

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

6 July 2026

John Greenewald, Jr.
27305 W. Live Oak Road
Suite #1203
Castaic, CA 91384
john@greenewald.com

Reference: EOM-2019-00272

Dear Requester:

This letter is a final response to your 8 January 2019 Mandatory Declassification Review request referenced above and submitted under Executive Order 13526 seeking a **re-review of the DCI Counterterrorist Center Directorate of Operations August 2001 Inspection Report, Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001525482.**

We completed a re-review of the enclosed document responsive to your request and determined that additional information can be released with deletions continuing to be made on the basis of Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c) and/or Section 6.2(d) (FOIA Exemption (b)(3)). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statutes are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(I) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please explain the basis for your appeal. You may address appellate correspondence to:

Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

If you have any questions regarding this response, you may seek assistance by calling this office at 703-613-1287.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Stephen Glenn".

Stephen Glenn
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

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*Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General*

IG 2000-0009-IN



**(U) INSPECTION REPORT
OF THE
DCI COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER
DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS
AUGUST 2001**

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IG-2001-0513

22 August 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chief, Counterterrorist Center

FROM: Rebecca R. Donegan
Acting Inspector General

SUBJECT: (U//~~AIUO~~) Inspection Report of the
DCI Counterterrorist Center

1. (U//~~AIUO~~) Attached is the final report of our inspection of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The three recommendations are the same as those contained in the draft report you reviewed. Based on the DDO's formal comments we have changed the text or, in cases where we did not agree, identified and included the comments (italicized) as part of the text. I will assume your concurrence unless I hear from you within 10 days. Please note that the recommendations will be included in our semiannual report to the DCI.

2. (U//~~AIUO~~) Please forward to me, within 60 days, a formal report setting forth the actions taken to implement the recommendations and/or a timetable for eventual full implementation.

3. (U//~~AIUO~~) If you have additional observations or comments about this inspection or any related matters, please feel free to contact my Acting Deputy, [redacted] the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, [redacted] or me.

6.2(d)

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/signed/

Rebecca R. Donegan

Attachment: As stated

cc: EXDIR (w/att)
DDCI/CM (w/att)
CFO (w/att)
D/CFO/Budget (w/att)
C/ORMS/DO (w/att)

~~Downgrade to U//~~AIUO~~ when
separated from attachment~~

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SUBJECT: (U//~~AIUO~~) Inspection Report of the DCI
Counterterrorist Center

OIG/INS: [REDACTED] (20 August 2001)

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FILE: INS TEAMS/CTC2000/ADMIN/A-Final Cover Memo.doc

Distribution:

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1 - AIG/INV (w/att)
1 - Team Leader/CTC2000 (w/att)
1 - Team File/CTC2000 (w/o att)

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(U) EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

(e) The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) is a well-managed component that successfully carries out the Agency's counterterrorist responsibilities to collect and analyze intelligence on international terrorism and to undermine the capabilities of terrorist groups. CTC fulfills inter-Agency responsibilities for the DCI by coordinating national intelligence, providing warning, and promoting the effective use of Intelligence Community resources on terrorism issues. The Center has made progress on problems identified at the time of the last inspection in 1994—specifically its professional relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Indeed, since 1994, the Center has broadened and deepened its operational partnerships with other US Government organizations working the terrorist target through an increased exchange of personnel and information.

(8) CTC owes its success to a number of factors.

- CTC employees clearly understand their mission and believe their work is vital to saving American lives. This sense of mission and belief in its importance and its success have helped to create what customers, partners, and CTC employees describe as a highly dedicated and motivated workforce which produces quality work.
- CTC's resources have steadily increased over the last five years, with personnel growing by 74 percent during that period and the budget more than doubling. The Center's comparatively favorable resource situation allows it not only to expand its own programs but also to support operations against terrorists and liaison relationships that DO area divisions otherwise could not fund. The OIG cautions, however, that, in recent years, most of the increase in CTC's budget has come in the form of supplemental funding, which is unpredictable.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

- Center employees have earned strong customer support. Customers describe CTC as the leading source of expertise on terrorism, responsive to requirements, and a community facilitator.
- Customers, partners, senior Agency managers, and Center employees credit the strong front office management team with articulating a clear vision and strategy and implementing an effective program against a difficult target.

(S) Although CTC received generally positive reviews, customers did identify some gaps. Military and diplomatic security customers are seeking detailed information on the plans and intentions of key terrorist groups and timely warning of terrorist attacks with specifics on target, date, and place. Customers are concerned that not enough work to provide context for policy decisions is getting done because reports officers are under pressure to disseminate threat reporting quickly, and analysts have time only to focus on crises or other short-term demands. Some consumers worry that Center analysts do not have the time to spot trends or to knit together the threads from the flood of information.

(S//NF) After reviewing the Center's capabilities, current management is trying to increase collection of actionable information—the reporting gap identified by consumers. The senior management team determined that to be successful against key targets requires an operational strategy that places an increased emphasis on recruitment and penetration of key terrorist organizations by traditional clandestine methods—unilateral operations. A key element of this strategy is [REDACTED]

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This includes some shifting of personnel from stations that [REDACTED] and generally have less [REDACTED] Although the program to implement the new strategy is in its early stages—implementation began in late 1999—CTC statistics suggest that it is having some success. The impact on [REDACTED] of the strategy shift at this early stage has been difficult to assess.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

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(S//NF) Although CTC has increased its emphasis on unilateral operations, a key component of the center's operational effort is [redacted]

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[redacted] the relationship with foreign liaison services so that they become active partners in identifying, surveilling, recruiting and penetrating, or disrupting terrorist targets. The [redacted] program has provided a number of benefits, but the ambitious effort to enlarge the program without a clearly documented and articulated plan risks the continuity of this strategy beyond the tenure of the current management team. Therefore, we recommend that CTC develop a written strategy for the [redacted] program to include, but not necessarily be limited to: a discussion of criteria [redacted] a five-year resource projection showing both personnel and funds required, a plan for improving responsiveness to operational correspondence [redacted] and continued increased counterintelligence scrutiny of CTICs.

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(C) CTC management faces additional challenges in fulfilling its mission: recruiting and retaining a skilled workforce, managing demands and crises to guard against burnout and to allow more strategic work, and coordinating and communicating internally and externally. Many of these challenges result from the complex, shifting, and high-profile nature of the target and from customer expectations that allow little room for error. Center managers are aware of and focused on most of these issues.

(C) **Workforce.** The Center has had difficulty attracting and retaining a sufficient cadre of trained, experienced officers required for the new operational strategy, expanded [redacted] program, and strategic analysis. CTC's customers, partners, and managers have identified some areas of inexperience among both operations and analytic officers. The Center has made a concerted effort to

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August 2001

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

attract and retain talented officers—largely through home-basing. A number of CTC managers and officers pointed to career development deficiencies that may dissuade talented officers from choosing the Center for a career, however. Analysts, for example, expressed concerns about career guidance and training and ill-defined career paths. They characterized the ceiling on the overall number of DI officers in the Center as a policy that has had a negative impact on CTC's ability to attract and retain analysts. Center operations officers also were uneasy about career planning and advancement opportunities. CTC management described several developmental issues that they are starting to address, but the OIG recommends a more systematic approach to include detailed, written career guidance for each discrete CTC home-based occupation.

(C) **Stressful Work Environment.** Center employees frequently operate in a state of crisis—resulting from a series of terrorist incidents and multiple known threats—and amidst strong demands from policymakers and Agency senior managers. Moreover, a substantial proportion of CTC personnel believe that their work unit does not have sufficient personnel to accomplish the mission. This combination leads to employee burnout and leaves little time for strategic reflection on both analysis and operations—potentially leading to missed opportunities. Employees told us that they deal with this situation by working extra hours and frequently they have time for only the most essential tasks. Center officers noted that management is sensitive to this issue. Without more personnel, however, the OIG accepts that CTC has limited options to deal with this work environment; the center is nearly fully staffed and crises are part of the nature of the target.

(S//NF) CTC also must cope with information overload, frequently resulting from successful operations against terrorist cells. Most Center interviewees who had an opinion gave mixed reviews of CTC's ability to effectively exploit the data the Center collects. They generally believed that the Center does its best to scope, scan, and prioritize information for immediate action. Some officers acknowledged, however, that the demands placed on CTC

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do not allow it to exploit all the information it collects. As a consequence, the risk exists that a potential warning will go unidentified. Once again, the OIG recognizes that CTC has limited options in dealing with this issue, but some efficiencies could be gained with the Language Exploitation Branch—the unit that bears primary responsibility for translating clandestinely acquired foreign language materials. Specifically, we recommend that CTC develop a plan for the Language Exploitation Branch to address workflow and morale issues.

~~(S)~~ **Communication and Coordination.** The Center brings an Agency focus to an important transnational target, requiring close cooperation with units in all directorates, particularly the area divisions in the DO. Interviews of area division and station officers indicated a need for closer communication and coordination. Such interaction is critical because CTC is the repository of counterterrorist funds, and changing priorities and strategies can lead to abrupt shifts in resources provided to the area divisions and field stations on which CTC depends to conduct much of its operational business. The OIG suggests that CTC management find opportunities to engage in a more active dialogue with DO area division management and ensure a dialogue with affected field stations to minimize potential fallout. Similarly, we found that CTC was not taking full advantage of resources available in the DI. The Center could increase the effectiveness of its analytic resources and gain more regional expertise by fostering stronger relationships with DI regional offices.

