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Marguerite K Kennedy
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Chief, Technical Systems Branch
The Albert F. Simpson Historical
Research Center

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
K-DIV-18-HI
Oct. 1960
5-2098-11

HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 31 October 1960

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by MSgt. Donald W. Bunker, Unit Historian under the supervision of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) Information Staff Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET under the provisions of paragraph 30b, AFR 205-1, 1 April 1959. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield, 2Lt USAF

For ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

5-2088-1

15AF OXJ CO-332-1
Cmdr 171

HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

Mission.

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, the Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 60, filed BDAS, FAFB

engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order (EWO). (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jun 60, filed BDAS, FAFB

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

Lineage and Background History.

While the 18th Air Division was a comparatively new organization, having been activated as recently as 1 July 1959, it had a long list of forebears.[4] (U)

In the early 1920's, the United States Army had little money for either ground or air forces, but in 1926 the Congress of the United States authorized a five year program for the gradual expansion of the army's air arm. One of the new organizations that resulted from that expansion was the 18th Wing, which three decades later was to become the 18th Air Division. This new organization, the 18th Composite Wing, was activated on 1 May 1931 at Fort Shafter, Hawaii.[5] (U)

During the next nine years, the wing was born anew several times under various redesignations, until, on 19 October 1940, it was redesignated the 18th Bombardment Wing at Hickam Field, Hawaii.[6] (U)

The tempo of activity had increased since the beginning of World War II, and in 1941 the wing was busily engaged in its training with B-17, B-18, and A-20 aircraft.

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3. Ibid.
4. History of 18AD, prep'd by USAF Historical Division, filed IXOH, FAFB
5. Ibid
6. Ibid

Then came the Japanese raid of 7 December 1941. The results of that attack were disastrous. In all, there were 192 casualties in the 18th Bombardment Wing, including four officers and 55 enlisted men killed, and four officers and 129 enlisted men wounded. Losses in aircraft and facilities were also heavy.[7] (U)

Inactivated on 29 January 1942, the wing was redesignated the 18th Replacement Wing less than five months later. Assigned to the Second Air Force, it was reactivated at Salt Lake City on 15 June 1942. As the replacement agency for the Second Air Force, the wing received virtually all of the officers and enlisted men entering the air force from the training commands and from other sources. On 11 April 1944, the wing was disbanded and remained that way for the next 15 years.[8] (U)

At last, on 1 July 1959, the 18th Air Division was activated at Fairchild Air Force Base by General Orders No. 38, Strategic Air Command, dated 25 May 1959. This new organization, assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force, actually was a reactivation of the 18th Replacement Wing.[9] (U)

Besides the 92d Bombardment Wing and its components, the 4170th Strategic Wing, located at Larson Air Force Base, Washington, was assigned to the 18th Air Division. This change in the chain of command entitled these two

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7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.

Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division

wings to the history, battle honors, and any colors belonging to the 18th Air Division.[10] (U)

On 16 July 1959, Colonel Harold W. Ohlke assumed command of the division, replacing the temporary command of Colonel Lester F. Miller, commander of the 92d Bombardment Wing. A native of Missouri, Colonel Ohlke attended the University of Missouri, and in 1936 graduated from Randolph Flying School, Texas.[11] (U)

During World War II, he spent four years in England with the Eighth Air Force, flying B-17 and B-24 aircraft. Later, he was deputy director of plans for the United States Strategic Air Force in Europe. In this capacity he worked with the staff of British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery on the Air Planning Committee for the invasion of Europe. He received the Order of the British Empire Medal for this work. Colonel Ohlke was also a member of the party that accompanied President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Yalta Conference with Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.[12] (U)

Upon returning to the States, Colonel Ohlke served with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Eugene M. Zuckert, after the Air Force became a separate service. Later, he attended the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, from which he graduated in 1949.

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10. Ibid.
11. G.O. #2, Hq, 18AD, 16 Jul 59, Exhibit #2.
12. Ibid.

Following this, he spent the years until 1952 in London, assigned to the American Embassy. Next came a series of assignments at Parks Air Force Base, California and Forbes and Schilling Air Force Bases, Kansas, finally culminating in the assignment as Commander, 18th Air Division.[13] (U)

On 1 January 1960, Larson Air Force Base, located near Moses Lake, Washington, was officially transferred from the military Air Transport Command to the Strategic Air Command. This was accomplished through DAF G.O. #59, dated 10 November 1959. Eighteenth Air Division Commander, Colonel Harold W. Ohlke accepted the base for SAC at a change of command ceremony on 31 December 1959. Both Fairchild and Larson Air Force Bases were now under the command of the division.[14] (U)

At Larson Air Force Base, the 4170th Strategic Wing was reactivated.[15] The 327th Bombardment Squadron, long a member of the 92d Bomardment Wing, would officially move to Larson and be assigned to the 4170th Wing. This was planned originally for June 1960.[16] (S)

A conference met at Fifteenth Air Force on 3 February to complete the programming plan for the movement of the squadron. Representatives from the 92d and 4170th Wings

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13. Ibid.
14. G.O. #59 DAF, 10 Nov 59, Exhibit #3
15. Ibid.
16. Msg. CINCSAC to 18AD, SECRET, DPO 0297, Subj: Manning Instr. for 4170SW, 12 Jan 60, Exhibit #4

attended the conference to discuss operations, personnel, materiel and other aspects of the move.[17] (S)

Plans were formed and steady progress was made on the movement. However, the actual movement operation had to be delayed until July 1960. This was due to a variety of reasons, the principal one being a delay in the availability of facilities at Bergstrom. Consequently, 15 July was designated M Day and the movement of the B-52 aircraft encompassed the period of 13 to 25 July. This permitted the 327th Bomb Squadron to begin assuming its alert status on 18 July with two bombers. This alert force was increased by two more on 19 and one on 20 July.[18] (S)

Meanwhile, the 22d Air Refueling Squadron, Medium, stationed at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, was redesignated a Heavy squadron, and assigned to the 92d Bombardment Wing. This placed elements of the 18th Air Division on three separate bases.[19] (U)

Activity During October 1960.

During the month of October the division found itself guiding its two assigned wings in the various functions that were assigned to them. This was due, primarily, through staff visits, during which problem areas both

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. G.O. #37, SAC, 2 May 60, filed BDAS, FAFB

actual and potential were discussed. Prompt action by the wings would insure that the splendid past record of the 18th Air Division, since it was first conceived over 30 years ago, would continue to be enhanced during the months and years ahead.[20] (S)

20. History, October, 92d BW, SECRET, filed IXOH, FAFB.

9

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Colonel Harold W. Ohlke
*Director of Operations	Colonel David A. Tate
*Director of Materiel	Colonel John B. Carey, Jr.
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Acting Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Acting Director of Materiel	Lt. Col. Darell G. Burgeson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Major Gordon A. Bailey

*TDY Castle AFB for B-52 training, graduating 17 Jan 1961

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETTEER

Davenport, Washington: A city located about 25 miles west of Fairchild Air Force Base, used as a dispersal area for non-essential military and civilian personnel evacuated by vehicle from the base in the event of an attack. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC). (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
G. O. #38, Hq, SAC, 25 May 59	1
G. O. #2, Hq, 18AD, 16 July 59	2
G. O. #59, DAF, 10 Nov 59	3
Msg, CINCSAC to 18AD, SECRET, DTG0297, Subj: Manning Inst, for 4170SW, 12 Jan 60	4
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET, DPLP 0283, 21 Jan 60	5
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DM3 0115, Subj: Supply Plan Move of 327BS, 92BW, 11 Jan 60	6

HEADQUARTERS
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
United States Air Force
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 38)

25 May 1959

SECTION

ACTIVATION OF THE 566TH STRATEGIC MISSILE SQUADRON (ICBM-ATLAS), OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA I
ACTIVATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS 13TH AND 18TH AIR DIVISIONS II
ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS III
AMENDMENT TO GENERAL ORDERS IV
DISCONTINUANCE OF UNIT V
DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATION OF UNIT AT LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON VI
ACTIVATION OF THE 924TH AIR REFUELING SQUADRON, HEAVY; REORGANIZATION OF THE 93D AIR REFUELING SQUADRON, HEAVY VII
REDESIGNATION OF THE 865TH STRATEGIC MISSILE SQUADRON (IRBM-JUPITER) VIII

I. ACTIVATION OF THE 566TH STRATEGIC MISSILE SQUADRON (ICBM-ATLAS), OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA. 1. The 566th Bombardment Squadron, Very Heavy, having been redesignated as the 566th Strategic Missile Squadron (ICBM-ATLAS) and assigned to Strategic Air Command, is activated under an appropriate unit manning document at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, and assigned to Second Air Force, effective 15 August 1959.

2. Upon activation, this unit is entitled to the history of the unit inactivated 27 June 1949 as the 566th Bombardment Squadron, Very Heavy. Unit history will be furnished the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command by the USAF Historical Division, Air University, through automatic distribution. Similarly information concerning the existence of battle honors and colors will be made available by the Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF. Requisition for the appropriate colors can then be made as provided in AFR 35-75, 29 January 1954. A photostatic copy of the unit's status history will be forwarded under separate cover by the Director of Statistical Services to the Air University for the attention of the USAF Historical Division.

3. Authority: Letter, Department of the Air Force, AFOMO 138m, 22 April 1959, subject: Activation of the 566th Strategic Missile Squadron (ICBM-ATLAS), and Air Force Regulation 20-27.

II. ACTIVATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS 13TH AND 18TH AIR DIVISIONS. 1. Effective 1 July 1959:

a. The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 13th Bombardment Wing, Very Heavy, having been redesignated as the Headquarters, 13th Air Division, and the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 18th Replacement Wing, having been reconstituted and redesignated as the Headquarters, 18th Air Division and both having been assigned to Strategic Air Command, are activated under appropriate unit manning documents with capability as cited in referenced Organization Table, and assigned to the respectively numbered Air Division:

UNIT	LOCATION	O/T COMPOSITION
Headquarters, 13th Air Division	Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming	(Not Applicable)
Headquarters, 18th Air Division	Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington	R88125, 1 January 1958, paragraphs 1 and 2a, Part I (Part IIA)

b. The 13th and 18th Air Divisions are assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force.

c. The 703d Strategic Missile Wing (ICBM-Titan) and the 706th Strategic Missile Wing (ICBM-Atlas) having been assigned to Fifteenth Air Force, are further assigned to the 13th Air Division.

d. The 92d Bombardment Wing, Heavy, having been assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force, is further assigned to the 18th Air Division.

2. Upon activation, the above units are entitled to the history, battle honors, and any colors belonging to the units, as indicated below. Unit history will be furnished the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command by the USAF Historical Division, Air University, through automatic distribution. Similarly, information concerning the existence of battle honors and colors will be made available by the Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force. Requisition for the appropriate colors can then be made as provided in AFR 35-75, 29 January 1954. A photostatic copy of the unit's status history will be forwarded under separate cover by the Director of Statistical Services to the Air University for the attention of the United States Air Force Historical Division.

New Designation	Old Designation	Date of Inactivation or Disbandment
Headquarters, 13th Air Division	Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 13th Bombardment Wing, Very Heavy	17 October 1945
Headquarters, 18th Air Division	Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 18th Replacement Wing	11 April 1944

3. Authority: Letter, Department of the Air Force, AFOMO, 157m, 20 May 1959, subject: Activation of the Headquarters, 13th and 18th Air Division, and Air Force Regulation 20-27.

III. ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS. 1. Effective 1 July 1959:

a. The 4128th Strategic Wing, Amarillo Air Force Base, Texas, is relieved from assignment to the 47th Air Division and is assigned to the 810th Air Division.

b. The 93d Bombardment Wing, Heavy, Castle Air Force Base, California, having been assigned to Fifteenth Air Force, is further assigned to the 47th Air Division.

2. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

IV. AMENDMENT TO GENERAL ORDERS. 1. Paragraph 1d, Section IV, General Orders 21, Headquarters Strategic Air Command 13 April 1959 pertaining to reorganization and redesignation of units is amended to add the 4050th Periodic Maintenance Squadron under Present Designation and the 4050th Organizational Maintenance Squadron under New Designation. (Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.)

2. So much of paragraph 1, Section IV, General Orders 27, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1 May 1959 pertaining to amendment to General Orders as reads "Section IV" is amended to read "Section VI."

3. Paragraph 1, Section VIII, General Orders 21, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 13 April 1959 relieving the 301st Bombardment Squadron, Heavy, from assignment to the 72d

Bombardment Wing, Heavy, and assigning it to the 4135th Strategic Wing, as reads "effective 1 June 1959" is amended to read "effective 17 June 1959." Authority: Letter, Department of the Air Force, AFOMO 166m, 22 May 1959.

V. DISCONTINUANCE OF UNIT. The 3911th Air Base Squadron, West Drayton RAF Station, United Kingdom, is discontinued effective 1 July 1959. (Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.)

VI. DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATION OF UNIT AT LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON. 1. Effective 1 July 1959:

a. The Headquarters, 4170th Strategic Wing is designated and organized under an appropriate Unit Manning Document at Larson Air Force Base, Washington, and is assigned to the 4170th Strategic Wing.

b. The 4170th Strategic Wing is assigned to the 18th Air Division.

2. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

VII. ACTIVATION OF THE 924TH AIR REFUELING SQUADRON, HEAVY; REORGANIZATION OF THE 93D AIR REFUELING SQUADRON, HEAVY. 1. Effective 1 July 1959:

a. The 924th Air Refueling Squadron, Heavy, having been constituted and assigned to Strategic Air Command, is activated under an appropriate Unit Manning Document at Castle Air Force Base, California and assigned to the 93d Bombardment Wing, Heavy.

b. The 93d Air Refueling Squadron, Heavy, is reorganized under an appropriate Unit Manning Document with capability cited in O/T R4315S, 1 January 1958, paragraphs 1 and 2b, Part I (Part IIB).

2. Authority: Letter, Department of the Air Force, AFOMO 156m, 20 May 1959, subject: Activation of the 924th Air Refueling Squadron, Heavy; Reorganization of the 93d Air Refueling Squadron, Heavy, and AFOMO 166m, 22 May 1959.

VIII. REDESIGNATION OF THE 865TH STRATEGIC MISSILE SQUADRON (IRBM-JUPITER). The 865th Strategic Missile Squadron (IRBM-Jupiter) is redesignated as the 865th Technical Training Squadron effective 25 May 1959. (Authority: Letter, Department of the Air Force, AFOMO 130m, 7 April 1959.)

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND OFFICIAL

BYRON K ENYART
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
M
plus
5 - Comdr, 13th, 18th, 47th, 57th, 810th and 820th Air Div
5 - Comdr, 703d and 706th Strategic Missile Wg
5 - Comdr, 72d, 92d and 93d Bombardment Wg

0020

HEADQUARTERS
15th AIR DIVISION (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

GENERAL ORDER)
NUMBER 2)

16 July 1959

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND.--Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 15th Air Division, effective this date, vice COLONEL LESTER F MILLER, 9001A.

Harold W. Ohlke

HAROLD W OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

DISTRIBUTION:
3 Ea Indv conc
1 Ea Unit and Staff Section
5 DPAO

MAJOR BERT E. DOWDY, 26483A
1955
(SECOND OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

MAJOR LLOYD R. LEAVITT, JR., 20257A
10 September 1958 to 10 November 1958
(SECOND OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

AIRMAN SECOND CLASS BERNICE E. LILES, AF15424254
23 July 1956
(THIRD OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

MAJOR RICHARD A. ATKINS, 16583A
10 September 1958 to 10 November 1958
(SIXTH OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

CAPTAIN JOHN R. BADZIK, AO708998
12 January 1959
(EIGHTH OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

V. AIR FORCE COMMENDATION MEDAL. – By direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force Commendation Medal is awarded to the following officers and airmen for meritorious service during the period indicated:

COLONEL J. C. BAILEY, 1862A
1 May 1957 to 20 April 1959
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN G. M. ANDERSON, 33497A
30 May 1958 to 1 July 1959
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORACE B. BAIRD, AO427111
5 October 1955 to 31 July 1959
LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE E. BAUCOM, JR., 6734A
July 1955 to July 1959
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. BRIGGS, 35959A
1 July 1958 to 15 August 1959
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES K. BRYAN, AO223733
1 January 1959 to 31 July 1959
MAJOR JAMES M. BAXTER, 15301A
29 November 1955 to 1 June 1959
MASTER SERGEANT CLARENCE R. BUSSELL, AF11122628
13 December 1954 to 7 August 1959
TECHNICAL SERGEANT CLARENCE A. ACHIU, AF39913218
18 May 1956 to 10 June 1959

VI. PURPLE HEART. – By direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Purple Heart for wounds received in action against an armed enemy on 1 October 1943 is awarded to TECHNICAL SERGEANT CHARLTON H. HOLTZ, 37175458, Air Corps, Army of the United States.

VII. INSTALLATIONS. – 1. The following installations are transferred from the jurisdiction, control and accountability of the Military Air Transport Command to the Strategic Air Command effective 1 January 1960:

Installation Name	Installation Number
Larson Air Force Base, Washington	2138
Larson ZH Homing Marker Annex, Washington	2139

2. Cottonwood Air Force Station (SM-150)(Installation Number 3294), Cottonwood, Idaho, was activated and assigned to the Air Defense Command, effective 1 March 1959.

3. Fallon Air Force Station (SM-156), Fallon, Nevada, was activated and assigned to the Air Defense Command, effective 1 November 1956.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

THOMAS D. WHITE
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

J. L. TARR
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

(DAF GO 59, 10 Nov 59)

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/S E C R E T/DPO 0297. ACTION: 15AF, INFO: 13AIRDIV, 4170STATUG, SUSPENSE 1 MARCH 1960, RELY ATTN: DPOPP. SUBJECT: (U) MANNING INSTURCTIONS FOR 4170TH STRATEGIC WING. THIS MESSAGE APPLIES TO OFFICERS IN THE GRADE OF LT COL AND BELOW. THIS MESSAGE IS IN FOUR PARTS. PART I: ONE THIRD OF THE B-52 CREW RESOURCES (QUANTITY - QUALITY WISE) AT FAIRCHILD AFB WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO LARSON AFB WITH THE 327 TH HEAVY BOMB SQUADRON. PART II: STAFF AND SUPPORT OFFICER MANNING FOR THE 4170TH SW IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDER, FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE. SUPPORT OFFICERS REQUIRED TO MOVE IN SUPPORT OF THIS PROGRAM WILL BE ASSIGNED PCS WITH PCS TO THE

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327TH HBS IN ORDER THAT UNIT MOVE FUNDS MAY BE UTILIZED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT. PART III: NO OFFICER WILL TRANSFER IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS MOVE IF HE FALLS WITHIN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES: A. OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN NOMINATED OR SELECTED FOR ANY PCS GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOL. B. OFFICERS WHO HAVE APPLIED FOR OR WHO ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THIS OR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR A PCS PROFESSIONNAL, TECHNICAL OR MISSILE TRAINING COURSE. C. DOS OFFICERS WHO FALL WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF DPMPS 45196 DATED 20 NOV 59 ON DOS EARLY RELEASE. MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF THE PROVISION OF THIS MESSAGE IS ENCOURAGED. D. OFFICERS IN OTHER THAN COMBAT AND OPERATIONS CAREER FIELDS WHO FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF PARAGRAPH 11C (4), SECTION I, CHAPTER 1, PART 1, AFM 35-1; AS AMENDED. E. OFFICERS WHO ARE VULNERABLE FOR OVERSEAS AS IDENTIFIED IN DPO LETTER "CATEGORY B PROTECTION" DATED 2 NOV 59 AS AMENDED OR SUPERSEDED. PART IV: SUBMIT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 1 MAR 60 A MANNING PLAN FOR OFFICERS IN THE GRADE OF LT COL AND BELOW IN THE 4170TH STRAT WING EXCLUDING THE TACTICAL SQUADRON. THE MANNING PLAN WILL BE AS OF 1 FEB 60 AND WILL BE SUBMITTED IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT:

AUTH AFSC, GRADE — CURRENTLY ASGD AFSC, GRADE — PROJ ASGD F M A M J

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THE PORCHAUTING PLAN
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RJWZUK/4177 STRATUC EMR OM AFB
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
SECRET
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HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 31 January 1961

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by MSgt. Donald W. Bunker, Unit Historian under the supervision of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) Information Staff Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET under the provisions of paragraph 30b, AFR 205-1, 1 April 1959. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis

ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

Harold W. Ohlke

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

5-2958-1

SECRET

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Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, the Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 60, Filed HHAS, FAFB.

wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (TSO). (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BOAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

Organization and Administration.

The impending dispersal on a permanent change of station basis of the 326th Bombardment Squadron, and the temporary duty status projected for the 325th Bombardment Squadron and the 920 Air Refueling Squadron, all assigned to the 93d Bombardment Wing, progressed with remarkable ease throughout January.[4] (U)

The movement of necessary equipment to Glasgow Air Force Base, Montana, in conjunction with the movement of personnel progressed. No serious problems areas were encountered and action was being continued to insure that all of the equipment would be in place at the new base in time to give full and immediate support to the incoming squadron including its aircraft and personnel.[5] (U)

When this move was finally accomplished in March 1961, the organizational structure of the 18th Air Division would take on a new posture. The 326th Bombardment Squadron and its immediately higher command, the 4141st Strategic Wing, would be under the command of the 821st Air Division.[6] (U)

The temporary duty moves of the other two squadrons to Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, and Larson Air Force Base, Washington, would not, of course, have any affect upon the structure of the 18th Air Division. However, the administrative responsibilities to be performed by the Commander, Colonel Harold W. Ohlke and his staff would be made more difficult because of the far-flung bases encompassed

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4. Progress Report, Plan 5-60 92BW, 25 Jan 61, Exhibit #1.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

in the organization.[7] (U)

Staff visits to monitor the activities of its subordinate organizations would continue as in the past but under more difficult situations. Difficult situations had never been known to daunt the members of the 18th Air Division. They were not expected to do so now.[8] (U)

Personnel.

In fact, action was taken in January to insure that the 18th Air Division and its organizations became an even more tightly knit unit. This was accomplished by placing upon the various organization commanders and their deputies a requirement that would improve their reaction time by shortening it. Specifically, the Strategic Air Command and Fifteenth Air Force had still been having difficulty in reaching the senior commanders. This was being corrected by requiring the senior commander or his deputy to be available on base at all times and within six rings of the [redacted] telephone. The only exception to this policy was in the event either of these officers were on temporary duty. In this case, the senior commander or his designated deputy, which could be either the deputy commander of operations or material or the base commander, would be available on base at all times.[9] (U)

Any delegation of this responsibility beyond the deputy commander was strictly forbidden when both were present for duty. In those somewhat rare instances when all of the commanders were absent, the organization commander was authorized to designate a senior commander and

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7. Minutes, TDY Prog, Report Mtg, 30 Jan 61, Filed WC, FAFB.
8. Ibid.
9. Msg, 18AD to Wings, Subj: Availability of Senior Commanders, 16 Jan 61, Exhibit #2.

deputy. They would then comply with the policy of one or the other always being available on base and within six rings of the SOCS telephone. This severe requirement was being met effectively by the commanders notifying the SOCS operator as well as the command post of their on-base location at all times. In the event of any aggression or disaster, vital minutes that quite conceivably could spell the difference between the life or death of the entire nation, could be gained.[10] (U)

The month of January brought the return of two of its key officers to duty with the 18th Air Division. Both the Director of Operations, Colonel David A. Tate and the Director of Materiel, Colonel John T. Carey, Jr., return from Castle Air Force Base, California, where they had been undergoing B-52 training. After graduating on 17 January they assumed their responsibilities at 18th Air Division Headquarters. Meanwhile the acting Director of Operations, Lieutenant Colonel Maurice F. Harler, reverted to the position of Deputy Director of Operations. In the same manner, the acting Director of Materiel assumed the position of Maintenance Staff Officer.[11] (U)

Operations.

It was with justifiable pride that the 18th Air Division and the 92d Bombardment Wing congratulated the 22d Air Refueling Squadron, stationed at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, upon its joining the ranks of the combat ready units.[12] (C)

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10. Msg, 18AD to Wings, Subj: Availability of Senior Commanders, 16 Jan 61, Exhibit #2.
11. Interview MSgt Bunker w/Capt. L. E. McRae, Adm St Off 18AD, 10 Feb 61.
12. Prog Plan 4-60, 92BW CONFIDENTIAL, Subj: 22 ARFS Program, 15 Aug 60, Exhibit #3.

This did not mean that this new addition of fighting strength to the 18th Air Division would be allowed to rest upon its laurels. The 22d Air Refueling Squadron would now be subject to several exercises. The first of these would be a walk-through or rehearsal for the graduation exercise to combat ready status. This would be followed in February by the actual graduation exercise. A team composed of members of officers from the division and the 92d Bombardment Wing would be on hand to observe these exercises.[13] (C)

However, even more was in store for the 22d Air Refueling Squadron and its proud personnel. They would now be eligible for an operational readiness inspection (ORI) and would remain in that status of eligibility for a period of 90 days after having reached the combat ready date.[14] (U)

At month's end, all of the problems areas had not been solved for this newly-reached combat ready unit. Some of these areas concerned supply, personnel, and perhaps maintenance. In view of this, frequent staff visits from Fairchild Air Force Base were being planned for the immediate future to enable the 22d Air Refueling Squadron to prepare itself to be in the best possible position to pass the ORI with flying colors.[15] (U)

While the combat ready capability of the division to meet or forestall any aggression would remain of paramount importance, the ability to act quickly in the event of a nuclear disaster from any cause was continuing concern. This type of a problem, either real or simulated, carried the nickname of BROKEN ARROW. Training to meet this

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13. Prog Plan 4-60, 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, Subj: 22 ARFS Program, 15 Aug 60, Exhibit #3.
14. Progress Report, Plan 4-60, 92BW, 25 Jan 61, Exhibit #4.
15. Ibid.

problem had long been of great importance. However, due to frequent personnel changes, leaves, or just plain indifference, it was feared that the effectiveness of the division and its organizations might deteriorate. Eighteen Air Division Commander, Colonel Harold W. Uhlke reemphasized the need for continual monitoring by his wing commanders of this program.[16] (U)

All combat crews of the scattered elements of the 18th Air Division were giving their whole-hearted attention to the new program for giving incentive awards for training.[17] The crews, under this new scoring method were being judged on their 50-8 training accomplishments, in inter and intra-wing competition. Certain training areas considered of greater importance than others were given a higher score value. While still new in operation, this program was expected to gain the enthusiastic support of the crews.[18] (C)

Materiel

In response to a requirement levied by Fifteenth Air Force, the wings assigned to the division were directed to designate a materiel monitor to act during large scale exercises and execution of the EWO. This monitor's primary function would be to deal with the determination of delays or deviations, including their causes or effects. The 18th Air Division Director of Materiel, Colonel John B. Carey, Jr., was of the opinion that the senior wing maintenance designee in the control room during this type of operation be appointed to act as the materiel

16. Ltr, 18 D to Wings, Subj: Broken Arrow Capability, 27 Jan 61, Exhibit #5.
17. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOT 0406, Subj: Incentive Training, 10 Feb 61, Exhibit #6.
18. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOT 0406, Subj: Bomber Incentive Training, 10 Feb 61, Exhibit #7.

monitor as an additional duty. While it was expected that many questions might arise concerning various base support type functions for which he did not have an immediate answer, it was felt that the most urgent queries would concern the current status of the aircraft and the reasons for the delay.[19] Such monitoring could conceivably alleviate many of the operational problems inherrent in a large scale exercise.[20] (U)

The transition by the 18th Air Division from the year 1960 to 1961 had started out smoothly, with every promise that the new year would be one of proud accomplishments, mixed, of course, with the inevitable problems, disappointments and frustrations that offer continual, new challenges to vigorous groups of military men. With its competent leadership and large store-house of dedicated men of all ranks in its subsidary organizations, the 18th Air Division looked forward eagerly to the remaining months of 1961.[21] (U)

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19. Ltr, 18AD to Wings, Subj: Met Deviat Drg. Lg Scale Ex., 19 Jan 61, Exhibit #8.
20. Ltr, 92SW to 18AD, Subj: Met Deviat Drg Lg Scale Ex., 19 Jan 61, Exhibit #9.
21. Ibid.

18TH [illegible] DIVISION
[illegible] OF [illegible] PERSONNEL

Commander	Colonel Harold V. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James M. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Captain Lewis T. McRae
Director of Operations	Colonel David A. Tate
Director of Materiel	Colonel John T. Carey, Jr.
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Peskell
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Darell C. Burgeson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Major Gordon A. Bailey

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agenices.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 417th Strategic Wing. (U)

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Progress Report, Plan 5-60, 92SW, 25 Jan 61	1
Msg, 18AD to Wings, C-5042, Subj: Availability of Senior Commanders, 16 Jan 61	2
Prog Plan 4-60, 92SW, CONFIDENTIAL, Subj: 22 AREFS Program, 15 Aug 60	3
Progress Report, Plan 4-60, 92SW, 25 Jan 61	4
Ltr, 18AD to Wings, Subj: Broken Arrow Capability, 27 Jan 61	5
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOT 0406, Subj: Incentive Training, 10 Feb 61	6
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOT 0407, Subj: Bomber Incentive Training, 10 Feb 61	7
Ltr, 18AD to Wings, Subj: Wpt Deviat Dwg Ig Scale Ex., 19 Jan 61	8
Ltr, 92SW to 18AD, Subj: Wpt Deviat Dwg Ig Scale Ex., 19 Jan 61	9

326th BOMB SQUADRON PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT
25 January 1961

WING COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

Overall progress of the move is very satisfactory. At this time there are no problem areas or any recommended action to higher headquarters anticipated to cause delay in the move. Experience gained during the move of the 327th Bomb Squadron (Programming Plan 3-60) has been of great assistance in planning for and conducting this move.

RODGER L. HOWARD
Colonel, USAF
Vice Commander

UNCLASSIFIED

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SUPPLY

AS OF: 25 January 1961

SUPPLY

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS, 326TH MOVEMENT
Programing Plan 5-60

GENERAL ANALYSIS:

1. Movement of equipment to Glasgow AFB in conjunction with the movement of the 326th Bomb Squadron has progressed as planned and no serious problem areas have been encountered. Action is being continued to insure all equipment be in place at Glasgow to meet 326th EWO requirements.

PROBLEM AREAS:

2. No serious problems have been encountered nor are any anticipated. Minor problem of obtaining information for equipment movement chart resolved at meeting of supply and maintenance representatives with Major Spicer, 15th AF representative on 1 February 1961 at Fairchild AFB.

RECOMMENDED ACTION FOR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS:

3. None

George L. Board Jr. Capt
for FRANK L. NIMS
Lt. Col., USAF
Director of Supply

TAB A-2

DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS, 326TH BOMB SQUADRON
Programming Plan 5-60

AS OF: 25 January 1961

GENERAL ANALYSIS:

1. Shipment of Material and Household Goods is progressing in an orderly manner.

2. As of the end of the second week of the move, 7 loads of General Freight and 36 lots of household goods have been moved.

3. General freight is moving by 3 motor freight carriers and via Great Northern Railroad in Piggy-back Service, all of which gives direct service to Glasgow AFB, Montana. There are 9 eligible household goods carriers participating in that tonnage.

PROBLEM AREAS:

4. None.

RECOMMENDED ACTION FOR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS:

5. None.

PROJECT STATUS & PROGRESS RECORD

Project Number	Project Title	Est % Comp	Est Dates Start	Est Dates Comp	Remarks
BDCM-1	Movement of Material	19%	16 Jan 61	15 Mar 61	
BDCM-2	Movement of Household Goods	15%	30 Dec 60	30 May 61	Advance party moved in latter part of December 1960. It is anticipated some families will wait until the school year is over to move.

F. G. GINTHER
Major, USAF
Director of Materiel

TAB B-1

UNCLASSIFIED

BASE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

UNCLASSIFIED

AS OF: 25 January 1961

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS, 326TH BOMB SQUADRON
Programming Plan 5-60

GENERAL ANALYSIS:

1. Required action of this activity deals principally with coordinated action to insure an orderly transfer of documents, records and related administrative functions. Instructions have been issued covering all projects. Satisfactory progress is being made in each instance. Time phased actions are necessitated since certain projects cannot be cleared until actual departure of the squadrons and crews.

PROBLEM AREAS:

2. None.

RECOMMENDED ACTION FOR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS:

3. None.

N. L. NOVINSKI
Major, USAF
Base Dir of Admin Svs

TAB B-2

BASE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (Continued)

PROJECT STATUS & PROGRESS RECORD

Project Number	Project Title	Est % Comp	Est Dates Start	Comp	Remarks
BDAS-1	Classified Documents	10%	1 Jan 61	Actual date of transfer	All documents have been reviewed for proper disposition. Appointment of security courier officers will be accomplished on actual date of transfer of documents. Instructions for packaging of classified documents have been furnished the 326BS. Transfer of documents is contingent on actual move of the unit and crews. Top Secret Intelligence Target materials account has been established for the 4141st SW at this station. All Target material will be returned to the Intelligence Section for transfer to 4141st DCOI.
BDAS-2	Official Mail	100%	18 Jan 61	18 Jan 61	Completed.
BDAS-3	Personal Mail	95%	18 Jan 61	3 Feb 61	Completed. Follow-up action 3 Feb 61.
BDAS-4	Publications Files	90%	20 Jan 61	3 Feb 61	All files are presently being inspected for completeness.
BDAS-5	Locator Cards	0%	9 Feb 61	21 Feb 61	Action has been accomplished to have locator cards made on each individual as he clears through the consolidated processing line on 9, 17 and 21 Feb 61.
BDAS-6	Records Management	90%	3 Jan 61	15 Feb 61	All records have been inspected. All non-current records through 1959 have been retired. Records disposition schedules, and file outlines for 1961 have been approved. All pertinent documents, i.e., Records Control Schedules, Management Reports, etc., in possession of Base Records Officer, will be forwarded by 15 Feb 61.

Project Number	Project Title	Est % Comp	Est Dates Start	Comp	Remarks
BDAS-7	Publications Requirements Tables	85%	2 Jan 61	1 Apr 61	Technical assistance has been furnished 326BS regarding submission of PRT's (AF Form 123) to Glasgow AFB. PRT's will be furnished from 326BS direct to 4141st SW for all necessary publications. In addition, all forms required will be filled prior to actual departure plus a 30-day additional stock. All requirements for publications and forms will continue to be filled until actual departure of the unit. After departure of unit support will be provided for a reasonable period.
BDAS-8	Records Disposition	100%	2 Jan 61	2 Jan 61	Completed.

FILER'S INITIALS	TEMP	2 YRS	PERM	FILE CODE
SYMBOL/DRAFTER'S NAME/PHONE NR/DATE TYPED/TYPIST'S INITIA				

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

AF

HQ 15 AIR DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

4170 STRAT WG LARSON AFB WN
22 AIR REFUELING SQ McCHORD AFB WN
92 BOMB WG FAIRCHILD AFB WN (COURIER)

UNCLASS C 5042

For immediate attention of Commander. Subj, Availability of Senior Commanders. SAC and 15AF are still having difficulty reaching the Senior Commander and with Senior Commander checks. The fol policy as directed by General Old to his Air Division Commanders will be followed without exception. Quote. The Senior Commander or his Deputy will be available on base at all times and within six rings of the SOCS telephone. Only exception to this policy is in the event either of the above officers are TDY. In this case, the Senior Commander or his designated deputy (DCO, DCM, BC) will be available on base at all times. Unquote.

042316 JAN 1961

HAROLD W OHLKE, Colonel, USAF
Commander, 15th Air Division

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UNCLASSIFIED

HQ 18 AIR DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

Delegation beyond the Deputy is specifically prohibited when both are present for duty. In the event all Commanders are absent; i.e., attending Commanders' Conferences, the Commander will designate a senior commander and deputy. They will then comply with the policy of one or the other always being available on base and within six rings of telephone. In view of past difficulties the Division Commander has had in reaching senior commanders at bases of this Air Division, it will be the responsibility of the Commanders to advise the SOCS operator as well as XXXX the Command Post of their on base location at all times. This message will be forthcoming as a division policy. Receipt and understanding is required.

CONFIDENTIAL

Headquarters
92ND BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

92BW Programming Plan 4-60 15 August 1960

SUBJECT: (C) Move, Conversion and Equipage of the 22d AREFS (H)
SHORT TITLE: (U) 22AREFS Program

OBJECTIVES

1. To establish 92d Bombardment Wing staff actions necessary in the move, conversion and equipping of the 22AREFS (H). (C)

2. To provide a time-phased build-up of personnel, materiel and facilities to assure a combat capability at the programmed date. (U)

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

3. The 22d AREFS moved WOE from March Air Force Base to McChord Air Force Base in June 1960 and will reorganize under 10 UE KC-135 tables. This unit will be under the jurisdiction of Fifteenth Air Force with assignment to the 92d Bombardment Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base. Equipping this unit with KC-135's will commence in September 1960. The 22d AREFS (H) will reorganize under 20 UE KC-135 tables in June 1961, reaching full strength in October 1961. The projected combat ready date for the 22d AREFS (H) under 10 UE KC-135 tables is February 1961. (C) (See Attachment #1, sequence of events.)

4. Upon reorganization, the 22d AREFS (H) will be assigned a mission as follows:

a. Develop the maximum potential to support the KC-135 operation. (U)

b. Develop a tactical capability in each KC-135 as soon as possible after receipt. (U)

c. Develop the command post to full operational capability concurrent with 22d AREFS (H) unit readiness. (U)

5. KC-135 tactical squadron authorization consists of cells 00, 02, 10 and 14 of master Unit Manning Document 1315 which includes an organizational, A&E and Field Maintenance capability. UMD is contained in atch #2. (U)

6. Crew Manning:

a. A tactical crew manning will be authorized at a 1.6 to 1 crew to aircraft ratio. The 22d AREFS (H) will initially possess 12 crews,

CONFIDENTIAL

including one squadron staff crew. In addition, two crew training quotas are provided for command post controllers. The tactical crew ratio of 1.6 to 1 will be attained in March 1961, three months subsequent to scheduled receipt of the last aircraft by the 22d AREFS (H) as organized under 10 UE KC-135 tables. See atch #3. (C)

b. Crew manning following reorganization of the 22d AREFS (H) under 20 UE KC-135 tables (effective June 1961) will be authorized at a 1.6 to 1 crew to aircraft ratio. This ratio will be attained in January 1962, which is three months subsequent to the scheduled receipt of the last aircraft by the 22d AREFS (H) as organized under 20 UE KC-135 tables. See atch #4. (C)

7. The 902d AREFS of the 4123d Strategic Wing, Clinton-Sherman AFB, will provide a SACR 60-7 qualified KC-135 instructor crew to be in place at McChord AFB not later than 15 Aug 60. (U)

8. Headquarters SAC was requested by Hq 15AF message, DPAP 7218, 15 Jan 60, to provide lead supply package in accordance with A/C input phasing schedule set forth in Attachment #5. Headquarters SAC was requested in the same message to program required airmen, AFSC 270X0/274X0, command post type, to be in place not later than 1 June 60. (U)

9. Fly-Away Kits provisioning will commence on 1 Aug 60. (C)

10. An MTD for Maintenance training will be located TDY at McChord AFB. Scheduling, of personnel into training will be coordinated between 15AF, 92d Bomb Wing and the Mobile Training Detachment commander to insure that training completion dates are compatible with assignment dates and to support aircraft delivery.

11. A KC-135 maintenance familiarization cadre to be furnished by the 43rd Bomb Wing, as indicated in attachment 6 (21 personnel) will be assigned to McChord AFB to arrive approximately 15 August 1960. Firm assignment instructions will be furnished at a later date. (C)

12. No KC-135 flight simulator is programmed for McChord Air Force Base. The facility at Fairchild AFB will support this phase of training for the 22d AREFS (H). (U)

13. Graduates of formal KC-135 training will be qualified to enter training required by SAC regulation 50-43 at home station if all applicable requirements of SAC regulation 51-19 have been completed at the KC-135 CCTS. Aircrews selected to conduct ferry operations must be qualified in accordance with SAC Supplement I to AFR 55-36. Fifteenth Air Force will determine method of qualifying 22d AREFS (H) crews or will furnish other experienced crews to conduct ferry operations. Fifteenth Air Force will closely monitor organization, manning and operation of the 22d AREFS (H) and will provide any assistance necessary, particularly in the areas of additional instructors, ferry crews, etc. (C)

14. Officer manning of the 22d AREFS (H) will be the responsibility of Fifteenth Air Force. The Director of Personnel, Headquarters SAC, will develop and implement an airman buildup plan (less aircrew airmen) for the 22d AREFS (H). One hundred percent manning will be consistent with aircraft delivery. (U)

15. Public information release procedures will be prescribed by higher headquarters. The routine release of public information does not constitute authority for downgrading the contents of this plan. Individual elements of the plan will remain classified according to content in accordance with AFR 205 series; this includes information which would imply unit capability with respect to quantitative factors of crews, aircraft, and readiness dates. The overall plan and general information pertaining thereto will become unclassified effective with publication of SAC General Orders directing unit activation. A reliable procedure is to treat all specific data related to tactical potential classified until the intended action becomes an accomplished fact. Personnel orders will not be classified. (U)

16. Staff agencies of the 92BW will assume staff responsibilities for the 22d AREFS (H) as required under SACM 20-15 and the Joint Tenancy agreement between SAC and ADC. They will closely monitor organization, manning and operation of the 22 AREFS and will provide assistance as necessary to assure SAC projected February 61 date for combat readiness is met. (C)

17. Each Staff Directorate or Agency will review actions pertinent to their directorate and will submit progress reports to the Director of Comptroller as required by Base Supplement 1 to 15AFR 27-1. (U)

IMPLEMENTING ACTION REQUIRED

18. Implementation action will be accomplished in accordance with the following annexes: (U)

a. Annex A - 92BW Staff

b. Annex B - 92CSG Staff

c. Annex C - 22 AREFS

22ARS PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT
25 January 1961
WING COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

Overall progress of the squadron is satisfactory. All aircraft have been received and are presently on hand with the exception of Aircraft #59-1523 which was damaged on 15 December 1960.

All crews have completed MITO, and the 22ARS has been declared combat ready. However, the necessity for deviating from published schedules to meet the MITO requirements, which call for VFR and dry runways, had a detrimental effect on the squadron's MCS standing. A letter of protest has been submitted to Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force.

The major problems which now exist are being caused primarily by personnel shortages. Requests for manning assistance have been forwarded to higher headquarters and should be acted on expeditiously in order to provide the 22ARS with adequate personnel capability.

The progress of the 22ARS is rapidly reaching the point where it is believed formal progress reporting may be safely terminated. The fundamental structure of the organization has been established and developed, and most major problems have been eliminated. The change from a 10 UE unit to a 20 UE unit will introduce no new fundamental problems. Therefore, consideration is being given to discontinuing formal progress reports after the February 1961 report, in accordance with paragraph 4a(3)(d), 15AFR 27-1.

for J. F. MILLER
Colonel, USAF
Commander

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 92BW
NARRATIVE SUMMARY, 22 AREFS PROGRAM
Programming Plan 4-60

As of: 25 Jan 61

GENERAL ANALYSIS:

1. Satisfactory progress is being accomplished on all Directorate of Personnel projects.

2. 22 AREFS UMD Change Requests submitted during December were staffed at this headquarters with the result that additional spaces in unit administration and operations and training were not considered justified. It was determined that workloads cited could be assumed as additional duties by other staff members. (Ref paragraph 3 below).

3. The original 22 AREFS UMD Change Request submitted in August was returned by indorsement from 15AF after approval of one additional SSgt, AFSC 70250, effective 1 October 1961 under Unit Administration. This addition will improve the administrative situation of this squadron.

4. The fourth indorsement from 15AF to original UMD Change Request recommended a minimum of six months under an operational status elapse before submission of any further UMD change requests in order that a thorough evaluation could be made on the basis of valid, continuing workloads. This will be accomplished.

5. Officer resources of the Wing were surveyed and an officer (with an appropriate background) was selected for transfer to the 22 AREFS to fill the management analysis officer vacancy. A request will be submitted to 15AF before 5 February 1961 in regard to waiver of POS status. (Reference Tab A-5).

6. An assistance visit is scheduled by the Director of Personnel on or about 13 February 1961. A thorough review of the problem areas and requirements will be conducted at that time.

PROBLEM AREAS:

7. Shortage of qualified supply personnel is creating problems in the supply function. Message DSUP 5458 to 15AF requested transfer of four key supply personnel from Fairchild AFB to the 22 AREFS. Transfer will be effected immediately upon approval of the request.

8. Expedited input of personnel to fill increased authorizations in the 4th Quarter, FY 61, is deemed necessary in order to train personnel in sufficient time to meet operational commitments. The manning plan sent to 15AF on 9 December 1960 shows projected shortages and desired time phased input. 15AF has advised that the plan will be sent to SAC for approval on 20 January 1961.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS:

9. Expedited action and approval by 15AF, and SAC as necessary, for transfer of four key personnel from Fairchild to the 22 AREFS.

10. Necessary action on manning plan in order to provide build-up of 22 AREFS in accordance with the time-schedule contained therein.

LINSEY J. SANFORD
Major, USAF
Project Officer

0130

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS, 22 AREFS PROGRAM
Programming Plan 4-60

GENERAL ANALYSIS:

1. MSgt Anthony, four (4) NCO's, and one (1) airman from the Director of Supplies Office, 92nd Bombardment Wing, were TDY to the 22nd ARS during the period 3 January 1961 thru 10 January 1961. The following was accomplished during this TDY.

a. Inventoried all the mobility equipment in warehouse.

b. Inventoried IFR and Fuel Systems, Recovery Section, and Flight Line equipment.

c. Work was begun to reaccomplish all 538 records; an inspection subsequent to Report Nr. 5 indicated discrepancies.

d. Assistance was given in Maintenance Supply Liaison to insure better coordination between 22ARS Maintenance and McChord Base Supply.

e. Assistance was given on all operational procedures in the Bench Stock and Pre-Issue Sections.

f. This team carried copies of all Aircraft Support Divisions Operational Procedures to the 22ARS Supply Officer.

2. MSgt Anthony with a team of seven (7) personnel from the Director of Supplies office departed Fairchild again on 24 January 1961 for a records and inspection check of the 22ARS Supply. An additional four airman departed Fairchild 27 January 1961. Three additional 7 level supply personnel are scheduled to depart 31 January 1961 for McChord AFB, Wash.

3. Lt. Col. Rosenbaum and a representative of McChord Base Supply visited Fairchild AFB, 17 January 1961 thru 20 January 1961. They were briefed on procedures at Base Supply, Organizational Supply, and the Aircraft Support Division.

4. Fairchild message number DSUP 5458 to Headquarters 15AF requested permission to transfer four key supply personnel from Fairchild AFB to the 22nd ARS. If this request is approved, these personnel will be transfered in February 1961. (Ref. Tab C-7).

5. A building has been assigned for 780 installed equipment and bulk unit supply storage. A building is now being re-habilitated for CLARK.

PROBLEM AREAS:

6. Shortage of qualified supply personnel authorized on UMD still exists.

0131

RECOMMENDED ACTION FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS:

7. Recommend action be taken to man the 22nd ARS Supply activities up to 4th quarter UMD strength as soon as possible. The additional personnel are required at this time to build up the supply to support the 20 aircraft programmed for later this year. (Ref Tab A-3.)

FRANK L. NIMS
Lt. Col., USAF
Director of Supply

0132

GENERAL ANALYSIS:

1. All projects and areas in the 22nd Air Refueling Squadron Supply are progressing satisfactory considering the unusual shortage in qualified supply personnel. A satisfactory storage area has been made available for the 780 equipment, arrangements have been made for adequate Clark storage, and a supply building for 538 Section will be assigned to Squadron Supply 25 January 1961. While there is still a need for a more accessible storage area for Mobility Equipment, this should not present an insurmountable problem.

PROBLEM AREAS:

2. While the help rendered this Squadron by TDY personnel from 92nd Bomb Wing was substantial, this action did not eliminate the need for additional qualified personnel. Nor will it prevent the deterioration of supply activities in the 22nd ARS since the workload is much too great for the present supply personnel complement. At present the 538, receipt, issue, storage, turn-in and Pre-Issue section is being operated by one S/Sgt. 64650 and an A/3C 64630. There is a definite requirement for seven personnel in this area. The Bench Stock and Tool Crib is manned with a S/Sgt 64650 and an A/3C 64630 when it should have a minimun of four men. Clark is manned by two S/Sgts, who have the responsibility of managing both Clark and 780 equipment. These two areas must have a minimum of five personnel considering the fact that the equipment will be stored in separate areas. Supply Liaison has no personnel authorized, however there are three men working in this section, namely, the acting Chief of the Aircraft Support Branch who has no supply experience and a minimun of administrative experience. This section requires a minimun of four personnel. The Accounting Section is operating with two qualified S/Sgts and two A/3C 64630's and should have at least eight personnel in order to properly function. The Personal Equipment Section is authorized six personnel in the fourth quarter UMD but has operated on sixteen hour a day schedule with only three men. One of these men is due to retire in the near future. There is a critical need for an officer for Chief of the Aircraft Support. This is especially required since the present Supply Officer will retire within a few months. This would furnish the Squadron with a qualified replacement for the Supply Officer. A UMD change request is presently being prepared asking for an officer for Chief of Aircraft Support Branch or at least a nine level SM/Sgt or M/Sgt. The number of reports both one time & recurring required from Squadron Supply, utilizes at least fifty percent of the normal man hours available, and increases and already excessive work load. This organization has been on an overtime schedule for several months, which is extremely detrimental to the morale and welfare of the assigned personnel, and should be corrected as soon as possible. The "expediter" system is still not up to SAC standards, however the situation has shown improvement within the past few days. The following action has been taken by the 22ARS: (1) A highly qualified maintenance M/Sgt. has been placed in Base Supply as a Liaison representative. (2) The "quickie" list has been revised and researched for master stock list and substitution stock list numbers and republished. (3) The Pre-Issue list for the KC-135 has been researched and a purified list has been republished. (4) An all out effort is being made to improve the pre-positioned supplies for the KC-135. This action includes asking OCAMA for an approved table listings and a request for Base Supply to obtain a table listings from Beale and Walker AFB. (5) The 92nd Bomb Wing indicates that we will be assigned a fully qualified Supply Liaison man in the near future.

RECOMMENDED ACTION FOR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS:

3. Expedite action to assign critically needed supply personnel to the 22nd Air Refueling Squadron. (Ref. Tab A-3.)

C 27 January 1961

Broken Arrow Capability

4170SW (WC)
92BW (WC)

1. In a letter to all bombardment units dated 7 November 1960 the Chief of Staff, 15th Air Force, stressed the absolute necessity for prompt handling of "Broken Arrow" incidents. Since then you have had ample opportunity to review for timeliness and adequacy your own procedures relative to disaster control. It is not enough to have a well written disaster control plan if the people upon whom you must depend for its execution are not thoroughly aware of all the actions they must take.

2. I am particularly concerned about the initiation phase of a potential or actual "Broken Arrow" incident in areas of the base beyond the immediate surveillance of the control tower. More specifically, do all personnel who work around alert aircraft or nuclear weapons know what they must do to initiate a "Broken Arrow" alert? Is the notification chain intact from the initial report of a "Broken Arrow" condition to full activation of the disaster control team? Are your controllers fully aware of their responsibility for notifying higher headquarters of a "Broken Arrow" incident?

3. I would like you personally to assess your "Broken Arrow" reporting procedures and assure that they are adequate. Please advise me when you are completely satisfied with their effectiveness. Further, during your disaster control exercises I want you to simulate a variety of situations to test the ability of your unit to cope with a nuclear incident arising from any possible source.

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

Copy for Col Ohlke

5

6

HEADQUARTERS
18TH AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DM

19 January 1961

SUBJECT: Material Deviations During Large Scale Exercises

TO: 92SW (MC)
4170SW (MC)

ATTN: DMM

1. The requirement for a material monitor established by 15th Air Force letter, subject as above, 11 Jan 61, is considered by this headquarters as an extremely important function during large scale exercises and ROD operation. The primary function of this monitor deals with the determination of delays or deviations and the causes or effects.

2. With this in mind, it is suggested that your senior wing maintenance designee in the Control Room during this type operation be appointed additional duty as the Material Monitor. Although many questions will probably arise concerning base support type functions that this individual does not have an immediate answer to, it is felt that the most urgent question will concern current status of aircraft and any reasons for delay.

3. In the event that you do not agree with this concept and have cogent reasons for a different approach, request you call this office at your earliest convenience.

JOHN B. GAINEY, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Director of Material

Received & Filed
Dispatched
Alerted
Date

8

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

WC

19 January 1961

Materiel Deviations During Large Scale Exercises

C

1. Reference is made to the attached letter from Colonel Smith, Fifteenth Air Force, which you discussed with me earlier, concerning the 1-SAC-V1 and M-23 reports.

2. After looking into this further, I find that submission of the 1-SAC-V1 report each two hours during "All Out" exercises only has been discontinued. In lieu thereof, the 1-SAC-V1 report is submitted at the beginning of the generation and thereafter only if an abnormal situation arises. This change does not affect the daily 1-SAC-V1 reporting nor reporting during an actual EWO situation.

3. I have designated the senior maintenance officer on the Battle Staff as the single point of contact (materiel monitor) as directed in the attached letter.

L. F. MILLER
Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Ltr, ISAF (CS), 11 Jan 61,
Subj as above

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	EXTENSION INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Disposal)

SAC FORM 55, OCT 60

(Reproduced for Local Reproduction)

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
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HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 28 February 1961

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by MSgt. Donald W. Bunker, Unit Historian under the supervision of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) Information Staff Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET under the provisions of paragraph 30b, AFR 205-1, 1 April 1959. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis

ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

James W Ohlke LTCol

FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

15AF DXI 61-129
Atch 16

HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 60, filed BDAS, FAFB.

capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO). (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

3. Ibid.

Organization and Administration.

At month's end the seconds were ticking off the last moments that the 326th Bombardment Squadron would be assigned to the 18th Air Division under the 92d Bombardment Wing. Although M day, the official date for the movement, was 1 March, a large portion of the transferring personnel, aircraft and supporting equipment had already been moved to Glasgow Air Force Base, Montana, where the 4141st Strategic Wing under the command of the 821st Air Division would assume the supervisory responsibility.[4] (S)

Another change in the status of the 18th Air Division's subsidiary units was the attainment of full combat ready status by the 22d Air Refueling Squadron stationed at McChord Air Force. The manner with which this member squadron of the 92d Bombardment Wing accomplished this task was primarily of an operational nature and will be covered in the Operations section of this February history.[5] (C)

Personnel

Two units assigned to the division were the happy recipients of congratulatory messages from the Fifteenth Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr.

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4. Program Plan 5-60, 92BW, SECRET, Subj: Move of 326BS, Annex G, 15 Dec 60, Exhibit #9.

5. Program Plan 4-60, 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, Subj: 22 AREFS Program, 15 Aug 60, Exhibit #10.

The 4170th Combat Support Group, Larson Air Force Base[6], and the 92d Bombardment Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, gained this distinction by winning the Fifteenth Air Force Professional Development Awards for conducting the best wing and group programs. These first place honors were in each case, given because of the outstanding program in individual proficiency training. Both organizations were also awarded the Fifteenth Air Force average in officer retention, which resulted in the group accumulating the maximum 400 points, with the wing running a close second with 392 points out of a possible 400 points[7]. (U)

The professional development program (PDQ) was established in the Spring of 1960 as a means of raising the quality of the personnel and the standards of their performance to the highest possible degree of excellence. This program encompassed three areas including retention individual proficiency training and academic education. The manner with which these two organizations of the 18th Air Division conducted their programs was bound to be reflected in an overall increased efficiency[8]. (U)

Operations.

The graduation exercise, the successful accomplishment of which raised the 22d Air Refueling Squadron to the full

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6. Ltr, 15AF to 4170SW, Subj: Favorable Comm., 27 Jan 61, w/1st Ind, filed C, FAFB.
7. Ltr 15AF to 92BW, Subj: Favorable Comm., 27 Jan 61, w/1st Ind, filed C, FAFB.
8. Ibid.

combat ready status, was flown under the name of Operation FINELINE FOXTROT ALPHA on 5 and 6 February. Its purpose was to evaluate the initial operational readiness capability of the squadron.[9] (C)

This mission was conducted on a no-notice basis and involved 12 of the squadron's available KC-135 tankers. The exercise consisted mainly of a refueling operation for each tanker. The receiver bombers were B-52D aircraft assigned to the 92d Bombardment Wing and were scheduled to take an on-load of 60,000 pounds of fuel from the tankers being evaluated. The refueling area was accomplished in the Barts Rock refueling area of northern Montana.[10] (C)

Prior to the participation of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron in this graduation exercise, the 18th Air Division conducted a walk-through inspection. The primary purpose of this inspection, which was conducted from 1 to 3 February, was to uncover any possible areas of weakness in sufficient time to permit their correction before the Operation FINELINE FOXTROT ALPHA was executed. These areas included the alerting procedures, aircraft generation, command post operation, and base support.[11] (S)

The results of this pre-operation inspection indicated

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9. Program Plan 4-60, 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, Subj: 22AREFS Program, 15 Aug 60, Exhibit #10.

10. Ibid.

11. Ltr, 18AD to 92BW, SECRET, Subj: Walk-through Insp. Rpt, 3 Feb 61, Exhibit #2.

minor deficiencies in several areas. Many of these were corrected in the few days prior to the execution date of the graduation exercises. This action could well have been instrumental in obtaining the rating of outstanding for the real mission. A follow-up inspection was performed on 23 and 24 February to determine the degree of correction accomplished on those weak or imperfect areas uncovered in the first inspection. In general, a great deal of improvement was noted on this second inspection. However, there continued to be a number of areas which needed corrective action. These would be the subject of future inspections and staff visits performed by the 18th Air Division.[12] (S)

Meanwhile, training of the missile crews to operate the Titan and Atlas missile complex planned for Larson and Fairchild Air Force Bases, was received with due consideration at both division and higher levels. A comprehensive long-range training plan and schedule would have to be devised if these bases as well as others projected for a missile capability were to be prepared to assume their part in the Aero-Space Force.[12] (S)

The Strategic Air Command, as a result of a study of this missile ORT training problem made a plan with areas of responsibility. The 1st Missile Division would be

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12. Ltr, 18AD to 22ARS, SECRET, Subj: Follow-up Insp. for 22ARS, 1 Mar 61, Exhibit #3.

13. Msg, SAC to 18AD, SECRET, DOTPM 1-4-0455, Subj: Atlas and Titan ORT Reprog. Conf. 3 Feb 61, Exhibit #1

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responsible for the conduct of the unit instructor training on the first available installation in order to provide each unit with a cadre of missile training instructors. While maximum use of the facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, would be made for the ORT consistent with any other requirements, these cadres would permit that ORT to be conducted as far as possible within each unit or installation.[14] (S)

While flying operations and missile training would, of necessity, receive the attention they deserved from the 18th Air Division, safety in its many aspects would continue to be of prime importance. Because of this, Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, division commander, developed a Command Accident Prevention Policy. This policy, scheduled for dissemination in the January Division Commander's Call, was postponed until February. It encompassed nuclear safety, flight and ground safety and the procedures to make these a reality. Education of all supervisory personnel, regardless of level, was considered of prime importance. Consequently, careful selection of such personnel and indoctrination in the need for full observance of all applicable published directives and guides would be mandatory. Nor were dependents free from observance of safety procedures.[15] In all cases, the enforcement of these

14. Ibid.

15. Ltr, 18AD to Sub-units, Subj: Command Accident Policy, 27 Mar 61, Exhibit #11.

division policies would be insured through the swift, fair and impartial administration of appropriate disciplinary action commensurate with the offense.[16] (U)

Materiel.

The 18th Air Division was extremely gratified to have one of its subsidiary organizations, the 92d Bombardment Wing, receive the Haskell Gray Trophy for the period ending on 31 December 1960. This trophy was awarded for outstanding maintenance achievement when a total of 927 points out of a possible 1,000 were amassed by maintenance personnel of the honored 92d Bombardment Wing. The 18th Air Division Commander, Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, in a congratulatory letter, said:[17] (U)

> The achievement of winning the Haskell Gray Trophy by the 92d Bombardment Wing for the period ending 31 December 1960 is especially gratifying. The shortage of critical aircraft spares during this period more than doubled the importance of your excellent on-base repair program. The superior maintenance performed during this period is also reflected in your MCS standing and the operational accomplishments.

The 18th Air Division was desirous of fostering this brand of professional maintenance performance at all of the air bases under its control. To achieve the objective, a series of staff visits was made by division materiel personnel during the month. This was a continuation of similar visits

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16. Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, Subj: Accident Prevention Program 1961, 17 Feb 61, Exhibit #8.

17. Ltr, 18AD to 92BW, Subj: Appreciation, 9 Feb 61, Exhibit #7.

made during recent months by officer and airmen specialists in all phases of bombardment wing functions.[18] (U)

The first of these visits in February was made to Larson Air Force Base where a follow-up inspection was made on the November Fifteenth Air Force IG report and the replies of the 4170th Strategic Wing. In nearly all areas reported as deficient in November, adequate corrective action had been taken. In addition, other problem areas were discussed. One of these was the shortage of refrigerator space in the commissary sales store. Since the purchase of refrigerated display and storage cases from the surcharge funds was authorized by MAAMA Letter 59-27, it was recommended that procurement of this or similar type equipment would alleviate the existing shortage of refrigerated storage for the meat products.[19] (U)

A second problem area at Larson Air Force Base concerned the necessity for the prompt development of a detailed plan for the utilization of the Boeing Flight Center facility. At month's end, no final decision had been reached.[20] (U)

The 22d Air Refueling Squadron stationed at McChord Air Force Base was next on the list of installations to be visited by division materiel personnel. The purpose of

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18. Ltr, 18AD to DM, Subj: Rpt of Staff Visit, LAFB, 15 Feb 61, Exhibit #5.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

this visit was to check the status of inventory of the custody receipt accounts and the action taken on the unit authorization list (UAL) items that were critically required by the armament and electronics shop. Only minor deficiencies were uncovered in the custody receipt accounts. These were being corrected.[21] (U)

However, there was found to be a shortage of 22 items critically required by the electronics branch to provide an adequate minimum support capability for the electronic equipment installed in the squadron's tanker aircraft. It was revealed that a special supply project had been established to solve this problem. Already, the effect of this action was being noticed although some areas were still in need of an improvement.[22] (U)

Finally, a staff visit to Fairchild Air Force Base revealed a quite satisfactory state of affairs, materiel-wise. This was no doubt a continuation of the excellent record made by the 92d Bombardment Wing when it gained for the 18th Air Division the honor of being awarded the Haskell Gray Trophy for the latter part of the year 1960.[23] (U)

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21. Ltr, 18AD to DM, Subj: Rpt of Staff Visit, 22ARS, 23 Feb 61, Exhibit #4.

22. Ibid.

23. Ltr, 18AD to DM, Subj: Rpt of Staff Visit, FAFB, 28 Feb 61, Exhibit #6

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Colonel Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Admimistrative Staff Officer	Captain Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Colonel David A. Tate
Director of Materiel	Colonel John B. Carey, Jr.
Director of Saftey	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Darell G. Burgeson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Major Gordon A. Bailey

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agenices.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 417th Strategic Wing. (U)

LIST OF EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, SAC to 18AD, SECRET, DOTPM 1-4-0455, Subj: Atlas and Titan ORT Reprog. Conf, 3 Feb 61	1
Ltr, 18AD to 92BW, SECRET, Subj: Walk Through Insp Rpt, 3 Feb 61	2
Ltr, 18AD to 22ARS, SECRET, Subj: Follow-up Insp for 22ARS, 1 Mar 61	3
Ltr, 18AD to DM, Subj: Rpt of Staff Visit, 22ARS, 23 Feb 61	4
Ltr, 18AD to DM, Subj: Rpt of Staff Visit, LAFB, 15 Feb 61	5
Ltr, 18AD to DM, Subj: Rpt of Staff Visit, FAFB, 28 Feb 61	6
Ltr, 18AD to 92BW, Subj: Appreciation, 9 Feb 61	7
Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, Subj: Accident Prevention Program 1961, 17 Feb 61	8
Program Plan 5-60, 92BW, SECRET, Subj: Move of 326BS, Annex G, 15 Dec 60	9
Program Plan 4-60, 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, Subj: 22AREFS Program, 15 Aug 60	10
Ltr, 18AD to Sub-units, Subj: Command Accident Policy, 27 Mar 61	11

SECRET

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RRJ671
PP RJWBFK RJWBKNRJWBAR RJWBGP
DE RJWXNL 576
P R 102050Z
FM SAC OFFUTT AF NEBR
TO RJWBFK/1MISSILEDIV VANDENBERG AFB CALIF
RJWBKN/15AF MARCH AFB CALIF
INFO RJEZHQ/OFS USAF WSH DC
RJEBKF/3AF BAKSDALE AFB LA
RJEXDM/6FWESTOVER AFB MASS
RJWBAR/1BAIRDIVF E WARREN AFB WYO
RJWBGP/18ADIV FAIRCHILD AFB ABB
RJWBKF/26TSTRATMISSILESQ FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
RJWBFK/AFBMD INGLEWOODCALIF
RJBFK/AFBMC INGLEWOOD CLI
RJWBKF/SBAMA NORTON AFB CALIF
BT
S E C R E T/DOTP 1-4- 2455.UIMEDIATE ATTENTION REQUIRED.
1ST MSSILE DIVISION ORD/Y, 15AF FOR DOT, USAF FOR APPTR, AFBMD
FOR WDT, AFBMD FOR I. S F, SBMC FOR SBN. ALL OTHERS FO TRAINING AND
PERSONEL. SUBJECT: ATLAS AND TITAC ORT REPROGRAMMING CONFERENCES.
THISMESSAGE IN 6 PARTS. PART 1. OTHER COMMITMENTS AND DELAYS IN
THE TURNOVER OFVARE FACILITIES HAVE RECN RED TI HEADQUARTRS TO
CONSIDER OTHER WAYS AND MEANS TO INSURE THAT QUALITYTRAINED CREWS/
PERSONNEL RE PROVIDED TO THE PERATIONAL UNITS ON A TIMELY BASIS.
A STUDY HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND APPROVAD BY THIS HEADQUARTERS WHEREBY
ORT WILL BE CONDUCTED AT THE FIRS OPERATINAL UNIT, FAIRCHILD OFR

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ATLAS "" AND LOWRY FOR TITN 1. AS AN INTERIM MEASUR UNTIL VFB
FACILITIES ARE TURNED OVER TO SAC FOR TRANING. BECAUSE OF THE
MANY PROBLEMS INVOLVAD ACD THE EARLT START DATES OF ORT, RPROGRAMMING
ONFERENCES TO INCLUDE LOGISTIC IMPLICATIONS ARE BEING TENTATIVELY
SCHEDULED AS FOLLOWS: ATLAS "E", 8-10 FEB 61 AT VANDENBER AFB AND
TITAN IN 15-17 FEB 61 AT LOWRY AFB. PART 2. PLANNING FACTORS TO
B USED IN THE CONDUCT OF THIS INTERIM ORT ARE: ALFA. 1ST MD WILL
RETAIN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ALL ORT. BRAVO. ORT WILL
BE PLANNED AN SCHEDULED IN TWO PHASES: (1) PHASE I: O BE
CODUCTED AT VANDENBERG AFB AND WILL CONSIST OF MAITENANCE MANAGE-
MENT, ACADEMIS ACD CRW PROCEDURES TRAINER (IF AVAILABLE). (2
PHASE II: ATLAS "E". TO BECONDUCTED AT FAIRCHILD AND WILL CONSIST
OF FIVE WEEKS HRDWARE TRAINING. INITIALLY A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF INS-
TRUCTORS WILL BE TRAINED TO SUPPORT THE BUILD-UP IN FORCE". THE FIRST
CLASS TO BE CONDUCTED ON THE FIRST AVAILBLE COMPLEX WILL BE INSTRUCTOR
ORT. THE SECOND CLASS, TO CMENCE ON COMPLETION OF THE FIRST, WILL
UTILZE THE COMPLEXES FOR INSTRUCTOR AND ONE COMPLEX FOR FORMAL RT.
THIRD CLSS WILL UTILIWESEVN COMPLEXES FORTHE CONDUCT OF FORMAL
ORT. THE FOURTH AND FOLLOWING CLASSES WILL UTILIZE ONLY FOR
COMPLEXES UNIL COMPLETION OF ORT. TITAN 1. TO BE CONDUCTED T

SECRET

0158

Headquarters
18TH AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO

SECRET

3 February 1961

SUBJECT: "Walk-Through" Inspection Report (U)

TO: 92BW (WC)

1. GENERAL: A Walk-Through inspection of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron was conducted by this headquarters 1-3 February 1961. Primary purpose of the inspection was to uncover possible areas of weakness in alerting procedures, aircraft generation, command post operation, and base support, in sufficient time to permit their correction prior to a possible ORI in the immediate future. (U)

2. GENERATION EXERCISE:

a. The exercise was initiated at 1815 PST, when a simulated "Blue Dot 2" message was handed to the officer controller on duty. The deciphered message directed that the 22AREFS assume a DEFCON 2 posture. A letter outlining the ground rules for the exercise (Atch 1) was presented to the Squadron Commander just prior to announcement of "A" hour. Although alerting of personnel was to be by covert means, signs were placed at base gates indicating that a SAC alert was in progress. (S)

b. Controllers' Action.

(1) Controllers copied message and checked authentication. (U)

(2) Controllers only decoded Part I and Part II and started their pyramid alert. They did not complete decoding of message until after pyramid alert was complete. They did not know the exceptions or whether alerting was overt or covert. (S)

(3) Thirty minutes after the Blue Dot 2 message was given controllers checked the exceptions. (S)

(4) The first M-23 Report had the wrong addressees. (U)

(5) The second M-23 was 3+30 hours late in submission because the person who prepared the message thought that an M-23 was sent every 12 hours from "A" hour. It should have been sent at 1200Z and 2400Z. (U)

c. The Commander's meeting was not held until 1905 hours, fifty minutes after initiation of the alert. This seems an

excessive time period, especially considering the apparent advance warning which the squadron possessed. (C)

d. General briefing for aircrews was held at 1930 hours. It was generally adequate with the following exceptions: (U)

(1) Weather charts were poorly displayed, and were of such a scale that they could not be seen from the back of the briefing room. (U)

(2) Much extraneous detail was included in the briefing which should have been pre-positioned in aircrew flimsies, and only highlighted in the briefing. (U)

(3) Glasgow AFB was briefed as an emergency airfield, yet the weather briefing did not cover terminal conditions at that base. (U)

e. An "E" hour of 0530 PST was declared at 0518. This was substantially more stringent than would normally be expected during an ORI; yet the weather scout aircrew was ready to taxi at 0532. The crew of Captain Treganza is to be commended for the professional way in which they removed engine dust covers and downlocks, in the absence of the maintenance crew, and were ready to start engines as soon as a fire guard was available. Subsequent aircraft started engines in a "Bravo" exercise at the times scheduled in the operations order. (S)

f. Nine reports were required following execution. One was missing, an M-15 on landing of the weather scout aircraft. Three were correct; five had errors: two M-23's, two T-8's, and one M-10. (C)

g. Generation of aircraft equalled or exceeded SACM 55-7 rates in all cases through A+14, at which time the exercise was terminated. (S)

h. From a maintenance standpoint, the generation was satisfactory throughout, although there were a few rough areas as follows: (U)

(1) The Chief of Maintenance should have briefed the Commander and his staff concerning aircraft status and lineup at the Commander's meeting in the Command Post. (U)

(2) Suggest consideration of use of launch teams and an operations supervisor on the flight line. (U)

(3) Recommend locally inspired alerts to polish the overall operation as soon as possible. (U)

(4) Questionable shifts (0600-1800) were established by Maintenance Control. (U)

(5) Recommend that a private telephone line be established between the Monitor in Job Control and the Monitor in the Command Post. (U)

(6) "E" hour notification was not given to A-E Section until after the first aircraft was "Bravoed." (S)

i. Organizational Supply was effectively manned at A+30 and reached full strength before A+1. Subsequently, shifts were established to support the exercise in an orderly manner. (S)

j. Base Supply was manned with four of their personnel and one 22AREFS liaison man at A+1. Of this number there was only one vehicle driver to service all organizations on the base. This could cause a slow down of delivery to the 22AREFS in the event a requirement was generated during the time the driver was delivering an order to another organization. (S)

k. Six requisitions (priorities 2 and 4) were processed between A hour and E hour. Supply action was as follows: (U)

(1) One item issued from Base Supply. (U)

(2) One item - maintenance repaired. (U)

(3) One item cancelled. (U)

(4) Three items back-ordered at Base Supply.(U)

Both the item issued and the item repaired were available in the CLARK. The three items back-ordered were not authorized for CLARK. (U)

l. Although Base Supply was effectively manned, only one out of six items requested was issued. This percentage of fill indicates that base levels are inadequate to support the KC-135 program. (U)

m. A Disaster Control exercise was not conducted during this operation because of time limitations. It is recommended that 92BW Disaster Control personnel be sent TDY to McChord AFB for the purpose of checking 22AREFS Disaster Control Plans. (U)

3. COMPLIANCE:

a. Operations.

(1) Organization and Facilities. The squadron organization appears adequate to carry on assigned functions and

responsibilities; however, space allocation leaves much to be desired. Only about sixty per cent of the space considered the minimum SAC standard in the operations function is actually available. No immediate solution of this problem is apparent. Almost every room contained charts leaning against walls or desks in an extremely untidy array. One notable exception was the crew status chart being prepared in the office of the operations officer. When completed this chart will be an excellent means of showing the status of all crew members and of controlling their activities. (U)

(2) Control Room.

(a) The following charts required by SACM 55-2 were missing from the Command Post: (U)

1. POL Status. (U)

2. Personnel Status. (U)

3. Personnel Mobility Chart. (U)

4. Logistics Status Summary. (U)

(b) The Command Post is missing many required regulations and manuals (i.e., SACM 55-7). Recommend 92d Bomb Wing DCOC compile complete list of all required regulations and manuals and aid the 22AREFS in obtaining them without further delay. (U)

(c) Results of controller exams administered are classified and have been given to DCOC, 92BW. (U)

(d) The Aircraft Generation and Replenishment Charts are not posted in accordance with SACM 55-2. (U)

1. Scheduled half block does not show A+ times for activities. (Page 41, SACM 55-2) (U)

2. Only five aircraft generation lines were shown, although the 22AREFS would be required to generate eight aircraft under EWO conditions at present. (S)

3. Aircraft maintenance lineup was not posted for EWO. (U)

4. Crew lineup was not posted for EWO. (U)

5. Generation schedule on one aircraft had preflight scheduled in midst of replenishment phase. (U)

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(3) Combat Operations.

(a) This section is in its infancy with Major Himes designated as responsible officer. He was briefed on probable IG discrepancy items to guard against. It is strongly recommended that he be placed TDY with 92BW DCOCO for two days for a complete indoctrination in KC-135 EWO procedures and CMF preparation. (U)

(b) Time available did not allow questioning of crew members on the SAC Tactical Doctrine. It is recommended that questions and lectures used by the 92BW in recent SSG preparation be made available to the 22AREFS operations staff for administration to crews. (U)

(4) Navigation Section:

(a) Celestial legs are being replotted in accordance with SACR 51-11. It is recommended that a wall chart be maintained as a ready reference to replot activities. Such a chart exists, but is not displayed, posted, or in optimum format. (U)

(b) Critiques are not being monitored in accordance with SACM 20-10 and SACM 50-6. It is realized that complete staff representation at all critiques is not always possible, but a minimum of one operations staff officer should be present at each critique. (U)

(c) SAC Forms 157 are being properly used, but records do not indicate proper use of replot results in critiques. (U)

(d) The squadron navigator is not yet a qualified instructor, but will be made one as soon as he has accrued the required flying hours. (U)

b. Materiel:

(1) Supply.

(a) Organizational Supply is considered satisfactory; however, there is room for considerable improvement in warehousing and housekeeping. (U)

(b) A detailed list of discrepancies existing in Organizational Supply is contained in Report of Staff Visit, DMS, this headquarters, 23 Jan 61, copies of which were furnished

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COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION: OAS-21

DO 1 March 1961

Follow-up Inspection for 22d Air Refueling Squadron (U)

22ARS (C)

THRU: 92BW (UC)

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME

1. Personnel from the Directorate of Operations performed a staff visit to the 22ARS 22-24 Feb 61. Purpose of the staff visit was to follow up on the Operations portion of the "Walk-Through" inspection performed by this headquarters 1-3 Feb 61. (U)

2. In general, a great deal of improvement was noted. Guide rails had been mounted for charts throughout the Squadron; a transparency projector and easel have been provided in the briefing room; special orders placing airmen on flying status are no longer being cut retroactively. Numerous other improvements have been made. (U)

3. The following areas of weakness continue to exist in the 22ARS:

a. No formal roster has been established for personnel required to attend the Commander's meeting immediately following designation of an "A" hour. This should be done immediately either through Squadron orders or through a Squadron policy letter. (U)

b. The personnel status chart is located just outside the Command Post door. This slight deviation from SACM 55-2 was directed by the Squadron Commander to permit orderly posting of information to the chart without disrupting activities in the Control Room. (U)

c. A personnel mobility chart is not maintained. With the present and projected mission of the 22ARS, the Commander does not deem such a chart necessary. (U)

d. A+ times for various activities are posted in the "actual" column of the generation chart. When an "A" hour is received the controller on duty adds it to the A+ times, writes the PST for each activity in the "scheduled" block, and erases the A+ times from the "actual" block. This is a minor deviation from SACM 55-2A but it does give a complete,

DO-61-0012

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RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 36, OCT 60 (Authorized for Local Reproduction)

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accurate, and up-to-date picture of aircraft generation. Another minor deviation is the use of actual times rather than X's in blocks to show completion of each scheduled item in aircraft generation. (U)

e. No crew line-up is posted at the present time. Upon assuming an alert posture the Squadron intends to post only those crews covering alert sorties. This is based on the local interpretation that paragraph 56d(1), SACM 55-2 is not applicable to tanker units. Admittedly, the tanker squadrons do not have crew assigned sorties as such, but the generation time of the first two follow-on sorties (A+4, A+6) is sufficiently stringent to require daily designation of crews to cover these sorties. (S)

f. Timely receipt of required regulations and manuals, and changes thereto continues to be a problem. The present situation wherein an attempt is made to make up shortages by "scrounging" from 92d Bomb Wing sources is intolerable and if continued will lead to serious deviations by the 22ARS. This was a subject earmarked for prompt attention in the report of previous inspection by this headquarters. Immediate positive action must be taken by the 92BW DAS to insure direct distribution of all pertinent SAC and 15AF regulations and manuals, electric messages, and letter correspondence to the 22ARS. (U)

g. The Squadron staff is still not monitoring critiques in accordance with SAC Manuals 20-10 and 50-6. (U)

h. 92BW OPORD 300-61A "Fine Line Fox Trot Alfa" is in need of immediate revision. In its present form it cannot be successfully implemented by the 22ARS under the 1 March posture. Items requiring revision are as follows: (C)

(1) The OPORD requires aircraft generation in accordance with SACM 55-7 rates. This generation is not required either by SACM 50-5 or 15AF OPORD 300-61. With three aircraft on alert (1 March posture) SACM 55-7 does not require generation of the sixth follow-on aircraft until A+42. The OPORD provides a possible requirement for this sortie to launch at A+17. Generation of this aircraft (9th in the maintenance line-up) by A+17 is extremely optimistic. Possible solutions to the problem are elimination of the requirement for an airborne spare or furnishing a weather scout from other resources of the 92BW. (S)

(2) The requirement that the crew scheduled to fly the aircraft have mobility and survival gear on board at SACM 55-7 generation time should be deleted. Some of the aircraft generated early must be preflighted by "buddy" crews to comply with crew rest directives. This results in equipment belonging to the primary crew being left unattended on the aircraft. (S)

(3) The OPORD should spell out the degree of participation of alert force crews and aircraft, if they are to be used. (S)

j. No formal amendment has been made to the Fairchild Task Force 44 OPORD to provide crew preparation schedules, generation schedules, and other tasks for the Air Refueling Squadron EWO. (S)

k. SAC msg DOT 14260, 20 Feb 61, subject: Elimination of the Term "Aircraft Commander" has not been complied with. The unit denied having received this message. (U)

l. Although a program has been initiated, certification and certificates required by SAC msg DOOMC 00372, 2 Feb, covering passenger carrying qualifications for pilots are not on file. (U)

m. Individual flight records, AF Forms 8, for Lt Colonel Rosenbaum, Major Wells, and Captain Gobbig are being maintained by Base Operations (Air Defense Command). These records are not being maintained in accordance with SAC and 15AF standards. The 2BAMS should take all possible steps to insure that existing discrepancies are corrected. (U)

n. Only two instrument hoods are available for instrument training. Immediate action must be taken to insure that additional hoods are obtained. (U)

o. Various visual aids such as an MRBA Computer and a new instrument panel are needed for the Instrument School. These items should be included in a report to 15AF required by their message DOTO 12279, 14 Feb 61, subject: Instrument School Program. (U)

p. The Operations Officer has been placed on orders as an evaluator pilot, however, a request for waiver of SACR 60-7 has not been forwarded to 15AF authorizing Major Brideton, the Assistant Operations Officer, to be designated as an evaluator pilot. (U)

q. Proper coordination with the ADC Training Section to insure a workable aquatic survival program has not been completed. (U)

r. Only 30 instrument ground school slides have been received from 15AF. It is understood that the remainder will be distributed by 10 March. (U)

s. SAC Forms 364A and B still are not being utilized to publish the weekly flying schedule (SACR 60-9). (U)

SECRET

t. A chart in the briefing room containing a list of current publications (Safety-of-Flight supplements, operating procedures, etc.) was posted as of 10 February. This list should be checked daily and the posting date changed daily so that aircrews will know that the list is current. (U)

u. At the time of the visit, the briefing room was still in need of cleanup. The floor was dirty, there were scuff marks from rubber soled shoes, and dried, spilled coffee on the floor. (U)

v. The "Hot Poop" section of the Safety Bulletin Board contained two items dated 5 January and 20 January respectively. This out-dated material was certainly not "Hot Poop", and should be removed if the value of the "Hot Poop" section is to be maintained. (U)

w. Many photographs were still missing from the aircrew status board in the Operations Office. A concentrated effort should be made to bring this chart up to date. (U)

4. This report is furnished for action as deemed necessary. No reply is required; however, deficiencies noted in preceding paragraphs will be given particular emphasis during future staff visits. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MAURICE E. MARLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations

SECRET

4

DO 61-0012

Col Ohlke has seen.

HEADQUARTERS
18TH AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DMS

23 February 1961

SUBJECT: Report of Staff Visit, 22d Air Refueling Squadron, McChord AFB, Washington

TO: DM, 18AD

1. Person Making Visit: Lt Colonel Charles B. Murray, Supply Staff Officer, 18AD

2. Period of Visit: 16 & 17 February 1961

3. Purpose of Visit: To check the status of inventory of Custody Receipt Accounts and action taken on UAL items critically required by the A&E shop.

4. Persons Contacted:

22ARS	Base Supply, McChord AFB
Colonel K. C. Diehl, Comdr	Captain George Eastman, Stock Control Officer
Captain John Moynihan, Supply Officer	Mr. Lew Walker, Chief, Property Accounting

5. Findings and Recommendations:

a. Supply Administration:

(1) Two Certificates of Accountability are required to be accomplished and filed. (Authority: Par 8, Sect 7, Volume IV, AFM 67-1). One is required for the transfer of the account from Captain John C. Moynihan to Lt Colonel Bert S. Rosenbaum which was effective 28 Nov 60. The other is required for the transfer from Lt Colonel Rosenbaum to Captain Moynihan which was effective 1 Feb 61. Failure to accomplish the first certificate was reported in Report of Staff Visit, this headquarters, 23 Jan 61. Both certificates should be accomplished without delay.

b. Inventory of Custody Receipt Accounts:

(1) All Custody Receipt Accounts have been physically inventoried and posted to the mechanized card deck. With the exception of three accounts, all new Custody Receipts have been signed and placed in file. Signatures for these three accounts should be reaccomplished at the earliest possible date.

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(2) At the present time Base Statistical Services is preparing two machine run listings for the Squadron: One from deck #1 (UAL deck) and one from deck #2 (Custody Receipt Deck). Upon receipt of these listings supply personnel will ascertain variances, if any, between the two decks and adjust property records as required.

c. Critical UAL Items for A&E Shop: There is presently a shortage of 22 items critically required by the Electronic Branch to provide adequate minimum support capability for the electronic equipment installed in the possessed KC-135 aircraft. The lack of these items has resulted in a zero percent support capability on the AN/ARC-34 UHF radio, AN/ARA-25 UHF direction finder, AN/ARN-21 UHF (TACAN) navigation system, and AN/ASN-7 computer portion of the AN/APN-99. Squadron Supply requested follow-up action on these items from Base Supply on or about 6 Feb 61. My visit to Base Supply revealed that a special supply project had been established for the 22 items in question. Base Supply personnel are to be commended for the thorough and detailed research, as well as depot follow-up, which they accorded each line item. In several instances, replies had been received from the various depots. However, insufficient time had elapsed by the date of my staff visit to properly evaluate the effect which the described action will have toward solving the problem in the Squadron A&E shop. By 6 March 61, date for next scheduled staff visit to McChord, all depots will have had sufficient time to advise Base Supply of the supply action taken. The situation will be investigated at that time and appropriate recommendation made relative to subsequent actions required.

Charles B. Murray

CHARLES B. MURRAY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Supply Staff Officer

HEADQUARTERS
18TH AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DM

SUBJECT: Report of Staff Visit, Larson AFB, Washington

TO: 18AD (DM)

1. Persons Making Visit: Lt Colonel D. G. Burgeson
Lt Colonel C. B. Murray
MSgt S. R. Hill, Jr.

2. Period of Visit: 8-10 February 1961

3. Purpose of Visit: Follow-up on adequacy of 4170th Strat Wing replies made to Hq 15th Air Force IG Report of 14 Nov 60.

4. Persons Contacted:

Colonel Ray	- Acting Comdr 4170SW
Colonel Calhoun	- Base Commander
Lt Col Salter	- BDCS
Lt Col Nicol	- DSUP
Lt Col Crane	- DCM
Lt Col Mann	- Ass't DCM
Lt Col Westberg	- Comdr, A&E Sq
Lt Col Johnson	- SATAF

5. General: In addition to stated purpose of the visit, the following areas were discussed:

a. Shortage of refrigerated space in Commissary Sales store. This matter was discussed with the Base Commander and the BDCS. We apprised the aforementioned officers that MAAMA letter Nr. 59-27 authorizes purchases of refrigerated display and storage cases from commissary surcharge funds. Also, a brochure of available equipment in Spokane identical to that being purchased by Fairchild Commissary was given the BDCS. It was our recommendation that procurement of this or similar type equipment would alleviate the existing shortage of refrigerated storage for meat products. Assurance was given us that this recommendation will be given careful study.

b. The necessity for the prompt development of a detailed plan for utilization of the Boeing Flight Center facility was discussed with the Base Commander, Wing DCO, and DCM. Lt Col Mann, Assistant DCM, had been appointed as Project Officer and was taking aggressive and forceful

action. Tentative arrangements were made for 4170SW personnel to brief the 18th Air Division Commander and staff on this matter on 14 Feb 61.

6. Aircraft Maintenance: The following comments are submitted relative to adequacy of replies and compliance by 4170SW to the Hq 15th Air Force IG Report of 14 Nov 60 by the Quality Control Division and Armament-Electronics Squadron. Paragraphs are numbered identical to those of the IG Report:

VI. BOMB WING DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR MAINTENANCE:

* * * * *

C. QUALITY CONTROL DIVISION:

1. The DCM had set a 120 day cycle for activities inspections. At the time of this visit, the second cycle was in progress. Further activity inspections were programmed for the remainder of the calendar year on a 120 day cycle. Corrective action taken by the various activities was adequate on reported discrepancies.

2. Special subjects for inspection (121-series) publications are now being received in Quality Control. A review revealed that all such current regulations affecting DCM were on hand.

3. Transfer of the PIP function from the Quality Control Division to the Reports and Analysis Division was made in accordance with CINSAC message DM4E 39391.

4. Corrective action cited by the 4170SW to this paragraph of the IG Report indicated that four or five "in-commission" inspections a month would be conducted. In the month of January 1961, however, only two "in-commission" inspections were accomplished.

I. ARMAMENT AND ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON:

* * * * *

2b. Welcoming letters by the Squadron Commander and letters of indoctrination by sponsors of newly assigned personnel are now being accomplished.

3b. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION: Of the four items of equipment listed in the IG Report as being not received and affecting the maintenance effort, only a portion of the Amplifier Tester, Stock Nr. 6625-490-3472, has been

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received. Recommend continued supply follow-up action be taken on all UAL shortages.

5. ANALYSIS AND TRAINING BRANCH: A review of all discrepancies cited in the IG report reflects satisfactory compliance and corrective action taken.

6a. PRODUCTION CONTROL BRANCH: Equipment flow to the shops is being effectively controlled and work loads continually monitored.

7c. ARMAMENT SYSTEMS BRANCH:

(1) The weapon degreasers and hot oil bath were still not operational. A completion date of 15 Jan 61 had been established as a completion date for this project. Recommend DCM take aggressive action to expedite.

(5) Aircraft, other than those on alert, are not being placarded when guns are "hot".

7. Supply: Following comments are submitted relative to adequacy of replies and compliance by 4170SW to the Hq 15th Air Force IG Report of 14 Nov 60. Paragraphs are numbered identical to paragraphing of the IG Report:

VIII. WING DIRECTOR OF SUPPLY:

* * * * *

B. AIRCRAFT SUPPORT DIVISION:

1. MAINTENANCE SUPPLY LIAISON BRANCH:

a. (1) - (9) A follow-up schedule is in effect on all priority requests. 15th Air Force Forms 104 are being signed off in accordance with directives.

b. A critical items list is being maintained. The latest date of review was 27 Jan 61.

c. Same as b above.

d. Maintenance Supply Liaison NCOIC makes frequent checks of reparable item pick-up points to preclude an item staying in reparable status for an excessive period of time.

e. Ten reparable pickup points have been established and posted to base maps. Base Supply and Maintenance Support have both been given distribution of map.

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2. BENCH STOCK AND PRE-ISSUE BRANCH: Not inspected.

3. AIRCRAFT INSTALLED EQUIPMENT BRANCH: Not inspected.

4. TOOL CRIB BRANCH: Not inspected.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION:

1. ACCOUNTING BRANCH:

a.(1)-(8). Hi-Value technical orders placed on requisition subsequent to Hq 15th Air Force inspection have been received. The PRT for Hi-Value tech orders has been annotated and submitted to the Base Publications Distribution Office. However, considerable laxity still exists in controlling the filing and cross-referencing of publications.

b. Action taken by 4170SW is as stated in their reply to the IG Report; continuance of existing procedures should preclude recurrence of cited irregularity.

(1) Shortages in combat crew 538's have been determined and requisitioned. Hq 15th Air Force has furnished clarification as to usage of ECL 10004 column as pertains to B-52 pilots and co-pilots.

(2) Same as par b above.

(3)(a) No action required.

(b) ECL 12201 not received; requisition follow-up should be instituted.

(c) Current ECL 13202 on hand and in file.

(d) Same as (c) above.

e. See par 2a below.

2. INVENTORY BRANCH:

a. Charts are displayed showing the programmed dates for inventory and the date of actual completion of inventory. Reference par 2c below, 24 accounts have been completed.

b. 15AF Forms 212 are complete.

c. See par 2a above.

3. STORAGE AND ISSUE BRANCH:

a. Although warehouse markings were completed after the IG Inspection, subsequent rewarehousing necessitates additional markings to be accomplished.

b. All cylinders turned in.

c. Weapons are still stored on pallets but at a height of approximately four weapons. Boxes to comply with 15th AFR 136-1 have been ordered, and Mt. Rainier Ordnance Depot has notified the base that they have been shipped. Upon receipt of boxes, a program will be established to comply with pertinent regulations.

d.-f. Answer adequate.

4. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT BRANCH:

a. SACR 67-9R and Changes 1 & 2, 15AFR Supl-1 to 67-9R, and T.O. 0-1-02 are on hand in Personal Equipment Branch.

b. Records of property are kept on AF Form 1130. Inventory is scheduled by Consolidated Wing Supply.

c. Cleared.

d. AF Forms 1297 are current.

D. G. BURGESON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acft Maint Staff Officer

CHARLES B. MURRAY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Supply Staff Officer

Col Ohlke has seen.

HEADQUARTERS
18TH AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DMS

28 February 1961

SUBJECT: Report of Staff Visit, Fairchild AFB, Wash., 17,20,21 Feb 61

TO: 18AD (DM)

Person Making Visit: MSgt Samuel R. Hill, Jr.

Persons Contacted:

TSgt Duncan - BDCM
TSgt Jones - BDCMG
Mr. Songaylo - Civil Engineers
TSgt Hendrix - BDCMAK
SSgt Tanner - Wg Supply

1. A staff visit was made by MSgt Hill to agencies located on Fairchild AFB 17,20 & 21 Feb 61.

a. Wing Supply. Shredout of equipment to Glasgow has been completed on all equipment available for shipment except approximately 100 line items which are scheduled to move with the departure of aircraft PCS and TDY.

b. CLARK Section. The 326th CLARK was shipped to Glasgow 97.1% complete. The 325th CLARK is 98.7% and 92d ARS is 96.5% complete.

c. Civil Engineers. A visit to the inspection of C.E. revealed that the following projects for improvement of Wherry Housing have been established:

(1) Installation of remaining counter tops in all kitchens.

(2) Installation of storm windows and doors.

(3) Installation of kitchen linoleum where required.

(4) Painting of Wherry units while they are vacant between occupants.

Samuel R. Hill, Jr.
SAMUEL R. HILL, Jr.
MSgt, USAF
Supply Supt.

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COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

C

9 Feb 1961

Appreciation

92 Bomb Wg

1. The achievement of winning the Haskell Grey Trophy by the 92d Bombardment Wing for the period ending 31 December 1960 is especially gratifying. The shortage of critical aircraft spares during this period more than doubled the importance of your excellent on-base repair program. The superior maintenance performed during this period is also reflected in your MCS standing and the operational accomplishments.

2. Please pass my congratulations to all of your people responsible for attaining this high honor.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
C	KMD
DM	Casey

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 26, OCT 60 (Authorized for Local Reproduction)

17 February 1961

Lieutenant General Archie J Old, Jr.
Commander
Fifteenth Air Force
March AFB, California

Dear General Old:

In reply to your letter of 21 December 1960, I have held a meeting of my key commanders and have briefed them concerning the accident prevention program for 1961. I have charged them to take continued personal interest in this program and to display daily their wholehearted support of the program. They are the models after which their units must pattern themselves. I hold them personally responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the program.

The program of this command is primarily education. This is closely followed by inspection and survey, and lastly, enforcement.

The education is in all fields of endeavor. Each unit is concentrating on education at all levels and through this approach supervision is also improved as the supervisors will be the tutors.

The inspection and survey is likewise extended through the entire unit structure. Surveys will be made periodically to assess ourselves, and inspections to insure compliance. My staff will be active, as will the lower echelon staffs. Items of conflict can thus be determined and attention given to correct them.

Enforcement will be complete and constant. Violations will be dealt with swiftly and fairly, and where warranted, drastically. Here, as in the other facets of our program, the supervisor will be the key man. If we find supervisors lacking in their performance or attitude, they will be downgraded and replaced.

With the missile squadron assignments in this command, my attention, and consequently the command attention to missile safety education has increased. This program is receiving continued attention and emphasis due to its importance. Restrictions and precautions are exercised in all activities connected with the operation to preclude accidents. As

our knowledge increases I'm certain some restrictions and precautions will be modified; however, safety will not be compromised.

I reemphasize that our attention is on the supervisors. We are inspiring supervisors by our example, and they in turn are inspiring their subordinates to safety.

My briefing to my four primary commanders and all squadron commanders was naturally much longer and more detailed than this. This does relate the primary points, however. I am certain that this program will contribute much to our safety standing.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

4 Atch
1. Ltr, Hq 92BW, 13 Feb 61
2. Ltr, Hq 92CSG, 13 Feb 61, w/1 Atch
3. Ltr, Hq 4170SW, 1 Feb 61
4. Ltr, Hq 4170CSG, 31 Jan 61

atchs filed in Do.

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SECRET

Headquarters
92d Bombardment Wing, Heavy
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington
15 December 1960

ANNEX "G"

TO

PROGRAMMING PLAN

5-60

Classified Information

EWO RESPONSIBILITY:

1. 15AF Directorate of Operations will insure that the necessary mission requirements of the 326th Heavy Bombardment Squadron are provided and coordinated in terms of aircrews, aircraft and weapons designated for transfer on the time schedules provided in appendix 2 & 3, this annex. Specific instructions will be provided through intelligence channels for the preparation of the necessary combat mission folders and the manner in which these folders are to be moved from Fairchild to Glasgow. Combat Crews will not have to be certified by the Commander, 4041st Strategic Wing, prior to 1 April 1961, for the new missions from Glasgow. (S)

WEAPONS MOVEMENT:

2. Action will be taken by 15AF Directorates of Materiel and Operations to insure that the SAC weapons movement schedule is published by 1 February 1961. This is essential in order to provide for the mission requirements and the necessary scheduling in conjunction with the movement. (C)

OPERATIONAL CONTROL:

3. Operational control of the 326th Heavy Bombardment Squadron aircraft will remain with Commander, 92d Bombardment Wing until aircraft arrive at Glasgow AFB. Operational control of 326th Heavy Bombardment Squadron aircraft will be the responsibility of Commander, 4041st Strategic Wing upon their arrival at Glasgow. (C)

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SECRET

Appendix 1
ARRIVENCE OF EVENTS, Continued
PPlan 5-60

SECRET

M+8 (9 March 1961) - Last 3 aircraft (total 17) move to Glasgow AFB.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

M+12 (13 March 1961) - 8 additional PCS crews (total 24) available for duty at Glasgow AFB. (S)

The following planned schedules and sequence of events are established in terms of M-Day defined as 1 March 1961. (S)

M-90 (1 December 1960) - Movement of Advon personnel authorized.

M-75 (15 December 1960) - All personnel to be moved will be notified.

M-20 (9 February 1961) - First package of support personnel, approximately one third, Phase I, of total support personnel depart Fairchild AFB.

M-12 (17 February 1961) - Phase II personnel depart Fairchild AFB.

M-12 (17 February 1961) - Eight Aircrews with dependents depart Fairchild AFB.

M-10 - (19 February 1961) - Phase I support personnel arrive Glasgow AFB.

M-10 (19 February 1961) - Three aircrews depart Fairchild PCS with Dependents.

M-8 (21 February 1961) - Phase III support personnel depart Fairchild AFB.

M-5 (24 February 1961) - Three aircrews depart Fairchild AFB PCS with Dependents.

M-3 (26 February 1961) - Two aircrews depart Fairchild PCS with Dependents.

M-2 (27 February 1961) - Phase II support personnel arrive Glasgow AFB.

M-2 (27 February 1961) - Eight PCS aircrews available for duty Glasgow AFB.

M-2 (27 February 1961) - First 6 aircraft move to Glasgow AFB.

M-Day (1 March 1961) - Three additional PCS Aircrews (11 total) available for duty at Glasgow AFB.

M-Day (1 March 1961) - Two additional aircraft (8 total) arrive at Glasgow AFB.

M+2 (3 March 1961) - Phase III support personnel (total support personnel) now in position at Glasgow AFB.

M+2 (3 March 1961) - Eight aircrews depart Fairchild AFB PCS with dependents.

M+2 (3 March 1961) - Three additional aircraft (total 11) move to Glasgow AFB.

M+5 (6 March 1961) - Three additional PCS aircrews (total 14) available for duty at Glasgow.

M+5 (6 March 1961) - Three aircraft (total 14) arrive Glasgow AFB.

M+7 (8 March 1961) - Two additional PCS Aircrews (total 16) available for duty at Glasgow.

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, Continued

M+8 (9 March 1961) - Last 3 aircraft (total 17) move to Glasgow AFB.

M+12 (13 March 1961) - 8 additional PCS crews (total 24) available for duty at Glasgow AFB. (S)

DCRM 60-0091

Appendix 2
ANNEX "G"
PPlan 5-60

SECRET

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT SCHEDULE

M-Days =	-4	-3	-2	-1	"M"	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10	+11	+12
Week Days =	S	S	M	Tu	W	Th	F	S	S	M	Tu	W	Th	F	S	S	M
Month Days =	25	26	27	28	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	FEBRUARY →				| ← MARCH →												
6 Aircraft			X														
2 Aircraft					X												
3 Aircraft										X							
3 Aircraft													X				

(17)

AIRCRAFT SCHEDULED FOR MOVEMENT

56-674	56-660
56-606	56-668
56-601	56-671
56-608	56-672
56-609	56-673
56-611	56-676
56-619	56-682
56-624	56-690
56-625	

NOTE: All aircraft J-57-19 engines and Block 11 Bomb/Nav Equipment

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DCRM 60-0091

Change 1
Appendix 3
ANNEX "C"
FPlan 5-60

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AIRCREW MOVEMENT SCHEDULE



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Appendix 4
ANNEX "C"
PPlan 5-60

SECRET

AIRCREW DESIGNATIONS
326TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON
92D BOMBARDMENT WING

Crew NBR	Rank	Pilot's Name
S-40	Lt Colonel (S)	Wagner
S-42	Captain	Jensen
S-46	Major	Roeder
S-48	Major (S)	Hess
S-50	Major	McKay
S-59	Major (S)	Johnson
E-08	Captain	Peterson
E-30	Lt Colonel	Fassmann
E-34	Captain	Buettgenbach
E-37	Lt Colonel	Downs
E-41	Major	Jackson
E-43	Major	Jennings
E-45	Captain	Perkins, C. B.
E-49	Major	Pugh
E-52	Captain	MacDonough
E-53	Captain	Forbes
E-54	Captain	Atkins
E-57	Captain	Fair
E-58	Captain	Frank
E-92	Captain	Fullenwider
E-93	Major	Ricketts
E-97	Major	Palmer
R-09	Major	Cykoski
R-20	Captain	Perkins, P. C.

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Headquarters
92ND BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

92BW Programming Plan 4-60

15 August 1960

SUBJECT: (C) Move, Conversion and Equipage of the 22d AREFS (H)
SHORT TITLE: (U) 22AREFS Program

OBJECTIVES

1. To establish 92d Bombardment Wing staff actions necessary in the move, conversion and equipping of the 22AREFS (H). (C)

2. To provide a time-phased build-up of personnel, materiel and facilities to assure a combat capability at the programmed date. (U)

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

3. The 22d AREFS moved WDE from March Air Force Base to McChord Air Force Base in June 1960 and will reorganize under 10 UE KC-135 tables. This unit will be under the jurisdiction of Fifteenth Air Force with assignment to the 92d Bombardment Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base. Equipping this unit with KC-135's will commence in September 1960. The 22d AREFS (H) will reorganize under 20 UE KC-135 tables in June 1961, reaching full strength in October 1961. The projected combat ready date for the 22d AREFS (H) under 10 UE KC-135 tables is February 1961. (C) (See Attachment #1, sequence of events.)

4. Upon reorganization, the 22d AREFS (H) will be assigned a mission as follows:

a. Develop the maximum potential to support the KC-135 operation. (U)

b. Develop a tactical capability in each KC-135 as soon as possible after receipt. (U)

c. Develop the command post to full operational capability concurrent with 22d AREFS (H) unit readiness. (U)

5. KC-135 tactical squadron authorization consists of cells 00, 02, 10 and 14 of master Unit Manning Document 1315 which includes an organizational, A&E and Field Maintenance capability. UMD is contained in atch #2. (U)

6. Crew Manning:

a. A tactical crew manning will be authorized at a 1.6 to 1 crew to aircraft ratio. The 22d AREFS (H) will initially possess 12 crews,

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including one squadron staff crew. In addition, two crew training quotas are provided for command post controllers. The tactical crew ratio of 1.6 to 1 will be attained in March 1961, three months subsequent to scheduled receipt of the last aircraft by the 22d AREFS (H) as organized under 10 UE KC-135 tables. See atch #3. (C)

b. Crew manning following reorganization of the 22d AREFS (H) under 20 UE KC-135 tables (effective June 1961) will be authorized at a 1.6 to 1 crew to aircraft ratio. This ratio will be attained in January 1962, which is three months subsequent to the scheduled receipt of the last aircraft by the 22d AREFS (H) as organized under 20 UE KC-135 tables. See atch #4. (C)

7. The 902d AREFS of the 4123d Strategic Wing, Clinton-Sherman AFB, will provide a SACR 60-7 qualified KC-135 instructor crew to be in place at McChord AFB not later than 15 Aug 60. (U)

8. Headquarters SAC was requested by Hq 15AF message, DPAP 7218, 15 Jan 60, to provide lead supply package in accordance with A/C input phasing schedule set forth in Attachment #5. Headquarters SAC was requested in the same message to program required airmen, AFSC 270X0/274X0, command post type, to be in place not later than 1 June 60. (U)

9. Fly-Away Kits provisioning will commence on 1 Aug 60. (C)

10. An MTD for Maintenance training will be located TDY at McChord AFB. Scheduling, of personnel into training will be coordinated between 15AF, 92d Bomb Wing and the Mobile Training Detachment commander to insure that training completion dates are compatible with assignment dates and to support aircraft delivery.

11. A KC-135 maintenance familiarization cadre to be furnished by the 43rd Bomb Wing, as indicated in attachment 6 (21 personnel) will be assigned to McChord AFB to arrive approximately 15 August 1960. Firm assignment instructions will be furnished at a later date. (C)

12. No KC-135 flight simulator is programmed for McChord Air Force Base. The facility at Fairchild AFB will support this phase of training for the 22d AREFS (H). (U)

13. Graduates of formal KC-135 training will be qualified to enter training required by SAC regulation 50-43 at home station if all applicable requirements of SAC regulation 51-19 have been completed at the KC-135 CCTS. Aircrews selected to conduct ferry operations must be qualified in accordance with SAC Supplement I to AFR 55-36. Fifteenth Air Force will determine method of qualifying 22d AREFS (H) crews or will furnish other experienced crews to conduct ferry operations. Fifteenth Air Force will closely monitor organization, manning and operation of the 22d AREFS (H) and will provide any assistance necessary, particularly in the areas of additional instructors, ferry crews, etc. (C)

14. Officer manning of the 22d AREFS (H) will be the responsibility of Fifteenth Air Force. The Director of Personnel, Headquarters SAC, will develop and implement an airman buildup plan (less aircrew airmen) for the 22d AREFS (H). One hundred percent manning will be consistent with aircraft delivery. (U)

15. Public information release procedures will be prescribed by higher headquarters. The routine release of public information does not constitute authority for downgrading the contents of this plan. Individual elements of the plan will remain classified according to content in accordance with AFR 205 series; this includes information which would imply unit capability with respect to quantitative factors of crews, aircraft, and readiness dates. The overall plan and general information pertaining thereto will become unclassified effective with publication of SAC General Orders directing unit activation. A reliable procedure is to treat all specific data related to tactical potential classified until the intended action becomes an accomplished fact. Personnel orders will not be classified. (U)

16. Staff agencies of the 92BW will assume staff responsibilities for the 22d AREFS (H) as required under SACM 20-15 and the Joint Tenancy agreement between SAC and ADC. They will closely monitor organization, manning and operation of the 22 AREFS and will provide assistance as necessary to assure SAC projected February 61 date for combat readiness is met. (C)

17. Each Staff Directorate or Agency will review actions pertinent to their directorate and will submit progress reports to the Director of Comptroller as required by Base Supplement 1 to 15AFR 27-1. (U)

IMPLEMENTING ACTION REQUIRED

18. Implementation action will be accomplished in accordance with the following annexes: (U)

a. Annex A - 92BW Staff

b. Annex B - 92CSG Staff

c. Annex C - 22 AREFS

Headquarters
18TH AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: C

27 March 1961

SUBJECT: Command Accident Prevention Policy

TO: 92WC, BC, Sq Commanders, Deputy Commanders, and Safety
4170WC, BC, Sq Commanders, Deputy Commanders, and Safety

For your information and guidance, attached is copy of the 18th Air Division Command Accident Prevention Policy for the year 1961, as briefed by Colonel Ohlke in the January Division Commanders' Call.

11

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lewis E. McRae

LEWIS E McRAE
Captain, USAF
Administrative Officer

1 Atch
Command Accd Prevention Policy

Headquarters
18TH AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

COMMAND ACCIDENT PREVENTION POLICY

The Command Accident Prevention Policy of the 18th Air Division can be stated quite simply: "Proper command and supervision at all levels of authority". This begins with me as Division Commander and ends with the A3C that is supervising an Airman Basic. When we have this "proper command and supervision", we will have a zero personnel error rate, leaving only Acts of God for which to account.

In the field of Nuclear Safety I have published an 18th Air Division Policy Letter establishing an 18th Air Division Nuclear Safety Council. This council will serve as an overseer to the Nuclear Safety Program. In each wing I have established a Nuclear Safety Survey Committee. This Committee will survey all phases of nuclear activity quarterly. This report will be discussed by the Council at their quarterly meeting and any problem area which cannot be resolved by the Wing Commander concerned will be resolved by the Council. In making the Wing Commander chairman of the Survey Committee, I visualize him as the guiding authority. The Wing Director of Safety, also a member of this Committee, will function as the Coordinator of the efforts of the remaining members in the execution of the survey. These two will essentially be the heart and brains of the Committee, with the remaining members being the nerves and the muscles. My Director of Safety has compiled a survey checklist which may be added to at your discretion, and if an item appears with which you are not concerned, this item may be marked Not Applicable.

In the field of Flying Safety we must expend great amounts of energy in safety education and enforcement. As Commanders you must set the example in all phases. This may, at times, call for tremendous self discipline in order not to establish safety deviations, minor though they may be, which will foster disregard for other safety considerations.

In almost every instance of an aircraft accident, these facts appear: It has occurred on a "normal training mission"; the personnel involved received an "above average" or "excellent" rating on their last standardization check; several "minor" and occasionally major deviations from the Tech Order instructions, Tactical Doctrine procedures or generally accepted safe practices have been unearthed. For example: A B-47 and crew were lost as a

direct result of unauthorized formation flying. Was this man truly an Aircraft Commander? Do you, as Commanders, ask this question of yourself about your aircraft commanders? A B-52 was lost as a result of panic among the crew when it entered an unusual position during a descent. Recovery to level flight was made and then the pilots ejected. After all crew members had bailed out, the aircraft flew on its own for approximately an hour before crashing. Was this proper crew discipline? Were these rational crew members? I could cite several more cases, but there is no need for it. You know already the loss to national security that these accidents and others like them have brought upon us.

In a recent communication from 15th Air Force, a unit was cited that had planned, because of maintenance difficulties, to have a B-52 take off on seven engines and attempt to start the 8th engine in the air. Since we are not at war or in an emergency situation, I cannot comprehend how anyone could possibly entertain such a thought, let alone plan on it. In another instance, two aircraft were scheduled into a high altitude refueling area without authorization to use the area. Such unsafe acts as these, committed at the direction of supposedly responsible supervisors are bordering on madness. From this communication, I quote: "It appears that the MCS system may be receiving priority to the extent that all other considerations are secondary, including safety of aircraft and personnel. It should be reemphasized that the Management Control System cannot be used as a crutch to justify any avoidable accident which results directly or indirectly from a lack of supervisory judgment. General Old's stated policy with respect to safety in every phase of mission planning and execution should be clear". Gentlemen, I am, at this time, making this suggested reemphasis:

As Commanders, I expect from you a total rejection of any deviation from Tech Orders, Tactical Doctrine, Regulations, Manuals, any other form of directive or guide, and generally accepted safe practices. We must operate totally within these publications since operating outside of them can only lead to catastrophy. In our flying safety program we must have:

a. Total rejection of safety deviations.

b. Stringent requirements in assigning instructor personnel.

c. Waivers must be held to a minimum, and genuinely be the exception.

d. Proper supervision and wholehearted cooperation at all levels of authority.

e. Swift and fair disciplinary action on all violations or deviations of safety.

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f. Complete education of all personnel in all phases of proper operation in maintenance, planning, briefing and execution of our missions.

In the military ground safety record, the same general situation prevails. Rarely is an accident listed wherein the speed limits were being observed, driving was proper for existing road conditions, no drinking had taken place and the persons concerned had received proper rest, and all laws were being complied with.

In almost every instance there were one or more violations of existing laws, rules and regulations, generally accepted safe practices, or personal conduct factors. The under-25 year old driver plays a starring role in this performance. At Fairchild during 1960 there were 17 private motor vehicle accidents. There were two fatalities and 15 injuries. Of the personnel involved, 10 were A2C, and 12 were under 25. Twelve of these 17 accidents occurred on Friday, Saturday, Sunday or Monday, and 14 of them between the hours of 1800 and 0200. The dollars and cents cost tabulation of this is $70,290. Military injuries not involving motor vehicles boosted this cost to a level in excess of $85,000 and 739 man-days were lost. All this in a year in which improvement had been shown by a lowering accident rate at the base. I point out Fairchild to show that even with a program showing results in a lowering rate, the cost is still high - not to mention the intangible cost of suffering and irreplaceable loss of life or unconsolable grief of parents, wives and children.

Here, as in our flying safety program, we must have:

a. Total rejection of safety deviations.

b. Swift and fair disciplinary action on all violations or deviations of safety.

c. Complete education of all personnel in all phases of: (1) Proper operation of motor vehicles, pleasure boats and sporting equipment, and (2) Proper conduct and performance in the execution of their duties.

d. No tolerance of the intoxicated driver or the law violator.

e. Concentrated emphasis on judicious guidance and control by every supervisor.

In the area of injuries in and around the home, we have enjoyed a good record to date, but we must accent the education of dependents in recognizing

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and correcting home hazards. Children playing in the streets, unconfined animals, bicycles and motor scooters present outside hazards which must be controlled. Fire potential, toxic materials improperly handled and controlled, poor lighting, are some of the inside hazards of our housing areas. I want a concentrated program covering this phase of our exposure, to include:

a. Strong emphasis on the storage of toxics.

b. Elimination of fire potential.

c. Establishment and vigorous enforcement of adequate regulations regarding motor scooter and bicycle operation.

d. Enforcement of our regulations on pets and animals in the housing area.

e. A program to get the children off the streets and into the open areas for their play.

f. Recreational safety training that gets into the homes and to the wives and children.

During this year we will more and more become involved in missile operation. As we do, our missile safety program must not merely maintain step, but must get out ahead and lead. We are new in this field but not entirely without guidance. My staff has been active in this field with studies and visits to commands involved with missiles. Your people have done likewise and many have attended several formal schools. You have highly qualified and motivated missile personnel who have heard Safety preached to them constantly throughout their training. This program must be expanded through education to the point where each and every man not only knows and follows the safety procedures and rules for his position and specialty, but those of the men working on each side of him. He must be able to recognize early, any safety deficiency and be able to correct it or prevent its worsening.

There must be a first aid program which will cope with any accident or Act of God injury at a site, until proper medical care arrives. Transportation to and from the sites must be scrutinized to eliminate any and all unsafe aspects. The operations within the MAB must likewise be scrutin purged of unsafe procedures and practices if they are found to exist.

Each of us is a commissioned officer in the service of our country. Each man in your command is voluntarily in the Air Force and is also in the service of his country. The prime responsibility of each and every one of us is to provide the greatest amount of national security to the people of this country

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with the least expenditure of resources. We must therefore experience a general stiffening of the backbone to the point where the needless expenditure of these resources of equipment and manpower is not tolerated, condoned or aided. Rather, we must amend items which require amendment, initiate items which require initiation and eliminate items which require elimination, to the point where this needless expenditure no longer exists.

It is insufficient to have the "willingness" to sacrifice for safety; we must desire safety so deeply that the following of it does not involve sacrifice; we must desire it so strongly that to do otherwise would impose the hardship.

In summary, the 18th Air Division Accident Prevention Policy for 1961 - or any year - is this:

1. Thoroughly educate all commanders and supervisors through the lowest level of authority on their responsibilities.

2. Tolerate no deviations from published directives or guides.

3. Maintain a stringent policy regarding selection of personnel as instructors, supervisors and commanders.

4. Accept no substandard conduct on or off duty (such as, excessive drinking, fighting, halfhearted support of command programs).

5. Educate dependents on proper safe practices and existing rules and regulations.

6. Enforce all rules and regulations to the fullest extent.

7. Administer swift, fair and impartial disciplinary action of a severity commensurate with the offense.

8. Display, through example, beyond any shadow of doubt, that safety is indeed paramount.

Harold W. Ohlke

HAROLD W OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

0193



SECRET

HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 31 March 1961

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by MSgt. Donald W. Bunker, Unit Historian under the supervision of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) Information Staff Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET under the provisions of paragraph 30b, AFR 205-1, 1 April 1959. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis

ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

James W Miller LTC

FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

EXCEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING BY

(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10
15AF DXI 61-140
1 Mar 61-0011
AFR 15

5-28-79

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HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 60, filed BDAS, FAFB.

practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO). (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

Organization and Administration.

On the first day of March, one of the 18th Air Division's Wings,

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

3. Ibid.

the 92d Bombardment Wing, lost one of its two bombardment squadrons to the 4141st Strategic Wing, located at Glasgow Air Force Base in eastern Montana.[4] (U)

During March, the completion of the deployments of the 325th Bombardment Squadron and the 92d Air Refueling Squadron to Ellsworth and Larson Air Force Bases, respectively, was completed and at month's end all aircraft, equipment, and necessary personnel had been moved to their temporary duty locations. Since the 18th Air Division's units were spread out at different locations, necessary action was taken to coordinate all units with one another and 18th Air Division Headquarters. Among the actions taken was the assignment of the 92d Bombardment Wing Vice Commander, Colonel Rodger Howard, to the position of Wing Director of Operations and Fairchild Task Force Deputy Commander. This would continue to keep the 18th Air Division coordinated.[5] (U)

Personnel.

A review of the E-8 and E-9 promotion cycles showed that an aggressive campaign was needed to improve the overall quality of the NCO selection folders. Colonel Norman D. Janney, Fifteenth Air Force Director of Personnel, believed that a campaign of this sort would pay off in increased promotions when 18th Air Division personnel competed before the central selection boards. This centralized method of selection was impersonal because the board members did not

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4. Msg, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, C 0092, Subj: Nominations for Task Force Commanders, Exhibit #1.
5. Ibid.

see the individuals, much less know them. The competition was solely on each person's records. Poorly prepared records tend to reflect unfavorably on the individual. Another problem was the items included in the selection folders. It was difficult to distinguish between the authorized and the unauthorized favorable communications. Colonel Janney stated further that an officer would be designated to personally approve all letters of favorable communication for file in selection folders. It would not be fair to deprive a deserving airman of a promotion by failing to present a true picture of his ability and potentiality.[6] (U)

Operations.

Brigadier General William E. Creer, Commander of the 72d Bombardment Wing stationed at Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico, expressed great appreciation to Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division Commander, for the professionalism shown by the 92d Bombardment Wing crews in the recent operation BLUE BANNER. This operation was a fly-by demonstration at Ramey Air Force Base and was witnessed by military leaders from several Latin American countries on Washington's birthday. The mission, with three B-52 bomber aircraft and one spare, was complicated by numerous thunderstorms. These storms disrupted the established call spacings and caused a 20 second delay. Other than this slight delay the mission was a success and it was believed that this celebration and aerial display would further solidify Latin American relations.[7] (U)

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6. Ltr, 15AF to 18AD, Subj: Promotion Selection Folders, 16 Mar 61, Filed 18ADC.
7. Msg, 92BW to 18AD, UNCLAS, C 3741, Subj: Appreciation for Exhibitions on 22 Feb, Exhibit #2.

Also held on the Caribbean Island, Puerto Rico, were Operation CROSS TIE and project Hail Victor II. In Operation CROSS TIE, Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division Commander, accompanied by Chief Master Sergeant William B. Wheeler, Jr, operations supervisor, flew to Ramey Air Force Base in a 22nd Air Refueling Squadron KC-135 aircraft for the purpose of a Fifteenth Air Force Division Commanders Conference[8]. Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr, Fifteenth Air Force Commander, four members of his staff, and all Fifteenth Air Force Air Division Commanders attended the conference[8]. After accompanying Colonel Ohlke to the conference, Sergeant William Wheeler participated in project Hail Victor II with other outstanding NCOs from other air divisions at Ramey Air Force Base. This project was designed to recognize senior noncommissioned officers throughout the command who had made outstanding contributions toward accomplishment of the SAC mission. During their brief visit, they were acquainted with tactical aircraft, weapons systems, and the mission of the 72d Bombardment Wing. The two conferences lasted three days with a departure date of 29 March[10]. (C)

The 4170th Strategic Wing's Larson Task Force 44 Operation Order was reviewed by Colonel Ohlke's staff and was considered a superior document upon which to build their task force operations. A briefing was also presented to Colonel Ohlke on the Larson Task Force. The nominated Larson Task Force Commander was Colonel E. W. Best and

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8. Msg, 15AF to 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, DOOT 0874, Subj: CROSS TIE, Exhibit #4
9. Msg, 15AF to 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, CS 0389, Subj: CROSS TIE, Exhibit #3
10. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, UNCLAS, DP 16476, Subj: Recognition Program Exhibit #5.

the nominated Fairchild Task Force Commander was Colonel Lester F. Miller.[11] (S)

Materiel.

Air Division staff supply personnel have been delegated the responsibility to evaluate supply activities under their jurisdiction for the Annual Supply Awards Program - SACM 67-4. Fulfillment of this responsibility would entail conducting 16 inspections annually, the first five of which a deadline date for completion was 31 March 1961. Present authorization of two supply personnel on the division staff precluded the orderly accomplishment of this task. Accordingly, it was necessary that the Division staff be assisted by personnel from the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 4170th Strategic Wing. Personnel from the former wing would be required to inspect the latter and vice versa. A requirement for assistance in the case of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron was not anticipated.[12] (U)

Base supply, base fuels supply and Air Force weapons supply activities would be reviewed at least once annually, and the consolidated unit supply activities would be reviewed at least twice annually. The first inspection of all consolidated unit supply activities was completed not later than 31 March 61 and the second inspection would be complete prior to 31 July 1961. After the air division supply personnel evaluation, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force would review evaluation worksheets, air division comments,

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11. Msg, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, C 0092, Subj: Nominations for Task Force Commanders, Exhibit #1.
12. Msg, 18AD to 92BW, 4170 SQ, 22 ARS, UNCLAS, DM 7269, Subj: Annual Supply Awards Program, Exhibit #6.

inspector general reports, reports of audit, and staff visit reports applicable to supply activities nominated by divisions. Supply activities nominated by divisions would be visited by representatives of this headquarters during August and September, as necessary, to equitably select the Fifteenth Air Force nominees for the "Best in SAC" award in each category.[13] (U)

The inspection date for the c dated unit supply sections of the 92d Bombardment Wing and 92d Co t Support Group was 21 through 24 March, and 28 through 31 March 1961 for the same activities of the 4170th Strategic Wing and 4170th Combat Support Group.[14] (U)

The final scores of the 92d Bombardment Wing and Combat Support Group Consolidated Supplies indicated the Wing Supply ranked first. The two unit supply functions at the 4170th Strategic Wing received less than satisfactory during the last Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force IG Inspection, thereby making them ineligible for competition. Nevertheless, Headquarters conducted complete formal evaluations of their activities. The Group people had made considerable progress toward getting their unit in shape, but the Wing Supply remained below the acceptable standard.[15] (U)

The condition of 4170the Strategic Wing supply was of keen concern to Colonel Ohlke, and had taken the matter up personally with Colonel Best. Colonel Ohlke was convinced that progress would be less than was demanded until such time as the new Director of Supply was in place and cracking the whip. The SACM 67-4 Evaluation

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13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ltr, Col J. B. Carey to Col Geo. P. Cole, Subj: SACM 67-4, Supply Evaluation Reports, Filed 18ADC.

Report could certainly provide the framework for a comprehensive plan to put their supply in shape. The other sub-standard supply in the 18th Air Division was at the 22d Air Refueling Squadron. Again SACM 67-4 provided them an escape from formal evaluation, because they had not as yet been providing operational support for six months.[16] (U)

It was decided that the entire McChord Air Force Base primary runway would undergo repairs, provided funding and contractual requirements could be met on or before August 1961. The north 150 feet of the runway would be repaired with an asphalt concrete overlay in order that runway downtime could be held to a minimum. The anticipated downtime would be from one to three weeks, depending on weather conditions.[17] A request was also made for funds to treat the shoulders of the taxiway. McChord Air Force Base Civil Engineer estimated the cost to be approximately $2500. and that funds were not available. The gravel and rocks displaced to the taxiway caused damage to engine guide reins and cowlings during COCO and DELTA exercises despite precautions taken by aircraft operators. Because of this major damage to the engine due to foreign objects, a request was made to degrade McChord Air Force Base's capability to perform COCO and DELTA exercises.[18] (S)

The fast approaching date of the operational missile sites and the completion of runway repairs at Fairchild would make the 18th Air Division one of the foremost air divisions in the Strategic Air Command.[19] (S)

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16. Ibid.
17. Msg, 92BW to 15AF, UNCLAS, WC 7485, Subj: Proposed Runway Closure of McChord AFB Runway, Exhibit #7.
18. Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARSC 0034, Subj: Taxiway Repair, Exhibit #8.
19. Ibid.

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Colonel Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Captain Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Colonel David A. Tate
Director of Materiel	Colonel John B. Carey, Jr.
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Darell G. Burgeson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Major Gordon A. Bailey

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agenices.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 417th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET C 0092, Subj: Nomination for Task Force Commanders	1
Msg, 72BW to 18AD, UNCLAS C 3741, Subj: Apperciation for Exhibition on 22 Feb 61	2
Msg, 15AF to 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL CS 0389, Subj: CROSS TIE	3
Msg, 15AF to 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL DOOT 0874, Subj: CROSS TIE	4
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, UNCLAS DP 16476, Subj: Recognition Program	5
Msg, 18AD to 92BW, 4170SW, 92ARS, UNCLAS DM 7269, Subj: Annual Supply Awards Program	6
Msg, 92BW to 15AF, UNCLAS WC 7485, Subj: Proposed Runway Closure of McChord AFB Runway	7
Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET 22ARSC 0034, Subj: Taxiway Repair	8

1

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (check)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION PRIORITY INFO ROUTINE	BOOK MULTI SINGLE	AF		

FROM: HQ 18 AIR DIV

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF

INFO: 92BOMB WG FAIRCHILD AFB WASH (COURIER)

4170 STRAT WING LARSON AFB WASH

0092

S E C R E T/C

For 15AF/DOPM. Info 92BW/4170SW/WC. (U) Nominations for SAC Task Force Commanders. Reference 15AF Secret DOPM 0302, same subject, 2 Feb 61. ALFA. Colonel F. M. Best is nominated for Larson Task Force Commander with Colonel R. J. Ray as Deputy Commander. BRAVO. Colonel L. F. Miller is nominated as Fairchild TF Commander with Colonel R. L. Howard as Deputy Commander.

Info copy to 92BW (WC)

DATE TIME

MONTH YEAR

SYMBOL D 16/Feb/61

WRITER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature of Writer)

HAROLD W. OHLKE, Colonel, USAF

PHONE 2171 PAGE NO. 1 NO. OF PAGES 1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET

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RELEASER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

0211

3

FM 7 BOMB SQDN ACC PG

TO RUMZGP/ 15TH ADVN HEADQUARTERS ATR LABN

INFO RJEXDNB/ SAF WESTOVER AFB MASS

BT

UNCLAS C 3741. XFROM GEN CREER TO COL CHLKE. I WISH TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THE FINE SHOWING YOUR 82D BW CREWS GAVE DURING THE FIRE POWER DEMONSTRATION 22 FEBRIARY. THE TIMING AND FORMATION DEMONSTRATED A HIGH DEGREE OF PROFESSIONALISM.

BT

24/1701Z FEB RJLJSA

0212

NNNNBA117.....CPA558
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DE RJWBKN 304
R 0923252 ZE
FM 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF
TO TANGO
RJWBGP/92BOMBWG FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
RJWBJM/93BOMBWG CASTLE AFB CALIF
INFO RJWBHK/4170STRATWG LARSON AFB WASH
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L/CS 0389. IMMED ATTN REQD. ACTION: TANGO, 92BOMBWG (PASS TO 22AIRFS), 93BOMBWG. INFO: 4170SW.
(U) "CROSS TIE." THIS MESSAGE IN SIX PARTS. PART I. REFERENCE SAC CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES CS4187, 19 DEC 60, AND CS 3854, 2 FEB 61(NOTAL), SUBJECT AS ABOVE. A REQUIREMENT EXISTS TO AIRLIFT THE 15AF COMMANDER, LT GEN ARCHIE J. OLD, JR., FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF, AND ALL 15AF AIRDIVISION COMMANDERS, TO SUBJECT CONFERENCE. THREE KC-135 AIRCRAFT WITH HIGHLY QUALIFIED CREW AND INSTRUCTOR PILOT WILL BE UTILIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS BELOW. PART II FOR 92BOMBWG(92AIRFS): REQUEST

PAGE TWO RJWBKN 304
YOU PROVIDE KC-135 AIRCRAFT AS FOLLOWS: DEPART MCCHORD AFB SO AS TO ARRIVE MARCH AFB NO LATER THAN 1300PST, 26 MAR 61; REPORT TO LT COL FELICES, CURRENT OPERATIONS BRANCH, BLDG T-529, ROOM SEVEN, HQ 15AF, FOR INFORMAL BRIEFING AND FINAL INSTRUCTIONS. PART III FOR 93BOMBWG(93AIRFS), 4170STRATWG: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE KC-135 IN ACCORDANCE WITH PART I ABOVE. AIR DIVISION COMMANDERS ABOARD YOUR AIRCRAFT WILL BE PICKED UP AS FOLLOWS:
(1)COL OHLKE, 18 AIRDIV COMMANDER, BY DIRECT COORDINATION DUE TO FAIRCHILD RUNWAY CONSTRUCTION.
(2)MAJ GEN PRESTON, 22AIRDIV; COL DESHAZO, 813AIRDIV, AT MALMSTROM AFB.
(3) BRIG GEN WILSON, 821AIRDIV, COL RADER, 13 AIRDIV, AT ELLSWORTH AFB.
PART IV FOR 93 BOMBWG: REQUAST YOU PROVIDE KC-135 AIRCRAFT IN ACCORDACCE WITH PART I ABOVE. CONFEREES ABOARD YOUR AIRCRAFT, AND PICK -UP POINTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
(1) MAJIGEN KINSBURY, 47AIRDIV; BRIC GEN MILLER, 14AIRDIV , AT CASTLEAFB.
(2) BRIG GEN YANCEY 819AIRDIV, COL MANZO, 810AIRDIV , AT DYESS AFB.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RJWBKN 304
PART V FOR ALL: THE 813AIRDIV, 15AIRDIV, 14AIRDIV, AND 812AIRDIV COMMANDERS WILL MAKE THEIR OWN ARRANGEMENTS TO PROCEED TO DESIGNATED PICK-UP POINTS WHERE KC-135 AIRCRAFT WILL MAKE A 30 MINUTE PASSENGER STOP, WEATHER PERMITTING. DEPARTURE OF AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE PLANNED SO THAT CONFEREES WILL ARRIVE RAMEY AKB NO LATER THAN 2100Z, 27 MAR 1961. AIRCRAFT WILL RON RAMEY AFB 27 AN 28 MARCH 1961. DEPARTURE FROM RAMEY AFB WILL BE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 29 MARCH 1461. DIRECT COORDINATION IS AUTHORIZED BETWEEN UNITS FOR TIMING PURPOSES. PART VI. THE 18AIRDIV AND 47AIRDIV WILL FORWARD THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS, ATTENTION DCR AND DOCT, NO LATER THAN 21 FEBRUARY 1961., WITH INFORMATION COPIES TO DIVISION COMMANDERS: AIRCRAFT CALL SIGN, ITINERARY WITH ETA AT INTERMEDIATE STOPS, ETA RAMEY AFB, AND LAST DEPARTURE POINT OF EACH AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING LIST OF CONFEREES ABOARD. IN ADDITION , A LIST OF NON-CONFEREES ABOARD AND WHETHER OR NOT QUARTERS ARE REQUIRED FOR SAME. ANY CHANGES AFTER 21 FEBRUARY 1961 WILL BE FORWARDED TO THIS HEADQURATERS IMMEDIATELY THIS MESSAGE CLASSIFIED CONFIEDNTIAL SOLELY DUE TO COMMANDERS'' CONFERENCE. THIS MESSAGE MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED ON 30 MARCH 1961.
BT
09/2346Z FEB RJWBKN

CONFIDENTIAL

DA089.....GPA538

KNJ751
OR RJWBGP
DE RJWDKN 286
R 222309Z ZEX
FM 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF
TO RJWERN/12AIRDIV MARCH AFB CALIF
INFO RJWBGP/92BOMBWG FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
BT
C O N F I J E N T I A L DOOT 0874. 92BOMBWG PASS TO 22AREFS.
(U) "CROSS TIE". REFERENCE 15AF MESSAGE OS 0389, 9 FEB 61.
COLONEL HUGHEY, 12AIRDIV COMMANDER, AND AN OUTSTANDING NCO WILL
ACCOMPANY GENERAL OLD ABOARD 22AREFS KC-135 TO RAMEY AFB. AIR-
CRAFT IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE MARCH AFB 00 24 MARCH 1961; HOWEVER
FIRM DEPARTURE TIME HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED TO DATE, PENDING
GENERAL OLD'S DESIRES. YOU WILL BE ADVISED OF FIRM DEPARTURE
TIME AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.
BT
22/2320Z MAR RJWDKN

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check) BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION ROUTINE INFO ROUTINE				AF		

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM:
HQ 18 AIR DIV

TO:
92BOMB WG FAIRCHILD AFB WASH (COURIER)
4170 STRAT WING LARSON AFB WASH
22 AIR RFLG SQ MCCHORD AFB WASH

UNCLAS DM 7269

For 92BW and 4170SW (WC); 22ARS (C). Subject: Annual Supply Awards Program. Reference paragraphs 5 and 6, letter this Hq, DM, Subject: Personnel Requirements for Annual Supply Awards Program, SACM 67-4, 6 Mar 61. This message in three parts. Part I. This confirms inspection dates of 21-24 March 61 for Consolidated Unit Supply Sections of 92BW and 92CSG, and 28-31 March 1961 for same activities of 4170SW and 4170CSG. Part II: Remainder of inspection schedule follows:

Organization	Activity	Dates
92d CSG	Base Fuels Supply	4-7 April 61

DATE | TIME | MONTH | YEAR

WRITER

SYMBOL: DM 1400/20/Mar/61

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): JOHN B. CAREY, COLONEL, USAF

PHONE: 2268 | PAGE NR. 1 | NR. OF PAGES 2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

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SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

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	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
ACTION ROUTINE				AF		
INFO ROUTINE						

FROM:
HQ 18 AIR DIV

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO:
92BOMB WG FAIRCHILD AFB WASH (COURIER)
4170 STRAT WING LARSON AFB WASH
22 AIR RFLG SQ MCCHORD AFB WASH

UNCLAS DM 7269

For 92BW and 4170SW (WC); 22ARS (C). Subject: Annual Supply Awards Program. Reference paragraphs 5 and 6, letter this Hq, DM, Subject: Personnel Requirements for Annual Supply Awards Program, SACM 67-4, 6 Mar 61. This message in three parts. Part I. This confirms inspection dates of 21-24 March 61 for Consolidated Unit Supply Sections of 92BW and 92CSG, and 28-31 March 1961 for same activities of 4170SW and 4170CSG. Part II: Remainder of inspection schedule follows:

Organization	Activity	Dates
92d CSG	Base Fuels Supply	4-7 April 61

DATE | TIME | MONTH | YEAR

WRITER

SYMBOL: DM 1400/20/Mar/61

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): JOHN B. CAREY, COLONEL, USAF

PHONE 2268 | PAGE NR. 1 | NR. OF PAGES 2

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FROM: HQ 18 AIR DIV

Organization	Activity	Dates
22d ARS	Unit Supply	10-13 April 61
4170th CSG	Base Fuels Supply	17-20 April 61
92d CSG	Base Supply	2-5 May 61
4170th CSG	Base Supply	9-12 May 61
92d BW	Consolidated Unit Supply	29 May-2 June 61
92d CSG	Consolidated Unit Supply	29 May-2 June 61
4170th SW	Consolidated Unit Supply	6-9 June 61
4170th CSG	Consolidated Unit Supply	6-9 June 61
22d ARS	Unit Supply	13-16 June 61

Part III. Dates of inspection include travel times. Parent wings will be requested to issue travel orders for personnel to assist with inspections sufficiently in advance of each scheduled inspection.

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DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1

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SYMBOL/DRAFTER'S NAME/PHONE NR/DATE TYPED/TYPIST'S INITIALS				
WC/Col Miller/2124/28 Mar61/GR				

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UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE
ROUTINE AF X

HQ 92 BOMB WG

15AF MARCH AFB, CALIF.

INFO: 22ARS MCCHORD AFB, WASH.

18 AIR DIV, FAIRCHILD AFB, WASH. (COURIER)

UNCLAS WC 7485

Subject: Proposed Closure of McChord AFB Runway. Reference telephone conversation between Colonel Miller, this headquarters, and Lt Colonel Vernon, Plans Division, your headquarters. The following letter dated 23 March 1961 from the Commander, 325th Air Base Group (ADC), McChord AFB, to the 22d Air Refueling Squadron, is quoted for your information and advanced planning action: "1. A decision has been made to accomplish runway repairs at McChord of the entire primary runway. This work is proposed in August 1961, providing funding and contractual requirements can be met on or before that date. The north 150

WC/1445P/28/MAR/61/fb

L. F. MILLER, Col, USAF, Comdr
2124

N. L. NO[illegible]
Maj.,
Base [illegible]

COORDINATION/FILE COPY

15AF FORM 370 FEB 60 FC 4730 PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED

UNCLASSIFIED

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

FROM
HQ 92 BOMB WG

feet of the runway will be repaired with an asphalt concrete overlay in order that runway down time can be held to a minimum. 2. The anticipated down time will be from one to three weeks, depending on weather conditions at the time of construction. 3. This confirms our earlier conversations with regard to the possibility of such a program due to failure of our primary runway in certain areas."

SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
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DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1

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SECRET

0227

Trans
S-17378

SECRET

HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 30 April 1961

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A3C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) Information Staff Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET under the provisions of paragraph 30b, AFR 205-1, 1 April 1959. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield, 2Lt USAF

ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

James E. Wilkae, Capt

HAROLD W. OHLKE FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
Colonel., USAF
Commander

15AF DXI 61-161

SECRET

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0229

GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

0230

FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADCHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Materiel Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
ORI	Operational Readiness
PCS	Perment Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest

---

1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 60, filed BDAS, FAFB.

practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO). (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

Organization and Administration.

From an organizational standpoint the 18th Air Division experienced

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

a fairly quiet April. The TDY movement of the 92d Bombardment Wing's 325th Bombardment Squadron and the 92d Air Refueling Squadron to Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota and Larson Air Force Base, Washington respectively had already been completed prior to 1 April except for two tanker aircraft crews which departed from Fairchild Air Force Base during the first week of April. The runway construction project at Fairchild Air Force Base which was the reason for the deployment of these squadrons, was well ahead of scheadule by the end of the month.[4] (U)

The 567th Strategic Missile Squadron was assigned to the 92d Bombardment Wing one year ago on 1 April 1960. From then till now, missile crew training was given the highest priority until the time came for the crews to take over the missiles in their complexes. As of the end of April 1961, eight out of the nine missile complexes had already had missiles installed with the final complex I-5 expected to be filled in early May.[5] (C)

As of 1 April, Lieutenant Colonel Francis L. Wallen resumed command of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron after recuperating from surgery performed on his knee during the month of March.[6] (U)

Personnel.

The 18th Air Division was about to start the second half of the fiscal year 1962 first term airmen retention cycle. The cooperation thus for among the units in both officer and airmen retention had placed Fifteenth Air Force first place in all numbered air forces.

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4. Interview, A3C Burhans w/Lt. C. L. Shoemaker 325BW, 6 May 61.
5. Interview, A3C Burhans, 2/Col. L. L. Jella, 567SMSC, 6 May 61.
6. Interview, A3C Burhans, w/Lt. C. L. Shoemaker 325BW, 6 May 61.

For the second half a new retention program had been instigated and would run from 1 May through 31 October. In some cases, due to small objectives or lack of eligibles, an objective was not assigned in every career field. While failure to reenlist in these fields would not affect the base score, it certainly would hurt the command effectiveness. While airmen would not be required to make a decision earlier than eight months prior to their date of separation, it was recommended that they be encouraged to make an early decision. Retention would be a rough problem, one that would always be with us. However, with the continued support of all units, we could continue to lead the way.[7] (U)

The per cent of assigned officers for the 92d Bombardment Wing was 95.41 with a total of 437 officers in their required specialties. The 22nd Air Refueling had scored 97.24 in percentage of assigned officers with 106 officers in their required specilaties. The 92d Bombardment Wing scored 88.06 in the per cent of assigned airmen with 2842 in their required specialty. Meanwhile, the 22nd Air Refueling Squadron scored 97.38 in the percentage of assigned airmen with 410 airmen in their required specialties. The 92d Bombardment Wing had 460 civilian personnel assigned during April. There were no civilian personnel assigned to the 22nd Air Refueling Squadron.[8] (U)

In a recent correspondence from Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr., Fifteenth Air Force Commander, to the 18th Air Division Commander, Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, General Old emphasized the need for intergrity when reporting. Any falsified records would not show the posture and

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7. Ltr, 15AF to 22ARSC, Subj: First Term Airmen Retention, 18 Apr 61, Exhibit #1.
8. Authorized and Assigned Strength Report, 92BW, 30 Apr 61, Filed, 92BW History.

and capability of a particular unit.[2] (U)

Operations.

In operation CLEAR ROAD, two KC-135 tanker aircraft from the 92d Air Refueling Squadron of the 92d Bombardment Wing participated daily to air refuel B-52 aircraft from the 4170th Strategic Wing stationed at Larson Air Force Base, Washington. During CLEAR ROAD missions the 4170th Strategic Wing aircrews were placed on airborne alert from ground alert. This arrangement was for the best interests of the individual crew member in that it increased each crew members compensatory time off over an extended period of time.[10] (S)

In CLEAR ROAD and COVER ALL missions, commanders had to inject the necessary consideration into their airborne alert operation to insure that the third loop of the route was shortened sufficiently to provide adequate fuel reserves for the situation that exists for that particular sortie. In those instances where destination weather was doubtful, the third loop was shortened sufficiently to provide fuels for penetration, low approach, missed approach procedure, and climb-out to the best altitude for flight to the alternate designated for that particular sortie.[11] (S)

Until further notice, air refueling of B-52 bomber aircraft in moderate or severe turbulence conditions was avoided. The bombers disconnected and followed the tanker until smoother air was found before resuming air refueling.[12] (S)

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9. Ltr, 15AF to 18AD, Subj: Intergrity of reporting, 1 Apr 61, Filed 18ADC.
10. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET DOPT 1031, Subj: Fly Alert Crews, 5 Apr 61, Exhibit #3.
11. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET, DO 0925, Subj: Airborne Alert Fuel Reserve, 28 Mar 61, Exhibit #4.
12. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET DO 1216, Subj: Air Refueling, 21 Apr 61, Exhibit #5.

Due to the repair on the primary runway at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, the taxiway was closed 25 through 29 April 1961. This repair did not affect the alert force when they used runway 16. However, when using runway 34, the active runway was used as a taxiway to get into position for take-off. It was estimated that when the aircraft used runway 34, launching capability was 20 minutes.[13] (S)

The 4170th Strategic Wing's 327 Bombardment Squadron had 17 aircraft assigned at the end of April. These aircraft flew 78 sorties with a total of 966 flying hours. The 43rd Air Refueling Squadron's 13 KC-135 tanker aircraft flew 56 sorties with 367 flying hours. The 22d Air Refueling Squadron which was a tenant unit at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, had eleven assigned KC-135 tanker aircraft. These aircraft flew 56 sorties for a total of 321 flying hours. In the 92d Bombardment Wing, the 325th Bombardment Squadron's 17 B-52 bomber aircraft flew 82 sorties for a total of 585 flying hours. The 21 KC-135 aircraft assigned to the 92d Air Refueling Squadron flew 123 sorties totaling 553 flying hours.[14] (U)

The results of recent inspections showed that some commanders were failing to place the proper emphasis on the importance of nuclear weapons security. Since these weapons were among our most vital Category 1 resources, it was essential that they be afforded the highest degree of security protection whether in storage, loaded aboard aircraft, or in transit. In addition to the obvious dangers involved, unsatis-

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13. Msg, 22ARSC to 92BW, SECRET 22ARSC 0048, Subj: McChord Taxiway, 21 Apr 61, Exhibit #6.
14. 4170SW, 92BW, and 22ARS, AFD-25 Report, Apr 61, Filed: 18AD.

factory security conditions involving nuclear security weapons could result in the loss of the operational flexibility, which was so vital to our mission requirements.[15] (U)

Safety.

As a result of the B-52 aircraft accident out of Mather Air Force Base, California, action was taken to tighten up our command control, supervision, operations and all other aspects. One of the actions taken was the forming of a panel of senior officers, headed by General Kingsbury and made up primarily of people from the field, for the purpose of thoroughly screening the records of approximately 700 key officers in an attempt to validate that they had the best people for the job in the various slots.[16] (U)

The first quarter of 1961 showed a definite dwonward trend in the number of motor vehicle accidents. Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division Commander, expressed his apprectiation to all unit commanders for their support in the program. Due to the approaching vacation and recreation period, exposure in this area would increase tremendously, therefore all unit commanders were directed to concentrate on this problem.[17] (U)

Materiel.

The 18th Air Division conducted a survey on management and preservation of combat resources nicknamed Project Stitch because recent events indicated that all Fifteenth Air Force units were not affording adequate attention to the foundamental practices of sound management

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15. Lt, 15AF to 18AD, Subj: Nuclear Weapon Security, 3 Apr 61.
16. Ltr, 15AF to 18AD, Subj: General Kingsbury's Panel, 28 Apr 61, Exhibit #8.
17. Ltr, 18AD to 92BW, Subj: Accident Rate, 1 Apr 61, Exhibit #9.

to insure the preservation of our combat resources, aircrews, and aircraft. Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division Commander, with his entire operations, materiel and safety staff in a team effort, conducted their survey at each individual unit to find the degree effectiveness of the unit. The inspections were conducted on their units, the 4170th Strategic Wing on 10-14 April 1961, 22d Air Refueling Squadron or 17-19 April, and the 92d Bombardment Wing on 21-28 April 1961.[18] (S)

The results of the inspections showed that the alert force activity was satisfactory in all three units. There were several disadvantages and hazards with the present alert aircraft parking area for the 92d Bombardment Wing bomber aircraft TDY at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota. Among these was the distance from alert crew quarters to the alert aircraft and from there to the take-off end of the runway. Another disadvantage was the arrangement of the parking area in which other aircraft and vehicle had to travel between alert aircraft.[19] (S)

In wing operation activities, the combat mission folders were in common discrepancy among all three units scored. The 92d Bombardment Wing scored the best in this division with very few major discrepancies. The major discrepancy was the flight records section which was completely inadequate and showed a definite lack of supervision. In the 22nd Air Refueling Squadron, the navigation section was given an unsatisfactory rating mainly because of the complete lack of an established mission

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18. Msg, 15AF to 92BW, UNCLASSIFIED EFTOC 38, Subj: Project Stitch, 6 Apr 61.
19. 18AD Inspection Report of 4170SW, 22ARS, 92BW, Apr 61, Filed 18AD.

critique program within the squadron. Although the 4170th Strategic Wing did not have an unsatisfactory rating in any section of their wing operations, a number of the sections received a marginal score.[20] (S)

The 325th Bombardment Squadron and 92d Air Refueling Squadron assigned to the 92d Bombardment Wing scored satisfactory by the inspection team. The 92d Air Refueling squadron was not covered thoroughly because of the concurrent inspection of the 4170th Strategic Wing. The primary areas covered were combat mission folders, standardization, alert facilities, and communication. All these were satisfactory except for combat mission folders which were marginal. The 327th Bombardment Squadron also scored satisfactory.[21] (S)

In the 18th Air Division inspection, all three units scored satisfactory in all sections of maintenance except for the materiel training control of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron. The main reason for this is that this section is only 50 per cent manned and an input of only one three level individual was projected for July 1961.[22] (U)

Base operation activities of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 4170th Strategic Wing both received marginal score. It was evident that insufficient progress was being made to bring the base operations facility up to the standard desired of a SAC base. Also insufficient command support was being given to effect the rehabilitation as outlined in their base operations plans. The 92d Bombardment Wing achieved a satisfactory rating in the overall safety program. The 4170th Strategic Wing received a marginal rating and the 22d Air Refueling

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20. 18AD Inspection Report of 4170SW, 22ARS, 92BW, Apr 61, Filed 18AD.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.

Squadron was rated unsatisfactory. Two units rated satisfactory in security and law enforcement and the 4170 Strategic Wing was rated marginal. All three units were marginal in personnel.[23] (S)

23. 18AD Inspection Report of 4170SW, 22ARS, 92BW, Apr 61, Filed 18AD.

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Colonel Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Captain Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Colonel David A. Tate
Director of Materiel	Colonel John B. Carey, Jr.
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Darell G. Burgeson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Gordon A. Bailey

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agenices.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 417th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Ltr, 15AF to 22ARSC, Subj: First Term Airmen Retention, 18 Apr 61.	1
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, UNCLASSIFIED EPTOC 38, Subj: Project Stitch, 6 Apr 61.	2
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET DOPT 1031, Subj: Fly Alert Crew, 5 April 61.	3
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECTET DO 0925, Subj: Airborne Alert Fuel Reserve, 28 Mar 61.	4
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET DO 1216, Subj: Air Refueling, 21 Apr 61.	5
Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET 22ARSC 0048, Subj: McChord Taxiway, 21 Apr 61.	6
Ltr, 15AF to 18AD, Subj: Nuclear Weapon Security, 3 Apr 61.	7
Ltr, 15AF to 18AD, Subj: General Kingsbury's Panel, 28 Apr 61.	8
Ltr, 18AD to 92BW, Subj: Accident Rate, 1 Apr 61.	9
Ltr, 18AD to 4170SW, Subj: Accident Rate, 1 Apr 61.	10

18 AD History
Photostat

16 APR 1964

Colonel Kenneth C. Diehl
Commander
[illegible] Air Refueling Squadron
Hatboro Air Force Base, Washington

Dear K. C.:

We are about to start on the second half of the Fiscal Year 1962 Fiscal Year Airman Retention Cycle. I know we have had your full cooperation in our program thus far, as evidenced by our first place position in both officer and airman retention among the numbered air forces. However, we have just received implementing instructions for the current program, and I am again requesting your assistance to keep us out front in retention. I want, also, to pass on some of the changes and procedures pertaining to this program.

By now the Directors of Personnel have received detailed instructions for conducting the program, plus the assigned objective. (This time we are using the word "objective" not "quota.") I have extracted from the instructions some items I believe each commander should have, and have attached them herewith. Some areas requiring specific comment are as follows:

a. In some instances, due to the small objective and/or every base not having eligibles, we did not assign an objective in every career field. These objectives are held here and will be furnished on request. While failure to realist in these fields will not affect the base score, it certainly will hurt the command effectiveness. You can help meet the command objective by encouraging personnel in these career fields to realist.

b. The realistment period will run from 1 May through 31 October and will be recorded in December. While airmen are not required to make a decision earlier than eight months prior to their ROS, we recommend they be encouraged to make an early decision. This will permit identification of the man on the fence and allow time to work with him.

Prior to assigning an objective to the bases and units, we took a real careful look at the objectives versus the number of eligibles, and found all units had about the same problems.

During this cycle, we will have an opportunity to recalist some men who have High AQE's in our support areas. This should help. Full information on this program will be forwarded to you by 15 April.

Education is a rough problem -- one that is always with us -- but with your continued support I believe we can continue to lead the way. If we have in the Directorate of Personnel can provide any assistance in this program, please let us know.

Sincerely,

HERMAN D. JAMNEY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Personnel

1 Atch
Notes on 1st Term Ann Rpt, FY62

cc: 18 Air Div(C)
92 Bomb Wg(C)

0247

FIRST TERM AIRMEN RETENTION, FY62

1. Program will be scored under the Management Control System for the quarter ending 31 December 1961.

2. All first term airmen with a DOS between 1 January and 30 June 1962 are to be considered.

3. Your reenlistment objective (quota) was based on the number of airmen your selection board found suitable and reported to us in March of this year. For example: Fifteenth Air Force has a total of 87 men eligible in the 73 career field. Strategic Air Command gave us an objective of 41 in this field. Forty-one divided by 87 equals .47 -- our percentage factor. You reported to us in March that you had 9 men suitable for reenlistment in this career field. Your objective was assigned as .47 times 9 = 4.23 or 4.

4. Airmen will not be required to make a decision sooner than eight months prior to their DOS; i.e., airmen with DOS in January must make their decision by 31 May; those in February by end of June, and so on through October. On the other hand, a man must make his decision by the end of the eighth month, and once it has passed, he cannot reverse his decision to reenlist or be discharged. This current cycle will start on 1 May and terminate 31 October. We hope the airmen will be encouraged to make their decisions prior to their eighth month.

5. The initial objective we assigned to you cannot be decreased nor can reenlistments in one career field be counted against another. The objective can be increased, however. This is done when you can exceed your objective in any specific career field or reenlist a man in a career field where you did not receive an objective. For example:

Career Field	Assigned Objective	Reenlistment Capability
43	10	6
30	4	8
60		1

You have an overall original objective of 14, but you can only retain 6 in the 43 career field; however, you can retain 8 in the 30 career field, exceeding your original objective by 4, plus retaining one additional man in the 60 career field for which you did not receive an objective. The additional quota is requested from this headquarters. Your retention situation now is:

Career Field	Assigned Objectives	Additional Objectives	New Objective	Reenlisted or Extended	MCS Effectiveness
43	10	-	10	6	15 divided by
30	4	4	8	8	19 = 78.9
60	-	1	1	1	
	14	5	19	15	

6. From the above, it is apparent that in order to receive a 100 per cent effectiveness, the original assigned objective must be met in each career field. However, failure to obtain the objective in one career field may be partially compensated by bettering the objective in other career fields.

ZNNN

DAJ23.....GPAJ66RJJ6313
RR RJVDGP RJUDEG RJWEAU RJUDHK RJVXDR
DE RJEDKN 263
R 052248Z
FM 15 F [ARCH AFB CALIF
TO RJUXEB/SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
INFO RJVBCP/18 AIRDIV FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
RJUEDC/8ID AIRDIV BIGGS AFB TEX
RJWEAU/4128S STRATAC AMARILLO AFB TEX
RJUEDM/4179 STRATAC LARSON AFB WASH
BT
S E C R E T ROUTINE [ASSIG] FOR SAC DOPLN; INFO
TO AIRDIV AND SAC AIRDIV FOR DO, 4128 SU AND 4179 SW FOR DOCO.
(S) REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO FLY ALERT CREWS ON "CLEAR ROAD"
FOLLOWING EXTENDED GROUND ALERT TOUR. REFERENCE USAF SECRET
MESSAGE06994, 1 APRIL 1961. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS.
PART I. REQUEST AUTHORITY TO DEVIATE FROM THE PROVISIONS OF
17D (1) SACM 27-1, 15 MARCH 1961, TO PERMIT
CREWS TO PARTICIPATE IN "CLEAR ROAD" OPERATIONS FOLLOWING
GROUND ALERT DUTY IN EXCESS OF THREE DAYS. PART II. IT IS
POSED THAT THIS SYSTEM OF FLYING ALERTS ON THE AIRBORNE

[redacted]

PAGE TWO RJUDKN 263
SORTIE FROM GROUND ALERT STATUS BE EMPLOYED BY THE 4128SU AND
4170SW DURING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN "CLEAR ROAD". SALIENT
FEATURES OF THIS TYPE SCHEDULE WHEN ALFA. EXTENDED GROUND ALER
TOUR PRIOR O FLYING THE AIRBORNE SORTIE SERVICE THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE INDIVIDUAL CREW MEMBER IN THAT IT INCREASES HIS TOTAL
COMPENSATORY TIME OFF OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD. BRAVO. STABI-
LIZES CREW AVAILABILITY FOR THE AIRBORNE SORTIE. CHARLIE.
THIS TYPE OF INTEGRATED GROUND A
ERT/FLY CYCLE LENDS ITESLF TO
INCREASED ALERT POSTURE WHERE CREWS WILL BE ON AN ALERT, FLY,
CTO TYPE SCHEDULE. PART III. REQUEST CONSIDERATION OF THIS
PROPOSAL AND AUTHORITY TO DEVIATE FROM CITED DIRECTIVE TO ALLOW
FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION.
BT

SECRET

4

--PARAPHRASE NOT P[illegible] PRIOR TO CATEGORY I
--CRYPTION [illegible]
--DATE-TIME GROUP [illegible] CLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RJUSKN 153N
AND SHOULD A CHANGE IN DESTINATION BECOME NECESSARY, ADJUSTMENT
OF ROUTES AT AIR REFUELING PLANES TO BRING ON EFFECT RE-
CONTACT, WHERE SUCH SHORTENING OF THE POSITIVE TIME IS STILL
PRACTICABLE. AREAS IN WHICH AIR REFUELING FLIGHT OPERATIONS
ARE CONSIDERED A VITAL PART OF MISSIONS REQUIRE CONSTANT ATTENTION
BY HQUS AND SUPERVISION OF FLIGHT PERFORMANCE OF THE REFUELING FIELD.
OF A UNIT'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS OPERATIONAL INCLUDEMENT OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAKES IT MANDATORY THAT MOST POSSIBLE FLYING
AND SUPERVISION BE APPLIED ON A CONTINUING BASIS. PART TO
AS CONFIRED IN USAF CLASSIFIED DO LETTER, UNITS MUST KEEP
THE COMMAND POST, 15TH AIR FORCE, INFORMED IN SITUATION
WHERE WEATHER DIVERSION OF AN AIRCRAFT ALERT AIRCRAFT IS
PROBABLE OR IMMINENT, AND FURNISH BEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION
ON FUEL RESERVES. THE DECISION TO LAUNCH AN ALERT TANKER, IF

REQUIRED, MUST BE MADE RAPIDLY, AND SHOULD BE MADE BY THE
DESIGNATED SENIOR OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE AT 15TH AIR FORCE,
OR, IN AN EMERGENCY IF TIME DOES NOT PERMIT, BY THE UNIT
COMMANDER CONCERNED WITH APPROPRIATE INFORMATION PASSED TO
15TH AIR FORCE COMMAND POST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN ALL,
REPEAT, ALL CASES, THE SAC COMMAND POST WILL BE KEPT

PAGE FOUR RJUSKN 153N
INFORMED BY THE 15TH AIR FORCE CONTROLLER ON ALL PERTINENT
FACTS, AND WILL DELAY EACH ENEMY MIG ITEM OF INFORMATION AS
IT OCCURS OR IS RECEIVED BY 15TH AIR FORCE.
BT
CR/15SAC MAR 54/BGO

SECRET

5

FM 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF

TO ZOLO

RJWBKD/9BW MT HOME AFB IDA
RJWBKN/22BW MARCH AFB CALIF
RJWBSE/310BW SCHILLING AFB KANS
RJWBJR/A1S1AIRRFLUG MALMSTROM AFB MONT
INFO RJWBKN/12AIRDIV MARCH AFB CALIF
RJWBAS/14AIRDIV BEALE AFB CALIF
RJWBGP/18AIRDIV FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
RJWBJN/47AIRDIV CASTLE AFB CALIF
RJWBKD/813AIRDIV MT HOME AFB IDA
RJWBJC/819AIRDIV DYESS AFB TEX
RJWBAP/821AIRDIV ELLSWORTH AFB SDAK

BT

S E C R E T DO 1216. IMMEDIATE ACTION
REQUIRED REGARDLESS OF TIME OF RECEIPT.
AMPLICATION OF B-52 FLEET RESTRICTIONS. REFERENCE SAC
SECRET DO 0738 DATED 31 JAN 61. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, PILOTS
OF ALL MODELS, B-52B THROUGH G-52G AIRCRAFT, REGARDLESS OF
MODIFICATION STATUS, WILL BE BRIEFED TO AVOID AIR REFUELING IN
MODERATE OR SEVER TURBULENCE CONDITIONS. PILOTS SHOULD
DISCONNECT AND FOLLOW THE TANKER IN THE OBSERVATION POSITION
AWAITING SMOOTHER AIR BEFORE RESUMING THE CONTACT POSITION
AND TRANSFER OF FUEL OR DRY CONTACTS. IF SMOOTHER AIR CANNOT
BE LOCATED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED AIR REFUELING AREA, THE REFUELING
WILL BE ABORTED. ADDRESSEES WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND
UNDERSTANDING OF THIS MESSAGE. ATTENTION DOTF. (SCP 4)
DT

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MARCH AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

3 APR 1961

Colonel Harold W. Ohlke
Commander
18th Air Division
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

Dear Hal:

Results of recent inspections reflect that some commanders are failing to place proper emphasis on the importance of nuclear weapons security. Since these weapons are among our most vital Category I resources, it is essential that they be afforded the highest degree of security protection whether in storage, loaded aboard aircraft, or in transit. In addition to the obvious dangers involved, unsatisfactory security conditions involving nuclear weapons could result in the loss of the operational flexibility, which is so vital to our mission requirements.

The fault lies not in the available security guidance but in implementation procedures. You will take positive action to insure that:

All personnel working with or around nuclear weapons, whether in storage, loaded aboard aircraft or in transit, are intimately familiar with existing security protection standards. Combat defense force supervisors will insure that each sentry is provided detailed written security instructions prior to being posted.

All personnel associated with nuclear weapons completely understand the SAC two-man policy. Review of local procedures for implementation of the two-man policy will be made to insure absolute compliance with existing directives.

