 aircraft over the same period of FY 1950. (2D) Increased attrition, due to the Korean hostilities and distribution of aircraft to fill MDAP commitments, exceeded the rate at which new aircraft were delivered. (3D)

with respect to the ending inventory position, 13,000 aircraft were active and 6000 were in an inactive status; 9500 were combat types and the remaining were trainers, transports, etc. Over 72 per cent were world War II types, six or more year old, all of which will be obsolete by the end of FY 1952. (hD) The Air Force is continuing maximum use of World War II aircraft to the extent that modification and stocks of spare parts will permit within the limits of economy and operational need.

The projection of currently available resources and the production program were designed to meet modernization requirements for the 95 wing Air Force Program at the earliest practicable date.

In addition to the computation of aircraft requirements for the 95 Wing Aircraft Procurement and Inventory Modernization Program, aircraft requirements were determined for the following tentative programs: (5D)

- 1. 260 wings, 20,000 pilot-training rate
- 2. 130 wings, 15,600 pilot-training rate
- 3. 135 wings, 15,600 pilot-training rate
- h. 162 wings, 15,600 pilot-training rate

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USAF Combat Reserve aircraft procurement was programmed based on a regular establishment of 95 wings, 29 separate squadrons, and 11 modernized ANG wings, together with 30 MATS transport squadrons and seven (7) special operations squadrons. (6D) The proposed FY 1952 budget reflected a combat reserve requirement of 3578 aircraft. (7D)

A study was undertaken to determine methods for reasonably meeting aircraft requirements for a build-up to 135 wings by July 195h. The goal was found to be attainable under the following assumptions: (8D)

- Highest production rates would not exceed those in the 95 wing program.
- 2. Pilot-training rate would be 15,600 per year.
- There would be no change in aircraft requirements for separate squadrons.
- 4. There would be no tanker squadrons for tanker units.
- 5. We second line aircraft would be available beyond those required for the 95 wing program.

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### Part V - Program Procedures

A study initiated by the Assistant for Programming led to a determination that there existed an urgent need for more specific USAF Head-quarters scheduling and monitoring control over unit activation, manning, equipping, and training. (1E) Specific facts were unearthed to support this conclusion:

- 1. Tactical units were being sent to Korea in varying stages of readiness. (2E)
- Units were sent to USAFE with inadequate individual clothing allowances. (3E)
- 3. Lack of coordination of personnel intake with equipment and housing availability led to "Lackland" and similar but less publicized incidents. (AE)

As a result of the study, the Control Division, D/Operations, DCS/O, was reorganized to exercise more specific controls as required. (5E)

A schedule for unit training by type of unit was set up. (6E) The

Priorities of Programmed Units, a monthly Operating Program document,
was a direct result of the study. In addition to establishing a manning and equipping priority for each major unit in the Air Force, it
shows, for these units, month of activation, completion of manning and
equipping, operational readiness; station locations and other operationally significant actions.

All of the recommendations in the study have been or are being carried out except for the phasing of manning requirements for newly activated units. At present, units are assumed to require full personnel authorization at the moment of activation despite the fact that only a small

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cadre is required initially. The need for such phasing is particularly significant when over-all personnel ceilings require authorizations to be spread as judiciously as possible.

During this period the Air Force Manual of Program Procedures (Tentative), AFM 150-3, was produced to place control emphasis on the current limiting factors of manpower and material as opposed to money which was the limiting factor during the 48 group period. The specific purposes of the manual were: (7E)

- Establish recurring program cycles with time-tables for accomplishing the principal programming tasks.
- 2. Differentiate between planning-budget programs on which preliminary plans and budget estimates are made prior to submission of an appropriation request, and operating programs on which the Air Force will expend appropriated funds and inventory stocks to attain authorized objectives.
- Provide recognition of the decentralization among command and staff agencies of the responsibility for various segments of programming.
- h. Assign Air Staff responsibility for the preparation of specific program documents and work sheets.
- Assign responsibility for monitoring the preparation of program documents.
- Promote uniformity and consistency in the published program documents.

Separation of program into planning-budgeting and operating series was initiated to clearly distinguish activities for which appropriations

are available from those which would be undetaken if money became available. Previous documents did not distinguish between the two. A new program document, "Projected Troop Housing Availability" was proposed in order to provide data as to limitations in that area which would affect other phases of the program.

A staff study was undertaken to determine means of effecting coordination in Headquarters directives to commands. (8E) It was found that directives were sent to the commands without the coordination or even knowledge of other offices concerned, that directives were sent even though non-concurrences were received from pertinent offices, and that concurrences were given without at the same time implementing actions which would make possible the activity originally concurred upon. Although this staff study, containing a recommendation to return to the system of coordination in use during World War II, was distributed throughout the Air Staff, no effective action has yet been taken. It appears that any effective action must originate at the highest echelon.

Where, as at present, limited manpower resources must suffice for an ever-increasing work load, manpower controls must be instituted to assure the most effective manpower utilization possible. A study was undertaken to determine the means to achieve this goal. It was recommended that: (9E)

- A means be found to project requirements rapidly and accurately which could also be used to control allocations.
- A means be found to rapidly translate these requirements into skill and grade data for training and manning purposes.

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- The scheduling of personnel procurement, training and assignment be gauged to meet these requirements.
- h. Manpower standards be established such as to enable Headquarters USAF to effectively police manpower utilization in the field.

Among the specific recommendations were:

- 1. The elimination of modifications to Tables of Organization.
- 2. The substitution of standard planning tables for Table of Distribution. The planning tables would serve to reduce the number of non-T/O units by encompassing several Tables of Distribution into one standard planning table and would provide guides to the commands for establishing non-T/O activities and yardsticks to this Headquarters for measuring manpower utilization.
- 3. Maintaining Tables of Organization and standard planning tables on punch cards to permit rapid mechanical computation of skill and grade requirements for any given program.
- 4. Projection of manning requirements (authorized versus actual)
  monthly by the commands to provide adequate manning guidance.
- 5. Programming of personnel pipeline to reflect actual needs rather than to serve as a "kitty."

The study producing these recommendations was looked upon as a long-range plan rather than a series of projects capable of immediate implementation. Work has already begun on items 1, 2, and 3 above.

#### Part VI - Allocation of Aircraft

The change by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the estimated termination date of hostilities in Kerea from 30 June 1951 to 31 December 1951 had (1F) far reaching effects in the programming of aircraft and the allocation of flying hours. The additional support required by FEAF decreased the ability of the USAF to convert and/or equip new units with aircraft. This was especially true for fighter type aircraft.

The ultimate authorization was increased during the six month period as follows:

Group Separ MATS

WS1	Origi	insl	Incre	eased
		Authorization	Ultimate	Authorization
pa		81		95
rate Squadrons		27		3lı
Squadrens		28		30

The plan current on 1 January 1951 provided for the attainment of the eighty-four (8h) group structure by 30 June 1953. The planned expansion was later accelerated to attain the ninety-five (95) group structure by 30 June 1952. (2F) The group structure existing at the times shown, although in skeleton form, was as follows:

USAF Groups		an 51 (3F) s Sodns	30 Ju Graups	in 51 (UF) Sgdns
Bomb, Heavy	2	6	14	12
*Fomb, Kedium	13	45	16	55
Bomb, Light	2		14	12
Strat Recon, Heavy	2	6	3	9
Motrat Mecon, Medium	2	9	3	12
Fighter, Fomber	12	36	18	54
Fighter, Interceptor	12	36	20	60
Tactical Recon	2	7	14	12

1947	1 4m 2	Z as Z	
Stronger	Immupe Sedire	levens Spiles	
trus Serte, News	3 3	3 3	
effren Gerrier, letter	6 29	22 35	
OTTAL OTTAL	55 151	li 23	
Legarana Squadrana			
Stret Beson, New York	*	*	
Strat Support		3	
Lisison	2	2	
lescue	5	77	
Tow Target	1	3	
Air Resupply		1	
2002	20	26	
XATS	20	28	
* Includes tanker squadrons.	dans (assessible)		
se Includes one troop carrier squa This scoeleration was achieved		of the Air Force	
Sweeter and Air National Guard into			
Chapter II, Part II, all existing			
Status of the Air Force Reserve and			
	1 Jan 51	30 Jun 51	
Air Reserve	Groups Sodns	Groups Sodns	
Troop Carrier Groups	17 68		
Bombardment Group, Light	l <sub>4</sub> 16		
Air National Guard			
Fighters	19 59	5 18	
Dombers	3 10		

17

Large number of stored aircraft were placed in the active inventory to meet expansion requirements. Reconditioning and modification of aircraft from storage congested AMC's depot facilities. This congestion and the lack of some parts bottlenecked the flow of aircraft into new or converted groups.

Top priority in aircraft allocation has been given to FEAF to support the Korean operation. Support of FEAF units has also contributed to slowing the flow of aircraft into other units.

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Part VII - Flying Hours

A Flash Rudget Flying Hour Program was prepared through FY 1953 showing 87 groups at end FY 1951 and 95 groups by end FY 1952. This program was based on the best thinking up to 26 January 1951, reflecting capability rates (except for spare engines) approaching, and/or meeting AFL 150-10 flying hour factors as adjusted for multiple crews in SAC, TAC, ADC and AAC. This program was revised as of 26 February 1951 to reflect informal command recommendations on changes to AFL 150-10 crew training and mission flying hour rates. Recommended crew training rates were considerably higher, overall, than shown in AFL 150-10.

An Aircraft and Flying Hour Operating Program was published as of 1 May 1951 showing the 4th quarter of FY 1951 and all quarters of FY 1952. (1G) This program included command recommendations as to flying hour rates but the January Flash Program assumptions as to multiple crews, etc. were retained. The higher flying hour rates for individual training could be accommodated only by a reduction in unit training flying hour rates agreed to by the commands. These command recommendations have been included in Tables V and VI of AFL 150-10.

An Operating Program was prepared as of 30 June 1951 for FY 1952 and FY 1953 projecting FTAF at war strength through 30 December 1951 and the latest refined crew training rates as adjusted by flying hour restrictions received from ANC on 16 April 1951. (20)

Severe shortages of replacement engines resulted in curtailing flying hour rates for many types of aircraft other than tactical.

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
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## FOOTNOTES

- 1A Memorandum for Chiefs, All OSAF and Headquarters USAF Offices, subject: Planning Policy Guidance dated 16 November 1950 signed L. L. Judge By Command of the Chief of Staff.
- 1B Memorandum from Sec AF to Sec Marshall dtd 30 Dec 50, AFODP 300 file.
- 2B Memorandum from Sec Marshall to OSAF dated 2 Jan 51, AFODP 300 file.
- 3B JC8 1800/137 dated 5 Jan 51, AFODP 300 file.
- 4B OSD Memorandum signed McNeil dated 13 Jan 51, AFODP 300 file.
- 5B Resulting from formal request for \$1,925 million indicated in Memorandum to Mr. McNeil from Under Sec McCone dated 3 Apr 51.
- 1C Air Force Troop List, 1 Jan 51, p 105.
- 2C USAF Expansion Program "Seed Corn", Tab L, pp 1-2.
- 3C Ibid Tab L, p. 3 item 10.
- 4C Toid Tab L, p. 4
- 5C AFCAG-lh, Subject: U. S. Air Reserve Planning Board by Order of Sec AF dtd 8 Feb 51.
- 6C Order of Sec AF, AFCAG-1k dtd 1 Mar 51, subject: Ancillary Committee to U. S. Air Reserve Planning Board.
- 7C Interview with Col Salisbury, AFODP, Chairman of Ancillary Committee.
- 8C Memorandum for Special Assistant for Reserve Porces et al from Thursan, Sec of the Air Staff dated 4 June 1951.
- 1D SC-AU-1, U. S. Air Force Aircraft, July 1951, table on USAF and Reserve Forces Airplane Inventory.
- 2D SC-AW-1 for July 1950, table on OSAF and Reserve Forces Airplane Inventory.
- 3D SC-AU-1 for July 1951, tables on Aircraft Gains and Losses and Aircraft Lost from USAF Inventory.


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4D - SC-AU-1 for July 1951, pp 14-16. 5D - Aircraft Programming Div File: Inventory. 6D - 10 Jan 51 Seed Corn Requirements, Aircraft Programming Div File: 95 Hings. 7D - Ibid. 8D - Modernization Study, Aircraft Programming Div File: Modernization. 1E - A Programming Procedures Study - January 1951, Procedures Division Files VIII, 5. 2E - Notes on Programming Procedures Study - January 1951, Procedures Division Files VIII, 5. 3E - TWX from 3rd Air Division. hE - Notes, Procedures Division Files VIII, 5. 5E - Hq USAF Organization and Functions, July 1951. 6E - Readiness Dates of Combat Units, R&R from D/Operations to Asst for Programming, 25 Jan 51, Procedures Division File VIII, 5. 7E - AFM 150-3, Air Force Manual of Program Procedures, Foreword. 8E - Programming Procedures Study on Concurrent Directives to Commands, 6 Feb 51, Procedures Division File XI, 20. 9E - Staff Study: Manpower Projections and Controls, June 1951, Procedures Division File III, 15. 1F - JCS 2101/34, 3 Apr 51. 2F - JCS 1800/137, 5 Jan 51. 3F - SC-U-85, Aircraft and Crew Status in Tactical Units, as of 1 Jan 51. AF - SC-U-85, as of 1 July 51, pp 6-10 and pp 20-24. 5F - The Air Force Troop List, Part IV for 1 Jan 51 and 1 July 51.




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PART I

#### WHINCTTONS

### ANALYSIS DIVISION

- Participates with other Staff agencies in formulating proposals for or changes in USAF objectives and limitations.
  - Maintains a record of all USAF program objectives and limitations established or proposed as a basis for formulating major Air Force programs.
  - Reviews plans, programs, proposals and directives; advises as to their implications and recommends appropriate action.
  - h. Analyzes USAF major programs for balance, phasing and consistency with USAF objectives and limitations and makes appropriate recommendations.
  - Analyses the implementation of the USAF program, points out deficiencies and recommends solutions therefor.
  - Provides membership and staff advisory services on joint Service boards and committees engaged in problems relating to USAF objectives or limitations.
  - Provides assistance to the Chief, Programming Division in the detailed development of established Air Force objectives, as required.

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#### ASSIGNMENTS AND TRANSFERS

- 8. At the time the Analysis Division submitted the last historical statement, personnel was a limiting factor; however, specialists in the fields of Army and Navy programs, aircraft production, materiel, installations and Reserve Forces have been authorized and obtained. Since the augmentation of these specialists, this division is functioning as a team, utilizing this acquired knowledge to discharge the functions and responsibilities listed above. Although an additional Lt. Colonel and two civilians were authorized during this period, they were not actually assigned until July 3rd, 8th, and 18th, respectively.
- On 19 February 1951, Lt. Colonel R. L. Praetorius reported to this division and was assigned the analysis responsibilities for the supply and materiel area.

#### PART II

#### HISTORY OF AMALYSIS DIVISION

1 January through 30 June 1951

Principal activities of the Analysis Division, Office of the Assistant for Programming.

During the reporting period, this division devoted its time in the following areas:

1. The most significant contribution made by the Analysis Division during the period 1 January to 30 June 1951 was the imaguration of a new long-range approach to Air Force programming, firmly tied to overall national considerations and objectives. The development of this concept which culminated in a document published 30 July 1951, "Formulation of FI 1953 Air Force Program", was begun in the fall of 1950. The confusion resulting from the rapid changes in Air Force programs following the outbreak of the conflict in Korea clearly indicated the need of some basic changes in Air Force programming.

The early thinking along this line is clearly indicated in an Air Staff Study dated 24 August 1950, "Broad Chjectives of Foresceable Air Force Programs." This document stresses the need for longer range programming tied to some desired goal rather than programming solely by fiscal years. It also points out the need for tying Air Force programs to national policy objectives.

This concept was further developed in the early months of 1951. In a memorandum from the Deputy Assistant for Programming to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, and other air staff offices which is dated 1 March 1951, he requested the formulation of a task group consisting of representatives from pertinent staff agencies under his monitorship "to evaluate the implications of current plans on the Air Force in 1953 and thereafter and to monitor the initial stages of the development of the FI 1953 program."

To assist the Task Force in its work, the Analysis Division prepared a document entitled "Approach to FI 1952 Program Development" dated 5 Morch 1951. This document reviews recent events leading to the expansion of the Military Establishment, discusses the role the National Security Council, Office of the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and the Services should play in the development of Air Force programs. The document goes on to cutline the work to be performed by the task force outlining the data to be prepared and assigning the preparation in each area to the participating staff officers. As guidence to the task force the document defines the parameters for FY 53 program and

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budget preparation. These parameters apply to four main areas:
Personnel, aircraft procurement and industrial mobilization, base
utilization, and mutual defense assistance. The document concludes
by directing the task force to prepare the basic strategic guidance
for the development of the FY 53 "platform" and the preparation of
broad program objectives to attain the forces spelled out in the
strategic guidance. It further indicated that the broad objectives
would then be expanded into detailed ground rules, assumptions,
policies, procedures, etc., which would result in the basic guidance
for the development of the detailed budget program for FI 53. Principal
responsibility for strategic guidance was given to the Mar Flans
Division and principal responsibility for program objectives was
assigned to the Analysis Division in conjunction with other agencies
of the Air Staff.

The preliminary meeting was held 9 March to establish contact and review in general terms the Analysis Division proposed approach to the problem and individuals were designated as the representatives of interested staff offices. The changes resulting from this meeting were incorporated in the 5 March draft and prepared as a second draft on 19 March.

The 19 March draft followed substantially that of 5 March but spelled out the work required to be done by the task force somewhat more specifically.

Work proceeded along these lines throughout March, April and May. By the end of May a strategic study indicating force requirements, deployments and concept of operation in the event of a war beginning July 1954 was completed in draft form. Parallel with it, Air Force objectives through FI 54, including ground rules, assumptions and policies, was prepared and poulished 31 May 1951. This document described the program objectives in consonance with the strategic plan in the areas of material war reserves, military aid requirements, support and service units, muming, training and equipping, maintenance and supply, installations, construction, civilian components, and so forth. This document was circulated to interested staff offices for study and comment. The collective comments and recommendations of these offices were incorporated in a revised draft published 21 June 1951, "140 Ming Air Force Program".

By this time the Air Council had directed that a study be made of two possible progress:

a. The attainment of 140 combat wings by and FI 54, the strategically desirable program.

b. The attainment of 140 combat wings as soon as practicable, but not exceeding peak production and training rates achieved as a result of the PY 52 program, namely, a limited objective program.

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This document was circulated to interested staff offices for a feasibility check and for the preparation of the necessary back-up data. The objectives and assumptions accompanying the force statement were along the same lines as those contained in the 31 May document, but in considerably abbreviated form. The collective findings of the Air Staff were consolidated by the Analysis Division and prepared for presentation to the Air Steff. The subject matter was published es "Air Staff, Presentation: Program Data - Cost Estimates and Feasibility of 140 Wing Program". This document covered all major areas of Air Porce programming, including forces, personnel, installations, training, aircraft, supply and maintenance, reserve forces, war reserves, costs, etc., and indicated in each area the extent to which the program was considered feasible. The possibility of attaining the 140 combat wings by end FI 54 was carefully evaluated and an alternative of attaining that program by PY 55 was also presented. It was pointed out that the 140 combat wings could be activated and reasonably supported by end PY 54, provided certain drestic actions were taken immediately. Attainment of the force objective by end FY 55 was considered much more easily attainable.

Preceding the presentation of program data by the Office of the Assistant for Programming was a presentation to the Air Council of the strategic basis underlying these proposed programs. The strategic guidance and program objectives were carefully considered by the Chief of Staff and the Air Council. The Chief of Staff outlined his philosophy as to how such forces might have to be manned, trained, equipped and supported initially. This philosophy was incorporated in the program which was re-presented to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff and the Air Council on 28 June 1951.

After further consideration of the proposed programs, the Air Staff was directed to continue work on a 138 combat wing Air Force by FT 54 with a composition and phasing somewhat different from that originally proposed to the Air Council. The comments and directives of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff and the Air Council were used as the basis for a thorough revision of the program guidance by the Air Staff under the monitorahip of the Analysis Division. This final revision was published as "Air Force Objectives through FT 54", on 30 July 1951. This statement of strategic guidance and program objectives for the build-up of the USAF to 138 combat wings by end FT 54 provided the foundation for the subsequent development of the FT 53 Air Force Budget Program.

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- 2. The Analysis Division in cooperation with other Staff offices as a basis for discussion with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, prepared and analyzed certain guide lines for reviewing the 3rd Supplemental F.Y. 1951 and F.Y. 1952 budget requests. The Air Staff's responsibilities were for reviewing each ground rule upon which the presently proposed Air Force program had been based, and determine the implications on these programs if the proposed guidance were enforced. Details of this analysis are submitted by all Air Staff offices to the Analysis Division and consolidated for further study and presentation as to feasibility.
- 3. The Analysis Division assisted, with the cooperation of the Air Staff, in compiling the necessary information on forces and personnel reflected in JCS 1800/137, which authority was requested to:
- (a) expand to the 95 wings and 971,000 military personnel as soon as practicable,
- (b) obligate funds as necessary to attain the new program objectives in anticipation of a deficiency appropriation.

JCS agreed to the forces and personnel requirements for F.Y. 1951 and F.Y. 1952 submitted to OSD for examination preliminary to BOB submission.

Air Force F.Y. 1951 F.Y. 1952
Wings
Personnel 971,000 \*1,061,000

- \* If the ANC and AFR are to be phased out in 21 months, the 971,000 must be exceeded by 90,000 in F.Y. 1952.
- 4. Upon approval of the above forces the major activity of this Division was to develop and participate in programs and analysis necessary to formulate a request for a supplemental. This supplemental was the funds required to attain the planned 87 wings by end F.Y. 1951 and 95 wings by end F.Y. 1952.
- 5. Mr. McCone's Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, requesting the Air Staff to review the current program with special attention to the housing capacity, and present the resultant programs to the Secretary of the Air Force, resulted in assignment of responsibility for monitoring this reprogramming and subsequent presentation to this Division on 12 March 1951.
- 6. On 28 March a preliminary finding of the troop program relative to the housing analysis was made by this division as follows:
- (a) Based on the assumption that all of the originally programmed third supplement Public Works money would be available about 1 May 1951, the resultant rate of construction would be barely man meet the troop strength expansion in terms of total and year strengths only. This relation would exist only if 100% utilization of capacity could be accomplished and if 60 square feet per man space allowance would be acceptable for most of F.Y. 1952.

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- (b) The ID system (except Camp Shoemaker) would be overloaded for three quarters of F.Y. 1952, although ID load would temporarily be placed in the Tech system at Sheppard AFE.
- (c) The Tech training system would have about 30,000 over-capacity even with a temporary ID load and an increasing over-capacity thereafter.
- (d) On the other hand, the capacity of ZI stations will be about 30,000 less than the troop program and will remain short during most of F.Y. 1952. This discrepancy is due largely to a probable 20% non-utilization, i.e., inability to deploy units and troops to fully use station capacities.
- (e) A cut-back in the troop program is accordingly indicated even if the third supplemental should be funded as originally assumed. It is estimated that the reduction should be about 30,000 airmen by 30 June 1951. Subsequent reductions would depend on when legislation is passed authorizing and funding the planning and construction phases of the public works program.
- (f) Upon the Director of Installations estimate of rate of delivery of housing during F.Y. 1952, a detailed housing estimate can then be made by the Engineers and an accurate program adjustment can be accomplished.
- 7. Upon request by General Twining, on 3 March, the Analysis Division prepared a summary comparison between the Finletter 70 Group Program developed about 1946-47 and the 95 Wing Program. This comparison was made to determine whether the 95 Wing Program represented a higher target than the 70 Wing program. Major areas covered were:
  - (a) Active Air Force
  - (b) Air National Guard
  - (c) Air Force Reserve (d) Personnel strengths
  - (e) Active Aircraft Inventory and in storage.
- 8. On 10 April this Division participated in the analysis of the program effects that would result from the proposed revisions in military personnel by the OSD and BOB for the F.Y. 1952 Air Force budget. The proposed revisions were analysed to determine whether:
  - (a) They would cause imbalance in the programs as a whole, and
     (b) to what extent they would affect attaining the end F.Y. 1952 program objectives as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 9. The Analysis Division has prepared and distributed, within the office of Assistant for Programming, a series of brief chronological summaries of significant documents and statements by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Air Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military policy, Service forces, War and Mobilization plans and other matters related to or affecting Air Force programming.

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- 10. This office participated in the preparation of the statement by the Program and Budget Advisors and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which recommended that the Joint Strategic Plans Committee prepare a strategic basis for planning applicable to the period through FY 53. This strategic basis was to be used to prepare the military objectives for budget guidance.
- 11. In order to be able to provide summary information on the FY 52 forces and programs an arrangement was made with liaison officers of the Program and Budget Advisors to exchange; between the three Services, pertinent data associated with FY 52 Budget programs.
- 12. During the course of developing the FY 53 program it became clear that the requirements for the expanded Air Force and for Mutual Defense Assistance must be considered together and that these programs be integrated. In participation with the Procedure Division, action was initiated to bring this problem to the attention of the appropriate Air Staff Agencies. Subsequent to the period covered in this report, a memorandum was drafted which proposed the establishment of an Air Staff Task Force under the monitorship of the Mobilization Division, Director of Plans to develop in cooperation with the appropriate agencies in Europe the operational plan and a set of objectives for the MDAP program. Work on this project is continuing.

SECREI HISTORY PROGRAMMING DIVISION ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING 1 January 1951 to 30 June 1951 Table of Contents FUNCTIONS PART I Division Punctions Assignments & Transfers SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES OF THE PROGRAMMING PART II DIVISION, OFFICE, ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING SECRET

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SECRE PART I FUNCTIONS PROGRAMMING DIVISION 1. Provides guidance and assumptions to the Air Staff for program development. Monitors preparation, revision and implementation Monitors preparation, revisit of USAF budget and operating programs. 3. Provides assistance to the Chief, Analysis Division in the development of recommended Air Force objectives, as required. SECRET

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# SECRET BASE REQUIREMENTS & UTILIZATION BRANCH 1. Maintains liaison with the Directorate of Operations and the Assistant for Air Bases on all matters pertaining to activation, manning, training and movement of USAF units, and the utilization of installations worldwide. 2. Provides policy guidance and assumptions required by the Assistant for Air Bases for the development of USAF Base Utilization and Requirements Programs. Provides members to working group of the Installations 3. Board. 4. Acts for the Chief, Frogramming Division in all areas pertaining to activation, manning, training and movement of USAF units, and the utilization of installations, and assists the Directorate of Operations and the Assistant for Air Bases in the presentation or defense of the above programs when reviewed by higher authority.

#### PERSONNEL AND TRAINING BRANCH

- 1. Maintains liaison with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Air Adjutant General, Judge Advocate General, and Surgeon General on all personnel and training matters affecting proposed or authorized USAF programs.
- Provides policy guidance and assumptions required by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel for the development and implementation of USAF Personnel and Training programs in the following areas:
  - a. Officer and Airmen grade structure.
  - b. Ratio of rated to non-rated personnel.
- c. Personnel gains and losses projected for programmed objectives.
  - d. Flying and technical training activity rates.
  - e. Professional training for USAF officers.
  - f. Individual movement of personnel and dependents.
  - g. Procurement and utilization of training aids.
- 3. Acts for the Chief, Programming Division in all areas pertaining to the USAF Personnel and Training program, and assists the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Air Adjutant General, Judge Advocate General, and Surgeon General in the presentation or defense of personnel and training aspects of USAF programs when reviewed by higher authority.

# ORGANIZATION AND MANPOWER UTILIZATION BRANCH

- 1. Maintains liaison with the Directorate of Manpower & Organization, providing or securing policies and/or assumptions necessary for the development of USAF Military and Civilian personnel requirements in USAF Troop Programs.
- 2. Exercises direction and control over the development, phasing and implementation of USAF Troop Programs and authenticates changes thereto.
- 3. Provides policy guidance and assumptions required by the Directorate of Operations in the development and preparation of the following:
  - a. Unit Activation and Deployment Forecast Worldwide.
  - b. Precedence List for USAF Unit Manning and Equipping.
  - c. Movement Schedules for USAF units.
- 4. Acts for the Chief, Programming Division in all areas pertaining to the USAF Troop Program and assists the Director of Manpower & Organization in the presentation or defense of the USAF Troop Program when reviewed by higher authority.

### MATERIEL AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT BRANCH

- 1. Maintains liaison with principal Air Staff agencies directly concerned with material matters pertaining to current and proposed USAF program objectives.
- 2. Provides policy guidance and assumptions required by the principal Air Staff agencies involved in development, procurement, and distribution of material required to attain time phased objectives of USAF programs.
- 3. Reviews, recommends, and coordinates implementing material policies, logistical support procedures, and procurement actions to insure adequate support of Air Force programs.
- 4. Acts for the Chief, Programming Division in all areas pertaining to material and logistics support, and assists the principal Air Staff agencies involved in the presentation or defense of USAF requirements in these areas before higher authority.

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#### ASSIGNMENTS & TRANSFERS

On 5 Jenuary 1951, Lt. Colonel D. Perkins reported to this effice and was assigned to duty in the Materiel and Logistic Support Branch.

On 11 Jamuary 1951, Major R. G. Kettleson reported to this office and was assigned to duty in the Materiel and Logistic Support Branch.

On 1 March 1951, Major John Moench departed on PCS orders to USAFE.

On 10 February 1951, Major T. W. Schwellenbach was transferred to the Office of the Assistant for Air  $\rm B_{R}ses$  .

On 24 February 1951, Major H. W. Zichterman reported to this office and was assigned to duty as Chief, Graphic Presentations.

#### PART II

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES OF THE PROGRAMMING DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING

At the beginning of this reporting period, this Division was devoting all Its energy to the development of policy guidance, ground rules and assumptions necessary for the Air Staff to begin preparation of the new program objectives and the detailed cost estimates for the third supplemental request for FI 1951 and for FY 1952.

This office participated in compiling the data necessary for computation of the budget estimates and at the beginning of this reporting period, the Secretary of the Air Force requested authority from Office of the Secretary of Defense to:

a. Expand to 95 Wings and 971,000 military personnel as soon as practicable.

b. Obligate funds as necessary to attain the new program objectives in anticipation of a deficiency appropriation.

This request was deferred until build-up schedules were approved, and the Secretary of Defense requested information on planned strength phasings and major military units.

The Programming Division in cooperation with other staff agencies compiled the necessary information on forces and personnel requirements for FT 1951 and FT 1952 and such information was reflected in JCS 1800/137. These JCS agreed forces and personnel requirements as noted below were submitted to OSD for examination preliminary to OSD submission.

AIR FORCE FI 1951 FI 1952
Wings
Personnel 971,000 \*1,061,000

\*If National Guard and Air Reserve are to be phased out in 21 months, the 971,000 must be exceeded by 90,000 in FT 1952.

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On 13 Jamery 1951, in a Memorandum signed McNeil, the desired military strengths were approved.

During March, the major activity of this office was to participate in staff wide activities necessary to formalize a request for a supplemental. This supplemental was requested for a build-up to 87 Wings in 1951 and 95 Wings in 1952. This program required greatly accelerated recruitment and training activities. This 3rd USAF supplemental appropriation (known as the 4th Supplemental because of a 3rd Supplemental Congressional appropriation to non-defense agencies), supplied \$1.886.7 million to the Air Force.

During the remaining part of this reporting period, this office was primarily engaged in participating in defense of the FT 1952 budget estimates before various reviewing authorities, including the RAC, the Special Review Penel of the Under Secretary of the kir Force, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Sudget.

Other special activities of this division included the following:

- a. This office has a continuing responsibility to present to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force monthly, a report on the status of the current program. This consists primarily of a presentation of the actual versus the programmed position of the various program elements.
- b. Programming activities involving the Air National Guard in the first six months of 1951 centered mainly around implementation of the 95 Wing Program and publication to the staff of programming guidance around which to plan reconstitution of the Air National Guard following federal service.

The former action, as previously outlined, involved the ordering to federal service of all but five wings of the Air National Guard 22-Wing complex in existence on 1 January 1951. Late in January, this office along with the Directorates of Plans, Operations, and Communications in expanding the induction program to include all remaining AGGW Groups of the Air National Guard plus three of the Communications Squadrons and five of the Signal Construction Companies. Approval of this additional induction was obtained early in February and implemented as planned.

Simultaneously, the unexpected events of partial mobilisation forced radical reprogramming and major revisions in ground rules on which to base the Air National Guard budget estimates for FY 1952, due for submission in the fall.

c. The activities of this office in regard to Air Reserve matters during this reporting period saw a continuation of the schedule for ordering Reserve individuals and units to active military service. By the end of the fiscal year all units of the Organised Air Reserve had been ordered into active duty as were most of the individuals. In addition, over 60,000 individuals of the Volunteer Air Reserve were ordered to active military service.

During the month of March 1951, by direction of the Secretary, the Air Force established a board under the chairmonship of Major General Earl S. Hoag to develop a plan for the Air Reserve Forces to be in consonance with the proposed Armed Forces Reserve Act. To work with this board, a working committee was established under the chairmanship of a member of this office. The original plan as submitted to the Council of Deputies totalled 1,600,000 Reserves; this was rejected as being infeasible of attainment and was adjusted downward.

It was realized that insufficient time had been available to the Committee to develop a sound long range plan. Therefore, Mr. Zuckert, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Brigadier General Robert Smith, a Reserve officer from Dallas, Texas. This Committee (SMITH COMMITTEE) was appointed on 4 June 1951 and included eight officers selected from various agencies of the Air Staff including 2 members from this office. It was directed to develop a sound Long Range Plan for Reserve Forces which would be in accordance with the provisions of the proposed Armed Forces Reserve Act being considered by the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.

- d. The 2nd half Fiscal Year 1951 was spent generally in the preparation, revision, and review of the Third Supplemental FY 1951 and FY 1952 material program requirements. This program admittedly had errors and inconsistencies, but it did provide a uniform basis for the computation of material requirements by the Air Staff and major commends. The review of the program and the resultant material requirements repeatedly high-lighted the need for more detailed program guidance for the determination of material reserves. Consequently, this office was instrumented in developing and coordinating Air Staff action to divide material reserves into two categories defined as follows:
  - (1) D-Day readiness reserves (quantity of any item required to be stocked in addition to the peacetime force requirement in order to support completely the forces in being on D-Day at war time activity rates until production deliveries are sufficient to support the war time requirements).

(2) Mobilisation reserve material requirements (the quantity of any item to be stocked in addition to the D-Day readiness reserve material requirements in order to equip and support completely the forces to be mobilized subsequent to D-Day at war time activity rates until production deliveries are sufficient to support the requirement).

The eletermination of these material reserves and the pre-positioning of these items resulted in a requirement for a firm policy on the muthorization of flyway kits, Tables II and XVI, station and house-keeping kits, and other special reserves such as pre-stocking in support of MATS operations along strategic air routes and the support of war plans in CINCUSAFE. In the computation of the material reserves, the need for a war plan consistent with the programmed forces and operational concept is required for a D-Day projected sufficiently in advance to provide sufficient lead time in order that funds may be available and procurement effected for those items of material needed to support the programmed forces.

HISTORY AIRCRAFT PROGRAMMING DIVISION ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING 1 January 1951 to 30 June 1951 Table of Contents PART I - FUNCTIONS PART II - ORGANIZATION & PERSONNEL PART III - ACTIVITIES SECRET

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### PART I FUNCTIONS

- 1. Develops planning guidance required for aircraft and guided missiles programming.
- Analyzes procurement, modification, modernization or disposal programs of aircraft and guided missiles.
- Prepares aircraft and guided missile program inventory and procurement requirements and objectives.

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# PART II ORGANIZATION & PERSONNEL

The Aircraft Programming Division contains the following branches:

- 1. Aircraft
- 2. Guided Missiles
- 3. Special Analysis

Personnel actual and authorized for beginning and end of the period

are:

Military

Civilian TOTAL 1 Jan 1951 30 Jun 1951
Auth Actual Auth Actual
4 3 4 4
8 4 8 4

PART III SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS, 1 JAN - 30 JUN 1951

Commencing with the second half of fiscal 1951, the office was in the process of compiling inventory requirements and formulating successive approximations to serve as the base for developing aircraft procurement requirements for the USAF 95 wing program. Subsequent development of aircraft modernization charts formed the basis for detailed studies resulting in pertinent aircraft procurement data for FI 51 supplemental and FI 52 budget requests.

During the reporting period, the aircraft inventory contained an average of about 20000 aircraft. This represents a decrease of 1000 aircraft over the same period of fiscal year 1950. Increased attrition, due to the Korean hostilities and distribution of aircraft to fill MDAP commitments, exceeded the rate at which new aircraft were delivered.

With respect to the ending inventory position, 13000 aircraft were active and 7000 were in an inactive status; 9500 were combat types and the remaining were trainers, transports, etc. Over 72% were World War II types six years or more old, all of which will be obsolete by end of fiscal year 1952. The Air Force is continuing maximum use of World War II aircraft to the extent that modification and stocks of spare parts will permit in consideration of economy and operational need.

The projection of currently available resources and the production program have been designed to meet modernization requirements for the 95 Wing Air Force Program at the earliest practicable date.

Disposition of assigned functions by the office generated the following activities and events:

6 January 1951. The division assembled data for submission to OSD, in support of cost categories for the 95 Wing Aircraft Procurement and Inventory Accessization Program.

10 January 1951. Completed original computation of first line aircraft inventory requirements for the 95 wing program. Requirement computations were completed during the reporting period for tentative planning on the following programs:

- a. 20 Feb 51 260 Wings, 20,000 pilot-training rate
- b. 26 Apr 51 130 Wings, 15,600 pilot-training rate
- c. 7 May 51 135 Wings, 15,600 pilot-training rate
- d. 10 May 51 162 Wings, 15,600 pilot-training rate

17 January 1951. Aircraft procurement for constitution of a USAF occubat Reserve was programmed against a regular establishment of 95 Wings, 28 separate squadrons, and 11 modernized ANG Wings, together with 28 MATS Transport squadrons and 7 Special Operations squadrons.

(JOS 2101/15 and JOS 1800/115 and 116.) This program currently reflects 3578 aircraft designated as combat reserve and was included as such in the proposed FY 52 budget. The combat reserve program was under constant study during this reporting period. Deletions and additions to aircraft categories within the program structure were necessary to establish required and/or tentative budgetary positions.

29 January 1951. Appropriate action for implementation of
FY 51 supplemental and FY 52 Guided Missiles budget programs was initiated,
based on the latest recommended schedules submitted by the War Plans
Division.

9 February 1951. Study of administrative aircraft requirements



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was undertaken. Comments were requested from interested directorates, based on the assumption that USAF operations require administrative travel and transportation of light cargo beyond that contemplated in the MATS mission.

28 February 1951. Completed a study of spare parts procurement for Aircraft is storage for War Reserve, based on a request from DUS/J.

Submitted information for specific guidance on spares to be procured under plan "SEED DORN."

8 March 1951. Action was initiated for revision of HOI 150-9 to provide for aircraft reclamation. This action would make a periodic review of the aircraft inventory mandatory to insure that aircraft are reclaimed according to a schedule designed to prevent the USAF from expending funds on unnecessary spares or storage costs.

16 March 1951. Prepared assumptions and required information to define the USAF position and limitations on MDAP assistance for the meeting of four (4) Air Chiefs of Staff (U.S., U.K., France, Canada). This office continually conducted specific MDAP studies for purposes of providing pertinent aircraft information. MDAP aircraft information submitted was as follows:

- a. Availability of F-86 aircraft
- b. NATO guidance for future USAF programs
- c. Availability of fighter aircraft to NATO forces
- d. Spares support required for Foreign Aid aircraft
- e. Estimated first line aircraft on hand in USAF-NATO units

22 March 1951. Instructions from OSAF to undertake procurement action on a cross-servicing order from the U.S. Army for 105 heavy heli-

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copters necessitated a study of USAF helicopter requirements for guidance in production programming. Allocation of helicopters to the U.S. Army from established production schedules deferred satisfaction of USAF program requirements until the first quarter of fiscal 1954, indicating a need for accelerated helicopter production to meet USAF and U.S. Army requirements within designated periods.

11 April 1951. The office completed preparation of statements, supported by aircraft data, to clarify specific facts pertaining to aircraft and related procurement, as summarized by the Joint Review Panel (OSD) following an analysis of the FY 51 supplemental and FY 52 budget estimates. Detailed information for support of the following issues was submitted:

- a. Procurement of aircraft excess to requirements
- b. Use of usable substitute aircraft
- c. Test aircraft

2 May 1951. Quantitative information pertaining to production and inventory requirements of KC-97 aircraft was developed. Model improvement of the KC-97 was studied in connection with requirements needed for the current B-47, RB-47 program. In addition, tanker requirements for SAC fighter type aircraft and tanker augmentations for B-52, RB-52 operations were under surveillance.

4 May 1951. Preparation of initial program guidance information was initiated for purpose of developing the aircraft program for FY 53.

7 May 1951. In connection with FY 1953 program planning, the office prepared a study which indicated methods for meeting aircraft requirements to permit reasonable programming for a build-up to 135 wings

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by July 1954. Preparation of this study was based upon the following assumptions:

- a. Righest production rates reached in the 95 wing program would not be exceeded.
- b. Pilot-training rate: 15,600
- c. No change in separate squadrons
- d. No tanker squadrons for tanker units
- e. No second line aircraft to be available beyond those already required for the 95 wing program


17 May 1951. The office terminated discussions with representatives of the Congressional Investigating Committee on Appropriations. The discussions involved aircraft programming methods and included a presentation of the current USAF Aircraft Modernization Program. Numerous questions associated with aircraft programming were answered. In addition, the following schedules were prepared and submitted for committee use:

- a. Projection of first line aircraft inventories (1951 thru 1953)
- b. Aircraft on hand as of 31 December 1950, including a breakdown of 1st and 2nd line aircraft


21 May 1951. A tabulation of aircraft on hand as of 28 February 1951 was developed in compliance with a request by Congressman Benson. The tabulation included a breakdown of World War II and post-World War II aircraft designed to reveal the significant predominance of World War II aircraft in the current USAF inventory.

8 June 1951. The office undertook a complete revision of aircraft


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# HISTORY OF THE PROCEBURES DIVISION 1 January 1951 - 30 June 1951

#### Chapter I - Organization and Functions.

Part I - Functions. At the start of the period covered, the functions of the Procedures Division were officially described as follows:1

- 1. In coordination with the Programming Group, establishes program procedures including forms and format.
- Maintains liaison with other staff agencies engaged in research or planning procedures, factors, and mechanical and arithmetic program devices.
- 3. Maintains current data on plans and programs of other defense agencies.
- h. Istablishes and maintains program accounting system.
- 5. Publishes and distributes printed and graphic program data and information; acts as project office for program presentations.
- 6. Maintains lisison with other agencies of the Air Staff on matters pertaining to progress analysis and reporting.

In May 1951, the functions were restated:2

- 1. Establishes program procedures.
- 2. Maintains program accounting system.
- Monitors the publication and distribution of program data and information.

There was no real change of function between December 1950 and May 1951. The latter statement of functions is merely a corrected and more precisely stated version of the former. No brief statement, however, can adequately portray the part played by this specialized operation in an organization as complex as USAF Beadcasters.

The Procedures Division makes no substantive determinations usually considered characteristic of Headquarters programing activities. Except for their procedural ramifications, the Division is not concerned with the number of wings, wing structure or composition, training loads, aircraft procurement, and other similar considerations. But it does play a large part in enabling subject matter offices to arrive at these and other answers such that each individual answer will fit each of the others.

The need for a separate office to prescribe procedures for
the USAF program can be seen from the fact that seventeen directorates covering all five of the BCS's participate directly in
the development and maintenance of its interdependent portions.
Without a single office establishing procedures as to timing, formut, content and distribution to insure that each subject matter
office gets the information it needs when it needs it, chaos
would prevail regardless of the internal procedures of each office.

The USAF Programs must not only be formulated, they must be continually maintained up-to-date; and a change in one of the major positions of the Program may result in changes in each of

the others. An increase in aircraft, for example, may result in increases in personnel, organization, installation and housing requirements. The method by which each of these portions of the UEAF Program is maintained in consomence with each of the others, is also the responsibility of this Division.

Those then may be considered the primary functions of the Procedures Division:

- 1. Wetablishment of procedures to insure that each part of the USAF Program is produced at the time and in the form needed to provide the required data for each subsequent portion so that the final product is a cohesive, consistent whole.
- 2. "stablishment of procedures to insure that each interdependent part is maintained up-to-date and that each part remains consistent with each other.

Part II - Organization and Personnel. Military and civilian porsonnel strength of the Division remained relatively static during the period. The military authorization remained at five; the civilian authorization was decreased from seven to six as a result of Department of Defense Directive, dated 2h July 1951, title 110 PRESCREEL. There were a reassignments of key personnel.

Until recently no attempt was made to organize into units below the division level. The reasons are fairly apparent. The
amount of routine or recurring work which lends itself to compartmentalization is minimal. Most of the work involves large, longterm projects in which all of the staff participates. The interrelation previously noted also militates against segmentation.

Toward the end of the period, the following areas were established within the Division:3

- 1. Program Publications and Coordination Procedures
- 2. Procedures Formulation
- 3. Aircraft Program Procedures
- h. Personnel Program Procedures
- 5. Organization Program Procedures
- 6. Procedures Research

This does not mean that the structure has been made more rigid. The personnel within a segment also work in each of the other segments. By this means, a contact man has been established for each general programming area, thus svoiding overlapping and redundant compiling of data, and insuring continuity of communication with other offices who, for the most part, are concerned with only one portion of the program.

#### Chapter II - Activities.

Part I - Unit activation, Manning, Training and Equipping. This period began during the greatest planned expansion of the Mir Force since World War II. There was at the same time a need for producing on schedule combat ready units to meet our commitments in Force and other parts of the world as well as the possibility of all-out mobilization in the near future. These conditions led the Procedures Division to a consideration of the necessity for reinstituting more specific scheduling and monitoring control over unit activations, manning, equipping, and training; and if it was found that such need existed, a determination of the necessary organizations, procedures, reports and other data needed to do the job.

pertinent offices, it was found that a need did exist for more specific scheduling and monitoring control over unit activations, manning, equipping and training. Specific facts uncarthed to support this conclusion were:

- Tactical units were being sent to Moros in varying states
  of readiness from an equipping and manning point of view.
- 2. Units were arriving in USAFS with inadequate individual clothing allowances. 5
- 3. Lack of a method of coordinating the arrival of personnel with equipment and bousing availability leading to the "Lackland incident" and similar equally significant but less publicized situations in organized units.6

The need having been shown, it remained to determine what tools were available to permit more precise scheduling of units. It was found that:7


- 1. There existed no direct translation of Air Force objectives of force and composition into phased schedules of dates by which the T/OAN units were to be combat ready and no Residuarters office was charged with that function. Each Major Command made up its own unit readiness schedules based on the limited data available to it regarding anticipated flows of personnel and equipment.
- 2. No up-to-date unit training standards were available in this Headquarters. Each Major Air Command made up its own without any formalized coordination. It was possible, in this situation, for two units of the same type in different commands to be considered combat ready by the standards of its own command but not by the other.
- 3. There was no office or agency within the Air Staff adequately prepared or staffed to monitor unit training or equipping. This situation was in direct contrast to the 1963-65 period when there existed within the Commitments Division of OCAH an office specifically charged with monitoring Air Force commitments of units, and within A/CAS Training another office which monitored unit training.

7

As a result of these and other considerations a staff study (see Tab A) was prepared by the Procedures Division setting forth these conditions and recommending:

- That the D/Operations, DCS/G be responsible for providing combat readiness dates for each Air Force Ming or separate squadron.
- 2. That the D/Operations establish criteria defining com-
- 3. That the D/Operations assume from D/Flans the responsibility for stating priorities for manning and equipping specific units.
- h. That D/Operations monitor unit training conducted by the commands.
- 5. That the D/Operations combine the old "Precedence List" and "Unit Forecast" together with unit readiness dates into a new program source document.9

As a result of this study, the Control Division, D/Operations, DES/O, was reorganized to undertake the functions recommended in the staff study. 10 A schedule for unit training by type of unit was set up. 11 AF-wide unit training standards are being established. The Priorities of Programmed Units document, first published in July shows each major unit in the Air Force by procedence by month projected for one year. In addition, month of activation, completion of manning, and equipping, sperational readiness, movement, reorganization, inectivation, command resessionment, station change and conversion of unit aircraft are shown.



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Part II - Program Procedures Manual. On 23 March 1950, AFL 150-15 was published establishing a procedure for up-to-date maintenance of the USAF Program. It was written during the period of the static AS group program and was aimed primarily at budget control. Easically AFL 150-15 provided that:

- The USAF Program was to be prepared in chree volumes: Aircraft and Flying Hours, Organization and Personnel, and Installations.
- 2. The Program was to be mainteined through the use of Program Change Vouchers which were used both to submit command change requests and to transmit Headquarters directed changes.
- 3. Coordination was to be achieved by requiring that each voucher (either command request or Headquarters directive) be funneled through the Programming Division of the Assistant for Programming. In this way, it could be ascertained that the total Air Force remained within the imposed budget ceilings and that no change was made in any one segment of the USAF Program until its effect on each of the others was examined. Thus, the various parts remained in consonance with each other. As an illustration, when a change in planned personnel authorisation was contemplated which would also affect aircraft maintenance capability, no change would be made in the Organisation and Personnel Program unless the concurrent change could be made in the Aircraft and Flying Hour Program.

h. Each program segment was to be maintained current on machine punch cards so that, at any given time, an upto-date program sould be printed.

AFL 150-15 was implemented just prior to the beginning of the police action in Morea. With the advent of the Morean action the program changed from a static condition and entered into a priod of flux. The number of change vouchers required to reflect this situation increased considerably over that originally anticipated. As the work-load grew, various requirements of AFL 150-15 were simplified or entirely eliminated. By the beginning of the current classicar year AFL 150-15 was for all practical purposes extinct.12

While the objectives of the programming control announced in AFL 150-15 were still desirable, the procedures for assuring program control in a rapidly expanding AF required modification. The flow of program change vouchers, as specified in AFL 150-15, recording minute details of program data essential to operating a h8 wing procedure force, peacetime budget support, and funding guidance had to be suspended because of the increased paper volume associated with the expansion objectives. Modified procedures dealing in greater aggregates were required, permitting greater flexibility in making program modifications known to all concerned.

Money was the major limiting factor during the static h8 group period. As the expansion not under way, the primary limitations became time, trained personnel, operational limitations, engines and spares, personnel processing capacity, and similar considerations.

To replace AFL 150-15, programming procedures were needed which would

be applicable to the current situation. The Air Force Manual of Program Procedures (Tentative), AFM 150-3, was developed by the Procedures Division to fill this need.

At the present time, AFM 150-3 is still in the hands of the AAG for final processing. It is expected that the manual will be available for distribution about 1 Drember 1951.

This Manual describes the Air Force programming process and establishes general procedures to be followed by Air Force Headquarters in preparation and publication of program documents. It also provides information to the Major Air Commands on:13

- The principal program data they may expect from Headquarters USAF for making preliminary plans and budget estimates and for controlling operating actions.
- The approximate times at which they may expect to receive program documents.

The specific purposes of the Hannal are to:lk

- "stablish recurring program cycles, with time-tables for accomplishing the principal programming tasks.
- 2. Differentiate between planning-budgeting programs on which preliminary plans and budget estimates are made prior to the submission of an appropriation request, and operating programs on which the Air Force will expend appropriated funds and inventory stocks to attain authorized objectives.
- 3. Provide recognition of the decentralization among command and staff agencies of the responsibility for various segments of programming.

- h. Assign Air Staff responsibility for the preparation of specific program documents and worksheets.
- Assign responsibility for monitoring the preparation of program documents.
- Fromote uniformity and consistency in the published program documents.

Among the revisions to past practice in AFE 150-3 is the separation of budgeting and operating program data into two distinct series of documents. Previous inclusion of both types of data into a single set of program documents made it difficult for Air Force implementing agencies to distinguish changes for which resources were available from those which would become available through anticipated supplemental appropriations or variants in a speculative program prepared for budgeting purposes. The resulting application of resources to other than authorized requirements is avoided by the proposed separation of programing data into the USAF Flanning-Eudgeting Program and the USAF Operating Program.

refficient Air Force programming is the product of properly coordinated staff actions, and is recorded in a series of related documents prepared by the various staff agencies. These related documents comprise a statement of Air Force program and contain the following general characteristics:

- The documents represent the planned implementation of a common set of authorized program objectives and assumptions.
- 2. All documents are projected from an inventory position as of the same date.
- 3. To facilitate the recognition of these documents as inte-

gral parts of the USAF Program, their appearance is standardized.

The USAF Flanning-Endgeting Program prepared annually, is based on the Initial and Secondary Guidance developed from the Air Force Objectives. This program is the basis used to justify the requests for appropriations in support of planned USAF operations for a future fiscal year; it is not designed for guiding or implementing surrent operations.

The budget-planning programming cycle begins with a statement of Air Force objectives as suthorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These objectives are expanded and disseminated to the Air Staff. The announcement of broad objectives is contained in the Initial Program Guidance prepared under the direction of the Assistant for Programming and published by that office. This Guidance describes the following areas:

- 1. Forces in being
- 2. Tactical Degree of Readiness
- 3. Plan of Deployment
- h. Logistics

This guidance is distributed to the USAF Headquarters staff agencies.

Procedures require review and approval of this guidance by the Air Force
Council.

A more detailed statement of objectives, Secondary Ouidance, is prepared by the responsible agencies and forwarded to the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O. Secondary Guidance covers the following areas:

- 1. Planned Troop Basis
- 2. Estimated Personnel Requirements by AFSC/SSN
- 3. Hase Utilization Plan
- h. Aircraft Procurement Planning Schedule

#### 5. Logistics

This Secondary Ouidance also is subject to review and approval by the Air Force Council.

The importance of the Primary and Secondary Guidanbe as well as the Operating Program Guidance is difficult to over-emphasize. The assurance that the guidance reflects the latest data as ilable and is internally consistent (e.g., the flying training rate is in consonance with pilots requirements) is the most important element in assuring that the Program documents based on the guidance will be consistent and timely. As was pointed out in Fart IV of the Requirements Survey prepared by the Marvard Mobilization Analysis Center (January-Farch 1951), "Minor imbalance in Program Guidance multiplies geometrically as the premises are developed into material requirements." 15

After the Air Force Objectives have been adequately defined in Secondary Guidance and competent review has been accomplished, the pre-paration of program documents can be started. The following "USAF Planning-Eudgeting Program" documents are prepared by the responsible Air Staff agencies:

- 1. Projected Aircraft Inventory
- 2. Conversion and Equipping Chart
- 3. Aircraft and Flying Hours
- h. Installations
- 5. Organisation and Personnel

The preparation of the above documents requires monitoring to insure:

1. That the production schedule is closely adhered to.

- 2. That the data in the documents are consistent and interrelated.
- 3. That the out-off date for changes to documents is enforced. The Planning-Budgeting documents are made available to the Director of Budget who forwards them to the Major Air Commands for preparation of Budget estimates. The Air Staff agencies and Major Air Commands prepare detailed Budget estimates based on the Planning-Budgeting Program. documents. These estimates are then assembled by the Director of the Budget, Meadquarters USAF, into the proper formats and language for budgetary presentation. This presentation is normally made before the following agencies in turn:
  - 1. Pudget Advisory Committee, USAF
  - 2. Office of the Secretary of Defense
  - 3. Bureau of the Sudget
  - h. Appropriations Committees of Congress

The USAF Operating Programs are published quarterly. Major changes are incorporated by means of special publications as the necessity arises. The Operating Program may differ from the corresponding Planning-Budgeting Program. The Planning-Budgeting Program documents, reflecting the position the Air Force would like to attain, are used by the Air Staff and Major Air Commands in requesting funds from Congress. The USAF Operating Programs are prepared based upon the funds made available by Congress and reflect the posture the Air Force is authorized to attain. This program serves to guide the immediate operations of the Air Force.

Realism must govern the operating process at all stages. The

building of Operating Programs is a process of planning for the best use of current and projected inventories to reach specified, attainable goals. The Operating Program is published quarterly on a recurring time phased schedule. This reprogramming is necessary for the following reasons:

- 1. Changes in actual versus previously forecast conditions external to the Air Force.
- Actual production of aircraft, components, spares, and other major equipment items versus those previously forecast.
- Actual gains and losses of personnel, school graduation rates, pipeline absorption of personnel, versus those forecast in the budget cycle.
  - 4. Changes in objectives caused by world events.
- 5. Changes in objectives caused by changing costs and other unpredictable events.

The normal cycle of Operating Programs sims at quarterly publications with a distribution date as of the first day of each quarter. Special publications may be made between quarters if the circusstances and major changes demand a new set of operating documents. The Operating Program cycle, like that of the Planning-Budgeting Program is initiated by the formulation of Program Guidance subject to review and approval by the Air Council. While similar in form to the Guidance for Budgeting, the Operating Program Guidance is adjusted to remain within the limits of resources actually available and to make objectives more explicit for operating purposes.

The USAF Operating Program documents prepared by the responsible Air Staff agencies are as follows:


- 1. Projected Aircraft Inventory
- 2. Projected Troop Mousing Availability (Proposed)
- 3. Conversion and Equipping Chart
- 4. Aircraft and Flying Hours
- 5. Pricrities of Programmed Units
- 6. Installations

Through this Manual the Air Staff seeks to:

- Provide, in the USAF Planning-Sudgeting Program a basis for justification for USAF appropriation requests.
- Establish controlled series of progressions through which the Air Force must pass in order to achieve a stated goal.
- Produce a document establishing a progression for each of the major resources of the Air Force and a guide for the economical use and central of those resources.
- 4. Assure that each portion of the USAF Program is in consciounce at any given time with all of the other parts.
- Frovide a means of maintaining a complete and reasonable upto-date program at all times in the hends of pertinent offices throughout the USAF.

AFA 150-3 is intended to overcome the shortcomings found in AFL 150-15 by:

 Recognizing troop housing as a limiting factor by including it as a major consideration in program development with which other



Part III - Occidention. The importance of coordinated USAF Program documents has already been indicated in Part II. The problem of coordination is not, however, limited to the programming process; it arises whenever an action taken by one directorate may affect the prerogatives of any other directorate. As the activities of the Air Force become more and more complex, few actions are possible which do not fit into this category.

The need for coordinated Air Staff activity is of special significance when it involves directives to the Major Air Commands. There are some fifty (50) Headquarters USAF offices with authority under HOI 10-1 to direct some area of smjor air command activity. If a command is given conflicting or even uncoordinated direction from a significant number of these fifty (50), the result may be chaotic. As an example, where one Headquarters office directs a command to assume a function, without the appropriate office authorizing the need for personnel spaces; the command must either ignore the directive or raid other functions for the personnel spaces.

In February the Procedures Division undertook a staff study on concurrent directives to commands (See Tab B). In the course of the study it was found that HDI 10-15 limits the definition of "coordination" to mean that a person signing a coordination sheet is in accord with the contents. The HDI is silent in regard to the preparation of a concurrent directive by the coordinating office. Yet, as previously indicated, coordination is not achieved by a signature; actions, not merely intentions, must be in accord.

When an office non-concurs, the office originating the paper


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can, and often does, ignore the non-concurrence. There is no procedure set out whereby the disputants may have the problem settled by the Deputy Chief of Staff or Vice Chief of Staff. No means are available to systematically inform the Deputy Chief of Staff that the disagreement exists. It is quite possible that an office of interest may be completely overlooked in the coordination process.

Investigation disclosed that during World War II the War Department Ceneral Staff developed two effective coordinating techniques.

The first required every officer to prepare a "Memorandum for Record" each time he concurred or non-concurred to a proposed directive. The "Memorandum for Record" contained information on concurrent actions required from the Staff office he represented. The second technique was the weekly publication of actions discussed at the General Council sectings based on the more important memorands for record of that week. Systematic review of the actions and directives of staff operating elements was thereby provided. The method also provided these elements with top echelon comments on their activities and informed each office of the major actions of each of the other staff components.

The study recommended the introduction of a system similar to that described above. It also recommended that the definition of "coordination" in NOI 10-15 be expanded to include the issuance of necessary concurrent directives by the coordinating office and that directives on which non-concurrences were received be forwarded to the Vice chief of Staff for decision. 17 A proposed HOI in the "10" series was developed proscribing the use of the Mesorandus for LS Record.



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Fart IV - Mannower Projections and Controls. As the military departments continue to expend, they require an increasingly greater share of the nation's resources of money, manpower, materials and facilities. As these requirements grow it becomes even more incumbent upon the services to insure that the resources on hand are utilized as effectively as possible before any greater decand on the national economy is made. As recently stated by President Truman:

"Now we are not aiming at a full war economy-we are trying to maintain a high readiness status for a long period--we are trying to develop greater economic strength both here and abroad--we have to plan our present job to do all these things and still seet the military goals." 21

Not the least of these problems is effective manpower utilization. This was stresped by the President in the same speech quoted above:

"...before this money becomes available for expenditure we must have accomplished the.... Treation by the Department of Defense of a system to control the requirements for and check on utilization of civilian and military personnel. I want the Budget Bureau to review this system and help in its establishment. We must prevent any hoarding of manpower in this program. "22

In a memorandum to Mr. Finletter, Mr. Zuckert, Assistant Secretary for Management, noted the importance of effective manpower control:

"We are taking a close look at the manpower requirements problem through the Committee on Personnel Utilization and Training. This Committee will specifically look into the Manpower Control Techniques available to appraise their adequacy for scheduling the procurement and training of personnel, and for the determination of manpower requirements. 23

The need to improve manpower projection and control techniques was recognized early by the Procedures Division. An especially urgent need was felt for manpower procedures which would be equally applicable in the event of full mobilisation. An investigation was made of the Personnel Training and manning scheduling processes employed during the latter stages of Norld War II. 24 Based on this research a plan was established to revitalize manpower procedures. A summary of the individual actions recommended was circulated to the Air Staff in a Staff Study distributed under a Routing and Record Sheet dated 26 June 1951. 25

It was pointed out that any system for projecting requirements and managing resources should be readily adaptable with the least possible change to total mobilization and war. To meet this goal in the manpower area required: 26

- A means of projecting requirements rapidly and accurately which could also be used to control allocations.
- 2. The rapid translation of these requirements into skill and grade data for training and manning purposes.
- The scheduling of personnel procurement, training and assignment to meet the requirements.
- 4. The establishment of manpower standards which would enable Readquarters USAF to effectively police manpower utilization in the field.

The basic personnel projection document is the Organization and Personnel Program. It spells out by quarter the planned unit composition and personnel authorization for a period in the future.

The Program is used in the preparation of the following:

- 1. Personnel procurement, training and assignment schedules.
- 2. Personnel promotion, rotation and separation policies.
- 3. Plans for the procurement and distribution of supplies.
  The Organization and Personnel Program is a planned projection only.
  Authorization of personnel are made through other publications.

Air Force units full into two major categories. The first of these is the Table of Organisation unit. The Table of Organisation originated as a standard package of perconnel and equipment to be used for a particular purpose. The advantage of such "standard packages" was to permit the expression of a pre-established set of personnel skills and equipment by the use of a T/D&E number. Unfortunately, these packages have grown less standard. By March 1951 the number of modifications (exceptions to the standard) averaged 3.78 per T/ORE tables in existence. Nine T/ORE's averaged 22.1 different personnel authorizations per table.27 The Director of Manpower and Organization charged with the smintenance of these tables has been working on a complete new system whereby separate tables would be set up for personnel and equipment and modifications to basic tables would become new basic tables. These new T/O's, although delayed by the introduction of officer AFSC's, should be in operation by January 1952.

The use of these tables and their up-to-date maintenance on

punch cards, will permit rapid mechanical computations of the personnel skills and equipment needed for the T/O portion of the program. Since T/O's contain only about 38% of the total Air Force programmed strength, 28 however, the major portion is not accounted for by this means.

The biggest portion of Air Force strength is found in Table of Distribution and Table of Distribution Augmentation units.

Unlike the T/D's these units are under complete control of the Sajor Air Command (by the terms of AFE 20-52). Shile the command authority over bulk authorizations is undoubtedly justified, it poses a problem in projecting personnel skill and training requirements from this Headquarters. Since the composition of bulk units are not controlled by Headquarters USAF, it cannot be forecast here with any degree of accuracy.

The recommended solution of this problem is the use of standard planning tables for determining bulk requirements. Under this concept, the entire bulk portion of an installation would be lumped into a single planning table. There would be a table, spelled out by skill and number of personnel, for each type of mission with further distinction for varying sizes of mission. These tables would be unlike the T/O's in that they would be guides only rather directive, but, to the extent they were followed, they would provide many of the advantages of T/O's without limiting the command prerogatives contained in AFR 20-52. Specifically, station planning tables offer the following advantages:29

1. Standardization of bulk personnel requirements. Non-T/O

requirements contained in the Organization and Personnel Program could be based on the standards provided by the station planning tables.

- 2. Rapid mechanical conversion of the Organization and
  Personnel Program bulk to specialty and grade requirements needed
  for planning the procurement, training, assignment and reassignment
  of personnel and for the procurement of individual items of remipment related to specific personnel specialties.
- Permit the establishment of time-phased schedules of activations, manning and training as a means of control and conservation of resources.
- 4. Save time in the computation of Organization and Personnel Programs by providing such larger packages for bulk than T/D's or T/DA's.
- 5. Serve as measurement standards for program planning and as a guide for the establishment of T/D organizations by the commands and as yardsticks in evaluating command manpower utilization.

The Director of Manpower and Organization has begun work on station planning tables. Up to now, no target date has been set for the completion of the project.

The capability of the new techniques to produce rapidly the specialty and grade requirements of the program has been stressed. It would be difficult to over-emphasize the importance of this factor. The projection of specialty and grade requirements is used for training guidance and guidance on the procurement of individual equipment.

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The system currently used for skills projection is largely manual. Because of lengthy preparation time it is impractical to produce the projection for more than a single point in time, generally four quarters out. There is no way, under this method, for the trainers to determine at that point between the issuance of the projection and the end of the period, the particular skill is required. Currently, there are no technical difficulties preventing a projection showing several points in time. The preparation time, however, would be so lengthy as to out date it by the time it could be prepared. By employing the T/D's and station planning tables on punch cards, the skills projection could be prepared within a reasonable length of time for each period shown in the Organization and Personnel document. This system is being considered but cannot be implemented until the T/D's and planning tables are available.

In addition to the long term training guidance, there exists also a need for a short term skills projection for manning purposes. Since this projection would be used for actual distribution of personnel to units, it must be more accurate than the projection for training. 30 For this reason, the staff study recommended that the manning projections be shown by menth and made by the Major Air Commands since they are closest to the scene and determine the skill requirements for the bulk portion of the personnel authorizations. Manning guidance should reflect the fellowing characteristics:

1. Phased requirements of T/O units based on actual manning

schedules, not automatic demands for full T/O strengths of activation dates. At present shows the requirement for the full T/O personnel authorization on the day of activation. Actual personnel requirements should be chased over a period of months.


- 2. Phased desand for bulk asnning based on station activations and planned workload growth.
- 3. The last reported status, i.e., shortages and overages in assigned personnel.
- 4. The identification of the above requirements by priority or functional groupings. Priorities are already available in the Priorities of Programmed Units but no functional groupings have yet been prepared.

Another summary figure shown in the Organization and Personnel Program is pipeline (sometimes given other designations such as "contingency"). Pipeline can have a worthwhile purpose: to provide personnel authorizations to be used for non-effectives such as prisoners, patients and transients. In current usage, however, the pipeline figure is not distributed to the commands, is shown only for the end of each year, and fluctuates erratically from year to year. If Further, non-effective personnel do not retain their authorizations in the Zone of Interior. It pipeline should be used only to provide space authorizations for non-effectives without reducing the authorizations of operating units.

\*Manpower authorizations of non-T/O spaces are presently made by a Personnel Allotsent Voucher for both military and civilian spaces. Depending on ceilings imposed for either military or civilian personnel, labor markets, local conditions and other factors, many jobe in the Mir Force may be either military or civilian. As standards for manpower requirements, determinations, and allocations are being built by the Requirements Division of the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, the problems of civilian versus military job and skill requirements become very important. A common system of identification or a method of conversion from one classification mystem to the other is required. A single system is impractical due to the differences between Civil Service practice and military classification. A system of conversions is clearly required. Such conversions should be usable at all echelons and locations of the Air Force. "32 Nork on this project has been started by the Directorate of Civilian Personnel.

as a result of these studies, the following recommendations were made: 34

- 1. Completion of station planning tables for each applicable Air Force Pase mission by size.
  - 2. Singly identified Tables of Organization.
- Regular publication of the Priorities of Programmed Units document.
  - 4. Setting up of categories of priorities and functions.
  - 5. Creation and use of phased unit manning tables.
- Projection of skills by month and the concurrent modification of statistical reporting to enable the commands to perform this function.



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#### FOOTHOTES

- Headquarters U. S. Air Force Organization and Functions,
   December 1950. Filed Sec of Air Staff, Administrative Division.
- 2. Ibid, 1 Hay 1951.
- 3. Assistant for Programming Personal Assignment Memorandum No. 90,
- h. Notes in Programming Procedures Study January 1951, Procedures
  Division Correspondence Files VIII, 5.
- 5. Tox from 3rd Air Division.
- 6. Notes, Correspondence Files VIII, 5.
- 7. A Programming Procedures Study January 1951, Procedures Division

  Correspondence Files VIII, 5. (See Tab A)
- 8. Hy USAF Organization & Functions filed Sec of Air Staff, Administrative Division.
- This recommendation resulted in the publication "Priorities of Programmed Units" (OFU).
- 10. Be USAF Organization & Functions, July 1951.
- Pendinese Pates of Combat Units, RAR from D/Operations to Assistant for Programming, 25 January 1951, Procedures Division Correspondence File VIII, 5.
- 12. Since the events described occurred before the period covered, they are not given the exposition justified. A more detailed coverage of these events is available in Procedures Division Correspondence File I hO.
- 13. AFM 150-3, Air Force Panual of Program Procedures, Foreword.

- lh. Ibid.
- 15. Meguirements Survey, Part IV: Harvard Mobilisation Analysis Center 1951.
- 16. Programing Procedures Study on Concurrent Directives to Commands, 6 February 1951 (See Tab B).
- 17. Proposed HOI 10-15, 8 February 1951 (See Tab B).
- 18. Proposed HOI 10- , 8 February 1951 (See Tab B).
- 19. Houting slip from Erigadier General Dau to Col McDowell dtd 2
  February 1951, Procedures Division Correspondence File XI 20-3.
- 20. Memorandum for Asst for Programming from Director of the Budget dtd 18 April 1951, Procedures Division Correspondence File XI 20-6.
- 21. Statement by the President at a moeting of the Defense Production Frogram 27 April 1951, Frocedures Division Correspondence File II 5-12.
- 22. Ibid.
- 23. Manorandum for Mr. Finletter from Mr. Zuckert, subject: Controls
  and Techniques for Validating Eudget Matimates, May 9, 1951, Procedures Division Correspondence Files II 5.
- 2h. NoI 150-1 dtd 9 December 19hh and AFL 150-2 dtd 5 April 19h5. A study prepared by Major Hagh Frown detailing certain phases of the wartime process proved especially valuable. All of these items are in the Procedures Division Document Files under Programming Frocedures.
- 25. Staff Study: Hampower Projections and Centrols (See Tab C).
- 26. Ibid.
- 27. These figures were derived from the Air Force Troop List, 1 Farch 1951.

- 28. The Organisation and Personnel Program for January 1951 shown 37.15 for 30 June 1951 and 38.25 for 30 June 1952 as the T/O portion of the total number of personnel programmed.
- 29. Memorandum for the Director of Hanpower and Organisation from
  Hajor General Todd, subject: Typical Station Tables, dated 5 January 1951. Procedures Division File III 10-5. Hemorandum for the
  Assistant for Programming from General Lynch, subject: Manpower
  Flanning Tables, dated 30 January 1951 (Procedures Division File
  III 10-6) in reply said in part, "The observations contained in
  your Hemorandum have aided materially in formulating the concepts
  which have motivated the establishment of a priority list for the
  construction of h7 planning tables."
- 30. The term "requirements" is usually used to mean the total need without regard to current availability. In this case, the current assigned strength would be subtracted from the "requirement" to give the manning need.
- 31. Organization & Personnel Program of January 1951 shows a pipeline figure of 3306 for 30 June 1951 which becomes 18,37h for 30 June 1952 while the total figures increased only from 651,095 to 795,000.
- 32. Memorandum for the Record: Heview of Category Information, 10 May 1951 (See Tab C).
- 33. Hemo for: Director of Givilian Personnel, FCS/P, Civilian Personnel Reporting, 26 April 1951.
- 3h. Manpower Projections and Controls (Tab C).

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HISTORY

ALLOCATIONS DIVISION .

ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING

1 January 1951 to 30 June 1951

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PART I - FUNCTIONS

PART II - PERSONNEL

PART III - ACTIVITIES

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#### I FUNCTIONS

Beginning on 1 January 1951, the Allocations Division began functioning as a Division of the Office of the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O.

Prior to 1 January 1951 it was known as the Aircraft Division. Actually it was a change in name anly as there was no change in assignment. The Division Chief throughout this entire period was Col. R. W. Puryear. The Division was composed of two branches; the Aircraft Branch, Col. W. W. Jones, Chief; and the Flying Time Branch, Col. Thomas Fletcher, Chief.

The functions of the Division are:

- a. The development of current and projected Air Force programs for the allocation of aircraft and flying hours.
- b. The direction of assignment and reassignment of aircraft to the major USAF commands.
  - c. The allocation of flying hours to the major USAF commands.
- d. The initiation and establishment of the relative precedents of all Headquarters USAF directed projects for aircraft modification.

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II PERSONNEL

There was no change in the number of military or civilian personnel authorisations during the period. Authorisations are as follow:

Military			Civilian	
Colonels	3		GS-13	1
Lt. Cols.	10		GS-12	1
Majors	11		GS-7	2
Captains	2		GS-6	1
			GS-5	4
			GS-4	12
			0S-3	6

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#### IV ACTIVITIES

Intense interest in the Korean Operation was present during the period and its effect upon all activities of the Division was great. Every effort was oriented towards support of the Far East Air Command. Aircraft and flying time allocations were met to the maximum extent. It had been the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this Operation would be terminated by 30 June 1951 and all programming data was based upon this assumption. Later the JCS changed the original date of termination and extended it to 31 December 1951. The ramifications of this decision were far reaching as the additional support required caused changes in the fields of flying time allocations and aircraft programs, especially true in the realm of fighter type aircraft.

A revision of the method of allocation of MIT and Administrative aircraft to the commands was approved by the Vice Chief of Staff. This resulted in the transfer of all two-engine transport aircraft in the Administrative category to the MIT category. In the future only four-engine aircraft will be included in the Administrative aircraft category.

#### Aircraft Branch

The authorized group and separate squadron structure of the USAF was revised upward during this six months period from the ultimate authorization of eighty-four (3h) groups, twenty-seven (27) separate squadrons, and twenty-eight (28) MATS squadrons to a larger ultimate authorization of ninety-five (95) groups, thirty-four (3h) separate squadrons and thirty (30) MATS squadrons. The planning on 1 January 1951 envisioned the attainment of the eighty-four group structure by 30 June 1953. However, in the later

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months of the period covered by this historical report the expansion was accelerated to attain the ninety-five group structure by 30 June 1952. The group structure of the USAF on 1 January 1951 and on 30 June 1951 as actually existing although skeletonized is as follows:

	1 Janu Groups	Squadrons		ine 1951 Squadrons
SAF				
Groups				
Bombardment, Heavy	2	6	14	12
*Bombardment, Medium	13	45	16	55
Bombardment, Light	2	8	4	12
Strat. Recon, Heavy	2	6	3	9
*Strat. Recon, Medium	2	9	3	12
Fighter, Bomber	12	36	18	54
Fighter, Interceptor	12	36	20	60
Tactical Recon.	2	. 7	4	12
Troop Carrier, Heavy	3	9	3	9
**Troop Carrier, Medium	6	19	12	38
Total	56	181	87	273
Separate Squadrons				
Strategic Recon, Wea.		6		6
Strategic Support, Sq.		3		3
Liaison Sqs.		2		2
Rescue Sqs.		8		11
Tow Target Sqs.		1		3
Air Resupply Sqs.		-		1
		-		-
Total	SECRET	20		26

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Military Air Transport Service

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- \* Includes tanker squadrons.
- \*\* Does include one troop carrier squadron (assault).

To achieve this acceleration it was necessary to order units of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard into active service. In the case of the Air Reserve, units will be depleted. As these units complete their period of service in the USAF they will be reconstituted in the Air Force Reserve in Fiscal Year 1953, although these plans for both the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard are not firm. The following represents these structures at the beginning and end of the period covered by this history.

	1 January 1951		30 June 1951	
	Groups	Squadrons	Oroups	Squadrons
Air Reserve				
Troop Carrier Groups	17	68	-	-
Hombardment Group, Lt.	4	16	-	
Air National Guard				
Fighters	19	59	5	18
Bombers	3	10	-	-

of interest is the appearance of a new type of unit. The Air Resupply and Communications Squadron. One of these units will be activated by 30 June 1951 and assigned to MATS. Others are scheduled for activation over a period of several years. Several types of aircraft are provided for use of these squadrons, i.e. B-29's, C-119's, SA-16's, and helicopters, the unit equipment calls for twelve (12), four (4), four (4), and four (4) each of the aforementioned types respectively.

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To meet the expansion objectives and to provide aircraft to equip the newly activated units, large numbers of various types and models of aircraft in storage had to be placed into the active inventory. The reconditioning and required modification of these aircraft withdrawn from storage have resulted in a congestion of AMC's depot facilities. Lack of various parts as well as numbers of aircraft are the cause of the overload and the resulting slow receipt of aircraft in the new or converted groups.

Priority in the allocation of aircraft has been given to the Far East
Air Forces to support its part in the Korean Operation. Every effort has
been made to fulfill these requirements whenever feasible and often this has
been done at the expense of units of the Air Force not committed to that
Operation.

#### Flying Time Branch

As of 26 January 1951, a Flash Budget Flying Hour Program through FY 1953 was prepared based on reaching 87 groups by the end of FY 1951 and 95 groups by the end of FY 1952. This program reflected capability rates (except for aircraft models restricted because of spare engine shortages) approaching and/or meeting AFL 150-10 flying hour factors as adjusted for multiple crews in SAC, TAC, ADC and AAC.

On 26 February 1951 this program was revised to reflect "off-the-cuff" commands recommended revisions to AFL 150-10 crew training and/or mission requirement flying hour rates. These rates were defended before EAC hearings as necessary to satisfy the crew training requirements of the Air Force and were in general considerably higher than those published in AFL 150-10 as of 13 September 1950.

An Operating Program was published as of 1 May 1951 for the 4th

Quarter of FT 1951 and for FT 1952. This program reflected the off-the-cuff"

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recommended revisions to the flying hour rates but with the same assumptions as used in the January Flash Program as to multiple crews, etc. When costed out it was found that the program exceeded the January budget program by approximately 650,000 hours. This was accounted for by the increased flying training student load and the higher command recommended flying hour rates. Before this new program would be coordinated by the Director of the Budget, DCS/C, it was necessary to reduce the unit training portion of the program by approximately 300,000 hours. This was accomplished by utilizing revised command recommended crew training rates which were not available at the time the 1 May Operating Program was published.

Recommended revisions have been made to Tables V and VI of AFL 150-10 pertaining to aircraft authorisations and flying hour rates. A new publication reflecting these revisions will be forthcoming in the near future.


At present this Branch is working in coordination with the Director of Operations, and Director of Plans, DCS/O, and the Director of Program Standards and Cost Control, DCS/O, on revising WPF-50 monthly sortic and flying hour rates for use in mobilization planning.

As of 30 June 1951 an operating program has been prepared for FY 1952 and FY 1953. This program reflects the same assumptions as to multiple crews, etc., as the January Flash Budget Program, except that FEAF is projected at war strength through 30 December 1951 and the latest refined crew training rates are used as adjusted by aircraft flying hour restrictions received from AMC on 16 April 1951.


Due to the increased tempo of unit training and the greater number of aircraft assigned to tactical units, the quarterly flying hour rate per aircraft for many types and models of aircraft had to be curtailed for lack of logistical support. This resulted in undesirable restrictions which in many instances were severe.

SECRET Almost without exception engine shortages were the cause of these restrictions. SECRET

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


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# Chapter I CRGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Directorate of Plans began the new year with its activities busily engaged in meeting the requirements caused by the accelerated expansion of the Air Force to 95 Wings.

The overall workload of the Directorate continued to increase gradually. The Air Force Emergency War Plan was undergoing revision, the first Air Force Mobilization Plan was being finalized, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was swinging into high gear.

Since the fall of 1950, the Directorate of Plans had furnished administrative support for the newly formed Directorate of Operations. By 1 January 1951, personnel had been trained, supplies procured, space allotted, and all arrangements completed for the permanent transfer of all administrative functions, to the new Directorate of Operations. On 17 January a complete, functioning Message Center Branch and Records Section (files) were transferred. With these units, the Directorate of Plans lost one Warrant Officer and three airmen who had formed the nucleus of the new units.

Just nine days later, 25 January 1951, the Director of Plans was relieved of all responsibility for the Headquarters USAF Command Post. This function, together with all assigned

<sup>1.</sup> DCS/O Duty Assignment Order #1, dtd 17 Jan 51





personnel, was transferred to the Directorate of Operations.2 Transfer of this function represented the final step in the division of the old Directorate of Plans and Operations.

Effective 26 February, the Director, Major General T. H. Landon, was reassigned to United States Air Forces in Europe for duty as Deputy Commander in Chief.3 Major General Thomas D. White succeeded General Landon, as Director of Plans on the same date.4 General White had been serving as Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCS/O) for approximately three months.5 When he assumed the duties of Director of Plans, he was authorised to represent the Air Force at meetings of the Joint Operations Deputies and to attend Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings with the Chief of Staff in place of DCS/O. This was the same arrangement as that approved by the Chief of Staff in August 1950 when General Landon was Director of Flans.

By mid-February the Directorate workload had climbed to approximately 140% of the 6 July 1950 level. Because of this increase, certain steps were taken to improve the efficiency of the Message Center Branch and the Records Branch. In the Message Center Branch the greatest suphasis was placed on strengthening the cable section. The early days of the Korean conflict brought

DCS/O, Duty Assignment Order #2, dtd 25 Jan 51
 Par 1, S.O. 26, DAF, dtd 6 Feb 51
 Par 1, S.O. 39, DAF, dtd 26 Feb 51
 Par 1, S.O. 226, DAF, dtd 16 Nov 50







compelling evidence of the importance of this section. In such an emergency, the "cable" comes into its own as the fastest means of communication with field commanders which is available to the Air Staff.

The Records Branch was strenghtened by the assignment of a Captain as Branch Chief. The internal reorganization of this Branch was begun in March. An evening shift worked until 2300 hours each weekday during the period covered by this history. By late April all backlogged material had been filed and since that time the system of current filing has been maintained. All documents received in the Records Branch during any duty day are completely indexed and filed in case files by noon of the following day.

During this same period 148 linear feet of classified file material were inventoried, recorded and retired. This retirement was complicated by the high classification of the material involved and required the preparation of over 3000 retirement identification cards.

The D/Flans Records Branch maintains the Air Force master files of all Joint Chiefs of Staff documents. It is used by many staff agencies outside this Directorate.

The revised organizati n of the entire Executive Office of the Directorate of Flans was approved by General White on





15 May 1951. This new organization included one entirely new office; that of the Assistant for Special Flans. This office was established in accordance with oral instructions from General white. It is considered to be temporary and will not appear in the HQ USAF Organization and Functions Book. The position of Assistant for Special Plans was filled by Colonel James F. Whisenand, formerly Assistant Deputy Air Force Member of the Joint Strategic Flans Committee. Colonel Whisenand was originally assigned to this headquarters in November 1950 after a period of temporary duty in the Far East theatre as a member of the Stearn's Group. 8 In December, General Edwards, acting as Air Force member of the Committee for Joint Policies and Procedures (CJPP), designated Colonel Whisenand as Air Force member of a special ad hoc committee under the CJPP. This ad hoc committee has as its purpose the development of a joint publication entitled Joint Action Armed Forces. This joint task was still in progress on 30 June 1951.

Colonel Whisenand, as Assistant for Special Plans, was instructed to initiate a study aimed at the development of plans for expanding the Air Force beyond the 95 Wing level. By 30 June 1951 a comprehensive study had been prepared for presentation to the Air Force Council and the Chief of Staff.



<sup>6.</sup> See Tab A

<sup>7.</sup> D/Plans, Personnel Memo #1, dtd 2 Jan 51

<sup>8.</sup> See pages 12 and 13

<sup>9.</sup> See page 19



On 2 May 1951 Colonel Hugh S. Judy received orders transferring him to the Air War College to report not later than 6 July 1951, exactly one year after his assignment to duty as Executive Officer of this Directorate. 10 Colonel Wallace C. Barrett, formerly Assistant Executive, Directorate of Plans, was assigned as Executive, Directorate of Plans, effective 7 June 1951,11

Only one change in Division Chiefs took place within the Directorate of Plans during the period covered by this history. Brigadier General Pierpont M. Hamilton, Chief of the Policy Division was assigned to duty as Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. 12 In this capacity General Hamilton was to head a special mission to Morocco.13

Colonel Richard D. Wentworth succeeded General Hamilton as Chief of the Policy Division effective 27 March 1951. 14

The Chiefs of Air Staff of Canada, France, United Kingdom, and the United States were requested by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to determine the immediate and further actions necessary to achieve front line air force for the Northern, Central, and Southern European commands and to evaluate the resources necessary to support such a force.

See pages 21 and 22 D/Plans, Personnel Memo #7, dtd 27 Mar 51



<sup>10.</sup> Par 15, S.O. 86, DAF, dtd 2 May 51
11. D/Plans, Personnel Memo #14, dtd 2 June 51
12. Par 3, S.O. 60, DAF, dtd 27 Mar 51
13. See pages 21 and 22

In a cable dated 24 February 15 General Eisenhower asked General Vandenberg to "spark" these international efforts.

General Vandenberg then directed Major General Joseph Smith,
Deputy Director of Flans, to supervise all preparations for a meeting of the Chiefs of Air Staff of the four powers. The first such meeting took place in Washington during April and a second meeting was scheduled to convene in Paris during June.

6

The purpose of these meetings was to determine ways and means of closing the existing gap between the air force requirements in D.G. 28 (NATO Plan) and the commitments made by NATO countries. The Four Power Air Chiefs were to determine whether NATO nations could meet their commitments and whether they could "fill the gap." They were to submit their report to General Eisenhower.

General Smith was responsible for preparing the USAF position on all matters involved and for furnishing guidance to the Chief of Staff.

General Smith selected Colonel S. J. Donovan, Assistant Chief of the War Plans Division, as his assistant in preparing for these meetings.

Prior to the Washington meeting, a working group was formed of officers selected from offices throughout the Air Staff. This


<sup>15.</sup> CAF IN 61225

<sup>16.</sup> See page 48

group, under the leadership of Colonel Donovan, 17 proceeded to Paris on 18 May 1951. The Paris meeting of the Four Chiefs of Air Staff began on 7 June 1951.

The International Working Group prepared studies in Washington and Paris which evolved into the "Paris Plan, "18 This plan was approved by the Four Chiefs of Air Staff, and was presented to SACEUR on 12 June 1951. The "Paris Plan" represents a major accomplishment in air force planning and it will provide guidance urgently needed by national and international agencies in resolving the many problems inherent in "building up" and establishing the MATO Air Force essential for the defense of Europe.

<sup>17.</sup> Ltr Order, AFCAG-14, dtd 11 May 1951 18. Filed in AFOPD



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RED TEAM

During the period of this report, the Air Force Emergency Wer Plan 1-50 (AFEMP 1-50) was revised to reflect an increase in capablality. This revision (AFEMP 1-51) assumed a D-day of 1 January 1951.
Copies of AFEMP 1-51 were submitted to the Air Staff and the major air commands for review and corrects. In addition, copies were sent to the other two Services for information. Addressees were informed that AFEMP 1-51 in its present form did not supersede AFEMP 1-50. They were further told that AFEMP 1-51 would be revised to reflect a D-day capability as of 1 July 1951, and would be submitted for approval by the Orief of Staff, U.S. Air Force assating in July 1951. The revision of AFEMP 1-51 has progressed concurrently with the revision of the Joint Emergency Mar Plan.

at the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, a committee was established to consider the strategic reconnaissance requirements in the year 1954. The Red Team, War Plans Division, represented the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, on the committee which was established to study the problem. The committee has completed its study which should be published in approximately thirty days. The major conclusion of the study is that the ability of the Strategic Air Command to accomplish the strategic air offensive is critically dependent on strategic reconnaissance and intelligence both pro-1-day and post-D-day. Among other things, the study recommends an investigation of low-level photography and an investigation of a two

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<sup>1.</sup> Staff Study "Requirements for Strategic Reconnaissance"



stage reconnelscance system involving a logistics aircraft and a combat some aircraft.

The Jaint Strategie Plans Carnittee, in January 1951, directed the Joint Strategic Flans Group to propers a Joint Outline Energency War Plan for a war beginning I Jennery 1772. This plan was to be based on capabilities greater than those in the currently approved short range energency war plan but less than those in the currently approved intermediate range plan. The Strategic Estimate for this plan? is now being considered by the Joint Strategic Flans Group. This estimate compares friendly and energy capabilities for the time period under consiburation and proposes to arrive at logical courses of action as a result of this comparison. It appears that a three-way split in the plant is developing between the three Services. The Air Force feels that our capabilities have not increased significantly over those contained in IRIMBARK; the Army considers that the plan should envisage holding a substantial bridgehead on the European continent; and, the Navy considers that the plan should be based on a considerable effort throughout the Moditerromesn Sea - Middle East.

Strategic Air Command outline Descriptony Nar Plan 1-49 has been the only JUS approved SAC war plan for some time. Since this plan does not fully utilize the present capabilities of SAC, SAC was requested to propers a new war plan. This they did, and their new plan, SAC 2-50, was submitted to the JUS for consideration. This plan was more of a requirements plan than a expability plan and, on the recommendation of the Object of Savel Operations and the Object of Staff, U.S. Army, it was

<sup>2.</sup> ASPC 877/178



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Force. Sat then submitted a new plan, Sat 2-50 (Revised), to this Beadquarters for approval. This plan, although improved in some respects was still short of being acceptable for JUS consideration. In order to assist the SAC planners, and to expect the completion of a new SAC war plan, it was decided to ask the SAC planners to come to this Beadquarters where, with the assistance of planners from this Beadquarters, a new SAC plan could be prepared. SAC Outline Energy War Plan 1-51 was the result of this joint effort. The Air Staff reviewed SAC 1-51 and recommended that the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force approve the plan and submit it to the JUS for their consideration. This was accomplished and the Joint Strategic Plans Committee is now considering the comments of the three Services on subject plan.

The matter of retardation of Soviet advances in the event of an emergency assumed more importance during this period. The JCS agreed that the three Services would prepare and forward to the Joint Strategic Plans Countites lists of the known targets which should be hit in the event of war to effect retardation of Soviet advances. These lists were to be based upon information which the Services would obtain individually from commenders in the field. To implement the decision in SN-3069-50, the Commender-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces Europe, the Commending General, Third Air Division, and the Commending General, Par East Air Forces were asked to submit lists of targets which should be hit to effect retardation of Soviet advances in the event of war.

In addition, the Directorate of Intelligence was requested to propers

h. 811-3069-50





similar lists of targets. The lists requested above have been submitted to this Beakpurters and have in turn been sust down to the Joint Strategic Plans Counities for consideration.

One of the staff planning officers of the Red Tean was palected to accompany a group of personnel boaded by Dr. Steeres, incoluent of the University of Colorado, to the Far Host for the purpose of ovaluating lessons lessmed in the Forest Her versus lessons pertinent to military operations against the UNDR. As a result of their maway, the group propered an extensive report on air operations in Feron. This report was circulated throughout the hir Staff for review and concents. It is full that the work done by the Steerns group will be extravely valuable to the Air Porce. This report, which was limited to Air Porce operations in the Far East Theater, pointed up the fact that the FARF mission in Force before 25 June 1950 was limited to air evacuation of . . nationals in an energency. Prior joint training in Japan was lighted. In addition, the army and his Force lacked certain eccential units and equipment with which to carry out joint sir-ground operations. There was also a general lack of understanding enoug the services concerning their respective responsibilities when operating jointly. Firming to Arropo shore future tectical operations may assume parameter importance, it has been indicated by observers to the testical exercises in Europe (1950) that a similar situation existed there. It seem advisable to ovaluate, in light of the Stearn Soport, the ontire testical sir capability in Europe in order to correct existing deficiencies and therefore be other propored to carry out the tactical mission. It should he noted that no presently approved testinal air comment exists for





Europe, Partly because of this, the Red Team, War Plans Division, prepared the first of a series of objective studies pointed toward the development of realistic Air Force requirements. 5 This study was an initial attempt through enalysis of one of the facts of the problem - the direct defense of Western Europe - to prodict Coross, the nature of the equipment, and the tactics required to accomplish our military objectives in Western Europe. This study is not complete, principally because it does not represent the complete Air Staff view. Accordingly, copies of the study have been sent to all theater air commenters, Tactical Air Command, Air University, and all Deputy Chiefe of Staff for detailed comments. Aside from the usual approach to the problem, some of the features of the study constitute a marked deviation from previous thinking. It visualizes that the use of range extension devices will parmit fighter bembers to carry greater loads from more secure bases, over greater distances, with longer periods over the target area, off shorter runsays, and during lower weather minimums. These factors, translated into capabilities, could mean that a wall developed rear base area, possibly England, could be used to Launch a sustained offensive in which fighter-bonbers would penotrate deep into Seviat occupied Durope for attack against appropriate targets. This study also visualises the use of light-bombers as nothers to fighters, acting as navigator, bosbardier, controller, command post, and/or tanker, which would enable the fighters to penetrate enery territory under



<sup>5.</sup> Study, "Tactical Air Concept in Europe"



accurate control.

on 2 Merch 1951, the Chief of Steff, U.S. Army, forwarded a quantitative statement of troop carrier requirements based upon the Army expansion program contained in JCS 1800/133. The type of operations envisaged in calculating the Army troop carrier aircraft requirements were as follows:

World-wide strategic lift of a 7500 infantry or airborne division.

The simultaneous tactical assault lift of a minimum of one airborne division and an optimum of three divisions.

Army intra-theater logistical support.

Airborne and air transportability training.

In forwarding the troop carrier requirements, the Army suggested that in order to meet their minimum assemble transport requirements, the Air Force should change the present troop carrier program to 7 medium troop carrier wings and 5 assemble transport wings. The above-cantioned letter from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, was forwarded to the Red Teat for action. A study was made in order to examine the Army's statement of its requirements. The study recommended that the Army's statement of troop carrier requirements be given further study, and upon determination of the proper ratio of medium troop carrier to assemble that Air Force medium troop carrier program be reorganized into separate assault and medium troop carrier wings. Accordingly, a meso-ranker was prepared informing the Army that its statement of troop carrier ranker was prepared informing the Army that its statement of troop carrier

<sup>7.</sup> Meno to C/S, USA, Or C/S, USAF, Subj. "Troop Carrier Aircraft Requirements", 7 Apr 51.



<sup>6.</sup> Study "Analysis of Troop Carrier Organisation"



requirements would assist his force planning in this field, and that
the supportion that certain troop exister utups to redesignated as
except transport utups had been unfor study for some time as a result
of a similar recommendation mate by the factical his Comment. It is
intended to give the large the results of this study when it is conelected.

In the latter part of the 1951, CHALDANS requested that he be proyided pridence for the proportion of his energony our plan. Altir bell had already been disputched from this Mesignarters on 15 May 1951. and a souttiend copy of the revised Joint marrowsy har than (300 1004/09) had been disputched on 18 May 1951. Povinions of both these plans based on 1 July 1951 copybilities are unlargey but it was believed that the two plane would provide adequate raddance for CIRCLETE in the preparetion of his use plan. The requirement for a Chillian conspensy was plan had been well known in this Ferdquarters; however, the absence of a CENTERED (or before that a CENTE) directive had obstructed efforts to obtain such a plan. In view of the success obtained in the proparation of 500 1-61 which use jointly propored in Markington by percornel from Hondquarters HAF and SaC, it was full that a planning toon from this Seedquarters should proceed to Europe to excist CONCLAPS in the proporotion of his company we plan. Accordingly, with Chattage agreed, a planning term which included ten respons of the field term was expendent. This teen, along with an error planning team which was going to Herope to emist MINIII in the proporation of its plan, departed Mashington in June 1971. The group (six Force) opent apprendicately three weeks in largor dering which time a CHURN'S over every war plan was written. CHURN'S 7a. S/S to C/S,USAF, subj. "Troop Carrier Aircraft Requirements", 29 Mar 51. 7b. Ltr Order - Dept of the Air Porce, 31 May 51.

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planners, as well as all members of the Headquarters USAF planning teem, felt that the joint participation in the preparation of CHRUSAFE's emergency war plan had been most beneficial and time saving.

on the atomic aspects of retardation has made it imporative that the Air Force isosdiately develop a firm position on the issue. Because of the interrelationship of several other equally pressing controversial issues of both inter-Cervice and intra-Service significance, it appeared unrise to attempt to isolate the one problem. As a result, the Red Team is preparing a comprehensive study to determine basic Air Force policy and position for guidance of the Air Staff in problems associated with the study aspects of the retardation mission. It is also to recommend appropriate specific actions in the implementation of these policies.

This study is to be presented to the Air Force Council.

During the pariod covered in this report, recoved attempts were made to formalize a plan concerning the wartime use of the scheduled and non-scheduled civil airlines. The major proposals have been contained in the Bouglas Consittee Report, the National Security Resources Board Task Group Report and the MATS Ad Boc Staff Group Report on the First and Second Line Resource Fleet. Red Team participation in this problem has been contered around the development of wartime airlift requirements. The numbers requirements studies were based upon varied Air Force (48, 58, 69 and 95 Wings) and/or Department of Defense

<sup>8.</sup> Study "Reterdation and Associated Issues"





program, and were subsequently used in the above-referenced reports as a bents for the varied recommendations as to that portion of the civil floot should be used for military operations in warting.

of work related to the utilization of air beson in the Northeast and in lecture. A number of the Ned Team stoured a conference on utilization of Northeast Consend air beson held in this Booksarters on 30 December 1950. This conference resulted in the following recommendations &a which were approved by the Vice Chief of Staff on 30 January 1951:

That fortag be acquired and developed for Haf military use.

That the concept of operating Heavy Recommissance and staging Heavy Rester directly from this area, as developed at the englarence, be approved as a basis for further planning.

that CRICE hold another joint conforces and develop a more detailed plan, one which would provide adequate guidance for construction programming at Northeast bases. This potent conference was hold at Northeast bases. This potent on 13-15 February 1951. As a result of this second conference, a sufficiently detailed plan was drawn up to employ the initiation of compraction programming at besse in this larthough Command.

in lealand cased the Assistant for his Besse to request that a pro-Dday and post-D-day statement of the mission of MAN units planned for
deployment to lealand be provided at the carliagt date. A coordinated
Air Force position on this matter was not available so the Red Texa
unfortcook to establish that requirements for Recland. This establishment
was based principly on Calla proposed utilisation of Reflamik on an
operating base for matter bestsoners and a staging base for beary borbors, and
on the requirement for possesting "security" forces for lealand as
Sa. S/S to DCS/O, subj. "Utilization of NEC Bases", 17 Nar 51.





result of this action were approved as interin guidance on which to base negotiations for additional base rights in Iceland. The USAF requirements were coordinated with the Army and Navy requirements for this area. An agreement with Iceland was subsequently obtained.

Implementing action to establish the USAF portion of the security force in Iceland is being taken by the Directorate of Operations.

In conclusion, mention should be made of the work done by the Red Team in presenting Air Force views to the JCS with respect to the determination of which terget destruction enner CO, SAC should use as a basis for his operational planning and training for that portion of the strategic air offensive involving attack of fixed industrial targets. There were neveral splits in the initial Service views on this subject, The Many condicated the problem by introducing a new issue concerning neval perticipation in the delivery of those bombs allocated for reterdation. ? The Air Staff position is that retardation is not directly related to the problem of providing CO, SAC with a target destruction enno: (fixed industrial targets), and should therefore be considered senarately. The Air Staff desires that the JCS authorize SAC to use JOS 2056 as a basis for its operational planning and training for that portion of the strategic air offensive involving attack on fixed industrial targets. At the time of this report, the issue was still pending before the JCS.

9. JCS 2056/11 thru /17





WHITE TEAM

The basic function of the Thite Tone is to monitor and participate in Air Staff planning for the intermediate range time period.

In carrying out this function, one of the White Team's princy duties is to discharge the responsibilities of the War Flans Division in the preparation and support of the budget. In light of the Korden conflict, the type of work involved in balget preparation, by nature based primarily upon peacetime requirements, was considerably changed. The basis of budget preparation changed from basically financial and political considerations, to that of military and political, due to the worsening of the international situation. During the time period of this report, work associated with FY 1952 was concluded and formulation of FY 1953 was initiated. This activity and additional primary fields of hir Staff action, monitored by or participated in by the White Team are summarised in the following paragraphs.

In Harch 1951 the Director of Plans requested a study be made of the interim forces required to support the matical objectives as expressed in 350 60/4. The initial staff study in compliance with this request developed a requirement for a force level of 135 ving Air Force for FT 1953. In Discussions between Programming and Plans personnel brought out that in order to determine and program the FT 1953 forces properly, the FT 1955 forces must first be determined. Consequently, on 15 May the White Team presented to the Air Force Council the justification for a force level of 156 wings for FT 1954. These forces

<sup>11.</sup> White Team Staff Study dated 30 April 1951, subject: "To determine an Interim Force Level of Combat Wings Required Above the 95 Wing Program to Support the Objectives of MSS 68/4."

<sup>12</sup> Procentation on file in Office of Secretary, Air Force Council.



were identified as the number of vince required by end FT 1998 to support the objectives of MC 60%, and were subsequently accordated with the formulation of the Fiscal 1953 bulget. The Air Force Council spent considerable time in reviewing the composition of this force level and decided that there was a requirement for additional modium book groups and for listing guided missile units as major combat units. On 17 May 1951 a new force level of 176 wings was presented to the Council and to the Secretary of the Air Force. 13 The reaction of the Secretary of the Air Force level was that it seemed reclistic to him but that the transport units should be separated from the combat units in order to present a clear indication of the fighting capability of the Air Force. As a result, the Air Force program for the FT 1953 bulget was identified as the 140 combat wing Air Force.

The 140 combat wing Air Force and its supporting units were incorporated into JGS 1800/147. This paper was intended to provide the
joint strategic guidance and forces for the Services to take their
outline program and balgets for FY 1953. In JGS 1800/149 the Onief of
Staff, USAF, recommended that 140 combat sings be authorized immediately
and be fully realised by end FY 1954. This statement by the Chief of
Staff, USAF, was a clear indication of his intent to consider FY 52,
FY 53, and FY 54 force objectives concurrently, and it was in direct
opposition to the Army and the Newy, whose views were that sugmentation
for FY 1952 should be sent forward to the Secretary of Defense prior to
deciding forces for FY 1953. General Emalley presented the Air Force

<sup>13.</sup> Procentation on file in Office of Secretary, Air Porce Council.



position to the Armed Forces Pelicy Council on June 13, 1951. The Armed Forces Policy Council recognised the logic in the Air Force position and decided to hold in absymme may FT 52 sugmentations for the Services. On 22 June, General Vandenberg reviewed the 140 combat wing presentation. With the approval of Secretary Finletter and agreement by the Air Force Council, 3 of the pilotless bomber (TAG) and 5 of the flighter beaber win a were deleted from the 140 combat wing force level. Six medium bombers were added to the remaining 132 wings to make a total of 136 combat wings. The cirlift waits remained unchanged, although the terminology med to identify these units was changed to "combat cargo groups."

As of 30 June 1951, it was established that the Calof of Steff, UNAF, would remain firm on 138 combat wings as the force required for national curvival. Every indication pointed toward submitting this position to the Secretary of Defence and higher authority.

on 22 December 1950, an agreement signed by the governments of the U.S. and France permitted the UEAF to develop air bases in French Morocco. The governmental agreement provided for the immediate magnituation of a becknical agreement between the UEAF and the Franch Air Force covering the use and occupancy of these bases. Accordingly, in Jemmry 1951 a DEAF mission, besied by General Benilton, Policy Division, AFGED, and including a War Plans Division representative from the White Town, preceded to Paris and thence to Rabat, French Borocco, for the purpose of formulating a technical agreement with the French Air Porce. The discussions led to the acceptance of two technical agreements by the

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governments of France and the United States concerning the Moroccan bases. These agreements provided among other things, that (1) the peacetime USAF complement in Morocco would be limited to 7,400 personnel, and (2) rotational units in Morocco would normally be limited to 2 combat wings at any one time.

while the agreements limit USAF personnel permanently in Morocco to far less than the 16,000 personnel desired in Morocco under the 95-wing program, the agreement does provide that the USAF personnel personnel ceiling in Morocco is subject to modification as may prove desirable in light of changing world conditions.

The decision to develop new sites at Sidi Slimme, Rechra Sel Keiri and Sen Quarir plus one additional site to be selected, instead of the original locations at Empreson, Eheuritga, Heimes and Embat was based primarily on the objections raised by the French to the inflationary impact on the Reroccan economy of "rich" American troops stationed in or near their sujer cities.

The primary objective of the USAF with respect to the development of the Noroccan base complex is to develop facilities capable of rentering support for a D-day deployment to that area of 5 Hedium Book Vinya, 2 Buratagic Recommissioner Vinga and 2 fighter second vings with a secondary objective to make the best possible use of the Noroccan area under the restrictions imposed by the agreement. A directive was forwarded to CINUUSAFA on 14 July 1951. Outlining the proposed usage of Respectan bases in percetime as well as in warting through D#3 menths.

<sup>14.</sup> Letter, subject, "Revelopment of Pacilities in Morocco", dated





At the case time letters were forwarded to CC. Edd and Commeder,

MATE, 6 requesting them to furnish CINCUSATE with their detailed requirements for facilities, supplies, and supporting services in Horseso.

Action was initiated to resolve factical Air Command Porce Requirements as expressed in a letter from Commanding General, MAG, dated 29 March 1951? A staff study was proposed on reorganization of troop carrier forces and action was initiated to implement the recommended changes. Other natures pertaining to efforts to activate as Assault Belicopter Wing and a factical Air Operational Development Wing were worked on in relation to these force requirements. This problem has been studied both in regard to carriently programmed forces and to planned additional forces.

Work on division of responsibilities between the Air Porce and the Army finally culminated in an Ad Noc Committee's study of the unter. The White Team participated in this analysis together with enmy correlated matters such as: "Procurement of Army Aircraft."

\*\*Allocation of the N-19 Aircraft to the Army," and "Army Requirements for Close Support Aviation."

A staff study was also prepared on the conversion of Fighter Interceptor Units to Fighter Bomber Units; this has been referred to the Air Proving Ground Command for further study.

The White Foun participated in the development of required fuctical Air Forces in Europe. 18 Fursuant to action directed by the

<sup>15.</sup> Letter, subject, "Development of Pacilities in Norocco", dated 15 June 1951 to CC, SAC.

<sup>16.</sup> Letter, subject, "Development of Facilities in Marcocco", detel

<sup>17.</sup> Letter, subject, "TAG Force Requirements," doted 29 March 1951, From CO. TAG. 18. Air Staff Study on Tackell Air Forces in March.



Socretary of the Air Force, a detailed cost analysis, based on an oversized Saction! Air Force commensurate with ratios prescribed by the Army, was prepared and substitud informally!

In collaboration with the other interested Air Staff agancies under the menterally of DCS/Comptroller, the Shite Team participated in the development and revision of planning factors currently established in the Martin Planning Factors Remail. The specific contribution was to furnish the strategic guidance isoluting measurery elaboration, so that basic planning factors and data would result. This action is of a continuing nature. It is essential that the factors be minterial on a current basic so that they reflect the most current staff planning assumptions and latest strategic concepts.

Plans Division participated in the development of mobilization plans.

Into included work on both joint and unilateral dir Force plans. In
the case of the Air Force Mobilization Flan, Air Staff directive
established a planning group to revise AFROD-2-51. 129 based on the
etrategic guidance contained in JCS 21/3/6 195 with an H-day and D-day
of 1 July 1952. North on this cycle of mobilization planning will contimes through calendar 1951. Concurrent with this action the division
was also empayed in the development of a Joint Mobilization Plan. 190
The initial stage of this development requires the proparation of joint
obtaining or operational and logistic plans. While based on the sense

<sup>19.</sup> Interial evolution in Valte Team files. AVVID 1967. U.S. Air Perce Habilitation Plan, 10 James 1951. 196. Joint Outline Var Plan for a Nor Beginning 1 July 1955. 1961. JUS 1705/97.





cuidance, the joint plane will be developed in considerably less detail them the unilateral Air Force plane. Each Service prepares the plane for the eren for which it is the executive agent. As of the end of Floral 1951 the activity has been concerned with agreement on format and scope of the plane. The only plane prepared as of this report and of current consideration by the working level personnel of the Services are of earops and the Far meet. Action will continue through calendar 1951.

The Deputy Uniof of Staff, operations, directed Air Staff action 19d to uniortains a study which would (1) analyze the relative effectiveness and root of tectical air operations with competing weapons such as the atomic artillery and (2) determine requirements for tectical atomic weapons. Pursuant thereto, primary responsibility for development of the "Target Systems" portion of the everall study was delegated to the Director of Flans and further to the War Flans Division. The Assistant for Atomic Energy, DGS/O, was nessed the responsible agent for general accordination of the study. The proposed target systems study was unforgoing coordination within the Air Staff as of 30 June 1931. The completed document is estimated to be available for transmission to AFOME by 31 July 1951. The tactical target system recommended for the

let Priority 40 mirfields 2nd / riority

32 rail communications

25 troop compentrations 13 oil storage depots 6 above-ground assumi-

19d. Tactical Englard," deted 22 May 1951.



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Personnel of the White Fean participated in the review of and requirement for various implementing plans in JCS 2143/6.

The White Wese furnished the USAF representative for the conmittee representing the Joint C lefe of Staff in military staff conferences between the U.S. and the Poderated Peoples Sopulite of Yugoslavia. The law was decignated executive agent for the Joint Chiefe of Staff and General Eddlowan, Chief of Army War Plane, honded the U.S. representatives. Chairman of the Turnslavian delegation was General Popovic, Chief of Staff, Tagoslavian Aray. These conferences lacted from 17 may until 13 June, and were to be exploratory in mature to determine how the military of the two governments could matually benefit each other. These discussions resulted in the indication of the intent of the Yagoslavian government to make a formal request to the U.S. Covergment for military assistance (MDAP). The Tugoslavian delogation agreed in principle to combact early military technical staff conferences, operational planning conferences and a program of technical and tactical courses of instruction for Tugoslevian military percomel.



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#### BLUE TEAM

Although the primary responsibility of the Blue Team continues to be the promulgation of Long Range War Plans and the preparation of staff studies in connection therewith, more urgent matters have necessitated that the main efforts of the Team be concentrated in the Far East, Africa, the Middle East and the Balkan nations. Also in conjunction with the Assistant for Air Bases, plans for the establishment of air bases in various parts of the world, exclusive of the Western Hemisphere, were developed by this Team. In resume, main points included in these efforts are summarized below.

In the Far East, CINCFE felt that his existing directive did not clearly define his responsibilities. This was a compilation of previous "piecemeal" directives summarized in JCS 1776/221. In an effort to clarify his views, Ceneral Ridgeway, after a series of cables, sent a representative to Washington. As a result of these cables and discussions, a new directive was prepared for CINCFE. This directive has been approved by the JCS and the President and is to be dispatched to CINCFE.

The heads of the French, British and American delegation to the 21 Tripartite Military Conference met in Singapore on 15-18 May 1951.

They submitted a rather voluminous report on logistic, intelligence and shipping control matters, which had little concrete substance. It did indicate, however, a variety of problems and called for additional conferences.

20. JCS 1776/23L 21. JCS 1992/83



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began to take over the responsibilities of the Director of Flans in the air base field. As a consequence, Colorada Cayatal and Insign were truncferred to thin new expeniention to continue air base work. However, the Blue Town was still called upon to contribute strategic studies and comments on everyone air bases; studies during this period have concerned bases in Hervey, Small Arabia, Spain, French Nerocco and Dayat.

Resources in Africa were also the subject of a namer of papers that required Air Steff action. The danger of substage to Grantum ero sources in Africa and the supportation of Delgian forces in the Congo were given cosmiderable study. A series of papers were issued outlining the S.C. policy on this subject. 22

the relation of the oil resources in this area to the force requirements medical to bold or retains the natural resource areas generated several studies on the Middle East. These studies 23 required Air staff action and Mus Tean participation in this action.

Paring this period, Salian problem, particularly in repart to Papealavia, case in for considerable attention. The possible established build-up caused increasing concern among the Sectorn Powers. The possible overdelplug belonce of power that might be aligned against Papealavia required coroful consideration as to just what position cheald be assumed with respect to Turnslavia. After a series of reports, a



<sup>22.</sup> JUN 1905 23. JUN 1907



plan was established providing fravoursk upon which the current national policy with respect to Tugoslavia was expressed. The approved report called for making and besping current plans to provide Yugoslavia military and logistical support. By the approval of this paper outline plans were made, a concept formed, and CHICREIN given the job of drawing up more detailed support plans.

In a scries of complimentary actions leading to the proparation of U.S. plans for Yugoslav support, the Chief of Staff of the Tugoslav Army came to the U.S. to discuss material aid for his country. Those talks culminated in an agreement on the military level that represented certain U.S. and Yugoslav countrasts.

In the serial refueling field, by the probe and drogue method, the fibre Team has been following the combat tests in FEAF, the service tests at Eglin and the requirements throughout the Air Force for this type of equipment.

The Huse Team made a considerable effort to increase the capabilities of fighter-bomber aircraft assigned to UBAFE, FEAF and TAC by
use of tip tank serial refusing by the probe and drogue system. Tests
at ANC and AFG proved the system workship and Cenerals Moretad,
Stratemeyer and Cannon stated that an urgent requirement for such a
refusing capability exists in their commads. However, because of
opposition which this office could not overcome, almost nothing of
concrete value was accomplished during the period covered by this report,

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<sup>24.</sup> JOS 1901/34 25. JOS 1901/10

<sup>25</sup>a. Memo for AFODC, 16 Jan Sl. subj. (TS) Aerial Refueling of FEAF Jet Fighters, fr AFDDC, /s/ M/Cen. Saville.

Sh. Nemo for D/P. DOS/O, fr AFDRO, 11 Jul 51, /s/ M/Cen Nelson.

#### BLACK TRAM

Based on a restedy of Alaskan force requirements in light of the Korean situation and more recent intelligence information, the Alaskan Command recommended to the JCS that military deployments to that area be increased. Resulting from further study of Alaskan requirements and an increase in available Army forces, the JCS authorized CINCAL to increase his forces, upon call, by 1 MCT and 2 AA Bas. It is anticipated that this total increase will be in place by winter of 1951.

In view of developments in the Far East and progress in EAGE Planning, the Iceland Covernment requested that the U.S. Covernment estimate
what U.S. forces should be deployed in peacetime to ensure the security
of Iceland. The JCS estimated that a force of approximately 2,600 of
the three Services would be required. Subsequently, the Icelanders
agreed that the United States should deploy these forces and in May of
this year the first contingent arrived in Iceland. Those the primary
aim of the USAF in Iceland is the development of extensive facilities
for support of the SAC offensive and for MATS operations.

During the period 19-23 March 1951, planning talks, attended by Colonel Disease, were held between the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the Commander-in-Chief, Caribbean, to discuss security arrangements for the oil and iron ore areas of Venezuela. An Agreement Document, recognizing certain army, naval, and air requirements, but not consisting the United States to furnish equipment or assistance, was signed and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs, who after considering it finally approved it with modifications.

26a. North Atlantic Ocean Region (NAOR).



<sup>26.</sup> JCS 1295/66

<sup>27.</sup> JCS 1950/28-28 28. JCS 1878/22

<sup>29.</sup> JCS 1878/23



During the period 26 March to 7 April, the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States took place in Washington, D. C. Colonel Siseman and Colonel Lowis, in their capacity as member and advisor, respectively, of the U.S. Delegation of the Inter-American Defense Board, assisted in the formulation of the military resolutions which were presented to and accepted by the Foreign Ministers. These resolutions asserted the principle of collective defense with the Organization of American States and cooperation within the United Eations to prevent and suppress aggression in other parts of the world, and recommended that each of the American Republics examine its resources to determine steps it can take to contribute to hemisphere defense and W. S. collective security efforts; and recommended that the American Republics, under the Rio Treaty, increase their resources and strengthen their armed forces to develop their collective strength, and charged the Inter-American Defense Board with vigorous preparation of plans for the common de ense.

An ad not joint committee established under the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission, with Colonel Biseman as a member, conducted exploratory, conversations with a committee of Mexican military planners at San Antonio, Texas, from 16 to 21 April 1951. The original talks discussed critical defense areas, coordination and limited, and other matters in forming a basis for the proparation of emergency defense plans between Mexican-United States Defense Committee, at later meetings. The Joint Mexican-United States Defense Committee, at its 59th Plenary Meeting on 15 May, approved the work of the Defense Flunning Committee and directed the proparation of the afore-mentioned emergency outline defense plan.

A meeting of the Committee is scheduled in August.





There were many meetings of the advisors to U.S. Delegation, IADB, to discuss various matters pertaining to U.S. military planning in Latin America. Foremost among the items for action was a series of studies and recommendations pertaining to the proposed legislation for a Dilitary assistance Program in Latin America for FY 1952. The proposed program provides \$40,000,000 in grant military assistance for selected Latin American countries which commit themselves in bilateral agreements with the United States to accept specific roles and missions in the performance of benisphere defense tasks.

On 19 March 1961 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan to be used as a basis for the Military Assistance Act. This plan established certain tasks to be accomplished in hemispheric defense and made a first approximation of forces in Latin America which could be used in implementation of the plan. Although not a detailed and accurate paper, the plan is acceptable as a basis for a United States position on multilateral and bilateral planning in Latin America.

The Canada-Inited States Military Cooperation Committee prepared a revision of the Canada-United States Emergency Defense Flan which was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee for consideration.

30. JCH 1976/47 31. JCH 1996/7





# SPECIAL WEAPONS TEAM

At the beginning of the period the FALCON, MAVAHO, RASCAL and MATADUR missiles had Joint Chiefs of Steff approval as weapons projects. In March, favorable action was achieved in the Research and Development Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include the BOMBARC and SNARK missiles as approved weepons projects. 32 Prior to this action, SHARK was a guidance system project and BOMARC was a study and component development project.

Activation and unit training programs for MATADOR were revised and firmed. The responsibility for activating and training the first five NATADER squadrons was given to the Long Range Proving Ground, 33 The responsibility for furnishing a training schedule against which the unit training will be accomplished was given to the Tactical Air Correnal 34

Early thinking on the operational aspects of missiles was recorded in a document "Preliminary Plans for Activation and Employment of USAF Guided Missiles" dated April 1951. This document was forwarded to interested Air Staff agencies and Air Force Commands. Upon receipt of comments and recommendations from those agencies, the document will be revised and expanded.

A complete review of the USAF guided missile wurhood program was made in January. In February, specific and complete warhead and fuse requirements for each missile were established.35 As a result of this

of Guided Missile Units, 20 June 1951 Ross fr D/Flans to D/Requirements, Guided Missile Warhead and Fune Requirements, 20 February 1951



JCS 1620/37

Litr to CG, LRPG, Patrick AFD, Responsibility for activation and Unit Training of Guided Missile Units, 29 March 1951

Litr to CO, TAC, Responsibility for Activation and Unit Training

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action, the Director of Requirements has established military characteristics for each warhead with the exception of the fragmentation werheads for MATADOR, FALCON and BOMARC and the incendiary warhead for BOMARC. Action to establish military characteristics for these warheads is in progress.

Significant progress was made in establishing working relations with the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Work on specific guided missile problems has been initiated at Rand which is expected to be of great assistance in introducing guided missiles into air operations. An air defense study incorporating guided missile considerations was completed during this period. Now in progress are studies involving tactical air operations as well as a study which evaluates the marmed and unnamed bomber.

Efforts were continued during the period to integrate guided missile functions throughout the Air Steff and to introduce guided missiles into the operations and planning of several Air Force communds. This is a day-to-day endeavor accomplished through briefings, meetings, steff visits and correspondence.

A draft of a document "URAF Guided Missile Position" was completed in June. The document is expected to be ready for presentation to the Air Force Council in July. This is one of several actions which should result in a more positive and aggressive Air Force approach to the guided missile program. This is a long range problem involving testical, strategic and air defense operational concepts, development policy, inter-service relations and the over-all use of guided missiles.





In addition to the previously mentioned accomplishments, the Special Mempons Team has: essisted other staff egencies in the processing of the 1952 Program 150 (guided missile procurement) through the Budget Advisory Cormittee, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of Budget and the Congress; furnished the Chairman for Working Party 15 (guided missiles) of the Air Standardization Coordinating Cormittee; furnished working personnel for the Guided Missile Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group.