~~(C)~~ While CTC employees were generally pleased with front office managers, a number of the interviewees, who commented on their management style, acknowledged that Center personnel saw little of the chief and deputies. They noted that in the fast-paced and stressful work environment, employees desired simple affirmation of a job well done from their managers. Almost all the interviewees recognized the increasing demands placed on the Center's senior management by external and internal customers, as well as the logistical challenges presented by a large workforce [redacted]

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

Nevertheless, the OIG encourages all front office managers to make interaction with center personnel a higher priority.

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(U) INTRODUCTION


~~(S)~~ The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was formed in 1986 as a result of perceptions that terrorist incidents were increasing and that CIA's counterterrorist efforts required focus (see figure 1). CTC operates under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) but resides in the Directorate of Operations (DO) for administrative purposes. It performs the counterterrorist responsibilities that Presidential Decision Directives/NSC-39 and -62 assign to the Agency. The Center oversees a comprehensive counterterrorist operations program to collect intelligence on and minimize the capabilities of international terrorist groups and state sponsors and produces all-source analysis on international terrorism. This Center brings an Agency and Community focus to a Tier One transnational target and has received steadily increasing resources to address this issue (see figure 2). The nature of the target and the breadth of the Center's scope requires CTC to cooperate closely with units in all four directorates, particularly the area divisions in the DO.¹ CTC fulfills inter-Agency responsibilities for the DCI by coordinating national intelligence, providing warning, and promoting the effective use of Intelligence Community resources on terrorism issues.

~~(S)~~ ¹ Presidential Decision Directive NSC-35 ranks counterterrorism as a Tier One objective.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

Figure 2



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(U) CTC operates in a challenging environment in which the target has become more complex and the potential consequences of terrorist attacks more deadly than in previous decades. Terrorists are growing less dependent on state sponsorship and instead are forming loose, transnational affiliations based on ideology or theology.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

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Originally organized into groups, terrorist organizations have become decentralized. Their funding and logistical networks cross borders, and they make use of widely available technology to communicate quickly and securely. As a result of these trends, terrorists are difficult to detect and track, and traditional tools to counter them—diplomatic activities, economic sanctions, and military actions—are less effective.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

(U) CTC AND THE DO

~~(S)~~ CTC management's operational focus is to develop a stronger unilateral effort to penetrate terrorist organizations in key areas, maintain strong foreign liaison relationships, and build on the [redacted]

[redacted] program. While CTC gets generally good reviews from field stations and area divisions, better coordination on strategy and operations could improve these relationships and the effectiveness of the Center.

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(U) Operations to Counter Terrorism

~~(S//NF)~~ CTC has had some recent notable successes in preempting and thwarting terrorists' plans. The Center employs a number of tactics, including recruitments, penetrations, disruptions, and renditions.²

- **Millennium Threat.** In collaboration with US law enforcement and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies, CTC orchestrated a global effort against Usama Bin Ladin [redacted]

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- **Disruption of** [redacted]
[redacted] In the second half of 2000, CTC, working with multiple stations and services, identified [redacted] operatives and detained or arrested [redacted] terrorists. This disruption prevented attacks against US interests, according to CTC.

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- [redacted] In late 2000, CTC worked with its DO and foreign partners to identify and disrupt a [redacted]

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² ~~(U//AIUO)~~ A rendition is the detention of a suspect for whom a legal warrant has been issued and who is turned over to a legal authority after seizure.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

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(S//NF) The current CTC senior management team determined that success against key targets, such as Usama Bin Laden, [REDACTED] required increased emphasis on recruitment and penetration of key terrorist organizations by traditional clandestine methods—unilateral operations. At the time of the program review by current CTC management, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which Center managers judged left CTC on the defensive and reactive to threats. They noted that unilateral operations would augment what they viewed as effective disruption and rendition programs. A key element of the strategy was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Center management increased the number of overseas positions and shifted some officers from stations [REDACTED] and generally have less potential for payoff (see figure 3). Cooperation with key liaison services would be maintained, but CTC management was seeking the right balance between unilateral and liaison operations.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

Figure 3

CTC Overseas Position Shifts FY 2000-2002*		
POSITIONS CUT	POSITIONS ADDED	NEW POSITIONS TO BE ADDED
*In alphabetical order		SECRET//NOFORN

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(S) CTC management recognized that this strategy would require new personnel policies.

- To increase the number of operations officers available to serve overseas, CTC plans to home-base officers from each Clandestine Service Trainees (CST) graduating class; CTC received officers from the December 2000 class. The Center began home-basing DO officers below GS-13 in 1999, which allows it to receive new CSTs. Moreover, CTC management launched a direct hiring campaign to employ officers with special skills: native fluency in languages, such as Farsi and

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
DCI Counterterrorist Center

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Arabic; military backgrounds; and advanced degrees. A senior CTC manager said that the campaign had been successful in bringing onboard [redacted] but that many applicants with the desired ethnic background could not pass the security process.

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- The Center developed a counterterrorist-focused operations course specifically tailored for officers undertaking CTC activities in the field.



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~~(S//NF)~~ In addition, CTC realized the need to communicate its new operational strategy to DO Headquarters and the field. Beginning in October 1999, a series of cables and briefings explained the strategy, including the need to realign personnel and budgetary resources. [redacted] field officers interviewed were familiar with CTC's new operational strategy.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

~~(S//NF)~~ Although the new program focusing on unilateral operations is in its early stages—implementation began in late 1999—CTC statistics suggest that it is having some success. Recruitment pitches [redacted]

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[redacted] suggesting a more aggressive operational posture.

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~~(S//NF)~~ Station managers primarily supported the strategy, although the majority also expressed caution.

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~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ As CTC continues to implement its new strategy and as priorities inevitably shift, further divides between the agenda of the Center and divisions are likely to occur, with possible long-term implications for stations' relationships with liaison services. Although CTC warned of resource implications, the actual cuts and shifts appear to have come as a surprise to those in the field, based on interview data. A senior CTC manager said that the Center does discuss the resource implications with affected stations—although generally after the decision has been made—and in some cases Center management has reversed decisions as a result of this dialogue. **The OIG suggests that CTC management find opportunities to engage in a more active dialogue with DO area division management and ensure a dialogue with affected field stations to minimize potential fallout.**

~~(S)~~ The [REDACTED] Program

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~~(S//NF)~~ Another key element of CTC's operational effort is its [REDACTED] funds—which focuses on [REDACTED] The program began in 1998 and was modeled on the successful

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³ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

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~~(S//NF)~~ The primary goal of the program is to enhance



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~~(S//NF)~~ The program has provided a number of benefits. It has proved successful in



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~~(S//NF)~~ *Program Strategy.* Although CTC senior management told us that it has a  program strategy, it has not yet been documented or articulated to ensure continuity of this strategy beyond the tenure of the current management team.

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- This lack of written documentation criteria for establishing  can lead to decisions that are viewed as inconsistent, according to interviewees.
- This lack of a documented approach can lead to inadequate communication among all pertinent parties,

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

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including area divisions, stations, [redacted]

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[redacted] For example, a field manager described problems and delays in the establishment of a [redacted]

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~~(S//NF)~~ Interviewees, including program managers, commented on the need for clearly articulated program guidance that is rigorous and transparent. At the same time, this guidance needs to remain flexible so that a [redacted] is established when it is the best tool to use against the counterterrorist target [redacted] flexibility to date. [redacted] CTC management has shown [redacted]

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~~(S)~~ DDO Comment: *"The discussion of [redacted] makes too much of the fact that there is limited written guidance on the program strategy. The lack of a written document does not equate to a 'lack of systematic approach'... That said, formalizing the guidance on [redacted] can be a useful exercise, and we will pursue that recommendation."*

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6.2(d) ~~(S)~~ Program Management. The [redacted] Branch has a clear role in establishing and providing ongoing logistical support [redacted] Branch personnel receive high marks from field officers, despite the fact that the unit is at less than half strength and experienced nearly 100 percent turnover in FY 2000. If the [redacted] program expands rapidly—as planned—this will tax already strained employees, and CTC will need to ensure an adequate staff.

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~~(S)~~ Operational guidance, however, has been more problematic. Field personnel had a difficult time identifying a focal point on operational matters, resulting in a perception of inconsistent, contradictory, or inadequate guidance from CTC. [redacted]

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~~(S)~~ The on-site program manager position is demanding and complex. We found that some of the [redacted] program managers were overworked and, in some cases, had additional duties. In one instance, the program manager put in at least 40 hours overtime per pay period. The administrative duties can be burdensome and can distract the manager from guiding [redacted]. Distractions can be damaging [redacted].


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6.2(d)

~~(S)~~ Program managers bear heavy responsibility for a [redacted] success, and CTC management is now giving greater attention to qualifications. The Center has recognized that experienced operations officers are needed to [redacted] [redacted] and run operations. Some program and station managers also stress that language proficiency is a necessity in most areas.

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~~(S)~~ FINDINGS

- 1.4(c)
6.2(d)

• [] have helped focus [] on the counterterrorist target, []

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6.2(d)
- CTC's plan to double the number of [] if realized, will require start-up money for a [] units and operations and maintenance money for two [] units, plus an increased support structure at Headquarters.

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6.2(d)
- CTC has no written formal plan or established criteria for the creation of []

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- Program managers who work a number of different terrorist targets find it difficult to deal with each of the CTC components responsible for the different targets.
- Program managers frequently are burdened with additional responsibilities or heavy administrative duties that distract them from guiding []

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- 1.4(c)
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(S) RECOMMENDATION #1 (For C/CTC): That CTC develop a written strategy for the [] program. The strategy should include, but not necessarily be limited to: a discussion of criteria for establishing [] a five-year resource projection showing both personnel and funds required for established and planned [] and the Headquarters [] plan clarifying points of contact and responsibilities for operational matters, []

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(U) CTC Relations with DO Stations

~~(S)~~ About two-thirds of field officers interviewed praised CTC for the assistance it provides, especially during high visibility events.