All combat defense force personnel working in the munitions maintenance squadron gatehouse are trained in the operational characteristics of the American District Telegraph Alarm System to include response and control procedures.

Continual inspections are made of the gates, fences, and lights in munitions maintenance squadron areas to insure they are operational.

Your senior security/law enforcement representatives inspect nuclear weapons security along with other component parts of the security system to insure the highest degree of operational capability.

I want your personal attention given to the nuclear weapons security program for compliance with the above policy, as well as all pertinent directives on this subject.

My Inspector General will place special emphasis on nuclear weapons security procedures during future inspections.

Sincerely,

ARCHIE J. OLD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

Ltr Sent to:
TANGO
UNIFORM
VICTOR
22d Air Rfl Sq
3950 and 3955th AB Sq
SACRAF, Eielson and Elmendorf

HEADQUARTERS
FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MARCH AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

OFF	ACT	INFO
DO		
DDO		
DOP		
DOC		
DS		
DOA		
DATE DEC'D 4 MAY 1961		

28 APR 1961

Colonel Harold W. Ohlke
Commander
18th Air Division
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

Dear Hal:

As the result of the B-52 accident out of Mather recently, we have taken quite a lot of action of various forms in an attempt to tighten up our command control, supervision, operations, and all aspects connected with flight safety.

One of the actions we took was to form a panel of senior officers, headed by General Kingsbury, made up primarily of people from the field, for the purpose of thoroughly screening the records of approximately 700 key officers in an attempt to assure ourselves that we have the best people for the job in the various slots. General Kingsbury and his panel completed their work a couple of days ago; however, the final report has not been received yet. A separate group of medical officers are screening the same records for any pertinent information that might be brought out. You will, of course, be given complete information reference this panel's findings; however, General Kingsbury brought out one item in his briefing to me at the conclusion of his panel's work that I want to pass on to you immediately.

Of the almost 700 records screened by the Kingsbury panel, they selected a total of 20 records of individuals whom they recommend be looked over very carefully reference their qualifications to be in their present assignments. Thirteen of these 20 are assigned to control rooms in the various organizations. If any of these are in your command, they will be brought to your attention. In the meantime, however, I am again asking you to take a good look at the background qualifications, etc., of all of your controllers, including your chief controller. I realize this has been a matter of continual interest on the part of commanders, but I am afraid that, in some instances, there is still a little tendency to assign controllers based on their availability rather than purely by qualification. In some instances, it is possible individuals have been assigned to control room duty because they are not very good airplane commanders, operations officers, etc.

As I have told you personally, and repeat again, it is mandatory that only the very best people we can find be assigned as controllers. That is certainly an area in which we cannot stand any substandard performance.

Sincerely,

ARCHIE J. OLD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

Ltr Sent to:
5, 6, 9, 22, 28, 92, 93,
95, 96, 303, 310, 341 Bomb Wgs
12, 13, 14, 18, 22, 47, 810,
813, 819, 821, Air Divs
4062, 4126, 4128, 4133, 4134,
4136, 4141, 4170 Strat Wgs
703, 706, Strat Msl Wgs
4061 Air Rfl Wg

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

1 Apr 1961

Colonel Lester F Miller
Commander
92d Reconnaissance Wing
Fairchild AFB, Washington

Dear Les:

1961 is emerging history thus far, and the accident rate [illegible] command can be far showing a downward trend. We must not allow this hard won improvement to lull us into a false sense of security. We can still improve.

Within your unit the rates show a need for more emphasis on [illegible] government motor vehicle accident prevention. So far, your unit has been very close to or in excess of the 12th Air Force average. This area must improve. In all other categories you have shown [illegible] improvement and results.

With the approaching vacation and recreation period our attention must be directed to off-duty activities, since our exposure in this area will increase tremendously. In the TDY status which you have are experiencing, this exposure problem multiplies many times.

I am therefore directing you to concentrate on the possible problems associated with your TDY status and to use all means at your disposal to have an accident or injury free TDY. Make maximum use of existing facilities to educate, instruct and indoctrinate your personnel, with special emphasis to your supervisory personnel as to their responsibilities in this program.

I wish to congratulate you and all of your personnel for your record thus far this year in the Military Injury, Civilian Injury and Private Motor Vehicle Accident categories. Keep up the good work. Each member of your unit has earned a pat on the back.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W GRILES
Colonel, USAF
Commander

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE		TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 26, OCT 60 (Previous Ed Local Reproduction)

0261

1 Apr 1951

Colonel Stephen W Kent
Commander
4135 Connecticut, NWash
Lemon Hill, Washington

Dear Steve:

It is with pleasure that I receive your statistical record for the past three months. The overall record you have made so far in 1951 is commendable.

The Pension Motor Vehicle and Civilian Injury rates are outstanding. The Military Injury rate which is one (1) below the 1950 Air Force average. In the area of Commercial Motor Vehicle accidents your rate is considered higher, but not disgracefully so. It appears that this area needs greater emphasis.

From this showing it would seem that your efforts in the field of safety are bearing fruit. With the summer season approaching, this area should present a safe transition and recreation period for you. I am confident that with the same attention to the approaching recreational period that you have given to safety these for, you will enjoy a commendable record for that period.

Again, I want to convey my appreciation to you and all of your personnel for establishing a good safety record for the first calendar quarter of 1951.

Sincerely,

ARNOLD W CHILES
Colonel, USAF
Commander

10


SECRET
HISTORY

SECRET

Trans S-X 2819

HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 30 June 1961

7

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by MSgt. Donald W. Bunker, Unit Historian under the supervision of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) Information Staff Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET under the provisions of paragraph 30b, AFR 205-1, 1 April 1959. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis
ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

James W. Ohlke LTC
for HAROLD W. OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY
AAFDXI 61-143 Roy Lewis
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

0311

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0312

GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

0313

FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADCHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Materiel Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
ORI	Operational Readiness
PCS	Perment Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0314

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

0315

practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit delpoyment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability of engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Colonel Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Captain Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Colonel David A. Tate
Director of Materiel	Colonel John B. Carey, Jr.
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Darell G. Burgeson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charlee B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Gordon A. Bailey

0318

Administration.

The 18th Air Division continued to enhance its combat capability by increasing its crew strength in June. At month's end the 92d Bombardment Wing had a B-52 combat crew strength of 26 combat ready or higher crews and one crew still in non-combat ready status. Meanwhile the KC-135 crew strength of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron was 34 combat ready tanker crews. For the 92d Bombardment Wing, this KC-135 crew strength was increased by 18 combat ready crews of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron.[4] (S)

The other large component of the division, the 4170th Strategic Wing, had a total of 27 combat ready and one non-combat ready KC-135 crews. This brought the division's B-52 crew strength to 53 combat ready and two non-combat ready crews. Meanwhile, the divisions tanker crew strength was 74 combat ready and one non-combat ready crews.[5] (S)

During the month of June the B-52D bomber aircraft flew a total of 2248:30 hours while the KC-135 tankers flew 1614:20 hours.[6] (C)

Only the 4170th Strategic Wing was involved in any major exercise, although the 22d Air Refueling Squadron, at McChord Air Force Base, was included for air refueling operations. The mission, nicknamed Operation FIRM GRIP, was the annual Fifteenth Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection.[7] (S)

This exercise, directed by Fifteenth Air Force Operations Order #300-61, was held from 21 to 26 June. Overall, the results of this

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4. Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARS 0079, Subj: Summ Unit Act Jun 61, 17 Jul 61, Exhibit #1.
5. Ibid.
6. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOT 1851, Subj: FY 4/61 Fly Hr Adjust, 20 Jun 61, Exhibit #2; Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOT 1913, Subj: FY 4/61 Fly Jr Adjust, 26 Jun 61, Exhibit #3.
7. Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, C 0189, Subj: 15AF OPORD 300-61, FIRM GRIP, 25 Jun 61, Exhibit #4.

inspection were considered satisfactory, with two exceptions. These exceptions were two unreliable Short Look RBS runs and the failure of a U-2 rack to release.[8] (S)

During the first night, difficulty was encountered on these bomb runs. This was evidenced by the bomb impact pattern. All of the radar navigators participating in the ORI stated that throughout the climb or the Short Look runs, the wind and turbulence picked up considerably from the north. An investigation of this unreliable run resulted in a charge of crew error. This was based on the fact that the radar navigator was apparently unable to compensate for the wind shear during the climb. It was on this sortie that the U-2 failed to fire.[9] (S)

The second unreliable Short Look RBS bomb run was attributed to materiel malfunctions in that the MSH amplifier was defective, causing a heading error and an unstable platform.[10] (S)

The corrective action taken on these unreliable runs included a final wind refinement lecture applicable to Short Look bomb runs. In addition the crew experiencing the U-2 bomb release difficulty were given a two hour lecture on the weapons release system.[11] (S)

In view of these two unreliable bomb runs, the 4170th Strategic Wing was placed on a unit probation status in accordance with SAC Manual 51-1. Because of this action which was taken on 27 June by Headquarters SAC, the wing forfeited all MCS points available for unit reliability for the April-June training period.[12] However the overall

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8. Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, C 0189, Subj: 15AF OPORD 300-61, FIRM GRIP, 25 Jun 61, Exhibit #4.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, C 0198, Subj: Follow-up Act Result of 15AF IG ORI, 29 Jun 61, Exhibit #5.
12. Msg, SAC to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DO 4501, Subj: Unit Probation, 27 Jun 61, Exhibit #6.

ORI mission was satisfactory and the inspector general concurred in a unit rating index of C-1.[13] Fortunately this period of probation for the 4170th Strategic Wing was short-lived as it was lifted on 30 June 1961.[14] (S)

The 22d Air Refueling Squadron at McChord Air Force Base was inspected at the same time but was more fortunate. The results of this ORI obtained a 100 per cent rating in all areas, with maintenance receiving an outstanding evaluation.[15] (S)

Units of the 18th Air Division continued to fly Operation CLEAR ROAD sorties as directed by SAC Operation Order 20-61A throughout the month of June. During the month, SAC conducted staff visits at Larson and Ellsworth Air Force Bases for the purpose of reviewing the status of the release system technical order compliances, weapon modifications and capability of the munition maintenance squadrons to provide and safely load a reliable weapon. This was being accomplished for each unit before any were placed on the airborne alert.[16] (S)

In the meantime training under Operation CLEAR ROAD continued apace with sorties increasing each month during the current training period. This increasing tempo brought to light certain problems for which recommendations were made by the 4170th Strategic Wing. One of these was the suggestion that the reporting requirements were excessive. To alleviate this, canned reports were prepared whereever possible and arranged in chronological order. However, it was still believed that

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13. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET, C 1932, Subj: Removal Unit Probation Status For 4170SW ORI Failure, 28 Jun 61, Exhibit #7.
14. Msg, SAC to 18AD, SECRET, DO 0008, Subj: Unit Probation, 4 Jul 61, Exhibit #8.
15. Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARS 0079, Subj: Summ Unit Act, Jun 61, 17 Jul 61, Exhibit #1.
16. Msg, 15AF to 92BW, SECRET, DMAE 1674, Subj: CLIP-IN Utilization, 2 Jun 61, Exhibit #9.

the number of reports could be reduced without affecting the quality of the training. It was also recommended that the aircraft be flown at standard cruise mach instead of at the endurance air speeds at the point of ineffectiveness.[17] (S)

During June rapid progress was continued on the repaving of the runway at Fairchild Air Force Base and soon this site of the 18th Air Division Headquarters would once again become an operational bombardment base. It was expected that the first elements of the returning B-52 aircraft of the 92d Bombardment Wing would arrive from Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, on 14 July.[18] (S)

Staff Visits by 18th Air Division Personnel.

In addition to the ORI conducted by Fifteenth Air Force on the 4170th Strategic Wing and the 22d Air Refueling Squadron in June, all of the units were subjected to staff visits by teams of the air division. The first of these was held from 5 to 7 June at Fairchild Air Force Base and both wing and group supply activities were the primary targets.[19] (U)

An overall evaluation of the wing supply revealed that in general the house keeping standards were outstanding. Only minor discrepancies were noted. Among these were incorrect recording of installed equipment of base flight aircraft.[20] (U)

The house keeping of the group supply activities was found to be below the desired standards. Uncleanliness was much in evidence in the

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17. Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, DCO 0210, Subj: Operation CLEAR ROAD, 6 Jun 61, Exhibit #10.
18. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET, DO 1992, Subj: Early Occupancy of Runway and Taxiway, FAFB, 5 Jul 61, Exhibit #11.
19. Summary, Insp of 92BW, 5-7 Jun 61, Exhibit #12.
20. Ibid.

storage area. Also it was not being properly used to the best advantage. There was found to be a laxity in the filing of office instruction letters of the organizational supply division. In addition, in an activity where all should be thoroughly conscious of the objectives of Project MONEY TREE, some personnel were unable to define them.[21] (U)

A staff visit was also made to the 92d Bombardment Wing maintenance quality control section, at the same time. The findings were satisfactory although it was recommended that all maintenance deficiency reports be reviewed and released by the deputy commander for maintenance. This would insure that reporting procedures were adequately controlled and to preclude a violation of T.O. 00-35D-54.[22] (U)

Later, on 12-15 June, the 22d Air Refueling Squadron's supply activities at McChord Air Force Base were inspected. Throughout most of the supply facilities a marked improvement was noted over the findings of the previous inspection in April. Plans for relocating the accounting section closer to the storage and issue section were nearing completion and the move was scheduled for the immediate future.[23] (U)

Next on the list scheduled for a visit by the 18th Air Division was the 4170th Strategic Wing at Larson Air Force Base. The results of this inspection of the supply activities were very satisfactory.[24] The same condition was found to exist within the supply activities of the 4170th Combat Support Group. In all cases a tremendous improvement over the previous staff visits was noted.[25] (U)

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21. Summary, Insp of 92CSG, 5-7 Jun 61, Exhibit #13.
22. Summary, Insp of 92BW, 5-7 Jun 61, Exhibit #12.
23. Summary, Snsp of 22ARS, 12-15 Jun 61, Exhibit #16.
24. Summary, Insp of 4170SW, 26-29 Jun 61, Exhibit #14.
25. Summary, Insp of 4170CSG, 26-29 Jun 61, Exhibit #15.

Policy Directives of the 18th Air Division.

Most of the directives that emanated from the division in June were concerned with some phase of safety. On 2 June, as a result of an aircraft accident of a Fairchild Aero Club member, all aero clubs in the division were directed to suspend all activity until such time as adequate directives and precautions had been taken to reduce to a minimum the chance of a recurrence of an accident. This suspension was rescinded on 19 June for the 4170th Strategic Wing and was expected to be lifted somewhat later for the 92d Bombardment Wing.[26] (U)

On 23 June Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division Commander, directed that no munitions loading teams would be permitted to handle any weapons until they had received a standardization check for each type of weapon assigned to that wing. He noted that the number of personnel required to come in contact with the various weapons had increased. This, of course, increased the danger of an accident by personnel not fully qualified to handle the device.[27] (U)

Throughout the month continued emphasis was placed upon automobile accident prevention. A rising trend involving privately owned vehicles was causing much concern. At Larson Air Force Base there were four deaths while the rate of accidents at Fairchild was almost double the previous quarter.[28] The wings were directed to take immediate action to reduce these unnecessary occurrences immediately at all levels. The base air police were expected to be particularly active in giving spot

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26. Msg, 18AD to 4170SW, UNCLASS, Subj: Larson AFB Aero Club, 19 Jun 61, Filed C, FAFB.
27. Ltr, 18AD to WINGS, Subj: Nuclear Safety and Loading Teams, 23 Jun 61, Exhibit #17.
28. Msg, 18AD to WINGS, UNCLASS, C 9502, Subj: POV Accidents, 12 Jun 61, Exhibit #19.

checks of private vehicles as well as observing the conduct of all military personnel.[29] (U)

This unnecessary waste of manpower and manhours was something that could not be condoned. All personnel would have to be increasingly aware that results of such actions were closely akin to sabotage. This was something that the 18th Air Division could not lightly disregard in view of the troubled times in which the nation found itself at the halfway point in 1961.[30] (U)

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29. Ltr, 18AD to WINGS, Subj: Intensified Provost Marshal Activities, 8 Jun 61, Exhibit #20.
30. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agenices.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 417th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARS 0079, Subj: Summ Unit Act Jun 61, 17 Jul 61	1
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOT 1857, Subj: FY 4/61 Fly Hr Adjust, 20 Jun 61	2
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOT 1913, Subj: FY 4/61 Fly Hr Adjust, 26 Jun 61	3
Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, C 0189, Subj: 15AF OPORD 300-61, FIRM GRIP, 25 Jun 61	4
Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, C 0198, Subj: Follow-up Act of Result of 15AF IG ORI, 29 Jun 61	5
Msg, SAC to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DO 4501, Subj: Unit Probation, 27 Jun 61	6
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET, C 1932, Subj: Removal Unit Probation Status for 4170SW ORI Failure, 28 Jun 61	7
Msg, SAC to 18AD, SECRET, DO 0008, Subj: Unit Probation, 4 Jul 61	8
Msg, 15AF to 92BW, SECRET, DM4E 1674, Subj: CLIP-IN Utilization, 2 Jun 61	9
Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, DCO 0210, Subj: Operation CLEAR ROAD, 6 Jul 61	10
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET, DO 1992, Subj: Early Occupancy of Runway and Taxiway, FAFB, 5 Jul 61	11
Summary, Insp of 92BW, 5-7 Jun 61	12
Summary, Insp of 92CSG, 5-7 Jun 61	13
Summary, Insp of 4170SW, 26-29 Jun 61	14
Summary, Insp of 4170CSG, 26-29 Jun 61	15
Summary, Insp of 22ARS, 12-15 Jun 61	16
Ltr, 18AD to Wings, Subj: Nuclear Safety and Loading Teams, 23 Jun 61	17
Msg, 18AD to Wings, UNCLASS, C 9480, Subj: Command Control and Supervision of Aircraft, 15 Jun 61	18

Msg, 18AD to Wings, UNCLASS, C 9502, Subj: POV Accidents, 12 Jun 61 19

Ltr, 18AD to Wings, Subj: Intensified Provost Marshal Activities, 8 Jun 61 20

---PARAPHRASE
ENCRYPTION---
BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTER
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YE
DOD DIR 5200.10

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

PAGE THREE RJWBHK 18
UNRELIABLE BOMB SCORED AT 4500 FT AT 178 DEGREES. A & E PERSONNEL
EMPLETED THOROUGH CHECKS ON THE BMS EQUIPMENT AND COULD NOT FIND
MY MALFUNCTIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE UNRELIABLE BOMB. THE U-2
RACK FAILED TO FIRE ON THIS SORTIE. THE P, CP, RN AND SN ON THIS
CREW WERE QUERIED BY MY STAFF EXTENSIVELY AND I AM CONVINCED THAT
THE CHECKLIST WAS FOLLOWED WITHOUT OMISSION. THE CP STATED OVER
INTERPHONE THAT HE ACTUATED THE SALVE BUTTON FOUR TIMES AT BOMBS
AWAY. MMS PERSONNEL COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE MALFUNCTION ON THE
GROUND. A NARRATIVE OF THE RN IS CONTAINED IN PART III OF THIS ESC.
NEW SACM 51-1, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE EVIDENCE TO THE
CONTRARY, THIS UNRELIABLE RUN MUST BE CHARGED TO CREW ERROR BASED ON
THE FACT THAT HE WAS APPARENTLY UNABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE WIND
NEAR DURING HIS CLIMB, AND FAILURE OF THE U-2 TO FIRE. BRAVO:
CREW R -26, RN CAPT. WEINBERGER. AIMING POINT IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT
A FACTOR. FROM THE IP TO THE TARGET, THE ECO LIGHT CAME ON INER-
TESTLY AND WAS ON AT BOMBS AWAY. INITIAL CROSS-HAIR PLACEMENT WAS
ON OFFSET ONE, THENCE TO THE DIRECT AIMING POINT. AS THE TARGET IS
A "BLINKER", THE OPERATOR WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE TARGET "LIMA". THE
OFFSET WAS SWITCHED TO CAP TWO AND THE CROSS-HAIRS FELL SHORT AND TO
THE RIGHT APPROXIMATELY TWO MILES, SO THE OPERATOR REPLACED THE CROSS

PAGE FOUR RJWBHK 18
HAIRS ON OFFSET TWO. ONCE AGAIN, HE NEXT TO OFFSET OUT AND THE CROSS
HAIRS FELL APPROXIMATELY TWO MILES NORTH OF THE TGT AREA. AT THIS
TIME HE RETURNED TO OFFSET ONE AND THE CROSS-HAIRS FELL OVER AND
RIGHT. HE THEN PLACED THE CROSS-HAIRS ON OFFSET ONE AND SWITCHED TO
DIRECT. THIS TIME THE CROSS-HAIRS FELL ON A RETURN WHICH WAS
BELIEVED BY THE OPERATOR TO BE THE TARGET. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE SCOPE
BEING 17 DEGREES OUT OF PHASE, THE RELATIONSHIP OF CAP ONE AND THE
RETURN WHERE THE CROSS-HAIRS FELL APPEARED TO BE PROPER AND THE
OPERATOR FELT THAT HE HAD FOUND THE TARGET. HE RETURNED TO OFFSET
ONE AND COMPLETED THE RUN. SYNCHRONIZATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER BOMBS
AWAY INDICATES A SLIGHT DRIFT OVER, AT 1500 FT. THE MATERIAL
DEFIRENCY FOUND WAS A DEFECTIVE MSH AMPLIFIER WHICH CAUSED THE
HEADING ERROR AND THE UNSTABLE PLATFORM. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT THE
GIMBLES TUMBLED IMMEDIATELY AFTER BOMBS AWAY INDICATING AN UNSTABLE
PLATFORM. IT SHOULD ALSOMBE NOTED THAT THIS MALFUNCTION COULD NO BE
DUPLICATED ON THE GROUND, BUT ONLY WHEN THE ACFT WAS ACTUALLY FLOWN
AT LOW ALTITUDE AHILE MAKING A SHORT LOOK MANEUVER IN LIGHT TURBUL-
ENCE. THE ACFT WAS TEST FLOWN 25 JUN 61. INVIEW OF THE ABOVE AND IN
ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER CONCRETE INFO, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE UNRELI-
ABLE BOMB SHOULD BE CONTRIBUTED TO MATERIELWM PART III, CREW HISTORY.

SECRET

0335

PAGE THREE RJMDRK 10
CEA IS 2191 FT. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE WIND SHEAR WAS
STILL PRESENT THE SECOND NIGHT AS ALL BIX IMPACTS WERE AT 090 DEGREES.
NARRATIVES BY THE OPERATORS DESCRIBING THE TWO UNRELIABLE SHORT LOOK
UNS AND THE U-2 FAILURE FOLLOW: SCAN I-135 TARGET COMPLEX WAS
IDENTIFIED AT 45 MILES AND ALL EFFECTS UNLOCKED. THE RUN WAS NORMAL
AND LOOKED GOOD ALL THE WAY UNTIL CLIMB. AT START CLIMB, THE CROSS-
HAIRS MOVED RIGHT OR SOUTH. I ATTEMPTED TO PLACE THEM BACK ON THE
AIMING POINT, HAS WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH AN ACCURACY OF 500 FT.
SLOT TRIED TO CENTER THE PELSOT CHAMBER AS SEEN BY TV SCREEN, AND AT
SOMES AWAY, I DETECTED LITTLE DEVIATION ON THE FOV. THIS READING
WAS HELD DURING RELEASE. THE CROSS-HAIRS SEEMED TO REMAIN WITHIN

1000 FT OF THE TARGET DURING TIME OF FALL. I AM UNABLE TO EXPLAIN
THE LANCE CEA. SCAN I-134 U-2 FAILURE TO FIRE. ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS
WERE IN AT WEAPONS PREPARATION. I CHECKED THEM AGAIN AND CHECKED
THEM BEFORE RECORD FOR LOW LEVEL CHECKLISTS. AT RELEASE, WHEN THE
NAV CALLED FOR SALVO, OP SALVOED AND CALLED OUT OVER INTERPHONE
"SALVO". AFTER PASSING, THE NAV WENT BACK TO CHECK THE RACKS AND
REPORTED THE AFT RACK AS NOT HAVING FIRED. AT THIS TIME I CHECKED
THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND FOUND THE RACK SELECTS B/B OUT, SINCE ALL
FUNCTIONS APPEARED NORMAL ON THE RUN, WE ASSUMED THAT A RELEASE HAD

PAGE FOUR RJMDRK 10
WERE AFFECTED. I AM UNABLE TO EXPLAIN WHY THE U-2 DID NOT FIRE.
SCAN I-25: I OPTICALLY ACQUIRED THE COUNTERS ON A
WESTERLY 40 NM SHORT OF THE TARGET AREA AND THE CROSS-HAIRS WERE
ABOUT 10 NM SOUTH OF THE AREA. I SWITCHED TO OFFSET ONE AND CLEWED
TO IT AND TOOK A SHORT WIND RUN. AT ABOUT (illegible) SECONDS TO I
SWITCHED THE WIND OFF AND WENT DIRECT, AND THEN SWITCHED TO OFFSET
TWO. THE CROSS-HAIRS FELL 2 NM SHORT. I DROVE THE CROSS-HAIRS TO
THE TWO AND SWITCHED BACK TO DIRECT. THE CROSS-HAIRS FELL OVER AND
SOUTH BY 2 NM OF THE TARGET AREA. I SWITCHED BACK TO OFFSET ONE AND
THE CROSS-HAIRS WERE 2 NM NORTH AND OVER. I DROVE BACK NITO OAP ONE
AND CONTINUED THE RUN USING THAT OAP. MY OPINION, AT THE TIME, WAS
THAT OFFSET TWO WAS NOT WORKING PROPERLY, AND I WROTE THE SET UP FOR
THAT AT MAINTENANCE DEBRIEFING. FOR TWO HOURS PREVIOS TO BOMBS
AWAY, THE ECO LIGHT CAME ON INTERMITTENTLY, BUT "RESET" WOULD TURN IT
OFF. ECO LIGHT WAS ON FREQUENTLY DURING LOW LEVEL FLIGHT, BUT I
THOUGHT THIS WAS DUE TO THE TURBULENCE WE WERE ENCOUNTERING. AFTER
BOMB RELEASE, THE ECO LIGHT WAS ON CONTINUOUSLY, THE SABLE PLATFORM
WAS TUMBLED, AND SEVERE FLUCTUATIONS SHOWED ON THE SCOPE. RESET WAS
USELESS. AFTER RE-CYCLING THE COMPUTER-SYSTEM SIX TIMES, AND OVER
AN HOUR LATER, THE PLATFORM CAME READY. AND NORMAL SCOPE PRESENTATION

0337

SECRET

5

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RJWBUK #8

(4) NOTED
(5) NOTED
(6) NOTED, REFERENCE A2E (13) (A) (C)
(7) NOTED
(8) NOTED
(9) NOTED
(10) NOTED
(11) NOTED
(12) NOTED
(13) REASONS FOR EMERGENCY OR UNRELIABLE RUNS:

(A) AIRCRAFT NR 189. DISCREPANCY WAS CORRECTED BY ADJUSTING THE GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL ON 23 JUNE 1961.

(B) AIRCRAFT NR 6QQPM DISCREPANCY WAS CORRECTED BY REPLACING THE SLEW SWITCH ON 23 JUNE 1961.

(C) CREW S-85 WILL BE REBRIEFED ON 29 JUN 1961 ON PROPAR BOMB RUN PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES BY H SQUADRON OBSERVER.

(D) CREW E-14 WAS REBRIEFED ON 27

SECRET

G
29/21223 JUN 1961

0340

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

DA866 ... CPAF SCHUKMEIER
RR RJUDKD RJUDJF RJUDJA RJUDGP
DE RJUDKN 2
R 022152Z
FM 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF
TO RJUDJL/4134STRATVG MATHER AFB CALIF
RJUDAS/4126STRATVG BEALE AFB CALIF
RJUDAP/28BOMDWG ELLSWORTH AFB SDAK
RJUDAU/4128STRATVG AMARILLO AFB TEX
RJUDHR/4114STRATVG LARSON AFB WASH
RJUDKD/99BOMDWG MT HOME AFB IDA
RJUDJB/93BOMDWG CASTLE AFB CALIF
RJUDJP/6BOMDWG WALKER AFB NMEX
RJUDJA/5ACRAF FIELTON AFB ALASKA
RJUDGP/92BOMDWG FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
BT

S E C R E T EMAC 1674. FOR DCS/OPS. (U) CLIP-IN UTILIZATION. THIS MESSAGE IS FIVE PARTS.

PART I: FOR B-52 ACTIVITIES. PRESENT SAC POLICY REGARDING STATIONS CONCERNED WITH FLYING "CLEAR ROAD" MISSIONS IS THAT ALL SHOULD RECEIVE A SAFETY AND CAPABILITY STAFF VISIT PRIOR TO PARTICIPATION IN AIRBORNE ALERT. PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WOULD BE TO REVIEW THE STATUS OF RELIABLE PURPOSE TOOTH, WEAPON MODIFICATIONS AND CAPABILITY OF THE MMS TO PROVIDE AND SAFELY LOADA RELIABLE WEAPON. PERSONNEL THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL VISIT FOLLOWING BASES ON DATES INDICATED FOR PURPOSES OUTLINED ABOVE.

PAGE TWO RJUDKN 221

BASE	DATE OF SAFETY VISIT
MATHER	9 - 8 JUNE
BEALE	13-16 JUNE
LARSON	19-22 JUNE
AMARILO	26-28 JUNE
ELLSWORTH	(SEE PART IV)

PARTLII: FOR MATHER BEALE, LARSON AND AMARILLO, 15AF MUNITIONS STAND TEAM WILL CONDUCT SAFETY SURVEY IN CONJUNCTION WITH STAND TEAM VISIT AT MATHER DURING PERIOD INDICATED ABOE. LT COL CHESTER A ROCKITT, AFSN 419634A AND CMSGT MORRIS T. GOOTE, AF7[illegible]21, WILL CONDUCT SURVEY AT BEALE DURING TIME PERIOD INDICATED ABOVE. CAPTAIN HENRY B. ELLIS, AFSN 432818A, AND TSGT CLENARD S. ROLF, AF17376[illegible]67, WILL CONDUCT SURVEY AT LARSON AND AMARILLO ON DATES INDICATED ABOVE. ALL PERSONNEL HAVE TOP SECRET CLEARANCES AND WILL BE GRANTED ACCESS TO ALL MATERIAL AND AREAS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT FUNCTIONS RELATED TO THIS SURVEY. STOCKPILE INFORMATION IS AUTHORIZED. REQUEST BILLETING ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE IAW ABOVE SCHEDULE.

PART III. FOR B-52 ACTIVITIES. STATIONS SCHEDULED TO PARTICIPATE IN AIRBORNE ALERT WILL TAKE NECESSARY ACTION TO INSURE THAT

SECRET

PAGE THREE RJWBKN 221
FOLLOWING LISTED IRCRAFT/WEAPON TOC'S HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED:
/A/ REQUIRED AIRCRAFT TOC'S

T.O.	DATE	SUBJECT
11N-T-249-1001	14DEC59	GUARD BARS ON T-249
11N-T-249-1002	26JUN59	MODIFICATIONS OF T-249
1B-52-1020	14AUG58	INSTALLATION OF GUARDS ON RELEASE CABLES
1B-52-1020A	24OCT58	" " " " "
1B-52-1091	17APR59	INSTALLATION OF BOMB BAY DOOR LIMIT SWITCHES
1B-52-1091A	8MAY59	" " " " "
1B-52-1120	8OCT59	CLIP-IN MODIFICATION
1B-52-1170	27APR59	ADDITIONAL GUARDING OF BOMB RELEASE CABLES
1B-52-1170A	2OCT59	" " " " "
1B-52-1263	10JUN60	READINESS SWITCH
1B-52-1263	1JUL60	RE-LOCATION EMRPL HANDLE

APPLICABLE TO SWESS EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT ONLY

1B-52C-689	8JUL60	RE-LOCATION OF BR SWESS PANEL
1B-52C-617	27APR60	REMOVAL OF SWESS PANEL FOR REWORK

PAGE FOUR RJWBKN 221
/B/ WEAPON TOK'S
15/39
ALTERATION 197 AND 193
25
ALTERATION 282 AND 285 OR 718
/C/ TRAINING STATUS AND CAPABILITY OF RMS TO MATE WEAPONS TO CLIP-IN, CHECK OUT CLIP-IN RELEASE SYSTEM AND LOAD CLIP-IN PACKAGES.
/D/ DEADLINE DATE FOR ACCOMPLISHING ABOE AT MATHER AND BEALE AND ELLSWORTH IS 15 JUNE 61. DEADLINE DATE FOR AMARILLO CND LARSON IS 31 JUNE 61.
PART IV. FOR 28BW. SURVEY AT YOUR BASE WILL BE CONDUCTED BY 26MMS PERSONNEL PRESENTLY TDY AT ELLSWORTH. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO 92BW WITH INFO 28BW WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY.
PART V. FOLLOWING LISTED STATIONS ARE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO GO CLIP-IN ON DATES INDICATED BELOW:

BASE	DATE
MT HOME	1-15 AUGUST
EIELSON	1-15 AUGUST
CASTLE	OCTOBER 61

SECRET

SECRET

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PAGE FIVE RJWDKN 22
WALKER NOVEMBER 61
CLIP IN ASSEMBLIES AND WEAPON ALTERATION KITS WILL BE FURNISHED
REFLEX STATIONS CONCURRENT WITH THE PARENT BOMB WING. EACH
REFLEX WING SHOULD COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH THE REFLEX STATION
PRIOR TO SENDING CLIP-IN AIRCRAFT FOR CHANGEOVER. HEADQUARTERS
SAC WILL PROGRAM CLIP-IN ASSEMBLIES AND ALTERATION KITS IF
INCREASED ALERT IS AUTHORIZED. MHU-7/M TRAILERS WILL BE IN
EDWARDSWORDEN WWWIENNELLBEECHTSOVERRAMEYERSOMESCHWAYS MAY HAVE TO
BEB
RPTING LAST TWO LINES

SHORT SUPPLY UNTIL FALL OF THIS YEAR AND SOME UNITS MAY HAVE TO
LOAD WITH MB1/TW UNTIL RECEIPT OF TRAILERS. SCP-4/
BT
02/2311Z JUN RJWDKN

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

10

0349

[redacted]

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

92D BOMB WING - CONSOLIDATED WING SUPPLY

CONSOLIDATED UNIT SUPPLY EVALUATION WORKSHEET	LEGEND O-OUTSTANDING G-GOOD E-EXCELLENT F-FAIR	EVALUATION DATE 5-7 June 1961					
ITEM		MAX PT	ITEM WEIGHT O	E	G	F	RATING
I. GENERAL AREA.							
1. IPT							
a. Numbers of Personnel Participating Expressed as a Percentage of Personnel Eligible to participate.		50	95% 50	85% 35	75% 20	50% 0	50
b. Percent of Personnel Tested Who Satisfactorily Pass the Tests.		50	50	35	20	0	35
2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel.							
a. Layout. This section applies not to whether a building is old or new, but to use made of existing facilities & is a matter of judgment of evaluator, specifically utilization of available facilities to include flow of paperwork, property, personnel & traffic.		50	50	35	25	20	50
b. General Housekeeping of Sections.		25	25	20	15	10	20
c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance.		50	50	35	25	20	35
3. Management Improvements. This a matter of judgment of evaluator & applies to manner of compliance with existing directives. Areas for consideration are internal SOPs, flow charts, use of displays, checklists & other improvements indicative of interest & initiative.		100	100	75	50	25	75
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION.							
1. Elimination of excess property on hand is a measure of supply management, discipline, & participation in the equipment authorization program. This item is rated on both a dollar value percentage of excesses vs total dollar value of the account, and on line item excesses expressed as a percentage of total line items in the account. For purposes of this computation the following items will not be considered as excess:		300					0
a. Items for which a valid requirement exists, this requirement having been documented by submission of a UAL change request.							
b. Items received on directed shipments prior to receipt of validating authorization change.							
c. Interim substitutes on hand will not be considered as excess when reviewing excesses on requisition.							

DOLLAR VALUE PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE	LINE ITEM PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE
1	0	2	0
.9	5	1.8	5
.8	10	1.6	10
.7	20	1.4	20
.6	30	1.2	30
.5	40	1.0	40
.4	50	.8	50
.3	70	.6	70
.2	90	.4	90
.1	120	.2	120
0	150	.0	150

2. The positive control of completed supply documents is necessary to support balances shown on accountable records. It provides a check on actions taken on routine requisitions, statement of charges, IAVs, droppage certificates and other adjustment documents. Control numbered documents over 30 days old which do not reflect action *(as annotated on control register)* is indicative of improper mgt & lack of control of acct docu.								150			150
Completed Documents Not In File	5	4	3	2	1	0					
Control Numbered Docu W/O Action	5	4	3	2	1	0					
Point Score	0	10	20	35	50	75					
3. Inventory Control. In conjunction with the requirement for a complete inventory of all organizational property annually, accuracy and validity is an important factor. Condition of custody receipt accounts will be evaluated based on documentary evidence of a completed inventory in coordination with the custodian of the account. This may be evidenced by reaccomplishment of the custody receipt and/or creation of a new AF Form 1297 or a stamped/typed statement on the custody receipt reflecting inventory								100			100
							TOTALS				

SAC FORM NOV 60 682

(Local Reproduction Authorized)

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ITEM		MAX PT	RATING
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION, Item 3, Inventory Control (*Continued*):			
date and signature of the custodian. A rating of 100 points is given when all accounts have been inventoried within the past year. Less points are allocated for custody receipts not inventoried:			
C/R Not Inventoried	Points		
4	0		
3	20		
2	40		
1	70		
0	100		
4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing & Equipment Record. Evaluation of general condition of AF Forms 538 is based on accomplishment of the ——-annual inventory requirement & submission of requisitions for all shortages of permanent retention items authorized to individuals concerned. A maximum of 100 points may be attained in each of the areas indicated below:			
a. AF Forms 538 not inventoried during the previous —— annual period:		100	50
No. 538's	Points		
20	0		
19	5		
18	10		
17	15		
16	20		
15	25		
10	50		
5	75		
0	100		
b. Shortages of authorized permanent retention items not on requisition:		100	100
No. 538's	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
5. Personal Equipment. Evaluation of this function is based on performance of the personal equipment branch in accomplishment of inspections & cleaning of personal & survival equipment, aggressive action taken on technical order compliance (*TOC*) & submission of requisitions for any shortages of items required to complete survival kits. A maximum of 100 points may be attained for completed inspections & cleaning of personal & survival eqp, 50 points for TOC & 50 points for submission of rqns for shortages.			
a. Personal & survival equipment overdue for inspection & cleaning more than:		100	0
No. Days	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
b. Technical Order compliance not accomplished for more than:		50	50
No. Items	Points		
5	0		
4	10		
3	20		
2	30		
1	40		
0	50		

ITEM	MAX PT	RATING
c. Requisitions not submitted for survival kit shortages for more than:	50	50
No. Items — Points		
5 — 0		
4 — 10		
3 — 20		
2 — 30		
1 — 40		
0 — 50		
6. Evacuation of Reparables. Evaluation of this area is based on review of reparables on hand to determine whether or not these items are being evacuated properly. Maximum score is attained by virtue of having no reparables on hand in excess of a specific period. Finding of one or more reparable items on hand exceeding 7 work days would result in the loss of all points & in the case of Hi-Valu property, the on-hand period must not exceed 1 work day.	50	50
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION.		
1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 versus AFTO Form 781B. Evaluation of this area consists of review of SAC Forms 230 to insure that priority requirements are properly verified & that SAC Forms 230 are properly maintained. Concurrently, AFTO Forms 781B will be compared against SAC Forms 230 to insure that item shortages & requisitioning action annotated on both records are in agreement. Maximum attainable score in this area as outlined below:	~~300~~	Not Scored
No. Discrepancies — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 20		
3 — 50		
2 — 90		
1 — 140		
0 — 200		
2. Bench Stock.	300	210
a. The rating of this section is based upon review of total bench stocks assigned to a consolidated supply. Rating is based upon number of not-in-stock items upon which no positive action has been taken, thereby eliminating the possible factor of a low-fill rate for a particular bench stock. Positive evidence must be available to show that NIS items are on order.		
NIS Items Not On Order: 5 — 4 — 3 — 2 — 1 — 0		
Point Score: 0 — 30 — 75 — 135 — 210 — 300		
3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy.	150	90
a. Evaluation of this area consists of verification of on-hand balances as indicated on AF Forms 197 for all authorized Hi-Valu property. Points are awarded as follows:		
Inventory Errors — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 30		
3 — 60		
2 — 90		
1 — 120		
0 — 150		
4. Operation.	150	150
a. Control exercised over temporary custody receipt loans from tool cribs. Rating in this area is based upon effectiveness of action taken to insure timely return of items loaned to individual personnel. Items are normally returned to tool cribs within 72 hours from date & time of issue or upon the "due date" whichever is later. Attainable score is computed as follows:		
No. Custody Receipts Over-due for Turn-in — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 15		
3 — 30		
2 — 60		
1 — 100		
0 — 150		

ITEM	MAX PT	RATING
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION, Item 4, Operation *(Continued)*.		
b. Calibration & calendar inspection of tools on hand in tool cribs. Certain items normally maintained by tool cribs require periodic test, check, inspection or calibration as outlined in applicable technical orders. A maximum score of 100 points is possible in this area, based upon the following:	100	0
No. Items Overdue For TOC — Points Earned		
3 — 0		
2 — 30		
1 — 60		
0 — 100		
5. Aircraft Installed Equipment. The evaluation of this function is based upon the proper storage of equipment & insuring that all shortages are on requisition. Property in storage must be segregated & identified by aircraft tail number. A maximum of 100 points may be gained provided segregated tail number storage is maintained and all shortages are on requisition. Zero points gained for failure to accomplish any of the above.	100	100
6. Document Control - Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch.	~~200~~	N/A
a. The rating of this area is based upon the control over the documents upon which requests for materiel were based & control of documents on which the materiel was received. Number of completed & supporting documents not properly filed is used as a measure of internal management of the branch.		
Documents Not Properly Filed: 5 — 4 — 3 — 2 — 1 — 0		
Point Score: 0 — 25 — 50 — 90 — 140 — 200		
7. Combat Launch and Recovery Kit Operation Within Organizations Tenant On Non-SAC Bases.	~~100~~	N/A
a. The rating attained in this area is dependent upon the overall rate of fill of authorized CLARK components. Attainable score is outlined below:		
% Of Rate Of Fill — Points Earned		
Less than 90 — 0		
90 — 5		
91 — 10		
92 — 15		
93 — 20		
94 — 30		
95 — 40		
96 — 50		
97 — 60		
98 — 80		
99 — 100		
TOTAL POINTS	2125	1365

REMARKS

Evalution conducted 5-7 June 1961. The following personnel from the 4170th Strat Wg performed the evaluation under the supervision of Lt Col Charles B. Murray, 18th Air Div Supply Staff Officer:

Major William H. Gidney, Jr., AFSC 6416 - Team Chief
TSgt Norman E. Long, AFSC 64570
SSgt Richard V. White, AFSC 64670

The attached additional comments are numbered in conformance with the paragraphing of the SAC Form 682.

TYPED NAME AND GRADE *(Evaluator)*	SIGNATURE *(Evaluator)*
CHARLES B. MURRAY **Lt Colonel, USAF**	Charles B. Murray

SAC FORM 682, NOV 60 (Local reproduction authorized)

Additional Remarks - 92BW Consolidated Wing Supply
Fairchild AFB, Washington, 5-7 June 1961

I. GENERAL AREA

1. IPT

a. There are 26 persons eligible, and all are participating.

b. At the time of the previous report, one test result was unknown; it is now known that the individual failed. Since January 1961, seven were tested and one failed; these figures are the basis for the scoring in this report. Results of a test administered in May are unknown at this time.

2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel

a. Layout. The ample space made available to Wing Supply functions is very well used. Clearly defined storage areas are laid out, and materiel and paper flow is efficiently planned.

b. General Housekeeping of Sections. Housekeeping in the Aircraft Support Division was outstanding, and generally very good throughout Organizational Supply Division; however, the Personal Equipment Branch was not up to the standard of the other branches.

c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance. Bearing and appearance were very good throughout the Aircraft Support Division and quite satisfactory otherwise.

3. Management Improvements. SOP's and charts were available throughout Wing Supply although there was not a positive showing that individuals concerned with the SOP's were required to read them. It is recommended that some such positive showing be made, such as the initialing of the SOP's by individuals affected. It was noted that Wing Supply has a positive program under Project "Money Tree." Six projects, numbered DSUPO-1 through 6, have been established: five concerned with the reduction of equipment requirements, and one with a procedural change to facilitate the determination of fund requirements. Compliance with existing directives is considered adequate; some discrepancies were noted and are listed elsewhere in this report.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION

1. Elimination of Excess Property. The computation of excesses was made by a review of a brownline listing of the accounting deck as of 1 June 1961.

a. Dollar value percentage of excesses:

Dollar value of the account	$6,105,233.00
Dollar value of excesses	$1,018,901.00
Per cent of dollar excesses	16%

b. Line item percentage of excesses:

Line items in the account	2488
Line items excess	479
Per cent of line items excess	19%

2. Positive Control of supply Documents. Records relative to the following two items evidence good document control and follow-up:

a. Completed Documents Not in File. Documents between Control Numbers 10107300 and 10109647 were checked; no discrepancies were noted.

b. Control Numbered Documents w/o Action over 30 Days. Documents between Control Numbers 10106400 and 10109314 were checked; no discrepancies were noted.

3. Inventory Control. No discrepancies were noted in the 59 accounts checked; all Custody Receipt accounts indicated that inventories were conducted within the past year.

4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing and Equipment Record

a. AF Forms 538 Not Inventoried During the Previous Annual Period. 860 Forms 538 were checked, 525 for aircrew, officers, and administrative type airmen, and 335 for airmen authorized tool kits. Only six instances were noted, all in the former group, of non-inventory during the past annual period:

Name	Date of Inventory
CWO W. S. Clay	21 April 1960
Lt Col E. O. Brown	6 April 1960
SSgt A. L. Downs, Jr.	20 April 1960
Major M. Gieb, Jr.	22 December 1959
SSgt J. P. Mendiola	28 October 1958
1/Lt M. E. Speed	22 April 1960

b. Shortages of Authorized Permanent Retention Items Not on Requisition. A check of the same Forms 538 noted in a, above, showed that all authorized items had been ordered. It is evident that much productive effort has been made in this area.

0358

5. Personal Equipment. This branch is operating on a very reduced scale. The vast majority of the equipment is in use away from the base by organizations on temporary duty.

a. Personal & Survival Equipment Overdue for Inspection and Cleaning More Than: As noted in the previous report, many oxygen masks were overdue for cleaning. The section has a follow-up system in effect, but it is apparent that individuals possessing the masks are not performing their part in this program. No other discrepancies were noted.

b. Technical Order Compliance not Accomplished for More Than: No discrepancies were noted.

6. Evacuation of Reparables. No discrepancies were noted.

III. Aircraft or Maintenance Support Division

1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 Versus AFTO Form 781B. This factor was not evaluated. At the time of this check, all aircraft were away from base; correlation of 230's and 781B's could not be accomplished.

2. Bench Stock. There was one A&E bench stock item noted as not in stock for which no positive replenishment action could be shown:

Stock Number	Line Item Number
5307-030-6583	10610809

3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy.

a. Two discrepancies in Hi-Valu pre-issue inventory were noted in the FMS pre-issue:

Stock Number	AF Form 197 Balance	On Hand Balance	Authorized	Due-in
2935-628-5984	1 ea	2 ea	3 ea	0 ea
2995-602-4467	5 ea	6 ea	8 ea	3 ea

b. Comment: Fifty seven Hi-Valu items were not in location, but were stacked in the aisle in the A&E pre-issue. Also, there were two inaccurate locations, although the quantities were correct.

A&E Pre-Issue: 5821-765-6909, AF Form 197 location 10E21; actual location 10E24.

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FMS Pre-Issue: 2995-529-3421, AF Form 197 location 4A7; actual location 4A5.

4. Operation

a. Control Exercised over Temporary Custody Receipt Loans from Tool Cribs. Activity in this area is practically nil. Inasmuch as no Custody Receipts were outstanding at the time of the check, maximum points were awarded.

b. Calibration and Inspection. Three items were overdue for calibration in the FMS tool crib:

Stock Nr.	Noun	Date Due	Quantity
6625-243-3475	Volt meter	30 May 61	2 ea
6625-185-3216	Ammeter	30 May 61	1 ea

5. Aircraft Installed Equipment

a. Base Flight Aircraft: It was noted that this function is being supervised by Wing Supply; however, the records are in the process of being transferred from the Combat Support Group to the Wing. Accordingly, it was evaluated as a Wing Supply function. Shortages are on order and tail number segregation of storage is maintained. However, the following discrepancies were noted:

Aircraft Nr.	Line Item	Remark
C-123 54-656	F-57	AF Form 781-1 shows item stored on the aircraft; it was actually stored in the 780 unit.
	F-51	AF Form 781-1 shows six each in 780 unit; there were actually 12 each in storage.
	F-22	AF Form 781-1 shows item issued on a hand receipt but no hand receipt is on file.
	F-23	AF Form 781-1 shows item stored on the aircraft but two each were actually in the 780 unit.
C-123 54-712	F-22	AF Form 781-1 shows item on hand receipt to Personal Equipment Branch but no hand receipt was on file.

0360

b. Tactical Aircraft: No evaluation was made as aircraft records are with the aircraft at TDY stations.

6. Document Control - Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch. Not applicable to the Wing Supply function.

7. Combat Launch and Recovery Kit. Not applicable at this base.

0361

92CSG CONSOLIDATED GROUP SUPPLY
Fairchild AFB, Washington

CONSOLIDATED UNIT SUPPLY EVALUATION WORKSHEET	LEGEND O-OUTSTANDING G-GOOD E-EXCELLENT F-FAIR	EVALUATION DATE 5-7 June 61					
ITEM		MAX PT	ITEM WEIGHT O	E	G	F	RATING
I. GENERAL AREA.							
1. IPT							
a. Numbers of Personnel Participating Expressed as a Percentage of Personnel Eligible to participate.		50	95% 50	85% 35	75% 20	50% 0	35
b. Percent of Personnel Tested Who Satisfactorily Pass the Tests.		50	50	35	20	0	N/A
2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel.							
a. Layout. This section applies not to whether a building is old or new, but to use made of existing facilities & is a matter of judgment of evaluator, specifically utilization of available facilities to include flow of paperwork, property, personnel & traffic.		50	50	35	25	20	25
b. General Housekeeping of Sections.		25	25	20	15	10	10
c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance.		50	50	35	25	20	50
3. Management Improvements. This a matter of judgment of evaluator & applies to manner of compliance with existing directives. Areas for consideration are internal SOPs, flow charts, use of displays, checklists & other improvements indicative of interest & initiative.		100	100	75	50	25	50
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION.							
1. Elimination of excess property on hand is a measure of supply management, discipline, & participation in the equipment authorization program. This item is rated on both a dollar value percentage of excesses vs total dollar value of the account, and on line item excesses expressed as a percentage of total line items in the account. For purposes of this computation the following items will not be considered as excess:		300					0
a. Items for which a valid requirement exists, this requirement having been documented by submission of a UAL change request.							
b. Items received on directed shipments prior to receipt of validating authorization change.							
c. Interim substitutes on hand will not be considered as excess when reviewing excesses on requisition.							

DOLLAR VALUE PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE	LINE ITEM PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE
1	0	2	0
.9	5	1.8	5
.8	10	1.6	10
.7	20	1.4	20
.6	30	1.2	30
.5	40	1.0	40
.4	50	.8	50
.3	70	.6	70
.2	90	.4	90
.1	120	.2	120
0	150	.0	150

2. The positive control of completed supply documents is necessary to support balances shown on accountable records. It provides a check on actions taken on routine requisitions, statement of charges, IAVs, droppage certificates and other adjustment documents. Control numbered documents over 30 days old which do not reflect action *(as annotated on control register)* is indicative of improper mgt & lack of control of acct docu.							150	
Completed Documents Not In File	5	4	3	2	1	0		75
Control Numbered Docu W/O Action	5	4	3	2	1	0		0
Point Score	0	10	20	35	50	75		
3. Inventory Control. In conjunction with the requirement for a complete inventory of all organizational property annually, accuracy and validity is an important factor. Condition of custody receipt accounts will be evaluated based on documentary evidence of a completed inventory in coordination with the custodian of the account. This may be evidenced by reaccomplishment of the custody receipt and/or creation of a new AF Form 1297 or a stamped/typed statement on the custody receipt reflecting inventory							100	100
							TOTALS	

SAC FORM NOV 60 682

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ITEM		MAX PT	RATING
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION, Item 3, Inventory Control *(Continued)*.			
date and signature of the custodian. A rating of 100 points is given when all accounts have been inventoried within the past year. Less points are allocated for custody receipts not inventoried:			
C/R Not Inventoried	Points		
4	0		
3	20		
2	40		
1	70		
0	100		
4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing & Equipment Record. Evaluation of general condition of AF Forms 538 is based on accomplishment of the ~~semi~~-annual inventory requirement & submission of requisitions for all shortages of permanent retention items authorized to individuals concerned. A maximum of 100 points may be attained in each of the areas indicated below:			
a. AF Forms 538 not inventoried during the previous ~~semi~~ annual period:		100	0
No. 538's	Points		
20	0		
19	5		
18	10		
17	15		
16	20		
15	25		
10	50		
5	75		
0	100		
b. Shortages of authorized permanent retention items not on requisition:		100	0
No. 538's	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
5. Personal Equipment. Evaluation of this function is based on performance of the personal equipment branch in accomplishment of inspections & cleaning of personal & survival equipment, aggressive action taken on technical order compliance *(TOC)* & submission of requisitions for any shortages of items required to complete survival kits. A maximum of 100 points may be attained for completed inspections & cleaning of personal & survival eqp, 50 points for TOC & 50 points for submission of rqns for shortages.			
a. Personal & survival equipment overdue for inspection & cleaning more than:		100	N/A
No. Days	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
b. Technical Order compliance not accomplished for more than:		50	N/A
No. Items	Points		
5	0		
4	10		
3	20		
2	30		
1	40		
0	50		

ITEM	MAX PT	RAT-ING
c. Requisitions not submitted for survival kit shortages for more than:	50	N/A
No. Items — Points		
5 — 0		
4 — 10		
3 — 20		
2 — 30		
1 — 40		
0 — 50		
6. Evacuation of Reparables. Evaluation of this area is based on review of reparables on hand to determine whether or not these items are being evacuated properly. Maximum score is attained by virtue of having no reparables on hand in excess of a specific period. Finding of one or more reparable items on hand exceeding 7 work days would result in the loss of all points & in the case of Hi-Valu property, the on-hand period must not exceed 1 work day.	50	0
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION.		
1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 versus AFTO Form 781B. Evaluation of this area consists of review of SAC Forms 230 to insure that priority requirements are properly verified & that SAC Forms 230 are properly maintained. Concurrently, AFTO Forms 781B will be compared against SAC Forms 230 to insure that item shortages & requisitioning action annotated on both records are in agreement. Maximum attainable score in this area as outlined below:	200	N/A
No. Discrepancies — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 20		
3 — 50		
2 — 90		
1 — 140		
0 — 200		
2. Bench Stock.	300	0
a. The rating of this section is based upon review of total bench stocks assigned to a consolidated supply. Rating is based upon number of not-in-stock items upon which no positive action has been taken, thereby eliminating the possible factor of a low-fill rate for a particular bench stock. Positive evidence must be available to show that NIS items are on order.		
NIS Items Not On Order: 5 — 4 — 3 — 2 — 1 — 0		
Point Score: 0 — 30 — 75 — 135 — 210 — 300		
3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy.	150	N/A
a. Evaluation of this area consists of verification of on-hand balances as indicated on AF Forms 197 for all authorized Hi-Valu property. Points are awarded as follows:		
Inventory Errors — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 30		
3 — 60		
2 — 90		
1 — 120		
0 — 150		
4. Operation.	150	150
a. Control exercised over temporary custody receipt loans from tool cribs. Rating in this area is based upon effectiveness of action taken to insure timely return of items loaned to individual personnel. Items are normally returned to tool cribs within 72 hours from date & time of issue or upon the "due date" whichever is later. Attainable score is computed as follows:		
No. Custody Receipts Over-due for Turn-in — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 15		
3 — 30		
2 — 60		
1 — 100		
0 — 150		

ITEM	MAX PT	RATING
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION, Item 4, Operation *(Continued)*.		
b. Calibration & calendar inspection of tools on hand in tool cribs. Certain items normally maintained by tool cribs require periodic test, check, inspection or calibration as outlined in applicable technical orders. A maximum score of 100 points is possible in this area, based upon the following:	100	100
No. Items Overdue For TOC — Points Earned		
3 — 0		
2 — 30		
1 — 60		
0 — 100		
5. Aircraft Installed Equipment. The evaluation of this function is based upon the proper storage of equipment & insuring that all shortages are on requisition. Property in storage must be segregated & identified by aircraft tail number. A maximum of 100 points may be gained provided segregated tail number storage is maintained and all shortages are on requisition. Zero points gained for failure to accomplish any of the above.	100	N/A
6. Document Control - Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch.	200	0
a. The rating of this area is based upon the control over the documents upon which requests for materiel were based & control of documents on which the materiel was received. Number of completed & supporting documents not properly filed is used as a measure of internal management of the branch.		
Documents Not Properly Filed: 5 — 4 — 3 — 2 — 1 — 0		
Point Score: 0 — 25 — 50 — 90 — 140 — 200		
7. Combat Launch and Recovery Kit Operation Within Organizations Tenant On Non-SAC Bases.	100	N/A
a. The rating attained in this area is dependent upon the overall rate of fill of authorized CLARK components. Attainable score is outlined below:		
% Of Rate Of Fill — Points Earned		
Less than 90 — 0		
90 — 5		
91 — 10		
92 — 15		
93 — 20		
94 — 30		
95 — 40		
96 — 50		
97 — 60		
98 — 80		
99 — 100		
TOTAL POINTS	1825	595

REMARKS

Evaluation was conducted 5-7 June 1961. The following personnel from the 4170th CSG performed the evaluation under the supervision of Lt Col Charles B. Murray, 18th Air Division Supply Staff Officer:

Captain Milton H. Ramsey, AFSC 6424 - Team Chief
MSgt Melvin L. Turner, AFSC 64670
TSgt Vernon K. Ryan, AFSC 64670
TSgt Robert K. Courayer, AFSC 64670

The attached additional comments are numbered in conformance with the paragraphing of the SAC Form 682.

TYPED NAME AND GRADE *(Evaluator)*	SIGNATURE *(Evaluator)*
CHARLES B. MURRAY **Lt Colonel, USAF**	Chas B. Murray

SAC FORM 682, NOV 60 — (Local reproduction authorized)

Additional Remarks - 92CSG, Consolidated Group Supply
Fairchild AFB, Washington, 5-7 June 1961

I. GENERAL AREA

1. IPT

a. Consolidated Group Supply has 37 personnel assigned. 17 of which are eligible to participate in the IPT program; 16 of these are now officially on training status. A total of 12 personnel are enrolled in ECI Courses.

b. Seven personnel on IPT status have completed the test and are awaiting the final results.

2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel

a. Layout. The flow of paper work, property, personnel, and traffic appear to be satisfactory. Within the warehouse the storage area is not being properly utilized in accordance with Section 8, Vol IV, AFM 67-1. The over-all arrangement of storage methods is inadequate. Serviceable and reparable appliances are commingled and not neatly arranged. Clothing is thrown on top and in between pallet bins.

b. General Housekeeping of Sections. The over-all Organizational Supply Division area is below the desired standard. Litter was found in many sections of the warehouse. Trash barrels and waste cans were full, lint and dirt on the floors, cabinets and bookcases dusty. The hand tool storage area, bins included, requires a thorough cleaning. The Aircraft or Maintenance Support Division was satisfactory although several of the bench stock areas were extremely dirty with considerable trash in the bins. Roads and Grounds, bench stock "M" was typical of this condition. This is the responsibility of the bench stock "user" in accordance with paragraph 69c, Vol II, SACM 65-2R.

c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance. The military bearing and personal appearance of all personnel was excellent.

3. Management Improvements

a. Within the Organizational Supply Division a series of Office Instruction Letters were in file. However, no instruction letters were on file to cover the Receiving and Storage Branch and the Inventory and Research Section. Display charts appear to be adequate. An inspection was conducted to see what procedures and progress was being made toward Project "Money Tree." One project was in operation: the UAL Review Program. Three personnel within the Property Accounting Section were asked to define Project "Money Tree". None of these could give an answer. It is recommended

that a project monitor be appointed for the Group Consolidated Supply so the proper emphasis can be placed on this project.

b. In the Maintenance Support Division SOP's were on file. These are outdated and require a complete review.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION

1. Elimination of Excess Property. The computation of excesses was made by a review of a brownline listing of the accounting deck as of 22 May 1961.

a. Dollar value percentage of excesses:

Dollar value of the account	$9,515,644
Dollar value of excesses	$280,562
Per cent of dollar excesses	2.9%

b. Line item percentage of excesses:

Line items in the account	1868
Line items excess	205
Per cent of line items excess	10.9%

c. Of the total dollar value excess $147,255 is the result of a realignment of vehicles since the beginning of the TDY of the 325th Bomb Squadron and the 92d ARS. The excess vehicles are with the TDY units.

2. Positive Control of Supply Documents

a. Completed Documents Not in File. Approximately 1000 document numbers were checked and all cards were found to be in the completed file.

b. Control Numbered Documents w/o Action over 30 Days. Out of the 1000 documents checked, five documents were found that had no action in the past 30 days, i.e., card deck #40, document numbers and dates follow:

Control Number	Date
03625	26 April 1961
03523	10 April 1961
03528	10 April 1961
03462	31 March 1961
03591	21 April 1961

3. Inventory Control. All accounts had been inventoried on an annual basis as required, and all custody receipts were signed.

0367

4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing and Equipment Record

a. AF Forms 538 Not Inventoried During the Previous Annual Period. Approximately 200 each, AF Forms 538 were checked. Out of these over 30 were found that had not been inventoried for one year. Numerous other discrepancies were found, i.e., using outdated ECL's (14701). Inventories being conducted against these outdated ECL's cause the inventories to be ineffective. Also noted were individual tool kit listings (custody receipts) with no name, grade, or serial number. Listed below are 22 AF Forms 538 that have not been inventoried for over one year:

Name		Date of Inventory
Arrington, W.J.	A1C	8 Oct 59
Buford, J.	A1C	4 Dec 59
Burn, H. L.	A3C	24 Sep 59
Cortez, A.C.	A1C	9 Dec 59
Davis, L.E.	A1C	None
Deiste, H.T.	A3C	None
Dietrich, R.D.	SSgt	27 May 60
Dietz, J.M.	A1C	9 Nov 59
Carr, N.	A3C	29 Jul 59
Cortese, A.D.	A3C	13 Jan 60
Crump, J.E.	SSgt	15 Jul 59
Davis, J.	SSgt	12 May 60
Sanderson, A.G.	A3C	12 May 59
Shafer, T.L.	A1C	None
Sherrod, S.	A3C	25 Jan 60
Skain, D.A.	A/B	14 Jul 59
Walker, B.H.	A1C	19 Nov 59
Ward, A.F.	A1C	20 Nov 59
Watson, E.S.	A1C	31 Mar 60
Watson, R.G.	A2C	5 Jan 60
Ahrens, W.E.	(Civ)	None
Brewer, H.	(Civ)	20 Dec 59

b. Shortages of Authorized Permanent Retention Items Not on Requisition. Approximately 120 AF Forms 538 were checked. Out of this number (20) twenty were found with items short and not on requisition. Listed below are (8) eight examples of those found:

Name		Stock Number	Noun
Arrington, W.J.	A1C	8405-290-	Jacket, field
Bailey, T.	A1C	8405-290-	Jacket, field
		6230-643-3486	Flashlight
		8440-160-	Glove, white

0368

Name		Stock Number	Noun
Ashburn, W.A.	A3C	1095-270-2042	Holster
		6230-681-8570	Flashlight
		8405-290-	Liner jacket
Briggs, C.R.	A1C	8405-290	Jacket field
Curran, J.E.	TSgt	8465-245-9654	Bag barracks
Deisten, H.T.	A3C	8465-243-9654	Bag barracks
		8405-290-	Jacket field
Aleshire, J.	A3C	1095-270-2042	Holster
		6230-643-3486	Flashlight
		8405-290-	Linen jacket
		8415-160	Mitten insert
		8440-160	Gloves white
Ballinger, H.D. (Thirty items short, none of which was on requisition.)	SSgt		

5. Personal Equipment. Not applicable.

6. Evacuation of Reparables. Within the housing supply storage area four each items were found with both the serviceable and reparable tags attached. None of the tags were dated or had an inspector's stamp or signature. One each item was found with the reparable tag dated 15 May 1961.

Stock Number	Noun	Date on Reparable Tag	Hi-Valu
7310-263-9016	Range, elec.	Not dated	No
7105-282-5883	Dresser	15 May 61	No

III. Aircraft or Maintenance Support Division

1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 Versus AFTO Form 781B.

Not applicable.

2. Bench Stock

a. Examination of 15 CP bench stocks covering a total of 459 line items revealed a total of 44 not in stock items not on order. Within the 14 LP bench stocks a total of 2253 line items were checked of which 248 items were not in stock and not on order.

Name		Stock Number	Noun
Ashburn, W.A.	A3C	1095-270-2042	Holster
		6230-681-8570	Flashlight
		8405-290-	Liner jacket
Briggs, C.R.	A1C	8405-290	Jacket field
Curran, J.E.	TSgt	8465-245-9654	Bag barracks
Deisten, H.T.	A3C	8465-243-9654	Bag barracks
		8405-290-	Jacket field
Aleshire, J.	A3C	1095-270-2042	Holster
		6230-643-3486	Flashlight
		8405-290-	Linen jacket
		8415-160	Mitten insert
		8440-160	Gloves white
Ballinger, H.D. SSgt (Thirty items short, none of which was on requisition.)			

5. Personal Equipment. Not applicable.

6. Evacuation of Reparables. Within the housing supply storage area four each items were found with both the serviceable and reparable tags attached. None of the tags were dated or had an inspector's stamp or signature. One each item was found with the reparable tag dated 15 May 1961.

Stock Number	Noun	Date on Reparable Tag	Hi-Valu
7310-263-9016	Range, elec.	Not dated	No
7105-282-5883	Dresser	15 May 61	No

III. Aircraft or Maintenance Support Division

1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 Versus AFTO Form 781B.

Not applicable.

2. Bench Stock

a. Examination of 15 CP bench stocks covering a total of 459 line items revealed a total of 44 not in stock items not on order. Within the 14 LP bench stocks a total of 2253 line items were checked of which 248 items were not in stock and not on order.

0370

b. The maintenance of bench stock number 436F by the using activity is unsatifactory. Empty bins were found, and the shop foreman stated that the material had been pulled and taken out on the job for a specific project. This is not in accordance with existing bench stock procedures.

c. Examples of not in stock items not on requisition are listed below. These are for the Civil Engineers Nike Shop, Bench Stock "B".

CP Items Stock Number	LP Items Line Item Number
6145-NL 0002	436B 0027
5930-698-2546	436B 0008
5930-329-4529	436B 0007
5310-209-1579	436B 0024
5310-296-1661	436B 0025

3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy. Not applicable as no Hi-Valu items are authorized in this pre-issue activity.

4. Operation

a. Control Exercised over Temporary Custody Receipt Loans from Tool Cribs. There is only one tool crib in operation which is located in vehicle maintenance section. The tool crib was in a neat and orderly condition. No overdue custody receipts were on hand.

(1) The Following Custody Receipts were Overdue for Turn-in. None.

b. Calibration and Inspection. All of the equipment requiring calibration and calendar inspection was located in the vehicle maintenance tool crib. No items were overdue.

5. Aircraft Installed Equipment. Not applicable to Consolidated Group Supply.

6. Document Control - Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch. Examination of 100 completed work order files revealed that 17 AF Forms 1445 were not signed off in accordance with paragraph 14b(3), SAC Sup-1 to AFR 93-26. Several of these discrepancies were created by the bulk delivery of wet cement to the job. The following work orders are examples of those not signed off:

W/O 493-60
W/O 684-60
W/O 709-60
W/O 725-60
W/O 814-60

7. Combat Launch and Recovery Kit. Not applicable.

0371

4170TH STRAT WING CONS. WING SUPPLY

CONSOLIDATED UNIT SUPPLY EVALUATION WORKSHEET	LEGEND O-OUTSTANDING G-GOOD E-EXCELLENT F-FAIR	EVALUATION DATE @ 26-29 June 1961

ITEM	MAX PT	ITEM WEIGHT O	E	G	F	RATING
I. GENERAL AREA.						
1. IPT						
a. Numbers of Personnel Participating Expressed as a Percentage of Personnel Eligible to participate.	50	95% 50	85% 35	75% 20	50% 0	35
b. Percent of Personnel Tested Who Satisfactorily Pass the Tests.	50	50	[illegible]	20	0	0
2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel.						
a. Layout. This section applies not to whether a building is old or new, but to use made of existing facilities & is a matter of judgment of evaluator, specifically utilization of available facilities to include flow of paperwork, property, personnel & traffic.	50	50	35	25	20	35
b. General Housekeeping of Sections.	25	25	20	15	10	20
c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance.	50	50	35	25	20	35
3. Management Improvements. This a matter of judgment of evaluator & applies to manner of compliance with existing directives. Areas for consideration are internal SOPs, flow charts, use of displays, checklists & other improvements indicative of interest & initiative.	100	100	75	50	25	75
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION.						
1. Elimination of excess property on hand is a measure of supply management, discipline, & participation in the equipment authorization program. This item is rated on both a dollar value percentage of excesses vs total dollar value of the account, and on line item excesses expressed as a percentage of total line items in the account. For purposes of this computation the following items will not be considered as excess:	300					0
a. Items for which a valid requirement exists, this requirement having been documented by submission of a UAL change request.						
b. Items received on directed shipments prior to receipt of validating authorization change.						
c. Interim substitutes on hand will not be considered as excess when reviewing excesses on requisition.						

DOLLAR VALUE PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE	LINE ITEM PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE
1	0	2	0
.9	5	1.8	5
.8	10	1.6	10
.7	20	1.4	20
.6	30	1.2	30
.5	40	1.0	40
.4	50	.8	50
.3	70	.6	70
.2	90	.4	90
.1	120	.2	120
0	150	.0	150

2. The positive control of completed supply documents is necessary to support balances shown on accountable records. It provides a check on actions taken on routine requisitions, statement of charges, IAVs, droppage certificates and other adjustment documents. Control numbered documents over 30 days old which do not reflect action (as annotated on control register) is indicative of improper mgt & lack of control of acct docu.	150							85
Completed Documents Not In File		5	4	3	2	1	0	
Control Numbered Docu W/O Action		5	4	3	2	1	0	
Point Score		0	10	20	35	50	75	
3. Inventory Control. In conjunction with the requirement for a complete inventory of all organizational property annually, accuracy and validity is an important factor. Condition of custody receipt accounts will be evaluated based on documentary evidence of a completed inventory in coordination with the custodian of the account. This may be evidenced by reaccomplishment of the custody receipt and/or creation of a new AF Form 1297 or a stamped/typed statement on the custody receipt reflecting inventory	100							70
TOTALS								

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* NOT EVALUATED

14

ITEM		MAX PT	RAT-ING
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION, Item 3, Inventory Control *(Continued)*.			
date and signature of the custodian. A rating of 100 points is given when all accounts have been inventoried within the past year. Less points are allocated for custody receipts not inventoried:			
C/R Not Inventoried	Points		
4	0		
3	20		
2	40		
1	70		
0	100		
4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing & Equipment Record. Evaluation of general condition of AF Forms 538 is based on accomplishment of the semi-annual inventory requirement & submission of requisitions for all shortages of permanent retention items authorized to individuals concerned. A maximum of 100 points may be attained in each of the areas indicated below:			
a. AF Forms 538 not inventoried during the previous semi-annual period:		100	50
No. 538's	Points		
20	0		
19	5		
18	10		
17	15		
16	20		
15	25		
10	50		
5	75		
0	100		
b. Shortages of authorized permanent retention items not on requisition:		100	0
No. 538's	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
5. Personal Equipment. Evaluation of this function is based on performance of the personal equipment branch in accomplishment of inspections & cleaning of personal & survival equipment, aggressive action taken on technical order compliance *(TOC)* & submission of requisitions for any shortages of items required to complete survival kits. A maximum of 100 points may be attained for completed inspections & cleaning of personal & survival eqp, 50 points for TOC & 50 points for submission of rqns for shortages.			
a. Personal & survival equipment overdue for inspection & cleaning more than:		100	0
No. Days	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
b. Technical Order compliance not accomplished for more than:		50	0
No. Items	Points		
5	0		
4	10		
3	20		
2	30		
1	40		
0	50		

0373

ITEM	MAX PT	RATING
c. Requisitions not submitted for survival kit shortages for more than:	50	50
No. Items / Points		
5 / 0		
4 / 10		
3 / 20		
2 / 30		
1 / 40		
0 / 50		
6. Evacuation of Reparables. Evaluation of this area is based on review of reparables on hand to determine whether or not these items are being evacuated properly. Maximum score is attained by virtue of having no reparables on hand in excess of a specific period. Finding of one or more reparable items on hand exceeding 7 work days would result in the loss of all points & in the case of Hi-Valu property, the on-hand period must not exceed 1 work day.	50	50
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION.		
1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 versus AFTO Form 781B. Evaluation of this area consists of review of SAC Forms 230 to insure that priority requirements are properly verified & that SAC Forms 230 are properly maintained. Concurrently, AFTO Forms 781B will be compared against SAC Forms 230 to insure that item shortages & requisitioning action annotated on both records are in agreement. Maximum attainable score in this area as outlined below:	200	90
No. Discrepancies / Points Earned		
5 / 0		
4 / 20		
3 / 50		
2 / 90		
1 / 140		
0 / 200		
2. Bench Stock.	300	
a. The rating of this section is based upon review of total bench stocks assigned to a consolidated supply. Rating is based upon number of not-in-stock items upon which no positive action has been taken, thereby eliminating the possible factor of a low-fill rate for a particular bench stock. Positive evidence must be available to show that NIS items are on order.		N/E *
NIS Items Not On Order: 5 / 4 / 3 / 2 / 1 / 0		
Point Score: 0 / 30 / 75 / 135 / 210 / 300		
3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy.	150	
a. Evaluation of this area consists of verification of on-hand balances as indicated on AF Forms 197 for all authorized Hi-Valu property. Points are awarded as follows:		N/E *
Inventory Errors / Points Earned		
5 / 0		
4 / 30		
3 / 60		
2 / 90		
1 / 120		
0 / 150		
4. Operation.	150	
a. Control exercised over temporary custody receipt loans from tool cribs. Rating in this area is based upon effectiveness of action taken to insure timely return of items loaned to individual personnel. Items are normally returned to tool cribs within 72 hours from date & time of issue or upon the "due date" whichever is later. Attainable score is computed as follows:		N/E *
No. Custody Receipts Over-due for Turn-in / Points Earned		
5 / 0		
4 / 15		
3 / 30		
2 / 60		
1 / 100		
0 / 150		

ITEM	MAX PT	RATING
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION, Item 4, Operation *(Continued)*.		
b. Calibration & calendar inspection of tools on hand in tool cribs. Certain items normally maintained by tool cribs require periodic test, check, inspection or calibration as outlined in applicable technical orders. A maximum score of 100 points is possible in this area, based upon the following:	100	N/E *
No. Items Overdue For TOC — Points Earned		
3 — 0		
2 — 30		
1 — 60		
0 — 100		
5. Aircraft Installed Equipment. The evaluation of this function is based upon the proper storage of equipment & insuring that all shortages are on requisition. Property in storage must be segregated & identified by aircraft tail number. A maximum of 100 points may be gained provided segregated tail number storage is maintained and all shortages are on requisition. Zero points gained for failure to accomplish any of the above.	100	100
6. Document Control - Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch.	200	N/A
a. The rating of this area is based upon the control over the documents upon which requests for materiel were based & control of documents on which the materiel was received. Number of completed & supporting documents not properly filed is used as a measure of internal management of the branch.		
Documents Not Properly Filed: 5 — 4 — 3 — 2 — 1 — 0		
Point Score: 0 — 25 — 50 — 90 — 140 — 200		
7. Combat Launch and Recovery Kit Operation Within Organizations Tenant On Non-SAC Bases.	100	N/A
a. The rating attained in this area is dependent upon the overall rate of fill of authorized CLARK components. Attainable score is outlined below:		
% Of Rate Of Fill — Points Earned		
Less than 90 — 0		
90 — 5		
91 — 10		
92 — 15		
93 — 20		
94 — 30		
95 — 40		
96 — 50		
97 — 60		
98 — 80		
99 — 100		
TOTAL POINTS	1625	695

REMARKS

The above evaluation was conducted by the following personnel under the supervision of the Supply Staff Officer, Hq 18th Air Division:

1/Lt Thomas A. Forbes - Team Chief - Hq 92 BW
SMS Jake Grant - Hq 92 BW
TSgt Claude L. Baird - Hq 92 BW

The attached additional comments are numbered in conformance with paragraphing of the SAC Form 682

TYPED NAME AND GRADE *(Evaluator)*	SIGNATURE *(Evaluator)*
CHARLES B. MURRAY LT COLONEL, USAF	Charles B Murray

SAC FORM 682, NOV 60 (Local reproduction authorized)

26-29 June 1961

Additional Remarks - 4170th Strategic Wing Supply - Larson AFB, Washington

I. GENERAL AREA

1. IPT

a. Number eligible: 13; number participating: 12 (94%)

b. Number tested: 10; number passed: 7 (70%)

2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel

a. Layout. The layout of all DSUP facilities except the Personal Equipment Section was considered excellent, especially the Wing Organizational Supply warehouse and Aircraft Installed Equipment Section. Personnel entering the personal equipment building were permitted to roam the area at random. It is, therefore, recommended that an issue counter be located in such a manner that access to personal and survival equipment be limited to authorized personnel only. (Ref AFR 67-10)

b. General Housekeeping of Sections The housekeeping of the Aircraft Installed Equipment Section and the Wing Organizational Supply warehouse was considered outstanding. Remaining sections were excellent.

c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance. All personnel observed presented excellent military bearing and neat appearance. There is a marked improvement in these areas since the last evaluation.

3. Management Improvements. SOPs and charts were on hand in all sections. Especially noteworthy were the existing charts and SOPs on hand in the Supply Liaison Section. A "Money Tree Program" is now in effect and several projects have been initiated. The projects are as follows:

a. Review of tool crib requirements.

b. Review of Hi-Valu Equipment for deletions.

c. Procedural changes in accounting and reporting for in-use dollar value of UAl equipment.

Personnel in all areas were aware of the "Money Tree Program" and its objectives.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION

1. Elimination of Excess Property. Excesses were extracted from a mechanized listing prepared by Statistical Services, dated 23 June 1961.

a. Line items in the account: 3,248.

b. Line items excess: 260 (8%).

c. Total dollar value of account: $5,277,611.14.

d. Total dollar value of excesses: $265,460.50 (5%).

It should be noted that although no points can be given in this area, considerable improvement has been made in the elimination of excesses. Excess lists have been prepared and forwarded to sections and a vigorous excess program has been initiated.

2. Positive Control of Supply Documents

a. Completed Documents Not in File: Control numbers 1316 thru 3673 were reviewed and two (2) completed documents were found not to be in file. The control numbers were: 3266 and 2324. Twenty-three documents were posted as completed in the Control Register and the supporting documents were filed in the completed file; however, the SAC Forms 263A were still in the suspense file.

b. Control Numbered Documents w/o Action over 30 Days: Control numbers 0001 through 3164 were checked and the following were found to be over 30 days old without action.

Control Number	Date
10101696	14 Mar 61

3. Inventory Control. The Inventory Section is responsible for the inventory of 138 accounts. Account SJ is the only account that has not been inventoried within the past year. It was noted that 32 accounts have not been transferred to machine-run listings. This section has shown a tremendous improvement since the last SACM 67-4 evaluation.

4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing and Equipment Record

a. AF Forms 538 not inventoried during the previous annual period.

Name	Date of Inventory
Alvis, Wayne E.	18 Apr 60
Black, Edward H.	No Date
Martin, William F.	13 Apr 60
Palmer, Ralph J.	7 Dec 59
Partridge, Kenneth R.	12 Oct 59
Wallberg, Darrl L.	14 Nov 58
Gatten, Hugh J.	4 Sep 59
Janecke, David C.	18 Jun 59
Jennings, Clifford B.	20 Jan 59
Asher, Olive F.	No Date

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Approximately 575 AF Forms 539/539A were checked and a big improvement was noted in this area. A program for accomplishing this recurring requirement is in effect at present.

b. Shortages of authorized personnel retention items not on requisition.

Name	Stock Nr	Nomen
Adamson, Herbert A.	6605-682-4548	Divider Set
Wilson, Donald	6605-586-6490	Plotter-Air Nav
Zellers, Donald E.	6645-526-7371	Watch A17A
Ciriello, Basil L.	6605-557-0303	Computer, R-1
Kee, Loren C.	5120-278-2423	Crimping Tool
Duncan, Oneal C.	5120-277-3002	Extension
Ulch, Clarence E.	4933-535-1217	Cage

Approximately 575 AF Forms 538,538A were reviewed and almost all attached ECL's had items not on requisition. It was noted that all flying clothing shortages were on requisition marked for individuals by name.

5. Personal Equipment.

a. Personal and Survival Equipment Overdue for Inspection and Cleaning More Than

(1) S/N 4220-541-0872 MB-4 Rafts. Approximately 75 each had been processed through the FM Flow Shop and certified as serviceable. However, there was no evidence that these rafts had been inspected and treated with talcum powder in accordance with TO 14S3-2-1. Further, two of these rafts had been returned as serviceable with green paint on them. This paint had caused the rubber to begin to deteriorate. It is recommended that a strict quality control be established and enforced by both the FM Flow Shop and the Personal Equipment Section.

(2) Oxygen Masks were Overdue Clearing on the Following Personnel:

Andrews, L., 2/Lt	Caulder, M. A., SSgt	Skillman, W. G., Capt
Archer, H. L., Capt	Carmell, L., Maj	Scheffler, W. G., Capt
Arrington, F. E., SSgt	Carpenter, W. W., Maj	Smith, R. W., Maj
Avalese, P. A., Capt	Davis, P. B., Jr., 1/Lt	Vald, D.J., Capt
Austin, L. M., 1/Lt	Dozier, I. F., 1/Lt	Venable, P.B., Maj
Andrews, W., Maj	Dial, D., Jr., SSgt	Withers, W.E., 1/Lt
Arledge, E. E., 1/Lt	Maguire, W. N., 1/Lt	Woodward, C.C. 1/Lt
Butt, G. E., 1/Lt	Morehead, C. R., TSgt	Whitmore, I.R., Capt
Berendzen, G. W., 2/Lt	McQueen, G. S., Capt	Westburg, K.C., Lt Col
Baker, Dale H.	Northcbm, J. W., Capt	
Baker, R. L., 2/Lt	O'Conner, T. H.	
Bernhart, C. S., Capt	Price, L. C.	
Boyd, C. R., TSgt	Pifer, J. C., 1/Lt	
Cantergiani, J., 2/Lt	Patterson, M. J., Maj	
Carter, M. G., 2/Lt	Perry, R. A.	
Clark, A. L., Capt	Simmons, R. W., 1/Lt	
Craig, E. C., TSgt	Saylor, J. B., Capt	

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b. Technical Order Compliance not Accomplished for More Than

(1) 5821-254 9352 ORC-4 Radio - 23 each - overdue inspection.

(2) Fourteen (14) each BA-1265/U Batteries overdue inspection.

c. Requisitions not Submitted for Survival Kit Shortages for More Than: All survival kits checked indicated that shortages were on requisition.

6. Evacuation of Reparables. There were no reparable items on hand in the areas evaluated.

III. Aircraft or Maintenance Support Division

1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 versus AFTO Form 781A. All outstanding priority items listed on the SAC Forms 230 were checked against the 781 records and the following discrepancies were noted as not being entered on the 781 records.

Stock Number	Noun	Control Number
5895-509-8626	Control	9228
0243-2840-657-7979	Kit	8507

Comment: The control listed above was verified by Supply Liaison on 22 June 1961 and appeared on the SAC Form 230 as a valid requirement. A check of the aircraft revealed no requirement. A further check with Job Control indicated that the item had been removed from the A&E bench mockup and installed on the aircraft. SACM 65-2R and 67-3 specifically state that only valid priority requirements will be carried on the SAC Form 230. The SAC Forms 230 were screened on all aircraft to determine the validity of priority requirements. This check revealed that 23 items have been cancelled and 18 items downgraded since 1 May 1961. This practice creates an excessive work load on the supply priority system and is not in consonance with Project Money Tree. Further, these items were requisitioned on T.R.J. Codes 17 and 18 when it was evident that T.R.J. Code 48 should have been used to determine if a serviceable item was available in Base Supply. Also, controller call-ins by maintenance personnel do not indicate whether an item is a one-time or recurring type requirement.

2. Bench Stock. Not evaluated due to transfer of this function to Base Supply on 1 July 1961.

3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy. Not evaluated due to pending transfer of this function to Base Supply on 1 July 1961.

4. Operation

a. Control Exercised over Temporary Custody Receipt Loans from Tool Cribs. Tool cribs were not evaluated due to their being segregated from the pre-issue and bench stock functions. This segregation is required prior to transfer of the latter function to Base Supply 1 July 1961.

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b. Calibration and Inspection. Same as item 4a above.

5. Aircraft Installed Equipment. Approximately thirty-eight (38) aircraft records were checked to determine if shortages were on requisition and that storage of property was in accordance with AFM 67-1 and TO 00-35D-780. There were no discrepancies noted.

Comment: One (1) each Amplifier, Electronics Type I-H, Item Number AH-5g, listed as installed on aircraft per inventory performed on 5 Dec 1960, appeared as a shortage on inventory performed 6 June 1961. Replacement item has been requested from Base Supply without a reparable turn-in or a Report of Survey to support the requirement.

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4170TH COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP

CONSOLIDATED UNIT SUPPLY EVALUATION WORKSHEET	LEGEND O-OUTSTANDING G-GOOD E-EXCELLENT F-FAIR	EVALUATION DATE 26-29 June 1961					
ITEM		MAX PT	ITEM WEIGHT O	E	G	F	RATING
I. GENERAL AREA.							
1. IPT							
a. Numbers of Personnel Participating Expressed as a Percentage of Personnel Eligible to participate.		50	95% 50	85% 35	75% 20	50% 0	50
b. Percent of Personnel Tested Who Satisfactorily Pass the Tests.		50	50	35	20	0	N/E *
2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel.							
a. Layout. This section applies not to whether a building is old or new, but to use made of existing facilities & is a matter of judgment of evaluator, specifically utilization of available facilities to include flow of paperwork, property, personnel & traffic.		50	50	35	25	20	35
b. General Housekeeping of Sections.		25	25	20	15	10	20
c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance.		50	50	35	25	20	35
3. Management Improvements. This a matter of judgment of evaluator & applies to manner of compliance with existing directives. Areas for consideration are internal SOPs, flow charts, use of displays, checklists & other improvements indicative of interest & initiative.		100	100	75	50	25	75
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION.							
1. Elimination of excess property on hand is a measure of supply management, discipline, & participation in the equipment authorization program. This item is rated on both a dollar value percentage of excesses vs total dollar value of the account, and on line item excesses expressed as a percentage of total line items in the account. For purposes of this computation the following items will not be considered as excess:		300					
a. Items for which a valid requirement exists, this requirement having been documented by submission of a UAL change request.							0
b. Items received on directed shipments prior to receipt of validating authorization change.							
c. Interim substitutes on hand will not be considered as excess when reviewing excesses on requisition.							

DOLLAR VALUE PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE	LINE ITEM PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE
1	0	2	0
.9	5	1.8	5
.8	10	1.6	10
.7	20	1.4	20
.6	30	1.2	30
.5	40	1.0	40
.4	50	.8	50
.3	70	.6	70
.2	90	.4	90
.1	120	.2	120
0	150	.0	150

2. The positive control of completed supply documents is necessary to support balances shown on accountable records. It provides a check on actions taken on routine requisitions, statement of charges, IAVs, droppage certificates and other adjustment documents. Control numbered documents over 30 days old which do not reflect action (as annotated on control register) is indicative of improper mgt & lack of control of acct docu.								150					125
Completed Documents Not In File	5	4	3	2	1	0							
Control Numbered Docu W/O Action	5	4	3	2	1	0							
Point Score	0	10	20	35	50	75							
3. Inventory Control. In conjunction with the requirement for a complete inventory of all organizational property annually, accuracy and validity is an important factor. Condition of custody receipt accounts will be evaluated based on documentary evidence of a completed inventory in coordination with the custodian of the account. This may be evidenced by reaccomplishment of the custody receipt and/or creation of a new AF Form 1297 or a stamped/typed statement on the custody receipt reflecting inventory								100					100
							TOTALS						

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SAC FORM NOV 60 682

(Local Reproduction Authorized)

* NOT EVALUATED

ITEM		MAX PT	RATING
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION, Item 3, Inventory Control *(Continued)*.			
date and signature of the custodian. A rating of 100 points is given when all accounts have been inventoried within the past year. Less points are allocated for custody receipts not inventoried:			
C/R Not Inventoried	Points		
4	0		
3	20		
2	40		
1	70		
0	100		
4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing & Equipment Record. Evaluation of general condition of AF Forms 538 is based on accomplishment of the semi-annual inventory requirement & submission of requisitions for all shortages of permanent retention items authorized to individuals concerned. A maximum of 100 points may be attained in each of the areas indicated below:		100	0
a. AF Forms 538 not inventoried during the previous semi-annual period:			
No. 538's	Points		
20	0		
19	5		
18	10		
17	15		
16	20		
15	25		
10	50		
5	75		
0	100	100	0
b. Shortages of authorized permanent retention items not on requisition:			
No. 538's	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
5. Personal Equipment. Evaluation of this function is based on performance of the personal equipment branch in accomplishment of inspections & cleaning of personal & survival equipment, aggressive action taken on technical order compliance *(TOC)* & submission of requisitions for any shortages of items required to complete survival kits. A maximum of 100 points may be attained for completed inspections & cleaning of personal & survival eqp, 50 points for TOC & 50 points for submission of reqs for shortages.			
a. Personal & survival equipment overdue for inspection & cleaning more than:		50	N/A
No. Days	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
b. Technical Order compliance not accomplished for more than:		50	N/A
No. Items	Points		
5	0		
4	10		
3	20		
2	30		
1	40		
0	50		

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ITEM	MAX PT	RATING
c. Requisitions not submitted for survival kit shortages for more than:	50	N/A
No. Items — Points		
5 — 0		
4 — 10		
3 — 20		
2 — 30		
1 — 40		
0 — 50		
6. Evacuation of Reparables. Evaluation of this area is based on review of reparables on hand to determine whether or not these items are being evacuated properly. Maximum score is attained by virtue of having no reparables on hand in excess of a specific period. Finding of one or more reparable items on hand exceeding 7 work days would result in the loss of all points & in the case of Hi-Valu property, the on-hand period must not exceed 1 work day.	50	50
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION.		
1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 versus AFTO Form 781B. Evaluation of this area consists of review of SAC Forms 230 to insure that priority requirements are properly verified & that SAC Forms 230 are properly maintained. Concurrently, AFTO Forms 781B will be compared against SAC Forms 230 to insure that item shortages & requisitioning action annotated on both records are in agreement. Maximum attainable score in this area as outlined below:	200	N/A
No. Discrepancies — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 20		
3 — 50		
2 — 90		
1 — 140		
0 — 200		
2. Bench Stock.	300	
a. The rating of this section is based upon review of total bench stocks assigned to a consolidated supply. Rating is based upon number of not-in-stock items upon which no positive action has been taken, thereby eliminating the possible factor of a low-fill rate for a particular bench stock. Positive evidence must be available to show that NIS items are on order.		N/E *
NIS Items Not On Order — 5 — 4 — 3 — 2 — 1 — 0		
Point Score — 0 — 30 — 75 — 135 — 210 — 300		
3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy.	150	N/A
a. Evaluation of this area consists of verification of on-hand balances as indicated on AF Forms 197 for all authorized Hi-Valu property. Points are awarded as follows:		
Inventory Errors — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 30		
3 — 60		
2 — 90		
1 — 120		
0 — 150		
4. Operation.	150	N/E *
a. Control exercised over temporary custody receipt loans from tool cribs. Rating in this area is based upon effectiveness of action taken to insure timely return of items loaned to individual personnel. Items are normally returned to tool cribs within 72 hours from date & time of issue or upon the "due date" whichever is later. Attainable score is computed as follows:		
No. Custody Receipts Overdue for Turn-in — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 15		
3 — 30		
2 — 60		
1 — 100		
0 — 150		

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ITEM	MAX PT	RATING
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION, Item 4, Operation *(Continued)*.		
b. Calibration & calendar inspection of tools on hand in tool cribs. Certain items normally maintained by tool cribs require periodic test, check, inspection or calibration as outlined in applicable technical orders. A maximum score of 100 points is possible in this area, based upon the following:	100	N/E *
No. Items Overdue For TOC — Points Earned		
3 — 0		
2 — 30		
1 — 60		
0 — 100		
5. Aircraft Installed Equipment. The evaluation of this function is based upon the proper storage of equipment & insuring that all shortages are on requisition. Property in storage must be segregated & identified by aircraft tail number. A maximum of 100 points may be gained provided segregated tail number storage is maintained and all shortages are on requisition. Zero points gained for failure to accomplish any of the above.	100	N/A
6. Document Control - Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch.	200	0
a. The rating of this area is based upon the control over the documents upon which requests for materiel were based & control of documents on which the materiel was received. Number of completed & supporting documents not properly filed is used as a measure of internal management of the branch.		
Documents Not Properly Filed: 5 — 4 — 3 — 2 — 1 — 0		
Point Score: 0 — 25 — 50 — 90 — 140 — 200		
7. Combat Launch and Recovery Kit Operation Within Organizations Tenant On Non-SAC Bases.	100	N/A
a. The rating attained in this area is dependent upon the overall rate of fill of authorized CLARK components. Attainable score is outlined below:		
% Of Rate Of Fill — Points Earned		
Less than 90 — 0		
90 — 5		
91 — 10		
92 — 15		
93 — 20		
94 — 30		
95 — 40		
96 — 50		
97 — 60		
98 — 80		
99 — 100		
TOTAL POINTS	1275	490

REMARKS

The above evaluation was conducted by the following personnel under the supervision of the Supply Staff Officer, Hq 18th Air Division:

Captain Thomas E. Caldwell - Team Chief - 92d CSG
MSgt Earl E. Watson — 92d CSG
SSgt Burdette A. Blackwell — 92d CSG

The attached additional comments are numbered in conformance with the paragraphing of the SAC Form 682.

TYPED NAME AND GRADE *(Evaluator)*
CHARLES B. MURRAY
Lt Colonel, USAF

SIGNATURE *(Evaluator)*
Charles B. Murray

REMARKS (Continued) 28-29 June 1961

4170th COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP, CONSOLIDATED GROUP SUPPLY

I. GENERAL AREA

1. IPT

a. There are 10 personnel eligible to participate in IPT, and all are presently participating.

b. This area was not evaluated as personnel were not eligible for testing during the evaluation period.

2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel

a. Layout. The flow of paperwork, property, personnel and traffic is excellent. Storage area is being properly utilized and overall arrangement is excellent. There has been a tremendous improvement in the overall activity since the last inspection. All personnel should be highly commended for this improvement. In one instance noted a condemned item FSN-6930-373-9647 Indicator, was co-mingled with serviceable property.

b. General Housekeeping of Sections. The overall Consolidated Group Supply area is excellent with the exception of Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch which was littered with paper and trash.

c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance. The military bearing and personal appearance of all personnel was excellent.

3. Management Improvements. The overall management improvements noted were excellent. The personnel and desks are arranged to facilitate the effective flow of paperwork. SOPs were on hand that cover most duties performed in the Consolidated Group Supply. These SOPs were detailed and current. Several individuals were asked to define "Project Money Tree", and all gave satisfactory answers. A "Money Tree" display was located within the entrance of the Group Supply Office. Recommend additional emphasis be placed upon the purging of excesses as outlined in "Project Money Tree". Specifically, each custodian of UAL property should be required to review his authorizations and delete non-essential items.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION

1. Elimination of Excess Property

a. The total dollar value of the account is $4,474,436.00, dollar value of excess on hand is $516,268.00 (11.2%).

b. The total number of line items in the account is 893; number of line items excess is 498 (26%).

2. Positive Control of Supply Documents

a. Completed Documents Not in File. Approximately 1500 documents that were annotated as having been filed, as evidenced by the Control Register (SAC Form 473), were checked. All documents were in file.

b. Control Numbered Documents w/o Action over 30 Days. Approximately 2900 document numbers over 30 days old were checked and the following document number did not reflect any action annotated on the Control Register:

Control Number	Date
40100661	23 May 1961

COMMENTS: When successive partial quantities are released against a single document number, all such quantities should be posted directly above the initial quantity. Several document numbers were found wherein only the initial quantity requested was posted. EXAMPLE: Document numbers 4010014 and 46100211. At the present time the Control Register is being maintained properly and the preceding comment is confined to the correction of previous transactions.

3. Inventory Control: There are 191 Custody Receipt accounts in this activity; all have been inventoried within the past year.

4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing and Equipment Record

a. AF Forms 538 not inventoried during the previous annual period. Approximately 200 AF Forms 538 were checked; 30 were found that had not been inventoried for over one year. Numerous AF Forms 538 were found with a valid inventory date but with no inventory date on the AF Forms 538A. Listed below are 20 AF Forms 538 that have not been inventoried for over one year:

Name	Date of Inventory
Dancy, Samuel R.	26 Apr 1960
Davis, George D.	22 Jan 1960
Davis, Stewart E.	18 Apr 1960
Davis, Willie	23 Mar 1960
Dawson, Theodore R., Jr	30 Jan 1960
D'Antoni, John, Jr	9 Jan 1960
Ellis, Norbert L.	26 Apr 1960
Elmore, Buford F.	17 May 1960
Emery, Donald E.	No inventory date, AF Form 538A
Evers, Peter J.	6 May 1960
Farmer, Weldon S.	29 Mar 1960
Ferrier, Oliver A.	11 Feb 1960
Filbert, Jack C.	14 Mar 1960
Fleming, Gary A.	16 May 1958
Garrison, Thomas L.	29 Mar 1960
Hafner, Harry L.A.	9 May 1960

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Name	Date of Inventory
Hamilton, William A.	11 Jan 1960
Hammerdinger, Franklin	16 May 1960
Hammet, Merril T.	3 Mar 1960
Hammond, Edwin K.	3 Mar 1958

b. Shortages of authorized permanent retention items not on requisition. Approximately 200 AF Forms 538 were checked. Out of this number 30 were found with items short and not on requisition. It was noted that the items had previously been on requisition but due to the conversion to mechanized accounting the requisitions had been cancelled and have not been reinstated. Listed below are five examples of those found.

Name	Stock Nr.	Noun
A1C Davis, Marion A.	8405-269-9840	Jacket
	8440-265-6074	Belt
A3C Delcour, Ben E.	8465-559-6215	Sunglasses
	8440-265-6074	Belt
	8465-557-8850	Carrier, Club
SSgt Edwards, John	8405-269-9841	Jacket
	8405-269-0245	Cover, Cap
Danihelka, Robert A.	8465-559-6215	Sunglasses
Ernest, Wilbur T., Jr	8465-559-6215	Sunglasses
	8440-265-6074	Belt

5. Personal Equipment. Not applicable.

6. Evacuation of Reparables. No reparables were on hand in excess of the specified period.

III. Aircraft or Maintenance Support Division

1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 versus AFIO Form 7818. Not applicable.

2. Bench Stock

a. Due to the pending transfer of Bench Stock activity to Base Supply on 1 July 1961, no evaluation was made.

3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy. Not applicable.

4. Operation

a. Control Exercised over Temporary Custody Receipt Loans from Tool Cribs. Tool cribs were not evaluated due to their being segregated from the pre-issue and bench stock functions. This segregation is required prior to transfer of the latter functions to Base Supply on 1 July 1961.

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b. Calibration and Inspection. Same as Item 4a above.

5. Aircraft Installed Equipment. Not applicable.

6. Document Control - Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch. Examination of approximately 200 completed work order files revealed that AF Forms 1445 (Material Request) were not signed off in accordance with para 14b(3), SAC SUP-1 to AFR 93-26. The following work orders are examples of those not signed off.

W/O
608-61
613-61
633-61
1017-61
1045-61

7. Combat Launch and Recovery Kit. Not applicable.

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22d Air Refueling Squadron, Consolidated Unit Supply, McChord AFB, Washington

CONSOLIDATED UNIT SUPPLY EVALUATION WORKSHEET	LEGEND O-OUTSTANDING G-GOOD E-EXCELLENT F-FAIR	EVALUATION DATE 12-15 June 1961					
ITEM		MAX PT	ITEM WEIGHT O	E	G	F	RATING
I. GENERAL AREA.							
1. IPT							
a. Numbers of Personnel Participating Expressed as a Percentage of Personnel Eligible to participate.		50	95% 50	85% 35	75% 20	50% 0	50
b. Percent of Personnel Tested Who Satisfactorily Pass the Tests.		50	50	35	20	0	N/A
2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel.							
a. Layout. This section applies not to whether a building is old or new, but to use made of existing facilities & is a matter of judgment of evaluator, specifically utilization of available facilities to include flow of paperwork, property, personnel & traffic.		50	50	35	25	20	35
b. General Housekeeping of Sections.		25	25	20	15	10	25
c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance.		50	50	35	25	20	35
3. Management Improvements. This a matter of judgment of evaluator & applies to manner of compliance with existing directives. Areas for consideration are internal SOPs, flow charts, use of displays, checklists & other improvements indicative of interest & initiative.		100	100	75	50	25	75
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION.							
1. Elimination of excess property on hand is a measure of supply management, discipline, & participation in the equipment authorization program. This item is rated on both a dollar value percentage of excesses vs total dollar value of the account, and on line item excesses expressed as a percentage of total line items in the account. For purposes of this computation the following items will not be considered as excess:		300					190
a. Items for which a valid requirement exists, this requirement having been documented by submission of a UAL change request.							
b. Items received on directed shipments prior to receipt of validating authorization change.							
c. Interim substitutes on hand will not be considered as excess when reviewing excesses on requisition.							

DOLLAR VALUE PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE	LINE ITEM PERCENTAGE (150 Points)	POINT SCORE
1	0	2	0
.9	5	1.8	5
.8	10	1.6	10
.7	20	1.4	20
.6	30	1.2	30
.5	40	1.0	40
.4	50	.8	50
.3	70	.6	70
.2	90	.4	90
.1	120	.2	120
0	150	.0	150

2. The positive control of completed supply documents is necessary to support balances shown on accountable records. It provides a check on actions taken on routine requisitions, statement of charges, IAVs, droppage certificates and other adjustment documents. Control numbered documents over 30 days old which do not reflect action *(as annotated on control register)* is indicative of improper mgt & lack of control of acct docu.						150	50
Completed Documents Not In File	5	4	3	2	1	0	
Control Numbered Docu W/O Action	5	4	3	2	1	0	
Point Score	0	10	20	35	50	75	
3. Inventory Control. In conjunction with the requirement for a complete inventory of all organizational property annually, accuracy and validity is an important factor. Condition of custody receipt accounts will be evaluated based on documentary evidence of a completed inventory in coordination with the custodian of the account. This may be evidenced by reaccomplishment of the custody receipt and/or creation of a new AF Form 1297 or a stamped/typed statement on the custody receipt reflecting inventory						100	100
TOTALS							

SAC FORM NOV 60 682 (Local Reproduction Authorized)

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0389

ITEM		MAX PT	RATING
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION, Item 3, Inventory Control *(Continued)*.			
date and signature of the custodian. A rating of 100 points is given when all accounts have been inventoried within the past year. Less points are allocated for custody receipts not inventoried:			
C/R Not Inventoried	Points		
4	0		
3	20		
2	40		
1	70		
0	100		
4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing & Equipment Record. Evaluation of general condition of AF Forms 538 is based on accomplishment of the [redacted] annual inventory requirement & submission of requisitions for all shortages of permanent retention items authorized to individuals concerned. A maximum of 100 points may be attained in each of the areas indicated below:			
a. AF Forms 538 not inventoried during the previous semi-annual period:		100	100
No. 538's	Points		
20	0		
19	5		
18	10		
17	15		
16	20		
15	25		
10	50		
5	75		
0	100		
b. Shortages of authorized pennanent retention items not on requisition:		100	0
No. 538's	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
5. Personal Equipment. Evaluation of this function is based on performance of the personal equipment branch in accomplishment of inspections & cleaning of personal & survival equipment, aggressive actions taken on technical order compliance *(TOC)* & submission of requisitions for any shortages of items required to complete survival kits. A maximum of 100 points may be attained for completed inspections & cleaning of personal & survival eqp, 50 points for TOC & 50 points for submission of rqns for shortages.			
a. Personal & survival equipment overdue for inspection & cleaning more than:		100	0
No. Days	Points		
5	0		
4	20		
3	40		
2	60		
1	80		
0	100		
b. Technical Order compliance not accomplished for more than:		50	50
No. Items	Points		
5	0		
4	10		
3	20		
2	30		
1	40		
0	50		

ITEM	MAX PT	RAT-ING
c. Requisitions not submitted for survival kit shortages for more than:	50	
No. Items — Points		
5 — 0		
4 — 10		
3 — 20		
2 — 30		
1 — 40		
0 — 50		
6. Evacuation of Reparables. Evaluation of this area is based on review of reparables on hand to determine whether or not these items are being evacuated properly. Maximum score is attained by virtue of having no reparables on hand in excess of a specific period. Finding of one or more reparable items on hand exceeding 7 work days would result in the loss of all points & in the case of Hi-Valu property, the on-hand period must not exceed 1 work day.	50	50
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION.		
1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 versus AFTO Form 781B. Evaluation of this area consists of review of SAC Forms 230 to insure that priority requirements are properly verified & that SAC Forms 230 are properly maintained. Concurrently, AFTO Forms 781B will be compared against SAC Forms 230 to insure that item shortages & requisitioning action annotated on both records are in agreement. Maximum attainable score in this area as outlined below:	200	140
No. Discrepancies — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 20		
3 — 50		
2 — 90		
1 — 140		
0 — 200		
2. Bench Stock.		
a. The rating of this section is based upon review of total bench stocks assigned to a consolidated supply. Rating is based upon number of not-in-stock items upon which no positive action has been taken, thereby eliminating the possible factor of a low-fill rate for a particular bench stock. Positive evidence must be available to show that NIS items are on order.	300	0
NIS Items Not On Order: 5 — 4 — 3 — 2 — 1 — 0		
Point Score: 0 — 30 — 75 — 135 — 210 — 300		
3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy.		
a. Evaluation of this area consists of verification of on-hand balances as indicated on AF Forms 197 for all authorized Hi-Valu property. Points are awarded as follows:	150	0
Inventory Errors — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 30		
3 — 60		
2 — 90		
1 — 120		
0 — 150		
4. Operation.		
a. Control exercised over temporary custody receipt loans from tool cribs. Rating in this area is based upon effectiveness of action taken to insure timely return of items loaned to individual personnel. Items are normally returned to tool cribs within 72 hours from date & time of issue or upon the "due date" whichever is later. Attainable score is computed as follows:	150	150
No. Custody Receipts Over-due for Turn-in — Points Earned		
5 — 0		
4 — 15		
3 — 30		
2 — 60		
1 — 100		
0 — 150		

ITEM	MAX PT	RATING
III. AIRCRAFT OR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DIVISION, Item 4, Operation (Continued).		
b. Calibration & calendar inspection of tools on hand in tool cribs. Certain items normally maintained by tool cribs require periodic test, check, inspection or calibration as outlined in applicable technical orders. A maximum score of 100 points is possible in this area, based upon the following:	100	100
No. Items Overdue For TOC — Points Earned		
3 — 0		
2 — 30		
1 — 60		
0 — 100		
5. Aircraft Installed Equipment. The evaluation of this function is based upon the proper storage of equipment & insuring that all shortages are on requisition. Property in storage must be segregated & identified by aircraft tail number. A maximum of 100 points may be gained provided segregated tail number storage is maintained and all shortages are on requisition. Zero points gained for failure to accomplish any of the above.	100	100
6. Document Control - Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch.	200	N/A
a. The rating of this area is based upon the control over the documents upon which requests for materiel were based & control of documents on which the materiel was received. Number of completed & supporting documents not properly filed is used as a measure of internal management of the branch.		
Documents Not Properly Filed: 5 — 4 — 3 — 2 — 1 — 0		
Point Score: 0 — 25 — 50 — 90 — 140 — 200		
7. Combat Launch and Recovery Kit Operation Within Organizations Tenant On Non-SAC Bases.	100	50
a. The rating attained in this area is dependent upon the overall rate of fill of authorized CLARK components. Attainable score is outlined below:		
% Of Rate Of Fill — Points Earned		
Less than 90 — 0		
90 — 5		
91 — 10		
92 — 15		
93 — 20		
94 — 30		
95 — 40		
96 — 50		
97 — 60		
98 — 80		
99 — 100		
TOTAL POINTS	2375	1350

REMARKS

The above evaluation was performed by the following personnel:
Lt Colonel Charles B. Murray, AFSC 6416, Hq 18th Air Division
SMS Jake Grant, AFSC 43190, Hq 18th Air Division (92d Bomb Wg)
TSgt Paul N. Clasby, AFSC 64670, Hq 18th Air Division (92d Bomb Wg)
SSgt Burdette A. Blackwell, AFSC 64670, Hq 18th Air Division (92 CSG)

Additional comments on attached sheets are numbered and lettered in conformance with paragraphing of the SAC Form 682.

TYPED NAME AND GRADE (Evaluator): **CHARLES B. MURRAY**
Lt Colonel, USAF

SIGNATURE (Evaluator): Charles B. Murray

SAC FORM 682, NOV 60 (Local reproduction authorized)

Additional Remarks - 22d Air Refueling Squadron - Consolidated Unit Supply Evaluation Worksheet (SAC Form 682) - 12-15 June 1961

I. GENERAL AREA

1. IPT

a. There are 10 personnel eligible to participate; all are presently participating.

b. Test results for personnel tested during this period have not been received. N/A

2. Appearance of Facilities and Personnel

a. Layout

The present location of the Accounting Section does not lend itself to the most effective flow of paperwork and property. This is due to a distance in excess of one mile between the Accounting Section and the Storage and Issue Section. This item was noted in the last 67-4 evaluation conducted by this headquarters on 13 April 61. The evaluators were informed that suitable space is now available and the recommended move will be made in the immediate future. Throughout the remainder of the supply organization there has been a marked improvement in the use made of existing facilities.

b. General Housekeeping of Sections

The appearance of all supply storage areas and offices is considered outstanding.

c. Military Bearing and Personal Appearance

The military bearing and personal appearance of all personnel observed was excellent. There is every evidence that most personnel were highly motivated and they had a keen desire to attain maximum points for their activity during this evaluation.

3. Management Improvements

Since the last evaluation there has been a marked improvement in the quality of SOP's, use of flow charts and other improvements indicative of interest and initiative. A need does exist, however, for development of an SOP relative to initiation and processing of formal Supply Difficulty letters. All personnel queried by the evaluators were familiar with

Project Money Tree. Also, there is an impressive Money Tree flip chart in the office of the Supply Officer. This chart depicts the various projects presently underway in the Supply organization.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPLY DIVISION

1. Elimination of Excess Property

a. The total dollar value of the UAL account is $1,732,311.84 of which $1,731.33 or .1% is excess. There are a total of 1385 line items on hand of which 8 line items or .6% are excess.

b. The present procedures utilized by this organization of requiring excesses to be turned in and/or justified for inclusion on the UAL within a three day period after the using activity has been notified is highly effective. This unit is the first in the 18th Air Division to be awarded points in this area.

2. Positive Control of Supply Documents

a. Completed Documents Not in File: Approximately 3000 documents that were annotated in the control register (SAC Form 473) as having been filed were screened, and one document control number 55100959, voucher number 10050419, was not in file.

b. Control Numbered Documents w/o Action over 30 Days: Approximately 3000 document numbers over 30 days old were checked and the following documents did not reflect any action as evidenced by the control register.

Control Number	Date
55800756	12 Oct 60
55800827	29 Nov 60
55800952	9 Jan 61
55800954	9 Jan 61
55800955	9 Jan 61
55800970	18 Jan 61
55800991	27 Jan 61

Comment: It was noted that successive issues entered in the SAC Form 473 (Unit Control Register) were not indicated directly above the initial quantity. (Reference control numbers 55800707 and 55800717). Further,

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all voucher numbers in support of these issues were not entered as required by Section I, Vol II, SACM 67-3. The Organizational Supply Division is utilizing the source code 8 card for requisitioning non-UAL items. SACM 67-3 specifies that source code 8 cards will only be used in support of maintenance shops. It is recommended that the source code 8 deck be transferred to the Pre-issue section and that all future organizational requirements be submitted on source code 1 cards.

3. Inventory Control

A test of 46 Custody Receipt Accounts was conducted and all have been inventoried within the past 12 months.

4. AF Forms 538, Personal Clothing and Equipment Record

a. AF Forms 538 not inventoried during the previous annual period.

A test of approximately 400 AF Form 538's was conducted and all have been inventoried in the past 12 months. This is the second unit in the 18th Air Division to be awarded points in this area. However, it was noted that the Radiac Detector had been deleted from the AF Form 538. Paragraph 3a, Chapter 6, Vol IV, AFM 67-1 requires that all authorized permanent retention items be listed on this form whether they are issued or not.

b. Shortages of authorized permanent retention items not on requisition.

Name	Stock Nr.	Noun
Baker, F. A. A3C	5120-222-1597	Forceps
Baker, F. A. A3C	5120-240-6104	Punch
Baker, F. A. A3C	5120-242-3435	Punch
Beam, L. L. A2C	5120-264-3794	Wrench
Bench, A. G. A2C	5120-224-3161	Wrench
Kelley, C. E. A2C	5120-222-8866	Screwdriver
Kelley, R. A. A2C	5120-222-8852	Screwdriver
Kibbee, J. R. A2C	5120-180-0713	Screwdriver
Parkin, J. E. A2C	5120-184-8441	Wrench

0395

5. Personal Equipment

a. Personal and Survival Equipment Overdue for Inspection and Cleaning More Than:

Oxygen masks belonging to the following individuals have not been cleaned in the past 30 days:

Broadhead, L. I. Captain
Overstreet, R. G. Captain
Shiramizu, J. F. Captain
Suave, R. E. 2nd Lt

b. Technical Order Compliance not Accomplished for More Than:

All personal and survival equipment on hand to support presently assigned UE aircraft is fully serviceable, and all TO's have been complied with. It must be noted, however, that a shipment of MD-1 and D1-2 Survival Kits received during the past week from Dyess AFB, Texas, contained many shortages, and all kits were overdue for TOC. Based solely upon the fact that no requirement will exist for any of these items prior to next September or October, a judgment decision was made to exempt them from this evaluation. Consequently, maximum points were awarded.

c. Requisitions not Submitted for Survival Kit Shortages for More Than:

All survival kit shortages have been placed on requisition, and adequate follow up action is being taken.

6. Evacuation of Reparables

No reparables were on hand in excess of the specified period.

III. Aircraft or Maintenance Support Division

1. Accuracy of SAC Form 230 versus AFTO Form 781B.

One outstanding requirement existed on the SAC Form 230's; however, completed action had been entered on the AFTO Form 781A and 781B

Stock Number	Noun	Control Number
2915-611-2016	Switch	1668

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Comment: This switch was cannibalized from aircraft number 318 and installed on aircraft number 504. The reparable item was repaired and re-installed on aircraft 318. The AFTO Form 780-1 reflected this action. SAC manuals 20-15 and 65-2 specifically state that Maintenance Supply Liason Section will exhaust all resources prior to verifying requirements to Base Supply. TO 00-20A-1 and AFM 66-1 outline bench check and repair procedures to be followed prior to cannibalization and/or requesting items from Base Supply. It was also noted that time change forecasts are not being received in sufficient time to permit forecasting of requirements to pre-issue and base supply six weeks in advance. Lastly, follow up action to base supply is insufficient to insure the timely receipt of T.O.C. requirements. The foregoing comments were cited in our last SACM 67-4 evaluation.

2. Bench Stock

a. A check of the bench stocks within A&E and FM activities revealed that no positive action had been taken on the following not-in-stock items:

Stock Number	Line Item Number
5340-663-2108	55631122
5315-252-5989	55631075
0245-2840-303-8012	55643009
0245-2840-386-4656	55643018
5305-298-8311	55643339

Comment: The Bench Stock bins in the Sheet metal and communications shop do not indicate the item stock number, bench stock line item number, or authorized level. (Ref: paragraph 4c(1)e, Section 5, Volume II, SACM 67-3) This discrepancy was noted on the previous 67-4 evaluation.

3. Pre-Issue Inventory Accuracy This area is considered unsatisfactory. All authorized Hi-Valu items were inventoried to determine the accuracy of the on hand balance against the balance indicated on AF Form 197 Accountable Record. This inventory revealed a 29% out of balance condition.

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Stock Number	AF Form 197 Balance	On Hand Balance	Authorized
0245-2840-654-7883	1	2	2
1660-691-4012	1	4	3
6125-327-9517	1	2	2
6605-565-9798	2	3	4
1650-601-1786	3	2	2
6620-342-0755	2	3	6
6115-803-7253	2	3	2
5841-303-2621	2	3	2
5990-679-3847	1	2	2
6605-660-8947	0	2	2
6605-336-3038	0	1	2
5841-099-3855	1	2	2
6605-629-8435	2	3	2
6615-624-4321	1	0	3
6615-509-1105	2	3	2
5841-505-3172	1	2	2
6605-776-6340	2	1	1
5841-504-2662	0	1	2
5821-505-3038	1	2	2
5821-630-8983	0	1	1
5821-505-0945	2	3	4
5841-303-2631	0	2	2
5821-505-1691	0	1	1
5821-691-6299	0	1	1

Comment: The following discrepancies are contributing factors to the out of balance condition:

1. Pre-issue items are being called in to the base supply expediter system by sections other than the pre-issue section. (Ref: paragraph 4c(2)(d), Section 5, Vol II, SACM 67-3)

2. Pre-issue transactions have been suspended pending reconciliation of records, thereby forcing unnecessary expediter call-ins for pre-issue items.

3. Failure of the maintenance Supply Liaison Section to comply with procedures as outlined in paragraph 3c(7), Section 5, Vol II, SACM 67-3 and paragraph 6a(1), Section 5, Vol II, SACM 67-3.

0398

4. Operation

a. Control Exercised over Temporary Custody Receipt Loans from Tool Cribs.

There were no outstanding custody receipts in file at the time of this evaluation.

b. Calibration and Inspection. There were no items on hand that required calibration and inspection at the time of this evaluation.

5. Aircraft Installed Equipment

All 780 Installed Equipment is segregated and identified by aircraft tail number and all shortages are on requisition. The storage of equipment and maintenance of DD Form 780 records is considered excellent.

6. Document Control - Civil Engineer Work Order Requirements Branch

Not applicable.

7. Combat Launch and Recovery Kit Operation Within Organizations Tenant on Non-SAC Bases

Based upon the 20 UE aircraft, the overall rate of fill is 96.1%. It was noted that six line items were transferred from Pre-Issue to the CLARK so as to bring up the percentage in the CLARK. This practice might well decrease the effectiveness of pre-issue support to Maintenance. Moreover, CLARK requirements should be attained by Base Supply from the Depot as prescribed in AFM 67-1.

0399



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

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE
ROUTINE X AF Hq 15AF msg, C 73, 12 Jun 81

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	INITIALS
C	

HQ 18 AIR DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

15 AF MARCH AFB CALIF

INFO: 92 BOMB WG FAIRCHILD AFB WN (COURIER)

4170 STRAT WG LARSON AFB WN

22 AIR REF SQ McCHORD AFB WN

/UNCLAS/C 9502

Ref: C. Reference your message C 73, 12 June regarding POV accidents. Larson has had four POV accident deaths. In addition, Fairchild rates in all areas are almost double last quarter's. I believe this due to the good weather finally arriving and our military personnel getting on the highways for the first time since last fall. Personal discussion of these increased rates with the wing and base commanders has been accomplished with their remedial actions briefed. Special officer, NCO and airman calls have been held.

C

162322 JUN 1981

HAROLD W CHILES, Colonel, USAF
2171 1 2

DAVID A TATE, Colonel, USAF

RETURN TO	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE				ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (Authorized for Local Reproduction)

19



E-1

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

C 8 June 1961

Intensified Provost Marshal Activities

4170SW(WC) 92SW(WC)

1. Recent trends in accident/incident rates show an unacceptable increase which requires immediate command attention. This [illegible] enter a degree of laxity and complacency as regards military discipline, personnel quality control, customs and courtesies of the service and safety matters.

2. Accordingly, it is my desire that the Base Police conduct intensified spot checks for at least one day during each week. Vehicles should be checked for defective lights, mufflers, brakes, etc. Wearing of the uniform should be observed closely for violations. All Base areas, including NX beer halls, should be checked closely for delinquencies or irregularities.

3. Offenders should be cited and entries made in the daily Police Blotter. This will assist Commanders in identifying substandard members, and provide a basis for appropriate quality control actions.

HAROLD W CHILES
Colonel, USAF
Commander

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
C	Chiles
[illegible]	[illegible]

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Disposal)

SAC FORM 95, OCT 60 (Authorized for Local Reproduction)

20

0407


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HISTORY

12

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 31 July 1961

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by MSgt. Donald W. Bunker, Unit Historian under the supervision of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) Information Staff Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET under the provisions of paragraph 30b, AFR 205-1, 1 April 1959. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield, 2LT USAF
For ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

Harold W. Ohlke
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

5-2433-12

15AF DX1 61-204

SECRET

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

0415

FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADCHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Materiel Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
ORI	Operational Readiness
PCS	Perment Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0416

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

0417

HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability of engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest

---

1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit delpoyment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate unite are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

---

2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Colonel Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Captain Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Colonel David A. Tate
Director of Materiel	Colonel John B. Carey, Jr.
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Darell G. Burgeson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Gordon A. Bailey

Administration.

July 1961 saw the 18th Air Division returning to more normal administrative functions. This was brought about by the redeployment to Fairchild Air Force Base of the two tactical squadrons of the 92d Bombardment Wing. This movement centralized the organizations of the division once again within the boundries of Washington state.[4] (S)

The combat capability of the two wings was increased due to the rising proficiency of the air crews. At month's end the 92d Bombardment Wing had a B-52 combat ready crew strength of 27 crews. Of this total, seven were in select and 16 in senior status. During the month one crew was upgraded to select and a second crew was upgraded to combat ready. Meanwhile the 92d Air Refueling Squadron had a KC-135 crew strength of 34 combat ready tanker crews of which 30 were in senior status. The second tanker squadron of this wing, the 22d Air Refueling Squadron, increased this KC-135 crew total by 32 crews. Nineteen of these were combat ready. Of the remainder, three were M and ten were IM crews.[5] (S)

The 4170th Strategic Wing, the second large component of the 18th Air Division, had a total of 29 B-52 crews. Five of this number were in select, 19 in senior and four in combat ready categories. The remaining crew was still in non-combat ready training. Of this wing's 34 KC-135 crews, all but three were combat ready. Three of these were in the senior category.[6] (S)

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4. Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, C 0180, Subj: Air Refueling Sqdn Commitment, 20 Jul 61, Exhibit #2.
5. Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARS 0085, Subj: Summ Events Jul 61, 14 Aug 61, Exhibit #1.
6. Ibid.

These crews brought the division's B-52 crew strength to 55 combat ready and one non-combat ready crews. Meanwhile the total tanker crew strength was 84 combat ready KC-135 crews and 16 more still in non-combat ready training.[7] (S)

During the month, all of these B-52 crews flew a total of 168 sorties in 1871:10 flying hours. Meanwhile the KC-135 tanker crews flew 298 sorties in 1653:10 flying hours.[8] (C)

None of the units comprising the 18th Air Division participated in any major missions during July. Only minor air refueling requirements in support of other units were completed.[9] Bombers of the 92d Bombardment Wing completed BIG BLAST bomber penetration activity against the 25th Air Division's defenses.[10] Results of this penetration revealed that these aircraft failed to produce any significant degradation of the tracking merit.[11] (C)

Consequently the major flying operation within the division was the redeployment of the aircraft and crews of the 92d Bombardment Wing to Fairchild Air Force Base. This movement began on 14 July, following the completion of the repaving of the runway.[12] (C)

Staff Visits by 18th Air Division Personnel.

During the month of July, the division devoted a large part of

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7. Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARS 0085, Subj: Summ Events Jul 61, 14 Aug 61, Exhibit #1.
8. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOTS 1627, Subj: AR Planning Guide Jul 61, Exhibit #3.
9. Msg, 15AF to 4170SW, CONFIDENTIAL, DOTS 2037, Subj: Ref Supp JOURNEY'S END, 10 Jul 61, Exhibit #4.
10. Msg, 25AD to 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, MHA/SEOTN 07-178, Subj: BIG BLAST - BIG HIT Mission, 19 Jul 61, Exhibit #5.
11. Msg, Spok ADS to 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, SPOOP-61-C-115, Subj: ECM Report, 17 Jul 61, Exhibit #6.
12. Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, C 0180, Subj: Air Refueling Sqdn Commitment, 20 Jun 61, Exhibit #2.

its effort to monitoring the action that was taken by the 4170th Strategic Wing to correct the unsatisfactory areas uncovered during the operational readiness inspection (ORI) conducted by higher headquarters from 21 to 26 June. Close coordination was effected with 18th Air Division Commander, Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, to assure that the crew interrogations, combat mission folders, crew certifications, PC examinations and overall combat operations supervision were immediately returned to a satisfactory status. Among the other unsatisfactory areas which had been or were being corrected were small arms training, physical conditioning and aquatic training.[13] (S)

Meanwhile at Fairchild Air Force Base, the preparations being made by the 92d Bombardment Wing to host the Bombing Competition in September were progressing satisfactorily. This progress, however, was being hampered by a lack of funds for the preparation of the facilities. Among the areas of concern was base operations. This was found to be far below the desired SAC and Fifteenth Air Force standards in appearance, operating procedures and other areas. A crash program was directed by the division to bring this facility up to par.[14] (S)

On 29 July the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron acheived an emergency combat capability with the turnover of the first of the nine ICBM complexes near Fairchild. Almost simultaneously with this achievement, many new problems arose. While most of these could be attributed to the normal growing pains experienced by a unit undergoing

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13. Ltr, DO to EXO, 18AD, SECRET, Subj: Div CO's Monthly Command Prog Ltr, 8 Aug 61, Exhibit #7.
14. Ibid.

such a transitional phase, it was felt that prompt action could eliminate some and prevent others from developing in the future.[15] (S)

One of these problem areas was in the personnel field where individuals were found to be improperly screened prior to the assignment to launch crew duty. Some persons had chronic ulcers, color blindness, and psychiatric problems, while in other cases it had been impossible to obtain the necessary Top Secret clearance for some of the launch control officers.[16] (S)

Another present and future trouble spot was due to the ineligibility of the power production specialists at the complexes to receive pro pay. These crew members were working under the most unpleasant conditions but had the training most in demand and readily adaptable to civilian industry. It was felt that this specialty would present a serious retention problem if an attempt was not made to make it more attractive through pro pay.[17] (S)

The 22d Air Refueling Squadron at McChord Air Force Base was paid a visit by 18th Air Division maintenance personnel during the period of 11 through 14 July. This monthly compliance visit revealed that the overall compliance in the several maintenance areas inspected was satisfactory. Despite this rating, numerous weak areas were disclosed, particularly in the field maintenance sections. The main trouble areas were in the effective utilization of the management tools provided in AF Manual 66-1. Among these was the non-existance of job standards

15. Msg, 15AF to 92BW, SECRET, DO 2077, Subj: Tng Sites Atlas E ORT, 12 Jul 61, Exhibit #8.
16. Ibid.
17. Ltr, DO to EXO, 18AD, SECRET, Subj: Div CO's Monthly Command Prog Ltr, 8 Aug 61, Exhibit #7.

in many sections. The analysis data that was made available each month from the D-25 report and the manhour utilization reports was not being used to help improve the problem areas. With very little internal analysis being accomplished, it was evident that with any appreciable increase in the present workload, it would be doubtful if this section could satisfactorily support the squadron's mission. Since the squadron possessed only 50 per cent of its programmed aircraft, an increased workload could be expected in the immediate months ahead.[18] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Air Division.

The Fairchild Aero Club remained in a state of suspended animation at the end of July. Since the suspension of activities in early June, Colonel Harold W. Olke directed that this be continued until such time as complete compliance with the original suspension order was made. This would include the dissemination of the necessary SOPs and directives to the various staff agencies of the wing and the combat support group.[19] (U)

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18. Ltr, DMM to DM, 18AD, Subj: Monthly Compliance Visit McCAFB, 19 Jul 61, Filed, DM, 18AD.
19. Ltr C to WC, 92BW, Subj: Aero Club Operations, 28 Jul 61, Filed, C, 18AD.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agenices.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 417th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHBIITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARS 0085, Subj: Summ Events, Jul 61, 14 Aug 61	1
Msg, 4170SW to 18AD, SECRET, C 0180, Subj: Air Refueling Sqdn Commitment, 20 Jun 61	2
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CONFIDENTIAL, DOTS 1672, Subj: AR Planning Guide, Jul 61	3
Msg, 15AF to 4170SW, CONFIDENTIAL, DOTS 2037, Subj: Ref Supp JOURNEY'S END, 10 Jul 61	4
Msg, 25AD to 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, MHA/SBOTN 07-178, Subj: BIG BLAST - BIG HIT Mission, 19 Jul 61	5
Msg, Spok ADS to 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, SPOOP-61-C-115, Subj: ECM Report, 17 Jul 61	6
Ltr, DO to EXO, 18AD, SECRET, Subj: Div CO's Monthly Command Prog Ltr, 8 Aug 61	7
Msg, 15AF to 92BW, SECRET, DO 2077, Subj: Tng Sites Atlas E ORT, 12 Jul 61	8

&EC
** DATE-FIXED GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION.

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KNJ698
RR RJUBAP RJUBAS RJUBBD RJUBBG RJUBDL RJUBGP RJUBJGS RJUBAU RJUBNG
DE RJUBKN 10
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FM 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF
TO WHI KEY
RJUBDM/22AIRRFLGSQ MCCHORD AFB WASH
RJUBJR/4061 AIRRFLWG MALMSTROM AFB MONT
XT

DCO (Fay)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOTS 1627. AIR REFUELING PLANNING GUIDE FOR FULY 1961. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART I. FIRM PLANNING INFORMATION IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. THE CHANGE OF ALERT STATUS AND ASSOKIATED SCHEDULES ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX AND AS FIRM PLANNINGSFACTORS ARE DEVELOPED AIR REFULEING CAPABILITITES WILL ARM. PLANNING INFORMATION PROIDED WILL PROIDE MATING OF UNITS AND INCLUDE MAJOR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS COMMITMENTS. FINAL DETAILS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AT SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 1000 HOURS, OFFICERS' CLUB ON 8 JUNE 1961. PART II. FOR TACKER UNITS

TANKER UNIT	RECEIVER UNIT	NO. OF SORTIES
6 ARS	6 BOMBWG	125
9 ARS	9 BOMBWG	40
	93 BOMB WGS	15
	4126 STRATWG	20
	4134 STRATWG	5
	TOTAL	80
22 ARS	9 BOMBWG	35
40 ARS	6 BOMBWG	10
	95 BOMBWG	20
	96 BOMBWG	20
	310 BOMBWG	20
	2 AF	10
	TOTAL	80
43 ARS	96 BOMBWG ON TARGET	10
	303 BOMBWG REFLEX	8
	4141STRATWG	15
	TOTAL	33
92 ARS	92 BOMBWG	15
	4170 STRATWG CLEAR ROAD	124
	TOTAL	139
93 ARS	22 BOMBWG	40
	93 BOMBWG	31

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310 ARS	6 DONEBUG	TOTAL	70
	96 DO'EWG		10
	310 DO'EWG		20
	4128 STR'TWG		20
	2 AI		10
		TOTAL	60
320 ARS	22 DONEWGS		40
	303 DO'EWG		40
		TOTAL	80
97 ARS	4134 STRA'WG		5
	5 DO'EWG		20
	28 DONE WG		15
	92 DO'EWG		20
	4141 STR'TWG		20
		TOTAL	80
913 ARS	303 DONEWG		20
	4126 STR'TWG		15
		TOTAL	35
90A ARS	22 DONEWG N		5
	4134 STRA'WG CLEAR ROAD		62
	413A STR'TWG'TRAINING		10
		TOTAL	77
905 ARS	96 DONE WG'REFLEX		6
	310 DO'EWG		27
		TOTAL	33
906 ARS	96 DONEWG ON TARGET		10
	96 DONEWG REFLEX		8
	28 DONEWG		15
		TOTAL	33
916 ARS	5 DONEWG		15
	303 DONEWG		20
		TOTAL	35
917 ARS	93 DONEWG		16
	310 DONEWG		13
	TAC		6
		TOTAL	34
28 ARS	96 DONEWG ON TARGET		10
	96 DONEWG'REFLEX		6
	4128 STRATWG'CLEAR ROAD		62
		TOTAL	80
924 ARS	93 DONEWGS TOTAL		136

PART III. FOR RECEIVER UNITS #

RECEIVER UNIT	TANKER UNIT	NO OF SORTIES
5 DONEWGS	97 AR J	20
	916 ARS	15
		TOTAL 35
6 DONEWG N	6 ARS	125
	40 ARS	10
	310 ARS	10
		TOTAL 145
9 DONEWGS	9 ARS	40
	22 ARS	35
	916 ARS	5
		TOTAL 80
22 DONEWG	93 ARS	40

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	320 ARS		40
28 BOMBG		TOTAL	80
	97 ARS		15
	906 ARS		15
92 BOMBG N		TOTAL	30
	92 ARS		15
	97 ARS N		20
92 BOMBG N		TOTAL	35
	92 ARS		15
	97 ARS		20
93 BOMBG		TOTAL	35
	9 ARS		15
	93 ARS		31
	924 ARS		136
95 BOMBG		TOTAL	181
	40 ARS		20
	917 ARS		15
96 BOMBG		TOTAL	35
	40 ARS		20
	43 ARS ON TARGET		10
	310 ARS		20
	905 ARS REFLEY		8
	906 ARS ON TARGET		10
	906 ARS REFLEY		8
	28 ARS ON TARGET		10
	28 ARS REFLEY		8
303 BOMBG		TOTAL	94
	43 ARS REFLEY		8
	320 ARS		40
	903 ARS		20
	916 ARS		20
310 BOMBG		595-)	80
	40 ARS		20
	310 ARS		20
	905 ARS		27
	917 ARS		13
4126 STRATUG		TOTAL	80
	9 ARS		20
	903 ARS		15
4128 STRATUG		TOTAL	35
	310 ARS		20
	28 ARS CLEAR ROAD		62
4134 STRATUG		TOTAL	82
	97 ARS		5
	9 ARS		51
	904 ARS CLEAR ROAD		62
	904 ARS TRAININGS		10
4141 STRATUG		TOTAL	82
	43 ARS		15
	97 ARS		20
4170 STRATUG		TOTAL	35
TAC	92 ARS TOTAL		124
2AF	917 ARS	TOTAL	6
	40 ARS		10
	310 ARS		10
IT		TOTAL	20 (SC

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COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

DO 8 August 1961

Division Commander's Monthly Command Progress Letter

18AD (EXO)

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NA

1. Following is a draft of comments on operations activities to be included in the Division Commander's letter to General Old for the period of May-July 1961:

a. As reported in my letter covering our activities for the month of April, members of my staff worked with the 92d Bomb Wing in improving their performance under Operation "Tune-Up." Although overall reliability during this operation was an unsatisfactory 62.5%, the final 50% of the runs made were 100% reliable. (U)

b. During the month of July my operations people devoted a large part of their effort to monitoring action taken by the 4170th SW to correct unsatisfactory areas exposed during their June ORI. Close coordination was effected with visiting representatives from your Headquarters to assure that crew interrogations, CMF's, crew certifications, PC examinations and overall Combat Operations supervision were immediately returned to a satisfactory status. Other unsatisfactory areas which have been or are being corrected are small arms training, physical conditioning, and aquatic survival. (U)

c. Another field receiving strong emphasis was SAC Aero Club operations. I grounded all Aero Clubs within the 18th Air Division until my staff and I were satisfied that they were operating in complete compliance with AFR 34-14, SACM 34-3, and directives received from your Headquarters. (U)

d. 92d BW preparations to host the Bombing Competition are progressing satisfactorily, although somewhat hampered by a lack of funds for facility preparation. One area of concern to me was our Base Operations which my DO found to be far below the desired SAC and 15AF standards in appearance, operating procedures, etc. At my direction, a crash program has been instituted to bring this facility up to par. (U)

e. With the achievement of an ECC by the 567th SMS, many problems have arisen in the missile business.

Most of these can be attributed to the normal "growing pains" experienced by a unit undergoing such a transitional phase. However, I feel that prompt action by higher Hq could eliminate some of the present problems and prevent the development of future trouble spots. (U)

f. In the personnel field, improper screening prior to assignment to missiles is evidenced by individuals with chronic ulcers, color blindness, and psychiatric problems being pipelined for launch crew duty. In other cases it has been impossible to obtain the necessary Top Secret clearance for some of the LCO's. (U)

g. Another present and future trouble spot is occasioned by the ineligibility of the Power Production Specialist to receive pro pay. This crew member works under the most unpleasant conditions within the complex. He also has the most salable training for civilian industry, and I feel the specialty will present a serious retention problem if the pro pay inequity is not alleviated. (U)

h. A serious problem holding up achievement of a more complete ECC arose when only seven of the first 17 constants boards received checked out. (S)

i. One fact which is handicapping the missile people in developing an "Elite Force" feeling among the launch crews is their continuing inability to furnish janitorial services at the complexes. Receipt of the necessary funding authority would remove this career irritant which is already being felt. (U)

j. Some of the above and other problems could be eliminated or greatly alleviated by receipt of permission to use commercial power at the complexes. This would do away with the noise problem, remove the necessity for retaining above ground structures, and reduce costs. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID A. TATE
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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78534

HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 31 August 1961

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by MSgt Donald W. Bunker, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis
ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

L. F. Miller
for + in absence of
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

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Major Roy Lewis
(Approving Authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

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0445

GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

0446

FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADCHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Materiel Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
ORI	Operational Readiness
PCS	Perment Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0447

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

0448

HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability of engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest

---

1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.

practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit delpoyment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Captain Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Colonel David A. Tate
Director of Material	Colonel John B. Carey, Jr.
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Darell G. Burgeson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Gordon A. Bailey

Administration.

On 1 August the Department of the Air Force announced that the Commander 18th Air Division, Colonel Harold W. Ohlke, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General. The effective date of this promotion was 28 July 1961.[4] (U)

On 14 August, General Ohlke departed this station for Offutt AFB, Nebraska, for the purpose of assuming airborne command post duties. During this assignment he was placed in charge of the command plane which would take charge of nuclear bomber forces of SAC if an enemy attack destroyed the SAC headquarters building.[5] (S)

At the end of August, the B-52 combat crew strength of the 92d Bombardment Wing was 27 combat ready crews and one non-combat ready crew. This was the same as the previous month except for the new "N" crew. This gave the wing seven select, 16 senior, four combat ready and one "N" crew. During this period one "IN" crew was formed and upgraded to "N". Meanwhile the 92d Air Refueling Squadron's KC-135 tanker combat crew strength was 34 combat ready crews broken down to 30 senior and four combat ready. This was the same as the previous month and no crews were upgraded. The 22d Air Refueling Squadron at McChord Air Force Base had 32 crews assigned with 19 combat ready. Three of the crews were on "M" status and 10 were "IM" crews. An aggressive upgrading program was in effect to upgrade those crews not combat ready in order to meet the unit's mission requirements.[6] (S)

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4. Special Orders Number AA-1397, DAF 1 Aug 61, Exhibit #1.
5. Msg, 18AD to SAC, SECRET, EXO 0329, Subj: Gnl Ohlke Arr SAC, 9 Aug 61, Exhibit #9.
6. Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARS 0098, Subj: Hist of 22ARS-Aug 61, 11 Spe 61, Exhibit #4.

SECRET

The 4170th Strategic Wing at Larson Air Force Base, Washington, had a B-52 combat ready strength of 28 crews. These included five select, 19 senior, and four combat ready crews. Tanker crews of the 4170th Strategic Wing totaled 34 combat ready. Three of the crews were on senior status and 31 were combat ready.[7] (S)

The bomber crews of the 92d Bombardment Wing flew 89 sorties in August with a total flying time of 702:40 hours. Meanwhile the KC-135 tanker crews assigned to the 92d Air Refueling Squadron flew 144 sorties in 654:55 flying hours and exhibited 100 per cent reliability in all areas of navigation. The tanker aircraft crews assigned to the 22nd Air Refueling Squadron flew a total of 76 sorties in 493 flying hours. The B-52 aircraft crews of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 83 sorties in 965:25 hours and the KC-135 aircraft crews flew 122 sorties in 783:10 hours.[8] (S)

The 92d Bombardment Wing participated in the only major mission of the 18th Air Division during the month. The Inspector General, Strategic Air Command, Brigadier General S. W. Wells began the no-notice operational readiness inspection, FINELINE FOXTROT, on 27 August and concluded the inspection on 1 September under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 123-1 and 123-6. Eight B-52 jet bombers and nine KC-135 Stratotankers participated in the mission. In general, the 92d Bombardment Wing demonstrated a satisfactory capability to perform its EWO mission during the ORI. This operation was conducted under the 92d Bombardment Wing Operations order

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7. Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARS 0098, Subj: Hist of 22ARS-Aug 61, 11 Sep 61, Exhibit #4.
8. Ibid.

#300-61. The 92d Air Refueling Squadron and the 4170th Strategic Wing also participated in another minor mission. Daily, two KC-135 Jet Stratotankers of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron air refueled B-52 bombers from the 4170th Strategic Wing in Operation KEEN AXE.[9] (S)

General Ohlke recently expressed deep concern over the repeated unsuccessful attempts to complete Technical Acceptance Demonstration (TAD) on the Atlas Weapons System at Fairchild Air Force Base. Contractors' unsuccessful attempts render questionable the reliability, dependability and maintainability of the weapons system. By 11 August 1961 only one complex had been successfully demonstrated and turned over to SAC. For this reason, General Ohlke felt that this was a transient success considering the failure on many subsequent attempted demonstrations and in view of difficulties the command experienced on the one complex turned over to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron. To correct this problem, General Ohlke suggested a joint task force manned by SATAF, 567th Strategic Missile Squadron and contract personnel.[10] (S)

Colonel Leonard L. Jella, 567th Strategic Missile Squadron commander further stated that he would not accept additional facilities or complexes from the contractor until such time a reasonable degree of reliability was shown.[11] (S)

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9. FORD 300-61, 92BW, SECRET, 1 Aug 61, Filed DCO, FAFB.
10. Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, TAD, 567 SMS, 11 Aug 61.
11. Msg, 92BW to 15AF, SECRET, 567 SMSC 0320, Subj: TAD, 10 Aug 61.

SECRET

Staff Visits by 18th Air Division.

During August personnel of the 18th Air Division visited all units of the division for the purpose of determining the degree of command control and supervision of aircraft operations. Within the 4170th Strategic Wing, this review disclosed that there was an element of supervisory laxness. This was evidenced when assuring that aircraft operating limitations were followed religiously with respect to MITO and maximum and minimum gross weights for air refueling. It was also shown in the method of scheduling tactical aircraft training missions which imposed an undue and cumbersome workload on maintenance personnel and combat crews. It was further shown in the lack of assurance that pilots whose instrument cards and instructor certificates had lapsed did not fly, or did not fly as instructors, as appropriate. Finally, it was revealed in the knowledge of and adherence to the principles of 15AF Manual 55-3, as it applied to tactical and support aircraft, and in the 24-hour-a-day supervision of flight operations involving support aircraft.[12] (S)

In a similar inspection, it was revealed that the 92d Bombardment Wing evidenced a need for improving supervision and control at all levels within operations and maintenance activities. This would be to insure that safe procedures were followed in all phases of aircraft operations. A number of the most serious deficiencies which

12. Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, Sp Rev Comm Cont Sup Fly Act 4170SW, 18 Aug 61, Exhibit #7.

called for prompt corrective action included lack of controls on standardization checks to assure that critical items of failure were rechecked in all cases, and that procedures for monitoring due dates on instructor and instrument checks assured that currency was maintained in these areas. A laxness was also noted in the standards for monitoring the proficiency of the aircrews. In one instance, Crew J-17 should have been placed in supervised student status, and retained in this status until an acceptable level of proficiency and safety-consciousness was demonstrated. There was also serious doubt as to the qualifications of some maintenance personnel authorized to clear red cross items. It was discovered some dangerous and unauthorized acts were being performed, such as the defueling of KC-135 aircraft with an engine running. Crew professional files did not comply with the spirit, intent, or letter of the directives which had been issued pertaining to the establishment, maintenance, and utilization of those files. There was evidence of incomplete supervision of command post activities as shown by the presence of obsolete regulations, incorrect aircraft data, incomplete and improper emergency notification sequence forms, incorrect SOPs, and a lack of control procedures over TDY and diverted aircraft operations.[13] (S)

A similar inspection was performed during the month on the 22d Air Refueling Squadron, at McChord Air Force Base. Here, two primary areas of weakness were brought to light during the review. Although

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13. Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, Insp Comm Cont Sup Fly Act 92BW, 25 Aug 61, Exhibit #8.

the flying safety program was being accomplished. In accordance with the letter of existing directives, it was being carried out without enthusiasm by the safety officer. Currently, there was no unit manning document authorization for a safety officer in squadrons that were tenants on non-SAC bases. Consequently, this important function had to be delegated to a highly qualified crew commander as an additional duty. His normal duties as aircrew commander, flight commander, and instructor pilot left little time for an energetic safety program. The second area of weakness was that the checklist for actions required during aircraft inflight emergencies was not up to the standards required by 15AF Manual 55-3.[14] (S)

During August, the 18th Air Division also conducted compliance inspections of the 92d Field Maintenance Squadron and the consolidated wing supply and group supply activities. Within the field maintenance squadron, it was found that compliance with the applicable maintenance directives had regressed from that noted prior to the April-July temporary duty of the unit during the rehabilitation of the Fairchild runway. Several areas of weakness had developed that required diligent attention by the maintenance supervision staff. The production control activity and the aerospace ground equipment show was unsatisfactory.[15] (U)

Within the first activity, supervisory personnel displayed

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14. Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, Sp Rev Comm Cont Sup Fly Act 22ARS, 11 Aug 61, Exhibit #6.
15. Comp Visit of 92FMS, 18AD, 22 Aug 61, Exhibit #3.

little knowledge of the Hi-Valu program. It was also discovered that maintenance documentation was being accomplished on AFTO forms 26K rather than on the AFTO 781-A. While the procedure being utilized was directed by the 92d Bombardment Wing and was scheduled for adoption on 1 October 1961, the information available to the 18th Air Division personnel was that pending that date, the documentation would be in accordance with existing directives. While the advantages and reasons for using the 26K form were recognized, written authority from higher headquarters should have been obtained. Also, it was discovered that the job standards generally were not current and in several shops were not being utilized. Finally, the high percentage of unscheduled work orders was detracting from the ability of the various shop cheifs to effectively program, plan, and accomplish the daily shop production.[16] (U)

The inspection of the consolidated wing supply resulted in a rating of satisfactory. No discrepancies materially affecting the operation of this activity were noted. In all divisions, personnel were well informed as to the pertinent directives and current operations. It was noted during the course of the inspection that action was in progress to transfer from the 92d Combat Support Group account to the 92d Bombardment Wing account the property in use, including tools in the tool crib supporting the motor vehicle maintenance activity. This transfer violated the provisions of Project LIFE INSURANCE.[17] (U)

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16. Comp Visit of 92FMS, 18AD, 22 Aug 61, Exhibit #3.
17. Supply Comp Insp Report of 92BW, 18AD, 24 Aug 61, Exhibit #2.

The consolidated group supply activity likewise received a rating of satisfactory, with base supply receiving a rating of outstanding in the materiel facilities. It was revealed that this branch was an outstanding example of neatness, clearliness, and represented a model of business endeavor for any base to emulate. Compliance with the existing directives was excellent, personnel spirit was very high, leadership very prevalent, and there was motivation behind every supply transaction.[18] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Air Division.

The extensive monitoring action taken by the 4170th Strategic Wing, at the direction of the 18th Air Division, to correct the unsatisfactory areas exposed during the June operational readiness inspection had resulted in the return to a satisfactory status the deficient areas. At Fairchild Air Force Base, the 18th Air Division directed that the 92d Bombardment Wing make all necessary preparations to host the SAC Combat Competition. However, plans were being hampered by a lack of funds for proper preparation of the facilities. One area which was of concern was base operations which was found to be far below the desired SAC and 15th Air Force standards in appearance, operating procedures, and other areas. A crash program was instituted to bring this facility up to par. The 18th Air Division Commander, Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, was determined that this SAC Combat Competition would be so conducted as to make all potential enemy agressors aware of the power of the Strategic Air Command to retali-

18. Supply Comp Insp Report of 92BW, 29 Aug 61, Exhibit #2.

ate instantly and effectively.[19] (S)

19. Ltr, DO to 18AD, SECRET, Div Comm Monthly Comm Prog Ltr, 8 Aug 61, Exhibit #5.

SECRET

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Order.

GAZETTEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Special Orders Number AA-1397, DAF, 1 Aug 61	1
Supply Comp Insp Report of 92BW, 18AD, 24 Aug 61	2
Comp Visit of 92FMS, 18AD, 22 Aug 61	3
Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, SECRET, 22ARS 0098, Subj: Hist of 22ARS-Aug 61, 11 Sep 61	4
Ltr, DO to 18AD, SECRET, Div Comm Monthly Comm Prog Ltr, 7 Aug 61	5
Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, Sp Rev Comm Cont Sup Fly Act 22ARS, 11 Aug 61	6
Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, Sp Rev Comm Cont Sup Fly Act 4170SW, 18 Aug 61	7
Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, Insp Comm Cont Sup Fly Act 92BW, 25 Aug 61	8
Msg, 18AD to SAC, SECRET, EXO 0329, Subj: Gnl. Ohlke Arr SAC, 9 Aug 61	9
Ltr, 18AD to 15AF, SECRET, TAD, 567 SMS, 11 Aug 61	10
Msg, 92BW to 15AF, SECRET, 567SMSC 0302, Subj: TAD, 10 Aug 61	11

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER AA-1397)

1 August 1961

1. DP, BRIGGEN PERRY M HOISINGTON, II, 1694A is temporarily promoted in the USAF to the grade of Major General, with DOR 1 Aug 56, per Chapter 839, Title 10, USC.

2. DP, each of the following Colonels is temporarily promoted in the USAF to the grade of Brigadier General, with DOR shown, per Chapter 839, Title 10, USC:

Name, AFSN	DOR
HARRY J SANDS, JR, 4145A	14 Jul 61
JOHN W O'NEILL, 4155A	16 Jul 61
CHARLES H ROADMAN, 3379A	18 Jul 61
JOHN H BELL, 4185A	20 Jul 61
ARTHUR G SALISBURY, 4224A	22 Jul 61
JOHN A ROBERTS, 4380A	24 Jul 61
ABE J BECK, 5831A	26 Jul 61
HAROLD W OHLKE, 1777A	28 Jul 61
DON S WENGER, 19186A	30 Jul 61

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

OFFICIAL

CURTIS E. LeMAY
Chief of Staff

R. J. PUGH
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION
J

AA-1397

B-7

Headquarters
18TH AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DM

24 August 1961

SUBJECT: Supply Compliance Inspection Report of 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild AFB, Washington

TO: 92BW (WC)

1. Attached is Supply Compliance Inspection Report conducted by the Supply staff this headquarters during the period 21-24 August 1961. Following are activities inspected:

a. Consolidated Wing Supply, 92d Bomb Wing.

b. Consolidated Group Supply, 92d Combat Support Group.

c. Base Supply, 92d Combat Support Group.

2. The report (Atch 1,2, and 3) will be processed in accordance with the following instructions:

a. Three copies of the 1st Indorsement will be forwarded to this headquarters not later than 11 September 1961.

b. Reply indicating corrective action is required for all paragraphs preceded by a single asterisk (*).

c. The reply will be made as an indorsement so as to coincide with the number of the report to which replies are required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN B. CAREY, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

3 Atchs (15 cys)
1. Cons. Wg Sup Rept 92BW
2. Cons. Gp Sup Rept 92CSG
3. Base Supply Rept 92CSG

I. CONSOLIDATED WING SUPPLY: Satisfactory.

*A. General: No discrepancies materially affecting the operation of this activity were noted. Personnel in all divisions were well informed as to pertinent directives and current operations. During the course of the inspection it was noted that action was in progress to transfer from the Combat Support Group account to the Wing account the property in use, including tools, in the tool crib supporting the motor vehicle maintenance activity. This transfer is directed effective 1 October 1961. This early transfer violates the provisions of letter, Hq SAC (DPLMO), 28 Mar 61, Project "Life Insurance", and msg Hq 15th AF, DPL 45405, "Life Insurance," dated 16 Aug 61.

B. Organizational Supply Division: Satisfactory.

1. Administration: Satisfactory.

*a. The revocation of AF Form 93, Supply Representative Authorization, for transferred or separated personnel who have been authorized to make withdrawals from the Air Force Service Store depends on notification being given to the Supply Officer by the Commander or staff agency concerned. If this notice is not given, the form will not be recovered by the Supply Officer.

(1) Recommendation: That notice of the issue of the form be placed in the individual's AF Form 538 folder, as is done in the case of individuals responsible for Custody Receipt accounts. A positive control of the forms will thus be obtained since the issue of the form will be noted when the individual clears Organizational Supply, and the form can be recovered at that time.

*b. There was no evidence of the existence of a written local policy or procedure for the processing of supply difficulties. Supply difficulties are, apparently, rarely encountered, and personnel are familiar with processing requirements; however, the publication of a local handling procedure would assist in the indoctrination of newly assigned personnel and insure compliance with AFR 67-7 and command supplements thereto.

(1) Recommendation: That local supply difficulty processing procedures be formalized by publication of a local supplement to AFR 67-7, or other appropriate directive.

2. Accounting Branch: Satisfactory.

*a. Copies of the current UMDs are not maintained within the Organizational Supply Division; they are available

in the Office of the Director of Supply. They should be on hand in the Accounting Branch, or at least in OSD, to facilitate the establishment or review of authorizations and requirements of items based on manning authorizations, such as bedding, quarters furniture, office furniture, etc.

(1) Recommendation: That copies of current UMDs and changes thereto be maintained in the Accounting Branch.

*b. Three Custody Receipt accounts were noted as overdue for the annual inventory. These were accounts AL, due 21 Jul 60; AO, due 1 Aug 61; and FH, due 20 Jul 61.

(1) Recommendation: That the annual inventory be accomplished.

c. It was noted that brownline listings used to itemize Custody Receipt accounts had been amended by hand. However, this practice is not now being followed, and overages and shortages discovered during inventory are being adjusted by the use of debit and credit Custody Receipts.

*d. It was noted that some Custody Receipts are improperly prepared, i.e., no date of receipt is shown. This is not a common error; however, the date of receipt is helpful in establishing a sequence of action or an audit trail and should be included.

(1) Recommendation: That emphasis be placed on the complete and accurate preparation of Custody Receipts.

e. All authorized items were on hand or on order, except items which were in the process of being deleted from the UAL, and some local purchase items which are not placed on order until fund credits are available for their purchase.

3. Organizational and Flying Clothing and Equipment Account: Satisfactory.

*a. 137 AF Forms 538 were checked, and the required annual certification had not been accomplished on 64 forms.

(1) Recommendation: That continuing emphasis be placed on the accomplishment of the annual certification of AF Form 538.

4. Inventory Branch: Satisfactory.

*a. It was noted that AF Form 1143, maintained in the ammunition storage area, showed 4323 rounds of caliber 45 ammunition, lot number 6422, on hand, while the records

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in Accounting Branch showed 4819 rounds. It was further noted that the ammunition in storage had been inventoried 8 Aug 61, and action is in progress to adjust records.

(1) Recommendation: That accounting records be adjusted as soon as possible to reflect the quantities of ammunition currently on hand.

5. Storage and Issue Branch: Satisfactory.

*a. Four items in reparable condition were on hand awaiting turn-in with inspection dates 21 to 38 days old. In addition, 20 line items were awaiting turn-in to the R&M activity for a period from one to four and one half weeks.

(1) Recommendation: That emphasis be placed on the expeditious turn-in of unserviceable property.

6. Personal Equipment Branch: Satisfactory.

a. Survival kits are not all 100% complete as to components; however, component shortages are noted on AF Form 50B for each kit and are on order. Required components on hand are being included in kits during periodic inspection and repack of the kits.

*b. One lot of 12 R-1A anti-exposure suits was noted which had been initially tagged on 13 Jun 61 as due for reinspection on 13 Sep 61. The AF Form 50B had been corrected to show the reinspection as due on 13 Aug 61 (60 days), but the suits had not been pulled for reinspection.

(1) Recommendation: That care be exercised to insure accurate initial tagging of items and to properly assess reinspection requirement changes necessitated by correction of tags.

C. Aircraft Support Division: Satisfactory.

1. Administrative: Excellent. This section is operating very efficiently and all personnel are highly qualified. It was noted that all personnel are taking very aggressive follow-up action to ascertain that reparables are promptly processed.

2. Maintenance Supply Liaison: Excellent. Above remark applies.

3. Tool Crib: Satisfactory.

*a. T.O. 32-1-101 was not available in the OMS tool crib.

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(1) Recommendation: That T.O. 32-1-101 be obtained.

*b. The OMS tool crib Custody Receipt account is overdue for the annual inventory and requires turnover to a new responsible person.

(1) Recommendation: That the inventory and change-over be accomplished as soon as possible, to insure maintenance of supply control over the property involved.

c. Excess items are on hand in the OMS tool crib and have been identified and prepared for turn-in.

(1) Recommendation: That excesses be turned in as soon as possible without jeopardizing the accurate inventory of the account.

4. Aircraft Installed Equipment Branch: Satisfactory.

a. All shortages are on order except for mattress covers and blankets. These items require funding; they are not being ordered since they will be available following the SAC Bombing/Navigation Competition to be held in September.

*b. Certificates of acceptance have not been completed on 14 B-52 aircraft. Certificates of delivery were completed on 15 and 17 Mar 61.

(1) Recommendation: That the certificates be accomplished without delay.

*c. Item Ah-5g for B-52D aircraft was deleted (2 each), and one each of item Ah-5n added by a change to T.O. 1B-52D-21. The deletion and addition are noted on AF Form 780-1 and the complete line entry for item Ah-5g has been lined out. However, the items are physically still installed. The lining out of the complete entry without an indication of the disposition of the items is confusing.

(1) Recommendation: That when changes of this nature are made, the authorization figure be changed, but no amendment be made to the on-hand check column until the items are removed from the aircraft and disposed of.

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II. CONSOLIDATED GROUP SUPPLY: Satisfactory.

A. Administration: Satisfactory.

1. AFM 67-1 was not properly identified by volume.

2. Two administrative binders were not identified as to contents.

*3. The following functions encompassed in Project "Life Insurance" have been transferred from Group to Wing in advance of the prescribed effective date of 1 October 1961:

a. Tool Crib Branch (vehicle maintenance).

b. Civil Engineering Work Order Requirements Branch.

This early transfer violates the provisions of letter, Hq SAC (DPLMO), 28 Mar 61, Project "Life Insurance" and msg Hq 15th AF, DPL 45405, "Life Insurance," 16 Aug 61.

B. Accounting Branch: Marginal.

*1. Unit Control Register: Approximately 350 documents on hand over three days old had not been posted and filed. Oldest document noted was dated 21 July 1961. (Ref: AFM 67-1, Vol IV, Sec II, par 7d). The Received, Backorder, and Date Filed columns were not being properly posted. Work orders registered did not indicate final action. (40101554, 40101652, 40101653, 40101787, 40102064, and 40102091)

*2. Accounting Records: Columns 37-46, AF Forms 158, did not agree with instructions contained in the letter published by SAC Hq on mechanized procedures.

*3. Custody Receipts: Custody Receipts were not being updated upon change of custodian.

*4. Transaction Cards: Transaction cards for the transfer of the Transportation Squadron tool crib indicated an 03 posting code in Column 45-46 while columns 56-59 indicated a quantity authorized. No UAL change request was on file deleting the authorizations.

5. Individual Vehicle Records:

*a. Columns 9,22, and 23 were not being completed.

*b. Column 12 was being erroneously posted.

Remarks: This is a very weak area and if immediate corrective action is not taken it could very easily regress to

unsatisfactory. The discrepancies listed in 1 thru 3, above, require corrective action before a correct 30 September UAL inventory can be accomplished.

C. Inventory Branch: Satisfactory.

D. Storage and Issue Branch: Satisfactory.

1. Excess fire extinguishers in stock should be turned in to Base Supply. There were numerous UAL items in the warehouse that should be issued to authorized functions or returned to supply channels. This comment is not applicable to items of furniture being held for use during the BALCOM.

*2. Weapons in semi-permanent or permanent storage were not being inventoried and inspected in accordance with SACR 136-5.

E. Organizational and Flying Clothing Equipment Account: Satisfactory.

*G. Tool Crib Branch: Satifactory. The following discrepancies were noted:

1. T.O. 32-1-101 was not on hand.

2. Two items were not calibrated as required: (5120-221-7945, torque handle, and 6680-303-0595, indicator)

3. Bench stock items stored in tool crib (fanbelts).

0470

III. BASE SUPPLY

A. Materiel Facilities: Outstanding. The Materiel Facilities Branch is an outstanding example of neatness, cleanliness, and represents a model of business endeavor for any base to emulate. Compliance with existing directives is paramount. Personnel spirit is very high, leadership very prevalent, and mission motivation behind every supply transaction.