### ATOMIC TESTS

During the period involved, the final plans were formalised and the operational phase of operation CERNICUEE was concluded. This operation consisted of four test detonations and was carried out by Joint Task Force THREE at Entwetok Atoll, Marchall Island. In Jamusry, the Commander, Joint Task Force THREE requested that his security instructions be clarified and occurity forces under his control be augmented. On 19 February the Commander, Joint Task Force THREE was notified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the forces assigned were capable of the physical security of the Atoll and were sufficient to afford an acceptable degree of denial of unauthorized observation. He was also advised that existing security instructions were not intended to limit the action of the Task Force Command in carrying out his mission. 38

At the request of the Commender, Joint Tesk Force THREE action was taken on 20 January to obtain Joint Chiefs of Staff approval of an

<sup>36.</sup> Memo fr Cmdr, JTF-3 for JCS through C/S USAF, 25 Jen 51 37. Memo by C/S USAF for Cmdr, JTF-3, Encl "A", JCS 1998/10





official observer program for GREENHOUSE.<sup>39</sup> A program which provided each Service and the Office of the Secretary of Defence with 28 and 21 observer spaces, respectively, was approved on 5 February 1951. 40 In compliance with instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Special Weapons Team handled the numerous administrative details involved in implementing the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense portion of the observer program.

The full scale surface and univerground atomic tests which were to be conducted on Amchitka Island between September and November 1951 (Operation WINDSTORM) were indefinitely postponed by Joint Chiefs of Staff action on 9 May 1951. 12 Joint Task Force ONE THREE ONE had been activated to perform these tests. The postponement stemmed from a recommendation by the Task Force Commander based on discovery of unfavorable geological conditions of the test area and the possibility that reduced scale shots of the type desired could be conducted in the United States. 13 Subsequent to this recommendation, the Atomic Energy Commission agreed to include the reduced scale shots in its fall 1951 test program at Las Vegas, Nevada. 14 Air Staff actions involved in the postponement of WINDSTORM were menitored or accomplished by the Special Meapons Toom.

Coordination was effected within the Air Staff and with the Army and Many in the preparation of general policy for the conduct of future

ble Neme fr Acts Chairman, AEC to Chairman, MLC, 2 May SI (Encl "A", JCS 2075/27



<sup>39.</sup> Memo fr Gen Landon to Ade Dumean & Gen Bolte, subje Official Observers for Operation OREENBOUSE, 20 Jan 51

LO. JCS 1998/37

bl. Ibid

<sup>13.</sup> Homo for JOS fr (NO (JOS 2075/21)



Project will continue responsibility for preliminary plans for budget for military phases of such tests. For the conduct of tests at the Las Vegas, Nevada Proving Ground, the Chief of Staff, USAF will establish a jointly staffed permanent test group for the purpose of coordinating military participation and assistance as required by the Atomic Energy Coordination. No For the conduct of tests outside of the continental limits of the U.S. joint task forces will be established as required. The Procutive Agent for these task forces will be retated among the three Services. To accomplish Air Force responsibility as outlined above, the Special Meapons Command was instructed to establish the jointly staffed permanent test group.

By THE on 24 April the Cornender, Joint Task Force THREE (GREENHOUSE) proposed the establishment of a Joint Carrison Force to maintain the feetlities at Endustrick until a succeeding task force is formed for 1952. This proposal was approved and the Special Meapons Command was designated as the agency responsible for administering support relative to the Air Force contingent of the Carrison Force. AS In addition, the Special Meapons Team initiated and coordinated action to designate the Special Meapons Command as the responsible Air Force agency for all atomic tests.

# ATOMIC, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE

A momerculum for Chief of Staff's signature was proposed which cotablished a possive defense panel to determine what actions must be

<sup>48.</sup> THE to Cher, JTF-3 and the CO, SHC, 1 May 51



<sup>15.</sup> JCS 2179/3

h6. Thid

b7. Thid



taken in the issuance and implementation of directives for Air Force possive defense. The passive defense panel was sponsored and organised by the Special Weapons Team. The Panel included members from all the interested Directorates and other major staff agencies. After one and a half weeks of daily meetings, the Penal had prepared an Air Force Regulation covering the policy, scope, organisation and respondibilities for passive defense and an Air Force Letter outlining general considerations for passive defense plans. The Panel also prepared a general outline for a namual to be used for information and guidance in the passive defense program.

The responsibility for the namual fell to the Special Memons Team. Since no outside agency would promise its preparation within a reasonable time limit, this was undertaken by this team with individuals of other agencies preparing cortain chapters. 52 At the end of the period covered by this history, the narmal is in the final steges of coordination at Deputy level.

Passive defense integrates radiological, chemical and biological defence and extended the scope to include all the hazards from the atomic book as well as from conventional weapons. The progress stresses the

MAR fr D/Plans to D/PRO, D/Preining, D/Installations, Air Provest Merchal, D/Raid, D/Prefessional Services, Surgeon General and Asst for Ground Safety, DCS/P, Preparation of an Air Force Manual on Passive Defense, 25 April 1951



<sup>19.</sup> 

Hemo fr C/S to DCS/O, DCS/D, DCS/P, DCS/M & Surgeon General, 26 Feb 51, Establishment of a Passive Defense Panel
RAM fr D/Flans to D/Rats, D/Rab, D/Operations, D/MAO, AFOAT, D/Trng,
Asst for Ground Safeig, DCS/P, D/MSAS, D/Installations, and Preventive Medicine Div, Surgeon General, Establishment of a Passive
Defense Panel, 5 Mar 51
AFR 355-3, 1 June 1951, Passive Defense, AFL 355-3, 1 June 1951,
Outline of Passive Defense Flan
RAM fr D/Flans to D/Feb. D/Fredning, D/Testallations, Air Passact

<sup>51.</sup> 



importance of advanced preparation for quick recovery from energy air attacks of any nature. The program exphasises that passive defense should fit into normal organizational and functional channels as nearly as possible and should be accomplished for the most part as additional duty. The regulation establishes an officer specialty, Passive Defense Officer to assist the Commanding Officer in passive defense responsibilities. This new specialty replaces the radiological defense officer.

In June, a docimal file letter was propered which establishes Air Force policy governing classification of natters concerning biological warfare. 53 The policy as outlined in this letter is in consenses with Joint Chiefs of Staff Policy Measurement dated 26 February 1951.

on their apprehensions concerning interceptor penetration of radioactive clouds. St It was pointed out that the probability of penetrating a cloud at dangerous radioactivity levels was extremely low. However, it was recommended that interceptor crows be furnished simple individual dosimeters for that physical and psychological protection they could after. It was suggested that passive defense equipment and techniques would meet the requirements for decontaminating aircraft which encounter radioactive clouds.

In Jume, the Special Meapons Team disapproved a plan originating in the Special Meapons Command for the establishment of six regular radiological defense squadrons and a group headquarters. Disapproval was

<sup>53.</sup> Decimal File Ltr, AFORD 380.01, Policy Governing Classification of Matters Concorning Biological Warfare, 4 June 1951

<sup>5</sup>h. HAR fr D/Plans to D/RAD, Decontemination of Aircraft, 1h June 1951 55. RAR fr War Flans Div, D/Plans to AFGAT, Radiological Defense, 31 June 1951



based on the opinion that present knowledge of radioactive hazards, the present passive defense program of the Air Force and the Civil Defense capabilities do not justify full time Air Force radiological defense units.

the office of the Assistant for Atomic Energy as the office for New Weapons. The proposal would broaden the scope and responsibilities of the new office to include its functioning for all new weapons in the same manner as it has functioned for atomic weapons. The Letter along with its accompanying Staff Surmary Sheet was not submitted for the Chief of Staff's signature since it was overtaken by the formation of a Panel on chemical and biological werfare which was to accomplish, in part, the objective of the Letter. The general concepts proposed by the Staff Surmary Sheet and Letter were adopted by the Panel insofar as they concerned biological and chemical warfare. As a result, a Mi-CM Division of the Office of the Assistant for Atomic Energy was established to monitor and coordinate staff responsibilities of Headquarters, USAF, in order to expedite an Air Force offensive and defensive capability in biological and chemical warfare.



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## PLANNING RECUIRINGSTS TEAM

The Air Defense Team was redesignated the Planning Requirements Team during the period of this report. However, the primary responsibility of the Team continued to be the planning for worldwide air defense systems and their components.

The subject of radar picket vessels for the air defense of the brited States has been the subject of a continuing anchange of letters between the Chief of Haval Operations and the Chief of Staff, USAF, To date no satisfactory arrangement as to the time of availability or miniber of ships has been made. It now appears that the lack of capability of the United States Navy to furnish picket ships for the air defense of the United States may force the United States Air Force to seek alternate meens of obtaining off-shore warning. A study of the use of B-29s as an alternate means of obtaining off-shore warning has been conducted. This study 17 is being circulated throughout the Air Staff for comments.

The Planning Requirements Team has continued to press for Air Force participation in the airborno air defense redar field. This requirement is further emphasized by the receipt of three letters from the Air



<sup>56</sup> m Lir to CHO, "Rader Picket Vessel Utilisation in Air Defense", 25 June 1951

Lir fr CHO, oubj as above, 11 May 1951

Lir to CNO, subj as above, 10 Apr 1951 Lir fr CNO, subj as above, 27 Pobruary 1951

Ltr to CNO, subj as above, 22 January 1951 Study "Possible Alternative Means of Meeting Requirements for Off-

Shore Warning", 11 June 1951 Name to DCS/0, "Airborne Early Warning and Control", 20 June 1951 58.




Defense Command, requesting Air Force participation in Airborne Early Marning (AIM) activities. 59

In response to a question by the Secretary of the Air Force as to what should be done about extending the Alaskan Aircraft Control and Marning (ACSI) system along the Alastian chain and on the Morth-castern Maskan and the Morthsestern Canadian borders, a study was proposed concluding that such a "Great Circle" warning system would cost a tremendous effort on our part and when completed the Seviet Air Force would have the capsidisty of completely mullifying the serning derived from it. Strengthening of the Alaskan air defenses could better be achieved by augmenting the presently planned system by approximately twelve additional radar stations. Currently, there has been no counitment or programing of funds toward radar augmentation in Alaska other than site survey funds.

The President, on 11 April 1951, approved the plan for the extension of the continental radar system into Canada, subject to the availability of required funds. This office continues to monitor the implementation of the plan.

An addition to the original memorantum of agreement concerning certain aspects of control of antisireraft units was sought to cover the period prior to the time that the appropriate authority establishes a state of exergency. On 30 December 1950, the acting Chief of Staff,

<sup>60.</sup> Presentation to Sec of Air Force, "Proposed Radar Notamic Along the Aleutien Chain", 5 June 1951



<sup>59.</sup> Lir fr Air Def Com, subj: "Requirement for Airborne Early Marning and Control Equipment", 21 March 1951
Lir fr Air Def Com, subj: "Requirement for Airborne Early Marning and Control Equipment", 9 April 1951
Lir fr Air Def Com, subj: "Increase of Air Defense Capability", 20 April 1951



United States army, stated that the proposed amendment was unnecessary and triged early submission of an air defence plan for approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Commenting General, Air Defense Commend. was advised of the rejection of his proposal by the arry and requested to furnish this Beadquarters any instances of failure to obtain desired conditions of readiness of anticircraft artillary units. 61

The Department of the Army requested the Air Force to establish a priority list of SAC installations worldwide, to include the United States, for which Army antiaircraft protection is desired through the fiscal year 1952, and a statement concerning the proposed air defense mission to be assigned to the Army Screes at each SAC installation. Study has been initiated to provide the Department of the Array with the required information.

Several actions in the Civil Defence Field were accomplished during this ported. A plan for the control of illumination 63 was prepared, coordinated with the Army and Herry and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for coordination with appropriate Civil Defense Agencies. Similar action was taken with respect to the plan for the interim Civil Air Baid Marning System, 66 the Military Air Raid Marning Plan 66 and the plan for the operation of a Ground Observer Corps. 67



Lir to Air Def Con, "Memorandum of Agreement", 25 January 1991. Name fr 0-3 Army, "Antinireraft Artillary Requirements for SAC Bases", 3 May 1991 USAF Plan for Illudnation Control in the Air Defense of the

Contingutal United States

Name for Sec Marchall, 23 May 1951 Name for Sec Marchall, 9 Pobrusry 1951 Lir to Air Def Com, "Military Air Raid Warning System", 6 April 1951 Name for Sec Marchall, 27 Pobrusry 1951



Advinistration, 68 a conference was held for the purpose of delineating responsibilities between the military and civil defence agencies for civil air raid warning. The results of this conference were inconclusive. This problem was again presented for resolution when the Pederal Civil Defense Administration requested authority to place limison personnel in Air Defense Control Conters to operate civil air raid warning systems and to see is the Administrator in his operations.

The Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administrator in his operations.

The Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration, was salvised that the present method of operation of the Civil Air Raid Warning Dystem by the Air Force was most a tisfactory, but that the placing of liaipon officers in Control Conters was acceptable to the Air Force. 70

After 1 April 1951, there remained within the United States sixteen fighter equadrons of the Air National Oward, which had not been ordered into active Federal Service. These squadrons were assigned the privary mission of air defense and Continental Air Command was directed to issue training directives that reflect these training requirements.


A study TI was prepared to determine necessary Air Force policy guidance concerning unresolved air defense problems pertaining to the Continental United States. The study discusses the advantages and disadvantages of various solutions to the unresolved problems and outlines actions probably ensuing from each possible solution.

Continuing offerts were made to resolve the problem of air defense of SAC units. A study, "Dispersal of Strategic Air Connend Units", was

<sup>68.</sup> Lir fr Administrator, FCDM, to Sec AF, 2 January 1951 69. Lir fr Administrator, FCDM, to Sec AF, 2 May 1951 70. Lir fr Aset Sec AF to Administrator, FCDM, 13 June 1951

<sup>70.</sup> Lir ir Asst See AF to Administrator, Scin, 15 June 1992 71. Study "Air Force Policy Guidance Conserving Enresolved Air Defense Problems Portinent to the Continental United States", 11 May 1951

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### RATHBOM TEAM

The primary missions of the Rainbow Team, War Plans Division, from 1 January through 30 June 1951 were twofold. The first mission was the preparation of USAF plans in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (RATO). The second mission was to prepare USAF plans for all joint command arrangements. One other function charged to the Team was disaster planning for the Air Staff. In addition, the Rainbow Team participated in various working groups and ad hoc committees within the National Military Establishment. In the execution of these missions, the Rainbow Team completed the following important projects which are considered worthy of permanent record.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most notoworthy development was the ostablishment of the Supreme Beadquarters, Allied Powers Europe and the assumption of command within the European Theater by this Beadquarters on 1 April 1951. 73 General Bisenhower thereby became the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In commection with the establishment of SHAPE, the following important actions were accomplished.

General Eisenhower established a major subordinate command directly under SHAPE Headquarters, the Northern Command. The area of this command roughly coincides with that previously under the jurisdiction of the Morthern European Regional Planning Group. The Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, British Royal Navy, was appointed commander of this area.

Directly under him was the Air Command for which a USAF officer was

<sup>73.</sup> SHAPTO 1 - March 1951 74. SHAPTO 2 - 15 March 1951 SECRET



nominated. Major General B. H. Taylor was given this position.

elapsed prior to the establishment of the Northern Command some time elapsed prior to the establishment of the Southern Command due to the resolution of several important problems on command jurisdiction in the area. Finally, General Eisenhower's proposal for the area was received and the Standing Group approved it essentially as he had proposed. The Southern Command roughly coincides with the area of the Southern European - Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group. This area was placed under the command of Admiral Carney, U.S. Navy, who is to establish a land-based headquarters. The Sixth Floet was to be placed under Admiral Carney with a separate headquarters officat. General Eisenhower specified that the Air Commander for this area was to be a USAF officer. Hajor General D. M. Schlatter was appointed to this commands.

between this international headquarters and the individual governments was determined by General Risembower. He established liaison sections from each of the nations to be adjacent to, but separate from, his cam headquarters. The responsibility for establishing this liaison for the U.S. was given to the Director, JAPAG, London, England, as an interim measure. He established an effice and is providing this liaison pending the final reorganization of the U.S. military structure in Durope.

One additional lisioon post was established during this period.

This was for lisioon between Standing Group, which is the permanent

<sup>75.</sup> SHAPTO 25 - 5 May 1951 76. JUN Mag 85164 - 7 March 1951





military strategy directing body of NATO located in the Pontagen

Building in Washington, D. C., and the North Atlantic Council Deputies
which are the working body of the North Atlantic Council. 77 General

R. C. Lindsay of the USAF was appointed to this post.

During the period covered by this report, much work was done on command organization in the Mediterranean - Middle East. Although no final determination of this problem was made, a working committee composed of members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. State Department, the British Embassy, and the British Joint Services Mission reached a tentative working agreement which was to be submitted to their governments for consideration. However, upon recommination of the two governments, considerable changes were made and at present no mutually acceptable agreement has been arrived at. However, the British have introduced this subject into the Standing Group where it will be considered in greater detail.

Orong was instructed to carry on studies of ways and means to make up the deficit between the requirements and the national contributions in D.C. 26. This has become known as "filling the gap". Nuch work has been done on this problem and, as the greatest gap was in the Air Forces, the USAF has taken a leading part in this work. The first method explored for filling the gap was the creation of a German air force. Two studies were conducted by the Rainbow Team during this period on the creation of a German air force. 80 It was determined from these studies that any

<sup>77.</sup> JCS 1868/26

<sup>78.</sup> SH 1570-51 - 19 June 1951

<sup>79.</sup> JOS 1868/271 80. Accelerating the Creation of a West German Air Force, 2 March 1951 The Creation of the West German Air Force, 2 June 1951



German air force contribution would have to be predicated on a "forward strategy" of D.C. 28, which, in turn, would raise the requirements. Therefore, although the creation of the German air arm was determined to be a critical requirement of NATO, it was decided that it could not be used in filling the cap.

In addition to the German air studies, General Vandenberg conducted two meetings between the four Air Chiefs of Staff of the U.S., England, Franco, and Canada. From these meetings a tentative schedule of build-up of the NATO air forces was agreed upon, which would provide the D.C. 28 requirements for 195h. The methods by which the four Air Chiefs agreed to filling the gap include several important policy considerations. The first of these was that they agreed to utilise previously planned war reserves to equip front-line units in order to fill the gap.

One of the Standing Oroup activities to fill the gep was the initiation of a semi-surmal report which is to indicate the status of the Armed Forces of each of the NATO nations and which portion of those forces are to be allocated to NATO. The Reinbow Team actively participated in determining the contents of the report and prepared the air portion of the first report submitted by the U.S. 82

Within NATO, poveral new organizations were established to further increase the military espabilities of the organization. These primarily consisted of the following committees on the Standing Group:

- (1) Research and Development Committee, (2) Intelligence Committee, and
- (3) MATO Flying Training Committee.

<sup>81.</sup> Washington Report of the Four Air Chiefs of Staff and JCS 2073/169 82. JCS 2073/160



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the approval of the terms of reference of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Bits terms of reference were approved by all the MATO nations and submitted to the Standing Group. Admiral Fechteler, USH, was nominated for this position. However, due to the controversial nature of the reaction to his appointment in England and the very narrow margin of approval of his appointment within the House of Communs, the U.S. decided to withhold the establishment of his command. Therefore, the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group is still conducting the planning functions for this area.

The primary work conducted by the Air Staff on U.S. command relationships during this period was to bring them into componence with HATO in Europe. The first important ISAF command change during this period was the assumption by Demoral Horstad of command of the air force in Europe and changing the command from a subordinate command under CHEERE to a separate command under the JCS. Although this change had been approved by the JCS prior to the first of the year, the actual change in command took place on Zi January. As a result of CHEURAFE's appointment in Europe and the increase in UNAF activities in the area, the following command changes were made.

With the development of strategic air command capability in the U.K. and the initiation of a base development program in French Morocco, the overlap between the two commanders required a delineation of the responsibilities by this Headquarters. On March 15, a directive was

<sup>83.</sup> JOS 1868/217 81. JOS 1259/192





and CHRUSAFE in the U.K. This directive gave CHRUSAFE all area command responsibilities, while giving SAC command of its own units and bases. It provided for the establishment of the Seventh Air Division as a SAC command unit in England and changed Third Air Division to Third Air Force as a CHRUSAFE command in England.

on 23 May, a similar directive was issued delineating CINCUSAFE and SAC responsibilities in French Morocco. This gave CHECUSAFE and CO SAC essentially the same responsibilities in the area. However, the subordinate command organisation was somewhat different. In North Africa the Fifth Air Division under SAC was established as the only major air force headquarters in the area. The Commanding Ceneral of this division was charged with responsibility to both SAC and CIECUSAFE for earrying out such portions of their responsibilities within the area as they wish to delegate to him. Both commanders were directed to use the Fifth Air Division as their headquarters in the area.

One major change in command which was effected during this period was the transfer of the Bonin-Harianas-Volcano Islands from the Far East Command to the Pacific Command. At the end of the war, these islands were given to CHRCFE for back-up, staging and processing areas for support in accomplishing his mission of occupation in Japan.

During the past year, the Amy decided to close out its activities in these islands. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to transfer the islands from CHRCFE to CHRCPAC. Of particular importance to the Air Force was the disposition of the air force units and

<sup>85.</sup> AFOCS 57040, 15 March 1951 86. AFOCS 52198, 24 May 1951 87. JCS 1259/27



facilities in the area. The Air Force considered that the units and their facilities should remain under the command of the Far East Air Porce as their prinary mission is in the Far East. CIMCPAC, however, considers that the facilities should come under his operational control and that only the "mobile flying units" should be under CINCFE. This problem is, as yet, unresolved. 88

A final command study propared by the Rainbow Tean charing this period was on the relationship of the Strategic Air Command to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. With the growth of NATO and the establishment of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Coneral Einenhouse, an increased need for strategic air support developed in the area. The Mar Plans Division prepared a staff study which recommended that the Air Force take immediate stops to establish adequate organisation to fulfill this responsibility. Two alternate proposals were submitted to the Air Vorce Council. The first was for the CG SAC to establish liaison with SACEUR and such other MATO commonders as were required. The second proposel was for the U.S. to introduce into the Standing Group a proposal which would create a SAC air force within MATO directly under the Standing Group and parallel to the SACEUR command. This study is presently before the Air Force Council. 89

Among other important activities of the Team which did not fall directly under the primary missions indicated above were the following.

Disaster planning for action to be taken in case of a major disaster occurring to the Headquarters of the Air Force was nonitored by the Team. 20

<sup>88.</sup> JOS Hag 88006, JCS Mag 89005

Staff Study, "Relationship of the Strategic Air Command to NATO" Ltr to CO Hos Cand, "Plan of Action in the Event of Attack Against Washington" dtd 12 Feb 51; Ltr to TAC, "Alternate Interim Hos, "Alternate Interim Hqs, USAF" carnate Interim Hqs, USAF", 2 Mar 51



During this tire, a manual for use of atomic weapons was prepared by Beadquarters, UBAF. The Rainbow Team wrote a chapter covering the command relationship aspects of this problem which it was considered would be desirable for the use of atomic weapons. 91


One additional project on which the Tean worked was the establishment of planning factors and attrition rates for use within the NATO. These factors must be determined in order that combat reserves can be developed, 92

Staff Study, "Command Arrangements Hoccessary for Tactical Use of

Atomic Operations", 12 March 1951 Staff Study, "Entes of Attrition of Combat Aircraft as a Basis for Calculating Level of NATO War Reserves", 19 April 1951



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### POLICY DIVISION

The organization and functions of the Policy Division, Directorate of Plans, were modified to a limited degree when the Base Rights Section of the International Branch was transferred to the Office of the Assistant for Air Bases, DCS/O, in January, 1951.

Changes in key personnel included the appointment of Colonel Richard

D. Wentworth as Chief of the Division to succeed Brigadier General

Pierpont W. Hamilton. General Hamilton was re-assigned to Headquarters.

United States Air Force in Europe on 1 May 1951. Colonel William J. Bell
was named Chief of International Branch on 7 February 1951 and Colonel

Samuel B. Knowles succeeded him as Chief of the Domestic Branch.

The history of the Policy Division for the period 1 January 1951 to 1 July 1951 is set forth below in five sections — one section for each branch in the division.

## NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF BRANCH.

In order to make the Bational Security Council of maximum value in assisting in the formulation of policies in the field of national security, the President appointed a staff of individuals to act and advise the Bational Security Council. This group of individuals has been given the title of Senior MSC Staff. Their function as a corporate body is to anticipate and identify problems and situations affecting the "objectives, commitments and risks of the United States" and initiate action to provide the required analyses and draft policy statements for the consideration of the Bational Security Council. In the formulation of these policy statements the members of the Senior Staff marshal the advice of their respective departments and agencies,



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maintaining close and informal contacts on all levels. A further function of the Senior Staff is the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. The Senior Staff is able to reduce or eliminate divergencies in views on policy matters, to coordinate the positions of the various departments and agencies, and to present to the National Security Council coordinated policies for recommendation to the President. The President has designated the following individuals to represent their respective departments on the Senior MSC Staff:

STATE:
LEFENSE:
NOTO:
TRHASUEY:
JCS:
CUA:
LEFENSE MOBILIZATION:

Mr. Cherles H. Bohlen Mr. Frank C. Besh Mr. Gilbert C. Jacobus Mr. C. D. Glendinning Mr. G. D. Glendining Mr. William H. Jeckson Brig. General Frank Roberts Mr. J. Murray Mitchell

With the advent of the Senior NSC Staff, the individuals assigned to participating departments and agencies who had previously been known as members of the MSC Staff became known as MSC Staff Assistants. They constitute a working group whose chief functions are the support of their respective Senior Staff member, the marshaling of the advice of their respective departments and the preparation of preliminary drafts of policy papers, eliminating points of conflict or making adjustments of views at the working level. The following individuals have been appointed from their respective departments and comprise the MSC Staff Assistants:





Dr. Merion C. Boggs Mr. Walter W. Welmsley Mr. John Weaver Mr. Arthur F. Blaser, Jr. Colonel William J. Verbeck Colonel Hugh Cort Captain Charles Weakley Colonel Paul B. Todd Lt. Colonal Edward N. Harris Mr. L. L. Montague DEPENDE MOBILITATION: Mr. J. Murray Mitchell

The MSG Staff Branch took part in the proparation and coordination of the following policy papers during the period under review: No additional information other that the title and the reference of the papers listed below is given in light of the President's directive to the effect that the distribution of MSC papers be strictly limited.

"The Sefety of the Asserican Civilian Population in Germany and Japan in the Event of Bostilities." MSC 106; and Record of Sanior MSC Staff Meeting on March 15, 1951, item 2.

"Proposed Transfer of the Point IV Program from the Department of State to the Meananic Gooperation Administration." NSC 110; Memo for Senior MSC Staff from Executive Secretary, case subject, dated June 18. 1951; and Record of Senior MSC Staff Meeting on June 28, 1951, item 1.

"Position of the United States with Respect to Scandinsvis," MSC 28/1: NSC 88: Progress report on MSC 28/1 and MSC 32/1, dated Movember 14, 1950; Memo for Senior NEC Staff from Bascutive Secretary. subject: "U.S. Courses of Action in the Svent the Soviets Attempt to Close the Baltic," dated March 26, 1951; and Record of Senior MSC Staff Meeting on April 3, 1951, item 3.

"United States Policy with Respect to Berlin and Rastern Germany." MSC 89; MSC 73/4, per 42; Hemon for MSC from Executive Secretary,

1. (MSC Action 408, 4 Jan 51



subject: "Additional Airlift to Support the Far East", dated
September 27 and November 20, 1950; NSC Action No. 368; Memo for
Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated
October 31, 1950; Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary,
subject "Courses of Action in the Event East Dermany Imposes a Blockade
in Berlin", dated February 15, 1951; Memo for Senior NSC Staff from
Executive Secretary, subject: "United States Folicy with Begard to a
Possible New Berlin Blockade", dated March 27, 1951; and HIR-h.

"Utilization of Manpower of other Nations for Military Purposes."

MSC 108; Nemo for all holders of MSC 108, dated April 24, 1951; Nemo

for MSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 8, 1951; MSC

Action No. 472; Record of Senior MSC Staff Meetings on May 15 and 17,


1951, item 3; Nemo for Senior MSC Staff from Executive Secretary,

subject: "Proposed MSC Stady of Manpower", dated December 4, 1950;

Memo for Senior MSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject,

dated March 19, 1951.

"The Position of the United States with Respect to Iran." MSC 107;
MSC 107/1; MSC 107/2; Memos for Senior MSC Staff from Executive
Secretary, same subject, dated 24 and 26 October 1950, 20 and 26 March
1951, 29 May 1951, 21 and 28 June 1951; MIE-14; Memo for Senior MSC
Staff from Executive Secretary, subject; "World-wide Appraisal of
Petroleum Supply vs. Requirements for a Major Mar." dated January 24,
1951; Record of Senior MSC Staff Meetings on 13 and 22 March 1951; 3,
15, 17 and 31 May 1951; 5 and 19 June 1951; and MSC Action Numbers
454, 473, 491 and 500.





"Congressional Publication of Information of Advantage to Foreign Oovernments." Hemo for ESC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 16, 1951; and MSC Action No. 478.

"United States Policy with Respect to Turkey." RSG Action

MU.S. Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression." NSC 101;
MSC 101/1: MSC Action No. 420; Memo for MSC from Executive Secretary,
subject: "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia"

(MSC 48/2), dated November 20, 1950; Memo for Senior MSC Staff from
Executive Secretary, subject: "The Position of the United States with

Respect to Communist China", dated November 22, 1950; Memo for Senior

ESC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject: "United States Policy

Toward Asia in General and Toward China in Particular", dated December

14, 1950; Checklist of Possible U.S. actions, dated January 11; MIE-10;

Memo for Senior MSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject: "U.S.

Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression", dated January 22, 1951;

Memo for Senior MSC Staff from Executive Secretary, sense subject, dated

March 15, 1951; and Memos for MSC from Executive Secretary, subject:

"United States Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression", dated

March 21 and April 10, 1951.

No Subject Releasable. (Special Security Precention directed by the President). RSC 26/4; RSC 26/5; Memo for the Senior RSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated 10 April and 3 May 1951; Record of Senior RSC Staff Resting on 12 April 1951, item 1; and RSC Action Mumber 467.





\*U. S. Courses of Action in the Event the Soviets Attempt to Close the Baltic.\* MSC 88; Memo for the Senior MSC Staff from Emecutive Secretary, same subject, dated Jenuary 2, 1951; and Record of Senior MSC Staff Meetings on January 18, 1951 and April 3, 1951, item 3.

Funited States Folicy on Defectors. BSC 86; MSC 86/1; MSC Action Numbers 364, 462 and 490; Record of Senior MSC Staff Meetings on 12 and 29 March, and 3 April 1951; Memo for Ad Hoc Committee on MSC 86, from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 5, 1950; Memo for Ad Hoc Committee on MSC 86, from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 8, 1951; and Memos for Senior MSC Staff, same subject, dated 6 and 26 March 1951, and 17 and 19 April 1951.

"Masic Issue on the Use of U.S. Armod Forces to Counter Further Soviet or Satellite Aggression." Record of Senior Staff Resting Jamury 18, 1951, per 5.

"Collaboration with Friendly Governments on Operations Against Duerrillas." MSC 90; Record of Senior MSC Staff Nestings on 15 Merch 1951, and 15 and 17 May 1951; and Memos for the Senior MSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated 12 Merch and 23 May 1951.


"The Position of the United States with Respect to Injochina."

USC 64/1: Memo for the Senior ESC Staff from Executive Secretary,

same subject, dated & January 1951; Record of Senior ESC Staff Meetings
on 5 and 8 January 1951, item 1; and ESC Action No. 458.

"The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece." MSG Action No. 366.

"The Position of the United States toward Yugoslavia." ESC 73/4, per 37-e-(2); and Nemo for MSC from Executive Secretary, subject:





"United States Policy Toward Yugoslavia and the Furnishing of Military Assistance to Yugoslavia in Case of Aggression", dated September 5.

1950.

"General Statements of Principle Derived from NSG Policy Reports."
NSG 73/4.

"The United States Objectives and Programs for National Security."

NSC 68 mories; NSC 20/4; Record of Senior HSC Staff Neetings on 8, 10,

24 and 31 May 1951, and 14 and 26 June 1951; Memos for the Senior NSC

Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated 14 December 1950,

12 January 1951, 26 April 1951, 1 June 1951, and 7 June 1951; and NSC

Actions Numbers 393, 487 and 488.


"Internal Security." MSC 17 series; MSC Action Numbers 414, 429, and 463; Memos for the Senior MSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject: "Hinimum Standards for the Handling and Transmission of Classified Information," dated 2 and 16 January 1951, and 19 June 1951; Memo for the Senior MSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject:

"Violations of the Security of Classified Information," dated 5 January 1951.

## AIR FORCE STATE DEPARTMENT LIAISON OFFICE

The functions of the Air Force - Department of State Liaison
Office (AFSLO) are such that in most cases the history of a particular
USAF action cannot be given from inception to completion. This office
maintains liaison with the Department of State on politico-military matters
having international connotations. USAF action agencies call upon the
AFSLO for advice and assistance on certain matters requiring coordination
with or negotiation by the Department of State and vice versa. If the
matter is such that the USAF is authorized to contact the Department of






State on a unilateral basis, the AFSLO, in order to expedite an action, may effect the necessary coordination. Therefore, only a record of that portion of an action which pertains to the required liaison with the Department of State is maintained in the AFSLO files. In preparation of this history reference will be made to the USAF action agency in which a complete record of that specific action is maintained.


Likewise, this office prepares and maintains a complete file of Memorandum for the Record for all actions in which the AFSLO participated. Reference to these Memoranda will be made in the "footnotes."

In addition to the above function, the Air Force - State Lieison
Office ecreens for dissemination to the Department of State all messages
which have been transmitted electrically to or from Air Force Headquarters
with the exception of those cables containing solely intelligence,
personnel or material information. The major purpose of this exchange
of information is to appraise State of those Air Force actions which
may have politico-military connotations. Likewise, through an agreement
between the Departments of Defence and State, this office receives the
sole Air Force copy of similar messages which State disseminates for
information to the Department of the Air Force. These cables are
subsequently disseminated to all interested Air Force agencies and
finally returned for filling in this office.

During the period 1 January 1951 to 30 June 1951, the Air Force - Department of State Liaison Office participated in the following USAF actions:

Processed Mobile Security Services Detachment at Ehartoum, Sudam, (Top Secret) -- Upon a request from the Director of Intelligence, the






ment at Khartoum, Sudan, with appropriate officials in the Department of State. Due to the extreme sensitiveness of the Anglo-Egyptian situation in Sudan, State suggested that an equivalent security service function might be performed with greater diplomatic finesse by the use of British personnel amalgaments with the established British units in Sudan. However, the State officials were of the opinion that the British would be reluctant to initiate such discussions until after the successful completion of their current negotiations with the Egyptians. It was decided that the USAF would not approach the British Government at this time, but instead informally explore the question on a Service to Service basis with the RAF.

Protest from Prefect of Police. Faris concerning Low Flying
American Plenes. (Restricted) — The Department of State advised the
AFSLO that their Ambassador to France had forwarded a complaint from
the Paris Prefect of Police concerning low flying American aircraft over
the city of Paris. In coordination with the Directorate of Operations,
a message was dispatched to all pertinent USAF agencies which might have
occasion to sand flights over Paris to observe the existing French
flying regulations.

Violation by USAF Aircraft of the Czechoslovskian Border (Secret) — On 14 February 1951, CIRCUSAFE dispatched a message Bo. BOOP 1380 to Headquarters USAF stating that two FGAE aircraft had inadvertently violated

<sup>3.</sup> RCS File Mo. 360.112, 13 Feb 51, Subj: "Protest From Prefect of Police, Peris, Concerning Low Flying American Planes"; and Memo for Mr. Carroll (State) 4td 6 Mer 51, No. 165, Vol. V, AFELO Files.



<sup>2.</sup> Memo for Col Poage, 4 Jan 51, No. 158, Vol. V, AFSLO Files; R&R From APOINto AFOPD, dtd 29 Dec 50, Subj: "Request for a Survey Relative to AFSS Site Requirements."



the Czech Border. In cooperation with appropriate State officials, a message was dispatched to the American Ambassador at Prague requesting that he inform the Czech Foreign Office that the U.S. admitted the inadvertent over flight, pass the pertinent details precipitating the incident, and give appropriate American applogies as well as reassurances that corrective action would be taken.

Civil Air Patrol Codet Exchange Program for 1951. (Unclassified) —
Upon a request from the Executive for Civil Air Patrol Affairs, the AFSLO
obtained concurrence from appropriate State officials for the inclusion
of Luxenburg among the countries maned for reciprocal Civil Air Patrol
Cadet exchanges. 5

Air Attaches to French Horth Africa. (Secret) — Mr. Godley from the Department of State inquired whether the Air Force desired to nominate Air Attaches to certain posts in French Borth Africa, specifically Rabet.

General Hamilton (AFOPY) felt that Air Attaches would not be required in French Borth Africa since the Headquarters for USAF units stationed in that area could easily effect and coordinate the necessary intelligence requirements for North Africa. The Department of State concurred in this visupoint.

Request for an Air Attache to Ethiopia. (Confidential) -- Ambassador Childs requested that an Air Attache be assigned to his staff in Ethiopia.

The Directorate of Intelligence believed that the assignment to an Air Attache would not be justifiable at this time since our Air Attache in Sgypt can adequately effect the intelligence coverage of Ethiopia, but that if an

<sup>5.</sup> Memo for Lt Gol Hesserscheidt. 27 Feb 51, No. 175, Vol. V. AFSLO Files 6. Memo for Becord, No. 176, Vol V. AFSLO Files.



<sup>4.</sup> Heno for Record, 1 Mar 51, No. 167, Yol. V. AFSLO Files, and AF Necessary GAF IN 98432 dtd 14 Feb 51, and GAF IN 99071 dtd 16 Feb 51.

Air Porce representative were necessary for regotiations conducted in that area an appropriate representative could be assigned during the conduct of such perstiations.

Authority to Evacuate UN Ballius Troops from the For East Via the U. S. in Helgium Aircraft. (Unclassified) - In coordination between the Air Force Transportation Office and the State Department, the AFSLO obtained permission for Relgium to evacuate her personnel from the Far Enot across the U. S. enroute to Europe.

USAF Use of Danish Aviation Gas. (Secret) - The Commanding General, Mortheast lossand, requested permission to use portions of the drumsed aviation gos belonging to the Darish Government stocked at Thule, Greenland, to sup ort proje t BLUE JAY. A message was dis atched to Copenhagen requesting the above permission and subsequent ap roval was received from the Banish Government providing that the aviation gas used would be replaced in the near future.9

Interia Approval for Caschoslovakian Overflight of Germany. (Secret) -Upon a request from the State Department, the APELO obtained approval from interested Air Force agencies for the Greek Airlines to everfly the American Home of Germany on a day-to-day basis. However, no interception of these flights would be untertaken should the Ozechs continue these flights without HICON persission. 10

Memo for Record, No. 177, Vol V, AFELO Files. Memo for Record, 20 Mar 51, Vol VI, AFELO Files; and AF Message AF IN 2376, 8 Har 51, No. 1.

Memo for Maj Cutler, 17 Apr 51, No. 3, Vol VI, AFSLO Files. Memo for Record, 26 Mar 51, No. 5, VOL VI, AFSLO Files; and AF Message GAF IN 68523 dtd 23 Mar 51. 10.



Return of Creahed Bungarian Aircraft. (Confidential) - The AFSLO obtained the Air Force approval recuested by the State Department for the delay in returning an Dungarian aircraft which creahed in the Asserican Zone of Germany. This delay will be used as an informal guid pro cuo pending clarification of pending negotiations with Bungary on other matters. 11

Uniforms for Saphi Arabia. (Confidential) -- The State Department solicited Air Force or ments reporting a Saudi Arabian request to jurchase 1500 summer type uniforms. Inasmuch as the Tablis have not signed an KDAF Agreement, the AVNLO salvised that such parch se small be impossible through Defense Charmels. 12

Restriction of Use of Aircraft Leased from the fidential) - Mr. Theyer of the Department of State was contacted upon the request of Mt. Col. Mipsoonb (AF T) regarding State's viewpoint of the request from Transocean Air Lines to extend its current arrangement with Air Djbouti for the use of two -66 Coverment lessed aircraft. State indicated that Transocean Air Lines had been conducting a commendable job in the Near Rest and that their current arrangement should be extended. 13

Offer of Evelve Dutch Jet Pilots for Service in Morge. (Top Secret) -Col. Heans (AFOFD) requested the AFSLO to discuss the above subject with appropriate State officials. The Department of State indicated that it would consider it highly desirable to accept any formal offer for Butch pilets participation in Kores, 14



<sup>11.</sup> Nemo for Record, No. 6, Vol VI, AFSLO Files; and AF Recordes GAF IN 65361, 9 Mar 51, and GAF IN 68541, 23 Mar 51.

12. Nemo for Maj. NcKensie, No. 7, Vol VI, AFSLO Files; and 29 Mar 51.

13. Mano for Lt. Gal. Lipscond, and 8 May 51, No. 11, Vol VI, AFSLO Files.

14. Nemo for Gal. Neens, and 17 May 51, No. 12, Vol VI, AFSLO Files.



Use of Abn Suicr, Royat, by USAF in Swent of War. (Top Secret) --The Department of State Officials felt that the USAF could plan on the use of Abu Suier in the event of a major war. They indicated that the Egyptians probably would not force the British to completely evacuate this Base, alt ough a reduction in strength may o necessary, since the income derived therefrom is important to the Egyptian scenery. It is likely that the overall Egyptian situation will not be clarified prior to the November meeting of the Egyptian Parliament. However, State felt that the USAF could accomplish limited sto kpilling through the British if discreetly handled.

Landing of Two F-Se's at Frague, Czechoslovakia. (Secret) -- On 8 June 1951, two UEAF F-848 aircraft landed on the Prayme Airport. For a period of 10 days efter their initial disappearance both pilots (one a Morwegian) and air roft were held incommicedo. The AFSLO in manerous discussions with the an regriste State officials assisted in the initial determination of the location of these pilots and sircraft and their subsecuent release to U. S. notherities.

Yugoslovia Royler Violation. (Secret) -- On 16 Pebruary 1951, the U. S. Air Attache to Tugoslovia informed Hendquarters, USAF that the Tugoslovia Covernment had reports that a twin engine USAF marked aircraft was observed flying over Forthern Tugoslovie for approximately 2) hours. After investigation through CINCURAPE it was determined that a E-26 Bomber on a flight from Germany to Italy became lost while flying over the top of an overcost and upon descent had flown over most of Northern Yugoslovia in an attempt at reorientation. The details precipitating this incident and appropriate applogies were thesed through the American Ambassedor at Belgrade to the appropriate Yugoslovian officials . 17

<sup>15.</sup> Mamo for Record.

No. 14, Vol VI, AFSLO Files.
No. 14, Vol VI, AFSLO Files.

1 Files on AF Messeges of the SI ebs CAF II Seel, atd 15 Feb 51.



## Over lights of Major Buroness Cities by USAF Afrord't on Arned

Porces Day. (Secret) - The APSLO obtained diplomatic electrance for the everflight of the major Festers Suropean Capitals excepting Austria and Trieste by USAF B-29 type circust on Arasel Forces Day.

INTERNATIONAL BRANCH.

Loren. The International Branch presented comments onely in January 1951 on the problem of bombing the Horsen power complex, consisting of installations on the Yalu and Chamjin Rivers. It was stated that although the Air Force did not have the capability to matray the Horsen dams, it could mack out the power stations or "heart" of the camplex. Encommendation was used that military action be taken to accomplish this. However, implementation of the project was not approved as Department of State political objections were considered by higher authority to be overriding.

Recommendations concerning courses of action to counter Chinese

Communist agreesion were submitted in Jamury 1951 to the effect that a

navel blockade of China should be imposed and that restrictions on the

operations of enti-communist forces should be removed. Plans should be


made for initiating six and m val attacks in Communist China after forces
of the latter attacked our forces outside Koren. However, no high level

Covernmental facision on this satter was reached.

The entired build-up, in early 1951, of Com uniet Air Forces in Manchuria was a problem given such deliberation. It was finally decided that if the Communists made mass six attacks on United Nations forces in Korse, the United States would take action to bomb airfields from which

18. AF Recoage AF IN 796, dtd & Her 51, and CAF OUT 54698, dtd 9 Her 51.





those attacks originated. The United States Delegation to the United Metions was instructed to advice memor nations with troops in Morea of this contemplated retalistion.


United Nations troops were again ready to assume the initiative and begin a northward advence in February 1951. It was decided that the most feasible cause of action would be to regard the 36th parallel as an academic matter and to advance as for north as militarily feasible.

Although a difficult problem was secondared in convining other United Nations members with troops in Force that the 36th parallel should be crossed, this policy was eventually adopted with the acted military mission of inflicting the maximum casualties on energy forces.

Services. It was ecided that distribution should be made first for intelligence, research and development and then to the Central Intelligence agency for clandestine operations, stockpiling for possible aid to Yugoslavia, and leatly for training and familiarization.

During the latter part of March 1951, decimation of Germanist forces had reached the point where it appeared feasible to attempt to achieve a cease-fire. Review of previously prepared Gense Fire Terms was made and adequate provisions were inserted to insure proper surveillance of Korea and and the appreciation on terms satisfactory to the United States. Discussion of the proposed terms was initiated with United Mations members having forces in Korea but were dropped when General ManArthur prematurely made cease fire proposals to the Generalist commenders in the field.

The Communist air build-up in Manchuria to an ostimated total of one thousand sircraft was the cause of such concern to Air Force officials.





Accordingly, it was recommended that our air power in the Fer East be suggested and that plans be developed for str fing Communist airfields if the build-up reached a point which might jeopardise United States air superiority in Eorea.

The Communist proposal for armintice talks found the United States propored with a policy concerning a cease fire. Only minor revisions were necessary prior to initiation of the military talks seeking a cease fire.

General Sectional Inquiry into the Relief of General MacArthur. The International Branch was charged with the responsibility for detailed analysis of all policy decisions by the United States concerning the Far Best and the resultant instructions to General MacArthur. The testimony of witnesses before the Joint Congressional Committee was closely studied. Detailed notes and briefings were prepared by members of the International Branch for Generals Vandenberg and O'Donnell, the two Air Force witnesses. Officers of the Branch accompanied both witnesses when they appeared before the Committee.

Japanese Peace Treaty. After the President designated Mr. Dulles as his representative to negotiate the terms of a Japanese Peace Treaty with Allied Nations and with Japan, the International Branch was called upon and appointed an officer to represent the Air Force on a Department of Defence ad hoc committee considering the many problems inherent to this subject. The consideration of a Japanese Peace Treaty brought forth a neries of papers to fulfill all the requirements of the President's directive to Mr. Dulles. These papers included the Japanese Peace Treaty, a U.S.-Jap-Security Treaty, which sanctioned the continued stationing of United States troops in Japan, an Administrative Agreement with numerous endemis prepared to implement the terms of the Treaty itself and the Security



Agreement. In this regard, the International Branch obtained the coordinated views of the Air Staff on these papers to insure that necessary safeguards were included to protect United States security requirements as these documents were frequently emended by Mr. Dulles to meet the demards of Allied Sations. This activity has resulted in the Jayanese Peace Treaty and the Security Agreements being approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Japanese Police Porces. The problem of developing, training, and equipping sufficient Japanese pre-trenty police forces was emphasized by the deteriorating international situation. The Communist aggression in Morea could have a serious bearing on the future security of Japan. The International Branch participated in discussions which resulted in the submission of recommunistions to the effect that ships and accessory equipment be loaned to the Japanese in order that their Maritims Police might be expanded. With regard to the Japanese Matienal Police Reserve it was decided to strengthen those forces initially to four divisions with a goal of expansion to ten divisions by 1 July 1952. It was further decided to stockpile heavy equipment in the United States for shipment to these forces at such a time when dislocatic considerations no longer are overriding.

Chinese Nationalist Forces. Recommendations were made in early January 1951 that Chinese Nationalist Forces on Formoca should not be employed in Rores. In addition, the United States should institute at once a program of covert operations in Communist China integrated with the Nationalist program.

Formose. The International Breach continued its activity in consultation with the Joint Strategic Europy Committee of the Joint Staff, and interservice ad hoc committees in the consideration of the Far East Command report as to the amount and type of military equipment that should be furnished to



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
the Chinese Mationalist Forces on Formoca. Such recommendations were made to and approved by General Vandemberg which resulted in the establishment of a United States Military Advisory Mission on Formosa, envisaged ultimately to consist of five hundred officers and men, to train and assist in the improvement of the quality of Chinese Mationalist forces. The advent of United States equipment and training has paid considerably in dividends if in no other may than the better morals among those Mationalist troops. In addition, the Intermetional Branch has worked very closely with other Air Staff agencies, in particular the Mobilization Division, in briefing the USAF officers and airmen, going to Formosa as part of the U. S. Military Advisory Group as to Usaf and United States Policy with regards to Formosa and its relationship with United States Asian policy.

Indechine. The situation in Indochina required International Branch consideration particularly in the interest of insuring that the French have really given the three Associated States in Indochina the agreed mutenessy in the operation of their governments and in the interest of convincing other For East sations that Indochina is not a puppet of France. Policies in this regard have been established and are being implemented with considerable success.

The implementation of the Military Assistance program for Indochina and the use of the material by the Proposition and indigenous forces has resulted in an improved security situation in I dochina. In the consideration of this improved cituation the International Branch effor several months of inter-service negotiations recommended to General Vandenberg that France be requested to semi several thousand additional troops to Indochina. This was a very delicate subject, in particular, because of General Risenbower's requirements for the build-up of MATO strength in Muross. The taking may



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of these troops might seriously affect the will of other European nations to comperate as urgently required. As a result of this activity and monitoring functions performed by International Branch, these French troops will arrive in Indochina (via U.S. bottoms) before the end of September 1951.

United States Treaty with Australia and New Zealand. Simultaneous with the consideration of the Japanese Peace Treaty, it was necessary for the International Branch to prepare, coordinate, and consider a sutual security agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States in view of the possible rearrang of Japan. The Treaty was subsequently signed by representatives of the three governments.

Southeast Asia. The International Branch continued its considerable activity in the affairs of Southeast Asia in the Interest of insuring that the security interests of the United States were fully protected. In addition, the International Branch was very active in various ad hoc counities considering the over-all Asian policy, re-examining the Military Assistance Programs for the various countries. Recommendations to General Vandemberg and to Mr. Finletter subsequently became United States policy.

Philippines Relands. Nuch consideration has been given, by the International Branch, to the impature and inexperienced government in the Philippines which resulted in considerable corruption and enabled the "makes" success in seriously affecting military security in these Islands. Policies that have in part improved the situation have been established. Consideration of these policies required considerable action by the International Branch.

In addition to the general over-all consideration of the politicomilitary situation in the Philippines, the International Branch has





recommended to General Vandemberg that the United States Government advance \$10 million to the Philippine Department of Defense in order to pay the Filipine soldiers. This was done in the interest of improving the morele of Philippine troops. Air Force recommendations as to other improvements in the personnel at higher schelons in the Philippine Defense Establishment resulted in a considerable improvement in the morals of these troops with the end result of inflicting greater damage to the Communist-led "Rake" guerrilles.

In addition, the International Branch worked closely with the State
Department in assisting their efforts to establish Voice of America
transmitters on the Philippines for broadcast to Southeast Asia. International Branch recommendation to General Vandenberg later resulted in the
establishment of a United States policy in this regard.

Inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO. During the period under consideration International Branch has continued to favor the full inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, even though these countries had already been allowed to associate therein on a consultative basis before the end of 1950.

In May, International Branch advocated the adoption of a national policy which would seek the lamediate inclusion of Turkey and Greece in NATO as full-fledged members, and which would, in case of delay, permit the development of alternative occurity arrange ents including Turkey, Greece, and the United States. A policy along those lines having been adopted, the U. S. Government than proposed, in the Gouncil of Deputies of NATO, that Turkey and Greece be pointted to the organization as full, rather than as associate members.

Deliberations on this problem are still in progress in the Council of Deputies. Oresce and Turkey now have the support of the United Kingdom



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MATO will eventually accede to the U.S. proposal. In the members of MATO will eventually accede to the U.S. proposal. In the meanwhile, International Branch has furnished comments on the military implications of admitting Greece and Turkey to MATO, and has collaborated with the Departments of State and Defense in providing additional guidance by cable to the U.S. Representative on the Council of Deputies.

Turkey. In addition to the very important problem of supporting the request of Turkey (and Greece) for addission to MATO, the International Branch has dealt with several other problems concerning Turkey. One of the most pressing and recurrent problems has been with regard to the Turkish Straits. The International Branch has taken the position that the United States should avoid raising the question of revising the Montreaux Convention which gives Turkey control of the Straits. It is axiomatic that any revision that would parmit the USSR or its satellites to have a voice in the control of the Darignelles would set to the detriment of the Western Powers.

In addition to the Straits question the International Branch has supported the contention of the United States Bavy that the Turkish Baval Forces should be encouraged to step up their operations in the Black Sea.

In addition the International Branch has supported the proposal of the Economic Comparation Administration that ECA funds should be used to improve telecommunications facilities in Turkey. In addition to these projects the International Branch reviewed a restatement of povernmental policies with respect to Turkey and submitted contain changes providing for interim assistance to Turkey in the event it is attacked by the USSR and/or its satellites prior to its admission to MATO.

Greece. In February the International Branch was maked to comment on a restatement of governmental policies with respect to Greece. In





ceneral these policies concerned centinued U.S. interest in this country; overt manifestation of U.S. interest in Greece; the continuation of U.S. economic and military assistance to Greece, and; U.S. courses of action if Greece should be attacked by the UEEE and/or its matellites. The Intermetional Branch took the position that the proposed statement of policy should revise for greater control by the Joint Chiefe of Staff of the military assistance program and that any military assistance to Greece should be premised on Greek capabilities.

Additional International Branch action with respect to Greek Army approved the furnishing of certain descrition equipment to the Greek Army and the initiation of studies of whether additional Greek forces are required to implement U.S. policies with respect to that country. In recommending approved of this latter study the International Branch took the position that the advisability of suggesting the ground forces appeared questionable, but that there did appear to be a need for some augmentation if a "balanced force" is to be achieved.

Yugoslavia. This country has posed one of the major politicomilitary problems throughout this period. Early in January 1951 a

Washington representative of the Yugoslav Government stated to a Central

Intelligence Agency official that Tito was desirous of discussions on
strategic matters at an appropriate time. Upon this matter being referred

to the Services, the International Branch supported the position that

(a) exploratory staff conversations between United States and Yugoslavian
military representatives should be held if the agenda was restricted to
matters of mutual interest with respect to Yugoslavia; (b) that the
Department of State should arrange for these talks which for security reasons
should take place in Washington; and (c) that there was no objection

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to British and French participation in these convergations if Tito so desired.

In light of the new factore being introduced into the equation of United States-Yugoslavian relationships, the Department of Defense was maked to comment upon a proposed revision of governmental policies with respect to this country around the first of March. In general the new proposals concerned the courses of action the United States should take if the Cold for continued; if extensive querrilla operations were undertaken against Yugoslavia, and; in the event of an overt attack on Yugoslavia by the U.S.S.R. and/or its satellites. The courses of action concerned principally economic assistance; a nore liberal policy with respect to export of arms to Yugoslavia; military planning; stockpiling of unteriel to permit immediate delivery to Tugoslavia in the event of certain contingencies, and; possible diplomatic and political support. While the International Branch concurred generally in these proposals it was recommended that arrangements be made for further United States-Yugoslaw military conversations in order to secure more authoritative data for planning purposes before any major military assistance program for this country was undertaken.

In the meantime the Yugoslav Government had approached Great Britain and France in an endeavor to buy limited quantities of military equipment and to solicit their support. The International Branch was given the job of monitoring the reports from these countries as to the progress of their talks with the Yugoslavs.

By the middle of April Marshall Tito had assented to the U. S. proposal that military staff talks on the question of military assistance



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for Yugoslavia should be held. Upon the Department of State conveying this information to the Department of Defence, the International Branch supported the position that the talks be held in Washington and that they should begin as soon as possible with the understanding that they were purely emploratory in nature. At approximately the same time the International Branch propaged Air Staff comments upon a joint intelligence estimate of the situation in Tugoslavia. In general the conclusions of this report were concurred in, namely, that Yugoslavia was strategically important to the United States, that the Tito-Stalin split seemed to be permanent, and that, although the Yugoslav Arry would resist agreesion, substantial and continuing Western assistance in military material would be required if the Yugoslava were to so time their resistance to such attack for any period of time.

Preliminary Air Staff action required to prepare for the forthcoming talks with the Yugoslave centered in the International Branch.

Typical problems of representation, terms of reference, agenda, intelligence, and briefing of personnel had to be disposed of. With agreement on such items being reached between the Services and upon the appointment of Col. Nevitt, AFOFD, as the USAF representative for these meetings, much of the pressure on the International Branch concerning this project was temporarily removed. However, prior to the talks International Branch was called upon to brief Col. Nevitt on politico-military developments leading up to these convergations and during the talks continued to maintain a general interest in any policy aspects involved. Upon the conclusion of these talks and the submission of the minutes, thereof, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the International Branch again assumed the major responsibility for resolving the problems that had arisen and



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laying the necessary (Foundwork for Air Force participation in further military staff conversations which will be held with Yugoslav officials to work out details of prospective United States military assistance to that country.

Israel. In Merch the International Branch was asked to comment upon conversations between the Israeli Military Attache and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, during the course of which it became apparent that Israel would welcome closer military planning and relationships with the United States. The position taken on this problem was that, although increased U.S.-Israeli military cooperation was desirable, it should be undertaken only in coordination with similar U.S.-Arab arrangements, in order to avoid favorities in the tense Middle East area.

In this regard International Breach, in its review of U. S. policy toward Israel and the Arab States, also suggested that U. S. arms supply programs to be developed without showing any partiality between Israel and the Arab States.

Saudi Arabia. While negotiations with Saudi Arabia for long-term
U.S. rights which would ge rait continued USAF operation of Dhahran Air
Field had been initiated during 1950 this matter had not been resolved
by the first of this year. One of the principal tasks of the International
Branch during the current period was to menitor the progress of these
negotiations.

In the interest of definitely obtaining U.S. airbase rights in Saudi Arabia, International Branch recommended in March that some upwardmodification of the reimbursable military aid program for that country be approved, in accordance with Saudi desires. This modification included





a small fighter force, beas shop facilities, an assumition reserve, and training in all phases of military activity.

On 31 May Ambassador Hare completed discussions with the Sandi Arabian Government on draft agreements concerning Danhran Airfield and a program of military assistance. International Branch expedited consideration of the draft airbase agreement and recommended its approval by the United States as written. Both the airbase and military assistance agreements were finalized by the U.S. Government on 18 June. Immediately following this, International Branch prepared over-all terms of reference for activating, instructing, and dispatching to Sandi Arabia a small joint survey group in accordance with provisions of the military assistance agreement.

As another consequence of the finalization of agreements with Sandi Arabia, International Branch recommended divulging to the British the nature and extent of our agreements with Sandi Arabia. This information had previously been withheld for fear of jeografizing the negotiations.

Iran. In order to achieve the best recults in training and equipping the Iranian Air Force under approved U.S. programs, International Branch supported the position of the combining of the U.S. Hilitary Mission to the Iranian Army with the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Iran, in order to form a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to Iran, similar to those in Greece and Turkey. This was opposed by Army, presumably on the basis of State Department objections. In view of this situation International Branch recommended, in April, that the new Army Chief of the U.S. Mission in Iran, who had an understanding of the Air Force viewpoint, be given an opportunity to improve the situation before insisting upon reorganization.


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In commenting upon drafts of national policy with respect to Iran, International Branch has supported the adoption of measures designed to stabilize the country, give it general and special political support, and strongthen it against communist subversion and pressure. Although advocating collaboration with the British, International Branch has pointed out that further development of the current situation in Iran may make necessary increasingly independent action on the part of the United States.

Politico-Military Review of the Current World Situation. One of the continuing responsibilities of the International Branch is to submit Air Staff comments on periodic reviews of the global politico-military picture as it affects U.S. strategic interests. In the latter part of January 1951 the International Branch was asked to prepare comments on a series of Department of State papers along this general line submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with a Presidential directive. The International Branch took the general position that the conclusions arrived at in State constituted an excellent beginning, but did not go far enough and should be phrased more in terms of U.S. security rather than deal in broad international generalities.

Export Control Policy. A series of papers regarding U.S. policies and progress in the accommandation which may affect the war potential of the Soviet Bloc, was initiated in Pebruary by a Department of State report to the President, recommending substantive policies and measures designed to weaken economically the USSE and Sete lites. In commenting upon this series of papers, International Branch had advocated severe restrictions on U.S. trade with the Soviet Bloc, particularly Hong Kong



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and Macao, and has supported proposals for influencing non-Gommunist nations to reduce trade with the USSR and its satellites.

The Mes Amendment of Public Law 45, approved 2 June 1951, forbids economic or financial assistance to any foreign country which exports certain categories of commodities to the Soviet Bloc while the United States is engaged in hostilities in conformance with a decision of the U.N. Security Council, unless the NSC makes exceptions in the security interest of the United States. International Branch has worked steadily with the Munitions Board and with the JCS Representative to the East-West Trade Committee in examining the military implications of proposed MSC determinations under the Mem Amendment.

Department of State prepared a position paper on Trieste which was 18 a referred to the International Branch. The paper recommended that: (a) if the Soviets do not alter their position, we should not bring up the Trieste Question with the Soviets or with the British and French at this time; and (b) if the Soviets change their position, we should jointly (excluding the Soviets), try to achieve Italo-Yugoslav Agreement on a territorial division of Trieste. The paper also contained a subparagraph which stated that our military presence in Trieste has strategic value as logistic support for Yugoslavia and a possible role as the maclaus of the southern anchor of Vestern Europe defenses. The paper also contained a proposed alternate course which would have provided for a gradual and unannounced rundown of US-UK troop strength in Trieste as an economy measure.

Fith respect to this paper the International Branch recommended preparation of a memorandum for signature of the Secretary of Defense 18 a. Dept of State draft position paper RPTS D-3/2b, entitled Trieste, dtd 19 Jan 11

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stating that: (a) From the military point of view, there are no objections to the recommendations contained in the Department of State paper; (b) there would be no military objection to removal of US-IK troops from Tricate under an international agreement which would proclude any political objection to such removal; and (c) we non-concur with a gradual rundown of our troops as an economy measure since we consider that the troop

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On 26 February 1951 International Branch recommended that General Airey (Commander, US-UK Forces, Trieste) be released from his command in order to be appointed as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Supreme Headquarters Allied Jowers Burope. It was also recommended that General Airey's successor should be a British officer.

units in Trieste should be kept at present strength or removed from

Trionto.

United States Policy Toward Spain. On 23 January 1951 the
International Branch took the position that: (a) U.S. officials should
emphasise in tripertite and North Atlantic Treaty Organization discussions
that military cooperation with Spain is essential to our common policy;
(b) emphasis should be placed upon our common policy of defending
Western Europe with all available forces; and (c) in our discussions with
the Spainards it should be emphasized that in achieving their security the
best method is through the common defence of the Mestern European area
as a whole.

In view of the above the International Branch recommended that U.S. policy toward Spain should be: (a) that the United States now propose acceptance of Spain into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and (b) whether or not Spain soon becomes a member of MATO, the United States should propose that the military agencies of the Borth Atlantic





Treaty Organization be authorised to associate with Spain, and that political arrangements be made at the earliest possible moment for conversations between U.S. and Spanish military planners.

On 29 March 1951 the U.S. Air Attache at Madrid, Spain requested that a flight of jets and bombers be sent to Spain to visit Madrid and Seville from 18 to 23 April 1951. International Branch obtained the approval of General Vandenberg, General Marchall and the Department of State and 9 F-84 jets were dispetched to Spain during the requested dates. The flight received an enthusiastic reception and the U.S. Ambersador to Spain requested that the USAF be congratulated on the excellent demonstration.

On 13 April 1951 International Branch was called u on to furnish their views as to how to further U.S. military aims with respect to Spain. International Branch recommend that: (a) The Department of State be informed of the urgent U.S. requirements for military operating rights in Spain; (b) Spain be declared sligible for direct grant military aid; and (c) preparations a made for the conduct of initial military discussions with Spain.

Purchase in the United States of Tanks by the Swiss Government.

On 31 January 1951 the Chairman of the Munitions Board requested guidance concerning the purchase in the United States of approximately 500 tanks by the Swiss Covernment. International Branch recommended that the Chairman of the Munitions Board be advised that: (a) the project is militarily advisable, but must not be allowed to adversely affect U.S. military programs; (b) any U.S. supply of tanks for foreign governments should be on a government-to-government basis, under the provisions of Section 406 (e), Public Low 329, as amended, and the Swiss Government





should be determined eligible for such reinbursable sid; (c) any agreement should provide for (1) U.S. retention of full authority to allocate the production facilities and the tanks produced in the interest of U.S. accurity, and (2) assurance from the Swiss that this equipment will be used solely for their own defense; and (d) the question of the logical contractor for this project is not a matter for USAF determination.

The International Branch recommendation was based on the following advantages to be accrued to the United States: (a) additional U.S. plants would be tooled for tank production; (b) five hundred U.S. type tanks would be produced at no cost to the United States and they could be retained in the United States in the event of a military requirement; and (c) U.S. approval of the project would proclude the possibility of such an order going to the USSE or one of its entellites.

Ethiopia. The International Branch has participated in the formulation of the Air Porce position on Ethiopia. In connection with the visit of Lt. General Charles A. Bolto, USA, as special Representative of the President, the Branch was asked to comment on the advisability of supplying bomber escort for General Bolto for reasons of prestice. After a thorough study of Ethiopian airfield facilities it was determined that it would be impossible to land light or madium bombers at Addis Ababa.

General Bolto's request for guidance relative to his mission caused the Branch to advance the Air Staff position that the question of sending a military mission to Sthiopia abould be reopened and submitted to study. It was the considered opinion of the International Branch, an opinion in which the Air Staff concurred, that such a mission would enhance the prestice of the Emperor, counterest anti-west propaganda and place the United States in a stronger position to negotiate for macessary military operating rights in Ethiopia in the future.



Based on International Branch recommendation, the JCT directed a complete study of the question. Upon General Bolte's return conferences between him and the JSPC indicated that the Emperor would be happy to receive the loan of several basic type U.S. weapons for training replacements for the Ethiopian Expeditionary Force in Korea but that a military mission as such was unnecessary.

Branch has adopted the position, a position in which the Air Staff has concurred, that it was vital to the security interests of the United States to recove the military restrictions imposed on Italy by the Treaty of Peace. The recoval of these restrictions would then enable her to meet such consituents as have been assigned by the Standing Group. It was the opinion of the International Branch that while the treaty provisions did not specifically authorize recoval of these restrictions without the concurrence of the USSE, removal could be accomplished by a majority vote of the signatories. The International Branch took the position that action for removal should be initiated through MATO.

Accordingly, the International Branch prepared a briof study showing the allowed strength of the Italian Air Force in sen and planes, the present strength and the strength necessary to permit Italy to meet the consistents assigned to her by the Standing Group. This subject is one of continuing study by the International Branch along the lines of the position outlined above.

Military Government and Givil Affairs. The International Branch has paid considerable attention to the question of military government and civil affairs as applied to various problems which may arise in the future. Assistance was given to the ad hoc committee, dealing with this





subject, in the preparation of a revised field manual for use in operational situations as well as in the proparation and revision of various plans to be used in the support of possible future military operations.

Treatice. The International Branch comment was requested on various treatics, including the application of the MATO multilateral treaty to the Mosfoundland leased bases, and those dealing with the securing of base rights in Libya, Sandi Arabia and Franch Morocco. It was the position of the International Branch that the MATO multilateral treaty should be applied to the Mesfoundland leased bases and that every effort should be made by the United States to appure the maximum jurisdiction possible over United States military and civilian personnel and dependents serving on the bases ascured by bilateral agreement, particularly in those areas where the basic law departed from the Roman-Common Law besis employed by the Western powers.

Branch were requested on the Brookings Institute Report relative to

The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operation. Accordingly.

The International Branch, after detailed study and consultation with the

Air Staff, concluded that the entire report and the subject thereof should

be resubstited for further study. It was the opinion of the International

Branch that the report proposed the establishment of a dual control of

military personnel inconsistent with sound military principles and

operation; accorded too much control by the Ambas ador over independent

staffs of military personnel operating abroad; and gove the Ambas ador



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authority relative to communications between autonomous military representatives abroad and their respective military departments.

Demial of German and Austrian Scientists and Technicians. Intermatical Branch, in cooperation with the Birectorate of Intelligence, maintains a constant study of this program. This study includes a watch over the travel of key scientists and technicians in Germany and Austria.

International Branch was requested to furnish views on the following revision of policy relating to the treatment of German scientists: (a) our policy objectives should include the security of information acquired by German scientists since the war, denial to Emesia in peacetime of the services of outstanding German scientists, and arrangements for emergency evacuation of these scientists; (b) the combined Allocation list should be discontinued; (c) subject to assurity safeguards, control over the severent of German scientists should be limited to a Denial and Evacuation List of not more than fifty outstanding German scientists; and (d) this list should be developed, kept current, the scientists should be kept under surveillance, and plane should be made for the emergency evacuation of those who are in Germany.

1951 recommended that: (a) the Combined Allocation List should be continued under present arrangements because it provides an exchange of information on a large number of German scientists and technicians with small expenditure of offert; (b) the United Kingdom and the United States should collaborate in a Combined Denial and Evacuation List which should not be limited to any specific masher of names; and (c) the U.S.





and U.K. forces in Gormany should collaborate in the evacuation phase of this program to the extent agreed upon by their respective commanders.

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On 29 January 1951 International Branch recommended, with respect to the program for emial of Austrian scientific personnel to potential enemy matters, that: (a) until the Department of State takes over the program, future budgeting should be accomplished by the Department of the Army; current arrangements, concurred in by the Department of State, for the program to be administered by the Commanding Coneral, United States Porces Austria, should be continued at least through FT 1952; and action to secure French collaboration is not appropriate.

with respect to transferring budget responsibility for the denial program from the Department of the Army to the Department of State, International Branch on 10 April 1951, recommended that: (a) Army should continue to suiget for the program; and, (b) such funds as are allocated by the Department of the Army for this program should be transferred to the Department of State when that Department assumed over-all assimistration responsibility.

With respect to a proposal that the Combined Allocation List of Gorman scientists be released to the Latin American countries. International Branch on 3 May 1951, recommended that the list be released to the Latin American countries if the Department of State considers it desirable.

Security of Icoland. During the period 1 January to 30 June 1951, there was considerable success in the efforts to provide for the security of highly strategic Iceland. International Breach perticipated in the formulation of the national policy relative to this matter during the latter part of 1950, and negotiations were opened with representatives of



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the Covernment of Iceland through NATO. Those negotiations resulted in the conclusion of an agreement with Iceland which provides for the stationing of U.S. forces on that island in peacetime. Implementation of the agreement has progressed to the formulation of an Iceland defense force. A portion of the authorized number of U.S. forces has been moved to Iceland. Additional forces are being sent to Iceland as facilities and housing are constructed. The particular interest of the Air Force in Iceland concerning the operation of Maflavik by the U.S. Air force is included in the agreement.

SAG Wee of Convilian Bases. In accordance with a request prepared by International Branch for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force and submitted through the Joint Chiefs of Stoff and the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State entered into negotiations with the Government of Canada relative to the need for a blanket egreement covering a wide scope of Strategic Air Command activities over Canada and from Canadian bases. The Department of State in a letter to the Secretary of Defense reported that the Consilan Covernment did not look favorably upon the proposal. This matter was again referred to the JCG. International Branch recommended that the nature of the contemplated operations was of such importance to both Censis and the United States that the matter should again be taken up with Canada. It was decided that the matter abould be reopened with Canada through the Persanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-U.S., incomuch as this agency is composed of both military and diplomatic representatives. This procedure is in accordance with the original lir Staff views comcerning the most feasible manner for handling this problem.

Most rundland Road Maintonance. During the latter part of 1950
International Broad handled the Air Steff consideration of the problem





of a Newfoundland request for U.S. assistance in the maintenance of roads which Newfoundland claimed were used extensively by the U.S. militery. During the first six months of 1951 the proposed arrangement which provided for the maintenance of an additional II miles of roads in Newfoundland was approved and the arrangement was finalised through the Permanent John Board on Defense, Canada-U.S. The Northeast Air Command was notified that the arrangement is now in effect.

Defense of Greenland. On 8 June 1951 U.S.-Danish Agreement covering military operating requirements in Greenland went into effect.

The Under Secretary of Defense requested the Joint Chiefe of Staff to initiate such action as may be considered necessary to forward to the Standing Group of RATO the decisions reached in this bilateral agreement.

International Branch recommended that only the Basic Agreement be forwarded to the Standing Group.

Planning for Inter-American Defense. International Branch
furnished representation to the U.S. Belegation, Inter-American
Defense Board (U.S. Del-IADE) and participated in the following planning
and policy activities:

a. A U.S. unilateral "Joint Outline For Plan for Latin

America for Wer Beginning I July 1954" was approved by the Joint Chiefe

of Staff in Merch. This plan provides the necessary guidance to the

U.S. Del-IADS in discharge of its responsibilities. The plan also

provides the tasks or missions for each Latin American nation. Acceptance
of these roles and missions by the Latin American countries concerned will

determine the basis for nature and extent of future U.S. military aid to

these countries.





b. With the guidance of the U.S. Del-IADE preliminary bilateral defence planning talks were held in May 1951 by the Joint U.S.-Mexican Defence Consission.

c. As a result of the planning talks held at curry Soights from March 19-2). 1951 agreement was reached between the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the U.S. Commander-in-Chief.
Caribbean, outlining the general area of sutual interest in protection of the cil industry and other strate is materials in Venezuela against external aggression and internal sabotage. The general areas of vulnerability and desirable security measures were outlined. The foregoing aggressent signed ad referendum was submitted to the two governments for approval and is currently being studied by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. A draft multilateral "General Military Plan for the Defence of the Western Hamisphere" similar to the unilateral U.S. Outlined Wer Plan was drawn up by the Staff of the IABB in June. The Director of the Staff of the IABB (a U.S. Brigadier General) was furnished guidance by the U.S. Del-IABB in the formulation of this plan.

o. The Chief of the U.S. Del-IADB rendered the decision that following completion of this multilateral plan for the detailed defense planning for Latin American acceptance of roles and missions will be carried out through bilateral errangements between the United States and Latin American countries concerned.

Fourth Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics (Inter-American Meeting (IAM). International Branch furnished representation on the Inter-Departmental Committee charged



CHARLES BOTH HISTORY



with preparing the agenda, U.S. position and draft resolutions for the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which eat in Mashington March 26 to April 6, 1951.

On the basis of full cooperation between the Departments of
Defence and State, the U.S., as co-sponsor with certain other governments, proposed three draft resolutions, which with relatively minor
changes, were unanimously approved as Resolutions II (Preparation of
the Defence of the American Republics and Support of the Action of the
United Mations), III (Inter-American Military Cooperation), and IV
(Importance of Mainteining Peaceful Relations Among American States) of
the Final Act of the Meeting. The following are regarded as the
principle positive results:

As recommendation (Resolution III) that the American

Republics orient their military preparation so that through self-help

and mutual eid they can (1) increase those resources and strengthen

those armed forces best adapted to the collective defense and maintain

those armed forces in such status that they can be immediately available

for the defense of the continent, and (2) cooperate to develop the

collective strength necessary to combat aggression against any of them.

This for the first time provides an inter-American policy basis for

directing the development of military strength toward collective


defense of the Continent, with military forces utilized in the performance

of specific roles and missions which will contribute to the common

defense.

b. A directive to the Inter-American Defense Board (Recolution III) to prepare vigorously and keep up to date the military
planning of the common defense and to submit plans formulated to the

18 b. Final Act of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign
Ministers is on file in the Pan American Union.



governments for consideration and decision. Emphasis was placed upon the importance of Delegations to the Board maintaining close lisison and consultation with their governments regarding the work of the Board.

c. A recommendation (Secolution III) that the Governments

(I) maintain adequate and continuous representation not only on the

Council of Delegates of the IADE but on the Staff and any other

organ which the Board may establish, (2) actively support the work of

the Board and consider promptly the results of its work, and (3) cooperate

in organizing within the Board a coordinated system of exchange of

appropriate information. Items (2) and (3) should contribute to

improved recognition of the functions of the IADE, to more firm backing

by the Governments, and improvement in its ability to carry out its

functions.

d. A declaration (Resolution II) that (1) the present world situation requires positive support by the American Republics for schievement of the collective defense of the Continent through the CAS. and (2) a recommendation (Resolution II) that, in accordance with the concepts of the U.N. General Assembly's "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, each government isomediately examine its resources and determine what it can contribute to defense of the continent and United Rations collective security efforts, particular attention being given to the development and maintenance of elements of its armed forces which could promptly be made swalleble for those purposes.

e. A declaration (Resolution IV) that observance of Inter-American commitments on non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes among the American Republics makes it possible for each to concentrate the development of its capabilities upon the tasks best



adapted to the role it is best qualified to assume in collective

f. The resolutions contained qualifications intended to indicate clearly that the development and possible use of military strength for common defense shall be (1) in conformity with constitutional processes, (2) in accordance with the countries' own judgment of their capabilities, (3) without projudice to individual self-defense and internal security. The resolution entitled "Inter-American Military Gooperation" (Resolution III) is also tied closely to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

have an important bearing on the objectives and conclusions of BSC 56/2 were those on "sconomic Davelogment" (Resolution XII) and on "Increase of Production and Processing of Resid and Strategic Materials," (Resolution XIII).

h. The Resolutions approved in the defence field having an important bearing on the objectives and conclusions of MSC 56/2 were the ones concerning "Strongthening of Internal Security" (Resolution VIII) and the one concerning "Defence and Security Controls" (Resolution XV).

Advantage was taken of the presence of high level political and military officials of various governments at the Foreign Ministers

Conference to hold bilateral conversations between officials of the

U.S. and representatives of Brazil. Peru, Mexico, Uruguay and Chile.

Although considerable suphasis was placed upon the importance of ground
force contributions to Horan, these meetings also served to more fully





acquaint these governmental officials with the principles and objectives of collective continental defense in accordance with the concepts of MSC 56/2.

Inter-American Defense Sourd (IAMS). The IAMS was given additional responsibilities by the IAM (see above). In the discharge of these responsibilities it directed its staff to proceed with the preparation of adequate plans for the common defens. of the hemisphere. In the period 1 January to 30 June 1951 the Inter-American Defense Sourd engaged in the following activities:

- a. Studied defense of maritime routes.
- b. Forwarded to the American Governments Resolution 26 recommending increased facilities over their coast to avoid danger of sabotage, espionage, or subversion.
- c. Studied formation of system for exchange of information as recommended by Resolution III IAM.
- d. Completed revision of "Satisate of the Situation" on 27 April 1951.
  - e. Drafted multilateral plan for hemispheric defence.

Uniting for Peace Program. The International Branch has participated on a continuous basis in interdepartmental work with the Bepartment of State connected with the implementation of the Uniting for Peace Program. On 25 January 1951, the Director of Plans designated a representative from the Branch to assist in the preparation of any studies and papers which would be required in this field. A State-Defense working group was established in February to process position papers and formulate policy recommendations on action to be taken by the U.N. Collective Resources Committee (CRS) established by the Uniting for Peace Resolution.






The military representatives prepared initial drafts of papers connected with (a) interim measures which might be taken by the United Nations to meet apprecian prior to full consideration by the U.N. General Assembly of the CHC report. (b) bases, facilities, and related assistance which might be furnished by U.N. members in support of collective military action to meet apprecian (prepared by the Air Force member), and (c) personent U.N. mechinary to further the collective security concept. The military members of the group also prepared a paper on the course the United States should follow in determining the relationship between the United States should follow in determining the relationship between the United States should follow in determining the relationship between the United States should heatilities or a localized military action in which a regional organization plays a substantive role.

In addition to the above, the Branch briefed Jus papers dealing with (a) the proposed communication from the United States to the United Nations describing the contribution in forces which the United States is now asking and is prepared to make in the future in support of U.N. action to meet aggression, (b) the panel of military experts established under the Uniting for Peace Resolution to provide technical advice on the organization and training of forces for U.N. service, and (a) military implications of the Resolution.

Connected with the gradual return of Germany to the status of a sovereign European nation. International Branch has proposed papers connected with the termination of the state of war between the U.S. and the Government of Germany and the formulation of U.S. position with regard to the terms upon which we would accept a quadripartite solution (which would include the USSE) of the German problem. On 27 June, International



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Branch briefel a paper dealing with German participation in the defense of Western Surope. The problem was viewed in light of the discussions with the representatives of the Bonn Soverement as to the basis on which the German should undertake represent, and the discussions in Peris on the French-proposed European army. Interactional Branch recommended acceptance of the proposal that the U.S. auntimus to support the concept of a European army but at the same time press for immediate agreement on practical terms for initiating German represent.

First of Fresier leven. Early in February, Premier Pleven of France visited the U.S. for the purpose of conferring with President Trussas. International Franch briefed position papers for these talks dealing with (a) the seams at the disposal of the Vestern Powers to discourage agreesion in Europe on the basis of existing estimates of Soviet forces, (b) strategic delay inherent in the analysis of existing estimates of the Seviet Union, (c) probable intentions of the USSE regarding Germany and the attitude to be adopted as a consequence thereof, (d) integrated NATO forces and the European Army, and (e) objectives to be obtained by the three restern powers during the than-insinent Four-Power Council of Forcign Ministers. The International President Four-Power Council of Forcign Ministers. The International Cranch recommended a position reporting all of these problems which called for a swift build-up of European military forces to include German continguable.

Release of laforention. International Branch has continued to retain briefing responsibility for papers dealing with the release of classified information to foreign mations or their representatives and certain other primarily intelligence matters. Specific papers




on the question have dealt with the establishment of a single U.S. agency responsible for authorizing release of classified information to MATO nations and to other nations regarding U.S. military aid, development of common policies and procedures pertaining to joint intelligence exploitations, and a request from the Central Intelligence Agency for certain MATO documents.

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Brookings Lastitute Seminar. Officers of the International Branch were designated to represent Hq., US. Air Force of two seminars conducted by the Brookings Institute at Philadelphia, Pa. and St. Louis, No. Subjects under consideration at both seminars were collective security action under the U.N. General Assembly and Anglo-American economic relations.

Mediterranean Command. In March, International Branch
participated in the formulation of an Air Force position on the
command organization to be established under NATO in the Mediterranean area.
A memorandum to General White on this question pointed out that Air Force
interest in this area could be reduced to two essential points: (a) the
retention of sufficient flexibility and independence of strategic air
operations through the North African and Middle East bases to insure
unbaspered execution of the strategic air offensive, and (b) the
essurance that all smallable military forces in the Western European
and Mediterranean areas are utilized to the optimum to stabilise Soviet
surface attack.

EATO Defence College. International Branch has briefed and recommended approval of two NATO Standing Group papers dealing with establishment of a NATO Defence College in Paris for the purpose of



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training officers to handle the problems attendant to the development of NATO forces into a unified efficient combat force. The College would include approximately 50 students and would be opened in September 1951.

U.S. Policy Objectives 1953-54. In connection with Air Staff action to propers the basis for determining Ff 1953 force requirements. International Branch prepared an estimate of U.S. policy objectives during the period 1953-54. A supporting staff study was also prepared which surveyed current U.S. policy and military objectives world-wide.

GIVIL AIR BRANCH.

As the Air Staff office charged with monitoring the work of the Estional Security Resources Board Air Transport Mobilization Survey, the Civil Air Branch was occupied primarily with this aspect of the relationship between civil and military eviation. The Reports of the ten Task Groups have now been received and the work of the Survey is completed.

Communier. Nilitary Air Transport Service, was instructed to prepare a detailed implementation plan for the creation of a first and second line civil air transport reserve. This was in accordance with the accepted general concept of the "Douglas Report." Five of the ten Task Group Reports pertinent to the problem were referred to MATS Reciquarters for use as reference material. The others are being analyzed and commented on individually by the Air Staff.

The MATS plan appears to be a sound and workable proposal for meeting military requirements. Through sensible compromise between military and civil points of view, it seems as though solutions have been found to the most difficult problems, reported as outstanding at the end of the last historical period.



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Following review and approval of the plan by Air Staff, it will be referred to the JUS for consideration through the Secretary of Defense. In view of the wartime air transport responsibilities conferred upon him by Executive Order 10219, it is boped that approval of the plan by the Secretary of Conserce can be secured prior to the time it is submitted to the JUS.

Other news worthy projects in which the Civil Air Branch played an important role included the continuing effort, on the part of the Air Force and the Civil Aeronautics Administration to arrive at joint agreed legislation authorizing the integration of that body into the Air Force in time of emergency.

The Civil Air Branch prepared the Air Force position with respect to various proposed bills looking toward the development and construction of prototype aircraft. This position is essence stated that the Air Force favored the development of long-range low-cost cargo type aircraft designed specifically for military surposes and the development of long-range low-cost cargo sircraft designed primarily for nonmercial uses but which could be adapted to serve the military in time of emergency. The Air Force would sponsor the development of the former type under Air Force muspices utilizing especially ser-marked appropriated funds, but would not underwrite the development of the second type aircraft.

The highly controversial question of the separation of sail pay from subsidies involved the Civil Air Branch insofar as the development of the Air Force position was concerned. The position taken was that the disclosure of certain information, should the subsidy question be too closely broken down, would be injurious to the national interest and therefore none should be made public beyond the total paid each carrier.

The Air Force advised the State Department that it could no longer support financially the program for the training of Austrian nationals in aviation techniques but that it would continue to furnish direction through the Aeronautical Airways Communication Service. This program will terminate at the end of the current fiscal year. These Austrian transmess who have completed their training period are to be absorbed into the civil aviation industry in Austria.

The Department of Commerce contracted with Hervard University for a study on "International Civil Aviation Policies as Belated to the Present Emergency." In this connection, considerable information was required from the Arased Services. The Civil Air Branch made the arrangements and participated in the briefings given to the Harvard Group by specialists from the three services. It is anticipated that the final report, when submitted by the Secretary of Commerce to interested government agencies through the Air Coordinating Committee, will have a considerable impact upon national policy with respect to international civil aviation.

### DOMESTIC BRANCH.


The Demestic Branch is responsible for reviewing and recommending Air Staff action with respect to politico-military matters primarily
of a demestic nature. Consequently, the Branch is not limited to
actions of primary interest to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,
but it is concerned with Staff-wide issues including transportation,
personnel, security, reserve forces, intelligence and research matters.
The following resume sets forth the most important Air Staff actions
handled by the Branch during this period.

Utilization of Civilian and Military Paracanal by Alaskan Air Command. On 26 February 1951, certain civilian employees of the Alaskan Air Command politicaed Semator Lyndon Johnson of the Arand Services Committee against AASL 35-32. They stated that this regulation satablished a dual organization doing a single tank and degrived civilian employees of security and stability in that it seriously limited opportunities for advancement by specifically prohibiting civilians from supervising military personnel. They requested that the letter be rescinded.

The high state of combat offectiveness required of the Alaskan Air Command and its extreme importance as a first line of defense is recognized. The Commanding General thereof must be given leavey within approved policy to group his forces as necessary to the accomplishment of his assigned mission. For this reason, his decision to militarize his command through vertical organization was superted with the recommendation that the most objectionable feature of the latter, that is, specific prohibition against supervision of military personnel by civilians, be deleted. On 19 July 1951 this office coordinated on a letter to Alaskan Air Command, setting forth this position.

Enlistment of Aliens in U. S. Armed Forces. The Commenting General, U. S. Mir Torce in Europe, requested authority to enlist in the U. S. Mir Force, at the outbreak of hostilities, certain male and fe ale aliens. He pointed out that the Army already had such sutherity. The Chief of Staff, USAF, requested that the JCS refer the problem of alien enlistments to an appropriate JCS Committee for development of a policy applicable to the three Services.





An ad hoc committee consisting of the Senior Personnel Officers of the Services recommended that a policy statement be issued by the Department of Defence declaring that aliens would not be enlisted in the U. S. Armed Forces "except to meet specific requirements not possible of fulfillment by any other me ms." However, before this recommendation could be considered by the JuS, the Secretary of Defense requested a plan for the utilization of 25,000 aliens as the first step of a possible larger program. This directive resulted in a revised report by the Ad Hoc Committee. The Demostic Branch non-concurred in this report and proposed a slant for consideration by the JUS. The JU returned the report, along with Army, Havy and Air Force compents, to the Ad Noc Counittee for further revision.

The JUS eventually approved the Ad Hoc Committee report which recommended:

a. Approval of a policy statement that aliens could be enlisted when an individual Service Secretary determined that a requirement for such action exists, and;

b. That legislation be obtained which would provide for the Army and Air Force the sens statutory muthority now afforded the Newy with respect to alian emlistments.

The Secretary of Defence, in a secorandum (24 May 1951) to the JOS indicated that while he agreed in principle with the policy statement regarding alien enlistments, he did not concur in the draft legislation. He proposed legislation which he believed ould be acceptable to the Congress. The JCS non-concurred in the lagislation proposed by the Secretary of Defense because:



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a. It is not in consonance with Department of Defense policy statement;

b. It applies to the Army only and does not remove restrictions pertaining to the Air Force:

c. The effect of legislation would be to create a form of mercenary troops — a principle opposed by JCS and SHAPE.

The JCS again recommended that the Secretary of Defense submit to the Congress the dreft logiclation which they had previously submitted to him. He further action on this matter has been referred to Demostic Branch since the JCS recommendations were sent to the Secretary of Defense on 4 June 1951.

Supervision of Puerto Rices Air Matienal Guard. In April 1950, the JCS approved the deployment of a medium bember ment wing to Remay Air Force Base, Puerto Rice, and provided for the transfer of Ramay Air Force Base to Strategic Air Command jurisdiction from Commander-in-Chief, Garibbean. Further, the JCS directed that the Commanding General, Ramay AFB, assume responsibility for the training and logistical support of the Puerto Rices Air Estional Guard. In Movember 1950, the Commanding General, Continental Air Command, was made responsible to Chief of Steff, USAF, for supervision and inspection of all Air Estional Guard units.

The Desertic Branch prepared a recommendation to the Chief of Steff that the Fuerto Rican Air National Guard be resoved from SAG jurisdiction and placed under ComAG for training and inspection. The JCS approved this transfer of responsibilities and the Commanding Generals of ComAG and SAG were notified. (JCS 1936/18)





Demostic Mir Transport Operation. On 1 June 1951, this Branch received a staff study from Military Air Transport Service which recommended that MATS be reassigned the responsibility for domestic airlift so that expended training requirements could be not and required siglift provided at one and the same time. This at first appeared to be antirely logical since Air Material Consend, which was presently performing the domestic mirlift in the form of depot-feeder nervice, had indicated that the present method was unsatisfactory. Commonts were received from interested staff agencies and the reco-emistion was made that MATS be reassigned the domestic sirlift. The paper was returned from Director of Plans for further coor ination. After this was obtained the consensus second to be against giving MATS this responsibility and the recommendation was charged to disapproved. The DCS/O returned the paper a second time for additional substantiation of the disapproval. Monatime General Tunner requested that the paper be returned to MATT for revision in light of the unnettled at the of the current MATS mission and composition.

Hilitary Air Transport Service. Upon the suggestion of the Chief of Neval Operations and as a result of the Joint Chiefs of Stoff inability to decide on the degree of Neval participation in MATS during wartise, the problem of revising MATS mission and composition was referred to the Joint Military Fransportation Committee in collaboration with the Joint Strategic Plans Committee and the Joint Legistic Flans Committee on 20 November 1950.

On 2) March 1951 the JMTO steff in collaboration with the JEPO and the JEPO submitted to members of the Joint Committees JMT 183/1 which was a report on Military Air Transport Service. This paper had concurrence from the JMTO steff and JEPO but the JEPO non-concurred.





The Air Staff was also unable to agree on the paper and the Demetic Branch initiated a staff study to establish an Air Force position on the controversial issues relative to MATS. This study was brought before the Air Force Demotil of Deputies who amended JAT 183/1 in such a way on to give a satisfactory Air Force position. The Air Force paper was published as JAT 183/8. The Army and Bavy each published their positions and a three-way split developed and was published as JAT 183/13. This paper will be returned to the JOH as split views on the subject.

Lend Transportation. In March 1949, the Secretary of Defence approved in principle, the assignment to the Army of the responsibility for the operation of common use military land transportation in overseas theaters. He directed the JCS to prepare the necessary plans. An ad hoc committee prepared a paper which was finally adopted by the JCS in June 1951. This paper provised that the Army was to be responsible for operating and maintaining land transportation in overseas theaters on a non-reimbursable basis for all of the Armst Forces.

Joint Intelligence Divisions. The Army recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the establishment of Joint Intelligence Divisions within the joint staff of unified comments. The Joint Intelligence Committee concurred in the Army proposal and recommended its approval. However, the Demestic Branch, on behalf of the Director of Intelligence, pointed out that Section V. Chapter III of Joint Action Armed Forces, embedded broad principles, responsibilities and doctrines pertaining to operational intelligence in joint commands, and the Air Force considered that this document night well provide the possessory guidance relating to



intelligence matters. Accordingly, Domestic Branch recommended that the Army proposal be withheld from consideration, pending Joint Chiefe of Staff action on the reference Joint Action Armed Forces document. This recommendation was approved by the Joint Chiefe of Staff.

Release of INT Mark & Information. Bomestic Branch recommended approval of a recommendation by the Joint Communications Slectronics Committee that the policy on release of LTV information be liberalised and that certain information relating to the new LTV Mark X system be released to Amstralia and New Zealand, since those countries are perticipating closely in collective defense plans. Actual release of equipment pertaining to the Mark X INT system would be subject to Joint Chiefs of Staff approval.

extension of Suthority to Stretegic Air Command. Domestic Branch, on behalf of the Director of Intelligence, recommended that the Joint Chiefe of Staff extend authority to the Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, to permit personnel captured by the enemy to release military information beyond the existing name, rank and serial number limitation.

The purpose would be to avoid harah or information treatment at the hands of enemy interrogators.

The Services were unable to reach agreement on the desirability of the action recommended by the Air Force, and the matter was withdrawn from consideration. However, the Commending General, Strategic Air Commend, and the USAF Director of Intelligence strongly feel that relaxation of the name, rank and serial number limitation is essential under certain circumstances. Accordingly, the Air Steff currently is preparing necessary papers to re-open the issue and bring it before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for re-consideration.

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Conduct of Field Research Under Combat Conditions. The Army,
Easy and Air Force, in reviewing a proposed policy on the conduct of Field
research under combat conditions, substitted three separate views on this
subject to the JUS. A proposed statement of policy had been presented
initially by the Research and Development Board and referred to the JSSC
for comments and recommendation. The differing opinions concerned:

- a. Designation of the authorities who will approve research
- b. Responsibility to and control over, members of research teams by the theater and appropriate subordinate commanders.
  - c. The routing of research activity reports.

The JCS informally referred this paper ("CS 2139/3) back to the action officers of the three Services with instructions to prepare a statement of policy combining the divergent views. The Demestic Breach continued to monitor the statement of policy presented by the ad hoc committee of action officers. The Air Stoff decided to strengthen the wording of the policy statement to insure maximum freedom of action to research teams, while keeping responsible commanders informed of their findings.

The JGS approved the proposed at tement of policy as revised on 18 June 1951, and forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense who issued it as a directive on 9 July 1951. (JGS 2139/4)

Control of Mactromagnetic Sadiations. On 13 December 1950, the

Jos forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a draft Executive Order designed

to provide necessary control over electromagnetic radiations within the

U.S. in case of air attack. The Executive Order was intended as an interim

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measure to provide the necessary control until such time as legislation could be passed. The projected Executive Order was subsequently re-drafted and approved by the JOS on 30 Merch 1951. At this time, a memorandum was prepared for the Director of Public Relations electing them against any unfavorable reaction from the processed in a lie of large. On the loth of July 1951 the Executive Prior was eding processed through the Bareau of the Sunget and Department of Justice for further consideration.

Joint Action Armed Porces. The joint publication intended to replace the new obsolete "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" progressed to the approval and publication of cortain sections as interim regulations pending the completion of the remaining sections. Upon completion and approval of the remaining sections, the entire publication will be rewritten and published as corrections deem necessary. Chapter III, Section 10, Sub-section 4 "Measures to Prevent or Minimise Natural Interference in Operations" and Section III, Chapter III "Joint Staff" have been published by the Air Force. The U.S. Newy, as executive agent, will publish succeeding sections for the three Services as they are approved. The sections mentioned above and the Introduction, Chapter I and Chapter II have been prepared by the Newy to be published as a joint publication.

Policy on Glearances for Personnel Jerking for Carabactachic Organizations. The Chairann, Armed Forces Security Agency Council, submitted certain proposed criteria for joint use in the investigation and clearance of Department of Defense personnel engaged in Cryptographic Organizations. The Air Force agreed in principle but did not agree with the proposed policy because it established more than one directive to accomplish the same objective. Existing investigation policies were

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considered adequate for all investigations with certain requirements unique to the activity for specified clearance criteria. This step not only standardized procedures within the three Sarvices but reduced the gui ance to perform the necessary investigations to one policy. Efforts are being directed to prevent deviations from this principle in the future.

Pacilities for Astinirgraft Artillery Units. In Asgust 1950 the Chief of Staff, U.S. Apry, concluded certain agreements concerning control of antimireraft artillery units for defence of certain Air Force bases. The Army was prepared to deploy those forces when facilities became available. In May 1951 it was agreed the Air Force would budget for and provide non-tactical facilities at the bases where these Asa units were deployed. A committee composed of representatives from the two Services was designated to form agreements where agreements were considered necessary in defining the terms of this support and providing basis for reciprocal agreements in their similar situations.

Concerning Search and Rescue. The Secretary of the Newy, for more effective utilization of Search and Rescue fectilities, proposed the coast Guard be given the responsibility of the coordination of general Search and Rescue matters. For military ressens the Air Force did not feel the Goest Guard was the proper agency to receive this assignment.

Because the Coast Guard was the proper agency to receive this assignment.

Because the Coast Guard has civilian responsibilities in search and rescue and is assigned to the Treasury Department except in time of war it was felt it should be represented in the coordination effort only and them

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
through the Department of the Navy. A Committee composed of the Army.
Envy and Air Force agreed that the coordination effort was necessary and
recommended that an Ad Noc Committee composed of representatives of the
three Services be appointed to serve in this capacity.

Defourive See Areas. On the Pyth of November, the Commander-in-Chief, Aleskan Command (Classia), recommended that the Chief of Staff, UEAF, request the Freel ent to issue an Executive Order establishing a defensive sea area in the vicinity of the Fort of Chittier, Alaska. CINCAL stated that the security of the Port of Chittier was jeopardized by the lack of control over small vessels in the harbor and requested that the authority for enforcement be vested in CINCAL for redelegation to subordinate commanders.

The Policy Division, after consultation with the Office of the Judge Advocate Conserve, prepared a draft Executive Order and forwarded some to the Director of Legislation and Limison for Later-Service coordination and ultimate implementation.

The draft Executive Order has been concurred in by the Department of the dray, but to date has been unacceptable to the Department of the Envy. This divergence of views, contains on the issue of whether Whittier Defencive Sea Araca should be controlled by the Secretary of Defence or the Secretary of the Envy, has been referred to the Joint Chiefe of Staff for resolution. The draft Executive Order will be subsitted to the Bureau of the Budget as soon as the Join recommendation is received.

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### I. CRGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

# AIR RESUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS WINGS

In the field of Special Operations, authorization was obtained to activate two Air Resupply and Communications Vings in FY 1952, and three additional wings in FY 1953. These wings are intended to provide theatre communders with additional capability to support covert operations and a vehicle for conducting overt psychological warfare.

The responsibility for the activation and operational training of the Air Resupply and Communications Wings within the Zone of Interior was assigned to Military Air Transport Service by letter dated 5 January 1951. The United States Air Force Installations Board designated Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, and assigned the site to MATS for the purpose of stationing and training of the wings as they become activated.

On 7 February 1951, the Psychological Warfare Division advised the Assistant for Air Bases, DCS/O, and the Director of Installations, DCS/M, of the deployment plans for these wings, 2A and requested required facilities be provided to support them in their overseas locations.

To assist in the problem of developing overseas facilities for these units, representatives of the Psychological Warfare Division conducted briefings for the Commanding General, USAFE, and his staff; Commanding General, Third Air Division; and Commanding General, Alaskan Air Command.

Z. Ibid.
 Special Operations case file, AFOPD-PW 322, on record in AFGPD-FW.



Special Operations case file, AFCPD-PW 322, is on file in Psychological Warfare Division, D/Plans.



These commanders and their staffs were briefed on the concept and mission of the wings and the operational requirements peculiar to them.

On 15 Merch 1951, instructions were issued to MATS to activate the 580th Air Resupply and Communications Wing at Mountain Rome Air Force Base, Idaho. The first ARC Wing was organized effective 16 April 1951 in accordance with special T/O's, with equipment authorized in accordance with applicable T/A's.

On 14 May 1951. T/O & E's were published for the specialized squadrone within the Air Resupply and Communications Wings, with the exception of the Communications Squadron. The T/O & E for this squadron is expected to be published in August, 1951.

On 5 June 1951, the Psychological Warfare Division requested that the Director of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O, take necessary action to activate the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho. It was requested the 580th ARC Wing be reorganized in accordance with T/O & E's applicable to the 581st ARC Wing. The strength authorized for these wings is as follows:

Unit	Officers	Airmen
Hq. Air Resupply and Communications Wing Hq. Air Resupply and Communications Group Aerial Resupply Squadron Reproduction Squadron Holding and Briefing Squadron Airborne Materials Assembly Squadron Communications Squadron Hq. Air Base Group	9 167 97 21 260 5 (to be	18 72 328 230 22 127 determined) 83

3. Special Operations case file, AFGFD-FW 322, is on file in Psychological Warfare Division, D/Flans.

Warfare Division, D/Plans.

5. RdR from APGPD-PW to Director, APGNO, Subject: Request for Activation of the 561st Air Resupply and Communications Wing, dtd 5 Jun 51. Filed in file 322 in APGPD-PW.

5. Ltr. DAF, dtd 9 Jul 51, file 322 (ARMO 333g), Subject: (UNCLASSIFIED)
Constitution, Activation and Re-organization of Units of the 580th and
581st ARC Wings.

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Units Supply Squadron Maintenance Squadron Motor Vehicle Squadron Installations Squadron Air Police Squadron Operations Squadron Base Communication Squadron Food Service Squadron	Officers 13 10 5 4 9 10 6 5 27	Aireen 411 186 227 159 145 65 84 246 98

On 14 May 1951, the Air Frowing Ground Command was instructed to conduct necessary tests, with assistance from MATS, to develop recommendations for aircraft modification, operational tactics and techniques. It is expected that the results of this project will be of value, not only to the Air Rescuply and Communications Service, but also to the Air Rescue Service and the Troop Carrier Command.

#### II. ACTIVITIES

### TRAINING

Facilities at Georgetown University were expanded in February, 1951 to permit the enrollment of 113 students under the Air Force Psychological Warfers Training Program. Of this mumber, 56 students were enrolled in a 4-month Psychological Warfers Course at the graduate school. In addition, a 13-week Psychological Warfers Course was begun at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University to meet the immediate needs of the expanded Air Force Psychological Warfers Program. Thirty-two students received psychological warfars training, and 25 students received language

<sup>6.</sup> On record in file 322, Psychological Warfare Division, D/Plans.



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refresher instruction under the new courses.

Upon completing their courses in May, 1951, the students received further specialized training at various service schools, or with government agencies, or reported for duty directly to Headquarters, 580th Air Resupply and Communications Service Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho.

The next class at Georgetown University's Foreign Service School, which began 14 May 1951, was comprised of 87 officers, 15 of whom were enrolled in the language refresher course. Instruction at the graduate school was discontinued for the Summer.

By 30 June 1951, 233 Air Force officers had graduated or were undergoing training at Georgetown.

On 21 June 1951, an Air Force Regulation: Applications for Assignment to Psychological Warfare Duty", was published to meet the continuing requirements of the Air Force Psychological Warfare program. Because of the immediate need for officers in this program, a TWX was dispatched to all Zone of Interior and air commands overseas, directing that the contents of the regulation be brought to the attention of all personnel concerned.

Monitoring of the training program for Psychological Warfare officers at Georgetown University was delegated to Military Air Transport Service and Air Resupply and Communications Service Headquarters by AFR 36-53.

A conference was held at Heedquarters, USAF, 13-15 June 1951, by this office to re-examine the psychological warfare role of the United States

AFR 36-53, Subject: Application for Assignment to Psychological Warfare Duty, dated 21 June 1951.



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Air Force within the Zone of Interior. Representatives from this
Division and from the major Air Commands attended. A full report of
the conference was prepared and copies were distributed to all interested
parties and agencies within the Air Force.

# PSYCHOLOGICAL MARPARE TRAINING MARUALS

On 26 December 1950, this Division established a requirement for four Psychological Warfare Training Hamuels: (1) Briefing Hamuel for Commanders, (2) Orientation Hamuel, (3) Specialized Training Hamuel, and (4) Inter-Departmental Manual.

At an Inter-Departmental meeting held at the Air University, Namwell Air Force Base, 24 March 1951, representatives of the Army, Many and Air Force agreed on the need for training menuals, and special consultants from a master of universities were given the job of determining:

- (a) How meny memorals should be written
- (b) Content outlines for the manuals

The consultants recommended the writing of three, instead of four training manuals, covering the following subjects:

- (a) Visual Media
- (b) Auditory Media
- (c) A Case Book on Paychological Warfare Operations

The Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D. G., was designated as the agency to scritor the writing of these manuals, and the following consultant-specialists were appointed as Project Officers:

- (a) Dr. Wilbur Schrame (University of Illinois) -- Hamual Sn Auditory Media.
- (b) Dr. Sebastian DeGrazia (University of Chicago) -- Manual on Visual Media.

<sup>8.</sup> Winutes of the conference are on record in AFGFD-FW, file 337.





(c) Dr. Morris Janowitz (University of Chicago) -- Case Book Psychological Warfare Operations.

The writing of these manuals began on 14 June 1951, and the first drafts are scheduled for completion by 17 September 1951. Content-wise, the manuals will be directed toward the following audiences:

- (a) Students and trainees.
- (b) Personnel in fields related to psychological warfare, such as public relations, information and education, etc.
- (c) Psychological warfare operators who may have had only limited previous training or experience in psychological warfare.
- (d) Social scientists who may not be aware how their specific skills and talents may be used in psychological warfare.
- (e) Personnel in command and staff positions in the military services.

### PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE GRIENTATION EXHIBIT

Final designs were completed in April, 1951 for the construction of a 40-foot Psychological Warfare Grientation Exhibit by the USAF Exhibit Group, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Deyton, Ghio. Flans for the exhibit were developed by this Division in cooperation with the Directorate of Public Relations, USAF.

Construction of the exhibit was completed in June, 1951, and its premier showing was held in the Concourse of the Pentagon, 25-29 June 1951. USAF Exhibit Group personnel estimated that approximately 28,000 people viewed the exhibit during the period it was on display.

As part of its psychological warfare orientation program, this
Division plans to display the Psychological Warfare Orientation Exhibit at the Air University, Air Force Association and similar veterans





organizations' conventions, and at such public events as the State Fair of Texas.

#### SYNE-AIR NEWS LETTER

In order to keep psychological warfare officers assigned to the various commands, Air Resupply and Communications Service Readquarters, Air Resupply and Communications Wings, and other interested agencies within the Air Force informed about the psychological warfare plans, operations, and training activities of the Air Force, arrangements were made in April, 1951, for the publication of a bi-monthly news letter titled "SYME-AIR News Letter". The first issued was published in May 1951.

### BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARPARE

The Psychological Warfare Division was assigned the specific responsibilities of integrating Air Force capabilities and requirements for Biological and Chemical Warfare into existing and future war plans and of determining quantitative munitions requirements for Biological Warfare and Chemical Warfare to implement approved plans. In accordance with these responsibilities, this Division prepared a separate BW-CW annex for inclusion in the Emergency War Plan.

As a part of this program, a Fanel was established to consider means of accelerating the Air Force EW-CW program and of attaining an operational capability as soon as possible to implement the JCS Directive of 21 February 1951. This Fanel consisted of sixteen representatives from the pertinent

9A. JCS 1837/18



<sup>9.</sup> D/Plans, USAF, Memo to DCS/O, et al, subject, "Biological and Chemical Warfare" (Top Secret), dated 19 January 1951.

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Directorates and offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staffs. The Fanel made recommendations pertaining to the establishment of a BW-CV Center and to changes in Heedquerters, USAF, structure. The approval of the Fanel recommendations by the Vice Chief of Staff vested the overall monitoring of the BW-CW program (including the establishment of suitable supporting field agencies such as a BW-CV center) in the office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, for Atomic Energy. The decision was based on that office's previous experience in expediting the development of new and unconventional weapons. The Assistant for Atomic Energy was authorized to augment his present staff with personnel qualified in the EW-CW field. These changes did not alter the responsibilities of the Air Staff as previously delineated.

A primary activity of Psychological Warfare Division was instigating the establishment of a Panel on EW-CW discussed above. The action of this Panel was considered to be the most effective means of solving the problems associated with accelerating the EW-CW program. Personnel of the Division served as Secretary of the Panel and as Chairman of one of the Panel Committees.

A detailed study of the feasibility of anti-crop missions other than those against wheat and rye was initiated. At the end of the period, the study had not progressed sufficiently to conclude that such attacks could compete with other missions for aircraft priorities.

With the assistance of personnel from other staff agencies, orientation briefings on the Air Force BW-CW program were given to: Headquarters,

<sup>10.</sup> Vice G/S, USAF, Memo to DGS/O, et al, subject, "Biological and Chemical Warfare" (Top Secret), dated 20 June 1951.



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Strategic Air Command; Heedquarters, Tactical Air Command; Air War College; Chief, Army Chemical Corps; and Inspector General, Headquarters, USAF.

Each of these briefings was tailored to emphasize the part each of these groupe or individuals would play in the present program, with sufficient overall information to stimulate their interest in the program.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARPARE INTELLIGENCE SUPPLET

At the 27 March 1951 meeting of the JSPD, Shief, Office, Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army, submitted a proposal for the establishment of an Intelligence and Evaluation Branch to provide Psychological Warfare Intelligence support to the JSPD, Army, Navy, and Air Force psychological warfare agencies. The proposal envisioned the Branch being staffed with intelligence officers from the three Services.

on 8 May 1951, Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, AFGPD, DCS/O, advised the Army that their proposal had been studied by the Air Force Psychological Warfare Division and discussed with Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, and that the proposal had not been favorably considered. The USAF recommended the establishment of an ad hoc working-level committee to consider Psychological Warfare Intelligence problems peculiar to the Armed Forces.

Subsequently, an <u>ad hoc</u> committee was established and met on 11 June 1951 to consider and review a general statement of interest on the question of Armed Forces Psychological Warfare Intelligence requirements.

The subject statement, prepared by the Army, was taken under advisement by the Navy and Air Force representatives. The <u>ad hoc</u> committee met again on 18 June at which time both the Air Force and the Navy recommended





a number of changes and additions for inclusion into the general statement. The revised statement will be reviewed prior to its submission to the Services and to JSPD for formal consideration.

A preliminary analysis was made of Air Force Psychological Warfare Intelligence requirements, and after informal discussions between representatives of Psychological Warfare Division and Directorate of Intelligence, these requirements were submitted to the Director of Intelligence on 28 May 1951. One of the recommendations called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee composed of representatives from this Division and Directorate of Intelligence to formulate a feasible plan of action acceptable to both agencies. The first meeting of the subject ad hoc committee took place on 22 June 1951 at which time a proposed plan of action was presented for review. Pive representatives from the Directorate of Intelligence and two from Psychological Warfare Division attended the meeting.

While these steps were being taken to develop a Psychological Warfare Intelligence support program within the USAF and coordinately with
the other Services in April 1951, CIA initiated an informal plan designed to coordinate Psychological Warfare Intelligence support activities of the governmental agencies. The tentative CIA proposal was submitted to the Services on 21 June 1951 and a meeting of Psychological
Warfare Intelligence representatives from the various governmental
agencies was held on 26 June 1951.





### RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The Psychological Warfare Division is charged with establishing the requirements, initiating the research, and monitoring the development of psychological warfare weapons and media. It is further charged with evaluating new ideas for waging overt psychological warfare. Coordination is effected with Army, Mavy and other government agencies in an effort to consolidate and atandardize psychological warfare equipment.

During the period covered by this report, a number of projects were initiated and completed in the development of psychological warfare weapons, media, and ideas, including:

### Leaflets

The use of phosphorescent materials for nocturnal leaflets was developed.

The project for the development of a more durable leaflet was assigned to DCS/N for procurement study.

On 1 May 1951, tests to determine adaptability of Flio-Film for use as leaflets were conducted at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. During these tests, a great many of the Flio-Film leaflets stuck together, or were torn, and proved unsatisfactory under the specific test conditions.

### Leaflet Bomb

At the request of this Division, Air Materiel Command ordered the M-105 Leaflet Boob sodified to facilitate the packing of leaflets.

Field tests were conducted by APG at Eglin Air Force Base to determine the stability of the bomb at altitudes of 30,000 and 35,000 feet. Drops were made from B-29 and B-50 type sircraft at 180 mph indicated sirspeed.





Preliminary reports revealed that the bomb had unsatisfactory stability characteristics from these altitudes.

The new T-60 leaflet bomb (M-17 container cluster) was tested on 1 May at Aberdeen Proving Ground, and good bellistic characteristics were shown up to 20,000 feet from B-29 sircraft at 300 mph. Additional high altitude speed tests were scheduled for July 1951 to determine the possibility of using the T-60 as an alternate interis bomb.

A test program was conducted by members of the Psychological Warfare Division, in conjunction with CIA, to determine the feasibility of fusing leaflet packages for air burst at appropriate altitudes. C-67 aircraft were used at 12,000 feet. Results have not yet been evaluated.

A conference was held with Army Psychological Varfare, Air Force Requirements, and Air Force Research and Development personnel to discuss requirements for T-58 leaflet bomb which is being developed in 'new family' series.

#### Loudspenkers

Several urgent requests were received during May 1951 from Far East Command for the development of airborne loudspeaker equipment for use in tactical aircraft. This request stimulated an investigation of projected and existing loudspeaker equipment, with the following results:

There are several types of lightweight electronic (Public Address)

Systems available. All have very limited range and would be unsatisfactory except at very low altitudes, or in anything but slow flying

limison airplanes or helicopters. This type has been used for commercial
advertising and in Air Rescue Service operations. Air-modulated throattype loudspeakers have been tested in light aircraft up to 4,000 feet

11. Indicates approximate an approximated.

with unsatisfactory readability and directional characteristics. Latest test of AN/TIQ-7 unit was witnessed by Psychological Warfare Division's representatives, June 25-26 at Fort Brags, N. C. ALA-14 type unit, currently used in Korea in C-47 type aircraft, is very heavy and ineffective above 5,000 feet or at high specis. Valuerability of this type aircraft under normal combat conditions would preclude its use. Informal tests are being arranged by this Division in conjunction with University Speaker Company, White Flains, N. Y. to test this equipment in B-25 aircraft. This equipment is a high-power output electronic unit of new design. The University Speaker Company is to supply the equipment for tests at no cost to the government.

### Balloons

Research is being conducted, on a continuing basis, to determine the possible use of balloons for psychological warfare purposes, and various balloon projects throughout the Air Force and other Services are being carefully sonitored.

### Frinting Presses

Regarding the development of printing presses for psychological warfare use, the following action was taken during the period:

Procurement was directed 3 April 1951 for 32, model 128A, Harris Offset Presses by the Air Adjutant General's Office for use by the Reproduction Squadrons of the ARC Wings.

After a study had been made of various types of light presses, requirements for a light press for Reproduction Squadrons were established

<sup>12.</sup> This unit is an air driven loud speaker which employs modulated throat principle.

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23 April 1951, and a procurement request was initiated on 30 June 1951 for two Image Transfer Model LHD-MES lightweight lithographic field presses for operational suitability test with the 580th Reproduction Squadron at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho.

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Several conferences were held with the Air Adjutant General, Government Frinting Office, and with the representatives of press manufacturers to gain information on the relative merits of various types of offset presses under development or on the market, and how such presses might fit the mission of the AHC Wings.

### Packaging Louisment

action was initiated 15 January 1951 for the development of a machine to package leaflets for leading in leaflet bosbs. A conference was held with Air Materiel Command representatives at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 12 April 1951, and it was decided to award a development contract to the New Jersey Machine Company. Action was postponed until 1 July 1951 for budgetary reasons.

### Pedalcorter

A new type flying machine, propelled solely by human power, was brought to the attention of this office by Mr. Charles Paul (its inventor). Interest was shown by JSFD in the further development of such a machine. Action was started through Mayy Psychological Warfare Office, to make US Mayy Lighter-Than-Air facilities available to Mr. Faul for further experimentations with the "Pedalcopter".





### USAF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN ACTION

The Air Force has been actively engaged in psychological warfare in the Eorean warfront and has been contributing to the common effort through the dissemination of leaflets and airborne loudspeaker operations. Air Force Psychological Warfare Officers assigned to the Far Eastern Air Forces are engaged in Air Force psychological warfare planning and participation in the theater joint psychological warfare program, and perform lisison functions between the operational units in the field and the various headquarters in Tokyo concerned with psychological warfare. In addition, the Air Force is fulfilling the air requirements aspect of the Armed Forces covert psychological warfare operations for the theater.

The expanding Air Force Psychological Warfare Program pointed up the desirability of sending a representative from this Division to the Far Eastern Theater to observe and analyze Air Force psychological warfare activities in that theater with a view to: (1) establishing closer limison between the Psychological Warfare Division, Headquarters, USAF, and Air Force Psychological Warfare Officers and units operating in the Far East Command, and (2) increasing the effectiveness of Air Force participation.

The actual dissemination of printed material by leaflet bombs is assigned to a B-29 flight based in Japan. A special flight of C-47's based in Korea disperse the remaining leaflets by hand. Loudspeaker operations are conducted exclusively by the C-47 flight.

Six Air Force Paychological Variance Officers are assigned to the Far Eastern Theater. Three (3) of these officers are on duty with Operations Section, Headquarters, Far Eastern Air Forces; two (2) are assigned to the Far East Command's Paychological Warfare Joint Staff; and one (1) has






assumed an intelligence assignment in FRAF Headquarters as his primary duty. The psychological warfare officers in FRAF Headquarters assist the Theater Air Commander in psychological warfare staff planning, coordination of Air Force participation in the Theater psychological warfare programming and perform limits on duties between the various Air Force units in the field which are charged with the responsibility of implementing the overall psychological warfare dissemination phases of the program. In addition, these officers give close attention to the development of technical needs of the Air Force in the field through Far East Air Materiel Command.

Inasmich as very few leaflets are disseminated by artillery shells, the responsibility for the strategic and particularly the tactical dissemination of printed psychological warfare material rests with the Air Force. Approximately 500,000,000 leaflets have been disseminated since the beginning of the war in Korea. The average weekly leaflet drop for the period covered by the vicit of this Division's representative was 14,000,000. The modes of airdrop utilized were approximately as follows:

(1) 4,500,600 per week dropped by B-29's from Japan over targets near the Talu River and over areas in Korea which were operationally untenable for the unarmed C-47's, (2) The remaining 9,500,000 leaflets were dropped by the C-47 flight based in Korea. These operations were usually of a tactical nature in support of and exploiting current situations along the battle front.



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### MOBILIZATION DIVISION

With the publication of Volume II of the USAF Mobilization Plan on
10 January 1951 and Volume III on March 1951, a series of presentations on
AFMOP were given to the Air Staff covering analysis of the planning procress,
the data in the plan, the uses of and applicability of the completed plan to
Air Force planning and programming. As a result thereof work on AFMOP continued with changes and revisions being made as occasions arose.

The proposed Fiscal Year 1952 MDA Program was successfully defended through Bureau of the Budget Hearings and is now before Congressional Committees. Representatives of this Division serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ad Hoc Committee On Programs of Military Assistance, prepared the Air Force portion of the military basis, which determines in broad terms the amounts and types of requisite equipment.

The Emergency War Plan with a D-Day of 1 July 1951 was completed during this period. Planning factors, assumptions and force tabs were furnished to all responsible Air Staff agencies for use in computation of support requirements and publication of the complete plan in final form.

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### MOBILIZATION PLANS BRANCH

Mobilization planning proceeded under the priority established by the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff on 16 December 1950. Planning officers within the Air Staff worked on an overtime and weekend basis to accelerate Completion of AFNOP 2-51.

- a. Volume II of the plan was published on 10 January 1951 and distributed to the Air Staff.
- b. Preparation of Volume III continued with publication occurring on 15 March 1951. This document was also distributed to the Air Staff.
- c. Following completion of these two volumes, Volume I was completely revised. Many appendices were rewritten, and Part III which contains an analysis of the plan, was included in this final version. This revision was published on 30 April 1951.
- d. On 23 May 1951, the Chief of Staff approved AFMOP 2-51 for planning purposes. The sets of three volumes were then distributed to the Joint Staff, the other two Services, the Air Staff, and the major Air Force commands both overseas and in the Continental U.S.
- e. Simultaneous with the distribution of the completed plan, a series of presentations on AFMOP 2-51 were given. This briefing was an analysis of the planning process, the data in the plan, the uses of the plan, and the applicability of the completed plan to Air Force planning and programming. This presentation was given to the Director of Plans, the Air Force Council, the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Directors





of the Air Staff, the Mobilization Planners Group, the Staff of USAFF, the Staff of the Third Air Force, and other interested members of the Air Staff, HATS, and AMC.