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DCI Counterterrorist Center

- Stations were particularly pleased that the Center's financial assistance allows them to conduct operations against terrorists and maintain programs to develop closer relationships with liaison services, which their home divisions could not fund (see figure 4).
- Usama Bin Laden (UBL) Station was frequently singled out for its exceptional support. Field officers described the assistance as "excellent," "timely," "forward leaning," and "substantive." One manager marveled at UBL Station's ability to respond immediately during fast moving situations.
- Station personnel consistently appreciated analysis and background information provided by CTC, [redacted] 1.4(c)
[redacted] When supplied in a timely fashion, the information fostered deeper cooperation with liaison.
- Stations visited by the team highly valued [redacted] 1.4(c)
training provided by CTC Training Branch, especially the courses [redacted] 1.4(c)
[redacted]
- Station officers praised CTC employees who traveled overseas to brief and discuss counterterrorist issues.

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Figure 4

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(S) The remaining one-third of field interviewees noted some shortcomings, ranging from fairly isolated incidents to broader concerns. Some stations in [] claim to have had to delay operations because of poor coordination [] over the source of funding. A more frequent complaint was slow or missing responses to cable traffic and inadequate name traces. Most interviewees were quick to point out that CTC was usually responsive to urgent requests, but routine queries sometimes fell through the cracks. They usually attributed this to an overworked staff that was busy putting out fires. Nevertheless, some reported that slow or inadequate responses put an extra burden on the station; one station has decided to rely on its own staff to undertake name traces, for example.

(S//NF) A number of field officers and managers voiced frustration that CTC's operational advice is sometimes "off the mark" and shows a lack of sound judgment or inexperience in dealing with liaison services or the situation in a given country. From their view these operational lapses—though infrequent—tend to mar the

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

important cooperative and mutually supportive relationship with the area divisions and stations. Interviewees and partner/customer survey respondents noted that these miscues foster the perception that CTC at times does not show an appreciation for the negative impact on liaison services of some of its proposals. Comments from several DO field managers echoed the wording of the recent IG inspection report on [REDACTED] that CTC is not always sensitive to "the difficulties they face in balancing broader, long-term [REDACTED] with short-term, changing requirements inherent in counterterrorism collection operations." They cited several examples of instances in which actions proposed by CTC could have jeopardized [REDACTED] and Agency credibility.

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~~(S)~~ A survey of Headquarters customers and partners mirrors the field response. Seventy percent of DO respondents were satisfied with their interaction with CTC, and 78 percent rated the overall quality of the work relationship as good or excellent. Thirty-four percent of the DO respondents, however, had specific criticisms to offer. When asked how CTC could be more responsive to customer/partner needs, survey respondents most frequently commented that the Center needed better coordination of operations and a better understanding of station equities and what liaison services could provide.

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(U) Technical Support to Operations

(C) The OIG found no strong evidence that the CTC mission has been impeded by these changes. CTC interviewees, both at Headquarters and in the field, were generally pleased with the technical support they receive, with the exception of support to computer operations, which reflects a broader Agency issue.

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
(U) Collection and Reporting

~~(S)~~ Counterterrorism has high priority, and, at several stations, this objective is a primary driver

1.4(c)

This emphasis, as well as resources directed at the target, has paid dividends in terms of the number and quality of disseminated reports. According to CTC statistics, the number of disseminated reports has risen steadily since 1997 (see figure 5). In addition, the quality of reports has improved, with 48 percent of the reports graded "good" or above in 1999 as compared to 44 percent the previous year.⁴ No figures for grades in 2000 were available.

Figure 5



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
⁴~~(C)~~ The DO assigns one of five grades—outstanding, excellent, good, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory—or a more neutral designation—not graded—to its reports. Grades are based on each report's relevance to national or security interests, impact on US policy, and authoritativeness.

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Figure 6



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(~~S//NF~~) Despite the positive reporting trends, CTC management and customers identified some reporting gaps, including the plans and intentions of key terrorist groups and timely warning of terrorist attacks with specifics on target, time, and place. In particular, military customers and some embassy officials stated the need for detailed, less generic information on planned attacks. CTC managers note that the emphasis on the unilateral penetration strategy is designed to close these gaps and provide the more predictive reporting demanded by their consumers. Nevertheless, the nature of the target will limit the Center's ability to collect timely warning of time, place, and target of attacks. While supporting this effort, a senior Agency manager warned that these operations require long-term commitment and discipline, which can be difficult to maintain in the current atmosphere, which rewards instant results.

(~~S//NF~~) Senior Agency officers were adamant that the Center had no choice but to follow the "zero threshold" approach for threat reporting—all threat information is disseminated quickly—leaving customers thirsting for more context and analysis. Threat reporting constituted 12 percent of all reports CTC disseminated in 2000. Almost all customers interviewed recognized this approach as a "necessary evil" in the counterterrorist field, but some senior

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
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customers, particularly from the military, complained that threat reporting was difficult to act upon if it did not include enough context to judge the reliability. One senior military officer explained that it was especially frustrating because reporting from CTC "carries tremendous weight." Given the level of activity and limited resources, however, CTC's Reports and Requirements Group (RRG) cannot provide both timeliness and context to each and every report. As a result, the Center engages in a delicate balancing act between the risk of losing credibility—a concern frequently voiced by field managers and officers—and unacceptable delays.

(C) Overall, Washington and field customers, managers, and officers give RRG high marks for rapid dissemination and reaction. The group accomplishes this mission despite being chronically understaffed, and many customers and partners credited this record to the dedication of the reports officers. The majority of field managers and officers were satisfied with the feedback they received on their terrorist-related reporting. Accessions lists—containing grades and comments on disseminated reports—are the primary source of much of the feedback. RRG provides grades and comments on counterterrorist reports to the area division reports officers who are responsible for sending feedback on all station reporting to the field. Two-thirds of field managers and officers interviewed rated the feedback as adequate to good; those from stations working high interest targets tended to be better satisfied.

(U) Counterintelligence and Security

~~(S//NF)~~ CTC in the last year has effectively established a robust CI element, which is aggressively addressing defensive and offensive CI issues.



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
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(U) CTC'S ANALYSIS

~~(C)~~ CTC provides tactical and strategic analysis to the policy, intelligence, and law enforcement communities, as well as support to operational targeting and planning. Customers, partners, and Assessments and Information Group (AIG) analysts were generally satisfied with the Center's tactical analysis, but reviews were more mixed on strategic analysis, with some interviewees identifying gaps in long-term research and analytical depth.

(U) The Role of Analysis

~~(C)~~ CTC has had an analytic component since its inception in 1986 as Agency management saw a need to centralize terrorism analysis. AIG is the Center's primary source of analysis, and, like the rest of CTC, has undergone growth and reorganization, particularly in the last three years.⁵ AIG has expanded from two regional branches focusing on the Middle East and the "rest of the world," to five branches, with increased focus on Usama Bin Ladin's network and the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Despite these increases, the group remains a relatively small part of the Center, accounting for only 14 percent of staff officers or only 7 percent of the total CTC workforce.

~~(C)~~ AIG's small size belies the critical role it plays in meeting the CTC mission. Analysts in AIG have a multidimensional mission that ranges from production of traditional Directorate of Intelligence (DI) current and longer-term analytic products to CTC-unique warning items in support of operational planning and liaison relations (see figure 7). This mission is made even more complicated by the strong demand from policymakers for support in the form of briefings, specialized products, and twice-weekly community video teleconferences, as well as by frequent briefings to Agency senior managers and Congressional

⁵ ~~(C)~~ In addition to AIG officers, ☐ CTC employees, who work in the Center's two operations groups, are in the analytic career service—CTC/DI.


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testimony. Interviewees from this group characterized their customer base as broad, high-level, and demanding. Moreover, AIG analysts devote a significant amount of time—interviewees estimated between 30 and 50 percent—to counterterrorism operations support, working closely with their colleagues in the [] operations groups on targeting and planning aimed at penetrations, recruitments, renditions, and disruptions.

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Figure 7

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Ⓢ Although analysts and managers consistently described their mission as a blend of analytic production and support to policymakers and involvement in operational planning, a number of interviewees expressed concern about unclear priorities among the competing demands on analysts' time. AIG interviewees most frequently cited lack of direction or conflicting signals as the biggest obstacle to accomplishing the mission. In an environment in which there is a general perception that analysts are pressed for time, they expressed the expectation that management would set clear priorities for them. AIG management was viewed as vacillating between its commitment to support operations and the more traditional DI analytic functions. As one analyst put it, "we are told the DCI and Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) want more analytic think

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pieces but management has not explained what that means." Others pointed out that AIG starts each year with good intentions of doing more long-term research, only to have those plans scrapped by inevitable crises and short-term demands. Nevertheless, some of the more senior analysts cited their disappointment at perceptions that management was attempting to emphasize long-term research at the expense of support to operations because they had been attracted to CTC by the opportunity to undertake nontraditional analysis. They expressed concern that the blend of support to operations and analysis that characterizes the "Center" concept was declining in CTC.

(U) Customer Reaction

~~(C)~~ Policy-level customers generally valued CTC analysis. Consumers most appreciated it when the analysis provided the needed context for decisionmaking. A senior Department of State officer, for example, appreciates the community video teleconferences—in which CTC usually takes the lead—because it affords him the opportunity to have a dialogue with analysts who have expertise and are familiar with intelligence report sourcing. A National Security Council (NSC) official said he rated most highly short, finished products that provided background information. An ambassador was effusive in his praise for the quality of analytic products on a major terrorist group; these products helped prepare him for his posting.