B. Property Accounting: Satisfactory.

1. Stock Control Section: Satisfactory.. The Stock Control Section is managed in a satisfactory manner; however, the following discrepancies were noted:

*a. Organization requests were back ordered with property on hand. (Ref: Document Nr. 48740283)

*b. Work order due-in cards were filed in work order number sequence in violation of paragraph 12d, Sec 4, Vol I, SACM 67-3.

*c. A record is not being maintained as to the reason for an item being controlled and the approving authority for the issue or shipment. (Ref: Par 6, Sec 11, Vol I, SACM 67-3)

*d. A current schedule for SBCR (Stock Balance and Consumption Report) products had not been provided the Base Machine Section as required by paragraph 2a, Sec 12, Vol I, SACM 67-3.

2. Research Section: Satisfactory. Two discrepancies were noted:

*a. Dated items were controlled as per paragraph 13, Sec 9, Vol I, SACM 67-3 except a check revealed stock number 1670-516-8825-82, parachute, is on hand in the warehouse but only basic stock number is loaded into the item record, i.e., 1670-516-8825. (Ref: Par 13, Sec 9, Vol I, SACM 67-3)

*b. Add items are listed in the Stock Number Directory prior to the item being added to the disk file in violation of paragraph 11d, Sec 9, Vol I, SACM 67-3.

*c. Stock number 9520-803-6957 (C9500-SL, Vol 2, 1 Aug 61) is deleted; yet it is loaded as an active item in the account. (Ref: Fig. 1-6, Sec 1, Vol I, SACM 67-3)

3. Machine Section: Satisfactory.

4. Expedite Section: Satisfactory.

C. Administration and Procedures:

1. Document Control: Satisfactory.

2. Inventory: Satisfactory.

3. Administration: Satisfactory.

4. Training: Satisfactory.

5. Procedures: Satisfactory. The following discrepancy was noted:

*a. Base Supply SOPs are not consonant with AFR 5-5. (Ref: Par 82, AFR 5-5, 1 Sep 60)

6. Hi-Valu: Satisfactory.

D. Base Procurement Service Store: Satisfactory.

E. CLARK: Marginal.

*1. A weight and cube check was made on some items; weights checked okay but cubes were incorrect.

*2. Stock number 6110-643-1117 on record as Category II item is in location 3A2 tagged as a Hi-Valu item.

*3. T.O. 00-35F series tech orders indexed in T.O. 00-35F-01 (List of Hi-Valu Technical Orders) but not in T.O. 0-1-2, General Technical Order Index (00 series).

*4. A new TOC record card index was in the process of preparation. A check was made of many items to ascertain whether correct T.O. 00-20K series tech order was quoted. It was found in many instances that the T.O. 00-20K series tech order was misquoted. For instance, a landing gear actuating cylinder was quoted as being listed in T.O. 00-20K-6 and having a three year storage life. Actually, the item was listed in T.O. 00-20K-7 and has a four year storage life. It is recommended that all CLARK personnel be given training by a qualified supply inspector to teach use and application of 00-20K series tech orders. It is also recommended that the services of a supply inspector be utilized when problems concerning 00-20K series tech orders become apparent.

F. Bench Stock and Pre-Issue: Satisfactory.

1. Pre-Issue Storage and Issue Section: Satisfactory.

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2. Resupply and Delivery Section: Satisfactory.

3. Pre-Issue and Bench Stock Records Section: Satisfactory. The following discrepancies were noted:

*a. Activity code 4 deck used for identity changes as required but SAC Form 473 (Unit Control Register) was not maintained.

*b. SAC Form 209a for identity changes were filed in the Bench Stock and Pre-Issue Records Section rather than the Inspection Section.

*c. Shop code identification was not in the sequence prescribed by Sec 20, Vol I, SACM 67-3.

G. Special Subject for Inspection:

*1. AFR 121-32, "Handling, Storage, and Issue of Aircraft Tire and Tube Stocks." The 92d BW BDCM performed the initial inspection and reported that tires were being stored as prescribed in AFM 67-3. A check of the storage area revealed tires were not being stored in racks or pallets (Ref: AFM 67-3, par 5.6.17). An analogous condition exists insofar as controlled temperature is concerned.

2. 15AFR 121-8, 24 July 1961, "Electronic Equipment Handling - Damage Prevention." Satisfactory.

0473

Headquarters
18TH AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DMM

22 August 1961

SUBJECT: Compliance Visit, 92d Field Maintenance Squadron, 14-17 ~~17-19~~ Aug 61

TO: 18AD (DM)

1. Activities Inspected:

Production Control
Structural Repair Shop
Machine Shop
Paint Shop
Welding Shop
Survival Equipment Shop
Aerospace Ground Equipment Shop
Repair and Reclamation Shop
Pneudraulics Shop
Electric Shop
Instrument Shop
IFR Shop

2. Personnel Performing Inspection:

Lt Colonel Burgeson	18AD DM
SMS Newberg	18AD DM
SMS Englehart	4170SW FMS
TSgt Abbott	4170SW MQC

3. Purpose: To review compliance with current maintenance and management procedures.

4. Findings: Compliance with applicable maintenance directives has regressed from that noted prior to the April-July TDY of the unit. Several areas of weakness have developed that require diligent attention by the Maintenance Supervision staff. The Production Control activity and Aerospace Ground Equipment Shop were unsatisfactory. The Structural Repair Shop was rated marginal.

*a. Supervisory personnel in the Materiel Processing Section of Production Control displayed little knowledge of the Hi-Valu Program.

**b. Maintenance documentation was being accomplished on AFTO Forms 26K rather than on the AFTO 781-A. While the procedure being utilized is Wing directed and is scheduled for adoption on 1 October 1961, the information available to

the Air Division staff is that pending that date, documentation will be in accordance with existing directives. The advantages and reasons for using the 26K are recognized; however, written authority from higher headquarters should be solicited.

*c. Job standards generally were not current and in several shops were not being utilized.

**d. The high percentage of unscheduled work orders is detracting from the various shop chiefs' ability to effectively program, plan, and accomplish daily shop production.

5. Specific deficiencies in the activities and shops inspected are as follows:

a. Production Control: Unsatisfactory. This activity has not shown satisfactory progress in complying with established procedural directives since the Wing's return from TDY. The numerous discrepancies noted during the inspection indicate the need for aggressive action by supervisory personnel to prevent a degrading of the maintenance effort.

*(1) Production Control boards are available but at the time of the inspection were not being used. It is difficult to establish pre-issue components in reparable status, shop production capability, shop workload by job classification, pre-issue, non pre-issue repair schedule, and local manufacture without the use of workload scheduling and control boards. (Ref: AFM 66-1, Chap 14, SAC Sup-1 14-23.4, par C; and 14-23.7, A thru E)

*(2) Job standards for line maintenance tasks were not current. Job standards, dated April 1959, had not been reviewed by shop chiefs. Job standards for shop tasks were being used; however, the system in effect is not in accordance with existing directives. (Ref: AFM 66-1, SAC Sup-1, Chap 2, 2A5a(3), and 15AFR 66-11)

*(3) 50D tags were not completed on 20 or more items including many Hi-Valu items. The following information was not on tags:

(a) Unit operating time.

(b) How malfunction code.

(c) When discovered code.

(Ref: AFM 66-1, Chap 14, SAC Sup-1, 14-23-10, par 4, and 14-23-6, par 6)

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*(4) A transducer, stock number 6620-342-0255, Hi-Valu item, was not stamped Hi-Valu. The 26K's stock number did not correspond with the stock number on the transducer. (Ref: AFM 67-1, Vol 1, Part 1)

*(5) One of the many items tagged found on base, an assembly, part number 486913, had a 50B serviceable tag attached. No one in the section knew what action to take on this item.

*(6) A generator, stock number 6115-536-2434, had not been routed through the Electric Shop but the tag had been stamped NRTS by someone. The shop chief or assistant shop chief is the only one authorized to stamp the tag NRTS. (Ref: AFM 66-1, Chap 3, SAC Sup-1, 3-39d, par (e))

*(7) Hi-Value items and Category II items were not kept separated. (Ref: AFR 400-24, and AFM 67-1)

*(8) Nine Hi-Value items, amplifiers (type ME1A), stock number 6605-679-3487, dated 3 August, were stored in the section awaiting to be picked up by Mr. Howard of the Supply TOC Section. These are Hi-Valu A&E items and should have had immediate action.

*(9) One Hi-Value item, a transmission, stock number 1650-D16-1723, dated 7 August, had been routed to the Pneumatic and Instrument Shops. Neither one of these shops had the capability to repair this item. Now it is being routed to the Engine Buildup Section. Added emphasis should be put on monitoring the Hi-Valu Program. (Ref: AFR 400-24)

(10) Parts are being stamped NRTS by unauthorized personnel. An hour meter, stock number 6645-551-8291, was checked by the Instrument Shop, stamped and signed by A1C Cave. (Ref: AFM 66-1, Chap 3, SAC Sup-1, 3-39d, par(e))

*(11) There was no tech order familiarization system of any kind set up on this section. (Ref: 15AF msg DM4A 11162, 7 Feb 61)

*(12) The Specialist Dispatch board did not show the same number of specialists available as Job Control for Sheet Metal shop or Hydraulic Shop. On one required job the number of specialists was not shown. (Ref: AFM 66-1, SAC Sup-1, Fig. 2-32)

*(13) These discrepancies were noted in the IPT Program of this section:

(a) ACB/AQE test results not shown on SAC Form 56.

0476

(b) No 30 day counseling interviews.

(c) No identifying signatures on 623 for trainee, trainer, and supervisor.

(d) Some folders did not have study reference list.

(e) Some men had been on OJT since 4 July and had not started the first phase of training.

b. Structural Repair Shop. Marginal.

*(1) Bench stock is excessive and is not properly binned or identified. (Ref: AFM 67-1, Vol 1, Part 1)

*(2) No current job standards. Job standards were not being used and some standards were dated April 1959. (Ref: 15AFR 66-11)

*(3) Specialist planning chart was not in proper format. (Ref: SAC Sup-1, AFM 66-1, Chap 2, par 2-38)

*(4) Some reparable parts and local manufacture parts not properly tagged. (Ref: Vol 1, Part 1, AFM 67-1)

*(5) Assemblies for machines stored improperly, also, poor control of special tools. (Ref: AFM 67-1, Vol 1, Part 1, Chap 4)

*(6) No goggles or face shields available for use during operation of Do All saw and grinding wheels. (Ref: AFM 32-3, 0302.14(4))

*(7) This section was charging time that the specialists spent standing by in the shops awaiting jobs to Code 02 (alert duty or stand-by). This time should be used in training, plant maintenance (Code 09), or cleaning and policing (Code 10). (Ref: AFM 66-1, Chap 8, 8-15)

*(8) A list of personnel authorized to operate machines was not posted. (Ref: AFM 32-3, 0308.1)

*(9) The appearance and housekeeping of the shop and storage area is sub-standard. (Ref: AFM 32-3)

*(10) There is no tech order familiarization system set up in this shop.

c. Machine Shop. Satisfactory.

*(1) No one in section authorized to stamp and sign NRTS parts tags. (Ref: AFM 66-1, SAC Sup-1)

0477

*(2) Assemblies for various machines stored improperly. (Ref: AFM 67-1, Vol 1, Part 1, Chap 4)

*(3) 50D tag made out improperly on fuel strainer, stock number 2915-142-0408. Item had been stamped NRTS by Engine Buildup. Tag was not signed. This item was AWP and should be stored in Production Control.

*(4) Items in supply bins not tagged or identified. (Ref: AFM 67-1, Vol 1, Part 1)

*(5) Housekeeping is below acceptable standards.

*(6) List of personnel authorized to operate machines was not posted. (Ref: AFM 32-3)

d. Paint Shop. Satisfactory.

*(1) No current job standards. (Ref: 15AFR 66-11)

*(2) No organizational functional chart posted. (Ref: AFM 66-1, Chap 14)

*(3) Approximately 50% of AF Forms 992 were not properly filled out. If supervisor had reviewed these, he had taken no action to correct them. (Ref: AFM 66-1, SAC Sup-1, Chap 14)

*(4) Wall lockers in the supervisor's office were used to store parts for paint guns, dirty rags, supply items, and miscellaneous items. This office was also in need of a general clean up. (Ref: AFM 67-1, and AFM 32-3)

e. Welding Shop. Satisfactory. The shop chief is making an extensive effort to identify and tag excessive bench stock to be turned in to supply. The Plating Shop is being rehabilitated and was not inspected.

*(1) Heat treat ovens were past due to be inspected and calibrated.

*(2) No job standards available. (Ref: 15AFR 66-11)

f. Survival Equipment Shop. Satisfactory. The overall operation of this shop is excellent.

*(1) Job standards are not current.

g. Aerospace Ground Equipment Section. Unsatisfactory.

*(1) Forms 11A and 646 are in active files and have not been replaced by DD Forms 829 and 829-1 as outlined in

0478

Section XII, par 12-11, T.O. 00-20A-1, and 15AF ltr, 27 Dec 60.

*(2) Historical records are being filed and maintained at AGE Section instead of at Records activity. (Ref: AFM 66-1, Chap 6, par 6-7)

*(3) AFTO Form 781B was not maintained in accordance with Hq 15th AF letter, 27 Dec 60, and T.O. 00-20A-1, Sec V, par 5-106. Forms checked included the following discrepancies:

(a) No entries in date and crew chief block.

(b) No entries in Block B.

(c) Incorrect entries were made in Block A of P.E. inspection. Other forms checked showed no entries at all.

(d) Discrepancies in Block E were not lined through after corrective action. No signatures of transferring to AFTO maintenance forms.

(e) No headings for columns in Block H as outlined in 15th AF letter, par 12-42.

(f) No entries in Block I.

*(4) 50D series tags were not maintained in accordance with Sec IV, par 4-23, T.O. 00-20A-1.

*(5) BT-400-1 heaters not in storage in accordance with T.O. 35-1-4. The following discrepancies were noted on units checked:

(a) Units not taped or preserved for storage.

(b) Units have no 50 series tags.

(c) Flat tire on unit.

(d) Wheel off and bearing missing. Engine, serial number 337, missing.

(e) No entries on Forms 781A relating to the status of units.

*(6) Units on deadline status not in accordance with T.O. 35-1-4, and AFTO Forms 781B not current or maintained in accordance with Hq 15th AF letter, 27 Dec 60.

(a) AFTO Forms 781B have no entries as to status.

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(b) 50 series tags not filled out in accordance with Section IV, par 4-23, T.O. 00-20A-1.

(c) Hydraulic test stand, MJ-1 #0006, has been deadlined since 30-11-60, has not been preserved in accordance with T.O. 35-1-4, and no entry of status in Block E.

h. Electrical & Battery Shop. Satisfactory. Because the Battery Shop was under repairs at the time of this inspection, only a limited evaluation was conducted. No discrepancies were noted.

i. In-Flight Refueling. Satisfactory. Shop has authorization for 13 personnel and has only five assigned and one borrowed from Instrument Shop. No discrepancies noted.

j. Instrument Shop. Satisfactory. No discrepancies noted.

k. Pneudraulic Shop. Satisfactory.

*(1) Outdated T.O. 00-20A-1, 10 Mar 59, in file.

*(2) Limited tech order file not maintained properly. (Ref: T.O. 00-5-1)

6. Paragraphs identified by an asterisk are considered to be of sufficient importance to require a report of corrective action. Paragraphs identified by a double asterisk should be commented on by the Wing Deputy Commander for Maintenance.

D G Burgeson

D. G. BURGESON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acft Maint Staff Off

0480

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

SECRET

DO 8 August 1961

Division Commander's Monthly Command Progress Letter

5

18AD (EXO)

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME

1. Following is a draft of comments on operations activities to be included in the Division Commander's letter to General Old for the period of May-July 1961.

a. As reported in my letter covering our activities for the month of April, members of my staff worked with the 92d Bomb Wing in improving their performance under Operation "Tune-Up." Although overall reliability during this operation was an unsatisfactory 62.5%, the final 50% of the runs made were 100% reliable. (U)

b. During the month of July my operations people devoted a large part of their effort to monitoring action taken by the 4170th SW to correct unsatisfactory areas exposed during their June ORI. Close coordination was effected with visiting representatives from your Headquarters to assure that crew interrogations, CMF's, crew certifications, PC examinations and overall Combat Operations supervision were immediately returned to a satisfactory status. Other unsatisfactory areas which have been or are being corrected are small arms training, physical conditioning, and aquatic survival. (U)

c. Another field receiving strong emphasis was SAC Aero Club operations. I grounded all Aero Clubs within the 18th Air Division until my staff and I were satisfied that they were operating in complete compliance with AFR 34-14, SACM 34-3, and directives received from your Headquarters. (U)

d. 92d BW preparations to host the Bombing Competition are progressing satisfactorily, although somewhat hampered by a lack of funds for facility preparation. One area of concern to me was our Base Operations which my DO found to be far below the desired SAC and 15AF standards in appearance, operating procedures, etc. At my direction, a crash program has been instituted to bring this facility up to par. (U)

e. With the achievement of an ECC by the 567th SMS, many problems have arisen in the missile business.

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Most of these can be attributed to the normal "growing pains" experienced by a unit undergoing such a transitional phase. However, I feel that prompt action by higher Hq could eliminate some of the present problems and prevent the development of future trouble spots. (U)

f. In the personnel field, improper screening prior to assignment to missiles is evidenced by individuals with chronic ulcers, color blindness, and psychiatric problems being pipelined for launch crew duty. In other cases it has been impossible to obtain the necessary Top Secret clearance for some of the LCO's. (U)

g. Another present and future trouble spot is occasioned by the ineligibility of the Power Production Specialist to receive pro pay. This crew member works under the most unpleasant conditions within the complex. He also has the most salable training for civilian industry, and I feel the specialty will present a serious retention problem if the pro pay inequity is not alleviated. (U)

h. A serious problem holding up achievement of a more complete ECC arose when only seven of the first 17 constants boards received checked out. (S)

i. One fact which is handicapping the missile people in developing an "Elite Force" feeling among the launch crews is their continuing inability to furnish janitorial services at the complexes. Receipt of the necessary funding authority would remove this career irritant which is already being felt. (U)

j. Some of the above and other problems could be eliminated or greatly alleviated by receipt of permission to use commercial power at the complexes. This would do away with the noise problem, remove the necessity for retaining above ground structures, and reduce costs. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID A. TATE
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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FILE DESIGNATION

15 August 1961

Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr.
Commander
Fifteenth Air Force
March Air Force Base, California

Dear General Old:

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME

This is the second personal letter on the activities of the 18th Air Division. During the period covered by this letter my staff and I have devoted a major portion of our efforts to the achievement of an early Emergency Combat Capability in the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron, improvement of the 4170th EWO capability, preparation for the Bombing Competition, Project Money Tree, attainment of safe efficient operation in the SAC Aero Clubs, bombing reliability, Project Meat Man, and continued emphasis on safety and standardization in the nuclear weapons area. (U)

The Air Division has continued to work with the 92nd Bomb Wing in improving their performance under Operation "Tune-Up". Although over-all reliability during this operation was an unsatisfactory 62.5%, marked improvement, as a result of our combined efforts, was noted during the latter portion of the exercise. The final 50% of runs accomplished were 100% reliable. (C)

The failure of the 4170th Strategic Wing to pass the 22 June ORI dictated the requirement for prompt and positive corrective action. Upon completion of the inspection my staff remained at Larson and assisted in the correction of those areas having an immediate effect on the EWO capability. To insure an adequate understanding of the problem areas revealed by the inspection and to further assure that aggressive action was being taken by all concerned, I directed the 4170th Commander to brief my staff and me on precisely what was being done to alleviate this unsatisfactory condition. I have every confidence, based on the information presented and particularly as a result of the discussion which followed, that the 4170th is properly oriented and that the follow-up inspection by your Inspector General will reveal dramatic improvement in this organization. (S)

Another field receiving strong emphasis is SAC Aero Club operations. I have grounded the Aero Clubs within 18th Air Division until my staff and I are satisfied that

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0484

they will operate in complete compliance with AFR 34-14, SACM 34-3, and directives received from your headquarters. (U)

With the achievement of an Emergency Combat Capability by the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron, many problems have been drawn into sharp focus. In the launch complex taken over, we have been plagued with many failures even though the missile has been in a stand-by status. During a two week period 111 work orders were processed for this one site; of these, eleven were of such serious nature the probability existed that the site would not have been capable of ECO accomplishment. On the second site which we were to accept, seven DPL's were attempted during the P-2 inspection, none have been successful. These problems, coupled with the ever increasing number of failures experienced at other sites prompted the recent TWX from the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron Commander advising your Headquarters and SAC that he could not accept additional sites until the contractor demonstrates consistent reliability. I further wrote you a letter expressing my ideas on this matter. My firm belief is that completion of a DPL is strictly random success and accordingly that we should not accept any more sites under the present acceptance demonstration criteria. In my letter a plan was set forth, for your consideration, outlining my ideas for successful completion of this weapon system. I will take no further time in this letter on this matter. (S)

In the missile personnel area, improper screening prior to assignment is evidenced by personnel with chronic ulcers, color blindness, and pychiatric problems being pipelined for launch crew duty. In other instances, personnel do not possess the necessary background investigation for the granting of required Top Secret security clearance. We have had one instance where a launch control officer has been denied a clearance. (U)

The 92d Bomb Wing's preparation to host the Bombing Competition is progressing satisfactorily. Plans are firm in the construction area and the contractor started work in the Competition headquarters on 11 August. Although budget limitations will not permit the luxuries of previous competitions nor allow all our desires as host, I feel that we will be lacking in none of the necessities and that adequate support will be provided. (U)

The return of the 92d Wing units from Ellsworth and Larson was effected with negligible problems. The motor vehicles were returned in not too good condition and were indicative of a general lack of care and attention. A concentrated program of rehabilitation has been in effect since the Wing returned and this problem is now in the past. (U)

Deficiencies which were brought to light in the Munitions Maintenance Squadron at Larson during the ORI have been corrected in the units of this command. I have charged the Commanders and DCM's with active, detailed supervision in this area. In addition, my staff constantly checks to insure that munitions personnel are included in SO-9 planning, stand-up briefings, commander's briefings, and that each loading crew is properly and currently qualified in each weapon in the Wing inventory. (U)

The first cycle of the 67-4 (Supply Awards Inspection) program has been completed with gratifying results. The detail required by this manual has uncovered many deficiencies and has promoted considerable improved efficiency. I consider this an excellent tool and recommend continuation of this project indefinitely. (U)

The supply situation at Larson is greatly improved following the removal, at my direction, of the Director of Supply. Lt Colonel Linn Mann was assigned to this position and, through the simple expedient of putting some people to work, has made great progress. (U)

The foil pack feeding, which I mentioned in my May letter, was tested at two sites during June. Experience gained from these tests has enabled us to make changes that have resulted in what our crews now feel is an excellent feeding process. We are currently utilizing foil pack feeding on a full time basis at two sites and are prepared to expand into the others as soon as they are released to SAC. The quality and desirability of this type feeding would also be especially appropriate for our flight crews on 24 hour missions, provided the B-4 ovens could be made available to the B-52 units. (U)

Project Money Tree continues to receive complete support at all levels; participation and improvement are excellent. Each of the project monitors is required to present a status and actions briefing in my conference room on the last Friday of each month. This joint briefing is paying dividends in the exchange of ideas and methods for manpower and dollar savings among the units of the division. (U)

Our bigger problems are that power production specialists on the launch crews are not eligible for proficiency pay. These crew members, who are normally junior in rank, work under the most unpleasant conditions in the entire complex. Also, they possess the most salable training for civilian industry. Retention of these critical crew members, unless this condition is rectified, could easily

become a problem. Recommend 15th Air Force assist in obtaining proficiency pay for these crew members. (U)

The 22d Air Refueling Squadron has practically no safety program and due to the 50% alert the designation of a crew to perform this function will not properly provide such a program. I have requested of 15th Air Force Plans to increase the UMD manning of this squadron to include a full time Safety Officer in order to properly cover this activity and have a firm safety program. (U)

A noteworthy practice which I have initiated has been the establishment of a Nuclear Safety Council in the Air Division. The attached policy on the Council and minutes of the first meeting speak for themselves. (U)

I will continue our efforts and vigilance in all areas of activity of the Air Division. I assure you we will be even more effective in all our endeavors by the time of our next letter. (U)

Sincerely,

FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

2 Atch
1. Policy Ltr Nr.122-1, 10 Feb 61, Nuclear Safety Program (U)
2. Division Nuclear Safety Council Minutes (U)

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

SECRET

FILE DESIGNATION

OPS 21-3

Headquarters
16TH AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO

11 August 1961

SUBJECT: Special Review of Command Control and Supervision of Flying Activities (22d AREFS)

TO: 15AF (C)

1. In accordance with your message C-95, dated 3 Aug 61, this headquarters performed a review of all activities contributing to command control and supervision of aircraft operations in the 22d Air Refueling Squadron during the period 9-11 August 1961. (U)

2. Two primary areas of weakness were brought to light during the review:

a. Although the Flying Safety Program is being accomplished in accordance with the letter of existing directives, it is being carried out without enthusiasm by the Safety Officer. As you know, there is no UMD authorization for a Safety Officer in squadrons who are tenants on non-SAC bases; therefore, this important function must be delegated to a highly qualified crew commander as an additional duty. His normal duties as air crew commander, flight commander, and instructor pilot leave little time for an energetic Safety Program. (U)

b. Check lists for actions required during aircraft inflight emergencies are not up to the standards required by 15AFM 55-3. (U)

3. The detailed report (Atch 1) provides complete information on the above problem areas, as well as other activities in which no major problems exist. (U)

4. The 22d Air Refueling Squadron has been directed to indorse the report through the 92d Bomb Wing to reach this headquarters not later than 25 August 1961, indicating corrective action taken or contemplated. Copies of the indorsed report will be forwarded to your headquarters on or before 31 August 1961. (U)

DO 61-20

COORDINAT	
OFFICE SYMBOL	NAME

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5. This letter will be downgraded to Unclassified when Attachment 1 is withdrawn. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID A. TATE
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

1 Atch
Special Review of
Command Control &
Supervision of Flying
Activities (5 cys)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

DO 18 Aug 1961

Special Review of Command Control and Supervision of Flying Activities (4170th Strat Wing)

15 AF (C)

1. In compliance with your message C95, dated 3 August 1961, this headquarters performed a review during the period 14-18 August, to determine the degree of command control and supervision of aircraft operations in the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

2. This review disclosed that there is an element of supervisory laxness; in assuring that aircraft operating limitations are followed religiously with respect to MITO and maximum and minimum gross weights for air refueling; in method of scheduling tactical aircraft training missions which imposes an undue and cumbersome workload on maintenance personnel and combat crews; in assuring that pilots whose instrument cards and instructor certificates have lapsed do not fly, or do not fly as instructors, as appropriate; in detailed knowledge of and adherence to the principles of 15AF Manual 55-3, as it applies to tactical and support aircraft; and in twenty-four hour a day supervision of flight operations involving support aircraft. (U)

3. The report attached provides detailed information on the above problem areas, as well as other operations within the wing. The Wing Commander has been directed to effect immediate action which will eliminate enumerated deficiencies and bring command control and supervision of flying activities into consonance with your stated requirements. (U)

4. The 4170th Strategic Wing has been directed to indorse the report to reach this headquarters not later than 25 August 1961, indicating corrective action taken or contemplated. Copies of the indorsed report will be forwarded to your headquarters on or before 31 August 1961. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID A TATE
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

1 Atch
Sp Review of Comd Control & Supv of Flying Activities, w/1 Atch (5 cys)

DO 61-21

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FILE DESIGNATION
OPS 21-1

C 25 Aug 1961

Inspection of Command Control and Supervision of Flying Activities, 92d Bombardment Wing (SAC)

15 AF (C)

1. A report of inspection of the 92d Bombardment Wing is attached and constitutes the final inspection of 15th Air Division units conducted in accordance with your C96 message of 3 August 1961. This inspection was performed during the period 21 to 25 August 1961. (U)

2. A perusal of the report will disclose that there is a need for improving supervision and control at all levels within operations and maintenance activities in order to assure that safe procedures are followed in all phases of aircraft operations. The following deficiencies are the most serious to be gleaned from the report and call for prompt corrective action: (U)

a. Controls on standardization checks do not assure that critical items of failure are rechecked in all cases. (U)

b. Procedures for monitoring due dates on instructor and instrument checks do not assure that currency is maintained in these areas. (U)

c. Standards for monitoring the proficiency of aircrews appear lax. Crew J-17 should be placed in supervised student status, to be retained in this status until an acceptable level of proficiency and safety consciousness is demonstrated. (U)

d. Qualifications of some maintenance personnel authorized to clear red cross items are in serious doubt. (U)

e. Some dangerous and unauthorized acts are being performed, such as defueling KC-135 aircraft with an engine running. (U)

f. Crew professional files do not comply with the spirit, intent, or letter of directives which have been issued pertaining to the establishment, maintenance and utilization of those files. (U)

DO 61-22

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OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
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DO	

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g. 15AFM 55-3 has not been fully implemented in that the Supervisor of Flying does not have complete and up-to-date regulations for ready reference and an efficiently prepared emergency notification sequence. (U)

h. There is evidence of incomplete supervision of Command Post activities as shown by the presence of obsolete regulations, incorrect aircraft data, incomplete and improper emergency notification sequence forms, incorrect SOPs, and lack of control procedures over TDY and diverted aircraft operations. (U)

i. Conflicting crash grid maps are in use in some offices. (U)

3. The report provides detailed information on the above deficiencies as well as other problem areas. The Wing Commander has been directed to take immediate action to correct the above and all other deficiencies pointed out in the report. Further, he has been instructed to review all aspects of supervision and control to assure a continuing program of surveillance of safety measures in all aircraft operations. (U)

4. The 92d Wing will indorse the report to this headquarters by 1 September. Copies of the indorsed report with appropriate comments of this division will be forwarded to your headquarters on or before 5 September. (U)

5. This letter will be downgraded to Unclassified when Attachment 1 is withdrawn. (U)

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Sp Review of Comd Control
& Supv of Flying Activities
(5 cys)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

DO 61-22

0492

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SECRET

FILE DESIGNATION

PRIORITY

15AF msg DC18, (U), 9 Aug 61

X AF

COORDINATION

SYMBOL	NAME
EXO	JOM
BDABC	

HQ 18 AIR DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

INFO: 15 AF MARCH AFB CALIF

/SECRET/ EXO 0329

For SAC CS and DOCOC. Info 3902 ABW (BDCS).

Brigadier General Harold W Ohlke, 1777A, will arrive Offutt via KC-135, RUSK 27, 2000Z, 14 August, for airborne command post duties. Desires quarters in SAC Motel. SCO 4*

11 23302 Aug 61

EXO SECRET

JAMES W MILLER, Lt Colonel, USAF, EXO ~~JAMES W MILLER, Lt Colonel, USAF~~ Executive Officer, 18th

2171 1 1

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0493

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COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

11 August 1961

Lieutenant General Archie J Old, Jr.
Commander
Fifteenth Air Force
March Air Force Base, California

Dear General Old:

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
	Eth

During the past several weeks we have been involved in witnessing contractor attempts to present Technical Acceptance Demonstrations (TAD) on the Atlas Weapon System. I am deeply concerned with the repeated unsuccessful attempts to demonstrate the system and seriously question the reliability, dependability and maintainability of the weapon system.

Demonstrations by contractors other than Kellogg and General Electric have largely been unsuccessful. They have been characterized by a series of equipment failures and malfunctions, the correction of many of which was inadequately covered by technical data or not covered at all. The failures and malfunctions have been transient ones, not often repeated, and not forming any definite pattern. However, the majority have been in the guidance and hydraulics systems.

To date we have had one complex successfully demonstrated and turned over to SAC. In light of subsequent failures to demonstrate successfully, I suggest that this demonstration was a transient success! It is certainly possible, considering the utter lack of success on many subsequent attempted demonstrations, and considering subsequent difficulties we have had on the one complex turned over to us. With regard to the complex turned over, we have been plagued with a series of malfunctions and failures even though all equipment is being kept in a standby status. I have absolutely no confidence that this equipment would meet tactical requirements if called upon now to do so.

There is no inference intended that our SATAF is not striving to give us a usable weapon system. On the contrary, he has done his utmost to insure that we get the best possible equipment under existing criteria. However, if the contractor meets demonstration criteria once regardless of how many repeated previous failures, SATAF is obligated to accept and then turn it over to us.

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The gaping difference between contract and tactical requirements presents problems which cannot be solved under the existing concept. I am certain that a "Golden Ram" must eventually be established. Delay in implementing this action will create additional months of lost time. I believe we can save time and prove or disprove the SM-65E system by creating a joint task force manned by SATAF, 567th Strategic Missile Squadron and contractor personnel. Under provisions of SACM 66-8 we should immediately withdraw from the TAT. As SATAF accepts a complex under contract requirements, it would go under control of a task force manned by SATAF, contractor and five (5) 567th Strategic Missile Squadron launch crews. This would pertain to each of the nine launch complexes and MAMS until all are under control of the task force, as would the personnel required to operate and maintain them. As the task force accepts each complex or the MAMS it should immediately start the following:

1. Maintain a maximum alert posture consistent with activities.

2. Verify, test and demonstrate all tech data using inputs of technically qualified contractor personnel and tactically experienced 567th Strategic Missile Squadron personnel.

3. Demonstrate use, troubleshooting and maintenance of all facilities, equipment and procedures.

4 Develop sufficient, compatible spares stock levels based on data received from these detailed demonstrations.

5. To avoid acceptance based on random successes, establish a 60-day test and demonstration period. During this period operate and maintain the complex and the MAMS using SAC personnel, equipment and supplies; spot check procedures as servicing, housekeeping and maintenance needs occur; conduct ten wet countdowns using SAC launch crews and joint SAC/contractor maintenance. All facilities, equipment and personnel to be under task force control and maximum training and experience of SAC crews to be developed using present Installations and Checkout (I&C) experienced contractor and SATAF personnel as instructors.

6. During the 60-day test, develop and test standardization and quality control programs. This type of program would give us a valid basis for judging the tactical effectiveness of this weapon system. It would also produce an experienced combat organization ready to assume EWO posture. Only then should we affix the SAC stamp of approval.

I consider our situation so serious that I urgently recommend an early meeting of senior SAC representatives with Air Force Systems Command to review the over-all Atlas problems and to consider the above recommendations as one of the actions necessary to provide a usable and dependable weapon system.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W ORLEY
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
ACTION PRIORITY		X		AF	X	
INFO PRIORITY						

FROM:
HQ 92 BOMB WING

TO:
15AF MARCH AFB CALIF

INFO: SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

SATAF FAIRCHILD AFB WASH (COURIER)

SECRET FROM 567 SMSC 1320 Action During Duty Hours.

FOR DM at 15AF. FOR DM4C at SAC. Subject: Technical Acceptance Demonstrations. Reference paragraphs 26 and 27(o), SACM 66-8. This is to officially advise that as the SAC member of the SAC Technical Approval Team at Fairchild AFB, I will refuse to accept any further facilities or complexes from the contractor involved with demonstrating the Atlas weapon system, as of this date. This action has been taken to preclude being involved in demonstrations and possible acceptance of a weapon system which I consider highly unreliable. Seven consecutive failures to demonstrate successfully on one complex and innumerable transient equipment failures and malfunctions on other complexes

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

DATE | TIME

MONTH | YEAR

COORD: 18 Air Div (C)

WRITER

SYMBOL: 567SMSC/1130/10Aug61

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): LEONARD L. JELLA, Col, USAF

PHONE 5281 | PAGE NO. 1 | NR. OF PAGES 2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

0497

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET

FROM:

HQ 92 BOMB WING

being readied for demonstration together with inadequate tech data to properly cope with these failures and malfunctions lead me to believe that any successful demonstration will be a random one and certainly not demonstrate an acceptable reliability. Pending SAC/BSD action causing the contractor to demonstrate under more definitive and comprehensive criteria which will guarantee a reasonable degree of reliability, no action will be taken to accept facilities or complexes.

High incidents of unscheduled maintenance on SAC owned Site Nine indicate doubtful reliability of this installation to support ORT or EWO. This is further substantiation of the actions taken as indicated above. (SCP 4)

	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
567SMSC	2	2	SECRET	

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1

0545

SECRET 34204

HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 31 October 1961

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis
ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

Harold W. Ohlke
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY
Major Roy Lewis
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET 15AF DX161-24

Atch 16' 1XOH 61-0026

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADCHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Materiel Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
ORI	Operational Readiness
PCS	Perment Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

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TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability of engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.

practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit delpoyment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Major Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Colonel David A. Tate
Director of Material	Colonel John B. Carey, Jr.
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Captain Frank J. Riddle

Administration.

At the end of October the B-52 combat crew strength of the 92d Bombardment Wing was 29 crews. Of this number, 26 were combat ready, with seven crews in select and 15 in senior status. There was also one N crew and two IN crews. The total of combat crews for the wing was one less than in September due to the PCS movement of one crew to Castle Air Force Base, California. In addition a senior crew was downgraded to N status and a combat ready crew was raised to senior status.

The 92d Air Refueling Squadron had a KC-135 crew strength of 34 combat ready crews of which 30 were in senior status. During this same period the 22d Air Refueling Squadron had 34 combat crews. Twenty-nine of these were combat ready. This figure represented an increase of three crews raised to this category during October.[4] (C)

Meanwhile, within the 4170th Strategic Wing, the B-52 bombat crew strength was 27 combat ready crews. Seven crews of this total were in select status, 16 were in senior and four in combat ready category. Tanker crews of this wing totalled 34, all combat ready, although three of these were in senior status.[5] (C)

This crew strength of the two wings gave the 18th Air Division 56 B-52 crews, of which 53 were in combat ready or higher categories, and 102 KC-135 crews, of which 97 were in combat ready or higher categories.[6] (C)

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4. Air Training Report, 92BW, CONFIDENTIAL, RCS: SAC-T12, 31 Oct 61, Filed DCO, FAFB.
5. Air Training Report, 4170SW, CONFIDENTIAL, RCS: SAC-T12, 31 Oct 61, Filed DCO, FAFB.
6. Ibid.

The B-52 bomber crews of the 92d Bombardment Wing flew 79 sorties in October. This was only one more sortie than in September. However the number of flying hours increased over 50 per cent to 933:00 hours. This increase was largely due to the lengthy missions flown under Operation WIRE BRUSH. Meanwhile the KC-135 tanker crews assigned to the 92d Air Refueling Squadron flew 181 sorties in 714:45 flying hours. The tanker crews of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron flew 133 sorties in 708:00 flying hours.[7] (C)

The B-52 bomber crews of the 4170th Strategic Wing participated in 80 sorties with 1053:10 flying hours, while the KC-135 aircrews flew 128 sorties in 714:40 hours.[8] (C)

Both wings assigned to the 18th Air Division participated in the Operation WIRE BRUSH and SKY SHIELD II missions. In addition, bomber aircraft and crews of the 92d Bombardment Wing flew Operation BAR NONE, a training exercise. Finally a number of minor missions, some of which were continuations from previous months, were flown by the division.[9] (C)

The total sorties flown by units of the 18th Air Division in October were 159 B-52 sorties with 1986:10 flying hours and 442 KC-135 sorties and 2137:25 flying hours.[10] (C)

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division commander, attended the SAC Air Division Commanders Conference, nicknamed Project STARRING ROLE, during 12 and 13 October in SAC Headquarters

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7. Air Training Report, 92BW, . CONFIDENTIAL, RCS: SAC-T12, 31 Oct 61, Filed DCO, FAFB.
8. Air Training Report, 4170SW, CONFIDENTIAL, RCS: SAC-T12, 31 Oct 61, Filed DCO, LAFB.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. During this same time Project HAIL VICTOR III, an event honoring senior NCO's throughout the command who had made outstanding contributions toward the accomplishment of the SAC mission, was held. Each air division selected an outstanding NCO within their command. Eighteenth Air Division's selection was Master Sergeant John J. Piotrowshi, NCOIC of the personal equipment section in the 22d Air Refueling Squadron at McChord Air Force Base, Washington. Sergeant Piotrowshi accompanied General Ohlke to SAC Headquarters and on the return trip to Fairchild.[11] (S)

Staff Visits by 18th Air Division.

A compliance inspection of maintenance activities of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron was conducted during the period 11 through 13 October by the 18th Air Division. A representative sampling of aircraft records, operating procedures, and training records was made in all areas covered during the inspection. There was a noticeable improvement in the entire maintenance field since the last visit conducted by the 18th Air Division. Control of personnel and equipment, the direction of maintenance tasks, and scheduling in the maintenance functions indicated an aire of professionalism had been developed. Morale was high and area relations with other units on the base were greatly improved. Usable status charts had been developed and status trends were being maintained, analyzed and corrective measures developed.[12] (S)

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11. Msg, 18AD to 22ARS, SECRET, EXO, Subj: Project HAIL VICTOR III and Project STARRING ROLE, 25 Sep 61, Exhibit #4.
12. 18AD Insp of 22ARS, SECRET, Compliance Inspection, 11-13 Oct 61, Filed 18AD.

The alert management portion of the inspection in the 22d Air Refueling Squadron was scored as marginal. Unsatisfactory areas uncovered by the inspection were manning, housekeeping, and administration. Training and scheduling procedures were generally satisfactory with only the flight orders section receiving a marginal score. The collateral training section was found to be unsatisfactory during the inspection. Activity in this area included the interrogation of the squadron training NCO, review of all records which he maintained and personal interviews with six instructors. The unsatisfactory overall rating was based largely on the results of critical area testing of aircrews. In the personnel and administration portion, the assignment of additional personnel who were recently authorized had enabled a greater degree of specialization with a resultant over-all improvement in this section. Although much work remained to bring this activity up to desired standards, assigned personnel were commended for the excellent improvement noted since the last compliance inspection. Safety and Security and Law Enforcement were also scored as satisfactory. [12] (S)

During the period 23 through 27 October the 18th Air Division accomplished a compliance inspection in the 4170th Strategic Wing at Larson Air Force Base, Washington. The inspection of maintenance activities gave the wing a satisfactory score. This rating was based on a notable improvement in maintenance during the last two-month period. Some problem areas still existed in the scheduling of recov-

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13. 18AD Insp of 22ARS , SECRET, Compliance Inspection, 11-13 Oct 61, 27 Oct 61, Filed 18AD.

ery and routine flight line maintenance operations and in more effective utilization of periodic and support branch personnel.[14] (S)

The entire operations function of the 4170th Strategic Wing was being reorganized along lines prescribed by regulation, except that the disaster control section was left under the base operations branch for better control and functional alignment. Although the DCO was given a satisfactory rating during the inspection, it appeared that he needed to give a firmer personel supervision of the collateral training program for assigned aircrews in order to produce the desired results. This conclusion was based on results of critical area examination administered to alert crews during the inspection. In the personnel portion of the inspection, the director of administrative services was the only section found unsatisfactory. The administrative and postal branch and squadron administration were scored unsatisfactory. Both the director of safety and security and law enforcement were scored marginal.[15] (S)

During the first part of October seven squadrons of the 92d Bombardment Wing were inspected by the 18th Air Division. The Civil Engineering Squadron, 92d Transportation Squadron, 26th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, 92d Armament and Electronics Squadron, 92d Combat Defense Squadron, 92d Food Service Squadron, and Headquarters Squadron 92d Combat Support Group were all inspected. Defisiencies ranged from a poor IPT program to obsolete publications and air force

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14. 18AD Insp of 4170SW, SECRET, Compliance Inspection, 23-27 Oct 61, 30 Oct 61, Filed 18AD.
15. Ibid.

and SAC indexes on file. In the Headquarters Squadron, 92d Combat Support Group the training and retention section was completely unsatisfactory.[16] (U)

During the past months, General Ohlke attended several critiques conducted by inspecting teams as well as briefings of corrective actions which had been taken by his units. With but minor exceptions, the same basic discrepancies were brought to light by each inspection. This was an indication that the action which 18th Air Division took to resolve specific discrepancies was not the solution to the overall problem.[17] (U)

At the conclusion of a 23-24 October briefing on the corrective actions taken by the 92d Bombardment Wing on the recent SAC ORI, both General Ohlke and Lieutenant Colonel James W. Miller, 18th Air Division Executive Officer made interesting observations on the possible action which could be taken to insure more positive and lasting improvement in overall effectiveness. Basically, this observation was that perhaps our people did not know specifically what they were supposed to do. To overcome this situation, an individual training program was suggested as a possible solution. It was felt that increased effectiveness would result from this increased knowledge.[18] (U)

Policy Directives of 18th Air Division.

After reviewing the third period MCS scores of the 4170th Strategic Wing, Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division comman-

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16. Informal Rep of Staff Visit, 92BW - CES, 92TS, 26MMS, A&ES, CDS, 92FSS, Hq Gp Sq, 3-6 Oct 61, Filed 18AD.
17. Ltr, 18AD to 22ARS, Subj: Informal Rep of Visit, 25 Oct 61, Exhibit #5.
18. Ibid.

der, found no improvement had been made during the October portion of the fourth quarter. In fact, the rates were a regression of an already totally unacceptable performance. Several areas in maintenance and operations showed no improvement. For example during October all the allowable cancellations and late take-offs for the three month period had already been used. General Ohlke stressed the fact that the airborne alert was a way of life and with the start of CHROME DOME would be as permanent as the ground alert. To correct these deficiencies, General Ohlke directed Colonel Everett W. Best, commander of the 4170th Strategic Wing, to take corrective action immediately.[19] (U)

The information program of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 4170th Strategic Wing was one of the low areas criticized by General Ohlke. In both instances the newspaper was the main factor contributing to the low MCS scores. General Ohlke further stated that during this period of tension, an aggressive well-rounded information program would be one of our most effective weapon systems. Immediate action was desired by the 18th Air Division to correct this condition.[20] (U)

It recently came to the attention of the 18th Air Division that some units of SAC were not complying with the requirements specified for compensatory time off (CTO) and the crew work week. Flight and missile crews' CTO had to cover a period equal to at least 50 per cent of the total time spent on the tour. Recently there had been

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19. Ltr, 18ADC to 4170SWC, Subj: MCS Scores, 31 Oct 61, Exhibit #1.
20. Ltr, 18ADC to 4170SWC, Subj: Infor Prog., 27 Oct 61, Exhibit #2. Ltr, 18ADC to 92BWC, Subj: Info Prog, 17 Oct 61, Exhibit #3.

entirely too many changes in the alert schedules for non-urgent reasons. Also, crew substitutions had been excessive. Both of these added to the problem of providing acceptable CTO and work week standards. Aggressive action by all commanders was desired and in the future 18th Air Division would be advised of all problems concerning these matters.[21] (U)

With the arrival of the fall season and the opening of hunting seasons the problem of hunting safety returned. To avoid the reckless use of firearms by personnel of the 18th Air Division, General Ohlke directed that all commanders personally brief each individual of their organization on hunting safety prior to his participation in the sport. It was hoped that in this way the useless loss of life in hunting accidents could be prevented.[22] (U)

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21. Ltr, 18AD to 92BWG, 4170SWG, 22ARSG, Subj: CTO and Work Week for Combat and Launch Crews, 9 Oct 61, Exhibit #6.
22. Ltr, 18ADC to All Comdrs, Subj: Hunting Safety, 17 Oct 61, Exhibit #7.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Order.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Ltr, 18ADC to 4170SWC, Subj: MCS Scores, 31 Oct 61	1
Ltr, 18ADC to 4170SWC, Subj: Information Program, 27 Oct 61	2
Ltr, 18ADC to 92BWC, Subj: Information Program, 17 Oct 61	3
Msg, 18AD to 22ARS, SECRET, EXO, Subj: Project HAIL VICTOR III and Project STARRING ROLE, 25 Sep 61	4
Ltr, 18AD to 22ARS, Subj: Informal Rep of Visit, 25 Oct 61	5
Ltr, 18AD to 92BWC, 4170SWC, 22ARSC, Subj: CTO & Work for Combat and Launch Crews, 9 Oct 61	6
Ltr, 18ADC to All Comdrs., Subj: Hunting Safety, 17 Oct 61	7

FILER'S INITIALS	TEMP	2 YRS	PERM	FILE CODE
SYMBOL/DRAFTER'S NAME/PHONE NR/DATE TYPED/TYPIST'S INITIALS				

31 Oct 1961

Colonel Everett W Best
Commander
[illegible] Strategic Wing
Larson AFB, Washington

Dear Terry:

I have reviewed your MCS scores for the quarter ending 30 September. I note your continued poor showing as indicated by the following:

Maintenance	
Cancellations	0
Additions	91
Deviations	34
Total	56.3
Operations	
Bombing Reliability	93
Unit Reliability	96
Air Refueling	92
Incentive Training	101
Total	97.6
Other Areas	
IPT	78
Fires	66
Weight Control	82
DID	94

All allowable cancellations and late takeoffs for the quarter have been used, and only 1/3 of quarter over.

These rates are a regression of an already totally unacceptable performance. No improvement was evidenced from last quarter, but a regression which I assume that "Team Ann" was the prime factor. The airborne alert is a way of life and with the start of "Chrome Dome" will be as permanent as the ground alert. I do not expect another excuse by your staff or yourself [illegible] airborne alert, or requesting relief from this operation. Commanders are expected to carry out their operations with dispatch and professionalism to the best of the organization's ability.

There are tools of management that afford excellent levers to increase operational capability. I personally believe that you are not intimately acquainted with all facets of your operation in order to place responsibility and direct corrective action to preclude recurrence or increase effectiveness.

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0562

I have in several instances discussed and [illegible] concerning your key personnel which was discretionary. [illegible] at my direction that your Director of Supply was relieved which has resulted in its increased effectiveness. I [illegible] A&E Squadron Commander which has been discussed, and has [illegible] in continued poor A&E support and maintenance. [illegible] has been discussed, with recommendations that he be [illegible] and assisted to increase maintenance effectiveness. No improvement has been forthcoming, but regression. I have requested his replacement.

It is your responsibility to show complete disdain for substandard performance and replace the lazy, inept and those who work from 1 to 5 only. I have a policy of no crew regression without my permission, yet you condoned and abetted in regression of a crew. This is complete disregard for orders and direction of higher authority. I expect you to re-form this crew with dispatch and advise me personally. Absence of senior officers during critical times or visits by senior commanders have been condoned by you and without my knowledge. In other instances, aspects of your operations have been coordinated with 15th Air Force rather than the Air Division to the embarrassment of both. This will cease. Complete disregard of recommendations of my staff, and replies to inspection reports indicate corrections and compliance have been completed when, in fact, no action was taken. This is a matter of integrity of reporting and false official statement. Any future instance will be dealt with through disciplinary action.

I expect you to take aggressive action to correct the deficiencies enumerated and advise me within one week of your actions for improvement.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W GUILES
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

0563

FILER'S INITIALS	TEMP	2 YRS	PERM	FILE CODE

SYMBOL/DRAFTER'S NAME/PHONE NR/DATE TYPED/TYPIST'S INITIALS

	LAST NAME	DTG
C		
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27 Oct 1961

Colonel Everett W Best
Commander
4170th Strategic Wing
Larson AFB, Washington

Dear Terry:

For some time I have been displeased with the Information Program in your wing.

In the time of a Cold War, an aggressive well-rounded information program is one of our most effective weapon systems. Through this media we can accomplish two extremely important objectives; the first, through our public information program keep the public constantly appraised of the essentiality of the SAC mission and gain their willing support and cooperation; the second, and equally important objective is accomplished through the internal information program - that of making our skilled personnel feel that they are a highly valued individual member of the SAC team - a team of which they desire to remain a member.

I have discussed the shortcomings of this activity with both you and your Director of Information on numerous occasions. There should be no question in either of your minds regarding the standards which I expect. Despite the complete awareness which you must have of this unsatisfactory condition, I have noted no improvement.

The time has come when I must insist upon appropriate positive action to provide an acceptable program. In order that you may have a clearly defined departure point for your actions, I will outline those portions of the program which are of primary concern to me:

a. The poor quality of your base newspaper has been repeatedly pointed out. In spite of this, the last evaluation conducted by Hq SAC placed Fairchild next to the bottom position in 15th Air Force. All that saved you from the bottom position was the extremely poor rating assigned Fairchild. I am fully aware of the requirement for printing SAC news service items. Along with this requirement, I expect a representative number of articles giving

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AIR FORCE-HQ, 15AF, MARCH 1961

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

0565

COMMUNICATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

17 October 1961

Colonel Lester F Miller
Commander
324 Bombardment Wing
Fairchild AFB, Washington

Dear Les:

For some time I have been displeased with the Information Program in your Wing.

For longer than I care to remember you have failed to obtain maximum, or even an acceptable share of MCS points in this area. I have discussed the shortcomings of this activity with both you and your Director of Information on numerous occasions. There should be no question in either of your minds regarding the standards which I expect. Despite the complete awareness which you must have of this unsatisfactory condition, I have noted no improvement.

The time has come when I must insist upon appropriate positive action to provide at least an acceptable program. In order that you may have a clearly defined departure point for your actions, I will outline those portions of the program which are of primary concern to me:

a. The poor quality of the base newspaper has been repeatedly pointed out. In spite of this, the last evaluation conducted by Headquarters SAC placed Fairchild at the bottom of the list with 74.9%. The top base in 16th scored 95.9% and the average score was 88.1%.

b. On several occasions no publicity has been provided on visits of distinguished visitors to Fairchild. The usual excuse in these instances is that the Information Office was not notified. I expect a normal degree of aggressiveness on the part of your Director of Information in finding out which newsworthy individuals will visit the base. In addition, I expect procedures to be established to insure his notification of pending arrivals as far in advance as possible.

c. In the interest of the best possible community relationship, I expect you and the Base Commander to make a representative share of talks to civic and similar groups. The responsibility for preparation of these talks should logically fall on your Director of Information, not to give them.

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 36, OCT 60 (Authorized for Local Reproduction)

0566

d. Furnishing a photographer for official and social events is a problem which has never been resolved. A typical example of this occurred at the annual dinner held at the conclusion of the annual bombing competition. The usual last minute scramble was experienced. A photographer was finally obtained by members of my staff. And, it was also necessary for a member of my staff to provide guidance and instructions on photographic coverage. In all probability, we will never again have assembled in one building the number of distinguished visitors who attended this function. No publicity was provided.

e. Within my headquarters I have delegated the responsibility for monitoring the Information Program to my Executive Officer. This officer, as my delegated representative, speaks for me on matters related to information. On several occasions your Director of Information has been informally requested to drop in to discuss information matters. The courtesy of responding to the request of my personal representative is often not extended.

f. Possibly no base in SAC is more abundantly endowed from a public relations standpoint. We have excellent facilities, our weapon systems are first line; we are pioneers in the aerospace age through the combination of manned and missile forces; the 92d Reconnaissance Wing has a long illustrious history and our relations with the civilian community are favorable. With all of these factors in our favor we have done little to sell to our civilian neighbors the importance of SAC, not only to preservation of world peace but to the economy of the surrounding community. With the many things that could be done to exploit our favorable circumstances - open houses, guided tours, talks to civilian groups, etc., your Director of Information saw fit to request permission from 15th Air Force to place an additional requirement upon our inadequate and overburdened support aircraft fleet. In this aerospace age, his desire was to fly 100 civilians on an orientation flight in our twenty-plus year old C-47s. I point out this example to illustrate how totally lacking this activity is in initiative and imagination.

The inefficiency of your Information Program has been commented too long. I not only commend you to take immediate action to correct this completely unsatisfactory condition, but to appraise me of your progress periodically until an acceptable program is in full operation.

HAROLD W GRIMM
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

2

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

SECRET

ROUTINE

15AF DP 2946,
25 Sep 61

X AF

HQ 18 AIR DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

22 AIR REFUELING SQ MCCHORD AFB WN

/SECRET/EXO 0482

For C. 15AF message Secret DP 2946, 25 Sep 61, is quoted for your information and guidance:

Quote. For Commanders. NCO Recognition Program (Hail Victor III). Project Hail Victor III will be held at Offutt AFB at the same time as Project Starring Role, 19-20 Oct 61. This project is designed to recognize senior NCOs throughout the command who have made outstanding contributions toward the accomplishment of the SAC mission. Request one senior NCO be selected from each Air Division. NCOs who participated in Hail Victor I and II will not be selected for Hail Victor III. Request name, grade, security clearance, unit, job title, on each selectee be forwarded to this Hq. ATTN: DPP, NLT 29 0020Z Sep 61

EXO 28/1600Z SEP 61

JOHNNIE W. HILL
CWO W-2, USAF
Dep Dir of Admin Svc

JAMES W MILLER, Lt Col, USAF, EXO
2171

SECRET

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	SIGNATURE OR NAME
EXO	Miller

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (or Dispatch)
		1 3				

SAC FORM 38, OCT 60

(Authorized for Local Reproduction)

0568

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET

NO 19 AIR DIV PARKSFIELD AFB WA

28 Sep 61. Uniform will be blue service. Participants should also bring white shirt and black bow tie. One formal affair will be held on the evening of 19 Oct 61 at Offutt AFB NCO Club. All participants will be billeted at Paxton Hotel in Omaha, due to nonavailability of quarters on base. Personnel selected will travel via military aircraft with participants of Project Starring Role. Maximum publicity will be given each participant upon his return from this program in the base newspapers. Especially significant should be the basis for selection. It is desired that Division representatives brief material presented at Conference to NCO Advisory Council or NCO Academy Graduates Association at Division bases within 45 days of return from conference. Request the following statement be included in TDY orders of each participant: Quote: Utilization of government quarters and messing facilities will adversely affect the accomplishment of assigned mission. Unquote. This message may be downgraded to Unclassified upon completion of conference. Unquote.

Following named airman your organization has been selected to represent 18th Air Division in Project Hail Victor III: Piotrowshi, John J, Master Sergeant, NCOIC Personal Equipment.

EXO

PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
2	3	SECRET	

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 -469064

0569

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FROM:

HQ 18 AIR DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

Sergeant Piotrowski will arrive Fairchild not later than afternoon of 18 October, and accompany General Ohlke to Offutt AFB. Request Sergeant Piotrowski be notified of his selection and furnished appropriate orders. Hq 15AF has been notified of the 18th Air Division selectee. SCP 4.

TO:

EXO

PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
3	3	SECRET	

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1

* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 - 489064

0570

FRAM

Ltr, Hq 15AF (DP), 12 Oct 61, Informal Report of Visit

1st Ind (EXC)

Hq 18 Air Div 25 Oct 1961

TO: 22 Air Rflg Sq (C)

1. The attached 15th Air Force report of Informal Staff Visit is forwarded for your information and action which you deem appropriate. You will note that no reply is required for this report.

2. During the past months General Ohlke has attended several critiques conducted by inspecting teams as well as briefings of corrective actions which have been taken by his units. With but minor exceptions, the same basic discrepancies arebbrought to light by each inspection. This is an indication that the action which we take to resolve specific discrepancies is not the solution to the over-all problem.

3. At the conclusion of a 23-24 October briefing on the corrective actions taken by the 92d Wing on the recent SAC ORI, both General Ohlke and Colonel Miller made some interesting observations on the possible action which we should take to insure more positive and lasting improvement in over-all effectiveness. Basically, this observation was that perhaps our people do not know specifically what they are supposed to do. In this regard, an individual training program has been suggested as a possible solution. In broad terms this training would consist of an hour or two each week, either during duty or off duty hours, to acquaint individuals with the specific responsibilities and skills required in the accomplishment of their duties. It is felt that increased effectiveness would result from this increased knowledge.

4. This information is provided for your consideration. You may desire to discuss this matter with Major Busch and establish a training program, using the discrepancies pointed out in the attached report as a departure point for improving the effectiveness of your personnel functions.

5. As per our conversation at the completion of the 18th Air Division critique conducted in your conference room 13 October 61, there is an apparent discrepancy in the evaluation of the IPT program by the 15th Air Force Team and the 18th Air Division Team. From the information which

2

Info: 92WG

I can gather, the following actions took place: The 15th Air Force Team expressed a desire to inspect one of the IPT activities. The A&E function was selected. This activity, along with your OMS section is in excellent condition. During the 19th Air Division inspection my people checked the squadron IPT office, the Field Maintenance activity and the Supply activity - these left much to be desired. The Organizational Maintenance activity was found to be in excellent condition. The A&E function was not inspected during the same inspection; however, our Directorate of Material inspectors checked the utilization of training devices and Contract Technical Representative utilization. These areas also left much to be desired. I can readily understand why these apparently conflicting reports could lead to confusion. I hope that this explanation at least partially clarifies this matter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES W MILLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

1 Atch
n/c

0572

0573

[redacted] I desire that you advise me of any problems you are having or anticipate concerning these matters.

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Headquarters
18TH AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: C

17 Oct 1961

SUBJECT: Hunting Safety

TO: Commanders

1. The useless loss of life and limb in hunting accidents must be stopped. There is no excuse for such accidents and they can be prevented so simply if the hunters will only observe the ten rules of hunting safety.

2. Violation of any of these ten rules is not only criminal negligence, it is very close to insanity. The man that carries a loaded weapon in a vehicle, the man that doesn't unload a weapon before crossing a fence, the man that has a loaded weapon in camp, the man that mixes alcohol and gunpowder are prime subjects for the institutions for the weak minded and mentally deficient. These men should not be allowed to handle a cap pistol let alone a lethal weapon.

3. Violation of Commandment No. 5 has killed many hunters: Never shoot at noise in the brush! Noise shooting has been responsible for the majority of hunting deaths. Most of the injured hunters are injured by their companions shooting at noises in the brush. You must see what you are hunting before firing. Let's stop this now and spare lives.

4. This command has already had two shooting accidents and the deer season is not yet one week old. Each of these accidents was caused by a violation of hunting safety rules. One violated a state statute as well. Both of these violators, in addition to the mental punishment they will undergo for the rest of their lives, are liable to criminal prosecution. Most definitely, these individuals did not expect their pleasure trips to turn out the way that they did, but, gentlemen, it happened.

5. I am now requiring that commanders personally brief each individual of their organization on hunting safety prior to his participation in the sport. I further require that this briefing be documented and certified by individuals

concerned. Hunter responsibilities must be realized and thoroughly understood by all if we are to stop this useless waste of manpower and human suffering. Further, this attitude must not be a one-time application or a "lip service" compliance, but a concentrated, continuing emphasis throughout the exposure period.

HAROLD W. O'NEIL
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

2 Atch
1. Checklist
2. Ten Commandments of Muzzle Safety

0576


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HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 31 December 1961

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis

ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

Harold W. Ohlke

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

15AF DX1 62-20
EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY
Major Roy Lewis
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

IVOH-62-0004

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Atch 12

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0638

GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

0639

FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADCHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Materiel Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
ORI	Operational Readiness
PCS	Perment Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0640

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

0641

HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability of engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit delpoyment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61. Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Major Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	
Director of Material	Colonel John B. Carey, Jr.
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Captain Frank J. Riddle

Administration.

On the evening of 18 December Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division commander, arrived at Offutt Air Force Base, Headquarters of SAC, in Nebraska for airborne command post duties.[4] (S)

Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force had recognized for some time the requirement to establish a missile capability within the headquarters of 18th Air Division which had a mixed aircraft and missile mission. Several attempts to acquire a missile officer authorization in the division had failed. Headquarters, SAC had stated emphatically that no additional authorizations would be forthcoming and that if a missile capability was required or desired in the division, one of the incumbents currently authorized therein should be trained. Countering this, however, is the fact that extensive missile training was permitted only for personnel who occupy missile authorizations. But this realignment of existing manpower resources to achieve the desired missile capability was viewed with serious reservations. It appeared that instead of trying to solve the problem, this program was directing efforts toward organizing around the problem. Assuring the maximum EWO capability with an ever increasing air and ground alert posture imposed responsibilities and associated work loads on the division which did not exist at the time the manning structure was conceived.[5] (U)

On 28 November through 6 December Headquarters, Fifteenth Air

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4. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET DC 3660, Subj: Airborne Command Post Schedule, 27 Nov 61, Exhibit #3.
5. Ltr, 15AF to 18AD, Subj: Attainment of Missile Capability, 7 Dec 61, Exhibit #7.

Force sent Lieutenant Colonel George C. Mitchell of the C & E Division at March Air Force Base to Fairchild under an exchange program aimed at increasing the staff and field knowledge in the missile program. During the eight days TDY, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell took over the duties of one of the officers assigned to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron and the officer reciprocated by assuming Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell's duties and responsibilities.[6] (U)

The 4170th Strategic Wing experienced an uptrend in their base rating under the management control system (MCS) during the October - December quarter. Their base rating for the July - September quarter was 86 per cent and the October - December quarter rating was 92.1 per cent. Weak areas included ground safety and weight control. In the bomber operations area bombing reliability was 92 per cent, two per cent below the SAC average. They also lost points on incentive training with a score of only 69 per cent. The wing lost additional points in bomber maintenance which was due mainly to scheduled cancellations of aircraft. However, despite these areas of weakness improvement over the previous quarter was evident.[7] (U)

During the October - December quarter the 92d Bombardment Wing was not scored in operations and maintenance, therefore, no base total could be arrived at. However, in the base support areas the

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6. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, UNCLAS DOTM 62350, Subj: Missile Exchange Program, 22 Nov 61, Exhibit #4.
7. Interview, A2C Burhans w/TSgt. G. Hassinger, 4170SW IXOH, 5 Feb 61.

wing did not fare as well as hoped. Although they were above the Fifteenth Air Force average in the personnel section and just six tenths of a point below the SAC average, the score was 2.3 per cent below the previous quarter. In base support the wing was slightly below the Fifteenth Air Force average and above the SAC average. In addition the base support rating increased 6.6 per cent over the previous quarter. Under the general section the base rating was below the SAC and Fifteenth Air Force average, however, there was a slight improvement over the previous quarter. Overall the wing increased from 89.5 per cent to 91.8 per cent, but this rating was still below the SAC and Fifteenth Air Force average.[8] (U)

In the past, 18th Air Division received the MCS results from the units too late to take corrective action on potential weak areas. This was a handicap which prevented the division from realizing their full capabilities, both operationally and MCS-wise. To remedy this situation, General Ohlke directed each unit to brief him each month on the MCS status of their organization by the use of flip charts. In addition he directed that the commander or staff officer who had the primary responsibility for each weak area be present for the briefing. The first briefing was scheduled for early in February.[9] (U)

During the month the number of combat ready bomber crews of the 92d Bombardment Wing remained the same as the previous month. Two non-combat ready crews which had been formed during the previous

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8. Ltr, DCRM to All Staff & Squadrons, Subj: Official SAC MCS Scores - Oct/Dec Quarter, Filed 92BW DCRM.
9. Ltr, 18AD to All Units, Subj: MCS Status Briefing, 28 Dec 61, Exhibit #5.

month were disbanded due to lack of crew resources. Of the 27 combat ready crews, seven were select, 15 in senior status and five in combat ready status.[10] (S)

The tanker combat ready crew strength of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron reached the 36 combat crew strength needed to meet the tanker ratio of 1.8 crews for each aircraft assigned. Of the 36 combat crews assigned, 30 were in senior status and four were in combat ready status. In addition there was an M crew and a P crew. Meanwhile the tanker combat ready crew strength of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron remained the same. There were 30 combat ready crews of which 11 were in senior status.[11] (S)

In the 4170th Strategic Wing the bomber combat ready crew strength was 27. This included eight select, 14 senior, and five combat ready crews. There were no crews in the non-combat ready crew classification. In addition the tanker crew strength totaled 35 combat ready crews of which three were in senior status and 32 were combat ready. Again there were no crews in the non-combat ready classification.[12] (S)

The total bomber combat crew strength of the 18th Air Division was 54 crews. Of this total 15 were in select status, 29 in senior status and 10 in combat ready status. A review of the tanker crew strength of the division showed 99 combat ready crews and two non-combat ready crews. Of this total 44 were senior and 36 were combat ready.[13] (S)

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10. History, 92BW, SECRET, 1-31 Dec 61.
11. Ibid.
12. Ltr, 4170SW to 92BW, SECRET, Subj: Crew and Flying Figures, 1 Feb 62, Exhibit #6.
13. Ibid.

Meanwhile the bomber crews of the 92d Bombardment Wing flew 66 sorties for a total of 562:05 flying hours. The bombers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 68 sorties for a total of 965:20 flying hours. This gave the division a total of 134 sorties flown by the bombers in 1527:25 flying hours.[14] (S)

The tanker crews of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron flew 136 sorties for a total of 861 flying hours and the tanker crews of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron flew 95 sorties in 630 flying hours. During this same period the tankers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 142 sorties for a total of 717:15 flying hours. This gave the division a total of 373 tanker sorties in 2,208:15 flying hours.[15] (S)

In the 4170th Strategic Wing the majority of the bomber sorties flown were attributed to the airborne alert and combat crew training missions. Most of the tanker sorties flown were for test and ferry flights. The 92d Bombardment Wing also participated in several missions which included Operation CHROME DOME, TEXAS STAR, BAR NONE, and AIR MAIL.[16] (S)

18th Air Division Staff Visits.

On 21 December the 92d Bombardment Wing conducted Operation SPRUCE UP with 18th Air Division personnel acting as umpires. Directed locally by the 92d Bombardment Wing Operations Order 19-61, the objective of this exercise was to determine the capability of tactical crews to carry on operations under simulated fallout and damage condi-

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14. Ltr, 4170SW to 92BW, SECRET, Subj: Crew and Flying Figures, 1 Feb 62, Exhibit #6.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.

SECRET

tions associated with weapon near misses.[17] (S)

During the exercise the alert force was not jeopardized and normal transient air traffic continued as scheduled although considerable delay was experienced in landings, take offs and servicing. Operation SPRUCE UP began early in the morning of 21 December when headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force sent a message to the wing designating that a nuclear weapon would be detonated near Fairchild in 10 minutes. After detonation and for the next 10 hours of the exercise, radioactive fallout was the major problem affecting operations of the follow-on force. During the exercise essential launch and recovery personnel were declared non-participants. After detonation all casualties and damaged areas were tagged by the umpires.[18] (S)

At the conclusion of the exercise Colonel Lester F. Miller, 92d Bombardment Wing commander considered it to have been satisfactorily executed and every effort was made to achieve as great a degree of realism as possible. However, Colonel Miller made one recommendation and that was that the exercise would be executed on an advance notice basis, as it was, but all damage situations and criteria, as well as the sequence of events, should be developed by the 18th Air Division umpires and known only to them.[19] (S)

The consensus of all the 18th Air Division umpires was that additional exercises of this type were required to attain and main-

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17. 18AD Umpire Report on Operation SPRUCE UP, SECRET, 92BW, 21 Dec 61, Filed in Dec 92BW History.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

SECRET

tain the desired level of efficiency. It was therefore recommended that a SPRUCE UP exercise be conducted by each base quarterly.[20] (S)

An informal staff visit by 18th Air Division was conducted in the 92d Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron of the 92d Bombardment Wing on 27 November through 1 December. Discrepancies found during the visit varied. The squadron publications file did not contain all required publications and in some cases these publications had not been ordered. The analysis activity appeared to be conducting an adequate program in the analysis of armament and Electronics systems and components. Also the productrol board being used in production control for processing equipment was not maintained in accordance with Fifteenth Air Force directives. These and other discrepancies noted during the staff visit were discussed with supervisory personnel and wherever possible, immediate corrective action was taken.[21] (U)

On 17 December Lieutenant Colonel James W. Miller, the executive officer for 18th Air Division flew a training mission with a bomber crew of the 92d Bombardment Wing. Several discrepancies were noted during pre-flight and flight which could have been an indication of the degradation of the professional standards of the wing. During the mission the bomber was unable to make contact with the Scenic Badlands. The control room at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota was finally contacted and they advised the crew that

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20. 18AD Umpire Report on Operation SPRUCE UP, SECRET, 92BW, 21 Dec 61, Filed in Dec 92BW History.
21. Ltr, 18AD to 92BW, Subj: Informal Staff Visit to 92 AES, 5 Dec 61, Exhibit #1.

the Scenic Badlands were closed until further notice. While on their low level route, the crew was unable to make contact with the La Junta bomb plot. Denver Center was then contacted and requested to relay the information. The center then requested the bombers altitude and position which indicated that the center had no knowledge of the aircraft position. The bomber crew was then advised to abort the run and climb immediately to the altitude assigned. Discrepancies noted prior and during the mission were brought to the attention of the wing commander for the necessary action.[22] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Air Division.

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division commander, was not pleased with the accident prevention programs within the units during 1961. The 18th Air Division accident prevention program which had been published at the beginning of 1961 had not been implemented to the fullest extent. Many areas had been omitted entirely and others had not been fully supported. As a result, accident prevention awareness was regressing. Before this regression worsened the division's rates any further, the program and structure would have to be revitalized. However this revitalization was not a one man job but required the support of every man in the unit. As a result, General Ohlke directed each unit to intensify their efforts throughout their commands to achieve the desired results.[23] (U)

During recent CEG evaluations performed on units of the 18th Air

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22. Ltr, 18AD to 92BWC, Subj: Combat Crew Training Mission Discrepancies, 19 Dec 61, Exhibit #2.
23. Ltr, 18ADC to All Units, Subj: 18AD Accident Prevention Program, 28 Dec 61, Exhibit #3.

Division, certain discrepancies were revealed which had to be corrected. The three major areas of failure discovered during the CEG were the gunners of the bombers, boom operators of the tankers, and the tanker crew failures on alert procedures. However it was interesting to note that there had never been any failures by bomber crews on alert procedures. In addition the combat support groups and crews were below acceptable standards. As a result General Ohlke requested that all commanders personally insure that adequate study programs were in effect and that standardization sections tighten up their criteria for grading the air crews.[24] (U)

It was brought to the attention of the division commander that the condition of the aircraft in his command was noticeably declining with regard to cleanliness and paint condition. Division standards stated that a neat and clean aircraft promoted efficiency and quality in both maintenance and operations personnel. Also, the safety requirements dictated that painting of our aircraft recieve the command attention that all elements of safety required. To eleviate the situation, General Ohlke directed that all units establish a continuing project that would result in the condition of the aircraft meeting with the high standards of the command.[25] (U)

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24. Ltr, 18AD to All Units, Subj: CEG Evaluation, 15 Dec 61, Exhibit #9.
25. Ltr, 18ADC to All Units, Subj: Painting and Cleanliness of Aircraft, 15 Dec 61, Exhibit #10.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Order.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Ltr, 18AD to 92BW, Subj: Informal Staff Visit to 92 A-ES, 5 Dec 61	1
Ltr, 18AD to 92BW, Subj: Combat Crew Training Mission Discrepancies, 19 Dec 61	2
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET DC 3660, Subj: Airborne Command Post Schedule, 27 Nov 61	3
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, UNCLAS DOTM 62350, Subj: Missile Exchange Program, 22 Nov 61	4
Ltr, 18AD to All Units, Subj: MCS Status Briefing, 28 Dec 61	5
Ltr, 4170SW to 92BW, SECRET, Subj: Crew and Flying Figures, 1 Feb 62	6
Ltr, 15AF to 18AD, Subj: Attainment Missile Capability, 7 Dec 61	7
Ltr, 18AD to All Units, Subj: 18AD Accident Prevention Program, 28 Dec 61	8
Ltr, 18AD to All Units, Subj: CEG Evaluation, 15 Dec 61	9
Ltr, 18AD to All Units, Subj: Painting and Cleanliness of Aircraft, 15 Dec 61	10



EXO 19 Dec 1961

Combat Crew Training Mission Discrepancies

92BW (WC)

1. On 17 December I flew a B-52 training mission with Major Young's crew. There were several discrepancies noted on this flight which may be an indication of degradation of the high professional standards of the 92d Bomb Wing. The Division Commander has directed that these discrepancies be brought to your attention. Following are items noted:

a. Briefing conducted by the squadron was very informal. The briefing officer was in shirt sleeves, slides were dirty and smeared, briefing items were covered in such rapid order that they were of little value. The squadron Operations Officer is to be commended for his excellent presentation of safety of flight and procedural change information.

b. Bus time at Personal Equipment was 0745. Bus actually arrived at 0807. This was only after the aircraft commander and I had called the Motor Pool. It has been noted that at many bases personal equipment is delivered to the aircraft, which reduces the crew's reporting time prior to takeoff. Several crews in the past have questioned as to why this procedure is not implemented at Fairchild AFB.

c. Although crews were 22 minutes late in reporting to Base Operations, weather information was not available.

d. Aircraft had been parked in the nose dock overnight. However, when removed from the nose dock, aircraft was parked heading in the opposite direction from the open taxiway, necessitating turning aircraft around in order to gain access to the active runway.

e. Last minute maintenance had to be accomplished on aircraft, with the usual confusion of maintenance personnel in and out of the aircraft.

f. Runway center marker lights were not visible, although turned to full intensity by the Control Tower.

g. Live firing was scheduled. Ammo had not been loaded.

h. Activity was scheduled and control times assigned for both Scenic Badlands and Clay Bank. Crew accomplished scheduled run on Scenic Badlands but unable to make radar contact. Control Room at Ellsworth was finally contacted. They advised that Scenic Badlands was closed until further notice. Crew unable to contact La Junta bomb plot while on low level route. Denver Center was contacted with request to relay information. Denver Center requested present position and altitude (Lake McConnahey, at 5,000 ft). Center advised to abort run and immediately climb to an altitude assigned. Even though aircraft was on an ATC approved flight plan, I have some doubt that Denver Center had knowledge of aircraft location.

i. There is a possibility that crew had an unreliable Large Charge run on bomb plot. Pilot and radar TG meter were not in agreement. Whether this was a contributing factor to the possible unreliable run is not known.

j. Crew complained of sleep being interrupted at 0300 Sunday, by testing of central heating plant steam whistle. Checks by Division personnel indicate that whistle was not being tested.

2. This report is submitted for your information and action which you deem appropriate. No reply is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES W MILLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

0660

DOWNGRADED AT
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

0662

15AF FORM 370 JUN 58

PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED. FC: 4780.

COORDINATION/FILE COPY

AIR FORCE-BIG. 15AF, MARCH 1958

0663

HEADQUARTERS
NINTH STRATEGIC WING
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

SECRET

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOM

SUBJECT: Crew and Flying Figures for December 1 Feb 62

TO: Office of Information (Historian)
924 Bombardment Wing
Fairchild AFB, Washington

1. Crew Status:

B-52 combat-ready, 27. These included 8 select, 14 senior, and 5 CR crews. There were no crews of NCR classifications. KC-135 tanker crews totaled 35, including 3 senior and 32 CR. There were no NCR crews.

2. Flying Missions:

B-52	Sorties	Flying Time
Airborne Alert	27	599:45
CCTM	32	305:30
Test/Ferry	9	60:05
TOTAL	68	965:20
KC-135		
Airborne Alert	44	88:40
CCTM	42	214:40
Test/Ferry	66	413:55
TOTAL	142	717:15

for George J. Hassinger, Jr.
JESSE M. SMITH
Capt., USAF
Information Officer

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~IXOH-61-016~~ 224
IXOH-62-002

SECRET

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

Ltr, Hq 15AF, (DPL), 17 Nov 61, Attainment of Missile Capability Within Air Divisions

1st Ind (C)

7 December 1961

Hq 15 Air Div, Fairchild AFB, Wash.

TO: 15AF (DPL)

1. The feasibility of achieving the desired missile capability in 15 Air Divisions through realignment of existing [illegible] resources is viewed with serious reservations. It appears that instead of trying to solve the problem, our efforts are directed toward organizing around the problem.

2. Assuring the maximum EWO capability with an ever [illegible] ing air and ground alert posture imposes responsibilities and associated work loads on the Air Division which did not exist at the time the current manning structure was conceived. The requirement for monitoring and supervising the EWO capability of missile units was unknown at that time, and possibly is still unknown. This we do know, there has certainly been no reduction in the Air Division work load during the time that the current manning authorizations have been in existence.

3. I have carefully considered the realignments proposed in paragraph 3 of your letter. Obviously, any one or combination of these changes can be implemented provided there is a clear understanding that the capability of the Air Division will be reduced in the affected functional area. The mission of the Air Division will remain unchanged by these actions, that of being the eyes and ears of the numbered Air Force commander. The question is, in which areas can we stand visual and audio impairment in order that we may have greater acuity in other areas? Following are my comments relative to your specific proposals:

a. Remove Lt Col 7016 from Executive Officer function and convert to AFSC 3116, Missile Maintenance Staff Officer position, in the Directorate of Material. I am adamantly opposed to this change. Finding a captain with the background, experience, and versatility to assume the functions of this position is like looking for a six year old boy with ten years experience. The EWO capability of an organization is comprised of more than trained crews and combat ready hardware. Without an adequate support capability the mission cannot be accomplished. The Executive Officer is a key [illegible] in the attainment of the mission objective. To accomplish his duties effectively he must be a combination personnel expert, administrator, comptroller, inspector, security

3

EXO Miller

RETURN TO	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Disposal)

SAC FORM 34, OCT 60 (Authorized for Local Reproduction)

specialist, and public relations man. He must possess the ability to detect actual and potential problem areas and the capability to develop courses of action which will insure expeditious corrective action. In many respects the functions of the Air Division are similar to those of a numbered Air Force headquarters. The responsibilities of the Division Executive are related to those of the Chief of Staff--insuring that the important matters are brought to the Commander's attention, that appropriate actions are taken on matters of lesser importance, and that the Commander is not bothered with trivia. Finding a captain with this capability is difficult, if not impossible. Where it is certainly desirable to have a missile trained officer within the Division Directorate of Material, I feel that the majority of Division Commanders will share in my feelings that regardless of USAF authorizations there will always be a mature Lt Col who serves as the Executive Officer.

b. Replace the Lt Col Administrative Officer with the Capt Administrative Officer. As stated above, I feel that the majority of Commanders will retain one of the authorized Lt Colonels as an Executive.

c. Convert SSgt Illustrator to Administrative Specialist in the Directorate of Operations. To effectively manage a dispersed Air Division it is essential that the Commander have basic charts showing the status and trends of assigned units. I seriously question the economy of utilizing Lt Colonels and senior noncommissioned officers to prepare and maintain these charts in a current status.

d. I reluctantly agree to conversion of the MSM position, AFSC 72B90, to a Missile Maintenance Superintendent. Under the current arrangement this position is of considerable benefit to me not only as a personnel superintendent but as a Sergeant Major as well. The welfare of the airmen in my unit is of vital concern to me. A noncommissioned officer is in a better position to obtain information and effect proper corrective action than a commissioned officer. However, realizing the critical requirement for a greater missile capability, I concur that this position should be converted to the missile career field and transferred to the Directorate of Material.

e. Convert Major Flying Safety Officer position from AFSC 1926 to AFSC 1916. I heartily concur in this action.

f. Convert Major Operations Staff Officer position, AFSC 1416, to Missile Staff Officer, AFSC 1816. I concur in this action; however, it must be recognized that degradation in the manned SAC planning and operational functional areas will result.

0666

4. Before a firm decision is made in the alteration of both manning and operational concepts of the XI Air Divisions, I feel that serious considerations should be given to the problem areas which have been encountered in the missile program since its inception. Due to the contemporary concept some of these were inevitable. Others, I am afraid, we must admit were the result of inadequate planning, supervision and management. Under the dual force concept we must exert every effort to develop the maximum deterrent potential of the unmanned force without degrading the known capability of the manned force. To serve effectively as the eyes and the ears of the numbered Air Force Commander, the Air Divisions must be provided the resources essential to the accomplishment of this important mission.

WARREN V. CURTIS
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
n/c

C 28 December 1961

18th Air Division Accident Prevention Policy

SAFE 2 Jan 62

4170 Strat Wg (WC) 92 Bomb Wg (WC)

1. I have not been pleased with the accident prevention programs within the command this past year. The 18th Air Division Accident Prevention Policy which I published at the beginning of 1961 has not been implemented to the fullest extent. Many areas have been omitted entirely and others have not been fully supported. This is also true of the policies drawn up by your safety staff and published by you. The command and supervisory support demanded in any accident prevention program has not been given in far too many cases. Too many times supervisors and commanders are totally unfamiliar with these publications and therefore are not influenced in the least by their requirements. As a result, accident prevention awareness is regressing. Before this regression worsens our accident rates any further, the program and structure must be revitalized.

2. This revitalization is far from a one-man job. In fact, it requires every man in your unit. Yet only one man can generate the necessary interest and drive required to start and maintain an effective program and structure. This man is the Commander.

3. Too many hours are being spent by your staff safety personnel in doing work which belongs in the units themselves. Just as your DCM does not change a defective unit on an aircraft and your DCO does not fly the missions directed by you, your DS should not be required to do the pick and shovel work which is the responsibility of the unit commanders, supervisors and safety personnel. The additional duty safety personnel throughout your unit must be utilized more and more in the programs. They constitute the staff of the Director of Safety and the backbone of the structure. Training of these personnel must improve and increase until they are "in fact" the accident prevention force which executes your policies and your program.

4. I expect an intensified effort throughout your command to achieve this goal. Your units must place motivated and energetic personnel in the additional duty of safety and they must be used by your staff Director of Safety in the day-to-day implementation and improvement of your program. Your

Director of Safety must be an organizer and administrator as well as a planner and trouble-shooter, and he must be able to effectively obtain the cooperation of the entire wing in the performance of his duties. With so few personnel assigned directly to his control, your unit commanders must assist him by favorably selling the product, by assigning good personnel to the squadron safety function and by motivating these personnel to perform to their fullest in accident prevention and safety education.

5. When this is accomplished, your rates will reflect the accomplishment, your effectiveness and efficiency will improve, and conservation and preservation of national resources will contribute more and more to the primary mission.

HAROLD W CHILES
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

0669

C 15 Dec 1961

CEG Evaluations

4170SW (WC) 92BW (WC) 22ARS (C)

1. The recent CEG evaluations performed on units of this Air Division have revealed discrepancies which must be corrected.

2. It appears that three of our major areas of failure in CEG evaluations are gunners of the B-52 crews, boom operators on KC-135 crews, and KC-135 crew failures on alert procedures. It is interesting to note that there have never been any failures of B-52 crews on alert procedures. Further, the CEG evaluation of combat support groups and crews is below acceptable standards, and this includes support aircraft crew chiefs.

3. It is requested that the above areas be given your personal attention and that adequate study programs are in effect for CEG evaluations. It is important that standardization sections tighten up their criteria for grading of our crews.

4. I expect future CEG evaluations to have outstanding results in all three areas of evaluation; that is, B-52s, KC-135s and the support areas.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander


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HISTORY

SECRET

HISTORY

18 AIR DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 31 January 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis
ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

15AF DXJ 62-31
EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY
Major Roy Lewis
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

IVOH 62-0806

SECRET

0677

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADCHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Materiel Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
ORI	Operational Readiness
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0680

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

0681

HISTORY

18TH AIR DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Air Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Bombardment Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Bombardment Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Air Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH AIR DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Major Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler (Acting)
Director of Material	Lt. Col. James W. Thompson (Acting)
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Captain Frank J. Riddle

Administration.

Effective on 1 January, Colonel John B. Carey, Jr., 18th Air Division director of materiel, was reassigned to the 92d Bombardment Wing as deputy commander for operations. This vacancy occurred following the assignment of Colonel Rodger L. Howard, formerly deputy commander for operations, as vice wing commander of the 92d Bombardment Wing. Until the assignment of additional colonels to the 18th Air Division for duty as director of operations and director of materiel, Lieutenant Colonel Maurice E. Marler and Lieutenant Colonel James W. Thompson, Jr., would be acting as director of operations and director of materiel respectively.[4] (U)

On 3 Through 5 January Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division commander, attended the Air Division Commanders' Conference at Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force at March Air Force Base in California. The primary purpose of the conference was to further define the role and mission of the air division within Fifteenth Air Force. At the conclusion of the conference, division commanders presented their recommendations to the commander which would later be utilized in outlining the division responsibilities within this air force.[5] (U)

The estimated overall base score for the 4170th Strategic Wing under the management control was 91.7 per cent. One of the problem areas which caused this score was the individual proficiency

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4. Msg, 18AD to 15AF, C 6024, Subj: Reassignment of 18AD DM, 20 Dec 61, Exhibit #7.
5. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, CS162, Subj: Commander Conference, 27 Dec 61.

training section. However as time progressed during the quarter, the maximum score in this area would be attained. In base support, fire incidents was scored at 80 per cent which was the only low score in the base support area. Weight control which was scored at 74 per cent and ground safety, scored at 50 per cent were also two weak areas in MCS. In operations, bombing reliability was 93 per cent, one per cent below the SAC average and bomber unit reliability was 96 per cent, one per cent below last quarter's score. Under bomber maintenance, the wing scored 82 per cent with one cancellation for the month. There were also three late take-offs for a score of 44 per cent. In tanker operations, air refueling efficiency was scored at 96 per cent, due to four chargeable lost refuelings. In tanker maintenance two late take-offs gave the wing a score of 76 per cent.[6] (U)

In the 92d Bombardment Wing, the overall base score was 101.2 per cent for January and a slight increase to 101.9 per cent was expected for the quarter. Problem areas included fire incidents which was scored at 80 per cent. Flying safety was 50 per cent due to the C-47D aircraft which crashed on 4 January and was caused by poor judgement on the part of the pilot when he failed to consider existing weather conditions and deviated from the planned route of flight. Ground safety was scored at 80 per cent and weight control increased to 74 per cent. By the end of the quarter the base expected to have attained a score of 86 per cent in this area. In

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6. Report, 4170SW SAC MCS Scores, 28 Feb 62, Filed 18ADC.

bomber operations the score was estimated at 104.8 per cent with bombing reliability obtaining a score of 94 per cent. In tanker operations, air refueling was the only item less than 100 per cent and it was scored at 97 per cent. In both bomber and tanker maintenance the score was 100 per cent with 97.4 per cent projected for the quarter.[7] (U)

During January the number of combat ready bomber crews of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 4170th Strategic Wing was exactly the same. Each wing had 27 combat ready crews of which 8 were in select status, 14 in senior status and 5 in combat ready status. In the 92d Bombardment Wing one crew was upgraded to select status.[8] (S)

Meanwhile the tanker crew strength of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron was 36 combat ready crews, the total number of tanker crews needed to meet the tanker ratio of 1.8 crews for each aircraft. Of the 36 combat tanker crews, 29 were in senior status, 6 in combat ready status and one crew in P status. The tanker crew strength of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron remained the same as the previous month with 30 combat ready crews of which 11 were in senior status. During this same period the tanker crew strength of the 4170th Strategic Wing was 35 combat crews which included 7 in senior status and 28 in combat ready status. Four crews were upgraded from combat ready to senior status.[9] (S)

In the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron of the 92d Bombard-

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7. Report, 92BW SAC MCS Scores, 15 Feb 62, Filed 18ADC.
8. Ltr, 4170SW to 92BW, Subj: Monthly Historical Report, 13 Mar 62, Exhibit # 8.
9. Ibid.

ment Wing the combat crew strength was 46 crews of which 44 were combat ready. In addition 10 missiles were assigned to the squadron. Meanwhile the 4170th Strategic Wing received their first Titan I missile on 25 January without the nose cone. However the launching complexes were not operational as of the end of the month.[10] (S)

The total bomber combat crew strength of the 18th Air Division was 54 crews. Of this total 16 were in select status, 28 in senior status and 10 combat ready status. A review of the tanker crew strength of the division showed 107 combat crews of which 47 were in senior status, 63 in combat ready status and one crew in P status.[11] (U)

Meanwhile the 18 B-52F aircraft of the 92d Bombardment Wing flew 99 sorties for a total of 882:45 flying hours. The 17 bombers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 83 sorties for a total of 709:50 flying hours. This gave the division a total of 35 bombers which flew 182 sorties for a total of 1633:35 flying hours.[12] (U)

The 21 KC-135A aircraft assigned to the 92d Air Refueling Squadron flew 98 sorties for a total of 744:40 flying hours and the 16 tankers assigned to the 22d Air Refueling Squadron flew 89 sorties for a total of 569 flying hours. The 20 tankers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 112 sorties in a total of 721:05 flying

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10. Ltr, 4170SW to 92BW, Subj: Monthly Historical Report, 13 Mar 62, Exhibit #8.
11. Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, 22AFSMA 5195, Subj: Historical Report for January, 8 Feb 62, Exhibit #9.
12. SAC MOS Chart of Operations in Division, 9 Feb 62, Exhibit #10.

hours. As a result the tankers assigned to the division flew 399 sorties in a total of 2034:45 flying hours.[12] (U)

During January the 92d Bombardment Wing participated in several missions. Among these missions were Operation BIG BLAST, a penetration training mission for the bomber crews, and Operation FINE-LINE CHARLIE, a requirement for tankers to air refuel B-47 bombers from the 9th Bombardment Wing. In addition the wing continued their support of Operation CHROME DOME and again assumed support of the TEXAS STAR requirements.[14] (S)

During this same period the aircraft of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew in support of Operation FINELINE CHARLIE and Operation BIG BLAST. Two bombers and tankers flew in support of the SAC NORAD mission and tankers continued to be sent to the Eielson Tanker Task Force in support of Operation CHROME DOME. TEXAS STAR requirements were also supported by the wing.[15] (S)

Staff Visits by 18th Air Division.

On 3 and 4 January Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Thompson, acting 18th Air Division director of materiel, made a formal staff visit to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild to determine the adequacy of corrective actions taken on discrepancies noted by the Fifteenth Air Force staff visit in September and to discuss critical problem areas which had not been resolved by the squadron and were beyond its control or that required command assistance.[16] (U)

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13. SAC MCS Chart of Operations in Division, 9 Feb 62, Exhibit #10.
14. Report, 92BW Historical Report for January 1962, Filed Historical Safe.
15. Ltr, 4170SW to 92BW, Subj: Monthly Historical Report, 13 Mar 62, Exhibit #8.
16. Ltr, Formal Staff Visit of 567SMS by 18AD, 92BW, 8 Jan 62, Exhibit #1.

The formal staff visit revealed that extensive progress had been made in maintenance, operations, and procedures and that supervisory personnel were highly motivated. New local management methods were being implemented or tried where the generally prescribed methods were not compatible with operations peculiar to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron. Ground was being laid to recommend adoption of more suitable utilization procedures for manpower and equipment where applicable. An example of this situation was when the MOCAM team and other specialist dispatch systems were being realigned to preclude excessive waste of manhours and utilization. Numerous simular problem areas existed and the squadron was aggressively pursuing solutions consistent with its operational experience and managerial capabilities.[17] (U)

Several major problem areas considered by the unit were planned to be presented to higher headquarters. One such problem was the lack of provisions in the current organizational structure for administrative assistants for site commanders. This hampered the accomplishment of responsibilities in completing OER's, inspection reports, and planning schedules. Another problem was the present and future deficiencies in trained power production personnel. Recent interviews indicated a low retention rate in this career field in the future. In addition despite the efforts made to provide adequate transportation for the squadron operations, it still continued to be a major problem area. In order to help resolve these and other problem areas, 18th Air Division contemplated that an additional formal

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17. Ltr, Formal Staff Visit of 567SMS by 18AD, 92BW, 8 Jan 62, Exhibit #1.

visit would be conducted during April of this year and informal staff visits to individual activities would be made at frequent intervals.[18] (U)

On 3, 4, 5, and 8 January, Major Thomas H. Paskell, 18th Air Division director of safety, performed an informal staff visit to the 92d Bombardment Wing. During the course of the visit, personnel from various squadrons were asked who their safety officer and NCO were, the majority of them did not know. In one of the squadrons, orders were not on file in the orderly room designating the safety officer and NCO but orders were on file naming the squadron safety committee. As a result of the staff visit, recommendations were made that each squadron post photos of the squadron safety officer and NCO at prominent locations. It was stressed that the squadrons maintain an accurate tally of personnel requiring AF Regulation 32-17 training. The mandatory attendance of primary members of the base safety council was also stressed. Representatives of the primary members would attend only when the primary members were physically absent from the base.[19] (U)

On 4 and 5 January an informal staff visit was made on the Headquarters Squadron, 92d Bombardment Wing by 18th Air Division personnel for the purpose of determining the status of the maintenance of individual proficiency training records. During the inspection the squadron orderly room was found to be in very poor shape as far as training was concerned. The first of two

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18. Ltr, Formal Staff Visit of 567th SMS by 18AD, 92BW, 8 Jan 62, Exhibit #1.
19. Ltr, Informal Safety Staff Visit 92BW, 16 Jan 62, Exhibit #2.

repeated discrepancies noted was that the organization still did not have a training NCO on orders, and the second was the lack of a current IPT status chart. In addition the squadron had been lax in meeting suspence dates on previous staff visit completion action reports.[20] (U)

An inspection of the different sections within the squadron revealed the same poor management trend throughout. In some sections record maintenance was entirely unsatisfactory with no improvement and in one section an individual had not been entered officially in training despite the fact that he had been stationed here for three months. As a result 18th Air Division recommended the immediate appointment of a qualified squadron training NCO, and an intensified effort to bring all records up to a current, acceptable standard.[21] (U)

During January the 18th Air Division performed an inspection on the inadequacies in the maintenance of officer and airman control rosters in the 22d Air Refueling Squadron. The inspection revealed no discrepancies, however action was taken to insure proper use of the officer and airman control program in the form of a letter initiated to query units as to their intentions concerning administrative, disciplinary, or elimination action on substandard and marginal personnel. This resulted in a minimum of deficiencies and the application of the control program was excellent. In addition the initial inspection revealed that commanders were hesitant to forward derogatory material for inclusion into a centrally controlled derogatory file. To correct this situation a supplement to AF Regulation 39-40 was published emphasizing the need for correlation and placing

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20. Ltr, Informal Staff Visit to Hq. Sq. 92BW, 10 Jan 62, Exhibit #3.
21. Ibid.

the responsibility of [illegible] commanders and staff agencies for furnishing derogatory material. As a result no recommendations for additional action by higher headquarters were necessary.[22] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Air Division

There were varying degrees of success in the accident prevention program within the command during 1961. With the exception of civilian injuries, the accident rate at Larson Air Force Base dropped appreciably under 1960. However, Fairchild Air Force Base did not fare as well. With the exception of private motor vehicle accidents all rates were higher in 1961 than in 1960.[23] (U)

In view of this, Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Air Division commander, started a study of the personnel assigned the additional duty of safety officer and NCOC. He discovered that the structure of the accident prevention program was not as strong as desired below the wing staff level. As a result General Ohlke sent a letter to all units of his command stressing the use of additional duty safety personnel. These individuals were the backbone of the accident safety prevention program and the best contact between the supervisors and the individual. In some cases, squadron personnel were not aware of the additional duty accident prevention personnel within their unit. In light of these requirements, commanders were required to select high caliber individuals for this duty, not just to satisfy a technical point of manning, but an individual that would actively, aggressively and effectively

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22. Msg, 18AD to 15AF, EXC 5817, Subj: Inspection of Maintenance of Officers and Airman Control Rosters, 24 Jan 62, Exhibit #4.
23. Ltr, 18AD to 15AFC, Subj: Accident Prevention Program, 9 Jan 62, Exhibit #6.

implement the commander's program. In this manner, the 18th Air Division accident record for 1961 could possibly be improved during 1962.[24] (U)

In spite of the emphasis General Ohlke had placed on improving the base newspaper at Fairchild, no improvement had been made. Fairchild continued to occupy a very low position in the over-all rating annually and also during January 1962. During the last week of January the assistant information officer replaced the NCOIC and attacked the problem from the angle of better management and training. Three weeks later, under the new system, the base newspaper received a score of 91.8 per cent. This was an improvement over the 78.5 per cent earned during the previous month. If this pace could be maintained Fairchild would show a marked improvement over the previous quarter.[25] (U)

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24. Ltr, 18ADC to All Units, Subj: Additional Duty Safety Personnel, 9 Jan 62, Exhibit #5.
25. Ltr, 18ADC to 92BWC, Subj: Base Newspaper Scores, 23 Jan 62, Filed 18ADC, FAFB.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Wing and Base Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Wing and Base Staff Agencies.

Files of the Wing and Base Staff Agencies.

Interview of Wing and Base Officials.

Wing Commander's Remarks attached to the Wing Flying Training Report.

Wing, Base, and 15th Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETTEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

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EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Ltr, Formal Staff Visit of 5678MS by 18AD, 92BW, 8 Jan 62	1
Ltr, Informal Safety Staff Visit, 92BW, 16 Jan 62	2
Ltr, Informal Staff Visit to Hq. Sq. 92BW, 10 Jan 62	3
Msg, 18AD to 15AF, EXO 5817, Subj: Inspection of Maintenance of Officer and Airman Control Rosters, 24 Jan 62	4
Ltr, 18AD to Units, Subj: Additional Duty Safety Personnel, 9 Jan 62	5
Ltr, 18ADC to 15AFC, Subj: Accident Prevention Program, 9 Jan 62.	6
Msg, 18AD to 15AF, C6024, Subj: Reassignment of 18AD/DM, 20 Dec 61	7
Ltr, 4170SW to 92BW, Subj: Monthly Historical Report, 13 Mar 62	8
Msg, 22ARS to 92BW, 22ARSMA 5193, Subj: Historical Report for January, 8 Feb 62	9
SAC MCS Chart of Operations in Division, 9 Feb 62	10

Col Jella
Your comments, please
RLH, VC
17 Jan 62

File
OPS
JB

DM 8 January 1962

Formal Staff Visit, 567th Strategic Missile Squadron

92SW (WC)

1. Persons Making Visit: Lt Colonel J. W. Thompson, DM
CMS Gordon L. Grimm, DMM
SMS Donald J. Newberg, DMAE

2. Period of Visit: 3-4 January 1962

3. Persons Contacted:

Colonel L. L. Jolla, 567SMS Commander
Lt Col H. R. Faison, Maintenance Control
Lt Col Charles Lower, OIC Maintenance Control Br.
Major J. C. Whitley, OIC Shops Maintenance
Major V. W. Ford, OIC QC & E
Major D. H. Owens, OIC PM Maintenance
CWO W. W. Gephart, OIC PM
SMS C. E. Berman, NCOIC Maint Tng.
CMS W. H. Sanders, NCOIC Job Control
CMS S. C. Speraw, NCOIC Quality Control

4. Purpose:

a. To perform initial formal staff visit by the Materiel Directorate of this Headquarters to 567th SMS.

b. To determine adequacy of corrective actions taken on discrepancies noted by 15th Air Force staff visit 25-29 September 1961 and the 3901st SMES, 14 and 15 November 1961.

c. To discuss critical problem areas which have not been resolved by the 567th SMS and are beyond its control or that require command assistance.

5. General: The initial formal staff visit by this headquarters since final acceptance of all launch complexes, revealed that extensive progress had been made in maintenance operations and procedures. Supervisory personnel are highly motivated. New local management methods are being implemented or tried where the generally prescribed methods are not compatible with operations peculiar to the 567th SMS. Ground work is being laid to recommend adoption of more suitable utilization procedures for manpower and equipment where applicable.

(Example: MMCAM Team and other specialist directed systems are being realigned to produce comparable units of measure and utilization.) However similar problem areas exist and the squadron is aggressively pursuing resolutions consistent with its operational experience and managerial capabilities.

6. Major Problem Areas: Several major problem areas considered by this unit are pertinent to be presented to higher headquarters. These are not contained within the capability of this 3901st SMS and require assistance or guidance from a higher level.

a. There are no provisions in the current organizational structure for administrative assistants for site commanders. This hampers the accomplishment of responsibilities in completing OERs, inspection reports, and planning schedules.

b. Present and future deficiencies in trained power production personnel. Recent interviews indicate a low retention rate in this career field in the future.

c. Control and Inadequacy of Transportation. In spite of all efforts to provide adequate transportation for the squadron operations this continues to be a major problem area. Control of current available facilities also is conflicting.

7. Comment on Discrepancies of Previous Staff Visits (15AF and 3901st SMRS) - A review of discrepancies noted during the 15th Air Force Staff Visit of 28-29 September and the 3901st Strategic Missile Evaluation Squadron of 14 and 15 November indicated satisfactory progress. Specific observations during this visit were as follows:

a. Maintenance Control:

(1) Firm procedures have been developed in preparing maintenance and training schedules.

(2) SOI procedures are not fully in compliance with SACR 66-15. Firm control over SOI by Job Control is questionable. A squadron SOI has been published certifying all LCOs as maintenance officers and they are granted blanket authority to break and re-seal inspection items. Job Control is not notified on a continuing basis daily when this authority is used. (Par 7a, SACR 66-15)

(3) The amount of unscheduled maintenance has decreased and LCOs are submitting Forms 526A on required maintenance. The scheduling section is now conducting a meeting at 1300 hours daily to correlate all known maintenance requirements. Maintenance shop chiefs are attending this meeting due to the fact that job standards have not been developed. Some progress

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is being made in developing standards and it is suggested that this program be expedited in order to save needed man-hours utilized by the shop chiefs in this meeting.

(4) Visual aids and forms are being utilized in an acceptable manner. SAC Forms 7A are in consonance with status boards and active AFTO Forms 130C.

(5) All documentation is now being entered on the AFTO Forms 130C, thus providing a permanent record for historical and analysis purposes.

(6) Much more planning is evident in task analysis of maintenance being performed by teams. As a result, utilization of existing transportation has improved considerably.

(7) Status boards have been devised to include most key support equipment and areas. All permanently assigned vehicles are designated on the vehicle status board.

(8) A master waiver document (for the integrating contractor (GDA)) reflecting waiver items as of November is on hand. Although nearly all items have been accomplished there is no up-to-date document reflecting current status and none showing waivered items completed by associate contractors.

b. Quality Control and Evaluation: The Quality Control Section has progressed to a point where complete coverage of all requirements has been either effected or is well along in planning and implementing stages. It is strongly recommended that an internal evaluation of this activity be immediately instituted by the Wing and Squadron Commander to insure that only the highest technically qualified personnel are assigned to Quality Control & Evaluation. In a missile organization this section should be the number one concern of all personnel in authority. It is also recommended that the UMD authorization be raised to a figure more compatible with the many requirements as outlined in SACM 66-1, SACR 66-15, and other applicable directives. Under the present UMD it will be virtually impossible to meet these requirements with 19 personnel authorized.

(1) All inspection requirements have been charted and are included in the monthly and weekly maintenance schedules. A program is also in effect to analyze trouble areas and situations utilizing data available from the Reports and Analysis Section.

(2) A program establishing more direct control of limited tech order files and a review of requirements has been completed. Periodic inspections of files are now being done on a schedule to insure proper maintenance of publications files.

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(4) [illegible] is now taking part in and contributing input to the Monthly Maintenance Schedule.

(5) Only limited personnel evaluation is being accomplished at the present time due to non-receipt of SJPE Forms.

c. Reports and Analysis: A firm analysis program has been implemented in accordance with SACM 68-1 as supplemented. Analysis data is being generated and presented to applicable sections. However, the small amount of data available due to a very short period of operational status and due to constant changes and procedures tends to create serious doubts as to its validity.

d. Periodic Maintenance: Teams have been formed and will perform the first missile P-1 on 15 January. All periodic personnel have completed training at Vandenberg and have had refresher courses based on specialties administered by QC&E in conjunction with the training section.

e. Calibration:

(1) The problems involving mobile calibration under squadron organizational maintenance on launch complex equipment have not been resolved. Satisfactory progress has been made in preparing plans and schedules for equipment calibration and in performing calibration within their capabilities. Several problems exist, however, which cannot be locally resolved:

(a) Two permanent type calibration vans have been programmed. These have not been received and no estimated delivery date is available. A calibration trailer has been borrowed and is presently undergoing modification for use as a temporary mobile calibration lab.

(b) Approximately one-fourth of required calibration equipment is not on hand. No estimated delivery dates have been provided by AFLC.

(c) Technical data from General Dynamics Astronautics will not be available until about 15 February.

(d) The five personnel authorized in the 1 Oct 61 UMD are not sufficient for manning two calibration trailers or for accomplishment of the approximately 2700 items of equipment required on complex calibration.

(2) PMEL: Action should be taken to insure that equipment requiring calibration by the base PMEL is accurately identified to include current location. Items scheduled for calibration by the PMEL are not being delivered at the times

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specified and in many cases are received four or five days late. Of 14 items scheduled on 4 Jan 62, only four have been delivered to the lab; these were received following several telephone calls between the PMEL and the missile squadron.

f. Maintenance Training: Utilization of CTS personnel is not in accordance with the intent of AFR 66-18. Scheduled formal training classes are inadequate. The January monthly maintenance order indicates 1,936 CTSD hours available and only 176 hours scheduled for formal training. It is recommended that immediate emphasis be effected to insure that CTSD are utilized in accordance with the terms of their contract and applicable directives. Formal training should be scheduled in weekly and monthly maintenance orders to insure that it is scheduled for specified personnel and/or teams.

8. Testing: A 50 question Missile Maintenance Safety Examination was administered to eight personnel with the following results:

	Number	Grades
Airmen	4	76 to 80%
NCO	2	72 to 84%
Officers	2	70 to 72%

9. Minor Items: The following minor items are listed for consideration or corrective actions where required:

a. LOX cleaning facility is being used effectively with limitations imposed by:

(1) Size of cleaning vats restricts use to comparatively small pieces of equipment.

(2) Storage drawers for components of CTU are too small to accommodate some items made bulky by air sealed polyethelene packages.

(3) Components test unit (CTU) is inoperative due to hydraulic pressure unit (HPU) awaiting parts. Test unit also should not be used for testing hydraulic components due to incompatibility in LOX cleaned facility. (Hydraulic pressure relief lines are vented into this room. Possible modification to CTU to run vent lines into other area may correct this condition. TWMA to relocate CTU was disapproved.)

b. Consideration should be given to extending the driveway completely around each launch complex. The requirement to turn around each heavy duty vehicle, trailer or van on

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completion of its use at the junction or fuels loading spots poses serious operational hazards, particularly during winter and icy periods.

c. Some organizational and section equipment charts were not posted and up to date.

d. Notification of missile movements were not being accomplished in accordance with the provisions of 92d Wing Logistics Plan 408-62 (Annex K, par 3b).

10. Conclusion: No reply or indorsement to this report is required. It is contemplated that an additional formal visit will be conducted by the Materiel Directorate of this Headquarters during the month of April, 1962. Informal visits to individual activities will be made at frequent intervals.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

6

SAFE file
My Sullivan MGT-S
Your actions -
Brief me on
this
LL Hartman
VE
22 Jan 62

DS 16 Jan 1962

Informal Staff Visit

92WC

1. On 3, 4, 5 and 8 January 1962, I performed an informal Safety staff visit to the 92d Bomb Wing. Units visited were:

SAFE - Major Sullivan, Sgt Suhly
92OMS - Lt Col Mink, Lt Allen, Sgt Turner, Sgt Hardt
92PMS - Lt Col Boyer, Lt Pritchett, Lt Kardell, Sgt Kelly
92PSS - TSgt Miner
92CES - MSgt Walters, TSgt Ranger

2. The visit to SAFE encompassed the areas of Base Safety Council meetings, Squadron Safety Council meetings, compliance with Wing Commander's Summer Safety Program Part II dated 6 June 1961.

a. The records in the SAFE office indicated that 10 Council meetings were held in 1961. The meetings in months of May and June were not held due to TDY status during runway construction. Safety Council activities at the TDY bases were accomplished on a separate basis.

b. A breakdown of attendance is as follows:

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
C				0	0							
EC			0x	0	0			0				
DCO							0x	0x		0x		
EDCO					0x				0	0	0	0
DCM			0x	0x	0			0x		0x		0
EDCM				0	0			0x		0		0x
SUCO			0x		0			0	0	0	0x	0

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
[redacted]	[redacted]											
[redacted]	[redacted]											
[redacted]	[redacted]											
[redacted]	[redacted]											
[redacted]	[redacted]											
[redacted]	[redacted]											
[redacted]	[redacted]											
[redacted]	[redacted]											
[redacted]	[redacted]											
[redacted] (Asst [redacted])	[redacted]											
Mr. Wynn	[redacted]											

0 Primary member absent
x Representative of absentee attended
(representative not always the same person)

c. Squadron Safety Council Meetings as required by BASE SUP-1/BACR 59-1. Minutes of these meetings on file at the Base Safety office are as follows:

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
TS						X						X
325BS										X	X	X
OMS		X					X	X	X	X	X	
92ARS				X	X							
A&E		X	X				X		X	X		
22ARS						X		X		X		
PMS		X	X				X	X	X			

	I	F	M	A	M	I	L	I	A	S	O	N	D
567SMS						X							
MMS			X		X	X	X	X					X
OS													
CDS												X	
ASUS		X	X	X	X		X						
CES					X			X	X	X	X	X	
FSS				X									
SS													
810Med													

In visiting the OMS and FMS these records were found accurate. Although the 810 Med Gp submitted no minutes to SAFE they did submit a report of safety meetings with personnel of the unit for each month Jan thru November. The FSS did the same for the months Jan thru October.

d. The actions required by the Commander's Summer Safety Program, Part II were on file at SAFE with the exception of 325BS, 92FBS and 810 Med Gp.

3. 92OMS

a. Safety Personnel. Fifteen personnel in OMS were asked two questions each. Who is the Squadron Safety Officer? NCO? Of the thirty answers, no one knew the Safety Officer and three knew the NCO. Nine tanker branch personnel gave the correct answer for their branch safety NCO.

b. 15AFM 32-4 Training and Testing. Of 444 Form 283s, 67 were checked for documentation of this training. All were correct and up to date. This indicates a reliability in excess of 92% that all records indicate the training and testing is complete and recorded.

c. AFR 32-17 Training. There are approximately 98 personnel under 25 years of age in the squadron. The number of these personnel requiring AFR 32-17 training is not known by the squadron.

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4. 82FMS

a. Safety Personnel. Fifteen personnel of FMS were asked two questions. Who is the FMS Safety Officer? NCO? Five answered correctly for the Safety Officer and three for the NCO. (Since Safety Officers were recently changed, two names were considered acceptable. All those considered correct were the past Safety Officer).

b. USAFM 32-4 Training and Testing. Training records indicate that 43 people requiring this training are not complete.

c. AFR 32-17 Training. There are 187 personnel in the squadron under 25 years of age. The number of these personnel requiring AFR 32-17 training is not known by the squadron.

5. 82FSS

a. Safety Personnel. Seven FSS personnel were asked two questions. Who is the FSS Safety Officer? NCO? Seven were correct for the officer (the squadron has only one officer) and two were correct for the NCO. All seven named one Sergeant as the Safety NCO. The two correct answers named two personnel as Safety NCO.

b. AFR 321-7 Training. There are 53 personnel under 25 years of age in the squadron. The number of these personnel requiring AFR 32-17 training is not known by the squadron.

6. 82CES

a. Safety Personnel. Eleven personnel were asked two questions each. Who is the CES Safety Officer? Safety NCO? Six were correct on the officer and seven on the NCO.

b. AFR 32-17 Training. There are an estimated 250 personnel under 25 years of age in the squadron. The number of these personnel requiring AFR 32-17 training is not known by the squadron.

c. Orders. Orders were not on file in the Orderly Room designating the Safety Officer or NCO. Orders were on file for the Squadron Safety Committee.

6. Recommendations

a. That each squadron post 8" x 10" photos of the Safety Officer and NCO at prominent locations. Photos to be on posterboard approximately 20" x 30"

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and printed with, "This is your Accident Prevention Officer/NCO", "Use him", "Phone XXXX". I emphasize using the phraseology "accident prevention" rather than "safety".

b. Squadrons maintain an accurate tally of personnel requiring AFR 33-17 training.

c. That a concentrated program to comply with AFR 33-17 training be established in the wing.

d. That attendance of primary members of the Base Safety Council be mandatory. Representatives be permitted only when primary member is physically absent from the base.

e. Squadron Council meetings be held IAW existing regulations.

f. That a monthly report to the Base Safety Council on compliance by squadrons with Squadron Safety Council regulations. This report to be included in the Base Safety Council Minutes.

7. An answer to this staff visit report is not required. Items covered will be items of interest on future visits.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS H PASKELL
Major, USAF
Director of Safety

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IRD

10 Jan 1962

Informal Staff Visit

92WC

1. An informal staff visit to Hq Sq 92 Bomb Wing was conducted 4 and 5 January 1962 for the purpose of determining the status of maintenance of IPT records.

2. Personnel making visit: Major Lewis E McRae, Adm Officer
SMSgt A D Bomba, Div Sgt Major

3. Personnel Contacted: Major Stephenson, Sq Commander
Major Lewis, IRD
MSgt Bowler, Office of DCO
Lt Col Petersdorf, DP
MSgt Burkhardt, Office of DP
Major Sheets, Retention Officer
MSgt Panther, NCOIC, Actg and Control, DP

4. Findings and Recommendations:

a. Sq Orderly Room

(1) This organization did not have a Squadron Training NCO appointed on orders. This is a repeat discrepancy, contained on DPMIT staff visit report dated 31 Oct 61.

(2) Squadron did not have a current IPT status chart. (Par 3. 1g(1), AFR 50-26/Base Sup-1). This is a repeat discrepancy.

(3) It was noted that this organization had been lax in meeting suspense dates on previous staff visit reports. Two inspections of this organization were performed by DPMIT during 1961. The first inspection performed on 8 June 61 and forwarded to Hq Sq on 13 June, with a suspense date of 5 July 61. Report was answered by squadron on 28 July 61, over three weeks late. The second inspection performed 20 Oct 61, forwarded to organization on 31 Oct, with a suspense date for completed action and return of 28 Nov 61. Corrective action had not been taken nor report answered as of date of this visit.

(4) On 13 Nov 61 the Wing Commander appointed a board of supervisors to review Wing's training records and assist where possible. A two-page list of general discrepancies, dated 7 Dec 61, was furnished the Hq Sq (Wg) for guidance. There was no indication that any corrective action had been

on listed discrepancies to date of this visit.

(2) In view of this organization not having a Training NCO, compliance with current directives as regards monthly meetings, periodic visits, ordering and control of training material, standardization of records maintenance and UPT status charts appeared to be inconsistent.

b. Custody Room - This section had one man who had just completed the 5-level test and was awaiting test results prior to entry in 5-level training. This man was carried in a chargeable status for approximately 5 months. A JTS was not available for 5-level training and required records were not accomplished nor utilized during period of 5-level training.

c. Office of the DCO, 92BW

(1) This office had one man in training. This man entered training on 19 July 61. Since entry on training, no entries had been made on the AF Form 623, the SAC 56 or the JTS, nor any other record to indicate that any training had been or was being done. The date of entry on training was not indicated on the SAC 56 or AF Form 623.

(2) Training record maintenance is entirely unsatisfactory.

(3) The Training NCO and supervisor stated that the reason for the present records status was that no one had been in to assist him or to tell him how to make up the records and that he did not have time to read the applicable directives. Pertinent directives were not on file, and index was not posted to indicate that these directives were required.

d. DCO

(1) This section had three airmen officially entered in training, and one man on whom official training status could not be determined. (A3C Hughes, D. E.)

(2) A2C Burhans, D. A., was placed on training to 72150 on 26 July 61. Proper forms were on hand; however, since date of initial entry on training no entries had been made in any records. AF Form 623 and JTS were completely blank as regards present level training entries.

(3) A3C Cross, Gerald D., was placed on training to 72150 on 25 Apr 61. Since entry on training, no entries had been made in any training records. The SAC Form 56 had not been accomplished. Record folder contained a JTS, AF Form 623, and one copy of SOP dated 4 May 61, only.

(4) A3C Jordan, R. E., status undeterminable. Training records could not be found.

0709

e. DP Administrative Office Three records were checked in this section. Entries were not current and file was not assembled as outlined in AFR 50-26, Base Sup-1.

f. Retention One man on IPT. Training entries not current and file not assembled as outlined in AFR 50-26, Base Sup-1.

g. Accounting and Control Division, DP

(1) Errors, deficiencies and non-compliance with current directives is apparent in all records checked. Applicable directives were not on hand. Responsible personnel were not acquainted with applicable directives. Training standards were not current. Records were improperly assembled and it was apparent that attention to training was practically nonexistent. Eleven sets of individual proficiency training records were checked. Not one record was being maintained as required. In this entire group of records checked, only one current Job Training Standard was found.

(2) Records of the following personnel were checked:

A3C Dixon, D. R.	A2C Furlow, W. D.
A2C Nielson, S. T.	A3C Rodriguez, A.
SSgt Shizaki, E. F.	A3C Johnston, G. A.
SSgt Lords, M.	A3C Buck, J.
A2C Lima, J.	AB Owens, J J.
A3C Christeman, J.R.	

5. The status of IPT records of 20 airmen in five staff sections of Hq Sq, 92d Bomb Wing were inspected. Not one record was being maintained current and in accordance with applicable directives, nor were current applicable directives available. Based on the above findings, IPT records maintenance in this organization is unsatisfactory.

6. Recommend the immediate appointment of a qualified squadron training NCO, and intensified effort to bring all records up to a current, acceptable standard. This report is forwarded for your information and actions you deem appropriate. No reply is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER,

JAMES W MILLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

3

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE X AF 15AF msg HQ 8580 22 Jan 62

HQ 18 AIR DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

HQ 15 AF MARCH AFB CALIF

INFO: 22 AIR RFLG SQ MCCHORD AFB WN

/UNCLASS/EXO 5817

For 15AF IG. Info 22 Air Rflg Sq (C). Reference messages your Hq, IG 8580, 22 Jan 62. This is a final report for 22 Air Rflg Sq of findings on 15AFR 121-1, Special Subject for Inspection, Inadequacies in Maintenance of Officer and Airman Control Rosters, 27 March 1961, conducted in accordance with paragraph 6d, AFR 123-8, 2 March 1956. The initial inspection revealed no discrepancies as listed in subject regulation. Recent staff visits show the present condition to be as follows: A. The Personnel Officer maintains centralized custody of control rosters and associated data, keeping adequate and current records. B. Derogatory and sensitive data are maintained and safeguarded by the Personnel Officer in conformance with current

22 2245 JAN 1962

EXO

2171 1 2 LEWIS E McRAE, Major, USAF

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	INITIALS	TYPIST'S INITIALS (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (Authorized for Local Reproduction)

EXO

BDMSCP

0711

directives. Extraneous and outdated material is withdrawn and destroyed as required. C. All derogatory matter is forwarded by the Commander to the Personnel Officer for action, control and safeguarding. 15AF Forms 86 are properly maintained, and are reviewed monthly by the Commander. D. The spirit and intent of AFR 39-40 are being honored. E. Officers and airmen who have been subjects of control roster actions have been removed at the end of the primary observation period, or have been extended for an additional period as the situation required. There are no recommendations for additional action by higher headquarters. This report is delinquent due to administrative error and misunderstanding as to responsibilities. Now that responsibility for inspection and reporting of special subject items concerning 22d Air Refueling Sq has been firmly levied on Hq 18 Air Div, a suspense file has been established to preclude recurrences.

HEADQUARTERS
4170TH STRATEGIC WING
United States Air Force
Larson Air Force Base, Washington

JAN - 1 1962

C

Final Report, Special Subject for Inspection, 15AFR 123-1, Inadequacies in Maintenance of Officer and Airman Control Records

15AF (IG)

1. This is a final report of findings on 15AFR 123-1, Special Subject for Inspection, Inadequacies in Maintenance of Officer and Airman Control Records, 27 March 1961, conducted in accordance with paragraph 6d, AFR 123-6, 2 March 1956.

a. The initial inspection revealed no discrepancies as listed in paragraph 1a, 15AFR 123-1. However, action was taken by this headquarters as follows:

(1) Corrective action: To ensure proper use of the Officer and Airman Control Program, a form letter was initiated to query units as to their intention concerning administrative, disciplinary, or elimination action on substandard and marginal personnel.

(2) Present condition: Deficiencies are at a minimum and application of the Control Program is excellent.

b. The initial inspection revealed that commanders were hesitant to forward derogatory material for inclusion into a centralized controlled derogatory file as prescribed in paragraph 1b, 15AFR 123-1.

(1) Corrective action: Larson AFB Supplement 1 to AFR 39-40 was published emphasizing the need for centralization and placing the responsibility on Unit Commanders and Staff Agencies for furnishing derogatory material for file in a centralized file.

(2) Present condition: Cooperation has been noted and present controls are considered excellent.

c. It was noted in the initial inspection that commanders were maintaining squadron derogatory files and that many commanders were not properly annotating the 15AF Form 66 to reflect a complete summary of facts and other pertinent information. Reference paragraph 1c, 15AFR 123-1.

(1) Corrective action: Files were centralized after receipt of SAC and 15AF Supplements to AFR 39-40, and publication of Larson AFB Supplement to AFR 39-40. This subject has been stressed to individual Commanders.

Copy to: 18AD (IG)

(2) Present condition: Review of correspondence files by squadron commanders is considered excellent. Improvement has been noted in annotation of the ISAF Form 66 by commanders. Overall, a satisfactory condition exists in this area.

d. No discrepancies were revealed by the initial inspection in relation to paragraph 14, ISAFR 125-1.

e. The initial inspection revealed that a laxity existed in removing personnel from the roster in that proper suspense controls were not exercised.

(1) Corrective action: This headquarters is now maintaining a duplicate copy of the SAC Form 130, allowing us to closely monitor and suspense the removal of persons from the roster.

(2) Present condition: Controls are now considered excellent.

2. There are no recommendations for additional action by higher headquarters at this time, and it is therefore suggested that this special subject be terminated.

DAVID A. TAYE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

Copy to:
18AD (EXCO)

0714

[redacted]

ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Disposal)

(Authorized for Local Reproduction)

5. We must improve our 1981 record during 1982. We must make Accident Prevention consciousness not second nature, but first nature in each and every individual.

HAROLD W ORR
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

0716

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE NUMBER

9 January 1962

Lieutenant General Archie J Old, Jr.
Commander
Fifteenth Air Force
March Air Force Base, California

Dear General Old:

The year 1961 showed varying degrees of success in Accident Prevention within this command. In Larson the rates dropped appreciably over 1960 with the exception of Civilian Injuries. In 1960 they had no civilian injuries, but 1961 showed a rate of 2.55. Otherwise, I believe they will have a lower rate than the 15th Air Force averages. Unfortunately the same is not true of Fairchild. With the exception of Private Motor Vehicle Accidents, all rates were higher in 1961 than 1960. The cost per capita at Fairchild will, however, be well below the 15th Air Force average. It is $6.52 and should place in the lowest three throughout Fifteenth.

In view of this, last quarter I started a study of the personnel assigned the additional duty of Safety Officer and Safety NCO. I discovered that the structure of the Accident Prevention Program was not as strong as I desired it to be below the wing staff level. Consequently, I directed that every commander select the most highly qualified personnel in their unit for the additional duty of Accident Prevention personnel. I also made it known that these personnel were to apply themselves to this duty and that accident support was insufficient. Factual production must be realized in our program.

We enjoyed a good year in Missile and Nuclear Safety. I am not allowing this to create complacency in these programs, however. My Director of Safety is scheduled to attend the Nuclear Safety School in February and the 92d and 4170th Wing Directors of Safety will complete this course by May of this year. I expect this to enhance our Nuclear Safety Program. I am continuing to stress Missile Safety at all opportunities. Our personnel are well trained and motivated in Accident Prevention and it is my intent to maintain this aggressiveness.

I am already making more demands on the Flying Accident Prevention Program. With reduced flying time for proficiency purposes, we must utilize every minute productively. We have suffered one inexpressible CRT aircraft accident already this year. There will be no more. As you said, General, "There's no way to standboard brains", but we are not letting up in our attempts to do just this. Needless to say, the CRT program is being monitored

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST
DS	Rayhill

RETURN TO	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

AIR FORM 20, OCT 60 (Authorized for Local Reproduction)

0717

[redacted] emphasis has increased on Accident Prevention. This has been continued with the tactical aircraft and Accident Prevention will become the prime way of life in all operations.

I know our programs are improving, General, but this will not be accomplished by us as usual. I am insisting that they continue to improve and am personally supervising myself, and insisting that my commanders do the same, toward this end.

Sincerely,

HAROLD V ORLEY
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

3 Atch
1. Ltr, AFTAC/IG, Subj: [redacted] Safety Supp, 3 Jan 62
2. Ltr, AFTAC, Subj: Accident Prevention Program, 3 Jan 62

0718

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

X AF

HQ 19 AIR DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

15 AF MARCH AFB CALIF

UNCLASS/C

For OT. Pursuant to my conversation with General Old, Colonel John B Carey, 4610A, 18AD Director of Materiel, will be reassigned to the 92d Bomb Wing for duty as Deputy Commander for Operations, with EDCSA of 1 January 1962. Until assignment of Colonels to the 18th Air Division for duty as Director of Operations and Director of Materiel, Lt Colonel Maurice A Meiler, 8721A, will be Acting Division DO and Lt Colonel James W Thompson, Jr., 22841A, will be Acting Division DM.

C

2171 1 1 JAMES W MILLER, Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer, 18th Air Division

UNCLASSIFIED

15AF FORM 370

PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED. FC 4730. COORDINATION/FILE COPY

AIR FORCE-HQ. 15AF, MARCH 1961

0719

SECRET

Headquarters
4170TH STRATEGIC WING
United States Air Force
Larson Air Force Base, Washington

IXOH

MCS, Crew and Flying Figures for January 13 Mar 62

Office of Information
(Historian)
92d Strategic Aerospace Wing
Fairchild AFB, Washington

1. MCS. Base scores, problem areas, and corrective action taken: See attachments #1 and #2, summary of scores, and analysis, respectively.

2. Number of aircraft assigned. B-52D's, 17; KC-135A's, 20; C-47's, 3; H-19's, 2; and T-33's, 6.

3. Missiles. One Titan I missile received from Denver (our first) on January 23d, minus nose cone, which will come later. Launching complexes not yet operational.

4. a. CCTM's: B-52 ---------- 79 sorties 681:20 hours
KC-135---------- 101 684:05
b. Test/Ferry B-52--------- 4 28:30
KC-135 11 37:00
c. Alert flying - none in January

d. Total sorties and hours for B-52's and KC-135's, including 10 special missions for KC-135's (see item e): B-52, 83 and 709:50; KC-135, 122 and 789:20.

e. Special missions: "Fine Line Charlie," 9th Bomb Wing ORI with six KC-135 from this wing; "Big Blast January," SAC-NORAD mission with two B-52's and two KC-135's; "Chrome Dome," Eielson Tank Task Force support with one KC-135 and two crews; and "Texas Star," support with one KC-135 and two crews.

5.

Total incentive points		Points per hour
B-52	16341	23.015
KC-135	22854	32.325

6. Combat Crew Status: B-52 combat-ready, 27. These included 8 select, 14 senior, and 5 CR crews. There were no crews of NCR classifications; KC-135 tanker crews totaled 35, including 7 senior and 28 CR, with no NCR crews. These figures reflected a change since December only in the number of KC-135 tanker crews, showing 4 upgraded, from 3 senior and 32 CR in December to 7 senior and 28 CR in January 1962.

IXOH-62-004

EUGENE W. HUNGERFORD
Capt., USAF
Information Officer

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

FILE
MGT 2
[illegible]

DO

9 February 1962

Operations MCS

92BW (WC) — DCO ve 12 Feb
4170SW (WC)
22AREFS (C)

1. The attached chart shows the operations standing in the SAC MCS for units of this command for the period 1-31 January, compiled from information furnished by the Statistical Reports Office of each unit. It provides a comparison of the relative standing of all units of the 15th Strategic Aerospace Division.

2. This summary is compiled weekly except for the week in which the end of the month falls, in which case the report is compiled as of the end of that month. We plan to distribute this information as each new posting is completed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MAURICE E. MARLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

1 Atch
MCS Operations
Chart

10

0722

OPERATIONS MCR

The following incentive points and percentages have been accomplished by subject units as of 31 January 1962.

Pts/Percent	92BW	92ARS	22ARS	4170BW	43ARS
Incent Pts	13,067	21,036	21,040	15,461	22,587
Incent Pts Per Flying Hour	19.0	31.4	32.2	21.7	32.3
60-8 Mins	78.4	65.5	73.9	88.0	75.0
Bomb Rel	94.0	NA	NA	92.6	NA
Unit Rel	97.0	100.0	100.0	95.8	100.0
A/R Effcy	96.5	97.1	95.9	98.2	96.0
Flying Time This Qtr	688	671	654	710	769

Atch 1


SECRET
HISTORY

SECRET

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 28 February 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis

ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

for James W. Miller

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

SECRET

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY

Maj Roy Lewis

(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10
15AF DX1 62-58

18th 62-0008

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0732

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

0733

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Major Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler (Acting)
Director of Material	Lt. Col. James W. Thompson (Acting)
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Captain Frank J. Riddle

Administration.

Effective on 15 February the 18th Air Division was redesignated the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division. In December of last year the division had accepted the role of both operational bombers and missiles when the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing's missile complexes were declared operational. By June of this year the 4170th Strategic Wing would have Titan I operational complexes which would make the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division a two wing division with both operational missiles and bombers in each wing.[1] (S)

On 27 February Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, began his airborne alert command post duties at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. On 13 March General Ohlke would be relieved of this duty by Brigadier General William R. Yancey, 47th Air Division commander.[2] (S)

The estimated overall base score for the 4170th Strategic Wing under the management control system (MCS) for January and February was 93.1 per cent. This was an improvement of 1.4 per cent over the previous month. Problem areas included fire incidents, ground safety, bomber cancellations due to materiel failures and was scored at 28 per cent. Three fire incidents caused the low score of 70 per cent and an excessive number of injuries, government and private motor vehicle accidents caused the low score of 65 per cent in ground safety.[3] (U)

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1. Msg, SAC to 92BW, UNCLAS DPL 09733, Subj: Redesignation of Units, 31 Jan 62, Exhibit #1.
2. Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET DP 3865, Subj: Airborne Command Post Schedule, 14 Dec 61, Exhibit #2.
3. Report, SAC MCS Scores for Jan - Feb 62, 4170SW, 13 Mar 62, Filed 4170SW Feb Historical Report.

In the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing the overall base score under the MCS was 95.5 per cent for the January - February period. Among the problem areas under the MCS were fire incidents scored at 80 per cent for this period and flying safety which was scored at 70 per cent due to the crash of the C-47 in January. Ground Safety was scored at 80 per cent due to six chargeable incidents thus far in the quarter. Weight control had remained at 74 per cent and was expected to improve to 86 per cent by the end of the quarter. In bomber and tanker operations the wing was estimated to earn 103.1 per cent for the quarter. Bomber maintenance was 100 per cent and tanker maintenance was scored at 82 per cent because of two cancellations caused by materiel failure.[4] (U)

During February the number of combat ready bomber crews of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 4170th Strategic Wing remained exactly the same. Each wing had 27 combat ready crews of which 8 were in select status, 14 in senior status, and 5 in combat ready status.[5] (S)

Meanwhile the tanker combat crew strength of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron was maintained at 36 combat crews, the total number of crews needed to meet the tanker ratio of 1.8 crews for each aircraft. Of the 36 combat tanker crews 29 were in senior status, 6 in combat ready status and one crew in P status. During this same period the tanker crew strength of the 4170th Strategic Wing was

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4. Report, SAC MCS Scores for Jan - Feb 62, 92SAW, 12 Feb 62, Filed 92SAW Feb Historical Report.
5. Air Training Report, 92SAW & 92ARS, CONFIDENTIAL, RCS: SAC-T-12, 28 Feb 62, Filed 92SAW Feb 62 History.

35 combat crews. Of this total 7 were in senior status and 28 in combat ready status.[6] (C)

In the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing the combat crew strength was 46 crews of which 44 were combat ready. In addition 10 missiles were assigned to the squadron. Meanwhile the 4170th Strategic Wing had received their first Titan I on 23 January however none of the launching complexes were as yet operational. The target date for the completion of the sites was set at 30 June 1962.[7] (S)

The total bomber combat crew strength of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division was 54 crews. Of this total 16 were in select status, 28 in senior status and 10 in combat ready status. A review of the tanker crew strength of the division showed 101 combat crews of which 47 were in senior status, 53 in combat ready status and one crew in P status.[8] (S)

Meanwhile the 18 B-52D aircraft of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing flew 73 sorties for a total of 610:10 flying hours. The 17 B-52D bombers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 75 sorties for a total of 598:10 flying hours. This gave the division a total of 35 bombers which flew 148 sorties for a total of 1208:20 flying hours.[9] (S)

The 21 KC-135A aircraft assigned to the 92d Air Refueling Squad-

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6. Air Training Report, 92SAW & 92ARS, CONFIDENTIAL, RCS: SAC-T-12, 28 Feb 62, Filed 92SAW Feb 62 History.
7. Historical Report 92SAW Feb 62, Filed Historian Safe.
8. Ibid.
9. Ltr, 18SAD to All Units, Subj: Incentive Points, 2 Mar 62, Exhibit #4.

ron flew 79 sorties for a total of 744:40 flying hours. The 16 KC-135A tankers of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron flew 179 first sorties and 13 second sorties and two test hops for a total of 620:00 flying hours. In addition the 20 KC-135A tankers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 113 sorties for a total of 715:50 flying hours. This gave the division a total of 57 tankers which flew 192 sorties, with the exception of the tankers of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron which are not included in this figure, for a total of 2080:10 flying hours.[10] (S)

During the month a tanker assigned to the 4170th Strategic Wing returned from TEXAS STAR requirements and two bombers from the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing completed the requirements of Operation BIG BLAST successfully. In addition the 92d Air Refueling Squadron continued to support the requirements of Operation CHROME DOME with three tankers and six crews TDY to the Eielson Tanker Task Force. An additional tanker from the squadron continued the support of the TEXAS STAR requirements.[11] (S)

Staff Visits by 18th Strategic Aerospace Division.

In the late part of January personnel from the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division conducted an audit of leave accounting procedures on the 22d Air Refueling Squadron and found the section in a completely unsatisfactory condition. The audit revealed a discrepancy of 916 days in airmen leave, with 722 days gained for the air force and 194

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10. Msg, 22ARS to 92SAW, SECRET, 22ARSMA 0022, Subj: 22ARS Historical Report, 92SAW, FEB 62, Filed Historian Safe.
11. Historical Report 92SAW, Feb 62, Filed Historian Safe.

days gained by the individuals. In officer records a discrepancy of 141 days was found, with 109 days gained by the air force and 32 days gained by personnel. In an attempt to correct the discrepancies found all travel vouchers and all leave orders were reviewed. As soon as the corrective action directed by General Ohlke was completed a follow-up inspection was conducted.[12] (U)

On 26 February through 3 March the division conducted the follow-up inspection on the squadron personnel section. The inspection revealed that many discrepancies still existed in the squadron's compliance with directives governing the granting and recording of leave of assigned military personnel. The 1962 leave records were also inspected and many discrepancies were noted. The cause of these inconsistencies was attributed to three factors. First, the orderly room maintenance of the leave order log, sign in/out register and the leave cards did not coincide in many instances and second, inconsistencies were revealed in an inspection of the MPOs and vouchers regarding leave ration settlements, per diem and DDALV. Third, the numerous 'nconsistencies between the entries on the MPSs, vouchers and the AF Form 617 and source documents adequately justified the contention that the provisions of governing directives were being completely ignored.[13] (U)

On 13 through 20 February Lieutenant Colonel Maurice E. Marler, acting director of operations in the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division, performed an operations staff visit on the 92d Strategic

12. Inspection Report on 22ARS, Subj: Leave Accounting, 15 Mar 62, Exhibit #5.
13. Ibid.

Aerospace Wing's operational force.[14] (S)

During the inspection aircrew knowledge of positive control and execution procedures was examined. A tape examination consisting of 20 questions covering six red dot and blue dot messages administered to 24 bomber and 26 tanker crew members. All achieved 100 per cent except for a co-pilot and a radar navigator. Each of these officers missed one question however during interrogation the co-pilot demonstrated an acceptable knowledge of the subject matter. The radar navigator was not questioned.[15] (S)

Lieutenant Colonel Marler also investigated the controller's knowledge of positive control and execution procedures. A 50 question examination was given the senior controller, three officer controllers and nine airmen controllers. All achieved passing grades of 90 per cent or higher except for one staff sergeant who only received a score of 88 per cent. Areas of possible weakness, uncovered during the investigation, were discussed with the senior controller as a basis for future emphasis in his training program.[16] (S)

On 26 February through 1 March Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Murray, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division supply staff officer, made an informal staff visit to the 22d Air Refueling Squadron to check the status of organizational property as it related to the forthcoming squadron deactivation. The visit showed that all organizational property had been inventoried and lists annotated

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14. Operations Staff Visit 92SAW, SECRET, 18SAW 23 Feb 62, Exhibit #6.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.

as to the serviceability and location as was recommended in the last staff visit. In addition lists had been annotated to indicate the quantities of items that could be turned in by property custodians prior to the transfer of the squadron's aircraft. These items could be turned into the host base immediately subsequent to the receipt of the appropriate shipping instructions. During the following month, a meeting would be held at OCAMA for supply representatives from the 22d Air Refueling Squadron and McChord Air Force Base. The primary purpose of the meeting would be to make redistribution of the squadron's internal assets. The transfer of the KC-135 base spares would also be discussed.[17] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division.

Along with the correction of the leave accounting discrepancies, Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, also directed his attention towards the accident prevention policy established for all the units in the division. During 1961 the accident and injury rate was much to be desired in the division. Although the cost of personal suffering could not be measured, the amount of equipment lost could be and was far in excess. A policy of educating and enforcing accident prevention consciousness on each individual, would have to be established within each unit. As far as General Ohlke was concerned accident prevention was the first and foremost requirement in the performance of our

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17. Report, Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS-DMS, 18SAD, 5 Mar 62, Exhibit #7.

mission.[18] (U)

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division established a nuclear safety program within the command and so far a rate of zero had been attained, mainly because safety had been designed into the weapon and procedures for handling were used by men who recognized its hazards. The emphasis placed on the nuclear hazards and restricting the number of people involved had been effective in controlling the problems. However, a gradual increase in incidents, and the number of discrepancies noted by the Fifteenth Air Force Inspector General command-wide, had indicated the need to coordinate and monitor the programs and directives which must be complied with to preclude a nuclear accident. At each wing level the air weapons officer and munitions maintenance squadron safety officer were directed to conduct the educational and enforcement portions of this program.[19] (U)

During February, General Ohlke brought to the attention of Colonel Lester F. Miller, 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing commander, the fact that the alert force was not fully manned despite the directives from Fifteenth Air Force. The alert force, our most important activity as well as the number one priority, required immediate action in the form of the assignment of airmen of the highest quality.[20] (U)

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18. Ltr, 18SAC to All Units, Subj: Accident Prevention, 12 Feb 62, Filed 18SADC.
19. Ltr, 18SAD to 26 & 47 MMS, Subj: Nuclear Safety Policy, 5 Feb 62, Filed 18SADC.
20. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Manning of Alert Force Management, 13 Feb 62, Exhibit #8.

The responsibility of the forthcoming transfer of the tanker aircraft of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron would be that of their maintenance organization. General Ohlke emphasized the fact that the key to a successful transfer operation was the systematic and programmed preparation of aircraft. It was essential that the receiving units praised the condition of the equipment.[21] (U)

The Fifteenth Air Force analysis of the incentive training accomplished during the October - December quarter was distributed to units of the division. The analysis shows how the leading units worked to the top and provided a guide as to what must be done if the wings and air refueling squadrons assigned to the division were to be contendors for top honors in the current training period. So far this quarter the division had made excellent progress but it would take a concentrated effort on the part of everyone connected with flying training to attain the top position.[22] (U)

The initial ground rules for the 1962 SAC Combat Competition had been distributed to all units of the command by Fifteenth Air Force. General Ohlke desired that each wing begin planning for the contest by studying each new bit of information as it was disseminated. He was convinced that the units of his command possessed the crew and staff talent to win the event if this talent was properly developed and utilized and a competitive spirit was fostered to make each individual in the wing determined to win.[23] (U)

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21. Ltr, 18SAD to 22ARSC, Subj: Transfer of Aircraft, 14 Feb 62, Exhibit #9.
22. Ltr, 18SAD to All Units, Subj: Incentive Training, 8 Feb 62, Exhibit #10.
23. Ltr, 18SAD to All Units, Subj: 1962 SAC Combat Competition, 22 Feb 62, Filed 18SADC.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Order.

GAZETTEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

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LIST OF EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, SAC to 92BW, UNCLAS DPL 09733, Subj: Re-designation of Units, 31 Jan 62	1
Msg, 15AF to 18AD, SECRET, DP 3865, Subj: Airborne Command Post Schedule, 14 Dec 61	2
Msg, 22ARS to 92SAW, SECRET, 22ARSMA 0022, Subj: 22ARS Historical Report, 8 Mar 62	3
Ltr, 18SAD to All Units, Subj: Incentive Points, 2 Mar 62	4
Inspection Report of 22ARS, Subj: Leave Accounting, 15 Mar 62	5
Ltr, Operations Staff Visit 92SAW, SECRET, 18SAD, 23 Feb 62	6
Report, Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS-DMS, 18SAD, 5 Mar 62	7
Ltr, 18SAD to SAW, Subj: Manning of Alert Force Management, 13 Feb 62	8
Ltr, 18SAD to 22ARSC, Subj: Transfer of Aircraft, 14 Feb 62	9
Ltr, 18SAD to All Units, Subj: Incentive Training, 8 Feb 62	10

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

BA090.....GPA105KNJ906
RR RJWBAP RJWBAR RJWBGP RJWBJG RJWBJM RJWXBR
DE RJWBKN 184
R 140002Z
FM 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF
TO RJWXBR/SAC
RJWBJG/47AIRDIV CASTLE AFB CALIF
RJWBAP/821AIRDIV ELLSWORTH AFB SDAK
RJWBAR/13AIRDIV F E WARREN AFB WYOO
RJWBJG/819AIRDIV DYESS AFB TEX
RJWBGP/18AIRDIV FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
BT
S E C R E T DP 3865. FOR SAC (DPO), 47AD
(C), 821AD (C), 13AD (C), 819AD (C), AND 18AD (C). (U) AIRBORNE
COMMAND POST SCHEDULE. SAC VC 0858, 4 FEB 61 (S) AND DP 44537, 30
NOV 61 (U) AS AMENDED BY DPOS 45589, 4 DEC 61 (S) AND DP 44537, 30
NOV 61 (U) AS AMENDED BY DPOS 45589, 4 DEC 61 (U). FOLLOWING IS
SCHEDULE FOR 15 AIR FORCE GENERAL OFFICERS FOR AIRBORNE COMMAND
POST DUTY FOR MONTHS OF JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AMD MARCH 1962. (SCP-4).

18 AD (C) - ACT

NAME	UNIT	DATE
B/GN WILLIAM R. YANCEY	47 AIR DIV	9 JAN 62
M/GEN DELMAR E. WILSON	821 AIR DIV	23 JAN 62
B/GEN WILLIAM S. RADER	13 AIR DIV	6 FEB 62

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PAGE TWO RJWBKN 184

B/GEN PINKHAM SMITH	819 AIR DIV	20 FEB 62
B/GEN HAROLD W. OHLKE	18 AIR DIV	27 FEB 62
B/GEN WILLIAM R. YANCEY	47 AIR DIV	13 MARCH 62

BT
L14/0154Z DEC RJWBKN

SECRET

0750

NNNM

SECRET

BA161.....

GPA015

UNMD025EEEEEAAA
RR RJWBGP
DE RJWBDM 6
R 0518152
FM 22AREVS MCCHORD AFB WASH
TO 92ED SKATAPROG AC FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
AS.

BT
S E C R E T GSAREVA 6922. HISTORICAL OFFICER. HISTORY 1-28 FEB 61. PERSONNEL AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. THE MAIN TOPIC REMAINS THIS UNIT'S DEACTIVATION. (U) FINAL WORD HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED ON INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENTS. (U) HOWEVER, NOMINATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 22 CREWS BEALE, HUNTER AND TRAVIS; 250 MAINTENANCE AIRMAN TO BEALE, HUNTER, AND TRAVIS; AND 50 AIRMEN TO FIELSON FOR PROJECT "OFFICE BOY" (S) THE TENTATIVE MOVE SCHEDULE IS FROM 25 MAY THROUGH 15 JUNE FOR THE MOVE. (U) THE REMAINING PERSONNEL NOMINATIONS ARE STILL FORTHCOMING, WITH APPROXIMATELY 40 AIRMEN PROGRAMMED FOR FINAL WITHDRAWAL. (U) INDIVIDUAL PROFICIENCY TRAINING HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY ON TESTING

PAGE TWO RJWBDM 6
BEING 100 PERCENT FOR THE JANUARY-FEBUARY PERIOD. (U) THE SOLUTION CALLED FOR A SPECIAL IPT REVIEW PANEL WHICH CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZES ALL PROSPECTIVE EXAMINEES. (T) MAINTENANCE. ALL HAMILTON STANDARD STARTERS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FOR THE R ENGINE AND REPLACED BY GENERAL ELECTRIC STARTERS. THIS WAS REQUIRED DUE TO THE STARTER DISINTEGRATION AND RESULTANT AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION BY FIRE AT ANOTHER BASE. (U) SUPPLY DEACTIVATION PROGRAM. A DEACTIVATION PROGRAM IS NOW BEING COMPLETED. DATES AND DESTINATION OF PERSONNEL AND SUPPLY EQUIPMENT ARE THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS PLAN. COMPLETE, FIRM DATA HAS YET TO BE RECEIVED. HOWEVER, PLANS ARE FIRM FOR THE STORAGE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. (U) OPERATIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. PROGRESS IS SATISFACTORY REGARDING STANDARDIZATION. JANUARY-FEBUARY 1ST SORTIES-179, 2ND SORTIED-15, AND TEST HOPS-2. FOUR WERE WEATHER DIVERSION RETURNS AND ONE A CHROME DOME RETURN. (U) 620 HOURS WERE FLOWN IN FEBUARY FOR A JANUARY- FEBUARY TOTAL OF 1189 HOURS FLYING TIME. 620 HOURS ARE SCHEDULED IN MARCH TO MEET THE FLYING TIME ALLOCATION OF 1809 HOURS FOR THE QUARTER. (U)
BT
NR/1525 MAR CORRECT

SECRET

0751

Headquarters
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO 2 March 1962

SUBJECT: Incentive Points

TO: 417OSW (SAC) 43rd Strat Aerospace Wg (SAC) Hamilton (C)

The following incentive points and percentages have been accomplished by subject units as of [illegible] February 1962.

Pts/Percent	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	417OSW	43ARS
Incent Pts	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	36,277	47,984
Incent Pts Per Flying Hour	25.1	25.6	[illegible]	26.9	23.2
30-8 Mins	97.8	98.7	[illegible]	98.0	94.7
Bomb Rel	98.9	N/A	N/A	94.0	N/A
Unit Rel	97.6	100.0	[illegible]	97.0	100.0
A/R Effcy	97.4	97.9	[illegible]	97.2	98.8
Flying Time This Qtr	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1398	1483
Ops Rdy	97.1	97.7	[illegible]	98.0	98.9

FOR THE COMMANDER:

PATRICK H. [illegible]
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

0752



0754



[redacted]

b. AFCC [illegible] dated 5 Jul 62 (Ref 3)

Reported on leave as of October 1961 remained from leave 4 May 61. However, a new SMC Form 803 (leave carryover) was issued on 1 Jul 62, and subsequently cancelled as leave was completed 57 days prior to issuance of carryover leave order.

c. In addition to the above, 68 carryover leave orders issued to individuals carrying of unlawful leave into the 1962 accounting period require complete reconciliation in order to comply with the requirements of SMCM 30-1 and 30-2.

6. All leave authorization cards accomplished since 1 Feb 62 appear to be correctly accomplished. Logs are neat and AF Form 1383 is now being properly maintained.

7. This report of findings is forwarded for information and any action you desire. Report of corrective action is not required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES W. MILLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

Headquarters
16TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO

SECRET

23 February 1962

SUBJECT: (U) Operations Staff Visit - 92d Strat Aerospace Wing

TO: 92SAW (WC)

1. Lt Colonel M. E. Marlor and CMS W. E. Wheeler, this headquarters, performed an operations staff visit to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing 13 through 20 February 1962. (U)

2. The following areas of interest were examined with findings as indicated: (U)

a. Aircrew knowledge of positive control and execution procedures. A tape examination consisting of 20 questions covering six red and blue dot messages was administered to 24 bomber and 24 tanker crew members on crews as indicated below. All achieved 100% except the co-pilot on crew B-01 (Clark) and the radar navigator on crew B-47 (Bath). Both of these officers missed one question. In subsequent interrogation Bath demonstrated an acceptable knowledge of the subject matter. Clark was not interrogated. (S)

Bomber Crews		Tanker Crews	
B-01	Stone	K-12	Quinn
B-04	Grant	K-16	Smith, M.T. (Less Nav)
B-07	Schubert	K-21	Kinney
B-14	Moore	K-27	Fisher
B-24	DeWill	K-36	McCrary
B-33	Durham	K-41	Neal
B-47	Bryan	K-43	Boyle
B-51	Gregory	K-49	Wren
		K-53	(Nav only) Correll
		K-56	(Nav only) MacDonald
		K-58	(CP only) Smith, I.D.

b. Controller knowledge of positive control and execution procedures. An examination consisting of 20 questions was administered to the senior controller, three additional officer controllers and nine airman controllers. All achieved passing grades of 90% or higher except Sgt Weiss, who received a score of 85%. Four individuals made 100%. Areas of possible weakness (questions missed by two or more persons) were discussed with the senior controller as a basis for future emphasis in his training program. (S)

SECRET

c. Bomber Alert Force. This activity is not receiving the attention it deserves, as evidenced by several significant findings: (U)

(1) The organizational chart was out of date. (U)

(2) Job descriptions of officers assigned to the Alert Force did not reflect duties actually being performed. (U)

(3) Several Alert Force SOPs were out of date. (U)

(4) CQ's were nearly all fresh from basic training with little or no knowledge of SAC alert philosophy or procedures. (U)

(5) Not all of the officers assigned against the Alert Force unit manning document are actually performing duty with the Alert Force. (U)

(6) Shelves and wash bowls in all latrines were covered with steel shavings at the time of the visit. (U)

(7) With few exceptions the magazine rack in the library did not contain up-to-date magazines. As a typical example, the most recent issue of "Life" was two weeks old. (U)

(8) Procedures for handling the daily inventory of Canteen assets were somewhat loose. (U)

d. Tanker Alert Force.

(1) As in the bomber alert facility, the magazine racks for the most part did not contain current periodicals. (U)

(2) Housekeeping was adequate, though not outstanding. (U)

(3) A small canteen should be established in the Alert building similar to that in the bomber alert facility. (U)

e. Aircrew scheduling. This activity was functioning generally in accordance with the provisions of 1SAFM 50-1; however, records were not being maintained to show the weekly number of hours duty time Jordan against each crew. Without such information it is not possible to ensure that crews stay within the maximum allowable hours per week over a six month period. (U)

f. Training Records. Automation of these records has not produced the intended saving in manhours for posting and

0759



(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Base Operations.

(1) An adequate search and rescue capable has not been furnished, although numerous [illegible] have been submitted. This [illegible] was brought to the attention of the 6594 ASG by 10th Air Division Inspection Reports, "Project Stitch," 20-26 April 1961, and "Special Review," 21-28 August 1961. (U)

(2) Personnel working in the control tower are not afforded an emergency power [illegible] as required by AFSC Standard 127-1, 1 Jan 61. It is suggested that an outage report be initiated as an interim measure. (U)

(3) A problem will exist in approximately 45 days when [illegible] will be [illegible] by a portable replacement element to [illegible]. If he can be moved from [illegible] this problem will be eliminated that the [illegible] recommended by [illegible] 61. It appears that [illegible] from [illegible] the [illegible] with four more projected [illegible]. (U)

(4) Special Orders were not [illegible] Transient Services Project Officer [illegible] message [illegible], 8 Aug 61. This [illegible] IG Inspections. (U)

3. This report [illegible] action the [illegible] necessary.] It requires no indorsement. (U)

4. This report [illegible] information pertaining to Positive Control and Detection procedures. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MAURICE E. [illegible]
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

4

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

Headquarters
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
United States Air Force
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DM

5 March 1963

SUBJECT: Report of Informal Staff Visit - 22AEHFS, McChord AFB, Wash.

TO: 22AEHFS (C)

Attached is report of informal staff visit conducted at your headquarters 26 February - 1 March 1963. No reply to this report is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

1 Atch
Staff Visit Rept

Copy to: [redacted]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible], Washington

[illegible]
[illegible] 8 Mar 1962

SUBJECT: Report of Informal Staff Visit - 11AREFS, McChord AFB, Washington

TO: 1st Fund Aerospace Div (DM)

INFO: 11AREFS (C)

1. An Informal Staff Visit was made to the 25th Air Refueling Squadron, McChord AFB, Washington, 25 February - 1 March 1962, to check status of organizational property as it relates to the forthcoming equation in-activation.

2. Person Making Visit: Lt Colonel Charles B Murray, Supply Staff Officer

3. Persons Contacted: 11AREFS

Colonel K C Diehl, Commander
Major C L Logan, DSUP

Air Defense Command

Major Wier, DSUP, 25th Air Division
Major Applegate, DSUP, 325th Ftr Wg
Major Allen, BSO, McChord AFB

4. Findings and Recommendations:

a. Organizational Property

(1) All organizational property has been inventoried and lists annotated as to serviceability and location as recommended in my last Report of Staff Visit. Additionally, lists have been annotated to indicate quantities of items that can be turned in by property custodians prior to transfer of unit aircraft. These items can be turned in to the host base immediately subsequent to receipt of appropriate shipping instructions.

92d Strat Aerospace Wg (SC)

0763

(2) A shipping order for nine line items of Controlled Mission Equipment (CME) was received from OCAMA on their TWX OCNAOG3 23362 dated 2 Feb 62. Instructions were to ship these items to Mather AFB and Travis AFB. Property was turned over to base Supply for packing, crating and shipment on 7 Feb 62. It was noted on 27 February that the items had not yet been packed or crated. I queried Major Allen, Base Supply Officer, as to the reason for this delay and was informed that it was due to a large backlog in their Packing & Crating Section. If this delay were to be an example of what might happen when we start our wholesale move, I thought it best to discuss our over-all supply movement with Major Wier, Acting Director of Supply, 25th Air Division. The matter was well received at that office, and I was assured that they would carefully monitor all aspects of the movement of 22AREFS organizational property. During the discussion I made several recommendations concerning the physical turn-in of our property; each was concurred in. Nevertheless, it behooves us to maintain strict on-the-spot surveillance of the movement program. At my suggestion the 22d notified OCAMA and the consignees of the aforementioned CME items that said items were turned over to the host base for shipment on 7 Feb 62.

b. OCAMA Meeting. A meeting will be held at OCAMA beginning 5 Mar 62. Supply representatives from 22AREFS and McChord AFB are among those invited to attend. The primary purpose of this meeting is to make redistribution of 22AREFS internal assets. Informal information is to the effect that transfer of KC-135 base spares will also be discussed.

CHARLES B MURRAY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Supply Staff Officer

C 13 Feb 1962

Manning of Alert Force Management

92WC

1. The Alert Force is our most important activity as well as our number one priority along with our missile alert. I am disappointed with the priority afforded this activity in manning.

2. SAC has authorized manning in both officer and NCO spaces. The 92d Wing has not fully manned this activity and is the only unit of this Air Division that is not fully manned, in spite of directives from 15th Air Force.

3. I expect immediate action to be taken to fully man the Alert Force as soon as possible. In addition, this manning to be of the highest quality with special emphasis on the airmen. Please advise.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

14 February 1962

Colonel Kenneth C. Diehl
Commander
22nd Air Refueling Squadron
McChord Air Force Base, Washington

Dear Ken:

I know you are fully aware of the responsibility your maintenance organization is charged with on the forthcoming transfer of your aircraft. I want to emphasize, however, that the key to a successful transfer operation is the systematic and programmed preparation of the aircraft. Now is the time to begin such preparation.

On implementation of the transfer program particular emphasis must be placed on the following:

a. Clearance of all delayed discrepancies on the aircraft general, and allied systems.

b. Condition, serviceability and status of TSO equipment.

c. Condition of aircraft records.

d. Compliance with outstanding technical orders and transfer directives.

e. Cleanliness of aircraft and proper aircraft markings.

To summarize, it is essential that receiving units will only praise, not criticize, the condition of the equipment on arrival at their new installations. Many of your personnel will soon resume working on these KC-135s. The very best job possible in preparing them for transfer will therefore accrue to the advantage of those who have done the work. You have a group of highly efficient and competent technicians. I am confident that they will acquit themselves accordingly in this imminent and exacting task.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W. CHLEK
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

C Copy

DO 8 February 1962

Incentive Training

41708W (DCO)
9[illegible]W (DCO)
22AR[illegible] (OPS)

1. The 15th Air Force analysis of incentive training accomplished during the October-December training period, has been distributed to units of this command. It shows vividly how the leading units got to the top and provides a guide as to what must be done if the wings and air refueling squadrons assigned to 15th Strategic Aerospace Division are to be contenders for top honors in the current training period.

2. It is recommended that you and your training staff study the analysis (Atch 1 to ltr, Subj: Incentive Training Program, 1 Feb) and realign your training section to produce a maximum of incentive points per flying hour (within limits imposed by low level entry times, air refueling control times and other factors beyond the control of the unit).

3. You have made excellent progress so far this quarter, but it will take a concerted effort on the part of everyone connected with flying training to squeeze the last possible point from each flying hour and thereby beat all other 15th Air Force units in the incentive point program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MAURICE E. HARLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

10

C Copy

0767


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HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 31 March 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis

ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

James W Miller LT61

FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

SECRET

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY

Maj. Roy Lewis
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

15AF-DX-1 62-60
IXOH 62-0010
Atch 142

5-3366-8

0773

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

0775

FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Exertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0776

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

0777

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

---

1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.