This office became actively and extensively engaged in preparing material for defense of Air Force programs before the Eureau of the Eudget. Working with war Plans Division and other Air Staff agencies, this branch developed requirements for combat units, aircraft, and personnel. During this work, the so-called "Finletter Forces" were developed.

On 1 March 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the preparation of Service mobilization plans in accordance with a joint schedule. The Air Force plan was given the short title of AFMOP-52. This is the first "Requirements" mobilization plan undertaken by the Air Force.

a. Because of the emphasis placed by the Joint Staff on the preparation of joint campaign or operational plans, liaison was established by the working level of the three Services to expedite preparation of these plans. This branch was made the liaison office for the Air Force.

b. This office prepared a directive to the Air Staff informing the Staff of the joint directive for development of AFMOP-52. It also directed the re-establishment of the Mobilization Planners Group and preparation of AFMOP-52 by a procedure similar to that for AFMOP 2-51.

c. Work was begun immediately on the development of the policies, missions, factors, and assumptions for the new plan. In some instances, this amounted to minor revisions to material prepared for AFMOP 2-51. Many other areas required extensive refinement and enlargement. Preparation of these data, therefore, became a major workload for this office.





d. Parallel with the development of new planning data, a planning procedure and time-phased steps were set up for the new plan. This was accomplished by means of the Mobilization Planners Group.

The Troop Basis for FEWP 1-51 was propared by this office by modification from the one in Volume II of AFMOP 2-51.

A new concept and planning procedure for development of FEMP 1-52 evolved in the Air Staff, and this office worked closely with Mar Flans Division in preparing this new procedure and new format for the published plans.

- a. In keeping with this concept, the work was initiated to develop the planning policies, missions, and assumptions for this plan.
- b. Also, a new format was developed for the Emergency War Plan incorporating elements of the mobilization plan and emergency war plans.

Personnel requirements for a long-range Peserve Force Program were estimated and presented to the Air Force Council. Long-range requirements for reserve units were subsequently developed by this office for the Smith Committee.





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#### FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE BRANCH


At the outset of the year, two major problems confronted the Foreign Military Assistance Branch in advancing the objectives of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The first problem centered around the refinement and consolidation of two FY 1951 programs into one firm program! on which definitive production plans and delivery schedules could be based, and the development of these plans and schedules to a point at which it was reasonable assured that accurate supply factors could be derived for the provision of supporting equipment and spare parts. The second problem was the formulation of the proposed MDAP for FY 1952 to be presented to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Congrass. USAF representatives from this branch serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ad Hoc Committee on Programs of Military Assistance, prepared the Air Force portion of the military basis, which determines in broad terms the amounts and types of requisite equipment. Every effort was made to insure that the material matched insofar as possible the size, composition, and rate of build-up of the air forces required for the defense of the North Atlantic Area, the Middle East, and the grant aid countries in the Far East.

In the period covered by this summary, both the foregoing problems were satisfactorily resolved. Substantive programming data was secured, correlated by this branch, and made available to material agencies engaged in supply requirements computations.

This period also marked the real start of active operations—the building and expansion of pipe lines to carry military weapons to our Allies in



MDA Program FY 1951 USAF (Filed in AFORD)





### LOGISTICS ANALYSIS BRANCH

AFERP 1 July 1951. The Emergency Mar Plan with a D-Day of 1 July 1951 was completed Juring the period of this report. .

Flanning factors, assumptions and force tabs were furnished to all responsible air staff agencies for use in computation of support requirements and publication of the complete plan in final form.

Although more complete in detail than previous plans of this type AFERF 1 July 1951 did not include area deployment of aircraft nor did it specify series of aircraft to be deployed. However, while work was being done on this plan consideration was given to including these details in succeeding plans and many decisions of a policy nature and statistical methods were worked out which would later facilitate the inclusion of this detail. This was of particular importance because the Mobilization Branch was concluding preliminary planning to publish the succeeding emergency war plan (1 January 1952) in a form similar to AFMOP 1-51. A tentative decision had been made to distribute AFEWF 1-52 to the field in order to receive comment and guidance from the major commands. This made it vital that as much information as possible be included in the preliminary planning stages (preparation of force tabs) in order that the detailed information based upon these force tabs would be usable by the major air force commands. The 1 July 1951 EMF force tabs contained more detail than previous emergency war plans in many respects. They were divided into three sections as follows: Section I showed deployed units including combat wings of aircraft, miscellaneous squadrons in support of these wings, Guided Missile units and ACAN and tactical control groups.





Section II repeated the same information for units in training and enroute to combat theaters. Section III showed the CCTS units and sireraft required to maintain the deployed forces in Section I. This included aircraft required to support miscellaneous squadrons as well as the combat wings.

Intermediate Range War Flans. Strategic guidance for intermediate range war planning was furnished the Logistics Analysis Branch in three forms prior to 1 July 1951.

JCS 1800/137 revised JCS 2143/6 D-Day from 1 July 1954 to 1 July 1952. JCS 2143/6 envisaged a 95 group strength on D-Day. This was unchanged by JCS 1800/137 and the peacetime program was accelerated to meet the 95 group D-Day strength by 1 July 1952. Both 2143/6 and 1800/137 were capability plans. In these plans the number of deployed groups decreased in the early stages of the war and then increased as production accelerated. The decrease in numbers of aircraft and planned decrease in the number of groups deployed in the early stages of this war required the deactivation of bases and the attendant transfer of personnel. Within a relatively short time as production increased and the number of deployed wings increased the bases were required to be reactivated and the personnel reassigned.

Following completion of the force tabs for 1800/137 it was indicated by Mr. Finletter that the number of deployed wings should not be reduced.

This was a requirements plan, one of whose purposes would be to furnish guidance for mobilization sireraft production schedules. The Logistics Analysis Branch rewrote the planning factors and assumptions and force tabs to reflect this new strategic concept. A sufficiently detailed analysis





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was made to arrive at the required production schedule to support this concept. However, series of sircraft was not defined and area deployment was not made in the initial stages of this plan, as a result the plan was not acceptable for use in completing detailed support requirements in the logistics planning area.

Prior to July 1951 work was undertaken to define area deployment by type, model, and series of aircraft to be deployed. The initial decision as to logistic areas to be used in the plan was made and work commenced writing force tabs which would show the aircraft deployed to these areas. The necessity of defining series of aircraft to be deployed considerably complicated preparation of the force tabs. However, the results gained more than offset the additional effort necessary.

JCS 1800/147 envisaged the 140 group Air Force starting point on a 1 July 1954 D-Day. A brief estimate of aircraft requirements vs. capabilities of production to meet the forces spelled out in JCS 1800/147 was made early in June of 1951. This flash estimate included type and model of aircraft and guided missiles required for NATO and MDAP as well as USAF but did not include area deployment nor did it specify series of aircraft.

JCS 1800/147 was not the subject of a detailed study by the logistics Analysis Branch and dissemination was not made to the Air Staff for computation of logistic support. As the period ended the Branch continued work on JCS 2143/6 (Revised) 95 groups on the D-Day of 1 July 1952 in order to complete in detail deployment of aircraft by type, model, series and area including guided missiles, ACAM and tactical control groups and miscellaneous squadrons. CGTS and OTU requirements, training requirements and






miscellaneous support requirements were also included.

AFMOF-52. While one section of the Mobilization Flans Branch, Mobilization Division was completing preliminary planning for a capabilities plan based upon the emergency war plan, another section was writing procedures and planning data for a requirements plan to be based upon the JCS 2143/6 (revised) requirements concept. This plan was to be the Air Force mobilization plan and would be completed in datail including all deployments and personnel and material requirements. Flanning for this would be carried on concurrently with the detailed run out of the emergency war plan. Both plans required from the Logistics Analysis Branch complete planning data, specification of type, model and series of aircraft and area to which these aircraft were deployed.

Analysis of Requirements and Availabilities of Alloying Materials for Jet Engine Production. The office of the Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff information indicating that shortages of jet engine materials would require reductions in engine procurement programs and would jeopardize the planned augmentation of the Air Force. During the month of May 1951 representatives of the Munitions Board câled a meeting of the aircraft and engine manufacturers of the United States wherein an alledged shortage of certain alloying caterials for the production of jet engines was discussed in detail. It appeared at the time that a drastic reduction in the capability to produce jet aircraft would result from the shortage of these alloying materials. Since this problem tied in directly with material logistics the Logistics analysis Branch made a study of the situation stated to exist by the Munitions Board and arrived at the conclusion that the findings of the Munitions Board were in error and that





if accurate estimates of jet engine alloying material and jet engine requirements were furnished to the Munitions Board the shortage could be greatly alleviated as the procurement and processing of these alloys could be controlled through proper programming. As a result of a study prepared by the Logistics Analysis Branch which was submitted to the Chief of Staff, USAF, and approved by him, and supported by the Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy, the JCS withdraw their original statement and directed the individual services to furnish as a matter of priority accurate estimates of jet engine alloying materials and jet engine requirements to the Munitions Board.

Procedure was published by the logistics Analysis Branch. The primary purpose of the Standing Operating Procedure was to instruct new personnel reporting to the office in proper methods of going about their work. Care was taken to present the information contained in the SOP in a simple manner and to encourage the user to ask questions of other office personnel.

Reference was made to pertinent publications such as Headquarters Office Instructions and war Planning Factors Manual and the method of procuring these publications was stated. A brief discussion of security considerations followed the introduction to the book after which the organizations and functions of the Logistics Analysis Branch were explained in detail. An introduction to planning policy was included. The book also discussed specific types of work done as a routine matter by the Branch. This included writing of force tabs for emergency war plans, intermediate range war plans, service

\*JCS 1725/113





mobilization plans and methods of establishing USAF policy.

Availability of Reserve Air Crew Personnel, 31 January 1951. During the month of January 1951 the Chief, Mobilization Division, D/P, DCS/O requested of the Chief Planning Research Division, Director of Personnel Planning, DCS/P, information concerning what number of air crews who would be integrated after D-Day of 1 July 1952 would consist of reserve and National Guard personnel. This information was for the purpose of determining the number of individual training type aircraft required during the period of July 1951 through January 1955 in order that an anticipated deficiency in this area could be eliminated by meeting it in peacetime programming as a war reserve.

Army Liaison and Helicopter Requirements for Mobilization, 8 February
1951. The Logistics Analysis Branch requested of the Army monthly
requirements for the build-up and attrition replacement of liaison and
helicopter type units for the preparation of a revised mobilization production schedule based on a D-Day of 1 July 1952 and extended 36 months. This
communication was answered on 10 April 1951 and included Army aircraft
requirements for USAF Army divisions and for international aid. On 18 April
the Logistics Analysis Branch informed the Army that Army aircraft
requirements less international aid were included in the USAF requirements.
It was recommended that the international aid requirements be referred to
the NATO Standing Group for decision because these allied requirements
would hurt production in more critical areas, might be excessive and could
better be allocated to other NATO countries. In replying, the Army proposed





that total Army and international aid liaison and helicopter type aircraft for Army mobilization requirements be used as tentative guidance for wartime production planning without commitment as to utilization by the USAF, Army, or allied rations. Major General Joseph Smith, USAF, Deputy Director, D/P, approved this arrangement reiterating that this information was to be used as tentative guidance for wartime production planning. General Smith also requested monthly Army pilot training requirements to be accomplished by the Air Force be submitted for USAF planning purposes. This matter was not closed by the end of June.

Disposition of Track Gear Tools for C-82 Aircraft, 9 February 1951.

The Logistics Analysis Branch concurred with the disposal of C-82 track landing gear tooling.

MATS Mobilization Program, 26 February 1951. A request from AFAFA concerning data pertaining to MATS workload which would allow that office to compute MATS aircraft requirements was answered stating that workload had not been agreed upon by the three Services and that ferry crew requirements would have to be developed from computation of aircraft input and aircraft losses. The work was deferred until a later date.

Auxiliary Fuel Tank Requirements, 6 March 1951. Assistant for Programming requested data pertaining to aircraft sortic rates, inventory, and ferry movements that would require auxiliary wing fuel tanks for JCS 2143/6 to be used in budget estimates. The Assistant for Programming was furnished with the requested data and was also furnished a formula generally used by AMC computing cost requirements. It was suggested that the use of





the formula would obviate the necessity for the aircraft ferrying data.

Fighter Bomber and Fighter Interceptor Training, 6 March 1951. The Director of Training requested comment as to the effect upon war potential of reduced manning and best method to overcome shortage of training fighter Ecomber and Fighter Interceptor aircraft for SEEDCORN (SECRET). The Logistics Analysis Branch, for the Director of Plans recommended full SEEDCORN (SECRET) manning as a minimum objective and establishment of additional training aircraft production requirements to support SEEDCORN (SECRET).

Disposition of J-35-GE-789 Special Tools, 9 March 1951. The Logistics Analysis Branch concurred with an AMC proposal to dispose of certain production tooling for jet engines. It was suggested that future requests include a statement that known peacetime and mobilization spare part requirements could be met from spare stocks. These engines were installed in the B-45A and F-84B.

Disposition of War Reserve Aircraft, 13 March 1951. The Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, proposed a mithod for peacetime employment of war reserve aircraft and requested comment. In order to complete formulation of policy, Logistics Analysis Branch recommended three methods of maintaining the war reserve:

- a. Maintaining aircraft on flying status with air reserve forces.
- b. Allocating sircraft to TOAS requirements.
- c. Storage with periodic processing through base maintenance.

  A spare parts reserve of peacetime stock level plus 6 months of wartime operations based on the intermediate range war plan was recommended.





Aircraft Reclamation Program, 16 March 1951. In answer to a proposed program of reclamation by the Assistant for Programming the Logistics Analysis Branch stated the proposed program evidentally did not provide for aircraft required by JCS 1960/9, AP OF 2-51, or planned MDAP requirements. Recommendation was made that no aircraft with any effective combat potential be reclaimed until replaced by modern jet reserve aircraft.

Assumptions and Planning Factors for JCS 2143/6, April 1951.

Proposed revisions to the planning factors for JCS 2143/6 began to reach the Logistics Analysis Branch early in April from the Air Staff agencies to whom they had been disseminated for comment. The comments were retained in Branch files for consolidation and ultimate revision of JCS 2143/6 planning factors prior to commencing work on the requirements plan for area deployment by type, model, and series of aircraft.

First and Second Line Aircraft, 10 April 1951. The Logistics Analysis Branch recommended a member of the Directorate of Flans be assigned to a First and Second Line Aircraft Board.

Aircraft Requirements for 21 Evacuation, 12 April 1951. Authorization for the inclusion of air evacuation squadrons in force tabulations was granted by the War Flans Division, D/P, DCS/O. Allocations were included in the estimated NA-6 production schedule.

Operational Flanning Unit Training Factors, 13 April 1951. The Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of Training were requested to reconsider certain proposed factors concerning CCTS and OTU training which would operate to reduce the number of aircraft available for deployed forces.







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
Procurement of Aircraft Reserves, 24 April 1951. The current war reserve aircraft requirements were submitted to the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O. These requirements were established jointly with the White Team, D/P.

Joint Outline Emergency War Plan, 11 May 1951. In compliance with the request from the War Plans Division for espability force tabulations for war beginning 1 July 1951, force tabs were completed, reviewed, and found acceptable by the Red Team, JLPC, and JLPG.





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DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER AND ORGANISATION DCS/O - HEADQUARTERS USAF JULY 1951 -PREPARED FOR THE HEADQUARTERS USAF HISTORICAL PROGRAM By: ROBERT W. BOWLES, Colonel USAF Executive Officer, AFOMO Assisted by: WALTER J. MACHTWEY, 1st Lt USAF Historical Officer, AFOMO APPROVED: ASTEC-3785

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### FORWARD

The first portion of Section I of this History, captioned
"Organization and Functions - General", is a copy of a brief which
provides a digest of the basic grouping and arranging into one while,
of the dependent parts of the Directorate, and of the performance of
duties of those parts and of the whole.

This brief fulfills a portion of the basic requirements of the purpose of compiling histories, namely; to "Serve as a manual for the indoctrination of key military and civilian personnel of the head-quarters."

Portions of the Directorate History were obtained from the various Divisions within the Directorate. The Divisions, in turn, obtained information from their various branches and sections.

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### SECTION I

### Organization and Functions

#### GENERAL:

This discussion of the organization and functions of the Directorate aims at providing, in frief form, a general overall picture of what actually these place in the day-to-day operations. It is not, by any means, a complete discussion with respect to all the technical details, a knowledge of which is necessary to a thorough understanding of the activities of the Directorate.

One way to present this discussion would be to take each segment of the Directorate organization and explain in detail what its functions are. However, this kind of an approach does not provide a real insight into how the Directorate operates and how the various segments are woven together in accomplishing the basic mission or objectives. A more meaningful approach is to isolate basic objectives, recognise the cycle - type of operations that take place, and show how the various elements of the organizational pattern contribute or condition this cycle.

After considering all the various activities and functions of the Directorate, it becomes quite clear that there are three basic objectives toward which all operations are directed, that is:

- 1. To determine military and civilian personnel requirements of the Air Force.
- To make sound allocations of authorized manpower to organizational segments.
- To assure that manpower resources throughout the Air Force are utilized effectively and efficiently.

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In striving to accomplish these objectives, all operations or activities center around the programming and allocations cycle. That is, in one way or another, everything done in the Directorate contributes to or conditions what goes on in this process. Since any cycle-type operation is something like the chicken and the egg proposition, we have to start somewhere. For our purposes, in this general type of discussion, it is accurate enough to assume that the Troop Program covers a period of one year and that our cycle starts at the beginning of that year.

Following the above assumptions, the first step in our operations is to develop a Troop Program for one year - - that is, a document which shows how total manpower resources will be distributed and phased over this period. We must not assume, however, that the job is over at the time the program is produced at the beginning of the cycle. Actually, numerous changes are required during the year because of unforseen conditions. An illustration would be a lag in procurement deliveries and the construction of Air Bases. Therefore, during the year's time, the program is revised to keep up with the conditions as they change.

Once the program is developed, it is then possible to make allocations of military and civilian spaces. If it were possible to produce a completely accurate program at the beginning of the year, the allocations process would be a simple one, because the job would be merely a clerical task of filling out authorising documents in accordance with what appears in the program. However, we can not possibly cover all future conditions; therefore, it becomes necessary, in making allocations to adjust the figures in the program in terms of what the conditions are

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at the time allocations are made. It may be said that this adjusting would not be necessary if the program were kept current. That is essentially true, however, we cannot, at this time at least, alter our program every time changes develop because they occur too frequently. We can summarize by saying that we use the program as a guide in making allocations. Deviations from it are brought about by information we receive from the major commands and from various staff agencies in this headquarters.

So far we have just covered the programming and allocating process in an over-simplified manner. In order to see how everything we do ties in with this operation, it is necessary to take our other major programs and show how their results feed into the cycle.

Since the basis of sound requirements is a knowledge of the elements which go into the Troop Program, a good point to start is with the documents in which these elements are expressed, i.e., Tables of Organization, Tables of Distribution, and Planning Tables. Basically, here at Headquarters, these documents are the tools of programming. If we start again at the beginning of the year for purposes of illustration, we find that the Troop Program was produced by using these documents. If the documents remained unchanged, there would not be any need for considering them during the yearly process; however, as is well known, they do not remain fixed — there are many changes throughout the year. Consequently, the result is that the documents have a continuous influence on the cycle because as changes are made in them, they are reflected in the program. There is another channel through which changes in the documents flow in influencing the programming process — that is, in the way in which they affect the Major Commands in requesting modifications in the

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Troop Program. For example, if changes are made during the year in Tables of Organization, these changes will have the effect of condition ing the modifications asked for by the Commands.

Another function of our Directorate, the results of which feed into the cycle, is the development of equipment authorization documents. This program deserves special mention because of its direct impact on the documents used for programming. That is, it is impossible to produce a manning document and keep it up-to-date without considering the effect of changes in equipment and technology on manpower resources required.

Two other important programs of the Directorate, i.e., Management Improvement and Organization Planning, also exercise influence on the programming and allocations cycle through the manning documents used for programming, in addition to the effect that they exert on the Commands in requesting changes in the Troop Program. To illustrate this point - - if a change in organization structure is effected, for example to the Wing-Base Plan, this change is either reflected immediately in changes in the documents produced here in headquarters or they are reflected after recommended modifications are submitted by the field. The same principle applies to management improvement. If better ways are found to do a job, those better ways, if they concern organization or personnel, will be reflected in the documents that are used in developing and modifying the Troop Program. Therefore, as in the case of the manning documents program, we find that management improvement and organizational planning activitire condition and influence the programming cycle continuously.

Up to this point, no direct mention has been made of how this cycle provides for accomplishing the third basic objective of the Directorate, that is, the assuring that mampower resources are used efficiently and effectively. In order to explain how this is done, it is important to recognize that we are interested in three types of utilization, that is:

- How total manpower resources are distributed among principal functional areas, e.g., combat, support, training and administration.
- 2. How manpower within these basic categories is allocated to and used in the various organizational segments with particular emphasis on quantity, e.g., the allocation to and use of personnel in the organizational machinery needed to provide Air Force training.
- 3. How each individual is used in the work situation with emphasis on both quantity and quality. This type of utilization encompasses the broad field of human relations as it affects the working relationship between the supervisor and the employee.

There is, of course, an element of timing which applies to each one of these areas, e.g., the distribution of personnel among functional areas takes place at the beginning of the process primarily. If we take each one of these areas of utilization separately, it will be easier to see when and how they affect our basic cycle of operations. The first one mentioned was the use of manpower in major functional areas. Its

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influence, as it is indicated above, is felt in the cycle at the time a Troop Program is developed or modified. It is at these times that we must be sure that we are programming and allocating our manpower in such a way that the maximum fighting power is achieved and the bare minimum of support is provided.

The second category of utilization, i.e., use of personnel in organizational segments, exertaits influence on the process primarily through the documents that are used for programming. That point becomes more clear when you consider how these documents are developed and reviewed. It boils down to this - - documents are approved only after it is assured that the minimum manpower for a given function or organizational unit is provided. It is in this area where the major command manpower groups play an important part. In their surveys of organizations, they develop findings and take actions which eliminate management inefficiencies; these actions find their expression primarily in the manning documents that are used.

The third and last category of utilization relates to the use of individuals in the work situation. In this area the primary responsibility is that of the supervisors. It is incumbent upon them to make sure that each of their employees are being used to the fullest of his capabilities. Any improvements in this area are again reflected in the process primarily through the effect they have on the documents used in programming. Important tools used in this area are management improvement techniques and work measurement.

Keeping this outline of our basic cycle of operations in mind, it is now possible to turn to the organization chart of the Directorate

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(TAB "A") and see how it is organized to provide for the functioning in in this manner. First, let us consider the skeleton of the programming and allocations process. By looking at the chart, it will be found that the Troop Program is developed and modified and that allocations are made in the Mannower Allocations Division. We have, therefore, the continuous operations of our cycle in this one division. The appropriateness of the breakdown within this division is apparent when the designations of the branches are considered: Mannower Programs, Military Allocations, Civilian Allocations, and Program Analysis.

Now, in going to the other division of the Directorate, i.e., Organization and Management, it will seem that we have combined in this one division all the activities which provide the tools used in the programming and allocations cycle and which provide a continuous flow of information and data which influence and condition the nature of this cycle. This, again, becomes apparent by referring to the designations of the branches and by recalling the explanation of how some of the results of our activities find their expression in the basic process. The names of these branches are as follows: Organizational Planning, Management Improvement, Manpower Utilization and Manning and Equipping Documents. The tie-in should be pretty clear with the exception of the Utilization Branch. The reason for this statement is that everything done in the Directorate is done in terms of how we can get the best utilization out of our manpower. Actually, it would not be too wrong to say that the name of our Directorate should be changed to the Directorate of Manpower Utilization. However, this would represent an extremely broad concept of utilization which does not reflect the

thinking of sveryone in the Air Force. Therefore, we have limited its functions to the more traditional views on the subject.

The responsibilities of the Utilization Branch are: To conduct the performance evaluation and work measurement programs; to develop manpower survey techniques; to review surveys made by Command Manpower O maps; to make surveys of areas which are "flagged" in performing evaluation studies, in reviewing Inspector General Reports, etc.; to perform research on problems, such as the use of women and physically handicapped; and to answer requests for information on manpower utilization which emanate from the Offices of the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force. While the Utilization Branch is not the only segment of our Directorate concerned with utilization, it does contain the functions which are usually identified with this title. Its relation to the programming and allocations cycle are very similar to the other branches of the Directorate - - that is, the results of its activities get into the programming stream either through the documents used for programming or through the contacts commands make requesting allocations which deviate from the program as it currently exists.

Up to this point, an attempt has been made to give an overall picture of how we operate within the Directorate. Now, it is desirable to touch briefly on the relationships of the Directorate, both vertically and horizontally. It is difficult to provide more than a general picture, in a brief discussion, of our relationships because, frankly, almost everybody from the Office of the President on down to the man at the base is interested in one way or another in what we do. It is

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possible, however, to bring a certain amount of order out of chaos in discussing these intricate relationships by referring once again to our cycle of operations. If we take the programming phase of the cycle, we find that the beginning of program guidance originates in part in the National Security Council. Certain determinations of the Council affect the decisions of the Joint Chiefs with respect to the overall composition and size of our Air Force. To these basic decisions of the Joint Chiefs is added the guidance which is developed by the Air Council and the Assistant for Frogramming.

The Assistant for Programming eventually provides us with the guidance on which we base our programs. But, this is an over-simplification because before a program is actually turned out, practically every Directorate in this headquarters and all field commands will get a chance to voice their views as to what should go into the program. As can be readily seen, we have the job of keeping everyone happy. If we had unlimited resources this would not be too hard. But as it is, we usually end up by not satisfying anyone completely. Be that as it may, we eventually produce a Troop Program which goes out to the field and which is the general guide by which the field operates. If this program did not change, it would not be so bad, but as pointed out above, the field and everybody who participated in the initial development of the program have no difficulty in coming up with reasons why it should be changed. These changes make our job of allocating very difficult in that we can not change the program every time a justifiable change is developed. It is this allocations area where our contact with the field is almost continuous.

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If the programming and allocations cycle, per se, was our only concern, the problem of relationships would not be so difficult. But, there is the phase of the process which was referred to earlier as the activities which condition and influence the cycle. These activities produce another patters of relationships. While most of the results of these activities will find their expression in the program cycle through the tools or documents used in programming, there is a lot that takes place before they get into the cocuments, i.e., there is considerable advanced planning involved which creates a time lag. Let us take a couple of examples - - If we decide to change the wing-base plan, we have to listen to the arguments of practically everyone in the Air Staff and the Major Commands. If a change is finally agreed upon, it will eventually be reflected in the programming tools. Another case would be changes in Tables of Organization. Although we have final authority to approve these tables, we always make it a point of getting the comments of the field and the interested Air Staff Agencies before we approve a major change. This dicussion could be continued for some length on the relationships that exist for each of our programs; however, enough has been said up to this point to show that our relations are by no means simple and that we certainly do not operate in a vacuum. Before leaving this subject, however, there are two more important relation- . ships that should be mentioned. One concerns reports on manpower controls and utilization. At times, we receive numerous requests for information on these subjects from the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force. The other area is the report which we must prepare annually

## SEURE I SECURITY INFORMATION

on the Air Force Management Improvement Program for submission to the Bureau of the Budget. In order to prepare a report that will satisfy the Bureau, we have to check with them periodically to assure that our approach to the problem is proper.

The story on our operations would not be complete without considering some of the things we are striving for in the future, e.g.:

- and quickly. Our efforts in this direction center around the T/O and T/D mechanization programs. Once we get these programs into operation fully, we will be able to produce better programming documents, that is, Tables of Organization, Tables of Distribution, and Planning Tables. With the development of better documents and electronic computation methods, it will be possible for us to turn out a better program in a shorter time. Our progress in this direction is going to be dependent to a large extent on the cooperation and support we get from the field.
- 2. We are currently testing a work-measurement system at a base in the Air Training Command. If this test works out satisfactorily, and we trust and hope it will, we plan to install it at other bases in the Command and in other Commands. Here again, we are dependent upon support and ecoperation from the field. While its successful operation is important to our operations, it should be even more important to the field as a tool to use in determining actual manpower requirements.

- 3. We are going to do all we can to see that the field is not assigned additional functions without the additional mampower required to perform them, or without the elimination of a lower priority activity. Three steps have already been taken in this direction:
  - e. The Chief of Staff has stated in no uncertain terms that this is his desire. He has made these statements to both his Staff and his Major Commanders.
  - b. Our recent AFR 150-5 reflects this type of thinking. (See TAB "B")
  - c. A letter to the members of the Air Staff has been signed by the Chief of Staff which states that all regulations emanating from this headquarters must clear through the Directorate of Manpower and Organization for the purpose of determining whether they generate additional workload for the field.

    (See TAB "C")

In closing this discussion, it should be emphasized that the objective was to provide, in as brief a form as possible, a general overall picture of our operations. If there is an interest in more of the technical details of our operations, Colonel Bowles, extension 75648, should be contacted. He will either answer those questions which may arise or will refer the caller to the proper person within the Directorate.

#### SECTION I

### Organization and Functions

CHAPTER I

Office of the Director:

The organization and mission of the Directorate of Manpower and Organization remained static during the period covered by this history.\*

Major General Edmund C. Lynch<sup>1</sup>, Director of Manpower and Organization was reassigned as Chief, Manpower Requirements Division,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, effective 8 October 1951. Brigadier General Roger J. Browne<sup>2</sup> assumed the duties as Director of this
Directorate on that date. Prior to assuming the duties of Deputy
Director of Manpower and Organization, General Browne had been assigned to JAMAG, London, and had been assigned to the Directorate on 31 August
1951. Brigadier General Aubry L. Moore was relieved from duty as
Deputy Director on 2 August 1951 and departed the Directorate for assignment to the Far East Air Force, to duty as Commanding General of the 1503d Air Transport Wing, MATS, APO 226.

Colonel Robert W. Bowles, formerly assistant executive officer of the Directorate, assumed the duties of Executive Officer immediately upon the departure of Colonel Robert B. Davenport on 6 November 1951.

Colonel Davenport was assigned to Hq FTAF, ATRC.

<sup>\*</sup> See Tab "A"

<sup>1.</sup> See Tab "D"

<sup>2.</sup> See Tab "E"

### Key Personnel: (As of 31 Dec 51) TITLE NAME Director Browne, Roger J. Ellis, Weldon T. Jr. Brigadier General Deputy Director Civilian Executive Colonel Bowles, Robert W. Activation and Records Section Chief Lt. Col. Gallo, Frank P. Organization Management Division Chief Colonel Seebach, Charles M. Deputy Chief Colonel Nuzum, James R. Organization Planning Branch Chief Wasem, Clinton C. Colonel Management Improvement Branch Chief Downing, Leighton F. Colonel Manpower Utilization Branch Chief Colonel Baer, Charles P. Manning and Equipping Documents Branch Chief Graves, Frank N. Colonel Manpower Allocations Division Chief Colonel Wadman, John F. Deputy Chief McChristy, Albert J. Colonel Manpower Programs Branch Colonel Chief Carmack, Beverly E. Military Allocations Branch Chief Colonel Opeil, Charles M. Civilian Allocations Branch Lt. Col. Chief Bailey, William W. Manpower Program Analysis Branch Lt. Col. Chief Beattie, Aldridge N. SECURITY TOPPORMATION

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It is believed that the turnover in Military and Civilian personnel was not excessive. During the period of this history, the turnover in the Directorate was as follows:

	LOST	GAINED
Officers	8	9
Airmen	2	2
Civilian	13	24

Authorized spaces for the Directorate for this period were as follows:

DATE	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
1 Jul 51	98	5	121	224
31 Jul 51	100	5	115	220
31 Aug 51	101	5	115	221
31 Sep 51	103	5	108	216
31 Dec 51	103	. 5	108	216

#### SECTION I

#### Organization and Functions

CHAPTER II

Activation and Records Section:

The Activation and Records S= ion is organized as a section directly under the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O.

This section develops plans, policies and procedures, and takes final action on matters pertaining to the activation, inactivation, reorganization, assignment and reassignment of USAF units. Maintains record of and assigns numerical and/or name designations to USAF T/O and T/D units. Maintains a register of all USAF T/O units (USAF-USAFR-ANG) by designation. Responsible for the preparation and file of DAF (322 Series) letters to include background material for action, and authorizes the constitution, activation, establishment and assignment or discontinuance of all T/O Air Force units; the same actions also apply to those T/D units above wing level.

The section prepares for publication certain Air Force Regulations of the 20 - series (AFR 20-38, 20-62) which governs the constitution, activation, designation, organization, reorganization, redesignation, assignment, reassignment, disbandment, inactivation and discontinuance of USAF T/ORE units or USAF activities. Prepares for publication

Air Force letters of the 20 - series (20-5) which controls the numbering and designation of T/D units. Maintains records of current status of all regular Air Force T/ORE and reserve T/ORE and T/D units. Prepares for publication the organization and personnel portion of Air Force

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regulations of the 150 series, (150-1) as pertains to the change voucher system. Maintains the current authorized strength of the USAF by Major Air Command. Reviews, audits, processes and maintains the official Hq USAF file of all non-T/O&E Personnel allotment vouchers by Major Air Command. Prepares weekly report "Military Troop Spaces Authorized" which reflects T/O&E and non-T/O&E troop spaces Air Force wide by Major Air Command (Student Authorizations included).

The Activation and Records Section was authorized two officers
(1 Lt Colonel, 1 Major) and 7 Department of the Air Force civilians
for the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951. During this period
the following officer personnel were assigned to duty with the section
on dates as indicated:


Colonel William R. Fisher 1 Jul 51 to 1 Sep 51

Lt. Col. Frank P. Gello 16 Jul 51 to 31 Dec 51

Major Robert W. Knost 1 Jul 51 to 31 Dec 51

Major Charles S. Wilson 25 Oct 51 to 31 Dec 51

On 1 September 1951 Colonel Fisher was reassigned to the Air Proving Ground Command and Lt. Col. Gallo assumed the duties as Section Chief.



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#### ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Part 1 -- Office of the Chief

#### ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS:

At the beginning of the period covered by this History, the Organization Management Division had just previously (1 May 1951) been organized. The period covered by this History is one marked by the materialization of the Division functions into a niche in the Air Staff.

The internal reorganization of the Organization Management Division was the result of a finer alignment of functions and responsibilities within the Division. The major change occurred on 1 August 1951 with the elimination of the Manpower Manning Standards Branch (whose functions became a part of the Manning and Equipping Documents Branch) and the organization of the Manpower Utilization Branch.

Toward the end of the History period, the Special Studies

Group was organized for the purpose of conducting a manpower and
organization survey of Headquarters, USAF and the Headquarters of
each Major Command. This Group is under the Direction of Colonel
James R. Nusum, Jr. The Group reports directly to the Director of
Manpower and Organization. Personnel who comprise the Group were
formerly members of the Organization Management Division.

#### MISSION:

The mission of the Organization Management Division is as follows:

- a. Originates and evaluates proposals concerning the USAF organizational structure.
  - b. Assigns functions to major USAF organizational elements.
  - c. Develops and directs the USAF Management Improvement Program.
  - d. Determines the effectiveness of manpower utilization.
- e. Develops and directs the Air Force Manpower Performance Evaluation Program.
  - f. Develops manpower standards.
- g. Exercises final approval over all Manning & Equipping Documents.

The above mission and the missions of the Branches may be found on a Chart of the Directorate of Manpower & Organization dated 1 August 1951. (See TAB "A")

#### ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Part 2 - Organization Planning Branch

In the reorganization of the Directorate of Manpower and Organization of 1 August 1951, the Organization Planning Branch remained in the Organization Management Division. However, the second main function set forth in the Branch history for 1 May 1951 to 30 June 1951, namely: "Determines the qualitative manning requirements, physical and mental generated by the mission and the organization structure" was transferred to the newly formed Manpower Utilization Branch. The personnel who had worked primarily on that function (called special project personnel in the previous historical report) were transferred along with the function.

The function of the Branch was, therefore, left as follows:

- 1. Determines the organizational structure that will most effectively accomplish the mission and reduce to a minimum the qualitative and quantitative requirements for manpower by:
- a. The application of sound principles of organizational management.
- b. Developing plans to the end that each organizational component is a logistic, separable, integral part of the whole organization having commensurate responsibility, authority and accountability.
- c. Developing organizational objectives and formulating policies pertaining thereto.

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d. Reviewing and analyzing mission directives and determines proper assignment of functions to major organizational elements.

The Branch was left with eight assigned personnel and a stenographer. Of the eight, one was at Command and Staff School for about four months. Another was detached and put in the Special Studies Group on 26 November 1951.

The Branch was not organized into Sections, but as one cooperating group. In order, however, to insure expert knowledge of all that pertained to the organizations of the various commands, certain officers were assigned commands as their special, but not exclusive function.

In order to fulfill the various aspects of the function, a statement of implementation was prepared. \*

<sup>\*</sup> See Appendix "B" for detailed statement of organization and of function implementation.

## ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Part 3 - Management Improvement Branch

In accordance with a Memorandum dated 31 July 1951 from Major General Lynch, the Director of Manpower and Organization, the Organization Management Division was reorganized in order to keep up with changing conditions. This reorganization affected the Management Improvement Branch in that the Performance Evaluation Section was transferred to the Manpower Utilization Branch with Lt. Col. Beth transferring with them. The Management Engineering Section, as a separate organizational entity was dissolved and its personnel and functions integrated with those of the Branch. The Section Chief, Lt. Col. John F. Wear, assumed the duties of Deputy Branch Chief.

On 19 November 1951, Col. R. T. Nichols, Jr., Chief of the Branch, was ordered on TDY for 90 days to "Operation Snow Fall." From that date until 19 December 1951 Lt. Col. Wear assumed the duties of Acting Branch Chief. On 10 December 1951, Col. Leighton F. Downing, was assigned to the Branch as its Chief. After an initial two-week indoctrination in the functions of the Directorate, Col. Downing assumed his duties in the Branch.

The functions of the Management Improvement Branch were as follows:

a. Prepare and disseminate written material to stimulate management personnel at all echelons in the application of sound management principles.

<sup>1.</sup> D/MMO Inter-Office Memorandum No. 11, 31 July 1951.

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b. Participate in staff work for the Director of Manpower and Organization on the following committees:

- (1) Defense Management Committee.
- (2) Department of the Air Force Efficiency Awards Committee.
- (3) Headquarters, USAF Manpower Coordination Group.
- c. Review and recommend action on all Air Force Management Engineering contracts.
- d. Serve as a coordinating point for management improvement activity by maintaining contact with the Air Staff; maintaining a file of reference material; and advising management personnel in the field of management engineering.
- e. Prepare reports and summaries of management improvement activities throughout the Air Force.



#### ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Fart 4 - Menpower Utilization Branch

The Manpower Utilization Branch was organized as a separate branch effective 1 August 1951, composed of the following two sections:

- 1. The Mampower Utilization Section formerly a part of the Organization Planning Branch.
- 2. The Performance Evaluation Section formerly a section of the Management Improvement Branch.

This arrangement integrated homogeneous functions and placed more commensurate emphasis on utilization. Effective 22 October 1951, the mission of the Branch was as follows:

#### 1. Utilization Section:

- a. Determines broad qualitative and quantitative requirements for use of WAF, civilian, limited service, indigenous and ablebodied male personnel within the Air Force. Coordinates aspects of utilization of these categories of people with Human Resources, Personnel Policy, Personnel Planning, Personnel Statistics, Physical Standards, Civilian Personnel, Career Planning and Training, and other staff agencies under the direction of CSAF and DCD programs.
- b. Provides guidance to the field on the conduct of manpower studies and promulgates the survey program and surveys.
- c. Responsible for the review of the field survey programs and provides for the inclusion of those recommendations which improve the manpower utilization program.

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- d. Ferforms field audit to determine effectiveness of the Air Force manpower utilization program. Makes recommendations for improvement of manpower utilization systems and policies.
- e. Performs staff coordination and continuity on the field review program of the Directorate.
- f. Performs required studies on manpower utilization within the Air Force.

#### 2. Performance Evaluation Section:

- a. Determines the degree of utilization of manpower within the Air Force. (By relating work accomplishment to the number of personnel utilized in the accomplishment through statistical methods.
- Determines trends in manning functions and organizational structure. (By review of manpower and management surveys).
- c. Develops common workload criteria for use at all levels within the Air Force. (Workload data to be used for developing and revising manning standards, Planning Tables, Tables of Distribution, T/O&E's and for performance evaluation).
- d. Develops new techniques for the use of statistical data, which will improve manpower controls within the Air Force.
- e. Evaluates all manning standards. (Planning Tables, Yardsticks, Factors & T/O&E's).

- f. Develops, installs and maintains an integrated work

  measurement program. (To be utilized in the development

  of manning standards, T/O&E's, T/D's, and Planning Tables).
- g. Performs special analysis as requested by other staff sections.

During this period a more detailed and adaptable mission for the Branch has been developed and is subject to approval. This is set forth as follows:

- Within the framework of national manpower policies and directives promulgated by the Department of Defense the Branch is responsible for developing policies, plans and procedures to insure maximum utilization of manpower resources in the Air Force.
  - a. Conducts research to improve qualitative and quantitative use of Officer, Airman, WAF, Civil Service, indigenous and contract personnel.
  - b. Develops and promulgates written directives establishing Air Force policy, procedures and guidance for the effective utilization of all personnel.
  - c. Field Tests staffing patterns to validate qualitative standards.
  - d. Coordinates the work of the D/M&O with related staff
    offices such as Human Resources, Civilian Personnel, Military Personnel, Personnel Plans and Personnel Statistics
    in all phases of personnel utilization.
- Responsible for continuing evaluation of personnel utilization throughout the Air Force.

- a. Analyzes reports of survey, manning documents, personnel statistics and work measurement data to chart trends by command, by functions and by category of personnel.
- b. Conducts comparative study of manning standards developed by the Mahning and Equipping Documents Franch, against yardsticks, work measurement data and other performance criteris.
- c. Reviews and analyzes reports of D/MAC Field Representatives to supply all branches of the Directorate with appropriate information taken from reports as a guide in developmental staff work.
- d. Supplies statistical analysis as required to other branches of the D/M&O.
- 3. Prepares reports on the condition of the manpower Utilization program throughout the Air Force and of the latest developments in this field for the D/M&O, Office Secretary of the Air Force and D.O.D.

Colonel Charles O. Moody was assigned as Chief of this branch.

On 6 December 1951, he was transferred to the Special Studies Group,
and Colonel Charles P. Baer succeeded him as Chief. Several of the
officers and civilians from the branch were also transferred to this
group.

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#### ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Part 5 - Manning and Equipping Documents Branch

Effective with a 31 July 1951 organizational change, the additional responsibility of the operation of the Manpower Manning Standards

Section was assigned this Branch. The function of this Section is the development, publication, and maintenance of the Manpower Guide,

AFM 150-1.

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
### SECTION I

Organization and Functions

CHAPTER IV

Manpower Allocations Division:

No reorganizations were effected within the Manpower Allocations Division. Colonel John F. Wadman replaced Colonel Allen R. Springer as the Division Chief in July 1951, in the only change which involved key personnel within the Division.



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SECTION II

Activities

CHAPTER II

Activation and Records Section:


The records of the Activation and Records Section indicate that as of 1 July 1951 there were a total of eighty-seven (87) T/OME Tactical Wings, and twenty-six (26) separate T/OME Squadrons. As of 31 December 1951 there were a total of eighty-nine (89) T/OME Tactical Wings, and twenty-five (25) separate T/OME Squadrons. This results in a net increase of two (2) T/OME Wings and a net loss of one (1) separate Squadron.\*

There was a net increase of 16,361 Officers, 323 Female Medical Corps Officers, 129 Warrant Officers, 78,255 Enlisted Personnel, and 14,142 Civilian Personnel in the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951.\*

Several major actions were accomplished during the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951.\*\*

<sup>\*</sup> See Appendix "D" for unit breakdown and totals.

<sup>\*\*</sup> See Appendix "E" for detailed major actions. (All of the listed actions are contained in DAF letters of the 322 Series, with effective dates as indicated in the appendix. Copies are available in the permanent records of this Headquarters).



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## ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Part 1 - Office of the Chief

Although the Office of the Chief, Organization Management Division, is primarily organized as a supervisory and administrative office, one operational development is being conducted by personnel of the Division Office.

Colonel Charles M. Seebach, Chief of the Organization Management Division, has sparked a drive to incorporate a work measurement system throughout the Air Force. Colonel Seebach has given this project priority attention and is at the present time conducting pilot studies and experimentation at Williams Air Force Base.

He is assisted by Mr. Leroy H. Mantell and Captain Harry W. Clement.

A History of Work Measurement in the Air Force to date is included as Appendix A.

The activities of the Branches of the Organization Management
Division are included in the individual Branch Histories which follow.

### ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Part 2 - Organization Planning Branch

The Branch dealt continuously with organizational problems of varying importance and magnitude. In each case it viewed the problems in accordance with well-established principles of organization. It attempted, also, to insure flexibility of organization and to insure strong central control and maximum possible decentralization and authority.

Some of the more significant projects are listed below:

### A. Missions of Air Force Organizations

(A continuing project - - - Project Officer - Lt Col Leslie)

PURPOSE: To review and analyze mission directives and determine proper assignments of functions to major organizational elements.

OBJECTIVES: Prevent duplication and overlapping in mission directives of major commands. Insure that all functions that have been assigned to USAF are reassigned to a major organizational element of USAF.

### B. Study for Dr. Learned's Committee on Manpower

(A completed project - - - Project Officer - Maj E. T. Reichert)

This was a study made in connection with the Manning and Equipping Documents Branch to delineate what echelons and what functions could be deleted or combined, and possible reductions in manpower. The resulting report recommended: reducing the spaces authorized a Wing, eliminating the Air Division Headquarters, connecting all numbered Air Force Headquarters to a proper T/O, converting major air command Head-

quarters to a planning, policy and guidance Headquarters and eliminating or reducing authorized spaces in vertical functional areas.

The report itself is classified. Some of its recommendations have been implemented; certain others are still under study.

#### C. USAF Organization Manual

(An inactive project - - - Project Officer - Lt Col J. W. Cook)

This project has as its objective the preparation for publication of an organizational manual containing the basic principles,
concepts, policies and philosophy of organization of the USAF. Unfortunately the project is now dormant as the project officer has been
assigned to the higher priority Special Studies Group.

He had completed drafts of the following sections: Chapter I - Introduction.

Chapter II - Authority, Mission and Functions of the Air Force.

Chapter III - Principles of Organization.

Chapter IV - Air Force Organizational Policies.

Chapter V - Techniques of Organizing.

Copies of the uncorrected drafts of this project are on file in the Organizational Planning Branch.

### D. USAF Logistic Structure in Europe

(A continuing project - - - Project Officer - Lt Col Kelly)

Continuing study is being made of the organizational structure
for logistics in Europe. No final action as yet.

### E. Reorganization of CONAC

(A completed project - - - Project Officer - W/C Burgess)

This project had as its purpose the study of CONAC organization to determine what effect the Smith Plan and the 138 Wing Program would have on it. The study was made in cooperation with CONAC. CONAC is to have approximately 27 Air Reserve Districts to handle Reserve activities. Headquarters for four such districts, geographically distributed, have been activated on an experimental basis. It is expected that the information gained from these districts will assist in determining the organization, capability and personnel requirements for future districts.

These Districts are to operate on an experimental basis for one year to determine capability and structure of future districts and to indicate the number that may be required.

## F. Organisation of Air Staff to Handle Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP)

(A functional project - - - Project Officer - Mr. A. E. Pierce)

This project was a study made at the request of Mr. Sweeney,

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Management. Its

purpose was to determine the way in which the Air Staff is organized and
functioning in relation to MDAP, and to determine problem areas needing

further study or correction.

Generally speaking, the Air Staff functions for MDAP in the same manner as for regular USAF activities. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations is the focal point for the Air Staff. He has delegated the function to the Director of Plans, Mobilization Division, Foreign Military Assistance Branch. That Branch is the contact with OSD. It is charged, too, with the coordination of Air Staff efforts.

The problem areas are chiefly in the following:

- 1. Coordination of USAF program and activities with those of MDAP.
- Complete recognition of Air Staff and Commands of the vital importance of MDAP and its impact of USAF.
  - 3. Inadequate programming data.
  - 4. Uncertainty of funds and lack of firm program.


The report was submitted to Mr. Sweeney on 14 December 1951.

It has been returned, and is now in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Staff for further study and action.

G. AFR 20-15 - "Organization of Air Force Combat Wings" (An Active Project - - Project Officer - Maj Reichert)

The Branch, with the assistance of the Air Staff and the major commands, is continuously studying the Air Force Wing in order to bring about improvement. The present regulation stipulates organizational structure and the placement of functions in some detail. It is designed primarily for the Combat Wing. It has been necessary to allow deviations and, in the case of Training Command, to develop a separate regulation, AFR 24-2, "Organization of Air Force Training Wings".

As a result of the study, a proposed AFR 20-15, "Organization of Air Force Wings" is in the preliminary stages of coordination. It is hoped that the proposed regulation will provide a basic pattern that will allow sufficient latitude to meet the needs of the various commands, but at the same time give uniformity of similar organizations within each major air command.



### H. Air Force Mobilization Plan

(A continuing project - - Project Officer - Lt Col Leslie)

One of the continuing functions of the Branch is to provide representation on the Mobilization Group. The function of the Branch in connection with the Group is as follows:

- 1. To design command and organizational structures for all combat and support commands.
- 2. This is to include charts for each phase of buildup. Charts to include all units down to Wing level. The mobilization plan is revised annually.
- In non-standard wings, indication should be made of composition of Wing
- 4. Basic information is obtained from "Force Tabs" which are issued by Mobilization Branch of Directorate of Operations.

### I. Delegation of Operating Functions - ATRC

In order to reduce routine, operational details in Headquarters Air Training Command, that command made an exhaustive study to determine which of those details could be performed at subordinate levels.

Of the 135 routine functions that the study felt could be delegated,

95 are required by USAF directives to be performed at command level.

Delegation of these would require deviation from or changes in the directives.

Training Command sent the study with recommendations for action to Headquarters USAF. The Assistant Vice Chief of Staff made the Director of Manpower and Organization the action agent, and the letter

delegated the project to this Branch.\*

The recommendations of the study have been reviewed by the Air Staff and by affected major commands. At present 62 of the recommendations have been approved, 17 disapproved, 5 more may be approved and the remaining 11 are still being studied.

The results of the study will have Air Force wide implications.


It is hoped that it will result in greater decentralization, more effective operation and savings in manpower.

### J. Reorganization of Strategic Air Command Combat Wing

(A completed Project - - - Project Officer - Maj Reichert)
On 5 January 1951, permission was granted for SAC to service
test a proposed Wing-Base organization in place of the organization
prescribed in AFR 20-15, "Organization of Air Force Combat Wings".
The major reason for the change was to increase the mobility of the
Combat Wing.

On 13 October 1951, SAC, in a letter to the Director of Manpower and Organization, stated that the service test indicated the
suitability of the new organization, accompanying the letter was a
proposed SAC Regulation 20-15, with a request that it be approved.
This Branch studied the regulation and coordinated it with the Air
Staff. On 13 December 1951, a letter of approval, with specific instructions, was forwarded by this Branch to the Vice Chief of Staff
for signature. The letter was singed and sent to SAC on 17 December
1951.

\* See Appendix "C"




The details of the new organization are set forth in the R&R sent to the Air Staff on 23 October 1951 with its attached letter from SAC and the proposed regulation. This correspondence is on file in the Organization Planning Branch.

The major changes are:

- The wing organization consists of the wing headquarters, only one group, the Air Base Group with light squadrons, and the tactical and maintenance squadrons which are assigned directly to the Wing Headquarters.
- 2. The Commanding Officer of the Air Base Group will be designated the Installation Commands.

#### K. Reorganization of Air Defense Command

(An inactive Project - - - Project Officer - Lt Col. Leslie)
On 4 October 1951 Air Defense Command submitted a proposed
reorganization. This was the result of the Commander's Conference at
which the Chief of Staff informed the commanders that they must operate
within certain ceilings and were to submit proposals that would enable
them to do so. The proposal was based on the command being relieved
of the mobility requirement as far as the Wings are concerned, thus
eliminating the present Wing Base requirement. The plan called for the
elimination of all group headquarters and to have operation on a separate squadron basis. Each fighter wing was to be inactivated and a new
defense wing activated to handle all fighter squadron administration.
The Air Division is to control all operations and functions as the area
controller.



This Branch, with the assistance of ADC personnel, briefed the Air Staff on the proposal. A letter authorizing the reorganization was coordinated by the Air Staff and sent to ADC on 22 December 1951.

#### EVALUATION:

It is felt that much of a constructive nature has been accomplished by the Organization Planning Branch during the past half year.


Certainly the functions of the Branch have been more completely and widely implemented than can be shown in an historical report.

Net, we are not satisfied. We feel that we should be at work on more of the long range projects, such as the Organizational Object—
ives of the USAF and the U SAF Organization Manual. We should be
getting to the field record often to see organization problems at
first hand, to see how some of those problems are being solved and to
help in solving some of them. It is felt, too, that, in some instances,
the Branch is not having its assigned voice in organizational struct—
ure or the placement of functions.

Some of the difficulty probably lies in inadequate planning on our own part. We are sure, however, that the following are important causes:

- 1. Insufficient officer personnel for handling projects.
- 2. Insufficient elerical help.
- 3. The necessity for spending an inordinate amount of time on putting out small and sometimes inconsequential fires, rather than working on bigger and more important projects.

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## SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

#### ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Part 3 - Management Improvement Branch

Management Engineering Services:

As indicated in one of the Branch responsibilities is the review and analysis of all requests for management engineering services.

Following are some of the highlights of the projects received by this Branch for pre-negotiation approval during the period covered by this history.

A. Packaging and Preservation:

On 30 July 1951, Air Materiel Command requested that this Headquarters grant pre-negotiation approval on a proposal to hire a team of industrial engineers to study Air Force equipment to determine whether or not they may be grouped in categories having the same packaging and preservation characteristics.

Investigation by the Branch of this request led to the conclusion that final results of this contract were vague; the requesting office seemed unsure of the end results of this study; and, the request was not sufficiently detailed. In view of the cost (\$150,000), it was felt that there were too many questions which could be raised to allow approval of this study.

While the requesting office prepared a new submission, the Branch continued its investigations of this area. It was discovered that other government agencies were working on this same problem and that certain industrial associations were also interested in these problems.

Letter from Air Materiel Command, (MCPPXG55) dated 30 July 1951 to the Director of Manpower & Organization, Hq U SAF, Subject: Request for Approval to Negotiate Management Survey Contract Under AFR 150-6.

On 19 December 1951, a statement of the work to be performed under this contract was submitted by the Air Materiel Command Packaging Officer. This amplification of the previous request is currently under study by this office and the Air Staff and no decision has been reached as yet.

B. Military Personnel Records:

On 20 July 1951, Mr. W. R. Sweeney, Deputy Assistant Secretary, sent a Memorandum to Col. Nichols requesting information on a contract which the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Zuckert, had previously approved:

"About a year ago, Mr. Zuckert approved a contract to be let by the Human Resources people for research on Air Force personnel records.

"To date, he has had no reports on what is happening on this contract.

"Since this is a management engineering-procedures research type of activity, would you undertake to get a report on what has been done, what is being done, and what is proposed to be done on the project?"

An R&R requesting this information was sent to the Human Resources
Division, Directorate of Research and Development, DCS/D. The reply
from the Human Resources Division brought out the information that Phase I
of the Project, an analysis of presently-used forms and the procedures
for their use, had already been completed; that the Human Resources
Research Institute at the Air University was considering placing a contract for Phase II of the Project, the design of new forms; and, that

Memorandum dated 20 July 1951 from W. R. Sweeney, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Management) to Colonel Nichols.

HRRI plans called for installation of the newly designed systems during the fall and winter of 1952. The Human Resources Division requested a reaffirmation of an original decision that contracts let in support of this project are "research" contracts, rather than "management" contracts.

In a memorandum to Mr. Sweeney, Col. Nichols summarized the comments received from the Human Resources Division and recommended that the contract for Phase II of the Project be delayed pending a complete evaluation of Phase I reports, and that the DCS/P be responsible for making this evaluation and guiding future action.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Zuckert agreed with this position and the Director of Research and Development, DCS/D was so informed:

"....it appears inadvisable to proceed with Phase II of the Military Personnel Records Project until Phase I has been evaluated at this Headquarters.

"It is therefore suggested that the HRRI be advised to take no action to contract for Phase II at this time."

Based on recommendations made by the Director of Personnel Planning, DCS/P, this decision was altered to permit the HRRI to reestablish negotiations to complete a contract in connection with Phase II of this Project prior to the final evaluation of the report on Phase I.<sup>4</sup>

R&R No. 2 dated 31 July 1951 from the Human Resources Division, Directorate of Research and Development, DCS/D, Subj: "Status of AF Contract".

<sup>2.</sup> Memo for Mr. Sweeney dated 7 Aug 51, Subj: Status of AF Contract on Personnel Records.

<sup>3.</sup> R&R dated 30 Aug 51 to the Director of Research & Development, DCS/D, Subj: Military Personnel Records Project.

<sup>4.</sup> R&R dated 21 Sep 51 to the Director of Research & Development, DCS/D, Subj: Military Personnel Records Project.

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The raising of further questions on this Project caused the Assistant in mid-October to direct that all action on Phase II be suspended until the evaluation of Phase I was completed. A representative of this Branch and an outside consultant were assigned to examine the manner of performance by the contractors on Phase I and to review the manner in which Phase II is to be carried on. This study supported the previous decision that no further action should be taken on Phase II until after the evaluation of Phase I is completed.

On 12 December 1951, the Assistant Secretary fixed the responsibility for Phase II of the Project in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and stated that action on Phase II of this Project should be suspended until Phase I has been properly evaluated.

C. Maintenance Engineering Manual:

On 15 May 1951, the Director of Maintenance-Engineering, DCS/M, requested AMC to negotiate a contract to provide necessary services for the preliminary engineering studies, collection, assembly and final preparation of material for a "USAF Maintenance Engineering Manual".

Informed of the existance of AFR 150-6, this request was sent to this office for pre-negotiation approval.

In a memorandum to General Lynch, the Branch stated that the broadness of the outline submitted plus the lack of detailed information makes it impossible to approve the project as submitted. The Director of Maintenance was requested to re-submit a more detailed specification of the project.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1.</sup> Memo for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, dated 12 Dec 51.

R&R No. 4 dated 30 Jul 51 to the Director of Maintenance-Engineering from Director of Manpower & Organization, Subj. Contract for Engineering Services.

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A more detailed specification of the work to be performed was submitted on 7 August 1951 and the Branch recommended its approval to General Lynch. The Director of Maintenance-Engineering was informed of the pre-negotiation approval of the Deputy Assistant Secretary on 14 August 1951.

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# SEGRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Air Pictorial Service:

On 29 March, the Air Pictorial Division submitted a request to this office to approve a contract for the services of a team of consultants to assist the Air Force in the establishment of the Air Pictorial Service as an operating unit of the USAF. This request was approved with the stipulation that, whenever possible, Air Force personnel will be used to accomplish the objectives of the study.

In compliance with this requirement, the Air Pictorial Division, Directorate of Public Relations, in cooperation with this Directorate, established a survey team consisting of representatives of that office and this one, to work with the civilian contractor in accomplishing the objectives of the survey. The contractor would be on call by the team as needed.

Mr. James P. Carroll of this Branch was assigned, full time, to this survey team and worked with it from the beginning of June until the end of September, 1951. During the course of this study, the team visited photographic facilities of the Army, Navy, Air Force and civilian organizations from coast-to-coast. This study investigated the facilities currently available in the Air Force, the way in which present USAF requirements were being met by these facilities and what facilities, personnel and equipment would be required by the Air Force to provide optimum photographic services to the Air Force.

The results of this study were presented in a report, "Study of USAF Photographic Responsibilities", made in October 1951. This study concluded that:

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"...(1) responsibility for establishing all USAF photograpic policies be vested in a single staff agency under the
Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations... with vertical technical
channels down to all echelons, and (2) that all operational
responsibilities be centralized in a single photographic
command (except in specific instances where the photographic
responsibility is peculiar to a particular organization and
could be discharged more effectively through decentralization)."

With the preparation and submission of this report to the Director of Public Relations, Brigadier General Scry Smith, the responsibilities of this Branch on this project was completed. A footnote to this project must be added: On 17 December, the Director of Manpower and Organization received a Letter of Appreciation from General Smith for Mr. Carroll's work on the survey team. General Smith said:

"I should like to express my appreciation for... the excellent assistance and service which Mr. Carroll gave to the survey team. The advice and constructive comments which he contributed in the field of management and organization during the conduct of the survey and preparation of the report were of great value.

"...the performance of Mr. Carroll as a member of this team
was considered to be greatly above average and worthy of official comment."2

<sup>1. &</sup>quot;Study of USAF Photographic Responsibilities" dated Oct 51. p. 39.

Letter of appreciation dated 17 Dec 51 from the Director of Public Relations to the Director of Manpower and Organization, DCS/0.

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
Management Improvement Through Marpower Surveys - A Case Study:

Throughout its development of the Air Force Management Improvement Program, the Branch has continually looked for techniques which could be used by management people at all echelons in examining and evaluating their activities. One such technique arose out of an exploratory analysis made by the Branch of some management surveys.

The concept of primary mission, direct support and indirect support had been developed as the Balanced Functions Policy of the Management Improvement Program. This concept states that all Air Force resources can be divided into these three categories depending on the extent to which they accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of the assigned mission of the USAF. It further states that the objectives of all Air Force management personnel should be to get as much of their resources as possible into the primary mission category.

The Branch had available to it some manpower surveys which had been submitted by one command. These surveys were analyzed in accordance with the Balanced Functions policy to see what picture they would show. Intended initially as merely an exploratory analysis for the use of the Branch only, the results were so interesting and the technique so useful that the study was first presented to the Manpower Training Course at George Washington University, and later reproduced and distributed to the field.

The technique was this: the manpower surveys were analyzed in terms of the three categories, and compared with the published yardsticks to discover what, if any, deviations existed. The Branch did



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# SEGRET SECURITY INFORMATION

The Department of the Air Force Management Summary Sheet:

One of the primary responsibilities of the Branch is the preparation and dissemination of written material to stimulate management action at all echelons. One of the primary efforts on this point was the publication of the Management Summary Sheet.

This Directorate had long felt the need for some means of direct communication with the field relative to Management Improvement activities. The Director said:

"It is known that many improvements in methods and systems are being made within the Air Force, but because of lack of communications, are not made available to other commanders, who are constantly searching for new ways to do a better job. "The Directorate with staff responsibility for management improvement is a focal point through which ideas for improvement can be circulated and distributed.

"Recommendation: That a news letter covering management improvement activities be published monthly and distributed to subordinate commanders".

The first issue was published in September 1951, containing a leadoff statement from the Chief of Staff. Subsequent issues in October,

November and December contained statements by the Director of Manpower
and Organization, the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, and the
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, all expressing top Air Force command
interest in the Management Improvement Program.

Air Staff Summary Sheet dated 6 Jun 51, from Director of Manpower and Organization, Subj: "Management Summary Sheet".

# SEGRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Production Control Chart For The Air Force Reserve Program:

On 27 July 1951 the Smith Committee, formed by Assistant Secretary Zuckert to develop a long-range, realistic plan for the Air Reserve Forces, issued its Report detailing what it felt were the requirements for a strong, properly balanced Reserve Establishment.

The Assistant Secretary asked the Air Staff to provide him with a technique by which he could keep advised of progress toward attaining the Reserve Program. After some unsuccessful attempts by various interested Air Staff offices to provide the Assistant Secretary with a satisfactory device, the Management Improvement Branch was asked to work on this as a management engineering problem.

Study of the files maintained by the Branch revealed that a technique similar to the one desired by the Assistant Secretary had already been used successfully both in Government and in private industry.


Required modifications to adapt this technique to the Air Force situation were made and a draft of the proposal was presented to the Assistant Secretary and his Deputy for Civilian Components on 1 October 1951.

The plan, which provided for a chart showing the actual program versus program attainment, as approved by Mr. Zuckert with one modification. To accomplish corrective action on any phase of the program which had any lead time elements alippages or deficiencies had to be noted as soon as they occurred, or could be predicted rather than when their effect was felt. For example, slippages in the aircraft portion of the program, if not discovered until the aircraft are delivered, are uncorrectable since aircraft lead-time is approximately 18 months.

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Mr. Zuckert therefore requested that the proposal be modified to allow for anticipation of slippage for enough in advance so that corrective action can be taken.

The Branch proposal was presented to the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, who was designated as the Air Staff action agency, on 2 November, Which completed the Management Improvement Branch action on this project.



## ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Part 4 - Manpower Utilization Branch

The role that the Manpower Utilization Branch has performed since its formation has been a busy one. Due to cooperation of both sections, a great many projects have been completed; others a -> in progress.

Included with these projects are several which are the outstanding contributions during this period.

In addition to his regular duties as Chief of the Manpower Utilization Branch, Colonel Charles Moody was charged with the required coordination in regard to the Manpower Management Course at George Washington University. The assignment was made to assist in a more reclistic presentation of current Air Force techniques, methods and procedures for controlling manpower, and in bringing to light current AF manpower management problems. On 16 October Lt. Col. Frank P. Gallo was assigned Liaison Officer, relieving Colonel Moody of that responsibility.

This Branch has done considerable research in the area of manpower conservation and has placed particular emphasis on the study of the effective utilization of the following types of personnel:

1. Physically Restricted:

The Air Force has established a firm policy in this relatively new area concerning the utilization of partially disabled Air Force members who possess usable experience and skills, and who have a desire and the ability to remain on active service. This policy is stated in

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the recently published AFR 35-86. A presentation on Estimated Maximum Percentage Absorption of Phusically Restricted Personnel was given on 4 December at a conference on Physical Evaluation Procedures. This problem is still being studied.

#### 2. WAF:

A detailed plan for the Utilization of Women in the Air Force was prepared pointing out those fields which would receive priority in assignment of WAF personnel in order to obtain maximum utilization of women and to free military males for duty to combat units. In substance present assignment of WAF is following the recommendations of this study.

#### 3. Civilians:

A study of Air Force Civilian Employment was made showing the percentage distribution per category and the average grade level per command covering FT 1951 to present. This is being forwarded to interested Staff Agencies.

#### 4. Indigenous:

A study is being made to determine under what conditions and circumstances the most effective utilization of native national personnel is possible. Included also is the use of additional foreign national personnel in this country.

The Management and Survey Procedure Manual, developed as a guide for the conduct and processing of manpower-management surveys and audits is being reviewed and refined. Included in the production of this manual will be a list of manpower terms and definitions.

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In answer to a query from Senator Johnson concerning the utilization of manpower at certain Air Force installations, a survey was conducted at Shappard Air Force Base in July just before the organization of this new branch. Since Sheppard is primarily a technical training base, authority was given to transfer the feasibility test from Sheppard to Lackland, basically an indoctrination center. A manpower survey of Lackland Air Force Base, Texas was conducted 29 October 1951 through 13 November 1951, to determine minimum manpower requirements and analyze the replaceability of combat qualified male military personnel, in accordance with the memorandum from Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&P) to the Secretary of the Air Force dated 20 October 1951. The purpose was to develop plans and procedures for effecting optimum utilization of manpower resources at Lackland Air Force Base, giving particular attention to the utilization of civilians, WAF, and limited service personnel. Survey findings were reported in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&P) dated 12 December 1951. The feasibility of such replacements will be tested in a pattern to be implemented 1 February 1952.

The questions relating to the utilization of personnel were extracte from the Hearing before a sub-committee of the Committee on Appropriations of the Fiscal Year 1952 Budget. These were analyzed for possible special studies. Then positive action answers for the record were obtained and compiled to be used at any future date for reference purposes (classified Secret).

SECURITY INFORMATION

# SECURITY INFORMATION Several reports on the status of the Manpower Utilization Program throughout the Air Force and of the latest developments in this field have been written by this branch. A Progress Report -

Manpower Controls in the United States Air Force - was submitted
20 July 1951. In a memorandum dated 27 August 1951, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (M&P) created a program for regular quarterly
progress reports on manpower and personnel controls in the service.
This branch has the continuing responsibility of compiling these for
the Air Force and two such reports have been submitted on 1 October
and 1 January.

## ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Part 5 - Manning and Equipping Documents Branch

During this period, an Air Force Regulation, 5-25, subject:
"Authorization Tables," was prepared and coordinated through the
Air Staff and will be printed under date of 30 January 1952. This
important Regulation prescribes the current responsibilities and
procedures for preparation, submission, review, approval, amendment,
revision, and publication of:

- 1. Tables of Organization (T/O's).
- 2. Master Equipment Authorization List (MEAL).
- 3. Tables of Allowances (T/A's).
- 4. Equipment Component Lists (ECL's).
- 5. Tentative Tables of Equipment (TTE's).

In conjunction with the equipment provisions of above Regulation,
AFL 5-7, subject: "Equipment Component Lists," to be dated 30 January
1952, prescribes the procedures for conversion from the 00-30 series
Technical Orders to Equipment Component Lists.

The briefings of all major commands on the mechanization of authorization documents and the MEAL system of equipment authorization were completed upon visits to the following Commands:

- 20 August to 25 September 1951 Alaskan Air Command and FEAF.
- 26 November to 21 December 1951 Northeast Air Command and USAFE.

Briefings were also presented at a Directorate of Manpower & Organization Management Seminar 1 and 2 October 1951, and to the Bureau of the Budget 4 October 1951.

Necessary action and coordination to implement the MEAL system of authorizing equipment have progressed to the point that the first portion of the MEAL, relating to approximately 114 Tables of Organization, will be forwarded to AMC for processing by 25 January 1952. All other current tables will be included in changes to the MEAL to be furnished AMC by 29 February 1952.

Machine-run T/O's are currently being published to replace all T/O&E's. Paper organizations of all units will begin under the T/O and MEAL concept. All units constituted and activated after 1 May 1952 will be under this concept. AFR 5-25 will prescribe procedures concurrent with above.

In this six-month period, considerable controversy has hinged around the inadequacy of present equipment authorization documents and methods in relation to the utilization of equipment and to programming equipment requirements. Interested staff agencies have been D/M&O and Asst for Programming, both DCS/O and Asst for Materiel Programs Control, DCS/M. This matter has been summed up in study prepared by this Branch, which has been circulated to the interested staff agencies for resolution.

The status of the Table of Organization mechanization program has progressed to the extent where IBM card decks have been completed for all current tables and 109 of the tables have been submitted to the printers. It is anticipated that all tables will be published and distributed during third quarter of FY 1952.

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Concurrent with the development of these IBM card decks, the tables were revised to incorporate officer AFSC's of the new Officer Career Fields and Airman Career Fields.

During this period, T/O's were further improved by processing approximately 100 accumulative individual changes and completely revising 79 tables to make them more flexible and economical manning tools, the utilization of which, in forthcoming activation and reorganization actions, will result in appreciable savings of troop spaces.

An example of the savings which may result is provided by the new cellular Air Weather Service Organization, which was designed to replace T/08E 1-1713, Air Weather Service. Reorganization of existing Air Weather Service units, under the new table, is calculated to result in a saving of over 1,300 troop spaces.

Complete initial machine listings of Tables of Distribution and Tables of Distribution-Augmentations have been received from all commands. These documents were prepared on 30 November 1951 authorizations. Change documents reflecting December 31 1951 personnel authorization vouchers have been received from most commands.

Initial listings of T/D's and T/D-A's have been reviewed and edited as to format and completeness. Letters of acknowledgment, with detailed notations of discrepancies and suggested corrective action, have been dispatched to fifteen (15) major commands. Acknowledgments to the remainder of the major commands are being processed.

Certain minor changes in procedures and format have been adopted from the experience of the first two months of operation and from a

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study of suggestions from the major commands. They were adopted to facilitate reproduction for command use, minimize statistical work-load, and maintain the essential similarity to Tables of Organization. These changes will be incorporated in Appendices of the forth-coming revision of AFR 20-52, Table of Distribution units.

During this period, numerous requests for additional non-T/O personnel spaces were analyzed based on the workload data supplied by the requesting commands and the number of spaces then authorized to accomplish that workload. In most cases, these requests for additional authorizations were predicated on an extension of the capacilities of an existing function in an established unit.

Total savings in personnel spaces which were effected by these reviews are shown below. Numbers of spaces shown as approved were reflected in PAV's to major commands, rather than numbers requested. Detail back-up material on each request is available in the Manning and Equipping Documents Branch.

Non-T/O	Requested	3,472	23,032	1,519	28,023	
	Approved	2,899	21,092	1,232	25,223	
	Savings	573	1,940	287	2,800	

Manpower Manning Standards:

Progress was made in extending the coverage of and refinement of the present standards of Air Force Manual 150-1, Manpower Guide.

The manual is a guide to realistic personnel requirements of Non-T/O units under operating conditions. Phase I of the plan for development of Basic Manpower Manning Standards for all organizations in the


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
Air Force has been completed. Refinement, for the purpose of increased validity of the standards, ease of application, and standardization of format, has been accomplished during this period, and will be reflected in future revisions of AFM 150-1, Manpower Guide.

Fifty-four (54) GM-series Mobilization Type Manpower Planning Tables, covering the majority of the Air Force Training activities, were produced. Factors based on these tables are available for inclusion in War Planning Factors - 50(A). Major changes in planned work-loads, particularly in Air Observer Training, have invalidated some of the current Air Training Command planning tables. Required revisions are receiving priority.

Military Air Transport Service has developed planning tables for Flight Service and Air Resupply and Communication Service which have been accepted by Hq USAF after careful review. Air Transport tables are being received and the project should be completed during January 1952. Tables for Air Weather Service and Air Rescue Service have been received and reviewed, but were returned for further refinement. Airway and Air Communication Service does not appear to lend itself to the normal planning table form. A planning factor is being developed to present the required information.

Approximately half of the recognized requirement for peace-time and mobilization tables of Continental Air Command have been prepared, but have not been completely checked and prepared for printing.





## MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION

Part 1 - Military Programs Branch

Lt. Colonels John W. Shinners and Andrew Kowalski performed special duty with the Learned Committee for a period of three months, ending October 1951. This special committee was organized for the purpose of developing a troop program designed to support the Survival Concept of Application of Air Power developed by the USAF. The resultant troop program was such that an approximate 50 per cent increase to the combat element of the Air Force could be achieved with an overall addition to the military strength of only 15 per cent.

A revision to the troop program for FY 1952 was completed and this branch participated in the determination of FYs 1953 and 1954 manpower objectives.

The Operating Troop Program (OPT 52-1) was completed in July. This was based upon achieving 95 wings by 30 June 1952, with an Air Force strength of 1, 061, 000.

Technically, this was a big step in the development of statistical methods of program presentations. It was produced by the use of IBM punch cards. An additional section of the program was included showing total strengths by station. Also a by-type-of-unit sorting was produced.

Original estimates were made for a program of 138 combat groups (approximately 160 groups total with airlift units and separate squadrons).

Initial estimates ranged from 1,700,000 to 2,000,000 as a manpower requirement under current concepts.

The programming staff not directly participating in the Learned Committee studies worked on problems relating to the planned expansion and the current operating program. Examples of these are:

- (1) Base construction program
- (2) Training crew and skill requirements, training loads and capabilities
- (3) The effect of the extension of Korea on operating and budget programs.

The office was also involved in review of program methods and procedures. A series of experiments were conducted involving presentation. The most important development was to use as a primary format a by-station of geographic area presentation. Activities by command are listed thereunder. Separate listings predominantly by command are to be produced for special purposes.

Data was prepared for OSD and BOB review of manpower requirements for FTs 1953 and 1954. These were based on an objective of 126 combat wings by FT 1954 with a manpower requirement of 1,220,000. Basically this was the outcome of the Learned Committee studies.

For the first time, the OSD Manpower Group performed a review of the AF objectives. This involved the establishment of procedures applicable to all services (Army-Navy-Air Force-Marine). Following this methods of presentation of Air Staff interests was worked out and the presentation data produced.

Final presentations were made to the OSD Manpower Group and BCB representatives. Following this final adjustments in objectives were made and initial costing of the program was initiated.

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The impact of dollar reductions on the AF requirement was evaluated in terms of manpower. Program objectives were still 126 wings but they were to be reached at a later date. The recommended reduction by OSD of 86,000 on the FY 1953 objectives was overshadowed by even more stringent dollar reductions.

A reduced end-year strength for FY 1952 was established as 973,350 military personnel.

An end-year strength for FY 1953 was fixed at 1,061,000 and at end FY 1954 at 1,190,000.

Data for establishing equipment and dollar requirements under the new budget program was produced. The major item was a summary of units by T/O&E for use by AMC. This was a departure from previous methods adopted because of time limitations. Lacking program details factors were used to produce the product for determination of unit equipment.

It has been necessary to continue granting waivers to AFR 39-47 (flying status of airmen) due to the shortage of Air Force personnel meeting requirements of the regulation for crew members with respect to grade and classification. The majority of waivers were granted for airmen holding grades higher than those presently authorized for crew members. A re-evaluation of the grade structure currently authorized for aircraft crew members is presently being undertaken at this head-quarters; it appears that upward grade revisions will be effected for airmen crew member personnel within the next calendar year.

As personnel increases for the Air Force expansion have been programmed through Fiscal Year 1954, the authorized grade structure has been adjusted to meet the established strengths. The grade adjustments

## SEURE 1 SECURITY INFORMATION

included a decrease in the percentage requirement of field grade officers and an increase to the top three grade percentages of airmen. The increased number of higher enlisted grades was attributable to the increase from 48 to 126 wings without a proportionate increase in the number of airmen. This resulted in a pressing need for airmen possessing higher degrees of skill in order that the U S A F mission could be effectively accomplished on the reduced manning standard. Officer increases were confined principally to company grades due to increase in tactical organizations and crew member requirements.

This branch, in conjunction with the entire Headquarters USAF staff, prepared the troop basis portion of the AF Mobilization Plan (AFMOP 52) during the period of September through December 1951. Said plan was prepared on a requirement basis, without regard to currently imposed space ceilings, using July 1952, as an assumed "D-Day" and projecting requirements through a subsequent three-year period.

Air Force Specialty Section - 5 skill runs were completed during the past six months based on Air Force program positions as follows:

	PR-9	)		Date of Publication		_	As	of	Date
4th	qtr	FY	1952	19 Jun 1951	Mary ODE	(	1	May	1951
2d	qtr	FY	1952	6 Aug 1951	May OPT	1	1	May	1951
4th	qtr	FY	1954	16 Nov 1951	(3d revision Dr. Learned		15	Sep	1951
4th	qtr	FY	1952	Sent PMP-11 direct	Program)	(		Nov	1951
3d	atr	FI	1952	Sent PMP-11 direct	Jul OPT	(		Dec	1951

The mechanization of skill runs on the T/O portion of the operating program, which was started in January 1951, should be completed within the next six months.

# MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION

Part 2 - Program Analysis Branch

During the month of November 1951, the Manpower Program Analysis Branch, as such, was primarily organized after being authorized as of 1 May 1951. During the period July through October, the Branch Chief, Lt. Col. Beattie was detached per directive of the Chief of Staff of 3 July, as the Directorate of Manpower and Organization representative on the Learned Committee. Lt. Col. Petri (then Major) and Major Tippen contributed to the Learned Committee on a part-time basis. During the few weeks that the Branch was officially operating as such, a few special projects were initiated and completed. These particularly dealt with distribution of personnel requirements within the proposed 126 Wing Program.

Some of the major projects completed by the Branch, chiefly by Major Hilderbrand and statistical assistants, included:

#### Major Projects Completed:

- 1. Published Operating Program (OPT) 95 Wing, July 1951.
- 2. Published Operating Program on Reserve, August 1951.
- 3. Published Budget Program (BPT) 138 Wing, September 1951.
- 4. Published Budget Program (BPT 53-1-R) on Reserve, December 1951.
- 5. Prepared special distribution of Revised Operating Program (OPT) September 1951.
- 6. Prepared special distribution of Revised Operating Program (OPT) October 1951.

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- 7. Revised format of Operating Program (OPT) from activity by location within Command to Command presentation by location within State or country including Command Summaries by location.
- 8. Implemented the mechanization of the USAF Operating Program covering civilian components which was previously manual.


## MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION

Part 3 - Civilian Allocations Branch

Final determination of the Fiscal Year 1952 Air Force appropriation resulted in a projected civilian strength for regular Air Force activity of 308,827 by 30 June 1952 with a grand total of 315,643 including MDAP, reimbursables, etc.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has directed that all
Services defend their civilian requirements in detail on a quarterly
basis before a Department of Defense Board. This results in an interim
Air Force ceiling as established by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to be adjusted quarterly, in line with hiring potential and
requirements. Presently the Air Force is still under the ceiling of
278,000 as established for the first quarter of the Fiscal Year.
Additional requirements have been defended before the Department of
Defense Board and the Air Force has been promised an increase in ceiling
in the near future.

In addition to this overall quarterly civilian ceiling, on 12 October 1951, the Department of Defense limited the number of graded civilians the Air Force could employ by establishing a ceiling of 118,000. This ceiling is a result of the Fiscal Year 1952 Appropriation Act as passed by Congress which placed a graded civilian limitation of 500,000 on the Department of Defense. On 7 December 1951 the Air Force graded civilian ceiling was changed to 120,700 by memorandum from Office of the Secretary of Defense.



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## MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION

Part 4 - Military Allocations Branch

A - Strategic Air Command:

The authorized and programmed (May PT-1) strength of the Strategic Air Command on 1 July was 121,696 including 32 combat wings. The last operating program (July OPT-52-1) reflected a phased buildup during fiscal year 1952 to 142,878 including 38 combat wings for end of second quarter (31 Dec 1951), and 155,703 including 40 combat wings for end fiscal year 1952 (30 June 1952).

At the inception of the 126-wing plan - with the guidance of the "LEARNED" committee" and in accord with the 30 August policy of the Chief of Staff - a budget program (Dec BPT-53-2) was compiled which reflected a phased buildup furing fiscal year 52 to 120,255 including 31 combat wings for end of second quarter (31 Dec 51), 151,430 including 41 combat wings for end fiscal year 1952 and 246,819 including 59 combat wings for end fiscal year 1954. The decrease in number of wings for the end of the second quarter fiscal year 1952 was caused by the transfer of four fighter wings to the Tactical Air Command, and the slippage of three medium bomb wings to a later fiscal quarter.

Conversely, a comperison of the figures for the end of fiscal year 1952 shows that under the new policy the program reflects an increase of one combat wing with a concurrent decrease of 4,273 manpower spaces.

Three combat wings were activated and four others reorganized.

Additionally, the reconnaissance technical function was reorganized to effect maximum utility while decreasing manpower and equipment requirement.


SECURITY INFORMATION

The Strategic Air Command continued the service-testing of their wing reorganization plan which had been authorized on 5 January 1951, and in November submitted a new Air Force Regulation 20-15, and new Tables of Organization. At the end of this period they are in the process of editing and publishing, and it is anticipated that reorganization of all Strategic Air Command wings will be effected in the near future.

A general lack of sufficient and firm information relative to projected manpower ceilings, aircraft delivery rate, base availability, and relative priority and/or essentiality of units and functions constituted one of the major problems in programming and allocating. This caused many program changes and many amendments to authorization letters and personnel allotment vouchers. This has been partially relieved by the Directorate of Operations assuming the responsibility of coordinating the activation and/or reorganization of major units prior to our authorizing action. The increasing accuracy and dependability of the "Priorities of Programmed Units" document has also helped immeasurably.

Another problem was the coordination - between the three major air commands concerned - of the distribution of the "too few" manpower spaces allowed under the French-imposed ceiling in the Moroccan area. This continues to be a controversial issue, but has been partially solved by closer coordination and firm policy statements. There is also a strong indication that the French will agree on an upward revision of the ceiling in the near future.

\* See Part 1



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#### B - USAFE:

USAFE began the new fiscal year with a T/D authorization of 22,613 and a T/O&E authorization of 17,407 for a total personnel authorization of 40,020. As of 31 December 1951 USAFE had a T/D authorization of 23,284 and a T/O&E authorization of 34,117 for a total personnel authorization of 57,401. The increase indicated shows a command buildup of 17,381 or 43 per cent during the first half of FX 1952.

The USAFE buildup included the deployment of two Air Depot Wings, the 73d to the Chateauroux Area, France, and the 80th to Nouasseur, French Morocco; a troop carrier wing, the 433d to Rhein Main which was the first Air Force NATO unit to reach Europe, a fighter interceptor wing, the 81st to Bentwaters, England, and a light bomb wing, the 126th to Bordeaux, France. Also of major importance was the deployment of the 7300th Materiel Control Group to the Chateauroux Area to handle the flow of MDAP supplies and monitor the Air Force portion of the MDAP program.

In addition to the major unit deployment listed above there has been a marked increase in activity in new areas within USAFE. Under NATO, USAFE has provided USAF portions of Allied Headquarters, i.e., Hq CINCAAFCE at Fountainebleau, France; Hq CINCAAFSE at Florence, Italy, and Hq CINCAAFNE at Oslo, Norway plus necessary Hq supporting units. The major areas of increased activity have been in France, England and French Morocco. In France, constant negotiations have been carried on with the French Government for additional new bases and numerous sites have been surveyed by USAFE. The ground work accomplished during this

period is expected to result in the move of Hq USAFE and Hq 12AF to France during the latter part of the fiscal year plus operating rights to several new bases. In England there has been a considerable increase in Engineer Aviation units and resultant construction work at numerous bases which the English Government has turned over for USAF occupancy. One of the missions of 3AD is to prepare these bases for eventual SAC operation at which time they are turned over to SAC under an existing SAC - USAFE transfer agreement. In French Morocco the desired buildup has been hampered by an overall troop ceiling for that specified area. This ceiling, as developed and negotiated through diplomatic channels, currently amounts to 7,432 plus 5 per cent for pipeline, leave, and hospitalization. This area has been jointly commanded and supervised by USAFE and SAC and consists mainly of a USAFE Air Depot Wing installation and four SAC operational bases. Further negotiations are now under way and current planning is based on an expected substantial increase in the troop ceiling effective 1 July 1952.

The growth of USAFE outlined herein also includes an existing potential for further expansion during the remainder of the fiscal year into the new areas discussed as additional bases are turned over to USAFE by the various governments involved.

# SECURITY INFORMATION

#### C - Alaskan Air Command:

At the start of the new fiscal year, Alaskan Air Command was authorized approximately 16,184 troop spaces half of which were T/OSE.

3,000 civilian positions were authorized at the start of the fiscal year with the ever present problem of securing adequate civilian labor. A study of this situation is now in process by the command, the results of which will indicate the feasibility of swapping military spaces for civilian positions.

The 39th Air Depot Wing composition and structure was the subject of a study by Alaskan Air Command and as a result the entire depot underwent an extensive reorganization. This reorganization is presently in operation on a 6-month operational test.

The Air Staff, after considerable study of the Medical organizations in Alaska, recommended the reorganization of the 5005th Hospital Group from a table of distribution unit to a T/OSE structure. When the views of the command itself were presented, it developed that it was more desirable to retain the medical group as presently organized since the organization has been operating as a fixed installation. The mobile capability that would exist under T/OSE organization for the group was considered unnecessary at this time and the command succeeded in selling the Air Staff their views.

To assist the command in more efficient development of communications activities in Alaska, an officer with considerable experience and training in a supervisory capacity was recruited from civilian status. The development of a control supervisory staff at Alaskan Air Command headquarters by this individual should show a considerable increase in communication capability in the near future.

# SECURITY INFORMATION

Audit responsibilities in Alaskan Air Command were transferred to the Auditor General during the month of September 1951.

Special investigations activities increased considerably when Alaskan Air Command assumed full responsibility for the maintenance of project "Washtub". An increase of 28 military spaces were authorized the 5002nd IG Special Investigations Flight when full responsibility was assumed.

The Air Staff has approved additional AC&W sites for the command. Although programming action has not yet been taken to include the new sites into the program, their includion will be made when distribution of world-wide AC&W resources is indicated.

The problem of "war strength" vs. "peace strength" for the headquarters and maintenance squadrons of the 57th Fighter Intercept Group is still a matter of consideration by the Air Staff. The command has indicated their desires to reorganize both the headquarters and the maintenance squadrons at war strength concurrently with the fighter squadrons reorganization to peace strength plus 24-hour augmentation in early July 1952.

The predominant problems that are facing Alaskan Air Command at the beginning of the calendar year are as follows:

- 1. Procurement of civilian labor.
- 2. Establishment of additional ACSW sites.
- Decision as to whether or not the Hq and Maintenance Sq of the Fighter Group will be at peace or war strength.

\* See Glossary

# DITU MEDDIANTION


### D - Northeast Air Command:

At the start of the fiscal year 1952, Northeast Air Command was authorized approximately 5,000 military spaces and approximately 3,000 civilian positions.

Northeast Air Command has requested assignment of Army personnel to assist in the development of base defense at their major installations. The Air Staff is considering the requirement from a world-wide standpoint and are leaning toward the thought that there exists within our own resources sufficient trained and experienced personnel to fulfill our worldwide requirements. A policy will be established in the very near future and should solve the problem.

ACEN activities in the Northeast are programmed for the addition of several new organizations during the first quarter of FT 1953. The 531st ACEN Group is presently en route to join the command and will be based at interim stations pending completion of permanent sites.

The command increased in military strength by approximately 2,000 additional space authorizations to provide for increased operations and development.



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## F - Air Research & Development Command:


On 25 July 1951, the Air Research & Development Command was directed to assume command jurisdiction of the Lawrence G. Hanscom Air Base, Bedford, Mass. An appropriate transfer of troop spaces required for the support of this installation was made from the Air Defense Command, the former command having this base and on 25 July 1951, the Central Air Documents Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base was transferred from assignment to AMC to AR&DC, with appropriate personnel transfer.

Effective in October 1951, the 1st Pilotless Bomber Squadron, Light, formerly known by the name Metador, was activated at Patrick AFB under the assignment of AR&DC, and the Air Force Missile Test Center, at a strength of 27 officers and 289 enlisted personnel, and action was taken to transfer the responsibility for supervision of the Air Force participation at the Naval Research Laboratory from Hq USAF, DCS/D, to the AR&DC.

Effective 1 December 1951, the ARADC was directed to assume assignment of the Armament Test Division and subordinate units from Air Proving Ground Command, per instructions received from the Chief of Staff.

Transfer of personnel authorizations in connection with this reassignment was accomplished by this office.

During December the responsibility for the administration of the Air Force personnel participating as liaison between the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission's Reactor Development Program were transferred from the Hq USAF to AR&DC. These personnel provide the mechanism whereby Air Force requirements can be injected into the AEC program.



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### G - Special Weapons Command:

During August 1951 action was originated by the War Plans Division, DCS/O, Hq USAF, and concurred in by this Directorate, that provided for the organization of two T/D units. The initial unit was designated as a support unit with station at Enivetok Island; the second was a joint-holding group at Kirtland. This action was in accordance with the Chief of Staff's (Hq USAF) directive that the CG, SWC, would be the responsible agency for the Air Force portion of any future joint participation in atomic tests. Air Force individuals returning from Project "Greenhouse"\* were diverted to this holding group at Kirtland AFB so that skills and experience could be utilized in monitoring the results of past tests and to prepare the Air Force portion of planning for future tests. Ten (10) officer and seventy-six (76) enlisted troop spaces were authorized for the support unit. Forty-one (41) officer and fifty-seven (57) enlisted were authorized for the Test Oroup Hq.

On 18 October 1951, the function of guided missile liaison with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Sandia Base, and agencies of the Atomic Energy Commission and its contractors or other operating units, was transferred from the Air Material Command to the Special Weapons Command, and an organizational change was effected by Special Weapons Command with regard to the Joint Task Group. The organizational placement of this unit was changed to a level with the CG, SWC, to simplify command channels

\* See Glossary

### H - Military Air Transport Service:

In general, the Military Air Transport Service continued performing its mission in providing airlift required in support of approved joint war plans, scheduled airlift for the Department of Defense within Continental U.S., between Continental U.S., and overseas areas and between and within overseas areas, as directed by higher authority.

World-wide air transport, air weather, airways and air communications and air rescue service systems; flight service within the ZI, supervision, control and maintenance of primary facilities required for performing its assigned mission.

During the period of 1 July 1951 and 31 December 1951, MATS accomplished major activations, transfer of units and changes to its troop space ceiling as follows:

- 1. During the months of July, August and September 1951, MATS activated a Ferry Group in the ZI and an increase in troop spaces with subsequent increase in personnel to MATS organizations in overseas areas to fulfill increased requirements.
- 2. In the months of September, October and November the following was accomplished: A complete reorganization of the Air Weather Service.
- 3. An increase of two hundred twenty-five (225) officer and eighteen hundred eighty-four (1,884) enlisted troop spaces were approved for
  MATS to activate the 1707th Air Base Wing at Morrison Air Force Base,
  Florida. MATS augmented the 1706th Air Base Group to a wing at Mountain
  Home Air Force Base to support the Air Resupply and Communications Wings
  in training at Mountain Home Air Force Base.

4. A substantial increase in personnel was given to AACS, both ZI and overseas, to fulfill additional operational requirements. 5. In the month of December the 61st and 62d Troop Carrier Groups at McChord Air Force Base were transferred from Military Air Transport Service to the Tactical Air Command.

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#### I - FEAF:


The period of 1 July 1951 to 1 September 1951 was periodically marked by the receipt of numerous requests from Hq FEMF to either increase the strength or reorganize existing organizations, or to organize or activate new units. This was an unfavorable situation from a programming and allocations view, but was justified on the part of Hq FEMF because of the everchanging tactical situation in Korea. This fluid condition produced personnel and equipment requirements that were impossible to foresee and necessarily generated the requests to this headquarters.

On 17 September 1951, representatives of Hq FEAF manpower office proceeded to this Hq with a brochure that contained their known personnel requirements for the duration of the Korean emergency. This requirement was firm provided that no change occurred to the tactical situation existing at that time, or that no additional missions or responsibilities were placed upon that headquarters. The major items of importance included in this presentation were as follows:

- 1. Redesignate the 314th Air Division to the Hq Japan Defense
  Force and concurrently reorganize this unit as a Table of Distribution
  organization. This action provided an organization that was adaptable
  to the mission that this unit had assumed upon movement of the 5th
  Air Force to Koree, namely the Air Defense of Japan.
- 2. Increased authorizations for and reorganization and redesignation to a Table of Distribution organization of, the Air Depot Wing at FEAMCOM. This action was twofold in purpose. One to allow this

depot to fully utilize the indigenous personnel available by eliminating and redistributing the military skills that could be performed by indigenous. Two, to organize a second depot in Southern Japan to be utilized as a dispersal area. The total troop space requirement proposed was 6,718 and with minor exceptions was accepted as valid and approved by the Air Staff, Reorganization action and authorization of troop spaces required was completed during the month of December and provided FEAF with the authorizations requested.

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### K - Air Pictorial Service:

Pursuant to the directive of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, the Air National Guard Facility at Lockheed Air Terminal, Burbank, California, was transferred from the Continental Air Command to Air Pictorial Service. Seventy-three (73) officer and two hundred sixty (260) airman troop spaces were transferred concurrently.

A request to reorganize Hq Air Pictorial Service was received furing this period and with the concurrence of the Organization Management Division of Hq USAF, the reorganization was approved and resulted in the substitution of ten officer spaces for ten airman troop spaces.

Facilities at Lookout Mountain Laboratory, California were transferred from the Air Proving Ground to Air Pictorial Service during the .

period, and Hq Air Pictorial Service moved from the Washington area to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

### SECURITY INTERMATION

### L - USAF Security Service:

The USAF was directed by a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to provide one-third representation with the Armed Forces Security Agency. This directive resulted in the commitment of 199 officer and 376 airman troop spaces to be phased over a period up to the third quarter of FY 1953. Allocation of these spaces was not begun but were committed during this reporting period.

As a result of the action of the 126-wing program, this command was programmed with an increase of almost 100 per cent its current strength. This increase to be allocated by the end of FY 1954. No actual authorization of spaces against this programmed increase was affected during this period.

The requests submitted by this command for increases and reorganimation during this period were coordinated with interested staff agencies of Hq U SAF and no conclusions had been reached at the time the problem was taken over by the Learned Committee.

The proposed reorganization of this command generated an unusual amount of paper work and required considerable attention on the part of the allocations officer prior to the time the Learned Committee took over and settled the matter. Subsequent actions relative to the increases for this command have been more or less routine.

### M - Headquarters USAF:

The Secretary of the Air Staff has directed the transfer of the following departmental functions to the field in order to reduce the number of personnel carried on departmental rolls:

- 1. Directorate of Procurement Inspection To 1002d IG Sq, Norton AFB.
- Directorate of Special Investigations To Hq Command,
   Special Activity Wing.
  - 3. Air Provost Marshal To Hq Command, Special Activity Wing.
- 4. Supplemental Research Branch., Collections Division.,
  Directorate of Intelligence To USAF Security Service.

The above transfers were approved by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and resulted in reducing departmental rolls by 116 officer and 12 airsan troop spaces.

The following joint boards were established as a result of recommendations made by the Joint Action Armed Forces Committee (JGS 2045/8):

- 1. Joint Tactical Air Support Board.
- 2. Joint Air Defense Board.
- 3. Joint Air Transportation Board.

The Air Force is designated as executive agency for these three boards. The Director of Plans DCS/O, has been designated as the office of primary interest.

Action was initiated by the Secretary of the Air Staff to organize and man the Joint Task Force 132. This action was not completed by the end of the period and is still under study by interested staff agencies of Hy USAF.

The Secretary of the Air Staff requested increases for the following Directorates: 1. Directorate of Procurement and Production Engineering, DCS/M 2. Directorate of Military Personnel, DCS/P 3. Assistant for Programming, DCS/0 These spaces were for support of MDAP activities within the Hq Staff.

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N - Air University:

Authorized Strength - military:

Jul 51 - 5,066

Jan 52 - 5,100

During this period only minor changes have occurred in Air University. The 3899th Personnel Processing Squadron, Maxwell AFB, Ala., was reassigned to CONAC, remaining at Maxwell as a tenant unit.

Command and Staff course has been increased from three months to five and one-half months and additional instructors provided.

Medical training being conducted at Gunter AFB, Ala., has been increased from a student load of approximately 500 to 1,400 and additional instructors and support personnel provided.

Action was initiated during November 1951 to transfer the AFROTC function to Air University, but implementation of this plan will not be accomplished until some future date.

#### 0 - Air Material Command:

The Air Materiel Command on 1 July 1951, had an authorized total military strength of 20,198 broken down to 10,491 T/0&E and 9,707 non-T/0&E. For this same period the assigned strength was 24,300. On 31 December 1951 the Air Materiel Command had an authorized military strength of 19,613 broken down to 3,037 T/0&E and 16,576 non-T/0&E. For this period, the assigned strength was 22,792.

The following break by months shows the fluctuation within AMC:

*110 TOT	TOWARD IN	Authorized		Assigned
Month	7/08E	T/D	Total	Total
Jul	11,417	9,882	21,299	23,542
Aug	7,822	9,882	17,764	22,281
Sep	3,037	11,017	14,054	22,141
Oct	3,037	15,394	18,307	21,093
Nov	3,037	15,636	18,673	22,723
Dec	3,037	16,576	19,613	22,792

The drop in authorized T/O&E totals during the Jul - Aug period is attributed to deployment of the 73d Air Depot Wing to USAFE.

A similar drop during the Aug - Sep period can likewise be attributed to deployment of the 80th Air Depot Wing to USAFE. These two wings trained in AMC were shipped by groups, thus explaining the two-month period involved.

A month-by-month break of significant changes to AMC follows:

Jul 51 - The 7300th Materiel Control Group was deployed to USAFE.

90 officers and 387 airmen.

Aug 51 - The Central Air Documents Office was transferred from AMC to Air Research & Development Command.

Sep 51 - AMC was given an additional 34 officers and 986 airmen for the Air Depot Wing Program. (228 off, 3,248 airmen now in ADW Program)

Oct 51 - AMC given increase of 228 officer and 3,640 airmen for the Air Depot Wing Program. (438 off, 6,888 airmen now in ADW Program)

Nov 51 - The 29th Air Depot Wing (T/OSE) inactivated at Hill AFB.

AMC given 119 officer, 17 FMC and 373 airmen T/D spaces for permanent
party support in lieu thereof.

Dec 51 - AMC given 940 airmen spaces for Air Depot Wing Program.
(438 off, 7,828 airmen now in ADW Program)

During this entire period AMC has been training individual personnel to man the overseas depots being reorganized. DAF letter was sent to AMC in October activating the 75th Air Depot Wing on 1 January 1952. The cadre personnel for this wing were in the training phase during the last three months of 1951.

### P - Continental Air Command:

The history of COMAC for the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951 parallels to some degree that of the Reserve Forces program. It was a period of confusion and uncertainty, as the Reserve program vacillated from a non-stable 1952 program to a new concept resulting in the execution of the Smith (Long-Range) Reserve plan. COMAC was authorized to activate 30 AFRTCs and four Experimental Reserve Districts, and directed to convert Corollary and VART units into Specialized Training Centers as initial steps in implementing the long-range Reserve program. COMAC was simultaneously recalling Reservists and ANG units to federal duty and attempting to rebuild the Reserve forces through an intensive recruiting campaign. The federalizing of Reserve units placed an increased load on processing stations requiring additional authorization for these functions.

The Air Force recruiting function was transferred from Eq Command to CONAC and a study was initiated to transfer ROTC functions from COMAC to AU. This study was approved in principle but the actual transfer has not been made due to physical space problems at AU. A further study was made and approved to change the ROTC curriculum from one of specialist training to general training for all students. The new curriculum will be initiated in the fall quarter 1953. This should decrease the ROTC instructor requirements and result in a considerable saving.

Another "miscellaneous" mission was inherited by COMAC - the editing and distribution of the "Air Forces Reserve Review" magazine was transferred from Hq USAF.

### Q - Reserve Program:

The original AF Reserve Program, excluding the Air National Guard, for the period of the last half calendar year 1951, was predicated on the following composition:

- 30 Air Force Training Centers.
- 30 Reserve Training Wings.
- 62 Major Corollary Units.
- 800 Volunteer Air Reserve Training Squadrons.
- 160 Volunteer Air Reserve Training Group Hqs.

71,568 Mobilization Assignees.

This program did not conform to the requirements or training concept embodied in the Smith Committee Long Range Plan Report dated 27 July 1951.

Upon receipt of the Smith Long Range Plan, the Air Staff directed a transition from the old FY 1952 Reserve Program to the new FY 1952 Program. This conversion resulted in the following composition taking effect in the third quarter FY 1952.

- 13 Troop Carrier Wings.
  - 9 Fighter Bomb Wings.
  - 6 Pilot Training Wings.
  - 2 Tactical Reconnaissance Wings.
  - 2 Air Depot Wings.
  - 2 Recommaissance Technical Squadrons.
- 180 Air Reserve Replacement Training Squadrons.
- 1,252 Air Reserve Specialist Training Units.
- 9,000 Mobilization assignees.

In carrying out the principle of integration of Reserve Forces within the regular establishment, each staff office in Hq USAF is charged with formulating plans and implementing the Long Range Reserve Plan and policies relating to administration of the Reserve Forces within its area of responsibility. The Commanding General, CONAC, is responsible for the activation, organization, maintenance, administration and training of units and individuals of the Air Force Reserve, as prescribed by Hq USAF.

The following designations were established to conform with the new program and Hq CONAC was granted the authority to use them on 19 December 1951:

For Regular Air Force T/D units whose function is administration and supervision of training:

- 1. Air Force Reserve Combat Training Center.
- 2. Air Force Reserve Flying Training Center.
- 3. Air Force Reserve Combat Support Center.
- 4. Air Force Reserve Specialist Training Center.

### For T/D units of the Air Reserve:

- 1. Air Reserve Replacement Squadron.
- 2. Air Reserve Specialist Training Flight, Squadron or Group (depending on size).
  - 3. Pilot Training Wing (Single-Engine or Multi-Engine).

### For T/O&E units of the Air Reserva:

Identical designations to like units in the active establishment.

CONAC was furnished with the following authorizations and information in order that the long range plan would be implemented:

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- A bulk allotment of personnel, showing grades and the required skills for activating the Air Reserve Specialist Training Program.
- The Tables of Distribution, including organizational pattern, skill requirements, and grades for activating six Flying Training Wings (T/D type).
- 3. Tables of Distribution for the Air Reserve Replacement Training Sausdrons.

Due to the current uncertainties of base utilization for Air Reserve Flying Units, activation directives for 24 combat wings (T/OSE) and four support units (T/OSE) are being held in abeyance by AFCMO pending the resolution provided by a new Reserve Base Utilization Plan.

Letters were submitted to all commands possessing corollary units outlining the personnel action that must be accomplished prior to the inactivation of such units.

Recap of USAF Reserve programmed spaces and FY 1952 - old program end FY 1952 vs. new program end FY 1952:

### Old Program

	Officers	Airmen	Total
Air National Guard	2,170	12,868	15,038
AF Reserve Training Centers	3,930	19,770	23,700
Corollary Units	2,081	11,500	13,581
Mobilization Assignees	12,630	59,184	71,814
Mobilization Designees	7,040	2,638	9,678
VARTU	100,360		100,360
TOTAL	128,211	105,960	234,171

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# SECURITY INFORMATION New Program (Long Range) Airmen Total Officers Air National Guard 2,631 22,108 24,739 6,580 42,123 48,703 AF Reserve Flying Wings 12,038 79,630 91,668 AF Reserve Unit Support 7,000 2,000 9,000 AF Reserve Mobilisation Assignees 7,280 2,538 9,818 AF Reserve Mobilization Designees 6,720 56,482 AF Reserve Individual Trainces 49,762 TOTAL 42,249 198,161 240,410

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R - Tactical Air Command:

Tactical Air Command continued to supply Fighter Bomber Units
to FEAF for the support of Korean operations. These units were placed
on permanent duty status in FEAF and retained in Tactical Air Command
as assigned only, FEAF having all operational, logistic and manning
control of units committed to the Korean operation.

This command continued to supply additional fighter bomber units to USAFE. The drain on Tactical Air Command both personnel and unitwise reduced the fighter bomber capability of that command to a minimum for a long portion of the period.

To alleviate the shortage of fighter bomber wings in Tactical Air Command four fighter escort wings were transferred from Strategic Air Command to Tactical Air Command on 16 November 1951. With the transfer of these units George AFB, California, and Dow AFB, Maine, were transferred to Tactical Air Command.

The 61st and 62d Troop Carrier Groups with assigned squadrons were transferred from Military Air Transport Service to Tactical Air Command. The 61st Group remained committed to Korean operations whereas the 62d Group was returned to Troop Carrier operations.

Tactical Air Command continued to support the Korean operation with medium troop carrier units on duty with FEAF in the same status as fighter bomber units.

The three Tactical Reconnaissance Wings continued training with no losses to overseas theaters.

SECURITY INFORMATION

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# SECURITY INFORMATION

The command continued to operate a light bomb CCTS at langley

AFB. Student output provides replacement crews for the Korean light

bomb operation, however, one wing with assigned squadrons was alerted

for deployment to USAFE which will reduce the light bomb capability

in Tactical Air Command to a minimum.

Several ACGW groups with their assigned squadrons were received in Tactical Air Command. These units will be reorganized into Tactical Control Groups.

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GEGRET CURITY INFORMATIO

S - Air Defense Command:

New functions assigned the Air Defense Command included the Canadian Arc Defense net and eight additional stations were programmed to accommodate this responsibility.

A plan for reorganization of ADC which had a major effect on the entire command was proposed. The reorganization requires the inactivation of all Fighter Interceptor Wings and their support elements.

Further, the Fighter Interceptor Squadrons are to be reorganized to delete all support personnel from T/OSE authorizations. Tenent squadrons support is to be furnished by the commands on which Fighter Interceptor Squadrons are stationed. Air Base Groups and Air Base Squadrons are to be activated for support of Fighter Interceptor Squadrons on Air Defense Command bases. Headquarters USAF letter, subject: Air Defense Command, was dispatched on 30 November 1951, authorizing this reorganization effective on 8 February 1952.

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### T - Air Training Command:

Total major stations by type are shown below with new stations assumed by the ATRC shown under the Remarks column:

Month	Indoo	Technical	Flying	Agg	
30 Jun 51	2	*7	15	24	*Amarillo activated but not opnl.
31 Jul 51	2	7	*16	25	*Bryan activated
31 Aug 51	*3	7	16	26	*Parks activated
30 Sep 51	3	7	17	27	"Moody trfd from SAC
31 Oct 51	3	7	*18	28	*Big Spring activated

Note: One additional flying tng station (Pinecastle AFB, Fla.)


was scheduled for activation during the 2nd quarter FY 1952,
but has been reprogrammed to activate in third qtr FY 1952

and become operational in April 52. This delay due to
slippage and reschedule of acft and delay in rehabilitation.

#### Civilian Contract Flying Stations included:

			No.		Total
30	Jun	51	5		5
31	Jul	51	2	(acti- vated)	7
30	Sep	51	1	Ħ	8
31	Oct	51	1	tt .	9

These stations conduct primary/basic flying training and are operated by civilian contractors. USAF permanent party squadrons of approximately 100 personnel are located at each one for administration and supervision of trainees.



Students undergoing instruction (does not include in-out pools awaiting assignment) were:

Flying Training:		Graduated
Month	Student Load	During Month
Jun 51	8,328	2,522
Jul 51	9,141	1,841
Aug 51	10,642	2,495
Sep 51	10,549	2,908
Oct 51	11,231	3,299
Nov 51	13,295	2,324

Students under instruction in all types of flying training (pilot; observer; combat crew; instructors; helicopter/liaison, etc.), increased from approximately 8,300 in June to 13,300 in November. The average monthly student load was approximately 10,500 and average monthly graduates was approximately 2,500.

### Technical Training:

AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY		Gra	Graduates		
Month	Student Load	During Month	Cumulative Total		
Jun 51	76,264	27,626	27,626		
July 51	76,529	26,745	54,371		
Aug 51	74,460	28,289	82,660		
Sep 51	73,263	26,332	108,992		
Oct 51	72,640	25,486	134,478		
Nov 51	71,370	24,219	158,697		

Students under instructions in tech training, decreased from approximately 76,000 in June to 71,000 in November. The average monthly student load was approximately 74,000 and average monthly graduates was approximately 26,500.

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Indestrination Training:		Graduates
Month	Student Load	During Month
Jun 51	24,530	13,615
Jul 51	39,178	8,536
Aug 51	32,461	18,832
Sep 51	36,146	-20,028
Oct 51	26,206	13,380
Nov 51	31,374	13,350


Students under instruction in indoctrination training varied from a low of 24,530 in June to a high of 39,178 in July. Average monthly load was 31,650 and average monthly graduates was approximately 14,600.

Assigned permanent party personnel (military and civilian) increased from approximately 142,000 in June 1951 to approximately 156,000 in December 1951. During this same period, total students increased from approximately 122,000 in June to 136,000 in July then gradually dropped to approximately 131,500 during November; however, it is significant that during that time, flying training - which is by far the most expensive in personnel and aircraft - increased by 5,000 students. A commensurate increase in flying school graduates will not be reflected until calendar year 1952.

During the latter part of FY 1951 and early part of FY 1952, the
Hq Flying Training Air Force and Hq Technical Training Air Force under
Hq ATRC, were approved and organized. The FTAF has been operational for
the entire period; however, the TTAF was not fully operational until the
latter part of the period covered. In November 1951, approval was granted

for ATRC to organize an additional subordinate Hq. for Combat Crew Training. This additional Hq. is scheduled for activation on 1 April 1952. During this period, the ATRC assigned military strength exceeded the authorized by 13 per cent in June, 8 per cent in August. Part, although not all, of this overstrength can be attributed to the following: 1. Assemblying cadres for manning new stations. 2. Lead time for instructor personnel. 3. Planned buildup under OPT-52-1, dated July 1951 (which is now being curtailed in line with reduced ceilings imposed for Fis 1952-1953).

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Alaskan Air Command AAC

Aircraft Control and Warning ACSM

Air Defense Command ADC

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

Air Force Mobilization Plan AFMOP

Air Force, Directorate of Manpower and Organization - (Allocations Division) AFOMO-A

Air Force Training Command AFTRC

Air Materiel Command AMC

Air Research and Development Command AR&DC

Air Training Command ATRC

Air University ATI

Bureau of Budget BOB

Budget Troop Program BPT

Combat Crew Training School CCTS

Commander In Chief, Allied Air Force, Central Europe CINCAAFCE

Commander In Chief, Allied Air Force, Northern Europe CINCAAFNE

Commander In Chief, Allied Air Force, Southern Europe CINCAAFSE

Continental Air Command CONAC

Deputy Chief of Staff, Development DCS/D

Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel DCS/M

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations DCS/0

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel DCS/P

# SECURITY INFORMATION

D-Day Commencing date

FEAF Far East Air Force

FEAMCOM Far East Air Materiel Command

FMC Female Medical Corps

FTAF Flying Training, Air Force

FY Fiscal Year

GREENHOUSE Atomic Energy Test Project in Pacific Area

LEARNED Committee Special Committee under direction of Dr. Learned,
Special Consultant to the Chief of Staff, USAF,
organized for the purpose of developing a troop
program designed to support the Survival Concept
of Application of Air Force power developed by the

USAF.

LINCOLN, Project Study and research to develop systems whereby multiple radar plotting of Airborne Aircraft

may be accomplished. Eventually to be utilized

in ZI AC&N network.

MATS Military Air Transport Service

MDAP Mutual Defense Assistance Program

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OPT Operating Troop Program

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps

SAC Strategic Air Command

SNOW FAIL, Operation Joint Army - Air Force - Navy maneuvers at

New York, New Hampshire and Vermont.

SWC Special Weapons Command

T/D Table of Distribution

# GLOSSARY 1/0 Table of Organization Table of Organization and Equipment T/OSE Technical Training, Air Force TTAF USAFE United States Air Force, Europe Handled by 5002d IG Special Investigations Flight Project "Washtub" has a precedence rating of V-28 with no activation or termination date reflected WASHTUB, Project in the OPU 52-7, January 52, "Priorities of Programmed Units". Alaskan Air Command has been assigned the mission of implementing phase a "Escape and Evasion" and phase b "Stay Behind" of operation "Washtub" within AAC. This operation was formerly a Joint Mission for both AAC and the FBI and is now entirely AAC's. The object of "Washtub" is to: Establish Escape and Evasion routes within AAC. b. Train and have available agents within AAC to stay behind in the event of an invasion Zone of the Interior. ZI

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# DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT MANPOWER PROGRAMMING MANPOWER UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DGS/OPERATIONS I AUGUST 1981 MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS DIVISION ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION OPIGINATES OR EVALUATES PROFOSALS CONCERNING THE USAF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. ASSIGNS FUNCTIONS TO MAJOR USAF OFGANIZATIONAL PRODUCES CURRENT AND PROJECTED AIR FORCE MAN-ALLOCATES MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SPACES TO MAJOR USAF ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS. ELEMENTS. DEVELOPS AND DIRECTS THE USAF MANAGEMENT IM-PROVEMENT PROGRAM. DETERMINES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MANPOWER UTI-LIZATION. CONDUCTS A CONTINUING ANALYSIS OF THE MANPOWER DEVELOPS AND DIRECTS THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER PEFFORMANCE EVALUATION FRUGRAP. DEVELOPS MANPOWER STANDARDS. EXERCISED FINAL APPROVAL OF ALL MANNING AND E-HIPPING DOCUMENTS. MANPOWER PROGRAMS BRANCH 1. PREFARE THE RESPONSE PORTION OF THE DEPAITMENT OF THE BEAF THEOF PROGRAM WHITE CONTY PLANS OF THE PROGRAM WHITE CONTY PLANS OF STREET, IN RESIDENCE AND STREET PROGRAMM OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STREET PROGRAMM OF THE STREET PROGRAMMENT. ORGANIZATION FLANNING BRANCH 2. FREE LAST STORET SECRETARY FOR PRESENTATION TO AFRICA, NO., ORD, NOW HER COMMERCIAL PRINCIPAL TRAIL STRUCK. TRAIL PROGRESS ON FRANCISC STRUCK STRUCKS OF THE SECRETARY SET OF PERSONS AND AND ARREST PROGRESS AND ARREST STRUCK STRUCK STRU PREFINES EXPONENT CAUTEMENT STRATES FOR THE SUFFICIO OF AF ADELLICATION FLOSS, ACR FLOSS AND APPOINT THAN FUNCES (OR AF PURTION OF COURT MODILIZATION PLANS) 4. PROF NOT PROGRAM THE ALL NO AS DEPARTURES OF TROOF SALES DETERMINED FOR PRODUCTIVE IN THE DETAIL AND OF THE AF POLITICS MELITIVE TO TROOP STEERING OF PRO-Developing organisational objectives and formulating policies per taining thereto. 5. DEVELOPS FLANC, PRICING AND PROCEEDING M. STREET FROM IN THE ALL PROCESSOR AS STREET AND PROCESSOR OF THE U.S. AND SERVINGS AS STREET APPROPRIATION OF THE ELTHON. ADDRESS AS STREET AND ADDRESS AS THOSE PROCESSOR AS THOSE FROM THE STREET, AND THE PROCESSOR ALL PR D. Neriewing and analyzing mission directives and determines proper assignment of functions to me for organisational elements. T. FOUTURE COME AND ACCURATE OFFICITIES TYPE AND SON-TYPE APPROXIMATIONS OF CHARLES AND DOESNO AFRO IN A DEAT TRACE BASIS ON DAY TRACE PRODUCE, YOR USE BY THE STATE ACCURATED YOU SCHOOL, TOTALS ON DESCRIPTION ADMINISTRA MILITARY ALLOCATIONS BRANCA MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT BRANCH Allocates William ofaces to easies descared within the other Precise and Residents ofaces to deferm with a process of order in regularization. 2. DEFECT: PRODUCTED SAVERING THE DISTRIBUTION OF RES-T/ORS AUTHORIZATION OF THE STATE OF CHARLES SOLVETTED OF THE STATE. INTEGRATING MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES OF STAFF ACASCING AND PUNCTICIAL ORGANIZATIONAL CONCURRENTS. A. FREPARED DET HED THRONG MARTS FOR THE BASE TROOP PROBABLE SAINTING RECEASE AROUSE OF MILITAR OF THE PARKET OF THE DEAF TROOF FREGUE I'M DIRECT, DWILLIAM SELECTION, PRINCIPLE DOSIGIES OF SPACES FOR SER SELECTION TO ARREST STR & BELLION FLYWING TOTAL WILLIAM SERVICES CHILDREN AND AUTHORITOS AND AUTHORITOS. 7. PERSON, OLD APPERSON, MUNICIPE FOR THE ESTABLISHENT, ASSISTED OF MINISTERS OF MANAGEMENT OF MINISTERS OF M S. PARTING PROGRAM DEPURENTION TO OTHER ADDROPP ASSISTED AS REGISSED.

PEFFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAP.
DEVELOPS MANPONER STANDARDS.
EXERCISED FINAL APPROVAL OF ALL MANNING AND
EQUIPPING DOCUMENTS.

# ORGANIZATION FLANNING BRANCH

 DETERMINES THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE THAT WILL MOST EFFECTIVELY ACCORD-LISH THE MISSION AND REDUCE TO A MINIMUM THE QUALITATIVE AND QUARTITATIVE REQUIRE—

- . The suplication of sound orinciples of organizational management
- Developing plans to the end that each organizational component is a logical, separable, integral part of the whole organization, and accountability, authority and accountability.
- C. Developing organisational objectives and formulating policies per
- D. Seviewing and analysing mission directives and determines prope

### MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT BRANCH

DESIGNS AND DEPLOYENTS THE USAY MANAGEMENT DEPOSITION AND IN CONCERNING MASS.
 MOST EXPECTIVE IN INCREASING ROUNDEY OF DEPOSITION AND IN CONCERNING MASS.

- A. DEVELOPING MARAGEMENT INSPONMENT FOLICIES, PRINCIPLES, PLACS, FOOG AND, TODIS AND TENEMICURES DESIGNATE OF ASSIST OFF ADMINISTRATION OF THE PRINCIPLE AND STAFF OFFICERS IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR PARAGEMENT SECURE SILITIES.
- 8. INTEGRATING NAMAGEMENT ACTIVITIES OF STAFF ACENCIES AND FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL COMPUNENTS.
- INTEGRATING, IN COORDINATION WITH PERTINENT CREATESTICAL UNIT WARRINGERT FINGINGERING SERVICES.
- IDENTISTING, TORGES STATEMATIC ANALYSIS AND RIVING, AREAS WORSD DOPONED REPRESTIVEMENTS IN RECEIPED AND RECOMMENDING CORRECTIVE.
- E. PROVIDING SUMMARIES, CONVILATIONS AND REPORTS PERTINENT TO THE RAI

### MANPOWER UTILIZATION BRANCH

1. DETERMINES THE COLLITATIVE AND COLUMNITATIVE HANDING PERCURBHING, PROSICAL AND HEMTAL, GENERATED BY THE MISSION AND THE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE, EX-

- A. DEVELOPISC TECHNIQUES AND PROVIDING CUIDANCE TO THE FIELD OF THE COMBOUT OF STUDIES AND SHRWERS TO DETERMINE THE 12 FECTIVENIES OF
- B. EVALUATING THE RESULTS OF FIELD SURVEYS AND INITIATING APPROPRIATE OCCURRENTIVE ACCION.
- C. DEVELOPING AND HAISTAINING & PROFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAM.
- D. DEVELOPING, INSTALLING AND MAINTAINING AN INTEGRATED WORK MEASURE-MENT SISTEM.
- 2. PHEFARES VARIOUS REPORTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MARRIAGE UTILIZATION

# MANNING AND EQUIPPING DOCUMENTS BRANCH

1. DETELOPS MERCORIS FLARRISG TABLES, RATIOS AND FACTORS DESIGNED FOR GROSS PROGRAM-LING AND MIDDET MERCS OF THE AIR FORCE.

