

19 December 2019

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr. 27305 W. Live Oak Road Suite #1203 Castaic, CA 91384

Reference: EOM-2019-00290

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is a final response to your correspondence of 24 January 2019, submitted on behalf of The Black Vault, requesting an Executive Order 13526 mandatory declassification review of the following:

Deleted (On One Evening in Late Summer 1973, Source Observed an Unidentified Document Number (FOIA)/ESDN (CREST): 0000015262

We have completed a thorough search of our records and determined that the document may be released in sanitized form. We have deleted material that must remain classified on the basis of Section 3.3(b)(1) of the Order. Additional information must be withheld because withholding is authorized and warranted under applicable law as provided by Section 6.2(d) of the Order. Enclosed is a copy showing our deletions and citing our exemptions.

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel in my care, within 90 dasys fore the date of this letter. Should you choose to do this, plese include the basis of your appeal.

To contact **CIA** directly or to appeal the CIA's response to the **Agency Release Panel**:

Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Information and Privacy Coordinator (703) 613-3007 (Fax) (703) 613-1287 - CIA FOIA Public Liaison / FOIA Hotline To contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) for mediation or with questions:

Office of Government Information Services National Archives and Records Administration 8601 Adelphi Road – OGIS College Park, MD 20740-6001 (202) 741-5770 (877) 864-6448 (202) 741-5769 (Fax) ogis@nara.gov Please note, contacting CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or OGIS does not affect your right to pursue an administrative appeal.

Sincerely,

Mark Lilly

Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

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Intelligence Information Report	EO 13526 6.2(d)
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REPORT NO. TIME RESILIENT	
COUNTRY USSR	
DOI DOI	3.3(b)(1)
SUBJECT The Sary Shagan Weapons Testing	
Range	
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SOURCE	3.3(b)(1)
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Summary: This report provides limited information on the Sary	1
Shagan weapons testing range, to include facilities, note aleas, security fencing the regional headquarters (V/Ch 03080), and a	
warhead checkout unit (Y/Ch 03142). Also included is limited in formation on the following: System-75 [SA-2] and System-300/	
Aldan [ABM-1 GALOSH] warheads; rumored laser research; and an unidentified aerial phenomenon. End of Summary.	
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a colonel. The steely 100 men whose job was to sections, with approxime unit also had more sts/laboratories), headed by a vand was tasked with the consible for servictions in the colonel. The sponsible for speciment consisted of services is responsible to	3.3(b)(1)
11.11	(V/Ch 03080), equently referred itself was known t of Area No. 4 a colonel. The ately 100 men whose job was to ivided into platoons ections, with approxi- e unit also had more ts/laboratories), headed by a y and was tasked with The 2nd ding work (pog- aded by a lieutenant onsible for servic- nant colonel. The sponsible for spe-

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responsible for checking the missile warheads.	3.3(b)(1)
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Owner of the series (W/Ob 02143) had found at five assistant	
Overall, the unit (V/Ch 03142) had four or five assigned	1
colonels: one served as commander, one was the political affairs officer, one was the chief engineer, and one or two were department	
chiefs. There were 10 to 15 assigned lieutenant colonels who were	į
main engineers, group leaders and section chiefs. There were	1
numerous majors and captains assigned.	
name to a suppose the contract of the contract	3.3(b)(1)
There were numerous senior	
lieutenants and lieutenants assigned as battery and platoon com-	
manders. There were no assigned junior lieutenants. There was	•
only one assigned warrant officer who served as a platoon commander	Ĭ i
in the 1st Battery. However, one soldier went to an unrecalled	ļ
school and returned to Sary Shagan as a warrant officer (duty	1
unknown).	2 2/6//1
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The warhead checkout unit (V/Ch 03142) was headquartered	
at a garrison known as Site 7. The garrison also housed an unknown	
number of Soviet Air Forces personnel assigned to a nearby airfield	
(no details), plus approximately 1,000 construction troops and an	1
unknown number of communications troops assigned to radar and com-	
munications sites in the area. Site 7 was also the operating loca-	į
tion for the 1st Department. (See Figure 2 for layout of Site 7.)	1
6 Marsh Jana San aka dah Districtura (Garain)	
6. Work done by the 4th Department (special weapons) was	
performed at Site 4 (obyekt-4), located about five or six kilo-	į
meters west of Site 7. It encompassed an area approximately 400	:
x 600 meters and was tightly guarded. (See Figure 3 for layout of Site 4.)	
Site 4.)	
7. Work on missile engines was performed at Site 3 (obvekt-3)	1 1
which was located about one kilometer east of Site 4	: 0.00.1/41
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	i ,
8. Experimental missiles were usually fired from Site 35	i
located northwest of Sary Shagan, about 80 to 100 kilometers	
northwest of Site 4. (See Figure 4 for the location of Site 35	
and other sites in the Sary Shagan area. Due probably to weather	
conditions, missile firings were normally carried cut between the	
end of May to the end of September. Targets for the missiles were	į
either towed sleeves or radio guided drones	3.3(b)(1)
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10. Besides the System-75 SA-2] warheads, Site 4 also checked the warheads for a missi e(s) known as the System-300	i
Ine System-300/Aldan warneass after being checked at Site 4 were taken to Site 35 for launching. According	3.3(b)(1)
to rumor, the missile was for antimissile defense (protivo raketnaya oborona - PRO)	3.3(b)(1)
11. The warhead for the System-300/Aldan missile was about two meters long and 80 to 100 certimeters in diameter. The warhead weighed approximately 400 kilograms, and it contained an unrecalled number of black cassettes, 45 x 12 centimeters, which housed an unknown number of metal balls (shariki). Warheads for the System-75 [SA-2] missile had approximately 100 grey cassettes, 30 x 7 centimeters, each of which held about 200 to 300 meral balls, each no more than 1.5 centimeters in diameter.	3.3(b)(1)
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
13. According to hearsay, experiments involving laser weapons were being conducted at an unknown location at the range. Supposedly, the tests involved powerful antennas (no further details).