0778

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Major Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler (Acting)
Director of Material	Lt. Col. James W. Thompson (Acting)
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Captain Frank J. Riddle

Administration

On 20 March Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander; Lieutenant Colonel Maurice E. Marler, acting directory of operations; Lieutenant Colonel James W. Thompson, acting director of materiel and Lieutenant Colonel James W. Miller, division executive officer visited Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force to present the division problem area briefing to Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr., Fifteenth Air Force commander. General Ohlke and the directors of operations and materiel remained at March for the division's commanders call on 23 and 24 March[4]. (U)

During the January - March quarter the 4170th Strategic Wing scores reflected an excellent performance and a considerable improvement over the previous three quarters with an overall base score of 95.5 per cent under the management control system (MCS). The wing was in the SAC top quarter in the personnel, bomber operations and tanker maintenance areas and well above the SAC average in the bomber maintenance and tanker operations areas. Problem items were primarily in the base support and general areas of which the latter was below the SAC average. These low score items were fires, ground safety and weight control and they cost the wing a total of 103 points. This loss, however, was more than off-set by the high score achieved in bomber incentive training. The outstanding performance in this item, which gave the wing 200 points more than the SAC average, was the primary reason that resulted in the 4170th Strategic Wing being in the top five in the SAC MCS for this quarter[5]. (U)

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4. Msg, 18SAD to 15AF, C 6931, Subj: Division Briefing, 29 Jan 62.
5. Report, SAC MCS, Jan - Mar 62, 4170SW, 17 Apr 62, Filed DCR, LAFB.

During this same quarter the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing attained an overall score of 94.9 per cent under the MCS program. This placed Fairchild in tie for tenth place in SAC and eighth in Fifteenth Air Force. In the personnel area 100 per cent was attained and in base support, all areas scored 100 per cent with the exception of fire incidents which earned a score of 60 per cent for the base. During the quarter the wing earned a score of 80 per cent in flying safety due to the C-47 aircraft accident in January. Ground safety was scored at 75 per cent due to 11 chargeable incidents during the period. Although the base score increased in weight control area to 96 per cent information activities decreased to 87 per cent due to the failure of the section to critique commander's calls. The operational performance in all areas was outstanding and all rated items attained scores equal to or above the SAC top quarter scores. Maintenance performance was also outstanding. With the exception of tanker cancellations, all areas attained a rating of 100 per cent.[6] (U)

During March the number of combat ready bomber crews of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 4170th Strategic Wing remained the same as previous months. Each wing had 27 combat ready crews of which 8 were in select status, 14 in senior status and 5 in combat ready status.[7] (S)

Meanwhile the tanker crew strength of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron was maintained at 36 combat ready crews, the total number of crews needed to meet the tanker ratio of 1.8 crews for each air-

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6. Report, SAC MCS, Jan-Mar 62, 92SAW, 19 Apr 62, Filed: DCRM, FAFB.
7. Report, Crew and Flying Figures for March 62, 4170SW, 21 Apr 62, Exhibit # 1.

craft. During this period one non-combat ready crew was disbanded and a senior crew was formed. Of the 36 combat ready crews 30 were in senior status and 6 were in combat ready status. In addition the tanker crew strength of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron decreased from 30 in February to 27 in March. Of this total 12 were in senior status and 15 in combat ready status. During this same period the tanker crew strength of the 4170th Strategic Wing was 35 combat crews. Of this total 7 were in senior status and 28 in combat ready status.[8] (S)

In the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing the combat crew strength was 46 crews of which 44 were combat ready. In addition 10 Atlas ICBM's were assigned to the squadron. Meanwhile the 4170th Strategic Wing had received their first Titan I on 23 January and on 23 March the wing received their second Titan, however, none of the sites were operational and would not be until 30 June 1962.[9] (C)

The total bomber combat crew strength of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division was 54 combat crews. Of this total 16 were in select status, 28 in senior status, and 10 in combat ready status. A review of the the tanker crew strength of the division showed 98 combat ready crews of which 49 were in senior status and 49 were in combat ready status.[10] (S)

Meanwhile the 18 B-52D aircraft of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing flew 89 sorties for a total of 685:15 flying hours and 17 B-52D

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8. Report, Crew and Flying Figures for Mar 62, 4170SW, 21 Apr 62, Exhibit # 1.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

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bombers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 88 sorties for a total of 685:15 flying hours. This gave the division a total of 35 bombers that flew 177 sorties in 1252:30 flying hours.[11] (S)

The 21 KC-135A tanker aircraft assigned to the 92d Air Refueling Squadron flew 92 sorties for a total of 725 flying hours. The 16 KC-135A tankers of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron flew 80 sorties and 84 turnaround sorties for a total of 688 flying hours and the 20 KC-135A tankers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 133 sorties in 735:20 flying hours. This gave the division a total of 57 tankers which flew 205 sorties and 85 turnaround sorties for a total of 2148:20 flying hours.[12] (S)

During the month the tankers of both wings supported the requirements of Operation CHROME DOME and the bombers of the 4170th Strategic Wing supported the SAC/NORAD exercise Operation BIG BLAST and the tankers flew Operation FLYING FISH. The tankers of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing supported the requirements of Operations TEXAS STAR and AIR MAIL and the tankers of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron flew an AIR MAIL mission.[13] (S)

Staff Visits by the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division.

In the late part of January personnel from the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division conducted an audit of leave accounting procedures in the 22d Air Refueling Squadron and found the section in a completely unsatisfactory condition. Since then it had been of

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11. Report, Crew and Flying Figures for Mar 62, 4170SW, 21 Apr 62, Exhibit # 1.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

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primary concern to Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander. On 27 through 29 March division personnel conducted another follow-up inspection and found considerable improvement had been made. The compliance with the current directives pertaining to leave accounting was satisfactory and the corrective action taken on the discrepancies noted during previous inspections was also satisfactory. These discrepancies were due mainly to a misunderstanding of the policy on excessive travel time while on TDY which would be chargeable as leave. However, General Ohlke directed that firm directives must always be complied with explicitly until changed by other firm directives by higher headquarters. Had such directives been abided by, the errors would not have occurred.[14] (U)

Another informal staff visit was conducted on the 22d Air Refueling Squadron on 20 and 21 March to determine what problems could arise in the operation of the various maintenance sections pending the deactivation of the squadron. The results showed all maintenance sections were operating satisfactorily despite the loss of personnel to SAC projects and the deactivation. However, it was recommended that authority be requested to delay the shipment of key personnel until the aircraft moves were completed. In addition the squadron had instrumented a project of repairing the radomes and thus far excellent results were obtained as evident in the reduction of radomes sent off base for repair. Step-by-step procedures were obtained and would be passed on to the maintenance organizations in

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14. Report of Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, Subj: Leave Accounting Discrepancies, 2 Apr 62, Exhibit # 2.

both wings.[15] (U)

On 19 through 23 March Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Murray, division supply staff officer, visited the 22d Air Refueling Squadron to determine the progress with which the squadron was complying with the instructions relating to the inactiviation of their supply account. At the time no firm action had been taken to physically ship any of the items, however, planning relative to the movement was progressing at a satisfactory rate. The supply squadron staff officer attended the conference at Headquarters, OCAMA, during the early part of March to discuss the shipping instructions for all UAL property assigned to the squadron. Although the majority of the UAL items were scheduled for shipping, no actual shipments would be made until the receipt of firm shipping instructions from Fifteenth Air Force.[16] (U)

On 12 and 13 March, Lieutenant Colonel Maurice E. Marler, acting director of operations, made a staff visit to the 22d Air Reueling Squadron to examine the positive control and execution procedures, standardization scheduling, collateral training, crew professional files and the alert force management. The majority of the training programs were deemed adequate and with the exception of small arms training, no problems were foreseen. However, an inspection of the alert force management revealed a lack of good house keeping in that the appearance inside and out left much to be desired. In addition many obsolete periodicals were in the magazine rack and the

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15. Report of Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, Subj: Maintenance Problems, 28 March 62, Exhibit # 3.
16. Report of Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, Subj: Supply Section, 30 Mar 62, Exhibit # 4.

canteen was out of the popular brands of cigarettes.[17] (U)

In addition the division performed a staff visit to complex six of the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild in the early part of the month to review the procedures of an operation walk-thru on GOLDEN NUGGET 301-62. Many of the discrepancies were pointed out to the site commander during the inspection and on the spot corrections were made. Overall, the walk-thru was handled in an efficient manner. Transportation contributed to the majority of the delays involved with the missile operation.[18] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division.

During March the 22d Air Refueling Squadron continued their preparations for the deactivation of the squadron, scheduled for 1 July 1962. The 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing was responsible for all the administrative activities in regard to the phase-out and inactivation of the squadron. However, thus far the wing had been aloof in their assistance to the squadron and the quality of assistance given the squadron in the problems associated with deactivation. Some of the problems involved were the supply phase-down in closing out the supply account, personnel leave accounting which had been thoroughly fouled up in this organization, and the disposal of records. As a result the wing was directed by Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, to take aggressive action concerning their responsibilities in all activities

17. Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, Subj: Training and Alert Force, 14 Mar 62, Exhibit # 5.
18. Staff Visit to 567SMS, Site #6, Subj: Walk-thru, 13 Mar 62, Exhibit # 6.

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of administrative nature in the inactivation of the squadron to be sure that there was a clean and outstanding inactivation of the organization.[19] (U)

The new requirement for officers to have a college degree for promotion had made it more difficult for some officers to be promoted. General Ohlke stressed the importance of developing an accurate officer effectiveness report. He also emphasized that it was the responsibility of the commander whether or not the officer was qualified for promotion. If the individual could perform his duties satisfactorily, the commander should request his upgrading on the officer effectiveness report.[20] (U)

During the past several months General Ohlke had placed special emphasis on safety. After reviewing the Fifteenth Air Force ground accident rates, General Ohlke was under the impression that the accident program in the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing needed additional emphasis and control in the civilian employee area. Ground injuries had placed the wing rate at 12.81. This was the highest rate in Fifteenth Air Force and would have to be reduced in future months. General Ohlke felt that a little more discipline could have averted these accidents. However, in military injury, private motor vehicle accident and government motor vehicle accident rates, the wing was below the Fifteenth Air Force total, but could still be improved. The overall rating of the wing was excellent and was something to be proud of. Continued command attention would have to be given daily to improve the accident rates in the wing.[21] (U)

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19. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Deactivation of 22ARS, 26 Mar 62, Exhibit # 7.
20. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: OER, 26 Mar 62, Exhibit # 8.
21. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Ground Accident Rates, 29 Mar 62, Exhibit # 9.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Order.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Report, MCS, Crew and Flying Figures for Mar 62, 4170SW, 21 Apr 62	1
Report of Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, Subj: Leave Account Discrepancies, 2 Apr 62	2
Report of Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, Subj: Maintenance Problem, 28 Mar 62	3
Report of Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, Subj: Supply Section, 30 Mar 62	4
Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, Subj: Training & Alert Force, 14 Mar 62	5
Staff Visit to 567SMS #6, Subj: Walk Thru, 13 Mar 62	6
Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Deactivation of 22ARS, 26 Mar 62	7
Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: OER, 26 Mar 62	8
Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Ground Accident Rate, 29 Mar 62	9

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4170TH STRATEGIC WING
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOH

21 April 1962

SUBJECT: MCS, Crew and Flying Figures for March 1962 Division History

TO: 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (IXOH)
Fairchild AFB, Washington

1. MCS. Base scores, problem areas, and corrective action taken. This item mailed separately on this date.

2. Number of Aircraft Assigned/Available:

B-52 average aircraft assigned/available:	17/15.5	(S)
KC-135A " " " / " :	20/20	(S)
C-47 " " "	3	
H-19 " " "	2	
T-33 " " "	6	

3. Missiles. Two Titan I missiles in inventory as of end of March. Second received on 23 March.

4. Flying Missions and Hours:

	B-52 Srts	Hours	KC-135 Srts	Hours
CCTM	87	683:05	109	561:40
Test/Ferry	1	2:10	1	2:30
Special	-	-	33	171:10
TOTAL	88	685:15	133	735:20

Incentive points.....Total.....62,789.....71,798
Avg/Hr....31.50.....36.13

"Chrome Dome" - During March we maintained one KC-135 and two flight crews at Eielson AFB tanker task force in support of this operation. (S)

~~"Texas Star" - One KC-135 and crew~~ 97H

"Big Blast" - In March we supported joint SAC/NORAD Exercise "Big Blast" with two B-52 and two KC-135 aircraft. (15AF OPORD 295-62)

"Flying Fish" - Two F-101 aircraft on a Tactical Air Command exercise nicknamed "Flying Fish" were refueled by our KC-135's on 29 March. (Auth: SAC OPORD 83-62)

Alert posture (acft & crews), Ground: B-52, 8; KC-135, 9

5. Combat Crew Status: B-52 combat ready, 27. These included 8 select, 14 senior, and 5 CR. KC-135 crews totaled 35, including 7 senior and 28 CR. There were no upgradings in March. There were no crews of NCR classification.

IXOH-62-006

EUGENE W. HUNGERFORD
Capt., USAF, Information Officer

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

0791

EXO 2 April 1962

Report of Informal Staff Visit, 22 Air Rflg Sq, McChord AFB, Wn

22ARS(C)

INFO: 18C
92WC

1. Activity Visited: Personnel Section, 22d Air Refueling Squadron, McChord AFB, 27-29 March 1962.

2. Personnel making visit: WO Clay, 92SAW/DP
SMS Bomba, 18SAD Sgt Major

3. Personnel contacted: Col Kenneth C Diehl, Comdr, 22ARS
Major Himes, Admin Off, 22ARS
Maj Busch, Personnel Off, 22ARS
MSgt Miller, 1st Sgt, 22ARS
MSgt Lee, NCOIC Pers Sec, 22ARS

4. This staff assistance visit was conducted for the purpose of determining status of corrective action on discrepancies previously reported, status of compliance with current directives pertaining to leave accounting and to insure compliance with SAC letter, DPMC, Clarification of Policy on Excessive Travel While TDY Chargeable to Leave, 12 Mar 62, as clarified by SAC message, DPMC 27912, same subject, 23 Mar 62.

5. Findings:

a. Present status of compliance with current directives pertaining to leave accounting is satisfactory.

b. Corrective action taken on discrepancies noted during previous assistance visits on leave accounting is satisfactory.

c. Discrepancies noted during this visit were due primarily to misunderstanding of policy on excessive travel time while TDY chargeable as leave. Findings are as follows:

(1) Source: TDY Worksheets. This time was picked up from TDY worksheets accomplished by personnel of the 22ARS Personnel Section from previously submitted vouchers in hands of Finance Officer. These errors

have not been corrected. Action required by Personnel Section, 22ARS.

A1C Arroyo	20 May 61	1 day
1/Lt Austin	7 Oct 60	1 day
A1C Carter	7 Aug 61	1 day
A2C Dile	20 Sep 61	1 day
Capt Emery	24 May 61	1 day
SSgt Hughes	6 Apr 61	1 day
A2C McMichael	26 May 61	1 day
Capt Overstreet	7 Apr 61	1 day
	Total	8 days

(2) Source: Alpha File of TDY Vouchers. Errors were not corrected. Action required.

MSgt Carvidi	11 Jan 62	1 day
	17 Jan 62	1 day
SSgt Cook, Sven	5 Jun 61	1 day
	1 Jul 61	1 day
SSgt Eaves	16 Jul 61	1 day
MSgt Pike	8 Nov 61	1 day
	17 Dec 61	1 day
A1C Keller	5 Aug 61	1 day
	Total	8 days

(3) Source: 1962 Travel Vouchers. These errors have been corrected.

Capt Carpenter	6 thru 10 Jan 62	5 days
	3 thru 7 Mar 62	5 days
TSgt Slaughter	2 thru 4 Jan 62	1 day
Capt Howell		2 days
1/Lt Zinn (Maxwell trip)	Aug 61	2 days
	Jan 62	3 days
Capt Hellberg (Maxwell trip)		2 days
	Total	20 days

(4) Days Adjustment in 1962 Leave Deck. 10 days, (Key punch errors). These errors have been corrected.

A1C Williamson	1 day - Credit USAF
WO Stuber	1 day " "
1/Lt Austin	1 day " "
A1C Mitchell	1 day " "
A2C Velon	3 days " "
Lt Ziegler	1 day - Credit individual
Capt Moran	1 day " "
Capt Gross	1 day " "

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(5) In addition to the above, irregularities were noted in 45 leave records accomplished during the period February-March 1962. These errors were due almost entirely to non-compliance with the provisions of SAC Manual 30-2. Errors consisted of improper accomplishment of the SAC Forms 603. On the spot correction was made in each instance. No further discrepancy is anticipated in this area.

6. A recapitulation of total leave discrepancy noted during audit and correction of leave records during the period Jan-March 1962 is as follows:

a. Total discrepancy noted	1938 1/2	days
Leave gained credit USAF	1603 1/2	days
Leave gained credit individual	335	days

b. The above includes 317 days gained credit USAF due to failure to properly close out leave records upon reenlistment of personnel.

c. Exact figures on the amount of leave discrepancy due to improper accounting for excessive travel time while TDY, Chargeable as Leave were not maintained separately. However, only eight (8) days charged as leave were of the nature in which the individual charged actually reported for and worked during a major portion of the normal duty day in which travel was completed. Travel performed was in excess of authorized constructive travel time and performed during a portion of two calendar days; therefore, chargeable under the USAF clarification of policy as outlined in SAC letter dated 12 March 62.

d. Inspections, as outlined in SACM 30-1, are now being accomplished. One inspection has been made and corrective action is adequate.

7. With the exception of those records which could not be corrected due to circumstances outlined in paragraph 4f, letter this Hq, subj: Memo for the Record (Leave Accounting 22AREFS, McChord AFB, Wn), dated 15 Mar 62, and discrepancies outlined in first part of this letter, records are now considered 100% correct. Present procedures are now aligned in accordance with current directives. Continued emphasis is desired on this phase of personnel administration with special attention afforded accomplishment of the SAC Forms 603, Key punch accounting cards and proper accomplishment of travel vouchers.

8. This report is forwarded for information and necessary corrective action. Report of completed action is not required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES W MILLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DMM

28 March 1962

SUBJECT: Report of Informal Staff Visit - 22ARWS, McChord AFB, Wash.

TO: 18th SAD (DM)

1. An Informal Staff Visit was made to the 22d Air Refueling Squadron, McChord AFB, Washington, 20-21 March 1962, to determine what problems may arise in operation of the various maintenance sections pending dissolution of the organization.

2. Persons Making Visit: CMS Gordon L. Grimm
SMS Donald J. Newberg
SMS Eugene R. Shankle

3. Persons Contacted: Lt Col Lance R. Davis, CM
Major Robin H. Theuer, OMS
Major Wells, Job Control
Captain Brady, FMSM
CMS Chapman, Maint Supv.
CMS Mitchell, QC
CMS Proctor, OMS

4. Findings and Recommendations:

a. All maintenance sections are operating satisfactorily despite the loss of personnel to SAC projects and the impending dissolution of the organization. It is recommended, however, that authority be requested to delay the shipment of key personnel until aircraft moves are completed.

b. A project for repair of radomes set up by the Field Maintenance shops has shown excellent results in reduction of radomes sent off base for repair. Under this program the radomes are removed each two months and are completely stripped and reconditioned. It requires two days per radome to complete and will be recommended by this directorate for utilization by our other KC-135 units. Step-by-step procedures were obtained and will be passed on to the 92d and 4170th Field Maintenance organization.

c. The test program utilizing a combined PE/Recovery program has been highly successful to date and has resulted in higher aircraft in commission rates. Aircraft are

averaging six hours from landing to in commission status. This program has also been implemented at Larson on a test basis.

for GORDON L. GRIMM
CMS, USAF
Acft Maint Supt

0796

KODAK SAFETY FILM

HEADQUARTERS
COORDINATION AEROSPACE DIVISION
15TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

FILE DESIGNATION

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DMS 30 March 1962

SUBJECT: Report of Informal Staff Visit to 22d AREFS and Hq 15th AF
MEMO FOR RECORD

TO: 18th SAD (DM)

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
DMS	

1. During the period 19-23 March 1962 the undersigned visited the 22d Air Refueling Squadron and Hq 15th Air Force. The purpose of the visit to the 22d AREFS was to determine the progress with which that activity was complying with instructions relating to the inactivation of their supply account. Upon arrival it was noted that no firm action had been consumated to physically ship any of the items, however, planning relative to the movement was progressing at a satisfactory rate.

2. It should be noted at this point that the supply officer of the 22d had attended a conference at Hqs OCAMA during the period 5-8 Mar 62. The purpose of this conference was to discuss shipping instructions for all UAL property assigned to the 22d AREFS. I examined the minutes of this conference and the attachment thereto. The latter consisted of an itemized listing of the majority of the UAL items, as well as the destinations to which they are to be shipped. The minutes of the meeting further indicated that no actual shipments were to be made until receipt of firm shipping instructions from 15th Air Force.

3. Inasmuch as a representative of ADC from McChord AFB was in attendance at the aforementioned conference, I called a joint meeting between the 22d AREFS supply personnel and the ADC supply personnel. The purpose of this meeting was to have them present any problems to me relating to the forthcoming movement which I, in turn, could present to Hq 15th AF. During this meeting I was told by ADC personnel that no packing and crating or transportation funds were available for this move. Further, they stated that such funds should be forthcoming from SAC channels. Additionally we discussed some of the administrative details pertaining to the turn-in and assembly of these items prior to actual shipment. I was informed that no building on McChord AFB was available for our use as an assembly point. Consequently, our only alternative is to use available space in Hangar 3 for assembly of property prior to shipment.

4. This hangar space will also have to be utilized for maintenance of KC-135 aircraft up until the time the last

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 26, OCT 60

0797

aircraft has departed; consequently, storage space is limited and property will have to be assembled and shipped as rapidly as possible. In some instances this will entail the shipment of partial quantities of items such as hangar and field maintenance stands, dollies, auxiliary power units, etc. Adoption of this procedure, however, should present no problem to the various consignees - Mather, Travis, and Beale AF Bases.

5. After departing the 22d ARRYS and attending the CEMO/BEMO Conference at 15th Air Force on Thursday, 22 Mar 62, I attended to the matters mentioned heretofore with 15th AF DM staff. The following actions were taken:

a. Commander 22d ARRYS was advised in writing by Hq 15AF to apprise the Base Commander at McChord of his specific requirements insofar as they relate to packing and crating funds and transportation funds. A written reply from that officer is to be obtained by the 22d ARRYS Commander. In the event that the Base Commander states in writing that it is not their responsibility to furnish packing and crating as well as transportation funds, the 22d ARRYS Commander is to so advise Commander 15th Air Force. It should be noted at this point that the Hq 15th AF Staff are pronounced in their thinking that the making available of such funds is a responsibility of ADC at McChord. Basis for this conviction is AFR 11-4. I will keep abreast of developments in this area.

6. I also obtained a copy of a six page set of instructions pertaining to the supply inactivation plan from the Hq 15th AF DM staff. I was told that these instructions had already been mailed to the 22d ARRYS. On Monday, 26 Mar 62, I telephoned both Colonel Diehl and Major Logan to ask if they had received the aforementioned instructions; they had not. Consequently, I sent a copy by Air Mail of my complete package of instructions to the 22d and had the assurance from both the aforementioned officers that they would take immediate action to comply with them, rather than wait for the official copies from 15th AF. Lastly, I apprised Colonel Dwight D. Patch, DSUP, 92d Strat Aerospace Wing, that our headquarters expected the 92d to actively participate in assisting 22d ARRYS with all supply inactivation problems. He was further advised that I would furnish him any and all information in this regard which the Division from time to time might receive.

CHARLES B. MURRAY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Supply Staff Officer

2

[redacted]
[redacted] AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO

14 March 1962

SUBJECT: Staff Visit

TO: 92ARFS (C)

1. The undersigned performed a staff visit to the 22d Air Refueling Squadron 12 and 13 March 1962. Primary items of interest were:

a. Positive Control and Execution procedures.

b. Standardization scheduling.

c. Collateral training scheduling, with emphasis on annual and semi-annual items.

d. Crew professional files.

e. Alert Force management.

2. Positive Control and Execution procedures. The training program in this area is adequate. The undersigned attended one lecture on this subject presented by an officer controller. The material was well organized and was presented in clearly understood terms. Individual crew members quizzed by the instructor demonstrated a good knowledge of positive control and execution procedures.

3. Standardization scheduling. No problem is foreseen in accomplishing all required aircrew standardization checks prior to inactivation of the squadron. All crew personnel with standardization due dates before 1 August are scheduled for checks prior to their reassignment. Staff personnel are not specifically scheduled by date, although blocks of time are provided in the standardization schedule for each individual requiring a standardization or instrument check. This part of the standardization program will need to be monitored very carefully to avoid delinquencies among staff personnel during the transfer period.

4. Collateral training scheduling. With the possible exception of small arms training no problem exists here. Annual and semi-annual items are all but complete. Small arms training has been deferred so far this year awaiting better weather. With a little care in scheduling this should

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	INITIALS

[redacted]

0800

HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO

13 March 1962

SUBJECT: Report of Staff Visit - 567th Site Nr. 6

TO: MEMO FOR RECORD

1. The undersigned performed a staff visit to the 567th Missile Squadron Complex Nr. 6 to review procedures of an operation walk-thru on "Golden Nugget" 301-62.

2. A number of discrepancies in the Operations Order were pointed out to Lt Col Stone. It was also noted that Lt Col Stone was in possession of a 38 cal. revolver which is contrary to security regulations. Only the MCC and AMCC are authorized to wear weapons while in the complex. Captain Mathis secured weapon for Lt Col Stone.

3. The safe was located behind the console which does not give clear view and allow for quick access during time of need. This was moved along side of console to make it more readily available.

4. The walk-thru was handled in an efficient manner and many things were corrected on the spot. Transportation causes most of the headaches and delays involved with missile operation.

FRANK J. RIDDLE
Captain, USAF
Plans Officer

Hq 18th Strategic Aerospace Division
[redacted]
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: C

26 Mar 1962

SUBJECT: Deactivation of the 22 Air Rflg Sq

TO: 92 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC)

1. As you may know, the 22d Air Refueling Squadron is scheduled for deactivation 1 July 1962. Further, the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for the operational control of this organization, with administrative control still vested in the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing. As such, the 92d Wing is still responsible for all administrative activities in regard to the phase-out and inactivation of the 22ARS.

2. To date, the 92d Wing has been too aloof in their assistance to the 22d Air Refueling Squadron in their phase-out and inactivation, as well as the quality of assistance given this organization in the problems associated with inactivation. Some of the big problems involved are the supply phase-down in closing out the supply account; personnel leave accounting, which has been thoroughly fouled up in this organization; disposal of records, etc.

3. I expect the 92d Wing to take aggressive action concerning their responsibilities in all activities of administrative nature in the inactivation of the 22ARS to be sure that we have a clean and outstanding inactivation of this organization.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

Hq 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

C 26 Mar 1962

Officer Effectiveness Reports

92WC 41705W(WC)

1. As you know, it is becoming more difficult for officers to be promoted as the result of having to have a college degree. In addition, if we want a man promoted we state in the Officer Effectiveness Report that this man is, or is not, recommended for promotion. Omission of this in an OER will automatically keep the man from being promoted, even though the last block has been checked. In addition, if any man is promoted within your organization, I expect that man to be used and not be told that he can't hack the job because, after all, you promoted this man by his OERs.

2. Further, requirement to have a college degree is a "must". Therefore, you must be careful in writing a man's effectiveness report. If the man is studying off-duty educational courses and working toward a degree, let's be sure that any studying this man is doing is put on the OER and, if known, indicate that he is working toward a college degree. In this way, we will enhance the man's promotion chances.

3. I expect you to pass this on to your commanders in order that they may give thought to these two areas.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

C

29 Mar 1962

Ground Accident Rates

92 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC)

1. In reviewing the 15th Air Force ground accident rates for the first two months of 1962, it is evident that your program needs additional emphasis and control in the civilian employee area.

2. Injuries have placed your rate at 12.81. This is the highest rate in 15th Air Force and must be reduced. I have reviewed each of the injury reports and find that both could have been averted through proper control and discipline. To dispatch an elderly worker under hazardous walking conditions is not using good judgment, and for a worker to attempt lifting a heavy tire without assistance is not proper discipline. Accidents such as these cannot be tolerated.

3. In the remaining areas, military injury, private motor vehicle accident and government motor vehicle accident, your rates are below the 15th Air Force total, but can yet be improved. The over-all rating of Excellent is something to be proud of. However, had the civilian injury rate been "zero", you very probably would have been rated Outstanding.

4. I am certain that this is as much a concern to you as it is to me, and has received your personal attention already. Continued command emphasis must be given daily to improve all accident rates.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander


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SECRET

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 through 30 April 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield, 1 LT USAF
FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
FOY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

James W. Miller LTCol
FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

5-3415-11

SECRET

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY
Andrew Stephenson Maj.
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

15AF DX 162-71

IXOH 62-0012

Atch 2

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commision for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Saftey Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

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TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

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HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Administrative Staff Officer	Major Lewis E. McRae
Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler (Acting)
Director of Materiel	Colonel Leonard L. Jella
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. James E. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Captain Frank J. Riddle

Administration

On 6 April 1962 Colonel Leonard L. Jella, formerly commander of the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron in the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing at Fairchild Air Force Base, was reassigned to the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division as director of materiel. During the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron's training at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Colonel Jella had been the squadron deputy commander and upon the assignment of the squadron to the wing in April of 1960 was raised in status to commander. The squadron had distinguished itself during the pre-operational period under his command. For the period of 1 January 1961 through 31 December 1961 the squadron was awarded the USAF Missile Safety Award in the intercontinental ballistic missile category. This was the first unit to win this award. Colonel Wilson E. Burrill assumed command of the missile squadron.[4] (U)

The Hail Victor IV Program, initiated in October 1960 to honor outstanding noncommissioned officers, was held at Headquarters, SAC, during 12 and 13 April 1962. Senior Master Sergeant Elvin H. Bratton from the 4170th Strategic Wing at Larson Air Force Base represented the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division. Sergeant Bratton, NCOIC, DCM logistics division, accompanied Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, to SAC Headquarters where Sergeant Bratton attended a formal dinner the evening of his arrival and was presented an orientation briefing and tour of Head-

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4. Msg, 18SAD to 15AF, C 7518, Subj: Assignment of Col. L.L. Jella to 18SAD, 14 Mar 62, Exhibit # 1.

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quarters, SAC, the following day.[5] (U)

During April the efficiency of the bases within the division continued to be rated under the management control system (MCS). Under this system Fairchild attained an overall score of 96.2 per cent with a 98.4 per cent projected for the quarter. In the personnel area, all categories attained the maximum number of points to give the wing 100 per cent for the month in this area and a projected quarterly rate of 100 per cent. In the base support area a score of 95.2 per cent was attained for April and 99 per cent was projected for the quarter. A fire in the housing area cost the wing a rating of 80 per cent. In the general area of scoring the base earned a 93 per cent for the month and 90.3 per cent was projected for the quarter. This forecast was based on the expected 10 per cent loss in ground safety during the next two months. Weight control earned an 86 per cent with no improvement in sight for the quarter. The estimated quarterly score for information activities was 94 per cent and security effectiveness was scored at 97 per cent with no improvement seen during the quarter.[6] (U)

In operations all items were expected to be equal or better than last quarter's scores. Prospects were excellent for a very high scoring quarter and incentive training, which was a determining factor was expected to improve greatly. In bomber maintenance the wing earned a score of 89.2 per cent with a projected quarterly score of 98.8 per cent. Low areas included cancellations, bombing and navigational systems and the aircraft systems effectiveness. In tanker main-

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5. Msg, 18SAD to 15AF, EXO 178, Subj: Hail Victor IV Program, 3 April 62, Filed 18SADC.
6. Historical Report, 92SAW, SECRET, 1-30 Apr 62, Filed IXOH.

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During April the efficiency of the bases within the division continued to be rated under the management control system (MCS). Under this system Fairchild attained an overall score of 96.2 per cent with a 98.4 per cent projected for the quarter. In the personnel area, all categories attained the maximum number of points to give the wing 100 per cent for the month in this area and a projected quarterly rate of 100 per cent. In the base support area a score of 95.2 per cent was attained for April and 99 per cent was projected for the quarter. A fire in the housing area cost the wing a rating of 80 per cent. In the general area of scoring the base earned a 93 per cent for the month and 90.3 per cent was projected for the quarter. This forecast was based on the expected 10 per cent loss in ground safety during the next two months. Weight control earned an 86 per cent with no improvement in sight for the quarter. The estimated quarterly score for information activities was 94 per cent and security effectiveness was scored at 97 per cent with no improvement seen during the quarter.[6] (U)

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5. Msg, 18SAD to 15AF, EXO 178, Subj: Hail Victor IV Program, 3 April 62, Filed 18SADC.
6. Historical Report, 92SAW, SECRET, 1-30 Apr 62, Filed IXOH.

tenance the low areas was the number of cancellations which brought the April score to 96.7 per cent with 100 per cent forecasted for the quarter. The overall maintenance performance of the wing earned a score of 92.9 per cent with 99.4 per cent forecasted for the quarter.[7] (U)

However, in the 4170th Strategic Wing the SAC MOS scores for April reflected only the personnel, base support and general areas since the wing was in a numbered air force free training period and the operations and maintenance items were not scored. The overall base score for the personnel through general areas was 95.6 per cent as compared with the 90.6 per cent earned during the last quarter. In the personnel area the one weak area was airmen retention with a score of 85 per cent. This earned the personnel section a score of 92.5 per cent for the month. In the base support area automotive maintenance earned a score of 97 per eent and fire incidents were scored at 90 per cent for an overall base support score of 98.7 per cent, a similar increase as experienced in the personnel area. In the general area of scoring improvement was shown in a score of 90 per cent for ground safety in comparison with the last several months. A similar improvement was noted in the weight control area and security effectiveness was rated at 84 per cent. The overall score in the general area of scoring was 92.4 per cent which was an improvement over the previous month.[8] (U)

During the month the number of combat ready bomber crews of

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7. Historical Report, 92SAW, SECRET, 1-30 Apr 62, Filed IXOH.
8. Historical Report, 4170SW, SECRET, 1-30 Apr 62, Filed IXOH.

the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing remained the same as the previous month. However, a senior crew was upgraded to select status. This gave the wing a total of 27 combat ready crews which included 9 in select status, 13 in senior status and 5 in combat ready status. Meanwhile the tanker combat crew strength of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron was maintained at 36 combat ready crews, the total number of crews needed to meet the tanker ratio of 1.8 crews for each aircraft. Of the 36 combat ready tanker crews, 34 were in senior status and 2 in combat ready status. In addition the tanker crew strength of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron was 27 combat crews during April. Of this total 12 were in senior status and 15 were in combat ready status.[9] (S)

During this same period the bomber combat crew strength of the 4170th Strategic Wing was 27 combat ready crews. Of this total 8 were in select status, 14 in senior status and five in combat ready status. The tanker crew strength of the wing remained the same as the previous month. Of the 35 combat crews, 7 were in senior status and 28 in combat ready status.[10] (S)

In the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing the missile combat crew strength was 46 crews of which 45 were combat ready and one crew in non-combat ready status. In addition 10 Atlas ICBM's were assigned to the squadron. Meanwhile the 4170th Strategic Wing had received nine Titan I missiles by the end of the month.[11] (S)

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9. Historical Report, 92SAW, SECRET, 1-30 Apr 62, Filed IXOH.
10. Ltr, 4170SW to 92SAW, SECRET, Subj: Crew and Flying Figures for Apr 62, 22 May 62, Exhibit # 2.
11. Historical Report, 92SAW, SECRET, 1-30 Apr 62, Filed IXOH.

The total bomber combat crew strength of the 18th Strategic Aero-Space Division was 55 combat crews. Of this total 17 were in select status, 27 in senior status and 10 in combat ready status. A review of the tanker crew strength of the division showed 98 combat ready crews of which 53 were in senior status and 45 in combat ready status. There were also 45 combat ready Atlas missile crews and one non-combat ready missile crew under the command of the division.[12] (S)

Meanwhile the 18 B-52D aircraft of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing flew 80 sorties for a total of 665:50 flying hours and 16 B-52D bombers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 82 sorties for a total of 660:15 flying hours. This gave the division a total of 34 bombers flew 162 sorties in 1,326:05 flying hours.[13] (S)

The 21 KC-135A tanker aircraft assigned to the 92d Air Refueling Squadron flew 88 sorties for a total of 593:15 flying hours and the 16 KC-135A tankers of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron flew 91 sorties for a total of 667 flying hours. During this same period the 20 KC-135 tankers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 144 sorties and amassed 741:10 flying hours. This gave the division a total of 57 tankers which flew 323 sorties in 2,001:25 flying hours.[14] (S)

During April four bombers and eight tankers of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing flew in support of the USAF mission, Operation DUSTY BEARD II. The aircraft were positioned at one of four remote dry lake beds in the west-central United States to test the SAC strike force in this area. The wing also continued to support the

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12. Historical Report, 92SAW, SECRET, 1-30 Apr 62, Filed IXOH.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

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requirements of Operation CHROME DOME and the 22d Air Refueling Squadron flew in support of Operation AIR MAIL. In the 4170th Strategic Wing bombers flew in support of Operation BAR NONE. The wing also supported Operation CROSS COUNTRY 62-1, an EWO generation exercise. This wing's tankers also continued to support Operation CHROME DOME and AIR MAIL.[15] (S)

Staff Visits by the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Murray, division supply staff officer, made an informal staff visit to the 22d Air Refueling Squadron to evaluate their progress in complying with the Fifteenth Air Force Supply Inactivation Plan. Although no shipments of equipment to Mather, Beale and Travis Air Force Bases had been made, a considerable amount of hangar and field maintenance equipment had been assembled for packing. The non-availability of packing and transportation funds had precluded any shipments of the equipment. Aware of this, Colonel Murray contacted higher headquarters and shortly thereafter the squadron was authorized $20,000 for crating and shipping. Although at the time of his visit, on 11 through 13 April, satisfactory progress was being made, Colonel Murray suggested that the division closely monitor the project to insure the timely compliance with the inactivation deadline date.[16] (U)

On 14 April Lieutenant Colonel James W. Thompson, acting director of materiel during the absence of Colonel Leonard L. Jella, and division personnel monitored the ability of the 4170th Strategic Wing to generate aircraft to meet the EWO timing criteria from plant # 53

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15. Historical Report, 92SAW, SECRET, 1-30 Apr 62, Filed IXDH.
16. Report, Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, 17 Apr 62, Exhibit # 3.

on the Boeing side of the airfield. The test, directed by Fifteenth Air Force, resulted in the effective generation of two aircraft from the Boeing side and two actual weapons uploadings within the specified time limits. Six bombers and four tankers were repositioned from the Boeing side to refueling pits on the Larson side with ample time to meet the generation schedule. No serious problems were encountered during the exercise and it proved that a normal generation rate could be achieved with maintenance activities located in plant # 53 on the Boeing side of the airfield.[17] (U)

On 17 through 19 April two division materiel supervisors made an informal staff visit on the deputy commander for maintenance activities in the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing to spot check general management and the degree of compliance with the current directives. The B-52 wheel movers which Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, division commander, had earlier ordered the use of on all moves, were being accomplished in accordance with existing directives. Alert swaps and alert aircraft tire rotation were the only exceptions. The documentation and utilization of the wheel mover and the training of qualified operators was progressing satisfactorily. One area which was found unsatisfactory during the visit was the maintenance and care of the MHU7/M trailer. A considerable amount of grease and foreign matter was evident on the piston rods and lift controls. The danger of this foreign matter damaging seals and lift cylinders was readily apparent. In view of the command emphasis in the correct operation and maintenance

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17. Report of Monitoring of 4170SW -- CROSS COUNTRY 62-1, 23 Apr 62, Filed 18SADC.

of these trailers and its importance to the SAC EWO, it was recommended that an improved maintenance program be implemented to insure the availability of operational trailers. It was also recommended that protective covers be developed to prevent damage and/or contamination to the piston rods and lift control seals during towing operations.[18] (U)

On 18 through 20 April Captain F. J. Riddle, division operations staff officer, performed an informal staff visit on the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing. During the visit, Cpatain Riddle covered the instructor program, EWO briefings, operations plans division, target intelligence branch and the fast reaction of the aircrews. With the exception of the fast reaction time of the aircrews, all areas were found to be in satisfactory condition. All alert crews were undergoing an extensive training program in positive control instructed by the chief of the control division and his assistant. During the 90-day period prior to the inspection all crews were examined on positive control on an average of twice monthly. During the months of February and March, 420 examinations were administered with 17 failures resulting in a failure rating of 4.05 per cent. As of 1 April a new examination technique was adopted and as of the date of the visit, 172 crew members had taken examinations with 38 failures and a rate of 22 per cent. This was unacceptable and demanded added emphasis immediately on the areas of weakness.[19] (S)

On 20 April Lieutenant Colonel Maurice E. Marler, acting director of operations, performed an operations staff visit to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild Air Force Base. The majority of the

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18. Report, 18SAD Informal Staff Visit to 92SAW DGM, 23 Apr 62, Filed 18SADC.
19. Report, 18SAD Informal Staff Visit 92SAW, SECRET, 7 May 62, Exhibit # 4.

areas covered during the visit were very satisfactory. However, there was an apparent need for additional emphasis on EWO training in the squadron. The records of 55 combat crew members tested on EWO procedures showed seven individuals had failed for an overall rating of 87.2 per cent. Training requirements, other than those directed by higher headquarters, were determined for each crew member through examination results and standardization checks. Weaknesses discovered in individual tasks were used as a basis for prescribing additional supervised training. This procedure was expected to insure that competence was maintained at the required level.[20] (U)

On 25 April Captain F. J. Riddle, division operations staff officer, made an informal staff visit to the 4170th Strategic Wing to observe the preparations for Operation SPRUCE UP scheduled for 22 June 1962. Numerous CBR lectures, covering shock damage, fall out, food, water and lodging, were conducted throughout the civilian community. On-base shelter areas had been designated but shelter capacity and attention factors signs had not been posted. Another factor was that the disaster control officer did not have the necessary background prior to assuming his responsibilities as required by SAC Regulation 355-1.[21] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

To Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, division commander, and higher headquarters, maintaining a complete capability to execute the unit EWO mission was the most important job in the tactical unit of any command. The majority of the areas in this field had been high-lighted

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20. Report, 18SAD Operations Staff Visit to 92SAW-567SMS, 23 Apr 62, Exhibit # 5.
21. Report, 18SAD Informal Staff Visit to 4170SW - Ops SPRUCE UP, 7 May 62, Filed 18SADC.

in recent months to the extent that they were no longer the serious problems that they once were. A lesser degree of emphasis had, however, been devoted to EWO study by combat crews. This subject was as important as any of the other critical areas. Inspections by higher headquarters had revealed a weakness among the combat crew members concerning knowledge of their assigned alert sortie. General Ohlke expected each wing commander to locate the weaknesses of the crew members during the crew certification process and take immediate action to correct the discrepancy.[22] (U)

As of 24 April and until further notice both wings in the division were directed by General Ohlke to cease all practive simulated engine failures during take-off and forced landings in the L-28 and L-20 fixed wing aircraft used in the support of the missile complexes. Three accidents in recent months had occurred while these aircraft were performing this type of maneuver. The most recent was the crash landing of a Fairchild L-28 on the runway on 24 April 1962. Further clarifying instructions would be forthcoming from Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force relative to this maneuver.[23] (U)

While driving near the Fairchild Base Hospital, General Ohlke observed children playing on the road. As a result General Ohlke directed that a special survey on dependent accident prevention be accomplished at Fairchild. This survey included the housing and playground areas and other areas occupied by children and directed action

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22. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, 4170SW, Subj: Combat Crew EWO Preparation, 3 Apr 62, Exhibit # 6.
23. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, 4170SW, Subj: STOL Aircraft Operations, 24 Apr 62, Filed 18SADC.

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be taken to correct the existing hazardous conditions and to prevent the development of hazardous conditions in the future.[24] (U)

24. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Dependent Accidnet Prevention, 9 Apr 62, Exhibit # 7.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Order.

GAZETEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

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EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, 18SAD to 15AF, C 7518, Subj: Assignment of Col. L.L. Jella to 18SAD, 14 Mar 62.	1
Ltr, 4170SW to 92SAW, SECRET, Subj: Crew and Flying Figures for Apr 62, 22 May 62	2
Report, Informal Staff Visit to 22ARS, 18SAD, 17 Apr 62.	3
Report, 18SAD Informal Staff Visit to 92SAW, SECRET, 7 May 62	4
Report, 18SAD Operations Staff Visit to 92SAW-567SMS, 23 Apr 62.	5
Ltr, 18SAD to 4170SW, 92SAW, Subj: Combat Crew EWO Preparation, 3 Apr 62.	6
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, Subj: Dependent Accident Prevention, 9 April 62.	7

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

ACTION / INFO / FROM	PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check) BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
	ROUTINE			X	AF		

FROM: HQ 18 STRAT AEROSPACE DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

TO: 15 AF MARCH AFB CALIF

INFO: SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
92 STRAT AEROSPACE WG FAIRCHILD AFB WN (COURIER)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Fwd 1 cy to 92SAW(C)

/UNCLASS/C

In accordance with telephone conversation with General Old that Colonel Wilson Burrill will take command of the 567 Strat Missile Sq, Colonel Jalla will be transferred to the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division as Director of Material. Colonel Burrill informed us that he plans to arrive Fairchild on 3 April, and it is our intention to have him take command of the 567SMS effective 6 April. Upon the same date Colonel Jalla will be assigned to the 18th Strat Aerospace Div with duty as Director of Materiel.

INFO: 92SAW (C)

DATE / TIME / MONTH / YEAR

SYMBOL: C

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)

PHONE: 2171 | PAGE NO. 1 | NR. OF PAGES 1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

HAROLD W OKLEY, Brigadier General, USAF
Commander, 18 Strat Aerospace Division

DD FORM 1 MAY 50 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 48, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4170TH STRATEGIC WING
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOH

22 May 1962

SUBJECT: MCS, Crew and Dlying Figures for April 1962 Division History

TO: 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (IXOH)
Fairchild AFB, Washington

1. MCS. Base score, problem areas, and corrective action taken. This item mailed separately this date.

2. Number of aircraft assigned/available:

B-52D	16/15.5	(S)
KC-135A	20/20	(S)
C-47	3	
H-19	2	
T-33	6	

3. Missiles: Nine Titan I missiles had been received by the end of April.

4. Flying Missions and Hours:

	B-52 Sorties	B-52 Hours	KC-135 Srts	KC-135 Hrs
CCTM	58	469:30	83	492:25
Test/Ferry	7	37:30		
"Bar None"	17	153:55		
Air Mail			14	52:20
Deployment, "Chrome Dome"			5	19:25
"Chrome Dome" support			32	113:15
Cross Country			10	63:45
TOTALS	82	660:15	144	741:10

5. Combat Crew Status: B-52 combat ready, 27. These included 8 select, 14 senior, and 5 cr. KC-135 crews totaled 35, including 7 senior and 28 CR. There were no upgradings in April. There were no crews of NCR classification.

Eugene W. Hungerford
EUGENE W. HUNGERFORD
Capt. USAF, Information Officer

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

IXCH-62-003

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: [illegible]

SUBJECT: Report of [illegible] Visit [illegible]

TO: 15th [illegible]

1. Period of Visit: 11-12 April [illegible]

2. Person Making Visit: Lt Col [illegible]
Supply [illegible]

3. Purpose of Visit: [illegible] 15th Air Force Supply Inactivation Plan.

4. Persons Contacted:

[illegible]

Lt Col [illegible], [illegible]
Major C. L. Logan, [illegible]

[illegible]

Col J. W. Riddick, Deputy Base Commander
Lt Col Allen, [illegible]
Major Starr, Transportation Officer
Mr. Lawrence, Comptroller

5. Findings and Recommendations:

a. No actual shipments of [illegible] equipment to [illegible] or Travis had been effected. However, several carloads of hangar and field maintenance equipment were assembled in Hangar 3 ready for transportation processing. Non-availability of packing and transportation funds was given as the reason for failure to move this equipment.

b. The following actions were taken by the undersigned to activate physical movement of the property:

(1) Contacted Colonel J. W. Riddick, Deputy Base Commander, to determine exactly what was necessary to get the program moving—was informed that funds for packing, crating and transportation was essentially the only factor holding up the program. Col Riddick also stated that his "in house" capability for packing and crating was limited to the extent that some packing and crating would probably have to be handled on a contract basis.

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	LAYOUT'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Division)

[illegible]

0835



7 May 1958

[illegible] - [illegible] Wing

[illegible], this headquarters, performed an [illegible] of [illegible] on the [illegible] Wing [illegible] Primary items of interest were:

a. Leadership program.

b. [illegible] Briefings.

c. Operations Plans Division.

d. Target Intelligence Branch.

e. Test reaction.

2. Instructor Program: In reference to SAC message DOPL [illegible], a check was made on the instructors being utilized in the tactical doctrine and EWO study program. Instructors for all crewmen are well-qualified in the area of responsibility and are being utilized to cover the respective specialties; navigators instructing navigators, pilots instructing pilots, etc. (U)

3. EWO Briefings: EWO briefings have been accomplished by all [illegible] and [illegible] been certified by either the Wing Commander or the Deputy Commander for Operations. All certifications are current and complete in accordance with SACR 55-7. Crews considered for the 1/8 or 1/16 concept are briefed prior to each tour of duty. (U)

4. Operations Plans Division:

a. A physical check was made on the sortie study folders for each crew assigned. Target study accomplishment and briefings have been properly documented on [illegible]'s as prescribed in SACR 55-7. (U)

b. The manning table assigns a clerk for the EWO Operations Branch. This slot is being utilized elsewhere in the

SECRET

Wing. A clerk is definitely needed in the EWO Branch prior to the implementation of the SIOP 63 plan. (U)

5. Target Intelligence Branch:

a. A page count check was performed and found to be correct. This unit has developed a unique method of page count change which should be submitted as a suggestion for Project Money Tree. (U)

b. The recent loss of a weapon from the Target Materials Section has caused the unit to over-stress weapons security. The weapons are locked in the rack with a securing cable, placed in a separate, secure room which is already a vault, located inside a building which is a vault. Yet the Deputy Commander for Security & Law Enforcement desires that a steel lock type door be added to the room. This appears to be a waste of funds when a daily inventory of weapons would accomplish the same goal. (U)

c. The Photo Lab under the Intelligence Division has a personnel shortage; 22210 Lab Technician, which will create a problem with the forthcoming SIOP change. At present, Deep Creek Air Force Station has an AIC 22260 (Tom Wilkerson) who is understood to be an average. It is recommended that the Wing survey the possibility of obtaining this lab technician now instead of waiting for the airman programmed for October 1962. (U)

6. Fast Reaction:

a. All alert crews are undergoing an extensive training program in positive control instructed by the Chief of Control Division and his assistant. In the last 90 days all crews have been examined on positive control an average of twice monthly. During the months of February and March, 480 examinations were administered with 17 failures giving a failure rate of 4.05%. (S)

b. A new exam technique has been adopted as of 1 April. To date, 172 crew members have taken these exams with 38 failures, a failure rate of 22.5%. This is unacceptable and demands added emphasis immediately on the areas of weakness. (S)

7. This report is furnished for information and any action which the Commander 92d Strat Aerospace Wing deems necessary. An indorsement is not required. (U)

0838

SECRET

5. This report is classified Secret because it reveals information pertaining to positive control and execution results. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HARRISON B. HARRAH
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

[redacted]

#16

4. Determination of training requirements. Training requirements, other than [illegible] are determined for each [illegible] and [illegible] dual training and used by [illegible] supervisor [illegible] completion of [illegible]

5. Execution and [illegible] determined [illegible] dual training [illegible] noted that [illegible] accomplished [illegible] follows: [illegible] be [illegible] a [illegible] following the end of [illegible]

6. Designation of [illegible] selected from [illegible] determined from [illegible] Director, [illegible] orders of [illegible]

7. This report is [illegible] demand [illegible] Ving and the [illegible] A reply is not required.

FOR THE COMMISSION:

[illegible] E. [illegible]
Lt Colonel, [illegible]
Acting Director of [illegible]

0841

[redacted]

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: G

9 April 1952

SUBJECT: Combat Crew MSO Inspection

TO: 4170th Strat Wing (VH)
[redacted] Strat Aerospace Wing (VH)

1. Maintaining a consistent capability in command and control MSO is the most important job this Headquarters has to do as command. Inspection of this capability, and its progress, must receive much attention by [redacted] Inspectors. Inspectors must be aware of the principles of positive control and coordination, and have knowledge of doctrine, weapons, weapons / procedures and duties of the intelligent combat crewman.

2. We have highlighted most of these areas in regard to the problems that they can expect to encounter. This, however, must constant to the crew, by command inspection. This emphasis is as important as any of the other critical areas mentioned above.

3. Reports of inspections by the MSO and combined MSO Standardization Boards occasionally indicate inspectors missing obvious crew problems concerning knowledge of their command post, equipment. Some of these inspectors [redacted] are almost unbelievable in the importance they appear) others are explainable; some can be understood.

4. I expect you as a Commander to be most searching in your interrogation of all combat crews during the crew certification process. If there is any weakness whatsoever in the knowledge displayed by any individual, I expect you to discover it and direct corrective action to correct it. However, from time to time my Director of Operations and I will attend crew certification briefings to personally their thoroughness and gain first hand information as to individual crew MSO capability and the MSO study program as a whole.

0842

5. I do not mean to imply that your present NMCO study program is inadequate. But I do want to assure that this facet of over preparation receives the same careful attention that is devoted to other areas critical to the Emergency War Order.

HAROLD K. JOHNSON
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

APRIL '62

[redacted]

2. The recent arrest [redacted] dependent children in a [redacted] and a lack of adequate recreation, prompts me to write [redacted] my concern about [redacted].

3. While [redacted] to the local newspaper, I have personally observed [redacted] on the roof. They had developed a game [redacted] I will not tolerate allowing such [redacted] I have observed many [redacted] have contributed little, if any, [redacted] a humanizing practice.

4. In regard to the [redacted] desire that a fence be [redacted] from the housing area entering the [redacted] In regard to the situation in the Wherry housing, I desire a control [redacted] children, from the street and into the [redacted] which would [redacted] most of the houses.

5. I desire that a complete survey on dependent accident prevention be [redacted] This survey will include, but not be limited to, [redacted] the housing areas, [redacted] the Teen Club, the housing activity location [redacted] I direct any and all [redacted] and to prevent the development [redacted] I request formal action against parents [redacted] to play on the streets of the housing [redacted].

6. A suspense date of 30 April is established for a report on the special survey. At the same time, I expect a progress report on the other areas mentioned.

HAROLD W CHASE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding

0844


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HISTORY

SECRET

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

May and June 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis

ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

Harold W Ohlke

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

SECRET

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY

Major Roy Lewis
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10
15AF DXI 62-97
Atch 16

5-3662-2

0850

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft our of commission for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

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TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

0854

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

0855

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Col. James W. Miller
Director of Operations	Lt. Col. Maurice E. Marler (Acting)
Director of Materiel	Colonel Leonard L. Jella
Director of Safety	Major Thomas H. Paskell
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Col. James E. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Col. Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Captain Frank J. Riddle

Administration

On 25 May the first crews and tankers of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron at McChord Air Force Base in Washington began the initial phase of their deactivation program. Under the SAC Programming Plan 5-62, the tankers and aircrews of the squadron were sent to Beale, Travis and Mather Air Force Bases during May and June. Two KC-135 tankers were also sent to the 912th Air Refueling Squadron at Warner-Robins Air Force Base in Georgia. At 0900 hours PST on 13 June the squadron was relieved of their EWO responsibilities and by 23 June all crews and tankers of the squadron had been sent to their respective bases. As a result of the transfer Travis Air Force Base and Beale Air Force Base received eight aircrews and five tankers respectively. Eight aircrews and four tankers were sent to Mather Air Force Base and Warner-Robins Air Force Base received two tankers. As far as non-aircrew personnel attached to the 22d Air Refueling Squadron were concerned, the transfer would not be complete until approximately the middle of July. Guidance for the deactivation as well as staff visits and daily supervision of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron was provided by the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division. The 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing provided support in the areas of administration, operations, logistics and others in which the dispersed air refueling squadron was not self-sufficient. The basic reason for this action was to free the wing commander of the additional supervisory requirement and permit him to place proper emphasis on the weapons systems assigned to his wing.[4] (S)

4. Ops. Ord. 15AF Suplement to SAC Prog. Plan 5-62, SECRET, Subj: 22AREPS Deactivation Program, 15 Mar 62, Filed: 1 May - 30 Jun 62, Historical Report, 92SAW.

On 16 May Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, arrived at SAC Headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska for airborne command post duties, nicknamed LOOKING GLASS, until 29 May 1962.[5] (S)

During May and June the effectiveness of both wings in the division continued to be measured by the management control system. Although the 4170th Strategic Wing was only scored in the personnel through general areas, the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing attained a higher rating. The 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing placed third in SAC and Fifteenth Air Force. The wing with a score of 96.5 per cent was only nine-tenths of one per cent from the first place rating. In the personnel section of the MCS, the wing score 100 per cent, well above the SAC average. In the base support area the wing was scored at 98.5 per cent, 10.1 per cent above the SAC average and in the general area the wing was rated at 94.3 per cent. In these three areas Fairchild placed second in Fifteenth Air Force with a rating of 97.6 per cent.[6] (U)

In bomber operations the wing was third in Fifteenth Air Force with a rating of 100.1 per cent and fourth place in bomber maintenance with a score of 93.6 per cent. In tanker operations the wing was scored at 93.2 per cent and was ninth place in Fifteenth Air Force. This low rating was the result of higher headquarters directed missions lowering the incentive points per yield. In tanker maintenance, the wing was tied with the 9th Air Refueling

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5. Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, SECRET, DP 511, Subj: Airborne Command Post Duties, 24 Feb 62, Exhibit # 1.
6. Report, 92SAW, MCS Standings, 24 Jul 62, Filed DCRM.

Squadron in fourth place due to manhour accounting with a score of 96.5 per cent. Overall this was an impressive improvement over the previous quarter.[7] (U)

During the same quarter, the SAC MCS scores for the 4170th Strategic Wing reflected only the personnel, base support and general areas. Since the wing was in the numbered air force free training period, operations and maintenance items were scored for this quarter. The overall score for the 4170th Strategic Wing in the personnel through general areas was 94 per cent, very close to the SAC average of 94.2 per cent and the Fifteenth Air Force average of 94.1 per cent. The wing tied for ninth place in Fifteenth Air Force out of 22 bases and tied for 33rd place in SAC out of more than 70 scored units.[8] (U)

During May and June the number of combat ready bomber and tanker crews of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing remained the same. Twenty-seven combat crews were assigned to the wing with 11 in select status, 11 in senior status and 5 in combat ready status. Meanwhile the tanker combat crew strength of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron suffered the loss of a senior tanker crew which was downgraded to non-combat ready. Of the 36 combat crews assigned 33 were in senior status, two in combat ready status and one crew in non-combat ready status.[9] (S)

During this period the bomber combat crew strength of the 4170th Strategic Wing stood at 27 combat crews of which 10 were in

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7. Report, 92SAWG, MCS Standings, 24 Jul 62, Filed DCRM.
8. Report, 4170SW, MCS Standings, 16 Jul 62, Filed DCRM.
9. Report, 92SAWG, Historical Rept, 1 May - 30 Jun 62, Filed: IXOH

select status, 13 in senior status and four in combat ready status. In the 43rd Air Refueling Squadron the 35 combat crews were divided into seven in senior status and 28 in combat ready status. This status remained the same during the two month period.[10] (S)

In the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing, the missile combat crew strength was 46 crews of which 45 were combat ready and one crew was non-combat ready. In addition 10 Atlas ICBM's were assigned to the squadron. Meanwhile the 4170th Strategic Wing had received 10 Titan missiles, however, they were still under the control of SATAF.[11] (S)

In conclusion the bomber combat crew status of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division remained at 54 combat crews of which 21 were in select status, 24 in senior status and 9 in combat ready status during the two month period. The tanker combat crew strength of the division was 71 combat crews of which 40 were in senior status, 30 in combat ready status and one crew in non-combat ready crew status. This remained the same during the two month period.[12] (S)

During May the 16 B-52D bombers of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing flew 85 sorties in 681 flying hours and the following month flew 81 sorties in 703 flying hours. Meanwhile the 15 B-52D bombers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 92 sorties and 713 flying hours in May and 14 bombers flew 74 sorties in 583:15 flying hours the following month. This amounted to 177 sorties being flown during May and 155 during June. There were also 1,394 flying hours flown

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10. Ltr, Crew and Fly Figures for June 62, 27 Jul 62, Exhibit # 2.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.

in May and 1,286:15 flying hours in June by the bombers.[13] (S)

During May the 20 KC-135A tankers of the 4170th Strategic Wing flew 160 sorties and 767:10 flying hours and the following month flew 143 sorties in 793:30 flying hours. Meanwhile the 21 KC-135A tankers of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron flew 89 sorties in May and 108 in June. They flew 785:15 flying hours in May and 543:50 flying hours the following month. As a result the division flew 249 sorties during 1,552:25 flying hours in May and 251 sorties in 1,337:20 flying hours in June.[14] (S)

During May and June the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing continued to support Operation CHROME DOME. The wing also launched five tanker sorties in support of the 303d Bombardment Wing's operational readiness inspection, nicknamed Operation STRAIGHT SHOT DELTA. Another tanker was launched in support of Operation TEXAS STAR to the United Kingdom. In addition one of the wing's bombers flew in support of Operation BIG BLAST, a realistic penetration training exercise. The 4170th Strategic Wing launched aircraft in support of Operation CHROME DOME to the Eielson Tanker Task Force in Alaska and Operation AIR MAIL. Tankers of the wing also flew in support of the 303d Bombardment Wing's operational readiness inspection with the tankers of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing. They also supported Operation PACE MAKER and DOMINIC during the two month period.[15] (S)

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13. Report, 92SAWG Historical Report, SECRET, 1 May - 30 June 62, Filed: IXOH.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.

Staff Visits by the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

On 22 June personnel from the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division performed their umpire responsibilities in relation to Operation SPRUCE UP conducted in the 4170th Strategic Wing. The umpire team, headed by Colonel L. L. Jella, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division director of materiel, reported that the wing had conducted the operation with a satisfactory degree of realism. Directed by SAC, Operation SPRUCE UP was conceived to determine the capability of tactical crews to carry on operations under simulated fallout and damage conditions associated with weapon near misses. According to the umpire team the wing demonstrated an excellent capability to perform its assigned mission under nuclear attack. The local civilian population had been thoroughly briefed and were highly interested in the exercise. The lack of activity throughout the housing areas and elsewhere on the base during the critical periods of the exercise showed that all personnel were enthusiastically supporting the exercise.[16] (U)

Among the major discrepancies brought to light during the exercise was the pre-positioning of personnel prior to sounding the alert signal which detracted from the realism of the exercise. Key staff personnel were also present for duty prior to the initiation of the exercise which gave an erroneous picture of the response time. In addition despite the briefings conducted by the wing, a few shelter monitors failed to understand the purpose of the total dosage cards and the simulated use of sand bags was totally unrealistic. The division umpire team recommended that a

16. Report, 4170SW Historical Rpt, 1 - 30 Jun 62., Filed: IXOH.

disaster control exercise be conducted semi-annually by the 4170th Strategic Wing to maintain the desired level of efficiency.[17] (U)

Colonel M. E. Marler, acting division director of operations, performed a supervisory staff visit to the 4170th Strategic Wing on 19 June to inspect the various aspects of the EWO capability in preparation for the quarterly briefing for the Fifteenth Air Force Staff. Areas included in the inspection were positive control and execution procedures for aircrews and missile crews and controllers, control room effectiveness, alert management, EWO study program and the aircrew duty week. All areas were in satisfactory condition or better during the inspection with the exception of the housekeeping and indoor recreational facilities in the tanker alert force. These two areas did not meet the standards expected in an alert facility.[18] (U)

On 16 May Major T. H. Paskell, division director of safety, performed an informal staff visit to Larson Air Force Base and attended the base safety council meeting. Throughout the council meeting Colonel David A. Tate, wing commander and safety council chairman, discussed items both timely and pertinent. Larson was having the same trouble Fairchild had been having in relation with civil engineers (BDCE) and the regulations applicable to BDCE. The participation by their representative was a great improvement over the previous meetings, the result of pressure brought to bear by Colonel Tate and the base safety officer. More active and positive support by the civil engineers would result in improved productivity

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18. Rpt, 18SAD Staff Visit to 4170SW, Subj: EWO Capability, 3 Jul 62, Exhibit # 3.

in the area of accident prevention.[19] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Safety continued to be one of the major concerns to the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division Commander, Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke. One of his main areas of concern was the accident rates within the division during the quarter. The high number of government motor vehicle accidents and civilian injuries contested to the poor accident prevention programs established within the two wings. Even though our EWO effectiveness did not suffer directly from these accident rates, indirectly some effect was felt. For an efficient safety program additional duty safety personnel had to be motivated into productive efforts for accident prevention. However, it was not their job alone but the duty of every individual in the organization. Without everyone's help the program could not possibly succeed.[20] (U)

Another area of interest to the commander was the seat belt program. During visits to the 4170th Strategic Wing, General Ohlke observed a production seat belt program in effect. Seat belts could be obtained through the base safety office as well as other sources. However, during this same period there was no evidence of a similar program underway at Fairchild. Although a program had been initiated a year ago it soon died out. At General Ohlke's direction the program was rekindled. Squadron commanders briefed incoming personnel on the safety aspects of the seat belt in an

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19. Rpt, 18SAD Informal Staff Visit to 4170SW, Subj: Safety Council, 17 May 62, Exhibit # 4.
20. Ltr, 18SAD to 4170SW & 92SAW, Subj: Accident Prevention, 23 May 62, Exhibit # 5.

effort to equip every privately-owned vehicle with seat belts. General Ohlke felt that every effort should be expended to conserve our natural resources, to do less would approach dereliction of duty.[21] (U)

Recently there had been an increase in the number of incidents occurring in the alert area of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing. Positive action had to be taken to stop this trend. The incidents varied from a B-52 taxiing into a power unit and dragging it 100 feet and a crew member violating the two-man policy. An aircraft involved in restarting an engine after difficulties were encountered without the fire extinguishers fully manned. These incidents were completely against all concepts of proper operation. General Ohlke directed that the necessary action be taken to improve this situation.[22] (U)

Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr., Fifteenth Air Force commander, was concerned over the unauthorized modification of administrative aircraft. This subject would also be of special interest to the inspector and staff on future visits. As a result General Ohlke directed that no modifications on administrative aircraft would be made within the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division and any proposals for modification would be brought to the attention of General Ohlke prior to the initiation of any action.[23] (U)

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21. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Vehicle Seat Belts, 11 May 62, Exhibit # 6.
22. Ltr, 18SAD to 4170SW & 92SAW, Subj: Alert Area Activities, 15 May 62, Exhibit # 7.
23. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW & 4170SW, Subj: Unauthorized Mod. of Admin. Acft, 24 May 62, Exhibit # 8.

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Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Order.

GAZETTEER

Deep Creek Air Force Station: An Air Materiel Command site located one-half mile south of Fairchild Air Force Base. (U)

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Bombardment Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

McChord Air Force Base: An Air Defense Base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the Division's 22d Air Refueling Squadron. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, SECRET DP511, Subj: Airborne Command Post Duties, 24 Feb 62.	1
Ltr, Crew and Flying Figures for June 62, 27 Jul 62.	2
Rpt. 18SAD Staff Visit to 4170SW, Subj: EWO Capability, 3 Jul 62.	3
Rept, 18SAD Informal Staff Visit to 4170SW, Subj: Safety Council, 17 May 62.	4
Ltr, 18SAD to 4170SW & 925AWG, Subj: Accident Prevention, 23 May 62.	5
Ltr, 18SAD to 925AWG, Subj: Vehicle Seat Belts, 11 May 62.	6
Ltr, 18SAD to 92 SAWG & 4170SW, Subj: Alert Area Activities, 15 May 62.	7
Ltr, 18SAD to 925AWG & 4170SW, Subj: Unauthorized Mod. to Admin. Acpt. 24 May 62.	8

SECRET

1

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RJWBAR/13AIRDIV FE WARREN AFB WO
RJWBJC/819AIRDIV DYESS AFB TEX
RJWBJM/47AIRDIV CASTLE AFB CALIF
RJWBGP/15STRATAEROSPACEDIV FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
BT
S E C R E T DP511.
FOR SAC (DPO), 821SAD (C), 13AD (C), 819AD (C), 47AD(C), AND 15SAD(C).
(U) AIRBORNE COMMAND POST SCHEDULE. SAC VC 0098, 4 FEB 61 (S) AND
DP 44537, 30 NOV 61 (U) SA AMENDED BY DPOS 44589, 4 DEC 61 (U).
FOLLOWING IS SCHEDULE FOR 15 AIR FORCE GENERAL OFFICERS FOR AIRBORNE
COMMAND POST DUTY FOR MONTHS OF APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE 1962. (SCP-4).

NAME	UNIT	DATE
M/GEN DELMAR E WILSON	821 SA DIV	10 APRIL 1962
B/GEN WILLIAM S RADER	13 AIR DIV	24 APRIL 1962
B/GEN PINKHAM SMITH	819 AIR DIV	1 MAY 1962

PAGE TWO RJWBKN 2A

B/GEN HAROLD W OHLKE	13 SA DIV	15 MAY 1962
B/GEN WILLIAM R YANCEY	47 AIR DIV	29 MAY 1962
M/GEN DELMAR E WILSON	821 SA DIV	12 JUNE 1962
B/GEN WILLIAM S RADER	13 AIR DIV	19 JUNE 1962

(SCP-4)
BT
24/00212 FEB RJWBKN

C (act)

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

0869

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4170TH STRATEGIC WING
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOH

27 Jul 62

SUBJECT: MCS, Crew and Flying Figures for June 1962

TO: 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (IXOH)
Fairchild AFB, Washington

1. MCS. Base score, problem areas, and corrective action taken. This item mailed separately.

2. Number of Aircraft Assigned/Available:

B-52D assigned end of June, 14; possessed, 14.0 during month; available, 6.77. KC-135--assigned end of June, 20; possessed, 20; avlable, 10.7%. (S)

3. Ten (10) Titan missiles had been received by end of May, all remaining under control of SATAF until operational ready date. (S)

4. Flying Missions and Hours, see attachment.

5. Combat Crew Status:

As of 30 June, 27 bomber crews were assigned, all combat ready, and 35 tanker crews, all combat ready. No losses in June and no projected upgrades for either aircraft. B-52 crews included 10 select, 13 senior and 4 combat ready. KC-135 crews included 7 senior and 28 CR.

HARRY T. FISK
Major, USAF
Information Officer

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

IXOH-62-012

SECRET


COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

3

3 July 1958

COORDINATION

0871

Hq 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

DS 17 May 1962

Informal Staff Visit - 4170SW (DS), Larson AFB, Wn

C

1. On 16 May I performed an informal staff visit to Larson AFB and attended the Base Safety Council meeting.

2. Personnel contacted were the Base Safety Council and the Office of Safety personnel.

3. The Council meeting was chaired by Colonel Tate and consisted of items both timely and pertinent. The actions which had been completed and the actions as assigned during the meeting were adequate. The same area of retardation exists at Larson as at Fairchild. This area being the BDCE, and regulations as applicable to the BDCE. The participation in this meeting by the BDCE representative was a great improvement over previous meetings. The pressures brought to bear by Colonel Tate and Colonel Calhoun to develop a positive attitude in the Civil Engineers are bearing fruit. There was no evasiveness on any subject which the BDCE had previously been unable to answer. True, action had not been completed on any subject, but positive information was rendered. I believe the improvement will continue and result in more active and positive support by the Civil Engineers. This will naturally result in improved productivity in the area of accident prevention.

4. The Director of Safety is making excellent headway in the reorganization and strengthening of the safety structure. This is due to his efforts, Captain Mornini's efforts and in no small measure to Colonel Tate's efforts. At the closing of the Base Safety Council meeting, Colonel Tate expressed his direct concern with the safety structure of the Wing. He emphasized that these people are in the safety structure for productive accident prevention efforts, and that they are, in fact, part of the staff of the Directorate of Safety. He left no doubt in anyone's mind that he wanted a stronger accident prevention structure, program and effort.

5. The Safety Technician, Sergeant McCallan, is alerted for transfer to the 22BW in July of this year. At this time, there appears to be little chance that the transfer will not take place. It has been protested by the Wing, but the protest is not expected to be honored. There is no

known programmed replacement. The Wing will screen all personnel to determine if someone is qualified to place in that slot. This will cause a serious deficiency in manning. Sergeant McClellan has been highly instrumental in the outstanding accomplishment of AFR 92-17 Driver Improvement Training. Upon his departure, the program will stop unless action is taken. Mr. Thompson is qualified to instruct this course, as is the Driver Training NCOIC of the Transportation Squadron. Either could satisfactorily accomplish this requirement, but it is my opinion that the Transportation Squadron NCO would do the better job. I do not feel that Mr. Thompson is properly motivated to accomplish the requirement in the manner desired, but I do feel that he would accomplish it in a satisfactory manner. The problem is well recognized by the Council, the staff and the commander, is receiving required attention, and will undoubtedly be resolved satisfactorily.

THOMAS H PASKELL
Major, USAF
Director of Safety

0873

Hq 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

C 23 May 1962

Accident Prevention

4170 Strat Wg (WC) 92 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC)

1. I am deeply concerned about our accident rates for the current year. We do not enjoy a good standing at this time. We have suffered entirely too many government motor vehicle accidents, and our civilian injury rate is far too high. We have injured too many military personnel both on and off duty. Such a record naturally detracts from our EWO capability, even though our EWO preparations may not suffer directly. We must improve our programs and redouble our efforts.

2. One area I am highly concerned over is the use, and in some cases the lack of use, of additional duty Safety personnel. These personnel must be utilized effectively in our accident program. Commanders and these personnel must realize that they are not poster-hangers, accident report-readers, or just filling a slot. They must be motivated into productive efforts for accident prevention. They must be trained and guided by the Safety Office. They must realize full well that these rates which we have today are their responsibility as well as the commanders'.

3. Toward the end of better utilization of additional duty safety personnel, I want you to look at this area closely. Do you have a training program for these addition duty Accident Prevention people? Do you have periodic meetings chaired by the Director of Safety and his office staff, giving them instructions, bringing them up to date, and in general, motivating them to factual support of the Wing program? Or, do you have an excessive turn-over in the area which does not allow such a program to bear fruit?

4. The emphasis placed at the top in your accident prevention program must carry through to the lowest man in the structure. The people selected at the terminal unit of the accident prevention structure must possess the same dedication toward accident prevention that exists at the top. There are examples in your unit of excellent accident prevention personnel in the terminal units of the structure. There are also examples of undesirable personnel as additional duty accident prevention officers and NCOs. Your program of motivating, educating, and instructing these people must be patterned to produce the desired results; and must be energetically pursued not only on a one-time basis, but as a program to be carried out indefinitely.

5. I believe that if this policy is pursued with an honest desire for productive results, your entire unit will benefit appreciably, and, as attrition takes place and your personnel are spread throughout SAC, that the benefits will continue and over a period of time the entire program of SAC will improve. I firmly believe that the improvement shown thus far by SAC is partially a result of efforts in this field which have been taken over the past years.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

0875

Hq 19th Strategic Aerospace Division

C 11 May 1962

Vehicle Seat Belts

92 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC)

1. During my visits to other bases I have observed productive seat belt programs in effect. As an example, Larson AFB has sold over 1,000 seat belts in the past year. These sales were handled in the Safety Office. Surveys conducted within that unit indicate that many belts have been purchased from other sources, since a much higher percentage of vehicles are equipped with safety belts than the sales from the Safety Office allow.

2. During this same period, I have not seen any evidence of a seat belt program here at Fairchild. A year ago, I expressed my desire for an effective program, even to the point of meeting the commercial representative who was putting belts into the 92d Wing on a consignment basis. The program did get a start, but it was a poor start, and therefore has died on Fairchild.

3. I want this program reborn, and reborn with a will. I want each commander to determine those personnel having seat belts in their vehicles and to counsel those who do not have seat belts. I want all efforts possible made to equip every privately owned vehicle with seat belts. No one must miss having this opportunity offered. There is sufficient educational material in the Safety Office for the commanders to use. There is sufficient knowledge and know-how in your Safety Office to direct this program.

4. It has been made a requirement by USAF to equip all military vehicles with seat belts. In order for me to keep abreast of this official requirement, I desire that an entry be made in your Base Safety Council minutes regarding the status of equipping all official vehicles with seat belts and the effort that is going into this requirement.

5. We must exert every effort to conserve our human resources. To do less would approach dereliction of duty.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

Hq 15th Strategic Aerospace Division

C

15 May 1962

Alert Area Activities

92 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC)

1. The number of incidents occurring in the Alert area is on the increase in your unit. Positive action must be taken immediately to stop this trend. You have operated in the past at an acceptable standard and you can again operate at that same acceptable standard.

2. An aircraft taxiing into a power unit and dragging it 100 feet is inexcusable. A crew member violating the 2-man policy is completely beyond comprehension. An aircraft involved in restarting an engine due to difficulties encountered, and not having fire extinguishers manned, is completely against all concepts of proper operation. These and like incidents must stop.

3. I expect you to take any and all actions necessary to terminate such happenings. We must maintain our Alert Force at its optimum, and incidents such as these are potentially catastrophic.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

C

Unauthorized Modifications to Administrative Aircraft

82 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC 4170 Strat Wg (WC)

1. The subject of unauthorized modifications to administrative aircraft has become a matter of personal concern to General Old and is a special subject for his Inspector General and staff on future visits. Accordingly, I desire that each Wing Commander peruse AFR 57-4, as well as 15AF message DM 30215, 16 May 62, and 15AF message C 78, 23 May 62.

2. Simply stated, my policy is that there will be no modifications to administrative aircraft within the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division. Any proposals for modification are to be brought to me personally prior to the initiation of any other action.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander


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HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

JULY 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis
ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

Harold W. Ohlke
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

SECRET

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY
Major Roy Lewis
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft our of commission for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

0886

FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0887

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

0888

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18th STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Colonel James W. Miller
Director of Operations	Lt. Colonel Maurice S. Marler (Acting)
Director of Materiel	Colonel Leonard L. Jella
Director of Safety	Lt. Colonel Thomas H. Paskell
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel James E. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Major Frank J. Riddle

0891

Administration

On 24 July Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, arrived at Headquarters, SAC, for airborne command post responsibilities effective at 0001 hours on 25 July. His airborne command post requirements were fullfilled by 1600 hours on 1 August following the launch of his replacement aircraft.[4] (C)

Several months ago General Ohlke discussed with Colonel J. D. White, commander of the 1st Combat Evaluation Group from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, the overall reliability of scores issued by the RBS sites in relation to the manner in which its operators conducted ECM scoring. For example within a 10-day period the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing lost five local defense runs at the Cinder Road bombing plot. The circumstances surrounding these five runs were similar. In each case, the runs were conducted utilizing the APS-54 radar warning receiver with the proper procedures and techniques. Consistently the APS-54 receivers failed to indicate a lock-on. The APS-54s were checked satisfactorily prior to and after the bad runs. Subsequent runs were made utilizing the APR-9 receivers which verified the weak lock-on signal transmitted from the site. Indications were that the Cinder Road ground operator had not been performing an accurate lock-on or that his radar was not operating at the rated power. The 4170th Strategic Wing voiced similar arguments after the wing received

4. Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, CONFIDENTIAL DP 1467, Subj: Airborne Command Post, 24 May 62, Exhibit # 1.

an unreliable score which they claimed as a site procedural error, during Operation BAR NONE, an important evaluation of the wing's reliability. At the request of the division commander Colonel White stated that he would investigate the circumstances and forward a report to General Ohlke.[5] (U)

During July the 4170th Strategic Wing continued to be scored under the management control system (MCS). In the personnel portion of scoring, all areas scored the maximum number of points with the exception of airmen retention which was rated at 84 per cent. In the base support area automotive maintenance, which was scored at 95 per cent, was the only area which failed to meet the criteria. Overall, base support was 96.7 per cent effective, 1.7 per cent lower than the previous month's score. Ground safety in the general section of scoring was at the SAC bottom with a score of 65 per cent. Overall this section was scored at 88.7 per cent, an increase of 1.5 per cent over the previous month.[6] (U)

In bomber operations bombing reliability was rated at 91 per cent and unit reliability and air refueling efficiency at 99 per cent. Scheduled cancellations rated at 88 per cent and the bombing and navigational system effectiveness at 50 per cent were two of the low areas scored in bomber maintenance. Also scored in this area was aircraft system effectiveness at 90 per cent. In tanker operations incentive training was one of the main problem areas and in tanker maintenance deviations from the take-off time, at 68

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5. Ltr, 18SADC to 1ST CEG, Subj: Site Procedural Error, 3 Jul 62, Filed 18SADC.
6. Hist Rpt, 4170SW, 1-31 Jul 62, Filed IXOH 4170SW.

per cent, was also below standard.[7] (U)

Meanwhile in the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing, individual proficiency training was the only area that failed to receive the maximum number of points under the MCS in the personnel area. Scored at 72 per cent, all point losses occurred in upgrading. In the base support section fires, scored at 70 per cent, was the only area less than 100 per cent. In the general section of scoring, ground safety was the only area which was below the 100 per cent goal and was the result of three private motor vehidle accidents and five off-duty injuries.[8] (U)

Bomber operations was progressing satisfactorily during July. With the exception of air refueling, all items were equivalent to the SAC top scores of the previous quarter. Overall bomber operations was scored at 96.4 per cent with 100 per cent forecssted for the quarter. In tanker operations the majority of the areas were satisfactory. Air refueling and incentive training were below the SAC top scores. Overall tanker operations was 95.2 per cent with 95.8 projected for the quarter. In bomber maintenance the wing earned a score of 98.1 per cent with 98.7 per cent expected for the quarter. In tanker maintenance aircraft system effectiveness prevented the wing from obtaining the desired goal in this area. They earned 98.3 per cent for July and a forecast for the quarter of 99.2 per cent. Overall the base earned a score of 95.3 per cent during July which was well above the SAC top quarter score

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7. Hist, Report, 4170SW, 1-31 Jul 62, Filed IXOH 4170SW.
8. Hist. Report, 92SAW, 1-31 Jul 62, Filed IXOH 92SAW.

of 93.2 per cent for the previous quarter. A score of 98.3 per cent was estimated for the current quarter.[9] (U)

As of the end of July the B-52 bomber combat crew strength of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing had made no changes over the previous month. Twenty-seven crews were assigned of which 11 were in select status, 11 in senior status and 5 in combat ready status. Meanwhile the KC-135 combat tanker crew strength remained the same as the previous month. Of the 36 combat tanker crews assigned to the wing, 33 were in senior status, 2 were in combat ready status and one was in non-combat ready status.[10] (S)

Meanwhile the bomber combat crew strength of the 4170th Strategic Wing remained at 27 bomber crews. Of the 27 crews, 11 were in select status, 12 in senior status, and 4 in combat ready status. In the tanker squadron 35 crews were combat ready. Of this total, 7 were in senior status and 28 were in combat ready status. There were no gains or losses by either the bomber or tanker squadron.[11] (S)

In the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing, the missile combat crew strength was 46 crews of which 45 were in combat ready status and one crew remained in non-combat ready status. Meanwhile 11 missile crews of the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron at Larson Air Force Base had completed sufficient upgrade training to be considered combat ready with waiver. Larson's first Titan I missile complex was declared opera-

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9. Hist. Rpt, 92SAW, 1-31 Jul 62, Filed IXOH 92SAW.
10. Ibid.
11. Ltr, 4170SW to 92SAW, SECRET, Subj: MCS, Crew and Flying Fig. for July 62, 30 Aug 62, Exhibit # 2.

tional by SAC on 16 July when the complex was turned over to the wing.[12] (S)

Overall the division maintained a bomber combat ready crew force of 54 crews. Of this total 22 crews were in select status, 23 were in senior status and 9 were in combat ready status. Of the 71 combat tanker crews assigned to the division, 40 were in senior status, 30 were in combat ready status and the remaining crew was in non-combat ready status.[13] (S)

During this same period 16 B-52D bombers of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing flew 81 sorties in 612 flying hours. Meanwhile the 21 KC-135A tankers assigned to the wing flew 99 sorties in 611:05 flying hours. In the 4170th Strategic Wing the 14 B-52D bombers completed 605:55 flying hours and 75 sorties. The 20 KC-135A Larson tankers also flew a total of 141 sorties in 713:35 flying hours. In conclusion the 30 B-52D bombers assigned to the division flew a total of 156 sorties in 1,217:55 flying hours and the 41 KC-135A tankers assigned to the division flew 240 sorties in 1,324:40 flying hours.[14] (S)

On 25 July a no-notice Fifteenth Air Force operational readiness inspection (ORI) was pulled in the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing. Conducted under SAC Operations Order 300-62 and nicknamed Operation STRAIGHT SHOT INDIA, the wing launched eight bombers and tankers in support of the ORI. The wing also concluded their support of Operation TEXAS STAR which required a highly proficient tanker and crew

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12. Ltr, 4170SW to 92SAW, SECRET, Subj: MCS, Crew and Flying Fig. for July 62, Exhibit #2.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

to Brize-Norton Royal Air Force Station in the United Kingdom. During July both wings of the division flew in support of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE, a SAC/NORAD exercise. The 4170th Strategic Wing also launched tankers in support of Operation CHROME DOME to Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. A Larson tanker also flew in support Operation DOMINIC modified under Project POWER BOX for communications testing flights under the direction of the commander, Joint Task Group 8.4, Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii.[15] (S)

Staff Visits by the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

On 9 and 10 July Captain Frank J. Riddle, division operations staff officer, completed an inspection of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) summer training unit at Fairchild Air Force Base. Areas of interest during the inspection were mainly those of command support under instructions from the Air University. The Fairchild unit equaled or surpassed the amount of training required in order to comply with AF Manual 45-3 and the training was considered adequately accomplished by all students. In addition all staff assignments were handled as required by regulation. A change in the summer training unit commander on 1 June, due to an overseas PCS assignment, in no way degraded command support. In fact the entire operation was commended for the excellent preparations and support.[16] (U)

The failure of the two tanker crews of the 43d Air Refueling Squadron, 4170th Strategic Wing in an inspection by the 1st Combat

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15. Ltr, 4170SW to 92SAW, SECRET, Subj: MCS, Crew and Flying Fig. For July 62, 30 Aug 62, Exhibit # 2.
16. Inspection Report, 18SAD DO to SAC DOTOS, Subj: AFROTC Summer Training Unit, 24 Jul 62, Exhibit # 3.

Evaluation Group was contested by Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander. The squadron's failure was based on excessive intervals for MITO procedures, exceeding one minute for both crews. An inquiry by General Ohlke revealed that a combination of circumstances led up to the crew's failure. The non-optimum runway was used for the exercise due to a combination of wind and tempature which rendered the optimum runway marginal. When using the non-optimum runway at Larson, it was necessary for the tankers to taxi more than three miles to the taxi-off position, making three 90 degree turns, two 45 degree turns and taxiing between two rows of parked tactical aircraft in the process. The slow speeds necessary for negotiating these turns would also cause an accordian type effect on the straight stretches. Only the pilot's judgement was available to indicate the speed necessary for negotiating the trouble spots. In addition SAC had a long history of wheel and tire damage occurring during Coco alerts. Much of this damage was directly attributed to excessive taxi speeds at high gross weights. It was the opinion of General Ohlke that the two crews exercised good judgement. However, had it been an EWO launch they would have increase their taxi speeds and been within normal MITO tolerance.[17] (U)

At the request of higher headquarters General Ohlke conducted a survey concerning the adherence to compensatory time-off (CTO) policies at Ellsworth Air Force Base in Montana, Grand Forks in North Dakota, 3955th Air Base Squadron at Namao and the 3950th

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17. Msg, 18SADC to 15AF, C 11288, Subj: CEG Evaluation Critisim, 3 Jul 62, Exhibit # 4.

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17. Msg, 18SADC to 15AF, C 11288, Subj: CEG Evaluation Critisim, 3 Jul 62, Exhibit # 4.

Air Base Squadron at Cold Lake. Only one definite deviation from General Thomas S. Power's, Commander in Chief of SAC, CTO policy was found during the survey and it involved an aircraft commander from the 310th Air Refueling Squadron. In this case the individual voluntarily interrupted his CTO to perform military duties. In addition compensatory time off for crew members whose tours had been extended for any reason, such as DNIF or a standboard failure, would in some cases have been marginal because of an oversight in providing sufficient additional CTO to cover the extension in alert duty. This condition would have to be carefully watched in the future by all commanders and schedulers. In the 9th Strategic Aerospace Wing, crews returning from Reflex were given 12 hours of crew rest prior to beginning their formal CTO. From a practical standpoint this had the effect of granting an extension of CTO without charging the individual for it in that no military duties were performed during the the period of crew rest. This survey was designed to discover whether General Power's policy on compensatory time off was being followed to the letter. Overall there were a few marginal areas, however, with added emphasis with commanders this situation could be readily corrected.[18] (S)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

After reading a report covering the 3901st Strategic Missile Evaluation Squadron's visit to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild, General Ohlke directed that the entire recurring

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18. Ltr, 18SADC to C, SECRET, Subj: Compliance with CTO Policy, 19 Jul 62, Exhibit # 5.

training program be re-evaluated. These results were similar to those obtained by the squadron's standardization division since 1 January. Apparently little or no effort was being expended within the squadron to correct the deficiencies continually being uncovered during local standardization checks. General Ohlke expected high standards of proficiency to be maintained and that combat crew proficiency perform to these standards. This would require a definite increase in supervisory activity by the wing staff and only when this level was attained could the squadron be truly a professional missile force.[19] (U)

In recent flying reports General Ohlke noticed that a few training missions were terminated early because of low incentive points. This indicated poor mission planning, poor scheduling or a combination of both. This to SAC was an indication of low ethical standards. General Ohlke stated that he would not tolerate the practice of terminating a mission prematurely due to low potential for incentive points. In addition General Ohlke directed the wing commander to review the flight scheduling and mission planning procedures to assure that productive activity was possible throughout each sortie and that each mission was planned to take advantage of the incentive point possibilities for the duration of the sortie.[20] (U)

As before, safety continued to be of paramount importance to General Ohlke and his staff. The division director of safety com-

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19. Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, Subj: Missile Combat Crew Qualification, 20 Jul 62, Exhibit # 6.
20. Ltr, 18SADC to 4170SW & 92SAW, Subj: Premature Termination of Training Missions, 6 Jul 62, Exhibit # 7.

piled an outline of a ground accident prevention course for additional duty accident prevention personnel. This course would be conducted by each base safety office and required 10 hours to complete. As it stood the course required that the wing directors of safety research and compose his own lecture, utilizing the division outline. This would have the two-fold effect of increasing the instructors knowledge and insight as well as indoctrinating the student. With the proper selection of the additional duty personnel, a strong motivating office of safety, presentation and acceptance of thecourse in the manner intended, and the continual command emphasis, the division's accident prevention structure and program would be second to none.[21] (U)

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21. Ltr, 18SADC to 4170SW & 92SAW, Subj: Accident Prevention, 26 Jul 62, Exhibit # 8.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing, Group, and 15th Air Force Operations Order.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command base located 19 miles east of Tacoma, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, CONFIDENTIAL, DP 1467, Subj: Airborne Command Post, 24 May 62.	1
Ltr, 4170SW to 92SAW, SECRET, Subj: MCS, Crew and Flying Figures for July 62, 30 Aug 62,	2
Inspection Rpt, 18SAD DO to SAC DOTOS, Subj: AFROTC Summer Training Unit, 24 Jul 62.	3
Msg, 18SAD to 15AF, C 11288, Subj: CEG Evaluation Critisim, 3 Jul 62.	4
Ltr, 18SADC to C, SECRET, Subj: Compliance with CTO Policy, 19 Jul 62.	5
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, Subj: Missile Combat Crew Qualification, 20 Jul 62.	6
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, 4170SWC, Subj: Premature Termination of Training Missions, 6 Jul 62.	7
Ltr, 18SADC to 4170SW, 92SAW, Subj: Accident Prevention, 26 Jul 62.	8

CONFIDENTIAL

BA 1119-F

GPA 262

MNJ256
RR RJWBJG RJWBGP RJWBJM RJWBAP RJWBAR RJWBKA
DE RJWBKN 2A
R 2A1642Z
FM 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF
TO RJWXBR/SAC
RJWBJG/819SAD DYESS AFB TEX
RJWBGP/18SAD FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
RJWBJM/47SAD CASTLE AFB CALIF
RJWBAP/821SAD ELLSWORTH AFB SDAK
RJWBAR/13AD FE WARREN AFB WYO
RJWBKA/4136SW MINOT AFB NDAK
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L DP 1467.
FOR DPOS AND C. ACTION. SAC, 819SAD, 18SAD, 47SAD, 821SAD, 13AD AND 4136SW. AIRBORNE COMMAND POST. FOLLOWING IS SCHEDULE OF AIRBORNE COMMAND POST REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATED THIS COMMAND FOR PERIOD JULY THRU DECEMBER 1962. THE FLIGHT SCHEDULE BEGINS AT 0001 HOURS EACH WEDNESDAY AND TERMINATES AFTER THE 1600 HOUR LAUNCH ON TUESDAY. OFFICERS WILL BE ADVISED OF REPORTING TIME BY HQ SAC COMMAND POST. THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OFFICERS ARE SCHEDULED FOR AIRBORNE COMMAND POST DUTY ON DATES INDICATED:

NAME	UNIT	DATE
BRIG GEN PINKHAM SMITH	819 SA DIV	4 JUL 62
BRIG GEN HAROLD W OHLKE	18 SA DIV	25 JUL 62
BRIG GEN WILLIAM R YANCEY	47 SA DIV	8 AUG 62
MAJ GEN DELMAR E WILSON	821 SA DIV	29 AUG 62
BRIG GEN WILLIAM S RADER	13 A DIV	26 SEP 62
BRIG GEN JOHN B MCPHERSON	812 ADIV	10 OCT 62
BRIG GEN PINKHAM SMITH	819 SA DIV	31 OCT 62
BRIG GEN HAROLD W OHLKE	18 SA DIV	7 NOV 62
BRIG GEN WILLIAM R YANCEY	47 SA DIV	14 NOV 62
MAJ GEN DELMAR E WILSON	821 SA DIV	28 NOV 62
BRIG GEN WILLIAM S RADER	13 ADIV	22 DEC 62
BRIG GEN JOHN B MCPHERSON	810 ADIV	26 DEC 62

BT
2A/1653Z MAY RJWBKN

CONFIDENTIAL

0905

HEADQUARTERS
4170TH STRATEGIC WING
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOH

SECRET

30 August 62

SUBJECT: MCS, Crew and Flying Figures for July 1962

TO: 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (IXOH)
Fairchild AFB, Washington

1. MCS. Base score, problem areas, and corrective action taken. This item mailed separately.

2. Number of Aircraft Assigned/Available:

B-52D assigned end of July, 14; possessed, 13.8 during month; available, 5.61. KC-135 assigned end of July, 20; possessed, 20; available, 9.00. (S)

3. Titan missiles - Ten (10) (S).

4. Flying Missions and Hours. see paragraph 6

5. Combat Crew Status:

B-52: As of 31 July 62, there were 27 crews; 11 select, 12-senior, 4-ready. No crew losses during July and no gains.
KC-135: As of 31 July 62, there were 35 crews; 7 senior, 28 ready, No crew gains or losses during July.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EUGENE W. HUNGERFORD
Captain, USAF
Information Officer

1 Atch
Stat. Br. figures

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

IXOH-62-015

SECRET

SECRET

STATISTICAL BRANCH

6. The following is the Statistical Branch history for July 1962:

a. Flying time B-52

	SORTIES	FLYING TIME
CCTM	50	398:20
Profile Mission	14	130:15
Ferry	7	47:30
Test Hops	1	4:00
Double Eagle	3	25:50
TOTAL	75	605:55

b. Flying Time KC-135:

CCTM	85	441:10
Chrome Dome	35	129:40
Dominic	13	106:00
Double Eagle	6	21:50
Higher Headquarters Directed	2	14:55
TOTAL	141	713:35

c. MCS Program B-52:

	PERCENT	POINTS EARNED
SACR 50-8 Training	74.6	298
Bombing Reliability	90.8	545
Unit Reliability	98.9	534
Air Refueling Eff.	99.1	297

SECRET

atch

	PERCENT	POINTS EARNED
Incentive Points	105.3	1106
OVERALL	96.2	2780
MCS Program KC-135		
SACR 50-8	67.1	268
Bombing Reliability	----	---
Unit Reliability	99.8	599
Air Refueling Eff.	100.0	900
Incentive Points	54.3	571
OVERALL	79.3	2338

The following is the Incentive Point Breakdown for the month of July:

B-52:

Total Incentive:	18452
Hours Chargeable:	472
Points Per Hour:	39.093

KC-135:

Total Incentive:	11293
Hours Chargeable:	469
Points Per Hour:	24.078

	PERCENT	POINTS EARNED
Incentive Points	105.3	1106
OVERALL	96.2	2780
MCS Program KC-135		
SACR 50-8	67.1	268
Bombing Reliability	----	---
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Hours Chargeable:	472
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KC-135:

Total Incentive:	11293
Hours Chargeable:	469
Points Per Hour:	24.078

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION
DO

STAFF VISIT BO

DO 24 July 1962

Inspection of Air Force ROTC Summer Training Unit

SAC (DOTOT)

1. An inspection of the AFROTC summer training unit at Fairchild [illegible] Washington was performed by Captain Frank I Riddle, this headquarters, on 9 and 10 July 1962. Inspection was conducted in accordance with AFM 45-2 and instructions contained in Air University letter dated 18 April 1962.

2. Areas of interest in this inspection were mainly those of command support as defined in AFM 45-2. Primary items were:

a. Training Program: The training required to comply with AFM 45-2 totals 154 hours. The Fairchild unit equaled or surpassed this amount. The total amount programmed by this unit was 242 hours, which included the survival exercise and the airborne (KC-135 aircraft) indoctrination flight for all students. The training was adequately accomplished by all students.

b. Staff Assignments: Staff assignments were in accordance with section C, Paragraph 27c of AFM 45-2. A change in the Summer Training Unit Commander was necessitated on 1 June 1962 due to overseas PCS assignment of original commander. This change in no way degraded command support. All preparation and planning was excellent.

c. Facilities, Equipment and Supplies: Facilities utilized by the summer training unit were renovated prior to arrival of the cadets. Equipment and supplies were from serviceable stock.

3. The staff of the Fairchild Summer Training Unit is to be commended on the excellent preparations for this encampment. No deficient areas were noted on this inspection.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES W MILLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

Info Cy
15AF(DOTOT)

#8

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
DO	Miller
DO	

RETURN TO	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 26, OCT 60

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION: PRIORITY	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		4170SW SST	
INFO: PRIORITY		X			KC-135 Blue 10901, 29Jun62	Uncl

FROM: HQ 18 STRAT AEROSPACE DIV

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF

INFO: SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

4170 STRAT WING LARSON AFB WASH

1 CMBT EVAL GP BARKSDALE AFB LA

UNCLAS C 11288 Immediate Action During Duty Hours. My 15AF (C); SAC (DO); 4170SW (UC); and 1CEG (C). Reference 4170SW msg SST KC-135 Blue 10901, 29 Jun 62. This msg in two parts. PART I. I do not concur in failure of two crews of 43d AREFS, 4170SW, for pre-takeoff procedures during alert exercise. Failure by CEG evaluators was based on excessive interval for NITO procedures, exceeding one minute for both crews. Following considerations support my position: ALFA. Non-optimum runway was prescribed for this exercise because combination of wind and temperature made use of optimum runway

930012 JUL 1962

DATE | TIME

MONTH | YEAR

SYMBOL: 1425/2/Jul/62

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): [illegible] Col., USAF

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: HAROLD V. GELKE, Brig General, USAF, Commander

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

0911

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

FM 1st Combat Evaluation Grp

original. Note: When one-eighteen runway in used for these exercises at Laredo, it is necessary for the tankers to taxi in excess of three miles to the takeoff position, making three ninety degree turns, two forty-five degree turns and taxiing between two rows of parked tactical aircraft in the process. The slow speeds required for negotiating the many turns and taxiing through the parking area create a series of congestion points or bottlenecks which in turn produce an accordion effect on the straight stretches, plus a distinct tendency for each unit to lag behind the unit ahead coming out of these bottlenecks. CONCLUSION. Only the pilot's judgment is available to tell him whether he is taxiing too fast, both during the congested portions and on the straightaway. REMARK. Throughout SAC there is a long history of wheel and tire damage occurring to KC-135 units during exercises. Much of this damage is directly attributable to excessive taxi speeds at high gross weights. RECMD. During peacetime exercises flying safety has always been, and must continue to be paramount. Knowing that this was an exercise, both pilots in question exercised their best judgment as to what constituted maximum safe taxi speed. Moreover, without instruments by which to accurately gage their

PAGE NR.	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
2	3	UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM MAY 58 173-1

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—[illegible]

0912

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

[redacted]

[redacted] 23 AD owned transports [redacted]

speed, the CNO authorized two otherwise home station sorties for unstable practices and they increased their landing speed sufficiently to provide the desired interval. I consider that the decision which each of these individuals took was correct under the existing circumstances. At the same time I have no doubt that had this been an MATS aircraft they would have increased their test speed and been within normal MATS tolerances. However, no firm standard has been published as to what constitutes acceptable MATS timing for exercise purposes when non-optimum runway is used. PAGE II. In view of foregoing I [illegible]ve that probationary status of 4170ABW crews T-17 and T-34 be revoked, and that all references to their unsatisfactory pre-takeoff procedures during alert exercise be deleted from the formal report of 1st CNO regarding their evaluation of the 43d Air Refueling Squadron.

PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
3	3	UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM 1 MAY 50 173-1

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950—[illegible]

0913

SECRET

19 July 1962

(U) Compliance with new policy

SAMF (U)

1. I have examined the memo which you directed concerning the assignment of the problems in connection with [redacted] and [redacted] were instructed on [redacted] was followed. (U)

2. Are there any deviations from normal format in policy and procedure for [redacted] which may be necessary to [redacted] (U)

3. Have [redacted] been coordinated with [redacted] (U)

4. a. Concerning item VII for crew members leaving [redacted] and [redacted] for [redacted] (U)

b. Does a crew member transit an [redacted] and begin normal leave immediately upon completion of [redacted] or do [redacted] (U)

c. In the 9th SAF crews returning from [redacted] are given twelve hours of crew rest before resuming their normal [redacted] military duties are performed during the period of crew rest. From a practical standpoint this has the effect of granting an extension of [redacted] without charging the individual [redacted] it does appear to be a technical violation. In this format [redacted] begin immediately upon return to home station. (U)

d. Are the twelve crews on Airmail duty considered in the same alert status as [redacted] crews? (S)

4. This correspondence is classified Secret because it discloses details of unit deployment to and alert posture

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

00 62-0021

0914

SECRET

at bases outside the United States. (U)

HAROLD W. GRANT
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

4 Atch (4 cys ea)
1. Ellsworth (U)
2. Grand Forks (U)
3. Minot (U)
4. Cold Lake (U)

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

DD 62-0021

SECRET

SECRET

REPORT OF COMBAT CREW INTERVIEW

[redacted] AFB, S.D.

16 July 1962

UNIT	CREW	DEVIATION FROM CYO
28th Bomb Sq 77th Bomb Sq	I-04	Negative
	B-06	"
	B-13	"
	I-14	"
	B-21	"
	I-22	"
	B-23	"
	I-24	"
	B-25	"
	I-26	"
	B-27	"
	I-28	"
	B-29	"
	I-30	"
	B-31	"
	I-32	"
	B-33	"
	I-34	"
	B-35	"
	I-36	"
	B-37	"
	I-38	"
28th AMMW	J-09	"
	T-09	"
	J-10	"
	J-13	"
	J-15	"
	J-21	"
	T-23	"
	J-24	"
	J-29	"
	J-31	"
	J-34	"
	T-39	"
	T-40	"
44MMW	B-14	"
	B-16	"

(Three additional missile crews have performed alert duty but were not available) (U)

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

DO 62-0021

SECRET

Atch 1

SECRET

REPORT OF COMBAT CREW INTERVIEW

[illegible], N. D.

17 July 19[illegible]



UNIT	CREW	DEVIATION FROM CFO
41[illegible] [illegible]	J-[illegible]	Negative
	J-[illegible]	"
	J-[illegible]	"
	T-[illegible]	"
	T-10	"
	T-11	"
	T-17	"
	T-20	"

Note: Bombardment crews were not interviewed inasmuch as the [illegible] squadron has not yet reached combat readiness. (U)

SECRET

0917


SECRET
Negative
Negative
(S)
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

REPORT OF CHEMICAL CORPS OBSERVERS
[illegible] AIR FORCE EXERCISE
CHEB, WEST
18 July 1956

WAY	CREW	INVESTIGATION FROM C/S	
		Reflex	Beam Alert
9th AAV	T-01	Negative	Negative
	A-11	"	"
	T-26	"	"
	A-29	"	"
	T-46	"	"
	T-63	"	"
	T-80	"	"

(1)

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

DO 62-0021

SECRET

0920

C

20 July 1962

Missile Combat Crew Qualification

ORBAW (WC)

1. I have just finished reading a draft of the report covering the 380lst SMS visit to the 567th Strat Missile Squadron. Needless to say, I am something less than happy with the results. When only two of seven crews examined are able to achieve a "qualified" rating something is obviously wrong with the training program.

2. The high combat crew failure rate should come as no shock to you. It confirms results obtained by the 567th SMS Standardization Division since 1 January. Apparently little or no effort is being expended in the unit to correct the deficiencies continually being uncovered during local standardization checks. This reflects a gross lack of staff supervision at the Wing level.

3. I want you to re-evaluate the entire recurring training program in the 567th SMS and direct it toward correcting the weaknesses that are repeatedly exposed during standardization checks. I expect the standards of proficiency to be maintained at their present high levels or increased as the necessity arises. And I expect combat crew proficiency to how to these standards. This will require a substantial increase in supervisory activity by the Wing staff. Only in this manner can the 567th SMS develop into a truly professional missile force.

HAROLD V. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

Gen Ohlke

0921



C

30 July 1962

Accident Prevention

93 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC) 4170 Strat Wg (WC)

1. My Director of Safety, while TDY, completed compilation of an outline of a General Accident Prevention Course for additional duty Accident Prevention personnel. This course is designed to be conducted by the Offices of Safety and will require ten hours to complete.

2. As the outline is reviewed, it will require that the Director of Safety research and prepare his own lessons and within the outline in presenting the lectures. This will increase the instructor's knowledge and insight as well as familiarize the students. With the proper selection of the additional duty personnel, a strong motivating Office of Safety, presentation and conducting of this course in the manner intended, and your continued command emphasis, your Accident Prevention structure and program will be second to none.

3. I desire that this outlined course be made a periodic requirement in your program. Where necessary and desirable, the course may be altered but not reduced. It may well be that you will want to increase the content or required attendance. This is encouraged, since it is inherent on command and supervision to accomplish the mission in an accident-free manner, and each and every person in your command shoulders this responsibility.

4. As a final word of caution I point out that you, your Office of Safety and your commanders must continue to give wholehearted and factual support to this phase of your program to achieve the desired results. I have no doubts that this will be the case.

HAROLD W CRISER
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

3 Atch
Gnl Accdt Prev Ctse


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HISTORY

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HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

AUGUST 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Roy Lewis

ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

Harold W. Ohlke

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

SECRET

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Major Roy Lewis
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commission for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0932

TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

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HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Special Assistant to the Commander	Colonel Leonard L. Jelle
Executive Officer	Lt. Colonel James W. Miller
Director of Operations	Lt. Colonel Maurice E. Narler (Acting)
Director of Materiel	Colonel Daniel V. Macdonald
Director of Safety	Lt. Colonel Thomas H. Paskell
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel James E. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Major Frank J. Riddle

Administration

On 13 and 14 August Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, and commanders and staff personnel from the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 4170th Strategic Wing flew to Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force to present their unit EWO briefing to the Commander, Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr. A staff review was conducted in the afternoon and the following morning the formal presentation was made to the commander.[4] (C)

Several months ago General Ohlke discussed with Colonel J. D. White, commander of the 1st Combat Evaluation Group from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, the overall reliability of scores issued by the RBS sites in relation to the manner in which its operators conducted ECM scoring on both wing of the division. However, Colonel White's reply was negative to the effect that none of the scores were changed. In addition the division had protested to higher headquarters the failure of two tanker crews of the 4170th Strategic Wing during an inspection by the 1st Combat Evaluation Group. The crews' failures during the Operation BAR NONE, were based on excessive intervals for MITO procedures. However, General Ohlke contested the rating on the basis that the two crews had proceeded at what they considered a safe and correct taxi speed and had it been an EWO launch they would have increased their taxi speed and been within the normal MITO tolerance. However, higher

4. Msg, 15AF to 18SADC, CONFIDENTIAL DOP 2032, Subj: Unit EWO Briefing, 16 Jul 62, Exhibit # 1.

headquarters failed to acknowledge General Ohlke's protest and the wing continued to hold the two failure ratings.[5] (U)

During the second month of flying operations following the free training period, the 4170th Strategic Wing improved it bombing reliability from 91 per cent under the management control system in July to 94 per cent by the end of August. The unit reliability dropped one point to 98 per cent. However, the wing was still well above the Fifteenth Air Force average in unit reliability. Bomber air refueling efficiency scored at 95 per cent represented a four per cent drop under the July standings. This was the result of two air aborts which resulted in the loss of two refuelings on one aircraft and 10 on other aircraft.[6] (S)

Meanwhile the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing was able to maintain a bombing reliability of 94.3 per cent. The bomber squadron maintained a unit reliability of 99.5 per cent and the tanker squadron achieved a 100 per cent unit reliability. The air refueling effectiveness was 94.2 per cent during August. Electronic counter measure activity and local defense runs were scored 98.7 per cent effective and the radar simulator runs at 98.4 per cent. Gunnery firing achieved the 100 per cent maximum for the two-month period. In other areas of the MCS, fire incidents was a low area at 50 per cent and ground safety scored at 75 per cent. The wing's civilian injury rate was double the Fifteenth Air Force average. In the personnel area of scoring, individual proficiency training

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5. Hist. Rpt of 18SADC for Jul 62, Filed IXOH.
6. Hist. Rpt of 4170SW for Aug 62, Filed IXOH.

(IPT) was the problem area. The increasing amount of test failures was the contributing factor to the low rating of 74 per cent. Overall the base score was 93.4 per cent and the forecast was 95.3 per cent for the quarter.[7] (U)

By the end of August, considerable advancement had been made by the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing's bomber combat crew force. Of the 27 combat ready crews assigned, 18 were in select status, 5 were in senior status and 3 were in combat ready status. This improvement in the wing's combat crew force occurred when five senior crews and two combat ready crews were upgraded to select status. Meanwhile the combat ready tanker crew force of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron remained the same as the previous month. Of the 36 combat crews assigned, 33 were in senior status, 2 were in combat ready status and the remaining crew was in non-combat ready status.[8] (S)

The bomber combat crew strength of the 4170th Strategic Wing also made an improvement over the previous month. Of the 27 bomber combat crews assigned, 17 were in select status, 6 were in senior status and 4 were in combat ready status. During this period six senior crews were upgraded to select status. Meanwhile the tanker crew strength remained at 35 combat ready crews. Of this total 7 were in senior status and 28 were in combat ready status.[9] (S)

In the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing, the missile combat crew strength was 46 crews of

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7. Hist Report of 92SAW for August 62, Filed IXOH.
8. Ibid.
9. Hist Report of 4170SW for August 62, Filed IXOH.

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which 45 were in combat ready status and one crew remained in non-combat ready status. Meanwhile 11 missile crews of the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron at Larson had already completed sufficient upgrade training to be considered ready with waiver.[10] (S)

Overall a total of 54 bomber combat crews were assigned to the division during August. Of this total 35 were in select status, 11 were in senior status and 7 were in combat ready status. The division's tanker combat crew force stood at 71 combat tanker crews. Of this force 40 were in senior status, 30 were in combat ready status and the remaining crew was in non-combat ready status.[11] (S)

During this same period the 4170th Strategic Wing possessed 13 B-52D bombers which flew a total of 86 sorties in 757:55 flying hours. Meanwhile the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing possessed a similar number of bombers which flew 51 sorties in 408:35 flying hours. The 20 Larson tankers completed 131 training sorties in 757:55 flying hours and the 20 Fairchild tankers flew 161 sorties in 779:50 flying hours. In all, the 26 division bombers amassed a total of 1166:30 flying hours and 137 sorties. The 40 tankers assigned to the division flew 292 sorties in 1537:45 flying hours.[12] (S)

During August the Fairchild bombers began their support of the 24-hour airborne alert operations, CHROME DOME. Tankers of both wings flew in support of this operation. Eight Larson tankers were flown in support of Operation STRAIGHT SHOT ROMEO and tankers of both wings were launched in support of Operation SEA FISH.[13] (S)

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10. Hist Report, 4170SW for August 62, Filed IXOH.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

Staff Visits by the 13th Strategic Aerospace Division

On 13 and 14 August Colonel Leonard L. Wells, special assistant to the commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Maurice S. Marler, acting director of operations, accomplished a staff visit to Larson to attend the critiques by the Fifteenth Air Force IG representative. The serious discrepancies noted during the ORI were confirmed by the division staff visit. Difficulties were being encountered in effectively supplying required items, largely because of unsatisfactory conditions revealed by the division and the Fifteenth Air Force IG in the base procurement service store and bench/pre-issue branch of base supply. Contemplated corrective action was discussed with the director of supply. The director objected to closing the base procurement service store because of the impact on mission effectiveness. He was confident that the condition could be corrected in both sections without outside help and within 90 days. However, this 90-day period was not acceptable and the expeditious completion of the corrective action was essential. The division would discuss the problem with Fifteenth Air Force in an attempt to obtain guidance or assistance.[14] (U)

On 14 August Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Thompson, director of materiel, attended the Fairchild 26th Munitions Maintenance Squadron meeting. During the briefing by Major T. A Sutton, squadron maintenance supervisor, the progress on the review, revising and publication of local standard operating procedures and documents

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14. Staff Visit Report to 4170SW, 17 Aug 62, Exhibit # 2.

as applicable to weapons and re-entry vehicle maintenance was covered. With the exception of the disaster control plan, all were to be completed prior to 20 August. The disaster control plan annex was being prepared by the munitions squadron to serve as interim disaster control procedures pending the revision of the wing disaster control plan in mid-September. The receipt of the trainer complete with nose cone and flares by 21 August was also discussed during the meeting. The trainer would enable complete standboarding and certifying of R/V maintenance teams.[15] (U)

On 15 August division personnel made a staff visit to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing director of supply to determine the adequacy of actions taken or programmed to correct deficiencies noted during the Fifteenth Air Force IG inspection. In all areas action had been taken to correct the discrepancies. To prevent recurrence, responsibilities within the office of the director of supply was realigned to provide adequate coverage in all areas. Progress taken on the discrepancies found during the IG were considered satisfactory. In the base equipment control office an aggressive program was in effect to eliminate excesse. The backlog in processing and posting transaction documents had been eliminated and to prevent recurrence, the supervisor of the accounting section included this item in his daily spot checks. Overall the findings were satisfactory.[16] (U)

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15. Staff Visit to 26MMS Meeting, 17 Aug 62, Exhibit # 3.
16. Staff Visit to 92SAW, DSUP, 17 Aug 62, Exhibit # 4.

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Despite the repeated emphasis by this headquarters concerning the assistance and support given to the development and sustenance of a combat capability in the division missile force, recent inspections and staff visits of the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron had uncovered a poor response to missile squadron problems and support requirements. This was especially apparent in transportation, security and overall staff surveillance. As a result the Wing Commander, Colonel David A. Tate, was directed to take immediate action to instruct all key members of his staff on General Old's policy concerning missile support. In addition General Ohlke expected continuous command emphasis, which appeared to be required, to issue staff awareness and aggressive response to missile squadron problems and support requirements.[17] (U)

In the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing emphasis was required on certain plans. The most important was the new war support plan. Directed by Fifteenth Air Force, the new plan was required to be prepared and published prior to 1 September. In addition the wing disaster control plan dated 16 January 1962 would not be revised and published prior to 15 September. Until the plan was published there were no written procedures for nuclear disaster at Deep Creek or at the missile complexes. In addition the wing aircraft pre-accident plan revision was approximately six months behind schedule. These situations indicated that the wing commander should review the

17. Ltr, 18SAD to 4170SW, Subj: Support of Missile Force, 21 Aug 62, Exhibit # 5.

trend on preparation procedures of plans in general.[18] (U)

In response to a message from Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr., Fifteenth Air Force commander, each wing commander was expected to personally counsel senior staff members, provide positive and formal guidance to each officer supervisor and senior airmen supervisor associated with flight operations and group meetings with flight personnel to assure familiarity with safety programs. Each commander had to insure that all flight operations were adhering to the established procedures. There were no peacetime missions which required violating any established procedures, regulations, directives or generally accepted safe practices. Any violations of this policy would not be tolerated.[19] (U)

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18. Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAW, Subj: Preparation of Plans, 24 Aug 62, Exhibit # 6.
19. Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, Subj: 15AF Message C-110, 13 Aug 62, Exhibit # 7.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing Group and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

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EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, 15AF to 1PSADC, CONFIDENTIAL DOP 2032, Subj: Unit SWO Briefing, 16 Jul 62.	1
Staff Visit Report on 4170thSW, 17 Aug 62.	2
Staff Visit to 26MMS Meeting,17 Aug 62	3
Staff Visit to 92SAW, DSMH, 17 Aug 62	4
Ltr, 1PSADC to 4170SWC, Subj: Support of Missile Force, 21 Aug 62.	5
Ltr, 1PSADC to 4170SWC, Subj: Preparation of Plans, 24 Aug 62	6
Ltr, 1PSADC to 92SAWC, Subj: 15AF Message C-110, 13 Aug 62.	7



[illegible]
[illegible] AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DMS

17 August [illegible]

SUBJECT: Report of Staff Visit, Fairchild AFB, Wash., 15 Aug 62

TO: 18SAD (DM)

1. Activity Visited - DSUP (BEMO)

2. Period of Visit - 15 Aug 62

3. Person Making Visit - TSgt J. R. Lovin

4. Persons Contacted - Lt Col Hill, DSUP
Major Sloan - BEMO

5. Purpose - To determine actions taken, or programmed, to correct deficiencies indicated on the 15th AF IG Inspection Report conducted 25-31 July 1962.

6. Findings

a. Office of the Director of Supply:

(1) Publication files have been reviewed and all required publications are on hand or on requisition. Check lists were revised to comply with current directives.

(2) Action taken to correct known discrepancies: Corrective action has been specifically assigned to respo[illegible] agencies or persons with deadlines for completion with [illegible] progress reports required. To prevent recurrence, respon[illegible]bilities within the Office of the DSUP have been realigned to provide adequate coverage of all areas. Personnel with the DSUP office have been assigned specific areas to monit[illegible] and any discrepancies uncovered will be followed up until corrective action is completed. Progress on action being taken to correct the discrepancies enumerated in the 15th AF IG Report is considered satisfactory.

(3) Records pertaining to the Hi-Valu Program, and copies of Hi-Valu visits to all organizations have be[illegible] located and placed in file. Hi-Valu check lists have been revised and inspections have been conducted in all applic[illegible] organizations.

b. Base Equipment Control Office:

(1) An aggressive program to eliminate excesses has been in effect [illegible] the month of June, 128 excess

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line items valued at $888,740 were eliminated. During July 162 line items valued at $528,623 were eliminated. The program was set back with the transfer of Deep Creek to Fairchild. Many excesses were generated as a result of this transfer. However, as a result of the rating received in this area, added emphasis has been placed on the current excess program. Seven personnel have been detailed to work on this project. The latest excess/shortage listing printed by Statistical Services is being screened to identify excesses. Through turn-in and redistribution action, many suspected excesses are eliminated. When it is determined what items are actual excesses, the account custodians are notified by letter that they must justify for authorization, or turn in the designated items. Due to the conversion to the Air Force Equipment Management System, turn in of items to Base Supply cannot be effected until 15 Oct 62. In the interim all items designated as excess are being grouped in a holding area in BEMO.

(2) The backlog in processing and posting transaction documents has been eliminated. To prevent recurrence the supervisor of the Accounting Section has included this item in his daily spot checks.

(3) An aggressive program to inventory all overdue accounts has been put into effect. Estimated completion date is 30 Aug 62. To prevent recurrence a listing is prepared indicating all accounts due for inventory during the month. Each account custodian is notified by letter seven days prior to the proposed inventory date. If the custodian will not be available, the inventory date is changed to insure his presence. With the adoption of the Air Force Equipment Management System, all custody receipt account listings will be reprinted each quarter thereby practically eliminating the possibility of delinquent inventories.

c. Base Equipment Support Office:

(1) Hand tools on hand in excess of authorized quantities are being turned in to Base Supply. In addition personnel from the 28th Strat Wing were queried as to their needs. It is estimated that all excesses will be disposed of by 30 Aug 62.

(2) Approximately 70% of the dash one series ECL have been preprinted on the SAC Form 61. Delay in converting from the AF Form 338a to the SAC Form 61 is due to non-receipt of the preprinted SAC Form 61. Estimated date of completion 30 Sept 62.

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C 13 Aug 1962

15AF Message C-110

~~4170SW (WC)~~ 92SAW (WC)

1. You have had sufficient time to have read and formulated your plans for compliance with General Old's message. There can be no misunderstanding on anyone's part as to the desires of General Old. I am confident that the units of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division will comply wholeheartedly, expeditiously, and in a continuing manner, with the desires stated in the message. I can only add my personal emphasis to this subject.

2. I expect your actions in response to this message to include personal counseling of your senior staff; positive, formal guidance to each officer supervisor and senior airman supervisor associated with your flight operations; and group meetings with your aircrews and associated flight personnel, to assure familiarity with higher headquarters policies, your policies, SAC Pamphlet 62-1, and SAC 1962 aircraft accidents.

3. I have noted in recent months an increase in the number of serious ground offenses, as reported in the daily police blotters. If this trend is also in being in flight operations, we are heading toward disaster. For this reason, if for none other, we must insure that our flight operations are adhering to the established procedures. I join with General Old in stating that there is no peacetime mission which requires violation of any established procedure, regulation, directive, or generally accepted safe practice, and will not tolerate any such violation. If commanders and supervisors do not initiate proper disciplinary action against violators, it will be necessary to take disciplinary action against these commanders or supervisors. The responsibility belongs to everyone.

4. I desire that you report to me by 17 August your method and extent of compliance with Part IV of General Old's message.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

Sent to 92SAW only, 4170SW answer already submitted.

92SAW refusing received

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
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18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 - 30 September 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

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Information Staff Officer

Harold W. Ohlke
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

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Ibid	In the same place
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c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 20-15, 31 Aug 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

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3. Ibid.

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Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Special Assistant to the Commander	Colonel Leonard L. Jella
Executive Officer	Lt. Colonel James W. Miller
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Director of Personnel	
Director of Safety	Lt. Colonel Thomas H. Paskell
Maintenance Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel James E. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Major Frank J. Riddle

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Administration

Colonel Daniel V. Macdonald, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division Director of materiel, succumbed to an advanced case of tissue cancer on 21 September. Colonel Macdonald had formerly commanded the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing. However, 26 days after his assignment he was reassigned to the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division as director of materiel due to his illness. Although his death was originally attributed to leukemia, an autopsy revealed an advance case of tissue cancer primarily in the liver, lungs and spleen. This malignancy dried up the blood producing capability to a considerable extent. The 42-year old native of Portland, Oregon had held a bachelor of arts degree from the University of California and had served at Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D. C. and on the staff of the Air War College. For two years he had been chief of plans Division in Allied Air Force at Fontainblue in France.[4] (U)

On 10 September Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander departed for Headquarters, SAC, to serve as board member in selecting SAC's top bomber unit. SAC deputy commanders and a division commander from each numbered air force comprised the board. The Air Force Association plaque for top bomber unit in SAC was presented to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing. Upon conclusion of the conference at Headquarters, SAC, General Ohlke flew to Greenham Commom Air Force Base in the United Kingdom as part of a SAC program for commanders to visit reflex bases.[5] (U)

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4. Memo, Lt. Col. J. W. Miller to Comdr, Subj. Autopsy Report of Col. D. V. Macdonald, 12 Sep 62.
5. Msg, 18SAD to 923AW, EFTO DO Subj: Itinerary for Brig. Gen. Ohlke, 7 Sep 62.

the wing had little control. Bomber maintenance was adversely affected principally by deviations from take-offs and maintenance data collection. Tanker maintenance problems existed in aircraft systems and maintenance data collection. The 567th Strategic Missile Squadron's missile maintenance training was rated for the first time with the unit attaining a perfect score. Fairchild, despite a few low areas, managed to attain fifth place in Fifteenth Air Force and seventh place in SAC with an overall score of 94.3 per cent. (S)

During the month a senior crew in the bomber combat crew force of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing was downgraded to non-combat non-availability status. As a result, of the 27 combat bomber crews assigned to the wing, 18 were in select status, 6 were in senior status and 2 were in combat ready status. Meanwhile the tanker combat crew strength of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron remained the same. There were 36 combat tanker crews assigned of which 33 were in senior status, 2 were in combat ready status while one crew was in non-combat-non-availability status.[8] (S)

During this same period the 4170th Strategic Wing had 27 bomber crews of which 17 were in select status, 6 in senior status, and four in combat ready status. Tanker crew strength of the 43d Air Refueling Squadron remained at 35 crews. Of this total 7 were in senior status and 28 were in combat ready status. There were no gains or losses experienced by either squadron during

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7. Historical Report for September 62, SECRET, 92SAW, Filed:IXOH.
8. Ibid.

0972

During September both wings participated with SAC bombers and tankers in SKY SHIELD III and tankers of both wings flew SEA VISN support missions. Fairchild bombers and tankers flew in support of CHROME DOME, airborne alert operations. Larson bombers flew profile missions and its tankers flew in support of Operation POWER BOX and TOP OFF.[13] (S)

Staff Visits by the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

On 7 September Major F. J. Riddle, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division operations staff officer, visited the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing to review the non-tactical training and standardization program. During the visit no discrepancies were found in administration. Manuals control had been incorporated under the standboard division and was functioning in an excellent manner. The flight management program was adequately controlled by a chart system and oxygen mask inspection was being monitored daily by the chief of the non-tactical branch. The H-19 checklists had been satisfactorily generated and were being utilized. However, the instructor ratio of one to ten was still short one initial pilot, but flight training was scheduled to produce another initial pilot by 12 September.[14] (U)

This corrective action was initiated by 19 September when division personnel performed a supervisory staff visit to the wing to determine the status of the U-8A,(formerly L-20A) fixed wing aircraft used in the support of the missile complexes, check-

13. Crew and Flying Figures, 4170SW, SECRET, 23 Oct 62.
14. Report of Staff Visit to 92d W, Subj: Non-tactical Training and Standardization, 11 Sep 62. Exhibit 32.

out program. Thirteen pilots were assigned to the program, with two scheduled at a later date. This would establish a pilot to aircraft ratio of five to one for the three U-8A aircraft assigned. At the date of the inspection there was only one qualified U-8A instructor pilot. Four additional pilots were tentatively identified and were being trained as potential instructors. This phase of the program appeared to be progressing smoothly. In addition adequate lesson plans, flight manuals and checklists were current and in use. However, training records did not completely document the training accomplished. As a result it was recommended that training folders comply with SAC Regulation 51-19 and the individual progress be documented.[15] (U)

On 28 and 29 September division personnel performed a staff visit to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron primarily to acquaint the incoming director of operations, Colonel Lucion N. Powell, with key personnel, the physical layout of the missile assembly building, and the location and arrangement of the missile complexes. During the visit a crew EWO certification briefing was observed and the crews appeared well-briefed in all aspects. The daily standup briefing was also attended. The briefing was a concise recapitulation of the status of the squadron and activity scheduled for each complex during that day. A combat crew daily briefing was also observed. Although not specifically required by higher headquarters, the briefing was considered an excellent management tool for informing crew members of current squadron status and latest changes

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15. Report of Staff Visit to 92SAW, Subj: U-8A Training, 21 Sep 62, Exhibit # 3.

in directives affecting their activities.[16] (U)

An inspection of individual proficiency training (IPT) records within organizations of the division during September and the past year revealed a serious and continuing lack of attention to several items that were of paramount importance to a successful IPT program. Among the discrepancies noted was the lack of current indexes within the squadron IPT sections of lack or utilization by IPT supervisors during staff visits. Suspense copies of requisitions for training material were not available within the squadron IPT section and adequate copies of current regulations were not available for use by supervisors, trainers and trainees. The squadron IPT supervisory meetings, assistance visits and corrective action on discrepancies were inadequate or ineffective. In view of the command emphasis placed on training, there was no excuse for chargeables or test failures. Each wing was directed to conduct a survey with corrective action taken regarding discrepancies noted during the inspections. Special attention was directed toward the removal and replacement of obsolete training materiel and the completeness of current reading files.[17] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, was deeply concerned over the safety program in the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron. During September the missile squadron's safety officer departed on Boot Strap and was

16. Report of Sraff Visit to 567SMS, Subj: 567SMS Operation, 10 October 62, Exhibit #4.
17. IPT Discrepancies, 92SAW & 4170SW, 28 Sep 62, Exhibit # 5.

expected to be away in excess of six months. The safety NCO was projected for two months of school while the other safety NCO had just returned from school. The squadron adjutant had been assigned additional duty as safety officer. General Ohlke found this entirely unsatisfactory as the prime factor in all missile operations was safety. As a result General Ohlke directed Colonel David I. Liebman, 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing commander, to assure that an adequate safety staff of fully qualified personnel were performing this function.[18] (U)

The 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing director of safety office and its operations were also unsatisfactory. An already acknowledged weak operation had further regressed in the short period that the new director had been assigned. With the loss of airmen secretary and clerks this situation was further hampered. In addition the wing director of safety to be assigned was a substandard B-52 aircraft commander. In the opinion of General Ohlke the director of safety should be the caliber of officer with proved initiative, drive and ability. General Ohlke directed that immediate action be taken to revitalize the directorate of safety and make it one of the strongest sections within the wing.[19] (U)

During the review of the law enforcement status of discipline record General Ohlke was shocked at the action taken on the more serious offenses committed by Fairchild personnel. With higher ranking military personnel, less punitive action was taken. This situation should be reversed. The higher the rank, the tougher

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18. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Missile Safety, 27 Sep 62, Exhibit # 6.
19. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Wing director of safety, 27 Sep 62, Exhibit # 7.

the punishment should be. In any event it should at least equal the action taken against lower grade personnel. General Ohlke directed that an education program be established for squadron commanders to eliminate the wide variation of actions taken on offenses. In addition a new policy would soon be instituted which was expected to reduce the number of offenses committed by division personnel.[20] (U)

20. Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Status of Discipline, 27 Sep 62, Exhibit # 8.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing Group and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

0979

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Crew and Flying Figures, 4170SW, SECRET, 23 Oct 62	1
Report of Staff Visit to 92SAW, 18SAD, Subj: Non-tactical Training and Standardization, 11 Sep 62	2
Report of Staff Visit to 92SAW, 18SAD, Subj: U-8A Training, 21 Sep 62.	3
Report of Staff Visit to 567SMS, 18SAD, Subj: 567SMS Operations, 10 Oct 62.	4
IPT Discrepancies, 92SAW & 4170SW, 28 Sep 62.	5
Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Missile Safety, 27 Sep 62	6
Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Wing Director of Safety, 27 Sep 62	7
Ltr, 18SAD to 92SAW, Subj: Status of Discipline, 27 Sep 62	8

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4135TH STRATEGIC WING
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOH

23 October 1962

SUBJECT: Crew and Flying Figures for September

TO: Office of Information (Historian)
92d Bombardment Wing
Fairchild AFB, Wash.

1. MCS. Base scores, problem areas, and corrective action taken. This item mailed separately on this date.

2. Number of aircraft assigned/available:

B-52D assigned and possessed end of September, 13; available, 5.
KC-135 assigned end of September, 21; possessed, 20.2, available, 10.2. (S)

3. Missiles: 10

4. Flying Mission and Hours: (S)

B-52	Sorties	Hours
Sky Shield	3	29:50
Profile	1	9:00
CCTM	70	613:20
Total	74	652:10

KC-135		
Sky Shield	8	32:50
Power Box	10	79:50
Seafish	23	117:55
Top Off	7	34:30
CCTM	69	360:15
Test Hops	1	3:00
Total	118	628:20

5. Combat Crew Status

Combat crew status as of 30 September was as follows: B-52, 27 crews assigned, including 17 select and six senior. KC-135, 35 crews assigned, including seven senior and 28 combat ready. No projected losses.

EUGENE W. HUNGERFORD
Captain, USAF
Information Officer

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

IXOH-62-018

DO

11 September 1962

Staff Visit

OSSAW (WC)

1. Major F. J. Biddle, this headquarters, performed a staff visit to the 93d Strat Aerospace Wing on 7 Sep 62. Purpose of the visit was to review the non-tactical training and standardization program in compliance with 15AF message DO 20000, 10 Jul 62. The following items were noted:

a. No discrepancies were noted in administration. A simple [illegible] reference chart system allows for a quick and ready [illegible] of [illegible] rating, altitude chamber and [illegible].

b. Manuals control has been incorporated under the Standboard Division and is functioning in an excellent manner. The Deputy Commander for Operations has further explained that personnel cannot participate in flights unless all current publications are in receipt of personnel involved. Flight orders are checked against manuals control documents before each flight.

c. The Flight Management Program is adequately controlled by a [illegible] system as prescribed by 15th AF [illegible].

d. [illegible] is being monitored daily by the [illegible] branch. A weekly scheduled [illegible] published and distributed with a five day [illegible].

e. E-10 Check Lists have been satisfactorily reproduced locally and are being utilized at the present time.

f. The instructor ratio of one to ten is still short one IP for C-130, however, scheduled flight training should produce another IP in the next five days.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[illegible]
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

#23

0982

HEADQUARTERS
16TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DO

21 September 1962

SUBJECT: Staff Visit

TO: [illegible]

1. A supervisory staff visit to the [illegible] was performed this date for the purpose of determining the status of the (formerly [illegible]) checkout program at Fairchild AFB. Lt Col [illegible] Staff and [illegible] were contacted on 19 Sept and advised of the proposed [illegible].

2. Specific items covered and findings are as follows:

a. Pilot assignments and aircraft availability. Thirteen pilots are presently assigned to the program, with two more programmed at a later date. This will establish a pilot [illegible] aircraft ratio of five to one for the three U-5A's assigned which conforms to the standard 5:1 support factor. There appears to be no problem here.

b. [illegible]. It is envisaged to present the only [illegible] qualified to instruct in the [illegible] Four [illegible] have been tentatively identified and are [illegible] of potential instructors. This phase of the program [illegible] to be progressing smoothly.

c. [illegible] lesson plans have been prepared and are being used amplifying the provisions of AFR 60-20.

d. Flight manuals and check lists. Current flight manuals and pilot check lists are being used.

e. Training Records. These records do not completely document training accomplished. (1) No evidence was available to the [illegible] training, to indicate that the proficiency written examination had been completed by those pilots in the flying phase of training. (Ref AFM 60-20, par 3-5a 2(a).

(2) Several AF Form 80 (used as mission progress sheets) were missing from training folders. Some of these

were for flights accomplished the last week in August.

(2) Procedures had not been established for recording individual items of training in readily usable form.

3. It is recommended that:

a. Training folders be changed to comply with AMCR 51-19, par 8a.

b. Individual progress be documented as prescribed in par 8b, AMCR 51-19.

c. A chart be prepared showing the names of all pilots in the T-6A transition program and a detailed breakdown of all training requirements. This will provide the OIC of the program a ready reference of items to go for each pilot and will simplify the scheduling problem.

MAVERICK E. HARLEE
Lt Col, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

0984

HEADQUARTERS
10TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DO

10 October 1962

SUBJECT: Staff Visit to 567th Strategic Missile Squadron

TO: MEMORANDUM RECORD

1. Personnel from this office performed a staff visit to the 567th SMS on 20 and 21 September 1962. Primary purpose of the visit was to acquaint the incoming Director of Operations, Colonel Lucien W. Powell, with key personnel, physical layout of the SMSH, and location and arrangement of typical missile complexes within the squadron.

2. Because of the nature of the visit, only a cursory examination could be made of the various operational activities except as noted below:

a. A crew EWO certification briefing was observed. The crew was thoroughly knowledgeable in all aspects.

b. A daily standup briefing was attended. It was a brief, concise recapitulation of the status of the squadron and activity scheduled for each complex that day.

c. A combat crew daily briefing was observed. This briefing, while not specifically required in any higher headquarters directive, appeared to be an excellent management tool for keeping crew members informed of the current status of the squadron and informing them of the latest changes in directives affecting their activities.

MAURICE E. MARLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations

5A

HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: C

28 Sep 1962

SUBJECT: IPT Discrepancies

TO: 92 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC) 4170 Strat Wg (WC)

1. Inspection of IPT records within organizations of this command during the past year reveal a serious and continuing lack of attention to several items that are of paramount importance if a successful program is to be conducted. All are repeat discrepancies requiring immediate, positive and continuing attention. These items I have ennumerated below:

a. Current indexes are not available within the Squadron IPT section, or are not being utilized by the IPT supervisor during staff visits.

b. Suspense copies of requisitions for training material are not available within the Squadron IPT section for purpose of follow-up.

c. Adequate copies of current regulations as listed in the current required reading list are not available for use by supervisors, trainers and trainees. (Especially for those trainees on duty with sections separated from a current working Publications file.)

d. Squadron IPT supervisory meetings, assistance visits and corrective action on discrepancies are inadequate or ineffective.

e. Supervisory support is inadequate.

f. Support of the local FTD IPT/OJT 75000 Course. Successful completion of the course presently being conducted is considered a mandatory requirement for assignment to duty as Squadron IPT Officer or NCO.

2. In view of the command emphasis being placed on training, there should be no excuse for a chargeable or test failure. All of the above are contributory to a poor training program. An immediate survey will be made and corrective action taken on any of the above repeat discrepancies noted. Special attention will be afforded the removal and replacement of obsolete training material and the completeness of current reading files.

3. Request I be informed of completed action. This subject will be an item of special interest to members of my staff during future staff visits.

Harold W. Ohlke

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

0987

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

C 27 Sep 1962

Missile Safety

92WC

1. At the present time I am deeply concerned over the safety program in the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron. As you may know, safety is paramount in the missile squadron as it is in the munitions maintenance squadron, and at no time should safety be degressed. I cannot accept anything short of safety first, last, and always in the missile squadron.

2. As I see the safety program in the 567th at the present time, it is as follows: Major Greves, Safety Officer, has gone to Boot Strap and will be away in excess of six months. Sergeant Beasley is projected to attend school in the immediate future and will be gone in excess of two months. Sergeant Hodges has just returned from school at Chanute and has no prior safety experience. This outlines the present status of the safety office of the missile squadron.

3. Because of this situation, I am deeply concerned and consider the the safety program of the squadron has degressed. "Flash" books at the sites are not standardized, the initialing process for the "flash" book is not standardized, and the MHR reporting procedure is not well estab-lished or well known by missile personnel.

4. In the interim, it is my understanding that Major Buehler, squadron adjutant, has been given the additional duty of safety officer. This, to me, is entirely unsatisfactory since the prime factor in any missile operations is safety. This must be a full time duty performed by the best officer available in the squadron.

5. In view of the above and my apprehension for the safety aspects of the 567th, I want you to assure me that an adequate safety staff and fully qualified personnel are available to perform this function. I cannot tolerate or accept anything less.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
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BDCM	
BDCE	
BDCL	
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BIXO	
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RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units)

62-219

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

C

27 Sep 1962

Wing Director of Safety

92WC

1. The Wing Director of Safety office and its operation is entirely unsatisfactory. An already acknowledged weak operation has further regressed in the short period that the new Director has been assigned. In addition, losses of airmen in this office have virtually made this staff agency ineffective when, in fact, it should be one of the strongest offices in the Wing.

2. Complete and unequivocal backing by the Wing Commander must be given this office in all respects. This includes the assignment of the most outstanding personnel in order for this function to operate properly. A further loss is being experienced in this office by reduction of airmen secretary and clerks. Further, it is my understanding that a new Director of Safety is to be assigned who was a substandard B-52 aircraft commander. To me, this is unthinkable.

3. The Director of Safety should be the caliber of officer with the initiative, drive and ability possessed by Major Costello. The Office of Safety has been weak for several years, and cannot continue its present substandard commanding and operation.

4. I expect vigorous and immediate action to be taken to revitalize the Directorate of Safety of the Wing to make it one of the strongest sections within the Wing.

5. Please advise me of your actions in this matter, and also assure me that this particular activity operates directly under the Wing Commander and has his full and complete backing.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
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RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units)

62-219

C

27 Sep 1962

Status of Discipline

92WC

1. In reviewing the attached Law Enforcement Status of Discipline, I am amazed and somewhat shocked at the action taken on the more serious offenses committed by our personnel.

2. It appears that the higher the rank of the people involved, the less action taken. This should be in reverse. The higher the rank of the person the tougher the punishment should be, in view of the increased responsibilities of higher ranking personnel and the fact they should know better to begin with. The action taken on the higher ranking personnel should be at least equal to the action taken against a lower grade person, but this is not the case. I expect you to take action to rectify this situation as I have indicated by the red pencil marks.

3. I think an education program is in order for our squadron commanders because of the wide variation of action taken on offenses. Likewise, I will have a discussion with you concerning a new policy I desire to be instituted, which I hope will reduce the number of offenses committed by our personnel.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Ltr, 92CSG, 12 Sep 62,
Status of Discipline Rept

SECRET

HISTORY

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 - 31 October 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield
For ROY LEWIS
Major, USAF
Information Staff Officer

James W. Mullen
LT(1) for
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

SECRET

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING BY
Ray J. Hartsfield
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

5-3841-4

15AF DXI 63-3
Atch 4

0996

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0997

GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commission for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

0998

FOB	Flack Order of Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OOCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

0999

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization.

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 23-15, 20 Apr 62, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

1000

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Special Assistant to the Commander	Colonel Leonard L. Jella
Executive Officer	Lt. Colonel James W. Miller
Director of Operations	Colonel Lucion N. Powell
Director of Materiel	Lt. Colonel James W. Thompson
Director of Safety	Lt. Colonel Thomas H. Paskell
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Charles E. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Major Frank J. Riddle
Deputy Director of Operations	Lt. Colonel. Maurice E. Marler

Administration

On 22 October the President of the United States made an announcement to the nation which ultimately resulted in the strategic weapon forces of the 4170th Strategic Wing and the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing to be placed on full alert status. In his address, President John F. Kennedy confirmed intelligence detection of the presence of Soviet missile forces on the island of Cuba and initiated the quarantine on shipping to the island to prevent further introduction of offensive weapons. On 22 and 23 October Larson and Fairchild respectively increased their airborne alert force from one bomber daily to two bombers daily overflying the Thule Air Defense Area. The remaining Larson bombers and tankers were on ground alert status during the eight-day period. In the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing 12 of the 13 bombers comprised the bomber alert force and 19 of the 21 tankers comprised the tanker alert force. Both wings launched tankers to Spain to participate in the Spanish Tanker Task Force at the outbreak of the Cuban Crisis. The missile complexes of both bases were at complete EWO status and remained so for the remainder of the month. During this period all flying training activities were curtailed as well as training for missile combat crews which entailed the use of missile hardware or the degrading of the missile. The commander's management program and the management control system (MCS) were suspended by both wings in order that they could devote their efforts towards maintaining their EWO status.[4] (S)

4. 92SAW & 4170SW Hist. Rpt. for Oct 62, SECRET, Filed: 92SAW IXOH.

On 17 October Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, in the position of chairman and three other commanders discussed certain items of the SAC management control system at Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force. The board, consisting of two division commanders, a wing commander and missile wing commander, met to determine what items Fifteenth Air Force would present at the major review of the SAC MCS when it convened.[5] (U)

The bomber combat crew force of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing remained unchanged during October. Of the 27 combat crews assigned, 18 were in select status, six were in senior status, two were in combat ready status and the remaining crew was in non-combat ready status. One crew became non-combat ready from non-combat ready non-availability status with the assignment of a crew member to the vacant position. Meanwhile the KC*135 combat crew strength also remained the same during the month. Of the 36 combat crews assigned, 33 were in senior status, two were in combat ready status and one crew was in non-comabt ready non-availability status. In addition 45 of the 46 Atlas E missile crews assigned were combat ready.[6] (S)

In the 4170th Strategic Wing the bomber combat crew status was 27. Twelve of the combat crews formerly in select status were downgraded to senior status due to spot promotion board actions. As a result the wing had only five crews in select status, 18 in senior status and four in combat ready status. Also, all 35 combat tanker

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5. Msg, 15AF to 92SAW, DCR 52132, Subj: Major Review of SAC MCS, 28 Sep 62.
6. 92SAW Hist. Rpt for Oct 62, Filed: IXOH.

crews assigned were in combat ready status and with seven of these crews in senior status.[7] (S)

Overall the division was assigned a total of 54 bomber combat crews of which 23 were in select status, 24 were in senior status, 6 were in combat ready status and one crew was in non-combat ready status. In addition 71 tanker combat crews were assigned of which 40 were in senior status, 30 in combat ready status and the remaining crew in non-combat ready status.[8] (S)

During this same period the 4170th Strategic Wing possessed 13 B-52D bombers which flew 76 sorties in 1,154:25 flying hours. The 21 Larson tankers flew 160 sorties in 738:35 flying hours. In the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing the 13 bombers flew 31 sorties in 1,165 flying hours and the 20 KC-135A tankers flew 121 sorties and 607 flying hours. In all the 26 division bombers flew 107 sorties in 2,319:25 flying hours and the 41 division tankers flew 281 sorties in 1,345:35 flying hours.[9] (S)

Mission support by division aircraft was somewhat limited due to the Cuban crisis. Both wings launched CHROME DOME sorties which accounted for the majority of the flying hours flown. Tankers from both wings flew SEA FISH support missions and the First Combat Evaluation Group (CEG) was in the process of evaluating the Fairchild bomber crews when the Cuban situation required the suspension of the test. Both wings also launched tankers in support of SAC and Tactical Air Command operations.[10] (S)

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7. Ltr, 4170SW Crew and Flying Figures, Oct 62, SECRET, Exhibit #1.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

Staff Visits by 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

During the first three days of October Lieutenant Colonel M. E. Marler, division deputy director of operations, performed a supervisory staff visit to the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron at Larson Air Force Base to determine the operational capability of the unit. In general, the missile squadron possessed an excellent operational capability considering the present state of operational readiness training. Organization was in accordance with the existing directives and quarterly phase plans were published in as great a detail as could be determined. These plans were revised as necessary and published w ll within the 74-hour work week standard established by SAC. Positive control and execution training was producing the desired results with 47 individuals tested during the month of September and no failures. Operational readiness training (Phase III) was progressing satisfactorily and of the 12 crews requiring this training, five had completed the academic phase and the remaining seven crews would accomplish this training by 12 October. Loadings, both the practice and qualification check, were progressing as rapidly as Project Shakedown would permit. All operational readiness training was thoroughly documented and crew training folders were in excellent condition. The standardization program, although still in the early stages, was satisfactory although no standardization review panel meeting had been held.[11] (U)

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11. Staff Visit Report, 568SMS, 9 Oct. 62, Exhibit # 2.

Another weak area was the squadron procedures for insuring that combat crews kept informed of current directives, instructions and the status of the squadron as a whole. In many cases these procedures were not producing the desired results. In some instances complex commanders were not available to pass the information to the crews. As a result it was recommended that action be taken to provide a genuine capability at complex B to act as the alternate command post for the unit. Short daily briefings should be held for all combat crews prior to leaving the squadron for their individual complexes to keep them abreast of current developments of general interest.[12] (U)

On 1 through 4 October Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Murray, division supply staff officer, made a routine visit to the maintenance activities of the 568th Strategic missile Squadron to determine the degree of action taken to correct deficiencies noted during previous staff visits. All areas inspected by the team were satisfactory with the exception of the production control branch which was found to be unsatisfactory. This was attributed to the failure of production control to comply with the procedures of AF Manual 66-1 and the respective SAC Supplements. The small number of items being processed had not presented a problem thus far. However, with the increased repairable processing requirements in the near future, satisfactory control could possibly be hampered. In general, the division inspectors found very few repeated discrepancies. In two instances work orders had been submitted to Fifteenth Air Force

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12. Staff Visit Report, 568SMS, 9 Oct 62, Exhibit # 2.

for action but as yet had not been returned. It was also recommended that the maintenance supervisor be moved closer to his area of responsibility. Other than these recommendations the squadron was functioning satisfactorily.[13] (U)

A visit by Colonel L. N. Powell, division director of operations, to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing standardization division on 15 and 16 October found the section manned by what he considered highly qualified and motivated personnel who were attempting to uphold the high standards essential to the SAC mission. Colonel Powell suggested that the standardization division be limited to purely standardization functions as they were continually being hampered by correctional actions which were the responsibilities of other staff agencies. This situation would be compounded with the reduction in the number of standboard crews on 1 January 1963. It was also recommended that the standardization division's surveillance of crews' inflight performance frequency could be increased by the utilization of qualified wing staff officers. The non-tactical flying program was also considered adequate. The supervision at base flight level appeared to be extremely satisfactory. However, the success of this program was contingent upon the strong command support and the DCO supervision by enforcing coordination and compliance from the different agencies supply flight personnel. Without this strong support the program would deteriorate into a dangerous condition. In base operations there was a manning problem

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13. Informal Staff Visit to 568SMS, 8 Oct 62, Exhibit # 3.

in that they were under the authorized eight dispatchers and that the NCOIC would be transferred in January leaving this area critical. The control of the classified communications folders being maintained by the dispatch section was considered unsatisfactory. These folders were not being receipted for by base operations and there was no evidence that the folders were checked when returned by crew members. Under this system it was possible that a folder could be no longer current yet still issued to a crew.[14] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, had observed that the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron had established excellent procedures relative to the posting of two-man policy signs. In the munitions maintenance squadron similar methods had been established with the additional card attached to the Form 138 summarizing the main points of the policy. Some of the signs had been installed at the Larson complexes and General Ohlke requested that this project be completed as soon as possible. In relation to aircraft, Larson had established a procedure for ground crew personnel gaining access to the aircraft containing nuclear weapons. Access to these aircraft was by a list only and all were well versed on the two-man policy. In addition every persone concerned at Larson had retaken the test on the two-man policy and each recertified. General Ohlke emphasized that he wanted the two-man policy in effect at all times. He also stressed the importance of staying abreast of nuclear accident

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14. Staff Vist to 92SAW Standardization Division and Base Operations 17 Oct 62, Exhibit # 4.

prevention at all times and the active support and guidance of commanders in this program. No one could be permitted to disregard or fail to consider accident prevention in any phase of operation.[15] (U)

15. Minutes, Nuclear Safety Council Meeting, 9 Oct 62, Filed: 18SADC.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing Group and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Ltr, 1170SW Crew and Flying Figures for Oct 62, SECRET.	1
Staff Visit Report, 568SMS, 9 Oct 62	2
Informal Staff Visit Report, 568SMS, 8 Oct 62	3
Staff Visit to 92SAW Standardization Division and Base Operations, 17 Oct 62.	4

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4170TH STRATEGIC WING
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOH

23 November 1962

SUBJECT: Crew and Flying Figures for October

TO: Office of Information (IXOH)
92d Bombardment Wing
Fairchild AFB, Wash.

1. MCS: Base scores, problem areas, and corrective action taken. This item mailed separately, 21 November. The management analysis officer says these figures, for October especially, should be used with caution as they are not formal scores truly representative of the wing's capability under normal conditions.

2. Number of aircraft assigned, available: B-52D assigned and possessed end of October, 13; available, all on alert as of end of October. KC-135A assigned and possessed, 21. On alert as of end of October. (S)

3. Missiles: 10

4. Flying Missions and Hours: (S)

B-52,	Sorties	Hours
Big Blast	1	2:10
Profile	15	124:15
Standboard	4	34:25
Chrome Dome	41	847:50
CCTM	15	145:45
TOTAL	76	1,154:25

KC-135		
Chrome Dome	58	180:15
Air Mail	6	25:25
Power Box	1	6:00
Seafish	17	97:45
Standboard	5	37:15
Dominic	10	83:00
SAC/TAC	2	13:00
Hq Directed	6	31:50
CCTM	55	264:05
TOTAL	160	738:35

IXOH-62-022

5. Combat Crew Status: Combat crew status as of 31 October was as follows: B-52, 27 crews assigned, combat ready. Twelve of these were downgraded from select to senior due to spot promotion board actions. Thirty-five KC-135 crews assigned, all combat ready. Seven of these were senior, 28 combat ready.

EUGENE W. HUNGERFORD
Capt., USAF, Information Officer

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

[redacted]

TO 9 Octo[redacted]

Staff Visit Report - 568th Strategic Missile Squadron

[redacted]
5685M8 (C)
IN TURN

1. During the period 1-3 October 1962 the undersigned performed a supervisory staff visit to the 568th [redacted] the purpose of determining the operational capability of the unit. The following specific areas were covered. Organization, Scheduling, Operational Capability, Standardization, Operational Readiness Training Command post [redacted] and on-site [redacted]

2. In general, the 568th [redacted] is excellent [redacted] tional capability considering the present state of [redacted] readiness training. Organization is in accordance with existing directives and each section of the squadron has a separate organizational chart posted and current. Quarterly phase plans are published in as great detail as can be determined. These are revised as necessary and published in the monthly and weekly schedules. Combat duty time is well within the 74 hour per week standard which SAC has established. Positive control and execution training is producing the desired results. Forty seven individuals were tested during the month of September with no failures. Operational Readiness Training (Phase III) is progressing satisfactorily. Twelve crews initially required this training; five of these have completed the academic phase and all 12 crews will be complete in academics by 12 [redacted] The actual hardware phase, which consists of two liquid loadings, one for practice and one qualification check, will progress as rapidly as project Shakedown will permit. All training given in ORT is thoroughly documented. [redacted] training folders are excellent. The Standardization Program although still in its infancy, is progressing satisfactorily however, no standardization review panel meetings have as yet been held.

3. Two problem areas of major significance were observed:

a. Complex "B" was not capable of functioning as an alternate command post.

(1) A chart showing the status of the other complexes was not on hand. (Par 11b, Chap 7, SACM 55-3)

(2) No individual contacted (including the office controller on duty in the primary command post) knew whether or not the alternate command post had an assigned call sign. If the alternate command post is to pass quick reaction messages to the other complexes, or to aircraft in flight, it is imperative that the call sign of the ACP be included in these messages; otherwise, the format is incorrect and the messages are, therefore, invalid.

b. Squadron procedures for keeping the combat crews informed of current directives, instructions, and status of the squadron as a whole were not producing the desired results. Cypher commanders were not in all cases available to pass this information to the crews.

4. It is recommended that:

a. Action be taken without further delay to provide a genuine capability at Complex "B" to act as the alternate command post for the unit.

b. Short briefings be held for all combat crews prior to leaving the squadron for their individual complexes each day to keep them abreast of current developments of general interest. (One crew, for example, had not been briefed that a supplemental SAC V-1 report is required any time a missile goes off alert, irrespective of the length of time it is down.

5. On-base feeding does not appear to be a serious problem at the present time. Meals are prepared at Larson AFB and trucked to the complexes. All personnel on the two crews questioned on this subject indicated that they were well satisfied with the quality of food and with the present feeding procedures.

6. This report is forwarded for any action which the Commander deems necessary. An indorsement is not required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MAURICE E. MARLER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations

1015

EM 8 October 1962

Informal Staff Visit - 568th Strategic Missile Squadron

4170SW (MC)

1. Persons Conducting Visit:

Lt Col C. B. Murray, MSC
MSgt D. J. Newberg, MSSC
MSgt E. E. Rhoads, MSC
TSgt U. Turner, 567MSS

2. Period of Visit: 1-4 October 1962

3. Persons Contacted:

Col E. S. Bilyeu, MSSC
Lt Col [redacted]
Major [redacted]
Major [redacted]
Capt Miller, Job Control
Capt Hampton, Unlist Trng
Capt Turner, MSSC OIC
MSgt Wahl, MS

4. Purpose: Routine visit to maintenance activities with emphasis on actions taken to correct deficiencies noted during previous visits and AFM 66-1 compliance. Findings and recommendations are for information and action as you deem necessary. A reply to this report is neither required nor desired.

5. Findings and Recommendations:

a. General: Discussion of previous staff visit reports revealed the following items where action is required or is pending:

(1) A work order was submitted on 16 Jul 62 and is awaiting action by 1365F to tile floors in the shop areas.

(2) A work order was submitted on 30 Aug 62 and is awaiting action by 1365F to air condition the Electronic I shop.

(3) The Maintenance Supervisor is located in an office completely removed from the shop area. Recommend action be taken to move the office closer to his area of responsibility.

(4) The Pneudraulics Shop still has no satisfactory equipment for cleaning filters. A sonic cleaner is required and a WAL change should be submitted.

(5) Recommend consideration be given to decreasing attendance at the 6908 Maintenance meeting to include only essential key personnel.

b. Maintenance Control: Satisfactory.

(1) The flow of traffic through the Control Room is considered excessive. Recommend consideration be given to relocating records section to reduce traffic.

(2) Complex Status Reports are not received in a timely manner by the [redacted] Problem developed to expedite [redacted] 16th SMS visit 30-31 Aug 62.

(3) Closer control of work [redacted] being accomplished at the complexes [redacted] exists between Job Control and SIOP maintenance with only one telephone line available. This problem will be discussed during the forthcoming communications Conference to be held at Hq 15th Air Force. In the interim, recommend periodic schedules be established for call in of current work order status.

(4) Job Control ensemble displays have been reworked so as to reflect a more comprehensive picture of work in progress at each complex. (16th SMS Visit 30-31 Aug 62)

(5) A spot check of missile record files in the records section disclosed that [redacted] an excessive number of errors on AFSC Forms 2407 and 2410. Recommend a training program be established for the maintenance of missile forms. Also suggest that QCMI inspect missile forms during 10% in-commission inspections as well as 100 day activity inspections.

c. Quality Control & Evaluation: Satisfactory.

(1) Inspection of Maintenance Evaluation work sheets (SAC Form 1064) revealed that blocks 20 to 24 were being completed as required by Chapter 20, AFM 66-1 and SAC SUP-1.

(2) Index for QCMI Office Instruction file was poorly kept and not up to date. A current index should be published as soon as possible.

d. Maintenance Training (Enclosure): Satisfactory.

(1) Discussion with shop supervisors on the OJT Program indicated an urgent need for supervisors training

program on procedures for accomplishing the JOTS packages.

(2) Maintenance Training Control scheduled 292 available spaces for various phases of training during the month of August. Of these available spaces only 154 were utilized. Recommend that work load requirements and other commitments be appraised so a more realistic training schedule can be published.

e. Maintenance Supervision: Satisfactory. Emphasis is needed in establishing an effective Production Control activity. Recommend the assignment of additional personnel as required to plan and supervise the operation of Production Control in accordance with procedures in AFM 66-1/SAC SUP-1.

(1) The Maintenance Readiness Plan, 1 Jun 62, was inaccurate due to personnel changes and other changes in organizational structure. Recommend periodic review and updating of supervisor's plans to insure accuracy.

(2) EWO check lists showing required actions of key personnel during EWO were not available at duty stations. (Par 2-15b, AFM 66-1/SAC SUP-1)

(3) Maintenance personnel are not familiar with Hi-Valu procedures. Recommend emphasis be placed on the Hi-Valu Program within the squadron.

f. Production Control: Unsatisfactory. Operation of Production Control is unsatisfactory due to failure to comply with procedures in paragraph 2-34a and 2-37, AFM 66-1/SAC SUP-1. The small number of items being processed have not presented a problem to date; however, with increased reparable processing requirements, satisfactory control could not be maintained. The following discrepancies were noted:

(1) Production Control boards were not available and no EDD is available for those currently on order. Recommend use of locally developed scheduling boards to aid in maintaining control of the in shop workload. (Par 2-34a(4), AFM 66-1, SAC SUP-1)

(2) Manhours available for in shop work was not maintained in Production Control. (Par 2-34a(1), AFM 66-1, SAC SUP-1)

(3) Suspense copies of [illegible] 211/211 were not available in Production Control for in shop work. (Par 3-37g(4)(d), AFM 66-1/SAC SUP-1)

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(4) Work center supervisors do not visit Production Control on a periodic daily basis to screen reparables. (Par 2-37c, AFM 66-1)

(5) Storage bins should be marked for AWM, AWP, and NRTS and designated by shop. Hi-Thin storage bins should be designated and marked.

(6) Condemned items are stored in Production Control. These items should be processed to DRMO.

5. MAINT: Satisfactory.

(1) Torque wrenches, calipers, micrometers and other test equipment located in the tool crib were overdue for calibration and in some instances have never been to the PMEL for calibration.

(2) Numerous items of test equipment have been in the PMEL for calibration for an excessive period of time with status unknown. Recommend periodic follow-up to determine current status of these items.

(3) Recommend moving the two mechanical shops to one location as soon as possible. Necessary shop tools, grinders, buffers, etc., cannot be operated in the present location.

(4) The [illegible] Program is not receiving adequate emphasis by shop chiefs and supervisors. Electronics II is the only section with adequate completion entries in JOPS training folders. Answering to records maintained in Maintenance Training, JOPS printouts were issued to maintenance shops on the following dates:

Electronics I & II - 20 Aug 68
Propulsion - 20 Aug 68
Mechanical - 20 Aug 68
Powerproduction - 20 Aug 68

(5) Specialist availability [illegible] on specialist planning charts in mechanical shop did not agree with availability in Job Control.

(6) Specialist planning charts were not posted in accordance with para 2-38, Fig 2-9, AFM 66-1/MAC [illegible]-1. Each shop chief had developed his own system for posting these charts. Recommend posting of planning charts in all shops be standardized.