 DEVELOPS TABLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR UNITS, LANGELL COMMAT IN SATURE, THAT ARE DESIGNED MITS A. MEMBERTENHESSED CAPABILITY OF PREFORMANCE IN COMMAT.

 REVIEWS AND RECOMMENS DEPROVMENTS IN TARIES OF DISTRIBUTION WHICH LEGI-GATE PRESCRIEG. RF. JOS TITLE, EFECULATE COSE AND ORATE, ATTRIBUTED FOR EACH FUNCTION OF AN ACTIVITY MARGEM LITTLE PRESCRIEG. LEGIS SIZE ALLOWERS.

4. DIRECTS THE DEVELOPMENT, PUBLICATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE MARCHEN COLLEGE APM 190-1.

2 0 617 48 100

5. DEVELOPS EQUIPMENT DOCUMENTS FOR AIR FORCE UNITS AND STATIONS.

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### MANPOWER PROGRAMS BRANCH

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### MILITARY ALLOCATIONS BRANCH

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### MANPOWER PROGRAMS ANALYSIS BRANCH

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4. CONCRETE WIMERIES STATISTICAL AMALINES AND MACHINE NEWS POSTRATING SEC

SECURITY INFORMATION

#### HEADQUARTERS INTERPRETATION OF AFR 150-5

\* \* \* \* \* \*

AFR 150-5 was issued with two objectives in mind with respect to field commanders:

To exphasize the responsibility of communders for maintaining a continuing check on the balance between personnel and workload, and the importance of examining thoroughly all requests for additional personnel.

To provide that carranders will not be assigned additional function by the air Staff without increased personnel authorizations, or without information being provided to the air Staff indicating the lower priority functions that have been, or will have to be, deferred or eliminated.

It should be noted that the emphasis in this regulation is on "additional" personnel, i.e., additional personnel in terms of augmentations or activations of units which do not appear in the carating program. The intent definitely is not to require rejustification of all strengths in the program. However, a certain amount of re-justification will be required under the following circumstances:

A troop ceiling is in existence and programmed strength is up to this ceiling, and

The satisfaction of urgent needs for personnel not programed is dependent upon the establishment of a priority of activities and the reallocation of spaces from units of lower priority to those with higher relative priorities.

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\*AFR 150-5

AIR FORCE REGULATION ) NO. 150-5 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, 19 SEPTEMBER 1951

### PROGRAM AND MANPOWER

Non-T/O Personnel Allotments

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- 1. Purpose. This Regulation outlines the procedure for submitting requests for changes in non-T/O strength authorizations.
- 2. Scope. The provisions of this Regulation are applicable to all major air commands (overseas and ZI) which receive non-T/O personnel authorizations, military and/or civilian, from Headquarters USAF.
- 3. General. There are not enough people available in the Nation to do all the things it might be desirable to do. Activities must be arranged, therefore, in an order of priority which conforms to the principle of "first things first" in relation to the assigned mission. These priorities will not remain fixed over an extended period of time because the activities will change. A function of command is to see that manpower is allocated to activities in accordance with priorities which exist in terms of mission. The proper use of manpower resources demands the personal attention of the commander who must review priorities frequently and readjust them to the existing situation. Without advance planning and predetermined skill requirements, manning will not conform to authorizations. Some time lag will always exist between the development of a new workload and the adjustment of personnel authorizations. It follows then, that minor or temporary changes in workload will be absorbed at the expense of lower priority activities. Major increases in workload will result in a temporary or indefinite deletion or deferment of lower priority activities pending consideration of requests for adjustment to personnel authorizations.

### 4. Definitions and Usage:

a. Major Air Commands—As used in this Regulation refers to air commands directly subordinate to Headquarters USAF.

b. Non-T/O Authorizations—Military and civilian personnel authorizations (also known as troop spaces and civilian positions respectively) allotted by means of Personnel Allotment

\*This Regulation supersedes AFR 150-5, 18 July 1949.

Vouchers to major air commands by Headquarters USAF.

quarters USAF.
c. Non-T/O Personnel Allotment Voucher
(PAV)—AF Form 271, "Non-T/O&E Personnel Allotment Voucher—Military," and AF
Form 271a, "Non-T/O&E Personnel Allotment
Voucher—Civilian," are the documents issued by
Headquarters USAF to establish the non-T/O
personnel authorizations of a major air command for a definite period. Responsibility for
the distribution of military and civilian authorizations as contained in the PAV, rests with the
headquarters of major air commands and may
not be delegated to lower echelons.

5. Authorization of Non-T/O Spaces. For the purpose of stabilizing the troop spaces and civilian positions authorized the major air commands, non-T/O authorizations will be changed by Personnel Allotment Vouchers (PAV's). Separate vouchers will be issued for military and civilian authorizations as follows:

### a. Military Personnel:

- Changes in personnel requirements effected by Headquarters USAF will result in a tentative authorization and a revision without prior request from the command.
- (2) The tentative authorization will be utilized pending analysis and review of the requirements by Headquarters USAF
- (3) PAV's for troop spaces will be issued on a monthly basis and will be furnished 90 days in advance.

#### b. Civilian Personnel:

- (1) Major air commands will submit personnel requirements by budget project when the change in workload is directed by Headquarters USAF.
- (2) Civilian personnel projections, for planning purposes, will be issued each month for a 90-day advance period at the same time that the military PAV's are issued.

### AFR 150-5

(3) PAV's for civilian positions will be issued on a quarterly basis 30 days in advance of the quarter.

# 6. Justification for Additional Authoriza-

a. Each request for additional personnel authorizations will be directly related to specific changes in the mission of the organization, or in the workload generated by the mission. The requests will include statements outlined below:

(1) When the requested increase is the result of an added function, a clear statement of the proposed function and its effect upon the present mission will be given. An estimate of the workload volume in terms of physically countable work units will be given together with the number of personnel which will be required to accomplish the workload. Work units to be used will conform to appropriate Basic Manning Standards work units contained in AFM 150-1.

(2) When the requested increase is the result of expansion of a present function, the statement will define the increase and the justification therefor in a similar manner. The requested increase in personnel must be related to a stated increase in countable workload. Measurable statistics on the workload accomplished during the past several months, together with the number of personnel which had been required to accomplish that workload, must be stated. Justification should include a statement of the steps taken to increase the productivity of presently authorized personnel, such as management improvements.

(3) When the increase is the result of a directive from higher headquarters, in addition to the steps cited in (1) and (2) above, the authority for the increase will be given.

b. Requests which involve increased space authorizations will be supported by a detailed

breakdown by SSN and/or AFSC and grade in accordance with current Regulations. Grades for enlisted personnel will be submitted in accordance with AFR's in the 35-400 series. Civilian position requests will include a statement on fund availability.

c. To balance fluctuations in workload, commanders at each echelon will make adjustments within their existing personnel space allotments before requesting additional spaces from higher echelons. A statement to this effect will be used as a part of the justification in each request forwarded to Headquarters USAF.

d. Each request will include a statement indicating which lower priority function has been or will be eliminated or reduced to accommodate the increased workload. The decision to increase authorization will be made in consideration of the relative importance of low priority functions eliminated or reduced.

e. When made, space allocations are usually identified by the function for which authorized. Upon cessation or curtailment of the function, the spaces will be subject to withdrawal by Headquarters USAF.

f. Anticipated workloads do not always develop to the extent for which spaces are programmed and/or authorized. If any spaces allocated are surplus to requirements, or if there is a curtailment or elimination of a function, commanders will report excess authorizations to the next higher headquarters. This action is just as important in proper utilization of manpower as a request for additional personnel to meet increased workloads.

7. Submission of Requests. To avoid a continuous stream of minor changes to current non-T/O authorizations, all requests for changes in non-T/O strength authorizations (military and civilian) will be consolidated by major air commands and submitted to Headquarters USAF within the first 15 days of each quarter. Exceptions will be made only in cases of emergency. All requests must be substantiated as outlined in paragraph 6 and will be submitted through channels to the Director of Manpower and Organization, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

By ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

#### OFFICIAL:

K. E. THIEBAUD Colonel, USAF Air Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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HOYT S. VANDENBERG Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

C26863

DEFARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE SECOND CHAPTOF STAFF
UNITED STATES AFA FORCE AT 10 N
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 November 1951

MEMORANDUM TO THE AIR STAFF

SUBJECT: Air Force Manpower Requirements

- On 30 August 1951, I presented to my commanders the manpower requirements for an expanded Air Force structure. These requirements involved changes in concept based on properly and completely using our mobilization potential.
- 2. So that there will be a full understanding of my intent and my commitments to the commanders, I will quote from my talk to them.

"I want to hold you fully responsible for the effective utilization of the resources we make available to you and I expect you to be able to operate within the limits that we set, when you generate new requirements regarded by you of high priority, I expect you to delete items of low priority within your command. If you have fat within the limits we have set, you can use that fat for meeting new requirements. In other words, you commanders must operate within fixed ceilings. Your manpower people ought to be the major agents for weeding out inefficiency.

"You should examine your projected requisitions for manpower in terms of your overall picture and not in terms of the specific proposal alone. Too often an individual project which is good and requires manpower spaces does not utilize the spaces already within the resources control of the commander.

"I am instructing my staff to give you a decent break. When they add to your workload they should either delete some other requirement so that you can absorb the load, or they should furnish extra manpower spaces. Nevertheless, as your manpower and management improvement staff becomes effective, you will be able and expected to absorb some increased loads."


3. The Director of Manpower and Organization is charged with managing the manpower program of the Air Force. The Staff is expected to clear with him, as to the availability of manpower, in precisely the same manner as it clears with the Director of the Budget as to the availability of funds. Proposals for changes in

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
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### SEGRET

#### HISTORY OF YORK PRADURE ENT IN THE AIR FORCE

The need for Tork Measurement in the Air Force was first felt about two and one half years ago during the days of the Air Force Manpower Group. Emphasis at that time was on the production of a set of guides for manning which would enable a survey team to assume the true manpower requirement of an organization. In addition, however, to the purely quantitative requirement, there was a need for arriving at a skill distribution. Tork Measurement would not provide the latter so it was decided, in view of time and manpower limitations, to confine activities to the production of a Yardstick or Easic Manning Standards manual which would contain both quantitative and skill requirements and would be readily assembled from survey experience of the Manpower Group.

Somewhat later the Assistant for Programming in conjunction with the Planning Research Division (DCS/C) approached the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, which by this time had absorbed the Panpower Group, on the subject of developing Typical Earning Tables. They had worked with the Basic Manning Standards manual (150-1) and had been unable to durive Manpower Requirements for planning purposes from the Base Type workload data used in that publication. What was needed was a system of tables which would proceed directly from program data (number of sireraft, type of aircraft, flying time, base population, etc.) to define both the quantitative requirements for personnel and the skill requirements depending upon the size of the program element workload. For example, a Training Base would have a different quantiative and skill requirement for a student load of 600 than it would for a load of 1800. Yet, only the student load figures are available in any program. Planning Tables were developed to meat this need and show for various student loads, the manpower requirements by squadron, by element and by skill.

The need for maintaining the continuity of these tables were recognized of course, but it was assumed that periodic review would suffice.

During the development phases of the Flanning Tables program, a means of placing Tables of Organization on punch cards was developed. This was quickly extended to Tables of Distribution. It is now possible, for example, to obtain a complete run by skill by grade for all organizations in the Air Force which are on either Tables of Organization or Tables of Distribution.

Two problems presented themselves. First, what means would be used to assure that the Tables presented were valid? We decided to standardize the workload information to be reported on the face of the Tables and relate them to each element reported in the strength section. The second problem was how could we analyze the great mass of Tables which would come in to Headquarters, HSAP?

Consideration of these two programs led to the development of a statistical procedure for the analysis of Tables of Distribution which would yelld Planning Tables, and Basic Manning Standards. These could then be kept current and could also serve as guides or standard manning lists against which to verify the Tables as submitted.



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This produced, however, that the relationships between canpower and workload as presented on Tacles of Distribution were valid and could be readily

Backing up just a bit in time, the Fureau of the Budget had been applying considerable pressure on the Department of the hir Force to install a Tork Measurement system. Looking at the sister services' work measurement system and the great mass of detail which these systems called for to be transmitted to Mashington, had caused this headquarters to view this proposal with little enthusiasm. In addition our experience with such reporting systems had been that by the time the data was transmitted to headquarters, the necessary analysis made and action taken, a considerable time would have slapsed so trat discussion on the points raised became somewhat scademic. To did, however, take this step. Using data provided by the Cost Control system, we aligned functions reported into a structure roughly parallel the Ming Base structure and studied the relationship between certain broad work units such as fuel consumption, vouchers processed, base personnel, etc., against the personnel totals for each function. We have successful in this endeavor in relating some interesting manning questions such as: If 75% of the bases in the Air Force can accomplish a given workload with a stated number or proportion of personnel, why can't the remainder, and there is a relationship in a given base between the workload and the personnel reported in each function, why are increases in authorization requested for that base out of proportion to the planned or assumed workload. If nothing else, these Torkload studies were educational in that they established that there were statistical relationships between personnel in given functions and manpower required which would remain relatively stable for Force wide. They also pointed out the difference between a workload in terms of units produced, and a justification for a function which does not change from period to period. In other words, requisition line items posted is a valid work unit -- acres of grand is not

In the closing months of last year, the producte to establish a Tork Measurement system could no longer be denied. In addition, if we were to have valid planning documents, we in the Air Force had a positive need for it, is had in addition the requirements of the Tanagement Improvement Program to contend with. This was an additional requirement imposed by the Bureau of the Budget in conformity with Presidential order and called for some means of assessing the need for management improvement and evaluating the progress made in operating efficiency after improvements were instituted. This meant that our Tanagement survey program, which had since ceased to become a vehicle for determining requirements hir Force wide, could no longer function on a continuous basis. Surveying had to be confined to areas in need of survey. Requirements could not be established for an organization without providing at the same time the procedures and methods which would enable a supervisor to function under those management mystem which would work, and quickly.

We went back to the original proposals which had been developed in 1949 and examined them again. The more we looked at them, the more it seemed to us that they would work. The system was simple, self operative, informed as it operated, required no statistical specialists to interpret or operate, and placed the detailed data where it would do the most good. It was a tested system

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since it was adapted from the Veteran's Administration system which had been developed in 1947 and was still functioning. We decided to try it. At present (Jan 1952) tests are being run at Milliams Mir Force Base in the Training Command and to date the results justify the initial faith in it.

APPLICATION TO THE AIR FORCE:

This is the way it works

First the work areas of an air base are determined and classified according to broad areas which are termed programs. A program is generally equivalent to a squadron. Each such program is further classified into functions and these functions into activities. The activities are further subdivided into operations which in turn are expressed as specific work units necessary in the performance of these operations. For example: Let us take Air Installations as a program. Functions within this program would be l'aintenance and depair, Fire Protection, and Sanitation. Tithin the Function of l'aintenance and depair, we find the following activities: Electric Shop, Field Lighting, Fainting, Carpenter Shop, Air Conditioning and defrigeration, Flumbing, etc. Examining the Electric Shop activity further we find the following operations descriptive of the work domains the following. The operation Poter Servicing can be expressed in work unit form as "A Fotor Serviced."

Each such work unit developed throughout the base is rigidly defined in collaboration with each supervisor and the source of workload data and manhour data noted.

The next step is the initiation of operation level reporting and the establishment of standards. A comprehensive and detailed reporting system is used which calls for each supervisor to report the total manhours available daily in his activity, the number of each designated work units produced together with the most amount of time required daily to process this work, and the number of minhours used in unmeasured operations or work not specifically covered by defined work units. This detailed reporting generally does not go beyond a two week period but may extend as long as a month depending upon the peculiarities of various types of work. There seasonal work is involved it may not be possible to arrive at standards until work of that type is done out this does not delay the program.

Production rates for each work unit are computed daily and at the end of the two week period they are arranged in order of size and that rate selected as a tentative standard which is helfway between the middle rate and the best rate. This standard is selected as an incentive standard for pusposes of appraising operations and is not used for planning purposes without modification as will be pointed out shortly.

With the functional and work unit layout completed, standards assigned and indoctrination complete, all activities on the base commence the reporting of effectiveness. This is what happens.

There each supervisor formerly reported total manhours, manhours against each work unit, and volume of production of each work unit, he now reports only total manhours for the organization and volume of production. The data is accumulated monthly and the lork resourcement deports prepared at the end of the month.

This report, which is prepared in a single copy only, by the function whief, goes to the Squadron Headquarters and a Summary lork Beasurement Record is prepared from it and other Nork Measurement Reports submitted by other Functions of that Squadron. Let us see what is on this work Measurement Report first.

The entries on the dork Measurement Report are, in addition to identifying each activity reportin, the title of each work unit, the volume produced, the standard, total manhours required at standard rate, for the activity as a whole measured manhours are reported (the number of manhours actually expended by all personnel working on identified sork units), the sumber of manhours expended on work not covered by work units and total manhours which is the total of measured and unmeasured. In effectiveness rate for the entire activity is computed by dividing standard manhours by the measured manhours. This rate is interpreted to mean the percent of standard time actually taken in an activity to accomplish the reported workload. It is not expected that organizations will meet this standard and therefore report 100% effectiveness because, as has been pointed out, this is an incentive standards. For planning purposes in computing manpower requirements directly from base type workloads, the standard is used to compute standard manhours required, then this is modified by the prevailing level of effectiveness to determine the actual requirement under conditions prevailing at the time or at the place in which the work is to be performed.

In other words, what is watched is the position of the effectiveness rate from month to month. If it shows improvement, it is generally indicative of a healthy organization; if it does not show improvement, remains static or declines the remarks section of the report should contain an explanation which should include a statement of action being taken to remedy conditions. There action necessary is beyond the capability of the reporting supervisor, this is noted and specific assistance required in terms of labor, equipment, space or instruction stated.

The unmeasured manhours column is indicative of effort spent on non-mission activities. In other words, it is a vehicle enabling a commander to assess the impact of one-time jobs on his regular mission. He cannot only provide a specific manhour figure for any such job but he can tell at a glance what it has cost in terms of decreased production on regular work.

The Squadron Commander then will receive one Tork Measurement Report from each Function in his Program. He consolidates the data onto a Sum-ary Tork Measurement Record by posting the totals of the manhour columns only and computing a new effectiveness rate for the squadron or program. This Tork Measurement Record goes forward to Group where it is again consolidated and Jork Measurement Reports for operating sections of Group Headquarters are added and a new Jork Measurement Record is prepared showing within it the manhour totals for each squadron and operating section and a Group effectiveness rate is computed. At each stage of the process, the remarks section is examined and any conditions indicated on the report are commented on from the standpoint of what was the matter and what is being done about it. In other words, this system does not wait for a report to po forward to the top and wait for criticism to be received before action is taken. The action is taken or commenced simultaneously with the forwarding of the report.

The information on workload does not appear outside of the squadron or operating section of a Group. This is as it should be since this is a command channels report and not a statistical services report. Dut, you may ask, how

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does the workload data necessary for the computation of planning factors and programs get to higher levels? This detailed data is processed through statistical services channels where it can be handled and the vehicle for it is the T/D Rechanization Program. With the work Measurement Program established our Yardstick Manual will be changed to conform with the structure and work units developed by the former and the justifications required for Tables of Distribution, and for Tables of Organization, will be in accordance with this format.

As we have mentioned, tests are being undertaken at fills AFB. These tests have resulted in admetting we have always known, and that is that fork Measurement is a management program which serves supervisors at all levels. Then we examined the Field Maintenance program prior to installing work measurement, we found that as set up it would duplicate to some extent the processes used in maintenance control. The analyzed the system in order to revise the control system enabling us to out out five forms and reduce work order volume about 50%. In addition, we put manpower requirements computations in field maintenance on a reslictio basis enabling production control to balance manpower against projected workload monthly by type of work by organizational segments.

Our ultimate objective, with the assistance of the Harvard Group and the cooperation of the Pirectorates of Panagement Analysis Services and Accounting is to align the cost accounting system and this work measurement program so that the same account groupings are used as are used in work measurement and the tables of organization and distribution. Then that is accomplished, we will be able to proceed from a statement of workload, compute manpower requirements, cost the manpower expended, and plan a budget for the requirement in a uniform manner. The ultimate objective —— performance budgeting.

With sound tables of distribution we get sound planning tables. This in turn means that we can use electronic computers for the preparation of programs and budget thereby reducing the time required to prepare these documents to a matter of days. This is the course of action to which the Directorate of Manpower and Organization is committed. With your help it can be carried out to the benefit of the Air Force and help us to produce more firepower with less manpower and less cost.

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTIE

# SECURITY INFURMATION INTERNAL ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION PLANNING BRANCH

	FUNCTIONAL AREAS	
Combat Compart	Personnel Training	Materiel R&D
	COMMAND AREAS	
SAC TAC ADC MATS FEAF AAC CAC NEAC	Conac ATRC AU Hq Command AF Finance Div USAF SECURITY SERVICE Air Fictorial Service PERSONERL ASSIGNMENTS	AMC ARDC AFG SVC USAFE
Major Reichert	Lt Col Cook *** Major Kolsted **	Lt Col Kelly

#### CHIEF OF BRANCH OFFICE

Col Wasem, Branch Chief
Lt Col Leslie, Deputy
Mr. Fierce, Special Assistant)
Mrs. Kahn, Secretary

NOTE: "REAF Exchange Officer \*\*At Command and Staff School - 31 August to 14 December 1951 \*\*\*Assigned to Special Studies Group, 26 November 1951

The Organization Planning Branch is not sectionalized. It is necessary that projects be assigned to the persons most available to handle them. It is desired, however, that each officer keep thoroughly abreast of developments in the functional area to which he is assigned. He will be the "consultant" in that area.

# ORGANIZATION PLANNING BRANCH SECURITY INFORMATION

 Determines the organizational structure that will most affectively accomplish the mission and reduce to a minimum the qualitative and quantitative requirements for manpower by:

a. The application of sound principles of organizational management.

#### Implementation

- (1) Establish, through policies, sound regardsational concepts for all USAF activities:
  - (a) Stabilization of Air Force structure
  - (b) Standardization of ephelons and nomenclature
  - (s) Standardization of staff structures
- (2) Assure that the USAF is organized along functional lines.
- (3) Prohibit the establishment of "Corpo" type structures
- (4) Provide flexibility in the USAF Organizational structure.
- (5) Stress maximum decentralization of responsibility and delegation of authority.
- (6) In the interest of economical manpower utilization to use the lowest possible Air Force organizational echalthat can effectively do the job.
- (7) Hold to a minimum the number of headquarters between operating units and major air commands.
- (8) Maintaining an appropriate balance between combat and supporting elements.

b. Developing plans to the end that each organizational composition a logical, separable, integral part of the whole organization, having commensurate responsibility, authority and accountability.

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Implementation

- (1) Study and continually review the organizational structure of all major USAF commands.
- (2) Study organizational structures of Army, Navy, Marine, industrial organizations and Foreign Military Services for the purpose of seeking and applying improvements to the USAF organization.
- (3) Examine the charter or missions of all types of USAF units to determine their essentiality, adequacy and functional alignment.
- (2) Reporting USAF organizational changes to the OSA for periodic publication in the Federal Register and annual publication in the U.S. Government Organization Manual.
- Respecting Organizational Charts showing Air Force organizational structure.
- (6) Properation of speeches relative to Air Force organisation for numbers of the Air Staff.
- c. Developing organizational objectives and formulating policies pertaining thereto.


#### Implementation

- Preparation of an organizational objective folder outlising the long range organizational objectives for the USAF.
- (2) Preparation of an Air Force organizational manual embodying current Air Force organization concepts, policies and criticria
- (3) Working in close coordination with other staff sections to assure that operational essentiaents, personnel plans and material needs are adequately reflected in current organization.
- (4) Review and revision of designated chapters of the Wartime Planning Factors Manual (BOI 170-3).
- d. Reviewing and analyzing mission directives and determining proper assignment of functions to major organizational elements.

#### Implementation

(1) Review and analyze the mission directives of all major air commands to insure against duplication, overlapping or malassignment of functions and that the missions are accurately and clearly stated.

SECURITY INFORMATION



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SECURITY INFORMATION

Office Of The Vice Chief Of Staff United States Air Force Washington, D. C.

28 SEP 1951

HEMORYDIES FOR DIRECTOR OF MANIONER & ORGANIZATION, DCS/O

SUBJECT: Delegation of Coorating Functions

- 1. Attached hereto is a letter, subject as above, from the Commending General, Air Training Command, with one inclosure, "List of Operating Functions". The recommendations of this letter and the attached inclosure will increase the effectiveness of the Air Training Command and contribute as well to significant savings in management.
- 2. General Cwining has advised the Commanding General, Air Training Command, that the Telef of Staff's office agrees with the general principles of those recommendations and that the matter will be given the extention of his office. Acceptance of these recommendations will enable the Training Command to reduce its Headquarters from a total Officer-Airmon-Civilian strongth of 1,329 on 1 August 1951 to a total of 870 on 1 January 1952. In order to accommish this desirable reduction, relief from the Regulations referred to in the inclosure is required in each practicable instance.
- 3. Your office is given the primary responsibility for Staff-wide fellow-through on these procumendations. This memorandum will be your authority with other Directorates to expedite action on these changes for the Air Training Command.
- 6. Your office should consult the legal authorities to determine that none of these roce mendations contravene either established law or directives of the Scorotary of Defense or the President.
- 5. A copy of the Training Command recommendations should be submitted to other Hejer Commands with the suggestion that they review the applications of these recommendations to their Commands and make any further recommendations of the same type to this Hendquarters. Relief to the Training Command should not be delayed by the reference of their suggestions to the other Commands.
- E. You will exmedite the processing of these recommendations throughout the Air Staff and bring to the attention of this office any major objections to the suggested changes.
  - 7. You will file a report on action accomplished on 1 November 1951.

Incl Ltr from CG, ATRO, undtd, w/incl

SECURITY INFORMATION
WILLIAM F. McKEE
Hajor General, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

# SECURITY INFORMATION PRICE OF THE COMMITTING GENERAL

SUBJECT: Delogation of Operating Punctions

TO: Chief of Staff Headquarters, USAF Washington 25, D. G.

- 1. It has been a center of considerable concern to me since the activation of the Training Air Forces that this Readquarters is still involved in many routine, operational details which should be performed at subordinate levels. I have felt that we are not fully achieving our purpose of limiting this Readquarters to Broad policy and plans, and possing the detailed operating and supervisory functions down to the Training Air Forces. I feel very strongly that we must get this Headquarters out of the operating, re-reviseing and routine business if we are to achieve taxinum effectiveness.
- 2. A board of officers consisting of my Vice Commander and Chief of Staff, and the Commanding Generals of the Training Air Forces, has theroughly studied this problem and recommended revisions of administrative procedures to affect decentralization of overating functions from this Headquarters. I have already taken action to delegate some 40 routine functions which were within my authority. There are an additional 95 functions which were within my authority. There are an additional 95 functions which I feel should be delegated, but which are required by USAF directives to be performed at major air command or higher level. These functions are listed in Inclease 1, together with recommendations for their disposition.
- 3. With approval of these recommendations for functional delegation, I will be able to reduce the personnel authorization for this Readquarters by £50 spaces. This reduction in manpower requirements alone is very worthwhile; however, the real benefit will be derived from the fact that this Readquarters can then devote the major portion of its time to plane and policy rather than to reutine operations.
- 4. I believe that the approach to this whole problem should be a recognition of the fact that each of our Training Air Forces is, in effect a major command, from the standpoint of size and complexity of operations. Each of them is command by a competent general officer and staffed with well qualified officers the are fully capable of making decisions and taking action, within the limits of the functional actionity and factual information available to them.

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### SECURITY INFORMATION

Ltr fr Hq ATRC to CofS, Hq USAF, Washington, D. C., subj: "Delegation of Operating Functions"

5. I realize that some of the recommendations involve rather drastic changes in present operating procedures. I am convinced, however, that we must make a break from our traditional examination of every detail from the subordinate echelons. Unless we can delegate authority and responsibility to subordinate commanders commensurate with their capabilities, we will hamstring ourselves by our proceduration with operational details, when we should be spending our effort on effective plans and policy.

1 Incl List of Operating Functions s/s ROBERT W. HARPER-Lieutenant General, U. S. A. F. Commanding

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
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
Major Actions Authorized:

Action	Effec	tivo	Date
Hq, 35th Air Division (Defense) constituted, assigned to ADC & activated	1	Jul	51
Rome Air Development Center; Air Force Cambridge Research Center; and Air Force Flight Test Center established and assigned to ARDC. Hq of each center designated and organized as	28 25	Jun Jun Jun respe	51,
T/D units.			
Long Range Proving Ground Division, and Hq & Hq Sq thereof, redesignated as Air Force Missile Test Center & Hq thereof, respectively.	30	Jun	51
Minth Air Force (Tactical) & Hq thereof redesignated as Minth Air Force & Hq, thereof respectively.	26	Jun	51
Eighteenth Air Force (Troop Carrier) and Hq there of redesignated as Eighteenth Air Force & Hq thereof respectively.	_ 26	Jun	51
Hq & Hq Sq, 314th Air Division relieved from further assignment to Fifth Air Force, but re- mains assigned to FEAF.	18	May	51
Hqs, 10th & 11th Air Divisions (Defense) inactivated.	20	Jul	51
Technical Training Air Force & Hq, Technical Training Air Force assigned to ATRC & Hq organ- ized as a T/D unit.		Sep	51
36th Air Division & Hq thereof assigned to SAC & Hq organized as a T/D unit.	4	Sep	51
Air Engineering Development Division & Hq thereof redesignated as Arnold Engineering Development Center & Hq thereof, respectively.	3	Aug	51
The 1st, 2d, 3d, & 4th Air Reserve Districts & Hqs of each assigned to CONAC & Hqs organized as T/D units.	1	Dec	51
49th Air Division & Hq thereof assigned to TAC. Hq, 49th Air Division activated as a T/O&E unit		Nov	51

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#### SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

#### HISTORY OF

ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING

1 July 1951 - 31 December 1951

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PART I FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION

> CHAPTER I FUNCTIONS

The functions of the Assistant for Programming, unchanged from the previous period, are:

- Program Control. The complete USAF Programming cycle is subject to the control of the Assistant for Programming. Besides monitoring the entire cycle, this office:
  - a. Provides guidance and assumptions to the Air Staff for program procedures.
  - b. Establishes program procedures.
  - c. Analyzes USAF major programs for balance, phasing and consistency with Air Force objectives.
- Aircraft and Flying Time Allocation. In addition to the responsibilities for over-all program control, the Assistant for Programming produces the programs allocating aircraft and flying time.

CHAPTER II ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

There were no significant organizational changes down to the division level during this period. However, below that level, there were changes in organization to reflect Mutual Defense Assistance programming in the Allocations and Aircraft Programming Divisions.

Authorized and actual strength for the beginning and end of the period were as follows:


	1 July 19 Authorized	A COLUMN TO THE PARTY OF THE PA	31 December 1951 Authorized Actual		
Officers Civilians Airmen	57 61 2	48 46 3	58 *61 2	54 49 2	
TOTAL	120	94	120	97	ĺ

\* Includes three (3) MDAP


Significant personnel changes during the period were as follows:

- Colonel N. D. Van Sickle, on 8 August 1951, was relieved from duty as Deputy Chief and assigned as Chief of the Aircraft Programming Division, replacing Colonel Pratt Brown.
- 2. Colonel P. M. Spicer, on 6 October 1951, was relieved from duty as Deputy Chief of the Analysis Division to become Chief of the Programming Division, replacing Colonel L. B. Ocamb.

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


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


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
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
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#### PART II MAJOR ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER I
PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING CYCLE, FISCAL YEAR 1953

The six month period just passed was characterized by the disruptive effects of the prior year on program and budget schedules. On a normal schedule of planning, programming and budgeting, the first Air Force programs for budgeting FY 1953 would have been prepared and released early in calendar 1951. However, through FY 1951 we programmed and budgeted on a supplemental basis and did not have the basis for beginning such a first set of FY 1953 budget programs until well into the latter half of calendar year 1951. The delays, the difficulty in providing correct and adequate program guidance to the Air Staff, also grew out of the difficulty encountered in formalating basic policy at high governmental levels. Basic decisions as to budget levels were not made until after the period under review. The rate of mobilization (the extension of mobilization goals in order to gain stability versus achieving mobilization targets at the earliest possible dates with its attendant disrupting effects) was the basic conflict which was resolved during this period. The resolution was in favor of extending goals in the attempt to achieve a relative stability of the national economy.

At the start of this period, a revised draft of strategic guidance for the FY 1953 program was prepared, based on reviews of the original guidance by the Air Force Council, Chief of Staff, and Secretary of the Air Force. The original guidance presented to the Air Force Council calling for a 2,160,000 military personnel requirement

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by end FY 1954 was completely unacceptable. The Chief of Staff noted that with limited manpower available, the larger force would have to be obtained at a much lower level of manpower. For purposes of further development of strategic guidance, the Assistant for Programming assumed that a military personnel strength of 1,480,000 would be acceptable. A manpower study was performed by a special working committee under the chairmanship of Major General Burns and active sponsorship of Dr. Learned. (1) The Assistant for Programming was represented on the committee and provided the major assumptions necessary for its work. (2) The committee was set up because of the importance of manpower limitations on the possible expansibility of the Air Force and because, since mid-1950, programs had been based on additions to the 48 Wing Program rather than complete restudies.

While the FT 1953 Air Force Program was being revised by the Air Staff in consonance with the views of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operation recommended that "the Chiefs of Staff should request from the Secretary of Defense, at an early date, preliminary guidance for the formulation of the FY 1953 budget, and upon its receipt, they should agree not only on the force tables and personnel ceilings, as they have done in the past, but on the desired degree of readiness and major procurement..." (3) In a reply prepared by the Assistant for Programming for the Chief of Staff (4) it was pointed out that the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to furnish the desired strategic bases, forces, degree of readiness and program objectives to the Secretary of Defense so that he would have the opinion of the military on strategic requirements in

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formulating the necessary budgetary guidance. This view prevailed, and the Chief of Naval Operations withdrew his memorandum. The Air Staff was thus left free to continue the development of the FY 1953 program on a unilateral basis. This was a desirable course of action from the Air Force point of view inasmuch as the FY 1953 program involved a major increase in the size of the Air Force and a considerable change in strategic concept. Until the program was well formulated and the Air Force positions clarified, it was undesirable to involve the Secretary of Defense. To do so might have pre-judged the program before it was fully developed.

Work meanwhile continued on the development of the FI 1953 Air Force program. On 23 July 1951 it was pointed out to the Air Staff that the planning-budgeting cycle was already six months behind schedule and that the remainder of the cycle would have to be speeded up measurably in order to meet budget deadlines. (5) It was also pointed out that the Chief of Staff had already advocated to higher authority the immediate authorization of 138 combat wings by end FI 1954.

After coordination with the Air Staff, the FY 1953 program objectives were presented to the Air Force Council. The Council decided (6) that FY 1953 budget estimates for the 138 combat wings would be held up pending approval by the Chief of Staff; and, pending such approval, a military personnel ceiling of 1,390,000 would be used as a basis for programming. The July 1952 program objectives were immediately adjusted in line with Air Force Council decisions and preparation of initial guidance was begun.

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Once the 138 combat wing program had the approval of the Air Force Council and the Chief of Staff, it was presented to the JCS.

(7) During the course of JCS deliberation on forces, the Air Force Program passed through a series of defenses and rebuttals, each requiring the preparation of new presentations. The force finally approved by the Joint Chiefs was 126 combat wings plus supporting units. (8) An analysis disclosed that the 126 combat wing program could be accomplished generally with a flow of resources not much greater than that required for the 80 combat wing program. Previously aircraft production had always been a governing factor. It now appeared that the production levels generated by the demands for rapid equipping of a 95 (80) wing Air Force would, if continued, suffice to equip a 126 wing or even a 138 wing Air Force.

Meanwhile, however, work on program and budget detail related to the 138 combat wing program was in progress in the Air Staff and at AMC. When the 126 combat wing program was approved it became necessary because of time limitations to continue to work on the former program with full recognition that a scale-down to 126 combat wings would have to be accomplished within the Air Staff prior to submission of the budget estimates. (9)

Meanwhile, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) had submitted to the three services a preliminary draft of guide lines for the preparation of the FY 1953 budget estimates. These proposals were reviewed by the Assistant for Programming. (10) The major difference between the Air Force and the OSD positions involved

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the procurement of mobilization material reserves. The Air Force maintained that such reserves should be limited to war consumables for forces to be in-being on D-Day. This was in consonance with the Air Force position that we cannot afford to build a wartime force in peacetime, but only one which would enable survival in the event of war. This would place emphasis on the forces-in-being on D-Day, granting a lower priority to forces to be mobilized after D-Day.

Upon receipt of the draft of OSD guide lines, a reconciliation was made between the program objectives of the three services with the aforementioned OSD guide lines. This work culminated in a memorandum to the JCS (11) providing a comparison of major services program objectives with the proposed CSD guide lines for FY 1953. Meanwhile, the Air Force comments on the preliminary draft of OSD guide lines were forwarded, through Comptroller channels, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and on 3 October, the final statement of OSD guide lines for formulation of FY 1953 budget estimates was forwarded to the Secretaries of the three services, the JCS and certain other agencies. (12) These were the guide lines used in the further development of the Air Force FY 1953 budget. The comparison of major services program objectives with the proposed OSD guide lines for FY 1953 were circulated to the Air Staff for further analysis and preparation of more detailed Air Force objectives. (13) The comments of the Air Staff were subsequently incorporated in a revised draft of Air Force program objectives for FY 1953 dated 11 October 1951. (14)

Following the establishment of relatively firm program objectives

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based on 126 combat wings, preparation was begun for the FY 1953 budget review. Inasmuch as the Air Force had released a 138 combat wing program for budget computation, the subsequent approval of a 126 combat wing program (1 October 1951) necessitated a major revision of the budget estimates being prepared in the field. This greatly delayed the presentation of budget estimates to the reviewing authorities in the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget. The Assistant for Programming therefore recommended that the Air Force program, as such, should be presented to the reviewing authorities without reference to dollar amounts, to be followed later with a presentation of the dollar request. (15) This course of action was followed.

On 29 October 1951 the Secretary of Defense imposed a budget ceiling for FY 1953 on each of the services. (16) Total ceiling for the entire defense establishment was \$45 billion; that for the Air Force was \$17 billion including construction, with a suballocation of \$5.1 billion for aircraft procurement which could not be exceeded. Budget estimates for FY 1953 were to be submitted in a manner which would state the military requirements for the FY 1953 Force as approved for planning purposes, giving due consideration to the mobilization potential being acquired through the establishment of a broad production base from FY 1951 and FY 1952 funds. If such estimates exceeded \$17 billion, additional amounts were to be shown separately, and supported in terms of military necessity.

This new approach completely upset the work already going forward in the Air Staff and in the field on the FY 1953 budget, since the FY 1953 program then being considered would have required a budget of approximately \$34 billion. An analysis was made of the Secretary of Defense's directive and its direct effects, plus the effects of similar cuts in Army and Navy programs on the Air Force program were evaluated. (17) Negotiations with the Office of the Secretary of Defense resulted in modifying the original directive to permit development of budget estimates based on four separate dollar ceilings: (18)

1. \$17 billion

2. \$18 billion 3. \$20 billion

Total estimated requirements computed under approved assumptions and guide lines, i.e., the original 126 combat wing program.

The Air Force Council decided to compute these budgets as directed. (19) The Air Staff was, in turn, directed by the Air Force Council to determine when the 126 combat wing force could be equipped and effective with an annual expenditure of between \$17 and \$20 billion without reducing Research and Development requirements. It was found that the \$17-20 billion ceiling, Lantimued at a level rate after FY 1953, would never permit attainment of 126 modern combat wings and supporting forces. (20)

On 20 November 1951, the Air Force Council reviewed the budget ceiling problem with the Chief of staff. The Chief directed the following course of action: (21)

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- a. Prepare the program and budget data on the 126 modern combat wdng force agreed to by the JCS.
- b. Prepare the program and budget data required by OSD giving priority in procurement funds to the strategic air mission as contained in the original JCS approved 126 combat wing program and apportioning the remaining procurement funds to forces performing the air defense and tactical air missions.
- c. Make maximum use of available and usable second line aircraft for air defense and tactical air missions.
- d. Provide air base construction and utilization programs in consonance with the above forces.
- e. Make no cut in Research and Development funds.

The next day, the Assistant for Programming outlined the forces possible under the OSD budget ceilings to the Chief of Staff and the Air Force Council. These forces were developed in consonance with guidance furnished by the Chief of Staff on 20 November. The Chief of Staff approved the recommended force structure as presented; and directed that any necessary further cuts be made in air defense forces. The magnitude of risk involved was to be justified on the basis that the strategic air forces and support could not be compromised. (22) The Chief of Staff them directed that the Assistant for Programming present the recommended force structure under the \$17 and \$20 billion OSD benchmarks based on the following additional guidance: (23)

a. All SAC units and support to be programmed at the 126

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wing level including the three medium bomb OTUs.

- b. All B-52\*s planned for procurement under the 126 program to remain in the program.
- c. SAC requirements to be met at the expense of all other portions of the program, if necessary. Second priority to be given to air defense.

This guidance was incorporated with the old and distributed to the Air Staff (24) in a memorandum approved by the Secretary, the Chief of Staff and the Air Force Council.(25) With this guidance the Air Staff began preparation of the budget estimates as directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Incidentally, total guidance produced by the Assistant for Programming during the period amounted to 481 pages.

Time did not permit preparation of all four of the budget programs directed by OSD. The Air Staff, therefore, concentrated on the \$17 billion and the original 126 combat wing programs. The latter program, however, was developed on a much reduced basis, particularly with respect to the degree of modernization and phasing of the forces. This resulted in a program calling for 110 wings equipped by 30 June 1953 and all 126 equipped by 30 June 1954. (26)

The \$17 billion program was accomplished by using a large portion of 2nd line aircraft and with phasing considerably later than that expressed in the optimum planning for the 126 combat wing program.

The Bureau of the Budget, in its review, considered only the \$17 billion program on the basis that the Air Force could achieve


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the 126 combat wing program within that dollar ceiling. This decision was immediately opposed by the Department of the Air Force, and, after a series of meetings with the Bureau of the Budget, Department of Defense, and, finally with the President a decision was reached to hold FY 1953 military expenditures to \$60 billion exclusive of Mutual Security Assistance. This compared to \$74.5 billion estimated by the Department of Defense.

At a series of subsequent meetings within the Defense Department, consideration was given to the ways and means by which the ceiling could be applied to requests for new obligating authority. Mr. Finletter suggested that slippages in existing schedules be legitimatized, that progress payments be held to a minimum and, if the first two courses did not provide the desired results, to delay modernization of the 126 wings. He cautioned, however, that the Air Force should never lose sight of the final goal: the wings to be attained and the modernization of the Strategic Air Forces. (27) In the remaining few days of 1951 the Air Staff reworked the 126 combat wing program to fit the new ceiling and arrived at a total budget request (new obligating authority) of \$20.9 billion exclusive of public works. This program was approved by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff on 31 December 1951. The program was then presented to the Secretary of Defense who agreed to immediately re-submit to the President the new budget request for \$20.9 billion together with a request for the greatest possible flexibility in the use of funds, i.e., permission to shift

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# CHAPTER II MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMING

As the MDAP program expanded, it became evident that greater integration was required between MDAP and the USAF programs.

Although the former is financed entirely apart from the USAF program, both are highly interrelated. Both compete for the same resources; i.e., the same manufacturing plants provide material for both, the USAF training establishment provides training for both. The most apparent means of achieving this integration would be for applicable Air Staff offices to perform for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the same function each performed for the USAF program. This would have made the Assistant for Programming responsible for the publication of program guidance for Mutual Defense Assistance. Actually, until early October 1951, the Mobilization Division, Director of Plans, DCS/Operations, functioned almost alone within the Air Staff on MDA matters.

To provide the desired integration, the Assistant for Programming, in October, collected and published a complete series of MDA basic program guidance. (29) This was reviewed at an Air Staff meeting on 9 October prior to a planned presentation to the Air Force Council. (30) This Air Staff review was made necessary by a large number of conflicts between the USAF and MDA programs. For example, prior to the publication of the guidance, the Director of Plans had made commitments against the USAF program for the training of approximately 6,000 foreign pilots, while the USAF program made provision for a maximum of 3,600.

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Because of the compressed time schedule, the FY 1953 Foreign Aid program objectives were not presented for review and approval to the Air Force Council prior to release in the budget call, as had originally been planned. This discrepancy was noted by the Air Force Council at its regular meeting on 6 November, at which time it had under consideration the problem of war reserve aircraft for MDAF recipient countries. The Council approved the programming of war reserve aircraft in the FY 1952 MDA program to the extent available funds permitted, but only after urgent requirements had been met. (31) At the same time, the Council also noted that the provisions of HOI 20-3, requiring Council review of program objectives, were not complied with in connection with the FY 1953 MDA program. The Council then directed that Air Force objectives, ground rules, and assumptions for the FY 1953 MDA program be presented for Council approval at the earliest practicable date and that in the future, MDA program guidance be integrated with program guidance for the USAF.

In compliance with this directive, the Assistant for Programming, together with other Air Staff agencies, presented the MDA FT 1953 program before the Air Force Council in the latter part of November. The Air Staff's conclusions and recommendations were generally accepted by the Air Force Council. (32) In addition to guidance, the Assistant for Programming accepted the responsibility for determining MDA aircraft requirements, and for developing MDA aircraft programs. (33)

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Considerable progress was made during the period 1 July through 31 December 1951 in the improvement of MDA programming procedures and processes. Much, however, remains to be done. The problem is a very complicated one, involving the correlation of Air Force programs of some 20 odd foreign countries with that of our own. A great deal of work will have to be done by the Air Staff and other agencies before this problem can be considered well in hand.

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
#### CHAPTER III SPECIAL COMMITTEE WORK

As previously noted, the Assistant for Programming provided representation on the manpower committee under the Chairmanship of Major General Burns (see Part II, Chap. 1). This committee work deprived the Programming Division, Assistant for Programming, of its two manpower and organization specialists for a full three months. (34) During this period all except the most pressing functions in this area were brought to a standstill and a very large backlog of routine actions were accumulated by the end of the three month period. With the advantage of hindsight it is now recognized that a committee system of resolving problems which lie in reasonably well defined functional areas is an unduly expensive method of staff operation. While the results of the committee's work were both enlightening and generally valuable, the breakdown in normal staff functions and the bottleneck created by the long absence of key personnel on special projects probably outweighed the gains from this special project.

This same division also lost its two reserve forces liaison officers for a period of three months to the Reserve Forces Committee under Brigadier General Robert J. Smith. (35) Further special committee representation was provided by the Division Deputy's full time participation on the Installations Review Committee.

The normal functions, capacity to meet deadlines, and day-today operating effectiveness were quite seriously disrupted by diversion of key personnel to these committee projects. In the

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
#### CHAPTER IV WAR PLANS PROGRESS

An activity believed to be of considerable significance in staff administrative procedures improvement was Assistant for Programming participation in the development of war plans. For some years there had remained a gap in material war reserve aspects of budget computations due to the lack of plans directly related to a projected program position and lack of detail suitable for computation of material war reserves. In early October, therefore, specifications and administrative procedures for two war plans were developed to satisfy material computation needs.

In outline, the concept of these plans (with respective D-dates of July 1953 and July 1954) was to project the inventories of aircraft, units and all pertinent activity rate measurements based on post D-Day aircraft production limitations. Unlike previously available mobilization plans which represented a "desired" force requirement, these plans represented a thoroughly realistic statement of the numbers of aircraft, their activity rates and probable utilization based on a projected inventory position of the Air Force. Thus, the computation of material reserves and plans for pre-positioning of reserve stocks could be based on realistic projections of war time forces within the limits of probable aircraft availability.

These two plans (short titled STYMIE I and STYMIE II (36) formed the basis of all materiel war reserve computations for the series of budgets then being developed. These studies were considered efficacious by all review agencies. Administrative

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#### CHAPTER V PROGRAM FROCEDURES

A revised edition of the Air Force Namual of Program Procedures (Tentative) 150-3 was published on 31 October 1951. Comments on the June 1951 edition from the Air Staff had been incorporated into the October edition (37) except for a proposal from the Director of Operations that the Priorities of Programmed Units document be made the sole USAF operating program document and that it include data now contained in all of the current operating program documents (38). The Assistant for Programming non-concurred with this recommendation. It was agreed to delete from the Manual those items objectionable to the Director of Operations. At the same time representatives of this office and of the Director of Operations were directed to visit major commands to determine their needs for operating program data.

In September 1951, visits were made to headquarters of ANC, SAC, ADC (39) and later to MATS (40) and TAC (41). Findings clearly disclosed that inadequacies existed in operating program documents for the purposes of all major commands visited. As a result, all major commands were requested to evaluate the usefulness of all USAF operating program documents to them. (42) Just before the close of this period, a working committee was established (43) to examine the command submissions, to work toward identification of problems, and to determine avenues of staff solution. (44)

One of the problems to be undertaken by the working committee is that of consistency of concurrent program documents. The

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Assistant for Programming has already completed studies proving that purportedly concurrent and consistent documents have, in fact, contained a significant number of discrepancies. (45) It would appear that the discrepancies are the result of the following failings:

- a. Inability to enforce common cut-off dates.
- b. Large amount of overlapping data.
- c. Difficulty of conveniently checking against discrepancies under present methods.

Means of rectifying this situation are presently under study within the Assistant for Programming.

A second major procedural problem currently being considered is in the area of equipment. (46) There are two facets to the equipment problem; one is the long range determination of projected equipment requirements for the purpose of computing budgets, the second is the near-in operation of controlling the distribution of equipment. While the two problems are related, it is an error to consider them identical. Neither can they be considered entirely apart; the vehicle used in the solution of one must be adaptable to the solution of the other in one form or another.

Distribution procedures are currently inadequate. Tables of Authorization are often as much as two pears out of date. (47) In addition, Tables of Authorization permit base supply officers to draw the same allowance on several different bases of issue. (48)

In the budget estimating area, there is no effective means of forecasting equipment requirements for non-Table of Organisation

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and Equipment units. Presently, these requirements are determined on the basis of comparatively rough average installations.

This office is not directly concerned with the determination of equipment requirements for budget estimating or with controlling distribution of equipment. These are primary responsibilities of DCS/Nateriel and the Air Nateriel Command. However, an important function of this office is the monitoring of USAF program documents. Since these documents play a large part in the determination of equipment requirements, and in controlling distribution, any modification of the present procedures which will affect the program documents will, of course, be of major concern to this office.

While several newly developed procedures are being circulated within the Air Staff, no single approach has yet been accepted for implementation.

This office is of the opinion that any set of solutions arrived at for these problems must conform to the following criteria:

- 1. The distribution procedure must:
  - a. Be capable of continuing up-to-date maintenance.
  - b. Result in a smaller number of bases of issue.
  - c. Provide experiential data which can be applied to the development of factors in the computation of budget requirements.
- 2. The budget requirements computation procedure must:
  - a. Be capable of employing the factors developed from the distribution procedure.

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# b. Permit valid computations to be made within the time actually available in the budget cycle. Be susceptible to rapid modification of budgets as required by higher policy decisions.

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#### FOOTNOTES

- Memorandum from General Twining to Dr. Learned, dated 3 July 1951, which stated that manpower requirements must be reduced and appointed Dr. Learned to organize this group. (Filed Programming Division)
- Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Deputy Asst. for Programming to Major General Burns, Subject: (U) Assumptions Pertinent to the FY 53-54 Program, 5 July 51 (in Analysis Division Diary).
- JCS 1800/155, dtd 14 July 51, Subject: (C) Memo by the Chief
  of Naval Operations for the JCS on Budget Formulation, FY 53
  (in JCS Files of Analysis Division).
- 4. Enclosure B to JCS 1800/154, 13 July 1951, revised 14 July 1951 (in JCS Files of Analysis Division).
- 5. Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Odom, Deputy Asst. for Programming to All Major Air Staff Agencies, Subject: (U) Formulation of the FY 53 Air Force Program, 23 July 51 (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 6. Memorandum from Colonel Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Programming, DCS/C, to General Odom, Col. Ocamb, Col. Brown, Subject: (U) Formulation of the FY 53 Program, 3 Aug 51 (in Analysis Division Diary).
- Outline of 138 Wing Program for JCS Presentation, prepared by Analysis Division, 31 Aug 51, (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 8. JCS 1800/171, 1 October 1951 (in JCS Files of Analysis Division).
- 9. Hemorandum for the Air Staff, subject: "Revised Program Guidance for FY 1953 Budget Estimates," dtd 31 Cct 51. (Filed in Programming Division)
- 10. Memorandum from Colonel Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Programming, DCS/O, to Director of the Budget, DCS/O, Subject: (U) Proposed Guide Lines for Preparation of FY 53 Budget Estimates, 21 Sep 51 (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 1]. JCS 1800/170, dtd 27 Sep 51 in JCS files of Analysis Division.
- 12. JCS 1800/173, dtd 3 Oct 51, memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to Secretary of the Army, Navy and Air Force and others in JCS files of Analysis Division.

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- 13. Memorandum from Colonel Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Programming, DCS/O, to Director of Budget, DCS/C, Director of Personnel Planning, DCS/P, Director of Training, DCS/P, and others, Subject: (U) Restatement of FY 53 Air Force Program Objectives, 15 Oct 51 (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 14. Department of the Air Force Program Objectives Fiscal Year 53 prepared by Analysis Division, 11 Oct 51 (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 15. Memorandum from Colonel F. M. Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Programming, DCS/O, to General Todd and General Odom, Subject: Preparation of Presentations for FY 53 Budget Review, 23 Oct 51 (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 16. Memorandum from Robert A. Lovett to the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force and others, Subject: Preparation of Preliminary FY 53 Budget for Initial Equipment, Operation and Maintenance, 29 Oct 51, (in Analysis Division Lulu File).
- 17. Memorandum for General Odom, Deputy Asst. for Programming, prepared by the Analysis Division, 2 Nov 51, Subject: Mr. Lovett's Memorandum of 29 Oct 51 (in Analysis Division Lulu File).
- 18. Hemorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Subject: Request for data in support of the budget requests for FY 53, 5 Nov 51 (in Analysis Division Lulu File).
- 19. Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Gouncil to Assistant for Programming, DCS/O = ODP, Director of Budget, DCS/C and Director of Plans, DCS/O, Subject: AF FY 53 Program, 9 Nov 51, (in Limitation Lulu File of the Executive Office of the Analysis Division).
- 20. Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council to the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, the Director of Budget, DCS/C and the Director of Plans, DCS/O, Subject: (U) The FY 53 Program, 16 Nov 51 (in Lulu File of the Executive Office of the Analysis Division).
- 21. Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinel, Secretary, AF Council to the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, the Director of Plans, DCS/O and the Director of Budget, DCS/C, Subject: (U) The AF FY 53 Program, 20 Nov 51 (in Limitation Lulu File of the Executive Office of the Analysis Division).

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- 22. Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council to the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, the Director of Flans, DCS/O and the Director of the Budget, DCS/C, Subject: (U) The AF FY 53 Program, 21 Nov 51 (in Limitation Lulu File of the Office of Assistant for Programming).
- 23. Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council to Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, the Director of Plans, DCS/O, and Director of Budget, DCS/C, Subject:
  (U) The AF FY 53 Program 23 Nov 51, (in Limitation Lulu File in the Office of Assistant for Programming).
- 24. Memorandum for Director of Personnel Flanning, DCS/P, Commands Division, Directorate of Operations, DCS/O, Programming Division, Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, and others from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Deputy Assistant for Programming, DCS/Operations, Subject: Program Studies Directed by OSD (U), 26 Nov 51 (in Limitation Lulu File of the Analysis Division).
- 25. Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council, to the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, the Director of Plans, DCS/O, the Director of Budget, DCS/C and the Director of Procurement and Production Engineering, DCS/M, Subject: (U) FY 53 Budget, 26 Nov 51, (in Limitation Lulu File of the Executive Office of the Analysis Division).
- 26. Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Deputy Assistant for Programming to Colonel Spicer, Colonel Van Sickle, Colonel Puryear, Colonel Dean, Subject: Compositions of the AF for End FY 52, 53 and 54, 16 Dec 51 (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 27. Memorandum for Record from Colonel Fred H. Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, assistant for Programming, 29 Dec 51, (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 28. Memorandum for the Record from Colonel Fred M. Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Assistant for Programming, Subject: Holiday Mestings on FY 53 Program and Budget, 2 Jan 51, (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 29. Strategic Guidance for USAF Foreign Aid, Section I (Top Secret), dtd 2 Oct 51. Initial Guidance MDAF FT 53, Section II, dtd 2 Oct 51. Corrigendum to the above referenced guidances, dtd 10 Oct 51. (Filed Programming Division).

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- 30. MDAP Neeting on FY 53 Budget prepared by Assistant for Programming, 9 Oct 51 (in Analysis Division Diary).
- 31. Hemorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council to the Director of Plans, DCS/O, the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, Subject: (R) AF FY 52 and FY 53 MDA Programs, 13 Nov 51, (in Air Force Council File) in Executive Office of Analysis Division).
- 32. Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary AF Council to the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, Subject: (R) Program Guidance for FY 53 MDA Programming, 27 Nov 51 (in Air Force Council File) in executive office of Analysis Division.
- 33. Memorandum for General Odom from Colonel Van Sickle, Subject: Expression of Aircraft Requirements, NDAP, dtd 5 Dec 51, filed AFODP-PR, HDAP file.
- 34. Memorandum for General White from Dr. Learned, dtd 26 Jul 51, Subject: "Special Sub-Committee." (Filed Programming Division)
- 35. Memorandum for the Special Assistant for Reserve Forces;
  Director of Manpower & Organization, Assistant for Programming, Director of Plans, DCS/O; and Director of Personnel Planning, DCS/P, dtd 4 Jun 51, from the Secretary of the Air Staff. (Filed Programming Division)
- 36. Assumptions and Planning Factors for Determining the Deployment Capability of the Air Force FY 53 Forces, dtd 17 Oct 51, prepared by the Chief, Mobilization Division, Directorate of Plans, PCS/O. (Filed Programming Division).
- 37. AFODP-PR file XI-45, Program Procedures Manual.
- 38. RAR from Director of Operations to Assistant for Programming, Subject: Final Revisions to AFE 150-3 dtd 11 Oct 51, filed AFODP-PR, XI-45, #13.
- 39. Hemorandum for General Todd from Colonel McDowell, Subject: Trip Report, dtd 19 Sep 51. (See Tab B)
- 40. Memorandum for General Todd and General Eamey from Colonel McDowell, Subject: Conference at Headquarters HATS re USAF Operating Frogram Documents, dtd 13 Oct 51. (See Tab B)
- 41. Hemorandum for General Todd and General Ramey from Colonel McDowell, Subject: Conference at Headquartems TAC re USAF Operating Program Documents, dtd 17 Oct 51, (See Tab B).


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- 42. Letter to commanding generals of major commands from Deputy Assistant for Programming, Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Subject: USAF Operating Program Documents, dtd 26 Oct 51. (See Tab C)
- 43. REF to Director of Operations, et al signed by Brig Gen Odom, Deputy Assistant for Programming, Subject: Improvement of USAF Program Documents, dtd 6 Dec 51. (See Tab E)
- 44. Memorandum for Record #1 from Colonel McDowell, Subject: Working Group on Program Document Improvement, dtd 17 Dec 51. (See Tab D)
- 45. Memorandum for Record, signed Huley, Subject: Program
  Documents Review Committee, dtd 30 Jul 51, filed AFODP-FR,
  XI-5, #64.
- 46. RAR to Director of Operations, et al from Colonel McDowell, Subject: Emprovement of USAF Program Documents, dtd 14 Jan 52. (See Tab A)
- 47. AMC Deficiency Report (SECRET), dtd 30 Sep 51 (518-144985) filed Procedures Division, AFODP, XVI-36, #8.
- 48. Memorandum for General Todd and General Odom, Subject:

  Improvement of Requirements and Control Techniques, dtd
  20 Nov 51, filed AFODP-PR, III-5, #8.

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#### PART I

#### FUNCTIONS

#### ANALYSIS DIVISION

- 1. Participates with other Staff agencies in formulating proposals for or changes in USAF objectives and limitations.
- Haintains a record of all USAF program objectives and limitations established or proposed as a basis for formulating major Air Force programs.
- Reviews plans, programs, proposals and directives; advises as to their implications and recommends appropriate action.
- 4. Analyses USAF major programs for belance, phesing and consistency with USAF objectives and limitations and makes appropriate recommendations.
- 5. Analyses the implementation of the USAF program, points out deficiencies and recommends solutions therefore
- Provides membership and staff advisory services on joint Service boards and committees engaged in problems relating to USAF objectives or limitations.
- Provides assistance to the Chief. Programming Division in the detailed development of established Air Force objectives, as required.

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# Organisation Assignments and Transfers

Since the time the Analysis Division submitted the last historical statement, three specialists in the fields of procurement and production, reserve forces and Joint Military programs have been assigned. The augmentation of the division with these specialists provides for the utilization of their specialised knowledge in discharging the functions and responsibilities of the division as a team.

- 1. Col. F. M. Deen continued to serve throughout this period as Chief of the analysis Division. He was assisted by Lt. Col. R. L. Praetorius, specialist in production and procurement and Lt. Col. D. L. Freeman as Assistant for Flans and Operations.
- 2. On 18 June 1951, Mr. Henry E. Glass reported to this division and was assigned as a program analyst specializing in the procurement, production and MDAF.
- 3. On 2 July 1951, Mr. B. C. Kelsey reported to this division and was assigned as a program analyst specializing in reserve forces.
- 4. On 2 July 1951, Lt. Col. J. W. Bacon reported to this division and was assigned as Assistant for Joint Military Programs.
- 5. On 15 October 1951, Col. P.M. Spicer was relieved from assignment as Deputy Chief, Analysis Division and assigned as Chief, Programming Division, Assistant for Programming.

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### PART II

## HISTORY OF ANALYSIS DIVISION

1 July through 31 December 1951

Activities of the Analysis Division, Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, Analysis Division, Assistant for Programming and DCS/O during the period 1 July through 31 December 1951 will be discussed under two major headings:

- 1. The Fiscal Year 1953 programming and budgeting cycle.
- 2. Mutual Defense Assistance Programming.

# I. The Fiees | Tear 1953 Programming and Budgeting Cycle:

The Analysis Division participation in the early development of Air Force Frogram Objectives for FI 53 was described in the historical statement for the period January 1 through June 31, 1951. During the six month period discussed herein, the Analysis Division continued to devote its major efforts to the further development of the FY 1953 Planning-Budgeting program. These efforts carried through a number of very major revisions of the program and culminated in a comprehensive presentation of the program to the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives.

By the end of Jume 1951, the USAF FT 53 program objectives, prepared by the analysis Division, in collaboration with the Air Staff, had been presented to and reviewed by the Air Force Council, the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of the Air Force and their views obtained. These views, particularly those of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force called for a major re-orientation of the FT 53 program. The Analysis Division promptly prepared a new draft of strategic guidance for the FT 53 program, reflecting the philosophy enunciated by the Chief of Staff. The Director of Flans, DCS/O was then requested by memorandum dated 2 July 1951 (1) to review this draft of strategic guidance, revise, and amend it to assure accuracy and to prepare the appendices required. The memorandum also pointed out that the Air Staff required this new guidance in order to continue the development of the FY 53 program objectives.

One of the principal points raised in the review by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff was the limitation on military personnel. It was pointed out to the Staff that the personnel requirements contained in the original program presented to the Air Council; namely, 2,160,000 by and FT 54 was completely unacceptable. In view of the limited manpower pool available to the military services, the Chief of Staff noted that if the larger force is to be obtained at all, it would have to be attained with a much lower level of manpower.

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Until the manpower problem could be given further study, the Analysis Division, in its memorandum to the Director of Plans, provided an assumption that a military strength of approximately 1,480,000 would be acceptable. The manpower study was assigned to a special committee established for this purpose. The work of this committee is covered in the concurrent history of the Programming Division, Assistant for Programming, DOS/O. The Analysis Division, however, provided the committee with the major assumptions necessary for its work. These assumptions, together with program objectives, policies, and general ground rules, were forwarded to the Chairman of the Committee, Major General Burns by memorandum dated 5 July 1951, signed by Brigadier General Odom, Deputy Assistant for Programming.

while the FF 53 Air Force program was being revised by the Air Staff in consonance with the views of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Haval Operations, in a memorandum for the Joint Chiefe of Staff (3) recommended that "the Chiefe of Staff should request from the Secretary of Defense, at an early date, preliminary guidance for the formulation of the FT 53 Eudget, and upon its receipt, they should agree not only on the force tables and personnel ceilings, as they have done in the past, but on the desired degree of readiness and major procurement ... This paper was referred to the Analysis Division for reply. A draft of a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefe of Staff was prepared outlining the position of the Air Force. (4) It was pointed out that it was the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish the desired strategic bases, forces, degree of readiness and program objectives to the Secretary of Defense so that he would have the opinion of the military on strategic requirements in formulating the necessary budgetary guidance. This view prevailed, and the Chief of Naval Operations withdrew his memorandum. The air Staff was thus left free to continue the development of the FT 53 program on a unilateral besis. This was a desirable course of action from the Air Force point of view inasmuch as the FY 53 progrem involved a major increase in the size of the Air Force and a considerable change in strategic concept. Until the program was well formulated and the Air Force positions clarified, it was undesirable to involve the Secretary of Defense. To do so might have pre-judged the program before it was fully developed.

The Analysis Division continued its work on the development of the FI 53 Air Force program, incorporating the views of the Directorate of Flans with respect to the strategic aspects, and on 23 July 1951 released the revised program to the Air Staff. In the accompanying removerandum (5) it was pointed out to the Air Staff that the promemorandum (5) it was pointed out to the Air Staff that the promemorandum completion of the cycle would have to be greatly compressed in that completion of the cycle would have to be greatly compressed in order to meet the budget deadlines. The memorandum also pointed out that the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force had already advocated to higher authority the immediate authorization of 138 combat wings to

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be attained by end FT 54, and that pending such authorization, the Air Staff would continue to finalize the FT 53 program objectives for submission to the Air Council for review and approval. The Air Staff was requested to carefully review the objectives, assumptions, limitations, policies and ground rules, and to informally submit their comments to the Analysis Division on programming aspects and to the Directorate of Plans on strategic aspects. By this time the FT 53 objectives had been worked out in considerable detail including the position, phasing and breakdown of the forces by priority tasks, definition of degrees of readiness to be attained and peacetime deployment.

The comments of the Air Staff were incorporated in a new revision of the FT 53 program objectives and presented to the Air Council on 2 August 1951. The presentation included:

- a. A tentative schedule for the preparation of the FT 52 supplemental and FT 53 budget estimates.
- b. Air Staff procedures and time schedules which would permit preparation and review of these budget estimates.
- c. A brief review of the "survival concept" sufficient to put into proper context changes since last presentation to the Air Council.
  - d. Brief summery of objectives.
  - e. From and cons to major controversial issues.

A decision of the Air Force Council was requested on these major controversial issues, these decisions to be used solely for planning and programming purposes until detailed computations could be made to test their validity. (The program objectives presented to the Air Force Council were released to the Air Staff on 30 July 1951 and forwarded to the Chief of Staff for his information. (6) The Air Force Council decided (7) that:

- a. The Vice Chief of Staff was to discuss with the Chief of Staff, the question whether the Air Staff should commence formulation of the FY 52 supplemental and the FY 53 budget estimates for the 138 combat wings.
- b. That pending this decision the military personnel ceiling of 1,390,000 was to be used as a basis for programming.
- c. That MDA would be provided for the NATO countries on the basis of the Faris Flan.
- d. That the scheme for the provision of combat reserves is acceptable.

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e. That the remaining Air Mational Guard squadrons, still on inactive status, may be recalled as required.

- f. That the deployment schedule is acceptable.
- g. That all units are to be provided their full unit equipment, etc.

The 30 July 1952 program objectives paper was immediately adjusted in line with the Air Force Council decisions and forwarded to the Programming Division, Assistant for Programming, DOS/O for preparation of initial guidance. (This action was taken informally).

After the adjusted program objectives had been turned over to the Programming Division, the Analysis Division personnel spent the next week or two working with the Programming Division in reviewing the early drafts of initial guidance. (8) The Analysis Division also furnished further guidance to the so-called Learned Committee, which was finally assigned the tesk of determining manpower requirements for the 138 Combat Wing Program. (9)

Towards the end of August 1951, the Analysis Division, in conjunction with the Directorate of Flans, began the preparation of the 138 Combat Wing Program presentation to the JCS. (10) A considerable part of the Division's efforts was expended on this task until a final decision on forces was reached by the JCS on 1 October 1951. (11) In this defense of the 138 Combat Wing Program before the JCS the Directorate of Plans carried the burden, with respect to strategy, while the Analysis Division did the work on program objectives. During the course of JCS deliberation on forces, the Air Force Program passed through a number of defenses and rebuttals, each one recuiring the preparation of new presentations. The force finally approved by JCS was 126 Combat Wings plus supporting units.

Parallel with ite justification of the forces, the Analysis Division, as the working staff for the Air Force member on the Program and Budget Advisors of the JCS, devoted considerable time and effort to the coordination of Air Force program objectives with those of the Army, Navy and the Defense Department. During the period in question, the Air Force member of this committee was the Assistant for Frogramming, who also acted as chairman. The Secretary of the committee was the Chief of the Analysis Division which served as the working group for the committee.

This particular task involved a considerable amount of work inasmuch as the Army and Mary had somewhat different views on program objectives. As the working staff for the FBA, the Analysis Division had to take the initiative in reconciling the views of the three services. These program objective papers went through a series of revisions.

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The first submittal of Air Force program objectives, prepared by the Analysis Division, was made to the Secretary of the Air Force on 10 September 1951 (12) They were forwarded by the Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense on 11 September. (13) Simultaneously, the Air Force program objectives were presented to the JCS. (14) The Mayy had already presented its program objectives to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for approval for planning and budget preparation on 6 September. (15) A brief outline of Army program objectives was forwarded to JCS on 10 September. During the course of this work, the Analysis Division prepared an analysis of Mayy program objectives (16) and Army program objectives (17)

Meanwhile, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) had submitted to the three services a preliminary dreft of guide lines for the preparation of the FT 53 budget estimates in a memorandum dated 20 September 1951. These proposals were reviewed by the Analysis Division in the light of its work for the PBA. The results of this review were furnished to the Director of the Eudget inasmuch as that office was the Air Force action agency on these proposals. (18) The major difference between the Air Force position and the OSD involved the procurement of mobilization material reserves. The Air Force maintained that such reserves should be limited to yer consumables for forces to be in-being on D-Day. This was in consonance with the Air Force position that we cannot afford to build a wartime force in peacetime, but only one which would enable survival in the event of war. This would place emphasis on the forces-in-being on D-Day, greating a lower priority to forces to be mobilized after D-Day.

Upon receipt of the draft of OSD guide lines, the Analysis Division, broadened the scope of its work for the PBA, to include a comparison and reconciliation of program objectives of the three services with the aforementioned OSD guide lines. This work culminated in a memorandum to the (19) providing a comparison of major services program objectives with the proposed OSD guide lines for FY 53. Meanwhile, the Air Force comments on the preliminary draft of OSD guide lines were forwarded, through comptroller channels, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and on 3 October, the final statement of OSD guide lines for formulation of FY 53 budget estimates was forwarded to the Secretaries of the three services, the JCS and certain other agencies. (20) were the guide lines used in the further development of the Air Force FT 53 budget. The comparison of major services program objectives with the proposed OSD guide lines for FT 53 were meanwhile circulated to the Air Staff for further analysis and preparation of more detailed Air Force objectives. (21) The comments of the Air Staff were subsequently incorporated in a revised draft of Air Force program objectives for FT 53 dated 11 October 1951. (22)

Following the establishment of relatively firm program objectives based on 126 combat wings, the Analysis Division began to prepare for

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the FT 53 budget review. Inasmuch as the Air Force had released to the field agencies a 138 combat wing program for budget computation, the subsequent approval of a 126 combat wing program (1 October 1951) necessitated a major revision of the budget estimates being prepared in the field. This greatly delayed the presentation of budget estimates to the reviewing authorities in the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget. The Analysis Division therefore recommended that the Air Force program, as such, should be presented to the reviewing authorities without reference to dellar amounts, to be followed later with a presentation of the dollar request. (23) This course of action was followed.

Just about this time the Air Staff received a directive from Secretary of Defense, dated 29 Oct. 1951, imposing a budget ceiling for FT 53 on all three services. (24) This directive pointed out that the Mational Security Council, on 17 October, had approved the preparation of a preliminary budget based upon requirements for initial equipment and operation and maintenance of the military forces approved for planning purposes for FT 53. It also indicated that a figure of 345 billion, representing a carrying ferward of the FY 52 build-up of the Defense establishment, had been provided the Office of Defense Mobilization for its guidence and that this figure was to be used as a benchmark by the three services for budget planning purposes. He further directed the military departments to proceed at once with the development of budgets within the total amount directed by the National Security Council. directive also provided an allocation by service and a breakdown by major appropriation area. The Air Force benchmark was \$17 billion including construction, with a sub-sllocation of \$5.1 billion for aircraft procurement which could not be exceeded. Budget estimates for FI 53 were to be submitted in a menner which would state the military requirement for the FI 53 Force as approved for planning purposes, giving due consideration to the mobilization potential being acquired through the establishment of a broad production base from FY 51 and FY 52 funds. If such estimates exceed \$17 billion, additional amounts were to be shown separately, and supported in terms of military necessity.

This new approach to the formulation of the FT 53 budget completely upset the work already going forward in the Air Staff and in the field. The Analysis Division was requested by the Assistant for Programming to analyze this directive and to prepare a preliminary evaluation of its effects on the program. This analysis was submitted on 2 November 1951. (25) In addition to dealing with the effect on the Air Force program, it also examined the effects of the cuts on the Army and Navy in relation to the Air Force. Inasmuch as the economic aspects of the FT 53 budget was stressed by the Secretary of Defense in his directive, the Analysis Division also provided a short statement on the economic feasibility of the proposed 126 combet wing program as originally formulated, and found that it could be accomplished generally with a flow of resources not much greater than that required for the 30 combat wing program. From that point on through the end of the year, the Analysis Division devoted the bulk of its efforts to the

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problem involved in adjusting the 126 combat wing program to the budget ceilings directed by the Secretary of Defense. The Analysis Division took responsibility, primerily, for the adjustment of forces and program objectives and collaborated with various other offices in the preparation of statements and memorandum for higher authority.

Further negotiation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense resulted in some modification of the original directive. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) by memorandum dated 5 Nov 51, (26) directed the three services to propare budget estimates for four separate programs, which for the Air Force meant one for \$17 billion, another for \$18 billion, a third for \$20 billion, and the fourth for the total estimated requirements computed under approved assumptions and guide lines, i.e. the original 126 combat wing program.

The Air Force Council at a special meeting held on 8 November 1951 began consideration of the impact of the budget ceilings on the Air Force program. It was decided at that time (27) to comply with the directives from the Department of Defense and compute the required budgets. The 126 combat wing objective would be retained and it would be assumed that the \$17 to \$20 billion figure would be the order of magnitude for annual Air Force appropriations. Using this order of magnitude the staff was instructed to determine when the 126 combat wing force could be equipped and effective. Or if this sum was inadequate the staff was to indicate the amount required in FT 54 and subsequent years. The Council further directed that the R&D requirements be held intect. The Assistant for Frogramming, the Director of the Budget and the Director of Flans were directed to present to the Council on 13 November 1951 the effects of the above guidance on the Air Force FY 53 program.

At a regular meeting on 15 November 1951 the Air Force Council continued its consideration of the budget ceiling problem. It was noted at that time that the \$17-20 billion ceiling, if continued at a level rate after FT 53, would never permit attainment of 126 modern combat wings and modern supporting forces (28). Further guidance was provided to the Air Staff at this meeting. This and previous guidance was incorporated by the Assistant for Programming in a memorandum for major air staff offices dated 16 November 1951 (29). This memorandum was prepared by the Programming Division in collaboration with the Analysis Division. It provided preliminary guidance to the Air Staff for the preparation of the three new programs (including policies, assumptions, limitations, force structures and deployment.) It also allocated responsibility for preparation of various parts of the program to affected air staff offices and established a time schedule.

At its regular meeting on 20 November 1951 the Air Force Council reviewed the budget ceiling problem with the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff directed the following course of action (30):

a. Frepare the program and budget data on the 126 modern combat wing force agreed to by the JCS.

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- b. Prepare the program and budget data required by OSD giving priority in procurement funds to the strategic air mission as contained in the original JGS approved 126 combat wing program and apportioning the remaining procurement funds to forces performing the air defense and tactical air missions.
- c. Make maximum use of available and usable second line sircraft for air defense and tactical air missions.
- i. Provide air base construction and utilization programs in consonance with the above forces.
  - e. Hake no cut in Ball funds.

The next day the Assistant for Programming outlined the forces possible under the OSD budget cailings to the Chief of Staff and the Air Force Council. These forces were developed in line with the guidance furnished by the Chief of Staff on 20 November. The Chief of Staff approved the recommended force structure as presented, including a number of detailed recommendations. The Chief of Staff further directed that any further cuts, if necessary, will be made in the air defense forces and that the magnitude of the risk involved be clearly shown and developed around the position that the Air Force cannot afford to lower the strategic air forces and their support (31). The Air Force Council again reviewed the problem at a special meeting on 23 November. The Chief of Staff then directed that the Assistant for Programming present to him and the Secretary the recommended force structure under the 317 and 320 billion OSD benchmarks based on the following additional guidance:

- a. All SAC units and SAC support to be programmed at the 126 wing level including the three medium bomb CTUs.
- b. All 3-52s planned for procurement under the 126 program to remain in the program.
- c. SAC requirements to be met at the expense of all other portions of the progres, if necessary. Second priority to be given to the mir defense (32).

This and the earlier guidance was incorporated in a new memorandum to major air staff offices dated 26 November 1951 (33). The earlier memorandum of 16 November was rescinded. The memorandum of 26 November provided a considerably greater amount of detailed guidance to the Air Staff and was given final approval by the Secretary, the Chief of Staff and the Air Force Council at a special meeting on 24 November 1951 (34). With this guidance the air staff proceeded with the work of preparing the budget estimates required by the OSD directives.

Time did not permit the preparation of all four budget programs directed by OSD. The Air Staff concentrated its efforts on the \$17 billion and the original 126 combat wing programs. The latter program,



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however, was developed on a much reduced basis, particularly with respect to the degree of modernization and the phasing of the forces. The results of these reductions and new phasing are shown in a document dated 18 December 1951 (35). This document showed 110 wings equipped by 30 June 1953 and all 126 equipped by 30 June 1953.

The Bureau of the Budget, however, considered only the 317 billion program and arrived at a decision that the Air Force could accomplish the 126 combat wing program within this dollar ceiling. This decision was immediately opposed by the Department of Air Force, and, after a series of meetings with the RDB, Department of Defense and, finally, with the President a decision was reached to held WT 53 military expenditures to \$60 billion exclusive of MSA. This compared to \$74.5 billion estimated by the Department of Defense.

At a series of subsequent meetings within the Defense Department, consideration was given to the ways and means by which this cailing could be applied to requests for new obligating authority. Mr. Finletter suggested that slippages in existing schedules be legitimized, that progress payments be held to a minimum and, if the first two courses do not provide the desired results, to delay modernization of the 126 wings. He cautioned, however, that the Air Force should never lose sight of the final goal, namely the number of wings to be attained and the modernization of the strategic air forces (36). In the remaining few days of 1951 the Air Staff reworked the 126 combat wing program to fit the new ceiling and came up with a total budget request (new obligating authority) of \$20.9 billion exclusive of public works. This program was presented to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff and approved by them on 31 December 1951. The program was then presented to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense agreed to immediately re-submit to the Fresident the new budget request for \$20.9 billion together with a request for the greatest possible flexibility in the use of funds, i.e., permission to shift dollars within appropriations (37). This was the status of the program at the end of December 1951.

The Analysis Division played a very active, if not leading, role in the series of events described above. During the closing weeks of 1951 the Division worked on a 7-day week basis in order to meet the extremely tight deadlines imposed by the course of events. In all of these activities it, of course, worked closely with the other divisions in the Office of the Assistant for Programming and with the air staff generally, but primary responsibility for the development of the alternative forces and program objectives rested with the analysis Division.

#### II. Kutual Defense Assistance Programming:

In the course of its work in the development of FY 53 USAF Program Objectives, the Analysis Division became increasingly owere of a lack of integration between the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and the USAF program. Although the former is financed entirely separately from the USAF program, both are, by their nature highly inter-related. MDAF training, for example, is conducted in the USAF training establishment

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Materiel procured for MDAF is produced in the same plants as USAF materiel.

Soon after the publication of the USAF FY 53 program objectives, at the end of July 1951, the Analysis Division began to study the MDAP Programming problem to determine ways and meens by which it could be integrated with USAF Programming Division of the Office of the Assistant for Programming meanwhile had approached the problem from the procedural point of view. During the latter part of August, the Chief of the Mobilisation Division, Directorate of Flans, asked several persons in the instructs and Procedures Division of the Assistant for Programming to develop concepts for an improvement in MDAP. (38) In answer to this request, the two programming divisions forwarded a memorandum to the Chief of the Mobilization suggesting the establishment of an Air Staff Task Force, under the monitorship of the Chief of the Mobilisation Division, to prepare an operational plan and a set of related program objectives designed to establish and maintain MATO and other allied Air Forces for which military assistance will be provided by the U. S. (39) The memorandum also outlined the steps to be taken immediately to improve MDA programming and pointed out that the Air Force MDA Frogram had greatly increased in size during the last few years and could no longer be handled as a special project. It must be integrated into the normal USAF Programming process. The memorendum concluded with some suggestions as to how this could be done and listed the program documents required.

The recommendations of the Assistant for Programming representatives were not fully accepted by the Mobilization Division, Directorate of Flans. The Analysis Division assumed that this reaction was caused by a lack of understanding of the programming process and what was required to work the MDA program into the USAF programming process. The Analysis Division therefore undertook the preparation of a draft paper, "USAF Foreign Aid Objectives through FY 54". This was to serve as an example for the Wobilization Division of what was required to place the MDA program on a solid programming basis. This document was completed 21 September 1951. (40) It consisted of 2 sections: Section 1: Strategic Guidance for USAF Foreign Aid Programming which included basic assumptions, fundamental criteria, overall strategy, U. S. military objectives in various areas of the world and finally a statement on the need for priorities. Section 2: Frogram Guidance, dealt with broad program objectives, forces and deployment, material, depot support, training, installations, and personnel.

The foreign aid program guidance document was forwarded to the Chief of the Mobilization Division, Directorate of Plans by memorandum dated 22 September 1951. (41) It was pointed out in this memorandum that the draft was not intended to be complete or authoritative. It was being offered merely as a guide to the Mobilization Division for its use in the preparation of the official draft. It was further pointed out that the preparation of this type of document was only the first step in the normal USAF Programming and Budgeting process, A time schedule listing the remaining programming steps to be taken was also furnished in this memorandum. During the next few days, the draft was

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
carefully reviewed by the Mobilization Division and later by all Air Staff personnel interested in this program. The revised draft was substantially the same as that originally furnished by the Analysis Division.

After the revised draft was reviewed by the Analysis Division, it was forwarded to the Programming Division by a memorandum dated 28 September 1951. (42) This memorandum provided a time schedule for the Completion of the Programming-Sudgeting process and requested the Procompletion of the Programming-Sudgeting process and requested the Procompletion of the Programming Division to review the document and publish initial guidance. The initial guidance was published 2 October 1951 and was reviewed at an Air Staff meeting on 9 October prior to a planned presentation to the Air Council. (43)

Secause of the compressed time schedule, the FT 53 Foreign Aid Frogram objectives were not presented for review and approved to the Air Force Council prior to release in the budget call, as had originally been planned. This discrepancy was noted by the Air Force Council at its regular meeting on 6 Hovember 1951, at which time it had under consideration the problem of war reserve aircraft for MDAP recipient counties. The Council approved the programming of war reserve aircraft in the FY 52 MDA Frogram to the extent available funds permitted, but only after urgent requirements had been made. (44) At the same time, the Council also noted that the provisions of HOI 20-3 were not complied with in connection with the FY 53 MDA Program. This was the BOI requiring Council review of program objectives. The Council then directed that Air Force objectives, ground rules, and assumptions for the FY 53 NDA Frogram be presented for Council approval at the earliest practicable date and that in the future, MDA program guidance be integrated with program guidence for the USAF.

In compliance with this directive, the Analysis Division, together with the Mobilization Division, Directorate of Flans, and other interested Air Staff agencies, prepared a presentation of the FT 53 Program which was given to the Air Force Council at a special meeting on 26 Hovember was given to the Air Force Council at a special meeting on 26 Hovember was given to the MISAF Foreign Aid Program, the six major "ifs" or "unknowns" in the USAF Foreign Aid Program, the six major "ifs" or "unknowns" in the program, requirements programming and budget procedures, the priorities problem, the forces to be supported and their phasing, factors used in computing aircraft requirements, the war reserve factors used in computing aircraft requirements, the war reserve structure and a summary and recommendations. The Council gave general structure and a summary and recommendations of the Air Staff. The acceptance to conclusions and recommendations of the Air Staff. The Council decisions may be found in a memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force Council to the Assistant for Programming dated 27 Hovember 1951. (57)

Considerable progress was made during the period 1 July through 31 December, 1951 in the improvement of MDA Programming procedures and processes. Much, however, remains to be done. The problem is a very complicated one involving the correlation of the Air Force Programming



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#### FOOTHOTES

- (1) Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Devuty Asst. for Frogramming to Director of Flans, DGS/O, Subject: (S) Strategic Guidance for Development of FT 53 and 54 Program, 2 Jul 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (2) Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Deputy Asst. for Programming to Major General Burms, Subject: (U) Assumptions Fertinent to the FY 53-54 Frogram, 5 Jul 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (3) JCS 1800/155, dtd 14 Jul 51, Subject: (0) News by the Chief of Navel Operations for the JCS on Budget Formulation, FY 53 (in JCS Files of Analysis Division)
- (4) Enclosure B to JCS 1800/154, 13 July 1951, revised 14 July 1951 (in JCS Files of Analysis Division)
- (5) Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Odom, Deputy Asst. for Frogramming to All Major Air Staff Agencies, Subject: (U) Formulation of the FY 53 Air Force Program, 23 Jul 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (6) Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Odom, Deputy Asst. for Programming to The Chief of Staff, Subject: (U) Formulation of the FI 53 Air Force Program, 30 Jul 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (7) Memorandum from Colonel Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst.for Frogramming, DCS/O to General Odom, Col. Ocemb, Col. Brown, Subject: (U) Formulation of the FY 53 Program, 3 Aug 51 (in Analysis Div Diery)
- (8) Comment #1 from Colonel Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Frogramming, DCS/O to Col. L. B. Ocemb, Chief, Programming Div, Asst. for Frogramming, DCS/O, Subject: (U) Logistics Annex, Initial Guidance, 10 Aug 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (9) Memorandum from Col. F. M. Dean, Lt. Col. M. Freeman of AFODF, Maj. J. E. Hennigan, AFOAB, Col. R. L. Temple, AFOAB, Col. C. D. Chitty, AFOOF, Col. M. C. Bacon, AFOOF and others to Lt. Gen. White, Subject (TS) Deployment of the Proposed 133 Combat Wings at End FT 54, 18 Aug 51, Analysis Div Diary
- (10) Outline of 138 Wing Program for JCS Fresentation, prepared by Analysis Division, 31 Aug 51, (in Analysis Div Diary)
  - (11) JOS 1800/171, 1 October 1951
  - (12) Air Staff Summary Sheet from Maj. General Walter E. Todd, Asst. for Programming, DCS/O to Chief of Staff and Sec'y of the Air Force, Subject: Air Force Frogram Objectives for FT 1953, 11 Sep 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
  - (13) Memorandum from Mr. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force, to the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Air Force Program Objectives for FT 53, 11 Sep 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)

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- (14) JCS 1800/168, dtd 12 Sep 51, JCS files of the Analysis Division
- (15) JOS 1800/165, dtd 6 Sep 51, JOS files of the Analysis Division
- (16) Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odem, Deputy Asst. for Fregramming to General White, Subject: (U) Analysis of Mavy Frogram Objectives - FY 53 (JCS 1800/165), 10 Sep 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (17) Nemorandum from Walter E. Todd, Moj. Gan., Asst. for Programming, Mos/O to General White, Subject: (U) Analysis of Army Program Objectives-FI 53 (JCS 1800/167) and Mavy Program Objectives FI 53 (JCS 1800/165), 13 Sep 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (18) Memorandum from Col. Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Programming, DCS/O, to Dir. of the Budget, DCS/O, Subject: (U) Proposed Guide Lines for Preparation of FY 53 Budget Estimates, 21 Sep 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (19) JCS 1800/170, dted 27 Sep 51 in JCS files of Analysis Division
- (20) JOS 1800/173, dtd 3 Oct 51.memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to Secretary of the Army, Havy and Air Force and others in JOS files of Analysis Division
- (21) Memorandum from Col. Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Frogramming, DCS/O to Dir. of Budget, DCS/C, Dir. of Fersonnel Planning, DCS/F, Dir. of Training, DCS/F and others, Subject: (U) Restatement of FI 53 Air Force Program Objectives, 15 Oct 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (22) Department of the Air Force Program Objectives Fiscal Year 1953 prepared by Analysis Division 11 Oct 51 (in Analysis Division Diary)
- (23) Memorandum from Col. F. N. Dean, Chief Analysis Division, Aset. for Frogramming, DCS/O to General Todd and General Odom, Subject: Fre-paration of Fresentations for FY 53 Budget Review, 23 Oct 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (24) Memorandum from Robert A. Lovett to the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the Havy and The Secretary of the Air Force and others, Subject: Preparation of Preliminary FY 53 Budget for Initial Equipment, operation and maintenance, 29 Oct 51, (in Analysis Division Lulu File)
- (25) Memorandum for General Odom, Deputy Asst. for Frogramming prepared by the Analysis Division 2 Nov 51, Subject: Mr. Lovett's Memorandum of 29 Oct 51 (in Analysis Div Lulu File)
- (26) Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to the Secretary of the Army, The Secretary of the Newy, The Secretary of the Newy, The Secretary of the Secretary of Defense for of the Air Force and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Subject: Request for data in support of the budget requests for FY 53, 5 Nov 51 (in Analysis Division Lulu File)

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- (27) Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council to Assistant for Frogramming, DCS/O ODF, Director of Budget, DCS/C and Director Of Flans, DCS/O, Subject: AF FT 53 Program, 9 Nov 51 (in Limitation Lulu File of the Executive Office of the Analysis Division)
- (28) Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council to the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, The Dir. of Budget, DCS/C and the Dir. of Flans, DCS/O, Subject: (U) The FY 53 Frogram, 16 Nov 51 (in Lulu File of the Executive Office of the Analysis Div)
- (29) Memorandum to Director of Personnel Flanning, DCS/P, Commands Div, Directorate of Operation, DCS/O, Frogramming Div, Asst. for Programming, DCS/O and others, from the Office of the Assistant for Frogramming, 16 Nov 51 (in Limitation Lulu File of the Analysis Div)
- (30) Memorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council to The Assistant for Frogramming, DCS/O. The Director of Plans, DCS/O and the Director of Budget, DCS/O, Subject: (U) The AF FY 53 Frogram, 20 Nov 51( in Limitation Lulu File of the Executive Office of the Analysis Division)
- (31) Remorandum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council to the Asst. for Programming, DCS/O. The Dir. of Flans, DCS/O and The Director of the Budget, DCS/C. Subject: (U) The AF FT 53 Program, 21 Nov 51 (in Limitation Lulu File of the Office of Asst. for Programming)
- (32) Hemorendum from Colonel David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council to Asst. for Frogramming, DCS/O, The Dir. of Plans, DCS/O, and Dir. of Budget, DCS/C, Subj. (U) The AF FI 53 Program 23 Nov 51, in Limitation Lulu File in the Office of Asst. for Frogramming
- (33) Memorandum fro Director of Personnel Planning, DCS/P, Commands Division, Directorate of Operations, DCS/O, Programming Div, Asst. for Frogramming, DCS/O and others from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Deputy Asst. for Programming, DCS/Operations, Subject: Frogram Studies Directed by OSD (U), 26 Nov 51 (in Limitations Lulu File of the Analysis Division)
- (34) Memorandum from Col. David A. Burchinal, Secretary, AF Council, to the Asst. for Programming, DCS/O, The Dir. of Flans, DCS/O, The Dir. of Budget, DCS/O and the Dir. of Froeurement and Production Engineering, DCS/M, Subject; (U) FY 53 Budget, 26 Nov 51. (in Limitation Lulu File of the Executive Office of the Analysis Div)
- (35) Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Deputy Asst. for Programming to Col. Spicer, Col. Van SicMe, Col. Furyear, Col. Dean, Shbject: Compositions of the AF for End FY 52, 53, and 54, 18 Dec 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)

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- (36) Memorandum for Record from Colonel Fred M. Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Programming, 29 Dec 51, (in Analysis Division Diary)
- (37) Memorandum for the Record from Colonel Fred M. Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Programming, Subject: Holiday Meetings on FY 53 Frogram and Budget, 2 Jan 51, (in Analysis Division Diary)
- (38) Memorandum from Col. F.M. Dean, Chief, Analysis Division to General Todd, Subject: Development of some Concepts for Improving MDAF, Taug 51, (in Analysis Div Diery)
- (39) Memorandum from Col. F. M. Dean, Chief, Analysis Div, and Col. George C. McDowell, Chief, Procedures Div, to General Hansell, Subject: (U) Frocedures for Integrating MDAP into USAP Program Processes, 23 Aug 51 (in Analysis Division Diery)
- (40) USAF Foreign Aid Objectives Through FY 54 prepared by Analysis Division, 21 Sep 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (41) Remorandum from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Deputy Asst. for Frogramsing, to Chief, Mobilization Division, D/Flans, DCS/O, Subject:
  (U) Formulation of the FT 53 AF Foreign Aid Program, 22 Sep 51
  (in the Analysis Div Diary)
- (A2) Mesorandum from Col. F. M. Dean, Chief, Analysis Division, Asst. for Programming, DCS/O to Col. Spicer, Chief, Programming Division, AFODF, Subject: (U) Formulation of FY 53 AF Foreign Aid Program, 28 Sep 51, (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (43) HDAF Meeting on FY 53 Budget prepared by Asst. for Progressing, 9 Oct 51 (in Analysis Div Diery)
- (44) Memorandum from Col. David A. Burchinal. Secretary, AF Council to The Director of Flans, DCS/O. The Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, Subject: (R) AF FY 52 and FY 53 NDA Programs, 13 Nov 51. (in Air Force Council File) in Executive Office of Analysis Div
- (45) Kemorandum from Naj. Gen. Walter E. Todd, Acet. for Programming, DOS/O to Secretary AF Council, Subject: (E) Air Force FI 53 MDA Program, 2 Nov 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (46) Presentation of MDA Program to Air Force Council prepared by Analysis Division, 23 Nov 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)
- (47) Memorandum from Col. David A. Burchinal, Secretary AF Council to The Asst. for Frogramming, DCS/O, Subject: (R) Program Guidence for FY 53 MDA Programming, 27 Nov 51 (in Air Force Council File) in executive office of Analysis Div
- (48) Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Thetus C. Odom, Deputy Asst. for Frogramming, to Dir. of Trens, DOS/M, Dir. of Flans, DOS/O and Dir. of Oper., D'8/O, DOS/O, Subject; (U) MATS Transport Aircraft and Flying Bour Program (FY 52, 53 & 54), 13 Sep 51 (in Analysis Div Diary)

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SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET HISTORY PROGRAPHING DIVISION ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951 PROGRAMMING DIVISION Table of Contents FUNCTIONS PART I Division Functions Assignments & Transfers SIGHIFICANT ACTIVITIES OF THE PROGRAMMING PART II DIVISION, OFFICE, ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING

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PART I

#### FUNCTIONS

- 1. During the entire period 1 July 1951 through 31 December 1951, the Programming Division retained the formal organizational structure previously reported and indicated graphically in Table IA.
- By mid October, however, a new internel organizational structure was experimentally adopted for the following reasons:
- a. It seemed administratively desirable to combine related functions under a single individual to minimize the number of functional agents reporting to the Executive Group (Chief and Deputy). For example, "Personnel and Training", and "Organization and Manpower" represented such inter-related functions that it appeared desirable to combine these branch activities into a single branch for administrative convenience and efficiency.
- b. As explained in the narrative portion, "Activities", two officers were functioning on a full time basis on the Manpower Requirements Committee (Learned Committee). In their work on this committee they were combining the branch functions as indicated in 2 a. above.
- c. Although the former organisation indicated in Table IA was a logical division of functions it seemed unduly susceptible to criticism from organizational review groups. These outside agencies had been found to react unfavorably to an organizational structure that implied a branch designation for individual office specialist; i.e. a "designated branch per man" probably could not stand close scrutiny from an academically inclined review agency.
- 3. The organizational structure adopted experimentally as indicated in Table IB represented an attempt to combine the office functions into two main branches. One of these, the "Forces Branch" was intended to cover all programming aspects dealing with major forces, supporting activities, training and personnel. The other, the Material Branch, was intended to cover all program components dealing with material logistics and "hardware".
- 4. In addition to the main functions the proposed organizational structure provided recognition for two special functions carried by the division, one of these, the "Assistant for Program Status and Publications",


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
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acknowledged the continuing responsibility for recording progrems progress and achievement and graphically reporting these data for presentations which were then regularly given to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Mr Bugene Auckert. The other special branch, "Deputies for Reserve Forces Projects", provided an organizational title for the two Section V officers assigned to the Programming Division under the provision of the National Defense Act of 1916 as assended. This law provided that "there shall be no less than 10 officers on duty with the Air Staff, one-half of whom shall be from the Air Hational Guard and one-half from the Air Force Reserve". Of these officers two were assigned to the Programming Division to perform duties in consonance with the above law and function generally as specialists in Reserve Forces matters. Since these officers duties were peculiarly specialized in Reserve Forces matters and since it was felt undesirable to loss their identity as Reserve Forces Specialists, it appeared unwise to bury their functions in standard branches; but rather provide proper recognition for their peculiar status by the provision of a special title; "Deputies for Reserve Forces Projects".

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#### ASSIGNMENTS & TRANSFERS

On 6 October 1951, Colonel L. B. Oceanb departed on PGS orders to

On 6 October 1951, Colonel P. M. Spicer was relieved from assignment as Deputy, Analysis Division and was assigned for duty as Chief, Programming Division.

On 14 Hovember 1951, Colonel H. C. Godman reported to this office and was assigned as Assistant for Troop Basis Matters.

On 24 December 1951, Lt Colonel R. A. Ackerly reported to this office and was assigned to duty as Assistant for Unit Programs, Forces Branch, Programming Division.

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#### PART II

#### ACTIVITIES OF THE PROGRAMMING DIVISION

- 1. During the period 1 July 1951 through 31 December 1951 the principal activities of the Programming Division centered around the problem of providing program guidance for the Air Force FT 1953 (and later years) programs. This involved a series of publications of program guidance reflecting the budget controls and restrictions applied by the Secretary of Defence, Bureau of the Endget and the Administration on the military services proposed programs.
- 2. At the beginning of the period the Air Force was engaged in developing program detail in support of the 138 Combat Wing Program which the Air Force was then presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. Although JOS 1800/171 formally affirmed the Air Force unjor unit program objective as 126 Combat Wings the Air Staff and Air Materiel Command were by then deeply involved in program and budget detail related to the 138 Combat Wing Program. Therefore, it became necessary to continue to work on the former program with full recognition that a scale—down to 126 Combat Wings would have to be accomplished within the Air Staff prior to submission of the budget estimates.
- 3. By mid-October the Air Staff was faced with the dilemma of continuing to document the 138 Combat Wing Program (with such publications as the troop program, RPT-52-1) even though the program basis had by them shifted to 126 Combat Wings. (Published as the BPT-52-2). This dual program problem forced the Division into what amounted to a double workload. To this complex problem was added the requirement for the publication of consolidated program guidance for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) during this same period. As a measure of the workload of the office, it is noted that 421 pages of formal program guidance was developed or collected and published by the Division during this phase. This figure does not include a large volume of routine correspondence and separate staff administrative instructions.
- 4. Among the program guidance references included in the above projects are the following:
- a. Memorandum for the Air Staff and Mejor Commands, subject: "Program Guidence for FY 1953 Budget Estimates", dated 26 September 1951.


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- b. Supplement No. 1 dated 4 October 1951 to the above referenced guidance.
- c. Memorandum for the Air Staff, subject: "Revised Program Guidance for FY 1953 Budget Estimates", dated 31 October 1951. (These instructions provided the Air Staff for the first time the basic data required for the revision of the 138 Combat Wing Program to the 126 Combat Wing Program level.)
- d. Supplement No. 1 to the above reference 4c., dated
- 5. Although a broad interpretation of Air Staff functions indicated that the Assistant for Programming should have been generally responsible for the publication of all program guidance including MDAP, the practical aspects of staff operation had led to the assimilation of MDA program natters in the Mobilization Division of the Directorate of Flans, DSS/Operations. Accordingly, until early October the above agency had functioned almost alone within the Air Staff on basic MDA matters. Recognizing that the implied staff responsibility for program publications might soon be enforced on the Assistant for Programming, this Division with the sid of the Procedures and Analysis Divisions undertook to collect and publish a complete series of MDA basic program guidance. These were published under the following references:
- a. Strategic Guidance for USAF Fereign Aid, Section I (Top Secret), dated 2 October 1951.
- b. Initial Guidance MMAP FY 1953, Section II, dated 2 October 1951.
- c. Corrigendum to the above referenced guidances, dated 10 October 1951.
- 6. Following the publication of the above guidence this Division, together with the Analysis and Procedures Divisions, acted as coordination conference leaders with all Air Staff agencies concerned with MDA programs in a series of meetings in mid-October which reviewed the above publications. These conferences were necessary inassuch as during the preparation of the guidences it became apparent that there were a large number of conflicts between the UBAF program and the MDA program. For example, until the publication of the guidence the Director of Plans had made consistents against the USAF program for approximately 6,000 foreign pilots. On the other hand, the USAF program had made no provision for facilities and permanent party greater than an output of approximately 3,600 pilots.

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- 7. During the first part of November the Air Force was in a process of preparing estimates of the probable cost of the 126 Combet Wing Program and at that stage was estimating that the program objectives, if achieved as scheduled, would represent a FY 1953 budget of approximately 34 billion dollars. Because the magnitude of the Air Force beget when combined with comparable large budget estimates of the other two services would exceed desirable expenditure levels in both FY 1953 and FY 1954, the DOD directed on 5 November 1951 that a series of limited budget studies be developed by each military service. In general toras these projects represented semi-detailed budget estimates with limits of 17, 18, 19 and 20 billion dollars. The OSD directive required the Air Staff to prepare a series of outline programs which would not exceed these dollar ceilings.
- 3. To accomplish this task the Programming Division dropped out of its full participation in the 126 Combat Wing costing job and focused its efforts, during the period of November and December, on developing programs around the budget levels above. These programs were costed by mid-December and were presented to the DOD during the latter part of December.
- 9. The principal concept used in developing these series of reduced programs was to delete aircraft procurement for lower priority forces and defer the procurement rate of the higher priority aircraft to the extent necessary to remain within the budget limits. As a result of this approach a series of alternate programs were developed containing a large proportion of second line aircraft and with a phasing considerably later than that expressed in the optimum planning for the 126 Combat Wing Program. The program guidence used by the staff in developing these OSD studies were published under the following references:
- a. Memorendum for Deputy Chiefe of Staff/ Personnel, Operations and Materiel, subject: "Program Studies Directed by OSDs, dated 16 Movember 1951.
  - b. Memorandum as above, dated 26 November 1951.
  - c. Memorandum as above, dated 28 November 1951.
- 10. Although the Air Staff prepared the above studies as directed by OSD the staff nevertheless formally protested the inability of the USAF to even approximately schieve its approved objectives under the largest of the OSD budget levels; i.e., 20 billion dollars. A formal reclama was presented to OSD and at the end of December was being negotiated with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (Mr. McMeil's staff) on the besis of an Air Force budget of approximately 24 billion dollars, (not including Public Works.)



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11. It is pointed out that at this time the Air Staff and Air Materiel Command were confronted with a remarkably confused situation. The following planning-budgeting projects were simultaneously underway in these agencies:

a. ANC was computing a detailed "Item" budget based on 138 Combet Wings.

b. Certain agencies in the Air Staff, especially the Assistant for Nateriel Program Control, DCS/Materiel and the Analysis Staff of the Director of Budget, were converting the above computation to a 126 Combat Wing level with dellar estimates in the general magnitude of 34 billion dellars.

c. Certain other Air Staff agencies were completing outline program studies for programs related to the 17-20 billion dollar budget ceilings.

4. The Director of Budget and Assistant for Programming were negotiating with OSD on a probable actual budget level of approximately 24 billion dollars, the program aspects of which were at that time only partly determined.

12. Throughout the period discussed above, in which a series of elternate programs were being developed and negotiated by this Division, the office continued under its directed responsibility for the monthly program status presentation to the Assistant Secretary of Air Force, Mr. Zuckert. This task included the maintenance of a complete "program objectives and programs data" book and a graphic representation of program information in the following fields:

- a. Programmed vs Actual military personnel.
- b. Programed vs Actual flying hours.
- c. Aircraft delivery and slippages.
- d. Programmed vs Actual aircraft inventory.
- e. Special studies; e.g., MDAP, Civilian Personnel, etc.

13. At the beginning of this period most of the data tabulations and collection work was done within the Division by one officer (Graphies Presentation - Major Zichterman). During the period an increasing responsibility for data collection and tabulation was delegated to the Director of Statistical Services so that more emphasis could be placed on analysis and the graphic presentation of the material. Also, during the same period of time continuous negotiations were conducted with the Directorate of Operations (Colonel Gibson) to coordinate the above material with the "Program

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Status Data" developed by the Director of Operations for the Program Status Committee. Meither office was able to completely reconcile the problems of generally similar presentations made to two different agencies and on different calendar schedules.

14. Accordingly, the Division continued to present the above type of information to Mr. Zuckert and his Assistants on the 20th of each month. The Division's presentation was often sugmented by material borrowed from the Program Status Committee.

15. Throughout the entire period of this report substantial manhours and division efforts were invested in special manpower studies which were recognized to be the probable key to the feasibility of the Air Force's expanded program. Due to the importance of the manpower aspects and because the programs since mid-1950 had been based on additions to the 48 Ming Program rather than complete restudies, a special working group was initially established under the Chairmanship of Major General Burns to fully re-examine the USAF major unit, support forces and general manpower programs for the proposed program expansion. This committee and subsequently designated sub-committees were established pursuant following references:

a. Memorandum from General Twining to Dr. Learned, dated 3 July 1951 which stated that manpower requirements must be reduced and appointed Dr. Learned to organize this group.

b. Memorandum for General White from Dr. Learned, dated 26 July 1951, subject: "Special Sub-Committee".

c. Memorandum from Assistant for Programing to Director of Munpower & Organization, dated 27 August 1951, subject: "FY 53 Budget Program".

16. The second instruction above required that this Division assign on a full time basis the only 2 officers working in the manpower and organisation field. Accordingly, in late July the Manpower Sub-Committee under the Chairmanehip of Colonel Casp (and Lt. Colonel Whitlow, acting as deputy) both from this Division moved from the office to a committee room where

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they continued to work until late October on the directed manpower review. It is pointed out that the magnitude of the job, that is, constructing a complete program from scratch, and the pressure of the deadlines required the above 2 officers from this Division and their colleagues from the Directorate of Manpower & Organization to work almost without interruption for this full period of 3 months. During most of this time the Committee averaged at least 12 hours per day, 7 days a week until publication of their reports on the 2 programs - 138 Wing and 126 Wing. (Documents were published as BPT-52-1 and BPT-52-2 respectively.)

- 17. Inasmed as the Division was without manpower and organization specialists for over 3 months, all except the most pressing divisional functions in this field were brought to a standstill and a very large backlog of routine actions were accumulated by late October. With the advantage of hindsight it is now recognized that a committee system of resolving problems which lie in reasonably well defined functional areas is an unduly expensive method of staff operation. While the results of the committee's work were both enlightening and generally valuable, the breakdown in normal staff functions and the bettleneck created by the long absence of key personnel on special projects probably outweighed the gains from this special project.
- 18. In an effort to stabilize planning for the Reserve
  Forces a committee had been established under General Robert J. Smith
  to develop a Long Range Reserve Flan. This committee, which took
  the full time of the 2 reserve forces limison officers of the Division
  (Colonel Ambrosen and Lt. Col. Hatch), was established pursuant to
  the following instructions:
- a. Memorandum for the Special Assistant for Reserve Forces; Director of Mempower & Organization, Assistant for Programming, Director of Plans, DCS/Operations; and Director of Personnel Flamming, DCS/Personnel, dated 4 June 1951, from the Secretary of the Air Staff.
- 19. The concept of the committee was to establish the specifications of reserve forces requirements from an analysis of the mid range war plan. By this means pilot and other special skill requirements could be related to the requirements of the military establishment after a D-Day rather than founded on traditional concepts as had been typical of past reserve forces plans. The magnitude of the project under this concept required the full time participation and absence from the Division of our representatives for approximately 3 months until 10 August 1951.

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- 20. Additional special committee representation was provided by the Division Deputy (Colonel Salisbury) by full time participation in the Installations Review Committee which reviewed the problem of rephasing the Air Force 95 Wing expansion program to match installations availability and further established a master installations plan with final station designations and construction priorities.
- 21. The normal functions, expacity to meet deadlines, and day-to-day operating effectiveness were quite seriously disrupted by diversion of key personnel to these committee projects. In the future the Division would be expected to resist such a wholesale dispersion of limited manpower resources and propose that such problems be resolved by the nominally responsible staff agency (s).
- 22. An additional division activity believed to be of considerable significance and important progress in staff administrative procedures was the Division's participation in development of war plans. For some years there had remained a gap in material war reserve aspects of budget computations due to the lack of plans reserve aspects of budget computations due to the lack of detail directly related to a projected program position and lack of detail suitable for computation of material war reserves. Accordingly, in suitable for computation of material war reserves. Accordingly, in early October the Material specialists of the Division (Lt. Colonel Parkins and Major Kettleson) developed the specifications and administrative procedures for two war plans for material computation purposes.
- 23. In outline, the concept of these plans, (with respective D-dates of July 1953 and July 1954,) was to project the inventories of aircraft, units and all pertinent activity rate measurements based on post D-Day aircraft production limitations. Unlike previously available mobilisation plans which represented a "desired" force requirement these plans represented a thoroughly realistic statement of the numbers of aircraft, their activity rates and probable utilisation based on a projected inventory position of the Air Force. Thus, the computation of material reserves and plans for pre-positioning of reserve stocks could be based on realistic projections of war time forces within the limits of probable aircraft availability.
- 24. These two plans (with the short titles of STEME I and STEME II) forced the basis of all material war reserve computations for the series of budgets then being developed. These studies were reported by all review agencies as being a significant advance in logical and realistic planning. At the end of the period being reported on administrative procedures were being developed for refinement and improvement of these "STEME" plans with a view toward their continued use in budget planning. At this stage it appeared their continued use in budget planning. At this stage it appeared probable that these types of plans would become a permanent and probable that these types of plans would become a permanent and the basic plans discussed above were published under the following reference:

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
a. "Assumptions and Planning Factors for Determining the Deployment Capability of the Air Force F1 1953 Forces", dated 17 October 1951, prepared by the Chief, Mobilization Division, Directorate of Plans, DCS/Operations.

25. It should be noted here that the participation of this Division in these war plans was largely that of sponsoring broad staff action tied to a realistic concept of post D-Day operations and limitations. Working agencies which produced the preponderence of details were the Directorate of Plans; Program Standards & Cost Control, DCS/Comptroller; and Operations Analysis Division, Directorate of Operations, DCS/Operations.

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# HISTORY OF THE PROCEDURES DIVISION 1 July 1951 - 31 December 1951

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# HISTORY OF THE PROCEDURES DIVISION 1 July 1951 - 31 December 1951

#### Chapter I - Functions and Organization.

The functions of the Procedures Division of the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, remained constant during this period. They are stated in the Headquarters USAF Organization and Functions Chart Book as follows:

- 1. Establishes program procedures.
- 2. Maintains program accounting system.
- Monitors the publication and distribution of program data and information.

Because of the small size of this Division and because of the nature of its work, it has been found inexpedient to make any organisational divisions below the Division level.

Military and civilian personnel authorizations and actual strength of the Division remained constant during this period. Strengths are as follows:

	1 July 1951		31 December 1951	
	Authorized	Actual	Authorized	Actual
Officers	5	5	5	5
Civilians	5	5	5	5
Total	10	10	10	10

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## Chapter II - Activities.

Part I - Program Procedures Manual. An edition of the Air Force
Manual of Program Procedures had been published in June 1951.

Based on comments received from the Air Staff, a revised edition
was published on 31 October 1951. A cover R&R to the revised
edition called the attention of the reader to the possibility of
further revisions in the sections covering operating program data.

While most of the recommendations received from the Air Staff (1E) could be and were incorporated into the October edition, there was one exception. The Director of Operations proposed (2E) that the Priorities of Programmed Units be made the USAF Operating Program document and include all of the data now contained in all of the Operating Program documents. This proposal was non-concurred in by the Procedures Division of the Assistant for Programming, because of:

- 1. The difficulty of combining all of the Operating Program data into a single document without sacrificing utility and readability.
- The major rearrangement of Air Staff office functions it would entail.
- 3. The difficulty of compiling all of the data within a single office. (3E)
  Brigadier General T. C. Odom, Deputy Assistant for Programming, conferred with representatives of the Director of Operations on

9 October 1951. As a result of this conference, it was decided to delete from the Manual those items objectionable to the Director

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of Operations. At the same time representatives of this office and of the Director of Operations were directed to visit major commands and determine their needs for operating data.

Findings on these visits led to a request for recommendations as to Operating Program Procedures from each major command. The replies were then brought to the attention of an intra-Air Staff Working Committee for determination. These events are more fully described in later sections of this history.

No absolute solution for any of the major problems brought to the attention of the Air Staff by the major commands has as yet been agreed upon. The determination of these solutions will undoubtedly require an extensive period of time. It has been decided, therefore, to publish a third edition of AFM 150-3 (Tentative) Manual of Program Procedures, some time in the early part of 1952, which will be confined to a presentation of the philosophy of programming. At a later date it will be supplemented by a second manual which will present the programming process, based on the solutions proposed by the working committee in much greater detail than has yet been attempted in any edition of AFM 150-3.

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Part II - Command Procedural Recommendations. In early October an Air Materiel Command deficiency report as of 30 September 1951 was sent to this Headquarters. (42) It indicated inadequacies in program data from the view of AMC's requirements and recommended that this Headquarters take action to provide AMC with firm program data. Among the limitations in the present program data noted were:

- 1. Construction and maintenance facilities requiring a lead time of from two to three years made it imperative that AMC receive program data projected at least three years.
- 2. AMC requires aircraft programming data by Air Nateriel
  Area so that a firmer determination can be made of the personnel
  equipment, construction, and other requirements of each Air
  Materiel Area.
- 3. Current program guidance used as a basis for preparation of Mutual Defense Assistance Program budget estimates is currently inadequate. Fundamental assumptions of program data are not now available in Headquarters AMC for preparation of Materiel requirements for MDAP.

The deficiencies noted by ANC presented the possibility that other commands also felt that current program data supply to them was not adequate or in any event could be improved. It was, therefore, decided to investigate utilisation of program documents by all major commands. In early September 1951 a representative of this office together with other members of the Air Staff visited ANC, SAC, ADC to determine what specific recommendations these

commands might have to improve the Operating Program documents. (5E) It was found that the need was felt for more specific identification of T/ONE organizations in order to determine specific skills and end items of equipment needed for these units to be procured with specific fiscal year funds. The Organization and Personnel Program (OPT) currently shows only the unit designation, its location and its strength without identifying the precise T/ORE number applicable to the unit. Without the specific T/O&E number AMC is not able to easily determine equipment requirements. For the same reason some means must be found for identifying non-T/O organizations or aggregates of these. At present these units are shown in the OPT only by designation, location and strength. AMC must, therefore, rely on the designation and location to indicate equipment needs. This is insufficient for effective determination of requirements. Current program documents containing conflicting data such as unit strengths, conversion dates and station locations further confused AMC. They were left, then, with the enigns of having to determine which of the Headquarters USAF programming information items was correct.

Following up investigations of the inadequacies of programming documents with major command agencies, a conference was held on 2 October 1951 with representatives of Headquarters MATS. (6E) It was found that MATS considered the data and program documents contrary and frequently unrealistic. MATS representatives also indicated that they would prefer a combined Operating Program document in lieu of the several documents now published. A third

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conference was held with representatives of Headquarters TAC on 16 October 1951. (7E) TAC representatives found that there was conflicting data in supposedly concurrent program documents. Much of the conflict was made possible by the overlapping information contained in various documents. TAC representatives, therefore, recommended that a single Operating Program document replacing the current several documents noted to avoid this overlapping. As a result of the findings indicated above, it became clear that inadequacies existed in program documents as far as all or most major commands were concerned, and were not limited to a small number of them.

As a result, 26 October 1951 a letter signed by Brigadier General Odom, Deputy Assistant for Programming, was sent to commanding generals of all major commands requesting Air Force evaluation of all USAF Operating Program documents from a standpoint of usefulness to their commands. (SE) Answers received from the major commands indicated that the requirements of each command differed; and, therefore, their recommendations were quite varied. (9E) Nevertheless, there was much room for improvement in the content, format and frequency of publication of Air Force documents. Since the recommendations were so diversified, it will, of course, be impossible to honor them all. Many are in direct conflict. Others require changes that are not possible at the present time. A good portion of the recommendations, however, are considered to have considerable merit.

A Working Committee is at present evaluating each recommendation to determine its feasibility and desirability. (10E) (A

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complete compilation of these recommendations is attached as Tab A.) This Working Committee, under the co-chairmanship of Colonel George C. McDowell, office of the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, and Colonel William P. Jones, office of the Assistant for Materiel Program Control, DCS/M, was established by joint directive by Major General Walter E. Todd, Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, and Brigadier General Paul E. Ruestow, Assistant for Materiel Program Control, DCS/N. (11E)

The function of the Working Committee is to work toward the identification of long range programming problems, determine avenues of staff solution, and present its recommendations to the Procedures Committee. (12E) At this writing the Working Committee has not been in existence long enough to make any specific recommendations. They have, however, divided the areas of determination into six (6) major subject matter categories as follows:

- 1. Relating Equipment to Units
- 2. Level of Detail
- 3. Combination of Detail Consistency
- A. Time Projection
- 5. Time Proportion of Documents
- 6. Frequency of Publication (13E)

Meetings have already been held to discuss possible solutions to the problem of relating equipment to units. The result of these meetings is discussed in a separate section.

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Part III. Consistency of Program Documents. As previously indicated in Part II some of the major areas for improvement in program data to be considered by the Jones-McDowell Working Group (see 11E) was the combination of detail consistency. The necessity for consistency in information appearing in concurrent programming documents which must be used in combination with each other is obvious. It has long been recognized that the requirement was not effected in many instances. (14E) In an attempt to improve consistency among concurrent program documents the Air Force Manual of Program Procedures (Tentative), AFM 150-3, provided that concurrent documents have a common cut-off date. (15E) However, later investigation disclosed that frequently a common cut-off date was not enforceable and that even in those instances where a common cut-off date had been adhered to that discrepancies nevertheless appeared in such proportions as to obviate the possibility that they were merely typographical or mechanical errors.

Two studies were performed comparing, on a random sample basis, the consistency of concurrent operating program documents. The first of these studies compared the Priorities of Programmed Units, the Conversion and Equipping, and the Installations Programs. (16E) The study revealed that discrepancies as to unit locations, current or projected, might appear in as many as 33% of the instances examined on random basis in any two of these programs. The second study compared the July 1951 editions of the Installations and Organization and Personnel Programs.

Both documents showed 6 July 1951 as the cut-off date. Three

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Zone of Interior Commands were checked. It was found that discrepancies of a major nature appeared in as many as 72% of a command's installations.

There were two major reasons for the large number of discrepancies between the two documents. One is the amount of data overlapping. It is axiomatic that the possibility of discrepancies increases proportionately with the arount of overlapping. For example, or the 294 line entries shown under SAC in the Installations document for SAC owned major bases, 187 or 64% were duplicated in whole in the OPT. The second apparent reason for the discrepancies is the lack of convenient means of checking for consistency in the present process. The dissimilarity in the sequence arrangement of the present documents makes any item by item check difficult and time-consuming. In addition the fact that the present documents are not prepared at the same time militates against consistency. Where the Installations Program can generally be prepared in approximately seven days after the cut-off date, the Organization and Personnel document requires a preparation time of thirty working days beyond the cut-off date. Between the time that the Installations document is ready for publication and the time that the Organization and Personnel Program is sent to the printer there is a period of approximately six weeks in which changes can be made with deliberate disregard of the cut-off date or by action of top level ranagement which is, of course, not obligated to honor the established cut-off date.