(C) Key CTC Customers		
<u>White House</u>	<u>Congress</u>	<u>Military</u>
President	SSCI	Pentagon
National Security Advisor	HPSCI	DIA
NSC		Commands
		NSA
<u>Law Enforcement</u>	<u>Department of State</u>	
FBI	INR	
Secret Service	Diplomatic Security	
Department of Justice	Counterterrorism Coordinator	
	US Embassies	

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(C) Customers were concerned that not enough work to provide context for policy decisions was getting done because analysts focus on crises or other short-term demands. A senior military customer asked for more predictive analysis from CTC with clearer implications because he may need to act to protect deployed forces based on information provided by the Center. Other military interviewees worried that Center analysts do not have the time to spot trends or to knit together the threads given the flood of information.

(C) The consensus from AIG's operational counterparts in CTC is that analyst support to operations planning continues to be one of the strengths of the Center. Several of the managers from the operations groups stressed the importance of close cooperation and continue to seek avenues to strengthen the relationship. Moreover, two-thirds of the analysts interviewed could cite examples of contributions they made to operations planning.

(C) AIG officers received mixed reviews on analytic depth and expertise from both their military customers and DI counterparts. Symbolizing this dichotomy of opinion, DI respondents to the OIG survey of CTC partners and customers identified staff expertise as both AIG's leading strength and an area in need of improvement. AIG employees represent a wide range of experience, but the group is slightly more junior than the DI average. A senior DI manager noted that the relative inexperience of AIG analysts shows. A primary theme in the comments that DI counterparts attached to the OIG survey was inexperience and lack of expertise, which sometimes resulted in weak assessments or questionable conclusions. A senior customer cited two examples of inexperienced analysts being poorly prepared to brief senior policymakers. More experienced analysts and managers were singled out for favorable reviews from several policymakers.

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(U) Analytic Concerns

~~(C)~~ AIG analysts acknowledge that the constant state of crisis and strong demand from policymakers and Agency seniors limit their ability to conduct strategic research and develop in-depth expertise. The lack of time to undertake warning and predictive analysis was one of the most frequent concerns voiced by analysts we interviewed. Such analysis, they noted, could enable them to predict terrorists' patterns of behavior or operational practices to allow the Center's operational components "to get ahead of the target."

~~(C)~~ This concern is neither new nor unique to CTC. Following the bombings of the US embassies in Africa, CTC management commissioned the [redacted] staff to review the Center's finished intelligence on Usama Bin Ladin and to suggest tradecraft improvements. [redacted] acknowledged that the finished intelligence revealed "significant strides in intelligence reporting, analysis, and the application of tradecraft principles" during the period reviewed, but recommended that AIG management make a conscious decision to set aside or dedicate analysts to undertake research. The study cautioned that new challenges—the eruption of reporting, much of it unreliable, and the dramatic growth in customer taskings—hindered the Center's ability to conduct in-depth research on Usama Bin Ladin and his organization. The OIG found that, 18 months after the [redacted] survey, these conditions persist, and AIG remains largely reactive despite the infusion of more analytic resources. **The OIG suggests that CTC continue to enhance its analytic expertise and improve its products by: (1) vigorously pursuing the "lessons learned" approach that it used successfully in the aftermath of the Khobar Towers and US Embassy bombings and by (2) commissioning a follow-up [redacted] study of analytic tradecraft across AIG.**

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1.4(c)

6.2(d)

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(S) DDO Comment: *"The report highlights the difficulty of undertaking strategic analysis in a near-constant crisis environment. The OIG should know that even as the inspection team was conducting its review of the Center, the DCI and DDI*

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were working on this issue. The DDI has provided a new infusion of seasoned analysts into CTC, many of whom will serve in a new strategic analysis branch to meet just those analytical needs identified in the report."

(C) AIG management is aware of the relative inexperience of the analyst cadre and the time pressures. C/AIG noted that the cadre is relatively junior, and some lack the experience to conduct sophisticated long-term analysis. 1.4(c) [redacted] strategy is to focus on recruiting from the DI, 1.4(c) [redacted] with AIG's improved reputation, [redacted] 1.4(c) will have success. [redacted] "grow" senior analysts from within the Center—which [redacted] will take five 1.4(c) years—by paying careful attention to career development issues. C/AIG's steps to date include seeking 1.4(c) developmental assignments for some analysts. [redacted] 1.4(c) [redacted]

(C) The OIG found that AIG was not taking full advantage of resources available in the DI. A number of partner/customer survey respondents—including several more senior analysts and managers—commented that CTC analysts should improve their coordination and collaboration with their DI counterparts. CTC and Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis managers have had preliminary discussions about exchanging analysts to encourage better collaboration and more "cross fertilization" of expertise. We conclude that AIG could increase the effectiveness of its analytic resources and gain more regional expertise by fostering stronger relationships with DI regional offices.

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(U) SURGE AND INFORMATION EXPLOITATION MANAGEMENT

~~(S)~~ Due to the nature of the target, CTC faces the challenge of surge management. Surge can be triggered in various ways, ranging from a terrorist incident or known threat to information overload resulting from [redacted]

[redacted] operations and disruptions of terrorist cells.

1.4(c)

(U) Crisis Management

~~(C)~~ A number of interviewees described CTC as frequently operating in a state of crisis—responding to a series of terrorist actions or threats. Center officers and managers overwhelmingly believe that they surge well in crisis situations through team effort, initiative, and prioritization. Employees have learned from experience their roles and responsibilities and automatically assume those roles when a crisis occurs. On occasion, the effort of CTC employees is supplemented with assistance from the DI and the DO. Several interviewees noted that their managers were sensitive to the potential for burnout. Management, for example, does encourage employees to take time off as needed and as appropriate.

(U) Exploitation of Data

~~(S)~~ The majority of interviewees who had an opinion gave mixed reviews to CTC's ability to effectively exploit the data the Center clandestinely collects. They generally believe that the Center does the best it can to scope, scan, and prioritize information for immediate action. They viewed technical operations as the most difficult challenge because of the immense volume of information these produce. Some officers acknowledged, however, that the demands placed on CTC do not allow it to exploit all the

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information it collects. As a consequence, the risk exists that a potential warning will go unidentified.

1.4(c) ~~(S)~~ As the unit that provides cleared, native linguistic support to CTC, the Language Exploitation Branch (LEB) bears the primary responsibility for translating clandestinely acquired foreign language materials. The branch, which is located at [REDACTED], also provides [REDACTED] support to a variety of language-related operations. At the time of the inspection, the branch included [REDACTED] [REDACTED] LEB has undergone significant growth since the last OIG inspection.

1.4(c)

1.4(c)

~~(S)~~ The biggest management challenge in LEB is finding the right people with the right skills and getting them cleared. The task of the linguists is particularly difficult because much of the material is audio and of poor quality. Often the language used is accented, slang, or in a specific dialect. [REDACTED]

1.4(c)

Recruitment is a constant process, and a large percentage of applicants are eliminated on security grounds.

~~(C)~~ LEB translators have an excellent reputation among CTC officers for responsiveness and high quality work, and they are in constant demand [REDACTED] [REDACTED] LEB has taken a number of creative steps to cope with the volume of data that requires translation. Some contractors act as workflow adjudicators, identifying the most time-sensitive work, making assignments, and establishing deadlines. The linguists also are adept at scanning quickly through the large volumes of information to identify threat tipoffs, summarizing data, and deciding what needs immediate translation and what can wait. Despite these efforts, the translators cannot process all of the information quickly, and several interviewees expressed concern about what they might be missing. Data from some very large operations can take months or longer to process fully. Although LEB has worked with the [REDACTED]

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[redacted] language complexity has limited the utility of technology.

1.4(c)

(C) Several interviewees commented specifically on the importance of a strong, continuous management presence [redacted] to ensure optimum operation. The triage process performed on the large volume of tasking requires guidance, even beyond what the workflow adjudicators can provide. At the time of the inspection, the newly-appointed branch chief was without a deputy, which forced him to divide his time between Headquarters and the LEB [redacted] facility; the recent selection of a deputy and improved secure phone and computer connectivity should increase management presence at the facility. According to some contractors, the lack of close attention to daily operations has resulted in a decline in work quality and productivity. Management also is an important conduit, providing customer feedback and information about the Center and Agency to a group of linguists who come from a variety of cultural backgrounds and who have little exposure to the Agency "culture." Some observed that having only one manager who is frequently absent had contributed to a decline in morale and did not allow sufficient oversight of personnel work habits and overtime allocation.

1.4(c)

1.4(c)

(C) [redacted] appear to be very security conscious about protecting [redacted] and their own personal security.

[redacted]

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
1.4(c)

(C) Protracted confusion and uncertainty exists among the linguists over changes in their  status, pay, and benefits, which have had a negative impact on morale.

1.4(c)



1.4(c)

 Several people strongly stated the desire for clear, written guidance.

~~(C)~~ FINDINGS

- Workflow management in the Language Exploitation Branch is difficult because of shifting priorities and the large volume of material and requires close management attention.
- Maintaining morale in a separate facility with officers of varied backgrounds and clearance levels has been a problem.
- Entitlements, including pay and benefits, have been subject to change and have not been spelled out in writing.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION #2 (For C/CTC): That CTC develop a plan for the Language Exploitation Branch to address workflow and morale issues. The plan should evaluate the usefulness of creating an administrative handbook that explains employee entitlements.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

(U) CTC'S COMMUNITY ROLE

~~(S)~~ The DCI is responsible for coordinating the counterterrorist efforts of the Intelligence Community (IC). In addition, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39 charges the DCI to disseminate to US Government entities threat warnings pertaining to terrorist threats derived from foreign intelligence. As the Special Assistant to the DCI, C/CTC acts as the DCI's community representative for counterterrorist matters.