(7) Artificial respiration signs were not posted in Electronics areas. (AFM 32-3, par 1082.2)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Material

DO 17 October 1962

Staff Visit

92SAW (WC)

1. During the period 15-16 Oct 62 Colonel L. W. Powell and Cpt W. D. Wheeler, this Headquarters, conducted a staff visit to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing Standardization Division and Base Operations. The following items were noted:

a. Standardization Division:

(1) The Standardization Division appears to be manned by highly qualified and motivated personnel who are attempting to uphold the high standards essential to the SAC mission. Particular attention was paid to the non-tactical flying standardization program and the Base Operations Branch. We consider that the Standardization Division is hampered in providing a quality control function by being saturated with correctional actions which should be the responsibility of other staff agencies and pertinent instrumentors assigned. It is recommended that consideration be given to limit the Standardization Division to purely standardization functions. The directed reduction in the number of standboard crews, effective 1 January, compounds the above. Recommendations were made to Colonel Carey and Lt Colonel Armstrong as to how the Standardization Division's surveillance of crews' inflight performance frequency could be increased by utilization of qualified Wing staff officers which could possibly insure a higher quality end product. A recommendation was made to Colonel Carey for improved supervision of crew training and performance by spelling out the air crew command inherent responsibilities in this area by personal letter.

(2) The non-tactical flying program currently established is considered adequate. The supervision at base flight level appears to be highly satisfactory; however, the success of this program is contingent upon strong command support and DCO supervision by enforcing coordination and compliance from the different agencies supplying flight personnel. Without this strong support the program will deteriorate rapidly into a dangerous condition.

(3) Current orders have not been published designating standardization evaluators for the non-tactical flying program.

(4) Four Standardization crew members are not on orders as instructors.

b. Base Operations:

(1) Eight dispatchers are authorized but only seven are assigned. The NCOIC will be transferred in January leaving this area critical. We recommend consideration be given to gain an input from MAC resources or by cross training eligible airmen into this career field. One Sgt, AFSC 27170, is being carried against Base Operations manning although doing duty as a Terminal Control NCOIC in the Standardization Division. It is recommended that the Terminal Control NCOIC be directed to maintain the currency of tech orders located in the Control Tower due to the shortage of clerical personnel in Base Operations.

[redacted] communications folders being maintained, the Dispatch area is unsatisfactory. These folders are not being inspected for by Base Operations. We could find no evidence that the folders were checked when returned. [redacted] it is possible that a folder may be non-current but may still be issued to a crew.

(3) A Search and Rescue console has not been constructed.

(4) Only eleven drops are authorized to the crash telephone net. Sixteen are presently installed.

(5) Special orders are not on file designating a Transient Services Officer.

(6) Assistant Base Operations Officers have not been designated on orders.

(7) Many loose wires lie exposed on the floor of the Dispatch Section. This constitutes a potential fire hazard.

(8) Many non-tactical pilots need in excess of 40 hours flying time to complete AFR 60-1 requirements by the end of the year. This situation will require close monitoring, especially with the forthcoming inclement weather.

2. This report is for information and necessary action. No reply is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCIEN N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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
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K-DV-18-HI
Nov 1962
RETURN TO
Directorate
Aerospace Studies Inst
Air University Library
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

HISTORY

SECRET

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1-30 November 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burbank, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield

RAY J. HARTSFIELD
1st Lt., USAF
Information Officer

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY

Ray J. Hartsfield
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commission for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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FOB	Flack Order Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADAMHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officers Effectiveness Report
OGCAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Materiel Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

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TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

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HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 23-15, 20 Apr 62, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Special Assistant to the Commander	Colonel Leonard L. Jella
Executive Officer	Lt. Colonel James W. Miller
Director of Operations	Colonel Lucien N. Powell
Director of Safety	Lt. Colonel Thomas H. Paskall
Director of Materiel	Lt. Colonel James W. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Major Frank J. Riddle

Administration

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division had encountered many problem areas during the Cuban crisis and the increased defense condition. Some of these areas were covered in a letter to Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force by Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, with comments and recommendations. Included was a recommendation that those crew members qualified in the unit's aircraft return to their station while unqualified crew members remain at combat crew training schools. He also recommended that headquarters establish circuits with their dispersal bases to minmise the delivery of important communications. Additionally, thus far exceptions to DEFCON requirements had been poorly defined. It was recommended that these exceptions be held to an absolute minimum and be clearly defined in DEFCON messages, not in other type messages. With the RI weapons shortages and the assignment of four types of weapons to the wing, excessive down and uploadings for airborne alert had occurred. The weapon availability necessitated daily degradation of tactics on five of 13 sorties. The receipt of ASQ-48 equipped aircraft had compounded this situation. As a result the division recommended that the procurement of additional RI weapons MOD kits be expedited and the weapon configuration be reduced to one type per unit or a maximum of two. Routine, essential and preventive maintenance on aircraft and support equipment had been curtailed during the DEFCON II posture. This resulted in the recommendation for accomplishment of maintenance to prevent excessive backlog and

resultant deterioration of systems and equipment.[4] (S)

General Ohlke expressed concern over providing fully effective guidance, assistance and supervision to elements of the missile program under his control. The recommendation to Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force stated that since the division was limited to the present number of staff authorizations, he would prefer to convert the supply position to a missile maintenance staff officer with an AFSC of 3116. He further recommended that specific AFSC authorizations for division staffs be at the commander's discretion as each division had a different complement of units to supervise. However, higher headquarters did not concur with his proposal to convert the supply position to a missile maintenance staff officer since they felt there was a definite requirement for a supply staff officer. Higher headquarters also considered that although some variation in division staffs did exist, additional flexibility to allow division commanders AFSC substitution with the present total authorization was required.[5] (U)

During November a senior bomber crew of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing was downgraded to non-combat ready non-availability status. Of the 27 bomber combat crews assigned to the wing, 7 were in select status, 17 in senior status, 2 in combat ready status and the remaining bomber crew in non-combat ready non-availability status. Meanwhile, the KC-135 tanker combat crew strength of the wing was 35 combat crews of which 32 were in senior status and 3 were in combat ready status. Also during this period a senior tanker crew was

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4. Msg, 18ADC to 15AF, SECRET C 954, Subj: Recommend Actions as Result of CC, 13 Nov 62, Exhibit #2.
5. Msg, 15AF to 18ADC, DM 57885, Subj: Division Staff Authorization, 21 Nov 62.

downgraded to combat ready status and another crew was disbanded.[6] (S)

The 4170th Strategic Wing also had 27 bomber crews assigned of which 6 were in select status, 18 in senior status and 3 in combat ready status. Additionally 35 KC-135 tanker crews were assigned to the wing. Of this total seven were in senior status and the remainder were in combat ready status.[7] (S)

This gave the division a total of 54 B-52 bomber combat crews of which 13 were in select status, 35 in senior status, 5 in combat ready status and the remaining crew in non-combat ready non-availability status. There were also 70 tanker combat crews of which 39 were in senior status and 31 in combat ready status.[8] (S)

The missile strength of the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild stood at 45 combat ready crews and one non-combat ready crew. In the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron at Larson the missile crew strength was 16 with four in combat ready status and the remaining eight crews in combat ready status with a waiver.[9] (S)

During November the 18 B-52D bombers of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing flew 2,343 flying hours and 124 combat crew training missions. They also accomplished 31 hours of low altitude flying. The 21 KC-135A tankers were able to complete 154 sorties for a total of 664 flying hours. Meanwhile the 13 B-52D bombers of the 4170th Strategic Wing launched 75 sorties and flew a total of 1,258:45 flying hours and the 21 KC-135A tankers flew 16, sorties in 526:20

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6. 92SAW Hist RPT for Nov 62, Filed: IHCH.
7. Ltr, 4170SW to 92SAW, Subj: Crew and Flying Figures for Nov 62, 26 Dec 62, Exhibit #1.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.

flying hours. This gave the division a total of 30 bombers accomplishing 199 sorties in 3,601:45 flying hours and 42 tankers flying 318 sorties in 1190:20 flying hours.[10] (S)

The flying activities of both wings were somewhat limited during most of November. Other than the daily participation in CHROME DOME, a 24-hour airborne alert tour circumnavigating the Dominion of Canada, the bombers did not participate in any other major missions. Periodically tankers were deployed to Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to participate in Operation CHROME DOME and the Eielson Tanker Task Force. Tankers were also deployed to Spain to participate in the Spanish Tanker Task Force. Three Larson tankers sorties were also launched in support of Operation SEA FISH. On 15 November limited flying activities under a modified DEFCON II were authorized by SAC. On 27 November when the defense condtion was returned to normal, both wings turned their full attention toward accomplishing their air training requirements.[11] (S)

Staff Visits by 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Major General Delmar E. Wilson, deputy commander of Fifteenth Air Force, recently reviewed the reports of staff visits made by the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division staff to missile activities under their command. General Wilson noted that the division reports indicated a more comprehensive check list, broader areas of surveillance, and a more systematic approach on the part of the division staff than was

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10. Ltr, 4170SW to 92SAW, Subj: Crew and Flying Figures for Nov 62, 26 Dec 62, Exhibit #1.
11. Ibid.

evidenced in some of the other divisions. General Wilson emphasized the established policy to division staff members that their primary objective was to "Find and Fix". He added, there seemed to be entirely too many discrepancies uncovered in some wings by the Inspector General and the 3901st Strategic Missile Evaluation Squadron that should have been detected and corrected by the division staff. Even though many of the areas were beyond the capability of the division staff to evaluate, adverse reflections were made upon a division when major discrepancies were identified in the material, operations, personnel and safety areas.[12] (U)

Constant improvement in the attainment of the desired effectiveness of both missile squadrons was evident. Although problem areas still existed, resolution of the majority of these was considered will within the capability of the wing and division staffs. By November the problem areas had been resolved into two broad categories which could not be corrected at the division level. In both missile squadrons the inability to exercise missile hardware without degrading the alert posture was adversely affecting crew proficiency and phase III ORI in the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron. Simulated countdown exercises were being conducted daily. However, this was not a satisfactory substitute for actual hardware exercises. The Fairchild missile squadron estimated that four launch simulator run and two double propellant loading exercises were required annually for each combat crew to maintain the desired level of proficiency. Approximately 150 missile alert days each year would be lost if this

12. Ltr, 15AF to 18SADC, Subj: Staff Visit Reports, 9 Nov 62, Exhibit #3.

training were accomplished at the missile complexes. This problem would be resolved in the 563th Strategic Missile Squadron when the programmed simulator was installed. A comparable simulator was also required to provide this essential training for the Atlas "E" squadrons. Another problem area existed in the inadequate or untimely input of qualified combat crew replacements. Approximately 18 months would have elapsed from the combat readiness of the Fairchild missile squadron until the first fully qualified replacement became available. Also, no information was available for Titan I replacement CRT. This identical situation would exist in the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron unless timely action was taken to establish a pipeline for replacement CRT. Meanwhile, both squadrons were having to fill combat crew vacancies and quotas levied by higher headquarters from authorized key maintenance and operations staff positions. These withdrawls had resulted in a dangerous under manning in key staff positions. Denial of proficiency pay for power production specialist as a retention incentive and the inadequate non-commissioned officer manning in the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron were two other problem areas which required resolution in the near future. The number of staff visits accomplished and the progress towards elimination of actual and potential problem areas evidenced the personal attention and support given these vital areas by the division commander and his staff.[13] (U)

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13. Ltr, 18SADC to 15AF, Subj: Division Staff Visits to Missile Squadrons, 2 Nov 62, Exhibit #4.

On 7 and 8 November Colonel Jelle observed the 4170th Strategic Wing's operations and maintenance activities in support of the tactical mission to determine the effectiveness of personnel during the period of the increased alert posture. During his visit to the wing Colonel Jelle noted that in the missile squadron, scheduled versus unscheduled maintenance percentage was very low - within 60-65 per cent range. This was undesirable especially during the increased operational readiness posture. Maintenance scheduling was not maintaining an analysis on accomplished versus scheduled maintenance work orders. This was discussed in detail with the responsible authorities and was recommended as a management tool to pinpoint inefficiencies in scheduling procedures and to increase productivity. Standup briefings continued to lack professionalism. There was no exact status on the weapons system and the work programmed or completed.[14] (U)

At the same time Colonel Jelle also observed the CHROME DOME recovery of the 4170th Strategic Wing. Recovery and maintenance debriefing were well organized and efficient. In addition, various preventive maintenance practices had been developed.[15] (U)

During the first two weeks in November Colonel Jelle also observed the recovery operations of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing CHROME DOME aircraft. Gradual improvement was noted in the organization of the recovery effort and the rapidity with which it was accomplished. One of the problem areas which was later rectified was the confusion in the traffic flow when the MHU-7 trailer was being towed into place.

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14. Staff Visit to 557SMS, 7-8 Nov 62, Exhibit #6.
15. Ibid.

At the suggestion of Colonel Jolla, the crews disconnected the trainer from the truck and pushed it into place by hand which alleviated the traffic conjestion. Crew debriefings gradually became faster and more efficient. Problem areas were brought to the attention of the responsible authorities and on the spot action was taken.[16] (U)

A staff assistance visit was made to Fairchild base operations on 26 November to evaluate and assist as required in establishing and conducting a U-6A instructor pilot transition school. The course as programmed was approved by General Ohlke with limitations prohibiting practicing engine failure on take-off. On 29 November an informal staff visit was made to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing by Colonel L. N. Powell, division director of operations, to determine the effectiveness of non-tactical navigation training. Non-tactical navigators were generally attempting to maintain an acceptable level of proficiency. However, they were severly hampered by the completely inadequate navigation facilities afforded by the C-123 aircraft.[17] (U)

On 14 November Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Thompson, division director of material, made a staff visit to the 25th Munitions Maintenance Squadron at Fairchild to attend weekly meetings and review the unit action to requirements of SAC Pamphlet 66-2, Material Items for IG Surveillance. During the briefing it was noted that a portion of the material required updating and that more reference should be made to operating directives. A firm nuclear safety program was in effect within the squadron, however, no program had been implemented to provide emphasis to the munitions objectives of the October and

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16. Staff Visits to 92SAW during Nov 62, Filed 18SADC.
17. Memo to Comdr, Base Ops, FAFB, 27 Nov 62, Informal Staff Visit, 18SADC to Non-tactical Nav Training, 92SAW, 29 Nov 62.

November issues of the SAC Weapons Maintenance Brief. It was also disclosed that munitions maintenance personnel were not familiar with the applicable munitions items which would be of interest to the IG. Colonel Thompson recommended that the SAC Pamphlet 66-2 be obtained and made readily available to all personnel. The division staff also observed a team performing loading and downloading operations. Both operations were performed efficiently and expeditiously.[18] (U)

On 20 through 22 November Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Paskell, division director of safety, performed a staff visit to the 4170th Strategic Wing to assist in conducting the annual flying safety survey required by AF Regulation 62-8. Cooperation throughout the wing in the accomplishment of this survey was satisfactory. The survey failed to disclose new items. On 23 November Colonel Paskell attended the Larson monthly safety council meeting. He considered the meeting too lengthly, the result of ineffective assignment of responsibilities and expeditious command resolutions of problems that were not settled prior to the meeting. This situation was discussed with the chairman who assured Colonel Paskell that steps would be taken to improve the council meetings.[19] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, found the parking of tactical aircraft at Fairchild

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18. Memo to Comdr, 26NMS, FAFB, 14 Nov 62, Exhibit #5.
19. Staff Visit to 4170SW SAFE, 20-22 Nov 62, Exhibit #7.

unsatisfactory. There were no permanently assigned parking spaces for either the bombers or tankers. Distance was not accepted as an excuse for failure to utilize permanent parking spaces for tactical aircraft that had blast fences installed. General Ohlke directed that the director of material and the deputy commander for maintenance coordinate and develop a permanent tactical aircraft parking plan.[20] (U)

General Ohlke remained dissatisfied with the progress made on the repair of tactical aircraft fuel seeps and leaks on the aircraft at Fairchild. For example a 1000 modified aircraft arrived at Fairchild early in the month; by the end of the month the fuel leak was just being repaired. It appeared that the deputy commander for maintenance and his senior supervisory personnel were not completely familiar with the technical orders governing fuel seeps and leaks. General Ohlke indicated that standard operating procedures on the repair of such discrepancies should be developed by the wing.[21] (U)

It recently came to the attention of General Ohlke that the 4170th Strategic Wing was not adhering to the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division Policy Letter 60-2 concerning weekend flying. In addition General Ohlke expanded this policy to include maintenance functions being performed on a weekend. Since SAC personnel, as a rule, work excessive hours, it was only fitting and proper that the weekend flying and working schedule be held to a minimum. With proper scheduling and planning, all work could be accomplished in a five-day work week with the exception of higher headquarters directed missions.[22] (U)

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20. Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAW, Subj: Parking of Tactical Acft at FAFB, 5 Nov 62, Exhibit #8.
21. Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAW, Subj: Fuel Leaks, 28 Nov 62, Exhibit #9.
22. Ltr, 18SADC to 4170SW, Subj: Weekend Fly, 28 Nov 62, Exhibit #10.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing Group and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

LIST OF EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Ltr, 4170SW to 92SAW, Subj: Crew and Flying Figures for November 62, 26 Dec 62.	1
Msg, 18SADC to 15AF, SECRET C954, Subj: Recommendation as result of CC, 13 Nov 62.	2
Ltr, 15AF to 18SADC, Subj: Staff Visit Reports on Missile Units, 9 Nov 62	3
Ltr, 18SADC to 15AF, Subj: Division Staff Visits to Missile Squadrons, 2 Nov 62.	4
Memo to Comdr, 26MMS, FAFB, 14 Nov 62.	5
Staff Visit to 567SMS, 18SADC, 7-8 Nov 62	6
Staff Visit to 4170SW, SAFE, 18SADC, 20-22 Nov 62	7
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAW, Subj: Parking of Tactical Acft, 5 Nov 62.	8
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAW, Subj: Fuel Leaks, 28 Nov 62	9
Ltr, 18SADC to 4170SW, Subj: Weekend Flying, 28 Nov 62	10

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4170TH STRATEGIC WING
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

26 Dec 62

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOH

SUBJECT: Crew and Flying Figures for November (U)

TO: 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (IXOH)
Fairchild AFB, Wash.

1. MCS: A summary of the SAC MCS for this month has been mailed under separate cover. (U)

2. Aircraft: Thirteen B-52D bombers were assigned; in addition, two were borrowed from the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing. Twenty-one KC-135A tankers were assigned. (S)

3. Missiles: 10 Titan I. One was removed from EWO status on 15 November, to be used in ORT Phase III training. (S)

4. Flying Missions and Hours: (S)

B-52	Sorties	Hours
Standboard	4	29:55
CCTM	17	150:40
Ferry	2	4:00
Chrome Dome	52	1,074:10
TOTAL	75	1,258:45

KC-135		
Seafish	3	16:55
HHQ Directed	18	98:40
CCTM	7	34:05
Chrome Dome	136	376:40
TOTAL	164	526:20

5. Combat Crew Status: Status of 30 November was as follows: B-52, 27 crews assigned. Six of these were select, 18 senior, three combat ready (CR). Thirty-five KC-135 crews were assigned; seven of these were rated senior and the remainder combat ready. There were no projected gains or losses. Missile combat crews numbered 16, with four CR and the remainder CR with waiver. (S)

FOR THE COMMANDER

ROBERT R. BOYD
Lt. Col., USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

IXOH 62-023

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OR REFERENCE
ACTION OPS IMMEDIATE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		15AF msgs CS11-2[illegible]	
INFO			X	AF	10 Nov & CS 3323, 2 Nov 62	Secret

FROM:
HQ 18 STRAT AEROSPACE DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Fwd 1 cy to 92SAW(WC)
Mail 1 cy to 4170SW (WC)

TO:
15 AF MARCH AFB CALIF

INFO: 92 STRAT AEROSPACE WG FAIRCHILD AFB WN (COURIER)

4170 STRAT WG LARSON AFB WN (MAIL)

/SECRET/Z[illegible]O/C 954

For CS. Part 1 of 5 parts. Following are comments and recommendations pertaining to prolonged alert status per referenced messages.

PART II. Operations

1. CCTS for B-52 crews was immediately terminated and personnel returned to home station. Recommendation: That only those crew members qualified in unit aircraft be returned. Others remain at CCTS.

2. Command post encountered difficulties in maintaining V-1 reporting. Recommendation: Revise V-1 Report for fast reporting.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

DATE | TIME | MONTH | YEAR

WRITER
SYMBOL: C
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)
PHONE 2171 | PAGE NR. 1 | NR. OF PAGES 5
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RELEASER
SIGNATURE
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
HAROLD WOHLKE, BRIGEN, USAF
Commander, 18 Strat Aerospace Div

DD FORM 1 MAY 58 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FROM: HQ 18 STRAT AEROSPACE DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

3. Communications delay of up to six hours experienced in delivering Zippo messages to the medium force dispersed to Geiger AFB, Washington. Due to proximity of Fairchild AFB, time reduced to approximately 40 minutes. Recommendation: Establish circuits between higher headquarters and dispersal bases.

4. Poorly defined and changing exceptions to DEFCON requirements. Recommendation: Exceptions to DEFCONs be held to absolute minimum and be clearly defined in DEFCON messages - not in other type messages.

5. Battle staff fatigue. Recommendation: Subsequent to generation of aircraft and missiles, reduce battle staff to representatives of WC, DCO, DCM, BC and Security.

6. Lack of timely and specific intelligence reports resulted in inefficient personnel management. Recommendation: Timely, concise and specific intelligence summaries to the field.

7. Grounding of support aircraft, creating problem in maintaining proficiency. Recommendation: Release support aircraft [redacted] for local flying.

PART III. Materiel

1. Shortage of authorized vehicles. Larson AFB is 11 vehicles

SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
C	2	3		

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1 ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET

HQ 18 STRAT AEROSPACE DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

short of their authorization. Recommendation: That immediate action be taken by higher headquarters to actually fill all vehicle shortages. The present lead time to provision vehicles is unacceptable.

2. DEFCON 2 posture and extraordinary events such as weather diversions from other units taxed transportation beyond available resources. Shortage of 11 vehicles required borrowing from other unit. Recommendation: Establish mechanism to immediately supply known, authorized shortages, or rental funds.

3. RI weapons shortages and assignment of four types of weapons have resulted in excessive down and uploadings during airborne alert. Weapons availability necessitates daily degradation of tactics on 5 of 13 [illegible] sorties. Receipt of GAM, ASQ 48 aircraft have compounded situation. Recommendation: (a) Expedite procurement of additional RI weapons MOD kits. (b) Reduce weapons configuration to one type per unit or maximum of two.

4. Routine essential and preventive maintenance on aircraft and support equipment is denied during indefinite DEFCON 2 posture. Recommendation: Consider degradation of non-alert sorties certain allowable periods for accomplishment of maintenance to prevent excessive backlog and resultant deterioration of systems and equipment.

CL C | PAGE NR 3 | NR OF PAGES 5 | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | INITIALS

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1958 -469064

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET

HQ 18 STRAT AEROSPACE DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

PART IV. Personnel & Administration

1. Augmentation of Combat Defense Squadron reduces capability of functions not directly related to alert posture. Recommendation: Higher headquarters guidance be provided relative to curtailment of non-essential reports and functions during DEFCON postures.

2. SACR 355-1 does not provide sufficient guidance for protection of non-essential personnel. Recommendation: That a plan be established for timely notification in order that non-essentials can be dispensed to pre-selected areas along with dependents.

3. Mobile recovery team and Start recovery team, comprised of 4 officers and 49 airmen, required to depart station no later than E+20 minutes. Personnel must rendezvous and then proceed by auto to appointed destination some 300 miles distance. Recommendation: That team depart at E+1 hours.

PART V. General

1. (4170SW) The existing regulations do not permit availability of increased fund requirements consistent with DEFCON 2 conditions. Recommendation: A simplified procedure for immediate allocation of funds necessary to meet strictly valid DEFCON 2 requirements.

CONTROL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
C	4	5	SECRET	

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1 ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 -469064

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FROM:

HQ 18 STRAT AEROSPACE DIV FAIRCHILD AFB WN

2. Advance readiness DEFCONs do not provide for all contingencies in maintaining a specific posture for a sustained period.

Recommendation: That guidelines be provided for relaxing requirement after aircraft and missile force is generated.

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C	5	5		

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173-1

☆ U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 -469084

3A

C 19 Nov 1962

Staff Visits and Reports

DO DM DS EXO

1. Attached for your information is letter from the Deputy Commander 15th Air Force concerning our staff missile activities as requested by the 1 November 62 TWX from 15th Air Force.

2. Your attention is invited to the second paragraph of General Wilson's letter concerning the prime objective of a division staff, which is that our approach on staff visits should be to "find and fix". As he indicates, thorough and comprehensive evaluations must be made to identify low standards of performance, noncompliance, marginal management, unsatisfactory job knowledge, low skill capability and unsafe practices that invariably result in accidents. After having completed the first requirement to "find", the second step is to devise appropriate actions such as staff assistance and continuing surveillance to insure that marginal areas are "fixed". This is the general operational policy that the division staff should operate under.

3. It is requested that you orientate your staff visits and staff reports to the above enunciated objectives of a division staff. In addition, it is necessary that each staff agency cover each and every activity under its responsibility which will give a systematic approach on your part, as well as wider scope of inspection and area of emphasis. Your entire activity should be divided 50-50 between missiles and aircraft. Now that the GAM is an integral part of the 92d, much assistance is needed by this wing to have a thorough and sound GAM program and in order to have a reliable missile.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
15AF Ltr, DC, 9 Nov 62

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
MARCH AIR FORCE BASE
CALIFORNIA

9 November 1962

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke
Commander
18th Strategic Aerospace Division
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

Dear Hal:

I have been reviewing staff visit reports made by your staff to the missile activities and forwarded in accordance with my TWX dated 1 November 1962. I find that there is a wide variance in the scope of inspection, areas of emphasis, and type of assistance provided among the various divisions with missiles assigned. Your reports, however, indicate a more comprehensive check list, broader areas of surveillance, and a more systematic approach on the part of your staff, than is evidenced in some of the other divisions.

To reiterate previous discussions that have taken place concerning the purpose and primary objective of a division staff, I think it is necessary to continually emphasize that the approach should be to "Find and Fix." Thorough and comprehensive evaluations must be made to identify low standards of performance, noncompliance, marginal management, unsatisfactory job knowledge, low skill capability, and unsafe practices that invariably result in accidents. After having completed the first requirement to find, the second step is to devise appropriate actions such as staff assistance and continuing surveillance to insure that marginal areas are fixed. If your staff has not already done so, I suggest the use of the data listed below as an approach for enhancing the capability of your staff to satisfy the first requirement.

a. 3901st SMES Staff Visit Reports - Particular attention should be given to that area covering QC and E and maintenance control. Emphasis should also be given all areas used in conducting standboard evaluations for launch crews.

b. The SAC IG Inspection Reports on the 4126th Strategic Wing at Beale, and 451st Wing at Lowry - These reports should give good guidance in areas that are receiving close scrutiny by the IG.

c. AFM 66-1 - This manual, with the SAC Supplements, provides invaluable guidance in conducting inspections for compliance and management in the materiel areas.

d. Fifteenth Air Force DM and DO Staff Visit Reports - The check lists used by this headquarters can be derived from those reports.

e. Materiel Items for IG Surveillance. - This is a listing of areas of special emphasis selected by the DM at SAC and at this headquarters.

f. Technical Data.

g. JCS safety rules.

h. Ground safety check list.

I would also like to invite your attention to staff visit reports prepared by this headquarters and inspections conducted by the Inspector General and the 3901st SMES. There seems to be entirely too many discrepancies uncovered in some wings by these agencies, that could, and should have been detected and corrected by the division staff. I fully realize that there are many areas that are beyond the capability of the division staff to evaluate. However, adverse reflections are made upon a division when major discrepancies are identified in the materiel, operations, personnel, and safety areas. Consequently, your staff must share part of the burden and deserve part of the credit, depending upon whether an evaluation of a wing is favorable or unfavorable.

Sincerely,

DELMAR E. WILSON
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

C

2 Nov 1962

Division Staff Visits to Missile Squadrons

15 AF (DC)

1. Attached are copies of reports of Division staff visits to missile squadrons as requested in your unclassified message DC 25, 1 Nov 62.

2. The number of visits which have been documented during this two-month period is not a true indication of the attention my staff and I have directed toward the attainment of combat ready status in the missile squadrons. I personally visit each of the missile squadrons at least twice monthly. In addition, I am in daily contact with my wing and missile squadron commanders. Members of my staff frequently attend daily stand-up briefings and take action on in dividual problems, often without documentation.

3. Constant improvement has been realized in the achievement of desired effectiveness in both missile squadrons. Problem areas still exist. However, resolution of the majority of these are well within the capability of the Wing and Division staffs.

4. As experience is gained in the operation and maitenance of these weapon systems, the requirement for higher headquarters assistance logically diminishes. At this time there are two broad categories of problem areas which, in my opinion, cannot be resolved at this level. These are:

a. Limiting Factors: Inability to exercise missile hardware without degrading the alert posture is adversely affecting missile crew proficiency. Simulated countdown exercises are being conducted daily; however, these are not a satisfactory substitute for actual hardware exercises. The 567th Squadron has estimated that four LSR and two double propellant loading exercises are required annually for each combat crew to maintain the desired level of proficiency. Approximately 150 missile alert days per year would be lost if this training were accomplished at the missile complexes. The problem will be resolved in the 568th when the currently programmed simulator is installed. A parallel simulator program is required to provide this essential training for Atlas "E" Squadrons.

b. Higher Headquarters Assistance Required:

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
C	
DEXO	
DM	
DO	
DS	
C	
VC	
DCO	
DCM	
DP	
SAFE	
IXO	
DAS	
DCR	
DCO	
SAFE	
DVC	
DCO	
BDCS	
BDM	
BDCE	
BDCL	
BDAS	
BDP	
BDCR	
BDS	
BJA	
BPR	
BIXO	
BCH	

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units)

62-219

(1) Inadequate or Untimely Input of Qualified Combat Crew Replacements. Approximately 18 months will have elapsed from the combat readiness date of the 567SMS until the first fully qualified replacement becomes available. No information is available for Titan I replacement ORT; however, the identical situation will exist in the 568SMS unless timely action is taken to establish a pipeline for replacement ORT. In the interim, both squadrons are having to fill combat crew vacancies and quotas levied by higher headquarters from authorized key maintenance and operations staff positions. These withdrawals have resulted in dangerous undermanning in key staff positions.

(2) Missile Simulator for Atlas "E": As stated above, minimum essential combat crew training cannot be achieved without degrading the alert posture until a suitable simulator is made available. Assistance is required in programming and installing this training device.

(3) Proficiency Pay for Power Production Specialists. The responsibilities of these key crew members, coupled with the time and expense incurred in training the individuals to the desired proficiency places them in a category where every effort should be expended to insure retention. Proficiency Pay is one relatively inexpensive method of retaining these key members of the SAC professional force.

(4) Inadequate NCO Manning in the 568SMS. The responsibilities of missile crew and key maintenance personnel dictate the requirements for experience, mature noncommissioned officers in these supervisory positions. Body manning has not kept pace with the authorizations or requirements in this squadron. Assistance is required to insure at least minimum acceptable NCO manning.

5. The number of staff visits accomplished in a two-month period are an indication of the emphasis which this division has placed on the missile program. The progress which has been made in the elimination of real and potential problem areas has been most gratifying. Please know that this program will continue to recieve my personal attention and support.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

22 Atch
Staff Visit Repts



SUBJECT Staff Visit - 96th [illegible] Wg/92d BMW

TO MEMO FOR RECORD

1. Date of Visit: [illegible]

2. Persons [illegible]

3. Persons Contacted: [illegible]

4. Purpose of Visit:

a. To attend [illegible]

b. Review unit actions to requirements of SACM 66-2, Materiel Items for IG Surveillance.

5. Findings:

a. Lt Col [illegible] briefed on munitions loading team commitments during the period from 28 Oct 66 to the present date. The briefing [illegible] following items.

(1) [illegible] teams available. The fifth team is [illegible] and is scheduled to be standboarded under the four man [illegible] is scheduled to return on 17 May [illegible]

(2) A minimum of [illegible] loading operations are performed daily. This number is frequently increased due to unscheduled commitments. During the daily peak period all four loading teams are required.

(3) A minimum [illegible] operations are performed each night. Times for these operations depend on aircraft recovery completion times and cannot be rescheduled. Two loading crews [illegible] to complete these operations.

(4) All [illegible] for immediate recall when not on [illegible]

(5) To [illegible] for loading teams the MMH has taken the following action:

(a) Crews are excused [illegible] all duties other than actual loading and [illegible] operations.

(b) Breakout and delivery of weapons is accomplished by maintenance personnel.

(c) Minimum noise is maintained in loading team barracks.

(d) Beds and other comfort items are maintained in the loading section to allow relaxation during short off duty periods.

b. TSgt Anderson briefed on current status of the MCS Program.

c. Lt Col Herring discussed the operation of MMS utilizing the canned flip chart briefing. The material requires updating. Also, recommend the briefing include references to principal operating directives such as AFR 123-6, AFR 123-9, SACM 136-1 etc.

d. The Squadron Nuclear Safety Program was discussed. Captain Haase, MMS Safety Officer, stated that a firm Nuclear Safety Program was in effect within the MMS Squadron. It was recommended that weekly Nuclear Safety briefings include a question and answer period to highlight current key Nuclear Safety items.

e. The MMS squadron has received the October and November issues of the SAC Weapons Maintenance Brief; however, no program has been implemented to acquaint personnel to the Munitions objectives. The Munitions Maintenance Improvement Program is now included in this publication under the heading Munitions Guidelines and should receive the same emphasis as the MMIP. It was recommended that the program receive immediate emphasis to include examinations for MMS personnel and applicable Wing staff personnel. Examinations should include information contained in SACM 136-1, Capability Inspection Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Units, SAC.

f. A discussion of SACP 66-2, Materiel Items for IC Surveillance revealed that MMS staff personnel are not familiar with applicable munitions items. This publication was not available in the MMS Squadron. It was recommended that SACP 66-2 be obtained and all personnel made aware of items pertaining to their area of responsibility.

g. Loading team #4 was observed on 15 Nov 62 performing loading and downloading operation. Both operations were performed efficiently and expeditiously.

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

DM 9 November 1962

Staff Visit - Larson AFB, Washington

18AAD (C)

1. Person Making Visit: Colonel L. L. Split

2. Period of Visit: 7-8 November 1962

3. Purpose: To observe 4170th SW Operations and Maintenance activities in support of tactical missions; and to determine utilization of personnel during the period of increased alert.

4. Persons Contacted:

Colonel D. A. Tate, Commander 4170SW
Colonel J. P. [illegible], Vice Comdr, 4170SW
Colonel R. V. Milner, Comdr, [illegible]
Lt Col L. Shaw, DCM, 4170SW
Lt Col D. Lovelace, MSCM, 4170SW

5. Findings:

a. "Chrome Dome" recovery was observed on the evening of 7 Nov 62. Recovery and maintenance debriefing were well organized and executed efficiently. One crew completed debriefing and departed within 17 minutes after aircraft engines were cut. The other crew required 30 minutes.

b. The DCM has developed various preventive maintenance practices which have produced good results. They are worthy of note.

(1) After several KC-135s failed to get water augmentation, water flow valves on all aircraft were closely inspected and actual functioning was timed with a temporary hookup. In this fashion, it was learned that some valves were bad, others were potential malfunctioners and others were all right. Replacement of valves, [illegible] and progressing through [illegible] has resulted in virtual elimination [illegible] in the KC-135 fleet.

(2) In trouble shooting various [illegible] tions, technicians often reported cables [illegible] damaged, worn, or [illegible] and, further, that they were often the cause of the malfunction. A program to replace

most cable bundles is in progress. Spares are made up and a systematic inspection program identified where a change is required.

(3) Some difficulty in the B-52 emergency gear system has caused the wing to require the flight crew to cycle the emergency gear system on the first flight each month on each B-52. Results thus far have been most enlightening. At least one malfunction has occurred on most aircraft. QC and Maintenance are working on this now to pinpoint why these malfunctions are occurring.

c. DCM has assigned priorities for the utilization of personnel as follows:

(1) Support [illegible] alert and Chrome Dome.

(2) Complete projects on trailers, etc.

(3) Proceed with move to Plant 52 insofar as possible. [illegible] is partly in. Orderly rooms of various units are next.

(4) Supply records review.

(a) [illegible]

(b) Excess property.

(5) Assist in missile site cleanup (Nickel Plate).

d. In the [illegible], scheduled versus unscheduled maintenance percentage is very low - presently in the 60-65% range. It should be much higher, especially while in the present operational posture.

e. Maintenance scheduling is not [illegible] an analysis on accomplished versus scheduled [illegible] work orders. This was [illegible] detail [illegible] and Captain Welch and [illegible] as an [illegible] management tool to pinpoint inefficiencies in scheduling procedures and to increase productivity.

f. Control room is still a very difficult place to get information. Presentation just doesn't lend itself to quick analysis of problems or status of complexes and equipment.

g. The squadron has established a program for keeping personnel occupied during this period. Priorities are:

(1) Maintaining [illegible].

(2) Concentrated effort on training - catching up on new JOTS and work on audio-visual program.

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(3) "Tinkel Plate" project to clean up all complexes.

(4) Squadron self-help projects.

h. Project "Tinkel Plate" is in planning phases - will be briefed to Colonel Tate [redacted] and to all concerned on Monday, 18 November. The mission is to go into each missile complex and do a thorough cleaning job - painting, corrosion control, buffing, sweeping, etc., everything necessary to get the facility in "mint" condition. The squadron will supervise and direct the project. Manpower will be drawn from squadron resources and augmented initially by 40 personnel from base/wing resources. Planning calls for 90-120 days for completion of the project.

i. The squadron has suspended all sanding of the MAMB floors. Instead of sanding, experiments with various floor paints have been completed. Test patches have been put down and a decision has been made to paint all floors with a gray paint after which Miller floor seal will be applied. Test patches using this treatment look very good and should provide the cleanliness and ease of maintenance desired.

j. The standup briefing still lacks professionalism and polish. There is no show-to it - nothing on exact status of weapon system and what programmed or completed.

LEONARD L. JELLA
Colonel, USAF
Special Assistant to the Commander

DS 26 Nov 1962

Staff Visit Report

C

1. On 20, 21 and 22 November I performed a staff visit to the 4170 Strategic Wing. Primary purpose of the visit was to assist in conducting the annual flying safety survey as required by AFR 62-8 and supplements thereto.

2. Personnel contacted other than those listed on the attached Order were: Col Tate, Col McKinnon, Lt Col Mann and Lt Col Lovelace.

3. The survey had been coordinated on the 7th and 8th of November between Capt Mornini and me. We selected 372 pertinent questions from Appendix F, AFM 62-5. We determined the number and position of augmentees required to perform the survey, and requested publication of the orders designating the personnel that were to conduct the survey.

4. Cooperation throughout the wing in the accomplishment of this survey was satisfactory. The survey team applied themselves in a professional manner and the various offices extended all possible courtesies and considerations. As a result, the report to Col Tate will be a good compilation of all known discrepancies and deficiencies as affects flying accident prevention. No new items were discovered; however, all standing items and known areas of weakness are now compiled in one paper. Col Tate is not required to forward all of the findings to higher headquarters, but can select those which he does desire to forward. His report to higher headquarters will come thru this headquarters for indorsement. I have attached a copy of the survey guide which was used, for your information.

5. The report to Col Tate had not been completed upon my departure. I did review all of the various reports from the individuals, and did list those items which I feel should be included in the report to Col Tate. This involved some 25 "items of interest". Capt Mornini will formalize and complete this report on Monday, 26 November.

6. On 23 November, I again visited Larson to attend the monthly Safety Council meeting. The meeting was entirely too long, lasting 2-1/2 hours. The reason for this length was that too much discussion took place, rather than effective assignment of responsibility and expeditious command resolution of problems that were not settled prior to the meeting. I discussed this with Capt Mornini, pointing out emphatically that he had not conducted this meeting in the proper manner. This council should receive short reports on completed action on assigned projects, should be presented with unresolved problem areas for command assignment of responsibility and realistic target dates, should introduce new areas of concern and interest, and study accident reports from other headquarters. This activity should be in each phase of accident prevention; flying, ground, nuclear, missile, and explosive. I also discussed this with Col McKinnon, who chaired the meeting, and he assured me that he would take the necessary steps to improve the Council meetings.

THOMAS H PASKELL
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Safety

2 Atch
S.O. M-199, 20 Nov 62
Survey Guide

C

5 Nov 1962

Parking of Tactical Aircraft, Fairchild AFB

DM

1. The parking of B-52s and KC-135s, whether on alert or CCTM flying aircraft, is unsatisfactory. There is no permanent assigned parking space for either type aircraft in a logical, sequential manner that denotes a high degree of professionalism or good management practices.

2. I do not consider distance as an excuse for not utilizing permanent parking spaces for 52s and 135s that have blast fences installed. Alert crews have fast-ride vehicles, so this is no problem. I do not consider it good planning when one day a 52 is in a parking space, and the next day, a 135.

3. I desire that you get together with the DCM in the Wing, and have them come up with a tactical aircraft parking plan that will remain permanent. I do not consider the area in front of base operations a suitable area for parking of tactical aircraft. This, because it interferes with tower operation, and run-up of engines on engine start has caused damage to the building. As far as possible, B-52s and KC-135s should not be interspersed in parking areas.

4. Please advise and brief me on a permanent parking plan for these aircraft.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

cc: DCM

Briefed on 13 Nov 62

C

28 Nov 1962

Fuel Leaks

92 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC)

1. I am still dissatisfied with the progress made on repair of fuel seeps and fuel leaks on the tactical aircraft. As a particular case, the first 1000 modified aircraft that arrived on the base approximately a month ago with a fuel seep is just now being repaired.

2. It appears that the DCM and his senior supervisory personnel are not completely familiar with the T.O. governing fuel seeps and fuel leaks. The T.O. states even on a fuel seep that the aircraft may be flown and not that it can be flown.

3. The SOP concerning repair of fuel seeps and leaks should be issued by the Wing so that there is no misinterpretation concerning their repair. The fuel seep aircraft should be repaired as soon as possible, consistent with the 60-9 schedule, in order that the Wing is not penalized under the MCS. The weekly 60-9 schedule can be altered so that the Wing does not become penalized in the event repair of the fuel seep is done, since the weekly schedule can be changed.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

C

28 Nov 1962

Weekend Flying

4170 Strat Wg (WC)

1. 18SAD Policy Letter 60-2 concerning weekend flying is not being adhered to by your unit.

2. In addition, I would like to expand this to include maintenance functions being performed on a weekend. SAC personnel as a general rule work more than an 8-hour day, and it is only fitting and proper that we hold down weekend flying and working to the absolute minimum. With proper scheduling and planning, all work of the wing can be accomplished in a 5-day work week with the exception of those higher headquarters directed missions; such as, Chrome Dome, and Chrome Dome deployments or redeployments. If this cannot be accomplished, then something is wrong with the organization concerned in meeting their requirements.

3. I expect all work to be accomplished during the normal work week except that necessary to fulfill requirements of higher headquarters directed missions. There are maintenance personnel who are normally on duty on the weekend. This does not preclude the use of those maintenance personnel who are on duty on a weekend to perform whatever work required while they are on duty over a weekend. This, however, does not include calling out of additional maintenance personnel.

4. With SAC personnel exceeding the normally accepted standard of work, it is only fitting and proper that we, as the senior supervisors, plan and conduct our day-to-day operations so that our personnel may be given Saturdays and Sundays off, except for that necessary to fulfill our requirements. It can be done, it should be insisted upon by our commanders, and will lead to a better organization if our people feel that we have their welfare uppermost in our mind.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander



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SECRET

HISTORY

RETURN TO
Director
Aerospace Studies Inst
AFIC Archives Branch
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 - 31 December 1962

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the soures documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield

RAY J. HARTSFIELD
1st Lt., USAF
Information Officer

Harold W. Ohlke

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY

Ray J. Hartsfield
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

15AF DXI 63-220
Dec 17

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SECRET

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commission for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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FOB	Flock Order Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Exertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
MADAMS	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officers effectiveness Report
OGAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the Job Training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance

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TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorisation List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
ZI	Zone of Interior

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 23-15, 20 Apr 62, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Orlke
Special Assistant to the Commander	Colonel Leonard L. Jells
Executive Officer	Lt. Colonel A. Louis Laney
Director of Operations	Colonel Lucian N. Powell
Director of Safety	Lt. Colonel Thomas H. Paskell
Director of Materiel	Lt. Colonel James W. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Charles P. Murrey
Operations Staff Officer	Major Frank J. Riddle

ADMINISTRATION

To insure that he had current, factual and complete information available at all times, Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division Commander directed that special reports be furnished daily. These reports would reflect the operational status of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 4170th Strategic Wing and would include applicable information concerning their respective strategic missile squadrons, the 567th and the 568th.[4] (U)

Two reports would be required. The first as of 0800, the other as of 1630 hours. These reports would be funneled through the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing command post to the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division director of operations. Included in the reports would be all flying and missile schedules for the next day plus current status as of 0800 each day. This reporting requirement, established by letter, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division, "Requirement for Information", 13 December 1962, also emphasized that certain information be made instantly available as they occurred.[5] (U)

During December, the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing had 21 KC-135A aircraft assigned with 10 of these on alert. Its B-52 bomber force had 16 aircraft assigned with eight on alert. The 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing flew 124 bomber sorties in December for a total of 1004 flying hours. A total of 648:35 hours flown in support of CHROME DOME operations were included. The tanker force flew 754 hours in 174 missions including 263 hours in CHROME DOME operations.[6] (S)

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4. Ltr, 18SAD, Subj: Request for Information, 13 Dec 62.
5. Ibid.
6. Hist. Rept. 92SAW, Dec 62, Filed IXOH 92SAW.

There were 27 combat crews assigned to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing Bomber Force. Included were eight crews in select status, 16 in senior status, two combat ready and one crew in combat-ready, non-available status. There were 35 KC-135A crews assigned with 31 in senior status and four combat-ready. [7] (S)

At Larson Air Force Base, there were 15 B-52D bombers assigned with eight on alert. The KC-135A tanker force consisted of 21 aircraft of which 10 were on alert. The B-52 bombers flew 77 sorties for a total of [illegible] hours. Operation CHROME DOME accounted for the largest share of mission hours. During the month 30 B-52 missions were flown for a total of [illegible] hours. A total of 125 KC-135 tanker missions were flown for 579:05 hours. Included were 27 CHROME DOME missions totaling 203:40 hours. [8] (S)

There were 26 bomber crews assigned to the 4170th Strategic Wing. Six crews were in select status, 18 in senior status and two combat-ready. The tanker crews totaled 35 of which seven were in senior status and the balance - 28 crews - were in combat-ready status. [9] (S)

The missile crew strength of the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild AFB stood all 16 assigned crews in combat-ready status. At Larson AFB, the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron had 16 crews assigned with five in combat-ready and 11 combat-ready, with waiver. [10] (S)

In a personal letter to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing commander, Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic

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7. Hist. Rept., 92SAW, Dec 62, Filed IICH 92SAW.
8. Ltr, 4170SW, SECRET Crew and Flying Figure, 27 Jan 63, Exhibit #2.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

Aerospace Division commander outlined his desires with regard to an imminent visit by the [illegible] Evaluation Group. The group was scheduled to be at Fairchild AFB for the period 30 through [illegible] February, 1963. Its purpose would be to evaluate tanker and non-tactical crew members. General Ohlke noted that his 18th Strategic Aerospace Division staff had found the 92d training well organized and comprehensive, however the General was concerned that the 92d wing had suffered a 25 per cent failure rate in its B-52 evaluation conducted 30 September through 12 October 1962. The need for personal support by the wing commander in reaching a 100 per cent passing grade was detailed by General Ohlke, who also noted that seven Fifteenth Air Force units had attained a perfect score during FY 62.[11] (U)

A change in key personnel within the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division developed in late December when Lieutenant Colonel A. Louis Laney was assigned as division executive officer. Colonel Laney succeeded Lieutenant Colonel James W. Miller, who will occupy the authorized administrative officer position until retirement. The new executive officer entered the service in 1943 and was commissioned as a navigator in 1944. During the Korean Conflict he flew 252 combat hours. Prior to his new assignment, Colonel Laney was stationed at Schilling Air Force Base, Kansas.[12] (U)

The use of MADREC, or rather its non-utilization, was a subject of special interest to Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force. In a letter

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11. Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, Subj. Evaluation Team, 12 Dec 62 Exhibit #4.
12. Interview, MSgt. W.O. Costello, NCOIC, w/Lt. Col. J.W. Miller, 3 Jan 63.

In his letter, 6 December 1962, it was emphasized that MADREC must be used and when used properly it could save many maintenance manhours and could aid in delivering more reliable Doppler and autopilot systems. Fifteenth Air Force made it clear that Headquarters, Strategic Air Command had established a MADREC utilization goal of 100 per cent. This meant that each "in-commission" MADREC would have to be used every flying day. It was obvious to Fifteenth Air Force that proper utilization was not being made by most units. To illustrate, an analysis for each B-52 unit was included with the 6 December letter. Within the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division, the analysis showed that the 4170th had FAIR utilization in August, GOOD utilization in September and October. However, tape analysis was WEAK in October. The 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing had POOR utilization in September, FAIR in October.[13] (U)

In his letter to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and 4170th Strategic Wing, General Ohlke reminded each that the use of MADREC in obtaining a better quality of RADAR is of special interest to SAC and Fifteenth Air Force. He stated that support of the program reflected slippage in both the DCO and DOM areas. He called for rejuvenation of the program to provide maximum utilization of MADREC.[14] (U)

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division continued to monitor flying time for both the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 4170th Strategic Wing. In his memo for the record dated 12 December 1962, the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division operations superintendent presented

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13. Ltr, 18SAIC to 92SAWC, Subj: MADREC System, 12 Dec 62, Exhibit #3
14. Ibid

a recapitulation for the 2d Quarter, FY 1963. It was brought out that Fifteenth Air Force had notified all units that allocated time not flown would be turned back to Fifteenth Air Force with no penalties charged to units. However, under no circumstances were allocations to be overflown.[15] (U)

In a memo to General Ohlke, the division director of operations, Colonel Lucion N. Powell, reviewed the non-tactical flying programs for both Fairchild Air Force Base and Larson Air Force Base. It was noted that some pilots were flying more than a prorate share of flying hours available. This was primarily due to the supposed non-availability of missile crewmembers. A firm 60-9 schedule is published monthly by the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing non-tactical scheduling section. The schedule is coordinated with the 567th Missile Squadron which in turn furnishes names and dates of personnel available to fly. A similar arrangement between the 4170th Strategic Wing and its 568th Missile Squadron would not be possible until better cooperation was obtained from the missile squadron.[16] (U)

Those pilots possessing more than a proportionate share of AFM 60-1 minimums were not authorized flights purely for proficiency purposes. Colonel Powell reported that logistic and administrative flights were being accomplished in conjuction with individual administrative requirements whenever possible. There were a total

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15. Memo to DO, Flying Time, 12 Dec 62, Exhibit #5.
16. Memo to C, Management of Proficiency and Support Aircraft Flying, 12 Dec 62, Exhibit #6.

of six pilots authorized multiple currency at Fairchild and Larson Air Force Bases. (U)

Staff Visits by 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

A three-day staff visit to the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Wash., was conducted 3-5 December, 1962. Colonel Lucien N. Powell, Director of Operations, headed the 18-man division inspection team.[18] (U)

This was a follow-up inspection to the Operational Readiness Inspection of the 4170th which was conducted by Fifteenth Air Force during the period 8-14 August, 1962. An overall rating of satisfactory was awarded the 4170th by the Fifteenth Air Force inspection team.[19] (U)

In his report to Fifteenth Air Force, 6 December Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, outlined the status of those items previously reported which were uncorrected, or on which corrective action was incomplete during the follow-up inspection.[20] (U)

It was estimated that corrective action on all items cited in the 6 December report, except for three minor areas, would be corrected by 31 December 1962.[21] (U)

An additional, informal follow-up staff visit was made to the 4170th Strategic Wing during the period 3-7 December, 1962. The visit was made by a team of two officers and three airmen, all from the directorate of materiel, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division.

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17. Memo to C, Management of Proficiency and Support Aircraft Flying, 12 Dec 62, Exhibit #6.
18. Follow-up Rept, 4170SW, 6 Dec62, Exhibit #7.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

Lieutenant Colonel James W. Thompson, division director of materiel was head of the five-man team.[22] (U)

The four-day visit included informal inspection of DCM, OMS, base flight logistics and the 47th Munitions Maintenance Squadron. There were two primary reasons for this visit. To ascertain degree of familiarity with and brief interested personnel in handling "Bad Flag" items and, also, to observe progress of the move to Plant 53.[23] (U)

A third visit to the 4170th was made during the month of December. Colonel Lucien N. Vandell, division director of operations was accompanied on this three-day visit by Major F. W. Riddle and Chief Master Sergeant W. B. Wheeler. The visit took place 17 through 19 December, 1962. Included were visits to base operations, Form 5 Section, procedural training and the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron.[24] (U)

Special attention was devoted to standardization in regards to SAC Message DOOF 307472, 8 Dec 62, Subj: "Weakness in Safety Emergency Procedures on the Part of Missile Crews." However, the standardization crew consulted was found to be well-qualified and informed on the contents of referenced message. The crew had recently returned from a conference at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., regarding the missile safety/emergency procedures.[25] (U)

Weaknesses displayed in technical data were attributed to

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22. Informal Staff Visit, 4170SW, 12 Dec 62, Exhibit #8.
23. Ibid.
24. Staff Visit to 4170SW, 26 Dec 62, Exhibit #9.
25. Ibid.

over-the-shoulder training received by the EPPT. Civilians observed by these EPPT trainees were adverse to using technical data in use by the Air Force. This disparity resulted in trainee confusion and caused a deficiency in the EPPT learning process. [26] (U)

A review of the testing failure rate for the period from September through December indicated that failures in the MMT and EPPT prevailed in the areas of safety emergency procedures. Statistics revealed that 11 of 47 tested failed. This was a failure rate of 29 per cent. [27] (U)

Since the recent DEFCON combat-ready status of the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron was at a standstill. To complete the upgrading process, wet load practice would have to be accomplished. This could only be done during shakedown periods and shakedown on each area could be accomplished on approval from SAC Headquarters. Additionally, wet loads could not be accomplished until a permanent fix could be accepted on procedures in event of failure of the LCX second stage fill and drain valve. [28] (U)

At this time there were only four crews which had been satisfactorily standardized. The present schedule - provided there were no further malfunctions - called for completion by 15 February 1963. [29] (U)

Scheduling and training was also inspected with regard to SAC Message DOOT 107473, 5 December 1962. Each crew was performing an average of eight alert tours each month with two additional eight

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26. Informal Staff Visit, 4170SW, 12 Dec 62, Exhibit #6.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.

two additional eight hour duty days utilized for P. C. examinations and classes for the LCO and OCO.[30] (U)

The MMTS and EPPTs were scheduled two hours of supervised study in emergency/safety procedures. Each crew commander was also required to instigate additional study in this area.[31] (U)

Colonel Powell and Major Riddle made visits to Complexes "A" and "B" to observe Project Nickel Plate. At each complex an insightly condtion was noted at the entrance with a general unkept appearance noted throughout the area. Corrosion control at Complex "A" showed evidence of having been painted to hide coorosion rather than the prescribed method of scraping and treatment to prevent further corrosion. There were 15 personnel assigned to Project Nickel Plate and it was estimated that 18 months would be required to give the complex a complete, one-time coverage.[32] (U)

The tunnel area was inspected at Complex "B" and showed a very favorable display of corrosion control. The entire complex reflects excellent preventive maintenance with 15 special duty personnel assigned in support of Project Nickel Plate. It was recommended that the program in effect at Complex "B" be used as a guide in establishing adequate corrosion control for all complexes.[33] (U)

During the period 10 through 14 December, 1962, Colonel Lucion N. Powell, division director of operations, conducted a staff visit to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild Air Force Base. This extensive visit included visitation to complexes number 8 and 9

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30. Staff Visit to 4170SW, 26 Dec 62, Exhibit #9.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Division Staff Agencies.

Files of the Division Staff Agencies.

Interview of Division Officials.

Division, Wing Group and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

1092

LIST OF EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Ltr, 18SAD, Subj: Request for Information, 13 Dec 62.	1
Ltr, 4170SW, SECRET, Crew and Flying Figures, 27 Jan 63.	2
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, Subj: MADREC System, 12 Dec 62.	3
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, Subj: Evaluation Team, 12 Dec 62.	4
Memo to DO, Flying Time, 12 Dec 62.	5
Memo to C, Management of Proficiency and Support Aircraft Flying, 12 Dec 62.	6
Follow-up Rpt, 4170SW, 6 Dec 62.	7
Informal Staff Visit, 4170SW, 12 Dec 62.	8
Staff Visit to 4170SW, 26 Dec 62.	9
Staff Visit to 567SMS, 14 Dec 62.	10

DO 13 Dec 1962

Requirement for Information

92SAW(DCO) 4170SW(DCO)

1. To keep the Division Commander fully informed of the operational status of units within this command, it is necessary that certain essential information be furnished this headquarters on a timely basis. Specific items and times of submission are listed in paragraph 3 below.

2. It is mandatory that all items of information be accurate and complete. This may be difficult at times; however, the requirement must be met. Telephone will be the normal means of forwarding the information, to conserve time. During normal duty hours, extension 2122 or Drop 6 will be used. During non-duty hours, information will be funneled thru the 92d SAW Command Post to the Division Director of Operations or his designated representative.

3. Effective upon receipt, the following required information will be provided by appropriate agencies of the Wing as designated by the DCO:

a. Each afternoon at 1630 hours:

(1) All scheduled flying activity for next day, to include all items of training.

(2) Scheduled propellant loadings or LSR exercises.

b. Each morning at 0800 hours:

(1) Ground alert status.

(2) Chrome Dome status.

(3) TDY - Location of each tactical aircraft away from home station.

(4) Transient tactical aircraft on station (except Sky Speed).

(5) Unscheduled aircraft.

(6) Missile sorties in Shakedown, ORT, or modification by sortie number.

(7) Generated sorties.

(8) Degraded sorties.

(9) Training activity scheduled for previous day but not accomplished, and reason.

(10) Unreliable activity from yesterday's training missions, if known.

(11) Total bombing activity by type, cumulative for training period.

(12) QFR bombing reliability by type run, cumulative for training period.

c. As they occur, if during duty hours; or at 0800 the next day if occurrence is after normal duty hours:

(1) Late takeoffs.

(2) Sortie cancellations.

(3) Air aborts, except Chrome Dome.

(4) Loss of one engine (B-52 or KC-135).

(5) LOX spillage at a missile complex.

(6) Near-miss involving an aircraft of this command.

d. As they occur, regardless of time of day:

(1) Serious aircraft emergencies; such as loss of two engines (B-52, KC-135), fire, control difficulties, etc.

(2) Chrome Dome aborts.

(3) Aircraft accidents, both major and minor.

(4) Missile accidents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCION N POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4170TH STRATEGIC WING
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOH

23 Jan 63

SUBJECT: Crew and Flying Figures for December, 1962 (U)

TO: 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (IXOH)
Fairchild AFB, Wash.

1. MCS: A summary of the SAC MCS for December has been mailed under separate cover. (U)

2. Aircraft: Fifteen B-52D bombers assigned, with eight of these on alert. Twenty-one KC-135A tankers were assigned, 10 of which were on alert. (S)

3. Missiles: 10 Titan I on hand. (S)

4. Flying Missions and Hours: (S)

B-52	Sorties	Hours
Standboard	2	36:20
Profile	11	25:35
CCTM	18	142:00
Ferry	6	16:45
Test	1	1:00
Chrome Dome	33	653:10
TOTAL	71	944:50

KC-135		
Seafish	10	34:00
Standboard	3	22:30
MAC directed	1	27:45
CCTM	61	289:10
Chrome Dome	47	205:40
TOTAL	123	579:05

5. Combat Crew Status: Bomber crews: 26, including 6 select, 18 senior, and 2 combat ready. Crew R-05 was disbanded on 31 December. Thirty-five tanker crews assigned; 7 rated senior, and remainder combat ready. Missile combat crews: 16, of which 5 were CR and 11 CR with waiver. There were no projected losses or gains for January 1963. (S)

FOR THE COMMANDER

ROBERT R. BOYD
Lt. Col., USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

1096

C

14 Dec 1962

Use of MADREC

92WC 4170WC ?

1. The use of MADREC in obtaining a better quality of RADAR is a subject of special interest to SAC and 15th Air Force.

2. Special reports on use of MADREC are disseminated by 15th Air Force and are a special interest item on all 15AF staff visits. Our support of this program has been slipping in both the DCO and DCM areas.

3. MADREC has not been put aboard all training missions. On some missions where the equipment has been installed, the crews have not bothered to turn it on; and on others, it has been removed to make room for additional passengers. These have been some of the operational/maintenance difficulties. Additionally, A&E has not always kept this equipment in operational condition, and has not had the best training program for reading MADREC tapes and use of MADREC results.

4. It is necessary to rejuvenate this program for maximum utilization of MADREC in order to have a better RADAR product. It requires DCM and DCO to get behind the program on a continuing basis.

5. The present MADREC does not apply to 1000 MOD aircraft. However, MADREC MOD kits will be supplied for 1000 MOD aircraft at a later date.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

HEADQUARTERS
FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MARCH AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DM

6 December 1962

SUBJECT: MADREC Utilization

TO: SIERRA TWO (4)
SIERRA THREE (4)
4128 Strat Wg (4)
95 Bomb Wg (4)
93 Bomb Wg (4)
821 Strat Aerospace Div (28 Bomb Wg) (4)
92 Strat Aerospace Wg (4)
4141 Strat Wg (4)
4170 Strat Wg (4)
4133 Strat Wg (4)

(C/DCM/DCO/AEMS)

INFO TO: QUEBEC TWO (3)
QUEBEC THREE (less 13 AD) (3)

(C/DM/DO)

1. The MADREC Utilization Summary and Analysis based on the August, September and October RCS 15-K21 "MADREC Utilization Report" is attached for your information and action.

2. The analysis of the utilization summary clearly identifies those units that have an inadequate MADREC program. The MADREC has proven its ability to detect malfunctions before they can be identified by the crew, thereby improving the system reliability. This is again substantiated by the attached summary. Notwithstanding that MADREC has proven itself, and despite the command emphasis placed on MADREC utilization, many units of Fifteenth Air Force are still remiss in emphasizing their MADREC program.

3. MADREC must be used. When used properly, it can save many maintenance manhours and can aid in delivering more reliable Bomb-Nav and Autopilot systems.

4. All facets of the MADREC program will continue to be an item of active command attention both at Headquarters SAC and at this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE P. COLE
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

1 Atch.
MADREC Utilization
Summary and Analysis

MADREC Utilization Summary (Aug-Oct 62)

1. The MADREC Utilization Report RCS:15-K21 submitted monthly IAW 15 AF Supplement 1 to SACR 66-16 has been in effect for three months. A compilation of the data submitted by the reporting units is attached for your information. It is recommended that each unit review the attachment in its entirety.

2. Most of the columns of the MADREC Utilization Summary are self explanatory. Columns 1 thru 7 are the same as Blocks 1 thru 7 on 15 AF Form 133 "MADREC Utilization Report". "Total MADREC Flying Days" is the number of assigned MADRECs times the number of flying days in the month. (This summary is based on 23 flying days in August, 19 flying days in September and 15 flying days in October. "MADREC in Commission Days" is the number of flying days that the MADRECs are in commission, e.g., one MADREC in commission for the full month of September is 23 "MADREC in Commission Days". "Per Cent Utilization" is the number of "MADREC Flights" (COL. 2) times 100 divided by the "MADREC in Commission Days". The "In Commission Rate" is found by dividing the "MADREC in Commission Days" times 100 by the total "MADREC Flying Days".

3. A review and analysis of the summary shows that few of the units are approaching the goal of 100% utilization. The SAC goal for MADREC utilization is 100%, which means that each "in commission" MADREC will be used every flying day.

4. Though all units have reported an adequate number of personnel qualified to read and interpret MADREC tapes, it is obvious that proper analysis is not being made by most units.

5. It is quite obvious that there has been a considerable lack of emphasis in the overall MADREC program. There is much that needs to be done before the program can be considered satisfactory in all units. Command attention is required with emphasis in the following areas:

a. Utilization.
b. Analysis of tape.
c. Care in installation and handling.
d. Maintenance capability.
e. Crew utilization.
f. Identification and requisitioning of parts.
g. Accurate and timely AWP reports.

6. An analysis of the MADREC utilization for each B-52 unit follows:

4170 SW, Larson - Fair utilization in August. Good utilization in September and October. Analysis of tape weak in October.

92 SAW, Fairchild - Poor utilization in September. Fair utilization in October. The large number of "clean" flights is questionable, possibly due to insufficient analysis of the tape on those flights on which the crew did not report a malfunction.

95 BW, Biggs - Good utilization in August and September. Poor utilization in October. Tape analysis very poor in October. Requires emphasis in tape analysis.

4128 SW, Amarillo -Poor utilization in August and September. Good utilization in October. Good tape analysis all three months.

4141 SW, Glasgow - Utilization poor. Analysis of tape is poor. Closer coordination required between Operations and Maintenance to effect utilization of installed MADRECs. 10 cases in three months in which the installed MADREC was not used. The entire MADREC program requires Command emphasis.

93 BW, Castle - Utilization of MADREC very poor. Excellent analysis of tapes on those flights on which the MADREC was installed.

28 BW, Ellsworth - Extremely poor utilization for the entire reporting period. Very poor analysis of tapes. Coordination between Operations and Maintenance very poor as indicated by non-use of installed MADREC systems. All facets of the MADREC program are weak. The entire program must be reviewed and receive Command emphasis so that the required standards may be attained.

4133 SW, Grand Forks - This is the first of the new AJM-14 MADRECs which are programmed to be installed in all ASQ-38/48 equipped B 52 aircraft. Preliminary information indicates that this is a good system. Very little installation difficulty has been encountered to date. This system will aid considerably in accomplishing ASQ-38/48 trouble shooting and maintenance.

7. An analysis of the MADREC utilization for each B-47 unit follows.

22 BW, March - Excellent utilization. Very good analysis of tape. Continued emphasis is required to assure utilization of the installed MADRECs.

9 BW, Mt. Home - The utilization of "In Commission" MADREC is very good. A review of supply procedures is required to improve the "In Commission" rate. During the reporting period, only 26 MADREC flying days were available out of a possible 116 MADREC flying days.

96 BW, Dyess - Utilization poor in August; fair in September and October. Tape analysis is good. Additional crew indoctrination and coordination between Maintenance and Operations is required. The observer failed to use the installed MADREC once in August, five times in September, and four times in October.

303 BW, Davis-Monthan - Utilization is poor. A review of supply procedures is required to improve the "In Commission" rate. Only 9 MADREC flying days were available during September and October. A potential of 70 MADREC flying days existed during this period.

1100

310 BW, Schilling - Utilization in August and September was very poor. Excellent utilization was attained in October. Tape analysis was good during the reporting period.

1101

BLANK NUMBER (See Form 133)		1	9	2		3	4	5	6	7		
B-52-D UNIT	MONTH	TOTAL FLIGHTS	MADREC "IN COMMISSION" DAYS	MADREC FLIGHTS	PERCENTAGE UTILIZATION	NOT REPORTED MADREC DISCOVERED	REPORTED AND MADREC VERIFIED	REPORTED NOT MADREC VERIFIED	"CLEAN" FLIGHTS CONFIRMED	NO READABLE TAPE	TOTAL MADREC FLY DAYS	IN COMMISSION RATE
4170	Aug	84	46	38	83	23	17	4	13	6	69	67
	Sept	74	27	24	89	13	9	3	10	2	57	47
	Oct	35	30	28	93	10	6	1	6	4	48	63
92	Aug	85	46	41	89	11	7	0	25	2	69	67
	Sept	85	57	39	69	11	10	0	28	0	57	100
	Oct	77	48	32	84	0	1	0	26	5	48	100
95	Aug	81	23	21	91	7	4	1	3	2	69	33
	Sept	76	19	17	90	4	9	0	1	3	57	33
	Oct	86	18	9	50	1	1	1	1	5	48	38
4128	Aug	80	46	23	50	15	10	1	6	2	69	67
	Sept	48	38	18	47	16	4	0	2	0	57	67
	Oct	26	26	22	85	14	4	1	5	4	48	67
4141	Aug	65	69	29	42	7	3	0	16	3	69	100
	Sept	56	57	34	60	2	11	0	9	8	57	100
	Oct	62	48	25	52	2	8	0	8	7	48	100
93	Aug	133	69	30	44	17	9	0	15	3	69	100
	Sept	108	52	28	54	29	13	0	14	4	57	91
	Oct	80	48	21	44	11	13	0	11	2	48	100
28	Aug	77	46	23	50	4	12	0	12	14	69	67
	Sept	52	38	16	42	1	2	2	5	4	57	67
	Oct	73	32	12	37	1	7	0	7	2	48	67
4133	Aug		NO REPORT	-	NOT EQUIPPED							
B-52H	Sept	37	-	3	"One Time" Depot Flights							
	Oct	23	2	2	100	1	2	0	1	0	2	100
					B-52 Totals							
15AF	Aug		345	205	59	84	62	6	90	32	483	71
B-52D	Sept		288	176	61	76	58	5	69	21	399	62
	Oct		250	149	60	39	40	3	64	29	336	74

BLOCK NUMBER 15AF Form 133		1	9	2		3	4	5	6	7		
B-47 UNIT	MONTH	TOTAL FLIGHTS	MADREC "IN COMMISSION" DAYS	MADREC FLIGHTS	PERCENTAGE UTILIZATION	NOT REPORTED-MADREC DISCOVERED	REPORTED AND MADREC VERIFIED	REPORTED NOT MADREC VERIFIED	"CLEAN" FLIGHTS VERIFIED	NO READABLE TAPE	TOTAL MADREC FLY DAYS	
22	Aug	206	22	22	100	25	0	1	7	5	46	
	Sept	205	17	15	88	8	3	2	4	2	38	
	Oct	122	14	14	100	5	0	2	7	2	32	
9	Aug	286	23	18	78	19	5	3	2	4	46	
	Sept		BOTH MADREC AWP ENTIRE MONTH								38	
	Oct	210	3	3	100	1	0	1	0	2	32	
96	Aug	220	31	21	68	10	2	0	9	5	46	
	Sept	185	20	16	80	6	0	4	4	6	38	
	Oct	160	15	12	80	8	2	1	0	4	32	
303	Aug		NO REPORT					NO REPORT				
	Sept	259	8	6	75	3	1	0	1	1	38	
	Oct	212	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32	
310	Aug	250	69	35	51	24	12	10	13	2	69	
	Sept	211	57	30	53	28	11	8	5	3	57	
	Oct	156	38	34	90	14	9	9	13	5	48	
					B-47 Totals							
15AF B-47	Aug		145	96	66	78	19	14	31	16	207	
	Sept		102	67	66	45	15	14	14	12	209	
	Oct		71	63	88	28	11	13	20	13	176	
					15AF Totals							
15AF Total *	Aug		490	301	62	162	81	20	121	48	690	
	Sept		390	243	62	121	73	19	83	33	608	
	Oct		321	212	66	67	51	16	84	42	512	

* Excluding B-52H at 4133

12 December 1962

Colonel David I. Liebman
Commander
92d Strategic Aerospace Wing
Fairchild AFB, Washington

Dear Dave:

I understand that the 1st Combat Evaluation Group will send a team to evaluate your tanker and non-tactical crew members during the period 10-22 February. This visit was originally planned for December but delayed due to the recent defense condition.

My staff studied the training program developed to enhance your passing rate for the December visit and found it well-organized and comprehensive. This was also true of the training program to prepare your crews for the B-52 evaluation during 30 September - 12 October; however, the Wing had a 25% B-52 failure rate. Apparently there was something missing in the preparation inasmuch as a 100% CEG passing rate is not only attainable but has been scored by seven units in 15th Air Force this calendar year.

I am aware that considerable classroom training was accomplished during the recent DEFCON. This could result in a cocksure attitude and complacency allowing us to be less than serious toward the forthcoming evaluation. I want you to take a good hard look at your program and make sure it is professional in its approach, that it is revitalized, that it is properly conducted and that each individual crew member understands his personal responsibility to insure his successful evaluation. I further expect you to pay personal attention to the program so that your Wing may achieve a 100% passing rate.

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

2 Atch
1. Cy of Ltr, 1st CEG, 7 Dec 62 w/3 Atch
2. CEG Results 1961-1962

Gen Ohlke

1104

HEADQUARTERS
1ST COMBAT EVALUATION GROUP (SAC)
United States Air Force
Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana

DCSS

7 DEC1962

CEG Evaluation Visit

92 Strat Aerospace Wg
Fairchild AFB, Wash

INFO TO: SAC (DOOTS) 15 AF (DOS) 18 Strat Aerospace Div

1. As directed by SAC Headquarters, a 1st Combat Evaluation Group evaluation team supervised by Major James K. Lambert will visit your organization during the period 10 February through 22 February 1963. This team will administer flight checks to tanker crews of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron and non-tactical crew members of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing, and will evaluate unit standardization/evaluation organization and specified training activities. The tactical teams consisting of nine officers and four airmen will arrive your station on 10 February 1963. The non-tactical team composed of five officers will arrive on 17 February 1963 and remain for the duration of the visit. Support will be required as specified in SACR 51-24.

2. The tactical teams will devote the first week to the scheduled evaluations of your evaluator crews (See Atch 1). Spot checks as noted in paragraph 3 will be accomplished during either the first or second week of the visit. The administrative inspection and CEG evaluator proficiency flying will be completed during the second week of the visit (See Atch 2). The in-flight requirements for each evaluation and proficiency sortie will be scheduled as listed. Schedule changes are not authorized. Takeoff times should be within plus or minus one hour of that requested. CEG proficiency flying as prescribed by SACR 51-24 will be conducted under your operational control. This flying is essential to CEG operations and requires your full support. No additional activity will be scheduled for CEG proficiency sorties other than that listed. For Fifteenth Air Force. Request that you insure that necessary coordination is effected in order that both evaluation sorties and proficiency sorties meet the takeoff times, sortie durations, and mission profiles specified.

3. As prescribed by SACR 51-4, five evaluator crews will be scheduled for complete qualification checks during this visit. This will include an instrument check for both pilots. If credit is desired for these instrument checks, all prerequisites as required by AFM 60-1 and appropriate SAC Supplements must be completed prior to the visit. After arrival at your station, CEG will select five additional crews

for a spot check evaluation. These crews will be evaluated during their scheduled training sorties as published in the unit flying schedule.

4. All evaluator personnel checked by CEG during this visit will be administered all examinations required for a qualification check as specified by SACM 51-4. In addition, these crews spot checked on a unit training sortie and eight other crews will be administered Emergency Procedures Examinations and the Engine Phase of the ENR Procedures Examination as applicable. Tactical evaluator personnel should complete the Proficiency Exercise prior to the arrival of the CEG team. Request your unit also administer to all evaluator pilots these unusual positions required by SACM 51-4 for their type aircraft.

5. Request you forward this organization not later than 9 January 1963 a roster of all tactical standardization crews that will be assigned to the 93d Air Refueling Squadron as of 16 February 1963. In addition, when available, but not later than 4 February 1963, request a copy of your unit tactical flying schedule for the period 11 February through 22 February 1963 be forwarded to CEG, FOR: DCSS.

6. The non-tactical team will administer an instructor qualification check to the Chief of the Non-Tactical Branch and to each Section Chief. Eight additional flying personnel will be administered appropriate qualification checks and will be selected by CEG after arrival at your station. All personnel selected for evaluation will accomplish written Emergency Procedures Examinations and Proficiency Exercises at 0830 hours, 18 February 1963. Branch and Section Chiefs should complete the appropriate Proficiency Exercise prior to arrival of the CEG team. Mission requirements are listed in Atch 3.

7. Request that you acknowledge receipt of this letter and appoint a project officer with SAC operations experience to coordinate matters pertaining to this visit and forward his name, rank, and duty and home telephone numbers by letter to this organization, FOR: DCSS, no later than 9 January 1963. It is further requested that you advise the availability of government quarters and messing for the duration of our visit and confirm CEG return airlift to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, departing your station at 1000 hours, 22 February 1963.

J. D. WHITE
Colonel, USAF
Commander

3 Atch
1. Unit Eval. Sortie Requirements
2. CEG Prof. Sortie Requirements
3. Non-Tac. Sortie Requirements

UNIT: 92 Air Refueling Squadron

TYPE ACFT: KC-135 UNIT EVALUATION SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

DATE	CDC SORTIE #	PROPOSED TAKEOFF TIME (LOCAL)	TYPE MISSION	DURATION	SPECIFIC MISSION REQUIREMENTS	REMARKS
11 Feb 68	T-1	0700	SACM 51-4 Qualification Check	8+00	All items required by SACM 51-4, including instrument checks for both pilots.	Adjust fuel load and offload to start initial penetration at 160,000 lbs. gross weight after 5 1/2 hours flight time in order to start instruments and emergency procedures
11 Feb 68	T-2	0730	Same as T-1	8+00	Same as T-1	Same as T-1
11 Feb 68	T-3	0800	Same as T-1	8+00	Same as T-1	Same as T-1
13 Feb 68	T-4	0700	Same as T-1	8+00	Same as T-1	Same as T-1
13 Feb 68	T-5	0730	Same as T-1	8+00	Same as T-1	Same as T-1

NOTE: KC-135 simulator requirements to be completed by unit for those pilots receiving qualification check credit, except for the Senior Standardization Crew, who will be checked in the simulator by CDC.

Atch 2

UNIT: 92 Air Refueling Squadron

TYPE ACFT: KC-135

CEC PROFICIENCY SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

DATE	CEC SORTIE #	PROPOSED TAKEOFF TIME (LOCAL)	DURATION	MISSION REQUIREMENTS	REMARKS
19 Feb 63	T-6	0900	7+00	Rendezvous Air Refueling Celestial Grid GCA/ILS, Full-Stop landings.	Adjust fuel load and offload to start initial penetration at approximately 148,000 lbs. gross weight after 5 1/2 hours flight time.
19 Feb 63	T-7	1400	7+00	Same as T-6	Same as T-6
19 Feb 63	T-8	1630	7+00	Same as T-6	Same as T-6
21 Feb 63	T-9	0930	7+00	Same as T-6	Same as T-6
21 Feb 63	T-10	1000	7+00	Same as T-6	Same as T-6

NON-TACTICAL SORTIE REQUIREMENTS

UNIT: 92 Strat Aerospace Sq

DATE	CEG SORTIE #	PROPOSED TAKEOFF TIME (LOCAL)	TYPE MISSION	DURATION	REMARKS
TYPE ACFT: G-129					
18 Feb 63	N-1	1530	CEG Proficiency	4+00	
19 Feb 63	N-2	1430	Instructor Qualification Check	2+00	Branch Chief and FWT Section Chief
20 Feb 63	N-3	0900	Qualification Check	2+00	
20 Feb 63	N-4	1400	Qualification Check	2+00	
TYPE ACFT: T-33					
18 Feb 63	N-5	1440	Instructor Qualification Check	2+00	Section Chief
20 Feb 63	N-6	0810	Qualification Check	2+00	
20 Feb 63	N-7	1410	Qualification Check	2+00	
TYPE ACFT: N-19					
19 Feb 63	N-8	1450	Instructor Qualification Check	2+00	Section Chief
20 Feb 63	N-9	0920	Qualification Check	2+00	
20 Feb 63	N-10	1420	Qualification Check	2+00	
21 Feb 63	N-11	1530	CEG Proficiency	2+00	
TYPE ACFT: L-20					
18 Feb 63	N-12	1540	CEG Proficiency		
19 Feb 63	N-13	1500	Instructor Qualification Check	2+00	Section Chief
20 Feb 63	N-14	0930	Qualification Check	2+00	
20 Feb 63	N-15	1430	Qualification Check	2+00	

Atch 3

CEG Results - 1961 - 1962

	92SAW						4170SW						22ARS					
1961	Nr.	HQ	O	CQ	U	Fail Rate	Nr.	HQ	O	CQ	U	Fail Rate	Nr.	HQ	O	CQ	U	Fail Rate
B-52	13	0	4	4	5	38.5	*9	0	6	2	1	11.1						
KC-135	16	0	14	0	2	12.5	17	0	14	1	2	11.7	12	0	7	4	1	8.3
1962																		
B-52	12	0	7	2	3	25.0	14	0	6	2	1	21.4						

* Oct - Nov 1960

Units Scoring 100% During 1962 (15AF)

B-52	KC-135
4126th	903d
4136th	916th
93d	924th

	B-52	KC-135
15AF Avg (Fail Rate)	20.0	25.0
SAC Avg (Fail Rate)	25.4	37.8

SAC FORM MAY 58 210 GENERAL PURPOSE WORK SHEET (10½ x 8)

DO

12 Dec 1962

Flying Time

MEMO FOR RECORD

1. Following is status of 92SAW and 4170SW flying hours for 2d quarter 63, as of 10 Dec 62:

92SAW	Allocated	Flown
B-52	1376	620
KC-135	2252	1396
T-33	212	165
C-123	675	508
U-6A	450	268

4170SW		
B-52	1367	612
KC-135	2257	1457
T-33	212	174
C-47	720	450
H-19	300	147

2. The units have been notified by 15AF that allocated time not flown will be turned back to 15AF, with no penalties charged to the units. Under no circumstances will allocations be overflown.

WILLIAM B WHEELER
CMS, USAF
Operations Supt

DO 12 Dec 1962

Management of Proficiency and Support Aircraft Flying
(SACL No. 121-5, 10 Dec 62)

MEMO FOR GENERAL OHLKE

1. The non-tactical flying programs at Fairchild and Larson were reviewed and the following items as listed in SACL 121-5 were noted:

a. Some pilots are flying more than a pro rata share of flying hours available. For example, Captain Shutt, 92SAW, has flown 126 hours during the past quarter. This is primarily due to the supposedly non-availability of missile crew members. A firm 60-9 schedule is published monthly by the 92SAW non-tactical scheduling section. This schedule is fully coordinated with the 567th Missile Squadron which in turn furnishes the scheduling section with dates and names of personnel available to fly. The 4170SW scheduling section is having difficulty in instituting a workable scheduling system with the 568th Missile Squadron. The difficulty here can be attributed to the poor cooperation received from the missile squadron.

b. Pilots who possess more than a proportionate share of AFM 60-1 minimums have not been authorized flights purely for proficiency purposes.

c. To the maximum extent possible, individual proficiency requirements are being accomplished in conjunction with logistic and administrative flights.

d. The following pilots are authorized multiple currency at Fairchild and Larson:

General Ohlke	B-52, KC-135
Colonel Powell	B-52, KC-135
Lt Col Paskell	B-52, KC-135, T-33
Colonel Tate	B-52, KC-135
Colonel McKinnon	B-52, T-33
Lt Col Guier	B-52, KC-135

LUCION N POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

DS 6 Dec 1962

Annual Flying Safety Survey

92SAW(SAFE)

1. In accordance with AFR 62-8 and supplements thereto, the annual Flying Safety Survey Report for the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing is due in 15AF headquarters on 1 April 1963. This survey will be completed and the report forwarded to this headquarters not later than 18 March 1963.

2. I recommend that the survey be programmed over the months of January and February to be completed by 1 March. The Survey Guide should be assembled before January so as to be ready when the Safety personnel return from the 15AF Safety Symposium scheduled for January. The Wing Director of Safety could easily survey with the qualified representatives as shown in 15AF Supplement to AFR 62-8, and would thereby gain considerable knowledge concerning the air base activities and requirements. In order to accomplish it in this manner, firm planning must be made and requirements met as planned.

3. This headquarters desires that orders be published designating those augmentees that are to be used for the survey, and that copies of the orders and survey guide used be attached to the final report.

4. I will actively participate in the survey and will accompany the Director of Safety during the accomplishment of the survey. I will be available to offer guidance and opinion as to the format and items to be included from the survey in the final report.

THOMAS H PASKELL
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Safety

HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DM

12 December 1962

SUBJECT: Report of Informal Staff Visit, 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson AFB, Washington

TO: 4170SW (WC)

1. Persons Conducting Visit:

Lt Col Thompson, DM
Lt Col Murray, DMS
SMS Newberg, DMAE
SMS Shankle, DMM
TSgt Lovin, DMS

2. Persons Contacted:

Col Tate, 4170SW Comdr
Lt Col Mann, DCM
Lt Col Roberts, BDCM
Lt Col Andrews, MMSC
Lt Col Knotts, OMSC
Lt Col R. Martin, FMSC
Lt Col R. E. Martin, AESC
Lt Col Cole, DSUP

3. Period of Visit: 3-7 December 1962

4. Purpose: In conjunction with ORI follow-up visit to:

a. Visit DCM, Munitions Maintenance Squadron, Base Flight, Logistics, and OMS activities.

b. Ascertain degree of familiarity with and to brief key staff members and commanders on procedures to be followed in handling and processing reports on SAC Pamphlet 66-2, and Hq 15th Air Force "Red Flag" areas.

c. Observe progress and discuss move to Plant 53.

5. Following are comments and recommendations on areas visited:

a. Logistics:

(1) These sections are items of special interest in SACP 66-2 and have been Red Flagged by Hq 15th Air Force. Separate reports on each of these are being forwarded. (Action: 18SAD)

Gen Ohlke

(108)

(2) Periodic briefings and training on mobile procedures and war support plans are being accomplished by the Logistics Division and Logistics NCOICs of the various units. Documentation of these sessions in the form of training outlines and objectives, schedules, meeting minutes, etc., is required. Mobility recovery team folders are on hand and are currently being updated. (Action: DCML)

(3) Exercising of mobility recovery and start control teams should be periodically scheduled and accomplished. (Action: DCM)

(4) EWO procedures prepared by individual units or sections and forwarded to Logistics as tabs to Annex "Z" of the War Support Plan should be standardized, i.e., identified as EWO check lists, office instructions or some similar format. (Action: DCML)

b. 47th Munitions Maintenance Squadron:

(1) Production Control is in urgent need of a Job Control console. Recommend expeditious processing and approval of UAL change request currently in administrative channels on the base. Also, recommend expeditious local manufacturer of the console from blue prints presently available. (Action: MMS & BDCE)

(2) Loading team personnel are not equipped with reflective tape or markings on outer garments as required by AFM 32-3, SACSUP-5. (Action: MMS)

(3) Three fire extinguishers on aircraft 5110 on 4 December were improperly safetied. All three extinguishers could be extracted and replaced without breaking the seal. (Action: BDCE)

(4) Standboard loading team #3 was observed during a download operation on 4 Dec 62. The operation was satisfactory but it was apparent that additional practice loadings beyond minimum requirements are needed to bring the team to the high standards required of a four man standboard team. Discrepancies were discussed with the Team Chief and Munitions Services Branch Chief. (Action: MMS)

(3) Weapons Maintenance Brief of October was discussed with the Commander and Maintenance Supervisor. Check list provided was reviewed and the following recommendations made:

(a) Review functional responsibilities outlined in Chapter 15, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1 during weekly scheduling meetings.

(b) Additional emphasis and review be given to munitions guidelines contained in Monthly SAC Weapons Maintenance Brief which has replaced the MMI program.

(c) That examinations be prepared and administered to MMS personnel on SACM 136-1, Capability Inspection Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Units.

c. Organizational Maintenance Squadron:

(1) Support Branch:

(a) A review of AS48-A B-52 wheel mover operations indicates need for program rejuvenation. Thirty nine of 805 aircraft movements were accomplished by this equipment. (Action: DCM & OMS)

(b) Three MB towing tractors do not have required fire extinguishers installed. (Action: OMS/Transp.)

(2) Base Flight Branch:

(a) Organizational charts require updating. (Action: OMSBF)

(b) AFTO series forms inspected were found satisfactory with the exception of SH-19B, 52-7541. AFTO Form 781B, indicates 780 equipment inventory check has been due since 23 Apr 62. (Action: OMSBF)

(c) Available dust covers were not being utilized on aircraft jacks. (Action: OMSBF)

(d) It was recommended that Sgt Hildreth of Base Flight, presently holding a current CAA airplane/engine ticket, be utilized to inspect and clear red cross items involving C-47 propeller maintenance. (Action: DCM & OMSBF)

(3) Recovery Branch: Special interest item. Reference 15AF message DM 52762, 3 Oct 62, subject: Inadvertent retraction of KC-135 landing gear during ground maintenance associated with cockpit area. Cited SAC messages, same subject, are being complied with and all maintenance personnel have been briefed as required.

6. On conclusion of this visit key staff members and commanders were contacted and were briefed on 66-2 and 15AF Red Flag areas as follows:

a. Personnel generally were familiar with the 66-2 Pamphlet and items involving their areas of responsibility. Action on some items was considered inadequate and will be reflected in the report forwarded under separate cover.

b. Some activities had not received the July 1962 Pamphlet and/or the October 1962 Change 1. Following are some of these activities:

Munitions Maintenance Squadron
Transportation Squadron
Base Procurement
Purchasing & Contracting

Recommend all materiel sections involved that have not already done so, immediately submit PETs to Base Publications for the Pamphlet and/or amendments thereto.

c. Red Flag policy of Hq 15th Air Force is to forward cautionary items to Division for follow-up. They are retained by Division until staff visit and investigation is accomplished. Comments are then sent to 15th Air Force with recommendations that the Red Flag be lowered or retained, depending upon conditions observed. Several Red Flag areas were looked into at Larson during this visit. Copies of correspondence pertaining thereto will be mailed to the 4170SW under separate cover. In the future Red Flag areas will be forwarded immediately to 15th SAD units upon receipt at this headquarters.

7. The move to Plant 53 is progressing satisfactorily. The main obstacle to expediency being installation of telephones. Percentage completion estimates by DCM were as follows:

OMS - 95%
MMS - 90%
A&E - 10%
FMS - 5%

8. A reply to this report is neither required nor desired.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

STAFF VISIT BOOK

DO 26 December 1962

Staff Visit - 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson AFB, Washington

4170th SW (WC)

1. An Operations staff visit to the 4170th Strategic Wing was conducted during the period 17-19 Dec 62 by Colonel L. N. Powell, Major F. J. Riddle, and CMS W. B. Wheeler of this headquarters. Areas covered during this visit were as follows:

a. Base Operations

b. Form 5 Section

c. Procedural Training

d. 568th Strategic Missile Squadron

2. The following items were noted:

a. Base Operations:

(1) Items noted in SAC msg DO 109839, 15 Dec 62, subject: Mission Support Aircraft Operations, were examined for adequacy as follows:

(a) Aircraft Clearance: Basic procedures are being complied with. Forms 21A are being properly maintained.

(b) Aircrew Records: A check of flight orders, Forms 8B, Forms 5, and SAC Forms 412 revealed that they are being properly maintained. It is definitely established and documented before each flight as to who is in command of the aircraft and the individual's qualifications.

(c) Aircrew Training: Excellent procedures have been established for insuring that individuals are cognisant of and adhere to proper clearance procedures. Larson Form 126 is utilized for obtaining Flight Coordination and approval before each flight and leaves nothing to the imagination. Forms 175 are closely reviewed to insure proper altitudes are entered. Pilots and navigators are being briefed on utilizing proper maps. A form chart is being devised showing emergency fields suitable for the type aircraft concerned and will be furnished for each

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STAFF VISIT BOOK

DO 26 December 1962

Staff Visit - 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson AFB, Washington

4170th SW (WC)

1. An Operations staff visit to the 4170th Strategic Wing was conducted during the period 17-19 Dec 62 by Colonel L. N. Powell, Major F. J. Riddle, and CMS W. B. Wheeler of this headquarters. Areas covered during this visit were as follows:

a. Base Operations

b. Form 5 Section

c. Procedural Training

d. 568th Strategic Missile Squadron

2. The following items were noted:

a. Base Operations:

(1) Items noted in SAC msg DO 109839, 15 Dec 62, subject: Mission Support Aircraft Operations, were examined for adequacy as follows:

(a) Aircraft Clearance: Basic procedures are being complied with. Forms 21A are being properly maintained.

(b) Aircrew Records: A check of flight orders, Forms 8B, Forms 5, and SAC Forms 412 revealed that they are being properly maintained. It is definitely established and documented before each flight as to who is in command of the aircraft and the individual's qualifications.

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#37

flight. Each crew member has been furnished a copy of a crew rest check list which clearly outlines instructions pertaining to crew rest. This is being absolutely adhered to.

(d) General Flight Rules: An examination of 25 comprehensive questions covering AFR 60-16 and FLIP has been published. Each pilot is required to complete this exam, corrected to 100%, before his next flight. Beginning 1 Jan 63, and after each individual has initially completed this test, this requirement will be quarterly, with a new exam given each quarter.

(2) Scheduling Section: Four pilots are not complete as of this date in AFR 60-1 requirements.

(3) Non-Tactical Standardization: Twenty four navigators are assigned to the Non-Tactical Program. Captain Cash, the designated Chief of the Nav Standardization Section, is not able to furnish the support needed due to the fact he is assigned to the 568th SMS. He has not been available to the section for approximately two weeks.

(4) Dispatch Section: Seven dispatchers are assigned to this section. Two of these are cross-trainees who must work under the supervision of a qualified dispatcher. A2C Divel has been assigned special duty for 59 days with the 568th SMS to support Nickle Plate, a clean-up operation. One dispatcher will be required to work in the Scheduling Section upon the transfer of the assigned clerk; this to be effective 19 Nov 62. In addition dispatchers are being required to furnish Air Police augmentation, Charge-of-Quarters and NCOD. Dispatchers are required to post publications during their off-duty time. Adequate and professional dispatcher support cannot be furnished under these existing conditions.

b. Forms 5 Section: The efficiency of this section has regressed since the last 18th SAD staff visit. The following items were noted:

(1) Captain Jarrett logged Instructor Pilot time on 14 Dec 62 although he was non-current as an instructor due to lack of one night landing.

(2) One tactical pilot and three non-tactical pilots remain to finish AFR 60-1 requirements.

(3) Extremely poor cooperation is being furnished this section by the Flight Surgeons Office. Forms 1042, Medical Clearance Certificates, are being held as long as

40 days before being typed and forwarded for file in the Aircrew records. A review of the records revealed the following personnel do not have a current medical clearance on file:

Major Meyer	Capt Franz
Capt Gilmour	Major Kuba
Capt Stratton	Capt Mead
Col Tate	Major Dayton
Major Howerton	Lt Williams

(4) All pilots are current in Annual Instrument check requirements.

(5) Delinquent Physiological Training Certificates:

Capt Horn	Lt Col Laubach
Capt Driscoll	Major Meyer
Lt Pope	Capt Weinberger

(6) Delinquent AFM 60-1 currency flights:

Lt Col Laubach
Major Meyer

(7) Delinquent AFM 60-1 currency landings:

Capt Heath	Major Johnson
Lt Col Laubach	Capt Dysart
Major Meyer	Major Zellers
Capt Wright	Major Campbell
Capt Gaspard	

(8) The following personnel have not accomplished C-11 instrument trainer time since date indicated:

Lt Col Lataweic	May 62	Lt Col Guier	Jun 62
Lt Allen	Aug 62	Capt Harper	Sep 62
Maj Campbell	Jun 62	Capt Keinholz	May 62
Lt Clark	Jul 62	Capt Nugent	Aug 62
Maj Flansaas	May 62	Maj Powers	Sep 62
Capt Flurett	Sep 62	Lt Rice	Jun 62
Lt Col Fromm	May 62		

c. Procedural Training: The following items were reviewed as noted:

(1) Small Arms Qualification: Personnel assigned to fire the carbine are 99.1% complete. Those assigned to fire the pistol are 90.6% complete.

Carbine	Assigned 3511	Complete	2978
Pistol	Assigned 1051	Complete	951

Combat crew personnel are 90% complete. No difficulty is contemplated in completing this training by 31 Dec 62.

(2) A Collateral Training Officer is not physically assigned to this branch to assist the Procedural Training Officer.

(3) An adequate SEX Program is in effect. Only one failure is listed as of this date.

(4) SACR 50-24 training requirements for this year are complete as follows:

Disaster Actions	98%
Code of Conduct	96%
Buddy Care	42%
Small Arms	97%

(5) Although Buddy Care training is a one time requirement, more emphasis should be placed on the completion of this training.

(6) An excellent program exists to insure the completion of scheduled training.

d. [redacted]. The visit to the Missile Squadron covered Standardization, Scheduling and Training, and Project Nickle Plate on Complex "A" and "B".

(1) Standardization:

(a) Major Martinich and crew (Chief Stbd Crew) were consulted on the Standardization Section with reference to SAC msg DOOT 107472, 8 Dec 62, Subject: Weakness in Safety/Emergency Procedures on the Part of Missile Crews. This crew was well-informed on discrepancies of referenced message as they had just returned from a conference at Vandenberg AFB regarding these subjects.

(b) The weaknesses displayed in technical data can be attributed to the over-the-shoulder training received by the EPPT. The civilians that were observed by these EPPT trainees, were adverse to the use of technical data used by the Air Force. This naturally caused the deficiency in the learning process of the EPPT.

(c) Testing failure rate for September thru December indicated that the failure rate for the MMT and the EPPT was largest in the area of Safety/Emergency procedure examination. There were 45 exams administered with 13 failures,

a failure rate of 20%.

(d) Combat ready status of the 568th has been at a standstill due to the recent DEFCON. To complete the combat ready upgrading process, wet load practice must be accomplished. This can be done only during Shakedown periods. Shakedown on each area will be accomplished only on approval from SAC Headquarters. Further, wet loads will not be accomplished until a permanent fix can be accepted on procedures in event of failure of LOX second stage fill and drain valve. There are currently only four crews that have been satisfactorily standboarded. The present schedule calls for completion by 15 February, if no further malfunctions cause additional delay.

(2) Scheduling & Training: The Scheduling & Training Section was checked with respect to correcting the deficient areas of SAC msg DOOT 107472, 8 Dec 62.

(a) Each crew performs an average of eight alert tours per month with two additional eight hour duty days being utilized for formal P.C. exams and classes for the LCO and GCO.

(b) The MMTs and EPPTs are scheduled two hours of supervised study in Emergency and Safety procedures. Each crew commander instigates additional study in this area to assist in the learning process.

(3) A visit was conducted by Colonel Powell and Major Riddle to Complexes "A" and "B" to observe Project Nickle Plate. The following was noted:

(a) Complex "A": The entrance area of Complex A was in a messy condition with cigarette butts and trash scattered throughout the area. An open garbage platform, without sufficient metal containers, is being utilized for garbage and trash pick-up. A tour of the tunnel area, power house, launch console were accomplished with particular emphasis being placed on corrosion control. The tunnel area nearest the entrance has the appearance of being painted over, to hide the corrosion, rather than that of having been scraped and treated to further prevent corrosion. At present, there are 15 personnel assigned to Project Nickle Plate in this complex. With the estimate of completion being only 5%/8% at this time, it will take approximately 18 months to cover the complete complex on a one-time coverage.

(b) Complex "B": The entrance area of Complex "B" was also plagued with unsightly cigarette butts and trash. The refuse platform was crammed full of garbage,

paint cartons, paint cans, and trash which was not in metal cans. A tour of the tunnel area was conducted. A very favorable display of corrosion control and preventive maintenance is being performed throughout this complex. Sgt David and crew are to be commended on the initiative being displayed. Complex "B" also has 15 special duty personnel assigned to accomplish Project Nickle Plate. The present state of completion is 5%/8% .

e. Recommendations:

(1) Non-tactical flight orders are not being signed by appropriate personnel. Individuals authorized to authenticate flight orders should be designated on special orders as representatives of the Base Operations Officer. (AFM 10-3)

(2) A program should be established to insure crew members are cognizant of the importance of maintaining Forms 83 and 21A. If required training listed on Forms 83 is not accomplished, a note should be made in the Remarks Section as to the reason.

(3) A weekly 60-9 flying schedule should be published and issued to each individual.

(4) Command support should be given to alleviating the problem of scheduling missile personnel for flying. A higher priority should be given to this requirement.

(5) An assistant should be furnished to the Procedural Training Officer, preferably an individual to fill the Collateral Training Officer slot.

(6) A concentrated effort should be made to implement pellet gun training in the Munitions Maintenance Squadron.

(7) Major Meyer, Commander of Othello Radar Site, is delinquent in 60-1 flying time, annual physical, physiological training, currency flights and currency landings. If this situation is not rectified by 31 Dec 62, a recommendation should be made to SPADS to categorize this individual in accordance with AFM 60-1.

(8) Command support should be given to establishing the proper cooperation from the Flight Surgeon in furnishing the Form 5 Section with physical clearance certificates no later than five working days after an individual completes his annual physical.

(9) The Form 5 Section Supervisor should make a concentrated effort in indoctrinating his clerks in the

importance of maintaining AFM 60-1 charts, filing of forms, and proper record keeping. A program should be established to teach these individuals the requirements set forth in all associated directives.

(10) To insure that qualified dispatchers are available to Base Operations and that a professional, wide-awake attitude may be demonstrated at all times, it is strongly recommended that dispatchers be removed from having to accomplish extra details as listed in paragraph 1a(6).

(11) A self-study type question sheet (study guide) should be prepared for each position of a missile combat crew. These questions should be prepared by a joint effort of the complete squadron. These questions should be compiled by a joint effort of the training and standardization sections, requiring the personnel to answer questions and note reference material and page where found. This study type questionnaire along with scheduled study will greatly assist and correct the weaknesses mentioned in SAC msg DOOT 107472, 8 Dec 62.

(12) A covered, screened-in area, should be constructed at each missile site for the gathering of waste material.

(13) An adequate corrosion control program must be established to correct corrosion deficiencies. The type program instigated at Complex "B" by SSgt David and team is a good guide for all complexes.

3. This report is forwarded for information and any action deemed necessary. A reply to deficient items as mentioned in SAC msg DO 109839, 15 Dec 62, will be in 18SAD Director of Operations Office by 0800 hours, 28 Dec 62.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCION N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

STAFF VISIT BOOK

DO 26 December 1962

Staff Visit - 567th Strategic Missile Squadron

92SAW (WC)

1. The Director of Operations, this headquarters, and members of his staff performed a supervisory staff visit to the 567th SMS during the period 10-14 December 1962.

2. Although all operations activities were items of interest, particular attention was devoted to Safety/Emergency procedures as outlined in SAC message DOOT 107472, 3 Dec 62. Eight of the nine complexes were visited as well as Operations/Training activities in the Squadron Headquarters.

3. Combat crews were generally well-qualified and highly motivated. Safety/Emergency procedures were receiving adequate attention. Standardization records revealed failure rates as follows:

	Crews Checked	Failures
October	23	0
November	15	2 crew members 1 SCM
December (Thru 7 Dec)	4	1 SCM

Overall crew failure rate 4.8%

These figures indicate a high degree of capability; however, it must be borne in mind that nearly all of the standardization checks were simulated exercises with no actual hardware operation. A realistic appraisal of combat crew capability is difficult, if not impossible to make, inasmuch as 27 crews have not had a DPL since 1 March and ten crews have not had a LSR exercise. The remaining crews have had only one or two DPL/LSRs. It was this unknown capability that led the Commander, 92SAW, to downgrade the Commander's estimate of readiness on 10 December.

4. One item not in the operations area was observed at several complexes and has been brought to the attention of the Division Director of Materiel for further action: the Corrosion Control Program does not in all cases appear to be accomplishing its designed purpose in that paint is being applied over rust, or over scraped surfaces without

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those surfaces being properly treated prior to application of paint.

5. This report requires no indorsement. It is forwarded for information and any action deemed necessary.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCION N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations


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HISTORY

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

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

18SAD

1 - 31 JANUARY 1963

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the history period. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield

RAY J. HARTSFIELD
1st Lt., USAF
Information Officer

Harold W. Ohlke

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY

Ray J. Hartsfield
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

5-3482-5

15AF DX163-30

Atch 13

SECRET

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
AMFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commission for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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HISTORY

8TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, The Commander, 18th Strategic Air Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and 4170th Strategic Wing are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th Strategic Wing develop and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 4170th

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1. SAC Reg. 23-15, 20 Apr 62, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Special Assistant to the Commander	Colonel Leonard L. Jella
Executive Officer	Lt. Colonel A. Louis Laney
Director of Operations	Colonel Lucion N. Powell
Director of Safety	Lt. Colonel Thomas H. Paskell
Director of Materiel	Lt. Colonel James W. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Maurice E. Marler
Operations Staff Officer	Major Frank J. Riddle

Administration

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, flew to Offutt Air Force Base on 22 January and the following day began airborne command post duties. On the fifth day of his seven-day tour, General Ohlke participated in a Looking Glass demonstration for the Ark-La-Tex Air Power Council at 1715 hours. This demonstration was arranged by the director of information, Headquarters, SAC, at the request of Second Air Force in an attempt to bolster Air Force Association activities in the Shreveport, Louisiana, area. Despite initial minor communication problems with the telephone company, contact was established. Response to the program was excellent, reported Brigadier General John A. Roberts, Fourth Air Division commander.[4] (C)

During January the combat bomber crew force of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing consisted of 27 combat crews. Of these 27 crews, eight were in select status, 16 in senior status, two in combat ready status and one crew in non-combat ready non-availability status. Meanwhile the combat crew strength of the air refueling squadron stood at 36 tanker crews of which 30 were in senior status, 5 in combat ready status and one crew in non-combat ready non-availability status. During this period one senior tanker crew was downgraded to combat ready status and another tanker non-combat ready non-available crew was formed.[5] (S)

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4. Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, CONFIDENTIAL DP 3704, Subj: Airborne Command Post, 7 Dec 62, Exhibit #1.
5. 92SAW Hist. Rpt for Jan 63, Filed: IXOH.

During this same period Larson Air Force Base had 26 bomber crews assigned of which six were in select status, 18 in senior status and two in combat ready status. The 43rd Air Refueling Squadron was assigned 36 tanker crews. Of this total seven crews were in senior status and 28 were in combat ready status.[6] (S)

The 15 B-52D Larson bombers flew 85 sorties in 1,047:15 flying hours and the 21 KC-135A tankers flew 156 sorties amassing a total of 801:35 flying hours. The Fairchild 16 B-52D bombers accomplished 163 sorties in 794 flying hours and the 21 KC-135A tankers were able to launch 163 sorties and 798 flying hours.[7] (S)

The division was assigned a total of 53 bomber combat crews with 14 in select status, 34 in senior status, four in combat ready status and one in non-combat ready non-available status. Of the 72 tanker crews assigned 37 were in senior status, 33 in combat ready status and one in non-combat ready non-available status. The division's 31 bombers were able to fly 248 sorties in 1,841:15 flying hours and the 42 tanker aircraft flew 319 sorties and amassed 1,599:35 flying hours.[8] (S)

During January the majority of Larson B-52 flying hours were spent on Operation CHROME DOME which required an aircraft daily to fly the northern round-robin route. Both of the division's wings flew BAR NONE missions and Fairchild launched a bomber on BIG BLAST, a penetration aid training exercise. Both wings launched tankers to Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska for air refueling support of bombers on airborne

6. 4170SW Hist. Rpt. for Jan 63, Filed: IXOH.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

alert in Operation CHROME DOME.[9] (S)

Staff Visits by 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Major F.J. Riddle, division operations staff officer, conducted a staff visit to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing procedural training section on 4 January to review their tactical doctrine study program. Major Riddle and his staff checked several items including the SAC Tactical Doctrine curriculum which included hours of training scheduled, courses outlined, examination results, and samples of examination questions.[10] (U)

In order to substantiate examination results, crew members of both tanker and bomber crews were orally questioned and were found highly proficient with no errors noted. During the past year and a half the wing had conducted an excellent and aggressive tactical doctrine training program giving bomber and tanker crews tactical doctrine training during each tour of alert duty. Lecture classes were held whenever necessary to present new material or explain changes. Tapes and slides were used during classes each training quarter but were supplemented by examination questions periodically to keep from over-exposing their personnel to one type of study program. Frequent use was made of practice examinations by the instructor.[11] (U)

Testing and critiquing of examination results proved a useful tool for indicating weak areas and evaluating the instruction program. An average of 1,560 instruction hours were accomplished each quarter with an examination to evaluate the course. The aircraft commander

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9. 4170SW Hist. Rpt. for Jan 63, Filed: IXOH.
10. Staff Visit to 92SAW, Subj: Procedural Training, 4 Jan 63, Exhibit #2.
11. Ibid.

was appraised of the questions missed by his crew members. However, failures in the tactical doctrine had not been encountered in the past six months. When questions were missed it became the responsibility of the aircraft commander to give crew members additional assistance and self study to correct the areas of misunderstanding. It was recommended, in view that evaluation of the tactical doctrine program thoroughly justified the adoption of the profile mission, and the reward of exemption from further tactical doctrine study for the remainder of the month be given a crew when they received 100 per cent.[12] (U)

Lieutenant Colonel M.E. Marler, division operations staff officer, performed a supervisory staff visit to the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron at Larson Air Force Base on 7 - 10 January. He was accompanied by Major F.J. Koller, 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing, and together they covered the communications facilities within the squadron. The Fifteenth Air Force Missile Commander's Checklist, dated 11 December 1962, was used as a guide for the visit.[13] (U)

All areas dealing with operations management and training were found to be satisfactory. Housekeeping practices, both in the squadron operations area and in the launch facilities, were generally excellent. This was especially true in those areas where Project Nickle Plate had been completed. Recommended corrective action on weak combat crew members was adequate and general areas of weakness had been identified and used as a basis for recurring training.[14] (U)

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12. Staff Visit to 92SAW, Subj: Procedural Training, 4 Jan 63, Exhibit #2.
13. Staff Visit to 568SMS, 17 Jan 63, Exhibit #3.
14. Ibid.

Communications facilities were installed as specified in the SAC approved document. However, since the installation of the facilities, operational and maintenance experience had shown a requirement for changes and additions, which were forwarded to Fifteenth Air Force by the 4170th Strategic Wing on 27 October 1962. Three approved projects were in the process of being accomplished and a fourth was complete.[15] (U)

Flying support for rated personnel remained a chronic problem. The use of available aircraft in a base support role was in most cases incompatible with the time available for missile crew members to fly. These people were frequently cancelled-out of local flights in order for the aircraft to be rescheduled on cross-country support flights. At least one missile crew member failed to qualify for flying pay in December for this reason. A solution to this problem had to be found in order to maintain a highly operational activity.[16] (U)

An operations staff visit was made to the 4170th Strategic Wing by Lieutenant Colonel L.N. Powell and staff from 15 through 18 January. The purpose of this visit was to observe functions of agencies under the deputy commander for operations and perform follow-up action on messages from higher headquarters. These pertained to non-tactical instructor pilot briefings, CCTM crew briefings, bomber and tanker ORIT briefings, BAR NONE exercises, tactical doctrine training program and missile ORI preparedness. With the

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15. Staff Visit to 568SMS, 17 Jan 63, Exhibit #3.
16. Ibid.
17. Staff Visit to 4170SW, Subj: Evaluate General Management, 21 Jan 63, Exhibit #4.

exception of BAR NONE exercises all areas were found to be adequate. In this area it was noted that due to the amount of unreliable bomb runs accomplished on BAR NONE missions, it was necessary for the wing to cancel the scheduled sorties for the remainder of the week and regroup, study results, and establish a procedure to eliminate any possible areas of weakness. Target intelligence branch and penetration aids required added emphasis to keep the unit from going on probation.[17] (U)

A staff visit was also made to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild Air Force Base by Colonel L. L. Jella and Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Thompson during 2 to 4 January. Many discrepancies were noted and it was pointed out that maintenance control operating deficiencies could result. Colonel Jella found that the majority of the discrepancies cited were attributed to the plans and scheduling element of maintenance control. The plans and scheduling maintenance readiness folder was incomplete and did not contain required items. This included a list of maintenance teams and a copy of each team supervisor's plan, key maintenance personnel work schedule and duty assignments, a copy of the war support plan and SAC Manuals 50-26 and 55-7.[18] (U)

There were also no records available to indicate that the maintenance supervision area, the organizational functional chart required updating since it reflected periodic maintenance and all other charts required up-dating such as the leave chart, project chart and personnel locator charts. It was also pointed out to

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18. Staff Visit to 567SMS, 8 Jan 63, Exhibit #5.

the production control section that personnel should not accept components from base supply unless they were accounted for through use of AF Form 1297.[19] (U)

A staff visit was made to the 4170th Strategic Wing during 15 through 18 January by Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Thompson, division director of material. The purpose of the visit was to evaluate general management and the degree of compliance with applicable procedural directives. In general the attitude and cooperation of all personnel contacted during the visit was extremely gratifying. Willingness to accept constructive criticism and to aggressively correct discrepancies on the spot were commendable. Some desks and file cabinets were cluttered with unnecessary paper-work, books and pamphlets. Some waste paper baskets appeared to have been used as garbage cans, with accumulation of food and drink stains. These visual irritants detracted from the overall professional, industrial look that is scrutinized by IG and staff visitors from higher headquarters. Colonel Marler recommended this be brought to the attention of all personnel during the monthly commander's call.[20] (U)

The deputy commander for maintenance was visited and found that overall maintenance activity was hampered by increasing number of shortages of supervisory personnel, both officer and enlisted. To alleviate critical shortages in the armament and electronics squadron it was recommended that Captain D.L. Birthisel be reassigned from job control to the squadron.[21] (U)

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19. Staff Visit to 567SMS, 8 Jan 63, Exhibit #5.
20. Staff Visit to 4170SW Subj: Operations Visit, 28 Jan 63, Exhibit #6.
21. Ibid.

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, directed that both wings would maintain an on-the-shelf capability to provide emergency refueling to CHROME DOME bomber aircraft inbound to the ZI from Alaska as directed by Fifteenth Air Force Frag Order #1. He further directed that the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing command post would be responsible for maintaining a current status chart reflecting weather, runway conditions, and alert status in sufficient detail to allow the command post to determine the unit to be launched. A normal schedule had been initiated, however, weather or higher headquarters could dictate deviations.[22] (U)

As a result of delinquent DD Form 46 reports sent to the Fifteenth Air Force director of materiel, General Ohlke directed both wings to establish prompt processing of reports survey, both DD Form 46 and DD Form 200. In addition he directed his director of materiel to make this a subject of special interest during all staff visits.[23] (U)

Colonel J.H. Baughn, director of civil engineering, Fifteenth Air Force, was assured by General Ohlke that both of the division's civil engineering squadrons within the two wings were supporting the missile squadron to the maximum. He further stated that this area was under constant surveillance by Fifteenth Air Force and his division

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22. Ltr, 18ADC to 92SAW, 4170SW, Subj: Axe Grinder Refuelings, 28 Jan 63, Exhibit #7.
23. Ltr, 18ADC to 15AF DM, Subj: Delinquent Reports, 14 Jan 63, Exhibit #8.

staff because if a constant check was not maintained, the squadrons had a tendency to slip back to their old procedures.[24] (U)

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24. Ltr, 18SADC to 15AFDCE, Subj: CE Support of Missile Sq., 14 Jan 63, Exhibit #9.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by Wing and Base Staff Agencies.

Reports submitted by Wing and Base Staff Agencies.

Files of the Wing and Base Staff Agencies.

Interview of Wing and Base Officials.

Wing Commander's Remarks attached to the Wing Flying Training Report.

Wing, Base, and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETTEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 4170th Strategic Wing. (U)

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LIST OF EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, CONFIDENTIAL DF 3704, Subj: Airborne Command Post Duties, 7 Dec 62.	1
Staff Visit to 923AW, Subj: Procedural Training, 4 Jan 63	2
Staff Visit to 568SMS, 17 Jan 63.	3
Staff Visit to 4170SW, Subj: Evaluate General Management, 21 Jan 63.	4
Staff Visit to 567SMS, 8 Jan 63.	5
Staff Visit to 4170SW, Subj: Operations Visit, 28 Jan 63.	6
Ltr, 18SADC to 923AW, 4170SW, Subj: Axe Grinder Refueling, 28 Jan 63.	7
Ltr, 18SADC to 15AFIM, Subj: Delinquent Reports, 14 Jan 63.	8
Ltr, 18SADC to 15AF DOE, Subj: 2S Support of Missile Squadron, 14 Jan 63.	9

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

STAFF VISIT BOOK

HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DO

15 January 1963

SUBJECT: Tactical Doctrine Training

TO: MEMO FOR RECORD

1. Major F. J. Riddle conducted a staff visit to the 92d SAW Procedural Training Section on 4 Jan 63, for purpose of reviewing the tactical doctrine study program as referenced in SAC unclassified message DO 000095, 2 Jan 63.

2. Items checked during this visit were: SAC tactical doctrine curriculum, to include hours of training scheduled, course outlines, examination results, and sample of exam questionnaires.

3. To substantiate exam results, crew members of both tanker and bomber crews were orally questioned in regard to tactical doctrine knowledge and were found to be highly proficient with no errors noted.

4. The following items were noted:

a. Curriculum: During the past year and a half the 92d SAW has conducted an excellent and aggressive Tactical Doctrine Training Program. During this period, B-52 and KC-135 crews received training in tactical doctrine during each alert tour of duty.

b. Classes: Lecture type classes were held whenever it was necessary to present new material, explain changes, etc. Tapes and slide classes were used during each training quarter but were supplemented by exam questions to keep from over-exposing personnel to only one type of study program.

c. Exams: Frequent use was made of practice examinations by the instructor. The testing and critiquing of exam results proves as a useful tool to point out weak areas and evaluate the instruction program. An average of 1560 instruction hours were performed each quarter with an exam to evaluate the course. No failures in tactical doctrine have been encountered in the past six months. The aircraft commander is apprised of the questions missed by his crew members. It than becomes the responsibility

#1

of the aircraft commander to give the crew members additional assistance and self study to correct the area of misunderstanding.

5. Recommendations: Evaluation of the Tactical Doctrine Program, as outlined in referenced messages, thoroughly justifys the adoption of the profile mission, and the reward of exemption from further tactical doctrine study for the remainder of the month when a crew receives 100%.

LUCION N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

STAFF VISIT BOOK 3

3

DO 17 January 1963

Staff Visit - 568th Strategic Missile Squadron

4170SW (WC)

1. Lt Colonel M. E. Marler, this headquarters performed a supervisory staff visit to the 568th SMS from 7 January through 10 Jan 63. He was accompanied by Major T. J. Koller, 92d SAW, who covered communications facilities within the squadron. Fifteenth Air Force Missile Commander's checklist, dated 11 Dec 62, was used as a guide during the visit.

2. Findings:

a. Operations Activities Management: Satisfactory.

(1) The file of Operations Instructions in the squadron Operations & Training Division contained a few obsolete OI's which should either be brought up to date or discarded.

(2) Housekeeping practices, both in the squadron operations area and in the launch facilities were generally excellent, particularly in those areas in which project "Nickle Plate" had been completed. Some additional effort should be made in these areas:

(a) Occasional cigarette ashes and coffee stains on lower floor of LCC (Complexes B and C).

(b) Puddle of lubricating oil on floor and large puddle of water from leaking water pump in power room (Complex B).

(c) Puddle of hydraulic fluid on catwalk under actuators for freight elevator doors (Complexes B and C). This is a potential safety hazard and should be eliminated.

(d) Uncovered containers for trash in the kitchen area (Complexes A and B. Not checked at C).

b. Operations: General. Satisfactory.

c. Training. Satisfactory.

(1) Crew training folders (with inserts for individual training) are particularly worthy of note.

#2

(2) Weak areas have been identified and formal corrective training initiated to correct them.

d. Standardization. Satisfactory.

(1) Evaluators are excellent. Recommended corrective actions on weak combat crew members is adequate. General areas of weakness are identified and used as a basis for recurring training.

(2) Standardization results for the October-December quarter are shown below:

		Safety/E.P.	Prof. Exer.	Maint Alert	NWO Perf.
LCO	Tested	7	4	3	3
	Failed	0	0	0	0
	Rate	0	0	0	0
GEO	Tested	8	5	3	3
	Failed	1	0	0	1
	Rate	12%	0	0	33%
EWAT	Tested	5	5	3	3
	Failed	0	1	0	0
	Rate	0	20%	0	0
MMT	Tested	10	5	4	5
	Failed	3	1	0	0
	Rate	30%	20%	0	0
EPPT	Tested	24	12	7	7
	Failed	7	1	0	0
	Rate	29%	83%	0	0
Total	Tested	55	31	20	21
	Failed	11	3	0	1
	Rate	20%	10%	0	5%

e. Operations Plans: Satisfactory. NWO and ORIT plans are adequate to cover the operation for which designed. Squadron personnel exposed to extra sensitive information should receive the briefing and accomplish the certificate required by SACR 205-15.

f. Operations Control: Satisfactory. Fast reaction checklists are within immediate reach of the LCO and GEO. KAA-29s and KAC-65s are also within easy reach. One crew was observed copying a practice Green Dot "Golden Nugget Golf" message and another crew was observed copying a White Dot.

All required actions were performed accurately and efficiently.

g. Communications:

(1) Adequacy. Communications facilities are installed as specified in the SAC approved document titled, "WS107A-2 (Titan I) Communications at Operational Bases." Since the installation of the facilities, operational and maintenance experience has shown a requirement for changes and additions, which were forwarded by the 4170th SW to 15AF on 27 Oct 62. Three approved projects are in the process of being accomplished. A fourth (subparagraph (d)) is complete:

(a) Install telephone extension on diesel fill line to diesel fill gauge in powerhouse.

(b) Install two extensions on emergency reporting net, one to be located outside air intake double door air lock and one to be located inside double door air locks.

(c) Relocate countdown maintenance jack from powerhouse office to communicator panel in powerhouse.

(d) Install extension on gate dial phone to enable use by roving guard.

Single side band and UHF radios installed at the complexes are still not operational because of excessive failure rate of tube PL 172. The Communications-Electronics Division and Western GEEIA should make every effort to eliminate this problem.

(2) Emergency back-up power. In the event of complete electrical power failure at the complex (this has happened) communications with Larson AFB and within the complex will be lost. The Deputy Commander for Civil Engineering is preparing a project to install a 30 KW generator at each complex to provide emergency back-up power for communications. This project should be expedited.

(3) Maintenance Capability. The Communications-Electronics Division with its present manpower is capable of maintaining the site communications facilities in EWO posture. The Lenkurt carrier/cable intersite system is presently being maintained by contract maintenance to ACE. Contract was negotiated by Western GEEIA and expires 9 May 63. Air Force maintenance will be required after this date. The present UMDs authorize six 304X0B with six airmen assigned. These airmen are three level and just graduated from technical school. A conscientious training program will be required for these airmen so as to have a maintenance capability by the required date. Due to the short

time for training, crew or PMR maintenance, [illegible] will be accomplished upon transfer to ICC. Crews maintenance and until such time as a launch can be attained at the required level of technical ability on the equipment involved. Crew training was not included in the contract, thus allowing actual on-the-job-training prior to turnover.

(4) Supply. A check of system status and spare parts revealed no systems inoperative due to parts. Test equipment required to perform maintenance on installed equipment is on hand. Test equipment required for future systems is on requisition. A schedule for PMR of test equipment is on hand and closely monitored.

(5) Communications Control Office. Personnel assigned to this section are properly trained in missile communications facilities. Necessary records and charts are on hand and on display to provide the CCO airman the material to effect rapid restoration of service. Maintenance logs were examined for the period 11 Dec 62 to 11 Jan 63. No trends were evident on any individual portion of a communications system having a critical function. Vehicle control provides maximum utilization of the two vehicles assigned. The Communications-Electronics Division is authorized two cable trucks, one V-47 and one V-17, but they are not on hand. Vehicles must be made available to Comm Division prior to 9 May 63 in order to have a stable maintenance capability on expiration of the present contract.

(6) Training. A training program for missile communications maintenance personnel is established. Program is adequate, closely monitored and supervised. Instructors are thoroughly familiar with the system and capable of conducting the training. Newly assigned personnel are given a thorough briefing on the mission, organization and procedures prior to being assigned a work section.

h. Weather Support: Satisfactory. Required weather observing equipment is installed and combat crews have been trained in its use.

i. Flying Support for Rated Personnel: This remains a chronic problem. The use of available aircraft in a base support role is in most cases incompatible with the time available for missile crew members to fly. These people are frequently cancelled out of local flights in order for the aircraft to be rescheduled on cross-country support flights. At least one missile crew member failed to qualify for flying pay in December for this reason. Some middle ground must be found to eliminate this impasse.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCIEN N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

DM 21 January 1963

Staff Visit to 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson AFB, Wash.

4170SW (WC)

1. A staff visit was made to 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson AFB, Washington, during the period 15-18 Jan 63. Purpose of the visit was to evaluate general management and degree of compliance with applicable procedural directives. AFM 66-1, and CRI reports on March, Ellsworth and Altus Air Force bases were used as guides.

2. Personnel Making Visit:

Lt Colonel J. W. Thompson, DM
Lt Colonel C. B. Murray, DMS
SMS D. J. Newberg, DMAS
SMS E. R. Shankle, DMM

3. Personnel Contacted:

Colonel J. P. McKinnon, Wg Vice Comdr
Lt Col J. N. Crowley, Dep Comdr Mat
Lt Col R. L. Martin, AMMDC
Lt Col P. S. Cole, Wg CSUP

4. General:

a. The attitude and cooperation of all personnel contacted during this visit were extremely gratifying. The willingness to accept constructive criticism and to aggressively correct discrepancies on the spot is commendable.

b. Housekeeping: Throughout the activities visited there is a general tendency toward disorderly arrangement of offices. Maps, diagrams, slogans of all kinds, telephone books, etc., are scotch-taped, thumb-tacked or hung on walls in a disorderly fashion. Some desks and file cabinets are cluttered with unnecessary paperwork, books, and pamphlets. Some waste paper baskets appear to have been used as garbage cans, with accumulations of food and drink stains. These visual "irritants" detract from the over-all professional-industrial "look" and eyewash that is desired by IG and staff visitors from higher headquarters. Recommend this matter be brought to the attention of all personnel during roll call or Commander Calls.

(4)

1157

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

e. Maintenance Control Division - Records Branch:

(1) An excessive backlog of completed TCTOs was on file awaiting return of action copy of AFTO Form 212 from activities responsible for compliance. Supervisors responsible for accomplishing TCTOs must insure prompt return of completed action copy of AFTO Form 212 to the Records activity for proper processing. (Par 2-42, Chap 2, AFM 66-1)

(2) The TCTO program chart is satisfactory; however, recommend chart also reflect a recap of over-all status, i.e., total TCTOs outstanding, total completed, per cent of total completed, and per cent of total awaiting kits.

d. Reports & Analysis Division:

(1) This division is computing maintenance capability and publishing reports satisfactorily in accordance with AFM 66-1. Improvement in over-all effectiveness could be achieved if more publicity were given to selected items of interest or achievement. Analysis personnel have a tendency to assume that all personnel will read and take cognizance of the published monthly maintenance bulletin.

(2) Systematic analysis is not being conducted and disseminated on training required resulting from recurring discrepancies. Quality Control makes random checks from information available in Analysis and develops training requirements.

(3) Organizational functional chart requires up-dating; i.e., reflects Quality Control, Analysis Division which is obsolete.

(4) Two copies of AFM 66-1 are not maintained in a current status. Several outdated MAC Supplements were on file.

f. Quality Control Division:

(1) Past 180 day activity inspections cover all required areas and reflect specific comments on these areas with the exception of management. Recommend all future subject inspections reflect comment on management. (Par 7-22, Chap 7, AFM 66-1)

(2) Corrective actions on 180 day activity inspections are properly reviewed by Quality Control Officer and/or NCOIC; however, recommend that in all cases corrective actions be reviewed by each inspector involved with subject inspection.

3

(2) Majority of [illegible] training to [illegible] and requirements.

(3) No [illegible] this [illegible] AFM 66-1/MAC MAM-1)

(4) [illegible] training [illegible] AFM 66-1, MAC MAM-1.)

(5) Improper form being used to record [illegible] to record [illegible] [illegible] assigned to [illegible]. (Par 2-20b, Chap 7, AFM 66-1/MAC MAM-1)

g. Training Control Division: The Wing Maintenance Training Control [illegible] for monitoring the training of all [illegible] and [illegible] documentation of all actions are [illegible]. All [illegible] required by AFM 66-1 are being [illegible] in a very satisfactory manner.

h. Isolation Division:

(1) Periodic [illegible] recovery, start and control [illegible] records reflect proper [illegible] meetings and scheduled training [illegible]. (ISAF Not Flag Item)

(2) Satisfactory [illegible] inclusion of missiles in the War Support Plan. No problem is foreseen in meeting the 30 Jun 63 [illegible] by 15th Air Force. (ISAF msg [illegible], 14 Dec 62)

i. Field Maintenance Squadron: Due to various stages of moving, the only [illegible] was Fabrication. The latest MAC and ISAF ORI Inspection [illegible] were reviewed with the Maintenance Supervisor and six [illegible] copies were left for utilization in their self-evaluation program.

(1) Fabrication Branch: The Branch office copy of AFM 66-1 requires up-dating. All 15th Air Force supplements were in file. Miscellaneous pipe, screen, angle iron, sheets of metal stock and screen are stored in a very disorderly fashion adjacent to machine shop. Arc welding operations were in progress with no curtains or screens in use to protect other personnel in immediate area from eye injuries.

j. Armament & Electronics Squadron:

(1) In the shop a group of six to eight airmen specialists were observed to be lounging around with no

specific job assigned. In view of the amount of work yet to be done in clean-up and shop arrangement, it appeared that lack of supervision and the injudicious utilization of personnel existed.

k. <u>A&E Analysis</u>:

(1) Review of aircraft records indicates that quality maintenance is being performed and adequate analysis is being prepared on maintenance effectiveness and operational capability. Recommend additional emphasis be given to the review of system histories for possible uncorrected aircraft discrepancies. For example, on aircraft 5108, seven azimuth computers and eight RT-[illegible] have been replaced since September 1962. This appears excessive and indicates a possible problem in aircraft cabling or in associated equipment. In other cases MADREC analysis indicated defective equipment; however, no action was taken to correct the suspected malfunction.

(2) The following items relating to maintenance effectiveness were not being prepared and disseminated by analysis:

(a) Quality Control discrepancies by work center and total.

(b) Trends in daily AWN backlog.

(c) Trends in daily AWP backlog.

(3) Component discrepancy rates are prepared and disseminated only on items exceeding a predetermined high failure rate. This information should be disseminated for at least the eight highest failure items.

(4) Recurring discrepancies in individual components were not being determined by Analysis.

(5) Shop action was not indicated on system histories for items removed for malfunctions in some cases. Recommend expeditious routing of AFTO Forms to the Analysis activity to provide data necessary for the determination of adequacy of corrective action taken.

(6) Bomb-Nav system operational checks were not current for bench maintenance sets. An operational check is required every 30 days or when a component which affects alignment is replaced. Records indicate that the last operational check was performed on 20 Nov 62.

1161

1. Training Control:

(1) The training program is being closely monitored by the training activity. A total of 20 personnel are on file. Non training on 8/8 in support of establishment criteria has been tested four recurring during the January cycle. The following discrepancies were noted:

(a) CYMP instructors do not attend monthly training meetings to assist in establishing training requirements.

(b) Personal training records for personnel assigned for flying status were not current as to flight proficiency, professional training, unit ejection and aquatic survival. These records were brought up to date during the visit. Recommend that the training section monitor and maintain training requirements for all personnel.

(c) The training activity has not been provided with all communications used by CYMP and results obtained. CYMP training should be closely monitored by the training activity, including a review of examinations administered to insure that adequate CYMP training is being conducted.

(d) 1464 Forms 126, CYMP Control Cards, were not available for assigned CYMP.

m. Production Control:

(1) An extremely effective Production Control Section was evidenced. Control of in-shop reparables, AWM and AWP components was particularly noteworthy.

(2) The intercommunications system has not been installed. Follow-up action should be taken to expedite the installation to provide direct communication between Production Control and Maintenance shops.

(3) Minimum working levels have not been established for reparable components, and supply levels were not available. Immediate action should be taken to establish minimum and available levels to enable Production Scheduling to assign proper priorities to AWM components.

6. On conclusion of this visit the Vice Wing Commander was critiqued on major findings contained herein.

7. The Supply portion of the report is appended hereto as Attachment 1.

d

8. A reply to this correspondence is neither desired nor required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Material

1 Atch
Supply Staff
Visit Report,
18 Jan 63

HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DMS 18 January 1963

SUBJECT: Staff Visit - Larson AFB, Washington

TO: DM

1. Person Making Visit: Lt Colonel Charles B. Murray

2. Period of Visit: 14-18 January 1963

3. Persons Contacted:

Colonel J. P. McKinnon, Acting Wg Comdr
Lt Colonel R. D. Salter, MC
Lt Colonel Perry Cole, Chief of Supply
WO J. R. Paris, Acting MSO
SMS Glogovsman, NCOIC, M&P Sect, Base Supply
Major T. M. Sullivan, BPO

4. Purpose:

a. To determine what initial actions were being taken to comply with missile supply improvement recommendations made by Hq 15th AF Missile Program Assistance Team during the week of 7 Jan 63.

b. To spot check compliance with the new Vol I, SACM 67-3, dated 21 Dec 62.

c. To check supply support of Civil Engineer Work Order requirements.

d. To make a routine visit to the Base Procurement Office.

5. Findings and/or Recommendations:

a. Initial Supply Actions Taken Reference Hq 15AF Missile Program Assistance Team:

(1) Outdated bench stock listings are in the process of being revised. Target date for completion is 15 Feb 63.

(2) Bench stock bin labels required by the new SACM 67-3 will be completed by 15 Feb 63.

(3) Base Supply personnel are presently inventorying stocks in the Missile Squadron Tool Crib; completion of

Atch 1

inventory and change over of Tool Crib operation to Base Supply should be completed not later than 25 Jan 63.

(4) A procedure has been established to notify the Materiel Control function of the 568th SMS when back order release issues are made to missile maintenance.

(5) The 17 line items of pre-positioned stock for which no requirement existed are presently being withdrawn from the missile site complexes. Additionally, a written query is being sent to the 568th SMS relative to any requirements which may exist for other pre-positioned stocks at the complexes.

(6) All AWP spares have been transferred to the Production Scheduling Section of the 568th SMS.

(7) System for verification of NORS and other priority requirements has been improved by the assignment of MSgt Moody from Base Supply to Materiel Control, 568SMS. It should also be noted that the Base Supply Controller has written verification for all previous priority requirements in his files. These files were not examined by the Hq 15AF Missile Program Assistance Team. Had such an examination been conducted, I believe that the nature of their findings in this instance would have been quite different.

b. Spot Check of Compliance with the New Vol I, SACM 67-3, dated 11 December 1962:

(1) All Base Supply personnel are involved with and studying the new manual. It is noted that many changes in internal operating procedures are directed. Progress being made at this time is considered satisfactory. It does appear, however, that several paragraphs will require clarification by higher headquarters, and such action was recommended to the Chief of Supply.

c. Supply Support of CE Work Order Requirements:

(1) Previous instructions published by Hq SAC in September 1962 which pertain to the establishment of a Civil Engineer Self-Service Department at the CE Maintenance location have been incorporated in the new SACM 67-3. The Base Supply Officer and the Chief of Supply notified the Base Civil Engineer over 90 days ago that a requirement in his area for 5000 sq ft of warehouse space was essential for the establishment of this self-service outlet. As yet the space has not been made available. Recommend that this matter be resolved as soon as possible so that compliance with SACM 67-3 can be effected.

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(2) There are 88 [illegible] supply [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]



HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DM

8 January 1963

SUBJECT: Staff Visit - 567th Strategic Missile Squadron

TO: 92SAW (WC)

1. Persons Conducting Visit:

Col L. L. Jella, Spec Ass't to the Comdr
Lt Col J. W. Thompson, DM
SMS D. J. Newberg, DMAE
SMS E. R. Shankle, DMM
MSgt R. C. Sicher, DCMQ

2. Period of Visit: 2-4 January 1963

3. Persons Contacted:

Col W. E. Burrill, 567SMSC
Lt Col A. Chalifoux, Chief of Maint
Lt Col H. R. Faison, OIC Maint Cont
Maj V. W. Ford, QCE
Maj J. C. Whitley, Maint Tng Off
CWO Gephart, PCOIC

4. Purpose: Scheduled visit with emphasis on compliance with higher headquarters directives, SACP 66-2 items, AFM 66-1 and EWO responsibilities.

5. Findings and Recommendations:

a. General:

(1) Maintenance activities visited did not have copies of SACP 66-2, "Items for Materiel and Inspector General Surveillance." Recommend submission of a PRT for sufficient copies to provide major activities with this publication.

(2) Publications are not being received promptly by activities of primary interest. For example, SACSUP-1 to Chap 4.1 and Chap 6, AFM 66-1 were received by publications and placed in the 567th distribution box on 22 Dec 62. These needed publications were not available on 2 Jan 63. Recommend added emphasis be given to prompt pick-up and distribution of all pertinent publications.

b. Chief of Maintenance: Activities visited were generally satisfactory. Personnel were aware of the many changes required by new SAC Supplements to AFM 66-1 and were implementing the new requirements. Improvement was noted in compliance with applicable directives by activities under Maintenance Supervision. Particularly noteworthy was Production Control where excellent control of in-shop reparables was evidenced. Numerous areas need general clean-up; crowded conditions indicate need for additional emphasis in housekeeping policies.

c. Maintenance Control: A basically sound, well-managed unit was noted. Personnel were well-informed concerning procedural directives and had firm over-all control of the maintenance effort. Missile status and outstanding maintenance requirements were accurately portrayed on the Maintenance Control and equipment locator boards.

(1) Stabilizing assignments of personnel assigned to Plans and Scheduling should be considered. Numerous reassignments have occurred during the past year and replacement of the NCOIC is programmed for the near future. Specific requirements of tasks within this section are such that frequent personnel rotation is not feasible. Operating deficiencies can result and it should be noted that the majority of the discrepancies cited are attributable to the Plans and Scheduling element of Maintenance Control.

(2) The Organizational and Functional chart was not current. It was being reaccomplished at time of inspection. The old chart on display had not been approved by the FAFB Manpower Management Office as required by FAFB SUP-1, to 15AFR 20-1.

(3) The Plans and Scheduling Maintenance Readiness folder is incomplete and does not contain the following:

(a) List of maintenance teams by type and a copy of each team supervisor's plan. (EWO and ORI)

(b) Key maintenance personnel work schedule and duty assignment.

(c) A copy of the War Support Plan.

(d) SAC Manuals 50-26 and 55-7 (Secret).

Some of the foregoing items were available but were not in the folder. They should be consolidated into one Maintenance Readiness folder and maintained by Plans and Scheduling. (Ref: Par 2-17L, Chap 2, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1)

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(4) Paragraph 2-19, Chap 2, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1 indicates that a SAC Form 541 is to be used for the Weekly Maintenance Schedule format. Presently, FAIR forms 12 are used for monthly plans and FAIR Forms 42 for weekly maintenance plans to comply with 15AFM 55- Test. Deviations from AFM 66-1 as supplemented are not permissable without coordinating through SAC. SAC Forms 541 should be implemented as soon as possible, or authority to continue use of the local FAIR forms requested through SAC.

(5) Time compliance technical orders are not included as firm scheduled maintenance requirements in monthly/weekly maintenance plans. (Ref: Par 2-19, Chap 2, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1)

(6) Pre-inspection meetings are conducted in the 567SMS; however, they are not included in monthly/weekly maintenance plans. (Ref: Par 2-19a, Chap 2, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1)

(7) Estimated specialist support requirements are not always indicated with scheduled maintenance in weekly maintenance plans. (Ref: Par 2-19, Chap 2, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1)

(8) Scheduling missile/RV mating, demating and transport are required items to be included in monthly/weekly maintenance plans. They were not included as pre-planned maintenance actions in the plans presented for inspection. (Ref: Par 2-9p(13), Chap 2, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1)

(9) SAC Manuals 50-26 and 55-7 (Secret) should be readily available to the Plans and Scheduling NCOIC so that EWO and ORI planning can be more effectively accomplished. Familiarity with these required directives was not firm.

(10) The EWO planning chart maintained in Job Control should be modified to provide space for entering "A" hour as paragraph 2-17(3)(b), Chap 2, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1 requires. The present chart should be modified to more closely resemble Figure 24-1, Chap 24, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1.

(11) Recommend that a foot operated switch be installed in the area of Job Control where radio facilities are employed. This installation would permit the operator/controller to write dispatch orders and erase or write on the console display boards while transmitting.

(12) The senior controller's (EWO), key supervisors' plan (checklist) was in the preparation stage. It should be completed and made ready for use by the senior controller and his designated assistant as soon as possible. (Ref: Par 2-17L (5), Chap 2, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1)

(13) The War Support Plan for the 567SMS was in the preparation stage. Suspense date for completion of the plan

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is 30 Jan 63. It should be completed and made ready for sue by all elements of the squadron as soon as possible. The plan up-dates the previous Maintenance Readiness Plan and Operations Plans. The lack of a current War Support Plan in force can affect unit capability to prepare for EWO and ORI. (Ref: SACM 400-2)

(14) The category of TCTOs "R", "U", or "I" was noted as frequently omitted from Column "C" of DD Forms 829-1, "Technical Order Compliance Records." (Ref: Par 5-12j, Sect V, T.O. 00-20E-1)

(15) The required entry in Block "C" directed by paragraph 5-14a(11) should be included for those records being annually reaccomplished. A set of DD forms 829-1 partially reaccomplished was inspected and this entry did not appear.

d. Quality Control and Evaluation:

(1) Activity inspections require additional emphasis. Primarily, activity inspections reviewed dealt with AFTO form discrepancies and technical matters. Little comment on the adequacy of supervision and management was noted. A standard format on the front cover of the activity inspections rated supervision and management; however, the body of the reports contained few comments or discrepancies.

(2) All detailed procedures required by par 25-3a, Chap 25, AFM 66-1 have been developed. At time of visit the following were being up-dated and/or were ready for publication:

(a) POL spot checks.

(b) Inspection during scheduled/unscheduled maintenance.

(c) Verifying status of hardware and condition during ORI/local exercise.

(d) Publication familiarization program.

(e) Monitoring TCTO status.

(3) Chapter 25, AFM 66-1/SACSUP-1, 10 Dec 62, has eliminated 10% in commission inspections, therefore, future site activity inspections must reflect a comment on verification of alert status.

e. Training Control:

(1) Correspondence received from SAC indicates that the UMD for Training Control will be increased from the present 7 to 15 personnel effective 1 Jul 63. Due to the excessive

workload levied on Training Control to prepare and administer required training programs, recommend consideration be given to assigning additional personnel in advance of the programmed date.

(2) The physical location of Training Control is unsatisfactory. It is virtually impossible to conduct the required interviews and evaluations, complete personnel testing, prepare audio visual programs, and accomplish other training requirements in the present location. Training Control should be moved or the present location should be extensively modified to provide an adequate facility.

(3) The Organization and Functional chart was not current. A new chart is being prepared but was not available at the time of the visit. Recommend that the chart be prepared and correctly posted as expeditiously as possible.

(4) Training programs established by Training Control appeared satisfactory; however, there were no records available to indicate that all maintenance training is monitored by Training Control. Recommend a planned program be developed for monitoring training to insure use of proper procedures.

(5) Additional emphasis is needed to insure positive control of AFTO Forms 35, Operator's Permit. The present method whereby the AGE supervisor submits a list of personnel qualified to operate a specified item of mobile AGE does not appear adequate for AFTO Form 35 certification by Training Control. Recommend that AGE supervisors develop a training program for all items of AGE, that course outlines be reviewed, and courses monitored by Training Control.

(6) An excellent Audio Visual Program is being implemented by TSgt Mangin with four programs completed, six under development, and 42 additional programs identified to be developed. Lack of required equipment prevented earlier completion of audio visual programs. Required equipment is now on hand.

f. Maintenance Supervision: Supervision and procedural management noted as marginal during previous visit by this headquarters is now satisfactory. The following discrepancies were noted during this visit:

(1) Organizational functional chart requires up-dating, i.e., still reflects periodic maintenance.

(2) All other charts require up-dating, i.e., leave chart, project chart, personnel locator charts, etc.

(3) 15th Air Force Weapons Maintenance Control letter file requires up-dating. Majority of applicable (AM & M) letters were not in file.

(4) AFM 66-1 requires up-dating, latest SAC supplements are not in file, i.e., Chapters 4.1, 6,9,16, etc.

(5) In this office, there was a general appearance of lax housekeeping, i.e., miscellaneous articles on top of and behind file cabinets and book cases.

g. Production Control: Excellent progress has been made since the last visit which rated this section unsatisfactory. Personnel assigned were well-versed in detailed procedures necessary for effective production scheduling. Productrol boards are employed and firm control of reparables was evident.

(1) Components in AWP status are being retained in Base Supply (previously AFW Supply). 15th AF WMCL, AM-40, and par 3-35F added (Secret), require AWP items to be retained, controlled and processed by Production Control. This deviation should be corrected immediately.

(2) AF Forms 1297, are not being initiated for all reparables, supply point items and bench check, and TCTO items withdrawn from supply stocks as par 3-35F added (3) and (6), SACSUP-1, requires. Initiation of the AF Forms 1297 is the responsibility of Base Supply. Personnel of Production Control should not accept components from Base Supply unless they are accounted for through use of this form. Maintenance supervision should coordinate with Base Supply to insure that AF Forms 1297 are used in all instances and not just for Hi-Valu items, as is the present practice.

(3) Floors are in very poor condition in tool crib and Production Control.

(4) Area in rear of Production Control needs immediate attention to provide proper warehousing and identification of equipment and supplies.

h. MAMS:

(1) Miscellaneous supplies, charts, etc., on top of and behind files.

(2) All areas of MAMS shops, including the MAMS office, are in need of floor clean-up, painting, and sealing. Over-all appearance is very unimpressive and does not conform to cleanliness standards expected in a missile maintenance area.

1. Electrical Checkout and Calibration:

(1) Equipment status chart does not show date equipment went to PMEL or date it is due back, thus, indicating there is no continuous monitoring or follow-up on equipment undergoing calibration. A signal generator, 299U, was overdue calibration since 26 Dec 62.

(2) Two metal storage cabinets were jammed with miscellaneous equipment, supplies, and "junk" which demonstrates very poor warehousing and housekeeping.

(3) Floors and rubber mats were not clean and floors need painting and sealing.

(4) Blackboard suspended from cable tray brackets near center of shop is an eyesore and should be relocated or removed.

(5) DITMOCO equipment on hand since contractor turned shops over to SAC has never worked. Numerous queries and follow-up have failed to produce any results. It appears that no one can get equipment to work, nor can anyone validate it. Equipment is now in semi-storage status in shop. Recommend equipment be cleaned, properly prepared and covered, and moved to supply for storage pending long delayed decision as to whether it will ever be used. Further recommend higher headquarters be advised of action, and disposition instructions requested.

j. Electrical Shop: Extensive bench stock being maintained in the shop. Action should be taken to request authority for a bench stock or move it next door to Production Control where it is authorized.

k. Guidance:

(1) The shop is crowded and generally untidy. Housekeeping is in need of attention but civilians involved in modification program, and crowded area, make it very difficult to maintain any semblance of order.

(2) Test equipment cabinets are badly in need of cleaning and repainting.

l. Propulsion Shop:

(1) Sensor Simulator Unit overdue calibration since 28 Jul 62. PMEL reports they cannot calibrate this item due to lack of equipment. Follow-up required of squadron to depot requesting action.

(2) Flush and purge area needs thorough clean up.

6. Summary:

a. General maintenance management practices and procedures are satisfactory with noteworthy progress being made in all areas.

b. Training Control is faced with an enormous task of testing, interviewing, and evaluating, plus developing and administering a multitude of training programs. This section requires the utmost cooperation and support of all personnel within the squadron.

c. Housekeeping and general cleanliness, particularly in the MAMS shops, has deteriorated and needs immediate attention.

7. Reply or indorsement to this report is neither desired nor required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. Thompson

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

STAFF VISIT BOOK

DO:

28 January 1963

Staff Visit - 4170th Strategic Wing, Larson AFB, Wash.

4170SW (SC)

1. An Operations staff visit was performed to the 4170th Strat Wing, Larson AFB, Washington, by Colonel L. N. Powell, Major F. J. Riddle, and Captain C. J. Munch during period 14-16 Jan 63. The purpose of this visit was to observe functions of agencies under the Deputy Commander for Operations and perform follow-up action on messages from higher headquarters pertaining to the following activities:

a. Non-tactical instructor pilot briefings.

b. CCTM crew briefings.

c. B-52 and KC-135 ORIT briefings.

d. Bar None exercise.

(1) Target Intelligence

(2) Penetration Aids

e. Tactical Doctrine Training Program.

f. Missile ORI preparedness.

2. Non Tactical Instructor Pilot Briefings:

a. A Non-tactical Instructor Pilot meeting was conducted by Captain Loy, Chief of Non-tactical Standardization Branch, at 1300 PST, 15 Jan 63, in the Base Operations Building. Emphasis was placed on impartial standardization checks, logging of hood time, correct procedures for Form 5 recording, 51-4 critique procedures and the importance of "Safety Above All" tactics for non-tactical flying.

b. These IP meetings are an asset to an organization and will prove to be a useful tool to offset the possibility of problem areas in non-tactical aircraft flying.

3. CCTM Crew Briefings: Combat crew training missions were monitored in the 327th Bomb Squadron and the 43d ARS. SACM 50-12 is being complied with and briefings are deemed adequate.

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4. CREW Briefings:

a. Briefings are conducted each day by bomber and fighter crews of the 4170th.

b. The bomber crews brief on the procedures to be used throughout the mission to include air refueling, RCM activity, low level, bombing, control procedures, navigation and entering procedures.

c. The crew knowledge is adequate; however, added emphasis must be placed on target materials utilizing knowledge gained from Bar None exercise.

5. Bar None Exercise: Due to the amount of unreliable bomb runs accomplished on Bar None mission, it was necessary for the 4170th to cancel the scheduled sorties for the remainder of the week and regroup, study results, and establish a procedure to eliminate any possible area of weakness. Listed below are areas which must receive added emphasis to keep the 4170th from going on probation:

a. Target Intelligence Branch:

(1) Radar photo montages furnished crews in target folders are a very poor caliber of material for such an important mission.

(2) The target intelligence branch lacks imagination, initiative and aggressiveness in supporting the Bar None mission. There is no indication that adequate research or attempts were made to secure sufficient contour information to portray quality predictions of the type essential to the success of this vital mission. Reference General Old's message C-107, Aug 1961, and C-130, 15 Dec 61.

b. Penetration Aids:

(1) Due to the trend established in unreliable LOR and RBR activity it is necessary to evaluate the procedures and equipment of the 4170th. Captain Bunch of the 92d BAV visited the Penetration Aids Section to discuss discrepancies and resolve noticeable problem areas.

(2) Discussion with operators who had received unreliable scores established the following facts:

(a) All runs were conducted using standard procedures which had consistently produced reliable results against fixed RBS sites.

(b) APR-54s appeared to be operating normally on all LDMs.

(c) All look-ons were detected on APR-54 and jammed with a resulting late-jamming score being received.

(d) APR-54 gain controls were set at a normal level, which gives satisfactory results at fixed RHAW sites.

(d) No AAM problems were reported on these sorties in regard to ECM equipment.

(3) Probable cause for the unreliable ECM activity can be attributed to either low gain settings used on APR-54 equipment, or failure of ECM gear to transmit signals from aircraft. This could be caused from feed back, improper grounding or laxity of maintenance check of equipment.

c. The following recommendations were made for future Bar None flights:

(1) Aircraft fly a successful CCTM mission with bombing and ECM activity accomplished with MADREC equipment operational, prior to flying on Bar None sorties.

(2) Have a duty crew preflight and check all equipment for perfection on day prior to flight.

(3) Aircraft that are not in top condition or are questionable, will be cancelled from scheduled sortie.

6. Tactical Doctrine Training Program:

a. For the last year and a half the 4170th SW has conducted an aggressive and adequate tactical doctrine training program. This training program has been accomplished at frequent intervals to present new material, introduce and explain changes.

b. Tactical doctrine study is being accomplished in the Wing Combat Operations EWO Study section along with EWO study; the instructor for this program being the EWO study officer.

c. Testing is performed orally each time a crew assumes alert. To facilitate this testing the instructor has prepared a flip card index with questions pertaining to each position on the aircraft.

d. The 4170th SW is presently preparing the profile type of training program directed by SAC message DO 000095, 2 Jan 63. Estimated implementation date 1 Feb 63.

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6. The Combat Operations Branch is responsible for tactical doctrine study; however, it is recommended that a pilot from the Training Division be augmented to assist in presentation of pilot techniques which are more readily accepted when explained by another pilot.

7. Missile CBI Preparedness: The 568MMS was visited by Colonel Powell on 17 Jan 63. This visit was accomplished to check on crew status, standboard status, and systems checkout procedures presently in progress.

8. The discrepancies noted in this report were discussed in detail by the undersigned with Colonel J. P. McKinnon, Acting Wing Commander, and Lt Colonel F. G. Latawiec, Wing DCO. They concurred in the validity of the noted discrepancies.

9. This report is for your information and whatever action is deemed necessary. No formal reply is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCIEN N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

Hino

[redacted]

26 January 1963

Arm Grinder Refuelings

4170SW (WC)
[redacted]AV (WC)

1. As directed by 15th AF Prog Order #1 to SAC OPORD 33-63, 10 Aug 62, the Commander 15th Strategic Aerospace Division, will maintain an on-the-shelf capability to provide emergency refueling to "Chrome Dome" B-52 aircraft inbound to the SI from Alaska.

2. It is your responsibility to establish and maintain flight plans and fixtures for your aircraft, so as to be capable of launching to either one of the areas listed in 15th AF Prog Order #1 to SAC OPORD 33-63 upon notification of requirement.

3. The 93d BAW Command Post will be responsible for maintaining a current status chart reflecting weather, runway, and alert crew status, in sufficient detail to allow the Command Post to determine the unit to be launched. Normally, the unit will be as contained in the attached assignment sheet. However, weather or higher headquarters, may dictate deviations.

4. This letter is directive and will eliminate the need for 15th BAD Prog Order #1 to SAC OPORD 33-63 "Chrome Dome." This letter is authority for destruction of 15th BAD Prog Order #1.

5. The 93d BAW will be primary for Arm Grinder support, with 4170th SW secondary support for the weeks as indicated below:

January 4, 21	July 7, 21
February 4, 18	August 4, 18
March 4, 18	September 8,15,29
April 1,15,29	October 14,28
May 12, 27	November 11, 25
June 10, 24	December 9, 23

6. The 4170th SW will be primary for Arm Grinder support, with the 93d BAW secondary support for the weeks as indicated below:

January 14, 26
February 11, 25
March 11, 25
April 8, 22
May 6, 20
June 3, 17

July 1, 15, 29
August 12, 26
September 9, 23
October 7, 21
November 4, 18
December 2, 16, 30

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCIUS H. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

2

14 Jan 1953

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

14 Jan 1963

Colonel J. H. Douglas
Director of Civil Engineering
Pittsburgh Air Force
March AFB, California

Dear Buss:

Attached per your request is a copy of my letter of 23 November to each of my wings concerning the civil engineering support of the missile units.

As you can see from perusing the answers, and particularly the 92d Wing's answer, they have included a bunch of gobbledygook and are really evading the question. I can assure you both the wing's CE organizations are supporting the missile squadrons to the maximum.

This is an area that needs constant watching by divisions as well as 15th Air Force, whenever they are making a staff visit. Through long and sad experience in dealing with the wings, we have found that unless you constantly check, they will go back to their old way of doing business.

I hope this information will be of assistance to you, and it is what I had discussed with General Wilson.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

2 Atch
1. 92SAW reply
2. 4170SW reply

MEMO FOR: General Ohlke 9 Jan 1963

SUBJECT: Civil Engineer Support of Missile Squadron

1. Colonel Baughn called at 1100 hours this date, requesting you send him a copy of the policy and study you presented at 15th Air Force for the use of Civil Engineer forces for missiles. General Wilson has asked Colonel Baughn to put out a similar policy for all 15AF units.

2. If you do not have a duplicate copy of the study, if you send him the original he will return it within a week.

A. LOUIS LANEY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

SECRET

HISTORY

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

1189

008189

HISTORY

SECRET

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1-28 FEBRUARY 1963

RETURN TO
Director
Aerospace Studies Inst
ATTN: Archives Branch
Maxwell AFB, Alabama



Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It was prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the period of this history. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield
RAY J. HARTSFIELD
1st Lt., USAF
Information Officer

A. Lewis Laney 4/61
FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY

Ray J. Hartsfield
(Approving Authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

5-4102-7

15AF DXI 63-48
Atch 19'

SECRET

1190

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A & E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commission for parts
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
ECM	Electronics Counter Measures
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base

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EGT	Exhaust Gas Tempature
EPR	Engine Pressure Ratio
ETS	Expiration of term of service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWO	Electronics Warfare Officer of Observer
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base
FOB	Flack Order Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
GCA	Ground Control Approach
GPI	Ground Position Indicator
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IP	Initial Point
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LDR	Local Defense Run
LGR	Low Gear Run
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
LSR	Launch Simulated Run
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment

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MCC	Missile Combat Crew
MCCC	Missile Combat Crew Commander
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
NDR	Nike Defense Run
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officer Effectiveness Report
OOAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the job training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
ORT	Operational Readiness Test
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PIP	Pre-initial Point
PST	Pacific Standard Time
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
RSR	Radar Simulated Run
SAW	Strategic Aerospace Wing
SEA	Scoring Error Average
SEP	Scoring Error Probable
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSG	Strategic Standardization Group
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty

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T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance
TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
VOCO	Verbal Order of the Commanding Officer
VOR	Visual Omni-range
ZI	Zone of Interior

1195

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, the Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing are organized, manned, trained and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing develope and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd

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1. SAC Reg. 23-15, 20 Apr 62, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

19TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Commander	Brig. Gen. Harold W. Ohlke
Executive Officer	Lt. Colonel A. Louis Laney
Director of Operations	Colonel Lucius N. Powell
Director of Safety	Lt. Colonel Thomas H. Paskell
Director of Materiel	Lt. Colonel James W. Thompson
Supply Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Charles B. Murray
Operations Staff Officer	Lt. Colonel Maurice E. Marler
Operations Staff Officer	Major Frank J. Riddle
Administrative Officer	Captain Louis F. Sparrow

Administration

Under the new SAC implemented program of retaining illustrious unit designations from World War II units, Larson Air Force Base's 4170th Strategic Wing was redesignated the 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing effective on 1 February. The old 462d Bombardment Group, Heavy had seen action in Thailand, Japan, Burma, China, Formosa and Indonesia until its deactivation at the end of the war. Originally, the 462d Bombardment Group had been assigned the 768th, 769th, 770th and 771st Bombardment Squadrons. When the 4170th Strategic Wing was redesignated the 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing, the 327th Bombardment Squadron assigned to the wing became the 768th Bombardment Squadron. The hospital section, munitions maintenance squadron, missile squadron and the tanker squadron remained the same. All other squadrons were redesignated the 462d. (U)

On 31 January Colonel Leonard L. Jelis, special assistant to the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, retired after 20 years military service. Prior to his assignment to the division, Colonel Jelis served as commander of the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild Air Force Base. During his tenure as commander, the squadron won the USAF Missile Safety Award for 1961 and contributed much to the winning of the SAC Charles D. Treil Materiel Award and several Fifteenth Air Force Haskel Gray Maintenance Awards. He was also credited for developing one of the most outstanding Atlas

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4. Special Order, G-139, Subj: Retention of Illustrious Unit Designations, 28 Nov 62, Exhibit in the 462d SAW Hist Rpt for Feb 63, Filed: IXOH.

E missile squadrons in Fifteenth Air Force. This loss coincided with the division losing one officer during February. He was Captain Louis F. Sparrow Jr., administrative officer on 11 February. Captain Sparrow was formerly a H-43B helicopter pilot assigned to the rescue detachment at Fairchild Air Force Base. [5] (S)

In February the bomber combat crew strength of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing numbered 97 crews. Of these, eight were in select status, 16 in senior status, two in combat ready status and one crew in non-combat ready non-availability status. Meanwhile the combat crew strength of the air refueling squadron stood at 36 tanker crews of which 29 were in senior status, five in combat ready status, one in non-combat ready status and one in non-combat ready non-availability status. During this period, one senior crew was downgraded to non-combat ready status. [6] (S)

Larson Air Force Base had 26 bomber crews assigned during February of which six were in select status, 18 in senior status and two in combat ready status. The 43rd Air Refueling Squadron was assigned 36 tanker crews. Of these, seven were rated in senior status, 28 in combat ready status and one crew formed in January was rated in non-combat ready status. [7] (S)

The 15 B-52D bombers at Larson Air Force Base flew 75 sorties in 961:45 flying hours and the 21 KC-135A tankers flew 139 sorties in a total of 762:15 flying hours. Fairchild's 16 B-52D bombers

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5. Special Order, AB-16677, USAF, Wash D. C., 21 Dec 62, Exhibit #1.
6. Hist. Rpt., SECRET, 92SAW for Feb 63, Filed: IXOH.
7. Ltr, Crew and Flying Figures for Feb 63, SECRET, 21 Mar 63, Exhibit # 2.

Accomplished 74 sorties in 606.20 flying hours and the 21 KC-135A tankers launched 203 sorties and achieved 593.30 flying hours.[8] (S)

During February, Larson continued to support the requirements of Operation OVROME DOME. Under this operation the wing launched a bomber daily on a 24-hour tour of airborne alert duty and tankers to Eielson Air Force Base and the Eielson Tanker Task Force on a rotational basis for air refueling support of the airborne alert force. Both wings also flew reflex and support missions including a tanker each to Hawaii in Operation AIR MAIL. Both bomber wings continued to fly BAR NONE missions.[9] (S)

Staff Visits by 19th Strategic Aerospace Division

Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Thompson, division director of materiel, conducted a staff visit to the 92d Air Missile Maintenance Squadron on 11 and 12 February. During the staff visit Colonel Thompson recommended that a temporary sign designating the squadron area be placed over the main entrance of the building while the unit insigna was pending approval. Housekeeping in general of the squadron area was poor and needed additional emphasis. One item noticed during previous staff visits had not been corrected. The hanger door as well as windows and doors needed sealing.[10] (U)

In the maintenance supervisor's office Fifteenth Air Force supplements were still contained in AF Manual 66-1 and these supplements were no longer effective. In a preflight walk-around of a

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8. Ltr, Crew and Flying Figures for Feb 63, SECRET, 21 Mar 63, Exhibit # 2.
9. Ibid
10. Staff Visit to 92AMMS, DM, 25 Feb 63, Exhibit # 3.