At the present time this office is preparing for presentation by the Jones-McDowell Working Committee a proposal which, it is

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felt will minimize, if not eliminate, the major problems of inconsistency. The proposal will include a single document in place of the two separate documents now used. In this manner it will be possible to eliminate all overlapping data since all the data pertaining to a base will appear in one place obviating the necessity for repeatedly identifying the same organizations. The proposal will permit a more efficient item by item review in that a combined document will have all data to be compared in the same place and the same sequence. Since item by item check for discrepancies would then become feasible, the single cut-off date would be enforced, for the lack of a common cut-off date would be obvious on the face of any particular page of the document. This proposed solution applies, of course, only to the Installations and Organization and Personnel documents. There remains a requirement for the establishment of some procedure by which discrepancies in the other Operating Program documents may be eliminated.

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Part IV. Equipment Authorizations. Among the problems on the agenda of the Jones-McDowell Working Committee (infra) was a consideration of the weaknesses in the present method of determining equipment authorizations. (17%) It had been previously pointed out by AMC (18%) that publication of revisions to equipment authorization documents by this Headquarters was delayed up to two years (see Table of Allowances 1-1 dated 4 October 1948 and 1-72 dated 21 May 1948). This office in November noted weaknesses in the Table of Allowances which permitted base supply officers to draw the same allowance on several different bases of issue. (19%)

This office is not directly concerned with the determination of equipment requirements. That is the primary responsibility of DCS/M and AMC. However, the primary responsibility of this office is the monitoring of the USAF Program documents. Since these documents play a large part in determination of equipment requirements, any modification of the present methods for determining equipment requirements which will affect the program documents will, of course, be of major concern to this office. At the present time the method employed for the computation for budget proposals of equipment requirements is basically as follows: (20E)

1. T/O&E's reflect the unit organic equipment requirements.

AMC, by the process of multiplying the requirements for each unit by
the number of such units appearing in the program, determines the
organic T/O&E equipment requirements.

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
- 2. Equipment for the Table of Distribution units, and non-organic equipment for T/OKE units, is determined from range listings received from the field by base which show the equipment on hand plus any additional requirement. The range listings are then arranged into categories by type and magnitude of mission. From these, for each type of mission an equipment authorization requirement is determined based on the average within each of the above categories.
- 3. In addition, requirements are determined for special authorizations, station kits, etc. However, these appear to be satisfactory and are not of immediate concern.

The data derived concerning the equipment requirements from any method should be applicable to three specific purposes. These are:

- a. Budget
- b. Authorization
- c. Research purposes (Information must be in such
  form as to provide an efficient means of performing
  research on the adequacy of current authorizations
  and bases of issue), and to discover accurate factor
  relationships for use in simplified budget estimates
  and item computations.

Thus far, two offices, the Director of Manpower and Organization and the Director of Program Standards and Cost Control have submitted

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suggestions to improve the determination of equipment authorizations. The suggestion submitted by Director of Manpower and Organization (21E) provides in the T/ONE organic area for the establishment in this Headquarters of a master equipment authorization list arranged by piece of equipment on which will be shown each T/O&E authorized to have this particular item. It is proposed that based on this master list (HEAL) the major commands prepare lists showing authorized organic equipment for each of their T/ONE units in the form of a Unit Property Record Equipment Authorization List (UPREAL). These will be sent to AMC to provide means of determining Air Force-wide requirements. For non-T/O&E organic equipment it is proposed that a report be submitted by each base (BAIR) which will indicate the requirements for these types of equipment. The BAIR in turn will be forwarded to AMC to be used in arriving at average station requirements similar to that now provided by the range listings. The BAIR will differ from the present range listings to the extent that only melected items of equipment will be considered rather than all as is the case with the range listing. It will also have an operating function in that station reports of requirements will also be considered as actual ceiling authorisations for replacement items of equipment at that station.

The suggestion of the Director of Program Standards and Cost Control (22E) proposes that all the replacement type items of equipment be grouped into three categories:

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- A small number of items requiring tailor-made programs and computations of requirements, examples may be peculiar items in the radar net or in globe-com.
- 2. A large number (10,000 or more) of items of relatively small dollar value which lend themselves to association with such general program elements as total personnel, total bases, etc.
- 3. A small number (1000-2000) of items which could be included in typical tables tailored to specific units and work load.

Requirements for items of equipment found in the budget project series, 200, would be computed from tailor-made special programs or typical planning tables. Items in budget project series, h21, would be pre-computed and arranged into functional tables which would facilitate computing dollar requirements at any given level in the program. Using data now available in various forms the proposal is to produce a set of punch cards consolidating the T/O&E organic equipment data into wing or separate squadron level of typical tables of equipment. For T/D and non-organic T/O&E items, it was proposed to run mechanical correlation studies to find a suitable program element which would provide an index of requirements for each unit of equipment.

This office, believes that much further research is necessary before any permanent revisions to the current procedure can be attempted. While the suggestions of the Director of Manpower and Organization as to T/O&E organic equipment computations appear to present an improvement over the present system, it would require that specific

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T/OUE data indicating not only the basic table but also the modification within must be provided in the Organization and Personnel Program. A system for other tables of equipment might well be based on station typical tables. These tables made up by station mission and work load, paralleling manpower planning tables, would provide a simplified approach to requirements which is not at variance with Planning Research Division proposals. Personnel planning tables are already being prepared by Director of Manpower and Organization to provide recommended personnel and skilled requirements for twop spaces under bulk authorization. It is proposed that these tables be expanded to include equipment as well. (23E) If these planning tables are placed on punch cards and identified by coding in the program documents, it would be possible for AMC to arrive mechanically at equipment requirements for the bulk of the replacement items.

As noted previously, Tables of Allowances are used as a basis for requisition. It is widely recognized that they are subject to the following failings:

- 1. They are often out of date.
- 2. It is possible to draw the same items on several different bases of issue, theoretically at least, permitting a single
  unit or base to draw its total requirement from each of the bases of
  issue.

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Part V. Special Weapons Capability Program. Various staff agencies and major air commands, including DCS/Development, the Assistant for Atomic Energy and AMC, indicated during this period a need for special program data published on a recurring basis reflecting projected Air Force capabilities with atomic weapons, EN-CW weapons, and guided missiles. Specifically, it was considered necessary to identify (1) combat and support units, by their ability to employ, assemble or store various specific mark number atomic weapons, BW-CW weapons, or guided missiles, and by their exact locations, and (2) quantities of aircraft and missiles capable of employing these special weapons, by organizational assignment. (24E) Representatives of this office and Director of Operations undertook this project. It was found that the programmed data needed were more definitive than data normally presented in any of the five USAF Planning-Budgeting Program documents or the six USAF Operating Program documents. The need existed to give procurement guidance for special types of equipment not completely covered by Tables of Organization and Equipment, to guide construction at storage and operational sites, and to provide the basis for individual and unit training. Guidance was also required in the distribution of special equipment.

Currently published program documents, while presenting all USAF unit designations and locations, do not provide required additional data on special weapons capabilities of specific units, aircraft and missiles projected for future time periods; nor should such detailed

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data be given the wide distribution normally given program documents.

A memorandum setting out specifications for this document was sent
from this office to the Director of Operations. (25E) The two offices
agreed that the document (26E) would conform to the following requirements:

- a. A projection, by command and type unit within command, of all units having special weapons capability, identifying each unit by designation, location, organization and support depot and indicating its special weapons capability.
- b. A phased projection of supplemental data on weapons carriers, showing, by commands, functions within commands and TMS carriers within functions, the number of carriers within each unit capable of employing a given special weapon.
- c. A projection of supplemental data on installations and facilities, showing, by location, missile launching sites and weapons and propellant storage sites.
- d. A projection of supplemental data on the missile launching program; by type missile. The special weapons capability program will become part of both the operating and planning-budgeting program cycles. It is anticipated that the first issue will be distributed sometime in April 1952.

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#### FOOTNOTES

- 1E AFODP-PR file XI-45, Program Procedures Namual.
- 2E R&R from D/Operations to Assistant for Programming, subject: Final Revisions to AFM 150-3 dated 11 October 1951, filed AFODP-PR, XI-45 #13.
- 3E Memo to General Todd from Colonel McDowell, subject: Program Procedures Manual, N. D., filed AFODP-PR, XI-45 #17.
- LE AMC Deficiency Report (SECHET), dated 30 September 1951 (515-114985) filed Procedures Division, AFODP, XVI-36 #8.
- 5E Memorandum for General Todd from Golonel McDowell, subject: Trip Report, dated 19 September 1951. (See Tab B)
- 6E Hemorandum for General Todd and General Ramey from Colonel McDowell, subject: Conference at Headquarters MATS re USAF Operating Program Documents, dated 13 October 1951. (See Tab B)
- 7E Memorandum for General Todd and General Ramey from Colonel McDowell, subject: Conference at Headquarters TAC re USAF Operating Program Documents, dated 17 October 1951, (See Tab B)
- SE Letter to commanding generals of major commands from Deputy Assistant for Programming, Brigadier General Thetus C. Odom, subject:

  USAF Operating Program Documents, dated 26 October 1951. (See Tab C)
- 9E RAR to Director of Operations, et al from Golonel McDowell, subject: Improvement of USAF Program Documents, dated 1h January 1952. (See Tab A)

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- Memorandum for Record #1 from Colonel McTowell, subject:
  Working Group on Program Recument Emprovement, dated 17 December
  1951. (See Tab D)
- Teputy Assistant for Programming, subject: Improvement of UNIF Program Documents, dated 6 December 1951. (See Tab E)
- 128 Memorandum for Mecord, dated 17 December 1951, supra.
- 13E RAE, dated 14 January 1952, supra.
- Memo for Secord, signed Suley, subject: Program Recuments Review Committee, dated 30 July 1951, filed APONY-PR, XI-5 664.
- 15E Air Force Manual of Program Procedures (Tentative) AFM 150-3.
- 16E Hemo for Record, dated 30 July 1951, supra.
- 178 MAR dated 1h Jenuary 1952, supra.
- 18E ANG Teficiency Teport (515-154985) pp 8-9, supre.
- 198 Name for General Todd and General Odom, subject: Improvement of Tequirements and Control Techniques, dated 20 Nov 1951, filed AFODP-PR III-5, #8.
- 200 Thid
- 21E Attachment to RAR from D/Kampower and Organization, subject: Equipment Authorization Documents or Methods and Their Application, no date.
- 22E Remorandum for Record #3, subject: Working Group on Program Document Improvement, dated 1h Jenuary 1952 (see Tab D) and Remorandum for Record #5, dated 25 January 1952, same subject. (See Tab D)
- 238 Hemorundum for General Todd and General Odom, supra.
- The Benorandum for General Ramey from General Todd, subject: Special

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Weapons Capability Program Information, dated 12 December 1951.
(See Tab F)

25E Ibid

26E Memo for General Hamey, subject: Special Meapons Capability
Program Information, dated 8 January 1952, filed AFODP-PR XI-5
#73.

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ODP-AP History

#### Functions

Punctions of the Aircraft Programming Division are to develop, establish, and prepare USAF MDAP programs pertaining to the requirements, inventory and procurement of aircraft, and of guided missiles which replace or extend the range of aircraft. Establishes and recommends related policies, assumptions, factors, and standards used in aircraft programming. Analyses aircraft losses with a view toward establishing and maintaining attrition rates for USAF and MDAP programs. Performs necessary research to develop the best possible phasing of aircraft requirements for the overall USAF program.

#### History

Arrangements were made on 3 December 1951 for this Division to express aircraft requirements for the MDA Program, integrating these requirements with those of the USAP.

## Organisation and personnel Changes

During this reporting period three existing personnel vacancies were filled, one military and two civilians. Two additional authorized spaces remain unfilled due to the lack of qualified personnel. One additional military space was authorized and filled, namely Deputy for MDAP, since this function has increased sufficiently in importance during this reporting period. The total authorization of this Division is five officers and nine civilians. Total assignment is five officers and seven civilians.

During the period, a comprehensive training program for newly assigned division personnel were conducted. This program included coverage of the origin and development of the aircraft program. The role of the Aircraft and Weapons Board, Air Force Council, & directors of the Air Staff was thoroughly discussed and analyzed. Other items of importance covered included: Aircraft authorization and attrition, pilot training requirements, theory and application of attrition

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rates, first line aircraft concept, translation of force requirements, use of statistical reports, derivation and application of replacement theory, production scheduling, and the presentation and defense of the aircraft budget before Air Council, BAC, OSD, BOB, and Congress.

#### Activities

The development of tentative aircraft requirements was accomplished early in the reporting period for the 138 Wing Program employing a 12000 pilot training rate. This was a preliminary step in the development of the 126 Combat Wing Program as presented to Congress in the FY 1953 budget. 1/ The 138 Wing Program was based on the program guidance dated 29 August 1951 and aircraft production schedule (proposal No. 1) also dated 29 August 1951. The resulting aircraft program was approved for planning purposes only. 2/ After this program was completed, a series of project programs and successive revisions were prepared and defended, leading to the final budget presented to Congress for FY 1953 funds, based upon reaching 126 Combat Wings modern by December 1955.

#### References

(Located in the Aircraft Programming Division unless otherwise indicated)

- 1. 138 Wing Modernization Charts dated 29 August 1951
- 2. Report of Aircraft and Weapons Board dated 20 Sept 1951

NEIL D. VAN SICKLE Colonel, USAF Chief, Aircraft Programming Div. Asst for Programming, DCS/O

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CONFIDENTIAL

19 February 1952

AFODP-AL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JENSEN, Historical Officer, Office of the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O

SUBJECT: Semi-Annual History Summary of the Allocations Division, 1 July 1951 - 31 December 1951

#### I. Organization

a. Functions - During this period the Division had no change in functions but did assume additional responsibility in the area of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact. The programming of this area was undertaken to be performed in a manner similar to the other programming activities of the Division. Within the Aircraft Branch a new section was established, however, within the Flying Time Branch the activity was superimposed upon the existing structure.

At the outset of the period the Aircraft Branch was organized into the Aircraft Section, the Analysis and Requirements Section, and the Movements Section. These last two sections have had their functions combined and are now designated as the Control Section. At the close of the period the Aircraft Branch organization has revolved into the Aircraft Section, the Control Section, and the newly added MDAP Section. There was no change in the organization of the Flying Time Branch.

At the close of the period the chiefs of the various organisational activities are as follows:

Allocations Division - Col. Romulus W. Puryear
Aircraft Branch - Col. James M. Vande Hey
Aircraft Section - Lt.Col. Robert H. Ficke
Control Section - Lt.Col. William E. Byerts, Jr.
MDAP Section - Lt.Col. James W. Lancaster
Flying Time Branch - Col. Thomas Fletcher, Jr.


b. Personnel - At the close of the period personnel authorizations were as follows:

Military - 24 Civilian - 27

II. Activities

The two most significant items during the period were,

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first the continuation of the Korean Operation, and the expansion of the group structure of the Air Force. The Korean Operation continued to be a drain on the aircraft inventory and to delay the group expansion and modernization aircraft—wise of existing groups. The growing strength of opposing air forces dictated the committal of more and more first line aircraft and groups by the USAF in order to maintain air superiority which was becoming increasingly difficult. If the present date, 30 June 1952, for cessation of hostilities is extended for another year the USAF expansion program will suffer another set back particularly in the fighter groups. At present the preponderance of losses is in fighter type aircraft.

Every effort is being made to continue the USAF expansion in the group structure. During Piscal Year 1952 the goal was the attainment of a ninety-five (95) combat group structure while moving during Piscal Year 1953 toward a one hundred twenty-six (126) group structure as rapidly as resources permit. Details concerning units and equipment are fully documented in the current series of aircraft and flying hour operating program documents, i.e.,

USAF Projected Aircraft Inventory OFX 52-1
USAF Projected Aircraft Inventory OFX 52-2
Conversion and Equipping Chart CFE 52-1
Conversion and Equipping Chart CFE 52-2
Aircraft & Flying Hour Program OFF 52-1


Concurrent with the problems concerning aircraft the allocation of flying hours in desired quantities was difficult. Lack of logistical support caused curtailments in the allocations of flying hours. Some of these were serious while others were not of significant importance. Continuing efforts are being made to eliminate these difficulties.

During the period the most significant activity was the initial planning of the Fiscal Year 1953 budget as it pertains to this Division. Many efforts at allocation of aircraft and flying hours were made and each was adjusted and readjusted as result of changes in plans and discovery of limiting factors. The result is the portion of the USAF budget pertaining to the aircraft and flying hour programs which is being presented to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1953.


JOSEPH B. RAMSEY, JR.
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Executive, Allocations Division
Office, Asst for Programming, DCS/O

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BRIDS BESUMES OF THE HISTORY OF THE DIRECTORATE OF CONCUENCATIONS

Forwarded herewith is the History, broken down by Division and Branches, for the Directorate of Communications, DCS/O, Hq United States Air Force. The History encompasses the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951.


Due to a change in the system of proparing the history and a somewhat sketchy background of previous histories from which to work, coupled with a tremendous workload in the directorate, this document may be found to have some shortcomings. However, by using it as a pilot model, it is expected that future issues will be complete and standardised. The directorate has established a "Daily Diary" which records, on a continuing basis, events of interest as they occur. By maintaining a file of these items, histories may be written in the future by the simple process of reference, expansion and documentation.

The period showed many changes in the directorate. Major General R. C. Mande relieved Major General F. L. Ankenbrandt as Director on 15 September 1951. Major General Ankenbrandt was reassigned to the staff of Lt General Morstad at Allied Air Forces Gentral Europe in Pontainbleau, France. Brigadier General Ivan L. Farman remained as Deputy Director of Communications. On 3 October 1951, Lt Colonel Heward S. Gee relieved Lt Colonel Melson C. Voshel as Executive to the Director of Communications; Captain Galon A. Livingood remained as Assistant Executive. Major Sidney Singer, Chief of the Programming Group was separated as an officer and immediately rehired as a civilian in the same capacity.


In consonance with hir Force policy, some reorganizations were effected to better place the functions of the directorate. To the Commanding General, ARCS, was delegated most of the angineering programs of GLOBECCH. In order to accomplish this function, the engineering group of the directorate was transferred simultaneously. The Electronics Systems Division was reorganized to the extent of removing those elements of combat electronics which were not properly assigned and placing them in branches more a propriate with the mission. All of these changes are shown in detail in the Division and Branch portions of the distory.

General Maude visited, during the fall, Eq Strategic Air Command, Eq Air Defense Command, Eq The Air University, Eq Air Froving Ground Command, and Eq Airways and Air Communications Service. In addition, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, was briefed on directorate functions and problems and called upon frequently to assist in the solutions of problems which had arisen. The most important briefings were those concerned with GLORECOM, Electronics Countermonsures, Communications in the Northeast Air Command and UNF conversion.

reasonnel-wise, the directorate remained fairly stable as concerned officers and very unstable as concerned civilians. The high grade technical civilians remained such the same as previously, but in the lower grades, particularly in the clerical field, there was a high rate of turnover. This can perhaps be attributed to the higher ratings obtainable in other agencies and the general instability in this labor area.



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## CHAPTER I ORGANIZATION

The period 1 July 1951 through 31 December 1951 was completed without organizational change to the structure of the Standards Branch.

The Branch functioned through the period in tasks similar to those of previous periods but marked increases in Branch work loads were noted as individual assignment tasks increased with the expanding U. S. Air Force.

A relatively great turnover of personnel was recorded during the period with assignment and reassignment of Branch people almost a monthly item.

#### CHAPTER II

#### ACTIVITIES

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT ORGANIZATION

A revision of the Installer-Cableman Ladder in the Nire Maintenance career field was recommended on 9 July 1951. A separate ladder for each of the lineamen, cable-splicers and installers was proposed. Originally, the cableman and lineman were together in the same ladder and required an unnecessary duplication of training.

On 19 July 1951, general planning factors concerning strengths of various types of Communications ACAN organizations were submitted to Comptroller for inclusion in Mar Planning Factor Book (MFF-50 (A)).

Recommendations to include UHF radio equipment were made on 2 August 1951 in T/OSE 1-2130T on all air-ground UHF equipment required in that table.

All Wing Communications Squadrons in Korea were recommended to be reorganized under T/OSE 1-2233T on 22 August 1951, in the strength of 7 officers and 110 airmen.

Change requests for T/OSE 1-2233 were submitted by this office to D/NSO, DCS/O on 25 September 1951 to include microwave terminal repeater and ISM teams, plus minor changes in team strengths and composition to permit greater flexibility in its use.


The inclusion of a Crystal Grinding team in T/OEE 1-1010 was recommended on 13 November 1951. The requirement for expeditious supply of required crystals at the time of the change in frequency prompted the authorization of a fabricating team in the theater depot to provide such support with minimum delay in putting the new crystals in the hands of the users. One team for each theater was recommended.

Kleinschmidt teletypewriter AM/PGC-1 was requested to be struck out of all current T/OSE's. The Air Force has no requirement for that equipment because the M-28 teletypewriter is believed to be more appropriate for Air Force requirements.

This request was made on 15 November 1951.

On 13 December 1951, a list of outdated T/OSZ's was prepared and submitted to DCS/M and DCS/O requesting that they be neither re-published as T/O's nor revised because more appropriate and current tables exist. It is also believed that a reduction in the number of authorization documents will create less confusion and make for better composition and economy in both manpower and equipment by using fewer and newer tables of authorization.

With the recommendations to reorganize additional FEAF communications units as proposed by this office on 26 December 1951, the majority of FEAF communications organizations will be organized under the new cellular T/OSE 1-2233T.



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PROBLEMS RELATING TO AIRPAYS AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE

# REQUEST FOR HOUSEKEEPING (COOK) PERSONNEL (AACS) (UNCLASSIFIED)

On 19 December 1951, this directorate recommended to the Director of Manpower and Organization that the AACS not be given troop spaces for the surpose of providing their own mess at Cape San Blas, Florida. This action was originally recommended by the Commanding General, ATRC. It was pointed out to the Director of Manpower and Organization that the AACS was not organized to provide its can mess support and that AFR 20-51 "Airways and Air Communications Service", specifically placed the responsibility for providing all logistical support for tenant AACS units on the responsible base commander.

# AACS MOBILE SQUADRON FOR ALASKA (CONFIDENTIAL)

In November, this Headquarters returned the proposal for establishment of an AACS Mobile Squadron to the Alaskan Air Command for re-evaluation of the maximum support to be charged to the proposed squadron. A mobile squadron consisting of eighteen (15) officers and three hundred eighty-six (336) airmen is considered entirely too large for the Alaskan area. This headquarters concurred that a requirement exists for a small AACS Pobile Squadron within the Alaskan Air Command and pointed out that since activation of such a unit is contingent upon availability of equipment and personnel, it was not contemplated that such activation would be possible prior to fiscal year 1952.

CONFIDENTIAL

# REQUEST TO AMEND T/ORE 1-2221 (AACS INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE SQUADRON) (UNCLASSIFIED)

This directorate did not concur with the request received from AAGS in August to remove field maintenance capability or responsibility from the Installation and Maintenance Squadron T/O&E. Currently, field maintenance resources have been allocated to the Installation and Maintenance Squadron in addition to that provided in the other units of AACS. These resources are being employed on tasks considered to be beyond the resources of other AACS units.

In a future re-printing of T/OEE 1-2222, paragraph 1, Section 1, General, will be amended to read: "To accomplish installation engineering, installation, removal and such field maintenance of communications and electronics equipment as is beyond the capabilities of other AACS units." Paragraph 1, Section 1, General, as currently written, can be interpreted to mean that AACS IEM Squadrons are responsible for all field maintenance of AACS operating units. This is not possible; nor was it ever intended that IEM Squadrons be charged with this responsibility.

#### TRAINING ACTIVITIES

In July, the 1060th Communications Group completed the operational indoctrination of one hundred (100) WAFs for teletype duties in USAFE communications centers.

During August, the Aircraft Control function was moved to the Operations Career Field from the Communications and Electronics Career Field.

In August, general training standards were prepared for the various types of Communications Operations Squadrons (1-2233), (Communications Constructions Squadrons 1-2234), Air Communications Squadrons (1-8013, 1-8023, 1-2233), Communications Security Squadrons (1-2236T), AACS units, Aircraft Control and Ferning Units (1-2129T and 1-2130T), Shoran Beacon Units (1-1017), and Padar Calibration Units (1-2127T).

A training course was established in September to train fifty (50) AACS and fifteen (15) 1060th Communications Group Personnel in maintenance of Plan 51 equipment.

In December, a refresher course was established by ATRC for communications officers assigned to cryptographic duties. This information has been discominated to the field commands.

A factory training course in micro-wave radio relay equipment is being established for about two bundred and fifty (250) radio mechanics from AACS and USAFE. In December, a proposal was made by this directorate to provide more warrant officer slots in communications type T/OSE's. This will provide better advancement for


airmen under the career program.

In December a proposal was made by this directorate to identify sirmen possessing special schooling skills. This will be done by adding several letters to the airmen's AFSC, and will obviate much of the need for shred-out of career fields.

With other offices in the directorate, a program was initiated to provide tests in the airman career fields for the following specialists:

- a. Communications Operation Superintendent
- b. Commications Center Supervisor
- c. Communications Center Specialist
- d. Cryptographic Operations Supervisor
- e. Senior Cryptographic Operator
- f. Communications Procedures Technician
- g. Semior Communications Security Analyst
- h. Air Traffic Control and Warning Superintendent
- i. Radio Operations Supervisor
- 1. Senior Aircraft Radio Operator
- k. Senior Ground Radio Operator
- 1. Senior Radio Intercept Operator

Action was initiated to provide for factory training of approximately one hundred and fifty (150) airmen in the operation and maintenance of Globecom single-side-band transmitting equipment. Approximately 100 airmen were trained during the period in the basic



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#### PUBLICATIONS

In July, it was decided to alter the format for the AIR

FORCE COMMUNICATIONS NEWSLETTER, from a dittoed sheet to a more

formalized booklet format in printed form. The first issue of

the new type LETTLE was published over Tajor General Raymond C.

Haude's signature in August. The NEWSLETTER serves as an

informal source of liminon with the senior communications and

electronics officers in the field. It is a SECRET document.

considerable work was accomplished during this reporting period on the Communications Electronics Instruction (CEI).

This work is a project of the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and when completed, will provide a single source of reference on communications electronics to officers in this work at Wing and higher levels of activity. The Publications

Branch has monitored and steered the CEI through the many staff phases of preliminary planning. A regulation establishing the CEI as a standard Air Force document was prepared and will be published early in 1952. Arrangements were made with the Covernment Printing Office, Washington, N. C., to handle the mechanical publication of the project. The UCAF Security Service at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, will be the distributing agency for the CEI. At year's end a review of the status of the publication was made and is attached as an inclosure to this report.

The subject of authenticating and distributing the Joint Army, Navy and Air Force Publications (JANAPs) and the Allied Comgunications Publications (ACPs) received considerable attention during the period intra-Air Force-wise. In December a regulation was finally prepared and accepted which will provide a one-time authentication for all JANAPs and ACPs. Prior to this time these documents were issued on joint authority of the Joint Communications and Electronics Committee (JCEC) and did not carry any Air Force authentication for intra-Air Force usage. The Air Adjutant General's office maintained that the publications, like all others should carry the standard authentication used in regulations and letters published by the Air Force. The Director of Communications viewpoint was that these publications contained specialized and peculiar information directly related to the communicationselectronics field only and that office, acting for the Chief of Staff, should be the channel of authentication. This view finally prevailed and the regulation was scheduled for publication during the early part of 1952.

The Standards Branch, working in joint action with the other two Services devoted considerable time and effort to a number of projects of a joint and allied nature. The most significant of these was completed in December when, as a member of a Joint Communications-Electronics Committee working group, the Air Force steering member, prepared and had accepted a paper outlining the U.S. position with regard to the release of certain joint publications to Latin American countries. The paper was submitted to the JCEC for further concurrence by the Coordinating Panel of the JCEC.

SECRET DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

10 December 1951

SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) Publication Directive -- Project AU 4736

Commanding General TO: Air University Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama

- 1. PURPOSE -- Plans for completing Project AU 4736, \*Preparation of USAF Communications-Electronics Instructions" (abbreviated herein as CEI) were formulated during recent discussions at this headquarters in which an officer of your command participated. (See Reference 2d, below.) The purpose of this directive is to set forth the authority and responsibility of the Air University in carrying out the agreed plans, and to specify the procedures and schedules that must be followed in order to make printed copies of the CEI available for distribution by 1 August 1952.
- 2. REFERENCES -- Reference is made to the following correspondence and discussions relative to subject project:
- a. Staff Study (Basic), dated 23 January 1951, forwarded from Hq Air Command and Staff School by letter dated 24 January 1951, with indorsements by Hq AU (3 Feb 51) and Hq USAF (8 Jun 51).
- b. Staff Study (Distribution), dated 1 July 1951, forwarded from Hq Air Command and Staff School by letter dated 26 July 1951, with indorsements by Hq AU (9 Aug 51), Hq USAF Security Service (11 Sep 51), and Hq USAF (20 Sep 51).
- c. Progress Report, dated 24 October 1951, forwarded from Manuals Branch, Electronics Division, Air Command and Staff School, by letter dated 26 October 1951, with indorsements by Electronics Division, AC&SS (26 Oct 51), Hq AC&SS (29 Oct 51), and Hq AU (9 Nov 51).
- d. <u>Discussions</u> held at Headquarters USAF on 26-30 November 1951 between Lt Colonel W. T. Judkins, Chief, Manuals Branch, Electronics Division, AC&SS, and representatives of the Air Adjutant General and the Director of Communications, Hq USAF, and the Government Printing Office.

B/L fm Hq USAF to CG, AU, subj: "Publication Directive - Project AU 4736"

## 3. GENERAL INFORMATION --

- e. Editorial Funds. Approximately \$75,000 has been made available to Air University from Air Force FI 1952 funds to cover the cost of professional rewriting, editing, and illustrating the original edition of the CEI.
- b. Printing Funds. Approximately \$50,000 from FY 1952 printing funds has been approved by the USAF Printing Committee for allocation by the Air Adjutant General to cover the cost of printing the original edition of the GEI.
- c. Printing Agency. The Government Printing Office declined to grant a waiver that would permit the CEI to be printed under contract, as originally proposed. However, per Reference 2d, above, the GPO agreed to print this publication at its plant in Washington, D. C., on a schedule that satisfies Air Force requirements.
- d. File Folders. Per Reference 2d, above, it was determined that 100 file folders (type specified in Reference 2a) should be furnished with each copy of the CEI. Action to procure these folders for delivery to the GPO by 1 July 1952 is being initiated by the Director of Communications, Hq USAF.

## A. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY --

- a. <u>Publication and Authentication</u>. An Air Force Regulation will be published authorizing the Commanding General, Air University, to publish and authenticate the CEI, and changes thereto, in the name of the Chief of Staff, USAF, by order of the Secretary of the Air Force. Exercise of the above authority will be subject to continuing policy approval of the content of the CEI by Headquarters USAF.
- b. Security Classification. Under provisions of AFR 205-1, it is requested that your headquarters take appropriate action to classify the entire CEI as SECRET Security Information, and to classify appropriate portions of the CEI as SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, or RESTRICTED Security Information. Notation will be made on SECRET material that it has been so classified by authority of the Chief of Staff, USAF.
- c. Approval of MS. Authority is hereby delegated to the Commanding General, Air University, to approve the edited manuscript of the CEI produced by the editorial contractor (see par. 5b, below) and to approve the page proofs submitted by the Government Printing and to approve the page proofs submitted by the Government Printing office. The draft manuscript of the CEI, as prepared by the Manuals Office. The draft manuscript of the GEI, as prepared by the Manuals Branch, AC&SS, will be submitted to Headquarter USAF for review and policy approval. This headquarters may also designate a liaison officer to assist in the review by your headquarters of the contractor's edited manuscript.

## SECAET

B/L fm Hq USAF to CG, AU, subj: "Publication Directive - Project AU 4736"

## 5. RESPONSIBILITIES --

- a. Preparation of Draft MS. The Air University will continue preparation of the draft manuscript of the CEI substantially as outlined in Reference 2a, above. This draft is to be organized in five major parts and will consist of approximately 50 chapters. Length of the entire manuscript will be approximately 5000 typewritten pages. The CEI will be prepared for issue as a registered document (or serial matter) and will be appropriately classified and handled as Security Information.
- b. Editorial Contract. The Air University will take immediate action to negotiate a contract with a qualified commercial firm for the necessary re-writing, editing, illustration, layout, and production of final printer's copy for the CEI. It is essential that every effort be made to have a qualified contractor selected and ready to begin work on this project not later than 15 January 1952. The editorial contract should require the contractor to meet the schedule for production of edited draft manuscript, with illustrations, and of final printer's copy as set forth in Inclosure 2 (see par. 6b, below).
- c. Security Matters. All pertinent security regulations will be complied with in the preparation and publication of the CEI. Your attention is invited particularly to the following:
  - Provisions of <u>AFL 205-9</u>, <u>AFR 205-17</u>, and AFR <u>205-18</u>, which apply to the commercial editorial services to be contracted for.
  - (2) Provisions of AFR 205-1, paragraph 25b, which apply to the marking of chapters, pages, etc., of classified material.
  - (3) Provisions of AFR 205-1, Section IV, which apply to publications included in the registered documents system.
  - (4) Executive Order of the President, No. 10290 (AF Bulletin No. 40), and TWX AFCDS 47001, dated 25 October 1951, which require that classified matter be identified as "security information" and provide for "serial matter " rather than registered matter.
- d. Printing Requirements. It is necessary that the GPO be furnished at an early date with sample sheets of CEI manuscript, indicating the various "weights" of headlines to be used and the general style and page makeup desired. Per Reference 2d, above, it is requested that information on printing requirements for the CEI be forwarded to this headquarters, for transmittal to the GPO, not later than 1 January 1952.

### SECKEI


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
- e. Additional Responsibilities. Certain responsibilities of the Air University in connection with the CEI production schedule, distribution and other matters are set forth in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, below.
- 6. PRODUCTION SCHEDULE -- Per Reference 2d, above, a flow chart (Inclosure 1) and production schedule (Inclosure 2), designed to make 3500 copies of the original edition of the CEI available for distribution on 1 August 1952, has been agreed upon. It is essential that Air Force agencies concerned rest this schedule.
- a. AU Portion. It is requested that your headquarters comply strictly with the following columns of Inclosure 2:
  - Column 1 Submission to this headquarters for review of at least 500 pages of draft CEI manuscript per week, beginning on 1 January 1952, with the final shipment of manuscript (not more than 500 typed pages) to be delivered on 11 March 1952.
  - Column 3 -- Submission of approved fraft manuscript to the contractor.
  - Column 5 -- Approval and return of edited manuscript to the contractor.
  - Column 8 -- Return of corrected page proofs to Government Printing Office.
- b. Contractor's Portion. It is requested that your headquarters secure compliance by the editorial contractor with Columns 4 and 6 of Inclosure 2.
- c. HQ USAF Portion. This headquarters will review the draft manuscript of the CEI in accordance with Column 2 of Inclosure 2. The Air Staff office primarily concerned with this review is the Director of Communications, Hq USAF.
- 7. DISTRIBUTION -- Per Reference 2b, above, and as indicated in Inclosure 1 (Flow Chart), it is planned that the CEI will be distributed by the USAF Security Service. (Distribution of JANAPs and ACPs by the USAFSS is not favorably considered at this time.) This headquarters is arranging with USAFSS for CEI distribution. The general basis of distribution will be established by the Director of Communications, Hq USAF. Attached as Inclosure 3 is a tentative distribution list proposed for the CEI.

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
- B/L fm Hq USAF to CG, AU, subj: "Publication Directive Project AU 4736"
- a. AU Study. It is requested that your headquarters undertake a study of Inclosure 3 and submit to the Director of Communications, Eq USAF, by 15 February 1952, your recommendations regarding a detailed distribution list for the CEI to insure that the best possible use is made of the 3500 copies to be printed in the original edition.
- b. Assistance to USAFSS and Hq USAF. The continuing assistance of your headquarters in monitoring CEI distribution and in maintaining an adequate distribution list is requested.
- GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES -- It is further requested that your headquarters accomplish the following in connection with publication of the CEI.
- a. <u>Liaison with Hq USAF</u>. Arrange for qualified officer-editors to hand carry draft manuscript to this headquarters and to receive verbally or in writing the comments of Air Staff reviewing officers.
- c. Revisions. Make such revisions in the draft manuscript as are considered necessary from a policy standpoint by the Director of Communications, Hq USAF, after review by this headquarters.
- c. <u>Liaison with Contractor</u>. Maintain a qualified officer or officers at the editorial contractor's plant with authority to approve final printer's copy and responsibility for seeing that delivery of this copy by the contractor to the Government Printing Office is made on schedule. Procedure for delivery of copy will be coordinated with the Air Adjutant General, Hq USAF.
- d. CEI Accuracy and Adequacy. Insure so far as possible that the CEI, as printed, is technically accurate, that it adequately reflects Air Force communications policy, and that the information it contains is presented in useful and readable form.
- 9. COMMENT ON PROGRESS REPORT -- The following comments are made on paragraph 9 of the Progress Report on subject project dated 24 October 1951 (Reference 2c, above).
- a. Officer Vacancy. Action has been taken by this headquarters to assign Major Ned K. Walters, AC-464569, to fill the Operations-Editor vacancy existing in the Manuals Branch, AC&SS.
- b. Other Requirements. It is considered that the remaining requirements stated in paragraph 9 of reference Progress Report are satisfied by various provisions of this directive.

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
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
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	O SECRET	0	SECRET APP TO USAP
* *	TENTATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF CEI		
	I. SUMMARY	Copies	
	HQ USAF (25 Offices)	75*	(11)
	COMMAND HQ (18)	69*	(III)
	AIR FORCE HQ (21)	60	(IV)
	AIR DIVISION HQ (35) 2ea	70	(V)
	ARS units, world wide	58	
	SERVICE HQ (5)	12	(VI)
	WING HQ (257)	499	(VII)
	AMA HQ (8) 2 ca AMC Proc Dists (6) HQ FFAFCOM	16 6 3	
	Air Eng Dew Diw Long Range Prov Gnd Div Wright Air Dew Cn Watson Labs	10 10 10	
	AC&SS Air Univ I4b Air War Col Arm For St Col AFRTC's (31) 10 ea ATRC Schools	100 2 10 15 310 400	
	Comma Gps, Sqs, Units (642)	720*	(AIII)
	Air Attaches (50) 1 ea US Gowt Agencies (CIV)	50 15*	(IX)
	State Hq, ANG (49) 1 ea ANG Nat Hq ANG Units (83) 1 ea	49 3 59**	(x)
	US Components, Allied Forces, Europe	40	
	USAF Tac & Tech Liais Com	1	
	Dep IG, Kelly AFB	1	
	US ARMI US NAVI	200 200	
	Reserve Stock	<u>7,26</u> 3500	- Incl 3


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
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
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
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1 1	TENTATIVE I	DISTRIBUTION C	CEI		
	VII. WING HQS	UNITS	Copies per UNIT	TOTAL COPIES	
	Bomber Compos Ftr Bomb Ftr Int Str Rcn Tac Rcn Training Trp Car	38 2 19 20 8 5 34	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	76 4 38 40 16 10 68	
	AACS Air Tran Air Wea Air Sup Air Res & Com	3 10 2 4	3 2 2 2 4	9 20 4 8 16	
	Air Base Air Dep Air Dep Tng Tran Con	13 11 7 1	2 3 3 1	26 33 21 1	
	Air Intel Exper Guid Miss	1 4 1	2 4 4	16 4	
	AIRU HQ Wg 1020th AFSA V	ig 1	1	1	
	ANG	51	1	51	
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
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* *	TENTATIVE DISTRI	IBUTION OF CEI			
VIII.	COMMUNICATIONS UNITS	Units	Copies per Unit	Total Copies	
	AACS Gps AACS Sqs AACS Fit Chk Sq AACS I&M Sqs AACS Loran Sq AACS Mobile Sqs	18 91 1 5 1 2	2 1 1 1 1	36 91 1 5 1 2	
	AACS Detach (Large) AC&W Gps AC&W Sqs	32 174	1 1	32 174	
	Comm Gps Comm Sqs Comm Sqs, AF Comm Sqs, Comd Comm Constr Sqs Comm Dep Sqs Comm Maint Sqs Comm Secur Gp Comm Sec Sqs Comm Sec Flts	10 125 9 17 22 11 7 1 2	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10	10 125 9 17 22 11 7 1 20 4	
	Electr Gps Electr Test Sq 3171 Electr R&D Gp Gnd Obs Sqs MARS Unit, Hq USAF	2 1 1 3	1 1 4 1 1 1	2 1 4 3 1	
	Radar Bomb Sc Sq Radar Calib Units Radio Relay Sqs Radio Sqs, Mobile	1 21 11 13	1 1 1 4	1 21 11 52	
	Sig Bns Sep Tac Sig Const Bn Sig Const Cos Sig Rad Maint Tm	2 1 11 1	1 1 1	1 11 1	
	Shoran Beacon Units	5	1	5	
	Tac Contr Ops Tac Contr Sqs	6 8	1	6	
	USAF Comm Gp USAF Comm Sqs	1 5	2	2 5	
	TOTAL	642		720	

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S E C R E T-SECURITY INFORMATION

J/CP 30/1 (Agenda Item No. 12)

25 January 1952

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#### NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

to the

JOINT COMMUNICATIONS PUBLICATIONS PANEL

OF

# JOINT POLICY FOR RELEASE OF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS PUBLICATIONS TO THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA References: a. J/SP 113/D b. CECM-1006-51

- The enclosure and appendices, prepared by the assigned Working Group\*, are circulated to the members of the J/CP Panel for telephonic concurrence or written comment.
- 2. On \_\_\_\_\_\_1952, the J/CP Panel approved the enclosure and appendices and instructed the Secretary to forward them to the JCEC Coordinators for consideration.

\*MAJ. R. J. Hennessy, USAF (Stg. Mbr.) CAPT. E. L. Hawk, USA MR. P. A. Petta, N MAJ. T. F. McGinty, USAF

J. C. RHODES

Secretary

DISTRIBUTION AFTER PANEL APPROVAL:
Secy, JCEC
Director (Mónitor)
Army Coordinator
Navy Coordinator
Air Force Coordinator
Chairman, J/CP
Case File
Day File

SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION

J/CP 30/1

SECRET

#### ENCLOSURE

Joint Communications-Electronics Committee

MEMORANDUM FOR: JCEC Coordinators

Subject:

Joint Policy for Release of Communications-Electronics Publications to the Countries of

J/CP 30 (Agenda Item No. 12) dated 2 November 1951 (J/SP 113/D)

- 1. By the reference, the Joint Communications Publications Panel reviewed the draft of proposed subject policy introduced by the Navy Member, Joint Communications-Electronics Committee. A revision of this draft policy embodying the changes recommended by the J/CP Panel is attached as Appendix "A".
- 2. Appendix "A: has been coordinated with the members of the Joint Strategic Plans Panel.
- The major changes recommended by the J/CP Panel in the draft policy contained in the reference are as follows:
  - a. Provision is made for changing JAMAP 199 to reflect the authorization of release to Latin American countries of JAMAPs/ACPs in LISTS I and II (Annexes "A" and "B", respectively, of the reference), with appropriate notations indicating the conditions under which LIST II publications are to be
  - b. Provision is made that JANAPs/ACPs in LIST III (Annex "C" of the reference) will not be shown in JANAP 199 as authorized for release to Latin American countries, but that the JANAP/ACP requirements of these countries will be determined by the Services at such time as the listed publications may be needed for combat operations. may be needed for combat operations.
  - c. ACP 112 and ACP 198 have been added to LIST I. JANAP 112 has been deleted from LIST II. ACP 147 has been deleted from LIST II and added to LIST III. PAC 7 and PAC 8 have been deleted from LIST III on the ground that these publications are under control of the U.S. Navy.
  - d. Certain editorial changes have been made in the original draft policy and annexe (Lists of publications) to clarify and correct these documents.
- 4. It is recommended that, upon approval of Appendix "A", Appendices "B", "C" and "D" be transmitted to obtain necessary intelligence clearances for release of communications-electronics publications in accord with subject policy.
- and "D" is obtained, it is recommended that Appendix "A" be submitted for CAN-UK-US JCECS approval.
- 6. Provided that the CAN-UK-US JCECS give necessary approval to Appendix "A", it is further recommended that Appendix "E" be transmitted for necessary implementation to the U.S. Delegation, Inter-American Defense Board.

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-1-

Enclosure

- 7. Provided that the necessary approvals are obtained, it is further recommended that Appendix "P" be forwarded to the U.S. Services.
- 8. This study satisfies the requirements requested of the Joint Strategic Communications Plans Panel as requested by CECM-1004-51.

J. C. RHODES

Secretary

DISTRIBUTION:
Secy, JCEC
Director (Monitor)
Army Coordinator
Navy Coordinator
Air Force Coordinator
Chairman, J/CP
Case File
Day File

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Enclosure

-2-

## APPENDIX "A"

DRAFT

# RELEASE OF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS PUBLICATIONS TO COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA

#### THE PROBLEM

1. To establish the U.S. Joint policy for the release of Communications-Electronics publications to the countries of LATIN AMERICA, i.e., ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, CUBA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, MEXICO, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, URUGUAY and VENEZUELA.

## FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- 2. An essential requirement for effective and efficient combat operations is the availability and skill in the use of common communications methods and procedures by all allied components.
- 3. The study and use of communications-electronics procedural publications in training or operational exercises may reveal deficiencies and translation difficulties in sufficient time to permit necessary modifications prior to the time they are required for actual operations.
- 4. It is the present policy to make certain JANAPs and ACPs available to the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the majority thereof to all nations of the British Commonwealth.
- 5. Countries who associate themselves with the United Nations effort in opposing Communist aggression, and who may be expected to participate in future operations in support of UN policy and objectives, including defense of the Western Hemisphere, require essentially the same communications-electronics publications which are to be used by NATO Nations.
- 6. Many of the communications-electronics publications concerned are now in use by the military contingents of certain Latin American countries actively engaged in support of the UN

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Appendix "A"

effort in the Far East, whereas the release of these same publications has not been made to the countries themselves.

- 7. a. The bulk of the information contained in many of the JANAPs is already known to the Armed Services of several Latin American countries by virtue of the training and guidance they have received from the United States Military Services.
- b. The material contained in most of the JANAPs has substantially been retained in the current ACPs now being offered to and adopted for use by NATO and associated nations.

  8. a. Some countries of Latin America may, because of language difficulties, military organization, or other factors, be hesitant to accept a part or parts of an ACP as written.

  Familiarization with the publications through training and use should, however, render them highly acceptable.
- b. It is believed that study of these publications by the Latin American countries, which do not participate in JANAP/ACP preparation, may disclose certain emissions, or indicate that portions of the books are incapable of implementation, and thus result in constructive recommendations for amendments.
- 9. It is the present policy of the United States to release to Latin American countries military information classified no higher than Confidential, which concerns procedures and techniques deemed necessary to standardize training and methods in furtherance of Hemispheric Defense.
- 10. The immediate authorization for the disclosure of basic communications-electronics publications will materially assist the preparation of Joint communications plans in support of Western Hemisphere Defense planning.

#### CONCLUSIONS

11. It is concluded that:

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Appendix "A"

- <u>a.</u> There should be a list of basic communicationselectronics publications authorized for immediate release to the Latin American countries referred to in the Problem portion of this study.
- <u>b</u>. There should be a list of communications-electronics publications which are authorized for release to Latin American countries, referred to in the Problem portion of this study, on a need-to-know basis, as determined by the Services, when required for intra-national training exercises.
- c. There should be a list of communications-electronics publications which may be issued to the Latin American countries referred to in the Problem portion of this study, when required for actual combat operations in the interests of United States policy and objectives.
- d. The publications shown in LISTS I, II and III, contained in Annexa "A", "B", and "C", respectively, should be authorized for release as indicated.
- 12. Combined agreement is necessary for the release of ACPs.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- 13. It is recommended that:
- a. The conclusions contained in paragraph 11, above, be approved.
- b. That JANAP 199 be changed to reflect the authorization for release to Latin American countries, referred to in the Problem portion of this study, of the JANAPs and ACPs in Annexa "A" and "B" with appropriate notations indicating the conditions under which LIST II publications are to be released.

#### COORDINATION

- 14. Coordination has been effected with the Strategic Communications Plans Panel.
  - 15. Coordination with AFSA has been effected

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Appendix "A"

## ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "A"

#### LIST I

Communications-Electronics publications authorized for immediate release to Latin American countries on a need-to-know basis as determined by the U.S. Services.

JANAP/ACP	SUB	JECT		CLASS	IFICATION
101	Air Force Addre	ss Groups			C
102	Army Address Gr	oups			C
103	Naval Address G	roups			R
104	Allied Joint & Groups				R
105	Master Index of & Address Gro	Four Letter	· Call	Signs	R
107	Emergency Rescu Procedure	e Communicat	tion		U
112*	Task Organizati	on Call Sign	n Book		R
113	Call Sign Book	for Ships			R
114	Call Sign Book	for Fixed S	tations		R
115	Call Sign Book	for Aircraf	t and A	irships	R
117	Routing Indicat	or Book			R
118	Visual Call Sig	n Book –			R
119	Voice Call Sign	1 Book			R
121	Communications	Instruction	s - Ger	neral	R
122*	11	11	- Se	curity	R
123	н	"		neral	R
124	п	н	- Rac	i1o legraph	R Procedure
125	п	н	- Rac	lio Lephone	R Procedure
126	er	#	Wr:	letype- lter (T/	(P)
127	н	и		e Relaj	7 R
129	п	н	- Vi:	sual /S) Proc	R

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- Annex "A" to Appendix "A"

#### SECRET

JANAP/ACP	SUBJECT	CLASSIFICATION
130	Communications Instructions - Direct Finding	tion R ng (D/F)
131	" - Operat	
132	" - Abbrev	
134	" - Teleph Switch Proced	nboard
145	Merchant Ship communications Facility	ties U
148	Wartine Instructions for Merchant St Vis, Sig. & Tactics	nips -
149	Wartime Instructions for Merchant St Radio	nips -
165	Operational Brevity Codes	R
166	Voice Procedure for Ground Controlla Approach	ed U
167	Glossary of Communications-Electron Terms	ics R
175	Naval Signal Book	R
176	NATO Naval Communications Instruction	ons C
198	Instructions for the Preparation of Communications Publications (ACPs	) H
CSP 1750	.Call Sign Device (MK 2)	U
CSP 1751	Call Sign Device, Instructions for	use of C
CSP 1752	(Training Editions) Key Lists	C
CSP 1756	Call Sign Device (Aux Mk 2)	ū
CSP 1757	Instructions for Maintenance of Cal Sign Device	1 R

\*ACP Edition only

SECRET

Annex "A" to Appendix "A"

### ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "A"

#### LIST II

Communications-Electronics information authorized for release to Latin American countries on a need-to-know basis, as determined by the U. S. Services, when required for intra-national training exercises (including operations simulating combat):

JANAP/ACP	SUBJECT	CLASS	SIFICATION
110	Tactical Call Sign Book		C
144	Amphibious Communications		С
150	Recognition & Identification	Instructions - General	C
151	п	- Air Forces	C
152	11	- Ground "	C
153	n n	- Surface "	С
154	II II	- Harbor Def.	C
155	(Training Editions) Recog. & Major Wa	Identif. Signals r Vessels	C
156	( " " ) Minor Wa	r Vessels	C
157	( " " ) Merchant	Ships	C
158	( " " ) Air/Grou	nd Forces	C
177	NATO, Naval Wireless Organiza	tion	S
197	Insts for Examination and En U.S. Ports in War	try into	С

SECRET

- Annex "A" to Appendix "A"

# ANNEX "C" TO APPENDIX "A" LIST III

Communications-Electronics information to be made available to Latin American countries on a need-to-know basis, as determined by the U.S. Services, when required for actual combat operations in the interests of United States policy:

Those publications appearing in LIST I and II, plus:

JANAP/ACP	SUBJECT	CLASSIFICATION
147	Call Sign Book Merchant Vesells in Time of War	C
155*	Recognition & Identification Signals- Major War Vessels	С
156*	Recognition & Identification Signals- Minor War Vessels	C
157*	Recognition & Identification Signals- Merchant Ships	C
158*	Recognition & Identification Signals- Air/Ground Forces	C
CSP 1270	Aircraft Code - Pacific Edition	C
CSP 1271	" - Atlantic Edition	C
CSP 1272	" - Instructions	C
CSP 1752*	Key Lists, Call Sign Encryption	C

\*Effective Edition

Annex "C" to Appendix "A

SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

Joint Communications-Electronics Committee CECM -52 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: (Service Intelligence Agencies)

Subject: Release of Communications-Electronics Publications

to the Countries of Latin America

Enclosures: (Appendix "A" with annexs )

- 1. On \_\_\_\_\_ the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee approved the enclosed joint policy for release of JANAPs and ACPs and certain other publications to the countries of Latin America.
- 2. It is recommended that the communications publications listed in Annexa "A", "B", and "C" of the enclosure be authorized for release as indicated.
- 3. Simultaneous approval of the above recommendation is being solicited from the Intelligence Agencies of the Departments of the \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_ and from the State Defense Military Information Control Committee.
- 4. Written approval of the action contemplated on the basis of the enclosure is requested by affixing signature to the first copy of this memo and returning by the bearer.
- 5. Upon approval by the Intelligence Agencies of the three Services, AFSA, and by the MICC of the recommendation contained in paragraph 2, above, action will be initiated to obtain the approval of Canada and the United Kingdom for release of ACPs in the Annexa to the enclosure.

Appendix "B

SECRET

Latin America.

#### APPENDIX "C"

	APPENDIA C			
Joint Communicat Electronics Comm		CECM	-52 1952	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Chairman, State Defense Mil Control Committee	itary In	formation	
Subject:	Release of Communications-E to the Countries of Latin	lectroni America	es Publication	ons
Enclosures:	(Appendices and Annexa )			
1. On	the Joint Communic	ations-E	lectronics	
Committee approv	ed the enclosed joint policy	for rel	ease of	
TANAPa/ACPs and	certain other publications t	o the co	untries of	

- 2. It is recommended that the communications publications listed in Annexa "A", "B" and "C" of the enclosure be authorized for release as indicated.
- 3. Your attention is invited to the fact that release of ACP 177 (Annex "B" to enclosure) requires that an exception be made to current policy as described in paragraph 9 of the enclosure.
- 4. Simultaneous approval of the above recommendation is being solicited from the Intelligence Agencies of the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
- 5. Written approval of the action contemplated on the basis of the enclosure is requested.
- 6. Upon approval by the Intelligence Agencies of the three Services, AFSA and by MICC of the recommendation contained in paragraph 2, above, action will be initiated to obtain the approval of Canada and the United Kingdom for release of ACPs listed in the Annexa to the enclosures.

Appendix "C"

Latin America.

### APPENDIX "D"

Joint Communicat Electronics Comm		DECM	-52 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Armed Forces Security Agen	су	
Subject:	Release of Communications- to the Countries of Lati		
Enclosures:	(Appendices and Annexa )		
1. On	the Joint Communic	ations-El	ectronics
Committee approv	ed the enclosed joint polic	y for rel	ease of
JANAPs/ACPs and	certain other publications	to the co	untries of

- 2. It is recommended that the communications publications listed in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of the enclosure be authorized for release as indicated.
- 3. Your attention is invited to the fact that release of ACP 177 (Annex "B" to enclosure) requires that an exception be made to current policy as described in paragraph 9 of the enclosure.
- 4. Simultaneous approval of the above recommendation is being solicited from the Intelligence Agencies of the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
- 5. Written approval of the action contemplated on the basis of the enclosure is requested.
- 6. Upon approval by the Intelligence Agencies of the three Services, AFSA and by MICC of the recommendation contained in paragraph 2, above, action will be initiated to obtain the approval of Canada and the United Kingdom for release of ACPs listed in the Annexa to the enclosures.

Appendix "D"

## APPENDIX "E"

Joint Communications-Electronics Committee DECM 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman, U.S. Delegation, Inter-American Defense

Board

Subject:

Release of Communications-Electronics Publications

to Countries of Latin America

Enclosures:

List of Communication Electronics (A)

Publications #I List of Communication Electronics (B)

Publications #II List of Communication Electronics Publication #III

date the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee approved the release to the below listed LATIN AMERICAN Countries of certain communications publications as outlined in enclosures A, B, and C.

ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, CUBA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EQUADOR, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, MEXICO, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, URUGUAY and VENEZUELA

- It is recommended that appropriate action be taken to inform the countries of LATIN AMERICA that limited numbers of publications listed in enclosure (A), LIST #I, are immediately available.
- 3. Enclosures (B) and (C), Lists #II and #II are forwarded for information only; however, publications listed therein are not to be released until such time as conditions stipulated in list headings exist.
- 4. Requirements for publications should be forwarded to the Counter U.S. Service concerned from which issue will be made to these Countries.

SECRET

Appendix "E"

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## APPENDIX "F"

Joint Communications-Electronics Committee

CECM

MEMORANDUM FOR: (U.S. Services)

Subject:

Release of Communications-Electronics Publications to the Countries of Latin America

Enclosures:

- List of Communication Electronics
- Publications #I List of Communication Electronics
  Publications #II
  List of Communication Electronics (B)
- Publications #III
- 1. On\_ the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee approved the release to the below listed Latin American countries certain communications publications as outlined in enclosures A, B, and C.

ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHIIE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, CUBA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECQUADOR, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, MEXICO, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, URUGUAY and VENEZUELA

- The Department of the Navy is requested to enter authorization of LISTS I and II in JANAP 199(C) with proper notation under which conditions publications in LIST II may be released. LIST III is provided for future guidance of the Services. Publications listed in LIST III are not to be released until such time as conditions stipulated in List Headings exist.
- 3. The Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, Inter-American Defense Board has been notified of this action with a request that requirements for these publications be forwarded to the Counter U.S. Service concerned from which issue will be unde to these countries.

SECRET

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Appendix "F"

## SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

# SECRET Auth CS, USAF 8 Fers 52

#### HISTORY OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS DIVISION

1 July-31 December 1951

PART I

ORGANIZATION

#### Electronic Systems Division

Col G. H. Sparhawk - Chief
Lt Col L. C. Clarks, Jr. - Executive
Mr. R. O. Smith - Spec. Assit. to
Director
Mr. D. C. Trafton - Spec. Assit. to
Director
Miss Huldeh J. Wiebe - Secretary

Aircraft Control & Warning Branch

Lt Col H. K. Anderson - Chief Lt Col R. S. LaMontagae

Mej G. M. Adams Mej C. A. Brooks

Maj L. D. King Maj L. S. Horman, Jr. Maj J. P. West

Maj J. P. West Cept R. L. Brouillard Cept E. R. Dickey

Cept S. M. Megimiss Miss Eloise V. Davis Mrs. Betty A. Porter Mrs. Helen R. Seylors Navigational Aids and Airborne Communications Branch

Col J. A. Plihal - Chief

Lt Col F. E. Eyer Lt Col E. H. Schwarze Lt Col E. L. Talley

Maj F. J. Jaeger Maj F. P. Quattlander

Mej G. P. Williams

Capt J. P. Donahue Opl Elsie Illg

Miss Anna M. Riedford Miss Ellen L. Tucker

Mrs. Gertrude C. Ingersoll

#### Electronics Warfare Branch

Lt Col H. H. Moreland - Chief Lt Col J. M. Venaradell -Ass't. Chief

eak

Mej L. E. Manbeck Capt R. A. Gordon Capt R. E. Holmes

Mrs. Mable H. Sanderson

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#### PART II

#### ACTIVITIES

Division personnel actively participated in Committees of the
Air Coordinating Committee, Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics,
Joint Communications-Electronics Committee, Research and Development
Board, National Security Resources Board, Military Amateur Radio
System, and Civil Aeronautics Administration, as well as numerous
steering groups on electronics equipment.

(RESTRICTED) The AN/ARC-34 RCA miniaturized UHF set and the Collins AN/ARC-27 (XN-3) started a joint evaluation program the latter part of 1951, which was completed in January 1952. It was agreed by the joint evaluation group, sponsored by JCEC, that the AN/ARC-34 came nearest to meeting the requirements for the Air Force and Navy and would be the set to be standardized between those two services. The Air Force expects to have a limited number of these sets for use on an extended service test, and expects to confine the use of these sets in the immediate future to only those aircraft which cannot accommodate the present AN/ARC-27 or AN/ARC-33 UHF set.

end the AN/ARC-26 developed by the Collins Company for the Nevy originated from the same basic military characteristics, and therefore were in competition with each other. Due to the requirements of such radio equipment in B-47 aircraft, it has been necessary to procure quantities of the AN/ARC-21 for such aircraft by the Air Force inasmuch as the AN/ARC-26 in the opinion of the Air Force had not been developed to the point where procurement could be justified. Action has

not been completed on the adoption of the AN/ARC-21 as a joint Air Force-Navy standard. Due to the immediate operational requirement by the Air Force, it was not practicable to jointly svaluate the AN/ARC-21 and AN/ARC-26, and therefore the AN/ARC-21 was adopted. However, for transport eigeraft and certain other aircraft where there are not such stringent requirements, it was concluded that a set less elaborate than the AN/ARC-21 could be employed. Progress with the Navy on such a development has been alow, and therefore action by the Air Force has been taken to provide such a set for repackaging the AN/ARC-21 components into separate units for installation in such aircraft where pressurization is not an important factor. This proposal requires the same units be used as in the AN/ARC-21, which will make the procurement and supply problem considerably improved for the Air Force. These sets will replace the AN/ART-13 transmitter and the BC-348 receiver.

(HESTRICTED) As a result of an Ad Hoc Working Group of JUEC, a program has been worked out whereby it will be easier to standardize items of equipment between the military services once the military characteristics have been jointly expressed. Such procedure includes standardization of technical specifications between the services and possibly reducing the numbers of competitive development contracts leading toward equipment to satisfy the military characteristics. This procedure is now being considered for future implementation by the three military services.

(SECRET) The British have indicated that they propose to convert their VHF equipment in Europe to 90-ke channel spacing by September 1952. This requires different crystals in the transmitter and receiver,

and also requires narrowing the IF bandwidth in the receiver to take advantage of this 90-ke channel spacing. Inassuch as the U. S. military VHF equipment operating in the VHF band is designed for not less than 130-ke channel spacing, the U. S. has opposed the 90-ke channel spacing in the areas where U. S. aircraft will operate in the VHF band. Reasons for this are (1) it is expected that this action would delay the current UHF program which the U. S. services are new engaged in, (2) it would require further procurement of additional crystals to accommodate such operation, which becomes an industrial problem as well as an expense, and (3) field modifications would be required for VHF receivers in order for them to work on a narrower channel spacing without interforence with adjacent channels.

their application to the military can now be considered. Transistors can replace vacuum tubes in many circuits, and their advantages are light weight, smaller size, greater reliability and longer life, more rugged, and practically no power consumption or heat dissipation problems. Bell Telephone Laboratories has done most of the development work on transistors, and while the theory and application of the transistors have been widely disseminated on an unclassified basis, the production know-how of such transistors has not been published.

Policy has recently been formulated that the transistors theory and their circuitry should be in the unclassified status, but that military classification of Restricted should be placed on manufacturing know-how and production processing, and should be made svailable to the NATO countries on a need-to-know basis. Requests for patent

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applications in countries other than NATO should be processed in accordance with existing regulations on an individual basis due to the security aspects of the individual countries.

(SECRET) The JOEC of JCS has directed a number of tests conducted to determine the vulnerability of the military strategic communications circuits to jamning. One of these tests is the responsibility of the USAF and consists of laboratory studies and tests of terminal radio equipment as used in the communications network of the three military services. This test is being conducted by Jansky and Bailey, Engineering Consulting Firm, in Washington, D. C. Tests are to be conducted on teletype, facsimile, CW telegraphy, and mix equipment. It is expected that this phase will be completed about July 1952, and will serve as a basis for future field tests to be conducted by the services at some later date.

(RESTRICTED) A decision was reached on the use of radiotelephone as the primary means of air/ground communications by the Air Force.

This decision was based on the demonstrated advantages of radiotelephone in commercial operations, on the requests of the Strategic Air Command and the Military Air Transport Service for this method, and on the need for providing an adequate method of long-range communication in certain new aircraft which will not have crew positions for a radio operator. The ground plan of the conversion involves the installation of 16 high-frequency radiotelephone stations in the United States and 33 outside the ZI with ground/air facilities. The operational success of the high-frequency radiotelephone plan is dependent upon installations of multi-channel, high stability transmitters and receivers in

aircraft operating on overseas routes. Accordingly, procurement is being made of commercial transcaivers - Collins Type 183-4 - for Military Air Transport eircraft. The modification of approximately 3000 AM/ART-13 transmitters, operated in aircraft in overseas areas, will be accomplished by installation of crystal conversion kits providing improved frequency stability on HF channels. New production aircraft of the bomber, recommaissance, and transport type, and requiring long-range radio communications, will be equipped with the new multi-channel AM/ARC-21 transceiver. Provision is being made in this transcoiver for (FSX) teletype operation; however, radiotelophone will be used as the primary system until the airborne teletype has been thoroughly tested and is found operationally feasible. Frequency requirements for the world-wide air/ground plan have been based upon the operational routing of overseas aircraft via established sirways and bases. The scarcity of frequencies for (A3) voice operations, on a peacetime basis, requires that three families of five frequencies each be repeated geographically for general erea coverage. Aircraft of all commands will therefore make common use of existing frequencies and facilities on overseas flights.

Organizational changes and detailed activities of the three branches are contained in Tabs A, B, and C.

SECRET

#### SECURITY INFORMATION

#### AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING BRANCH HISTORY

SECRET
Auth CS. USAP

4 February 1952

SUBJECT: Aircraft Control and Warning Branch Historical Report - 1 July to 31 December 1951

#### PART I

#### ORGANIZATIONAL

On 1 July 1951 the following personnel were assigned to the AC&W Branch with duties as indicated:

- a. Herbert K. Anderson, Lt Colonel, Chief of Branch.
- b. Ralph S. LaMontagne, Major, Flans & Special Projects.
- c. Deorge M. Adams, Major, Chief of Equipment Section.
- d. Charles Toon, Major, Equipment & CAA & USAF Committee.
- e. James P. West, Major, Operations, Organization & Training.
- f. Charles A. Brooks, Major, Equipment Section.
- g. Mrs. Barbara E. Davis, Secretary.
- h. Mrs. Betty Forter, Secretary.
- On 1 August 1951 Major LaMontagne promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.

On 1 September 1951 - Major Toon reassigned PCS to Kelly AFB.

On 12 October 1951 Captain Rex L. Brouillard assigned this branch upon completion of overseas tour in FEAF. Captain Brouillard was assigned primarily to work with Major West on organizational & operational matters as well as assisting the equipment section with Major Adams & Major Brooks. At this time Mrs. Davis left the branch and on 1 November 1951 was replaced by Miss Eloise V. Davis.

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SUBJECT: Aircraft Control and Warning Branch Historical Report - 1 July to 31 December 1951

On 14 November 1951 Major Lowell D. King assigned this branch upon completion of overseas tour in FEAF. Major King was primarily assigned to act as an assistant to Major West and eventually to be his replacement.

On 20 November 1951 following a reorganization within the division, the following personnel with indicated duties were assigned this branch from the Combat Electronics Branch:

- a. Lewis S. Norman, Major, Shoran & AEW.
- b. Stephen S. Meginniss, Captain, IFF.
- c. Earl R. Dickey, Captain, Airborne Intercept Radar.
- d. Mrs. Helen Saylors, Secretary.

Following the addition of personnel listed in preceding paragraph the ACEW branch was reorganized as follows and remained as such for the remainder of the year:

Lieutenant Colonel Anderson - Chief of Branch

#### Equipments Section

Major Adams - Chief

Major Brocks - Ground Radar

Captain Brouillard - Ground Radar

Captain Meginniss - IFF

## Plans & Projects Section

Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne - Chief (REP Project Officer)

Major Norman - Shoran & AEW

#### Operations Section

Major West - Chief

Major King - Ground AC&W Operations, Training & Organization
Captain Dickey - AEW & Airborne Radar Operations, Training & Organ-

ization.

SECURITY INFORMATION

#### PART II

#### ACTIVITIES

#### JULY

Requested DCS/D to investigate expediting of radome development for 150 MPH - winds. Project "Blue Jay" radar requirements recommended.

Also concurred in establishment of two (2) additional lashup stations for AAC.

#### AUGUST

Engineering assistance requested for USAF-RCAF Hadar Extension Plan for Canadian manufacturers.

Funds made available for procurement of all C-E equipment and initial construction phases of MEP.

Recommended power requirements for Air Defense Command mobile AC&W and TAC groups to Director of Installations.

Followup action initiated on TPS-LOD procurement and production difficulties.

Action initiated to procure 180 STALO's (AN/CPS-6B) to replace difficient units in USAF AN/CPS-6B's.

Action initiated to defer procurement of last 97 each AN/TPS-LD's pending results of tests on AM/TPS-16.

Recommended to DCS/D that a TAC ground relay system for TAC groups be developed.

#### OCTOBER

Recommended to Director of Operations with concurrence of DCS/M that a portion of the M-35 trucks programmed for TO&E purposes be diverted for mobilising radar sets AN/MPS-7, AN/MPS-8, AN/MPS-11, AN/MPS-14 and AN/MSQ-1. Vehicles for radar sets concerned could not be made available in

SECURITY INFORMATION

# SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Aircraft Control and Warning Branch Historical Report - 1 July to 31 December 1951

time to meet requirements for TAC and mobile AC&W units and above action was necessary to enable delivery of mobile radar equipment to USAF.

Requested Director of Procurement and Production Engineering to initiate necessary emergency procurement action for 40 each new type close support radar equipments to partially meet total Air Force requirements.

Modifications to original requirements covering electronics and communications equipment in contractual services for joint USAF - Canadian Radar Extension Plan submitted to DCS/M.

Program established in conjunction with Headquarters, ADC for redeployment of lashup radar equipment.

#### NOVEMBER

Requested action be taken on the addition of 25 KW diesel power units for the light weight radar team, RJ under TO&E 1-2130T, in previously supplied power equipment.

Forwarded to DCS/M allocation to cover the 268 AN/TFS-ID radar sets under procurement.

Radar equipment programmed for 10 station addition to AAC permanent ACAW system; it is planned to use FY-53 funds to procure this equipment.

Requested that DCS/D to draw up specification engineering data for new operations room equipment to be used in TACC's.

Forwarded to DCS/M the depot ground radar rehabilitation and mobilization program that will require completion by 1 July 1952 for USAF TAC groups. TAC also advised of program.

Concurred with NGB on Tactical electronic requirements for ANG
TAC Control Group. SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET<sup>4</sup>

## SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Aircraft Control and Warning Branch Historical Report - 1 July to 31 December 1951

Requested DCS/M to transfer 6 AN/M3Q-1 deferred to USAF from MDAP with modification kits for shipment to USAFE. Sets required for classified project with operational precedence of II 36-A under OFU-52-5.

Requested that DCS/M to initiate a study contract for purpose of determining optimum type of equipment for proposed radio relay system in NEAC's AC&W program.

DCS/D requested to prepare necessary specifications for modifying existing arctic tower to withstand wind-loads of 150 MPH (along with radomes).

Comments or requirements for air-movements information sections forwarded to Director of Operations, including proposed priorities consistent with priorities assigned to ADC radar sites.

#### DECEMBER

Request forwarded to Director of Installations for estimates of construction work required for the proposed radio relay system of the radar extension plan in the NEAC area.

It is stated that AFCAC is of the opinion that proposed radio relay system is only means of maintaining reliable communications for AC&W system in NEAC area.

Clarification forwarded to Deputy, Inspector General for security on the border line case involving AFR-205-4.

AMC given authority to cannibalize AM/TFS-10 radar sets at own discretion in order to secure necessary parts and components for operational AM/TFS-10 and 10A sets in field.

Action was initiated in J/WI to obtain permission to retrofit

AN/APX-6 equipment in aircraft of Greece, Thailand, SAAF, and ROK, as requested
by Commanding General, FEAF.

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

#### ELECTRONICS WARFARE BRANCH HISTORY

Saunas Anth CS, USAF 8 FCO S2

4 February 1952

SUBJECT: Electronics Warfare Branch Historical Report - 1 July to 31 December 1951

#### PART I

#### ORGANIZATIONAL

Captain Robert E. Holmes reported for assignment to this branch in November 1951.

Major Lewis S. Norman, Jr., Captain Stephen M. Meginniss, Captain Earl R. Dickey, and Mrs. Helen Saylors (GS-4) transferred from this branch to the Aircraft Control and Warning Branch - November 1951.

Licutement Colonel John M. Van Arsdell reported to this branch in November 1951 for assignment as branch chief, vice Lt. Col. Hugh H. Moreland who was scheduled to enter the Armed Forces Staff College in February 1952.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II

ACTIVITIES

SECRET

SECS 52

JULY

(CONFIDENTIAL) Plans and policies governing procurement, supply and stockpiling of window material were revised and restated. The Air Material Command was assigned responsibility for implementing the plan and all major commands were informed of its provisions. The program provides for a minimum USAF window stockpile in excess of 23 million units.

(COMPIDENTIAL) The Branch arranged to loan to the US Maval Air Test
Center, Patuxent River, Maryland, three (3) Radio Sets AN/APN-3, two (2) Radio
Sets AN/CPN-2, one (1) Radio Set AN/CPN-2A, and two (2) Radio Sets AN/ARC-33.

This equipment was to be used to conduct interference tests between Shoran and
URF communications.

(SECRET) The Shoran Field Engineers sent to FRAF early in 1951 were authorized to remain in FRAF as long as their services were required. Future funding for this program is to be done by FRAF.

(RESTRICTED) The Branch established minimum desired operational features for a Grash-Rescue Boat Search Radar, and, in coordination with the Air Staff, drew up a proposed standard communications-electronics configuration for all present and future USAF crash-rescue boats over 55 feet in length.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

JULY (continued)

(RESTRICTED) Office given responsibility for clearing requests for visits by foreign nationals to USAF installations concerned with the production of electronic equipment.

(RESTRICTED) A new distribution list was made up for ADC's COI 21-2, an interpretation of JANAP-160. The new list included the Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3; The Chief Signal Officer; the Army Anti-aircraft Artillery Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado; and the Chief, Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

(SECRET) An Alaskan Air Command IFF Mark I deficiency report pointing out a lack of ground radar to control F-9AB interceptor aircraft was answered by this office. Our answer pointed out that delivery dates had alipped several times and for this reason no effort had been made to the delivery schedules to time but to serial number only. Latest information available points to delivery of certain IFF Mark I interconnect equipments to AAC in September/October 1951.

(SECRET) Letters were initiated to advise the Departments of Navy and Army, and the FCC that the IFF Mark III System has been discontinued in the Air Defense Command as of 1 July 1951.

(SECRET) A memorandum to DCS/O was prepared recommending revision of AF policy on employment of this DFF Mark X System, so that we could give CG FEAF limited capability in Korea as requested in his TS TAX dated 12 July 1951. This plan included the marrying by contractor of available preproductions L-R units and certain other available production ground items.

SECRET

#### AUGUST

(RESTRICTED) Review of an Air Defense Command proposed plan containing preliminary planning factors for use of EUM in air defense was completed.

Comments of this headquarters regarding the plan were forwarded to ADC along with information regarding actions taken in connection with the proposed plan.

(RESTRICTED) A review of ECM equipment deficiencies was prepared for the signature of the DCS/O and forwarded to the DCS/M. Five individual instances of production and procurement deficiencies were outlined along with recommendations for correction of the unsatisfactory situation.

(SECRET) The decision was made that ADC would use the basic DF Mark X system for identification as well as beacon assist for the control of fighter aircraft.

(COMPIDENTIAL) Director of Training was informed that establishment of an early requirement for airborne X-band jammers for training purposes might make some of this type equipment available to the Air Training Command by 1 July 1952.

(SECRET) A request was initiated for an investigation to be conducted

behind the "Iron Curtain" to ascertain the extent of the compromise of the IFF

Mark X system and the use being made of this information by the enemy. No reply
to date on this item.

#### SEPTEMBER

(RESTRICTED) The directorate established a firm policy on the Security Classification of Radar Scope photographs, writing an interpretation of AFR 205-21 that delineated all points subject to bread interpretation.

SECRET

### SEPTEMBER (continued)

(RESTRICTED) At the request of the Royal Australian Air Force, three (3)
Radio Sets AN/URC-A were lent to the Australian government. An effort is being
made by the RAAF to standardize on USAF rescue equipment.

(RESTRICTED) The Keesler AFB Shoran Mechanic School began producing graduates. At the request of DGS/P, the Branch recommended initial assignments and provided a recommended list of subsequent assignments by command.

(SECRET) CG FEAF was advised by TWX that Special Project USAF-FEAF-1-COMM with Precedence Rating I-39A was being implemented and that authority was granted to employ basic IFF Mark X in FEAF wherever needed.

(CONFIDENTIAL) The Director of Requirements was advised that FMAF has a tentative requirement for two hundred (200) each AN/APW-11 radar beacons.

(SECRET) The Department of the Navy conducted the first evaluation tests of PTC at the Chesapeaks Day Annex (CBA of MEL).

#### OCTOBER

(SECRET) Provided representation on a team which surveyed atomic energy installations in the U. S. to study their vulnerability to air attack and recommend countermossures.

(CONFIDENTIAL) A preliminary FT 1953 ELM budget estimate based on the planned USAF wing structure was prepared. Thirty-two separate items of equipment were included which amounted to over 61 million dollars.

(RESTRICTED) A small search radar, AM/SPM-11, was purchased and sent to ARC for evaluation as a crash-rescue boat radar.

SECRET

### OCTOBER (continued)

(SECRET) Action was taken to make the priorities for retrofit of AN/AFX-6

IFF Mark X transpondors agree with precedence ratings cited in USAF Operating

Program OFU-52.

(UNCIASSIFIED) All commands and Air Staff offices were furnished new issue of allocation booklet dated 1 October 1951, and were advised that this issue would be the basis of issue.

(SECRET) The first evaluation test of SII was conducted at APG, Eglin AFB.

(SECRET) Action was taken by this of lice to implement a project to have sites M-87 and P-80, equipped in same manner as in Project USAF-FEAF-1-COM, with preproduction I-R units, and production interconnect equipment.

(SECRET) Action was taken to initiate procurement of sufficient quantity of IFF Mark X SII equipment to permit extensive operational evaluation of this security equipment.

#### NOVEMBER

(CONFIDENTIAL) A conforence was convened of representatives of Headquarters USAF, Headquarters ADC and Headquarters Rose Air Development Center to discuss USAF procurement of a modified version of the AN/TEQ-8 ground-based james. A decision to procure six (6) each of subject equipment was reached by the majority of the representatives, however, procurement action was suspended pending fund availability.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Briefed General White, DCS/Operations, on the AF 2DM program.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Over 200 requests for visits by foreign nationals have been processed through this office.



### NOVERER (continued)

(SECRET) The Branch initiated a requirement, concurred in by the Director of Requirements, for a mechanical analogue geodetic computer for Shoran. This device is expected to decrease markedly the time now consumed in pre-strike calculation of targets. This computer is not the same as a more sophisticated device directed for development for future systems requiring geodetic calculation.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Certain tactical radar systems functions, such as Shoran, Beaconry and IFF, and personnel monitoring them, were transferred to the ASSA Branch.

(RESTRICTED) It was recommended that the Directorate of Statistical
Services, DCS/Comptroller, call a meeting to determine the purpose and desired
content of AFR 65-103, subject: "Report of Selected Air Force Property Installed
in Aircraft." This regulation has long been a subject for controversy among
reporting agencies.

(RESTRICTED) A list of badly needed publications was processed through
AFMSS for shipment to the Communications Section of the Hilitary Air Advisory
Group in Formosa.

#### DECEMBER

(UNCLASSIFIED) An ECH presentation was made at Offutt Mir Force Base to the Headquarters SAC ECM Committee headed by General Montgomery. The presentation included a review of FY 1950 to FY 1952 ECM equipment procurement and production data and an outline of FY 1953 budget plans.

SECRET

JOHN M. VAN ARSDELL Lt. Colonel, USAF Chief, Flectronics Werfare Branch

### SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Auth CS, USAF

## NAVICATIONAL AIDS AND AIRBORNE COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH HISTORY

5 Feb 1952

SUBJECT: Newigational Aids and Airborne Communications Branch Historical Report - 1 July to 31 December 1951.

#### PART I

### ORGANIZATIONAL.

- Major Frank J. Jaeger reported for assignment to this brench in July 1951.
- Pfc Elsie Illg assigned to fill vacancy created by transfer of S/Sgt Wayne Frakes - August 1951.
  - 3. It Colonel J. A. Plihal promoted to Colonel August 1951.
  - 4. Pfc Elsie Illg promoted to Corporal December 1951.
- 5. Miss Dorothy Ritter (GS-4) transferred from this branch to Plans and Policies Division - November 1951.
- 6. Mrs. G. C. Ingersell assigned to fill vacancy created by transfer of Miss Ritter December 1951.

#### PART II

#### ACTIVITIES

#### JULY

(RESTRICTED) The scheduled activation of the UNF program for 1 July 1951, including minimum ground facilities, production aircraft conversion and retrofit of in-service aircraft, was deferred because of delivery delays of all major items of equipment. Adjustments to the various phases are as follows:

a. ZI minimum ground UHF program adjusted to 1 January 1952.

SECRE

- b. Production conversion of aircraft to begin in January 1952 with certain combat types deferred until mid-year.
  - c. Retrofit of in-service aircraft to begin in mid-1952.
- d. Oversees minimum ground UHF program to be activated on 1 September 1952.

Since the UHF program is essentially in arrears a full year, the target date for completion of the conversion program has been deferred from 1 January 1953 to 1 January 1954.

(UNCLASSIFIED) UHF for CAA Federal Airways. A UNF installation program for CAA FEderal Airways to be executed in five phases has been established by the USAF, USN, and CAA. The USAF and USN will jointly provide CAA with the supporting UHF radio equipment and installation funds on a parity basis. CAA will install and operate cited UHF facilities, with first phase channel activations virtually completed, on 1 January 1952, and fifth and final phase fully active by 1 January 1954.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Honshu Loren Chain. As the result of an urgent FEAF requirement, USAF initiated action through the Joint Aids to Navigation Penel of JUEC which resulted early installation of the Honshu Loren Chain. This Loren Chain was Priority I on the JUS Plan but was not scheduled for installation and operation prior to midsummer of 1952. Expedited action resulted in having the chain in operation at least six months sheed of time.

(UNCLASSIFIED) <u>LF/MF Four-Course Redio Range Decommissioning</u>

Policy. The CAA has installed a large number of VOR ground facilities and it is their aim to use the VOR as the Airway and Air Treffic

had to oppose the decommissioning action because very few of its aircraft are presently equipped with the VCR airborne receiver. Through the Air Traffic Control and Navigation Panel of ACC the USAF was able to work out a policy that all IF/MF four-course radio ranges would be reviewed on a yearly basis by the local Airspace Subcommittee (on which USAF is represented) with first, the view of determining local Air Traffic needs, and second, the view of its being a requirement as an en route aid. Should there be no requirement from either standpoint, then the facility could be decommissioned. The USAF estimates it will be 1956-1958 before its aircraft can fly the Federal Airways using the VCR as primary aid and thus discontinue the use of the IF/MF four-course radio ranges.

#### SEPTEMBER

(UNCLASSIFIED) GCA for PANAM at Gender. Newfoundland. The CAA end PANAM both queried USAF as to possibility of retaining the GCA on loan to PANAM at Gender, Newfoundland, for an indefinite period.

Conference and exchanges of correspondence established that CAA would not permit civil air carriers, PANAM, nor any other airline into Gender unless a GCA was located there. It was further established that the GCA will serve USAF a useful purpose. Accordingly, the loan was extended to be reviewed on a yearly basis.

(SECRET) MEAC Requirement for Hi-Powered Beacons to Support

Operation BLUEJAY. HEAC submitted a requirement for four high powered
beacons for the following locations:

3 SECRE

Upernavik, Greenland Holsteinborg, Greenland River Clyds, Canada (NWT) Alert, Canada (NWT)

This requirement was in support of Operation BLEEJAY. Immediate action was taken to procure off-the-shelf Wilcox 96-2000 Transmitters to satisfy this requirement. These equipments were all delivered to MEAC prior to December 1951.

(UNCLASSIFEE) FEAF Requirement for a Multi-Channel VHF Pack Set. FEAF submitted requirements for the MAW Marine Type 10 Channel VHF Pack Radio Set. Action was taken to procure fifty of these sets through the Navy. These sets will be used by Forward Ground Support parties. The sets are in production and will be delivered to FEAF shortly.

J. A. PLIHAL Colonel, USAF Chief, Navigational Aids and Airborne Communications Brench

HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS DIVISION

1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951

SECTION I

### ORGANIZATION:

Colonel George A Westphal, chief of the division from September of 1949, was transferred to the Airways and Air Communications Service on 15 November 1951 and was replaced by Colonel Gordon W Wildes. During the reporting period the post of deputy chief of the division was discontinued and the occupant, It Colonel Retzbach, was reassigned to the Engineering and Technical Requirements Branch.

In addition to the reaseignment of personnel just described, the most important organizational change which occurred in the Communications Systems Division during the period 1 July to 31 December 1951, was the transfer of the Communications Technical Control Branch to the AACS. This transfer was effected because AACS was made the responsible agent for the planning, installation, and maintenance of practically all stations in the Air Force global communication system. Incident to this transfer of responsibilities, all personnel of the Communications Technical Control Branch was transferred to AACS.

The organization of the division with respect to the three branches is shown in the inclosures.

SECTION II

#### ACTIVITIES:

The various activities of the division are set forth in detail in the inclosures.

3 Incls

- 1. History of Security Branch
- 2. History of Operations Branch
- 3. History of Engineering & Technical Requirements Branch

Communications Systems Division Directorate of Communications



SECURITY DEPORTATION

HISTORY OF SECURITY BRANCH


1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951

JOHN M. ANDERSON, Jr., Naj USAF EDVIN J. GIESE, Maj USAF JAMES V. TIPTON, Capt USAF

Communications Systems Division Directorate of Communications

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#### SECTION I

#### ORGANIZATION:

In November 1951, an additional officer, Captain James V. Tipton, an expert in technical communications equipment, was assigned to the Communications Security Branch. This assignment made possible a more efficient organization of the branch with the responsibilities being evenly divided between the Policy Section and the Equipment Section.


#### SECTION II

#### ACTIVITIES:

During this period, the overall mission of the Communications Security Branch remained unchanged. The overall level of activity remained near normal with every effort being made to serve the immediate and long-term requirements of the Air Force. The primary goal remains to provide maximum security to USAF Communications with minimum interference with the requirement for rapid communications.

Sarly in October 1951, equipment to permit on-line cryptographic teleconference facilities between Sacramento AMA and Far East AMA was provided. The purpose of this secure teleconference facility was to provide maximum communications support to AMC as an aid in expediting supply action in support of Far East Air operations.

(SECRET) The security of Air Defense Command, ACEN communications has



long been less than satisfactory. Difficulties in providing adequate cryptographic facilities arose from the fact that both USAF and ECAF stations were involved and from the fact that many of the remote locations involved were unable to provide adequate physical security to cryptographic equipment. A determined effort was made to arrive at an acceptable solution to the problem. Conferences were conducted with personnel of the USAF, ECAF, and Armed Forces Security Agency participating. It was ultimately agreed that the USAF should take action to have a special strip cipher system developed and to distribute such system to all Air Defence locations of both the USAF and the ECAF.

This action was taken prior to the end of 1951. It was further determined that at such time as the necessary degree of physical security can be attained at all locations, a secure machine cipher system should be provided. Action to accomplish this goal is continuing.

(RESTRICTED) The Communications Security Branch participated in a US/UK Canadian Conference on Combat Cryptosystems. The conference opened on 15 October 1951 with representatives of operational commands of the Military Services of the three nations present. Agreement was reached on the format and content of the following combat cryptosystems of interest to the USAF: World-Wide Aircraft Code, Theater Aircraft Code, and Format for Aircraft Movement Messages.<sup>2</sup>

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Minutes, Communications Security Conference, Air Defense Problems, United States Air Force - Royal Canadian Air Force, 17-19 July 1951.
 Committee Paper C/SC 33/1/2, 29 Dec. 1951, Agreement on Combat Cryptosystems - Report of Conferences Held by the Special Working Group on Combat Cryptosystems.

(SECRET) A USAF communications operating instruction for Project Cottonseed was prepared and distributed to all participating organizations during October 1951. This COI explained in detail the method of handling communications involved in this highly classified project.<sup>3</sup>

AFR 100-34, Subject: Selection of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties, was changed to bring the USAF policy on this subject completely into accord with the recently established joint policy.

During November 1951, action was initiated to transfer accountability and control of the AM/FGQ-1 and the 4TXD 100-GW to Air Force
Security Service. Completion of this action will result in the responsibility for accountability, control and issue of all cryptographic and cryptographic associated items being placed with one agency, the USAF Security Service.4

Arrangements were completed with Continental Air Command and Air Force Security Service for the establishment within CONAC of an extensive Cryptographic and Communications Security training program for Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel. Thirty instructors for this program, which will involve approximately seven hundred (700) officers and airmen, are being trained at Air Force Security Service, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. Implementation of the program in CONAC will begin about February 1952.

<sup>3.</sup> Hq USAF COI 54, effective 1 November 1951, Subj: Project Cottonseed.
4. Hq USAF (AFORC-S/C) letter, 15 November 1951, Subj: Equipment Accountability.

As an additional aid to Air Force wide communications security training, a program involving the use of posters and training films was initiated. New posters are being prepared each month. Existing training films will be used to the maximum extent possible; new films will be produced to fulfill training requirements created by the introduction of new equipments and techniques. The Air Force Security Service has been charged with the implementation of this program.

(CONFIDENTIAL) On 26 December 1951, it was proposed by USAF Security Service that on-line security tests be conducted on the Plan 51 system. This proposal was concurred in with recommendations that a study project be initiated as soon as possible. Direct correspondence was authorized between Hq USAFS and Hq 1060th Communications Group regarding the station from which the tests will be conducted, assistance required, and other matters pertaining to subject test.

(RESTRICTED) The Air Force was charged by JGSC to act as Executive Agent for providing communications facilities for NATO meetings in Lisbon, Portugal. OG USAFSS was charged with placement of crypto equipment and CINCUSAFE was directed to provide necessary personnel in the form of one officer and four crypto operators. This unit will augment and utilize the existing crypto facilities operated by the Air Attache, Lisbon. No military circuits were provided. All traffic will be passed over commercial circuits.

Ltr, Hq USAFSS, 14 May 1951, Subj: Communications Security Posters, with 1st Ind from Hq USAF, 17 September 1951.

Ltr, Hq USAPSS, 26 December 1951, Subj: On-line Security for Plan 51.1
 CECH-1163-51, 20 December 1951, Subj: Communications Facilities for Nato meetings in Lisbon, Portugal.

(SECRET) During this period, continuous action has been taken to procure approximately 100 modification kits for the 131E2 subsets (AN/FCQ-1). These kits are designed to suppress the radiation of classified clear text signals from those equipments and to eliminate the transmission of these same clear text pulses from going out on the receive side of the teletype line.

There has been continuous coordination and collaboration with the Director of Training relative to the establishment by the Air Training Command of cryptographic maintenance schools. The first course to be organized will be ASAM 2-1 and SAMSON maintenance. Following will be courses in the AFSAM 9, AFSAM 15, and finally CLIHOMY. The first quotas for the ASAM 2-1 and SAMSON course were announced in December 1951.

Mobile Communications Centers. Ten (10) Complete Mobile Communications Centers<sup>8</sup>, manufactured by Nickes Engineering and Construction Company, were system tested and shipped<sup>9</sup> to end locations during the last six months of calendar year 1951. Each center included a Transmitter Van, Receiver Van, Communications Center Van and associated power unit trailers. Each Communications Center Van included three (3) full-duplex terminals of on-line SIGTOT equipments and a three (3) combination safe for storage of tapes.

cations for Mobile Communications Vans.

9. R&R, Dir. Comm. to DCS/M, 27 Nov. 1951, Subj: Shipment of Mobile Communications Vans

<sup>8.</sup> Der, Dir. Comm., to DCS/N, 4 Jan 1951, Subj: Procurement of Mobile Communications Vans.
R&R, Dir. Comm. to DCS/N, 27 Jan 1951, Subj: Equipment and Specifications for Mobile Communications Vans.

The 131E2 terminating and mixing equipments were removed from the 131E2 tables and installed in specially built tables to conserve space and provide a means of maintaining the equipment from the front. Circuit modifications were made to eliminate all circuit relays which were not required for full-duplex on-line operation.

Mobile air Transportable Communication and Navigational Aid Trailers.

The first phase of the AACS Mobile Communications Program, which included the fabrication of 330 —ton Communication and Navigational Aid Trailers, least processed through this branch. Appropriate revisions were effected in order that newly developed equipments under current procurement could be included in the project. These equipments included a complete complement of miniaturized VHF and UHF transmitting and receiving equipments. These equipments seem exceptionally well adapted for mobile installation and should materially improve both the effectiveness and flexibility of the overall mobile program. This project included seven (7) types of trailers.

<sup>10.</sup> Letter, Hq AACS, 7 May 1951, Subj: Construction of Mobile Air Transportable Communication and Navigational Aid Trailers.


Letter, Hq AACS, 14 Sep. 1951, Subj: Revision of & ton AACS Mobile Units.

11. MAR, DCS/O to DCS/D and DCS/M, 31 Oct. 1951, Subj: Nobile Air Transportable Communication and Navigational Aid Trailers.


- Receiver-operating unit
- Transmitter unit
- Facsimile-intercept unit
- UHF/VHF/DF operating unit
- 5. UHF equipment unit
- Control tower unit
- 7. Power supply unit

A production model of SAMSON (Synchronizer and Mixer Unit) was service tested on the Washington-Mitchel Air Force Base radio circuit. Minor modifications were made and acceptance tests were conducted at the factory using simulated land-line circuits. 12 Procurement and supply action was taken on SAMSON spare parts, bulk spares, equipment cabinets, tools, rectifiers and test equipments.13 First SANSON deliveries are scheduled for early spring 1952.

<sup>12.</sup> RAR, Dir Comm. to DCS/M,5 July 1951, Subj: Procurement of SAMSON Equipment. Letter, Dir. Comm. to Transmitter Equipment and Manufacturing Co., Inc., 16 May 1951, Subj: Acceptance Test. 13. R&R, Dir. Comm. to DCS/M, 24 May 1951, Subj: Procurement of Associated SAMSON.



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SECTION II

ACTIVITIES

### AIR FORCE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (Restricted)

An interim policy for the management and operation of the Air Porce Global Communications System had been formed and promulgated to the air commands on 9 August 1951. However, during this report period, a wide variance of interpretation was evident. The advocates of "Communications for Command" chose to interpret the policy to suit their concept. They would divide the system into theatre areas making the operation of area stations entirely a theatre problem. The proponents of the "systems concept." notably the global commands i.e., Strategic Air Command, Military Air Transport Service, Airways and Air Commanications Service, pressed for a global system operated by a single communications agency claiming greater efficiency in use of manpower, equipment, frequencies, and system operation. There were those who felt that channels in multi-channel circuits should be allocated to individual users such as SAC, Weather, Air Force Security Service. Another camp was firmly convinced that no channels should be allocated, but that all message traffic should flow slong channelized routes using semi-automatic and later fully automatic switching techniques.

In the meantime, engineering construction, and programming for GLOBECOM continued. The engineers were designing the system so that either of the two opposing concepts could be satisfied. Many problems arose during the period which could have been greatly alleviated had a firm course and goal been defined.

The decision to convert all Air Force high frequency air/ground radio stations from continuous wave. Morse code, to radio telephone had been made

Note 1. Eq USAF 1tr. subj. "Air Force Global Communications System, GLOBECOM, dated 9 August 1951.


on 9 July 1951 2. The Airways and Air Communications Service was designated as the agency to install, operate, and maintain a world-wide integrated voice air/ground system. Efforts were continued to obtain frequency clearances for this system and to work out operational and engineering problems for the integration of point-to-point and air/ground facilities.

In October the Air Force program for fiscal years 1953 and 1954 was published for the use of the air staff. This program had a great impact on the global communications system. The base utilization schedule for overseas areas called for a greater number of SAC deployment bases in the European, Middle Bast, and Indian Ocean areas. It reflected expanded Air Force responsibility in supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The planned global system was expanded to keep pace with the base utilisation schedule under the 126 wing program. The additional funds which would be required to expand the system were derived and presented to the Budget Advisory Committee, the Secretary of Defense, and the Bureau of the Budget. An original requirement for 32 million dollars in FY 53 was cut by the BOB to

There remained at the end of the period the major policy problem on delineation of management responsibilities. In the meantime, the existing world-wide system of partly rehabilitated world war II equipment, allocated Army and Navy channels, and leased facilities, was not meeting the Air Force's day-to-day operating needs.

Note 2. Hq USAF ltr, subj, Provision for Operation of HF Air/Ground Phone Communications, dated 30 July 1951...addressed to all major air commands.


Charts -- Chart #1. The Immediate Objective, GLOBECOM Program Chart #2, The FT 54 Objective, GLOBECOM Program Chart #3, The Present AF World-wide Communications Network



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### USAF Leased Connercial Systems (Restricted)

The landline systems in the continental United States continued to grow, particularly the air defense system which was rapidly being installed to keep pace with the installation of permanent radar sites, the organization of Air Defense Control Centers, Military and Civil Air Raid Warning Mets, Ground Observer Corps Nets, a network for the control of electromagnetic radiations, etc. The air defense systems consisted of leased facilities with the monthly expenditure during this period running to approximately \$360,000.00.

Plans were completed for the expansion of other leased wire systems in phase with the growing number of Air Force units and installation. The AIRCONNET switching centers reached their capacity and an order was placed with the Western Union Company to add thirty Plan 51 positions to each center. The overseas gateway station at Andrews Air Force Base was moved to the Pentagon and consolidated with the AIRCONNET switching center there.

Minor additions were made to the MATS Private Line, Weather Teletype,
Weather Facsimile, Military Flight Service, Air Force Sedurity Service Networks, and CAA Services.

The new Air Force Program reflected greater requirements for leased commercial service. After all air command and theatre requirements had been reviewed \$38,000,000.000 would be needed to meet them in FY 53. The FY 52 obligation schedule in this area indicated an estimated expenditure of \$16,000,000.00.

The greatest increases were needed for landline systems in Europe and for excension of air defense communications.

### COMMUNICATIONS (Restricted)

During the first part of October, an effort was made to establish a commercial radio teletype circuit Washington to Rabat, French Morocco via Hackay facilities. However, wire lines in French Morocco between Rabat and Tangiers were so poor that this project was abandoned,

on 2 October, this headquarters renegotiated with Mackay Radio to establish three radio channels Tokyo-San Francisco. The Communications Systems Division had been negotiating with Mackay for these circuits since May of 1951, but had to abendon the idea in July because of tri-partite contractual arrangements involving the USAF - Japanese government and Mackay. The USAF general consel took this tri-partite matter under study.

During the second week in October, based upon a request from the Royal Australian Air Force, action was taken to establish a redio teletype circuit between Okinawa and Melbourne, Australia.

On 15 November, an 8-hour west bound Western Union submarine cable was established between Wiesbaden and Washington via Bushy Park. This cable passes traffic at the speed of 50 wpm and costs \$9,850 per month. The Headquarters, USAF communications center at Wiesbaden had been extremely overloaded. The installation of this channel helped, but traffic loads still exceeded channel capacity.

On 12 December, this branch arranged for two (2) AT&T duplex landline telegraph circuits from the Pentagon to Newfoundland, one operating directly Pentagon to Pepperrell, the other operating Pentagon-Limestone-Harmon. The circuits were necessary to give Headquarters SAC greater facility in the NEAC area.

### TRAFFIC ENGINE RING STUDY (Restricted)

Inasmich as the use of teletypewriter switching equipment was relatively new to the Air Force, together with the fact that little or no publications are evailable which comprehensively outline the major factors, considerations, and problems associated with system engineering, the Traffic Engineering Section instigated a study in this connection in April 1951. In order to present a comprehensive analysis, this study was divided into several sections. Each section deals with a specific facet which has a bearing on system engineering and must be considered collectively for proper evaluation of the problem.

The study endeavors to set forth the besic requirements of a communications system and, in the light of these requirements, to evaluate the several systems and equipment, in current use by the military, commercially available, and currently under development. It is the observation of the study, that all descrepancies in equipment functions and operating instructions now in effect or desired by the three services, are predicated on equipment limitations of present systems.

The study attempts to present those factors which have a bearing on system engineering and includes such details necessary to promote a working knowledge and understanding of the problems involved. The study further reveals the inherent limitations of existing teletypewriter switching equipment which, while being inconsequential to consercial industry, are of major significance to the military and discusses a possible solution to the problem. Copies of this study

are being submitted to all major commands.

### TELETYPEWRITER SWITCHING EQUIPHENT (Unclassified)

Present teletypewriter switching systems, full automatic and semiautomatic, were developed around the operational requirements and
characteristics of commercial industry. The operation of such a
system (Plan 51) by the Air Force reveals that limitations are inherent
in the equipment which, while being inconsequential to commercial industry, are of major significance to the military. Subsequent evaluation
of other such systems in the light of this operational experience reveals
that they offer little or no advantages over that which is employed by
the Air Force.

Evaluation of the Military Characteristics and Specifications covering the development of the AM/GGC-2 equipment by the Automatic Electric Company indicates that the resulting equipment will not offer any appreciable advantages over commercially available systems. Intensive research and evaluation of latest developments and techniques by Air Force personnel and leading commercial communications engineers reveal that proper application of available component equipments will overcome these known military limitations.

The development of communications operating instructions are governed by the limitations of the equipment employed. These instructions insure that proper message handling will result in spite of these equipment limitations. Inasmuch as proper application of available component equipments will overcome known limitations it is mandatory that those operating instructions which no longer apply should be

discarded and not be imposed as a military characteristic or requirement on the design of new equipments.

The major portion of teletype message handling personnel are engaged in the preparation of messages for transmission, therefore, it is essential that new techniques and developments be employed which materially reduces the information that must be incorporated in each message to facilitate its handling over the electrical communications system. The development of equipments to electrically conform with procedures which are a product of an archaic method of operation (torm tape) does not represent an appreciable advancement in the art of teletype message handling, particularly when the present stage of the art permits the elimination of such.

It is significant to note that teletypewriter switching systems, existing and under development, cannot be considered as an item of equipment in the same sense that a Model-19 or AN/TGC-1 represents an item of equipment. Current teletypewriter switching systems are a collection of component units, each performing a specific function and which are essential to each other for operation. Total or temporary incapacitation of the selector gear, for example, renders the remainder of the relay center inoperative insofar as relaying messages is concerned. Such a system does not have the individuality or the flexibility of present torn tape equipment. It is desirable, from a military point of view, that the teletypewriter switching concept of operation employ equipment which has the individuality and flexibility of the torn tape type equipments.

The experience gained in the operation of teletypewriter switching equipment within the Air Force indicates that such equipment should be automatic to a degree commensurate with the quality of reception (radio) and the expected level of personnel proficiency, particularly during an emergency. No equipments should be employed requiring, on the part of message preparation personnel, a proficiency level higher than present basic teletype operators or which are considered to be available during an emergency.

(UNCLASSIFIED) OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF USAF TAPE RELAY EDEWORK. Since the inception of channelized routing throughout the USAF, and the employment of the reperforator switching system within the ZI, an appreciable improvement has taken place in the operation of the AIRCOMNET as a whole. Much of this may be attributed to the experience gained by the state-side and overseas communications personnel in the procedure related to reperforator switching operation, particularly with respect to the machine functions utilized in the beginning and the ending of the message format. A considerable amount of the minor reprocessing initially required at the overseas gateway stations, and at inter-service transfer stations within the ZI, has been eliminated. The refinement of both routing doctrine and operating procedure has also played an important part in bringing about better overall efficiency. In any existing teletype system which is adapted to the handling of a different type of traffic than was provided for in the original engineering design certain procedural changes are inevitable as experience is gained. Such revisions have been made over the past nine months but on a gradual basis to reduce resultant adjustments on the part of communications personnel. From general observation it appears that a continuing improvement should be reflected in the future operation of the network.

USAF and FEAF concerning the communications plan involving weather, operational and administrative traffic for the FEAF area was climaxed on 9 October by a letter from the CG AACS. This letter voiced objections to the FEAF communications plan pointing out the objections from an AACS standpoint.

As a result of this letter a message was sent on 21 December to FEAF establishing the basic concepts upon which the FEAF communications plan should be formulated and querying FEAF for their objections to the AACS continuing to operate the major relay stations in the Pacific area. On 29 December FEAF replied to this message concurring in the basic concepts upon which the FEAF communications plan would be formulated as well as concurring in AACS continuing to operate the relay centers in the FEAF area.

this Headquarters received a number of messages from Colonel Dearmond,
USAFE Communications Officer, complaining about the large volume of weather
traffic that was being handled through the Wiesbaden relay center. He
proposed that one circuit be allocated between the Rhein/Main weather
central and Washington for the purpose of exchanging all the weather
traffic between the U. S. and Europe. It was the plan that when this
circuit was inoperative the weather traffic would be mailed. This Headquarters offered violent objection to such an arrangement and outlined the
consequences which would result. However, this plan was implemented on
1 December 1951. At the same time this Headquarters approved Colonel Dearmond's
plan for handling the weather traffic between Europe and the U. S., an
Ad Hoc Weather Group was formed to study the overall weather handling
problem. Shortly after implementation of Colonel Dearmond's proposal the
weather service and AACS flooded this Headquarters with complaints about

the service being received. It was stated that approximately 37 percent of the required weather traffic was being transmitted to the U.S. This Headquarters delayed any corrective action, however, pending completion of the study on the handling of weather traffic by the Ad Hoc Group.

(RESTRICTED) COMMUNICATIONS - UNITED KINGDOM. The location of the major relay center in the United Kingdom and the agency who would operate the relay facilities was a controversial issue of considerable importance during the months of October through December. USAFE made a decision that the relay center would be moved from Bushy Park to South Ruislip and commenced action to accomplish this prior to 27 January 1952. Headquarters USAF advised Headquarters USAFE that it was not possible to make sound appraisal for USAF approval or disapproval of the USAFE plan with the piecemeal information available. USAFE was requested to submit a formal plan for consideration. As of 1 January 1952 a plan had not been received from USAFE.

RESTRICTED) ACP 101 - AIR FORCE ADDRESS GROUPS. During the period of October through December 1951 two and sometimes three people were working full time compiling information for typing and editing the manuscript for ACP 101, "Air Force Address Groups." The earlier stage of this period was spent in conferences with Army and Navy representatives. Items discussed were types of formats, methods of listing assignments, and the dividing of address groups between the services and joint organizations according to the amount of groups required determined by usage in the past. It was determined that the Navy had the largest requirement for address groups with the Air Force, Army, Joint books following in that order. The Air Force book was greatly expanded with the inclusion of the Commonwealth Nations and other NATO countries which were not contained in JANAP 116.

ACP 101, containing approximately 350 pages, was sent to the Government Printing Office on 3 January 1952.

(UECLASSIFIED) REVISION OF HEADQUARTERS USAF COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS. The Headquarters USAF COIs were revised to conform to current USAF policy. The COIs have been distributed to all major commands and communications stations, where applicable. Included in these revisions was COI Number 41 USAF Tape Relay Routing Doctrine, which now reflects the change in the handling of commercial refile traffic.

(UNCLASSIFIED) COMMERCIAL REFILE. With the establishment of 40 USAF communications stations, effective 1 September 1951 within the Zone of Interior, as designated refile points the handling of this type traffic has definitely improved and with a resultant monetary savings to the Government. Verbal comment voluntarily offered recently by Headquarters AMC representatives indicates that their experience with the new refile system has proved satisfactory.

(RESTRICTED) USAF PROVISIONAL TAPE RELAY PROCEDURE. In order to correct and bring the publication up-to-date a Memorandum Number 1 to the USAF Provisional Tape Relay Procedure was prepared and has now been disseminated to communications stations Air Force wide, to become effective on 15 January 1952. Several major portions of the procedure were revised completely. This included the handling of missent and misrouted messages which should bring about a reduction in the number of duplicate transmissions within the USAF tape relay system. Another significant change involved is the new joint procedure for the alternate routing of traffic on an interservice basis which was also implemented by the Army and Navy. The USAF sponsored the standardized procedure which should greatly assist in the handling of alternately routed traffic within and between the three services.

In addition, this new procedure has been incorporated in the draft of ACP 127B (Allied Tape Relay Procedure) for the consideration of the British and the Canadian services and may be acceptable for combined usage.

(RESTRICTED) USAF TAPE RELAY ROUTING DOCTRINE. During the period under report negotiations were carried on with the Navy for the establishment of additional tare relay transfer points to facilitate the exchange of Air Force - Navy traffic. In certain areas it was necessary to give excessive relay handling to such traffic. Realizing this condition was one which should be acted upon promptly, the USAF took the initiative in recommending, and ultimately establishing, two new Air Force - Navy inter-service points in the Japan-Okinawa and European areas. This will permit the exchange of inter-service traffic without reprocessing. This plan has resulted in a reduction of traffic on heavily loaded circuits to and from our stations in these areas. This routing was incorporated in the revision of OOI Number 41 dated 1 November 1951.

(RESTRICTED) HEW AND REVISED AFRS.

A draft copy of a proposed Air Force Regulation authorizing the use of general messages within the Air Force has been coordinated and sent forward to the Air Adjutant General. Additional information with reference to the handling of general messages may currently be found in revised Headquarters USAF COI Number 6.

AFR 100-11 relative to authorized users of Air Force communications facilities was completed and disseminated Air Force wide during the month of October. This regulation prescribed the policy and responsibility for the use of the USAF communications system. A list of agencies authorized to use these facilities has been included.

A recommended change to AFR 100-3, concerning handling of TOP SECRET Redline messages, was prepared, coordinated, and forwarded to the Air Adjutant General. This change has been recommended to expedite the delivery of TOP SECRET Redline messages by providing that the communications center duty officers be appointed TOP SECRET control officers for this purpose.

Recommended certain changes to the Director of Statistical Services pertaining to AFR 171-12. The subject AFR contained several items which were considered to be detrimental to the established Air Force communications policy, and was not coordinated with this Headquarters prior to publishing.

(RESTRICTED) REVISIONS TO JAMAP PUBLICATIONS.

An additional chapter to JANAF 125A was drafted. This includes voice procedures for use in air/ground communications. After further coordination is effected, it will be presented to the JCEC for inclusion in the next issue of JANAF 125.

JANAP 121A is being revised and should be published sometime in the near future as ACP 121B. Working group action of the revision of this draft has been completed.

(UECLASSIFIED) PROPOSED AIR FORCE MARGAL. Considerable work has been done in the past several months on the new USAF Communications Operating Manual. The draft of this manual is nearing completion and should soon be available to the major commands and other interested activities for review and comment prior to final publication. This manual outlines the principles and factors that should be given consideration in the establishment of USAF communications stations. These instructions from a guidance standpoint should prove helpful to communications officers in their basic training.

(UNCLASSIFIED) JOIN AIR FORCE - NAVY TAPE RELAY ROUTING DOCTRINE.

In November, following prolonged negotiations, the Navy agreed to the exchange of inter-service traffic between Air Force - Navy tape relay transfer stations on the basis of line 2 routing. This change became effective 1 December 1951 and is another step, sponsored by USAF, to facilitate the handling of messages between the two services without any reprocessing of message traffic.

(RESTRICTED) INSPECTION OF AACS FACILITIES, MORTHEAST AIR COMMAND.

A representative of the Methods and Procedures Section accompanied General
Gerland, Commanding General, AACS, on a TDY trip to all air bases within
the Northeast Air Command. The trip included inspection of all AACS
operated facilities at the following places:

McAndrew AFB, Newfoundland

Ernest Harmon AFB, Newfoundland

Pepperrell AFR, Newfoundland

Goose Bay, Labrador

PW-1, Greenland

BW-8, Greenland


Thule Air Base, Greenland

Westower AFB, Massachusetts

A verbal report was furnished following the inspection trip.

(RESTRICTED) TRANSFER OF JEZ HELAT RESPONSIBILITIES FROM AACS TO

1060TH USAF COMMUNICATIONS GROUP. Preceding the retermination of overseas
tape relay circuits from Andrews AFR to the USAF communications center.



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HISTORY OF THE ENGINEERING & TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BRANCE 1 October 1951 to 31 December 1951 ROBERT S. DRAKE, COLONEL, USAF Communications Systems Division Directorate of Communications CRET

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SECRET

SECTION I

### ORGANIZATION:

During December the branch underwent a reorganization. New functions and responsibilities were added and the branch was divided into three sections.

The Programming Section, the Logistics Control Section and the Technical Control Section. A total of sixteen personnel were authorised and all but two of the positions filled.

SECTION II

### ACTIVITIES:

During this period the first attempt was made to program communications equipment for new and existing bases on a logical and realistic basis. This programming was used by representatives of the Programming Section, Plans & Policies Division, Operations Branch and assistant for Programming to develop the FY 53 budget requirements for accounts P233 and P239. In account P233 considerable coordination with the Director of Engineering, AACS, was necessary as detailed equipment lists and cost thereof was furnished by him. When the Technical Control group was transferred from the Directorate of Communications to the Directorate of Engineering, Eq AACS many of the administrative and technical functions pertaining to the Global Communications Systems were delegated to this branch. Programs to implement vital portions of GLOBECOM were drawn up and transmitted to AACS for implementation.

Revised bills of material covering the major belt line GLOBECOM facilities were prepared and sent to the Air Material Command for supply action. A total

Punctional Charts inclosed

SECRET

# SECRET

of three hundred twenty Class IV communication projects were approved and processed in the quarter ending December 31st. These projects included both navigational aid facilities as well as communication facilities. A new system was established to determine the priority on which the projects would be implemented. This system utilized the OPU publication which established the category and precedence of each installation and unit within the Air Force. In addition to the normal Class IV projects, numerous crash programs were handled, among these being "Equipment for Maneuvers," "Equipment for Thule Air Force Base," "Microwave Equipment for North Africa," and "Automatic Electric Dial Telephone Office System for North Africa,"

When the branch was reorganized, representation on committees dealing with important developments in the communication equipment field was reassigned among personnel within the branch.

Project "Roar" (confidential) which deals with the propagation of VHF frequencies with high power and by using the forward scatter technique is one of the projects being followed closely by this branch. This new method of transmission shows much promise toward establishing reliable communication in the artic area. At present, this branch is monitoring the activities of E. C. Page & Company, contractors, in establishing a circuit between Boose Bay and BW-S to evaluate this new technique.

- 3 Incls
- 1. Functional Chart for Tech
  - Centrol Section
- 2. Furctional Chart for Logistics
  - Control Section
- 3. Functional Chart for Programming Section

SECRET

# TECHNICAL CONTROL SECTION

- Prepares military characteristics for proposed communications equipment.
- 2. Represents the Air Force on the Communications & Equipment Panel and the Standardization Panel.
- 3. Keeps in touch with the Signal Corps laboratories and commercial communications equipment manufacturers on the development of new equipment.
  - 4. Disseminates to the field information on new equipment.
- 5. Coordinates with the Standards Branch of the Communications Division and Manpower and Organization on keeping TO&E's and TA's up to date.
- 6. Represents the Air Force on special committees dealing with communications equipment research such as projects "Roar" and "Long Range Communications."
- Coordinates with Logistics Section to assure that proper types of equipment are being provided in projects.
- 8. Coordinates with Programming Section to assure of the procuring of modern equipment.
- Coordinates with Air Installations in determining that new communications buildings are adequate.


# LOGISTICS CONTROL SECTION

- 1. Receives all projects under AF Regulation 190-17 for communications and electronics facilities.
  - 2. Maintains file of approved projects.
  - 3. Secures necessary coordination of all interested agencies on projects.
- 4. Haintains a running record of status of major end items of communications equipment.
- 5. Assures in the approval of projects that necessary communications equipment is available.
  - 6. Assures that project is properly justified.
  - 7. Forwards project for processing to DCS/M.

mel# 2

# PROGRAMMING SECTION 1. Prepares detailed long range master plans. Prepares detailed budget justifications. Prepares detailed procurement directives for equipment. 4. Coordinates with logisites section to assure that communications projects are in consonance with master plans. mit#3

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AIR FORCE MARS HISTORICAL REPORT, 1 JULY 1951 TO 31 DECEMBER 1951

# Activity

The MARS program experienced a considerable increase in membership and activity during this period. Memberships totaled 3,223 on 1 July 1951 and increased to a total of 4,728 as of 31 December 1951.

MARS teletype operation expended during this period with teletype stations established at Headquarters Air Materiel Command, Wright

Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (AFSAIR); Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force, Stewart Air Force Base, New York (AF2FAL); Headquarters Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York (AF2AIR); Fort

Monmouth, New Jersey (AF2EMS); and the Headquarters USAF station in the Pentagon (AIR). The December 1951 cover of CQ magazine displayed a photo of the Director and Deputy Director of Communications inaugurating the Air Force MARS teletype network at Headquarters USAF station (AIR).

See Inclosure #1.

Three remote transmitters for operation on MARS frequencies were established during this period; a 375 watt transmitter located at Bolling Air Force Base, and two each 1,000 watt transmitters at Andrews Air Force Base for operation on 3497.5 kes and 6997.5 kes.

Air Force Military District of Washington MARS nets were established to provide emergency communications for the Military District of Washington area. See Inclosure #2, MDW SOP, which established the MDW MARS nets.


Combined Army and Air Force MARS exhibit was displayed at the National Convention of the American Radio Relay League, Seattle, Washington, 27, 28, and 29 July 1951; at the 21st Annual Convention, Wast Guif Division, American Radio Relay League, Austin, Texas, 17, 18, and 19
August 1951; and at the Central Division Convention, American Radio
Relay League, French Lick Springs, Indiana, 20 and 21 October 1951.

This exhibit consisted of a 20 x8 display with photographic montage
background of GSL cards sent to the Headquarters MARS stations from
various amateurs and dynamic displays consisting of amateur radio
teletype transmitters and receivers maintaining operating schedules on
MARS frequencies with the Pentagon. This display created much interest
smonget amateur circles. The above MARS exhibit was also displayed in
the Pentagon concourse during the week of 26 November 1951 to commemorate
the third anniversary of MARS (26 November 1948).

The first MARS membership certificate issued by Major General Raymond C. Meude, replacing Major General Francis L. Ankenbrandt as Director of USAF Communications, was presented on 20 September 1951 to Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Timm, Aleskan Air Command Director of Communications and Command MARS Director.

In November 1951 action was taken by the Director of Communications to transfer all MARS troop spaces in the office of Chief MARS to the 1060th USAF Communications Group with personnel remaining on duty with the Directorate of Communications, this headquarters. A stenographer, OS-5, was added to the space allocation within the office of Chief MARS in November 1951.

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HILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON MILITARY AMATEUR RADIO SYSTEM

standard Operating Procedure

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STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

1

# Initiation of MDW Nets

- 1. There will be two types of MARS nets for the Military District of Washington.
  - a. Pixed station not.
  - b. Mobile net.
- 2. This SOP will concern primarily fixed station operation with the exception of those drills and emergency operations whereas both types of operation will be combined.
- 3. All sembers of the Military Amateur Radio System, military and civilium, who are assigned to the Military District of Washington (and surrounding areas as defined in Section IIO will be required to participate in active net proceedings in accordance with air Force Regulation 102-3, dated 26 November 1948; and revisions thereof. Pailure to do so will result in possible dismissal from the MARS program.

II

### MDW HARS Area

I The following areas (states, counties and military bases) are included in the MDW MARS program, and all MARS members, as designated by the Chief MARS, residing within these limits are, or will be assigned to the Military District of Washington MARS program.

- a. District of Columbia
  - (1) Entire District
  - (2) Bolling Air Force Base
  - (3) Anacostia Naval Air Station
- b. Maryland
  - (1) Prince Georges County
  - (2) Montgomery County
  - (3) Andrews Air Force Esse
- c. Virginia
  - (1) Arlington County
  - (2) Fairfax County
  - (3) Fort Myer

-3-

III

### Frequencies

I. The following frequencies will be utilized for the MDW note at the times indicated.

- a. 3307.5 kes (A-3 emission), 2000 EST
  - (1) Tuesday Hobile
  - (2) Wednesday Fixed
  - (3) Thursday Mobile
- b. 3497 | kcs (a-1 amission), 1900 EST
  - (1) Honday Fixed
  - (2) Priday Pixed
- c. 27994 kos (4-3 esission), 2000 EST
  - (1) Wednesday Mobile
- 2. Crystals for the above frequencies will be issued to those members who have not already received them. VFO operation is discouraged as the above frequencies are "spot-frequencies" and a very small percentage of tolerance in deviation is allowed by the Federal Communications Commission. However, those members who possess transmitters where expetal operation is not provided will be required to "zero beat" to the Net Control Station at the beginning of the respective net, and periodically thereafter to ensure proper frequency operation.
- All Net Control Stations will be crystal controlled when operating on MARS frequencies and conducting nets.

IN

### Net Hanager

- 1. The Net Manager will be appointed by the Chief MARS, USAF, and will serve for an indefinite period of time, or until relieved of his duties by the Chief MARS, or until the member resigns the position.
  - 2. Duties of the Mat Hanager are as follows
    - a. Appoint the Net Control Stations for each net.
    - b. Appoint the Alternate Net Control Stations for each net-
    - c. Appoint Official Bulletin Stations (MOBS), Official

Relay Stations (MCRS), Official Monitor Stations (MCRS), Emergency Coordinators (MEC), and Laisson Stations (MLS).