~~(C)~~ The Community Counterterrorism Board (CCB) is the organizational component of CTC that executes the DCI's community responsibility. C/CCB chairs the Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), a forum for organizations representing the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, and regulatory communities to advise and assist the DCI with respect to the coordination and publication of national intelligence on terrorism issues and to promote the effective use of IC resources. A subcommittee of the IICT, for example, meets quarterly to determine tier listings of intelligence priorities for terrorist groups. Moreover, CCB manages the procedures, production, and mechanisms by which the IC prepares, coordinates, and disseminates terrorist threat publications. The Terrorism Warning Group (TWG), a cross-community group residing within CCB, prepares coordinated IC threat warnings from the DCI to alert senior policymakers of possible foreign terrorist attacks against US and allied personnel, facilities, and interests.

~~(C)~~ The majority of customers and Center managers whom we interviewed and who claimed to be familiar with CCB praised the board for its coordination role. Customers valued CCB most for its capacity as an "honest broker" in facilitating and deconflicting community views on threat warnings. Most CTC managers who had views recognized that CCB plays a necessary and frequently unheralded role as liaison with the community. One manager noted that CCB is not adequately acknowledged for the contribution that it makes. Indeed, more than one half of the Center

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managers whom we interviewed lacked a clear understanding of CCB's role and function.

(C) Some Center managers noted that CCB—particularly the Terrorist Warning Group—is understaffed because other agencies had not filled their assigned community positions. Director of Central Intelligence Directive [] mandates TWG's role and composition. Interviewees suggested that Center employees often step in to fill gaps created by this understaffing.

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(U) EXTERNAL OPERATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

~~(S)~~ Since the OIG's last inspection of CTC in 1994, the Center has broadened and deepened its operational partnerships with other US Government organizations working the terrorist target. The working relationships have been marked by an increased exchange of people and information (see figure 8). The detailees currently assigned to CTC form the core of the Center's tactical partnerships. This number represents a jump of almost 50 percent from the total in 1997. In turn, detailees have increased the two-way flow of information by supporting joint efforts by CTC and their home organization or by working in regular CTC line positions.

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Figure 8

Military and Civilian Detailees in CTC*		
External Organizations	CTC Office	Number of Employees
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms	CTC	
Defense Intelligence Agency	CTC	
Department of Defense	CTC	
	CTC	
	CTC	
Department of Energy	CTC	
	CTC	
Department of Justice	CTC	
Department of State	CTC	
Federal Aviation Administration	CTC	
Federal Bureau of Investigation	CTC	
	CTC	
	CTC	
	CTC	
	CTC	
Total FBI		
Immigration and Naturalization Service	CTC	
National Security Agency	CTC	
	CTC	
	CTC	
	CTC	
Total NSA		
Naval Intelligence Support Center	CTC	
United States Army	CTC	
United States Customs Service	CTC	
TOTAL DETAILEES		
*Based on January 2001 CTC Statistics		

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(U) Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~(S)~~ CTC and FBI interviewees consider the relationship between the two organizations to be vastly improved since the 1994 OIG inspection of CTC. That report criticized the effectiveness of the Center's support to the FBI and noted that the interaction between the two organizations was overly dependent on personal relationships; the OIG drafted an advisory to that effect for the DCI. The growth in joint activities and cross assignments suggests that the relationship is now more institutionalized and less personality dependent. The Center provided operational support [redacted] FBI [redacted] in 1999-2000. In written responses to questions from the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2000, CTC described, "cooperative relations with the FBI, which allowed us to work together on what were closely linked domestic and international terrorist threats" as one of the three key elements to the success of the Agency's response to the millennium threat. The assignment of top flight personnel to significant positions at the Headquarters level of both organizations has substantially improved coordination; one of the three CTC deputies is an FBI officer, and a senior Agency officer is assigned to the Counterterrorist Section of the FBI.

1.4(c)

~~(C)~~ Interviewees noted that some problems persist and probably will never be overcome fully. A natural tension exists between the two organizations, deriving from their different missions, which can be negotiated but never eliminated. The most frequently cited catalyst for disagreements was the difference in organizational mission—intelligence collection for the Agency and successful prosecutions of terrorists for the FBI. While some interviewees commented that potential intelligence opportunities were lost because of deference to law enforcement goals, most acknowledged the mutual benefits derived from cooperation. Concerns still remain in both organizations about access to the counterpart's mission critical information. The intensity of this issue, however, was much less pronounced than that encountered during the 1994 inspection, suggesting improvement in this area. The cross assignments provide a mechanism for employees from

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both organizations to gain perspectives on the different missions and facilitate sharing of information through approved channels.



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(U) Department of Defense

(~~S//NF~~) CTC's relationship with NSA has improved dramatically since the last inspection. NSA information has been critical to a number of disruptions and renditions orchestrated by CTC.

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
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(U) Department of State

~~(C)~~



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(U) CTC LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES

(C) CTC's mission-oriented workforce is generally well managed, especially given the size and scope of the organization and the target. Nevertheless, the OIG found several areas of employee concern that—if ignored by management—could erode the Center's effectiveness.

(U) Mission

(S) CTC employees clearly understand their mission and believe that their work is vital to saving American lives. Most of the employees interviewed described the mission as incorporating, in total or some part, the effort to "identify, disrupt, render, or, in some other manner, stop terrorism and terrorists." Survey results show that 98 percent of respondents understand the mission and function of their work units—a figure slightly higher than average in the DO. Moreover, employees believe that they are having an impact. Interviewees pointed to specific actions—renderings, arrests, disruptions—as exemplars of mission successes. According to the survey, 93 percent of respondents believe that they are meeting the needs of their customers.

(C) This sense of mission and belief in its importance and success have helped to create what customers, partners, and CTC employees describe as a highly dedicated workforce that produces quality work. Field officers, for example, characterized the workforce as "enthusiastic," "proactive," "energetic," and "hard working." More than 80 percent of the respondents to the customer/partner survey agree that CTC is committed to doing high quality work. Likewise, 97 percent of the respondents to the component survey said that the work of their unit is of good quality, slightly more positive than attitudes measured in other DO component inspections.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

(U) Quality of Leadership and Management

(C) Interviewees characterized CTC's front office managers as operationally savvy and models of mission-oriented managers. Component and field personnel generally commend C/CTC, in particular, for his review of the Center's counterterrorist strategy and decision to expand unilateral operations. Senior Agency managers regard front office management as operating an effective program against a difficult target. Customers respect the Center's chief and deputies for opening channels of communication and for their expertise. Senior customers described C/CTC as "responsive," a "facilitator," and an excellent spokesperson for the Center.

(C) CTC employees were generally pleased with front office management, and survey respondents rated these officers on par with the rest of the DO management in communications issues. Of the interviewees who commented on their management style, a significant number indicated that Center personnel seldom saw the chief and deputies. They noted that, in their fast-paced and stressful work environment, employees desired simple affirmation of a job well done from their managers—something that they thought could be done more often. Almost all the interviewees recognized the increasing demands placed on the Center's senior management by external and internal customers, as well as the logistical challenges presented by a large, dispersed workforce, [REDACTED]. Nevertheless, the OIG encourages all front office managers to make interaction with Center personnel a higher priority.

1.4(c)

(C) Interview and survey results suggest that analysts feel more removed from Center management than the rest of CTC officers. The survey showed that they were less comfortable discussing concerns or ideas with the CTC front office than were the rest of the Center respondents; only 32 percent of analysts feel free to discuss these issues with senior management as compared to 49 percent of total respondents. A minority—about 20 percent of AIG analysts interviewed—observed that the CTC front office does not understand or fully appreciate the contribution that analysts

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
make to the center. Their concern frequently centered on the operations focus of the current management team. Indeed, a review of the briefing slides used by CTC management to market its strategic vision reveals a focus on operations and little mention of analysis. Some interviewees also expressed concern over the lack of any institutional mechanisms for top-down communications. As an example, one observed that the absence of information fuels an active and negative "rumor mill." The career development recommendation presented later in this report should help clarify for analysts the front office's expectations about the role of CTC analysts and offer a mechanism for communication between managers and analysts.

(C) Interview and survey data show that Center personnel generally value the dedication and effectiveness of their branch and group chiefs. Comments from the component survey suggest that employees find the relatively high rate of supervisor turnover to be disruptive, however. Analysts' survey responses were less positive about their branch and group management than on average in the Center and Agency (see figure 9). AIG interviewees gave mixed reviews of their branch management, and many were reserving judgment about the AIG group chief, who was new to the job at the time of the inspection.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

Figure 9


This chart is classified U//~~ATUO~~**(U) Funding**

Although CTC's overall budget has enjoyed growth over the last five years, the Center has become increasingly dependent on supplemental funding to maintain a robust mission (see figure 10). Interviewees overwhelmingly said that to date the budget had been adequate. DO area division officers compared the Center's finances favorably to other parts of the directorate and were generally pleased with CTC's financial support to them. Field interviewees, for

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example, were able to identify operations undertaken and liaison relationships strengthened as a result of CTC funding. Nevertheless, supplemental funding as a financial source is unpredictable, and the attendant uncertainty can have a negative impact on sustaining the mission.