1201

scheduled GAM-77A missile it was noted that several screws were missing around the forward section of one missile. Munitions maintenance personnel were also late arriving for the safe sealing of the squibs. A supply problem was indicated when certain items were listed as critical within the squadron but were not listed as critical in the office of the chief of supply.[11] (U)

Colonel Thompson also performed a staff visit to the 26th Munitions Maintenance Squadron at Fairchild Air Force Base on 13 February. At the time of the inspection munition maintenance operations for the current quarter were considered excellent. A tour of the production control, re-entry vehicle weapons maintenance and loading sections was conducted and housekeeping appearances of these facilities were outstanding. Procedures, compliance with directives and local operating instructions were thoroughly understood and being complied with by supervisors and specialists. A standboard check of a re-entry vehicle mating was in progress and the checklist utilization by personnel being teated as well as the standboard team was excellent. A shortage of 4100-B engine loading trailers was noted in the munitions loading section.[12] (U)

Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Murray, division supply staff officer, supervised a staff visit to complex two of the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron on 20 February. The purpose of the visit was to identify existing discrepancies and render assistance where possible. During the course of the visit, Colonel Murray discovered that the missile

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11. Staff Visit to 02AM9S, DM, 25 Feb 63, Exhibit # 3.
12. Staff Visit to 26MM9, DM, 25 Feb 63, Exhibit # 4.

crews were extremely dissatisfied with the foil pack feeding program. Chief Warrant Officer H. D. Harding, acting food service commander, disclosed that the food service squadron was in the process of establishing a program to improve the packaging situation at each site.[13] (U)

Colonel Murray noted many discrepancies at the missile site. A large number of these discrepancies had been outstanding for the last six months. Among these were the first and second stage low pressure filter switches plumbed backward on the HPU and drinking water too rusty for consumption. Other outstanding problems included a broken missile well headset phone and a helium leak at the high pressure filter in the PCU emergency supply line. In addition, many water leaks were noted. Bins were not labeled to indicate stock numbers nor were bench stock master item numbers and authorized quantities of bench stock items listed.[14] (U)

During Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Thompson's staff visit to the 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing from 3 through 8 February an attempt was made to pinpoint the reasons for the wing's excessive late take-offs and cancellations. Since November, there had been at least six discrepancies pertaining to fluctuating, inoperative or erroneous readings of fuel gauges. Other write-ups pertained to leaking fuel pumps, lamp light and radio failures.[15] (U)

The 47th Munitions Maintenance Squadron at Larson Air Force Base provided satisfactory support activities although numerous items

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13. Staff Visit to 567SMS, IM, 21 Feb 63, Exhibit #5.
14. Ibid.
15. Staff Visit to 462SAW, IM, 12 Feb 63, Exhibit # 6.

included in the programmed more to Plan 53 had not been accomplished. Reports of quality control inspections were not available in the squadron and a review of status information on vehicles and critical equipment indicated that an excessive amount of out-of-commission time was being experienced while equipment and vehicles were undergoing maintenance. [16]

In the maintenance supervision area it was found that the war support plans did not contain the latest amendments and that the current team supervisors plan required updating. Performance of production control was considered satisfactory although action to procure the scheduling console had not been adequate. The facility was also not equipped with adequate communications. For example, two dial lines were controlled with one instrument. In addition, loading supervisors listed the GWM-8 and the Boeing tester as required equipment although these items were no longer required for normal operations. Production control had been designed a category II restricted area but access was not being adequately controlled. The munitions maintenance squadron was preparing a monthly training schedule which duplicated the entries in the wing maintenance training plan. Wing training control was maintaining the training folders for munitions maintenance personnel who were not on individual proficiency training (IPT). The munitions maintenance squadron was also administered maintenance proficiency tests for personnel on IPT whereas all maintenance tests should have been

16. Staff Visit to 462SAW, IM, 12 Feb 63, Exhibit # 6.

administered by wing training control.[17] (U)

A review of the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron operations revealed all items of special interest to the division visitors were satisfactory. Of special significance was the fact that the results of the safety and management examinations were above the SAC average.[18] (U)

Upon visiting the base deputy commander for civil engineering, Colonel Thompson found that although the plan and priorities placed on snow removal were properly established, the organization and operating control were totally inadequate.[19] (U)

Fairchild's 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing deputy commander for maintenance received a staff visit from Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Thompson between 29 January and 1 February. Staff agencies were found to be generally satisfactory in most phases. However, in the maintenance control area the office instruction file was completely unsatisfactory. Operational instructions were dated as early as 1958 and ran through 1961 with only two dated in 1962. SAC Supplements were not annotated in AF Manual 66-1 and SAC Forms 230 and letters to the organizational maintenance squadron for the past six months reflected bomber crew chiefs were continually late in reconciling SAC Forms 230 against the AFTO Form 781. The production control branch also constituted a problem area. This branch required immediate emphasis to insure compliance with primary responsibilities. The location of the production

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17. Staff Visit to 462d SAW, IM, 12 Feb 63, Exhibit # 6.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

boards did not permit satisfactory economy of operation by the production scheduler nor was a control of in shop repairables maintained.[20] (U)

Major Frank J. Riddle, division operations staff officer visited the 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing at Larson Air Force Base on 25 February. The intelligence branch of the deputy commander for operations was found to be placing the same emphasis on domestic target materials as on EWO materials. New montages had been prepared for the BAR [illegible] folders and were used for study for the mission. Target material had been on requisition to experiment in possible new procedures to be utilized in developing a more suitable montage for radar target study with less time consuming delays. In the Form 5 section, five pilots were found to be delinquent in landings. The deputy commander of operations delegated two squadron officers the responsibility of checking the Form 5 section each month. The most recent check had been on 31 January 1963.[21] (U)

Briefings for the wing's battle staff had been conducted every 90 days on current EWO requirements including the status of sorties as prescribed by SAC Manual 55-7. A comprehensive study program was being conducted which included tactical doctrine, special weapons, emergency procedures and combat mission folder study. Additionally, the wing commander had directed the base commander to conduct two Broken Arrow exercises which had been completed satisfactorily.[22] (U)

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20. Staff Visit to 92SAW DCM, DM, 4 Feb 63, Exhibit # 7.
21. Staff Visit to 462SAW DOO, DO, 25 Feb 63, Exhibit #8.
22. Ibid.

Adequate check point control procedures were found to have been established by the 17th Munitions Maintenance Squadron commander for use when removing or transporting re-entry vehicles from storage to the complexes. Pre-selected convoy routes of travel and frequent check points had been established and noted in the control center. In the event of communications failure or deviations from the call-in procedures, the central security force and disaster control personnel would be immediately dispatched.[23] (U)

Supervised and self-study programs were established by the 569th Strategic Missile Squadron training and standardization branches on safety/emergency procedures and were being conducted on a daily basis since 1 January 1963. At that time only sites A-01, B-01 and B-02 had completed a shakedown. Another supervised and self-study program was implemented in the missile squadron. Crews were scheduled to attend a supervised study program covering the use of the dash one and allied publications during each four-day cycle. The self study program included a series of five by eight cards with questions, answers and reference material. These were utilized at the complexes by the missile crews and thus far had produced excellent results as evidenced in the higher grades on examinations.[24] (U)

On 7 February Chief Master Sergeant W. B. Wheeler, division operations staff, conducted a staff visit to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing base operations and the standardization division.

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23. Staff Visit to 462SAW DCO, DO, 25 Feb 63, Exhibit #8.
24. Ibid.

During the visit Sergeant Wheeler noted that the flight planning facilities were in need of improved housekeeping techniques. Loose wiring on the floor of the dispatch section constituted a fire hazard, the base and building directory was unsatisfactory and the passenger lounge was marginal. The condition of the base operations facility offered sufficient evidence that proper maintenance was not being furnished by the janitorial services. In addition the base operations officer had been grounded for physical reasons. The control of manuals was found to be marginal. The flight traffic board was up-to-date and deficient items noted during the division staff visit on 20 December had been corrected.[25] (U)

A staff visit to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild Air Force Base was conducted from 28 January through 1 February by Lieutenant Colonel M. S. Marler. Most areas were adequate and some exceptional. However, Colonel Marler noted that no action had been initiated to relocate the sleeping quarters of the off-duty sentries or provide an alternate solution to the problem of dust and dirt in the communications relays. Supply difficulties had created several communications problems which would be solved locally. The division inspectors also noted that maintenance training would have to be stressed in the micro wave units since the civilian outfit presently maintaining the microwave intersite system and closed circuit television was only under contract until 30 June 1963. After this date military personnel

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25. Staff Visit to 92SAW, DO, 11 Feb 63, Exhibit # 9.

would assume the responsibility of these communications.[26] (U)

Policy Directives of the 15th Strategic Aerospace Division

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 15th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, directed the Larson and Fairchild wing commanders to assume the responsibility of assuring that all crews were in a state of proficiency, permitting immediate and successful completion of their assigned missions. He further directed that these crews develope and maintain a level of proficiency capable of passing any examination - written or flying - at any given time. He also instructed that critical EWO subjects should continue to be a matter of concern to all crew members and commanders.[27] (U)

Recently deficiencies had been revealed through inspecting general teams and division staff visits. General Ohlke was concerned not only with the SAC crew deficiencies, but also deficiencies concerning the 1st Combat Evaluation Group, operational readiness inspections and ordinary proficiency examinations on positive control and the tactical doctrine including weapons.[28] (U)

As a result of several fatal accidents within SAC involving air force motor vehicles, General Ohlke directed that seat belts be installed and used in all government vehicles.[29] In turn the base commanders of the two bases directed the operators of all government vehicles to insure that the seat belts were in use prior to proceeding off base. (U)

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26. Staff Visit to 567SMS, DO, 7 Feb 63, Exhibit # 10.
27. Ltr, 183ADC to 92SAW & 4,62SAW, Subj: Crew EWO Knowledge, 18 Feb 63, Exhibit # 11.
28. Ibid.
29. Ltr, 183ADC to 92SAW & 4,62SAW, Subj: Seat Belt in Gov. Motor Vehicles, 21 Feb 63, Exhibit # 12.

A special subject of concern to General Chlke was the accurate and timely submission of officer effectiveness reports. In correspondence Major General Delmar S. Wilson, deputy commander of Fifteenth Air Force, criticized Fifteenth Air Force units for their unsatisfactory support of this program. Guidance checklists to improve the quality of reports as well as timely submission had been provided all units, but thus far to no avail. Additionally, each commander was instructed to emphasize this program and re-evaluate their system for adoption of a procedure which would insure quality officer effectiveness reports and their timely submission.[30] (U)

30. Ltr, 15AADC to 92SAWC, 462SAW, Subj: Submission of Late & Incorrect OERs, 15 Feb 67, Exhibit # 13.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by division staff agencies.

Reports submitted by division staff agencies.

Files of the division staff agencies.

Interviews of division officials.

Division, Wing, Group and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group; Headquarters for the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing. (U)

LIST OF EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Special Order, AB-16677, USAF, 21 Dec 62.	1
Ltr, Crew and Flying Figures for February 63, SECRET 21 Mar 63.	2
Staff Visit to 92AMXS, DM, 25 Feb 63.	3
Staff Visit to 26MMS, DM, 25 Feb 63.	4
Staff Visit to 567SMS, DM, 21 Feb 63.	5
Staff Visit to 462SAW, DM, 22 Feb 63.	6
Staff Visit to 92SAW DCM, DM, 4 Feb 63.	7
Staff Visit to 462SAW, DCO, DO, 25 Feb 63.	8
Staff Visit to 92SAW, DO, 11 Feb 63	9
Staff Visit to 567SMS, DO, 7 Feb 63.	10
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, 462SAWC, Subj: Crew EWO Knowledge, 18 Feb 63.	11
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, 462SAWC, Subj: Seat Belts in Gov. Vehicles, 21 Feb 63.	12
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC, 462SAWC, Subj: Submission of Late and Incorrect OERs, 25 Feb 63.	13

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SPECIAL ORDER
AB-16677

21 December 1962

1. So much of par 5, SO AB-16491, DAF, 1962, relating to retirement effective 4 Jan 63 of TSGT JOHN J HARRIS, AF33080060, 964 AEW and Con Sq, ADC, McClellan AFB, Calif, is revoked.

2. COL LEONARD L JELLA, 7346A is relieved from assignment Hq 18 Strat Aerospace Div, SAC, Fairchild AFB, Wash; retired per sec 1201 and 1372, Title 10, USC effective 31 Jan 63, and will proceed home of selection. SDN 563. PCS. TDN. 5733500 P 538.01 S 503725 2100 2200.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

CURTIS E. LeMAY
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

R. J. PUGH
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION
S

AB-16677

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4620 STRATEGIC AEROSPACE WING (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

IXOH

21 March 1963

Crew and Flying Figures for February 1963 (U)

924 Strategic Aerospace Wing (IXOH)
Fairchild AFB, Wash.

1. MCS: A summary of the SAC MCS for February has been mailed under separate cover. (U)

2. Aircraft: Fifteen B-52D bombers assigned with seven on alert. Twenty-one KC-135A tankers were assigned, 10 of which were on alert. (S)

3. Missiles: 10 Titan I on hand. (S)

4. Flying Missions and Hours: (S)

	B-52		KC-135	
	Sorties	Hours	Sorties	Hours
Airborne Alert and Support Missions	28	590:05	a* 29	147:55
Reflex and Support Missions			b* 15	73:20
Profile Missions	c* 40	351:20	74	428:20
Test Missions	3	7:15		
Other Missions (Instrument Training)	4	13:05	21	112:40
TOTAL	75	961:45	139	762:15

a* These are the missions in support of Chrome Dome flying out of Eielson AFB, Alaska. They include the deployment and redeployment.

b* The reflex and support missions include Airmail to Hawaii.

c* Ten missions were flown on Bar None.

SECRET

IXOH 63-005

1214

5. Combat Crew Status: Bomber crews: 26, including 6 select, 18 senior and 2 combat ready. There were 36 KC-135 crews with 35 being combat ready; 7 of these were rated senior and 28 were combat ready, and one crew formed in January was not combat ready. Missile combat crews: 16, of which 8 were combat ready and 8 were combat ready with a waiver from the commander. (S)

6. This correspondence is classified SECRET under the provisions of Paragraph 10b, AFR 205-1, dated 10 June 1960. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted or extracted for use in this report, which bears on the combat capability of this organization. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER

ROBERT R. BOYD
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

DM 25 Feb 1963

Staff Visit - 92AMMS

18SAD (C)

INFO: DCM
92AMMS (C)

1. Period of Visit: 11-12 February 1963.

2. Purpose of Visit:

a. Evaluate progress in establishing internal procedures and degree of compliance with maintenance-management directives.

b. To determine problem areas that require on-the-spot guidance or correct or assistance.

3. Persons Contacted: Captain G A Coey, Maint Supv, 92AMMS
1st Lt D C Sands, Asst Maint Supv, 92AMMS
SMS E B Swett, NCOIC Maint Supv, 92AMMS

4. Persons Conducting Visit: Lt Col J W Thompson, DM
SMS D J Newberg, DMAE

5. Following is a resume of findgs and recommendations during this visit:

a. There is no unit designation on any portion of the hanger maintenance building. It is understood that unit insignia is pending approval; recommend a temporary sign designating the 92AMMS be placed over the main entrance of the building.

b. The main office entrance was in bad need of policing. Numerous bits of paper, paper cups, and cigarette butts were evident. During tour of facilities it was noted that a hanger door and Guidance Shop window and doors had not been sealed, as recommended in previous visits. Recommend that this project be implemented immediately and that Guidance Shop be sealed as soon as possible. Captain Coey indicated that sealing of Guidance Shop window and doors would be accomplished no later than 31 Mar 63. It was further recommended that a visit to Hurlburt AFB be made to study the sealing project in the AMMS Building at that base.

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
C	
DEXO	
DM	
DO	
DS	
C	
VC	
DAS	
IXO	
DCO	
DCM	
DSUP	
DP	
BC	
BVC	
BDCO	
BDCS	
BDCE	
BDCL	
BDAS	

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 98, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units) 61-383

1216

c. The facility air conditioning unit was noted to be inadequate to condition the Vace Shop area and in view of the high degree of heat during the summer months, recommend that the current modification project of the air conditioning facility include ducting to the Vace Shop space.

d. It was noted that 15th Air Force Supplements were still contained in the AFM 66-1 and maintained in the Maintenance Supervisor's office. Recommend that these supplements be disposed of since they are no longer effective.

e. A preflight walk-around of the scheduled GAM mission was conducted with Sgt Swett. The following was noted:

(1) Several screws were missing around the forward section of one GAM. This was attributed to the hangar maintenance personnel and corrective action was taken on the spot by Sgt Swett.

(2) The MMS personnel were late arriving for the safe sealing of squibs. This was attributed to delay in crossing the runway from the MMS area.

f. The daily standup briefing was attended and the following discussed:

(1) The problem of obtaining decal break-of-inspection seals during the current austere local restrictions was brought up. It was recommended that:

(a) The DCM be apprised of the importance of the BOI requirement and that the seals be listed as essential mission hardware in order that appropriate priorities for purchasing may be established by the Base Commander during the weekly Local Purchase Funds meeting.

(b) That the preferred method of sealing be utilized wherever possible; i.e., wire seals. (Ref: Par 19-1a(11)(c), SACSUP-1, AFM 66-1).

g. The Analysis Section is maintaining significant progress and establishing its functional responsibilities. Some discrepancies exist, such as the maintenance of malfunction records by separate GAM systems; i.e., hydraulics, flight control, propulsion, fuel, etc. The present method of maintaining this is by individual GAM. For denoting immediate malfunction trends, it should include a separate Form 210 for each system in all GAMs. (Ref: Par 19-1c (2)(d)& g, SACSUP-1, AFM 66-1).

k. A supply problem was indicated where certain items listed as critical within the squadron were not listed as critical in the Office of the Chief of Supply. A followup on this situation was conducted by Sgt Newberg and Sgt Lovin on 12-13 February to correct this irregularity. The problem evolved around a shortage of astro-trackers, helicoils, and pylon attaching bolts.

6. On conclusion of this visit the Acting Squadron Commander, Captain Coey, was briefed on the above findings and recommendations.

JAMES W THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

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COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION
40-0

DM 25 Feb 1963

Staff Visit

General Chilko

INFO: DM
26MMS (C)

1. Activity Visited: 26MMS.

2. Period of Visit: 13 Feb 63

3. Persons Contacted: Lt Col G E Cameron, DCM
Lt Col W G Herring, 26MMSC

4. Persons Making Visit: Lt Col J W Thompson, DM
SMS D J Newberg, DMAE

5. Purpose of Visit:

a. To attend weekly management meeting.

b. To discuss current problem areas and render assistance where required.

6. Findings:

a. The briefing on MMS operations for the current quarter conducted by Sgt Anderson was excellent. It clearly highlighted the management aspects of the MMS operations as well as areas needing immediate attention.

b. A tour of Production Control, R/V Weapons Maintenance and loading sections was made. The housekeeping and appearance of each of these facilities was outstanding. Procedures, compliance with directives, and local operating instructions were thoroughly understood and being complied with by supervisors and specialists.

c. A standboard check of a R/V mating was in progress. The [illegible] list utilization by personnel being tested and the standboard team [illegible] excellent.

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
C	
DEXO	
DM	
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DS	
C	
VC	
DAS	
DCR	
IXO	
DCO	
DCM	
DSUP	
DP	
SAFE	
BVC	
BDCO	
BDCS	
BDCM	
BDCE	
BDCL	
BDAS	
BDP	
BDCR	
BDT	
BJA	
BIXO	
BSM	
BSO	

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AP Subordinate Units) 61-25

1219

d. In the Munitions Loading section it was noted that there was a shortage of 4100-B engine loading trailers. Shortage of this equipment hampers MMS ballast loading operation. One on hand was on loan from the Engine Buildup shop. The unit has been unable to obtain its authorization of two of these trailers. It was recommended that:

a. (1) The DCM be requested to authorize an indefinite loan to the MMS in order that the unit might have absolute control of the trailer.

(2) That aggressive action be taken with the office of the Chief of Supply to obtain the authorized equipment.

NOTE: Subsequent to this visit, message received from Hq 15th Air Force reiterated critical shortage of this trailer. That headquarters recommended maximum use of available resources. (See par a, above).

JAMES W THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

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COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

50-6

DMS

21 February 1963

Staff Visit - 567th SMS

1SSAD (DM)

1. Activity Visited: Complex 2

2. Period of Visit: 20 February 1963

3. Persons Making Visit: Lt Col C. B. Murray, DMS
TSgt J. R. Lovin, DMS

4. Persons Contacted: Lt Col A. Chalifoux, 567SMSC
Major H. H. Wilson, MCCC

5. Purpose: To identify any existing discrepancies and render assistance, where possible.

6. Findings:

a. Foil pak feeding program. Comments relative to the likes and dislikes of this program were received from the missile crew members. General complaint was in relation to the meager portions of coffee received per crew member and the lack of condiments, i.e., catsup, mustard, seasonings, meat sauces, etc. CWO R. D. Harding, Acting Food Service Commander, was contacted 21 February and disclosed that the Food Service Squadron was in the process of establishing a program whereby coffee and condiments would be sent to each site as a package. Delivery of these packages to all complexes will be effected 22 February.

b. Site discrepancies (SAC Form 209). Many of these discrepancies have been outstanding for more than six months. Following are verbatim reproductions of the write-ups:

(1) JCN 1940, 25 Jun 61. 1st and 2d stage low pressure filter switches are plumbed backward on the HPU.

(2) JCN N/A, 12 Jun 62. Drinking water too rusty to drink and creating housekeeping problems (water cooler supply valve closed).

(3) JCN 6802, 20 Jun 62. Missile well phone broken (headset receiver).

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
DMS	[illegible]

5b

(4) JCN 3027, 27 Aug 62. Metal tags on LO2 slug tank vents are rusty and paint is chipped off.

(5) JCN 2051, 6 Sep 62. Helium leak at high pressure filter (bleed port) in PCU in emergency supply line.

(6) JCN 0654, 20 Nov 61. Water leak between tunnel doors 1 and 2. (Leak is out of the wall).

(7) JCN 4124, 15 Nov 62. Water leak at door between kitchen area and vestibule.

(8) JCN 4256, 30 Nov 62. Water leak in communications room from ceiling inside operations office door.

(9) JCN 3047 and 3048, 27 Oct 62. Intake and exhaust ports require cleaning and valves and seats require grinding on both 1 and 2 diesel engines.

(10) JCN 1630, 8 Feb 63. Valve S-42 leaking at bottom fitting on skid #5.

Recommend aggressive action be taken to correct these discrepancies as soon as possible.

c. General Comments:

(1) Bench Stock

(a) Par 20b(6), Chap 7, SACM 67-3, stipulates that bench stocks of ARLS controlled items will be segregated from Base Supply controlled items. There was no display or sign to distinguish ARLS items from Base Supply items.

(b) All bins were not labeled to indicate the stock number, bench stock master item number and authorized quantity. (Par 20b, Chap 7, SACM 67-3)

(2) Housekeeping of sections, military bearing, and personnel appearance were considered excellent. However, it was noted that hand-written signs were placed on the walls of the Power Production room with scotch tape.

Charles B. Murray

CHARLES B. MURRAY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Directorate of Materiel

2

1222

6A-10

DM 12 February 1963

Staff Visit - 463d Strategic Aerospace Wing

463SAW (WC)

1. Subject visit was made to the Materiel activities referenced in paragraph 5 below during the period 5-8 Feb 63.

2. Purpose of Visit:

a. Conduct routine visit to MMS activities.

b. Follow-up on the 3901st MMES unsatisfactory and marginal ratings given to the 568th MMS.

c. Discuss, review, and analyze the unsatisfactory recent rise in late takeoff and cancellation rate of aircraft.

d. Review snow removal plan and make appropriate recommendations for improvement.

3. Persons Conducting Visit:

Lt Col J. W. Thompson, DM
MMS D. J. Newberg, DMAM

4. Persons Contacted:

Col J. P. McKinnon, WC
Lt Col Salter, M.D., MC
Lt Col D. H. Lovelace, MDCH
Lt Col L. H. Mann, DCM
Lt Col W. F. Andrews, MMSC
Lt Col A. Segal, MMSCM

5. Deputy Commander for Maintenance:

a. In an effort to pinpoint reasons for excessive late takeoffs and cancellations, 781 records on several aircraft were examined. Results were as follows:

(1) B-52 5103: (LTO 2 January - no fuel to wing. Bad relay) Since November, there were at least six write-ups pertaining to fluctuating, inoperative or erroneously reading fuel gauges. One write-up pertained to leaking fuel pump.

Gen Chike

(2) B-52 6600: (LTO 8 January - #8 starter shaft sheared). Since 1 December there were over six fuel write-ups pertaining to gauges or erroneous tank readings. There were numerous lamp and light out write-ups along with a comparable number of radio (UHF, Omni, and TACAN) discrepancies.

(3) B-52 6101: (LTO 30 January - electrical short in dump valve) Write-ups since November:

Refuel valve lights out	4
Cannon plug	1
Interphone	4
Radio (UHF-HF-TACAN)	9
Fuel (switches, gauges, flow)	10
Gear indicator	1
Miscellaneous lights out	6
Spare tubes, fuses missing	3
Throttle out of alignment	5

b. Conclusions drawn from the above indicate a definite problem area in instrument-electrical and radio shops and recovery team supervision. A review of Quality Control inspection in these areas reflected minimal activity in recent months (although 180 day activity dead line was due in February, this should not preclude frequent spot checks of problem areas).

c. Further analysis revealed that minimum trend data is retained or maintained in the shops referred to above. The responsibility for seeing that this data is available to and within the shops rests with Reports & Analysis.

d. In view of the foregoing recommend that the electrical, radio, and instrument shops and their specialist activities be established as items of special interest and that aggressive action be taken to reduce excessive number of discrepancies indicated in these areas.

e. On reviewing status of aircraft being prepared for flight it was revealed that:

(1) Aircraft systems deficiencies are frequently picked up on ground crew preflight approximately four to five hours prior to scheduled takeoff. Minimum maintenance time then remains to correct discrepancy prior to arrival of the flight crew.

(2) Normally, aircraft being recovered from flights or being removed from alert status are called in-commission to Job Control 12-24 hours prior to scheduled takeoff times.

1224

The resulting 8-14 hour delay between recovery and ground crew pre-flight time creates a maintenance void. This time could be utilized to pick up discrepancies in systems not scheduled for checking by the recovery team.

f. In view of the foregoing it was recommended that:

(1) The ground crew pre-flight of aircraft systems be scheduled to commence on termination of recovery team action.

(2) That aircraft being taken off alert be taxied rather than towed whenever possible in order to exercise aircraft systems.

(3) That a study be conducted to determine the number and frequency of no-go type discrepancies picked up on ground crew pre-flights. Comments by crew chiefs during this visit indicated that generally one or more such items was discovered.

6. 47th Munitions Maintenance Squadron:

a. Support being provided by the Munitions activities visited was satisfactory. Numerous items included in the program for the move to Plant 83 have not been accomplished. Continuous follow up must be made to expedite completion of these items which could effect the unit's MMO capability. Emphasis should be given to providing emergency power for Production Control and controlling access to Production Control.

b. The 462X0 assigned to DCMQ is not providing adequate coverage of all MMH activities. A review of Quality Control reports for a six month period indicates that too much of his time is being devoted to inspection items unrelated to MMH; end product, and operational inspections of munitions are not being accomplished. There was no evidence of coverage in M/V, Weapons Maintenance, MMD, and Supply activities. Recommend emphasis be given to increasing coverage of all MMH activities. Coordination should be effected between DCMQ and MMH QCAM to obtain assistance from the Missile Squadron 381X0B as necessary to increase job knowledge of the MMH inspector. (Action: DCM)

c. Reports of Quality Control inspections were not available in MMH. Recommend a file of all QC inspection reports be established, and maintained current.

d. A review of status information on MMH vehicles and critical equipment indicates that an excessive amount of

"out of commission" time is being experienced while awaiting and "validation and accounting maintenance." For example:

[redacted] ton trunk, #0910, out 15-20 Nov 62 due to engine stalling.

[redacted] ton trunk, #1040, out 19 Nov-3 Dec 62 for leaking clutch housing.

[redacted] ton trunk, #0918, out 2-4 Dec 62 for electrical system.

[redacted]-8 #1039 out 12-20 Dec 62, will not serve.

[redacted] ton trunk, #0918, out 15-17 Jan 63, for alternator trouble.

Tug, #804, out 22-25 Jan 63 for starter trouble.

Due to the required availability of this equipment in support of ROD recommend a priority be established for the repair of items on the critical equipment list in MACR 136-2. (Action: DCM & MMM)

c. CEI reports from other units are not being received by MMM. Reports were not available for any AD inspections conducted since 1 Dec 62. In view of the importance of these reports as self-inspection guides, recommend expeditious distribution be established for all DCM activities. It should not be necessary to furnish extracts to all activities. Reports can be made available at a central location for supervisors to review, and extract data for themselves. (Action: DCM)

f. Maintenance Supervision:

(1) The War Support Plans reviewed did not contain latest amendments. Recommend periodic review to insure that this and other Wing plans are maintained current.

(2) Action taken to procure the scheduling console for Production Control is not adequate. Although the performance of Production Control is considered satisfactory, the requirement for the console is readily apparent and the delays encountered in building it are not justified. Recommend immediate attention be given this project by all concerned to insure expeditious completion. (Repeat item.)

(3) The Production Control facility is not equipped with adequate communications. Direct line communications to DCM Job Control, Missile Job Control, Central Security, and the Wing Command Post, plus inter-office communication, and two dial lines are all controlled with only one instrument.

A work order was requested on 5 Dec 63 to install [illegible] to secure additional [illegible].

(4) Work center/shop plans require updating. Current plans [illegible] 1 May 63, whereas current [illegible] 1 May 63. In addition leading [illegible] the MMS and Heating Tender are required [illegible] although these items are no longer used for normal operations.

(5) Although Production Control is designated as a [illegible] is not adequately controlled. [illegible] completion of [illegible] scheduled in Production [illegible] recommend additional segments to insure control of [illegible] by this agency.

(6) As of 6 Feb 64 Statistical Services report #10, listing [illegible] submitted to the PMEL for February had not been received by MMS. A review of the report for January 1963 indicates the need for correction procedures necessary to verify the report. The January report listed six items due for calibration. None of the items listed were actually due for calibration; however, six items were due none of which were on the report. Three of the items on the report were tongue wrenches which have not been a PMEL calibration item since 1961. (Action: DCM & MMS)

(7) MMS is preparing a monthly training schedule which duplicates entries in the Wing Maintenance Training Plan. Recommend a review of present procedures for scheduling training to insure that only essential requirements are submitted to DCMT and to assure that all training is scheduled by or through DCMT. (Action: DCM & MMS)

(8) Wing Training Control was maintaining Training folders, SAC Form 56, for MMS personnel who are not on IPT. Action was taken by DCMT during the visit to transfer training folders to squadron training activities.

(9) The MMS Squadron was administering Maintenance Proficiency Tests (MPT) for personnel on IPT. All MPTs should be administered by Wing Training Control. Action was taken during the visit to transfer MPTs to DCMT.

(10) SAC Forms 360 are still being used by MMS. This form is obsolete and has been replaced by SAC Form 56. The training NCO was in the process of accomplishing the SAC Form 56 at the time of this visit. Recommend expeditious completion of the new training record for all personnel.

5

7. 568th Strategic Missile Squadron:

a. The purpose of this visit was to review corrective action taken to correct items rated marginal by the 3901st SMES during their visit from 21-25 Jan 65.

b. The primary reasons for the marginal rating was the discovery of personnel performing maintenance who were not task qualified for the job, and the failure of QCAE maintenance inspectors to become fully JOTS qualified. Corrective action taken is as follows:

(1) The current program for insuring that only task qualified personnel perform maintenance tasks requires the Work Center supervisor to review the technician's JOTS, and certify on the reverse side of the work order that the technician is task qualified for the job prior to dispatch. In addition, the complex chief is required to call Job Control for verification of task qualification prior to accomplishing any unscheduled jobs.

(2) Current plan is for all QCAE personnel and personnel designated as replacement evaluators to become 95% task qualified by 25 Mar 65. QCAE is monitoring the program to insure satisfactory progress. Orders designating maintenance inspectors specifies that they are authorized to inspect only those areas for which they are task qualified.

c. It was noted in reviewing the 3901st Report that, except for the above discrepancies, progress being made by the 568th SMS is excellent. Special Subject items were all rated satisfactory, and results of Safety and Management examinations administered were all above the SAC average.

8. Base Deputy Commander/Civil Engineering:

a. Snow Removal: Although the plan and priorities are properly established, the organization and operating control is totally inadequate. Examples are as follows:

(1) The central control is located in and integrated with the CE Job Production Control facility.

(2) There is no separate status board for snow removal equipment nor does the status board delineate separate maintenance responsibilities.

(3) There is no separate airdrome schematic or diagram used specifically for and reflecting color coded snow removal priorities.

b. In view of the foregoing it is recommended:

(1) That personnel responsible for Larson snow removal operations visit the outstanding facility at Fairchild.

(2) What immediate action be taken to establish a separate control facility in order that snow removal operations will be unhampered during implementation of the plan.

(3) That discrepancies cited above be corrected concurrently in complying with the above recommendation.

9. Briefings on findings of this visit were given to BC, BDCE, BCM, and SMSCM.

10. Reply to this report is neither required nor desired.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION
INV-1-1

7a-5

DM 4 February 1963

Staff Visit - 92d SAW, Deputy Commander for Maintenance

92SAW (WC)

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME

1. A staff visit was made to the 92d SAW Deputy Commander for Maintenance organization during the period 20 Jan thru 1 Feb 63. Purpose of visit was to evaluate general management and degree of compliance with directives. AFM 66-1 and ORI Reports on Schilling AFB, Kansas; Laughlin AFB, Texas; and Ellsworth AFB, S.D., were used as guides during this visit.

2. Personnel Making Visit: Lt Col J. W. Thompson, DM
SMS D. J. Newberg, DMAE
SMS E. R. Shankle, DMM

3. Personnel Contacted: Lt Col G. E. Cameron, DCM
Lt Col G. T. Iovine, Ass't DCM
Major J. I. White, A&E Comdr
Capt D. D. Carpenter, AEMS

4. General:

a. Housekeeping: Appearance of offices and facilities was generally satisfactory throughout those visited. Frequently, however, waste baskets presented an unsightly appearance. The interiors needed cleaning or repainting. In some instances maps, diagrams, and slogans were thumb-tacked or scotch-taped to walls in a disorderly fashion. These items detract from the over-all professional-industrial look and eyewash that is desired by IG and visitors from higher headquarters. Recommend this matter be brought to the attention of all personnel during roll call or Commander's Call.

b. EWO Briefings: These are being conducted on a broad basis periodically by the Logistics Division. It is recommended, however, that individual sections with EWO roles conduct monthly briefings and discussions to cover individual responsibilities and any recent changes. These sessions should be documented to reflect names of persons involved, dates held, and brief resume of subject matter discussed. Folders covering these briefings should be kept in each individual section or agency.

c. ORI Reports: Copies of other unit ORI reports are not in distribution to DCM for permanent file. Investigation

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

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reveals that three copies for Wing distribution are received on base. The MCM office is given a minimum number of days to review the request and return to Base Classified or Message Center. In view of the importance of these reports to Material activities, recommend HHQ establish distribution of at least one permanent file copy to the MCM.

d. Some units/sections still are not aware of or do not possess copy or extracts of pertinent information of AACP 66-2 (AAC Inspector General Items for Material Surveillance).

e. AAC Supplements to AFM 66-1 are not annotated in numerous cases.

5. Maintenance Control - Job Control:

a. Managerial and procedural actions exercised in this branch are insuring that aircraft are recovered promptly. The control of specialists and maintenance assets are adequately enforced to insure timely work completion.

b. The location of all AGE is not current in Job Control. A check accomplished at 1130 hours, 20 Jun 62, revealed inaccurate status/location of two of six units.

c. The Job Control Technical Order Familiarization Program is marginal. Several personnel had not initialed to indicate familiarity with required reading matter.

d. Fifteenth Air Force Weapons Maintenance Control Letter file contains obsolete material.

e. Minimum NMC requirements for AGE are not indicated on the AGE status board nor in the War Support Plan.

6. Maintenance Control - Plans & Scheduling:

a. The Scheduling Section is accomplishing its function in a satisfactory manner.

b. The TCTO records and aircraft record jacket files were extremely neat. TCTO records were accurate and complete and are being closely monitored by the Branch Officer.

c. No current chart was available to reflect TCTO program progress at a glance from month to month, i.e., total number TCTOs outstanding and per cent complete.

7. Maintenance Control - Material Control:

a. A comprehensive visit was not accomplished in this section, however, one will be scheduled at a later date.

2

b. The Office Instruction File is completely unsatisfactory. [illegible] were dated as early as 1948 and ran through 1961 with only two dated in 1962.

c. SAC Supplements were not annotated in Air Force Manual 66-1.

d. SAC Form 250, and letters to CMS for past six months reflect that B-52 crew chiefs are continually late in reconciling SAC Form 250 against the AFTO Form 781. (Action: DCM)

8. Reports & Analysis:

a. The functions of this office are being carried out in an excellent manner. Personnel are highly qualified to perform their mission. Sound policies and procedures are in effect and all phases of analysis and reporting as required by AFM 66-1, SAC Supplements thereto, and other directives are being accomplished.

b. The noteworthy adoption of a recovery team comparative chart is considered an excellent management tool.

c. The TCTO Program is not being monitored by Analysis. (Although monitored satisfactorily by Maintenance Control, Analysis Sections have received frequent write-ups for failure to do so).

9. Training Control:

a. The Wing Maintenance Training Control has an aggressive and effective program for monitoring all training within the individual squadrons throughout the Maintenance organization.

b. Maintenance management testing has been very thorough. The test is very effectively categorized, which is an excellent aid in pinpointing weak areas for further training.

c. Maintenance training schedules are excellent. All known training is scheduled and closely monitored to assure maximum compliance.

10. Quality Control:

a. The Quality Control Division is performing its mission in a very satisfactory manner. Activity inspections are being accomplished on a timely basis. Reports are very comprehensive and provide an accurate picture of unit capabilities. Corrective actions taken at all levels of review are positive.

1232

b. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

11. Logistics

a. Considerable improvement was noted as compared to conditions cited in previous staff visits of 61 CMS and 11 Maint SQ by this inspector. Recommendations of training problem and solution of mobility equipment were satisfactory. All discrepancies and/or recommendations have been adequately complied with.

b. The procedure developed by Logistics for assembly and storage of all small mobility gear in 2-by engine dunn for control, start and mobile recovery teams is considered outstanding.

c. Fifteen prepositioned tool kenns with MMH listings are 99% complete which is considered excellent.

d. Discrepancies cited in IGAF msg DNHA 04319, 10 Jun 65, pertaining to the War Support Plan and start control teams have been adequately corrected.

12. Armament & Electronics:

a. Maintenance Supervision:

(1) Review of aircraft systems histories indicates that quality maintenance is being provided by AAK activities. The check lists prepared by maintenance supervision from previous ORI reports have produced an excellent system of self-inspection within the squadron.

(2) The Production Control Branch is not performing its required functions in accordance with applicable directives and should receive immediate attention.

(3) The Maintenance Supervisor did not have a copy of HACP 66-2, Items for Materiel and Inspector General Surveillance. This pamphlet contains selected items considered significant by HAC HQ and should be obtained as soon as possible.

(4) Change 2 to the Wing War Support Plan had not been received at the time of the visit. Recommend coordination with MSS to insure that expeditious distribution is being made by MSS activities.

(5) The file of Weapons Maintenance Control Letters (WMCL) was not current. These control letters are normally furnished upon receipt of the next published directive or supplement. Recommend that the file be periodically screened for accuracy.

(6) AFM 66-1 was not being maintained current in any of the activities visited. In most cases the basic manual was not being annotated upon receipt of supplements and in Comm-Elec the furnished July Supplements were still included in the Manual.

b. Analysis:

(1) Excellent analysis is being performed by this activity. Reliability and effectiveness data is prominently displayed and trends are rapidly disseminated to applicable supervisory personnel. Analysis records disclosed the following data on bombing reliability:

Total synthesomat runs	200
Number reliable	185
Percent reliable	92.5
Bombing sorties on first flight after alert	21
Number successful	18
Percent successful	85.7

It should be noted that only one of the three unsuccessful sorties after alert was attributed to material failure.

(2) MADDMC utilization is being closely monitored by the Comm-Elec and Analysis Sections. Utilization is considered excellent during January with MADDMC installed on 28 of 30 training sorties flown.

(3) Comm-Elec system history records, AD Form 828-2, do not always indicate shop action taken. Recommend continuous review of history records, and shop follow-up to insure that shop action is expeditiously received by Analysis personnel.

c. Training:

(1) A good training program is in effect. Excellent utilization of CMTP and FTD is being realized. Periodic reports keep the Maintenance Supervisor informed of training

1 2 3 4

status and trend data.

(2) Closer monitoring of NCI enrollment and progression is recommended. Training folders for personnel on IPT indicates numerous personnel enrolled in NCI courses for excessive time with no record of any completion.

d. Production Control: This branch requires immediate emphasis to insure compliance with primary responsibilities. The following discrepancies were noted with recommendations as indicated:

(1) Production scheduling does not maintain control of in-shop reparables. For example:

(a) Numerous items due out of the shops had not been received in Production Control. No action had been taken to determine the current status of these items.

(b) Production Control was not being informed of work stoppage by the shop chiefs.

(c) Items completed by the shops had been released to the launch truck or returned to serviceable status without going through Production Control.

Recommend an immediate review of operating procedures be made and action taken as necessary to maintain control of items scheduled to the shops.

(2) The location of the productrol boards does not permit a satisfactory economy of operation by the production scheduler. Productrol boards should be placed in a location where the scheduler can operate the intercom and view the boards simultaneously, and the boards should not be accessible to other personnel except for viewing.

(3) Production Control does not maintain satisfactory control of items in AWP status. For example:

(a) The correct number of items AWP was not known. The Production Scheduling productrol board indicated 118 items AWP, the AWP productrol board showed 97 items AWP, and Base Supply records indicated 70 items were AWP.

(b) Production Control indicated 19 items with no back order information on the parts request. A cross-check with the Supply Point showed that 13 of these items had either been received, back ordered or cancelled. One part received on 16 January was stored with the unit in the AWP bin. This unit should have been processed to the shop for repair on 16 January.

1235



1236

DO

25 February 1963

Staff Visit - 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing, Larson AFB, Wn.

462SAW (WC)

1. A staff visit was conducted by Major F. J. Riddle, this headquarters, to the 462d SAW, Larson AFB, Washington, from 19 thru 21 Feb 63. Purpose of this visit was to follow-up on previous discrepancies noted by members of this organization. Areas checked during this visit were:

a. DCOI Target Intelligence Branch

b. DCO Form 5 Section

c. EWO Plans Branch

d. Disaster Control Section

e. 568th Training and Standardization Branches

2. DCOI Target Materials: Domestic target materials are being given the same emphasis in preparation as the EWO materials. New montages have been prepared for the "Bar None" folders and are in present use for study of this mission. Target material (plastic type relief maps) are presently on requisition for the purpose of experimentation in possible new procedures that can be utilized to develop more suitable montages for radar target study with less time consuming delays. The target study section is using these montages and materials prepared by the Target Materials Section.

3. DCO Form 5 Section: Items checked with no discrepancies were physical examinations, instrument requirements and physiological training requirements. Five pilots are delinquent in landings and are so noted on the board. They are as follows:

a.	Major Dayton	Last landing	26 Nov 62
b.	Capt Gaspard	" "	4 Oct 62
c.	Capt Mead	" "	12 Dec 62
d.	Major Keller	" "	19 Dec 62
e.	Capt Bailey	" "	14 Dec 62

The Form 5 Section has properly notified the Scheduling Section two weeks in advance of these impending delinquencies; however, these people have still failed to receive a currency landing

#7

Staff Visit Book

flight. The DCO has delegated the responsibility of checking the Form 5 Section to two squadron officers monthly. The most recent check was accomplished on 31 Jan 63.

4. NWO Plans: The 468d SAW battle staff was briefed on the current NWO requirements and status of sorties. This requirement has been accomplished each 90 days as prescribed by SACM 55-7. A comprehensive study program is still being conducted to include tactical doctrine, special weapons, emergency procedures, and CHP study. An informal question and answer program is used to quiz the crews on their knowledge of the above subjects. A questionnaire has been prepared which covers each and every discrepancy that was previously noted in other organizations of SAC. These questions are used to drill the crews on possible weak areas. This section is considered adequately managed and controlled.

5. Disaster Control:

a. To date there has been no disaster control "Broken Arrow" exercise performed at any of the 568th SMS activities. The Base Commander was given instruction from the Wing Commander to initiate and exercise at least two Broken Arrow exercises prior to 23 Feb 63.

b. Adequate check point control procedures have been established by the 47SMS Commander to be used when removing or transporting NWs from storage to the site. Pre-selected convoy routes of travel and frequent check points have been established and noted in the control center. In the event of communication failure or deviations from call-in procedures, the CSP and Disaster Control personnel are immediately dispatched.

6. 568th SMS Standardization and Training Branches:

a. The Missile Squadron Training and Standardization Branches have established a study program, both supervised and self-study, on Safety/Emergency Procedures and have been conducting this daily since 1 Jan 63. There have been 196 Safety/Emergency Procedures NWO exams administered since January 1963 with 14 failures or 8% failure rate. All personnel will reaccomplish this type exam prior to 24 Feb and those failing will immediately be established in the retraining program. In each case where there has been a crew failure, it is interesting to note that the LCO and OCO of thatcrew also has a low grade. This does not mean that they also fail the test but that they do not attain the 100% score.

b. The Standardization Section has run an analysis of crews to determine if there were any common deficiency areas in the program. A trend was noted in the education level of the [illegible] but has not been completely substantiated at this time. Lesson plans are constantly under revision to insure better materials and procedures which would improve the organization. Lesson plans, in the type of information brochure from standboard, have assisted the crews in the self-study program being used at the complexes.

c. At present there are only three sites that have completed Shakedown: A-01, B-01, and B-03.

d. A supervised study program as well as self-study program has been implemented at the 568th. During each four day cycle, the crews are scheduled to attend a supervised study program which covers the use of the dash-one and allied publications. The self-study program consists of a series of 3x5 cards with questions, answers and reference materials which may be utilized at the complexes by the crews. In each case where these have been used, the results are evidenced by the higher grades attained on examination.

7. This report is rendered for your information and whatever action is deemed necessary. No reply is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lucion N. Powell

LUCION N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

1239

STAFF VISIT BOOK
OPS 17-5 9a-b

11 February 1969

Staff Visit - [illegible]

[illegible] (U)

1. A [illegible] was [illegible] by [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]



OPS 17-4

10a-F

7 February 1963

#4



[redacted] system may well become a major problem. It is recommended that training and familiarization of the military personnel assigned to perform AFSC tasks begin without delay. Additionally, the most economical method of accomplishing this training should be determined. Once that firm followup on instructions to contractor already published by this Wing to correct the most prevalent wire maintenance and provide permanent equitable remedies to this problem.

(3) At the time of the visit no actions had been taken to relocate the following equipment out of dirty environs or provide an alternate solution to the problem of dust and dirt in communications relays. (Deficiencies 1[redacted] and [redacted]-1 [redacted], 16 Jun 62, and 11[redacted] and [redacted] 19 Jun 62). Until this action is completed a serious communications maintenance problem will exist at all complexes except the alternate Command Post. Nearly half of all wire systems malfunctions are caused by dirty relay contacts.

(4) Supply difficulties have created three communications problems: Five communications panels are inoperative at missile complexes for two types of relays; the HF radio (AN/GRA-85) at the ACP is out of commission for a blower assembly; a critical shortage of explosion proof joints exists. Proper follow-up had been taken on these items, to include submission of supply difficulty letters. Delivery of the blower assembly and explosion proof joints is expected in mid-April. No delivery date is available for the relays, however.

(5) Contracts for the three assigned CTEMs are scheduled to be cancelled 30 Jun 62. This will leave Fairchild AFB as the only missile unit in 15th Air Force without CTEP assistance. Considering the low proficiency level of assigned and projected input personnel, plus the fact that contract maintenance is also scheduled to terminate on 30 June, the loss of CTEP personnel will create a critical problem. It is recommended that a letter be submitted through command channels requesting assistance until Fairchild AFB possesses an in-house capability to maintain the missile communications system.

3. This report is furnished for information and whatever corrective action the Wing Commander deems necessary. A reply is not required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCIEN N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

1 Atch
507[redacted] Standardization
Results, Oct-Dec 62

5

10F

[illegible]
Standardization Results
October-December 62

Over-all Results - Crew

Tested	EQ	Q	CQ	U
42	1	35	4	2
Rate	2.4	83.3	9.5	4.8

Over-all Results - Individual

225	48	167	6	4
Rate	21.3	74.2	2.7	1.8

Safety/Emergency Procedures

225	186	33	3	1
Rate	83.5	14.6	1.4*	.45**

*2 MMT, 1 EPPO

**1 MMT

Proficiency Examination

225	194	30	0	1
Rate	86.25	13.3		.45*

*1 MMT

Site Performance

225	129	93	2	1
Rate	57.3	41.35	.90*	.45**

*1 DMCC, 1 BMAT

**1 BMAT

Simulated EWO

225	99	124	1	1
Rate	44	55.1	.45*	.45*

*EPPO

**Spare EPPO

Atch 1

1247

SAFETY FILM



12

C

21 Feb 1963

Seat Belts in Government Motor Vehicles

92SAW(WC) 462SAW(WC)

1. A recently received SAC message stated that the command had experienced three fatal accidents involving USAF motor vehicles within two months. In each of these accidents the fatality occurred when the airman was thrown from the vehicle. There is a requirement that seat belts will be installed and used in all Government vehicles.

2. I desire that your SDCM survey all Government vehicles and compile a report on the subject of seat belts installed, programmed for installation, and expected 100% completion date. I also desire a report on the method you have utilized to insure strict compliance regarding use of seat belts.

3. The suspense date for this report to reach this headquarters is 1 March 1963.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

Replies for both wings in DS office

1250




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HISTORY



18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 - 31 MARCH 1963

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C David A. Burhans, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It was prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the period of this history. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Frederick C. Bale 2Lt
for RAY J. HARTSFIELD
1st Lt., USAF
Information Officer

James W. Miller Lt Col
FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING BY
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(Approving Authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10
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SECRET

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A&E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully Equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commission for parts
BDR	Bomber Defense Run
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEA	Circular Error Average
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DEFCON	Defense Condition
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
DPL	Dual Propellant Loading
ECM	Electronics Counter Measure
ECCM	Electronics Counter Counter Measure

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EGT	Exhaust Gas Tempature
EPR	Engine Pressure Ratio
ETS	Expiration of term of service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWO	Electronics Warfare Officer of Observer
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base
FOB	Flack Order Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
GCA	Ground Control Approach
GPI	Ground Position Indicator
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IP	Initial Point
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LDR	Local Defense Run
LGR	Low Gear Run
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
LSR	Launch Simulated Run
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment

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MCC	Missile Combat Crew
MCCC	Missile Combat Crew Commander
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
NDR	Nike Defense Run
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officer Effectiveness Report
OOAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the job training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
ORT	Operational Readiness Test
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PIP	Pre-initial Point
PST	Pacific Standard Time
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
RSR	Radar Simulated Run
SAW	Strategic Aerospace Wing
SEA	Scoring Error Average
SEP	Scoring Error Probable
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSG	Strategic Standardization Group
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty

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T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance
TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
VOCO	Verbal Order of the Commanding Officer
VOR	Visual Omni-range
ZI	Zone of Interior

1262

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, the Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing are organized, manned, trained and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing develope and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd

---

1. SAC Reg. 23-15, 20 Apr 62, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

1265

SECRET

Administration

During March the [illegible] Strategic Aerospace Wing at Larson Air Force Base and the [illegible] Strategic Aerospace Wing at Fairchild Air Force Base continued to be scored under the SAC management control system (MCS). With the exception of fire incidents all areas in personnel and base support were 100 per cent. Fairchild was scored at 70 per cent as a result of two chargeable equipment fires and Larson at [illegible] per cent due to a single fire incident. Overall, Fairchild and Larson [illegible] 100 per cent in personnel with Larson scoring [illegible].9 per cent and Fairchild [illegible].3 per cent in the base support area. In the general areas, ground safety and information activities were the only areas less than 100 per cent. Fairchild was rated at [illegible] per cent in ground safety as a result of excessive private motor vehicle accidents and on-duty military injuries and information activities at 96 per cent. Low areas were the base newspaper and the historical section. At Larson, ground safety was 75 per cent and information activities [illegible] per cent.[4] (S)

In operations, minimum proficiency requirements (MPR), continuation training (CT) and profile mission effectiveness were not scored under the MCS at Fairchild. However, an estimate showed that the wing was only slightly above marginal. One extremely low area was tanker combat crew effectiveness scored at 75 per cent. At Larson, bomber operations was above the SAC average while tanker operations was 100 per cent and tied for first place in SAC. However, this failed to offset the points lost in bomber maintenance.

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4. Hist Rpt, SECRET, 92SAW & 462SAW, 1-31 Mar 63, Filed: IXOH.

SECRET

1266

The greatest loss of points occurred in sorties airborne as scheduled and aircraft systems reliability which resulted in an overall bomber maintenance rating of 58.1 per cent. Tanker maintenance was 99.4 per cent and slightly below the SAC top quarter scores. At Fairchild, bomber and tanker maintenance scored reasonably high with a 93.5 per cent and 97.8 per cent respectively. Overall Fairchild received a rating of 96.8 per cent and Larson earned a total of 96.6 per cent. (S)

Presently, the bomber combat crew strength of the 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing remained at 26 combat ready crews of which three were in select status, 21 in senior status and two in combat ready status. Of the 36 tanker crews assigned, all were in combat ready status of which nine were projected for reassignment in June 1963. Additionally, the missile combat crew strength was 16 crews of which nine were combat ready and seven were combat ready with a waiver from the commander.[6] (S)

In the 93d Strategic Aerospace Wing the B-52 combat crew strength was 27 crews. Of this total, five were in select status, 17 in senior status, four in combat ready status and one in non-combat ready non-availability status. During this period four crews were downgraded to combat ready status, three crews to senior status and two crews were upgraded to senior status. Meanwhile the combat crew strength of the 92d Air Refueling Squadron consisted of 36 crews of which 29 were in senior status, six in com-

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5. Hist. Rpt, SECRET, 93SAW & 462SAW, 1-31 Mar 63, Filed: IXOH.
6. Ltr, Crew and Flying Figures, 462SAW, 25Apr 63, Exhibit #1.

bat ready status and one in non-combat ready non-availability status. One non-combat ready tanker crew was upgraded to combat ready status. The missile combat crew strength of the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron was 45 combat crews and one non-combat ready crew.[7] (S)

During March the 15 B-52D aircraft assigned to Fairchild flew 71 sorties in 628:45 flying hours. The 22 KC-135A tankers also assigned flew a total of 1[illegible]4 sorties in 625 flying hours. There were also [illegible] Atlas E missiles assigned to the wing during the month. Meanwhile the 15 B-52D aircraft assigned to Larson flew 1:34:[illegible] hours and 86 sorties. The 21 KC-135A tankers flew 1[illegible]4 sorties in 623:3[illegible] flying hours. There were also 10 Titan I missiles assigned to Larson.[8] (S)

Larson continued to support Operation CHROME DOME with a bomber on 24-hour airborne alert daily circumnavigating the Dominion of Canada and a tanker stationed at Eielson Air Force Base and the Eielson Tanker Task Force in Alaska on an eight-day rotational basis. Fairchild tankers were also deployed to Eielson on Operation CHROME DOME. Each base deployed tankers in support of Operation AIR MAIL and TAC air refuelings.[9] (S)

Staff Visits by [illegible] Strategic Aerospace Division

At the direction of Fifteenth Air Force message 1252[illegible], 16 February 1963, and Fifteenth Air Force Letter 51-1 an operations staff visit was conducted to both wings in the division. Colonel L. N. Powell, division director of operations, and his staff interrogated 15 bomber and nine tanker crews of the 4[illegible]2d Strategic

7. Hist. Rpt. SECRET, 92SAW, 1-31 Mar 63, Filed: IXOH.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.

Aerospace Wing on 25 February through 1 March during Fifteenth Air Force questions and additional questions developed from previous IG reports. Twelve bomber and 15 tanker combat mission folders were reviewed for completeness and accuracy. Two bomber and two tanker daily briefings were also observed by the division staff.[10] (S)

For the most part, EWO knowledge was highly satisfactory among the bomber crews. However, radar navigator and navigator were generally weak in radar let-down procedures at their assigned post strike bases. The tanker crews exhibited excellent knowledge of EWO procedures in most cases. No serious discrepancies were noted in the combat mission folders although several minor errors were discovered. With the exception of the weather briefings and the EWO briefings for new crews, pre-take-off briefings were conducted in a highly professional manner.[11] (S)

Colonel Powell performed a similar operations staff visit to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing from 4 through 8 March. The 15 bomber crews interrogated exhibited an excellent attitude toward their jobs and the responsibilities inherent in their EWO assignments. For the most part, EWO knowledge was satisfactory, however, additional emphasis was required in the knowledge of combat mission folder contents, electronic warfare knowledge of tactics employed against SAC radars, radar navigator knowledge of procedures for radar let-down at the post strike base, pilot knowledge of maximum allowable temperatures and tailwind components as well as wing re-

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10. Staff Visit, 46thSAW, SECRET, DO, 1 Mar 63, Exhibit # 2.
11. Ibid.

fueling procedures. Generally, the tanker crews exhibited adequate knowledge of their assigned EWO mission and no serious discrepancies were noted in the combat mission folders. Several minor errors were discovered. The daily pre-takeoff briefing was considered to have been conducted in an unmilitary, unprofessional and lackadaisical manner. Other than the weather portion, the briefing was completely unsatisfactory.[12] (S)

On 25 February through 1 March Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Thompson, division director of materiel, and his staff accompanied and observed the SAC IG Team during the scheduled 568th Strategic Missile Squadron operational readiness inspection training. Preplanning of ORI procedures and requirements appeared weak in several areas. The availability of TV cables to monitor two liquid oxygen loading exercises was not known prior to initiation of the exercise. Additionally, it requires three days for a SAC directive on the demating of the re-entry vehicle during a liquid oxygen loading exercise to be effected. Another weak area was the size of the display board in job control for phase II, EWO to ORI configuration and phase IV, ORI to EWO configuration which was too small to serve as an adequate planning board. Communications facilities adjacent to job control were inadequate. Colonel Thompson also discussed corrective action concerning electrical problems on B-52 aircraft during recent training missions.[13] (U)

Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Murray, division materiel staff, examined

12. Staff Visit, 92SAW, SECRET, DO, 11 Mar 63, Exhibit #3.
13. Staff Visit, 568SMS, DM, 8 Mar 63, Exhibit #4.

the procedures in operation within base supply at Larson from 4 through 7 March. Colonel Murray noted that the delivery effectiveness was being computed in error on the missile/ARLS Control Register. Additionally, organizational cancellation was not eliminated from the total requests as computed for the delivery effectiveness information. A priority monitor file had been established to monitor status on all priority requisitions. However, it was not being maintained in a current status. Many of these requisitions had been cancelled, received or downgraded, but action had not been taken to remove the monitor cards.[14] (U)

On 6 through 12 March Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Thompson reviewed and evaluated progress in establishing procedures for accomplishing JOTS training for BDCE missile support personnel at Fairchild. Civil engineering activities had expended a great deal of effort in preparation and implementation of the JOTS program. However, the training section did not have pertinent data available to adequately monitor the JOTS program. All personnel identified for missile support had not received their initial interview and evaluation by missile maintenance training. Additionally, maintenance inspectors for BDCE had not been designated. The selection should be made immediately and be restricted to supervisors considered highly qualified for missile support.[15] (U)

On 13 March a member of the division materiel staff visited

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14. Staff Visit, 4028AW, DM, Mar 63, Exhibit #5.
15. Staff Visit, 91BDCE, DM, 20 Mar 63, Exhibit #6.

Fairchild to collect information relative to the status of the requirement for the model 4100 series trailer for use with the GAM-77A. Confusion had previously existed despite contact with higher headquarters on several occassions. A total of 11 trailers were authorized at Fairchild and only seven were assigned.[16] (U)

Major P. S. Riddle, division operations staff officer, conducted a staff visit to the 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing on 18 an 19 March to primarily check command post procedures in compliance with higher headquarters. During the visit the command post received word that there was an indication of an explosion in silo three of complex A located at Odessa, Washington. The liaison disaster control team was immediately dispatched by ground vehicle and the wing commander, missile maintenance officer and missile safety officer were dispatched by helicopter. One hour and 21 minutes after the fire warning light illuminated on the console panel the warning light went out and the missile combat crew commander and safety personnel observed the tunnel bulkhead door had buckled from the explosion. After entry personnel noted that one of the separation rockets had fired.[17] (U)

Aircrews were receiving training in positive control on the first day of each alert tour and was being conducted in a professional manner and considered adequate. A program was initiated to indoctrinate and educate staff personnel on positive control

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16. Staff Visit, 92SAW, DM, 13 Mar 63, Exhibit #7.
17. Staff Visit, 462SAW, DO, 26 Mar 63, Exhibit #8.

procedures, EWO information, missile reaction and messages of the type received by controllers. A schedule was also established to afford a complete coverage of supervised indoctrination tours by controller through complex B control center.[18] (U)

On 26 March Lieutenant Colonel T. H. Paskell, director of safety, conducted a staff visit to the 92d Airborne Missile Maintenance Squadron. Although Colonel Paskell was sure the squadron commander supported the accident prevention program and was fully aware of his responsibilities, documentation supporting this was non-existent. Colonel Paskell also recommended that operational instruction covering accident prevention responsibilities and squadron safety structure be published. Personnel assigned the additional duty of safety officers and safety non-commissioned officers were reasonably familiar with their requirements. Overall general conditions of all areas were satisfactory but could be improved with more vigorous housecleaning activities during the period of modification of three buildings.[19] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, was extremely displeased with the bombing results of the 426d Strategic Aerospace Wing for this quarter. Larson had been consistently on the bottom of Fifteenth Air Force B-52 units. General Ohlke's operations staff analized the wing's bombing through

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18. Staff Visit, 462SAW, DO, 26 Mar 63, Exhibit #8.
19. Staff Visit, 92AMMS, DS, 27 Mar 63, Exhibit #9.

11 March and discovered that 19 of the 32 unreliable QFR bombs were preventable with professional preparation and firm supervision of bombing training by the wing staff. There could be no excuse for poor bombing, particularly those involving crew error. There was a wealth of talent and experience which General Ohlke expected to be used to the best possible advantage to place the wing back on top of Fifteenth Air Force.[20] (C)

In a letter to Colonel David A. Tate, 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing commander, General Ohlke strongly criticized the managerial practices evidenced in the gross overpayment of civilian overtime at Larson during 1 July 1962 to 31 January 1963. During this period Larson was authorized to expend about $14,000 when actually the expenditures were in excess of $35,000. Under any circumstances this gross overpayment would be unacceptable, and it was particularly serious in the light of present fund limitations. As a result General Ohlke directed that in the future overtime expenditure would not exceed one per cent of the civilian payroll. Additionally he desired that management control be established that would preclude any similar occurrence in the future.[21] (U)

It was General Ohlke's desire and standing policy that the missile maintenance facilities and complexes be surgically clean at all times. While the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing's complexes were generally in a satisfactory condition. The condition was

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20. Ltr, 18SADC to 462SAWC, CONFIDENTIAL Subj: Bombing Reliability, 14 Mar 63, Exhibit #10.
21. Ltr, 18SADC to 462SAWC, Subj: Over Payment of Civilian Overtime, 14 Mar 63, Exhibit #11.

retrogressing in the M&NS building and the hanger maintenance facility of the [illegible]. General Ohlke requested Colonel David I. Liebman, wing commander, to inspect these projects, developed to maintain the facilities in excellent condition, and determine whether they could by expedited without jeopardizing other high priority projects requiring funding.[22] (U)

22. Ltr, 16SAMC to 92SAWC, Subj: Maintaining Facilities, 15 Mar 63. Exhibit #12.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by division staff agencies.

Reports submitted by division staff agencies.

Files of the division staff agencies.

Interviews with division officials.

Division, Wing, Group and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group; Headquarters for the 19th Strategic Aerospace Division. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing. (U)

1276

LIST OF EXHIBITS

	EXHIBIT NUMBER
[illegible], 29 Mar 63.	1
[illegible], 1 Mar 63.	2
[illegible], 11 Mar 63.	3
[illegible], 6 Mar 63.	4
[illegible], 7 Mar 63.	5
[illegible], 20 Mar 63.	6
[illegible], 13 Mar 63.	7
[illegible], 26 Mar 63.	8
[illegible], 27 Mar 63.	9
Ltr, [illegible] to [illegible], CONFIDENTIAL	10
Ltr, [illegible] to [illegible], Subj: Overpayment of Civilian Overtime, 14 Mar 63	11
Ltr, [illegible] to [illegible], Subj: Maintaining Facilities, 15 Mar 63	12

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
462D STRATEGIC AEROSPACE WING (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
LARSON AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IXOH

SUBJECT: Crew and Flying Figures for March 1963 (U)

25 April 1963

TO: 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (IXOH)
Fairchild AFB, Wash.

1. MCS: A summary of the SAC MCS for March has been mailed under separate cover. (U)

2. Aircraft: Fifteen B-52D bombers assigned with eight on alert. Twenty-one KC-135A tankers were assigned, 10 of which were on alert. (S)

3. Missiles: 10 Titan I on hand. (S)

4. Flying Missions and Hours: (S)

	B-52		KC-135	
	Sorties	Hours	Sorties	Hrs.
Airborne Alert and Support Missions	30	642:35	2[illegible]	[illegible]
Reflex and Support Missions			3	[illegible]
Profile Missions	1* 55	[illegible]	52	[illegible]
Ferry Missions				
Other Missions (Proficient Trail Boss)				
TOTAL	85	1[illegible]	57	[illegible]

1* Two [illegible] were War Room Sorties.

2 [illegible] Eielson A.F, Alaska. They include [illegible]

3 [illegible]

SECRET

IXOH-63-00

SECRET

5. Combat Crew Status: Bomber crews: 26, three select, 21 senior and two combat ready. There were 36 KC-135 crews and all were combat ready. There were nine crews projected for loss during June 1963. Missile combat crews: 16, of which nine were combat ready and seven were combat ready with a waiver from the commander. (S)

6. This correspondence is classified SECRET under the provisions of Paragraph 10b, [illegible] 205-1, dated 10 June 1960. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted or extracted for use in this report, which bear on the combat capability of this organization. (C)

FOR THE COMMANDER

Robert R. Boyd

ROBERT R. BOYD
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR. 5200.10

SECRET

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

2A-1

FILE DESIGNATION
OPS 17-

HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

REPLY TO
ATTN OF : DO

1 MAR 1963

SUBJECT : Staff Visit (462nd SAW)

TO : 462nd SAW (C)

1. Under the provisions of 15AF Message 12526, 16 Feb 63, and 15AF ltr 51-1 an operations staff visit to the 462nd SAW was performed during the period 25 February thru 1 March 1963. (U)

2. Fifteen bomber and nine tanker crews were interrogated in detail using 15AF questions and additional questions developed from findings of past IG reports. Twelve bomber and 15 tanker combat mission folders were reviewed for completeness and accuracy. Two bomber and two tanker daily briefings were observed. (U)

3. Findings:

a. Bomber Crews: EWO knowledge among bomber crews was for the most part highly satisfactory; however, radar navigators and navigators were generally weak in radar let down procedures at their assigned post strike bases. Additional comments are: (U)

(1) Crew B-22 - Satisfactory (U)

(2) Crew B-25 - Aircraft commander was vague on [redacted] Red procedures and klaxon out procedures. (U)

(3) Crew B-18 - Satisfactory (U)

(4) Crew B-14 - Satisfactory (U)

(5) Crew B-20 - Satisfactory (U)

(6) Crew B-02 - Satisfactory (U)

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	NAME
C	
DEXO	
DM	
DO	
DS	
C	
VC	
DAS	
DCR	
DCO	
DCM	
DP	
DSUP	
SAFE	
IXO	
VC	
DAS	
DCR	
DCO	
DCM	
DSUP	
SAFE	
BC	
BVC	
BDCO	
BDCS	
BDCM	
BDCE	
BDCL	
BDAS	
BDP	
BDCR	
BDS	
BJA	
BPE	
BWO	
BCH	

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

DO-63-0006

SECRET

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)
	DO					

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units)

62 21

1280

(7) Crew E-09 - Satisfactory (U)

(8) Crew E-01 - Satisfactory (U)

(9) Crew E-11 - Aircraft commander was weak on Valid Red procedures. (U)

(10) Crew E-27 - Crew was weak on knowledge of radio areas and MITO procedures. (U)

(11) Crew E-06 - Aircraft commander was weak on Valid Red and MITO procedures. (U)

(12) Crew E-07 - Satisfactory (U)

(13) Crew E-16 - Satisfactory (U)

(14) Crew E-08 - Aircraft commander was weak on degrading tactics. (U)

(15) Crew E-24 - Aircraft commander was weak in general knowledge of his assigned sortie and information contained in pilots flimsies. The radar navigator was weak in knowledge of information annotated on the low level chart. Electronics Warfare Officer was weak in knowledge of defense tactics to be employed against SAM radars. (U)

b. Tanker Crews: Generally speaking, tanker crews exhibited an excellent knowledge of EWO procedures. The following crews were interrogated: T-31, T-32, T-22, T-15, T-27, T-30, T-28, J-05 and J-20. (U)

c. Combat Mission Folders: As a general comment, no discrepancies of a serious nature were discovered. In several instances, however, minor but significant errors were discovered. (U)

(1) CMF: (Packets)

(a) Air Order of Battle: Information (legend) is not available on the navigators Strip Charts. The EW Officer's flimsy does contain the legend, but the navigator should have the information on his chart. (Reference SACM 55-7, Vol II, Chap 2, pages 19 and 20). (U)

(b) Annotations of IP, PIP, etc., do not appear adjacent to the action points on some of the high and low level charts. (Reference SACM 55-7, Vol 2, page 38). (U)

(c) Acceleration, deceleration points and times for bomb run are not shown on the low level charts. (U)

(d) ECM activity requirements are not annotated on the low level charts. (U)

(e) BW Officers' charts for several sorties are not annotated with ECM activity points (Sortie B-[illegible]0-01 AO 1-4). (U)

(f) Pilot has no chart with bomb run information for high level bomb runs. (Reference page 49, para 4a & 4b). (U)

(g) On pilot low level charts lead lines to action points would help alleviate possible confusion. (U)

(h) Target material control numbers appear vague, out of sequence, or are missing. (U)

(i) A chart, properly drawn and annotated, for the route from the post strike base to the first recovery area, although not required would be helpful. (U)

(j) Packaging and indexing of back-up charts is incomplete. (Has been started, but is incomplete.) (U)

(k) Charts for all sorties are <u>very neat</u> and sequentially indexed for proper use. (U)

(2) <u>CMF (Filmsies)</u>:

(a) Sortie <u>1</u> has not been completely checked or certified. (U)

(b) Pen and ink changes are present (degradation of tactics). (U)

(c) Emergency Bomb Data For Pilot (Last Resort) should be available in tabular or graphic form for immediate reference. (U)

(d) Weapon interchange not always noted or apparent on Bombing Data Charts. (U)

(3) ORF's:

(a) Bomber ORF's are in excellent condition, but some card sequence deviations were noted. (U)

(b) Tanker ORF's are in excellent order except for all sorties missing a card. SAC Form 628 (Reference SACM 55-7) (is available in jacket). (U)

(c) Tanker sorties 111 to 120 have a card, SAC Form 620, (Pre-Takeoff Data) missing from the navigator's flimsy. (U)

(4) Study Folders: The study folders are neat and well organized. All available information appears to be included in each folder. (U)

d. Pre-Takeoff Briefings: With two notable exceptions the pre-takeoff briefings were conducted in a highly professional manner. (U)

(1) Material covered in briefing for new crews coming on alert was duplicated completely in the briefing for all crews which immediately followed it. It is recommended that the double briefing of new crews be deleted. (U)

(2) The Weather Briefing was completely inadequate because of the indirect method of presentation (via the inter-com system). The seriousness of the Bomber EWO Mission dictates personalized, detailed briefings to assure success of the missions. (U)

4. Because Weapons Separations Print Out Sheets had not been received from SAC, bomber crews were not aware of the number of DGZ's in their assigned complex, nor did they know what destruction they might expect in the target area from prior weapons. This should receive immediate attention as soon as Print Out Sheets are available. (U)

5. This report is furnished for any action which the Wing Commander deems necessary. A reply is not required. (U)

6. This document is classified SECRET because it tends to reveal information pertaining to the unit's EWO. (U)

LUCION N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

3A-C

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DO

SUBJECT: Staff Visit (92SAW)

11 MAR 63

TO: 92 SAW (WC)

1. Under the provisions of 15AF message 12526, 16 February 63 and 15AF letter 51-1 an operations staff visit to the 92nd SAW was performed during the period 4-8 March 63. (U)

2. Fifteen bomber crews and eight tanker crews were interrogated in detail using questions furnished by 15AF and additional questions developed from findings of past IG reports. Eleven bomber and five tanker combat mission folders were reviewed for completeness and accuracy. One daily briefing of the bomber alert force was observed. (U)

3. Findings.

a. Bomber Crews: All crew members exhibited an excellent attitude toward their jobs and the responsibilities inherent in their EWO assignments. EWO knowledge was for the most part satisfactory; however additional emphasis is required in five areas: knowledge of CMF contents, EW knowledge of tactics to be employed against SAM radars; radar navigator knowledge of specific procedures for radar let down at the poststrike base; pilot knowledge of maximum allowable temperatures for 7 - engine take-off and maximum allowable tailwind component, and over wing refueling procedures. Comments for specific crews are: (S)

(1) Crew E-91. Aircraft commander was weak on positive control back-up procedures. (U)

(2) Crew E-22. Generally weak in knowledge of the sortie, and location of information in the CMF. The aircraft commander did not know what check list to use to assure an armed release in case the two navigators were incapacitated. The navigators were not familiar with the restriction against bombing targets of opportunity. (S)

(3) E-28. This crew was the most knowledgeable of all crews interviewed. All crew members were thoroughly professional in all aspects of their assigned sortie. (U)

#19

SECRET

DO-63-0002

(4) Crew E-06. The gunner did not know the proper tactic to use against unconventional fighter attacks. The navigator indicated that he would cut corners if necessary to make up time. (U)

(5) Crew E-18. The radar navigator indicated that he would stop antenna rotation at the passive detection line. He was also weak on knowledge of weapon configuration in case the TOT cannot be made good and a free impact time is not available. (S)

(6) Crew E-47. The Aircraft Commander was weak on Valid Red procedures and format for the strike report. (U)

(7) Crew E-33. Satisfactory. (U)

(8) Crew E-51. The crew was weaker than most in knowledge of CMF contents. (U)

(9) Crew E-01. Satisfactory. (U)

(10) Crew S-73. The crew was highly professional in all respects. (U)

(11) Crew S-11. The aircraft commander was weak on Valid Red procedures. (U)

(12) Crew E-29. Satisfactory. (U)

(13) Crew E-44. Satisfactory. (U)

(14) Crew S-07. Satisfactory. (U)

(15) Crew S-02. The crew was weak in knowledge of PACOM Communications procedures. (U)

b. Tanker Crews. All tanker crews exhibited adequate knowledge of their assigned EWO mission. The following crews were interviewed: J-49, J-35, J-06, J-02, J-26, J-06, J-28 and T-27.

c. Combat mission folders. As a general comment, no discrepancies of a serious nature were discovered. In several instances, however, minor but significant errors were found:

(1) Action points and date symbols are not oriented in a uniform manner. (para 30d (1) page 34A, SACM 55-7, Vol II) "Letters and data symbols oriented to grid or true North". Neither of these procedures is being adhered to. Recommend that allocation point symbols uniformly be oriented to true North. (U)

(3) Level off action point symbols were missing in a few instances. All CMF's should be reviewed for this error and brought up to date. (U)

(3) Charts in general do not conform with the requirements as listed in SACM 55-7 Vol II para 30 (d) page 34. "Chart size either 13 inches or 26 inches. (U)

(4) Low level charts should be in red BRI folder. Whether this was changed by crews who have used the CMF's for study is not known; however, a revision of CMF's should be accomplished and low level charts inserted in correct folders. (U)

(5) SAC TAC option 613 tabs are not attached to check lists. Ref para 21a example # 3, SACM 55-7, Vol II. (U)

(6) In some instances, there were insufficient pages in the BRI's with as many as four charts in one insert page - more insert pages should be added to those folders. (U)

(7) Seven engine (Dry) take off performance charts were missing from all bomber CMF's. (U)

d. Daily pre-takeoff briefings. The one briefing observed was conducted in an unmilitary, unprofessional and lackadaisical manner. It was completely unsatisfactory. Only the weather briefing came up to the standard prescribed in SACM 55-7, Volume II. Lack of visual aids and extreme informality of the briefing were the primary shortcomings. This item has been reported previously. (U)

4. Because Weapons Separation printout sheets had not been received from SAC, bomber crews were not familiar with the number of DGM's in their assigned complex, nor were they aware of destruction to be expected in the target area from prior weapons. This should receive immediate attention as soon as the printout sheets become available. (U)

5. This report is furnished primarily to assist the Wing Commander in improving the EWO study program. A reply is required not later than 15 March indicating action taken to improve the quality of daily briefings. (U)

6. This document is classified SECRET because it tends to reveal information pertaining to the unit EWO.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Lucion N. Powell

LUCION N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

4a-b

HEADQUARTERS
10TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DM

8 March 1963

SUBJECT: Staff Visit - 568th SMS, Larson AFB, Washington

TO: MEMO FOR RECORD

1. Persons Making Visit: Lt Col Thompson
SMS Newberg
MSgt Sicher

2. Period of Visit: 25 Feb - 1 Mar 63

3. Purpose of Visit: To accompany and observe the SAC IG Team during the scheduled 568th Missile Squadron ORIT.

4. Findings:

a. Detailed results of the Missile ORIT are included in the SAC ORI Report.

b. Preplanning of ORI procedures and requirements appeared weak in some areas, for example:

(1) Availability of TV cables to monitor two LOX only loading exercises simultaneously was not known prior to initiation of the exercise.

(2) Requirements for demating the RV during a LOX only loading exercise were changed by a SAC message on 22 Feb 63. This message stated that requirement of AFR 122-39 would be complied with. Applicability of the SAC message to the scheduled ORIT was not resolved until approximately 1500 hours on 25 Feb 63.

c. The display board in Job Control for Phase II, EWO to ORI configuration and Phase IV, ORI to EWO configuration is too small to serve as an adequate planning board. Entries are too small to be discernable at distances in excess of ten or 15 feet. It was suggested that these charts be reaccomplished on separate sliding panels which will allow for adequate size of each presentation.

d. Communications and facilities in the conference room adjacent to Job Control are not satisfactory for monitoring Job Control during an exercise. As a result the Job Control room became extremely congested during each wet count down. Modification of the conference room to include lowering of

windows and installation of adequate communications is necessary in order to avoid excessive numbers of personnel in Job Control during critical periods.

e. An informal visit was made to the 462d AEMS, FMS, and Quality Control to discuss action taken to correct reported electrical problems on B-52 aircraft during recent training missions. The following action has been taken or is pending by the 462d SAW:

(1) TSgt Curry, 92d AEMS, was sent to Larson during the period 18-22 Feb 63 to assist in resolving problems and train personnel in alignment of RT 503s.

(2) A&E has realigned personnel assignments in bomb/nav. One officer and two bomb/nav technicians have been reassigned from DCM to A&E and one 7 level and four 5 level bomb/nav personnel are projected in by 1 Apr 63.

(3) Utilization of MADREC has been increased to include analysis of tape for detection of possible malfunctions.

(4) Bomb/nav system film is being reviewed for possible power problems following all missions. This has resulted in several minor discrepancies being corrected which might have resulted in major power problems had they gone undetected.

(5) Quality Control has initiated a system of charts depicting all discrepancies reported for each aircraft system. This is intended to provide an analysis of each system and will be extremely useful in establishing and detecting malfunction trends. This, however, is an analysis of system discrepancies which is a responsibility of the DCM Analysis activity in accordance with para 6-8m(2)(b)4, Chap 6, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1. It was recommended that Quality Control personnel bring this to the attention of the DCM and that this responsibility be delegated to the Analysis activity.

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

5a

FILE DESIGNATION
MTN-4

DM

7 March 1963

Staff Visit Report - Base Supply

4623AW (UC)

1. Attached is Report of Staff Visit conducted at your Base Supply during period 4-7 March 1963.

2. No reply to this report is required or desired.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. V. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

1 Atch
Rept of Staff
Visit, 4-7 Mar 63

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
DM	

ACTION TO	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORGANIZATION'S NAME AND CHIEF	PHONE NO.	PRIORITY ACTUALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Disposal)

1289

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]: [illegible]

6 March 1963

[illegible]: Report of Informal Staff Visit - Larson AFB, Washington

TO: [illegible]

1. Persons Making Visit: Lt Col Charles [illegible] Murray
Capt James [illegible] Levin

2. Period of Visit: 4 - 7 March 1963

3. Purpose of Visit: To examine procedures in operation within Base Supply.

4. Persons Contacted: Lt Col Perry [illegible] Cole ([illegible])
Major Henry [illegible] Davison ([illegible])

5. Findings:

a. Management & Procedures Division:

(1) Procedures Branch:

(a) With the exception of the Priorities Branch of Property Accounting, all Base Supply activities have been inspected within the past six months as prescribed by SACM 67-3.

b. Property Accounting Division:

(1) Priorities Branch:

(a) The delivery effectiveness was being computed in error on the Missile/[illegible] Control Register. Many issues that were reflected on the SAC Form 236 were not included in the total number of issues consolidated on the lower right hand corner of the form. In addition, organizational cancellations were not eliminated from the total requests as computed for the delivery effectiveness information. (Para 19b, Sect C, Chapter 7, Vol I, SACM 67-3)

(b) Block 13 of the Routine Call In Center Delivery Control Register was not being completed. (Para 13a(1), Sect B, Chapter 7, Vol I, SACM 67-3)

(c) A priority monitor file has been established to monitor status on all priority requisitions. However, it was not being maintained in a current status. Many of these requisitions had been cancelled,

1290

received or downgraded, but action had not been taken to remove the monitor cards.

(d) Necessary follow-up action is not being taken in all cases on priority requisitions with TRJ Codes as listed in attachment D-32 to Chapter 3, Vol I, SAGM 67-3. Examples:

Requisition [illegible]	TRJ	14	No Follow Up
Requisition [illegible]	TRJ	14	No Follow Up
Requisition [illegible]	TRJ	08	No Follow Up

(Para 13, Sect I, Chapt 4, Vol I, SAGM 67-3)

(e) Items in ASF status are not being evacuated as outlined in Para 13a(3), Sect I, Chapter 4, Vol I, SAGM 67-3. Following are examples of bits or pieces on requisition for over 30 days with no status received from the depot:

Requisition Number	Required For
[illegible]	To repair a non hi-value item
[illegible]	To repair a non hi-value item

(2) Hi-Value Recovery:

(a) A monitor has been appointed on orders and is conducting hi-value inspections of all applicable sections of Base Supply. Tagging, marking and storage of hi-value material is in accordance with current directives.

c. Maintenance Support Division:

(1) Repair Cycle Support Branch:

(a) AGE Materials Control Section:

1. File of AF Form 862, Parts Request, is not maintained in a current status. Some AF Forms 862 were held in file for items that had been received or cancelled. The forms were not annotated to indicate any action had been taken. Examples:

Requisition [illegible]	Item was issued on the 53d day
Requisition [illegible]	Item was issued on the 37th day
Requisition [illegible]	Sub was issued on the 15th day
Requisition [illegible]	Cancelled by organization on 15th day

(b) Civil Engineering Support Unit:

1. Many AF Forms 1445 (materials, equipment and labor estimates) reflected requisitions for bits and pieces that were annotated as cancelled on the control register. Eighty-Eight work orders were on hand with supply action 100% complete.

CHARLES B. MURRAY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Directorate of Materiel

1291

[redacted]

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DM

30 March 1963

SUBJECT: Staff Visit - 92d BMCW

TO: 18SAD (C)

INFO: 92CSG (BMCW) [redacted]
462CSG (BMCW) [redacted]

1. Period of Visit: 8-12 Mar 63

2. Persons Contacted:

Col C. N. Burcky, DC Civ Engrg
Maj M. Gieb, Jr., CEBC
TSgt Pauli, CES Tng
SMS Berman, [redacted]

3. Persons Conducting Visit:

Lt Col J. W. Thompson, DM
SMS D. J. Newberg, DMM

4. Purpose of Visit: Review and evaluate progress in establishing procedures for accomplishing JOTS training for BDCE missile support personnel.

5. Findings: Following is a resume of findings and recommendations made during this visit:

a. The Civil Engineer activities have expended a great deal of effort in preparation and implementation of the JOTS Program. Additional emphasis in areas of control and supervision is required to insure satisfactory progress and success of the over-all program.

b. The following items were noted with recommendations as indicated:

(1) The CE Training Section did not have pertinent data available to adequately monitor the JOTS Program. Examples are:

(a) Number and names of personnel identified for JOTS training.

(b) Phase test results administered by Missile Unit Maintenance Training.

(c) Progress being made by personnel in JOTS training.

It was recommended that the CE Training Section develop additional control procedures to include a chart reflecting status of the JOTS Program. This chart should be based on the period of time established as a goal for completion of JOTS training and should reflect the current rates of progression for personnel in training.

(2) Section supervisors contacted did not possess adequate knowledge of the JOTS Program and were not familiar with their responsibilities. It was recommended that procedures be established to insure that all applicable personnel become intimately familiar with the JOTS Program. Periodic meetings should be scheduled with supervisors for discussion and review of the program.

(3) All personnel identified for missile support have not received their initial interview and evaluation by Missile Maintenance Training. In some cases personnel have been issued the JOTS package and have not been tested. Purpose of this evaluation is to make available to the supervisor areas of deficiency requiring specific emphasis during training and should be accomplished prior to issuing the JOTS package. Recommend expeditious scheduling of personnel for testing in coordination with Missile Maintenance Training.

(4) Phase test results were not entered on all SAC Forms 56 and test results were not available in the Training Section. Recommend that test results be obtained from Missile Maintenance Training and posted to the individual SAC Form 56. Further recommend that the SAC Form 56 accompany personnel scheduled for testing.

(5) The AF Form 1320, training chart maintained in CE shops did not reflect the actual status of each individual in JOTS training. Numerous personnel were entered on the charts who were not in JOTS training. Recommend that a separate AF Form 1320 be maintained to include only those personnel in JOTS training and that these charts be monitored for task qualification, phase test completion, and certification.

(6) Maintenance Inspectors for BDCE have not been designated. The requirement for selecting maintenance inspectors to inspect missile work performed by BDCE is contained in SAC message DMAC 017826, 28 Feb 63. 15th Air Force CE and SAC have indicated that Maintenance inspectors should be identified by over printing "Maintenance Inspector" on the AF Form 483, Certificate of Competency, and that this-

should be accomplished immediately. Selection of personnel for inspectors should be restricted to foremen and/or supervisors considered highly qualified for missile support.

6. On conclusion of this visit Colonel Burcky, Deputy Commander for Civil Engineering, was briefed on the above findings and recommendations.

7. A reply to this report is neither desired nor required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. THOMPSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

HEADQUARTERS
9TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DMS

13 March 1963

SUBJECT: MEMO FOR RECORD - Model 4100 A/B Trailers (GAM-77A)

TO: 18SAD (DM)

1. Person Making Visit: TSgt J. R. Lovin

2. Period of Visit: 13 Mar 63

3. Persons Contacted: K. Remillard, Civ Special Activities Base Supply

4. Purpose of Visit: To collect information relative to the status of the requirement for the Model 4100 Series trailer for use with the GAM-77A.

5. Findings: It should first be noted that several electrical messages from higher headquarters and numerous local telephone conversations concerning the status of these trailers have resulted in the existance of some confusion as to exactly where we stand. Consequently, I queried appropriate operating officials with the following results:

a. A total of five model 4100A trailers are authorized for GAM support.

b. One each model 4100B is on hand against this authorization.

c. One each model 4100A trailer is due in from Mather AFB. Estimated delivery date is 15 Mar 63.

d. Three each model 4100B trailers are due in from SAAMA. Estimated delivery date is April 1963.

e. According to the GAM-77A Controlled Mission Equipment (CME) listing, the model 4100A trailer is a substitute for the model 4100B.

f. It was noted that five power packs applicable to the Model 4100B trailer were received from the depot. They are the power packs required to modify the trailers to allow automatic raising and lowering.

g. The base position on the Model 4100 trailers is as follows:

A total of eleven (11) trailers are authorized the 928AW.

A total of seven (7) each are on hand.

Activity	Qty Auth	Qty on Hand
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted] (for CAM support)	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted] (for B-52 support)	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted] (for EC-135 support)	[redacted]	[redacted]

JAMES R. LOVIN
TSgt, USAF
Supply Supt

FILE DESIGNATION

OPS 17

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME

26 March 1963

SUBJECT: Visit - Colonel Hank Pfeiffer

TO: [illegible]

1. Major T. J. Kibble, this headquarters, conducted a staff visit to the 569th SMW, Larson AFB, on 18 and 19 March. The visit was accomplished primarily to check Command [illegible] in compliance with 1AAF message DOCT 13477 [illegible].

2. The Command Post was checked upon arrival at the [illegible]. All activities had been in progress for six hours having started at 0600 PST. Alerting of the follow-on forces were being generated in accordance with Annex "J" of the SIOP 63 plan.

3. At 1215 PST there was indication of an explosion in silo 3 of "A" complex located at Odessa, Washington. The fire warning light illuminated on the console panel. First indications were that the CO2 purge cannisters were activated but were later noticed to have not been activated.

4. The Larson AFB Disaster Control Team was immediately dispatched by ground vehicle. The Wing Commander, missile maintenance officer and missile safety officer were immediately dispatched by helicopter.

5. At 1440 PST the fire warning light on the console went out. The MCMC and safety personnel observed the tunnel sliding door had buckled from explosion so entry was accomplished into silo from the equipment tunnel door and it was observed that one of the separation rockets had fired. The missile was still erect and apparently had suffered no other damage; however, the possible twist and corrosive action on the missile will be another facet to accomplish.

6. Personnel were dispatched from Norton AFB, California, to inspect damage that was caused to the missile and evaluate the work to be accomplished prior to missile being placed back on alert.

7. Command Post: Air crews are receiving training in positive control on the first day of each alert tour. This training is from tape and lectures followed by an examination. This program is conducted in a professional manner and is considered to be adequate at this time. The instruction

SYMBOL	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

AAC FORM 316, OCT 60

has not started on the new SACM 55-3, Volume 2.

8. A program has been initiated to indoctrinate and educate staff personnel on positive control procedures, NDS information, missile reaction and messages of type received by controllers. These classes are to be two hours in duration Monday, Wednesday, and Friday starting at 0700 MST, 20 March.

9. A schedule has been established which will afford a complete coverage of supervised indoctrination tours by controllers through Complex "B" control center within the next two weeks. This schedule will be accomplished each month. A check list of items to cover has been established and will be utilized with all controllers trips through the alternate command post.

10. Each controller attends classes once each month with a tape and written test being accomplished each day. Also this controller administers a test each day to the crew that is to replace them. This gives a total of 676 exams in the last year with only one failure. The only one to fail an exam was AlC Hodges. This could be caused by the possible immaturity of the individual.

11. The unit is scheduled to loose five of the airmen controllers prior to 1 Jun 63. A recent survey was accomplished with a request for volunteers to be controllers published on base. Twelve applicants volunteered with six of the twelve being qualified and interviewed for the training.

12. 15th Air Force DOC 62236, subject: Controller Training and Training Records, established the minimum requirements to be accomplished by each controller. The 462d has been conducting this training program adequately.

FRANK J. RIDDLE
Major, USAF
Operations Staff Officer

[redacted]

27 March 1968

[redacted]

[redacted] (G)

1. On 26 Mar 68 I [redacted] visit to the [redacted]. I conferred [redacted] Lt Col [redacted], Lt Smith, and [redacted]. During the visit I was accompanied by Major Young and M/Sgt Hunt both on the Office of Safety.

2. [redacted] it would be very difficult to [redacted] from. I do have [redacted] which the squadron can support the accident prevention program. [redacted] of his responsibilities in this program. However, documentation in support of this is inadequate.

3. Recommendations. I recommend that Squadron Operational [redacted] be published in the following areas:

a. An OI covering Accident Prevention responsibilities and squadron safety committees.

b. An OI outlining accident/incident/hazard reporting procedures within the squadron. This OI would include instructions regarding the accomplishment of AF Form 471 AMR and 1680 form 854.

c. An OI outlining the requirements for the dissemination of accident prevention topics at work cells. This would include the methods of directing the subject usage and the references where the NCO conducting the work cell would obtain the necessary information.

4. Safety Meetings. The required personnel are on orders as Safety Officer and Safety NCO, and these people are reasonably familiar with the requirements of this additional duty. SO G, 15 Mar 68, lists the squadron Safety Council with Lt Col Dickson as the Chairman. This council is now in accordance with AFCR 50-2 and applicable supplements. The minutes of the Safety Council meetings while reflecting adequate subject matter are not in the proper format. At the time of the visit there were two councils. One council was called the Safety Council and the other the Accident Prevention Council.

OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SEC.

AFCP/AFNA 88, OCT 65

Recommendation:

a. That the minutes be kept in the format which I supplied to Lt Sands, the Council Recorder.

b. That the Accident Prevention Council be dissolved.

4. Maintenance Area, Building 2025:

a. Sgt Squires accompanied me during the tour of Bldg. 2025 and recorded each discrepancy that we found. Approximately 20 discrepancies were noted, most of which were of a minor nature. Those warranting inclusion in this report were:

(1) Nitrogen bottle was not secured at Station 2.

(2) Floor sealant was pealing badly.

(3) Fire extinguishers were all inspected last on 21 February.

(4) Civil Engineers carpentry work within the building was causing housekeeping difficulties.

(5) While ammonia vent lines were available, three missiles stored in the hangar were not being vented due to nonavailability of couplers.

b. The couplers, mentioned above, have been on order since 7 March, Control Nr. [illegible]. There is no expected delivery date at this time and if the couplers do not arrive within 30 days, they will be reordered. A Supply Difficulty letter has been forwarded on this subject.

c. The sealing problem for the floor of the hangar has been a continuing problem. Work orders were submitted on 29 Mar 62, Project Nr. 2-607, and this work order was returned on 9 May 62 as being denied. On 26 Jun 62 another work order was submitted, Project Nr. 3-47. This work order was reviewed on 23 August. Again, on 11 Sept 62 a work order was submitted, the status of which could not be determined. The reasons given by the FSE were that the requested work was not required by existing directives.

d. Sealer for the windows of the hangar arrived on the base on 26 March, the day of the visit and five tubes were issued on 27 March without stipulation that if more was needed it would be issued.

5. Combined Systems Checkout, Building 2025:

a. Sgt Squires accompanied me on my tour of this facility also. At the time of the visit ammonia servicing was taking

1300

place. All necessary precautions had been taken with the exception of two items.

(1) The hazard sign for "Ammonia Servicing in Progress" has not been posted at the entrance to the facility area.

(2) The doors at one end of the missile bay had not been opened to allow maximum ventilation.

b. These two items were brought to the attention of Captain Coey and he assured us they would be corrected and not recur.

6. Ammonia Servicing Facility, Building 2004: The ammonia servicing facility does not have an emergency telephone at the location. The safety instruction format recommended by AFM 160-39 was not posted at the facility.

Recommendations:

a. That the PSE Section take immediate action to have an emergency telephone installed.

b. That the PSE Section post the safety instruction format recommended by AFM 160-39.

7. The general condition of all areas of the AMMS were satisfactory but could be improved with more vigorous housecleaning activities during the period of modification by the Civil Engineer in Building 2020.

8. A copy of this report is being sent to the Wing Commander and the AMMS Commander with no reply required.

THOMAS H. PARKHILL
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Safety

Copy to: 93WC
AMMSC

CONFIDENTIAL

C

14 Mar 1963

Bombing Reliability

462 Strat Aerospace Wg (WC)

1. The bombing results of the 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing for the current quarter leave a lot to be desired. Your wing has been consistently on the bottom of the bombing ladder of 15th Air Force B-52 units during this period.

2. My Operations staff has performed an analysis of your bombing through 11 March, with the conclusion that 19 of the 32 unreliable QFR bombs were preventable with professional preparation and firm supervision of bombing training by the wing staff. With the new SO-8 and QFR bombing a requirement exists for additional crew study in bombing techniques and for stricter staff supervision in order to attain acceptable bombing results. I consider this crew training in the same sense of positive control studying in order to accomplish 100%.

3. There can be no excuses for poor bombing, particularly those involving crew error. There is a wealth of talent and experience in your wing which is borne out by past excellent bombing reliability standings within the 15th Air Force. I expect this talent to be used to the best possible advantage to bring the 462d back to the top in bombing where it rightfully belongs.

4. I expect you and your staff to thoroughly examine every facet of your bombing training and supervision to determine and correct the causes for your substandard bombing performance.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Analysis, Unreliable Bombs

This letter is classified Confidential because it reveals weakness in the orgn. When attachment is withdrawn or not attached the classification of Confidential will be changed to Unclassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

1302

CONFIDENTIAL

106

DO 13 March 1963

Bombing Reliability in 462d SAW

MEMO FOR GENERAL OHLER

1. I have completed an evaluation of bombing reliability in the 462d SAW for the current training period and am convinced that the primary cause is inadequate mission preparation on the part of some crews and insufficient supervision on the part of the Operations staff.

2. As of 11 March the unit had achieved these results:

	Accomplished	Reliable	Per Cent Reliable
Hi altitude QFE	136	121	88.9
Lo altitude QFE	127	110	86.6
Combined QFE	263	231	87.6

3. Through 28 February the 462d was in 12th place of twelve 15th Air Force B-52 units in bombing reliability.

4. Causes of the 32 unreliable bombs are broken down as follows:

Aiming point identification	5
Wind shear	2
Materiel failure	11
Hi altitude fixed angle procedures	4
Large charge timing procedures	6
Contested runs at this time	2
Synchronization error	1
Offset information - staff error	1

As you can see, 19 of the 32 unreliable bombs were clearly of the type that careful mission planning, properly supervised, would have prevented.

5. As a result of my analysis I have prepared a letter for your signature calling the attention of the Wing Commander to the deficiencies which I have uncovered and directing action to eliminate those deficiencies.

LUCIEN N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

1303

14 March 1963

Colonel David A Tate
Commander
462d Strat Aerospace Wing
Larson AFB, Washington

Dear Dave:

As you know, a commander is primarily a manager. In fulfilling his responsibilities he must insure that adequate controls are in effect to enable him to discharge his managerial responsibility in conformance with established standards.

The most flagrant abuse of the principle of sound management that I have observed recently is the gross overpayment of civilian overtime at Larson during the period 1 July 1962 to 31 January 1963. According to information available to me, you were authorized to expend about $14,000 during this period. Your actual expenditures were in excess of $35,000 -- roughly 2-1/2 times the allowable amount. Under any circumstances this gross overpayment would be unacceptable, and it is particularly serious in the light of present fund limitations.

Please refer to Attachment 1 concerning expenditures.

Both General Old and I are keenly aware of the fact that the Cuban crisis imposed additional workloads, as well as your move to Plant 53, for which your organization was not adequately manned. We could accept a token overpayment of civilian overtime as an expedient for mission accomplishment. However, I cannot accept the apparent, complete disregard of sound management practices and the adoption of a "blank check" philosophy during this period.

As senior commanders, it is our responsibility to keep informed on the obligation of funds at all times. When we encounter problems which exceed our authority and capability, it is likewise our responsibility to advise our superiors before we grossly over-obligate. After the fact notification is not acceptable.

Your commanders and key staff officers have a solemn obligation to keep you advised of all major problem areas. In this instance, it appears that either you were not properly advised or you didn't heed their advice.

I desire that in the future and in conformance with directives issued several times from 15th Air Force that civilian overtime expenditure will not, repeat not, exceed 1% of the civilian payroll. I further desire that you establish management controls which will preclude any similar occurrence in the future.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Expenditures, Civilian Overhire

11c

Civilian Overhire - Larson AFB

1. Authorized expenditure was 1% of civilian payroll during period 1 July 62 through 31 January 63. (7 months)

2. Payroll last year was $2,434,000.
   1% = $24,340 for 12 months
   For 7 months, authorized expenditure was $14,182.

3. Actual expenditure (extracted from message) was:
   $35,183 during the 7-month period.

4. $\frac{14182}{100} : \frac{35183}{248}$ -- Actually spent 2-1/2 times authorized amount.

ATCH 1

15 March 1963

Colonel David I. Liebman
Commander
92d Strategic Aerospace Wing
Fairchild AFB, Washington

Dear Dave:

As I have indicated in previous correspondence, it is my desire and standing policy to have our missile maintenance facilities and complexes surgically clean at all times. While our complexes are generally in a satisfactory condition in this regard, it has been my observation that the condition is retrogressing in the MAMS Building and hangar maintenance facility of the AMMS.

Sometime ago a project was instituted to paint the MAMS and shop floors with sealant compound. Also, to seal the doors and windows of the Guidance Shop, and access doors to the hangar maintenance facility of the AMMS. To date neither of these projects have been completed. I am advised that the MAMS facility is awaiting procurement of materials and that the AMMS estimate of costs for labor and materials is in the engineering phase.

I would like for you to look into this matter and determine if these projects can be expedited without jeopardizing other high priority projects requiring funding. Also, the feasibility of accomplishing these on a do-it-yourself basis should be considered -- our missiles are just as sensitive to destructive or harassing interference of our elemental environment as any space vehicle. I believe that maximum elimination of dust, lint, and exposure to corrosion can have a direct bearing on our ability to launch.

If there are any matters that are deterring completion of these projects I would appreciate your discussing them with me.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

General Ohlke



1359

SECRET

HISTORY



18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 - 31 MAY 1963

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C Donald E. Hughes, Unit Historian, under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It was prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals the classified operations conducted by division during the period of this history. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield

RAY J. HARTSFIELD
1st Lt., USAF
Information Officer

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING BY
A. Louis Laney
(approving authority)
DOD DIR 5200.10

A LOUIS LANEY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

Eugene Powell
Col USAF
for HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING BY~~
~~Fred C. Gale~~
~~(approving authority)~~
~~DOD DIR 5200.10~~

SECRET

BDASAC 92-32

5-4325-4

USAF DX163-74 Atch 16'

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A&E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully Equipped
AOGP	Aircraft out of commission for parts
BDR	Bomber Defense Run
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEA	Circular Error Average
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DEFCON	Defense Condition
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
DPL	Dual Propellant Loading
ECM	Electronics Counter Measure
ECCM	Electronics Counter Counter Measure

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EGT	Exhaust Gas Tempature
EPR	Engine Pressure Ratio
ETS	Expiration of term of service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWO	Electronics Warfare Officer of Observer
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base
FOB	Flack Order Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
GCA	Ground Control Approach
GPI	Ground Position Indicator
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IP	Initial Point
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LDR	Local Defense Run
LGR	Low Gear Run
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
LSR	Launch Simulated Run
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment

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MCC	Missile Combat Crew
MCCC	Missile Combat Crew Commander
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
NDR	Nike Defense Run
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officer Effectiveness Report
OOAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the job training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
ORT	Operational Readiness Test
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PIP	Pre-initial Point
PST	Pacific Standard Time
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
RSR	Radar Simulated Run
SAW	Strategic Aerospace Wing
SEA	Scoring Error Average
SEP	Scoring Error Probable
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSG	Strategic Standardization Group
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty

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T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance
TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
VOCO	Verbal Order of the Commanding Officer
VOR	Visual Omni-range
ZI	Zone of Interior

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HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, the Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing are organized, manned, trained and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing develope and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd

---

1. SAC Reg. 23-15, 20 Apr 62, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed HDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

KODAK SAFETY FILM

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

A staff visit on 3 May was conducted to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing base operations by division operations personnel. This visit was a follow-up of the wing CSI and general inspection made by the Fifteenth Air Force Inspector General during April 1963. Overall, it was obvious that proper action had not been taken to correct the discrepancies listed in the previous visits and inspection reports of the division and also of higher headquarters. (S)[8]

Among items of primary interest that had not been attended to were loose wiring in the dispatch office which had not been secured, the flight planning room had not been reorganized in compliance with Fifteenth Air Force Manual 55-2, and base maps and information sheets were still not being provided to transients. An equal number of previous discrepancies were either corrected or in the process of being corrected, but there was no feasible excuse for most of the trouble areas which still remained unchecked.[9] (S)

Lieutenant Colonel M.E. Marler, division operations staff officer, made a staff visit to the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron from 6 through 9 May to determine, by analyzing recent propellant loading exercise (PLX) failures, if action could be taken locally to improve the reliability of missiles in the squadron. In all, 46 PLX's were analyzed, beginning with February and extending through 8 May. Of the 46 only 14 were successful and 32 suffered premature shutdowns for various reason.[10] (S)

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8. Staff Visit, 92SAW Base Ops, DO, 3 May 63. Exhibit #5.
9. Ibid.
10. Staff Visit, 568SMS, SECRET, DO, 6-9 May 63. Exhibit #6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by division staff agencies.

Reports submitted by division staff agencies.

Files of the division staff agencies.

Interviews of division officials.

Division, Wing, Group and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group; Headquarters for the 13th Strategic Aerospace Division. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing. (U)

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LIST OF EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAW, DP, Subj: Reassignment of Colonel Milner, 13 May 63.	1
Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, CONFIDENTIAL, Subj: Tactical Squadron Commander's Conference, 18 Apr 63.	2
Ltr, 15AFC to 18SADC, Subj: B-52 Maintenance NCS, 2 May 63.	3
Staff Visit, 462SAW, DO, 1-2 May 63.	4
Staff Visit, 92SAW, DO, 3 May 63.	5
Staff Visit, 56FCMS, SECRET, DO, 6-9 May.	6
Staff Visit, 92SAW, DO, 17 May 63.	7
Staff Visit, 462SAW, DO, 28 May 63.	8
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC and 462SAWC, Subj: Falcon Foundation, 28 May 63.	9
Ltr, 18SADC to 92SAWC and 462SAWC, Subj: AF Manual 60-5 Requirements, 13 May 63.	10
Ltr, 18SADC to 462SAWC, Subj: Major Organizational Relocations, 27 May 63.	11

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

C 13 May 1963

Assignment of Division Officers

92DP

1. Request orders be issued assigning Colonel Robert S Milner, 10740A, as Division Director of Materiel, AFSC 0046, effective 6 May 1963 VICE Lt Colonel James W Thompson, Jr.

2. Assign Lt Colonel James W Thompson, Jr., 22841A, as Maintenance Staff Officer, AFSC 4316, effective 6 May 1963.

HAROLD W OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

COORDINATION	
OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
C	
DEXO	
DM	
DO	
DS	
C	
VC	
DAS	
DCR	
IXO	
DCO	
DCM	
DSUP	
DP	
SAFE	
BC	
BVC	
BDCO	
BDCS	
BDCM	
BDCE	
BDCL	
BDAS	
BDP	
BDCR	
BDS	
BJA	
BIXO	
BCH	
BSO	

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units) 61-393

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CONFIDENTIAL

CZCGPA438ZCC0A331
RR RUWHGP
DE RUWBKN 1A
R 180006Z
FM 15AF MARCH CALIF
TO RUCSBR/SAC
RUWHGP/18 SAD FAIRCHILD WASH
RUWHJM/47 SAD CASTLE CALIF
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L DP 1170
FOR DPOS AND C.AIRBORNE COMMAND POST.RE MY DP 3704, 7 DEC 62
CONF) , SAME SUBJECT.THE AIRBORNE COMMAND POST SCHEDULE IS
CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: BRIG GEN HAROLD W OHLKE, 18 SADIV, IS
CHANGED FROM 26 JUN 63 TO 29 MAY 63;BIG GEN WILLIAM R YANCEY,
47 SADIV,WILL REPLACE GEN OHLKE ON 26 JUN 63.
BT
18/0013Z APR RUWBKN

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

3 May 1963

Lieutenant General Archie J Old, Jr.
Commander
Fifteenth Air Force
March Air Force Base, Washington

Dear General Old:

In reply to your letter of 25 April, my staff and I have thoroughly analyzed the low B-52 Maintenance Management Control System [illegible] at Larson for the January - March period.

Point loss during January caused the unsatisfactory and [illegible] for the quarter. January's low performance was preceded by a [illegible] ful six-month period of high MCS scoring, Cuban crisis and Christmas Dome activity. Subsequent to January, progress has been made in [illegible] MCS areas cited in your letter.

The January condition was aggravated by an abnormal number of [illegible] fuel leakers and weather diversions of B-52s and KC-135s of other [illegible] units to Larson. We discovered personnel misassigned and [illegible] these to strengthen the DCM organizations. Changes to organizational [illegible] and managerial procedures were also made, particularly in job [illegible] the Assistant DCM, A&E and OMS.

Results of the foregoing have virtually eliminated the problems which caused the January condition. Steady improvement has been [illegible] since mid-February. As of 26 April the Larson Maintenance MCS [illegible] stood at 97.8%. I expect that unit to remain at that level or higher [illegible] this quarter.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W ORLER
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

Copy to: 4682AW(WC)

COORDINATION

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RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Disposal)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units)

1380

HEADQUARTERS
FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MARCH AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

25 APR 1963

Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke
Commander
18th Strategic Aerospace Division
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington

Dear Hal:

I have just been briefed on the SAC Management Control System results for the January-March 1963 scoring period. I am concerned with Larson's low performance and particularly displeased that the 462d was the lowest-scoring wing in SAC in the B-52 Maintenance area.

Those items reflecting low performance were:

B-52 Airborne as Scheduled
B-52 Aircraft Systems
B-52 Munitions Maintenance
B-52 First Sortie after Ground Alert
Shop Reparable
Information Activities

Continuing below-average performance highlights a lack of personnel attention, planning, emphasis, and control on the part of responsible commanders and supervisors. I want you to seek out and eliminate the underlying causes of this unsatisfactory situation.

Sincerely,

Archie J. Old, Jr.

ARCHIE J. OLD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

DO

7 May 1963

Staff Visit - 92SAW

MEMO FOR RECORD

1 Major F. J. Riddle and CMSgt W. S. Wheeler, this headquarters, conducted a staff visit to the 92SAW Base Operations on 30 April and 2 May 63 respectively. These visits were follow-up to the 92SAW CRI/General Inspection conducted by the I&IG during period 21-26 Apr 63.

2 The following items were noted:

a. A general clean up was in progress. Many of the venetian blinds need replacing.

b. Loose wiring in the dispatch office had not been covered as noted in previous 18SAD visits.

c. The organizational functional chart has been up dated.

d. Windows have been cleaned.

e. The flight planning room had not been reorganized in accordance with 18AFM 55-2.

f. The Pilots Information file had been brought up to date.

g. Operating procedures required by 18AF 55-2 had been reaccomplished.

h. The contents of the ACD/AO books had been revised.

i. A T-square had not been provided for the flight planning room.

j. AF Forms 457 (Operational Hazard Report) have been provided to the Dispatch Section.

k. The revision to the Fairchild Air Traffic Control Manual (FAFBM 55-1) was in the printers at this writing.

l. The Aircraft Emergency Notification Checklist had been revised.

RETURN TO	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Disposal)

1383

n. The secondary crash alarm system was in the process of being realigned. Estimated date of completion by the phone company: 10 May 63.

o. The dispatcher's quick reference check list and instruction book had been revised.

o. A more thorough check of information on clearance forms was being accomplished.

p. Airdrome inspections were being properly documented on SAC Form 315.

q. Base maps and information sheets were still not being provided to transients.

r. Inspection of the Tower Officer's book had not been completed.

s. The primary crash alarm system in the tower was in the process of being realigned. Estimated completion date by the phone company: 10 May 63

t. Crash alarm systems checks are being made 15 minutes after the beginning of each day in accordance with 15AFM 55-2.

u. The B-52 Safety of Flight Supplements and Operating Procedures and KC-135 Flight Manual were brought up to date.

u. Painting of walls and the renovation of the Base Operations facility cannot be accomplished until funds are available in FY 1/64.

3. The DCO, 922AW, was present during the staff visit made on 3 May 63.

4. It is obvious that proper action has not been taken to correct discrepancies as listed in previous visit and inspection reports of this and higher headquarters.

LUCIEN N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

Secret

DO

24 May 1965

Staff Visit to 600th Strategic Missile Squadron

SUMMARY (U)

1. Lt Col Snyder, this office, made a special visit to the 600th SMS (SAC) May 65 for the purpose of determining current analysis of reentry propulsion systems operation (RPSO) failures, whether any actions can be taken locally to improve the reliability of missiles in the 600th Squadron. (U)

2. Statistically, 48 RVs were analyzed, beginning with the February 1963 and extending through 6 May. Fourteen of the countdowns were successful; the remaining 34 experienced premature shutdowns for a variety of reasons. (U)

3. In an effort to detect commonality among the malfunctions were broken down four different ways. (U)

a. By major system or function. (Atch 1) (U)

b. By individual item. (Atch 2) (U)

c. By general type of item. (Atch 3) (U)

d. By causes. (Atch 4) (U)

4. General Comments:

a. As indicated in Atch 1, approximately two thirds of all failures occurred in propellant loading and associated preservations. Both of these functions are performed by the propellant loading preservation system (PLPS). (U)

b. Valves and switches accounted for 20 failures. This high rate can be accounted for in part by the large number of these items in the system. (U)

c. Electrical failure accounts for over half of all malfunctions, followed by improper tank data and minimum errors by computer or guidance subsystem. These three areas accounted for 36 of the 48 failures. (U)

d. Local maintenance is charged with only one failure (LOX probe leak), and this might easily have been charged to design deficiency. (U)

Page 64

e. Maintenance practices, insofar as could be determined, were in accordance with operating procedures and sound maintenance practices. Approved check lists were being used, and theoretically qualified personnel were performing the maintenance tasks. Actual qualification of these people could not be accurately determined, nor could it be determined whether any of the failures attributed to material failure were the result of improper maintenance. (U)

f. Technical representatives (TRSP) were being properly utilized to train maintenance personnel; however, the TRSP contract expires 30 June. (U)

g. Particularly noteworthy was the debriefing system used by the Chief of Maintenance to identify malfunctioning systems and corrective action required. (U)

h. Prior to 20 April three highly qualified civilian engineers were assigned to the squadron to assist in trouble shooting and de-bugging the system. It is too early to assess fully the adverse effect that their loss will have on over-all system reliability; however, it will most likely be substantial. (U)

i. Through a design deficiency several automatic shutdowns occurred because a component failed which was not directly concerned with securing a successful launch. A few of these items have been removed from the logic sequence; however, several more remain. (U)

j. Self-checking features of the system are not adequate to detect malfunctioning helium pressurization valves and switches during routine checkout procedures.

5. Conclusions:

a. Maintenance within the 500th SMS does not appear to be a significant factor in the unreliability of the missile system. (U)

b. No one cause can be pinpointed for the failures that have been experienced; however, if valve and switch failures could be eliminated the system reliability would more than double. (U)

c. SMAM does not appear to have adequate procedures for determining the exact causes for component failure and correcting these causes, either through improved hardware or revised operating procedures. (U)

1386

d. There is no place in a weapon system of this nature for automatic shutdown features which would prevent a successful launch through failure of a non-critical item. (U)

6. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. An urgent letter or TWX be dispatched through channels to SBAMA asking for their immediate assistance in solving the high failure rate in components of the Titan I system, particularly valves and pressure switches. (U)

b. A high level committee, preferably headed by a general officer, be established to determine those malfunctions which now result in automatic shutdown, but which could be tolerated for [illegible] launch. A program should then be directed to eliminate these components from the emergency logic of the system. Highly qualified members of Titan I squadrons, SBAMA technicians and Martin Company engineers should be members of the committee. (S)

c. CTSP personnel in the [illegible] SMS continue to be used to the maximum for training maintenance personnel. (U)

d. Command level pressure be brought to bear to obtain CTSP assistance for at least a year subsequent to 30 June. (U)

7. This document is classified Secret because it reveals a weakness in a [illegible] weapon system. (S)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCION N. [illegible]
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

4 Atch
1. Malfunctions by System (S)
2. Malfunctions by Individual Item (S)
3. Malfunctions by General Type of Item (S)
4. Malfunctions by Cause (S)

1387

MALFUNCTIONS BY SYSTEM

(P)	Propellant loading	9
(L)	Launcher	3
(H)	Hydraulic	1
(MP)	Missile pressurization	12
(F)	Fire water system	4
(PV)	Power	1
(G)	Guidance	3
	Total	32

(S)

Atch 1



1389

MALFUNCTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL ITEM

Item	No.	Malfunction	Cause
LOX Probe Leak	1	Improper mating	Maint
Press. Reg valve [illegible] and [illegible]	1	Faulty valves	Mat
Check valve [illegible]	1	Installed backwards	Contr
Helium sphere press. sw.	3	Defective switches	Mat
Helium accum. press. sw.	1	Defective switch	Mat
Launcher brake press. sw.	1	Defective switches	Mat
Low hydraulic accum. pressure	1	No rqmt to check	T/Data
Cold helium quick disc.	2	[illegible] not done. Failure to release or lanyard adj.	Contr Undet
R.O.V. 803	2	Faulty valve	Mat
Primary regulator, helium	1	Faulty regulator	Mat
Deposition selector valve	1	Faulty valve	Mat
Valve PCV 802 (Fire water)	1	Design deficiency or improper calibration	Undet
Liquid level sensor	1	Faulty sensor	Mat
Pressure switch [illegible]	2	Improper calibration ([illegible] vs [illegible])	T/Data
Deceleration cylinder	1	Undetermined	Undet
Power fluctuation	1	Countdown started on one engine, insuff.power	Higher Eq
Elevator servos	1	Servos had drifted 177 mils	Undet
Radio receiver frequency	1	Failure of installed test set used as freq ref	Mat
PCV 804	3	Out of calibration. Foreign matter in valve. Defective control switch.	T/Data Mat Mat
PCV 803	2	Defective valve. Leaking flange.	Mat Depot

(S)

Atch 2

1390

MALFUNCTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL ITEM (Continued)

Item	No.	Malfunction	Cause
LOX probe retraction micro sw.	1	Sw. loose. Failed to stop LOX flow thru probe.	T/Data
Electronic chassis	1	End power board. Failed to give sub sys. readout.	Mat
FCV 217	1	Possible faulty valve	Mat
Helium leak	1	Leak between secondary press reg and tank.	Depot

(S)

Key:

Maint.....Squadron maintenance

Mat.....Material failure

Contr.....Contractor error

T/Data.....Erroneous tech data

Depot.....Depot maintenance error.

Undet.....Undetermined

DO 63 [illegible]

Atch 2

1391

MALFUNCTIONS BY GENERAL TYPE OF ITEM

LOX probe	1
Valves	10
Switches	8
Quick disconnects	2
Regulators	1
Sensors	1
Deceleration cylinder	1
Servos	1
Radio	1
Electronic chassis	1
Miscellaneous	2

(2)

De Ca

Atch 3

1392

[redacted] BY CAUSE

Maintenance	1
Material failure	27
Contractor error	2
Depot maintenance	2
Test data	6
Higher HQ directives	1
Undetermined	4
	(43)

Atch 4

[redacted]

STAFF STUDY

DO 31 May 1960

Staff Visit, 63d Strat Aerospace Wing

[redacted]

1. A staff visit was conducted on 17 May 1960 by Col[redacted] Wheeler, Jr., Chief, Management, DO for Combat Operations Division for the purpose of reviewing the Wing Management program in accordance with SAF (DO) Letter, 7 May 59, subject Flight Management Program. The following items were noted.

a. All "F" model support aircraft are under the operational control of the consolidated aircraft support maintenance.

b. Support aircraft are not being requested for contractor use of individuals or detachments. All flying is accomplished in accordance with SACR 55-9. Discrepancies logged by transient aircrews are requesting changes in the SAC controlling order (I to I) from permissive, i.e., system changes were completed in the schedule the week of 9 May by commander-pilots logged by transient aircrews.

c. Flight manuals [illegible] are being mailed. When the 1/ increment of [illegible] arrives in July, each pilot is assigned [illegible] to insure the pilot library is kept.

d. Materiel deficiency [illegible] Combat Readiness, [illegible] is the only [illegible] necessary to meet this type standard.

e. Flying hours are distributed to all pilots by the scheduling section in the maximum allowed [illegible]. Personnel with the least seniority are given the necessary flights. This assignment of [illegible] is accomplished by [illegible] Some pilots have a limited number of flying hours [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]



HEADQUARTERS
15TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DO

31 May 1963

SUBJECT: Flight Management Program

TO: 4628AW(WC)

1. A staff visit was conducted on 28 May 1963 by CMSgt William B. Wheeler, Jr., this headquarters, to the 4628AW Base Operations Division for the purpose of reviewing the flight management program in accordance with 15AF (DC) letter, 7 May 63, Subject: Flight Management Program. The following items were noted.

a. All "S" coded support aircraft are under the operational control of the consolidated mission support manager.

b. Support aircraft are not being reserved for exclusive use of individuals or functions. All flying is scheduled in accordance with SACR 60-9.

c. Pilot support factors as established by AFR 55-30 are being realized at the present. When the SPMS personnel are transferred, only 27 non-tactical people will be left at Larson. Action is being initiated from Larson to have one C-47 transferred to another base, which will alleviate the problem somewhat.

d. Multiple currency is being adequately controlled. Colonel Templeman is the only pilot authorized currency in more than one aircraft.

e. All pilots are receiving an equitable amount of flying time to maximum extent possible. Cross-country flights are being utilized by those pilots most available. This situation is due to non-availability of certain missile crew members for these cross-country flights. A certain amount of the problem is in the 566th SMS scheduling procedures, but this is primarily an individual problem that could be rectified if the individual crew members displayed more initiative in making themselves available for flights away from the station. Command support should be given to this area.

f. Types of flying are being properly identified. The scheduling section has adequate procedures established for properly identifying each flight.

1396

2. The 4453AW Flight Management Program is adequate. The scheduling section is doing an excellent job in maintaining close supervision over AFM 60-1 requirements. If necessary, command support should be given to the scheduling program to insure that 15AF does not over-allocate flying time after the AFSC people are lost to the non-tactical section.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LUCION N POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

2

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE DESIGNATION

C 28 May 1963

Falcon Foundation Fund Drive

92SAW (WC)
462SAW (WC)

1. The Falcon Foundation is one of very few undertaki[illegible] that recognize and help the Air Force take care of its [illegible]. The primary objective of this Foundation is to pay the [illegible] of highly qualified young men who attend the Air Force Academy. Financial support through this outstanding endeavor applies equally to dependents of officers and enlisted men.

2. Our goal must be complete support of this noteworth[illegible] endeavor. Through our financial help to this foundation we are actually helping ourselves insure that only the best trained and best qualified individuals will be the lea[illegible] of our Air Force tomorrow.

3. I desire that you appoint a project officer to represent your Wing. Each project officer is authorized to contact Lt Colonel Edward O. Martin, 15th Air Force Project Officer, at 15AF Extension 22229 for assistance, if necessary.

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Ltr, Hq SAC (CINC), 30 Apr 63, w/1 [illegible]
Ind 15AF, 21 May 63
(2 cys)

COORDINATION	
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RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units) 61-293

1398

13 May 1963

Colonel David I. Liebman
Commander
92d Strategic Aerospace Wing
Fairchild AFB, Washington

Dear Dave:

My staff has reviewed the annual flying accomplishments required by AFM 60-1 by the rated officers in your Wing. On the whole the accomplishments are satisfactory at this date of the Fiscal Year, although there are a number of non-tactical rated officers who have fallen behind.

I wish to restate my long established policy regarding attaining minimum flying accomplishments and rated proficiency. I quote: "In this command the primary duty of officers on flying status is to maintain flying proficiency. All other assignments are secondary." Those officers who fail to maintain their rated proficiency and indicate a lack of interest in their flying careers can expect to be recommended for suspension from flying status.

I desire that you pay personal attention to this particular problem to insure that AFM 60-1 minimum flying requirements are achieved by members of your command.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W. ORLEN
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

C Copy

13 May 1963

Colonel David A. Tate
Commander
462d Strategic Aerospace Wing
Larson AFB, Washington

Dear Dave:

My staff has reviewed the annual flying accomplishments required by AFM 60-1 by the rated officers in your Wing. I consider the findings of upwards to 90:30 and in many cases more than 15 hours remaining to be flown to be excessive at this date.

I wish to remind you of my long established policy regarding meeting USAF minimum flying requirements and maintaining pilot proficiency. I quote: "In this command the primary duty of officers on flying status is to maintain flying proficiency. All other assignments are secondary." Those officers who fail to maintain their rated proficiency and indicate a lack of interest in their flying careers can expect to be recommended for suspension from flying status.

I expect you to give this matter your personal attention to insure that AFM 60-1 minimum requirements are met by the members of your command. There will be no reclama for failure to do so.

Sincerely,

HAROLD W. CHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

C Copy

1400

C

27 May 1963

Major Organizational Relocations - 462d SAW

462SAW (WC)

1. The requirement to move the major elements of your command either to the SPADS building or into the old Boeing facilities on the east ramp has prompted me to evaluate your decisions against the criteria established by paragraphs 2a(2)(3) and 2b(1) of SACR 23-15, 1 Jan 63.

2. If you locate major command elements in facilities on the east ramp and others in the SPADS building, your span of control appears to be jeopardized. This distance limitation will also complicate the functions of planning, organizing, coordinating, directing and controlling your manpower, material and financial resources provided to support your mission.

3. In order of priority, your missiles must be operational and demonstrate reliability above 80% at all times; alert aircraft must be maintained and supported for 100% reliability; facilities to support your MWO must be functionally positioned to give operations, maintenance and supply, in that order, the maximum capability to respond.

4. Prior to 10 June I want a briefing on your plans to locate all major command and staff elements of your Wing and the Combat Support Group. This briefing will include an evaluation of your ability to command and control after all organizations have been relocated.

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

C Copy



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SECRET

HISTORY



18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

(Unclassified Title)

1 - 30 June 1963

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

This document was prepared by A2C Donald E. Hughes, Unit Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It was prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 28 November 1958 and is classified SECRET because it reveals classified operations conducted during the period of this history. This classification conforms to that of the source documents, which are quoted extensively in this work and which bear on the combat capability of this organization. This title page contains no classified information. (U)

APPROVED:

Ray J. Hartsfield

RAY J. HARTSFIELD
1st Lt., USAF
Information Officer

R. Louis Lowey

HAROLD W. OHLKE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING BY
Approving authority
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

15 AF DXI 63-89

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

SECRET

IXOH

2 AUG 1963

(U) Transmittal of History (18th Strategic Aerospace Division, 1 - 30 June 1963).

15AF DXIH

1. Transmitted herewith is the history for the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division for the month of June 1963. (U)

2. If attachment No.1 is withdrawn (or not attached), the classification of this correspondence will be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED in accordance with paragraph 18b AFR 205-1. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER

F.E. KANE
2nd Lt., USAF
Dep Dir of Admin Svs

1 Atch
Complete history, 18SAD, June 1963, (S), (3 cys)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING BY
Approving Authority
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units)

61-282

1408

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GLOSSARY

AB	Air Base
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADG	Aviation Depot Group
A&E	Armament and Electronics
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Depot
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANFE	Aircraft not fully Equipped
AOCP	Aircraft out of commission for parts
BDR	Bomber Defense Run
BW	Bombardment Wing
CCTM	Combat Crew Training Mission
CEA	Circular Error Average
CEP	Circular Error Prediction
CSG	Combat Support Group
CSH	Critical Safety Hazard
DCM	Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DCO	Deputy Commander for Operations
DEFCON	Defense Condition
DMU	Dynamic Mobile Unit
DP	Director of Personnel
DPL	Dual Propellant Loading
ECM	Electronics Counter Measure
ECCM	Electronics Counter Counter Measure

1410

EGT	Exhaust Gas Tempature
EPR	Engine Pressure Ratio
ETS	Expiration of term of service
EUR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Report
EWO	Emergency War Order
EWO	Electronics Warfare Officer of Observer
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFB	Fairchild Air Force Base
FOB	Flack Order Battle
FTF	Fairchild Task Force
FY	Fiscal Year
GCA	Ground Control Approach
GPI	Ground Position Indicator
IBDA	Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment
Ibid	In the same place
IFE	In-flight Esertion
IFI	In-flight Insertion
IG	Inspector General
IP	Initial Point
IRAN	Inspection and Repair as Necessary
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LDR	Local Defense Run
LGR	Low Gear Run
LOGAIR	Logistical Air Support
LSR	Launch Simulated Run
MADACHE	Mobile Automatic Program Checkout Equipment

MCC	Missile Combat Crew
MCCC	Missile Combat Crew Commander
MIRS	Manning in Required Specialties
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
NIR	Nike Defense Run
OCAMA	Oklahoma City Air Material Area
OER	Officer Effectiveness Report
OOAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Material Area
OJT	On the job training
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
ORT	Operational Readiness Test
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PIP	Pre-initial Point
PST	Pacific Standard Time
RBS	Radar Bomb Site
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
RSR	Radar Simulated Run
SAW	Strategic Aerospace Wing
SEA	Scoring Error Average
SEP	Scoring Error Probable
SES	Strategic Evaluation Squadron
SJR	Specialist Job Record
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSG	Strategic Standardization Group
SSS	Strategic Support Squadron
TDY	Temporary Duty

T/O	Table of Organization
TOC	Technical Order Compliance
TWX	Electrically Transmitted Message
UAL	Unit Authorization List
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USCM	Unit Simulated Combat Mission
VOCO	Verbal Order of the Commanding Officer
VOR	Visual Omni-range
ZI	Zone of Interior

HISTORY

18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION

Organization

The 18th Strategic Aerospace Division stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, was composed of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H), Fairchild Air Force Base, and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing, Larson Air Force Base, Washington.[1] (U)

As directed by Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force, and according to the policies established by the United States Air Force and the Strategic Air Command, the Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division will: (U)

a. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing are organized, manned, trained and equipped to conduct long-range bombardment operations using either nuclear or conventional weapons. (U)

b. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing develope and maintain the capability to engage in effective air refueling operations. (U)

c. Assure the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing (H) and the 462nd

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1. SAC Reg. 23-15, 20 Apr 62, Filed BDAS, FAFB.

Strategic Wing develop a strategic missile operational capability at the earliest practicable date and are prepared to conduct missile operations according to the emergency war order. (EWO. (U)

d. Assure subordinate units develop a mobility capability and are trained to permit deployment and establishment of operations on short notice in any part of the world. (U)

e. Assure subordinate units support the Air Reserve and National Guard programs according to instructions from higher headquarters. (U)

f. Assure subordinate units are prepared to participate in emergency protection, defensive action, disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies. (U)

g. Insure establishment of missile, flying, and ground safety programs in subordinate units and monitor said programs for effectiveness. (U)

h. Perform such special missions as may be directed by higher headquarters.[2] (U)

Responsibilities.

The Commander, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division is responsible for:

a. Exercising command jurisdiction over such units and installations as may be assigned. (U)

b. Assuring necessary support is provided, according to applicable directives and/or joint use agreements, for such tenant units as may require support.[3] (U)

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2. 15AF Reg 23-12, 22 Jan 61, Filed BDAS, FAFB.
3. Ibid.

1416

Administration

On 28 June Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, was aboard a KC-135 traveling to Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, as a PCS movement. Major General William C. Kingsbury, commander of 3rd Air Division, accompanied the return flight to Fairchild to assume duties as commander of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division. Major General Kingsbury was scheduled to assume his new duties on 20 July 1963.[4] (U)

The division learned that in the future they would use checklists and/or questionaires provided by the Fifteenth Air Force combat mission folder review team. These checklists would be used in evaluating EWO intelligence knowledge during division scheduled quarterly staff visits.[5] (U)

Staff Visits by 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

On 12 June, personnal of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division directorate of materiel made a staff visit to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing to determine the maintenance and syatems reliability of B-52 aircraft on alert. There were several items which required immediate correction. One was the inspection of three B-52 aircraft which revealed that delayed discrepancies were excessive and had existed for extended periods. Proper action to correct delayed aircraft maintenance discrepancies was not planned or monitored. The inspectors noted that crew chiefs, flight chiefs and branch chiefs were not seeing that known maintenance was scheduled weekly and daily plans were not checked for adequacy or omission as required.[6] (U)

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4. Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, DP 33495, Subj: Appointment of Commander, 25 June 63.
5. Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, SECRET DO/DI 1885, Subj: EWO Intelligence Knowledge, 26 June 63, Exhibit #12.
6. Staff Visit, 92SAW, DM, 12 June 63, Exhibit #1

Inspection of all B-52 aircraft on alert revealed several were dirty. A review of the wing's monthly maintenance schedule indicated the aircraft were washed once each 75-90 days. There were 38 tactical aircraft assigned and if the aircraft wash rack was used on a five-day per week basis, and accommodating one aircraft per day, all aircraft assigned could be washed every two months.[7] (U)

Maximum maintenance as required by AF Manual 66-1 was not being accomplished by the wing. During the division inspection, numerous minor discrepancies were noted. They also inspected the B-52 tip gear wheel well doors and found three of six doors had excessively loose and worn bushings and fittings. The loss of these doors in flight had been the subject of many flight incident reports in SAC and Fifteenth Air Force. Colonel Robert S. Milner, division director of materiel, proposed that immediate action be taken to correct aircraft maintenance discrepancies as AF Manual 66-1 required. Maintenance personnel were to assure that maximum utilization of the aircraft wash rack was effected and that excessively loose tip gear wheel well doors on B-52 aircraft were corrected.[8] (U)

On 17 through 19 June, Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Thompson, division maintenance staff officer, headed the initial materiel staff visit to the 91st Bombardment Wing, Glasgow Air Force Base, Montana. The purpose of the visit was to orientate division materiel personnel with the physical layout of on-base facilities, meet supervisory personnel in materiel activities and identification of serious

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7. Staff Visit, 92SAW, DM, 12 June 63, Exhibit #1.
8. Ibid.

or major problem areas, existing or anticipated. This visit was in preparation of the division assuming control of the 91st Bombardment Wing.[9] (U)

In general, observations of the materiel teams were favorable. The personnel appeared to be thoroughly familiar with their duties and EWO responsibilities. Supervisory personnel generally were highly qualified and displayed a businesslike and professional attitude. Offices and production control facilities were neat and orderly.[10] (U)

The division conducted a staff visit to the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing base operations facility on 12 June 1963. The discrepancies noted during the staff visit were repitition of previous division staff visits as well as in the Fifteenth Air Force staff visit of 18 April and the SAC ORI conducted late in April. In view of the fact that the condition of the base operations facility was specifically mentioned by the Fifteenth Air Force deputy commander it would appear that a concerted effort would have been made to bring this facility up to standard. As a result, Brigadier General Harold W. Ohlke, 18th Strategic Aerospace Division commander, recommended that the wing commander re-examine his schedule for work order completions.[11] (U)

Colonel Robert S. Milnar, division director of materiel, and his staff, made a staff visit to the 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing

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9. Staff Visit, 91st Bombardment Wing, DM, 17-19 June 63, Exhibit #2.
10. Ibid.
11. Staff Visit, 92SAW, DM, 12 June 63, Exhibit #3.

at Larson Air Force Base on 6 through 7 June to review the Fifteenth Air Force Red Flag items within applicable wing activities. They also inspected the mobile recovery, start and control items along with evaluating the effectiveness of the publications familiarization program required by Fifteenth Air Force Letter 11-2.[12] (U)

Of the 12 Red Flag items reviewed, 10 were covered, and in two instances inadequate corrective action required continued monitoring and follow-up by the division. In the deputy commander of maintenance, correction of discrepancies noted during previous staff visits as pertained to aircraft recovery procedures and status of alert aircraft was considered satisfactory. Particularly noteworthy was the cleanliness of aircraft and the low delayed discrepancy rate.[13] (U)

A recent decision by the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron changed procedures for delivery and receipt of test equipment whereby each shop supervisor handled delivery and receipt of his own test equipment. These procedures were not acceptable from a PMEL standpoint in that excessive number of transactions would result, and the continuing problem of timely delivery and pick-up of test equipment would be amplified. Considering the responsibility of production control to process and control all repairables, Colonel Milner recommended that the requirement for handling of test equipment be retained by production control. The compliance with these recommendations was effective during the visit.[14] (U)

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12. Staff Visit, 462SAW, DM, 5-7 June 63, Exhibit #4.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

An informal staff visit was made by Colonel R.S. Milner to the 567th Strategic Missile Squadron at Fairchild on 13 June. Colonel Milner noted that compliance with Fifteenth Air Force Letter 11-2, 15 February 1961, Subject: Knowledge and Use of Technical Publications, was not complete. Colonel Milner suggested that commanders should stimulate and counsel the non-commissioned officers who were managing this program by encouraging these men to explain the efficiency with which each supports technical publication training. A follow-up visit was projected to be conducted in mid-July.[15] (U)

A practice exercise of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing mobility teams was called and monitored by the division director of materiel on 14 June. A delay of approximately 40 minutes resulted during personnel notification because the type of exercise was not properly identified. In some instances members were not notified. Several recommendations were made by the inspectors. One of the most important recommendations was for more realism by requiring participation by the alert force. Crew chiefs in the alert force could be alerted and on standby in fast ride vehicles.[16] (U)

Colonel L.N. Powell, division director of operations, and Lieutenant Colonel T.H. Peakall, division director of safety, conducted a staff visit to the Fairchild control tower on 5 June to verify that adequate instructions and understanding existed to maintain a safe air traffic separation. Instruction and procedures employed

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15. Staff Visit, 567SMS, DM, 13 June 63, Exhibit #5.
16. Mobility Practice Exercise Rpt, 92SAW, DM, 14 June 63, Exhibit #6.

were found to be adequate and controllers possessed the desired knowledge.[17] (U)

On 6 June a staff visit was performed by Lieutenant Colonel M. E. Marler, division operations staff officer, to the 568th Strategic Missile Squadron. Colonel Marler covered the safety/emergency procedures training, positive control training and standardization activities. All activities were found to be satisfactory, however, the failure rate in positive control and execution procedures had greatly increased in June. This was attributed to the fact that the examinations administered in those sections during the month were much more difficult that those given previously. It was expected that this practice would result in higher passing rates during future inspections.[18] (U)

From 17 through 19 June, members of the division operations staff, headed by Colonel L. N. Powell, accomplished a staff visit to the 91st Bombardment Wing, Glasgow Air Force Base, Montana. The primary purpose of this visit was to become acquainted with the wing staff and determine if any problem areas existed which the division should be aware of. Overall, members of the wing's operations staff appeared to be highly qualified for their positions. Several potential problem areas were noted which would require scrutiny in future months. Among them was roughness of the runway, space for the tanker squadron, especially the alert crews and manning in operations staff

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17. Staff Visit, 92SAW, DO, 5 June 63, Exhibit #7.
18. Staff Visit, 568SMS, DO, 6 June 63, Exhibit #8.

positions.[19] (U)

Policy Directives of the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division

According to information available to the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division, the movement of the commissary at Larson Air Force Base to building 2602 was proposed for fiscal year 1965. Since this move was approved by Headquarters, SAC, it was forwarded to Headquarters, USAF, several months ago. The division considered the delay in moving the facility until fiscal year 1965 as completely unsatisfactory. Their position is further substantiated by the latest Fifteenth Air Force IG report in which the commissary was rated marginal with a recommendation that it be moved at the earliest possible date.[20] (U)

One of the main problems which prevented moving the commissary was the lack of assurance that they would receive funds. Division suggested that O&M funds be expedited. Permission was granted to use military labor and local resources.[21] (U)

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19. Staff Visit, 91BW, DO, 17-19 June 63, Exhibit #9.
20. Msg, 18SAD to 462SAW, C 9597, Subj: Movement of Commissary, 3 June 63, Exhibit #10.
21. Msg, 18SAD to 462SAW, C 9873, Subj: Movement of Commissary, 12 June 63, Exhibit #11.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Historical Reports submitted by division staff agencies.

Reports submitted by division staff agencies.

Files of the division staff agencies.

Interviews with division officials.

Division, Wing, Group and Fifteenth Air Force Operations Orders.

GAZETEER

Fairchild Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located ten miles west of Spokane, Washington; home of the 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing and the 92d Combat Support Group; Headquarters for the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division. (U)

Spokane International Airport: Home of the 84th Fighter Group (AD) (ADC), located five miles west of Spokane. (U)

Larson Air Force Base: A Strategic Air Command Base located five miles west of Moses Lake, Washington; home of the 462nd Strategic Aerospace Wing. (U)

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LIST OF EXHIBITS

ITEM	EXHIBIT NUMBER
Staff Visit, 92SAW, DM, 12 June 63.	1
Staff Visit, 91BW, DM, 17-19 June 63.	2
Staff Visit, 92SAW, DM, 12 June 63.	3
Staff Visit, 462SAW, DM, 5-7 June 63.	4
Staff Visit, 567SMS, DM, 12 June 63.	5
Mobility Practice Exercise Report, 92SAW, DM, 14 June 63.	6
Staff Visit, 92SAW, DO, 5 June 63.	7
Staff Visit, 568SMS, DO, 6 June 63.	8
Staff Visit, 91BW, DO, 17-19 June 63.	9
Msg, 18SAD to 462SAW, C 9597, Subj: Movement of Commissary, 3 June 63.	10
Msg, 18SAD to 462SAW, C 9873, Subj: Movement of Commissary, 12 June 63.	11
Msg, 15AF to 18SAD, SECRET DO/DI 1885, Subj: EWO Intennigence Knowledge, 26 June 63.	12

DM 20 June 1963

Staff Visit - 924 SAW

924SAW (WC)

1. A staff visit was conducted on 12 Jun 63 by a member of this directorate to determine the quality of maintenance and system reliability of B-52 aircraft on alert. The following items requiring immediate correction were noted:

a. Delayed Discrepancies: Inspection of three B-52 aircraft revealed delayed discrepancies are excessive and have existed for extended periods. Adequate action to correct delayed aircraft maintenance discrepancies is not planned, programmed or monitored. In one instance a delayed discrepancy in the AFTO Form 781B of B-52 6504 has been carried for 18 months. General corrosion throughout the flap wells was written up on 30 Feb 62. Special Subject for Inspection, AFL IN1-5, 30 Dec 61, is retired. This Special Subject letter required Commanders to have an adequate, continuing program for prevention and treatment of corrosion in aircraft, missiles and AGE. Two other delayed discrepancies in the AFTO Form 781B of B-52 6504 have existed for 9 months. B-52 6500 had one delayed discrepancy for almost four months. A six inch crack in left fuselage was entered in the AFTO Form 781B as temporarily repaired on 26 Feb 63. None of the discrepancies cited above require parts for maintenance. Paragraph 11-12b, AFM 66-1 requires fast, efficient accomplishment of maintenance, and expeditious correction of discrepancies entered in AFTO forms. Records were not available in the tab files of Plans & Scheduling, DCMC, to program future correction of the cited discrepancies. Obviously crew chiefs, flight chiefs and branch chiefs are not insuring that known maintenance is scheduled. Weekly and daily plans are not checked for adequacy or omission as required by para 11-13.4c, AFM 66-1, AFCMD-1. Full compliance with paragraphs 2-9q and 2-9q(1), AFM 66-1, would reduce your present and future incidence of delayed discrepancies. General Wilson, SAC DM, in his recent visit to Fairchild stated that delayed discrepancies are intolerable and only a zero balance is acceptable. We found an average of six on these B-52s inspected. This is well over the 15th Air Force average.

b. Washing of Tactical Aircraft: Inspection of all B-52 aircraft on alert revealed several were dirty. Review of

your monthly maintenance schedule indicates aircraft are washed once each 75-90 days. There are 38 tactical aircraft assigned. The aircraft wash rack, if used on a five day per week basis and accommodating one aircraft per day, would result in washing all aircraft assigned once every two months. We realize that maintenance precedence, alert and flying commitments may prohibit this ideal condition.

c. Maximum Maintenance on Alert Aircraft: Maximum maintenance as required by para 11-13.1a(3), AFM 66-1/SACSUP-1, is not being accomplished. During our inspection numerous minor discrepancies were noted. Broken clamps on the tubing in the tip gear wheel wells, improper positioning of landing lights, tip gear taxi light shock mounts worn out, main landing gear brake return spring plates bent, left tip gear tire low on air, tip gear shimmy damper improperly serviced are all minor discrepancies noted requiring a minimum time to correct. Alert aircraft would not be degraded for this type maintenance.

d. B-52 Tip Gear Wheel Well Doors: Inspection of the doors revealed three of six doors had excessively loose and worn bushings and fittings. Loss of these doors in flight has been the subject of many flight incident reports in SAC and 15th Air Force.

2. Recommendations:

a. Immediate action be taken to correct long delayed aircraft maintenance discrepancies as AFM 66-1 requires.

b. Aircraft maintenance schedules be reviewed to insure maximum utilization of the wash rack and increase over-all cleanliness of tactical aircraft.

c. Maximum utilization of maintenance personnel on duty in the Alert Force to accomplish servicing and maintenance requirements in accordance with Chapter 11, AFM 66-1, SACSUP-1.

d. During scheduled aircraft recovery inspections necessary maintenance actions be taken in accordance with the dash six work cards to detect and correct excessively loose tip gear wheel well doors on B-52 aircraft.

3. Request this directorate be advised by 15 July 1963 of your action to correct the deficiencies cited above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT S. MILNER
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

2

COORDINATION AND FILE COPY

FILE COORDINATION

DXO

21 Jun 1963

Narrative Report Get Acquainted Visit to Glasgow AFB, 17-19 Jun 63

10C

1. Trip to Glasgow was made via C-47 from Larson. Upon arrival [illegible] 1115, the team was met by Wing Commander Colonel Robinson and [illegible] staff. Introductions were made and personnel proceeded to quarters. Enlisted personnel were quartered in Bldg 817, which is regular troop billets occupied by Hq Sq Group. Quarters are new and adequate. Noise, including radio, TV, singing, etc. created by regularly billeted personnel prevented anyone from sleeping until approximately 0200 each night while at Glasgow. This item was mentioned to responsible personnel after first night; however, corrective action was not taken.

2. Monday afternoon, 17 June, was spent with Lt Colonel Vines, [illegible] and CMS Wood, Base Sgt Major. All BDAS activities were visited. Group Hq including staff offices, the bank, and credit union are housed in the first two floors of an airmen's dormitory, Bldg 810. Part of the second floor and all of the third floor are used as troop housing. Utilization of quarters as office space is due to shortage of regular office buildings. Additional office and troop housing construction is programmed during FY 64. Airmen personnel are presently quartered two to a room. However, the Base Commander stated it is anticipated that KC-135 personnel influx will require that 4 personnel be quartred in each room. New programmed construction is not expected to be completed prior to requirement for additional space.

3. DP, Resident Auditor, DXO and Comptroller are housed in Building [illegible]. This building was built and originally planned to house Wing Headquarters and staff. Wing Headquarters is located in building 672, on the flightline. All DP functions were visited. Operations appear highly satisfactory. Colonel Larsson, DP, gave a briefing on personnel status. Retention of first term airmen is a problem area. The OJT and education programs are well staffed and progressing satisfactorily. Night school College and other courses are conducted in the on-base grade school buildings. Relations with off-base educational institutions are excellent.

COORDINATION

OFFICE SYMBOL	LAST NAME
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DXO	
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BDS	
BJA	
BIXO	
BCH	
BSO	

RETURN TO:	OFFICE SYMBOL	ORIGINATOR'S NAME AND GRADE	PHONE NO.	TYPIST'S INITIALS	DATE TYPED	ADMIN SERVICES (For Dispatch)

SAC FORM 96, OCT 60 (15AF Subordinate Units)

61-393

1428



[illegible]

[illegible]

6. The Human Shake Rate were Balanced. Mess's were well prepared, [illegible], and [illegible] served. The NCO dining area is separated from the Airmen's dining area and [illegible] service which is [illegible] partly by surcharge and partly by [illegible] levy.

7. There are no on-hand laundry or dry cleaning facilities. All troop linen has to be sent to Nevis, Mountain 100+ miles distant.

8. The Compatible, 1st Colonel Hart, briefed on comptroller activities. The Legal office was not visited. The Base Hospital was visited. Colonel [illegible], Hospital Commander, briefed on activities. All wards were visited. The Base Chaplain was in the hospital with coronary troubles. Chaplain activities were discussed with his assistant. BX and Exchange are satisfactory; however, limited due to space.

9. This base does not have an approved firing range. As a result, personnel firing requirements have not been met since September 1962. Immediate steps should be taken to locate suitable area and establish an arms firing range. Recommend responsible Glasgow personnel visit the range at Larson AFB, with a view toward building a similar facility at Glasgow. Space is available and a range similar to the one at Larson could be built using self-help. This item is considered unsatisfactory and requires attention and correction.

10. Areas and grounds were neat and recently mowed. The base has approximately 1400 family housing units. All are relatively new and the area is neat, clean and well managed. A new grade school is presently under construction. Two grade schools are presently in being; however due to crowded conditions, some grades must conduct two classes daily; one class from 0700 to 1200, and the other from 1300 to 1800. This condition will be alleviated upon completion of the new school building.

1429

11. There is no on-base swimming pool. The base has a recreation area located below the Fort Peck Reservoir which is approximately 40 miles from Glasgow AFB. This area offers excellent camping and fishing to personnel with automobiles. No provisions have been made to furnish transportation for single airmen without transportation to the recreation area. The majority of off-base roads in this area are unpaved and, except for improved county roads, are impassable after any precipitation whatsoever.

12. Glasgow AFB is located in the north central part of Montana. The base is approximately 700 road miles from Fairchild. The Great Northern railroad runs through the town of Glasgow, which is located approximately 25 miles from Glasgow AFB. Rail time from Spokane to Glasgow on the Great Northern is 15-1/2 hours. Rail distance is 582 miles. Trains depart from Spokane daily going east at 0640 and 2310. Population of Glasgow is approximately 7000. This is the only town of any size within 100 miles of the base. Acceptance of military personnel by the local populace is excellent with two exceptions: (1) reportedly racial prejudice among the civilian populace is very strong, and (2) An Indian reservation is located in this vicinity, and nearly all reported incidents/altercations involve off-duty military personnel and Indians. This trouble spot is recognized and minimized through education and restrictions. However, apparently little or no provocation is required to motivate the firewater-saturated Indian to complete the job started by his ancestors at the Little Big Horn.

13. All personnel contacted were very cooperative and helpful. Division requirements were discussed and plans initiated to forward concrete instructions at an early date. No major problem areas other than housing shortages and lack of adequate troop entertainment were encountered. Morale appears to be excellent despite adverse factors of location, weather and off-duty activities.

ALBERT L. SOMBA
SMS, USAF
Division Sgt Major

C

12 June 1968

Staff Visit - 92d SAW

92SAW (WC)

1. Mgt Stephen S. Shores, this headquarters, conducted a staff visit to the 92d SAW Base Operations facility on 12 Jun 68. The following discrepancies were noted:

a. Venetian blinds were extremely dirty.

b. Loose wiring in the dispatch office had not been covered.

c. The flight planning room had not been reorganized in accordance with 15AFM 55-2. Civil Engineering estimate completion during Fiscal Year 1968.

d. Map room is inadequate in size and not properly maintained.

2. These and other discrepancies have been noted repeatedly in previous 15AFB staff visits, as well as in the 15th Air Force staff visit report, 15 Apr 68, and the [illegible] report of 30 Apr 68. In view of the fact that the condition of the Base Operations facility was specifically mentioned in the 15th AF Deputy Commander's letter of 30 Apr 68, it seems to me that a concerted effort should be made to bring this facility up to standard. I desire that you re-examine your schedule for work order completions and notify me not later than 20 Jun 68 of action to be taken to correct the deficiencies.

HAROLD V. [illegible]
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1431

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] DM [illegible] 4

[illegible] Staff Visit, [illegible], Larson AFB, [illegible]

[illegible] MEMO FOR RECORD

1. Personnel Performing Visit:

Col Robert [illegible]
Lt Col [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Richard C. [illegible]

2. Period of Visit: 3-7 June 1963

3. Purpose of Visit:

a. Review 15th AF Red Flag Items within applicable 462d SAW activities.

b. Exercise and inspect the mobile recovery, start and control teams.

c. Evaluate the effectiveness of the publications familiarization program required by [illegible] AFL 11-[illegible].

d. Ascertain problem areas and make recommendations for correction where necessary.

4. Key Persons Contacted:

Col Tate, WC
Col Templeman, VWC
Lt Col Mann, DCM
Lt Col Palmer, ADCM
Lt Col [illegible], [illegible]
Major [illegible], [illegible] Maint Cont Off
Major [illegible], [illegible] Maint Supv

5. Findings:

a. Red Flag Items: Twelve Red Flag items were reviewed with applicable supervisors. Ten Red Flags were [illegible] and in two instances inadequate corrective action requires continued monitoring and follow-up by this directorate. The following deficiencies still exist:

(1) Red Flag DM4-[illegible], (Lax Control of Separable Processing by Production Control - [illegible]) has not been corrected or received supervisory emphasis. Shop backlog for components AWM was unknown and not posted on charts.

1432

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

officer be appointed from internal manning resources to fill this position not later than 12 Jun 63.

(4) No records are being kept on NCO overtime. With an 85% NCO manning in DCM activities, recommend that this item be closely monitored and analyzed.

c. BDCE:

(1) Compliance with SACSUP-1 to AFR 52-1. The SAC Supplement to AFR 52-1 is in detail and [illegible] difficult to comply with. For example, the regulation requires all houses, buildings, and facilities to be inspected quarterly. To inspect all houses quarterly eight men working 6½ days a week would be required. This is above the Wing's capability. Recommend action be taken through 15AF CE to obtain a waiver of this requirement.

(2) The BDCE is taking firm action to comply with all other parts of the SAC Supplement 1 to AFR 52-1. For example:

(a) All AF Forms 1487, "Fire Hazard Inspection Reports" will be processed within 24 hours.

(b) Size of the Area Fire Marshal's Committee to be reduced.

(c) Closer attention given to minutes of Area Fire Marshal's Committee.

(d) All newcomers to the base will be briefed, a "fire prevention kit" issued, and a member of the Fire Prevention section will visit each newly occupied set of quarters within the first month of occupancy.

(3) Poplar trees in East [illegible] area are dying from lack of water or blight. Trees should be properly cared for or removed. BDCE took immediate remedial action.

d. BDCE:

(1) O&M Project for Commissary, the meat cutting room in the Commissary has been [illegible] out and as a result meat has to be cut and carried to the Commissary. Move of the Commissary is in the FY 1965 BCP. The only way to make the move faster is to reduce the project in scope and hand-carry through as an O&M project. No one at Larson wishes to do this although 15AF CE indicates that it is feasible. Recommend that the Base Commander reconsider his position regarding this project for possible expeditious completion.

1434

(2) Clothing Sales Store: Sales store warehousing needs improvement, and all areas in rear of store were badly in need of policing and cleaning. Recommend action as necessary to insure effective utilization of this facility and satisfactory housekeeping procedures.

e. 560th SMS: A recent decision by the 560th SMS changed procedures for delivery and receipt of test equipment whereby each shop supervisor handles delivery and receipt of his own test equipment. These procedures are not acceptable from a PMEL standpoint in that an excessive number of transactions would result, and the continuing problem of timely delivery and pickup of test equipment would be amplified. Considering the responsibility of Production Control to process and control all reparables, recommend that the requirement for handling of Test equipment be retained by Production Control. Compliance with the above recommendation was effected during this visit.

Robert S. Nielsen

ROBERT S. NIELSEN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Material

HEADQUARTERS
19TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DM

14 June 1963

SUBJECT: Staff Visit to 567th Strategic Missile Squadron - 13 Jun 63

TO: 92SAW (WC)

1. An informal staff visit was made by Colonel Robert S. Milner to the 567th SMS, 13 Jun 63. He interviewed:

Colonel Alph Chalifoux, Comdr
CMS Marvin L. Anderson, NCOIC DM Adm
MSgt Richard Novell, NCOIC Elec Shop

2. Squadron Commander reads, indorses or signs all QCAR reports.
Recommendation: Wing Commander read, review and comment on at least 50% of these reports.

3. Compliance with 15AF Letter 11-2, 15 Feb 63, Subject: Knowledge and Use of Technical Publications in conjunction with para 1-2.f AFM 66-1, is not complete.
Recommendations:

a. Commanders check for compliance, within 567th Squadron, with 15AF Ltr 11-2. Primarily to understand the requirement, to insure credit is being taken for all supervisory study and that "suitable records" are being maintained to reflect control.

b. Commanders should stimulate and counsel the NCOs who are managing this program by encouraging them not to explain the efficiency with which each supports technical publication training. Such action is considered to be "active support of the maintenance training program."

4. Commanders should review para 1-2, AFM 66-1, in detail, and become acutely aware of how he is complying with each sub-paragraph.

5. A follow-up visit on these subjects will be conducted after mid-July. No answer is required to this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT S. MILNER
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

Copy to: 15SAD (C)
567SMS (C)
92SAW (DCM)

15SAD (C)

5

[redacted]

Mobility Function Exercise

[redacted] (U)

1. A practice exercise of the [redacted] Mobility Function was conducted [redacted] (U//FOUO).

a. A delay of approximately two minutes occurred during personnel notification because [redacted] was not available to be contacted with news that a simulated exercise is to be conducted with some [redacted] who were not members of mobility teams.

b. General confusion existed when personnel began arriving at the assembly area due to lack of time planned preparation.

c. At 0431:00 seven personnel on the Mobile Recovery Team and five personnel on control start teams had not arrived at the assembly area.

d. At 1431:25 when the exercise was terminated two officers and two airmen of the control/start teams and two airmen of the MRT had not arrived.

e. Several personnel contacted were not sure of their assembly point for an actual MVD.

f. Several members of the MRT did not know the names of their OIC or NCOIC. Only one of approximately 14 team members had participated in a simulated exercise as many as three times. Since frequent exercises and briefings have been conducted, this indicates an excessively high turnover of mobility team members.

g. All personnel had dog tags, Geneva Convention cards and up-to-date shot records. Five personnel did not have dosimeters.

h. Bus drivers were issued the wrong folder by the Motor Pool dispatcher. They should have reported to the

IGSAD (C)

6

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
18TH STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DO

5 June 1963

SUBJECT: Staff Visit

TO: MEMO FOR RECORD

1. Colonel Powell, the undersigned, and Lt Colonel Pankell, Division Director of Safety, paid a staff visit to Base Operations Control Tower, this date, to verify that adequate instructions and understanding by Control Tower personnel existed to maintain safe air traffic separation at Fairchild AFB. Personnel contacted were:

Colonel Clements, DCO
Captain Dennison, Communications Sq
CWO Greenlaw, Communications Sq
SSgt Ogle, Senior Controller
Controllers on duty

2. Instructions and procedures employed were found to be adequate and controllers knowledgeable.

LUCION N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

[illegible]

[illegible]

7 June 1963

[illegible] Staff Visit

[illegible]

1. The undersigned performed an Operations Staff visit to the [illegible] on 5 June 63. Items covered were:

a. Safety/Emergency Procedures Training

b. Positive Control training

c. Standardization activities

2. All activities were satisfactory. It was noted, however, that the failure rate in Positive Control and Execution Procedures had taken a dramatic jump in June. This is attributed to the fact that the PCAN exam being given this month is considerably more difficult than those given previously. The net result should be higher passing rates during future ORIs and 3001st [illegible] visits.

MAURICE E. [illegible]
Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Staff Officer

8

24

1440

[redacted] DO

SUBJECT: Staff Visit - Glasgow AFB, Montana

TO: MEMO FOR RECORD

1. Members of the Aviation Operations staff, headed by the undersigned, visited the 341st Bomb Wing, Glasgow AFB, 17 to 19 Jun 65. Purpose of the visit was to [redacted] with the Wing staff and accomplish certain of our major problem areas existed of which we should be aware.

2. Members of the Operations staff appeared to be well qualified and highly motivated. No deficiencies were noted in any area of combat crew proficiency. All ORIs had been completed, including all CY items, within the last six month. The unit expects to achieve 96.0 per cent of maximum in the SAC MCS for the period ending 30 June.

3. Four caution areas were observed which will require our careful scrutiny in coming months:

a. Roughness of the runway.

b. Space for the KC-135 squadron, particularly alert crews.

c. Manning in operations staff positions.

d. Aircrew checkout in the AN/ASQ-[redacted] bomb-nav system.

LUCIEN N. POWELL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations


SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
MONTH
YEAR
1442





1444



SECRET

GPA125ZCCOA638
RR RUWHGP
DE RUWBKN 14A
R 262225Z
FM 15AF MARCH AFB CALIF
TO RUWHBD/12SAD DAVIS MONTHAN AFB ARIZ
RUWHAS/14SAD VEALE AFB CALIF
RUWHGP/18SAD FAIRCHILD AFB WASH
RUWGS2/22SAD SCHILLING AFB KANS
RUWHJM/47SAD CASTLE AFB CALIF
RUCDKA/810SAD MINOT AFB NDAK
RUWHKB/813SAD MT HOME AFB IDAHO
RUWGJ6/819SAD DYESS AFB TEX
RUWHAP/821SAD ELLSWORTH AFB SDAK
ZT
S E C R E T DO/DI 1885.
(U) EWO INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE. THIS MESSAGE IS TWO PARTS. PART I. FIFTEENTH A.F. FORCE SECRET LETTER, DI/63-405, 1 APR 63, SUBJECT AS ABOVE, IS HEREBY RESCINDED EFFECTIVE THIS DATE. PART II. THE FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE COMBAT MISSION FOLDER REVIEW TEAM WILL PERIODICALLY PROVIDE DIVISION COMMANDERS WITH CHECKLISTS AND/OR QUESTIONNAIRES TO BE UTILIZED IN EVALUATING EWO INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE DURING STRATEGIC AEROSPACE DIVISION SCHEDULED QUARTERLY STAFF VISITS. CP-3.
BT
26/2225Z JUN RUWBKN

E-325
F-D

12

NNNN

SECRET

HISTORICAL REPORTS

K-DIV-19-HI
JAN 1950 —
NOV 1951

4-2152-20

19th Div Div
Jan 50 - Nov 51

1451

STAFF MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 3)

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

6 March 1951

HISTORY OF AIR DIVISION

1. All Staff Sections of this Headquarters will furnish the Adjutant General sufficient information to be used for preparing the 19th Air Division History.