14. On one evening in late Summer 1973, Source observed an


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ENTIAL/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED FIRK-311/01638-77 - 5 -3.3(b)(1)unidentified phenomenon at Site 7. While watching a sport competition between Canada and the USSR on television, he stepped outside for some air and observed an unidentified sharp (bright) green circular object or mass in the sky. The object was situated west of the site at an angle of sighting of approximately 70 degrees. The altitude of the object was undeterminable. (Field Comment: Although there were no clouds in the sky that evening, Source believed that the green mass would have been higher than cloud level. Source could not estimate the diameter of the object.) Within 10 to 15 seconds of observation, the green circle widened and within a brief period of time several green concentric circles formed around the mass. Within minutes the coloring disappeared. There was no sound, such as an explosion, associated with the phenomenon. (Field Comment: Source had no opinion as to what this phenomenon was. There was no resultant rumors. Source could not provide any further details.) 15. 13.3(b)(1)16. 3.3(b)(1)6.2(d)

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Legend to Figure 2:

1. Permanent radar sites. One site contained a van with an antenna sail approximately six to seven meters wide and about two meters tall. The van was located on top of a hill or bunker, and it appeared to be able to turn a full 360 degrees (no details) The other antenna appeared to be a height finder.

3.3(b)(1)

- Three-story brick barracks, each about 80 x 30 meters, providing housing for about 600 communications specialists.
- 3. Barracks (same construction as item 2) for men in V/Ch 03142.
 - 4. Asphalt square, about 80 x 50 meters.
- One-story brick messhall which could seat approximately 800 men.
- Barracks for Air Forces personnel assigned to a nearby airfield.
 - 7. Messhall for Air Forces enlisted personnel.
 - 8. Square for Air Forces personnel.
- 9. Headquarters for V/Ch 03142, three-storied, building of grey brick construction. The building was approximately 40 x 20 meters.
- 10. Foodstuffs and clothing warehouse area, approximately 100 x 200 meters.
- 11. Water tower, approximately 12 meters tall. The water storage area was seven meters in diameter and four meters in height.
 - 12. Sports field.
 - 13. Club for enlisted personnel.
 - 14. Officers club.
- Officer family housing, each building was four storied and 50 x 20 meters.
 - 16. Flightcrew messhall.

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- 17. Cafeteria.
- 18. Store.
- 19. Open warehouse storage area for building materials.

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Legend to Figure 2 (Cont'd):

- 20. Heating plant known as "Avrora". The facility had a 25 to 30 meter tall smoke stack.
 - 21. Controlled access point.
- 22. Technological zone (zona tekhnologii), approximately 800×800 meters belonging to $V/Ch \cdot 0.3142$. This area contained many concrete hangars, each about 100 meters long and 50 meters wide. Possibly approximately 20 buildings inside the area (no details). The zone was surrounded by a barbed wire security fence.
- 23. Area for construction troops. Commander of the troops was possibly a major (no details).

CONFIDENTIAL/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED FIRK-311/01638-77 - 10 -3.3(b)(1)Figure 3 Site 4 at Sary Shagan 8 600m · -400m 1km to Site 3 5-6km to Site 7

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Legend to Figure 3:

- 1. Barbed wire security fence about two meters tall, with 20×20 centimeter concrete posts positioned about four or five meters apart.
 - 2. Sosna security fence (see Figure 5).
- 3. Guard building (karpom), one story, five by eight meters, constructed of grey brick.
- 4. Main building, approximately 40 x 80 x 12 to 13 meters, reinforced concrete construction. Along the sides of the building were laboratories and shops, each about three meters tall and three meters wide. About 10 enlisted troops and up to 20 officers worked in the building. Their work involved missile systems (no details).
- 5. Warehouse for warheads, approximately 15 to 20 x 10 to 12 x 6 to 7 meters. The building was partially surrounded by an earthen revetment made of tampered yellowish clay covered by a layer of sod. The revetment was about 2.5 meters thick. There were up to 20 warheads for the System-75 and System-300/Aldan missiles stored in the building.
 - 6. System-75 missile checkout area.
 - 7. Wooden unmanned watch towers.
- 8. Operational surface-to-air missile site known as System-200 [SA-5].
 - 9. Fueling area built in late 1973 (no details).