Figure 10



This chart is classified ~~SECRET~~

(~~S//NF~~) In addition, unanticipated crises, which necessitate a surge in spending, require program adjustments, both at Headquarters and in the field. Problems occur during the gap between the time that resources are expended on these surges and reserve or supplemental funds are allocated to the Center to offset these costs. A number of interviewees described FY 2000, during which CTC estimates that 15 percent of its budget was consumed by the additional cost of the millennium surge, as an especially difficult or "rollercoaster" year. The additional expenditures were made during the first quarter of the fiscal year, but reserve funds were not received until May, with supplemental money following in August. During the gap period, interviewees told us that programs ranging from [redacted] [redacted] were affected. The impact of the fluctuation in funding was felt in a number of areas, such as [redacted]

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

The Center cut financial resources to several groups and DO divisions in the spring, and [] cut deployments, resulting in dramatic cuts in the [] CTC, which is facing the start-up costs of the new [] along with the operating and maintenance costs for existing [] may eventually require increased funding or be forced to make cuts elsewhere in its program.

1.4(c)


1.4(c)

(U) Staffing

~~(C)~~ CTC draws on employees from all four directorates, incorporates detailees from the Intelligence Community (IC) and law enforcement agencies, and employs a large staff of contractors (see figure 11). The OIG views this diversity as a strength because it contributes to the Center's ability to integrate the needs and differing approaches and cultures of Agency components as well as various IC partners. We noted previously how detailees serving in CTC allowed a smoother exchange of information and contributed to better working relationships with these agencies.

Figure 11

1.4(c)



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(C) While Center employees consider budget resources to be adequate, they are less sanguine that CTC has adequate personnel resources to effectively fulfill the mission. Forty percent of survey respondents believe that their work unit does not have sufficient personnel to accomplish the mission; these figures are largely comparable with survey results from the rest of the DO and are symptomatic of perceived shortages in the entire directorate. A substantially higher proportion of respondents from the operations, reports, and operational support groups do not believe that their work units have sufficient personnel. Interview data generally paralleled the results of the survey.

[redacted] managers interviewed identified a shortage of personnel or inadequate skills mix as the biggest obstacle to accomplishing the mission. Every interviewee in [redacted]

1.4(c)

[redacted] said they needed additional personnel to do the job well. In AIG the responses were more evenly split between those who believed the group needed additional personnel resources and those who found the resources adequate.

1.4(c)

(C) CTC has limited options for dealing with this perceived personnel shortage. [redacted]

1.4(c)

[redacted] Nevertheless, employees are stretched by any staffing shortage, particularly in those units that are chronically short-staffed, [redacted]

1.4(c)

Center management has redistributed personnel to areas it feels are facing the greatest demands; UBL Station, for example, is actually over strength by [redacted] workers as of January 2001. Management is also trying to improve the effectiveness of the staff by addressing the skills mix issue, which is discussed below in more detail.

1.4(c)

(C) Center employees are managing this perceived shortage in a way that leaves many vulnerable to burnout and allows little time for strategic work. Personnel regularly work extra hours and are only able to perform what they perceive to be the essential tasks. One manager commented that the demand on the staff means that they go from crisis to crisis and are not able to look at trends or more long-range issues to get ahead of the terrorist. An AIG analyst

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

worried that he only had time to answer the mail, and, as a result, he might miss warning signs of a threat.

(U) Skills Mix Issues

~~(C)~~ As discussed previously, CTC's customers, partners, and managers have identified some areas of inexperience among both operations and analytic officers. CTC has taken great strides in recent years to attract and retain talented officers—largely through home-basing. Yet CTC managers and employees perceive that the Center has not been as successful as it could be in this area. Center managers identified a number of developmental issues, which they are starting to address.

~~(C)~~ *Home-basing.* For several years after CTC's inception, it relied almost exclusively on rotatees from other directorates to undertake the substantive work. This strategy did not ensure that the Center was able to retain the best officers and contributed to the lack of expertise and depth.

~~(C)~~ The Center now home-bases both analysts and DO officers as a method of developing in-house talent while continuing to draw on DI and DO rotational officers to provide experience and regional expertise. CTC evaluates its home-based officers below the GS-14 level in two panels—one for DI and one for DO career tracks. About three-quarters of interviewees had a favorable reaction to home-basing, viewing it as a commitment on the part of Center management to counterterrorism as a professional specialty worthy of its own career service.


~~(C)~~ *Career development issues.* Although CTC's ability to home-base its officers has addressed some of the Center's difficulties with retaining and building expertise, a number of CTC managers and officers pointed to career development deficiencies that may dissuade talented officers from choosing to home-base in CTC. Survey and interview data revealed concerns, particularly among analysts and

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operations officers, that cause them to question the viability of a career in counterterrorism.

~~(C)~~ The component survey shows that analysts are less satisfied with career guidance and training than survey respondents from CTC and the DI on average (see figure 12). Of the analysts who commented on training during interviews, only one expressed satisfaction with the level and type of training. Moreover, 25 percent of AIG interviewees worried about the lack of a career path, and the component survey response suggests similar career development concerns.

Figure 12



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DCI Counterterrorist Center


(C) Several CTC managers and AIG analysts identified the ceiling on the overall number of DI officers in the Center—commonly referred to as the “quota”—as a source of tension and a policy that has had a negative impact on the Center’s ability to recruit and retain analysts. CTC managers explained the strategy as a means to better manage the migration of analysts to operational groups where they often experience career development problems. Many of these analysts perform target analysis—operational opportunities identified through research—a job unique to the centers. As a result, these analysts can face difficulty advancing in the DI career track and frequently do not have sufficient training and experience for acceptance into one of the DO career services and to sustain a successful DO career. All of the analysts and most of the managers who discussed the “quota” issue were unhappy with the way in which it was handled, particularly the inadequate level of communication to explain its purpose and impact. **The OIG suggests that CTC management review its strategy for balancing between DI and DO officers in the Center and communicate its thinking clearly and comprehensively to the Center workforce.**

(C) Survey and interview results show that operations officers—both CTC home-based and those currently on rotation to the Center—are uncertain about the prospects for a successful and full career when home-based in CTC. Operations officers who responded to the component survey were less positive than the Agency average on career planning and advancement opportunity issues (see figure 13). About 50 percent of these officers, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with CTC’s career development process. Most case officer interviewees claimed to be weighing their career options and taking a “wait-and-see” attitude to a CTC career. Several voiced their perception that, despite increased hiring and more overseas slots, CTC management is not focused on career development guidance for operations officers, particularly at the GS-13 journeyman level and beyond. Some noted that the expectations for what experiences and training constitute a career path for CTC home-based DO officers appear to have changed and are not transparent. Several interviewees

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suggested that Center management needed to be more aggressive in articulating the special role of CTC operations officers and serving as their advocate in DO assignment and promotion panels.

Figure 13



This chart is classified U//AIUO

(C) Center managers are aware that these career development issues need to be addressed if CTC is to compete for talent with the rest of the Agency and develop its own cadre of qualified counterterrorism specialists. For instance, the new C/AIG is focusing on training and developmental assignments, including internal rotations and the Analyst Overseas Program. Prior to arrival, the

1.4(c)

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Center had begun, but never completed, a process to define an analytic career for CTC. The multi-dimensional recruiting program [] and the pilot [] Course all are steps taken to enhance career opportunities in CTC for DO officers. The recent plan, titled "CTC Best Management Initiative - 2001" includes a proposed "Career Development Council" that is designed to address multiple career development issues.

1.4(c)

(C) FINDINGS

- Home-basing, while helpful, has not addressed the career concerns of CTC officers, particularly as CTC has stepped up efforts to recruit officers directly into the Center.
- A sizable number of CTC analysts and operations officers have expressed dissatisfaction with the career development guidance and training opportunities currently available to them.
- CTC managers have taken some steps to address these concerns; but, as in the case of the DI "quota" issue, they have not been adequately communicated and have lacked a comprehensive, Center-based approach.

(C) RECOMMENDATION #3 (For C/CTC): That CTC prepare detailed, written career guidance for each discrete CTC home-based occupation (analyst, operations officer, desk officer, reports officer), building on the initial work done last year for analysts and taking into consideration the "Career Development Council" model. The guidance should identify assignments, training, and other development opportunities for each CTC occupation at the developmental, full-performance, and senior/expert levels. This guidance should be made available to all CTC employees, and managers should be held accountable for counseling employees individually on the implications for them. CTC should also develop a program for educating managers on the new guidelines and a plan for holding them accountable.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

~~SECRET//NOFORN//XI~~**(U) Managing Contractors**

(S) CTC employs about [] contractors—or roughly [] percent of the Center's total workforce—who perform vital services. They translate documents and other materials acquired in support of CTC's mission, provide central [] development and support, train [] personnel in the tradecraft of counterterrorism, and provide surveillance support for stations []

1.4(c)

1.4(c)

1.4(c)

1.4(c)

1.4(c)

(S) This diverse contractor population is complex to manage. Contractors fall under three different types of arrangements— []


1.4(c)

[] each governed by a different set of regulations. Moreover, many of the contractors are located []

1.4(c)

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1.4(c)

The decentralized administration and diversity of contracts have made it difficult for Management Group to ensure fairness and consistency, particularly as the number and variety of contracts have grown. CTC management recognizes the problems in contract administration and has recently created a business advisor

1.4(c)

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position to provide centralized oversight. The advisor reported for duty at the beginning of January 2001, and one of her first tasks was to create a list of all contractors to include the type of arrangement under which they work. OIG strongly endorses the creation of this new position and recognizes that CTC's contract population would benefit from oversight and standardization. The size and complexity of that population also suggests some level of on-site support in outlying units.