2. Report may be submitted on office memorandum, in two (2) copies, and will include the following:

a. Changes in personnel or assignments.

b. Staff accomplishments.

c. Any supporting documents deemed to be of historical value.

3. Reports will be submitted to the Adjutant General not later than the 6th of each month. For the purpose of implementation, initial report will be submitted not later than the 8th of March.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

J. L. TYKEL
Captain, USAF
Adjutant General

ADAG - Orig and 1 copy
CO 7BW - 1 copy
CO 11BW - 1 copy
A-2 (Historical Section, 19AD) - 1 copy
file - 1 copy
Total 6 copies

1452

4-2151-20

COORDINATION & FILE COPY

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Office of the Inspector General
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

13 November 1951

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to determine and report upon the state of readiness, effectiveness and efficiency of the Command, in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof, and to insure maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with staff supervision of the activities of:

The 7th Bomb Wing, 11th Bomb Wing and 7th Air Base Group Inspectors who are responsible for inquiring into and reporting on all matters affecting the technical, tactical, logistical and administrative effectiveness of the Command.

ADMINISTRATION, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

Follow-up inspections were continued throughout the month of October.

Required Special Subjects were completed and forwarded through proper channels.

PERSONNEL:

19th Air Division

Gains: None

Losses: None

7th Bomb Wing

Gains: None

Losses: None

COORDINATOR
DIR
AD
D
DM
DIG
7TH B WG
CO
OCO
ADJ
A-1
A-2
A-3
A-4
IG
CCP
OES
4010AE
11TH B WG
CO
OCO
ADJ
A-1
A-2
A-3
A-4
IG
CCP
4014AE

CAFB FORM 11-3 (23 MAR 51)

7TH A BGP
CO
OCO
EXO
ADJ
S-1
S-3
S-4
AIO
ABGS
CCP
IG
MC
PC
PIO
PM
SURG

COORDINATION & FILE COPY

11th Bomb Wing

Gains: None

Losses: None

7th Air Base Group

Gains: None

Losses: None

VISITORS: Lt Col Allen E. Haveman, Major F. W. Berlin and Major D. A. Johnson, Headquarters Eighth Air Force and Dow Air Force Base. Purpose of Visit: Liaison visit by Dow Air Force Base Inspectors, Headquarters Eighth Air Force Representative introducing Dow Inspectors. Length of visit: three hours.

Major Albert A. Rudd, Headquarters 1800th AACS Hq. Headquarters Represented: 1921st AACS Squadron. Purpose of Visit: complimentary visit. Length of visit: 30 Minutes.

P. D. BROWN
Lt Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

COORDINATOR

8TH AD		
DCG		
DAG		
ADDO		
ADDM		
ADIG		
7TH B WG		
CO		
DCO		
ADJ		
A-1		
A-2		
A-3		
A-4		
IG		
CCP		
OES		
4010AE		
11TH B WG		
CO		
DCO		
ADJ		
A-1		
A-2		
A-3		
A-4		
IG		
CCP		
4014AE		

CAFB FORM 11-3 (23 MAR 51)

7TH ABGP																				
	CO	DCO	EXO	ADJ	S-1	S-3	S-4	AIO	ABBS	CCP	IG	MC	PC	PIO	PM	SURG				

1456

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Office of the Inspector General
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

6 October 1951

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to determine and report upon the state of readiness, effectiveness and efficiency of the Command, in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof, and to insure maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with staff supervision of the activities of:

The 7th Bomb Wing, 11th Bomb Wing and 7th Air Base Group Inspectors who are responsible for inquiring into and reporting on all matters affecting the technical, tactical, logistical and administrative effectiveness of the Command.

ADMINISTRATION, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

The second semi-annual inspection was completed during the month of September according to schedule. Follow-up inspections were continued throughout the month of September.

An inspection team under the supervision of Lt Col Paul D. Brown and composed of inspectors from the 7th Bomb Wing and 7th Air Base Group, conducted a semi-annual inspection of Gray Air Force Base during the period 5 - 7 September 1951.

PERSONNEL:

19th Air Division

Gains: None

Losses: None

7th Bomb Wing

Gains: 2 officers

Lt Col Arthur C. Nadeley 2260 2120 30 Aug 51

Major Louis L. Walton 2161 2151 11 Aug 51

Losses: 1 officer, 1 airman

Major Warren K. Manning 2161 2161 11 Aug 51

M Sgt Robert D. Charette 27170 27170 8 Aug 51

11th Bomb Wing

Gains: None

Losses: None

7th Air Base Group

Gains: None

Losses: 1 airman

T Sgt Earl L. Jacobs 30172 30172 4 Sep 51

VISITORS: Wayne C. Edwards, Civilian, Offutt AFB. Purpose of visit: Information concerning USAF Tech Inspection. Length of Visit: ten days.

P. D. BROWN
Lt Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1458

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Office of the Inspector General
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

6 September 1951

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commanding General by keeping him informed as to the state of the Command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof, and to insure maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with staff supervision of the activities of:

The 7th Bomb Wing and 11th Bomb Wing Inspectors who are responsible for inquiring into and reporting on all matters affecting the technical, tactical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the Command.

AVIATION, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

The second semi-annual inspection of Base and Wing proceeded through the month of August according to schedule. Plans were laid for a team of inspectors composed of 7th Bomb Wing and 7th Air Base Group personnel to proceed to Gray Air Force Base to conduct the semi-annual inspection of that installation.

The administrative, tactical and technical inspectors of the 7th Bomb Wing visited the 43d Bomb Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base during the period 7 Aug 51 to 12 Aug 51, for the purpose of observing methods and policies in effect. Critiques were presented to the Wing Commanders and the 19th Air Division Commander pointing out ideas gained from the visit which would possibly benefit the operation of the local commands.

PERSONNEL: Lt Col Paul D. Brown was assigned as Inspector General of the 19th Air Division vice Col Richard T. Black who was relieved to assume

PERSONNEL (Contd)

command of the recently organized Provisional Training Group.

VISITORS: Lt Col Leo C. Brooks. Headquarters represented: 47th Air Division. Date of visit: 10 Aug 51. Length of visit: one day. Purpose of visit: Information relative to USAF Tech Inspection Team.

P. D. [redacted]
Lt Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1460

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Office of the Inspector General
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

6 August 1951

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commanding General by keeping him informed as to the state of the Command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof, and to insure maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with staff supervision of the activities of:

the 7th Bomb Wing and 11th Bomb Wing Inspectors who are responsible for inquiring into and reporting on all matters affecting the technical, tactical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the Command.

ADMINISTRATION, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

Base and Wing activities were inspected according to schedule during the month of July by inspection teams of the 7th and 11th Bomb Wings. The current schedule was approximately half completed at the end of the month. This schedule continues through 21 Sep 51, including follow-up inspections on completed semi-annuals.

The 7th Bomb Wing Inspector and a team from that office inspected certain Special Subjects and held personal conference periods during the period 9 to 12 Jul 51 at Gray Air Force Base. Another visit to that Base is tentatively planned by the 7th Bomb Wing Inspector during the month of August.

The Division Inspector General assumed the duties of Commander of the newly activated B-36 Provisional Training Group on 16 Jul 51.

[redacted]: There were no personnel gains or losses within the Division Inspector General's Office during the month of July.

W. T. BLACK
Colonel, TAG
Inspector General

1462

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Office of the Inspector General
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

9 July 1951

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commanding General by keeping him informed as to the state of the Command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof, and to insure maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with directing the activities of:

The 7th Bomb Wing and 11th Bomb Wing Inspectors who are responsible for inquiring into and reporting on all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the Command.

ADMINISTRATION, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

All activities within the 7th and 11th Wing Inspectors' Sections continued the Semi-Annual inspections according to schedule. A 7th Air Base Group Inspection Section was activated during the month; however, the Wing Inspectors will complete the current inspection schedule which includes the Air Base Group activities, with the Air Base Group Inspectors observing and assisting in the inspection of their activities.

The 11th Wing Inspector's Section was moved from Building T-2-204 to Building T-2-167 and the Air Base Group Inspection Section was moved into Building T-2-204 to utilize facilities and space formerly occupied by the 11th Wing Inspector.

Plans were laid and coordinated for an inspection team composed of 7th Bomb Wing personnel to visit Gray Air Force Base for the purpose of conducting personal conference periods and Special Subject Inspections.

PERSONNEL GAINS AND LOSSES:

Note: Notification was received of a change to SAC PAT 30-2, 16 Jan 51, which affected the Wing Inspectors. Among these changes were the addition of an Administrative Inspector (AFSC 2200) and the change of designation from "Inspector General" to "Wing Inspector."

19th Air Division:

Gains - none

Losses - none

7th Bomb Wing:

Gains - 1 - 47170

Losses - 1 - 47170

11th Bomb Wing:

Gains - none

Losses - none

R. T. BLACK
Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1464

HEADQUARTERS 11TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Wing Inspector
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

20 July 19[illegible]

ORGANIZATION: The Wing Air Inspector's Office is subdivided into three sections for the purpose of specializing the functions and responsibilities of the Air Inspector. Namely the sections are the Personnel and Administration Section, the Operations and Training Section and the Supply and Maintenance Section.

MISSION: The mission of the Wing Inspector is to keep the Wing Commander informed on the current status of matters and conditions affecting the accomplishment of the command mission. This is accomplished primarily by inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical and administrative effectiveness of the Wing and the efficiency, economy and adequacy thereof.

PERSONNEL: Four officers, one civilian and 16 airmen staff the Wing Inspector's office. Lt Col Fred W. McNally is the Wing Inspector. Assisting him are one officer and one airman in the Personnel and Administration Section, one officer and one airman in the Operations and Training Section and one officer and seven airmen in the Supply and Maintenance Section. Assigned directly to the Office of the Wing Inspector are the civilian secretary, and two administrative airmen, one being the chief clerk for the office.

SUPPLY: A critical shortage exists for binders within which the Technical

Orders, Regulations and other publications used by the Inspector's office can be filed. A requisition was again submitted in June for 300 Technical Order binders and for the required three-ring looseleaf binders for other publications. A previous requisition submitted in March had failed to obtain results.

ACTIVITIES: The 11th Bomb Wing Air Inspector's Office, which had here-to-fore occupied offices jointly with the 19th Air Division and 7th Bomb Wing Air Inspectors, moved to a new location in Building T-3-167 of the 11th Bomb Wing area. The move was completed 15 June 1951.

Semiannual Inspections of the 4080th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron, the 26th Bomb Squadron, the 42nd Bomb Squadron and the 98th Bomb Squadron were performed during the month by the 11th Bomb Wing Inspection Teams.

FRED W. McNULTY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Wing Inspector

1466

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Office of the Inspector General
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

6 June 1951

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commanding General by keeping him informed as to the state of the Command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof, and to insure maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with directing the activities of:

The 7th Bomb Wing and 11th Bomb Wing Inspectors who are responsible for inquiring into and reporting on all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the Command.

ADMINISTRATION, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

The 7th and 11th Wing Inspection Sections began the second semi-annual inspection schedule on 21 May 1951. These schedules include the 7th Air Base Group activities which will again be inspected by the two Wing Inspection Sections. The schedules include follow-up inspections of the tactical Wings to continue through the month of September 1951.

Inspection activities during the month were routine including some informal unscheduled inspections of certain activities. A team of USAF Inspectors was present during the first of the month on matters pertaining to maintenance and supply. This delayed the original semi-annual inspection schedule for the Base by one (1) week.

Col Richard T. Black was assigned 19th Air Division Inspector General replacing Lt Col John B. Bartlett who was assigned to the 7th Bomb Wing.

PERSONNEL GAINS AND LOSSES:

19th Air Division:

Gains 1 - 2162
1 - 70250

Losses 1 - 2162
1 - 70230

7th Bomb Wing:

Gains 1 - 2162
1 - 70250

Losses 1 - 2162

11th Bomb Wing:

Gains 1 - 2162

1 - 70231

Losses - None

VISITORS: Col C. W. Rogers, Lt Col W. L. Bittman, Capt V. Markur, Lt Col L. M. Braun, Lt Col B. L. Hardy, Lt Col B. W. Holmes, Maj J. A. Gardner, Maj R. F. Gingland, Maj C. A. Israelsen, Maj H. J. Thompson, Capt. N. H. Torrance, and 1st Lt D. T. Box, Jr. Headquarters represented: 10023d ID Unit (USAF IG). Date of visit: 5 May 51 (for 2 weeks). Purpose of visit: Technical Inspection.

Lt Col E. F. Estrauss. Headquarters represented: Hq Flight Service. Date of visit: 10 May 51 (for 4 days). Purpose of visit: Annual Air Inspection of Carswell Flight Service Center.

R. T. BLACK
Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1468

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Office of the Inspector General
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

4 May 1951

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commanding General by keeping him informed as to the state of the Command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof, and to insure maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with directing the activities of:

The 7th Bomb Wing and 11th Bomb Wing Inspectors who are responsible for inquiring into and reporting on all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command.

ACTIVITIES, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, AND RELATIONS WITH OTHERS:

The 7th and 11th Wing Inspectors completed the semi-annual inspections during the month of April 1951 and the second inspection schedule will begin on or about 14 May 1951 to be completed in September 1951. Pending the establishment of an Inspection Section of the 7th Air Base Group, this organization will be inspected again by the 7th and 11th Bomb Wing Inspection teams.

One (1) off-base activity was inspected during the month in the course of completing the semi-annual inspections. A team of three (3) officers and eleven (11) airmen, composed of 7th and 11th Bomb Wing personnel, conducted the inspection of Gray Air Force Base during the period 23 to 27 April 1951, inclusive.

1469

PERSONNEL LOSSES AND GAINS:

19th Air Division:

Gains — 1 - 70230

Losses — None

7th Bomb Wing:

Gains — 1 - 4823

1 - 27150

1 - 47171

Losses — 1 - 4823

1 - 43170

1 - 47171

1 - 0200

11th Bomb Wing:

No gains or losses

VISITORS: Colonel Burlin S. Bennett, Lt Colonel M. F. Allen, Major C. T. Butterfield, Captain A. B. Colwell. Headquarters represented: USAF. Date of visit: 16 April 1951 (for 2 days). Purpose of visit: Examination of WAF Program.

Joe C. Beecher, Civilian. Headquarters represented: AAFRPS, Dallas, Texas. Date of visit: 19 Apr 51 (for 1 day). Purpose of visit: Theater Administration Review.

JOHN B. BARTLETT
Lt Col, USAF
19AD Inspector General

1470

1471

Lt Col Fred W. McNally, 11th Bomb Wing Inspector--Conference at Headquarters SAC pertaining to IG activities and organization.

Semi-Annual inspections of the following activities were performed during the month:

7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy: 7th Maintenance Sq

11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy: 11th Maintenance Sq

7th Air Base Group: Hq and HS Sq

7th Installations Sq

11th Installations Sq

Base Information and Education

7th Supply Sq

11th Supply Sq

Post Office

Special Services

4010th Operations Sq

4014th Operations Sq

Transient Airmen's Quarters

Officers' Mess

7th Security Sq

11th Security Sq

Personal Affairs

Separation and Recruiting

HEREBY:

19th Air Division:

Authorization - SAC PAT 110-1 (2)

Shortages - 1 - 70250

Overages - None

1472

1473

1475

Office of the Wing Inspector

6 February 1951

MISSION: The mission of the Wing Inspector is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Wing Inspector is specifically charged with the directing of the activities of:

Air Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

Air Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

ADMINISTRATIVE, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

Completed inspection of the 7th Bomb Group.

Authority has been received from 3AC to conduct inspections once every four months instead of once each quarter.

The designation Inspector General will be used only by Division, numbered Air Force or higher, therefore, designation of this section has been changed to Wing Inspector.

PERSONNEL:

Authorized: 14 f/[illegible] 6T0[illegible] Total 20

Overages: 1 Air Inspector (T/A) [illegible] 2120 (Not authorized but considered essential)

1479

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Air Provost Marshal
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

6 January 1951

ORGANIZATION:

Major Joseph W. Parks, Jr., Air Provost Marshal

Captain Robert J. Rushing, Asst. Air Provost Marshal

M/Sgt James E. Garrison, Provost Sergeant

S/Sgt Lonnie B. Brightwell, Asst. Provost Sergeant

S/Sgt John C. Cleary, Chief Clerk, Security

Cpl Eldon E. Maul, Files, Security

Cpl Thomas C. Roberts, Clerk-Typist, Security

Cpl Ralph E. Thompson, Clerk-Typist, Security

Cpl David L. Aldridge, Clerk-Typist, Security

Mrs. Ola J. Padgett, Civilian Stenographer

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS:

Letter, Headquarters 7th Bomb Wing, subject: "Policy Regarding Reserve Parking", dated 31 January 1951, was prepared and published by the Air Provost Marshal.

The following pertinent notices were placed in the "DAILY BULLETIN" for the month of January 1951:

Attention of all personnel is directed to the fact that when the ownership of a vehicle registered on this base changes in any way or the owner is transferred, the registration decal (sticker) must be removed from the vehicle and the pieces turned into the Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police. Personnel failing to comply will be denied the privilege of registering a vehicle on this base.

IGPM-Historical Report

6 January 1951

Presentation of one of the following is sufficient for individual entrance of airmen to Carswell Air Force Base: WD AGO Form 7, WD AGO Form 8, WD AGO Form 345 or DD Form 2AF.

All military personnel who have not had their pictures made for the new DD Form 2AF (Identification Card) and new ramp passes should be instructed to report to Service Club #1 between 0815 hours and 1615 hours week days. This faculity will be discontinued on 15 February 1951. The Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police, Building T-1-145, will continue to process dependents and civilians for pictures.

During the month of January 1951, fifty-three (53) Atomic Energy Clearances and five hundred and eight (508) National Agency Checks were requested.

During the month of January 1951, thirteen (13) Interim "g" Clearances and eight (8) "g" type Atomic Energy Clearances were granted. There were eighty-five (85) Secret and no (0) Top Secret Clearances granted. There was one hundred and six (106) requests for Top Secret Clearances forwarded for investigation. There was one (1) Cryptographic Clearance requested and three (3) granted.

Total number of persons transferred or discharged from this Base with Clearance was forty (40).

No (0) Clearances were reactivated in January 1951.

ROBERT J. MESHINE
Captain USAF
Asst. Provost Marshal

HEADQUARTERS [illegible], USAFE
Office of the Inspector General

6 January 1951

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with the direction of the activities of:

Air Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

Air Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

ADMINISTRATIVE, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

Prepared answers to Eighth Air Force Annual General Inspection.

An OVT was conducted by Eighth Air Force OVT Team. Team was led by Colonel Frank W. Iseman, Jr.

A special inspection was conducted of the Base by a team from Headquarters USAF. Team consisted of Col Rollin M. Winingham, assisted by seven other officers and two airmen. Purpose of that inspection was to have background in preparing for the Annual General Inspection of Headquarters Eighth Air Force.

PERSONNEL:

Authorized: 14 T/OSE 6 TDA Total 20

1482

PERSONNEL (Contd)

Overages: 1 Air Inspector (PM) SSN 2120 (Not authorized but considered essential)

#1 Air Inspector (Communications) SSN 4400 (utilized for authorized SSN 542)

#2 Air Inspectors (Aircraft Inspector) SSN 750F (1 filling vacancy of SSN 925 - 1 addition considered essential)

Shortages: 1 SSN 925 (See # above)

1 SSN 542 (See ## above)

1 SSN 955 (Vacancy used for additional 750F)

VISITORS: Col Hellin M. Wininghan - SAC, Lt Col T. G. Gillespie - SAC, Lt Col R. C. Jenkins - SAC, Lt Col A. E. Seball - SAC, Major J. H. Hall - SAC, Maj J. Stuart, Jr. - SAC, Maj V. H. Parker - SAC, MSGT R. B. Standley - SAC, M Sgt H. S. Knowlton - SAC, and M Sgt C. J. Newsome - SAC. Purpose: Inspectional visit.

P. D. BROWN
Lt Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1483

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Air Provost Marshal
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

ORGANIZATION: 28 December 1950

Major Joseph W. Parks, Jr., Air Provost Marshal

Captain Robert J. Rushing, Asst. Air Provost Marshal

M/Sgt James E. Garrison, Provost Sergeant

S/Sgt Lonnie B. Brightwell, Asst. Provost Sergeant

S/Sgt John C. Cleary, Chief Clerk, Security

Cpl. Eldon E. Maul, Files, Security

Cpl. Thomas C. Roberts, Clerk-Typist, Security

Pfc David L. Aldridge, Clerk-Typist, Security

Pfc Robert L. Swanson, File Clerk, Security

Mrs. Noreen M. Bailey, Civilian Stenographer

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION:

Amendment #2 to Operations Order 16-50, dated 10 August 1950, was written and published by the Air Provost Marshal on 8 December 1950.

The following pertinent notices were placed in the "DAILY BULLETIN" for the month of December:

Effective 2400 hours, 15 December 1950, WD AGO Forms 65 will not be honored for entrance of assigned officers to Carswell Air Force Base. Assigned officers must possess or be accompanied by an officer possessing a DD Form 2AF. All officers not possessing a DD Form 2AF will report to the Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police immediately for processing.

SECURITY IS EVERYBODY'S JOB - HAVE YOU DONE YOUR PART?

Effective immediately the Gravel Road Gate (Roaring Springs Road) will be open to out bound traffic only from 0730 to 0830 hours and 1630 to 1730 hours week days. This gate will be closed Saturday, Sunday and Holidays.

Reference Daily Bulletin #237 Volume 9 Par VI dated 5 Dec 1950 WD AGO Form 65 will be accepted for entrance of assigned or attached officers through 2400 hours, 20 December 1950. WD AGO Form 65 will be accepted for entrance of Technical Representatives employed on Carswell Air Force Base until further notice.

The practice of airmen soliciting rides on or off of this station will be discontinued immediately. It is desired that all personnel be indoctrinated regarding the provisions of AFR 125-13, subject: "Conduct of Transient Military Personnel on Public Carriers", as well as AFR 125-27, subject: "Soliciting Rides". Information relative to these directives will be placed on the permanent part of all bulletin boards.

There will be a meeting of all group and squadron security officers in the quonset hut East of Building T-1-146 (Air Police Orderly Room) at 1000 Friday, December 29, 1950.

During the month of December 1950, one hundred and twenty-eight (128) Atomic Energy Clearances and four-hundred and sixty-five (465) National Agency Checks were requested.

During the month of December 1950, two (2) Interim "M" Clearances were granted and one (1) "M" type Atomic Energy Clearances were granted. There were forty-seven (47) Top Secret clearances forwarded for investigation. There was one (1) Top Secret and nineteen (19) Secret clearances granted. There were four (4) Cryptographic Clearances requested and no (0) granted.

IGPM - Historical Report 28 Dec 1950

Total number of persons transferred or discharged from this Base with Clearances was eighteen (18).

No (0) clearances were reactivated in December 1950.

JOSEPH E. PARKS, JR.
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

1487

1488

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Air Provost Marshal
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

4 December 1950

ORGANIZATION:

Major Joseph W. Burke, Jr., Air Provost Marshal

Captain Robert J. Rushing, Asst. Air Provost Marshal

M/Sgt James E. Garrison, Provost Sergeant

S/Sgt Lonnie B. Brightwell, Asst. Provost Sergeant

S/Sgt John C. Cleary, Chief Clerk, Security

Cpl. Elden E. Maul, Files, Security

Cpl. Thomas C. Roberts, Clerk-Typist, Security

Cpl. Harry F. Lewis, File Clerk, Security

Pfc David L. Aldridge, Clerk-Typist, Security

Mrs. Noreen M. Bailey, Civilian Stenographer

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS:

The following 7th Bomb Wing, Heavy, Regulations and Memorandums were written by the Air Provost Marshal and Assistant Air Provost Marshal:

Amendment to Reg 125-5, 27 November 1950, was prepared and sent to Publication.

The following pertinent notice was placed in the "DAILY BULLETIN" for the month of November:

All officers who have processed through the Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police for DD Form 2AF should pick up their Identification Cards from this section immediately.

[redacted] - Historical Report 4 Dec 50

During the month of November 1950, eighty-five (85) Atomic Energy Clearances and two-hundred and forty-six (246) National Agency Checks were requested.

During the month of November 1950, nine (9) Interim "AE" Clearances were granted and no (0) "AE" type Atomic Energy Clearances were granted. There were seven (7) Top Secret and forty-six (46) Secret clearances granted. There were two (2) Cryptographic Clearances requested and two (2) granted.

Total number of persons transferred or discharged from this Base with Clearances was eleven (11).

No (0) clearances were reactivated in November 1950.

[redacted]
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

1490

Title

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Inspector General

6 November 1950

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with the directing of the activities of:

Air Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

Air Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

ADMINISTRATIVE, ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING, AND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

Follow-up inspections of the last Annual General Inspection were conducted and the yearly Narrative Inspection Report was forwarded to the Commanding General, 7th Bomb Wing, in preparation for the Annual General Inspection by Eighth Air Force.

PERSONNEL:

Authorized: 14 T/OSE 6 TDY Total 20

Overages: 1 Air Inspector (PSA) SSN 2120 (not authorized but considered essential)

1 Air Inspector (Communications) SSN 4400 (utilized for authorized SSN 542)

2 Air Inspectors (Aircraft Inspector) SSN 750F (1 filling vacancy of SSN 925 - 1 addition considered essential)

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HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Air Provost Marshal
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

2 November 1950

PERSONNEL:

Major Joseph W. Parks, Jr., Air Provost Marshal

Captain Robert J. Rushing, Asst. Air Provost Marshal

T/Sgt. James E. Garrison, Provost Sergeant

S/Sgt. John C. Cleary, Chief Clerk, Security

Sgt. Lonnie R. Brightwell, Asst. Provost Sergeant

Cpl. Eldon E. Beul, Files, Security

Cpl. Thomas G. Roberts, Clerk-Typist, Security

Cpl. Harry F. Lewis, File Clerk, Security

Pvt. David L. Eldridge, Clerk-Typist, Security

Mrs. Doreen M. Bailey, Civilian Stenographer

Captain Orville I. Lee, 0298A, Hq & Hq Sq, 7th Bomb Wing, H, this station, Eighth Air Force (SAC), was relieved as Asst. Air Provost Marshal and assigned primary duty as Special Weapons Training Officer, Wing A-3, per Special Order 220, dated 2 October 1950, paragraph 17.

Captain Robert J. Rushing, AO-484899, 7th Air Police Squadron, 7th Air Base Group, this station, Eighth Air Force (SAC), was relieved as the Commanding Officer, 7th Air Police Squadron, 7th Air Base Group, and reassigned to Hq & Hq Sq, 7th Bomb Wing, H, as Asst. Air Provost Marshal, per Special Order 220, dated 2 October 1950, paragraph 18.

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS:

The following 7th Bomb Wing, Heavy, Regulations and Memorandums were written by the Air Provost Marshal and Assistant Air Provost Marshal:

7th Bomb Wing, H, Reg 205-6, Firearms - Knives (Non-governmental),

has been stencilled and forwarded to Reproduction and at present is awaiting publication. (Reg 205-6 dated 16 October 1950)

Report of Arrest - Delinquency - Incident, Reg 125-4, 6 Oct 50 1/

Traffic Regulations and Vehicle Control, Reg 125-5, 26 Oct 50 2/

The following pertinent notices were placed in the Daily Bulletin for the month of October:

A list of establishments placed "Off Limits" to all military personnel.

It is desired that all personnel who have a vehicle registered on Carswell Air Force Base place the blue security decal on their vehicles. These decals should be placed in the lower right hand side of the windshield, but may be placed in some other conspicuous place on the vehicle if so desired. Decals are available at the Squadron Orderly Rooms.

All units will designate a disposition point for solicitation and deliveries. Effective 10 October 1950, there will be no solicitation and deliveries made within any barracks, i.e. newspapers will be delivered to Day Rooms or Orderly Rooms, laundry and dry cleaning will be picked up and delivered at the Unit Supply Room, etc.

Following message from Hq SAC is quoted for necessary action: "This hq made recommendation to Hq USAF in connection with issuance of DD Form 2/F, "Identification Card." The folg reply which is self-explanatory is passed on for info and dissemination: "Par A. A space is provided for individual's birth date on DD Form 2/F and birth date will be entered in this space. Par. B. The agmt of new service numbers of non-regular offs and warrant officers has been suspended indefinitely, see AFR 5-2, SAC III, par 26'."

1/, 2/

1494

In order to expedite traffic through the entrance gates, personnel are reminded to have their passes ready for the sentinel prior to arriving at the gate house.

The Accident and Traffic Control Committee will meet at 1500 hours on 30 October 1950 in the Court Room of the Wing Legal Office. All personnel who have received traffic tickets prior to 2400 hours, 26 October 1950, which are still pending proper action, will appear before the committee. They will advise their Commanding Officer regarding the above, so that necessary action may be taken in accordance with 7th Bomb Wing Regulation 32-3. All traffic tickets issued subsequent to 2400 hours, 26 October 1950, will be processed in accordance with 7th Bomb Wing Reg 125-5, dated 26 October 1950.

Reference AF Reg 35-60, as amended, DD Forms 2AF are available for issue to all Air Force Officers on Active Duty in excess of 90 days who are stationed on Carswell Air Force Base. All officers will report to the Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police immediately to complete AF Form 279 in order that a new identification card may be issued. It is anticipated that cancellation of the DD 400 Form 65 will be effective on 1 December 1950.

During the month of October 1950, seventy (70) Atomic Energy Clearances and one hundred and seventy-four (174) National Agency Checks were requested.

During the month of October 1950, nineteen (19) Interim "S" Clearances were granted and one hundred twenty-three (123) "S" type Atomic Energy Clearances were granted. There were eighty-eight (88) Positions of Unusual Trust Clearances granted. There were five (5) Cryptographic Clearances requested and three (3) granted.

1495

[illegible] - Historical Report [illegible] 2 Nov 1954

Total number of persons transferred or discharged from this base with Clearances was twenty-seven (27).

No (0) clearances were reactivated in October 1950.

[illegible]
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

1496

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Inspector General

9 October 1950

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with the directing of the activities of:

The Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

The Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

ADMINISTRATIVE: Inspector General's Office.

An Initial Inspection on Special Subject, 6th AF Ltr 121-23, "Personnel Augmentation of Air Police Squadrons." Report was forwarded to the 7th Air Police Squadron Commander, through the Air Base Group Commander, for necessary corrective action.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

During the month of September, Major T. O. Renfro, the Tactical Inspector for this section attended the Staff Officers' Radar Indoctrination Course at Mather Field, California. The purpose of this course was to familiarize the commanders with the techniques, problems, and limitations of the radar operators. Major Renfro also participated in a Classified maneuver conducted by the 7th Bombardment Group. This flight was to observe crew

1497

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING (Contd):

techniques and degree of training of combat crews.

One Special Subject, AFR 121-44, "Utilization of Graduates of USAF Instrument Pilot School," was received and the initial inspection revealed this base in compliance. An extension of CAC Reg 121-6, "Survival Equipment and Associated Training Programs," was received. This Special Subject was originally to have terminated on 30 June 1950, but due to its growing importance it has been extended until December 1951.

MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY:

A new Technical Order distribution system was initiated requiring the construction of new simplified distribution bins which will enable units to obtain their distribution in a more efficient manner, and will eliminate past confusion and congestion.

The present schedule was revised whereby more aircraft, for completed major inspection, will be inspected which necessitated the transfer of one (1) inspector, M Sgt Lee E. Galloway, from Maintenance Control to this section on 22 Sep 50.

Two (2) special inspections were conducted on 5 Oct 50 on a damaged oxygen regulator in Aircraft B-36B No 44-92064A, and an alleged fire in No 4 engine of Aircraft B-36B, No 44-92066A. Findings of these Special Inspections were that the oxygen regulator had been subjected to a greater than normal pressure, thereby causing failure of the rubber diaphram plate securing rivets. The alleged fire was caused by screws of excess length having been mounted in the propeller spinner after body, which were rubbing against the propeller faring causing spark flashes.

1498

MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY (Contd):

A special inquiry was conducted based on a complaint received against the company having Government contract to transport household goods. No evidence was found to support the charges and a reply to this effect was forwarded to the individual making the complaint.

PERSONNEL:

Authorized: 14 T/O&E 6 TDA Total 20

Assigned: 1 September - 20

30 September - 21

Overages: 1 Air Inspector (T&E) 53X 2120 (not authorized but considered essential)

1 Air Inspector (Communications) 53X 4A00 (Utilized for authorized 53X 542)

*2 Air Inspectors (Aircraft Inspector) 53X 750F (1 filling vacancy of 53X 925 - 1 addition considered essential)

Shortages: 1 53X 925 (See * above)

1 53X 542 (See ** above)

1 53X 955 (Vacancy used for additional 75XF)

Gains: 2 Lt Lee E. Galloway 53X 750F

Mrs. Rosemary H. Healy

Losses: Mrs. Evelyn A. Dennis

VISITORS: Capt. R. F. Puglt, and S Sgt B. L. Shuptrine, 24th Weather Sq, Brooks AFB, Texas, on 1 Sep 50. Purpose of visit: Quarterly Technical Inspection.

TSgt R. B. Standley, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 18-21 Sep 50. Purpose of visit: Annual Inspection.

1499

[illegible] (Contd)

Major James [illegible] Hall, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 18-22 Sep 50.
Purpose of visit: Special inspection of Observer (1037) activities.

Captain Harold W. [illegible], Headquarters Eighth Air Force, 25-26 Sep 50.
Purpose of visit: Inspection of photographic equipment and aerial cameras - including radar cameras.

[illegible]
Lt Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1500

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, [illegible]
Office of the Inspector General

[illegible] September 1950

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with the directing of the activities of:

Air Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

Air Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

[illegible]: Inspector General's Office.

A Personnel and Administration Inspection of the [illegible]21st AACS was conducted for Major Albert C. Granger, 1300th AACS Wing, Tinker AF Base, Oklahoma, in conjunction with the Annual Air Inspection he was conducting on this unit, from 21 August to 25 August 1950.

[illegible]:

Special Inspection on Combat Crew Interrogation was conducted 24 August 1950 and the results and findings were forwarded to the Commanding General, 7th Bomb Wing, through Wing S-2.

[illegible]:

Special Inspection was conducted 24 August 1950 on engine fire occurring on B-36 type aircraft number 44-92081. Results and findings of this Special Inspection were forwarded through concerned commanders to the Commanding General, Seventh Bomb Wing.

MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY (Cont'd)

A special survey was conducted 15 August 1950 on transportation difficulties of Air Installations. Results and findings of this survey were forwarded through concerned commanders to the Commanding General, Seventh Bomb Wing.

PERSONNEL:

Major R. G. Renfro, Wing Air Inspector, departed for TDY at Mather AFB, California on 25 August 1950, for a period of approximately 14 days for attendance of an Airplane Commanders Indoctrination School in Radar Bombing.

Strength:

Authorized: ~~12~~ 13 T/O&E 6 TDA Total ~~12~~ 19

Assigned: 1 August - ~~19~~ 20

31 August - ~~19~~ 20

Overage: 1 Air Inspector (P&I) SER 2121. (Not authorized but considered essential)

Shortage: None

Gains: None

Losses: None

VISITORS: MAJG L. L. Hicks, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, on 2 August 1950. Purpose of Visit: Inspection of JAFAP Distribution.

Major Albert C. Granger and 1st Lt. Dean R. Anholt, 1600th AACS, Wing, Tinker AF Base, Oklahoma, on 21 August 1950. Purpose of Visit: Annual Air Inspection of 1921st AACS.

P. D. BROWN
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1502

Office of the Inspector General

[illegible]: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with the inspection of the activities of:

The Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

The Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

[illegible] Inspector General's Office.

Personnel of the Administrative Section conducted a special survey to determine the utilization of man-hours in the Base Dental Office. Results of this survey were reported to the Base Commander for his information.

Routine quarterly inspections were conducted in accordance with published Inspector General's quarterly inspection schedule.

[illegible]

The Maintenance and Supply Section conducted a special survey on the laundry service for hospital linen, based upon the reported loss of sheets that had been sent to the Camp Wood Quartermaster Laundry. Results of this survey were reported to the Base Commander for his information.

PERSONNEL: Inspector General's Office (Cont'd)

Authorized: 9 T/DAA 6 TDM Total 17

Assigned: 1 July - 18

31 July - 19

Overage: 1 Air Inspector (PEA) SSN 2121. (Not authorized but considered essential)

1 Clerk, typist SSN 405 (Anticipated authorization on Mrs [illegible])

Shortage: None

Gains: Pfc. Victor Monogan

Losses: None

VISITORS: Lt. Col. D. H. Bailey and Major W. C. Bulting, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, on 1 July 1950. Purpose of Visit: Inspection of Base Security Implementation Program.

P. D. [illegible]
Lt. Colonel, [illegible]
Inspector General

Office of the Air Provost Marshal
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

3 August 1950

HISTORICAL REPORT

AIR PROVOST MARSHAL

ORGANIZATION:

Major Joseph S. Parks, Jr., Air Provost Marshal

Captain Orville F. Lee, Asst. Provost Marshal

T/Sgt. James E. Garrison, Provost Sergeant

Sgt. John C. Cleary, Chief Clerk, Security

Cpl. Eldon E. Maul, Files, Security

Cpl. Thomas C. Roberts, Clerk-Typist, Security

Cpl. Harry F. Lewis, File Clerk, Security

Miss Cora Lee Lightfoot, Civilian Stenographer

1st Lt. John A. Minor, 17415A, Hq & Hq Sq, 7th Bomb Wing (Heavy), this station, 8th AF (SAC), was transferred ICS to Ellington Air Force Base, Houston, Texas, SO 150, Par 35, 29 June 1950.

T/Sgt. Charles E. Morgilar, AF6699086, Hq & Hq Sq, 7th Bomb Wing (Heavy), this station, 8th AF (SAC), was transferred to Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D. C., SO 153, Par 19, 3 July 1950.

Sgt. Lonnie B. Brightwell, Jr., AF3869826, 7th Air Police Sq., 7th Air Base Group, this station, 8th AF (SAC), was transferred to Hq & Hq Sq, 7th Bomb Wing (Heavy) and assigned as Asst. Provost Sergeant, Air Provost Marshal Office, 7th Bomb Wing (Heavy), SO 161, Par 24, 13 July 1950.

Major Joseph S. Parks, Jr., Air Provost Marshal, 7th Bomb Wing (Heavy), was granted four (4) days of emergency leave due to the death of his father, effective 17 July 1950, SO 164, Par 4, 17 July 1950, Auth: AR 600-115.

1506 - Historical Report

Office of the Air Provost Marshal, 7th Bomb Wing (Heavy), this station, 8th AF (SAC), moved from Building T-1-161 to Building T-1-138, 25 July 1950.

The new Base Defense Plan was prepared and submitted to the Wing Commander for approval by the Air Provost Marshal, 7th Bomb Wing (Heavy).

PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:

The following 7th Bomb Wing, Heavy, Regulations and Memoranda were written by the Air Provost Marshal and Assistant Air Provost Marshal:

Traffic Regulations and Vehicle Control, Reg 125-50, dated 14 July 50. 1/

Reports of Absentees and Return of Absentees, Memo 125-1, 17 July 50. 2/

Identification of Offenders, Memo 125-5, 14 July 50. 3/

Instructions to Office of the Guard, Memo 205-50, 12 July 50. 4/

The following pertinent notices were placed in the "DAILY BULLETIN" for the month of July:

Effective 15 August 1950, all dependents over 12 years of age of personnel stationed at Carswell Air Force Base will be required to have dependent passes for entrance to Carswell Air Force Base. This applies to both military and civilian personnel.

The Air Provost Marshal and Wing Security Office have moved to BUILDING T-1-138.

The following message is quoted for information and compliance:

"CPX 3278. Folg info recd fr USAF and SAC is quoted for compliance: For purposes of add sec, use of lock washers on all screws or bolts fastening hasps and bar holders to filing cabinets locked with bar, hasp and three way combination lock is planned. Cabinets of this

1/, 2/, 3/, 4/

1506

type currently in use will be modified by flattening the end of on screw or bolt on the hasp and bar holder to prevent removal."

Until further notice, no personal cameras will be permitted on the flight line or airfield without written notice from the Commanding General, 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy.

All non-Civil Service civilian personnel employed on Carswell Air Force Base will report to the Identification and Registration Section (Building T-1-145) of the Air Police not later than 31 July 1950 and complete 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, Form 205-12, in duplicate, in order that a new permanent pass for entrance to Carswell Air Force Base may be issued. Hiring agencies or individual employers are responsible for compliance. This includes all non-Civil Service civilian personnel who are employed by the Officers Club, NCO Officers Clubs, Service Club, P.X., Commissary, domestic employees, and all other agencies employing non-Civil Service personnel.

Effective this date, the vehicle belonging to the Haddox Ice Company may operate on the ramp for the purpose of delivering ice.

Pending revision of 7th Bomb Wing, Heavy, Regulation 125-5, dated 30 March 1950, all traffic tickets issued to government vehicles will be referred to the Accident and Traffic Control Committee for review and necessary action.

All officers on active duty may vouch for all personnel in their vehicle and thus suffice their individual entrance requirements. All officers are reminded that they are solely responsible for personnel admitted in this manner. Established procedures for admitting non-registered vehicles and other visitors will remain in effect.

Personnel in registered vehicles with proper identification, who normally use the Main Gate, should consider the time saved by using the Gravel Road (Roaring Springs Road) Gate just north of the Traffic Circle. This gate is open between 0600 hours and 0715 hours and 1515 hours and 1600 hours weekdays only.

Until further notice, no civilian vehicles will be allowed on any portion of the Ramp. Motorscooters, motorcycles, and other two-wheeled vehicles, and the P-X Mobile Canteen are excepted. Any person noting a civilian vehicle on the Ramp will stop the vehicle and detain the driver and occupants for the Air Police. Unit Commanders will insure that all personnel are properly instructed.

Pending revision of 7th Bomb Wing, Heavy, Regn 205-1, 24th March 1950, the blue laminated 7th Air Force Police Squadron identification card will be honored in lieu of 7th Bomb Wing, Heavy, Form 205-1, while Air Police are on duty.

Vehicle safety checks will be given each Wednesday and Saturday at the Post Exchange Filling Station. These safety checks are required in order to register a privately-owned vehicle on Carswell Air Force Base. Temporary permits, in authorized cases, may be obtained at the Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police, Building T-1-145.

Effective this date, personnel will not be required to wear ties while travelling between their residence and place of duty provided they are in a privately-owned vehicle. Ties will be worn off the station at all other times. It will be the responsibility of all officers and non-commissioned officers to insure compliance so as not to abuse this privilege.

1508

Military personnel will insure that their dependents over 12 years of age obtain a dependent's pass. Personnel residing on the Base who have houseguests may obtain a temporary dependent's pass for these guests. These passes are available at the Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police, Building T-1-145.

No person may discuss matters of a restricted, confidential, secret, or higher classification on regular telephone circuits, leased circuits, or through any telephone toll system. This restriction applies to all types of telephone calls over wire circuits and radio circuits.

During the month of July 1950, no Atomic Energy Clearances were requested.

During the month of July 1950, twenty-four (24) Interim "A" Clearances were granted and seventy-six (76) "A" Type Atomic Energy Clearances were granted. There were eighteen (18) Unusual Trust Clearances granted. There were no Cryptographic Clearances were requested, and none granted.

Total number of persons transferred or discharged from this Base with Clearances was fifty (50).

No clearances were reactivated in July 1950.

JOSEPH W. PARKS, JR.
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

1509

REGULATION)
NUMBER 125-5B)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

14 July 1950

AIR PROVOST MARSHAL

Traffic Regulations and Vehicle Control

7th Bomb Wg, H, Reg 125-5, 30 March 1950, is amended as follows:

* * *

3. RESPONSIBILITY:

* * *

a. Air Police observing violations of this regulation will complete, in triplicate, the Air Force Traffic Ticket Form 764, the distribution of which will be as follows: The original copy to the violator, the duplicate copy to the Accident and Traffic Control Committee, and the triplicate copy to be filed by the Air Police Squadron for at least two (2) years. All previous offenses will be indicated on an R&R to the Accident and Traffic Control Committee with each traffic ticket when applicable.

* * *

4. TRAFFIC TICKET DISPOSITION:

* * *

b. Government Vehicles: The driver of a government vehicle receiving a traffic ticket will immediately inform his commanding officer or, in case of a civilian, his supervisor, of this fact giving full particulars. The violator and his commanding officer and/or supervisor in the case of a civilian will report to the Accident and Traffic Control Committee at the designated time.

* * *

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O. CASON
WOJG USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus 50 cys to AFM

1511

Memo
205-5D
1 Para
Para 1

MEMORANDUM) HEADQUARTERS, 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY

NUMBER 205-5D) CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

12 July 1950

SECURITY

Instructions to Office of the Guard

Headquarters, 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, Memorandum #205-5, 1 Mar 50, is amended as follows:

Paragraph 3. l. is rescinded.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN K DOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O CABON
MAJG USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "A"
Plus 50 cys to Air Provost Marshal

Headquarters 7th [illegible], [illegible]
Office of the Inspector General

10 July 1950

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with the directing of the activities of:

Air Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

Air Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

ADMINISTRATIVE: Inspector General's Office.

Routine quarterly inspections were completed of the 7th Bomb Group, 93d Engineer Aviation Battalion, and the Specialized Organizational Maintenance Activity. Inspection of the Commandant, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, was not conducted during this quarter due to their having received an Annual General Inspection by Headquarters Eighth Air Force Inspector General's Office during this period.

The Wing Inspector General was designated by the Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, to act as umpire on Maneuver "Socalm"; report submitted under separate cover.

HEADQUARTERS 7th BOMBARDMENT WING, [illegible]
Office of the Inspector General

10 July 1950

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with the directing of the activities of:

Air Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

Air Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

PERSONNEL: Inspector General's Office.

Routine quarterly inspections were completed of the 7th Base Group, 43 th Engineer Aviation Battalion, and the Specialized Organizational Maintenance Activity. Inspection of the Commandant, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, was not conducted during this quarter due to their having received an Annual General Inspection by Headquarters Eighth Air Force Inspector General's Office during this period.

The Wing Inspector General was designated by the Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, to act as umpire on Maneuver"Decalm"; report submitted under separate cover.

ACTIVITIES: Inspector General's Office (Cont'd)

Completed action was taken on the reorganization of the Specialized Aircraft Maintenance Program which had been the responsibility of the Wing Inspector General, and final instructions accomplishing this were issued to concerned commanders.

Quarterly Inspection Schedule for the period 1 July to 30 September 1950 was prepared and distributed to all units and activities; copy enclosed.

PERSONNEL: Authorized: 9 T/Os [illegible] Total 17

Assigned: 1 June 1950 - 1

30 June 1950 - 1

Overage: 1 Air Inspector (MAJ) AO 2121. (Not authorized but considered essential)

Shortage: None

Gains: None

Losses: None

VISITORS: Lt. Col. H. F. Estrumsa, Headquarters Flight Service, Washington 25, D. C., on 2 June 1950. Purpose of Visit: Annual General Inspection of Carswell AF Base Flight Service Center.

Mr. Ross Stephens (Civilian), Mr. Bert A. Aslet (Civilian), and T Sgt. John C. Chathas, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, on 19 June 1950. Purpose of Visit: Inspection of Fire Protection and Aircraft Crash Rescue (Equipment).

Attachment copy of letter on Maneuver "Becalm" filed in Wing #2

[illegible]
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1516

RESTRICTED

JSP/11

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Air Provost Marshal
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

5 July 1950

HISTORICAL REPORT

AIR PROVOST MARSHAL

ORGANIZATION:

Major Joseph D. Parks, Jr., Air Provost Marshal

1st Lt. John M. Miner, Assistant Air Provost Marshal

T/Sgt James E. Garrison, Provost Sergeant

T/Sgt Chas. M. Norgilar, Assistant Provost Sergeant

Sgt John C. Cleary, Chief Clerk, Security

Cpl Eldon E. Maul, Files, Security

Cpl Thomas C. Roberts, 405, Clerk-Typist, Security

Cpl Harry F. Lewis, 055, File Clerk, Security

Miss Cora Lee Lightfoot, Civilian Stenographer

Captain Orville I. Lee, 6298A, Hq & Hq Sq, 7th Bomb Sg, W, this station, 9th AF (SAC) is assigned for permanent duty as Wing Security Officer, SO 134, Par 28, this Headquarters, dated 10 June 1950. Captain Lee was granted a 15-day leave of absence effective on or about 17 June 1950.1/,2/

Cpl Clyde D. Dixon, Atomic Energy Commission Clearances, Security, processed for discharge on 15 June 1950.

Cpl Eldon E. Maul was granted a 19-day leave of absence 1 June through 24 June 1950. 3/

1/, 2/3/

RESTRICTED

1517

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION:

The following 7th Bomb Wg, H, Regulations were written by the Air Provost Marshal and Assistant Air Provost Marshal:

Traffic Regulations and Vehicle Control, Reg 125-50, dated 13 Jun 50./1/

Guarding Procedure for Classified Aircraft, Memo 205-2, dated 7 Jun 50./3/

Security Measures for "Restricted Data," Memo 205-7, dated 12 Jun 50./2/

Passes for Training Maneuvers, Memo 205-10, dated 14 Jun 50./4/

The following appeared in the SCANNER of 16 Jun 50:

"CRACK-DOWN ON HOUSING AREA SPEEDERS

"Two airmen, caught speeding in the housing area last week, will be unable to drive their vehicles on the base for a long time. Charged with speeding and endangering the lives of children in the area, one received a 30-day restriction for a second traffic offense and the other 21 days for a first offense. In addition they received a grave warning that serious consequences will result if they should re-oat.

"Captain Bushing of the Air Police then told the SCANNER that a full time patrol is now on duty within the Housing Area to crackdown on violators of Base Traffic Regulations, and that maximum sentences will be given to ALL offenders. SPEEDING IN THE HOUSING AREA WILL NOT BE TOLERATED."

The following appeared in the SCANNER on 23 June 1950:

"OLD BASE STICKERS NO GOOD TOMORROW

"Effective Saturday, July 1, no cars bearing old base stickers will be allowed to operate on Carswell AFB, according to an announcement yesterday."

"IDENTIFICATION REQUIRED OF ALL DEPENDENTS NOW

"Effective immediately, all dependents of military personnel desiring

RESTRICTED

1/, 2/, 3/, 4/

1518

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION, continued:

admission to Carswell AFB will be required to present some form of identification at the gates, it was announced at 8th Air Force Headquarters. Acceptable identification was defined as Post Exchange cards, commissary cards, or dependents' passes."

The following pertinent notices were placed in the "DAILY BULLETIN" for the month of June:

All Unit Commanders will check the records of personnel [illegible] subsequent to 31 December 1949, and comply with 7th Bomb Wing Regulation 125-2 dated 26 April 1949.

Every effort is being made to curb the speed and prevent accidents involving children in the housing area. Your attention is directed to the fact that the speed limit in the housing area is 15 miles per hour. You are cautioned to observe this speed limit not only for your own protection but also for the protection of these young children.

All personnel (both civilian and military) are cautioned to carry their identification card on their person at all times inasmuch as these will be required for entrance to Carswell Air Force Base effective this date and until further notice.

All military personnel will wear the prescribed uniform while on the station during their duty hours. The uniform will be worn at all times while in the following areas: Flight Line and any portion of the airfield west of Flight Line; Restricted Areas 1, 2, and 3; All areas immediately adjacent to perimeter fence.

1519

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION, continued

Effective this date (26 Jun 50) all visitor passes will be issued at the Main Gate. All non-registered vehicles, other than commercial vehicles specified in existing directives, will be directed to proceed via off-base roadways to Main Gate for proper sign.

Effective this date (26 June 50) Dependents' Passes, P-X Cards, or Commissary Cards will be required before Dependent Personnel will be allowed allowed to enter Carswell Air Force Base. It is suggested that all personnel make arrangements for their dependents to be issued one of the above passes immediately. It is recommended that the Dependents' Passes (Picture Type) be given priority. To obtain these passes, applicants will contact the Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police, Building T-1-145.

In order for the dependents of Technical Representatives working on Carswell Air Force Base to have proper identification for entrance, Dependents' Passes have been authorized. Subject dependents should contact the Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police, Building T-1-145, in order to secure these passes.

Effective 1 July 1950, the 1949 Base Registration Decal will not be honored for entrance to CarswellAir Force Base. All concerned will be advised accordingly and instructed to use the facilities at the Main Gate for all vehicles not properly registered.

During the month of June 1950, Twelve (12) Atomic Energy Clearances were requested; fourteen (14) Interim "H" Clearances were granted and

CLASSIFIED

1520

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION, continued

ten (10) "E" Type Atomic Energy Clearances were granted. There were twenty-eight (28) Positions of Unusual Trust Clearances requested and seventeen (17) Positions of Unusual Trust Clearances granted. There were six (6) Cryptographic Clearances requested and no Cryptographic Clearances granted for June.

Total number of persons transferred or discharged from this base with clearances was thirty-three (33).

Thirty-two (32) clearances were reactivated in June.

JOSEPH S. PARKS, JR.
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

RESTRICTED

1521

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, H
DYESS AIR FORCE BASE
ABILENE, TEXAS

SPECIAL ORDERS)
: 10 Jun 50
NUMBER 134)

EXTRACT

* * *

26. Capt DANIEL I [illegible] 6209A, Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg, H this sta Eighth Air Force (SAC) is reld fr present dy asgmt & resumed [illegible] as Asst Wing Security Officer.

* * *

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVIS:

JOHN P. [illegible]
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

/s/ [illegible]
[illegible] O. CASON
CWO, USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "F"

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

JOSEPH W. PARKS, JR.
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

RESTRICTED

1522

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING,H
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

16 Jun 50

SPECIAL ORDERS)
:
NUMBER 139)

EXTRACT

20. SHOF 10 SO 117 this Hq as pertaining to awarding WOS to AMN this sta as pertains to S Sgt 867 Charles Konsis AF19017810 7th Maint Sq 7th M&S Gp as reads: "(P) 955F S-sk" is amended to read: "(P) 955E S-sk". Due to adm error. Eff 20 May 50.

21. SHOF 6 SO 137 this Hq as pertaining to 1st Lt WILLIAM ZURIVITZA 1423?A asgd this sta as reads: "WILLIAM JURIVITZA" is amended to read: "WILLIAM ZURIVITZA". Due to adm error. Eff 14 Jun 50.

22. Capt CLYDE L GIBSON A0707402, USAFR, 26th Bomb Sq 11th Bomb Gp this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) having been found physically disqualified for flying status, is susp fr all fly dys, eff 6 Apr 50 & will not be asgd to the performance of flying dys until notification is recd by him that susp has been removed & removal confrd by approp auth. Auth: AFR 35-16, AFR 160-1 & AR 35-1480. Confirming VOCG 6 Apr 50. Exigencies of sv precluded issuance of orders in adv of tvl.

23. 1st Lt 2159 BEN R EATON A02044701, having been reld fr asgmt & dy w/USAF Special Activities Wg, South Port, Ft Meyer, Va & asgd this sta per par 15 SO 112 Hq USAF Special Activities Wg, South Port, Ft Meyer, Va dtd 6 Jun 50, is further asgd Hq & Hq Sq 7th AD Gp for Separation. EDCSA: 12 Jun 50. Confirming VOCG 12 Jun 50.

24. Capt ORVILLE I LEE 6298A Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg,H this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is granted fifteen (15) days Lv of Abs eff o/a 17 Jun 50. Auth: AR 600-115.

25. Par 31 SO 133 this Hq as pertaining to the asgmt of Cpl 055 Bobby L Eberle AF18296347 to 7th AD Gp is revoked. Eff 9 Jun 50.

26. 2d Lt 1034 BERNARD J THOMPSON A0946351, USAFR, (Nav on flying status) (YOB 1924)(FSC 36)(DRCS 10 Jun 50)(ATSS Jan 53) having been reld fr asgmt with (P/L)(ConAC) San Francisco Port Det, 2349th AF ORD Ft Mason, Calif & asgd this sta per par 1 LO 305, San Francisco Port Det, 2349th AF ORD, Ft Mason, Calif dtd 10 Jun 50, is further asgd to 11th Bomb Gp this sta. EDCSA: 23 Jun 50.

27. Lt Col 1095 CALVIN T FITE JR 5106A, 4010th Orgn Maint Sq 7th M&S Gp this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is aptd Certifying O for the purp of certifying O & AMN pay & allowances of the 4010th Orgn Maint Sq 7th M&S Gp this sta for an indef period.

28. SHOF 23 SO 136 this Hq as pertaining to AMN asgd to this sta as pertains to Pfc Gene E Drewry AF13349210 as reads: "Asgd 7th AD Gp" is amended to read: "Asgd 7th M&S Gp". Due to Adm error. Eff 13 Jun 50.

RESTRICTED

29. Confirming VOCG 9 Jun 50 FN O & MTN orgns ind this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) TP 9 Jun 50 to Francis E Warren AFB, Wyo on TDY for two (2) days for the purp of transporting student Personnel. Upon compl ret prop sta. TDN TEMA 5704400 067-1440 P 442-02 S 41-191. Govt qrs & messing fac will be utilized to max extent available. AR 35-4820 & AFR 173-5 applies. Upon ret prop sta vou for per diem will be utilized to max extent available. FO making pmt for this tour of TDY will furn Fiscal Sec this sta cy pd vou. Auth: 8th AFR 35-7 & AFR 35-59 dtd 21 Feb 50. Exigencies of sv precluded issuance of orders in adv of tvl.

RANK	MOS	NAME	AFSN	ORGN
Maj	2162	ROBERT S FAIN	8007A	Hq & Hq Sq 7th AB Gp
Capt	2510	THOMAS S GARRETT III	1020LA	Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg,H
T Sgt	750C	Julius H Stender	AF19002341	Hq & Hq Sq 7th AB Gp

30. Confirming VOCG 9 Jun 50 FN O & MTN orgns ind this sta Eighth Air Force (SAC) TP 9 Jun 50 to Mitchell AFB, N.Y. on TDY for three (3) days for the purp of transporting student pers. Upon compl ret prop sta. CTAP. TDN TEMA 5704400 067-1440 P 442-02 S 41-191. Govt qrs & messing fac will be utilized to max extent available. AR 35-4820 & AFR 173-5 applies. Upon ret prop sta vou for per diem will be utilized to max extent available. FO making pmt for this tour of TDY will furn Fiscal Sec this sta cy pd vou. Auth: 8th AFR 35-7 & AFR 35-59 dtd 21 Feb 50. Exigencies of sv precluded issuance of orders in adv of tvl.

RANK	MOS	NAME	AFSN	ORGN
Capt	1024	GEORGE J SAVAGE	A0802945	Hq 11th Bomb Gp
1st Lt	2120	JOHN L FARRELL	A02101619	Hq & Hq Sq 7th AB Gp
1st Lt	1024	JOHN A BARRICKLOW	17370A	Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg,H
Sgt	750	Ralph F Hellman	AF6489624	Hq & Hq Sq 7th AB Gp

31. Pfc 687 Robert L Pock AF57501771, 98th Bomb Sq 11th Bomb Gp this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is reld fr asgmt & dy thereto & reasd to 7th M&S Gp; eff 16 Jun 50. EDCSA: 20 Jun 50.

32. T Sgt 268 John F Connolly AF12000781, Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg,H this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is reld fr asgmt & dy thereto & trfd in gr to Hq & Hq Sq Eighth Air Force, CAFB, FTW, Tex. Eff o/a 23 Jun 50. EDCSA: 23 Jun 50. No tvl involved. Auth: 8th AF TWX PDP2B 7302.

33. MOJG OSSA B DOWNING JR AO950558, Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg,H this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is granted twelve (12) days ordinary lv of Abs eff o/a 19 Jun 50. Auth: AR 600-115.

***** ***** *****

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JAMES R CURRAN
Major, USAF
Acting Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O. CASON
MOJG, USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "F"

1525

PM

[RESTRICTED]

125-5A
2 Pages
Page 1

REGULATION)
NUMBER 125-5A)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

13 June 1950

AIR PROVOST MARSHAL

Traffic Regulations and Vehicle Control

7th Bomb Wg, H, Reg 125-5, 30 March 1950, is amended as follows:

* * *

6. TRAFFIC RULES:

a. Speed limit:

* * *

(7) Government trains, engines and other similar equipment will have a flagman to control traffic at all railroad (roadway) crossings, where no other warning system is operating, both on and off the station. This flagman will be a member of the train crew and will be equipped with a red flag at least one (1) foot square which will be used to signal oncoming traffic during hours of daylight and a red lantern to be used during the hours of darkness.

* * *

c. Parking:

* * *

(4) Vehicles will not be parked on any street, or road, facing traffic except as specified by competent authority.

* * *

7. RIGHT OF WAY:

* * *

f. Formations of personnel marching shall have the right-of-way over vehicular traffic except vehicles on emergency calls.

Drivers of vehicles approaching marching troops shall stop their vehicle on the righthand side of the roadway until the formation has passed, unless otherwise directed by the person in charge.

* * *

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O. CASON
WOJG USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus
50 cys to APH

MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 205-2)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

7 June 1950

SECURITY

Guarding Procedure for Classified Aircraft

(This memo supersedes 7th Bomb Wg, H, Memo 205-2, 10 Apr 50)

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to establish a guarding procedure for classified aircraft assigned to the 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy.

2. CONFIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT:

a. The B-36 aircraft is classified as confidential because of one (1) piece of equipment. Characteristic data, performance data, and certain dimensions are also classified.

b. One (1) airman, preferably the crew chief of each aircraft, will be delegated as the Security Chief and will be briefed by the Squadron Security Officer as to the security requirements and his responsibilities and duties.

(1) The Security Chief may delegate his duties to other personnel at the aircraft to insure that it is properly safeguarded at all times when the aircraft is unlocked.

(2) He will see that all personnel, both civilian and military, do not enter the B-36 (Classified) or loiter on the ramp unless they have the proper type pass (Re: 7th Bomb Wing, H, Memo 205-1).

(3) The Security Chief will lock the aircraft at all times when he, or other competent airmen, delegated and briefed as to his responsibilities concerning security, is not present at the aircraft. Bomb bay doors may be left cracked but not sufficient for personnel to enter. Locking aircraft will include the doors from the bomb bay to the forward and rear compartments of the B-36.

c. During non-duty hours, the Air Police will be responsible for maintaining a continuous jeep patrol on the ramp so as to cover the entire ramp and pass a given point, a minimum of every fifteen (15) minutes. This patrol will ascertain that all personnel on the ramp or in the B-36 aircraft are authorized (Re: 7th Bomb Wg, H, Memo 205-1). The Air Police will take

down the names and addresses of all personnel who are on the ramp without proper authority. The information will be reported to the King Provost Marshal at the beginning of next work day. Unauthorized personnel will be requested to leave the ramp area immediately.

(1) Air Police will inspect all B-36's during the course of their patrol to determine if they have been locked and also to determine if bomb bay doors are properly closed. Any aircraft found unlocked will be immediately reported to the Squadron Engineering Officer (in the event personnel are not available at the Engineering Office, the orderly room will be contacted and informed that the aircraft is unlocked) and request them to lock subject aircraft. A report will be submitted at the beginning of the next work day to the Provost Marshal and will contain the following information:

(a) Serial number of aircraft.

(b) Time and date of incident.

(c) Door unlocked?

(d) Bomb bay doors open?

(e) Who notified, and action taken by same?

(f) Other pertinent information.

d. Unit Security Officers will make spot checks of B-36 aircraft in their organization to see that the Security Chief or their authorized representatives are properly executing their duties pertaining to security. They will also conduct periodic inspections to see that aircraft have not been left unlocked.

3. SECRET AND TOP SECRET AIRCRAFT: When an aircraft is scheduled for a "CLASSIFIED" mission, it first becomes classified as Top Secret upon the installation of certain equipment. It remains in this category until the above-mentioned equipment is removed. This paragraph deals only with local missions and is not to be confused with combined maneuvers.

a. There are three (3) areas through which the aircraft must go before the actual taking off. These areas are to be designated as "D-1," "L," and "D-2" areas.

(1) "D-1" Area is that area in which the above-mentioned equipment is installed and where the aircraft first becomes Top Secret.

(2) "L" Area is the loading area in which the "unit" is installed in the bomb bay.

(3) "D-2" Area is the area in which the aircraft is parked to await actual flight. In "D-2" Area, final maintenance is accomplished.

b. The guards in "L" Area are furnished by the Air Police while guards in "D-1" and "D-2" will be furnished by the squadron to which the aircraft or aircrafts are assigned. Squadron guards will be required from the time the aircraft leaves "L" Area until classified as confidential. In some incidents, depending upon the time the aircraft returns to the Base, it may be necessary that the aircraft wait in "D-2" Area before having access to "L" Area, which in such an event would require squadron guards. Guards will be briefed as per paragraph 3c below.

c. A SAC maneuver picture pass or visitor's pass, which will have stamped on the front of it one letter or a combination of letters "D" and "L" depending on which area or areas the holder will have access, will be used for local missions. Guard personnel utilized in area "D-1" or "D-2" will allow only those personnel with SAC maneuver passes stamped with the letter "D" to have access to the aircraft. The same procedure will be used in "L" area.

d. It is the Squadron Security Officer's responsibility to see that all squadron guards are properly briefed and have an appropriate clearance before they are placed on duty. He will also be responsible that proper reliefs are maintained. Furthermore, he will see that at any time before and after flights proper guards are maintained to insure the security of the Top Secret material within the aircraft. The Air Police Patrol will make periodic checks on all aircraft guards.

e. Prior to a classified mission, the Group Security Officer will obtain necessary SAC maneuver passes from Air Provost Marshal's office for issue to the pertinent personnel within his group. Upon completion of the mission, passes will be collected and returned to office of Air Provost Marshal for safekeeping.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O. CASON
WOJG USAF
Asst Adjutant

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus 50 cys for APM

RESTRICTED

Memo
205-7
3 Pages
Page 1

MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 205-7)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

14 June 1950

SECURITY

Security Measures for "Restricted Data"

(This Memo supersedes 7th Bomb Wg, H, Memo 205-7, 12 Sept 1949)

1. PURPOSE: To establish a standard procedure for the handling of all incoming and outgoing "Restricted Data" documents, writings, sketches, plans, items, notes or information, originating on or received by this base.

2. PROCEDURE:

a. Under the provisions of Eighth AF Reg 205-1, one (1) officer will be appointed as Restricted Data Control Officer. The Control Officer is the custodian and responsible property officer for all "Restricted Data" wherever located within the 7th Bombardment Wing.

b. Within the absolute minimum necessary, the Wing Commander may approve the designation of other officers to act as assistants to the Control Officer, or to replace him during periods of temporary absence.

c. All documents containing "Restricted Data" will be inclosed in double-sealed envelopes for transmission and will be covered by a receipt, WD AGO Form 996. The inner envelope only, in addition to being stamped with the appropriate military classification, will contain a statement on the face thereof indicating that it contains "Restricted Data" Type "A" or "B." The inner envelope will be either addressed to an individual by name (known to be properly cleared), staff, or to an organization.

d. Incoming Documents:

(1) Care will be exercised to see that received documents are intended for the 7th Bomb Wing and not for Headquarters Eighth Air Force.

(2) All Restricted Data documents which are couriered to this base during duty hours will be received by the Restricted Data Control Officer or an Assistant Restricted Data Control Officer for proper processing and logging.

RESTRICTED

(a) Documents known to be Top Secret Restricted Data Type "A" or "B" delivered after duty hours will be held by the Courier until the Control Officer or an Assistant Control Officer has been notified.

(b) The Officer of the Day will open the outer envelope of documents whose classification is unknown to the Courier.

1. If the inner envelope is marked "Secret" or "Confidential" Restricted Data Type "B", it will be opened by the Officer of the Day and the urgency of the contents ascertained. If urgent, the Control Officer or an Assistant Control Officer will be immediately notified. If the contents are not urgent, the document will be retained by the Officer of the Day until the following morning when he will notify the Control Officer or Assistant Control Officer.
2. If the inner envelop is marked "Secret" or "Confidential" Restricted Data Type "A" or if the Type is not posted then the inner envelope will not be opened and the Officer of the Day will notify immediately the Control Officer or Assistant Control Officer.

(3) Documents which are received by registered mail by an organization will follow the procedure outlined below:

(a) If the inner envelope of the document is addressed to an individual by name, the document may be receipted for and read by that individual and as soon thereafter as practicable, turned over to the Control Officer or his authorized assistant for processing and logging.

(b) Documents addressed to a title, organization, or section will be processed in the following manner: As soon as the outer envelope has been removed and the document determined to be "Restricted Data," the Control Officer or his authorized assistant, will be contacted and the document turned over to him, the inner envelope being unopened. The Control Officer will process and log subject document. He will then determine for when it is intended and will then ascertain whether the individual is qualified to receive this information. The document will be turned over to this individual or to an authorized representative who is properly cleared to receive the information.

c. Outgoing Documents:

(1) All outgoing documents will be coordinated as outlined by Eighth Air Force Reg 205-1. When addressing the inner envelope to an individual by name, it shall be the responsibility of the originating officer to see that the individual for whom it is addressed is cleared to receive the information.

(2) All outgoing documents will be processed through the Control Officer or his authorized assistant for proper marking and processing before being forwarded from this base or being carried to Headquarters Eighth Air Force.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

OFFICIAL:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

HUGH O. CASON
WOJG USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus 50 cys to AFH

MEMORANDUM) HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY

NUMBER 205-10) CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

14 JUNE 1950

SECURITY

Passes for Training Maneuvers
(This Memo supersedes 7th Bomb Wing, H, Memo 205-10, 7 Apr 50)

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to establish a uniform procedure for the control of all personnel having access to the maneuver areas.

2. TYPES AND SCOPE OF PASSES:

a. Restricted area identification cards will be of two (2) types:

(1) Blue Card (SAC Form 125-8-1): Personnel authorized this card are those whose duties require access to Restricted Data Type "A" material or information.

(a) Issuance Criteria: This card will be issued only to those individuals who possess - either an Interim "H," "H," Emergency "Q," or "Q" type Atomic Energy Clearance.

(2) Gold Card (SAC Form 125-8-2): Personnel authorized this card are those whose duties require their presence in areas listed in paragraph 3d, below, at all times, except when Type "A" Restricted Data is present. This card does not grant access to Type "A" Restricted Data information and material.

(a) Issuance Criteria: This card will be issued only in accordance with AFR 205-6 and SAC Regulation 205-2, i.e., to personnel required to participate in the maneuver, who have been granted a LSC and initiated a DA AGO Form 6434, and personnel who possess either a PUT Clearance or Crypto Clearance.

3. JOINT TRAINING MANEUVERS:

a. The Strategic Air Command Identification Card will be the standard pass for joint maneuvers between the Strategic Air Command and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and will be used by all personnel participating in same. The Air Provost Marshal is responsible for the completion and issuing of passes to personnel involved. Passes will include photo, name, serial number, and individual description. The Restricted Areas in which the individual is authorized to work or visit will be stamped with the area letter symbol in the space provided on the front of the pass. Individuals will wear passes on display at all times while in the maneuver areas.

b. The Task Force Commander at the maneuver area will be notified in advance of the arrival of visitors and observers. Information will be forwarded by the Wing Provost Marshal prior to arrival of the individual and will include name, rank, serial number, type of clearance, and phases of the maneuver to which the visitor or observer may have access. The security classification assigned to such information will be determined by the Wing Provost Marshal. Under no circumstances will this information be sent by any section or organization other than the Wing Provost Marshal.

c. Authorized Observer Personnel arriving at maneuver area without the picture identification pass will be issued a block number pass for the restricted area to be visited. It will have the area authorized stamped on it and will be signed by the Wing Provost Marshal. In the square marked "photo" will appear in typewritten letters the words "Visitor Pass" and the local number of the pass. Each wearer will have in his possession a Strategic Air Command Form 125-8-3, AGO Identification Card, issued by the Wing Provost Marshal. On this card will appear the pass number corresponding to the badge being worn by the visitor. The card will have the man's name, rank, serial number, signature and areas authorized to enter and will be signed by the Wing Provost Marshal. All SAC badges will be worn externally and clearly visible to all guards. At the completion of the mission, they will be returned along with Strategic Air Command Form 125-8-3 to the Wing Provost Marshal's office.

d. Restricted areas for maneuvers will be identified by the following letter symbols. These symbols are to be standard for all maneuvers regardless of the location or type of area involved.

(1) Assembly building, area - - - - - - - - - - - - A

(2) Loading area - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - L

RESTRICTED

(3) Storage of units - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - S

(4) Technical equipment supply - - - - - - - - - T

(5) Dispersal area - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - D

(6) Personnel authorized to visit all the above-listed areas will be issued a pass with the letters "AA."

c. Access Lists: It is necessary that special access lists be prepared for the Assembly Building area and technical equipment supply area. These access lists shall be as the name implies, a list of authorized personnel who may enter each of these areas. This access list will be controlled by the Wing Provost Marshal's office and will be an additional check to the normal system to see that only authorized personnel enter those areas.

(1) Bomb Commanders and Weaponeers will have the letters "AA" on their pass. The names of all Bomb Commanders and Weaponeers actively engaged in the operation will appear on the access lists.

(2) Armament personnel will have the letters "DL."

(3) Special Ordnance personnel (personnel working with ordnance A-4 in loading operations) will have "DLTS" placed on their passes and will be included on the Access List for technical equipment supply area.

(4) Crew Chiefs, Hangar Chiefs, and Line Chiefs will have the letters "DL" on their passes. They will be responsible for spotting the aircraft for loading and unloading purposes.

(5) All crew personnel will have the letters "DL" on their pass.

(6) All maintenance personnel will have the letters "DL" on their pass.

(7) All guards will have the letters "AA" on their pass but will not appear on the access lists.

(8) The fire fighters and ambulance personnel need not be issued passes. They will be utilized in places where their presence is necessary. They will receive special instructions from the Wing Provost Marshal and will not appear on any access lists.

f. Preparation and Issuance of Passes:

(1) Passes will be prepared in accordance with SAC Regulation 125-8. Unit Security Officers are responsible to see that all personnel who are required to participate in the maneuvers are instructed to have AGO type pictures made at the Base Photo Laboratory and to sign the required pass in the Office of the Air Provost Marshal.

(2) Prior to a Training Maneuver, the Tactical Group Security Officers will obtain completed SAC Maneuver passes from the Office of the Air Provost Marshal for issuance to the pertinent personnel within their respective groups. For personnel in non-tactical groups and squadrons, completed SAC maneuver passes will be issued by the Air Provost Marshal to Section Heads or individual persons depending upon need.

4. CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN JOINT TRAINING MANEUVERS AT OTHER BASES:

a. Crew members and other personnel from this headquarters participating in Training Maneuvers at other bases will obtain their SAC maneuver passes from the office of the Air Provost Marshal prior to departing Carswell Air Force Base.

b. In certain instances, in addition to having a SAC Maneuver Pass, a roster of crew members, loading crews, etc., will be furnished the Base Commanders concerned by the Air Provost Marshal.

c. Group Security Officers will be responsible for accomplishment of paragraph a, above, plus furnishing the Wing Air Provost Marshal the necessary roster for notification purposes in compliance with paragraph b, above.

5. LOCAL TRAINING MANEUVERS:

a. The pass system as set forth in SAC Regulation 125-8 will be utilized for all Local Training Maneuvers at Carswell Air Force Base.

b. Policies for control of all personnel having access to the maneuver areas and classified aircraft during Local Training Maneuvers are set forth in 7th Bomb Wing, H, Memorandum 205-2.

6. LOSS OR THEFT OF MANEUVER PASSES:

a. Upon determining that a pass has been lost or stolen, a report will be made to the Maneuver Security Officer at the Maneuver Site, or to the Air Provost Marshal at Carswell Air Force Base, either in person

or by telephone. The Maneuver Security Officer or Provost Marshal will, in turn, notify the Strategic Air Command immediately with information copy to Headquarters, Eighth Air Force. (Ref: SAC Reg 125-8).

b. A complete investigation of the loss or theft of the pass(es) will be conducted by the Unit Security Officer on all passes lost or stolen on Carswell Air Force Base and by the Maneuver Security Officer for those personnel under his jurisdiction at other bases. A report will be forwarded to the Air Provost Marshal, this headquarters, within seven (7) days of the incident, and will include:

(1) Loser's name, rank, SSN and organization.

(2) Officer's or airman's duty assignment in conjunction with the maneuver.

(3) Complete report surrounding loss or theft of pass to include dates, where occurred, how being carried, and other detailed information.

(4) What action was taken to recover the pass.

(5) A signed statement to be attached, made by the individual who lost the pass.

c. Upon receiving the Report of Investigation, a completed report will be forwarded to the Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, with an information copy to the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, ATTN: Provost Marshal.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O. CLSON
WOJG USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus
50 cys for APM

Office of the Inspector General

6 June 1950

[redacted]: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission, the Inspector General is specifically charged with the directing of the activities of:

Air Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

Air Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

[redacted]: Inspector General's Office.

Routine quarterly inspections were completed on the 7th Maintenance and Supply Group and the 7th Air Base Group.

The Wing Inspector General was designated by the Commanding General to assume responsibility for effecting the reorganization of specialized aircraft maintenance program in accordance with AAF General Order No. 25, dated 15 May 1950. Conferences were held with all concerned personnel to establish plans required to effect the reorganization. The 4010th Organizational Maintenance Squadron and the 4014 Organizational Maintenance

Squadron were activated with one Officer and one Airman on 24 May 1950, in accordance with the SAC General Order. Due to this Wing being reinforced, a proposed reorganization which is not in exact conformance with the requirements as established by Strategic Air Command was prepared for the Commanding General for presentation to the Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, for approval. The difference in the proposed plan and the plan as specified by SAC, was the assignment of periodic maintenance personnel from both tactical groups to the 4711th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, and the utilization of the 4711th Organizational Maintenance Squadron as an Electronics, Armament, and related specialty squadron. The 7th Bomb Wing proposed reorganization results in:

1. Reduction in the number of personnel that would have been assigned to the field maintenance squadron in the interest of efficient personnel and administration.

2. Provides a specialized Electronics Squadron consisting of Electronics, Armament, and related specialists.

3. Provides a majority of the personnel in the Wing with an assignment to the squadron responsible for their utilization, administration, and welfare.

Further action on this reorganization is pending approval from SAC.

~~Confidential~~: T Sgt. Byron R. Bilton was placed on Special Duty with the Eighth Air Force Inspector General's Office for the purpose of assisting in the accomplishment of the annual general inspection of Dargstrom Air Force Base from 8 to 12 May 1950.

2Lt Kenneth R. Bruner received his orders transferring him to the Far Eastern Air Force, departure date in June 1950.

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[redacted]: (Continued)

Authorized: 9 T/Sgt 8 Sgt Total 17

Assigned: 1 May 1950 - 18
31 May 1950 - 18

Overage: 1 Air Inspector ([illegible]) [illegible] 2121. (Not authorized but considered essential)

Shortage: None

Gains: None

Losses: None

[redacted]: Mr. Burl H. Robins (Civilian), Headquarters Strategic Air Command, on 5 May 1950. Purpose of visit: To facilitate contract of Hydrant Refueling System.

Capt. Erwin A. Hemmert, 1st Lt. Louis E. Campbell, and T Sgt. Richard P. Mueller, Headquarters 1803d AACS Gp, Kelly AFB, Texas, on 17 May 1950. Purpose of visit: Annual Air Inspection.

F. O. BROWN
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1541

JAG/11

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Air Provost Marshal
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

6 June 1950

MONTHLY REPORT

AIR PROVOST MARSHAL

Personnel:

Major Joseph W. Parks, Jr., Air Provost Marshal

1st Lt. John H. Minor, Assistant Air Provost Marshal

T/Sgt James E. Garrison, Provost Sergeant

T/Sgt Chas. H. Borgiler, Assistant Provost Sergeant

Sgt John C. Cleary, Chief Clerk, Security

Cpl Clyde D. Dixon, Atomic Energy Commission Clearances, Security

Cpl Eldon L. Mudd, Files, Security

Cpl Thomas G. Roberts, 405, Clerk-Typist, Security

Cpl Harry P. Lewis, 055, File Clerk, Security

Miss Cora Lee Lightfoot, Civilian Stenographer

Lt. John H. Minor was granted ordinary leave of absence for fifteen (15) days, effective on or about 26 May 1950.1/

Miss Cora Lee Lightfoot was granted a leave of absence, 11 May through 26 May 1950.

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION:

The following 7th Bomb Wing, Heavy, regulations were written by the Air Provost Marshal and Assistant Air Provost Marshal:

Special Orders 116,10May50.1/

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION, continued

Passes for Identification and Control of Military Personnel, Dependents, and Civilian Employees, Reg 205-2, dated 9 May 50.2/

Firearms - Knives (Non-governmental), Reg 205-64, dated 15 May 50.3/ (Amending Reg 205-6, dated 4 Apr 50).

Monthly Report of Cleared Personnel, Reg 205-16, dated 16 May 50.4/

Security Measures for Transient Officer Couriers, Memo 205-11, 22May50.5/

The following appeared in the Seamaster on "Traffic Court Doings":

"As a result of the traffic prevention campaign being carried on by the Base Provost Marshal's office, accidents at this station have been brought to the point where only one airman appeared before the traffic court last week.

"This airman failed to heed a stop sign at an intersection on the Base. As a result his car smashed into the side of another vehicle, causing serious damage. It was also found out in the investigation that the airman's car was illegally registered on the Base.

"In addition to paying for all damages, this unhappy airman will face a 14-day restriction when he properly registers his auto.

"Those stop signs at street intersections are for a purpose. Take an extra minute and stop; it will save you a lot of trouble and keep you out of the Traffic Court."

The following pertinent notices were placed in the "Daily Bulletin":

"TOPOGRAPHIC SURVEY: In order to accomplish a topographic survey, there will be no parking allowed on 2d Street between F and G Streets and in the Photo Lab Parking lot from 0600 hours until 1300 hours, 19 May 50."

2/, 3/, 4/, 5/

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ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION, continued

"IV - SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION:

"Classified correspondence indicates that numerous classifying officers are not complying with the requirements established by paragraph 20c of AFR 205-1 dated 14 March 1949, subject: Security, Safeguarding Military Information. Attention of all concerned is invited to the fact that all Top Secret and Secret matter will show the authority for the classification, the initials of the classifying officer, and the date the classification is affixed."

"V - [illegible] ARMED FORCES DAY:

"During the Armed Forces Day activities scheduled from 1300 hours through 1700 hours, 20 May 50, all registered vehicles will enter the base via the North or Main Gates only and will utilize regular base parking facilities.

"Guests and/or dependents of military personnel who intend to utilize Base Club facilities at the termination of the Armed Forces Day activities will be required to have a guest pass for non-registered vehicles. These passes may be obtained from the Squadron Orderly Rooms. These passes should be placed in the left hand lower corner of the windshield. Vehicles with guest passes will be required to park in the designated visitors parking area during the program, but will be allowed to operate on the basestreets as under normal conditions when the activities are terminated. At the termination of the activities, all vehicles without base stickers, visitor passes or guest passes will be directed from the base. It is the responsibility of all concerned to obtain these guest passes prior to 1100 hours, 20 May 50, as no visitor passes will be issued for this purpose."

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1545 - Historical Report 6 June 1950

AIR PROVOST AND SECURITY, continued

"It has come to the attention of this headquarters that personnel, both civilian and military, are walking through the housing area going to and from their place of duty and in some cases, walking across the yards. Foot traffic through the housing area will be confined to the base streets only. Any one observing a non-compliance will report the name of the violator to the Air Police. (This will be brought to the attention of all concerned)."

During the month of May 1950, thirty-five (35) Atomic Energy Clearances were requested; forty-two (42) Interim "S" Clearances were granted, and twenty-eight (28) "S" Type Atomic Energy Clearances were granted. There were no Positions of Unusual Trust Clearances requested and ten (10) Positions of Unusual Trust Clearances were granted. There were no Crypto Clearances requested and no Crypto Clearances granted.

Total number of persons transferred or discharged from this base with clearances was fifty-six (56).

Seven (7) clearances were reactivated in May.

JOSEPH M. PARKS, JR.
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

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HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, H
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

SPECIAL ORDER)
:
NUMBER 116)

19 May 50

EXTRACT

24. 1st Lt JOHN H MINOR 17415A, Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg, H this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is granted ordinary Lv of Abs for fifteen (15) days off o/a 26 May 50.

*** *** *** ***

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. DUTLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

Hugh O. Cason /s/
HUGH O. CASON
WOJG, USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "F" plus 3 cy Hq USAF, Wash D.C. ATTN: Director of Personnel Div for ea O trfd PCS PCA.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY: Joseph Parks Jr.
JOSEPH W. PARKS, JR.
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

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2 Pages
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REGULATION)
NUMBER 205-2)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

9 May 1950

SECURITY

Passes for Identification and Control of Military Personnel, Dependents, and Civilian Employees

1. PURPOSE: To establish a uniform procedure for the issue of identification cards to military personnel, dependents of military personnel, and civilian employees which will permit entrance to Carswell Air Force Base and authorized activities.

2. SCOPE: The provisions of this regulation are applicable to all personnel and organizations on Carswell Air Force Base.

3. REFERENCE: AF Reg 67-33, AF Reg 125-5, AF Reg 205-1, and TM 26-405, AR 210-390, AR 30-2290, and S.C Reg 125-6.

4. RESPONSIBILITY: The Air Provost Marshal will exercise staff supervision of the provisions set forth in this regulation. The Air Police Squadron Commander will be responsible for the enforcement of the provisions set forth in this regulation. All identification cards and passes will be issued by the Identification and Registration Section of the Air Police, except those listed under paragraphs c, h, i, j, k, and l below.

5. GENERAL: The following passes will be issued in accordance with existing instructions:

a. Identification and Privilege Card (yellow), 7th Bomb Wing, H, Form 205-11, will be issued to all civilian employees on Carswell Air Force Base (Post Exchange, Clubs, and Civil Service).

b. Identification and Privilege Card (green), 7th Bomb Wing, H, Form 205-11, will be issued to all military personnel on Carswell Air Force Base, dependents of military personnel on active duty, all retired military personnel and their dependents, members of the active and inactive Reserve, and members of military services of other countries who are stationed at Carswell Air Force Base.

c. WD AGO Form 65, Officers' Identification Card.

d. Visitor passes

e. Vehicle Registration Pass (Windshield decal) and Temporary Vehicle Registration Pass.

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R E S T R I C T E D

f. 7th Bomb Wing, H, Form 125-6, Temporary Pass

g. Picture Badge for Civilian Technician

h. WD AGO Form 8, Soldier's Permanent Pass - Class A

i. Restricted Area Identification Cards (SAC Form 125-8-1, 125-8-2, and 125-8-3).

j. Consolidated-Vultee Identification Badge.

k. 7th Bomb Wing, H, Form 205-1 and 205-14.

l. 8th Air Force-Carswell Air Force Base Restricted Area Identification Card.

All personnel who possess valid passes which permit entrance to Carswell Air Force Base are permitted to have "visitors" accompany them on this station, except in restricted areas, and they will be held responsible for the conduct and actions of visitors while on this installation. They will personally accompany the visitors at all times while on this station.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O. GIBSON
WOJG, USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus 50 cys for APR

R E S T R I C T E D

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1 Page
Page 1

REGULATION)
NUMBER 205-6A)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

15 May 1950

SECURITY

Firearms - Knives (Non-governmental)

7th Bomb Wg, H, Reg 205-6, 4 Apr 50, is amended as follows:

* * *

3. PROCEDURE:

* * *

d. The firing of personally-owned firearms within the limits of Carswell Air Force Base is prohibited except on approved ranges when authorized by the Range Officer. Proper supervisory personnel must be present at all times when the range is in operation.

* * *

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O. GIBSON
TOJG, USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION "A"
Plus 50 cys to APE

REGULATION)
NUMBER 205-16)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

16 May 1950

SECURITY

Monthly Report of Cleared Personnel

1. PURPOSE: This regulation provides a method of reporting the clearance status of military personnel and civil service employees to include transfer and discharge of all airmen and civil service employees possessing clearance higher than a Local Security Clearance.

2. SCOPE: Further reference to cleared personnel, within the scope of this regulation, will pertain only to personnel possessing a clearance of a type higher than a Local Security Clearance. This report will constitute an accurate accounting each month of the total number of cleared personnel within each group of the 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, those attached squadrons or units this headquarters, and civil service employees this headquarters. The report will further reflect the following:

a. Offbase transfer of cleared airmen

b. Inter-group transfer of cleared airmen

c. Discharged airmen with clearances

d. Reenlistments

3. RESPONSIBILITY: It will be the responsibility of the commanding officer of each group of the 7th Bomb Wing, H, the commanding officers of attached squadrons or units of this headquarters, and the Director of Civilian Personnel to accomplish this report monthly on 7th Bomb Wing, H, Form 205-8 (15Apr50) and Form 205-9 (26Apr50), (sample copies attached).

4. AS OF DATE AND SUBMISSION: The report will be prepared as of 2400 hours on 15th of each month. The report will be submitted NLT 1200 hours on 20th of each month to the Air Provost Marshal.

5. AUTHORITY: SAC Manual 15-35-1.

6. SUPPLY OF FORMS: Blank forms will be requisitioned from Wing Publications under titles:

Monthly Report of Transferred & Discharged Personnel with Clearances,
7th Bomb Wing, H, Form 205-8 (15Apr50)

Monthly Report of Cleared Personnel,
7th Bomb Wing, H, Form 205-9(26Apr50)

7. CLASSIFICATION: 7th Bomb Wing, H, Form 205-9 (26Apr50), subject: "Monthly Report of Cleared Personnel," will be stamped "Restricted" when entries are made thereon.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O. CAMSON
WOJG USAF
Asst Adjutant

2 Attachments
1. 7th Bomb Wg, H, Form 205-8(15Apr50)
2. 7th Bomb Wg, H, Form 205-9(26Apr50)

DISTRIBUTION: "A", plus 50 cys for APM

SUBJECT: Monthly Report of Transferred and Discharged Personnel with Clearances

Name	Rank	AFSN	Disposition	Type of Clearance					
				"A"	"A"	IC	PUT	Crypto	SUB
OFF BASE TRANSFERS			WHERE TRANSFERED AND PAR, SO, AND DATE OF TRANSFER						
LOCAL TRANSFERS			ORGANIZATION OR GROUP TRANSFERED TO						
DISCHARGES			PAR, SO AND DATE OF DISCHARGE						
REENLISTED TO FILL OWN VACANCY OR OTHERWISE			ORGANIZATION REENLISTED FOR, OTHER THAN TO FILL OWN VACANCY						

7th Bomb Wg. [illegible] Form 205-8 (15 Apr 50)

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SUBJECT: Monthly Report of Cleared Personnel

	DATE	
	OFFICERS	ALL
AEC "L" GRANTED		
AEC INTERIM "L" GRANTED		
AEC SUBMITTED		
PUT GRANTED		
PUT SUBMITTED		
CRYPTO GRANTED		
CRYPTO SUBMITTED		

CLEARANCE STATUS OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL*

AEC "L" GRANTED	
AEC INTERIM "L" GRANTED	
AEC SUBMITTED	
PUT GRANTED	
PUT SUBMITTED	
CRYPTO GRANTED	
CRYPTO SUBMITTED	

* TO BE UTILIZED BY DIRECTOR OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL:

7th Bomb Wg, H, Form 205-9(26Apr50)

R E S T R I C T E D

Memo
205-11
Pages
Page 1

MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 205-11)

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

22 May 1950

SECURITY

Security Measures for Transient Officer Couriers

1. PURPOSE: To establish a standard procedure for providing security of classified material for transient officer couriers of Top Secret material.

2. AUTHORITY: Letter SAC 380 (14 Apr 50), subject: "Security of Classified Material in the Hands of Transient Officer Couriers While at SAC Bases."

3. RESPONSIBILITY: It will be the responsibility of the Wing Adjutant and the Officer of the Day to insure that the provisions of this directive are adhered to.

4. PROCEDURE: Transient Officer Couriers requesting facilities for proper storage of classified material will be directed by the Base Operations Officer or Airdrome Officer on duty to report to the Office of the Wing Adjutant.

a. Normal duty hours: The Wing Adjutant will contact the Top Secret Control Officer or one of his assistants and request that he receive and provide for suitable storage of the classified material in accordance with AFR 205-1.

b. Off Duty Hours: The Officer of the Day will contact the Top Secret Control Officer or one of his assistants and request that one of the Control Officers report to the Office of the Wing Adjutant for the purpose of receiving and providing storage facilities for the classified material.

5. ROSTER OF TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICERS: The Wing Adjutant will be responsible for furnishing the Officer of the Day with an up-to-date roster of the Top Secret Control Officer and his assistants.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH C. CLASON
CJG USAF
Asst Adjutant

R E S T R I C T E D

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus 50 cys to APM

1555

[illegible]:

Inspections during April revealed that flying time increased considerably over the preceding three months. At the same time the amount of flying increased, the Ground School Classes for combat crews increased to a new high. This increase in the Ground School, combined with increased flying, tended to disrupt or work against "Crew Integrity". During a three month period, our lead crews averaged only two flights flying as a complete crew. The rest of the time there was usually a substitute crew member being used to replace a regular crew member who was in some sort of school.

The OJT Program was found to be improving steadily on the base, but with the Conversion Board working on reclassifying Airmen into a definite career field, the amount of OJT should start decreasing soon.

[illegible]:

Preparations were made for the revision of Technical Order requirements of the base with submission date planned for 10 May 1950.

PERSONNEL: Authorized: 9 T/OGE 8 TDA Total 17

Assigned: 1 April 1950 - 17
30 April 1950 - 18

Overage: 1 Air Inspector (P & A), [illegible] 2121. (Not authorized but considered essential)

Shortage: None

Gains: Major William R. Kavanaugh
S Sgt John P. Osborn
Mrs Evelyn A. Dennis

Losses: M Sgt Collins A. Patton
Mrs. Joyce Wilson (Transferred overseas)

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[redacted]: [illegible] U. S. Air Force, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, on 4 April 1950. Purpose of visit: To determine whether or not any complaints relative to pay and allowances are on file in the Inspector's Office.

Major Langer, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, on 12 April 1950. Purpose of visit: Checking Mess Schools, security and tests given.

[redacted]
Lt Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1557

Training:

a. Crew integrity is emphasized at all AF levels. At present, the bombing team flies as a complete crew an average of once per quarter. With this in mind as individual training increases, additional emphasis should be placed on standardization, enabling the filling of a bombing team from other crews with the minimum loss of efficiency.

b. Personal Equipment: A definite shortage of personnel to perform required maintenance and account for property exists. As the full complement is received, the acute shortage of personnel for maintenance and periodic inspection, as well as the training program, will be a problem.

Maintenance:

a. Flight line.

(1) The number of discrepancies noted indicates maintenance was being delayed or postponed on aircraft until inspections. This waiver of minor discrepancies causes a back log in docks. The work load is reflected in the number of days aircraft are in docks.

(2) Motorized equipment: The user is not performing the operator's maintenance and the lack of such maintenance, unqualified operators, and lack for operation of equipment is causing a back log in equipment repair unit, and a critical shortage of serviceable equipment.

b. Periodic.

(1) A "booster crew" would reduce man hours consumed by flight line personnel getting aircraft flyable after leaving dock.

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a. The Armament Branch is short maintenance equipment and/or testing equipment. Examples: C-22 power plants, selsyns analyzers, and voltmeters. If this equipment was available in adequate quantities, the overall efficiency would be greatly increased.

b. A large percentage of aircraft are awaiting armament parts. A more vigorous follow-up action should be taken and situations that cannot be corrected locally be reported on supply difficulty letter (See Log 6/-3) in order to expedite replacement of parts.

Other Activities:

a. Morale: Discipline has improved, however, recreation, which was to have been completed early this year, has forced some transient officers to look for accommodations.

b. Squadron administration: Four squadrons were given "Satisfactory" ratings, which is the adjectival rating just above "Unsatisfactory", and reflects the need of improvement in administrative efficiency.

c. Civilian Club: The Civilian Recreation Club was in an unsatisfactory condition at the time of inspection, as it was on the preceding inspection (October 1949). As a result of this inspection, however, a new manager was appointed and sound business procedures have been placed in effect. The interest of the Board of Governors appears stimulated and continued operation is considered justified at the present time. This is a matter of frequent inquiry by this office.

d. Wing Reduction Board correspondence indicates an excessive delay on action on reduction board cases by the Wing Reduction Board, e.g., 7th

1562

1563

Captain R. [illegible]. Vroeland, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, on 16 March 1950. Purpose of Visit: Investigate fire of 42d Bomb Squadron hangar.

Mr. Rex Hopkins and S. F. Stevens, Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, on 28 March 1950. Purpose of visit: Information re line maintenance procedures.

P. J. BROWN
Lt Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

J F/11

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Air Provost Marshal
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

5 April 1950

HISTORICAL REPORT

AIR PROVOST MARSHAL

ORGANIZATION:

Major Joseph W. Parks, Jr., Air Provost Marshal

1st Lt. John T. Minor, Assistant Air Provost Marshal

T/Sgt James A. Garrison, Provost Sergeant

T/Sgt Chas. H. Mortiler, Assistant Provost Sergeant

Cpl Clyde O. Dixon, Atomic Energy Commission Clearances and Acting Chief Clerk, Security

Cpl Aldon E. Haul, Files, Security

Cpl Thomas C. Roberts, AC5, Clerk-Typist, Security

Cpl Harry F. Lewis, TDY Finance Office

Sgt John C. Cleary, Chief Clerk, Security, still confined in Brooks General Hospital, San Antonio

Miss Cora Lee Lightfoot, Civilian Stenographer

1st Lt. John T. Minor, 174154, went on a 15-day leave from 6 to 22 March 1950 as per Hq 7th Bomb Wg, R, SO 53, Par 26, dated 7 March 1950.

Major Joseph W. Parks was appointed chairman of the Publicity Committee of the 7th Bomb Wg, H, for the Mardi gras Festival held at the Officers Club from 5 March 1950 to 11 March 1950.

Excellent report of activities submitted to keep on file.
AIG.

1565

1566

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION, continued

The 24th issue of the Scanner carried the following among sentences issued: "A reason why a certain airman cannot drive his car on the base is this: he was in a line of outbound traffic, the first car stopped, second car stopped, third car (which he was driving) didn't. Result: he received a ticket for careless collision. The traffic court ruled that he is liable for all damages - (his 5-10-5 insurance fortunately takes care of that) - and that he be restricted from driving on the base for 14 days."

The 31st issue of the Scanner cited the following among others: "A Carswell sergeant, driving at night off base at an excessive speed was blinded by oncoming lights. He had been drinking, which didn't help. An accident resulted and the airman was assessed a $50 dollar fine by the traffic court; in addition, he must foot an expensive repair bill for both the other car and his own."

Information from the Air Provost Marshal to civilians and dependents on what to do when an alert is sounded on this base was made available to all by means of the Scanner in the 24 March issue as follows:

"The signal for an "ALERT" on this base is five short blasts on a siren, repeated at ten-second intervals, and continuing for three minutes.

"The "ALL CLEAR" signal is a long blast of the siren, repeated at ten-second intervals, and continuing for three minutes.

"When the "ALERT" is sounded, all civilian employee personnel will remain at, or return to, their place of duty, except when driving a vehicle.

1567

[redacted] - Historical Report

[redacted] 5 April 1950

[redacted]ept when driving a vehicle, all dependents who reside on the base will return to their quarters, and other dependents will take shelter in such buildings as the Officers' Club, NCO Club, Service Club, etc., and remain therein until the "ALL CLEAR" is sounded, or is announced by the Control Officer.

"When driving a vehicle on the base at the time the "ALERT" sounds, all personnel will pull off the road and stop until further instructions are given by the MP Police, or until the "All Clear" is sounded.

"No water will be used for drinking purposes on the base during an Alert until approval has been given by [redacted], or until the "ALL CLEAR" is sounded."

During the ALERT of 17 March 1950, the [redacted] Provost Marshal took over the Headquarters as a command post. In an analysis of the TEST ALERT, Major Parks stressed the necessity of military personnel informing their dependents of correct actions during an ALERT, as well as their being more thoroughly orientated themselves as to their duties. He further stated that while many persons had advance knowledge of this ALERT, in the future no such information would be made available and it would behoove each and every member of this base to be thoroughly informed because, one day, the ALERT might not be just a drill.

The following notice appeared in the Scanner of 31 March 1950:

"[redacted] ATTENTION [redacted] WORD HEARD JAY

"Carpoolers who live in Mineral Wells, Arlington Heights, Ridglea or points west of the Base can get to work quicker and with less traffic

1568

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION, continued

jams if they make use of the new gravel road gate, it was learned from Major Joseph W. Parks, Jr., Wing Provost Marshal. The new gate was designed to relieve the crush of traffic during mornings and evenings, and is open to any registered vehicles from 7 a.m. to 8 a.m. and from 4:30 p.m. to 5:15 p.m. At present some 250 cars are using the gate, according to Major Parks, and another 150 could be easily handled. The gate is reached from the Base by taking the road around the east side of the runway between the motor pool and the brown hangar. It parallels the runway, running into the extension of Roaring Springs Road, which enters White Settlement Road at the traffic circle west of the Main Gate."

During the month of March 1950, 9[illegible] AEC clearances requested and forwarded to Eighth Air Force; 77 Interim "E" clearances granted, and 3 Type "E" clearances were granted while PUT clearances requested were 42 and granted 9, and [illegible] clearances requested [illegible] and granted 2.

JOSEPH W. PARKS, JR.
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

1569

FILE

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, USAFE
Inspector General

13 March 1950

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission the Inspector General is specifically charged with the directing of the activities of:

Air Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

Air Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONS: Inspector General's Office.

The first administrative inspection was conducted on Detachment 24-61, 24th Weather Squadron, Carswell Air Force Base, as requested in letter, Hdqs 24th Weather Squadron, 2103d Air Weather Group, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, subject: "Inspection of Air Weather Service Activities," File 333, 19 January 1950.1/

The initial inspection on compliance with SAC Regulation 121-7, Special Subject for Air Inspectors, Utilization of Trained, Critically Short, Maintenance Personnel, in accordance with letter, SAC, IG, subject:

*Report on SAC Regulation 121-7, 24 February 1950, was commenced with expected completion date of 8 March 1950.2/

The OMT of the 7th Bomb Group Heavy was conducted by the Strategic Air Command OMT Team during the period from 2-23 February 1950. The OMT was observed by a team of inspectors from the 3rd Regional Office, Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force. Team Captain from the 3rd Region Office was Colonel [illegible]. Davis.

PERSONNEL: Major William C. Henfro was assigned to this office to replace Captain Frank D. Jackson as Wing Air Inspector. Captain Jackson will depart, PCS, to St. Johns, Newfoundland, in March 1950.3/

Major Thomas S. Taylor, formerly Wing Supply and Maintenance Inspector, was transferred to Walker Air Force Base, Roswell, New Mexico, and departed this station on 17 February 1950. Reporting date at the new station was 1 March 1950.4/

Strength:

Authorized: 9 T/O&E 8 TDA Total 17

Assigned: 1 February 1950 - 18
28 February 1950 - 18

Overage: 1 Air Inspector (P & A), SSN 2121 (Not authorized but considered essential)

1 Air Inspector (O & T) (Pending departure on PCS)

Shortage: 1 Air Inspector (S & M) (To replace Major Taylor, transferred)

VISITORS: Joseph D. Finnerty and Samuel D. Philips, Keesler Air Force Base, on 20 February 1950. Purpose of visit: Familiarization and indoctrination on APQ 24 line maintenance techniques.

1571

VISITORS: continued

Dacus E. Clark and J. [illegible]. Thibodeaux, Kessler Air Force Base, on 27 February 1950. Purpose of visit: Familiarization and indoctrination on APQ 24 line maintenance techniques.

Captain Harold B. Armer, Hqs, 6th Air Force, on 27 February 1950. Purpose of visit: Photographic Requirements and Radar Scope Photography. No report received.

Captain Raymond F. Fugit, 24th Weather Squadron, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, on 28 February 1950. Purpose of visit: Routine quarterly technical inspection of the Base Weather Section. (Detachment 24-6L, 24th Weather Squadron). No report received.

Captain F. M. Lumsie and Mr. A. [illegible]. Hilera, St. Louis Medical Depot, on 28 February 1950. Purpose of visit: Coordination on medical supply matters.

P. D. [illegible]
Lt Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1572

COPY

CC/L.L/bls

HEADQUARTERS
24TH WEATHER SQUADRON
2103D AIR WEATHER GROUP
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

24 SI 333

19 January 1950

SUBJECT: Inspection of Air Weather Service Activities

TO: Commanding Officer
Carswell Air Force Base, Texas

1. Reference is made to paragraph 11, AFR 123-1, 24 June 1948, requiring Administrative Inspections of subordinate units and activities at least once each three months. In the event that the weather detachment of this organization has not heretofore been inspected by the Air Inspector at your base, it is requested that the activity be included in the future inspection schedule.

2. It is further requested that one (1) copy each of administrative inspections and indorsements thereto be furnished to this headquarters in order that the Squadron Commander may be cognizant of the administrative status and condition of the detachment.

3. This headquarters will continue to conduct quarterly technical inspections of weather detachments.

4. In addition to the above, it is requested that Special Subjects for Inspector General which are applicable to the weather detachment be investigated by the Air Inspector. Currently, AFL 121-31, dated 12 December 1949, is applicable to detachments of this organization.

LOUIS D. LAUBIN
Major, USAF
Commanding

COPY

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H)
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

14 Feb 50

SPECIAL ORDERS)
:
NUMBER 35)

EXTRACT

15. Confirming VOCG 9 Jan 50, FN O & AMN 26th Bomb Sq 11th Bomb Gp (H) this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) are placed on SD w/7th Bomb Wg(H) Specialized Acft Maint Rgn.for an indefinite period eff 9 Jan 50. * Ind eff 28 Jan 50, Confirming VOCG 8 Jan 50. No tvl involved.

NA	MOS	NAME	AFSN
1st Lt	4823	SAMUEL E. BAKER	A0935632
1st Lt	4823	ALEXANDER D'ANGIO	A0872164
OJG	4823	*ROBERT F. SEWARD	AF591589
1st Lt	4823	GILBERT L WEBB	A0876748
Sgt	750F	Bunny Gant	AF14056942
Sgt	826	William C Bailey	AF6903842
Sgt	835	George W Cleary	AF33890773
Sgt	826	Horace M Green	AF18173163
Sgt	821	Aubrey W Richards	AF38550607
Sgt	747D	William D Walker	AF17225488
Sgt	521	William J Dallas	AF20810495
Sgt	686	Lawrence E Krause	AF16219414
Pvt	750F	Irvine M Burks	AF38116970
Pvt	055	Rodney R Williamson	AF18326309
Pfc	835	William M Broach	AF18141450
Pfc	521	Lowell E Thomas	AF13306702
Pfc	594	James N White	AF18321288

16. Par 4 SO 30 this Hq cs pertaining to AMN 7th AP Sq 7th AB Gp this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) placed on DS to Cp Gordon, Ga for the purp of attending Sch Crse #677 is revoked. Eff 8 Feb 50. Auth: 8th AF TWX PDP2C 2013 dtd 7 Feb 50.

17. 1st Lt 1034 EWETT F STEWART A0936604, USAF (Comp USAFR) (Nav on flying status) (YOB 1921) (FSC 59.2) (DROS 6 Feb 50)(AFSS Dec 52) having been reld fr asgd 2349 AF ORD Fort Mason, Calif & asgd this sta per par 1 Ltr Order 65, Hq San Francisco Port Det 2349th AF ORD Fort Mason, Calif dtd 6 Feb 50 is further asgd 7th Bomb Gp. EDCSA: 18 Feb 50. Fifty (50) days delay e/r auth.

18. 1st Lt 1034 GEORGE H THOMAS A02076780, USAF (Comp USAFR) (Nav on flying status)(YOB 1918)(FSC 62.5)(DROS 6 Feb 50)(AFSS Jan 52) having been reld fr asgd 2349th AF ORD Fort Mason, Calif & asgd this sta per par 1 Ltr Order 65, Hq San Francisco Port Det 2349th AF ORD Fort Mason Calif dtd 6 Feb 50 is further asgd 7th Bomb Gp. EDCSA: 18 Feb 50. Forty-five days delay e/r auth.

19. T Sgt Spurgeon G Emanuel AF6571356, Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg(H) this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is placed on Separate rations eff 7 Feb 50. Confirming VOCG 7 Feb 50.

R E S T R I C T E D

1575

R E S T R I C T E D

20. Major 7536 THOMAS E TAYLOR 5609A Br Sv USAF, Comp USAF, Race W, Aero ratin
Pan rated Non flying, Ship MOS 7536, QOS, 104 Mo Comm Sv, 16 FSC, DROS 7 Jul 43,
Expiration of Sv Commitment Indefinite, Status present, Control Br USAF, YOB 1913,
Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg(H).this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is reld fr asgmt thereto
and 509th Bomb Wg Walker AFB, Roswell, N.M. WP O/A 17 Feb 50. Ten days delay e/
ta chargeable as Lv of Abs. Reptg NLT 1 Mar 50. TDN TOT TPA PCA PCS 060-204 P
34-02 03 07 5704500 S 99-999. EDCSA 22 Feb 50. Auth: TWX 8th AF PDP1A 1861 dtd 6
Feb 50 & AFR 35-59 as amended 22 Apr 47. PPP.

21. FN 0 USAF Hq 11th Bomb Gp(H) this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) WP O/A 19 Feb
50 to MacDill AFB, Fla on TDY for approx seven(7) days reptg to CO 307th Bomb Wg
thereat for the purpose of attending or observing Combat Crew Standardization Sch.
TDN TBMAA 067-1550 P 552-02 5704500 S 41-191. Tvl by Military Acft is directed; in
emergencies tvl by commercial acft and/or common carrier auth. This is a crse of
instructions. Govt qrs & messing fac will be utilized to the max extent available.
AR 35-4820 applies. Auth: 1st Ind to Ltr fr 8th AF Subj: Combat Crew Standardiza-
tion School dtd 30 Jan 50 with 2nd Ind by 7th BW dtd 6 Feb 50 & AFR 35-59 as amend
ed 22 Apr 47. Upon compl ret prop sta. Upon ret prop sta vou for pmt of this tour
of TDY will be submitted w/in ten days. FO making pmt for this tour of TDY will
furn BFO this sta cy pd vou.

RANK	MOS	NAME	AFSN
Major	1037	CLYDE J DOONEY	3502A
Major	2161	CARROLL H PAYNE	6056A
Capt	9301	ROBERT L WENIGER	9278A

22. Capt 2136 JAMES M POPPELL 6528A USAF 7th Base Sv Sq 7th Air Base Gp this
sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) WP O/A 22 Feb 50 to Craig AFB, Ala on DS for approx six
(6) wks reptg to the CO thereat for the purpose of attending Academic Instructor
Crse. Reptg date NLT 1500 hours 26 Feb 50. TDN TPA 067-1550 P 552-02 5704500 S 41-
191. Tvl by TPA auth; in emergencies tvl by commercial acft and/or common carrier
auth. This is a crse of instructions. Govt qrs & messing fac will be utilized to
the max extent available. AR 35-4820 applies. Auth: TWX 8th AF PDP1B 2154 dtd 9 Fe
50 & AFR 35-59 as amended 22 Apr 47. Upon compl ret prop sta. Upon ret prop sta vo
for pmt of this tour of TDY will be submitted w/in ten days. FO making pmt for thi
tour of TDY will furn BFO this sta cy pd vou.

23. SMOP 4 SO 5 this Hq cs pertaining to AMN & EM 838th Engr Avn Bn this sta
Grid PCA PCS to CO "C" 838th Engr Avn Bn Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Ariz as perta
to Sgt-3 014 ## Robert O Lewis RA34068679 Co "A" 838th Engr Avn Bn is revoked. Eff
9 Jan 50.

***** **** **** *****

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O CASON
WOJG, USAF
Asst Adj

DISTRIBUTION: "F"

1576

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING(H)
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE
FORT WORTH TEXAS

SPECIAL (NO.38)
:
NUMBER 36)

15 Feb 50

EXTRACT

22. Capt 1037 WILBUR H SNODGRASS AO375185 USAF, Comp USAFR, Nav Bmbdr on flyin status, YOB 1917, 16 FSC, DHOS 15 Apr 48, having reld fr asgd 97th Bomb Wg Biggs AFB, Texas and asgd this sta per Par 2 SO 13 Hq 8th AF Fort Worth, Texas dtd 8 Feb 50 is further asgd 7th Bomb Gp(H). Thirty(30) days delay e/r auth. EDCSA 17 Feb 50.

23. Major 1095 WILLIAM C RENFRO 7239A Hq 11th Bomb Gp(H) this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is reld fr asgmt thereto & asgd Hq & Ha Sq 7th Bomb Wg(H) eff 16 Feb 50. O asgd dy 2166 OJT (Wing Inspector). Pilot on flying status. EDCSA 23 Feb 50.

24. Lt Col ERNEST B MAXWELL 3356A Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg(H) this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is granted seven(7) days lv ef Abs eff O/A 15 Feb 50.

25. Pfc 345 Ralph D Langley AF15416522 Ship MOS 345, QOS, Non-flying, status present, Race W, 4 yr enlistee, DOS 12 Aug 52, YOB 1931, No FSC, 7th Motor Vehicle Sq 7th Maint & Supply Gp this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) is reld fr asgmt & dy ther to & trfd in gr to 3750th Technical Training Gp Sheppard AFB, Wichita Falls, Texas to attend A/P & Eng Mech Crse 74740 for approx twenty-eight(28) weeks commencing 2 Feb 50. AP O/A 24 Feb 50. No delay e/r auth. TDN TOT PCS PCS 060-205 P 535-02 03 C 5704500 S 99-999. TO this sta will determine & issue the nec meal tickets & trans for compl of this tvl. EDCSA 25 Feb 50. Reptg date NLT 25 Feb 50. SAC Funding Seri No P-2-321. Auth: SAC Form 50-18 dtd 14 Dec 49 Tng fer month of Feb 50 & AFR 35-59 as amended 22 Apr 47. PPP.

26. SWOP 5 SO 35 this Hq cs pertaining to Pfc 677 LeRoy Williams AF33991534 Hq 7th Maint & Supply Gp trfd to 7th Air Base Gp as reads:"7th Supply Sq 7th Maint & Supply Gp" is amended to read:"Hq 7th Maint & Supply Gp". Eff 14 Feb 50.

27. Confirming VOCG 13 Feb 50 PN O & AMN Orgns ind this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) NP 13 Feb 50 to San Antonio, Texas on TDY for one(1) day reptg to the Special Services O thereat for the purpose of participating in Basketball Games. TDN best means available at no expense to the Govt. Govt qrs & messing fac are available. Auth: TWX 8th AF PDS1 353.8 dtd 6 Dec 49. Upon compl ret prop sta.

RANK	NAME	AFSN	ORGN
1st Lt	ROBERT L DOBBS	17456A	Hq & Hq Sq 7th Air Base Gp
S/Sgt	Stanley R Stewart	AF36483178	do
T/Sgt	Jasper I Kirk	AF6277441	do
Cpl	Evert D St Clair	AF15345575	7th Supply Sq 7th M & S Gp
Cpl	Bruce L Presnell	AF14297783	Hq & Hq Sq 7th Air Base Gp
Pfc	Percy C Rudison	AF17267800	7th Comm Sq 7th Air Base Gp
Pfc	George Henderson	AF15278784	7th Instl Sq 7th Air Base Gp
Pfc	Joseph E Saar	AF13300268	7th Supply Sq 7th M & S Gp
Cpl	Ralph J Kelsay	AF17246288	Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg(H)

-3-

R E S T R I C T E D

28. Lt Col 4010 ROBERT E THACKER 4463A 26th Bomb Sq 11th Bomb Gp(H) this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) AF O/A 19 Feb 50 to XXXXXXXX on TDY for approx twenty-one (21) days rptg to XXXXXX for the purpose of XXXXXXX. TDN TBMAA 067-1550 P 552-02 5704500 S 41-191. Tvl by Military Acft is directed; in emergencies tvl by commercial acft and/or common carrier auth. This is a crse of instructions. Govt qrs & messing fac will be utilized to the max extent available. AR 35-4820 applies. SAC Funding Serial No XXXXX. O to be atchd to XXXXXX for flying tng. O current in minimum flying requirements. Auth: XXXXXX & AFR 35-59 as amended 22 Apr 47. Upon compl ret prop sta. Upon ret prop sta vou for pmt of this tour of TDY will be submitted w/in ten days. FO making pmt for this tour of TDY will furn BFO this sta cy pd vou.

29. SMOP 1 SO 23 as amended this Hq cs pertaining to O & AMN this sta placed on TDY to XXXXXXX as reads:"for approx ten(10) days" is amended to read:"for approx twenty(20) days", is amended to delete FN O:

1st Lt	1024	JAMES D JELLY	A0633655	42nd Bomb Sq 11th Bomb Gp(H)
1st Lt	1028	JOHN P LOKERMOON	A0543344	do

And further amended to add FN O: Eff 31 Jan 50. Due to adm error. Confirming VOCG 1 Feb 50. Exigencies of the Sv precluded issuance of competent orders in adv of tvl

Capt	1024	WILLIAM M CRUMPTON	A01699409	42nd Bomb Sq 11th Bomb Gp(H)

30. SMOP 2 SO 27 this Hq cs pertaining to amendment of SMOP 1 SO 23 this Hq as is amended to delete FN O: Eff 4 Feb 50.

1st Lt	1024	JOSEPH F SLEJKAL	A0689383	436th Bomb Sq 7th Bomb Gp(H)

31. Confirming VOCG 12 Feb 50 Capt 4823 MAX M GILLASPY A0696311 Hq & Hq Sq 7th Bomb Wg(H) this sta Eighth Air Force(SAC) AF 12 Feb 50 to Fairfield-Suisun AFB, Calif on TDY for approx seven(7) days rptg to OC thereat for the purpose of representing 7th Bomb Wg(H) in Tech Matters Pertaining to B-36 Acft. TDN TBMAA 067-1440 P 442-02 5704400 S 41-191. Tvl by Military Acft is directed. CIPAP. Govt qrs & messing fac will be utilized to the max extent available. AR 35-4820 applies. Auth: VOCG 7th BW(H) & AFR 35-59 as amended 22 Apr 47. Upon compl ret prop sta. Upon ret prop sta vou for per diem will be subm itted for pmt w/in ten days. FO making pmt for this tour of TDY will furn BFO this sta cy pd vou. Exigencies of the Sv precluded issuance of competent orders in adv of tvl.

**** *** *** ****

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVING:

JOHN H BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH O CASON
WOJG, USAF
Asst Adj

DISTRIBUTION: "P"

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Inspector General

10 February 1950

MISSION: The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander by keeping him informed as to the state of the command in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security. In the accomplishment of his mission the Inspector General is specifically charged with the directing of the activities of:

Air Inspector who is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.

Air Provost Marshal who is responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS: Inspector General's Office.

A pre-ORT (Operational Readiness Test) was performed on the 7th Bomb Group during the period from 16 - 20 January 1950 inclusive. This ORT was given to assist the 7th Bomb Group Commander in preparing for the ORT to be given by the Strategic Air Command ORT Team during the period from 5 - 15 February 1950. The ORT given by Strategic Air Command (SAC) will be monitored by a team of inspectors from the Third Regional Office, Office of the Inspector General, United States Air Force. A formal written report was not submitted by this office on the pre ORT but each squadron commander and section head

and the Group Commanders were given a critique on irregularities noted during the course of inspection. Inspection notes taken during the inspection were given to concerned section heads for follow-up.

An Ineffective Man-Hour Survey was conducted by this office in accordance with letter, Office of the Inspector General, Headquarters United States Air Force, Third Regional Office, San Antonio, Texas, file IGTR-AI2 200, 13 January 1950. 1/ This survey was conducted on the basis of a 40 hour work week with purpose of determining percentage of total manhours made ineffective through AWOL, leaves, boards, committees, training, etc. 2/.

A new system for preparation of inspection reports has been placed in effect. In the past, each section, i.e., Personnel and Administration, Operations and Training, and Supply and Maintenance, have prepared, processed and forwarded their individual reports as inspections were completed. Under the new system, team type inspections are made and inspection reports from each Section covering the same unit or activity are consolidated and forwarded by cover letter so as to provide the commander receiving the consolidated report an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of his organization(s) as a whole.

PERSONNEL: Captain Frank E. Jackson, Wing Air Inspector and Operations and Training Inspector, received orders transferring him to St. Johns, Newfoundland.

Cpl Elmer Ezell, [illegible] 405, was discharged from the Air Force on 20 January 1950.

1580

Strength:

Authorized: 9 T/OAE 8 TDA Total 17

Assigned: 1 January 1960 - 19
31 January 1960 - 18

The one man overage in this section is the Personnel and Administration Inspector, who is considered essential to the performance of the Inspector General's mission. Recommendation for the inclusion of an Administrative Inspector, SSN 2121, on subsequent T/OAEs has been made and it is anticipated this position will be authorized.

VISITORS: Lt Col Ralph C. Jenkins, Lt Col A. E. Zobell, Lt Col Harry J. Mrachek, M/Sgt H. S. Knowlton - Inspector General Section, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, on 23 January 1960. Purpose of visit: Observation of specialized maintenance program at Carswell Air Force Base in accordance with SAC Regulation 66-12. No report received in this office as yet re this visit.

Lt William C. Rogers, 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, on 10 January 1960. Inspection re ARC-24 Operation and maintenance training program... received suggestions on setting up Q-24 TnG Program from the Electronics Standboard, this base.

P. D. BROWN
Lt Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

1581

COPY

Department of the Air Force
HQ [illegible] UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington

Inspector General, Third Region
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas

IGTR-AI2

13 Jan 1950

SUBJECT: Manpower Utilization Survey

TO: Commanding General
Seventh Bomb Wing
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas
Attention: Inspector General

1. The Inspector General, USAF, has directed that this office conduct a survey of manpower utilization at a representative number of USAF activities located within the Third Region, Inspector General, USAF.

2. Attached hereto are six copies of the form which has been devised for the purpose of this survey. It is requested that this form be completed in quintuplicate based upon the most practicable four-week period which will permit its completion by 1 February 1950.

3. Representatives of this office will contact your headquarters during the course of the ORI of the Seventh Bomb Group, scheduled 1-15 February 1950, for the purpose of discussing these matters and picking up the completed form.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl
Manpower Utilization
Form (sextup)

RAY M. CLARK
Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

Info Cpy to:
The Inspector General, USAF
CG, SAC Offutt AFB, Nebr.
CG, 8th AF, Carswell AFB, Texas

1/

COPY

(Based on previous 4-wk periods)

Inspector General

7th Comb Gp, H (Compiled by) | 7th Comb Wing, H (Command Inspected)

31 Jan 50 (Date)

ACTIVITY	OFFICERS	WACS	AIRMEN	TOTALS
1. Authorized Strength	543	1	3436	3980
2. Average No Pers Assd Daily	686	23	3781	4490
3. Average No Pers Attchd Daily	1	0	16	17
4. Man hrs available per 4-week period represented by lines 2 & 3 based on 40 hr wk	109,920	3680	605,760	719,360
5. Ineffective man hrs per 4-wk period based on 40 hr wk	23,207	654	111,382	135,243
a. TRAINING				
1. Chemical Warfare	176	7	1003	1186
2. Physical Training	1500	45	3500	5045
3. Flying Safety	408	0	849	1257
4. Gnl In Arms	150	5	268	423
5. AF Troop Info Program	1780	60	9628	11,468
6. Ground Safety	80	0	100	180
7. Inspection (Training)	166	7	493	666
8. Drills	5	0	50	55
9. Other Military Training				
10. Airman Indoctrination Program	4	0	291	295
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
b. SPECIAL PROJECTS				
1. AR 615-369 Boards	36	0	14	50
2. A/C Accident Boards	0	0	0	0
3. Flying Evaluation Boards	9	0	0	9
4. Promotion Boards	129	5	95	229
5. Survey Boards	160	0	0	160
6. Unit Fund Council	36	2	14	52
7. Post Exchange Council	5	0	0	5
8. Ground Safety Committee	20	0	0	20
9. Summary Courts	12	0	0	24
10. Inventories	198	53	2112	2363
11. Airman Morale and Welfare Council	1	0	18	19
12. Reduction Boards	15	0	4	19
13. Prisoner Rehabilitation Board	36	0	6	42
14. IG Investigations	150	0	0	150
15. Character Guidance Council	21	0	0	21
16. Central Post Fund Council	18	0	0	18
17. Manpower Board	16	0	0	16
18. PRO Exchange Committee	0	0	9	9
19. Holidays Fund Council	2	0	0	2
20. Suggestions and Awards Committee	1	0	1	2
21.				
22.				
23.				
24.				
c. OTHER USE				
1. Processing	480	0	5360	5840
2. AWOL	10,338	430	37042	47,808
3. Confinement	0	0	2400	2400
4. Confinement	0	0	3184	3184
5. EP	0	0	2338	2338
6. Passes	46	0	8442	8488
Percentage of ineffective man hours to total available man hours	22%			

2/

MANPOWER UTILIZATION - CIVILIAN
(Based on previous 4-wk period)

INSPECTOR GENERAL, 7th BW
(Compiled by)

7th BOMB WING (H)
(Command Inspected)

31 January 1950
(Date)

		AUTHORITY	TOTAL
1. Authorized Strength			345
2. Actual Strength			335
3. Average man hrs per 4-wk period represented by line 2 based on 40-hr wk			53,600
4. Average ineffective man hrs per 4-wk period based on 40-hr wk (total of a, b, & c below)			4,808
a. CIVILIAN TRAINING			
1. Orientation		SAC Reg 40-7	6
2. On-the-Job			0
3. Supervisory			0
4. Efficiency Rating		FPM	1
5. Apprentice Training			0
6. Vehicle Training			0
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
b. SPECIAL PROJECTS			
1. Suggestion Committee		AFM 40-1	3
2. Base Restaurant Council			0
3. Grievance Committee			0
4. Efficiency Rating Committee		FPM	4
5. Employee Relation Council		FM 40-14	1
6. Red Cross, Cancer, X-Ray Seal, etc. Drives		Verbal	1
7. Civilian Training Committee			0
8. Civilian Welfare Fund Council			0
9. Security Lectures		SAC Reg 205-6	12
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
c. OTHERWISE			
1. Annual Leave		AFM 40-1	3,523
2. Sick Leave		AFM 40-1	1,259
3. Leave Without Pay			0
4. Civil Service Examinations		CS Hand BK F-102	4
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
5. Percentage of ineffective man hours to total available man hours			9%

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c.	OTHERWISE (Cont'd)				
	7. Leaves	69¾	40	2800	11,076
	8. Special Duty	50	0	113	1,174
	9. Base Schools	111.2	0	57.00	6,8.2
	10. Sick Leaves	0	0	12	120
	11. Barracks Orderlies	0	0	20	2,000

EXPLANATORY NOTE: Line 5: (a) TRAINING - Includes all types training covered by existing directives, but not included in the assigned mission.

(b) SPECIAL PROJECTS - Includes all Boar's Councils, Committees, Inventories, etc., covered by directives, written or verbal.

(c) OTHERWISE - Includes Processing, Sick Leaves, Passes, AWOLs, Confinement, K.P., etc.

NOTE: Use this or reverse side if additional space is needed

IG FILES 7Feb50

JPP/11

HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
Office of the Air Provost Marshal
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

7 February 1950

HISTORICAL REPORT

AIR PROVOST MARSHAL

ORGANIZATION:

Major Joseph W. Parks, Jr., Air Provost Marshal

1st Lt. John W. Minor, Security Officer and Asst. Provost Marshal

T/Sgt. James E. Garrison, Provost Sergeant

Cpl. Clyde D. Dixon, Atomic Energy Commission Clearances, Security

Pfc. Eldon E. Ward, Files, Security

Miss Cora Lee Lightfoot, Civilian Stenographer, reported for duty in the Provost Marshal's Office on 9 January 1950.

Cpl. Thomas C. Roberts, AF 14286609, returned to duty from the Finance to the Special Security Section on 12 January 1950.

Cpl. Harry P. Lewis, AF 38771125, replaced Cpl. Roberts, temporarily, in the Finance Office effective 12 January 1950.

1st Lt. William J. Snow II, 17038A, was separated from the Service per Par 10, S.O. 11, Department of the Air Force Special Orders dated 17 January 1950. Effective date of discharge 20 January 1950.

Major Joseph W. Parks returned from 30 days' leave of absence on 6 January 1950.

1st Lt. John W. Minor, 17415A, was appointed Assistant Provost Marshal, per Par 46, Special Order 9, this Headquarters, dated 13 January 1950.

1st Lt. John W. Minor was placed on TDY for the purpose of discharge of official duty to Eielson Air Force Base, Fairbanks, Alaska, from 6 January to 14 January 1950, per Par 1, S.O. 1, Hqs., 7th Bomb Wing, dtd 3 Jan 50.

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ORGANIZATION, continued

Sgt. John G. Cleary, Chief Clerk, Security, went to the Post Hospital from duty on 9 January and from the Post Hospital to the Brooks General Hospital, San Antonio, Texas, on 10 January 1950.

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION:

New regulations regarding driving of vehicles on the Ramp were issued in the SCANNER of 13 January and 20 January as follows:

"Personnel at Carswell who have been driving their personal vehicles on the ramp are advised that the red ramp pass, issued under provisions of 7th Bomb Wing Memo 2051 are no long in force.

"It was learned today from Major J. W. Parks, Wing Provost Marshal, that an increased accident rate has made it necessary to cut down the number of non-government vehicles using the ramp area.

"A new decal, to be placed on the windshield of private cars, will be issued beginning the 23rd of January. Only automobiles bearing this decal will be allowed on the ramp, and drivers found on the ramp without the new permit will have their cars barred from the base for thirty days on first offense and permanently for any additional offense.

"To procure the new decal, personnel must put in a letter to the commanding general, 8th Air Force, showing cause why such a permit should be issued."

CORRECTION - appearing in January 20 issue:

"In the story, Unauthorized Cars "Keep Off Ramp" is New Warning, on page one of last week's Scanner, the last paragraph stated: To procure the new decal, personnel must submit a letter to the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, showing cause why such a permit should be

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issued.

"This was in error as permits to enter the ramp area are controlled by the Base, therefore, application for a permit should be made to the Commanding General, 7th Bomb Wing, CAFB."

Memorandum 125-4 dated 19 January 1950 concerning Air Provost Marshal Report of Arrest-Delinquency-Incident was amended and published. 1/

A check list of driving on Carswell Air Force Base was mimeographed and given to the Air Police at each entrance to the Base 2/. This form is to be given to each visitor who enters this Base. In substance this form contains the Do's and Don't's while operating a vehicle on this Base.

The Daily Bulletin for 24 January 1950 carried the following:

"V - PARKING AREAS: No organization or activity will make a reserved parking area or request reserved parking signs until permission has been granted from the Provost Marshal in accordance with 7th Bomb Wing Regulation 125-5, 25 Oct 49."

"IX - MOTORCYCLES AND MOTOR SCOOTERS: Motorcycles and Motor Scooters are governed by existing traffic regulations and will abide by same, i.e., remain in line of traffic, pass on left, etc."

"X - BASE ENTRANCE: Effective 23 January 1950 until further notice, the gate between the Officers' Club and the hospital will be opened for all registered incoming traffic from 0645 to 0815 weekdays. It is recommended that personnel working in the areas easily accessible by the route enter the base through this gate, i.e., personnel working in the hospital, pea

1/ Memo 125-4, 19Jan50

2/ Driving Check List

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patch area, etc., who normally use the North Gate, continue on Meandering Road from the bridge past the North Gate to Hospital Gate. Non-registered vehicles will not use this route."

"XI - PRIVATELY-OWNED VEHICLES: Effective 23 January 1958, privately-owned vehicles will not be operated on the ramp, taxiways or runways under authority of the red or buff ramp passes issued under the provisions of 7th Bomb Wing Memo 205-1. Requests, with justification, for permission to operate privately-owned vehicles in these areas will be directed to the Commanding General, 7th Bomb Wing. A new ramp windshield decal will be issued to all authorized personnel and will replace the aforementioned ramp passes. Traffic tickets will be issued to all violators and a minimum of 30 days restriction of vehicle operation will be the penalty."

The Daily Bulletin for the 25 January 1958 carried the following:

"Paragraph III - ROAD CLOSED: Due to the construction of a bridge over Silver Creek, Meandering Road will be closed sixty days, effective 25 January 1958."

"Paragraph IV - NEW ROADS: The gravel road leading north from the Traffic Circle on Highway 183 to Carswell Air Force Base will be open to incoming registered vehicles between the hours of 0715 to 0800 and to outgoing registered vehicles between the hours of 1640 and 1710. Personnel will be directed as to route by the Air Police and those desiring to use this route will use the road at the southeast corner of the Brown Hangar, Building 1-1330."

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Section IV on "NEW ROAD" carried in the Daily Bulletin of 25 January 1950 was amended as follows:

"NEW ROAD: Section IV, Daily Bulletin, 25 January 1950, is amended to read as follows: The gravel road leading north from the Traffic Circle on Highway 183 to Carswell Air Force Base will be open to incoming registered vehicles between the hours of 0715 to 0800. No Outgoing traffic will use this road." This information was passed on to the Base Personnel through the Daily Bulletin dated 26 January 1950.

On 25 January 1950 Major Joseph W. Parks, Air Provost Marshal, in company with the following delegation, Lt. Col. W. R. Orr, AFO, this Base, Mr. Henry Cook, County Engineer, Judge Gus Brown, County Judge, Commissioner Jim Owens, Precinct No. 3, and Commissioner Bryan Henderson, Precinct No.1, left for Austin, Texas, where they were to meet with the Texas Highway Commission. The Texas Highway Commission Board was composed of the following members: Dewitt Greer, State Highway Engineer, George Garrett, Dept. Highway Engineer, Fred Temple, Chairman, A. F. Mitchell, member of the Board, and Robert J. Potts, member of the Board. The problem discussed was the road leading to the Main Entrance of the Base. Information regarding the condition of the road and the amount of traffic that uses this road during a twelve (12) hour period was presented to the Board for discussion.

Our delegation requested that the State Highway Commission annex the road leading into the Base and make it State Highway 183A. This would

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cause it to be put under the jurisdiction of the State Highway Department. It was brought before the Board that the road should be widened and made into a four-lane road. Also, that this road should be extended across Highway 183 to where it would intersect Roaring Springs Road. Traffic lights and other control methods were discussed for use at these intersections.

During the month of January 1950, thirty six (36) Atomic Energy Clearances were requested and forwarded to the 8th Air Force. Thirty two (32) Interim and twelve (12) "R" Type Atomic Energy Clearances were granted. Twenty four (24) Positions of Unusual Trust Clearances were requested while one (1) Position of Unusual Trust Clearance was granted. There were eight (8) Cryptographic Clearances requested and three (3) Cryptographic Clearances were granted.

JOSEPH W. PARKS, JR.
Major, USAF
Air Provost Marshal

MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 125-4)

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, FORT WORTH, TEXAS

19 January 1950

AIR PROVOST MARSHAL

Report of Arrest-Delinquency-Incident

(This memo supersedes 7th Bomb Wg, H, Memo 125-4, 7 June 49, and Memo 125-4A, 16 Nov 49)

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to bring to the attention of all unit commanders of this base the proper procedure for handling WD AGO Form 19-71, Report of Arrest-Delinquency-Incident.

2. RESPONSIBILITY: It will be the responsibility of the Air Police to initiate and forward WD AGO Forms 19-71. Squadron commanders concerned will be responsible that appropriate disciplinary action is administered. Group commanders concerned will review the completed report and determine that the disciplinary action taken is commensurate with the offense.

3. ROUTING:

a. Personnel on this station: Forms 19-71 will be delivered by messenger direct to the unit commander concerned within 48 hours after incident occurs. Information copies will be forwarded to the Wing Adjutant and the Air Provost Marshal. A reply by indorsement to basic report as to action taken will be forwarded to the Wing Commander. After reports are reviewed by the Wing Commander, they will be forwarded through the Air Provost Marshal to the Air Police Squadron Commander, where they will be filed for a period of one year.

b. Personnel from other stations: Forms 19-71 will be prepared by the Air Police Squadron Commander and delivered by messenger direct to the Air Provost Marshal. A letter of transmittal will be prepared by the Air Provost Marshal, for the Wing Adjutant's signature, addressed to the Base Commander concerned.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IRVINE:

JOHN H. BOYLE
Major, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HUGH C. CASON
WOJG USAF
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus 50 cys to PI

CHECK LIST OF DRIVING ON CARSTENS AIR FORCE BASE

1. Do not exceed posted speed limits:

   a. Twenty-five (25) miles per hour on base streets.

   b. Fifteen (15) miles per hour in housing area and parking lots.

2. Do NOT:

   a. Park within thirty (30) feet from the intersection of two (2) streets.

   b. Park within thirty (30) feet upon the approach of a stop sign.

   c. Park within thirty (30) feet on either side of a "No Parking" sign.

   d. Park within twenty (20) feet on either side of a fire hydrant.

   e. Park within twenty (20) feet of a driveway.

   f. Park within twenty (20) feet of a building.

   g. Park within twenty (20) feet on either side of a "Reserved Parking" sign where parallel parking is required.

   h. Park within five (5) feet on either side of a "Reserved Parking" sign where diagonal parking is required.

   i. Park vehicles facing traffic.

   j. Park on cross walks or cross-souded areas.

   k. Double park.

   l. Drive in Restricted areas.

   m. Make "U" turns.

   n. Pass other vehicles at intersections and on curves and turns.

3. DO:

   a. Report all accidents to the Air Police immediately and allow no one to move vehicles involved until accident has been investigated.

   b. Stop at all stop signs.

   c. Observe and obey all traffic and parking control signs.

   d. Use correct hand signals.

   e. Use parking lots instead of streets for parking whenever possible.

   f. Drive carefully.

   g. Help us keep the base clean.

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K-DIV-19-HI
Feb 1951

HISTORY

19TH AIR DIVISION

FEBRUARY
1951

CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

MICROFILMED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

FEBRUARY 1951

PREPARED

BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - CAPTAIN EDWARD G BUNTER

"the following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the ~~19th~~ Air Division."

C. S. IRVINE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding

1600

PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERSONNEL

The recent reorganization at Carswell Air Force Base, under the new Wing Base Plan 1 /, activated the 19th Air Division Headquarters, per Strategic Air Command, General Order No. 12, dated 6 February 1951. 2 /

Brigadier General C. S. Irvine, is designated as Division Commander, per par 1, SO 34, Headquarters USAF, dated 16 February 1951.

The 19th Air Division Headquarters authorized strength is ten (10) officers and seven (7) airmen. As of 28 February, nine (9) officers, three (3) airmen were assigned and two (2) airmen are performing duty in this headquarters pending assignment orders.

A total of four (4) civilian personnel are assigned to this headquarters.

The total assigned military strength of the 19th Air Division as of 28 February was 6,088, of which 684 were officers, 20 warrant officers, and 5,384 were airmen. The authorized and assigned strength by individual

1 / Revised Combat Wing Organization within SAC, dtd 17 Jan 51

2 / SAC GO, No. 12, dtd 6 Feb 51

units is appended. 3/

The 19th Air Division was short one (1) officer and two (2) airmen as of 28 February 1951.

The following key personnel are assigned to Headquarters 19th Air Division:

Brigadier General C. S. Irvine, Commanding General

Colonel Ernest B. Maxwell, Acting Chief of Staff

Colonel Carl V. Ekstrand, Deputy for Materiel

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Bartlett, Inspector General

Lieutenant Colonel Clyde J. Downey, Staff Observer

Major William C. Harrison, Asst Deputy for Operations

Captain John L. Winkel, Adjutant General

1st Lieutenant William E. Kaake, Aide-de-Camp

ORGANIZATION

Headquarters 19th Air Division is composed of the following sections: Commanding General, Adjutant General, Operations, Materiel, and Inspector General.

Functions: The Office of the Adjutant General will be responsible for screening all incoming and

3/ Chart: Auth and Assigned Strength by Units, Feb 51

RESTRICTED

outgoing correspondence and messages requiring 19th Air Division Headquarters decisions or signature. This office will issue Field and General Orders, and policies of the Commanding General will be disseminated by this section. The Adjutant General is Top Secret Control Officer for the 19th Air Division.

The office of Deputy for Materiel, 19th Air Division was established effective 16 February 1951. Routine staff functions were initiated on 19th of February.

During the month plans were made to formulate suitable functional and organizational policies for aircraft maintenance organizations affected by the activation of the 19th Air Division Headquarters.

The SAC Aircraft Allocation Program is under study by this section with view of submitting a request for a more equitable distribution of aircraft between the 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings.

Members of this command attended an AMC conference during February, relative to K-1 System Steering Committe Actions. The Vacuum Tube improvement program was the

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major subject on the agenda.

The Office of the Inspector General: The activation of the 19th Air Division necessitated a reorganization of the Inspector General Section and certain personnel adjustment in that the two Wing Air Inspectors are presently coordinated under the Air Division Inspector General. At the present time both Wing Air Inspectors and their staffs are utilizing the same facilities and organization.

The Office of Deputy for Operations: The 19th Air Division Operations Section was activated 17 February 1951, with routine staff functions being initiated 19 February.

This section monitors all operations and training of the division. The remainder of February was spent by this section working out new procedures and establishing ways and means of a small staff accomplishing the duties outlined in SAC Reg 20-15, dated 19 January 1951.

It is the opinion of this section that it will

have to be 100 per cent manned in order to accomplish their mission. All minor and routine functions must be eliminated in order that a staff section of this size will be able to function effectively.

Since the primary mission of this section is inspectional and supervisory in nature, their work must must be carried out with a minimum of paper work and filing at division level. Therefore, staff personnel of this section will be required to spend much of their time in the field rather than in the office.

The primary problem of this section at the present is the orienting of the various units in the interpretation of SAC Reg 20-15, as to the administrative capabilities of this section.

ADMINISTRATION

The Air Division structure is a definite change in the usual concept of a Headquarters Command. It is not intended, however, that this fact necessitate the establishment at division level of a staff fully capable of performing for the Division Commander the detailed

tasks of reviewing, analysing, planning, cordinating and implementing required action in any matter that can be effectively handled at a lower level of command. The establishment of such a staff at Division level would largely duplicate the organization already provided at Wing and Air Base Group level specifically for the performance of these detailed functions, and would unquestionably detract from, rather than add to the overall performance of the organization. For example procedures should be established which eliminate (through utilization of these subordinate staffs) the need for the Division Commander even to prepare such indorsements to official correspondence as may require his personal signature. Since the primary mission of this command is combat, and since its tactical capabilities are the basic limiting factors in the performance of this primary mission, his staff organization has been designed to facilitate his devoting more attention to the operational and flying training matters handled by his subordinate units than to the administrative and support

activities.

He will, however, be expected to utilize his entire staff to maximum degree practicable to assist him in providing timely direction, as required, to his subordinate commanders in all matters of major importance, particulary those which affect two or more of his assigned units and are likely to be controversial or competitive in nature.

The functions of the 19th Air Division are as follows:

To correlate the activities of all units assigned.

To provide command supervision and direction of the tactical operations of the combat wings.

Provide command supervision and direction of the tactical training of the combat wings assigned, insuring that the highest standards of quality are attained.

Promote standardization of operating techniques of the combat wings assigned.

Insure that proper emphasis within combat wings is

being placed upon the essential preparations for execution of combat missions assigned.

Advise the numbered Air Force Headquarters concerned as to any action required to improve operational capability of assigned units.

Closely monitor and participate in by means of observer personnel the execution of all simulated combat missions conducted by the combat wings assigned.

APPENDIX

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

PLD 322 17 January 1951

SUBJECT: Revised Combat Wing Organization Within Strategic Air Command

TO: Commanding General
7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

1. Attached for your information and advance planning purposes are:

a. Five copies of Headquarters Strategic Air Command instructions outlining the procedure for accomplishing subject reorganization. (Inclosure 1)

b. Five copies of tentative organizational charts for a one-wing and a two-wing station. (Inclosure 2)

2. Although paragraph 3a, SAC letter DPI1 322 to Headquarters Eighth Air Force, subject as above, dated 10 January 1951, indicates that Carswell Air Force Base has been selected for reorganization as a two-wing station, it has not been included in the list of Strategic Air Command bases for which authorization to establish an Air Division Headquarters has been requested. (Reference paragraph 3, SAC letter DPI1 322 to Headquarters USAF, subject as above, dated 10 January 1951.) Headquarters Strategic Air Command was queried concerning this discrepancy, and they advised that separate action had been taken concerning the reorganization of Carswell Air Force Base. As additional information concerning the reorganization of your station becomes available it will be transmitted to your headquarters.

3. Upon receipt of authorization mentioned in paragraph 3c, SAC letter DPI1 322 to Headquarters Eighth Air Force, subject as above, dated 10 January 1951, orders will be issued by this headquarters directing necessary reorganization.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL OLD:

2 Incls
1. SAC ltr DPI1 322 to Hq 8AF, w/incls, (5 cys)
2. Organizational charts (5 cys)

ELMER M. SWALLOW
WOJG, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

R E S T R I C T E D

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HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE
OMAHA, NEBRASKA

DMI 322 (10 Jan 51)

10 January 1951

SUBJECT: Revised Combat Wing Organization Within Strategic Air Command

TO: See Distribution

1. Attached hereto as Inclosure No. 1, is USAF letter dated 5 January 1951, subject as above, which approves certain actions to be taken by this headquarters.

2. Action required by paragraph 4 of Inclosure No. 1 has been accomplished as indicated in Inclosure No. 2. The Air Division Headquarters referred to in these inclosures will be organized as indicated in Inclosure No. 3.

3. For your information, further implementation of Inclosure No. 1 by this headquarters is scheduled as follows:

a. Pending receipt of authority requested in Inclosure No. 2, necessary TAT's will be prepared to implement the reorganization outlined in Inclosure No. 1. See Inclosure No. 4 for list of TAT's required. A target date of 20 January 1951 has been selected for providing all units concerned with required TAT's. Preparation and distribution of required TAT's will be accomplished in a manner designed to provide stations concerned with necessary documents in the following order of priority:

(1) March (two-wing)
(2) Fairchild (two-wing)
(3) Walker (two-wing)
(4) Hunter (one-wing)
(5) Davis-Monthan (one-wing)
(6) Carswell (two-wing)
(7) Rapid City (one-wing)
(8) Ramey (one-wing)
(9) Travis (two-wing)
(10) Barksdale (two-wing)
(11) Biggs (one-wing)
(12) Castle (one-wing)
(13) MacDill (two-wing)
(14) Bergstrom (one-wing)
(15) Turner (one-wing)

b. Prepare and publish prior to 20 January 1951 a revised Strategic Air Command Regulation 20-15 delineating the functional responsibilities of units under the new organization.

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DNII 322 (10 Jan 51)
Subj: Revised Combat Wing Organization Within S/C

c. Upon receipt of authority requested in Inclosure No. 2, general orders will be issued directing necessary reorganizations. It is anticipated that authority required will be received by Headquarters Strategic Air Command on or before 20 January 1951 and that Strategic Air Command general orders will require organization to be effected 1 February 1951.

d. Prepare specific instructions to be issued prior to 1 February 1951 regarding preparation of new TOE's to support reorganizations required.

4. You will take necessary action to accomplish the following as soon as practicable:

a. Designate a Base Commander for each of your stations and assign the individual so designated as Commanding Officer of the Air Base Group retained as an active organization at each station. In this regard, Inclosure No. 2 indicates the Air Base Group Headquarters that are to be inactivated.

b. Transfer at each of your stations responsibility for performance of the functions listed in paragraph 1a of Inclosure No. 1 from the Wing Headquarters to the retained Air Base Group Headquarters.

c. Prepare to implement remaining actions specified in paragraph 1 of Inclosure No. 1 as rapidly as possible upon receipt of necessary authority from this Headquarters.

5. The foregoing is furnished for your information and advance planning and to obviate the necessity for individual queries. As additional information becomes available it will be transmitted to your headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

/s/ A. W. Kissner
/t/ A. W. KISSNER
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

4 Incls
1. DSP ltr, subj as above, dtd 5 Jan 51
2. S/C ltr, subj as above, dtd 10 Jan 51
3. Air Division Org and Functions
4. TAT's Required for Reorg of S/C Combat Wings

DISTRIBUTION:
CG, 2d AF - 50 cys
CG, 8th AF - 50 cys
CG, 15th AF- 50 cys

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

5 Jan 51

SUBJECT: Revised Combat Wing Organization within Strategic Air Command

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. Reference is made to your letter CS 320 (20 December 1950). In order to provide a method for immediate implementation of the revised combat wing in Strategic Air Command, the following reorganization will be authorized for all Strategic Air Command wings.

a. Designate air base group commanders as "Base Commanders" and transfer the following functions and troop spaces therefor from the wing headquarters to the air base group headquarters:

(1) Provost Marshal and Security

(2) Public Information Office

(3) Comptroller (Accounting & Disbursing, Budget and Fiscal and Reporting activities)

(4) Chaplain

(5) Surgeon

(6) Legal and Claims

(7) Air Installations supervision

(8) All Office of Record activities of the Wing Adjutant

(9) Ground Safety

(10) Civilian Personnel

b. Transfer all functions now included in the maintenance and supply group headquarters to either the wing headquarters or air base group headquarters as applicable. Troop spaces now authorized the maintenance and supply group headquarters will be converted to non-T/O spaces upon inactivation of maintenance and supply group headquarters. T/O and

Incl 1

equipment now authorized maintenance and supply group headquarters may be transferred to the wing headquarters and/or air base group headquarters, as appropriate, and retained by these units pending revision of T/O&Es.

c. All functions and troop spaces assigned to the combat group headquarters may be attached to the wing headquarters pending revised T/O&E. The combat group headquarters will not be inactivated. The wing commander will be additionally designated as combat group commander.

d. Designate, organize and assign to each wing a T/O armament and electronics squadron in accordance with the methods outlined in Department of the Air Force letter 322 (AFO L 64lf), 22 March 1950. All armament and electronics functions and personnel now authorized in current T/O&Es may be transferred to this squadron, as overstrength, within the limitations contained in referenced letter. The designation "_____ armament-electronics Maintenance Squadron" is approved for these units.

e. Designate, organize and assign to each air base group headquarters, a T/O Operations Squadron.

(1) Transfer the following functions and troop spaces therefor from the Hq & Hq Sq, air base group to the operations squadron and organize by flights:

(a) Base operations (conducts flying safety program and operates synthetic trainers)

(b) Photographic laboratory

(c) Base and transient aircraft. Performs organizational maintenance on base flight and transient aircraft.

(2) Transfer all functions and troop spaces now included in the communications squadron to the operations squadron and organize these functions as a flight. Troop spaces now authorized communications squadrons will be converted to non-f/O spaces upon inactivation of communications squadrons.

(3) T/O equipment now authorized the air base group Hq & Hq Sq and communications squadron for above functions may be transferred to the operations squadron and retained by these units pending revised T/O&Es.

f. Designate, organize and assign to each air base group a

1615

T/O medical squadron

(1) Transfer all functions and troop spaces now included in the medical group to the T/O medical squadron. Troop spaces now authorized the medical group will be converted to non-T/O upon inactivation of Strategic Air Command medical groups.

K. You will be authorized upon request to designate, organize and assign to each two or more wing station within Strategic Air Command, a T/O air division headquarters to provide proper control of assigned wings. Troop spaces to organize the T/O air division will be provided by Strategic Air Command from existing authorizations. No increase in non-T/O or T.D authorizationswill be made by this headquarters for the organization of these air division headquarters. On a station where two or more wings are located, all but one T/O air base group Hq & Hq Sq will be inactivated and the remaining air base group Hq & Hq Sq will be augmented by T/O-A.

2. The provisions of Air Force Regulation 20-18 and restrictions of current T/O&Es which are in conflict with the foregoing are waived pending the submission and approval of revisions thereto. The provisions of AF regulations 20-32 and 20-36 will be complied with.

3. The restrictive provisions of Department of the Air Force letter 322 (AFOA 54lf) will apply generally to the implementation of the foregoing under this authority.

4. Department of the Air Force letters authorizing actions approved above will be processed by this Headquarters upon receipt of revised proposed reorganization (inclosure 3, referenced letter).

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

(sgd) I. [illegible] dwards
I. D. EDWARDS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

1616

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

DPI 322 (10 Jan 51)

10 January 1951

SUBJECT: Revised Combat Wing Organization Within Strategic Air Command

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

1. In compliance with letter, Headquarters United States Air Force, dated 5 January 1951, subject as above, it is requested that Department of the Air Force directives be published to authorize the following specific actions, at the earliest practicable date:

a. Inactivations:

Hq, Maint & Supply Group
2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 22, 28, 31, 43, 44
55, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97, 98, 301, 305, 306,
307, 509

Hq & Hq Sq, Air Base Group
5, 6, 44, 90, 98, 301, 305, 307

Medical Group
2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 22, 28, 31, 43, 44, 55,
90, 91, 92, 93, 97, 98, 301, 305, 306, 307, 509

Communications Squadron
2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 22, 28, 31, 43, 44, 55,
90, 91, 92, 93, 97, 98, 301, 305, 306, 307, 509

b. Reassignment to the Air Base Groups indicated:

Unit	New Air Base Group Assignment
91st Supply Sq	91st Air Base Group
91st Motor Veh Sq	
301st Air Police Sq	
301st Food Sv Sq	
301st Installations Sq	
301st Supply Sq	
301st Motor Veh Sq	

Incl #2

DHI
Subj: Revised Combat Wing Organization Within S/C

Unit	New Air Base Group Assignment
5th Air Police Sq 5th Food Sv Sq 5th Installations Sq 5th Supply Sq 5th Motor Veh Sq 9th Supply Sq 9th Motor Veh Sq	9th Air Base Group
2d Supply Sq 2d Motor Veh Sq	2d Air Base Group
305th Supply Sq 305th Motor Veh Sq 305th Air Police Sq 305th Installations Sq 305th Food Sv Sq 306th Supply Sq 306th Motor Veh Sq 307th Supply Sq 307th Motor Veh Sq 307th Air Police Sq 307th Food Sv Sq 307th Installations Sq	306th Air Base Group
55th Supply Sq 55th Motor Veh Sq	55th Air Base Group
31st Supply Sq 31st Motor Veh Sq	31st Air Base Group
12th Supply Sq 12th Motor Vehicle Sq	12th Air Base Group
97th Supply Sq 97th Motor Veh Sq	97th Air Base Group
7th Supply Sq 7th Motor Veh Sq 11th Supply Sq 11th Motor Veh Sq	7th Air Base Group
28th Supply Sq 28th Motor Veh Sq	28th Air Base Group

1618

DF11
Subj: Revised Combat Wing Organization Within S.C

Unit	New Air Base Group Assignment
6th Supply Sq 6th Motor Veh Sq 6th Air Police Sq 6th Food Sv Sq 6th Installations Sq 509th Supply Sq 509th Motor Veh Sq	509th Air Base Group
93d Supply Sq 93d Motor Veh Sq	93d Air Base Group
43d Supply Sq 43d Motor Veh Sq	43d Air Base Group
90th Supply Sq 90th Motor Veh Sq 90th Air Police Sq 90th Food Sv Sq 90th Installations Sq 92d Supply Sq 92d Motor Veh Sq 98th Supply Sq 98th Motor Veh Sq 98th Food Sv Sq 98th Installations Sq 98th Air Police Sq	92d Air Base Group
22d Supply Sq 22d Motor Veh Sq 44th Supply Sq 44th Motor Veh Sq 44th Air Police Sq 44th Food Service Sq 44th Installations Sq	22d Air Base Group

2. Upon receipt of authority requested in paragraph 1 above, this headquarters will take concurrent action to implement same and to designate, organize, and assign the Armament-Electronics Maintenance Squadron, Operations Squadron, and Medical Squadron authorized by letter cited in paragraph 1 above.

1619

DHI
Subj: Revised Combat Wing Organization Within SAC

3. In accordance with paragraph 6, letter, Department of the Air Force, 322 (AFOMA 567F), subject: "Numbering and Designation of Table of Distribution Units," dated 15 May 1950, it is further requested that this command be granted authority to establish, designate, and organize a Table of Distribution Unit at Air Division level, on the Strategic Air Command stations indicated below. It is proposed to utilize a four digit number from those presently allotted; i.e., Hq 4020th Air Division:

Barksdale Air Force Base
MacDill Air Force Base
Walker Air Force Base
Fairchild Air Force Base
March Air Force Base
Travis Air Force Base

4. All personnel authorizations in T/O & E units that are inactivated by the above action should be returned to this command as Non-T/O & E authorizations.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ A. W. KISSNER
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

1620


AIR DIVISION
COMMANDER
COMMANDING
GENERAL'S SIDE
ADJUTANT
GENERAL
INS. SECTOR GENERAL
OPERATIONS
MATERIEL
M & S OFF LT COL 4010
CIK-STENO SGT 213

1621

AIR DIVISION FUNCTIONS

1. TO CORRELATE THE ACTIVITIES OF ALL UNITS ASSIGNED

2. PROVIDE COMMAND SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION OF THE TACTICAL OPERATION OF THE COMBAT WINGS ASSIGNED.

3. PROVIDE COMMAND SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION OF THE TACTICAL TRAINING OF THE COMBAT WINGS ASSIGNED, INSURING THAT THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF QUALITY ARE ATTAINED.

4. PROMOTE STANDARDIZATION OF OPERATING TECHNIQUES OF THE COMBAT WINGS ASSIGNED.

5. INSURE THAT PROPER EMPHASIS WITHIN COMBAT WINGS IS BEING PLACED UPON THE ESSENTIAL PREPARATIONS FOR EXECUTION OF COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED.

6. ADVISE THE NUMBERED AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS CONCERNED AS TO ANY ACTION REQUIRED TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF ASSIGNED UNITS.

7. CLOSELY MONITOR AND PARTICIPATE IN BY MEANS OF OBSERVER PERSONNEL THE EXECUTION OF ALL SIMULATED COMBAT MISSIONS CONDUCTED BY THE COMBAT WINGS ASSIGNED.