- d Be responsible for all activities of the MDM nets, including the planning of drills and exercises, contests, and other special events.
- e. Initiate and maintain records of each member assigned to all MDW nets.
- f. Arrange periodical emergancy operations with both the fixed stations and mobile stations participating.
- g . Instruct and help all stations appointed specific duties and assignments.
- 3 The Net Manager will be directly responsible to the Chief MARS, USAF, for proper functioning and activities of his nets, and will receive direct supervision from the Chief MARS.
- 4. A Certificate suitable for framing or an official letter of appointment signed by the Director of Communications, United States Air Force will be awarded to the member accepting responsibilities of Net Manager.

# The Net Control Station, bereafter referred to as NES, will be appointed by the Net Manager and will be responsible to him for the net to which he is assigned auties as such-2. Duties of the HCS are as follows a Call his not to order at the prescribed times and on days he is sasigned as NCS. b. Conduct his net precisely and courteously as prescribed in Sastion X, "Procedure for Condusting Nets." o. Submit a report of stations 46 and of other activity on his net within everty four (24,) hours after the net is QNE to the Net Manager as prescribed in Section AV, "Reports and Records." 3. NCS's will be appointed for a total of four (4) not sessions, at which time the duties will be rotated to another station, therefore enabling all MDW mambers to gain experience as such

VZ.


### Alternate Net Control Station

- 1. The Alternate Net Control Station, hereafter referred to as NCSA, will be appointed by the Net Hanager and will be responsible to him for the net to which he is assigned duties as such, under the provisions contained in paragraph 2, below.
  - 2. Duties of the NCSA are as follows.
- no. In the event that the assigned NCS does not call his net to order within three (3) minutes after the designated net time, the NCSA will proceed to act as NCS, conducting the net as prescribed in Section V, "Net Control Station," and Section X, "Procedure for Conducting Nets."
- 3. NCSA's will be appointed for a total of four (4) net sessions, at which time the duties will be rotated to another station, therefore enabling all MDW members to gain experience as such.

VII

### MARS OFFICIAL BULLETIN STATION

- 1. The MERS Official Bulletin Station, hereafter referred to as "MCBS" will be appointed by the Net Hanager, subject to approval by the Chief MARS.
  - 2. Duties of the HOBS are as follows.
- a. Acquire each current ARRL bulletin from the Not Hanager or other sources as designated to the HOBS verbally, and present such bulletins to the net to which he is assigned for each individual member's information, guidance, or compliance.
- b. Acquire any pertinent MARS information which should be disseminated to MARS members from either the Chief MARS or the Net Manager, and present such information or data to the net to which he is assigned for each member's information, guidance or compliance.
- technical information, propagation bulletins, and other items which would tend directly or indirectly to benefit the net participants, either as MARS rembers or amateurs, and present such information or data to the net to which he is assigned for each member's information, guidance or compliance.
- d. The MOBS will accept queries pertaining to MARJ or amateur activities from any net member and forward them to the Net Manager for action or information, whichever. Answers to queries and problems will be routed through the MOBS.
  - 3. Appointments as MOBS will be made on a voluntary basis and



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
### MURS Official Relay Station

- 1. The SAGD Official Relay Station, hereafter referred to as "MORS," will be appointed by the Net Hanager, subject to approval by the
  - Dolles of the MORS are as follows.
- a. Advise the Net Manager of the various traffic outlets he has acheduled, and of what other nate, either amsteur or MARS, in which he QNI's,
- b. Accept any traffic that can easily be disposed of on one of the traffic nets in which he QNI's
- traffic from other nets whose designations are within the areas as prescribed in Section II, "MDW MARS Area," and dispose of same on the MDW nets. Also, traffic from other sources may be passed on the HDW nets to another member who has different traffic outlets, and can was such traffic speedily.
- 3. Appointments as MORS will be made on a voluntary basis and will remain in effect for an indefinite period of time until rescinded by the Chief MARS, or the member resigns the position.
- 4. A certificate suitable for framing or an official letter of appointment signed by the Director of Communications, United States Air Porce will be awarded to the member accepting responsibilities of MARS Official Relay Station-

IX

### MARS Official Monitor Station

- 1. The MARS Official Monitor Station, hereafter referred to as "MONS" will be appointed by the Nat Manager subject to approval by the Chief MARS.
  - 2. Duties of the MCMS are as follows.
- a. Monitor closely the net frequency to which he is assigned, guarding carefully and ensuring that none of the member stations drift off the assigned frequency. If a station does drift off frequency the MOMS will immediately, or as quickly as possible advise the erring station of such deviation and to correct his transmitter frequency setting. (This will ordinarily apply only to those stations who are not crystal controlled.)
- b If operating on a MARS frequency other than his net assignment and a station is detected off frequency, the MOMS will advise the erring station of such deviation, and to correct his transmitter frequency setting. The MOMS will also inform the erring station of his official assignment as a MARS Official Monitor Station, thereby advising the errant station and all other stations on the frequency that they are being safeguarded from possible infraction notices from the FCC.
- time a station is cited for being off frequency. (See Section IV, "Reports and Records.") If infraction reports on any one station are recurrent and too frequent the erring station will be requested to make necessary adjustments or modifications to his transmitter to ensure his remaining on frequency.




- 4. Appointments as MOMS will be made on a voluntary basis and will remain in effect for an indefinite period of time, until rescinded by the Chief MARS, or the member resigns the position.
- 5. A certificate suitable for framing or an official letter of appointment signed by the Director of Communications, United States Air Force will be awarded to the member accepting responsibilities as MARS Official Monitor Station.

X

# MARS Emergency Coordinator

- 1. The MARS Emergency Coordinator, hereafter referred to as "MEC," will be appointed by the Net Manager, subject to approval by the Chief MARS.
  - 2. Duties of the MEC are as follows.
- a. Plans and puts into effect simulated emergency operations
- (1) Prepares dummy emergency or disaster traffic to be transmitted in conjunction with the type of emergency operation being conducted.
- b. Informs the local Red Cross officials, Civil Defense authorities, other local and Government officials, broadcast stations, and other local communication facilities of the presence and preparedness of the MDW nets and their members for emergency radio operations.
- c. Periodically, and as set forth in Section XIV, "Drills and Emergency Operations," the MEC will coordinate a combined simulated emergency operation with both the mobile stations and the fixed stations.
- 3. Appointments as MEC will be made on a voluntary basis and will remain in effect for an indefinite period of time until rescinded by the Chief MARS or until member resigns the position.
- a. In the event a volunteer is not available for this appointment, any member may be delegated temporarily by the Net Manager to fill this position.
- 4. A certificate suitable for framing or an official letter of appointment signed by the Director of Communications, United States Air



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XI

# MARS Laiason Station

- 1. The MARS Laiason Station, hereafter referred to as "MIS" will be appointed by the Net Manager, subject to approval by the Chief MARS.
  - 2. Duties of the MLS are as follows.
- a. Act as laiason station between the fixed stations and the mobile stations when the occasion warrants same.
- b. During simulated combined emergency operations he will act as laisson station between the phone and CW stations, or nets, as the case may be.
- c. Act as laisson station between the MDW nets and other amateur traffic or emergency net facilities.
- 3. Appointments as MIS will be made on a voluntary basis and will remain in effect for an indefinite period of time until rescinded by the Chief MARS, or until member resigns the position.
- a. In the event a volunteer is not available for this appointment, any member may be delegated temporarily by the Net Manager to fill this position.
- 4. A certificate suitable for framing or an official letter of appointment signed by the Director of Communications, United States air Porce will be awarded to the member accepting responsibilities of MARS Laiason Station.

IIX

# Procedure for Conducting Nets

# A. Phone Net:

- 1. The following procedure for conducting a phone net session will be strictly adhered to in accordance with current JANAP instructions.
- a. NCS will convene the net thus: "Calling the MDW net, this is AFASLD all stations who are not crystal controlled please zero beat to my frequency at this time."
- b Roll call will be taken thus: "AF4SDK this is AF4SLD, over."
- c. Member station will answer roll call thus: "AF4SLD this is AF4SDK, \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* (one of the following).
  - (1) No business, no traffic
  - (2) No business, one message for (destination)
  - (3) Have business for the net, no traffic
  - (i) Have business for the net, and one message for (destination)
- d. In the case of the MORs, he will answer with one of the above, plus \* \* \* \* \* \* \* (one of the following).
  - (1) Have no bulletin(s)
  - (2) Have one bulletin
- e. The NCS will make a written note of the business and/or traffic each station has on hand, and at the end of the roll call he will instruct the MOBS to present any bulletins on hand, after which the NCS will request a QSL from each station to whom the NCC is directed. This will

be done by the NCS, thus: "The following stations (or the net) please QSL," and proceeds to indicate each station concerned. As each station is called that station will answer simply, "APASOK, reger, over." If a member missed any part or all of the QNC he will so state and the NCS will proceed to fill-in what the member missed.

- f After all bulletins have been delivered and USL's received for same, the NCS will proceed to have each station who has traffic dispose of same by advising the station with traffic of whom to pass his traffic.
- g. After all traffic has been cleared, any business on hand will be taken up and cleared.
- h. Upon completion of all business and traffic the NCS will dismiss from the net those stations who so request it and proceed to declars the net QNF and open for a round table discussion.
- i. At the end of the round table discussion, which in no case may last over thirty (30) minutes, the NCS will declare the net QNX.
- 2. Within twenty four hours after the end of each conducted net the NCS will prepare MDW Form #2, "Report of Net Activity," and forward same to the Net Manager.


### B. CW Net:

- The following procedure for conducting a CW net session will be strictly adhered to in accordance with current JANAP instructions.
- a. NCS will convene the net thus: "C4 MDW DE AF4SLD 4ND QNZ QNE."
  - b. Roll call will be taken thus: AP45DK DE AP4SLD QNI

INT QRU K."

c. Hember station will answer roll call thus: "AF4SID DE AF4SDK QNI \* \* \* \* (one of the following)".

- (1) QRU K
- (2) QIC 1 (destination) K
- d. MOBS will answer roll call thus: "AF4SLD DE AF4SDK
  QNI \* \* \* \* \* (one of the following)."
  - (1) QRU K
  - (2) QTC 1 (destination) K
  - (3) QTC 1 (destination) QTC QNC K
  - (4) QTC QNC K
- station has on hand, and at the end of the roll call he will instruct the MOBS to present any bulletins, after which the NCS will request a USL from each station to whom the UNC is directed. This will be done by the NCS thus: "AF3PWI INT QSL K." As each station is called he will answer simply: "DE AF3PWI QSL QNC K." If a member missed any part of the UNC he will request repetition thus: "DE AF3PWI IMI WA (indicate phrase preceding the word missed) K," or "DE AF3PWI IMI ABN (indicate phrase before and after portion missed) K," or "DE AF3PWI IMI AA (indicate phrase preceding all that was missed) K."
- received for same, the NCS will proceed to have each station who has traffic dispose of same by advising the station with traffic of whom to contact, thus: "AF4SDK DE AF4SLD QNK (destination of traffic) (call sign of station to receive traffic) K."
  - g. After all traffic has been cleared the NCS will close




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### XIII

### Not Attendance

- 1. Points for net attendance will be given to each member as follows
  - a. One (1) point for each net QNI.
- b. One and one half (12) points for each net UNI by a member who holds one of the various MARS appointments.
- 2. A minimum of four (4) points must be obtained within a thirty day period beginning with the first net session of each month.
- 3. If for some reason, unforeseen, a member cannot wNI his assigned net he may QNI to one of the other MDW nets, advising the NCS thereof that he is assigned to another net and was, or will be unable to wNI to his assigned net. The NCS will then include such station on his "Report of Net Activity" when submitted to the Net Manager, and one credit will be given for net attendance. Only one irregular net QNI will be allowed during any one month.
- 4. If a member finds he cannot QNI his assigned net at the prescribed time and day he will be transferred to another net of his choice.
- 5. If any member fails to QNI more than twice during a period of one month he will be required to submit MDW Form #3, "Report of Failure to QNI," to the Net Hanager.
- 6 If an MDW member fails to show any activity whatsoever he will be referred to the Chief MARS for appropriate action and possible cancellation of membership in the Military Amateur Radio System.
- 7. Refer to Section XVIII, "Non-Operational Members," for information regarding how a non-operational member may obtain credits for net attendance.
  - 8. Points will also be awarded to any member for outstanding, or



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# XIV

# Drills and Energency Operations

- 1. Feriodically the MDW fixed station members will combine with
  the MDW mobile members for simulated emergency operations. The MEC will
  prepare plans for such emergency operations with the Mobile stations and
  provide proper coordination with the Net Manager. All MDW members, fixed
  and mobile, will be advised in advance of where their stations will be,
  in the case of the mobile units, and of what type emergency traffic will
  be handled.
- 2. The entire drill and emergency operation will be under the complete supervision of the MEC.
  - 3. The MLS will act as the laisson between the phone and CW stations.

XV

### Reports & Records

- l. Each station holding an appointment, as prescribed in preceding sections, will be required to submit a report of his activity or duties to the Net Manager.
- 2. MDW Form #1 will be prepared by all MARS members assigned to the Military District of Washington MARS program. Information included on this form will serve to aid the Net Manager in selecting stations for the various appointments, and will also aid the HEC in preparing and carrying out emergency operations.
- 3. MIW Form #2 will be prepared by each NC3 within twenty four hours after his respective net has been conducted. Information included on this report will be transcribed to each individual member's records for the purpose of awarding points for net attendance, and for special achievements and activities.
- MIW Form #3 will be required from any member failing to initiate proper net attendance as shown by each report submitted by each NCS. This form will be mailed to the member concerned for completion and returned to the Net Manager within a reasonable length of time. Failure to complete and return this form as required will result in the member being referred to the Chief MARS for necessary action.
- 5. MDW Form #4 will be prepared by the MEC upon completion of each simulated or actual emergency operation. This report will be transcribed into a permanent record for presentation to the Chief MaRS and the Director of Communications, United States Air Force.
  - 6. MDW Form #5 will be prepared by the MOMS each time a MARS station

is cited for being off the prescribed frequency to which the member is assigned. These reports of infraction will be retained in the respective member's record file.

- 7. An individual MDW member's records will consist of the following.
  - a. Station status informational sheet.
  - b. Net activity sheet.
  - c. Copy of approval for membership in MARS
  - d. Copy of letter of appointment (if any)
  - e. Copies of reports of infraction (if any).
- 3 A consolidated record of net activities will be compiled at the end of each month for maintaining parmament records in the office of the Chief MARS.

# XVI Bulletins & Newsletters

- 1. Periodically an MDW Newsletter or bulletin will be published and mailed to each mamber who is actively engaged as a net participant.
- 2. Contributions from net members on any subject pertaining to amateur radio, its services, and the Military Amateur Radio System in general will be accepted for publication.
- 3. One item which will be of interest to all members will be the "Swap & Shop" column where anyone can list items he has for sale or trade, or items needed.
- 4 This newsletter or bulletin will depend entirely upon the MDW members and their contributions

### YAII

#### Station Requirements

- 1. HARS members who are assigned to the Military District of Washington MARS program should possess the following equipment.
- a. Transmitter capable of operation on frequencies of 3222-5 kes, 3307-5 kes, 3497-5 kes, and 27994 kes, utilizing both A-1 and A-3 emissions.
  - b. Receiver capable of receiving on the above frequencies.
- 2. Wherever possible, mambers should obtain an energency power plant to be utilized in the event of commercial power failure.

26

#### ITIVX

#### Non-Operational Members

- I. Those members who are unable to be operational due to various circumstances will have the opportunity to participate in MDW MARS activities by operating "AIR" the Headquarters USAF station, or AF3FMC, the Headquarters MATS station located at Andrews AFB.
- 2. In line with the above, non-operational members may participate by operating another member's station, whose prior permission and coordination has been sstablished by the Net Manager. This will enable both the visiting member and the station itself to receive credit for net attendance.

### XIX Net "Q" Signals Are you calling me? I am calling \_\_ QAV Answer in pre-arranged order. QNA Act as relay station between QNB All Net stations copy (bulletins, etc.). QNC Net is directed. QND Entire Net please stand by QNE Net is free ONF Take over as Net Control Station QNG Your Net frequency is high QNH Report into Net, or I report into Net. QNT Can you copy me (or \_\_\_\_\_)? QNJ ) to Transmit message(s) (for \_\_\_ QNK Your Not frequency is low. QNL You are QRMing ; please stand by CNM Net Control Station is \_\_\_\_\_ (on \_\_\_\_ kcs). ONN -Going out of Net. QNO -Unable to copy you (or \_\_\_\_\_). QNP Send your informational QNC. QNQ Answer and relay (or receive) traffic. QNR -Following stations in Net \_\_\_ QNS Leaving Net temporarily (or for \_\_\_\_\_ minutes). QNT has traffic for you; await instructions (or UNU UNR). QNU -Please request to USV. QNV -Through whom shall I relay message(s) for \_\_\_ -28

1			
	WIN		You are excused from Net
			Please shift to another frequency (or to kcs) to
4.	NI		prevent Willing other Net stations (or to clear traffic with
			prevent during owner has a
	QNZ		Zero Seat your signal with that of the Net Control Station.
	QRG		Your frequency is kcs
	QRH		Your frequency varies.
	QRI		The tone of your transmission is (1. good; 2. variable;
1	NO. C. C.		3" bad).
	QRJ	-	I cannot receive you. Your signals are too weak.
	CRK		The readability of your signals is (1 to 5)
		-	I am busy (or busy with)
	QRM	20	I am being interfered with.
	QRN		I am being troubled by atmospherics
	QRQ		Send faster ( words per minute).
	QRS	10	Send more slowly (words per minute).
Back Char	QRT		Stop sending.
	QRU		I have nothing for you.
9.3	QRV	10	I am ready-
	QRW	·	Please tell that I am calling him.
	QRX		Stand by I will call you back.
	QRZ	-	You are being called by
BE CONTRACT	QSA		The strength of your signals is
	QSB	-	The strength of your signals varies.
	QSD	141	Your keying is incorrect; your signals are bad.
	QSG	***	Send messages at a time.
			20-
			-29-

QSL - I give you acknowledgment of receipt.
QSM - Repeat the last message you sent me.
QSO - I can communicate with direct (or through)
USP - I will relay to
QSV - Send a series of VVV
QSW - I will send on kcs, etc.
USX - I am listening for on kcs.
QSY - Change to kcs without changing type of wave.
QSZ - Send each word or group twice.
QTA - Cancel NR as if it had not been sent.
QTB - I do not agree with your number of words; I will repeat the
first letter of each word and the first figure of each number.
QTC - 1 have messages for you or for
QTH - My location is (by any indication).
QTR - The time is
QRRR - A distress call for emergency use only by a station in an
emergency situation.
-30-

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MILITARY AMATEUR RADIO SYSTEM Military District of Washington

9 January 1952

#### MDW MARS SOP SUPPLIMENT #1:

- 1. Effective Tuesday, 15 January 1952, all MDW MARS nots will be held at 2000 EST Tuesday and Thursday evenings.
- 2. The Net Control Stations of 3307.5 kes and 27994 kes will each dispatch one mobile station to the premises of the Net Control Station of 3497.5 kes to act as liaison stations between the three nets.
- 3. Each Not Control Station will be responsible for the proper functioning and programming of his respective net. On the first and third Monday of each month the three NCS's will meet with the MDW Not Manager at a designated location to plan the ensuing two week's activities for the MDW program.
- 4. Once a month the MDW MARS Emergency Coordinators, the three NCS's, and the MDW Net Manager will meet at a designated location to plan and initiate a simulated emergency test. One communications emergency test will be held each month.
- 5. All MDW MARS members will be required to participate in their respective assigned net each Tuesday and Thursday evening.
- 6. Those members who have been issued mobils equipment by the Chief MARS will be required to participate in their respective assigned net each Tuesday and Thursday evening. Inactivity will result in the recall of such equipment for re-issue to another member. One week's non-participation or the missing of two net sessions during a thirty (30) day period without valid reason will result in such action.
- 7. The Chief MARS and MDW Net Manager will not be assigned to any specific net but will have the perogative of reporting in on any one of the three MDW nets, either fixed or mobile.
- 8. During each net session, one or more mobile stations from the 'phone nets will be dispatched to a specified location to accomplish a "mission" as prescribed by the Chief MARS and the MDW Net Manager.

Howard D Riddle WASDK/AFASDK

MILITARY AMATEUR RADIO SYSTEM Military District of Washington

9 January 1952

### MOW MARS SOP SUPPLEMENT #1-A:

- l. Reference Section I, paragraph 2, change to read: "This SOP will govern both mobile and fixed station operation including regular net sessions, drills, emergency tests, and all other activities whether regular or extra-civicular."
- 2. Reference Section III. paragraph 1 a. b. and c. change to read:
  - a. Net #1, 3307.5 hes (A-3 emission), 2000 EST
    - (1) Tuesday Fixed and Wobile
      - (2) Thursday # Fixed and Mobile
  - b. Net #2, 3497.5 kes (A-1 emission), 2000 EST
    - (1) Tuesday Fixed
    - (2) Thursday Fixed
  - e. Net #3, 27994 kos (A-3 emission), 2000 EST
    - (1) Tuesday Fixed and Mobile
    - (2) Thursday Fixed and Mobile
  - 3. Reference Section III, paragraph 3, add: "if possible."
- 4. Reference Section V, paragraph 3, change to read: "NCS's will be appointed for a sixty (60) period, approximately sixteen (16) net sessions, at the end of which time the duties will be rotated to another station, therefore enabling all MDW members to gain experience as such."
- 5. Reference Section VI. paragraph 3, change to read: "NCSA's will be appointed for a sixty (60) day period, approximately sixteen (16) net sessions, at the end of which time the duties will be rotated to another station, therefore enabling all MDW members to gain experience as such."
- 6. Reference Section XIII, delete entire Section. (Refer to MDW MARS SOP Supplement #1).

9 January 1952 MDW MARS SOP SUPPLEMENT #1-A (continued): 7. Reference Section XIV, delete entire Section. (Refer to MDW MARS SOP Supplement #1). Howard D Riddle WLSIK/AFLSDK MDW MARS Net Manager

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MILITARY AMATEUR RADIO SYSTEM Military District of Washington

9 January 1952

### MDW MARS SOP SUPPLEMENT #2 .

- 1. MESSAGE HANDLING: All messages, without exception, must be written, transmitted, and received in accordance with JANAP procedure. Wessages routed through MARS facilities will have the same style heading, address form, and text form as an official message transmitted through standard government facilities.
- 2. While MARS message headings resemble the amateur message heading very closely, the slight difference must be adhered too. Instructions for converting MARS headings into amateur form for transmission on amateur frequencies, and vice versa, will be given below.
  - 3. All MARS messages will bear the following heading formats

AFISLD DE AFISDK NR 1 -R- AFISDK \$923352 GR 16 BT

- 4. All messages, without exception, will include the following five components in the heading.
- a. Station Serial Number: This number will always remain the same as it is the originating station's serial number and serves to identify the message precisely at all times.
- b. Precedence: A precedence is required for all messages except for "routine" messages when the prosign -R- may be left off whereas all stations handling the message will handle it as routine. All other prosigns, listed below, must be included in the heading when warranted.
- (1) -P- (Pricrity): Any message bearing the prosign -P- will be handled as soon as possible and will have precedence over all routine messages.
- (2) -OP- (Operational Priority): Any message bearing the prosign -OP- will be in the classification of EMERGENCY traffic and will be handled immediately.
- c. Originating Station: All messages must bear the originating station's call sign. This serves as a positive identification of a message, along with the station serial number, as well as indicating geographically where the message originated.
- d. Date-Time-Group: All messages, without exception, must contain a date-time-group given in "Z" time (GMT) in the message heading.

MDW MARS SOP SUPPLEMENT #2 (continued):

9 January 1952

Of the three message identifiers (station serial number, originating station, and date-time-group) this is by far the most important.

- (1) For computing "Z" time simply add five hours to local (EST) time.
- (2) The first two numbers indicate the date of the month; the next two numbers indicate the hour of the day; and the last two numbers indicate the minute(s) past the hour.
- e. Group Count: All messages, without exception, must contain a group count in the heading. This protects both the originating station and the recipient station (also any station relaying) from errors such as omitting or adding words from and to the message text.
- (1) For computing the group count, count only the actual words in the text. Example:

XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX (Text - sount: in this XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX (example it is GR 8)

XXXXXXXXXXX (Signature - do not sount)

- (2) Such signatory remarks as "love." "sinearely," ste... will be included in the text and goup count. However, the actual signature will not be counted.
- (3) To encourage the use of a message group count recipient stations should refuse to accept any message until a group count is made and added to the message heading.
- 5. For converting message headings the examples shown below will be followed at all times.
  - e. MARS to amateurs

(MARS) AFASDK DE AFASDD NR 1 AFASDD #9233#2 gr 16


(Ameteur) Wirha DE Wisde NR 1 Wisld CK 16 ALEXANDRIA VA 1836 JAN 9

b. Amateur to MARS:

(Amateur) Wisdk DE Wiftha DR 4 Wiftha CK 11 Falls Church VA 1500 Jan 10

9 January 1952 MDW MARS SOF SUPPLEMENT #2 (Continued): (MARS) AFESLD DE AFESDE NR 4 WARRA 1520252 OR 11 Howard D Riddle W4SDK/AF4SDK MDW MARS Not Manager

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### CHAPTER I ORGANIZATION

During the period 1 July through 31 December, the organization of the Liaison Branch remained the same. However, during most of the period, the Branch was under-staffed due to the fact that the Branch Chief and several of the key personnel were away from the Headquarters on temporary duty.

# CHAPTER II

### EXTRAORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE (EARC) (UNCLASSIFIED)

Major R. G. Hall returned from the EARC in October, after having participated in the aeronautical and low frequency portions of the conference. The Aeronautical Off Route (OR) Plan was agreed to at the EARC with changes which would permit the U.S. to negotiate directly with other administrations (other foreign countries belonging to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU))directly with the country concerned to extend our present allotment and assignments of radio frequencies when necessary to their countries without official sanction of the ITU. Low frequencies were engineered into the ITU and Region II Frequency List to satisfy AF requirements in the Northeast Air Command area. The frequency bands affected were between 14 and 200 kc/s. The Air Force gained an additional seven 4 channel multiplex circuits internationally registered in the Northwestern and Northern Atlantic areas which will be implemented during the fall of 1952.

Mr. John D. Corley returned from the EARC, Geneva, Switzerland on 13 November 1951 after having participated in the engineering of the Region II Frequency List between 2000 and 4000 kc/s. Mr. Corley participated in the original Wagner Committee set up under the auspices of the Department of State and the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee to draw up a United States list for radio frequencies in this band which was later coordinated with Canada

and other Central American countries. Mr. Corley's leadership in this national and international project was such that Ambassador Butterworth, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation at the EARC, requested that Mr. Corley be flown to Geneve to assist and advise in the completion of the Region II International Frequency List between 2000 and 4000 kc/s. Mr. Corley was of very great assistance in helping the U.S. Delegation reach an early agreement with the other administrations of the Mestern Hemisphere (North and South America). Mr. Corley's ability to gain agreement from other countries and still maintain U.S. operations without interference difficulties is to be commended.

Major Seymour Stearns returned from the EARC on 20 December after having attended the entire conference. Major Stearns participated in the Region I, Region III and the Fixed Service portions of the Conference. These portions of the conference dealt with the most controversial subjects discussed; however, the U.S. Delegation was able to exert considerable influence in both the European and Eastern Asiatic areas because of Major Stearns' knowledge of both areas and his rational thinking in solving problems presented from both areas. The Fixed Radio Service agreement was also followed very closely by Major Stearns. The results of the EARC agreement do not show fast progress since this service, together with High Frequency Broadcasting, hold the key to the solution of all Services. Major Stearns' untiring efforts were applied to the fixed service agreement, and apparently his suggestion to the U.S.

Delegation to have the over all U.S. listings be in the name of the U.S.A. rather than in the name of individual U.S. operating agencies will go a long way in assisting the U.S. on its mission of efficient radio frequency management, as well as helping the U.S. keep its leadership in the field of International Telecommunications.

Major Benjamin W. Filipski and Captain L.L. Bradley, Jr., with the assistance of the civilian staff are to be commended for the manner in which they kept up normal operational and administrative activities in the branch during the period that three of the key personnel from the Branch were attending the EARC.

# HIGH FREQUENCIES (CONFIDENTIAL)

Frequency assignment program to satisfy the GLOEECOM program continued throughout the period with particular efforts having been exerted on circuits in the European-Nowth African area; Andrews-Pepperrell area; and McClellan-Hickam area. By virtue of an agreement reached with the Department of Navy, the retermination of a circuit from the Azores to Port Lyautey was approved, making available & channel multiplex circuits between the Azores and Sidi Slimane and between Sidi Slimane and Wheelus AFB in Tripoli. Additional frequencies were made available for the SSB circuit between Fort Pepperrell, Newfoundland and Andrews AFB as a result of negotiations with the Department of Army and widening out of the emission of other frequencies employed on radioteletype circuits between Andrews and Newfoundland. Approximately 85% of the frequencies necessary for the McClellan-Hickam SSB circuit have been cleared through IRAC during the period.

CONFIDENTIAL

Progress on the air/ground portion of the GLOBECOM project was such that approximately 50% of those frequencies necessary for the Atlantic, Pacific, and ZI stations have been engineered.

Project ROAR was followed very closely by the Branch during the period. This Branch, in connection with the Bureau of Standards and the Commander in Chief, Northeast Theater, arranged for engineers and material to be transported to Labrador and Greenland to pursue the possibility of using VHF frequencies to attain the propagation and service range of high frequencies in lower frequency bands.

Several days were spent with representatives of the Air
University to advise on matters of radio propagation. Necessary
information was supplied to permit the instructor staff at the
Air University to work up a four hour presentation to Senior Air
Force Communications Officers attending the course. The representatives from the Air University were conducted on a tour of the
Central Radio Propagation Laboratories operated under the Eureau
of Standards and the Fort Belvoir Propagation Radio Observatory.

Mr. E. C. McCarley of this Branch and Mr. Bassussen, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, attended a conference in Ottawa, Canada during the week of 20 November to arrange for radio frequencies for use between the U.S. and Canadian Military Services for air defense purposes. Final clearance of frequencies were agreed in December 1951 to complete U.S. Canadian circuits as a result of this conference.

CONFIDENTIAL

#### VERY HIGH FREQUENCIES (UNCLASSIFIED)

This Branch participated with representatives from the Directorate of Operations in working out a frequency plan for use with the radar control system in the Washington area. This plan places operational restriction on sircraft equipped with only four channel VHF communications equipment and requires eight channel equipped aircraft to install additional frequencies. The use of radar by GAA to control air traffic in a congested terminal area is being evaluated in the Washington area first and, if this system proves successful, similar systems will in all probability be installed in other congested areas. Radar control increases the amount of air/ground communications to such an extent that all the available channels in present VHF equipped aircraft must be utilized to the fullest extent.

### DEVELOPMENTAL AND EXPORTMENTAL USE OF FREQUENCIES (CONFIDENTIAL)

A considerable number of frequencies licensed to Air Materiel Command for experimental and developmental purposes were transferred to the Air Research and Development Command, Baltimore, Maryland.

A conference was held between representatives of AMC and AFPC to accomplish the above transfer of frequencies as well as to discuss the problems in licensing contractors through USAF resident representatives assigned, rather than through Federal Communications

Commission channels. A complete solution to this problem has not as yet been worked out with AMC and AMDC since discontinuance of licenses to USAF representatives, where the representative could not personally supervise the operation, would necessitate an


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CONFIDENTIAL

additional cost to the USAF in providing radio operators and officer supervisory personnel to conduct the radio operation, or for the contractor to provide qualified personnel and get the licenses through the Federal Communications Commission and thereby delay operations.

## IRAC PARTICIPATION (UNCLASSIFIED)

During the year 1951, the Department of the Air Force submitted 615 applications for radio frequency operations in the U.S. and Possessions. This represents a total of approximately 2000 frequency assignments to commands and activities of the USAF. A major portion of these resulted from the Aircraft Control and Warning Program of the Air Defense Command, emergency back-up circuits of other commands, GLORECOM and developmental work. By comparison, the number of applications of the other agencies were: Navy 250, Army 300, GAA 312, and FCC 266 coordinated items.



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### CHAPTER I ORGANIZATION

While no major organizational changes were made during this period, a reallocation was effected in September reflecting new divisions of responsibility for the officers of the Branch. This step had been under active consideration for some time prior to its implementation but was not thought feasible in the light of personnel shortages. It was only with the influx of newly assigned officers up to that month, that this step was possible.

#### CHAPTER II

#### ACTIVITIES

POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

### CONTROL OF ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION (UNCLASSIFIED)

Much research and inter-agency coordination and study preceded hearings before both houses of Congress on the subject of the bill to modernize section 606C of the Communications Act of 1934, which was necessary before further action in this field could be completed. When this bill was passed and signed, an Executive Order was drafted for the approval of the President. Following repeated conferences at the White House, at which the Air Force was represented by Colonel Lewis, the President signed this Executive Order which carries out the legislation mentioned above. Under this order, FCC is now empowered to draft legislation applicable to all privately owned broadcasters as a safeguard against air attack. This was probably the most important single accomplishment of this Branch during this period.

### MOBILIZATION PLANNING (SECRET)

This Branch participated in the writing of the Air Force
Mobilization Flan "AFMOP -52". Information furnished was Communication-Electronics Annex, Communications Troops (including
AACS) Required. This equipment list is distributed to the
Munitions Board for industrial planning.

SECRET

# MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (WDAP) ACTIVITIES (SECRET)

During this period, Lt Colonel Coss and Major Williams were assigned the primary duty of fulfilling the responsibilities of the Directorate for the MDAP.

On 1 July, an allocation schedule of certain new production communications items to the MDAP was prepared and distributed.

This allocation schedule was prepared for the purpose of furnishing guidance to the various material agencies concerning the division of new production items between the USAF and the MDAP.

It also served the purpose of providing the country MAAGs with approximate delivery date information for their use in planning for the receipt of material. Due to slippages in the production schedules on which the allocations were based, the allocations schedule was revised and reissued on 1 November.

During the preceding six months, a consolidated listing of all Communications-Electronics items appearing in the FY '50, '51, and '52 MDAP had been prepared. On 1 December, this consolidated listing was brought up to date and reissued. The consolidation provides a rapid and convenient means of determining the types and quantities of communications-electronics items on the MDAP and the countries and fiscal years for which they were programmed.

Many requests for programs changes and refinements of the PY 150, 51 and 52 programs were received from the MAAGs during this

SECRET

period. These requests were reviewed and acted upon by the Plans Branch in accordance with procedures previously arranged with the Bobilization Division, Directorate of Plans and the Office, Assistant for Materiel Program Control.

From 1 September to 8 October, Lt Colonel Coss was placed on TDY with JAMAG in London for the purpose of assisting them in the development of the communications-electronics portion of the FY \*53 MDAP. While in Europe Lt Colonel Coss visited the MAAGS in the UK, France, Italy and Portugal. On 8 October, Lt Colonel Coss departed JAMAG and joined a USAF MDAP survey team in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. This team conducted a survey of the facilities of the YUgoslavian Air Force for the purpose of determining the types and extent of the aid which would be necessary through the MDAP. This tour was completed on 26 October.

In December, the Plans Branch provided the Directorate of
Procurement and Production Engineering with the refined requirements for communications-electronics equipment for the FI \*52 MDAP.
Procurement action was initiated on 26 December.

During the month of December, the deficiency lists submitted by the Title I MAAGS for the FY '53 MDAP were received and approved with certain recommended additions.

#### PLANS (SECRET)

A considerable ascunt of the effort expended by the Franch dealt with the revision of existing plans or the initiation of new ones. Invariably these efforts were carried out under pressure induced by tight schedules, close deadlines and the necessity to

SECRE

by-pass equally high priority projects during the period of preparation of these plans.

Some of the plans for which revisions were offered are: Communications Annex to "AFETP 1-51"

- "Long Range Plan for Reserve Forces of the USAF"
- "War Plans Mission for the Civil Air Patrol"
- "Canadian US Air Defense Plan"
- "Low Frequency Communications Plan for the North Atlantic"

  New plans which were developed during the period include:

  The first phase of the Communications Annex to "AFEWP 1-52"

  Communications Annex to "Development (Base) Planning in the United Kingdom"

Communications Annex to the "Passive Defense Plan"

Communications Support Plan for Lash-Up "AC&W System for NEAC"

SPECIAL STUDIES (SECRET)

In order to effectively answer the many questions raised by other offices in this headquarters, and the major commands, special studies were required from time to time. Some of these included:

Those devolving from the determination that the 500 km transmitter, originally intended for installation at Offutt AFB, be relocated.

Those incident to the resolution of CIA requirements world-wide. In connection with this problem the study of the ARC wing mission and evasion and escape were required because of their inter-relationship in many respects.

### SPORET

Not the least of those studies pursued by this Branch in this period, in the element of time consumed for their resolution, were the five which emanated from the facile pen of Lt Colonel Pat Moran.

One study "A Type Integrated Theater Signal System,"
which was developed by the Signal Corps and forwarded to this Branch
for our information, was sent to the Electronics Division of the
Air Command and Staff School of the Air University for evaluation
by the faculty of that division in the school.

Numerous studies, of equal importance but lesser volume, were inaugurated and completed in order to give the guidance, information and support requested. Probably the cost important in this category was that involved in the establishment of long line circuit requirements to support "Alcanus EDP-51".

Recurring studies together with accompanying coordinating action were required in the responses required by quarterly deficiency reports. In addition to these quarterly deficiency reports, answers were required on those which resulted from the Commanders Conference which was held in Colorado Springs in October.

It might be noted that invariably, deficiencies reported were those which were already known and acknowledged by this directorate. Chief among the causes for most difficiencies is that resulting from long-lead-time procurement.

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#### PROJECTS (CONFIDENTIAL)

Continuing effort, to a considerable degree, was put forth in keeping existing projects current, furnishing guidance for new projects, and evaluating the results, communications-wise, of completed ones. These projects include:

BLUEJAY ZRELOP JACKAL DRILLPRESS OAKNOOD Southern Pine Maneuvers SNOWFALL ROAR

Continuing counsel and assistance was given the Director of Communications in the continuing development of GLOSECOM.

Toward the end of the period, supervisory guidance was also given to the further study of the effects of ionospheric scatter techniques (Project ROAR). In this connection, a team of engineers was sent to Greenland to install the point-to-point system between Goose Bay and BW-8 and BW-8 and Thule.

This Branch advised the Chief, Programming Branch and the other divisions as to items budgeted for in the FY \*53 budget versus known war plans and requirements.

#### FIELD CONTACTS AND SURVEYS (RESTRICTED)

Without any attempt to mention the many trips for the above purposes which were made in the United States, the following over-seas contacts were completed within this period:

Lt Colonel Coss to Europe, from 1 September to 8 October Lt Colonel Wicker to Spain, August 31 to November 1

CONFIDENTIAL

### RESTRICTED

Wing Commander Likeness to Canada and Alaska in December Colonel Higginson to England, France, North Africa, Azores, and Berenda in June

### MEMBERSHIP ON BOARDS. PANELS AND COMMITTEES (UNCLASSIFIED)

The officers of this Branch have or are serving on various

National and International Boards, Fanels and Committees. The

amount of time required to effectively discharge such duties, not

only in actual attendance, but in preparation therefor, as well


as subsequent implementation actions which result, is considerable.

Additionally, this Branch furnishes the Air Force Coordinator for the Joint Coordination Panel of the Joint Communications Electronics Committee which position is practically a full-time position from the standpoint of the time which is necessary to adequately discharge these responsibilities.


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


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


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### HISTORY OF DIRECTORATE OF PLANS CONTENTS Page Chapter I. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. . 7 WAR PLANS DIVISION. . II. Blue Team. . . 9 15 Special Weapons Team . 29 Rainbow Team . . 71 Planning Requirements Team . 75 Black Team . 84 White Team . 100 Red Team . . . . . . 113 POLICY DIVISION . . . III. Air Advisor to the National Security 114 Council Staff. . . . . . 122 Air Force-Department of State Liaison Office 132 International Branch . . . . 190 Civil Air Branch . 202 Domestic Branch. . . . . . . . . . . 217 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION . . . 218 Air Resupply and Communications Wings. . . . 221 Research and Development. . . . 227 Orientation Program. . 230 231 Training . . . . . . 239 Biological and Chemical Warfare. .



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SECURITY INFORMATION

Chapter I

### ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This period in the history of the Directorate of Plans began with a change of Directors. Major General Thomas D. White was assigned to duty as Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, effective 2 July 1951. He was succeeded by Major General Joseph Smith, who had served as Deputy Director since August 1949.

In addition to the regular duties of the Director of Plans, General Smith was a member of the Air Installations Board, and the Aircraft and Weapons Board. He also acted as the Air Force Operations Deputy on JCS matters in the absence of General White.

The position of Deputy Director, vacated by General Smith, was filled by Major General Robert M. Lee who reported for duty on 20 July 1951. General Lee came to this Headquarters from Project GREENHOUSE at Eglin Air Force Base where he had served as commander of Air Task Group 3.4.3 As Deputy Director of Plans, General Lee assumed the duties of Air Force Member of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee.

General Smith's tour of duty as Director of Plans was cut short when, on 15 November 1951, he became the second Commander of the Military Air Transport Service, succeeding Lt General Euter. 4 General Smith was succeeded as Director of Plans by Major General Lee, formerly Deputy Director. 5

On 27 July 1951, General Lee, then Deputy Director of Plans, was appointed Air Force Member of the Ouided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group (GMIORG), vice Maj Gen G. P. Saville.

<sup>1.</sup> Par 1, SO 128, DAF, 2 Jul 51

<sup>2.</sup> Par 5, SO 128, DAF, 2 Jul 51

<sup>3.</sup> Par 2, SO 118, DAF, 18 Jun 51

<sup>4.</sup> Par 2, SO 220, DAF, 7 Nov 51 5. Par 1, SO 220, DAF, 7 Nov 51

<sup>6.</sup> Note to Holders of JCS 1620/18, 27 Jul 51

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This Group was established by the Secretary of Defense on 21 March 1950 upon the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Lee, the senior officer of the Group, serves as Chairman, and the weekly meetings are held in his office. The GMTORG is primarily concerned with the operational aspects of the guided missiles program. Its primary functions, as stated in Enclosure "B" to JCS 1620/18, are substantially as follows:

- a. Each member of the Group is responsible to the Chief of his Service for advising the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the military departments, regarding the coordination and integration of the operational portion of the National Guided Missiles Program.
- b. The Group is to formulate and recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a requirements program for guided missiles for the Joint Chiefs of Staff annual review of the program.

During August, September, October and November 1951, the CMIORO was in the process of preparing its annual report and recommendations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the preparation of the report it became obvious that an unusable paper, containing many split views, would be developed and that the divergent views were all related to a few fundamental issues. As a result of this inability to reach agreement within the CMIORO, General Lee was convinced that the Group must have policy guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an effort to obtain this essential guidance, a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, USAF, was circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 October 1951. This memorandum

<sup>7.</sup> JCS 1620/42



pointed out the confusion existing in the guided missiles field and proposed a policy guidance for the GMIORO. Neither the Army nor the Navy concurred in the statement proposed by the Air Force and action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was delayed.

The CMIORG report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was forwarded as a split paper on 23 November 1951. General Lee stated in this report:9

> "The major portion of the specific items covered in this report cannot be resolved on the sound basis until resolution of the issues covered in JCS 1620/h2 and JCS 1620/LL (Army Position). The Air Force member therefore reserves comment on the army and Navy views set forth in succeeding paragraphs and in the Enclosures and Appendices to this report."

This same position was taken by the Air Force on subsequent papers before the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealing with the guided missiles program. 10 On December 1951, General Lee recommended to General Vandenbergll that:

- (a) He remain firm on the positions outlined in the Air Force Guidance for GMIORO12 to the extent of sending divergent views forward to higher authority for decision, if necessary.
- (b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff not refer this problem to any group or committee lower than the Operations Deputies for consideration.
- (c) Shortly after 1 January 1952, the Chief of Staff, USAF, force the matter to higher authority for decision, enlisting the active support of the Secretary of the Air Force.

JCS 1620/44

JCS 1620/46, 5 Dec 51

<sup>10.</sup> 

JCS 1620/L7; /L8; /L9 Memo for Gen Vandenberg, subj: Policy Guidance for GMIORG (JCS 1620/L2 11. and JCS 1620/44) /s/ Gen Lee, 6 Dec 51

JCS 1620/42



As of 31 December 1951, no further action has been taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this problem. Throughout the period covered by this history, officers of the Special Weapons Teas, War Plans Division, served as members of the working party of the GMIORG. 13

The Air Force position on guided missiles was prepared by Colonel James F. Whisenand, Assistant for Special Plans, 14 assisted by Colonel Robert H. Orr. This preparation included two presentations to the Air Force Council, and development of the Air Force papers for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The preparation of the Air Force expansion program, in connection with the FY 1953 budget, was continued to completion during this period. This task, supervised since May 1951 by the Assistant for Special Plans, included numerous presentations to the Air Force Council, to the Chief of Staff, and to the Secretary of the Air Force; preparation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff documents: 15 preparation of the case for the Secretary of Defense; and monitoring the project through the Mational Security Council papers to the President. 16 JCS 1800/164 was probably the most important single document prepared in the sir Staff during 1951. It not only sets forth the basic concepts upon which the expanded Air Force is to be built, but develops the strategy for employment of a 138 Wing Air Force.

During the period covered by this history, the Assistant for Special Plans also prepared the Air Force position on the question of Strategic Priorities (Military Organcies) and monitored to completion and JCS approval Chapters I, II, and III of the publication, Joint Action Armed Forces. 17a

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<sup>13.</sup> Summaries of individual GMIORO Mtgs on file in AFOPD-PL-SW lh. See Chap I, Vol II, D/Plans History 15. JCS 1800/164 thru 1800/171; 2101/52 17. JCS 1725/126

<sup>17.</sup> JOS 1725/126 17a. JOS 2045/8, 2045/12


On 11 December 1951, General Lee abolished the Office of Assistant for Special Plans. Colonel Whisenand was reassigned to duty as Assistant Deputy Director of Plans. 18 His former assistant, Colonel R. M. Orr, was returned to duty in the White Team of the War Plans Division.

During this period in the Directorate history, the organizational structure remained unchanged. There was, however, one change in Division Chiefs. Brigadier General Haywood S. Mansell, Jr., replaced Colonel Myles W. Brewster as Chief of the Mobilization Division on 16 July 1951. 19 Following General Lee's assignment as Director, the position of Deputy Mirector remained vacant until the end of 1951. On 7 December 1951, Major General Herbert B. Thatcher was ordered to report for duty as Deputy Mrector of Flans not later than 20 January 1952. 20

D/Plans Personnel Memo No. 31 (1951)


See page 245 Par 3, SO 240, DAF, 7 Dec 51

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# 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951

### BLUE TEAM HISTORY

During the period 1 July 1951 thru 31 December 1951 the activities of the Blue Team were largely confined to providing staff guidance from a Plans viewpoint to the Air Planners or the Chief of Staff on:

- A. The Far East
- B. Philippines
- C. Air Bases in various parts of the world
- D. Africa, the Middle East, and Balkans
- E. Strategic Oil Problems
- F. Aerial refueling (probe and drogue system)
- C. Spain

A brief resume of each of the problem areas in which Air Force positions have been recommended during the development of action papers on Air Staff positions are given below.

### FAR EAST

In the Far East the Blue Team was concerned with advising on Air Force deployments in Korea and the Air Force responsibility in Japan and Southeast Asia. The most significant papers in this regard were:

- 1. In the Far East CINCFE felt that his existing forces were inadequate for the mission assigned and requested augmentation. A message to CINCFE stated that no additional forces were available to augment his command at this time.
- The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army requested that a determination be made of the likelihood of the Soviet attempting to envolve the U.S. in a

1. JOS 211/7/36

SECRET

localized conflict in the Far East in the near future. The JCS decision was that, although there was little likelihood of the Soviets attempting such a course of action, the JSPC should explore the problem more fully in order to determine the U.S. course of action and adequacy of our plans for such action.

3. In the Far East CDGFE requested additional Naval forces to accomplish his current mission. A message to CDRGFE<sup>3</sup> stated that additional naval forces are not appropriate to the current task, and that the defense of Formosa and the Philippines are being transferred to CINGPAC.

h. The comments and recommendations on the Tripartite Military
Staff talks on Southeast Asia held at Singapore 15-18 May 1951 were
reviewed by the Blue Team. A memorandum was sent to the Secretary of
Defense outlining the JCS views on the conference report and requested
that certain views be forwarded to the Secretary of State and C.I.A.. The
Service Chiefs were to take certain actions (essentially fact finding in
nature) before final implementation was directed.

5. A memorandum to DCS/O containing a Staff Study on what forces FEAF must have for sustaining operations against Air Bases in North China and Manchuria. This study emphasizes the requirement to provide an aerial refueling capability to all fighter and fighter reconnaissance aircraft now in order to carry out the requirements of a sustained operation against Air Bases in North China and Hanchuria.

6. A JCS paper containing planning assumptions to be used by the High Level State-Defense Mission on the Japanese Defense Forces was reviewed. The paper<sup>6</sup> covered the Forces to be organized by the Japanese for the

<sup>2.</sup> JCS 1921/60

<sup>3. 400</sup> STULL/UT

<sup>5.</sup> Staff Study - Operations against Air Bases in North China and Manchuria

defense of Japan. The planning assumptions were not to be discussed with Japanese by the present mission but were to be discussed at a later date when the Peace Treaty comes into effect.

### PHILIPPINES

A series of papers were reviewed relating to the necessary revisions of directives to CINCFE in the transfer of responsibility for the defense of Formosa and the Philippines to CINCPAC. These revisions were finalized in a JCS paper? which will be implemented when presidentially approved.

## AIR BASES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD

During the period the Assistant for Air Bases absorbed the remaining functions that the Director of Plans had relative to requirements of air bases. In a number of instances the Blue Team furnished guidance on requirements as they effected current war plans and are listed below.

- 1. The Blue Team prepared a statement of requirements in Norway, as developed within the Directorate of Plans, for briefing the Team to negotiate for rights in Norway. These requirements were as visualized under present approved War Plans.
- 2. A number of other papers covering the U.S. Air Force military requirements in Belgium, Netherlands, Ceylon, Trinidad and Bermuda were prepared based on current War Plans.
- 3. A staff study was prepared covering the USAF requirements for Turkish bases and to re-assess the MDAP aircraft program for Turkey. This study developed a concept and determined the forces required for the offensive and defensive air operations which would take optimum advantage of the strategic location of Turkey and the probable availability of bases as a result of their adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty.

8. Statement of requirements in Norway.

<sup>7.</sup> JCS 1259/218

<sup>9.</sup> Staff Study - US requirement for Turkish Bases. SCOURTY INFORMATION



- 4. A study 10 was prepared to furnish the Director of Operations with a broad strategic guidance on desirable USAF Air Base rights in various political areas between 1952 - 1960. The study pointed out that in the period under consideration the USAF must:
  - a. Increase the flexibility of its striking force.
  - Secure adequate air base rights to support land battles, and
  - Plan an air base program for piloted or pilotless aircraft, in depth, with minimum essential logistic facilities around the Seviet periphery.

The conclusions of the study points out the political areas in which additional USAF rights should be obtained.

## AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND BALKANS

A number of papers were reviewed and developed that covered activities in Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. The pertinent papers are:


- 1. A combined US UK study 11 of Allied capabilities for military operations in the Middle East during the period of 1951 - 1955.
- 2. A JCS paper 12 which provided guidance to the US Representative to the Council Deputies, NATO, as to the proper means of introducing the Yugoslav support problem into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- 3. A Study13 was prepared to determine a USAF position in the Middle East which was to form a basis for U.S. position on future problems or revisions of Joint War Plans that pertain to this area. This paper covered the following:

Study - Strategic Study of the Middle East



<sup>10.</sup> Staff Study - USAF Air Base Rights 11. JCS 1887/23

<sup>12.</sup> JCS 1901/44



- a. Strategic location or "real estate" value of the Middle East.
- b. Importance and value of Widdle Bast Oil.
- o. Political factors that are of importance in the area.
- 4. Resources in Africa were also the subject of a numbers of papers that required Air Staff Action. The danger of sabotage to Uranium 4 ore sources in Africa developed a requirement by MATS to develop a plan for the movement of this ore. The plan was reviewed by the Blue Team and returned to MATS for revision.

## STRATEGIC OIL PROBLEMS

The World Oil Survey - Strategic assumptions (UK) is a paper 15 containing comments on the British strategic assumptions on the world oil survey. In general the Chief's agreed that the assumptions were adequate.

Another paper 16. World Wide Demand and Supply of Petroleum in event of a Major War-was reviewed by the Blue Team. This paper covers the production and storage of war supplies of POL to be placed in strategically located areas to assist in meeting service and civilians POL requirements. The paper reaffirms the position that:

a. The development of a National Petroleum Program should be expedited to reduce U.S. dependence on Middle East Oil.

AERIAL REFUELING (Probe and drogue system)

In the aerial refueling field, by the probe and drogue system, the Blue Team has been following the combat tests in FEAF, the service tests at Eglin and the requirements throughout the Air Force for this type of equipment. The Blue Team made considerable effort to increase the capabilities of Fighter-



<sup>14.</sup> Outline Flan - Emergency Movement of Uranium Ore

<sup>16.</sup> JCS 1741/56 16. JCS 1741/59



Bomber aircraft assigned to USAPE, MEAF and TAC by use of tip tanks in aerial refueling by the probe and drogue system. Tests at AMC and APG preved the system workable and Generals Horstad, Weyland and Cannon stated that an urgent requirement for such a refueling capability exists in their commands. The Air Staff and the Major Commands have determined that aerial refueling will materially improve operating efficiency and develop heretofore impossible operational missions.

#### SPAIN


With United States policy toward Spain changed to permit the approach to the Spanish Government to acquire Air and Naval facilities, and the successful discussions by Admiral Sherman and General France, action was taken to form a Joint Military Survey Team to survey the operating facilities in Spanish territory. JCS 1821/44 contained the Terms of Reference which were to be used by the Survey Team. The Blue Team took active part in the formation of the Terms of Reference and acted as coordinating office for all matters that involved the team as a whole. After the departure of the team to Spain considerable action was necessary in order to assimilate and coordinate, with the other services. Upon return of the team from Spain the Blue Team reviewed the report<sup>17</sup> and made recommendations to the JCS.

#### PERSONNEL CHANGES


On August 13 Lt Col John Melcher reported for duty with the Blue Team.

Major I. Stern departed for the Air Porce Separation Center on 24 September for processing prior to return to a civilian status. On December 3rd Lt Col G. Davis reported for duty with the Blue Team.


17. JCS 1821/61



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RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1908 GUIDED MISSILES

During the period action was taken to program four additional 18 MATADOR squadrons. As a result of this action the initial USAF guided missile program now includes nine MATADOR squadrons.

In July, the Commanding General, USAF in Europe was advised that preliminary plans called for the deployment of the first five 19
MATADOR squadrons to his command. He was further advised that, subject to his aproval, a briefing team would visit his staff to 20 discuss all aspects of the MATADOR program. In August, General Morstad stated that he would welcome a briefing team and indicated tentative locations for the first five squadroms. In October, the aforementioned briefing team headed by Colonel E. P. Mechling, briefed General Morstad's staff on the MATADOR program. The items discussed included operational dates of units, rate of supply, logistic support, training requirements, tentics and techniques, and other aspects of the program.

In October, the Director of Requirements recommended that the Shaniole guidance system be deleted as a requirement for the MATADOR

SECURITY INCOMMATION

RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1946


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<sup>18.</sup> JCS 1800/171, subject, Military Force Required for Mational Security, 26 September 1951

<sup>19.</sup> Letter to Commanding General, USAFE, subject, Deployment of Guided Missile Units, dated 51 July 1951

<sup>20.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21. 1</sup>st Indorsement to Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, subject, Deployment of Guided Missile Units, dated 31 August 1951



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progress. Rather than development of another line of sight guidance system, they felt that the modified MSQ-1 system which is already available, will provide adequate guidance for MATADOR until the ultimate system (Whynn) is available in 1956. The Special Weapons Team non-concurred in the above recommendation and pointed out that to make full use of the MATADOR weapon during the interim period (1955 - 1956) it was considered necessary to utilize both the Shanicle and MBQ-1 systems. As a result of the above action, the Director of Requirements soknowledged a requirement for both systems for the MATADOR progress and withdrew its recommendation.

The first thetical guided miscile squadron was activated at

Patrick Air Force Sase on 1 October 1961. This squadron, designated
the first Pilotless Bomber Squadron, Light, (MATADOR) will undergo
training until the latter part of 1952 and will then be deployed to
USAFE. Although presently assigned to the Air Research and Development Command, unit training for this unit will be the responsibility
of the Tactical Air Command.

Letter, (322) Department of the Air Force, subject, Construction and Activation of the First Pilotless Bomber Squadron, Light, dated 19 September 1961




RESPUENTED DATA - AUGUST EMERGY ACT 1940

<sup>22.</sup> R&R from Director of Requirements, subject, Guidance System for MATADOR, dated 7 December 1961

<sup>23.</sup> RAR from War Plans Division, subject, Guidance System for MATADOR, dated 7 December 1951

<sup>2</sup>h. Raw from Assistant for Development Flanning, DCS/D, subject, MATADOR Guidance System, dated 27 December 1951

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aircraft are being modified; the B-23 eircraft should be considered as a substitute mascal carrier; the mascal program has elipped to the extent that the modification program and the scallability of missiles are no longer competible. Smood on the above, Strategic Air Command recommended that the existing modification program be deferred pending further refinement of the mascal program and a decision on the B-29 as a substitute carrier. In reply, Strategic Air Command was advised that; because the first mircraft were not conscious to be withdrawn until September 1982, action to defer the modification program at this time was considered to be presenting; some slippage had occurred but the impact of this slippage on operational dates could not be fully determined at this time; as even as events dictated on adjustment of the modification program a program action would be team.

Action was initiated in July to program two modified T-55 airoraft for each unTADUE squadron. These aircraft are required for unit training and maintenance of profficiency in tectical units.

During the period covered by this report several guided missile presentations have been given to the Air Perce Council. In August,

<sup>28.</sup> Letter, Eq. Strategie Air Connend, subject, SASCAL Suised Simelle Carrier, dated 23 Sovember 1951

<sup>29.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30.</sup> Letter from DCS/O to Commanding General, Etrategio Air Command, subject, RASCAL Guided Missile Carriers, dated 17 December 1961

<sup>31.</sup> ReR from War Flanc Division to Assistant for Programming, subject, T-33 Aircraft for Bombordsont Squarron, Missile, Light, dated 17 July 1961

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RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC EXERGY ACT 1966 the LEAF guided missile position was presented. This presentation pointed out that to provide the importus necessary to implement a so nd aggressive progress it was first necessary to publish a missile policy statement makes provides the necessary program guidance. Subsequent to this presentation the Council requested enother presentation to include recommended policy and objectives with respect to development and employment of missiles. On 14 august the Council was briefed regarding recommended policy and objectives and provided with a proposed statement of policy in the form of a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, J. S. Air Ferce to the Joint Chiefe of Steff on Air Force policy on the employment of guided missiles. As a result of the 14 August briefing, it was necessary for the Director of Flank to propers three items for Public presentation to The first of these was a complete program for integraling guided missiles into the Air Porce embat espatility asterited On 28 September 1981 the other items, a new on 24 Neptember 1901. etatement of policy for signature by the Vice Chief of Staff, T. S. Air Force and a study entitled "Service Responsibility for Guided

ARROWSTON DATA - ATOMIC ENGINEY ACT 194


<sup>32.</sup> Decement, USAF Guided Missile Position, prepared by Special Pospens Term, Far Plans Division, dated July 1961

<sup>33.</sup> Homograndum for Director of Flace, subject, USAF Guided Hissile Policy, dated 9 August 1861

<sup>3</sup>h. Inclosure 1 to memorandum for Secretary, Air Force Council, subject, SMAF Guided Fissile Policy, dated 15 August 1951

<sup>35.</sup> Memorandum to DCS/O, DCS/D, DCS/E, D/Flans, subject, Folicy Guidance with Respect to Guided Missiles, 17 August 1961

<sup>36.</sup> Inclosure to Air Staff Summary Sheet, from DCG/O to Air Force Council, subject, Report on Program for Integration of Guided Dissiles into Air Force Council Capability



RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC REERCY ACT 1968 Nissiles" were submitted. After reviewing the above items, the Council suggested that they be used as a basis for a single coordinated study which presents a balanced guided missile program. Although a study was prepared it was never submitted because of subsequent events. Disagreement within the Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group necessitated policy guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A proposed statement of policy guidance was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force. In light of this action, the Air Force Council requested a new briefing with respect to the Air Force position on Service responsibilities for guided missiles and the proposed Air Force course of action. This briefing was given on 23 October 1961. Subsequent to this briefing, the Council directed the Director of Flans to; rewrite the position paper in accordance with verbal guidance prowided; prepare the necessary papers for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposing that Service submission on guidance for the Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group be referred to the Operations Deputies; develop a long range

<sup>11.</sup> Document entitled Air Force Guided Missile Position, November 1951



<sup>37.</sup> Inclosures 1 & 2, Air Staff Summary Sheet from D/Plans to Air Force Council, subject, Policy Guidance with Respect to Guided Missiles, dated 28 September 1951

<sup>38.</sup> Heneraudum for the D/Flans, subject, Staff Action on Guided Missiles, 4 October 1951

<sup>39.</sup> Enclosure to JCS 1820/42, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, USAF for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Policy Guidence for the GMICRG, dated 29 October 1951

<sup>40.</sup> Memorandum for the D/Plans, subject, Status of Air Force Position on Guided Missiles, dated 14 November 1951

outline war plan to include strategic concepts, and besic tasks as a 1/2 guide for long range research and development. These actions are being accomplished by agencies within the Directorate of Plans other than the Special Weapons Feam.

In addition to previously mentioned accomplishments, the Special Weapons Team has; assisted other staff agencies in the processing of the 1955 budget program (guided missile procurement) through the Sudget Advisory Committee, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense; furnished working personnel for the Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group; assisted the Assistant Deputy Director of Place in preparing Joint Chiefs of Staff papers for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


Efforts were continued during the period to integrate guided missile functions throughout the Air Staff. This has been accomplished by briefings, staff visits and peetings.

A study to determine an effective and logical Air Stuff organization to monitor the introduction of all new weapons into the Air Force combat capability was made in October. Recommendations



RESTRICTED DATA - ATCHES INSIGT ACT 1946

<sup>42.</sup> Monorandum for the Director of Plans, Subject, Air Porce Position on Guided Missiles, dated 27 Exember 1961



RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC EXERGY ACT 1946

resulting from this study were bhat; the Office of the Assistant for Atomic Energy, DCS/O be designated as the Air Force Office for New Meapons; the new office assume responsibility for guided missiles and functions in a manner similar to the way it now functions in the fields of stonic energy and biological and chemical warfare.

Papers necessary to implement the above recommendations are in the 143 process of coordination.

#### PASSIVE DEPRESE

During the period two memorandums pertaining to passive defense responsibilities within Headquarters, USAF were prepared. The first memorandum, signed by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff enumerated by responsibilities of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff or their equivalent.


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The second enumerated responsibilities within DCS/C. As a result of these actions the Director of Flans is responsible for the preparation of Air Force regulations and letters which outline plans and policies pertaining to passive defense.

A proposed "Fassive Defense Manual" prepared by the Special Weapons Team with the assistance of other Air Staff agencies, was

- h3. Inclosure to Air Staff Summary Sheet from the Director of Plans, to DCS/O, DCS/D, DCS/P and Chief of Staff, USAF, subject, Introduction of New Weapons, dated 19 October 1951
- hh. Memorandum for DCS/0; DCS/P, DCS/B, DCS/E, DCS/C, Surgeon General, USAF, Inspector General, USAF, subject, Passive Defense Responsibilities within Headquarters, USAF, dated 23 August 1951
- 45. Memorandum for the Director of Plans, Director of Operations, Director of Manpower and Organization, Assistant for Atomic Energy, subject, Passive Defense Responsibilities within DCS/O, dated 19 September 1951

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approved by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff on 21 Hovember 1951.

It is now being processed by the Air Adjutant General and publication is expected by early 1952.

ATOMIC PHEROY

At the request of the Armed Forces Special Wespons Project, the Special Wespons Team collected and forwarded to that agency, target information on which to bese fuze designs for guided missile marheads.

In August, the Commander, Joint Task Force TERRE, forwarded to
the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force as Executive Agent, a summery report
on the completion of Operation GREENWARE, for consideration by the
h8
Joint Chiefs of Staff. This document was submitted to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff who approved certain conclusions of the report, noted
others, and approved the recommendation that the task force be
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inactivated. As a result of the above action, the Commander, Joint
Task Force THREE was directed to inactivate his organization as of
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S1 October 1951.

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
<sup>16.</sup> Memorandum for the Director of Plans, subject, Proposed Passive Defense Manual, dated 21 November 1981

<sup>17.</sup> Letter, Hq. USAF, subject, Request for Target Data, dated 18 November 1951

<sup>18.</sup> Inclosure to letter, Hq. Joint Task Force THREE, subject, Report on Completion of Operation GRANNHOUSE, dated 1 August 1951

h9. JCS 1998/47, Report on the Completion of Operation GREENHOUSE, 22 September 1961

<sup>50.</sup> Letter, Eq. USAF, Report on Completion of Operation ORKANHOUSE, dated 29 October 1951



52

In November, a representative of the Special Meapons Team, in conjunction with other Air Staff representatives, assisted the Air Materiel Command in preparing budget estimates for the Air Force atomic weapon program for Fiscal Year 1965.

During the period covered by this report, the Special Beapons

Team obtained Air Staff coordination and propared the necessary briefs
involving the following actions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. The designation of the Armed Forces Special Meapons

Project as the Department of Defense agency to participate with the

Atomic Energy Commission in disseminating pertinent atomic test data

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to the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

b. Recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the Department of Defense should provide nominal support for the atomic test proposed by the Federal Civil Defense Administration and that the Chief, Armod Forces Special Weapons Project should be designated the Department of Defense representative on the Joint Planning 52 Group involved.

- 51. JCS 1998/46, Dissemination of JREESHOUSE Date to the Federal Civil Defense Administration, dated 17 September 1981
- 52. JOS 2199/1. Civil Defense Atomic Bomb Test, 10 July 1951



RESTRICTED DATA - ATORIC EMERGY ACT 1846



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e. The forwarding of a memorandum to the Chairman, Military
Limitan Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, containing information on which to bese a reply to Senator McMahon's letter pertaining
to the security of atomic memoras storage sites.

- d. The forwarding of a memorandum to the Secretary of
  Defense which contains comments as to "How to maximize the role that
  States was an and should play in the defense of the United States."
- o. Advised the Chairman, Military Limison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objections to the Commission's plan for the construction of the storic energy facility in Chie.
- f. Advised the Chairman, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Emergy Commission that the Commission's plans for the construction of the atomic energy facility in Colorado are considered 56 satisfactory.
- 53. JCS 2110/13, Reply to Senator McCahon's Letter Concerning Security of Atomic Scapons Storage Sites, dated 17 August 1961
- 5h. JCS 2110/15, Report on Atomic Energy Expansion Program, dated 18 December 1951
- 55. JCS 2080/22, Air Defense of Atomic Energy Production Pacilities, dated 24 August 1951
- 56. JCS 2050/24, Air Defense of Atomic Emergy Production Pacilities, dated 14 November 1951



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- g. Forwarded to the Chairman, Military Limison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning possibilities of increasing fissionable 57 material production.
- h. Approved a proposal by the Chief, Armed Forces Special Meapons Project, that the military should conduct an atomic weapons 58 effect test at the Newada test site in the Spring of 1963.
- i. Forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, a statement of views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Department of Defense interest in the use of atomic weapons (statement includes views on policy, requirements, method of delivery and security).
- j. Approved the procedures submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission, for providing military guidance to that agency; motified the three Services as to the procedures concerning requirements, military and technical characteristics, and modification of stock-

<sup>60.</sup> JCS 2108/9, Military Guidance in the Atomic Weapons Field, dated 10 December 1981




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<sup>57.</sup> JCS 1828/61, Possibilities of Increasing Pissionable Material Production, dated 18 October 1951

<sup>58.</sup> JCS 2217, Military Weapons Effects Test of Atomic Weapon Early In 1953, dated 7 December 1951


<sup>59.</sup> Jos 2215/1, Joint Chiefs of Staff View on Department of Defense Interest in the Use of Atomic Weapons, dated 11 December 1951

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## RAINBOW TEAM

The organization and functions of the Rainbow Team remained essentially the same as for the previous period, however the disaster planning responsibility in the Mar Plans Division was transferred from this team to the Red Team the latter part of November. The expansion of SHAPE and the increased MATO matters in general accelerated the tempo and increased the variety of subjects handled by this team during the period. Colonel L. W. Moomaw was transferred in September to USAFE, and was replaced by Colonel S. B. Hardwick who reported in from FRAF in late September.

One of the first projects participated in at the beginning of
July 1951 was the preparation of a letter for the Chief of Staff's
eignature reflecting a change in the Plan of Action in Event of Disaster to Washington Headquarters. This letter, in substance, directed
that, in event of disaster, all personnel who could not report to their
places of duty would report to one of a list of reporting points and
fill out a registration card. In order that Headquarters USAF and
Office, Secretary of the Air Force personnel so reporting would remain
under Air Force control, the Commanding General, Headquarters Command
was required to establish a system for periodic collection of these
registration cards and relay subject data obtained to the Commanding
General, Tactical Air Command for his use in event control of the Air
Force could not emanate from Washington. The decision as to whether

<sup>61.</sup> Letters to Commanding General, Hos Command, Bolling Air Force Base and to Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Lengley Field, Va., both signed by General Twining, 10 August 1951.



control could continue to emanate from Washington would be the responsibility of Commanding General, Headquarters Command with the Commending Officer, Andrews Air Force Base as the alternate.

In early July an Air Staff reply was prepared in response to request to the principal nine NATO Defense Ministers BACEUR \*s requesting their general observations concerning the "Paris Plan" and specific answers to the following two questions:

a. What major obstacles have to be overcome by the U. S. in order to enable it to meet targets in the Paris Plan?

b. Will the attainment of targets, within the times stated, have an effect on the attainment of Army and Mavy commitments in D. C. 28? The JCS indicated that a final reply would have to await more detailed U. S. programing, but that from the then present indications there were no foreseeable obstacles to meeting the U.S. portion of the Paris Plan.

An Air Staff view was prepared on proposed answers to questions presented to General Marshall by Congressman Reece during General Mershall's testimony on 2 July 1951 before the House Foreign Affairs In general, these questions covered overall U. S. mutual Committee. security objectives, MATO wer plans, and the probability of MATO success. It was considered that giving specific answers to the questions posed



<sup>62.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Recommendations to the Supreme Allied Command, Europe, concerning the Requirements and the Effects of Service Programs of Implementing the Paris Plan.

<sup>63.</sup> JOS 2073/190

<sup>64.</sup> JCS 2073/172 65. DM-112-51 66. JCS 2101/39

might create an inaccurate or distorted picture of the MSP military objectives. Therefore, it was recommended that General Bradley present a detailed resume of a long range program objective to the committee in an "off-the-record" executive session; and in the meantime, a reply should be made to Mr. Reece's query that would be general in nature in order that any specific facts or figures taken out of context would not create an erroneous impression.

Many significant command jurisdiction problems involved in the transfer of the Marianas-Bonin-Volcano Islands from CINCFE to CINCPAC arose throughout the period of this report. In substance, the basic disagreement involved was CINCPAC's contention that all USAF units in this group of islands should come under his jurisidiction upon this transfer. The Air Staff maintained the view that the Commanding General, Far Fast Air Forces should retain administrative and operational control of Air Force facilities including air bases loc-It was agreed, however, that in accordance with the ated therein. Unified Cosmand Plan, promulgation of local procedures, and search and rescue operations would become a CINCPAC responsibility.

An interesting facet in detail pertaining to this problem was the dispute over the operational control of the Search and Rescue Flight on Quam. This point of controversey had been referred to the JCS previously for resolution, however the JCS apparently decided not to provide guidance on such a detailed matter and, therefore, no decision was ever reached.

Memo for Gen Vandenberg, Subj: Transfer of Marianas-Bon Volcano Islands from CINCFE to CIMCPAC.

<sup>68.</sup> Memo for Gen Vandenberg, Subj: Transfer of Marianas-Bonin Volcano Island from CINCFE to CINCPAC, dtd 9 July 1951. 69. Memo for Gen White, Subj: (8) Operational Control of the SAR

Flight on Guam.

As the flight was under the operational control of CINCFE, and in turn FEAF, prior to the transfer, FEAF had retained this control. The administrative control of this flight, Flight B, had been and weather retained by the 11th SAR Squadron in Mawaii. The positions of the commanders on this question were as follows:

a. CINCPAC considered that the Bonin-Marianas were a communications zone and not a forward area. Therefore, under existing JCS directives he should properly have operational control of the SAR flight on Guam.

b. FRAF's position was that although under existing directives this flight would normally come under the operational control of CINCPAC, it represented the only B-29 MAR capability which FRAF had in the Far Rest; therefore, if he relinquished operational control of the flight, he would have no long-range SAR capabilities to meet possible combet operations requirements.

The War Plans Division position on this question was as follows:

a. The SAR flight in the Marianas was there for the benefit of FEAF. With the war in Morea, FEAF was priviledged to move it forward or redeploy it as he saw fit in accordance with his mission.

b. This was a matter which should be resolved by FFAF and 70 commanders with existing directives. Which required that commanders with contiguous fields of responsibility cooperate with each other in the accomplishment of their assigned missions.

70. JCS 1259/27.





- c. This matter had not been officially brought to the attention of the Air Staff or the JCS since the previous JCS consideration of this ratter, when it was decided not to resolve such a detailed point. Therefore, we should not take cognizance of the then present dispute.
- d. As the flight was presently under FEAF control our position should be not to resolve this matter in the JCS, but rather, to leave the question open looking toward resolution by the commanders themselves.
- e. If the question was formally introduced into the JCE the
  Air Staff position would be to support FFAF in accordance with our
  policy of supporting our field commanders.

As anticipated by General Kuter, then Commander MATS, the subject of a proposal of a Pacific Air Command arose again during the 72 latter part of September. This time the Chief of Naval Operations proposed that a Pacific Air Command be activated in the Pacific area under the command of CINCPAC with the assignment of all local forces of the Air Force permanently based in the area of the responsibility to the Pacific command. General Vendenberg replied that a study was being made by the Air Staff to analyze the over-all USAF requirements in the Pacific and to determine the command organization best suited to the area and that a reply would be forth coming in the 76 near future.

Volcano Islands from ClaGFs, 10 aug 21.

76. Memo for CNO, Subji (S) Designation of Forces to Operate under the



<sup>71.</sup> Letter from Gen Kuter to Gen McKee, 13 July 1951.

<sup>72.</sup> Letter to Gen Kuter, MATS, from Gen Smith, D/F, 25 July 1951.
73. Memo for CNO to C/S, USAF, Subj: Designation of Forces to Operate

<sup>7</sup>h. Memo for Gen White, Subj: USAF Command in the Pacific.



Another command problem of significance occuring in late August was a study on the desirability of setting up a U. S. theater in This was initiated as a re-England under an Air Force commander. sult of a letter from General Moretad. He recommended that the USAF should try to get away from a three area concept divided between the three U. S. Services, within the SHAFE area. He considered that this would adversely effect USAF interests on the Continent and in the Mediterranean. The War Flans Division generally concurred in GINCUSAFE's views. However, it was requested that a draft of CINCUSAFE's proposal be submitted to this headquarters in order that further guidence could be provided.

In view of the controversial U. S. Command Jurisdictional problems arising in Europe from time to time a study was initiated in the War Plans Division during the latter part of September 1951. It was pointed out in the study that the then present U. S. military organization in Europe was established under a committee of the Senior Service Commanders, namely the JOSRE. In addition, to the JOSRE, each of the three senior Service commanders operated as a commander under the JCS. Also, the European area was generally divided into three geographical regions for joint planning and logistic planning. It was concluded that the then present U. S. organization in Europe appeared to have certain serious limitations, and further that these limitations would become particularly acute in case General Fisenhover

<sup>80.</sup> JCS 2098 81. JCS 1725/114



Cable 335 from CINCUSAFE to Ho USAF 07/1545E.

<sup>77.</sup> Cable 335 from CINCUSAFE to he USAF 07/19492.
78. Mag (TS) Operational Immediate from Hq USAF to CINCUSAFE, 19 Sep
79. Memo for Gen Smith, Subj: U. S. Command Organization in Europe, 25 Sep



was no longer SACEUR. It appeared that a solution to this problem would be to establish an over-all theater headquarters to command the forces then presently under CINCEUR, CINCUSATE, and CIECUELM.

At this writing a study was being prepared for submission to the Chief of Staff covering this problem.

From time to time during this period various problems of U. S. command relationships in Europe were attadied and commented on by the War Flans Division. One of the most significant arose early in July. In this instance the Joint Strategic Flans Committee presented for Air Staff review, a new U. S. Military Organization required in 82 Europe. This paper presented two views, which were divergent in the two following aspects:

a. Whether or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representatives,
Europe, as a corporate body, should be responsible for the MDAP
Program or whether General Handy as CINCEUR should have this
responsibility.

b. Whether Europe should be divided into three geographical areas under the primary cognizance of the individual CINCS or kept as a single theater directly under the JCSRE. Concurrence in the view which charged the JCSRE for responsibility of the MDAP program and for the European area as a whole was recommended by the War Plans Division.

Probably one of the most perplexing command problems participated in by the War Plans Division during this period was the complex 82. JSPC 876/335.





Mediterranean Middle East Command arrangements. This problem arose many times between July and December and at this writing was still unsolved, however a brief account of considerations involved and the recommendations made from time to time is recounted below. On 11 July 83 1951, in a memorandum to the JCS, the U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, transmitted for JCS comments, the Pritish Chiefe of Staff position on a command organization in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Area. In essence, these comments recommended that the following factors be considered in setting-up a command in the Mediterranean.

- a. The command arrangements devised should take into account the participation of Greece and Turkey in the Defense of subject area.
- b. The command should be a NATO command and should be called "Supreme Allied Eastern Command" in order not to imply that the entire Middle East was involved.
- c. The U. S. should not cormit itself to furnish forces to the command.
  - d. The headquarters of the command should be in Cyprus.
- e. The British should continue to use their own Commander of the Middle East and this same commander should be the Supreme Allied Commander with both headquarters being located in Cyprus.
- f. The purpose and nature of the Middle East Defense Board should be somewhat expanded.

<sup>83.</sup> JEPC 876/334. 8L. JCS 1868/271.



SECURITY INFURMALL



g. The title "British Navel Commander-in-Chief, British Navel Forces, Maditerranean" should be redesignated "Commander-in-Chief, British Navel Forces, Mediterranean."

h. The coordination of all air activities in the Mediterranean-Middle East and Borth African area should be the subject of a separate study in order to insure the maximum overall defense with the forces available with no possible duplications of effort.

During the latter part of July a second proposal was put forward by the U.K. concerning the command in the Mediterraneen and Middle 85
East. This proposal from one point of view was essentially the same as the position taken by the Department of State at that time. In essence, the subject proposal stated:

a. "Greece and Turkey should be full members of NATO with Greece forming a part of SACEUR's command while Turkey becomes part of a proposed new Middle East Command."

b. "The Allied Middle East Command under the command of a British officer would not be under the jurisdiction and guidance of the Standing Group but would be governed by a Headquarters consisting of representatives of France, U.K., U. S., and Turkey. The Supreme Headquarters should be located in Egypt. Egypt would be offered participation in the command organization in return for certain facilities to be placed at the disposal of the Middle East Command."

<sup>86.</sup> JCS 1868/276.



<sup>85.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subjt Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East. (JCS 1868/274)

c. \*In the Mediterranean, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe and the Commander-in-Chief Pritish Mediterranean
Fleet would each control his own forces and bases and maintain his
own line of see communications. Fach would maintain lisison at the
other's headquarters.\*


d. "Upon the admission of Turkey to the NaTO, there would be established a Middle East Defense Board consisting of political and military representatives of the U. S., U.K., France and Turkey for the purpose of acting in an advisory and consultative capacity to those Commonwealth countries and countries willing and able to contribute substantially to the defense of the area." The Air Staff position in this case was that this proposal was unsatisfactory in that it was not believed that it met the requirements the JCS must have to insure the proper coordination for forces belonging to SACKUR and those of the Middle East Command. Further, that the U. S. position would not be as strong in this area if the above command arrangements were considered acceptable.

This problem appeared again in August for study and comments by the War Plans Division. In this instance the following guidance, which superseded all previous guidance, was recommended to be given to the Deputy U. S. Representative to the Standing Group.

s. Greece and Turkey should be full members of NATO and represented in all NATO bodies with the exception of the Standing Group.

<sup>87.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East. (JCS 1868/283.)





- c. Greece should form part of SACRUR's command and Turkey part of SACRE, each represented at the other headquarters by liaison personnel.
- d. The conjuct of operations in the Mediterranean should be on a functional basis with a division of responsibilities between the Naval commander under SACME and the Naval commander under Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe.
- e. In order to establish some form of military representation in Mashington for those non-NATO nations contributing to the
  common defense of the Middle Mast, there should be a Middle Mast
  Military Representative Committee, headed by U.S., U.K., French, and
  Turkish personnel. It was also anticipated that some form of political
  representation would come into being.

Another national interest appeared in the Mediterranean Middle
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East problem in September. In this instance, the French government
desired that a French Command be established in the Western Mediterranean on the "same status as the British Naval Commander in the
Eastern Mediterranean." It was stressed in JCS guidance to General
Bradley that there should be only one principle Naval Commander
in the Western Mediterranean, who would be the Naval Commander under

<sup>88.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Maval Command in the Mediterranean, French Participation (CUSM-494-51). 89. DUSM-494-51



CDMC Southern Europe. Any French or Italian Mayal Commands should be within the Maval command structure for CINC Southern Furope.

SECRET

Another facet of this problem was studied during the latter part of November. In this instance it was a proposal for the establishment of a U.S. Unified Command in the European-Mediterranean-Middle This plan was proposed in view of the problems arising East Area. as a result of the existing command arrangements. The principle problems were the growing confusion, Suplication and Solay in the fields of military construction, negotiations for base rights, procurement of local facilities, and related logistical and administrative matters. The Air Starf study proposed to simplify the present U. S. command errangements in the European-Mediterranean-Middle Fast Area and to provide an organization that could be easily expended and utilized in the event of war.

The Rome meeting of the Morth Atlantic Council (U.C.) precipitated another instance of consideration of the Bastern Mediterranean problem during the latter part of December. In this particular instance the substance of the mobilem was as follows: At the Rome meeting the North Atlantic Council (NAC) noted a Military Committee progress report on these command arrangements and requested the Standing Group to continue the development of same. The MAC further requested a definitive report on this subject through the Military Committee at the Lisbon Conference scheduled for 2 February 1952.

Memo for Gen Vendenberg, Subj: Establishment of a U.S. Unified Command in the Europe-Med-Mid East Area, 11 Dec 51.
Staff Study on the Establishment of U.S. Unified Command in the Europe-Med-Mid East Area, Prepared by Ho USAF, Nov 51.
JSPC 757/117
Memo for Col Tibbetts, Subj: Command Arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, 26 Dec 51.



In light of these events it was considered necessary to formulate a Joint Chiefs of Staff position for the guidance of the U.S.
Representatives to the Standing Group, U. S. Member of the North Atlantic Military Committee, and for such other uses as may be required. The approved JCS position envisaged three steps to be taken to resolve the over-all problem of command arrangements in the Mediterranean-Middle East Area which were:

- a. To admit Greece and Turkey to NATO and to place them in a NATO command.
  - b. To establish a Middle East Command.
- e. Arrange a means of coordination between MATO and the Middle East Command.

The War Plans Division was of the opinion that the proposed guidance was sound from the U. S. point of view and that the command arrangements for Greece and Turkey were acceptable to our Allies. It was also believed that broad concessions should be made in setting up the Middle East Command and a method of coordination between the Middle East Command and NATO. However, it was recommended that no concessions should be made which would in any way obligate the United States to furnish troops to the Middle East Command, nor which would tend to integrate the NATO command and the Middle East Command.

On 7 July the Joint Logistics Plans Committee presented a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an Alternate Joint Communications

<sup>96.</sup> JCS 1851/332.



<sup>94.</sup> JCS 1868/329.

<sup>95.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Command Arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Area.

Center. A requirement had been established by the JCS for an Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) to be located at Camp Ritchie, Raven Rock, near Hagerstown, Maryland. This facility was to provide a rendezvous location for coordinated operational control of the Armed Forces in the event of war. An Inter-Service ad hoc Committee, which was appointed in September 1950, determined that a JCS committee study the project with a view toward establishing it as a joint project. The team concurred in the recommendations that the Communications Center should be designated a joint project with the provisions that the Army provide the management service, that operating and logistic responsibilities would be discharged by the Services by mutual agreement, and that funding arrangements therefore be administered by the Services in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense.

The Italian Peace Treaty problem came to the forefront during
July of this period. In this instance a reply was submitted

20 July to Mr. McCone, office of the Secretary of the Air Force, to his
query as to the effect the Italian Peace Treaty limitations would
have upon her contributions to NATO, between July 1951 and July 1952.

The Air Force view on this problem was that the Italian Peace Treaty
limitations should be removed if Italy was to provide a virile Air
Force for NATO by the target date of December 1954. If such action
was not effected it was considered that Italy's air contribution
would remain small and impotent.

97. Memo for Secretary Marshall signed by John A. McCone, 20 July 1951.





During the latter part of July the Air Member of the Canadian

Joint Staff requested information as to where the USAF Headquarters

might be located in event evacuation became necessary from the present

location. This information was requested in as much as the main function of the Royal Canadian Air Force Staff, in Washington, was to

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provide liaison between the RCAF and the USAF. Reply was made

that "when determination is made that the Washington Air Force Headquarters becomes inoperable, due to enemy action, interim command

of the Air Force will be vested in the Commanding General, Tactical

Air Command, Langley Air Force Ease, Virginia. He will exercise

such command until relieved by proper authority."

CINCUSAFE was advised, on 14 July 1951, that as a basis for future programming of NATO-USAFE forces the Paris Plan was not acceptable at that time, and further, that the Paris Plan should be approved by the JCS before it could be used as a future planning instrument. It was further stated that the only firm basis for future programming at that time was the U. S. Medium Term Plan and D.C. 28. CINCUSAFE was further advised that major units programmed for USAFE in 1952 were one Fighter Interceptor Wing, three Air Depots, one Troop Carrier Wing, four Fighter Bomber Wings, one ACRM Group, one Air Division, one Light Bomb Wing, one TAC Recon Wing, one Air Supply and Communications Wing, three Engineer Aviation Battalions, and one Tactical Control Group.

101. Mag from AFOPD to CINCUSAFE, 14 July 1951, CAF in 97242.



<sup>98.</sup> Letter from Dept of Mational Def, Canadian Joint Staff, 1700 Mass. Ave, N.W., Washington 6, D. C., 25 July 1951. 99. JCS 927/89

<sup>100.</sup> Memo to Foreign Liaison Branch, Policy Div., Dir of Intelligence, 17 July 1951.

An Air Staff reply was prepared in response to a congressional inquiry on aircraft for "NATO" purposes. This information, in substence, stated that for NATO purposes the USAF would man 1000 aircraft, the U. S. would furnish to European countries for manning by European Nationals, 1492 aircraft, and European countries would furnish and man a total of 3421 aircraft.

Early in July 1951 Admiral Carney, the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe foresaw the possibility of gaining NATO experienced personnel for his newly formed staff from the EMMO region. SHAPE agreed with Admiral Corney that this plan of obtaining experienced and well qualified personnel was highly desirable. It was recommended to the Air Staff that this plan be concurred in and further, that CINCUSAFE be advised.

Another phase of the problem of "closing the gap," which had been a subject of considerable discussion previously, arose again during July. This time it was a proposed U. S. Solution to closing the gap This particular solution made a slight revision in the in D.C. 28. force contributions as previously listed in that the added land and naval forces were generally along the lines of the International Security Affairs Committee recommendations while the Air Force contributions were made to agree with the Paris Plan. The Chairman of the International Security Affairs Committee recommended that these

<sup>105.</sup> JCS 2073/157.



on A/C for NATO purposes.

103. NATO mag from Hq USAF to CINCUSAFE, 18 Jul 51.

10h. JSPC 876/331. 102. Memo for L/Gen Rewlings, 17 Jul 51, Subj: Congressional Inquiry

resolution would probably be required by the U. S. and countries concerned, that serious financial and economic considerations in meeting these added requirements were foreseen and that the U. S. should continue to work on these figures. He further recommended that any U. S. Representative in NATO using the figures should present them to NATO with these explanations included. The Secretary of Defense approved these recommendations. It was further noted that although the President had actually approved the proposed program no international commitment had yet been made. It was considered that two important changes should be made in the paper before the U. S. submitted it to the Standing Group. The first of these changes concerned land force requirements and added U. S. commitments thereto. The second major change which, it was considered should have been made, was that an indication of priorities be made.

Another interesting detail of "closing the gap" that came up during early fall of this reporting eriod was the JCS proposed 106 solution for filling the gap in D.C. 28. This proposal was in substance as follows: An Army proposal was made that certain Air Force units such as SAC and home defense aircraft be canmarked to meet D.C. 28 requirements. These proposals were considered invalid justifications as D.C. 28 requirements were determined for the landair battle for Mestern Europe, and, further, that D.C. 28 requirements were predicated on the need for having such forces in place and operational D-Dsy.

<sup>106.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: "Glosing the Gap" Between
Force Contributions and Force Requirements for NATO Medium Term
Defense Plan. (JCS 2073/179)



Comments were also prepared by the War Plans Division on the 1954 Naval Force Requirements for NATO in a memorandum to General Vandenberg, 26 July 1951. In essence, the International Working Team (INT) to the Standing Group prepared a suggested breakdown of D.C. 28 Naval Forces by tasks and areas. Air Force wise, no objections were seen to these breakdowns except that the Air Staff desired to point out that these forces were not placed under SACEUR's operational control. It was believed, Air Force wise, that SACRUR should eventually exercise such control if they were to be integrated into his combat operations.

Another interesting facet of activities connected with MATO problems was the review of Air Chief Marshel, Sir Hugh W. L. Saunder's letter sent to General Vandenberg, early in July, concerning the equipping of six Royal Air Force Squadrons with F86E's. Air Chief Marshal Saunders principal concern was whether a USAF expension would effect the availability of government furnished parts to Canada which, in turn, would delay the delivery of Canadian made F86E's to Britain. If a delay was anticipated, then Air Marshal Seunders explained that the RAF's contribution to SACFUR's integrated force would be delayed. Air Marshal Seunders was advised that short of any Canadian insbility to keep production up to the then present schedule, and assuming the conclusion of necessary fiscal arrangements between the governments concerned, there should be no difficulty in the Royal Air Forces obtaining the F86E's so that their units would be equipped on schedule.

Letter from Saunders to Vendenberg, dtd 9 Jul 51. Letter to Air Chief Marshal, Sir Rugh W. L. Saunders from General Vandenberg, dtd 27 Jul 51.



The U. S. Deputy Representative to the Standing Group requested guidance concerning a proposal by the French Representatives, General May during the latter part of July, for a conference of the three 110 Army Chiefs of Staff of the Standing Group nations. It was recommended by the War Plans Division that the JCS take the position that problems affecting the development of NATO land forces could be adequately handled through the then existing NATO machinery, therefore the JCS would not be favorably disposed to a meeting of the Army Chiefs of Staff, Standing Group nations at that time. Further, that the JCS would not wish to be arbitrary in the matter in event the French Representative felt strongly concerning such a conference, and was therefore prepared to review more outlined detailed objectives of such a conference.

A conference of Army Chiefs of Staff was again proposed in the fall by Lt General Ely to work out the problem of land force requirements in view of the results obtained by the four Air Chiefs of Staff conference. It was considered that the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, had the major interest in this matter; however, it was pointed out that the four Air Chiefs met at the personal request of General Eisenhower whereas the conference proposed by the French Representative a psared to have been made without thought as to SACEUR's interest in the matters.

<sup>110.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Conference of Army C/S, S.G. Netione, JCS 2073/177.

<sup>111.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Conference of Army Chiefs of Staff, Standing Group Mations. (JCS 2073/177)

SECRET

During the latter part of July the Chief of Staff requested a summary of the German Air Force problem and recommendations on the timing and method of its development. This study analyzed the elements of the problem of creating a German Air Force by the end of 1954 and was based on practical considerations and a feasible approach to the entire problem. This study incorporated the belief that it was wise to aim at a German Air Force by the same date as the Paris Plan - the end of 1954. It was estimated that from a military point of view the eventual minimum required German Air Contribution, beyond 1954, should be on the order of 1600 to 1800 aircraft. The size of the German air contribution that would be obtainable through MDAP, at the end of 1954, was estimated at 750 aircraft. Support for the German Air Force would have to come from 112 which meant that the U. S. would have to foot most of the bill.

The subject of the German Air Force problem arose egain during 113
the first part of August. The complete study that had been previously prepared was approved for planning purposes only - not for implementation. The forces recommended in this study were subsequently approved by the JCS and incorporated the following:

a. The size of the German Air Force that was obtainable through MDAP at the end of 1954 should be 750 U. S. provided aircraft.

(It was estimated that from a military point of view the required German Air contribution goal should be 16/1800 sireraft).

Problems, 20 Jul 51.

113. Memo to C/S, Subj: (Conf) Summary of German Air Force Problems,
4 Aug 51.



<sup>112.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Summary of German Air Force Problems, 20 Jul 51.



Incorporate the sims of the German Air Force slong the some program as the Paris Plan, the and of 1954.

c. The support for the German Air Force should come through MATO channels. However, the U. S. should expect to be called upon to foot most of the bill, due to the reluctance of the European nations to equip a German Air Arm at the expense of their own.

were sgain made in late August Comments and recommendations on snother aspect of the German participation in the European Defense as proposed by German officials in their Bonn meeting. Arrangements It was stated in the Bonn report that German air elements should be used for support of German ground elements. Two reasons were given for this statement:

a. Necessity for a common language between Air and ground units.

b. Expressed German doctrine of having a ground force division or corps commend control sir units supporting him. The Air Staff held to the belief that it was necessary to give the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe complete freedom in the use of Air Force under his control. Should German air units support only German ground forces, those units could not be used in support of eny other national or international ground elements. Further, the U. S. Air Force should not concede to the German proposal of Army-Air Force

<sup>114.</sup> Letter, Mes USAFE, Subj: CIMCUSAFE Comments on the Final Report of the Boan Technical Conversations Pertaining to German Participation in the Defense of Western Europe, 19 Jul 51, to C/S, USAF.

<sup>115.</sup> Bonn Technical Conversations Pertaining to German Participation

in the Defense of Western Europe, dtd 19 Jul 51. 116. Mamo for General Vandenberg, Subj: German Participation in the European Defense Arrangements (Bonn Report) JCS 2124/52.



affinity at Division level, as this was contrary to accepted U. S. Air Force doctrine. The Born Report called for 352 sircraft for the German Mavel Component. The Air Staff position was that the German Fir Force could furnish such air support as might be required by the 117 German Navy.

As a meens of subordinating the overall military interests of Germany to certain control, it was recommended in the Bonn Report that an Air Inspector General under the Defense Minister be the Commanding General for administration and supply of all German military units, including air and navy elements. Further, it was stated that Germany should be divided into four geographical areas, each to be commanded by a territorial organizational commander who would be under the direct supervision of the Inspector General. The territorial Commander would be assponsible for the administration, supply and training of all military units in his area, including air and nevel elements. The Air Staff considered that this was not only en extension of the old German general staff principle but, that it also failed to establish the proper relationship between the three German Services; therefore, the proposal was considered unacceptable. The Air Staff considered as a me no of accentuating the proper relationship between the three German Services, a Deputy for each Service abould be placed under the Inspector General and under each territorial organizational Commander. This would provide direct

<sup>117.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Bonn Technical Conversations Pertaining to German Participation in the Defense of Western Europe, 19 Jul 51.



command lines for administration, supply and training from the lowest units of each Service through the territorial organization, to the Inspector General.

As a result of a request from SHAPE a reply was made approximately 1 August to the U. S. Linison Officer, SHAPE, pertaining to infrastructure obstacles in support of difference between D.C. 28 118 and Paris Flan Figures. In substance the reply stated that:

- a. "Definite final designation must be made without delay of tactically suited sites for UEAF bases and escential supporting structure in accordance with an approved SACEUR deployment."
- b. "Bese rights agreements must be concluded without delay for USAF Air Bases and essential supporting infrastructure before any units can be decloyed."
- c. "Common construction requirements, based on NATO standards, must be determined."
- d. "Construction potential and phased construction schedules must be developed."
- e. "Common costing and funding formulae must be established immediately on NATO level to enable budgeting programming for required construction."
- f. And finally, that the JCS view was the overcoming of above obstacles could be accelerated by SAGEUR personally bringing the infrastructure problem before the principal governments concerned (i.e., U. S. and France) as a matter or urgency.

<sup>118.</sup> Msg to USLO SHAPE, NOFCHE.



In the early part of August the preparation of a U. S. policy toward Spain was begun. As the overall policy toward Spain was to eventually bring her into NATO for the common defense of the NATO areas, and as this was not politically feasible at the time, it was felt that the U. S. policy should be to work out mutual arrangements with Spain that would be militarily profitable to both countries and which would assist Spain in joining NATO. As a result of Admiral Sherman's message to the JCS during his visit with Generalissimo Franco, it was proposed by the War Plans Division that in order to retain the advantages accrued by Admiral Sherman's discussion with Franco, a U. S. Joint Military Survey Team (JMST), headed by a Senior Air Force General officer, should be sent to Madrid as early as possible to meet with Spanish officials. Also, as a means of getting our foot in the door, the U. S. desired the right to stage aircraft through Spanish Airfields, overfly Spain, make use of an improved Spanish air and logistic facilities, and to obtain anchorage rights for U. S. Naval vessels in Spanish harbors. Our next step would be to obtain Joint utilization of airfields at Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, and an airfield in the vicinity of Gibralter, possibly Tetuan, Malaga, or Cadiz Huelva.

Another problem of significance worked on during the early part of August was the problem of the channels for transmission of warning of attack. 121 In a memorandum received from the Deputy U. S.

121. JOS 2073/184.



<sup>119.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: US Policy Toward Spain, 9 Aug 51.

120. Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Negotiations for Spanish Air
Bases and Command Relationships in Spain.



Representative to the Standing Group the JCS were requested to take the necessary steps to implement the current provisions concerning the proper U. S. channels for the transmission of warning of attack. In substance, this report recommended that:

s. The President should authorize the transmittal of warning of attack messages.

b. The JOS should be designated as the U. S. sgency to transmit such messages to the Standing Group.

c. In case actual hostilities had commenced or were considered to be no imminent that time was of vital importance, the JCS would transmit warning of attack messages without first securing the approval of the National Security Council.

It was the opinion of the air Staff that the proposed action on this problem fully satisfied the requirements presented. It was further believed that it was the most suitable and secure means of providing the proper channels for transmittal of a warning of attack.

In a comparative study of the various national and international organizations and headquarters it was noted that as a general rule U. S. Air Torce representation was small when compared to representation from other Cervices. This was especially true in the instances of SHAPE, Standing Group and MDAP. As a result of this observation a study was begun in the War Plens Division to ascertain the causes. At this writing of the history the study was pending completion.

<sup>124.</sup> Study conducted by the Rainbow Team, in Rainbow Team Files.



<sup>122.</sup> JGS 2073/147.

Another item of interest occurring in early August was the establishment of an Inter-Service Ad Hoc Committee to study two proposals made by the Standing Group which were as follows:

a. One proposing the establishment of a permanent NATO committee on general research and development.

b. The formation of a NATO Advisory Group for aeronautical It was believed in the War Plans Division research and development. that the two above groups would serve a useful purpose and establishment of same was recommended,

In a memorandum from Secretary Finletter, General Vandenberg was requested to determine if there were any directives other than JCS 1259/27 pertaining to theater commanders taking over control of A study was made and it was SAC units in time of emergency. determined that only one ap roved directive existed which applied to this problem. In substance, the directive provided that even in the case of a major emergency no commander could take operational control of SAC units, but that in case of dire emergency a commander could apply to the JCS for authority to assume temporary operational control of all or part of SAC units in his area of command.

Another interesting facet of MATO activities participated in during the middle of August was the problem of training of foreign

<sup>129.</sup> JCS 1259/27, Paragraph 13.



SG 110, "Report of the Conference of Aeronautical Research and Development Directors.

Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Policies Regarding Cooperative Research and Development in NATO. 126.

JCS 1868/279.
Memo to C/S, Subj: (Conf) Theater Commanders taking Operational Control of Strategic Air Command Aircraft in Case of Emergency.



pilots in USAF schools under MDAP. This problem considered whether spaces for training of foreign pilots in the USAF achools under MDAP could be given in bulk to the Standing Group for allocation and also whether the MDAP program pertaining to the U.K., in total or in part, might be considered as a previously existing bi-lateral agreement that would be currently valid as a continuation. This problem was partially originated by a letter from Air Chief Marshal, Sir William Elliot, concerning RAF training vacancies.

In preparing a reply to Air Chief Marshal, Sir William Elliot, it was indicated that there was conflict between MDAP law and SG memo 64/5 and stated that the Air Staff was looking into the matter and would have a reply shortly. Subsequently, a legal opinion was obtained from the Department of Defense on the question as to whether flying training spaces for foreign nationals in the USAF training program could be offered by the U. S. to the SG Air Training Team for allocation as previously specified in a Report by the Air Training Team ing Team on NATO flying training. The legal opinion was that flying training spaces for foreign nationals in the USAF training program could not be allocated to any international agency such as the

<sup>133.</sup> SG 64/5
13h. Memo, Ofs Sec of Def for Deputy Director of Plans, Dept of AF,
23 Aug 51.



<sup>130</sup> Memo frm War Flans Division to Chief, Mobilization Division, Subj:
(TS) Report by the Air Training Team to the SG on NATO Flying Trng
(SG 64/5), 16 Aug 51.

131. SG 64/5, Paragraph 5.

St 64/5, Paragraph 5.
 Letter to Air Chief Murshal, British Joint Services Mission, AF Staff from General Vendenberg, 20 Aug 51.



assistance program which should be administered soley by a U. S. agency. Air Chief Marshal, Sir William Elliot, was advised to 135 this effect.

On 26 April Admiral Wright, Deputy U. S. Representative to the Standing Group, NATO, forwarded a staff study to the Chief of Staff USAF on the Relationship of Strategic Air Command to NATO. The staff study recommended that the U. S. take action to establish the Strategic Air Force (SAF) within HATO. This problem was studied in detail by the Air Staff and it was decided undesirable to 136, 137 establish a SAF within NATO at that time.

The important problem srose during this period on the lack of 138

Air Force control over the MDA program in Europe. A compromise position was offered by the Air Force whereby the Air Force would appoint a senior officer as a Deputy to General Kibler, the Director of JAMAG. Although this officer would occupy a JCS position and would serve as Deputy to the Director of JAMAG, it was anticipated that the arrangements would permit CINCUSAFE easier access to the problems being considered by JAMAG, particularly on air matters.

The problem of the Unified Command Plan arose during this period. Specifically it pertained to exemption from command by



<sup>135.</sup> Letter to Air Chief Marshal from C/S USAF, 12 Sep 51.

<sup>136.</sup> Nemo to DCS/O, Subj: (TS) Relationship of Strategic Air Command

to NATO, 25 Aug 51.

137. Memo for Admiral Wright, Subj: (TS) Relationship of Strategic Air Command to North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 31 Aug 51.

138. Letter from Deputy C/S Operations to CDNCUSANE, 24 Aug 51.

unified commanders of SAC units designated for atomic operations. Reasons posed in this instance were that transfers and activation of SAC units resulted in frequent changes in the composition of the Strategic Air Command which in turn reflected changes in composition and operational plans. As a result of above the Air Force recommended to the JCS that all SAC units be exempted under permission of the Unified Command Plan.

An analysis was made during the latter part of August of the The points of particular 1954 force requirements submitted by SHAPE. interest to the Air Force were:

a. SACEUR reiterated that we must immediately implement the Paris Plan. He amphasized that this represented the minimum forces that must be in place on D-Dsy.

b. The primary role of aircraft carriers shown in this study was to support the land-air battle.

c. The study discussed a "proper balance between land and carrier based tactical sir." As no amphibious operations were mentioned, such a concept was not considered in consonance with U. S. roles and missions agreements.

d. Maximum use would be made of offensive neval operations, including carrier air, for defense of the Morthern European area.

e. SHAPE anticipated using Air Forces in Central Europe for strengthening Northern or Southern Air Commands as required.

<sup>11:2.</sup> JOS 2073/198, Enclosure.



<sup>139.</sup> JCS 1259/115. 140. JCS 1259/166.

LLL JOS 1259/27



f. SHAPE anticipated a coordinated pre-planned attack against Soviet Tactical air power and other installations, in cooperation with Allied Bomber Commands.

The subject of mobilization of NATO forces arose again during the latter part of August. 143 In this instance, the Chief of the French Delegation to the Standing Group proposed like that the Army Chiefs of Staff of the Standing Group nations meet to make a comparative study of the mobilization systems in force in France, U. K. and the U. S., and to recommend the best arrangements to reach the proposed objective. It was recommended 115 that the JCS consider that the problems of mobilization were peculiar to each country and should be solved uni-laterally and that no meeting was required.


In late August the Standing Group requested each NATO member nation to furnish its national intelligence estimate for use in the preparation of a Standing Group intelligence estimate and as a basis for furnishing intelligence guidance to the major commands under the Standing Group. 146 This request was forwarded to the JCS by the Deputy U. S. Representative to the Standing Group. 147 The Joint Intelligence Committee, in recognition of its intelligence responsibilities to the Standing Group forwarded to Admiral Wright, on 20 August, the requested information 11:8 plus additional information

JCS 2073/192 - "Request for Guidance on Intelligence Matters." 147. Document, "Basic Intelligence for Planning" - 1 July 1951.



<sup>14.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Mobilization of NATO forces,

<sup>31</sup> Aug 51. Appendix to JCS 2073/192 - "Request for Guidance on Intelligence 146.



The subject of the division of responsibility in wartime between the Mational territorial commanders and the Supreme commanders and subordinate allied commanders was studied during 151 the early part of September. In a memorandum to the JCS the Deputy U. S. Representative to the Standing Group requested 153 authority to approve the set of principles which were dispatched to all NATO nations. This paper outlined the general principles to be followed in the division of responsibilities between national authorities and the allied commanders of the NATO. It was felt that this revision was appropriate and approval was recommended thereon.

Another varied subject participated in during this period was recommending an Air Staff position on Military Requirements for 15h shipping in support of the Medium Term Defense Plan. In substance, this subject had to do primarily with a request by the Stending Group to the MATO nations to submit their requirements for military shipping in support of the Medium Term Defense Plan

h9. JCS 2073/200


<sup>150.</sup> Memo for Gen Vandenberg, Subj: Intelligence Guidance for the Standing Group, 10 Sep 51.

<sup>151.</sup> Memo for Gen Lee, Subj: Division of Responsibilities in Wartime Between the National Territorial Commanders and the Supreme Commanders and Subordinate Allied Commanders, 11 Sep 51.

<sup>152.</sup> Enclosure to JCS 2073/193. 153. Appendix to JCS 2073/193.

<sup>154.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Military Reqs for Shipping in Support of the Medium Term Defense Plan, 13 Sep 51.

<sup>155.</sup> Memo for General Variethberg, Subj: As Above.



ments should be forwarded to the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping as preliminary guidance.

b. The Nato nations should again submit their shipping requirements using common assumptions and stowage factors.

c. The Standing Group should direct a study of factors and assumptions to be made which would accompany the request for NATO nations to re-submit their shipping requirements."

A presentation was prepared in late September to be given to 158 159, 160 General Eisenhover covering the special weapons program.

Recommendations were made on the composition of a team to present the program, definitions of the special weapons to be considered, and the scope of the presentations. It was also recommended that the briefing should be postponed until after the October military committee and council meetings due to any possible adverse influence this briefing might have.

<sup>156.</sup> JCS 2073/187.

<sup>157.</sup> JCS 2073/199.

<sup>158.</sup> Messo for Gen Lee, Subj: Presentation to Gen Eisenhouer, 20 Sep 51.

<sup>159.</sup> SPOM-132.

<sup>160.</sup> JCS 2073/201.



The War Plans Division prepared comments in September on the (Confidential) Transfer Agreement and Delineation of Responsibilities 161
Between USAFE and SAC in the U.K. The Chief of Staff, USAF, directed that certain responsibilities and resources assigned to the 3d Air Force (USAFE) in the U.K. be transferred to the 7th Air Division. Accordingly, CINCUSAFE and CG, SAC were directed to work out details for the transfer guided by the principles set forth in a USAF message. Subsequently, CG, 3d Air Force and 7th Air Division, representing CINCUSAFE and CG, SAC respectively, drew up a transfer agreement dated 16 May 1951, which served as the basic document for negotistion. This document was amended by CINCUSAFE and CO, SAC in a series of messages resolving all points of differences.

A study was made in September on the SaC forces in the Medium 163

Term Defense Plan of NATO areas. It was considered that although the Medium Term Defense Plan stated a requirement for a strategic air offensive, no force tabs had yet been included in the Medium Term Defense Plan for the forces required for this air objective. The primary responsibility for the conducting of a strategic sir offensive lies, of course, with the United States. However, it was felt that the air requirement for the strategic air offensive should not be added to the present air requirements of the Medium Term Defense Plan for the following reasons:

<sup>163.</sup> Memo for Col Gideon, Subj: Should U. S. SAC Forces be Included in the Medium Term Defense Flan of NATO area. (DC13 and DC 28).



<sup>161.</sup> Memo for C/S, Subj: (Conf) Transfer Agreement and Delineation of Responsibilities Between USAFE and SAC in the U.K. 162. AFCCS 57040.

- a. SAC was strictly a U. S. command under the JCS, and as such, did not at that time constitute a part of the MATO command.
- b. This mission entailed a world-wide operation and could not be tied to any geographical area.
- c. Inclusion might, in the future, commit SAC forces to less important missions and thereby piecemeal its efforts and forces.
- d. Inclusion might tend to make its mission co-equal in importance with the mission of MATO forces rather than more important missions thereby losing its present status.
- e. Inclusion might subordinate its bese requirements to other force base requirements, thereby hindering the accomplishment of its mission.

The subject of construction for the U. S. Armed Forces in Europe arose during the latter part of October. It was proposed that coordination of construction by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, programs with each host country should be accomplished by a single agency and commander. This coordination would encompass priorities, standardization, and procedures. It was considered that the Army proposal was completely unscreptable to the Air Steff for the reason that Army and Navy commanders would have had the responsibility for determining construction priorities and policies in areas where Air Force interests were vital, (France, Benelux, Spain, Italy and North Africa). The Air Staff position in this



Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Construction for the U. S. Armed Forces in Europe, 11 Oct 51. 165. JCS 1891/29.



that no single service could impartially establish construction policies and priorities in areas where interests of other Services were pronounced.

It was noted in the War Plans Division that many papers were circulated from time to time, both inter-service and inter-national, which made reference to geographic definitions of Asia and Africa. For example, the terms Far last, Middle East, Mear East and North Africa. It was noted also that there were various concepts as to what areas these terms represented. As a result of the above the War Plans Division originated a staff study which outlined the definitions used by various U. S. and foreign agencies. From these terms, a common definition was determined for usage within the three services and it was recommended that the subject be introduced into the Standing Group.

On 8 October the Deputy U. S. Representative to the Standing Group requested guidence from the JCS on the proposed terms of reference for the Allied Commander, Channel and Southern North Sea. The War Plans Division recommended approval of the terms of reference provided the Commander-in-Chief, Channel, with full power in vartime as follows:

a. To plan and conduct anti-surface and anti-sulmarine

warfare.

166. Memo by the C/S, USAF to the JCS on Construction for the U. S.

Armed Forces in Europe, Ref JCS 1891/29.

167. Memo for Gen Lee, Subj: Geographic Definition of Asia and Agrica

17 Oct 51. 168. Staff Study of Geographic Definition of Asia and Africa, 17 Oct 51, Ref: JCS 1725/114, JCS 2098, CFP 1/28, CFF 1/29, CFP 1/19.

169. Memo for Gen Lee, Subj: Terms of Reference for the Allied Commander Channel and Southern North Sea, 22 Oct 51.

170. JSPC 876/377



- b. to undertake naval control of shipping in the open sea and cross-channel convoy organization.
- c. To plan and conduct minelaying and mine sweeping operations in the open sea.
  - d. To carry out support missions.
- e. To plan and conduct maritime air operations (in conjunction with the Air Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic).

On 24 October 1951 a staff study was forwarded to General Vandenberg with reference to the advisability of relieving Lt General Norstad of his dual role as Commander-in-Chief, USAFE, and Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Force Central Europe and assigning him as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces Central Europe of the NATO. 171 It was concluded that the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, as an International Air Commander with Headquarters located at Fontainbleau, France, should not be burdened with additional duties from Headquarters USAF if he was to satisfactorily perform the duties and responsibilities assigned him in his NATO terms of reference. Additionally, the difficulties of maintaining continuous presence in his NATO headquarters, while at the same time, being charged with maintaining that same physical presence in the Wiesbaden Headquarters, made it doubly apparent that this commander was faced with an impossible situation if he was expected to perform to the satisfaction of all concerned the duties outlined for him in his dual role as CINCUSAFE and CINC Allied Forces, Central Europe. General Vandenberg subsequently approved

171. Staff study regarding the Dual Role of General Norstad as CINCUSAFE and CINCAIRCENT, 11 Oct 51.



the recommendation made in the staff study with the proviso that such action should not occur prior to 1 March 1952.

Pursuant to a request of the Channel Committee, NATO, the Standing Group in October forwarded to the United States an invitation to nominate a U. S. Mayal Observer to attend future meetings of the Channel Committee. This was non-concurred in by the War Plans Division in that the Channel Committee's area of responsibility and command was mainly local and beyond the interests of the United States.

In early November 1951 the Italian government expressed a requirement for one light fleet carrier, four fleet destroyers, 17h
This justification was attempted nd 84 maritime sircraft. on the basis of tasks assigned the Italian Navy in the Revised Medium Term Plan. The War Plans Division concurred in the international planning team's point that this requirement was not valid, in that Italy was responsible for the defense of her own coastal waters and that defense of communications outside that area was a MATO responsibility.

In early November a study was made on measures to be taken on and after warning of an attack. Essentially this comprised guidance to the Deputy U. S. Representative to the Standing Group This pertained to the on his reference to SACEUR's request.

<sup>178.</sup> JSPC 876/395.



<sup>172.</sup> Memo for Gen Lee, Subj: U.S. Military Organisation Required in Europe (U.S. Participation in the Work of the Channel Committee).

<sup>173.</sup> JSPC 876/389. 17h. Enclosure to SG 20/39. 175. SG 20/37. 176. SG 20/42.

<sup>177.</sup> Memo for Gen Lee, Subj: Measures to be Taken on and After Marning of an Attack, 11 Nov 51.

source, extent, and nature of political guidance which the Standing Group and MATO commanders could expect to receive, plus the question of whether the North Atlantic Council or any other NATO activity should be the agency through which NATO governments would indicate their implementation of mobilization plans and make known their authorization for the full employment of military forces in action against aggression. It was considered that certain modifications to the proposed clan of action were necessary. It was further considered that regarding political guidance, the nature and extent of resulting guidance would depend on existing circumstances. Further, that the North Atlantic Council (Council of Deputies) might be the appropriate agency through which NATO governments should indicate their implementation of mobilization plans and make known their authorizations for the full employment of military forces in action against aggression.

In response to a request from the Secretary of Defense in
November to furnish certain force deployment information for the
181
(TCG) Temporary Council Committee a study was made which indicated
that to reveal specific information on world-wide deployments of U.S.
Air Forces would be inimical to national security; therefore, a
general reply relative to the deployment of forces which would
reveal nothing that had not already been revealed in public
182
announcements would be appropriate.

182. JCS 2073/245.



<sup>179. 50 129/2.</sup> 

<sup>180.</sup> Appendix to JCS 2073/241.

<sup>181.</sup> Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: Temporary Council Committee Request for Information on Forces.

# SECURITY INFORMATION

In the middle of November SACEUR requested the Standing Group to furnish:  $^{183}$ 

a. As much data as was possible, unclassified and classified relative to the effects of atomic weapons and assumed mumbers of bombs that could be made available to the Standing Group.

b. Planning figures or assumed figures on monthy availability of additional aircraft by types from 1 January 1954 to 1 January 1955 to be furnished to units assigned to SHAPE after the front-line forces were attained. These figures should include peacetime attrition replacements for the most obsolescent aircraft.

The War Plans Division considered that the information SACEUR requested 184 relative to atomic weapons and monthly input of aircraft to units assigned to SHAPE was a matter which the U. S. JCS should consider before a release of this information could be made to the Standing Group. 185

Another varied subject worked on during the latter part of November was the SHAPE defense information storage program. 186 The Chief of Staff of France, the U. K., and the U. S. were requested by SHAPE to initiate Static-Defense Information Collection Programs (SDICP) within their respective zones of occupation in Austria and Germany. This information would have included basic logistical and operational planning information of a static nature, i.e., such as

Rates for SHAPE, 19 Nov 51.

186. Memo for General Vandenberg, Subj: SHAPE Defense Information Storage Program, 29 Nov 51.



<sup>183.</sup> Memo to DCS/O, Subj: (S) A/C Attrition Rates for SHAPE, 15 Nov 51.
184. DUSN-587-51, 6 Nov 51.

<sup>184.</sup> DUSM-587-51, 6 Nov 51.

185. Memo for U. S. Deputy Rep to the SG, Subj: (S) A/C Attrition

Peter for SHAPE, 19 Nov 51.

key points, beaches, communications systems, factory espacities, etc., of all participating powers of NATO. This information would have been available to SACEUR for use in peacetime planning, or event of war, to facilitate the conduct of effective operational planning. For this reason SACEUR requested that he be given the proper coordinating agency within each country which he could contact whenever information compiled under this project was It was recommended that the Air Staff concur in this needed. matter.

During the latter part of November a study was made on the command responsibilities and relationships in Greenland. a letter to the Chief of Staff, USAF, CINCIE requested guidance to enable his command to proceed with planning responsibilities concerning the defense of Greenland. Specifically, CIRCHE requested guidance as follows:

a. How was it intended that the plans of CINCME and SACLANT be brought into consonance one with the other?

b. Was CINCRE permitted to coordinate military matters locally with the Danish authorities in Greenland in view of the fact that CINCNE commanded bases in Greenland under NATO arrangements?

c. Did CIMCNE have the authority to formulate plans for and coordinate arrangements with Danish authorities for such matters

Creenland, 30 Nov 51. 189. Letter from CINCNE, Hq U.S. Northeast Command, APO 862, c/o PM NYC, 20 Nov, to Chief of Staff, HQ USAF.



<sup>187.</sup> JCS 1783/8.

Memo for General Vendenberg, Subj: Command Relationships in



as the provisions for employment of mobile striking forces and sledge patrols for the defense of the Greenland land mass?

It was recommended by the War Plans Division that the above questions be submitted to the JCS for consideration.

The question was raised in early Movember as to whether sufficient shipping could be made available to meet SHAPE's requirements 190 in event of necessity. The War Plans Division in a study of this 191 question recommended concurrence in the plan that the CNO should seek a pre-allocation of shipping from the inventory of U. S. shipping to meet the U. S. military shipping requirements for the first 90 days of a war. Also, that the JMTC, in collaboration with the JSPC, undertake a study to determine how long it would take to deploy U. S. forces to Europe.

Another NATO problem handled during the latter part of December 1951 was the consideration of the minimum operational standards for 19h airfields in NATO Tactical Air Force. This particular problem centered around SACKUR's final views pertaining to a compromise position among NATO representatives on airfield criteria standards. It was considered that the criteria included in above referenced papers were sub-standard to USAF air base criteria; however, they were believed to be acceptable for cost sharing purposes. It was therefore recommended that in view of the fact that airfield construction was being delayed because of lack of agreement on criteria, that the proposed criteria be approved as a matter of urgency.

<sup>190.</sup> JOS 2073/240.

<sup>191.</sup> JCS 2073/257. 192. Memo for Gen Vendenberg, Subj: SHAPE Shipping Requirement, 11 Dec 51.


<sup>193. 80 20/37.</sup> 

<sup>194.</sup> JCS 2073/205.

<sup>195.</sup> JCS 2073/263.

106. Hemo for Gen Vandenberg, Subj: Minimum Operational Standards for SECREMITIEDS in NATO Tactical Air Force. 29 Dec 51.

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#### PLANNING REQUIREMENTS THAM


The Flanning Requirements Team changed its function during the period of this report. On 1 August all functions pertaining to air defense planning, along with Colonal Cunningham, were transferred to the Black Team. A history of those air defense actions taken by the Flanning Requirements Team during the period 1 July through 1 August can be found in the Black Team bistory for this period. The Flanning Requirements Team was given the new function of admissing the other teams of the War Flans Division on inter-service matters.