Diversity Issues

The OIG found no pattern of gender or minority discrimination in CTC. The Center's workforce—48 percent female and 11 percent minority, according to CTC statistics—is roughly as diverse as the rest of the Agency's population. More than 80 percent of component survey respondents saw no gender or race preferences with regard to promotions, assignments, awards, and other personnel actions. These responses were slightly more positive than responses from other DO and Agency components. Center management should note, however, that 39 percent of respondents who identify themselves as minority believe that non-minorities receive preference with regard to personnel actions as compared to 22 percent of minorities in the DO. Comments from CTC minority interviewees, however, did not further clarify this perception. C/CTC is aware of this issue and has indicated that he will address it.

FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**(S) FINDINGS**1.4(c)
6.2(d)

- [] have helped focus [] on the counterterrorist target, []

1.4(c)
6.2(d)

- CTC's plan to double the number of [], if realized, will require start-up money for a [] units and operations and maintenance money for [] units, plus an increased support structure at Headquarters.
- CTC has no written formal plan or established criteria for the creation of []
- Program managers who work a number of different terrorist targets find it difficult to deal with each of the CTC components responsible for the different targets.
- Program managers frequently are burdened with additional responsibilities or heavy administrative duties that distract them from guiding []

1.4(c)
6.2(d)1.4(c)
6.2(d)1.4(c)
6.2(d)1.4(c)
6.2(d)

(S) RECOMMENDATION #1 (For C/CTC): That CTC develop a written strategy for the [] program. The strategy should include, but not necessarily be limited to: a discussion of criteria for establishing [] a five-year resource projection showing both personnel and funds required for established and planned [] and the Headquarters' [], a plan clarifying points of contact and responsibilities for operational matters, []

1.4(c)
6.2(d)1.4(c)
6.2(d)1.4(c)
6.2(d)1.4(c)
6.2(d)

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~~(C)~~ FINDINGS

- Workflow management in the Language Exploitation Branch is difficult because of shifting priorities and the large volume of material and requires close management attention.
- Maintaining morale in a separate facility with officers of varied backgrounds and clearance levels has been a problem.
- Entitlements, including pay and benefits, have been subject to change and have not been spelled out in writing.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION #2 (For C/CTC): That CTC develop a plan for the Language Exploitation Branch to address workflow and morale issues. The plan should evaluate the usefulness of creating an administrative handbook that explains employee entitlements.

~~(C)~~ FINDINGS

- Home-basing, while helpful, has not addressed the career concerns of CTC officers, particularly as CTC has stepped up efforts to recruit officers directly into the Center.
- A sizable number of CTC analysts and operations officers have expressed dissatisfaction with the career development guidance and training opportunities currently available to them.
- CTC managers have taken some steps to address these concerns; but, as in the case of the DI "quota" issue, they have not been adequately communicated and have lacked a comprehensive, Center-based approach.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION #3 (For C/CTC): That CTC prepare detailed, written career guidance for each discrete CTC home-based occupation (analyst, operations officer, desk officer, reports officer), building on the initial work done last year for analysts and taking into consideration the "Career Development Council" model. The guidance should identify assignments,

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training, and other development opportunities for each CTC occupation at the developmental, full-performance, and senior/expert levels. This guidance should be made available to all CTC employees, and managers should be held accountable for counseling employees individually on the implications for them. CTC should also develop a program for educating managers on the new guidelines and a plan for holding them accountable.

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(U) SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

~~(C)~~ A team of eight inspectors, one research assistant and one secretary conducted an inspection of CTC from September 2000 through February 2001. Based on the Terms of Reference provided to senior CTC management, the inspection focused on a range of topics, including: mission accomplishment, customer satisfaction, and operational and personnel management success. The goal was to provide Agency senior managers, and the Chief of CTC in particular, a balanced, objective view of the Center—highlighting programs and processes that are working well, and noting those areas that need improvement.

~~(C)~~ The team gathered information for this report from interviews, a CTC employee opinion survey, a customer/partner survey of DI and DO officers, two focus groups, and numerous documents on a wide range of topics related to the Center's activities. In addition to 16 overview briefings from CTC managers, [REDACTED]

1.4(c)
6.2(d)

[REDACTED] Inspectors spoke with 112 non-Agency customers and CTC counterparts in the Washington area, [REDACTED] and overseas. Views were solicited from officers representing the following agencies and organizations: the National Security Council, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Departments of State and Defense, the Secret Service, and the Congressional oversight committees. The team supplemented its own interviews with information relevant to CTC from interviews conducted as part of IG inspections of Central Eurasia Division and Latin America Division in 1998, and inspections of European Division, Office of Military Affairs, and the DCI Nonproliferation Center in 1999. Team members reviewed a large number of policy, substantive, administrative, and budgetary documents, as well as the June 2000 report of the National Commission on

6.2(d)
1.4(c)

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Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador Bremer. There were [] responses to the employee opinion survey, which represents 56 percent of the CTC employees and detailees who were polled. In addition, [] DO and DI officers responded to the customer/partner survey, including [] who provided written comments. These surveys provided valuable data on CTC employee and customer/partner perceptions of key issues.

6.2(d)
1.4(c)6.2(d)
1.4(c)6.2(d)
1.4(c)~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~

SURVEY

DCI Counterterrorist Center

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~**(U) EMPLOYEE OPINION SURVEY**

(U//~~AIUO~~) As part of its inspection of the DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC), the Office of Inspector General conducted a component survey. We distributed the survey questionnaire via Lotus Notes to all CTC careerists—both working in CTC and on rotation outside the Center—and to personnel belonging to other Agency components but currently serving in CTC. We received responses representing a return rate of nearly 55 percent.

1.4(c)
6.2(d)

(U//~~AIUO~~) The survey items assessed opinions on a number of career and job related issues. For most items, respondents were asked to choose from among six possible responses" Agree, Tend to agree, Neutral, Tend to disagree, Disagree, and Not applicable/Don't know. The responses were aggregated into three categories as follows:

Category	Responses
Agree	Agree and Tend to agree
Neutral	Neutral
Disagree	Disagree and Tend to disagree

(U//~~AIUO~~) Most items in the report are worded so that "Agree" represents a favorable opinion and "Disagree" an unfavorable opinion. Responses of "Not applicable/Don't know" were not counted in tabulating results. For comparison to the CTC survey results, columns labeled "CTC1994" and "AGENCY" are included. The first represents the survey results from the 1994 OIG inspection of CTC, the latter is a compilation of OIG survey results taken of 38 other Agency components since 1993.

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000

Total Sample	CTC1994	CTC2000	AGENCY	
1. Considering everything, I am satisfied with my job.				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
Agree	86%	81%	78%	
Neutral	6%	9%	9%	
Disagree	8%	10%	14%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
2. My job makes good use of my skills and abilities.				
Agree	78%	81%	76%	
Neutral	6%	8%	9%	
Disagree	16%	11%	15%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
3. I believe that my efforts and contributions are valued and appreciated.				
Agree	80%	74%	67%	
Neutral	11%	12%	14%	
Disagree	9%	14%	19%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
4. I believe I am performing a valuable function for the Agency.				
Agree	-	93%	-	
Neutral	-	5%	-	
Disagree	-	1%	-	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
5. CTC is a good place for me to work and develop my career.				
Agree	70%	77%	61%	
Neutral	19%	10%	19%	
Disagree	12%	12%	20%	
Base				6.2(d) 1.4(c)
6. If you have your own way, will you be working for CTC 3 years from now?				
Yes	-	58%	51%	
No assgt ends	-	22%	15%	
No will retire	-	3%	8%	
No other	-	16%	26%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
7. I believe the primary strengths of CTC are:				
Staff exp	-	58.7%	-	
Work unit sup	-	31.5%	-	
Cntr leadrshp	-	28.0%	-	
Resources	-	62.2%	-	
Work impact	-	86.2%	-	
Work env	-	62.6%	-	1.4(c)
Other	-	10.2%	-	6.2(d)
Base	-		-	
Responses	-	99.2%	-	1.4(c) 6.2(d)

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

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Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000

	CTC1994	CTC2000	AGENCY	
Total Sample				1.4(c)
8. I believe CTC needs improvement most in these areas:				6.2(d)
Staff exp	-	26.4%	-	
Work unit sup	-	32.7%	-	
Cntr leadrshp	-	28.7%	-	
Resources	-	17.7%	-	
Work impact	-	3.9%	-	
Work env	-	8.3%	-	
Other	-	22.8%	-	1.4(c)
Base	-		-	6.2(d)
	-	82.7%	-	
Responses				
9. I understand the mission and functions of my work unit.				1.4(c)
Agree	99%	98%	94%	6.2(d)
Neutral	-	1%	3%	
Disagree	1%	1%	3%	
Base				1.4(c)
10. My work unit meet the needs of our customers, i.e., we are doing the right things.				6.2(d)
Agree	93%	93%	87%	
Neutral	3%	5%	7%	
Disagree	4%	2%	6%	
Base				1.4(c)
11. The people in my work unit are committed to doing high quality work.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	94%	-	
Neutral	-	3%	-	
Disagree	-	2%	-	
Base				1.4(c)
12. Overall, the work done in my work unit is of good quality.				6.2(d)
Agree	97%	97%	93%	
Neutral	1%	2%	4%	
Disagree	3%	1%	2%	
Base				1.4(c)
13. I know what is expected of me at work.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	84%	-	
Neutral	-	10%	-	
Disagree	-	7%	-	
Base				1.4(c)
14. At work my opinions seem to count.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	74%	-	
Neutral	-	15%	-	
Disagree	-	10%	-	
Base				1.4(c)
15. My work unit has sufficient personnel to accomplish its mission.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	50%	49%	
Neutral	-	10%	9%	
Disagree	-	40%	43%	
Base				1.4(c)