PATS REQUIRED FOR REORGANIZATION OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND COMBAT WINGS

The following PAT's are required to implement the provisions of Inclosure #1 and will be prepared by Headquarters Strategic Air Command:

WING HEADQUARTERS

1. Bomb, Medium, Readiness
2. Bomb, Heavy, Readiness
3. Strat Rcn, Medium and Heavy, Readiness
4. Strat Rcn, (Jet)
5. Bomb, Medium, Peace
6. Bomb, Medium, Readiness (Special for 306th)
7. Bomb, Heavy, (Special for Carswell)
8. Fighter, Peace
9. Fighter, War
10. Fighter, Readiness

AIR BASE GROUP HEADQUARTERS

1. Bomb, Medium and Heavy, Readiness
2. Strat Rcn, Medium, Heavy, and Jet
3. Bomb, Medium, (Peace and Readiness combined)
4. Bomb, Heavy, (Special for Carswell)
5. Two Wing Station, Bomb and Rcn (Barksdale)
6. Two Wing Station, (Peace and Readiness combined, Fairchild)
7. Three Wing Station (MacDill)
8. Two Wing Station (Walker)
9. Fighter (All Units)

COMBAT SQUADRONS

1. Bomb, Medium, Readiness B-29
2. Bomb, Medium, Readiness B-50 A & B
3. Strat Rcn, Readiness B-50B
4. Strat Rcn, Readiness RB-45
5. Strat Rcn, Readiness RB-36
6. Bomb, Medium, Readiness B-50D
7. Bomb, Heavy, Readiness B-36
8. Bomb, Medium, Peace B-29
9. Fighter, Peace F-84
10. Fighter, War F-84

ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE SQUADRONS

1. Bomb, Medium, Readiness B-29 (with ARS)
2. Bomb, Medium, Readiness B-29 (without ARS)
3. Bomb, Medium, Readiness B-50 A & B (with ARS)
4. Bomb, Medium, Readiness B-50D (with ARS)
5. Bomb, Medium, Peace B-29 (without ARS)
6. Bomb, Heavy, Readiness B-36
7. Strat Rcn Wing, Heavy, Readiness B-36
8. Strat Rcn Wing, Medium, Readiness B-29 and B-50B (with ARS)
9. Strat Rcn Wing, Medium, Readiness B-45 (with ARS)
10. Fighter, Peace
11. Fighter, War

Incl #4

1623

ARMAMENT AND ELECTRONICS SQUADRONS

1. Bomb, Medium, Readiness, B-29 and B-50A (with ARS)
2. Bomb, Medium, Readiness, B-29 and B-50A (without ARS)
3. Bomb, Medium, Readiness, B-50D (with ARS)
4. Bomb, Medium, Peace, B-29 (without ARS)
5. Bomb, Heavy, Readiness, B-36 (30 aircraft)
6. Strat Rcn Wing, Medium, Readiness, B-29 and B-50B (with ARS)
7. Strat Rcn Wing, Medium, Readiness, B-45 (with ARS)
8. Strat Rcn Wing, Heavy, Readiness, RB-36
9. Fighter, Peace
10. Fighter, War

FIELD MAINTENANCE SQUADRONS

1. Bomb, Medium, Readiness, B-29 (with ARS)
2. Bomb, Medium, Readiness, B-29 (without ARS)
3. Bomb, Medium, Readiness, B-50 (with ARS)
4. Bomb, Medium, Peace, B-29 (without ARS)
5. Bomb, Heavy, Readiness, B-36 (30 aircraft)
6. Strat Rcn Wing, Medium, Readiness, B-29 and B-50B (with ARS)
7. Strat Rcn Wing, Medium, Readiness, B-45 (with ARS)
8. Strat Rcn Wing, Heavy, Readiness, B-36 (30 aircraft)
9. Fighter, Peace
10. Fighter, War

AIR DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

1. March Air Force Base
2. Fairchild Air Force Base
3. Walker Air Force Base
4. MacDill Air Force Base
5. Barksdale Air Force Base
6. Travis Air Force Base
7. Carswell Air Force Base

OPERATIONS SQUADRONS

1. Bomb, Medium, and Heavy, Readiness
2. Bomb, Medium and Heavy, Peace
3. Strat Rcn Wing, Medium and Heavy, Readiness
4. Fighter, Jet, Peace

MEDICAL SQUADRONS

1. Cellular PAT

COMBAT SQ
COMBAT SQ
COMBAT SQ
A/C SQ
MAINT SQ
A/C & DIRECT
MAINT SQ
PERIODIC
MAINT SQ
FIELD
MED SQ
SUPPLY SQ
VEHICLE SQ
AIR INSTL SQ
SECURITY SQ
OPS SQ
FOOD SER SQ
PERS
OPS
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COMM
FM
CIO
LEGAL
CHAPLAIN
HIO
SG
CLIFF ST AFB
OFFICIAL BASE CO
E/P
T/O BRIEFING TEAM
D/M MAINT COMT.
COMM
INSP
J. G
WING C.C.
TEMPORARY MS CRASHER
(SQUADRON MEETING PLACES CITY)

(FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY)

WING HEADQUARTERS



Incl 2

1626



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
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FOOD SV
TR MG
FX
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MED SQ
AIC SQ
FOOD SV SQ

19TH AIR DI
ORGANIZATIONAL



APPROVED _____ DATE 16 FEBRUARY 1951

C S IRVINE
BRIG GEN, USAF
COMMANDING

TENANT ORGANIZATION
HEADQUARTERS 8 A F
19TH COMMUNICATION SQ
1921 ST AACS SQ
3903 RD RADAR BOMB SCORING SQ
2103 RD WEATHER DETACHMENT
CARSWELL FLIGHT SERVICE CENTER

1629

19TH AIR DIVISION
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



1630

RESTRICTED

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 12)

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska
6 February 1951

ACTIVATION, INACTIVATION, AND REORGANIZATION OF CERTAIN UNITS I
DISCONTINUANCE OF 4209TH BASE SERVICE SQUADRON II

SECTION I

ACTIVATION, INACTIVATION, AND REORGANIZATION OF CERTAIN UNITS. Effective 16 February 1951:

a. The units listed below are inactivated at present stations:

Hq, Maintenance & Supply Gp
7, 11

7th Communications Sq

b. The following unit is redesignated:

Present Designation	New Designation
7th Medical Group	7th Medical Squadron

c. The following units are relieved from present wing or group assignment, and are assigned as indicated:

Unit	New Group Assignment
7th Supply Sq	7th Air Base Group
7th Motor Veh Sq	7th Air Base Group
7th Medical Sq	7th Air Base Group
11th Supply Sq	7th Air Base Group
11th Motor Veh Sq	7th Air Base Group
7th Maint Sq	7th Bomb Group, Heavy
4010th Organ Maint Sq	7th Bomb Group, Heavy
11th Maint Sq	11th Bomb Group, Heavy
4014th Organ Maint Sq	11th Bomb Group, Heavy

d. The unit listed below, having been assigned to the Strategic Air Command, is further assigned to the Eighth Air Force as a Table of Distribution unit, and organized at Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas:

Unit	SAC PAT No.
Hq, 19th Air Division	110-1, 15 Jan 51

e. The units listed below are designated and organized at Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas, and assigned to the groups indicated:

RESTRICTED

GO 12

Unit	SAC PAT No.	Group Assignment	T/O&E
4010th Armt Elec Maint Sq	90-7, 15 Jan 51	7th Bomb Gp, Heavy	1-9022T, 31 Mar 50 Sec II, 1 x colm 5, 9 and 10; 3 x colm 8 Sec III, 1 x colm 5B 9 and 10; 3 x colm 8 (UEE only)
4010th Opns Sq	120-1, 15 Jan 51	7th Air Base Group	
4014th Armt Elec Maint Sq	90-7, 15 Jan 51	11th Bomb Gp, Heavy	
4014th Opns Sq	120-1, 15 Jan 51	7th Air Base Group	

f. The following units are assigned to the Eighth Air Force, and activated at Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas:

Unit	T/O&E	Auth Str OFF	Auth Str AMN	Assignment
Hq & Hq Sq, 11th Bomb Wg, H	1-1021T 14 Apr 50 Sec II & IIA 1 x colm 5 Sec III & IIIA 1 x colm 5B	33	86	11th Bomb Wg, Heavy
11th Air Police Sq	1-8024T 5 Apr 50 Sec II, 1 x colm 6 Sec III, 1 x colm 6B & C	4	109	7th Air Base Gp
11th Food Sv Sq	1-8015 24 Mar 48 1 x colm 49, as changed by 1-0001B, 1 Jan 49, as modified by EML 1-8015-4	5	202	7th Air Base Gp
11th Instl Sq	1-8501T 3 Nov 50 Sec II, 1 x colm 6 Sec III, 1 x colm 6B & C	4	174	7th Air Base Gp

g. The following units are assigned to the 19th Air Division:

7th Bomb Wing, Heavy
11th Bomb Wing, Heavy
7th Air Base Group

h. The 11th Bombardment Group, Heavy, is assigned to the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy.

i. The 11th Medical Group is redesignated the 11th Medical Squadron, and activated at Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas, in accordance with T/O&E cited:

1-9022T, 31 Mar 50
Sec II, 1 x colm 5,
9 and 10; 3 x colm 8
Sec III, 1 x colm 5B
9 and 10; 3 x colm 8
(UEE only)

2. a. The uni
of the Department of

b. Records

3. Personnel t
furnished from sourc
Air Force, made avai
as outlined in SAC R

4. Equipment,
thorized in accordan
Essential Equipment
Table of Distributi
T/As. Redistributi
instructions

5. Authority:
subject: "(Unclass
Heavy," 8 February

DISCONTINUANCE
ma e of the discont
Hose Air Force Base

2. Military t
the Military Air Tr
above unit.

3. Records wi

4. Authority:
1951.

BY COMMAN

OFFICIAL:

GLENN P. NELL
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

T/O&E	Auth Strength OFF	AMN	Assignment
1-9022T, 31 Mar 50 Sec II, 1 x colm 5, 9 and 10; 3 x colm 8 Sec III, 1 x colm 5B, 9 and 10; 3 x colm 8 (UEE only)	17	73	7th Air Base Group

2. a. The units listed in paragraph 1a, above, revert to the control of the Department of the Air Force upon inactivation.

b. Records will be disposed of in accordance with AFM 181-5.

3. Personnel to man the newly activated or organized units will be furnished from sources under the control of the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, made available by reorganization of Strategic Air Command units, as outlined in SAC Regulations 20-15.

4. Equipment, less general purpose vehicles, for T/O&E units is authorized in accordance with appropriate columns of T/O&E cited. Unit Essential Equipment only is authorized where indicated. Equipment for Table of Distribution units is authorized in accordance with appropriate T/As. Redistribution of T/O&E equipment will be as directed in separate instructions.

5. Authority: Letter, Department of the Air Force, 322 (AFOMO 959f), subject: "(Unclassified) Activation of Units of the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy," 8 February 1951.

SECTION II

DISCONTINUANCE OF 4209TH BASE SERVICE SQUADRON.--1. Announcement is made of the discontinuance of the 4209th Base Service Squadron, at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, effective 24 January 1951.

2. Military troop spaces and civilian positions are transferred to the Military Air Transport Service concurrently with discontinuance of the above unit.

3. Records will be disposed of in accordance with AFM 181-5.

4. Authority: AFR 20-52 and Hq USAF message AFMAI 53485, 29 January 1951.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

OFFICIAL:

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND OFFICIAL

A. W. KISSNER
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

GLENN P. NELL
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

GO 12

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5 - CG, OOAMA, Hill AFB, Hill Fld, Utah
5 - CG, SAAMA, Kelly AFB, Tex
5 - Commander, MATS, Andrews AFB, Wash 25, DC
5 - CO, 4209th Base Sv Sq, Mt Home AFB, Mt Home, Idaho
5 - CO, 831st Specialized Depot, Shelby, Ohio
1 - AF Ln Off, Hq Third Army, Ft McPherson, Ga
5 - AF Ln Repr, KCRC, 601 Hardesty Ave, Kansas City 1, Mo
12 - D/Plans, SAC

1635

Organization	31 January 1951		28 February 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers			10	[illegible]
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			7	3
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	44	75	54	61
Warrant Officers	0	5	0	1
Airmen	149	201	102	81
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	21	29	1	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	30	34	1	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	64	60	100	58
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	155	157	231	172
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	64	65	100	62
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	155	156	231	169
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	64	63	100	64
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	155	166	231	183
4010th Gun & Elec Sq				
Officers			9	11
Warrant Officers			0	2
Airmen			280	274

1637

Organization	31 January 1951		28 February 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th Maint Sq				
Officers	11	6	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	2
Airmen	439	353	430	41[illegible]
40[illegible]th OM Sq				
Officers	6	4	4	4
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	0
Airmen	531	409	2[illegible]1	20[illegible]
Hqs 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers			54	36
Warrant Officers			0	1
Airmen			102	67
Hq 11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	23	2[illegible]	1	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	36	33	1	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	64	64	100	58
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	155	160	231	169
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	64	64	100	59
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	155	162	231	171

1638

Organization	31 Dec 1951		31 Dec 1952	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
98th Tech Sq				
Officers	14	11	17	19
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	213	183	221	170
110th Tech Sq				
Officers	12	4	10	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	349	312	400	339
Avn Sup Sq				
Officers	16	14	4	14
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	457	324	242	422
Hdqtrs Trn & Svc Sq				
Officers			9	13
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			279	252
Hq & Hq Sq (4th A/D Gp)				
Officers	19	20	32	17
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	5
Airmen	241	197	137	227
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	11	11	4	12
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	448	413	135	500

1639

Organization	31 January 1951		28 February 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers			4	1
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			109	1
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	6	7	4	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	225	417	174	268
11th Installation Sq				
Officers			4	1
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			174	1
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	4	5	3
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	200	239	202	253
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers			5	1
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			202	1
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	9	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	166	157	177	170

1640

Organization	31 January 1951		28 February 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers			10	5
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			177	171
40[illegible]th Ops Sq				
Officers			11	13
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			135	285
40[illegible]th Ops Sq				
Officers			11	1
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			135	1
7th Med Sq				
Officers			42	50
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			164	193
11th Med Sq				
Officers			17	1
Warrant Officers			0	0
Airmen			79	1
7th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	4	4	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	166	138	217	188

1641

Organization	31 January 1952		28 February 1952	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	3
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	111	217	131
585th Band				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	43	34	44
7th Avn Sq				
Officers	18	13	16	16
Warrant Officers	6	6	6	5
Airmen	22	23	24	23
4006th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	1	1	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	3	3	3
Total Officers	673	696	952	684
Total Warrant Officers	7	20	7	20
Total Airmen	5133	4952	6049	5384

Organization	31 January 1951		28 February 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	3
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	111	217	131
585th Band				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	43	34	46
7th Avn Sq				
Officers	18	13	16	16
Warrant Officers	6	6	6	5
Airmen	22	20	24	23
ACC&W WAF Sq				
Officers	1	1	1	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	3	3	3
Total Officers	673	696	952	684
Total Warrant Officers	7	20	7	20
Total Airmen	5133	4952	6049	5384

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SECRET

K-DIV-19-HI
MARCH 1951

HISTORY

19TH AIR DIVISION

MARCH
1951

CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

MICROFILMED

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HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

MARCH 1951

PREPARED

BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - 2nd Lt ROSE A PALMER

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division."

C. S. IRVINE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

1650

PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERSONNEL

Reassignment of Key Personnel

Colonel Ernest B. Maxwell was relieved from assignment as Acting Chief of Staff, 19th Air Division,, and was assigned as Deputy Commander 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, Carswell Air Force Base effective 7 March 1951. 1 /

Military Strength: During March two (2) airmen were assigned to this headquarters, which now has eight (8) officers and five (5) airmen assigned. The assigned strength of the 19th Air Division as of 1 March was 6,088 and 6,882 as of 31 March. These figures show a gain of 794 personnel for the month. The authorized and assigned strength of the 19th Air Division by individual units is appended. 2 /

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Office of the Adjutant General

Brigadier General C. S. Irvine, Commanding

1 / Hq 19th Air Division General Order #4, dtd 6 Mar 51

2 / Chart: Auth and Asgd by Individual Units, Mar 51

General, 19th Air Division, established a policy where as the 7th and 11th Bomb Wing Commanders would act as Deputy Division Commanders for the 19th Air Division.

The Commanding Officer of the 7th Bomb Wing to act as Deputy Division Commander responsible for Maintenance and Supply activities of the 19th Air Division, in addition to his duty assignment as Wing Commander, through 30 April 1951.

The Commanding Officer of the 11th Bomb Wing to act as Deputy Division Commander responsible for Personnel, Air Installations and Comptroller activities of the 19th Air Division, in addition to his duty assignment as Wing Commander, through 30 April. It is contemplated the Division duties of the two Deputy Commanders will alternate after 30 days.

Office of Deputy for Materiel

Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Koenig has been given authority to act as base maintenance controller with the prerogative to act on urgent supply and maintenance

issue in the absence of the 19th Air Division Deputy for Materiel.

Lieutenant Colonel Orcutt was designated as Officer-In-Charge of all Base Shop facilities supporting the Aircraft Maintenance Program.

The aircraft maintenance organizational structure was revised to establish a central control of Base Facilities jointly used by 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings. This plan was instituted to provide maximum utilization of existing facilities, and training of key maintenance personnel. The revised organizational structures permits, within the limitations of prevailing physical conditions, maintenance activities to be in consonance with spirit and intent of SAC Regulation 66-12.

Aircraft Distribution: Three (3) B-36B aircraft were transferred to San Diego for conversion on project AMC-OSB-141. Present planning is to maintain a total of 42 B-36 aircraft on this station. Future aircraft transfers to conversion center will be on

a one for one basis as new aircraft are received.

A request was submitted for review of the SAC aircraft allocation program and recommendations for changes that would permit more equitable distribution of aircraft and maintain maximum combat potential during contemplated expansion program.

Supply: Shortages of QEC kits of 2182 configuration is expected to become more critical in the near future. An attempt is being made to get authority to send QEC #70 kits to the conversion center, San Diego for refurbishing and bringing up to 2182 configuration. A letter was submitted to Headquarters Eighth Air Force, requesting that the supply action, scope and definition of AOCP and ANCR items be reviewed to determine the feasiability of revising supply procedures to enable Heavy Bomb Wings to receive supply action on ANCR items comparable to AOCP requisitions.

Office of the Inspector General

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Bartlett, 19th Air

Division Inspector General attended a conference in Boston, Massachusetts, pertaining to Reserve Personnel during the month.

The Semi-Anual inspection of the following units of the 19th Air Division was accomplished during March by the 7th and 11th Bombardment Wing Inspectors;

7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy	7th Maintenance Sq
11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy	11th Maintenance Sq
7th Installations Sq	11th Installations Sq
Base Information and Education	7th Supply Sq
11th Supply Sq	Post Office
Special Service	4010th Operations Sq
4014th Operations Sq	Transient Airman's Qrts
Officers' Mess	7th Security Sq
11th Security Sq	Personal Affairs
Separation and Recruiting	

Office of Deputy for Operations

The Deputy of Operations and Assistant attended a conference at Eighth Air Force relative to the

establishing of a B-36 Flight Engineer School at Carswell Air Force Base. This school was assigned to the Provisional Training Squadron, with Major Herbert J. Tillapaugh Jr., as the Project Officer.

The Deputy of Operations and Assistant attended a conference at Eighth Air Force regarding the training program for recalled reserves. This program was delegated to the two tactical wings and to the 7th Air Base Group to be accomplished in two phases. Phase I was assigned to the Provisional Training Squadron, 7th Air Base Group, for indoctrination of all recalled personnel in such items as customs of the service, gas drills, firing, organization of the Air Force, etc. This course is for approximately five (5) days. At the completion of this initial indoctrination the recalled reserves were then returned to the tactical wings or to the 7th Air Base Group (the one to which originally assigned) for phase II, consisting of refereshcr training in their particular specialty to the proficiency required by the Wing

Commanders.

The 19th Air Division flew a total of 2,962 hours with the 7th Bomb Wing flying 1,181 hours, and the 11th Bomb Wing flew 1,243 hours during March. The 7th Air Base Group flew 538 hours during this period. The 7th and 11th Bomb Wings completed all 50-8 requirements, with the exception of three (3) visual RBS runs in the 26th Bomb Squadron, 11th Bomb Wing. This 100% accomplishment of training re-emphasized the fact that it will be necessary for the Division to fly at peak louds to accomplish the requirements of SAC Regulation 50-8.

The new SAC Rating System was effective 1 March 1951, and preliminary figures indicate that the 19th Air Division suffered from visual RBS runs and visual bombing relative to lost points. The RBS record runs for radar bombing for both wings for March was below the SAC requirement for the rating system, and as a result this allowed both wings the maximum number of points.

Eight (8) B-36D aircraft of the 11th Bomb Wing participated in a mission involving cell compression over the Air Proving Ground, Eglin Air Force Base, Flordia. Results of this mission will be included in the 11th Bomb Wing History.

A CPX mission with the Senior Controller designated as Lieutenant Colonel Warren C. Stirling, 7th Bomb Wing, was executed at Limestone Air Force Base on 10 March 1951.

During the month the 7th Bomb Wing flew three (3) B-36D aircraft on a profile type mission with maximum time at 40,000 feet. This project was scheduled to be completed by 16 March 1951.

During March the 11th Bomb Wing was required to furnish a B-36D with select crew for the Eighth Air Force and Strategic Air Command observers relative to evaluation of the Sharkey System for radar bombing.

The 11th Bomb Wing completed two (2) instrument checks with representatives of General Montgomery's

Office, Headquarters SAC, on 23 March 1951. The instrument check pilots are being dispatched by General Montgomery to SAC units to check the proficiency of combat crew pilots.

A project was originated in the Office of the Deputy for Operations, 19th Air Division, which sent through channels to USAF requesting that authority be authorized to commission the best qualified enlisted flight engineers of this organization. These flight engineers were being replaced by officers recalled to active duty, as the B-36 flight engineer position requires a commissioned officer. The new flight engineers required up to six months training and background on the B-36, this procedure slowed down the tactical mission of the bomb wings. In order to keep the enlisted flight engineers most of which had been with the B-36 program from the beginning; Captain Arthur J. Orillion Jr., AD Staff Flight Engineer was appointed Project Officer to hand carry the applications for direct commissions

of the flight engineers through the various higher headquarters. This project was successful and resulted in thirteen (13) of the flight engineers of this command receiving direct commissions.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

1662

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

6 March 1951

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 4

Section I

ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF RELIEVED

Col ERNEST B MAXWELL 3356A, Acting Chief of Staff, this headquarters, is relieved, effective 7 March 1951.

Section II

ASSIGNMENT OF DUTY

Colonel ERNEST B MAXWELL 3356A, is assigned duty as Deputy Commanding Officer, 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, this station, effective 7 March 1951.

C. S. IRVINE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Organization	28 February 1951		31 March 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers	10	8	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	3	7	5
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	54	61	56	73
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	102	81	140	82
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	1	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	1	1	0	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	58	100	68
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	172	231	174
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	62	100	63
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	169	231	177
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	64	100	69
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	183	231	188
4010th Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	11	9	13
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	280	274	280	329

1666

Organization	28 February 1951		31 March 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th Maint Sq				
Officers	10	8	10	7
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	0
Airmen	430	410	430	430
4010th OM Sq				
Officers	4	4	4	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	202	231	211
Hqs 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	54	36	54	46
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	102	67	102	82
Hqs 11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	1	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	1	1	0	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	58	100	73
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	169	231	182
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	59	100	69
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	1
Airmen	231	171	231	193

1667

Organization	28 February 1951		31 March 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
98th Fmb Sq				
Officers	100	59	100	72
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	170	231	196
11th Maint Sq				
Officers	10	4	10	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	2
Airmen	430	355	430	392
4014th OM Sq				
Officers	4	4	4	2
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	281	253	281	216
4014th Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	13	9	16
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	279	252	279	319
Hq & Hq Sq 7th A/B Gp				
Officers	32	47	43	76
Warrant Officers	0	5	0	4
Airmen	117	227	237	382
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	4	12	14	12
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	135	500	441	439

1668

Organization	28 February 1951		31 March 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	4	1	5	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	109	1	209	109
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	6	5	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	268	200	233
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	1	4	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	1	174	77
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	253	202	154
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	1	5	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	1	202	154
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	8	11	9
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	1
Airmen	177	170	205	189

1669

Organization	28 February 1971		31 March 1971	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	5	10	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	1
Airmen	177	171	177	183
40[illegible]th Ops Sq				
Officers	11	13	15	14
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	135	285	232	233
4[illegible]4th Ops Sq				
Officers	11	1	11	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	135	1	135	115
7th Med Sq				
Officers	42	50	66	46
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	164	193	218	197
11th Med Sq				
Officers	17	1	17	10
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	73	1	73	51
7th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	186	238	177

1670

Organization	28 February 1951		31 March 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	3
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	131	217	143
505th Band				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	46	34	46
7th Avn Sq				
Officers	16	16	16	17
Warrant Officers	6	5	6	5
Airmen	24	23	24	21
ACC5th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	1	1	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	3	3	3
Total Officers	952	684	1004	815
Total Warrant Officers	7	20	7	20
Total Airmen	6049	5384	6837	6047

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History

19th AIR DIVISION

April
1951

Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

SECRET

SECRET
AUTH. CO. 19TH AD
INITIALS F A Buttner
DATE 7 June 51

SECRET

HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

April 1951

PREPARED
BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - 2nd Lt ROSE A PALMER

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division."

C. S. IRVINE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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station. Data gathered as a result of this study will be used to substantiate recommendations pertaining to reorganization of [illegible] maintenance structure to parallel the present aircraft general maintenance organization.

A general plan for expansion of base maintenance facilities, and recommendations for equipment requirements to support this program are being drawn up by this office and when completed will be forwarded to Headquarters Eighth Air Force. It will probably be the middle of May before this study and plans will be completed. The report on the findings of this study will appear in the History for May.

The "Go Top" project activities were considerably ahead of planned work schedules, however, shortages of kits necessitated returning to original work schedules. This project is the modification of the Bomb Bay racks of the B-26 aircraft to accommodate all special types of bombs.

B-26 aircraft 42-96101 was sent to Oklahoma

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

POSITION	NAME	RANK
C. G. 19th Air Division	Irvine, C. S.	Maj Gen
Deputy For Materiel	Ekstrand, Carl V.	Col
Deputy For Operation	Black, Richard T.	Col
I. G. 19th Air Division	Bartlett, John D.	Lt Col
Staff Observer ADDO	Downey, Clyde J.	Lt Col
Asst Deputy For Operation	Harrison, William C.	Maj
Adjutant General	Winkel, John L.	Capt
Aide-de-Camp	Kaske, William E.	1st Lt

Organization	31 Mar 1951		30 Apr 51	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers	10	8	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	5	7	6
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	56	73	56	83
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	0
Airmen	140	82	140	101
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	2	0	2
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	0
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	68	100	85
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	174	231	193
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	63	100	75
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	177	231	187
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	69	100	88
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	188	231	192
4010th Aux Qualec Sq				
Officers	9	13	9	16
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	3
Airmen	280	329	280	330

1690

Organization	31 Mar 51		30 Apr 51	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th Bomb Sq				
Officers	10	7	10	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	3
Airmen	430	437	430	468
4010th CM Sq				
Officers	4	4	4	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	211	281	210
Hqs 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	54	48	54	55
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	102	82	102	93
Hq 11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	73	100	85
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	182	231	223
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	69	100	80
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	231	193	231	214

1691

Organization	31 Mar 51		[illegible]	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
98th [illegible] Sq				
Officers	100	72	100	83
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	186	231	209
11th [illegible] Sq				
Officers	10	5	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	430	392	430	394
401Ath [illegible] Sq				
Officers	4	2	4	3
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	2
Airmen	281	216	281	217
401Ath Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	16	9	16
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	1
Airmen	279	319	279	362
[illegible] Sq 7th A/D Gp				
Officers	43	76	43	109
Warrant Officers	0	4	0	2
Airmen	237	382	237	346
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	14	12	14	12
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	441	439	441	544

1692

Organization	31 Mar 51		30 Apr 51	
	Auth	Assd	Auth	Assd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	1	5	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	109	209	121
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	5	9	5	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	200	233	200	195
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	1	4	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	77	174	159
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	154	202	165
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	1	5	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	154	202	150
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	11	9	11	9
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	2
Airmen	205	189	205	188

1693

Organization	31 Mar 51		30 Apr 51	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	5	10	11
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	177	183	177	189
4010th Ops Sq				
Officers	15	14	13	15
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	232	233	226	261
4010th Ops Sq				
Officers	11	6	11	11
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	135	115	135	120
7th Med Sq				
Officers	66	48	66	47
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	218	157	218	174
11th Med Sq				
Officers	17	10	17	11
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	73	51	73	63
7th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	1
Airmen	238	177	238	204

1694

Organization	31 Mar 51 Auth	31 Mar 51 Asgd	30 Apr 51 Auth	30 Apr 51 Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	3
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	143	217	154
58th Band				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	46	34	47
7th Avn Sq				
Officers	16	17	16	17
Warrant Officers	6	5	6	5
Airmen	24	21	24	24
4005th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	1	1	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	3	3	3
Total Officers	1004	815	1002	980
Total Warrant Officers	7	20	7	25
Total Airmen	6837	6047	6831	6507

SECRET

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SECRET

[illegible] 400
Subject: Logistical Support for * ACS [illegible] Squadron, Site [illegible]-7[illegible], Duncanville, Texas

3. This squadron operates under T/O&E 1-2125-T with the following authorized strength:

Officers - 22

Airmen - 211

The beneficial troop occupancy date of this site (partial occupation) is 1 March 1951; the contemplated completion date for full occupancy is 16 April 1951. Railhead for freight shipments is Cedar Hill, Texas; railhead for passenger service is Dallas, Texas.

4. Supplies and/or Services Required:

a. Class I (Rations).

(1) This squadron will operate with field rations, and will draw rations as prescribed by [illegible] 30-2210-50, and [illegible] 140-6.

b. Class II (Support).

c. Class III (Support).

(1) This support will include heating fuels and ground petroleum products.

(2) The following fuel requirements as estimated by a survey conducted by the Office of the District Engineers are quoted for your information:

(a) Estimated Yearly Requirements. Natural Gas (quantity unknown).

d. Purchasing and Contracting Support.

(1) Purchasing and contracting for all general types of supplies exclusive of electronic supplies.

(2) Negotiation of contractual agreements.

(3) Burial and mortuary services.

e. Post Exchange Service.

(1) To be furnished in accordance with instructions of Regional Office.

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1698

A 400
Subject: Logistical Support for [illegible] Squadron, Site P-70, Duncanville, Texas

f. Laundry and Dry Cleaning.

(1) Laundry and dry cleaning service to be performed on or by support installation.

(2) Local contract to be negotiated if (1) above is impracticable, due to distance.

g. Separables and Salvage.

(1) Separables and salvage to be turned into support installation with exception of electronic supplies and equipment.

(2) Electronic supplies and equipment to be turned into presently assigned electronic support station, Tinker AFB.

h. Automotive Field Maintenance.

(1) Organization maintenance to be performed by the squadron.

(2) Field maintenance to be performed in accordance with existing regulations by the support installation.

(3) If facilities and services to be performed are undesirable and uneconomical due to distance involved, request service and parts be furnished through the medium of commercial contract.

(4) This organization authorized the following vehicles:

1 ea. Trailer, Fuel, type A-1
7 ea. Trucks, 1/4 ton, Utility M-38
2 ea. Trucks, 3/4 ton, 4x4, M-37
1 ea. Trucks, Fork, 3000 lbs, 108"
2 ea. Trucks, Fuel, Gv. M-3
6 ea. Trailers, 1 ton, cargo
3 ea. Trailers, 1 ton, cargo
4 ea. Trailers, water tank
3 ea. Trucks, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo w/o winch
3 ea. Trucks, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo, w/winch
2 ea. Trucks, Tractor, 4-5 ton
1 ea. Truck, Fire Class 325

SECRET

COPY

1699

SECRET

GM 400
Subject: Logistical Support For a ACAN Squadron, Site P-70, Duncanville, Texas

h. Medical Supplies and Services.

(1) Expendable and non-expendable medical supplies.

(2) If distance and time involved is such as to prevent adequate medical service, a request for authority to have part time civil service civilian physicians should be made upon Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force.

(3) No medical statistical reports will be submitted by the ACAN squadron. ACAN squadron will furnish necessary data for inclusion in reports of support installations.

i. Finance Service.

(1) Payment of all personnel both military and civilian.

(2) Payment of commercial bills.

(3) Unit commanders will contact accounting and disbursing officers relative to and regarding method required for above requested finance service.

j. Repairs and Utilities.

(1) Applicable repairs and utilities support, as defined in AF Regulation 20-42, 85-2, and 86-5. In order to outline more clearly the R&U responsibilities, it is requested that the following support be furnished:

(a) The logistical support station be responsible for the custody and accountability of real estate and installed property records, and for preparing and forwarding recurring R&U reports.

(b) EADF be responsible for budgeting and providing regular Air Force funds to the support station for the provision of R&U services.

(c) The commanding officer of the ACAN station be responsible for assisting, as required, in the supervision of R&U functions in accordance with existing regulations and policies established by the Air Installations Officer, of the support installation.

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SECRET

SECRET

BPLl 400 (12 Mar 51) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 31 Mar 1951

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

1. Request your comments on the basic communication and your proposed plan for implementation of the program be forwarded at an early date.

2. The *ACAW Squadron to be located at Duncanville, Texas, is but one of several to be supported by Strategic Air Command stations. These units are links in the complete radar net to be established for defense of the United States and Canada which in turn is a defense of Strategic Air Command.

3. Of particular interest are paragraphs 4j(3) and 4k(1). Headquarters Air Defense Command has agreed to provide all funds and manpower authorization requirements generated in the support of ACAW units. However, such requirements must be mutually agreed upon by Strategic Air Command and Air Defense Command.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LeMAY:

/s/ R. M. MONTGOMERY
Colonel, USAF
for
A. W. KISSNER
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

Copies to
CG, RAIW
CG, ADC

1702

SECRET

MDL 400 (12 Mar 51) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Logistical Support for * ACAW Squadron, Site P-75, Duncanville, Texas

Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Fort Worth, Texas, 6 Apr 51

TO: Commanding General, 19th Air Division, Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

1. Request this headquarters be advised of the ability of your station to furnish the logistical support requested in basic correspondence.

2. It is further requested that your headquarters contact representatives of the ACAW squadron at Site P-75, Duncanville, for purpose of reconciling differences which may exist in amount of support requested and that which is available and can be efficiently furnished. This headquarters should be advised of any difficulties which may arise.

3. Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force will be contacted by Headquarters SAC upon receipt of this information. Any matters not reconciled will be handled between Headquarters SAC and Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Command. This applies in particular to par 4f(b) and 4k(1) of basic correspondence.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL [illegible]:

/s/ HAROLD S. COY
MAJ, USAF
Asst. Adj. Gen.

SECRET

1703

SECRET

Hq EADF DM 400 Subject: Logistical Support for * AC&W Squadron, Site P-78, Duncanville, Texas

A334 3d Ind CMH/amh

HQ 18TH AIR DIVISION, Carswell Air Force Base, Ft Worth, Texas, 3 May 1961

TO: Commanding General, Eighth AF, Fort Worth, Texas

This headquarters can furnish support to Duncanville, Texas as follows:

a. Class I (Rations). The Sales Commissary will require one (1) additional civilian employee if Carswell is to furnish rations permanently. This station has been advised that Hensley AF Base is establishing a Commissary. If this is correct, then it would be more economical to base Duncanville on them for this support. If this support will go to Hensley AFB in the near future, then no additional personnel will be required.

b. Class II supplies.

c. Class II supplies

d. Purchasing and Contracting support will require one (1) additional employee

e. Post Exchange facilities will be a branch of Carswell.

f. Laundry and Dry Cleaning will be by local contract due to the distance involved and the fact that Carswell has no base laundry.

g. Reparable and Salvage.

h. Automotive Field Maintenance can be performed by this station with three (3) additional civilian mechanics. It is recommended that a wrecker be authorized and supplied the AC & W Squadron for the purpose of towing vehicles out of commission.

i. Medical supplies and services.

(1) Exependable and non-expendable medical supplies will be furnished as required.

(2) It is requested that authority to contract for a part time civilian physician consultant be furnished the commanding officer. Duncanville.

SECRET

1704

SECRET

AB54 Subject: Logistical Support for *ACAS Squadron, Site P-78
Duncanville, Texas

(3) The medical and dental facilities at Carswell will be available for this unit, although a considerable amount of time will be lost in travel to and from Duncanville, Tex.

(4) It is recommended that an ambulance be authorized and supplied the AC & W Sqdn for transporting patients.

j. Finance Service will require two (2) additional person and also one (1) for Budget and Fiscal.

k. Repairs and utilities will be furnished. Six (6) additional Airmen and seven (7) civilian personnel or twelve (12) civilian personnel will be required to perform this support.

l. Estimate of funds required for the complete support of Duncanville, Texas will be prepared and submitted directly to HADF upon receipt of information that this proposed support is approved.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

SECRET

1705

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

" 7th BOMBARDMENT WING, HQ. VY "

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
9th Bomb Squadron	405:20
436th Bomb Squadron	407:55
492nd Bomb Squadron	445:25
Total	1258:40

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

11TH BOMBARDMENT WING, H.VY

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
25th Bomb Squadron	416:10
42nd Bomb Squadron	411:20
98th Bomb Squadron	417:45
Total	1244:15

History

19th AIR DIVISION

May

1951

Carswell Air Force Base

Fort Worth, Texas

SECRET

SECRET
AUTH. CG 1910-AD
INITIALS Gas
DATE 10 July 1951

K-DIV-19-HI
MAY 1951

SECRET

1715

HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

May 1951

PREPARED

BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - 2nd Lt. ROSE A. PALMER

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division."

J. S. IRVINE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

1716

PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERSONNEL

The assigned strength of the 19th Air Division Headquarters as of 1 May was eight officers and six airmen. A gain of only one airman is noted for this month.

The assigned strength of the 19th Air Division was 7,588 as of 1 May, of these figures; 980 were officers, 25 warrant officers and 6,507 were airmen. At the end of this period, 31 May, the total rose to 8,182 - of which 1,052 were officers, 21 warrant officers and 7,109 were airmen. The gain for May is 72 officers and 602 airmen, and a loss of four warrant officers. The increase of personnel was due to the large number of recalled officers and airmen reporting, and the assignment of basic airmen to this base. The authorized and assigned strength by individual units of the 19th Air Division is appended. 1 /

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Office of the Adjutant General

1 / Roster of Auth and Asgd Strength by Units of the 19th Air Division, See appendix No. 1.

There were four changes during May of the assigned key personnel of this headquarters. Major Hugh O. Cason was announced as Adjutant General, 19th Air Division, effective 1 May 1951. 2/ Captain John L. Winkel was reassigned to the 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy.

Colonel William R. Calhoun Jr., was announced as Deputy for Operation, releaving Colonel Richard T. Black. This reassignment of personnel is to give those concerned a workable knowledge of the various staff sections of the 19th Air Division.

Colonel Walter E. Chambers was announced as Deputy for Materiel and Colonel Carl Ekstrand was reassigned to 8th Air Force. This change of personnel was effective 25 May 1951.

Colonel Black relieved Lieutenant Colonel John C. Bartlett as 19th Air Division Inspector General. Colonel Bartlett was reassigned to the 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, 25 May 1951.

The roster of key personnel of the 19th Air Division

2/ GO 7, Hq 19th Air Div, dtd 1 May 51, See Appendix No 2

Headquarters is appended. 3 /

Office of Deputy for Operation

For the third consecutive month the 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings, Heavy, of the 19th Air Division set an all time record for flying time. A total of 2640:30 hours were flown by the two wings during the month, with the 7th Bombardment Wing flying 1580 hours and the 11th flying 1060:30 hours. This months flying time was an increase of 117:30 hours over that of April which had a total of 2523 flying hours. The hours flown by individual squadrons of the 7th 4 / and 11th Bombardment Wings are appended. 5 /

The monthly Division Flying Safety Meeting was held on 17 May 1951. At this meeting, the plaque for outstanding flying safety record for the month of April was presented, for the second consecutive month, to the 492nd Bomb Squadron, 7th Bombardment Wing. This plaque is presented once a month to the squadron which has the most flying hours with the lowest accident rate. It is a

3 / Roster of Key Personnel, See Appendix No 3

4 / Chart: Flying Time per Squadron, 7th Bomb Wing for May 51, See Appendix No 4

5 / Chart: Flying Time per Squadron, 11th Bomb Wing for May 51, See Appendix No 5

continuing program within the 19th Air Division. The 492nd Bomb Squadron is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Finlay F. Ross Jr.

"This means a lot of sweat and tears", Major General C. S. Irvine told a group of officers and airmen after 1,000 hours of flying time had been completed in one of the 9th Bombardment Squadron's aircraft. The B-36, number 2073, is one of the few "B" models left, and was delivered to Carswell from Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation (CVAC) on 2 August 1949, nearly two years ago. The 7th Bombardment Wing aircraft completed the flying time during simulated combat missions and added the last hour as it touched the run-way on 26 May.

A photograph showing General Irvine complimenting the crew of 2073 is appended. 6 /

The Deputy for Operation, Colonel Black, attended a conference at Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC) on 9 May 1951 relative to transition of the 92nd Bombardment Wing to B-36 Aircraft. He was also on temporary

6 / Pic: General Irvine Complimenting Crew of B-36 #2073 after completing 1000 flying hours

duty at Goose Bay, Labrador, for inspection of the existing facilities for utilization as a B-36 staging base.

Two B-36 Aircraft of the 7th and two from the 11th Bombardment Wings participated on 19 May in Armed Forces Day flyovers of towns and cities designated by higher headquarters. Those missions were completed successfully except where weather prevented.

On 30 May, Memorial Day, one B-36 of the 11th Bombardment Wing, distributed rose petals over Carswell Air Force Base in conjunction with services at the grave of Major Horace Carswell, in whose honor this base was named.

A B-36 aircraft, #44-92660 of the 9th Bombardment Squadron, 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, Carswell Air Force Base, crashed at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, at approximately 1330 Central Standard Time (CST) 6 May 1951. This Aircraft departed Carswell at 1038 CST, 6 May, with 25 personnel aboard for 30 days temporary duty on a classified mission.

Upon arrival at Kirtland Air Force Base, there was a 30 mile per hour East wind with possible down drafts at the approach end of the runway. On the final approach the aircraft was left of the center line, so the pilot assumed a right wing low position to correct this. In assuming this attitude, the right jet pod and # 6 propeller struck the runway approximately 458 feet from the final approach end. The blades of # 6 propeller were torn off and the right jet pod was scraped on the under side; however, the jet pod did not tear loose from the wing. The pilot undoubtly decided to go around as power was applied to the remaining reciprocating engines. The aircraft became airborne approximately 375 feet from initial touchdown with the right wing approximately 17° low. In continuing the turn, the angle of bank increased to approximately 75° right wing low position. The maximum altitude achieved in the turn was about 200 feet. Being unable to maintain this altitude in the sharp bank, the right wing struck the ground in a northerly direction

approximately 3,600 feet south of the initial contact point, and immediately burst into flames.

Of the personnel aboard, 22 were killed instantly, one survivor died shortly thereafter, and two survivors are remaining. This accident will be covered in detail in the 7th Bombardment Wing History for May 1951.

Office of the Inspector General

The 7th and 11th Wing Inspection Section began the second semi-annual inspection scheduled on 21 May. The schedules include follow-up inspection of the tactical wings which will continue through the month of September 1951.

Inspection activities during May were routine, including same informal unscheduled inspections of certain activities. A team of United States Air Force (USAF) inspectors was present during the first of May on matters pertaining to maintenance and supply. This delayed the assigned semi-annual inspection scheduled for the base by at least a week.

Office of Deputy for Materiel

B-36 aircraft #44-2649 was damaged by fire during the month of May. The fire was believed to have originated due to alternator disintergration during a "green run". The necessary arrangements were made by this office with CVAC to repair this aircraft.

In an attempt to acquaint key maintenance personnel of tactical units scheduled to receive B-36 type aircraft, a familiarization training course was initiated at this base. The training is to be practical work on the aircraft and formal class room instruction by the Mobile Training Detachment. A total of 33 airmen and one officer from Walker Air Force Base, New Mexico, arrived at Carswell Air Force Base on 28 May to commence this training.

A conference convened at CVAC, Fort Worth, Texas, to establish preliminary plans, outline objectives, and discuss the modification of the B-36 Service Test Program to be conducted jointly by CVAC and Carswell. The Headquarters represented at this conference were: Strategic

Air Command, Eighth Air Force, Fifteenth Air Force, Air Materiel Command, and 19th Air Division. It was agreed and arrangements were completed to initiate a familiarization course of instruction on (R-4360-53 engines) for personnel participating in the program. Carswell was committed for crews, and maintenance personnel to support this service test program. Carswell AFB, Operational Engineering Section (OES) was designated as the monitoring agency for the R-4360-53 improvement and data gathering program. Carswell operation personnel will plan missions and effect coordination with Eighth AF, SAC, and CVAC Flight Test Unit to insure, insofar as possible, that realistic combat profiles are flown.

The proposed recommendation for the expansion of maintenance at base level, which was started in April, was completed during May. (See History, 19th Air Division for April 1951, page 2)

On May 22nd a letter was sent to the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, subject: Expansion of Maintenance at Base Level. The letter was attached to

recommendations which concerned only personnel, equipment, and floor space requirements.

It was strongly advised, by the 19th Air Division, that the using agencies of these facilities be contacted regarding their required supply levels and their rate of consumption. Without adequate supplies, it was noted, the expansion of the maintenance facilities would obviously be a useless expenditure.

In these recommendations, the fixed base concept for heavy bombardment type aircraft has been used as the guide for determining the extent to which expansion of maintenance, at base levels, could best benefit the heavy bombardment type program.

Also this letter pointed out that it is not intended that extensive repair and overhaul will be fully exercised at all times. Those items in critical supply will be given priority in accordance with the needs of the base; while items in regular repetitive use will be repaired or overhauled on master schedules as needed for stock replenishment, with excessive

workloads being evacuated to the responsible Air Materiel Areas.

Copies of the recommendations for expansion of Maintenance at Base level are appended. 7/

The report of tentative plans for movement of the 11th Bombardment Wing from Carswell Air Force Base to Limestone Air Force Base, Maine, was completed and forwarded during May. (See History, 19th Air Division for April 1951, page 4.)

Present plans of the Strategic Air Command provide for the movement of the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy to Maine during the second quarter of fiscal year 1952. A tentative movement date was established as 1 November 1951. X-Day has been set up to be the symbol for the movement day, or 1 November 1951.

The movement plan for the 11th Bombardment Wing will be formulated to permit this wing to maintain combat effectiveness during and subsequent to the period of the move.

7/ Copies: Recommendations for expansion of Maint at Base level, see appendix no. 7.

Plans for the movement will be based on the assumption that housing for military personnel will be available on 1 November 1951.

During the period of the move the wing will remain under the jurisdiction of the 19th Air Division, but after the move has been completed, it will be directly under the command of the 8th Air Force.

Preliminary planning, supply action, organization and preparation for movement of the units of the 11th Air Base Group, is slated to take place between now and X-75 days.

Phase II extends from X-75 days to X-Day. It included activation of the 11th Air Base Group at Limestone Air Force Base and preparation for movement of units of the 11th Air Base Group and one combat squadron.

From X-Day to X+30 days is Phase III of the movement plan. This phase includes the completion of movement for units of the 11th Air Base Group; the inactivation of 4215th Base Service Squadron and the transfer of its accounts and personnel to the 11th Air

Base Group; one combat squadron and advance maintenance echelon arrives at Limestone Air Force Base not later than X+30 days.

Phase IV covers the period from X+30 days to X+60 days. This phase includes the movement of maintenance squadrons to Limestone and the remaining two combat squadrons will also be moved as soon as maintenance capability is established there.

A copy of the tentative movement plan for the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, to Limestone Air Force Base, Maine, is appended. 8 /

8 / Plan 1-51; Movement of the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, from Carswell AFB to Limestone AFB, Maine, dtd 17 May 51, see appendix no. 8.

Appendix

APPENDIX

Appendix No. 1

Organization	30 Apr 51		31 May 51	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers	10	8	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	6	7	7
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	56	83	56	77
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	140	101	108	115
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	2	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	0	0	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	25	100	91
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	199	231	198
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	75	100	96
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	187	231	189
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	88	100	92
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	192	231	205
7107th Gp & Alloc Sq				
Officers	9	16	9	16
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	2
Airmen	280	330	280	365

1732

Organization	30 Apr 51		31 May 51	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th F Ai Sq				
Officers	10	7	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	430	460	442	490
40l0th CM Sq				
Officers	4	5	4	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	210	281	307
Hq 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	54	55	54	71
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	2
Airmen	102	93	102	103
Hq 11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
2 6th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	85	100	90
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	223	231	227
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	80	100	90
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	231	214	231	230

1733

Organization	30 Apr 51		31 May 51	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
28th Tech Sq				
Officers	100	83	100	87
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	209	231	229
11th Q Ant Sq				
Officers	10	8	10	7
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	430	394	442	423
AOI(Th) Of Sq				
Officers	4	3	4	3
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	0
Airmen	281	217	281	257
AC1Ath Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	16	9	19
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	279	362	279	400
Hq & Hq Sq 7th A/D Gp				
Officers	43	109	43	112
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	237	346	247	388
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	14	12	14	14
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	441	544	441	487

1734

Organization	30 Apr 51		31 May 51	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	7	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	121	209	235
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	5	7	5	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	200	195	198	190
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	8	4	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	159	174	177
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	7	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	165	202	186
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	1	5	3
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	150	202	161
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	11	9	11	9
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	205	188	205	201

1735

Organization	30 Apr 1951		31 May 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	11	10	11
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	177	1[illegible]	177	1[illegible]6
40[illegible]th Ops Sq				
Officers	13	15	13	15
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	226	261	226	2[illegible]
40[illegible]th Ops Sq				
Officers	11	11	11	12
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	135	120	135	144
7th Med Sq				
Officers	66	47	59	59
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	218	174	1[illegible]1	165
11th Med Sq				
Officers	17	11	35	11
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	73	63	137	[illegible]4
[illegible]th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	4	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	4
Airmen	23[illegible]	204	238	217

1736

Organization	30 Apr 51		31 Apr 51	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	6	3	6	3
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	134	217	142
565th Trng				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	47	34	49
7th Avn S				
Officers	16	17	16	17
Warrant Officers	6	8	6	4
Airmen	24	24	24	28
4005th MAF Sq				
Officers	1	1	1	2
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	3	3	4
Total Officers	1002	900	1013	1002
Total Warrant Officers	7	25	7	21
Total Airmen	6831	6507	6868	7109

1737

Appendix No. 8

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

GENERAL ORDER
NUMBER 7

1 May 1951

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ADJUTANT GENERAL

MAJOR HUGH O. CASON, AO183817, USAF, is announced as Adjutant General, this headquarters, vice CAPTAIN JOHN L. WINKEL, 13923A, USAF, reassigned.

C. S. IRVINE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: "A"

Appendix No. 3

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

POSITION	NAME	RANK
C. G. 19th Air Division	Irvine, C. S.	Maj Gen
Deputy For Materiel	Chambers, Walter E.	Col
Deputy For Operation	Calhoun, William R. Jr.	Col
I. G. 19th Air Division	Black, Richard T.	Col
Staff Observer ADDO	Downey, Clyde J.	Lt. Col
Asst Deputy For Operation	Harrison, William C.	Maj
Adjutant General	Cason, Hugh, C.	Maj
Aide-de-Camp	Kaake, William E.	1st Lt.

Appendix No. 4

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

* 7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY *

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
9th Bomb Squadron	508:25
436th Bomb Squadron	516:30
492nd Bomb Squadron	555:05
Total 7th Bomb Wing	1580:00

Appendix No 6

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

* 11TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY *

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
26th Bomb Squadron	347:00
42nd Bomb Squadron	377:20
98th Bomb Squadron	336:10
Total 11th Bomb Wing	1060:30

General Irvine complimenting A/C Commander and part of crew upon completion of 1,000 hours

Appendix No. 7

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

1750

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

Incl 1

KODAK SAFETY FILM

1765

1766

1767

SECTION : Hydraulic Shop

Stock Number	Nomenclature	Amount
8017-T-161530-1	Wrench, 7½" Vickers accumulator	2 ea
8017-T-161530-2	Wrench, 7½" Vickers accumulator	2 ea
8017-T-161531-1	Wrench, 10" Vickers accumulator	2 ea
8017-T-161531-2	Wrench, 10" Vickers accumulator	2 ea
8100-46[illegible]30	Honing Machine small parts	1 ea
7900- 31250	Gage, depth micrometer 0 to 3" grad in. .001" base type 7 spec GGG-C-106	1 ea
7900- 36230	Gage, bit adj 0 to 1"	1 ea
7900-368640	Spanner wrenches 3½ to 6"	1 ea
7900-36[illegible]0	Spanner wreches 3/4 to 2"	1 ea
7900-[illegible]760	Spanner wrenches 1½ to 3"	1 ea

Control Number	Instrument Nomenclature	Amount
4010-1770	Latch, Navigation	1 ea
4010-1770	Latch, Navigation, Master	1 ea
4010-1770	Latch, Navigation, Master	1 ea
7920-[illegible]	Duty, Air, Short Fluorescent	10 ea
5930-[illegible]	Varios, Variable transformer	1 ea
5305-[illegible]	Fastener, Stainless Steel Type	1 ea
5305-[illegible]	Shield, Face protection	1 ea
1680-[illegible]	Cutter, Multitooth	1 ea
1680-[illegible]	Cutter, Tube	1 ea
1680-[illegible]	Cutter, Multitooth	1 ea
1680-[illegible]	Cutter, Multitooth	1 ea
5120-[illegible]	Driver, Tubular	1 ea
7105-[illegible]	Frame, Arbor	1 ea
8105-[illegible]	Stool, Metal	10 ea
7920-[illegible]	Sheet, Tool	1 ea
7909-[illegible]	Cutter, Soldering	1 ea
7910-[illegible]	Frame, Sawing	1 ea
7920-[illegible]	Tool Assy, terminal connector	1 ea
7909-[illegible]	Stripper, Wire	1 ea
7909-[illegible]	Wire, bench	10 ea
7909-L	Part No. LF 80 JIC, Sealing locks Eng. Del	1 ea.
7909-L	Part No. LF 80-3 spring, soldering locks Eng co.	1 ea
7909-L	Part No. GA 81000175 Pliers, Truearc #5	1 ea
7909-L	Part No. GAD-85-87 Pliers, Truearc #2	1 ea

1771

1774

SECTION: Miscellaneous Equipment

Stock Number	Nomenclature	Amount
7920-001400	Pliers, piston ring remover	1 ea
7920-007100	Reamer, cylinder ridge torque 2 11/16 to 5" cap	1 ea
7920-002870	Replacer, valvebay split type	1 ea
7920-070000	Punch, cutting leather double bow 7/16" type 6 class A spec 000-1-001	1 ea
7920-070100	Punch, cutting leather double bow 1/2" type 6 class A spec 000-1-001	1 ea
7920-000000	Punch, cutting leather single bow 1/0" type 6 class B spec 000-1-001	1 ea
7920-000100	Punch, cutting leather single bow 0/10" type 6 class B spec 000-1-001	1 ea
7920-000800	Punch cutting leather single bow 1/4" type 6 class B spec 000-1-001	1 ea
7920-000800	Punch cutting leather single bow 6/10" type 6 class B spec 000-1-001	1 ea
7920-000400	Punch leather cutting single bow 7/10" type 6 class B spec 000-1-001	1 ea
7920-000825	Handle socket wrench torque indicating scale 1/2" sq dr 0 to 100 ft lbs 1000	1 ea
7920-000800	Handle, socket wrench torque indicating scale 1/2" sq dr 0 to 1000 in lbs	1 ea
7920-000000	Puller, gear, bearing and wheel 2 arm 6" cap O.D. type B class 1 spec Jan 1-000 Owatonna or equal	1 ea
7920-000010	Puller, gear bearing and wheel 2 arm 6" cap. OD reversible type B class 2 spec Jan 1-000 Wantenna or equal	1 ea
7920-000000	Puller, gear bearing and wheel 2 arm 6" cap OD reversible type C class 1 spec Jan-1-000 Owantonna or equal	1 ea
7920-000000	Extractor, screw 2-ay out No 1	1 ea
7920-000000	Extractor, screw 2-ay out No 2	1 ea

Incl #3

46		46170	1		1		
46		46180	1		1		
4		46190	1		1		
4		46195	1		1		
46		46196	1		1	0	
4		46197	1		1	0	
41		46198	1		1	0	
4		46199	0		1	1	
46		46270	1		1	0	
46		46280	1		1	0	
4		46290	0		1	1	
4		46295	0		1	1	
4		46296	0		1	1	
4		46297	0		1	1	
4		46298	0		1	1	
4		46299	0		1	1	
4		46350	0		1	1	
4		70080	0		4	4	
4		46[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	
46		6017	1		1		
4		60150	1		1	0	
4		60160	2		4	2	
4		60170	1		1		
46		[illegible]					
47		60170	0		1	1	
47171		60171	1		1		
		60180	1		10	10	
		60190	0		0	0	
46		60196	0		1	1	
4		60198	0		0	0	
4		60199	0		0	0	
46		[illegible]					
65		60490	1		1		
6		60571	0		0	0	
6		60580	10		07	14	
6		60590	0		30	42	
6		[illegible]					
6		60670	1		1	1	
6		60680	0		10	7	
6		60690	4		10	8	
6		[illegible]					
64		60670	0		1	1	
6		60680	7		10	14	
6		60690	1		3	4	
6		[illegible]					
66		4483	0		0	0	
67		47181	1		1	0	
67		47182	0		0	1	
6		47191	2		0	1	
66		66181	1		1		
66		66182	0		0		
66		[illegible]010	0		0		
60		4[illegible]1	1		2	1	
60		48183	2		4	2	
60		48184	2		4	2	
61		48191	18		18	9	
61		48192	11		22	11	
		TOTAL	113		227	219	

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CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix No. 8

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

PROGRAMMING PLAN 1-51 17 May 1951

SUBJECT: Movement of the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, from Carswell AFB Texas to Limestone AFB, Maine

OBJECTIVE

1. To provide this headquarters with a plan which when implemented will result in the efficient movement of the 11th Bomb Wg, H, from Carswell AFB to Limestone AFB.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Present plans of SAC provide for the movement of the 11th Bomb Wg, H, to Limestone AFB during the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 1952. A tentative movement date has been established for 1 Nov 51.

3. For planning purposes, the date of movement will be referred to as X-Day. Until further notice, X-Day will be assumed to be 1 Nov 51.

4. The following ground rules will apply:

a. The movement plan for the 11th Bomb Wg, H, will be formulated to permit this wing to maintain combat effectiveness during and subsequent to the period of the move.

b. Plans for the movement of the 11th Bomb Wg, H, will be based on the assumption that housing for military personnel will be available on X-Day.

c. If possible, SAC and 8th AF will assume jurisdiction over Limestone AFB prior to X-Day.

d. The 11th Bomb Wg, H, will remain under the jurisdiction of the 19th Air Div during the period of the move.

e. After the move has been completed, the 11th Bomb Wg, H, will be directly under the command of 8th AF.

f. The CO, 11th Bomb Wg, H, will be responsible on

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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1792

14. The Director of Plans will:

a. Distribute and coordinate this programming plan.

b. Furnish the required movement directives.

c. Request reactivation of the 11th Air Base Gp on X-75.

d. Insure that the detailed movement plan is furnished this headquarters.

e. Provide for any special augmentation required for or peculiar to Limestone AFB or the 11th Bomb Wg.

f. Upon completion of the movement of the 11th Bomb Wg, [illegible], to Limestone AFB request authority from SAC to deactivate the 19th Air Div.

15. All staff agencies will:

a. Insure maximum coordination and cooperation in the planning and execution of this movement and programming plan.

b. Appoint a project officer to monitor this program and submit reports on progress in accordance with 6th AF Staff Memo 53-1. The name and telephone number of the appointed officer will be furnished the Comptroller 6th AF, ATTN: Chief, Special Analysis Branch at the earliest possible date.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ANDERSON:

CLIFFORD [illegible], REES
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

History

19th AIR DIVISION

JUNE
1951

Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERSONNEL

For the second consecutive month the assigned strength of the 19th Air Division Headquarters was on the increase. On 31 May 1951, the total was eight officers and six airmen, but on 30 June the total had increased to seven airmen. There were no changes recorded in the number of assigned officers.

The total assigned strength of the 19th Air Division was also on the up-swing during June 1951. On the 1st of June the reported total assigned personnel was 8,182, of which 1,052 were officers, 21 were warrant officers and 7,109 airmen. But, the report for the 30th of June, shows 8,358 assigned personnel within the 19th Air Division. Of this amount, 1,081 were officers, 22 warrant officers and 7,252 airmen. Comparing these totals we find an increase of 176 personnel. Twenty-nine officers, 143 airmen and one warrant officer are noted as gains during the month. Again this month, as it has been in the past four months, the increase in personnel is due to the large number of basic airmen and recalled officers and airmen who are being assigned

RESTRICTED

to this Base. The authorized and assigned strength, by individual units, of the 19th Air Division is appended. 1/

Lieutenant Colonel Charles T. Moreland was assigned as Assistant Deputy for Operations during June 1951. Colonel Moreland's autobiography is appended. 2/ Major William C. Harrison, who was the Assistant until now, was reassigned to Headquarters, 8th Air Force, effective 18 June 1951. A roster of Key Personnel 3/ and photographs of Key Personnel of the 19th Air Division are appended. a/

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Office of Deputy for Operation:

An all time high in flying time was recorded by the 19th Air Division during June. A total of 3,027 hours were flown; which is the most time ever flown by the 19th Air Division in one month. It shows the continued increase in operation of B-36 type aircraft. The 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, flew 1,643 hours, and the 7th completed 1,348 during the same time.

1/ Authorized and Assigned Strength of the 19th Air Division is appended, see appendix no 1

2/ Autobiography of Colonel Moreland, see appendix no 2

3/ Roster of Key Personnel of the 19th Air Division is appended, see appendix no 3

a/ Photos of Key Personnel of the 19th Air Division are appended, see appendix no a

RESTRICTED

Also the 26th Bombardment Squadron, of the 11th Bombardment Wing, set a new record by logging 607:30 hours during June. This was the most flying time ever produced by a squadron for a one month period. Hours flown, by individual squadrons of the 7th [4] and the 11th [5], Bombardment Wings, Heavy, are appended.

The 26th Bombardment Squadron was in the limelight twice during the month. Besides setting a new flying record, it was also awarded the Flying Safety Plaque along with the 9th Bombardment Squadron of the 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy. The tie occurred even after the 19th Air Division had devised a new seven-point rating system for determining flying safety proficiency. Scoring is now as follows: 20 points for an accident-free period; 10 points for lack of any Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) or airdrome violations; 20 points for unit flying safety; 20 points for crew proficiency; 10 points for Division Flying Safety Meeting attendance; 10 points for abort rate and better utilization of each hour flown; and ten points for

[4] Hours flown by individual squadrons of the 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, see appendix no 4

[5] Hours flown by individual squadrons of the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, see appendix no 5

percentage of six-hour transition time completed and estimated amount of new knowledge acquired by the crew during simulated combat missions. Both squadrons received 98 points under the new system of grading. To gain these points the average flying time for aircraft of the 9th Bombardment Squadron was 98.9 while that for the planes of the 26th was 105.26. However, to prevent any ties in the future three new items for which a safety score will be given are: ground control approach landings, transition flying, and instrument flying. These all have bearing on flying safety, and it was felt by the 19th Air Division that they should be included in the list. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Rogers, commander of the 26th Bombardment Squadron, and Major Douglas H. Smith, acting commander of the 9th Bombardment Squadron, were presented with the plaque at the monthly flying meeting. A photograph of the presentation of this plaque is appended. b/

Several officers from other nations visited

b/ Photo of Flying Safety Plaque presentation is appended, see appendix no b

1804

Carswell Air Force Base during this month and were escorted around the base by Colonel Calhoun of the 19th Air Division Headquarters. Commandant S. L. Bosch, Air Attache from South Africa was here on 21 June and the following personnel from the British Royal Navy visited here on 22 June: Captain J. R. Barnes, Commander J. C. A. Ingran, Commander W. H. N. Martin, and Commander R. D. Sterndale-Buenett.

Missions ordered by higher headquarters and flown by this organization were an Operational Readiness Test Mission (ORT) including planes from both the 7th and the 11th Bombardment Wings. These missions took place on the 6th and the 8th of June and included 36 B-36's. The results insured that the 19th Air Division is capable of supporting and successfully accomplishing its assigned mission. On 22 June, 12 B-36's of the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, participated in an Air Defense Command (ADC) mission. The 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, had planes assigned to them fly over the Arnold Engineering Division Center, Tulahoma, Tennessee,

on 25 June. Then on 28 June, three aircraft from the 7th Bombardment Wing flew non-stop to Lakenheath, England, from Carswell. A more detailed report on these missions will be included in the 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings' Histories for June 1951.

Office of the Inspector General:

All activities within the 7th and 11th Wing Inspector's Sections continued the Semi-Annual inspections according to schedule. A 7th Air Base Group Inspection Section was activated during the month; however, the Wing Inspectors will complete the current inspection schedules which include the Air Base Group activities, with the Air Base Group Inspectors observing and assisting in the inspection activities.

Office of Deputy for Materiel:

During the month of June, a total of 3,027 hours were accomplised by the Tactical units of the 19th Air Division. This is an average of 71 hours per assigned B-36 aircraft, and is the greatest amount of flying time ever accomplished during a one month

operation. In support of this flying time, a total of 24 - 100 hour inspections were completed with an average time of 4.4 days for each inspection. A total of 43 engines were changed; this too, is the greatest number of engine changes in any 30 day period.

Five B-36D's were received from San Diego, California, for assignment during June. This brought the total assigned aircraft to 44 - B-36D's in the 19th Air Division.

The Accelerated Service Test of the B-36D is continuing with good results. A number of profile missions have been accomplished, and all indications are that a decision may be reached within a short time as to the reliability of the 4360-53 engines. Several relatively minor discrepancies have been reported during this test. However, no major problems have been encountered, and it is believed that Air Force acceptance of these aircraft will begin in July 1951.

The supply situation for aircraft parts has become

increasingly critical during this reporting period. The inability of Supply to procure necessary engines, and "bits and pieces", retarded our engine build-up line to the extent that only 39 engines were built-up during this period, although 43 engines were used. This situation has been brought to the attention of higher headquarters through personal contacts and correspondence. Because of the critical B-36 part situation, Air Force wide, a policy was established that the 19th Air Division limit the amount of flying time to the minimum consistent with training requirements for July.

HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

June 1951

PREPARED

BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - 2nd Lt. ROSE A. PALMER

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - T Sgt James H. Mitchell

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - Cpl Laurence L. Benson

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division."

C. S. IRVINE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

1809

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Appendix No 1

Organization	31 May 1951		30 June 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
19th Adv Division Hqs				
Officers	10	8	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	6	7	7
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing, H				
Officers	56	77	59	81
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	108	113	110	119
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	91	100	97
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	198	229	208
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	96	100	98
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	189	229	210
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	92	100	94
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	205	229	221
40[illegible]0th Gnd & Aloc Sq				
Officers	9	16	9	18
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	280	365	280	354

1812

Organization	31 May 1951		30 June 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th Maint Sq				
Officers	10	8	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	442	490	442	499
4010th OM Sq				
Officers	4	4	4	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	297	281	307
H.q 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	54	71	57	67
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	3
Airmen	102	103	104	129
Hq11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	90	100	95
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	231	227	229	233
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	90	100	69
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	231	230	229	237

1813

Organization	31 May 1951		30 June 1952	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
92d [illegible] Sq				
Officers	10	87	100	93
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	251	229	239	236
11[illegible] Lt Sq				
Officers	10	7	10	9
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	446	433	442	435
4[illegible]4th Cml Sq				
Officers	4	3	4	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	257	281	240
4[illegible]14th Armt & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	19	9	21
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	279	400	279	373
Hq [illegible] Hq Sq 7th A/B Gp				
Officers	49	112	45	106
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	247	388	247	384
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	14	14	14	13
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	441	497	441	500

1814

Organization	31 May 1951		30 June 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	235	209	231
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	5	9	5	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	198	190	198	203
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	9	4	11
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	177	174	186
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	186	202	193
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	161	202	154
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	11	9	11	11
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	205	201	211	220

1815

Organization	31 May 1951		30 June 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	11	10	12
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	177	186	183	186
49th Ops Sq				
Officers	13	15	13	13
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	225	288	225	279
407th Ops Sq				
Officers	11	12	11	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	135	144	135	171
7th Med Sq				
Officers	59	48	59	46
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	191	165	191	159
11th Med Sq				
Officers	35	11	35	20
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	137	64	137	88
7th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	4	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	238	217	238	217

1816

Organization	31 May 1951		30 June 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	235	209	231
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	5	9	5	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	198	190	198	203
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	9	4	11
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	177	174	186
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	186	202	193
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	161	202	154
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	11	9	11	11
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	205	201	211	220

1817

Organization	30 May 1953		30 June 1953	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Ltr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	182	217	200
565th Band				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	19	34	19
7th Avn Sq				
Officers	16	17	16	16
Warrant Officers	6	4	6	4
Airmen	24	28	24	28
AOG 5th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	2	1	2
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	4	3	4
Total Officers	1013	1052	1021	1031
Total Warrant Officers	7	21	7	22
Total Airmen	6868	7109	6872	7252

1818

Appendix No 2

Biography of Lieutenant Colonel Charles T. Moreland

Lieutenant Colonel Charles T. Moreland, Jr. was born on 27 December, 1920, in Post Oak, Texas. He graduated from Post Oak High School in 1938, attended Howard Payne College, Brownwood, Texas for 3 years, from September 1938 to June 1941. While in college he served for one year in enlisted status in the Texas National Guard, assigned to an Infantry Company, 142d Battalion, 36th Division.

He enlisted as an aviation cadet on 2 September 1941 and graduated as a pilot with commission as 2d Lieutenant, 21 May 1942. Upon graduation, Colonel Moreland was assigned to the heavy bombardment program, and completed a tour of combat consisting of 25 missions as first pilot of a B-17 in the European Theater in 1943. He was assigned to the 500th Bomb Group upon his return from Europe, and transferred to Saipan with the 500th Bomb Group in October 1944. He completed 20 combat missions as aircraft commander with a B-29 lead crew.

Colonel Moreland went into the B-36 program in January 1949, and has been connected with the very heavy bombardment aircraft ever since, except for breaks of short duration.

APPENDIX No 3

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

POSITION	NAME	RANK
C. G. 19th Air Division	Irvine, C. B.	Maj Gen
Deputy For Materiel	Chambers, Walter E.	Col
Deputy For Operation	Calhoun, William R. Jr.	Col
I. G. 19th Air Division	Black, Richard T.	Col
Staff Observer ADDO	Downey, Clyde J.	Lt. Col
Asst Deputy For Operation	Moreland, Charles T.	Lt. Col
Adjutant General	Cason, Hugh C.	Maj
Aide-de-Camp	Kaake, William E.	1st Lt.

Appendix No 4

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

9TH BOMBARDMENT WING HEAVY

JUNE 1951

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
9th Bomb Squadron	500:40
436th Bomb Squadron	446:55
492d Bomb Squadron	436:30
Grand Total	1384:05

Appendix No 5

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

11TH BOMBARDMENT WING HEAVY

JUNE 1951

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
26th Bomb Squadron	607:30
42d Bomb Squadron	503:40
98th Bomb Squadron	532:35
Grand Total	1643:45

PHOTOGRAPHS

1827

APPENDIX "A"

MAJOR GENERAL C.S. IRVINE C.G. 15TH AIR DIVISION

DEPUTY FOR MATERIEL COLONEL WALTER E. CHAMBERS

Appendix B

APPENDIX C.

DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS COLONEL WILLIAM R. CALHOUN JR.

APPENDIX 8.

I. G. 1954 AIR DIVISION COLONEL RICHAR T. BLACK

APPENDIX B.

STAFF OBSERVER ADDO LT. COLONEL CLYDE J. DOWNEY

APPENDIX 4.

ASST DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS LT. COL CHARLES T. MORELAND

APPENDIX C

MAJOR HUGH A CASON ADJOTANT GENERAL 1944 A.D.

APPENDIX C.

1.ST LT. WILLIAM E. KAAKE AIDE-DE-CAMP

Appendix B

LEFT TO RIGHT: GENERAL IRVINE; COLONEL ROBERTS; MAJOR SMITH; AND COLONEL CALHOUN

PRESENTATION OF FLYING SAFETY PLAQUE

History

19th AIR DIVISION

JULY
1951

Carswell Air Force Base

Fort Worth, Texas

K-DIV-19-HI
JULY-1951

SECRET

SECRET

1844

HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

July 1951

PREPARED
BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - 2d Lt. ROSE A. PALMER

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - T Sgt James H. Mitchell

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - Sgt Laurence L. Benson

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division"

O. S. IRVINE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

SECRET

PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERSONNEL

The assigned strength of the 19th Air Division Headquarters remained unchanged during July, for the first time since the activation on 16 February 1951. On 28 February, nine officers and three airmen were assigned and two additional airmen were performing duty in this headquarters pending their assignment orders. On 31 July, eight officers and seven airmen were assigned, which are the same totals reported in June. (See History, 19th Air Division for June, page 1).

On 18 July, one change was recorded concerning key personnel of Division Headquarters. Major Ralph Wallace, Jr., replaced Lieutenant Colonel Charles T. Moreland as Assistant Deputy for Operations. Colonel Moreland was then reassigned as Commanding Officer for the recently activated B-36 Air Training Squadron (Provisional). The roster of Key Personnel of the 19th Air Division Headquarters is Appended. 1 /

The assigned military strength of the 19th Air Division and components increased 120 during July.

SECRET

Last month, the assigned strength was 8,355, and by the 31 July this total had gone to 8,475. A breakdown of this figure shows a gain of 39 officers, 82 airmen, and a loss of one warrant officer. Of the assigned strength, 1,120 were officers, 21 warrant officers, and 7,334 airmen. Assignment, reassignment, and the constant shifting and adding of new personnel to Carswell Air Force Base were seen as reasons for this increase in strength. The authorized and assigned strength, by individual units, of the 19th Air Division is appended. 2 /

The total assigned civilian personnel strength was 431 on 1 July, and 437 as of 31 July 1951. A gain of six for the month is noted.

ORGANIZATION

Nineteenth Air Division General Order Number 9, dated and effective 16 July 1951, provided for activation of the B-36 Training Group (Provisional) at Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas, with assignment to the 19th Air Division. 3 /

2 / Chart: Auth and Assgd Strength by Units, 19th Air Division for July 1951, See Appendix No 2

3 / 19th Air Division General Order No 9, dtd 16 July 1951, See Appendix No 3

SECRET

This newly activated Group is under the Command of Colonel Richard T. Black. Lieutenant Colonel Charles T. Moreland, was assigned as Commanding Officer of the B-36 Air Training Squadron (Prov). Pending assignment at a later date, the following key personnel were utilized in establishing and initiating the B-36 Training Group (Prov): Lieutenant Colonel Stephen C. Matula, 7th Air Base Group; Major Delbert L. Huffman, Operations Officer, 492d Bombardment Squadron; and Major Edwin D. Easley, Ground Training Officer, 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy.

The mission of the B-36 Training Group (Prov) is for the "transition of air crew personnel to B-36 operations, and to monitor the many phases of ground training requirements for air crew and ground crew personnel".

The period from 16 July to 1 August was utilized in establishing flying training curricula, and ways and means of conducting training through mutual cooperation and support between the B-36 Training Group (Prov) and the 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings, Heavy.

SECRET

Also during these 15 days, time was spent in briefing the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Major General Samuel E. Anderson, relating to the requirements of a B-36 Training Group (Prov). At the request of General Anderson, the same briefing was presented to Lieutenant General Curtis E. LeMay, Commanding General Strategic Air Command, and his staff.

Target date for initiating actual flying transition training was established as 1 August 1951.

The one problem encountered thus far by the B-36 Training Group (Prov) was the crowded conditions of the base which caused a shortage of facilities, such as, a building to be used as an orderly room and office equipment. So far it has not been authorized to requisition material, and for the most part, what they are now using has been allocated or borrowed.

OFFICE of DEPUTY for OPERATIONS

A restriction of 1400 flying hours per wing was placed into effect by Major General C. S. Irvine, Commanding

General, 19th Air Division, for the purpose of increasing the supply level and placing a premium on good planning. A better utilization of flying time for the accomplishment of Strategic Air Command (SAC) requirements was stressed. This cut the two tactical wings of the 19th Air Division to 2539:55 hours, which is 487:10 hours less than that flown in June. The assigned aircraft of the 7th Bombardment Wing, flew 1412:00 hours while those of the 11th Bombardment Wing, accounted for 1126:00. The number of hours flown by individual squadrons of the 7th 4 / and the 11th 5 / Bombardment Wings are appended. Sufficient B-36D aircraft are presently assigned to each wing to accomplish their assigned missions.

Two B-36D aircraft of the 11th Bombardment Wing, and six from the 7th Bombardment Wing, participated in staging maneuver from Goose Bay Air Force Base, Labrador, between the 16th and 25th of July 1951. One B-36D from the 7th Bomb Wing, flew to Limestone Air Force Base, Maine, for the purpose of conducting refueling tests. Then on 25 July, one B-36D of the 11th Bomb Wing, flew to Westover

4 / Hours Flown by the Units of 7th Bomb Wing, See Appendix No 4

5 / Hours Flown by the Units of the 11th Bomb Wing, See Appendix No 5

SECRET

Air Force Base to survey facilities there. All missions were reported as "completed successfully" and will be discussed more fully in the 7th and 11th Bombardment Wing's Histories for July.

OFFICE of the DEPUTY for MATERIEL

A total of 2,539 hours were flown by tactical units of the 19th Air Division. This is an average of 67 hours per aircraft.

To support this effort, thirty 100 hour inspections were completed, and three acceptance inspections with an average elapsed time of 5.12 calendar days per inspection. Again this month the number of engine changes was increased to a total of 56, or 13 more than for any other 30 day period.

The B-36F service test was completed in July 1951. (See 19th Air Division History for June 1951, page 7). Sufficient data was accumulated to justify acceptance of aircraft in the present power plant configuration. The 19th Air Division will be the first Tactical Command

SECRET

to be equipped with B-36D type aircraft.

Preliminary plans were formulated to establish an engine conditioning program based on the concept of removing power packages from aircraft inspection periods nearest 200 hours of engine life, and mounting them on suitable stands to facilitate complete inspection of components. These inspection requirements include valve check, inspection of valve guides, rocker arms, cylinder compression, ignition timing, inspection of accessories, ducts, fan, diffuser, afterbody and exhaust system components. This program, when fully implemented, will tend to improve engine life, and reduce the out-of-commission time for 100 hour inspection.

Plans are now underway to alleviate the critical shortage of "bits and pieces" which were reported to have existed during June. A request was initiated outlining requirements for spares and special tools to support the B-36F program. Plans also were made to establish a familiarization course for B-36 mechanics.

OFFICE of the INSPECTOR GENERAL

Base and Wing activities were inspected according to schedule during the month of July by inspection teams of the 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings. The current Schedule was approximately half completed at the end of the month. This schedule continues through 21 September 1951, including follow-up inspections on completed semi-annuals.

The 7th Bomb Wing Inspector and a team from that office inspected certain special subjects and personal conference periods during the period nine to 12 July at Gray Air Force Base, Texas. Another visit to that base is tentatively planned by the 7th Bomb Wing Inspectors during the month of August.

Presentation of Awards

Major General C. S. Irvine presented the Oak Leaf Cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross, 4th and 5th Cluster to the Air Medal to Mrs. Walter S. King, wife of Lieutenant Colonel Walter S. King. Colonel King is missing in action in Korea.

APPENDIX

Appendix No. 1

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

POSITION	NAME	RANK
C. G. 19th Air Division	Irvine, C. S.	Maj Gen
Deputy For Materiel	Chambers, Walter E.	Col
Deputy For Operations	Calhoun, William R. Jr.	Col
I. G. 19th Air Division	Black, Richard T.	Col
Staff Observer ADDC	Downey, Clyde J.	Lt. Col
Asst Deputy For Operations	Wallace, Ralph	Maj
Adjutant General	Cason, Hugh C.	Maj
Aide-de-Camp	Kauke, William E.	1st Lt.

Organization	30 April 1943		31 May 1943	
	Auth	Aggd	Auth	Aggd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers	10	8	10	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	9	7	7
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	59	61	59	61
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	110	119	110	117
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	97	100	100
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	208	229	223
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	98	100	100
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	210	229	225
441st Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	94	100	94
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	221	229	238
441st Ord & Armt Sq				
Officers	9	16	9	20
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	280	354	280	335

1858

Organization	30 June 1951		31 July 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	12	10	11
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	183	166	183	175
40[illegible] Ops Sq				
Officers	13	16	13	11
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	226	279	226	237
41 Ath Ops Sq				
Officers	11	9	11	11
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	1
Airmen	139	171	135	155
7th Med Sq				
Officers	59	46	59	43
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	191	159	191	162
11th Med Sq				
Officers	35	20	35	23
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	137	88	137	103
7th Str Msh Sq				
Officers	5	4	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	238	217	238	223

1859

Organization	30 June 1951		31 July 1951	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	4	5	3
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	227	200	217	194
58th Band				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	49	34	50
7th Avn Sq				
Officers	18	16	16	16
Warrant Officers	6	4	6	4
Airmen	24	26	24	20
AOC5th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	2	1	2
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	4	3	3
Total Officers	1021	1061	1021	1120
Total Warrant Officers	7	22	7	21
Total Airmen	6272	7252	6272	7234

1860

Organization	[illegible] June [illegible]		1 July [illegible]	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th Maint Sq				
Officers	10	8	10	7
Warrant Officers	4	5	0	3
Airmen	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	505
4010th OM Sq				
Officers	4	5	4	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	[illegible]	307	[illegible]	306
Hqs 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	57	67	57	63
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	104	129	104	132
Hq 11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	95	100	98
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	233	229	239
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	97	100	98
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	229	237	229	246

1861

Organization	[illegible]		[illegible]	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
98th Light Sq				
Officers	100	93	100	110
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	236	229	240
11th Light Sq				
Officers	10	9	10	9
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	3
Airmen	442	448	442	475
40/14th Obs Sq				
Officers	4	4	4	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	201	240	201	265
40/14th Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	21	9	29
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	0
Airmen	279	373	279	337
Hq & Hq Sq 7th A/B Gp				
Officers	45	106	45	90
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	1
Airmen	247	384	247	368
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	14	13	14	19
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	441	500	441	478

1862

Organization	[illegible]		[illegible]	
	Auth	Aspd	Auth	Aspd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	7	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	221	209	214
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	5	9	5	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	196	203	198	221
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	11	4	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	186	174	175
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	193	202	195
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	4	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	174	202	167
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	11	11	11	11
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	211	220	221	224

1863

Appendix No 3

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

16 Jul 51

GENERAL ORDER
NUMBER 9

	SECTION
ACTIVATION OF B-36 TRAINING GROUP (PROV).	I
ANNOUNCEMENT OF STAFF APPOINTMENT	II

SECTION I

ACTIVATION OF B-36 TRAINING GROUP (PROV)

1. In accordance with AFR 20-36, a B-36 Training Group (Prov) is activated and established at Carswell Air Force Base effective 16 July 1951.

2. Concurrently with the activation, the B-36 Training Group (Prov) is assigned to the 19th Air Division.

3. The following units, hereby activated at Carswell Air Force Base are assigned to the B-36 Training Group (Prov):

B-36 Ground Training Squadron (Prov)
B-36 Air Training Squadron (Prov)
B-36 Crew Evaluation Squadron (Prov) (To be activated at a later date)

4. Initial manning of all above units will be from resources under the control of this headquarters.

SECTION II

ANNOUNCEMENT OF STAFF APPOINTMENT

Announcement is made of the appointment of Colonel RICHARD T. BLACK, 1192A, USAF, as Commanding Officer of the B-36 Training Group (Prov), effective 16 July 1951.

C. S. IRVINE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Appendix No 4

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY

JULY 1951

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
9th Bomb Squadron	371:45
436th Bomb Squadron	449:55
492nd Bomb Squadron	590:20
GRAND TOTAL	1412:00

Prepared by Statistical Services:

Appendix No 5

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

11TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY

JULY 1951

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
26th Bomb Squadron	351:15
42nd Bomb Squadron	423:00
98th Bomb Squadron	352:00
GRAND TOTAL	1126:00

Prepared by Statistical Services:

History

19th AIR DIVISION

AUGUST
1951

Carswell Air Force Base

Fort Worth, Texas

SECRET
SECRET
AUTH: E.O. 13526, 1.4(D)
INITIALS
DATE

HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas

August 1951

PREPARED

BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - 2d Lt. ROSE A. PALMER

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - T Sgt James H. Mitchell

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - Sgt Laurence L. Benson

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division."

C. S. IRVINE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

1876

There was one gain in the assigned strength of the Headquarters 19th Air Division in August. This was the assignment of Lieutenant Colonel Harry H. Landry as Adjutant General, to replace Major Hugh C. Cason. Major Cason is being transferred to an overseas command and will not be dropped until September. Major Howard M. Kensh was assigned as Assistant Deputy for Operations, vice Major Ralph Wallace, Jr., reassigned as Commanding Officer, 4014th Operations Squadron, 7th AirnBase Group. One other change was noted during the month with Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Brown, Deputy Commanding Officer, 7th Air Base Group replacing Colonel Richard T. Black as Inspector General of this Headquarters. Colonel Black assumed command of the B-36 Training Group (Provisional), which was activated in July 1951. (See History 19th Air Division for July, page 2). These three changes in the assigned personnel, leaves nine officers and seven airmen assigned as of 31 August 1951. The roster of key personnel for 19th Air Division Headquarters is

appended. 1/

The assigned military strength of the units of the 19th Air Division was 8,565 as of 31 August 1951. Of this total, 1,128 were officers, 18 warrant officers, and 7,419 were airmen. The 31 August figures show a gain of 90 over that for July which had 8,475 assigned. During August there was a gain of eight officers, 85 airmen, but a loss of three warrant officers. The chart showing the authorized and assigned strength of the units of the 19th Air Division is appended. 2/

The civilian personnel assigned strength of all units of the 19th Air Division increased by 14 during the month, as 436 were assigned on 1 August and 450 as of 31 August. The assigned strength of the 19th Air Division Headquarters was four at the first and last of the month.

Major General C. S. Irvine, Commanding General of 19th Air Division, attended the Air Force Association Convention at Los Angeles, California from 24 to and including 26 August 1951.

1/ Roster of Key Personnel of Hq 19th Air Div for Aug 51, See Appendix No 1

2/ Chart: Auth and Assigned Strength of Units of the 19th Air Division for Aug 51, See Appendix No 2

ORGANIZATION

Office of the Adjutant General

The activation of the B-36 Training Group (Provisional) by General Order # 9, Headquarters 19th Air Division was rescinded by General Order # 12, Headquarters 19th Air Division, dated 14 August 1951. 3 / The new general order provides for the activation of the following squadrons: B-36 Air Training Squadron (Prov); B-36 Maintenance and Supply Squadron (Prov); and a B-36 Ground Training Squadron (Prov). A B-36 Crew Evaluation Squadron (Prov) will be activated at a later date in accordance with instructions from higher headquarters.

Office of Deputy for Operations

The 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings, Heavy, completed 100% of their Strategic Air Command (SAC) training requirements with the exception of one visual Radar Bomb Scoring (RBS) run by one crew of the 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy. The two tactical wings of the 19th Air Division flew a total of 2869:10 hours during this month.

3 / 19th Air Div GO # 12, dtd 14 Aug 51, See Appendix No 3

This was 750:10 more flying hours accomplished than in July. In accomplishing this total, the 7th Bombardment Wing flew a total of 1381:10 hours 4/, and the 11th Bombardment Wing flew a total of 1488 hours. 5/

At the monthly Division Flying Safety Meeting conducted on 18 August 1951, the plaque for the outstanding Flying Safety Record was awarded again to the 9th Bombardment Squadron, 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph R. Taylor commands this squadron.

In compliance with Eighth Air Force Operations Order, Number 25-51, dated 28 June 1951, the 19th Air Division conducted a night Coordinated Radar Evaluation Mission on a commercial center type located in the city of Binghampton, New York, between the 4th and 10th of August. A total of 35 combat crews from both the 7th and 11th Bomb Wings successfully bombed designated targets with a resultant circular average of 2016 feet. This mission will be discussed in detail in the 7th and 11th Bombardment Wing's Histories.

4/ Hours Flown by Units of the 7th Bomb Wing for Aug 51, See Appendix No 4

5/ Hours Flown by Units of the 11th Bomb Wing for Aug 51, See Appendix No 5

Six crews from the 19th Air Division participated in the SAC Annual Bombing Competition at the Midland Bombing Range; however, none of the six won any honors.

One B-36 aircraft from the 11th Bomb Wing flew a classified mission on 14 August in conjunction with the Daugway Proving Ground, North Dakota. This mission will be discussed in the 11th Bombardment Wing History for August.

Six aircraft of the 19th Air Division participated in a fly over of Detroit, Michigan on 19 August 1951.

On 9 August, four aircraft of the 11th Bombardment Wing flew a classified mission to Eglin Air Force Base, Flordia, to dispense chaff. The results of this mission will be presented in the 11th Bomb Wing History for August.

One B-36 aircraft from the 7th Bombardment Wing flew a classified mission to Halloman Air Force Base, Alamorgordo, New Mexico. This mission will be covered by the 7th Bomb Wing History.

Office of Deputy for Materiel

During the month of August, a total of 2,869 hours was flown by the two tactical wings of the 19th Air Division. This represents an average of 59 hours per possessed aircraft. A total of 34 one-hundred hour inspections, and four acceptance inspections were completed in support of this effort. An average of 9.1 calendar days was required to complete each one-hundred hour inspection. Also, 37 engine changes were required to accomplish the flying requirments for this period. Supply and man-power resources available permitted 45 complete power packages to be assembled during the month.

The 19th Air Division had a total of 53 B-36 aircraft assigned as of 31 August. Forty-nine of these were "D" aircraft and four were "F's". The first "D" aircraft was transferred to project "SAN SAN" at San Diego, California, on 30 August. This project is to complete maintenance on these aircraft that can not be completed at Carswell due to special tools and parts not being available at this base. One other "D" aircraft

was transferred to this project on 27 August, completing this months commitment. Two "D" aircraft were received from San Diego Conversion Center during the month.

B-36F, serial number 49-2670 was received on 4 August 1951, and was designated as C-1 Gunnery System Test aircraft. The objective of this program is to detect, and determine corrective measures for inherent design and production deficiencies in the Armament System at earliest possible date. In an effort to expedite successful completion of this program, the maintenance and supply support for this aircraft is on a priority basis. The overall planning and test scheduling of this aircraft is under the direction of Major Landry, with Operational Engineering Section (OES) assisting in the reporting phase.

Office of the Inspector General

The second Semi-annual Inspection of the 19th Air Division proceeded through the month of August according to schedule. Plans were being laid for a team of inspectors composed of the 7th Bombardment Wing and 7th

Air Base Group personnel to proceed to Gray Air Force Base, Killeen, Texas, to conduct the Semi-annual Inspection of that installation.

The administrative, tactical, and technical inspectors of the 7th Bomb Wing visited the 43d Bombardment Wing, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, from 7 through 12 August 1951, for the purpose of observing methods and policies in effect at that base. Critiques were presented to Wing Commanders, and the 19th Air Division Commander pointed out ideas gained from the visit which would possibly benefit the operation of this base.

Lieutenant Colonel Leo C. Brooks of the 47th Air Division, Walker Air Force Base, New Mexico, visited this section on 10 August 1951, relative to information on the United States Air Force Technical Inspection Team.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

All sections of the 19th Air Division Headquarters, Adjutant General, Inspector General, Deputy for Materiel, Deputy for Operation, reports of meetings, minutes of conferences, personal interviews, Comptroller and Central Files.

Appendix No 1

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

POSITION	NAME	RANK
C. G. 19th Air Division	Irvine, C. S.	Maj Gen
Deputy For Materiel	Chambers, Walter Z.	Col
Deputy For Operations	Calhoun, William W. Jr	Col
I. G. 19th Air Division	Brown, Paul D.	Lt Col
Staff Observer ADDO	Downey, Clyde J.	Lt Col
Adjutant General	Wendry, Harry H.	Lt Col
Asst Deputy For Operations	Hensch, Edward L.	Maj
Aide-de-Camp	Raake, William E.	1st Lt

1890

1891

Appendix No 2

Organization	July Auth	July Asgd	August Auth	August Asgd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers	10	8	10	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	7	7	7
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	59	91	61	87
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	110	117	123	143
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	100	100	100
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	223	229	221
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	102	100	103
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	225	229	227
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	94	100	99
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	238	229	245
4010th Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	20	9	25
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	280	335	278	329

1892

Organization	July		August	
	Auth	Augd	Auth	Augd
7th Photo Int Sq				
Officers	10	7	10	6
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	442	505	430	478
4010th QM Sq				
Officers	4	4	4	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	306	281	301
Hqs 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	57	63	57	66
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	104	132	115	132
Hq&11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	98	100	101
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	239	229	251
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	98	100	98
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	229	246	229	248

1893

Organization	July Auth	July Asgd	August Auth	August Asgd
[illegible] Sq				
Officers	100	110	100	104
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	240	229	248
[illegible] Sq				
Officers	10	9	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	442	475	430	453
[illegible] Sq				
Officers	4	6	4	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	265	281	271
[illegible] Sq				
Officers	9	29	9	29
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	279	337	278	355
Hq & Hq Sq, 7th A/D Gp				
Officers	45	90	45	80
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	0
Airmen	247	368	221	340
7th [illegible] Office Sq				
Officers	14	19	14	16
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	441	478	453	450

1894

Organization	July		August	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	214	209	237
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	5	9	6	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	198	221	194	222
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	9	4	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	175	174	168
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	195	202	200
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	167	202	215
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	11	11	12	11
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	221	224	211	216

1895

Organization	July		August	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	11	10	10
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	183	175	183	181
4010th Ops Sq				
Officers	13	11	15	12
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	226	287	228	288
4014th Ops Sq				
Officers	11	11	11	13
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	0
Airmen	135	155	140	153
7th Med Sq				
Officers	59	43	60	55
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	191	182	205	177
11th Med Sq				
Officers	35	23	35	24
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	137	103	137	128
7th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	238	223	218	239

1896

Organization	July		Aug	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Ltr Vsh Sq				
Officers	5	3	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	194	217	221
585th Bond				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	50	34	41
7th Avn Sq				
Officers	16	16	16	16
Warrant Officers	6	4	6	2
Airmen	24	28	26	30
4005th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	3	1	2
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	3	3	2
Total Officers	1021	1120	1028	1128
Total Warrant Officers	7	21	7	18
Total Airmen	6872	7334	6854	7419

1897

1898

Appendix No 3

HEADQUARTERS 19TH AIR DIVISION
Carswell Air Force Base
Fort Worth, Texas

GENERAL ORDER
NUMBER 12

14 August 1951

RESCISSION OF GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 9, HQ 19TH AIR DIVISION — SECTION I
ACTIVATION OF B-36 TRAINING GROUP (PROV) . . . . . — II

SECTION I

RESCISSION OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 9, HQ 19TH AIR DIVISION

1. General Order Number 9, Headquarters 19th Air Division, dated 16 July 1951, is hereby rescinded.

SECTION II

ACTIVATION OF B-36 TRAINING GROUP (PROV)

1. In accordance with AFR 20-38, a B-36 Training Group (Prov) is activated and established at Carswell Air Force Base, effective 16 July 1951.

2. The specific mission of the B-36 Training Group (Prov) is to transition air crews and key ground personnel in B-36 flying operations and ground support activities.

3. Concurrently with the activation, the B-36 Training Group (Prov) is assigned to the 19th Air Division.

4. The following units hereby activated at Carswell Air Force Base are assigned to the B-36 Training Group (Prov):

B-36 Air Training Squadron (Prov)
B-36 Maintenance & Supply Squadron (Prov)
B-36 Ground Training Squadron (Prov)

5. Initial manning of all above units will be from resources under the control of this headquarters.

6. A B-36 Crew Evaluation Squadron (Prov) will be activated and assigned to the B-36 Training Group (Prov) at a later date in accordance with instructions from higher authority.

DISTRIBUTION "A"

C. S. IRVINE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

1900

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY

AUGUST 1951

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
9th Bomb Squadron	443:40
436th Bomb Squadron	443:35
492d Bomb Squadron	493:45
GRAND TOTAL	1381:00

Prepared by Statistical Services:

1902

Appendix No 3

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

11TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY

AUGUST 1951

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
26th Bomb Squadron	482:15
42d Bomb Squadron	548:40
98th Bomb Squadron	457:15
GRAND TOTAL	1488:10

Prepared by Statistical Services:

History

19th AIR DIVISION

September
1951

Carswell Air Force Base

Fort Worth, Texas

1908

6061



CATALOGED

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division."

JOHN A. ROBERTS
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

1910

PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Personnel

On 24 September 1951, a change was effected concerning Key Personnel of the 19th Air Division Headquarters. Major John L. Winkel was assigned as Adjutant General, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Harry M. Landry, who was reassigned to the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, on this station. Assigned strength of this headquarters remained at nine officers and seven airmen during the month. The Key Personnel Roster for the 19th Air Division Headquarters is appended. 1/

Assigned military strength of units of the 19th Air Division increased only 17 during September 1951. The total at the end of August was 8,805, but it had increased to 8,822 by September 31st. A breakdown of September's strength indicates that of the 8,822, 1,100 were officers, 16 warrant officers, and 7,406 were airmen. These figures indicate a gain of 10 officers, a loss of two warrant officers, and a gain of nine airmen. The chart, showing authorized and assigned strength of units of the 19th Air Division is appended. 2/

1/ Roster of Key Personnel for 19th A. D., see appendix no 1

2/ Chart of assigned strength of units of the 19th Air Division, see appendix no 2

ORGANIZATION

Office of the Adjutant General

Action on Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOsE) for the B-36 Training Group (Provisional) had not yet been received at the close of September. This Training Group (Prov) was activated by General Order #12, Headquarters 15th Air Division, dated 14 August 1951. (See History, 15th A. D. for Aug 51, pg 3). At the present time this unit is submitting its history under separate cover.

Office of Deputy for Operations

The 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings (Heavy) completed 100 per cent of their Strategic Air Command (SAC) training requirements for the second straight month. The two tactical wings flew a total of 2,760 hours, or 103:10 hours less than that during August. Of the total hours completed in September, 1,681:00 were required to accomplish SAC training minimums, the balance was devoted to special missions. In accomplishing this total the 7th Bombardment Wing,

Heavy, flew 1,[illegible]:30 3/, and the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, 1,[illegible]:00 hours. 4/

The Assistant Director of Operations attended a conference at Eighth Air Force Headquarters on 12 September to discuss the tactical development training to be accomplished during the month of October, since all flying training minimums have been waived for this purpose. Eighth Air Force approved the plans as submitted.

Air Division Flying Safety Meeting for September was held on the 22nd with the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, acting as host. The Flying Safety award was presented to the 42nd Bombardment Squadron.

Two Flying Safety bulletin boards were set up in the Officer's Club and another board was delivered to the B-36 Training Group (Prov). These boards are kept up to date when material is received in the Flying Safety office. SAC wide Flying Safety Year started 1 September 1951 and a Flying Safety Display Board was erected on the Post Exchange lawn. This

3/ Hours flown by units of the 7th Bomb Wing for September 1951, See appendix no 3

4/ Hours flown by units of the 11th Bomb Wing for September 1951, see appendix no 4

board was set up in the effort to keep base personnel informed of their efforts to better the flying safety record over last year's aircraft accident rate. It will also show how Maxwell Air Force Base ranks in [illegible] competition.

Six B-36's of the 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, and one from the 11th participated in a staging maneuver to Goose Bay Air Force Base, Labrador, between 12 and 23 September 1951. Between the 7th and 11th of September six B-36's of the 11th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, participated in a staging maneuver through Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska.

Office of Deputy for Materiel

During the past 30 days a total of 3,760 hours were flown by Tactical Units of the 19th Air Division. This represents an average of 30.8 hours per possessed aircraft and is 108 hours less than those logged during August.

A total of twenty-six 100 hour inspections and four acceptance inspections were made by maintenance

personnel in September. Forty-two engine changes were completed in support of this accomplishment.

Forty-two complete tower packages were made available to Tactical Units. Considerable difficulty was encountered in maintaining continuity in engine build-up operations due to shortages of GSE components and the lack of adequate supply support.

As of 30 September, [illegible] type aircraft were assigned. Three B-52C aircraft were transferred to San Diego, California, for modification at San Diego Project. Two B-52's were received from Convair Aircraft Corporation (CVAC) production facilities of Fort Worth, Texas. Two more B-52D's were gained from the [illegible] conversion program at San Diego, California.

Office of the Inspector General

The second semi-annual inspection was completed during the month of September according to schedule. Follow-up inspections of all types were continued throughout the month of September.

An inspection team composed of inspectors from the 9th Bombardment Wing and the 7th Air Base Group conducted a semi-annual inspection of Gray Air Force Base during the period of 5 through 7 September 1951.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1918

APPENDIX

Appendix No 1

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

POSITION	NAME	RANK
C. G. 19th Air Division	Irvine, C. S.	Maj Gen
Deputy for Materiel	Chambers, Walter H.	Col
Deputy for Operations	Calhoun, W. R. Jr.	Col
Staff Observer ADDC	Downey, Clyde J.	Lt Col
I. G. 19th Air Division	Brown, Paul D.	Lt Col
Adjutant General	Winkel, John L.	Maj
Asst Deputy for Operations	Hensch, Edward H.	Maj
Aide-de-Camp	Haake, William E.	Capt

1920

Appendix No 2

Organization	August Auth	August Asgd	September Auth	September Asgd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers	10	9	10	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	7	7	7
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	61	87	61	86
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	123	143	123	160
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	100	100	99
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	221	229	228
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	103	100	103
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	227	229	2 30
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	99	100	98
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	245	229	239
4810th Air & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	25	9	24
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	1
Airmen	278	329	278	337

1921

Organization	August		September	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th Point Sq				
Officers	10	6	10	7
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	430	478	430	478
40(40) Obs Sq				
Officers	4	3	4	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	301	281	296
Hqs 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	57	66	57	71
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	115	130	115	136
Hq11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	101	100	102
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	251	229	242
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	98	100	100
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	229	244	229	258

1922

Organization	August		September	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
98th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	104	100	109
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	248	229	247
11th Maint Sq				
Officers	10	8	10	7
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	430	453	430	457
401st Ord Sq				
Officers	4	5	4	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	261	271	261	259
40 4th Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	29	9	24
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	278	355	278	351
Hq & Hq Sq 7th A/D Gp				
Officers	45	80	45	82
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	221	340	221	339
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	14	16	14	14
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	453	450	453	447

1923

Organization	August		September	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	237	209	232
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	6	7	6	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	194	212	194	213
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	9	4	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	168	174	170
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	200	202	193
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	215	202	200
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	12	11	12	12
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	211	216	211	211

1924

Organization	August		September	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	10	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	183	181	183	176
401Oth Org Sq				
Officers	15	12	15	15
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	228	288	228	332
407th Org Sq				
Officers	11	13	11	11
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	140	153	140	165
7th Med Sq				
Officers	60	55	60	58
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	205	177	205	175
11th Med Sq				
Officers	35	24	35	24
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	137	128	137	123
7th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	218	239	218	233

1925

Organization	August		September	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	221	217	219
585th Band				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	41	34	39
7th Avn Sq				
Officers	16	16	16	16
Warrant Officers	6	2	6	2
Airmen	26	30	26	31
ACC 5th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	2	1	2
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	2	3	3
Total Officers	1028	1128	1028	1138
Total Warrant Officers	7	18	7	16
Total Airmen	6854	7419	6854	7428

9

1926

Appendix No 3

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON

7TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY

SEPTEMBER 1951

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
9th Bomb Squadron	401:25
436th Bomb Squadron	537:30
492nd Bomb Squadron	499:35
GRAND TOTAL	1438:30

Prepared by Statistical Services:

Appendix No 4

HOURS FLOWN BY SQUADRON
11TH BOMBARDMENT WING, HEAVY
SEPTEMBER 1951

ORGANIZATION	HOURS FLOWN
26th Bomb Squadron	424:35
42nd Bomb Squadron	471:25
98th Bomb Squadron	431:00
GRAND TOTAL	1327:00

Prepared by Statistical Services:

History

19th AIR DIVISION

October
1951

Carswell Air Force Base

Fort Worth, Texas

SECRET

AUTH. CO. 18TH AD
INITIALS CAB
DATE 7 Dec 51

SECRET

SECRET

2-25/3-1

1934

HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

October 1951

PREPARED

BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - 2d Lt. ROSE A. PALMER

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - T Sgt James H. Mitchell

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - Sgt Laurence L. Benson

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division."

George T. Chadwell Col USAF
FOR JOHN A. ROBERTS
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

1935

SECRET

SECRET

1936

PERSONNEL

Office of the Adjutant General

Major General C. S. Irvine, Commanding General 19th Air Division, Major John L. Winkel, Adjutant General, and Captain William E. Kaake, Aide-de-Camp, were placed on Temporary Duty (TDY) to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, effective 29 October 1951.

Colonel John A. Roberts, Commanding Officer of the 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, assumed command of the 19th Air Division during the temporary absence of General Irvine.

Lieutenant Colonel John H. Boyle was assigned as Adjutant General of this headquarters vice Major Winkel. Lieutenant Colonel Boyle was relieved from S-1 Section, 7th Air Base Group.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Galer was assigned as Deputy for Materiel vice Colonel Walter E. Chambers who was reassigned to the 7th Bombardment Wing.

The roster of key personnel of the 19th Air Division Headquarters for October is appended. 1 /

The assigned strength of the 19th Air Division

1 / Roster of Key Personnel, 19th Air Division Hq, see appendix no 1

SECRET

was decreased by 136 during this period, as the military strength of 8582 on 30 September, showed only a total of 8446 at the end of October. These figures indicate a decrease of 33 officers, one warrant officer, and 102 airmen. A chart showing the assigned and authorized strength of units of the 19th Air Division is appended. 2 / Also charts showing the authorized and assigned strength of officers 3 / and airmen for this organization are appended. 4 /

The civilian strength, graded and un-graded of the 19th Air Division totaled 445 for October. A chart showing the breakdown of civilian personnel is attached. 5 /

ORGANIZATION

Office for the Deputy for Operations

The two tactical wings flew a total of 2369.50 hours during October, which represents 390.10 hours less than that flown in September which had 2760 hours. A chart showing the flying time of the two tactical wings by units for the past four months is appended. 6 /

2 / Chart; Auth and Assgd Strength of Units 19th AD, see appendix no 2

3 / Chart; Auth and Assgd Officers, see appendix no 3

4 / Chart; Auth and Assgd Airmen, see appendix no 4

5 / Chart; Graded and Un-graded Civilian strength, see appendix no 5

6 / Chart; Flying time of the two tactical wings, see appendix no 6

SECRET

SECRET

The average hours flown by possessed aircraft of this organization for 1950 and 1951 7 /, and the ratio of increase in flying hours by the two wings for 1950 and 1951 is appended. 8 / The direct cost of B-36 flying hours comparison chart for 1950 and 1951 is appended. 9 /

This headquarters was notified by Strategic Air Command (SAC) that they had won the SAC Trophy and the $1,000.00 for the SAC base having the best flying safety record during the month of September. Captain Grayson H. Bowers' crew in the 98th Bomb Squadron, 11th Bomb Wing was selected as the "Crew of the Month" for Carswell in its Flying Safety Program. Consequently since Carswell was the leader in SAC, Captain Bowers and his crew became the "SAC Crew of the Month".

Although the 98th Bomb Squadron produced the leading crew, flying safety wise, it was the 492d Bomb Squadron in the 7th Bomb Wing that was awarded the plaque for the outstanding flying safety record for an individual squadron for the month of September.

7 / Average hours flown, see appendix no 7

8 / Ratio of increase in flying hours, see appendix no 8

9 / Direct cost of B-36 flying hours, see appendix no 9

SECRET

SECRET

Major Arthur L. Barnes, Commanding Officer of the 492d Bomb Squadron received the plaque at the Monthly Flying Safety Meeting conducted on 22 October 1951. This makes the 492d Bomb Squadron a first place winner for the third time during this year; also they have tied for first place honors once during this time.

The flying safety record for Carswell was darkened this month when Captain Leslie W. Brockwell, 436th Bomb Squadron, 7th Bomb Wing, was forced to crash land B-36 aircraft #2664 at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, on 18 October 1951. After all efforts to lower the landing gear had been exhausted, Captain Brockwell ordered nine of his twelve-man crew to abandon the aircraft. Then he, together with his pilot and first flight engineer, made a very commendable landing at Kirtland. A chart showing the rate of aircraft accidents per 10,000 hours flown for 1950 and 51 is appended. 10 /

The 7th Bomb Wing sent its third squadron, the 9th Bomb Squadron, through Goose Bay, Labrador, for a staging maneuver during the period 10-18 October.

10 / Chart; rate of aircraft accidents per 10,000 hours, see appendix no 10

SECRET

SECRET

Six B-36 aircraft were dispatched from the 9th on this mission, along with #2681 for the 42d Bomb Squadron, 11th Bomb Wing, who also participated in this maneuver.

On 1 October during the dedicatory services at Gray Air Force Base, Killeen, Texas, three B-36 aircraft of the 7th Bomb Wing accomplished a fly over of that base. Later in the month, the 11th Bomb Wing was directed to furnish familiarization flights to two visiting VIP's - namely, Mr. W. R. Swinnery on 17 October and Mr. Eugene Zuckert of 29 October. Both Mr. Swinnery and Mr. Zuckert are Assistant Secretaries for Air. One B-36 from the 11th Bomb Wing was dispatched on 14 October to perform a flyover at Vernon, Texas to cooperate with that city on celebrating "Aviation Day".

Office of the Deputy for Materiel

Total flying hours (2369:50) accomplished by the two tactical wings of this command for the month of October, represents an average of 63 hours per possessed B-36 aircraft. Twenty five - 100 hour inspections and 34 reciprocating engine changes were completed in support

SECRET

SECRET

of this effort. Man hours and supply resources avialable permitted a total of 47 - 41 power packages to be assembled during this period. A chart showing the average hours prior to the removal of R-4360-41 Engine Changes for units of the 7th and 11th Bomb Wings are appended. 11 /

Wing Mobility Plans were reviewed and revised to reflect changes in consonance with latest concept of DMTF (Prestrike) and Staging requirements with respect to personnel and equipment support. Action was taken to review fly-away kits requirements for "F" aircraft, and revise present kits to include those spares peculiar to B-36 aircraft.

A retrofit program for improvement of B-36F Bombing System was initiated. This program encompasses modification and rework of equipment in #4 Bomb Bay to same configuration that is now installed in #1 Bomb Bay.

The 7th Bomb Wing had a total of 25 B-36D and seven B-36F aircraft assigned as of 31 October. Two of the "B's" and one "F" aircraft were undergoing modification;

11 / Chart; average hours prior to removal of Engine Changes for units of 7th and 11th Bomb Wing, see appendix no 11

SECRET

therefore, this left 23 "D's" and six "F's" possessed. The 11th Bomb Wing had 23 B-36D and seven B-36F aircraft assigned with only one B-36D undergoing modidication.

During the month, two B-36F aircraft were received and two B-36D's were transferred to San Diego for San San Project Modification. In view of the continued outlook of spare TEC kit components on an austerity basis, a program was instituted whereby 20 per cent of engines built-up will be placed in a Mobility Reserve Pool for support of MWP. This policy will continue in effect until a suitable level of reserve engines has been reached.

Office of the Inspector General

Follow-up inspections of all types were continued by the 19th Air Division Inspector General's Office during October. All expired Special Subjects were completed and forwarded through proper channels by this section.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1944

BIBLIOGRAPHY

All section of the 19th Air Division Headquarters, Adjutant General, Inspector General, Deputy for Materiel, Deputy for Operation, reports of meetings, minutes of conferences, personal interviews, Comptroller and Central Files.

1945

APPENDIX

1947

Appendix No 1

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

POSITION	NAME	RANK
C. O. 19th Air Division	Roberts, John A.	Col
Dep for Materiel	Galer, Michael J.	Lt Col
Dep for Operations	Calhoun, W. R. Jr.	Col
Staff Observer ADDO	Downey, Clyde J.	Lt Col
I. G. 19th Air Division	Brown, Paul D.	Lt Col
Adjutant General	Boyle, John H.	Lt Col
Asst Dep for Operations	Hensch, Edward K.	Maj

1948

COLONEL JOHN A. ROBERTS CO. 1944 AIR DIVISION

1949

1950

Appendix No 2

Organization	SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers	10	9	10	9
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	7	7	6
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing, H				
Officers	61	86	61	86
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	123	160	123	159
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	0
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	99	100	100
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	228	229	227
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	103	100	101
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	230	229	225
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	98	100	94
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	239	229	237
4010th Gp & Msc Sq				
Officers	9	24	9	24
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	0
Airmen	278	337	278	352

Trial #1

1951

Organization	SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th Night Sq				
Officers	10	7	10	5
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	430	478	430	478
401Cth CM Sq				
Officers	4	4	4	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	296	281	289
Hq 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	57	71	57	75
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	115	136	115	136
Hq11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	102	100	97
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	242	229	239
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	100	100	99
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	229	248	229	247

Organization	SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
98th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	109	100	102
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	247	229	243
11th M-Int Sq				
Officers	10	7	10	6
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	430	457	430	456
401st OM Sq				
Officers	4	6	4	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	259	281	276
401st Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	24	9	23
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	278	351	278	352
Hq & Hq Sq 7th A/D Gp				
Officers	45	82	45	75
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	221	339	220	342
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	14	14	14	12
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	453	447	453	427

1953

Organization	SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	232	209	210
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	6	9	6	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	194	223	194	212
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	8	4	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	170	174	171
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	193	202	178
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	200	202	192
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	12	12	12	11
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	211	211	211	200

Organization	SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	8	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	183	176	183	185
4010th Ops Sq				
Officers	15	15	16	14
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	228	332	260	293
4024th Ops Sq				
Officers	11	11	11	9
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	140	165	140	197
7th Msl Sq				
Officers	60	58	60	54
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	205	175	205	176
11th Msl Sq				
Officers	35	24	35	31
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	137	123	137	104
7th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	4	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	218	233	218	217

1955

Organization	SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	7	5	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	219	217	226
585th Fwd				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	39	34	38
7th Avn S				
Officers	16	16	16	15
Warrant Officers	6	2	6	2
Airmen	26	31	26	31
ACC5th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	2	1	2
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	3	3	3
Total Officers	1028	1138	1029	1105
Total Warrant Officers	7	16	7	15
Total Airmen	6354	7428	6885	7326

1956

1957

Appendix No 3

ASSIGNED, AUTHORIZED, & EFFECTIVE

19TH AIR DIVISION
OFFICERS



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
HQ 19TH AIR DIVISION	AUTH		10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10		
	ASGD		8	8	8	8	8	8	9	9	9		
	EFF												
7TH BOMB WING	AUTH		400	401	401	401	404	406	406	406	406		
	ASGD		295	323	389	411	427	444	449	444	434		
	EFF												
11TH BOMB WING	AUTH		378	377	377	377	380	380	380	380	380		
	ASGD		235	291	338	374	386	420	419	425	413		
	EFF												
7TH AIR BASE GROUP	AUTH		171	223	221	232	234	239	239	239	240		
	ASGD		166	213	270	280	282	269	269	276	264		
	EFF												
TOTAL	AUTH	680	959	1011	1009	1020	1028	1037	1035	1035	1036		
	ASGD	716	704	835	1005	1073	1103	1141	1146	1154	1120		
	EFF												

1958

1959

Appendix No X

ASSIGNED, AUTHORIZED, & EFFECTIVE

19TH AIR DIVISION

AIRMEN



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
HQ 19TH AIR DIVISION	AUTH		7	7	7	7	8	7	7	7	7		
	ASGD		3	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	6		
	EFF												
7TH BOMB WING	AUTH		1811	1848	1848	1828	1824	1825	1825	1825	1825		
	ASGD		1523	1616	1705	1898	1947	1978	1975	2000	1999		
	EFF												
11TH BOMB WING	AUTH		1786	1785	1785	1797	1793	1792	1868	1791	1791		
	ASGD		1418	1581	1713	1870	1874	1935	1959	1941	1950		
	EFF												
7TH AIR BASE GROUP	AUTH		2445	3197	3191	3236	3248	3229	3231	3231	3262		
	ASGD		2440	2845	3083	3334	3424	3414	3478	3480	3371		
	EFF												
TOTAL	AUTH	5133	6049	6837	6831	6868	6872	6853	6854	6854	6885		
	ASGD	4952	5384	6047	6507	7109	7252	7334	7419	7428	7326		
	EFF												

1960

1961

Appendix No 5

AUTHORIZED & ASSIGNED

19TH AIR DIVISION
CIVILIANS



ORGANIZATION	AUTH											
HQ 19TH AIR	G		4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
DIVISION	U		4									
7TH	G		12	10	13	13	13	13	14	13	13	
BOMB WING	U		76	76	77	77	77	77	49	50	50	
11TH	G		4	2	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	
BOMB WING	U								26	26	26	
7TH AIR BASE	G		161	163	181	181	183	190	188	189	188	
GROUP	U		161	167	164	164	164	164	159	158	158	
TOTAL	G	181	181	179	204	204	206	213	212	212	211	
	U	241	241	241	241	241	241	241	234	234	234	

1962

1963

Appendix No 6

B-36 FLYING TIME

19TH AIR DIVISION



1964

1965

AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN

PER AIRCRAFT POSSESSED

19TH AIR DIVISION



APPENDIX NO 7

AVG ACFT POSSESSED	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
7TH BOMB WING	18	174	179	128	131	156	155	156	166	155	173	168	173	178	187	190	187	203	224	250	268	275		
11TH BOMB WING	5	56	6	6	92	96	124	126	127	159	149	147	167	183	178	135	160	186	208	235	261	274		

1966

1967

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B-36 FLYING TIME

19TH AIR DIVISION



Appendix No 1

SECRET

1968

1969

B-36 FLYING HOUR DIRECT COST

19TH AIR DIVISION

CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE



THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
MAINTENANCE COST	385	299	302	256	383	404	470	492	446	421	494	519	572	541	595	552	653	617	644	805	662			
COMBAT CREW COST	216	209	209	203	195	185	200	217	233	237	240	245	244	238	242	268	294	311	321	360	361			

GALLONS

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
GAS CONSUMPTION PER HOUR	913	1029	972	817	756	707	752	790	939	827	835	864	870	967	844	893	841	910	969	1033	1030			

APPENDIX NO. 9

1970

Appendix No 10

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

CARSWELL A F B

RATE 1 PER 10,000 HOURS FLOWN



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
PRIMARY A/C	HOURS FLOWN	1827	1976	2425	2522	2641	3027	2539	2870	2765	2371		
	FATAL	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0		
	NON-FATAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		
	TOTAL	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2		
ALL OTHER A/C	HOURS FLOWN	718	559	1067	1161	1475	1469	1606	1104	1046	997		
	FATAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	NON-FATAL	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		

1972

1973

APPENDIX NO. 11

R-4360-41 ENGINE CHANGES

AVERAGE HOURS PRIOR REMOVAL

19TH AIR DIVISION



History

19th AIR DIVISION

November
1951

Carswell Air Force Base

Fort Worth, Texas

1979

SECRET

SECRET
AUTH: CG, 19TH AD
INITIALS GAR
DATE 4 Jan 80

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

1980

HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

November 1951

PREPARED

BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - 2d Lt. ROSE A. PALMER

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - T Sgt James H. Mitchell

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - Sgt Laurence L. Benson

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division."

JOHN A. ROBERTS
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

1981

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION II, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

SECTION II

Office of the Adjutant General

For the first time since the activation of the 19th Air Division Headquarters, 16 February 1951, there were no changes in personnel of this Headquarters. Major General C. S. Irvine, Commanding General 19th Air Division, Major John L. Winkel, and Captain William E. Kaske, Aide-de-Camp, are still on Temporary Duty (TDY) to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. At the close of November, a total of 10 officers and seven airmen were assigned to this headquarters. The roster of key personnel is appended. 1 /

The total assigned military strength of the 19th Air Division was 8,544 as of 30 November, which is an increase of 98 over that for October. The November total broken down is as follows: 1,114 officers, 15 warrant officers, and 7,415 airmen. This increase is mainly due to rotation personnel being assigned to this base from overseas. A chart showing the assigned and authorized strength of the units of this headquarters is appended. 2 / Also charts showing the authorized

1 / Roster of Key Personnel, 19th Air Division Hq, see Appendix no 1

2 / Auth and Asgd Strength, 19th Air Div, see Appendix no 2

SECRET

and assigned strength of officers 3__/ and airmen for this organization are appended. 4__/

The civilian strength for this organization increased by one with 446 being assigned as of 30 November. A chart showing the total assigned for graded and un-graded civilian personnel is attached. 5__/

Office of the Deputy for Operations

The 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings flew a total of 2750:50 hours this month. This was an increase of 301:00 hours over that for October, with 2369:50 hours flown. All crews of the two Tactical Wings met their Minimum Training Requirements for this month; with the exception of two crews from the 11th Bomb Wing which were excused. A chart showing the flying time of the two tactical wings, by units, for the past five months is appended. 6__/ Charts, showing the hours flown by assigned aircraft for 1950 and 1951 7__/ and the ratio of increased flying hours by the two wings for 1950 and 1951, are also appended. 8__/

The Flying Safety Award was again presented to the

3__/ Auth and Asgd Strength of Officers, see Appendix no 3

4__/ Auth and Asgd Strength of Airmen, see Appendix no 4

5__/ Graded and un-graded Strength of Civ Personnel, see Appendix no 5

6__/ Flying time for two wings, see Appendix no 6

7__/ Average hours flown, see Appendix no 7

8__/ Ratio of increase in flying hours, see Appendix no 8

492nd Bomb Squadron, 7th Bombardment Wing, for the fourth consecutive month. The award was presented to Major Delbert I. Hoffman, acting commander of the 492nd Bomb Squadron, at the monthly Flying Safety Meeting. This squadron also has tied for first place this year.

The 7th Bomb Wing had three special gunnery missions during the month, and the 11th Bomb Wing participated in two fighter escort missions which were ordered by Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC). They also sent one B-36 aircraft on a fly-over of Fort Hood, Texas, in conjunction with Armistice Day exercise at that post.

One minor aircraft accident occurred at Carswell Air Force Base on 26 November 1951. B-36 #2671 of the 26th Bomb Squadron, 11th Bomb Wing, discovered that the pin which holds the front and rear double wheels of the landing gear apart was broken. A scanner noticed something was wrong when the plane left the ground at 9:55 A. M. The aircraft circled the base for six and one-half hours while lightening the load and trying to repair the landing gear. After all efforts to

repair the gear had failed, the crew bailed out leaving only the aircraft commander, pilot, and copilot. Some 15,000 gallons of fuel and eight 100 pound practice bombs were then jettisoned into Lake Worth. Captain Clarance E. Horton, Aircraft Commander, brought the big ship down on a rain soaked runway at 4:30 pm without the expected mishap. One crew member received a broken leg while landing from his parachute jump. A chart showing the rate of aircraft accidents per 10,000 hours flown for 1950 and 1951 is appended. 9 /

Office of the Deputy for Materiel

With the total flying time for the two tactical wings reaching 2,750:50, an average of 64 hours per possessed B-36 was obtained. A total of 26 - 100 hour inspections, five acceptance inspections, and 32 reciprocating engine changes were accomplished in support of this effort. Charts showing the out of commission rate for the two tactical wings for the past five months 10 / and the commission status for this same period are appended. 11 /

9 / Chart: Rate of aircraft accidents per 10,000 hours, see Appendix no 9

10 / Chart: Out of Commission Rate, see Appendix no 10

11 / Chart: Commission Status for the two Wings, see Appendix no 11

At the close of the month, the 7th Bomb Wing had 25 - B-36D aircraft and 11 B-36F's assigned, but possessed only 13D's and 10 F's. The 11th Bomb Wing had 28 - B-36D's and 11 F's assigned and 20 D's and 10 F's possessed.

A program was instituted to retrofit all assigned B-36 aircraft with production E-System, which incorporates all of the currently approved engineering changes. Technicians from Sperry Gyroscope Company and San Antonio Air Material Area are assisting CAFB personnel in effecting the change over to modernized systems.

Preliminary plans were formulated to ready CAFB facilities to support an additional B-36 aircraft schedule to be attached to this command for utilization by the Provisional Training Squadron. This training program is to include personnel scheduled for assignment to bomb wings which will be equipped with B-36 aircraft.

Office of the Inspector General

During the month of November, a full complement of inspectors, officers and airmen, was assigned to the 7th

Air Base Group Air Inspector's Section. Due to the administrative necessity, personnel were assigned to special duty status awaiting authorization. Specific duties were assigned and exact missions of the 7th Air Base Group's Air Inspector Section was determined. With the mission thoroughly implanted in the minds of all assigned personnel, the section proceeded with their inspection function. The schedule of 1952 semi-annual inspections was completed, and aircraft, special subjects, and Semi-Annual Inspection Charts were accomplished and brought up-to date.

A concentrated effort was made by this office to determine the extent of compliance with existing directives concerning the Officers' Mess and the Non-Commissioned Officers' Mess, particularly the sale of tobacco and alcoholic beverages.

All units, activities, or installations of CATG were visited on an informal inspection status to determine the state of preparedness of said organization for the annual inspection to be conducted by the Eighth

SECRET

Air Force Inspector General.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Brown, Inspector General 10th Air Division, visited the 147th AC & W Squadron, Duncanville, Texas, to coordinate the inspection requirements of that particular organization. He also visited the Texas Sheet Metal Company, Dallas, Texas, to observe procedures of a base level contract.

SECRET

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1990

BIBLIOGRAPHY

All sections of the 19th Air Division Headquarters, Adjutant General, Inspector General, Deputy for Materiel, Deputy for Operation, reports of meetings, minutes of conferences, personal interviews, Comptroller and Central Files.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

1992

1993

Appendix No 1

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

POSITION	NAME	RANK
C. O. 19th Air Division	Roberts, John A.	Col
Dep for Materiel	Galer, Michael J.	Lt Col
Dep for Operations	Calhoun, W. R. Jr.	Col
Staff Observer ADDO	Downey, Clyde J.	Lt Col
I. G. 19th Air Division	Brown, Paul D.	Lt Col
Adjutant General	Boyle, John H.	Lt Col
Asst Dep for Operations	Hensch, Edward K.	Maj

Appendix No 2

Organization	October		November	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers	10	9	10	10
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	6	7	
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	61	86	61	88
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	123	159	123	164
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	0	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	
Airmen	0	1	0	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	100	102	103
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	227	229	229
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	100	101	102	102
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	225	229	217
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	94	102	98
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	237	229	229
4010th Gp [illegible] Sq				
Officers	9	24	9	21
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	278	352	278	389

1996

Organization	October		November	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th Fight Sq				
Officers	10	5	10	6
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	430	478	430	487
40[illegible]th OM Sq				
Officers	4	4	4	3
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	249	281	299
Hq 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	57	75	57	70
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	115	136	115	131
Hq 11th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	97	102	102
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	239	229	246
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	99	102	100
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	229	247	229	246

Organization	October		November	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
98th Bomb Sq				
Officers	100	102	102	106
Warraht Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	243	229	252
11th Maint Sq				
Officers	10	6	10	6
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	430	456	430	457
401th OM Sq				
Officers	4	5	4	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	276	281	279
401th Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	23	9	21
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	278	352	278	359
Hq & Hq Sq 7th A/B Gp				
Officers	45	75	45	77
Warraht Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	220	342	220	339
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	14	12	14	12
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	453	427	453	415

1998

Organization	October		November	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	210	209	215
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	6	8	6	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	194	212	194	209
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	7	4	8
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	171	174	182
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	178	202	192
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	192	202	188
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	12	11	12	10
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	211	200	211	219

1999

Organization	October		November	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	8	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	183	185	183	190
40[illegible]0th Ops Sq				
Officers	16	14	16	13
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	260	293	260	300
140 4th Ops Sq				
Officers	11	9	11	8
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	140	197	140	188
7th Med Sq				
Officers	60	54	60	54
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	205	176	205	172
11th Med Sq				
Officers	35	31	35	34
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	137	104	137	103
7th M'tr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	218	217	218	218

Organization	October		November	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	7	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	226	217	221
58th Band				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	38	34	38
7th Ftr Sq				
Officers	16	15	16	15
Warrant Officers	6	2	6	2
Airmen	26	31	26	31
ACG 5th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	2	1	2
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	3	3	3
Total Officers	1029	1105	1041	1114
Total Warrant Officers	7	15	7	15
Total Airmen	6885	7326	6885	7415

Appendix No 2

ASSIGNED, AUTHORIZED & EFFECTIVE

19TH AIR DIVISION OFFICERS



HQ 19TH AIR DIVISION	AUTH		10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
	ASGD		8	8	8	8	8	8	9	9	9	10
	EFF											
7TH BOMB WING	AUTH		400	401	401	401	404	406	406	406	406	412
	ASGD		295	323	389	411	427	444	449	444	434	442
	EFF											
11TH BOMB WING	AUTH		378	377	377	377	380	380	380	380	380	386
	ASGD		235	291	338	374	386	420	419	425	413	415
	EFF											
7TH AIR BASE GROUP	AUTH		171	223	221	232	234	239	239	239	240	240
	ASGD		166	213	270	280	282	269	269	276	264	262
	EFF											
TOTAL	AUTH	680	959	1011	1009	1020	1028	1037	1035	1035	1036	1048
	ASGD	716	704	835	1005	1073	1103	1141	1146	1154	1120	1129
	EFF											

Appendix 15 x

ASSIGNED, AUTHORIZED & EFFECTIVE

19TH AIR DIVISION

AIRMEN



HQ 19TH AIR DIVISION	AUTH		7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	ASGD		3	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	6	6
	EFF											
7TH BOMB WING	AUTH		1811	1848	1848	1028	1824	1825	1825	1825	1825	1825
	ASGD		1523	1616	1705	1898	1947	1978	1975	2000	1999	2046
	EFF											
11TH BOMB WING	AUTH		1786	1785	1785	1797	1793	1792	1868	1791	1791	1791
	ASGD		1418	1581	1713	1870	1874	1935	1959	1941	1950	1971
	EFF											
7TH AIR BASE GROUP	AUTH		2445	3197	3191	3236	3248	3229	3231	3231	3262	3262
	ASGD		2440	2845	3083	3334	3424	3414	3478	3480	3371	3392
	EFF											
TOTAL	AUTH	5133	6049	6837	6831	6868	6872	6853	6854	6854	6885	6885
	ASGD	4952	5384	6047	6507	7109	7252	7334	7419	7428	7326	7415
	EFF											

2006

Appendix No 5

AUTHORIZED & ASSIGNED

19TH AIR DIVISION
CIVILIANS



ORGANIZATION	AUTH	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
HQ 19TH AIR	G		4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
DIVISION	U		4										
7TH	G		12	10	13	13	13	13	14	13	13	13	
BOMB WING	U		76	76	77	77	77	77	49	50	50	50	
11TH	G		4	2	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	
BOMB WING	U								26	26	26	26	
7TH AIR BASE	G		161	163	181	181	183	190	188	189	188	189	
GROUP	U		161	167	164	164	164	164	159	158	158	158	
TOTAL	G	181	181	179	204	204	206	213	212	212	211	212	
	U	241	241	241	241	241	241	241	234	234	234	234	

B-36 FLYING TIME

19TH AIR DIVISION

CY 1951



2009

Appendix No 7

AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN

PER AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

19TH AIR DIVISION



AVG. ACFT. ASSIGNED

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
7TH BOMB WING	20	19	18	18	17	18	17	19	20	21	21	19	19	19	23	22	22	22	25	28	31	32	36	
11TH BOMB WING	5	6	7	9	11	13	14	16	17	17	16	16	18	19	21	22	22	22	24	28	30	30	34	

B-36 FLYING TIME

19TH AIR DIVISION



Appendix D 7

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

CARSWELL A F B



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
PRIMARY A/C	HOURS FLOWN	1827	1976	2425	2522	1641	3027	2539	2870	2765	2371	2743	
	FATAL	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	NON-FATAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	
	TOTAL	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	
ALL OTHER A/C	HOURS FLOWN	718	559	1067	1161	1475	1469	1606	1104	1046	997	963	
	FATAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	NON-FATAL	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	

B-36 OUT OF COMMISSION RATE

7TH BOMB WING

BOMB SQDN	MONTH	AOCP HOURS	MAINT. HOURS	OTHER HOURS
9TH	JUL	226	1073	0
	AUG	898	738	0
	SEP	625	727	0
	OCT	1016	658	0
	NOV	1074	1033	0
	DEC			
436TH	JUL	280	823	0
	AUG	463	578	0
	SEP	732	655	40
	OCT	1567	801	8
	NOV	1017	530	0
	DEC			
492ND	JUL	649	588	0
	AUG	833	948	0
	SEP	714	836	0
	OCT	496	1330	10
	NOV	839	1243	0
	DEC			



11TH BOMB WING

BOMB SQDN	MONTH	AOCP HOURS	MAINT. HOURS	OTHER HOURS
26TH	JUL	237	1149	0
	AUG	332	1094	0
	SEP	1094	672	0
	OCT	1240	719	0
	NOV	881	615	0
	DEC			
42ND	JUL	107	1683	57
	AUG	671	388	0
	SEP	1200	1145	201
	OCT	576	2069	0
	NOV	664	1382	0
	DEC			
98TH	JUL	267	1000	72
	AUG	391	962	0
	SEP	452	1208	0
	OCT	934	1663	0
	NOV	620	988	0
	DEC			



B-36 COMMISSION STATUS

7TH BOMB WING

BOMB SQDN	MONTH	AVG ACFT ASGD	AVG ACFT IN COMM
9TH	JUL	7.1	5.4
	AUG	8.4	6.2
	SEP	8.0	6.1
	OCT	8.7	6.5
	NOV	9.1	6.1
	DEC		
436TH	JUL	7.6	6.2
	AUG	7.9	6.5
	SEP	9.0	7.0
	OCT	9.3	6.1
	NOV	9.0	6.9
	DEC		
492ND	JUL	7.7	6.0
	AUG	8.7	6.3
	SEP	9.8	7.6
	OCT	9.6	7.1
	NOV	9.8	6.9
	DEC		



11TH BOMB WING

BOMB SQDN	MONTH	AVG ACFT ASGD	AVG ACFT IN COMM
26TH	JUL	6.7	4.8
	AUG	7.9	6.0
	SEP	8.6	6.2
	OCT	8.7	6.1
	NOV	9.8	7.7
	DEC		
42ND	JUL	6.8	4.4
	AUG	7.7	6.3
	SEP	8.6	5.0
	OCT	9.7	6.1
	NOV	9.2	6.4
	DEC		
98TH	JUL	7.3	5.5
	AUG	7.9	6.1
	SEP	8.9	6.6
	OCT	9.1	5.6
	NOV	9.5	7.2
	DEC		



Appendix D 11

History

19th AIR DIVISION

December
1951

Carswell Air Force Base

Fort Worth, Texas

SECRET

AUTH. CO. 19TH AD

INITIALS CTB

DATE 6 Feb 52

SECRET

2-2740-2

SECRET.

2025

HISTORY

of the

19TH AIR DIVISION, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

DECEMBER 1951

PREPARED

BY

BASE HISTORICAL OFFICE

BASE HISTORIAN - 2d Lt. ROSE A. PALMER

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - T Sgt James H. Mitchell

HISTORICAL TECHNICIAN - Sgt Laurence L. Benson

"The following represents a complete and accurate description of the activities of the 19th Air Division."

JOHN A. ROBERTS
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

2026

FORWARD

The intent of this History is to show activities, carried on during December by the 19th Air Division, in comparison to and relation with the overall statistics compiled in the year of 1951.

PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

PERSONNEL

Office of the Adjutant General

There was only one change in the assigned personnel strength of the 19th Air Division Headquarters during December 1951. Major Joseph W. Parks, Jr. was assigned as Assistant Deputy for Operations effective 17 December 1951. Therefore, the assigned military strength of this Headquarters is now 11 officers and six airmen. It was reported that seven airmen were assigned to this Headquarters in the November History, which was an error and should have been six assigned. As reported in two previous Histories, Major General C. S. Irvine, Major John L. Winkel, and Captain William E. Kaake, are still on Temporary Duty (TDY) to Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. The roster of key personnel for this Headquarters for December is appended. 1 /

The assigned military strength of the 19th Air Division showed a gain of 270 personnel over the 9,544 recorded in November. The December strength broken down shows 1,142 officers, 17 warrant officers, and 7,655 airmen assigned to this organization. With

1 / Roster of Key Personnel, 19th Air Division; see Appendix no 1

activation of the 19th Air Division, per Strategic Air Command General Orders #12, dated 6 February 1951, the assigned strength was 6,088 on 28 February 1951, and 8,814 were assigned on 31 December. This is an overall gain of 2,726 for the 19th Air Division in 1951.

A chart showing the authorized and assigned strength of this organization by units is appended. 2 / Also, graphs showing the authorized and assigned strength for officers 3 / and airmen is attached. 4 /

ORGANIZATION

Upon the activation of Headquarters 19th Air Division in February 1951, Major General C. S. Irvine, then Brigadier General, was assigned as Division Commander. This was authorized per Par 1, SO 34, Headquarters USAF, dated 16 February 1951. Along with the activation of this Headquarters, the 11th Bomb Group was deactivated and the 11th Bombardment Wing (Heavy) was activated and assigned to this Headquarters. Also, the 7th Bombardment Wing (Heavy) and the 7th Air Base Group were assigned.

2 / Chart; Auth and Assgd Strength; see Appendix no 2

3 / Chart; Auth and Assgd Strength for Officers; see Appendix no 3

4 / Chart; Auth and Assgd Strength for Airmen; see Appendix no 4

This Headquarters received instructions from SAC on 29 December 1951, to man the Operational Engineering Section (OES) at Carswell AFB, utilizing 19th Air Division Personnel currently performing duty with this section. The OES is authorized a total of 18 officers and five airmen, who will be assigned to Headquarters SAC, with permanent duty station at this base. The 19th Air Division Commander will have complete administration and control over the personnel involved. It is believed by this Headquarters that the primary reason for this procedure is to insure that once personnel are assigned to the OES, only SAC will have the authority to transfer them. Therefore overseas quotas at this base will not affect these personnel. The operation of this section should improve now that personnel have some assurance they will remain in this section for at least a minimum period. 5 /

A TWX DPLCT 11485, dated 8 December 1951, was received at this Headquarters to activate the 4017th Training Squadron (B-36 Transition) effective 17

5 / TWX; Concerning transfer of OES Personnel; see Appendix no 5

December 1951, and that it would be assigned to Eighth Air Force and further assigned to the 19th Air Division. 6/ Concurrently with the activation of the 4017th Training Squadron, the B-36 Training Group (Provisional), which was established at this base effective 16 July 1951, was deactivated.

ADMINISTRATION

This Headquarters is composed of the following Staff Sections: Commanding General, Adjutant General, Office of the Deputy for Operations, Office of the Deputy for Materiel, and Office of the Inspector General. The primary mission of this Headquarters is correlation of the activities of all assigned units: to provide command supervision and direction of the tactical operation of the combat wings assigned; to provide command supervision and direction of the tactical training of the combat wings assigned, insuring that the highest standard of quality is attained; promote standardization of rating techniques of the combat wings assigned; insure that proper emphasis within the combat wings is being

6/ TWX dtd 8 Dec 51, Activation of 4017th Tng Sq; see Appendix no 6

placed upon the essential preparations for execution of combat assigned; to advise the numbered Air Force Headquarters concerned as to any action required to improve operational capability of assigned units; by means of observer personnel to closely monitor and participate in the execution of all simulated combat missions conducted by the combat wings assigned.

Office of the Deputy for Operations

The combined total of flying time for both the 7th and 11th Bombardment Wings (Heavy) for the month of December 1951 was 2405:15 hours. This is a decrease of 345:35 hours from that total reported in November, which was 2750:50 hours. 7/ During the past year, beginning with activation of this Division in February, flying time has remained on an even keel, with the exception of June when 3,027 hours were recorded by the two Wings. However, the gradual increase from February's 1,962:35 to June was brought to an abrupt end by General C. S. Irvine, Commanding General of the 19th Air Division. He placed a restriction of 1400 hours

7/ Chart; Flying time for the two Wings; see appendix no 7

per wing for the purpose of increasing the supply level and thus placing a premium on good planning. Also, a better utilization of flying time for the accomplishment of Strategic Air Command (SAC) requirements was stressed.

Most of the 19th Air Division's Flying Time during December consisted of training, test flights, ferrying, gunnery, special missions, and minimum training requirements (50-8). A chart, showing the average hours flown by assigned aircraft for 1950 and 1951 is appended. 8/ It was reported that 100 per cent of the 50-8 requirements were completed by both Wings. B-36 Flying Time chart for 1950 and 1951 is appended. 9/

The monthly Flying Safety Meeting was held to present the Flying Safety Plaque to the squadron with the outstanding flying safety record for December. For the third month in a row, the 492nd Bomb Squadron, 7th Bombardment Wing (Heavy), walked off with top honors and were presented the plaque

8/ Chart; Average hours flown per assigned aircraft; see Appendix no 8

9/ Chart; B-36 Flying time for 1950 and 1951; see Appendix no 9

to keep for their own. One rule regarding the plaque states that when one squadron wins the plaque three times in a row they are allowed to keep it. This same squadron also won the award during the months of March and April 1951.

Major Frederick E. Bachmann's crew, of the 436th Bomb Squadron, 7th Bombardment Wing (Heavy), was selected as "Crew of the Month" for December 1951. Major Bachmann's crew was selected through competition with all B-36 crews at Carswell Air Force Base. His crew's high score was based on total flying hours for the month, completion of transition training, flying without violation, accomplishment of link trainers and ground control approaches, participation in unit flying safety activities, and safe flying for the period.10 /

Aircraft Accidents: There were four aircraft accidents recorded this year with two being major and two minor. The first minor accident happened on 6 March 1951 at Carswell Air Force Base. On a take-off, high

10 / Chart; Aircraft Accidnet Rate per 10,000 hours flown, 1950 and 1951, See Appendix No 10

SECRET

winds caused a B-36 to wind vane placing the aircraft in a nose high position. This resulted in the number one propeller striking the runway.

The other minor aircraft accident occurred the 26th of November at this base. Just after take-off of a B-36, it was discovered that the pin holding the front and rear double wheels of the landing gear apart was broken. The aircraft circled the base for six and one-half hours trying to repair the trouble. After all efforts had failed and 15,000 gallons of fuel and eight 100 pound practice bombs had been jettisoned into Lake Worth, Captain Clarence F. Horton, Aircraft Commander, ordered the crew to bail out. Captain Horton brought the B-36 in on a rain soaked runway without mishap. One crew member received a broken leg in landing from his parachute jump.

The first major aircraft accident occurred on 27 April 1951. A B-36 from the 436th Bomb Squadron, 7th Bombardment Wing, was on a routine mission (Fighter -

SECRET

Gunnery practice) over the Oklahoma City area when intercepted by four F-51 aircraft of the 185th Tactical Reconniassance Squadron, Will Rogers Field, Oklahoma. While making passes at the B-36, one fighter pilot undoubtedly misjudged his distance and failed to pull up in time, crashing into the B-36 at exactly 1341 Central Standard Time. Thirteen members of the B-36 crew were fataly injured along with Major Charles E. Crecelius, Aircraft Commander. The pilot of the F-51 was also killed. This accident occurred approximately 10 miles south of Perkins, Oklahoma, and 37 miles northeast of Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.

The second major aircraft accident occurred on 6 May 1951 at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. B-36 #2660 of the 9th Bomb Squadron, 7th Bombardment Wing, was attempting to land at Kirtland when the right jet pod and #6 propeller struck the runway. The blades of #6 propeller were torn off but the jet pod did not tear loose. The pilot presumably

decided to go around as power was applied to the remaining engines. In making the turn, the bank became approximately 75° right wing low position. The maximum altitude achieved in the turn was about 200 feet, and being unable to maintain this altitude in the sharp bank, the right wing struck the ground, and immediately burst into flames. Of the personnel aboard, 22 were killed instantly, one survivor died shortly thereafter, and two survivors are remaining.

During the month of December, both wings were assigned special missions which were completed successfully and without mishap. The 11th Bomb Wing completed Operations Order #77-51 successfully by dispatching six B-36 aircraft to Sidi Slimane, French Morocco, on the 1st of December. The purpose of this mission was to familiarize the 11th Bomb Wing with the base at Sidi Slimane, to test the capability of this base to support a B-36 Staging Operation, to provide realistic training in station keeping tactics, and to test the unit's

capability to complete the profile mission while penetrating defenses in depth with a cell for simulated strike against an industrial target. Four C-124's from Biggs Air Force Base, Texas, arrived at Carswell on 26 November to transport the advance party of this mission. These aircraft departed on the 27th of November and route was flown as briefed; Carswell, Kindley, Lages, and Sidi Slimane.

The 7th and 11th Bomb Wings completed a mission on 4 December by dispatching one each B-36 aircraft to Sculthorpe, England, to participate in a Royal Air Force Bombing and Navigation Competition on a non-competitive basis. Both aircraft successfully accomplished the mission at briefed altitudes, with from good to excellent results on all targets. The 11th Bomb Wing Advanced Party, at Sidi Slimane, French Morocco, provided maintenance personnel and equipment which was airlifted by one C-124 of the 1st Strategic Support Squadron to Sculthorpe, England.

The 11th Bomb Wing also sent B-36 #1075 and crew to Limestone Air Force Base, Maine, on 7 December for the purpose of operational testing of hydrant refueling system at Limestone. The mission was accomplished successfully with a total of 25 hours flying time.

The Air Force participated in the 48th Anniversary of the Wright Brothers' flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, by dispatching a B-36 from the 7th Bomb Wing to fly over the Wright Brothers' monument.

Due to the critical supply shortage, the 19th Air Division has put a restriction of 45 hours flying time on each aircraft, for the month of January. This does not include any special training that might be ordered by higher headquarters.

Office of the Deputy for Materiel

The total flying time for the two tactical wings was 345.35 hours less than that for November which had 2750.50. The flying time for this month was accumulated by tactical training, test flights, and miscellaneous

missions, This month's flying represents an average of 44 hours per possessed aircraft. In December, a total of 24 - 100 hour inspections, and 33 reciprocating engine changes were completed in support of this effort. Charts showing the Out of Commission Parts rate (AOCP) 11 / and In-Commission Status for the two tactical wings are appended. Also a chart showing the Commission Status for the last half of the calender year 1951 is appended. 12 / In spite of continuing upward trend in AOCP rate, an In-Commission rate of 74 per cent was maintained for December. This high figure is primarily due to controlled cannibalization and strong desire and determination of maintenance personnel to maintain an acceptable In-Commission rate.

During the month, a total of 38 reciprocating engine failures was experienced. Limited availability of Quick Engine Change Kits (QECK) spares permitted assembly of only 33 complete power packages. The problem of supply support for Engine Build-up is being approached from

11 / Chart: AOCP Rate for last half of 1951, See Appendix No 11

12 / Chart: In-Commission Status for 1950 and 1951, See Appendix No 12

two different directions: first, from a standpoint of renewed emphasis placed upon local repair of CEC components to maximum extent; and second, furnishing control depots with realistic overall requirements as far in advance as possible. This course of action, together with controlled liaison visits to area provisioning agencies, seems to offer the most logical approach to the early solution of Engine Build-Up Supply Problems.

The 7th Bombardment Wing, Heavy, had 25 B-36D and 14 B-36F aircraft assigned, but only possessed 16 and 12 respectively as of 31 December 1951. The 11th Bombardment Wing had 23 B-36D and 12 B-36 aircraft assigned, and 16 D's and 12 F's possessed at this time.

Four B-36D aircraft were phased into the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation CVAC, San Diego, California for modification on the San San Project. Also, four B-36F aircraft were received from CVAC, Fort Worth, Texas.

Office of the Inspector General

The Inspector General's Office and all sections thereof were inspected by the Eighth Air Force Inspector General's Staff during the annual inspection of Carswell Air Force Base in December. Following the inspection of this staff section, inspectors of the 19th Air Division accompanied and assisted Eighth Air Force Inspectors. Five special subjects were closed out in compliance during the month. These were: "Air Force Information Program", "Shipment of Engineer Type Equipment", "Use of Radio and Wire Facilities", Office and NCO Messes", "Inspection of Survival Equipment", and "Compliance with Eighth Air Force Regulation 205-5 Classified Material". Also during this time, an initial inspection of AFL 121-17 "Maintenance of Service Records", was conducted. Units were found to be in non-compliance. Intermediate inspections will be conducted to insure compliance before the expiration of said special subject.

SECRET

With the close of the year 1951, a concerted effort by all members of the 7th Air Base Group inspectors was given towards the inventorying, posting, and requisitioning of Technical Orders and publications.

SECRET

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

All sections of the 19th Air Division Headquarters, Adjutant General, Inspector General, Deputy for Materiel, Deputy for Operation, reports of meetings, minutes of conferences, personal interviews, Comptroller and Central files.

APPENDIX

Appendix No 1

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

POSITION	NAME	RANK
C. O. 19th Air Division	Roberts, John A.	Col
Deputy for Operations	Calhoun, William R. Jr	Col
Deputy for Materiel	Galer, Michael J.	Lt Col
Adjutant General	Boyle, John H.	Lt Col
Inspector General	Brown, Paul D.	Lt Col
Staff Observer ADDO	Downey, Clyde J.	Lt Col
Asst Deputy for Operations	Hensh, Edward K.	Maj
Asst Deputy for Operations	Parks, Joseph W. Jr	Maj

Appendix No 2

Organization	November		December	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
19th Air Division Hqs				
Officers	10	10	10	11
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	7	6	7	6
Hqs 7th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	61	88	57	88
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	123	164	115	165
Hq 7th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
9th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	102	103	102	107
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	229	229	228
436th Bomb Sq H				
Officers	102	102	102	106
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	217	229	228
492nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	102	98	102	101
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	229	229	234
410th Ord & Eloc Sq				
Officers	9	21	9	20
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	278	389	278	394

Incl #1

Organization	November		December	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
7th Ftr Sq				
Officers	10	6	10	4
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	430	487	430	483
401Oth OM Sq				
Officers	4	3	4	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	299	281	303
Hq 11th Bomb Wing H				
Officers	57	70	57	68
Warrant Officers	0	3	0	3
Airmen	115	131	115	146
Hq 17th Bomb Gp				
Officers	0	1	0	1
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	0	1	0	1
26th Bomb Sq				
Officers	102	102	102	106
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	246	229	250
42nd Bomb Sq				
Officers	102	100	102	109
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	229	246	229	253

Organization	November		December	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
96th Tech Sq				
Officers	102	106	102	111
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	229	252	229	249
11th TnAnt Sq				
Officers	10	6	10	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	1
Airmen	430	457	430	474
40/4th Off Sq				
Officers	4	4	4	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	281	279	281	281
40/4th Arm & Elec Sq				
Officers	9	21	9	21
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	1
Airmen	278	359	278	382
Hq & Hq Sq 7th A/B Gp				
Officers	45	77	45	68
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	220	339	220	352
7th Air Police Sq				
Officers	14	12	14	14
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	453	415	453	415

Organisation	November		December	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Air Police Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	209	215	209	216
7th Installation Sq				
Officers	6	7	6	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	194	209	194	230
11th Installation Sq				
Officers	4	8	4	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	174	182	174	206
7th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	4	5	5
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	192	202	209
11th Food Sv Sq				
Officers	5	4	5	4
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	202	188	202	202
7th Supply Sq				
Officers	12	10	12	11
Warrant Officers	0	2	0	2
Airmen	211	210	211	252

Organization	November		December	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Supply Sq				
Officers	10	8	10	8
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	2
Airmen	183	190	183	216
AC10th Ops Sq				
Officers	16	13	16	15
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	260	300	260	313
AC14th Ops Sq				
Officers	11	8	11	8
Warrant Officers	0	1	0	1
Airmen	140	188	140	190
7th Med Sq				
Officers	60	54	60	55
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	205	172	205	175
11th Med Sq				
Officers	35	34	35	34
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	137	103	137	112
7th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	5	5	7
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	218	218	218	205

Organization	November		December	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
11th Mtr Veh Sq				
Officers	5	6	5	6
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	217	221	217	206
585th Band				
Officers	0	0	0	0
Warrant Officers	1	1	1	1
Airmen	34	38	34	40
7th Avn Sq				
Officers	16	15	16	15
Warrant Officers	6	2	6	2
Airmen	26	31	26	31
4065th WAF Sq				
Officers	1	2	1	2
Warrant Officers	0	0	0	0
Airmen	3	3	3	3
4017th Tng Sq				
~~Total~~ Officer			15	1
~~Total~~ Warrant Officers			0	0
~~Total~~ Airmen			31	4
Total Officers	1041	1114	1052	1142
Total Warrent Officers	7	15	7	17
Total Airmen	6885	7415	6908	7655

Appendix V03

ASSIGNED, AUTHORIZED & EFFECTIVE

19TH AIR DIVISION
OFFICERS



HQ 19TH AIR DIVISION	AUTH		10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	25
	ASGD		8	8	8	8	8	8	9	9	9	10	12
	EFF												
7TH BOMB WING	AUTH		400	401	401	401	404	406	406	406	406	412	408
	ASGD		295	323	389	411	427	444	449	444	434	442	451
	EFF												
11TH BOMB WING	AUTH		378	377	377	377	380	380	380	380	380	386	386
	ASGD		235	291	338	374	386	420	419	425	413	415	434
	EFF												
7TH AIR BASE GROUP	AUTH		171	223	221	232	234	239	239	239	240	240	240
	ASGD		166	213	270	280	282	269	269	276	264	262	262
	EFF												
TOTAL	AUTH	680	959	1011	1009	1020	1028	1037	1035	1035	1036	1048	1059
	ASGD	716	704	835	1005	1073	1103	1141	1146	1154	1120	1129	1159
	EFF												

Appendix No X

ASSIGNED, AUTHORIZED & EFFECTIVE

19TH AIR DIVISION

AIRMEN

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
HQ 19TH AIR DIVISION	AUTH		7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	38
	ASGD		3	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	10
	EFF												
7TH BOMB WING	AUTH		1811	1848	1848	1028	1804	1825	1825	1825	1825	1825	1817
	ASGD		1523	1616	1705	1898	1947	1978	1975	2000	1999	2046	2067
	EFF												
11TH BOMB WING	AUTH		1786	1785	1785	1797	1793	1792	1868	1791	1791	1791	1791
	ASGD		1418	1581	1713	1870	1874	1935	1959	1941	1950	1971	2036
	EFF												
7TH AIR BASE GROUP	AUTH		2445	3197	3191	3236	3248	3229	3231	3231	3262	3262	3262
	ASGD		2440	2845	3083	3334	3424	3414	3478	3480	3371	3392	3542
	EFF												
TOTAL	AUTH	5133	6049	6837	6831	6868	6872	6853	6854	6854	6885	6885	6908
	ASGD	4892	5384	6047	6507	7109	7252	7334	7419	7428	7326	7415	7655
	EFF												

Appendix No 5

C O P Y

CGAF EIGHT CARSWELL AFB TEX UNCLASSIFIED

DEFERRED

CGADIV ONE NINE CARSWELL AFB TEX/COURIER/

COSTRATRECONWG TWO EIGHT RAPID CITY AFB X

PDAI 5635. Fol info is extracted fr Hq SAC msg DPAOA 40630 dt 12 Dec 51 and quoted FYI and aprop action: "This hq now has auth for manning the OES. The auth for Carswell AFB and Rapid City AFB are as indicated below. Req immed action be taken to fully man these sec. In the asgmt of pers to these psn, it is recm that pers be asg who are curr performing dy w/ths OES. Pers w/b rsg to this hq, w/perm dy sta at the respective AFB. Comdr of the 19th ADiv and 20th Strat Recon Wg under whom the sec will function will have compl admin and con over the pers involved. Rept of compl action to inc name, gr, AFSN and exact psn indiv is occupying at EPD.

CARSWELL AFB

OFFICERS

TITLE	SSN	GRADE AUTH
Sec Chief	7051	Lt Col
M. E. Unit Chief	7051	Maj
E. E. Unit Chief	7051	Maj
A. E. Unit Chief	7051	Maj

2061

C O P Y

C O P Y

TITLE	SSN	GRADE AUTH
A/C Struct Off	70C1 (6025)	Capt
A/C Sys & Instr Off	70C1 (6025)	Capt
A/C Grd Equip & Misc	70C1 (6025)	Capt
Power Plant Off	70C1 (6025)	Capt
Power Plant Off	70C1 (6025)	Capt
Power Plant Off	70C1 (6025)	Capt
Power Plant Off	70C1 (6025)	Capt
Electronics Off	70C1 (0141)	Capt
E.C.M. Off	70C1 (7800)	Capt
Elect Sys Off	70C1 (4025)	Capt
Arm & Bomb Off	70C1 (4595)	Capt
Flt Engr Off	70C1 (1020)	Capt
Flt Engr Off	70C1 (1020)	Capt
Admin Asst	2120	Capt

AIRMEN

TITLE	AFSC
Senior Clerk	70250
Senior Clerk	70250
Senior Clerk	70250
Clerk Helper	70010
Senior Draftsman	99250

RAPID CITY AFB

OFFICERS

TITLE	SSN	Grade Auth
Sec Chief	70C1	Lt Col
M. E. Unit Chief	70C1	Maj
E. E. Unit Chief	70C1	Maj
A. E. Unit Chief	70C1	Maj
Power Plant Off	70C1 (4823)	Capt

COPY COPY

C O P Y C O P Y

TITLE	SSN	GRADE AUTH
Power Plant Off	7051 (4023)	Capt
A/C Grd Equip & Misc	7051 (4023)	Capt
Electronics Off	7051 (0141)	Capt
E.C.M. Off	7051 (7855)	Capt
Photo Off	7051 (7052)	Capt
Adm Asst	2120	Capt

AIRMEN

TITLE	AFSC
Senior Clerk	70250
Senior Clerk	70250
Clerk Helper	70010
Senior Draftsman	99350

Accordingly, req rept of compl action to inc name, gr, AFSN, and exact psn indiv is occupying be furn this hq NLT 10 Jan 52. For 20th Strat Recon Wg only: This answers your msg DP 315 dt 6 Dec 51.

UNCLASSIFIED 4 4

WOJG WALKER - jad

PDA1 258

2064

Appendix No 6

FM CG SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO JNFOB/CGA RIGHT CARSWELL AFB TEX
INFOJ WTOB/CGAIRDIV OFF NINE CARSWELL AFB TEX
/RESTRICTED/DPLCT 11485 PD THE 4017TH TRAINING SQUADRON (B-36)
TRANSITION) IS DESIGNATED, ASSIGNED TO THE EIGHTH AF AND FURTHER
ASSIGNED TO THE 19 TH AIR DIVSON, IT IS DESIRED YOU TAKE NECESSARY
ACTION TO ORG NIZE THIS UNIT T CARSWELL AFB, TEX EFF 17 DEC 51, PAV
BEING FORWARDED BY SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE. INITIAL MORNING REPORT
WIL BE PREPARED AS OF EFF DATE OF ORGN IN ACCORD WITH SAC MANUAL 171-1.
CITE THIS MSG AS AUTHORITY. CONFIRMING SAC GO FDL.
08/2256Z DEC JETWH

2066

APPENDIX "D"

B-36 FLYING TIME

19TH AIR DIVISION

CY 1951



AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN

PER AIRCRAFT POSSESSED

19TH AIR DIVISION

AVG ACFT POSSESSED

7TH BOMB WING	18	174	179	128	131	156	155	156	166	155	173	168	173	178	187	190	187	203	224	250	268	275	279	262
11TH BOMB WING	5	56	6	6	92	96	124	126	127	159	149	147	167	189	178	192	180	186	208	235	261	274	285	295

Appendix VIII 8

B-36 FLYING TIME

19TH AIR DIVISION

Appendix No 4

Appendix No 10

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

CARSWELL A F B

RATE PER 10,000 HOURS FLOWN



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
PRIMARY A/C	HOURS FLOWN	1827	1976	2426	2532	2641	3027	2539	2870	2765	2371	2743	2405
	FATAL	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	NON-FATAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
	TOTAL	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
ALL OTHER A/C	HOURS FLOWN	718	553	1067	1161	1475	1469	1606	1104	1046	997	963	705
	FATAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	NON-FATAL	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

B-36 OUT OF COMMISSION RATE

7TH BOMB WING

BOMB SQDN	MONTH	HOURS AOCP	MAINT.	OTHER
9TH	JUL	226	1073	0
	AUG	898	738	0
	SEP	685	727	0
	OCT	1016	658	0
	NOV	1074	1033	0
	DEC	620	752	0
436TH	JUL	280	823	0
	AUG	463	578	0
	SEP	732	655	40
	OCT	1567	801	8
	NOV	1017	530	0
	DEC	1097	1034	0
492ND	JUL	649	588	0
	AUG	833	948	0
	SEP	714	836	0
	OCT	496	1330	10
	NOV	839	1243	0
	DEC	644	797	0



11TH BOMB WING

BOMB SQDN	MONTH	HOURS AOCP	MAINT.	OTHER
26TH	JUL	237	1149	0
	AUG	332	1094	0
	SEP	1094	672	0
	OCT	1240	719	0
	NOV	881	615	0
	DEC	989	959	0
42ND	JUL	107	1683	57
	AUG	671	388	0
	SEP	1200	1145	201
	OCT	576	2069	0
	NOV	664	1382	0
	DEC	1287	880	0
98TH	JUL	267	1000	72
	AUG	391	962	0
	SEP	452	1208	0
	OCT	934	1663	0
	NOV	620	988	0
	DEC	823	948	0



Appendix No 41

B-36 COMMISSION STATUS

7TH BOMB WING

BOMB SQDN	MONTH	AVG ACFT ASGD	AVG ACFT IN COMM
9TH	JUL	7.1	5.4
	AUG	8.4	6.2
	SEP	8.0	6.1
	OCT	8.7	6.5
	NOV	9.1	6.1
	DEC	8.1	6.3
436TH	JUL	7.6	6.2
	AUG	7.9	6.5
	SEP	9.0	7.0
	OCT	9.3	6.1
	NOV	9.0	6.9
	DEC	8.2	5.3
492ND	JUL	7.7	6.0
	AUG	8.7	6.3
	SEP	9.8	7.6
	OCT	9.6	7.1
	NOV	9.8	6.9
	DEC	9.9	8.0



11TH BOMB WING

BOMB SQDN	MONTH	AVG ACFT ASGD	AVG ACFT IN COMM
26TH	JUL	6.7	4.8
	AUG	7.9	6.0
	SEP	8.6	6.2
	OCT	8.7	6.1
	NOV	9.8	7.7
	DEC	9.5	6.9
42ND	JUL	6.8	4.4
	AUG	7.7	6.3
	SEP	8.6	5.0
	OCT	9.7	6.1
	NOV	9.2	6.4
	DEC	9.4	6.4
98TH	JUL	7.3	5.5
	AUG	7.9	6.1
	SEP	8.9	6.6
	OCT	9.1	5.6
	NOV	9.5	7.2
	DEC	10.6	8.2



Appendix [illegible]

B-36 IN-COMMISSION STATUS



Appendix No 6

DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

Frame Number	Classification Number	Date Period	Vol	Pt	Title	Security Classification	Remarks
4	K-DIV-18-HI	Oct 60			18th Air Division	S	
31		Nov 60				S	
66		Dec 60				S	
103		Jan 61				S	
143		Feb 61				S	
198		Mar 61				S	
227		Apr 61				S	
267		May 61				S	
310		Jun 61				S	
412		Jul 61				S	
443		Aug 61				S	
503		Sep 61				S	
543		Oct 61				S	
581		Nov 61				S	
636		Dec 61				S	
676		Jan 62			18th Air Division	S	
728		Feb 62			18th Strategic Aerospace Div	S	
772	K-DIV-18-HI	Mar 62			18th Strategic Aerospace Div.	S	

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DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

Frame Number	Classification Number	Date Period	Vol	Pt	Title	Security Classification	Remarks
809	K-DIV-18-HI	Apr 62			18th Strategic Aerospace Div.	S	
849		May-Jun62				S	
883		Jul 62				S	
928		Aug 62				S	
961		Sep 62				S	
995		Oct 62				S	
1027		Nov 62				S	
1073		Dec 62				S	
1132		Jan 63				S	
1189		Feb 63				S	
1256		Mar 63				S	
1312		Apr 63				S	
1359		May 63				S	
1406	K-DIV-18-HI	Jun 63			18th Strategic Aerospace Div.	S	
1451	K-DIV-19-HI	Jan 50-Nov 51			19th Air Division	U	
1598		Feb 51				U	
1648		Mar 51				S	
1676	K-DIV-19-HI	Apr 51			19th Air Division	S	

DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

Frame Number	Classification Number	Date Period	Vol	Pt	Title	Security Classification	Remarks
1714	K-DIV-19-HI	May 51			19th Air Division	S	
1799		Jun 51				S	
1843		Jul 51				S	
1874		Aug 51				S	
1908		Sep 51				S	
1933		Oct 51				S	
1979		Nov 51				S	
2024	K-DIV-19-HI	Dec 51			19th Air Division	S	
2078	Index				Index		

Some unreadable pages - Poor original

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