On 24 July the following named officers joined the Placking Requirements Team: Colonel Wilbur W. Aring, Colonel Joseph L. Dickman, and 197 Colonel Broadus B. Taylor. Subsequently Colonel Dayharsh was transferred to Europe. Thus, the team consisted of the following officers for the major part of the reporting period:

Colonel Wilbur W. Aring 1265A
Colonel Joseph L. Dickman 1656A
Colonel Broadus B. Taylor 1833A
Lt. Colonel John H. Thorne 8132A

The Planning Requirements Team continued to furnish information to
the Air Staff on economical and military factors to be considered in the
employment of aircraft carriers. In this connection, the Planning Requirements
Team recommended against Air Force approval of the construction of the shore

<sup>197.</sup> More, War Flans Division, dtd 24 Jul 51, subj: Assignment of Officers.



based prototype of an atomic power plant "suitable for use" in an aircraft 198 carrier.

A study was initiated to determine a recommended Air Force position on the redeployment of medium bomb units in the Far East. This study concluded that the plan to return the TDY units to the United States should continue. However, no action should be initiated to actually return these units until the current armistice negotiations are concluded. These recommendations were forwarded on 9 August, and reaffirmed on 31 August.

In response to a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations request, the Planning Requirements Team forwarded to the Air Force Council a 201 recommended Air Force position on tactical air matters. This matter was not completed during the reporting period.

On 22 September the Planning Requirements Team furnished to the Directorate of Communications a recommended position on the Air Porce responsibility for furnishing communications for long range artillery

<sup>202.</sup> R&R, Comment No. 4, subj: "Long Range Artillery Adjustment by High Performance Aircraft," dtd 22 Sep 51.




<sup>198.</sup> JCS Papers of the 2047 Series.

<sup>199.</sup> Summary Sheet to Chief of Staff, dtd 9 Aug., subj: Questions to the AF Council.

<sup>200.</sup> Memo for Lt. Gen. White from the Dir. of Plans, dtd 31 Aug 51, subj: Questions to the AF Council.


<sup>201.</sup> Staff Study, subj: "AF Actions Concerning a Possible Congressional Investigation of Tactical Aviation," wrtn 17 Nov 51.

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#### HLACK TEAM

The Defense Planners' Committee, an ad hoc organization under the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission (JRUSDC), met at Cuernavaes, Mexico, during the period 2-10 September 1951 and prepared a tentative Mexico-United States Emergency Defense Plan. The JRUSDC approved the plan on 15 September 1951 and forwarded it for the approval of the two governments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan in December 1951; the Mexican General Staff has not yet indicated its position. Colonel Willis F. Lowis of the Black Team was Chairman of the U. S. Section of the Defense Planners' Committee and Air Force Advisor to the JMUSDC.

Following enactment of Public Law 165, "The Mutual Security Act of 1951", which provided \$38,150,000 in military grant aid to selected Latin American countries, the Secretary of Defense appointed the Chairman, U. S. Delegation, Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), as his personal representative in the negotiations of bilateral defense agreements. As an adviser to the U. S. Delegation, IADB, Colonel Levis assisted in the selection and briefing of personnel for the negotiating teams and in the preparation of drafts of the proposed bilateral military agreements. The recommendations of the JCS to the Secretary of Defense concerning implementation of the Mutual Security Program in Latin American are substantially as developed by the Black Team. Actual negotiations for and implementation of Mutual Security Program in Latin America will take place in 1952.

203/ JCS 2166/2, "Mexico-U. S. Emergency Defense Plan (Tentative)".
201/ JCS 2099/161, "Bilateral Military Plans to be Regotiated with Recipient Countries in Title IV, Mutual Security Program".
205/ JCS 2099/183, "Title IV Matual Security Programs and Their Implementation".

OEC!



Revisions of the U. S. joint outline emergency and mid-term war plans for Latin America? were accomplished in December 1961 to bring the plans up to date and revise the force tabs in consonance with the current situation and Mutual Security Program arrangements.

A "General Military Plan for the Defence of the American Continent" was prepared by the Staff, IADB, to expand the previously prepared "Common Defence Scheme for the American Continent 2011. Colonel Levis, as an adviser to the U.S. Delegation, IADB, collaborated in the preparation of this plan, which is to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval early in 1982.

During the period of this report, the responsibility for the planning for worldwide air defense systems and their components was transferred from the Planning Requirements Team to the Black Team. The transfer to the Black Team of one officer and pertinent files was accomplished on 1 August 1951.

Radar picket vessels was the subject of a continued exchange of correspondence between the Chief of Staff, USAF, and the Chief of Naval Operations. In view of the extreme shortage of escort vessels (DE) the CHO requested the Chief of Staff consider limiting the functions of radar picket vessels in order to determine whether a less critical type could be used for picket duty. At the direction of the Air Force Council O. and as a result of the Mavy's indication that different type

JCS 1976/63, "Revision of U. S. Joint Outline Emergency War Plan for Defense of Latin America" (JCS 1976/16).

JCS 1976/64, "Revision of Joint Outline War Plan for Latin America for a War Beginning 1 July 1954" (JCS 1976/47).

Memorandum to Director of Plane, DCS/O, "Unresolved Air Defence Problems" dtd 18 July 1961.





ships with possibly different single ship capabilities might fulfill redar picket ship requirements, Air Force requirement for seaward extension of the land-based radar system was restated. Sea areas were delimented within which a ses-based capability for early warning, identification, tracking and limited intercept control is required. As a result, the GMD initiated a survey to determine the availability of vessels capable of fulfilling the stated tacks. Upon completion of the survey, the Chief of Staff, USAF, is to be informed as to types, characteristics, and estimated readiness dates of vessels available for use as redar pickets?

Continued offorts to establish Air Force requirements for Airborne
Harly Warning and Control siroraft resulted in the following:

- a. The inclusion of five AEV squadrons in the 126 wing Program.
- b. The modification of ten G-121's to approximate the PO-2-W configuration.
  - c. Tentative programming of 38 PO-3-W's.
- d. A request to DCS/D and DCS/N to initiate a program for the withdrawal and modification of 30 B-29's as ANN mircraft. 212/

A proposed plan 213 for augmentation of the Alaskan radar system was submitted and approved by the Vice Chief of Staff on 10 November 1951.

- 210 / Letter to CHO, "Radar Picket Vessel Utilization in Air Defense,"
- 212 / Memorandum to DCS/M and DCS/D, \*Procurement of Mirborne Early Warning Aircraft\* dtd 29 December 1951.
- 213 / Susmary Sheet (w/7 Incls) to Chief of Staff, "Additional Rader for Alaska" dtd 10 November 1951.





The plan provides for the strengthening of the permanent system by ten radar stations at an estimated cost of \$40,000,000.

Implementation of the plan for the extension of the continental redar system into Canada which was approved by the President, on 14 April 1951, was delayed considerably by the lack of a legal basis to transfer funds to Canadian agencies charged with certain implementing measures.

On 1 August 1951, an exchange of notes with the Canadian Government was signed. The resulting agreement provided the basic authority for expenditure of USAF funds for construction and for procurement of equipment required for the system. The war Plans Division, Directorate of Plans, the basic responsibility of the War Plans Division, Directorate of Plans, was met. On 10 August, the responsibility for further monitoring of this project was reassigned by the DCS/O to the Director of Operations, DCS/O.

on 17 July 1951, the Air Force Council considered a study which had been prepared to determine Air Force policy guidance concerning unresolved air defense problems. The Council 217 determined in part, that plans for Air Defense of the United States, together with the concept from which they are developed, are an Air Force responsibility and do not require submission to or approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further, that pursuit of data regarding Army and Mavy participation in the air

dtd 18 July 1951.



<sup>231)/</sup> R&R (w/1 Incl) to Director of Budget, DCS/C, "Legal Basis for Expenditure of Funds for Extension of Continental Redar System" dtd

<sup>9</sup> August 1951. Remorandum to Director of Operations, DCS/O, "Monitoring of Rader System Extension in Canada" dtd 10 August 1951.

Study, "Air Force Policy Guidance Concerning Unresolved Air Defense Problems Pertinent to the Continental United States" dtd 14 May 1951.



defense of the United States should be done as inter-Service matters, not submitted through the Joint Chiefs of Steff.

Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM) was the subject of an exchange of correspondence 218 between the Chiefs of Staff Army and Air Force.

Concern was expressed by the Air Force over the possible duplication of effort of the two Services in the programing of equipment for the same purpose and the possible nullification of our air defense system by indiscriminate and uncoordinated jamming. The Army's approach to this matter was semewhat vague and continued to draw the subject from ECM use in Air Defense to the over-all use of ECM. Divergent views as to responsibility in this field are evident with the Chief of Staff, Army, indicating an intent to present the entire ECM subject to the JCS.

Purther exchange of memorandum on this subject was discontinued upon determination by the DCS/O that such exchange would serve no useful purpose at this time.

Colonel Joseph A. Cunningham of this Team served during the period of this report as Directorate of Plans representative on the Joint GAM-USAF Air Defense Planning Board. One of the primary tacks of the Board was accomplished in the finalisation of a Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic During a Military Emergency. The plan has been prepared for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval and forwarding to the Secretary of Defense.

Measures Equipment dtd 27 August 1951.

Measures Equipment dtd 27 August 1951.

Memorandum fr Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, same subject, dtd

20 September 1951.

Memorandum to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, same subject, dtd

5 October 1951.

Memorandum fr Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, same subject dtd

27 October 1951.

Summary Sheet (w/3 Incls) to DCS/0, case subject dtd 17 December 1951.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION



In the Fall of 1951, the Canadians expressed the desire that the U. S. Northeast Command be reorganized into a combined Canada-U. S. command with a Canadian Deputy. 219/ Informal discussions through the PJED on this subject are still in progress. At this time, the Canadians are studying a U. S. proposal which would limit Canadian participation on staff representation primarily for the purpose of deordinating matters pertaining to Canada and the U. S. Bortheast Command as follows: Air defense, base defense, air traffic control, air rescue, combined exercises and surveys, and other related matters.

The JCS directed CINCLANT last summer to establish a unified command in Iceland comprised of U. S. forces deployed there under terms of 5 May 1951 agreement. 220 This organisation was to be established in accordance with the Unified Command Plen. However, the Air Force component (under MATS) was never clearly organised and as a result confusion developed over who should direct operations of Meeks Air Force Base (Keflavik) and who should direct base development planning. Action is now under way which should clearly establish Meeks as an Air Force facility under direct control of Air Force component commander in Iceland.

Construction of SAC base at Thule, "Project Blue Jay", was commenced early last summer and progressed according to schedule through the first construction season (completion date, end of 1952) which ended in October. Due to urgancy of starting construction as soon as possible in 1951, this project was exempt from control of Northeast Air Command. It soon became apparent, however, that the Northeast Air Command should be brought into

<sup>220/</sup> JCS 1950 Series, "Security Porces for Iceland".



<sup>219/</sup> JCS 1259/212, "Canadian Participation in the U.S. Northeast Command".



the development picture. Accordingly, in August, Plans originated a directive which assigned coordination and linison responsibility to Commanding Ceneral, Northeast Air Command for construction of "Hume Jay".

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) mot in the United States from 11 Movember to 21 Movember 1951 to discuss defense problems common to both Governments. In the course of its meetings, the Board made visits to several military installations in the western part of the United States. Colonel Frank G. Jamison, Chief of the Black Team, and also Assistant to the Steering and USAF Nember, U.S. Section of the PJBD, was in attendance at the meetings.

On 29 October 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the "Basic Defense Plan for Continental United States", 221 in which the Air Force was assigned certain primary and collateral defense tasks. Subsequent to the approval of the Plan, implementing letters 222 were forwarded to the Commanding General, Air Defense Command, and the Commanding General, Continental Air Command, who are designated as the planning agents in the Plan.

Civil defense planning as it pertains to deception measures, such as dimout, blackout, camouflage, etc., is mearing completion. A suggested regulation 223 on illumination control was prepared and coordinated with the Air Defense Command and the Departments of the Army and Navy. It will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval and submission

223/ Suggested Regulation, "Lighting Regulations, Minimum Control of Lighting".

JCS 2086/1, "Basic Defense Plan for Continental United States".

222/ Letters to ADC and ConkC, dtd 8 November 1981, "(Top Secret) Basic Defense Plan for Continental United States".




to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for final coordination with
the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). When the suggested
regulation is accepted by the Administrator, FCDA, this will fulfill
the Air Force's responsibility for preparing regulations on deception
measures for enforcement by civil authorities, as assigned in a memorandum
from the Secretary of Defense, dated 26 april 1955.


During this period, Colonel Lloyd H. Dalton, Colonel Joseph A. Gunninghem, Lt. Colonel Woodward B. Carpenter, and Lt. Colonel James W. Bothwell were assigned to the Black Team. Lt. Colonel Joseph H. Husu was transferred from Headquarters, USAF, to the Northeast Air Command, located at Newfoundland, Province of Canada.

JCS 1783/15, "Responsibility for Flamming and Preparation of Certain Civil Defense and Allied Programs within the Department of Defense".

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WHITE TEAM

The basic function of the White Team is to monitor and participate in Air Staff planning for the intermediate range time period. As such, the primary continuing tasks are centered around the Intermediate War Plans, budget, force, and deployment requirements.

During this period, a great portion of this team's effort was spent in assisting other Air Staff agencies in tasks not the primary responsibility of the Team but related to it chronologically.

Participation in the following functions was made by the White Team:

a. An officer (Colonel W. R. Nevitt) was furnished for three months to the USAF Planning Team which visited Headquarters, United States Air Forces, Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. This Team participated in planning activities in Hq USAFE and exchanged information in the various NATO Hq and the USAF sections of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups of the NATO countries. This was an initial team to participate in this method of keeping officers of Hq USAF and USAF personnel in key jobs in Europe informed of each others activities.

b. One officer (Lt Colonel E. McFarland, Jr.) was sent with a Robot Aircraft briefing team to USAFE. This team was primarily concerned with the tactical employment of MaTADOR.

c. Colonel R. H. Orr was on loan to the Office of the Assistant for Special Plans for the whole time covered by this history (see the history of the Assistant for Special Plans for details of the work accomplished). 225

225. See Page 5.



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d. One officer (Colonel A. J. Knight), fulltime, a second (Colonel R. R. Little), part time, were furnished for approximately four months to work on "An Air Concept for War". Details of this concept are found in the history of the Red Team. Army - Air Force and Inter-Service Controversies

Specific controversies between the Army and the Air Force which have been worked on from time to time by the White Team pertaining to (1) "Army Requirements for Close Support Aviation", (2) "Procurement of Army Aircraft", (3) "Organic Army Aircraft Requirements", (4) 227 (5) "Air Force Support in 228 "Support of Army Divisions by Air Wings", Army Execution of Assigned Psychological Warfare Responsibilities", (6) "Request by the Army for Additional USAF Photographic Units", and (7) "Policy and Guidance in Logistic Matters on Port Operations". The White Team prepared a reply to an inquiry by CINCUSAFE concerning Further, this Team contributed to the the Army's organic air arm. clarification of the definition of Air Force responsibilities in conjunction with Army operations, taking the position that the Air Force relied upon a logical interpretation of appropriate guidance documents such as The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Functions Paper, and the Joint Action Armed Forces papers. Army-Air Force controversial subjects were summarized for the Vice Chief of Staff by the

Wings" dated 19 October 1951.

228. RoR to Psychological Warfare Div., subj: "AF Attitude to Army's Request for Air Support in Execution of Its Assigned Psychological Warfare Responsibilities", dated 5 October 1951.

229. Brief for C/S, Subj: "Frocurement of Aerial Mapping Photography", JCS 1866/39, dated 27 July 1951.
230. JCS 1891/18 - /28 etc. in this series.

231. Personal ltr to Gen Norstad frm Gen Vandenberg dtd 7 Sept 51.

A part of the History of the War Plans Division, D/P, DCS/O. Summary Sheet to C/S, subj: "Support of Army Divisions by Air 227.



and eventually the Domestic Branch of Planning Requirements Team, the Policy Division, Directorate of Flans, assumed all previous responsibilities in this field. The Manorandum of Understanding the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force necessitated a re-analysis.

stemmed from the subject of "Air An important policy document Force Procurement of Army Aircraft". It grew out of the Army's request for the USAF to procure L-20 Dellaviland Beavers for Army usage, and it firmly established Air Force policy of frowning upon the Army's usurping prescribed Air Force functions.

Two matters related to inter-Service controversies, upon which the White Team devoted considerable effort, were "Allocation of Transport Type Helicopters" and "Allocation of M-47 Tanks". A joint ad hoc comwas organized to recommend a position on helicopter distribution, but as an outgrowth of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Service Secretaries, the committee was dissolved and the whole Air Force position changed. In effect, the interpretation of the Memorandum of Understanding transferred most of the liaison service functions to the Army and thereby dissipated most of the USAF halicopter requirement save part of Aero-medical Evacuation and the Assault Transport Missions. The distribution of tanks, per se, does not primarily concern the Air Force as it amounted to an argument between the Army and the Marine Corps; however, the USAF seized upon an opportunity to press for the principle of "First things first", and equip forces in accordance with task priorities.



On file in Planning Requirements Team, War Plans Div., D/P, DCS/O.

<sup>233.</sup> Namo of Understanding between the Sec of Army and the Sec of AF, dtd 2 Oct 51.

<sup>23</sup>h. Memo fr Sec Pace frm Under Sec McCone, dtd 1 Aug 51. 235. JSFC 977/1/D.



### Aircraft and Weapons Board

Members of the White Team have been almost continuously involved in the affairs and problems of the Aircraft and Meapons Board. From the actions of this board grew the politically complex, and still very much alive, problem of exchanging types of fighter bomber aircraft between the USAF and the Military Security Program (MSP) (formerly MDAF). After examining this particular problem, the Air Force Council made the decision to have both USAF and MSF procure fighter bombers as scheduled (at the close of calendar year 1951), with the Director of Plans assuming for internal MSP planning purposes only, the substitution of F-86's for F-84's in MSP budgets of FY 1953 and later. The Efrector of Plans also seized upon an opportunity to press for staff action on 237 the A3D aircraft.

### Military Characteristics

White Teem provided the Director of Requirements, DOS/D, with numerous comments on desired military characteristics of USAF aircraft, equipment, and munitions. Constant effort was exerted toward having all 238 such requirements developed in the light of the new Air Concept for war. The general position taken was that individual weapons systems must be continually considered in light of progressive USAF requirements and concepts. In regard to this subject, personnel from the White Team devoted considerable effort to cooperating with the Directorate of Requirements toward the development of consistent General Operation Requirements (G.O.R.s) for aircraft and weapons systems. These requirements are being

<sup>238. &</sup>quot;Air Concept" - a study on file in AFOFB-PL-WH.



<sup>36.</sup> AFC Decision on Substitution of F-86's for F-84F's in MSF.

<sup>237.</sup> RAR to Asst fr Prog, Dir/Requs etc., on subj of incorporation of A3D or similiar type aircraft in the USAF programming.

developed to give aircraft industries some guidance on the types of vehicles which the Air Force will want for future warfare (1957 - 1960), despite the fact that neither the Air Force unilaterally, nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff have an approved long range war plan.

Relative Military Urgencies

This Team has been associated with the difficult and controversial problem of Relative Military Urgencies. The Director of Defense Mobilization has brought pressure to bear upon the Secretary of Defense to fix the demands of the Department of Defense for equipment in order to ascertain the percentages of equipment to be allocated to military needs, as against those left for the satisfaction of civilian require-In seeking a solution to this problem the Secretary of Defense has stated. "An initial step in this direction might be the establishment of the relative priority list of our military missions . . . that the establishment of task The Air Force has taken the position priorities is a strategic responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that the JCS should therefore establish a relative priority list of our military missions. In turn, priorities for equipment would be based thereon. The Navy has taken the viewpoint that the priority of tasks changes, and the Army has insisted upon relating relative and to the view that priorities to the obsolete mid-range war plan a percentage of each service's approved procurement should be placed in each priority category. The Chief of Staff, USAF, agreed

<sup>239.</sup> Enclosure to JCS 1725/124 dated 13 November 1951.

<sup>21:0.</sup> JCS 1725/126.

Ohl. JCS 1725/136. Ohl. See Far in this History on Review and Revision of the Current

<sup>2</sup>h2. See Par in this History on Review and Revision of the Cartante Intermediate JOKP for AF action to have this plan (JCS 2143/6) rewrit.

<sup>2</sup>h3. JOS 1725/131.

accepting a stop-gap method of listing equipment priorities. As a result, an attempt was made to submit the Department of Defense 2hh Master Urgency List to the Director of Defense Mobilisation through the Munitions Board and the Secretary of Defense, but at the turn of the year, this list had not been agreed upon.

### Review of the Policies and Programs Contained in MSC 68/4

On 12 July 1951 the Fresident directed that two reports be prepared by the National Security Council for his consideration. The first, to be ready by 1 August 1951, was to review the status of the programs in NSC 68/4, including an analysis of any difficulties which may be impeding or preventing their successful execution. The second, to be ready on 1 October 1951, was to make ready any revision or modifications of the policies and programs in NSC 68/4 by the National Security Council and subordinate national agencies. These actions resulted in the NSC 114 series of papers - Status and Timing of Current US Programs for National Security. This series of papers concluded thats

- a. The danger to the national security of the United States position by the USSR is greater now than was anticipated during the 246 development of the MSC 68/4 program.
- b. The current U.S. program for national security generally will not be met by the established target dates at the present pace and 2h6 scale of effort.
- c. It is vital to our national security that the objectives 246 in MSC 68/4 programs be achieved at the earliest practicable date.

  The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already reaffirmed the validity of the

<sup>211.</sup> Enclosure to JOS 1725/133.

<sup>215.</sup> NSC Action 487.

<sup>216.</sup> JCS 2101/42.

target dates of 1 July 1952 for U.S. forces and 1 July 1954 for Military Support Program forces in their report to the Secretary of 2h7
Defense dated 24 July 1951.

- d. The problem of achieving readiness as soon as possible requires a selective program by a program approach.
- e. As a basis for preparation of budget estimates, departments and agencies should be directed to accelerate their presently approved programs, particularly in the production field in order to advance currently projected composition dates, as far as feasible towards the target dates established in NSC 68/4.

The problems in sub-paragraphs <u>d</u> and <u>e</u> above were highly controversial between the Services. Faragraph <u>d</u> reaffirmed the Air Force position regarding the requirement for the establishment of priorities of tasks and programs. Whereas paragraph <u>e</u> had several remifications, the principle one was that acceleration of production programs without assurance of additional monies and supplemental budget would expend all of the funds prior to the availability of the next Fiscal year's budget. This would entail a sharp cut-back in production facilities rather than a phased production change.

The primary Air Force objections to the NSC 114 papers is that they do not point up the requirement for the establishment of priorities of tasks.

Review and Revision of the Current Intermediate Joint Outline War Flan

A paper was prepared for the Chief of Staff and for circulation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating the Air Force opinion that the

247. JOS 2101/41. 248. JOS 2143/18.



no longer furnishes current Intermediate Joint Outline War Plan adequate strategic guidance, and recommended a review to determine whether a revision of the current plan or the development of a new plan or plans was necessary. The above paper initiated a series of papers in the various joint committees and the basic service positions indicated are as follows:

- a. The Army's main concern appeared to be that the program to attain forces currently approved must not be "tampered" with. The current plan is basically the ground concept for war; the army forces are adequate and they are not anxious for any change at this time.
- b. The Navy's basic position is that the date for the Intermediate Joint Outline war Flan should be changed immediately to 1 July 1955, and that the current plan be revised but that a "new" plan is not necessary. The Navy forces approved for the current plan are more than adequate and are to a large extent left in a "free wheeling" status, i.e. not committed to particular tasks, and the Navy is also not interested in major changes.
- c. The Air Force position was that the plan did not specify any priorities of tasks and that because of critical shortages in manpower, material, and production space, priorities were required for the production of first things first. In addition, although it was not mentioned in joint papers the Air Force feels that the basic concept and strategy contained in the current plan should be revised to reflect a more realistic position, and place more emphasis on an air concept.

<sup>250.</sup> See Par in White Team History on Mobilization Planning for details of plans based on this guidance.



<sup>249.</sup> JCS 2143/6.

The Army and Navy maintained that a revision of force tabs to indicate those currently authorized for this time period and a revision which would bring the strategic estimate up to date was all that was necessary. The Air Force position was that it was not possible to ascertain how much revision would be necessary until a new jointly approved strategic estimate was available.

The basic differences in the Services' position were the degree of revision or change desired in the current plan. The Army and Navy are happy with the concept and strategy, whereas the Air Force desires to introduce priorities of tasks and major changes in the strategy and concept.

The JCS deferred decision on the revision of the current Intermediate 252

Joint Outline war Flan and directed that they be informed in a single report of the basic Service disagreements which cause recurring split views between the Services. The Joint Chiefs indicated that they would resolve these basic differences and that the submission of the paper should not be delayed in an attempt to resolve these differences at a lower level.

### Mobilization Planning

The White Team's responsibility in the Mobilization Planning field consisted of the preparation of joint operational plans for areas for which the USAF is executive agent, and the preparation of the unilateral plans for all areas that are included in the Air Force Mobilization Plan (AFMOP-52). It was intended that these plans be the jointly approved operational plans on which each Service would then base the detailed computation of requirements. Mowever, as yet, they have not been

<sup>251.</sup> JCS 2143/20.

<sup>252.</sup> JSPC 887/9/D. 253. JCS 1725/114 and JCS 1725/47.

approved, and each Service has computed mobilization requirements based on War Flanning Factors and the approved Force Tabs.

All of these plans had been started during the latter part of 25h the previous fiscal year. All of the unilateral plans are finished.

Although the joint plans are based on jointly approved strategic guidance, difficulty has been encountered in obtaining joint working level agreement on any but insignificant points. It should be noted that action has been started by the Air Force to have this guidance rewritten.

The main point of disagreement with the plans prepared by the U. S. Air Force is the emphasis given to the Strategic Air Command and its operations.

There are two primary and major USAF working level objections to the plans prepared by the Navy. First, although the bulk of the Naval forces in the force tabs show their assignment to the Atlantic and to the Facific areas, the majority of their tasks are performed in adjacent areas. The forces and tasks and command are not tied together. Second, the plan covering the operations in the Middle East area envisages a major offensive employing a series of amphibicus operations to retake Turkey, the Dardanelles and by D/36 months the linking up with the European forces through operations in the Black Sea.

The USAF working level objections to this plan are basically:

a. The offensive is of greater magnitude than that supposi-255 tioned by the basic guidance.

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<sup>25</sup>h. See AFMOP-52, Vol II. 255. JCB 1725/47, with the Outline War Plan extracted from JCS 2143/6. 256. See Par on Review and Revision of the Current Intermediate JOMP in this History.



b. The large number of sizeable amphibious landings in face of probable atomic attacks. These landings, if successful, would not materially assist in the ultimate Allied victory, and if caught by an atomic bomb, could be horrible disasters.

The working level Air Force has no major objections to the campaign plan for Europe prepared by the Army, except wherein it ties to the juncture with the Middle East forces and uses an arbitrary number of amphibious landings.


Plans for other areas have lesser points of disagreement.

It is not expected that the working level of the three Services can further reconcile any differences, and the plans will scon be submitted to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for action.

#### Air Base Requirements

The white Team participated in an Air Staff project designed to develop a more efficient air base complex to fit the requirements of the USAF 126 Combat Wing Program. The primary contribution to the project was strategic guidance on the desired deployment of our available force. Additional special projects included studies and comments on requirements for a South Atlantic Airline Route, requirements for airfields in the Hawaiian Islands, and the development of base facilities at Limestone and Dhahran. The Air Force Council considered the proposal that base structure for permanent Air Force be changed from 48 Wings to 70 Wings. Council agreed that the 48 Wing criteria should be discarded but decided that new additions to the permanent base structure should

<sup>258.</sup> Air Force Council meeting on 28 August 1951.



<sup>257.</sup> Nemo fr Asst for Prog, subj: "Planned Deployment of USAF Through FY 1954", dated 27 October 1951.



be decided on an individual basis as a firm and continuing need for a base is established, i.e. the limiting factor of 48 or of 70 wings was deleted.

### Korean Hostilities

Recommendations were made to the Chief of Staff on the setting of an assumed date for cessation of hostilities in Korea. Initially, an indefinite date was recommended but the Chief settled for a 30 June 1952 259 date. Later, recommendation was made to the Air Force Council that a system of short term extensions of the assumed date is unrealistic and that therefore the assumed date should be set up to 30 June 1953 with a quarterly review of the situation.

### Strategic Guidance and Force Determination for FY 1953 Budget

Subject to a request by the Program and Budget Advisors for joint strategic guidance for the development of Service programs upon which the FY 1953 budget would be based, the White Team carried the ball in the Directorate of Plans. Forces were repeatedly developed to go along 261 with the philosophy and guidance of appropriate JCS papers. The Air Force position was quickly determined to be entirely different from that of the other two Services, and to oppose a "three way split of budget monies", and any augmentation of FY 1952 without regard to force increases to be attained in FY 1953 and 1954. The Air Force position of minimum forces required for national security was fixed to be 138 wings, but subsequently agreed force levels were watered down by the

<sup>259.</sup> JCS 1800/172. 260. Hemo fr AF Council, subj: "Assumption on End of Korean Hostilities",

dtd 16 October 1951. 261. JCS 1800/146 and /147. 262. JCS 1800/154 and /155.

<sup>263.</sup> JCS 1800/154 and /164.

Correlatively, it was necessary to wage Joint Chiefs of Staff. a small battle for proper designation of USAF forces. ments for additional support units for the 126 Wing Program were developed in coordination with the Directorate of Operations; these additional units applied to the Special Weapons Program. After the forces were agreed upon, a major responsibility of the white Team was that of representing War Plans Division in budgetary matters. Colonel Riordan of the White Team attended Budget Advisory Committee hearings and coordinated actions in which War Plans Division was involved. On 9 November a general review of the USAF FY 1953 program was presented to the Bureau of the Budget and the Office, Secretary of Defense. Colonel Riordan presented deployment of forces; explanation of war planning studies used in the budgetary computations and the air lift, separate squadrons, and major (Stymie Plans); supporting units included in the program.

### Deployment

The primary accomplishment in this area was the development of planned USAF deployment of the forces available under the USAF 126 Combat Wing Program. Both peace and war deployment were indicated for 268 Revisions of this basic end positions in FY 1952, 1953, and 1954, deployment were made throughout the balance of the period to meet the constantly changing force compositions due to fluctuations in the FY

JCS 1800/171 and JCS 2101/52.

JCS 1800/174, /175 and /179.
RAR frm AFOOP, subj: "(5) Support Requirement for the USAF Atomic Energy Program End FY 1954" dtd 26 Oct 51.

On file in AFOPD.

Memo fr Asst for Prog, subj: "Planned Deployment of USAF Through FY 1954" dtd 26 Oct 51.



1953 Budget positions. Considerable deployment guidance over a wide range of individual problems was given to the Air Staff and major commands for planning purposes. Of particular importance was a deployment study for the purpose of determining readiness and mobilization reserve material requirements. Phased deployments through D/12 months of aircraft by type, model and series were furnished.

### Tactical Atomic Capability

A newly developed tactical atomic capability gave rise to a revolutionary concept in the employment of tactical air forces. As a result, a special air task force, FANDANGO (Secret-RD) was created in order to exploit this expanded power which arises from the capability of fighter bombers and other small airplanes to carry atomic bombs. It is worthy of note that this project is only the forerunner of the complete implementation of the Chief of Staff's philosophy that all light bomber and fighter bomber wings shall have an atomic capability. (Secret-RD) is presently composed of one fighter bomber wing and 2/3 light bomber wing (B-45), to be based in England and to be operationally ready by 1 April 1952. Its first priority target system, to be attacked on D-Day, is composed of 44 airfields and 10 troop concentrations.

The White Team has been involved in Project FANDARGO (Secret-RD) since its inception and, although the Director of Operations has been subsequently directed to monitor this project, the War Plans Division has participated regularly in all its aspects. Both the




<sup>269.</sup> R&R to Asst for Prog, subj: "Readiness and Mobilization Reserve Nateriel Requirements", dated 10 August 1951. JCS 1800/164, and restated in JCS 1800/171. Orally by Lt Gen White, DCS/O, to Maj Gen Ramey, D/O.

Tactical Air Command and the Strategic Air Command have been read in on the project to the extent that the Tactical Air Command specifically designated those units which would comprise the Special Air Task Force. At the turn of the year, a member of the White Team (Colo el Knight) was still participating in ironing out the many problems involved, such as the proposed expanded version of FANDANGO (Secret-RD), and the problem of command relationships, the problem of airlift of certain elements of the force, etc.

Related to the development of FANDANGO (Secret-RD) and the exploitation of this new found atomic capability, the White Team, in collaboration with AFOAT and the Special Weapons Team, participated in the development of an Air Force position on required atomic weapons. This position appears to be the basis for an involved inter-Service argument on the subject of atomic weapons and guided missiles. Based upon information obtained from CINGUSAFE and AFOAT, the White Team prepared a Tactical Atomic Target Study and began studying the atomic delivery capability of the USAF.

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#### RED TEAM

During the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951 the workload of the Red Team increased constantly in amount and importance. This can be attributed primarily to events in Korea where, during this period, there was a steady increase in Communist land and air forces, and a display of more aggressiveness on the part of those forces. The following narration highlights some of the major actions participated in by the Red Team during the past six months.

During this time the Red Team presented the Strategic Air Command's Emergency War Plan 1-51 (SAC EWP 1-51)2 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who approved it on 22 October 1951. Up to this point, the approved SAC war plan had been SAC EWP 1-49, which of course did not reflect current SAC capabilities. Although the concept of operations envisaged in SAC EWP 1-51 remained essentially the same as that in SAC EWP 1-49, the new SAC plan which conducts the strategic air offensive with equipment and facilities either presently available or to be available in the immediate futured is primarily a revision to conform with changed forces and capabilities. A member of the Red Team steered the activities of a group of Air Staff and SAC planners in the preparation of SAC EWP 1-51. The plan itself is good evidence of the mutual benefits to be derived whem planners of this Headquarters collaborate with planners of major air commands in the preparation of emergency war plans.

SAC EMP 1-51; on file in AFOFD Records Branch JCS 2057/28; on file on AFOFD Records Branch

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Another good example of results obtainable through this sort of collaboration is CINCUSAFE's Emergency War Plan which is now being reviewed by this Headquarters. Hq USAF planners were placed on IDY with Hq USAFE to assist in the preparation of this plan. The Air Staff planners were so well received by CINCUSAFE that at his request, it is now an established policy to send Air Force planners to Europe periodically. This practice not only benefits the major air commands; it also gives the planners of this Headquarters an intimate acquaintance with the problems peculiar to the individual commands. In addition to expediting the preparation of emergency war plans, this collaboration in war planning will normally save this Headquarters a tremendous amount of work in the review of the plans when they are formally submitted. Furthermore, it is felt that personnel from this Headquarters, because of their daily work on and association with Joint Chiefs of Staff matters, are in a better position to know how plans should be prepared to make them susceptible to approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the period covered by this report, the Services took necessary joint action to revise the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan (JOEWP) (MAST-HEAD - TOP SECRET) to indicate forces available for a D-Day of 1 July 1951? The Red Team monitored Air Force action incident to the above revision and the preparation and distribution of the necessary implementing directives.

274 JCS 1844/89; on file in AFOFD Records Branch 279 JCS 2056/7; on file in AFOFD Records Branch



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
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Concurrent with the above revision of the JOEMP, the Red Team supervised a similar revision of the Air Force Emergency War Plan 1-51 (AFEMP 1-51). The revised AFEMP 1-51 was distributed to Air Force commands at the same time that it was submitted for the approval of the Chief of Staff, USAF, in order that action could be initiated on necessary supporting plans. The revised plan was approved by the Chief of Staff, USAF, on 5 November 1951 and major commands were then directed to complete and forward the supporting plans by 1 January 1952.

In connection with their responsibility for maintaining continuous review of joint war plans, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee initiated in January 1951 the formulation of a new strategic estimate (FIREWATER - TOP SECRET) based on Allied capabilities greater than those in MASTHEAD (TOP SECRET) but less than those contained in the JOEWP for a war beginning 1 July 1954. Service comments on the new strategic estimate developed several major splits which were forwarded to the JOS (1844/116) for resolution. The JCS resolved these splits and the JSPG is contiming with the preparation of a plan for a war beginning 1 January 1952 based on above strategic estimate. Realizing that the new plan would not be ready for JCS approval by 1 January 52, the Air Force recommended that the force tabs in MASTHEAD (TOP SECRET) be brought up to 1 January 52 and that it remain in effect until the new plan is approved. This recommendation was not approved.

Concurrent with the joint development of a new plan the Air Staff initiated development of a new AFENP. The scope of the new plan is to

276/ AFEWP 1-51; on file in Red Team, AFOFD



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
be broadened to provide more detailed planning guidance, especially in logistical planning areas. While responsible for the overall development of the entire plan, the Red Team actually prepares only Part I of Volume I while the Mobilization Plans Branch, Mobilization Division, Director of Plans, prepares or coordinates the preparation of Part II Volume I and Volumes II and III.

After it was determined that the force tabs in MASTHEAD (TOP SECRET) would not be brought up to 1 January 1952 and that the new joint plan would not be completed until March-April 1952, it was decided that AFEMP 1-52 would be based on the MASTHEAD (TOP SECRET) concept but will reflect force capabilities as of 1 January 1952. It was anticipated that AFEMP 1-52 would be completed in February 1952.

The problem associated with atomic operations in support of the retardation mission has reared again during this period out of all proportion to its real importance, largely because of the inter and intrascribe problems stemming therefrom. Although logical deduction does not admit to too much interpretation in connection with retardation, the absence of a jointly agreed definition of the term "retardation" has been used to becloud the basic issues, particularly in inter-Service considerations. A large proportion of the Red Team effort during this period has been devoted to problems stemming directly or indirectly from this one problem. In an exhaustive study entitled: "The Atomic Aspects of Retardation and Associated Problems."

277/ Staff Study: "The Atomic Aspects of Retardation and Associated Problems"; on file in AFOPD-PL-RD





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problem in great detail in an attempt to determine basic Air Force policy and position in problems associated with the atomic aspects of the retardation mission. In addition, this team has done a great amount of work on JCS papers pertaining to the same subject. At the end of the period there was a possibility that the Air Force and Navy would engage in bilateral discussions in an attempt to resolve the areas of differences prior to further consideration of the problem by the JCS.

One of the component action papers of the aforementioned study was prepared for submission by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending forward storage of nuclear components at certain locations. This paper is important primarily because it represents the culmination of a gradual change in Air Force thinking from the days when forward storage of the nuclear component, because of its criticality and scarcity, was never seriously considered. The Red Team paper emphasizes the extent to which operational readiness will be enhanced by secure forward storage. Accordingly, it requests that the Secretary of Defense procure Presidential approval for the forward storage of certain quantities of nuclear components in certain specific areas. As of 31 December 1951, the Red Team was holding this paper in abeyance at the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, pending a presentation by the CG, SAC to the JCS on SAC operations. This presentation was scheduled to take place early in January 1952.

278/ JCS 2056/16/20/21/22/23; JCS 2173/6 and JCS 1854/13/14/15 and /16; on file in AFOFD Records Branch
279/ JOS 2056/23; on file in AFOFD Records Branch

"Forward Storage of Nuclear Components"; on file in AFOFD-PL-RD




Meanwhile the Air Force was coping with the command problems posed by the fact that the JCS had already allocated a finite number of atom bombs to the task of retarding Soviet advances as a part of the Strategic Air Offensive. The CG, SAC, and appropriate commanders were directed to establish procedures for accomplishment of this mission. The Deputy Commander, Strategic Air Command, evolved operational procedures and policies which were mutually acceptable to CINCFE and CG, SAC.

In order to evaluate the procedures thus set up in the Far East, the Red Team monitored Project HUDSON HARBOR ( SECRET). This exercise consisted of a number of very carefully assessed simulated atomic drops on tactical targets in Korea. Reports on the exercise were evaluated by the Red Team. In the main, the results obtained by HUDSON HARBOR ( SECRET) were considered very satisfactory.

Recognizing the more complex command structure in Europe, General
LeMey and General Norstad on S July 1951 discussed the establishment of
operational procedures and policies for that area similar to those established in the Far East. As a result of their discussions, the Red Team
momitored a series of staff actions which eventually resulted in a working
arrangement for Europe substantially as follows: SACEUR would be responsible for determining the military significance of retardation targets;
OG, SAG would be responsible for assessing the operational feasibility
and advising on the technical aspects of the weapons, and for all preparations necessary to execute approved strikes; finally, SACEUR would be

281/ JCS 2056/7; on file in AFOFD Records Branch



responsible for target approval and the weapon expenditure. CINCAAFCE (Gen Norstad), acting as a staff officer for SACEUR, would be responsible for handling these arrangements for SACEUR.

In December 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved broad statements of U.S. requirements in NATO countries and selected territories of the NATO nations— which were forwarded to the NATO Standing and Regional Planning Groups so that, upon invitation, negotiations for base rights could be initiated bilaterally between the U.S. and countries concerned. A request was received from the Southern European/Western Mediterranean (EMMO) Planning Groups for the U.S. to consult with the governments of France, the United Kingdom and Italy on the military operating requirements needed by the U.S. in implementation of NATO plans in the EMMO region. Accordingly, the State Department obtained clearance for an on-site survey to be made in French North Africa, Mibya, Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Crete and Italy (including Sardinia and Sicily).

To accomplish the on-site survey, a Joint Survey Team headed by a Mavy officer was formed. It consisted of approximately 45 specialists and planners from the three Services, and departed the U.S. on 7 September 1951. The Air Force section of this team was composed of personnel from this Headquarters, SAC, MATS and CINCUSAFE, and was headed by an officer from the Red Team. Overall responsibility for control and direction of Air Force participation in the survey was delegated by this Headquarters

284 JOS 570/142; on file in AFOFD Records Branch



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to CINCUSAFE. The total U.S. requirements in each country were put in a "single package" in sufficient dotail to enable the survey team to determine the capabilities of selected sites to support proposed installations. The Air Force requirements were developed by consolidation of SAC, CINCUSAFE and NATS requirements, including the necessary supporting elements, and were in general those requirements foreseen for an Air Force composed of 138 wings. It was recognized at the time that the Air Force requirements might well be modified by such factors as the approval of the 126 wing Air Force and the possibility that some air bases might be located in Spain.

In a memorandum forwarded by the Red Team on 24 November 1951
the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, was informed that the Joint
Survey in the North Africa-Mediterranean area had been completed as far
as possible at that time, and that the Secretary of Defense had authorized recall of the team on 14 November 1951 on advice from the Department
of State and that French clearance to survey in Tunisia did not appear
to be immediately forthcoming. The surveys in French Norocco and Algeria
were incomplete because of restrictions imposed by the French Government
on activities of the team. These restrictions stemmed from the French
not recognizing the stated U.S. requirements in North Africa as being in
implementation of NATO plans except as a point for further discussion.
Subject memorandum contained some general comments by the Air Force

Memo from AFOPD to DCS/O, dtd 24 Nov 51; on file in AFOPD Records Branch

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representatives on the Joint Survey Team concerning the activities of the team:

- a. The Department of State clearance for right to survey was not sufficiently informative to enable foreign governments to know what the team proposed to do.
- b. The team was too large and attempted to cover too much territory.
- c. A large amount of Intelligence data on airfields in the Mediterranean area was obtained and would be of assistance to USAFE in
  emergency war planning. It was anticipated that the requirements
  generated by the report of the Survey Team would be finalized
  for presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by January 1952,
  prior to initiation of any negotiation.

Possibly because of British failure to disseminate information relative to the activity of the U.S. Mado Survey Team through their own proper channels, the British Chiefs of Staff, through their representatives in the British Joint Services Mission here in Washington, indicated concern on several occasions immediately following the return of the Survey Team, over what they felt to be a lack of coordination of U.S.-U.K. requirements in the Mediterranean. In reply to one of their first expressions of this concern, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the British that U.S. military requirements in that area, to be determined as a result of the Device survey, would not be known prior to January 1952, and, at that time, U.S.-U.K. requirements would be coordinated. Notwithstanding this assurance from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British wrote several subsequent letters citing what they felt to be specific instances of U.S.

281 SM-2530-51; on file in AFOPD Records Branch and AFOPD-PL-RD

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failure to coordinate requirements in the Mediterranean and requesting a reaffirmation of the assurance offered in the above cited reference.

The majority of the correspondence from the British concerned requirements in Libya. On 31 December 1951, correspondence on this subject 285\_/
was still being exchanged with the British.\_\_

A broad air concept for war, which was consistent with a concept developed by the Air University, was developed by members of the Red and White Teams. This concept was approved in principle by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, and was presented at the Commanders Conference at Colorado Springs in October 1951.

Subsequent to this presentation, DOS/O directed that a staff study be developed to expand this air concept in order to examine the strategy and tactics of warfare with a view toward insuring that technological advances, potential weapon availability and available resources are further exploited in optimising our war-making capabilities. The required staff study was prepared by a member of the Red Team and of the White Team, assisted by a special task group made up of representatives from appropriate Air Staff agencies.

The study which was practically all-encompassing, exemined national objectives and commitments, economic and man power resources, U.S., Allied, and Soviet capabilities and vulnerabilities, and current strategic concepts. The resulting concept for war included priorities of tasks, phasing, roles and missions of Services and a doctrine for employment of air power.

Implications in specific areas of consideration were examined for the

289 JCS 838/33/35, JCS 570/218,/219,/222, on File in AFOFD Records Branch

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purpose of ascertaining the validity of the concept.

Basically the strategic concept is to conduct, simultaneously, individual theater campaigns for the protection of vital strategic areas and an air offensive campaign which, by exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities in depth, will accomplish the neutralization of the Soviet war-making and war-sustaining capabilities. The conclusion is that air power, previously constituted and employed to take advantage of its inherent flexibility, holds the key to our national survival.

This study, which was designed to fulfill a basic need in the Air Force, should provide an important basis for broad guidance and for further development in sufficient detail that it can be used as a basis for:

- a. Air Force actions with regard to detailed joint and internal planning.
- b. Air Force internal guidance in the form of a concrete framework for the generation and orientation of pertinent programs.

Accordingly, at the year's end, this study was in the process of being reorganized for presentation to the Secretary of the Air Force, Chief of Staff and a board of senior Air Force officers.

The growing Communist air strength in Korea caused considerable apprehension in all UN countries during the closing months of 1951. Discuseion on the subject of augmentation of the Far ast Command was in progress within the Armed Services Policy Council when CINCFR requested the JCS to reconsider augmentation of his air strength. The Red Team



handled the consideration of a proposal to augment FEAF's F-86 strength. The Air Staff position was one of unequivocal opposition to deployment of additional F-86's in view of the ultimate effect this action would have on other requirements for, and commitments of, our meager interceptor strength. The JCS concurred in general with the Air Force position, but informed CINCFE that partial air augmentation was still being considered.

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
It was at this point that the Secretary of the Air Force placed the problem in a new light by submitting to the Secretary of Defense an "Air Force position" that recommended augmentation of FEAF but principally specifying F-94's. The Secretary of Defense forwarded this memorandum to the JCS for consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while generally in agreement with the Air Force position, were of the opinion that any "augmentation" proposal to the Secretary of Defense should be accompanied by a statement bringing into focus all the ramifications of such an action. At the end of December, the problem was still under consideration by the 286/JCS.

286/ Correspondence pertaining to this subject on file in AFOPD Records Branch




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POLICY DIVISION

There were no changes in the organization or functions of the Policy Division, Directorate of Plans, during the period 1 July 1951 through 31 December 1951.

Changes in key personnel included the appointment of Colonel William J. Bell as Assistant Chief of the Division on 23 July 1951. At the same time, Colonel Samuel B. Knowles was named Chief of International Branch and Colonel William B. Keese succeeded him as Chief of the Domestic Branch.


The history of the Policy Division for the period 1 July 1951 through 31 December 1951 is set forth below in five sections - one section for each Branch of the Division.

## THE AIR ADVISOR TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF.

The organizational and functional structures of the National Security Council and its subsidiary staffs have undergone several revisions and augmentations during the period of this history. In accordance with a Presidential Directive, the Psychological Strategy Board was established and has now been organized to effect the formulation, promulgation, coordination, and evaluation of the overall national psychological objectives, policies, progress, and efforts. While this Board is directly

1. JCS 1735/66 dated 10 April 1951, pp 528-530.







responsible to the NSC for its activities and its evaluation of all national psychological operations, it only offers appropriate guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for these operations. It is composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, a representative for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and appropriate representatives from such other departments or agencies of the government as may be determined from time to time. This Board likewise has a representative<sup>2</sup> on the Semior NSC Staff.

The Natural Security Agency was established in order to prepare and present to the Congress such programs of foreign military, economic, and technical assistance as may be required in the interest of the security of the United States and also to coordinate and supervise the operation of these foreign assistance programs. The Director of the MSA has Cabinet status and is a statutory member of the National Security Council with a suitable representative appointed to the Senior NSC Staff.

The scope of the National Security Council responsibility for atomic energy matters has been increased<sup>6</sup>. When in the direct interest of the common defense and security of the United States and upon obtaining

<sup>6.</sup> P. L. 235, 82d Congress, 1st Session, dated 30 Oct 51.



<sup>2.</sup> Mr. George Morgan

<sup>3.</sup> P.L. 165, 82d Congress, 1st Session, Chapter 479, HR 5113 dated 10 Oct 51

<sup>4.</sup> Mr. Averill Harriman.

<sup>5.</sup> Brigadier General Frank N. Roberts.



written approval from the NSC and the President, the Atomic Energy Commission has been authorized to communicate certain restricted data to friendly foreign governments. The security sensitivity of the restricted data involved and the adequacy of the security safeguards undertaken and to be maintained by the recipient nation must be specifically considered by the ABC and the NSC:

Upon the recommendation of the Chief of Staff, USAF, 7 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that their representative on the Senior NSC Staff should seek guidance as appropriate from senior Service representatives and from principal JCS advisors while National Security Council papers are in the formative stages. It was realized that these individuals and committees could reserve their positions as advisors while extending their best thoughts of the time to the JCS representative on the Senior NSC Staff.

The USAF has initiated appropriate action (1) to establish a system of rotation among the services for providing the JCS representation on the Senior NSC Staff, (2) to have this representative appointed with the rank equivalent to a major general or higher, (3) to establish his tour of duty as two years and (4) to have a USAF officer appointed as the next JCS representative. The adoption of the above recommendations would call for the appointment of a new JCS representative in July 1952.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

<sup>7.</sup> JCS Memo for the Record, subject "Guidance for JCS Representative on Senior NSC Staff" dated 12 October 1951, signed W. G. Lalor.

Hemo for General Vandenberg, subject "Rotation Among the Services of Responsibility for Providing Joint Chiefs of Steff Representation on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council", dated 8 January 52.



The President has designated the following individuals to represent

their respective departments on the Senior NSC Staff:

State:

Alternate:

Defense: Alternate:

Treasury:

JCS:

CIA:

MILAS

Psychological Strateby Bd:

Defense Mobilization:

Mr. Charles E. Bohlen Mr. Walter N. Walmsley

Mr. Frank Nash Mr. Charles P. Noyes

Mr. Edward T. Dickinson

Mr. C. D. Glendinning

Rear Admiral M. T. Wooldridge

Mr. Allen W. Dulles

Brigadier General Frank Roberts

Mr. George Morgan

Mr. J. Murray Mitchell

The following individuals have been appointed to represent their

respective departments and comprise the NSC Staff Assistants:

Coordinator:

State: Assistant:

Treasury:

Army:

Mavy:

Air Force:

Defense:

Mr. Marion C. Boggs

Mr. Walter M. Walmsley

Mr. Marry Schwarts

Mr. John Weaver

Mr. Arthur F. Blaser, Jr.

Colonel William J. Verbeck

Colonel Mugh Cort

Captain Charles Weakley

Colonel Paul E. Todd

Captain John Webster

Hr. Hiram Stout

Mr. Louis Claser Defense Mobiliza



The Air Advisor to the National Security Council Staff participated in the preparation and coordination of the following policy papers during the period under review: Additional information other than reference to the specific documents and their respective subjects is not included in accordance with the directive from the President stating that the distribution of NSC papers be strictly limited.

Progress Report on MSC 15/3 (Secret), "U.S. Civil Aviation Policy toward the USSR and its Satellites."

Progress Report on and memoranda relating to NSC 17/4 and NSC 17/6 (Top Secret), "Internal Security."

Memoranda relating to MSC 20/4 (Top Secret), "U. S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U. S. Security."

Progress Report on NSC 26/2 (Top Secret), subject not releasable.

Progress Report on NSC 29 (Top Secret), "Security of Strategically
Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries."

Progress Report on MSC 38/4 and MSC 38/6 (Top Secret), "Future Courses of Action with Respect to Austria."

Progress Report on NSC 42/1 (Top Secret), "U. S. Objectives with

Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to U. S. Security."

Progress Report on and memoranda relating to NSC 48/5 (Top Secret),

\*\*U. S. Objectives, Policies, and Courses of Action in Asia."

9. HSC Action 408 dated 4 January 1951.





Progress Report on NSC 56/2 (Top Secret), "U. S. Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration."

Progress Report on and memorandum relating to NSC 59/1 (Top Secret),
"The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Harfare Planning."
Revised drafts of and memoranda relating to NSC 68/4 (Top Secret),
"U. S. Objectives and Programs for National Security."

Memorandum relating to NSC 69/1 (Top Secret), "Export Controls and Security Policy."

Progress Report on NSC 72/6 (Top Secret), "U. S. Policy Toward Spain."

NSC 78/2 and memorandum relating to MSC 78/2 (Top Secret), "Port Security."

Memorandum relating to MSC 81/2 (Top Secret), "U. S. Courses of Action with Respect to Morea."

Progress Report on RSC 84/2 (Top Secret), "The Position of the U.S. with Respect to the Philippines."

Progress Report on NSC 85 (Secret), "Program of UN Action to Stop Aggression."

Progress Report on NSC 86/1 (Top Secret), "U. S. Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors."

Memorandum relating to MSC 96/1 (Secret), "Provision for State Guard Forces."

NSC 97/2 and memorandum relating to NSC 97/2 (Top Secret), "A National Petroleum Program."





Progress Report on MSC 98/1 (Top Secret), "The Position of the United States with Respect to South Asia."

Progress Report on RSC 103/1 (Top Secret), "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece."

Progress Reports on and memoranda relating to NSC 104/2 (Top Secret), "U. S. Policies and Programs in the Economic Field which may affect the War Potential of the Soviet Bloc."

MSC 106/2 and memoranda relating to NSC 106/1 and NSC 106/2 (Top Secret), "The Possibilities of Reducing the U. S. Civilian Population in Sensitive Areas Abroad."

Progress Report on NSC 107/2 (Top Secret), "The Position of the United States with Respect to Iran."


Revised drafts of and memorandum relating to MSC 108 (Top Secret), "Utilization of Manpower of other Mations for Military Purposes."

Hemoranda relating to MSC 110 (Restricted), "Proposed Transfer of the Point IV Program from the Department of State to the Economic Administration."

NGC Determinations numbers 4 through 21 and memoranda relating to NGC 111 (Secret), "NGC Determinations under Section 1302, Third Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951."

MSC 112 and memorandum relating to MSC 112 (Top Secret), "Formulation of a U. S. Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments."





MSC 113 (Unclassified), "Government Employee Security Program."

NGC 114/1 and Memoranda relating to NGC 114 and NGC 114/1 (Top Secret), "Status and Timing of Current U. S. Program for National Security."

NSC 115 (Top Secret), "Definition of U. S. Policy on Problems of the Defence of Europe and the German Contribution."

MRC 116 and memoranda relating to MRC 116 (Top Secret), "Channels for Transmission of Warning of Attack."

MSC 117 (Top Secret), "The Anglo-Iranian Problem."

NGC 118/2 and memoranda relating to NGC 118/2 (Top Secret), "U. S.

Objectives and Courses of Action in Morea."

NEC 119 and memoranda relating to NEC 119 (Top Secret), "The Position of the U. S. with Respect to Switzerland."


NSC 120 and memorandum relating to NSC 120 (Top Secret), "Communication of Data to Canadians Concerning New Ore Refinery."

NSC 121 and memoranda relating to NSC 121 (Top Secret), "The Position of the U. S. with Respect to Scandinavia and Finland."

NCC Memoranda, 10 (Confidential), "Congressional Publication of Information of Advantage to Foreign Governments," dated 2 July 1951 and 3, 10, 12, December 1951.

10. "MSC Hemoranda" are from the Executive Secretary of the MSC to the National Security Council.





MSC Memoranda, (Secret), "A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the United States", dated 7 and 30 August 1951.

USC Memorands, (Top Secret), "Evacuation of May Indigenous Personalities from Danger Arcas", dated 26 September 1951 and 5 December 1951.

MSC Memoranda, (Top Secret), "The Position of the U.S. with Respect to the General Area of the Eastern Mediterraneam, Red Sea, and Persian Culf", dated 5 October 1951 and 11 and 21 December 1951.

MSC Memoranda, (Top Secret), "Effective Utilization of Civilian Manpower of Non-Soviet Nations for Nork of Value to the Mobilization Program", dated 17 October 1951 and 16 and 29 November 1951.

MSC Memoranda (Restricted), "Minimum Standards for the Handling and Transmission of Classified Information", dated 2, 6, 11 and 12 July 1951; 6 August 1951; and 27 September 1951.

### THE AIR FORCE-DEPARTMENT OF STATE LIAISON OFFICE.

The organization, functions, and personnel of the Air Force-Department of State Limison Office have undergone no important changes since the previous history. During the period 1 July 1951 through 31 December 1951, the Air Force-Department of State Limison Office (AFSLO) participated directly in the following USAF staff actions:

Il. In addition, while the AFSIO assisted many action officers from either the Air Force or from the Department of State in contacting their respective counterparts on their various matual problems, the AFSIO controlled and affected dissemination to State Department of those Air Force messages which contained sensitive politico-military connotations and received for appropriate control and dissemination to the interested Air Force agencies similar cables transmitted through State channels.



(Secret) "Participation of Three B-36 and a flight of B-50 Aircraft in the International Aero Exhibition at Paris 1 July 1951" — Upon a suggestion from the French Air Force, the Birectorate of Operations (AFOOR-00-5) requested the AFSEO obtain department of State sanction and clearance for three B-36's and a flight of UK based B-50 aircraft to overfly Paris and La Bourget Airport in conjunction with the Paris International Aero Exhibition on 1 July 1951. Department of State officials initally believed that participation of the B-36's at this time might create an adverse reactions or comments from the American Enhancies in London, Paris, and Hoscow, State approved these flights and a subsequent request for the aircraft to include overflight of The Hague, Brussels, and London while enroute to the Paris Exhibition. 12

(Secret) "Defense of Dhahran Airfield and the Oil Producing Areas of Saudi Arabia" — The Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia approached responsible Air Force officials at Dhahran regarding air defense of the Dhahran Air Base and the surrounding oil producing areas. Department of State officials i dicated that they had no prior knowledge of this approach but believed it to be an unlightening development of considerable importance since the Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister had been the principal Obstacle during the negotiations for the Dhahran Air Base agreement.

<sup>12.</sup> Secret AFELD Memorandum for the Record, same subject, dated 28 June 1951; AFELD files, Vol VI, No. 16. Secret AF Messages CAF-IN 87375, dated 6 June 1951; CAF-IN 92629, dated 25 June 1951; CAF-IN 93196, dated 28 June 1951; CAF-IN 93220, dated 28 June 1951; and CAF-IN 93364, dated 29 June 1951.



Prom a political viewpoint State indicated that it would be desirable to deploy an air defense unit at Dhahran whenever the Air Force determined its feasibility. The State officials believed that political considerations were not sufficient to press the matter at this time, and suggested that the matter be left open without implying refusal to honor the Saudi Arabian request. Upon indicating to the Department of State that the Air Force currently does not have the necessary forces available for such a task, State suggested that consideration be given to periodically sending a fighter training flight to Dhahran. This would tend to relieve Saudi Arabian anxiety by indicating our continued interest in this matter and our ability to deploy fighter units to the area on short notice. 13

(Confidential) "Training and Testing of Air Rescue Procedure and Equipment in Greenland" — The Directorate of Operations (AFOOR-OO-S) requested the AFSLO obtain, through the Department of State, concurrence from the Danish Government for an air rescue training project to be conducted on the Greenland Ice Cap. Suggestion was also made that Greenland send an appropriate representative to participate in this exercise. Subsequently State informed the AFSLO that the Danish Government imposed no objections to the above project and indicated that it would be interested in sending an observer. 14

E. M. Day, same subject, dated 9 July 1951.

14. Confidential AFSIO Memorandum for Lieutement Colonel R. C. Lewis (AFCOF-CO-3), same subject, dated 17 July 1951; AFSIO files, Vol VI, No. 18. Confidential AF Messages CAF-IN 92889, dated 27 June 1951; CAF-IN 93511, dated 29 June 1951; and CAF-IN 94123, dated 2 July 1951.



<sup>13.</sup> Secret APSID Memorandum for the Record, same subject, dated 9 July 1951; APSID files, Vol VI, No. 17. Letter from Brigadier General




(Unclassified) "Austrian Invitation for a USAF Representative to Attend Their Boy Scouts World Jamboree from 3-13 August 1951" -- The Austrian Minister to the United States forwarded through State Department, an invitation from the Austrian Boy Sc uts Association for a representative of the USAF, specifically Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Murphy, to attend their world jamboree in August. State indicated that USAF acceptance of this invitation had little political importance since a sizeable representation from the U.S. would attend this jamboree. It was felt that Austria would not be unduly offended by a declension and accordingly State would not press the matter or sponsor our acceptance. It was agreed that the invitation probably was initiated as a personal courtesy to Lieutenant Colonel Murphy for the past work he had done for the Boy Sc uts Program of Austria. ithout specific State sup ort it would be difficult for the USAF to sponsor such a trip and the invitation was subsequently declined by appropriately notifying the Austrian Legation.15

(Secret) "Request for Information Regarding a Possible Violation of the Manchurian Border by UM Aircraft" — A query was received from the Department of State regarding a report by the Peking press that seven of the eight aircraft which violated the Manchurian border on 21 July 1951 were destroyed. Upon investigation it was determined that a flight of

<sup>15.</sup> Unclassified ARSLO Memorandum for Colonel W. Thurman (ARCS), same subject, dated 3 August 1951; ARSLO files, Vol VI, No. 19. Unclassified letter from the Austrian Legation, Washington, D. C. to the Secretary of State, same subject, dated 25 July 1951.







seven Navy aircraft inadvertantly overflew Manchuria after climbing through an overcast. One of these aircraft failed to return. This query was passed to the Mavy who subsequently advised appropriate State officials of the incident.16

(Confidential) "Reported Selling of Diamond Bort to the USSR" —
The Air Force (AFMIR) has been informed that the demestic jewel bearing industry is finding it increasingly difficult to obtain diamond bort for conversion to dust. This dust is necessary for cutting and polishing the sapphire jewel bearings for which the Air Force has substantial requirements. It has been reported that the shortage as well as the current high prices of this bort has been caused by increasing purchases of the Bussian Government. State officials indicated that this was an item which the principal western Allies had agreed to embargo in May 1951.

However, this agreement did not cancel the previous USSR contracts for diamond bort. In due time it was believed that embargo should solve the problem unless any of allied countries fail to honor their commitment. 17

(Secret) "Retroactive Payment of Rent at Theelus Field, Tripoli" —
The British occupation authorities in Tripoli have forwarded to the Commanding Officer of Theelus Field, Tripoli, a claim for retroactive payment

<sup>17.</sup> Secret AFSLO Memorandum for Colonel John N. Dick (AFSLE), same subject, dated 6 September 1951; AFSLO files, Vol VI, No. 23. Confidential memorandum for the AFSLO from Colonel John N. Dick, same subject, dated 20 August 1951.



Secret APSLO Memorandum for the Record, same subject, dated 10 August 1951; APSLO files, Vol VI, No. 20. Secret Air Force Message CAF-IN 79666, dated 24 July 1951.

of rent during the period 1 October 1948 to 1 October 1949. The disbursing officer at wheelus Field has declined payment of this claim since he believes that it will be contrary to existing regulations unless justified by evidence of a formal lease. The AFALO determined from the Department of State that a formal lease for wheelum Field had not been concluded. Suggestion was made to DCS/E, Directorate of Installations that the Commanding Officer of sheelum Field contact appropriate British officials in Tripoli in an effort to determine what formal arrangements may have been made concerning the payment of this rent.18

Military Porsonnel" — The AFSLO was requested by the Directorate of Intelligence (AFOLN-C/SE) to determine the current Department of State policy guidance issued to its Embassies and Legations regarding the assistance to be given Air Force personnel who have been forced inadvertently to land in potentially hostile countries but who have escaped from or evaded apprehension. Although the United States is not officially involved in a war, USAF personnel currently are missing as a result of non-completion of their flight over or contiguous to a satellite area. It is possible that a successful escape or evasion from Communist custody might be effected to a United States Consulate or Embassy. The AFSLO determined that State is unwilling and unable at this time to issue

18. Secret Directorate of Plans and file No. 686, serial No. 118, same subject, dated 10 October 1951; AFSID files, Vol VI, No. 24.





standing instructions to its representatives in foreign countries which delineate the treatment which should be given to American personnel falling into this category. Instead, the State Department has left to the discretion of the respective United States Ambassador or Minister to handle these matters in view of the circumstances prevailing in the country and surrounding the individual concerned. In no case, however, would born fide American citizens be turned out of the Embassy or released to foreign control if it were within the legal or moral power of the State representative to prevent it. 19

(Secret) "Possible Internment of Three USAF Pilots at Sibiu,
Roumania" — The Department of State forwarded to the AFSLO a letter
from the Swedish Embassy in Washington which requested that the Air
Force assist in the location of a missing Swedish national. During
the war this Swedish national helped arrange the escape of many persecuted personnel from Central Europe. However, during 1946 this priminent Swedish individual disappeared in Hungary, and the Swedish Government has since been seriously concerned over his safety. An extensive
investigation so far has failed to produce confirmed information regarding his whereabouts. Sweden has now received information that



<sup>19.</sup> Secret Directorate of Plans MCS file No. 327.36, serial No. 48, same subject, dated 5 December 1951; APRIO files, Vol VI, No. 31.




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Polesti Gil Refinery have been interned incognito at Sibiu, Roumania and that the missing Swedish national possibly may be with them. The Air Force was unable to determine the validity of this Swedish report without more information regarding the identity of the Air Force personnel involved or the location and date of their having been shot down. 20

(Secret) "Awarding of 1952 Fiscal Year Contract for Stevedoring Service to Delgado Brothers, Inc., Manila, Philippine Islands" - The United States Ambassador to the Philippine Islands submitted to the Department of State a number of allegations regarding the award by the Thirteenth Air Force of a contract to Belgado Brothers, Inc., to perform stevedoring service during Fiscal Year 1952. Specifically it was alleged that: (1) The Air Force awarded this contract to the highest instead of the lowest bidder which is contrary to governmental procurement policies, and which will result in increased costs to the United States; (2) The awarding of this contract was illegal; (3) This contract will have an adverse effect upon the welfare of organized labor and will result in a wage reduction for the workers, contrary to governmental labor policies; (4) The capabilities of the Luzon Stevedoring Company are superior to those of Delgado Brothers, Inc., who do not have the ability nor the equipment to satisfactorily perform the contract; and (5) The firm of Delgado Brothers, Inc., aight be under the influence of Communists.

<sup>20.</sup> Secret AFSLO Hemorandum for the Record, same subject, dated 19 Decomber 1951; AFSLO Files, Vol VI, No. 32.



The Department of the Air Force determined that the awarding of the contract to Delgado Brothers, Inc., was in the best interest of the United States Government. Regarding the above allegations, it was determined after an exhaustive investigation that: (1) The contract was negotiated and awarded to Delgado Brothers, Inc., after thorough consideration of all the factors involved and in full compliance with the spirit and letter of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations; (2) The contract is a valid and legal instrument and there appears to be no legal justification for its cancelation; (3) No adverse effects upon the welfare of organized labor will occur since the wage scales for both union organizations involved are the same; (4) There is no reasonable basis for questioning the ability of Delgado Brothers, Inc., to perform the contract in view of their highly satisfactory performance under the contract previously awarded to them; (5) Specific evidence has not been presented which would indicate that this firm is under the influence of Cormunists, 21

(Secret) "Violation of the Hungarian Border by a USAF C-47 on 19 November 1951 and Interment of its Grew of Four" — On 19 November 1951 a C-47 type aircraft with a crew of four departed from Erding, Germany with Belgrade, Tugoslavia as its intended destination. This aircraft failed to arrive at Belgrade, and for two weeks it and its

<sup>21.</sup> Confidential AFSLO Memorandum for the Record, same subject, dated 19 December 1951; AFSLO files, Vol VI, No. 34.





crew were not located even after an exhaustive air search and after pointed queries to the respective Foreign Offices of the Balkan countries. Several reports were received indicating that this aircraft and its crew were forced down or crashed in Yugoslavia, Moumania and Hungary. Finally, on 3 December 1951 the Soviet Tass News Agency revealed that the C-47 had been forced down in Hungary by USSR fighters and that the four crew members were initially interned by the Soviet Armed Forces but had subsequently been released to Hungarian custody. After several protests, negotiations were initiated for the release of the four crew members and their aircraft. The four flyers were finally released to United States custody on 28 December 1951 after payment of a \$120,000 fine. The AFSIO coordinated this entire matter with the Department of State and assisted in the preparation of the various Air Force and State messages dispatched to the pertinent agencies in Europe. 22

(Top Secret) "Electronic Countermeasures" -- When appropriate throughout the period under review, the AFSLO contacted the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. George W. Perkins, regarding the Electronic Countermeasures Program. Mr. Perkins was authorized to give State's approval and sanction to the proposed ECM routes, the frequency of the flights during a stated period, and the conditions under which these flights should be undertaken whenever State concurred that the military necessity overrode the inherent political objections.

 Secret AFSIO Memorandum for the Mecord, same subject, dated 10 January 1952; AFSIO files, Vol VI, No. 35.





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#### INTERNATIONAL BRANCH

During the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951, the International Branch continued to exercise responsibility for the development and preparation of the politico-military positions used in the formulation of Air Force plans. In large part these positions were developed in relation to questions being considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The International Branch also continued to provide personnel to sork with Department of State on matters of joint concern.

Uniting for Peace Program. The International Branch has continued to participate in the work of the State-Defense Working Group on United Mations Gollective Measures. In August 1951, in anticipation of final consideration at Lake Success of the report of the Collective Measures Committee, the Department of State requested guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on three position papers dealing with (a) facilities, rights, and related assistance for U. M. armed forces, 23 (b) the U. S. approach to the question of the relationship between the U. M. and collective self-defense arrangements, 24 and (c) initial steps for the U. M. coordination of collective measures involving use of armed forces. 25 These papers were substitted to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for review and were subsequently briefed by the International Branch for JCS consideration. It was recommended that the Chief of Staff support the concept of seeking provision for broad international logistic support and other related assistance in the event of another Koree-type limited action in some other area of the world. Regarding the question of the relation-

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<sup>23.</sup> JGS 1670/64 24. JGS 1670/65

<sup>25.</sup> JOS 1670/66

<sup>26.</sup> Brief on JGS 1670/67


ship between the U. M. and regional arrengements, it was regarded as being of paramount importance 27 that any connection agreed upon insure that strategic direction and control of any military action, whether limited or global, be exercised by those few nations making the major world-wide contribution of armed forces and national treasure and holding direct responsibility for the operation of those forces in prosecuting the war. Accordingly, any U. N. control, as such, over the actual operation of forces was opcosed. The paper on initial steps to be taken by the U. N. in the event of the necessity for international military action was regarded 28 as generally acceptable.

In October 1951, further sectings were held with Department of State representatives to discuss the draft Ceneral Assembly resolution on the Collective Measures Committee report. The question was reised of having the Assembly recommend to States which are sembers of regional arrangements that they "take secount of the complementary relationship between the activities of such arrangements...and collective measures undertaken by the United Nations" The Defense representatives opposed inclusion of this recommendation. Subsequently it was moderated so as to avoid any implication that members of MATO would be obligated to introduce into a MATO agency for consideration the question of MATO's relationship with the United Nations.

NATO Guestions. In connection with the responsibility of the International Branch for certain policy questions relating to the NATO, a number of miscellaneous matters have been briefed by or processed through the Branch.

Subsequent to JCS approval on 9 July 1951 of the project to establish a MATO Defense College (NDC),29 it was recommended 30 that the Chief of Staff

<sup>30.</sup> Brief on JOS 962/192



<sup>27.</sup> Brief on JOS 1670/69

<sup>28.</sup> Brief on JGS 1670/68

<sup>29.</sup> JOS 962/190

approve arrangements to set up a temporary advisory committee to sasist in getting the NDC started. In August, further errangements were made 31 to select three U. S. officers to serve on the MDC staff. Coordination was effected with D/Personnel32 with regard to the appointment of a MAF officer for this duty who would be a specialist in strategic bombing. Further coordination with D/Ferconnel was required with regard to the designation of two ISAF officers to fill the two student vacancies for the NDC allotted to USAF plus an additional officer to fill an extra vacancy allotted to WaF. Subsequently, cables were dispetched33 informing the Commendant, NEC, that the ISAF students would be Cols. J. E. Barr, J. F. Mears, and T. L. Hayes. On 6 October 1951, International Branch recommended approval of a proposal that the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, act as executive agent for the JCS to handle NDC metters.34

On 30 October 1951, a paper was briefed for JCS consideration dealing with the dissemination of standard land/sir marfare procedures 35 throughout MATO. At issue was a Navy proposal designed to insure that Navy and Marine tectical sir occtrises were taken into consideration by SacratR when devising standard Maro tectical sir doctrines. International Branch proposed that the JCS recommend to SACETA that he develop procedures flexible enough to accommodate all destrines presently used by NATO air elements.

On 30 October 1951, approval was recommended of a paper 36 dealing with informing SATO of the S. S. - Italian arrangement for the establishment of a line of communications through Italy for U. S. forces.

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<sup>31.</sup> 962/196 JOS

RAR "HATO Defense College" to DCs/Personnel, 16 Aug 51

AFOFD, 53057, 16 Oct 51, AFOFD, 53568, 20 Oct 51, AFOFD, 54967, 6 Nov 51 Brief on JGS 962/200 JGS 1868/297

<sup>35.</sup> 

JCS 570/201



U. S. Requirements for Military Rights Abroad. In July 1951, a paper 37 was briefed at JSFG level dealing with the determination of departmental responsibility for the contribution of the Department of Defense in the preperatory work and subsequent negotiations with foreign countries relating to the acquisition of military rights abroad. A basic split appeared between the Army and Havy representatives on the one hand sho desired that the determination of this responsibility be made to conform with the allocation of responsibility for logistic planning coordination38 and the Air Porce representative on the other who considered that such determination should be made on the basis of primary interest in the particular foreign country involved for each set of requirements. This split was referred to the JCS39 where the disagreement remained. In November 1951, the JCS again reconsidered the matter in conjunction with another unresolved paper40 dealing with the establishment of priorities for construction and procurement of local supplies and services in Europe. At this point, a memorandum41 was prepared for submission by the Chief of Steff to the JOS recommending that the entire issue with all pertinent papers be referred back to a joint committee for review and submission of a single comprehensive report to the JCS. The JCS accepted this recommendation. In December, a draft of the report42 was submitted for consideration by the JEFC and JLFC. As the year closed the report was still under study.

In August 1951, a paper43 was briefed at JSPC level dealing with procedures for the assembly of all-Service requirements for military rights for



<sup>37.</sup> JSFC 684/70 38. JGS 1725/114 39. JGS 570/186

<sup>40.</sup> JGS 1891/29

<sup>41.</sup> JCS 570/212 42. JLFC 418/34

<sup>43.</sup> JSPC 684/75



a given area, approved of these requirements by the JCS, and satisfaction of the requirements through diplomatic negotiations and subsequent construction. A representative of the International Branch participated in working out an extensive recraft<sup>44</sup> of the paper which was subsequently approved with minor modification by the JSFC, JUFC, and JCS.45

Intelligence questions. In connection with its continuing responsibility for preparing JoS briefs on certain intelligence questions, International Branch has briefed papers dealing with (s) the development of common policies and procedures with other NATO nations on matters pertaining to exploitation of captured personnel, material, and documents; 46 (b) disclosure of information concerning the armed forces and defense plans of NATO; 47 and (c) exchange with the United Kingdom of technical and scientific information on other than atomic energy matters. 48

MSC approval of policy on this matter, 40 a USAF report 50 was forwarded to the Chief of Staff for subalsation to the JGS on the extent to which oversess troop bases and commands should be provided with suitably qualified enlisted personnel in order to reduce the number of Department of Defense civilian employees oversess.

On 18 December 1951, a paper 51 was briefed for the JETG recommending approval of the courses of action which will be necessary in order to implement

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

A4. JSFG 684/76 45. JCS 570/202 46. JCS 950/31 47. JCS 927/105 JCS 927/108 48. JCS 927/110 49. JCS 1879/14 50. JCS 1879/16 51. JSFC 927/14



approved HSC policy.

International Security Affairs. On 12 October 51, International Branch forwarded a draft memorandum 52 from the Chief of Staff to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force commenting on a proposed set of terms of reference for the position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The Air Force view was that this position should not be accorded extensive operating functions which more appropriately should be performed by the Military Departments and other agencies of the Department of Defense.

Germany. Conversations concerning centractual relationships, which would in effect constitute a treaty of peace between Germany and the three Sestern Occupying Powers, had progressed by late August, 1951, to a point necessitating Department of Defense coordination on a continuing basis. The Office of the General Counsel and the International Branch were designated by the Air Force to participate with Defense in this problem. In addition to coordinating comments of the Air Staff regarding contractual relations, a member of International Branch was appointed 53 member of an ad hoc committee of the JCS comments 54 on instructions to be forwarded to Mr. McCloy concerning further development of the contractual relationship. International Branch also prepared the Air Force position 55 on a later set of instructions issued to the Allied High Commission by the Foreign Ministers of France, the UK and



<sup>52.</sup> AFOPD files

<sup>53.</sup> JOS 2124/58

<sup>54.</sup> JCS 2124/61

<sup>55.</sup> Brief on JOS 2124/69



the U. S.

In September, 1951, the French, UK, and US Foreign Ministers agreed that a tripartite meeting should be held in London to determine what restrictions should be maintained over derman manufacture of certain munitions, including aircraft. International Branch developed an Air Staff position on this question, and also participated with the Departments of Defense and State in drawing up a U.S. governmental position. A member of International Branch was then designated to participate in the London tripartite conference held in October, 1951. In this capacity the International Branch representative directly negotiated the U.S. position concerning German aircraft manufacture.

In October 1951 the German Chancellor requested that the Testern Occupying Fowers include in the contractual agreement a security guarantee for the Federal Republic and a commitment to station troops therein. On this issue International Branch concurred 56 with the JBBC in recommending that the existing security guarantee be resffirmed, but not as part of the contractual agreement, and not in such manner as to commit 3. 3. forces specifically.

Chancellor Adequater and the Foreign Ministers of the Mestern Occupying

Fowers concurred in late November 1951 in the text of an Agreement on General

Melations, to be followed later by specific supporting contracts. Authority

of Allied military commanders in Germany to take pre-emergency measures to

protect the security of their forces was not included in this Agreement.

International Branch supported a proposal by General Collins that such authority

be included in one of the related contracts.



<sup>56.</sup> Brief on JGS 2124/68

As the year ended International Branch was cooperating with the Department of Defense in reviewing on a day-to-day basis the development of German contractual agreements and their relationship to the formation of the European Defense Porce.

Morea. Morean armistice negotiations began in July 1951. The Communists had refused to accept the United Nations Communid (UNC) proposal that the talks be held on the Danish hospital ship "Jutlandia" and suggested instead that they be held in the Korean city of Kaesong. U. S. political pressure dictated acceptance of the Communist proposal, although the military line of communistication to Essenong was controlled by the Communists.

International Branch guidance has been provided to the JCS throughout the ermistice negotiations. The first problem confronting the negotiators was the development of an agenda upon which to bese the armistice negotiations. After much harangue and bickering on the part of the Communists, an agenda was finally approved by the armistice negotiating subcommittee. Throughout this discussion it was plainly evident that the Communist's objective was to echieve a demarcation line at the 36th Parallel and effect the withdrawal of all non-Communist forces from Korea. The approved agenda was sa follows:

- a. Adoption of an agenda;
- b. Fixing a military descreation line and demilitarized some;
- Establishing a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of the cease-fire and araistice;
  - d. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war; and
- g. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.



Formal ermistice negotiations commenced on 26 July 1951 with the

Communist delegation proposing the 38th Farallel as the demarcation line and
that both sides withdraw an equal distance from this line. The UNC counterproposal was to the effect that the demarcation line should consist of the
battle line with northern and southern boundaries setting off the demilitarised
some. Negotiations were suspended on several occasions as the result of claims
of violations and purported violations of the Kassong neutral zone. One of
these suspensions extended for a period of approximately two months. However,
during this time the Far East air Force initiated "Operation Strangle" the
purpose of which was to effect the maximum possible interdiction of enemy
lines of communication and supply.

Both sides achieved agreement on 27 November 1951 to a line of demercation represented by the battle line on that date. UN ground forces actively had by that date achieved the best possible defensive battle line. This agreement was to remain in effect for a period of thirty days pending resolution of the other outstanding items on the ermistice agends. However, the time deadline was extended on 27 December 1951 by lack of reference by both sides to the existence of a deadline. At the end of the year, negotiations were still under way concerning the armistice supervising organizations and the repatriation of prisoners of war of both sides.


The International Branch, on numerous occasions, has assisted in the preparation of a joint political-military position concerning the guidance provided to the UNC in armistice negotiations. Generally this position, developed throughout the period in review, sought to insure to the highest possible degree the security of UN forces in Korea. This objective was achieved insofar as the demarkation line was concerned, but increased

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Communist intransigence has been demonstrated on the remaining items of the armistice agenda. Whereas the position had been taken that it was essential to provide for the security of UN forces in Korea and US forces in the Far East, it was also admitted that the adherence to such a position might not achieve a Korean armistice. It was determined that if a deterrent were found to a Communist breach of an armistice, it might then be possible to concede on the remaining items of the armistice agenda which could impinge upon the security of UN forces in the Far East. Concessions in future negotiations will be made on the assumption that such a deterrent will obtain upon the signature of a Korean armistice.

The International Branch voiced concern over the negative effect of a Moreen araletice on the U. S. mobilisation program. It was recommended that government leaders, through the media of statements and public speeches, take steps to counter public opinion favoring a demobilization. Such expressions should be to the effect that the present international situation precludes \*letting our guard down". It was further recommended that it would be unwise to press reliance on a continuous crisis method to achieve mobilization objectives but that a continued long-range, down-to-earth information program was desirable to develop public understanding of the requirements for, and instill the desire for, adequate defense separate and spart from recurrent critical situations. Such a program should include educational media caphasizing that the cost of a deterrent preparedness program would hit the American texpayer's pocketbook much less than another world war. It was further recommended that there be no let up in the Par East rotation programs so that the highest possible morele might be obtained in the USC without adversely affecting U. S. security in that erea.






The International Branch participated in the development of new U. S. courses of action in Korea necessitated by the armistice negotiations. The JCS policy which finally emerged 52 stated that increased military pressure should be applied on Communist forces in Korea whenever the enemy demonstrated recalcitrence during the armistics negotiations. In the event that negotiations completely break down, military actions against Communist China such as a naval blockade and "hot pursuit" of enemy sircraft should be adopted. Similar recommendations were made for presentation at the September 1951 Feshington Foreign Binisters' Hesting at which there was tripartite representation. Also similar guidance was provided to the U. S. representatives at the U. N. General Assembly meeting which convened in Paris in the fall of 1951. Further revision of U. S. objectives and courses of action in Korea was developed and approved by the Fresident on 20 December 1951.59 This policy stated that upon effectuation of a Korean ermistice a warning statement should be made by the UN nations participating in Korea that further aggression in Korea would call for a military reaction without geographic limitations. In the event armistice negotiations failed or were deliberately delayed by the Communists, military operations in Kores and against Communist Chins would be increased to include unilaterally attacking Chinese Communists air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activities threatens our security in the Korean ares.

The establishment of a policy on the repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners became a matter of cancern on several occasions during the period under review. 60 International Branch took exception to the position defended by the other Services that repatriation should be only on a voluntary

<sup>60.</sup> JCS 2095 Series



<sup>58.</sup> JCS 1776/240

<sup>59.</sup> JOS 1776/268



basis with full consent required of each prisoner of war of both sides. International Branch argued that such a policy would be inconsistent with our eagent democratic versus Communist argument that we adhere to the Ceneve Convention (Article 118). For the United States to renege on international complements after its voluminous criticism of the Soviet Union for doing the same thing would make us look hypocritical in the world's eyes. We would further be negating our previous United Mations' resolution calling for Soviet repatriation of Japanese FOWs and we would be gambling that the Communists would not use tactics to dissuads United Nations POWs from requesting repatriation. Also such a policy would leave us with a great many of the enemy who didn't wish to be repetriated and we would therefore be faced with the problem of where to put them. Thus for the International Branch's views on this matter have not been accepted. However, Communist armistice negotiators in December 1951 began stacking the UNC position on POW repatriation. Indications are such that the International branch's position on this matter will have to be accepted if we desire an armistice in Korea.

General Ridgesy, CDRCURC, indicated on 1 August 1951 that the Communists were suplaying the key communications center of Majin (Rashin) in Northeast Mores as a focal point for intensifying the enemy supply build-up in the bettle area. General MacArthur had been directed on 8 September 1950 to discontinue attacks on that target to prevent incursions of the USSR border. This restriction had been reiterated on 21 February 1951, in response to a request by General MacArthur to attack this target. International Branch prepared a position which advocated that restrictions on air attacks on Majin be removed. This position was subsequently approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the President. An attack GOA The full story of the Korean Armistice negotiations and correspondence

between General Ridgway and the JCS is contained in "JCS Sensitive" cables on file in the office of the Directorate of Flans.

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on the Nejin marshelling yards was made in August 1951 with excellent results. The growing Communist air build-up in China was a matter of much concern during the period under review. International Branch, on several occasions, made recommendations to General Vandenberg on this matter. He was advised that the "hot pursuit" course of action in case of no armistice in Morea was not the answer to the problem as it had been overtaken by events. substitute course of action involving FEAF attacks on enemy aircraft on North Chinese and Manchurian bases represented a better course of action. It was evidenced that the primary advantage of striking Communist bases in these areas or UN bases in Morea rested with the air force which took the initiative in such an action. The United Nations should retain this initiative, however, as we did not have the where-with-all logistically to support an operation involving strikes against all possible enemy air bases, we should nevertheless take action against certain of those bases, especially those in the Antung area. We could logistically support such a confined operation provided that we had available jet reconnaissance capability to cover the majority of North China and Manchurian air bases. By schieving the maximum possible attrition of enemy aircraft on the Antung bases and also obliterating these bases, we would achieve the objective of getting the enemy off our backs as they would be driven out of range of our front lines and our forward air bases. The course of action proposed by International Branch in case of no Korean armistice was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>61</sup> and in December by the Mational Security Council. FEAF sireraft strength to cope with possible incressed enemy air activity was augmented by additional F-26's and will be additionally augmented in the near future. However, one of the more pressing problems still feeing FEAF is the paucity of air bases and facilities in Korea.

61. JOS 1776/260





Present policy is still to strike back at the enemy sir bases from which massive air attacks are made against United Nations forces in the Far East.

Nevertheless, FEAF is still in a precerious situation as its aircraft are lined up wing-tip to wing-tip on about four air fields in Horea. International Branch repeatedly pointed out that further augmentation of the Communist air forces might force us to make a decision to evacuate a portion of our air forces in Korea to other, safer Far Eastern air bases.

Southeast Asia. Froblems concerning Southeast Asia have become of increasing concern. Although offensive in Indochina was initially successful in driving back the enemy and decimating a portion of his forces, the combined Prench-Vietnam forces in Indochina have gradually approached a stalemete situation. Frior to reaching this stalemete, General Jean de Lattre Tassigny, Commander of French-Vietnam forces, was invited by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to come to this country for the purpose of discussions sixed at a possible resolution of the situation. International Branch participated in the development of the position that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should take in such discussions. This position procluded the use of United States forces in Indochinese hostilities, but recommended expediting material assistance to French and Vietnam forces in Indochina. Recommendations concerning the Southeast Asia problem were also made to the effect that no different mid technique be adopted for Indochina and that no combined military command be established to supervise operations in that ares. Further recommendations were made that periodic intelligence conferences be held in the area by representatives of the interested mations participating, with United States representatives attending such conferences on an observer basis. Discussions concerning the control of shipping in the Southeest Asian area were also authorized.

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Japan and Japanese Peace Treaty. The officer appointed to represent the Air Force on the Department of Defense ad hoc committee considering the many problems inherent to the preparation of the Japanese Feace Treaty and collateral papers continued this activity during this period. The final drafts of the Japanese Feace Treaty<sup>62</sup> and the Japanese-United States Bilsteral Security Agreement<sup>63</sup> were completed in August 1951 and the Chief of Staff briefod with a recommendation that he approve the proposed drafts with certain amendments from a military standpoint.

An officer was provided to represent Beadquarters, USAF and set as an adviser to the Secretary of State at the Japanese Peace Conference held at San Francisco, California in early September 1951. The duties incumbent upon the USAF adviser to this conference required attendance at all of the sessions of the conference, the diplomatic social functions and the ceremonies in connection with the actual signing of the documents on 8 September 1951.

As a side issue, this officer was designated as the military escort to Senator Styles Bridges (N.M.), an official United States observer to the conference, and, Ranking Minority Member of the Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services. This assignment was for the purpose of assisting in his inspection of a food processing plant at Stockton, California holding a contract to essemble army "C" rations. The Air Force received considerable publicity in trade magazines and newspapers as a by-product of this inspection from the numerous press photographs.

62. JCS 2180/17 4 /18 63. JCS 2180/21, /24 4/32

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
Subsequent to the signing of the Peace Treaty and Security Treety, the same representation was continued on the previously mentioned ad hoc committee for the preparation of an Administrative Agreement64 between Japan and the United States for the implementation of the torms of the bilateral Security Treaty and the Peace Treaty itself.

During the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951, International Branch has been the focal point within the Air Staff, on numerous occasions with various JCS committees, with regard to the composition, training and equipping of post-treaty Japanese armed Forces from the standpoint of a future Japanese Air Force.

Formosa. Collaboration and consultation with various Jos consistes was necessary in the consideration of United States interest in Formosa. This activity resulted in a firm statement of policy, briefed for and approved by General Vandenberg in October 195165 that we should continue to support a Chinese regime on Formosa friendly to the United States and that the Chinese Nationalist Forces must be developed so as to support effectively United States policies in the Far East. The training of Chinese Nationalist in Facific ocean areas outside of Formosa was also considered with General Vandenberg approving the decision 66 that such training must be limited to U. S. possessions.

Australia and New Zeeland. The tripertite security agreement between Australia, New Zeeland and the United States was considered in its formative stages, was later briefed 67 for and approved by General Vandenberg. The

<sup>67.</sup> JGS 2190/1 0 /2



<sup>64.</sup> JOS 2180/48 & /51

<sup>65.</sup> JCS 1966/62

<sup>66.</sup> JCS 1721/64




agreement was signed at the Presidio, San Francisco, Galifornia on 1 September 1951 with this office providing Air Force representation for this event. During this period consideration was given to the advisability of releasing the IFF Mark X system to these countries. An officer from International Branch monitored this action which resulted in the preparation of a brief for General Vandenberg recommending the approval of this release which General Vandenberg approved. 68

Caylon. The JSSC of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested collaboration in the development of a military position, as the result of a request from the Government of Caylon that the United States establish and operate certain military facilities in that country. This request was of primary interest to the Air Force because the Covernment of Caylon desired that the United States station bomber and fighter squadrons there. This requested collaboration by the JSSC required extensive coordination within the Air Staff for the establishment of a sound military position. As a result the Air Force proposed expressing an interest in certain bases and facilities in Caylon in the foreseeable future but that the nature and scope could not be determined at this time. General Vandenberg was briefed on and approved this position which was subsequently approved by the JCS. 69 In addition it was recommended that the Department of State consult with the United Kingdom on the security problems involved in Caylon because this is an area of primary Fritish responsibility.

Philippine Islands. Additional consideration has been given to the improvement of our relations with the Philippine Government in the hope of improving local conditions. In view of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the

<sup>68.</sup> JCS 378/20 69. JCS 570/217



security agreement between the United States, Australia and New Zealand the Philippine Government requested a security pact with the United States. In collaboration with the JSSC, a military position was prepared which stated that no military advantage would accrue to the United States through the conclusion of such a treaty. However, it was recognised in this position that when all matters are taken into consideration it might be to the over-all advantage of the United States to have such a treaty. General Vandenberg was accordingly briefed and subsequently approved To this position. The ceremony for the signing of this treaty was held in Washington in August 1951 with International Franch providing Air Force representation. The Fray proposal that \$5,000,000 he diverted from the previously approved Presidential advance of \$10,000,000 for the pay of Philippine zoldiers T was objected to because of the various tax charges (about 30%) imposed by the Philippine Government upon contractors doing Air Force construction work there. Our objection resulted in the Army withdrawing this request from further consideration. In addition this action aided the Air Force Comptroller in his efforts to have this watter called to the attention of the Secretary of State.

SAC Operations in Ganada. 72 In July 1951, the International Branch recommended that the JCS reject a State Department proposal: (a) to have frequent consultations between State, Defense and the Ganadian Ambassador to examine developing world situations that may or may not necessitate use of atomic measures and (b) that SaC overflights of Ganada with atomic measures should be cleared through diplomatic channels. The JCS and the Secretary of Defense did reject State's proposal 73 on the grounds that it broadened the

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<sup>70.</sup> JOS 1519/74

<sup>71.</sup> JGS 1519/78

<sup>72.</sup> JGS 2057/20

<sup>72 100 2057/20</sup> 



concept of simplifying the proceedure for SAG Operations. State then asked for a reconsideration of its proposal AA to the direction of General Vandenberg, International Branch prepared a raphy suggesting that an agreement be reached at the political level to: (a) confirm Canadian authorization for intransit SAG flights over Canada, subject to a satisfactory prior notification procedure; (b) include Canadian authorization for SAG deployments to Canada preparatory to a strike subject to a satisfactory prior notification procedure; (a) confirm that the United States assures Canada that no strikes from Canadian bases or no strikes involving overflights of Canadian territory will be undertaken without prior approval of the Canadian Government. This proposal was sent by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State.

On 19 December 1951, the Secretary of State notified the Secretary of Defense that Canadian officials had been informally approached with a view to securing their reactions to the above proposal. The answer received was that the problem was under active consideration but Canadian reaction would have to assit return of key Canadian officials then at international meetings in Parls and Rose. 76

Aluminus Flant in Sritish Columbia. 77 In September, a recommendation was forwarded to the Director of Plans that he approve the JSFC proposal to forward a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense stating that the JCS perceived no objection security-wise to the proposed expansion of the plant and that there were no overriding objections to the proposed method of delivering cre from Jamaica by ship which would be subject to interception by submarines.

<sup>71. 308 2057/21</sup> 

<sup>75.</sup> JCS 2057/26

<sup>76.</sup> JCS 2057/31

<sup>77.</sup> JSPC 786/22



Wilitary Grant Aid to Latin America. 78 The International Branch during the period covered by the report furnished one deputy delegate and one edvisor to the U. S. Delegation of the Inter-American Defense Scard (IADB). These representatives coordinated with other Air Staff agencies and assisted in formulating the ULAF position for presentation to the U.S. Delegation TADB. During this period much time was devoted to the study of the formulation of a program authorized by the Mutual Security Act to provide military assistance to Latin America. The Congress appropriated \$33 million to effect this military assistance program. Countries named as recipients of this assistames were: Brazil, Columbia, Chile, Cuba, Mouador, Mexico, Feru and Gruguay. To receive military aid the recipient country must agree to prepare forces for certain hemisphere defense tasks. These tasks are defined in detail in bilsteral military plans which the U. S. Delegation TADB prepared. For the negotiation of the bilateral plan military advisors will be sent from the United Utstes to advise and assist the U. S. Ambassador in the recipient countries. These military negotiators were briefed by the U. S. Delegation TADB and other representatives from the Defense and State Departments.

Inter-American Defense Board. During this period the representatives of International Branch to the U.S. Delegation IADS worked on the IADS General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent. In Howember the plan was transmitted by unanimous approval of the IADS Council to the various American governments. This plan is not as complete, but is in consonance with the U.S. Unilateral Joint Outline Mar Plan for Latin America.

In Sovember 1951, the Council of Delegates of the IADS transmitted to the American governments a Plan for the Organization of a Coordinated System

78. JCS 2099/129





of Exchange of Appropriate Information. The system does not interfere with others already established for this purpose but provides an additional mutual contact for the exchange of information appropriate to the defense of the Americas.

Chairman Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). 79 In October, 1951 it was recommended that the JCS approve a request of the Chief of Staff, United States Army to separate the two jobs of Chairman IADB and U. S. Army member IADB. The JCS approved the proposal with the result that Army now has two General officers on the IADB, the USAF one general officer and the Navy one Admiral.

Joint Planning Talks Between CINCCARIB and the Governor of the Netherland Antilles. 80 In November 1951 it was recommended that the JCS approve the proposal of the Chief of Staff, United States Army for the Secretary of Defense to request the State Department to ask the Netherland Government to resume planning for the defense of the Netherland Antilles.

Third Fen American Consultation on Geography. 81 In December 1951 it was recommended that the JCS approve the proposal of the JIC to nominate a representative to the Third Fan American Consultation on Geography to be held in Mashington during July and August 1952.

Cuban Offer for Korea. In August the Department of State asked International Branch for an informal USAF reaction to a possible Cuban offer of three C-47's for use in Korea subject to the condition that the USAF would make available three others for purchase by Cuba at a later date. The Air Staff determined that C-47 aircraft were not available, but that the project



<sup>79.</sup> JGS 629/40

<sup>80.</sup> JGS 1827/27 81. JGS 529/41

could be accomplished with C-46's. Upon query, CINCFE objected to the Guban offer unless political considerations were over-riding and State was so advised. State then made a formal request of Defense to sell Guba the three C-46's stating that it believed political considerations to be over-riding and International Branch eccordingly recommended that the Secretary of Defense accede to the State position.

Hotifying Soviet Government of 1951 Alaska Surveying Program. 82 In August 1951 it was recommended that the JCS ask the State Department to withhold notifying the Soviet Government of the 1951 Alaska surveying program. The position held was that the United States should refrain from any act the possible effect of which may prejudice our position that the waters divided by the line of demarcation of the Convention with Russia of 1867 are part of the high sess.

Bilateral agreement with Denmark Govering Military Operating Requirements in Greenland. 83 In reference to the Danish-United States agreement which went into effect on 8 July 1951 the International Branch recommended that the JOS forward to the Standing Group, NATO only the basic agreement less the Technical Schedule and the minutes because of their sensitive nature. Such action would satisfy the requirement that bilateral military arrangements must be filed with the Standing Group of MATO.

Responsibility for Silitary Government. In considering the assignment of Staff responsibility for Civil Affairs/Military Government within the Air Staff, International Branch took the position that the monitoring of such

82. JOS 2091/9 83. JOS 570/187



Air Force plans required for the proper acquittal of the responsibilities essigned by the JCS to the Chief of Steff, USAF is appropriately the responsibility of the DGS/Operations. Primary interest, however, should not be assigned without further analysis. International Branch recommended that the responsibility for monitorship be assigned to Mobilization Division. This recommendation was not adopted and the responsibility was subsequently assigned to Domestic Branch, Policy Division.

French Morocco. In the preparation for both the Possible U. S. - U. K. talks in November 84 and the Truman-Churchill 85 talks, International Branch took the position that the United States should firsly support French rights and jurisdiction in Morocco in view of the present delicate situation in the Near and Middle East and the status of U. S. base rights in North Africa. In JCS 2116/70 International Granch advanced this position and in JCS 2222, it concurred in the JESC position to this effect. In this view International Branch has been opposed to the State Department position of encouraging evolutionary development and encouragement of the Nationalist movement towards independence. The view of International Branch has been adopted by the JCS.

Military Operating Requirements in Libys. On 17 July 1951, the Secretary of Defense requested JCS views regarding an Army requirement for the alternate location of certain specific military operating requirements in Libya if they could not be obtained from the French in Algeria. International Branch perceived no objection to this plan 86 and concurred in the forwarding of a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense approving this course of action.

<sup>35.</sup> Brief on JCS 2222 86. Brief on JCS 570/196




S4. Brief on JCS 2116/70

In the preparation of a reply to Air Chief Mershall Sir William Elliot, Chairman, British Joint Services Mission<sup>87</sup> proposing military discussions on military operating requirements in Libys, International Branch adopted the position that multinational coordination of lists of military base requirements would be necessary for the Mediterranean area as a whole as well as for Libys. It further recommended that these discussions be held in abeyance until early 1952 in order to permit the finalization of U. S. requirements based on the report of the three Services Survey Team at that time operating in the Mediterranean area. International Branch further endorsed the JSSC position that French military representation be invited to participate in the discussions.

International Branch concurred in the position advanced by the Joint Communications - Electronics Committee (JCEC), relative to a reply to the British Chiefs of Staff (BCCS) in reference to their questions concerning a proposed establishment of a wireless station at Berns. \$8 The BCCS stated that it was their understanding that the United States had effected an agreement in principle with the King-designate for this area and that construction would start shortly. The JCEC pointed out that the installation was planted and that initial survey was consummated with the consent of the British authorities. International Branch reiterated the position that military operating requirements in Libys would be coordinated with the proper British authorities.

Violation of Foreign Frontiers. In a letter to the Department of Defense, dated 20 July 1951, the Secretary of State outlined recent violations of the

87. Brief on JGS 838/33 88. Brief on JGS 838/35 87a. See Page 107




Czechoslovak frontier by components of the U. S. Armed Forces, requesting that additional steps be taken to guard against recurrence of such violations. He further requested that the Embassy in Frague and the Department of State be advised of any future violation.

Approval was recommended of the JSPC recommendations that a mamorandum be sent to the Secretary of State stating that overseas commanders had been notified of the gravity of the situation and had been directed to notify the Senior State Department representative to the country concerned and the Department of State whenever it was determined that an inadvertent violation of neutral or unfriendly frontiers had occurred. Sp. Insofar as additional steps to guard against recurrence was concerned, International Branch, concurring with the JSPC, took the position that the appropriate overseas commanders were best able to select and institute the necessary control measures to minimize future insovertent incidents.

Landing, Parking and Take-Off Fees at Orly Field, Paris France. On 19 October 1951, the Director of Finance requested International Branch comments on Air Force policy with respect to paying landing fees at Orly Field in settlement of one of a series of claims advanced by the Franch for servicing U. S. aircraft at Franch civilian fields.

This question was discussed with the Department of State, and the verious French-American Agreements and the correspondence between the U.S. Ambassador in Paris and the Department of State were examined. It was not possible to find any specific provision or arrangement which either exempted or required U.S. payment of such fees.

89. Brief on JOS 2161/5



In the interest of furthering U. S. negotiations for base rights in

France and French territory, International Branch recommended the Secretary

of State to undertake the establishment of final policy on this matter, subject

to over-riding political considerations involved. It was further recommended

that a definite understanding be reached with France relative to exemptions

from landing fees etc. for U. S. aircraft specifically engaged in MATO missions.

Truman-Churchill Telks. In preparation for the Truman-Churchill telks to be held in January 1952, an officer of International Branch was designeted to serve as the Air Force Member of the Steering Committee to meet with State and consider the position papers designed to serve as a basis for the telks.

In addition, International Branch was requested to prepare the position paper "Mar Planning and the Re-Creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff".

The position was taken that the U.S. should oppose at this time the promotion, even by implication, of an over-all military authority to exercise higher direction and command in global war; superimposition of a COS over MATO command would be disadvantageous; future military contingencies are too indeterminate to justify a decision on a future command organization in time of war and adequate limined or military matters now exist between the U.S. - U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This position was adopted and became the U.S. position in these talks.

The International Branch represented the Air Force in all conferences prior to the telks and coordinated all papers presented with the Air Staff and with the appropriate agencies in OSD. Among the more important subjects covered in addition to that dealing with the OCS were; Nature of U. S. - U. K. Relationship, 91 U. S. - U. K. Appreciation of Soviet Future Noves, 92 Exchange

<sup>92.</sup> Brief on JCD 1924/63



SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

<sup>90.</sup> Brief on JOS 2222/1 91. Brief on JOS 2221/2



of Technical and Scientific Information other than atomic Energy, 93 Small Arms Standardization, 94 BACLANT, 95 Spain, 96 Coordination of Policies in the Middle East, 97 Middle East Command, 96 Divergence of U.S. - U.K. Policies Respecting China, 99 Military End-Item Assistance to the U.K., 100 Technical Cooperation with the U.K. in atomic energy matters, 101 Indochina, 102 Decision as to the Use of the Atomic Respon, 103 and Exchange of Information Regarding the Australian Guided Missile Project. 104

Ethiopis. In JCS 2197/2, the JCS directed the JSSC to determine the desirability of providing a military mission to Ethiopia and further directed that the JSFC meet with Meut. General Charles L. Bolte upon his return from Ethiopia.

The International Branch studied the question and on 16 July recommended 105 that a mission be sent in order to enhance the prestige of the Emperor, counteract the influence of Communist propaganda, retain Western crientation of Ethiopia, strengthen the U.S. bargaining position in the future and provide a safeguard in the event of defection of the Arab States. This recommendation was referred to the JSFC for study.

Subsequent meetings with General Bolte disclosed that such a mission would serve no useful purpose from a military point of view but that Ethiopia did deserve some consideration in view of the long orientation toward the West.

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93.
     Brief on JOS 927/109
    Brief on JCS 1941/12
     Brief on JGS 1868/334
     Brief on JGS 1821/65
     Brief on JCS 1887/34
97.
98.
     Brief on JCS 1868/330
     Brief on JGS 2118/28
99.
     Brief on JGS 2099/156
100.
           on JGS 2172/12
101.
     Brief
     Brief on JGS 1992/129
     Brief on JCS 2201/3
     Brief on JCS 927/110
104.
     Brief on JSFC 974/2
105.
                                SECHET SECURITY INFORMATION
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Acting on General Solte's suggestion, the International Branch concurred in granting a request from the Experor to furnish Ethichia with samples of certain ground force weapons and radios for the purpose of training Ethopian troops to be assigned to the Ethiopian Expeditionary Force in Korea. This was deemed as a gesture demonstrating the friendship of the United States and "not completely closing the door" on Ethiopian requests for assistance. 106

North East Command. On 14 September 1951, CINCRE requested permission to send representatives to Copenhagen for the purpose of receiving necessary coordination with the Danish Government relative to effecting lisison with the military authorities in Greenland, traffic control procedures for Greenland, exchange of local intelligence and information, navigational aid facilities and the establishment of the North East Greenland Weather Station. Conferences between International Branch and State disclosed that State opposed such a visit because of possible violations of protocol, the prerogative of SACEUR and lack of control on subjects discussed. State consented to NEC representation with a D. S. team to discuss the North East Greenland Weather Station. Accordingly, International Branch secured places for two representatives of MAC on the Air Force - U. S. Meather Service Team which conferred with the Benish Government on 22 October 1951 at Copenhagen. In addition, and with the agreement of State, International Branch suggested a possible meeting between the Greenland authorities and MEC to be held at Godthaeb. Initiation of this conference was to be left to CINCHE and all errangements were to be made locally. The conference was originally scheduled for 4 December 1951, but was postponed until late in the month because of bad


106. Brief on JCS 2197/3



weather. The lateness of the conference date procludes inclusion of its results at this time.

Deployment of Aviation Field Depot Squadrons. On 7 September 1951, the Directorate of Operations requested the Director of Flans, in the light of a Memorandum from General Twining, to obtain approval for negotiations with the Canadian and French Sovernments for the storage of atomic bombs less nuclear material, at Goose Bey and in French Morocco, from the necessary agencies. It was requested that upon completion of this, the Assistant for Air Bases be notified to proceed with the necessary negotiations. The Director of Flans was further requested to initiate action to obtain presidential approval for release of the non-nuclear bombs for storage abroad as soon as approval was obtained from the French's ad Canadian Governments. It was noted that in order to supply the necessary personnel to service the bombs in North Africa the authorized troop ceiling would have to be relead by 424 to cover the deployment of two AFD squadrons.

International Branch advanced the position that the JCS have continually supported the idea that it is vital to the security interests of the United States and to the strategic air offensive that the United States maintain freedom of action with respect to the employment of atomic seepons. Megotiations of the type requested by the Directorate of Operations would lead to the establishment of a highly undesirable precedent whereby foreign governments would acquire some degree of control over the employment of the U.S. strategic air offensive thus jeoperdising its effectiveness. International Branch strongly advised against any steps being taken which approached negotiation relative to the storage of atomic bomb components except in the last resort.






Insofar as French Morocco was concerned, the treaty of 22 December 1950, International Branch contended, provides for the use of three bases as facilities to support bombardment units for peacetime training and wartime operations. A fourth base was specificate support wartime bombardment unit operation. Specific provisions for restricted areas and the safeguarding of sensitive material were contained in the treaty. It was the opinion of International Branch that inasmuch as the French knew the atomic bomb was an integral part of the U. S. strategic bombing complex, the French Government must have envisaged its ultimate storage in the Moroccan area. Therefore, International Branch considered that further negotiations would be inappropriate and unnecessary.

The Commanding General, 5th Air Division has included provisions for one AFD Equadron within the agreed ceiling. International Branch recommended that the Director of Operations take the necessary action through the Director of Manpower and Organisation to ascertain whether the deployment of the second aquadron (212 men) could be included within the existing ceiling.

International Branch recommended against the deployment of the AFD Squadren and the non-nuclear bombs to Goose Bay until firm rights were obtained on the field and until the question of a simplified prior consultation or notification procedure with Canada relative to SAC overflights and the deployment and storage of atomic weapons could be settled. Negotiations which were then in progress might be jeopardised by any routine deployment at that time.

Upon approval of its position, International Franch initiated action to secure presidential release of the non-nuclear elements for storage in Morocco.




Spain. In preparation for the Washington Tripertite Foreign Ministers Meetings, the JCS were requested to comment on a Department of State draft position paper on Spain. The purpose of this paper was to inform the French and British of the exploratory character of the U.S. - Spanish talks and to minimize Anglo-French opposition to U.S. acquisition of certain air and naval facilities in Spain.

On 24 August 1951, International Branch recommended 107 that General Vandenberg approve the proposed paper subject to certain changes intended to eliminate excessively restrictive implications.

On 8 November 1951, the JCS were requested to comment on a draft Department of State briefing paper on Spain to be used for U. S. - U. K. conversations in Mashington in Movember. This paper stated that the U. S. objective is to develop urgantly the military potentialities of Spain's strategic geographic position for the common defense of the MAT area. The paper outlined the British and French positions along with the following position to be presented by the United States:

- a. The U. S. decision to utilize Spain's strategic position for the common defense came after extensive study and after full consideration of the French and British views;
- b. Initial talks of Ambassador Griffis and Admiral Sharman with Generaliseiso Franco were exploratory and without commitment;
- g. The Joint Military Survey Team has now completed military discussions and surveys of improvements for air and neval facilities necessary to meet U. S. requirements. The Team's report will form the basis for determining the further conduct of negotiations;

107. Brief on JCS 1821/48





- d. British and French will be kept informed of developments; and
- e. It is keped that the French and British will not allow the Spanish question to become a cause of friction in our mutual relations.

On 19 November, International Branch recommended 108 that General Vandenberg approve the Department of State paper subject to certain minor changes for clarity and deletion of the statement that the United States is not contemplating a defense of Europe based on a defense line in the Pyrences.

The JCS were requested to comment on a dreft negotiating paper on Spain to be used by President Truman in the event Prime Minister Churchill raised the subject during their conversations. The U.S. position to be presented if necessary, is as follows:

g. Because of her geographic location it is essential that Spain be available to MATO, if NATO is to be prepared to meet armed attack. Spain provides depth in the center of Western Europe's defense, and military forces operating from Spain can influence military operations in alsost any direction within the area of the Mediterranean, Western Europe and the North Atlantic.

b. U. S. telks with the Spaniards have been entirely tentative and no U. S. commitments have been made. The United States has expressed a desire for such rights and privileges as air operating and transit rights, use of mayal anchorages, the right to stage aircraft through Spanish fields, overflight and the right to use and isprove Spanish air and navel facilities etc. A military survey has been completed and U. S. plans are now in a development stage. Details are not yet available for discussion but the British will be kept informed of the progress made in subsequent negotiations. Any U. S. assistance to Spain will be guided by the rule that the NATO countries have priority on U. S. eid.

108. Brief on JoS 1821/60, dtd 10 Nov



On 22 December 1951, International Branch recommended 109 that General Vandenberg approve those portions of the Department of State negotiating paper having military implications.

Smitzerland. On 23 November 1951, the Secretary of Defense requested JCS comments on a draft statement of policy on the position of the United States with respect to Switzerland. This paper was prepared by the Mational Security Council Staff on the basis of a preliminary Department of State draft. This paper stated that the ability of Switzerland to defend itself is important to U. S. security interests and the United States should:

a. Make Switzerland eligible for reimbursable military aid from the United States and antitlad to consideration on a case by case basis for other supply assistance; and

b. Invite, through appropriate channels, an exchange of views with the Swiss General Staff with the ultimate purpose of coordinating defense plans which would become effective in the event Swise territory is violated by the Soviets or the Swiss determine that an attack is imminent.

On 30 Movember, International Branch recommended 110 that General Vandenberg approve the proposed policy toward Switzerland. This policy was approved by the JCS and by the President.

Austrian Treaty. On 24 August 1951, the Secretary of Defense requested the JCS to comment on a draft position paper, subject above, prepared by the Department of State for use in the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings. This paper stated that U. S. objectives are to end the occupation of Austria by four power agreement and to reestablish a free and independent austrian

Brief on JGS 1821/65, dtd 27 Dec 51 Brief on JGS 2218/1




state. Action to obtain an Austrian settlement should be correlated with our other efforts to stabilize Europe, such as the German settlement, revision of the Italian Treaty and a Trieste settlement.

On 30 August, International Branch recommended!!! that General Vandenberg approve the position paper subject to assurance that the Department of Defense will participate in the final U. S. decision on the timing of the coming into effect of any Austrian Treaty and subject to acceptance of certain minor changes.

Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty. On 24 August 1951, the Secretary of Defence requested JCS comments on a draft position paper, subject above, prepared by the Department of State for use in the Sashington Foreign Ministers Meetings. This paper stated that W. S. objectives should be to obtain a revision of the Italian Peace Treaty which will: (a) Remove the psychological and military limitations on full Italian participation in a common defense effort, to include Yugoslavia; and (b) have the widest possible political support among the signatories of the Treaty and the free nations. The principal points in the proposed position were:

- 5. The U.S., U.K., and France should agree to Italian action having the effect of revising the spirit of the Treaty and the military clauses limiting Italy's ability to defend itself;
- b. Formal initiative should come from Italy and action should be completed before the German settlement is signed;
- g. We believe Yugoslav support can be obtained by stressing the common external threat to Yugoslavia and Italy; and
- g. Consideration of the satellite treaties should not delay action on the Italian Treaty.

111. Brief on JCS 1685/43.



On 28 August 1951, International Branch recommended 112 that General Vandenberg concur in the proposed paper subject to certain minor changes.

On 7 November 1951, the Secretary of Defense requested JCS comments on a draft position paper, subject above, prepared by the Department of State for use in the U.S. - U.K. conversations to be held in November. The paper presented the above mentioned U.S. objectives and stated that the French and British positions supported a procedure for de facto revision of the treaty on a bilateral basis.

The United States hoped to avoid waiving of Italy's obligations under Articles 15-18 by declaring such action unnecessary. If this is not acceptable to Italy, then the reply presumably would have to relieve Italy of obligations under Articles 15-18 as well as Articles 46-70 in accordance with the understanding reached by the Foreign Ministers and communicated to the Italians.

On 10 November 1951, International Branch recommended 113 that General Vandenberg approve the proposed position paper subject to one minor revision.

Trieste. On 9 November 1951, the British Chiefs of Staff pointed out to the JCS that if forthcoming Italo-Yugoslav conversations aimed at a political settlement of the Trieste problem are successful, the problem of the future of U. S. - U. K. troops in Trieste mill arise.

On 15 November 1951, International Branch recommended 11% that General Vandenberg approve a memorandum to the British Chiefs of Staff stating that they consider that the question of retention or withdrawal of Allied Forces from Trieste, in the event of Italo-Yugoslav Agreement, lies solely in the

<sup>112.</sup> Brief on JGS 553/35 113. Brief on JGS 553/37 114. Brief on JGS 1701/49



political field and the JCS note that the British Foreign Office and the Department of State are communicating on this subject. International Branch also commented that in the event of withdrawal from Trieste, the reallocation of U. S. forces should be considered in the light of the situation existing at the time the political decision for such withdrawal is made.

Portuguese Participation In and Equipment For Air-Rescue and Reather Operations at Lages Field, Azores. In a memorandum to General Vandenberg, dated 11 July 1951, the Under Secretary of the Air Force (Nr. McCone) referred to his counitment to the Portuguese Winister of Mational Defense to give his personal attention to the above problem.

On 31 August 1951, International Branch prepared a letter 115 to the Fortuguese Minister of National Defense for signature by Mr. McCone. This letter presented the following proposals to the Portuguese: (a) the Portuguese do not need new equipment beyond that presently scheduled under MDAP to be able to carry out half of the sir rescue and meather operations at lages; (b) the MDAP through MDAP, rehabilitate 4 Portuguese 8-17s and take direct action to insure effective supply support of these aircraft; (c) the Portuguese should concentrate on SA-16s for reacus work and the MDAP will train two Fortuguese SA-16 craws through MDAP. Mr. McCone signed this letter on 13 September 1951.

115. AFORD File No. PO 580,82 Azores

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
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March. The Anglo-C votica Suder. The Adminsion of Greece and Turker to March, and Problems of a Middle Eastern Command Organization. In the period from 1 July to 31 December 1951, the Middle Eastern deak has been particularly concerned with (1) the Anglo-Egyptian deadlock over British base rights in the Sues Canel area, (2) the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Sudan, (3) the admission of Greece and Turkey into MATO, and (4) attempts to develop a regional defense organization for the Middle East. Instance as these four matters have become closely interlocked they should be considered together.

Regotiations initiated by Egypt to revise the Anglo-Egyptian Treety of 1936 (providing for British base rights in the Swar Canal area and recognizing the Condominium in the Sudan) had broken down in June 1951. Therefore, in preparation for the September Hashington Foreign Hinisters' Secting (British Talks) the International Branch reviewed policy with respect to Egypt, taking the position that the maintenance of British strategic facilities in Egypt is extremely important. Consequently, while supporting the right of the British to stay in the Canal Zone, the Halted States hoped that the United Eingdom would be able to make new and imaginative proposals to Egypt which would present her with a "new deal" and at the same time enable the British to retain the use of Egyptian facilities. However, any such proposal should minimise perticipation in a Middle East commend structure and not involve the commitment of forces. It was further hoped that the solution of the Eudan controversy could be kept separate from that of British base rights in Egypt, and also protect the right of the Sudanese to self-determination, 116 Simulteneously, in ensuer to questions posed by the Secretary of Defence 117 the further position was taken that the melatenesce of British troops in the Egyptian facilities is an over-riding military consideration to the end that

116. JCS 2105/10 117. JCS 2105/9



these bases will be immediately available in the event of war or an emergency.

Consequently, the United States has no objection to a Preach-Turkish cooperative effort to meet the Anglo-Egyptian impasse so long as this does not invalve the consistent of troops. Furthermore, it would be highly detrimental U.S.

to/interests for the British to take percetime military action against Egypt to maintain her base rights under the 1936 Treaty mithout first marshalling world opinion on the British side. Shother British troops in the Canel Jone could be reduced and where the Readquarters, British Middle East Land Porces, should be located mere matters to be decided by the British, but the United States placed no faith in sir defense arrangements for Egypt which rely primarily upon Egyptian forces. 118

Concerning the Anglo-Sgyptian Sudan, it was considered that if the Suss Basez were lost to the British, the Sudan should be dominated by a government friendly to the United States. 119

In line with the anticipated multilateral approach to the Anglo-Egyptian crisis, a study recommended that a United States-Egyptian bilateral staff conference on Egypt's possible military colleboration with the United States in the event of war, proposed by the Egyptian Air attache to the United States, not be held at least watil the situation was clarified. 120

In view of rapid developments, in the latter part of October the current Egyptian situation was reviewed for General Vandenberg. This review indicated that policy recognizes that because of the strategic importance of the Middle East to the United States; offerts should be made to offset the Middle

<sup>121.</sup> Brief for General Vandenberg, 22 Oct 51



<sup>118.</sup> JOJ 2105/11

<sup>119.</sup> JGS 2105/13

<sup>120.</sup> Staff Study, "Proposed Conference Between Personnel of the United States Armed Parces and the Egyptian Armed Parces", 1 Oct 51

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Eastern trend toward neutrality, the United Mingdom anould have primary military responsibility for largel and the arab States, and should retain her strategic facilities to Egypt, and the Luden should be controlled by a friendly government. In view of these policies, and the weakened British position in the Middle Lest, a four-power approach was being developed. This program involved: (1) inviting Parkey into NATO (which had been agreed to in September at Ottase), (2) establishing a Middle East Command (MEMO) with Readquarters in Egypt, (3) inviting Egypt to be a founding member of AMS along with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, and (4) transforming British troops and facilities in Egypt into EEO troops and facilities. Almost invedistely the Egyptisa Severnment rejected this multilateral proposal and simulateneously announced the abrogation of the Treaty of 1936 with wreat Britain. Revertheless, the British have esintained their hold on their Egyptian facilities despite the fact that they have been harrassed by both the Egyptian Government and populate. Furthermore, the four powers have indicated their intention to establish (NO and seek the adherence of other trab States, certain British Dowlnions, and possibly Israel, Iran and Pakistan,

As a result of the decisions to establish an MCC, increasing attention necessarily was given to problems attendent on its foundation, including; the status of Greece and Turkey, the relationship of a Midele East Command organization to SATO, the nationalities of commanders in the area defense organization, and the continuing Egyptish crisis.