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DCI Counterterrorist Center

Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000

	CTC1994	CTC2000	AGENCY	
Total Sample				
16. My work unit has the appropriate skills mix to accomplish its mission.				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
Agree	-	77%	71%	
Neutral	-	8%	9%	
Disagree	-	15%	20%	
Base				6.2(d)
17. I have access to the computers and specialized equipment I need to do my job.				1.4(c)
Agree	94%	85%	88%	
Neutral	2%	7%	4%	
Disagree	4%	8%	8%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
18. I receive the computer support I need to do my job.				6.2(d)
Agree	86%	72%	80%	
Neutral	5%	12%	8%	
Disagree	9%	15%	12%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
19. I receive the administrative and clerical support I need to do my job.				6.2(d)
Agree	72%	58%	71%	
Neutral	7%	15%	11%	
Disagree	21%	27%	18%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
20. I have access to the information I need to do my job.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	82%	-	
Neutral	-	9%	-	
Disagree	-	10%	-	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
21. CTC effectively exploits the information on terrorism that is available to it.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	83%	-	
Neutral	-	11%	-	
Disagree	-	6%	-	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
22. People in my work unit cooperate to get the job done.				6.2(d)
Agree	93%	92%	88%	
Neutral	2%	3%	6%	
Disagree	6%	4%	6%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
23. My work unit's working relationships with its contacts in other CTC components are:				6.2(d)
Excellent	-	31%	-	
Good	-	55%	-	
Fair	-	12%	-	
Poor	-	2%	-	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)

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Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000

	CTC1994	CTC2000	AGENCY	
Total Sample				1.4(c)
24. My work unit's working relationships with its contacts in other Agency components are:				6.2(d)
Excellent	-	26%	-	
Good	-	62%	-	
Fair	-	12%	-	
Poor	-	1%	-	
Base				1.4(c)
25. My work unit's working relationships with its contacts in other government organizations are:				6.2(d)
Excellent	-	31%	-	
Good	-	58%	-	
Fair	-	11%	-	
Poor	-	1%	-	
Base				1.4(c)
26. Responsibilities for issues that cut across different work units within CTC are clearly defined.				6.2(d)
Agree	61%	56%	44%	
Neutral	18%	15%	23%	
Disagree	21%	29%	33%	
Base				1.4(c)
27. Responsibilities for issues that cut across CTC and other Agency components are clearly defined.				6.2(d)
Agree	64%	51%	47%	
Neutral	17%	22%	23%	
Disagree	19%	26%	30%	
Base				1.4(c)
28. I understand CTC's current work priorities.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	81%	-	
Neutral	-	12%	-	
Disagree	-	7%	-	
Base				1.4(c)
29. Most of the time, the amount of work I am expected to do on my job is:				6.2(d)
Too much	33%	38%	36%	
About right	60%	59%	56%	
Too little	7%	3%	8%	
Base				1.4(c)
30. I am satisfied with the amount of freedom I have in doing my work.				6.2(d)
Agree	92%	84%	86%	
Neutral	3%	6%	5%	
Disagree	5%	10%	9%	
Base				1.4(c)
31. Overall, my own management at the work unit level is doing a good job.				6.2(d)
Agree	87%	80%	78%	
Neutral	6%	9%	11%	
Disagree	8%	11%	12%	
Base				1.4(c)

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Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000

	CTC1994	CTC2000	AGENCY	
Total Sample				1.4(c)
32. Overall, my supervisor manages people effectively.				6.2(d)
Agree	77%	74%	70%	
Neutral	5%	10%	11%	
Disagree	18%	15%	19%	
Base				6.2(d)
33. Overall, my supervisor effectively manages the substantive or operational efforts of my work unit.				1.4(c)
Agree	87%	78%	74%	
Neutral	5%	11%	11%	
Disagree	8%	11%	14%	
Base				1.4(c)
34. My supervisor gives appropriate attention to security matters.				6.2(d)
Agree	92%	90%	85%	
Neutral	3%	8%	9%	
Disagree	4%	2%	6%	
Base				6.2(d)
35. CTC devotes appropriate attention to counterintelligence.				1.4(c)
Agree	-	86%	80%	
Neutral	-	9%	13%	
Disagree	-	5%	8%	
Base				1.4(c)
36. Overall, my own management at the group level is doing a good job.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	71%	67%	
Neutral	-	15%	17%	
Disagree	-	14%	17%	
Base				1.4(c)
37. My group level management has a good understanding of what my work unit does.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	72%	-	
Neutral	-	13%	-	
Disagree	-	14%	-	
Base				1.4(c)
38. CTC management sets and communicates clear standards for employee conduct and office practices.				6.2(d)
Agree	76%	68%	64%	
Neutral	12%	19%	15%	
Disagree	11%	13%	21%	
Base				1.4(c)
39. CTC management deals effectively with people who are not meeting the requirements of the job.				6.2(d)
Agree	45%	37%	28%	
Neutral	22%	31%	23%	
Disagree	33%	32%	49%	
Base				1.4(c)

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Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000

	CTC1994	CTC2000	AGENCY	
Total Sample				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
40. CTC management communicates to its employees a clear vision for the future of the Center.				
Agree	66%	53%	50%	
Neutral	16%	25%	19%	
Disagree	18%	22%	30%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
41. The vision and mission of CTC make me feel like my work is important.				
Agree	-	85%	-	
Neutral	-	10%	-	
Disagree	-	5%	-	
Base				6.2(d) 1.4(c)
42. CTC seems to be making reasonable progress in achieving its long-range goals.				
Agree	77%	76%	56%	
Neutral	17%	15%	27%	
Disagree	6%	8%	17%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
43. Overall, CTC front office management is doing a good job.				
Agree	83%	69%	59%	
Neutral	9%	21%	21%	
Disagree	8%	10%	20%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
44. CTC front office management explains adequately the reasons for its actions.				
Agree	63%	48%	45%	
Neutral	19%	29%	21%	
Disagree	19%	24%	34%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
45. I am informed in a timely manner about events and decisions that affect my work.				
Agree	73%	61%	56%	
Neutral	9%	16%	17%	
Disagree	18%	23%	28%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
46. I am satisfied with the information I receive about what is going on in CTC.				
Agree	66%	45%	52%	
Neutral	9%	24%	20%	
Disagree	25%	31%	28%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
47. I feel free to discuss work-related matters with my immediate supervisor.				
Agree	92%	88%	87%	
Neutral	2%	5%	5%	
Disagree	6%	7%	8%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)

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	CTC1994	CTC2000	AGENCY	
Total Sample				
48. I feel free to express concerns or ideas to management at the group level in CTC.				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
Agree	-	66%	63%	
Neutral	-	18%	14%	
Disagree	-	16%	23%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
49. I feel free to express concerns or ideas to CTC front office management.				
Agree	78%	49%	51%	
Neutral	6%	22%	18%	
Disagree	16%	29%	31%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
50. My PARs fairly and accurately reflect my performance.				
Agree	90%	84%	80%	
Neutral	4%	9%	9%	
Disagree	6%	7%	11%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
51. My supervisor gives me enough feedback so that I know how I am doing.				
Agree	68%	72%	62%	
Neutral	8%	14%	14%	
Disagree	24%	14%	24%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
52. There is sufficient reward and recognition given in CTC for doing good work.				
Agree	62%	59%	47%	
Neutral	11%	11%	17%	
Disagree	27%	29%	36%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
53. My supervisor encourages my development.				
Agree	-	73%	-	
Neutral	-	12%	-	
Disagree	-	15%	-	
Base				6.2(d) 1.4(c)
54. At work, I have had opportunities to learn and grow.				
Agree	-	81%	-	
Neutral	-	9%	-	
Disagree	-	10%	-	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)
55. I know the criteria for promotion from my current grade level to the next.				
Agree	79%	69%	61%	
Neutral	5%	8%	11%	
Disagree	15%	23%	28%	
Base				1.4(c) 6.2(d)

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Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000

	CTC1994	CTC2000	AGENCY	
Total Sample				1.4(c)
56. The CTC promotion panels evaluate people fairly.				6.2(d)
Agree	-	62%	48%	
Neutral	-	17%	23%	
Disagree	-	21%	29%	
Base				1.4(c)
57. I am satisfied with the help I get from CTC in planning my career.				6.2(d)
Agree	37%	32%	34%	
Neutral	19%	26%	22%	
Disagree	44%	42%	45%	
Base				1.4(c)
58. I am satisfied with my opportunities for advancement in CTC.				6.2(d)
Agree	45%	50%	40%	
Neutral	21%	22%	19%	
Disagree	34%	28%	40%	
Base				1.4(c)
59. I have received adequate training for my current job.				6.2(d)
Agree	77%	67%	75%	
Neutral	8%	16%	11%	
Disagree	15%	17%	14%	
Base				1.4(c)
60. New people in my work unit receive sufficient guidance and on-the-job training.				6.2(d)
Agree	79%	70%	68%	
Neutral	12%	13%	14%	
Disagree	10%	17%	18%	
Base				1.4(c)
61. Personnel practices in CTC demonstrate strong commitment to creating and maintaining an effective, culturally diverse workforce.				6.2(d)
Agree	60%	69%	65%	
Neutral	23%	19%	20%	
Disagree	17%	13%	15%	
Base				6.2(d)
62. With respect to promotions, assignments, awards and other personnel actions, my experience in CTC is that:				1.4(c)
Men preferred	-	11%	10%	
Women preferred	-	6%	17%	
All are equal	-	83%	73%	
Base	-			1.4(c)
63. With respect to promotions, assignments, awards and other personnel actions, my experience in CTC is that:				6.2(d)
Minority pref.	-	3%	15%	
Non-minor pref.	-	9%	7%	
All are equal	-	88%	78%	
Base				6.2(d)
				1.4(c)

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