During the second seek in Dotober Ceneral Bradley visited SHAFE Headquarters, Athens, and Ankers to discuss problems relative to the Admission of Greece and Turkey into HATO. His report was reviewed 122 and showed that:

122. Brief for General Vandenberg, 1 Nov 51



(1) General Steenhower was reluctant to have Greece under SACEUR and felt that Turkey should not be, (2) Greece desires to be under SADEUR, (3) Turkey considers herself a European metion and therefore should be integrated into SaCAUR, and (4) Turkey was willing to sid in gaining Egyptian adherence to MEC but was unwilling to be in an MEC only. As a result, in considering command arrangements in the Middle Rest, International Branch took the position that United States policies concerning this problem should be re-evaluated by apropriate agencies. 123 In addition it supported the issuance of a public statement of the political philosophy and principles involved in establishing an Mac. 184 Once this public statement was agreed upon, action was taken opposing further changes proposed by Secretary of the Army Pace (1) to use a contraction of the Arabic term for Middle Cast, i.e. "ANGRALL", as the name for the projected Command, and (2) to indicate that United States participation would be in the Fore of a Joint Military Rission rather than as a sponsoring or founding member, 125

At the time that it was considering these Middle East command problems, International Branch was concerned with further developments in Egypt. Frevious policies were reaffirmed and the added points unde that the United States: (1) would give the United Kingdow its "full political and diplomatic support to measures necessary (but which do not go beyond what is necessary)" in protecting her Egyptian beas and keeping the Canal oyes, (2) should maintain its prestige in Egypt in order to be able to sid in the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian stalemate, (3) urgs that the question of the Sedan be removed as an obstacle to the settlement of the defense question, and (4) recognize that the MED proposals




<sup>123.</sup> Brief for General Vandenberg on 56-2635-51, 1 Nov 51 124. Briefs on JGS 1868/310, 5M-268G-51, and JGS 1868/313 125. Brief on JGS 1868/322



might require reformulation in order to gain Egyptian adherence. 126 In connection with British plans to protect Western Mationals in Egypt, it was considered that the United States should not participate in any show of force in Egypt but rather should confine its nations to those necessary for the emergency evecuation of citizens, and to collaboration with the British to that limited and. 127

At the end of 1951, International Branch participated in preparations for the Trussa-Churchill Talks scheduled for Jenuary 1952. A sejor group of items for the talks pertained to multilateral efforts to provide for the defense of the Middle East and to meet the Egyptian crisis. Comporning NEC: 128 it was recognized that political considerations had become predominent, that the admission of Greece and Turkey into MATO and their integration into the MATO command structure must proceed the establishing of WEC and coordination between the contiguous MATO commends with an MEC, that British facilities in Egypt cannot be placed under SEC until Egypt joins the Command, that consideration will have to be given to special problems involved in the possible future inclusion of Israel, Iren and Fakistan in 200, that U. S. participation in 200 will be limited to staff participation and mose military assistance to the countries involved, and that the United States should give tentative support to a British commander for MEC. In addition, the President should inform Mr. Churchill that United States interests sere not confined to the Sues Canal area but required a defense of the Middle East as near the borders of the W. H. R. as possible. Consequently Mr. Churchill should be saked to indicate British intentions and capabilities with respect to the whole Middle Mast area, and

<sup>128.</sup> JCS 1868/330



<sup>126.</sup> JOS 2105/15

<sup>127.</sup> JSPC 668/5 and JGS 1789/18

what forces he believes the British Componwealth countries can contribute to this eres in pescetive and in war, 129

with respect to Egypt, it was believed that the United States position should recognize the danger inherent in letting entters drift. It was considered that the United States should urge a "package deal" for Laypt, recognizing King Farouk as the "King of the Sudan" (with adequate protection for the right of Sodanese self-determination) in return for Egyptian adherence to MEC, in order to arrive at a lasting solution to the Egyptian problem. It was insisted, however, that this proposal should not be rationalized on pracarily military grounds since as long as the British remained in control of the Suez bases our military requirements there are set 130

Finally, International Branch took the position that the United States and the United Kingdom should coordinate their policies in the Middle Fast. This would involve: (I) resognising British interest in maintaining stability in the Middle Mest and giving full diplomatic and political support in behalf of this British effort and British | restige in the area, (2) taking cognizance at the same time of the lacressed United States stake in the area, (3) recogmixing that the defense of the Widdle East increasingly requires a coordinated multilateral responsibility, (4) making efforts to chemolize the nationalistic trends in the eres slong favorable lines, and (5) continuing limited United States economic and military aid to the Middle Mantern States where W. S. interests cake this desirable. 131

Turkey. Apert from the consideration of Turkey's place in WAYO or in a Middle Mast Command (MMC), a memorandum was prepared informing the other services



<sup>129.</sup> JGS 1887/33

Brief on JGS 2105/18 JGS 1887/34

Turkey under the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT). 132
These arrangements were made by the Chief, JAMMAT, with the assent of the MS
Ambessador to Turkey and cleared in Mashington with the Departments of State
and Defense. Action was also taken to support the rejection of a Turkish
offer to increase her infantry divinious from 16 to 22 to be under a "common
cause command" insemuch as this would involve additional U. S. military aid
to Turkey. 133 It was feared that this might prejudice the final acceptance
of Greece and Turkey into MATO by the other countries receiving U. S. aid and
involve a modification of existing U. S. priorities for providing foreign
military assistance. It was noted that Turkey can oppropriately make this
offer as a contribution to MATO after her admission to MATO.

Greace. During the period under consideration, the outstanding policy question that arose in consection with Greece was the inclusion of that country in the North atlantic Treaty Organization (MATO). This has been discussed in a preceding section. However, two other major policy questions wrose during these months with respect to U. S. military activities in Greece.

In August, the International Branch monitored air Stoff action in commention with a recommendation from the Joint U. S. Military Aid Group to Greece (JUBRES) that the Fiscal Year 1952 military aid program for the Greek Ground Forces be increased to enlarge their mobilization strength from 147,000 to 300,000 mm. 134 JUBRES believed that this increase in mobilization strength was necessary to enable Greece to (a) repol an attack by satellite forces

<sup>132.</sup> Circulated in JCS, 1 August 1951

<sup>133.</sup> JGS 1704/53

<sup>134.</sup> JOS 1798/57

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augmented by goerrillas, (b) cause maximum practicable delay to an attack by satellite forces (with indirect soviet assistance) or to an attack involving direct Soviet participation, and (c) conduct guarrilla warfare in Greece and contiguous areas in the event of general heatilities. Action ass taken recommending approval of a reply to JUNHAG115 which, while recognizing that implementation of its recommendation would enhance the capability of the Greek army to execute certain missions, stated that implementation of this proposal would require a change in currently approved military satisfance programs and possibly an assignment to Greece of an over-riding priority. Furtherance, the reply stated that no change in the precent priority for the allocation of military assistance to Greece was warranted at that time, and if a critical aituation developed justifying an over-riding priority for the Greek armed Forces, the military aid program for Greece would be re-evaluated.

The other major policy question in connection with process concerned the termination of the British Military Missions in that country. In Deptember, action was taken to review a suggestion by Jesuad that the British Missions in Greece should be dissolved by autual agreecent as they had outlived their usefulness. Upon reviewing the situation and weighing the effect such a proposal might have upon U. S. - U. S. relationships it was considered 36 that it would be wiser to press vigorously for substantial reduction in the British Missions rather than for their complete elimination. As matters have turned out, the British on their own initiative in December suggested the programed run-down of their army and Air Missions in Greece and their eventual termination. At this same time, it was indicated that the British Saval Mission would be reduced, but would centimes certain limited operations.

135. JOS 1798/58 136. JOS 1798/59


SCORET SECURITY INFORMATION

Cytrus. In December the Air Force received a letter from the British Joint Services Stasion in Mashington stating that the British Chiefs of Staff were concerned over possible U. S. requirements in Cytrus as revealed by discussions between numbers of the Joint U. S. Meditorranean Survey Year and British officials on Cyprus during the summer of 1951. On 17 December 1951 a reply was dispatched to the British Joint Services Mission stating that (a) the United States continued to have a firs requirement for an air base at Miccola and that Bervice-to-Service discussions conserving this base were in progress, (b) the report and recommendations of the U. S. Survey Group had not yet been received, but that the survey party's interest in alternate base sites in Cyprus was purely exploratory in order to determine their adequacy for possible future requirements, and (a) should there be any U. S. base requirements in Cyprus beyond that at Micoola the British would be immediately informed and the matter fully explored with them.

While this reply disposed of most of the original points reised by the British Chiefs of Steff, hir Chief Marshel Dir Billion Elliot approached General Vandenberg on certain specific points in connection with the G. S. Air Force's position. The International Branch prepared the necessary briefing papers collating the details required to parmit General Bhite to explain these matters to Air Earshal Elliot to the latter's complete estisfaction. 136

Iran. During the period under consideration, the breakdown in anglo-Iranian associations concerning the anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), the subsequent shutdown of the Iranian oil facilities, the resulting strained relations between Iran and the West, and the internal deterioration in Iran have made that country another "hot spot".

<sup>138.</sup> Memorandum for Guneral White, deted 21 and 31 Det 51



<sup>137.</sup> JCS 570/222



In preparation for the September Machington Poreign Ministers' Meetings (British Talke), a proposed United States policy statement with respect to Iran 139 emphasized the importance of continued Iranian independence and recognized that, while the United States desires to support British policy there, Angle-Transan difficulties make it essential that the United States not follow British policies too closely. Furthernore, the United States will not support the introduction of British troops into Iran except for the energency protection of British nationals. International Branch concurred in the statement ambject to midifications designed to stress the importance to Iran's orientation toward the Mest and to take into ascount the extremely fluid situation there. 140

A similar policy statement, All prepared for Movember U. S. - U. E. conversations included the additional points that the continued evaluability of
Tranian oil to the West, or at least its denial to the Soviets, is a part of
our ever-riding objective of maintaining Iran's independence and Western orientetion, and that if Iran is attached by organized Soviet forces, the United
States should take political measures and, while minimizing U. S. commitments
in the eres, place convenives in the best possible position to meet the threat
of a global war. This policy statement was approved.

Early in October notion was taken to determine the effect on Bussian military potential if framian oil fields should fell into their control, and specifically whether such a development would permit the U.S.S.R. to continue a war longer, whether it would require an alteration of our strategic targets, and whether it would require an increase in the level of United States military

<sup>139.</sup> JGS 1714/25 140. JGS 1714/26 141. JGS 1714/31






establishments. 142 It was considered that if Iran is dominated by the M.S. J.R. the Smited States could expect (a) the loss of Francan oil and probable eventual loss of all siddle Tast oil, (b) the relative schangement of Soviet strength and prestige throughout the world and in the Widdle East, (c) the expansion of the Soviet espire to the Fersian Gulf and consequently a threat to India, Faklaten, and Afganistan, and (d) the exposure of the Turkish castern flank. Furtherwore, peacetine Soviet domination of Iran would breach the Trusan Doctrine, provide a Soviet springboard in the Middle East thus threstening the dues Cenel eres, and Purther disinish U. M. prestige in the iddle East. With respect to the sore specific questions relacd above, it was recognised that it would take longer to defeat the U.S.J.R. and would probably require increases in the level of mestern military establishments if the U.S.B.R. dominated Iranian oil, but an answar to the question of altering our strategic targets would depend upon how long the U.B. J.R. possessed Tran's oil and how much she was able to develop facilities for its transportation. Therefore, in view of these considerations, the United States should seek a solution to the Iranian problem which would estatein Iran's meeters orientation, make possible a Middle east command organization, and assure the continued supply of franten oil to the Test. These considerations were deemed sufficiently important to transcend both the meintenance of British prestige in the Middle Bast and U. S. - U. E collaboration with respect to Iran, 143

As beekground information for a State-Defense meeting in mid-December,
International Stanch reviewed the them current developments in Iran. These
indicated not only that the oil issue was little assers a settlement and that
Frime Minister Reseaded was reluctant to give assurances required by the Sutual

142. JOS 1714/28 143. JOS 1714/29



Security Act of 1951 for continued United States economic and military sid, but also that the internal situation in Iran was deteriorating. 144

At the end of the year, the implications of a possible Francis failure to provide the appraises required by the Mutual Socurity Act for continued military assistance were considered. In view of the fact that the contracts for two of the U. S. military missions to Iran (GEMMISH and ARMISH) had some months to run, International Franch took the position that legal ways and seems to continue the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MANG) beyond the cut-off date of S January 1952 should be sought as a matter of priority.

Hilitary Aid to Middle Eastern Sations Under the Matual Security Act of
1951: The Mutual Security Act of 1951 (SMG. 202) provides that in order to
receive grant military aid a Middle Eastern country must satisfy certain requirements pertinent to its strategic location, the importance of the assistance
to it, and the ability of the country to defend itself, as determined by the
President. In response to the question of whether countries other than Greece,
Turkey, and Iran should receive such grant aid, International Branch took the
position that, from a military standpoint, aid to additional Middle East
countries was not justified, but political considerations might provide an
over-riding reason for the granting of such sid. However, if such were the
case, the JCS should be consulted in each instance. 146

The Shishikli coup d'etat in Syris of 20 Sovember 1951 provided a possible case wherin military aid should be granted as a result of over-riding political considerations. In this instance, it was recommended that Syria be declared eligible for cash reinbursable aid under Section 408e of the Sutual Security

<sup>146.</sup> Briefs on JSPC 883/17 and JCS 2099/139



<sup>144.</sup> Brief for General Vandenberg, 20 December 1951

<sup>145.</sup> Brief on JGS 1714/34



ict, rether than for grant eld under Section 202. It also recommended that this aid should be confined to limited quantities of selected, non-competitive items which could be supplied under existing priorities and not interfere with current arms program. Furthermore, a portion of the swallable equipment should be excepted for anticipated requests from other widdle Eastern countries. 147

Sendi Arebia. Several times during the course of United States negotiations with Sendi Arabia, the British (who had been advised by the United States
as to the general purpose of the conversations) requested details of the segotistions. The Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the Department
of State, had delayed forwarding such information to the U. M. as an inadvertent
disclosure of such U. S. - U. M. collaboration might prejudice the successful
outcome of the negotiations. The agreement with Saudi Arabia successfully
concluded in the middle of June. Accordingly, early in July the International
Branch offered no objection to the dispatch of a memorandum to the British Shiefs
of Staff informing them that Saudi Brabia had granted the United States a longterm removal of rights and privileges correctly enjoyed at Dhahran Air Field,
together with certain additional rights and privileges, and a summary of the
cash reinbursable military assistance which the United States had agree to
furnish Saudi Brabia. 148

One of the provisions of the U. S. - Saudi Arabia agreement was that a Joint U. S. Survey Team would be immediately disputched to Saudi Arabia in order to fire-up detailed recommendations for the military assistance program which had already been agreed upon. Due to a misunderstanding of the terminology employed in the negotiations, the Sourcetary of Defense's office after the agreement was concluded forwarded a memorandum to the Services requesting their

147. Eriefs on JSFC 883/18 and JCS 2099/149






recommendations for the establishment of the parament Military Mission to Saudi Arabia. 149 Action was incediately instituted to clarify this point and to approve a senerandum for the Secretary of Defence informing his that a Survey Team must be dispatched to Saudi Arabia prior to the establishment of the personnel Military Mission, that General Day (Commander, Dhahran Air Field) should be designated as the head of this Survey Team rather than Chief of the Military Mission, and that suitable guidance had been prepared for the Survey Team. 150 Complementary schion was also taken to designate General Day as the head of the Survey Team and take care of the necessary administrative details is connection with the dispatch of the Team to Saudi Arabia.

In the meanwhile, a high Saudi Arabian official, on his own initiative, auggested to General Day that a U. S. air defense unit should be stationed at Dhahran Air Field. A reply to General Day was cleared with the Department of State informing the Commander, Dhahran Air Field, that he could tell the Saudis that the stationing of an air defense unit at Dhahran was not presently contemplated, but to do so in a measure that would not completely discourage this proposal on the part of Saudi Arabia. 151

At approximately the same time the International Branch was requested to take action necessary to designate a Department of Air Force Lisison Officer to the Secretary of Defense in connection with the preparation of orders for Reservists (employed in) certain Widele East oil facilities. After coordinating this matter with interested Air Staff agencies the necessary papers were prepared designating Lt. Col. J. A. McKinney (AFFWF-1-R-1) for this job. 152

<sup>152.</sup> Henorandum to Secretary of the Air Force, dated 17 July 51



<sup>149.</sup> JGS 1881/38

<sup>150.</sup> JGS 1881/40

<sup>151.</sup> Memorandum to DCS/O, dated 14 July 51



As the result of the signing of the new agreement with Saudi Arabis a ses problem in connection with MAF operation of Dhahran Air Field arose in the middle of July. Under the old agreement the Saudi Arabian Government had been charging cortain services, supplies and subsistence furnished their personnel and units by the United States. While the new agreement signed on 18 June 1951 provided for a much more extensive military assistance program it did not take core of this contingency, and yet the Saudis were continuing to receive such items on credit. After some delay due to the necessity of securing Department of State coordination on a very touchy diplomatic problem, General Day was informed that the Department of State would press the matter of Saudi Arabian indebtedness at every opportunity consistent with the furtherence of U. S. interests in that country, and that he was authorized to extend 30-day credit to the Jaudi Arabian Government for such services, supplies and subsistence as he was sutherized to furnish their personnel and units. 153 In the meantime, the Department of State had contacted the American Ambassador to Sandi Arabia, he and General Day had secured the essent of the Sandi Arabian Covergment to a thirty day credit arrangement, and the Saudis had paid all of their past-due 1951 secount.

In the middle of September the International Granch received ection on a suggestion from the Arabian-American Cil Gompany that the mapping of the Southeastern Arabian Peninsula would be beinful in settling boundary disputes in that area. The Department of State in forwarding this suggestion to the Department of Defense took the position that it did not believe the matter important enough to justify interfering with strategic determinations or military mapping priorities. Action was taken recommending that the Air Force

153. Mesoranda to DCM/O, dated 22 august 1951 and 19 January 1952



take the position that the military mapping and charting programs already in progress could take svalishle preliminary black and white charts (scale 1/250,000) during the period of July - December 1952 which will be of assistance in settling the boundary disputes in Saudi Arabia. 154

In the middle of Movember, the International Branch had air Staff sation on a letter from Sir Sillian Elliot of the Smitish Joint Services Mission expressing concern over the lack of coordination in July and August 1951 between the Joint U. S. Military Survey Team and the British Military Mission to Saudi Arabis. Sir Military Survey Team and the British Mid received indications from the Saudis that they desired to close down the British Military Mission and suggested discussions concerning closer Suture cooperation between the anticipated U. S. Military Mission and the existing British Mission in Saudi Arabis. 155

The International Branch recommended concurrence in a reply to the British Joint Services Mission which while recognizing the desirability of coordination in Saudi Archip, stated that useful discussions could not be held pending complete S. S. Government coordination of the Survey Team's Report, but at that time we would be glad to confer regarding such coordination. 156 It should be noted that the British Chiefs of Staff and already been informed of the substance of the Bhahran Air Field agreement of 18 June 1951, and that the United States had received strong indications that the early sithdrawal of the British Mission to Saudi Arabia was inevitable and consequently that any discussion of coordination between it and the future S. S. Military Mission to Saudi Arabia would be useless.

154. JGS 2041/3 155. JGS 1881/43 156. JGS 1881/44

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

In early December, the Secretary of Defence forwarded a memorandum to the Bervices calling attention to their previous statement that if Iran passes to the domination of the U.S.S.R., immediate loss of Iranian oil and probable eventual loss of all Middle East oils with the consequent greatly increased and possibly intelerable deficiency in oil resources are to be expected, 157 Accordingly, Mr. Lovett requested the views of the Services with regard to what action should be taken now or in the future to secure Kuweit, Saudi Arabia and Sabrein or any part thorsof to avoid the possibility of an intolerable deficiency in oil resources. Jotion was taken to prepare a reply to Mr. Lovett. The general position was established that the British should scoopt responsibility for and develop, organize, and provide the necessary forces in order to defend these areas together with the over-all area of the Middle Rest. Specifically, it was reconcended that (1) U. S. - U. H. talks be initiated to explore British intentions and capabilities with respect to Middle Mastern defense as it might affect the defences of Euseit, Sandi Arabia, and Behrein, (2) the precent status of British plans for the denial of Middle East oil be determined and whether these plans can be expedited, (3), U. S. support be given U. K. efforts to obtain Commonwealth contributions for Middle Mastern defense, and in the event of their refusel to commit forces, a unilateral U. S. approach be made to the verious Dominions to obtain their commitment of forces, and (4) intensification of U. S. political and psychological efforts to gain acceptance in the Middle East for the Hiddle Fast Command. 158

<u>Tudoslavia</u>. United States-Tugoslavia exploratory military talks were held in Mashington during the period 17 May - 13 June 1951. At this time Yugoslavia

157. JGS 1714/29 158. JGS 1887/28 and /29





indicated its desire to obtain military essistance under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance act and soknowledged the necessity for technical and logistical staff conversations if a substantial progress of military assistance was to be utilized effectively. As a result of these talks, the Secretary of Defense asked the Services to prepare directives on matters lying within their cognizance for the guidance of a Department of Defense mission which would conduct further military manistance talks with Togoslavian representatives.

Early in July a reply was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense designating the head of the proposed mission, outlining tentative military terms of reference for the mission, and providing for the designation of Service representatives on the group. 159 In bandling this matter primary U. S. army interest in the material aspects of prospective military essistance to Yugoslavia was recognized.

Largely because of the combined effect of the extreme touchiness of the Tugoslava concerning the manner in which they would accept U. S. military massistance, the intense interest of the Department of State in the political aspects of the program, and requirements imposed by security sapects of the proposed program, by sarly August the matter was so confused that some misunderstanding had misen in the Department of Defense as to how the military assistance program would be handled in Tugoslavia. In order to clarify this matter the Secretary of Defense requested an intelligence evaluation of the following factors affecting the Tugoslav attitude on the subject of Military Assistance Mayisory Group arrangements: (1) the degree of Tugoulavian concern over the demostic and external political and internal ascurity implications, (2) the extent of their fear that a Military Assistance Edvisory Group would involve ampervision of the kind imposed by the U.S.S.R. prior to the Tugoslav-U.S.S.R.

159. 308 1901/42



break, and (3) how such of their attitude was dictated by their desire to minimize U. S. observation of the use made of military assistance.

The International Branch recommended approval of a response to the Secretary of Defense stating, generally, that it appeared that the Yugoslav Government was mainly concerned over the internal military security implications connected with military assistance Advisory Group arrangements, and that demostic and external political implications were of lesser importance. 161

In the middle of august, action was taken on intelligence material accusulated in the course of discussions held between U. S. and Yugoslavian military officials. The principal items of interest revealed by these conversations were as follows: (1) Yugoslav besic strategy has changed from guerrilla warfers in the scuntains to formal organized resistance on the plains, (2) Yugoslavia desperately needs material, (3) their armed forces are larger than we had thought, and (4) Yugoslav munitions production is in better shape the had been thought.

After reviewing the results of those discussions, the continued inclusion of technical experts on future conferences with the Yugoslavs was supported.

Furthermore, it was recommended that steps should be taken to avoid compremising the details of exactly what material was being furnished Yugoslavia in order to further Tugoslav efforts to convince the U.S.S.R. that it was getting much more than was the case. 162

Recognizing the necessity of baving scenthing concrete to go on in the event that Eugoslavis became the object of direct or indirect U.S. R. aggression, early in 1951 the Services began formulating plans for such an avertuality. In connection with such planning it was considered advisable to have bileteral someoreations between military representatives of the United States and the

<sup>162.</sup> JOS 1901/50



<sup>160.</sup> JCS 1901/47 161. JCS 1901/48

U. K., France, and Italy, respectively, to ascertain what contributions these countries might make in this connection. In September, Seneral Eisenhower indicated that any such planning and conversations should be held under his direction. In light of Seneral Eisenhower's increased interest in Yugoslavia, it was recommended that: (1) General Eisenhower and Admiral Sarney act as representatives of the United States with reference to the planning and conversations, (2) Admiral Sarney act under General Eisenhower's direction, (3) bilateral planning proceed without weiting for consideration of the problem at the governmental level, (4) it be definitely understood that any arrengements agreed upon in such bilateral conversations would be purely interim measures pending the North Atlantic Treaty Organization taking cognimance of the problem of Yugoslavia, and (5) the proposed agends for the U. S.U. E. conversations be marrowed to meet the desires of the British, 163

In early October, General Bradley gisited General Sisenhover in Paris.
One of the topics discussed at this meeting was Yugoslavis, and the conclusion was resched that the first step in planning military assistance to Yugoslavis in the event that it was attacked, must be politico-military bilateral talks between the United States and the British, French, and Italians respectively. In effect, this meant that the scope of the contemplated bilateral talks must be broadened from purely military to politico-military considerations. The International Branch supported the necessary changes in existing policies as the best way of expediting discussions that had toolong been delayed. At the came time, action was instituted to secure the necessary clearances from the Department of State in order to proceed with the bilateral conversations on the new basis, 164

163. 305 1901/57 164. JCS 1901/60




One of the asjor items scheduled for discussion during the January 1952
Trumen-Churchill talks in Mashington was the exemination of the problem of
Yugoslavia. The International Branch was requested to review the paper prepared
for the President's guidance on this topic. The position recommended was
essentially as follows: (1) keeping Yugoslavia free of Soviet domination is
extremely important to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (2) economic sid
to Yugoslavia should be continued, (3) arms aid programs to Yugoslavia should
be continued, and (4) planning for the military support of Yugoslavia in case
of attack should proceed as rapidly as possible, reserving the political
decision as to implementation until circumstances require a decision. 165 It
was stressed that such plans should be developed by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Standing Group. In the meantime, however, hilsteral talks between
G. S. representatives and military representatives of the U. K., France and
Italy should proceed.

One of the latest policy developments in connection with Yugoslavia was to examine the military advisability of U. S. participation in the development of uranium and beryl ore sources in Yugoslavia as suggested by a Yugoslavian official in Mashington. It was recommended that the Air Force support an errangement whereby the United States might conduct or participate in exploration for uranium and beryl ores in Yugoslavia, but that no firm Department of Defense position with respect to exploitation should be reached until further information as to the exact acture and extent of the ere bodies was known.

Training of Foreign Sationals. As a result of the growing politico-military importance of Yugoslavia and Spain to the United States, re-sommideration of

165. JCS 1901/66 166. JCS 2134/4





the over-all listing of foreign countries in order of group priority for the allocation of spaces for training foreign asticuals in U. S. Services Schools came up for consideration. In light of the important strategic interests of the United States in Spain and Yugoslavie, it was recommended that the U. S. Air Force support the placing of these countries in Priority Group 7.167

Politico-Military Review of the Current Sorld Situation. Early in July air Staff comments were prepared on the periodic review of the global politico-military picture as it affects U. S. strategic interests. In general the Air Force position concluded that (1) some progress had been made in the cold wer, but the United States was not receiving adequate support from other non-communist nations, (2) U. S. military posture was improving but still deficient, (3) the demestic economy was becoming disturbed over the demands being made on civilians, and (4) neutralish and nationalism were becoming increasingly troublesoms factors. Accordingly, the Air Staff supported measures designed to increase and strengthen our major allies, to socialize our deliveries of WAF material, to easure that there is no relevation in our build-up, and to develop a psychological surface progras, 168

167. JGS 962/195 168. JGS 1888/16

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION



## CIVIL AIR BRANCH

1. The Civil Air Branch prepares the policies of the Air Force in the field of Civil Aeronautics and advises the Chief of Staff, USAF, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Department of Defense on the military aspects of matters pertaining to Civil Aviation. In respect thereto, the Civil Air Branch is responsible for furnishing liaison with government agencies and private industry as the DCD or USAF may require. There were no changes in the organization and functional structure of the Civil Air Branch during the period 1 July 1951 to 1 January 1952. Colonel John D. Bridges replaced Colonel Glynne M. Jones as Chief of the Branch.

2. During the period between 1 July 1951 to 1 January 1952 the most important items of work of the Civil Air Branch can be summarised as follows:

a. NATO - Air Transport Advisory Committee: By membrandum/
6 July 1951, the U. S. Deputy Representative to the Standing Group, NATO
Military Committee requested the Chief of Staff, USAF to designate a
representative conversant with U. S. air transport policies and procedures,
to the Standing Group, Air Transport Advisory Committee. Colonel John
D. Bridges was selected for this assignment. This advisory committee,
comprised of representatives from the U. S., U. K., and France, developed
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a report/ to the Standing Group on a military point of view for coordination and control of military and civil air transport. The JCS agreed
in principal with the basic concepts in the Standing Group report. The
report has been reviewed by the U. S., U. K. and France and the Standing

169 The Control and Allocation of Air Transport in the Event of an Emergency.

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Group Advisory Committee will reconvene at an early date for the purpose of rewriting it in the light of the comments of member nations. Informal coordination has been effected with the Department of State and a U. S. position on proposed redrafts of the report is now being formulated.

b. Civil Reserve Fleet Plan: At the instance of the Civil Air the Vice Chief of Staff on 3 July 1951 directed the Deputy Chiefs of Staff to prepare the Air Staff position concerning a plan for a "first and second line reserve fleet". The Air Force Councily, after being briefed by the Civil Air Branch, approved the Civil Reserve Fleet and directed it be forwarded to the Navy, Army, JOS and the Secretary of Defense for approval. The U.S. Army approved the plan on 31 August; the Navy on 28 August concurred in the plan but requested that 45 of the civil aircraft concerned be allocated to Navy Fleet Logistic Wings. On 21 September 1951 the CNO was informed that the 45 civil aircraft requested could not be made available since all of the aircraft under the plan (331) would be required by MATS alone to meet DOD airlift require-The JCS/ approved the plan on 7 December 1951 as written, and in so doing supported the Air Force position as prepared by the Civil Air Branch. On 15 December 1951, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce signed a joint "Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Modification and Use of Civil Aircraft for Defense Purposes". Members of the Civil Air Branch monitored the negotiations and coordinated

<sup>175</sup> Name of Understanding between the DOD and DOC concerning the Modification and use of Civil Aircraft for Defense Purposes", 15 Dec 51.



SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION


<sup>171</sup> RAR's prepared by Civil Air Branch to Deputy C/S.
172 AF Council Decision "MATS Mobilization Plan for Civil Aviation", 25Jy 52.
173 Civil Reserve Fleet Plan (MATS Plan), 27 June 51.
174 JCS 2165/9, 7 Dec 51



the final drafting of this document. It provides that the Secretary of
the Air Force should implement the CRAF plan for the DOD, and the Defense
Air Transport Administrator should implement the plan for the Department
of Commerce. The Civil Air Branch will monitor the implementation of this
plan within the USAF. In summary, the plan provides that the Civil
Aviation industry furnish the DOD on 18 hours notice, 331 aircraft, 3.5
aircrews per aircraft, and full ground support. The Air Force will
stock pile the spare parts necessary to maintain these aircraft at a
10 hour utilization rate. The 331 aircraft will be modified by civil
contract, to permit the installation of equipment required for 2500
mile over water flights. The communication, navigation, identification,
emergency and rescue equipment will be made ready for immediate installation
and/or removability at a weight growth of not exceeding 100 pounds per
aircraft.

- c. Air Priority System: The Civil Air Branch continued to assist the Air Force, Army, Navy and Munitions Board and Office, Secretary of Defense in developing a Department of Defense position concerning the administration of a wartime air priorities system. A coordinated position 176 was resolved 28 December 1951 / as follows:
  - (1) During war, a single system of air priorities based on a single set of criteria, and administered by a single agency will be required to achieve the maximum utilization of the nation's airlist capabilities. The


priorities system should apply to all traffic on all 176 Letter to Mr. Butler from DOD signed Foster transmitted 2 Jan 52.





civil and military, domestic and international except military operations excluded by the Secretary of Defense. Priority policies and regulations governing military traffic thus excluded should be developed and administered by the DOD.

- (2) An Air Priorities Board comprised of one representative from each, the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce, should develop the broad policies governing civil and military air priorities.
- (3) Responsibility for the wartime administration of an Air Priorities system should be vested in a Director of Air Priorities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Commerce should delegate authority to him for the wartime administration of air priorities on the civil air carriers. The Director of Air Priorities should be guided by the policy determinations of the Air Priorities Board.
- (4) In summary, the DOD believes that:
  - (a) There should be a single system of air priorities.
  - (b) This system should be administered by a single agency.
  - (c) During wartime, the single agency should be the DOD.





- d. The Japanese Peace Treaty: The Civil Air Branch participated 177 in the preparation of that portion of the Japanese Peace Treaty/ dealing with civil aviation and joint military/civil aviation. The Branch also commented on the contents of the administrative agreement / providing for the garrisoning of U. S. forces in Japan as permitted under par 3 177 of the Bilateral Security Treaty/ between the U. S. and Japan. Advice was furnished by the Civil Air Branch in the drafting of the proposed Japanese Civil Aeronautics Laws.
- e. ACC Studies "Development of Commercial Helicopters";

  Separation of Mail Pay from Subsidy": The Civil Air Branch provided

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  assistance in the preparation of two ACC studies/ of national significance,
  i.e. "Federal policy on development of commercial type Helicopter", and
  "Separation of mail pay from Subsidy for commercial Scheduled Air Carriers
  of the U.S." The studies were instituted at the request of the Senate
  Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Senator Johnson, chairman),
  and were submitted to the President by the ACC.
- f. The North Atlantic Route: The post-war commercial air route certificates were issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1945 and 1946 for seven year periods. The first and most important of these, the North Atlantic Route, is now being reviewed. The Civil Air Branch is the Air Staff office of primary interest and has provided policy guidance in the development of the DOD position.

SECURITY INFORMATION



<sup>177</sup> JGS 2180/48 178 ACC 110 and ACC 93/1. 179 JGS 687/19



g. Utilization of CAA in Case of Emergency: The Civil Air Branch monitored a study on this subject. Mr. C. F. Horns, administrator of CAA, and Brig. Ceneral I. F. Farman, USAF, are members of a Working Group responsible for determining the (1) military requirements for CAA services in emergencies; (2) national interest requirements for CAA services during emergencies and thereafter; (3) Civil Aeronautics Administration mission in accordance with requirements; (h) extent of militarization, if any; and (5) preparation of a plan for utilization of the CAA during emergencies. The preliminary report/ was incomplete and was returned to the Working Group with appropriate instructions to prepare a detailed plan and the necessary draft legislation for the warting use of the Caa when the Fresident so directs. The Working Group after further consultation with the Secretary of Commerce (CAA), returned their study to the Chief of Staff, USAF, again with a request that DCS/O, Plans, determine DCD requirements for CAA service. The Civil Air Branch is at present preparing a Staff Study "To Determine the Air Force position for Utilization of CAA in a National Emergency".

h. Evacuation by Air of U.S. Nationals in Troubled Areas in Emergencies: The Civil Air Branch obtained the following information for the Secretary of the Air Force:

(1) Six Field Liaison Groups have been established with responsibility for developing a plan for the evacuation of American citizens from troubled areas


180 Working Group report now Civil Air Branch for study.





during emergencies. In occupied areas the senior military commander will prepare such plans. The lisison groups, comprised of representatives of the civil and military agencies within the area concerned, assist in determining the priorities of evacuation and in notifying the principle diplomatic and military officials. The Washington Liaison Group coordinates all plans prepared by field liaison groups and forwards such plans to JCS for approval. Broad Air Force policy provides that no U. S. military aircraft can be pre-allocated for evacuation purposes. The Department of State has made charter arrangements whereby commercial air carriers may be used for evacuation in emergency periods short of war. If war occurs, the theater commander is authorized to suspend, curtail or adjust U. S. commercial air carrier operations as necessary. The military position is that U. S. Blag carriers may be used for a one way, one time, evacuation trip in order that these aircraft can be placed quickly in position to perform their wartime mission. Military aircraft will be used to move military wounded, sick and dependents in that priority. Thereafter, U. S. national evacuses will





be moved in available military aircraft as the situation 181 merits. However, surface means of transportation will be used in the main for this purpose.

- i. The German Contractual Agreement: The Civil Air Branch is 182 perticipating in the German contractual agreement 7 and ancillary documents as they relate to German civil aviation activities and responsibilities, and to joint military-civil aviation.
- j. MSRB Air Transport Mobilization Survey: The Civil Air Branch is the Air Staff office charged with monitoring the work pertaining to the National Security Resources Board, Air Transport Mobilization Survey. Ten Task Groups, comprised of representatives of government and industry, were created to recommend solutions for the problems under 183 survey. The reports/ of the Task Groups were revised and the Air Staff comments with respect to each of the reports were prepared in the Civil Air Branch for transmittal by the Secretary of the Air Porce to the Chairman of the Air Transport Mobilization Survey Committee.
- k. ACC Discussions Comparaing Selection of U. S. Delegations to International Civil Aviation Organization Meetings: Colonel John D. Bridges represents the Air Force on an ACC Ad Noc Working Group charged with determining the best method of selecting delegates to represent the U. S. at international conferences including ICAO meetings. The Marking Group has submitted a report/ to the ACC outlining the

181 Jos 2001/6; 2001/7; 2001/8.

182 JOS 2124/61

183 10 MSRS reports were prepared.

184 ACC 51/23/10





principles and procedures which will govern the selection of these delegates. The ACC has decided to apply the principles and procedures in the selection of the U.S. delegation to the next International Civil Aviation Organization Conference. The final acceptance of the principles and procedures in the report is predicated upon the success of this trial.

- 1. The ACC Airport Use Fanel Ad Hoc Working Group: Colonel John D. Bridges is serving as Air Force representative on an Ad Hoc Working Group comprised of impartial individuals from interested government agencies to study the problem of reconstituting the Airport Use Panel as a division of ACC and under the established rules of procedure of the ACC. The final report of this Working Group has been held in abeyance.
- m. Contracting for Services of Aircraft of Foreign Registry:
  On 13 December 1951 at the request of MATS, an Air Force policy was 185
  developed permitting the contracting for services of aircraft of foreign registry after the use of U. S. aircraft had been fully considered. MATS will forward offers of aircraft of foreign registry on which they have positive recommendations to Headquarters, Air Force, for disposition. The issuance of Air Force procurement instructions covering this matter has been referred to the Air Materiel Command.
- n. Establishment of Emergency Reserve Pool Airways and Air Traffic Control Equipment: On 21 December 1951, the Civil Air Branch prepared a reply to Mr. Myrop, Chairman ACC, stating that in accordance 185 1st Ind to MATS dated 13 Dec 1951





with the agreement reached in ACC 59/39.1A, the Air Force has included in FY-53 budget, a requirement for five emergency reserve pool GCA units. When procured these five GCA units will be made available to the Civil Aeronautics Administration for operation at agreed locations. The Air Force will support the CAA in securing legislation necessary to establish and maintain the proposed emergency reserve pool as a matter of national interest.

- o. Standby Operational Plans for Use of Military Airlift in the Event of Suspension of Railway Services: The Civil Air Branch pre186
  pared the papers leading up to a JCS conclusion/ that the Air Force should have primary responsibility for planning and controlling the use of all military-owned aircraft made available to meet a domestic transportation crisis. The JCS concluded that the Chief of Staff, USAF, should designate a Task Force commander who would exercise operational control. Commander, MATS, was designated Task Force Commander, by the Chief of Staff, USAF, after coordination had been effected with the Navy.
- p. DGD Policy Book: The Civil Air Branch is monitoring a relater vision of the Department of Defense Policy Book/ regarding civil aviation.

  General policies of the Department of Defense in the field of seronautics are being drafted, in addition to specific policies covering Air Transport lift, Air Navigation facilities and services, civil

186 JCS Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 11 July 1951.

187 Policies and Programs of the Department of Defense in the Field of Givil Aeronautics dated 1 May 1950.





aviation as an instrument of strategic policy (international route patterns), wartime use of the CAA, civil contributions to U. S. military effort and military contributions to civil seronautics.

q. ACC Representation: Mr. H. Heinrich Spang was designated Air Force member of the Economic Division of the Air Coordinating Committee, 27 July 1951, vice Colonel Glynne M. Jones, relieved.

Colonel John D. Bridges was designated alternate Air Force member of the Economic Division of ACC on 27 July 1951, vice Mr. H. Heinrich Spang, relieved.

Colonel Phil B. Cage was designated Air Force member, International Aviation Facilities Subcommittee, Economic Division, vice Lt Colonel James B. Kendrick, relieved, effective 20 August 1951. In this connection, Colonel Cage, as a member of the U. S. delegation, attended the International Civil Aviation Organization European Mediterranean Air Traffic Control meeting held in Paris during October 1951. This is reported as being the first international meeting at which complete agreement was reached concerning a standardized system of air traffic control.

Colonel Phil B. Cage, designated Air Force member, Subcommittee on Chicago Convention, 20 August 1951, and Air Force member, Subcommittee on General ICAO Matters, 20 August 1951, vice Lt Colonel James B. Kendrick, relieved.

Lt Colonel F. F. Riley served as Air Force member of the National Security Resources Board, Air Transport Survey Task Group "D" - Airports. A Final report was sent to the Air Force for comment by the Chairman of






the National Security Resources Board Air Transport Survey Committee.

The Air Staff strongly disagreed with much of the substance of this report.

Mr. Van Zandt, Office, Secretary of the Air Force, transmitted the formal reply in which Interagency conflicts were avoided. He stated that the Airport Use Panel had proved to be adequate to meet situations covering Airport matters and that its success rendered largely superfluous any further comment on the Report of Task Group

Colonel John D. Bridges was appointed alternate Air Force member to Major General Patrick Timberlake, on the Planning Committee on a Second National Airport to be located at Burks, Virginia.





#### DOMESTIC BRANCH

The Domestic Branch continued to exercise its responsibility for the development and preparation of Air Staff positions on politicomilitary matters primarily of a domestic nature. The following resume sets forth the most important Air Staff actions handled by the Branch during the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951.

Military Air Transport Service. The inability of the Army, Navy and Air Force to reach an agreement on a proposed charter for MATS at joint staff agency level resulted in a split paper (JCS 279/32) being forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution. The controversial issues with respect to the MATS charter remain: (a) control and direction of MATS, (b) Air Force and Navy contribution to MATS, (c) relationship of MATS to service organic transport capability. The JCS did not reach agreement on this matter and on 6 December 1951 they directed the Chief of Staff, USAF, to submit a revised MATS directive for consideration. The revised directive, which consisted of the original MATS charter of 3 May 1948 with obsolete wording removed was presented to the JCS on 21 December 1951. The charter as revised was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and is currently under study in the Management Committee.

Land Transportation. In March 1949 the Secretary of Defense approved in principle the assignment to the Army of the responsibility for the operation of common-use land transportation in overseas theaters. In a memorandum dated 14 November 1951 the Acting Secretary of Defense proposed a draft directive designed to assign to the Department of Army coordinating control of all Department of Defense use of land transportation and land





transportation facilities in the Zone of the Interior.

At Joint Chiefs of Staff level and at the level of the Secretaries of the three Services the Navy and Air Force strongly opposed this action on the ground that it would place one Service in the position of monitoring the strategic capabilities of the other two. By the end of December 1951 the differences between the Services were unresolved. The Acting Secretary of Defense has proposed to send the matter to the Armed Forces Policy Council for recommendations.

Joint Boards Established in Consonance with JAAF. Chapter II of AFM 1-1 (Joint Action Armed Forces) approved by JCS (2045/8) calls for the establishment of six joint boards. These boards are:

Joint Tectical Air Support
Joint Air Defense
Joint Air Transportation
Joint Amphibious
Joint Airborne Troop
Joint Landing Force

### ESTABLISHED BY AND RESPONSIBLE TO

Chief of Staff, USAF
Chief of Staff, USAF
Chief of Staff, USAF
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, USA
Commandant, Marine Corps

The three boards responsible to the Chief of Staff, USAF, were

to "lly established by AF General Orders #37, dated 2 July 1951. Although

each " the boards has been established by the service concerned, none is

yet fully man..." or completely operational.

Prior to establishment of JAAF Boards the Department of Army had for some time contended that adequate machinery did not exist for effecting essential coordination between the Services in Joint Training and Joint Action - particularly in the areas of tactical combat, troop carrier and SECURITY INFORMATION

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air defense. The Army solution advocated was the establishment of Joint Training Centers, under the JCS, with the Army as Executive Agent for Tactical Centers and the Air Force as Executive Agent for only the Air Defense Center. Implementation of Army proposals would, in effect, have surrendered Air Force control of TAC, Tactical Aviation and its functions in almost all aspects from research and development to combat employment, and further would have made Air Defense a JCS rather than Air Force function. In finally arriving at an agreed compromise solution, Joint Boards were established with representation from all Services but operating under and responsible to the Chief of the Service having primary interest.

This solution preserves Air Force control but requires that the Air Force properly man and operate its primary interest boards and provide competent and adequate representation on three other boards on a full time basis. This solution is considered to be the most advantageous obtainable to the Air Force. If it had been necessary to force the basic splits between the Air Force and the Army past the JCS, decision by higher authority might have gone, at least partially, against the Air Force, resulting in loss of control by the Air Force of nearly half its functions and forces. If these boards fail or are not efficient, the Army case for establishment of Joint Training Centers and control of Tactical Aviation will be materially reinforced.

After resolution of problems culminating in JCS decision to establish the joint boards, the Domestic Branch has undertaken the problems relating to making the boards operational and manned to permit discharge of responsibilities prescribed by JAAF. Coordination has been completed with DCS/P and Secretary of Air Staff to the extent that Air Force space allocations

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for the several boards have been approved and required personnel have been ordered to them for duty. Charters for the JAAF boards responsible to the Chief of Staff, USAF, have been drafted and forwarded to Departments of Army and Navy for concurrence or comment. To date, Department of Army has concurred in Air Force proposed charters for the Air Defense and Tactical Air Support Boards, and minor Air Force-Army differences on charter for the Air Transportation Poard are nearly resolved. The Department of Navy has to date refused to coordinate or comment on Air Force board charters submitted for consideration. After completion of inter-service coordination of board charters responsible to the Chief of Staff, USAF, they will be submitted in turn to the Chief of Staff, USAF, and the Secretary of Defense for final approval and publication.

The Domestic Branch is responsible for monitoring the JAAF created boards until such time as Board charters have been officially promulgated and the boards themselves are fully operational when monitorship will revert to Directorate of Operations.

Personnel Matters for Joint Emergency War Plan. Part VI-Personnel, of the Logistics Plan in support of the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan, was amended by the Joint Logistics Plan Committee to reflect current policies.

The Air Staff agreed with the Joint Logistics Plan Committee revisions with one exception. With respect to plans for the evacuation of military dependents and U. S. Nationals from the "overseas area" to the continental United States, it was recommended that this be limited to "threatened or critical areas overseas". Further, the policy with respect to evacuation of allied nationals from combat areas should be broadened to include nationals of allies in all occupied areas and should not be limited to North Atlantic Organization powers participating in the occupation of Germany. The JCS approved this SECURITY INFORMATION

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recommended change.

Document Regarding Universal Military Training. A draft brochure which purported to inform the American people what Universal Military Training is and how it will affect their children was prepared for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Mrs. Rosenberg) with the assistance of an advertising agency. Mrs. Rosenberg requested the JCS to indorse this document, which would be given wide publicity through the newspapers, magazines, radio and television. This Branch non-concurred in the proposal that the JCS indorse this brochure because the document does not properly reflect the views of the JCS with respect to the relative importance of Universal Military Training in our present effort to achieve and maintain military preparedness.

By implication throughout the paper, and by direct statement in at least one instance, the brochure made the assertion that "above everything else, Universal Military Training appears to be our best hope of avoiding war". It was considered that the JCS should not indorse a document to the American people which would lead them to believe that implementation of Universal Military Training is the primary means of attaining and maintaining that state of military preparedness necessary for the security of the United States. It was recommended that the document be rewritten so as to put Universal Military Training in proper perspective with respect to the military preparedness program of the United States. The JCS, as a result of the Air 189 Force position, withdrew this matter from consideration.

188. JCS 1844/104 189. JCS 1849/89






## Composition of the U. S. Navy.

The Department of the Navy recommended for inclusion in the 1952 Legislative Program a bill to provide a new basic authorization act for the Navy with respect to vessels. It would repeal all existing tonnage authorizations and provide a new tonnage composition of four categories.

This office prepared Air Staff comments on the Navy proposed legislation which recommended that the Air Force interpose no objections, provided amendments were included to bring the legislation in line with the National Security Act of 1947. Among the other objectional items was authority for the Secretary of the Navy (a) to present his annual ship building program to Committees of the Congress prior to study by the Secretary of Defense, and (b) authority to proceed with his program prior to the appropriation of necessary funds in the event that Congress took no adverse action on the proposed program.

Subsequent to submission of these comments, the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense prepared a revision of the bill which incorporated a number of changes designed to limit the authority of the Secretary of the Navy in consonance with the National Security Act of 1947. These changes would overcome the objections previously raised by the Air Staff and as a result this office recommended that the Air Force interpose no objections to the bill as revised by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense.

<sup>190.</sup> R&R to Legislation & Limison, Subject: OSD Number 170, a bill "To provide for the composition of the U. S. Navy and Under Age vessels, and for other purposes", dated 23 Jan 1952.





Safeguarding of Vessels, Harbors and Ports. A proposed Executive Order, "Amending regulations relating to the safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities of the United States," was referred to this Branch for preparation of Air Staff comment. The purpose of the proposed Executive Order is to prohibit vessels of the USSR and satellite nations from entering major ports and certain navigable waters of the United States. This subject has been a matter for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Council for some time.

On 30 January 1951 the President directed a joint Navy-Treasury Committee to coordinate and integrate their programs with respect to the defense of United States ports. As a result, the President approved a joint committee report which recommended that an Executive Order be promulgated to prohibit Soviet and Soviet satellite vessels from entering certain major ports. The report and the draft Executive Order were not made available to the Air Staff for study.

The Air Staff recommended to the Director of Legislation and Liaison that the Air Force concur in principle with the proposed Executive Order. However, since the report prepared by the joint committee was not made available to the Air Staff and since the Staff was not aware of the criteria used in establishing the lists of satellite countries and prohibited ports, it was not in a position to offer comment thereon. It was noted that vessels of the Soviet zone of Austris, Finland, Latvis, Lithuania registry were not excluded from U. S. ports by the Executive Order. Since there has been considerable discussion with respect to the relationship of these countries to the USSR it was considered advisable that the Office of the Secretary of



Defense be advised of their omission from the proposed Executive Order.

There is a possibility that certain critical materials now being received by the U. S. for defense purposes are being transported in vessels of the countries listed in the proposed Executive Order; the Air Staff felt that this should be brought to the attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense so that the possibility of the U. S. being denied these materials might be given consideration.

On 30 November 1951 the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force forwarded a report to Office, Secretary of Defense which indicated that the Air Force concurred in the principle of the proposed Executive Order; the report did not point out the possible objections indicated by the Air Staff. On 5 December 1951 the Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Bureau of the Budget a letter which indicated the Department of Defense approved the proposed Executive Order but suggested that promulgation be held in abeyance until 1 January 1952.

Prototype Aircraft. H. R. 3914, a bill "To provide for the design, development and construction of prototype aircraft suitable for local-service airlines," was referred to the Director of Plans for a Department of Defense position; the bill would authorize the appropriations of \$8,000,000 for development of such an aircraft. It was pointed out to Legislation and Liaison that the Prototype Aircraft Advisory Committee of the Civil Aeronautics Administration had this matter under consideration, and recommended that the Air Force withhold comment pending the committee's report.

The Office of the Secretary of Air Force indicated that the Air Force should not withhold comment on this legislation because the Prototype Aircraft Advisory Committee report would not be forthcoming in the near future and

191. RAR, Directorate of Flans, Subject: Proposed Executive Order, dtd
29 November 1951.
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because members of Congress were pressing the Air Force for a definite opinion. As a result, this office, working with interested Air Staff agencies, determined that it would not be advisable for the Air Force to support N. R. 3914, because the local-service aircraft to be developed under this legislation would not meet the military requirements either combat or combat support, and the diversion of critical funds to development of such an aircraft is considered inadvisable at the present time. The Air Staff opinion was rejected by the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force in lieu of a position which favored the legislation provided it was amended to require that the Secretary of Commerce should receive the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense prior to granting contracts under this act.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense subsequently non-concurred in the Secretary of the Air Force position, inasmuch as the amendment would give the Department of Defense a statutory veto power over activities, which by law are matters of primary concern to the Department of Commerce.

The Air Staff reaffirmed its opposition to enactment of H. R. 3914 and indicated that neither the Secretary of the Air Force position nor the Assistant Secretary of Defense position on this matter were acceptable 193 to the Air Staff as the Air Force position on H. R. 3914.

<sup>192.</sup> R&R, Directorate of Flans, Subject: H. R. 3914, dtd 12 September 1951. 193. R&R, Directorate of Flans, Subject: H. R. 3914, dtd 23 January 1952.





Authority for the Secretary of Agriculture to Build Air Ports. This Eranch prepared Department of Defense comments on S. 2229, a bill "To authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to apply, construct, operate, and maintain public air ports in certain areas and for other purposes". Enactment of this legislation will result in the Department of Agriculture being added to the list of government agencies now authorized to promote air port development.

Although the Air Force generally favors projects that will enhance the development of any phase of service aviation, in this case it was thought unwise for the Air Force to support legislation which would in effect give the Department of Agriculture and Civil Aeronautics Administration carte blanche to utilize material and personnel available for air port construction without prior consideration for defense needs. Therefore, the Air Staff recommended that the Air Force interpose no objection to S. 2229, provided the legislation was amended so as to require the CAA to coordinate establishment of each project initiated under the provisions of this bill with the Department of 194 Defense.

Legislation to Remove the 70 Group Ceiling of the Air Force. As a result of a request, initiated by this Branch 26 December 1950, that immediate action be taken to remove the limitation of 70 Air Force groups as provided in Public Law 604, two bills were introduced in the Congress.

S. 1652 introduced by Senator Russell on 12 June 1951 was identical to the bill proposed by the Department of the Air Force. This legislation was referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and to date no action has been taken by the Committee.

194. RAR, Directorate of Plans, Subject: S. 2229, dtd 11 December 1951.

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In lieu of the Air Force draft bill on 70 group limitation

Congressman Vinson introduced H. R. 5077 which proposed to amend the

Army and Air Force Authorization Act of 1949 by increasing the strength

of the Air Force from 70 groups to 138 combat wings (plus separate units

including 25 air cargo groups). This office prepared Air Staff comment

on H. R. 5077 which indicated that it would seem inappropriate to fix the

number of Air Force combat units by law in view of the present international

situation. The Air Staff felt that the Air Force, with the approval of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be permitted to adjust its organization within

the limits composed of personnel ceilings and appropriated funds. This

would provide the Air Force the same leeway with respect to internal

organization now enjoyed by the Army and Navy which are not statutorily

limited as to the number of combat units.

The Air Staff further indicated that in the event the Congress determines that a limitation must be placed on the number of combat wings authorized the Air Force, it was recommended that H. R. 5077 be amended as as to clarify the present nomenclature of Air Force units and to indicate that the limitations 195 would not apply during any war or national emergency. Before this Staff position was submitted to the Director of Legislation and Liaison it received approval of General Twining and General Vandenberg. The Director of Legislation and Liaison submitted this Air Staff position to the General Counsel, Department of the Air Force, on 14 September 1951. As of 25 January 1952, Legislation and Liaison had received no indication from the office of the General Counsel as to what position that office favored with respect to H. R. 5077.

195. R&R, Directorate of Plans, Subject: H. R. 5077, dtd 4 September 1951.





On 18 August 1951 Senator Harry F. Byrd in a letter to the Secretary of Defense pointed out that under Public Law 604 the Air Force is limited to 70 groups but in the current appropriation bill the Air Force was requesting funds for a 95 wing Air Force. This letter was referred to the Secretary of the Air Force for preparation of a reply to Senator Byrd. A letter signed by Mr. Finletter, dated 23 August 1951, stated that "the limitations imposed by Title II of the Authorization Act do not apply in the present emergency".

This office non-concurred in that statement and attempted to have the Secretary's office reconsider its position inasmuch as the Secretary had already indicated to the Congress that removal of the statutory limitation was considered necessary.

In June 1951 Congressman Form introduced H. R. 258 which expressed the sense of the House of Representatives that the U. S. Air Force should attain at the earliest possible date a strength of at least 150 Air Groups. As a 196 result of comments prepared by this office, the Directorate of Legislation and Liaison prepared a report on H. Res. 258 which indicated that the Department of Defense agrees in principle with the resolution in that it looks to an expanded and stronger air arm. However, to favor a specific, larger number of wings at this time would involve definite programming commitments and manpower determinations which neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of the Air Force is presently prepared to make. Both the Army and the Navy non-concurred in this proposed report and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as of 31 December 1951, had not indicated its position with respect to this Resolution.

196. R&R, Directorate of Plans, Subject: H. Res. 258, dtd 2 July 1951.





Separation of Subsidy from Air Mail Pay. During July and August 1951 several bills pertaining to the separation of air mail pay from subsidy were referred to this office for preparation of Air Staff comment. This Branch working with Civil Air Branch prepared the Air Staff position on this matter which was subsequently forwarded to the Congress by the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The position on these several bills is as follows.

The Department of Defense is of the opinion that this subject is one of primary concern to other agencies of the government; however, we do have an interest in any bill which may affect the development of a prosperous, economically sound air transport system. The desirability from the point of view of efficient government administration of separating subsidy and air mail pay has been recognized by the Department of Defense. The manner in which such separation is accomplished is not of direct concern to this department with one possible exception, namely, that relating to international operations.

In the international field, the Department of Defense considers that injury to the national interest might result from disclosure of certain types of detailed information on subsidy payments which would reveal either the monetary value or the relative importance this government attaches to its commercial air service to any particular point or particular country, such as might be developed in hearings leading to subsidy awards. This department recommends that adequate safeguards against the disclosure of such details be accomplished by expanding Section 1104 of Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, to permit the withholding of information, the disclosure of which, in the opinion of the President would jeopardize the national interest.





In legislation providing for separation in both the domestic and international fields, it may be desirable to permit the regulatory agency to give first priority to domestic routes and to defer separation for international groups for a year until experience has been gained in the 197 domestic field.

Legislation to Authorize Modern Aircraft Carriers. On 28 September 1951 this office forwarded to the Director of Legislation and Liaison, after receiving approval of the Chief of Staff, Air Staff comment on a proposed Department of the Navy report favoring H. R. 5078, a bill "To authorize the construction of modern aircraft carriers". The Staff indicated that the Air Force should oppose enactment of H. R. 5078 because:

- a. There is no compelling strategic requirement for the construction of two additional 60,000 ton aircraft carriers.
- b. Inclusion of these carriers as additional defense forces will undoubtedly adversely affect the attainment of forces for which there is a very great strategic need.
- c. Until such time as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended and the Secretary of Defense has approved the addition of two large aircraft 198 carriers to defense forces, legislation such as H. R. 5078 is premature.

The Director of Legislation and Liaison forwarded a report similar to that indicated above to the Army, Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense 199 for coordination on 12 October 1951. As of 31 December 1951 the Department of the Navy had not submitted a revised report on H. R. 5078.

<sup>199.</sup> OSD letter, Subject: H. R. 5078, dtd 12 October 1951.



<sup>197.</sup> Letter to Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, dated 3 August 1951, signed by John A. McCone, Acting Secretary of the Air Force. 198. R&R, Directorate of Plans, Subject: H.R. 5078, dtd 28 September 1951.




Joint Action Armed Porces. The joint publication "Joint Action Armed Forces", FM 110-5 (Army), JAAF (Navy) and AFM 1-1 (Air Force), was distributed during November and December of 1951. This publication sets forth principles, dectrines and procedures governing the activities and performances of the Armed Forces when two or more Services or elements thereof are acting together to achieve a common task or mission. The three completed chapters contain basic guidance for the Services and commanders of joint forces on "The Functions of the Services" (Chapter I), "The Functions of the Individual Services" (Chapter II), and "Command and Organization" (Chapter III). Chapter IV, which contains "Joint Aspects of Special Operations", has been drafted but has not been approved.

Domestic Branch has monitored preparation of this publication for the



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#### I. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

#### AIR RESUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS WINGS

In further implementation of the programmed activation of Air Resupply and Communications (ARC) Wings, the 581st ARC Wing was activated on 9 July 1951 at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho.

Simultaneously, the 580th ARC Wing was reorganized in accordance with revised T/OhE's.

As a result of tests conducted under Project POSSUM, at Air Proving Ground, certain alreaft modifications were determined to be requirements for ARC Wing aircraft and arrangements made with Air Materiel Command to accomplish same. For example, it was determined that the activities of these Wings required the removal of all turrets from B-29's with the exception of the tail turrets.

In connection with the deployment schedule of these Wings, representatives of this Headquarters held conferences in Tripoli, USAFE, and Third Air Force in the United Kingdom. This resulted in confirmation of Wheelus Field, Libya, as the temporary location for the 580th ARC Wing, pending negotiations for and construction of a permanent base in Libya, and confirmation of Molesworth in the United Kingdom as the location for the 582nd ARC Wing.

To assure high level Air Force-wide appreciation of the ARC program and the mission for which they are being organized and trained,

Ltr, Dept of the Air Force, File 322 (AFOMO 333g), dtd 9 Jul 51, Subject: (U) Constitution, Activation and Reorganization of Units of the 580th and 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wings.



Special Operations Case File, AFOFD-PW 322, is on record in Psychological Warfare Division, D/Plans.



a briefing by representatives of the Psychological Warfare Division was conducted at the Senior Commanders' conference at Colorado Springs, Colorado, on the 31st of October 1951.

The deployment of the 580th ARC Wing to Wheelus Field was started in Movember 1951. Due to strenuous objections raised by the Department of State, this deployment was temporarily cancelled. Further objections were received from the British Chiefs of Staff shortly thereafter. All necessary action was initiated immediately following the postponement of the deployment to obtain full concurrence from the Department of State and from the British. At the present time, formal clearances have not been received, but such clearances are anticipated in the near future.

Due to unavoidable delays in the procurement of equipment with resultent delays in training, it proved impossible to deploy the 581st as originally programmed. Further, due to the postponement of the deployment of the 580th and the resultant saturation of Mountain Home Air Force Base, it has been impossible to activate the 582nd ARC Wing. Therefore, reprogramming was effected which resulted in the following schedule:

WING	ACTIVATION	DEPLOYMENT
580th	Complete	As soon as possible, but not prior to 1 April 1952
581st	Complete	FEAF, May 1952
582nd	February '52	United Kingdom, October 1952
583rd	April '52	Burope, December 1952
584th	Sept '52	Remain at Mountain Home; operational readiness, May 1953

Movement Directive contained in Hq USAF Msg AFOOP-OO-C, CAF OUT 53085, dtd 16 Oct 51.

<sup>4.</sup> TS 2706, dtd 16 Nov 51 5. CAF IN 89545, 11 Nov 51





On 12 December 1951 a policy guidance letter outlining the missions of an ADC Wing was dispatched to CINCUSAFE and CO, FEAF for their information and guidance.

#### ORGANIZATION

In Hovember 1951 the personnel on duty in the Special Operations
Team of the Psychological Warfare Division were increased from two to
four. At this time a reorganization was effected in order to expedite
handling of the rapidly increasing work load. This reorganization consisted of the establishment of a Team Chief, one officer for Plans and
Policy, one officer for Current Special Operations, and one officer for
AEC matters.

#### CURRENT OPERATIONS

Current operations have been increasing at a rapid rate. However, Air Force support has, of necessity, continued to be on a piece-meal or project-by-project basis. In an effort to provide more efficient and economical Air Force support, a staff study concerning aircraft requirements for the following six month period was prepared in December of 1951. Although a final decision relative to the furnishing of aircraft enumerated in the staff study has not been reached at the present time, it is anticipated that such favorable decision will be received within the next thirty (30) days. In conjunction with this, deployment of an AEC Wing to the Fer East, estimated to be in May 1952, will materially assist in this program. This assistance will consist of an organization to provide centralised administration and control, plus furnishing of necessary sirlift, maintenance and planning assistance.

<sup>7.</sup> On record in AFOFD-PW files.



<sup>6.</sup> Ltr, Subject: (U) Air Resupply and Communications Wings, dtd 12 Dec 51, filed in AFOFD-PW 322.



#### II. ACTIVITIES

#### RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Activities conducted by the Division during the period of this report included the following projects:

#### Leaflots

A full report<sup>8</sup> on the sources and availability of phosphorescent material for use in producing nocturnal leaflets was received by this office in October 1951 from Air Research and Development Command. Lack of interest by Psychological Warfare units in the Far East in such leaflets has caused suspension of a proposed project to prepare and service test them in the Korean conflict. Information from Air Research and Development Command will be retained for future use.

Specifications were received from the General Tire and Rubber Company of a material developed by them which might fill the requirement for durable leaflets. The material is satisfactory in every way for the purpose, except that normal offset printing methods cannot be determined by the manufacturer, field use of the material for leaflets appears impractical.

## Leaflet Bombs

M-105- Final operational suitability test results 10 from Air Proving Ground were received on 7 August 1951. The report indicated satisfactory performance from B-29 type aircraft below 30,000 feet with bursting altitude of approximately 1,500 feet. A field visit to Far East Air Force

<sup>10.</sup> File 471.6, Psychological Warfare Division



<sup>8.</sup> File 415, Psychological Werfare Division

<sup>9.</sup> Loc. cit.



indicated satisfactory operation of M-105 leaflet bombs for rear area drops in Korea from B-29 aircraft at bombing altitudes of 20,000 to 25,000 feet.

T-80- Representatives of this office and Army PsyWar witnessed high speed, high altitude tests of the T-60 leaflet bomb from B-29 and B-45 aircraft at 35,000 feet at Edwards Air Force Base, California, in August. Preliminary results indicated bomb stability but faulty fuzes, and lack of bombing aircraft in commission prevented completion of tests during visit. The final report was received late in December; results have not been fully evaluated.

T-58- Additional requirements livere submitted to the Director of Research and Development to increase the projected dispersal pattern of leaflet bombs in general, and the T-58 bomb in particular, because its larger size intensifies the dispersal problem. Tests of fuzed leaflet packages at Air Proving Ground in June and good results of similar packages used currently in Korean tactical operations, led to the recommendation that several such packages be contained within the leaflet bomb, individually fuzed to burst at varied altitudes below bomb burst altitude. Development of the T-58 leaflet bomb has not progressed to the point that this additional requirement will affect target date of 1953.

#### Loudspeakers

A request by the Far East Command through Far East Air Force for the installation of six (6) AM/AIA-4A (Navy) loudspeakers in tactical

11. File 471.6, Psychological Warfare Division





aircraft for Psychological Warfare operations in Korea was received 12 in July. The following actions were performed on the project:

- a. After study of the requirement, B-26 type were selected as the only tectical aircraft feasible for this use.
- b. Wright Air Development Center completed emergency details and installation in test aircraft in September. Many modifications were necessary on both loudspeakers and aircraft to effect the completed units. Tests were witnessed by representatives of this office, 18-20 September which indicated performance of equipment was far better than units currently in operation in Korea.
- c. One B-26 was allocated to project FAF 2B-173, and installation was made at Ogden, Utah. Personnel from this office observed final tests in November, and the simplene arrived in Far East Air Force late in Becamber 1951.
- d. Three (3) additional loudspeaker-equipped B-26 aircraft were en route Far East Air Force at the end of the reporting period.
- e. No report on the use of these aircraft in Korea has yet been received.

Two projects were started and requirements established through Special Projects Division, Director of Requirements, for loudspeaker development:

- a. The development of an airborne loudspeaker for use in modern tectical aircraft for use over tectical targets on friendly troops and 12A occupied friendly populations.
- 12. DF, dtd 6 Jul 51, fr Dept of Army, Subject: Tactical Aircraft for the Installation of Public Address Set AN/AIA-hA. (File 676.5, AFOPD-PM)
- 124. BAR to Special Projects Div, DCS/D, dtd 3 Oct 51, Subject: Air-to-Ground Communications Equipment for PW (File 676.5, AFOPD-PW)



# SECURITY INFORMATION

- b. The development of a droppable loudspeaker <sup>12B</sup> capable of disseminating short messages over strategic targets in enemy homeland areas (such as target warning in conjunction with Strategic Air Offensive).

  The statements of military characteristics for both loudspeakers have been approved and forwarded to the Directorate of Research and Development for implementation with a target date of 1953.
- c. This office has investigated a voice reproduction device developed by the University of Miami. The research department of that university was given a briefing on our requirements for droppable loudspeakers. The University is planning a presentation to this office and the Directorate of Research and Development on how their device could be modified to fit our requirements.

#### Leaflet Dispenser

A requirement was established for a dispenser to be mounted on low flying fighter or fighter-bomber aircraft. 13 Its use could greatly improve the efficient dissemination of leaflets over front line and adjacent rear areas where enemy opposition precludes the use of slow transports for such operations. Confirmation of such a requirement was received in Korea during an inspection trip by a representative of this office.

#### Leaflet Packaging Machine

Air Materiel Command has been unable to obtain a bidder for a proposed packaging machine without preliminary development contract, and is now in the process or preparing bids for such a contract.

12B. R&R to Special Projects Division, DCS/D, dtd 3 Oct 51, Subject: Airto-Ground Communications Equipment for PW (File 676.5, AFOPD-PW)

13. R&R to Strategic Air Div., D/Requirements, DCS/D, dtd 1 Nov 51, Subject: (U) Leaflet Dispenser, fr Psychological Warfare Division

SECURITY INFORMATION



Presses and Printing Equipment, Air Resupply and Communications Wings

Constant pressure was maintained during the reporting period for the procurement of presses and allied lithographic equipment for the Air Resupply and Communications Wings. With the exception of equipment borrowed for training purposes no Unit Essential Equipment has been received by the 580th and 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wings. Current schedules indicate that the majority of subject equipment will become available in the first six months of 1952. The following action was initiated during period relative to printing equipment:

a. A study of web-fed presses 14 and recommendation that the TO/E of the Reproduction Squadrons be changed to substitute two such presses for eight (8) of the sheet-fed presses now authorized. This recommendation has received the approval of the Director of Requirements and new equipment will be fed into the Air Resupply and Communications program whem available.


b. Action was initiated in July 1951 to produce two (2) image transfer (Claff) field lithographic presses for operational suitability tests at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho. If tests prove successful, these presses may be included in the TO/E for the reproduction teams which have no specified printing equipment at the present time.

#### Skywriting

At the request of Far East Air Forces, a project was initiated to investigate the feasibility of using skywriting for psychological warfare purposes over enemy and friendly occupied territory. This request was

Composing and Duplicating Equipment (File Approved 115.52)

6. Raff to Special Projects Div, DCS/D, dtd 12 Oct 51, 373.1)




<sup>14.</sup> RAR to Printing Rr. Publishing Div, AAG, dtd 16 Aug 51, Subj: Procurement of Web-Fod Printing Equipment (File 413.52 AFOFD-W)

<sup>15. 1</sup>st Ind, Hq USAF, to Ltr, Hq ARCS, dtd 6 Aug 51, Subjt Procurement of

submitted to Directorate of Requirements in October 1951, but no information has been received to date. (A current study by Dr. Chen of the Air University, Far East Research Group, studying the psychological impact of symbols, may well be correlated with this project.)

The following Research and Development activities were engaged in by this Division during the reporting period:

- a. Continual liaison with Human Resources Research Institute, Air University, on requirements for Psychological Warfare Research. This included participation in leaflet drops at Salt Lake City (Project Revere) in July 1951.
- b. Representation on Human Resources Sub-Committee of the USAF Technical Committee.
- c. Limison with RAND Corporation on current Psychological Warfare
- d. Attendance at annual Bombing Accuracy Conference at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
- e. Conferences with representatives of Psychological Strategy
  Board and Research and Development Board Ad Hoo Committee on research
  problems.
- f. Continued limison with staff officers of the Air Resupply and Communications Service on problems of material development and procurement.
- g. Study of Strategic Air Command leaflet and leaflet bomb stockpile requirements in light of current Emergency War Plans.
- h. Trip to Japan and Korea in December to study psychological operations in the Far East Theatre, and ourrent requirements for research and





development in that field. Visits were made to Far East Air Forces
Headquarters, Far East Air Materiel Command, Psychological Warfare
Section, Far East Command; Psychological Warfare Section, Eighth
Army; Fifth Air Force Headquarters, and Air University Far East Research Group.

#### ORIENTATION PROGRAM

## "Battle Report - Washington"

At the invitation of Dr. John R. Steelman, Special Assistant to President Truman, Colonel James W. Anderson, this Division, appeared as guest speaker on the weekly TV program "Battle Report - Washington", Station WHEW - NBC - TV, Sunday, 9 September 1951 (1500-1530 hours). The program is sponsored by the White House and has an estimated audience of 4,000,000.

During the four-minute spot allocated to the Air Force, Colonel Anderson described United States Air Force's assigned mission in military psychological warfare program, and steps being taken to implement these responsibilities. In this connection, he pointed out (a) the need for trained military personnel, and (b) USAF's training program at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.

#### "Bullets or Words"

In October 1951, work was completed on an eight-page, two-color informational brochure, devoted to the basic aims and military application of psychological warfare as a weapon. The illustrations for the pamphlet were contributed by the noted cartoonist, Milton Caniff, and Herbert Block, editorial cartoonist for the Washington Post.





The brochure, carrying the provocative title, "Bullets or Words", was printed late in November and copies were distributed throughout the Air Force and other interested agencies. Continental Air Command has made arrangements to distribute 1,600 copies of "Bullets or Words" to the various Air Force Reserve units.

#### Goodwill Tour


At the request of the Department of State (Homorable George C. MoGhee, Assistant Secretary of State), this Division, in cooperation with the Directorate of Public Relations, assisted in the development of plans to send Major James Jabara, USAF, the world's first jet ace, on a goodwill tour to Syria and Lebanon under the sponsorship of the Syrian-Lebanese-American Federation.

Major Jabara is of Syrian descent and it was felt that a goodwill tour of the Arab countries would contribute to the attainment of our national objectives in the Near East.

Major Jabara was detailed to the Department of State for a period of forty-five (45) days, and left for Beirut, Lebanon, on 7 January 1952.

Three (3) days after Major Jabara departed for the Near East, a request was received from Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe, to have Major Jabara visit Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, for technical discussions pertaining to his experiences in Korea and a goodwill tour of NATO air bases. Request was granted on 12 January 1952 and USAF Psychological Warfare officer in Headquarters, USAFE was advised to monitor Major Jabara's tour in Western Europe. Special guidance was also dispatched at this





time. This project was the first use of Air Force personalities for psychological warfare purposes. 17

## USAF Psychological Warfare Orientation Exhibit

The first public showing of the USAF Psychological Warfare Orientation Exhibit was held 24-26 August 1951, at the Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, California, in connection with Air Force Association's Fifth Annual Convention. An estimated 8,000 people, representing Air Force Reservation personnel and the general public viewed the exhibit. In addition, Los Angeles television station ETTV devoted a half-hour program to the exhibit on 25 August 1951 (1300-1330 hours). A representative of this Division explained the content and significance of the exhibit to an estimated 300,000 audience who viewed the special program. The exhibition stimulated interest in the Air Force Psychological Warfare program, and as a result, an appreciable number of queries were received from Reserve personnel and civilians interested in our activities.

The exhibit was next displayed at the annual Texas State Fair,

Dallas, Texas, 6-21 October 1951. This is one of the largest of the

State Fairs in America and draws more than 2,000,000 people each year.

Then early in August 1951, a request was received from Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe to schedule the USAF Psychological Warfare Orientation Exhibit for a tour in Europe. The necessary coordination was effected with the Directorate of Public Relations and the

<sup>17.</sup> Information and documents pertaining to arrangements connected with this project are on record in Psychological Warfare Division.





USAF Exhibit Group, and the exhibit was displayed at the following locations in Germany: (a) Wiesbaden, 19-23 November; Heidelberg, 26-29 November; and (c) Frankfurt, 3-6 December 1951. The exhibition at Heidelberg was in conjunction with the joint United States Air Forces in Europe-European Command Psychological Warfare Conference.

### Artzybasheff Illustration

Color plates of a Time magazine cover illustration (17 September 1951) by the noted artist, Boris Artzybasheff, were forwarded to the Far East Air Forces for psychological warfare exploitation purposes in Kores. Mr. Artzybasheff is employed as an art consultant to this Division.

#### PLANS

#### Annex for War Plans

For the first time the Psychological Warfare Division was asked to sit in on the original discussions preceding the preparation of a new war plan.


Heretofore war plans have been prepared without giving consideration to the psychological implications. Only after the plan was complate that the Psychological Werfare Annex was prepared and attached.

In this case, the psychological implications were fully considered before the final draft of the plan was completed.

#### Briefing of RAND Reports

This Division made written and verbal briefs of RAND Reports dealing with psychological warfare, to selected key Air Staff personnel.






Among these was R-215 which is Volume II of an over-all RAMD study of "Service Conditions and Morale in the Soviet Armed Forces" and deals specifically with the Soviet Air Force. While the written brief was prepared during the period of this report, the verbal briefing is to be given in January 1952.

#### TRAINING

On 6 July 1951, nine (9) officers were enrolled at the American University, Beirut, Lebanon, for a six (6) weeks' Summer course in geopolitics. With the opening of the Fall school term at Georgetown University, one hundred (100) officers were enrolled for the thirteen (13) weeks' Psychological Warfare Courses of the School of Foreign Service; these courses started on 17 September 1951, and on 1 October 1951. Fifty (50) officers were enrolled in the special courses of the Graduate School. Of this number, thirty-five (35) were also enrolled for foreign language refresher courses at Georgetown. These enrollments met our total space allotment for this school period.

As previously reported, the monitoring of the training program for Psychological Warfare officers at Georgetown University was delegated to Military Air Transport Service and Air Resupply and Communications Service Headquarters in accordance with AFR 36-53.

Twenty-seven (27) officers attended an eight (8) weeks' course at the Armed Forces Information School (for Public Information Officers) at Fort Slocum, New York, seven (7) of whom completed the course on



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10 August 1951 and the remaining twenty (20) on 15 October 1961.

Ten (10) officers attended the Army General School at Fort Riley, Ransas, completing a ten (10) weeks' special course on 15 Hovember 1951.

It should be noted that this program still has priority in obtaining the services of officers who successfully complete the three (3) months! special warfare course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Thirteen (13) Air Force officers, eight (8) from Air Resupply and Communications (ARC) Service, and five (5) from other commands, attended this course of instruction beginning 10 December 1951.

## Voice of America

As the Division's Psychological Warfare Program continued to expand throughout the year, various other sources of specialized training were utilized for the further training of Psychological Warfare Officers (9305) and Foreign Language Propaganda Officers (9306), all of whom are earmarked for key positions in the USAF Psychological Warfare Program.

A majority of the graduates from the previous class at Georgetown
University received on-the-job training with other government agencies or were enrolled in other schools. Ten (10) officers who were placed on ninety (90) days temporary duty with "Voice of America" in New York, completed their further training with "Voice of America" on 15 November 1951 and reported to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, for duty.

On 23 December 1951, arrangements were made to increase the number of Air Force officers assigned for on-the-job training at Voice of





America" from ten to twenty-eight, and eight more officers will be sent to "Voice of America" installations overseas for additional training.

The eight officers to be trained overseas will be reassigned to the appropriate Air Resupply and Communications Wing, at the completion of their training.

At the end of the year, forty-four (44) officers were enrolled in USAF Institute of Technology Foreign Language Program in civilian institutions and at the Army Language School at Monterey, California. Thirty-four (34) other officers have already been earmarked for enrollment in one or the other of these civilian or military language schools for similar training during the ensuing months. It is understood that upon successful completion of this training each of these officers will be assigned to the Air Force Psychological Warfare Program.


It is to be noted that during the period covered by this report,

AFR 36-65, Application for Assignment to Psychological Warfare Duty,
was distributed to the major air commands, thus bringing the Psychological Warfare Program to the attention of military personnel throughout the Air Force. This Regulation has already resulted in a sufficient
number of volunteers to fill the quota for the Georgetown training course.

#### Extension Course

The Director of Training, Headquarters USAF, notified the Psychological Warfare Division on 29 October 1951 that the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, does not have adequate facilities to take care of a request which was initiated by this Division on





7 August 1961 to prepare a Psychological Warfare extension course for training Reserve and Regular Air Force officers.

## Search for Linguists, Area Experts, Artists

Action has been taken to establish a Psychological Warfare mobilisation training program for this Headquarters. A tentative training schedule has been prepared and search is being made to locate and recruit experts who can be integrated into the Air Force Psychological Warfare Program as mobilisation assignees, designees, consultants, experts, or as officers on active duty.

## Orientation-Training Film

With the activation of the Air Resupply and Communications Wings during the first half of 1951, the demand for a psychological warfare orientation-training film was further accentuated. On 20 August 1951, this Division submitted to the Air Pictorial Service, Directorate of Public Relations, a preliminary synopsis for such a film. After the synopsis had been reviewed, approval was obtained from Directorate of Training, DCS/Personnel, for the film's production during 1952 (Training Pilm Project 19107), and the Air Pictorial Service contracted for the services of Mr. MacMinlay Kantor, the noted author, to write the script for the Air Force Psychological Warfare orientation-training film. The script is expected to be completed by 1 April 1952. Air Pictorial Service plans to have the picture produced by one of the leading studies in Hollywood, California.





## Psychological Warfare Training Manuals

The final drafts of the three psychological warfare training manuals, the request for which was initiated by this office on 26 December 1950, are expected to be completed by 1 April 1952. This project is being jointly sponsored by the Air Force and the Army.

Current status of the training manuals is as follows:

- Vol I "The Theory and Nature of Psychological Warfare" 50% completed
- Vol II "The Nature and Use of Psychological Warfare" First draft is being revised
- Vol III "Case Book on Psychological Warfare Operations" 80% completed

## Translation of German Psychological Warfare Leaflets

An album of German Psychological Warfare leaflets was made available to this Division by Mr. Robert Levitt of New York. These leaflets were used by the faculty of Georgetown University for instructional purposes and are being translated by them into English. Translations will be made available to this Division when complete.

LECTURES

### Dallas, Texas

In connection with the displaying of the USAF Psychological Warfare Orientation Exhibit at the Texas State Fair (G-21 October 1951), arrangements were made with Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force, for a representative of this office to give a two-hour lecture on psychological warfare





to members of the 2596th Air Force Reserve Training Center and other Reserve Units in the Dallas area. Approximately seventy-five (75) officers attended the lecture, 12 October 1951. Reservists attending the lecture were given a conducted tour of the Psychological Warfare Exhibit.

## Harvard University

At the request of the Commanding Officer, 9231st Volunteer Air Reserve Training Squadron, Boston, Massachusetts, a representative of this office gave a two-hour lecture to members of 9231st Reserve Unit, 13 November 1951. Members of the Unit all hold an Intelligence Air Force Specialty Code and are largely faculty members of Harvard University. In addition to Air Force, members from the Army and Navy Reserve units also attended the lecture.

## Georgetown University

Early in December, an invitation was received from the Director,
Institute of Languages and Linguistics, Georgetown University, Washington,
D. C., for a member of this Division to give two lectures (13 and 14
December 1951) to some 150 Air Force officers attending the University.
This lecture dealt with the essentials and application of psychological
warfare.

#### CONFERENCES

#### In Europe

Late in October 1951, information was received from Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe of plans for a joint United States





Air Forces in Europe-European Command Psychological Warfare Conference at Heidelberg, Germany, 27-28 November 1951, to coincide with a European Command Commanders' meeting scheduled for the same period.

This Division was requested to (1) arrange for the scheduling of the display of the USAF Psychological Warfare Orientation Exhibit as an informational feature of the conference, (2) select a number of Air Force guest speakers for the agenda. The following speakers represented the Air Force on the conference agenda:

Colonel James W. Anderson, Jr., Psychological Warfare Division,
Directorate of Plans, DCS/O, Subject: "USAF Psychological
Warfare Operating Units";

Dr. Hans Spier, The RAND Corporation, Subject: "Soviet Satellite Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare"; and

Dr. W. Phillips Davison, The RAND Corporation, Subject: "Psychological Warfare Operations in Korea".

In addition to the Air Force speakers, the following additional agencies and organizations were represented: Brigadier General J. D. Balmer, Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army; Colonel John F. Splain, Directorate of Plans, United States Air Forces in Europe; Lt Colonel R. G. Cicolella, Buropean Command; Mr. C. D. Jackson, President, National Committee for a Free Europe; Mr. A. V. Boerner, Public Affairs Division, High Commissioner, Germany; Mr. Waldoman A. Nielsen, Public Information Office, Mutual Security Agency.





Approximately two hundred (200) military and Federal civilian agency representatives attended the two-day conference.

## At the Air University

Officers of the Psychological Warfare Division attended a conference sponsored by the Human Resources Research Institute of Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, on 6 and 7 December 1951.

The first day of the conference consisted of a series of lectures given by the staff of the Human Resources Research Institute and by the principal contractors who are performing research for the Air Force in the field of Psychological Warfare.

The second day consisted of a seminar attended by Human Resources
Research Institute staff members and by the principal contractors. Subjects discussed consisted of the identification and analysis of Psychological Warfare vulnerabilities and the methodology for the gathering
of psychological warfare intelligence on politically inaccessible areas.

#### Physical Security Equipment Agency

The Physical Security Equipment Agency has been established by the Federal government to develop unusual items needed by such operating agencies as the Air Force.

On 10 July 1951, representatives of this Division met with representatives of the agency to develop mutual areas of interest from the standpoint of Air Force Psychological Warfare equipment and non-rational appeal items requirements. Discussions covered the following:





- a. Equipment Printing presses and supplies, loudspeaker equipment for planes, photographic equipment including tiny cameras for black operations, radios, sky-writing equipment, balloons for all types of operations.
- b. Non-Rational Appeal Items (to be air dropped) Toys, booklets, out-outs, candy, needles, thread, rice, scap-paper, phosphorescent leaflets, metallic or other glittering material for leaflets, trick-pictures, and pornographic items.

#### At Headquarters USAF

With the second in a series of leaflet test operations scheduled for early 1952, a conference was held on 11 December 1951 at Headquarters USAF, to discuss and develop plans designed to coordinate part to be played by this Division, Air Resupply and Communications Service, and Human Resources Research Institute of the Air University. Plans call for active participation by one of the Air Resupply and Communications Wings in the projected leaflet test operations, scheduled for the summer of 1952. These tests are known by the code title, "The Revere Project", and are under the overall supervision of Public Opinion Laboratory, University of Washington. Representatives of the Air Resupply and Communications Service were briefed on the responsibilities of the Air Resupply and Communications Wing in these tests.

## BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARRANG

Activities in Biological and Chemical Warfare were keynoted by the approaching completion of chemical and biological agent plant production facilities. During this period it became a matter of urgency to establish





quantitative requirements for agents to be produced in these facilities and to initiate action necessary to insure that the Air Force would be prepared to effectively utilize EW and CW munitions in the execution of war plans.

Paramount in preparing for a D-Day capability with anti-personnel BW munitions was the establishment of a logistics system compatible with the short-life, or viability, of the agents, and with the requirement of refrigorated transportation and storage of agents. The Psychological Warfare Division requested that the Director of Requirements consider the feasibility of transporting agent in bulk or capsules to overseas areas and filling and assembling manitions at those points. This method would reduce the requirement for refrigerated transportation and storage space, and permit the replacement of agent as viability was lost. This legistic concept was subsequently incorporated into guidance to the Army Chemical Corps by the Assistant for Atomic Energy, for development of BW munitions. 21

An analysis of the suitability of various categories of tactical and strategic targets to biological attack, previously requested from the Directorate of Intelligence by the Psychological Warfare Division, was completed. The tabulation of degrees of suitability of these categories and a similar tabulation for suitability to chemical attack were included in the January 1952 revision of the Emergency War Plan. 22

AFEWP 1-52, Annex A, Appendix I. Part I, Volume I



<sup>18.</sup> JCS 1837/18

Toid 19.

RMR, Strat Air Div, D/R, DCS/D to D/Plans; (Cmt #2, D/Plans to D/R, DCS/D, dtd 23 Nov 51) Subj: (SECRET) Filling, Clustering and Storage of EW Bombs in Forward Areas, dtd 25 Oot 51) (AFOFD-FW 385 EW 3)
Ltr DAF file CMMR 4-04-14-006 AFOAT, Subj: (SECRET) Storage, Assembly and Delivery of EW Agents and Maintions, dtd 17 Sept 51, w/Z Inds. 20.

<sup>21.</sup> 



A comprehensive analysis of chemical munitions requirements was initiated by the Psychological Warfare Division, in conjunction with the War Plans Division, Directorate of Plans; Air Targets Division, Directorate of Intelligence; Commands Division, Directorate of Operations; and IM-CW Division, Assistant for Atomic Energy. This study, to be completed in March, 1952, was based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept for the conduct of a war beginning 1 July 1954, and the results of the study would enable computation of quantitative requirements from the standpoint of comparatity effectiveness to other types of weapons, and tonnage requirements for neutralization of specific targets. Psychological Warfare Division also requested the Director of Intelligence to prepare a target study, including target folders, for an additional anti-crop mission. Since the agent and munition for this mission were still in the experimental stage, and data on the munition and agent had not been compiled for Air Force use, the Psychological Warfare Division collected available data from the Chemical Corps and various Air Force Research and Development sources to enable the conduct of the target study. Procurement of munitions for this mission was also initiated by the Psychological Warfare Division. 24

Requirements for additional BW-CW munitions were included in the FY 1955 budget. Herve gas munitions stockpile requirements were expanded on the basis of a 50% usage factor for one month's sorties of all medium bombers, light bombers and fighter bombers and a 20% usage

25.

ReR (TS), D/Plans to D/Intelligence, Subject: (Restricted) Request for Target Study, 6 December 1951
ReR (TS), D/Plans to D/Requirements, DCS/D, Subject: (S) Procurement of BW Manitions, dtd 22 Oct 51; and ReR (TS) D/Plans to D/Requirements, same subject, dtd 29 Nov 51
ReR (Confidential) fr AFMSS, subject: (Restricted) Requirement for EW-OW Manitions, dtd 16 Nov 51



factor thereafter. Anti-personnel BW munitions stockpile requirements were expanded to provide for the capability to attack eighty (80) industrial complexes.

At the request of the Chairman, Research and Development Board, and based on information presented by him, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the priority with which ten (10) biological agents should be developed to end items. Botulinum toxin, the only agent included with potential tactical use, was given lowest priority based on the apparently high cost of munitions and the high tonnage required per unit area of target. As the data on which the botulinum toxin costs and tonnages were estimated were extensively limited and subject to revision upon further testing, and realizing the urgent need for a tactical BW agent, the Air Force strongly opposed the priority list when it was considered by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. Although the priority listing was logical based on the meager data available, approval of the paper as it read, would have precluded further developing and testing of botulinum toxin and would have given no significant priority to the development of a tactical BW agent. At Air Force insistence, it was agreed to include a statement as to the real requirement for tactical agents and specifying a high priority for their development. Further, the paper was rewised to specifically direct that additional test data be obtained on botulinum toxin in order that it might be re-evaluated. Thus, without altering the actual priority listing, the Air Force was able to protect the status of botulimum toxim and give impetus to the development of additional tactical agents.

28. JCS 1837/23






In accordance with the policy of familiarising a greater number of Air Force personnel with the EW-CW program, personnel of the Psychological Warfare Division participated in the briefing of the Commanding Generals of Tactical Air Command and the United States Air Forces in Europe, and members of their staffs. A member of the Psychological Warfare Division also participated in a briefing on EW and CW for certain staff members of the Royal Air Force Headquarters and attended a Tri-partite Planners Meeting in which theories of employment of EW-CW munitions by the member nations were exchanged and discussed. Further, in order to gain insight into the problems associated with producing EW agents, a member of the Psychological Warfare Division attended a one-week orientation course conducted by the Army Chemical Corps primarily for engineering and production personnel who are associated with the design and operation of EW facilities.

Colonel Arthur E. Hoffman, the only member of the BW-CW Team at the beginning of the period, was transferred to the newly organized BW-CW Division, Assistant for Atomic Energy, in August. Major Whitfield A. Martin was assigned to the Team in Aly, and Lt Colonel Leland W. Stead was assigned in October, assuming the position of Team Chief vacated by Colonel Hoffman. 27


<sup>27.</sup> Copies of Special Orders are on file in AFOFD, Office of Asst Executive for Personnel and Administration.



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MOBILIZATION DIVISION, D/PLANS, DCS/O:

The Mobilization Division consists of the following branches:

Mobilization Plans Branch

Foreign Military Assistance Branch

Logistics Analysis Branch

Brig. Gen Haywood S. Hansell, A017h68, was recalled from retirel to become Chief of the Division on 16 July 1951, replacing
Colonel Myles W. Brewster, 2070A, assigned overseas. General Hansell
has had a long and brilliant career as an Air Force planner. His experience and leadership are fully utilized by the increased work load
imposed on this Division due to Korean hostilities and present world
conditions.

The Mobilization Division is assigned the following:

Prepares USAF Mobilization Plans

Organizes and develops post D-Day aircraft strength tabulations of Air Force Units (by type and model) for use in formulating War and Mobilization Plans.

Prepares foreign military assistance programs and is the focal point within the Air Staff for foreign military assistance matters.


Par 5, 5012A dtd 26 June 51 Hq USAF

<sup>2</sup> Par 4, S0136 dtd 16 July 1951 Hq USAF

<sup>3</sup> Hqs USAF Organization and Function Chart Book page 12F dtd May 1951.

#### MOBILIZATION PLANS BRANCH

- 1. Effective on or about 1 July 1951 the Mobilization Plans Branch was reorganized into two Sections as follows:
- a. Capabilities Section for mobilization planning connected with the Emergency War Plan (AFEWP).
- b. Hequirements Section for preparation of Air Force Mobilization Plan (AFMOP).
- Administrative control continued to be vested in the Branch Chief and his assistants.
- 3. To achieve maximum planning efficiency, the personnel within each Section were organized as a planning group responsible to the Chief of the Section for development of the complete plan. Lisison with companents of the Air Staff resulted in Mobilization Plans Branch officer personnel specializing in various portions of each plan's development.
- h. The mission of the Branch, as prescribed in an unnumbered memorandum from Director of Plans, DCS/O, dated 20 September 1950, was applied to the component Sections as follows:
  - a. Capabilities Section was made responsible for:
    - (1) Assisting in preparation of AFEWP.
    - (2) Esvision of mobilisation aspects of AFRWP to reflect changing responsibilities.
    - (3) Initiation and coordination of mobilization staff studies to test the feasibility of strategic concepts in terms of resources excepting aircraft.



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- b. Requirements Section was made responsible for:
  - (1) Preparation of AFMOP on a requirements basis.
  - (2) Concerting AFMOP with comparable plans of the other Services and with the Joint Mobilization Plan.
  - (3) Review of mobilization plans of the major Air Force Commands.
  - (b) Participating in the formulation of Air Force Reserve policies.
  - (5) Reviewing, briefing and recommending courses of action to GS/USAF on joint, combined and inter-departmental papers pertaining to mobilization.
  - (6) Advance demobilization planning and special mobilization studies as directed.
  - (7) Translating mobilization plans into guidance for budgeting and programming.
  - 5. Experience gained in the development of AFMOP 2-51, completed during period 1 Jan 30 Jun 51 resulted in materially shortening the pre-planning and development time for AFMOP-52. Comparative time-phase statistics for the two plans are as follows:

AFMOP 2-51 AFMOP-52

Pre-planning period 12 months 5 months

Development period 7 months 6 months

 The development of AFMOP 2-51 further resulted in a revision of the method of preparing and presenting AFEWP. Whereas AFEWP previously

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had been prepared by the War Plans Division, Directorate of Plans, the experience gained with AFMOP 2-51 and the reaction of various recipients indicated that a similar development and presentation should be adopted for AFEMP. Accordingly, by memorandum from Director of Plans, dated 17 August 1951, the Mobilization Division (Mobilization Plans Branch) was designated the principal agency soliciting Air Staff assistance for both AFMOP and AFEMP. However, primary responsibility for AFEMP continued to remain with the War Plans Division.

- 7. The date of commencing development (K-Date) of AFEMP 1-52 was established as 1 October 1952. Target date for completion was set as 7 January 1952 but delays resulted in the estimated completion date being moved to 1 March 1952.
- 8. K-date of 15 August 1951 was established for AFMOP-52 with target date of completion set for 31 December 1951. However, as in the case of AFEWP 1-52, interruptions caused by the problems cited later in this chapter delayed completion of AFMOP-52 until the estimated date of 1 February 1952.
- 9. To facilitate planning procedures by the Air Staff on both
  AFEMP and AFMOP, the Mobilization Flanners Group was reconstituted as
  per memorandum from the Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, dated 24 April 1951.

SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) USAF Emergency war Plan for January 1952 (AFEWP 1-52) and Air Force Mobilization Plan based on the Joint Mobilization Plan (AFMOP-1-52).

Memorandum from Chief, Mobilization Division, 27 September 1951, SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) Planning Data and Procedures for preparation of Air Force Emergency war Plan (AFEMP 1-52).

<sup>3.</sup> Memorandum from Director of Plans, 21 August 1951, SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) PROCEDURE for Preparation of U. S. Air Force Mobilization Plan (AFMOP-52)

See Glossary on page 271
 SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) U. S. Air Force Mobilization Plan (AFMOP-52)

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10. A representative of this Branch was on the committee formed
4 June 1951 by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force to develop a
realistic, long-range plan for the proper utilization of the Air Reserve
Forces. The committee in collaboration with the Air Staff, developed
and published a comprehensive plan on 27 July 1951.


11. Commencing on orabout 15 May 1951 this Branch monitored a series of informal conferences of Air Staff members to develop Wartime Planning Factors for aircraft utilization and activity rates. These factors were developed for use in computing mobilization data for guidance of current programs and in developing requirements for AFMOP-52.


12. Major problems, which delayed preparation of certain portions of both the Mobilization and Emergency War Plans, were encountered as follows:

- a. Emergency War Plan:
  - (1) Changes in basic information and concepts.
  - (2) Lack of firm basic guidance in sufficient time to allow scheduled completion of plan.
- b. Mobilization Plan:
  - (1) Lack of agreement within certain sections of the
    Air Staff on composition, amount and deployment of
    forces (air) as set forth in JCS guidance.

6. (SECHET) Report of the Smith Committee Appointed to Develop the Long Range Plan for the Reserve Forces of the United States Air Force.

 Published on or about 1 August 1951 in document entitled "Wartime Planning Factors for Aircraft Utilization".





- (2) Lack of sufficient guidance in certain aspects of the joint plan to enable detailed determination of supporting forces.
- 13. The following difficulties, which advertely affected both the Emergency War and Hobilization Plans, have also been encountered:
- a. Confusion within the Air Staff between the Emergency War and Mobilization Plans as to their respective purposes, contents and methodologies.
- b. Failure to secure timely assistance within the Air Staff due to the higher priority accorded other programs.
- 14. The functions, organization and methods of this Branch are continuously under review for improvements. Additional experience with AFEWP and AFMOP and refinement in planning methods are expected to eliminate the major problems cited above.

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Foreign Military Assistance Branch

1. The mission of the Foreign Military Assistance Branch, Mobilization Division, Director of Plans, remained the same during this period, and the Branch continued to be the focal point for MDA Programs within the Air Staff. Aside from the continuing problem of refining the FY 1950 and FY 1951 MDA programs, the refinement of the FY 1952 program was placed on a high priority by all agencies concerned in an effort to align the FY 1952 program with the revised FY 1950 and 1951 programs.

2. On October 10, 1951, the Congress passed the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Public Law 165. This Act authorized funds to be appropriated to the President for the FY 1952 MDA Program and in addition authorized a Director for Mutual Security under the executive office of the President, who will be fully responsible for policy and leadership over the three operating agencies: The Defense Department, the State Department, and the ECA.

3. The total Air Force FY 1952 MDA Program as prepared for Congress amounted to 2,0h1,266,3h9 dollars. However, as this program passed thru Congress the total dollar value was reduced, and based upon the reduction, a new 1952 MDA Program,

SENSORES SERVICES

<sup>1.</sup> Dollar value contained in JCS 2099/77

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
plan h, was prepared. FY 1952 MDA Program, Plan h, when subsequently reviewed by the Ad Hoc Committee was further reduced so that at the close of the year the FY 1952 MDA Program totaled approximately \$1,713.2 million and was still subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This dollar value plus the \$1,857.3 millions received for the FY 1950 and 1951 MDA Programs being the total allocations to the Air Force for MDA Programs to approximately \$3,570.6 millions. Even though the FY 1952 MDA Program funds had not been approved at the year's end by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supplemental funds for necessary capital items in the FY 1952 MDA Program were provided thru the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

4. In addition to the refinement of the FY 1952 program preliminary estimates of the FY 1952 Military Assistance Program were formulated and the dollar values were subsequently reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget.


5. The FY 1953 Programs were tentatively formulated on the basis of deficiency lists submitted by the US MDAP missions in the recipient countries. These deficiency lists, upon receipt in this headquarters, were correlated in relation to over-all country priorities for equipment and training in keeping with current strategic plans. These deficiency lists were then submitted to DOS/Materiel for further distribution to AM with necessary guidance for the preparation of an operating or working document to be used in the implementation of the MDA Programs, upon receipt of funds and the approval of Hqs, USAF.

la JCS Ad Hoc Committee on Programs for Wilitary Assistance

SECURITY INVOCANT



- 6. During the period of this report, every effort was made to furnish AMC with essential programming criteria in order to compile requirements pertaining to support equipment. This data included Flying Hours, Projected Aircraft Inventories, MDAP Aircraft Allocations, Activation and Deployment Schedules, Conversion and Manning Schedules, Armament, Electronic and Construction Programs. In the past our support programs have been developed without the benefits of this essential guidance.
- 7. Considerable progress was realized by the Branch in bringing to the attention of the Air Staff the magnitude and the many problems confronting the over-all MDA Programs. In this respect a report on MDAP dated 29 August 1951 was prepared by the Branch encompassing the following:
- a. An outline of the problem, including the background and authorization of MDAP.
  - b. An outline of the objectives to be implemented.
- c. The present established procedure in approaching implementation.



<sup>2.</sup> Subject report on file in the FMA Branch (AFOPD-PM, Hqs USAF)

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- d. The major aspects of the material problem.
- e. Present Organizational responsibilities and progress to date.
- f. Conclusions and recommendations for further action.

This report was used as the basis for a presentation of MDAP by
Brig Gen Hansell, Chief, Mobilization Division, D/Plans, to the DCS/Operations, DCS/Materiel, and DCS/Comptroller on 29 August 1951. As a result of this presentation it was agreed by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff
that:

- a. The Air Staff as a whole must bear the responsibility of MDA Programs under the general guidance and monitoring of one staff agency.
- b. The implementation of MDA Programs should be placed on a systematic basis and programmed, as far as possible, generally like our own Air Force program.
- c. Respective activities of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff would undertake to perform such MDAP responsibilities as they are now performing for USAF programs.
- 8. During this period representatives of the Branch visited various MAAG's in Europe (Title I countries) and the Middle East (Title II countries) in connection with established MDA Programs.

See Department of the Air Force Temporary Duty travel order #AFCAO-14, 2h Oct 51.



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hepresentatives of the Branch were among the members of the survey teams that visited Yugoslavia and Saudi Arabia for the purpose of determining military requirements in those areas.

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<sup>4.</sup> Supplementary USAF Report of Department of Defense Joint MDAp Survey Mission for Yugoslavia (Sept-Oct 51) on file with OSD.

<sup>5.</sup> Report on Reimbursable Aid Agreement, Saudi Arabia (July-Aug 51) on file with JCS Secretary.



## LOGISTICS ANALYSIS BRANCH

- l. The second half of 1951 marked the rapid expansion in office personnel and space as well as a change in organizational structure which fostered the development of more refined methods of computations; a system for a more detailed collection of assumptions and planning factors; and allowed for the application of a more comprehensive study method on special projects.
- 2. In September the office location was moved to a new and enlarged location to accommodate the personnel increases both present and expected. A new work sheet format and procedure was prepared in November which should greatly facilitate the accurate working of the force tabs used as the initial guide in the development and preparation of war and mobilization plans.
- 3. Two outstanding special studies were developed during this period. The first originating within the Branch on the Air Staff Considerations of Certain Logistic Limitations and the second on the new family of bombs vs the old family of bombs in relation to present aircraft modifications. This second study which is still continuing

Three part manual on Force Tab Computations-Logistics Analysis Br.

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum: Assignment of Units for EMP-Logistics Analysis Branch.

Computation of available USAF aircraft and combat crews for development by appropriate Squadron, Group or Wing in 30 day periods throughout war plan period.

Study prepared for DCS/C on Air Staff Consideration of Certain Logistic Limitations.

RAR, subject: Aircraft Monifications Required in order to



developed as a result of a request by D/Requirements for the Branch comments on aircraft modifications to accommodate the new type bombs.

4. EMP 1-52 was initiated and completed during this period as 8 was AFMOP-52. EMP 2-52, the first plan using the new format and many of the refined procedures, was begun in December 1951 with a completion date projected in January 1952.

5. A memo prepared by this office to Director of Plans from Mobilization Division suggested that specific responsibility for area deployment of USAF forces be identified. The specific recommendation that Mobilization Division (Logistics Analysis Branch) prepare force tabs by aircraft type, model, and series and War Plans Division (Red or White Team as appropriate) deploy the force indicated, was accepted, approved and implemented in July 1951. The recessity for area deployment stemmed from requests by various Air Staff offices for additional information to assist in computing and planning various logistic support items.

6. Department of Army submitted their desires as to the Assault Transport ratios and the White Tesm, War Plans Division prepared a

Emergency War Plan, January 1952.

Air Force Mobilization Plan, July 1952.

Emergency War Plan, July 1952.





study with the following recommendations within the 95-group Air Force:

3 heavy groups
7 medium groups
5 assault groups
4 squadrons each
5 assault groups
4 helicopter group
3 squadrons each
6-124
6-129
8-19, H-21

\*(Attached to assault groups for logistic support.)

Comments from this office indicated that the Air Force would lose 141
C-119 aircraft and gain 88 C-123 aircraft plus gaining the balance in helicopters if this study is approved.

7. A monthly meeting to point out Air Staff responsibilities to effect top management control and assure proper balance in the guided 10 missile program was attended by a representative of this office who later briefed the office on the effect on the functions of the office.

8. A review of the Monthly Report on Aircraft Spare Parts and 11 Special Tools disclosed that some aircraft tooling is being disposed 12 of prior to the relegation of the aircraft to non-combat status and elimination from valid war or mobilization plans. A study on this matter was presented to Director of Plans who recommended to DCS/M a proposed amendment to AFR 65-80 to preclude continuation of such action and also recommended that Headquarters, AMC be advised of the changed policy as outlined in the proposed amendment.

Conference 20 July 1951 directed by General Robey, Director of R&D, DCS/D with Chief, Special Weapons Team, D/P, DCS/O as chairman.

Nr. V. Everding.

Stat Control Report, RCS-AF-MD-E-12hC.

B-29 and B-26.



9. DCS/M request for concurrence or comment regarding the disposal of special tooling for producing YC-125 aircraft and spare parts was reviewed for the Mobilization Division with the result that AMC's request to relieve Morthrop Aircraft Company of the obligation to retain this equipment was concurred in.

10. USAF Helicopter requirements were computed on 13 August 1951 and forwarded to Materiel Control Division for inclusion in MA-6 production planning in order for helicopter squadrons to be organized and appear in EMP force tabs and be supported in the wartime production schedules. Air evacuation and forward area airlift requirements were included.

II. The Director of Plans upon study and recommendation by this Branch recommended to the First and Second Line Aircraft Board that the disposal of stored B-29 aircraft at this time was not advisable inasmuch as current war planning and contemplated Air Force expansion indicates a need for a large number of the present B-29 stored inventory. This recommendation was recognized by the Board.

12. A detailed and comprehensive study to indicate the absence of and requirement for a statistical document to facilitate Air Staff evaluation of certain supply limitations and their effect on current planning was prepared for DCS/O.

Study prepared for the DCS/O on Air Staff consideration of certain logistic limitations.





This study pointed out the necessity of knowing logistic limitations in advance of planning to prevent unstable plans and programs and reduce the tremendous procurement and supply problems. It also included the development and background data on the necessity for concurrent logistic and strategic planning.

In summary this study detailed the necessary statistical data to support the action recommended.

13. Machine Accounting Division, Director of Statistical Services, DCS/C, was asked to comment on the possibility of extracting by machine 14 process the aircraft inventories from the OPX reports which if possible would greatly accelerate the present methods of hand extraction now necessary in the Branch to obtain the necessary starting position for war planning force tabs developent.

14. DCS/M sponsored world-wide logistic planners conference was attended by Colonel Rheberg, Lt Colonel Conlin, and Mr. Everding.


Mecessary data to support revisions to WPR-50(A) were furnished to Program Standards and Cost Control, for the portions of which this office is responsible. Data on Guided Missiles and Targets were included in this revision for the first time.

Disposition of J-35-GE 7&9 Special Tooling, 28 September 1951.

16. A review of subject tooling requirements was made and reply 11. USAF Operating Program Data Projected Aircraft Inventory Report. 15
Wartime Planning Factors Manual (Revised).

16

General Electric Jet Aircraft Engine.





prepared for Mobilization Division concurring in DCS/M request for authority to dispose of all such tooling used in the early series of F-8h, B-h5, B-h7 and B-h9. This review concerned the disposition of J-35-GE 7&9 special tooling.

17. Comments were prepared for the Director of Plans on a pamphlet regarding planning guidance for USAF Logistic Structure in Overseas Areas circulated by the Assistant for Logistics Plans, DCS/M. A detailed summary pointed out some discrepancies and overlapping with AFM 400-5.

18. Peak pilotless aircraft, production requirements in connection with AFMOP-52 were developed and furnished to Director of Procurement and Production Engineering, DCS/M. All future production schedules will include pilotless as well as piloted aircraft.

19. A review of the current war plans which contemplate using stored B-29 aircraft has been made to determine the necessity for procurement of R-3350 fuel injection systems for these aircraft in order for Mobilization Division to reply to DCS/M query on this matter.

Mobilization Division recommended that the current EMP be used as a guide in procurement of the systems considering the necessity to procure sufficient numbers to modify 649 B-29 s to be withdrawn from storage less the number currently available for the present aircraft lost from the inventory.




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20. Mobilization trainees were not requested for this Branch since the authorized AFSC was indicated as readily available and not recommended for training. Also the peculiarities of the job, space limitations and security clearances required would make training highly impractical in providing qualifications for future use.

Analysis Branch in conjunction with the White Team of the War Plans
Division, to prepare assumptions and planning factors for force tabulations assuming a D-Day of 1 July 1953. These force tabulations
were called STMME I(UNCL). They envisaged a capability plan based on
the survival concept. The plan was for the purpose of providing
budgetary guidance for the procurement of a readiness reserve of combat consumable material during FY 53 against the contingency of a war
commencing 1 July 1953. Certain computations for this plan were made
by DCS/Comptroller and processed through the pertinent air staff agencies
for the preparation of secondary planning factors concerning amamition,
POL, landing mats, JATO and other combat consumables. Six hundred
forty-nine (649) B-29's were assumed withdrawn from storage in connection
with this plan and budgetary requests were made for pre D-Day stockpiling of the spare parts necessary to re-activate these aircraft.

Inactive duty personnel recalled for periodic short tours of active duty.





Assumptions and planning factors for STYMIE II (UNCL), a similar plan, with a D-Day of 1 July 1954, were prepared on 17 October 1951 for the purpose of computing combat consumable material readiness reserve to be procured during FY 1954 for a war starting 1 July 1954. This plan assumed no B-29 aircraft withdrawn from storage. Computations similar to those in STYMIE I were made by DCS/Comptroller and processed by the Air Staff.

These plans were routed to Programming for use in their presentation to the Budgetary Advisory Committee and subsequently to the Bureau of the Budget.

22. A study was prepared on the disposition of Special Tooling for the PJ31-F-1 Impluse Jet Engine on 18 October 1951 for the Directorate of Plans in reply to a query from Materiel Control Division,

Directorate of Procurement and Production Engineering, DCS/M. This study indicated that final decision must be based on the use of the 18 JB-2. The indications were that the JB-2 will not be required by the USAF thus eliminating the need for the PJ-31-F-1. The Director of Plans indicated that the Directorate did not plan to employ either the JB-2 or PJ-31-F-1 engine in any forces on hand after D-Day. It was suggested, however, since the Navy was known to be using the JB-2 that they be contacted regarding their requirements prior to final disposition.

23. DCS/O forwarded an approved report of the First and Second
Line Aircraft Board to Director of Plans for information and requested

Navy test missile.

19
Pulse Jet engine used to propel the JB-2.



a study to review the MDAP planned requirements for 311 R-47 aircraft in 1952 with a view to eliminating the requirements for obsolete aircraft spare parts. They also requested a study on the B-29 storage requirements for possible disposal of these aircraft. The study by this Branch disclosed a definite MDAP requirement for the F-47's as well as a requirement for 649 stored B-29's to be considered for withdrawal in the January 1952 EMP, leaving a balance of 49 B-29's in storage. The recommendation to DCS/O was not to reclaim an aircraft with any effective combat or training potential until it was replaced by a modern aircraft.

24. The Directorate of Requirements requested comments regarding modification of aircraft to permit them to carry the new family of bombs or the modernized World War II bombs, both of which are now being procured. The proposed modifications were in two phases:


Modification of bombardment aircraft now in the Air Force Inventory

Provisioning of new production aircraft during construction or retrofiting those aircraft not so provisioned.

The proposal entails substantial reduction in quantity and pounds of standard WorksWar II bombs which could be carried except by the B-36.

20
Mutual Defense Assistance Program now called Mutual Security
Program.
21

RAR from Directorate of Requirements to Directorate of Plans, subject, "Modification Program to Provide Capability to Carry New Family Bombs and Bombs Equipped with Conical Fins in Heavy and Medium Bombardment Aircraft," (Restricted), dated 14 September 1951.



The reduced capacity was caused by the revised bomb configurations.

Modification of the B-29 and B-50 appears questionable until an analysis could be obtained from SAC indicating such modification is warranted.

22

SAC in making this analysis did not concur in modification of the B-29 and B-50 and recommended immediate action to obtain adequate stocks of the old family of bombs. As the result of the non-concurrence on this phase, a meeting was scheduled at AMC Headquarters to resolve the problems regarding modifications and specifications. As the result of this meeting WADC will develop the cost of the B-29, B-50 aircraft modification to carry the new family of bombs and the modernized World War II bombs, with the final decision on the modification to be deferred pending results of this study which is expected to be completed within six (6) months.

The Directorate of Requirements desire to modify the B-47 aircraft and produce future aircraft to accommodate the new family of bombs was concurred with contingent upon engineering studies to improve the bomb loadings to approximate more closely the published military 24 characteristics. Present loadings of the new bombs of approximately 3,000 pounds as compared to published loads of 16,000 pounds was not acceptable.

Ltr Headquarters USAF, AFCPD to Headquarters SAC, subject, "Aircraft Modifications Required in Order to Accommodate the New Family of Bombs," (Secret), dated 8 November 1951 and 1st Ind in reply thereto, dated 28 November 1951.

<sup>23</sup> Wright Aeronautical Development Center.

Memo from Directorate of Plans to DCS/O with 2 inclosures, subject, "Aircraft Modifications Required in Order to Accommodate the New Family of Bombs," (Secret), dated 6 November 1951.



25. The phased sircraft and guided missile mobilization production requirements for Mobilization Requirements Plan with a D-Day of 1 July 1952 and including the MSP USA and USA International Aid requirements were computed and forwarded to Materiel Control Division, D/P&PE, DCS/M, in answer to their request for such data.

26. Director of Requirements, DCS/D, advised by R&R the results of a conference to select for procurement an aircraft to satisfy the tactical reconnaissance (Night Photo and ECM ) function during 1954. The recommendations were:

Procure RB-57A aircraft immediately to replace the RB-26 during 1953-55.

Procure immediately service test quantities of a USAF version 26 of the A3-D for testing during 1953.

Procure at the earliest practicable date the USAF A3-D to meet qualitative and quantitative requirements for the night and ECM tactical recommaissance force in 1955-56. Specifically the RAR in addition to asking for comments from D/P, DCS/O, and D/P&PE, DCS/M, advised that facilities necessary to produce the A3-D would curtail the mobilization potential of either the C-119 or C-12h and asked for clarification of their interpretation of NSC paper 11h/2 which indicated that the equipping of combat units with modern aircraft took precedence

<sup>25</sup>Electronic Counter Measures.
26
Navy Attack Bomber.
27
National Security Council paper dated 1 October 1951.




over the retention of a mobilization potential. Review of this matter for the Director of Plans disclosed sufficient information for the D/P to concur in D/Requirements interpretation of NSC 111/2 and recommend implementation of the conference recommendations.

27. Production Projection for an Assumed D-Dsy of 1 July 1952, 28 November 1951.

The wartime production schedule for aircraft to include guided missiles in preparation for development of force tabs for EMP 2-52 was requested from Materiel Control Division.

- 28. Attrition rates for use on EMP 2-52 were requested from Operations Analysis Division. A later request in December 1951 asked for detailed evaluation of strategic reconnaissance rates comparing concurrent recon flights with bombing mission and separate recon flights before and after.
- 29. Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, requested comments on the proposal to compute capability type war plans for budgetary purposes and to complete such plans within a very short period after the USAF budget planning documents are published. Comments are being withheld pending a conference of interested staff agencies necessary to obtain the desired objectives and details required.
- 30. Reduction of Test and Test Support Aircraft Liventory in Mobilization Plans, 7 December 1951.






Supporting Resources Division, DCS/D, in reply to a request for detailed data regarding the withdrawal of test aircraft to support an EMP presently being developed, objected to the use of any test aircraft and appeared to be particularly concerned with the possible loss of any new production type aircraft. Insamuch as previous plans required the use of a substantial number of test aircraft the Red Team, war Plans Division, insists the present plans continue to use these test aircraft until the Supporting Resources can factually support their position in connection with war planning.

31. A review and comment on AFM-400-5 "USAF Logistical and Operational Planning Manual" for D/P, DCS/0, as requested by Materiel Program Control, DCS/M, indicated general satisfaction with the manual and its contents and presented some comments on specific items in the manual.

32. Assistant for Logistics Plans, DCS/H, requested comments on estimated replacement and conversion aircraft schedules which they prevared for EMP 1-52. They also requested this Branch to develop similar schedules for future EMP's. Mobilization Division concurred in the method of preparation used by Assistant for Logistic Plans and agreed to provide similar schedules for future plans.

33. A study of the RAND project concerning Suropean tactical air 28 base locations was completed and comments were furnished to Chief, Mobilization Division.

<sup>28</sup>Hemo: Subject, Project RAND, Research Memorandum, Buropean Theater
Tactical Air Base Locations, The Employatory Study," dated 29 December
1951 from Logistics Analysis avanch to Robilization Division.



34. The initial tabulations of aircraft and crew capability including assumptions and planning factors for an EWP with a 1 January 1952 D-Day were completed and forwarded to Mobilization Plans Branch during the early period of this report.

This plan presented the monthly deployment of groups and separate squadrons by aircraft types and models. The groups and squadrons in both CCTS and OTU training and the groups and squadrons in a cravel status were also shown. In addition this plan detailed the aircraft inventory by type, model, series and function. The inventory and input capability of combat crews and the aircraft resource utilization by type, model and source was also shown.

35. Assumptions, planning factors and force tabulations for an Air Force Mobilization Plan based on the Joint Mobilization Plan 29
30
JCS 1725/h7 and JCS 1725/103 for a July 1952 D-Day were completed and furnished Mobilization Plans Branch during the period of this report.


This plan indicated the requirements necessary to support the 95 Group Air Force at full UE and to build the Forces up to 217 Groups by the end of the 36 month planning period.

The plan detailed Allied Air Force requirements for MSP Forces,
U. S. Army, and U. S. Army International Aid Forces in addition to the
USAF requirements. Also included were guided missile, pilotless aircraft,
ACEW and tactical control groups.

Joint Chiefs of Staff paper dated 2 August 1919.

Joint Chiefs of Staff paper dated 19 January 1951.

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## GLOSSARY

	GLOSSARY
AFEWP	Air Force Emergency War Plan; a plan
	designed to provide the most effective
	use ofin-being capabilities in the
	event of war.
AFMOP	Air Force Mobilization Plan; a plan
	containing complete data and actions
	necessary for mobilization of the
	USAF in the event of war.
CS/USAF	Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Development period	The time during which the various component
	of a plan (AFEWP or AFMOP) are produced by
	the Air Staff.
JCS .	Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Joint Mobilization Plan	A unified plan of action produced by the
	JCS for the three services outlining
	major force deployments and basic gui-
	dance necessary for the development of
	each Service's mobilization plan.
K-date	The date on which the development period
	begins.
Mobilization Planners Group	The group of officers and civilians from
	the various sections of the Air Staff
	concerned with preparation of AFMOP.
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Members of this group serve as the focal points for activities of their sections in the development and refinement of components of the Plan.

The time during which initial decisions,

The time during which initial decisions, procedures, and responsibilities are arrived at relative to development of a plan (AFEWP or AFMOP).

Pre-Planning Period

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